# Hypothetical - NATO vs WP 1970s



## parsifal (Jun 17, 2010)

I am curently about to play a simulation literally called "The Next War", designed by James Dunnigan (now DOD military consultant working for the pentagon). 

Its a biggish game, about 2000 counters, and looks at the possibilities for a hypothetical war set in the early to mid 70's. As it turns out, I think Dunnigan over-estimated the Soviet capabilities especially in the air, but it still poses some very interesting questions.

My chief question is probably at what time would the Soviet chances for victory have been at their greatest. Victory in game terms means the defeat of the NATO forces on the German front in central europe. I think they stood to achieve the best possibility around the time of the 1973 Yom Kippur war.....US still buried in the Vietnam quagmire, huge distraction in the ME, Britain facing major unreast in Ulster. I still think the Soviets would not have won, but for us old guys, it was what we trained for, but it never eventuated.

Happy to discuss any aspect of the situation as the game designers depict it, and if people want, can report on the outcome of my war

Anyway, here are some phots of the situation immediately prior to the outbreak of "hostilities"


----------



## Colin1 (Jun 17, 2010)

I think the Soviets much-vaunted river-crossing capability would have come to naught.
They'd have suffered dreadful losses as they inevitably backed up at the crossing points and all the while NATO in front of them would have been preparing for the ones that got away.


----------



## parsifal (Jun 17, 2010)

Thats interesting. In the simulation, rivers are major defensive lines and unbridged rivers are major points of interdiction to the Soviet advance. There are two classifications of rivers....major or inor. Minor can be attempted for an opposed crossing, major rivers cannot (by the Soviets...some NATO nationalities can try to cross major rivers, but is dangerous).

In the NATO defensive line there is a gap, called the Fulda Gap, where Soviets were thought to treat asa high priority in their pre-war plans. Capturing that point would allow them to outflank most of the river lines east of the Rhine

Herer is a photograhic detail from the gamer, showing how they saw the situation. the weakness in the NATO deployment is obvious....


----------



## timshatz (Jun 17, 2010)

IIRC, Fulda was a spot with a lot of US combat strength. Critical is right. 

I don't know how much luck the WP would've had with an attack. I agree with the perspective that Nato was distracted. But, from what I've seen, the WP didn't put as much into Logistics as Nato. 60000 tanks are great, until they start running out of gas. 

Given a short war with limited objectives, they could probably pull it off. If they achieved suprise. How they do that is beyond me. But if their goal was the Rhine, they had a decent chance of getting there. It really comes down to Reinforcements. After the pre-positioned troops on both sides (and equipment) chew each other up, who has the ability to get more into the zone of battle faster? 

One more thing. Almost certain this war goes nuclear. Even if Nato keeps it together, there's just too many moving parts to keep it from going that way.


----------



## Colin1 (Jun 17, 2010)

timshatz said:


> IIRC, Fulda was a spot with a lot of US combat strength. Critical is right.


Obviously in the US sector then
I can't quite make out what Fulda is, as a feature but if it's the corridor running between those green features (contours?) then it's a killing lane. I imagine there'd have been an awful lot of US artillery, already spotted-in from years of field exercises, zoned in on that area.

Very big chance I'm not reading it right, but difficult to imagine the 1 US Corps commander not openly inviting the Soviets to come through there.


----------



## timshatz (Jun 17, 2010)

From what I've read and heard, the Fulda Gap is one of the two really good places to run a lot of tanks through to the Rhine. The other is the North German Plain. The WP was big on sending lots of tanks wherever they were going to attack and those were the only two really good spots to do tanks. Everybody knew when the balloon went up. somebody was going to come through at Fulda. 

It was protected by the Black Horse Calv for a long time. At least it was in the 70s.


----------



## timshatz (Jun 17, 2010)

Parsifal, I am really interested in finding out how your war game plays out. From what I have heard, read and remember at the time, it was pretty much taken for granted that we couldn't stop them and they would be at the Rhine in 7 days. Then it would go nuclear. 

A lot of little details pop into my head about it.

The French were stuck with the choice of staying out of it or having a Soviet Army on their border. Tom Clancy has them coming in but I personally think they would've stayed out. 

The Soviet sub force wouldn't come south into the Atlantic. I think the guys in our subs knew it but we (surface forces) played a game where they would go after our re-inforcement convoys. They had no or little chance of surviving that far south. With the Sosus line and scads of P3/attack sub/hunter killer groups, ect, chasing them, they would be working very hard just to survive. The Soviets seem to know this too and were using their Fast Attack subs to protect their Boomers up in their end of the oceans as a counterstrike to the US and Britians subs. 

No matter how you look at it, Iceland was gonna take a pounding at some point. Just to exposed and too important not to. Probably get nuked. 

Back to the Reinforcement convoys. Getting them organized and heading for Europe would've taken weeks, if not months. Not a week or less as gamed out. Can see that by what happened in the first Gulf War where the prepositioned ships broke down within a day or two of leaving port in Texas and had to be towed home. If you want to see how the logistic progressed (or would have progressed), follow the First Gulf War. Good example. 

Italy and southern europe didn't sit it out, but the main fight was going to be in the area between the East German border and the Rhine. Everything else was a side show. Win or lose, the battle was going to be there. 

Just some thoughts.


----------



## parsifal (Jun 17, 2010)

A few things to respond to.....Fulda in the 70's was defended but not heavily. In the game map that you see, the hexagonal overlay is there to regularize movement and combat, and has a diameter of approximately 5 miles. The green and the brown is meant to represent rougher terrain, whether that be due to slope, vegetation, lack of roads. The most open fighting country is the clear that you see.

About 30 miles behind this point the US did withold powerful armoured formations (3rd armoured from memory), but at the front they refused to adopt a forward deployment strategy, except for mech cav recon units centred around that 11Cav Brigade that you see. To the north there was a brigade of the WG 2PG XX, but according to the map, this unit will have to also cover a crossing point immediately to the north. This formation is in a difficult position.

The US witheld its main forces for two reasons. Its priority in the initial phases was to cover the reforger sites, deployed around Frankfurt, and was concerned about possible surprise attacks by Soviet Special Forces and/or airborne units. So most of the army was held back from the front line to cover this eventuality. In the second instance the US did not want to expaose their main formations to the possibility of a preemptive frontal assault, something the Soviets were good at, and likley to try and exploit. The US felt they would get enough advance warning to be able to mobilize their forces and then push them forward from their barracks positions, so as to cover these critical positions.

I think the US were being over optimistic in their abilities to respond quickly enough. 

Coming down that road will be approximately 5-6 WP divs, mostly guards armoured and mech units. They will be allover the defenders in a very short space of time. But the open country of the frontier rapidly changes to more urban areas, closer to the Rhine, and in these areas the Soviet advantages in armour will not help that much. NATO believed they could contain the Soviets by focussing their defences around these German urban concentrations. Defending in the cities also would act as a deterrent to nuclear exchanges, since an attack against an urban area would be seen as a strategic exchange (as opposed to tactical) and would be likley to lead to a full retalitory strike. 

I will keep you posted about the progress of the game. Am scheduled to start this weekend. The scenario is scheduled to last 30 days of time, and allows for the full range of options. There are rules in the game to cover the political reliability of the nations, including the East germans Czechs, French and Italians. The willingness of the Dutch and Belgians is also covered. They are essentially random eventsthough, so i wont know the outcome until after the battle has started.

I will be happy to give you udates on the progress of this battle.


----------



## timshatz (Jun 18, 2010)

Parsifal, definitely interested in the results of your wargame. I gather from your posting that it specifically covers the Air/Land war in Western Europe and doesn't have an extensive sea component. No biggie, Western Europe was going to be the center of gravity anyway. 

Agreed with your assesment of Fulda. The trick of holding back against massed Armor is pretty much standard. You don't want to fight the battle the way your opposition desires it. Better to hit him after he's strung out in a linear formation rather than take the full blow of his massed firepower. Hold the shoulders of the breakthrough (around Fulda, from what I've seen, the terrain practically does that for you) and counterattack the follow on forces and resupply. You can do that with land forces in the case of the follow on and air in the case of the resupply. But the other guy knows the trick too and will set up his responses in view of your plan. 

Not really much unknown on either side, but it's still going to be very interesting to see how it plays out. 

The covering of the Reforger points is a strategic dilema. Do you keep major forces back to cover Rhamstien or use them to counterattack. I guess the question becomes, which option buys you more time ('cause time is what you are really looking for). The screening forces in Fulda will not hold the WP for long but, it is always better to have your enemy come to a battlefield of your choosing than meet him further up on ground that might not be as good. A lot can happen between the gap and Rhamestien, most of it bad for the WP. On the other side, such a decision will have political rammifications as the West Germans are not going to be happy and will probably want a more forward defense. Similar to the French in 1914, the closer to the border they WP is stopped, the better. Casualties may be secondary to this consideration. 

The politics of this thing are something that is going to be huge, at least in my opinion. Luckily, for you, it seems that most of your problems are around Fulda and that means it is a US problem. Not entirely, but the majority of C and C are US as are the forces. Up on the German Plain, things are much different. Brits, Belgians, Dutch, West Germans, a whole mishmash of countries and considerations. Resupply is not as much of a problem, from a standardization point of view of equipment, but little oddities like language, operational tempo, enthusiasm (or strong lack thereof) will come into play. Does the game cover that as well? Essentially, the Fog of War. Is it covered and how?


----------



## Airframes (Jun 18, 2010)

As I remember it, the Fulda gap was designated as a choke point. Many of the forests had been cultivated as barriers against a possible/probable Soviet advance with armour, leaving two 'gaps', one at Fulda, and one further north, on the edge of the North German plain. It was hoped that these would be the routes taken in event of a major incursion, and that NATO forces could be rushed into the areas to combat the threat.
I think you're right about October 1973 - I was just about to leave Germany after a major NATO exercise, wnen we were put on immediate alert, as the Soviets had started to mass armour along the border apparently. Anytime between roughly 1970 and 1974 coild have been critical. It was thought that the WP forces could have reached the area of Hannover and further west within three to four days, with heavy use of NBC preemptive strike and airborne forces, followed quickly by the MRD's and Armour.
If you can get a hold of a copy,'The Third World War', published around 1974 I think, is worth a read. (can't remember the name of the author! But he's a well known historian, former senior officer!).


----------



## syscom3 (Jun 18, 2010)

Airframes said:


> If you can get a hold of a copy,'The Third World War', published around 1974 I think, is worth a read. (can't remember the name of the author! But he's a well known historian, former senior officer!).



You are referring to the book writtn by Sir John Hackett in 1982?


----------



## Airframes (Jun 18, 2010)

Hmm. It could be, but I think I would have remembered that name, seeing as who he was. I could be wrong about the date, but I feel fairly sure it was the mid 1970's, and a double-barreled name, like Liddell-Hart, but not him!


----------



## timshatz (Jun 18, 2010)

Hackett wrote one. It was a pretty good one too. He later revised it and both sold very well. If anybody had a good idea how it was going to turn out, it was him. I like the idea he had about dropping the 1st Air Cav in behind the advance elements of the WP attack to screw things up and buy time. But I wouldn't want to BE in the 1st Air Cav when it happened as they were going to get chewed up, probably wiped out. 

There were two other decent fictional accounts of the European War (that never was). One was by Tom Clancey called "Red Storm Rising". Good fiction, had those odd little vingettes that happened like a guy stepping off the curb and looking the wrong way, getting hit by a car and ending up being in the head's up Nato needs to get it's act together. That one has the main force coming through Fulda.

The other, that I thought was better, was by Ralph Peters. I think it was called "Red Army" and told the story from the point of the Soviets involved in the war. Good read. In this one, the Soviet forces come in over the North German plain and really stick it to the Northern flank. A better read, IMHO, than "RSR" but not as wide spread. No naval or air component to think of, but plenty of stuff about the ground war.


----------



## Glider (Jun 18, 2010)

Up to about 1973 my money would be on the WP to win. After that it evens out and probably by say 1978 the advantage switches to NATO.


----------



## parsifal (Jun 19, 2010)

we made a start with the game, but I couldnt really do a lot today, with the new addition to the family, and some other things to do around the house. Guess I have to get used to that.

But we did complete the setup, choose the particular scenario we wanted to try, undertake the pre-invasion moves, and fight the air combat segment. We finished up selecting a scenario called "spring manouvres", which postulates a Soviet attack in April, using their annual WP manouvres as a screen fopr a partial buildup. But surprise is not total.

Regarding the political unreliability aspects, we have not yet reached the stage for checking the Allies, but the WP was extremely lucky in its unreliability checks. The Czechs staged an attempted coup, but it is failing, though this means the Czech army is unavailable for a couple of days. Its air assets are unnaffected. Apart from that the WP is more or less intact politically.

In the air, losses were very heavy, but particulalry so for the WP. In the game there are four air sectors: Baltic, North, Central and South regions. The air war is very abstracted, essentially however there are two levels of air combat, which are misleadingly called strategic and interception combat. Really what they are trying to simulate are, in the first instance stand off missile attacks, which the allies have a marked advantage in, and then close in combat, using guns and close range missiles. Here the Soviets enjoy at least parity. If a side wins combat at this level, helos cannot fly in that sector and airborne operations become prohibitively expensive. If the interception level is won (the stand off attacks strand of air combat), the losses to fixed win attack aircraft rise dramatically, and ther are also some losses to transports and helos. 

We have not yet resolved the combats against helos, tranports and strike aircraft, but the fighter v fghter combats are complete. WP forces won air superiority in the North (over north germanyHolland and Belgium), and the south regions (Austria and Italy. They lost it over the Baltic (Denmark) and the Central (southern Germany) two of the planned airborne ops planned have had to be cancelled. There may be additional losses to the allies however if any allied forward air bases are overrun. Both sides are likley to take further losses due to flak and SAMs

But the majority of losses have been sustained, with the following results:


WP: 152 lost, 248 damaged
loss break downs were as follws:

SU: 72 MiG-21, 8 MiG-23, 4 MiG-27 
HU: 12 MiG-21
Cz: 12 MiG-21, 
Po: 20 MiG-17, 4 MiG-21
EG; 20 MiG-21

NATO/Neutral: 84 lost, 80 Damaged

Au: 4 Saab 105
It: 12 F104, 8 G-91
WG: 12 F104, 4 G-91, 4 Alpha
RCAF: 4 F104
RNAF: 12 F104
Belg: 12 F104
Fr: 4 x Mirage III
Den: 8 F104 

The damaged numbers are significant. barring a runaway breakthrough and capture of NATO airfields, all the NATO aircraft should return to operational by GT-2. WP return to readiness will not exceed 100 ( and will be less if airbases are bombed, so WP losses from the ready to fly lists are actually closer to300A/C to 80 NATO aircraft. 

The F-15s of the USAF and F4Es/F4s of the USAF and LW do a disproportionate amount of killing. They excel at standoff attacks, and so long as the lesser aircraft can hold the WP suffer no losses. All the NATO losses to this point have been with the older, less capable types, whilst Soviet losses are pretty much spread across all their types. The Soviets just dont have the capability to sit back and shoot into the barrel, so to speak...... 


By the third day, with the arrival of a second F-15 wing, and 9 squadrons of F4s from the US, the WP will be in deep trouble in the air......


----------



## syscom3 (Jun 19, 2010)

parsifal, what about US and UK naval assets being available? Or are they busy fighting at sea?

And just wondering; what if an airbase is seized by WP paratroopers with the missions to hold out and deny its use for "x" number of days?


----------



## parsifal (Jun 19, 2010)

There are no British or US Naval assets (apart from an outside chance of the a US Marine Div arriving). Its strictly WG and Danish coastal forces, and a significant portion of the Soviet Baltic Fleet. Chief weapon for the allies are mines, aircraft and small subs, in roughly that order of importance. Probably the best Soviet wepons are their CGs, DGs , PGs and twin engined Naval Air. 

Unlike most WWII sims, airborne units (particularly airmobile formations) can move pafter landing. Not being able to drop in Denmark is a major blow, and my WP partner and me are not sure whether to make a deep penetration into the low countries, or a more consertive drop just west of Hanover. I will let you know which if any airfields will fall. We also have eight companies of commandoes to drop, their main mission will be to take out the three main SAM sites protecting northern Germany. 

The southern airborne force is larger - two divs. Traditionally these are used on suicide runs to disrupt the US forces around Frankfurt, but I see this as high risk, high cost. We have decided to drop the airborne divs around Innsbruck, to contain the Italians south of the Alps, and maximise the chances of a blitz through Austria.


----------



## Colin1 (Jun 19, 2010)

parsifal said:


> ...and my WP partner and me are not sure whether to make a deep penetration into the low countries, or a more consertive drop just west of Hanover


The aim of the para drop is to do what? Secure something? Disrupt something?
Because into the low countries from a standing start on their side of the start line, is a hell of a thrust for the Soviet ground forces if they intend to hook up with, and relieve, the para drop.

The Soviets maintained 7 Airborne Divisions during the Cold War or 1.75 armies, if you like. It could be argued that just putting down one 'army' in the Low Countries would hold NATO up long enough in the rear for the Soviets to make good their gains but I would argue that concealing the build-up to a four-division drop from NATO intelligence would be nigh impossible; the consequent run-in would also likely be a turkey shoot.


----------



## parsifal (Jun 19, 2010)

That gets back to the original starting surmise of the scenario. We are using the Spring Manouvers scenario which masks, to a degree the actual intent of the Soviet buildup. Every April the Soviets undertake theatre wide manouvers, that involve I presume the use of at least a portion of their airborne formations. Thats why the WP in this scenario have 5 airborne divs.

What your saying about these formations getting cut to pieces is absolutely true, provided NATO can achieve air superiority in those sectors of the front. Thats why in those sectors where air superiority has not been achieved, the airborne operations that were planned have been postponed. In those sectors where air superiority for the WP has been achieved, namely in this case over norther germany and Italy, we can proceed with our airdrop. We still have the localised AA defences to contend with, but we do not have a gaggle of NATO fighters roaring in to hack our transports and our helos out of the sky. It is the opposite in fact....it is the WP for the moment (and temporarily given the cost needed to achieve their victories) that controls these skies.

What is arguable is whether in a real shooting war the Soviets could have gotten anywhere in the air combat along the front. They outnumber the Allies almost three to one in the air, and not all the allied air assets are impressive in terms of the electronics and firepower they are carrying. In terms of straight up performance the WP aircraft are very good....a MiG-21 is a very dangerous manouvre fighter. They lag in their electronics, long range weaponary, command and control, pilot skills and servicing rates. They have an advantage in close in fighting, turn and burn tactics and sheer numbers


----------



## timshatz (Jun 20, 2010)

Parsifal, thanks for the update. I was amazed to see the WP got Air Sup over Nothern Germany. The Italian end of the world is less of a suprise but also less of a worry. More on that later. 

The numbers you quoted for losses seem to indicate that the WP lost about 400 aircraft to the Nato 160. Of the Nato bunch, 80 will be returned to active service within the next period or two. Given that, and seeing as how the F15/F4 USAF replacements are on the way from the US, I'm questioning the wisedom of going after those SAM sites with so much of your airmoble components. Maybe a wiser move would be to supress the SAMs with a lessor force of combined Air/Air mobile while going after the crossing and bridging sites in the NG Plain in preparation for your coming ground assalts. You don't really need to destroy the SAM sites a much as suppress them for now. Deal with them using ground forces in a week or so. 

Also, with the given exchange rate with Nato and the fact that they are losing second line aircraft more than primary while you are losing primary, at what point does your air offensive collapse due to losses? Assuming your losses will increase with the USAF reinforcements. My thought would be, if you're going to use your airmobile assets, you'll have to do it fast. In a week, they may not survive without air cover (that will be driven down to the level of losses that their appearence is sporatic). 

Lastly, just my thought on this, I'd forget about Italy. Airmoble and air action over there is probably easier, but it is a distraction from real fight going on up in Germany. If you sieze territory on the far side of the Alps, you set yourself up for getting cut off due to a Airmoble assault on the passes supported by air and an armored counterattack. Toss in an arial blockade of the mountain passes/valleys of Austria and anything you throw over the Alps is as good as lost. If Nato High Command throws anything serious in your way down there, they are making a mistake. Northern Italy is a side show.

IMHO, of course.


----------



## syscom3 (Jun 20, 2010)

What about Russian airpower reinforcements? Is China making rumblings out east, making it impossible for Russia to move assets from there?


----------



## parsifal (Jun 20, 2010)

The particular scenario allows for considerable WP movement on their side of the border, and for a lesser degree of freedom of manouvre for the NATO formations. Austrian, Italian, Belgian and French formations cannot at all, and there are only very limited options for the Dutch and Danish forces. British recon artillery and three armoured brigades can move and did so to present a consolidated front in northern Germany (British forces are dark green with black letterring). The Germans can also move their HQ assets and the combat elements of three divs. They moved 2PG div in the Fulda area, as well as two divs around the Hamburg area. The US is permitted to move its HQ elements, recon formations and one of its two armoured divs. 11 Cav retreated from Fulda to lihnk up with 3rd armoured to positions in front of Frankfurt, and the main US bases at Darmstadt and Ramstein.

The WP has concentrated into six main assault groups.
Group 1 is tasked with the capture of Hamburg and Denmark, and includes seaborne marines not shown in the photos. The airborne components to this attack have been grounded due to the loss of air superiority in this region. 

Group 2 is tasked with a drive to the Ruhr via Hanover, or possibly further to the south depending on NATO resistance. It would be preferable for this group of forces to be able to link up with Group 1 formations if possible.

Group 3 is a smaller force, tasked with a crossing of the Elbe near to Fulda, and then to take up defensive positions to maintain a potential threat to Frankfurt, and to prevent US led counterattacks designed to threaten the flanks of the groups operating further to the north. . It will be reinforced after the fall of Berlin (group 7).

Group 4 is a larger formation tasked with the capture of Nurenberg and Munich, and the destruction of US 1st Armoured Div. 1st Armoured will be supported initially by 2.5 WG mech formations, but can be reinforced by up to 5 italian Divs and about 4 French Divs, if and when these national armies get moving

Group 5 are the currently immmobilized formations in Czech territotry. They are busy putting down a coup at the moment but will cross into lower germany from GT-2. 

Group 6 is a large contingent tasked woth the destruction of Austria and then a push into southern Germany, to link up with the survivors of group 4 and 5, and try and outlflank the defences around Frankfurt

Group 7 are the formations tasked with the defeat of the Berlin garrison. Once this has been achieved this formation will form a ready reserve to reinforce where needed.


----------



## parsifal (Jun 20, 2010)

"_Parsifal, thanks for the update. I was amazed to see the WP got Air Sup over Nothern Germany. The Italian end of the world is less of a suprise but also less of a worry. More on that later. 

The numbers you quoted for losses seem to indicate that the WP lost about 400 aircraft to the Nato 160. Of the Nato bunch, 80 will be returned to active service within the next period or two. Given that, and seeing as how the F15/F4 USAF replacements are on the way from the US, I'm questioning the wisedom of going after those SAM sites with so much of your airmoble components. Maybe a wiser move would be to supress the SAMs with a lessor force of combined Air/Air mobile while going after the crossing and bridging sites in the NG Plain in preparation for your coming ground assalts. You don't really need to destroy the SAM sites a much as suppress them for now. Deal with them using ground forces in a week or so."_

The allies needed to cover all the sectors whereas the WP could tend to concentrate their forces in more critical sectors. The WP also has regional limits for some of their members, which expalins the efforts made in the far south.

SAMs represent an ongoing source of attrition that needs to be dealt with in order to string out the effectiveness of of the WP airforces. If ther is a lull of bad weather, the WP will have a breathing space in which to repair its damaged aircraft, so its important to keep the pressure up. Finally dont forget that the WP have the very real capability of overrunning NATO airfields, which may reduce the return rate and force available rates. It aint over just yet, despite the drubbing the WP air forces are receiving. And the WP has access to vast reserves as the interior air forces are released and made ready for operations 


"_ Also, with the given exchange rate with Nato and the fact that they are losing second line aircraft more than primary while you are losing primary, at what point does your air offensive collapse due to losses? Assuming your losses will increase with the USAF reinforcements. My thought would be, if you're going to use your airmobile assets, you'll have to do it fast. In a week, they may not survive without air cover (that will be driven down to the level of losses that their appearence is sporatic)." _

Agreed, they are a wasting asset as airmobile formations, but they still are useful as regular infantry particulalry in the urban areas around the Ruhr and such. 


"_ Lastly, just my thought on this, I'd forget about Italy. Airmoble and air action over there is probably easier, but it is a distraction from real fight going on up in Germany. If you sieze territory on the far side of the Alps, you set yourself up for getting cut off due to a Airmoble assault on the passes supported by air and an armored counterattack. Toss in an arial blockade of the mountain passes/valleys of Austria and anything you throw over the Alps is as good as lost. If Nato High Command throws anything serious in your way down there, they are making a mistake. Northern Italy is a side show_"

The battle does not hinge on italy....yet, but the key to southern Germany is in getting suffiicient resources so as to releve the Americans, so that they can rest, and then counterattack. The Americans represent the best offensive elements in the NATO arsenal, with powerful artillery and combat element, as wellas, of course their airstrike capabilities


----------



## parsifal (Jun 20, 2010)

syscom3 said:


> What about Russian airpower reinforcements? Is China making rumblings out east, making it impossible for Russia to move assets from there?




Abstracted out of the equation by force non availability....the Russians have about 90 dive and roughly 3000 a/c not included in the battle for the very reason they have alot of other fronts to consider


----------



## timshatz (Jun 21, 2010)

Thanks for the update Parsifal. Looks good so far. 

Won't give Berlin much time to survive. Looks like vacation time in Odessa from all the Soviet controlled forces that ring it. Still, the longer they hold, the better it is for Nato. A distraction, but one that has to be dealt with by the WP. 

Does the game allow for attacks by SAC on targets in the SU via conventional bomber runs? Something to force the Soviets to keep forces back to cover air assaults from different directions. How about Carrier strikes up north or in the Far East? Just a thought to keep the Soviets on their toes. 

Seems like Group 1 and 2 are the two the Soviets are putting their money on. Given the Air losses, Group 1 is going to have a rough time keeping the Nato birds off it's back when pushing for their objectives. Further, if the bridges are down and local forces make a fight of it, it could take a while to get to Hannover. Seems like Group 2 is the real key. They can swing north and cover the flank of Group 1 (in doing so expose themselves to the Americans farther south, pulling Group 3 in as a flank support) or they can swing south and hit the US forces (essentially ignoring the Nato forces in the North and reducing Group 1 to the same position of Group 3 in a flanking attack to the north by Group 2). It seems the fight is really coming down to which way Group 2 is going to move, how well the US forces around Fulda are re-equiped and rested, and who is going to get control of the air. At least that seems to be the narrative as it stands now.

You made a note about French divisions coming into it. Are they committed on Nato's side or is this just a possibility?

Thanks for the update on the southern front. I see the option of letting the WP run riot is not an option. I guess a fighting retreat is the best option for the Nato forces in the south. I don't think there is much that can be done about Austria. It may be possible to hold part of it but the whole thing would really be a question of if the Italians want to fight north of the Alps or south of them. On the far side of the Alps, there are just too much in the way of WP stuff for the Austrians to hold for long. And they are coming from two directions, both of which looks stronger than the total Austrian forces. My thought would be the smartest move for Nato is a fighting retreat by Nato forces to the Passes over the Alps. Or even in front of the Alps. The ground around there is another spot like Fulda, but even worse. Oddly enough, I've driven through it and it's all uphill on winding roads. Take the Main Highway out and it's nothing but problems for an attacker. 

But such a move may not be politically feasable. The Austrians may demand a response from Nato. 

Another thought, both Turkey and Greece are part of Nato as is Spain. Are any of their contingents active?


----------



## timshatz (Jun 21, 2010)

Parsifal, one thing that's been bothering me is Austria. It seems that the Austrians are in the bag. They are essentially flanked on two sides by WP forces. If they decide to defend Wein, they end up in the middle of a pincer movement. While it might be politically needed to hold Wien, in military terms, it would probably be better to move the Govt to Innsbruck or something and fall back to the Passes over the alps with the Italians in support. That way, they are not cut off from their lines of communication to the Nato forces. But if the WP in place attack directly towards Wein, essentially dong a diversion attack along an expected axis, with a secondary attack as a deep thrust to cut the Austrians off from the Italians in a pincer coming together west of Wein, they Austria falls and they are out of the war. Itally has to fall back as far as the passes and holds there, probably with support from USMC or other Nato Forces (strikes from the 6th Fleet in the Agean would be a definite). Wien is something of a trap for the Austrians. 

If the Hungarians and Checz WP forces attack, they are on the horns of a dilema as well. Go for the retreating Austrian forces, and you expose yourself to a drive from Munich. Go for Munich, and the Austiran/Italians hit you in the flank. And with the Austrians back at the passes, they can counter attack with Nato assists and drive the WP back. 

Down there, thinks can get interesting and hairy all at the same time.


----------



## parsifal (Jun 21, 2010)

These are all excellent points, and I am not so blinded as to say the game will answer all of them. Games are only as good as the assumptions that underpin them, but usually they can tell us something about a given military situation. 


We hope to get an hour or two of playing time in soon. My apologies for the delay, but family issues do take precedence I am sad to report. We intend to complete the operations of one Group at the time, and then its the NAT players who get to move. They wont be attacking to start with.

I think Berlin will fall quickly, but then it must......it acts as a major choke point for the WP as most of their rail links pass close by the city. The forces tied down containing the Berlin garrison are needed elsewhere, and fast.

Austria does not surrender as such. The game postulates that they will continue to fight after the fall of Vienna (though there is a chance for surrender. But yes, the majority of the Austrian army is caught in a pincer attack, about to be unleashed, made even worse by the Hungarians moving around their flank close to the Yugoslav border.

There are no Spanish forces, as I dont think they were part of the alliance at that time (or were they?) We wont know what the French will do until halfway through GT-1. If they do live up to their treaty obligations well and good. in fact there are several NATO unreliability issues to address, and none of these will be known until just after the first ground combats occur. Will let you know of the outcomes of these random events as they occur.

Having playewd NATO several times before, the usual run of events is to try and stabilise the north German sector, and after an initial period of setbacks in the south, to use the Americans to counterattack there, whilst their flanks are guarded by the French, remnants of the Germans and the italians. Will have to see how things pan out however.


----------



## Zniperguy114 (Jun 22, 2010)

Sorry what I have to say has almost no relation to the simulation, But I have always wondered why people think that the Soviets would attack from Eastern Europe. The most strategic place for the Russians to invade first would have to be the Middle East. This would be great for the year 1973 for the Soviets. Even though at this time Americans still used some American Crude Oil, Tensions in the Mid East had a huge impact on the US. If war did break out and the Reds took the Middle East, NATO would have very limited Fuel Sources. One of the biggest sources left would be in Alaska, which is only a short flight for Russian Paratroops. If that did happen, The USSR could cut through the world like a knife through hot butter. For that matter, even if NATO forces took the Mid East, the Soviets had Siberia, oil rich although relatively hard to get to.


----------



## timshatz (Jun 22, 2010)

parsifal said:


> These are all excellent points, and I am not so blinded as to say the game will answer all of them. Games are only as good as the assumptions that underpin them, but usually they can tell us something about a given military situation.
> 
> 
> We hope to get an hour or two of playing time in soon. My apologies for the delay, but family issues do take precedence I am sad to report. We intend to complete the operations of one Group at the time, and then its the NAT players who get to move. They wont be attacking to start with.
> ...



Thanks for the reply Parsifal, I appreciate it. No worries, take your time. These post are appreciated but not a needed response. Family always comes first and you have a little fella to worry about. To paraphrase Woody Allen, "Start the Revolution (or in this case, the third world war) without me". 

Do appreciate your letting us know what's up and how it's trending. 

I see your perspective on being Nato in the past. It does seem that things will head that way again. Given political viability, military effectiveness and cohesion, the North Plain is the weak point for Nato. One thing I was thinking about was the possibility of Group 2 doing a feight towards Group 1, then swinging down and heading south to hit the Americans in the flank. Hey, if they Americans can do it to them, why not the other way around. Then, Group 3 would become a critical part of your campaign. They could attack into the American flank if the US Forces turn to meet Group 2. And with the Airmobile forces, Group 3 becomes a decent threat. Just a thought.


----------



## timshatz (Jun 22, 2010)

Zniperguy114 said:


> Sorry what I have to say has almost no relation to the simulation, But I have always wondered why people think that the Soviets would attack from Eastern Europe. The most strategic place for the Russians to invade first would have to be the Middle East. This would be great for the year 1973 for the Soviets. Even though at this time Americans still used some American Crude Oil, Tensions in the Mid East had a huge impact on the US. If war did break out and the Reds took the Middle East, NATO would have very limited Fuel Sources. One of the biggest sources left would be in Alaska, which is only a short flight for Russian Paratroops. If that did happen, The USSR could cut through the world like a knife through hot butter. For that matter, even if NATO forces took the Mid East, the Soviets had Siberia, oil rich although relatively hard to get to.



Zniper guy, there was probably a scenario where such a thing happened. It does have the positive affect, from the Soviet point of view, of going after a strategic asset of the west. I do not have the figures but do not know how much of that oil was actually used by the US. I know it was a lot less than at present. Back in the 70s, the US used most of the oil it produced. The majority of the oil that came out of the middle east went to Europe and Japan. At least that is how I recall it. 

But moving on. The Soviets would not need to control the oil fields to have that affect, only to deny access to them. The two are not really the same. To do that, they would have to effectively cut the sea lanes. To do that, they would have to invade at least one of the countries bordering the persian gulf. Most likely Iran. I don't think the US would stand still for it and I also don't think they would roll over the Iranians. They have a history of being very difficult to beat. 

A Soviet land attack into the Middle East has all the potential of going very badly, very quickly. A couple of problems. Firstly, the oil reserves in the ME are huge and spread all over the place. It's going to take a lot of doing to interdict and control them. The people in that end of the world are not going to just sit there while it's happening, especially with the US as their sponsor. It would take just about every solider/asset in the SU as well as sizeable chunk of the WP. Secondly, the SU controlled a lot of Eastern Europe by fear and troops. Most of those troops would have to leave that area to fight in the ME. As such, local revolts (such as the Checz Spring of 1968 or Hungarian of 1956) would start popping up. Or at least a serious burst of local unrest. Think of what happened in 1989. 

And that is not even considering the political dimension in the UN or other bodies. It would probably be the only time in history where you would see the Israelis and Arabs on the same side of a question. The SU actions would be interperted as an open agression. As such, the moral impetus would change. Think of Afghanistan on a larger scale. 

In short, and this is just my opinion, the gains from going into the ME would, in no way, counter the problems that pop up from stripping forces from Europe and the problems of trying to control the ME. In sum, it's a loser proposition. 

From a tactical point of view, with the Nato/Allies holding the sea lanes, they would be able to launch attacks anywhere they want, pretty much whenever they want. Not good for the SU. Lot of coastline to cover. 

Lastly, this thing would not stay in the ME. It would spread. Such an attack would be the opening gambit in a World War. No way you can go after a strategic asset like that and not get everyone in a tizzy. For the SU, it means the majority of their assets are in the ME while the majority of Natos are in Western Europe. 

As to the point about Alaska, if the balloon went up from an invasion of the ME by the SU, the final battles would be fought long before the Alaskan oil fields even got established. This is the kind of war that would be over in 30 days, one mushroom cloud way or another.


----------



## parsifal (Jun 22, 2010)

_Sorry what I have to say has almost no relation to the simulation, But I have always wondered why people think that the Soviets would attack from Eastern Europe. The most strategic place for the Russians to invade first would have to be the Middle East. This would be great for the year 1973 for the Soviets. Even though at this time Americans still used some American Crude Oil, Tensions in the Mid East had a huge impact on the US. If war did break out and the Reds took the Middle East, NATO would have very limited Fuel Sources. One of the biggest sources left would be in Alaska, which is only a short flight for Russian Paratroops. If that did happen, The USSR could cut through the world like a knife through hot butter. For that matter, even if NATO forces took the Mid East, the Soviets had Siberia, oil rich although relatively hard to get to._


What you are saying may make sense, and in game terms ther is no reason why this might not be hapening simultaneous to the invasion of western europe....

However, the kind of war you are envisaging is not the kind of war the Soviets planned for, or shaped their force structure for. Whilst in our eyes the Soviets represent the evil empire on world domination, they never planned to achieved that by an overt invasion of the whole planet. Soviet infiltration and control of the third world was always by supporting and exporting insurrection. The only exceptions to this were in Europe (Czechoslovakia, Hungary) and later, Afghanistan (to an extent the cuban missile crisis might be argued as an act of overt Soviet aggression outside Europe, but in that case there were not significant numbers of conventional forces involvedjust a dangerous deployment of nuclear assets to the western hemispher). Putting Afghanistan to one side for a moment, why would the Soviets be prepred to use overt agression in Europe, and nowhere else???

I think the answer lies somewhere in the fact that the Soviets saw eastern europe as vital to their national interest, as a linchpin to securing the defences of the USSR itself. They did not view dominance of the middle east in the same vein as that, and hence until Afghanistan were not prepared to commit large ground or air forces under the Soviet flag to any of those non-euorpean theatres.

Whilst I have no doubt the Soviets would have acted militarily to any significant military threat into eastern europe, I am less sure about overt agression into western europe. There are a number of possibilities, however, including:


1) curbing covert infiltrations by the west into eastern europe
2) as a distraction tosome domestic problem (similar to the argentinians in 1982)
3) a perceived or real weakness in western resolve , that allowed the Soviets to believe a conquest of western europe was possible


----------



## timshatz (Jun 22, 2010)

parsifal said:


> _
> 
> I think the answer lies somewhere in the fact that the Soviets saw eastern europe as vital to their national interest, as a linchpin to securing the defences of the USSR itself. _


_

Excellent point. Russia/Soviet Union was attacked and savagely mauled 2X in 2 centuries. Both attacks came from the West. As a consequence, it was especially sensitive, even possible neurotic, about any threat from the West. Just the existance of Nato was enough for the SU to consider it a major threat. Keep in mind, Nato came into being after a war during which the SU lost 20+ Million people. The Warsaw Pact was a direct response to Nato. 

From the Soviet Union's perspective, Nato was a threat in being just waiting for the word "Go"._


----------



## Zniperguy114 (Jun 22, 2010)

I can see your right, tim. Getting bogged-down in the ME would suck when trying to fight off NATO in Europe. But the SU still had more resources than the US.


----------



## Colin1 (Jun 22, 2010)

Zniperguy114 said:


> But the SU still had more resources than the US.


Warsaw Pact strength always looked good on paper
I don't think the Soviets logistical expertise ever matched their 'paper strength' and you need to take into account the fact that NATO and the Warsaw Pact measured their respective strengths in subtly different ways eg NATO counted their artillery strength by number of platforms, Warsaw Pact by number of 'tubes' (ie there could be several tubes to a platform).

That is not to say they didn't outgun us and they did apply common sense in areas that we didn't eg (and back to the artillery) they didn't rely totally on tracked SPGs, alot of their pieces were towed; the obvious advantage here being that if the prime mover broke down, it can be towed by something else. A team of horses if need be.

No sadder indictment of the Soviets lack of logistic capability is needed than their exit strategy from Afghanistan - at the end of hostilities, troops had to make their own way home.


----------



## timshatz (Jun 22, 2010)

Another thought about the SU that I read some time in the late to middle 90s was an anaysis of the fighting strength of their divisions. It was something of a closely guarded secret that the US knew their divisions weren't all of the same caliber. The Guards units tended to be good but the rest of the Army tended to be very uneven. In some cases, just straight bad. 

What had happened is the SU had sacrificed qualtiy for quantity in their buildup of the 70s. This info was kept very close to the vest by the analysts. They didn't want the SU or our own polititians to know.

Further, the SU had as it's main method of Logistical movement, the rail system whereas Nato used Air. It is fairly easy to drop a bridge and wreck a switching yard. Whereas airports can be destroyed, not all of them. And not at once. But once the trains start backing up...

When you think of the SU resources, think in terms of Lennin's "Quantity has a quality all it's own" statement. It is true, to a certain extent, but it isn't everything. Where I think it really was going to hurt was in the air. If the SU came over the German border, or into the ME, they would've been flying against Air Forces that had recent combat experience (in the USAF and the Israelis). That is a force multiplier. Think of the Battle of France but with the Air Forces switched. German 109s on the French side and RAF on the German side. 

It would've been interesting to say the least.


----------



## parsifal (Jun 23, 2010)

I think as a general statement its true to assert the Soviets were patchy in quality, but is only a short step from there to assert that all Soviet forces were poor quality. And very similar conclusions could be drawn about the NATO force structurees. There were some abolutely yawing gaps in the capabilites of some of the national armies in the '70s. One only has to look at the structure and organizations of the French, Dutch, Danish, Austrian and Italian armies, and then look at the national resolve of their governments to start to wonder exactly which side was more patchy in its quality assessments. We tend to measure NATO capabilities against the best of the best....and then draw another erroneous conclusion that all the NATO forces were in that category. To draw another WWII analogy, its like looking at the LW experten and then drawing the conclusion that all of the LW was trained like that.

I have to make a correction about Red Army readiness rates. The Soviet army was organised on three readiness levels for their 115 Mech and 50 Tank Divs, that were more or less evenly distributed. Category 1 were the front line forces and were maintained at 100% strength and readiness. Most of these, but not all were Guards units. Category II were maintained at 50-75% strength, and 100% equipment rates, category 3 were kept at kept at 30% strengths and about 50% equipment.

Cat 2 Divs were expected to be brought up to full combat readiness in 15-30 days whilst Cat3 were mostly used as fillers for other divs, but could be made fully combat ready in about 90 days. 

None of this was secret Tim, it was commonly known and taught at officer training schools allover the world, and compares quite favourably with the readiness rates for western european armies. To give yourself a rough idea of our cabailities, think back to the preparations for the wars in Iraq, '91 and 2002....how long did it take the Americans to redeploy their forces, and bring them up to combat readiness.....quite a while in my opinion. This sort of delay in the 70's led to my country and I think the US as well to developing rapid deployment forces at a high state of readiness. In the Australian experience incidentally, despite maintaining a field force of mor than 30000, it still took us more than 3 months to make ready a force of just 6500 for deployment into Timor. The British prepratiions for the Falklands is another good illustration that most military formations are not immediately combat ready... 


I never fought or encountered Soviet land forces, but I did get to see their Naval and long range air assets in top cold war action and face off against them in the Arabian sea during the 79-81 invasion of Afghanistan. We were there as a not so subtle reassurance to the Pakistanis, should the Soviets think about pushing to the sea from Afghanistan. They were there to challenge that, and show the Pakis that there was a serious threat at sea to western dominance. I was greatly impressed with how well they were trained, and precision that they delivered their simulated attacks on us. I dont think they outclassed us, but neither were they impotent or inneffective....they had their strengths, and we had ours, it was as simple as that


----------



## renrich (Jun 23, 2010)

Don't know about the 70s but in 1961, when the Berlin Wall went up, I was in a Texas National Guard outfit, the 49th AD which was called to active duty. We trained for about six months and were designated a STRAC division and theoretically were ready to go to Europe and engage the WP. As I remember, the US had around ten divisions in Europe, but only about 13 divisions overall and the WP had about 50 divisions facing them. Another division, the 26th ID, I think, had been called up also. If it had come to a straight up fight, without nukes, I think Nato would have been in for a very difficult time and I would probably not be here to write this. We were sent home in August, 1962, just before the Cuban Missile Crisis.


----------



## Freebird (Jun 23, 2010)

timshatz said:


> IIRC, Fulda was a spot with a lot of US combat strength. Critical is right.
> 
> I don't know how much luck the WP would've had with an attack. I agree with the perspective that Nato was distracted. But, from what I've seen, the WP didn't put as much into Logistics as Nato. 60000 tanks are great, until they start running out of gas.
> 
> ...



Depends who is in command though doesn't it? With NATO composed of the UK, Netherlands, Denmark, W. Germany Belgium - they sure don't want to use nukes in Europe.




timshatz said:


> Parsifal, I am really interested in finding out how your war game plays out.



Parsifal, have you played the other games in this era? We has "NATO" by victory games, (divisional level) and "Third World war" by GDW, also on a similar scale, all were about mid-70's or early 80's simulations of warsw Pact vs. NATO.


----------



## parsifal (Jun 24, 2010)

freebird said:


> Parsifal, have you played the other games in this era? We has "NATO" by victory games, (divisional level) and "Third World war" by GDW, also on a similar scale, all were about mid-70's or early 80's simulations of warsw Pact vs. NATO.



ive played the GDW game once, for the southern front, it was more playable than "Next War" but not as detailed or accurate either (though I may chage that view if we get a rubbish result) Ive also played a game called "NATO" which is a great "beer and pretzels" gamei but nbot really a serious attempt at simulating the likley outcomes. It gets played as a tournament game still, and I usually play it because of that, but as a simulation it sucks big time.

But by far the worst game i have ever had the misfortune to play on this subject material was an abomination called "world War III" by SPI. It was kind of like Third Reich, only it sucked it a big way. I ahd a copy years agao, I think I used it to light my barbecue one day.....

There are lots of tactical simulations that do a pretty good job. I think the best might be "Mech War 77" or "Fulda", both of which are worth playing, and are good fun to boot


----------



## timshatz (Jun 24, 2010)

Parsifal, do you know any good computer games that do the same thing as the board games. There seem to be a bunch of games out there but I can't tell one from another in terms of being any good. Not limited to WP/Nato, across the board decent strategic/tactical games.


----------



## timshatz (Jun 24, 2010)

freebird said:


> Depends who is in command though doesn't it? With NATO composed of the UK, Netherlands, Denmark, W. Germany Belgium - they sure don't want to use nukes in Europe.



My understanding is the Head of Nato was always an American. Or ground forces. Something like that. In truth, I am a little fuzzy on it (fuzzy on a lot of things this morning, good night but paying for it). The reason was the US commited most of the troops and assets. 

But your point of use of nukes is a very good one. Politically, it is a no-go. Militarily, it may become neccesary. My understanding of the nuke scenario is the use is Tactical, not strategic. The most common use is for interdiction of supply routes of maybe (and this is a big if) the attack on an armored thrust. The interdiction is more likely as it is a non-mobile situation whereas finding and fixing a Tank Army has got to be difficult. 

I have also heard of the used of tactical nukes in everything from torps to depth charges in use against US Battle Groups, Re-supply convoys or attacking enemy subs. 

The problem with all the scenarios is, once the button gets pushed, even on a limited, local basis, it is impossible to stop the growth in yield and expansion of targets. Especially with a sustained loss situation with air assets, you get fewer shots at a target as your sortie rate drops (due to losses) so going up in yield and type of weapon is almost a natural occurence, that is after the first one gets used. 

But the first one is the trick. Nobody is going to raise their hands and volunteer to do it, but it's probably going to happen. For instance, West Germany is not going to sign on to firing a nuke on West German soil but they may ok the use in East Germany on a supply/command target that is critical to an armored thrust running rampant in West Germany. Same might be true if the target is in Poland or Checz. 

In short, the initial use of nukes wouldn't be cut and dried (lets nuke Moscow) but something that is more grey and lower yield/targeting than launching a city killing 3 meg warhead at a major population center. 

IMHO


----------



## parsifal (Jun 25, 2010)

We hade a little time (about 90 minutes) to get the war started, we decided to resolve the combat in and around hamburg as a starting point.

The attacking Warsaw Pact forces consisted 7 Divs: 4 Soviet (9G Tk, 12G Tk, 32 Mot, 94G Mot) and 3 East German(1, 8 Mot 9 Tk). These land forces were supported by 3 regiments of artillery, and 7 Bns of ZSU-23 AA. In the air the Sovietsw fielded approximately 100 strike aircraft and 54 Mi24 Hind attack helos.

NATO forces consisted of two West German Divs, 3 and 6 PG . They were supported by a battery of Nike Hercules SAMs and 15 Jaguar Light Attack a/c (RAF) .

WP fixed wing aircraft were able to effectively suppress NATO SAM defences, which enabled the Hindws to provide effective close support to the forces attacking into the city

The east Germans managed to force the retreat of the 16/6 Bdde, though with some losses. They captured Lubeck and Kiel, and threatened the northern flank of the hamburg defenders.

The Soviets attacked in two echelons, one directly into the city from the east, and second, following the initial assaults, that skirted and outflanked the city to the south and southwest.

The Hinds were decisive in forcing the retreat of the German forces to the North west of the city. Brekthroughs were achieved at two points (which has the effect in the game of reducing the effectivnees of the defenders in subsequent combats that turn. The RAF Jaguars provided some help, but not enough, whilst the flak resources of the PG Brigades themselves were just not heavy enough to deter the Hinds .

The following photographs shows the situation in this sector at the end of GT-1. I have also posted the TO&Es for the Soviet Tank and Motorized formations and the West German Pz and PG Brigades of the time. 

It was a great evening, everybody had a lot of fun, though progress was slowas we had a lot to learn.

My opinion is that the results achieved so far are at least plausible. NATO was outnumbered by about 5:1 on the ground and about 10:1 in strike aircraft


----------



## timshatz (Jun 25, 2010)

Parsifal, my guess is this is your Group 1 from the WP launching it's attack on the North German plain towards, well, I guess they are heading in the general direction of Antwerpt. Do you have a goal as yet or are you just letting it play out to see what the opportunities are? Is it the Rhine or a closer, intermediate goal? You look like you are pretty much have Hamburg finished with a sizeable force in the area around Bremen. By the looks of it, Nato forces in the north are reelling and Nato air has not had a decisive affect (or even anything more than an incremental affect) on the forces in and around Hamburg. It is somewhat discouraging from the Nato perspective but very attractive from the WP view of things. 

Any idea on the losses for both sides? In general percentages? I was thinking if the WP can reinforce faster than Nato (or if the losses are not as severe), this thing is over. However, that will become more difficult the further west you go as the WP moves away from it's bases and Nato moves closer to theirs. 

Did Nato do a fighting withdrawl or was did it break and move back west? It important, they could be trading ground for time figuring there was no way they could hold Hamburg anyway. They may leave a battlegroup in Hamburg with instructions to keep fighting as long as possible to slow things down.

Just a few ideas.


----------



## Amsel (Jun 25, 2010)

timshatz said:


> Parsifal, do you know any good computer games that do the same thing as the board games. There seem to be a bunch of games out there but I can't tell one from another in terms of being any good. Not limited to WP/Nato, across the board decent strategic/tactical games.



I own several titles from Paradox Interactive that are fairly smart strategy games. Heres a link-

Games - Paradox Interactive

Hearts of Iron III is a pretty good WW2 strategy game.

I'm not too familiar with any other companies that produce PC strategy games, but am always looking.


----------



## parsifal (Jun 25, 2010)

timshatz said:


> Parsifal, my guess is this is your Group 1 from the WP launching it's attack on the North German plain towards, well, I guess they are heading in the general direction of Antwerpt. Do you have a goal as yet or are you just letting it play out to see what the opportunities are? Is it the Rhine or a closer, intermediate goal? You look like you are pretty much have Hamburg finished with a sizeable force in the area around Bremen. By the looks of it, Nato forces in the north are reelling and Nato air has not had a decisive affect (or even anything more than an incremental affect) on the forces in and around Hamburg. It is somewhat discouraging from the Nato perspective but very attractive from the WP view of things.
> 
> Any idea on the losses for both sides? In general percentages? I was thinking if the WP can reinforce faster than Nato (or if the losses are not as severe), this thing is over. However, that will become more difficult the further west you go as the WP moves away from it's bases and Nato moves closer to theirs.
> 
> ...




Tim, your apparaisal is pretty close the money. As the WP we have a flexible approach as to how we want to win....basically where the opportunity arises, we will pursue that avenue of attack. However our general aim at this stage is to swing througth Northern Germany,, get across the Rhine, before turning south and try and outflank the Ruhr urban agglomeration.

I think Hamburg is lost, and with that goes Denmark basically. The West Germans 3rd and 6PG divs need to pull west across the Elbe, which will be difficult and exhausting for some of the formations (particularly the 16/6 brigade, now isolated south of Lubeck....it has to cross a minor and a major river system and manouvre via a very circuitous path to get past the WP formations attempting to block its retreat). The WG 3+6 PG flanks will need flank protection,which can only be achieved by pulling units out of the defensive lines further south and forming a line from Bremen to the Elbe. I think the NATO players are likely to pull the 11PG XX and the US 4/2 Arm III out of NORTHAGs main defensive positions further to the south. They will need to rush the Dutch reserves from Holland forward in a hurry ( assuming these national forces are released - we dont know that yet) to try and stiffen this position, because the German and US forces are going to be simply too thin to hold that position firmly. And the Dutch ground formation have big questions hanging over them with regard to their combat effectiveness. They are among the least well trained NATO formations, and will almost certainly either crack or take heavier losses than the well trained WG formations. 

Losses are not heavy unless a unit cannot or will not retreat. A unit cannot retreat if it is attacking, or if it has no clear path of retreat. This is affected by its trainiing level. Losses are measured in steps rather than numbers of men and material. A WP Div has three steps before going into remnant, whilst a NATO Div has four. However, depending on the training level of the formation, if it receives an adverse result from battle, it can either stand and take a step loss, or retreat. When attacking a unit cannot retreat, it must take a step loss. 

In the battle last night, the East German tank formations took a step loss as an attacker whilst the West germans simply retreated.....but they came very close to losing and entire Brigade as the 16/6 Bdes retreat options became nearly impossible to find ( a unit with an adverse combat result that cannot retreat, must take a loss instead). In the air the RAF lost 6 jaguars, whilst the WP lost an Su74 and 4 Hinds (the loss of one SU24 is not enough to register as a loss in the game). 


So, to summarize, NATO withdrew rather than stand and take losses. I would estimate losses to be several hundred WG men, and some material, to about 2000 EG and probably about 30-50 Tanks

Attacjhed are the VP levels as given in the scenario instructions for the game.


----------



## timshatz (Jun 30, 2010)

Parsifal, sorry it took so long in getting back to you. I thought you might've gotten delayed with little one and finally went looking for your post. Low and behold, you'd posted and I'd missed it. Damn, I was looking for that post!

Ok, I guess a lot has gone on since your last one but I think it is interesting that the WG and other formations are trading ground for time. While that may be the result of your attacks, the lack of Nato air is disturbing. It is pretty easy to move aircraft around and effective interdict an airspace. If Nato really had a jones for that space up North, they'd have reinforced it by now, at least with some air assets and possible gone after the lines of communication in an interdiction mode. In short, be careful, somebody might be setting you up for a heavy flanking shot.


----------



## timshatz (Jun 30, 2010)

Amsel said:


> I own several titles from Paradox Interactive that are fairly smart strategy games. Heres a link-
> 
> Games - Paradox Interactive
> 
> ...



Thanks Amsel, every little bit helps.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 10, 2010)

We have now finally had the chance to complete another turn of the simulation. We are now at the end of Day 2 of the battle. The summary of losses for both sides were as follows:

WP

40-45000 men, 156 A/C (126 Mig-21, 4 Mig-17, 8 Mig-27, 18 Mig-23), 12 Naval Air (Tu-16s mostly), 2 x SS, 1 x FF.

The WP AFs also have 368 U/S aircraft, whilst NATO have none

NATO

15-16500 men, 118 A/C (54 F104, 12 G-91, 4 Mirage III, 16 F4E, 4 x F4D, 6 x Harrier, 5 Lightning, 7 x F-35 Draken, 4 x F-100, 6 x Jaguar), 2 x minor naval auxiliaries and 6 x Naval Air (F-104s). The F4 losses were serious, and were due to the USAF being spread too thinly, to cover all the air sectors. 


In the air NATO won control of three of the four air sectors. They did not win control of the critical Northern sector


The WP lost 2 x airborne regiments outright, whilst the allies lost 6 x SAM Batteries, VI Corps HQ (Dk), 8/3 PG Bde, 2 Recon Bn (Ne), 41/4 Mech Bde (Ne). The remainder of the 3 PGXX was encircled and isolated. 

Losses for both sides were heavy and serious, but the WP airforces are now just about on their last legs. 


WP landed marine forces on the main Danish island of Sjaelland, but were frustrated in their attempts to capture Copenhagen and the critical ferries . Further to the south the EG V Corps crossed the Kiel Canal, at heavy cost, engaging the Jytland division, and 6 PG Div. 

Airborne assaults by two regiments managed to destroy the key SAM batteries near Oldenburg, and then make a redoubt near to Willhelshaven. 4 Recon Bn (Ne) could not defend these batteries, and retreated with loss. I Corps (Ne) moved up and enveloped this bridgehead, but could not destroy it

2 GTA meanwhile attacked west of Hamburg. The formation managed to cross the Elbe near the Heligoland Bight, and destroyed the 8/3 Bde, and encircled the remainder of 3 PG XX. 

This success allowed the remainder of the SNGF (Soviet Northern Group of Forces) to push further to the west. Their MLA was actually to the north and south of Bremen, which was largely captured, with the Dutch suffering serious losses and the Weser crossed though subsequent counter attacks by the BAOR forced them back to the eastern side of the river. As a result of these counterattacks, 11 PG XX and 26 FJ Bde managed to restore a line on the western side of the Weser Nth of Bremen. I Corps (WG) had suffered heavy losses, however. 

These losses in the North forced the BAOR to abandon their positions south of Bremen along the Weser, and move north to reinforce the hard pressed I Corps . This movement north by the British resulted in a near catastrophe to the south , with the WP attempting to encircle the Belgians and 3 PG Divs. Though unsuccessful (thanks to the intervention by the US 3rd Armoured Div), the NATO formation in this sector (just north of the Sauerland forested region) were forced to relinquish Kassel and fall back towards Dortmund. 

NATO suffered two serious political setbacks….the Austrians surrendered after Vienna was invested, though more than half the Austrian army defected and joined NATO anyway. The French decided to prohibit the movement of forces across the Rhine, allowing only one div out of their 5 div contingent to move up to the fray. Conversely a very large contingent of the FAF was placed at the disposal of NATO.

The WP air forces are not in good shape, though achieving air superiority over the North sector allowed them to inflict heavy losses on NORTHAG. There is a strong possibility the WP will initiate chemical warfare in the following GT, to maintain their offensive momentum, as their airpower begins to expire. The first reforger units have begun arriving, and major reinforcement for the USAF is imminent, including a second F-15 equipped TFW. 

Some further images of the game as it currently stands


----------



## parsifal (Jul 10, 2010)

And a few further images of the game


----------



## parsifal (Jul 19, 2010)

A quick update. We completed to the end of the third day, withy some continued progress in the north . However WP losses are mounting, as NATO defensive lines firm up and the impacts of NATO Helo gunships begin to take effect.

Soviets pushed back the NATO lines a further 10 miles or so in the north by achieving brekthroughs in the area north of Bremen and to the approaches to Dortmund. NATO was forced to retreat in order to maintain the integrity of their line.

However as a general observation the the mobile war is slowing in the North, and the Soviets are beginning to to experience the first logistic problems. The arrival of two wings of F-111 bombers will excacerbate this i think.

In the south the situation remains slightly more fluid, as the NATO lines south of the US TO remains short of men. The arrival of the italians, a single division of the French and the WG territorials is hoped to check this advance

Denmark surrendered, and with that the war in the Baltic collapsed. The surrender of the Danes had a knock on effect, resulting in the loss of a further two WG Brigades, and the encirclement of a further three. These formations had been foolishly sent north to assist the Danes, and can now be considered lost. It was a major blow to NATOs reserve situation

The impact in the game by helicopter gunships is critical, and in this field NATO enjoys a significant advantage. This raised considerable discussion amongst the players, as to how important helos are or could be in a situation like this. Makes me wonder about the actual performance of the AH64s in places like Iraq


Game situation in pictures follows


----------



## parsifal (Jul 19, 2010)

Tweo more images showing the situation in the far south


----------



## BombTaxi (Jul 20, 2010)

timshatz said:


> Parsifal, do you know any good computer games that do the same thing as the board games. There seem to be a bunch of games out there but I can't tell one from another in terms of being any good. Not limited to WP/Nato, across the board decent strategic/tactical games.



Sorry to trawl back through the thread, but I can recommend Matrix Games and Shrapnel Games as places to start looking. Most of their games are tactical, but there are some brigade-level and upwards titles in their ranges. And the tactical games a re pretty good too


----------



## timshatz (Jul 20, 2010)

BombTaxi said:


> Sorry to trawl back through the thread, but I can recommend Matrix Games and Shrapnel Games as places to start looking. Most of their games are tactical, but there are some brigade-level and upwards titles in their ranges. And the tactical games a re pretty good too



Thanks Bomb Taxi, I appreciate it.


----------



## timshatz (Jul 20, 2010)

Parsifal, thanks for posting. Sorry I missed all the fun and games of the first three days. It is very interesting. 

At this point, it looks like the WP is running out of steam. With heavy reinforcement coming up from the Reforger of NATO, do you have anything coming your way (as WP commander) that will help you? At this point, it could come down to who reinforces first and most. Shades of Bedford Forrest. 

US reinforcement with Air is going to be tough. Especially with your air power dwindling. 

Have read that the WP considered Nato Divisions about 1.5-2X combat power due to their Helicopters.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 24, 2010)

The WP Pact offensive is slowing, no doubt about it, and NATO is even counterattacking in places (eg 3rd armoured pushing very slowly toward Kassel) but there are some Verdun style battles of attrition occurring. From GT-7 the WP start to receive a steady flow of air and ground reinforcements, averaging about 60 aircraft per GT, and about 3 or so Divs per Turn. On the NATO side, the WG army is beginning to receive territorial reserves, and there are Reforger units arriving over the next seven days. In the air the USAF receves another wing of F-15s, two wings of F-4s and two wings of F-111s. They receive two squadrons of A-10s and some A-7s and AV-8s. They now have AWACs and wild weasel to support their operations, and some of the casualties are returned due to the effects of ARVs and other repair services. Soviet repair and recovery capabilities are not considered too good in the game, and those F-111s are going to be deadly to the WP supply network.

If the WP can retain some semblance of logistic support, they could win this still. But every day that goes by, the allies are increasing their level of air superiority. Conversely, after about seven days, the WP will still be receiveing a steady stream of air and ground reinfocements, the allies virtually no air, and a much smaller level of ground reinforcement/replacement. Unless they can dislocate the WP supply network, they will have a hard time of it.

The ace in the hole are NBC weaponary. Only the WP can initiate their use, and so far they have witheld them. The reasoning is that a bit more attrition never hurt anyone, and for the moment the WP supply train is just holding. If those F-111s start to bite, the frontline units will have a few days of supplies with which to survive. there is a strong possibility that chemical, followed by nuclear warfare might be initiated at that point. This will completely alter the whole equation, but using these weapons too early will lessen their impact. Timing the right moment will be crucial to deciding the outcome of this battle


Its a very interesting scenario, and worth some discussion in the wash up. I look forward to people assessments, hopefully they will be forthcoming. I already am considering the impact of those Apache gunships....they are really devastating. In the gane, two squadrons have more firepower than your average division....is that a realistic assessment?


----------



## syscom3 (Jul 24, 2010)

Parsifal, what is the political reliability of Poland? Wouldn't Russia need more and more troops just to keep them inline?

And wouldn't it be interesting if naval assets are included. If a carrier is disabled, then those air units that are left can be included.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 24, 2010)

We now know that the WP was a deeply divided alliance and the Poles were far more unreliable than was assumed when this game was designed. I will concede all of that. But then, some of the NATO countries have proven to be somewhat of a liability to the unity of the alliance as well. Look at the carry on France has made regarding the war in Iraq......games that involve political conjectures are always open to debate, and there is never any right or wrong answer. 

In the game, political unreliability rules are addressed by a simple die roll....event "A" happens and the players have to then check the effects of that event. The WP Pact Player has been very careful not to trigger more than one of those events. Further checks would be required after the the initial decision to go to war. If any of the WP start to sustain too many losses, or NATO starts to win, or NATO had been able to hold Berlin, or NBC war breaks out, or a couple of other events occur (I forget exactly what), the WP must make further checks. Poland is probably as bad as Hungary for reliability....

As far as stationing forces in Poland or the other countries there are no rules as such. Its outside the scenario parameters I guess, though ther are more divisions from each of the contributors, all being withheld until later in the game.

NATO has done extremely badly in its reliability checks. The French wont cross the Rhine, the Dutch are suffereing morale problems, both the Danes and the Austrians have surrendered as soon as their capitals were threatened. The only real success enjoyed by NATO has been the full co-operation of the Italians, and they have 8 Divs to pour into the battle. They are sorely needed.

The Naval war only lasted two days. Both sides had substantial air resources, and the Danes contributed significantly to the effort until their surrender. With the loss of the naval air stations in Shcleswig-Holstein, and the surrender of Denmark, the remaining West German specialist naval and naval air forces were witdrawn from the Baltic, but thats where the WP must stop....they have run out of ground to conquer. We have commented that such an outcome is disappointing, and somewhat unrealistic, but its the way it is playing.

We do seem to receive some naval assets, in the form of the A-7s and the AV-8s (I assume these are USMC assets). We also receive a full Marine Div, but only after GT-14 (withdrawn from Norway I believe). I would have thought that if a carrier gets hit, it would almost certainly be sunk or suffer heavy damage. Look at what happened to major warships in the Falklands, if they were hit, they were out of the battle basically 

Under those circumstances, the transfer of a CAG and its support elements would be unlikley. Remember we have only fought for three days in real time, I doubt that ad hoc decisions about redeployments couold be made within that time frame. 


I agree however, having access to USN air assets would be a very handy resource


----------



## syscom3 (Aug 30, 2010)

Whatever happened to your wargame?


----------



## vikingBerserker (Aug 30, 2010)

Just started to read this thread and I'm curious as well.


----------



## parsifal (Sep 3, 2010)

Sorry guys for the late reply. A number of the players have been crook, and as we have had some pretty attrocious weather, and as the game is set up in my not so warm garage, we have postponed a lot of playing days. Wee are up to Day 5 of the campaign, and NATO is successfully counterattacking. I will post details in a day or so, and hopefully we will get back t o a regular metting schedule as the weather improves


----------



## timshatz (Sep 3, 2010)

Parisifal, sorry I missed out on the game results, been very busy. Sounds like things are so-so for Nato. 

Counterattacking? Not sure that's a smart move. Look forward to your update.


----------



## parsifal (Sep 8, 2010)

Day 4 5

NATO achieved air superiority after the arrival of a further wing of F-15s and 12 squadrons of F-4s. There are also two wings of F-111s and a wing of A-7s on strength.

WP were denied the ability to provide effective air support of any kind to their ground forces. The F-111s, A-7s, RAF Buccaneers and FAF Mirage B-IV bombers pounded the WP supply lines, causing supply shortages along the entire front. Cobra, B105 and S331 gunships pounded WP frontline formations for moderate cost. 

However the WP doggedly continued their attacks, hoping to keep the NATO ground forces from regaining the initiative. In the far north , elements of 6 PG XX (WG) had been isolat3ed and trapped along the coast, near Bremerhaven on Day 3 of the battle. The Soviets now used 87 and 94 Gds Rifle XX to try and crush the defenders. Whilst they made some progress and inflicted losses on the beleagured Germans, they could not eliminate the pocket completely. On the following day, NATO forces built around three divisions, 5 PG (WG), 5th Mech (NE) and 4th Armoured (BR) counterattacked west and south of Bremen, with the objective of achieving a breakthrough and relieving 6PG XX. They were unable to break through, but they did inflict heavy losses on the WP. 9 Tk XX (EG) was destroyed, and 12 Rifle (PO) suffered losses and was forced back, and then encircled. 

Further south, 20 miles SW of Osnabruck, 3 Shk Army attacked to envelope the city, but were heavily repulsed by 1 Mech XX (BE) and 7 PG XX (WG). The Soviets did achieve a small breakthrough south of the Lippe River, forcing back the 16 Mech XX (BE, and the 2 PG XX (WG), as well as a composite Task force composed of German Landswehr and US Recon elements defending on the edge of the Saurland Forest. 

A determined assault along the Lahn River by a large WP formation built around the 31 Gds TkXX, 16 Gds Rfl, and 2 x Polish Rfl Divs was held by the Canadian 4 Mech Bde, supported by US artillery assets and 3 squadrons of US Cobra gunships. However the WP did achieve a lodgement on the right flank of the Canadians, which triggered a strong counterattack by 5 Pz XX (WG, but the Polish spearhead units held this attack at days end . 

In the far south began mopping operations against the Austrians and continued to drive deeply into southern Germany. NATO is hard pressed in this sector, and the absence of the French army is being keenly felt. However the italians and some EG reserve units are now in position to resist the southern spearheads, and US and the single French division west of the Rhine are assisting.


----------



## parsifal (Sep 8, 2010)

The southern sector......


----------



## vikingBerserker (Sep 8, 2010)

Wow, how long does it normally take to play one of these games?


----------



## parsifal (Sep 8, 2010)

They can take a while. Remember however, this is classified as a "monster" and we have spent more time discussing the parameter and assumptions in the game than actually playing. 

I estimate we have spent approximately 10 hours playing 5 GTs. There are 30 GTs to the full campaign so it would take approximately 60 hours to play the full game. 

We hope to get back into a regular schedule in about two weeks, when hopefully it is not too cold to play


----------



## vikingBerserker (Sep 8, 2010)

Wow, that's fricken cool!


----------



## parsifal (Sep 8, 2010)

The game system is derived from the German "KriegSpiel", which literally translates to "wargame". Before WWI the germans developed a system of quantifying combat strengths, and developed means of assessing other military variables. It has obvious limitations, but its strength is evident in the thorough preprations that prededed most major military operations the germans were involved with. Even without the time to "playtest" a particular situation, those trained in its applicatiuon have the advantage of being able to visualise what will happen in a given situation.

"wargaming" is often criticised as not producing accurate result. True enough, and even more true if the variables affecting a battle are not taken into account. However this type of simulation has the best record in the pre-computer age, and really shows the limitation of modern commercialised computer simulations. The problem with many of these computer sims, is that they are inadequately researched, and not designed by people with military experience. The result is what you often see in this place....one sided, unbalanced assessments of a given situation


----------



## timshatz (Sep 9, 2010)

Nice job Parsifal. Very nice. 

It seems the WP attacks are losing some steam. Or at least not attaining the same results as earlier assaults. Any idea on why? If I had to guess, I would go with the assumption that supply losses, lack of air cover, extending supply lines, reaction from Nato are big factors. At least it seems that way. 

How do you counter such a scenario? Your point about dogged attacks seems about all they can do. In short, hunker down, keep attacking and hope for the best. 

I guess the basic question is, who will run out of ground reinforcements first? Failing that, can air power be decisive? It may have to be for Nato to have any chance of winning. 

I don't see the French coming in until it is practically settled. If Nato really starts to lose, then they stay out. WP starts losing steam, they might come in. Is there a provision for this? It could be decisive. But with Denmark and Austria out of it already, it is hard to believe they will do anything.


----------



## timshatz (Sep 9, 2010)

Has the WP made it to Munich in the south? Looks that way.


----------



## parsifal (Sep 9, 2010)

_It seems the WP attacks are losing some steam. Or at least not attaining the same results as earlier assaults. Any idea on why? If I had to guess, I would go with the assumption that supply losses, lack of air cover, extending supply lines, reaction from Nato are big factors. At least it seems that way. 

How do you counter such a scenario? Your point about dogged attacks seems about all they can do. In short, hunker down, keep attacking and hope for the best. 

I guess the basic question is, who will run out of ground reinforcements first? Failing that, can air power be decisive? It may have to be for Nato to have any chance of winning. 

I don't see the French coming in until it is practically settled. If Nato really starts to lose, then they stay out. WP starts losing steam, they might come in. Is there a provision for this? It could be decisive. But with Denmark and Austria out of it already, it is hard to believe they will do anything._

The WP are losing the initiative, and NATO are now able to mount effective counterattacks. You questioned the wisdom earlier about NATO counterattacking, but for a number of reasons it is necessary for them to do that. The winner in the game is decided by the number of cities and regions controlled at the end of the game. And at this stage WP have done just enough to claim a marginal victory. This is not total war. Unconditional surrender is not a realistic option for either side. What this hypothetical assumes is that at the end of a relatively short period, the hot war will cool off, and some peace settlement would be worked out. With two countries (Denmark Austria) completely overrun, and a third substantially occupied (West Germany), the WP leadership could argue that they have some bargaining power….perhaps to occupy Berlin, for example. It’s a situation similar to that attained by Israel after the six days war, and the occupation of the west bank and Golan.

My prediction is that WP will need to endure some rough handling for about 4-6 days. The initial land grab is now over, and the superior NATO technology is starting to bite and their logistical depth and improving organization starting to have an effect. For NATO they receive a further 3 or 4 reforger divs from the US, the Canadian Brigade receives enough resources to upgrade to a division, and the West Germans receive the balance of their landswehr units. The Brits send in two of their “Field Forces”…essentially weak Divisions, but high quality manpower. However whilst there are relatively few new formations as such, NATO does begin to receive replacement fillers….manpower and equipment to replace losses. These are the first of the reservists. The West Germans receive the most, beginning in GT-6, the Brits and the Italians receive about half as much each, beginning on Day 10, whilst the US receives relatively few also beginning Day 10. This means NATO needs to be careful with the Americans, they are vulnerable to unrecoverable losses.

NATO aims at this stage, I think, will be to firstly halt the WP offensive, and make the initiation of chemical or tactical nuclear warfare unattractive. By attacking the supply net, they impose combat penalties on the WP. Given that NBC attacks are represented in the game by combat modifiers in the game, but at a huge political cost, the advantages of initiating NBC warfare are negated by the supply problems. 

A secondary objective for NATO will be to mount limited counterattacks, to peg back the territorial gains made by the WP. NATO receive more “points” for liberating cities than WP does in taking them, so even if they capture only a portion of the cities lost they will neutralize any bargaining chips the WP have gained so far. 

For the WP all hope is not gone, far from it. All that’s happened at this point is that the initial offensive is grinding to a halt, but the battle has a long way to go from here. From GT 7 through to the end of the game, WP receive a steady flow of reinforcements as their category II and some III formations join the battle. In all they receive about 50 additional Divs, with artillery and AA support. These formations are not as well trained or equipped as the front line gds units, but in an attrition battle they may have a decisive effect. From GT-10, the WP also start to receive replacement fillers, to rebuild their shattered formations. In the air the WP receive a steady stream of reinforcements, about 60-80 aircraft per GT, mostly MiG-21s and 23s and Su-7s and 15s. In the immediate term they have a large number of damaged aircraft, and must leave the ground forces to their own devices for a few days whilst these damaged units are made airworthy again. They need to rebuild their air force, and await the arrival of reinforcements. If the NATO heavy bombers (the F-111s mostly) can be thinned or slowed in their primary interdiction mission, and supply returned normal, the situation can be reversed. The supply lines will be further protected by the arrival of additional ADA units in the near future. 

The NATO players had some very bad luck at the beginning of the game, with regard to the French. Essentially a political “random event”, the French have declined to allow their main forces to cross the Rhine, unless those main forces are attacked by the WP (this does not include the single Div currently in Germany). This has without doubt a massive effect on the game, and is the subject of much debate. My opinion is that whilst it might be possible for the French to decline their support, this would not necessarily be a final, or last decision. The French would surely realize that the WP would not stop at the French border if they are successful, and would be considering their position with each passing day. For that reason, we may instigate a game “fix”(ie a non-standard rule) that allows the French position to be re-checked every couple of GTs or so. 

WP have captured Munich as indicated.


----------



## timshatz (Sep 10, 2010)

Bummer, I liked Munich. Great beer. No doubt the occupation will screw THAT up!

Thanks for the update Parsifal, great stuff. And thanks for the clarification of the rules/objectives. It helps a lot. 

From what you've written, it looks like Nato has a window of opportunity to counterattack and get some points back. Given the situation with the WP, they are strung out, starting to have trouble with supplies, exposed to the air and hurting for troops. It might be a good idea for the WP to hunker down and await reinforcements. I am thinking that they've already won a pretty significant victory and Nato is bound to counterattack at some point. Better to hold what you've got than get strung out and destroyed in detail (thinking Tannenberg or 2nd Panzer during the Bulge).

WP already has two countries and a good chunk of a third. What more can they realistically expect to gain? The Rhine might be a bit far. From what's been posted about Nato, the French aren't in and aren't coming in, the Dutch are wavering, the Belgians are bleeding and West Germans are in for the long haul but there aren't enough of them. Everyone else seems to be in regardless of what happens (US, Brits, Canadians, Italians). About the only turf the WP might get is the Netherlands. And that probably wouldn't be worth it. They'd be very strung out. 

If I were WP, I'd sit and consolidate. Even a couple of days might be enough to make your position impregnable. Send out spoiling attacks to confuse and keep the opposition thinking the attacks are still going forward.


----------



## vikingBerserker (Sep 10, 2010)

This actually is pretty fascinating, thanks for posting Parsifal.


----------



## HealzDevo (Aug 11, 2011)

Sorry this thread hasn't been posted in for a while, but I did have some views I would like to put out.

I really do think the Soviets stood a large chance of getting 
away with a European War having large quantities of men and material to throw into combat.
A lot of Soviet Tactics were based on the fact that a large numerical advantage could be achieved
fairly quickly with large divisions. Also you are assuming that the Soviets will aim for the urban areas
with tanks rather than totally destroying the place with artillery and aircraft. The Soviets believed in the
use of less sophisticated technology in large numbers. 

The Americans also have a large problem in that they are relying on being able to ship men and materials to 
England and Europe. They lose Europe, they have to do a D-Day Invasion against modern radar, aircraft, infantry
and ships as well as submarines. Also you have forgotten that China would hardly remain totally on the sidelines but would
look for an advantage in the war. We know they supported North Vietnam in some ways during the Vietnam War.
So that is an unexpected wildcard that in real life would have to be answered. What would China do?

Whether it was fought in 1973 or 1990, a war with the Soviets would have been a very bloody and close fought
thing similar to WWII. We know that Germany had the upper hand in a lot of technologies at the beginning of the
war but still lost to Britain. Modern China has the ability to have the advantages of both tactics- Numbers and Technology.

A good book to read is "The Third World War: The Bestselling Future History" by General Sir John Hackett others,
published in 1975 about a European Soviet Invasion in 1985, published by Sphere.


----------



## HealzDevo (Aug 11, 2011)

Sorry this thread hasn't been posted in for a while, but I did have some views I would like to put out.

I really do think the Soviets stood a large chance of getting 
away with a European War having large quantities of men and material to throw into combat.
A lot of Soviet Tactics were based on the fact that a large numerical advantage could be achieved
fairly quickly with large divisions. Also you are assuming that the Soviets will aim for the urban areas
with tanks rather than totally destroying the place with artillery and aircraft. The Soviets believed in the
use of less sophisticated technology in large numbers. 

The Americans also have a large problem in that they are relying on being able to ship men and materials to 
England and Europe. They lose Europe, they have to do a D-Day Invasion against modern radar, aircraft, infantry
and ships as well as submarines. Also you have forgotten that China would hardly remain totally on the sidelines but would
look for an advantage in the war. We know they supported North Vietnam in some ways during the Vietnam War.
So that is an unexpected wildcard that in real life would have to be answered. What would China do?

Whether it was fought in 1973 or 1990, a war with the Soviets would have been a very bloody and close fought
thing similar to WWII. We know that Germany had the upper hand in a lot of technologies at the beginning of the
war but still lost to Britain. Modern China has the ability to have the advantages of both tactics- Numbers and Technology.

A good book to read is "The Third World War: The Bestselling Future History" by General Sir John Hackett others,
published in 1975 about a European Soviet Invasion in 1985, published by Sphere.


----------



## parsifal (Aug 11, 2011)

The game remains in limbo at the moment because two of the players are unavailable, and my shed is just too cold in winter to be comfortable. I also have had a young addition to the family which soaks up much time, something I like actually....its still set up and with a bit of luck might restart in the Spring. if not, well its been an interesting experience. 

At the conclusion of the last GT, WP was consolidating and strengthening their lines of communication. NATO were hammering Soviet supply lines with F-111s and the Cobras were really starting to hurt the Soviet armour. Germans had taken a nasty pumbling but their territorials were filling gaps in the lines. NATO was counterattacking everywhere, but whether they could sustain was difficult to determine at the stop point that we reached.

Currently we are up to the 9th day of the battle. Soviet casualties are about 300000 men, to NATO 100K. Soviet Air force has lost about twice as many aircraft, but they have many more grounded due to damage. The US F-15 wings, and the West German F-4s are proving decisive in gaining air superiority. Soviets simply have nothing to combat them effectively. On the other hand Soviet SAMs are thickening up, more reinforcements are arriving and the Russians are reciving their Cat-2 and 3 divs whilst the Allies are not now seeing much further reinforcement. Similar to the Germans in WWII, NATO quality is high, but everything is in the shop window. hard to give units proper R&R in those conditions. i am one of the Soviet players, and our plan is to re-commence offensive operations in four game days time, if we ever restart.

The game is very even at this stage, and very intersting. there are possibilities for both sides. 

We will see if things restart 

Have read Third WW, is a good read, and a fairly accurate prediction IMO.

China is abstracted into the game by the Soviet reinforcement schedule, but rememeber this is primarily a "Central Front" sim, done at squadron/Regiment/Divisional level. Thats a massive undertaking, made even more difficult by the fact that we are using the optional Naval Game and air war rules. Makes things very slow, but accurate


----------



## HealzDevo (Aug 13, 2011)

The casuality figures posted prove what I am saying that a 3:1 ratio is very close, especially 
with an enemy that can reinforce with the way in their own backyard. I realise China is abstracted 
into the game but in real-life China really would be a swinging element. NATO has to throw everything 
at the front, because their potential reinforcement of fresh recruits is far away, Australia and the United 
States are on the other side of the world and could potentially have their own problems with Indonesia and 
Mexico at their doors...


----------



## davparlr (Aug 13, 2011)

Some opinions. I always felt that the 1970s would be the worst time for the Warsaw pact to start a war, certainly after 1975. My primary reason was the availability of combat trained *and hardened* troops from the Vietnam War, over 2 million. A vast number of these troops could be recalled and deployed with minimum training. War time command structures were well understood and could be manned with experienced officers. In 1974, the airlift pilots squadrons were 160% manned, and at that time, all AF pilots, on graduation, were considered trained and qualified and noted on their records as fighter pilots. That would be in addition to hordes of combat experienced pilots that could be quickly recalled from the AF, Navy and Marines. Weapons were still stockpiled with many operational aircraft being mothballed. Many could be quickly made operational. During the Yom Kippur War, old A-4s form all over the world were being quickly checked out for delivery to Israel. The Israelis only wanted the control surfaces and the weapons release systems to work! I would guess that in a deadly war time mobilization, massive US air force deployment could begin in weeks, including fighters, bombers, tanker aircraft, and airlift aircraft. While it would take months to deploy army equipment, the AF and ground based Naval Air, could make a quick impact on the airspace above Europe. 

In addition, the weapons of the Vietnam War were maturing with increase counter SAM and AAA missions well understood. Aim-7 and Aim-9 missiles were now quite a bit more reliable than the poor showing early in the Vietnam War. Smart weapons had also become effective and more widespread. All those young military officers who learned war in the rice paddies and over the heavily defended skies of North Vietnam, and, in their General Officer periods, would develop the most power military the world had ever seen, were, in the 1970s, Field Officers, and quite capable.

After 1973, the West was well aware of the deadly capability of the new Soviet SAMs and were deploying counter weapons and planning strategy to defeat them.

Battle hardened troops are a valuable asset, something the Warsaw Pact did not have the mid 70s.

Also, Poland was mentioned as a problem for the Soviets, but so were the other Warsaw Pact countries. They all hated the Soviet Union, even some Soviet republics. They all would need to be watched by the Soviets. Would East German soldiers attack their Western brothers and cousins, or would they turn around and bite the hated Russians? At least NATO could reasonably not need to worry about an ally attacking them.

Of course most of this would occur past your time line.


----------



## syscom3 (Aug 14, 2011)

HealzDevo said:


> The casuality figures posted prove what I am saying that a 3:1 ratio is very close, especially
> with an enemy that can reinforce with the way in their own backyard. I realise China is abstracted
> into the game but in real-life China really would be a swinging element. NATO has to throw everything
> at the front, because their potential reinforcement of fresh recruits is far away, Australia and the United
> ...



In the 1970's, Indonesia was solidly anti-communist. Mexico being a border threat to the US? Hardly. The US and Mexico have our differences, but it sure wasn't at the point (in 1970's) where Mexico would cause troubles.

daveprlr .... interesting perspective. It is something to consider for time lines going past the 30 day mark. While having battle experienced forces is important, many were years past their experiences and would still need to be trained into workable units.


----------



## parsifal (Aug 14, 2011)

These are all valid points though as you say, in the context of a 30 day battle, with little or no warning none of the issues about long term reserves are really going to matter much. And even in the context of a long haul war, stretching to say D+90, the Soviets have huge reserves of semi trained manpower and weapons. As far as experience is concerned, the US certainly brought with it a large amount of experience from the Vietnam War, but the US alone does not have the manpower or the machines to defeat the Soviets in a continental war on their own, and much of the NATO Allies have little combat experience and poor standards of training. The US forces in Europe probably represented the pointy end of the spear, along with the BAOR and the Regulars of the WG Army. But other nationalities....the italians, the Danes, the Dutch, the German reserve units, the Belgians, the Austrians, the French all had various problems that cannot be overlooked. Wherever the US forces would deploy, they would probaby do quite well, but if the other contributors of the the NATO alliance failed the US would be stretched thinner and thinner until the elastic broke. Unless NATO could be made to work as an alliance, not just individual countries, I have serious doubts that the US, on its own, could hope to hold a line anywhere in werstern Europe. Ive read in the early 70s the US army was looking into the planning needed for the Dunkirk evacuation, which sounds massively ominous to me.

And though the Soviets might be accused of a certain patchiness in quality, some of the National guard units, as well as some of the experiences of Vietnam were not great for the US.

I am not saying that the Soviets would win in the long term....I think they would lose, for precisely the reasons you are suggesting. I also think that if NATO could get their act together as an alliance, then there was a good chance, even in the context of a 30 day war, that the Soviets could be defeated. But to concede that the alliance would fail, but that the US regardless could prevail in a continental scale land battle, is over-estimating US strengths and abilities of the time. They needed their allies to win....this was not WWII...the US worldwide had perhaps 20 Divs, of which they could afford to commit perhaps 6 or 7 to Europe....the Soviets had 180 Divs, of which they would commit about 110 Divs to the Central Front within that 30 day time frame, and thats not including their WP allies. Sure there are numerous issues that make straight numbers comparisons a bit pointless, but by any standards thats a massive number to concede, and still claim victory is possible......110 to 7. I have serious reservations about the feasibility of such an undertaking

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## HealzDevo (Nov 21, 2011)

I was just using those as places where trouble could come. With Mexico being a problem, I was referring to the potential for the Soviets to covertly sponsor drug-lords. They were always there as it was a convenient spring-board to the US markets. Perhaps in overall military terms it was the worst time davparlr for the Warsaw Pact but in terms of will to fight in the United States it could have been the best time. The US had just come out of Vietnam with a bloody nose where they had won every battle but still lost. I am saying that the numbers indicate that the Soviets could potentially have stood a real chance of achieving their goals depending on their tactics. A lot of these new weapons systems to counter Soviet AA and SAMs were just coming into service therefore realistically with some of them there would still have been a shortage in the 1970s. As well, there had been a peace movement in Europe that had destroyed a percentage of Europe's preparation for a potential East-West Conflict meaning that the US, Britain and France may have had to make the hard decision on whether to use nuclear weapons in the conflict, thus escalating it if the Soviets can't be halted by conventional means. Don't forget that at the height of the Cold War the Soviets had a large advantage in numbers but the United States and the Allieds had the advantage in technology and training. The Soviet plan was to use large numbers to grind down the enemy. They would throw troops at the enemy in various places until the enemy cracked and then exploit that crack. Even in a 30 day scenario, a lot depends on what China decides to do. China and the Soviets split from the 1960s through to the 1990s therefore the question for the Soviets is whether China would hold position and stay neutral, join the US and NATO in attacking Russia and the Warsaw Pact, or Join Russia and The Warsaw Pact in attacking the US and NATO forces. China had Russian republics it was eying off that it saw as being part of China... I would say that China might have decided it was the right time to seize those republics immediately and therefore a war between Russia and the US could easily become a three front war. In the Vietnam War, it was China that did a lot of the supplying to the North Vietnamese Forces. Even today, there is a very strong link between Pyongyang and Beijing....


----------



## manta22 (Sep 6, 2022)

Airframes said:


> As I remember it, the Fulda gap was designated as a choke point. Many of the forests had been cultivated as barriers against a possible/probable Soviet advance with armour, leaving two 'gaps', one at Fulda, and one further north, on the edge of the North German plain. It was hoped that these would be the routes taken in event of a major incursion, and that NATO forces could be rushed into the areas to combat the threat.
> I think you're right about October 1973 - I was just about to leave Germany after a major NATO exercise, wnen we were put on immediate alert, as the Soviets had started to mass armour along the border apparently. Anytime between roughly 1970 and 1974 coild have been critical. It was thought that the WP forces could have reached the area of Hannover and further west within three to four days, with heavy use of NBC preemptive strike and airborne forces, followed quickly by the MRD's and Armour.
> If you can get a hold of a copy,'The Third World War', published around 1974 I think, is worth a read. (can't remember the name of the author! But he's a well known historian, former senior officer!).


I realize that this is a VERY old thread but from an historical point, let me add a few things that were NOT simulations or video games. In the very early Sixties, just after the Berlin Wall was built, things were extremely tense with the Soviets. As you pointed out, the Fulda Gap was a choke point, a place where Soviet & Warsaw Pact armor was forced to pass through. There was an array of defenses against this attack but the one that I am intimately familiar with was our V Corps artillery. Our unit was equipped with the Corporal IIB liquid-fueled nuclear-armed guided missile. Our main fire mission was to protect the Fulda Gap. If a massed formation moved through there, their armor would have been vaporized. However, after firing our basic load of missiles, we all would become riflemen. We spent lots of time in the field training for this. Thank God it never came to pass.

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Winner Winner:
1 | Informative Informative:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## syscom3 (Sep 7, 2022)

Looking at the performance of the Russian army in the Ukraine right now, I wonder if we could extrapolate backwards to the 70's and 80's that they would fail just from their command structure and logistics issues.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## manta22 (Sep 7, 2022)

syscom3 said:


> Looking at the performance of the Russian army in the Ukraine right now, I wonder if we could extrapolate backwards to the 70's and 80's that they would fail just from their command structure and logistics issues.


I doubt it. But after the '60s their experienced field commanders were mostly gone.


----------

