# Who was responsible for the USAAF debacle in the Philippines - Dec 1941



## Freebird (Aug 5, 2011)

After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the FEAF (Far East Air Force) had several hours warning, but was still largely caught on the ground and destroyed

Who was to blame?


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## ccheese (Aug 5, 2011)

Gen. Douglas MacArthur !! He was warned and did nothing, except have the planes moved the the inner parts of the airfield,
almost wingtip to wingtip, to prevent sabotage. This, according to the book, "At Dawn We Slept". Don't remember the author.
The Japanese wiped out everything in one raid.

Charles


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## Freebird (Aug 5, 2011)

Geez, no sympathy for poor 'ol Dugout Doug? 

Doesn't Brereton deserve a solid share of the blame?
(note - I made the poll multiple choice, you can pick more than one)


Make no mistake, the Americans caught a huge break when the Japanese strike was delayed. 
Even if MacArthur (or Sutherland) was dithering about authorizing a strike, isn't Brereton responsible for safeguarding *his own force*?

Who's idea was it to have ALL the aircraft up?
With 100+ pursuit types, couldn't they keep 1 or 2 squadrons up, and the rest fueled ready?


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## davebender (Aug 5, 2011)

FEAF (Far East Air Force) ground based radar provided ample warning of the Japanese air attacks. B-17 bombers should have been sent to the new bomber airfield at Del Monte, Mindanao to remove them from danger. P-40 fighter aircraft should have been vectored to intercept the Japanese air strikes. Gen. Brereton was responsible for for the inept aircraft control system and overall poor aircrew training. 

However....
Gen. Brereton was hand picked by MacArthur to be the FEAF commander. That reflects rather poorly on Gen MacArthur's leadership ability.


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## parsifal (Aug 6, 2011)

Mac was dithering, but he was also waiting for clearer weather over Takao. He intended to strike offensively against the Japanese Air Force.

The Americans were also surpised by the range and quality of Japanese aircraft. Nobody in 1941 had fighters that could reach from Formosa to Clark. And Japanese Bombers were not thought to be very effective

The failure to Disperse I can only put down to US inexperience....they simply did not realize I think what this would do to their airpower if caught on the ground


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## davebender (Aug 6, 2011)

Of course. That was the whole point for stationing four B-17 heavy bomber groups in the Philippines. But it doesn't explain why FEAF got their butt kicked on 8 December 1941 (Philippine time).

24 Nov 1941. USAFFE (U.S. Armed Forces Far East) receives war warning message.
.....extract.
_SURPRISE AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN ANY DIRECTION INCLUDING ATTACK ON PHILIPPINES OR GUAM IS A POSSIBILITY_
Intelligence estimates don't get much more blunt then this. USAFFE should have immediately made all necessary preparations to meet a Japanese attack.

8 Dec 1941 (Philippine time)
1:06 am. Gen Marshall dispatches another war warning message to USAFFE.
.....About 11 hours prior to Japanese air strikes on Clark Airfield.

4:30 am. USAFFE receives message from U.S. War Department stating that hostilities with Japan have commenced. 
.....About 7 hours prior to Japanese air strikes on Clark Airfield.

7:10 am. Gen Brereton receives telephone call from Gen Arnold instructing him to insure the safety of his aircraft and recommending that they be dispersed.
.....Common sense when expecting enemy air attacks. Perhaps Gen Arnold lacked confidence in Gen Brereton so he sent specific instructions. Still almost 5 hours before the Japanese air strikes on Clark Airfield.

8:00 am. FEAF radar contact with incoming IJA bombers.

9:10 am. IJA bombers strike Baguio and Tueguegarao (northern Luzon).
.....Most popular histories omit Japanese Army air strikes on Northern Luzon 3 hours before Japanese Navy air strikes on Clark Airfield. They also typically omit FEAF radar which was operational and worked just fine on 8 Dec 1941.

11:27 am. FEAF radar contact with IJN airstrike heading for Iba and Clark Airfields.

*Historical Radar Sets in Philippines as of 8 December 1941.*
Iba Airfield. SCR270. Operational since October 1941.
Paracale.
…..SCR270. Operational.
…..SCR271. Still in crates.
Tagaytay Ridge. SCR270. Faulty. Useful for training.
Burgos Point. SCR270. Still in crates.
Nagasugbu. SCR268. Operational. Crew untrained.
Manila. SCR271. Still in crates.

The SCR270 radar station at Iba was considered the only one fully competent and able to perform its role. This continued until the station was bombed at 1320 on 8 December 1941.


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## Freebird (Aug 6, 2011)

davebender said:


> FEAF (Far East Air Force) ground based radar provided ample warning of the Japanese air attacks. B-17 bombers should have been sent to the new bomber airfield at Del Monte, Mindanao to remove them from danger. P-40 fighter aircraft should have been vectored to intercept the Japanese air strikes. Gen. Brereton was responsible for for the inept aircraft control system and overall poor aircrew training.
> 
> However....
> Gen. Brereton was hand picked by MacArthur to be the FEAF commander. That reflects rather poorly on Gen MacArthur's leadership ability.



So are you blaming Brereton? (with an assist to Mac for choosing poorly)


Am I reading this correctly that ALL the fighters were in the air, then ALL came down to refuel?

Was Brereton at Clark?
Or who was directly in charge there?


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## davebender (Aug 6, 2011)

Gen Brereton was commander of FEAF and present in the Philippines during December 1941. Otherwise Gen Arnold would have spoken to someone else when he phoned FEAF HQ.


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## Freebird (Aug 6, 2011)

parsifal said:


> The Americans were also surpised by the range and quality of Japanese aircraftI. Nobody in 1941 had fighters that could reach from Formosa to Clark.



OK, I don't think this sounds right.
It's about 480 - 500 miles from Clark to the southern tip of Formosa, the Buffalo F2A could (just) make it rith a range of 1000 miles.
Accounting for the use of drop tanks on (or even carrier launched) fighters, it really should not be a surprise.



> The failure to Disperse I can only put down to US inexperience....they simply did not realize I think what this would do to their airpower if caught on the ground



And yet they seemed to get them all in the air (earlier that morning) for exactly that reason?
They just seemed to have forgot the need to stagger CAP refuelings


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## parsifal (Aug 7, 2011)

Buffaloes might have range, but they dont have the combat range, which is different. F4fs have a printed range of 770miles, but in reality its effective radius of action under combat conditions was no more than 220 miles, and early in its career about 150miles. Brewster Buffaloes were not deployed into the Phillipines, but had a range of of 960miles. using the F4Fs range as a guide, that gives the buffalo a nominal combat range of about 270 miles. 

Not sure either if any of the far eastern commands had access to drop tanks in december 1941. I know that the japanese had to rush them through for the battles in the Phillipines and SEAC region. Maximum combat radius of a Zero was eventually stretched to about 600nm, with drop tank. Without a drop tank they had a combat radius of about 400nm. However the printed normal range for the A6M2 was 1160 miles, and the long range was 1930 miles. What does this tell us....that printed ranges are virtually meaningless when determining combat capability.


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## JoeB (Aug 7, 2011)

freebird said:


> OK, I don't think this sounds right.
> It's about 480 - 500 miles from Clark to the southern tip of Formosa, the Buffalo F2A could (just) make it rith a range of 1000 miles.
> Accounting for the use of drop tanks on (or even carrier launched) fighters, it really should not be a surprise.
> 
> ...


I agree with previous post that the US was indeed surprised when it learned (only later) that the Zeroes had escorted the bombers all the way from Formosa. The a/c were assumed to be flying from carriers, and even the Japanese themselves had planned to use carriers for this operation until only months before the war, when extra training in cruise control techniques proved that the Zero could fly such a long mission.

But to clarify Buffalo statistics, the longest range F2A was F2A-2 without armor or fuel tank protection, ie equivalent configuration to the Zero Model 21. According BuAer performance data sheet dated May 1 1943, it had a max range of 1485 statute miles. This data sheet does not quote a combat radius, but as already mentioned, USN official combat radii were a remarkably small % of the maximum still air range, so the equivalent official data sheet for F4F-4 with two 58gal drop tanks (not used until late summer 1942) quotes a max range of 1275 miles and combat radius of 325 miles. This was including assumptions and reserves (which are given in detail) typical of carrier operations, so from land bases the practical range would be a higher %, but still nothing like 50% of the max range. As previously mentioned, the Zero 21's official max range w/drop tank was 1930 statute miles, which by USN standards would yield a combat radius around 490 miles, but in operations from land bases Zero's routinely ranged well over 500 miles right from the start of the war, and up to 650 miles, Vunakanau>Henderson Field, in the early part of the Guadalcanal campaign before any divert fields were established in the upper Solomons.

Some of the US fighters were in the air during the inital Japanese attacks on Clark and engaged and shot down some Zeroes, though suffered heavier losses themselves and did not seriously disturb the bombers. William Bartsch's book "Dec 8 1941" is the definitive work on this debacle IMO, giving as much detail of these operations as anyone could want, from both sides; his earlier "Doomed at the Start" gives even more as far as the USAAC fighter units.

Separately, it's remarkable reviewing the Navy and Army volumes of the Japanese official history related to air ops in PI, how many later attacks there were on the US bases on Luzon, and how many claims made of additional a/c destroyed, yet a fair number (mainly fighters) remained and hardly any more were actually destroyed. By then the US bases had adequate protection and camouflage, and lots of decoy a/c (previously damaged ones and homemade decoys). If they'd had that to begin with, the fighter force would have survived the initial attacks even if caught entirely on the ground, and only around 1/2 the B-17's were at Clark, the rest out of reach at Del Monte field on Mindanao whose existence the Japanese only discovered later.

So the basic problem was a 'peace time mentality' when nobody thought to make such preparations, so obvious and so quickly implemented after the disaster. Note that the Marine air contingent on Wake was similarly caught hours after PH with its a/c arrayed without protection and the majority of the small F4F force was destroyed on the ground at that time, though even the remaining few were a notable nuisance to Japanese operations against the island after that. But, the Marines have much better PR than MacArthur, and that aspect is seldom dwelled upon in the story of the defense of Wake.

Joe


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## davebender (Aug 7, 2011)

Wake was tiny with only a single airfield. They didn't have dozens of airfields for aircraft dispersal, quite a few of which were located out of Japanese bomber range.


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## parsifal (Aug 7, 2011)

Hi Joe

With regard to the F4F, Ive read elsewhere as wll that it had a combat radius of 325 miles, yet i can find not a single instance of that ever being used operationally. I can find several references that say its maximum effective range was 220 miles. The longest ranged strikes I know of occurred in the Solomons and at Sastern Solomons (or maybe Santa Cruz....I will check tonite), where (from memory), the Americans could not provide escort to their SBDs beyond the 220 mile mark.

Im not challenging your 325 mile combat radius....ive learnt to respect your knowledge far too well to even attempt that, but i was still curious as to where you have found that range of 325miles used operationally.....


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## JoeB (Aug 7, 2011)

davebender said:


> Wake was tiny with only a single airfield. They didn't have dozens of airfields for aircraft dispersal, quite a few of which were located out of Japanese bomber range.


The point is, neither air arm did anything much to prepare for this forseeable outcome, but the Marines are hardly ever blamed for it. 

I was not saying the situations were otherwise identical which they obviously weren't, should go without saying. The Army in PI had more bases, although it also lost a considerably smaller % of its strength in the initial raids, because as mentioned, 1/2 the B-17's *were* at a base outside the radius of Japanese landbased a/c on Formosa, Del Monte. And only around 1/4 of the fighters on Luzon were destroyed on the ground Dec 8, v 2/3 of the Marine fighters at Wake in the intial raid there (8 out of 12, one later restored, including by Type 96 Rikko flying back and forth at low altitude with the flexible gunners strafing them!). OTOH the Army had to face follow up operations the next few days by Zero's which its P-35's and P-40's could not at that juncture face on anything like even terms in air combat, and it suffered more ground losses too. The remnant of the Marine fighter force in contrast operated against unescorted bombers and flying boats, and ships without air cover, until the Japanese sent Soryu and Hiryu to support the second invasion attempt on Wake and make quick work of the by then 2 remaining operational F4F's.

Still if either force had undertaken basic airfield protection measures, soon taken for granted for any field with possible range of enemy air attack, the Japanese would have had a considerably harder time both places, but probably not actually failed in either place. Because, they could eventually bring overwhelming carrier power against Wake if US carriers didn't effectively intervene, just as they eventually did. And, more relevant to the main point of this discussion, the FEAF in PI would have been defeated anyway even if its airfields were well prepared all else equal: its fighter units couldn't compete in air combat with JNAF fighter units at that time, its bombers did not use effective antishipping tactics, and moreover the PI were effectively cut off from resupply, like Wake.

On F4F's and drop tanks, the 58 gallon wing tank was only used in the 1942 carrier battles by VF-10 at Santa Cruz and only one at a time. On the one escort mission they conducted in the battle, they were ambushed by Zuiho Zero's while still close to Enterprise and had to drop them anyway. IOW the 58 gal tank wasn't that relevant to the F4F's reign as the frontline carrier fighter. A smaller (42 gal) higher drag bathtub-shape belly tank was used by Hornet's a/c at Santa Cruz, and also used at Eastern Solomons. I don't know of a source giving official radius with that early drop tank. 

The relative fuel capacities and radii with the 58 gal tank were: no tank 144 gals for 105 mi radius; 1*58 gal 202 gal for 245 mi, 2*58 gal 260 gal for 325 mi. The apparently strange relationship of capacity to radius is due to the fact that the large reserves assumed for return and at the end of the flight had to be internal fuel, heavily penalizing the no-tank case, while OTOH an a/c carrying 2 58 gal tanks would have to drop them before they were completely empty for internal fuel to suffice for an assumed 20 min of full power combat plus the return and reserves. Lundstrom quotes the F4F's generally accepted radius with no tanks as 'around 175 miles' in the 1942 battles, which presumably just meant taking more risk of fuel exhaustion losses than the official calculation assumed, and ditching for lack of fuel wasn't uncommon. 

Joe


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## parsifal (Aug 8, 2011)

so, in regard to the 325 mi radius of action, is it fair to generalize that it was used very rarely and was not a fair representation of the F4fs range capabilities......not trying to put words in your mouth, but wanted to understand if 325mi was common or the exception


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## parsifal (Aug 8, 2011)

anyway, this all confirms the allies definately could NOT strike back at Formsa with escorted raids in 1941. The Zero really was exceptional in 1941-3, for a number of reasons, and range was one of them


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## davebender (Aug 8, 2011)

> FEAF in PI would have been defeated anyway even if its airfields were well prepared all else equal: its *fighter units couldn't compete in air combat *with JNAF fighter units at that time, its *bombers did not use effective antishipping tactics*,


The result of faulty training. 

During my 20 years in the U.S. military unit commanders were held accountable for training. Gen. Brereton was the FEAF commander. If his P-40 pilots didn't employ proper aerial tactics and his bomber pilots couldn't hit the broad side of a barn it was his fault.


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## parsifal (Aug 9, 2011)

Hard to disagree with that, but just the same, USAAC training was not all that realistic, tactics were poor....the whole country was unready in terms of the national mood for war. You would be hard pressed to find a country less prepred for war....psychologically, materially, or experience wise. 

Brereton was never a commander that fires me up in a good way......he probably deserved a courts martial but that was never going to happen.


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## davebender (Aug 9, 2011)

I agree. But leadership has to start somewhere. 

Claire Chennault had P-40 fighter aircraft similiar to those of Gen. Brereton. Ground support and logistics were more primative then in FEAF. Unlike FEAF he had no early warning radar. Yet Chennault's so called "American Volunteer Group" were generally successful. That's the difference competent leadership can make.


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## parsifal (Aug 9, 2011)

Thats a good point actually. I need to study the AVG more closely, its one of those many areas I dont know so much about....was he ever surprised what occasions did he actually lose a battle.....


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 9, 2011)

Read my ex's grandfather's book, "Surviving the Day." he talks about the situation at Baatan.

Surviving the day: an American POW ... - Google Books


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## parsifal (Aug 9, 2011)

looks like an intersting book....I will try and get hold of a copy. At the risk of being crass, what does he say with respect to preparedness of the air corps in the Far East. Was there any chance for a different outcome. Did Brereton and Mac screw the pooch?


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 9, 2011)

parsifal said:


> looks like an intersting book....I will try and get hold of a copy. At the risk of being crass, what does he say with respect to preparedness of the air corps in the Far East. Was there any chance for a different outcome. Did Brereton and Mac screw the pooch?


From what I remember he did speak about the disorganization throughout the Pacific but he really didn't have bad words for Mac (he was on his staff). He was upset about surrendering, he felt we should have attempted to resist especially after what he witnessed as a POW.


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## JoeB (Aug 9, 2011)

davebender said:


> The result of faulty training.
> 
> During my 20 years in the U.S. military unit commanders were held accountable for training. Gen. Brereton was the FEAF commander. If his P-40 pilots didn't employ proper aerial tactics and his bomber pilots couldn't hit the broad side of a barn it was his fault.


Yes, in a military (or civilian for that matter) organization, it's usually better to err on the side of holding specific leaders accountable, even if some of the factors that led to their failures are far broader than their own units, or beyond their control.

But as later historians, we should look at the big picture, and not have a strictly kneejerk reaction of blaming relatively low level commanders, which even Brereton was relative to some of these problems. The USAAC was rapidly expanding in 1941, and was thoroughly suffused with problems of both training and material unreadiness, plus just inexperience. For example on the material side, the best fighters of the FEAF, their P-40E's (they also had P-40B's like the AVG, as well as obsolescent P-35's) were plagued by gun problems (with the hydraulic gun chargers).

The AVG can't be directly compared to the USAAC, nor to contemporary British/Commonwealth fighter units which it also significantly outperformed in fighter combat with the Japanese in 41-42. The very basic difference was that virtually all AVG members were high-hour peacetime military pilots (of Army, Navy and Marines), although almost all lacked actual combat experience. In contrast typical units in the rapidly expanded USAAC had lots of green pilots, with not a lot of hours *nor* any combat experience; and the Brit/CW fighter units, in an air arm still expanding despite heavy pilot losses in 1939-41, had some combat experienced leaders, but were mainly composed of even more hastily trained and inexperienced men; and the Far East units were sucking hind tit even within that overall situation.

Also, the AVG was able to gain fighter combat experience facing almost exclusively JAAF Type 97 (later 'Nate') units, before commonly facing Army Type 1's (later 'Oscar') in spring of 1942. The USAAC units were immediately faced by a strong force of JNAF Zeroes, and actually didn't do as badly against them in just kill ratio terms as most other Allied units at the time (but *ongoing* ground losses, even after Dec 8, are what bascially neutralized the USAAC fighter force), or even as badly as USAAF P-40 units did in the DEI v the same Zero units a few months later. But still the FEAF fighter units were not equal to the Zero units in air combat.

But again in this context, something like basic airfield defence measures are a much more realistic 'what if' improvement for the FEAF compared to changing basic material/training readiness problems of the whole AAC, whole US as was mentioned. Again, the US air bases on Luzon were well protected and eliminated further ground losses after a few days, whereas USAAC/F meeting the JNAF on equal terms in fighter combat took a lot longer.

Again re: F4F range the 325mile figure was real, presumably even conservative (considering that the official figure for no tanks was only 105, but the general opinion was that the F4F was capable of ~175 mile radius escorts w/o drop tank, albeit with little margin for error). However the 325 figure was not relevant to the heyday of the F4F's career in 1942, because the 58 gal drop tank was only used in late '42, and apparently not two at a time. The 2 tank capability was relevant to some 1943 Solomons ops, and to the CAP endurance of FM's from escort carriers later in the war. But 325mile radius offensive carrier strikes (or anywhere close) by F4F's from the big carriers? no not that I know of.

Joe


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## davebender (Aug 9, 2011)

The Iba radar station was operational from October 1941.

By October 1941 FEAF had 81 modern P-40 fighter aircraft. An additional 24 crated P-40Es arrived Nov 25, 1941.

FEAF received an additional 140 fighter pilots between February and October 1941.

FEAF had plenty of fuel. An IJA report dated Feb 20, 1942 states that to date they have captured 107,964 liters of aviation gasoline and 1,402,954 liters of regular gasoline.

Gen Brereton arrived in Manila Nov 4, 1941 to take command of FEAF.

The big picture.
By November 1941 FEAF was well equipped with modern fighter aircraft, pilots, fuel and early warning radar. Gen Brereton had 34 days in which to train his command.


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## JoeB (Aug 9, 2011)

davebender said:


> The Iba radar station was operational from October 1941.
> The big picture.
> By November 1941 FEAF was well equipped with modern fighter aircraft, pilots, fuel and early warning radar. Gen Brereton had 34 days in which to train his command.


No that's not the really big picture, but a lot of stuff specific to the PI which I obviously know already if I recommended Bartsch's highly detailed book on the topic (and yes I did read it). The larger picture of the *whole USAAC* was n organization which had so rapidly expanded, from very small in 1939-40, though still a long way to go in 1941 that there were a lot of flaws in the details, and a pervasive lack of operational experience by most air crews, and combat experience by *any* air crews. This is easily seen by the fact that Army fighters didn't perform very well against Japanese Navy fighters for many months after the PI campaign; and also Army bombers hit hardly any Japanese ships for many months after. Your point would have validity if we saw other USAAF units quickly inflict serious losses on the Japanese in the period immediately following, but that's not the case. 

A lot of the factors were clearly much larger than PI situation, like general level of training and unit cohesion (long time together training at least) and complete lack of combat experience, which more senior JNAF pilots often had. There was a lot more than 34 days to deal with this, don't know how you calculate that, but clearly not enough, since again the same issue affected USAAF units in PTO for much of the rest of '42, hell they were often roughly treated by the Germans even in early 1943 for the same reasons.

In contrast to these truly bigger picture issues, the FEAF could have further dispersed and protected its bases. That was more a matter of a mental gap out by leadership. The basic qualitative problems v the JNAF were just not solvable without hard experience, such basic lack of experience and preparedness on a whole air force, whole national, basis never is.
Joe


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## parsifal (Aug 9, 2011)

I wouldnt limit the Japanese combat experience to just the japanese senior airmen. I think the majority of their airmen had considerable combat experience


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## buffnut453 (Dec 8, 2011)

JoeB said:


> But to clarify Buffalo statistics, the longest range F2A was F2A-2 without armor or fuel tank protection, ie equivalent configuration to the Zero Model 21.



Sorry to nitpick, Joe, but the longest range Buffalo was the F2A-*3* not the -2. And the -3 had armour plate and fuel tank protection. What's not clear is whether you're quoting the range for the -2 without armour plate or the -3 without armour plate. Can't dig into my test reports right now to find the answer for myself - I may if there's more interest in this topic.


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## parsifal (Dec 8, 2011)

Id be interested to know Mark, but not from a theoretical maximum combat range perspective. Id like to know from an operational range perspective....what were the longest ranged ops the Buffalo was engaged in


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## Arossihman (Dec 8, 2011)

I still believe it was MaCarthurs arrogance which led to poor decision making from him and some of the men who answered to him.....IMO the guy was kind of power hungry and did'nt have much time for warning or constructive criticism. This was to be his main downfall in my book.


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## parsifal (Dec 9, 2011)

Well in the context of the forum topic, just before the outbreak of hostilities, hes was given a war warning 27 November and told to carry ourt strikes in accordance with Rainbow 5 warplan. That means he should have had his B-17s at a high rediness state to attack from that point on, but in the end, they werent ready to attack on the 8th.

When Japanese transports were first spotted heading south on the 26th November, Stark wanted to attack them with PI based B-17s, I believe he was supported by Mac. They were both overruled by Roosevelt. "we want the Japanese to fire th first shot". They were specific orders given to the FEAF by Washington on or about the 1st December, in the lead up to war.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jan 16, 2012)

I've seen a number of quotes that the F2A-3 had a ferry range of 1,680 miles. a few years back, I spoke to Don Cheek (who seemed to prefer the F2A-2 to the F4F-3) who said that when he and his squadron mates got _rock happy_ in Hawaii they joked about flying the F2A-3 home to the mainland! That seems extraordinary but that's what he told me. The F2A-3 was apparently equipped with a fuel capacity of 240 gallons and there are reports of pilots flying 5-6 hour patrols! (Maas, Page 37)


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jan 16, 2012)

Damn memory... I mean _*Tom*_ Cheek. Well I said it was "some years ago" and nowadays, I can barely remember why I came into a room a few minutes after entering.


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## renrich (Jan 17, 2012)

To pin the blame on Mac or any of his subordinates is one way to handle the situation but the fact is that practically all of the US Military, the political system and the electorate were unprepared for war. The Japanese had the initiative, the doctrine, the weapons, the experience, the training and the will to be successful. It took at least six months for the US to begin to catch up. An example of poor doctrine was that the US was convinced that heavy bombers could prevent a sea borne invasion. That is the reason the PI had more B17s than any other US base. Even if the B17s had not had the losses they were practically useless against ships. McDowell was fired after First Bull Run, the commanders at Pearl were fired, it is fortunate that Mac was not fired.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jan 17, 2012)

Wish I could agree Ren, but there are too many 'stories' about Mac ignoring his responsibilities for personal gain and pleasure to give him a pass without a thoroughinvestigation. Moreover, The suggestion that the war came as a shock to everyone, especially the top brass is a little too self-serving. The Japanese attack on the Phillipines is exactly what the US was preparing itself to handle by its forward basing of B-17s and moving the battle fleet to Pearl. When News of the attack on Pearl came and SecDef Knox responded with "...this MUST mean the Phillipines" suggests the thought processes necessary for an appropriate response were already engaged. How effectively they were engaged is another matter. ultimately Mac was the guy in charge although non-flying commanders typically deferred to their senior flight officers so I think Brereton must share the responsibility for tactical employment that was abysmally organized. There are professionals who say our war effort suffered due to the loss of Kimmel (I can't speak for Short). The leadership qualities evident during the initial South Pacific offensivein the Solomons left a LOT to be desired and suggest there may be a strong case to be made there. How the Pacific campaign would have been waged if Kimmel had been given a pass and retained as CINCPAC is perhaps worthy of a war college thesis. (imagine Ghormley replaced by Nimitz?) Of course all of this is the most (worst?) unbridled speculation. For me, Halsey's greatest moment as a leader came November 28th 1941, a week before the Pearl Harbor attack, when he informed his fliers to act according to the pre-existence of a state of war and gave the order to shoot-first and argue later. It didn't take competence to recognize or respond to the imminence of war. The rest of Halsey's career was blunder piled upon blunder with an icing of fighting spirit and bluster the bluejackets and press loved.


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## renrich (Jan 17, 2012)

oldcrow, you misunderstand me. I am not saying that the US was surprised by the attacks and the onset of war or that the war was a shock. I am saying that all or most of all of the US was unprepared for war both physically and emotionally. The previous Pacific Fleet CO had told the administration that PH was not safe for the fleet and could not be successfully defended. He wa overruled and retired. Our soldiers were training with sticks instead of MGs. The Air Corps was only gradually getting up to speed. The USN did not have enough patrol planes to cover all the sectors out of PH and there was an actual shortage of Navy fighters so that after the war had begun some of the VFs were equipped with both Grummans and Brewsters or two different models of Grummans. There were all types of intelligence failures and even the Doolittle Raid was ill conceived, a public relations stunt and may have pro longed the war and could have been a catastrophe. Undoubtedly, Mac would have probably been fired if not for his exalted reputation and the administration needed a hero. No commander fails to make mistakes, even Bobby Lee. History judges too by different standards. Grant is exalted because he knew how to overcome his enemy with superior numbers and by grinding him down and getting his soldiers killed by the bushel. As you say, Halsey has a great reputation but seemed to blunder a lot while Fletcher without the great rep upon close examination did a very good job.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jan 17, 2012)

Sec Nav Knox that is...


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jan 17, 2012)

Gotta agree with you Ren. Especially about Fletcher. WRT to Mac, even now its difficult to reflect on the FEAF tragedy without frustration. It astonished me he escaped the ax.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jan 17, 2012)

Just finished reading Neptune's Inferno and am just as astomished at the Savo Island debacle as the loss of the FEAF just one day after PH. Seems like some commanders were still suffereing the effects of the peacetime mindset even 9 months after the Pearl Harbor attack!


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## renrich (Jan 17, 2012)

Think about it like this. Mac commanded a regiment ( ?) in WW1. He was born at a frontier fort during the Indian Wars(I think) What the heck does he know about air power? In fact, a lot of the Army Air Corps had a bunch of mistaken notions about Air Power. They had radar at PH but barely knew how to use it. To me, one of the most astounding accomplishments during WW2 was that less than one year after December 7, The Anglo American invasion of North Africa took place largely with American forces.

One of my uncles was in Chicago at Savo Island. He was a career Navy man, a Chief Gunners Mate and one of his brothers was in Salt Lake City. His account of the Savo Island will raise the hair on your neck and the other's account of the Second Battle of Savo (Cape Esperance) will too.


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## parsifal (Jan 17, 2012)

Not much that Mac can do about the national psyche and readiness for war. i agree. however, Mac is still guilty of disregarding direct war warnings issued from the 27 November onwards, and direct orders that were attached to those warnings . He was directed to prepare and execute immediately on the commencement of hostilities the operational plan for RAINBOW 6. This meant specifically air attacks on land targets in southern Formosa. Instead Mac, and his command descended into a kind of atrophy that failed to seriously attempt these orders, and led directly to the loss of most of the airpower assets under his comand in the first 48 hours of the battle.

Therein lies your reasons (at least the direct ones) for the defeat of the FEAF so easily. Command paralysis, and at its head is General Macarthur.

I am incidentally a big fan of Mac and his effort later, even in this campaign. His retreat to Bataan was nothing shoirt of brilliant. but his handling of his orders regarding the air assets under his command, was abysmal


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jan 17, 2012)

Ren, Two uncles in the Guadacanal campaign! What stories they must have told! Reading Hornfischer's detailed descriptions of the battles from the personal perspective DID raise the hair on my neck. I wonder what your uncle thought of his CO Capt. Bode? I got the impression he was something of a martinet and distanced himself from his crew.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jan 17, 2012)

Pars, I have long held a low opinion of Mac despite his later brilliance. As I get older, and read (learn?) more, I become more accepting of Ren's observation "No commander fails to make mistakes..." Nimitz is supposed to have said, "every dog deserves two bites" and was reputed to give subordinates the opportunity to learn from their mistakes. Yet I still find it difficult to give Mac or Kelly Turner or Halsey their just due, probably because so often their advocates sometimes seem reluctant to acknowlege their icons feet of clay. But of course, I didn't walk an inch in their shoes and have little right to judge.


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## drgondog (Jan 18, 2012)

I just finished the biography on George Marshall which is the most illuminating view I have ever had on the events and the communications from late November through December 7/8.

It is complex. From the biography Marshall accepts the blame for the combined screw ups simply because he was Chief of Staff of the US. Having said that he alerted MacArther and MacArthur responded "I'm on it". I voted MacArthur in this poll with mixed feelings simply because he did issue orders to Brereton, including instituting long range patrols. Brereton failed to execute properly and now I am in the camp of Ren and several others here.

Our Air Force was expanding rapidly, few had ever fired a shot in air combat, nobody knew about the zero and everybody was confident that the forces in PI were adequate for coastal and air defense - and were wrong.

Marshall also had culpability in another strange way. He did not like to use telephones. He received the Looooong 13 point instructions to Japanese Ambassador decoded from Magic early Sunday am and started reading it carefully from the Top rather than skipping to the 'war' part immediately. By the time he finished only a couple of hours were left and he issued orders for an emergency order via Signal Corps. As fate would have it, executing the order on Sunday morning didn't work out. Marshall SHOULD have picked up the phone to follow up - ditto Admiral King.

In my opinion the major cause of the fiasco was threefold. First and foremost we were not prepared mentally for War and certainly not from Japan. Second, the training that would have ensued had we been prepared to fight would have manifested itself all the way down to taking ammo out of the Hawaii ammo bunkers, maintaining long range recon, daily scrambles of fighter assets, ships out of Pearl harbor, dispursed aircraft in PI and HI, etc, etc

Last, Marshall should have been in direct telephone contact with his commanders to make sure they were aware of the high reliabilty of the intelligence warnings with detailed discussion about contingency plans. There were in fact several plans but even those were screwed up relative to communications.

Net US Congress and American people - fault number one - for emasculating our military between wars, and not being prepared for a war that we believed could escape. Fault numer two - Immediate air commanders on PI and HI for not instilling wartime mentality on their troops. Fault number three - Marshall and King for not following up in direct communications with their Theatre commanders to ensure that they understood the seriousness of the potential war threat (with as yet unkown target) and hear in detail what they were doing to be prepared.

Back to the Poll. At PI, the buck stopped with MacArthur. He was the only one of the senior commanders (PI and HI) that escaped blame and punishment. Thank God he did - because I personally consider him to be the best military mind our country has ever produced. Arrogant - yes. But if he was ignorant of airpower on December 7 he more than made up for it with his SW PTO Campaigns in the incredible blend of air, sea and ground tactics.


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## renrich (Jan 18, 2012)

Bill, a very good post, IMO, and very informative. Mac did seem a little (a lot) foggy in the early going in PI but really did good work later in WW2, after Japan surrendered and in Korea. He was a giant. To me, one can pick any "giant" in history and point out where he blundered. An example is Mac. Another might be R E Lee, in my mind probably the greatest battlefield general in American history. Well, Malvern Hill was a disaster. Probably much worse than the third day at Gettysburg where there were extenuating circumstances, IMO.

How about this? Many historians consider that Lincoln was our greatest president. That is what I was taught in school. The only thing my history classes did not focus on was: Lincoln ordered that Fort Sumter be resupplied which precipitated the bombardment. At that time, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky had not seceded. Lincoln then ordered that 75000 of the state militias be called up to put down the insurrection. The states that had not seceded had by far the most men available for war but declared they would not stand still to see their militia used to attack their fellow southerners. The fat was in the fire. Sounds like Lincoln made a big mistake to me and lost any chance for a peaceful resolution of the problem and more than 600000 good men died when the population of the US was only around 30M. Grant made a big mistake at Cold Harbor among several and had around 7000 casualties in a half hour.

Placing the blame often depends a lot on one's perspective and how deep one delves into the subject. And sometimes bad stuff just happens.


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## renrich (Jan 18, 2012)

My recollection is that my uncle was not fond of Bode. On the other hand the other uncle was fond of Captain Zacharias who commanded SLC when war broke out. He said that the crew of SLC was disappointed that they did not get to sink the Japanese picket boats encountered which caused the early launch of Doolittle. He also reflected on how exposed they felt on SLC when the scout plane caught on fire and had to be jettisoned the night of Cape Esperance. The Boise had one turret blown up and he said he had trained that turret crew and that he was absolutely certain that SLC was responsible for sinking Furataka. Every other ship probably felt the same. I asked if he was scared when standing on deck next to his five inchers in open mounts with shells and torpedos whizzing about and only a steel helmet for protection. He said that they were so excited while firing full broadsides they felt invincible and forgot to be scared. At that range at Esperance a broadside was ten 8-inchers and four 5-inchers. The uncle on Chicago said that prior to Savo, the Australians, when Chicago was in port treated them like royalty but when they limped back in after Savo for temporary repairs they were shunned because the word was that Chicago had abandoned Canberra. He was transferred out before Rennel Island where Chicago was sunk.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jan 18, 2012)

Ren, 

Big well deserved salute to your uncles! I was surprised at learning of the SLC scout plane incident... One of those crazy, inexplicable, heart-stopping events that seem to happen in combat when everything is on the line. 

Drgon, what is the title of the Marshall Bio. Stepping up to accept responsibility for the disaster is the mark of a great commander, although of course it may be professional suicide. I wonder whan he did this. Was it well after the event and after the war or before? 

"_nobody knew about the zero and everybody was confident that the forces in PI were adequate for coastal and air defense_" We are probably all aware of the reports by Chennault coming out of his China experience but of course, they were largely ignored. I think a case can be made (or would at least like to see it explored, if it hasn't already come up. I am a newbie so maybe its already been argued to death.) that the forces in the Phillipines might have been up to the task, if The FEAF hadn't been lost on the first day of the war. If not already discussed, it might be a logical progression for this discussion. Asked diffferently: how long could have the FEAF survived if it had been allowed to respond appropriately to the initial Japanese assault. Appropriately meaning, surviving the initial shock of the Zero long enough to read and absorb the Chennault reports and adopt the AVG's tactics. At Pearl, we had two pilots (Welch and Taylor) who in some sense at least were prepared for the attack and enjoyed some success in responding to it. If we inflate that to include a third of the fighters at Clark and out-lying fields employed on rotating CAP, I would expect the results to have been quite different. I mean, the AVG was effective wth about as many aircraft. But I haven't looked at the differences in the Japanese Order of Battle between China and the Phillipines.


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## drgondog (Jan 18, 2012)

renrich said:


> Bill, a very good post, IMO, and very informative. Mac did seem a little (a lot) foggy in the early going in PI but really did good work later in WW2, after Japan surrendered and in Korea. He was a giant. To me, one can pick any "giant" in history and point out where he blundered. An example is Mac. Another might be R E Lee, in my mind probably the greatest battlefield general in American history. Well, Malvern Hill was a disaster. Probably much worse than the third day at Gettysburg where there were extenuating circumstances, IMO.
> 
> *Marse Robert is one of several War of Northern Agression giants that I have studied in depth. I would offer Stonewall jackson as Lee's near equal, however.*
> 
> ...



MacArthur, Lee and Patton are the US military leaders most often studied in foreign military academies.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jan 18, 2012)

Going back I see that the issue of FEAF survival has indeed already been subject to some examination by JoeB, Parsifal and others. Yes, 'the war of Northern aggression,' as I (a native of NJ) have heard so often since coming to live in rebel territory!


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## drgondog (Jan 18, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Ren,
> 
> Big well deserved salute to your uncles! I was surprised at learning of the SLC scout plane incident... One of those crazy, inexplicable, heart-stopping events that seem to happen in combat when everything is on the line.
> 
> ...



In retrospect, given the disaster at Pearl harbor and Japanese dominance quickly in Singapore, Java, etc, the USN was in no position to provide logistics support to PI. Even if FEAF had survived the events of the first couple of weeks I think the outcome would have been the same. The B-17D's were largely ineffective against the IJN so their ability to sustain attacks by IJN fighters during the invasion processes are doubtful at best - and the FEAF had nothing else but a few B-18s to attack the Japanese navy. Pure speculation on my part but with no hope of re-supply until after Midway at the earliest, the attrition on FEAF would have the same result, the invasion would have had the same result and the defeat of US in PI would have been same, albeit longer.

Curiously, my father was linked to FEAF although he only fought in ETO. The three future leaders of the 355th FG (my father's unit) were Bill Cummings, Thomas (Speed) Hubbard and gerald (Dixie) Dix who went from PI to Java (then to Australia) in the rear guard action flying P-40s.. thence to the States to form the 355th FG in late 1942.
An example of 'difficulties' was that they ran out of .50 cal links and tried to find tinkers in Dutch java who could make them - highest production they could get was 100 per day! Simple issue like that would have killed the FEAF ultimately anyway.

As to Chennault reports I am not familiar with his warnings re: Type Zero A6M or equivalent. The AVG, per se did not encounter the Zero IIRC, only the Oscar, until after absorbed into the 23rd FG.


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## drgondog (Jan 18, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Going back I see that the issue of FEAF survival has indeed already been subject to some examination by JoeB, Parsifal and others. Yes, 'the war of Northern aggression,' as I (a native of NJ) have heard so often since coming to live in rebel territory!



My personal favorite is 'Save your Confederate money boys, the South will rise again". In retrospect, the US dollar is closely approaching the Confederate Dollar!


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jan 18, 2012)

Yes, I was aware that most AVG 'modern' opposition was vs Ki-43 Oscars but had also heard he faced some detachments of IJN zeroes deployed to China.in 1940 Can't remember the source. Found it! in Shultz's Maverick War, paperback page 75.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jan 18, 2012)

You've made me so glad I saved the confederate money collected as a kid when I lived in VA in the 50's. I know its around here somewhere. I never throw anything out unless its green and appears to be alive.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jan 18, 2012)

> the USN was in no position to provide logistics support to PI.



The truth of the saw: 

"amateurs speak tactics, professionals speak logistics" 

You've gone straight to the heart of the issue.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jan 18, 2012)

Drgon, which Marshall bio did you read (recommend) by Pogue or Cray? Sh_t! you answered my question. Creeping senility or oldtimers disease!


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## drgondog (Jan 18, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Yes, I was aware that most AVG 'modern' opposition was vs Ki-43 Oscars but had also heard he faced some detachments of IJN zeroes deployed to China.in 1940 Can't remember the source. Found it! in Shultz's Maverick War, paperback page 75.



There is a lot of controversy re: Type I, Type 0, Zero, etc. For sure there are no victory credits of IJN Zero's in USAAF Victory Credits listings. Tex Hill was credited with 2 Type '0' and one Zero in April 28/May 5 1942 at the very end of the AVG experience. Both China, both Army. Questions still remain 'Type 0' vs Oscar in that window. For sure the Jap fighters encountered prior to April 1942 were I-97's. Burghard got only I-97'2, Neale only got I-97s, Little credited with one Type 0 in April 1942, Herbst I-97s, Howard I-97s.


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## renrich (Jan 18, 2012)

The PI P40s were able to put up some opposition to the Japanese for quite some time but I don't believe that, even if the AAf in the PI had been handled properly, it would have made much difference in the outcome.

I visited West Point in about 1983 and was impressed when going through the museum that the biggest exhibit there was on Stonewall's Valley Campaign.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 18, 2012)

drgondog said:


> There is a lot of controversy re: Type I, Type 0, Zero, etc. For sure there are no victory credits of IJN Zero's in USAAF Victory Credits listings. *Tex Hill was credited with 2 Type '0' and one Zero in April 28/May 5 1942 at the very end of the AVG experience.* Both China, both Army. Questions still remain 'Type 0' vs Oscar in that window. For sure the Jap fighters encountered prior to April 1942 were I-97's. Burghard got only I-97'2, Neale only got I-97s, Little credited with one Type 0 in April 1942, Herbst I-97s, Howard I-97s.



I think "recent research has revealed" that the AVG never fought against the Zero as there were no IJN units in Southern China during the AVG's lifeline.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jan 18, 2012)

The Chenault report on the zero was pre-AVG (cited in MW) and I should have edited the first sentences of my post to reflect that it did not describe a circa 1942 confrontation between Zeros and P-40s. Going over MW, It appears the AVG spent some time worring about such a confrontation but I can find no indication in that source that such an event ever occurred. Schultz does claim, some AVG members decided to throw in the towel after hearing Channault describe the performance of the A6M which he apparently observed on September 13, 1940.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jan 18, 2012)

Ren, reading Killer Angels, I came away with the impression that Jackson was (with most of his less-successful contemporaries) more a classic Napoleonic commander specializing in manuever warfare and artillery whereas Longstreet was more in tune with advances in small arms technology and the implications thereof. Thatwas reinforced reading Longstreet's autobiography.


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## drgondog (Jan 18, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> I think "recent research has revealed" that the AVG never fought against the Zero as there were no IJN units in Southern China during the AVG's lifeline.


 
Joe - I basically agree simply because there is no evidence of IJN in China in my reference sources (other than below) which was a Japanese Army theatre. Having said that, there sre several different AVG pilots which did claim Type 0 and there is no evidence that they were mistaking the Zero for another fighter.

According to Zero " Inside story of Japan's air war in the pacific" by (Designer of the Zero) and Jiro Horikoshi and Masatake Okumiya (JNAF Commander who fought from 1937 to EOW, the Zero was attached to China ops and flew first combat mission on August 19, 1940 over Chunking and remained with 12th Air Corps and flew at least until mid September, 1941 in China. According to the authors the JNAF pilots learned a great deal about long range escort while in China.

The authors were silent regarding ops against AVG following Pearl Harbor, focusing from there on PTO.


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## drgondog (Jan 18, 2012)

oops - just picked up Toland's "The Flying Tigers" and there are specific references to Zero's flying escort to Rangoon and Mingaladon on December 23rd, 1941 that the AVG opposed, but the actual combat was with I-97s.

Several engagements in China against Zeros are cited for late February, March and April, 1942. The latter coincides with the Type 0 claims by Hill, Older etc.and they do make a distinction between Type 97, Type 0 and Oscar as different aircraft (See Stars and Bars by Olynyk).


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 18, 2012)

drgondog said:


> Joe - I basically agree simply because there is no evidence of IJN in China in my reference sources (other than below) which was a Japanese Army theatre. Having said that, there sre several different AVG pilots which did claim Type 0 and there is no evidence that they were mistaking the Zero for another fighter.
> 
> According to Zero " Inside story of Japan's air war in the pacific" by (Designer of the Zero) and Jiro Horikoshi and Masatake Okumiya (JNAF Commander who fought from 1937 to EOW, the Zero was attached to China ops and flew first combat mission on August 19, 1940 over Chunking and remained with 12th Air Corps and flew at least until mid September, 1941 in China. According to the authors the JNAF pilots learned a great deal about long range escort while in China.
> 
> The authors were silent regarding ops against AVG following Pearl Harbor, focusing from there on PTO.



Good info Bill - you might remember discussion about this on a previous thread. I have come up with the same info. It seems that the IJNAF left southern China prior to the AVG's birth. In the end, I believe that some of the April reports by AVG pilots mentioning type 0 in combat were the result of mis-identification.

I posted this previously - A partial list of AVG "victims." Not one IJN NCO or Officer

http://www.warbirdforum.com/jaafloss.htm


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## renrich (Jan 18, 2012)

The Zero was easy to mistake for something else. The first USN pilots to see them ( and they had lots of intelligence about them,) identified them as a VB because they thought they had a two person canopy.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jan 18, 2012)

LCDR Paul Ramsey CO of VF-2 apparently reported downing two Me(Bf)-109s at Coral Sea on May 8, 1942!


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jan 18, 2012)

That strikes me as a pretty serious misidentification of a A6M for a high-time pilot, but in the midst of a fight I imagine correct ID of your opponent's A/C takes a back seat to killing him.


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## parsifal (Jan 18, 2012)

I know there was Naval units in southern Indochina at the start of the war, initially there was a force of 25 Zeroes called the Yawata detachment. after the demise of the FEAF this force was modestly expanded.

AFAIK (and i am not 100% certain), the IJN flotillas did not transfer to the CBI in 41 or early 42. They fought initially over Malaya, and then the NEI. Around March or April most of the Naval air assets were transferred to Rabaul, New Guinea and the Marshalls. 

I have read reports of Zeroes operating over burma later in the war, along with some betty bombers. However, these were not really permanent deployments, and I admit my sources are neither good or specific.


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## drgondog (Jan 18, 2012)

parsifal said:


> I know there was Naval units in southern Indochina at the start of the war, initially there was a force of 25 Zeroes called the Yawata detachment. after the demise of the FEAF this force was modestly expanded.
> 
> AFAIK (and i am not 100% certain), the IJN flotillas did not transfer to the CBI in 41 or early 42. They fought initially over Malaya, and then the NEI. Around March or April most of the Naval air assets were transferred to Rabaul, New Guinea and the Marshalls.
> 
> I have read reports of Zeroes operating over burma later in the war, along with some betty bombers. However, these were not really permanent deployments, and I admit my sources are neither good or specific.



The two Japanese authors of Zero were very specific about not only their engagement in China ain 1940 and 1941 but cited several 'Letters of Commendation" including a Unit Coomendation for a September 13, 1940 mission.

Specifically from CIC Shigetaro Shimada, China Area Fleet to !2th Air Corps Commander Lieutenant Shindo, dated October 30, 1940, issued a Unit Citation for the destruction of "all enemy planes" during a mission to Chunking against a numerically superior fighter force. I don't think there is any question IJN had Zero's in China, the question is did the AVG shoot any down while in China (or Burma).


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jan 18, 2012)

That September 13, 1940 mission over Chunking was evidently the very one witnessed by Chenault that formed the basis of his report on the A6M. apparently the defending NCAF fighters (Polikarpov I-16s?) were wiped out.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jan 19, 2012)

drgondog said:


> Pure speculation on my part but with no hope of re-supply until after Midway at the earliest, the attrition on FEAF would have the same result, the invasion would have had the same result and the defeat of US in PI would have been same, albeit longer..



The question seems to hinge on the dates and the locale of the airfields to the South of Clark and North of Del Monte of which AFAICT there appears to be only Nichols near Manilla: Clark AFB fell sometime in early January 1942 (Angeles City fell on January 1st), Nichols field on was essentially lost when Mac declared Manilla an open city on Dec 26th with the Japanese apparently showing up on Jan 2. Bataan fell April 9 and Corregidor on May 5th. Del Monte field, a secret base only begun Nov 26 1941 was essentially abandoned as anything but a staging base on December 15. With US forces withdrawing May 1.

Midway was fought June 4, 1942. Watchtower was initiated August 7th. I expect there was some limited amount of spares on hand to keep a fair number of aircraft flying for a while, with cannibalization, although getting what existed south or bringing replacements north from Oz may have been too great a logistical hurdle at that early stage of the war. I doubt there was much in Oz at that time.

Not sure what other airfields might have been able to support fighter and bomber ops north of the Del Monte field on Mindanao. But it does seem unlikely operations could have been sustained anywhere in the PI for 6-8 months without major resupply. On the other hand, from May1st is only about 3 months shy of August 7th. It seems agonizingly close on first glance.  There is also perhaps a tendancy for me to attempt to make an analogy with the AVG experience in China where they fought on for about 7 months with great effectiveness and a roughly equal number of fighters (and essentially no heavy bombers). Of course the difference in leadership and geography were probably among the major factors that differentiate the might-have-beens from the what-was. 



drgondog said:


> Curiously, my father was linked to FEAF although he only fought in ETO. The three future leaders of the 355th FG (my father's unit) were Bill Cummings, Thomas (Speed) Hubbard and gerald (Dixie) Dix who went from PI to Java (then to Australia) in the rear guard action flying P-40s.. thence to the States to form the 355th FG in late 1942.
> An example of 'difficulties' was that they ran out of .50 cal links and tried to find tinkers in Dutch java who could make them - highest production they could get was 100 per day! Simple issue like that would have killed the FEAF ultimately anyway.



This forum has some serious heritage.  to your dad, Ren's Uncles and FlyboyJ's granddad. A generation of heroes.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jan 29, 2012)

I just finished *Bloody Shambles* by Chris Shores. I had it totally wrong. Mac's airforce was not entirely wiped out the first day. Apparently, 75% of FEAF fighter force (mainly P-40s) survived the air battles and bombings of December 8th. What I didn't appreciate was the impact of roughly 100 covering IJN A6M escort fighters piloted by combat veterans over the span of a week's worth of air battles pitted against the relative novices of FEAF. I also didn't appreciate the evident loses due to the risky flying practices that desparation forced on the losing FEAF as it fought to survive. I was astonished at how many aircraft accidents occurred (many multi-aircraft) that lost valuable fighters and bombers before they saw action. While the losses included pilots, in the end there were apparently far more pilots than planes. Brereton comes off as a reasonably competent commander whose air force was simply overwhelmed by numbers and the poor logistical state of his command that he didn't have an opportunity to correct.


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## buffnut453 (Jan 29, 2012)

drgondog said:


> The two Japanese authors of Zero were very specific about not only their engagement in China ain 1940 and 1941 but cited several 'Letters of Commendation" including a Unit Coomendation for a September 13, 1940 mission.
> 
> Specifically from CIC Shigetaro Shimada, China Area Fleet to !2th Air Corps Commander Lieutenant Shindo, dated October 30, 1940, issued a Unit Citation for the destruction of "all enemy planes" during a mission to Chunking against a numerically superior fighter force. I don't think there is any question IJN had Zero's in China, the question is did the AVG shoot any down while in China (or Burma).



Bear in mind the AVG's first combat came after the attack on Pearl Harbor. By that time, all the A6Ms had been withdrawn from China (presumably because they were needed for IJN-specific operations aboard carriers). The AVG did come up against the Ki-43 which can be very easily mistaken for an A6M. IIRC Allied intelligence didn't identify the Ki-43 as a separate type, distinct from the A6M, until 1943.


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## parsifal (Jan 30, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> Bear in mind the AVG's first combat came after the attack on Pearl Harbor. By that time, all the A6Ms had been withdrawn from China (presumably because they were needed for IJN-specific operations aboard carriers). The AVG did come up against the Ki-43 which can be very easily mistaken for an A6M. IIRC Allied intelligence didn't identify the Ki-43 as a separate type, distinct from the A6M, until 1943.



hi buffnut

I agree that the oscar was frequently mistaken for a zero...in fact most Japanese fighters were referred to as Zeroes in that first year, but it seems inconceivable that allied intell would not separately identify the oscar as a separate type for over a year. That just seems not right. I will do some checking and see what comes to the surface


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## buffnut453 (Jan 30, 2012)

I'm trying to recall where I read about late identification of the Ki-43 but I just can't recall where I found it. Bear in mind that the Ki-43 only entered service in Aug 41 and its main operational areas were in locations where Allied intel didn't have much of a footprint. I believe it was during the Solomons Campaign that the Ki-43 was first identified.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jan 30, 2012)

The contrast with the AVG experience, previously seemed to me to argue that FEAF leadership was responsible for a major failure that could have been averted. However, reading _Bloody Shambles_, I have come to believe the AVG benefited from being confronted by generally smaller numbers of strike aircraft and escorts attacking single specific targets. The AVG also enjoyed a well developed early warning network and well established, intelligent post-launch tactical doctrine. In contrast, the Phillipine debacle seems more an organizational failure rather than a purely tactical one. I don't get a strong sense (in _Bloody Shambles_) that Brereton had organized any kind of an early warning system coupled with fighter direction. Indeed it seems he simply didn't have time to do much organization and was primarily focused on improving the training of his generally inexperienced aircrews. 
On December 8, the fighters were launched in the expectation the attack that eventually materielized but while waiting its appearance, they simply milled about aloft burning AVgas without a clear idea the major threat axis or what to do before the raids materielized. They seemed dedicated to defend Clark, but Iba was in some sense even more important to defend with its RADAR. I didn't get a sense the RADAR was even employed in an early warning capacity. The large number of well escorted raids on multiple targets apparently caused some confusion among the large number of FEAF fighters airborne that day.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 30, 2012)

drgondog said:


> Specifically from CIC Shigetaro Shimada, China Area Fleet to !2th Air Corps Commander Lieutenant Shindo, dated October 30, 1940, issued a Unit Citation for the destruction of "all enemy planes" during a mission to Chunking against a numerically superior fighter force. I don't think there is any question IJN had Zero's in China, the question is did the AVG shoot any down while in China (or Burma).


I think evidence shows that there were Zeros in SE Asia in 1940, all removed by December 1941. I think there's more information about this in the book "Japanese Army Air Force Units and Their Aces: 1931-1945"


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 4, 2012)

Been reading Edmunds, _They fought with what they had_. The story of the AAF in the SW Pacific 1941-1942. The section on the PI in 1941 is quite interesting with FEAF records showing conflicting versions of what happened on December 8, 1941. Apparently much turned on poor comms and lack of oxygen. Evidently the fighter direction art was better organized than I imagined, but the RADAR showed the Japaneses strike holding at 100 miles out to sea, which subsequently caused much confusion amongst the pilots of the 3rd Pursuit squadron aiborne over Iba field. Their reaction to this delay was essentially chaotic. They had poor ground to air comm and sought to improve it by getting closer to the source of the signals they expected to be hearing. This led to flying between Manilla AHQ and Iba. Without oxygen they couldn't engage the high flying IJ bombers attacking the airfields. It seems USAAF leadership was less a factor than poor comm equipment, possibly failing in the presence of IJ Comm jamming. Still the failure of RADAR to privide better information is puzzling. According to one account, the mission to Bomb Formosa was canceled in favor of local targets to be bombed at the end of the day, so the bombers might have been on the ground in any event!

My reading of this doesn't change my low opinion of MacArthur or Sutherland. I think Brereton was happy to be away from the SW Pacific when it came time to go. There was evidently a lot of tension between him and Sutherland. Sutherland was so much MacArthur's creature that I don't think the two can be separated in a poll. My impression is that Macarthur was the guy in charge and bears the responsibility but Sutherland was a contributing factor by being more of fire wall and incurring the emnity of the aviation leadership. That role continued to Australia and showed up in his relationship with Brett and Kenney who evidently couldn't stand him.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 4, 2012)

freebird said:


> After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the FEAF (Far East Air Force) had several hours warning, but was still largely caught on the ground and destroyed
> 
> Who was to blame?



From Edmunds: They fought with what they had: 

Not that many aircraft were actually caught on the ground. It's apparently a very persistent myth that evaporates in the light of facts. Out of 4 P-40 1 P-35 squadrons of 18 planes each, only the 20th consisting of P-40s, based at Clark, were on the ground having just been refueled when the the Japanese attacked. Thus only 18 operational fighters were caught on the ground and destroyed. However, each squadron had a small number of spare aircraft to round out their roster and these were probably eliminated when their fields were hit. Of course, all but two of the B-17's based at Clark were also destroyed leaving only that half of the (15-16 a/c) force based at Del Monte on Mindanao. These were all the old C and D models with no tail gun and far less armament than on the more modern marks.

The radio discipline among the many (~70) airborne fighters was so bad that it apparently amounted to self-jamming of their own comms. Little fighter direction was possible. For example, The fighters over Iba heard (amazingly!) the call of "Tallyho!" at Clark and abandoned their own base-protection mission to the Japanese attack that arrived about 5 minutes after they rushed to Clark Field to go where the action was. Very little Oxygen was available for the pursuit squadrons, so most fighters could not engage above about 18,000 feet, depending on their own physiology.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 9, 2012)

After reading Bartsch's _*Doomed at the Start*_, I believe my summary above was incorrect. It was a far more complicated post-Pearl Harbor situation for the first three days during which a significant FEAF air force was essentially pissed away to little effect due to misdirection and lack of good command orgainization and decisions. 

Ater reading some online bio materiel on The situation in Australia when General George Kenney arrived in the summer of 1942, it is looking to me that the person who initially appeared to have been on the sidelines of this debacle (_*Richard K. Sutherland*_) was actually at the heart of it. The logistical and support situation in Australia appeared as bad or worse than what existed in the PI before December 8. It seems to me that Kenney placed much of the blame for the situation on Sutherland.


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