# Game changers!



## Kryten (Oct 21, 2011)

Whilst we all love to debate the merits of favourite planes, few can be regarded as being designs that changed the way the war was fought in Europe.
for instance whilst the Spitfire and Me109 were capable aircraft neither was a "game changer" that forced rapid development or change of tactics on the enemy.

off the top of my head I can think of four that did:-

the FW190,
It's appearance on the western front put the Luftwaffe in a position of technical superiority over the MkV Spit and drove development of newer and faster Spits, along with more powerfull designs.
as far as I know it was over six months before the MkIX Spit came into service that resored the balance.
In many of the memoirs of fighter pilots I have seen mentions of the overnight change of attitude of the Luftwaffe pilots, I believe it was Al Deere who stated "it was suprising to see the way the FW pilots stayed around and got stuck into the fight when hunched behind the controls of a 190, a marked difference to the one pass and dive away tactics of the 109's, sound tactics when fighting spits in a 109"

The Mosquito
This fast light bomber and fighter bomber gave the Allies an ability to take the fight to the enemy and had the speed to survive in hostile skies, a marked contrast to earlier designs.
it's performance led to Goering commenting on allied technical superiority in the air and the forming of a unit dedicated to intercepting these aircraft.

P51,
At last the Allies fielded a highly capable aircraft that had the range to escort the bomber all the way to Berlin, we can spend all day debating the relative strengths and weaknesses of differing types but the ability to fly an advanced escort fighter that distance made a considerable change to losses and morale on both sides.

ME262
the nail in the piston engined aircrafts coffin, it may have been no dog fighter but that was irrelevant as the bomber is the true instrument of air power and these aircraft were the perfect answer to the bomber, if enough of these could have been produced, pilots trained and fuel produced, the air war could have been tipped on its head as the threat they would have meant to the daylight bombing campaign would no doubt have prolonged the war, probably the biggest game changer of them all.


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## fastmongrel (Oct 21, 2011)

Agree with all the above but can I add 1 more the VLR (very long range) Liberators that closed the Atlantic gap and neutered the U boat threat. No Liberators, possibly no D Day or at least a much later one.

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## Kryten (Oct 21, 2011)

thats a good one, strategically very important!


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## buffnut453 (Oct 21, 2011)

How about the Zero? The B-29? To be a bit different, I'd also add the early radar-equipped nightfighter Blenheims.

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## Thorlifter (Oct 21, 2011)

I would throw in the appearance of the Corsair and Hellcat in the pacific. Until then, the Wildcat and P-40 were taking on the Japanese and had a kill ratio of, at best, 3-1. The Corsair had a 12-1 and the Hellcat was 15-1 kill ratio (if memory serves, please correct me if I'm wrong).


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## drgondog (Oct 21, 2011)

Kryten - I wouldn't modify your list. Each entry did in fact change the game and force a specific new set of tactics and development in an attempt to offset.


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## krieghund (Oct 21, 2011)

I agree with the list for Europe

However, to a much larger magnitude was the paradigm shift in the Pacific of the Zero-sen fighter. The current western thought of the agrarian culture of Japan is that they were incapable of producing any technology that could match up to what the west could produce and thus we were confident that behind our technology we were safe and could not be challenged. Even after being engaged the western powers had to invent stories that they just copied our technology to justify our paradigm of technical superiority.

It was the Japanese leader's confidence in their new weapons that gave them the courage to take on the world. A few screw ups on their part enabled us to have the time to surpass and then out produce them.

Thus I believe the Zero was a game changer.

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## pbfoot (Oct 21, 2011)

fastmongrel said:


> Agree with all the above but can I add 1 more the VLR (very long range) Liberators that closed the Atlantic gap and neutered the U boat threat. No Liberators, possibly no D Day or at least a much later one.


Of all the aircraft I would choose the B24 as the biggest game changer as for the reasons set out above . An often forgotten part of the war is how the 24 changed ASW


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## renrich (Oct 21, 2011)

I believe that Krieghund hit the nail on the head. The A6M could be places no other fighter in the world could be and when it got there was better than any other fighter it would encounter. As far as fighters go, it was better in 1941-42 than the F2A, F4F, P40, P39, Hurricane and Spitfire, to name a few. Overall it outperformed all of those in ACM and none of it's prey could come close to matching it's range. It would have been extremely difficult for the Japanese strategy in the first six months of the war to have been successful without the Zeke. On top of that, as I pointed out the other day in another thread. The Zeke I saw landing at our airport two Mondays ago was one beautiful fighter. Way ahead of it's time in looks with the exception of the 109 and Spit.

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## buffnut453 (Oct 21, 2011)

Although in terms of Japan's strategic objectives, the much-forgotten Ki-43 did more damage than the Zero. It was the Ki-43 that won air superiority over Malaya that ultimately enabled Japanese victory over Singapore and the onward assault into the Dutch East Indies. That said, I already added the Zero in my earlier post.


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## renrich (Oct 21, 2011)

The KI43 was a formidable opponent and instrumental in the early Japanese success and it did all that with only two 12.7 MGs. However, the Zeke was unique in the world in that it had a combat radius of 300 miles off a carrier. That was twice that of the F4F.

Thorlifter, I doubt the F4F or P40 ever had a kill ratio of 3-1 over the Zeke. Lundstrom, whose books are heavily researched says that the F4F in November, 1942 had a roughly even ratio with A6Ms, which was chiefly due to superior tactics by USN pilots. I doubt the P40 did as well. The FM2s later in the war may have done a little better as the quality of the IJN pilots declined.


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## TheMustangRider (Oct 21, 2011)

The B-29, in my opinion, was a game changer towards the end of the war.
It enable the USAAF to bomb Japanese soil from bases as far as India and China and helped to put pressure on the Japanese while B-29 crews and the B-29s themselves evolved and became more proficient during the campaign.
The Superfort devastated Japanese cities, destroyed a great percentage of its war industries, cut off the home islands from their remaining maritime supply lines and by delivering the world's first nuclear weapons, it set the rules for American air power in the looming Cold War.


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## davebender (Oct 21, 2011)

The 1940 German invasion of Norway would have been impossible without it. So would the 1941 invasion of Crete. Without the Ju-52 transport the 1942 Demyansk Pocket becomes a German defeat instead of a German victory. Probably quite a few other encirclement battles also. Ju-52 transports were crucial in allowing Luftwaffe fighter and bomber units to rapidly relocate to other airfields, allowing CAS to keep pace with Heer units on the move. 

The USA took these lessons to heart, producing a massive C-47 fleet to support both themselves and Britain. But it was the Ju-52 that got there first.


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## nuuumannn (Oct 21, 2011)

The B-29 Superfortress, but not just for the reasons mentioned elsewhere; the impact I'm talking about was felt largely post-war, but it is important nevertheless. During the war the Russians had requested B-29s but were denied them. Three landed in Russian soil during the war and by a miracle of patient examining and analysis (not to mention the pressure of the NKVD on their backs), the Tupolev engineers reverse engineered what was one of the most complex aircraft that existed in the world at that time. The impact of the B-29 on Russian (Soviet) aviation was astounding; new methods and materials were developed from it in the manufacture of aircraft and components, quality control was essential for the close tolerace fits of many of the components, the automated gunnery systems - extraordinarily sophisticated, the pressurisation system, and more.

Every big bomber and transport that appeared in the post-war Soviet Union benefitted enormously from the work that Tupolev did in reverse engineering the B-29. Yeah, we can write them off as copy cats, but Russia was a nation of farmers and tractor builders, but with fine engineering expertise at their availability; they were an industrially backward nation by comparison to the USA (largely thanks to the Soviets and their terrible collectivisation farming programs and Stalin's purges - but we won't go into that here), so, technologically the Tu-4 was a massive step forward for them. You could argue that it directly led to an escalation in the cold war with Curtis Le May's perceived 'Bomber Gap'. Game changer indeed.


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## Thorlifter (Oct 21, 2011)

renrich said:


> The KI43 was a formidable opponent and instrumental in the early Japanese success and it did all that with only two 12.7 MGs. However, the Zeke was unique in the world in that it had a combat radius of 300 miles off a carrier. That was twice that of the F4F.
> 
> Thorlifter, I doubt the F4F or P40 ever had a kill ratio of 3-1 over the Zeke. Lundstrom, whose books are heavily researched says that the F4F in November, 1942 had a roughly even ratio with A6Ms, which was chiefly due to superior tactics by USN pilots. I doubt the P40 did as well. The FM2s later in the war may have done a little better as the quality of the IJN pilots declined.



I thought so, but since I was shooting from the hip, I couldn't remember exactly. I was actually thinking 1:1 or 2:1. Thanks for the input, but that further enforces my belief that the F4U and F6F were game changers to the benefit of the American's as the Zero was to the Japanese.


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## pbfoot (Oct 21, 2011)

There was front in WW2 that lasted from 39-45 and that was the Battle of the Atlantic and for the first 4 years there was ahuge hole in the centre that lacked air cover , they placed Catalinas , Canso, wellingtons Sunderlands and all sorts of sundry aircraft from Iceland , Newfoundland the Orlneys and all possible points in between to try and plug this hole where U-boats could safely surface, gather and set up unhindered for attacks on convoys and along came the Liberator and its use certainly helped put a nail in the Uboats coffin


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## vanir (Oct 21, 2011)

The Yak-9 was a game changer for the VVS as it epitomises the period where Soviets matched contemporary Me-109 performance with general issue fighters (frontal aviation), the position shared by the La-5 which matches or exceeds Fw-190A performance.
Their other game changer would be the Il2 of course, unlike any other tactical bomber force they stood up penetrating enemy controlled airspace to perform routine missions, around Smolensk they became known as Black Death according to the Russians, despite air cover when they approached all your vehicles and installations were about to go up in black smoke.


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## nuuumannn (Oct 22, 2011)

Not strictly the same, but I put forward aircraft equipped with the cavity magnetron - or at least centimetric radar. Over the North Atlantic RAF aircraft fitted with ASV (Air to Surface Vessel) radar (this is what _really_ tipped the balance in favour of the Allies against the U-boats) were able to intecept U-boats long before the U-boat was aware it was being stalked. Over Enemy territory, British heavy bombers equipped with H2S ground mapping radar were able to make their way to their targets and bomb them more accurately than before, British night fighters fitted with AI (Air Interception) Mk.IV radar had the advantage over German bombers over the UK, and last but not least, post-war, the humble mcrowave oven - melted cheese on soggy bread, anyone?


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## vanir (Oct 22, 2011)

One of my favourite warbirds, the unsung Arado Ar196A-3 was a nice little gamechanger for the Kriegsmarine. Germany didn't have any dedicated maritime air force which should've terribly disadvantaged them, but a combination of specialised Luftwaffe maritime formations and the little Ar196 in Kriegsmarine hands made a pretty good combination, whilst not on the same footing as Allied naval air forces, at least competent in the midwar period for limited operations.

So I'll put the Ar-196A-3 forward as another game changer, the Kriegsmarine had a slit throat without them.


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## Siegfried (Oct 22, 2011)

nuuumannn said:


> Not strictly the same, but I put forward aircraft equipped with the cavity magnetron - or at least centimetric radar. Over the North Atlantic RAF aircraft fitted with ASV (Air to Surface Vessel) radar (this is what _really_ tipped the balance in favour of the Allies against the U-boats) were able to intecept U-boats long before the U-boat was aware it was being stalked. Over Enemy territory, British heavy bombers equipped with H2S ground mapping radar were able to make their way to their targets and bomb them more accurately than before, British night fighters fitted with AI (Air Interception) Mk.IV radar had the advantage over German bombers over the UK, and last but not least, post-war, the humble mcrowave oven - melted cheese on soggy bread, anyone?




The increased attrition that occurred in 1943 to u-boats has several causes:
1 Breaking of the 4 rotor enigma shark code in December 1942.
2 Introduction of ASV Mk.III centimetric PPI radar in march 43 (though metric Mk II was also effective).
3 The curtailing of the German microwave program in December 1942 with many personnel drafted into the army. This greatly muted the German response since they had to be recalled from duty nevertheless they had radar warning detectors in service by September 43 only 6 months after ASV.III first use. The Germans own microwave program was producing 25kW pulses at 18cm from magnetrons and could produced microwaves down to 20cm from the LD6 triode and a little bit latter down to 11cm at 12kW from the LD7 triode. General Martini, who headed German counter measures effort had in fact protested the shutdown and tried to get it reopened in Jan 43 "inorder to be prepared for the enemy". Two weeks latter the H2S was recovered from a shot down Stirling near Rotterdam Holland.

The continuation of u-boat losses after the introduction of radar warning receivers reflects partially the success of code breaking but also the time it took to develop u-boats equipped with all the other features needed: masthead stealth, snorkels and I think most importantly a u-boat that can stay down for days at speed.

There were also other improvements such as long range aircraft, better depth charges, hedgehog etc.

It think even with the earlier ASV.II the u-boast were in trouble to the extent that they could not have operated on the surface.


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## Ratsel (Oct 23, 2011)

I'll throw in a "Coulda been a Contenda" : Focke-Wulf Ta 400 Focke-Wulf Ta 400 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia







scale model ready for windtunnel testing


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## vanir (Oct 23, 2011)

My every instinct sees a suddenly manifesting German strategic airforce in the late war to be an industrial fantasy, but you gotta love the designs.

Most realistic basis of a budding strategic fleet would've been Ju-390 production in 43, but you're already running five years behind the US with 1/100th its industry and they aren't being bombed. The Amerika bomber project was just another one of those things that convinced OKH/OKL that Hitler was indeed simply insane. But a strategic air force might've been nice in Apr42 when it could've assaulted Soviet Ural industry and oil supply. As a maritime aircraft it could've helped the Kriegsmarine blockade the British isles too.

One of the reasons the US leapt into the European war more than the Pacific, using Pearl Harbour as justification was because some urgency existed not so much that Britain was under any serious threat, but if it could be sieged and starved into submission in the Battle of the Atlantic, any invasion of Europe would have to come through the Med. Look how bad Italy turned out as it was. Losing Britain would be disastrous. And the Soviet Union was physically vast with mountain ranges and every type of climate and terrain from desert to arctic.

Just both those two points alone should've had Hitler tearing his hair out back in 1938 screaming for a strategic air force. Yet oddly it was these two only real obstacles to total domination that Hitler in fact utterly dismissed as any kind of serious problem or challenge.


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## Siegfried (Oct 24, 2011)

It's difficult to see that an “Amerika Bomber” able to penetrate up to 1000km into the entire east coast could be a 'game changer' that could seriously threaten the USA's industry or moral. It could however force a significant defence expenditure on home protection. It would come at a very heavy price for the Luftwaffe crews that flew these aircraft into combat. It would also tend to irritate and anger Americans though I doubt psychologically things would change in the 8th airforce's treatment of Germany.

To penetrate during the day a large 'critical mass' of say 200 aircraft would be needed, an almost impossible resource. Even then they would suffer serverly at the hands of swarms of P-47D and P-38L. This aircraft is only suitable for night missions.

The main benefit of such a 'bomber' would be its potential as a maritime patrol and reconnaissance bomber able to properly support u-boat operations while able to survive escort carriers aircraft and various aircraft such as Beaufighters and Mosquitos. The would attack and harass Allied ASW aircraft.
Fly missions to Japan for exchange of technology and special materials.

The only aircraft the Luftwaffe had were derivatives of transports; the FW 200 and Ju 290 and not really up to the task.

The Ju 290 was a direct derivative of the Ju 90 (the first Ju 290 was built out of the Ju 90 prototype) transport which itself was a spin off of the Ju 89 bomber of 1937. the Ju 290 was on the verge of being able to do a one way mission while the Ju 390 could get part way back.

Had the Luftwaffe properly developed the Ju 89 through to a Ju 289, thereby not burdening the aircraft with the bulky transport fuselage it might have had its aircraft.

The He 277, which was flying in Jan 1944 in its developed form as the He 277B5 was expected to have a range of 6900 miles with 3 tons of bombs, just enough to reach the coast of America.

Me 264 ran into runway issues. It could do the mission but a 10000ft concrete runway was in dreamland in those days and a big target. More powerful engines however did become available but by then it was too late.

The Ta 400 didn't have the runaway issue but had a fuel efficiency issue. It too became plausible as new powerful engines such as the Jumo 213 and DB603L became available that could get the huge fuel loads of the ground.

In the end the Luftwaffe realised piston bombers were not survivable, switched to high flying jets that were to be in flight refuelled.

A series of experiments over the years culminated with succesfull hookups between Ju 290's and Ju 390 in 1943 proved the concept could work.


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## Siegfried (Oct 24, 2011)

*Another “Game changer” was the radio proximity fuse.*
The USA fielded them at the end of 1942 on USN ships.

The British carried out tests that were terminated in 1942 since by that time the US fuse was a production state. They detonated shells by remote control. The shells were tracked by embedded corner reflector by microwave radar and detonated by an extra long radar pulse when the target and shell signals merged.

Of course while this was a game changer for the allies and helped defeat the kamikaze onslaught and the V1 attacks it would have been more of a game changer for the Germans since it was a defensive weapon.

The Germans never deployed but successfully tested proximity fuse shells fired from guns at the beginning of the war 1939; perhaps even beforehand. They shut down their program after some success because the fuses didn't have enough range (2m or so it seems). (Its not true that they couldn't shock harden them, they were already in use in bomb fuses). They reactivated their program towards the end of the war and got to about 10m - 15m range. There are tantalising accounts of them being used as part of Artillery (detonating 1m from the ground) and of an officer being sent to retrieve a shell fuse for use on the V2 warhead.)

*Had they have introduced a proximity fuse in 1943 the following would have happened:
1 FLAK kills would go up by a factor of 3-4 or more forcing operation at much higher altitudes.
2 The B-24 Liberators low service ceiling vs the B-17 would make it's use unviable.*

The Germans shell fuses were were (mainly) electrostatic fuses that used a vacuum tube known as a cold cathode thyratron or triode. It's not strictly a vacuum tube as it is filled with low pressure argon gas. (they apparently had radar type thermionic tubes in development as well)

Basically a small antenna a little less than the radius of the shell (eg 44mm being half of 88mm) is trailed from the tip of the nose of the shell. As the shell is rotating at several hundred RPM and the antenna passes through the static field created by the aircraft and its disturbance of the shells own field the antenna senses an alternating current. This is filtered (about 1kHz as per rotation of the shell depending on rifling) and applied to the control anode (or “grid”) of the tube which then 'fires' and discharges electricity from a capacitor that had been pre-charged into a link which blows and detonates the shell.

Since the cold cathode tube does not consume electricity till it is triggered there is no need for a shock hardened battery; a capacitor pre-charged before firing or even in the barrel is enough. 

It must have been an exceedingly cheap fuse, it also had a nose contact switch as a backup fuse.

Using the same technology they were also working on electrically programmable time fuses for FLAK. In this a capacitor in the shell is charged to the desired level, ideally while still in the barrel. When the shell is fired the acceleration closes a switch which discharges the capacitor into a second capacitor via a resistor. When the second capacitor reaches a certain level the cold cathode thyratron fires. The work was centred not on making the fuse work (it worked ) but on getting the high accuracy required consistantly.

There is a little info here:
http://www.cdvandt.org/CIOS-XXXI-50.pdf
This is from the tube designers not the fuze manufacturer and so is quite vague, there were several other tube companies involved as well.


There is a little here in section 13 of a broader program.
http://www.cdvandt.org/CIOS-XXXII-87.pdf

There is supposedly a more complete report here but I've never been able to find it:
CIOS report ITEM no 3 file no XXVI -1 1945 which looks at Rheinmetall-Borsig who
were actually designing, test firing and building the fuses.


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## NZTyphoon (Oct 24, 2011)

What about the good old DC-3/C-47/Goonybird? As an airliner the DC-1, 2, 3 series changed the game for commercial aircraft; without it the Allies would have struggled to supply their troops in the field, would have had difficulty dropping paratroops, towing gliders etc etc - was there any other aircraft type which could have done the same job for the Allies, and was involved in every theatre of war during WW2?


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## Siegfried (Oct 24, 2011)

NZTyphoon said:


> What about the good old DC-3/C-47/Goonybird? As an airliner the DC-1, 2, 3 series changed the game for commercial aircraft; without it the Allies would have struggled to supply their troops in the field, would have had difficulty dropping paratroops, towing gliders etc etc - was there any other aircraft type which could have done the same job for the Allies, and was involved in every theatre of war during WW2?



As they say amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics.

I did an analysis once of how much fuel was needed to deliver 1 ton of cargo 1000km for a Ju 52/3m and a DC3. The DC3 used signifcantly less fuel and of course had a longer range. It wasn't an easy comparison as fuel capacity and engine power signicantly improved the Ju 52 and closed the gap somewhat.

The idea was to see if the DC3 could've supplied the 300-500 tons daily the German Army in Stalingrad needed. The Ju 52 probably had slightly better STOL and rough field performance but the logisical problems of supply goods from 1200 miles (distance Berlin to Stalingrad) as well as the fuel needed was complicated by the Ju 52 need to refuel at least once even twice on the way to the destination and its greater needed for fuel which coomplicates the amount of fuel needed at the staging airport. 

The replacement for the Ju 52 was supposed to be the Ju 252, it had extremely good performance and could have flown from Berlin to Stalingrad with 2.5 tons of cargo and returned without refueling, but only a few dozen were ever made.

The DC3 made a difference because it was a perfect combination of quality and quantity.


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## davparlr (Oct 24, 2011)

vanir said:


> One of the reasons the US leapt into the European war more than the Pacific, using Pearl Harbour as justification



Actually, the justification of US going to war in Europe was Germany declaring war on the US.



NZTyphoon said:


> What about the good old DC-3/C-47/Goonybird? As an airliner the DC-1, 2, 3 series changed the game for commercial aircraft; without it the Allies would have struggled to supply their troops in the field, would have had difficulty dropping paratroops, towing gliders etc etc - was there any other aircraft type which could have done the same job for the Allies, and was involved in every theatre of war during WW2?


The C-46, although there was not as many available at the start of the war. The C-46 was more capable.


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## vanir (Oct 24, 2011)

Yeah good point dave, I do that, dunno when to stop adding afterthoughts that aren't really thought through.


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## michaelmaltby (Oct 24, 2011)

"... Design work was begun in 1943, much of it being carried out by French technicians working for Focke Wulf at Châtillon-sous-Bagneux near Paris, with contracts for design and construction of major components being awarded to German, French, and Italian companies in an attempt to speed the process and begin construction of prototypes as soon as possible." [Wikipedia above]

Most interesting ... fore shadowing the future. 

MM


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## Ratsel (Oct 24, 2011)

Like the Americans bombing Tokyo after Pearl Harbor, if the Germans could bomb New York, Washington, Boston, etc., with the TA 400 it instill the same fear, no? if then perhaps London, Moscow.. all on the same day. It wouldn't win the war for the Germans, but perhaps a _conditional_ surrender? Germany was already lost. Save whats left. My opinion anyways.


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## michaelmaltby (Oct 24, 2011)

"... It wouldn't win the war for the Germans, but perhaps a conditional surrender? "

In truth - the only target is Allied Leadership. Japan could have taken many more "hits" but, to his credit, *The Emperor* and like-minded Japanese spoke to the reality Japan was facing - and ordered "unconditional surrender". * Leadership* - if a nuclear device took out Stalin, for example, the Soviets _might_ stumble ...over succession and Leadership. Perhaps ... . Whereas ... if Churchill or Roosevelt were taken out - behind those men is broad leadership in depth.

MM


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## davparlr (Oct 24, 2011)

I think if you look at the American bomber offensive in 1943, before long range escort capability, it was reeling and close to termination. The Fw-400 would be met by a far more formidable defense with no support. And that if the thing actually worked. And, the resorces required would come from a far more stressed defense industry than the one attacked.


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## Siegfried (Oct 24, 2011)

davparlr said:


> Actually, the justification of US going to war in Europe was Germany declaring war on the US.
> 
> QUOTE]
> 
> ...


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## davparlr (Oct 24, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> The justification for Germany declaring war was, among other things, 6 months of the US Navy escorting British convoys, depth charging u-boats in doing so and protecting them from the German surface fleet. These escorts were eventually extended in range and almost reached the West coast of Ireland. These were called "neutrality patrols" though they weren't really neutral as I can't imagine them protecting a German blockade runner. During this time u-boat commanders were ordered not to attack a US ship unless in direct self protection in order to try and keep the US out of the war. Hitler’s declaration of war immediately following Pearl Harbour merely formalised what was already happening. Roosevelt's direction in involving the US against Germany seems clear in hindsight however most US people had a neutralist attitude, wanted to stay out of European barabarism and he couldn't directly involve the US on Britain's side should he wish to have done so.
> 
> Hitler might have avoided declaring war and suffered the neutrality patrols and US "lend lease" (which gave arms in return for leasing British Bases for 100 years or so) and watched the US turn more of its military towards Japan.


The justification for the US going to war with Germany was indeed Germany declaring war on the US. I have heard that one of the primary reasons Hitler declared war on the US was his hope that Japan would honor its obligation by declaring war on Russia and easing the fight on the eastern front. Japan, having already been slapped by Russia once was not eager to do this.


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## nuuumannn (Oct 24, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> The increased attrition that occurred in 1943 to u-boats has several causes:
> 1 Breaking of the 4 rotor enigma shark code in December 1942.
> 2 Introduction of ASV Mk.III centimetric PPI radar in march 43 (though metric Mk II was also effective).
> 
> ...



If we are going into specifics, yes, I agree, but centimetric radar was the theme of my thread; my point was, aircraft equipped with it contributed hugely to the victory over the Germans, not just over the Atlantic.



> 3 The curtailing of the German microwave program in December 1942 with many personnel drafted into the army. This greatly muted the German response since they had to be recalled from duty nevertheless they had radar warning detectors in service by September 43 only 6 months after ASV.III first use. The Germans own microwave program was producing 25kW pulses at 18cm from magnetrons and could produced microwaves down to 20cm from the LD6 triode and a little bit latter down to 11cm at 12kW from the LD7 triode. General Martini, who headed German counter measures effort had in fact protested the shutdown and tried to get it reopened in Jan 43 "inorder to be prepared for the enemy". Two weeks latter the H2S was recovered from a shot down Stirling near Rotterdam Holland.



Now, you're just being a smartie pants.  Sorry, talk of LD6 triodes means gibberish to me; I'm a simple spanner turner. Nevertheless, the German program did nothing to prevent their U-boats' defeat.

Another thing of interest that could have produced dividends for the Germans was Walther's closed cycle motor powered U-boats. U792 and U794 were both launched in 1943, but this isn't a discussion of the Battle of the Atlantic; maybe you could open one?


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## Siegfried (Oct 25, 2011)

@ nuumannn

The magnetron and microwave radar were indeed game changers. However that the Germans "didn't" have them (Untill very late in the war) was more decisive to the war than the fact that the allies "did" have them. It was the Germans that needed microwave radar due to its abillity to avoid jamming more easily. The allies on the other hand could more easily have lived without it. I rather suspect that H2S was of little value as it seems to have had shockingly poor accuracy. Previus ASV 2 radar (metric) sent a beam out along each wing; the opperator would see a blip on an A-scope on either the left or right as the aircraft swept past. The aircraft could then turn towards the contact and use a second antena one the nose (which was also in use all the time). Of course the classic "PPI" display is easier to use but ASV2 worked. 

The Germans did have a microwave program, but they were in no hurry to make use of it as their existing radars worked quite well and they were short of resources. In 1942 they suspended a great deal of work in favour of advancing existing radars despite having some magnetrons that would have worked, not as good as the Allied stuff but good enough. They paid a high price for this.

Interestingly the Japanese invented a magnetron Before the British and introduced 10cm radar as early as 1942. However they just relatively slowly on the engineering front and with only 400 radars in used missed an opportunity.


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## vanir (Oct 25, 2011)

davparlr said:


> The justification for the US going to war with Germany was indeed Germany declaring war on the US. I have heard that one of the primary reasons Hitler declared war on the US was his hope that Japan would honor its obligation by declaring war on Russia and easing the fight on the eastern front. Japan, having already been slapped by Russia once was not eager to do this.



This was exactly what I read by a historian who published the Nomohan incident. Interesting stuff, but my impressions of the Japanese point of view it apparently wasn't burned fingers, it was just sheer lack of incentive. Part of the general staff wanted to cut the south pacific from Japanese war plans anyway, but once they moved in that direction there was no possible way they could start a third major battlefront against the Siberian/Kazak troupé. These were well equipped with tanks and modern artillery, they found that out at Kalkin Gol.
So the Japanese thought ahead, saw no incentive and moved in a direction which precluded the suggestion.


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## Njaco (Oct 25, 2011)

davparlr said:


> The justification for the US going to war with Germany was indeed Germany declaring war on the US. I have heard that one of the primary reasons Hitler declared war on the US was his hope that Japan would honor its obligation by declaring war on Russia and easing the fight on the eastern front.* Japan, having already been slapped by Russia once was not eager to do this*.



Dave, can you explain as I have not heard of this. I thought Japan won in 1905 unless there was another conflict I'm not aware of.


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## Milosh (Oct 25, 2011)

Njaco said:


> Dave, can you explain as I have not heard of this. I thought Japan won in 1905 unless there was another conflict I'm not aware of.



Battles of Khalkhin Gol, 11 May – 16 September 1939

Battles of Khalkhin Gol - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## vanir (Oct 25, 2011)

It actually started off by the Nomohan incident though. China was in civil war...sort of, it had broken into warring states because the Kuomintang went utterly corrupt and leapt onto individual wealth opportunities, the whole place was a shambles. The Yellow River Valley traditionalists, the real old world Chinese from the prehistoric age, those guys got together and decided to form a local nationalist party. They went in with the Russians for materiél support, so they became the Communists, at this stage (and until after the war) they elected to play the part of a Soviet satellite. They always intended to function as the local nationalist party replacing the fallen kuomintang basically. After the war they simply declared themselves "Chinese Communists and not Soviet" which is when Russia stopped giving them lend lease surplus MiGs and started charging up front.

Anyway Japan had planned on reinstating the Q'ing Dynasty as a puppet so they were a bit miffed the Soviets went in with the Chinese. If it wasn't for them, they would've walked through the European Treaty Ports and never looked back, but the press towards the Yellow River Valley is ultimately what committed the Japanese Army resources it did for the entire war period, it was a drain on the South Pacific and Pacific Rim operation they couldn't afford, it prevented sustained reinforcement that was telling when the Americans came back to the Philippines, if not as early as the Solomons campaign.

So the Japanese contingent in Manchukuo decided to have a little border skirmish with the Russians on the Mongolian border. They fought very well. Right up until the Russians brought up their artillery and tank brigades. Then it was all over, it was embarressing really.


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## Njaco (Oct 25, 2011)

Ah, thanks guys. Never heard of it before.


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## nuuumannn (Oct 25, 2011)

Hi Siegfried



> The allies on the other hand could more easily have lived without it.



Hmmm, I find that one hard to stomach. In the case of the Atlantic, finding a submarine without it would have been a damn sight harder. It's one thing to roughly know where a submarine might be, but when you have a search area of anywhere up to a hundred miles, it would prove extremely useful. I'm pretty certain that all branches of the British armed forces that used centimetric radar would sternly disagree with you. 

H2S was far from having little value; it was a ground mapping radar used for finding the bombers' way to the target more effectively at night; to all intents and purposes, it worked quite well. The problem was it often got 'confused' with too much ground clutter in built up areas, but I've seen screen shots of H2S where the difference in terrain can be easily seen. Such a thing was extremely valuable. In fact, H2S was still in use aboard British jet powered bombers in the Cold War. 

Interesting about the Japanese developing centimetric radar; I did not know that. I found some info on their work on the net. Fascinating stuff. Compared to the British scientists Randal and Boot's unit of 1940, the Japanese on of a year earlier had a lower power output, but unfortunately for them (and perhaps fortunately for us), the Japanese military saw little use for the device!


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## pbfoot (Oct 25, 2011)

H2S was okay as long as the difference on terrain was very different . it was almost useless in Berlin the only geographic features that it could differentiate was 
between ground and water , it was super for a port like Hamburg but in Berlin the only the small lakes could be used as way points


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## michaelmaltby (Oct 25, 2011)

Nomonon images on Google:

nomonhan - Google Search

MM


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## Siegfried (Oct 25, 2011)

@nuumann,

Don't forget that it is possile to make radar without microwaves. Around 1941 the Royal Navy Started to introduce 50cm radar for fire control of main guns and AAA direction (Type 285, Type 284). It remained the dominant radar for ship to ship fire control till the end of the war. This radar can be formed into a tight beam in an antenna small enough for a destroyer, tight enough to make a PPI display.

The problem was that the British were opperating at 7.5m (type 279) and 3,75 (type 279Y) whose beam is so broad it confuses targets from multiple directions and was poor at detecting a u-boat conning tower.

The Germans had by then been opperating in the 50cm to 80cm range on their Wurzburg and Seetakt radars for years since 1938 and had completely bypassed these longer wavelengths. They had no problems picking up a u-boat with their own radar.

Magnetron 10cm radar was brought in as surface search radarby the RN but it is generally ackknowleged that the 50cm radars would have done the job.

So the British kind of jumped a step. The Germans didn't have the same problem as their radar worked OK and they fitted on a destroyer, they had no great need for sub hunting nor did they have a great need over the horizon navigation. There were those pushing microwaves in the German camp put their arguments didn't get priority. In the end the magnetron ended up having huge advantages not fully appreciated.

I am highly dubious of H2S, the USAAF experience, with carefull analysis of their 3cm H2X version was a CEP of around 5 miles. Louis Brown gives 1.2 or 2 km for the 3cm version. Post war H2S moved down to 1.5cm and a lot more signal processing and may have become usefull. There may have been greater accuracy if used on port/harbour cities.

It seems to have been an aid to visual bombing through partial cloud cover rather than a blind bombing system.


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## parsifal (Oct 25, 2011)

In my opinion there are certain aircraft that played critical roles in the progress of the war. they are not particularly technologically outstanding, but technology is not the aim of the exercise....achieving a strategic outcome is the main aim, and airpower, whether it is the allied view of "strategic" warfare or the more "tactical" continental view is still just an adjunct to the overall campaign. 

That said, what aircraft contributed most to victory, or near victory (in the case of the axis)???? this is my list


1) C-47 Dakota. Without it, more than any other single aircraft the whole campaign in the pacific TO would have changed. it enabled major offensives to occur in NG and burma, it enabled China to be kept in the war, without which it would have been far more difficult to advance across the pacific. It allowed many far flung garrisons to be maintained and sustained, and it allowed airborn operations such as Arnhem to be undertaken with unsung and substantial strategic implications. the Dak did more to win the war than any other single type

2) Ju87 Stuka and Il-2 Sturmovik. Both these aircraft transformed the nature of mobile warfare and influenced the outcomes of land battles far in excess of any other type. The allies had similar aircraft in the forms of the typhoons and p-47, but their effect was never quite so profound

3) SBD Dauntless, D3A Val, B5n Kate, Fairey Swordfish. These aircraft, collectively transformed the nature of naval warfare. They rendered battlefleets obsoleter in the traditional sense, and in the case of the allies, in the pacific, delivered critical victories that whilst not known at the time, were the seeds of ultimate victory. in the pacific there was Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons, Santa Cruz and o0thers, that really, would not have been possibloe without the existence of the Dauntless. In the ETO, destruction of the Bismarck, Matapan, Taranto, and a number of lesser battles, delivered victory at sea, that enabled the RN to then concentrate on defeating the greatest Axis threat of the war....its U-Boats. Even here, the Swordfish was instrumental in assisting victory because of its exceptional all weather usage

4) Mosquito Ju88 Airctraft. Were the future of aircraft development with their proven multi-role capabilities. High speed pinpoint accuracy was the future of "strategic" bombing, and should have been adopted by both the Britiah and Americans in their prosecution of the Nazis. 


Note that i have not included SE fighters, in this list. Despite being the glamour pin up boys of all air forces fighters actually achieved the least effet on battles. There are one or two exceptions of course....Spitfire/Hurricane in the BoB, zeros/Oscars in the early stages of the pacific, P-51 in the later parts of the war, but even though very important, they are not as critical to the overall outcome as the aircraft I have mentioned. it was on the strengths and weaknesses of the aircraft I have mentioned that the strategic directions of the war were decided.


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## vanir (Oct 25, 2011)

I know next to nothing about the technical side of radars. I do remember a British Air Ministry concern published about Bomber Command losses due to poor navigation. At one point just before Harris took over entire bomber squadrons simply never arrived at waypoints and never returned to base, later wreckage was found everywhere from Norway to the Danish coast on missions targeting northern France. I can understand the Ministry going a little ape on it, so they appointed Harris to clean it up and make losses return some of the investment for a change.

Anyway the way I was hearing it, H2S proved invaluable in...wait for it...finding the french coast at night. Apparently it was a weather thing, as it was missions were often scrapped because in the time it took to form up the bomber stream over england, weather over the channel had turned bad. Flights of aircraft wound up tossed like pieces of paper trying to cross, lost flights were a regular occurance.
I can't remember the British Ministry figure, but it was a significant proportion of Bomber Command combat losses in the early-mid war, simply losing them over water at night.


Given that kind of age of flight, I really don't picture radar operators as searching for topographical details. It would be pure artform just to be able to figure out where on the coast you are. I don't picture them as anything like a modern digital multimode operating flicking on terrain hugging and searching for a particular building complex on the screen. I really don't think it worked that way. It was just a line of squiggles on a round crt with squares drawn on the glass.


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## nuuumannn (Oct 25, 2011)

Hi Siegfried,



> It seems to have been an aid to visual bombing through partial cloud cover rather than a blind bombing system.



I think you need to re-read my post and the one above; nowhere did I mention that it was a blind bombing system; although - oddly enough, despite its apparent inadequacies, it was used as such. H2S was a ground mapping radar, and yes, it could differentiate different terrain, but as posted earlier, only if there were big differences in the terrain. As I said, it was practically useless over a city due to clutter. From books I've read, Berlin was always difficult because it was so flat (I've been to Berlin numerous times; you can see the Fernseh Turm - excuse the spelling - for miles! We nicknamed it the Death Star!).

Despite your reluctance to accept the value of H2S, it certainly aided in improving the RAF's ability to find thits target in night bombing. They considered it a big breakthrough in what they were doing. Whilst your knowledge of the technical details is impressive; you need to read some books on the operaytional side of the subject. Might I suggest "Bomber Command" by Max Hastings?


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## barney (Oct 26, 2011)

davparlr said:


> The C-46, although there was not as many available at the start of the war. The C-46 was more capable.



The C-46 was a great hauler with twice the load lifting capacity of a C-47. It also had a longer range but was a great gas guzzler. The problem with the C-46 is that none were made with self sealing tanks. So, if you were going into a defended drop zone you shouldn't be in a C-46 for health reasons.


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## riacrato (Oct 26, 2011)

With regards to the C-47 and Ju-52: I know I am going against the trend here, but if those were not available, there would've been other designs to replace them. They are both great planes esp. the C-47, but I don't think they were game changers.


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## parsifal (Oct 26, 2011)

Its a case of being in the right place at the right time. The aircraft were certainly replaceable as designs, but it would have taken time to do that, then set up a production line, and get the numbers to make a difference. Without them, whole offensives crucial to the outcome of the war would have been either lost, or not fought at all. In the case of the germans, it was the limitations of the aircraft that probably cost them the war. Ju52s were too short ranged and too limited in numbers to be properly deployed and used at Stalingrad ( i am not saying there are many aircraft that could do better, but the Ju52 was an old and limited design by 1942) . Forced by their range limitations to be deployed too far forward to reach Stalingrad (and it also happened elsewhere, but less dramatically), it became ipossible to provide proper servicing, maintenance, crew resting facilities and traffic control to get anywhere near the tonnages needed by 6th Army. I would call that a game changer by any standard. And unfortunately for the germans, the expedients they adopted to try and circumvent these weaknesses in their main transport aircraft, like press ganging bombers into the trasnsport role proved inadequate, both in terms of the numbers available, and in terms of the individual lift capabilities of the aircraft so used. 

In the case of the C-47, there was at least an alternative....the C-46, though this aircraft suffered certain limitations that made it less than ideal for certain roles. In any event, the workhorse of the allied transport efforts remained the C-47 throughout the war, and had a direct influence on the outcome of certain operations. Only because i know operations in the pacific better than Europe do i concentrate on that TO, however suffice it to say that without the C-47, the outcome would have been far longer to achieve and far more costly. The "biscuit bombers" enabled a sustained offensive to be maintained against the japanese at a time when the US Navy was still recovering and not yet quite up to the task of cutting loose on the Japanese. By maintaining the pressure on the japanese across multiple fronts, the Japanese were prevented from concentrating their forces and consolidating their early victories. Given the stubborn defences encountered later in the war, at Okinawa and Iwo, it was just as well that the Japanese were not given an extra year or 18 months to prepare their defences whilst they stilol had a navy and airforce to contest the control of the seas. 

And finally, the destruction of the Japanese mainland armies was the product of a soviet offensive into manchuria, made possible by the operations of its c-47 equipped transport arm. It remains the most rapid and complete defeat of an enemy force and the conquest of the biggest land area, in history, all made possible by aggressive use of transport aircraft. Something like the combined land area of all of western europe was overrun in less than a week, from memory (or was it a month....i forget) 

So I agree that the aircraft were replaceable, but not in the time frame of the war, And I dont agree that the role they fulfilled was not a game changer


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## nuuumannn (Oct 27, 2011)

I largely agree with your post, parsifal, but I have to say, I honestly don't think the C-47 itself was a game changer. It most certainly deserves to be in the list you posted above - and I agree with the list, but these were aircraft that played critical roles in the course of the war, historic because they were good at what they did. To this list you could add the likes of the de Havilland Tiger Moth, the Airspeed Oxford, the Stearman Kaydet etc for the same reason.

In my opinion, a 'game changer', as Kryten put it, changed the tactics of the enemy and forced new designs through to counter the new threat, i.e. changed the face of the war, technology etc. For example, the entire DC-3 family would be more appropriate, rather than just the C-47; the DC-3 was a game changer because after it entered airline service, airlines could be categorised in either one of two ways; those that operated DC-3s or those that didn't. Those without DC-3s would end up in one of two situations, they would either: go out of business, or buy DC-3s. To me that's a game changer.

Sure, the C-47 delivered vast numbers of Allied toops to the different battlefields, but that was its job and the enemy _were_ expecting that; the 'game changer' with regards to a battlefield scenario that's discussed in the posts was the difference having those troops there to fight made to the outcome of the battle, not really how they were transported to the battlefield. If this was the case, then the humble bicycle, a random horse encountered along the way to ease walking if the drop zone was missed, the landing craft for seaborne invasions, even the humble boot then becomes a game changer.

All these things aided the troops to get to the fight, as you would expect them to do so in a warzone. That doesn't make them game changers in the strictest sense of the term. Their impact on the enemy's tactics was minimal as individual items (although it would be pretty rotten to go to war in flip flops instead of boots!), but the fact the troops were there fighting certainly tipped the balance in their favour.

An interesting thing about the Ju 52/3m; during the Spanish Civil War, without it, Franco's army would have been stranded at their training camp in North Africa and the war might not have gone the way the fascists wanted it to. What's more, the transports were Lufthansa examples!


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## Shortround6 (Oct 27, 2011)

We also have the the difference between the "idea" and the actual "effect". The British were very big on dual purpose bomber/transport planes during the late 20s and 30s. Planes that could bomb or transport 1 to 2 squads of equipped troops to far reaches of the empire. More for policing the Empire and a quick reinforcement of a local garrison than a grand tactical or strategic move against a powerful opponent. Granted they needed a lot fuel stops (which the British had) and a lot of planes (which they did not) to move a really useful number of troops. But the idea was there and planes were built to meet the requirement. The Ju-52 was the first plane to show that the idea really could work. The C-47 allowed to to work over longer ranges or at higher tonnages per day/per plane. The C-47 did change the way game was played by more by degree. And with just a few years between the Spanish civil war and the start of WW II not all the lessons had been fully absorbed.


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## Siegfried (Oct 27, 2011)

riacrato said:


> With regards to the C-47 and Ju-52: I know I am going against the trend here, but if those were not available, there would've been other designs to replace them. They are both great planes esp. the C-47, but I don't think they were game changers.



The Ju 52 was a good transport for short or shorter-medium missions but it was inadequate in a number of ways:

1 Range.
2 Fuel efficiency; it was good at transporting goods 600 km or so but after that it would need to refuel at its destination to return and that means either reduced load or ground transport carrying the fuel or other Ju 52 shuttling fuel.
3 Volume of the fuselage would bulk out.
4 Slow and easy to intercept.

Of course the Luftwaffe had a supreme transport in the Ju 252 which could carry 2.5 tons from Berlin to Stalingrad, evacuate a light load of wounded all without refueling.
It could carry 4 tons of fuel to Nth Africa from Germany and return without refueling. In needs be it could lift 7.5 tons, I think even 9 tons if overloaded on a hardened runway.

Unfortunately the aircraft was delayed by a development suspension and then re-engineering for the trapoklappe. Much better than the DC3/C47 and even better by a small margin than the C46 in terms of fuel burn. It even had armament.

The Ar 232 was another supreme transport: it could take-off and land in 200m and taxi over 2m ditches.

The problem was that the only aircraft the Luftwaffe had in quantity was the Ju 52 and for some of its supply missions in Nth Africa and the Soviet Union it was inadequate.


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## davebender (Oct 27, 2011)

This information is from "Hitler's Pre-Emptive War" by Henrik Lunde.

*Largest air transport operation in military history up to that time.*
582 transport aircraft (mostly Ju-52s) flew 13,018 sorties.
29,280 troops delivered. 21% of total troops delivered.
2,376 tons of supplies delivered.

*Norway sealift. For comparison purposes.*
about 370 merchant ships. 21 of which were sunk.
107,581 troops delivered.
109,400 tons of supplies delivered.
20,339 vehicles delivered.
16,102 horses delivered.


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## nuuumannn (Oct 27, 2011)

Good points Siegfried; those German transports were awesome aircraft; especially the 'Klapotrappe' idea. Sorry shortround6, still not convinced; your post just tells me that the C-47 did what the Ju 52 had done, but just a bit better; not really a 'game changer' in the strictest sense of the term. My reference to the Ju 52 was specifically to the Lufthansa examples expressly sent from Germany for airlifting Franco's army into Spain from North Africa, not to their use as a bomber/transport. Lufthansa is Germany's national airline. The bomber/transport was not the best in an actual combat arena, because it did both jobs rather poorly compared to a dedicated type. Clearly _not_ a game changer.


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## michaelmaltby (Oct 27, 2011)

".... the destruction of the Japanese mainland armies was the product of a soviet offensive into manchuria, made possible by the operations of its c-47 equipped transport arm. It remains the most rapid and complete defeat of an enemy force and the conquest of the biggest land area, in history, all made possible by aggressive use of transport aircraft. Something like the combined land area of all of western europe was overrun in less than a week, from memory (or was it* a month*...




".... http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_invasion_of_Manchuria"

(August Storm)


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## vanir (Oct 27, 2011)

Yeah Siegfried comes up with some good posts. Kudos mate.


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## davebender (Oct 27, 2011)

> soviet offensive into manchuria, made possible by the operations of its c-47 equipped transport arm


I doubt that. By August 1945 the Soviet Army was well equipped with vehicles of all types and had plenty of artillery. You don't supply a large mechanized force by air transport. Not even today when we have C5 and C17 transport aircraft.

April 1940 Heer offensive operations in western and northern Norway were conducted almost entirely with light infantry. A heavy attack might be supported by a few mortars or 75mm mountain howitzers. That's the sort of operation which can be supplied by air.


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## michaelmaltby (Oct 27, 2011)

@DB "... soviet offensive into manchuria, made possible by the operations of its c-47 equipped transport arm 
I doubt that"

C-47's weren't _the only _reason for success - but the air support the Soviets had available allowed them to "run" the three prongs of their strike flat out and not worry about the armour outrunning supply - as well as air drops at key bridgeheads. The whole operation was masterfully planned = up there with Normandy IMHO. 

MM


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## Shortround6 (Oct 27, 2011)

nuuumannn said:


> Sorry shortround6, still not convinced; your post just tells me that the C-47 did what the Ju 52 had done, but just a bit better; not really a 'game changer' in the strictest sense of the term. My reference to the Ju 52 was specifically to the Lufthansa examples expressly sent from Germany for airlifting Franco's army into Spain from North Africa, not to their use as a bomber/transport. Lufthansa is Germany's national airline. The bomber/transport was not the best in an actual combat arena, because it did both jobs rather poorly compared to a dedicated type. Clearly _not_ a game changer.



Well, the C-47 could carry about 50% more troops/cargo almost 50% faster over 100% more range? 

And while the bomber transport wasn't the best idea going the fact that the British had been building them or using air transports for military purposes since the early 20s Vickers Victoria - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Means the idea itself wasn't confined to visionaries or sci-fi writers before the Spanish civil war. The Requirement that led to the Handley Page H.P.54 Harrow, The Bristol Bombay and the unsuccessful Armstrong Whitworth AW.23 also show that the British were pursuing the idea of the military transport even if their execution may have lacked something.


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## davebender (Oct 27, 2011)

Many military aviation ideas date back to WWI.

Air transport.
CAS.
Torpedo bombing.
Aerial mine laying.
Photo recon.
Strategic bombing.
etc.
IMO none of these were "Game Changers" during WWI as aircraft payload and aircraft numbers were too small. 

April 1940 aerial transport was on an entirely different scale. Large portions of Norway were seized or supplied using only aerial transport.

One could argue the 1932 Chaco War was the first conflict where transport aircraft made a serious military difference. The Ju-52 was the star performer of those air transport operations. A great advertisement which helped make the Ju-52 very popular for both civil and military use during the 1930s.
Aerial operations in the Chaco War - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


> During the war, the JU 52 alone transported more than 4,400 tons of cargo to the front


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## parsifal (Oct 27, 2011)

Their entire right hook through the trackless roadless Desert could not be supported by wheeled transport. The Japanese were totally surprised by this manouvre, and it caused the total collapse of their Manchurian army. The Soviet centre and left hooks were essentially pinning manouvres, which the Japanese had anticipated, and were managing rather well.

Because the offensive through the desert was thought impossible for large bodies of men and machines, it acted as a 'game changer". moreover this late war offensive probably did more to change the face of the post war Asia than any other single event. In my opinion the rapid conquest of Japanese occupied China by the Soviets led to the comm,unists in China in gaining the upper hand and gain crucial material advantages over the KMT. We are still living with its consequences.

All made possible by the unique availability and capability of the C-47


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## parsifal (Oct 27, 2011)

This is an extract from Glantz's book which you can read in full under this link Leavenworth Papers No. 7 (August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria)

Progress of the 6th Guards Tank Army continued to be spectacular, although the task of resupplying the numerous armored vehicles was becoming a problem. After the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps had secured Tuchuan and the 5th Guards Tank Corps had taken Lupei, both urits experienced severe fuel shortages. The 7th Guards Mechanized Corps had only half of its fuel supply, while the 5th Guards Tank Corps had only fourtenths of its fuel supply. Because the 9th Guards Mechanized Corps was short of fuel even before it crossed the Grand Khingan Mountains, it had no fuel when it arrived at Lupei.18 The transportation network, which reached 700 kilometers to the rear, was badly overextended. When the campaign began, the 6th Guards Tank Army itself had 6,489 serviceable vehicles out of the 9,491 authorized by TO&E. Army automobile battalions had only 50 to 60 percent of their assigned vehicles; thus, they were capable of carrying only 500 tons of supplies. This vehicle attrition was primarily the result of the harsh march from distant assembly areas. In order to augment the truck transportation assets of 6th Guards Tank Army, the Trans-Baikal Front attached to 6th Guards Tank Army the 47th Automobile Regiment of six battalions comprising more than 1,000 trucks. In order to transport critical supplies of fuel, the front attached to the army the 453d Aviation Battalion with 400 aircraft. 19 The tank army's rapid advance strained these resources to a breaking point. In order to increase fuel supplies to a level sufficient to maintain offensive momentum, the 6th Guards Tank Army began airlifting fuel to the two advanced corps on 11 August. While resorting to this expedient, the 6th Guards Tank Army commander halted his units for a two-day period (12-13 August). 

On 13 August this army resumed the offensive by pushing reconnaissance units towards Tungliao and Taonan. A reinforced tank or mechanized brigade from each corps followed the reconnaissance units as each corps's forward detachment. All available fuel in each corps was put at the disposal of these forward detachments. Other units remained in static positions awaiting fuel. At nightfall on the fourteenth, after a march hindered by wet weather and by Japanese kamikaze attacks, the forward detachment of the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps occupied Taonan, while that of the 9th Guards Mechanized Corps continued to drive southeastward toward Tungliao and Kailu


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## parsifal (Oct 27, 2011)

nuuumannn said:


> I largely agree with your post, parsifal, but I have to say, I honestly don't think the C-47 itself was a game changer. It most certainly deserves to be in the list you posted above - and I agree with the list, but these were aircraft that played critical roles in the course of the war, historic because they were good at what they did. To this list you could add the likes of the de Havilland Tiger Moth, the Airspeed Oxford, the Stearman Kaydet etc for the same reason.
> 
> In my opinion, a 'game changer', as Kryten put it, changed the tactics of the enemy and forced new designs through to counter the new threat, i.e. changed the face of the war, technology etc. For example, the entire DC-3 family would be more appropriate, rather than just the C-47; the DC-3 was a game changer because after it entered airline service, airlines could be categorised in either one of two ways; those that operated DC-3s or those that didn't. Those without DC-3s would end up in one of two situations, they would either: go out of business, or buy DC-3s. To me that's a game changer.
> 
> ...




hi Nuumann

I havent followed krytens definition of what is a gamechanger, because i think the basic proposition is faulty. The assumption here is that technology equates to major changes to warfare or major changes to outcomes. whilst it is generally the case, often it is the way that resources are used that lead to major changes.

In the case of the transport aircraft, the way they were used , their availability, and the capabilities of the aircraft characteristics themselves served to fundamentally alter the outcomes of major campaigns. 

If we look at the C-47 (and C-46), in the pacific they helped to sustain China in the war for the duration. Whilst China did not deliver a single offensive option for the whole war the mere fact that it remained in the war, tied down over 40 Divisions of the Japanese, and at least 40% of its Army air force strength. It was a constant and significant drain on limited supplies for the Japanese, to the extent that they could not garrison or fortify their island chains, or Burma properly. This had far reaching implications. The shortage of troops proabably saved australia and india from invasion, which in turn can reasonably be argued that middle eastern oil was also saved, since it was Indian and australi troops in the middle east that stopped the Germans and italians, for the most part 9certainly without them it would have been much harder to hold Egypt). 

This was not their only contribution. It was the Australians in NG that worked out how to defeat the Japanese Hook tactics, and defeat them in terrain that previously the Japanese had never been defeated....how did they do this. Hook tactics worked because they were a direct threat to traditional logistics. it forced the defeat of the british in Malaya, the east indies and Burma in quick succession, and the brits at least were still vulnerable to it as late as the Arakan offensives. The Americans were not all that intersted in developing a successful land strategy to defeat the japanese, and given time, they had the resources to follow that path....their island hopping strategy however was dependant upon gaining complete control of the oceans and the skies, and taking objectives at a tolerable cost in lives (something that would have been denied them if the Chinese were not in the war). The Australians worked out the tactics and strategy to defeat hooking tactics, and it required re-supply by air, in terrain that no other aircraft at that time other than the DC-3 could provide. There was no other aircraft that could operate in the NG jungles and mountains to the same extent as the DC-3 (not until the introduction of the caribou was their an aircraft that could undertake jungle supply operations better....not even the hercs). It enabled Australian formations threatened with encirclement to not worry about their lines of supply. they dug in, hedgehogged, and outlasted the outflanking Japanese. Battles were fought and won using this method, completely dependant on the capabilities of the c-47 that changed the entire outcome of the war. Without thye victories in New Guinea, and the avoidance of defeat in China, the Americans could not have done what they did later in the war.

And then, of course there were the operations of the Chindits, without which, the Japanese may well have been able to achieve a different result with their 1944 offensives into India.

I fauil to see how the capabilities, numbers and usage of the c-47 cannot be seen as a game changing aircraft.


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## michaelmaltby (Oct 27, 2011)

..... I fail to see how the capabilities, numbers and usage of the c-47 cannot be seen as a game changing aircraft."

*usage* is the game changer -- but the plane is/was damn good.

MM


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## nuuumannn (Oct 27, 2011)

> I havent followed krytens definition of what is a gamechanger, because i think the basic proposition is faulty. The assumption here is that technology equates to major changes to warfare or major changes to outcomes. whilst it is generally the case, often it is the way that resources are used that lead to major changes.



Based on the fact that you haven't followed Kryten's definition of what is a game changer alters everything. Your examples of where the C-47 played a role in combat certainly prove that indeed it altered the course of that particular conflict. In that context, then, yes, it is a game changer, based on that definition. For you to state that an assumption that technology could equate to a major change to warfare or a major change to an outcome is a faulty proposition is quite ignorant of the actual definition of “Game Changer”. 

In business, a game changer is defined as something (or someone) that transforms the rules and business strategy or redifines the sector in which it competes. My example of the DC-3 as an airliner changed the industry for ever in the USA and forced its competitors to buy DC-3s or go out of business. The example of the B-29s landing in Russia, which then resulted in its copying by the Soviets changed the entire Soviet aircraft industry, resulting in the knock on effect of how US foreign policy changed to meet the threat.

The Me 262, being a jet meant that fighter technology and application would never be the same because of the advantages that jets offer over piston engined fighters. The Atom bomb; possession of the Atom bomb alone, without its application brought about nuclear stalemate, which continues to this day. These are examples of what I take Kryten to mean in his 'game changer' thread. These examples are closer to the true definition of the term. I don't understand how you can claim that this proposition is faulty.

The definition of a game changer in reference to an individual is a visionary, or a person who is given to audacious or highly speculative, or impractical ideas or schemes. The application of the C-47 in the contexts you mention were dictated by the course of and the tactical needs of the battle. This does not fit the definition. 

I agree with your thoughts regarding the application of the resources, which leads to changes in a tactical situation on the battlefield, because yes, the C-47 did do this, as you have pointed out in your posts. All you are doing, however is reinforcing what I stated in my post, that indeed the C-47 belongs in your list of significant types that played a critical role in the course of the war. But the use of the C-47 did not bring about a change in the way we carry out offensive air warfare, that element was already there and had been since the end of the First World War.

Kryten stated at the beginning of this thread that he did not believe that the Spitfire or the Bf 109 were game changers, this then, reinforces my point, because if we take your definition of the term, then both the Bf 109 and the Spitfire most certainly were game changers.

In the true definition of the term, a game changer is not just an aircraft that played a significant part in a battle or an attack (like the C-47, Ju 87, Il-2 etc), which might have changed its outcome, but something that causes the application of that technology or philosophy to bring about a paradigm shift in contemporary thought on how the conflict is waged. There is a big difference between what he means and what you mean.


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## nuuumannn (Oct 27, 2011)

To reinforce my point. Let's take the Nomonhan Incident as an example, as you refer to in your post. The presence of the Japanese in Manchuria has caused the Russians to develop a nuclear weapon, which they then threaten to drop on Tokyo if the Japanese don't pull out of Manchuria. What do the Japanese do? Pull out of Manchuria, of course.

Obviously, the Russians possessing a nuclear weapon in the Thirties would have dramatically altered world events. This would have been a game changer in the truest sense of the definition.


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## parsifal (Oct 27, 2011)

hi neumann

you mentioned two examples of technology that act as game changers. for clarity i quote:

"_The Me 262, being a jet meant that fighter technology and application would never be the same because of the advantages that jets offer over piston engined fighters. The Atom bomb; possession of the Atom bomb alone, without its application brought about nuclear stalemate, which continues to this day. These are examples of what I take Kryten to mean in his 'game changer' thread. These examples are closer to the true definition of the term. I don't understand how you can claim that this proposition is faulty._

In the case of the me 262, it changed the design of aircraft, ushering in (along with the Meteor) the jet age. And yet, in the context of WWII what did either the meteor or the 262 actually achieve in terms of combat operations that actually affected or changed the nature of the war. The 262 never got the chance to prove its potential, and neither did the meteor. If you view the technology in the context of the war, and the results they achieved 9per your business model) they achieved nothing really....

In the context of the Atomic bomb in the war, it was certainly a game changer, in every sense. It represented a technological revolution that still affects us and the way we fight wars. I doubt there will ever be a "Total War" of national survival ever again, because of the principal of MAD. 

In the context of the war itself, the bomb had a profound influence on Jaspanese resolve and led directly to their surrender. many have argued that this would have happened anyway, but at the very least, the bomb saved millions of lives by avoiding the scenario of national hari kari that the japanese had set themselves in 1945. Perhaps some could be accused of overstating the effect of the bomb, but no-one can legitmately argue that it didnt change many things....not least the balance of power.


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## nuuumannn (Oct 28, 2011)

parsifal said:


> hi neumann
> 
> you mentioned two examples of technology that act as game changers. for clarity i quote:
> 
> ...



So, Parcifal, based on your response then, you agree in principal what I'm arguing? Good. As far as the Me 262 and Meteor is concerned, yes, you are right, they did achieve little in WW2, but they ushered in a whole new era in aviation - that, I think is the original reason why the Me 262 was offered as a game changer. Glad you see the point now.


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## Jabberwocky (Oct 28, 2011)

davebender said:


> The 1940 German invasion of Norway would have been impossible without it. So would the 1941 invasion of Crete. Without the Ju-52 transport the 1942 Demyansk Pocket becomes a German defeat instead of a German victory. Probably quite a few other encirclement battles also. Ju-52 transports were crucial in allowing Luftwaffe fighter and bomber units to rapidly relocate to other airfields, allowing CAS to keep pace with Heer units on the move.
> 
> The USA took these lessons to heart, producing a massive C-47 fleet to support both themselves and Britain. But it was the Ju-52 that got there first.



The Ju-52 wasn't game changing. 

A trimotor civilian transport with fixed landing gear that could be used for light bombing was hardly revolutionary when the aircraft was (re)designed from a single to a three engine configuration in the early 1930s. It was just a continuation of the G24/G31 line that Junkers had successfully manufactured for years and followed the well worn pattern laid down by the Ford Trimotor, Fokker VII and various other types across the world. 

The DC-2/DC-3/C-47 line really was much more of a revolution than the Ju 52/3. It was of more modern design and construction and could fly notably faster and notably further with much more inside. 

The Ju 52/3 was manufactured in such large numbers because it was there and the Luftwaffe had little choice of anything else. The C-47 was manufactured in such large numbers because it was the best design trade off in terms of capabilities vs cost, despite all the options that the Allies had (C-46, C-54, C-56 ect).


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## Siegfried (Oct 28, 2011)

davebender said:


> This information is from "Hitler's Pre-Emptive War" by Henrik Lunde.
> 
> Largest air transport operation in military history up to that time.
> 582 transport aircraft (mostly Ju-52s) flew 13,018 sorties.
> ...


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## Siegfried (Oct 28, 2011)

Shortround6 said:


> Well, the C-47 could carry about 50% more troops/cargo almost 50% faster over 100% more range?
> 
> And while the bomber transport wasn't the best idea going the fact that the British had been building them or using air transports for military purposes since the early 20s Vickers Victoria - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> 
> Means the idea itself wasn't confined to visionaries or sci-fi writers before the Spanish civil war. The Requirement that led to the Handley Page H.P.54 Harrow, The Bristol Bombay and the unsuccessful Armstrong Whitworth AW.23 also show that the British were pursuing the idea of the military transport even if their execution may have lacked something.



The Ju 52/3m started out as the Ju 52/1m (with one motor instead of 3). It was purely a passenger or transport liner, like the DC-3, built on the aluminum technology Junkers had pioneered such as the Junkers W.24 trimotor. The Ju 52/3m was really the last of that fairly long type of construction and Junkers was moving on to flat sheet. A good aircraft that could be easily built, maintained and with STOL like abilities. The Germans set up production in France.

The reason the Ju 52 was popular is the same reason the DC3/C47 was popular: large numbers were already being built for civilian customers and so a good tooling and manufacturing infrastructure was set up. The Luftwaffe surely would have preferred something else but the Ju 252 and Ar 232 just came too late since no one was going to cut into fighter and bomber production to set up a factory to get a better cargo aircraft. This is essentially what happened to the Ju 252; had it been in even low production for Lufthansa it might have been ramped up to large scale production as it was it just missed out and only a score or so were made.

It's hard to get exact range-load charts but this looks like what a Ju 52/3m7ge might be able to do (all figures rounded)
Empty Weight 6500kg
Max Takeoff Weight 11000kg
Internal fuel 2470L (about 1800kg or 4000lbs) Auxiliary fuel can raise this to 3164L (about 2400kg or 4000lbs)
Range is given as 870km/540 miles.

This is clear the range at full load which would be 2700kg, in reality 2500kg given the weight of the flight crew.
With Auxiliary fuel the range was probably around 1160km/740 miles with 600kg less cargo: ie about 1.9 tons)
(The 3ge version is given as 1300km or 808 miles range so I'm just taking 10% of to get the range of the heavier more power 7ge version)

So in effect the Ju 523m7ge had an radius of action of around 270 miles or up to 370 miles with auxiliary tanks.

Roughly it can deliver 2500kg, 540 miles(870km) for 1800kg of fuel.

*Scaling that 1000kg of cargo can be transported 1000km using 827kg of fuel.*

With With Auxiliary tanks 1900kg, 740 miles(1200km), for 2400kg fuel
Scaling that 1000kg of cargo can be transported 1000km for 1052kg fuel
(showing the deterioration that happens)



For the C-47 the data seems to be
Wing Span: 95 ft (29 m)
Length: 64 ft 5 1/2 in (20 m)
Height: 17 ft (5.2 m)
Weight Empty: 18,500 lbs (8,390 kg)
Cabin Payload: Up to 6,000 lbs (2,720 kg)
Max Take-Off Weight: 29,000 lbs (13,150 kg)
Max Overload: 31,000 lbs (14,060 kg)
Fuel Capacity (Normal): 670 Imp Gals (3,046 L) (about 2250kg fuel)
Oil Capacity: 48 Imp Gals (218 L)

With a range of 1000 miles (wiki)

Which gives

2500kg cargo for 1600km for 2250kg fuel
Which scales to:

*1000kg cargo for 1000km for 562kg fuel*

_This compares to the Ju 52 requirement for over 827kg fuel for the same distance._

The C-47B which was powered by R-1830-90 engines with superchargers and extra fuel capacity to cover the China-Burma-India routes, 3,364 built
actually does better. I haven't used the overload figures which would suggest greater loads if a long sealed runway is available)

Of course the Ju 52 had STOL and rough field performance better than even that of the DCC/C47 and was carrying dorsal and waist guns. In its normal role of carrying 12 passengers up to 400 miles it was perfectly adequate. 

When used in Stalingrad its bases were sited so close to the front they were over run by tanks and subject to air attack and of course suffered congestion.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 28, 2011)

Those capabilities for the C-47 seem a bit low? 

One source claims that a commercial DC-3 could carry 1780kg of payload at 205mph (.75 power) at 5,000ft . Take off weight of 25,200lbs. Empty weight was 16,865lbs Fuel burn was 105 US gallons an hour. Tanks held 600 gallons. Useful load was 8335lbs. Range is over 1000miles (1600km). That 1780KG payload already has the 3 man crew and the engine oil factored out. 

Full tanks did hold 804 US gallons and with a smaller pay load (or over load) could give a range of 1500miles (perhaps a a lower power setting? like 185mph?) 

A different source (1946 Jane's) gives weights of 16,970lbs for a C-47 and a 26,000lb loaded weight. 
At 24,800lbs the take-off run was supposed to be 1000ft. Depending on exact model and load the stalling speed for the two planes was within a few mph of each other. The 1946 Jane's also claims a max range of 2125miles (3,400km) for the commercial DC-3 withe the maximum fuel and most economical cruising speed. Payload and speed not given. 

While The Ju-52 certainly did good work and was used for the first large scale airlift, it did NOT introduce the IDEA or concept of the airlift and it proved (more due to it's age) to be unable to sustain the airlifts the Germans needed.


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## vanir (Oct 28, 2011)

The economic situation, particularly in Europe was very bad in the 1920-30s. A lot of what would become major military aircraft were actually funded and requested as private civilian ventures. The Bf-108 (the airframe base used for the 109), the Blenheim was paid for by some British Lord who wanted a private business aircraft, the original Ju52 was fairly typical of period mail planes (ie. multipurpose medium, single engine passenger and cargo liners). Even aero engine manufacture was in debt to civilian flag and endurance racing, neither the Merlin/Griffon nor the Daimlers probably would've existed but for it (they still would've been produced but would've been underpowered and not as developed, more along Curtiss D-motor lines with ~950hp max potential double blown and overboosted).

Given that, the Ju52/3m is a really awesome plane for its longevity, adaptability and simple robust qualities. You didn't see Ford Trimotors, which were copied from it, in use by the Allies in the war.
I'd give it a medal for accomplishment, it deserves its place in history right up near the top, but I wouldn't go comparing it with something like a DC3 in all fairness. We used those in New Guinea and no way the Ju52 would've done the same job as good, no way.

some of those Dornier flying boats though, RAAF had at least one of those it operated throughout the war and gave it rave reviews, among best in class easily, I read of it and that was in comparison to Catalinas.


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## parsifal (Oct 29, 2011)

The main problem for the Ju52 was its relatively short range, and somewhat limited payload. According to Haward ("Stopped At Stalingrad - Defeat Of the LW") the Ju52 fleet, relative to more modern types suffered quite badly from icing in the winter weather.

In any event there not enough of them. Early in the east fromnt they had been used to keep the forward panzer elements supplied, but really, the limits for German re-supply were about a Corps, no more. And in poor weather they had difficulty even then. Demyansk was probably the best success for the germans, stalingrad was their most abject failure


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## vanir (Oct 29, 2011)

just being facetious but it's almost like a corporal was in charge of their military


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## Siegfried (Oct 29, 2011)

The DC3 and C47 range payload issue is complicated by the fact that as engine power grew so does Maxium Takeoff weight: this means more cargo can be lifted without sacrificing fuel.
In additon C47B carried more than the 3046Litres and some variants had an extended wing span. Moreover the C-47 had access to 100/130 octane which increased takeoff power
enormously and therefore payload. The fuel issue (B4/87 octane for the Ju 52 and 100/130 octane for the C-47 explains some of the differences in performance)

My understanding is that range calculations are given at full internal normal fuel load with maximum cargo permissable at that MTOW at cruise speed. 
Greater range is possible at reduced load or reduced speed. Reduced speed gets you nowhere in a head wind and irritates passengers as well as wasting aircraft time.

In the C-47's case an overload was possible: this I suspect required 100/130 fuel, a long sealed runway, no obstacles at the end of the runway and probably accepted increased risk of a crash landing if there was an engine failure immeidatly after takeoff. The Ju 52/3m range figures are clearly given at Max Fuel with Max Payload at that Max Takeoff Weight
at maximum cruise. The Ju 52/3mge3 could econ cruise at 117L/100km which would give a range of 2400km at a mind numbing slow speed with little cargo.

Roughly it looks like the basic 1940 DC3 with 20% more fuel than the Ju 52/3m (circa 3000L instead of 2500L) carried the same cargo as the Ju 52/3mge3 some 66% further ie 1000 miles instead of 600 miles.

Assuming a 15% reserve one could argue that a DC3 could supply 2.5 tons of cargo to a base 425 miles away while the Ju 52/3m only 260 miles. This is a huge difference as it
gets the takeoff point well away from enemy fighter attack. The C-47B and better fuel improved these figures. The Ju 52 proably had better short field performance.

Vanir, Ju 52 continued to opperate in New Guinea till 1970. In some situations over short ranges with rough landing fields rugged simplicity, bush mechnic level may be the key factor.

Its worth looking at the Ju 252 parameters:
Crew: 3-4
Length: 25.11 m (82 ft 4¼ in)
Wingspan: 34.10 m (111 ft 10⅛ in)
Height: 5.75 m (18 ft 10⅓ in)
Wing area: 122.6 m² (1,320 ft²)
Empty weight: 13,127 kg (28,880 lb)
Loaded weight: 22,257 kg (49,560)
Max takeoff weight: 24,050 kg (52,911 lb) (overload)
Powerplant: 3 × Junkers Jumo 211F liquid-cooled inverted V12 engines, 1,007 kW (1,350 hp) each
Performance

Maximum speed: 438 km/h (237 knots, 272 mph) at 5,800 m (19,030 ft)
Cruise speed: 335 km/h (181 knots, 208 mph) (econ cruise)
Range: 3,981 km (2,150 nmi, 2,473 mi) with maximum payload, 6,600 km (3,565 nmi, 4,100 mi) with 2,000 kg (4,400 lb ) payload
Service ceiling: 6,300 m (20,670 ft)
Rate of climb: 12.5 m/s (748 ft/min)

http://www.pilotfriend.com/photo_al... Ju 252.htmcraftwwii.com/blog/archive-201108/

Maximum speed was 272 mph (438 km/h) with a maximum cruising speed of 242 mph (390 km/h). The service ceiling was 20,670 ft (6300 m). Range of 2,473 miles (3980 km) with maximum payload. With only 4,410 lbs (2000 kg) of payload range increased to 4,100 miles (6600 km). Empty the aircraft weighed 28,880 lbs (13100 kg), with a normal loadout it weighed 49,560 lbs (22480 kg) and with maximum overload it weighed 52,910 lbs (24000 kg). It had a span of 111 ft 10 in (34.09 m); length 82 ft 4 in (25.10 m); height 18 ft 10 1/4 in (5.75 m) and a wing area of 1,320 sq ft (122.3 sq m).


My reading of this is that at normal (non overload) the aircraft confifuration was
1 Empty weight 13100kg
2 MTOW (normal) 22480kg
3 Cargo 2000kg
4 Therefore assuming MTOW the fuel capacity might be be 22480kg-2000kg-13100kg = 7380kg = about 10000L

Thus carrying 2000kg cargo , 6600km, 7380kg fuel leads to:
1000kg being carried 1000km for 560kg fuel.

As good as the DC3 but over twice the range.

Assuming that when opperating at 2400 miles instead of 4100 miles the fuel load is reduced pro rata to 59%and 10% added; leaving only 5000kg fuel and 2500kg crago added to make up the weight we have
4500kg, 4000km, for 5000kg fuel
1000kg, 1000km, for 312kg fuel.

Much better than the DC3. This is probably produced by a more modern high aspect ratio wing and the good fuel efficiency of the Jumo 213F.

The Ju 252 design was halted to militarise it for a rear loading ramp (it was alwasy duel Lufthansa/Luftwaffe) and then paused to concentrate on more important armaments work.

The delay in producing the Ju 252 may just have cost the Germans a loss at Stalingrad and hastened the Afrika corps demise in Nth Africa. Not only could the Ju 252 have supplied cargo great distances it could do so efficiently (half the fuel of the Ju 52) and it could avoid vulnerable and congested staging fields and the double handling of transhipping from forward train depots to forward airfields.

If you think about it it was a false economy: the Ju 252 could have carried over 2.5 times cargo 4 times as far as the Ju 52 and done so with half the fuel burn per unit of cargo.
In extreme situations it could fly the same weight of cargo 6.5 times the distance for 70% the fuel burn per km.

I would add that burned out engines of Ju 52 at Stalingrad from lack of maintenance and heavy use meant they were restricted from using max takeoff power and this limited loads to as little as 0.5 tons at times. A pitfull waste of human life when one considers the risk to only deliver a small cargo. Again, if one has an adaquet aricraft does one need to overuse it?


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## vanir (Oct 29, 2011)

You're way more read up than me on this, I might mention I've found problems with things like comparing range quotes internationally, as they vary by convention and pilot training. US uses unique NACA developed cruise settings designed to increase range, no other country uses three different typical cruise settings and divides climb/military power and normal takeoff, WER, etc., Europeans have two and one 30-min setting plus emergency or overboost and engine idle, but have shorter quoted ranges on average in the same class.

What I've found with bomber and transport ranges though is the US tends to quote range with "normal payload" or in otherwords in a typical configuration, not maximums unless specified. Europeans tend to be a little more specific, and give ranges at maximum payload unless specified. Eg, the Lanc compared to the B-17, actual loadbearing capacity is within hundreds of kg between them. But quoted figures for the B-17 always use the typical load employed by the 8th for long ranging missions off english aerodromes, a third its capacity. That's also the load for which range is often quoted.

When McDouglas threatened to bomb Tokyo with his B-17s in early 41 the Japanese took it seriously because with a light bomb load they can make it, but they should've gotten out their calculators because it's a very light load.
Conversely, unless otherwise specified in the source, I'd always assume any quoted range for an American transport or bomber to be at typical loads, about a third of maximum.


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## davebender (Oct 29, 2011)

First cargo aircraft to provide effective CAS.








Personally I question the sanity of employing a large, slow cargo aircraft for CAS. But a crazy idea that works is often referred to as genius.


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## tyrodtom (Oct 29, 2011)

davebender said:


> First cargo aircraft to provide effective CAS.
> 
> View attachment 181709
> 
> ...



About 20 years after WW2. only used when we had complete, unchallanged, air superority. Then it couldn't be used if there was much chance of opposing AA. They developed the AC-119, and AC-130, both were much more useful in a hostile enviroment.


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## pbfoot (Oct 29, 2011)

The C47, Dak, Gooney bird or whatever it was named is an iconic aircraft of WW2, It was not a game changer in the same catagory as the as the Lib or B24, please name one other aircraft that could take the place of the 24 with its radar in closing the mid atlantic gap .


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## davebender (Oct 29, 2011)

> please name one other aircraft that could take the place of the 24 with its radar in closing the mid atlantic gap


I suspect the British Lancaster bomber would work just fine in the maritime patrol bomber role. Britain just needs to change priorities from firebombing civilian property to defeating the enemy submarine threat.


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## pbfoot (Oct 29, 2011)

davebender said:


> I suspect the British Lancaster bomber would work just fine in the maritime patrol bomber role. Britain just needs to change priorities from firebombing civilian property to defeating the enemy submarine threat.


Post war the Lanc was used for ASW but required the removal of turrets and additiom of 400 gals of xtra fuel .But that is post war there was no other aircraft available in numbers that could perform the job in WW2. The North Atlantic was the only front active from 39 -45. The DC3 could've easly been replaced by C46 . The JU52 was an outmoded design it may have gone above and beyond in its performance of duties but suggest that may be a compliment to the crews


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## Shortround6 (Oct 29, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> The DC3 and C47 range payload issue is complicated by the fact that as engine power grew so does Maxium Takeoff weight: this means more cargo can be lifted without sacrificing fuel.
> In additon C47B carried more than the 3046Litres and some variants had an extended wing span. Moreover the C-47 had access to 100/130 octane which increased takeoff power
> enormously and therefore payload. The fuel issue (B4/87 octane for the Ju 52 and 100/130 octane for the C-47 explains some of the differences in performance)



DC-3/C-47 was just flat out more efficient. As well it should be considering it was much newer. The fuel issue is a non-issue. Some R-1830s were able to give 1200hp for take-off on 100 octane (not 100/130 and there is a difference) and some managed it on 95 octane and a few even did it on 91 octane. C-47 used 28 cylinders to get 2400hp. Ju-52 used 27 cylinders to get 2175-2490hp depending on version. 
The Ju-52 used high drag engine installations, the corrugated skinning was high drag and the fixed landing gear was high drag. Needing to use more power to get the same speed explains a lot of the performance difference. 


Siegfried said:


> My understanding is that range calculations are given at full internal normal fuel load with maximum cargo permissable at that MTOW at cruise speed.
> Greater range is possible at reduced load or reduced speed. Reduced speed gets you nowhere in a head wind and irritates passengers as well as wasting aircraft time.



For transport planes the range calculations were a bit more complicated. For economy of manufacture transport planes were often fitted with a standard fuel tank set up. It was up to the user airline (or military) depending on route flown (or stage in route) or mission to adjust the fuel capacity and passenger/cargo load to suite up to the max capacity of the tanks or a maximum allowable cargo or passenger load. Some aircraft due to fuselage floor or other limits could only carry xxx amount of cargo no matter how much fuel was left out. DC-3 was original designed as a "sleeper" aircraft. Fuselage was designed to hold 12-14 passengers in bunks on over night flights. When changed to a "day" aircraft the passenger load went to 21. 


Siegfried said:


> In the C-47's case an overload was possible: this I suspect required 100/130 fuel, a long sealed runway, no obstacles at the end of the runway and probably accepted increased risk of a crash landing if there was an engine failure immeidatly after takeoff. The Ju 52/3m range figures are clearly given at Max Fuel with Max Payload at that Max Takeoff Weight
> at maximum cruise. The Ju 52/3mge3 could econ cruise at 117L/100km which would give a range of 2400km at a mind numbing slow speed with little cargo.



The figures I have given for the DC-3/C-47 are at normal operating weights, over load was certainly possible. 


Siegfried said:


> Roughly it looks like the basic 1940 DC3 with 20% more fuel than the Ju 52/3m (circa 3000L instead of 2500L) carried the same cargo as the Ju 52/3mge3 some 66% further ie 1000 miles instead of 600 miles.
> 
> Assuming a 15% reserve one could argue that a DC3 could supply 2.5 tons of cargo to a base 425 miles away while the Ju 52/3m only 260 miles. This is a huge difference as it
> gets the takeoff point well away from enemy fighter attack. The C-47B and better fuel improved these figures. The Ju 52 proably had better short field performance.



There is no reason to suppose the Ju 52 had enough better short field performance to make any real difference. Take off run for the DC-3 at 24,800 lbs is about 1000ft and one source give 1050ft for the JU-52. Stalling speed for the Ju-52 seems to be 63-65mph while the DC-3 seems to be 67-69mph (unless overloaded). Technically the Ju-52 may be better but since the difference seems to be 10% or less I don't think there is much practical difference. 



Siegfried said:


> Its worth looking at the Ju 252 parameters:



Why?

It is a given fact that at given level of technology a bigger airplane will carry more cargo, more economically than a smaller airplane. It is why airplanes kept getting bigger. 

A 50,000lb 4050hp transport should be faster and show better economy than a 26,000lb 2400hp transport. 

A better match would be the C-46. 

But back to the point of the thread. Neither aircraft introduced the idea of troop movement or supply by air. The C-47 did a better job of it and was able to do it in places the Ju-52 could not (over water or over mountains, large areas of jungle)


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## davebender (Oct 29, 2011)

*Ar232 Tactical Transport Aircraft*. WWII equivalent to modern day C-130.
Luftwaffe Resource Center - A Warbirds Resource Group Site - Arado Ar 232







*Ju-290 Long Range Transport Aircraft.* WWII equivalent to C-141 or C5.
www.warbirdsresourcegroup.org - Luftwaffe Resource Center - Junker Ju 290





IMO this is a better way to go then the Ju-252 which was a jack of all trades but master at nothing.


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## parsifal (Oct 29, 2011)

These aircraft are mpressive and innovative, but are branching down a differnt pathway....the heavy lift transport, comparable in concept as you say to to the modern heavy lift aircraft. 
However, the Dakota was able to provide capability at least similar to the DeHavilland Caribou, for which there remains no modern equivalent. The Dakota was probably best described for its time as a medium lift all purpose transport, as opposed to the C-46 heavy lift strategic transport. The aircraft you are suggesting are in that category but heavier.

And as far as game changers are concerned, well, if this thread really is not interested in operational usage, then perhaps yes, the terchnological advance these aircraft represent perhaps are game changers. However I dont see these aircraft having even the slightest effect oiperationally. Far to expensive, far too specialised far too late, to make any bit of difference to the outcome of the war. That remains the preserve of aircraft like the c-47 and potentially the Ju52(if it had been built in greater numbers and the design updated).


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## davebender (Oct 29, 2011)

Do you have production costs for the Ju-290 and Ar-232 transport aircraft? 

*Price data for 1941 for some German aircraft types*, via Olaf Groehlers GdLK, 1910-1980: Without engine / with engine, in Reichsmarks (RM)
Bf 109E : 58 000 / 85 970
Ju 87B : 100 300 / 131 175
*Ju 52 : 125 800 / 163 000*
Bf 110C : 155 800 / 210 140
Do 17 : 185 500 / 235 00
He 111H : 203 900 / 265 650
Ju 88A : 245 200 / 306 950

2.5 RM per U.S.A. dollar.
$65,200 for a Ju-52 transport complete with engines during 1941.
$128,761 for a C-47 transport during 1941. Per USAF statistical digest.

The Ju-52 was dirt cheap, which goes a long way towards understanding why it was an international best seller during the 1930s. It also goes a long way towards explaining why wartime Germany was not anxious to replace the Ju-52. It wasn't pretty, fancy or state of the art but the Ju-52 got the short range air transport mission done for very low cost.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 29, 2011)

Once again you make an argument about cost without understanding that the dollar to mark conversion rate was artificial and did not reflect the true cost of the items in question. For instance the average price of a Beech AT-11 trainer was $51,000. two 450hp engines and an empty weight of about 5000lbs. Do you really think that a Ju-52 complete with *THREE* engines could be built for just 28% more? Or that a JU-52 could be built for $20,000 less than a Lockheed Hudson or Loadstar with TWO 9 cylinder engines? Speaking of engines the BMW was a modified copy (licensed) of a P&W Hornet. 27 cylinders, 3 crankshafts, 3 crankcases and so on compared to 28 cylinders, two crankshafts, two crankcases and so on. I am trying to see the big savings in cost of building the engines here but not finding it.


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## Vincenzo (Oct 30, 2011)

Shortround6 said:


> Once again you make an argument about cost without understanding that the dollar to mark conversion rate was artificial and did not reflect the true cost of the items in question.
> For instance the average price of a Beech AT-11 trainer was $51,000. two 450hp engines and an empty weight of about 5000lbs. Do you really think that a Ju-52 complete with *THREE* engines could be built for just 28% more? Or that a JU-52 could be built for $20,000 less than a Lockheed Hudson or Loadstar with TWO 9 cylinder engines? Speaking of engines the BMW was a modified copy (licensed) of a P&W Hornet. 27 cylinders, 3 crankshafts, 3 crankcases and so on compared to 28 cylinders, two crankshafts, two crankcases and so on. I am trying to see the big savings in cost of building the engines here but not finding it.



i'm full agree that exchange rate was artificial, but it's also possible that a Ju-52 cost 28% more that a AT-11, the difference of costs from US to Germany were immense.
We need to known labour hours for build the plane (and all that within) and after this, compare the industrialization level of the countryes


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## Siegfried (Oct 30, 2011)

I agree with most of what you said re my post but make a few notes:
1 ALL Allied aircraft, even transports and bombers eventually switched to 100/130. US 100 octane was meant to opperate mainly stoichiometric so its rich rating was not noted usually. I immagine about 100/120 (same as pure octane)

2 The empty weight of the DC3 is 33% greater than the Ju 52/3m. That alone justies that the DC3 was more expensive. Also proves its aerodynamic efficiency.

3 The Ju 52/3m was in full swing mass production by June 1932 having been preceded by a few Ju 52/1m from 1931. It had an incredible carear starting from then. It was very rugged, easy to service. It continued flights to London in 1935 when there were 120kmh gales that stopped all other flights. Note the single engined Ju 52/1m was in low rate production since 1931 though only one was sold commercially, it opperated from 31 to 1947 with an uncowled loepard engine in canada in aid of logging and minning opperations.
4 The DC2 entered production and service in May 1934, about 2 years after the Ju 52/3m. About the same time Erhard Milch placed an order for 1200 aircraft on Junkers.
5 The DC3 entered production in January 1935.

The Germans could clearly do better than a curragated skin aircraft: Ju 86 were around in 1934, He 111 were delivering mail in 1934.

However it seems that the Junkers Ju 52/3m was considered the only all metal aircraft that could be produced in its thousands at the time (and they were after 5000 aircraft) and the company needed an injection of funds.

This likely set the die. 

Its likely the Ju 52 required less tooling than the DC3 which would aid immediate expansion. It was actually an extra effort to replace the currugated townend rings with drawn smooth ones. Ju 52 production is probably easier to set up. Mainly 2 dimensional shapes and small pressings and stampings for the minimal internal structure. 

As far as the Ju 252 is concerned: yes bigger is better in transport economics but I suspect that the Ju 252 had some technical advances as well; the engines were particularly fuel efficient.

The combinaion of Junkers industrial capacity and the simplicity of its established manufacturing techniques, going back to the all metal Junkers F13, as well as the respect the G.23, G24 metal aircraft from the early 1920s had earned them as well as the later W.33 and W.34 gave it a ready market.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 30, 2011)

Vincenzo said:


> i'm full agree that exchange rate was artificial, but it's also possible that a Ju-52 cost 28% more that a AT-11, the difference of costs from US to Germany were immense.
> We need to known labour hours for build the plane (and all that within) and after this, compare the industrialization level of the countryes



Possible? 

The AT-11 used a pair of P&W Wasp Jr. (R-985) engines. The Ju-52 used three modified but basically licensed P&W Hornet (R-1690) engines. AT-11 had a 347.5 sq ft wing and weighed about 5000lbs empty. Ju-52 had a 1190 sq ft wing and weighed 12550lbs (?) empty. 

Unless retractable landing gear is made of gold and silver or German steel and aluminum were a fraction of the cost of US steel and aluminum there is no way that you can build a plane of 2 1/2-3 times the size and nearly 3 times the power for only 28% more.


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## parsifal (Oct 30, 2011)

Its just not possible to make realistic comparisons about unit costs like that, because of the artificial currency and trade manipulation undertaken by the Nazis. During the Second World War, Germany established fixed exchange rates between the Reichsmark and the currencies of the occupied and allied countries, often set so as to give the Germans economic benefits. Moreover they imposed war reparations on occupied countries that were often paid for by the delivery of goods and services at artificially low and fixed prices. Reparations imposed by the Nazis always required the expropriation of all Gold reserves to the reich, so as to artificially prop up the RM. According to Overy, the Germans robbed occupied Europe in this way to the tune of about $600million (US). When it is considered that Germany entered the war with about $140million in Gold Reserves, the extent that Germany was propped up, and prices kept artificailly low by price fixing, the inability to make valid comparisons becomes very apparent.

German armaments were expensive, because of inherent innefficiencies in their procurement machines. the system was basically corrupt and not operating until later to a wartime schedule. Ive read some accounts that say the dollar value can be multiplied by a factor of 5 or 6 times. I dont know if that is correct or not, but if it were, and we took that RM63000 for a Ju52, multiplied it by 5 and divided it by 2.5 (the approximate number of RM to the dollar in 1938), we would get a dollar cost of about $130000 (US) per unit for the Ju52. This would, of course vary depending on the timeframe of the war. But really comparisons like that are not very accurate, and not very helpful. Suffice it to say that the real cost to the Germans is not reflected in that costing of RM63000


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## Vincenzo (Oct 30, 2011)

Shortround you ve not understand my point, is near sure that a Ju-52 built in US was more expansive of a AT-11 built in US, but compare a german built Ju-52 with a us built At-11 is not so easy, and raw materials are a small fractions of value of a plane


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## michaelmaltby (Oct 30, 2011)

"... because of inherent inefficiencies in their procurement machines. the system was basically corrupt and not operating until later to a wartime schedule."

And that "wartime schedule" was the real beginning of the slave labour economic factor - the "solution".

I'm glad you're posting this Parsifal because it is almost impossible to grasp how totally misguided and F***ED UP Nazi German Economics really were* 

*[according to Adam Tooze] 

MM


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## parsifal (Oct 30, 2011)

You know something is really wrong when they take one of the most brilliant bankers of the century, Herr Schacht and sack himn because they dont like what he tells them........


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## davparlr (Oct 30, 2011)

The use of transport aircraft in war was certainly a game changer, I am not sure any particular aircraft can claim uniqueness here. Certainly not the Ju-52 which was obsolete at the time of the war. It did not perform much better than previous corrugated metal aircraft. Just upgrading the engines on the earlier Ford Tri-motor or the Fokker Tri-motor would probably provide similar performance to the Ju-52, indeed the Fokker F-10A was very similar.

The C-47/DC-3 was a much more important aviation game changer, often vying for the most significant aircraft ever built.


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## michaelmaltby (Oct 30, 2011)

It is interesting to note that DC-2's turned up in _both _Japanese and Russian service pre-1939. Both countries interested in licence-build agreements with Douglas. Clearly many saw the design as a game-changer long before it became the C-47 "Old Goonie" that we so love. 

MM


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## michaelmaltby (Nov 1, 2011)

Returning to the original premise of this thread. I think Herman Goering was correct -- P-51's (from England) over Berlin in daylight was a game changer. (In the same way B-24's in mid Atlantic were)

MM


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## parsifal (Nov 2, 2011)

Of course, I agree, but within the parameters that have been set for this thread....which i think are wrong (ie gamechangers = technology only) mean that neither the p-51, or the PB4Y Privateers or B-24 were gamechangers. Why? because they dont embrace new technology.

So, here we have this rather ridiculous situation where the me 262, which did squat to change the war is a gamechanger, whilst P-51s which probably had one of the most profound effects on the war is not, because it used or adapted existing off the shelf technologies.

as I said when I kicked off the discussion about transports, operational usage was the main game changer, not technology


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## michaelmaltby (Nov 2, 2011)

".... operational usage was the main game changer, not technology".

That is usually the case. Pointed stakes and pits dug in the ground aren't high "tech" but can sure be a game-changer against armoured cavalry. There is only so much "break through" technology -- but there is almost unlimited human imagination to determine operations and usage.

MM


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 2, 2011)

parsifal said:


> You know something is really wrong when they take one of the most brilliant bankers of the century, Herr Schacht and sack himn because they dont like what he tells them........



That happened to a lot of people "who knew what they were doing". It really is telling of what was going on in the country at the time. Pretty much the same thing that happens in most military dictatorships.


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## michaelmaltby (Nov 2, 2011)

"... That happened to a lot of people "who knew what they were doing". It really is telling of what was going on in the country at the time".

So true. Immigration is another very telling factor.

MM


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## parsifal (Nov 2, 2011)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> That happened to a lot of people "who knew what they were doing". It really is telling of what was going on in the country at the time. Pretty much the same thing that happens in most military dictatorships.



Hitler is often credited with pulling Germany out of the depression. I dont agree. It was this man Schacht (or Schlacht....I forget) that turned the German economy around, stbilzed her finaces, and made possible German re-armament. But he fell out with hitler because he could see that the fragile economy was being somewhat overheated. He wanted to return German industry to a consumer based economy, to cement the newly acquired economic position the Germans had carved for themselves in Eastern Europe. He felt that about a further 10 years or so were needed for the German economy to be strong enough for a war. not that he wanted war, he was against it.

It was a miscariage of justice after the war that he was placed on trial for war crimes. He was about as innocent of that as was possible. He was one of the few acquitted, and rightly so.


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## Siegfried (Nov 2, 2011)

I actually think that war time production planning went well in some areas.

Firstly the notion that the Germans hadn't gone to a war time economy till 1942 is dispelled by Adam Tooze. Basically the the Germans were working hard and investing hard but the labour and money was going into investing in plant and equipment. In 1942 the labour/investment that was going into building plant switched to actually producing the weapons those plants (and improved designs) that were made for them. In fact they were investing so hard they imperilled their own economy and food supply.


In 1940 there were Me 109E7s, there were even Me 109F's there were no P-47, P-38s until when? 1942?

One need only look at French efforts at aviation production which resulted in a plethora of either aged under-performing types or highly promising types that were either not produced in numbers in their piecemeal factories or lacking a competitive engine; the Hispano-Suiza HS12Y never reached its high potential and was way behind the DB601. Did anything apart from the Spitfire really match the Me 109 till 1942?

Of-course 1942 was a watershed year: new allied weapons came in such as the Lancaster, B-17E, P-47 etc while the Germans stumbled in their ambitious Me 210, He 177, Ju 288; these were really 1943/44 weapons that were removed from mass production because they missed the boat by 1 year.

The Germans gambled on short wars as they had immediate situations on or close to their borders that were more imperative than long term strategic goals hence some important weapon categories were missing such as long range maritime bombers.

They also started to sharply focus their R+D efforts; abandoning microwave radar research to a low level even abandoning a promising 25cm radar from Lorentz when it was 80% complete.. There was in some ways a lack of diversity insurance. It was at this time that decisions of 1939/1940 when the Battle of France was raging around suspending work on projects that could not be completed in 6 months impacted areas such as radar and aircraft such a the Ar 240, a backup for the Me 210/410


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## michaelmaltby (Nov 2, 2011)

"... Firstly the notion that the Germans hadn't gone to a war time economy till 1942 is dispelled by Adam Tooze. "

That's not the conclusion I draw from the aforementioned author.

Mass production balls-to-the-wall production did not begin until after Barbarossa. The German AIRCRAFT industry was in war production mode - Ju 88's, Me-109's, Fw-190's etc.,
but commodities such as AMMUNITION were ongoing production priority issues. 1942-levels of production are introduced with "labour" programs ... and we know what that means.

I am not critiquing German war efforts ... I am constantly amazed ... but the country was not on the all-out effort until after Barbarossa ... and that is the message I take/took from Tooze.

MM


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## parsifal (Nov 2, 2011)

I kinda agree, but there are fundamental areas that I have to take issue. I admit that i dont use Tooze as much as perhaps i should, but I do have a copy of Overys analysis of the wartime and prewar economy, and I have read some accounts by others as well. I dont think Tooze dispels their positions completely. One good source i can recommend is Resource mobilization for World War II: the U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., and Germany, 1938-1945 ; Mark Harrison, Department of Economics, University of Warwick.

I agree that German wartime economy was reasonably managed....i draw the line that it was well managed....there was too much wastage on useless prototypes and theoretical research, and component deliveries too haphazard to ever say that. Financial management was also incredibly bad. Nazi interference prevented Speer from implementing the full program that he wanted, and this had a major effect on delivery of some items. There was too much emphasis on size and technology, and not enough emphasis on numbers....aka Tiger tanks which actually weakened the effectiveness of formations as a whole whilst providing merit on an individual basis. 

Moreover, whilst german industry was working to capacity in terms of factory floorspace, in terms of availabloe manpower (and woman power) it was anything but. The basic problem gets back to this Schacht issue. He wanted, among other things, in the prewar situation, to return German industry for a while to a consumer based economy, so that cash flows could be restored, so that more percentages of industries could be readied for war production. He was overuled and eventually sacked. Hitler wanted the machines of war now, not the sinews for a long war. whereas in places like britain, great efforts were made to prepare industry for a long war, the germans prewar wanted the machines. The result was that when war actually came, the Germans were left with a relatively limited portion of their economy that they could direct to war production, whilst the Brits, and others, could power on. it was a fundamental, and fatal error, because in the critical years 1939-42, the germans could not compete in military outputs despite having the second most powerful ecoomies overall in the world at that time. 

Moreover, there is strong argument that the german economy was mobilized after 1942, primarily on the back of loot it took from the economies of occupied nations and nations allied to it (loot by various means). all gold reserves were immediately appropriated from these occuiped territories, all these nations were forced to pegging of the RM at rates highly favourable to the germans, all these nations were forced to sell raw materials to germany at below cost. All these nations were forced to pay massive reparations to the germans, provide free labour and pay for the occupying forces. And of course they were forced to hand over all stocks of military equipment they possessed.

All this looting and pillaging allowed the germans to mobilise their own industries, but at the cost of wrecking the economies of the nations they occupied. unlike the economies of Czechoslovakia and Austria, which under Schacht had been carefully integrated into the overall German economy and provided a great deal of help materially to the Germans during the war, the economies of the occupied nations were completely trashed and mismanaged. Germany could have benefitted directly from industrial potential of france, for example, but in the end received only a limited amount of help, because it was not worth French industry the effort to do anything. Stripping iout the European economies as they did, gave the germans a short term gain, but long term made their occupation of euro[pe a financial liability


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## bobbysocks (Nov 3, 2011)

ok...here's my choices for game changers. i know there is an strong argument about cargo ac....its which came first the chicken or the egg deal. cargo ac are no good if you arent winning at the front....and you cant win at the front with out supplies. but still you must first be able to produce a victory to then have to supply. to out run your supply lines is a logistical matter to be managed

You are going to laugh but...the Curtis MB 2 bomber. Not because of that particular plane but because of the chance it was given and the outcome that was the result. in 1921 Billy Mitchell picked it to participate in the naval testing he was involved in. the MB2 dropped bombs which sunk the German dreadnought Ostfrieslan ( thought to be unsinkable) . these tests were blown off by the US high command but not by a Japanese General named Yamamoto. Impressed by this test he adopted a theory of naval warfare based on aircraft. the Val and Kate carrier born ac were direct results of this theory and bitter lesson learned by the US at Pearl harbor. That early "experiment" with that relic ended up changing the face of naval warfare from that point on.

the Me 109. cutting its teeth in the spanish civil war it outclassed fighter aircraft of the day and brought that standard to new heights. it dominated the skies in Germany's early eastern wars ( Poland, etc..) and even the early years of the russian war. in the western war it proved itself over belgium and france. during the battle of britian the german high commands decision to change tactics ( and later strategy ) seriously hindered it from completing it task of winning air superiority which it was able to do. it also was instrumental in gaining air superiority over europe by inflicting serious and unacceptable loses to the US bomber forces in 43...enough so for them to halt daylight bombing. this had extreme and far reaching results....

the P 51 Mustang. with its ability to escort bombers to the furthest parts of german occupied areas the US was again able to resume daylight bombing campaigns. the implication of this was the resumption of the D-day invasion and thus relief to the eastern front. the ability of long range bombers to continue over operations central germany was paramont to the the success of invasion...which was important to the war in eastern europe ( western russia). ground troops and LW ac that could have been repositioned to both corridors were now "fixed" in defense of the homeland and out of range of both fronts. at this point the LW no further enjoyed battle free zones where they could rest. repair and recover in peace. allied bomber losses dropped to "acceptable " levels. when Jimmy Doolittle took over command of the 8th Af the standing rule of staying with the bombers and disengaging if the enemy dove beneath 18k feet was no longer in effect. p 51s were free to roam and destroy the Lw where ever they found them...in the air..or on the ground. the range of the p 51 removed the unmolested sanctuary of all LW ac. while LW factories were being bombed US factories were unencumbered and able to mass produce hundreds of ac daily. where the allies could roam every inch of nazi controlled area germany could only transgress into less than 5% of the allied territory. it became a war of attrition but at a break necks pace..... if the allies had not come up with a long range escort...p51 or some other ac....much of what we read would not have happened...or at least as soon as they did.

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## nuuumannn (Nov 4, 2011)

Hi Bobbysocks, your reference to the Martin MB-2 bomber (not Curtiss) and mention of the attack on Pearl Harbor as influenced by Billy Mitchell is interesting, but I don't know if you are aware that it was the British who trained the Japanese in the art of sinking warships using aircraft.

In 1921 the British sent a naval mission to Japan led by Col. The Master of Sempill, which comprised 30 instructors and several examples of recent British naval aircraft, including Avro 504L floatplanes, Nieuport Nighthawks and two different torpedoplane designs; three Blackburn Swifts and six Sopwith Cuckoos. The latter were of significance because the Sopwith T.1 was the very first aircraft carrier based torpedoplane. During WW1 the British Admiralty adopted a plan to sink the German High Seas Fleet in its own anchorage on the Jade River at Wilhelmshaven. Before the end of the war, training had begun using Cuckoos for this raid, but little priority was placed on it due to the U-boat threat taking up resources.

Nevertheless, the Cuckoo crews carried out pioneering training on the type, torpedoeing destroyers and motor boats with the depth setting mechanisms set to run under the vessels off the coast of Scotland. In October 1918 the very first aircraft carrier based torpedo squadron was formed at East Fortune; this was 185 Sqn, RAF. At that stage the very first flat top carrier, HMS _Argus_ had completed trials and was in Royal Navy service and 185 Sqn was assigned to that ship lter that month.

At the time of the British Naval Mission to Japan, the Cuckoos and Swifts operated from the first Japanese carrier _Hosho_; Torpedo drops were carried out in Tokyo Bay by both types.












I'm sure that Mitchell's efforts were examined by the Japanese, as they would have been by most major powers at the time, but the seed had already been sown in the minds of the Japanese to use aircraft for this purpose.

You might also be interested to learn that the Japanese carried out the first sinking of an enemy warship using torpedoes during the battle of Port Arthur on the night of 8/9 February 1904. Japanese destroyers snuck into Port Arthur and carried out a surprise attack on the ships at anchor. The Russian cruiser Pallada was sunk and two Russian battleships were holed, but were later repaired. 

The British referred to such an attack as to 'Copenhagen' an enemy fleet after Admiral Horatio Nelson's singular burst of initiative against the Danish fleet in 1801. In Admiralty paper work concerning the plans to torpedo the German fleet in WW1, this term 'Copenhagen' is used to describe the attack.

It is also documented that Yamamoto was highly impressed with the Royal Navy's attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto on the night of 11 November 1940 using Fairey Swordfish torpedo bombers flying from the carrier HMS Illustrious.

I hope this is helpful. By the way, this by no means suggests that anything I have mentioned here constitutes game changers. Back to the game changing posts... sorry.


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## nuuumannn (Nov 4, 2011)

I have written articles on the subject of these pioneering torpedo trials, which I will post a thread in another section of the forum...


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## michaelmaltby (Nov 4, 2011)

Thanks Nuuumannn. 

Jerry


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## nuuumannn (Nov 6, 2011)

No worries Jerry, that second post was a double, but I modified it - I'm using my wife's laptop, so things are a bit slower. I didn't mean to hijack the post, by the way.


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## bobbysocks (Nov 6, 2011)

nuuumannn, a lot of great info there. at 3:30 in the morning and half a snoot full of rum a lot of the details in that part of the post were turned askew...go figure. mitchell was lobbying for an airforce...basically claming that they could produce a fleet of bombers for the price of one dreadnaught. he was basing more of the defense of a nation on a strong presence in the air. but as much as he was for aerial bombardment he didnt see the virtue in aircraft carriers. in his mind they were foolish and just bigger targets for a bomber. the upper command of course didnt tumble to his advice right away but the navy finally did see come around. The concept in the beginning seemed lost the the US where others were studing it with an open mind as a viable tactic/stragegy. anytime you go against the established hierarchy way of doing things...its usually met with a stone wall and negativity. as was in this case and with claire chennaults strategy for fighter ac to bring down bombers. anyways...since you seem to have studied this in great depth...when was the first time in other nations bombs were dropped on ships? i only came across mitchell's experiment because i was looking for something else. but i would be interested to know who used them and the details surrounding the indicents.


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## nuuumannn (Nov 7, 2011)

Hi Bobbysocks,

I'm no expert on this sort of thing, but torpedo aircraft of that period are of interest to me. The first unofficial record of a ship being attacked by aircraft is again by our erstwhile Far Eastern friends (in WW1 at least) the Japanese during the siege of Tsingtao, a German held colony in China. At the outbreak of WW1 the Japanese sent a naval task force that included the seaplane tender _Wakamiya_ equipped with four Maurice Farman floatplanes. These carried out a number of notable aviation firsts against German targets, although some of these are disputed. On 5th September 1914 one of the Japanese Farmans dropped what were essentially naval artillery shells on a German mine layer, which is often referred to as a torpedo boat, and caused damage to it; some accounts claimed this vessel was sunk, but this is not recorded in German shipping losses around that time.

Also during the Wakamiya's aircraft's ventures, German ground positions were attacked. These operations are often claimed by many sources, notably on the internet, to be the first successful aircraft carrier air strikes in history. This is somewhat over stating their significance since the _Wakamiya_ could not launch her aeroplanes, they had to be lowered into the sea; she was a seaplane tender. Another claim of the Japanese Farman seaplanes at Tsingtao is that they made the first night attacks against enemy positions, but there is debate about this and whether if it at all took place, how successful such an attack was. Nevertheless, these actions illustrated the resolve of the Japanese to use any weapons at their disposal to achieve their aims before many European and US military organsations were prepared to realise the potential of military aviation.

Unless I can be proven wrong, the first bombing attack on a capital warship by an aeroplane was by Royal Navy Short 184 seaplanes against the German battlecruiser _Goeben_ sailing under the Turkish flag as the _Yavuz Sultan Selim_. On 20 January 1918, the seaplane tender HMS _Empress_ launched a night attack against the ship, which had run aground off Nagara Point off the Dardanelles; one bomb struck the ship but caused little damage. Over the next few days more Short seaplanes dropped bombs on the ship, causing small amounts of damage, but none of the small sized (230 lb) weapons were able to penetrate the _Goeben_'s deck armour and it was towed off the reef by a Turkish warship.

One of the unsung aircraft of WW1, the ubiquitous Short 184 has a distinguished naval history; during the Dardanelles campaign in 1915, Short seaplanes sank Turkish vessels using torpedoes on more than one occasion, although one of the vessels had been disabled by a submarine prior to being shot at by the aeroplane. For more, read my article posted under the World War One heading on this forum called Laying Eggs in Someone Else's Basket.

One again, I've hijacked a thread! Mind you, you could argue it was in order to establish a potential game changer!


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## parsifal (Nov 7, 2011)

no, not at all....very intersting material Nuuumannn


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## bobbysocks (Nov 7, 2011)

thanks for the info nuuumannn, any time you think outside the box and experiment like in the examples you illustrated above...that is the potential for...or the "seeds" of game changers. good stuff.


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## pbfoot (Nov 22, 2011)

The B24 aside from closing the mid Atlantic gap which no other aircraft was capable was also used as a transport , in 42 prior to El Alamein there was shortage of anti tank ammunition in the middle east the B24 on its ferry flights was tasked with carrying the ammo from the US to the front , also the B24 used to carry the armour and other equipment removed from B17 on the trans Atlantic ferry allowing B17 to carry enough fuel reserves for the crossing . The B24 ferry flights were always loaded with high priority supplies or passengers

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## michaelmaltby (Nov 22, 2011)

B-24's with bomb bay fuel bladders were used to ferry fuel to General George Patton's hard-driving armoured columns in west France IIRC.



MM


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## Sagittario64 (Nov 22, 2011)

The C.202 was definitely a game changer for the Italians. with one fell swoop the italians possessed a aircraft in sufficient numbers to rival and sometimes outdo the p-40s and hurricanes that were devastating the C.200s and Fiat G.50s


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## pbfoot (Nov 22, 2011)

michaelmaltby said:


> B-24's with bomb bay fuel bladders were used to ferry fuel to General George Patton's hard-driving armoured columns in west France IIRC.
> 
> 
> 
> MM


and grass seed for Malta which was needed to prevent erosion post bombing attack by LW


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## aurora-7 (Aug 11, 2016)

Almost made a thread with this exact title until I saw this one. The original post stated in the beginning:



Kryten said:


> Whilst we all love to debate the merits of favourite planes, few can be regarded as being designs that changed the way the war was fought in Europe.



I move to include aircraft for the war in general, for all theaters.

In that context I choose the Douglas SBD Dauntless.

Though it was not the best of all dive bomber designs of the war or as an aircraft design in general, it's impact was immense. I think few weapon systems can be credited with changing the course of a war and the SBD was one of them. It's actions in the Battle of Midway of June, 1942 changed the Imperial Japanese Navy's (and also Japan's in general) from a war of expansion to a defensive war. 4 aircraft carriers lost that Japan could not readily replace and that bludgeoning completely halted the Japanese Empire's expansion and allowed the smaller US Navy to outpace it's fleet development and begin rolling back Japan's conquests.

There was plenty more of horrendous combat in the following years and at the time the Allies were not aware of the extent of the devastating blow they dealt but a thing the actions of this one weapon on that one day had the greatest proportional effect on the course of the war than any aircraft.


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## drgondog (Aug 11, 2016)

I applaud the mention of the SBD - but it was the USN pilots flying an obsolete dive bomber taking complete advantage of Zeros drawn to the deck by the Torp bombers.

Somehow I missed the contribution in CBI, ETO, Aleutians, and MTO


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## pinehilljoe (Aug 11, 2016)

aurora-7 said:


> In that context I choose the Douglas SBD Dauntless.



No question to me, the SBD was the right plane at the right time. We also owe the Naval Aviators that flew them undying gratitude. Walter Lord said it best: "THEY HAD NO RIGHT TO WIN. YET THEY DID, AND IN DOING SO THEY CHANGED 
THE COURSE OF A WAR…EVEN AGAINST THE GREATEST OF ODDS, THERE IS 
SOMETHING IN THE HUMAN SPIRIT – A MAGIC BLEND OF SKILL, FAITH AND 
VALOR – THAT CAN LIFT MEN FROM CERTAIN DEFEAT TO INCREDIBLE VICTORY." 

England had its Few, those brave Naval Aviators in 1942 were our Few.


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## fastmongrel (Aug 12, 2016)

Its often hard to spot the moment a battle turned but Midway you can pretty well point your finger and say there thats it. It was an incredible stroke of luck but as the great Gary Player said "the more I practice the luckier I get" without superb pilots in good enough to do the job planes you cant take advantage of the opportunities. The pilots could have been flying Curtiss SBC divebombers and probably still done as much or similar damage.


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## pinehilljoe (Aug 12, 2016)

Another Game Changer, the B-29. It was a jump in technology from prior LRB aircraft. One could argue it was the only plane to successfully carry out a strategic bombing campaign, even without the Bomb.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 12, 2016)

Are we talking about planes participated in a battle that changed the course of the war or about planes that changed the tactics of air warfare as it was being practiced at the time? 

Momentous as the success of the SBDs at Midway was in the course of the Pacific war dive bombers had been a major component of carrier aviation for years before hand and would continue to be for several years after. 

The US Navy and the Japanese had both gone through a succession of dive bombers to reach the ones used at Midway. The SBD certainly confirmed the concept (if the Japanese Vals hadn't already) but there was no major reshuffling of the mix of aircraft of carriers or change in the tactics as a result of the Midway battle.

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## stona (Aug 13, 2016)

pinehilljoe said:


> Another Game Changer, the B-29. . . One could argue it was the only plane to successfully carry out a strategic bombing campaign, even without the Bomb.



Just how, pray, would you make that argument?
Cheers
Steve


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## GrauGeist (Aug 13, 2016)

The SBD was certainly a notable aircraft and proved itself more than capable on many occasions, but I wouldn't go as far as to say it was a "game changer".

A game changer would be more like the B-29 that caused the Japanese to rethink their fighter design and manufacturing just to counter it. (And in a twist of irony, the B-29 bombing raids were destroying the manufacturing facilities that were trying to produce these powerful new interceptors).

Another game changer could be the Me262, which forced the Allies to shift their tactics to counter the new threat.


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## pinehilljoe (Aug 13, 2016)

stona said:


> Just how, pray, would you make that argument?
> Cheers
> Steve



My opinion. Based on the Strategic Bombing Survey done after the war. German Industrial output kept going, it was the ground offensive that ended the War. The Survey's conclusion on Japan: "Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."

The European bomber offensive contributed but was not decisive in the outcome of the War.


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## stona (Aug 13, 2016)

pinehilljoe said:


> "Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."



But that was not due to the bombing offensive alone, any more than the German surrender was. The Japanese had been forced back to the Home Islands, lost all their early gains, and just like the Germans, had been deprived of the vital raw materials they sought. None of this was as a result of the strategic bombing.
The strategic bombing of Japan was just one element resulting in her defeat. Had Japan still held its territories from New Guinea to Burma and been in a less parlous position in China and the Korean peninsula then the bombing would not have compelled her surrender.

The same applies to Germany. In the case of Germany the wrong question is always asked. The question is not how Germany managed to maintain and even increase SOME production until the last months of the war but what might have been achieved if there had been no combined bombing offensive. The manpower and resources invested in the civil defence and anti aircraft defences would have been freed for other purposes, as indeed could many weapons and ammunition. The disruption caused to industry from everything from sleep deprived workers to absenteeism (it took an average of five days absence for a 'bombed out' German worker to sort out accommodation, compensation etc at the relevant offices). Tens of thousands of tradesmen were retained in Germany to patch up and make habitable damaged buildings, whilst children went to the fronts.The huge investment and disruption caused by the dispersion and in some cases burying under expensive and labour intensive bomb proof structures could also have been used elsewhere.
The idea that the combined bombing offensive was ineffective does not stand up to scrutiny. It certainly did not, and could not, have won the war alone, anymore than the campaign against Japan did. The report of the British equivalent to the USSBS is heavily influenced by the prejudices of some of the authors, just as Harris' post war report is. The truth lies somewhere between, and a more sober and realistic modern appraisal will take this into account.
Cheers
Steve

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## wuzak (Aug 13, 2016)

I would argue that Combine Bomber Offensive played some part in the success of the D-Day landings and invasion success - the attrition of German fighter strength countering the bombing effort made the Luftwaffe's presence at the beaches negligible, the Transportation Plan reduced Germany's ability to move men and equipment to places needed to oppose the invasion and the Oil Plan severely reduced their ability to mount counter-offensives.

Each of the plans had side effects. The Transportation Plan prevented raw materials from reaching production facilities, including coal being moved to synthetic oil plants.

And the Oil Plan disrupted not only oil production but also synthetic rubber and explosives production, which were products of the synthetic oil plants.

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## stona (Aug 14, 2016)

I agree with all that. The real miracle is that the Germans managed not just to carry on under the bombs but to successfully continue to take up the slack in their economy and increase some elements of their war production whilst expending considerable resources in attempts to prevent and or mitigate the effects of the bombing. I don't know to what extent the same applied to the Japanese.

All these factors contributed to Germany's defeat, but the one, unequivocal victory of the offensive, and it was an almost entirely American one, was the destruction of the Luftwaffe. Without this victory not just the invasion in mid 1944, but all the preparation for that invasion, including the plans mentioned above, become at best much more problematic, at worst impossible. Bomber Command would certainly not have been bombing by day and it would not have made the substantial (and often over looked) contributions to those plans, particularly the Transport Plan. Harris would have had the excuse he needed to carry on redistributing rubble around the centre of many German cities.
In this respect I don't think the bombing offensive against Japan was nearly as influential. In some respects the collapse of the Japanese air forces was as much a result of Japanese incompetence as it was US/Allied aggression.

Cheers

Steve

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## stona (Aug 14, 2016)

I confess to not reading back over all this old thread, so apologies if this is a repetition. If there ever was a game changer in any theatre it was a long range escort fighter.
Preeminent in the ETO were the later versions of the P-51, but there were others. In the ETO the P-51 was a game changer, and it changed the game in an unexpected role as part of the combined bombing offensive.

On the German side there are only what ifs. The Me 262 was certainly a potential game changer, but it never came close to realising that potential.

Cheers

Steve

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## aurora-7 (Aug 14, 2016)

GrauGeist said:


> The SBD was certainly a notable aircraft and proved itself more than capable on many occasions, but I wouldn't go as far as to say it was a "game changer".



In terms in changing the nature of how air combat evolved, that's true. While I think it changed the course of the Second World War in the Pacific for the actions it did in a single day, it's not the same as the the P-51 giving new capabilities in fighter escort or the B-29 in load, speed and range capabilities for heavy bomber development.


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## GrauGeist (Aug 14, 2016)

The turn of events at Midway was something short of miraculous, to be honest.

There is no denying that the SBDs stood head and shoulders above all that day, but by the narrowest of margins.

Timing is everything and in this case, worked against the Japanese and favored the USN attacks. There is just so much that could have gone horribly wrong for the USN and even the SBDs could not have prevented that, if the timing of a few events were just a little bit different.

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## Thorlifter (Aug 15, 2016)

If the SBD's taking out 4 carriers is "by the narrowest of margins", what event at Midway is close to it?


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## GrauGeist (Aug 15, 2016)

If you follow the order of battle, you'll see what I am referring to.

Nagumo initially held half his force in reserve, his scout from the Tone was late in reporting the sighting of Taskforce 16, he was recovering the Midway strike force and didn't have sufficient CAP in place, the reserve CAP aircraft were still below decks, they were changing from land-based bombs to naval bombs after a delay in decision making, and on and on.

Had Nagumo brought his full force to bear initially AND brought the rest of the fleet into position AND established a steady CAP over the fleet (launching small groups in a rotation instead of waiting to launch full flights), the SBDs would have been challenged on a level that the TBDs encountered.

As it happens, the air cover over the fleet was low on fuel and out of ammo and were trying to be recovered when the SBDs from Yorktown and Enterprise arrived.

Had the SBDs arrived sooner, the A6Ms would have been in a position to refuse the SBD's attack. Had Nagumo brought up his fleet into a full concentrated arrangement, the AA from the Battleships and Cruisers would have contributed to the defenses, and so on.

It's all alot more complex than what I am describing here, but I recommend reading about the order of battle for Midway and you'll start to see how timing and mistakes left the door open for the SBDs to be able to cornhole the IJN the way they did.

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## Thorlifter (Aug 15, 2016)

Sure, I understand the steps of how the battle unfolded. You are right that many events had to happen just so to set up the SBD's to be as successful as they were. I was just confused when referring to the accomplishments of the SBD's being a game changer as apposed to something being almost as equal.

Clear as mud now!


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## drgondog (Aug 15, 2016)

Steve - IMO I agree with you that the later versions of the P-51 (P-51D by implication in your comments above) were more capable than the P-51B/C by virtue of 50% more firepower. That said, it was the P-51B/C that killed the LW from mid Germany to Poland prior to D-Day and for a significant period afterwards. It took till October for the P-51D fleet to exceed the B/D in operational strength.

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## pbehn (Aug 15, 2016)

I propose the Fairey Swordfish, not so much for its capabilities as an aeroplane but after Taranto and the crippling of the Bismark all of the worlds navies realised that the game had changed. Although an obsolete design it did have the ability to loiter about and carry a RADAR system which is the basis of anti submarine warfare.

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## stona (Aug 15, 2016)

pbehn said:


> I propose the Fairey Swordfish, not so much for its capabilities as an aeroplane but after Taranto and the crippling of the Bismark all of the worlds navies realised that the game had changed. Although an obsolete design it did have the ability to loiter about and carry a RADAR system which is the basis of anti submarine warfare.



I do like the old Swordfish, but I can't really see IT as the game changer. The vulnerability of ships to air attack was well known, in fact I would argue that as the war progressed navies realised that surface shipping was not as vulnerable as first feared, given certain measures, certainly the British thought so after the Battle of Crete, and Cunningham said so.

The game changers in anti submarine warfare were technological advances, not the aircraft that carried the electronic boxes. There were far better anti submarine aircraft than the venerable Swordfish.

The Swordfish did have one feature which as far as I know no other aircraft had. This was the attachment for the observer, the fantastically named 'anti cavorting chain'. For this alone the Swordfish should be at the top of at least one superlative list 

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Aug 15, 2016)

The game changer in aircraft attacking ships had come in 1915 when Shorts 184 aircraft sank several ships using torpedoes. Granted they were small ships but they were using small torpedoes (14in diameter).

This was pretty much the impulse behind carrier aviation. While scouting and spotting were important functions the ability to actually sink other ships with a ship borne aircraft relied on air dropped torpedoes. 
Billy Mitchell not withstanding, he use land based twin engine bombers carrying much bigger bombs than any WW I or 1920s carrier based plane could ever hope to carry. 
The success at Taranto may have come as a surprise (the extent of the damage vs planes used) but most Navies had their carrier building programs underway when the raid took place. For instance the US already had 11 Essex class carriers on order (even if not laid down) at the time of the Taranto raid.

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## pbehn (Aug 15, 2016)

The Bismark was one of the biggest and best battleships, to be taken out by a biplane with a torpedo changed the game as far as surface raiders went.


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## pbehn (Aug 15, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> The success at Taranto may have come as a surprise (the extent of the damage vs planes used) but most Navies had their carrier building programs underway when the raid took place. For instance the US already had 11 Essex class carriers on order (even if not laid down) at the time of the Taranto raid.


That is what I meant, the amount of damage that could be done by just a few planes.


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## stona (Aug 15, 2016)

Bismarck was destroyed by a Royal Navy task force of considerable size, not a biplane with a torpedo. It took nearly two hours for two battleships, and a couple of heavy cruisers along with Bismarck's own crew to finally sink her. She was damaged in way that would eventually prove fatal by an air launched torpedo strike, but even the British acknowledged this to be fortuitous.

Taranto was a success, attacking enemy fleets at anchor is something of a Royal Navy tradition. It makes the job somewhat easier 

Cheers

Steve

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## pbehn (Aug 15, 2016)

stona said:


> Bismarck was destroyed by a Royal Navy task force of considerable size, not a biplane with a torpedo. It took nearly two hours for two battleships, and a couple of heavy cruisers along with Bismarck's own crew to finally sink her. She was damaged in way that would eventually prove fatal by an air launched torpedo strike, but even the British acknowledged this to be fortuitous.


It was very fortuitous, however considering the investment of men and materials the loss was catastrophic, and absolutely no guarantee that another attack against another ship would not have a similar result.


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## gjs238 (Aug 15, 2016)

pbehn said:


> I propose the Fairey Swordfish, not so much for its capabilities as an aeroplane but *after Taranto and the crippling of the Bismark all of the worlds navies realised that the game had changed*. Although an obsolete design it did have the ability to loiter about and carry a RADAR system which is the basis of anti submarine warfare.



Guess the US Navy missed that one.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 15, 2016)

What they may have missed was that the RN got torpedoes to work in shallow water. 
It was assumed that torpedoes dropped from aircraft would plunge too deep and hit bottom before rising back up to normal operating depth. In deeper anchorages it was common to use torpedo nets to help protect against torpedo attack. 
Like I said in the Previous post The US Navy had 11 Essex class carriers on order before the Taranto raid took place. They may have been ordering battleships at the same time (actually all six Iowas' were ordered before Taranto) but It doesn't look like Taranto made any difference to US plans and 11 Essex class carriers would carry more aircraft than all the worlds non-US carriers combined.


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## Thorlifter (Aug 16, 2016)

Not a bad choice Pbehn! Hadn't even thought of the old stringbag.


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## parsifal (Aug 16, 2016)

stona said:


> I do like the old Swordfish, but I can't really see IT as the game changer. The vulnerability of ships to air attack was well known, in fact I would argue that as the war progressed navies realised that surface shipping was not as vulnerable as first feared, given certain measures, certainly the British thought so after the Battle of Crete, and Cunningham said so.
> 
> The game changers in anti submarine warfare were technological advances, not the aircraft that carried the electronic boxes. There were far better anti submarine aircraft than the venerable Swordfish.
> 
> ...




not many were better than the swordfish. It was unquestionably obsolete as an aircraft, but its ability to operate from CVE platforms, in the most attrocious weather conditions, carrying a wide array of weapons and detection systems, make it a standout platform for hunting submarines in the atlantic. It major shortcoming was its short range, but against this it had the ability to stay airborne for long periods....high endurance and short range, due to its slow speed.

it took time to come to the conclusion that carrier borne aircraft were critical in the protection of convoys against uboats, and the swordfish was at the very forefront of that. it was the perfect aircraft for the proof of concept stage, the perfect aircraft for the conditions the RN was forced to fight under, the perfect aircraft in terms of ease of maintenance, strength and durability

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## GrauGeist (Aug 16, 2016)

So perhaps the Royal Navy's torpedo was the real game-changer in this case...


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## parsifal (Aug 16, 2016)

no other carrier borne strike aircraft was capable of undertaking what the Swordfish achieved at Taranto and later against the Bismarck, at least in the timeframe of the historical strike. at Taranto, the slow speed of the stringbag allowed the pilots to drop to the very low launch heights that allowed most of the torps to avoid hitting the bottom (coupled with the box tails which the IJN copied for PH). the attack at Taranto required some very precise flying at a very low speed so that the torpedoes could be set so as to pass under the protective torpedo netting but above the harbour floor....a window of about 6 feet. it makes Luke Skywalkers destruction of the Death star look like a walk in the park really.

At Bismarck, agin, any other aircraft, in the pitiful numbers available would have failed miserably against the wall of flak the BISMARCK was capabale of putting into the air. The aircraft flew so slowly as to fool the german predictors, and dip and climb between the wave creast as they approached the target. Its a peculiar way of achieving the status of game changer, but it was a game changer nevertheless. a successful sortie by the Bismarck could have utterly wrecked the Nth Atlantic defences and it was here, in 1941, that the crucial battle wwas being fought.

The Swordfish is the unsung hero of the naval war for the allies. its importance ought not be judged on its obvious obsolescence.

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## nuuumannn (Aug 16, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> This was pretty much the impulse behind carrier aviation. While scouting and spotting were important functions the ability to actually sink other ships with a ship borne aircraft relied on air dropped torpedoes.



Actually it goes back even further than this; the Italians were the first to drop a torpedo like object from an aircraft, although it wasn't an actual torpedo and the RNAS did it the same year, 1914 in June - Arthur Longmore, an Aussie (Oi oi oi!) was piloting the Short seaplane, and senior RNAS and Admiralty staff, including and at the forefront of enthusiasm for the idea, Winston Churchill, who was First Lord at the time. The first proposals for ships carrying torpedo carrying aeroplanes came about in discussions held in 1914 at the time Longmore made his torpedo drop, Churchill even coining the term 'seaplane' as opposed to 'hydro-aeroplane', which was a lot more cumbersome and in use at the time. This is where the navy's use of fast picket steamers for carrying aeroplanes came about and at the outbreak of war, the RN had a number of seaplane tenders that were designed for carrying offensive as well as observation aircraft.

At Christmas time in 1914, the RN launched a raid against German facilities at Cuxhafen using seaplane tenders - although not an entire success, the raid was the first combined air and sea op, which was let down by technology rather than the concept. The aircraft used were Short Folder seaplanes, so called because, well, you work it out... Which was the same type used by Longmore to drop the torpedo, although they were used as bombers, not for carrying torpedoes.

Edmonds, who was the first person in history to sink a ship at sea with an air launched torpedo took part in the Cuxhafen raid and the captain of the tender HMS Ben-My-Chree, which carried the Short 184s in the Dardanelles, Cecil L'Estrange Malone was also at Cuxhafen.

In 1914 the first proposals for sinking the German High Seas Fleet at anchor in Wilhelmshafen were also written. Churchill (there he is again with extraordinary foresight) suggested removing the floats from a seaplane and fitting wheeled undercarriage to lighten the aircraft and enable them to carry a heavier torpedo to be carried aboard the ships, but his idea was shot down as being impracticable, although in 1915 and 1916, letters were written expressing the same idea and from these came the world's first aircraft carrier based warplane with a conventional undercarriage - odd, because the first aircraft carrier as we know it hadn't been built at that time, the Sopwith Torpedoplane, named the Cuckoo after the Armistice.

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## nuuumannn (Aug 16, 2016)

To add to that above, it was the Japanese who were the first to use ship launched aircraft with an offensive purpose; the seaplane Tender Wakamiya carried licence built Farman aeroplanes, which carried bombs for sinking German ships during the Tsingtao campaign in September 1914. The aeroplanes were largely unsuccessful as bombers, but still managed to sink a German torpedo boat.

On the subject, the Whitehead locomotive torpedo was certainly a game changer in naval warfare.

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## Shortround6 (Aug 16, 2016)

While the Swordfish certainly did many amazing things and did affect the direction of the war at times (change of balance of power in the Med,etc) it wasn't a "game changer" in sense of:

1. MAN, we need some of those Biplanes like the British got, how soon can we build some!!!!

2. Crap, they hit us again, how can we stop them?? More AA guns? different fighters? We are defenseless!!!

A bit of an exaggeration but I hope you get the idea. True game changers would require the enemy to at least come up with some sort of counter measure. Different weapons or tactics or both to counter the threat. They also at times spur development of similar weapons/aircraft in allies and enemies alike, sometimes in the fear of being left behind rather than an real tactical need in some forces. 

Changing the low speed setting or range of adjustment on an anti-aircraft predictor isn't really a game changer.

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## fastmongrel (Aug 16, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> Changing the low speed setting or range of adjustment on an anti-aircraft predictor isn't really a game changer.



I have always been suspicous of the claim that the predictors wouldnt work on such a slow speed aircraft. When Bismark was laid down all carrier navies and most Air Forces had torpedo bombers capable of about 100mph flat out when carrying a torpedo and anyone who didnt allow for a current aircrafts attacking speed is an idiot even if the aircraft on the drawing board were meant to be faster. 

I have read that the predictors would only work down to 140mph which is an odd speed of 225.3 kilometers per hour. Even if it was said the predictors only went down to 200kph (124.2mph) which seems a more believable figure because human brains tend to prefer round numbers I would still be suspicous as any gunnery officer worth his salt would know the speed of a Stringbag and allow for it. Maybe its not as easy to hit a slow moving aircraft as we think or maybe the Bismarks gunners werent quite as good or well trained as the internet would have us believe.


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## pbehn (Aug 16, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> While the Swordfish certainly did many amazing things and did affect the direction of the war at times (change of balance of power in the Med,etc) it wasn't a "game changer" in sense of:
> 
> 1. MAN, we need some of those Biplanes like the British got, how soon can we build some!!!!
> 
> ...


The Germans came up with a new and novel idea, the Tirpitz was kept in a fjord lol

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## pbehn (Aug 16, 2016)

gjs238 said:


> Guess the US Navy missed that one.


I think the US Navy took note but since war had not been officially declared they were taken unawares. I know from living and working in Japan that the Japanese saw the oil embargo as a de fact declaration.


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## stona (Aug 16, 2016)

pbehn said:


> The Germans came up with a new and novel idea, the Tirpitz was kept in a fjord lol



Not from fear of Swordfish!

If Swordfish were a game changer then so were the X-Craft which did more damage to Tirpitz than did Swordfish to Bismarck. 

I think a more stringent definition of game changer might be needed 

Cheers

Steve


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## pbehn (Aug 16, 2016)

stona said:


> Not from fear of Swordfish!
> 
> If Swordfish were a game changer then so were the X-Craft which did more damage to Tirpitz than did Swordfish to Bismarck.
> 
> ...


Steve I said in my original post that it wasnt so much the aircrafts capabilities but what it achieved, wiping out a major part of the Italian fleet and crippling a major battleship at sea. Basically it showed that the theory of air power at sea was a reality. For the Germans the Tirpitz was probably better in a fjord, the British spent enormous resources trying to destroy it and keeping a battle fleet at readiness should it put to sea.

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## buffnut453 (Aug 16, 2016)

Haven't read this entire thread but, IMHO, the biggest single game-changer for aerial warfare was the advent of radar. It was a vital contributor to British and German ground-controlled intercept capabilities in both daylight and at night. Installed in fighter aircraft, it enabled the first successful night-fighters and, from there, all-weather engagement of enemy aircraft. Other airborne applications included detecting ships and submarines, as well as ground-mapping radar as a night/bad weather bombing aid. It went to see for over-the-horizon detection of enemy vessels and to improve air defence of ships and task forces. It was deployed with searchlight and AAA units to improve their performance in locating and tracking enemy aircraft. It wass even used for early proximity fuses for heavy AAA munitions. It continues to be a major influence on SAMs and stealth countermeasures to this day.

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## bobbysocks (Aug 16, 2016)

all the talk of Taranto made me look for more on the subject. I found this from a war college ( Canadian I presume )

https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment...Taranto,-The--Tactical-Success,-Operatio.aspx


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## Shortround6 (Aug 16, 2016)

pbehn said:


> Steve I said in my original post that it wasnt so much the aircrafts capabilities but what it achieved, wiping out a major part of the Italian fleet and crippling a major battleship at sea. *Basically it showed that the theory of air power at sea was a reality.* For the Germans the Tirpitz was probably better in a fjord, the British spent enormous resources trying to destroy it and keeping a battle fleet at readiness should it put to sea.



The Swordfish did show the bolded part but since the building programs for carriers in the US, Britain and Japan were already well under way and don't seem to have been modified much, if any, right after the Taranto attack.
Likewise the next generation of carrier strike aircraft don't seem to have been modified/changed much, if any. First flight of the Fairey Barracuda was less than 4 weeks after Taranto so work had obviously been going on well before that. The first two prototypes for the Grumman Avenger had been ordered in April of 1940. First flight of the Japanese B6N was in March of 1941, 4 months after Taranto in response to a 1939 request. 
The "game" of measure and counter measure as far as carrier strike aircraft goes would have played out much the same almost regardless of the Taranto raid. Even a complete failure would have been written off as too few obsolete aircraft trying to make the strike. 
It certainly would NOT have caused massive cancellations of carrier construction and substitution of battleships.


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## pbehn (Aug 16, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> It certainly would NOT have caused massive cancellations of carrier construction and substitution of battleships.


Quite the reverse, it just showed that battleships were more of a liability than an asset in many theatres. I dont read so much naval history, after the sinking of the Bismark did battleships play a significant part in any theatre of operations? If anything I would think construction of carriers would have been stepped up/maximised.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 16, 2016)

Many commentators don't realize the amount of time it takes to design and build large ships. Battleships especially as their armament is so complex. It often took more time to build the main guns and mounts/turrets than the rest of the ship. 
Changing Naval construction programs cold not be done on a whim. 
The HMS Vanguard, Britian's last battleship was only constructed due to the availability of surplus Turrets/guns from WW I (in part the guns/mounts removed from the Courageous and Glorious upon their conversion to carriers). It was often 6 months to year after a ship was ordered before it was laid down. Often hundreds of tons of structural steel was gathered before construction started but this was not stock sizes, it was plates and girders specifically sized to the hull in question. Also see the number of coastal fortification guns the Germans got from the canceled battleships that were to follow the Bismark and Tirpitz. 
Carrier construction did become increasingly important and some programs were highly modified but that was as a result of war losses or further considerations. The US modified the Cleveland class light cruisers into the Independence class carriers but the Buships was against the Idea as late as Oct of 1941. President Roosevelt pushed the idea but it was only after Pearl Harbor that the idea went forward. One conversion being ordered in Jan 1942, two in Feb, 3 in March and the last 3 in June of 1942. 1st one commissioned was in Jan of 1943 and the hull had been laid down in May of 1941 as a Cruiser. All nine commissioned in 1943 and provided a useful reinforcement as much the larger Essex class carriers were completed. 
Very, very hard to trace any influence on these decisions to the Taranto raid. 
The US used fast battleships as floating flak batteries to help defend the carriers. Of course the Americans had better radar than the Japanese and had proximity fuse ammo for the large batteries of 5in AA guns in the latter parts of the war. 
AA guns and gunnery also made large advances during the war. Late war attacks involved aircraft numbers that would have been wild dreams in 1939/40 so comparing late war attacks to early war attacks gets confusing at best.

As evidence of "game" changes see destroyers that landed either guns or torpedoes (or both) in order to carry more anti-sub or anti aircraft armament. Some cruisers sacrificed a main gun turret for more AA guns.

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## parsifal (Aug 16, 2016)

stona said:


> Not from fear of Swordfish!
> 
> If Swordfish were a game changer then so were the X-Craft which did more damage to Tirpitz than did Swordfish to Bismarck.
> 
> ...



Its true, in a technical sense that swordfish were not directly responsible for the bottling up of the Tirpitz in a direct sense, yet the logic being applied to make this statement is really wide of the mark. In a direct sense, by the time the Tirpitz was finally operational, Swordfish were no longer considered frontline material. Bismarck was basically the swansong of the Swordfish as the FAAs front line strike aircraft, though it continued to serve with distinction from the second rate carriers the RN continued to rely upon, because mainly of the swordfish's benign deck handling characteristics

However in an indirect sense at least, the achievements of the swordfish had a profound effect on the career of the Tirpitz. after the experiences of 1940-41, the DKM issued a fleet wide directive that no capital ship was to be risked in open water operations if an enemy carrier was detected as operating in the area. The only time this could be overridden was with the direct approval of the Fuhrer, and this approval was seldom given. 

The Tirpitz continued to be the target of FAA attentions for the remainder of the war, driving home in spades that the battleship as a class of warship was now totally secondary to the capabilities of carrier borne aircraft, and this conclusion, whilst not pioneered by the Swordfish (that had been done 20 years earlier) was at least instrumental in maturing the concept and applying it operationally.

Beginning on 9 March 1942 the Commander-in-Chief Admiral Tovey ordered HMS Victorious to fly off a reconnaissance force of 6 Albacores on a diverging search between 105° and 155° to a depth of 150 miles to search for the Tirpitz during Convoy PQ12 once it was learnt via ULTRA that Tirpitz had been given approval to go to sea. 50 minutes later a strike force of 12 torpedo-carrying Albacores under the command of Lt Cdr W. J. Lucas, was flown off behind them. The orders to the strike force were to make a course of 135° and to act on any intercepted enemy reports. At 0802 on 9 March 1942 Albacore coded "F" sighted Tirpitz with the destroyer Friedrich Ihn in company and made a report. Four 4 Fairey Albacores of 832 Squadron, from HMS Victorious, emerged from the cloud abeam of Tirpitz and the destroyer Friedrich Ihn and began to dive to an immediate attack. The third of the Albacores was attacked and the navigator wounded by cannon fire although the Albacore made a successful return to Victorious. At 0917 on 9 March 1942 Tirpitz was attacked by the strike force of 12 torpedo-carrying Albacores under the command of Lieutenant-Commander W. J. Lucas from the aircraft carrier Victorious. The attack failed and 2 Albacores was shot down. Undamaged, Tirpitz nevertheless was, by standing orders (the direct result of the Swordfish successes the previous year) forced to abort her mission and proceed at full speed for the shelter of Vestfjord/Bogenfjord, where she arrived later the same day, while the remaining Albacores returned to Victorious. DKM was badly rattled by this experience with Hitler immediately ordering Tirpitz to be confined to the fjords again. She was reduced to a fairly impotent fleet in being role. Whilst all it took for the Tirpitz to assist in the destruction of PQ17 was a few puffs of smoke from her engines, and the Tirpitz was used sheepishly once or twice again, she remained effectively bottled up in port for the remainder of her career, largely impotent as a weapon of war. Her immasculation was not caused directly by Swordfish, but it was the swordfish that had led directly to the crisis in the german admiralty confidence that in turn ruined the career of the great ship. To me that is a game changing effect.

I think there is hardly an aircraft that can claim a greater single impact on the nature of warfare until the B-29 or perhaps the P-51. ,


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## nuuumannn (Aug 16, 2016)

parsifal said:


> I think there is hardly an aircraft that can claim a greater single impact on the nature of warfare until the B-29 or perhaps the P-51.



Hmmm, Not convinced by this; I don't think it was the threat of the Swordfish that caused such an upset, this is a tactical use of available resources. The Swordfish was a torpedo bomber and its equal in the RAF between the wars was the Blackburn Shark, the two compare closely in terms of size, weight and performance, with the edge going to the Shark, not the Swordfish, yet the latter remained in service for much longer - although it did enter service a year after the Shark. No one would qualify the Blackburn Shark as a game changer, yet, if it were Sharks aboard RN carriers in WW2, the same accolades accorded the Swordfish would have gone to the Shark

We also know that there were senior British (and overseas) naval personnel who were decrying the obsolescence of battleships even during the Great War; Murray Sueter comes to mind, so the impact of aircraft carrier based aviation had already shown to have generated support, and in support of proposed raids against the High Seas Fleet in Wilhelmshafen, the conversion of existing hulls into aircraft carrying ships had already been proposed before the war's end - Courageous and Glorious. By the end of the war, every British capital warship had facilities for carrying aircraft, although not all were allocated its own and this was introduced in 1917, so the concept of aviation at sea and its implications were not unknown and were readily foreseen.

As far as changing the nature of warfare, the Swordfish did not. It took part in gallant actions, which were in effect the day to day tasks that aircraft of the RN were expected to do - the concept of what we know as a Taranto style raid was first proposed in the Great War and serious planning was undertaken to its end before the war ended and, as Steve pointed out in an earlier post, taking out enemy ships in their own harbours was RN policy; it was, at the time known as a 'Copenhagen', after Adm Nelson's manoeuvring in 1801.

So, no, can't agree Parcifal; the Swordfish did not bring about a fundamental sea change (pardon the pun) in warfare at all. It was just doing its job; something that the navy did and had been doing for years.


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## BiffF15 (Aug 16, 2016)

Okay, here is my question / point? If the Swordfish is not a game changer (and I see both sides of this argument / point), then would it be the pilots / airpower? If the Shark would have made the same impact but didn't, then what is the constant in the equation (air crew / air power). Thoughts...

Cheers,
Biff

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## parsifal (Aug 16, 2016)

nuuumannn said:


> Hmmm, Not convinced by this; I don't think it was the threat of the Swordfish that caused such an upset, this is a tactical use of available resources. The Swordfish was a torpedo bomber and its equal in the RAF between the wars was the Blackburn Shark, the two compare closely in terms of size, weight and performance, with the edge going to the Shark, not the Swordfish, yet the latter remained in service for much longer - although it did enter service a year after the Shark. No one would qualify the Blackburn Shark as a game changer, yet, if it were Sharks aboard RN carriers in WW2, the same accolades accorded the Swordfish would have gone to the Shark"
> 
> The difference is in the ability of the swordfish to operate from carriers, including escort carriers, in weather conditions that would ground most other aircraft. The shark may well have been able to be adapted to that, im really unsure of its flying qualities. I do know that NO other aircraft of WWII was able to come close to the reliability of the swordfish and its rough weather and STOL qualities as well as its fantastic adaptability. Quoting, or looking at the outright performance will lead you into error with the swordfish. it was a poor performer by any standard, except that it could do what it could do under the most unfavourable conditions.
> 
> ...


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## parsifal (Aug 16, 2016)

I don't think its solely the performance of the aircraft, and id even concede that other aircraft could have been used to achieve the outcomes. There is a difference between a "game changer" and a "revolutionary aircraft'. im not claiming the Swordfish was revolutionary as a piece of technology. It was actually its "mundaneness" that made it such a game changer. it was well tested, its capabilities and limits well understood by the time it stepped up to do what it did. it was a game changer because it was the first aircraft of its kind to successfully in and operational sense fight battles in a totally new way and prove, conclusively that battleships could no longer exist without air cover, and in fact were no longer the final arbiters of seapower. there had been theoretical investigations well before the era of the Swordfish, and some very courageous officers (in the RN at least) that went out on a limb and insisted that carrier aviation continue to be developed. until 1938 this was a decidedly unhealthy practice to engage in in the RN, with control of the FAA not under the RNs control until that date.


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## nuuumannn (Aug 17, 2016)

parsifal said:


> it was a game changer because it was the first aircraft of its kind to successfully in and operational sense fight battles in a totally new way and prove, conclusively that battleships could no longer exist without air cover, and in fact were no longer the final arbiters of seapower.



But it wasn't Parsifal, that's why I mentioned the Shark - anything the Swordfish did, could have been done by something else - that's the point, not its performance. Also it didn't fight in a totally new way as you put it; the foundations for what the Swordfish did had been laid and in that these actions were not revolutionary in themselves because nothing really changed after Taranto; the battleship had already had its heyday before the Swordfish and recognition of the rise of aircraft at sea took place before Taranto _and_ the Swordfish entering service.

It was demonstrated before Taranto that battleships, indeed any enemy warship couldn't operate successfully without air cover in a war zone; within days of the war beginning, a single Heinkel He 111 sank a German destroyer (might have been more than one) with a well placed bomb, because the navy failed to get the message through to the Luftwaffe that it had ships in the vicinity. Had escorting fighters been present the unfortunate incident would not have taken place and perhaps the He 111 would have been shot down - who knows. British ships were regularly attacked at sea during the Phony War. In fact it was a lesson learned during the Great War, why do you think the RN invested so much in naval aviation during that war?

Taranto proved that the RN's policy of Copenhagening an enemy fleet could do serious harm to its ability to fight, but again, it wasn't a new idea and the RN wasn't the first to carry out an air attack against ships in their own harbour. As I put earlier, the Japanese did it with Farman biplanes in September 1914 and they sank a torpedo boat. Whilst not overly successful, in hindsight the concept is hard to miss. Taranto knocked the Italian fleet up a bit, but some of those ships not sunk or damaged beyond repair sailed again and took part in Matapan, which proves that Taranto was not the striking blow that it's made out to be. These two actions, not just Taranto alone, proved to the Italians that the RN was still a force to be reckoned with in the Med. Airpower dominated in the Med, not battleships, but that was a given, not something that was learned specifically from Taranto.

As for the Bismarck, again, a torpedo strike against its rudder, a lucky strike, not a game changing event and something that any torpedo bomber could have done. The loss of the Bismarck didn't change the course of the war for the Germans; let's not overstate its strategic importance.


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## nuuumannn (Aug 17, 2016)

Following on from this debate, if the Swordfish was a game changer, then I'd put up the Sopwith Cuckoo; the first specifically designed aircraft carrier based torpedo dropper. It was designed specifically for a ship launched raid against the High Seas Fleet in its own harbour and although it was never used in anger, exercises after the war and the actions of the Swordfish proved that what the Cuckoo pilots trained for could actually be done. But since I don't think the Swordfish is a game changer, perhaps the Cuckoo wasn't either.

I still maintain that it was the locomotive torpedo that changed naval warfare for ever. You might even say that airpower changed naval warfare for ever, but not specifically the Swordfish.


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## stona (Aug 17, 2016)

nuuumannn said:


> You might even say that airpower changed naval warfare for ever, but not specifically the Swordfish.



I would say that, it was exactly my point.

Cheers

Steve

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## pbehn (Aug 17, 2016)

stona said:


> I would say that, it was exactly my point.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve


It was mine too when I posted it, the swordfish showed that any aircraft that can carry a torpedo or a depth charge and radar was a danger to ships and submarines. I wish I hadnt said ainything .


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## stona (Aug 17, 2016)

pbehn said:


> .... any aircraft that can carry a torpedo or a depth charge and radar was a danger to ships and submarines. .



Or bombs, or rockets. Torpedoes were a fantastically expensive and high maintenance method of attacking ships from the air (or anywhere else). They were also by no means the most effective or reliable in the 1940s.

Cheers

Steve

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## michaelmaltby (Aug 17, 2016)

I, like Parsifal, think the Swordfish was a game changer, but on reading the pros and cons in this thread I think perhaps it was Taranto -_ the operation itself_ - that was the game changer. In the tradition of the highly risky, daring attacks that Sir Francis Drake pulled off against the Spanish and Lord Nelson against the French and their allies. Taranto was the epitome of the Royal Navy's agressive esprit ... and _that _was game changing .... the IJN were the students of the RN as were seamen like John Paul Jones.

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## pinehilljoe (Aug 17, 2016)

A little off topic but related to the radar post. A game changer was when Marshall Dowding developed the concept of an integrated weapons system, radar, fighters with HF radios, fighters with 8 machine guns to bring bombers down, hardened communication lines linking the radar stations to a central command center, a combat information center that processed information and directed aircraft in what we now call "real time". No one had envisioned anything like this until Dowding, now its part of all levels the modern military.


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## stona (Aug 17, 2016)

nuuumannn said:


> Following on from this debate, if the Swordfish was a game changer, then I'd put up the Sopwith Cuckoo; the first specifically designed aircraft carrier based torpedo dropper. It was designed specifically for a ship launched raid against the High Seas Fleet in its own harbour and although it was never used in anger, exercises after the war and the actions of the Swordfish proved that what the Cuckoo pilots trained for could actually be done. But since I don't think the Swordfish is a game changer, perhaps the Cuckoo wasn't either.
> 
> I still maintain that it was the locomotive torpedo that changed naval warfare for ever. You might even say that airpower changed naval warfare for ever, but not specifically the Swordfish.



In 1914 an effort was made by the Air Department at the Admiralty to provide some means of carrying torpedo aircraft into the North Sea to surprise German warships operating in the area. HMS Riviera and HMS Engadine (later to feature in the Battle of Jutland) were both fitted out for this purpose. This was despite the concentration of resources in anti submarine operations. One operation against a German cruiser was set to go when it was cancelled due to adverse weather. No more opportunities presented themselves in 1914 and the aircraft were diverted for more pressing duties, but the idea that torpedo aircraft could cause unpleasant surprises to enemy warships was well established.

In an Admiralty conference of 3rd April 1915 Churchill argued forcefully that the development of torpedo aircraft should be _"pressed on with" _and envisaged their use against Germany's capital ships in Fleet action or _"in his harbours"_. I mentioned before that attacking enemy fleets at anchor was a well established RN tradition. There was nothing new or radical in the conception of the Taranto attack by illuminating and torpedo dropping aircraft more than 25 years later. Both tactics were developed between 1915 and 1918.

Shortly after this conference two torpedo carrying aircraft were dispatched to the Dardanelles on board HMS Ben-my-Chree with the intention of attacking the German warships Goeben and Breslau. This never happened and initially the aircraft were used for reconnaissance duties. However the Turks would attempt on occasion to push merchant ships through the British blockade and these vessels became targets for the torpedo aircraft. On 12th August 1915 a 5,000 ton merchantman was sunk by an air launched torpedo. At least two more vessels were sunk or destroyed by the same method over the next few weeks. It was the first time a naval blockade of an enemy's merchant sea traffic had been attempted from the air, and the results greatly heartened the Admiralty.
The Squadron Commander. (C. Estrange Malone) on board Ben-my Chree wrote.

_"One cannot help looking on this operation as being the forerunner of a line of development which will tend to revolutionise warfare."_

The date was 14th August 1915 and Estrange Malone was right. The game changing moment had occurred two days earlier, and it had nothing to do with the Fairey Swordfish.
I cannot deduce what aircraft were used in the Dardanelles, but given that the first flight with a torpedo slung from an aircraft was achieved on 28th July 1914 by an aircraft (unnamed in source) designed and built by Short Bros. that would be my best guess.

Cheers

Steve

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## Shortround6 (Aug 17, 2016)

stona said:


> Or bombs, or rockets. Torpedoes were a fantastically expensive and high maintenance method of attacking ships from the air (or anywhere else). They were also by no means the most effective or reliable in the 1940s.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve



The 40s covers an awful lot of time/ground. Yes torpedoes were expensive to build and maintain (and train with) and yes reliability varied from Nation to Nation and even from model to model from the same nation. However at times it *was *the most effective way of attacking ships (at least sizable ones). In the Norway campaign the British were limited to 250-500lb SAP bombs or GP bombs ( at least that is what they used, whatever may have been available somewhere in the British isles). There were no rockets and using mines on ships in areas away from a coast needs an awful lot of mines. 
While the bombs were cheap the aircraft and men were not. One attempted strike on the Scharnhorst after it was hit by a torpedo involved 15 Skua divebombers of which 8 were shot down, in part by German fighters, the rest did attack the ship and scored one hit, which failed to explode (bombs seemingly weren't all that reliable either). There were a total of air four attacks on the Sharnhorst in the days after the torpedo hit from the Acasta and that was the only one that any success at all although the others didn't suffer anywhere near the losses. The first was 12 Hudsons dropping 36 250lb SAP bombs, all missed. the Second was the Skua attack, the 3rd was 6 Swordfish and the 4th was 9 Beauforts using 500lb bombs. The last two were beaten of by AA fire and fighters. 
Attacking very large ships with small bombs was seldom going to work. Attacking small ships with small bombs is another story.

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## Shortround6 (Aug 17, 2016)

stona said:


> I cannot deduce what aircraft were used in the Dardanelles, but given that the first flight with a torpedo slung from an aircraft was achieved on 28th July 1914 by an aircraft (unnamed in source) designed and built by Short Bros. that would be my best guess.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve



Shorts 184


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## stona (Aug 17, 2016)

Shorts 184....thanks for that.

The most cost effective method of attacking shipping from the air hasn't even been mentioned! Mine laying.

Between April 1940 and May 1945 the RAF's mine laying operations accounted for 638 vessels from 19,917 sorties for a loss of 450 aircraft.
366 were sunk by direct attack for an expenditure of 37,837 sorties and a loss of 857 aircraft.
One vessel was sunk for every 31 mine laying sorties or every 104 attack sorties. The BBSU concluded that each vessel sunk by mine cost 0.55 aircraft whereas for the anti shipping squadrons this was 5.28 aircraft per vessel sunk. This latter figure did improve later in the war with the introduction of the Strike Wings whose losses on daytime operations were 1.62 aircraft per vessel sunk, still expensive.

Torpedo attacks were the most expensive, 3,000 man MONTHS per vessel sunk. Second, at 2,600 man HOURS was low level bombing attacks.This compares with 2,300 man HOURS per vessel sunk for the Mosquito Wings using rockets, by far the cheapest method.

To add to the problems of cost and maintenance of torpedoes, the British suffered a severe shortage all the way up to mid 1943.
Coastal Command's own ORS concluded in its report 'Air Attacks on Merchant Vessels' (Dec '42) that bombing attacks were more effective than torpedo attacks, and would be made even more so with the use of the Mk XIV bomb sight.


Cheers

Steve

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## Shortround6 (Aug 17, 2016)

Mine laying is very effective in certain circumstances, However fleets/task forces or even groups of ships at "sea" is certainly not one of those circumstances. "Sea" being anywhere the ships really have freedom of maneuver. Mining also works best in "shallow" water. Shallow being several hundred feet or less. 






And the term "vessel" is hardly precise as it covers just about anything that floats. 45,000 ton Battleship or 20 ton barge. 
Trying to torpedo coastal shipping in daylight using aircraft is going to be expensive in losses for the attackers. 
Trying to stop raiders using mines once they are a few dozen miles from port is probably futile. 
Each weapon has it's place.

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## pinehilljoe (Aug 17, 2016)

stona said:


> Shorts 184....thanks for that.
> 
> The most cost effective method of attacking shipping from the air hasn't even been mentioned! Mine laying.
> 
> ...



My earlier point about the B-29 being a game changer. During Operation Starvation, during the last 6 months of the war, ONE B-29 group of 160 planes was assigned to lay mines in the Japanese inter-coastal sea lanes. The mines sank or damaged 670 ships totaling more than 1,250,000 tons for the loss of only fifteen B-29s. More than all other methods of attacking shipping over the same period.

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## stona (Aug 17, 2016)

The British, or at least the RAF (Bomber/Coastal Commands) with a few notable exceptions hardly concerned themselves with the German surface fleet. The two priorities were anti submarine and anti trade operations. The primary target of the latter was the flow of raw materials from Norway.

Action and adventure on the high seas are great for propaganda and ideal subjects for post war films, but wars are won on more mundane events.

It cost coastal command 2,500 man months to sink a ship. The total cost to the German economy of the loss of an 'average' vessel of 3,000 tons was 8,600 man months. This is how wars are won.

Between 14% and 17% of Germany's merchant fleet was more or less continually in need of repair. Between July 1943 and the end of the war there was a 79% reduction in the production of steel plate suitable for the building and/or repair of smaller merchant vessels. About half the plate allocated to the 66 vessels (300,000 tons) in the Hansa Emergency Shipbuilding Programme 1944/45 could have been used for U-Boat production. It was not because repairing or replacing merchantmen was more important to keep the economy moving, and this did effect the production of U-Boats by indirect means.

Cheers

Steve

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## nuuumannn (Aug 17, 2016)

> I cannot deduce what aircraft were used in the Dardanelles, but given that the first flight with a torpedo slung from an aircraft was achieved on 28th July 1914 by an aircraft (unnamed in source) designed and built by Short Bros. that would be my best guess.



Two different aeroplanes, actually. The aircraft used on 28 July (oops I said June in an earlier post) was a Short Folder Seaplane, which differed in powerplant to the 184, being powered by a 160 hp Gnome rotary, while the 184, which was bigger was powered by a 225 hp Sunbeam Mohawk. The 184 was also known as the Short 225 as a result of its engine power output. Short 166s were also used during the Dardanelles campaign, which were essentially similar to the Folder, but not for torpedo duties. These were restricted to the Ben-My-Chree's three Short 184s. Rather prescient that the navy should send a seaplane tender to the war zone with the specific role of torpedoing enemy shipping.

Both these pics were taken during the Dardanelles campaign:






This is a Short 166, which was operated by the seaplane tender Ark Royal and is pictured at the makeshift seaplane station at Kephalo Bay on the island of Imbtros. Note the torpedo crutch between the floats, although the 166 was actually insufficiently powerful to carry one aloft. Even the 184s struggled to get airborne with a torpedo and were flown as single-seaters to save weight on torpedo ops.







This is Short No.184, which was George Dacre's aircraft, who sank a Turkish vessel from the surface of the water after it suffered engine failure forcing Dacre to alight on the surface. After fixing his engine from the floats, he started it and taxied into a firing position and launched his torpedo, at which point he was noticed by Turkish spotters on the shore, who began to fire at him. Gunning his engine, he bounced along the water's surface for about a mile whilst under fire, eventually getting airbore, before his engine failed again! he was able to glide back to the Ben-My-Chree.



> The Squadron Commander. (C. Estrange Malone) on board Ben-my Chree wrote.
> 
> _"One cannot help looking on this operation as being the forerunner of a line of development which will tend to revolutionise warfare_.



I used this very same quote in a series of articles on air operations in the Dardanelles published last year for the centenary of the campaign. (Psst - it's Cecil L'Estrange Malone)

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## stona (Aug 17, 2016)

nuuumannn said:


> Cecil L'Estrange Malone)



I don't think even the toffs give their children names like that anymore, or maybe they just aren't the kind of people I'm likely to meet 

I did once meet the superbly named Evelyn Bufton-Morriss, a Captain in the Glosters, when I was involved in the celebration of that great Regiment's tercentenary back in '94, before they got 'amalgamated'.

Cheers

Steve

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## nuuumannn (Aug 17, 2016)

I've always liked the name Cecil!


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## Shortround6 (Aug 17, 2016)

stona said:


> The British, or at least the RAF (Bomber/Coastal Commands) with a few notable exceptions hardly concerned themselves with the German surface fleet. The two priorities were anti submarine and anti trade operations. The primary target of the latter was the flow of raw materials from Norway.
> 
> Action and adventure on the high seas are great for propaganda and ideal subjects for post war films, but wars are won on more mundane events.
> 
> ...


 All that is true but the British certainly tried to use mines as a general blockade. It was pretty much a failure. 170,000 mines were laid by surface craft in defensive mine fields, the majority in the Iceland to Faroes barrier that sank one known German submarine. This field was laid from July1940 to early 1942 with a few supplemental layings later on. What is interesting, in a negative way, it that anybody studying the 1918 Orkney to Norway barrier mine field could have pretty much predicted the results or lack thereof. 
Granted these were not air launched (or more more properly air delivered) but do show that no one weapon was the answer to multiple tactical situations. 

One reason the mine fields were effective in coastal waters was the coastal shipping patterns/lanes/routes were constrained by the _threat _of attack from aircraft or surface ships. That is going further from shore might reduce the threat of mines but increased the time exposed to air or surface attack (or submarine of the coast of Norway). Some movements being by night or bad weather only. 
That and some of the air attacks on "vessels" may have been on minesweepers. Germany had or built over 620 minesweepers during the war not included captured vessels or converted merchantmen. 
Un-protected mine fields are usually swept fairly soon. Protected mine fields are those that have some sort of deterrence/hindrance to sweeping. Coastal batteries, gun boats/floating batteries, air patrols, Naval patrols., etc. 
True cost of effective mine campaign includes a lot of auxiliaries.


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## stona (Aug 17, 2016)

It was Coastal Command that forced the Germans to route their convoys close to land and to sail only at night. Many Norwegian sailed through the Inner Leads making them difficult subjects for air attack. These convoys were entirely dependent on navigational beacons and lighthouses and these were attacked by the British, following an agreement with the Norwegian government. Other efforts to force shipping out of the Inner Leads involved one of the great bluffs of the campaign.
Most of the channels were too deep for anchored mines, the Admiralty did not have any moored mines capable of being dropped by aircraft anyway. The British reasoned that the Germans would not be aware that air dropped moored mines were not available. Moored mine laying was simulated by dropping single large bombs from low level into the deep water channels. The bombs had delayed action fuses set to simulate premature mine detonations. The ruse only partially worked, the Germans did continue to use the routes but several convoys were delayed whilst the channels were swept of non existent mines!
Cheers
Steve


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## gjs238 (Aug 17, 2016)

nuuumannn said:


> I've always liked the name Cecil!



It's a unisex name


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## gjs238 (Aug 17, 2016)

stona said:


> It was Coastal Command that forced the Germans to route their convoys close to land and to sail only at night. Many Norwegian sailed through the Inner Leads making them difficult subjects for air attack. *These convoys were entirely dependent on navigational beacons and lighthouses and these were attacked by the British, following an agreement with the Norwegian government.* Other efforts to force shipping out of the Inner Leads involved one of the great bluffs of the campaign.
> Most of the channels were too deep for anchored mines, the Admiralty did not have any moored mines capable of being dropped by aircraft anyway. The British reasoned that the Germans would not be aware that air dropped moored mines were not available. Moored mine laying was simulated by dropping single large bombs from low level into the deep water channels. The bombs had delayed action fuses set to simulate premature mine detonations. The ruse only partially worked, the Germans did continue to use the routes but several convoys were delayed whilst the channels were swept of non existent mines!
> Cheers
> Steve



Interesting! Any more info on the bold part above?


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## parsifal (Aug 18, 2016)

British mines were used both offensively and defensively and were intended initially as a deterrant to both surface warships and uboats. As time progressed, on the northern front, the greatest successes by the Allied mining effort in home waters and across the Denmark Straits were against enemy controlled shipping. something in excess of 300000 mines were laid in and around home waters and in the Baltic. I don't have the figures handy, but the results of this massive effort were very modest.

in the med, the allied efforts at mining were far more limited, but the results were also a bit better in my view. Of the 4.3 million tons of axis shipping lost in the MTO to September 1943, 174,000 tons of shipping was lost to mines, but of this total 98000 tons were lost from June 1940 to September 1941, and overwhelmingly, these losses were due to the offensive efforts of the malta based 830 squadron who pioneered for the FAA the air launched mine, from those non-game changing swordfish (representing 4.1% of total axis shipping losses in the med) . Until june 1940 the numbers or tons of mines dropped by FAA aircraft could be counted on one hand and results were correspondingly non-existent. don't know the tonnages of mines laid by the RAF in that period, but axis shipping losses to british air dropped mines were again almost non-existent. whilst a somewhat dangerous over simplification, the RN relied almost exclusively on ship launched mines until the latter part of 1940, and these almost exclusively were defensive in nature.

The malta based FAA squadrons, along with the malta based submarines launched a mere fraction of the mine numbers compared to the masses released by the allies in the nth sea and other home waters. Defensively the home waters mines were successful (in that they materially affected DKM estimates for success in Seelowe) but as offensive weapons the med based groups were all over it.

Axis efforts by comparison were also a mix of surface launched defensive mines and air (and u-boat launched offensive mines). The germans made one notable slip up during the war in the mine wars. at the outbreak of the invasion of Norway, the Kattegat was not mined and british submarines were able to unleash a devastating attack on German shipping, sinking close to 500000 tons of shipping in a month. That was about 25% of total german shipping at the time and a devastating blow to their transport capabilities. They quickly rectified that problem, and the leads of Norway, a belt of shoals and reefs just offshore the jagged Norwegian coast was a natural barrier, easily sealed at the few entry points that protected axis shipping very effectively until 1943

The axis offensive capabilities were devastating for the efforts they put into it. The early offensive with magnetic mines in 1939-40 is well known. less well known are the efforts of the LW during the Dunkirk evacuation, often deliberately obscured because most of the losses were on ships under 500 tons and these little ships are often not included in tonnage losses for shipping ( including the numbers quoted below) June 1940 remained the worst month for the war if those little ships are included, with close to a million tons lost, most of them to air dropped mines and something like 300000 tons of small craft lost (and not recorded).

The following is a bit of a breakdown of Alied shipping losses, the first number being the losses to mines, the second number being overall admitted losses:

1939: 262500/755232......35% of the total losses
1940: 509889/3991641....12.7% of the total losses
1941: 230842/4328558.....5.31% of the total losses
1942: 104488/7790697....1.34% of the total losses
1943; 108638/ 3220137....3.37% of the total losses
1944: 95855/1045629......9.16% of the total losses
1945: 93663/438821.......21.33% of the total losses

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## stona (Aug 18, 2016)

gjs238 said:


> Interesting! Any more info on the bold part above?



The attacks on the lighthouses, eventually 15 were 'put out of action', came in early 1945 and against a background of some tension between the British and Norwegian governments. Norway was occupied but she was also an ally, one of the reasons so many convoys were attacked and located was because they could rarely sail without the Norwegian resistance informing London, they were also tracked by the Norwegians when the passed through the Leads and in the Fjords.
On 24th August 1944 the Royal Norwegian High Command issued a warning via the BBC that heavy attacks on shipping along the Norwegian coast were expected and asking that Norwegian civilians keep to a minimum fishing and other seaborne activities.
Shortly afterwards Coastal Command crews were reminded that passenger or fishing vessels marked with Norwegian flags were not to be attacked.
On 21st September Mosquitoes of Nos. 235 and 248 Squadrons mis-identified and sank a Norwegian fishing vessel of 75 tons.
On the night of 15/16 October a Norwegian fishing vessel of 150 tons was bombed by a Halifax in the Skaggerat.
The Norwegians were obviously not happy about these incidents, but understood that mistakes can be made. Then on 8th January 1945 Beaufighters of the Dallachy Wing attacked a Norwegian passenger vessel and a fishing boat on one operation, sinking both. This was a step too far and the Norwegian Government in Exile raised objections in London, finally accepting that the aircrews involved believed they were attacking much larger vessels.
On 21st February another incident involving a Norwegian passenger ship occurred, this time the Norwegians had had enough. They demanded a full enquiry and this took place at Banff on 2nd March. The enquiry concluded that the aircraft had an 'extremely short time' to identify the vessel and that its size (490 tons) meant that it could have mounted anti aircraft weapons of sufficient calibre to inflict fatal damage on the aircraft. Bad weather was ultimately blamed for the failure to correctly identify the vessel. The conclusion was accepted by the Norwegian government.
Unfortunately, on 23rd March Beaufighters seriously damaged a coastal passenger steamer and a fishing boat, killing five Norwegians. Poor visibility was once again blamed for the failure to identify the targets. This time Group Captain R T Corry, Commanding Officer Dallachy Station, made a formal apology to the Norwegians via No. 18 Group headquarters. The headquarters reissued the instruction of 12th October 1944 which specified in detail the restrictions on the attack of small vessels off the Norwegian coast. At each briefing before anti-shipping operations crews were to be reminded of the regulations and the rules of engagement clarified such that if there was any doubt about the size or identification of a vessel, an attack was not to be carried out.
The attacks on the lighthouses did not commence until 9th March 1945, having been delayed for several weeks by the negotiations with the Norwegian Government in Exile, which were obviously complicated by these incidents. Britain and Norway had a common goal in the defeat of Germany, but the Norwegian government also had a responsibility to its citizens. The British never stopped their attacks, but it would be unfair to suggest that they rode rough shod over Norwegian concerns. They did listen to the Norwegian government and they did make efforts to mitigate and minimise the inevitable Norwegian losses in such a campaign.
Most British people then, and now, would consider the Norwegian people to be friends, we have a long shared history across the North Sea, and no one wants to kill their friends, even by accident and when larger issues are taking precedence.

......and thanks for the Xmas trees 

Cheers

Steve

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## gjs238 (Aug 18, 2016)

Targeting lighthouses is interesting.
Wonder if this occurred in all theaters/theatres.

The Japanese "attacked" the Estevan Point lighthouse on Vancouver Island in British Columbia

_*Bombardment of Estevan Point Lighthouse*
More than 5 Japanese submarines operated in Western Canada during 1941 and 1942. On June 20, 1942, the Japanese submarine I-26, under the command of Yokota Minoru,[26] fired 25–30 rounds of 5.5" shells at the Estevan Point lighthouse on Vancouver Island in British Columbia, but failed to hit its target.[27] Though no casualties were reported, the subsequent decision to turn off the lights of outer stations was disastrous for shipping activity.[28]_


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## stona (Aug 18, 2016)

gjs238 said:


> Targeting lighthouses is interesting.
> Wonder if this occurred in all theaters/theatres.



The Coastal Command attacks were for a specific purpose. The light houses and beacons were the only means by which the convoys could navigate the Inner Leads along the Norwegian coast. They were effectively weaving in and out of the islands and fjords along the coast line, and this made them much harder targets for air attack. By denying the convoys the means to navigate this route (the dummy mining of the Leads was to the same end) the British hoped to force the convoys out to sea where they would present an easier target.
Cheers
Steve

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## gjs238 (Aug 18, 2016)

RE: Lighthouses
Just found this at World War II | Sumburgh Head
_The rules of war stated that lighthouses were not legitimate military targets._


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## Shortround6 (Aug 18, 2016)

Yep, blowing up a light house so that the enemy shipping hits the rocks and sinks isn't _fair._
But putting mines in the channel between the rocks and blowing the ship/s up _is. _

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## gjs238 (Aug 18, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> Yep, blowing up a light house so that the enemy shipping hits the rocks and sinks isn't _fair._
> But putting mines in the channel between the rocks and blowing the ship/s up _is. _



Yes, kinda like you can't shoot a soldier with an expanding bullet*, but it's fine to burn him alive with a flamethrower.

*The Hague Convention of 1899, Declaration III prohibits the use of expanding bullets in international warfare.


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## stona (Aug 18, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> Yep, blowing up a light house so that the enemy shipping hits the rocks and sinks isn't _fair._
> But putting mines in the channel between the rocks and blowing the ship/s up _is. _



You can't stop people mining, and neutral shipping has to take its chance, but you can at least try to prevent combatants attacking lighthouses and other navigational beacons which also serve neutral or non combatant shipping.
I expect that the negotiations with the Norwegian government may have had something to do with the protected status of the lighthouses.
Cheers
Steve


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## parsifal (Aug 18, 2016)

The two sides had differing standards that tended to change as the war progressed. The hague convention required belligerents to declare areas that were not safe due to minelaying activities. these were termed "declared areas". There was no requirement to inform an enemy, but protagonists were supposed to inform neutrals of their activities, and where it was safe for their shipping. Similar to unrestricted uboat war these rules heavily favoured the dominant seapowers and the smaller navies like the KM were soon forced to abandon such announcements and gentlemanly behaviours. unconstrained minelaying carried with it a heavy political and economic cost for Germany. As 1939 and 1940 passed, the germans began to lay mines anywhere, often using untethered drift mines and laying mines in the territorial waters of the neutrals. there were several incidents in 1939-40 with the Scandinavian countries for example (it didn't help that the germans in 1939 were running around, basically seizing any foreign ship in their ports as their own, even those of friendly nations and those trying to trade with the germans. Finland for example, had many ships seized and taken over in German ports at the outset of the war) . Almost in protest, nearly all the free shipping came under the control of the allies 9nearly 6million tons ended up in the service of the allies in this way). most of the Swedish merchant fleet, for example, ended working for the british. Even the Spanish merchant service transported more cargo for Britain than it did for the axis.

The allies were never really able to engage in "unrestricted" minelaying the same as Germany did. They absolutely needed shipping to move as freely as they could and protect it, not lay traps that might sink it. more damage was done in this regard than was done by mines, in terms of putting the germans outside in the cold as a pariah, but there is something about laying mines without telling third parties that really upsets people.

In the pacific, everything was reversed. For the americans, after the loss of so much territory in the far east, these waters were no longer important as a free trade area, whereas for the Japanese they really did not want to make things difficult for their shipping. so the Americans went to town with their minelaying. It was an interesting twist, a dominant seapower applyiny Jeune Ecole strategies with superior resources. almost from the start the Japanese merchant shipping service began to suffer, whereas US shipping losses in the pacific were almost non- existent.


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## stona (Aug 19, 2016)

It's worth mentioning that the German desperation for shipping was largely due to a self inflicted wound. In 1939 Germany had 3, 500,000 GRT of registered blue water and coastal shipping. Almost a third of this, close to 1,000,000 GRT was blockaded in neutral ports at the beginning of the war because the Germans had failed utterly to plan for this possibility.

To put this in perspective, when planning for Sealion, the Germans had available 550,000 GRT of their own shipping, plus another 200,000 GRT of shipping captured in France and the Low Countries. The total available, 750,000 GRT was LESS than the amount blockaded in foreign ports! 
The figures are from Schenk/Groener

Whether Sealion was ever an achievable operation is another question, but the lack of foresight, losing nearly a third of the merchant fleet without a shot or torpedo being fired smacks of the sort of lack of long term planning that bedeviled the German effort throughout the entire war.

Cheers

Steve

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## pinehilljoe (Aug 19, 2016)

The more I read this thread, I keep coming back to the B-29. 
During the Tokyo Fire Raid, 330 B-29s destroyed 16 sq miles and killed between 60,000 and 125,000 people depending on which estimate is accurate. The subsequent fire raids are well known. 
Operation Starvation, 160 B-29s sank 1.25 million tons of shipping in 6 months. 

The aircraft was step forward in technology and gave the USAF a capability no other country had. That is a game changing aircraft.


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## pbehn (Aug 19, 2016)

pinehilljoe said:


> The more I read this thread, I keep coming back to the B-29.
> During the Tokyo Fire Raid, 330 B-29s destroyed 16 sq miles and killed between 60,000 and 125,000 people depending on which estimate is accurate. The subsequent fire raids are well known.
> Operation Starvation, 160 B-29s sank 1.25 million tons of shipping in 6 months.
> 
> The aircraft was step forward in technology and gave the USAF a capability no other country had. That is a game changing aircraft.


Only in terms of range, bombing and setting fire to cities didnt really change anything.


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## fastmongrel (Aug 19, 2016)

The Silverplate B29s were game changers but in my view only because of the weapon they carried. Nothing was the same afterwards.

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## Shortround6 (Aug 19, 2016)

Some changes are incremental, at what point (or how big) does an increment have to be to be game changer? if ever?
A bomber that carries 10% more bombs 10% further isn't a game changer. 
A B-29 could carry the same bomb load as a B-24 (5000lbs) but carry it almost twice as far and do it at higher speeds and higher altitudes. If the B-29 stayed at lower altitudes it could carry almost 2 1/2 times the bomb load almost the same distance as the B-24. Granted it sucked a lot more fuel but the crews were just about the same and the ground crews certainly weren't 2 twice as big per plane. Perhaps that isn't enough of a game changer?


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## drgondog (Aug 19, 2016)

pinehilljoe said:


> The more I read this thread, I keep coming back to the B-29.
> During the Tokyo Fire Raid, 330 B-29s destroyed 16 sq miles and killed between 60,000 and 125,000 people depending on which estimate is accurate. The subsequent fire raids are well known.
> Operation Starvation, 160 B-29s sank 1.25 million tons of shipping in 6 months.
> 
> The aircraft was step forward in technology and gave the USAF a capability no other country had. That is a game changing aircraft.



Not disagreeing the impact - but Korea showed that the B-29 was very vulnerable to jet fighters. In that context the me 262 was the 'counter' to the strategic capability. That said, the B-29s range combined with payload, made the night attacks and mine laying capability more efficient, earlier, than B-24s based out of Okinawa and/or Iwo.

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## stona (Aug 19, 2016)

drgondog said:


> ... the B-29s range combined with payload, made the night attacks and mine laying capability more efficient, earlier, than B-24s based out of Okinawa and/or Iwo.



Yes, which means that they upped the game, not that they changed the game.
Cheers
Steve


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## pbehn (Aug 19, 2016)

The game that changed with the B29 was the loss rate, it and its crew were far too valuable to risk losses of 10 or 20%


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## Balljoint (Aug 19, 2016)

pbehn said:


> The game that changed with the B29 was the loss rate, it and its crew were far too valuable to risk losses of 10 or 20%


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## pbehn (Aug 19, 2016)

You just quoted me,nothing else.


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## GregP (Aug 19, 2016)

Boosting the post count, like this post. 

Just in case you don't get it, that was a joke, not a ping on balljoint ... I've done that, too.


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## bobbysocks (Aug 22, 2016)

BiffF15 said:


> Okay, here is my question / point? If the Swordfish is not a game changer (and I see both sides of this argument / point), then would it be the pilots / airpower? If the Shark would have made the same impact but didn't, then what is the constant in the equation (air crew / air power). Thoughts...
> 
> Cheers,
> Biff



given that another model of ac could have flown the same sortie with all the limitations or that adaptations could have been made to accommodate that model...I would say it was the pilots/training.....and same degree of luck ( especially with the bismark ). they aircraft did not have to out maneuver and EA to get into position. it went up against flak batteries which would have had the same effect on any other craft. having air superiority due to the lack of EAs opens the success rate up to just about any ac. take off conditions, range, payload become the limiting factors. I think any ac that could operate within those envelopes would have had relatively the same success with the same pilots or those of equal training.


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## pbehn (Aug 22, 2016)

bobbysocks said:


> take off conditions, range, payload become the limiting factors. I think any ac that could operate within those envelopes would have had relatively the same success with the same pilots or those of equal training.


My original post about the swordfish made the same point,the fact that the swordfish crippled the Bismark and that it wasn't by any means a high performer meant the game had changed.

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## bobbysocks (Aug 22, 2016)

I don't know if the swordfish could carry the same torp that the kate did but if so I think the same number of SF if flown at pearl ( instead of kates ) could have netted the same result due to the absence of us air cover. after that the speed of the ac would added to the duration between waves and would have played to the defenders. they would have been able to bring more ground fire to bear. they would have still only had a couple of ac to meet the wave.....so the second wave may not have been equal.


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## pbehn (Aug 22, 2016)

bobbysocks said:


> I don't know if the swordfish could carry the same torp that the kate did but if so I think the same number of SF if flown at pearl ( instead of kates ) could have netted the same result due to the absence of us air cover. after that the speed of the ac would added to the duration between waves and would have played to the defenders. they would have been able to bring more ground fire to bear. they would have still only had a couple of ac to meet the wave.....so the second wave may not have been equal.


With respect Bobby by that time the game had changed, it is for historians to discuss why Pearl Harbour happened.


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## pinehilljoe (Sep 7, 2016)

Without the B-29 I have to think the War in the Pacific could have been at least one year longer.

Even after the capture of Okinawa, the distance from Kadena to Tokyo is almost 1000 miles. Compare that to London to Berlin about 575 miles. No other plane had the range to strategically attack Japan, and also execute Operation Starvation. It would have been a much longer road to Tokyo without the 29 or a plane with similar performance. 

All this is aside from the Bomb, its pure speculation how the Bomb could have been delivered without the B-29.


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## tomo pauk (Sep 7, 2016)

Okinawa to Nagasaki is 470 miles as the crow flies. Okinawa to Hiroshima is 632 miles.
Amami (north to Okinawa) to Nagasaki 303 miles, to Hiroshima is 450 miles. 
Within the reach for the B-17s, let alone B-24s, and their escort.

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## drgondog (Sep 8, 2016)

Only the B-29 was capable of carrying the Tall Boy and Fat Man internally. The Lancaster could be adapted to carry under one wing but may not have been able to make Nagasaki from Okinawa because of the huge amount of drag. The B-36 could but wasn't ready.

Additionally, only the B-36 had room for early Thermonuclear weapons until B-47/B-52 came into operations.


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## parsifal (Sep 8, 2016)

bobbysocks said:


> I don't know if the swordfish could carry the same torp that the kate did but if so I think the same number of SF if flown at pearl ( instead of kates ) could have netted the same result due to the absence of us air cover. after that the speed of the ac would added to the duration between waves and would have played to the defenders. they would have been able to bring more ground fire to bear. they would have still only had a couple of ac to meet the wave.....so the second wave may not have been equal.



Swordfish could not do quite what the kate could do, but then the RN FAA (certain units at least) had a priceless advantage of being equipped with ASV radar and having other equipment and training for rough weather and night ops. in 1941, there were no other navies capable of that sort of operations, and few other types other than the swordfish.

As far as the ordinance carrying capability, both the Kate and the Swordfish could carry a single 18" torpedo. Neither were oxygen enriched (long lance). The Kates carried Type 91 17.7"torpedoes, with a warhead of 529 lbs. The outstanding thing about these torps was their ruggedness. They could be dropped up to 260 kts from a height exceeding 150 feet. The torps used at Pearl were were mod 2s, with inbuilt stabilisers that greatly assisted their depth settings (the box tails were added as an insurance)

The British torps were the RNs Mkl XII, which had a warhead of around 400lbs, with the torp having better range. 
Swordfish had a rated ordinance load of around 2000lb of bombs or rockets, whilst the kate was rated to carry up to 3 551 lb bombs.

both a/ were basically bomb trucks with not enough performance to evade their attackers. Neither had self sealing tanks or armour that I know of. the Kate had significantly more range


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## wuzak (Sep 8, 2016)

drgondog said:


> Only the B-29 was capable of carrying the Tall Boy and Fat Man internally. The Lancaster could be adapted to carry under one wing but may not have been able to make Nagasaki from Okinawa because of the huge amount of drag. The B-36 could but wasn't ready.
> 
> Additionally, only the B-36 had room for early Thermonuclear weapons until B-47/B-52 came into operations.



Lancasters could carry the Tallboy internally - they did so often enough.

But I think you refer to the Little Boy nuclear device. This was 28" in diameter and 120" long, or 2" less than the 4,000lb HC Cookie and 10" longer. Apart from the American style square box fin tail, Little Boy could fit inside a Mosquito's bulged bomb bay (not that the Mossie would be able to take off with one aboard).

Thin Man was the one that wasn't used against Japan. It was suggested that the Lancaster carry this as its length required much modification to the B-29. The Thin Man was the same diameter as the 12,000lb HC block buster bomb and the 12,000lb Tallboy, longer than the former but shorter than the latter.

Fat Man would be the one that the Lancaster would find difficult to carry, being 14" larger in diameter than the 22,000lb Grand Slam bomb, which required the bomb bay doors to be removed in order for it to fit. 

The B-29 did need modifications to carry this bomb also - mainly to do with the bomb racks, I think.

All three were less than the Lancaster's nominal maximum of 14,000lb.

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## stona (Sep 9, 2016)

The protocols for arming the bomb(s) could not have been followed if carried by a Lancaster. The bomb bay is not accessible to the crew 
Cheers
Steve

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## nuuumannn (Sep 11, 2016)

> I think any ac that could operate within those envelopes would have had relatively the same success with the same pilots or those of equal training.



That's essentially my point when I mentioned the Blackburn Shark - the very fact that another aircraft could do exactly what the Swordfish could meant that it wasn't a game changer. Sinking ships with air launched torpedoes was a given to the RN and it had practiced for this scenario since during the Great War; there was no change to the strategic situation after the Bismarck or Taranto; Taranto was _reinforcing _the _existing_ strategic situation - that the RN was top dog in the Med. It was aircraft that brought about a change in that however, but land based, not sea based, which steers the discussion away from the original premise.

But we can say that airpower as a means of changing a strategic situation was a game changer, but again, we can go back to the Great War and many earlier prophets warning/advocating its use in this fashion.

As I stated earlier, the locomotive torpedo was a game changer; naval; warfare was never the same once it was introduced - air launched torpedoes were another dimension to that situation; The game had already changed by the time the Bismarck was sunk and Taranto happened.


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## parsifal (Sep 11, 2016)

There is sufficient unique characteristics in the swordfish relative to its predecessors to state that it (the swordfish) could undertake operations that its predecessors could not.

The nearest equivalent to the swordfish in the RN inventory was the Blackburn shark. the Shark was developed in 1933, about a year before the swordfish. 269 were built. in many ways it was strikingly similar to the Fairey aircraft, but it did have some shortcomings compared to the swordfish. I wouldn't classify them as sufficient as to claim the Swordfish was a game changer, the swordfish was a gane changer because it allowed a convergence of all the things that are now being excluded from the equation.

why would i say the Shark could not replace the Swordfish in 1940-41. It was slightly slower, but had an engine almost 100hp more powerful. It was a fuel guzzler comparatively speaking, with an endurance only about 2/3 that of the Swordfish 9neither type were outstanding in terms of endurance, but the swordfish had an endurance approaching 7hrs, compared to less than 5 in the Shark) . It was unable, or at least not used , to deliver torpedoes in quite the same way as the Swordfish did. Sharks needed long slow straight delivery paths of at least 5000 feet, whereas the swordfish was able to pull out of a dive and make runs of less than 3000 feet to drop torpedoes at nearly point blank range. It may be that the shark could be used in that way, but the point is, it wasn't, and the swordfish was.

Which brings up the other major difference inherent to the design, the inherent ruggedness of the type. Aircrew flying the type are on record as saying they could undertake operations in conditions that no other aircraft they flew could possibly emulate . Presumably these guys had flown aircraft like the shark prewar, so first testimony is there that to proves the swordfish could do stuff that no other aircraft was capable of. if the comments about toughness are at all correct, no other aircraft could possibly have undertaken the airstrike against the Bismarck

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## oldcrowcv63 (Oct 15, 2016)

drgondog said:


> I applaud the mention of the SBD - but it was the USN pilots flying an obsolete dive bomber taking complete advantage of Zeros drawn to the deck by the Torp bombers.



drgondog, that is the most oft-told and venerable story of the battle of Midway, and I suggest, it is, at least to some extent, an unfounded myth. The contribution of the TBDs was substantial and went beyond merely clearing the sky of defenders over the IJN carriers. However, I suggest that the success of the SBDs was not dependent on the sacrifice of the TBDs.

I believe I have made this point in the past in the forum, but I'll repeat it here. The IJN's greatest weakness was its inability to effectively deal with a high altitude aerial threat to its carriers. To mount an effective defense with any fighter system including the legendary Zero-sen, the IJN needed both EW RADAR and a reasonably sophisticated (aka '_British_') fighter direction system . It had neither. It possessed EW RADAR during the battle of Santa Cruz and the obsolescent (not obsolete) SBDs were able to penetrate the fighter screen and do considerable damage to the Shokaku without serious loss to the attackers. I submit that even had the Zeros at Midway managed to detect the incoming SBD raid, it would have been difficult to forestall it. The SBD raid by three squadrons was approaching from two widely different points of the compass, diluting the numbers of defenders that could be arrayed against any one to something like the Santa Cruz situation. SBDs virtually always penetrated the IJN CAP. VALs when encountering a fighter directed CAP defense even when mounted by the obsolescent F4F, were most often (but not always) slaughtered. In this case, the early and undoubted effectiveness of the VAL against USN CVs owes much to the considerable skill and dedication of the pilots. When the PPI Scope and F6F were introduced, USN CAP defense became nearly impermeable until the advent of the Kamikaze.

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## drgondog (Oct 16, 2016)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> drgondog, that is the most oft-told and venerable story of the battle of Midway, and I suggest, it is, at least to some extent, an unfounded myth. The contribution of the TBDs was substantial and went beyond merely clearing the sky of defenders over the IJN carriers. However, I suggest that the success of the SBDs was not dependent on the sacrifice of the TBDs.
> 
> I believe I have made this point in the past in the forum, but I'll repeat it here. The IJN's greatest weakness was its inability to effectively deal with a high altitude aerial threat to its carriers. To mount an effective defense with any fighter system including the legendary Zero-sen, the IJN needed both EW RADAR and a reasonably sophisticated (aka '_British_') fighter direction system . It had neither. It possessed EW RADAR during the battle of Santa Cruz and the obsolescent (not obsolete) SBDs were able to penetrate the fighter screen and do considerable damage to the Shokaku without serious loss to the attackers. I submit that even had the Zeros at Midway managed to detect the incoming SBD raid, it would have been difficult to forestall it. The SBD raid by three squadrons was approaching from two widely different points of the compass, diluting the numbers of defenders that could be arrayed against any one to something like the Santa Cruz situation. SBDs virtually always penetrated the IJN CAP. VALs when encountering a fighter directed CAP defense even when mounted by the obsolescent F4F, were most often (but not always) slaughtered. In this case, the early and undoubted effectiveness of the VAL against USN CVs owes much to the considerable skill and dedication of the pilots. When the PPI Scope and F6F were introduced, USN CAP defense became nearly impermeable until the advent of the Kamikaze.



Respectfully, the SBD's at Midway had no opposition during that game changing attack. The reason the A6m's weren't flying in CAP at the right altitude is because the myth was true - they were hunting Torpedo bombers. You may be correct that SBDs would have gotten through to make an attack, but you would be hard pressed to predict an outcome anywhere near the loss of 4 carriers arising from almost 'target practice' conditions for the SBD force.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Oct 16, 2016)

There is no doubt that the purported facts do appear to lend credence to the story. But, based on examples from prior and subsequent instances, is more likely to be a circumstantial association and one that is created in the telling not in the facts. Enemy fighters overwhelm and annihilate the TBDs, while no IJN fighters confront SBDs, there must be a connection between the tragedy of the former and the success of the latter. The story also appears to justify the sacrifice of the USN aircrews. But some facts suggest it is a false narrative or at least a poorly-correlated association.

First, the example of orbiting and observed VF-6 escorts.

At about the time the TBDs arrived (0915), VF-6 squadron commander Gray arrived over head the IJN fleet leading 10 'level-bombers", clearly observed by the crews of the ships below and quite likely by the returning Tone scout plane as early as 0855. No attempt was made to intercept the F4Fs until about 1000 and no attempt was made to intercept the B-17 formation that arrived earlier. at about the same altitude.

USN tactical doctrine allocated one VSB squadron for each major CV combatant. There were three squadrons of SBDs and three carriers hit. At Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons & Santa Cruz, with IJN CAP defense permeable, in cases where a single SBD squadron approached a defended carrier, in a variety of circumstances with and without TBD sacrificial lambs, the Japanese carriers were hit and seriously damaged either sinking them or putting them out of action. At Santa Cruz, two opportunistic SBD Pilots attacked the Zuiho in the face of significant but out-of-position A6M defense and delivered debilitating blows that ruined her flight deck.

Perhaps most telling is the timing. The attack of VT-8 was made at just after 0915 AM and was over before 0930. The attack of VT-6 was begun at about 0938 and was done by about 10:10. There was time for the CAP to reorganize and disperse to assigned altitudes Coincidently, the IJN CAP pursuing the survivors of the VT-6 attack were in good position to disengage their pursuit and engage the incoming Yorktown strike with whatever ammo remained. The air battle waged by Yorktown's Thach and Massey occurred at the time of SBD assault and was most likely solely responsible for the lack of a high altitude IJN CAP defense. So to that extent and that alone, does the myth hold some water but credit should be shared equally between the TBD and its VF escort. 

The widely held assumption that the full weight of the A6M CAP would have been applied and able to prevent the SBDs from doing their deadly work may be based upon a land-based perspective. The battle field area over Kido Butai was dynamic. It moved with the ships at about 35 mph and was quite large, not the extent of one point airfield or even four closely positioned targets but over the area of a fair sized county (see the telling photo 14-6 on page 263 of Shattered Sword). Marshaling an effective defense over that large an area with limited resources with potential and real threats appearing from different directions and at different altitudes is subject to the limitations of the fighters and systems making it possible to direct them (RADAR, Radio and IFF). In the IJN case the limited range of the human eyeball, poorly functioning radios and the bustering speed of an A6M of about 4 to 5 miles per minute and its climb rate of about 3,000 fpm. Yes, maybe if all 41 or so CAP A6Ms could have been ideally positioned, they might have prevented a total destruction of the three IJN carriers. But that is a reality that is extremely unlikely (and maybe impossible) to have materialized. A very good account of this can be found in Shattered Sword pages 226 to 227. The IJN Cap was in the process of being overwhelmed by the multiple attacks staged from very different directions. The USN's extraordinary luck of that day was that it couldn't have planned the accidental timing of its nearly simultaneous high altitude attacks to have happened more advantageously. That stroke of luck was in stark contrast to frequently mediocre tactical planning and execution (with the exception of the Yorktown).


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## oldcrowcv63 (Oct 16, 2016)

I should have added that the destruction of the Hiryu was a classic counter-case to discredit the myth. there were no low-level TBDs during the attack by the SBDs that destroyed her flight deck and air wing. The airborne IJN CAP was formidable, undistracted and able to ascend to, or already at, a suitable intercept altitude. Over a dozen A6Ms actually engaged the 24 SBDs to no significant effect beyond downing three of their number.


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## parsifal (Oct 16, 2016)

The primary aim of CAP is not, and was not the total destruction of the attacking force. The aim was to interfere with the attacking forces to throw them off their aim, break up attacks thereby degrading the effectiveness of the attack. This was certainly the case for the RN where the presence of even a single fighter over the fleet could make all the difference. Conversely, all the resources in the world can amount to very little. again the salient lesson can be learnt from the RN, 10 January 1941. The four a/c on CAP were out of position preventing them from disrupting the stukas' form up and dives. by the time the fulmars were able to get into the battle the damage had been done.

That seems to me to be the case for the IJN at midway. I think they had plenty of fighter resources to disrupt the attack, and it could even be claimed that they had some measure of success in the way they so completely decimated the TBDs sent in against thgem. But they lacked the technology and doctrine to provide such effective defence on anything but the simplest of tasks. I doubt they could have completely stopped the SBD attack completely because of those constraints 

If the Zekes had not been drawn down to deal with the TBD threat, maybe they could have broken up the SBD attack, but doubtful it would totally effective. Successful CAP defence was not something you threw together at the last minute and could hope for a perfect score. it was a hard thing to do. Even for navies that practiced it and made it the focus of their available resources.

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## oldcrowcv63 (Oct 17, 2016)

Good points Pars, and as dd suggested, serious opposition might have diminished the scale of the damage inflicted on the IJN flat tops. Yet the history suggests that every time a squadron (or less) of SBDs attacked a *CAP defended IJN carrier,* they drew sufficient blood to put the target out of action. Considering the status of the IJN carriers loaded with fueled and armed aircraft, even a single hit would have likely been sufficient to write their end. Irving and Strong's single hit fired the Zuiho's cleared flight deck at Santa Cruz and put her out of action. Of course, at Midway, the damage that lead to scuttling four CVs was due to the readied nature of their embarked air groups. Akagi suffered only one bomb hit and two near misses. If CAP interference had prevented that one bomb from hitting that one CV, and had added its air group to the Hiryu's. The battle might very well have had a less lopsided outcome. The USN order of battle for the afternoon battle would then have been portions of 2.5 squadrons of VF (about 20 arrayed against the initial IJN attack by 2 squadrons of VB and another 21 airborne (depending on the outcome of the first attack) to defend against an attack by 1.5 squadrons of VT. It's hard to say how that battle would have played out considering the vulnerability of the Val and Kate and their demonstrate efficiency in inflicting serious damage. if the two battles followed the pattern of subsequent CV Battles in 1942, the IJN's losses would have been severe while inflicting serious damage on the USN counterparts, regardless of the effectiveness of the USN CAP. With all or parts of 4 IJN squadrons attacking three USN CVs, would two or all three American CVs been put out of action?

We know that the bulk of the Yorktown's air group had taken refuge on the Enterprise and Hornet when their home plate was attacked by Hiryu aircraft. If Enterprise was attacked before that occurred, would Yorktown's SBD's probably had the fuel to successfully divert to the Hornet a short distance away. But then their refuge might have been put out of action in the first or second IJN wave. In that event, all SBDs on board would be stranded and unusable. If one USN flight deck remained operational it would have probably been able to collect approximately 20 SBDs (11 from Hornet on Midway and 10 from Yorktown on a morning search) and whatever else might be already on board. Enterprise might have 25 SBDs (7 VS-6, 4 from VB-6, and 14 from VB-3), while Hornet had, including the previously counted 11 from Midway, about 30 SBDs. The aircraft available for a counterstrike on Akagi and Hiryu would therefore have been at least two and possibly 3 squadrons of SBDs At least 45 and up to 50+ SBDs). Enough to put both out of action if they could be hit. In contrast, the survivors of the first two-wave IJN attack on the USN carriers might have been too few to put an end to a surviving USN carrier, defended by more than 20 F4F on CAP. Nevertheless, there are so many variable in this '_what if_' scenario that it is virtually impossible to predict an outcome. All that can be said is that two IJN CVs (Kaga and Soryu) would have almost certainly been scuttled. Likely two or more USN CVs at least damaged. If just one USN flight deck was operational after the IJN's two attacks, I would guess that at least one of the two surviving IJN CVs would be put out of action, but not scuttled. Survivors (un-sunk and un-scuttled) would have presumably limped away to fight another day with far reaching consequences for prosecution and duration of the Pacific war. Absent Kido Butai on the scene, Midway would most probably have remained in US hands.


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## pinehilljoe (Oct 17, 2016)

The SBD is one of those legendary aircraft, like the Swordfish. It was the right aircraft at the right time at the right place. I hesitate to call it a game changer. 

The start of the thread defined a game changer as a plane that changed the way the war was fought. In the Pacific, I still point to the B-29. The introduction of B-29 fire bomb raids, and the execution of Operation Starvation in my opinion changed the way the war was fought.


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## nuuumannn (Oct 17, 2016)

> There is sufficient unique characteristics in the swordfish relative to its predecessors to state that it (the swordfish) could undertake operations that its predecessors could not.



Parsifal, you are absolutely right, but it doesn't make the Swordfish a game changer for the reasons I've already stipulated. (Actually I've got the Shark at a higher maximum speed than the Swordfish; from British Naval Aircraft since 1912 by Thetford: Shark 152 mph @ 6,500 ft, Swordfish I, 139 mph @4,750 ft, Shark range 625 miles with bombs or 792 miles without bombs. Maximum range 1,130 miles. Swordfish I range 546 miles with normal fuel and one 1,610 lb torpedo. Maximum range for reconnaissance with no bomb load and extra fuel (236 gal), 1,030 miles. Shark ceiling 16,400 ft, Swordfish I 10,700 ft.)

Also, just because the Shark didn't do these things, didn't mean they couldn't be done by it. You've got no proof that the Shark would have been less capable than the Swordfish in this role had it remained in service. Are you suggesting that no other torpedo bomber could have done these things? If the RN had Avengers, would they not have been able to carry out Taranto or damage the Bismarck? I don't think so.


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## michaelmaltby (Oct 17, 2016)

If the Swordfish legends are to believed, on the Bismarck attack run the observer hung over the side to best-time the drop between wave peaks and crests.
Try doing that out of an Avenger .


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## pinehilljoe (Oct 17, 2016)

nuuumannn said:


> Parsifal, you are absolutely right, but it doesn't make the Swordfish a game changer for the reasons I've already stipulated. (Actually I've got the Shark at a higher maximum speed than the Swordfish; from British Naval Aircraft since 1912 by Thetford: Shark 152 mph @ 6,500 ft, Swordfish I, 139 mph @4,750 ft, Shark range 625 miles with bombs or 792 miles without bombs. Maximum range 1,130 miles. Swordfish I range 546 miles with normal fuel and one 1,610 lb torpedo. Maximum range for reconnaissance with no bomb load and extra fuel (236 gal), 1,030 miles. Shark ceiling 16,400 ft, Swordfish I 10,700 ft.)
> 
> Also, just because the Shark didn't do these things, didn't mean they couldn't be done by it. You've got no proof that the Shark would have been less capable than the Swordfish in this role had it remained in service. Are you suggesting that no other torpedo bomber could have done these things? If the RN had Avengers, would they not have been able to carry out Taranto or damage the Bismarck? I don't think so.



Why dont you think TBFs could have flown the Taranto or Bismarck strikes? They did a fair job against Musashi and Yamoto, and Truk Atoll. Kate's had their day at Pearl, similar to Toranto.


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## parsifal (Oct 17, 2016)

_Parsifal, you are absolutely right, but it doesn't make the Swordfish a game changer for the reasons I've already stipulated. (Actually I've got the Shark at a higher maximum speed than the Swordfish; from British Naval Aircraft since 1912 by Thetford: Shark 152 mph @ 6,500 ft, Swordfish I, 139 mph @4,750 ft, Shark range 625 miles with bombs or 792 miles without bombs. Maximum range 1,130 miles. Swordfish I range 546 miles with normal fuel and one 1,610 lb torpedo. Maximum range for reconnaissance with no bomb load and extra fuel (236 gal), 1,030 miles. Shark ceiling 16,400 ft, Swordfish I 10,700 ft.)_

I think we do agree that there is not enough difference between the Shark and the swordfish to claim that the Swordfish was a game changer relative to that aircraft. The shark was introduced in 1932-ish and the Swordfish 1935-ish. we don't have any definitive information to say the swordfish was markedly superior, but it did replace the shark at a time when the FAA was critically short of any carrier capable aircraft, moreover pilots that flew the Swordfish (and presumably also the slightly earlier Shark) say that no other aircraft they had flown had the rough weather handling the swordfish possessed. I have to assume they included the Shark in that back room assessment.

as far as range is concerned, well, there are lies, damned lies and then range values. I was sheepish to make those claims, but they were on the basis of what little information I had on the shark. What would be needed is operational data....how long the shark could stay aloft with weapons aboard in a fighting trim, compared to a swordfish in the same situation. I know the swordfish situation, its about 7 hours, but I don't know the shark statistics. 

_Also, just because the Shark didn't do these things, didn't mean they couldn't be done by it. You've got no proof that the Shark would have been less capable than the Swordfish in this role had it remained in service. 
_
I agree that we have no data with regard to the shark. that cuts both ways however, we don't know if it could, or could not undertake such a mission. 
_
Are you suggesting that no other torpedo bomber could have done these things? If the RN had Avengers, would they not have been able to carry out Taranto or damage the Bismarck? I don't think so_.

If the RN had avengers in 1940, they would not have been able to attack at night into a constricted like Taranto (and repeated many time subsequently by 830sqn operating out of malta) waterway at night. Taranto is a port ringed by a ridge a shallow depth of water under the keels of the ships in the harbour and a short run in to get the altitude right, the speed right, the bearings right. too much speed or height and your fish will not be able to stay between the bottom of the torpedo netting and the harbour bottom. speeds had to be kept to below 80 knots airspeed, and altitudes under 60 feet (i think it was 60 feet, i would need to check, but the point is the height was very limited). no other aircraft at that time could undertake a mission of that type with such narrow parameters to work with. add to that that the mission needed to be undertaken at night and the issue is not in doubt, no other aircraft in 1940 could undertake the mission, and that made the swordfish a game changer.

The nearest equivalent to Taranto occurred at Pearl harbour the following year, but that was a day operation, with an extra 20 feet (approximately) of depth to play with and torpedoes specially modified to not hit the bottom at the design launch speed of 200 kts. with regard to the avenger, I know of no strategically significant operations this aircraft undertook under similar conditions in its time frame. bear in mind that the Avenger was an aircraft 7 years newer than the swordfish.

The swordfish had some unique capabilities, that the RN used to maximum possible advantage. I would not however call those abilities, viewed in isolation, as game changers. what made the aircraft a game changer was the combination of those rather unique capabilities in conjunction with the torpedo capabilities you and I have both talked about at various times as well as the timing of the whole package. before the swordfish, the continental navies opposed to the RN were full of confidence and expected their super battleships, ships that the RN had no answer to at the time, to gain dominance in the seas around europe. though the airpower supporters had challenged that notion prewar, there was no conviction in naval circles to support the claims. the swordfish (and the ordinance that they carried, and the fast carrier that conveyed them) in 1940 turned that whole situation around and saved britain from one of the major challenges threatening it at the time.

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## GrauGeist (Oct 18, 2016)

parsifal said:


> with regard to the avenger, I know of no strategically significant operations this aircraft undertook under similar conditions in its time frame.


Abut the only event that may be close in comparison would be the attack on Truk Lagoon during Operation Hailstone - starting on 17 February 1944.

The lagoon is not very deep where the primary anchorages were, many of the Japanese ships were in about 50 feet (15m) when stricken and of course, further out, the depth increases where other ships were hit, too.


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## parsifal (Oct 18, 2016)

pinehilljoe said:


> Why dont you think TBFs could have flown the Taranto or Bismarck strikes? They did a fair job against Musashi and Yamoto, and Truk Atoll. Kate's had their day at Pearl, similar to Toranto.



You need to look at the date, 1940. Then you need look at the specifics of Taranto. Attacks at night, shallow harbour, difficult approach route, slow drop speed.

The torpedo that equipped the USN torpedo bombers was not a great piece of kit. In mid-1943 an analysis of 105 torpedoes dropped at speeds in excess of 150 knots showed clearly why aviators distrusted the Mark 13: 36 percent ran cold, 20 percent sank, 20 percent had poor deflection performance, 18 percent gave unsatisfactory depth performance, 2 percent ran on the surface, and only 31 percent gave a satisfactory run. The total in excess of 100 percent proved that many torpedoes were subject to more than one of the defects, just as the bulk of the problems were still due to the effects of poor air stabilization on water behavior. Better performance at reduced aircraft speeds was small comfort since aviators could not be held down by paper restrictions that imposed serious and dangerous handicaps in combat

In 1940 there was zero chance that the US could have pulled off Taranto given these limitations

Musashi was lost after 19 torpedo hits and 17 bombs had hit her, broad daylight and ideal attack conditions. She had been subjected to attack by more than 170 aircraft. To sink or disable the three Italian battleships, the RN had just 21 swordfish. most observers believe that Musashi would probably have survived if her DC had been up to scratch.

Over truk, the USN committed over 550 aircraft over a two day period of frenetic strikes. There is no denying the damage was massive, but also the resources available were not comparable to the 1940 situation, and I don't believe these strikes were at night There wasn't an extensive use of torpedoes in these strikes that I am aware of. At no stage at any time in the war did Britain have access to 550 carrier borne aircraft, let alone Swordfish in 1940.

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## GrauGeist (Oct 18, 2016)

The Dauntless and Avenger worked the shipping over pretty hard, fighters strafed anything that even resembled a target...and any ship that tried to escape faced surface ships and submarines. And then there were the Japanese ships that had the misfortune to be within range of the U.S. Cruisers or Battleships.

I'm aware that the timeframe is off, but Operation Hailstone is about the only action that U.S. torpedo bombers conducted that would be even remotely close to Taranto or Pearl Harbor in the way of conditions regarding the depth of the anchorage and the lack of enemy shipping mobility.

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## Shortround6 (Oct 18, 2016)

The Avenger wouldn't have worked at Taranto because it didn't exist. First flight was Aug of 1941.

The MK 13 Torpedo was a horrible piece of equipment in 1940-41,* Max *drop speed being about 110 knots even in 1942 and max drop height was 50 feet. Since the Avenger was _supposed _to land back aboard the carrier at 77mph while carrying the torpedo and 1/2 fuel so flying at less than 110kts should not have been a problem. 

Of course the Avenger could NOT carry the long skinny British torpedo either. 

What the Avenger could do in 1944 with much modified MK 13 Torpedoes doesn't have a whole lot of bearing on the abilities in 1940/41.

The Shark had a lot less wing area than the Swordfish and used the AS Tiger engine instead of the Bristol Pegasus. If they wanted to they probably could have swapped engines. 
Intangibles are control response at low speeds and climb out. Albacore was supposed to be heavy on the controls which would not inspire confidence at low speeds/altitudes even if measured performance was the same. 
Swordfish got some the long endurance (over 5 1/2 hours or so) from either a fuel tank taking the place of one of the crewmen or an external drop tank. The Shark may never have gotten the option of the internal tank and reduced crew. 
For some reason the RN went with Swordfish in 1937 and I doubt it had anything to do with radar being installed in the plane. It may have been better handling or flying qualities that don't show up in a quick performance chart. It may have been disenchantment with the AS Tiger engine although the 700-800hp versions may not have had the troubles the 800-900hp ones had. 

The Swordfish was lucky in that it was the right plane at the right time in the right missions. WW II might have been much harder for the British without it but it didn't really change tactics or strategy. It may have pushed the envelope on occasion, anti sub air-cover in bad weather for example, but that is hardly a game changer if some navies are flying anti-sub missions (even if recon) up to the limits of their carriers and planes in a particular weather condition. 

When dealing with carrier planes, _especially torpedo planes, _you have a 3 prong situation. The weapon itself, the torpedo, all torpedos were certainly not equal. The planes, much discussed, and the Carriers themselves. Flight deck length, catapults (if used) flight deck width (deck storage) and ship length and flight deck height above water affect what conditions flight is possible with certain aircraft. 
What combination worked for one Navy might not work for another or even been desirable. 

The US Navy got very lucky indeed when the Avenger was able to operate from short, slow carriers even though at reduced weights at times when that had not really been part of it's design specification. Smallest carriers the US was contemplating during the Avenger initial design were the Ranger and Wasp.

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## fastmongrel (Oct 18, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> The Shark had a lot less wing area than the Swordfish and used the AS Tiger engine instead of the Bristol Pegasus. If they wanted to they probably could have swapped engines.



Sharks built by Boeing Canada had Pegasus engines. The only thing I have read that compared the Swordfish and the Shark said landing wasnt as nice in the Shark in poor visibility because of a long nose and a sharp stall.

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## oldcrowcv63 (Oct 18, 2016)

parsifal said:


> *You need to look at the date, 1940.* Then you need look at the specifics of Taranto. Attacks at night, shallow harbour, difficult approach route, slow drop speed.
> 
> The torpedo that equipped the USN torpedo bombers was not a great piece of kit. In mid-1943 an analysis of 105 torpedoes dropped at speeds in excess of 150 knots showed clearly why aviators distrusted the Mark 13: 36 percent ran cold, 20 percent sank, 20 percent had poor deflection performance, 18 percent gave unsatisfactory depth performance, 2 percent ran on the surface, and only 31 percent gave a satisfactory run. The total in excess of 100 percent proved that many torpedoes were subject to more than one of the defects, just as the bulk of the problems were still due to the effects of poor air stabilization on water behavior. Better performance at reduced aircraft speeds was small comfort since aviators could not be held down by paper restrictions that imposed serious and dangerous handicaps in combat
> 
> ...



I don't disagree with anything you've said here except for the emboldened statement above which is presumably based in equal part upon the quoted 1943 report and the bulk of the early 1942 experience with the TBD-Mk 13 combination. Pretty solid evidence, but anecdotally, there is an apparently anomalous moment in the record of the Devastator-Mk 13 combo that some might call its one moment of glory and might weigh somewhat against your statement I am referring to the attack on the IJN light carrier Shoho on the first day of the Coral Sea Battle. During this attack, flown against a defended (if lightly) carrier the 12 TBDs of VT-2 scored 5 of 12 times while executing a successful anvil attack against the maneuvering ship before it was debilitated by multiple bombs dropped by SBDs from VB-2 and VS-5 and escaped to tell the tale. This performance was not isolated on that occasion. The 10 TBDs of VT-5 also scored multiple times (surely more easily) against an essentially immobile target. Also, on the previous March 10 raid on Lae and Salamaua, TBDs scored on an apparently anchored Transport. Before that, during the early USN Pacific island raids, the TBD was typically armed with bombs rather than torpedoes so the Midway and subsequent experience with the Mk 13 may have come as something of a surprise. I've read, can't recall the source, that the early batch of Mk-13s had better performance than later production runs. If true, that information may be based solely upon the early experience or possibly some sort of pre-delivery testing. In 1940, if TBD's were using early run Mk-13s, perhaps they could have pulled off a Taranto style attack. Although the Swordfish had better performance in most categories, it seems as though the range to the target and circumstance may have been barely within the capability of the TBD-Mk 13 combination. If the Mk-13 did not run too deep for the harbor, perhaps....? At Lae and Salmaua, the harbor depth was apparently a factor preventing more USN-favorable results.


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