# Malta 1940



## Shortround6 (Mar 18, 2013)

There can be a big difference between being "in commission", "declared operational" and actually being _operational. _ HMS Rodney had had ONE practice shoot with it's 16in guns in the year before it fought the Bismark. 

How many practice shoots did the new Italian battleships have when they were declared "operational"? 

As near as I can figure Malta had seven 9.2in coast defense guns and 10 6in coast defense guns plus some smaller. This could be in error and I welcome correction. 

There were a few bigger antiques around but of no practical value. 

For a 1940 attack (June through August?)to work the Italians would have had to start preparations before they declared war on France, at least for the June/July scenarios. The Italian forces (aside from the navy) seem to be committed elsewhere and a rapid shift to Sicily doesn't seem likely. You can fly a few hundred bombers to Sicily pretty easily but getting the needed fuel, spare parts and hundreds of tons of bombs there may take a little more doing, likewise the several thousand support staff, (living in tents?) and their rations. What was the Sicilian rail and road network like in 1940? Granted there was the rail ferry across the straits of Massina.


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## DonL (Mar 18, 2013)

There is only an option end of August beginning September, when no Italian troops are involved at other frontlines and most BB's were action ready

5 BB's were operating at end of august.
British
Also see Vincenzos post nr. 88 in the other thread.
Both VV and Littorio had 750sm sea training before HATS at 31.08.1940
How many shots and training did POW before she did engage Bismarck?

Form Sicily were operating roundabout 700 a/c's March 1941 and 500 at Januar 1941. So do you think 4-5 month before it is unimpossible?
Also look at post nr. 55 from Vincenzo at the other thread. I think there is no problem to operate 300-500 a/c's at August/September from Sicily.

For Malta:

Fort Bingemma: 1 x 9,2'' Mk.X
Fort Madalena: 2 x 9,2'' Mk.X
Fort San Leonardo: 2 x 9,2'' Mk.X
Fort Benghisa: 2 x 9,2'' Mk.X

Fort Delimara: 2 x 6'' Mk.VII
Fort San Rocco: 3 x 6'' Mk.VII
Fort Tigne: 3 x 6'' Mk.VII
Fort Campbell: 2 x 6'' Mk.VII

Bing Maps - Driving Directions, Traffic and Road Conditions

Also a footnote:
The german Vizeadmiral Eberhard Weichold, chief of the german navy for cooperation at Italy, had tried to get the interest of the Italians to invade Malta with plans from the KM and help from german troops and LW already at July 1940.
The first german LW Korps (X Fliegerkorps) was stationed at Sicily December 1940.


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## Vincenzo (Mar 18, 2013)

The full moon days were:
19th july ( i think too early)
18th august
16th september
16th october (only if not greek campaign was to start)

i don't think was realistic german deployement, italian never would recquired it and german deployement had the trouble that germans use enigma...


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## vinnye (Mar 18, 2013)

Vincenzo, Why are you suggesting full moon days?
I would have thought that from an Axis point of view, a daylight landing would be most advantageous. The Axis aircraft would be able to try to engage the RN forces that we assume would be sent to contest theses landings. Given the advantage that the RN had in night engagements , I would expect the landings would be during daylight.


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## DonL (Mar 18, 2013)

To speak with parsifals words, it is hot air to imply the RN would be at Malta when a invasion would be started.
30 hours minimum to arrive.

When you attack at the morninglight, you have full moon for the navigation.


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## Vincenzo (Mar 18, 2013)

vinnye said:


> Vincenzo, Why are you suggesting full moon days?
> I would have thought that from an Axis point of view, a daylight landing would be most advantageous. The Axis aircraft would be able to try to engage the RN forces that we assume would be sent to contest theses landings. Given the advantage that the RN had in night engagements , I would expect the landings would be during daylight.



just because was common landing in full moon. The RN forces... Gibraltar is almost 2 days from Malta, Alexandria is a little more near... so hours of the landing are not the hours of the engaging (ever if RN came, and i'm not sure that RN try to defend Malta)


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## parsifal (Mar 18, 2013)

It was harder than that. it needed to be a ful moon or near full moon, and a high tide coinciding. Anyone have the almanac for malta in 1940. We need to check both to determine optimum date.


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## Vincenzo (Mar 18, 2013)

high tide i don't think is important in Malta, how many can be in Malta 50 cm?


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## Shortround6 (Mar 18, 2013)

Historically it _seems_ that Malta was at it weakest in June, July and August of 1940.

Unfortunately for the Italian position this apparently coincides with the Italians being rather weak or out of position, as in no dive bombers-no torpedo bombers, many troops tied up in other places, some major ships still working up/completing. 

The RN may very well be 48 hours from arriving if not a bit longer if the Italians can achieve _complete_ surprise. 

What other aircraft were on Malta besides the fighters? Recon planes? Can the Radar detect surface targets?

How long will it take to silence the shore batteries? Done by level bombing or by bombardment by ship? A fair number of the Italian cruisers were rather thin skinned. The 9.2in guns were _supposed_ to be able to penetrate 6in of armor at 14,000yds. 

How long will it take to defeat the British troops once ashore? 

Are there any British submarines in the area? The Italians seem to be much better at anti-sub work than they were given credit for during the war but exposing high value ships to submarine attack is a big gamble. 

If the RN can make it to Malta while the situation on shore is still in doubt the Italian landing force _may_ be in big trouble. 

75mm howitzers are the bare minimum for dealing with "field" fortifications in an effective manner. Against Concrete or excavated rock they may be a bit lacking. 


That is an awful lot of "IFs" to declare and easy win one way or the other. Once September arrives new sets of "IFs" come into play.


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## Vincenzo (Mar 18, 2013)

is out of doubt as historical preparation/deployement the landing are impossible.
maybe some recon and some swordfish but i suppose that RA need to work more of that actually did historically so that there was would be destroyed or near in the What If sitation
navweaps data on 9.2 inch gun give lower capability also if i think are for older shell (and older amor) (for navweaps data give impression that newer shell are only HE).
The strenght of army in Malta is higher of i thinked before the read the other thread and following my research for it (4+ btls is high concentration of force, the italians had 6 btls (1 div) in all the Eagean island and 15 (2 divs + 1 bersaglieri rgt) in sicily) so the work is not easy but what's the british strenght and ammo reserve?
For submarine same is true for the eventually RN fleets caming in help.

the 18th august probably the RM had only 3BBs (Cavour, Cesare back to repair, and Vittorio Veneto) the RN 3 in Alexandria and 1 a Gibraltar (there was also CV Eagle in Alex, and Ark Royal in Gib)
the 16th september the RM had 5 BBs (as above + Littorio and Duilio), the RN 4 in Alexandria and 1 a Gibraltar (there was th Eagle in Alex, but not carrier at Gib)


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## Shortround6 (Mar 18, 2013)

According to Ian Hogg there were 26 'approved' models of shells for the 9.2 at the height of WW II. Since the guns date back to before 1900 this not too surprising but trying to figure out which guns had which shells and in what proportions seems to be impossible. Some mounts had 15 degrees elevation, some had 30 degrees and a few had even more. 

During the war the "shrapnel" shell went out of service, being used up for practice firing. The MK 10A Shrapnel shell contained 2500 lead/antimony balls of 1/2 ounce (just under 13 grams) each. It was supposed to be used against troop transports trying to land troops near the guns. How many in 1940 in Malta? 

Some AP shells were the old 2 caliber radius head type but Campbell gives a few details of a 5/10 caliber radius head shell. 

At any rate these are very dangerous guns for cruisers to deal with. 

Please look at the Japanese vs Wake and Guam for some ideas on what it took to attack a defended Island. How many more attackers than defenders are needed? landing 4-5 battalions to defeat 4-5 battalions of defenders probably isn't going to work. 12-15 battalions of attackers is a more likely minimum. And then they have to be supplied. The 75mm howitzers landed with the force could go through hundreds of shells per day. Some 75-84mm guns in WW I went through over 500 rounds per day.


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## parsifal (Mar 19, 2013)

Vincenzo said:


> high tide i don't think is important in Malta, how many can be in Malta 50 cm?



Absolutely critical actually as demonstrated during husky three years later. Actually the ideal tiing is a rising tide before dawn and a setting moon just before dawn, with the LCs approaching from the west to maximise the coover of darkness. In summer in the northern hemisphere you can get away with a an approach from the south as well.We need detailed topo maps of Malta and its coast to determine where this might occur. we need the 1940 nautical almanac to determine when it can occur. 

Small changes in tide are still important, especially when using extemporised landing craft. . Your craft have to come in on a rising tide to avoid underwater obstacles, beach itself, unload the cargo, thereby reduciung the displacement, and decreasing the draft of the vessel. this allows the vessel to to refloat and thenn either reverse under its own power, but more usually for makeshift craft be towed by ocean going tugs back out to the transports for a reload of troops and supplies, waiting for the next change of tide. Without the change of tide, notwithstanding the decreased displacement of the vessel, it wont get off the beach. There are always vessels that get stuck, so there is always a wastage of vessesls just due to the conditions. Without the risng tide, you wont get sufficient "lift" to get the majority of your craft off the beach. And that will be critical in this scenario where you have just FOUR dedicated LCIs the rest being a depressing array of over optimistic conversions and lash ups. 

If the currents are unfavourable, you will get many of the craft swinging after beaching, which is highly likley to cause the craft to get stuck....if the swell or the surf is high, you will lose the ship to broaching effect.

Properly designed LCs have design features to counter tidal and current drift. They have stern mounted anchors that hold the ship in place whilst unloading and can be used to pull the craft off the beach when it comes time for that. it gives the craft greater flexibility to unload and control the vessel in difficult conditions. For extempoprised craft, unless the conditions are spot on, most of them wont get off the beach, and thats a problem when you have 8000 defenders in front of you, and you can sealift roughly 3-4000 men at a time, tops. Foreget the theoretical totals, think tactical loading constraints, and what other maritime nations, with vastly greater experinece in these things, had to do and the numbers of people they could fit into their craft, when loaded for assault operations. Good rule of thumb, if the vessel is theoretically capable of carrying 3000 troops under ideal conditions, in real combat, they can carry about 1/3 of that number. I am sure there are USMC guys here that will confirm that basic planning rule. 

Beyond that the italians will need to have undertaken some kind of beach survey to determine the underwater topography. You cannot have rocky bottoms, or beaches that shelve too little. The ideal situation (and you need nothing less than ideal for extemporised LCs) is a deeper approach and a beach shelving up at more than 15 degrees. Without a proper beach survey, and without a large purpose designed amphibious fleet, you have imediate cause for alarm.


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## parsifal (Mar 19, 2013)

Nothing wrong with using old guns for coastal defense. Less efficient than modern CA, but BBs historically have a hard time against any sort of heavy coast defence weaponary. The coastal guns cant really hurt the BBs, but they can hurt the invasion forces. This means the BBs have to deal with the CA first, and that means they need HE artillery to do it, which means they are vulnerable to enemy ships. You cannot undertake shore bombardment and be ready to fight enemy ships at the same time with the samer ships, as the Japanese found out in November 1942. 

Moreover, it takes time to reduce well placed coastal defences, a lot of time....days or even weeks in fact.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 19, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Nothing wrong with using old guns for coastal defense. Less efficient than modern CA, but BBs historically have a hard time against any sort of heavy coast defence weaponary. The coastal guns cant really hurt the BBs, but they can hurt the invasion forces. This means the BBs have to deal with the CA first, and that means they need HE artillery to do it, which means they are vulnerable to enemy ships. You cannot undertake shore bombardment and be ready to fight enemy ships at the same time with the samer ships, as the Japanese found out in November 1942.
> 
> Moreover, it takes time to reduce well placed coastal defences, a lot of time....days or even weeks in fact.



Malta had a few _really_ old coast defense guns, the 17.7in RML 100 ton guns but they had been out of service for over 30 years. The 9.2 in guns were not that far off a 1930s 8in gun. The ammo might be a bit dated but 380lb shells can ruin a cruisers whole day. If the gunners thought the 9.2in AP or common shells wouldn't penetrate a target (battleship) they had the option of using HE shells ( also for use against unarmored ships or landing parities) and wrecking the top works. The Bursting charge for a 9.2in HE shell was 33lbs compared to the 18lb charge for an Italian 8in gun.


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## parsifal (Mar 19, 2013)

In order for malta to be held, and a crushing defeat inflicted on the italians, I think it would be necessary for the garrison on the island to hold out for at least 4 days. however that four days needs to be measured from the time of departure for the italian onvasion forces, not from the point of arrival. The British would almost certainly have wind of italian plans, since they were reading Italian naval ciphers up until they were changed at the end of June, and even some low grade siphers into July. The italians would need to plan something like this well in advance, so the British would know something was coming. Moreover, the embarkation would need to be undertaken fom many ports, similar to the great amphibious assaults undertaken by the allies. It is not possible to emabark quickly enough from just one port, and much of the equipments and supplies would need to come from many distant depots and bivouacs in Italy. 

Next, having embarked it would be necessary for the various elements of the invasion force to concentrate into the one task force at some point, much as the allies had to do for their invasions, and then, once concentrated, the forces would need to organise and begin their journey to Malta. They cannot do this in a straight line, however,, because of the risks of submarine attack. all invasion fleets of WWII had to adopt a zig zag pattern in open waters, as a defensive measure, and that basically doubles the distance needed to be travelled compared to a straight line advance. Whilst the allies also need to approach using zig zag, because of the higher fleet speed compared to the italian Amphiobious fleet, could adopt a shallower less pronounced zig zag patter. a fleet travelling at 20 knots fleet speed in a shallow zig zag patter, can generally cover about 4 times the distance of a 10 knot Task Force convoyusing acute zig zag pattern. There would also be acute difficulties I think for the italians to maintain proper station keeping for the diverse menagerie of ships they would be using, which all adds greatly to the time needed to bring the assault force to the enemy shore. 

Once they arrive offshore, the Italians will need to organise their assault waves, clear minefileds and begin to reduce the dug in coastal guns. The biggest time delay would the mine clearance operations and the suppression of the guns. 

It is very likly that the embarkation organization and transport components of the operation might take 1.5 to 2 days. The minesweeping operations couldnt really be undertaken whilst the coastal guns remain active, so they would mostly have to be done sequentially. The bombardment might not need to eliminate the coastal guns altogether, but given the very limited number of assault vessels at the disposal of the italians, such bombardment would need to be more thorugh than say for that used during Overlord. From memory overlords bombardment was about 6 hours, for this hypothetical operation you might be looking at 12 hours ( I have no idea how the italians would replensh their bombardment forces.....they dont have much at sea replenishment, so I guess they would have to shuttle back and forward from Syracuse to restock ammunition) .

Once the journey has been made, a channel swept of mines and the coastal guns cleared or at least suppressed, its time for the assault craft to go in. they have to go in on a rising tide, before high tide. This will be very tricky foir the Italians, again because of the very limited over the beach lift capability that they have.....they will need to get their ships on the enmy shore, unloaded and heading back out to sea for reloading, before the change of the tide. Once the assault forces have disembarked, and the qassault craft off the the beach, they need to be reloaded (afloat) and ready for a run back into the beach area before the next change of the tide 6 hours later.

Moreover the entire islands need to be under Italian control in amatter of hours before the arrival of the RN and reinforcements of the garrioson. Frankly I see no chance of this happening. I see this as a golden opportunity to sink most of the italian fleet actually, something the British time and again tried to do but were stymied by the high speed of the italian ships.


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## stug3 (Mar 19, 2013)

HMS CUMBERLAND in Grand Harbour, Malta


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## Vincenzo (Mar 19, 2013)

Just for clear on italians war book codes break: December 1940


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## parsifal (Mar 19, 2013)

Vincenzo said:


> Just for clear on italians war book codes break: December 1940



Which confirms that the british would have known about a planned malta invasion well in advance. The British were reading high level ciphers of all three services up until the italian DoW in June. All three services then changed their cipher codes with the RM cipher code remaining imprenetrable for the entire war, but their lower grade enigma and C-38 codes providing enough intell for the allies to achieve such victories as Matapan and the numerous convoy intercepts.

But its the compromised security of the other services that ensures the British would know virtually all there needed to be known about a planned invasion. The Army and Air Force (as wellas the italian diplomatic codes) secret codes were broken almost immediately, after the introduction of new codes 10June, as the following excerpt clearly shows

"_Before Italy entered the war, BP had been regularly reading a wide range of Italian high-grade cyphers, including those of their three armed services, and of their diplomatic service. Decrypts gave nearly a month’s warning about the entry of Italy into the war on 11th June 1940. The Italians changed their army and air force high-grade ciphers on 10th June. They also introduced new lower-grade cyphers for all the Italian armed forces but these were soon read, albeit at first with some delay. *By July BP was making progress in reading the new high-grade army and air force cyphers*, and by August a steady stream of decrypts was reaching Cairo. BP increased the number of cryptanalysts in Cairo to ensure that as much of the traffic as possible would be read locally. So *the British had been expecting the Italian attack from Libya into Egypt on 13th September 1940*, though the decrypts did not give the actual date. The arrival of Italian air reinforcements in Albania had been revealed by decrypts and so their attack on Greece on 28th October was no surprise; steps had been taken to provide some limited RAF assistance to Greece and to plan for troop transfers to Creteand delivered a wealth of information...._" 

Because the proposed italian invasion of Malta would have necessarily have been a tri-service effort, with diplomatic communications to the Germans (to receive the additional equipment from them, as suggested by DonL) it is inconceivable that the british would not have a detailed knowledge of what was coming, in what strength and when. They would have had plenty of time to position their fleets for ambush, which in August included at least 7 BBs and provide additional ground troops for the islands defence, as well as beefing up the defensive minefileds and shoreline defences at the known point of assault.


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## Vincenzo (Mar 20, 2013)

Just again for clear you can not intercept the wired comunication. 

on coastal artillery i did some research most of large pieces fired in open so the capability to remain operational is limited


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## vinnye (Mar 20, 2013)

Vincenzo, when you say wired comminication do you mean telephone type communication?

I still think any sea based invasion will be very difficult.
As previously posted, the mine fields would either need to be navigated or neutralized - not an easy task.

I also believe that the British either by aerial recon or by other intelligence gathering - radio etc, would have seen any large sclae build up in Italian ports and been able to react in plenty of time.

Even if you believe that the RN did not see Malta as worth defending, the opportunity to engae the Italian fleet where it could not disengage would have tempted the RN out.


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## Vincenzo (Mar 20, 2013)

For true i thinked to telegraphy.
there were minifields? where? and if new minefields (not as historical but following more info on possible italian attack) where were the ships? and the mines?
surely intelligence had some infos also w/o break in codes, recon idk if there wer capability of recon fly from Egypt, Malta as historically did also bombing mission but italian pressure was very low with a pression need for prepare the invasion i think is easy take out most of flying capability from Malta
maybe, but remember the RN had the force divise, if italian waiting the training of their BBs and attack around the september full moon day the british had their 5 BBs, 4 in Alex (3 QE and 1 R) and 1 a Gib (Renown) they are good BB but are not impossible win it also because is not compulsory to be lucky under italian air attack


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## parsifal (Mar 20, 2013)

The allies knew about the Italian intention to declare war a month before it happened. they knew that the italians were going to attack in the western Desert (graziani's offensive). They knew in advance of the Italians attack on Greece. they knew that the italians were sending air reinforcements to the Albanian front. There is no way they couldd keep the planned invasion of Malta a secret. to claim otherwise, that somehow the Italians would just restrict their communications to wire communications is just silly and not supported by any of the other major events and attacks that they actually carried out. Onl;y when the combat was purely a navy affair were the British ignorant of Italian movements, such as taranto, wherer there was no benefit derived for the attackers. This proposed operation would have involved all three services and the diplonatic service. There is no possibility they could keep it a secret if the allies were reading high grade army and airforce ciphers, low grade navy ciphers and a high percentage of Italian diplomatic ciphers. 

With regard to the vulnerability of Maltas coastal artillery, much of the coastal guns at tarawa were open and based on the British pattern of defence. Many of these guns were still firing right up to their capture, so they could not be destroyed after four days of furious fighting. The gun emplacements on the southern side of the island are still there, and visible. I will say this however, gun emplacements on Tarawa were not generally neutralised by the USN battlewagons, though they did try. most of the suppression work had to be done by DDs attached to provide direct support, firing mostly at point blank range (a couple of hundred yards maybe, and just pumping shells into these positions 

The Maltse had Martello towers which date back to Napoleon. These towers were in turn based on fortifications built by the knights of St John during the middle ages. However these towers were modernized generally by adding a reinforced concrete embrasure at the base of the tower. These towers and the concrete embrasures were not the latest and best thing in coastal defence thats for sure, but they were also remarkably tough. We dont have combat performce for Malta but similar Martello towers at ramsgate and Dover put up with sporadic German shelling for four years. I dont think it can be validly or convincingly argued that these gun emplacements on Malta were somehow vulnerable to the magical powers of the italian Batteships. in any event the italian fleet will be fighting for its life against a superior number of British Battaleships that will in all likleihood have been placed in ambush positions because theu know the italian fleet is coming, thanks to the now known security failures .


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## Vincenzo (Mar 20, 2013)

i don't tell that british don't know that italian were preparating the invasion just don't known the actual plane. 
i don't know the battle of tarawa.
the british BBs are not superior in number, and you can not ambush it the navy book code was not break and the break in enigma was useless. known that the fleet is coming is not sufficient for a ambush.


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## parsifal (Mar 20, 2013)

> there were minifields? where? and if new minefields (not as historical but following more info on possible italian attack) where were the ships? and the mines?




Naval History.net confirms that there were no minefields laid in 1940, because the Allies knew no invasion was planned. However, if they knew the italians were planning an invasion, as surely they would, there were forces already available for that capability There were cruiser minelayers operating with virtual impunity in an out Malta for many months. There was a dedicated Coastal Minelaying flotilla, the 3rd Minelaying flotilla, based at Malta. 

In the waters around Scapa and dover, the British laid over 60000 mines in the first threee months of the war. ive seen a report somewhere that the resources in the med capable of laying around 36000 mines around Malta in a similar time frame. 



> surely intelligence had some infos also w/o break in codes



A gross understatement. According to the information you posted yourself, the British were reading the code traffic from all three services up to June, and then all but the navies high grade ciphers after June. 



> recon idk if there wer capability of recon fly from Egypt, Malta as historically did also bombing mission but italian pressure was very low with a pression need for prepare the invasion i think is easy take out most of flying capability from Malta maybe



Possibly, but there is nothing to support the claim, The Italians and the Germans took many months to reduce the air strength of Malta to nothing , so I am doubtful that the italians with their poor serviceability rates could actually do it. 




> , but remember the RN had the force divise, if italian waiting the training of their BBs and attack around the september full moon day the british had their 5 BBs, 4 in Alex (3 QE and 1 R) and 1 a Gib (Renown) they are good BB but are not impossible win it also because is not compulsory to be lucky under italian air attack



True that the RM could operate from interior lines and that the RN forces were divided, but even though classically this was a theoretical disadvantage, the British actually on several occasions used it to their advantage. RNM never gained much benefit by operating from a central position.

I dont understand your BBs numbers at all. For one thing you assume that the Italians will know exactly when to strike and exactly when the british BB forces will be at their weakest. they never had that ability to know enemy dispositions that accurately. You also assume that the british will initiate diversionary attacks on the french or into the Atlantic even when they know the Italians are prepring for something this big is just wishful thinking. The primary mission of both Force H and the Med flt was for both forces, the defeat of the italains and the control of the med. If they know something is coming that big, every ounce of their strength will be devoted to ambushing the Italians....they wont be frittering away their strength on sideshows like Dakar I can tell you.

In any event, my reading of Naval History/net gives the British 7 BBs, not 5. I think that they had available the following ships for part or most of September 

Barham, Malaya, Valiant, Warspite, Ramillies, Resolution (part rt of Fce H, Fce H primary mission included protection of Malta, not diversions to Dakar, there would be no Dakar if there was a credible threat to Malta) ) At Gib until 6th September, then sailed as part of Force H to Dakar, torpedoed and damaged 20th, eventually removed from the effective list),Renown (In September from 23rd took part in Menace, but still part of Fce H with priority for the med ops)


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## parsifal (Mar 20, 2013)

> i don't tell that british don't know that italian were preparating the invasion just don't known the actual plane.



THe co-operation of the air force and the army would both be needed. These services would give dates and locations for the fleets and the times for departure. The RN would know from pre-war intercept the italian plans to invade Malta. They would therefore almost certainly be lying in wait just outside Z501 range (the only a/c that the RM could rely on for good search reports....the RA never gave this level of support to the RM. The RN would attack from two directions and the italians would crumble. 



> i don't know the battle of tarawa.




Its one of the first allied opposed landings, so the skill levels are similar. The island is much smaller than Malta, and the terrain much easier to fight over. 



> the british BBs are not superior in number, and you can not ambush it the navy book code was not break and the break in enigma was useless. known that the fleet is coming is not sufficient for a ambush


.

I think they were superior in number, but instead of squabbling about it lets work together and get an agreed figure. The allies dont need to read the navy codes, they will all the information they need from the leaky army and air force ciphers, as the link you posted clearly points out.


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## Vincenzo (Mar 20, 2013)

Parsifal i'm bored of your propaganda agenda.
1) the impunity derive of low intensity action of italian forces, how many days/weeks need to sunk the few ship on Malta?
2) i was just agreeing with vinnye that also w/o code break intelligence can work, not is easy as you write, "So the British had been expecting the Italian attack from Libya into Egypt on 13th September 1940, though the decrypts did not give the actual date" so they knew the attack but not the plan.
3) if you don't understand the numbers is your problem. i choice the full moon days not the weakest day, after that the italian BBs get operations, the only days that british had more BBs was from 29th august to 6th september when they had 6 or 7 (from 2 sept) BBs and Barham was not part of force H was sent to Gib specifically for Menace operation. So you think no Menace operation because the italian was planning malta invasion since 1937 and was preparating just from start of war or before (need before for be ready in summer '40)?
4) the cooperation need but when you talking with italian comand in italy i think was relatively common use wired comunication. sure some go wireless (talking flying plane or sealing ship). So you have the full plane intercepted pre war (and i've doubt on this) but you don't know the day don't know all the changes, and because the planes crew don't get the info in the briefing but with radio oh yes so they need used the radio for all the Parsifal agenda not work fine. fine idea wait out Z 501 range with possible enemy subs, and if they used bombers (common for the long range recce) they must go to wait where?
5) you've show already not be a reliable source, so you word on tarawa battle w/o confirmation ae not valuable for me
6) already reply above


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## Freebird (Mar 20, 2013)

Vincenzo said:


> The full moon days were:
> 
> i don't think was realistic german deployement, italian never would recquired it and german deployement had the *trouble that germans use enigma*...





Vincenzo said:


> Just again for clear you can not intercept the wired comunication.
> 
> on coastal artillery i did some research most of large pieces fired in open so the capability to remain operational is limited



Vincenzo, the problem is that the Italains diddn't _*know*_ that enigma or their communications were compromised, so there is no reason to avoid them.

As Parsifal wrote, the British would certainly be aware of the operation in general terms, and the arrive of aircraft large numbers of shipping and landing craft would signal that a landing is imminent



DonL said:


> To speak with parsifals words, it is hot air to imply the RN would be at Malta when a invasion would be started.
> 30 hours minimum to arrive.
> 
> When you attack at the morninglight, you have full moon for the navigation.



Unless of course the British send the battleships en route to Malta as they figure out than an invasion is imminent.

However an attack on a moonlit night might well allow a night torpedo attack by the Swordfish




parsifal said:


> I think they were superior in number, but instead of squabbling about it lets work together and get an agreed figure. The allies dont need to read the navy codes, they will all the information they need from the leaky army and air force ciphers, as the link you posted clearly points out.



Well the Royal Navy would have 7 battleships in the Med or Gibraltar, two more than the Italian numbers: 
Warspite, Malaya, Valiant, Barham, Renown, Resolution Ramillies. - this would assume that the invasion is full-moon of mid september.

Now, if the invasion is mid-August the RN might only have 5 or 6 but Italy might not have Duilo or Cesare.

Vincenzo, do you have a reference to the date that Cesare is repaired from damage?


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## Shortround6 (Mar 20, 2013)

Shore batteries may be a bit harder to knock out than many people realize. Even in a "paired" battery the guns are quite a distance apart. 













While "open" they are not the "open" of a field gun battery.


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## Freebird (Mar 20, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> There can be a big difference between being "in commission", "declared operational" and actually being _operational. _ HMS Rodney had had ONE practice shoot with it's 16in guns in the year before it fought the Bismark.
> 
> How many practice shoots did the new Italian battleships have when they were declared "operational"?
> 
> ...



There are also 10 x twin mounts of 6 pdr (57mm) on Malta, to repel smaller craft.

The main danger to the landings would not be the larger 9.2" guns, but rather the heavy concentration of light heavy mobile artillery, including mortars, that would be used against landing craft. 

There is a good wbsite here with Malta deployments:  Malta Garrison 1940

There are two forces on Malta in 1940, both Royal Artillery Royal Malta Artillery
There are over 3,000 men deployed in the RA, RMA and Malta Dockyard Defence Battery

In Nov 1940 there was serious concern over the threat to Malta, and an additional 3+ regiments were deployed:


10th Hvy AA - RA
12th Field - RA
59th light AA - RA

Had the British gotten intelligence that an attack was imminent in Aug 1940, they may well have sent some regiments earlier

*Royal Artillery*  

On 10 June Italy entered the war. On the following day it launched its first air raids on Malta.
In Dec 1940, the Heavy Defence Units were redesignated Coast Defence Units. 
•7th AA Regt RA. Strength (30 Sept 1940): 19 officers, 364 rank and file. 
◦10 AA Bty RA. From 2nd AA Bde to 7th AA Bde RA in Oct 1936. 
◦13 AA Bty RA. From 2nd AA Bde to 7th AA Bde RA in Oct 1936. 
◦27 HAA Bty RA – Arrived Oct 1940. Left Mar 1944.

•13th Mobile Coast Defence Regt RA. Strength (30 Sept 1940): 14 officers, 234 rank and file. 
◦15th ATK Bty RA. 
◦40th ATK Bty RA. (40th and 71st linked temporarily in August 1939). 
◦48th ATK Bty RA. 
◦71st ATK Bty RA. 

•4th Heavy Regt HQ RA. Strength (30 Sept 1940): 20 officers, 378 rank and file. Located at Fort Tigne.
Became 4th Coast Regt with 6th and 10th Coast Bty RA. 
◦6th Heavy Bty RA 
◦10th Heavy Bty RA 
◦23rd Heavy Bty RA

•26th Anti Tank Regt RA – Arrived on 13 Apr 1939 on HMT Nevasa. Strength 284 men. Left Sept 1943. 
In Sept 1940 it was redesignated 13 Mobile Coast Defence Regt RA (280 men). 
◦15th ATK Bty RA. 
◦40th ATK Bty RA. (40th and 71st linked temporarily in August 1939). 
◦48th ATK Bty RA. 
◦71st ATK Bty RA. 

•12 Fld Regt RA – Arrived on 10 Nov 1940 as a mobile artillery. Operated smoke screen of the Grand Harbour.
Left for North Africa in Sept 1943. ◦6/23 Fld Bty 
◦49/91 Fld Bty 

•10th Heavy Anti Aircraft Regt arrived Nov 1940. Left May 1943. 
◦190 HAA Bty RA (T)
◦191 HAA Bty RA (T)
◦222 HAA Bty RA (T)

•59th Light Anti Aircraft Bty arrived from Liverpool in Nov 1940 and marched to Fort Ricasoli.
•4 SL Regt RA/RMA. Arrived Nov 1940. Left Mar 1945. 
◦484 Search Light Bty RA (TA) joined 4 SL Regt RA/RMA – from the UK on Nov 1940. 

*Royal Malta Artillery*  

Strength (30 June 1940): 78 officers, 1,624 men.

•HQ Royal Malta Artillery 
•1 Coast Regt RMA Dec 1940 to June 1956. ◦ 1 Coast Bty RMA
◦ 2 Coast Bty RMA
◦ 3 Coast Bty RMA. HQ Bty attached to No 3 Heavy Bty
◦ 4 Coast Bty RMA

•1st Heavy Regt RMA – Formed Dec 1939. Left Dec 1940. On 3 Sept 1940 4 Heavy Bty RMA was formed in 1st Heavy Regt RMA.
•11th AA Regt RMA formed on 21 Sept 1939. 
◦20 Heavy AA Bty (T).
◦21 Heavy AA Bty (T).
◦22 Heavy AA Bty (T). 22 Bty was equipped with Bofors and joined 3rd LAA Regt RMA (T) on its formation in March 1941.
◦23 Heavy AA Bty (T) formed on 25 Nov 1940.

•2 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regt Raised on 2 Dec 1939 with non-commissioned-officers from 1st Coast Regt RA and new recruits. Disbanded Sept 1945. 
◦ 5th HAA Bty. Formed at Mtarfa on 1 July 1939. Sailed for Egypt on 7 May 1940. Returned to Malta in 1943 Manned AA defences in Egypt and the Coast defence battery at Port Tewfik. 
◦ 6th HAA Bty. Formed in Aug 1939. Joined 2 AA Regt RMA on its formation on 2 Dec 1939.
◦ 7th HAA Bty. On 2 Dec 1939 joined 2 AA Regt RMA. Disbanded Mar 1945.
◦ 8th Search Light Bty. – Formed Jan 1940. In Nov 1940, it joined 4 S/L Regt RA/RMA on its formation.

•9 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Bty. Raised Nov 1940. ◦10 Light Anti-Aircraft Bty. Raised Dec 1940.
◦30 Light Anti-Aircraft Bty. Raised Mar 1940 to May 1941. 
◦4 Heavy Bty. Raised Sept 1940 to Dec 1940..
◦7 Searchlight Battery Bty.


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## Vincenzo (Mar 20, 2013)

freebird the italians refused, as historically, german help (with troops not in material/weapons rather this were recquired) until they were defeat in the british first offensive in NA, within our timeline in this WI i think is right put not germans in the operations.
freebird the italian navy as historically not used their old enigma variant as common, please read the source linked previously.
i'm sure that british intelligence would be aware of italian invasion fleet sailing and don't need of ultra for this.

Swordfish need to came with the fleet, with around 3 months of attack i've doubt that an air attack can start from malta.

As i writed the british had 7 BBs in medit only from 2nd to 6th september, just because Barham was waiting in Gibraltar for Menace operation.

unlucky no atm, i've searched but i found only data of arrive in La Spezia..... i just came in mind an other book to check


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## Freebird (Mar 20, 2013)

Vincenzo said:


> The strenght of army in Malta is higher of i thinked before the read the other thread and following my research for it (4+ btls is high concentration of force, the italians had 6 btls (1 div) in all the Eagean island and 15 (2 divs + 1 bersaglieri rgt) in sicily) so the work is not easy but what's the british strenght and ammo reserve?



Actually the strength of Malta is much higher than that, there are 7 battalions on Malta in June 1940, + another battalion arrived in the Autumn. (There is an additional militia battalion defending Gozo AFAIK)

An additional battalion, 3rd Buffs (East Kent) seems to arrive in 1940 but I'm not sure what month.

I've posted a map of the rough deployment areas below.








DonL said:


> Laut Ordersofbattle.com:
> 1.Dorste: regulär
> 2.Devon: regulär
> 2.West Kent: regulär
> ...



7 battalions may not seem so impressive at first glance, but consider:

In 1944 the planners for US V corps planned to land 34,000 men and 3,300 vehicles on Omaha beach on D-Day transported and guarded by a force of some 2,000 ships (not including any of those in the British sector!)

The US forces took some 3,000 casualties landing at Omaha, and yet the landing was only opposed by just 3 battalions - a single battalion of the 352nd division and 2 battalions of the 716th Static division!

From Hyperwar:



> Omaha Beach lay in the *53-mile sector reportedly held by the 716th Infantry Division*, extending from the Orne River to the Vire Estuary (Map No. I). This was a defensive division, estimated at two regiments, two or three artillery battalions, and other small divisional units. Non-German elements in the division were estimated to be as high as 50 percent, mostly Poles or Russians, and morale was thought to be poor. The 726th Regiment was responsible for the coast defenses from west of Grandcamp to a point three miles east of Port-en-Bessin.
> 
> According to the intelligence available, *defending troops in the Omaha Beach strongpoints amounted to about a reinforced battalion, some 800 to 1,000 troops*, most of them needed to man the beach defenses. Local reserves of the 716th Division were estimated at three battalions, two of these near enough to the Omaha assault area to reach it in two or three hours.



Assuming that the 716th division had 7 battalions defending the coast (with a couple more in reserve) that amounts to about 7.5 miles of frontage per battalion. 
From what I can tell, the coastline of Malta has about 45 - 48 miles of coastal frontage, and had 6 battalions deployed, with another in reserve. All of the battalions had about a 6 - 7 mile frontage, except for about 9 or 10 miles in the 2nd Malta militia sector facing the South coast, which was mostly high cliffs and without a major useful port or bay.


Would somebody like to compare the amphibious capabilities of the Italians in 1940 vs the US landing at Omaha?


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## Freebird (Mar 20, 2013)

Vincenzo said:


> freebird the italians refused, as historically, german help (with troops not in material/weapons rather this were recquired) until they were defeat in the british first offensive in NA, within our timeline in this WI i think is right put not germans in the operations.



I would agree, however they might requested some material help .



Vincenzo said:


> i'm sure that british intelligence would be aware of italian invasion fleet sailing and don't need of ultra for this.



That's my opinion as well.
The interesting question is how they might prepare for an invasion, with the intel that they get.




Vincenzo said:


> As i writed the british had 7 BBs in medit only from 2nd to 6th september, just because Barham was waiting in Gibraltar for Menace operation.



Somehow I doubt that the British would go through with "Menace" if they were expecting a massive battle around Malta in September, the Dakar operation was not urgent and may well have been postponed


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## Vincenzo (Mar 20, 2013)

The point is: the italian was preparing malta invasione since somewhere before of war, for ready in time almost from september '39, the british can be sure the invasion coming in that month or the follow month? so they postponed for ever the Manace operation? and Barham was sent for Manace w/o Manace you don't have Barham (but you've Ark Royal).

on Cesare back: the book have not date but there is a table with bimestral report of ready ship (the italian words are "pronte all'impiego" i think this would be that the ship are in the fleet is a decision of Admiral (the Squad (Corps) Admiral) the use: 1/7/40 BBs: 4, 1/9/40 BBs:4, 1/11/40 BBs:6, 1/1/41: BBs:3, 10 june 1940:2, this not help we already knewn that Cesare was back in operation to end of august.


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## parsifal (Mar 20, 2013)

Looks like i need to produce the sources that prove 7 Battleships available in September. Remember, it is faulty to asssume the british would divert strength or resources to sideshows (for Fcee H or the Med Flt) until after Italians had either committed to the operation, or it became clear that they had lost their nerve. Destruction of the french fleet could well wait until after taranto


The ships we need to look at for September are



> Barham, Malaya, Valiant, Warspite, Ramillies, Resolution (part rt of Fce H, Fce H primary mission included protection of Malta, not diversions to Dakar, there would be no Dakar if there was a credible threat to Malta) ) At Gib until 6th September, then sailed as part of Force H to Dakar, torpedoed and damaged 20th, eventually removed from the effective list),Renown (In September from 23rd took part in Menace, but still part of Fce H with priority for the med ops)



So lets see what Nav History has to say forthese ships in September

*Barham*

_Passage to Gibraltar.
2nd - Arrived at Gibraltar.
6th - Sailed from Gibraltar in company with aircraft carrier ARK ROYAL, battlecruiser RENOWN, battleship RESOLUTION, and screened by destroyers FAULKNOR, FORESIGHT, FORESTER, FURY, GREYHOUND, ECLIPSE, ESCAPADE and INGLEFIELD. (ECHO joined later after completing repairs at Gibraltar).
20th - Pre-operation conference held on board at Freetown.
21st - Sailed from Freetown for Operation MENACE. (Note: cruisers DEVONSHIRE, CORNWALL, AUSTRALIA (RAN) and DEHLI had joined MENACE at Freetown.)
23rd - Arrived off Dakar to find the area shrouded in fog. 
24th - In misty weather BARHAM, RESOLUTION, AUSTRALIA and DEVONSHIRE carried out a further bombardment of the port area and the shore batteries at a range of 14000 yards. BARHAM concentrated her fire on the RICHELIEU. The return fire from RICHELIEU and the shore batteries was concentrated on BARHAM and she was hit by two shells causing slight damage. 
At 1325 hours the bombardment was checked and the bombarding force moved out to sea. An assessment of the results was that despite the battleships having fired 400 rounds of 15in little or no damage had been caused to RICHELIEU or the shore batteries. Engaged French submarine PERSÉE with depth charges _(this was after an extended bombardment....so much for it being "easy" to take out shore batteries) 
_25th - In clear weather she launched her Walrus aircraft which then spotted for her when a further bombardment of RICHELIEU was carried out which obtained one hit. (Note: Post war evidence records this caused no damage.) The Walrus was shot down. 
At 0910 hours RESOLUTION was torpedoed by French submarine BÉVÉZIERS. Shortly after this BARHAM was hit in the bows by a 15in shell from RICHELIEU. 
At 0930 hours the attack was called off. BARHAM took RESOLUTION in tow and they proceeded to Freetown.
28th - BARHAM towing RESOLUTION arrived at Freetown_.

Now, if people want to believe that its "propaganda (as Vincenzo so eloquently puts it) to say that this whole operation would be cancelled or postponed with an imminent invasion of Malta known and on the cards, then fine, but given the primary mission of Fce H was the protection of British interests in the Meditteranean, I dont think saying she was available is propaganda at all. The propaganda here is giving the Italians super powers that they never possessed whilst assuming massive stupidity on the part of the RN....


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## parsifal (Mar 20, 2013)

*Resolution *was at Gibraltar as part of Fce H from 28th August. She had a similar history as the barham, except she took a torpedo and was moderately damaged. If she had not been diverted to Dakar, as is highly likley with an invasion of malta likley, she would have remained on station in the Med for some time. To be fair, I dont think that her replacement was likley to arrive in the following month 

For the remaining 5 Battleships/Battlecruisers I dont think there is any argument between the two sides as to their availability 

Im enjoying this "propaganda". Bring it on


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## parsifal (Mar 20, 2013)

> The point is: the italian was preparing malta invasione since somewhere before of war, for ready in time almost from september '39, the british can be sure the invasion coming in that month or the follow month


? 


They had full access to the Italian secret ciphers up until they were changed. they most certainly WOULD know the planned invasion date if it was set before 10 une 1940. 



> so they postponed for ever the Manace operation? and Barham was sent for Manace w/o Manace you don't have Barham (but you've Ark Royal).




Incorrect. Barhams transfer to Fce H was sheduled from well before MENACE was finally decided upon. She was part of the British build up in the Med, not a special transfer just for MENACE. Resolution is a bit more "iffy" but it just shows that the British had the capability to make such increases to the force structure if the need arose. 

In the Summer of 1940, the Admiralty believed that provided they had a fast Battleship at Scapa (ie the Hood) and 2 other slow Battleships (Revenge was one of them) they had sufficient battelship strength to contain the German Navy Seelowe notwithstanding. In September, the Germans had no battlships ready for service, so the general plan was to increase the pressure on the italians whilst they could. Hence the gradual build up of strength. Fce H was initially set up to replace the French fleet, its destruction was bitterly opposed by all except Adm Phillips (of Fce Z fame) and Churchill. But on several occasions Somerville showed his merttle and refused to be drawn into hairbarained schemes ordered by Churchill. Eventually he was subjected to an inquiry (over the battle Of Site, but his subordinate was actually court martialled - and exonerated, over the failure to intercept Richelieu with Renown). The point is this, The Amiralty, not Churchill issued the operational priorities, and proved many times that if they could not achive their primary objectives, they would not do Churchills bidding. This hypothetical situation fits perfectly that situation, but I doubt even Churchill would allow Malta to be placed at risk in favour of a Dakar style operation.


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## Vincenzo (Mar 20, 2013)

on Barham you've too smart you selected the quote ahahah:
August
Nominated for support of planned French landings at Dakar. (Operation MENACE – For details see MENACE by A Marder, ENGAGE THE ENEMY MORE CLOSELY by C Barnett, and Naval Staff History.)
28th - Took passage from Scapa Flow escorted by destroyers ECHO, ECLIPSE, ESCAPADE and INGLEFIELD.
September
Passage to Gibraltar.
2nd - Arrived at Gibraltar.

so they was sent to Gibraltar for Menace. I've already writed i'm not agree the virtually infinite posponing of Menace operations the british don't know the data of the invasion until after the fleet sail, and operation Menace had a sense if did.
Set the invasion date before of war??? and again they had access to intercepted comunication there is no reason for put on air a war plan before of war... (for true also after for the plane as a whole). Barham Nominated for Medit Fleet ? and because in naval history this there is not? and a Source for the opinion of Admiralty? or are just your opinions?


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## Vincenzo (Mar 20, 2013)

On Omaha beach the defend unit was the 352nd divison, a rgt of 716th division was under of 352nd divison, on the beach there were III/726 and the I/916 btls. in the area there were the 3 rgt of 352nd division and the attached 726 of 716th, the Panzer Lehr division later was added to defend forces


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## parsifal (Mar 20, 2013)

> on Barham you've too smart you selected the quote ahahah:
> August
> Nominated for support of planned French landings at Dakar. (Operation MENACE – For details see MENACE by A Marder, ENGAGE THE ENEMY MORE CLOSELY by C Barnett, and Naval Staff History.)




I quoted availability for September, which is the month you nominated. If you actually bothered to have a read of barnett, instead of selectively quoting bits and pieces of him, you would know that from the middle of August on, the British were receiving increasingly detailed decrypts of the German invasion plans. they were worried, but not enough to hold back forces, including Barham, for Menace. If they were prepred to transfer Barham for a bombardment of French ports, why would they be less likley to send the Barham to give the Italians some stick. Your argument is just non-sequita. Haha right back at ya sunshine......




> so they was sent to Gibraltar for Menace. I've already writed i'm not agree the virtually infinite posponing of Menace operations the british don't know the data of the invasion until after the fleet sail, and operation Menace had a sense if did.



Here we go again, giving the italians perfect strategic vision, giving the british isurmountable stupidity 



> Set the invasion date before of war???



Yes, of course, oh i forgot the italians are supermen, they dont need to set a date until the day of the invasion. The Germans, with their inadequate planning for Seelowe set the date for the invasion in the final plan in July for a late september invasion, it changed a couple of times, but well in advance. The Allies, in planning for the cross channel assault set the invasion day initially for June 4th I think back in January 1944. The italians, with their inherently innefficient interservice co-operation, and the need to requisition shipping and obtain foreeign help would need months or yeasrs to prepare for an assault like this. The Japanese were planning their amphibious operations for December 1941, as far back as July, planning for the Midway operation began in January 1942, and detailed planning was occuring from the middle of March. The amphibious excercises Ive been involved in take years to organize, but the actual planning for a brigade sized asault generally takes about 3 months to plan and prepare for. This is a Corps sized assault, so planning and preprations would take at least a year, allowing for the low levelof italian efficiency, probably about 12.5 years. Everything from beach surveys to shipping contracts and req1uisitions, training, selection of equipment, working out the tactical loading sequences, how to solve the beaching and beach unloiading problems.....trust me there are lots of issues... 




> and again they had access to intercepted comunication there is no reason for put on air a war plan before of war... (for true also after for the plane as a whole).



You would say that as well about Operation MI (invasion of midway), but they did. You would say it about seelowe, but they did too. You would say that about Overlor, but they did. The difference is that Allied Ciphers were secure enough to protect secrets like that, Axis (including the Italians) were not. 




> Barham Nominated for Medit Fleet ? and because in naval history this there is not? and a Source for the opinion of Admiralty? or are just your opinions?



I was going to suggest several chapters of Barnett, but that might be a waste of time seeing you already quoted him, and must therefore have a copy that is missing several chapeters. Probably better to just ask you this....if the British were confident to send Barham and Resolution to Gibraltar and then to Freetown why would they be any less likley to send Barham to Gibraltar and then Malta for a decisive shown with the italians?


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## parsifal (Mar 20, 2013)

Vincenzo said:


> On Omaha beach the defend unit was the 352nd divison, a rgt of 716th division was under of 352nd divison, on the beach there were III/726 and the I/916 btls. in the area there were the 3 rgt of 352nd division and the attached 726 of 716th, the Panzer Lehr division later was added to defend forces



How much of that force was actually on the frontline and absorbed the initial shock of the assault. how many battalions were in each of these regiments and and how many companies attached to each battalion.

Its very dangerous to assume full strength for german formations in 1944

One more thing about the map ive attached....the length of coastline held by that single battalion was longer than the entire eastern flank of Malta, which is the most likley place for an assault. Moreover, Matese Beaches arent like the Normandy beaches. Maltese Beaches tend to be short affairs, punctuated by steep rocky outcrops. There are only about 5 or 6 beaches suitable for amphibios craft by the loof of it, so the Beach defences are going to be formidable. Once the threat of airborne assault recedes, the Britsh could deploy some of the Maltese reserve units to the battle as well. 

This is not a good look for the italians at all......


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## Vincenzo (Mar 21, 2013)

parsifal i never quoted Barnett i quoted the naval-history.net and i just added a few line of your selected quote. They can sent a BB so they deleted Menace and up the medit fleet so this is an other WI, for me is ok no Menace the Barham was send to Medit Fleet or Force H. This give 7 BBs to british fleets in mid september (Resolution no Menace no damage stay in service) and 2 CV (no Menace no detachment of Ark Royal) a this point probably the alone Medit Fleet had almost the same number of BBs of italian fleet plus the CV, too enemy fleet for a invasion of Malta w/o large marines capability so postponed the Malta invasion. 
I don't give stupidity to british, iv'e just stay with Menace operation, if was not a important operation was not did and prepared within the BoB.
No relatively impossible set the data of invasion if you are not in war, in july the germans were in war with the british, and for true never did a actual day of invasion only possible days that is a different thing, in juanary 44 the allies were already in war from years, the japanese start of war was following their planes, oh so the italian were incapable also in a WI scenario oh i was sure that this was your opinion.
And sources of this (planes on air)?? 

On Omaha i've writed but obviously you can not read, there were 2 btls (III/726 and I/916) on the beach. Generally at time the german rgt were on 2 btls. i've the orbat on my laptop not here so i can not give info on what coy were where.


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## vinnye (Mar 21, 2013)

We seem to have had some discussion as to how many BBs may be available for this showdown, what about the relative merits of the two Navies actual ships, leaders and tactics?


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## Shortround6 (Mar 21, 2013)

The Italians may be very well capable of putting 5-10 battalions _ashore_ in August/Sept of 1940. Can they keep them there? Supplied and provide reinforcements? 

Malta gets stronger with convoy that arrives so the window of opportunity is fleeting. Granted the Italians also get stronger. 

The British and Maltese know _exactly_ where the Italians have to land (or at least the most likely sites) because Malta has been invaded before and fortifications/watch towers have been in place to watch all the likely spots for over 300 years. Coming up with a new spot (capable of handling a force of battalion size)is impossible. 
The sooner the Italians strike the less time the British have to put out mines and prepare other surprises, but the less time the Italians have for aerial bombardment. The Italians have a very short window on the codes (if any) and while the British may not know the course/speed of the Italian ships they are probably going to get a pretty good idea of when the whole operation is scheduled for. 

Italians have an ammo problem, load the BBs with HE blast the shore defenses or load with AP and hang back letting the cruisers duke it out with the shore batteries and wait for the British fleet? Doing shore bombardment and then running back to port to reload leaves the invasion fleet open to the British attack. AP doesn't work well for shore bombardment and HE, while it can mission kill a ship cannot usually put one on the bottom. 

Italians also have to be careful with logistics. Using Syracuse as a base is convenient but if you swipe some of the Messina ferry's for ersatz landing craft that means you may have trouble getting supplies _TO_ Syracuse and they will have to be stockpile before hand.


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## parsifal (Mar 21, 2013)

Malta appears to be an easy place to defend.

Attached is a map showing the beaches of Malta. There are no beaches on the southern coast, one very close to valletta another in a Bay on the extreme southern tip of the island, again in the confines of a small bay. The majority of the beaches are in the north, between Gozo and the main island. Some of the beaches are better from an asault point of view than otherm but none of them apear large enough to attempt a large scale invasion on a broad front, Many of them are small, and flanked by high headlands and the like....perefect for enfilading fire. Quite a few beaches appear to have rocky underwater obstacles that would play havoc on the invasion barges.

Bottom line is this i think, the beaches of malta dont appear all that good for a large scale invasion. Many locations could be easily mined others are too small, or have danagerous enfilading positions. Others appear to have underwater hazards. 

Of course this is only a very cursory examination, one would need a detailed beach survey to do that, and without frogmen that means an onsite surface appraisal . Beach surveys could be cursory, but there is an increasing risk of disaster the less information is provided to planners. And this situation that I am seeing is not one where safe assumptions can be made about anything. Ideally you need cadastral surveys done complete with theodalite and depth lines, as wll as diver inspections of the bottom surface. That would be difficult to do in a 1938 style environment, given that Italy was considered a potential enemy and pariah state from 1935. You cannot exactly send in military survey teams for beach assessments and not attract attention to yourself. 

Anyway, quite apart from the discussion, what a beautiful place.

http://www.maltamaltamalta.com/activities/beaches-swimming/


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## Ascent (Mar 21, 2013)

Something to remember about the Normandy landings is the hard won experience of the Allies from previous landings in the Med and the fiasco at Dieppe, experience that the Italians wouldn't have had. Were they aware of what an opposed landing would require fully? how much support was required? how effective would a bombardment be?

I think it would be foolish to believe that the British would have no warning about a planned invasion of Malta. Even if they didn't have the codes broken there would be an increase of radio traffic simply because of the extra organisation involved. Again going back to Normandy the Germans were expecting something they were just fooled as to the real location by a massive disinformation campaign, something that is not really open to the Italians in this case.


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## parsifal (Mar 21, 2013)

The italians have the runs on the board as far as capbility. They can and did, undertake amphibious assaults of meedium scale. However, they never had to undertake such operations against a large number of modern equipped defenders and/or anything other than an opposing force that at best can be described as "primitive". The operations in Albania were perhaps the most opposed landings they ever undertook, but the defending forces were basically pitch fork armed militia in pathetic numbers. Against the 346 defenders at Vlore (I think it was Vlore) the defenders managed to contain a total force of more than 15000 (of which I think about 1000 were in the initial assaults) for almost 24 hours. Against the 7-9000 Malta defenders the 15-30000 attackers, attacking at what appears at most reinforced battalion to regimental level (both because of the limited sealift capacity and also because of the very limited beach sizes), I dont see the italians making much headway at all. Perhaps at best they might achieve a lodgement, and then dig in relying on further reinforcement some days or weeks down the track. But in that time the RN will react, and from there it is inescapable to conclude....game over. The Italian fleet never once got the upper hand in 1940 in toe to toe engagements, and always avoided outright defeat by using their superior speed. Even at Sirte, where there were 2 Italian Battelships to one small British Battelcruiser (the Renown.....Ramillies was there but fired only two rounds), the italians were already retiring after Renown had opened fire. 


How the italians conducted themselves makes good sense, but that is not what is required for a sea control mission. The italains neeeded to accept battle, and in open battle the 15" heavy Battleships of the RN had a distinct advantage over the 13.5 in armed older, lighter BBs of the RM. The modern BBs of the RM were a different matter, but they never had the accuracy to be more than a problem to the RN , not a solution to the RMs problems.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 21, 2013)

The older Italian Battleships didn't have 13.5in guns, they had 12.6in guns. AP shells were 1157lbs? 

The Italian 15in shells carried about 1/2 the amount of explosive as the British 15in shells for both AP and HE.


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## parsifal (Mar 21, 2013)

Ill stand corrected on that, but its the type of armament that ships like Warspite were designed to withstand. I dont think they were invulnerable, not at all, but they were tougher and more resilient than their older Italian counterparts.

Its not impossible for the italians to win, but it is hard. They would need to be super aggressive and super resilient in a fight like this and prepared to take a lot of punishment to win the battle. If I were the Italians I would use my two new BBs to try and work the flanks of the British battle Line, whilst trying to keep them honest with the three old der modernised BBs. As the British, I would attach the Renown to the cruiser line and use her to try and thwart or stymie the Italian flanking moves. I would organize my main gun line into two divisions, a fast division (built around ships like the Warspite....top speed 24.5 knots) and slow division built around the old R class (top speed around 22 kn). The old ships would hang a beeline straight for the invasion fleet, no deviations, sabres drawn ready to cut it to pieces. Forces the italians to place their battle line in such a way as to protect the amphibs, and thereby place themselves at great risk. 

I would not expect Italian airstrikes to be at all effective. They had no track record to suggest otherwise up to that point, and no great usage of torpedoes in their aircraft until the following year. Therer was some usage, but not extensive. RN Carriers, would consist of Ark Royal, Illustrious and Eagle, with Argus a possibility. That gives them a strike capability of around 50 a/c, well proven and able to inflict significant damage on the Italians.


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## fastmongrel (Mar 22, 2013)

parsifal said:


> and slow division built around the old R class (top speed around 22 kn).



Just a minor point but I believe by 1940 the Rs were well down on speed and were around the 20 knot speed on a good day, they were all badly in need of new boilers and turbines.


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## stug3 (Mar 22, 2013)

Sorry, I know this thread is concerned with 1940, but it seems somewhat relevant.
From Red Tobruk: Memoirs of a World War II Destroyer Commander Bless Our Ship: : Captain Eric Bush

_On the 21st March a convoy of four merchant ships had set out from Alexandria to bring relief to Malta. Intelligence indicated that the Italian fleet would attempt to attack at some point. The heavy escort of Royal Navy ships was therefore somewhat prepared when on the afternoon of 22nd March 1942 ‘a thin wisp of smoke’ appeared on the horizon. Frank Gregory-Smith records that he felt curiously relaxed at this point, even though the next more detailed report suggested they faced three battleships. As a matter of routine they could also expect to come under air attack from both bombers and torpedo bombers.

Vice Admiral Vian had prepared a plan that involved shielding the convoy with some of his force of destroyers, whilst constantly threatening the Italian fleet with a torpedo attack from other destroyers – a plan that very largely succeeded.

Captain Frank Gregory-Smith was on HMS Eridge:

A series of flashes in the smoke followed by a dull, rumbling boom announced the opening of the surface engagement. As if this was a signal, a formation of torpedo bombers flew into sight, skimming just above the sea. Simultaneously an even larger group of high level bombers were briefly glimpsed through the smoke and clouds on the opposite side of the convoy. Escorts to port and astem of the convoy immediately engaged the high formation, leaving the torpedo bombers to HMS Southwold, HMS Dulverton and HMS Eridge.

The ship shuddered under the opening salvoes and high explosive started to burst around the low flying aircraft. Their crews, obviously surprised by such a heavy concentration from so few ships, promptly split into smaller groups and tried to penetrate the screen on a broader front. Even then gunfire continued to harass them, forcing them into individual units which dropped their torpedoes haphazardly and at such long range that all ships had time to tum towards their tracks, just as bombs from the high formation exploded in a compact mass well astern of the supply ships.

Meanwhile, the two surface forces, exchanging rapid fire as they rolled, twisted and plunged through the heavy seas, were closing at a relative speed of fifty knots. The British were already partially hidden by smoke, which the Italians would have to penetrate if they were to get within range of the supply ships. Just before reaching effective gun range, the Italian Admiral swung his ships to port. To prevent him stealing the weather gauge, the British followed his movements and stretched at high speed eastwards.

On this course, British smoke drifted rapidly to leeward and, when its outer fringes reached the Italians, their Admiral, fearing a torpedo attack, edged his ships further to port. But the smoke still thickened around his ships, harassing them until the Italian Admiral suddenly lost his nerve and swung his cruisers, followed by a division of destroyers which had unexpectedly appeared astem, in a broad sweep to the northward. Rear Admiral Vian held on until satisfied that the enemy was definitely retiring and then turned towards the convoy; some twenty miles to the south-westward.

It was not all over. A very short time later another force appeared. Captain Eric Bush was in command of HMS Euryalus:

The enemy, as we know now, was in two groups at this stage, the nearer, about nine miles away, consisting ofthe two eight-inch and one six-inch cruisers and four destroyers we had met before, and the second group, at a distance of fifteen miles, comprising the modern battleship Littorio and four destroyers. We were in for something now, all right! I knew that Admiral Vian would never leave the convoy to its fate, so if needs be we would be fighting to the end.

In the next two hours the fate of our whole force was in the balance. With the powerful ships at his disposal the Italian admiral could easily have wiped us out, but he could not bring himself to enter the smoke-screen knowing that we were waiting for him on the other side._


HMS CLEOPATRA throws out smoke to shield the convoy as HMS EURYALUS elevates her forward 5.25 inch guns to shell the Italian Fleet.






An ammunition supply party bringing up shells for the 5.25 inch guns, during a lull in the action, on board HMS EURYALUS, on convoy duty in the eastern Mediterranean.






The Italian battleship Littorio outranged and outgunned all of the Royal Navy ships but dared not penetrate the British smokescreen. When darkness fell, without radar, she was forced to withdraw.


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## Freebird (Mar 22, 2013)

Vincenzo said:


> on Cesare back: the book have not date but there is a table with bimestral report of ready ship (the italian words are "pronte all'impiego" i think this would be that the ship are in the fleet is a decision of Admiral (the Squad (Corps) Admiral) the use: 1/7/40 BBs: 4, 1/9/40 BBs:4, 1/11/40 BBs:6, 1/1/41: BBs:3, 10 june 1940:2, this not help we already knewn that Cesare was back in operation to end of august.



Why would there only be 4 BB's on 1/9/40?



Vincenzo said:


> The point is: the italian was preparing malta invasione since somewhere before of war, for ready in time almost from september '39, the british can be sure the invasion coming in that month or the follow month? so they postponed for ever the Manace operation? and Barham was sent for Manace w/o Manace you don't have Barham (but you've Ark Royal).



Well I would say Menace probably postponed about 5 or 6 weeks.

I agree with Parsifal on this, The threat on Malta BoB takes first priority, Menace is not nearly as urgent.

If I were to decide, I'd see Menace in early November, with Royal Sovereign + another BB.
Frankly, I don't see why they can't support an operation against French West Africa with a French battleship! 



parsifal said:


> The italians, with their inherently innefficient interservice co-operation, and the need to requisition shipping and obtain foreeign help would need months or yeasrs to prepare for an assault like this. The Japanese were planning their amphibious operations for December 1941, as far back as July, planning for the Midway operation began in January 1942, and detailed planning was occuring from the middle of March. The amphibious excercises Ive been involved in take years to organize, but the actual planning for a brigade sized asault generally takes about 3 months to plan and prepare for.



Do we have any examples of amphibious assaults done with shorter preparation?



Vincenzo said:


> On Omaha beach the defend unit was the 352nd divison, a rgt of 716th division was under of 352nd divison, on the beach there were III/726 and the I/916 btls. in the area there were the 3 rgt of 352nd division and the attached 726 of 716th, the Panzer Lehr division later was added to defend forces


 


Vincenzo said:


> On Omaha i've writed but obviously you can not read, there were 2 btls (III/726 and I/916) on the beach. Generally at time the german rgt were on 2 btls. i've the orbat on my laptop not here so i can not give info on what coy were where.



I can read just fine.
The 352 was NOT just defending Omaha, but Gold beach sector as well.

So bottom line, the US landed 60,000+ troops with heavy support during the first 24 hours, in a sector that had 2 battalions defending the beach, with about one other regiment as backup in the first 24 hours.
The Italian assault will be facing a similar concentration of defensive troops, with a force perhaps 10% the size of the Omaha landings, correct?


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## Freebird (Mar 22, 2013)

fastmongrel said:


> Just a minor point but I believe by 1940 the Rs were well down on speed and were around the 20 knot speed on a good day, they were all badly in need of new boilers and turbines.



The Resolution had been recently refitted and might have been in the 21 - 21.5 knot range
The British ships will certainly be slower than the Italian ships



parsifal said:


> Ill stand corrected on that, but its the type of armament that ships like Warspite were designed to withstand. I dont think they were invulnerable, not at all, but they were tougher and more resilient than their older Italian counterparts.
> 
> Its not impossible for the italians to win, but it is hard. They would need to be super aggressive and super resilient in a fight like this and prepared to take a lot of punishment to win the battle. If I were the Italians I would use my two new BBs to try and work the flanks of the British battle Line, whilst trying to keep them honest with the three old der modernised BBs. As the British, I would attach the Renown to the cruiser line and use her to try and thwart or stymie the Italian flanking moves. I would organize my main gun line into two divisions, a fast division (built around ships like the Warspite....top speed 24.5 knots) and slow division built around the old R class (top speed around 22 kn). The old ships would hang a beeline straight for the invasion fleet, no deviations, sabres drawn ready to cut it to pieces. Forces the italians to place their battle line in such a way as to protect the amphibs, and thereby place themselves at great risk.
> 
> I would not expect Italian airstrikes to be at all effective. They had no track record to suggest otherwise up to that point, and no great usage of torpedoes in their aircraft until the following year. Therer was some usage, but not extensive. RN Carriers, would consist of Ark Royal, Illustrious and Eagle, with Argus a possibility. That gives them a strike capability of around 50 a/c, well proven and able to inflict significant damage on the Italians.




In regards to battleships, while the British would have 7 cappital ships, I can see them retaining one in Gibraltar, and not sending the entire Force H to Malta.

So just just for the sake of argument, suppose the British have 6 ships: Warspite, Malaya, Barham, Valiant, Resolution Renown.
How would they plan the operation? Would they try to intercept off the coast of Malta?

How would Italy plan to defeat a powerful British fleet, especially given the ineffective performance of airstrikes during battle the previous month?


Suppose that Italy did have 250 or so fighters available, how many could actually be held on station to escort/defend during the naval action at Malta? 
Suppose a squadron of CR42's take off from Italian airbases that are 80 or 90 miles away, so about 30 min flying time to Malta, how many min would they have to linger? What would be the turnaround time to rearm refuel when they returned?


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## parsifal (Mar 22, 2013)

> Do we have any examples of amphibious assaults done with shorter preparation?



None that I can think of that are of a similar size to the one being projected here.There are contemporary examples that we could consider. 

1) Gallipoli - First proposed 14 November 1914, active planning underway from Feb 9 1915. Good similarity in terms of size of the operation, but suffered from very poor prepration and survey work

2)Weserubung - Invasion of Norway. Similar time frame, multiplicity of landings, extemporised landings, landings largely (or expected to be) unnopposed. Military planning for operation began 14 December 1939

3) Watchtower - invasion Of guadacanal - Similar time frame, but smaller operation (single division). Planning began June 19 1942, in time for an August landing. Landing went without a hitch, because it was largely unopposed (not Tulagi). Did not attempt any deep peenetrations of the islands....just to set up defensive perimeter around the airfield. 

4) Operation RI - Operational side of the Pt Moresby invasion - reinforced regimental sized operation.Operational planning began from January 6 1942, operation began (but was recalled) early May 1942. 

5) Operation FS - Operational plan for the overland occupation of moresby, including amphiob ops at Buna. Landing by about 7000 Japanese of the SSF. Basically a reinforced regiment again, and using the same transports and organization as Op RI. A lot of overlap with the earlier cancelled seaborne invasion, but operational planning began 9 June for planned invaion in early August. The Japanese believed the Australian ground forces were at Kokoda, but 39th Bn was arriving as the landings went in (landings themselves were unopposed however) 

6) Milne Bay (Operation RE) - Poorly conceived and executed operation at Battalion strength. Planning began July 26, carried out late August 1942....total failure. 

Im sure there are examples of smaller, less well planned amphibs, such as the hooking operations by Yamashita in Malaya, but I dont think, for various reasons, that these operations are comparable to a fully planned major assault such as this one 




> In regards to battleships, while the British would have 7 cappital ships, I can see them retaining one in Gibraltar, and not sending the entire Force H to Malta.
> 
> So just just for the sake of argument, suppose the British have 6 ships: Warspite, Malaya, Barham, Valiant, Resolution Renown.
> How would they plan the operation? Would they try to intercept off the coast of Malta?
> ...



They might a lesser number (around 5 as you suggest) at the actual battlefront because of refit issues. british ships were not as completely rebuilt as the italians, and already in 1940 were showing signs of wear. Typical rule of thumb, a ship will spend 1 week out of 4 undergoing some kind of repair. Italy would have this sort of problem too, but for a major operation like this they have the initiative so can sort of "fudge things" to bump up operational numbers a bot.....in other words they might have 5 BBs, but at least one might be a bit sick.

Contrary to what DonL and Vincenzo claim, there is no rush for the british. The outer defences of the island are more than likley to take some time to soften up for invasiopon, and ideally the Italiansd need to be committed to the actual invasion at the time of the british intervention.....that means the fleet will arrive off malta at night....around midnight I would surmise. I have to make some estimations here, which is always dangerous in this environment, but I would estimate the italians would need a day to embark and a day to asseble their fleet. I would surmise that they would draw ships from Naples, Taranto, Messina and Syracuse. Naples is about 3 days sailing time from Malta, plus we have the dealys of embarkation and assembly....all up transit time is about 5 days minimum. 


For the British I expect they would split into two forces....one to escort the relief ground forces (possibly built around the "R" class ships and the carriers Eagle and Argus). The other would be the main force....the fast division, and I see them built around Renown, Warspite, Malaya, barham and Valiant, and the Carriers Ark Royal and Illustrious.

If I were to prepare a "wet dream" plan of attack for the british, i would be using Malta as bait, so as to ambush as much of the italian fleet as i could. The trick for the british is to remain undetected on that last day that the Italians are approaching....a didfficult ask, but certainly not impossible, given what happened with hats (the entire fce H remained undetected until after completion of the operation and Somervile was heading home). If Fce H and the med flt could remain undetected, I would position the british forces over the horizone and allow the italian fleet to approach. Once night fell and the invasion bombasrdment had begun, I would arrange for the shore parties on Malta to commence firing starshell and continue to do so, thereby illuminating the Italian armada (and very possibly blinding the ships lookouts). I would then approach from the ofshore side of the fleet and reduce range to point blank before opening fire. Have the DDs on the lee side ready to make smoke. I would worry too much about the amphibious forces too much....concentrate on disabling all five battleships. iwould intend to bag all five of them, 

With a night battle, the Italians are going to do really poorly. It wouldnt matter if i only have parity, or even less, italian night fighting skills are just so poor that this would end up being a duck hunt for the british...battleships pouring fire into their opposition, Night trained Swordfish crews launching torepdo after totpedo at point blank range....it would have be considered that a massacre of the italians is the overwhelming likelihood.

This is the sort of situation that Cunningham and Somerville could only dream about. Historically the italians never risked this sort of operation for good reason. They preferred to die the slow death of the convoy wars to North Africa, but that made sense....it was the operational imperative for them. 



> Suppose that Italy did have 250 or so fighters available, how many could actually be held on station to escort/defend during the naval action at Malta?




None. the action will be a night action, not unlike Savo Island


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## Juha (Mar 22, 2013)

On the vulnerability of open pit coastal guns during early part of WWII. From an old reply on another site.
"Also the inability to hit pinpoint targets is shown on what happened to two Finnish coastal batteries, Mantsi and Järisevä. Both of these were subjected to much bombing and counter-battery fire but were not silenced even if they were two gun (Mantsi with 152mm cannon and Järisevä with 120mm cannon) open pit structures, if I remember correctly still in WWI style side by side layout and without any meaningful AA defense. IIRC Mantsi, which very early fell far behind Soviet rear and was therefore completely on its own, had only one or two 7,62mm AAmgs most of the war, after 2½ months fighting Mantsi got one 40mmBofors, but even after numerous bombing attacks it stayed in action to the end of war and harassed Soviet supply traffic along the coastal road on the NE shore of Lake Ladoga. It suffered some damage but I cannot remember how much of that was caused by bombing and how much by counter battery fire. Järisevä on the other hand situated in Karelia Isthmus near the eastern end of Finnish Mannerheim Line, which was the main line of defense of the Finnish Field Army. One important function, other than its own firepower, of Järisevä was to mask nearby much more powerful (4x152mm cannon) Kaarnajoki battery, which remained unknown to Soviets almost to the end of the war. The older Järisevä which situated at the tip of a point of land was known by Soviets but the new Kaarnajoki battery, which situated more inland in a forest was not. Even if subjected to heavy bombing and much counterbattery fire also Järiseva, even if rather badly damaged, stayed in action to the end of the war."

Juha


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## Shortround6 (Mar 22, 2013)

The thing is you have to get just about a direct hit on the gun/mount. landing 20ft away does kill would crew but does little or nothing to the gun. A hit 20ft away on a ships gun can jam the turret, start fires ( setting concrete on fire is difficult) or let water into the ship. 

When being shot at by ship mounted guns the shore battery guns are very small targets. Again what would be a near miss on a ship (20 feet below turret) doesn't do a thing to these guns ( 20ft low puts the the shell into the cliff quite a number of feet in front of the gun.)

If things get really bad (bombing?) crew can take shelter in bombproof shelters and come out when the planes leave.


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## Ascent (Mar 22, 2013)

stug3 said:


> Sorry, I know this thread is concerned with 1940, but it seems somewhat relevant.
> From Red Tobruk: Memoirs of a World War II Destroyer Commander Bless Our Ship: : Captain Eric Bush
> 
> _On the 21st March a convoy of four merchant ships had set out from Alexandria to bring relief to Malta. Intelligence indicated that the Italian fleet would attempt to attack at some point. The heavy escort of Royal Navy ships was therefore somewhat prepared when on the afternoon of 22nd March 1942 ‘a thin wisp of smoke’ appeared on the horizon. Frank Gregory-Smith records that he felt curiously relaxed at this point, even though the next more detailed report suggested they faced three battleships. As a matter of routine they could also expect to come under air attack from both bombers and torpedo bombers.
> ...



As an aside to this aside, my grandfather served on HMS Eridge from commision to pay off in either X or Y turret, unfortunatley I don't know which. I would definatley recommend Red Tobruk as a cracking read.


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## vinnye (Mar 25, 2013)

Some of the RN BBs had already been tested by hits from French and German BBs and shown that they were quite resilient - would the Italian BBs have stood up to a stand up shoot out with the RN 15 inch shells?


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## fastmongrel (Mar 25, 2013)

I think the Rs would have been equal to and QEs would have been better than the rebuilt Conte di Cavour and Andre Dorias. The rebuilds had a speed advantage but the rebuild left the main armour belt almost completely submerged and the deck armour was in thin layers and probably wouldnt have kept out a plunging 15" shell. The Littorios would have overmatched the RN ships but did seem to have lots of main armament accuracy problems and never fired as fast as designed. 

If the Italian fleet had been caught at night by a force of QEs and either Hood or Renown plus at least one flat top I think the italians would have had to turn and run or be badly mauled.


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## vinnye (Mar 25, 2013)

Yes, I had read that the Italian guns had some issues with their accuracy - their spread of shot being far greater than that of the RN ships. That and the accompanying aircraft carrier would make any Italian battlefleet very nervous!


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## fastmongrel (Mar 25, 2013)

I think the carrier would have been the Ace in the hole for the RN. A strike by Swordfish would throw the Italians into a panic and say 15 torpedoes dropped 2 or 3 are going to hit and slow down the Italians so that the slower RN vessels could move in for the kill. If the Italian fleet exits the area at night to avoid the Battlefleet then the RN can send in cruisers and smash the invasion fleet and any bridgehead the infantry have gained. The RN would rule the waves at night and could come back repeatedly and sink anything bigger than a box of matches.


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## vinnye (Mar 25, 2013)

Would the RN have used the Swordfish during daylight or were they able to operate at night?
If they were nigh time capable, then the Italian Navy would have a real phobia of getting into a shooting match with the RN - who had already shown their superiority at night with their radar.


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## parsifal (Mar 26, 2013)

Its not the aircraft so much as the crews. Swordfish from 1941 were being fitted with ASV radar that did enhance their ability to find things in conditions of poor visibility, however the attacks themselves generally until quite late in the war were done visually with the aid of flares.

ASV will help but its the training and operational techniques that makes the difference. Not all CAGs were trained for Night Operations, but in 1940, Eagle, Illustrious and Ark Royal all had night capable crews.

Illustrious delivered the taranto attack at night, and the attack on Bismarck were mostly in the half light of twight and with low cloud cover and poor visibility to boot. Somerville planned to use his Swordfish and Albacores in Night counterstrikes during the Japanese Indian Ocean raids


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## vinnye (Mar 26, 2013)

Thanks for the information Parsifal, having the night time capability is a real bonus and would be a major worry for your opponent.


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## stug3 (Apr 2, 2013)

The remains of a Gloster Sea Gladiator, which formerly flew with the Malta Fighter Flight and No. 261 Squadron RAF, lies by the side of the airfield at Ta Kali, Malta. In the background is a parked Hawker Hurricane Mark I, W9133, of No. 261 Squadron


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## stug3 (Apr 15, 2013)

With invasion an immediate threat, Instructors address troops from a Matilda tank in distinctive Malta camouflage.


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## parsifal (Apr 16, 2013)

any idea when the shot of the matilda was taken?


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## stug3 (Apr 16, 2013)

April 1942 maltagc70.com


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## vinnye (Apr 16, 2013)

Has that Matilda got a different turret on it? 
Does not look normal to me!


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## stug3 (Apr 16, 2013)

Yeah, it does look different. Maybe some type of command or communications variant.


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## vinnye (Apr 19, 2013)

Just found this site - good info on Matilda variants and deployment.
Infantry Tank Mk.II Matilda (A12)


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## Ascent (Apr 19, 2013)

I think the turret is a normal one but it's turned directly away from the camera so you're seeing it from an unusual angle compared to the hull.


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## vinnye (Apr 19, 2013)

You could be right, but to me it looks too tall?


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## stug3 (Apr 19, 2013)

Matilda IIA Mk III at Malta, 1942. These tanks have a particularly unique livery, with large spots of sand color over an olive green factory color. The most well known is the "Griffin", of the 4th independent tank platoon of the Malta tank squadron, RTR.


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## parsifal (Apr 19, 2013)

great looking tank IMO. Pity the tureet ring was too small for much improvement. 

I think the Matilda was the best tank until the T-34....despite the limits of its gun


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## stug3 (Apr 20, 2013)

RAF Spitfire V takes off from USS Wasp (CV-7) after a 200-foot run, May 1942. Probably taken during Wasp's second Malta aircraft ferry mission.


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## stug3 (Apr 21, 2013)

Ground crew refuel a Spitfire Mark VC of No. 601 Squadron RAF, using four-gallon petrol tins, in a sandbagged revettment at Luqa, Malta, while two armourers service the Spitfire's cannon. In the cockpit, conferring with other squadron personnel, is Flight Lieutenant Dennis Barnham.


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## parsifal (Apr 22, 2013)

the poms came to regret those flimsy 4 gallon drums....too easily pierced and prone to leakage, no adequate seal at the fill point. Much fuel was lost because of them. the German "jerry can" was a much better proposition


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## Ascent (Apr 23, 2013)

There's a reason those petrol tins were known as 'flimsys'.


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## fastmongrel (Apr 23, 2013)

Expediency as always meant the 4 gallon flimsy was better for Britain early on. A Jerry can needs big pressing and welding equipment to make it in a big factory. A 4 gall Flimsy is sheet metal soldered together and could be made in a small workshop by anyone with Guillotine, a bending jig and a gas or electricity supply for the soldering iron. Until US supplies of welding and pressing machinery became widely available what welding and pressing plants that were available were too busy making things like ships and steel helmets (just 2 examples I thought of). Part of the Flimsys problem with leaking is that they were supposed to be one use but often because of shortages were re-used and throwing an empty can in the back of a lorry to be sent back to base along desert roads wasnt what it was designed for.


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## vinnye (Apr 23, 2013)

Also, that is why whenever they were captured, Jerry cans were put to good use by the Brits!


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## fastmongrel (Apr 23, 2013)

Great picture of a Crusader Tank being juiced up with a 4 Gall can and a funnel also made from a 4 Gall can


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## fastmongrel (Apr 23, 2013)

And a British Jerry petrol can from 1942


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## stug3 (May 21, 2013)

Flight Lieutenant Dennis Barnham, flight commander of No. 601 Squadron RAF, in the cockpit of his Spitfire Mark VB at Luqa, Malta, at a time when his victory tally was five enemy aircraft. Pilot Officer M H Le Bas looks on. 





Is that some kind of inlet to the right of the windscreen?


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## Airframes (May 21, 2013)

Yes, it's the cool air inlet, which could be opened or closed. Just read Barnham's book, describing his tour on Malta, April - July 1942 - powerful stuff, and really brings home the ordeal of the most bombed place on Earth!


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## stug3 (Jun 8, 2013)

40mm Bofors anti-aircraft gun position overlooking Grand Harbour, Malta, 1942






A 4.5-inch anti-aircraft gun opens fire during an air raid on Malta, June 1942.






Vertical aerial photograph of Ta Kali airfield, Malta, following bombing raids of April 1942.






Army and RAF personnel and Spitfire Mk V, Malta, 17 June 1942.


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## stona (Jul 21, 2013)

I've just spent a few days working in Malta and have read this thread with increasing dismay.
The premise seems to be that the Italians should attempt a seaborne assault on Malta in 1940 sometime between their entry into the war in June 1940, and before the destruction of Marshal Graziani's 10th Army in North Africa by General O'Connor's Anglo-Indian 13th Corps and before the raid on Taranto in November which sent the remaining serviceable Italian ships bolting for the safety of Naples, La Spezia and Genoa. The R.N. was subsequently able to reduce the number of Battleships in the Mediterranean (Ramilles and Malaya were sent home).

I don't believe that the Italians had a snowball's chance in hell of mounting such an operation.

After the German intervention in Greece this became a German problem. General Warlimont (deputy chief of operations for the OKW) relates that the question discussed was essentially whether to seize Crete or Malta. The staff _unanimously_ concluded that Malta should be seized "since this seemed to be the only way to secure permanently the sea route to North Africa". It was Hitler who vetoed this leading to the attack on Crete because he felt, according to Warlimont, that there was a danger of "attacks on the Roumanian oil fields" and more fancifully that bases on Crete would open up "far reaching possibilities for offensive action in the Eastern Mediterranean".

General Thoma was sent to North Africa in October 1940 to assess whether and how German forces might support the Italians. He reported that any campaign would depend on regular supplies and that this matter would be decisive. British possession of Malta rendered this uncertain and therefore compromised the intended campaign. The OKW rejected any plan for invasion and the alternative plan, to bomb the island into submission, was adopted.
Thoma was correct. By April 1942, despite the relentless bombing of the island, the Axis supply situation in North Africa was serious if not desperate. Up stepped General Student with a plan for a joint Italo-German invasion of the island. German paratroops would seize a bridgehead to be quickly reinforced by an overwhelming Italian seaborne force of up to 8 divisions.
" I hoped", recalled Student, "to carry out the plan not later than August (42)". He was summoned to a final conference on the operation in June at Hitler's HQ. Unfortunately Hitler had just received a very unfavourable report on the state of Italian forces in North Africa and their morale from General Cruwell. Hitler took alarm and felt, according to Student, that if the British Fleet appeared on the scene the Italian ships would bolt for their home ports. The plan was abandoned.

Just as in 1940, in 1942 the Axis had neither the wherewithal, nor the will to invade Malta. The failure to do so cost the Axis dear.

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Jul 21, 2013)

Its a good summary Steve, and I agree with everything youve raised. however, I should point out that with, or without Malta, Axis logisitics were severely compromised. certainly the loss of cargoes made Axis preparations just that much harder, but the main constraint affcting Axis supply wasnt just Malta, it was also the wodefully inadequate port capacities that they struggled with. The main ports were Tripoli, followed by a very distant second place Benghazi. All the rest, including tobruk (totally and hopelessly wreckewd by the time it was captured) were laregely irrelevant. 

According to OKW Quartermaster estimates, Rommel needed 60000 tons of supply per month to undertake operations at a normal pace. He received, on average 56000 tons oif supply per month AT THE PORTS OF DISEMBARKATION. Two things, however conspired to undo him. the first was Rommels complete disregard for his logistics limitations. He just kept attacking, and advancing, lengthening his supply lines well past the danger point. A division that is mobile and advancing will consume an average of 400 tons supply per day, in periods of heavy action, whereas a unit in a static position, or in mopping up operations, could consume about 60-100 tons per day. Obviously divisions sometimes on the move and sometimes in heated fights will be somewhere in between, and obviously a division that has been gutted will have lower supply demands than one that is full strength. Conversely, I am unsure if that 60000 tons would cover the numerous support echelons, like Corps troops and the like. Pz Armee Afrika used over 30000 trucks at full establishment, which was more than the entire AGS provisions....for just 12 divs. 

Infantry Divs (unmotorized) were about half those numbers. In the middle of 1942, the Axis had about a dozen division, plus their air force, and their rear area garrisons to worry about. 60000 tons was not enough especially with Rommel disobeying orders and attacking like crazy all the time.

If Rommel had not advanced as he did, and did not attack so constantly, one might think he would survive a little longer. perhaps, But again, by June 1942, there were simply too many troops in North Afdrica, operating at very long distances from the supply heads, at an unsusceptible pace of operational tempo, for this to ever be a front that they were going to win. 

Most unloading occurred from tripoli, about 1500 miles from Alamein. Tobruk is 300 miles, whilst Benghazi is 600. If we compromise, and assume for the excercise the supply head to be Benghazi, then for every 1000 tons unloaded at the port, only 636 will get to the front....the rest is lost in the trip (not inlcuding enemy action. In point of fact, of that 56000 tons per month, after we take into account the DAF operations and acts of sabotage by the LRDG and similar, less than half that 56000 tons was making it to the front (most estimates are about 26000 tons). Rommel at Alamein had 12.5 divs, of which 8 were mechanized, and 4.5 were german. Italian Infantry were only about 60% strength, , so in German equivalents, there were about 9 divs feeding on that supply line, plus about 350 a/c (roughly the equivalent of about 3.5 divs in terms of supply demand). Thus we have 12 div equivalents feeding off that supply line, with a minimum supply demand, even in the static role, of about 12-1500 tons per day. That equates to a minimum of around 36000 tons per month just to remain effective in a defensive situation.....but in mobile operations that figure would multiply by about 4 times.

Malta was critical, dont get me wrong, but Rommels supply problems were not solely due to Malta. Even without Malta to impede the flow of ships, Rommel would still have foundered due to a lack of supply. And that was mostly due to the limited port capacities available to the Germans.


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## stona (Jul 21, 2013)

I agree.

The cost of defending and sustaining Malta was enormous. One battleship, two aircraft carriers, four cruisers, one fast minelayer, twenty odd destroyers and minelayers, forty submarines were all sunk. There was huge damage to many other vessels. 1600 civilians and 700 soldiers died on Malta. The RAF suffered about 900 dead. It lost 547 aircraft in combat and another 160 on the ground. The Royal Navy lost about 1700 submariners (often overlooked) and about 2,200 surface personnel. About 200 merchant seamen died.
An island, initially described as indefensible had proven itself indestructible thanks to these men and the incredible resilience of the islanders themselves.
I would argue that the long running battle for Malta was one of several pivotal points in the battle for democracy. Had it been lost the war would have progressed differently, how we will never know because it was a battle won.
It has been argued by some that the cost was too high and it was a battle not worth fighting (a view held by Admiral King, admittedly no friend of the British). This is not a view to which I subscribe.
Cheers
Steve


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## Civettone (Jul 22, 2013)

stona said:


> I've just spent a few days working in Malta and have read this thread with increasing dismay.
> The premise seems to be that the Italians should attempt a seaborne assault on Malta in 1940 sometime between their entry into the war in June 1940, and before the destruction of Marshal Graziani's 10th Army in North Africa by General O'Connor's Anglo-Indian 13th Corps and before the raid on Taranto in November which sent the remaining serviceable Italian ships bolting for the safety of Naples, La Spezia and Genoa. The R.N. was subsequently able to reduce the number of Battleships in the Mediterranean (Ramilles and Malaya were sent home).
> 
> I don't believe that the Italians had a snowball's chance in hell of mounting such an operation.


You say this and back it up with a whole range of reasons dating after Crete. What is the point in that ???

Malta was virtually undefended in June 1940, but the Italians chose not to invade. Why? Because they did not see the need. Britain was going to sue for peace anytime soon. Nor Hitler nor Mussolini expected them to continue to fight. 
Then, Britain reinforced Malta and it would require a large operation to conquer it. Instead, the Italians chose to neutralize it by air attacks. That failed due to a lack of bombers and payloads.

You can say that they did not have a chance either in 1942. But Student, who you like to refer to, was convinved it would have been a success if operation Herkules had not been cancelled. And indeed, Malta was neutralized in 1942 and the Italians ruled over the Central Mediterranean Sea. Italians and Germans had superb elite troops trained just for this and I am positive Malta would have fallen. The only reason why it was cancelled is because Rommel was on a roll and needed all the air and armoured support. It was a risk but it could have been brilliant: if Rommel had pushed through El Alamein he would have taken Alexandria and the Suez Canal and the Royal Navy would be neutralized and Malta would be out of range to interrupt the shipments. In the end, Rommel was stopped AND Malta was allowed to re-invigorate.

Kris


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## stona (Jul 22, 2013)

What resources were the Italians supposed to use for their 1940 landings on Malta? It is true that the island was virtually undefended apart from the presence of the Royal Navy. If the Italians had mustered the resources to mount an invasion from somewhere and been prepared to confront the elements of the Royal Navy which would have appeared they had a good chance of success. My argument is that they didn't have the will to attempt it. It was just one of many opportunities which they threw away in the first months after their entry into the war.

It is also true that the Marine Militaire appeared to enjoy local superiority. Unfortunately for it Napoleon's old adage "the moral is to the material as three is to one" held good. The MM repeadtedly failed to press home its advantage. 
Campioni's excuse to retire after Somerville's typically aggressive manoeuvring (culminating in Renown opening fire at 27,000 yards) during operation "Collar" sums it up in one example. 

The "state of affairs was unfavourable to us numerically and qualitatively" which it was not. 

A British commander making such a report would need to be mindful of the fate of Admiral Byng at Minorca. With a four hundred year tradition, something the MM notably lacked, he would have been too.

From a British perspective Somerville reported that "almost immediately after opening fire the enemy cruisers and destroyers commenced to emit dense smoke and retired behind it."

He wanted to pursue the Italians but was told by Holland not to as the Italians enjoyed a three knot speed advantage which was true. Despite this Somerville still had to face an Admiralty Board who felt he might have forced a big gun duel on the Italians. The First Sea Lord, Sir Douglas Pound thought that Somerville had not been aggressive enough, should have handed the convoy over to Cunningham and gone after Campioni. The Chairman of the Board, Lord Cork seems to have shared this view. In the end, but not until December 7th, Somerville was cleared and his actions deemed "correct and spirited".

We are talking about two very different navies here.

Whilst the Axis did enjoy a measure of control in the central Mediterranean it was most certainly never Mussolini's "Mare Nostrum". The example above also illustrates just why the Germans, in 1942, had so little faith in their ally, as reported by Student.

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Jul 22, 2013)

guys

weve already looked at this adnauseum, and i think it fair to summarise that there are two diametrically opposed viewpoints. One is that the italians had a small window of opportunity probably around August in which they had opportunity and resources to undertake the operation. The opposing view is that the italains never had such opportunity.

We can happily go round and do this allover again, but it wont add anything to the body of knowldge already in this thread. Weve done the issues already, Unless there is something we missed, I think we would just be working over the cold ashes of an old argument.


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## parsifal (Jul 22, 2013)

(duplicate post)


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## Shortround6 (Jul 22, 2013)

Pretty much the window of opportunity was there, but it was fleeting. To time an Invasion for the window of opportunity would have required marshaling the required air and sea lift capability and the required troops _before_ Italy declared war on France. 
It might also have required Italy postpone it's invasion of Southern France or weakened it. The window starts closing in Sept/Oct as re-reinforcements arrive.


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## pattle (Jul 23, 2013)

It would have been interesting to see how such an invasion would have turned out given the Italian record against the Allies in North Africa, East Africa, France and Greece.


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## stona (Jul 23, 2013)

Actually I think that the opportunity did exist briefly, this of course with the benefit of hindsight.
I don't believe that the Italians had the resources or ability to seize it. They did have the ability to seize various other opportunities to inflict serious damage on the British in 1940-42 but almost invariably failed to do so.
Later the Germans may have had the ability to seize Malta, but they lacked the will and certainly were not prepared to bank on their Axis allies.
Cheers
Steve


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## fastmongrel (Jul 23, 2013)

Not to be racist in any way but the Italian armed forces of the time couldnt co-operate and organise a drinking contest in a brewery. This pretty much was the same with all armed forces of the day inter service co-operation even today sometimes goes spectaculary wrong. Its a skill that comes from a long list of **** ups and experiments how do the Italians suddenly master the art when they arent even at war. 

My take on it yes it could be done but the list of things that could go wrong is long and painful. It would take a braver man than Benny to do it.


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## stona (Jul 23, 2013)

There are many factors that make or break a fighting force. The individual bravery and heroism of many Italian fighting men is well established and on the record. What the MM did not have was the esprit de corps of the RN. This is not something that can be developed overnight but is rather something that ALL military organisations invest a lot of time and effort developing. The RN had a several hundred year head start on its Italian adversary in 1940, it was arguably the only advantage it had.

It is worth saying that the Admiralty was worried about how merchant seamen would perform at war. The Merchant Navy is a bit of a misnomer, an invention of WWI propagandists. It comprised a motley collection of privately owned vessels. These varied from the liners of Cunard-White Star and the P and O Navigation Company (where every deck officer was a master mariner) to the "pound and pint" tramp ships manned by seamen on minimum wage and victualled to the minima laid down by the Board of Trade.The inter war depression had hit these men badly, the British Merchant Fleet had been largely idle.

The performance of the Master and crew of SS Cornwall, a 10,600 ton cargo liner, badly damaged by three Italian bombs when part of convoy MF 2 on 30th August 1940, did much to allay such fears. Surgeon Lieutenant Adnams was transferred from HMS Juno to Cornwall to treat her wounded and reported that "the officers took their extra labours very lightly quite as though it was normal procedure. The ship's company also showed excellent spirits and a cheerful and helpful manner. All difficulties were minimised." 
The commander of the convoy, Captain PJ Mack gave a more sober, but complimentary report. He praised the Master's (Pretty) achievement in "keeping an accurate course with no steering gear at all" as "a most seamanlike performance."
SS Cornwall made Malta, off St Elmo's lighthouse on the morning of 2nd September. The heavily listing but no longer burning ship was towed into Grand Harbour by the tugs Ancient and Jaunty just two hours behind her escorts. She carried nine wounded men, some serious and one dead, Junior Radio Officer Chamberlain, killed by the second hit.

Cheers
Steve


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## parsifal (Jul 23, 2013)

The failure of the Italian armed forces arose for a multiplicity of reasons.The problem for the italians was that whilst other nations at various times in their history have faced one or two of the generic problems standing in the way of military efficiency, in the case of the Italians in the lead up to WWII faced nearly all of them at the same time. 

Italian officers were inherently conservative and conventional in their thinking. italian tactics and training was flawed (instances of italian Infantry at the beginning of the war in the desert forming square are true, and well documented, and known to have occurred on many occasions). Italian society was suffering from deep social stresses and inequalities, so that the sense of community....workingas a team, was very lacking. There was little or no trust between officers and their men. Average recruits lacked depth of education, and tended to be more focussed on family over community....the lack of education made advances in the technical aspects of the army more difficult. 

There were numerous equipment failures, logistic support was poor, the TOE of the army left a lot to be desired.Equipment was old,sometimes in poor repair, and often in short supply. There were no less than 16 different calibers of weapons just for basic rifles.....and the list goes on and on. The ability of the italian supreme command system was chaotic, to say the least. In my opinion there were simply too many factors at work to ever make it possible for the italians to serioulsy consider or be able to pull off something as complicated as a major seaborne invason. And from day 1 it would have required significant forces to be committted. The largest amphibious operation the italians had ever attampted to that point was the invasion of Albania, where the italians had strained (and expended much of their very meagre ampbibious lift capability) to put 1500 men ashore against virtually no opposition. They passed on the projected invasion of Corfu and Crete (until goaded to do so by the germans,and even then it was an abject failure).....the italians themselves had little or no faith in their ability to mount any significant amphibious invasions during the war.....and the british were busily fortifying and recruiting in malta prewar from 1937 onward, such that from june 1940 there were about 4 battalions of regulars and 6 battalions of local militias already on the island.

i dont think there was a snowfalkes chance in hell of the italians ever being able to invadee the island on their own, in 1940. Too many problems, too little capability.


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## stug3 (Jul 27, 2013)

Flight-Sergeant G F “Screwball” Beurling of No. 249 Squadron RAF, standing by a sandbag revetment at Ta Kali, Malta, with the rudder and unit emblem cut from a crash-landed Macchi MC.202 of the Regia Aeronautica, one of four enemy aircraft which he shot down over Gozo on 27 July 1942.






Ground crew refuelling a Supermarine Spitfire Mark VC(T) from a petrol tin at Ta Kali, Malta


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## Civettone (Jul 28, 2013)

parsifal said:


> i dont think there was a snowfalkes chance in hell of the italians ever being able to invadee the island on their own, in 1940. Too many problems, too little capability.


I agree with your analysis of the Italian state of affairs. But let's take a look at a similar analysis of Maltese defences. Those troops you mentionned were undertrained and lacking just about everything. In fact, British military planners had already given up on Malta. It was expected to put up token resistance. 

Like I said before, the later Herkules invasion was much much more difficult, but back in June 1940, Malta was ripe for the taking. The Italian Navy, suppemented with a few Stormi of Italian bombers would have been able to land a couple of divisions on the island and that would have been the end of it. Italian losses might have been heavy. But ... there is no way that the Italians could have been driven back into the sea as NO British replacements were going to be send to Malta. In worst case scenario, Italian losses would have been heavy, but it would have been only a matter of time before the weak Maltese defences would have collapses. 

There is only ONE reason why the Italians did not invade: political. Mussolini believed that Britain was going to sign an armistice as soon as France has capitulated. He believed the war would have been short and limited. Malta could be neutralized and be acquired at the negotiation table.

Kris


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## Civettone (Jul 28, 2013)

Oh, and the Italian Navy was called Regia Marina. Marine militaire is French. 


Kris


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## Shortround6 (Jul 28, 2013)

Civettone said:


> I agree with your analysis of the Italian state of affairs. But let's take a look at a similar analysis of Maltese defences. Those troops you mentionned were undertrained and lacking just about everything. In fact, British military planners had already given up on Malta. It was expected to put up token resistance.



Given up when? The planners _had_ given up in 1937/38 but there seems to have been a bit of a change of heart by 1940. Not that Malta saw any great amount of supplies coming in but some of those Malta Infantry units didn't exist in the 1930s .

And " the British decided in July 1939 to increase the number of anti-aircraft guns and fighters on Malta". with the needs of the rest of the Empire Malta didn't get anywhere near top priority but that doesn't mean they gave up on it. Did Malta get 3.7" AA guns before June of 1940? 


Civettone said:


> in June 1940, Malta was ripe for the taking. The Italian Navy, suppemented with a few Stormi of Italian bombers would have been able to land a couple of divisions on the island and that would have been the end of it.



Uh, no. Malta _was_ ripe for the taking, but like grapes or fruit on high branches, it was as out of reach to the Italians as the high fruit is to pickers with no ladders. The Italian Navy had, in now way,shape or form the ability to put several divisions ashore in a short period of time. Unless they use the desperation measure of running the transporting ships aground and having the soldiers swim for shore. Suitable landing beaches are few in number, well known ( the Island had been invaded a number of times in the preceding centuries) and covered by shore batteries. 




Civettone said:


> Italian losses might have been heavy. But ... there is no way that the Italians could have been driven back into the sea as NO British replacements were going to be send to Malta. In worst case scenario, Italian losses would have been heavy, but it would have been only a matter of time before the weak Maltese defences would have collapses.



There is no need for British replacements to arrive to drive the Italians into the sea. By the time any British replacements could arrive (unless they were already on transports at Gibraltar Or Egypt) the Sea Battle will be over. If the Italians win it is over for British Malta, if the British win the Italian soldiers on Malta have only the weapons and ammo they managed to get ashore before the RN showed up, limited food and depending on which towns they have managed to capture, perhaps limited water. British and Maltese troops have what ever is stockpiled in bunkers and supply dumps, perhaps not much but how much did the Italians get ashore using ships boats and a few fishing vessels to supplement their all too scarce landing ships/craft. Please note the losses the allies suffered in EVERY landing of beached, brooched and holed landing craft within 2 days of the initial landings and the equipment used to salvage them.


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## parsifal (Jul 28, 2013)

Maltaa has historically been a very difficult place to invade , as the Sultan of turkey found out in the 1550s. And in that fight, the Maltese, whom are being dismiossed here as ineffective fighters, with a miniscule force (from memmory about 500 Knights Templar and about 2-3000 islanders fought off a force that managed to get ashore but then was beaten back with heavy losses. Maltese are, by nature ferocious fighters, as Napoleon found out again 300 years later. 

I dont think the italians would even get ashore frankly. There are few beaches, and those that there are are covered generally by the most imposing heights ion their flanks. There really only one or two invasion points. As Freebird showed in his deployment map, every major entry pointwas covered in 1940, and becuse of the nature of the constructed beaches, every beach covered by significant levels of Coastal artillery. Heavy concentrations of coastaL artiller demands sustained bombardment, and sustained bombardment will take time. If there was any RN presence at all, history shows us that the italians coul;d only deal with such situations by using their superior speed to keep the range open....something they could not do if tied to an amphibious fleet. 

So, with limited fire support, a small lift capability, a need for a prolonged sofftening up bombardment, what are the allies going to do. They will concentrate their forces at the point of invasion. So, the regimental sized Italian invasion force will be assaulting maybe 2 or 3 batallions of defenders, dug in, with enfilade fire, troops with a history and tradition of being ferocious fighters, into terrain anything but ideal for invasion. I predict a massacre in that situation. 

And, its untrue that there were no reserves. Britain never lost control of the central basin in 1940, and a brigade was deployed to Gibraltor to cover just such a situation. not sure about Egypt, but with 8 divs training in the Delta, one could reasonably surmise that a ready reserve was there as well. . So imedialtely upon this invasion being detected, which would be I think about a week in advance, one can expect, or should make allowance for likley British reacxtion, rather than play up italian capabailities way beyond anything they ever actually achieved during the war, and play down British capabilities way below anything they ever attempted or achieved.

As for the italian air force, well, history shows that the RN was quite prepred to fight it out with them in the the waters around Malta, and history also shows the Italian Air Force to be almost totally inneffective in 1940 in the two areas they needed to work in in this projected invasion.....fleet support and ground support. So too was the RAF, but the FAA was an altogether different story. Able to attack effectively at night, with well trained crews, good ordinance, and well worked out tactics.....they would have hurt the italians in a big way


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## stona (Jul 29, 2013)

parsifal said:


> As for the italian air force, well, history shows that the RN was quite prepred to fight it out with them in the the waters around Malta, and history also shows the Italian Air Force to be almost totally inneffective in 1940 in the two areas they needed to work in in this projected invasion.....fleet support and ground support.



From June 1940 to January 1941 the Italians had bombed the British navies with limited success. It took the Luftwaffe six and a half minutes to reduce HMS Illustrious to what one naval historian (Richard Woodman) described as "an impotent liability".

The watching Cunningham remembered that Illustrious disappeared "in a forest of great bomb splashes.....there was no doubt we were watching complete experts.....we could not but admire the skill and precision of it all."

Boyd described the attack on his ship as "severe, brilliantly executed and pressed home with the utmost skill and determination."

That pretty much sums it up for me, the Luftwaffe had most certainly arrived and things were going to get a lot more difficult.

Cheers
Steve


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## parsifal (Jul 29, 2013)

ah yes, if the germans are there, it might be different.


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## Civettone (Jul 29, 2013)

I agree with your analysis of Italian military capabilities. But do not forget in what lousy state the British were in. Equipment, training and tactics were all outdated. Granted, better than those of the Italians as demonstrated in Libya in 1940. 



Shortround6 said:


> Given up when? The planners _had_ given up in 1937/38 but there seems to have been a bit of a change of heart by 1940. Not that Malta saw any great amount of supplies coming in but some of those Malta Infantry units didn't exist in the 1930s .
> 
> And " the British decided in July 1939 to increase the number of anti-aircraft guns and fighters on Malta". with the needs of the rest of the Empire Malta didn't get anywhere near top priority but that doesn't mean they gave up on it. Did Malta get 3.7" AA guns before June of 1940?


Of course, they reinforced Malta before the war, just like they reinforced everywhere. But in June 1940, Churchill and his cabinet decided that Malta could not be held. If the Italians would invade the island, no reinforcements would be send and the Royal Navy would NOT intervene.

This may be difficult to believe, but you have to see this in its time frame: this was before any Italian defeats. The British believed the Italian army, navy and air force was on a good to very high level. In fact, Churchill was willing to cede Malta to the Italians in return for peace, although his memoirs hide these intentions. It was only after the first weeks, that a gradual turn came in the assessment of Malta and the decision was taken to defend it.

So feel free to discuss what _could_ have been done to protect Malta, but keep in mind what the historical situation was in June 1940.
Kris


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## pattle (Jul 29, 2013)

Civettone, very good point the British were unable to realise just how weak the Italians were until the Italian defeats started. We take the weakness of Italian forces for granted these days, but on paper in 1940 the Italians looked very dangerous, once again it is easy to see things with hindsight. I suppose the question is how much confidence the Italians had in their capabilities in 1940.


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## DonL (Jul 29, 2013)

> Uh, no. Malta was ripe for the taking, but like grapes or fruit on high branches, it was as out of reach to the Italians as the high fruit is to pickers with no ladders. *The Italian Navy had, in now way,shape or form the ability to put several divisions ashore in a short period of time. Unless they use the desperation measure of running the transporting ships aground and having the soldiers swim for shore. *Suitable landing beaches are few in number, well known ( the Island had been invaded a number of times in the preceding centuries) and covered by shore batteries.



I'm not going again for the Malta issue, but please stay to the facts!

The Italians *had a whole class of landingships*, which could deliver up to 5000men or 3000men with howitzer and small tanks. 
I have posted a list in this forum with all ships the Italian Navy had 1940, which were able to deliver troops as landingships.
So stay to the facts and not some myths!

Edit to stona:

What has your reply to do, with the claim the Italian Navy had not the ships and capacity to do a landing with several thousand men? 
They had the ships, *landingships*.


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## stona (Jul 29, 2013)

DonL said:


> I'm not going again for the Malta issue, but please stay to the facts!
> 
> The Italians *had a whole class of landingships*, which could deliver up to 5000men or 3000men with howitzer and small tanks.
> I have posted a list in this forum with all ships the Italian Navy had 1940, which were able to deliver troops as landingships.
> So stay to the facts and not some myths!



They could have had any amount of materiel. They did not have the will to mount such an operation. Every operation they had attempted (unless against men equipped with sharpened sticks) had either failed or been a close run thing. I include their "invasion" of Albania. Most senior Albanian military officers had left the country before the Italians arrived. Where there was even a semblance of resistance the vastly superior Italian forces faltered. However undermanned and under gunned the resistance from the British and Maltese would have been ferocious. When the RN arrived, as it surely would, how much would you bet on the Italian ships staying and fighting?
The only way the Italians could have landed was by seizing a port, preferably Valetta. The Italians, as I intimated above, had struggled to seize Durres from a few Gendarmes and local irregulars. Valetta or Marsaxlokk would be a different prospect.
Cheers
Steve


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## parsifal (Jul 29, 2013)

The Italians had about 70 landing craft and maybe 3 to 10 landing ships. the landing ships were unsuited to direct beaching, or if they did, were never going to get off that beach. They had special craft for landing, with a theoretical total lift of about 500 troops, but when tactically loaded more like 150. these used raised gangways to unload their troops so that the ship did not get stuck on the beach. The craft also had dragging anchors to try and keep the ship stable whilst debarking the cargoes. But they did noit have proper dredge anchors that could be used to pull the craft off the beaches like allied LSTs and the like later did. Light tanks under the most ideal conditions could be unloaded from these ships. Any sort of tidal movemement, or swell or wave action and these craft were in trouble and could not really in any way be seen as anything comparable to the later Allied LSTs LCIs and LCVPs. They were workable, but innefficient, and their estimated lift capacities under comabat conditions, wildly optimistic in my opinion. 

The Italians could and did have the lift capacity to move up to about 30000 men, but their ship to shore capability was very limited and inneffieicnt, and appears to not exceed about 1500 men. They could use boats, Gallipoli style, but this would place them at a severe disadvantage. The converted civilian craft they may have commandeered would, in my opinion be highly unlikely to be a recoverable asset. Use once and throw away basically, and in the narrow confines of the Malta beaches, not suitable. For an invasion to work, the beaches would have to remain clear and be under very tight beachmaster control. Ships would have to come in, unbload, and get off the beach in very short order. The Italians had none of those skills and I seriousoly doubnt that much of their lift capacity was at all suited to the purpose, that is, fully capable of getting to the beach, unloading and then gettig off with any sort of efficiency. In my opinion, having now had the opportunity to study some of the beach conditions, I am actually doubtful that even the Allies, even at the height of their amphibious efficiency could undertake such a complicated and difficult operation without suffering horrendous casualties. And allied capability in amphibious operations was far more efficient than anythig the Italians were capable of before or since.


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## DonL (Jul 29, 2013)

This is not true!

Axis History Forum • Sesia class landing ships
Sesia-Klasse

And I'm tired to repeat this every time, stay to the facts and not some myths!


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## Shortround6 (Jul 29, 2013)

So according the "facts" the Italians have 5 (or 4 1/2) landing ships of which the big 4 can hold 1000 men each or a fewer number of men plus some light artillery or 3.2 ton tankettes. There may be some smaller craft in 1940 plus assorted fishing vessels and Navy motor launches, motor torpedo boats and ships boats. 

Now another member has stated in a post "The Italian Navy, suppemented with a few Stormi of Italian bombers would have been able to land a couple of divisions on the island and that would have been the end of it."

It is a far cry from 3-5000men plus support equipment to "a couple of divisions" (TWO?). That is a "fact". even the under strength Italian Divisions were around 7,000 men each. That is a "fact"

In _general_ it is considered advisable to have a 3 to 1 margin in strength for a "normal" attack. Amphibious invasion may require more? 

The big 4 Italian ships had a draft of 0.5 meters at the bow which is quite commendable but a draft of around 4 meters at the stern, depending on loading and ballast tank. THAT is a "FACT". 
Depending on which beach the Italians are try to land on do they have 4 meters of water 140-150 meters from the "beach" they are trying to land on? And that includes the 70 meter pontoon bridge they were equipped with in 1941, not 1940. 

Even if the "landing ships" just pull 12-15 miles off shore to take on more men/equipment from larger ships, the 1940 Malta invasion advocates seem to discount the possibility of one or more of these ships being hit by shore batteries, getting stuck ( for at least one tide change) or hitting a rock. Just one of these ships out of action slows the transfer rate by around 20% depending on which ship. 

About 4 landings per ship to get the "couple of Divisions" ashore taking how many hours? 

Loss for landing ships in the D-Day invasion from June 6th to the 25th but NOT including ships/craft lost due to the storm from June 18th to 22nd were 4 LSTs lost and 4 damaged, 9 LCI (L) s lost and 4 damaged, LCT (4) 2 lost, 5 damaged. LCT (5) 14 lost, 13 damaged. LCT (6) 9 lost, 17 damaged. These may be US losses only, other losses include LCVPs, 26 on Utah Beach and 55 on Omaha Beach. 

How much "reserve" shipping does the Italian Navy have to keep the forces supplied once they get a few thousand men ashore? A single 75mm Howitzer can go through several tons of ammo in one day.


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## parsifal (Jul 29, 2013)

Plus we are relying on the discussion of another forum. Since when did that become a "fact". i am relying on better sources than that. Plus the "fact" that the italians never attempted a major invasion for the whole of the war. that is a fact, and thre are good reasons to underpin it.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 29, 2013)

German wiki entry:

Sesia-Klasse

The Ships are listed in old editions of Jane's ( at least in my 1942 copy) but true capabilities may be lacking. 

I certainly do not deny the ships existed or that they were not clever and innovative ships. But 4-5 such ships are simply too few to base an invasion of several divisions on. To go back to my fruit analogy it is like trying to use 4 very short step ladders for several dozen fruit pickers and trees that have top branches out of reach even standing on the top step.


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