# What plane (if any) could have made a difference for Germany in the Battle of Britain



## zoomar (Jul 23, 2010)

In another thread regarding the He-100, I suggested that the real thing Germany lacked in the BoB was not a second plane similar (or even slightly superior) to the Bf-109, but effective long range escort fighters equal to the Spit and Hurri and a real long range strategic bomber. I threw out the Fw-187 and the A6M Zero (!) for the first need and one of the Ural Bomber designs (Ju-89 or Do-19) for the second.

What other planes available in 1940 might have been available to the Luftwaffe to address these needs? You are free to consider any Axis plane (or Soviet - this was the time the USSR and Germany were still linked by the non-aggression pact). More critically, would any of these plane really make a difference given that the Germans probably lost the BoB as much a result of poor tactics and preparation rather than poor combat capability of their planes.


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## Nikademus (Jul 23, 2010)

With a large enough pilot base, the A6M2 could have gotten the job done. Luftwaffe needed a strategic long range fighter with staying power. No gurantee of success but it would have at least allowed the fighter pilots the time to try to attrit their opposite numbers and conduct longer ranged offensive sweeps.


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## zoomar (Jul 23, 2010)

Regarding the A6M and pilots, one wonders if the Germans would not try to "improve" it by adding some pilot armor and self-sealing tanks at the cost of performance and range/endurance? Would this have eliminated its potential advantages?

I'm more inclined to see the Fw-187 single seater as a better and more realistic bet. But German Zeros would be fascinating!


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## gjs238 (Jul 23, 2010)

Perhaps German A6M improvements could have included a more powerful German engine.
PS: But I guess the airframe will only take so much. For example, can't just bolt a R-2800 onto a Zero and expect success.


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## zoomar (Jul 23, 2010)

The "more powerful German Engine" would have added more weight, which would have had an adverse effect on range/endurance, which was the one real advantage the Zero had.


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## Nikademus (Jul 23, 2010)

The Japanese themselves designed the A6M's successor, the A7M in 1940 (though delays resulted in it being tested in 1944 IIRC). It wasn't as fast as hoped for but overall it was a bigger badder "Zero" with a high HP engine.

Improving an existing airframe is always tricky and i marvel at some of the detailed discussions that result on this board regarding the engineering of such a thing. Zero had limited growth potential while the Spitfire airframe had an impressive potential still being tapped by war's end. "As is" though, I think the plane could have done the job it did elsewhere. 

Bomber question is more tricky. The Luftwaffe bombers weren't all that bad in terms of payload and range...but were a bit weak in defensive armament. I'm not necessary sure a different bomber is needed at all. Of course a big 4E bomber would be nice.....but necessary? And the early B-17's themselves needed development to make them more defensible though their bombload remained modest for the life of the airframe.


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## Colin1 (Jul 23, 2010)

zoomar said:


> Regarding the A6M and pilots, one wonders if the Germans would not try to "improve" it by adding some pilot armor and self-sealing tanks at the cost of performance and range/endurance? Would this have eliminated its potential advantages?
> 
> ...But German Zeros would be fascinating!


Without too much doubt, yes
The Type 52 (A6M5) and the Type 63 (A6M7) both sported 1,130hp for take-off from the Sakae 21 and 31a respectively. The A6M5 weighed in at 6,025lbs (2,733Kgs) and the A6M7 at 6,600lbs (3,000Kgs). The former had a top speed of 351mph and the latter 337mph.

Add to the beefed-up skin of the A6M7 all the goodies that your average ETO pilot took for granted (self-sealing tanks, armour protection for pilot and critical systems) and the margin is only going to widen.

Someone made the point in another, vaguely related thread, the Japanese didn't learn the lessons of armour and protected tanks because early in THEIR conflict, they didn't need to. Strapping all the essentials of an ETO fighter to any in the A6M series would have resulted in precisely what happened to the F4F when it was thus saddled.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 23, 2010)

The He 111 was a reasonable strategic bomber for the time. Compare it's bomb load and range to the Hampden, or the Whitley or Wellington. 
None of them were viable daylight bombers but neither was the B-17c or the the two German Ural bombers. 
200 hundred German Ural bombers means 400 fewer twin engine bombers and the Ural bomber, even with 6-8 rifle caliber MGs in hand held mounts could no more survive in the skies over England than the twin engine bombers could in daylight.


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## Nikademus (Jul 23, 2010)

One could try adding the P.108 to the mix and we'd have a true multi-Axis airforce.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 23, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> Improving an existing airframe is always tricky and i marvel at some of the detailed discussions that result on this board regarding the engineering of such a thing. Zero had limited growth potential while the Spitfire airframe had an impressive potential still being tapped by war's end. "As is" though, I think the plane could have done the job it did elsewhere.



The Zero did have more development potential than it was allowed.

The decision to keep using the Sakae engine rather hamstrung the Zero as Sakae developments kept showing up behind schedule and lower on power than planned. Imagine trying to use a MK V Spit as an air superiority fighter in 1944-45. 

Wither switching to the Kinsei engine would have made a big difference I don't know, see A6M8.
I don't know if earlier lower powered versions would have been able to overcome their slightly greater weight, drag and fuel consumption to give an earlier Zero better overall performance.


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## timshatz (Jul 23, 2010)

Get the FW-190 out 18 months earlier and have it as an escort/fighter bomber. Heavily armed and armored, good bird. 

Still have a problems of the same guys in charge. If you want the Germans to win the BOB, Keep Fat Herman in Prussia with his morphine and kimonos, promote Kesselring ( or maybe Sperrle) to take charge of the battle with the goal of destroying the RAF.


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## Kurfürst (Jul 23, 2010)

zoomar said:


> What other planes available in 1940 might have been available to the Luftwaffe to address these needs?



Most realistically - the Bf 109F with droptanks. The beauty of it that it was there, it entered production July 1940, and was in combat in small numbers by October. With the droptank and more streamlined lines it also had ample range and endurance for the task (about 2,5 times the Emil had w/o droptank).All it would need for this "what if" is a couple of months advance in production, and ironing out the bugs which propably held the a/c from operations late in 1940..

Best choice would be of course the Zero, as it could circle around until all RAF fighters simply fall down when they run out of gas  but I think it was not introduced yet...?


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## Nikademus (Jul 23, 2010)

The A6M2 was operational in July 1940.


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## merlin (Jul 23, 2010)

zoomar said:


> More critically, would any of these plane really make a difference given that the Germans probably lost the BoB as much a result of poor tactics and preparation rather than poor combat capability of their planes.



I think the above part is the most important. The Germans had an image of teutonic professionalism, but it turned out it was the RAF who were the 'professionals' while the Germans were the amateurs. Their intelligence was based on wishful thinking, no one could agree on the target list - which wasn't linked to Sealion priorities, and it was all on the basis of last minute plannig. Whilst the RAF were all geared up to fight such a battle, they had radar, and the observer corps to track the enemy, the information could be co-ordinated via the plot tables, and Squadrons alerted scrambled when needed.
The German advantages were cannon armament, battle experince, and unit tactics.

Different aircraft for the LW: Do-19 instead of Do-17 - even if two for five basis; Me-110 as an attack/light-bomber, Fw-187 - longe range fighter, and maybe a mix of He-100D Me-109.

Yet, with all the debate about a longer range single engined fighter, it won't make that much difference it it only has 60 rounds per cannon!


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## Milosh (Jul 23, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> The A6M2 was operational in July 1940.



But it didn't fly its first operation til Aug 19 1940. And, there was only 15 of them.

Japan was too busy equiping it own air forces with the A6M, So where are the Germans to get their A6Ms from? The Japanese used different tactics which was counter to German tactics. The non- existant protection of the A6M would have made easy 'kills' for the British .303s.


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## vikingBerserker (Jul 23, 2010)

I'd go with the Fw 190 idea timshatz had and continue to attach military targets instead of switching to civilian ones.

An A6M built with German quality, that would have been interesting.


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## davebender (Jul 23, 2010)

That would be nice but it's not necessary. The existing aircraft types will work if Germany has them in quantities similiar to what U.S. 8th Air Force had during February 1944. Plus all the supporting pieces 8th Air Force had like drop tanks, an adequate stockpile of ordnance, an unlimited supply of high octane aviation gasoline, an unlimited number of replacement aircraft and aircrew etc.


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## parsifal (Jul 23, 2010)

The Germans needed a plan more than anything to win the battle, and needed to start preparations from before the war....much the same as the British were doing. They needed a far better organized procurement machine and depth in their pilot training programs, a true heavy bomber, long range escorts, better targetting procedures, to name but a few issues.

There was scarcely a less well prepared force for a strategic campaign than the Luftwaffe in 1940. it had been built for a specific purpose, and it undertook that purpose with supreme efficiency. Once the mission parameters changed, it became a veritable fish out of water. Changing one or two things....tinkering at the edges of the organization, is not going to change the inherent weakneses of the force to this mission


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## Nikademus (Jul 23, 2010)

Milosh said:


> But it didn't fly its first operation til Aug 19 1940. And, there was only 15 of them.
> 
> Japan was too busy equiping it own air forces with the A6M, So where are the Germans to get their A6Ms from? The Japanese used different tactics which was counter to German tactics. The non- existant protection of the A6M would have made easy 'kills' for the British .303s.



I wasn't preposing that there was any way, shape or form by which this hypothetical situation could come about. I was simply asserting that the A6M, the "plane" could have gotten the job done given that the Germans were most hamstrung (fighter wise), by the short legs of their most effective fighter (109) and that it was around (aka "operational") in 1940 just before the battle of Britian. I was admitedly puzzled that the plane was immediately "ruled out" at the beginning the thread. 

The lack of protection did not stop the plane from being an integral and indispensible part of the Japanese acheivement of air superiority during the First Operational phase nor did it prevent the plane from being in the thick of it during the air battles of 1942 (nor the Oscar in Burma all the way through 1945). Over the course of a bigger, broader conflict, yes it becomes a problem. For a 3 to 6 month campaign? Not so much.

Its a similar argument to the various P47 vs P51 vs. P38 vs. Spitfire etc etc. All fine planes.....each with their strengths and weaknesses but ultimately the key factor for these plane's contribution to the Allied air offensive was that they were good designs, in sufficient number with sufficient range to escort the bombers and attrit the enemy force competatively. One can argue which was the best at this or that but ultimately in the greater scheme of things, it's irrelevent. The Germans lost the air war as soon as the Allies gained the ability to escort their bombers to and from their targets. It was an attrition war they couldn't win.


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## claidemore (Jul 24, 2010)

davebender said:


> That would be nice but it's not necessary. The existing aircraft types will work if Germany has them in quantities similiar to what U.S. 8th Air Force had during February 1944. Plus all the supporting pieces 8th Air Force had like drop tanks, an adequate stockpile of ordnance, an unlimited supply of high octane aviation gasoline, an unlimited number of replacement aircraft and aircrew etc.



ditto


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## Shortround6 (Jul 24, 2010)

merlin said:


> Different aircraft for the LW: Do-19 instead of Do-17 - even if two for five basis; Me-110 as an attack/light-bomber, Fw-187 - longe range fighter, and maybe a mix of He-100D Me-109.
> 
> Yet, with all the debate about a longer range single engined fighter, it won't make that much difference it it only has 60 rounds per cannon!



The Do-19 was a loser. Germany didn't have the engines to power such a plane at the time. Much like the Boeing B-15 or Douglas B-19.
The Do-19 had a wing that was about 22-23% larger than a B-17 wing and a fuselage 10 feet longer. changing from the prototype's 810hp engines to 1000-1100hp engines available in 1940 is not going to improve performance enough to allow anything except night bombing or escorted day light flights. The first needs better navigation to be effective, especially at longer ranges, and the second limits the range to that of the fighters. 
Perhaps a smaller number of big bombers in a smaller formation is more easily protected than a large formation of smaller bombers?
The Do-17 has been described as a very good low level bomber even if it's bomb load was rather small.


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## davebender (Jul 24, 2010)

Germany had no desire to fight either Britain or France. So why would pre-WWII Germany spend massive amounts of money on a bomber force geared to that purpose? It's not going to happen.


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## renrich (Jul 24, 2010)

No doubt the A6M would have been more effective than the Bf109 in the escort role during the BOB especially if the LW pilots had been trained as the IJN pilots were. Whether or not the additional range of the A6M would have enabled the LW to "win" the BOB is not clear to me. Hitler was never serious about Operation Sea Lion and even if he had been a German invasion at that time was not likely to be successful. Nik, the statement that the war was lost as soon as the escort fighters became available is, to me, an overstatement. No doubt, strategic bombing played a role in the war but I believe that most "experts" agree that the Allies would have won the war regardless. I believe the war was lost for Germany the moment the US entered the war. As long as Hitler invaded the USSR and the US was in it, the Axis was doomed.


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## Glider (Jul 24, 2010)

renrich said:


> No doubt the A6M would have been more effective than the Bf109 in the escort role during the BOB especially if the LW pilots had been trained as the IJN pilots were. Whether or not the additional range of the A6M would have enabled the LW to "win" the BOB is not clear to me. Hitler was never serious about Operation Sea Lion and even if he had been a German invasion at that time was not likely to be successful. Nik, the statement that the war was lost as soon as the escort fighters became available is, to me, an overstatement. No doubt, strategic bombing played a role in the war but I believe that most "experts" agree that the Allies would have won the war regardless. I believe the war was lost for Germany the moment the US entered the war. As long as Hitler invaded the USSR and the US was in it, the Axis was doomed.



I would second this statement. The only point I would disagree with is that if the Luftwaffe pilots were trained as the IJN. In my view if they did this then they could easily be in trouble. One of the strengths of the Luftwaffe was the training to fight as a team and the finger four formation. One of the weaknesses of the IJN was the emphasis on fighting as an individual.

There is one problem with both the Zero and the 109 with drop tanks, and that is the lack of ammunition for the 20mm. In the Pacific the Zero tended to fly considerable ranges to combat but the actual combat was limited. A long range mission over the UK could easily involve considerable fighting and the lack of 20mm ammunition would be critical. To be left with 2 x LMG after firing approx three bursts, is almost equal to being left unarmed. The Spitfire in particular was well protected against LMG fire from the rear, lacking the wing tanks of the Hurricane.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 24, 2010)

The He 111 could carry about 2 tons worth of bombs in 1939-40. This is about as good as most other peoples bombers except perhaps the Whitley, at least those bombers that existed in any numbers. While the range might be a little short it was good enough to reach just about anywhere in France from Germany. 

It was also only about 400 miles from Düsseldorf to Birmingham, Cardiff, or Southampton.

Granted people in many countries thought the "bomber would always get through" in the late thirties but as shown by actual war experience an unescorted "Ural" bomber would have been little more than targets for the Soviet Air force had such long range missions been attempted in daylight.

The Germans really needed a "bomber" engine in the category of the R-2600 or Hercules (1400-1700hp) flying in prototypes in 1940 for production models in 1941. The Jumo 222 and the Daimler double engines were too far in the future. Even the BMW 801 reached production status too late for a smooth transition to improved bombers in 1941-42. 
Maybe they should have taken the Do 217 and ditched the dive bomber requirement and stuck a bigger wing on the thing and gone for payload and range over speed.


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## davebender (Jul 24, 2010)

> only about 400 miles from Düsseldorf to Birmingham, Cardiff, or Southampton.


Unfortunately (for Germany) the KM failed to stockpile aerial mines in quantity. Consequently the Luftwaffe was forced to bomb port facilities rather then simply mining British ports shut. Fixing the aerial mine shortage would probably do more for Germany then substituting heavy bombers and longer range Fw-190 fighter aircraft.


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## herman1rg (Jul 24, 2010)

Shortround6 said:


> It was also only about 400 miles from Düsseldorf to Birmingham, Cardiff, or Southampton.



It still is the same distance


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## Shortround6 (Jul 24, 2010)

herman1rg said:


> It still is the same distance




I wasn't sure of the continental drift.


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## Milosh (Jul 24, 2010)

davebender said:


> Germany had no desire to fight either Britain or France. So why would pre-WWII Germany spend massive amounts of money on a bomber force geared to that purpose? It's not going to happen.



Yes, but there was the SU to contend with and long range would be required there.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 24, 2010)

Milosh said:


> Yes, but there was the SU to contend with and long range would be required there.




It is fortunate for the Germans (and unfortunate for everybody else) that the Germans didn't get sucked into the strategic (or Ural) bomber plan. While it looks good on paper and everybody thought it would work during the 1930s they also thought the bomber would always get through. They also assumed that small numbers of aircraft carrying light bombloads could do major damage.
Experience in Spain reinforced all these notions. 
The Japanese were already having problems in China with the bomber getting through without escorts though. 
The British managed to show by early 1940 (if not late 1939) that unescorted bombers could NOT get through without such high losses as to making the tactic unsustainable in daylight. It did take the British and few other people (like the Americans) somewhat longer to fully absorb these lessons. Germans managed to figure it out during the BoB. 
Without suitable escort fighters this leaves night bombing.

It also means night navigation, which neither the British or the Germans managed to pull off with any degree of regularity for quite some time. Small percentages of bombers finding even the right city let alone a military target was the norm. 
Considering the problems the Germans had navigating over the British Isles with landmarks like the coast, major rivers and estuaries and even major cities not all that far apart, while using good maps or charts one wonders what the navigation would have been like flying over hundreds of miles of Russian steppes and trying for targets hundreds of miles beyond Moscow using maps of what reliability? Using what for land marks? 
The Germans did use electronic navigation aids and bombing aids against England (which the English managed to spoof a number of times) which would have been useless against the Russians. The range of the radio beams wasn't long enough. 

You also have the problem of how many aircraft would really be needed. 
How many thousands of aircraft did the British use before it had any real effect on the German war effort?
The British built almost twice the number of Short Sterlings as the Germans did He 177s and almost 5 1/2 times the number of Halifax's let alone Lancasters. 
Throw in the thousands of Wellingtons, the Whitleys and the Hampdens used in the Early part of the war (and leaving out the Americans for now) one can see that a true strategic bombing campaign would require not just a few thousand bombers but something much closer to if not over (well over?) 10,000 Heavy bombers. 
Germany may not have had the necessary resources to build large aircraft in such quantities or the fuel to power them. Even the provision of thousands of tons, if not ten's of thousands of tons of explosives for such a bombing campaign might have strained German resources.


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## Nikademus (Jul 25, 2010)

renrich said:


> Nik, the statement that the war was lost as soon as the escort fighters became available is, to me, an overstatement. No doubt, strategic bombing played a role in the war but I believe that most "experts" agree that the Allies would have won the war regardless. I believe the war was lost for Germany the moment the US entered the war. As long as Hitler invaded the USSR and the US was in it, the Axis was doomed.



I agree. I should have clarified and said that the "Air war" [over Germany] was lost as soon as long range escort fighters appeared that could escort to and from the deepest targets inside Germany. Whether it be a P-51, P-38 or P-47...the Luftwaffe could not win an attrition battle with the Western Allies and against Russia at the same time.


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## renrich (Jul 25, 2010)

Glider, the early war IJN pilots were as well trained as any in the war and they were trained to fight in the three plane shotai and contrary to popular and incorrect opinion, they did not fight as individuals but like their counterparts in the USN "they relied mainly on hit and run tactics, predicated on deflection shooting and teamwork, without merely trying to ride their opponent's tails in a dogfight." That is a quote from Lundstrom, "The First Team." The probem was that their tactics took a long time to learn and become proficient in but they suited the characteristics of the A6M very well. They were not likely to be hit executing the tactics and they could use the excellent climb of the A6M to reattain a firing position after a firing run. The IJN training program was inadequate to replace those splendid pilots who were lost in the meat grinder of the Pacific War in mid to late 1942.

However, as you mentioned the 60 rounds per cannon in the Zero was a handicap, just like the low cannon ammo capacity of the 109 was. The Japanese had quite a lot of luck though shooting down "rugged aircraft" like the Hurricane and P40 with the two 7.7 mm MGs of the Ki 27 and the two 12.7s of the Ki 43. Was the Spitfire more survivable than the Hurri and P40?


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## BombTaxi (Jul 25, 2010)

If the Germans wanted to 'win' the BoB - which I'm taking as the elimination of the RAF as an effective fighting force, they didn't need different a/c or more of them. The solution was simple; bomb airfields in daylight, factories at night. Do that for a couple of months, and the RAF would have been finished. In 'real life' the RAF was a matter of weeks away from actually being bombed out of action, before the LW turned to bombing London, which achieved absolutely zero.

Of course, the point is somewhat moot, because even if the LW had gained air superiority over the UK, there was simply no way that the Kreigsmarine could actually have got the troops over to invade. They didn't have the kit, and the RN hadn't been neutralised. That was a task which neither the LW or KM was capable of completing...


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## Glider (Jul 25, 2010)

renrich said:


> Glider, the early war IJN pilots were as well trained as any in the war and they were trained to fight in the three plane shotai and contrary to popular and incorrect opinion, they did not fight as individuals but like their counterparts in the USN "they relied mainly on hit and run tactics, predicated on deflection shooting and teamwork, without merely trying to ride their opponent's tails in a dogfight." That is a quote from Lundstrom, "The First Team." The probem was that their tactics took a long time to learn and become proficient in but they suited the characteristics of the A6M very well. They were not likely to be hit executing the tactics and they could use the excellent climb of the A6M to reattain a firing position after a firing run. The IJN training program was inadequate to replace those splendid pilots who were lost in the meat grinder of the Pacific War in mid to late 1942.


I was basing my comment on a number of actions that Sakai mentioned where he complained about the lack of discipline where little was achieved because each pilot got in the way of others. Assuming that my memory is inaccurate, of it was a one off situation which could happen to any unit there can be little doubt that the German four plane unit was a lot more flexible than the three plane shotai.



> However, as you mentioned the 60 rounds per cannon in the Zero was a handicap, just like the low cannon ammo capacity of the 109 was. The Japanese had quite a lot of luck though shooting down "rugged aircraft" like the Hurricane and P40 with the two 7.7 mm MGs of the Ki 27 and the two 12.7s of the Ki 43. Was the Spitfire more survivable than the Hurri and P40?


I don't know sufficient about the internal protection of the P40 to comment but the big difference between the Hurricane and the Spitfires protection is that the Hurricane had wing tanks. These were an additional vulnerability open to attack from the rear. On the Spitfire you had to penetrate the pilots armour protection to get to the fuel tanks. 
Its also worth remembering that we were fighting over England not Jungle. A hit in the Rad may well bring the plane down, but over England so what?. There were plenty of aircraft in reserve, a number of places to make an emergency landing and the pilot had a good chance of surviving a landing or a bail out.
Nothing is certain about combat but a SPitfire being chased by a 109 or Zero with 2 x LMG would have a good chance of getting away with it, a better chance than a Hurricane, plus of course its extra speed.

This talk about the Zero is of course just that. During the BOB there were if I am not mistaken the grand sum of 15 (ish) prototypes and 30-40 of A6M2. They wouldn't have lasted two weeks with the attrition rate.


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## dennis420b (Jul 25, 2010)

Well the trip from France to the UK, is a bigger difference than from UK to Germany, so P-51 range is not the requirement. but why not add an additional internal tank behind the pilot or more external fuel to the 109F, or perhaps a German adaptation of the Arsenal VG-33 with its 700+ mile range? just a what if.


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## renrich (Jul 25, 2010)

I have Saburo's book but have not reviewed it in a while. If memory serves he was referring to a late war incident where a bunch of Hellcats were chasing him and getting in each other's way. I may be wrong. The P40 was supposed to be a very rugged AC. My guess is that it was more robust than the Spitfire.

It is interesting to me that it appears that, on this forum, there is a distinct Eurocentric POV which somewhat dismisses the war in the Pacific as kind of the second string. After reading Shores' books and others, I have a different viewpoint. The fact is that the premier fighters in the early going in Europe could never really match the Zero, because they could not get there. If you can't be in the fight, you can't win. Britain never was able to develop a single engine fighter that had an extended range which could compete. Neither could Germany. The US did. Most of their fighters, P51s, Hellcats, Corsairs and even late P47s could fight successfully many miles further from base than Britain's and Germany's. Some of Japan's also and they had much more limited resources than the other combatants. The Ki84, which first flew in 1943 and which reportedly could compete with the best of the American fighters had a max range of 1815 miles. To me, it is good to recognise that.

Facts don't lie. The best of the European fighters, in spite of some gaudy performance figures, could not even get into the fight in the Pacific. Those wonderful LW fighter pilots which we all have heard so much about never landed on a carrier and never had to do much navigating over miles of the trackless Pacific. The IJN, USN and FAA pilots knew those skills and could be successful in ACM. It is true that the kill claims of a lot of the AAF and especially USN and UCMC pilots were inflated by kills on kamikaze pilots or raw JAAF pilots but the early war Japanese pilots and their mounts were as good as most and much better than generally accepted by those whose focus is the war in Europe.


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## parsifal (Jul 26, 2010)

Excellent post ren, and if Joe Bs comments about spitfire vs Zero comments are to be accepted, the exchange rates of Spit to zero losses is very poor. The zero could outmanouvre spit mark V and VIIIs so it should be able to deal with a mk I and II with little difficulty


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## Hop (Jul 26, 2010)

> If the Germans wanted to 'win' the BoB - which I'm taking as the elimination of the RAF as an effective fighting force, they didn't need different a/c or more of them. The solution was simple; bomb airfields in daylight, factories at night.



That's pretty much what they did. They weren't too successful at either.



> In 'real life' the RAF was a matter of weeks away from actually being bombed out of action, before the LW turned to bombing London, which achieved absolutely zero.



In reality the RAF was in a much stronger position relative to the Luftwaffe than they had been at the start of the battle.

The Germans began their campaign proper on 13 August. They switched to London on 7 September.

Serviceable fighters, 13 August:

Bf 109 - 853
BF 110 - 189
Spitfire - 226
Hurricane - 353

Serviceable fighters, 7 September:

Bf 109 - 658
Bf 110 - 112
Spitfire - 223
Hurricane - 398



> Excellent post ren, and if Joe Bs comments about spitfire vs Zero comments are to be accepted, the exchange rates of Spit to zero losses is very poor. The zero could outmanouvre spit mark V and VIIIs so it should be able to deal with a mk I and II with little difficulty



I don't think you can reasonably compare. The RAF effort in the far east was very much a second string affair, fighting against a Japanese first team. The RAF was focused on Europe, not the far east.

As they always say, it's the pilot, not the plane. I'd add organisation too. 

As to range for the Luftwaffe, it wouldn't really achieve anything because of 11 Group's tactics. Park used to send very small forces to intercept, then reinforce with more as the battle continued.

Caldwell in JG 26 details the first combat JG 26 got in to during the BoB. A force of 40 109s, escorting 18 Dorniers, was intercepted by 6 Spitfires. Later another 6 Spitfires were sent as reinforcements. The fighting lasted so long the 109s had to break off with low fuel. The combat was over the channel.

The RAF tactic meant the withdrawal of British fighters for low fuel was covered by the newly arrived fighters. The downside was that the RAF would fight most of the battle outnumbered. What the Luftwaffe needed wasn't more range, it was a way of dealing with the first squadron whilst they outnumbered them, before the next squadron showed up.

Of course, if 11 Group had been operating Leigh Mallory's big wing, things might have been different. Then combat persistence might have allowed the Luftwaffe to outlast the RAF and chase them down when the British fighters broke for fuel. But with 21 squadrons of Spitfires and Hurricanes in 11 Group, being committed in small numbers (sometimes as little as a third of a squadron) at a time, it wasn't really possible for the Germans to outlast the RAF in combat.


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## davparlr (Jul 26, 2010)

renrich said:


> I believe the war was lost for Germany the moment the US entered the war. As long as Hitler invaded the USSR and the US was in it, the Axis was doomed.



I agree. Germany's fate was sealed when they invade a country with "unlimited" manpower, and declared war on a country with "unlimited" materiel.


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## Gixxerman (Jul 26, 2010)

BombTaxi said:


> If the Germans wanted to 'win' the BoB - which I'm taking as the elimination of the RAF as an effective fighting force, they didn't need different a/c or more of them. The solution was simple; bomb airfields in daylight, factories at night. Do that for a couple of months, and the RAF would have been finished.



I'm sure there has been a new study of the numbers (including all the peripherals like pilots downed but returning to service, training school numbers, production etc etc and projecting the losses if things had not changed) that disproves this idea.

I too once believed this was the case and that the RAF was perhaps as few as one or two weeks away from defeat until the LW turned to the bombing of London, but, IIRC the latest research says that in fact the RAF never came even close to outright defeat and that it was the LW that was the force which was always going to lose - on either of their adopted tactics.
The RAF could stand the (lesser) losses but the LW was always losing the war of attrition over the UK and simply had no means to increase the rate of RAF losses.

My apologies for not remembering turning up the books title, it's a recent publication and I'm sure (I hope!) someone will mention it.
(please do as I'd like to buy it )


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## zoomar (Jul 26, 2010)

I'm curious why no one seems to suggest the Fw-187 as a possible difference-maker. With a prototype in 1937, it would seem that development of this plane would have given Germany in 1940 a single-seat twin engined fighter in the mold of the P-38 that might have been well suited for the progressive addition of upgraded weapons and armament. Like all twin-engined fighters it migtt not have been truly the equal of its best single-seat opponents, but it would have been a damn sight better in fighter vs fighter combat than the Bf-110 was in the close escort role, letting the Bf-109s zoom in and out in fast fighter sweeps.

I may be wrong, but it seems to me that the BoB really was a different type of "strategic" air campaign than the US/UK offensive against Germany. It was the first phase of a potential invasion and its purpose was very limited - cause sufficient attrition in the RAF that Germany could maintain air superiority over the channel and southern england during the key early months-weeks of Operation Sealion. Attacking industries and cities would only be bait to make the RAF engage, with most attacks going against airfields and radar stations. The Luftwaffe began the BoB with that tactic in mind and might have echeived its aim with the planes it had had the focus not switched to more "strategic" city bombing/night attacks - for which its fast twin engined bombers bombers were poorly suited. This begs the issue whether or not the whole idea of Germany successfully crossing the English channel is remotely possible, but a successful BoB could have set up a situation in which air superiority over the channel and southern engliand was legitimately at issue until 1942-43 - with possible effects on the allies own strategic offensive and schedule for Operation Overlord.


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## Gixxerman (Jul 26, 2010)

I have read that using the Me110 as a pin-point strike aircraft (in it's C-4 varient) en mass along with the Ju88 might have been far more useful than much of the rest of the bombing they undertook.
I suspect that the Me110 might also have been better employed on low level free sweeps (much as the Mustangs of the 8th AF would do later over Germany)

The Fw187's performance was outstanding, undoubtedly, but I guess once the decision had been taken to go with Me110 there was little point in diluting the effort.


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## Nikademus (Jul 26, 2010)

zoomar said:


> I may be wrong, but it seems to me that the BoB really was a different type of "strategic" air campaign than the US/UK offensive against Germany. It was the first phase of a potential invasion and its purpose was very limited - cause sufficient attrition in the RAF that Germany could maintain air superiority over the channel and southern england during the key early months-weeks of Operation Sealion. Attacking industries and cities would only be bait to make the RAF engage, with most attacks going against airfields and radar stations. The Luftwaffe began the BoB with that tactic in mind and might have echeived its aim with the planes it had had the focus not switched to more "strategic" city bombing/night attacks - for which its fast twin engined bombers bombers were poorly suited. .




I'd say the biggest difference was the total Intel breakdown on the German side. Had they had such a comprehensive (or at least competent) intel picture, they might have pulled it off.


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## Glider (Jul 26, 2010)

renrich said:


> I have Saburo's book but have not reviewed it in a while. If memory serves he was referring to a late war incident where a bunch of Hellcats were chasing him and getting in each other's way. I may be wrong. The P40 was supposed to be a very rugged AC. My guess is that it was more robust than the Spitfire.
> 
> It is interesting to me that it appears that, on this forum, there is a distinct Eurocentric POV which somewhat dismisses the war in the Pacific as kind of the second string. After reading Shores' books and others, I have a different viewpoint. The fact is that the premier fighters in the early going in Europe could never really match the Zero, because they could not get there. If you can't be in the fight, you can't win. Britain never was able to develop a single engine fighter that had an extended range which could compete. Neither could Germany. The US did. Most of their fighters, P51s, Hellcats, Corsairs and even late P47s could fight successfully many miles further from base than Britain's and Germany's. Some of Japan's also and they had much more limited resources than the other combatants. The Ki84, which first flew in 1943 and which reportedly could compete with the best of the American fighters had a max range of 1815 miles. To me, it is good to recognise that.
> 
> Facts don't lie. The best of the European fighters, in spite of some gaudy performance figures, could not even get into the fight in the Pacific. Those wonderful LW fighter pilots which we all have heard so much about never landed on a carrier and never had to do much navigating over miles of the trackless Pacific. The IJN, USN and FAA pilots knew those skills and could be successful in ACM. It is true that the kill claims of a lot of the AAF and especially USN and UCMC pilots were inflated by kills on kamikaze pilots or raw JAAF pilots but the early war Japanese pilots and their mounts were as good as most and much better than generally accepted by those whose focus is the war in Europe.



There are some good comments here but they are based on the fighting in the far east. As mentioned before the Zero didn't effectively exist in July 1940. However for the sake of argument we would like to continue with this fallacy, if the Zero did fly during the BOB it would be up against a very different situation. The radar warning, support, numbers and intensity of the fighting is very different.

The Spit 1 would be a very dangerous opponent. Once the 20mm ammo has gone the Zero is almost weaponless. its a fact you cannot ignore. I have no doubt that in the early combats the Spitfires would try and fail to dogfight it with the Zero and pay the price. The secret unknown is how long would it take the RAF to work out the achilles heal of the Zero. In brief this is STAY ABOVE 250MPH AND DON'T DOGFIGHT. Once this lesson is learnt then the Zero is in serious trouble, as I said earlier the question is how long would it take. I don't know and neither does anyone else.

It has been stated correctly many times that the weak spot of the Hurricane and Spitfire are the Rads even for an LMG, but over the UK does this matter as much?

The fighting in Burma and the Far East was seen as a second string affair. The RAF were using Hurricanes, Blenhiems and Wellingtons well into the conflict. They had a lousy supply chain and lacked in integrated air warning system, these were present in the BOB and made a huge difference. If I can use the example from todays This Day in the BOB Thread

_At 0945 hours a formation of Bf 109s flying off the Isle of Wight were bounced by Hurricanes of RAF No. 601 Squadron and although several Messerschmitts were damaged, they managed to destroy one of the British fighters, a Hurricane flown by P/O P.Challoner-Lindsey, the only casualty for the RAF. Another flown by F/O J.H. Riddle was damaged by gunfire but managed to return to base. RAF No. 601 Squadron managed to shoot down two German bombers. _
If the 109's had been Zeros how many of the several damaged 109's would have been destroyed Zero's? We don't know but we do know that the 109E was a far more robust aircraft with armour and self sealing fuel tanks. My money would have been on some of those would have been lost, why, because the Hurricanes had the warning and the bounce.



> The fact is that the premier fighters in the early going in Europe could never really match the Zero, because they could not get there. If you can't be in the fight, you can't win. Britain never was able to develop a single engine fighter that had an extended range which could compete.


This is a range question but the obvious reply is that in the BOB the RAF didn't need a long range, as the enemy came to them. Pretty straight forward.
PS the RAF didn't develop a long range fighter not because they couldn't but because they didn't try. It has been mentioned before that two Spit IX's were fittted with 2 x 60 gallon drop tanks and flew the Atlantic. Presumably they used the Newfoundland Iceland route but they did do it and it isn't something that you would try in a twice around the airfield machine.


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## renrich (Jul 26, 2010)

The British in the CBI long after the BOB learned better tactics which could be used mainly against the Ki43 which was not as well armed and did not have quite the performance of the A6M and they certainly did not overwhelm the JAAF. To say they would have adopted new tactics quickly in the BOB against A6Ms is questionable and to say the new tactics, (don't get under 250 MPH) would work, is simplistic and did not prove to work well in the CBI. Once again, both the IJN and JAAF did not necessarily and predominately try to get in a turning horizontal fight. That is a myth.


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## zoomar (Jul 26, 2010)

As mentioned by many, the strategic and tactical situation in the PTO and ETO were fundamentally different, especially before 1944. It is really comparing apples and oranges. I also had never really considered the possibility (claimed by several posters) that the quality of British aircrew in the PTO was substantially different from that in the ETO. All this is why it is so fascinating to speculate how the A6M might have performed in the BoB or in the Med/North Africa in Luftwaffe service - recognizing that this would be virtually impossible given the relative unavailability of the type in mid-1940. 

I tend to believe the A6M would not be anything like a dominating machine against RAF Spitfires and Hurricaines in the BoB, but as a long-range escort fighter to supplement the Bf-109 it would almost certainly be superior to the Bf-110 - which could then be deployed itself as a long range fast light bomber. 

The range and performance of many Japanese types would also be helpful in the Med and North Africa, where the allies tended not to deploy their most modern planes. To what extent could long range escorts have helped the campaign against Malta?

The problem with all such speculations is that Japan could barely provide eneough planes for her own use. It's is also hard to imagine that the German Aircraft industry would easily (or willingly) give up its own teutonically complex manufacturing standards to make simple copies of Japanese designs. The RLM would want stronger construction, more armor, bigger engines, etc., all of which would probably reduce most of the handling and range advantages the Japanese planes possessed.


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## Glider (Jul 26, 2010)

renrich said:


> The British in the CBI long after the BOB learned better tactics which could be used mainly against the Ki43 which was not as well armed and did not have quite the performance of the A6M and they certainly did not overwhelm the JAAF. To say they would have adopted new tactics quickly in the BOB against A6Ms is questionable and to say the new tactics, (don't get under 250 MPH) would work, is simplistic and did not prove to work well in the CBI. Once again, both the IJN and JAAF did not necessarily and predominately try to get in a turning horizontal fight. That is a myth.



I certainly didn't say that the RAF would learn the lessons quickly. The words were:-
_The secret *unknown *is how long would it take the RAF to work out the achilles heal of the Zero. In brief this is STAY ABOVE 250MPH AND DON'T DOGFIGHT. Once this lesson is learnt then the Zero is in serious trouble, as I said earlier the *question is how long would it take. I don't know and neither does anyone else.*_

As for the tactics being simplistic, they are and they are effective. For instance how many times were Typhoon Pilots told not to dogfight with a 109 but to keep their energy levels up. 
I admit that I thought that the Spitfires did quite well against the JAAF and that the JAAF were seriously concerned about the Spits. 

But you are still talking about the CBI, we are talking about the Japanese planes in the ETO. Big difference.


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## Markus (Jul 27, 2010)

Let´s start with the traditional Zero-rant:

The thing was horrible! Weak engine, flimsy airframe, not good at high speeds, even worse in a dive. It was the ideal plane for fighting inexperienced pilots using the wrong tactics and flying obsolete aircraft but once the other side was made up of pros and decent a/c, the Zero´s luck ran out faster than an Aircobra´s fuel. 

As far as the German a/c are concerned they were generally ok. Give the Me109 a drop tank and much of the range problems are solved, 12,7mm machine guns for the bombers also won´t require the use of handwavium, the only true design flaw was the lack of guns in the tail a´la B-25. 

While this would make a difference it would not be decisive. The RAF´s air defence system was well developed, their pilots could fight again if they were shot down, they outproduced the germans by a big margin and even if the Germans have Messerschmitts with drop tanks, the RAF still has the ability to fall back to areas the LW can´t reach. 

With regard to plane´s ruggedness. It IMO depends on what guns the enemy is using. RCMG are almost useless against twin-engine a/c even if we are talking about 8 to 12 of them. The Japanese fighters had just two and 20mm cannons that were handicapped by a much lower muzzle velocity than their German counterparts. A Zero with four 12.7x81mm machine guns would have made F4F and P-40 look a lot less rugged.


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## Glider (Jul 27, 2010)

Markus said:


> It IMO depends on what guns the enemy is using. RCMG are almost useless against twin-engine a/c even if we are talking about 8 to 12 of them. The Japanese fighters had just two and 20mm cannons that were handicapped by a much lower muzzle velocity than their German counterparts. A Zero with four 12.7x81mm machine guns would have made F4F and P-40 look a lot less rugged.



I have to agree with this. Recently I was reading a book on the Ki44 and there was an observation that the JAAF considered the initial version with 4 x HMG to be sufficient for everything up to Heavy Bombers.


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## renrich (Jul 27, 2010)

The only way to practically compare how an A6M might have done against Spitfires and Hurricanes, (if by magic the A6M could have been in the BOB and bearing in mind that the Hurricane was much more numerous than the Spit in that battle) is to see how those British AC did against a fighter somewhat similar to the A6M, (the Ki43 and secondarily the Ki27) in another theatre of the war,( since the British AC mentioned did not have much experience against the A6M.)

It is erroneous to think that the Bf109 with a drop tank could have as much range as the A6M, especially as the A6M used drop tanks also. The A6M could have stuck around with the bombers a lot longer than the Bf109 and it could have interfered with the Hurris and Spits trying to shoot down the bombers probably just as well as the 109, certainly much better than a 109 which had to flee for France when the fuel low light came on. A fighter which is not there can't be effective.

The evidence from the Pacific war suggests strongly that the Hurricane,( the most numerous fighter for the Brits in the BOB) was not very effective against the JAAF fighters which were probably not as competent as the A6M. Some of those Hurris which did not compete well against the JAAF had the four 20 mms so armament was not the key factor. Some of the Spits in the CBI had the MGs removed and went with only the cannon to increase maneuverability and climb. Apparently, they were having difficulty competing also.

Oh well, it is only speculation and it is hard for some to deal with the reality that shooting down Japanese fighters in the CBI, and keeping from getting shot down, may have been just as difficult as performing the same tasks in the ETO.


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## claidemore (Jul 27, 2010)

Did the Hurricane do poorly against the Ki43? Or did the Hurricane do poorly in that particular tactical situation? 
There is a HUGE difference between Burma (for example) and Britain. Britain had a very effective detection system, Burma had a very ineffective one. ( Not to mention the fact that the scale of the air fighting in the two theatres is significantly different.) 

It doesn't matter if the Zero or any other fantasy plane has enough endurance to stay over Britain all day long, it's ammo is limited and it will be detected and intercepted. They simply cannot stooge about in unfriendly skies and maintain a tactical advantage. 
If the Zero is escorting bombers, then the RAF fighters that engage the Zeros will provide the same opportunity for other RAF fighters to attack the bombers as they did when the 109 was escorting.

I happen to agree that the Hurricane was a very poor match against the Zero or Ki43, it had parity in some performance areas, but no significant advantages. The Spitfire on the other hand had a very good speed advantage. Had the Zero been the primary Luftwaffe fighter instead of the 109, and given the same sort of occurances as happened with the 109 , ie a captured Zero from France for RAE to test, tactics would have been developed to combat it. In the 109 vs Spitfire tests RAE relayed to RAF pilots that the Spitfire was more manueverable. Though this statement is hotly contested today, that information was accepted by Spit pilots and they prevailed. With hypothetical tests of the Zero vs Spitfire, RAE would have found the speed difference, the lack of armor and s/s/tanks etc and made the appropriate recomendations.


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## Markus (Jul 27, 2010)

One user said the Hurris in the CBI were using lower octane fuel than the ones in Europe and the Med for quite some time. This reduced the Mk.II´s performance to the levels of the Mk.I.


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## Nikademus (Jul 27, 2010)

claidemore said:


> Did the Hurricane do poorly against the Ki43? Or did the Hurricane do poorly in that particular tactical situation?
> There is a HUGE difference between Burma (for example) and Britain. Britain had a very effective detection system, Burma had a very ineffective one. ( Not to mention the fact that the scale of the air fighting in the two theatres is significantly different.)
> 
> It doesn't matter if the Zero or any other fantasy plane has enough endurance to stay over Britain all day long, it's ammo is limited and it will be detected and intercepted. They simply cannot stooge about in unfriendly skies and maintain a tactical advantage.
> ...



The Hurricane's track record kill ratio wise varied by Theater. It performed sterling work during the BoB....did less well during the Battle of France (at least after the Sitzkrieg period ), won in Greece, did well in East Africa but got kicked it's hardest over Malta. In the Desert, it began competetively but quickly fell behind as time went by. Burma/SRA - got kicked pretty hard. (I'll forgo the usual exact statistical figures unless asked  ) 

I do not agree at all with the assertion that the Zero was a piece of junk that could only win against unprepared or poorly experienced opponents. The USN pilots certainly didn't think so and gave the plane (and the initial group of men who flew them) "a lot of g'dam respect" per Jack Fletcher's famous quote after Aug 8. The plane scored a very impressive 4.5:1 ratio against enemy fighters (of three different airforces including the USAAFFE) during the SRA fighting. (contrast to the at least 5:1 achieved by the Jagdwaffe during Barbarossa's opening months)

In both cases, of course the state of the defending force(s) contributed to the skewed ratio....but that does not IMO take away from the attributes of either plane or pilot....Jagdwaffe or IJNAF...Zero or Messer. What i would expect to occur in a hypothetical matchup against an airforce that is better organized and has good ground control would be a much closer ratio of exchange revolving around 1:1 which is what some accounts of the BoB show as happening despite the advantages enjoyed by the Luftwaffe during 1940. 

1:1, 1.8:1, 1:1.8 etc etc. Its irrelevent in the big picture to an airforce _if that side achieves it's objectives_. An airforce that has a good plane with the range to escort it's bombers to and from the target would present a great challenge to Fighter Command. You need the other elements discussed in every BoB out there, but its a start.


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## Marcel (Jul 27, 2010)

claidemore said:


> Did the Hurricane do poorly against the Ki43? Or did the Hurricane do poorly in that particular tactical situation?
> There is a HUGE difference between Burma (for example) and Britain. Britain had a very effective detection system, Burma had a very ineffective one. ( Not to mention the fact that the scale of the air fighting in the two theatres is significantly different.)


This is something that when judging the poor performance of the Allied a/c in the Pacific in the early years. Early warning did not exist while the fighting area was much bigger. In the BoB, the British only had to expect the Germans in the south-east, while having a fair early warning. This was not the case in the far east. A great advantage for the attacker who will dictate where and when the fighting will take place.


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## timshatz (Jul 27, 2010)

I haven't seen a lot of comment about the bombers that were used. It seems the Luftwaffe could've used a decent 4 engined bomber, especially given the armament of the average RAF fighter. 

Something like the B24 or Lancaster would've meant a lot more bombs on each mission. More destruction. 

It might've made the difference.


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## renrich (Jul 27, 2010)

In the section of Shore's books about the IJN raid on Ceylon, the British stated that the only fighter that they had among the Fulmars, Hurricanes and Martlets that somewhat had parity with the A6M was the Martlet and it did not get into any action.


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## zoomar (Jul 27, 2010)

timshatz said:


> I haven't seen a lot of comment about the bombers that were used. It seems the Luftwaffe could've used a decent 4 engined bomber, especially given the armament of the average RAF fighter.
> 
> Something like the B24 or Lancaster would've meant a lot more bombs on each mission. More destruction.
> 
> It might've made the difference.



I don't disagree at all, but here are some things to consider:

The BoB was decided by the fall of 1940. Neither the B-24 nor the Lancaster was in squadron service in 1940. Infact, very few moden 4-engined bombers were in squadron service anywhere in the world. Not the Halifax, and I'm not even sure the Stirling was. Bomber Command was limited to Wellingtons, Whitleys, Blenheims, and Hamptons - all twin engine planes no better than what the Germans had. The B-17 models available were not the well-protected versions available later in the war, and even the US had only a relative handful. The two "Ural Bombers" the Germans cancelled in the 1930's (Ju-89 or Do-19) would have been virtually obsolete in 1940. They also probably would have been produced in pitifully small numbers, meaning that He-111s and the like would still bear the brunt of the offensive. So it takes more than one might imagine to give the Luftwaffe a 4-engined bomber for the BoB. Perhaps rather than more engines, German bombers might have benefitted by more defensive guns...in power turrets...in the tail.


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## Glider (Jul 27, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> I do not agree at all with the assertion that the Zero was a piece of junk that could only win against unprepared or poorly experienced opponents.



I don't think anyone as said that is was a piece of junk that was only any good against poor opposition


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## Nikademus (Jul 27, 2010)

So post 48 was said in jest?


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## zoomar (Jul 27, 2010)

renrich said:


> ... The A6M could have stuck around with the bombers a lot longer than the Bf109 and it could have interfered with the Hurris and Spits trying to shoot down the bombers probably just as well as the 109, certainly much better than a 109 which had to flee for France when the fuel low light came on. A fighter which is not there can't be effective..



Irrespective of arguments and counterarguments about the relative merits of the Zero in the ETO, this is the critical point. To acheive its objective, an escort fighter does not need to be better than the defenders. It just has to be there and be good enough to be a credible threat to the interceptors so that they have to worry about avoiding it, rather than shooting down bombers. Every time a Hurri or Spit had to dive away to escape a Zero, a He-111 might make it to the target. The Bf-110 was not such a threat, and no single engined German fighter had the endurance to be a escort fighter. The A6M would have been this, even if it only acheived a 1:1 kill ratio against the RAF fighters. The Fw-187 might have also.


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## Glider (Jul 27, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> So post 48 was said in jest?



I hope so


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## Nikademus (Jul 27, 2010)




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## zoomar (Jul 27, 2010)

Marcel said:


> This is something that when judging the poor performance of the Allied a/c in the Pacific in the early years. Early warning did not exist while the fighting area was much bigger. In the BoB, the British only had to expect the Germans in the south-east, while having a fair early warning. This was not the case in the far east. A great advantage for the attacker who will dictate where and when the fighting will take place.



This and Claidmore's point above it are also something we tend of forget when focusing only on planes. Frankly I had forgotten about the advantages EWR gave to the RAF and how this could negate some of the advantages that long-ranged escorts could provide. But nonethess, I believe the absence of a good high-endurance escort fighter was still the key failing of the German plane mix in 1940, not the Bf-109, not the twin-engineed bombers.


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## Nikademus (Jul 27, 2010)

zoomar said:


> To acheive its objective, an escort fighter does not need to be better than the defenders. It just has to be there and be good enough to be a credible threat to the interceptors so that they have to worry about avoiding it, rather than shooting down bombers. Every time a Hurri or Spit had to dive away to escape a Zero, a He-111 might make it to the target. The Bf-110 was not such a threat, and no single engined German fighter had the endurance to be a escort fighter. The A6M would have been this, even if it only acheived a 1:1 kill ratio against the RAF fighters. The Fw-187 might have also.



My point exactly....only better worded.


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## zoomar (Jul 27, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> My point exactly....only better worded.



Thank you, sir.


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## Nikademus (Jul 27, 2010)

timshatz said:


> I haven't seen a lot of comment about the bombers that were used. It seems the Luftwaffe could've used a decent 4 engined bomber, especially given the armament of the average RAF fighter.



I'm of the view that the bombers were good enough to get the job done.....especially in context of knocking out the key airfields and sector stations. The Luftwaffe acomplished alot when the bombers were well protected...even the Stuka.


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## Hop (Jul 28, 2010)

> The Bf-110 was not such a threat, and no single engined German fighter had the endurance to be a escort fighter.



That depends on how far away the targets are.

Britain was in the unfortunate position of having the Luftwaffe camped on the doorstep. Dover is 25 miles from the Luftwaffe fighter bases, central London 95 miles. The battle was fought at less than a quarter of the range of the 109. 

The Germans didn't need a long range escort fighter because their targets were in the SE of England. They concentrated their force against the SE and still failed to bomb enough targets or shoot down enough fighters. Dispersing their effort over the rest of the country would have meant less pressure against 11 Group.


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## Nikademus (Jul 28, 2010)

(dup post)


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## Nikademus (Jul 28, 2010)

A good long range fighter isn't just about being able to reach distant targets, it's also about having a large fuel reserve allowing maximum flexability over targets at short and medium distances. Even over SE England, the 109's 'linger' time was constrained which hurt their efforts to protect the bombers and engage the defenses.

On another note....same fighter would also have allowed Luftflotte 5 to remain engaged in the battle which would have diverted Fighter Command resources and created more fatigue and wear. (basically increase the pressure.)


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## Colin1 (Jul 28, 2010)

Hop said:


> The Germans didn't need a long range escort fighter because their targets were in the SE of England.
> 
> They concentrated their force against the SE and still failed to bomb enough targets or shoot down enough fighters. Dispersing their effort over the rest of the country would have meant less pressure against 11 Group.


You can be sure that they did. Loiter time over SE England was poor, full power combat duration over London would be in the order of 10 minutes. Then it's home-time and pray you're not intercepted en route.

This wasn't because of the range issue, it was because the Luftwaffe switched to bombing London; had the Jadgwaffe been given free rein to escort the bombers going after RAF airfields, they would have drawn Fighter Command into the air and into an attrition war where the Luftwaffe hold the initiative; eventual greater fighter production than the Germans would have counted for nought if the guys being strapped into them have barely six weeks training.


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## BombTaxi (Jul 28, 2010)

Four-engined bombers with greater payloads would have helped the LW. If heavy raids could have been mounted across the North Sea by Luftflotte 5, the RAF would have had to spread resources thinner to counter the threat, thereby helping the offensive in the Southeast. It would also have made it harder for the RAF to rest pilots by moving them to 12 Group, further weakening the overall defense. However, such a strategy would demand an effective long range escort, and we know the LW didn't have that. I don't think thier doctrine of close support for Blitzkrieg ever envisioned a need for long range fighters...


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## Glider (Jul 29, 2010)

BombTaxi said:


> Four-engined bombers with greater payloads would have helped the LW. If heavy raids could have been mounted across the North Sea by Luftflotte 5, the RAF would have had to spread resources thinner to counter the threat, thereby helping the offensive in the Southeast. It would also have made it harder for the RAF to rest pilots by moving them to 12 Group, further weakening the overall defense. However, such a strategy would demand an effective long range escort, and we know the LW didn't have that. I don't think thier doctrine of close support for Blitzkrieg ever envisioned a need for long range fighters...



There is no doubt that the Zero would have been invaluble with Luft 5. In the SE of England I don't personally believe that it woulve made much difference, the pluses balanced out by the minus's. With Luft 5 it was a clear cut case.
The bombers lacked the payload and 4 engined bombers would have been a great help. 

The only problem of course is that we are now talking about bombers that didn't exist being escorted by fighters that to all intents and purposes didn't exist.


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## Hop (Jul 29, 2010)

> If heavy raids could have been mounted across the North Sea by Luftflotte 5, the RAF would have had to spread resources thinner to counter the threat, thereby helping the offensive in the Southeast.



The RAF already were spread around the country. Covering against German raids across the North Sea were the following Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons:

Coltishall, Norfolk - 3 squadrons
Wittering, Cambridgeshire - 1 squadron
Digby, Lincolnshire - 3 squadrons
Kirton-in-Lindsey, North Lincolnshire - 1 squadron
Church Fenton, Yorkshire - 3 squadrons
Carrerick, North Yorkshire - 1 squadron
Acklington, Northumberland - 2 squadrons
Usworth, Tyne and Wear - 1 squadron
Turnhouse, Falkirk - 2 squadrons
Drem, East Lothian - 1 squadron
Prestwick, Ayrshire - 1 squadron
Dyce, Aberdeenshire - 1 squadron
Wick sector, North Scotland - 2 squadrons

That's 21 squadrons spread out along the east coast of Britain from the midlands northwards.



> It would also have made it harder for the RAF to rest pilots by moving them to 12 Group, further weakening the overall defense.



That would be true if any German long range presence in Norway was in addition to what they had in the real world. In that case there would be extra pressure on the RAF that didn't exist historically.

But if the Germans had the same number of planes, with some based in Norway instead of France, then any pressure on the RAF in the north comes at the expense of reduced pressure on the RAF in the SE. In effect the German attack would be diluted, which would make the RAF job easier.

More aircraft would of course have helped the Luftwaffe. But even with more long range aircraft it would still make more sense to base them in France and keep up pressure on 11 Group, not mount sporadic raids on the North.



> it was because the Luftwaffe switched to bombing London; had the Jadgwaffe been given free rein to escort the bombers going after RAF airfields, they would have drawn Fighter Command into the air and into an attrition war where the Luftwaffe hold the initiative



This is precisely what the Luftwaffe tried to do. They failed at it. Luftwaffe losses were very high which is one of the main reasons they abandoned the tactic.



> eventual greater fighter production than the Germans would have counted for nought if the guys being strapped into them have barely six weeks training.



The problem for the Luftwaffe is their replacements were of similar quality. When Milch did a tour of airfields in late August and early September, he found new pilots who had only made 10 landings in 109s, and had never fired a cannon in training.

How long was a 109 training flight? I'd say 10 landing would equal less than 10 hours flying training on type.

Steinhilper wrote about one of his replacement pilots:



> High also on the list of losses as the battle wore on were the replacement pilots. They simply didn't have the experience that we pre-war regulars had acquired. In our Gruppe at the beginning of the French Campaign we had thirty-six experienced pilots, none of whom had less than three years flying experience. Now we were getting replacements for the experienced pilots we had lost straight from Jagdfliegerschule (fighter school]. At that time we still tried our best to take care of these fledglings until they could accrue some experience.
> Typical of these youngsters was a young Gefreiter who arrived in late September. His flying time was minimal - he had only fired a few shots at a ground target, had never flown on oxygen and still had no idea how to use his radio. We tried to increase their experience before they actually came along on combat missions by taking them up on patrols between missions. Then we would talk on the radio, climb to altitudes in excess of 8,000 metres (25,000 ft) and make them use oxygen. Of special importance was teaching them how to change the pitch of their propeller to get maxmum pull from the engine at high altitude. A flat pitch would allow the engine to rev up to its maximum so that the super-charger would deliver the maximum volume of air to the cylinders and produce optimum power; changing to a coarser pitch would have that engine power converted into more pull and consequently speed our rate of climb. It was vital they mastered this technique if they were to keep up in a battle-climb or at high altitude.5
> After about ten hours of 'tuition' we would take them out over the Channel to shoot at shadows on the water or cross to Dungeness and shoot at a black medieval tower which stood there (the old Dungeness Lighthouse). Finally when we could not excuse them combat duty any more we would have to take them along with us. This became the case with the Gefreiter and so I took him as my Rottenhund Iwingman]. We began our climb almost immediately after take-off and he was constantly using the radio to ask us to slow down so that he could keep up. It was obvious that he wasn't manipulating the pitch control with the skill of the more seasoned pilots to produce the same power as our machines. We tried to tell him what to do on the radio but to no avail. Eventually, about half-way across the Channel and at 4,000 metres (13,000 ft) Kiihle told him to leave the formation and return to base. He broke away but in his confusion he turned not for home but towards Dover. Kiihle realised what was happening and ordered me to give chase and take him home. I rolled out and soon overhauled him, just before we reached the balloon barrage at Dover. I had tried to raise him on the radio but he was in such a state of anxiety that he wouldn't or couldn't respond. Positioning myself in front of him I rocked my wings, using the signal for him to follow me. He dutifully hung onto my tail and we were soon back at Coquelles. This was one of only two missions I missed during the whole of our time in the Battle of Britain.
> As a result we decided that we would not take any more replacements on high altitude missions until we could give them more, much more, training. They were supposed to be replacements but in the event they were more of a problem for us than reinforcement for the squadron.


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## Glider (Jul 29, 2010)

Hop Very interesting post. I never realised before the skill needed to get the best out of the 109.


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## Njaco (Jul 29, 2010)

I don't believe that a change among any of the a/c that populated both sides would have changed the outcome for Germany in the BoB. To my mind, there is only one: Stay the course! If objectives hadn't been changed based upon emotion and instead, RAF airfields and production centers had gained more attention, it would be different.

Someone mentioned that it might have been a fallacy that the RAF was on its 'last legs' on 7 Sept. Depends upon your definition. Dowding was needing more pilots, desperately. The results of the "Bad Weekend" in late August/early Sept devastated the airfields almost to the point of uselessness. And aircraft production was reaching a point where the daily arrival of new aircraft wasn't exactly matching the losses. It was hitting the RAF and everyone from pilots to map plotters were exhausted (during the weeks previously EWR units at many of the airfields took a pounding: many ended up in tents working with damaged equipment.)

If the Luftwaffe had stuck to hitting the RAF (and that includes leaving the relatively strategically useless satellite airfields like the Coastal Command stations alone!), I believe it would have collapsed - at least for the areas near landing sites. The RAF could have continued from northern areas but it would have been daunting.

Since going through my thread "Tactics: Spitfire vs Zero", I understand that the Spitfire didn't really have long legs. So maybe zoomar's opening statement of Germany needing a long-range aircraft like the Spit might be wrong? IIRC the early attempts by Bomber Command were mostly unescorted Blenheim bombers - those that were escorted were by fighter versions of the Blenhiem.


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## zoomar (Jul 29, 2010)

Njaco said:


> Since going through my thread "Tactics: Spitfire vs Zero", I understand that the Spitfire didn't really have long legs. So maybe zoomar's opening statement of Germany needing a long-range aircraft like the Spit might be wrong? IIRC the early attempts by Bomber Command were mostly unescorted Blenheim bombers - those that were escorted were by fighter versions of the Blenhiem.



I never meant to imply in my initial post that the Spit was long ranged. It isn't and I know that. What I said, or meant to say, was that the LW needed a long range escort fighter that could meet the Spit and Hurri on equal terms over England...and they didn't have a plane that could do that. I then suggested the Fw-187 and A6M as planes that would good choices if there were available. I was hoping to hear people who know more than me talk about the Fw-187, but instead the Zero became the focus of interest - which is also a fascinating discussion. On re-reading the post I can see how my statement could be misunderstood as you misunderstood it. Thankfully, most folks either didn't read that statement or understood it how I meant it.


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## Nikademus (Jul 29, 2010)

BombTaxi said:


> Four-engined bombers with greater payloads would have helped the LW. If heavy raids could have been mounted across the North Sea by Luftflotte 5, the RAF would have had to spread resources thinner to counter the threat, thereby helping the offensive in the Southeast. It would also have made it harder for the RAF to rest pilots by moving them to 12 Group, further weakening the overall defense. However, such a strategy would demand an effective long range escort, and we know the LW didn't have that. I don't think thier doctrine of close support for Blitzkrieg ever envisioned a need for long range fighters...



The Bf-110 was supposed to fill that role for deep penetration raids on the Operational/Strategic level. It's early successes over Poland and France (against light opposition) lulled Goering into further delusion regarding his beloved Zerstorer. The Luft5 debacle over NE Britian paid proof to the power of misplaced faith.


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## renrich (Jul 29, 2010)

Hop, many thanks for your post about the LW fighter pilot training. That was interesting and informative. The bit about the changing pitch of the prop explains why the FW190 was designed to make mixture and prop automatic tied to throttle. Contrast that training to that of the wartime training of USN pilots explained in Lundstrom's books. What a difference!

I still believe that if the RAF near the end of the BOB had been stressed enough their bases would have been withdrawn enough to the west or north to be out of range of the escort fighters of the LW. The cities like London would have suffered more but weather was beginning to be more of a factor and the targets could have taken a pounding from the relatively puny bombloads of the LW bombers without undue overall effect. Sort of the "rope a dope" tactics.


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## Nikademus (Jul 29, 2010)

Njaco said:


> I
> Since going through my thread "Tactics: Spitfire vs Zero", I understand that the Spitfire didn't really have long legs. So maybe zoomar's opening statement of Germany needing a long-range aircraft like the Spit might be wrong? IIRC the early attempts by Bomber Command were mostly unescorted Blenheim bombers - those that were escorted were by fighter versions of the Blenhiem.



Didn't the RAF experiment with a twin engined long range fighter as well? (saw a thread around here on such) I think the RAF, conservative in many ways gave up on the idea of a long range fighter (by necessity twin engined) because it was felt such a design couldn't compete with a modern1E intercetor in overall performance. There was also the lingering "the bomber will always get through" crowd. BC's initial forays (using Blenheims, Whitleys and Wellingtons) attempted sporadic unescorted day raids which ceased after the disaster of Dec 18, 1939, convincing BC that unescorted night bombing was the only viable option.


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## Colin1 (Jul 29, 2010)

zoomar said:


> ...would any of these plane really make a difference given that the Germans probably lost the BoB as much a result of poor tactics and preparation rather than poor combat capability of their planes


I know what you probably meant
but I'll pick it up anyway. The Bf109 had a poor endurance capability wrt the role that was being asked of it in the Battle of Britain; I doubt any RAF pilot in 1940 would have accused the Bf109 of poor combat capability


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## dennis420b (Jul 29, 2010)

I have the wing loading of the Fw 187 at 164.14 kg/m² (33.62 lb/ft²) how did it turn? how does it stack up in a dog fight against the Spitfire? Is it a contender? or would it have been a just a bit better than the bf 110 (but they needed a lot better)? I think to "make a difference" the Germans would have had to developed a single engined fighter for the role. I love those twin engines, but in a dog fight... not so much.


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## Njaco (Jul 29, 2010)

zoomar said:


> I never meant to imply in my initial post that the Spit was long ranged. It isn't and I know that. What I said, or meant to say, was that the LW needed a long range escort fighter that could meet the Spit and Hurri on equal terms over England...and they didn't have a plane that could do that. I then suggested the Fw-187 and A6M as planes that would good choices if there were available. I was hoping to hear people who know more than me talk about the Fw-187, but instead the Zero became the focus of interest - which is also a fascinating discussion. On re-reading the post I can see how my statement could be misunderstood as you misunderstood it. Thankfully, most folks either didn't read that statement or understood it how I meant it.



No problem and I didn't mean that in a bad way. As I read through the posts I wondered if I had it wrong!


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## Glider (Jul 29, 2010)

dennis420b said:


> I have the wing loading of the Fw 187 at 164.14 kg/m² (33.62 lb/ft²) how did it turn? how does it stack up in a dog fight against the Spitfire? Is it a contender? or would it have been a just a bit better than the bf 110 (but they needed a lot better)? I think to "make a difference" the Germans would have had to developed a single engined fighter for the role. I love those twin engines, but in a dog fight... not so much.



I would expect any modern single engined fighter to have an advantage against a twin. The single engined machine would have the advantage in roll rate, and that has to be done before you can turn. What I would be interested to know is how would a Fw 187 stack up against a Whirlwind, in many ways a very similar aircraft.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 29, 2010)

Unfortunately that match turns into a real "what if".

Historically I would have to say the Whirlwind would be the winner. All it's book performance numbers are with 87 octane fuel and little seems to survive saying if they ran it on 100 octane and if so what the changes were.

The FW 187 numbers are with Jumo 210 engines and speed is enough below the Whirlwind to give the nod to the Whirlwind.

BUT would have production versions shifted to the DB 601 engines? One prototype did use them but again, what would a production version have posted for numbers? 

We maybe guessing at the performance of both aircraft?


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## The Basket (Jul 29, 2010)

One must remember that the BoB was neither planned for or expected so the Germans would always have to run what they brung.

A long range fighter had to carry a lot of fuel which made it big and heavy and with the 1,000 bhp engines on offer...instantly turned it into a twin. And the Bf 110 had excellent stats for its type.

A big single engined fighter would have the performance of the Defiant so no help their either.

All the combat machines in the BoB were based on the 1930s dogma and technology which created them.

A good example of this is the P-51. It was designed for a more powerful engine so could be physically larger and the designers could learn from shortcomings that current fighters had at the time. Both Japan and USA needed long range fighters because they thought in long range terms. Either due to Pacific operations or large size of US land mass.

The Spitfire could get away with short range because its role was purely interceptor over a relatively small island.

So...my view is that the Bf 110 and 109 were perfect for the roles which they were designed for but ill suited to a role for which they weren't. They didn't need range as they were designed to operate from home or forward bases in support of ground forces.


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## Kurfürst (Jul 30, 2010)

Hop said:


> The problem for the Luftwaffe is their replacements were of similar quality. When Milch did a tour of airfields in late August and early September, he found new pilots who had only made 10 landings in 109s, and had never fired a cannon in training.
> 
> How long was a 109 training flight? I'd say 10 landing would equal less than 10 hours flying training on type.



There's a tad bit of difference.


Alll RAF fighter pilots arriving with a mere 6 weeks of training (instead of the orginal, iirc 3 months..), very little flight experience with either general flying or on their operational type to their operational units. How can you fly the Spitfire if you haven't even mastered the Tiger Moth yet..?

In contrast the training in the Luftwaffe wasn't shortened at all, it was also quite different than in the RAF. Pilots who finished their training in Germany were not posted immediately to combat units, they were first posted to the replacement unit of their future operational unit, where they got a practical flight training on their operational under the wings of experienced fighter pilots. Pilots had plenty of flying experience on trainers, and after receiving their basic training on their operational type at their flight school, they were posted to these units until they were seen fit for combat, and were re-assigned to frontline units.

BTW anyone who reads Heinz Knoke's diary can get a farily good idea how long did this process take in the Luftwaffe early in the war.

He made his first flight in* April 1940*, and finished basic flight school sometime in August 1940, and was then transferred to the fighter school. He began flying the 109 in October, and it was not until January 1941 he was re-assigned to the replacement/operational training unit of JG 52 (made up of 2 Squadrons and a command Schwarm), where the pilots were posted before assigned to operational duties. He was not *actually posted to an operational unit (2./JG 52) until 23 May 1941* and flew his first combat sortie on the next day.

His training lasted a bit over_ a year_. His opponents on the other side of the channel had_ six weeks_ to match his skills - impossible. Essentially the RAF was filling the breach in the wall with hastly trained cannon fodder; it was dictated by military logic, and it was sound in the short term, but there was a bloody price to pay for that in 1941. 

So IMHO drawing a parellel between RAF and LW flight training in 1940 borders a bit the ridiculus. Unless someone has some other reasonable explanation why Fighter Command's losses were so devastating - practically 100% of the initial British force was lost during the battle, compared to about 50% losses in the Jagdwaffe... difference in pilot training was a major factor in that.


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## Juha (Jul 30, 2010)

Hello Kurfürst
what is your source of that 6 weeks training?
After all Neville Duke, later ace and a famous test pilot, first fly on 20 Aug 40, first solo on 6 Sept 40, at the end of the year 100h, sent to 92 Sqn at Biggin Hill 2 Apr 41 with some 145h flight time.
A bit later, Tony Jonsson, the only Icelander ace, to RAF June 40, the first flight in Oct 40, to 17Sqn in July 41.

But anyway, at the height of the BoB, OTU courses’ were of two weeks duration with final training on the “C” Class sqns, ie on fighter sqns resting in north and having some 2/5 of their pilots combat ready in case of surprising LW appearance and 3/5 of pilots non-operational and under training. That according to Norman Franks RAF Fighter Command 1936-1968. I have some doubts that pilots were rushed through elementary and service flight training in appr 3 weeks at most.

Juha


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## Njaco (Jul 30, 2010)

I believe Kurfurst is correct with LW training. Hartmann I think joined late 40/early 41 and wasn't operational until fall of '42.


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## Milosh (Jul 30, 2010)

Hartmann's first training flight was Mar. 5 1941 but this is after the BoB.


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## Glider (Jul 30, 2010)

You would be pushed to get a license for a Glider within four weeks with one to one tuition.


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## Juha (Jul 30, 2010)

Hello Njaco
I have no difficulties to believe Kurfürst’s info on LW training, having read some LW memoirs, best of which on training is Kauffmann’s, who served as a Bf 110 pilot.
But I have serious doubt on that 6 week claim. After all if we looked on William Murray’s Strategy of Defeat p. 314, early in the war, up to Sept 42, LW fighter pilots got some 240h of flight training, of which some 80h on operational types, RAF fighter pilots got some 200h, of which 50h on operational types. 

Chaz Bowyer in RAF Handbook p. 22 writes prior to the outbreak of war RAF pilots received almost 150 flying hours’ instruction and practice before being posted to sqns, where they underwent further ”continuation” training until considered fully competent to undertake normal sqn flying duties. When war broke out the sqn training was substituted by training on Group Pool or Reserve sqns, later on Operational Training Units (OTUs). By 1941 pilot tryining incl. 8 weeks ground instructions at an initial training wing, 10 weeks flying and ground lessons at an elementary flying training school followed up to 16 weeks at a service flying training school and in the end 4-6 weeks at an OTU. So pilots received some 200 flying hours before commencing operational duties. 

Besides that the critique I have seen on training unit operations during the BoB wasn’t that training time was drastically cut short but that training schools continued to work much like peacetime, ie not utilicing their resources fully.

Juha


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## Nikademus (Jul 30, 2010)

Quality of training is another factor. Much of early RAF training focused on formation flying and rigid pre-established attack patterns. There was very little (if any) actual gunnery training. This "raw"/green issue continued even after the BoB and is fairly well documented during campaigns such as NA, Tunisia, Malta and Malaya.


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## Juha (Jul 30, 2010)

Hello Nikademus
Quote:” Much of early RAF training focused on… rigid pre-established attack patterns”
IMHO that is not so much true on pre-sqn service training, but is true on how the training was done in sqns.

Quote:” There was very little (if any) actual gunnery training”

IMHO there was some gunnery training during yearly armament camp week, but of course those coming to sqn after last armament camp week not necessary have any gunnery training to speak with. But in fact I cannot recall other AFs other than USN that gave a good gunnery training to its pilots, the Finnish AF in theory also gave rather good gunnery training, but in FAF there were fighter pilots who had not got that training.

Juha


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## Milosh (Jul 30, 2010)

Usual sequence of pilot training in the BCATP

Dec 1940

Recruiting Center > Manning Depot - 4-5 weeks > Initial Training School - 4 weeks > Elementary Flying School - 7 weeks > Service Flying Training School - 10 weeks > Overseas Pool or BCATP instructors/staff pilots

more info see table A-2, http://www.airmuseum.ca/refs/aerodrome_of_democracy.pdf

"_Of the schools transferred by the RAF special mention must be made of the operational training units which added an altogether new dimension to the air training in Canada. The OTU concept, a simple yet radical development in flying training, did not come into general use until after the war began. In the RAF until 1938, and in the RCAF until the outbreak of war, pilots went directly from advanced training to operational squadrons, where they had to be taught to fly operational aircraft before they were of any use to the squadron. In 1938, to remove the training burden from front-line squadrons, the RAF set aside special units whose function was to conduct training on operational aircraft and whose graduates would be passed on to fighter, bomber, and maritime air squadrons. In April 1940 these were designated as OTUs._"

I would appear that, what would be called OTUs, existed pre-war.

BTW, those RAF hastly trained cannon fodder pilots put up a pretty good fight with those superior trained LW pilots.


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## Juha (Jul 30, 2010)

Hello Milosh
IIRC, and that on BC, those sqns designed to become Group Pool or Reserve sqns became those when the war began, not before. Before that they were counted as first-line sqns. So plans were there before Sept 39 but they were implemented only when the war broken out. And LW pilots had a bit longer training than RAF pilots before Sept 42.

Juha


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## fastmongrel (Jul 30, 2010)

Milosh said:


> BTW, those RAF hastly trained cannon fodder pilots put up a pretty good fight with those superior trained LW pilots.



Well said Milosh. Its amazing isnt it according to a lot of threads on this forum and other aircraft forums. The Luftwaffe had better aircraft, better engines, better guns, better tactics, better pilots, better pilot training, better ground crew, better fuel and probably better food in the mess for all I know.

Yet the stupid little RAF with its inferior aircraft, inferior engines, inferior guns, inferior tactics, inferior pilots, inferior pilot training, inferior ground crew, inferior fuel and bloody awful food. Still managed to give the oh so superior Luftwaffe a bloody nose and Germanys first defeat (Or more correctly Germanys first non victory)

I mean those inferior RAF types probably just flew around wingtip to wingtip twirling there moustaches and shouting "tally ho" and baring there inferior teeth at the boche. Whilst the Luftwaffe with its deadly efficency went about crushing the RAF.


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## renrich (Jul 30, 2010)

Fastmongrel, don't forget they had to stop for tea every so often, but they were still pretty effective.


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## Glider (Jul 30, 2010)

Joking aside, Kurfurst have you anything to support your six week statement? It could be between the pilots getting thier wings and going to the squadrons but I don't have any evidence.


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## claidemore (Jul 30, 2010)

I'm kinda curious, I've read about how Germanys training program was not adequate to replace pilot losses near wars end, but I've read little about how serious pilot attrition was for the Luftwaffe during BoB. 
Obviously all Luftwaffe pilots shot down over Britain would end up in British hands, so those were not recovered. Were there enough reserves that Germany didn't worry too much about it, and consequently did not change their training program? Or were there enough new pilots coming down the pipeline that they thought they would be ok? 
Did the RAF's 'more serious' attrition problem encourage the massive training programs they initiated which resulted in a surplus of pilots by wars end contribute to the eventual allied victory? 
Hmmm, this maybe could be a new thread?


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## Kurfürst (Jul 31, 2010)

Juha said:


> Hello Njaco
> 
> But I have serious doubt on that 6 week claim. After all if we looked on William Murray’s Strategy of Defeat p. 314, early in the war, up to Sept 42, LW fighter pilots got some 240h of flight training, of which some 80h on operational types, RAF fighter pilots got some 200h, of which 50h on operational types.
> 
> Juha



Len Deighton specifically mentions this in "Fighters", that fighter training was drastically cut from, I believe, 3 months to 6 weeks (canát seem to find the book atm) and I believe Wood and Dempster mentions this, too. The latter are very concious of the pilot replacement and experience problems in Fighter Command, and I remember them having some figures on German training programme (which they consider sufficient and to have been in a far more extended stage at that time of the war compared to the British), but I can't seem to find the exact figures, they are hidden in some chapter of the book.

All in all it seems pretty common knowledge, as a poster just mentioned the same a couple of posts before mine as well.

EDIT: found a summary giving a pretty good insight about the problems in RAF's early war traning programme. Basically pilots were issued to operational Squadrons with very little to no operational tactical training, and were expected to learn this at their Squadron in time. Now, this worked in peacetime, and even during skirmishes of the Sitzkrieg, but once the meat grinder started to kick in, there were simple no time or possibility to teach them the necessary skills between two combat sorties.


_By* June 1940 *the vigorous efforts which had been made to complete Fighter Command's preparations now made it all the more imperat ive that the squadro ns sho uld be supported by a proper backing for operat ional training, and it was agreed that every pilot sho uld go through an OTU on the same basis as that to which Bomber Command had already been working. . .. Their backing in operational training resources was extremely slender. By that time they only had three OTUs behind them. These OTUs were all under the direct control of one of the
operational Groups (No . 10). The Battle of Britain was to show most clearly how essential was organised operationa l training*. It was only by a most drastic shortening of courses that the flow of pilots to squadro ns was maintained, and had the Service Flying
Training School organisation been properly geared to the programme for first line expansion the Fighter OTUs would have formed a most severe bottleneck. *As it was it was necessary to resort to many expedien ts in order to give the pilots their conversion.'

In *October 1940* the numbering system of the OTUs was changed, with Aston Down becoming No. 55 OTU, Sutton Bridge No. 56 OTU and Hawarden No. 57 OTU. By late 1940 the Fighter Command plan was to have one OTU for every ten fighter squadro ns, with each OTU turning-out 34 pilots a month *from a six-week course*._

From Delve's Fighter Command.


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## fastmongrel (Jul 31, 2010)

renrich said:


> Fastmongrel, don't forget they had to stop for tea every so often, but they were still pretty effective.



All RAF aircraft are equipped with a kettle and teapot. Officers get fine bone china, Earl Grey tea and silver sugar tongs. Non coms get a chipped mug and a teabag. 

Everyone says it was the carburettor on the Merlin prevented Spits and Hurricanes diving as fast as a 109. It wasnt it was the tea spilling that was the problem. Which was only cured by the invention of the pressure injected Bendix-Stromberg teacup.


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## Colin1 (Jul 31, 2010)

Kurfürst said:


> All in all it seems pretty common knowledge, as a poster just mentioned the same a couple of posts before mine as well.


For God sakes man
bring yourself to use my name - it was me

Deighton does mention it and I'm going through my biographies/autobiographies to build a consistent picture


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## Juha (Jul 31, 2010)

Hello Kurfürst
so you compared RAF "fighter training" to Knoke's whole flight training, and found out that LW's flight training was clearly longer than RAF fighter training? A bit strange and absolutely meaningless comparison. OTU training might well be cut shorter during the height of the BoB, no doubt on that. But as official figures show, see my earlier message, even if LW fighter pilots got more flight training and more hours on operational a/c before Sept. 42, the difference was much smaller than the impression you wanted to give in your earlier message.

Juha


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## Kurfürst (Jul 31, 2010)

Juha said:


> But as _official figures_ show, see my earlier message, even if LW fighter pilots got more flight training and more hours on operational a/c before Sept. 42, the difference was much smaller than the impression you wanted to give in your earlier message.
> 
> Juha



Nope, the difference between training on operational types were enormous. Earlier you wrote, based on Murray:

"LW fighter pilots got some 240h of flight training, of which some 80h on operational types, RAF fighter pilots got some 200h, of which 50h on operational types."

The discussion is about the BoB period (July-October 1940 FYI), and the specific question is how did the British and German fighter pilots flying time relate to each other in the period. You, on the other hand, quote an avarage figure via Murray _in the period of September 1939 to September 1942_. Obviously it includes three periods: pre-war RAF training, where there were a lot of flying, the BoB period when they showed where the stick and pedals were and off you go to shoot Heinkels, and the 1941-1942 period when Fighter Command spending less and less time fighting and more and more time training.

Now, the actual number of flying hours _during the BoB period_ were massively less then that. Delve writes, on page 227, in Chapter "1941 - More problems":

_The average OTU course *by mid 1941 was 40 hours on type - four times more than it had been in 1940. *Although tactics and gunnery were still not significant part sof the syllabus, A great deal of time was spent honing the skills of pilots to enable them to manoeuvre in attack and defence. and it is strange that so little was done to ensure thatthey had a good standa rd of mark smanship. Less than three of the 40 hours were spent on actual firing, and cine-gun, whilst very useful, was of limited use in comparison._

In other words, the avarage OTU course in 1940 was a mere 10 hours. Of course this was an avarage, some got even less, some got more. Delve notes on page 220 that J. Johnson for example had a massive 23 hours of Spitfire flying when he was posted to a Squadron. :

_A general comment made by many fighter pilots is that they were given very little tactical training, either in training or on the squadron. In 1940 Spitfires and Hurricanes were in short supply and were needed in the squadrons; there were very few to spare for the training units and pilots had to make do with whatever types were availab le. 

However, the policy of leaving such additional type experience and tactical training to the squadrons was massively flawed. It was workable in 1939 and even into early 1940 with the Phoney War, although it very much depended on the attitude of the CO and his senior pilots, some of whom saw 'sprog' pilots as more trouble then they were worth.

*In August 1940 Johnnie Johnson was posted to 19 Squad ron at Duxford with a total of 205 hours in his logbook, of which 23 were on Spitfires.* The promised extra training was not forthcoming as the Squadron was having problems with its new cannon armament: ' I don't know how we shall find time to train you chaps. We've simply got to get these things working first.'

The concept of on-squadr n training was totally flawed, especially at a time when the squadrons were hard-pressed to maint ain operational status. Most Flight and Squadron Commanders did the best they could and tried to shield new boys from ops unt il they had built-up a few more hours and had flown a few mock combats. Sadly, for many a bright young fighter pilot his first combat experience was often his last._

Now, how much training did on avarage a Luftwaffe fighter pilot got in avarage between 39-42 on an operational type, 80 hours? And I am pretty confident they got more early in the war than in 1942.. and these were the_ freshmen_. I dare not to imagine how much time the veterans of Spain, Poland and France had under their belt on their operational type, and at the start of the Battle they were pretty much all veterans, and at the minimum flying their operational type for at least a year..


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## Milosh (Jul 31, 2010)

Steinhilper wrote about one of his replacement pilots:

Quote:
High also on the list of losses as the battle wore on were the replacement pilots. They simply didn't have the experience that we pre-war regulars had acquired. In our Gruppe at the beginning of the French Campaign we had thirty-six experienced pilots, none of whom had less than three years flying experience. Now we were getting replacements for the experienced pilots we had lost straight from Jagdfliegerschule (fighter school]. At that time we still tried our best to take care of these fledglings until they could accrue some experience.

Typical of these youngsters was a young Gefreiter who arrived in late September. His flying time was minimal - he had only fired a few shots at a ground target, had never flown on oxygen and still had no idea how to use his radio. We tried to increase their experience before they actually came along on combat missions by taking them up on patrols between missions. Then we would talk on the radio, climb to altitudes in excess of 8,000 metres (25,000 ft) and make them use oxygen. Of special importance was teaching them how to change the pitch of their propeller to get maxmum pull from the engine at high altitude. A flat pitch would allow the engine to rev up to its maximum so that the super-charger would deliver the maximum volume of air to the cylinders and produce optimum power; changing to a coarser pitch would have that engine power converted into more pull and consequently speed our rate of climb. It was vital they mastered this technique if they were to keep up in a battle-climb or at high altitude.5

After about ten hours of 'tuition' we would take them out over the Channel to shoot at shadows on the water or cross to Dungeness and shoot at a black medieval tower which stood there (the old Dungeness Lighthouse). Finally when we could not excuse them combat duty any more we would have to take them along with us. This became the case with the Gefreiter and so I took him as my Rottenhund Iwingman]. We began our climb almost immediately after take-off and he was constantly using the radio to ask us to slow down so that he could keep up. It was obvious that he wasn't manipulating the pitch control with the skill of the more seasoned pilots to produce the same power as our machines. We tried to tell him what to do on the radio but to no avail. Eventually, about half-way across the Channel and at 4,000 metres (13,000 ft) Kiihle told him to leave the formation and return to base. He broke away but in his confusion he turned not for home but towards Dover. Kiihle realised what was happening and ordered me to give chase and take him home. I rolled out and soon overhauled him, just before we reached the balloon barrage at Dover. I had tried to raise him on the radio but he was in such a state of anxiety that he wouldn't or couldn't respond. Positioning myself in front of him I rocked my wings, using the signal for him to follow me. He dutifully hung onto my tail and we were soon back at Coquelles. This was one of only two missions I missed during the whole of our time in the Battle of Britain.

As a result we decided that we would not take any more replacements on high altitude missions until we could give them more, much more, training. They were supposed to be replacements but in the event they were more of a problem for us than reinforcement for the squadron.


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## Juha (Jul 31, 2010)

Hello Kurfürst
one could get flying time in rather vaguely termed operational a/c already in service flying training schools, which doesn’t at least usually in 1940 mean in Spitfires/Hurricanes. And you have completely forgot the training given in "C" Class sqns, which were given in operational a/c usually in Spits and Hurris. This scheme using resting operational sqns in North to give the final tactical training was in force from Sept 8 to Dec 1 1940, ie until new OTUs were formed.

One didn’t necessarily use Spits or Hurris in operational training, older fighters would do too. The main things to be learnt were the principles of formations and tactics.

J.E.J.'s experience was rather unique, No 19 Sqn being the only sqn operating with Spit Mk IB at that time. Of course the sqns were run rather independently, so much depended on S/L’s attitude. And in fact he was soon trasferred to 616 Sqn just because they did not have time to train him in 19 Sqn.

Quote: “I dare not to imagine how much time the veterans of Spain, Poland and France had under their belt on their operational type, and at the start of the Battle they were pretty much all veterans, and at the minimum flying their operational type for at least a year..”

Also RAF pre-war regulars and even pre-war auxiliaries had clearly more flying hours under they belts than LW pilots coming to combat sqn, so again apples and oranges. But yes in average LW fighter pilots had more combat experience and more importantly, they had much better tactics. But many FC pilots had some combat experience before BoB, from France or from Dunkerque

Juha

And on Murray's Sept 39 to Sept 42 clearly didn't include prewar training, in 1941-42 IMHO the training system didn't change much, syllabus might have but of course in sqns there was more time for training, but that is a different matter


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## Juha (Jul 31, 2010)

Hello
I checked Rall’s memoirs, when he was transferred to 4./JG 52 on 20 Sept 39, he had 55 min, yes minutes, not hours, flight time in Bf 109, and that in D model. In the Staffel, which was a first-line Staffel, he got 10 hours in Bf 109E before his first combat sortie.

Juha


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## Juha (Aug 1, 2010)

I checked a bit more
Rall had spent 2 months in Werneuchen Fighter School, but most of time flying in Ar 68 in tight vic, only 5 gunnery exercises, but he cannot remember was even one air-to-air. He was introduced to Rotte and Schwarm flying only at 4./JG 52, he also flew 2 gunnery training flights in 4./JG 52 before his first combat sortie.

Not so much different to what Tim Elkington got, when he arrived No. 1 Sqn in mid July 40, so during the BoB , with 166 flight hours in his logbooks. Before his first combat sortie he accumulated in the sqn 16 hours incl. 2 flights in Miles Master, rest in Hurricane, one air firing exercise.

And as I remembered from a couple articles on RAF training during the BoB, same info from Vincent Orange's Park p. 155 When Park arrived at South Cerney, he was astonished to learn that the flying schools were working at only two-thirds capacity and following peacetime routines more than 15 months after the outbreak of war.

As Kurfürst wrote OTUs were the bottleneck, and that was tried to easy by introducing "C" Class sqn training, but otherwise training was run as before but expansion programs in UK and in Commonwealth.

Juha


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## fastmongrel (Aug 1, 2010)

Juha said:


> And as I remembered from a couple articles on RAF training during the BoB, same info from Vincent Orange's Park p. 155 When Park arrived at South Cerney, he was astonished to learn that the flying schools were working at only two-thirds capacity and following peacetime routines more than 15 months after the outbreak of war.
> 
> 
> Juha



Hi Juha do you have any information on why the flying schools were running at 2/3 capacity. Was it lack of instructors, planes or trainees. I would have thought flying schools would have been working flat out from early 38 could it possibly have been because training command was spread too thin as it was also building up the commonwealth training schemes at the same time.


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## Juha (Aug 1, 2010)

I cannot remember much of those articles other than attitude, urgency wasn't there. Park also found out that not all the daylight wasn't used for flying and the way the things were organized wasn't the best one, so with a little stick and organising things better the output was increased.

Juha

ADDITION: On material side there was especially lack of spares and Park thought that there was a need for more permanent runways, so that rain and frost would have hindered less the use of airfields but his boss objected preferring grass airfields. Also rapid expansion of training meant lack of experienced instructors and proper training planes. But already by organising the flight training better the resourced already there could be utilized more effectively.


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## Nikademus (Aug 2, 2010)

Juha said:


> IMHO there was some gunnery training during yearly armament camp week, but of course those coming to sqn after last armament camp week not necessary have any gunnery training to speak with. But in fact I cannot recall other AFs other than USN that gave a good gunnery training to its pilots, the Finnish AF in theory also gave rather good gunnery training, but in FAF there were fighter pilots who had not got that training.
> 
> Juha



Yes, there was some, but it didn't amount to alot and in some cases was lacking entirely. My main point was that one cannot look at Flying hours in general and get a complete picture. Said discussion triggered memories gleaned from the books i've collected on the BoB. A relevent passage is below from Patrick Bishop's "Fighter Boys";

_ The pilots who went into action for the first time in 1939 and 1940 might have known a lot about flying. They knew little, though, about how to fight in the air and less about how to shoot. Aerial gunnery was supposed to be taught as part of training and each regular fighter squadron was expected to go to an annual camp at one of the armament training stations for practice with live ammunition, shooting at drogues towed behind other aircraft, or at ground targets. This was occasionally suplemented by use of camera guns, from which theoretical scores could be deduced. It was a long way from reality. In retrospect, the amount of time spent on what was a fundemental air skill would seem desperately inadequate. _

Some pilots [per the author] never fired at all at an aerial target before going into action and Al Deere wrote after the war that gunnery practice in it's entirty was dreadfully neglected. His opinion was that squadron morale, (vs. straight shooting) carried the "few" safely through the early fighter battles.

One explanation for the state of things was money. The Air Ministry felt that the budgetary funds were better spent to man and equip new squadrons vs. building gunnery ranges and allowances for practice ammunition were cut to a bare minimum before the fighting started. After the war started, shortage of time was the primary culprit. As noted, normally pilots emerging from ranks such as the Volunteer Reserve went to OTU's which normally put them through a six week training process "marrying" the pilot with the machine he would do actual fighting in. Due to the heavy losses of May and June 1940, this process was shortened to two weeks. Worse....shortages of pilots was so severe that the OTU's were bypassed entirely putting the men directly into the front lines from the Flying training schools. Overall national training was eventually cut in half to 22 weeks total by mid 1940

Part of the problem too was the losses suffered by the RAF before the battle of Britian even started. According to Bishop, the Battle of France cost the RAF 110 pilots + another 47 wounded and 26 taken prisoner. This tore holes in the ranks of virtually every squadron that participated. 3 Squadron CO's (+1 POW), six flight CO's (+1 POW) and 12 section leaders were among the casualties.


Fortunately, pilot skills and plane attributes are only one part (albeit an important part) of the mix that goes into large scale fighter combat. It is also true that the Luftwaffe (obviously) was not manned purely by Experten. As history would show, whatever edges the sharp end of the Jagdwaffe might have in terms of experience and fighter vs fighter tactics, it would not prove sufficient by itself to overcome the RAF. (anymore than simply substituting a long range strategic fighter for the Messer leaving all else the same)

Pointing out the challenges facing the RAF to me only highlights the acomplishments made by Fighter Command during the BoB. This highlights to me though why Dowding worried about one thing and one statistic above any other: Pilot levels, before and after the missions. I'm reminded of the never ending Cannon vs. MG arguments. Both sides have good arguments. Here, its been mentioned in more than one book that a boon to the young RAF recruits, in addition to flying a robust plane like the Hurricane, was having those 8 x .303's with a generous ammo supply. Cannon's require finese.....MG's you can afford to go with brute force more and spray your target. Against a good fighter pilot it may or may not work more often than not. Against a Stuka or a level bomber? Odds are better. I've felt for some time that being armed as such was a hidden boon to the RAF during the Battle.


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## Juha (Aug 2, 2010)

Hello Nikademus
IMHO the greatest handicap for FC was the clearly more backward tactic. Even if Rall and even Maimberg, who arrived in JG 2 in Dec 39, had been trained only to tight vic tactics at Fighter Schools, and in Maimberg's case the use of that tactic continued a while in the sqn but then arrived an officer with experience from Spanish Civil War who said, forget all your tactical training, and then began Rotte and Schwarm flying.

Quote:” Overall national training was eventually cut in half to 22 weeks total by mid 1940”

Can you say what that means in flying time? Because at least in theory one could get more flying time per week in summer (longer days and usually better weather) than during winter. After all Elkigton had 166 hours, accumulated in 7 months, when he arrived to 1. Sqn in mid July 40. He seemed to have skipped OTU but he came from Cranwell. And JEJ had 205 hours when he arrived to 19 Sqn and was trasferred to 616 Sqn just because they did not have time to give him more training in 19 Sqn. Anyway at the beginning of Nov 40 OTUs were extended to 4 weeks, but again that doesn’t necessary meant doubling the flying time in OTUs because shorter days and more bad weather.

Juha


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## Njaco (Aug 3, 2010)

fastmongrel said:


> Hi Juha do you have any information on why the flying schools were running at 2/3 capacity. Was it lack of instructors, planes or trainees. I would have thought flying schools would have been working flat out from early 38 could it possibly have been because training command was spread too thin as it was also building up the commonwealth training schemes at the same time.



As Juha pointed out, I think this is because of a peace-time attitude towards the training program. BoB an BoF changd that.

I believe I have Hans Ekkard Bob's diary that lists his flight training hours to get an idea of LW about that time.


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## Jerry W. Loper (Aug 3, 2010)

Never mind substituting a fighter, let's try a different bomber. Considering that the RAF's single seat fighters were armed with eight .303-caliber guns, how would they have fared against the durable B-17 (the version flying in 1940, not the later B-17G with the thirteen .50-caliber guns)?


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## BombTaxi (Aug 3, 2010)

They would probably have fared quite well, as the LW's fighters did when they faced that model of Fortress over Germany some months later, operated by the RAF's 90 Squadron.

The B-17D had no tail guns, no ventral guns, no powered turrets, and a very small bombload if it were to travel any useful distance. Once the close escort had been stripped away, Hurricanes and Spits would have been able to beat such big bombers up with impunity. While they wouldn't have shot many down, they would have been able to break up the formation and dilute the effects of the attack, much as they tried to do with the Heinkels. I am sure the RAF would not have suffered any higher losses operating against early-model B-17s, nor would the Germans have derived any significant benefit. The B-17 prior to the E/F/G versions was not a type to be feared, IMHO.


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## Colin1 (Aug 3, 2010)

A 1940 B-17
is still a tough, durable ship, 8 x .303s are going to take some time (ammo) to start hurting it.
He might not be bristling with .50 cals yet but he's got a reasonable'ish chance of toughing it out; if He111s made it back to France riddled with thousands of bullet holes, I see no reason why B-17s couldn't do the same in larger numbers.


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## BombTaxi (Aug 3, 2010)

My point is that the lack of defensive armament increases the risk of the formation being broken up, regardless of the real damage inflicted on the airframes. Also, the small bombload means that no significant advanatge would be acquired by operating a much larger, fuel-and-manpower-hungry machine like the Fortress as opposed to the LW twins.


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## Colin1 (Aug 3, 2010)

Surely
if a 1940 B-17 isn't bristling with guns just yet, then the absence of weapon systems, ammunition and crew to man them translates into a decent bombload?


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## claidemore (Aug 3, 2010)

Colin1 said:


> A 1940 B-17
> is still a tough, durable ship, 8 x .303s are going to take some time (ammo) to start hurting it.
> He might not be bristling with .50 cals yet but he's got a reasonable'ish chance of toughing it out; if He111s made it back to France riddled with thousands of bullet holes, I see no reason why B-17s couldn't do the same in larger numbers.



Hi Colin1,

You are probably right, but how do we measure it? What would make the B17 tougher than an He111? 

It is approximately 1/3 bigger than a Heinkel and 1/3 heavier. Would that make it 1/3 harder to damage or destroy? 

It's a bigger target, hence higher hit probability, does that offset heavier construction in a larger aircraft?

While 8 x .303 is probably not as effective as mulitple .50 mgs or 20mm cannons, it is not "ineffective". Didn't some FW200s succumb to .303 fire from Hurricanes?

edit: After a bit of research the first FW200 to be shot down was by a catapault launched Hurricane 1A from the CAM ship Maplin.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 3, 2010)

Colin1 said:


> Surely
> if a 1940 B-17 isn't bristling with guns just yet, then the absence of weapon systems, ammunition and crew to man them translates into a decent bombload?



Why it didn't I don't know but here is one description:

Boeing B-17C Fortress


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## Colin1 (Aug 3, 2010)

Shortround6 said:


> Why it didn't I don't know but here is one description:
> 
> Boeing B-17C Fortress


Less than impressive


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## Nikademus (Aug 3, 2010)

Juha said:


> Hello Nikademus
> IMHO the greatest handicap for FC was the clearly more backward tactic. Even if Rall and even Maimberg, who arrived in JG 2 in Dec 39, had been trained only to tight vic tactics at Fighter Schools, and in Maimberg's case the use of that tactic continued a while in the sqn but then arrived an officer with experience from Spanish Civil War who said, forget all your tactical training, and then began Rotte and Schwarm flying.



It certainly helped the Jagdwaffe elite inflate their scores. 



> Quote:” Overall national training was eventually cut in half to 22 weeks total by mid 1940”
> 
> Can you say what that means in flying time? Because at least in theory one could get more flying time per week in summer (longer days and usually better weather) than during winter.



44 weeks was quoted as being start to finish in terms of the total package from neophyte wannabe Fighter Boy to being actively posted in a squadron so this would encompass not only "flying hours" but classroom instruction and lecture covering quote "every aspect of aviation". Of these 44 weeks, 6 of them nominally would be in an OTU whereby the pilot would get actual flight hours in the aircraft he was to actually fly in combat. So in the "general" the war's fortunes coupled with the BoF losses and the current attrition level saw overall training halved right from the get go with OTU training (assuming one got any at all) being reduced by 2/3rd's from six weeks to two weeks or less.

On the specific vis-a-vis flying hours, A sample taken in 1988 of the many survivors who reported on their OTU training [per authors Hough Richards], was that the average time in the OTU was Eleven days, which usually translated into six to nine flight hours (sometimes less) in the air. There was very little gunnery practice and what there was might consist of firing once into a cloud. Many had no air to air gunnery practice or experience with the reflector gunsight.

Some squadron CO's would try to take their newbies up into the air at least once or twice before sending them on "real" missions. I can only imagine the stress this must have been like for both veteran and newbie.


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## Nikademus (Aug 3, 2010)

claidemore said:


> Hi Colin1,
> 
> You are probably right, but how do we measure it? What would make the B17 tougher than an He111?
> 
> ...




Every plane has it's weak points. German bombers with armor and self sealers proved pretty durable. One point of vulnerability however was from astern. The engines were unprotected from that quarter (unless modified) making that the most profitable line of approach. Even if a plane isn't shot down, only shot full of holes....thats still going to result in downtime and possible wounding and killing of crew. Even in the absense of that....there's the fatigue factor for said crew after undergoing such an experience. Whatever bomber is chosen.....minimizing attack on the bomber formations is vital.


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## Colin1 (Aug 3, 2010)

claidemore said:


> You are probably right, but how do we measure it? What would make the B17 tougher than an He111?
> 
> It is approximately 1/3 bigger than a Heinkel and 1/3 heavier. Would that make it 1/3 harder to damage or destroy?
> 
> ...


Hi Claide
sorry, I missed your post
agree with the posts in response to yours

I think in the case of the B-17, size does count for something vs a Heinkel. The Warren truss construction could absorb considerable battle damage and demonstrated a significant advantage over the Davis wing of the B-24 in terms of battle damage absorption; translating size as volume, you have to knock out an awful lot of the B-17's wing to get it to fall.

You also have double the powerplant redundancy over the Heinkel coupled with the fact that they're radials vs the Heinkel's inlines.

I would say that whilst 8 x .303s are not ineffective, if the RAF had found themselves facing B-17s, the demise of the said battery would have come about much, much sooner. I maintain my point that it would take an awful lot of .303 to make a B-17 hurt, I would argue likely more than one fighter. Of course, you could get lucky and kill the guys in the office but that applies to any bomber.

The Fw200 was not, if I recall, the most robust of 4-engined aircraft, having been a design for civilian application that was pressed into military service. I don't know too much about the type other than that; armour, fuel cells, defensive armament but the BMW801s would be up to it.


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## RCAFson (Aug 3, 2010)

Another point is that the RAF had a good idea of the aircraft types in the Luftwaffe inventory. If the Luftwaffe had large numbers of B-17 equivalents, then there is a high probability that the RAF would have begun outfitting fighters with larger calibre guns. For example, they might have decided to go with the Vickers or Browning .5" MG, and/or begun 20mm cannon development sooner.


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## Juha (Aug 3, 2010)

Hello Nikademus
Quote:” 44 weeks was quoted as being start to finish in terms of the total package from neophyte wannabe Fighter Boy to being actively posted in a squadron so this would encompass not only "flying hours" but classroom instruction and lecture covering quote "every aspect of aviation"”

Yes, I’m well aware of that, as shown for ex in my message #91, IIRC at least in some schools half of the pupils flew in mornings and had lectures in afternoons, for the other half it was other way around. But still in summer one tended to have more days suitable to flying than in winter, and there is clear difference in daylight, so at least in theory one could get more flight hours per month in summer than in winter. 

On Hough Richards, I assume You mean their The Battle of Britain book, would you be so kind and inform me the pages on training? I have a copy of their Jubilee History edition, paperback Coronet Edition 1990, they used the results of that survivor survey few times, tried to look info on training from the book but couldn’t find much and went then to look Bowyer’s and Franks’ books. I have always found the survey results interesting.

Even if experience in the actual type they would use in active service is very important one could learn lot by flying in Harvard or in Master or in obsolete fighter like He 51 or Ar 68 as Rall and Meimberg did, if the training incl useful tactics and for ex attack excercises.

Juha


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## Nikademus (Aug 3, 2010)

Juha said:


> Hello Nikademus
> 
> On Hough Richards, I assume You mean their The Battle of Britain book, would you be so kind and inform me the pages on training? I have a copy of their Jubilee History edition, paperback Coronet Edition 1990, they used the results of that survivor survey few times, tried to look info on training from the book but couldn’t find much and went then to look Bowyer’s and Franks’ books. I have always found the survey results interesting.



The bulk of the commentary i posted thus far was drawn from Patrick Bishop's "Fighter Boys". I cross referenced it today with Hough/Patrick [Battle of Britian] looking for more detailed info on "flight hours". Pages 199 - 200 discusses the pilot shortage, OTU and said 1988 sampling of surviviors on actual experiences within the OTU's

Interestingly, the latter book makes mention that the OTU's were only running at 2/3rds capacity as if said shortage did not exist. It echoes Bishop's comments regarding the negative impact of the loss of experienced vets prior to the battle.



> Even if experience in the actual type they would use in active service is very important one could learn lot by flying in Harvard or in Master or in obsolete fighter like He 51 or Ar 68 as Rall and Meimberg did, if the training incl useful tactics and for ex attack excercises.
> 
> Juha



It depends. Eric Bergerud made mention of the big gulf between flying a trainer and a modern high performance aircraft. Ultimately there's no substitute for getting behind the sports car upgraded from the moped.  That problem bit the Japanese hard latewar as attested by their operational loss rate. As long as the pilot isn't rushed through....shouldn't be a problem. Rush through or skip entirely....there's a problem.


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## Juha (Aug 3, 2010)

Hello Nikademus
thanks for the page numbers, same in my copy. 
And yes the 2/3 is Park’s opinion also mentioned Orange’s Park biography.

Yes, real thing is always a real thing, but for ex Master, 715hp Kestrel or 870 hp Mercury, was much nearer 1075 hp fighter than 130 hp elementary trainer. One could throw it around sky very much like a real fighter. So it could be used in fighter tactics training, not sure was it used. Finns used their 420hp Pyry advanced trainer also in that kind of work.

Juha


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## Juha (Aug 5, 2010)

Checked from Wing Leader J.E.J’s case and yes, the important thing in his case was that when it became clear that it wasn’t possible to give to him and to the two other new pilots that had arrived same time extra training in 19 Sqn, they were not sent to combat missions without that extra training but were transferred to 616 Sqn. It was clearly a Class “C” Sqn, see my messages #87 and #106, and the trio and other new pilots who arrived later got extra training there. In fact only an ½ hour after the trio had met the S/L J.E.J was sitting in the cockpit of a Spit ready to took off for an hour flight with the S/L after which the S/L gave to J.E.J lot of advices on combat flying and then began the training in earnest which incl. air to air gunnery training.

Juha


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## The Basket (Aug 7, 2010)

Even if the luftwaffe had flown a 4 engined bomber...the RAF would still have used the 303 as the main gun.

Just the way it is.

Flying a trainer is better than flying nothing.

And also saying the Germans had great tactics...

What about the tactic of wing welding with the bombers...same speed same altitiude...that weren't a great tactic...


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