# Hood vs. Scharnhorst



## tomo pauk (Nov 21, 2009)

What ship would you pick against another, and what would be a better choice over all. The modernized Hood should be considered.


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## Amsel (Nov 21, 2009)

The Scharnhorst could stand away in the engagement and fire long range shots into the Hood due to her speed and 11" guns. The problem is that the 11" guns trajectory was very flat making most the hits have to defeat the armor belts. The Scharnhorst would be much more difficult to destroy but the 15"guns of the Hood would do great damage to the Scharnhorst. I think it would be a great battle but the Hood would have the slight advantage.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 21, 2009)

If the battle is at great ranges, then the incoming angle is rather steep.


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## davebender (Nov 21, 2009)

Dreadnought fights were rare during WWII. Cruiser fights were common. Although not used in that role historically the Scharnhorst class would make superb cruiser killers. 

Therefore I would opt for the Scharnhorst as being more useful to the war effort. Perfect for gunning down German Panzerschiff in the Atlantic or IJN/USN CAs around Guadalcanal.


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## parsifal (Nov 21, 2009)

davebender said:


> Dreadnought fights were rare during WWII. Cruiser fights were common. Although not used in that role historically the Scharnhorst class would make superb cruiser killers.
> 
> Therefore I would opt for the Scharnhorst as being more useful to the war effort. Perfect for gunning down German Panzerschiff in the Atlantic or IJN/USN CAs around Guadalcanal.




Dave

Scharnhorst proved incapable of dealing with cruisers effectively in her last fight, and when I get back from my trip in a few days I will check for other instances of her failure in this regard.....the basic problems for heavy ships when firing at small manouverable targets is the slow rate of fire. This wasnt a problem unique to the Scharnhorst or indeed the Germans

The second problem for the Scharnhorst was the technological and operational flaws in her radar suite. Despite the early lead in ship borne radars the Germans did not keep pace with the Allies, such that by her last fight, she was unable to fire accurately in a heavy sea, or in poor conditions. I know that the Seetakt radar was destroyed in the last fight off North Cape, but its operational limits compared to the Allies was marked by that time. Even more damning for the Germans was that the set was switched off at the beginning of her last battle, in accordance with standard KM operational policy. They believed their radar signals was the same as radio silence. It was a major tactical flaw in KM operatioons

The Scharnhorst could not engage outside Hoods effective gunnery range......the longest ranged shot in the whole of WWII was 27000 yards and this happened just once, moreover, for the 11 in guns to be effective against the hoods armouring scheme they would have needed to actually close the range to below 24000 yards. As someone pointed out, they could try to achieve a plunging shot through the deck of Hood, but this was an exponentially more difficult firing solution.....essentially plunging fire is aiming for a point on the ocean, whereas flat trajectory is trying to hit something on a line from point to point

I also am very doubtful about the speed advantage of the german ship. Because of the wet bow the german ship suffered, any kind of seaway and her speed had to be reduced. This was never as marked in the Hood, which was always known as a fast boat in a seaway

The final irony is that Hood was due for a major refit for just after her loss. My opinion is that a modernized Hood would have virtually nothing to fear from Scharnhorst


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## Kurfürst (Nov 22, 2009)

parsifal said:


> Dave
> 
> Scharnhorst proved incapable of dealing with cruisers effectively in her last fight,



Pardon me but this is nonsense, she beated down one of them very badly (IIRC when she popped up the second time)... Sure it reminds me of King Arthur and the Black Knight.. Arthur was certainly incapable of properly dealing with him, only cut off the limbs.. 



parsifal said:


> The second problem for the Scharnhorst was the technological and operational flaws in her radar suite. Despite the early lead in ship borne radars the Germans did not keep pace with the Allies, such that by her last fight, she was unable to fire accurately in a heavy sea, or in poor conditions.



Any specifics or sources? According the Garzke and Dullin, the captain of Gneisenau (? - too lazy to look up) spoke very highly of the radar sets and their usefullness. 



parsifal said:


> I know that the Seetakt radar was destroyed in the last fight off North Cape, but its operational limits compared to the Allies was marked by that time.



Any specifics?



parsifal said:


> Even more damning for the Germans was that the set was switched off at the beginning of her last battle, in accordance with standard KM operational policy. They believed their radar signals was the same as radio silence. It was a major tactical flaw in KM operatioons



Disagree... radar IS using radio waves, its easy to detect (the Bismarck fairly easy picked up the HMS PoW's radar signals, even though itself was actually not detected). Scharnhorst was disengaging, switching radar on was equivalent to trying to flee in the dark with a torch in your hand... I would be very surprised if Allied ships would lack such passive sensors.

But in general, I agree about Scharnhorst vs Hood. Scharnhorst was simply not built to match the Hood, the latter having most of the cards in such an engagement. Of course its possible for Scharnhorst to deal a killing blow, but the chances are not good.


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## Juha (Nov 22, 2009)

Hello Kurfürst
Do you really think that Scharnhorst did well during the battle of North Cape? One CA and 2 CLs, using radar, kept it away from her target, the convoy, twice surprised it and forced it to retreat and when the German commander decided to run for home those cruisers followed it, incl the HMS Norfolk, which had taken two 11in hits which disabled one of her turret and all but one of its radars, but still was able do its job and had knocked out Scharnhorst’s main radar and that was her only radar which could “see” the forward sector. Without being able to see what was front of her Scharnhorst run onto approaching RN battlegroup, could turn around because those cruisers, in this stage Norfolk and Belfast, blocked that route with 4 DDs, so the only route open to her was to run to east.

Same to use of radar, Germans sailing blindly in Arctic darkness, not finding their target and lost each other, surprised repeatedly by RN ships, which by using radar could position themselves at right places for surprise fire attacks.

Juha


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## Kurfürst (Nov 22, 2009)

Juha said:


> Hello Kurfürst
> Do you really think that Scharnhorst did well during the battle of North Cape?



I do, as do C-in-C of the British task force... basically every author understands clearly the actual causes leading to the Scharnhorst's loss : it was hopelessly outnumbered by a much larger naval force (a fact seemingly never bothered the Axis bashing crowds), and the British had good intel of the whole operation.

Compared to these circumstances, the Scharnhorst and her crew performed extremely well, and gave the gave the usual high battle performance German Navy.



Juha said:


> One CA and 2 CLs, using radar, kept it away from her target, the convoy,...



Kept it away... how?  

Seriously there is so much wishful wishful thinking involved that it reminds me of Montgomery's memoirs.. whatever happened did not ever bother him, he always explained that it was actually his masterful plan all along.  

Still the historical fact remains that Scharnhorst was manouvering for a better a position after it first approached the convoy. Perfectly legit naval tactic.. You try to describe that as some sort of vice, making that into how _heavy cruisers_ 'drove off' _a battleship_ - laughable...



Juha said:


> twice surprised it and forced it to retreat



_Forced it _to retreat... again how wishful thinking is applied here..? When Scharnhorst turned away the second time, the German commander was luring away the British CAs from the convoy - in which he succeeded btw - , so his DDs receiving his attack signal could attack the defenceless convoy - which in they failed, having only outdated coordinates, but that was to tactical goal of the manouvre, regardless how you oversimplify it.

Again typical and expected from this poster who's extremely biased. You simply do not respect the historical facts of this Battle.



Juha said:


> and when the German commander decided to run for home those cruisers followed it, incl the HMS Norfolk, which had taken two 11in hits which disabled one of her turret and all but one of its radars, but still was able do its job and had knocked out Scharnhorst’s main radar and that was her only radar which could “see” the forward sector. Without being able to see what was front of her Scharnhorst run onto approaching RN battlegroup, could turn around because those cruisers, in this stage Norfolk and Belfast, blocked that route with 4 DDs, so the only route open to her was to run to east.



I am not sure what are you try tell with that...? Besides your description of the events is inaccurate again.

The Battle of North Cape was quite typical - a single KM capital vessel against some 14 British ships, which had good intel, still managing to wreck one badly, and almost succeeding in outmaneuvering them.. the odds were against Scharnhorst from the beginning, despite that she fought well and effectively, and as was skillfully handled by her commander, which even the adversaries admitted... the outcome was the result of the tactical/operational circumstances, _way beyond the responsibility of the ship's commander, crew, or designers. _



> Same to use of radar, Germans sailing blindly in Arctic darkness, not finding their target and lost each other, surprised repeatedly by RN ships, which by using radar could position themselves at right places for surprise fire attacks.



But OF COURSE, poor stupid Germans were sailing blindly in the Artic, perhaps even bumping into each other... typical Juha stuff I am afraid. Poor, stupid Germans, always the same story from you, while you fail to answer ANY of the questions I made.

1, Use of radar is already discussed. It gives away the ship's presence, therefore it was tactically not recommendable. If you do not understand this simply concept, widely accepted by everybody else, its your problem...
2, The bashing of Scharnhorst for not being able to use the forward radar due to battle damage is most bizarre, but again, typical.
3, The 'surprise fire attacks' story limps - it had nothing to do with radar alone (if it does, it would speak very poorly of the capabilities of Allied radar, given the short ranges at which firing was commenced), rather the fact that the RN had several ships in the area, some of which already made battle contact with the single German ship, and could report that to other British ships already in area. 

*What technological flaws did German naval radar had? * No answer...

*What alleged 'operational limits' the Seetakt series gunnery radar sets had ompared to the Allies was marked by that time?* No answer either... 

_Facts, specifications, serious sources_ please, IF we are to have a SERIOUS discussion on the subject, not the usual fruitless, dumb and predictable skewing of the facts by the usual Axis-bashing trio...


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## red admiral (Nov 22, 2009)

> What alleged 'operational limits' the Seetakt series gunnery radar sets had compared to the Allies was marked by that time?



- Inability to spot large calibre shell splashes making blindfire impossible (tying into the poorer resolution)

- Limited bearing accuracy, requiring the need for optical bearing measurements *

- Limited range

- Limited resolution

- Lack of search function (the radar being tied to the director)

German Naval Radar to 1945 by Erwin F. Sieche in Warship Vol 21 and Vol 22 provides a background and technical specs.



> 3, The 'surprise fire attacks' story limps - it had nothing to do with radar alone (if it does, it would speak very poorly of the capabilities of Allied radar, given the short ranges at which firing was commenced)



It's easier to hit at short range. In the main action, Duke of York acquired Scharnhorst with search radar at 45,500yards, formed a solution with gunnery radar at 26000yds but allowed the range to close to 10,000yds before opening fire (and scoring two hits in the opening salvo).


* Should be noted that optical measurements with the long baselength rangefinders in use were still better than those of centimetric sets


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## Juha (Nov 22, 2009)

I disagree, with better tactics Scharnhorst could have inflict much more damage, and even at least temporary disappear into Artic darkness.

Quote:” Kept it away... how?”

Simply using radar and positoned themselves between convoy and Scharnhorst and then surprisingly opening fire and hitting Sch’s foretop and knocking out its main radar. Why Sch. Retreat, a bit strange but probably tried to outflank the cruisers and then got to convoy, when in the second attempt it again ran onto the cruisers which, by using radar could again position themselves between Sch. and convoy, it is more difficult to explain why Scharnhorst didn’t fight it out but chose to withdraw. One reasonable explanation is that being much weaker force KM tried to minimize risks and Bey thought that maybe next time it would be easier to get to a convoy. especially if it is true that Germans thought that 8in splashes from Norfolk's shells were heavier stuff.

Quote:” how heavy cruisers 'drove off' a battleship – laughable…”

One CA and 2 CLs did that twice. Hard, isn’t it?

Quote:” so his DDs receiving his attack signal could attack the defenceless convoy –“

On the German DDs, the convoy has 10 DDs as close escort, 2 of which IIRC were old Ws but 3 were big Canadian Tribals which were match to big German Zs in gunnery duel,so nthe convoy wasn't defenceless and if one can draw conclusions on what had happened a year earlier, it seems that RN DDs were more aggressive than KM DDs.

Quote:” Again typical and expected from this poster who's extremely biased. You simply do not respect the historical facts of this Battle.”

Funny that you wrote that, remember the 100 Oct thread.

Quote:” The Battle of North Cape was quite typical - a single KM capital vessel against some 14 British ships, which had good intel, still managing to wreck one badly, and almost succeeding in outmaneuvering them.. the odds were against Scharnhorst from the beginning, despite that she fought well and effectively…”

You completely ignored the fact that RN units were widely dispersed, if Germans had bothered to use their radars and kept contact between Scharhorst and KM DDs Germans would probably have been able to do clearly more damage, remember that Belfast open fire at 09:14, DOY at 16:47 even if Sch had sailed since 1250 at high speed towards Norway, so Germans would have had some 8 hours to do something effective before DOY and its escort would have arrived. And as hard it seems to be for you Norfolk wasn’t wrecked badly it was perfectly capable follow Scharnhorst during its 30 kts retreat. But if you mean DD HMS Saumarez, yes it was badly hit, but if one had exchange rate one capital ship to one badly damaged DD and one moderately damaged CA I would say that things didn’t go very well.

Quote:” But OF COURSE, poor stupid Germans were sailing blindly in the Artic, perhaps even bumping into each other... typical Juha stuff I am afraid. Poor, stupid Germans, always the same story from you, while you fail to answer ANY of the questions I made.”

I would say that typical for you, I have gave to you numerous answers over the time, but not in this thread before now simply because you don’t have earlier ask anything from me in this thread.

Quote:” 1, Use of radar is already discussed. It gives away the ship's presence, therefore it was tactically not recommendable. If you do not understand this simply concept, widely accepted by everybody else, its your problem...
2, The bashing of Scharnhorst for not being able to use the forward radar due to battle damage is most bizarre, but again, typical.
3, The 'surprise fire attacks' story limps - it had nothing to do with radar alone (if it does, it would speak very poorly of the capabilities of Allied radar, given the short ranges at which firing was commenced), rather the fact that the RN had several ships in the area, some of which already made battle contact with the single German ship, and could report that to other British ships already in area.”

But without using radar Scharnhorst could even find the target but was seen by enemy, which was using radar, far away without Germans having a slightest idea what was happening. You seem to think that was bright tactic, I definitely don’t see it that way.
2. I didn’t bash Sch I only stated a fact.
3. simply, read more, please, a bit ridiculous.


Some facts to you:
Duke of York radar spotted Scharnhorst at 41.500 meters
At 08:30, Norfolk radar got the Scharnhorst on bearing 280° at 30.500 meters, immediately after at 08:40 Belfast got Scharnhorst on radar too on 295° at 32.500 meters.
At 12:10, H.M.S. Sheffield's radar spotted Scharnhorst coming back toward the convoy on bearing 079° at 24.500 meters on course 240°.

Juha


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## Vincenzo (Nov 23, 2009)

imho is not a large trouble that the 280/54 was not good versus de Hood decks at common battle range the 280/54 has a relative flat trajectory and belt carmour of Hodd can be defeated from 280/54 (can be is not same of are defeated, the 12' inch belt area need hit under 18 km, the other area can hit at all actually range)


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## Juha (Nov 23, 2009)

Hello Vincenzo
It is a bit more complicated because when range increases the horizontal area becomes more and more important, of course that happens slower in case of 28cm/54 because of its flatter trajectory. Also the strike angle onto deck is more or less given but by manoeuvring one could decrease the hit angle onto belt and so increase the effectiveness of the belt, why show the full broadside when one can use one’s full main armament also at 60deg target angle if one had thin belt.

Juha


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## Juha (Nov 24, 2009)

For those who don’t know the armoured schemes of Scharnhorst and Hood, which armour layout wasn’t so different from that of Sch. in principle, see DonL’s message #617 in http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww2-general/best-world-war-two-warships-3592-42.html . As you see, to do really bad damage, shell must first penetrate the belt and then the armoured deck or its slope. Hood's belt was slightly inclined/sloped which increased its effectiveness a bit.

Juha


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## renrich (Nov 24, 2009)

If memory serves, Lion took 17 hits from heavy( 11inch and 12 inch) guns at Jutland and was still operational. Hood' s armor was substantially heavier than Lion's. IMO Scharnhorst would have had to have been really lucky to survive an encounter with Hood. Graf Spee's 11 inchers did not even sink Exeter at the Plate.


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## DonL (Nov 24, 2009)

I have voted for Hood, because she has the best overall performance with her very good 15in Guns.

The only chance for SH to win this battle is to engage the enemy more closely (I'm not Admiral Beatty but in this match it is deadly importent) as fast as possible.
SH is in the same position as Hood at her fight against Bismarck because of the poor horizontal protection of SH and the 15"/42 Mark I are very good deck penetrators. So SH must close the range to between 15000m and 18000m to have optimal protection from her main Belt 350mm and the lower main deck 105mm and on the other hand could bring her guns in action with their best performance to punch main belts (15000m-335mm and 18000m.291mm). SH had a speed advantage of 2,5 -3 knots because Hood is only fit for 29-29,5 kn and SH could go 32-32,5 kn. So if SH could close the range under 18000m without serious damage it could be very interesting. Who hits first, fast and hard will be the winner.
Under these circumstances the weak points of SH are her turrents and the weak points of hood is her main belt at specific points.

At a long range fight SH will be dead after the first 3 serious hits from Hood because of her poor horizontal protection and the 11inch/54,5 are very very poor deck penetrators so Hood is passably save.

Edit:


> Graf Spee's 11 inchers did not even sink Exeter at the Plate.



Because the armour of Exeter was as thin as coke tins and the APC shells couldn't blow up only HE Shells and a mixed APC/HE shell could blow up.


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## Vincenzo (Nov 24, 2009)

Saw the Scharnhorst armour scheme: the main belt (350mm) is penetrated from Hood only under 15 km, but for real damage the projectile need pass almost also a 30 mm deck so need more near battle. the lower belt (170 mm) is penetrated to all range but need pass almost a 45 mm paratie and a 30 mm deck so need i think almost under 18 km hit. the 50 mm deck is penetrated over 16.5 km but under there is a 95 mm deck (or a 20 mm paratie and a 80 mm deck) so this not give possibility to hit internal.
the 130 mm deck need hit over max actual hit in WW II. the high belt (45mm) and after this the 95 mm deck also need too long range hit for WW II. So i think the Scharnhorst has good protection versus Hood, this need to go almost a 18 km or less for has good chance of damage the Scharnhorst.
If some has scheme for Hood i'm curious to see the other side

rewriting for missinterpretation, i left the original comment THAT it's WRONG for real Scharnhorst
he main belt (350mm) is penetrated from Hood only under 15 km, but for real damage the projectile need pass almost a 95 mm deck but this is impossible for the 15' of Hood. the lower belt (170 mm) is penetrated to all range but need pass almost a 45 mm paratie i think this is penetrated at WWII max range. the high belt (45mm) and after this the 95 mm deck also need too long range hit for WW II. the 50 mm deck is penetrated over 16.5 km but under there is a 95 mm deck (or a 20 mm paratie and a 80 mm deck) so this not give possibility to hit internal part.
So for 15' of Hood the best it's hit the lower belt, in this case the range is not very important but need lucky hit. the other area show good protection vs 15' (this is reasonable saw that 15' was the more common gun in enemy BB), good is not for invincible


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## DonL (Nov 24, 2009)

Here the original armour sheme of Scharnhorst


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## Freebird (Nov 24, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> What ship would you pick against another, and what would be a better choice over all. The modernized Hood should be considered.



You should also consider the Scharnhorst *IF* it had been upgraded as planned, with 3 x twin 15" turrets, compared to 3 x triple 11" as built. Otherwise the Hood will probably win hands down



davebender said:


> Dreadnought fights were rare during WWII. Cruiser fights were common. Although not used in that role historically the Scharnhorst class would make superb cruiser killers.



Huh? Rare in the Pacific, but lots in the ETO/MTO.

1.) Bismarck ( P Eugen) vs Hood PoW
2.) Bismarck vs Rodney KGV
3.) Renown VS Scharnhorst Gneisnow (Norway 1940)
4.) Duke of York vs Scharnhorst (Norway)
5.) Battle of Calabria 
6.) Battle of Cape Matapan 
7.) Battle of Cape Spartivento 
8.) Richelieu ( coastal batteries) vs Resolution Barham (Dakar 1940)
9.) British attack on Mers-el-Kebir



davebender said:


> Therefore I would opt for the Scharnhorst as being more useful to the war effort. Perfect for gunning down German Panzerschiff in the Atlantic or IJN/USN CAs around Guadalcanal.



And why would Sharnhorst be better at this than Hood?


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## Juha (Nov 24, 2009)

Hello Vincenzo
The Battle off North Cape showed that even 14in shells, which had a bit less penetration power against decks than 15in, could from long range damage Sch. so badly that loss of speed was result, saying nothing on knocking out main artillery turrets.

Juha


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## Vincenzo (Nov 24, 2009)

DonL said:


> Here the original armour sheme of Scharnhorst



i've used the two schemes posted from you in other thread


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## DonL (Nov 24, 2009)

Hi Vincenzo,

the first one was the original scheme!
And the other one was a modified or alternative scheme from me with the same armour weight.


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## Vincenzo (Nov 24, 2009)

Juha said:


> Hello Vincenzo
> The Battle off North Cape showed that even 14in shells, which had a bit less penetration power against decks than 15in, could from long range damage Sch. so badly that loss of speed was result, saying nothing on knocking out main artillery turrets.
> 
> Juha



yes a bit pratically we can tell the same, the difference it's more vs the side armour. after i don't told that can't damage only that can't penetrated the armours for hit deposit and engine local. almost this can tell with pen data and armour scheme. but it obvious that a 2nd or 3rf hit on plate give a different result that a first. and the real word it's always different form maths


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## Vincenzo (Nov 24, 2009)

DonL said:


> Hi Vincenzo,
> 
> the first one was the original scheme!
> And the other one was a modified or alternative scheme from me with the same armour weight.



oh i have not understand this i'll rewrite my comment only using the first scheme


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## parsifal (Nov 24, 2009)

_


Kurfürst said:



Pardon me but this is nonsense, she beated down one of them very badly (IIRC when she popped up the second time)... Sure it reminds me of King Arthur and the Black Knight.. Arthur was certainly incapable of properly dealing with him, only cut off the limbs

Click to expand...

_


Kurfürst said:


> .
> 
> Scharnhorst only ever got one or two hits on the Norfolk, due entirely to the Norfolk not having flashless powder. The other cruisers were using this new propellant, and were never troubled by Scharnhorsts fire
> 
> ...


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## Freebird (Nov 24, 2009)

The numbers (from Hazegray) if anyone is interested


Scharnhorst class 
Displ: 34,841 tons standard; 38,900 tons full load
Dim: 754 x 98.5 x 27 feet
Prop: Steam turbines, 12 boilers, 3 shafts, 165,000 hp, 32 knots
Crew: 1669-1840
Arm: 3 triple 11/54.5, 4 dual, 4 single 5.9/55, 7 dual 4.1/65, 8 dual
37 mm, 8 single 20 mm.
Armor: 6.7-13.8 inch belt, 2 inch deck, 14.2 inch turrets, 13.8 inch CT
Designed as 'unsinkable' commerce raiders, sometimes classified as 
battlecruisers because of small main guns. Really were small
battleships, with smaller guns and armor on the battleship scale.
Designed to allow replacement of triple 11 inch guns with dual 15 inch.
These vessels were a reply to the French Dunkerque class.
Both lengthened to 777.5 feet 1938-39 by addition of a clipper bow.

-----------------------------------------------------------------

Hood class battlecruisers
Displ: 42,670 tons load
Dim: 860 x 104 x 28.5 feet
Prop: Steam turbines, 24 boilers, 4 shafts, 144,000 hp, 31 knots
Crew: 1477
Arm: 4 dual 15/42, 12 single 5.5/50, 4 4/45, 6 21 inch TT (2 sub, 4 aw)
Armor: 5-12 inch belt, 1.5-3 inch deck, 5-12 inch barbettes, 15 inch 
turrets, 11 inch CT 
Originally designed as light battlecruisers, cancelled and 
restarted as battlecruisers/fast battleships. Three ships
cancelled after Jutland. Often considered to be the first
modern fast battleship.

Hood
Built by John Brown. Laid down 31 May 1916, cancelled and scrapped.
Laid down again 1 Sept 1916, launched 22 Aug 1918, completed 5/1920. 
Refitted 1929-1931. Reconstruction authorized 3/1939, cancelled due 
to war. Final armament was 4 dual 15 inch, 7 dual 4 inch, 3 8 barrel 
AA, 5 AA rocket launchers; displacement had reached 48,360 tons full
load. Was very badly in need of refit or replacement by 1941. Sunk by 
Prinz Eugen and Bismarck 24 May 1941 off Iceland.


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## Juha (Nov 25, 2009)

Hello Vincenzo
DoY didn't necessary need numerous hits near each otherto penetrate inside Sch protection, look what happened to A turret of Scharnhorst. But Scharnhorst armour protection was able to keep out from vitals vast majority of 14in hits, but most were not fired at optimum distance but nearer in order to get more hits.

Juha


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## Kurfürst (Nov 25, 2009)

parsifal said:


> _
> 
> 
> Kurfürst said:
> ...


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## Glider (Nov 25, 2009)

Kurfürst said:


> parsifal said:
> 
> 
> > _
> ...


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## hartmann (Nov 25, 2009)

> Clearly the passive sets were not effective or they would have seen the DOY,



In fact, They were very effective, but the lucky hit on the foremast destroyed both, passive systems and the forward Seetakt radar set as both thenm were grouped closely, so It didn´t worked only because It was previously destroyed, but there are evidences of traces of signals picked up by the "Scharnhorst" from the "Jamaica" or the "DoY" some 15 minutes before the final battle thanks to a "Naxos" set given by the Luftwaffe. But this set couldn´t track properly the range nor the true size of the enemy.



> plus the Germans relied on a few radar sets the 80cm Seetakt being on the forward and aft fire control posts.



That is not correct. The "Scharnhorst" had a "Hohentwiel" set plus the two "Seetakt" sets.



> The surface search radar would not have helped with fire control but would have warned of danger ahead.



Only If It is turned on, but the main problem was that when the "Scharnhorst" firstly engaged the British Heavy crusiers, activated the "Funkmesstile" ("silent active radar" more or less) protocol, turning off all the radar sets and leaving only the passive sets which were still working to escape from them.



> The German destroyers didn't have any radar



That is nonsense, all the German heavy destroyers had one "Seetakt" set instaled from 1942, and from mid to finish 1943, also a "Hohentwiel" surface search set also, among the passive radar sets.

Hope this can help.


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## Juha (Nov 25, 2009)

Hello Kurfürst
As I wrote earlier, the were 3 combats, firstly Scharnhorst vs one CA and 2 CLs 09:24-09:40, then 12:24-12:41 Sch vs. the cruisers and 4 DDs, after that Sch. began its high speed withdrawal towards Norway while the 3 cruisers and 4DDs shadowed it, then final battle began when DoY opened fire at 16:50.

Hello Hartmann
Quote:” all the German heavy destroyers had one "Seetakt" set instaled from 1942…”

That is also my understanding. Did they use their radars? After all they past fairly close some of the escorts of the convoy?

Quote:” They were very effective, but the lucky hit on the foremast destroyed both, passive systems and the forward Seetakt radar set as both thenm were grouped closely, so It didn´t worked only because It was previously destroyed…”

Interesting, but why didn’t they pick up the radars of the cruisers before the first clash, the cruisers have had Sch. in their screens c. 54 minutes before they opened fire?

Juha


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## Glider (Nov 25, 2009)

hartmann said:


> In fact, They were very effective, but the lucky hit on the foremast destroyed both, passive systems and the forward Seetakt radar set as both thenm were grouped closely, so It didn´t worked only because It was previously destroyed, but there are evidences of traces of signals picked up by the "Scharnhorst" from the "Jamaica" or the "DoY" some 15 minutes before the final battle thanks to a "Naxos" set given by the Luftwaffe. But this set couldn´t track properly the range nor the true size of the enemy.
> 
> That is not correct. The "Scharnhorst" had a "Hohentwiel" set plus the two "Seetakt" sets.
> 
> ...


Thanks for the information its appreciated. The only question mark I have is the fitting of the Hohentweil on the destroyers, my understanding is that this happened during 1944 not1943. The rest I accept without question.
It must be said though you have to wonder why the radars were not turned on once combat had been initiated. I doubt if passive sets were able to allow blind firing and at night that is pretty critical.

Thanks again


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## parsifal (Nov 26, 2009)

There is a pretty good account of the battle by Mike Kemble, a well known author, at the following site

The Battle-Cruiser Scharnhorst

A few things that have been raisede that need to be responded to

Myth-1 
"The German Destroyers were detached on a separate search arc, deliberately by Adm Bey"

Not so according to Kemble, as the following extract shows

_The German Battle-Cruiser Scharnhorst was now on her way to her destiny, heading north at 25 knots, into worsening weather. Seas were washing completely over the destroyer escorts battling along with her. At 0300 hrs 26th December, Bey received a signal confirming the operation was to proceed. By 0700 hrs the Scharnhorst's navigator reckoned that they were now within 30 miles of the convoy, and ahead of it, another 40 minutes and the convoy should be in view. At 0820 hrs, for some unknown reason, Admiral Bey turned the Scharnhorst to the north. However, Bey neglected to inform the 4th Flotilla who sailed blindly on at 90 degrees to the Scharnhorst, contact soon being lost, never to be regained._

It should be obvious to anyone with any inkling of the nature of naval operations that this losing of contact would not have occurred if the the Germans had adopted a more up to date operational policy with their radar

Myth 2

"Using Radar was more dangerous than not using it". 

The Germans used a passive bistatic system during World War II. This system, called the Kleine Heidelberg device, was deployed at seven sites (Limmen, Oostvoorne, Ostend, Boulogne, Abbeville, Cap d'Antifer and Cherbourg) and operated as bistatic receivers, using the British Chain Home radars as non-cooperative illuminators, to detect aircraft over the southern part of the North Sea. none were instaleed into warships that I know of 

There were a number of passive detection systems that could be in use with the KM that I know of, including Metox 
Naxos, Samos and Timor. There were others, but as far as I am aware they were incapable of detecting the HF radars below the 10cnm wavelengths such as the Type 274. Afaik, effective passive detection of this radar was not developed until the mid-50s

According to wiki "_The FuG 350 Naxos radar detector was a World War II German counter measure to SHF band centimetric wavelength radar produced by a cavity magnetron.

Telefunken built a simple detector named "Naxos" that could pick up 10 cm / 3 GHz H2S radar transmissions, and a more sophisticated detector named "Korfu" with greater range and accuracy.

Korfu saw little use, but Naxos saw widespread service. There were two different types of Naxos. "Naxos Z" was developed for night fighters and mounted in a blister on top of the fighter's canopy. It could detect an RAF bomber from much longer range than FuG 227 Flensburg. Another version, the S-band (2500-3700MHz, 12-9 cm wavelength)[1] FuMB7[2] Naxos U, was provided to U-boats to allow them to detect 10 cm / 3 GHz ASV, though by that time the U-boats were entirely on the defensive and it did them only a little good. By one of those weird coincidences which occur in wartime, the U-Boats received their Naxos 10 cm detectors on the same day that RAF Coastal Command deployed its first 3 cm ASV radar sets. Naxos was further hobbled by the fact that it proved very fragile in field conditions, and working out the bugs ended up being a difficult task."

As will be seen below, Naxos was unable to detect either the Type 284M or the Type 274 gunnery radars in use by the RN in the battle

Metox was a similar device, able to detect radars above the 10 cm bandwidth. Since the surface radars installed in the RN surface ships after 1942 were all well below this wavelength, there was no hope of the device being effective after 1942, even against its intended target ASV radars, which by then were also operating below the specified band width.

Passive detection could not assist in gunnery direction finding, or fire control, though they might give a general warning of the proximity of enemies. Since this was already known to the Germans at the time of the battle, I dont see a great deal of benefit arising from them

The basic question that has to be asked is this, was using radar actively more dangerous than not using it. The Germans could hardly have done worse, and handled their forces worse with a strong policy of not using radar actively, so there should be little doubt about which policy was the more successful.

Postwar, no Navy adopted as operational policy the general "radar silence" policy adopted by the KM during the war, until well into the 70's with the adoption of radar seeking weaponary. This did lead to the use of radar silence, but for reasons that simply did not exist during the war.

no question in my mind, the Germans were mistaken in their operational policies during the war 


Myth 3

"German radar was comparable in performance to the late war British radars"

German radfar was in fact comparable to British radar in 1940-41, but lagged very badly as the war progressed, especially those sets actually employed in an operational capacity 

I have provided figures on the essential characteristics for the following radars

Type 284/284M/274/Fumo 27

in that order. Note that DoY was fitted with Type 284M and Type 274, and Scharnhorst with Fumo 27 at the time of the battle


Frequency: 600/600/3296/368. Frequency is important because it is a major determinant in the definition the set will achieve an its overall accuracy. As can be seen, the German set operated at about half that of the Type 284s, and about 10% as high as the Type 274 

Power: 25/150/400/60 (FUMO 34)

Pulse (microseconds): 2/1/0.5/5.0

Range/error: 21950+/- 110/ 27430+/- 25/ 36650 +/-20 / 22000 +/- 75 m

Bearing Error: +/-30/5/3/300

By 1945, my sources tell me that the new sets fitted to the Prinz Eugen had reduced the PP to 4 microseconds, and the accuracy to +/-50m

At no point however were German naval radars at all compaparable to Allied radars, refelected in the fact that by early 1943, the principal fire control mechanisms in RN ships were all radar controlled, whereas they remained conteolled by optical means in the KM

Myth 4

HMS was out of action until after D-Day

Not true. According to this site..... HMS Norfolk, British heavy cruiser, WW2


Engaged German battleship SCHARNHORST after radar contact by HM Cruiser SHEFFIELD 

and joined by Home Fleet destroyers. Twice hit by enemy fire which damaged "X" turret and

radar equipment. Seven of ships’ company were killed and five wounded.

Took part in the subsequent surface gun action against SCHARNHORST with HM Battleship

DUKE OF YORK, HM Cruisers BELFAST and SHEFFIELD –

For details see THE KOLA RUN by D. Campbell and D. Maclnryre, ENGAGE THE ENEMY

MORE CLOSELY and Naval Staff History).



1 9 4 4



January Deployed with Home Fleet.



February Under major refit in Tyne shipyard.

to "X" turret removed. Gunnery fire control radars fitted (Type 274,282,283 and 285.)

November New Surface Warning radars Type 277 and 293 fitted.

(See RADAR AT SEA by D. Howse).

The ship rejoined the Home Fleet in January 1944. It was taken in hand for refit in February, which lasted until November. This cannot be seen as being put out of action as a result of damage received. If it had it would have been decommissioned immediately after the battle_


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## DonL (Nov 26, 2009)

What I don't understand is this discussion about Nordkap!

Yes SH was only an average design and yes there was no radar control fire equipment on german vessels during the WWII. But that's not the fault of the vessel if radar control or not. And this Thread should be discussing Hood versus SH 1939 till 1941 so no radar is in this match.

I have described my opinion so what is your opinions guys? Long range; short range, guns especially at which range can SH hit through the main belt of Hood; speed advantage.............?

I think there are some very interesting points so what's going on without Nordcap!


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## renrich (Nov 26, 2009)

The threads on this site do seem to wander from time to time. It is all interesting though.


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## parsifal (Nov 27, 2009)

The main characteristics of the Hoods defensive scheme were as follows (from wiki)

Hood's protection accounted for 33% of her displacement; a high proportion by British standards, although less than was usual in contemporary German designs (for example, 36% for the battlecruiser SMS Hindenburg).

The armoured belt consisted of face-hardened armour (Krupp cemented or KC), arranged as follows:

Main belt: 12 in (305 mm) between A and Y barbettes; forward extension 5 to 6 in (127 to 152 mm); aft extension 6 in (152 mm); 
Middle belt: 7 in (178 mm) between A and Y barbettes; forward extension 5 in (127 mm); 
Upper belt: 5 in (127 mm) amidships, extending forward to A barbette, with a short 4 in (102 mm) extension aft. 
All sections of the belt were angled outwards by 10 degrees, increasing the effective armour thickness by causing incoming shells to strike at a less favourable angle for penetration.
The deck protection was constructed from high tensile (HT) steel, arranged as follows:
Forecastle deck: 1.75 to 2 in (44 to 51 mm); 
Upper deck: 2 in (51 mm) over magazines; 0.75 in (19 mm) elsewhere; 
Main deck: 3 in (76 mm) over magazines; 1 in (25 mm) elsewhere; plus 2 in (51 mm) slope meeting bottom of main belt; 
Lower deck (forward and aft): 3 in (76 mm) over propeller shafts; 2 in (51 mm) magazine crowns; 1 in (25 mm) elsewhere. 
The 3 in (76 mm) plating on the main deck was added at a very late stage of construction, after live firing trials with the new 15 in APC (armour-piercing, capped) shell in the autumn of 1919 showed that this shell could penetrate the ship's vitals via the 7 in (178 mm) middle belt and the 2 in (51 mm) slope of the main deck. Further trials showed that the additional plating was just adequate to defeat this threat. It was apparently proposed to extend the new plating to the whole of the upper deck, removing the conning tower, torpedo tubes and four 5.5 in guns as weight compensation; in the event, only the areas above the magazines were reinforced. As completed, Hood remained susceptible to plunging (high-trajectory) fire and bombs, and had no margin of protection against the next generation of heavy guns.
The armament turrets had a frontal armour thickness of 15 in (381 mm), side-armour of 11 to 12 in (280 to 305 mm) and a roof of 5 in (127 mm). For protection against torpedoes she was given an "anti-torpedo bulge", an air-filled space backed by an inner reinforced wall. It was a new and effective solution for WW I ships. 

The weak link in the Hood was of course its level of deck protection . It appears to be faulty in concept to me, though my opinion is that her rapid demise in 1941 was still somewhat the result of very bad luck

On the assumption that her armouring scheme was designed to withstand the British 15" shell, one therefore needs to compare this venerable gun to the performance of the SKC/34 28cm fitted to the Scharnhorst to determine if the latter weapon was of sufficient power to deal with the Hoods defensive scheme adequately. 

Using the Nav weapons site, I found the following characteristics for each gun. 
Elevation With 727.5 lbs. (330 kg) APC L4,4 Striking Velocity Angle of Fall 
2.0 degrees 5,470 yards (5,000 m) 2,513 fps (766 mps) 2.5 
4.3 degrees 10,940 yards (10,000 m) 2,139 fps (652 mps) 5.7 
7.4 degrees 16,400 yards (15,000 m) 1,824 fps (556 mps) 10.3 
11.3 degrees 21,870 yards (20,000 m) 1,578 fps (481 mps) 17.2 
16.2 degrees 27,340 yards (25,000 m) 1,430 fps (436 mps) 25.7 
22.0 degrees 32,810 yards (30,000 m) 1,371 fps (418 mps) 35.3 
29.2 degrees 38,280 yards (35,000 m) 1,404 fps (428 mps) 44.0 
38.2 degrees 43,740 yards (40,000 m) 1,509 fps (460 mps) 52.0 
40.0 degrees 44,760 yards (40,930m) --- 

At maximum recorded range for any hit on a warsgip, the 28cm weapon is going to strike its target at sbout 20-25 degrees. Because of its flat trajectory, it gained a reputation as an accurate gun, but this also means it has a lesser chance of achieving a plunging fire solution compared to its 38cm cousin

This means that it will have to defeat the side armouring scheme of the Hood. We therefore need to check the AP characteristics of the gun:

Range : Side Armor/ Deck Armor 
0 yards (0 m): 23.79" (604 mm)/ --- 
8,640 yards (7,900 m): 18.09" (460 mm)/ 0.76" (19 mm) 
16,514 yards (15,100 m): 13.18" (335 mm)/ 1.63" (41 mm) 
20,013 yards (18,288 m): 11.47" (291 mm)/ 1.87" (48 mm) 
30,000 yards (27,432 m): 8.08" (205 mm)/ 2.99" (76 mm) 
Note: The above information is from "Battleships: Axis and Neutral Battleships in World War Two" for a muzzle velocity of 2,920 fps (890 mps) and is based upon the USN Empirical Formula for Armor Penetration. I copied this and the next dataset from the Nav weapons site

Range: Side Armor 
10,936 yards (10,000 m): 13.70" (348 mm) 
16,404 yards (15,000 m): 11.02" (280 mm) 
21,872 yards (20,000 m): 8.86" (225 mm) 
27,340 yards (25,000 m): 7.64" (194 mm) 
Note: The above information is from "German Capital Ships of World War Two." The data is based upon the pre-war Krupp test shoots on their range in Meppen with L/4,4 APC projectiles using RPC/32 propellant against KC-type armor at an impact angle of 70 degrees. 

Just glancing at these figures, it becomes apparent that the 28cm gun could not penetreate the main belt of the Hood outside of 16000 yards (ignoring any interanl bulkheads after the main belt. I estimete the middle belt was protection against projectiles fired at greater than 21000 yards. The deck plating of the main deck could not be penetrated by plunging fire.

These are not good figures forthe SKC 34 

Now, the Scharnhorst armouring scheme was:
main belt: 6-13.75
Deck: 2in
armoured deck (below): 3in
Turrets: 6-14 (face) 

The 15in Mk II had the following characteristics

Range
Elevation(see Note 2) With 1,920 lbs. (871 kg) 4crh AP Shell 
1.0 degree 1,920 yards (1,756 m) --- 1.0 
2.6 degrees 5,000 yards (4,570 m) 2,074 fps (632 mps) 3.0 
5.0 degrees 8,629 yards (7,980 m) --- 6.0 
5.9 degrees 10,000 yards (9,140 m) 1,776 fps (541 mps) 7.3 
10.0 degrees 14,853 yards (13,582 m) --- 13.0 
10.1 degrees 15,000 yards (13,720 m) 1,537 fps (468 mps) 13.6 
15.0 degrees 19,707 yards (18,020 m) --- 21.0 
15.6 degrees 20,000 yards (18,290 m) 1,377 fps (420 mps) 22.3 
20.0 degrees 
(see Note 3) 23,734 yards (21,702 m) --- 29.0 
20.0 degrees 
(see Note 3) 23,387 yards (21,385 m) --- --- 
22.5 degrees 25,000 yards (22,860 m) 1,317 fps (401 mps) 32.7 
30.1 degrees 29,000 yards (26,520 m) 1,326 fps (404 mps) 42.0 


In summary, it has a steeper angle of descent than the 28cm weapon, making a plunging fire shot more likely, roughly 50% more likely in fact.

Now, the AP characteristics of this gun:

Armor Penetration with 1,938 lbs. (879 kg) APC Shell
. 
Range Side Armor Deck Armor 
17,200 yards (15,730 m) 14.0" (356 mm) --- 
18,000 yards (16,460 m) --- 2.0" (51 mm) 
19,400 yards (17,740 m) 13.0" (330 mm) --- 
21,700 yards (19,840 m) 12.0" (305 mm) --- 
24,000 yards (21,950 m) --- 3.0" (76 mm) 
24,500 yards (22,400 m) 11.0" (279 mm) --- 
28,000 yards (25,600 m) 10.0" (254 mm) 4.0" (102 mm) 
29,500 yards (26,970 m) --- 5.0" (127 mm) 
32,500 yards (29,720 m) --- 6.0" (152 mm) 
Notes: 
This data is from "British Battleships of World War Two." This table assumes 90 degree inclination and is based upon theoretical calculations performed in 1935, not actual firing trials. 

Armor Penetration with 1,938 lbs. (879 kg) APC Shell
. 
Range Side Armor Deck Armor 
0 yards (0 m) 27.1" (687 mm) --- 
10,000 yards (9,144 m) 16.5" (422 mm) 1.25" (32 mm) 
15,000 yards (13,716 m) 13.9" (353 mm) 1.95" (50 mm) 
20,000 yards (18,288 m) 11.7" (297 mm) 3.10" (72 mm) 
25,000 yards (22,860 m) 10.2" (259 mm) 4.30" (121 mm) 
30,000 yards (27,432 m) 9.0" (229 mm) 5.70" (145 mm) 
Note: This data is from "Battleships: Allied Battleships in World War II" for a muzzle velocity of 2,400 fps (732 mps) and is partly based upon the USN Empirical Formula for Armor Penetration and partly based upon official data. 

In 1921 the British conducted a series of gunnery trials using the last battleship completed by the Germans during World War I, the surrendered Baden. These trials were conducted as a part of the design process for the next generation of capital ships, which were later cancelled as a result of the Washington Naval Limitation Treaty. During these gunnery trials, the monitors Erebus and Terror fired a total of 31 shells using reduced charges in order to obtain striking velocities equivalent to the expected battle ranges. Two primary striking velocities were used, 1,550 fps (472 mps) simulating a range of 15,500 yards (14,170 m) and 1,380 fps (421 mps) simulating a range of 21,800 yards (19,930 m). 
Tests at 1,550 fps (472 mps) with 4crh "Greenboy" APC showed that these projectiles could penetrate turret face armor of 35 cm (13.8 in) when struck at an angle of 18.5 degrees and penetrate barbette armor of 35 cm (13.8 in) when struck at an angle of 11 degrees, but that this same armor thickness on the conning tower successfully defeated an APC striking at an angle of 30 degrees. Another test at this velocity saw an APC striking at an angle of 14.5 degrees penetrating the upper armor belt of 25 cm (10 in) and this shell then traveling some 38 feet (11.6 m) before bursting on the funnel casing and damaging two boilers, having first penetrated a 3 cm (1.2 in) splinter bulkhead and the 1.2 cm (0.5 in) main deck


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## hartmann (Dec 7, 2009)

> all the German heavy destroyers had one "Seetakt" set installed from 1942…”
> 
> That is also my understanding. Did they use their radars?



In this battle probably yes, but those sets were of less capability than the installed in heavy cruisers and battleships, so I don’t know If really were effective in the so rough sea of these days and, also, They had very limited range (given the reduced height of the aerials) of some 10-12 kms (probably less in those meteorological conditions.)



> ” They were very effective, but the lucky hit on the foremast destroyed both, passive systems and the forward Seetakt radar set as both them were grouped closely, so it didn’t worked only because it was previously destroyed…”
> 
> Interesting, but why didn’t they pick up the radars of the cruisers before the first clash; the cruisers have had Sch. in their screens c. 54 minutes before they opened fire?




Probably, the cruisers were using a combination of search radar models of Type 273 Q and Type 284, both in decimetric and centimetric wavelengths so it was far more difficult to track them. 
Honestly, the battle of North Cape isn’t one of the mostly studied by me. I can’t tell you more about this at the moment.




> Thanks for the information it’s appreciated.



Thanks a lot for your words  



> The only question mark I have is the fitting of the Hohentwiel on the destroyers; my understanding is that this happened during 1944 not 1943.



I have been reading some notes and documents, and probably you are right. I thought firstly in the bigger vessels, which received a set of “Hohentwiel” in mid to finish of 1943. My mistake (I was writing from my memory ).



> It must be said though you have to wonder why the radars were not turned on once combat had been initiated.




You have to take in account that those sets were driven by electronic vacuum valves, and not by chips and silicon components, so They needed sometime to warm and properly functioning (the German valves were realtively fast, comparatively, the British sets needed large periods of pre- heating, by this reason the British almost never turned off their sets, because they needed a lot of time to restart them again.



> I doubt if passive sets were able to allow blind firing and at night that is pretty critical.



Pretty correct my friend. It was almost impossible to make blind fire with only passive sets in night and gale weather as in Nordkapp.


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## hartmann (Dec 7, 2009)

> There is a pretty good account of the battle by Mike Kemble, a well known author, at the following site
> 
> The Battle-Cruiser Scharnhorst
> 
> A few things that have been raisede that need to be responded to



In fact, the writer of the webpage has no idea about the ship, as She was classified ever as a fast battleship by Germany and built as such (Schlachtschiff, not Schlacht Kreuizer).




> There were a number of passive detection systems that could be in use with the KM that I know of, including Metox, Naxos, Samos and Timor. There were others, but as far as I am aware they were incapable of detecting the HF radars below the 10cm wavelengths such as the Type 274.



That’s not correct. 
“Naxos” was tuned to catch emissions in the range of 10-9 cm as direct response to H2S panoramic radar, but It in fact could track at very short ranges, sub-harmonics of this frequency, giving the possibility under certain circumstances of detect also H2X, in the 3,3 cm range. Because It was not a very common success, the much more specialised “Korfu” and “Mücke” were created, which were capable of tracking radar emissions ranging from 1,5 cm to 12 cm. And finally, in very late 1944 entered the FuMB 36 “Athos”, capable of tracking wavelengths between 1, 5 cm to only millimetric waves (frequencies up to 40.000 MHz).

Also, the radar set Type 274 was a set tuned to send in 10 to 9 cm so it was perfectly capable of being tracked by a “Naxos” (as in fact happened in the battle).



> Afaik, effective passive detection of this radar was not developed until the mid-50s.




Not again. The Germans put in service passive sets (FuMB sets) capable of detecting wavelengths ranging from millimetres to metres. If Naxos wouldn´t have worked, the British bomber crews wouldn´t have suffered so much. 




> Korfu saw little use,



 It saw good use in the Kriegsmarine in the last year of war, mainly in cruisers and destroyers, but also in U Boote.




> As will be seen below, Naxos was unable to detect either the Type 284M




Quite obvious, as it operated in 50 cm band.




> or the Type 274 gunnery radars in use by the RN in the battle





The Type 274 was not used by DoY in this battle, as it was the centimetric replacement of gun laying radar Type 284 in all its variants (and again once more, If it would have been used, which was not the case, It would have been tracked as It had centimetric wavelength).

May be you refer to surface-search set Type 273Q which was carried in DoY and some of the cruisers. 




> Metox was a similar device, able to detect radars above the 10 cm bandwidth.




Yes, It was tuned to catch only signals in the 1,5 metres wavelenght, and in the third sub-harmonics, rarely catched sets in the 50 cm band.



> Since the surface radars installed in the RN surface ships after 1942 were all well below this wavelengt,




Even the RAF used well until 1944 metric sets in ASW search and interception.

In fact, during the war there was not a single set below the 10 cm band installed in a single RN ship (only a pair of experimental sets as the Type 268U). All ranged from 7,5 metres to 10 cm in wavelength, so, no one surpassed the capability of Naxos, much less the more advanced passive sets.



> even against its intended target ASV radars,




Again it is not absolutely correct. As I previously stated, the introduction of centimetric wave sets was a very hard work. By example, the USS Washington battleship used until well late 1944 the MK3/MK4 decimetric sets even when their sisters had the far better MK8 sets. 
And this is only one example.



> "German radar was comparable in performance to the late war British radars"
> 
> German radar was in fact comparable to British radar in 1940-41, but lagged very badly as the war progressed, especially those sets actually employed in an operational capacity




That is the true myth my friend, the German gunlaying sets both in Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine were as capable or more than the Allied counterparts. Indeed, a good work in disinformation and dissemination of propaganda. Rather the inverse, the British radar of 1941 was not on par with the late 1941 German radar sets. Not until the Type 271 the British had comparable surface search radar to the basic Seetakt sets of first series¡¡



> Type 284/284M/274/Fumo 27
> 
> in that order. Note that DoY was fitted with Type 284M and Type 274,



 
That is nonsense, the DoY *only* had the decimetric gunlaying Type 284M set, but not the 274. Again it must be the surface search Type 273Q, not the gunlaying Type 274.



> and Scharnhorst with FuMO 27 at the time of the battle




Again, it is not the case my friend. The “Scharnhorst” was upgraded to the FuMO 26 (the true German gunlaying beast set) just a couple of moths before the last engagement (probably the radar servants were not well trained with this new set).


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## hartmann (Dec 7, 2009)

The last post of my answer.



> Frequency: 600/600/3296/368. Frequency is important because it is a major determinant in the definition the set will achieve and its overall accuracy.



Again not. Taking into account only the frequency (or the equivalent, wavelength) by itself, means nothing about overall accuracy and definition of the set. There are a lot of other parameters far more important than wavelength. If this would be the case, the SCR 268 family of AA gunlaying sets, operating at 1,5 metres would be completely useless, which of course was not the case, as SCR 268 AA gunlaying sets were the most capable of US Army until the entry of SCR 584.




> As can be seen, the German set operated at about half that of the Type 284s, and about 10% as high as the Type 274.



I would better put the wavelength, as it is more understandable to the rest of the people:

Type 284 and 284 M = 50-55 cm.
Type 274 = 10-9,8 cm.
FuMO2x = Between 70 to 83 cm.





> Power: 25/150/400/60 (FUMO 34)



The transmitted power of the FuMO 26 was only 16 Kilowatts and beat the Type 284 in range and equals to the Type 284M, so, again as the wavelength/frequency, taken alone, is senseless. And aagain, the FuMO 34 had an emitting power of 125 Kwatts, not of 60 Kwatts.




> Pulse (microseconds): 2/1/0.5/5.0



What do you refer with this data? Pulse duration (PL) or Pulse Repetition Frequency (PRF)? 

the Type 284 used a PRF of 500 Hz, the Type 284M maybe was boosted to 600, but again, the FuMO27 and 26, used a PRF of 500 Hz (the first series, aka FuMO21 and 22, between 1000-2000 Hz). 

If We talk about Pulse length, It is also wrong, *all*the Seetakt radar sets had ever a Pulse Length (PL) of 2-3 microseconds (average 2,5), not 5.



> Bearing Error: +/-30/5/3/300



Again, the data is not correct for German set, and misleading (as is commonly given in degrees and mils, not in meters or feets, as you are speaking of angular data when talk about bearing).



> By 1945, my sources tell me that the new sets fitted to the Prinz Eugen had reduced the PP to 4 microseconds, and the accuracy to +/-50 m




Again, range accuracies of 100-50 metres with FuMO sets were obtained in late 1941 to mid 1942, not in 1945, and btw, both, the PL and the PRF of German sets remained the same, 2,5 microseconds and 500 Hz, It didn’t changed in second and third FuMO series.




> At no point however were German naval radars at all comparable to Allied radars,





Which were not? Again, the FuMO26 or the “Renner” series gunlaying coastal artillery sets were equal to the best Allied sets. Concerning surface search radars, the late war “Hohentwiel” model was very comparable to SG and Type 273 sets, so I don’t see an abysmal difference (even the early “Hohentwiel” was superior to Type 271).


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## parsifal (Dec 7, 2009)

Well, ther is virtually nothing that we agree on I can see. If you dont mind, I will continue to rely on the sources that I draw from, such as Campbell and the nav weapons, if they are "propaganda sources", then they are pretty good, since they are accepted by all except the most cocketed pro-germans around. We will have to agree to disagree on this issue I am afraid. 

Of course, I could be wrong, and in fact the Germans only let us win because they felt sorry for us....or, the accpted texts are correct.


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## hartmann (Dec 8, 2009)

> I will continue to rely on the sources that I draw from, such as Campbell and the nav weapons



If You like, I would suggest better the book "GEMA" from Harry von Kroge, original German documents like AGR, or the manual of the FuG 224 (or If You like FuMO 81) "Berlin" series radar sets, books like "Blitz und anker" (both 2 volumes) from Joachim Beckh, some books about radar technology like from Skolnik, in both two and third edition and University courses (like when I studied optics). 
Or may be books like "Deckname Würzburg" from Arthur O. Bauer, or may be "A RADAR HISTORY OF WWII" written by Louis Brown and so on, instead on reliying in Internet. But I can say You a lot more (and certainly, I have also campbell book "Naval Weapons").



> since they are accepted by all





> cocketed pro-germans



Do You think so it really? 

Well, then I will forget all that I have learned until now form WWII radar technology and naval technology and I will reconsider the "Bismarck" class as a mere bigger "Baden" ships, or that German radar technology was far behind the allied technology from 1941, as It is the accepted by allmost all writers 
(uhmm, I have cited some others which don´t consider this, very extrange , they must be also cocketed pro-germans ). 



> and in fact the Germans only let us win because they felt sorry for us



 

What sh*t is this? 

Facts are facts.
I have given you enough data to reconsider some things wrtitten by the common wisdom, from new research, completelly correct, and It doesn´t matter If Germany was behind or beyond the Allies in some technology, They lost by their mistakes and because a lot more things. Not by They felt sorry for Us. If the data given doesn´t fit in your agenda, It is not my problem.

By myself, this discussion can be finished. I have not intention to ear insults and discredits.


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## parsifal (Dec 8, 2009)

Sorry that you feel that way.

Correct me if I have misunderstood you, but just one of the issues you raised was that the Duke Of York was not fitted with Type 279 Radar. 

So how do you explain this???? The Photo, incidentally was taken prior to 1944 according to the internet source that I found the image..... The captions are not mine

I think that Internet sources in a forum such as this have the advantage of being verifiable. 

One article from the Nav Weapons site which includes input by such venerable experts as Nathan Okun had this say regarding the application of radar on ships of the KM

_Although German radar development was very promising in its early stages it was quickly overtaken by allied technology. One major reason for this was that the German Navy, which was the most conservative of the three services, did not realize the full potential of active radar, leaving the Allies in a favorable position to force the pace of the microwave war. The German Navy had decided that radar transmissions would provide a source from which an enemy could obtain a 'fix' on a ship's position, in the same way that direction-finders could be used to obtain a 'fix' on the source of a radio transmission. Extensive use of radar was therefore discouraged, a decision reinforced by the German belief in the superiority of their optical equipment. It is significant that young officers were taught absolutely nothing about radar and had to learn from scratch about the complex microwave war while on active service, in conditions where any fault could be fatal. It was not until March 1945 that German Naval Command issued Tactical order No 10 entitled Instruction for use of radar aboard surface units. 

Thus the story of German naval radar in surface units is one of 'too lates'. The other services, especially the Luftwaffe, the Flak (AA) troops and even coast defense artillery, employed radar skillfully and extensively, while the Navy was tardy in proving information and training in new technology. 

Knowledge of high-frequency radio emissions was therefore limited and the quality of the radar aboard German ships depended substantially on the personnel interest of the responsible radio officer. Only a few of these were electronic experts, by virtue of being enthusiastic, and even fewer had good contacts in the electronic industry, thus reducing their chances of improving sets in service. It is not surprising therefore that, under the rough conditions aboard a ship, the sensitive electronic equipment soon deteriorated and became faulty. Many surface units did not have their radar equipment recalibrated during the long periods of their careers! Thus sets became so unreliable that the commander refused to use them - an easy decision, when asked to hold strict radar silence whenever possible. 

To counter the superior Allied radar technology, German surface vessels were fitted with more and more passive sets, the field becoming so extended that description of the German passive radar-sets, the Funkmess-Beobachtungsgeräte or FuMBs has been reserved for a separate article. _

The article was written by E. Sieche. His bibliograhy was

Bibliography:
Beaver, Paul: U-Boats in the Atlantic, Patrick Stephens, Cambridge 1979; 
German Capital Ships, Patrick Stephens, Cambridge, 1981; 
German Destroyers and Escorts, Cambridge, 1982 
Bekker, Cajus: Die versunkene Flotte, Gerhard Stalling, Oldenburg 1969 
Das große Bildbuch der Kriegsmarine, Gerhard Stalling, Oldenburg 1972 
Bekker, Cajus: Augen durch Nacht und Nebel, die Radar-Story, Gerhard Stalling, Oldenburg 1962 
Breyer, Siegfried/Koop, Gerhard: Von der Emden zur Tirpitz, 2 volumes, Wehr&Wissen, Bonn 1981 
Brown, David: Tirpitz, the floating Fortress, Arms Armour Press, London 1977 
Friedmann, Norman: Naval Radar, Conway Maritime Press, London 1981 
Giessler, Helmut. Der Marine-Nachrichten und -Ortungsdienst, Lehmann, Munich 1971 
Harnack, Wolfgang: Zerstörer unter deutscher Flagge, Koehlers, Herford 1978 
Herzog, Bodo: Die deutsche Kriegsmarine im Kampf, eine Dokumentation in Bildern, Podzun, Dorheim 1975 
Herzog, Bodo/Elfrath, Ulrich: Schlachtschiff Bismarck, ein Bericht in Bildern und Dokumenten, Podzun, Dorheim 1975 
Humble, Richard: Hitler's High Seas Fleet, Pan/Ballantine, 1971 
Jones, R V: Most Secret War, Hamish Hamilton, London 1978 
Mallman-Showel, Jak P: The German Navy in World War Two, Arms Armour, London 1979 
Niehaus, Werner: Die Radar-Schlacht, Motorbuch, Stuttgart 1977 
Prager, Hans-Georg: Panzerschiff Deutschland, Schwerer Kreuzer Lützow, Koehlers, Herford 1981 
Price, Alfred: Instruments of Darkness, W Kimber Co, London 1967 
Thomas, Egbert: Torpedoboote und Zerstörer, Gerhard Stalling, Oldbenburg 1970 
Schmalenbach, Paul: Kreuzer Prinz Eugen, Koehlers, Herford 1978 

Edwin Sieche lives in Vienna and wrote "German Naval Radar to 1945" and published in "Warship" volumes 21 and 22 in 1982

I hardly think these are sources that should not be given some credence. Unfortunately they dont align at all with what you are telling...like the photo

He received assistance from Dipl.-Ing. Heinz-Gerhard Schöck


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## Vincenzo (Dec 8, 2009)

Parsifal for true hartmann tell not 274 and the pic give him reason


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## parsifal (Dec 8, 2009)

Yes, hes right in that regard, though he said a lot of other things as well, which at odds with a lot of sources, and then says they are just "propaganda".


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## hartmann (Dec 8, 2009)

That is becoming quite anoying. 



> Correct me if I have misunderstood you, but just one of the issues you raised was that the Duke Of York was not fitted with Type 279 Radar.



Now you try to justify all the things that you have said by confound the metric surface search radar type 279 (which you didn´t mentioned previously in none of your previous post) with the gunlaying centimetric radar Type 274? 
You have said all the time:


> Type 284/284M/*274*/Fumo 27





> There were others, but as far as I am aware they were incapable of detecting the HF radars below the 10cnm wavelengths such as the Type 274.





> in that order. Note that DoY was fitted with Type 284M and *Type 274* and Scharnhorst with Fumo 27 at the time of the battle





> As will be seen below, Naxos was unable to detect either the Type 284M or the
> 
> 
> > Type 274
> ...



Where is the Type 279 mentioned in your posts parsifal? We didn´t discussed about this, but about the Type 284M and Type 274 (both gunlaying sets)

Do you thing that I am joking or that I can´t read, or that I am a liar? I know perfectly both types of radar and their functions.




> The article was written by E. Sieche. His bibliograhy was
> 
> Bibliography:
> Beaver, Paul: U-Boats in the Atlantic, Patrick Stephens, Cambridge 1979;
> ...



Do you really thing that I don´t know about Erwin Sieche? 
I have almost 1/2 of his books and articles.

BTW, the article posted in navweaps, is from 1999. The article is oboslete in some points as He has pointed sometime ago.



> like the photo



The photo only gives to me reason. That there was no Type 284 and Type 274 gunlaying radars at same time in the DoY.

You could check some of the works in original (and my translation to Spanish also If you like) by the author David Saxton, to whom I am infinitely indebted for his help and data:

Allied Search Radars - KBismarck.org

May be


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## hartmann (Dec 8, 2009)

> Parsifal for true hartmann tell not 274 and the pic give him reason



Thanks Vincenzo (faster than me aswering )



> Yes, hes right in that regard, though he said a lot of other things as well, which at odds with a lot of sources, and then says they are just "propaganda".



Prove that all the data I have given is false with original documents and with those books which I have cited.

Do you t know about the trial data (not theoretical) obtained by the prototypic "Seetakt" in 1937-38?

You would probably understand what I am talking if you see the outstandingly good results (the adoption of the full equiped Seetakt by the Kriegsmarine was much later, in late 1941 because a lot of the German captains considered the radar very complex and instead of that, GEMA gave them a far more simplified and less accurate kit, the first series of FuMOs, but this is another thing).


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## parsifal (Dec 10, 2009)

The fundamental myth for me is that german radars were comparable to allied radars. Sieche says, along with a lot of others that it wasnt, ehich runs counter to what you are saying.

You also say that DoY was not equipped with gun laying radr at the time of the north Cape battle. Thats contray to EVERY account I have ever read on this engagement.

Why are you insisting on personalising every word that you or i say in this debate. To me it looks churlish in the extreme. how about a little less emotion. Just because there is a different opinion in the room does not make that person, or their opinion your mortal enemy. 

Why are you getting so angry over all of this?


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## Soren (Dec 10, 2009)

> The fundamental myth for me is that german radars were comparable to allied radars



Do you mean on battleships or in general? Cause German radar technology was atleast on par with the Allied one, the German fielding perhaps the most advanced in their Wurzburg gun laying radar.


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## Vincenzo (Dec 10, 2009)

parsifal said:


> You also say that DoY was not equipped with gun laying radr at the time of the north Cape battle. Thats contray to EVERY account I have ever read on this engagement.



Parsifal you don't read hartmann words he tell no 274 but 284 on board as the real.
imho it's not good.


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## Juha (Dec 10, 2009)

Hello Vincenzo
are you saying 284 wasn't good. I didn't bother to look what gunnery radar DoY used at North Cape but its shooting was very good, first salvo hitting and causing fire in magazine of Scharnhorst's "A" turret and some 41 salvos producing hit(s) out of some 55.

Juha


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## Vincenzo (Dec 10, 2009)

Juha said:


> Hello Vincenzo
> are you saying 284 wasn't good. I didn't bother to look what gunnery radar DoY used at North Cape but its shooting was very good, first salvo hitting and causing fire in magazine of Scharnhorst's "A" turret and some 41 salvos producing hit(s) out of some 55.
> 
> Juha



no juha i'm not sayng so.
replying don't reading is not good


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## Juha (Dec 10, 2009)

Hello Vincenzo
Thanks for clarification.

Juha


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## parsifal (Dec 10, 2009)

Soren said:


> Do you mean on battleships or in general? Cause German radar technology was atleast on par with the Allied one, the German fielding perhaps the most advanced in their Wurzburg gun laying radar.



Battleship radars, or radars used operationally afloat. Also the way the technology was integrated into the operational systems afloat. There just was not comparability there


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## HerrKaleut (Dec 15, 2009)

This could have been intresting had it not gone off at a tangent. The subject (Hood v Scharnhorst) drifted very heavily into the realms of the theoretical surrounding the battle of the North Cape, allied and axis radar, battle tactics (dont forget Bey had orders, if you suspect heavy units, withdraw...nobody mentioned that). Fellow members getting short fuzed with each other...why not fight a duel, 15 inch guns at 20,000 yards ( I refuse to go metric). Anyone served on a ship in arctic seas in a december storm. I have and even modern circuitry has been known to be put out of action. Everyone seems to assume the sets were all top line. Given 1943 technology it wouldn't surprise me if some of them were at least playing up. Scharnhorst was trapped and sunk by a superior force..end of story. So gentlemen let us calm down and resume our deliberations........Hood v Scharnhorst lets say in 1940, to the death......who wins.


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## Juha (Dec 16, 2009)

Hello Herr…
Quote:” the theoretical surrounding the battle of the North Cape, allied and axis radar, battle tactics (dont forget Bey had orders, if you suspect heavy units, withdraw...nobody mentioned that)…”

The orders should not have had any effect on cruisers vs Scharnhorst actions, because there was no heavy unit present. Did the Germans really thing that Norfolk’s 8in splashes were 14 or 15in, or were they convenient excuse to abort mission which was clearly running into trouble? It is entirely possible that Germans made genuine error even if 14 or 15in shells were clearly very much heavier than 8in but still...

IMHO North Cape, actions against Renown and Glorious and against Bismarck show how it worked in real for Scharnhorst and for Hood. Pure speculation based on paper figures isn’t IMHO very rewarding. IMHO Hood was an old-fashioned design to which I don’t have much interest, so I didn’t check the safety zones, but IMHO in good weather Scharnhorst had edge, on stormy weather Hood, but the one who began first hitting hard probably would win. Reasons to my opinion: Scharnhorst shooting was excellent against Glorious (in good weather) but against Renown not good, IIRC it was Gneisenau which got the hit on Renown’s hull and the hit on Renown’s mast. Also in stormy weather Scharnhorsts suffered bad gunnery problems, during engagement Renown fired 230 15in shells, Gneisenau 54 and Scharnhorst 182 11in shells, so in bad weather 11in high rate of fire was negated by unreliability in stormy sea. Also the action showed than unexpected may happen as shown by the effect of a 4.5in hit on Gneisenau’s A turret, it made a contribution to breaking down of the turret, even if theoretically a hit of so light shell should not have any effect on the working of so well armoured turret.

Hood’s shooting in Bismarck action was poor but even one hit from 15in could have disastrous effect on Scharnhorst, even if that wasn’t probable, see the effects of the DoY’s first hit on Scharnhorst, which knocked out the A turret on one hand, on the other hand see how much pounding was needed to sink or even to neutralize it.

Rawalpindi action was a short range work.

Juha


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## parsifal (Dec 16, 2009)

I also dont see why we have to restrict the debate to hood vs scharnhorst in 1940. The thread topic is Hood vs Scharnhorst ....period. Hood was scheduled for a major overhaul later in 1941, so any engagement later than May 1941 we have to consider the possible electronics fit after that early war period

For the record, incidentally I have been in the Antarctic waters, firstly aboard the a training ship, and two years later on the Antarctic re-supply ship, the Nella Dan, travelling almost all the way to the ice shelf. I agree that the weather in those latitudes can be attrociaous and very scary, and i agree that it could be hard on electronic systems, but for the record on both trips we never suffered even a single serious failure in our electronics systems. The Training ship was fitted with radars directly descended from the radars we are discussing, and if anything I would consider them less fragile and delicate to the later transistorised systems on the supply ship.....

If you restrict the engagement times to before 1941, I would think the advantage lies with the Scharnhorst...she had superior radar at that point, better optics, and a better trained crew. But where I disagree with our friend is his hard assertion that German radar technolgy afloat remained technically superior throughout all or most of the war. It did not, as even German sources acknowledge


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## timshatz (Dec 16, 2009)

Juha said:


> some 41 salvos producing hit(s) out of some 55.
> 
> Juha



Juha, is that accurate? 41 hits from a 15" tube is a brutal pounding. Do you have any source data on it? 

Not doubting you, just wanted to know the details. The Kirishima was shot full of holes by the Washington and she took something like 20 hits (orginally stated as 9 but upped to 20 in view of more recent info that has come to light). 

41 hits (at least, not counting double hits in the salvos) is a lot of holes.


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## Juha (Dec 16, 2009)

Hello Timshatz
it always good to be sceptical and ask sources. Now I have made a typo and remembered wrongly. The source is Garzke's and Dulin's Battleships. Axis and neutral Battleships in WWII. DoY fired 52 salvos of which 31 straddled and it got at least 13 hits. And the main armament of DoY was 10 14in guns.

Juha

ADDITION: In their Battleships. Allied Battleships in WWII Garzke and Dulin give the number of hits as "at least ten"


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## Kurfürst (Dec 16, 2009)

parsifal said:


> The fundamental myth for me is that german radars were comparable to allied radars.



As much as it annoys certain posters with a long history of trashing German equipment and trumpet the superiority of the British stuff at every opporunity, without any decent ground for it if I might add. You are utterly incapable of presenting an objective view on these matters.

As far as the German sets go, they were indeed comperable. It doesn't matter if it upsets you, or if you wish for something else. It also doesn't merit a lengthy discussion to compare data which shows that the capabilities of the sets in practical use was identical. To give an example, if one radar sets would have a range accuracy of 200 meter, and the other having a range accuracy of 50 m it might be a meaningful difference; but if one has an accuracy of 50m and the other and accuracy of 30, wherease the dispersion of the guns themselves is as much as 100 meter, the relative small difference in the accuracy of the fire control data becomes meaningless. I think this is well illustrated by Gliders example of the HMS Tiger gunnery results - I am sure the modern radar sets and FC systems provided far more accurate solutions, and regardless, the firing accuracy was not much better, if better at all, than that of World War II warships; while the radar was better, the inherent inaccuracy of guns themselves at such range presented the same limiting factor again. 

Its better and more accurate to say that early in and before the war they had considerable technical lead in fire control radars, the Seetakt series being specifically developed for such work, and having a magnitude better range and bearing accuracy. The early war British sets were not particularly good in comparison, hence why they needed to be replaced by newer sets which actually worked they should have in the first place. 

The German sets were already capable of providing more accurate firing solution than the dispersion of the guns themselves. Even their early war sets were comparable in that regard to the latest Allied sets. 

Later in the war the Allied sets improved, although using a different approach. The common logical flaw you show is that you assume that German sets didn't improve at all in the meantime. This is false, of course - but the German improvements revolved around refining the existing set, and using much higher transmitting powers. For example Scharnhorst's sets as of late 1943 were operating with 100 kW instead of the original 7 kW of the earliest Seetakts before the war. Naturally the greater power yielded higher range, but there were minor improvements to bearing accuracy as well; in the latter there was little room for improvements, the Seetakt was very good in this regard from the start.

Its easy to look up to specs from reliable sources, ie. Norman Friedman and others. As far as your comments about the passive sets such as Naxos being incapable of detecting 3cm waves, this is wrong, too, apart from that it was also proven that the DoY did not have 3cm sets present at all. As far as Naxos goes, there were about a dozen subtypes of it, some of which were capable detecting the 3cm waves as well. Obviously your reliance on a short wiki article did you disservice in that regard, but in any case, IMHO it is also very doubtful that there would be any meaningful technical difficulty in building a _receiver_ device that could detect radio waves of a given wavelenght. Obviously the Germans did not have a need for such a passive device until the British did not start fielding one that could be detected... 



> Just because there is a different opinion in the room does not make that person, or their opinion your mortal enemy.
> 
> Why are you getting so angry over all of this?



It seems to me that you should be asking this question from yourself... you should realize that it is your aggressive and arrogant style yields such responses.


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## Kurfürst (Dec 16, 2009)

parsifal said:


> Battleship radars, or radars used operationally afloat. Also the way the technology was integrated into the operational systems afloat. There just was not comparability there



I dont know of Würzburg set theoretically compatible or not, but in practice was present on the Tirpitz (or was it Prinz Eugen?) 8) as an air search radar, possibly as a AAA FC radar well (for which purpose it was used in ground installations in the first place).

PS. As a matter of fact the land based Freya radar sets were also based on the naval Seetakt AFAIK.


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## parsifal (Dec 17, 2009)

Not in every case do i think German equipment is inferior. In this thread I have stated my opinion that in 1940-41 the Scharnhorst would have held the advantage in terms of its radar, crew training and optics. It was an exceptionally well protected ship, and fast.

The issue that upsets you is that I dont accept that German shipborne radars were not the equal of Allied radars in the latter paret of the war. Thats my opinion, and its shared by a lot of others, including eminent German writers.

Instead of losing your temper, how about you produce some evidence to support your position. Given that this is meant to be a general discussion, why not post some general texts that support the notion that german naval radars were the equal or superior of allied radars in the late war period


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## timshatz (Dec 17, 2009)

Juha said:


> Hello Timshatz
> it always good to be sceptical and ask sources. Now I have made a typo and remembered wrongly. The source is Garzke's and Dulin's Battleships. Axis and neutral Battleships in WWII. DoY fired 52 salvos of which 31 straddled and it got at least 13 hits. And the main armament of DoY was 10 14in guns.
> 
> Juha
> ...



No worries Juha. Still pretty good shooting. 31 straddles with 13 hits sounds low. Probably more hits. I guess there weren't enough survivors to tell. 

I was reading the analysis of the action btween the Kirishima and the Washington. The USN only claimed 9 hits because they were counting splashes. They figured if there was a splash, there wasn't a hit, and vice versa. It turned out in the author's investigation that the angle of the rounds was so flat that half the rounds that hit the Kirishima actually splashed first and then penetrated. So the total was closer to 20 hits. 

As the DoY was firing at a greater distance, plunging fire might be less viable to this point. But it is something to keep in mind when considering hit/miss in such a situation. IMHO.


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## vinnye (Jan 4, 2010)

Scharnhorst was a very powerful ship designed if I remember correctly as a raider. She was given speed to try to elude the RN Capital ships and engagew with Cruisers and convoy close escorts. I do believe that orders were given to KM Captains to avoid engagements with HM Capital ships - as the KM had fewer large assets than the RN. Even though the RN were severely stretched - trying to cover all the possible routes that the KM could use to attack the convoys.
HMS Hood was an old design that had recognised flaws - mainly the poor deck armour. Her speed was good in nearly all conditions - an advantage over Scharnhorst. This would in most situations in the battle give Hood the option to close or to stand off.
I believe that the 15 inch sheels of the Hood would do significant damage to the Scharnhorst - at ant range. But the Scharnhorst I believe would need to close the range to Hood to do serious damage. Evidence for this is the survival of both 6inch and 8 inch RN cruisers after 11 inch hits. So assuming that Hoods armour was at least on par with a light cruiser, HOOD WINS!
If Hood ahd had a refit - and Scharnhorst had also had a refit it would have been a closer run engagement.
Also - it needs to be remebered that the RN had had over 200 years building up a reputation - that they were not willing to lose easily. The actions of HM destroyers and light cruisers epitomises this. Also whilst getting hammered from the air in the Med - Cunningham continued to send cruisers and destroyers to evacuate troops - despite no air cover and previous heavy losses.
This is not down playing the courage and skill of the men in the KM - they were skilled and brave - but also fighting under strict orders to save their ships !


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## delcyros (Jan 4, 2010)

Any engagement of HOOD versus SCHARNHORST, or even versus SCHARNHORST GNEISENAU would certainly end in both german ships trying to disengage at utmost speed rather than trying to engage the HOOD.

HOOD is a great ship. One on one, it enjois very strong advantages altough some may also imagine situations when HOOD is at disadvantage. Don´t make the mistake to judge HOOD by it´s rapid demise at DS!


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