# IJN attacks vs defended islands: Ceylon compared to Midway



## oldcrowcv63 (Oct 19, 2014)

In early 1942, IJN's Kido Butai attacked and scored substantial aerial victories over two defended island bases: Ceylon and Midway Island. The former much larger land mass, involved two different mass raids on two geographically separated targets with associated air battles between escorting zeroes and defending Hurricanes and Fulmars, while the latter involved one raid on a single target defended by an arguably obsolescent fighter, the F2A-3. 

The Ceylon raid was not accompanied by a great or decisive naval carrier clash as occurred at Midway and so may seem a historically minor event in a warzone backwater. 

The Action over Ceylon is described by Shores, Cull and Izawa in _Bloody Shambles, vol. 2_

They describe the bases on Ceylon as being reinforced in the days leading up to the IJN raids somewhat similar to Midway's strengthening.


On April 5, a strike force launched from 5 Kido Butai carriers (Akagi, Hiryu, Shokaku, Soryu, and Zuikaku) comprised of 53 B5N, 38 D3A and 36 A6M, attacked Columbo on the SW side of the island. The port although without Radar, was on alert due to prior IJN activity in the area and a radio-sighting report by an intrepid RCAF PBY pilot the day before. PBY searches early on the 5th revealed no carriers but major surface combatants. For its defense, launched 30 Hurricane Mark IIBs, 5 Mark Is and 6 Fulmar (II?)were able to launch from Ratmalana and Race Course Airfields which were primary targets with Ratmalana coming under attack as the last 3 Hurricane IIBs took off. The defenders apparently lost 19 of 35 Hurricanes and 4 of the 6 Fulmar IIs launched according to Shores et al. The IJN apparently lost 1 A6M, 6 D3A or 7 lost with 15 suffering damage. Seems like, despite some level of forewarning of the enemy presence, the RAF and FAA assets were caught somewhat flat-footed so that the Hurricane IIB strengths could not be exploited. Apparently 6 Fulmar II were on an extended patrol in the area during the attack but failed to make contact. 

At 0600, April 9, Nagumo's Kido Butai launched a second raid, consisting of 91 B5Ns and 41 A6Ms, on Trincomalee's port and China Bay airfield. Radar detected the raid before 0700. 3 Hurricane's were launched at 0635 and vectored to intercept at 0655. Upon sighting the raiders, the 3 Hurricanes climbed to 22,000 feet to take position above the escorting A6Ms. The defenders splashed 2 A6Ms for the loss of 1 Hurricane and 1 damaged. In the meantime, At 0710 13 more Hurricanes were ultimately scrambled to meet the incoming raid which arrived over head at about 0730. Half the 16 Hurricanes launched were evidently lost for 3 A6Ms and 2 B5Ms lost as well as a three damaged. Based at Trincomalee but not used for its defense were apparently 2 Martlets and 6 Fulmars. These aircraft apparently were held in reserve or due to a lack of proper ammo. In total, there appears to have been 24 fighters potentially available for defense of the port. The RAF Hurricane pilots were apparently relatively inexperienced with a few more seasoned pilots in the mix, similar to the Marines at Midway. 

The performance of the Midway based Marine F2A-3s has been well documented on this site and it (seems to me) that the results are surprisingly similar to those of the RAF. a few more lost with about the same or a few more IJN casualties: The 22 F2A-3s launched in Midway's defense apparently rendered half the Hiryu's VT out of action for the day and outright accounted for about the same number of aircraft as lost by the IJN raiders over Ceylon. 

Just thought the comparison might be interesting.

Postscript, Later in the day, 8 Fulmars launched from Ratmalana to defend carrier Hermes accounted for 4 D3As with 5 damaged for the loss of 2.


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## RCAFson (Oct 20, 2014)

At Midway the USMC deployed 18 F2A-3s and 6 F4F-3s against the IJN raid. The USMC fighters had ample radar warning and all 24 attacked with a clear altitude advantage. The IJN force numbered 36 fighters, 36 Kates and 36 Vals. In First Team Lundstrom states that the USMC fighters shot down 3 or 4 IJN aircraft (one or two fighters and two attack aircraft) and 3 or 4 more IJN aircraft were lost to AA, for a total of 7 IJN losses. The USMC lost 13 F2A-3s, and 2 F4F-3s with only two F4Fs flyable after the action.

The 16 RAF Hurricane fighters on April 09 faced longer odds and did comparatively better,


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## oldcrowcv63 (Oct 20, 2014)

Getting senile in my old age… I had forgotten about the F4F in the mix.


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## buffnut453 (Oct 20, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> At Midway the USMC deployed 18 F2A-3s and 6 F4F-3s against the IJN raid. The USMC fighters had ample radar warning and all 24 attacked with a clear altitude advantage. The IJN force numbered 36 fighters, 36 Kates and 36 Vals. In First Team Lundstrom states that the USMC fighters shot down 3 or 4 IJN aircraft (one or two fighters and two attack aircraft) and 3 or 4 more IJN aircraft were lost to AA, for a total of 7 IJN losses. The USMC lost 13 F2A-3s, and 2 F4F-3s with only two F4Fs flyable after the action.
> 
> The 16 RAF Hurricane fighters on April 09 faced longer odds and did comparatively better,



Unfortunately, VMF-221 did not engage the Japanese en masse despite the advanced warning. Instead, they flew in obsolete Division formations of 4-5 airframes that were tactically unsound - worse even than the 3-ship vic that was still being used by some inexperienced RAF fighter units. Also, the Divisions were employed piecemeal, allowing each Division to be dealt with in turn as evidenced by the bulk of the losses being incurred by the first two Divisions that engaged the IJNAF attacking force.


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## FLYBOYJ (Oct 20, 2014)

After action report by William Brooks and break out of each VMF-221 division that fought at Midway.

I was pilot of F2A-3, Bureau number 01523, Our division under Capt. Armistead was on standby duty at he end of the runway on the morning of June 4, 1942, from 0415 until 0615. At about 0600, the alarm sounded and we took off. My division climbed rapidly, and I was having a hard time keeping up. I discovered afterwards that although my wheels indicator and hydraulic pressure indicator both registered “wheels up”, they were in reality about 1/3 of the way down. We sighted the enemy at about 14,000 feet, I would say that there were 40 to 50 planes. At this time Lt. Sandoval was also dropping back. My radio was at this time putting out no volume, so I could not get the message from Zed. At 17,000 feet, Capt. Armistead led the attack followed closely by Capt. Humberd. They went down the left of the Vee , leaving two planes burning. Lt. Sandoval went down the right side of the formation and I followed. One of us got a plane from the right side of the Vee. At this time, I had completely lost sight of my division. As I started to pull up for another run on the bombers, I was attacked by two fighters. Because my wheels being jammed 1/3 way down, I could not out dive these planes, but managed to dodge them and fire a burst or so into them as they went past me and as I headed for the water. As I circled the island, the anti-aircraft fire drove them away. My tabs, instruments and cockpit were shot up to quite an extent at this time and I was intending to come in for a landing. 

It was at this time that I noticed that a important feature in their fighting. I saw two planes dog-fighting over in the east, and decided to go help my friend if at all possible. My plane was working very poorly, and my climb was slow. As I neared the fight both planes turned on me. It was then that I realized I had been tricked in a sham battle put on by two Japs and I failed to recognize this because of the sun in my eyes. Then I say I was out-numbered, I turned and made a fast retreat for the island, collecting a goodly number of bullets on the way. After one of these planes had been shaken, I managed to get a good burst into another as we passed head-on when I turned into him. I don’t believe this ship could have gotten back to his carrier, because he immediately turned away and started north and down. I again decided to land, but as I circled the island I saw two Japs on a Brewster. Three of my guns were jammed, but I cut across the island, firing as I went with one gun. But I could not get there in time to help the American flier and as soon as the Brewster had gone into the water I came in for a landing at approximately 0715 (estimated). 

VMF-221 was composed of the following aircraft and pilots.

FIRST DIVISION (F2A-3)

Plane # Bu.No. Pilot Status

MF-1 01518 Maj. Floyd B. Parks USMC MIA

MF-2 01548 2nd Lt. Eugene P. Madole USMCR MIA

MF-3 01525 Capt. John R. Alvord USMC MIA

MF-4 01537 2nd Lt. John M. Butler USMCR MIA

MF-5 01569 2nd Lt. David W. Pinkerton Jr. USMCR MIA

MF-6 01552 2nd Lt. Charles S. Hughes USMCR, Did not engage, turned back due to Engine problems



SECOND DIVISION (F2A-3)

Plane # Bu.No. Pilot Status

MF-7 01552 Capt. Daniel J. Hennessey USMC MIA

MF-8 01541 2nd Lt. Ellwood Q. Lindsay USMCR MIA

MF-9 01524 Capt. Herbert T. Merrill USMC Bailed out WIA

MF-10 01528 Capt. Herbert T. Merrill USMC MIA

MF-11 01568 Capt. Phillip R. White USMC Survived

MF-12 01542 2nd Lt. John D. Lucas USMCR MIA



THIRD DIVISION (F2A-3)

Plane# Bu.No. Pilot Status

MF-13 01562 Capt. Kirk Armistead USMC Survived

MF-14 01563 2nd Lt. William B. Sandoval USMCR MIA

MF-15 01553 Capt. William C. Humberd USMC Survived

MF-16 01523 2nd Lt. Williams V. Brooks USMCR WIA

MF-17 01521 2nd Lt. Charles M .Kunz USMCR WIA

MF-18 01559 2nd Lt. Martin E. Mahannah USMC KIA (his body washed up later)

23 (F4F-3) 3989 2nd Lt. Walter W. Swansberger USMCR Survived



FOURTH DIVISION (F2A-3)

Plane # Bu.No. Pilot Status

MF-19 01520 Capt. Robert E. Curtin USMC MIA

MF-20 01550 2nd Lt. Darrell D. Irwin USMCR Survived



FIFTH DIVISION (F4F-3)



Plane # Bu.No. Pilot Status

22 4008 Capt. John F. Carey USMC WIA

24 4000 Capt. Marion E. Carl USMC Survived

25 3997 2Lt. Clayton M. Canfield USMCR Survived

26 4006 Capt. Francis P. McCarthy USMC MIA

27 2532 2nd Lt. Roy A. Corry USMC Survived

28 1864 2nd Lt.Hyde Phillips USMCR Did not engage, mechanical problems

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## buffnut453 (Oct 20, 2014)

Thanks Joe. Didn't have my references with my so was working from my (faulty) memory about the Divisional composition of VMF-221 but tactics and training were certainly not up to the latest (and many of the pilots were newly-arrived at Midway. The USMC air arm was expanding rapidly, splitting squadrons and then backfilling with newly-trained pilots.

I had the privilege of meeting Bill Brooks, one of the survivors from the Third Division, about 16 years ago - a real gentleman!

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## oldcrowcv63 (Oct 20, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> At Midway the USMC deployed 18 F2A-3s and 6 F4F-3s against the IJN raid. The USMC fighters had *ample radar warning *and *all 24 attacked with a clear altitude advantage*. The IJN force numbered 36 fighters, 36 Kates and 36 Vals. In First Team *Lundstrom states that the USMC fighters shot down 3 or 4 IJN aircraft *(one or two fighters and two attack aircraft) and 3 or 4 more IJN aircraft were lost to AA, for a total of 7 IJN losses. The USMC lost 13 F2A-3s, and 2 F4F-3s with only two F4Fs flyable after the action.
> 
> The 16 RAF Hurricane fighters on April 09 faced longer odds and did comparatively better,



Lundstrom's focus in recounting battle damage focused on the losses suffered by the Hiryu Air Group: 2 VF damaged and three VT splashed, one ditched and 4 inop. due to damage. 

According to Fuchida: 3VT, 1VB and 2 VF were lost over Midway. (one of these possibly lost to AA)
Prange lists: 3 VT and 2 VF were lost in a-2-a combat. Losses and damage supposedly attributed to a Nagumo post battle summary.
Damaged: 16 VT, 4 VB and 12 VF although Prange suggests Nagumo's figures are not reliable as he lists no losses to Hiryu VT which was apparently hardest hit. This talley of losses and damage seems fairly consistent with the results over Ceylon. 

VMF-221 launched the following a/c:

*Park's 1st Division* consisting of 6 F2A-3 flown by: Madole, Alvord, Butler, Pinkerton, *Hughes(DNE-RTB)*
*Hennesy's 2nd Division* consisting of 6 F2A-3 flown by: Lindsay, Merrill, Benson, *White* Lucas
*Armistead's *3rd Division consisting of 6 F2A-3 flown by: Sandoval, *Humbard*, *Brooks*, *Kunz*, Mahannah and 1 F4F-3 flown by Sansburger
Curtin's Fourth Division consisting of 2 F2A-3 flown by: *Irwin*
Carey's Fifth Division consisting of 3 F4F-3 flown by: *Carl Canfield*
Morning CAP consisting of 2 F4F-3 flown by McCarthy and *Correy*.

Bold faced indicates pilot survived the battle, all others were KIA. 

It looks like the total number of fighters launched was 20 F2A-3 and 6 F4F-3 of which 19 F2A-3 and 6 F4f-3 actually engaged IJN a/c. 

Warning time at Midway appears to have been 35 minutes (detection at 0555, launch at about 0605 and bombs drop on Midway at 0630. 

No radar warning was available to the Columbo defenders for the 5 April raid.

According to Shores et al., RADAR Warning time at Trincomalee, Ceyon on April 9, also appears to have been 35 minutes (detection at 0655, fighter scramble at about 0710 for 6 Hurricanes of A flight 261 squadron, and an additional 6 in B Flight launched at 0715. Bombs drop on China Bay air field at 0730. 3 Hurricanes were aloft on CAP having launched at 0635 and 9 of the 16 Hurricanes launched achieved altitude superiority (21 or 22k') before engaging the IJN VTB a/c at ~12-15K', escorts at 20k'. B Flight launched from an dispersal air field launched (Kokkilai) late and only got to 16k' about 2K' lower then the IJN escorts. 8 RAF a.c were downed with 3 damaged. IJN loses were already tallied. 

I wouldn't make a comparison of a/c in these two battles and certainly would conclude that I'd rather be flying a Hurricane IIB or even a HI than a F2A-3. I think the number of defenders in both cases was insufficient to the size of the raid and the tactics employed by both the RAF/FAA and USMC/USN in defense were flawed at this stage of the war. 

What I found particularly interesting and what may have made a major difference in limiting the RAF Hurricane score was that apparently the IJN escorting VF arrived over China Bay BEFORE the VTB a/c arrived and it seems the RAF might have had only a brief(er?) pass at the IJN bombers. I also wonder whether more damage might have been inflicted by the F2A-3's 4x 0.50s than did the Hurricane's 8x.303s but that seems unlikely to be a factor, considering the un or lightly armored opposition.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Oct 20, 2014)

Sorry Joe, I didn't see your post before posting my own with duplicate info on the USMC defenders.


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## gjs238 (Oct 20, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> I wouldn't make a comparison of a/c in these two battles and certainly would conclude that I'd rather be flying a Hurricane IIB or even a HI than a F2A-3.



Well, Finnish B-239's managed to shoot down a Soviet Hawker Hurricane


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## Juha (Oct 20, 2014)

gjs238 said:


> Well, Finnish B-239's managed to shoot down a Soviet Hawker Hurricane



several Hurricanes!

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## oldcrowcv63 (Oct 20, 2014)

*Armistead* landed his *F2A-3* with a damaged aileron, hydraulics and brake. 
*Carl* landed his *F4F-3* with minor damage.
*Humbard* land his *F2A-3* with significant damage to his hydraulics and airframe (multiple holes in fuselage, wing and hood). 
*White* landed his *F2A-3* after rearming launched again and *finally landed unharmed*.
*Canfield* landed his *F4F-3* with damage to his fuselage, wing and landing gear which collapsed on touchdown.
*Corry* landed his *F4F-3* with small caliber wing tank and probable fuselage damage. 
*Hughes* RTB in his *F2A-3* due to engine power loss and placed it in the protected revetment before the attack. Presumably undamaged in the attack with the engine repairable with some maintenance.
*Phillip's* *F4F-3* was in maintenance and presumably in a revetment during the attack. Some maintenance presumably required.
*Brooks* (WIA) landed his *F2A-3* with significant cockpit and landing gear and probable fuselage damage (72 bullet cannon holes). 
*Kunz* (WIA), landed his *F2A-3 *with damaged radio hydraulic system. Many holes. 
*Irwin* landed his *F2A-3* with significant wing fuselage damage including a non-fatal cannon hit to the wing tank. 

My guess is that Carl's F4F-3 and White's F2A-3 remained serviceable with probably some of the other a/c fairly quickly repairable including Hughes F2A-3 and Phillips F4F-3.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Oct 20, 2014)

gjs, I didn't say I'd pick a Hurricane over an F2A-1 although I might. I said I'd pick a Hurricane IIB (and maybe an HI) over an F2A-3.. The two Brewsters were, in my opinion, VERY different airplanes. From what I've read, at least some USN USMC pilots would choose an F2A-2 over either Hurricane, or any F4F.

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## VBF-13 (Oct 20, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> At Midway the USMC deployed 18 F2A-3s and 6 F4F-3s against the IJN raid. The USMC fighters had ample radar warning and all 24 attacked with a clear altitude advantage. The IJN force numbered 36 fighters, 36 Kates and 36 Vals. In First Team Lundstrom states that the USMC fighters shot down 3 or 4 IJN aircraft (one or two fighters and two attack aircraft) and 3 or 4 more IJN aircraft were lost to AA, for a total of 7 IJN losses. The USMC lost 13 F2A-3s, and 2 F4F-3s with only two F4Fs flyable after the action.
> 
> The 16 RAF Hurricane fighters on April 09 faced longer odds and did comparatively better,


The Hurricanes probably fared better against the fighters than anything the Marines had. Against the Zeros, forget about it. This account on Midway is pretty much my understanding on that stage in the war. This is from Lord, _Incredible Victory_ (1967), p102: 

"But it wasn't deception, skill or even numbers that made the big difference. As the Marine fighters fluttered down to the sea, or staggered back toward Midway, it was clear that the greatest Japanese advantage lay in the Zero itself. The Marine pilots were astonished. Like most Americans, they had been taught to think of the Japanese as an imitative people who couldn't do much on their own. Now here was a fighter that could outclimb, outrun, outmaneuver any plane the U.S. had. If it was also highly vulnerable, they rarely had a good enough shot at it to find out. Even the F4Fs were completely outclassed, and the ancient Buffaloes--as Lieutenant Charles Hughes sadly remarked--"looked like they were tied to a string while the Zeros made passes at them."


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## buffnut453 (Oct 20, 2014)

Lord raises a valid point about the ethnic bias applied against Japanese technology in the late-30s and through until late-41. However, simply blaming the aircraft is a naiively simplistic. Poor tactics coupled with a large number of pilots fresh out of training and a squadron organization that was just rebuilding after having been split to form VMF-222...hardly the makings of a robust defensive force. I'm not saying the F2A-3 was a good aircraft - it was too heavy, with manouverability sacrificed for long range (at the USN's behest, I must add) - but just blaming the tool is a workman's cop out.

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## gjs238 (Oct 20, 2014)

From Wiki:

_The poor performance of the Buffalo at Midway later prompted Finnish Air Force ace Hans Wind to develop new combat tactics for the FAF Brewster, which were later used with remarkable success in 1942 and 1943 against the Soviet Air Force during the Continuation War.[47] Wind's combat tactics, which emphasized diving speed and zoom climbs, were much the same as Claire Chennault's advice for employing the Curtiss P-40B against the A6M Zero in Burma and China.[47] Chennault's report on the Zero and air combat reached Washington in 1941, where it was disseminated to aviation forces of the U.S. Army and Navy.[48] This information, along with the development of two-plane mutual defensive formations and tactics, were incorporated into U.S. and Marine Corps air combat training doctrine by some prescient U.S. commanders, including Lieutenant Commander "Jimmy" Thach. The Thach Weave was developed for use by Wildcat pilots against the Zero, and was later adopted by other Wildcat squadrons in the Pacific.[48]_


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## VBF-13 (Oct 20, 2014)

buffnut453 said:


> Lord raises a valid point about the ethnic bias applied against Japanese technology in the late-30s and through until late-41. However, simply blaming the aircraft is a naiively simplistic. Poor tactics coupled with a large number of pilots fresh out of training and a squadron organization that was just rebuilding after having been split to form VMF-222...hardly the makings of a robust defensive force. I'm not saying the F2A-3 was a good aircraft - it was too heavy, with manouverability sacrificed for long range (at the USN's behest, I must add) - but just blaming the tool is a workman's cop out.


If he was "simply blaming the aircraft," or "just blaming the tool," I think I'd be inclined to agree with you.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Oct 20, 2014)

gjs238 said:


> From Wiki:
> 
> _The *poor performance of the Buffalo at Midway later prompted Finnish Air Force ace Hans Wind to develop new combat tactics for the FAF Brewster, which were later used with remarkable success in 1942 and 1943 against the Soviet Air Force during the Continuation War.*[47] Wind's combat tactics, which emphasized diving speed and zoom climbs, were much the same as Claire Chennault's advice for employing the Curtiss P-40B against the A6M Zero in Burma and China._



This is surprising to me. I had not heard of this influence half a world away, but I have to add, looking at the B-239 pre-Midway success, Wind's tactical modifications appear to be merely gilding the lily:

From the start of the continuation war in June of 1941 to the end of 1941, B-239s assigned to LeLv 24 rolled up a score (admittedly against mainly inferior opposition) of 67.5:1. 

In the first 5 months of 1942, B-239s destroyed about: 23 Mig-1 -3, 2 LAGG-3 and 20 Hurricanes, for a kill ratio of ~69:1 

These numbers appear on Dan Ford's site but I don't know whether they are claims or confirmed. 

http://www.warbirdforum.com/scores.htm


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## Shortround6 (Oct 21, 2014)

buffnut453 said:


> I'm not saying the F2A-3 was a good aircraft - it was too heavy, with manouverability sacrificed for long range (*at the USN's behest, I must add*)



Do you have a source for this?

while _max_ capacity did change the _normal_ fuel capacity did not. The old wing tanks contained in the box spar held 160 gallons and could not be made self sealing to the standard the USN wanted. The right tank had two outlets, the higher one was the 'normal' outlet and when used left about 25 gallons in the tank which was accessed by switching to the 'reserve' setting on the fuel tank selector. The left tank had one fuel for the full capacity of the tank. 3 new protected tanks totaling 80 gallons were added. The left tank filler was sealed off and stenciled " Not to be filled except on the special authority of Commanding Officer". Right tank with it's reserve capacity was kept for a 'normal' fuel capacity that stayed the same. Since the box spar and ribs provided the walls, top and bottom of the wing tanks the only weight saving in getting rid of them would have been the fuel filler/s, outlets and drains, and fuel piping to the fuel selector valve. The F2A-3 could be fitted with a CO2 system to purge the wing tanks of gas fumes after the fuel was used for less of a fire hazard. 

The prototype XF2A-1 and XF2A-2 (same airframe) held only 110 gallons so the US Navy certainly did ask for more fuel/range in the production versions. Reasons for the increase from 160 to 240 gallons are a bit more confused. 

Weight tables in 'AHT' show 660lbs (110 gal) as 'normal' fuel load and 1080lbs (180 gal) as overload, which doesn't quite add up. 240 gallons would be 1440lbs of fuel


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## buffnut453 (Oct 21, 2014)

I don't think the performance of the Buffalo at Midway had any impact on Finnish tactics. The cited link makes no such claim, merely observing that Soviet pilots used poor tactics and that the Finns used three-dimensional tactics that successfully countered the flat circles adopted by their adversary. How would the Finns get any knowledge of the tactics employed by the USMC pilots at Midway? The combat reports would be classified and I just don't see that data being shared. Even if it was, the Finns were flying the lighter, more manoeuverable F2A-1 which offered more tactical options than the sluggish -3 used by the USMC. 'Fraid this is a case of Wiki barking up completely the wrong tree.

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## buffnut453 (Oct 21, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> Do you have a source for this?
> 
> while _max_ capacity did change the _normal_ fuel capacity did not. The old wing tanks contained in the box spar held 160 gallons and could not be made self sealing to the standard the USN wanted. The right tank had two outlets, the higher one was the 'normal' outlet and when used left about 25 gallons in the tank which was accessed by switching to the 'reserve' setting on the fuel tank selector. The left tank had one fuel for the full capacity of the tank. 3 new protected tanks totaling 80 gallons were added. The left tank filler was sealed off and stenciled " Not to be filled except on the special authority of Commanding Officer". Right tank with it's reserve capacity was kept for a 'normal' fuel capacity that stayed the same. Since the box spar and ribs provided the walls, top and bottom of the wing tanks the only weight saving in getting rid of them would have been the fuel filler/s, outlets and drains, and fuel piping to the fuel selector valve. The F2A-3 could be fitted with a CO2 system to purge the wing tanks of gas fumes after the fuel was used for less of a fire hazard.
> 
> ...



I believe the extra fuel was for long-range CAPs but that role disappeared with the advent of ship-borne radar. The fundamental problem with the F2A is that the wing was appropriately-sized for the original, unarmoured -1 variants. With each increase in weight, the wing loading increased thus impacting manoeuverability. By the time of the -3, weight had increased considerably with armour plate, the extra 3 self-sealing fuel tanks and their piping, and the extended fuselage which required longer structural support for the engine. I'll accept my glib statement was an oversimplification but the net result was the same and manouverability did suffer.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Oct 21, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> *The Hurricanes probably fared better against the fighters than anything the Marines had.* Against the Zeros, forget about it. This account on Midway is pretty much my understanding on that stage in the war. This is from Lord, _Incredible Victory_ (1967), p102:
> 
> "But it wasn't deception, skill or even numbers that made the big difference. As the Marine fighters fluttered down to the sea, or staggered back toward Midway, it was clear that the greatest Japanese advantage lay in the Zero itself. *The Marine pilots were astonished. Like most Americans, they had been taught to think of the Japanese as an imitative people who couldn't do much on their own. Now here was a fighter that could outclimb, outrun, outmaneuver any plane the U.S. had. *If it was also highly vulnerable, they rarely had a good enough shot at it to find out. Even the F4Fs were completely outclassed, and the ancient Buffaloes--as Lieutenant *Charles Hughes sadly remarked--"looked like they were tied to a string while the Zeros made passes at them.*"



Losses appear difficult to assess in both cases but it seems the results in the two instances were fairly similar against both IJN VF and VTB: At Ceylon, IJN reports 3 VF and 2VTB lost (Shores et al.) while at Midway it looks like 2 VF, and perhaps 3 or 4 VTB (2 Hiryu and 1 Soryu) destroyed with one VTB ditching on return to its carrier dues to damage or fuel loss/starvation. (Cressman)

Lundstrom: (for just Hiryu) 3 VTB lost in a2a combat with one ditched in return.

Prange cites 2 VF 3 VTB

Japanese Story cites: 

Kaga: 2 VF (1 vs a-2-a 1 vs AA), 1 VB (probably vs AA?)
Akagi: 1 VF (1 vs a2a)
Hiryu: 4 VTB (2 vs a-2-a 2 vs AA), 1 VTB 
Soryu: 1 VTB (1 vs a-2-a)

Fuchida lists: 3 VTB, 2 VF 1VB 

I'd guess however accurate the type-loss accounting, the numbers are too small in this instance to draw a conclusion. However, The surviving pilots and aircraft might be another measure or performance. In that case, I suspect, based on Shores et al. that more of the RAF a/c survived were fit to fly, although perhaps by a small margin. Seems perhaps 3 or 4 Hurricanes survived the encounter with no or minor damage and might be immediately operational. Careful accounting shows 10 of 16 Hurricanes forced down, with 2 crashed landed at the airfield, but with 14 of the 16 pilots surviving the action. That appears to be the biggest difference in the two actions.

I think by this point, 6 months into the war, with reports on the A6M coming in from action in China, the PI, SE Asia, Coral Sea and particularly Australia, Lord's statement seems just a bit of dramatic hyperbole. Not to diminish the existence of an ethnic bias but I would expect the magnitude of the difference to be most shocking to the rookies such as Hughes. Armistead's, Humbard's and particularly White's critiques seem a bit more analytic, while Carl doesn't make a comparison. Assuming the reports had been shared with the pilots, I would expect their reaction to the aerial fight was more like, "SOB, those reports on the '0' weren't exaggerating."


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## oldcrowcv63 (Oct 21, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> Do you have a source for this?
> 
> while _max_ capacity did change the _normal_ fuel capacity did not. The old wing tanks contained in the box spar held 160 gallons and could not be made self sealing to the standard the USN wanted. The right tank had two outlets, the higher one was the 'normal' outlet and when used left about 25 gallons in the tank which was accessed by switching to the 'reserve' setting on the fuel tank selector. The left tank had one fuel for the full capacity of the tank. 3 new protected tanks totaling 80 gallons were added. The left tank filler was sealed off and stenciled " Not to be filled except on the special authority of Commanding Officer". Right tank with it's reserve capacity was kept for a 'normal' fuel capacity that stayed the same. Since the box spar and ribs provided the walls, top and bottom of the wing tanks the only weight saving in getting rid of them would have been the fuel filler/s, outlets and drains, and fuel piping to the fuel selector valve. The F2A-3 could be fitted with a CO2 system to purge the wing tanks of gas fumes after the fuel was used for less of a fire hazard.
> 
> ...



Short Round, in 1993, before his passing, I spoke to Tom Cheek by telephone about the F2A-3 and he claimed the additional fuel capacity was installed to allow CAP to perform long range radar directed intercepts. I don't have a written source for this other than his words and the anecdote he related that "Rock Happy" naval aviators ashore at PH would joke about using the F2A-3 prodigious range to fly back to the mainland. a distance of about 2,000 miles and probably beyond the range of an F2A-3 even with a full bag unless of course winds were very favorable.

On the other hand, Jim Mass states that CAP pilots reported flying 6 hour duration patrols. But that the advent of radar made the excess range unnecessary which of course seems to conflict with Cheek's rationale to some extent.


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## buffnut453 (Oct 21, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> If he was "simply blaming the aircraft," or "just blaming the tool," I think I'd be inclined to agree with you.



The excerpt you quoted fails to mention tactical employment, those awful Division formations, the inexperience of many USMC fighters etc etc. Lord seemingly doesn't accept that IJNAF fighter pilots were highly skilled. That doesn't leave much room for blame other than pointing at the aircraft itself.

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## oldcrowcv63 (Oct 21, 2014)

Another difference in the two action, is noteworthy by its absence in the Shores postmortem of the RAF action. Apparently, no surviving RAF pilot is, at least as reported by Shores, to have landed and called for the retirement of the Hurricane due to the superiority of the '0'. Of the senior surviving pilots, Armistead and Humbard commented on the superiority of the A6M with over-estimates of its performance, but did not call for the F2A-3's retirement. White similarly complained about the disparity between the F2A's and A6M's performance but also bitterly concluded that the F2A-3 did not belong in combat. Carl of course flew a Wildcat.


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## buffnut453 (Oct 21, 2014)

And the more vitriolic the statement, the more eye-catching it becomes for historians who want to trot out a story. IIRC one of the VMF-221 pilots declared that neither the F2A nor the F4F were suitable for combat against the A6M.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Oct 21, 2014)

buffnut453 said:


> And the more vitriolic the statement, the more eye-catching it becomes for historians who want to trot out a story. IIRC one of the VMF-221 pilots declared that neither the F2A nor the F4F were suitable for combat against the A6M.



Two pilots, Phillips and Musselman, did not fly that day but rather *were ground-based witnesses*. Their comments implied the performance of both F4F F2A were equally unsuited to combat the A6M. Corry, in an F4F, did comment that the performance of neither USMC fighter could compare to that of the Zero. The "tied-to-a-string" comment was made by Hughes who was also a grounded observer at the time.


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## RCAFson (Oct 21, 2014)

Here's the standard Aircraft Characteristics charts for the F4F-3 and F2A-3:

http://www.alternatewars.com/SAC/F4F-3_Wildcat_(Land)_PD_-_14_August_1942.pdf

http://www.alternatewars.com/SAC/F2A-3_Buffalo_PD_-_1_December_1942.pdf

as I've stated in the past, I have a hard time believing some these performance stats, because testing on actual aircraft showed somewhat lower figures for the F4F-3 and -4.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 21, 2014)

Please remember the data cards/sheets are for 59 degrees F at standard air pressure at sea level. 

Higher temperatures are going to cause a loss of power in the engine and a loss of lift from the wing. There is a reason that 'hot and high' take-offs are a lot longer than 'standard' or book. Some planes/engines handle it a bit better than others. 

This is in addition to whatever 'fudging' may have been going on but fudging isn't going to be too bad as each airplane is flown before delivery and any plane that fails to meet contract speed or climb (by around 3% on some contracts) is either rejected for rework or accepted with a penalty payment taken out of the price of the plane for final accounting of the contract. If too many planes perform poorly the company is selling them below cost.

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## VBF-13 (Oct 21, 2014)

buffnut453 said:


> The excerpt you quoted fails to mention tactical employment, those awful Division formations, the inexperience of many USMC fighters etc etc. Lord seemingly doesn't accept that IJNAF fighter pilots were highly skilled. That doesn't leave much room for blame other than pointing at the aircraft itself.


You're not giving this guy a fair shake. Here's the first sentence of that paragraph, again: "But it wasn't deception, skill or even numbers that made the big difference." He mentioned what you're saying he didn't mention, that's what that first sentence was in reference to, he just covered that.

I guess this is where I say, you're jumping to conclusions; read the book.


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## VBF-13 (Oct 21, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Not to diminish the existence of an ethnic bias but I would expect the magnitude of the difference to be most shocking to the rookies such as Hughes. Armistead's, Humbard's and particularly White's critiques seem a bit more analytic, while Carl doesn't make a comparison. Assuming the reports had been shared with the pilots, I would expect their reaction to the aerial fight was more like, "SOB, those reports on the '0' weren't exaggerating."


On that "ethnic bias," Crow, if you're referring to this, "Like most Americans, they had been taught to think of the Japanese as an imitative people who couldn't do much on their own," let me suggest, that was no ethnic bias, but based on how the Japanese behaved, right down to the Emperor's coat, tails, and top hat. It was a reference to the Westernization. And, I'll agree, once the Americans got going, we handled the Zeros better, our tactics overcoming the shortcomings of our fighter aircraft.

Then we built the Hellcat. Game over...


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## oldcrowcv63 (Oct 22, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> On that "ethnic bias," Crow, if you're referring to this, "Like most Americans, they had been taught to think of the Japanese as an imitative people who couldn't do much on their own," let me suggest, that was no ethnic bias, but based on how the Japanese behaved, right down to the Emperor's coat, tails, and top hat. It was a reference to the Westernization. And, I'll agree, once the Americans got going, we handled the Zeros better, our tactics overcoming the shortcomings of our fighter aircraft.
> 
> Then we built the Hellcat. Game over...



Sorry if I wasn't clear. I didn't mean Lord was demonstrating an ethnic bias. From what I have read, Lord was far too generous a man to label a people or culture with a broad brush. I meant that he was describing the mindset of period-contemporary US citizens, who were generally ignorant of the esoteric technological minutiae clearly demonstrating that, as individuals, they could be every bit as creative as people of any other culture. 

With respect to his book: Incredible Victory. It was the first book I read on the subject and remained one of my favorites for a very long time. I didn't then make the distinction between a well-researched academic treatise and the work of an avocational historian. Lord was exemplar of the latter while I believe Lundstrom to be one of the former. To be fair, this subject is noteworthy for the instances of flawed academic research or first person accounts with which Lord compares VERY favorably. I'd list Morrison, Bates, Tuleja, and Fuchida as examples of seemingly well-researched but seriously flawed histories and, to perhaps, a lesser degree, even Prange. I suspect, not having Lord's book at hand, some of the academics (and probably Fuchida) were sources for Lord's own research on the topic. If you have a copy and can check, I'd like to know.

Obviously just my opinion and own prejudice.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Oct 22, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> You're not giving this guy a fair shake. Here's the first sentence of that paragraph, again: "But it wasn't deception, skill or even numbers that made the big difference." He mentioned what you're saying he didn't mention, that's what that first sentence was in reference to, he just covered that.
> 
> I guess this is where I say, you're jumping to conclusions; read the book.



It seems to me that Lord is using a well turned phrase that, to me at least, drastically oversimplifies the reality to make the point that the A6M was a phenomenal fighter airplane for its time that utterly shocked and struck fear in allied pilots at this stage of the war. Writing after the war, he may have felt that the very success of the Hellcat you cite and its antecedent Corsair had obscured that shock in the minds of his readership. 

Moreover, it is likely that skill (experience and tactics) and numbers would have brought greater success than enjoyed by the Midway marine pilots as indeed demonstrated at Guadalcanal and during the carrier battles of 1942. 

I have the general impression that the pilots least relatively impressed by the appearance of the A6M were those generally more experienced pilots of the USN during the first two carrier battles of the war. Where you see the USN pilots really get up in arms is when they are forced to trade their F4F-3s for poorer performing F4F-4's. Probably seen as a step backward from a disadvantageous position (but perhaps temporarily tolerable) to an even worse intolerable state of affairs.


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## VBF-13 (Oct 22, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Sorry if I wasn't clear. I didn't mean Lord was demonstrating an ethnic bias. From what I have read, Lord was far too generous a man to label a people or culture with a broad brush. I meant that he was describing the mindset of period-contemporary US citizens, who were generally ignorant of the esoteric technological minutiae clearly demonstrating that, as individuals, they could be every bit as creative as people of any other culture.


Crow, the Americans didn't have a monopoly on ignorance. The Japanese had ignorant ideas, too, of the Americans. Both were as erroneous. 



oldcrowcv63 said:


> respect to his book: Incredible Victory. It was the first book I read on the subject and remained one of my favorites for a very long time. I didn't then make the distinction between a well-researched academic treatise and the work of an avocational historian. Lord was exemplar of the latter while I believe Lundstrom to be one of the former. To be fair, this subject is noteworthy for the instances of flawed academic research or first person accounts with which Lord compares VERY favorably. I'd list Morrison, Bates, Tuleja, and Fuchida as examples of seemingly well-researched but seriously flawed histories and, to perhaps, a lesser degree, even Prange. I suspect, not having Lord's book at hand, some of the academics (and probably Fuchida) were sources for Lord's own research on the topic. If you have a copy and can check, I'd like to know.
> 
> Obviously just my opinion and own prejudice.


I sat for many hours with pilots in my Dad's club. How can I verify what they said? Does that mean it didn't happen? Hardly. 

Lord got a lot of his stuff that way, through interviews of survivors. He also did first-hand, extensive research, in both countries. He didn't lean on "academics," like some schmuck. This was a Princeton history scholar, a Yale Law grad, and lawyer. This was a man of high intellectual accomplishment who knew how to fact-check and who wasn't going to say anything he wasn't sure of. Don't hold his style of writing against him. Better still, look him up. This was a David McCullough. You don't look for footnotes in men like those.


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## tomo pauk (Oct 22, 2014)

With respect for the noted authors, all of them can make mistakes. In the acclaimed book 'America's hundred thousand', there is the claim that XP-39 attained 390 mp at 20000 ft, but there is no shred of evidence that supports that. Contrary, the book 'Vee's for victory' provides us with speed graph where such speed would be attained *IF* the XP-39 is cleaned up after NACA recomendations - and that never happened. But then, the Vee's claim that XP-40Q was outfitted with laminar flow wings - what was not the case.
In many books, even from the US authors, we can read that V-1710 lacked supercharger. R.W. Gruenhagen states that DB-601 'featured a supercharger' - others did not?? Same author: Jumo 213, used in the Fw-190, featured a multi-stage supercharger?? Mr. Green stated that late Bf-109Ks were to have two MG-151s under cowlings?
Further, the sentence from 'Incredible victory' (if I'm reading this right): _"But it wasn't deception, skill or even numbers that made the big difference." _ But is was about skill of the IJA pilots, and skill (or lack of it) also provided for numbers, since piecemeal coming to fray of the US fighters meant that IJA fighters have the local numerical superiority.

My point: most of the books need to be read with respect to the author, but also with clear mind at the side of the reader.

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## Shortround6 (Oct 22, 2014)

With all due respect to the men who served, most only know _what they were told at the time._

The fact that they flew plane XXX in combat does NOT mean that they knew how or why it was designed the way it was. The men who knew that were in the design offices of the aircraft factory and in the purchasing agencies or air ministries. 

The men who served are telling their stories to the best of their knowledge, trouble is if some rear area 'bozo' gave them bad information and it was never corrected the fact that the Veteran repeates that information in his story does not make it true. Many P-38 pilots were taught to cruise at high rpm and low boost by the USAAF _in direct contradiction_ of the recommendations of both Lockheed and Allison for example. 

Now who knows better what the cruise procedure should have been? The engine maker? the Airplane maker? 20 year old pilot who got bad information but flew in combat until he rotated home/to another unit _before_ the corrections reached him? 

Same with a lot of other "facts". Ask any cop about how accurate "eye witnesses" are. Or how well they agree.

The stories of the men who were 'there' are interesting and can shed light on many things but please remember that _each_ man's view point is also shaped by his experiences, training, and exact location in a given action. Very few pilots were in a position to 'see' and entire action and many had trouble keeping track of more than a few planes at a time. Range estimations should also be taken with a very large dose of salt. The ranges given in combat reports are what the pilots "believed" them to be. I don't know about other air forces but when the RAF tested pilots in training (and used ground observers and analyzed gun camera footage they found the _average_ pilot was opening fire about 2-3 times further away than he though he was. Instead of opening fire at 300yds they were shooting at the target sleeves at 500-800 yds. This is _without_ the adrenaline of actual combat and with a gun sight that could be set for range (adjust range scale for expected wingspan of target.) 

The men are not intentionally lying. They are telling the story as accurately as they can. Unfortunately it may not be 100% accurate.

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## VBF-13 (Oct 22, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Further, the sentence from 'Incredible victory' (if I'm reading this right): _"But it wasn't deception, skill or even numbers that made the big difference." _ But is was about skill of the IJA pilots, and skill (or lack of it) also provided for numbers, since piecemeal coming to fray of the US fighters meant that IJA fighters have the local numerical superiority.
> 
> My point: most of the books need to be read with respect to the author, but also with clear mind at the side of the reader.


Tomo, on "Incredible Victory," I'm sure you know, that's an opinion by that author. History may bear out your opinion better. Nobody can really say. We all understand the factors that go into the analysis. That's but a start. What weights do we assign to those factors? There's our issue. 

To Lord, and his evidence, that aircraft ruled the day. That's all that paragraph, really, was saying.

OK, on your point. You bet. Well said.


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## VBF-13 (Oct 23, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> With all due respect to the men who served, most only know _what they were told at the time._
> 
> The fact that they flew plane XXX in combat does NOT mean that they knew how or why it was designed the way it was. The men who knew that were in the design offices of the aircraft factory and in the purchasing agencies or air ministries.
> 
> ...


You're impeaching the credibility of dead men, not on their sincerity, as you say, but on their perception. These are fact-witnesses who are unavailable to respond. Let's appreciate that. Let's let the totality of the facts, their testimony included, tell us the story.


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## buffnut453 (Oct 23, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> You don't look for footnotes in men like those.



'Fraid I do. I want to know the source of a statement and its veracity: is it documentary, personal recollection or the author's opinion and does that one piece of evidence jive with all the other corpus of data on the topic. I wish I had a buck for every piece of third-hand misinformation that's been trotted out repeatedly by even highly-respected authors and historians. And please understand I'm not pointing fingers - having been published myself, I understand the changes that can occur between draft and book. Nobody's perfect but, equally, nobody should be beyond question and even accepted knowledge needs to be reviewed when the spotlight of new data or plausible reinterpretation are shone on the subject.

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## Shortround6 (Oct 23, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> You're impeaching the credibility of dead men, not on their sincerity, as you say, but on their perception. These are fact-witnesses who are unavailable to respond. Let's appreciate that. Let's let the totality of the facts, their testimony included, tell us the story.




Try a little 'experiment'. Go ask a bunch of veterans (from any war, or even peace time service) about the .45 automatic pistol. See what kind of stories you get about it's effectiveness, or about it's accuracy.
Don't confront them, or tell them they are wrong. Just let them talk.


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## gjs238 (Oct 23, 2014)

I find it interesting how/why the M1911 pistol was adopted - then "retired" - and now being used again:

From Wikipedia:
_American units fighting Moro guerrillas during the Philippine-American War using the then-standard Colt M1892 revolver, in .38 Long Colt, found it to be unsuitable for the rigors of jungle warfare, particularly in terms of stopping power, as the Moros had very high battle morale and frequently used drugs to inhibit the sensation of pain.[10] The U.S. Army briefly reverted to using the M1873 single-action revolver in .45 Colt caliber, which had been standard during the late 19th century; the heavier bullet was found to be more effective against charging tribesmen.[11]_


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## FLYBOYJ (Oct 23, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> With all due respect to the men who served, most only know _what they were told at the time._
> 
> The fact that they flew plane XXX in combat does NOT mean that they knew how or why it was designed the way it was. The men who knew that were in the design offices of the aircraft factory and in the purchasing agencies or air ministries.
> 
> ...





VBF-13 said:


> You're impeaching the credibility of dead men, not on their sincerity, as you say, but on their perception. These are fact-witnesses who are unavailable to respond. Let's appreciate that. Let's let the totality of the facts, their testimony included, tell us the story.



How many years did some members of the AVG say they fought aganst the Zero when in fact it was known Zeros weren't anywhere near the area of China where the AVG operated??? No disrespect to their stories, but facts are facts.

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## gjs238 (Oct 23, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> In many books, even from the US authors, we can read that V-1710 lacked supercharger.





FLYBOYJ said:


> How many years did some members of the AVG say they fought aganst the Zero when in fact it was known Zeros weren't anywhere near the area of China where the AVG operated??? No disrespect to their stories, but facts are facts.



Some of this, but of course not all, is from terminology/jargon in use at the time.
Today every kid has heard of a turbocharger, so we sometimes get confused because back in the day turbosuperchargers were often referred to simply as a supercharger.

I suspect the same was happening with the term "Zero."
Today we use the term precisely, but back in the day a Zero could me most any Japanese fighter.

I'm pretty sure we've discussed this on other threads.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 23, 2014)

FLYBOYJ said:


> How many years did some members of the AVG say they fought aganst the Zero when in fact it was known Zeros weren't anywhere near the area of China where the AVG operated??? No disrespect to their stories, but facts are facts.




You can also go through British pilot combat reports of 1940 and find they shot down more He 113s (He 100) than the Germans ever built, and since none of them were used by a combat unit in France or the low countries?????


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## Shortround6 (Oct 23, 2014)

gjs238 said:


> I find it interesting how/why the M1911 pistol was adopted - then "retired" - and now being used again:



For a real confusion of "stories" vs facts look at the adoption of the sub-sonic 9mm load by a number of police departments. 
They got rid of .38 specials firing .357in dia 158 grain bullets at around 800-850fps from revolvers and after several gyrations of guns/cartridges and bullets _somehow_ decided that a 9mm (.355in dia) 147 grain bullet with a MV of 950fps was gods gift to police departments. _After all it was the *choice* of a number of *special forces* units, it *must* be good???_. 

The special forces were using it in silenced submachine guns/carbines to get rid of the 'crack' of the bullet upon firing. Not because it was all that great a "man stopper". They used it their pistols so as to have one type of 9mm ammo in the unit. Some of the pistols may have had suppressors too. A need the police did NOT have. 
It took a while but the sub-sonic 147 grain 9mm load has pretty much gone the way of the Dodo for police use. 

A case where a _little_ bit of _knowledge_ was a dangerous thing. Looking for a 'better' cartridge for your police department? Don't bother to do any of your own testing or even read a bunch of technical reports, just use what "Delta Force" (or clone/s) are using.


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## gjs238 (Oct 23, 2014)

Yes, and what of the Nazi UFO sightings?

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## FLYBOYJ (Oct 23, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> You can also go through British pilot combat reports of 1940 and find they shot down more He 113s (He 100) than the Germans ever built, and since none of them were used by a combat unit in France or the low countries?????



Or the Me 209s that Bob Johnson shot down...

Fold3 Viewer


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## VBF-13 (Oct 24, 2014)

gjs238 said:


> Today we use the term precisely, but back in the day a Zero could me most any Japanese fighter.


"Meatballs." Ever hear that one? Guaranteed political correctness keeps that one out of Wikipedia.


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## gjs238 (Oct 24, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> "Meatballs." Ever hear that one? Guaranteed political correctness keeps that one out of Wikipedia.



Yes, growing up watching the television series Baa Baa Black Sheep (later syndicated as Black Sheep Squadron).

PS: OK, you can stop laughing now


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## Timppa (Oct 24, 2014)

gjs238 said:


> From Wiki:
> 
> The poor performance of the Buffalo at Midway later prompted Finnish Air Force ace Hans Wind to develop new combat tactics for the FAF Brewster, which were later used with remarkable success in 1942 and 1943 against the Soviet Air Force during the Continuation War



This is total baloney, of course.

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## VBF-13 (Oct 24, 2014)

gjs238 said:


> Yes, growing up watching the television series Baa Baa Black Sheep (later syndicated as Black Sheep Squadron).
> 
> PS: OK, you can stop laughing now


I'm not laughing, I heard it in a Robert Mitchum movie.

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## oldcrowcv63 (Oct 25, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> Crow, the Americans didn't have a monopoly on ignorance. The Japanese had ignorant ideas, too, of the Americans. Both were as erroneous.



No doubt true, but we were discussing the specific Lord text regarding the response of the USMC pilots, not whether there was mutual cultural ignorance. 



VBF-13 said:


> I sat for many hours with pilots in my Dad's club. How can I verify what they said? Does that mean it didn't happen? Hardly.



First person accounts are certainly a good starting source of information on any event historic or otherwise but must be processed and integrated with other eye- witness accounts or contemporary records to create a coherent whole picture of what most probably happened; certainty being ever elusive. Human perceptions are notoriously flawed and the magnitude of the flaws are, at least in part, a complex function of the experience and reliability of the witness weighted by the stress or task-load the witness may be under during the event. 



VBF-13 said:


> Lord got a lot of his stuff that way, through interviews of survivors. He also did first-hand, extensive research, in both countries. He didn't lean on "*academics*," like some schmuck. This was a Princeton history scholar, a Yale Law grad, and lawyer. This was a man of high intellectual accomplishment who *knew how to fact-check *and who wasn't going to *say anything he wasn't sure of*. Don't hold his style of writing against him. Better still, look him up. This was a David McCullough. You don't look for footnotes in men like those.



Words have specific meaning: Scholar, Avocational are two we have each used here:

Definition of ‘scholar’: Two most relevant definitions according to: 
Scholar - Definition and More from the Free Merriam-Webster Dictionary

1.	a person who attends a school or studies under a teacher
2.	a person who has done advanced study in a special field
3.	a learned person

According to the Oxford Dictionary: 
scholar: definition of scholar in Oxford dictionary (American English) (US)

1. A specialist in a particular branch of study, especially the humanities; a distinguished academic:

archaic usage listed in both dictionaries are more general in scope, probably because in times past, higher education was more rare in the population and the few that could read or attended any level of schooling were probably considered ‘scholars’.

However vague the meaning in common usage, a _scholar_ in this sense, is either an academic (i.e. possessing an earned Ph.D.-holding Professor or Museum curator or acknowledged expert based upon a collected body of work validating the person as a specialist in a particular field of study. 

Avocation: according to: 

Avocation - Definition and More from the Free Merriam-Webster Dictionary

1. A subordinate occupation pursued in addition to one's vocation especially for enjoyment.

avocation: definition of avocation in Oxford dictionary (American English) (US)

A hobby or minor occupation.

Lord graduated from Princeton and then as you have pointed out, he attended Law School at Yale and apparently became for an unknown period, a lawyer. He also worked for a period as a copywriter for an ad agency. His vocation was the law and apparently some period in advertising, his avocation was history. That doesn’t diminish the quality of his writing or his research. 

Lord graduated with a Bachelor’s degree in history in 1939. That, in and of itself, does not make one a ‘history scholar’ except in the archaic sense of being studious or more generally a serious student. Making it a phrase “history scholar” changes the word’s meaning to the former specific definition. "_a person who has done advanced study in a special field_" Like some other notable authors, Lord may have done a senior project creating an edited commentary of Arthur Fremantle's diary, which formed the basis for his first published work in 1954. Whatever was the source he was working in an ad agency when it was published.

What he did with his avocational interests after he graduated from Princeton earned him the well deserved accolade of scholar but he earned it as avocational historian. He may have learned the obvious rigor of his research from some excellent teachers. I don't know. But the quality of his research and the writing speak for itself.  Day of Infamy is a masterpiece, like Incredible Victory and Night to Remember.

Lord like McCullugh (an English literature major as an undergraduate), successfully turned an avocational interest into a vocation. 

This is not uncommon in many fields of inquiry, particularly the humanities. Avocational interests blossom and the so-called amateur often makes significant contributions to disciplines outside of their vocational pursuits. This occurs frequently in the arts and also the sciences, particularly astronomy and archaeology to name just two fields that have greatly benefited by the work of dedicated amateurs. I was not maligning Lord when I referred to him as "_avocational_" merely describing the fact that he came to his life’s work through a different door. Lundstrom is a museum curator, Bill Bartsch is a professor of history. Harold L. Buell, an SBD and SB2C pilot in WW2, was a Ph.D. and Professor of History at Florida State. Thadeus Tuleja was apparently a professor of history. 

I believe the first priority of both Lord and McCullough is the story they are telling which is not to say they didn't do rigorous research. I expect Lord was happy to incorporate the versions of certain "_academics_" with whom he interacted: most of all, the widely accepted version of Midway history provided by Samuel E. Morison. Unfortunately, as has been related here on numerous occasions, that source is very flawed and Lord's story reflects those flaws. I always check the sources of any historical treatise especially when one raises obvious but unanswered questions about events being addressed as did Lord's book. In my recollection, Tuleja, an academic historian's version of Midway is one of the most flawed of all, but he at least recognized and identified the historical inaccuracies or inconsistencies in prior accounts and attempted to address them.

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## gjs238 (Oct 25, 2014)

gjs238 said:


> From Wiki:
> 
> _The poor performance of the Buffalo at Midway later prompted Finnish Air Force ace Hans Wind to develop new combat tactics for the FAF Brewster, which were later used with remarkable success in 1942 and 1943 against the Soviet Air Force during the Continuation War.[47] Wind's combat tactics, which emphasized diving speed and zoom climbs, were much the same as Claire Chennault's advice for employing the Curtiss P-40B against the A6M Zero in Burma and China.[47] Chennault's report on the Zero and air combat reached Washington in 1941, where it was disseminated to aviation forces of the U.S. Army and Navy.[48] This information, along with the development of two-plane mutual defensive formations and tactics, were incorporated into U.S. and Marine Corps air combat training doctrine by some prescient U.S. commanders, including Lieutenant Commander "Jimmy" Thach. The Thach Weave was developed for use by Wildcat pilots against the Zero, and was later adopted by other Wildcat squadrons in the Pacific.[48]_





buffnut453 said:


> I don't think the performance of the Buffalo at Midway had any impact on Finnish tactics. *The cited link makes no such claim, merely observing that Soviet pilots used poor tactics and that the Finns used three-dimensional tactics that successfully countered the flat circles adopted by their adversary.* How would the Finns get any knowledge of the tactics employed by the USMC pilots at Midway? The combat reports would be classified and I just don't see that data being shared. Even if it was, the Finns were flying the lighter, more manoeuverable F2A-1 which offered more tactical options than the sluggish -3 used by the USMC. 'Fraid this is a case of Wiki barking up completely the wrong tree.



Good find.
I just removed that bit from the Wikipedia article.


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## Juha (Oct 25, 2014)

Oh no gjs
that article of Wiki seems to be complete BS, LLv 24 used boom and zoom from the beginning of the Continuation War (25 June 41 - 4 Sept 44) against I-153s but tried to lure MiG-3s to low-level turning combats, it was simply to use the advantages of one's own plane against the weaknesses of the enemy's plane. The tactics were developed in LLv 24 before Wind arrived there as a green junior officer in Aug 41. What Wind did later was that he wrote a short "training manual" for a fighter pilot course after consulting with other experienced pilots in his unit.

Juha

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## VBF-13 (Oct 29, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> No doubt true, but we were discussing the specific Lord text regarding the response of the USMC pilots, not whether there was mutual cultural ignorance.
> 
> First person accounts are certainly a good starting source of information on any event historic or otherwise but must be processed and integrated with other eye- witness accounts or contemporary records to create a coherent whole picture of what most probably happened; certainty being ever elusive. Human perceptions are notoriously flawed and the magnitude of the flaws are, at least in part, a complex function of the experience and reliability of the witness weighted by the stress or task-load the witness may be under during the event.
> 
> ...


Crow, I can't address all the issues in this, now get serious. This is easy. It doesn't turn on sweeping condemnations. Show us your evidence. That's all you have to do. Simply pick out a statement of this author and show us your evidence he's off-base. This is typically where a "helper" comes in. Come on in, I don't care who I hear it from. Just one statement, that's all. Pick it out, and come forward with your countervailing evidence. Let's see it. If you think you can.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 4, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> Crow, I can't address all the issues in this, now *get serious*. This is easy. It doesn't turn on sweeping condemnations. Show us your evidence. That's all you have to do. Simply pick out a statement of this author and show us your evidence he's off-base. This is typically where a "helper" comes in. Come on in, I don't care who I hear it from. Just one statement, that's all. Pick it out, and come forward with your countervailing evidence. Let's see it. If you think you can.



What made you think I wasn't being serious? What sweeping condemnations? If I had made sweeping unfounded condemnations, I expect others besides you would have brought me up short. Evidence of what? Lord's use of flawed accounts?

Let's see? One error would be his parroting of Fuchida and Okiyama's (and Morrison's I believe) numbers of aircraft remaining on Hiryu after launching two strikes on Yorktown. How many does Lord cite? I believe the number is exactly the same as cited in Morrison and Fuchida, all of whom should have known better.

Here are two sources that report pretty much what I have said before: that Lord used flawed sources that he should have questioned. He didn't question them or the motivations of his sources. 

example 1:

Divebombers, Mr. Rico! Zillions of ?em! | Wargame_[space]

"_Both Walter Lord and Gordon Prange conducted a number of interviews with Japanese survivors of the battle (often using intermediaries) and incorporated their views in their excellent histories. But among the sources in translation, the most influential was a memoir by *[eyewitness]* Mitsuo Fuchida (with Masatake Okumiya) published in America as Midway: The Battle that Doomed Japan, the Japanese Navy’s Story…

Alas, as Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully demonstrate in their book Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005) Fuchida had an agenda of his own, which was to suggest just how close the Japanese had come to delivering a coup de grâce against the Americans, and as a result, not everything in his book can be taken at face value. Parshall has charged that “it is doubtful that any one person has had a more deleterious long-term impact on the study of the Pacific War than Mitsuo Fuchida.” (Parshall, “Reflecting on Fuchida, or ‘A Tale of Three Whoppers,'” Naval War College Review 63, no. 2 (Spring 2010) 127-38._"

2. from: Explaining the ?Miracle? at Midway

"Lord’s narrative description of the battle _*incorporated Fuchida and Okumiya’s view *_of the imminent launch of the Japanese strike against the American carrier force and the attack of American dive-bombers happening within minutes of each other.9 Lord’s conclusions would also mirror those of The Battle that Doomed Japan.

If I had a copy of the book and could spend the time, I'd doubtless find plenty of errors in scholarship based, upon sources that come to light in the last half century. Lord himself may not have been a mean spirited person but he listened either first or second hand, to people who were not so generous, yet styled by the navy's establishment as "Great American Naval leaders" who clearly had their own agendas.

Lord's is a great and well written book for its time, but even a great and well written book that stirs the soul can be historically inaccurate.

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## VBF-13 (Nov 6, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> "_Both Walter Lord and Gordon Prange conducted a number of interviews with Japanese survivors of the battle (often using intermediaries) and incorporated their views in their excellent histories. *But among the sources in translation, the most influential was a memoir by [eyewitness] Mitsuo Fuchida (with Masatake Okumiya) published in America as Midway: The Battle that Doomed Japan, the Japanese Navy’s Story*._


_
OK, you're continuing to pile allegations on top of allegations, none of which are supported by facts. You're continuing to be long on allegations and short on facts. Let me illustrate that with just this *second sentence*. Where did this *second sentence*, that allegation, come from? I inquire as it's imminently plain it didn't come from Lord. To wit, neither of these gentlemen are even in Lord's list of contributors. Take a look at that list. Verify that fact for yourself. It's not an allegation. You'll find it in the back of the book.

This is vicarious character assassination, isn't it? Sure it is. It's lumping Lord together with others whose characters are being called into question. Again, show us the evidence, show us the facts, we have good eyesight. You want to discredit someone, that's how I suggest you do it. You don't do it on mere allegations piled on top of mere allegations. 

I'm wanting to be persuaded, Crow, if you can to it. Don't hold it against me I'm not giving you bacon. You got enough bacon._


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 6, 2014)

To be fair to VBF, I have to include the analysis found at the _Battle of Midway Roundtable_. This is a forum consisting of a collection of scholars discussing the battle in some detail. They list Lord's book as ranked number 4 among the source material in their collective Library:

Battle of Midway RoundTable

The following descriptive comment is made there:

"_Its faults are few and minor, and can generally be attributed to the limits of known and unclassified information in 1967._" 

It is worth noting that Shattered Sword is ranked no. 2. Cressman's Glorious Page is number 3. While Layton's And I was there is number 6. Prange is number 8. Lundstrom's First Team is number 7 with the following caveat:

"_The book is essentially devoid of the common errors found in other works. *The only reason it is not higher on the list *is because the Battle of Midway only comprises the last chapter of the book, about 140 pages. Nevertheless, its Midway chapter is widely regarded as one of the most accurate accounts of the battle._"

Perhaps not surprising, I tend to disagree with the ranking because I judge the errors in Lord to be of somewhat greater consequence than they allow. Not a lot greater but enough to drop it by perhaps a few rungs. My guess is that the status it enjoys is at least in part the result of a particularly american bias based upon the quality of Lord's writing and the implicit patriotism it may invoke. 

As an example see: the WSJ review of the roundtable's number 1 ranked Symond's BOM book by Hornfischer. 

Book Review: The Battle of Midway - WSJ

Lord's concluding narrative is quite literally "_set in stone_" in the minds of US citizens regarding the battle and it's outcome.

Apparently the roundtable ranking is at least in part due to reader feedback, so popularity may well play a significant role.

Post script: This exchange has convinced me to procure a copy of Lord's Morison's books (among some others) to reread it in the light of recent revelations (Shattered Sword and Lundstrom in particular)


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 6, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> OK, you're continuing to pile allegations on top of allegations, none of which are supported by facts. You're continuing to be long on allegations and short on facts. Let me illustrate that with just this _*second sentence*_. Where did this _*second sentence*_, that allegation, come from? I inquire as it's imminently plain it didn't come from Lord. To wit, neither of these gentlemen are even in Lord's list of contributors. Take a look at that list. Verify that fact for yourself. It's not an allegation. You'll find it in the back of the book.
> 
> This is vicarious character assassination, isn't it? Sure it is. It's lumping Lord together with others whose characters are being called into question. Again, show us the evidence, show us the facts, we have good eyesight. You want to discredit someone, that's how I suggest you do it. You don't do it on mere allegations piled on top of mere allegations.
> 
> I'm wanting to be persuaded, Crow, if you can to it. Don't hold it against me I'm not giving you bacon. You got enough bacon.



I'll let you know when I receive my copy of the book and have a chance to check his sources as well as his tally of remaining Hiryu a/c just before she is bombed by the USN.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 6, 2014)

Well, many thanks to the OldCrow for providing us with a link to the Japanese document that covers the battle, translated that is: link.

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## VBF-13 (Nov 6, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> To be fair to VBF, I have to include the analysis found at the _Battle of Midway Roundtable_. This is a forum consisting of a collection of scholars discussing the battle in some detail. They list Lord's book as ranked number 4 among the source material in their collective Library:
> 
> Battle of Midway RoundTable
> 
> ...





oldcrowcv63 said:


> I'll let you know when I receive my copy of the book and have a chance to check his sources as well as his tally of remaining Hiryu a/c just before she is bombed by the USN.


Fair enough. Give the accused some due process. 

FWIW, I see where the critics are coming from. Again, I have pretty good eyesight, lol. But I've seen one, I've seen maybe a dozen Wikipedia articles heavily footnoted, too. In certain cases, where possible, I looked up the sources purporting to support the propositions. Would you believe it if I told you they were more hearsay than were the propositions, themselves?

Lord's work, in short, is based on first-person testimony, which is subject to cross-examination on all kinds of levels, not just sincerity. Witnesses testify falsely, for any number of reasons. By all means, when there are inconsistent statements, when there are discrediting facts, whatever, let's lay them out, let's see them. Nobody's version is sacrosanct. That goes for the critics', too. Separate the allegations from the facts. Discredit on facts. Now we're going places.

Let me know where you see Lord is embellishing, missing the boat. Let me see your basis for concluding that. If you must bring in his critics, by all means, that's fine, but bring them in on facts. I'm not interested in their allegations unsupported by facts. 

Finally, there's another bacon in this for you if you can do that, lol. Seriously, as far as I can discern, you're as highly scholastic as are these critics you're relying on, Crow, let's face it. Make the call, yourself. Let's see what issues, if any, you have with Lord. I know you'll give him a fair shake. Just support it by facts.

Then I'll get off your back. Lol.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 6, 2014)

From your post #33 on this thread:

"_You don't look for footnotes in men like those._"

to:



VBF-13 said:


> Lord's work, in short, is based on first-person testimony, which is *subject to cross-examination* on all kinds of levels, not just sincerity. Witnesses testify falsely, for any number of reasons. By all means, when there are inconsistent statements, when there are discrediting facts, whatever, let's lay them out, let's see them. *Nobody's version is sacrosanct.* That goes for the critics', too. Separate the allegations from the facts. Discredit on facts. Now we're going places.



seems like progress to me.

Now to elaborate the "charges" Seems like you are accusing me of repeating unfounded allegation of Lord's use of flawed sources whether they be first person witness (Fuchida Okumiya) or secondary academic (such as Morison). 

It appears you are also accusing me of claiming that Lord "embellishes" the history or "missed the boat" in some way. I can only think of two instances where you might be able to suggest that: In post #32 where I said he used a well turned phrase to emphasize a point at the expense of oversimplification. I don't consider use of a stylistic device to be an "_embellishment_" so I don't consider that something to which I need to respond. 

With regard to Lord's "_missing the boat_," in Post #55 58 I asked for Lord's tally of the Hiryu's air group after the two strikes on Yorktown and in preparation for the third. 

If my memory serves, Lord, like virtually every other historian covering the battle did miss the boat by relying on an inaccurate primary (or less likely, a secondary) source. That source inaccuracy should have been obvious to anyone critically examining the battle but it wasn't corrected until the appearance of Lundstrom's First Team. I may be mistaken and Lord makes no final accounting of the Hiryu Air Group. In that case, I have no current proof beyond what I've already provided that he used any flawed sources, whether primary or secondary. So I'll have to await your report on what he wrote or see for myself when the book arrives. In this case, I don't need a cited reference to know if he got it as wrong as everyone else. It was glaringly apparent from my first reading (circa 1967-70) that all contemporary histories were flawed in this one respect. I vividly recall holding *First Team* in my hand and perusing the book to the pages where I might discover a correct account. And there it was, after more than three decades of quite evident historical inaccuracy: Lundstrom had finally gotten it right. In other words, the proof that he (Lord) used Fuchida and Okumiya is explicit in the text. 

I also think it likely that the critique of Lord, however light, at the Midway Roundtable (or for that matter, although with perhaps a bit less authority the _Naval Aviation News_) website is less likely to be hearsay than Wikipedia. 

reproduced here: 

"_Its faults are few and minor, and can generally be attributed to the limits of known and unclassified information in 1967._"

This strikes me as generally accurate and indicates (to my own satisfaction) his use of at least some of the flawed sources available at the time and most likely they are as others have claimed, Fuchida and Okumiya.

late edit: added "(Lord)" to text for clarification.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 6, 2014)

I do recall one author of a historical treatment of the battle that got it more right than anyone else by listening to the accounts of the SBD pilots attacking the Hiryu the afternoon of June 4. It may have been Lord's Incredible Victory, I simply don't remember. But, if it turns out to be Lord, then his attention to the details provided in eyewitness accounts yielded him an advantage over his contemporaries. We'll see.


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## VBF-13 (Nov 9, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Seems like you are accusing me of repeating unfounded allegation of Lord's use of flawed sources whether they be first person witness (Fuchida Okumiya) or secondary academic (such as Morison).


To repeat, neither are Fuchida nor Okumiya in Lord's list of contributors. As for any reliance on Morisin, that probably came from his critics, as well.



oldcrowcv63 said:


> If my memory serves, Lord, like virtually every other historian covering the battle did miss the boat by relying on an inaccurate primary (or less likely, a secondary) source. That source inaccuracy should have been obvious to anyone critically examining the battle but it wasn't corrected until the appearance of Lundstrom's First Team. I may be mistaken and Lord makes no final accounting of the Hiryu Air Group.


Yes, you are mistaken. Or, if there is reference to that, I didn't see it.



oldcrowcv63 said:


> So I'll have to await your report on what he wrote or see for myself when the book arrives. In this case, I don't need a cited reference to know if he got it as wrong as everyone else. It was glaringly apparent from my first reading (circa 1967-70) that all contemporary histories were flawed in this one respect. I vividly recall holding First Team in my hand and perusing the book to the pages where I might discover a correct account. And there it was, after more than three decades of quite evident historical inaccuracy: Lundstrom had finally gotten it right. In other words, the proof that he (Lord) used Fuchida and Okumiya is explicit in the text.


Again. Find it in the book.


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## VBF-13 (Nov 10, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> "_Its faults are few and minor, and can generally be attributed to the limits of known and unclassified information in 1967._"


Just one more observation. That's still but an unsupported allegation. The authors back then beat their wives, too, as wife-beating was more commonplace back then, especially when the wives deserved it. Ah, I dunno, think I want to see a supporting fact or two or three, before I go off calling those authors wife-beaters...


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## gjs238 (Nov 10, 2014)

Is it still OK to wear a wife beater?


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## buffnut453 (Nov 10, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> Just one more observation. That's still but an unsupported allegation. The authors back then beat their wives, too, as wife-beating was more commonplace back then, especially when the wives deserved it. Ah, I dunno, think I want to see a supporting fact or two or three, before I go off calling those authors wife-beaters...



Am I the only one who thinks this is going a bit far? Oldcrow has said he's waiting for the book to arrive so he can review against more recent treatments. Why don't we just have the patience to let him get the bluddy book, read it and report back? Or am I missing something?

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## VBF-13 (Nov 11, 2014)

buffnut453 said:


> Am I the only one who thinks this is going a bit far? Oldcrow has said he's waiting for the book to arrive so he can review against more recent treatments. Why don't we just have the patience to let him get the bluddy book, read it and report back? Or am I missing something?


A bit too far, or a bit too real for you? I don't know if you happened to have noticed it, but this author, Walter Lord, has been having his good character vicariously smeared in this thread based on hearsay and unsupported allegations in reference to authors there's not one iota of evidence he even relied on as sources. I do want to know Crow's opinion when he reads the book. Wherever you got the idea I'm rushing him, there, search me.


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## buffnut453 (Nov 11, 2014)

VBF13

In fairness, you haven't provided any data to help move the discussion along. Oldcrow asked several times for Lord's count of aircraft on Hiryu and your stock response is "read the book" which he doesn't yet have. Wag more, bark less methinks!

I was the first person in this thread to say that I absolutely want to see sources cited for statements made in historical works...and I absolutely stand by that statement. I don't take anybody's word as gospel in a published item because it's just too easy to conflate fact, opinion and perception. This isn't a slam against Lord or any other author. It's simply a realistic reflection that the conclusions drawn by any published history depend entirely on the sources used. If those sources can't be verified, either through citation or comparison with other data that has been confirmed, then the work must be questioned. I'm afraid that's what historians do...and they should do it because different interpretations can rightly be drawn as new sources emerge. 

To use a specific example of sourcing issues, Martin Caiden's "Ragged, Rugged Warriors" includes a claim, sourced as being from Greg Board, that 21 Sqn RAAF was entirely wiped out in the air when the reality is that only 3 pilots were killed in combat. Now, I'm not comparing Caiden to Lord - to do so would be foolish. I am merely highlighting how even sourced information can prove to be incorrect. If information isn't sourced, the reader has an even harder problem ensuring the veracity of what he/she is being fed. 

This has nothing to do with character assassination. It's merely the need to understand what sources were used to build a story or argument. I want to know explicitly what sources were used, preferably associated with the text as a footnote so I can ensure the provenance of a particular statement. Many sources that we have today were simply not available in 1967, often due to security classification concerns. I would never criticize an author who used the best available sources at a given time. Equally, an older history that has been bypassed by more recent research cannot be beyond criticism as a work of history. 

Cheers,
B-N


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## RCAFson (Nov 11, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> . Seems perhaps 3 or 4 Hurricanes survived the encounter with no or minor damage and might be immediately operational. Careful accounting shows 10 of 16 Hurricanes forced down, with 2 crashed landed at the airfield, but with 14 of the 16 pilots surviving the action. That appears to be the biggest difference in the two actions.



Shores states that six 261 Squadron aircraft, five Hurricane II and one Hurricane I were left serviceable after the attack, or 6 of 16.

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## VBF-13 (Nov 12, 2014)

buffnut453 said:


> VBF13In fairness, you haven't provided any data to help move the discussion along. Oldcrow asked several times for Lord's count of aircraft on Hiryu and your stock response is "read the book" which he doesn't yet have. Wag more, bark less methinks!


To the best of my knowledge, it's not in the book, B-N. That's what I'm trying to tell you guys. If Crow can find it, that's one on me, I missed it.



buffnut453 said:


> I was the first person in this thread to say that I absolutely want to see sources cited for statements made in historical works...and I absolutely stand by that statement. I don't take anybody's word as gospel in a published item because it's just too easy to conflate fact, opinion and perception. This isn't a slam against Lord or any other author. It's simply a realistic reflection that the conclusions drawn by any published history depend entirely on the sources used. If those sources can't be verified, either through citation or comparison with other data that has been confirmed, then the work must be questioned. I'm afraid that's what historians do...and they should do it because different interpretations can rightly be drawn as new sources emerge.
> 
> To use a specific example of sourcing issues, Martin Caiden's "Ragged, Rugged Warriors" includes a claim, sourced as being from Greg Board, that 21 Sqn RAAF was entirely wiped out in the air when the reality is that only 3 pilots were killed in combat. Now, I'm not comparing Caiden to Lord - to do so would be foolish. I am merely highlighting how even sourced information can prove to be incorrect. If information isn't sourced, the reader has an even harder problem ensuring the veracity of what he/she is being fed.
> 
> ...


Ah, I dunno. He's being attacked in large part through his association with others there's no evidence he even relied on, not based on anything he said, specifically. Yeah, but on the rest, count on it, we're on the same page.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 12, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> A bit too far, or a bit too real for you? I don't know if you happened to have noticed it, but this author, Walter Lord, has been *having his good character vicariously smeared in this thread *based on hearsay and unsupported allegations in reference to authors there's not one iota of evidence he even relied on as sources. I do want to know Crow's opinion when he reads the book. Wherever you got the idea I'm rushing him, there, search me.



"_Character viciously smeared_?"

Buffnut Post #23:

“_Lord raises a valid point…_”

My Post #14: “_Lord's statement *seems* just a bit of dramatic hyperbole._”

“seems just a bit” is obviously an opinion and is hardly vicious.

Buffnut Post #23: “_Lord *seemingly* doesn't accept that IJNAF fighter pilots were highly skilled._” 
“Seemingly doesn’t accept…” is (once again) obviously an opinion and is hardly vicious

OldCrow Post #31: “_I didn't mean Lord was demonstrating an ethnic bias. From what I have read, Lord was far too generous a man to label a people or culture with a broad brush.

It (Lord’s) was the first book I read on the subject and remained one of my favorites for a very long time. I didn't then make the distinction between a well-researched academic treatise and the work of an avocational historian. *Lord was exemplar of the latter* while I believe Lundstrom to be one of the former._"

"Exemplar" As in the best of that form of historical account. Vicious?

OldCrow Post #32: “_It *seems] to me *that Lord is using a *well turned phrase* that, to me at least, drastically oversimplifies the reality to make the point_”

That’s an opinion on a stylistic device which contains explicit compliments. 

OldCrow Post #51: "_*I believe* the first priority of both Lord and McCullough is the story they are telling which is *not* to say they didn't do rigorous research._"

Once again, it's clearly an opinion that implicitly salutes the quality of their research. 

Do you want me (us?) to simply agree with everything you or Lord says? 

The Round table's comments seem to me to be more a complimentary note than a vicious smear. 

In fact I don't think any of these could be characterized as vicious but that's just my opinion. 

So far I have received Symonds' book (rated by the forum as their number 1 pick) and I wasn't terribly impressed after reading just one section, which he evidently thought wasn't terribly important enough to receive a more detailed account. I also received Morison's Volume IV. No sign of Lord just yet but I expect it will arrive soon along with the roundtable's own account from first person sources.

*I hope you see this as funny as do I. I just reread VBF's post and realized my smudgy glasses (or alternatively failing eyesight) misread "vicariously" as "vicious". As Roseanne Roseannadanna used to say: "Nevermind…"*


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 12, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> To repeat, neither are Fuchida nor Okumiya in Lord's list of contributors. As for any reliance on Morisin, that probably came from his critics, as well.
> 
> Yes, you are mistaken. Or, if there is reference to that, I didn't see it.
> 
> Again. Find it in the book.



Lord (famous from his brilliant account of the Titanic) presumably has access to an esteemed academic (Morison) who had written what was to the time purported to be the most up to date and 'accurate' quasi-official history of USN operations in WW2 gleaned from many eyewitness sources, as well as the nearly contemporary account of two acknowledged aviation expert eyewitnesses to the battle and chooses not to use them? I will be shocked to the point of being speechless but NOT I repeat, NOT postless. I will report it. 

late edit: Deleted unnecessary comment on numbers based on VBF's post #70


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 12, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> Shores states that six 261 Squadron aircraft, five Hurricane II and one Hurricane I were left serviceable after the attack, or 6 of 16.



I just read the same sentence this morning. Page 429, vol 2 Bloddy Shambles: "10 of 16 Hurricanes forced down, with 2 crashed landed at the airfield" Do the accounting from the text. I came up with "_3 to 4 undamaged and two crash-landed (in pilot accounts) with no or minor damage and might be *immediately* operational._" Shores might have considered a crash-landed (gear up?) aircraft as 'serviceable' if it could be quickly repaired as opposed to *immediately *available. Dunno, but try the detailed accounting based on the text:

Page 420: 

"...of the 16 which had taken off, 8 were shot down, crashed or forced landed. 3 more were damaged. 16 minus 11 is 5 a/c. 

Here is my own accounting from the text:

Dawn Patrol: 
1. Fulford: RTB(?) landed? ok
2. Rawnsly: Crash landed at base, OK
3. Walton: *Shot Down*, KIA

A Flight:
1. Cleaver: RTB landed, OK
2. Lockwood: Crash Landed: OK
3. Martin: Forced Landing: OK
4. Counter: Crash Landed at base, OK
5. Bowie: Shot Down, WIA
6. Pearce: Shot Down, KIA

B Flight: 
1. Marshall: RTB landed OK
2. Warnick: RTB(?) OK
3. Mann: Shot Down, Bailed Out, OK
4. Hall: Damaged, RTB, OK
5. Mayes: Damaged, RTB, WIA
6. Gauthier: Shot Down, KIA

261 CO Lewis: Shot Down on Take Off: WIA

By my count, at most 4 landed undamaged, while 4 more landed (RTB) with some damage. That leaves 8 of the total that took off, or attempted to, that were either shot down, washed or force landed. Seems like there may be some uncertainty in the final tally or serviceable may simply mean some repair was probably necessary.

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## Shinpachi (Nov 12, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Well, many thanks to the OldCrow for providing us with a link to the Japanese document that covers the battle, translated that is: link.



Thanks for the nice find, tomo pauk 

The report says 
"PART IV: ORDERS, REPORTS, ETC.:
War Diary (Abbreviated).
[This part is missing from the document.- Ed.]" 

but the original Japanese text I have says 
"Description for Part IV is omitted as described in the war diary."

I think nuance sounds different.


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## RCAFson (Nov 12, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> I just read the same sentence this morning. Page 429, vol 2 Bloddy Shambles: "10 of 16 Hurricanes forced down, with 2 crashed landed at the airfield" Do the accounting from the text. I came up with "_3 to 4 undamaged and two crash-landed (in pilot accounts) with no or minor damage and might be *immediately* operational._" Shores might have considered a crash-landed (gear up?) aircraft as 'serviceable' if it could be quickly repaired as opposed to *immediately *available. Dunno, but try the detailed accounting based on the text:
> 
> Page 420:
> 
> ...



I got so interested in this that I purchased and downloaded 261 Squadron's Operations Record Book. 6 Hurricanes were serviceable after the attack, but two of these aircraft were spares (one spare was a Hurricane 1). Warnick's aircraft went u/s from a glycol leak, not from enemy action.

Using full overboost at low altitude, Cleaver was able, by hard rudder turns, to evade and slowly pull away from 4 pursuing Zeros after 40 miles, who nonetheless, were able to put 20 mg rounds into his fuselage.

Fulford got into a climbing match with 6 Zeros from about 15000 to 22000ft when he decided that they were slowly catching up. He dived away vertically and recorded his IAS as 420mph at pull out of his dive (7000ft).

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## RCAFson (Nov 12, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Well, many thanks to the OldCrow for providing us with a link to the Japanese document that covers the battle, translated that is: link.



From the above:



> The enemy apparently anticipated our attack and had their attack planes and flying boats take off. They also concentrated about 50 fighters (all Grummans), and intercepted our first attack wave at a point approximately 30 miles short of our target. When we subjected these to fierce counterattacks, however, they were put on the defensive and engaged, for the most part, in evasive maneuvers. Our ship-based attack planes and bombers suffered no casualties from enemy interceptors while the greater part of their fighters were brought down by us. Results we obtained were 41 enemy ship-based fighters, 1 ship-based bomber and 1 float recco shot down. *We lost 4 planes from the exceedingly hot enemy AA fire, so our total losses including 2 which were scuttled during air engagements, were 6 planes.*


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## slaterat (Nov 13, 2014)

Hello to everyone. I dug up some notes on this topic I wrote down some time ago. My sources for the actions at Ceylon are mostly from "Bloody Shambles" and Terrence Kelly's "Hurricane Over the Jungle". 

At the first action over Ceylon at Columbo you have 6 Fulmars of the FAA, 8 Hurricane IIbs and 5 MKIs of 258 sqn and 21 Hurricane IIbs of 30 sqn. Many sources quote this as the total intercept force but that number is misleading. As there was a lack of radar warning not all of the force was able to launch. Bloody Shambles describes four of the 6 Fulmars as being shoot down on take off. One hurricane ,Cartwrights,is also shot down on take off and another one is described as being prevented from taking off from a bomb blast. However published combat results account for only for 12 hurricanes in action from 30 sqn. Whalen,Davidson, Wagner and Davies all rtb. Allison and MacDonald are shoot down but survive and Ovens, Geffene, Brown, Paxton and Caswell are all kia. It would seem perhaps ,that the other 7 hurricanes of 30 sqn werewere unservicable or probably stuck on the ground as a result of the 5 or 6 aircraft shoot down on the airfield. Bloody Shambles states that 30 sqn had 7 servicable aircraft available after the raid which would mean there were at least 3 unused hurricanes left on the ground assuming that all 4 Hurricanes that rtb'd were immediatly serviceable, or if they weren't then the 7 servicable aircraft would be the ones that were never launched.
258 sqn launches all of its hurricanes 9 mk IIs and 5 clapped out mkIs. They launch from the racetrack and are able to get airborne and make a co alt attack on the bomber force but are then set upon by the escorting zeros coming from an altitude advantage. They attack the bombers as long asthey can but lose 7 hurricanes . Brown,Nicholls, Sharp, Cambell/White, Milnes, Gavin, and Morehouse all rtb . Fletcher and Peacock are shot down but survive and Lockert, McFadden, Tremlett, Neill, and Thain are all kia. Terence Kelly notes in "Hurricanes Over the Jungle" that all of the 258 pilots that had gained combat experience against the Japanese with the squadron in Sumatra and Java survived this action.


In summary in the action at Columbo there are

An airborne intercepting force of( not counting aircraft shot down on take off)
26 hurricanes 2 Fulmars 
losses 14 loss rate 54%
kills 7 sorties per kill 4


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## RCAFson (Nov 13, 2014)

After the April 1942 combats, Somerville signalled the Admiralty asking for more Sea Hurricane IIs, and he stated that they were considered superior to the Zero. We now know that there was a rough parity between the Hurricane II and A6M-2-21 but this certainly wasn't the opinion of the USN in regards to the Zero and F2A or F4F.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 13, 2014)

Maybe we should not compare one opinion (Zero 21 vs. F2A) vs. second opinion (Zero 21 vs. what subtype of F4F?) vs. a modern day knowledge (Zero 21 vs. Sea Hurricane)?


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 14, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> After the April 1942 combats, Somerville signalled the Admiralty asking for more Sea Hurricane IIs, and he stated that they were considered superior to the Zero. We now know that there was a rough parity between the Hurricane II and A6M-2-21 but this certainly wasn't the opinion of the USN in regards to the Zero and F2A or F4F.



Been trying to find information on the Sea Hurricane II. Can you point me to any websites or published descriptions you'd recommend? I've got Eric Brown's Wings of the Navy with a description of the SH IIC. 

Finally got back from travel and found a copy of Lord's IV waiting for me. I immediately went to the List of contributors (page 309). Indeed, no sign of Fuchida. Then I turned to the pages describing the Hiryu's surviving air wing (page 232) and found the tabulation I was seeking:

6 VF, 5VB and 4VT survived on Hiryu… basically Fuchida's numbers; which are wrong. In fact, he (Lord) suggests the remaining Zeroes weren't available for the follow up third strike because they had to remain on CAP… VERY Wrong and, as before, follows Fuchida's account. 

So with that confirmation in hand, I happened to accidentally open the book to the acknowledgments page (301): Abouth half way down page 302 Lord writes:

"_On the Japanese side, the traditional authority has long been Mitsuo Fichida and Masatake Okumiya's Midway- the battle that Doopmed Japan. This remains an indispensable work...._"

I was actually hoping that VBF was on to something. Hoping that Lord put two and two together: That he recognized from SBD accounts of the numbers of zeroes reported by the USN VB striking Hiryu and realized that much of the large morning CAP would have been available and operating from the Hiryu. The Hiryu was well defended by a stronger CAP than Yorktown had thrown against the VB force attacking it. Hiryu was as well defended as it could be without RADAR and an FDO, and their were no USN VT to "distract" the IJN CAP. Yet, Hiryu was damaged beyond salvage.

Late edits to clarify where the text was found and to clarify whether it was Lord's or Fuchida's contribution regarding Hiryu CAP assignment.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 15, 2014)

And I made sure my glasses were clean before I read the passages!!


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## tomo pauk (Nov 15, 2014)

You already have the bacon....


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 15, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> You already have the bacon....



No Extra Bacon? Bummer! How about donations for the expansion of my Midway library? (Still one book that has not yet arrived)


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 15, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> From the above:



Symonds Book "Midway" states that 6 IJN aircraft were destroyed by Midway's VMF CAP. He mentions no losses to AAA. I've seen other sources (especially Fuchida) that indicate a score of 4 VB and VTB lost to AAA and 2 IJN VF unaccounted-for. I'd expect the AA losses occurring over or near the island would be the easiest to validate while IJN losses to VMF CAP would be most difficult having occurred at some tens of kilometers from the island. 
Cressman says: 1 VT, 1 VB and 1 VF were downed by AAA. Prange cites: 3 VT and 2 VF lost to CAP and 2 VT, 1 VB and 1 VF to AAA. The record is notoriously spotty. for example, Nagumo in the Japanese story said no VT a/c from Hiryu were lost, yet only half the squadron was operational later in the day and other sources say it suffered the worst casualties of the battle over Midway. I suspect the records for the Ceylon raids are more accurate on both sides.

This is another example where the Symonds account, nominally the most lauded by the roundtable list is lacking in substance and detail.


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## RCAFson (Nov 15, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Been trying to find information on the Sea Hurricane II. Can you point me to any websites or published descriptions you'd recommend? I've got Eric Brown's Wings of the Navy with a description of the SH IIC.



I would like more info as well. My understanding is that it was possible to convert either a Hurricane I or II to Sea Hurricane using a kit, with the real problem being access to airframes. IIRC, the basic conversion only added about 100Lbs. The Sea Hurricane IIC as described by Brown was probably a more extensively engineered aircraft for naval service, than the Sea Hurricane Ib, and IIRC, it had a full naval avionics outfit.


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## slaterat (Nov 15, 2014)

I'm not sure how Somerville would come to the conclusion that the Sea Hurricane was superior to the Zero as I am unaware of any combat between these two types. In any case most Sea Hurricanes were 1Bs which were modified Hurricane Mk Is. These would be equipped with Merlin IIIs and usually Dehavilland props. These Hurricanes were equipped with catapult spools, Navy radios and arrestor hooks. As their weight had not increased much their performance was typical for a Hurricane MkI initial climb rate around 2500 ft/min and max speed around 325 mph TAS at 160000 ft. They would be armed with 8x.303 with around 330 rds/gun.


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## slaterat (Nov 15, 2014)

Former Hurricane pilot Terrence Kelly has written several books on his wartime experiences in the Far East. In his writings he considers the Hurricane an even match for the Navy O and the Army O as he refers to the Zero and the KI 43. Kelly was flying tropicalized Hurricane IIbs. His books are particularly insightful into the air combat surrounding Singapore, Sumatra and Java and the best tactics to employ when flying a Hurricane against the Japanese.


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## RCAFson (Nov 16, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> I would like more info as well. My understanding is that it was possible to convert either a Hurricane I or II to Sea Hurricane using a kit, with the real problem being access to airframes. IIRC, the basic conversion only added about 100Lbs. The Sea Hurricane IIC as described by Brown was probably a more extensively engineered aircraft for naval service, than the Sea Hurricane Ib, and IIRC, it had a full naval avionics outfit.



I think Somerville was basing his comments on pilot reports from the air battles over Ceylon and extrapolating these to the Sea Hurricane. However, he did make a distinction between the Hurricane I and II. RAF reports from Burma and Singapore also rated the Hurricane II as superior to the Zero.


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## buffnut453 (Nov 17, 2014)

Although the Hurricane never flew in combat against the Zero over Burma. Need to check my references to see how many times it flew against the Zero over Singapore.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 17, 2014)

buffnut453 said:


> Although the Hurricane never flew in combat against the Zero over Burma. Need to check my references to see how many times it flew against the Zero over Singapore.



Or Java. However, from what I've read (primarily Shores and internet citations) The RAF RAAF (and RNZAF) were flying Hurricane IIb or IIc's optimized for ground attack mission. I believe this was also the case over Ceylon, whereas I believe the Sea Hurricane IIB is a different animal with the XX engine and two 20's in each wing. I don't think it's got the two stage supercharger however, that made the F4F-4 an effective stop-gap high altitude interceptor over Guadalcanal. However, it does seem like the SH IIb was most probably a better CV defense weapon than the -4. I think one should probably be careful in representing the hurricane in its many variants as superior to the A6M and define the specific mark. Just saying.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 17, 2014)

The Merlin XX (2-speed single-stage supercharger; the Hurricane never got any of the 2-speed 2-stage Merlins) was every bit as powerful as the two-stage R-1830 at altitude (and more powerful under ~19000 ft). Further, it was a better streamlined thing, with better useage of exhaust thrust. The Hurri IIC was the one with 4 cannons (it was not optimized for ground attack, though), earlier versions of the Mk.II have had 12 .303s. 
The ground pounder Hurricane was the Hurri IID (tank hunter with 40mm cannons and extra armor) and the Hurri IV (with Merlins allowed for even greater boost power at lower altitudes, at higher altitudes in the ballpark with Merlin XX)

Sea Hurricane IIC was the adoption of the Hurricane IIC for the needs of the FAA, Sea Hurricane I versions were with Merlin III and 8 .303s, ie. similar to the Hurricane Is of BoB fame. The Merlin III was alowed for a greater boost for FAA needs, thus making 1440 HP at lower altitudes.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 17, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> The Merlin XX (2-speed single-stage supercharger; the Hurricane never got any of the 2-speed 2-stage Merlins) was every bit as powerful as the two-stage R-1830 at altitude (and more powerful under ~19000 ft). Further, it was a better streamlined thing, with better useage of exhaust thrust. The Hurri IIC was the one with 4 cannons (it was not optimized for ground attack, though), earlier versions of the Mk.II have had 12 .303s.
> The ground pounder Hurricane was the Hurri IID (tank hunter with 40mm cannons and extra armor) and the Hurri IV (with Merlins allowed for even greater boost power at lower altitudes, at higher altitudes in the ballpark with Merlin XX)
> 
> Sea Hurricane IIC was the adoption of the Hurricane IIC for the needs of the FAA, Sea Hurricane I versions ware
> with Merlin III and 8 .303s, ie. similar to the Hurricane Is of BoB fame. The Merlin III was alowed for a greater boost for FAA needs, thus making 1440 HP at lower altitudes.




Thanks for the clarification Tomo, However, I believe there is some gray in this discussion due to what I gather was common usage of the type (M-IIc) as ground attack. This according to *Profile Pubs #24:* Hawker Hurricane IIc. Even with the XX engine, performance appears to have been considerably reduced and the plane was evidently thought most useful applied in an interdiction role. So I think you are correct, the model was not optimized _per se _for a ground attack role (as was evidently the H-IID) but found itself most useful in that capacity (although check out the wikipedia citation below). 

Some Interesting side notes in this pub: It cites a H-I equipped with a RR-Merline XX with 8 .303 gun armament that achieved 348 mph at a weight of 6,689 lb. In comparison, the IIc with bombs fuel tanks and 4x cannons could do about 220 mph and was relegated by the Fall of 1941 to dusk or night attacks for its survival. IIc's shipped overseas were apparently equipped with the drag inducing sand filters that also degraded their clean performance. Evidently two cannons were occasionally removed to restore some lost performance. The same source mentions the use of Canadian Built Sea Hurricanes Mark XIIs with 4 cannons on US Carriers, something I had never heard before. 

In contrast, Shores in BS, Vol I: Tuesday 13, January 1942, 51 crated Hurricane Mk IIbs (with the 12 LMGs) were arriving in Singapore but these also had the sand filters that seriously degraded their performance. Apparently there was a problem with removing the filter. 

Pilot Officer Parker is quoted:

"_The extra guns and ammo must have weighed an additional half ton. The Hurricanes were not only slow,… in climb, but also heavy and unwieldy in maneuvers._"

So the question seems to be which mark Hurricane was at Ceylon and was it equipped with the filter? Shores says IIb which I assume meant 12 guns. Perhaps it was/would have been a match for the A6M without the filter. But I expect it wouldn't have been so lauded if the offending filter was attached. 

Finally from wikipedia: 

"_Hurricane IIC

The Hurricane IIA Series 2s armed with four 20 mm (.79 in) Hispanos become the Mark IIC in June 1941, using a slightly modified wing. The new wings also included a hardpoint for a 500 lb (227 kg) or 250 lb (113 kg) bomb, and later in 1941, fixed 40 gal (182 l) fuel tanks. By then performance was inferior to the latest German fighters, and *the Hurricane changed to the ground-attack role, sometimes referred to as the Hurribomber.* The mark also served as a night fighter and "intruder._""


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 17, 2014)

Also, if the Sea Hurricanes promoted by RCAFson as Mark IIBs are actually Canadian built former Mark XX models They evidently have the two stage superchargers in their Packard built Merline XX engines. If that's the actual source of the Sea Hurricane IIb, it's performance must be a significant improvement over the F4F-4 in all respects except perhaps a marginal range deficit. But I don't know the timing of its introduction.


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## RCAFson (Nov 17, 2014)

This video discusses the origins of the Sea Hurricane, it's early use, and the history of Sea Hurricane 1B Z7015. Some noteworthy points:

Z7015's Canadian Connection 

slow mo carrier landings

interviews with an actual WW2 pilot of Z7015 (also an author of some note)

film footage of a Blackburn Roc carrier landing (misidentified as a Skua)

info on Sea Hurricane production and conversions 


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6vNH0rYGqVE_

Some of the statements regarding the FAA and it's attitude towards fighters is plainly wrong, as per the documents from armoured carriers website:
Fulmar: Development â€” Armoured Aircraft Carriers in World War II


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## tomo pauk (Nov 17, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Thanks for the clarification Tomo, However, I believe there is some gray in this discussion due to what I gather was common usage of the type (M-IIc) as ground attack. This according to *Profile Pubs #24:* Hawker Hurricane IIc. Even with the XX engine, performance appears to have been considerably reduced and the plane was evidently thought most useful applied in an interdiction role. So I think you are correct, *the model was not optimized per se for a ground attack role (as was evidently the H-IID) but found itself most useful in that capacity *(although check out the wikipedia citation below).



Problem was that Hurricane II also received more guns ammo vs. the Hurri I, and that cuts in the speed and RoC. The situation deteriorated when it received 4 cannons and even heavier ammo load. The bolded part is right on the money - the Hurri IIC was no longer competitive as a 'pure' fighter, so it got bombs attached to it in order to be used as a fighter bomber.



> Some Interesting side notes in this pub: It cites a H-I equipped with a RR-Merline XX with 8 .303 gun armament that achieved 348 mph at a weight of 6,689 lb.



Might be true. 



> In comparison, the IIc with bombs fuel tanks and 4x cannons could do about 220 mph and was relegated by the Fall of 1941 to dusk or night attacks for its survival. IIc's shipped overseas were apparently equipped with the drag inducing sand filters that also degraded their clean performance. Evidently two cannons were occasionally removed to restore some lost performance. The same source mentions the use of Canadian Built Sea Hurricanes Mark XIIs with 4 cannons on US Carriers, something I had never heard before.
> In contrast, Shores in BS, Vol I: Tuesday 13, January 1942, 51 crated Hurricane Mk IIbs (with the 12 LMGs) were arriving in Singapore but these also had the sand filters that seriously degraded their performance. Apparently there was a problem with removing the filter.
> Pilot Officer Parker is quoted:
> "_The extra guns and ammo must have weighed an additional half ton. The Hurricanes were not only slow,… in climb, but also heavy and unwieldy in maneuvers._"



A table that lists performance of different Hurricanes, also the cost in performance with tropical filter installed, open it separately:









> So the question seems to be which mark Hurricane was at Ceylon and was it equipped with the filter? Shores says IIb which I assume meant 12 guns. Perhaps it was/would have been a match for the A6M without the filter. But I expect it wouldn't have been so lauded if the offending filter was attached.



Hopefully others are more 'fit' to answer this 



oldcrowcv63 said:


> Also, if the Sea Hurricanes promoted by RCAFson as Mark IIBs are actually Canadian built former Mark XX models They evidently have the two stage superchargers in their Packard built Merline XX engines. If that's the actual source of the Sea Hurricane IIb, it's performance must be a significant improvement over the F4F-4 in all respects except perhaps a marginal range deficit. But I don't know the timing of its introduction.



No Merlin XX was ever outfitted with 2 stage superchargers. The designations of ww2 Merlins with 2 stage S/C was 60 and 70 series, eg. Merlin 63 or 72. 
The US production of 2 stage Packard Merlins was insufficient for the main costumer, the P-51B/C until perhaps late 1943. Not sure when it was installed in anything else, maybe mid 1944 in Spitfire 16? 
For example, the 10th V-1650-3 engine (= engine with a 2 stage S/C) were manufactured in May 1943. The V-1650-1 (called Merlin 28 in many sources) was with single stage supercharger.

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## RCAFson (Nov 17, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Also, if the Sea Hurricanes promoted by RCAFson as Mark IIBs are actually Canadian built former Mark XX models They evidently have the two stage superchargers in their Packard built Merline XX engines. If that's the actual source of the Sea Hurricane IIb, it's performance must be a significant improvement over the F4F-4 in all respects except perhaps a marginal range deficit. But I don't know the timing of its introduction.



My understanding of Sea Hurricane nomenclature is that Hawker Sea Hurricane I = Merlin III engine.
HSH 1A = Hurricat, catapult only
HSH 1B = Catapult and arrestor gear fitted to Hurricane 1 (8 x .303mgs)
HSH 1C = HSH 1B with 4 x 20mm cannon

HSH IIA, B, C = HSH with Merlin XX (or equivalent Packard Merlin) and 8 x .303, 12 x .303, or 4 x 20mm cannon, respectively, as per RAF Hurricanes. Some HSH II A/B types were built in Canada. It was common for some of the IIBs to have the outer 4 guns removed to boost performance.
Sea Hurricane IIC: some of these were new builds rather than conversions. 

Somerville noted that he only had 1 HSH II along with 11 HSH IIs on strength in Indomitable in April 1942. 

A HSH 1B, even with a Merlin III at 12lb boost, still had a much superior (~6900lb and 1310hp)power to weight ratio over the F4F-3 (7550lb and 1200hp) or -4 (7970lb and 1200hp).


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## RCAFson (Nov 17, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Thanks for the clarification Tomo, However, I believe there is some gray in this discussion due to what I gather was common usage of the type (M-IIc) as ground attack. This according to *Profile Pubs #24:* Hawker Hurricane IIc. Even with the XX engine, performance appears to have been considerably reduced and the plane was evidently thought most useful applied in an interdiction role. So I think you are correct, the model was not optimized _per se _for a ground attack role (as was evidently the H-IID) but found itself most useful in that capacity (although check out the wikipedia citation below).
> 
> Some Interesting side notes in this pub: It cites a H-I equipped with a RR-Merline XX with 8 .303 gun armament that achieved 348 mph at a weight of 6,689 lb. In comparison, the IIc with bombs fuel tanks and 4x cannons could do about 220 mph and was relegated by the Fall of 1941 to dusk or night attacks for its survival. IIc's shipped overseas were apparently equipped with the drag inducing sand filters that also degraded their clean performance. Evidently two cannons were occasionally removed to restore some lost performance. The same source mentions the use of Canadian Built Sea Hurricanes Mark XIIs with 4 cannons on US Carriers, something I had never heard before.
> 
> ...



My understanding is that all FAA aircraft involved in Operation TORCH carried USA markings because it was felt (wrongly!) that the Vichy French were less likely to oppose USA rather than Commonwealth forces. Somehow Aircraft profile 24 got this mixed up and assumed that these were USN HSHs. However, AFAIK, some the these HSHs were Canadian built, but AFAIK, no Canadian built HSHs carried 4 x 20mm, as stated by Profile 24, although it is possible that some Cdn built aircraft were converted to the HSH IC or IIc.

220mph for a IIC with 2 x 250lb bombs is wrong. Mason states that Vmax for the IIB with 2 x 250lb bombs was 287 mph at 17800 ft but Vmax at SL was only 217mph and 237mph at 5000ft (I suspect these speeds are with continuous rather than combat power). Flying from the UK in 1941, the Hurricane didn't compare well to the Spitfire, but then what other Allied fighter did?

Mason gives the Vmax of the:
IIA as 342 at 17500ft and 340 at 20k ft and 8.2 minutes to 20k ft.
IIA trop as 334 at 17500ft and 333 at 20k ft and 10 min to 20K ft.
IIB as 330 at 17800ft and 328 at 20k ft.
IIC as 329 at 17800ft 328 at 20k ft.
HSH IIC as 317 at 17500ft and 311 at 20k ft with a time to 20k of 8.1 minutes.

The extra 4 x mgs and ammo on the IIB weighed about 200lbs.

The Secret Years gives the IIB/IIC Vmax with 2 x 45IG DTs as 310/306mph at ~20K ft. Same source states IIB Vmax as 330mph at 20,800ft.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 17, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> My understanding is that all FAA aircraft *involved in Operation TORCH carried USA markings *because it was felt (wrongly!) that the Vichy French were less likely to oppose USA rather than Commonwealth forces. Somehow Aircraft profile 24 got this mixed up and assumed that these were USN HSHs. However, AFAIK, some the these HSHs were Canadian built, but AFAIK, no Canadian built HSHs carried 4 x 20mm, as stated by Profile 24, although it is possible that some Cdn built aircraft were converted to the HSH IC or IIc.



You know I wondered whether he was talking about Torch but in the text on page 9 he says: "_By the eve of the *Sicilian landings* (Mid July thru mid August in 1943),_" followed by a discussion of the RAF usage of Hurricanes which is then followed by:
"_around this time, US Navy Detachments … aboard US Carriers were also flying Hurricanes_." That's almost a year after Torch… 

Don't know quite what to make of it.


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## VBF-13 (Nov 18, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Lord (famous from his brilliant account of the Titanic) presumably has access to an esteemed academic (Morison) who had written what was to the time purported to be the most up to date and 'accurate' quasi-official history of USN operations in WW2 gleaned from many eyewitness sources, as well as the nearly contemporary account of two acknowledged aviation expert eyewitnesses to the battle and chooses not to use them? I will be shocked to the point of being speechless but NOT I repeat, NOT postless. I will report it.


OK.


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## RCAFson (Nov 18, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> You know I wondered whether he was talking about Torch but in the text on page 9 he says: "_By the eve of the *Sicilian landings* (Mid July thru mid August in 1943),_" followed by a discussion of the RAF usage of Hurricanes which is then followed by:
> "_around this time, US Navy Detachments … aboard US Carriers were also flying Hurricanes_." That's almost a year after Torch…
> 
> Don't know quite what to make of it.



I know the USAAF didn't go out of it's way to advertise it's use of Spitfires in the ETO, so maybe the USN hushed up it's use of the HSH...but I really doubt it.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 18, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> OK.



If you weren't exactly sure what I was looking for or where to might be embedded in the text, the list of Hiryu aircraft survivors would most likely be a bit difficult to locate. Also, when I initially picked up Lord, I looked for the acknowledgements section at its usual position near the front. It wasn't there. I looked further and noticed the contributors' list at the back and, as you had indicated, there was no mention of Fuchida and Okumiya. I happened to open the book again, quite by accident, to the acknowledgements page and realized it had been placed at the back. Examining this revealed the names of the two missing sources. I looked at the acknowledgement section again today and of course found the significant reference to S.R. Morison on page 304 allowing me to speak once again. 

What makes this particular reference most interesting is the fact that he says he disagreed with Morison on some issues: "_On some points my own conclusions stray from Admiral Morison's findings._" Without knowing the details of his disagreement, this demonstrates that Lord was no simple student of, or reporter for secondary sources. He had a mind of his own and could critically analyze the facts he was given. I think you are certainly justified in holding him in high regard as do I.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 18, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> I know the USAAF didn't go out of it's way to advertise it's use of Spitfires in the ETO, so *maybe the USN hushed up it's use of the HSH*...but I really doubt it.



That's another possibility. But it does seem unlikely. Yet worth trying to track down if there is even a grain of truth to it.

Just found this reference with a cryptic remark:

http://www.navsource.org/archives/02/people/odendhal_charles_j_jr.pdf

"_During 1939-1941, the English had extra fighters, but a shortage of trained pilots. However, American pilots were not officially able to assist until after American entered the war in December 1941. 

His then commanding officer, Captain Don Wilcox, said they would go to a local airfield in full pilot “kit” and
were welcomed to take any fighter that was ready to fly. These were usually Hawker Hurricanes, with which
they were familiar *by way of limited training*. They would follow after the assigned fighters and shoot down
German bombers which were separated from formations and trying to make it back to France._"


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## VBF-13 (Nov 21, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> If you weren't exactly sure what I was looking for or where to might be embedded in the text, the list of Hiryu aircraft survivors would most likely be a bit difficult to locate. Also, when I initially picked up Lord, I looked for the acknowledgements section at its usual position near the front. It wasn't there. I looked further and noticed the contributors' list at the back and, as you had indicated, there was no mention of Fuchida and Okumiya. I happened to open the book again, quite by accident, to the acknowledgements page and realized it had been placed at the back. Examining this revealed the names of the two missing sources. I looked at the acknowledgement section again today and of course found the significant reference to S.R. Morison on page 304 allowing me to speak once again.
> 
> What makes this particular reference most interesting is the fact that he says he disagreed with Morison on some issues: "_On some points my own conclusions stray from Admiral Morison's findings._" Without knowing the details of his disagreement, this demonstrates that Lord was no simple student of, or reporter for secondary sources. He had a mind of his own and could critically analyze the facts he was given. I think you are certainly justified in holding him in high regard as do I.


Well that in itself is at least some recommendation. 

Two points in relationship to this acknowledgment. One, Morison's historical account was what spurred Lord on to write the book. Lord said as much on that page. Why write a book if Lord thought Morison's historical account was complete? Two, any author on the subject not having read Morison's historical account had to have been negligent. It would be like an author writing on the history of the Peloponnesian War, or the history of Rome, and ignoring the historical accounts, respectively, of Thucydides and Livy.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 22, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> Well that in itself is at least some recommendation.
> 
> Two points in relationship to this acknowledgment. One, Morison's historical account was what spurred Lord on to write the book. Lord said as much on that page. Why write a book if Lord thought Morison's historical account was complete? Two, any author on the subject not having read Morison's historical account had to have been negligent. It would be like an author writing on the history of the Peloponnesian War, or the history of Rome, and ignoring the historical accounts, respectively, of Thucydides and Livy.



Good points. Completely agree with you on both counts. What puzzles me most about all the pre-Lundstrom histories (and even his account) is how everyone appears to have missed (ignored?) the IJN CAP situation after the USN VB attack. Even now, this is not typically presented as important or relevant to understanding what transpired during the morning battle.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 22, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> Somerville noted that he only had 1 *HSH II* along with 11 *HSH IIs* on strength in Indomitable in April 1942.



typo?



RCAFson said:


> A HSH 1B, even with a Merlin III at 12lb boost, still had a much superior (~6900lb and 1310hp)power to weight ratio over the F4F-3 (7550lb and 1200hp) or -4 (7970lb and 1200hp).



If I can believe wikipedia (???):

it looks like the 12 lb boost upgrade wasn't implemented until August 1942 for Pedestal by which time, the F4F-3 was essentially removed from service. 

for the *F4F-3*: 

Specific Power: *0.159 hp/lb. *

Wing loading: *29.05 lbs/ft2*

For the *F4F-4*: 

Specific Power: *0.151 hp/lb*

Wing loading: *30.65 lbs/ft2*


For the *Sea Hurricane I*, (hard to get specific numbers. Any sources would be appreciated)

weight loaded ~6,700 lbs???., RR Merlin III 1030 hp?

Specific Power: *0.154 hp/lb.*

Wing Loading: *26.07 lbs/ft2*

This suggests to me the rough parity of the F4F-3 to the Sea Hurricane Mk I-Ic:

For the *Sea Hurricane IIC*, I get:

Specific Power: *0.179 hp/lb* at 7,300 lbs normal load and 1,310 hp from your horse power numbers:

Wing Loading: *26.07 lbs/ft2*

and from Brown's "Wings...:

Specific Power: *0.2 hp/lb* at 7,300 lb normal load and 1,460 hp. 

Wing Loading: *28.40 lbs/ft2*

I wish I had better numbers for the various Hurricane marks. But whatever the numbers turn out to be, it seems obvious to me that the Sea Hurricane II was the hottest allied carrier based fighter of 1942.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 22, 2014)

The Merlin III was allowed for +12 lbs boost on 100 oct fuel before 1940. Specifically for the needs of S.H. the boost of +14 lbs was allowed, making IIRC 1440 HP at some 6-7000 ft. The table confirmig this can be found at Williams' site.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 22, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> The Merlin III was allowed for +12 lbs boost on 100 oct fuel before 1940. Specifically for the needs of S.H. the boost of +14 lbs was allowed, making IIRC 1440 HP at some 6-7000 ft. The table confirmig this can be found at Williams' site.



Tomo, 

The text I think you are referring to is at: Hurricane Mk I Combat Report and refers to the Land- based Hurricane operations. 

Aside from that, I confused the numbers from the Pedestal comment with those in RCAFson's post. However, the duration of the 12 boost is limited in time and only effective below 10,000' according to:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/ap1590b.jpg

I don't know whether the Sea Hurricane operations would have been more limited but if so, it may be something peculiar to the naval modification and extended remotely based operational environment (perhaps to minimize engine changes from a limited supply?). I don't think I have a good handle on the weight of the Sea Hurricane I either. In general, I find the information and lack of specificity regarding variants of the Sea Hurricane I to be a bit frustrating.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 22, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Tomo,
> 
> The text I think you are referring to is at: Hurricane Mk I Combat Report and refers to the Land- based Hurricane operations.



Here is the table I was speaking about: picture 
The +14 lbs boost for Sea Hurricane only.



> Aside from that, I confused the numbers from the Pedestal comment with those in RCAFson's post. However, the duration of the 12 boost is limited in time and only effective below 10,000' according to:
> 
> http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/ap1590b.jpg



The higher the boost is intended to use, the lower the altitude it is, for same engine type. The chart showing the Merlin III power vs. altitude: picture




> I don't know whether the Sea Hurricane operations would have been more limited but if so, it may be something peculiar to the naval modification and extended remotely based operational environment (perhaps to minimize engine changes from a limited supply?). I don't think I have a good handle on the weight of the Sea Hurricane I either. In general, I find the information and lack of specificity regarding variants of the Sea Hurricane I to be a bit frustrating.



The Fulmar Mk.I's Merlin (Mk.VIII) was also rated for over-boosting when using 100 oct fuel.


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## RCAFson (Nov 22, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> typo?
> 
> 
> 
> ...



Sorry, Somerville noted that he only had 1 HSH II and and *11 HSH I* fighters.

Thanks to Greyman we have the basic specs for the HSH Ib:

Max weight = 7015lb
Vmax = 315mph at 7500 (Merlin III 1440hp at 16lb boost).
Vmax = 308 mpg at 18000ft (Merlin III 1010hp at 6.25lb boost)
Climb = 2200fpm max and 10min to 20k ft. ( continuous rating) Combat climb = ~3500fpm and ~6.5min to 20k ft. (my estimates)

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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 22, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Here is the table I was speaking about: picture
> The *+14 lbs boost *for Sea Hurricane only.



you meant +16 lb boost. no?


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## tomo pauk (Nov 22, 2014)

Oops, +16 boost it is


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## slaterat (Nov 23, 2014)

I wouldn't say the Hurricane in any variant produced is superior to a Zero. Their relative performance in 1942 is fairly close. The advantage of the Zero is low speed maneuverability, the Hurricane has the same advantages that an F4F would have, high speed maneuverability, armour and self sealing tanks. The advantage would go to the one that had better trained pilots,larger numbers and tactical advantages in altitude and surprise. In 1942 that was usually the Japanese.

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## slaterat (Nov 23, 2014)

Francis K Masons book "The Hawker Hurricane", is a pretty good one stop source for the performance and development of different Hurricanes. Although he doesn't state the power ratings of the engines used to produce the performance numbers, he does use figures from official PRO documents.


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## Greyman (Nov 23, 2014)

I find many of the performance figures in that book to be somewhat ... off. I wouldn't recommend using them.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 23, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Oops, +16 boost it is



Clearly, my own condition is contagious. sorry 'bout that.


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## thedab (Nov 26, 2014)

by the way,does anyone know the rate of roll for the Hurricane?


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## RCAFson (Nov 26, 2014)

thedab said:


> by the way,does anyone know the rate of roll for the Hurricane?



NACA compared the Hurricane IIa and Spitfire V and concluded that their roll rates were almost identical (NACA paper dated 16 Nov 1942), so we can use the normal wing Spitfire rates here as almost completely indicative of the Hurricane roll rates:


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## Neil Stirling (Nov 26, 2014)

Sea Hurricane 






Neil.

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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 26, 2014)

Neil Stirling said:


> Sea Hurricane
> 
> Neil.



8 x .303 cal guns Merlin III engine: Sea Hurricane IB, yes?


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 26, 2014)

duplicate post


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## thedab (Nov 26, 2014)

I take it that the level speed and time to climb,is done with 6655lbs weight,as it give about the same numbers as is on here Hurricane L-2026 Trials Report with 6750lbs weight

when was the Merlin III cleared for 16lbs boost?


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## RCAFson (Nov 26, 2014)

thedab said:


> I take it that the level speed and time to climb,is done with 6655lbs weight,as it give about the same numbers as is on here Hurricane L-2026 Trials Report with 6750lbs weight
> 
> when was the Merlin III cleared for 16lbs boost?



Time to climb and climb rate is given at maximum weight, while speed is stated for mean weight.

I suspect that clearance for 16lb boost was given in Jan 1942, but in any event it was sometime before 22 April 1942, which is the date on the Sea Hurricane data card


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## tomo pauk (Dec 13, 2014)

If I may return on the 'no looking for footnotes when reading this or that author'. 
First, the excerpts from the W. Bodies book on the P-47. Great book as it was, it is harshly wrongly opinionated on some aircraft:







The wing profile and thickness of the P-38 were certainly both 'slower' and thinner; the Tempest II was outfitted with drop tanks. We cannot speak of duplicating the wing from the P-47N for the Tempest. The P-47 with a 20mm cannon was nothing more than an one-off, and 4 Hispanos were at least a bit more devastating than 8 BMGs, not that it mattered though.

The book by Richard B. Davis, 'Bombing the Axis powers', would lead us to believe that P-38 and P-47 received an extra fuselage tank each. Not the case for the P-38 (it did receive 2 x 55 US gal tanks in wing), nor for the P-47 - the main fuselage tank 'grew' higher, hence it carried 270 instead of 205 US gals.






Next - the widely acclaimed (also from me) book 'America's hunderd thousand' states that P-47M was outfitted by belly rack only, with 110 US gals of external fuel as maximum. There is enough of photos in the 'net showing the P-47Ms carry also wing-mounted drop tanks, eg. here. That should not be a great surprise, the P-47D-30 was the 'donor' of the wing for the P-47M, and that wing was plumbed for drop tanks.


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## Greyman (Dec 13, 2014)

thedab said:


> when was the Merlin III cleared for 16lbs boost?



The earliest I have is an amendment to the Hurricane I Pilot's Notes - dated May 1941:



> _23. NOTES ON THE SEA HURRICANE
> (i) Increased boost:
> (i) The use of +16 lb/sq.in boost is permitted for periods of about 15 minutes at low altitudes ..._

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## thedab (Dec 13, 2014)

good god for 15 minutes?


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## FLYBOYJ (Dec 13, 2014)

thedab said:


> good god for 15 minutes?



For some aircraft it's even less.


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## thedab (Dec 13, 2014)

well that what i maen,on the Merlin 45 it just 5 minutes
it's seems too good to be true


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## Shortround6 (Dec 13, 2014)

Couple of things _may_ be going in here ( or I have my head planted where the does not shine).

Merlin III used an 8.588 supercharger gear and the Melrin 45 (and XII) used a 9.089 supercharger gear. The 8.58 gears need just under 90% of the power of the 9.089 gears to turn. A slightly lower strain on the engine? The intake charge is heated less. ALso a slightly lower strain on the engine? 

Merlin IIIs in Sea Hurricanes might have been considered throw away engines? In the Spring of 1941 the "Sea Hurricane MK I" was starting to operated from CAM ships and any "combat" mission was a one way trip for the _airframe and engine_. July saw the First deployment on a carrier where the plane might land after combat. 

Sea Hurricanes not expected to have to fight a number of days in row using combat power unlike land based aircraft? Carrier only stayed in combat "area" for a few days before withdrawing so engines didn't rack up high numbers of hours at "combat" settings before maintenance periods? 

Feel free to shoot holes in any/all theories.


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## Greyman (Dec 14, 2014)

I think the standard '5 minute' emergency boost limit indicated in manuals is quite conservative. I've read several accounts of pilots pulling emergency boost right at - or soon after - take off and keeping it on for essentially an entire sortie.

Possible for a pilot or engine to pull off regularly? Certainly.

Advisable from a logistic/strategic point of view? Most likely not.


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## thedab (Jan 8, 2015)

any know when the Merlin XX was cleared for 16lb boost?


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## tomo pauk (Jan 9, 2015)

Looks like November 1942 (in 2nd supercharger gear only): link


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## thedab (May 8, 2015)

So a Sea Hurricane running 16lb boost, anyone know what it's climb and level speed performance would be up to about 10.000ft ?


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## Shortround6 (May 9, 2015)

Well, at 9,000ft it would be back to 12lbs of boost and at 7250ft about 14lbs boost if you are referring to the early Sea Hurricanes.


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## Neil Stirling (May 9, 2015)

Sea Hurricane +16lbs bottom r/h corner.










Neil.

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## Koopernic (May 9, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> If I may return on the 'no looking for footnotes when reading this or that author'.
> First, the excerpts from the W. Bodies book on the P-47. Great book as it was, it is harshly wrongly opinionated on some aircraft:
> 
> 
> ...



He makes the tiresome mistake, unforgivable really for an author, of failing to nominate or consider the altitude a fighter achieved a particular speed at. That mistake then endlessly repeats as the author is requoted and another generation begins to make the same mistake again. 

I attribute the work of online simulation gamers who had a thirst for data so as to model their simulations. 

It's likewise with declarations of range with no indication of load carried and cruise speed chosen and furthermore declarations of performance of an aircraft type with no indication of when it first entered service and for what period.


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## thedab (May 10, 2015)

thanks Neil.I didn't see that first time

has any one got rate of climb for any mark of Hurricane on combat power?


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## Greyman (May 10, 2015)

Only one I can find:

Hurricane V (Merlin 27) 8,170 lb - 40-mm Vickers Guns
Ground Level: 3,880 ft/min --- +18 boost


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## thedab (Aug 19, 2015)

any one know were I can Pilot's notes for the Sea Hurricane mkI


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