# MacArthur vs. King



## gjs238 (Aug 28, 2009)

Who was the better strategist?


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## parsifal (Aug 28, 2009)

Afte3r Kings performance in the Atlantic in the early months of the war, he should have been sent to Greenland for the duration. His hatred of the English almost cost the allies the war. 

I have very little good to dsay about King.

Macarthur was perhaps the best strategist of the war, right up there with Mountbatten or Nimitz


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## diddyriddick (Aug 28, 2009)

Sorry, but I'm gonna disagree, Parsifal. MacArthur was monomaniachal in his desire to get back to the Phillipines. Overall strategy suffered for this, in my view.

King.


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## syscom3 (Aug 28, 2009)

parsifal said:


> Afte3r Kings performance in the Atlantic in the early months of the war, he should have been sent to Greenland for the duration. His hatred of the English almost cost the allies the war.
> 
> I have very little good to dsay about King.
> 
> Macarthur was perhaps the best strategist of the war, right up there with Mountbatten or Nimitz



Youre right about King. Good thing he came to his senses.

Macarthur drawback was indeed his obsession for reinvading the PI. Politically he was correct. But the war might have ended sooner had the allies invaded Taiwan/Okinawa/Iwo in 1944 when they had the chances.


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## Glider (Aug 28, 2009)

If I am honest these two were probably amongst the worst US leaders in the war and are amongst the worst in any nation. For that reason I cannot choose between them.


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## syscom3 (Aug 28, 2009)

Glider said:


> If I am honest these two were probably amongst the worst US leaders in the war and are amongst the worst in any nation. For that reason I cannot choose between them.



Why?

They had their faults, but also the capabilities to win when it counted.


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## B-17engineer (Aug 28, 2009)

Glider, you can't call them the worst....atleast MccArthur

"He was... perhaps the most disliked Allied leader of World War II. Only British Field Marshal Montgomery may have had more enemies... King also loved parties and often drank to excess. Apparently, he reserved his charm for the wives of fellow naval officers. On the job, he "seemed always to be angry or annoyed."[25]" 



I do agree King wasn't close to an IDEAL strategist...... You cannot say MacArthur was the worst. 

I will go with MccArthur


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## Ferdinand Foch (Aug 28, 2009)

I gotta say MacArthur to King. King really screwed the merchant marine the first half of 42. I think even Eisenhower said that the war would be a lot better run if somebody shot King, or something like that. 

Can't say I'm a big fan of MacArthur, though. Kind of a pompous @@s. Could have led us into World War Three if Truman didn't put the foot down in Korea.


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## vikingBerserker (Aug 29, 2009)

I'll be honest, I'm still not sure how King ever became an Admiral. He spent more time fighting the Royal Navy, American Army and common sense then he did the Axis.

I have to go with McArthur.


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## Glider (Aug 29, 2009)

syscom3 said:


> Why?
> 
> They had their faults, but also the capabilities to win when it counted.



*First of all General Macarthur*.
He had a habit of getting things wrong and then blaming anyone else, it was a pattern that started well before the war. 

*WW1*
He was divisional commander of the 42nd Division when one of the battalions suffered heavy losses he berated the commander as to why. When told that the battalion lacked artillery support he blamed the artillery commander. He however was the divisional commander and the responsibility for such a failing in planning was his. 

*Between the wars *
At the height of the depression in 1932 thousands of ww1 Veterans with their families who were destitute set up a peaceful camp to ask for monies due to them for service in WW1. Hoover ordered him to clear the camp which he did. He used tanks, mounted cavalry and infantry with fixed bayonets resulting in the death of a number of protestors including women and children. This time he blamed the protestors saying that 90% of the protestors were communists. This was proven by the investigating authorities to be a lie. He also claimed not to have received orders telling him not to clear the camp, a clam which has not been proved. Even if this was true it does not excuse the use of tanks to break up an unarmed crowd. 

*WW2*
When war broke out he had 8 hours warning that an attack was coming and had been expressly ordered to commence defensive and offensive operations. He did nothing. Blame this time was assigned to his air commander who insisted that he had asked permission to launch raids on the Japanese fleet but that permission had been denied. The air commander was also with some reason blamed for not dispersing his aircraft but again, Macarthur was the man in charge, gave no orders and took no action to ensure that preparations had been made.
The pre war plans called for Manila to be abandoned and not defended so no preparation had been made. He decided to fight and this resulted in a large number of US troops and civilians being trapped.
He does get credit for the island hoping campaign but that was little other option, anyone else would have the same solution.
Initially his best troops were Australian and their thanks, was to be excluded from some of the most important fighting towards the end of the war. So much so that RAAF officers threatened to resign their commissions in frustration. He was determined to make the Pacific War an American War, not an allied war.

*War Crimes Trials*
There were some concerns that he was personally involved in these in particular to protect the Emperor from blame. Also in some of the trials for example General Yamashita and in giving immunity to those involved in bacterial warfare tests on prisoners including allied soldiers.

*Korean War*.
The landing at Incheon was an undoubted success but his claim that the war was over at that point was the height of folly. He ignored a number of warning including ones from the Chinese themselves that they would get involved if the advance approached the Yalu river. He took no preparitory actions just in case the Chinese attacked, ordered no extra recce flights to cover the likely formation areas or had any back up plans, the result of which we all know.

So in brief the only bit that worked for him was the Island hopping campaign which he had no option about the rest was less than impressive.


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## gjs238 (Aug 29, 2009)

Glider said:


> *First of all General Macarthur*.
> So in brief the only bit that worked for him was the Island hopping campaign which he had no option about the rest was less than impressive.



Are you sure Macarthur should be given credit for the Island Hopping strategy?


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## Glider (Aug 29, 2009)

He was responsible for one part of the campaign and Nimitz the other so in some way yes he did play a part. The point that I was trying to make was that there was no choice, it was the obvious thing to do and any leader would have done the same. The only alternative would be to take every island regardless of their importance at a huge cost.


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## RabidAlien (Aug 29, 2009)

Wow. Its like choosing candidates in the 2008 Presidential elections again. Neither one a very good choice. I'm gonna bow out of the vote.


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## davebender (Aug 29, 2009)

I have very little good to say about either King or MacArthur. Thanks to their incompetence Japan ran wild in the Pacific during the first 6 months of WWII.


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## diddyriddick (Aug 29, 2009)

davebender said:


> I have very little good to say about either King or MacArthur. Thanks to their incompetence Japan ran wild in the Pacific during the first 6 months of WWII.



That is a stretch. Especially for King, who inherited a mess after the Pearl Harbor debacle.


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## davebender (Aug 29, 2009)

The US lost nothing of importance at Pearl Harbor except their self confidence. We still had as many CVs as Japan plus more battleships, cruisers, destroyers, land based aircraft and infantry divisions available for immediate deployment. 

HyperWar: Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-42 [Appendix G]
The U.S. military had 529,164 tons of shipping in the Pacific as of Nov 30,1941. This doubled to 1,294,919 tons by Feb 28, 1942. The quantity of available shipping continued to increase through May 1942. 

There was nothing to prevent the USN from transporting ground troops and fighter squadrons from San Francisco to places like the Solomon Islands, Gilbert Islands and Rabaul during December 1941. All the pieces were in place except competent leadership.


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## B-17engineer (Aug 29, 2009)

Nothing of importance? 2,000 men, ships and aircraft are nothing of importance. OK.


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## parsifal (Aug 29, 2009)

Pearl was a military defeat that allowed the Japanese to overrun the whole of South East Asia. It tipped the immediate military balance so heavily in favour of the Japanese that the US was unable to contemplate any sort of relief effort for many months. That applied to every class of warship, including carriers, and every category of aircraft. 

Immediately after the raid the US only possesed three carriers in the Pacific, the Enterprise, Lexington and Saratoga. Saratoga was soon to be put out of action for months asa result of a torpedo hit. The other ships of the US Carrier fleet were not in the theatre, and most of them were short of CAG components.

The Japanese possessed 6 fleet and 4 Light carriers. Every one of the Fleet carriers was at full fighting efficiency with a more or less full complement of aircraft. My opinion is that the USN was simply not ready at that point in time to undertake any significant offensive action until the serious deficiencies in the fleet had been addressed. This process was seriously delayed by the attack at Pearl. 

In the air the Japanese demonstrated time and again their marked superiority. On average, the allies were losing approximately five aircraft for every one allied. That included the losses being suffered by the US (the only exceptions I can think to that observati0on were the operations of the US carriers).

Above all else, Pearl drove home the realization that Japan was a first class veteran opponent that had been badly underestimated. The US never made that mistake again for the rest of the war. Only after the war did the notions that the Japanese were inferior to the west, easily beaten, arise. We would do well to take heed of the original wartime lessons in this regard


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## syscom3 (Aug 29, 2009)

Considering on what happened to the Repluse and the POW, theres nothing the US surface fleet could have done to change the course of events for the several months after pearl.

Any of the slow BB's that would have sortied into the Central Pacific would have been sunk without much effort by the Japanese in deep waters and would have been lost for good.


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## davebender (Aug 30, 2009)

> nothing the US surface fleet could have done to change the course of events for the several months after pearl.


How about transporting ground troops to garrison strategically important islands? These units were certified combat ready and sitting in California awaiting transport to the Philippines:

41st Infantry Division. Ship to Rabaul.
34th Infantry Regiment. Ship to Guadalcanal.
161st Infantry Regiment. Ship to Tarawa.

These transport missions, conducted with no enemy opposition during December 1941, would likely shorten the Pacific War by a year.


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## renrich (Aug 30, 2009)

The problem in comparing Mac and King is that both are hard to view with out intense emotion. Both had their faults but both also were competent in some ways. IMO MacArthur, despite his egotism was one of the great leaders in US history.


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## parsifal (Aug 30, 2009)

davebender said:


> How about transporting ground troops to garrison strategically important islands? These units were certified combat ready and sitting in California awaiting transport to the Philippines:
> 
> 41st Infantry Division. Ship to Rabaul.
> 34th Infantry Regiment. Ship to Guadalcanal.
> ...





None of these formations could be considered combat ready in any sense of the word. 

Moreover, it is simply untrue that there was no opposition in the areas wher you are proposing to send the formations. 

In the case of Tarawa, they are in range of the anti-shipping units based at Kwaj and the Marshall islands generally. Whilst I dont doubt that the forces could get ashore, keeping them supplied would have been problematic. In the case of the 41st and the 34th Divisions, there simply was not the transport available at that time to undertake such a large sealift. In 1941 there was barely 500000 tons of shipping available, this had roughly tripled by the end of February. However it would have taken time to assemble and load these units, so it would probably be midMarch before the unit could sail. 

If a more realistic lift is adopted and an RCT is sent in for these formations, they probably would have made it in time for Rabaul, but lacking any sort of proper taining, or Jungle skill, they would have been bagged with ease. The Japanese had already demonstrated the ease with which untrained troops could be dispatched by their seasoned veterans, and ther is nothing to suggest that these green formations would have done any better at all. The RCT that was already there could not stop the Japanese at that time, and this formation had far more experience than eithe the 34th or the 41st.

And supply of these formations would have been well nigh impossible, and would have placed the inexperienced US fleet, particularly her carriers at great risk whilst undertaking the deperate re-supply efforts that would have been required. And even Guadacanal would have been under sever blockade, with the Americans enjoying none of the advantages that the airfield and secure (relatively) supply lines gave their troops in August.

Far from shortening the war this strategy would have lengthened it. Instead if sending these formations off to be trained as they needed to be, they would have been thrown into battle green, and in all probability lost, along with a sizable portion of the US fleet as it tried to resupply and support them. The later campaigns in NG would have faltered and possibly stalled by their absence.


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## Juha (Aug 30, 2009)

Agree with Parsifal
Rabaul was important in Dec 41 but Tarawa and Guadalcanal became important only after Japanese occupied them and begun built airfields on them. Even in 43 US knowledge on Tarawa was very limited, that was one of the reasons why Betio landing was so close run thing. And even if there were US troops on Tarawa, what would have hindered Japanese occupation Makin and other atols they occupied in the area? On Guadalcanal, Japanese could have landed on a neighboring island or on Guadalcanal away from US base, as they did later even there was a USMC division there.

Juha


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## syscom3 (Aug 30, 2009)

One thing that does give credit to both of them:

King over saw the expansion and manning of the USN to a size that we will never see again. Just the issues involved in the planning, construction, logistics, training of the fleet was something that required a commander with an incredible talent for planning and identifying subordinates who could carry out his vision and responsibilities.

Mac gets the nod from me for being one fast learner and being adaptable to make the most of what what was given him. He may have been a megalomaniac, but he delivered when he had too.


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## renrich (Aug 30, 2009)

Sys, excellent summation that cuts to the meat. The only people who never make mistakes are those who never do anything.


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## Glider (Aug 31, 2009)

syscom3 said:


> One thing that does give credit to both of them:
> 
> King over saw the expansion and manning of the USN to a size that we will never see again. Just the issues involved in the planning, construction, logistics, training of the fleet was something that required a commander with an incredible talent for planning and identifying subordinates who could carry out his vision and responsibilities.
> 
> Mac gets the nod from me for being one fast learner and being adaptable to make the most of what what was given him. He may have been a megalomaniac, but he delivered when he had too.



I have to agree re King which is a pretty major change to my original understanding and position says he eating considerable portions of humble pie. There is little doubt that his reaction to Operation Drumbeat was little more than a disaster and his anti british feelings were not exactly helpfull when co operation was needed. However that said, he did do good things in the Pacific and pre war had a major part in increasing the number of naval aviators which was very important once war broke out. 
So as long as you keep him away from the British or anti submarine warfare, he was pretty good.

However we will have to agree to disagree over MacArthur I don't see him as being a slow learner let alone a fast learner. The mistakes he made in Korea are very similar to the ones he made at the start of WW2. He was warned that an attack was on its way (WW2) or was likely to come (Korea), took no action, attack took place result, total chaos.


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