# Pearl Harbor Attack



## Koty Owen (Jan 4, 2008)

Never forget what happened on December 7, 1941!


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## evangilder (Jan 4, 2008)

Umm, I don't think anyone here has forgotten, nor will we.


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## syscom3 (Jan 4, 2008)

Damn, I thought this thread was going to be a discussion on Pearl harbor!


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## evangilder (Jan 4, 2008)

It still could be...


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## Njaco (Jan 4, 2008)

Kimmel was a scapegoat.

(does that work? )


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## syscom3 (Jan 4, 2008)

Njaco said:


> Kimmel was a scapegoat.
> 
> (does that work? )



He was responsible for the debacle and he is lucky he wasn't executed for incompetence.


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## Freebird (Jan 4, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> He was responsible for the debacle and he is lucky he wasn't executed for incompetence.



Even if the mistakes were not all his, the guy in charge (usually) takes the blame. 

Imagine if "Overlord" had been a huge disaster, and the Allies had failed to hold the beaches, Ike would probably have taken the fall, even if his planning leadership were not the problem.


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## Njaco (Jan 4, 2008)

I may have to go with freebird on this. I've read postive things about him and negative. Not totally his blame but sometimes crap rolls uphill.


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## ToughOmbre (Jan 4, 2008)

Kimmel (and Short) were *incompetent*. They were warned more than once about a potential Japanese attack and did not take the necessary steps to defend Pearl. Marshall's last "war warning" went out ten days (27 November) prior to 7 December. They are not scapegoats in my mind.

TO


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## AVRoe (Jan 5, 2008)

Im not up on Pearl Harbor.I`ve seen the newish film,was it factual?


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## ToughOmbre (Jan 5, 2008)

AVRoe said:


> Im not up on Pearl Harbor.I`ve seen the newish film,was it factual?



"Pearl Harbor" was an awful movie. Watch the 1970 movie "Tora! Tora! Tora!", very accurate.

TO


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## B-17engineer (Jan 5, 2008)

I luved tora tora tora so much better than Pearl Harbor it was all having to do with a Love story


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## wilbur1 (Jan 5, 2008)

ToughOmbre said:


> "Pearl Harbor" was an awful movie. Watch the 1970 movie "Tora! Tora! Tora!", very accurate.
> 
> TO



God i loved that movie!


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## Erich (Jan 5, 2008)

make a note that the original poster has not returned if h/it is a poster or a spam bot ?


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## wilbur1 (Jan 5, 2008)

Just noticed that myself erich good eyes


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## Rich46yo (Jan 5, 2008)

I believe Tora, Tora, Tora was probably the most impressive WW-ll flight movie ever made. The scenes of the Japanese lifting off their carriers, enterring PH airspace were just awesome. I love the scene of the trainer airplane being surrounded by IJN aviation. It was incredible.

TTT is probably in my top 5 favorite war movies of all time.


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## SeaSkua (Jan 5, 2008)

ToughOmbre said:


> Kimmel (and Short) were *incompetent*. They were warned more than once about a potential Japanese attack and did not take the necessary steps to defend Pearl. Marshall's last "war warning" went out ten days (27 November) prior to 7 December. They are not scapegoats in my mind.
> 
> TO



Wasn't the defence of HAWAII supposed to be ARMY responsibility?


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## syscom3 (Jan 5, 2008)

SeaSkua said:


> Wasn't the defence of HAWAII supposed to be ARMY responsibility?



It was a joint Navy and Army affair, with primary defense going to the Navy due to the naval shipyard.

Neither Kimmel nor Short had unified planning meetings, unified C&C and neither knew what each other was doing.


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## evangilder (Jan 5, 2008)

An couple of interesting inaccuracies in TTT. When the Japanese are flying near Pearl, there is a large cross on the hill. That was erected after the war. There is another scene where you see nurses running on base. Look closely, there is the Arizona Memorial! Not to nit-pick, the rest of the facts were well done, just some Hollywood ****-ups that happen.


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## syscom3 (Jan 5, 2008)

evangilder said:


> An couple of interesting inaccuracies in TTT. When the Japanese are flying near Pearl, there is a large cross on the hill. That was erected after the war. There is another scene where you see nurses running on base. Look closely, there is the Arizona Memorial! Not to nit-pick, the rest of the facts were well done, just some Hollywood ****-ups that happen.



That isnt nit picking, its just a fact that untill recently, movies could only be historically accurate to a degree.

Imagine the studio asking the navy if they could remove the memorial for a bit?

Nowadays, computer graphics can be used to edit out structures that arent supposed to be there.


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## ToughOmbre (Jan 5, 2008)

evangilder said:


> An couple of interesting inaccuracies in TTT. When the Japanese are flying near Pearl, there is a large cross on the hill. That was erected after the war. There is another scene where you see nurses running on base. Look closely, there is the Arizona Memorial! Not to nit-pick, the rest of the facts were well done, just some Hollywood ****-ups that happen.



Yea, just production goofs, every movie has got them, even the great ones. But the historical stuff about the actual attack is pretty much right on.

TO


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## Wildcat (Jan 7, 2008)

Love the scenes of the Zeros strafing the P40's that are trying to get airborne. Some of the finest action scenes ever filmed IMO.


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## syscom3 (Jan 7, 2008)

Wildcat said:


> Love the scenes of the Zeros strafing the P40's that are trying to get airborne. Some of the finest action scenes ever filmed IMO.




I think I read somewhere that the shot of the Zero's flying through an explosion, damaged them and nearly sent them crashing.


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## ToughOmbre (Jan 7, 2008)

Wildcat said:


> Love the scenes of the Zeros strafing the P40's that are trying to get airborne. Some of the finest action scenes ever filmed IMO.



Wildcat,

Love that scene as well. The "action" was very real.

The P-40 crashing in the flight line was an unplanned accident - it was a life-sized mockup powered by a gasoline engine turning the propeller and steered by using the wheel brakes, just like real airplanes, but was specifically designed not to fly. The aircraft shown was loaded with explosives which were to be detonated by radio control at a specific point down the runway. Stunt actors were strategically located and rehearsed in which way to run. However shortly after the plane began taxiing down the runway it did begin to lift off the ground and turn to the left. The left turn would have taken it into a group of other mockups which had also been wired with explosives, but weren't scheduled to be destroyed until later. The explosives in the first P-40 were detonated on the spot in order to keep it from destroying the other planes, so the explosion occurred in a location the stunt men weren't prepared for. When it looks like they were running for their lives, they really were. This special effect was filmed with multiple camera so that it could be reused in other shots in the film, as were all the major special effects.

TO


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## renrich (Jan 9, 2008)

The primary responsibility for the protection of the bases at Pearl Harbor belonged to the US Army.


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## renrich (Jan 9, 2008)

Pg 13, "Pearl Harbor Betrayed" by Michael Gannon. "The Army, which was officially charged with the defense of the fleet and naval station at Pearl, was, in the Navy's view, woefully unequipped to perform that task." " By joint agreement between the War and Navy departments, and by provision of the Navy's war plan (WPL-46), protection of the fleet was the core reason for the Army's considerable presence on Oahu." From the Chief of Staff George Marshall to Lt Gen Walter Short on 7 Feb, 1941 "The fullest protection for the Fleet is THE rather than A (Marshall emphases) major consideration for us." When one thinks about it, it makes sense since the Navy did not man the coast defense guns, the Navy had no troops except for a few Marines to repel invasion, the Navy had no fighters(except one squadron on each carrier and a few Marine AC) to defend against bombers, No bombers except for the Vts and Vsbs on the carriers to bomb an invasion fleet. It was accepted doctrine in the US military at that time that the heavy bomber(mainly B-17s) would be able to bomb enemy warships and transports and repel an invasion. That was the reason the B-17s were in Hawaii and the Philipines, not for strategic bombing purposes.


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## Freebird (Jan 9, 2008)

renrich said:


> The primary responsibility for the protection of the bases at Pearl Harbor belonged to the US Army.



Almost all of the 29 japanese aircraft lost were from Flak, was the Navy AA more effective than the land-based? 

{from Wikipedia}



> The defenders were very unprepared. Ammunition lockers were locked, aircraft parked wingtip to wingtip to deter sabotage, guns unmanned (none of the Navy's 5"/38 AA and only a quarter of its machineguns, and only four of 31 Army batteries got in action).


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## renrich (Jan 9, 2008)

According to this source, after April 29, 1941, each BB had two 50 cal MGs with two cases of ammo continuously manned with two 5 inch AA guns with 15 rds of ammo each also manned. No guns in destroyers or cruisers were manned but by Kimmels orders ammo was in the ready boxes at the guns and the crews normally lived near the guns. The reason the guns on dds and Cas, Cls werent continuously manned was because the crews were too small versus large crews of BBs.


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## Freebird (Jan 9, 2008)

renrich said:


> According to this source, after April 29, 1941, each BB had two 50 cal MGs with two cases of ammo continuously manned with two 5 inch AA guns with 15 rds of ammo each also manned. No guns in destroyers or cruisers were manned but by Kimmels orders ammo was in the ready boxes at the guns and the crews normally lived near the guns. The reason the guns on dds and Cas, Cls werent continuously manned was because the crews were too small versus large crews of BBs.



"Wiki" references quoted-



> The defenders were very unprepared. Ammunition lockers were locked, aircraft parked...., guns unmanned....
> 
> <refrences>Parillo, Mark, "The United States in the Pacific", in Higham, Robin, and Harris
> 
> Stephen, ''Why Air Forces Fail: The Anatomy of Defeat'' (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2006),



Do you suppose the references mean "unmanned" as in when the first wave hit, but got into action later?

I know the MG's were used, do you have any specific info on the 4" 5" guns getting into action on the ships?

If the Navy BB guns were manned and the DD CL guns had "ammo ready", it doesn't sound like Kimmel was unprepared. Rather it seems like Short would get most of the blame, ie Army AA guns not alert, radar not vigilant, early reports (from US aircraft) not forwarded to the Navy base, etc.

What's your take, was it mostly the Army's failing?


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## renrich (Jan 9, 2008)

freebird, I don't know how credible this book that I am reading now is. It is footnoted and has references and is relatively new(2001) I feel sure the direct quotes are accurate but some of it's inferences may be off base. The early part of the book(I am only a third of the way finished) indicates that Kimmel and Short communicated often and were close to the extent they played golf many Sundays together. I have quite a number of other books that address Pearl but they are packed. I don't give Wikipedia a lot of credibility because of it's superficiality and because I think it just reflects the current popular opinions and you know about opinions. My personal opinion(for what it is worth) is that the US was unprepared from a material point of view for war. The Pacific fleet had already been weakened by sending a number of ships to the Atlantic to help Britain. One interesting fact this book points out that Adm King on Nov. 5, 1941 sent Task Force 1 comprising 2 old BBs, 2 CAs and 3 DDs to the Denmark Strait to intercept Admiral Scheer or possibly Tirpitz, that British intelligence predicted would sortie(Ultra) As it turned out probably luckily for the US it was Scheer that was supposed to sortie but a mechanical kept her in port.(probably those dratted diesels) If Scheer had sortied the fat would have been in the fire because if the US ships had sunk her, Hitler would almost certainly have declared war on the US and Japan would have done the same and Pearl would have been on full alert Dec 7 if the IJN carried out it's plans. Just think about what would have happened if Tirpitz had come out. Anyway the USN and Army was stretched thin everywhere with not enough men and guns to do a decent job anywhere in the Pacific and I believe that Kimmel and Short were just scapegoats.


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## syscom3 (Jan 9, 2008)

The problem was both Short and Kimmel were still in peace time mode of thinking.

Why didnt Kimmel have the PBY's searching all points of the compass?

Why didnt Short have a squadron or two on ready alert from a couple of dispersal fields?


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## renrich (Jan 9, 2008)

According to Gannon reports by gunnery officers indicated that West Virginia returned fire immediately with mgs and all batteries within 5 minutes. No log is availble for Arizona. California ready mgs immediately, her mgs in the foretop and maintop in 3 to 4 minutes and the 5 inchers in about two minutes. Other BBs similar times. Here is the fly in the ointment. The 50 cal mgs have somewhat limited knockdown power and range. The 1.1 quads heated up jammed and had feed problems. My uncles were CGMs on CAs and at that stage of the war they had to estimate the range of the AC and it's bearing and course, set the fuse on the shell, slam it into the breech, fire it and the projectile either had to hit the target directly or else the fuse would set off the charge when the estimated range was reached. Duh, have you ever tried to shoot doves with a 22 rifle? There were no 20 mm Oerlikons or 40 mm Bofors until later in the war.


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## renrich (Jan 9, 2008)

According to quotes from Richmond Kelly Turner and Nimitz there were only enough planes with the range to conduct a full compass sweep for a period of time of only several days in November and December. Prior to that time there were not enough planes period. Kimmel had been promised an additional 100 PBYs but they were allocated to Britain instead.


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## renrich (Jan 9, 2008)

Couple of other interesting facts. Prior to and during December 1941, Kimmel was not receiving "Magic" intercepts. Of course when Nimitz relieved Kimmel he began receiving "Magic" which enabled him to plan for Midway. On Dec. 7, 1941, Hickam Field had only six B17s in operating condition while Clark Field in the PI had 35, the largest concentration in the world. This was a result of a belief in the US High Command that a strengthening of our forces in the PI could keep Japan from striking south to Malaysia.


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## Freebird (Jan 9, 2008)

renrich said:


> I don't give Wikipedia a lot of credibility because of it's superficiality and because I think it just reflects the current popular opinions and you know about opinions. My personal opinion(for what it is worth) is that the US was unprepared from a material point of view for war. *The Pacific fleet had already been weakened by sending a number of ships to the Atlantic to help Britain.* Anyway the USN and Army was stretched thin everywhere with not enough men and guns to do a decent job anywhere in the Pacific and I believe that Kimmel and Short were just scapegoats.



Probably just as well not to have been in port that day anyways....

I don't trust Wiki that much either, but if the give specific numbers cite references I would take that as more valuable than "opinions" (the Navy could have done this, the Army should have done that...)

It seems that very few of the 29 destroyers or CL were hit, are they docked some distance from Ford Island?


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## renrich (Jan 9, 2008)

Yes, most of the cruisers and DDs were moored in different locations from the BBs. The CL Helena(torpedoed) was moored where a BB had been before moved to a drydock. The CL Raleigh(torpedoed) was moored in front of BB Utah which was torpedoed. The only DDs destroyed were in a drydock with a BB, Pennsylvania.


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## renrich (Jan 13, 2008)

Since the US had broken the Japanese diplomatic code(Magic) they were reading all messages to and from Jap consulates. A short time before 7 Dec the Japanese Consulate was asked to report if the US had in place barrage balloons over PH and whether they were using torpedo nets on the BBs. The answer was negative on both questions. The US decoded those messages but since Kimmel was not in on the secret of "Magic" he was not informed about those messages. Of couse they were prime indicators of a bombing and or torpedo attack on the fleet.


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## d_bader (Jan 16, 2008)

Didn't the British inform the U.S about a future attack on Pearl Harbour by the Japanese?

Agent Tricycle was sent to discover information on torpedo netting etc by the Germans to give to a Japanese diplomat.

If this is corect, surely ignoring a trade partner was a stupid thing to do and possibly the American mentality that they would not be attacked?


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## syscom3 (Jan 16, 2008)

The British were as clueless about the attack on Pearl Harbor as the US was.

The mentality at that time was an attack on pearl was possible. But it made more sense for the main thrust of a potential attack to be made on the Philipines.

Two things the RN and USN intel personell were sure of:
a) The Japanese carriers were "missing".
b) There was a Japanese invasion fleet that had departed from Vietnam and was enroute "somewhere".

Everything pointed to an attack on the PI.


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## Freebird (Jan 16, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> The British were as clueless about the attack on Pearl Harbor as the US was.
> 
> The mentality at that time was an attack on pearl was possible. But it made more sense for the main thrust of a potential attack to be made on the Philipines.
> 
> ...



Agreed, it was quite a surprise that pearl was attacked. Am I correct that the "Magic" intercepts indicated that Japan was planning for war, but not specific targets? In any event, the warnings that Short got earlier shold have prompted better preparation.


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## d_bader (Jan 17, 2008)

I shall hunt around for the facts, but agent tricycle had to do a questionnaire many pages long about the defences at Pearl Harbor. These however were dismissed by the Americans and ignored.......


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## Propellorhead (Jun 6, 2010)

I'm pretty certain "Tricycle" was Dusko Popov who was turned double agent by MI5 in Spain before sailing for New York. Popov gladly shared with the british the information which he had including a microdot with a long questionaire about Pearl Harbour. Popov arrived at New York 4 months before Pearl Harbour was attacked and the British had tipped off the FBI.

J Edgar Hoover was so dismissive of the British advice that after a brief cursory interview, Popov was allowed to head to sunny Florida where he womanised and spent all his money on booze. Perhaps though since he was already turned to a double agent by the British he was told to go have a good time and let MI5 do all the talking? 

Here's a question I'd like to ask please...

When did the carriers leave Pearl and why? 
In which direction did they sail?
Which carriers were at Pearl in December 1941?
Has anybody ever read their orders?


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## Freebird (Jun 6, 2010)

Propellorhead said:


> Here's a question I'd like to ask please...



When did the carriers leave Pearl and why? CV-6 CV-2 Nov 28 Dec 4

In which direction did they sail? West

Which carriers were at Pearl in Dec 1941? Lexington, Enterprise Saratoga, joined by Yorktown on Dec 30


*Enterprise*: On 28 November 1941, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel sent TF-8, consisting of Enterprise, the heavy cruisers Northampton (CA-26), Chester (CA-27), and Salt Lake City (CA-24) and nine destroyers under Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., to ferry 12 Grumman F4F-3 Wildcats of Marine Fighting Squadron (VMF) 211 to Wake Island. Upon completion of the mission on 4 December, TF-8 set course to return to Pearl Harbor. Dawn on 7 December 1941 found TF-8 about 215 miles west of Oahu. 

*Lexington*: On 5 December 1941, TF-12, formed around Lexington, under the command of Rear Admiral John H. Newton, sailed from Pearl to ferry 18 Vought SB2U-3 Vindicators of Marine Scout Bombing Squadron 231 to Midway Island. Dawn on 7 December 1941 found Lexington, heavy cruisers Chicago (CA-29), Portland (CA-33), and Astoria (CA-34), and five destroyers about 500 miles southeast of Midway. The outbreak of hostilities resulted in cancellation of the mission and VMSB-231 was retained on board [they would ultimately fly to Midway from Hickam Field on 21 December]. 

*Saratoga*: The Saratoga, having recently completed an overhaul at the Puget Sound Navy Yard, Bremerton, Washington, reached NAS San Diego [North Island] late in the forenoon watch on 7 December. She was to embark her air group, as well as Marine Fighting Squadron (VMF) 221 and a cargo of miscellaneous airplanes to ferry to Pearl Harbor.

http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq66-9.htm


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## diddyriddick (Jun 13, 2010)

A couple of points if I might....

The points about the Phillipines are correct here. Yes, an invasion fleet had been observed heading south. Yes, the Americans had beefed up the defenses of the Phillipines. But the Americans became fixated with the Phillipines much before Pearl Harbor. The fundamental assumption of War Plan Orange (later to become the "rainbow" plans) was that the Japanese would move south and into the Phillipines. This warplan was surprisingly unchanged since its inception during the Teddy Roosevelt administration. Frankly, the basis of the plan was for abandonment of the Phillipines as unsustainable in the event of Japanese attack; CincPac was then to bravely sally forth and beat the IJN on Japan's left flank.

We've missed a couple of things here.

1. American ambassador to Tokyo Joseph Grew reported a tip that he got from his Peruvian counterpart that the Japanese were specifically planning a raid on Pearl about a year prior. How in hell did that get **** canned?

2. One of the significant mistakes of Kimmel was that he ordered torpedo baffles/nets removed. His reasoning was that the defense measures hindered movement in the harbor, and that Pearl was too shallow for airborne torpedoes. Ok. I'll buy that to a point, but what about Taranto? The British proved that wrong if only the Americans had the wisdom to pay attention.

3. The fundamental failings of both Kimmel and Short, it seems to me, were their complete underestimation of and ignorance to airplanes as weapons of war. Remember that at the time the battleship was still the "ship of the line." Short's decision to park his fighters close to avoid 5th columnists made all the sense in the world....If one was an infantryman by training. Likewise, Kimmel still believed that carriers main role would be in support of the main battle fleet.

4. To clarify, Short's first and foremost task as specifically assigned by Marshall was the defense of the fleet and Pearl. Everything else was secondary. When he should have been thinking of how to use his assets to defeat a potential enemy, he was husbanding his resources.


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## buffnut453 (Jun 13, 2010)

Re the invasion fleet heading from French Indochina. Actually, there were 2 fleets, one out of Hainan and the second out of FIC. In addition, the locations of the Japanese aircraft carriers were unknown. However, Japanese radio silence was so good, and Allied signals intellience still relatively embryonic, at least in that part of the world when it came to tactical comms of the Japanese Army and Navy, that the ultimate destinations and compositions of the various IJN fleetscould only be guessed at. PI was one option, the others being Thailand, Malaya or the Dutch East Indies. Ultimately, the Japanese ended up attacking the first 3 and Pearl Harbor virtually simultaneously, which nobody in Britain or the US expected.


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## renrich (Jun 16, 2010)

Nit picking FB but Salt Lake City(the old Swayback Maru) was CA25. My uncle was aboard her that day and until 1943. Pensacola was CA24.


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## Freebird (Jun 23, 2010)

renrich said:


> Nit picking FB but Salt Lake City(the old Swayback Maru) was CA25. My uncle was aboard her that day and until 1943. Pensacola was CA24.


 Oops, missed that. 



diddyriddick said:


> We've missed a couple of things here.
> 
> 1. American ambassador to Tokyo Joseph Grew reported a tip that he got from his Peruvian counterpart that the Japanese were specifically planning a raid on Pearl about a year prior. How in hell did that get **** canned?



Because in Jan 1941 there was no serious thought of Japan going to war with the us (it was before the embargo) so the "plans" to attack Pearl harbour were likely contingency plans, such as every nation makes. 

Heck, in the 30's the US even had "War Plan Red" a plan to invade Canada. 



> Further, in 1935 Americans planned to build three military airfields near the Canadian border and disguise them as civilian airports. "In February 1935, the War Department arranged a Congressional appropriation of $57 million to build three border air bases for the purposes of pre-emptive surprise attacks on Canadian air fields" (Berlin Glasnost, 1992-2007). The airfields were to be kept secret but their existence was accidentally published by the Government Printing Office and reported on the front page of the New York Times on May 1, 1935.



War Plan Red - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The fact that in Jan '41 Japan had a "plan" to attack Hawaii is hardly surprising. AFAIK the "tip" actually came from the Peruvian Ambassador's cook - so not exactly the most credible of sources.  He may have overheard a few drunken Japanese officers talking in a saki bar for all we know...


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## parsifal (Jun 25, 2010)

A few things worth noting. The Americans were unable to read the miltary traffic after 7 november because of the the change in codes. They had never been able to read the Army military codes, which continued to evade the Allies until the end of 1942. The new JN25 code was retained until just after Midway, and was broken as a result of the massive increases in signal traffic, often with plain text incriminating the coded traffic, that arose as a result of the Doolittle raids. As a result of the intell blackouts that arose after 7 november, the allies were left guessing as to the actual targets. They fell back on their instincts, and assumed the Japanese would attack into the PI and Malaya. incredibly, the british believed the malayan Jungle was impenetrable to a modern army, and therefore Singas would be safe. The whole allied reaction to the japanese invasaion is one of incredible miscalculation.

The Americans were even worse in their responses. Despite the ability to read much of the diplomatic traffic, courtesy of MAGIC, the Americans lacked the ability to analyze and determine appropriate countermoves to that information. The American command, from top to bottom proved incredibly lethargic and aparently incapable of a coherent response to the japanese attacks. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the PI, where depite advance warnings, at at least twelve hours of delay in the first japanese raids, the Americans under Mac were unable react decisively.

From these perspectives the Japanese plans were brilliantly planned and executed. There were a few errors on the japanese side however. Most obvious is the strategic miscalculation about what the Pearl Attacks would do to US resolve. Their target choices are another source of controversy, though they never envisaged the raid to be an all encompassing defeat of the USN, and only ever wanted to achieve a free hand in their southern drives.

The attacks into Siam were a small miscalculation....if the Japanese had waited just 24 hours longer, the thais probably would have voluntary joined the japanese as allies.


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## ccheese (Jun 27, 2010)

I am currently reading a book, “The American Magic”, by Ronald Lewin. In it he tells about “Ultra G” , “Ultra J”, “Enigma” and “Magic.”

He devotes almost an entire chapter to the fight between the US Army and Thomas E. Dewey,
who was running for President, against FDR. This was in 1944. Dewey knew all about Ultra
and Enigma, and planned to use it against FDR is his campaign for President. He was going to 
tell the world that FDR had been reading the Japanese coded messages since before Pearl Harbor,
and use it as a means of scape-goating FDR for the surprise attack. He was going to claim FDR knew 
all about the plans for the attack and did nothing.

General George Marshal, then Army Chief of Staff was to meet with Mr Dewey and explain the ramifications if what would happen if he told the world about us reading the codes. He had prepared a letter, which Dewey started to read, then stopped. “I stopped reading when my eye caught the word, ‘cryptograph’. “Now if this letter merely tells me that we were reading certain Japanese codes before Pearl Harbor and that at least two of these codes are still in use, there is no point in my reading the letter, because I already know that.” “Instead of being re-elected”, Dewey observed, “Roosevelt should be impeached.”

There was quite a to-do over it, but Dewey finally relented and kept quiet about Enigma, Ultra and Magic. He also lost the election.

The book is a good read, and recommended for anyone interested in codes and ciphers.

Charles


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## buffnut453 (Jun 27, 2010)

parsifal said:


> incredibly, the british believed the malayan Jungle was impenetrable to a modern army, and therefore Singas would be safe.



I think that's something of an overstatement. The eastern side of the Malay peninsula was not well-served by transportation, and hence it was not conducive to operations by a large military force. The western half of the peninsula was a different story because it had the main north/south road which proved to be the main axis of advance for the Japanese Army. These facts were clearly understood by the British (Percival had done the first study to show the practicality of an invasion from Siam when he was a Colonel and Chief-of-Staff to GOC Malaya in the late-30s). The key problem was that nothing was done to strengthen defence alone the road, although it was recognised that the flanks of any defensive force could easily be turned by small-scale coastal landing operations. The primary failing of the British was in not developing tactics to meet these threats. 



parsifal said:


> The attacks into Siam were a small miscalculation....if the Japanese had waited just 24 hours longer, the thais probably would have voluntary joined the japanese as allies.



What's your source for this, Parsifal? Reading "Thailand and WWII" by Direk Jayanama, who was Deputy PM in Dec 41, I get the impression that Thailand was piggy-in-the-middle, caught between 2 major powers and unable to appease both. There were undoubtedly pro-Japanese elements within the Thai Government but there were also strong anti-Japanese feelings (they'd seen what had happened in French Indo-China and didn't want a repeat in Thailand...unfortunately for them they were to be disappointed).

Regards,
Mark


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## ToughOmbre (Jun 27, 2010)

ccheese said:


> I am currently reading a book, “The American Magic”, by Ronald Lewin. In it he tells about “Ultra G” , “Ultra J”, “Enigma” and “Magic.”
> 
> He devotes almost an entire chapter to the fight between the US Army and Thomas E. Dewey,
> who was running for President, against FDR. This was in 1944. Dewey knew all about Ultra
> ...



If Thomas E. Dewey believed that fairy tale, I'm very gald that he lost the election. 

The WW II myth that "FDR knew" has long been discredited. 

THe only Japanese code broken by the US prior to December 7 was the DIPLOMATIC code. No mention of an attack or hostlie action was ever mentioned in anything intercepted and read by the American code breakers. 

We have the same thing today. They're called the "911 Truthers" and they're just as lost!

Long story short.....people love conspiracy theories. Especially people that write books about them!

TO


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## ccheese (Jun 27, 2010)

ToughOmbre said:


> THe only Japanese code broken by the US prior to December 7 was the DIPLOMATIC code. No mention of an attack or hostlie action was ever mentioned in anything intercepted and read by the American code breakers.
> 
> Long story short.....people love conspiracy theories. Especially people that write books about them!
> 
> TO



According to this author [Ronald Lewin] the US was reading the Japanese Navy's coded messages in
1929 !! In 1931 a man who had been working on this stuff, Herbert Yardley, wrote a Book,
"*The American Black Chamber"*, and some articles for the Saturday Evening Post telling everything 
about the US reading "the Japanese mail". [Nothing is mentioned about the diplomatic code].

The Japanese were furious and the code was changed to what is now known as JN25. After Yardley
was 'blacklisted" he tried to go to work for Canada and Britian. Neither wanted anything to do with 
him.

The Enigma was a bit different. It was manufactured and sold on the open market by Chiffreimaschinen
Aktiengesellschaft of Berlin, in 1923. It was adopted by the German Navy in 1926 and by the German Army
in 1929. It was used universally by Hitler's High Command and all his armed and secret forces.

In 1927 the US Army bought an enigma machine for $144.00.... which was the commercial version mentioned above.

_As most people who have worked with the US or a foreign nation's crypto devices know.... the machine is
useless, unless you have the day's code set-up._ [Italics mine !]

Charles


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## ToughOmbre (Jun 27, 2010)

ccheese said:


> According to this author [Ronald Lewin] the US was reading the Japanese Navy's coded messages in 1929 !!



If they were reading it in 1929, and I'm not sure that they were, they certainly weren't reading it in 1941. Again, it was only the diplomatic code that was broken, and this fact led to many of the conspiracy theories about how "FDR knew" and let the attack happen. FDR's focus was on Europe and Hitler. Since American DDs and U-boats were already in a shooting match in the Atlantic, war was inevitable. 



ccheese said:


> The Japanese were furious and the code was changed to what is now known as JN25.



JN25 started to be deciphered after December 7 and it did tip off Nimitz as to the Japanese plans for the invasion of Midway. 

TO


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## R Leonard (Jun 27, 2010)

freebird said:


> When did the carriers leave Pearl and why? CV-6 CV-2 Nov 28 Dec 4
> 
> In which direction did they sail? East
> 
> ...


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## ccheese (Jun 28, 2010)

ToughOmbre said:


> If they were reading it in 1929, and I'm not sure that they were, they certainly weren't reading it in 1941. Again, it was only the diplomatic code that was broken, and this fact led to many of the conspiracy theories about how "FDR knew" and let the attack happen. FDR's focus was on Europe and Hitler. Since American DDs and U-boats were already in a shooting match in the Atlantic, war was inevitable. TO



The Japanese code was changed in 1931 to JN25. The diplomatic code, first known as "Red" was changed,
broken again, and was called "Purple". "Purple" was being read throughout the war.

Charles


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## cptsmith (Aug 26, 2010)

The Army had coatal guns to defend the islands, but nothing to defend against a large air attack. There were observation and plotting stations at the top of Diamond head that aimed the guns at Ft Derussey. The 2 gun battery at Ft Derussey is a museum now ( they tried to destroy it to make room for more hotels on the beach but it was constucted too well). 
I was at Ewa airfield 7 Dec 08 for a wreath ceremony. The attack there killed 2 Marines and 2 civilians (an old man and little girl). Not much left, just overgrown runway and hangar foundation. The area had been closed off for a decade or two.

Recent study of attack photos show that one of the midget subs may have entered the harbor and fired their torpedos. This would be the sub that has never been located.


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## BombTaxi (Aug 26, 2010)

I suspect that no sub was ever located because none was ever used. 69 years after the event, we know what happened that day in near forensic detail, so do you really think that a few subs, albeit small ones, would be missed. they would have to be carried very close to Pearl by a large, cargo-type ship or a large submarine, launched, and then recovered the same way. Don't you think some record would have been made of this deployment, which essentially would have been a separate plan in itself? Or perhaps the Japanese might have discarded the idea due to the risk of giving the plan away?

And did the IJN have a midget sub or launch vehicle in service in 1941 anyway?


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## Messy1 (Aug 26, 2010)

BombTaxi said:


> I suspect that no sub was ever located because none was ever used. 69 years after the event, we know what happened that day in near forensic detail, so do you really think that a few subs, albeit small ones, would be missed. they would have to be carried very close to Pearl by a large, cargo-type ship or a large submarine, launched, and then recovered the same way. Don't you think some record would have been made of this deployment, which essentially would have been a separate plan in itself? Or perhaps the Japanese might have discarded the idea due to the risk of giving the plan away?
> 
> And did the IJN have a midget sub or launch vehicle in service in 1941 anyway?



Yes, the IJN did have the means to launch the midget subs, and the midget subs were used, although maybe none made their way into the harbor itself. The USS Ward fired on and sunk a midget sub 5 miles outside of Pearl Harbor. The sub has been found recently with one hole in the conning tower right where the USS Ward claimed to have hit it. It was not believed for decades that the Ward had sunk a midget sub. Also the first Japanese POW was a survivor of a midget sub. He was captured when his sub was found beached on shore the following morning. Recovery was never a plan for the midget sub's crews, most planned on never coming back, so recovery was not that big of a worry. All the midget submariners that were lost were memorialized on a painting or lithograph, except for the one who was captured.

Japanese Midget Submarine

http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-fornv/japan/japtp-ss/mdg-a-2.htm


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## cptsmith (Aug 26, 2010)

The POW's sub washed up on the beach at Bellows Field, the other crewman swam out to his death. Five Midget subs were launched, four have been accounted for/located. It's not that hard to check the facts, the sub that was captured was even used for War Bond drives.


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## Messy1 (Aug 26, 2010)

cptsmith said:


> The POW's sub washed up on the beach at Bellows Field, the other crewman swam out to his death. Five Midget subs were launched, four have been accounted for/located. It's not that hard to check the facts, the sub that was captured was even used for War Bond drives.



Thanks for the additional info. I didn't have that info available at hand. Knew there were 4-5 subs involved, just knew for sure three had been found.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 26, 2010)

BombTaxi said:


> I suspect that no sub was ever located because none was ever used. 69 years after the event, we know what happened that day in near forensic detail, so do you really think that a few subs, albeit small ones, would be missed. they would have to be carried very close to Pearl by a large, cargo-type ship or a large submarine, launched, and then recovered the same way. Don't you think some record would have been made of this deployment, which essentially would have been a separate plan in itself? Or perhaps the Japanese might have discarded the idea due to the risk of giving the plan away?
> 
> And did the IJN have a midget sub or launch vehicle in service in 1941 anyway?



You sure about that? It has been pretty well documented that they were used. 

There are also plenty of pics of the Subs from 1941 and even when they were found today.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/18/Japanese_midget_submarine_h54302.jpg

Japanese Submarines

Here is a pic of one that is washed up on the shores of Oahu the day after the attack.

http://www.combinedfleet.com/Pearl.htm

There is also supposed to be a photo taken from a Japanese aircraft that shows the a Midget firing her torps at the Oklahoma. (As cptsmith here has pointed out) I have not seen this picture however and have not been able to find it online. Would be cool if someone could find it.


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## Glider (Aug 26, 2010)

I cannot find it on line but it was shown on a TV programme about the attack and the evidence plus the explanation was very impressive.

The small subs were carried by larger subs and the plan of attack was explained.


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## Messy1 (Aug 26, 2010)

It was on Myths of Pearl Harbor on the Military Channel.
Here is the photo.
The theory is that the white marks in the left circle circle are caused by the midget sub rocking due to the weight difference of just firing a torpedo, and the prop coming out of the water as the sub rocks forward to back. The middle picture is of the torpedo prop flinging water up into air. They blew up this photo, and there does appear to be something sticking out of the water, in the middles of the white area in the left circle on the water, some believe it is the conning tower of a midget sub. In the right circle are two very faint, white lines you can see going off to the right towards the ships are what some believe to be torpedo trails (for lack of a better phrase) from the torpedoes fired from the midget sub.


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## evangilder (Aug 26, 2010)

I saw a photo at the Estrella Warbird Museum in Paso Robles that shows a sub in Pearl at the time. It is quite clearly a sub in the shot.


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## norab (Aug 26, 2010)

The fifth was recently found

Pearl Harbor – Discovery of Japan’s Mysterious Mini-Subs Fill in the Missing Pieces of the Attack | BionicBong


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## Night Fighter Nut (Aug 27, 2010)

Upon closer examination you can even see the shockwaves eminating from the side of the battleship at the end of those white lines.


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## Messy1 (Aug 27, 2010)

Sorry for the quick and rough description. I was trying to finish my post at work.


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## cptsmith (Aug 27, 2010)

The sub must of circled Ford Island after firing the torpedos if they think the pieces were from the West Loch area. Also the harbor is larger on the west side. The Utah is still at it's mooring on the west side of Ford, almost directly across from the Arizona.


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## Dennislara (Sep 17, 2010)

Pearl Harbor is an beautiful movie


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## diddyriddick (Sep 17, 2010)

Dennislara said:


> Pearl Harbor is an beautiful movie



You probably want to find a foxhole around here, friend.


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## Messy1 (Sep 17, 2010)




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## Messy1 (Sep 17, 2010)

That did not take long at all.


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## diddyriddick (Sep 17, 2010)

_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rNQRfBAzSzo_


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## ccheese (Sep 23, 2010)

What's a rock band got to do with Pearl Harbor ???

Charles


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 23, 2010)

ccheese said:


> What's a rock band got to do with Pearl Harbor ???
> 
> Charles



The song is titled "Another One Bites the Dust" and he was referring it to the spammer that I had just banned. As in _another spammer bites the dust_.


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## ccheese (Sep 24, 2010)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> The song is titled "Another One Bites the Dust" and he was referring it to the spammer that I had just banned. As in _another spammer bites the dust_.



Ah so..... very clever, these Chinese......

Charles


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## diddyriddick (Sep 24, 2010)

ccheese said:


> Ah so..... very clever, these Chinese......
> 
> Charles



Sorry, Charles. Didn't mean to muddy the water.


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## cptsmith (Sep 26, 2010)

Although they did have a point. The cinematography was great....it was the script and acting that sucked!


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## ccheese (Sep 26, 2010)

cptsmith said:


> Although they did have a point. The cinematography was great....it was the script and acting that sucked!



That had to rate Pearl Harbor [a war movie] "R" because of the sex scene in the hanger, to get
it to "sell". Pure trash....

Charles


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