# Doolittle's Raid - what was the Japanese public told?



## janel90 (May 11, 2012)

Hi all -

I'm continuing research for my mother (Helga Hofmeier Kiderlen) and a written version I'm trying to write up about her interesting life. 

Yesterday she and I were talking about Doolittle's Raid and I asked for more info about her story of what she was doing on that Saturday in April 1942. She remembers her parents and the press saying that only Tokyo was a target, that there was very little damage, and that it was no big deal. I told her that wasn't true - there additional city targets and it WAS a big deal. She was stunned to learn this, even 70 years later, she still thought Tokyo had been the only target!!

I'm wondering if there is anyone who can offer info on two things --
1. Press clippings or translations of what the people in Tokyo were publicly told about the raid? Any Japanese newspapers of the day (that I, not reading Japanese, could read)? Any German newspapers of that time that might have mentioned the raid as being of little importance? 
2. Local Tokyo information on civilian targets that had been hit or civilian casualties/injuries?

Any info or direction for me to research on my own would be of huge help to me, and to my mom!

Thanks so much --

Jane Lang


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## muscogeemike (May 11, 2012)

Western media was censored and Japan (and Germany and Russia) were even more censored then the West.

That your mother’s memories are remiss is not surprising. My parents were teenagers in S. Calif during the war and what they remember is what was reported in newspapers and on the radio. If a person has done no additional reading on the era their knowledge is going to be limited.

While the raid was a huge moral booster for the US it really did little real damage to Japan, I would be interested in how the Japanese reported on the earlier raids by the Chinese Air Force. What, if anything, did the Japanese public know of the raids?


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## janel90 (May 11, 2012)

Exactly, muscogeemike --- that's what I'd like to learn, as well. What was the Japanese public told about the raid??

Jane


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## Shinpachi (May 14, 2012)

I think your mother is correct. Damage was limited with only a dozen of tons bombs though spiritual impact to the Japanese was greater.
Japanese media reported "9 Enemy Bombers Shot Down" immediately. Few believed it as the sky was clear and no one witnessed aircrafts crashed.

Indiscriminate bombing you mention on major Japanese cities by the B-29s began from November 1944.
It was two and a half years later from the Doolittle raid.


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## davebender (May 14, 2012)

The Japanese statements are true. 

It was the American public that were deceived when told the Doolittle Raid was a great military achievement. In reality this publicity stunt tied up two USN CV task forces that might have made a decisive difference at the Coral Sea battle of May 1942.


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## FLYBOYJ (May 14, 2012)

davebender said:


> The Japanese statements are true.
> 
> It was the American public that were deceived when told the Doolittle Raid was a great military achievement. *In reality this publicity stunt tied up two USN CV task forces that might have made a decisive difference at the Coral Sea battle of May 1942*.



Yes and no - One could argue the value of the Doolittle Raid, it did provide a great propaganda tool for the American people. The raid wasn't intened to do great damage, it was intended to show the Japanese that their homeland was invunurable and it did tie up resources that could have been better used.

From Wikipedia;

_"The raid caused negligible material damage to Japan, but it succeeded in its goal of helping American morale, and casting doubt in Japan on the ability of the Japanese military leaders. It also caused Japan to withdraw its powerful aircraft carrier force from the Indian Ocean to defend their Home Islands, and the raid contributed to Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's decision to attack Midway—an attack that turned into a decisive rout of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) by the U.S. Navy near Midway Island in the Central Pacific.

Compared with the future devastating B-29 Superfortress attacks against Japan, the Doolittle raid did little material damage, and all of that readily repaired. Eight primary and five secondary targets were struck. In Tokyo, the targets included an oil tank farm, a steel mill, and several power plants. In Yokosuka, at least one bomb from the B-25 piloted by Lt. Edgar E. McElroy struck the nearly completed IJN aircraft carrier Ryūhō, delaying her launch until November. Six schools and an army hospital were also hit. Japanese officials reported that the two aircraft whose crews were captured had struck their targets.

For years before Pearl Harbor, there had been mock air raid drills in every Japanese city, although China's air force was almost non-existant. Such may have been part of the process of keeping warlike emotion at a high pitch. The Japanese press was told how to convey the news. The attack was depicted as a cruel, indiscriminate bombing targeted at civilians, women and children.

Despite the minimal damage inflicted, American morale soared when news of the raid was released. Still reeling from the attack on Pearl Harbor and Japan's subsequent territorial gains, the American public appreciated knowing that a successful military response had been undertaken.

The raid also had a strategic impact, though it was not known at the time: It caused the Japanese to recall some fighting IJN units to the Japanese Home Islands for defense. Its main aircraft carrier task force, spearheaded by five large, fast carriers—with its best naval aircraft and aircrews—under the command of Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, had inflicted serious losses on the Royal Navy and merchant shipping during the Indian Ocean Raid, steaming as far west as Ceylon (Sri Lanka) for air raids on British shipping and Royal Air Force airfields there. Following the Doolittle Raid, Nagumo's force was recalled to Japan, removing all pressure from the Royal Navy in the Indian Ocean.

*The Imperial Japanese Navy also bore a special responsibility for allowing an American aircraft carrier force to approach the Japanese Home Islands in a manner similar to that of the IJN fleet to Hawaii in 1941, and likewise it escaped undamaged. The fact that rather large twin-engine land-based bombers carried out the attack served to confuse the IJN's high command about the source of the attack. This confusion and the conclusion that Japan itself was vulnerable to air attack strengthened Yamamoto's resolve to capture Midway Island, with the attempt to do so resulting in the decisive Japanese loss at the Battle of Midway."*_


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## davebender (May 14, 2012)

Sink the two Shōkaku class CVs at Coral Sea and we would have an even better propaganda tool in addition to putting a serious dent in the Japanese war effort.


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## FLYBOYJ (May 14, 2012)

davebender said:


> Sink the two Shōkaku class CVs at Coral Sea and we would have an even better propaganda tool in addition to putting a serious dent in the Japanese war effort.



Better than destroying 4 Japanese carriers at Midway sent there because of the raid?


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## davebender (May 14, 2012)

Yes.

Gaining naval superiority in the Coral Sea allows easy victories on Tarawa, Guadalcanal and New Guinea during the summer of 1942 if the U.S. Army and USMC are aggressive enough to seize the opportunity.


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## FLYBOYJ (May 14, 2012)

davebender said:


> Yes.
> 
> Gaining naval superiority in the Coral Sea allows easy victories on Tarawa, Guadalcanal and New Guinea during the summer of 1942 if the U.S. Army and USMC are aggressive enough to seize the opportunity.



That's an assumption and "would have" only took out a smaller portion of the Japanese fleet had the USN even been successful if put in that situation. The fact remains that because of the Doolittle raid, the Japanese allowed 4 aircraft carriers to be destroyed chasing an elusive enemy.

I remember reading a quote that read something like this "When the Japanese attacked us at Pearl Harbor, it was like getting hit over the head with a 2 x 4. When Doolittle bombed Tokyo it was like shoving a needle into Japan's heart."


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## davebender (May 14, 2012)

> because of the Doolittle raid, the Japanese allowed 4 aircraft carriers to be destroyed chasing an elusive enemy.


A much bigger assumption then thinking the U.S. Army could occupy Tarawa and Guadalcanal almost cost free during June 1942 after gaining naval superiority in the Coral Sea.


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## FLYBOYJ (May 14, 2012)

davebender said:


> A much bigger assumption then thinking the U.S. Army could occupy Tarawa and Guadalcanal almost cost free during June 1942 after gaining naval superiority in the Coral Sea.


 I'm not assuming that, just pointing out that the Doolittle Raid was well worth the cost of men and resources.


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## fastmongrel (May 14, 2012)

If you want to talk about being worthwhile the Doolittle Raid has to be the best value for money bombing raid of WWII. At a cost of 10 lives and 16 aircraft the Japanese changed there strategy in the Pacific completely. Name one other bombing raid that can claim to have changed the course of a war.


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## davebender (May 14, 2012)

By May 1942 the Imperial Japanese Army had already achieved their December 1941 Pacific objectives. The Doolittle raid had no effect on the capture of Malaya, Burma, the Philippines, East Indies, Borneo, Guam or Western New Guinea. After seizing these objectives Japan had no Pacific strategy besides reacting to events. China remained the primary Japanese theater of operations.


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## tyrodtom (May 14, 2012)

It's true that the Japanese had reached their 1941 pacific objectives, but they counted on the western powers negotiating for peace once they reached those objectives. 

The whole point of those objectives was the resources they could get from their new conquests, unhindered by any outside interference. With allies still in the war and using Austrailia and New Zealand as a base of operations, they realized they had to expand to interdict those supply routes. Then the Doolittle raid gave them a extra worry that they took very seriously. Not that the raid itself did any harm, but what would be next?


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## FLYBOYJ (May 14, 2012)

davebender said:


> By May 1942 the Imperial Japanese Army had already achieved their December 1941 Pacific objectives. *The Doolittle raid had no effect on the capture of Malaya, Burma, the Philippines, East Indies, Borneo, Guam or Western New Guinea.* After seizing these objectives Japan had no Pacific strategy besides reacting to events. China remained the primary Japanese theater of operations.


Check the dates of those actions and when the Doolittle Raid went down... 

The Doolittle Raid PREVENTED the capture of Midway, possibly the Hawaiian Islands and an invasion of Australia and prevented valuable resources from being used in the "Primary Theater."


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## buffnut453 (May 14, 2012)

Not so sure about the whole "invasion of Australia" thing. My reading is that Japan saw Australia as too much risk for not enough benefit.


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## tyrodtom (May 14, 2012)

I don't think the Japanese had any realistic chance of invading Australia, but if they had took Guadalcanal, and then New Caledonia, keeping Australia in the war would have been much more difficult.


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## FLYBOYJ (May 15, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> Not so sure about the whole "invasion of Australia" thing. My reading is that Japan saw Australia as too much risk for not enough benefit.


Perhaps, but during early 1942 the intensions of the Japanese were not known.


tyrodtom said:


> I don't think the Japanese had any realistic chance of invading Australia, but if they had took Guadalcanal, and then New Caledonia, keeping Australia in the war would have been much more difficult.


Yes and that's the point here. The Doolittle Raid set into motion events that would lead to the crippling of the Japanese fleet and its ultimate defeat. What "could have" been accomplised at Coral Sea with 2 more carrier groups wasn't worth what actually happened at Midway, again events set in motion by the Doolittle Raid. Coral Sea and the Doolittle Raid gave hope to the folks back home, the victory at Midway was the proof the American people needed to show that the Japanese can be defeated.


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## muscogeemike (May 15, 2012)

Back to the thread subject - what did the Japanese public know of the air raids by both the Chinese AF and Gen Doolittle?


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## tyrodtom (May 15, 2012)

What raids on Japan by the Chinese AF ?

I know raids were planned, but I never knew of any carried out.

The origional intention was for the Doolittle aircraft to fly on to Chinese air bases, and to carry out additional air raids on Japan from China, but the early discovery by Japanese picket boat meant when they took off they were out of range from those Chinese bases.


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## Freebird (May 15, 2012)

davebender said:


> A much bigger assumption then thinking the U.S. Army could occupy Tarawa and Guadalcanal almost cost free during June 1942 after gaining naval superiority in the Coral Sea.



There's no guarantee that adding a couple of US carriers would win the battle, or that they wouldn't be sunk. 



fastmongrel said:


> If you want to talk about being worthwhile the Doolittle Raid has to be the best value for money bombing raid of WWII. At a *cost of 10 lives* and 16 aircraft the Japanese changed there strategy in the Pacific completely. *Name one other bombing raid that can claim to have changed the course of a war*.



TARANTO.

(BTW, what was the cost in lives of the Chinese executed in retaliation for helping the raid? - Just a thought)



tyrodtom said:


> I don't think the Japanese had any realistic chance of invading Australia, but if they had took Guadalcanal, and then New Caledonia, keeping Australia in the war would have been much more difficult.



Or the US could simply route supplies to Australia via Tahiti New Zealand.
The capture of New Caledonia is not a critical as made out to be, and it's doubtful that Japan could supply it.


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## renrich (May 18, 2012)

"Conceived and developed by Combined Fleet staff officers during March, 1942, the Midway Operation was the child of expediency."

The above from a book, "Hawaii Under the Rising Sun" by John J Stephan. In other words the Midway attack was planned well before the Doolittle Raid. In fact Yamamoto ordered planning for the invasion of Hawaii to begin on December 8, 1941. The Midway operation was part of that plan.

Originally an invasion of Hawaii was considered by the Japanese planners to be part of the December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor. Yamamoto decided that the invasion was too risky and canceled the planning for that. However, an invasion of Hawaii was always an operation that he thought necessary and he realised after Pearl Harbor, because of the weakness of the US defense, that the invasion would have probably succeeded. His reasoning about the invasion of Hawaii was that Japan could never win a long drawn out war with the US and that the invasion and occupation of Hawaii would give Japan a bargaining tool for a negotiated peace with the US before the US could bring her massive power to bear. Many in Japan disagreed with Yamamoto.

The Hawaii invasion plan was labeled "Eastern Operation" and it was scheduled for October, 1942. The Japanese Army was not on board with "Eastern Operation" initially but Yamamto and the Combined Fleet staff went forward with the "Midway Operation."

"To circumvent army opposition, this operation would be carried out without infantry or armor. To win support from the Navy General Staff, the operation was designed to lure the US Pacific Fleet into a "decisive battle" at a point where the Imperial Navy could use land based as well as carrier planes against it. It was called "Midway Operation."

In effect, the Midway Operation was the prelude for the Hawaii invasion. The Combined Fleet approved the plan on April 5. The Doolittle Raid took place on April 18. So that raid did not cause the Midway Operation to go forward as it was already planned and in the process of being readied. What the Doolittle raid may have accomplished was that after the raid, the Japanese Army changed it's stance and became supporters of "Eastern Operation" the invasion of Hawaii.

It boggles my mind to reflect on what would have been the outcome if Japan had gone forward with the plan to make the invasion of Hawaii a part of the Pearl Harbor attack on December 7. Given the state of preparedness of the US forces on that day, it seems that the invasion would have probably succeeded. The two carriers the US had in the vicinity would have intervened and probably have been sunk, along with many of their escorts. Of course the Japanese operations elsewhere would have had to have been altered and whether or not they could have solved the logistical problems of a prolonged occupation of Hawaii would be in question. Hawaii had about 400000 inhabitants at that time with 160000 of those people being native born or first generation Japanese.


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## buffnut453 (May 18, 2012)

But Hawaii wasn't Japan's main objective. It was a sideshow to prevent American forces interdicting the Southern Advance into Thailand and Malaya en route to the Dutch East Indies which were Japan's primary goal. Taking Hawaii would have done nothing to help Japan economically or militarily, other than extend the war even longer and perhaps affording more breathing space before America went on the offensive in the Pacific.


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## renrich (May 18, 2012)

It was thought by Yamamoto that the Japanese could not win a pro-longed war with the US which was true. As stated in the post, he thought that an invasion of Hawaii would bring the US to the bargaining table for an early negotiated peace and allow Japan to retain some or all of it's war goals. He also believed that possession of Hawaii would preclude air strikes of the Japanese homeland by US carriers. Whether or not Japan retained possession of Hawaii was secondary to not allowing the US to bring it's power to bear against Japan. He told other Japanese Commanders that he would run wild against the US for six months or even a year but not beyond that.


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## buffnut453 (May 18, 2012)

Like I said, taking Hawaii would have done nothing to help Japan economically or militarily.


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## renrich (May 18, 2012)

The object of the post was to show that the Midway Operation was planned before the Doolittle raid and whether or not the Doolittle raid took place the Midway Battle was going to happen. Incorrectly, IMO, some believe that the Doolittle Raid was a worthwhile and successful operation becuse it triggered Midway which altered the balance of power in the Pacific forever. IMO, the Doolittle raid was ill considered and was a gamble which could have been disastrous and at the very least may have cost the US a decisive victory at Coral Sea.

Yamamoto was correct in believing that Japan could not win a long war against the US. Ultimately WW2 was a disaster for Japan both militarily and economically. To the extent that Yamamoto's belief that a successful invasion and occupation of Hawaii by Japan would have worked to bring the US to the bargaining table resulting in a negotiated peace in 1942-43, then that event would have done everything to help Japan economically and militarily. Whether on not the US would have negotiated because of a successful "Eastern Operation" by Japan, we will never know.


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## javlin (May 18, 2012)

The Dolittle Raid made the Army capitulate to Yamamoto for the invasion of Midway according to "The Rising Sun" by John Toland from a Japanese perspective.

"On the face of it ,the objective was to capture Midway and the Weatern Aleutians.These islands would then become key points in a new outer perimeter stretching all the way from Kiska in the north,through Midway and Wake to Port Moresby in the south,just three hundred miles from Australia.Patrol planes based on on these three isalnds could detect any enemy task force attempting to pierce the empire's inner defense." pg 321

The Dolittle Raid also "forced the Supreme Command to overreact.Four fighter groups were reassigned to protect Japan from assualts that were not even being planned by the enemy.The China Expeditionary Army was ordered to cease other operations and rout enemy airbases in the Chekiang area." pg 310

It does mention the raid was more a moral booster for the US no real damage was done but a thumb in the eye of the enemy.The lost at Midway for the Japanese Navy also put Port Moresby off the table if I remember correctly?Also Strike Force 5(?) at Coral Sea was the weakest and least trained of the Japanese Carrier groups and they still got the upper hand!!


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## renrich (May 24, 2012)

The most recent and authoritative study of the Midway battle is, IMO, "Shattered Sword" by Parshall and Tully. The book researches that battle and the events leading up the battle from the Japanese perspective and using Japanese sources. It seems clear that the authors of the book regarded the Doolittle affair was, at best, ill considered and of little benefit to the US war effort. Also, in Lundstrom, "The First Team" which is probably the best study of US carrier operations in 1941-42 ever written the following quote: " The Tokyo Raid proved a grand gesture, but deprived Nimitz of half his carrier strength at a time when they would have far more valuable in the South Pacific."

It is also clear in both books that Yamamoto was determined to carry out the MI and AL operations whether the Army was involved or not and those ops were planned well before the Doolittle raid. That raid may very well have effected the attitude of the Japanese army but it had no influence on whether Yamamoto was going forward with MI.

The Coral Sea battle was rated as a draw but the result was that the Japanese canceled the invasion of Port Moresby, cost the IJN a light carrier and deprived the IJN of the services of two fleet carriers and their highly experienced air groups at Midway. As to the quality of CarDiv5, page 64, "Shattered Sword"; "This revealed a rather condescending and wholly unwarranted view of the relative skill of CarDiv5, not to mention a misreading of the true importance of the losses Kido Butai had just suffered."


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 16, 2012)

I agree that sinking the Sho and Zui would indeed have been a significant contribution to the eventual allied victory. However, my impression (largely from reading Lundstrom's Fletcher book which covers the naval ops in detail during that period) is that King would not have allowed a US concentration of carrier assets in any distant area. He was committed to keeping at least one CV and preferably two close to Hawaii whenever possible. The US was slow to embrace carrier concentration despite the evidence of Pearl Harbor. It also had too few early on to do that. In fact, King was irritated that Fletcher wasn't more aggressive with just the Yorktown. The Lex was brought back to PH and tied to operting pretty close to the Hawiian islands until just after the Doolitte raid. The implicit assumption by King and company appears to be, that Yorktown and Lex were more than a match for anything the IJN could mount in the CS. It took the USN a couple of bloody noses before its leadership accepted just how effective and well equipped was the IJN and it couldn't be taken for granted. 

It also would have been a great boon to the allies to have invaded the gllberts before they became fortresses. However, I don't think such an early offensive was in the cards. Early on, there were evidently only three tankers in the entire pacific theater. The USN spent the first 6 months of the war getting its ducks in a row and sufficient assets on the board to launch the Guadacanal campaign, which is characterized historically as a "shoestring operation" by participants and was debated as too soon with too little to succeed. Prior to that, there were no US attempts at offensive action in the Pac theater.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 16, 2012)

Should also have mentioned or echo-confirmed: Lundstrom: *First Team*, Hornfischer's *Neptune's inferno*, R.B. Frank's *Guadacanal *and Parshall and Tully's *Shattered Sword*, all good sources for early war USN and IJN ops, capability and leadership.

In this regard it may also be worth noting (probably not for the first time here) that the perception or realization emerged during this period that operating two carriers together represented a *force multiplier*. One CV alone (with three attack squadrons on board) could rarely mount an attack with more than one squadron of bombers because the other two squadrons were devoted to search and asw patrols while combining two CV's would allow attack with a total of four squadons by leaving one as the "duty carrier" to perform search and asw. The term squadrons here representing 12 to 18 numbers of aircraft as opposed to orgganizational units.


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