# Scharnhorst vs Alaska



## renrich (Nov 24, 2009)

To go along with the Scharnhorst vs Hood thread but not to hijack it, a perhaps more interesting comparison would be a Scharnhorst vs Alaska fight. A lot might depend on the weather but the Scharnhorst would have an advantage in armor and the Alaska might have a knot or two in speed, an advantage in gun power and probably in fire control. What do you think?


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## timshatz (Nov 24, 2009)

Man, that's a good question.

I'm guessing (I'm sure somebody will put me straight on it) that the Alaska has the advantage in terms of Fire Control (especially the radars, assuming they have the same setup as the WW2 US BBs). Maybe the Alaska will have an edge in ROF but that's questionable. 

I think the Scharnhorst was designed earlier and based on a much older design. Usually, especially with warship design, later is better. 

But, like I said, I'm sure somebody will put me straight on it.


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## DonL (Nov 24, 2009)

That's very easy SH has no chance under normal circumstances only if the crew of Alaska makes a fatal error.

SH could only win this match under a range of 18000m because of her very bad horizontall protection and her guns that are very poor deck penetrators. On the other hand Alsaka had a good horizontal protection and good guns for deck penetration. 

for a more detail explanation look at the Hood vs SH thread #15.

It's very easy under 18000m SH is completly save against Alaska and Alaska very vulnerable under 18000m because of her thin main belt of 220mm inclined. But SH has no speed advantage over Alaska to close the range so Alaska could dictate the fight.
Over 18000m Alaska is save and SH very vulnerable. So under normal circumstances Alaska is the winner.


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## Vincenzo (Nov 24, 2009)

Saw the Scharnhorst armour scheme: the main belt (350mm) is penetrated from Alaska only under 16 km, but for real damage the projectile need pass almost also a 30 mm deck (that is penetrated alone over 9 km) so the window range maybe only 11/12. the lower belt (170 mm) is penetrated to all range but need pass almost a 45 mm paratie and a 30 mm deck so need i think almost over 12 km hit. the 50 mm deck is penetrated over 13 km but under there is a 95 mm deck (or a 20 mm paratie and a 80 mm deck) so need a hit over max actual hit in WWII. the 130 mm deck need hit over max actual hit in WW II. the high belt (45mm) and after this the 95 mm deck also need a long range hit aroun a 24 km. So i think the Scharnhorst has good protection versus Alaska.
If some has scheme for Alaska i'm curious to see the other side

rewriting for missinterpretation, i left the original comment THAT it's WRONG for real Scharnhorst

he main belt (350mm) is penetrated from Alaska only under 16 km, but for real damage the projectile need pass almost a 95 mm deck but this is impossible under 16 km. the lower belt (170 mm) is penetrated to all range but need pass almost a 45 mm paratie i think this is penetrated at WWII max range. the high belt (45mm) and after this the 95 mm deck also need too long range hit for WW II. the 50 mm deck is penetrated over 13 km but under there is a 95 mm deck (or a 20 mm paratie and a 80 mm deck) so this not give possibility to hit internal part.
So for 12' of Alaska the best it's hit the lower belt, in this case the range is not very important but need lucky hit. the other area show good protection vs 12'

This is on armour scheme posted to DonL not on more partucular posted on Kurfuerst


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## vikingBerserker (Nov 24, 2009)

Great comparison. Alaska has firepower and speed, Scharnhorst has the armor. Interestingly enough the Alaska's were designed to counter Scharnhorst types of ships. IMO is comes down to fire control and I'd assume the Alaska's were better.

I'd have been a good fight.


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## Kurfürst (Nov 24, 2009)

Vincenzo said:


> Saw the Scharnhorst armour scheme: the main belt (350mm) is penetrated from Alaska only under 16 km, but for real damage the projectile need pass almost also a 30 mm deck...



Huh... ? I think you mixed it up with a poster's own armoring scheme for an 'alternate Scharnhorst', with an armor layout much like the French new battleships (thick top deck, thinner turtle deck below).

The real Scharnhorst had a 350 mm main belt, with a 105mm slope and a right behind the belt which together with the 80 mm main deck formed a turtle deck - much like Bismarck, and very hard, if not impossible to penetrate into the vitals through the belt.


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## Juha (Nov 24, 2009)

Hello
on Scharnhorst defence I must add that Scharnhorst had a proper torpedo defence system which Large Cruiser Alaska didn't have, so in it more weight was available for other things like armour, armament or... Even if the torpedo defence would not have any impact on duel between the two one must remember that its inclusion made Sch more balanced design from POV of protection and survival ability.

Juha


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## DonL (Nov 24, 2009)

@ Kurfürst

I agree with you.
But the very weak point is the upper belt with 45mm and this is nothing!
Up from 18000-19000m a shell can penetrate the upper belt and can go directly to and through the main deck.
And then you have a 12, 14 or 15 inch shell in the vitals


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## renrich (Nov 24, 2009)

The Alaska displaced full load 34253 tons and had a top speed of 33 knots. She was armored against 12 inch shell fire barely and had poor protection against torpedos. She mounted a new type of 12 inch gun which was equivalent in performance to the US prewar 14 inch gun. Her three triple turrets could maintain an average rate of fire of 2.4-3 rounds per minute and could throw an 1140 pound AP projectile 38573 yards at an elevation of 45 degrees. With a slight speed advantage and a much longer and heavier reach with guns and probably better fire control, if well handled, the odds would seem to favor Alaska over Scharnhorst.


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## Vincenzo (Nov 24, 2009)

beautiful this new schemes 
The 80 mm deck it's not without defence value, also take in consideration the loss of velocity for pass the 45 mm higher belt, for Alaska 12' maybe a 20 km and over hit


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## DonL (Nov 24, 2009)

@ renrich



> average rate of fire of 2.4-3 rounds per minute and could throw an 1140 pound AP projectile 38573 yards at an elevation of 45 degrees.





> much longer and heavier reach with guns



SH had an elevation of 40 degrees but a muzzle velocity of 890mps (Alaska 762 mps) and could shoot at a range of 44,760 yards
So yes heavier but not longer theoreticly and SH can shoot 3.5 rounds per minute
Source:
German 28 cm/54.5 (11") SK C/34

Edit:


> She was armored against 12 inch shell fire barely



Yes horizontal but vertical she was weak with her 220mm inclined belt. SH can penetrate 335mm straight belt at 16,514 yards and 291mm at 20,013 yards, this is enough to go through the 220mm inclined belt at tis range.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 24, 2009)

Assuming a much more practical max range of 25,000-30,000yds which ship had the better chance of penetrating it's oppenents deck?

Main belt is a mighty small target compared to the deck at these ranges.


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## Vincenzo (Nov 24, 2009)

Shortround6 said:


> Assuming a much more practical max range of 25,000-30,000yds which ship had the better chance of penetrating it's oppenents deck?
> 
> Main belt is a mighty small target compared to the deck at these ranges.



maybe best assuming max 27,000 yards (max actual hit in WWII it's around 26,500)

Scharnhorst guns are not good vs decks they have too long range so they angle of fall it's too low


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## parsifal (Nov 24, 2009)

The superior radar fit out of the alaska should make her more than capable of overpowering the Scharnhorst at range or in poor weather. I will get the details of the radar fits once I am home (am interstate at the moment for work). Assuming KM operational policy of avoiding contact with same or heavier class ships, the Scharnhorst can be expected not to engage her full braoadside for much of the theoretical battle, as she makes her escape, Also presenting her stern to the enemy as opposed to her broadside on, generally means the ship is more exposed to plunging fire, since, as a generalization, azimuth is more difficult to lock onto than bearing in finding a gunnery solution


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## Vincenzo (Nov 24, 2009)

The Alaska go in fleet in early '45 the Scharnhorst was sinked more one year before. only comparion possible it's whai if so need think what equip (radar) can use the Scharnhorst if was in fleet in early '45


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## davebender (Nov 25, 2009)

Not so sure about this if we are comparing fire control for the same time period. U.S.S. Alaska was not worked up until December 1944. If Scharnhorst survives that long it will have late war German fire control improvements.


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## parsifal (Nov 27, 2009)

davebender said:


> Not so sure about this if we are comparing fire control for the same time period. U.S.S. Alaska was not worked up until December 1944. If Scharnhorst survives that long it will have late war German fire control improvements.



The longest ranged set developed by the germans was the FuMO 34, which had had a peak power of 125 kw and a reported theoretical range of 40-50000 metres. With a pulse width of 4 milliseconds, this was still not a short wavelength set, and did not provide surface fire control radar capability.

It does not compare very well to the equivalent USN fire control radars, of which the Mk 34 was typical. The power output of this set was 1500-2000kw, the range similar at 45000 m (before the advent of AEW this was about the limit of surface radars), Pulse width, 0.5 ms, . This setwas very accurate 15 metre error at 40000 yards. It was also capable producing very reliable range data, something even the latest naval radars in Germany could not do.

A Scharnhorst fighting an Alaska in 1945 will be fighting at a severe disadvantage due to its poor radar fits. Ship borne radar was one area in technolgy where the allies achieved a massive superiority by wars end....


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## Vincenzo (Nov 27, 2009)

parsifal said:


> The longest ranged set developed by the germans was the FuMO 34, which had had a peak power of 125 kw and a reported theoretical range of 40-50000 metres. With a pulse width of 4 milliseconds, this was still not a short wavelength set, and did not provide surface fire control radar capability.
> 
> It does not compare very well to the equivalent USN fire control radars, of which the Mk 34 was typical. The power output of this set was 1500-2000kw, the range similar at 45000 m (before the advent of AEW this was about the limit of surface radars), Pulse width, 0.5 ms, . This setwas very accurate 15 metre error at 40000 yards. It was also capable producing very reliable range data, something even the latest naval radars in Germany could not do.
> 
> A Scharnhorst fighting an Alaska in 1945 will be fighting at a severe disadvantage due to its poor radar fits. Ship borne radar was one area in technolgy where the allies achieved a massive superiority by wars end....



please can you explain how work the Mk 34 fire control radar?

oh i just found that Mk 34 it's of 1953 too late for our comparation, or it'a a different Mk 34?


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## Glider (Nov 27, 2009)

If the weather is good then the Alaska's advantage of its better radar will be of less importance. Both vessels will have the practical problem of hitting the other ship at great distances and experience showed that there was a practical limit of around 27-30,000 yards. Beyond this then all you will do is use up the ammunition and wear the guns down. Even in this band that chances of a hit are small to remote.

With this in mind we are looking at a combat between two well matched ships. I would tend to go with the Scharnhorst as she has one asset the Alaska doesn't and that is 5.9 secondary weapons. Should the range get to about 20,000 then these will become effective and could do telling damage to the Alaska although they would not of course penetrate her armour.


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## renrich (Nov 27, 2009)

Because, Alaska had a speed advantage as well as the heavier main battery it is unlikely in clear weather during the daytime that the 5.9s would come into play. The 5.9s on Graf Spee were not able to sink any of the CLs at the Plate and they had little armor compared to Alaska.


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## parsifal (Nov 27, 2009)

US radar was so clear it could observe the fall of shot. The turret azimuth and bearing was controlled from the director, and this in turn obtained its data from radar fixes.

Radar assisted fire control, from 1943 onward was vastly superior to optical fire control, even in clear weather. Fall of shot was often not observed accurately under visual conditions, and the stereoscopic system in use at the time had the same difficulties as the low definition radars

A Naval War College study performed during World War II estimated that an Iowa Class (BB-61) battleship firing with top spot against a target the size of the German battleship Bismarck would be expected to achieve the following hit percentages (when using the Mk 34 Director) . 
Range Percentage hits against a broadside target Percentage hits against an end-on target Ratio 
10,000 yards (9,144 m) 32.7 22.3 1.47:1 
20,000 yards (18,288 m) 10.5 4.1 2.56:1 
30,000 yards (27,432 m) 2.7 1.4 1.92:1 

An image of the Mk 34 director with mk 13 radar is attached 

Sdmittedly this is a study for the 16" gun, but it does show just how good the USN FC systems had become by wars end

If these estimates were accurate, these ships were dangerously accurate in their fire which has to be attributed to radar direction in the Fire control arrangements. nothing else can explain its accuracy in my opinion. During Java Sea, for example there was something like 1200 rounds fired (from memory, at ranges of about 20000 yards. Only a handful of these rounds hit anything


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## parsifal (Nov 27, 2009)

I fail to see how the 5.9s could be considered any better than the USN 5/38s. The 5.9s could only really be expected to do damage to the upper works, but with a ROF about 1/3 that of the USN 5/38, I think the range disadavantage of the 5/38 is more than compensated for by the high ROF.


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## Glider (Nov 27, 2009)

The Alaska's speed advantage is of little use once battle has been joined unless she wants to keep the range long or run away.
The use of radar ranging in WW2 is little better than optical ranging in clear weather, at night or poor visibility certainly but not in clear weather. The accuracy of the German optical rangfinders at long range was proven in almost every action and radar is very vulnerable to damage once action is joined.
5.9 in guns have a clear advantage to the 5in when firing at ships. They have a longer range, a bigger shell and an improved chance of doing damage to the upperworks. 
Remember if you throw in the 5in then the Scharnhorst can include the 4.1 in. If you want to get really fussy the Scharnhorst also had some torpedo tubes but that is getting a little silly.


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## vikingBerserker (Nov 27, 2009)

I thought the 4.1's were AA guns?


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## renrich (Nov 27, 2009)

Why would not the Alaska try to keep the range open to the point were her guns were most effective and the Scharnhorst's were least effective, just like the British BCs did with the original Scharnhorst?


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## parsifal (Nov 27, 2009)

Glider, you keep saying that radar assisted FC was no better than optical in wwii, but the circumstantial evidence does not support that. Why would the USN undertake a study that suggests a far higher level of accuracy when using radar, over using optical guidance, even in clear weather.

I participated in gunnery training excercises in the '70s in Battle and Daring class DDs, which whilst modernized, were still very much wwii era technologies. I was not a gunery officer, but when we turned the radars off, our shooting accuracy slumped badly. These were still hand worked turrets remember....and they were also laid by hand as well, so I think the correlation to wartime experience is pretty close

So, what is your background information or experience for saying that optical gunlaying and FC is as good as radar directed gunfire????


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## parsifal (Nov 27, 2009)

renrich said:


> Why would not the Alaska try to keep the range open to the point were her guns were most effective and the Scharnhorst's were least effective, just like the British BCs did with the original Scharnhorst?



The AP capabilities of the 12/50 were as follows, using the 1140 lb Mk 18 AP shell ( these are straight cut and pastes from Lundstroms site)

Armor Penetration using 1,140 lbs. (517.093 kg) AP Mark 18 Shell
. 
Range Side Armor Deck Armor Striking Velocity Angle of Fall 
0 yards (0 m) 24.48" (622 mm) --- 2,500 fps (762 mps) 0.0 
5,000 yards (4,572 m) 21.34" (542 mm) 0.51" (13 mm) 2,215 fps (675 mps) 2.6 
10,000 yards (9,144 m) 18.23" (463 mm) 1.26" (32 mm) 1,948 fps (594 mps) 6.0 
15,000 yards (13,716 m) 15.56" (395 mm) 2.14" (54 mm) 1,745 fps (532 mps) 11.0 
20,000 yards (18,288 m) 12.73" (323 mm) 3.02" (77 mm) 1,550 fps (472 mps) 17.5 
25,000 yards (22,860 m) 10.52" (267 mm) 4.02" (102 mm) 1,435 fps (437 mps) 25.3 
30,000 yards (27,432 m) 9.08" (231 mm) 5.11" (130 mm) 1,400 fps (427 mps) 32.8 
35,000 yards (32,004 m) 7.35" (187 mm) 7.18" (182 mm) 1,427 fps (437 mps) 44.5 
Note: The above information is from "Battleships: United States Battleships 1935-1992" by Garzke and Dulin and is based upon the USN Empirical Formula for Armor Penetration. These values are in substantial agreement with armor penetration curves published in 1942. 


The SKC 34 had the following characteristics (have previously posted this stuff)

Armor Penetration with 727.5 lbs. (330 kg) APC L4,4 Shell
. 
Range Side Armor Deck Armor 
0 yards (0 m) 23.79" (604 mm) --- 
8,640 yards (7,900 m) 18.09" (460 mm) 0.76" (19 mm) 
16,514 yards (15,100 m) 13.18" (335 mm) 1.63" (41 mm) 
20,013 yards (18,288 m) 11.47" (291 mm) 1.87" (48 mm) 
30,000 yards (27,432 m) 8.08" (205 mm) 2.99" (76 mm) 
Note: The above information is from "Battleships: Axis and Neutral Battleships in World War Two" for a muzzle velocity of 2,920 fps (890 mps) and is based upon the USN Empirical Formula for Armor Penetration. 

. 
Range Side Armor Deck Armor 
10,936 yards (10,000 m) 13.70" (348 mm) --- 
16,404 yards (15,000 m) 11.02" (280 mm) --- 
21,872 yards (20,000 m) 8.86" (225 mm) --- 
27,340 yards (25,000 m) 7.64" (194 mm) --- 
Note: The above information is from "German Capital Ships of World War Two." The data is based upon the pre-war Krupp test shoots on their range in Meppen with L/4,4 APC projectiles using RPC/32 propellant against KC-type armor at an impact angle of 70 degrees. It should be noted that RPC/32 propellant was replaced by the more powerful RPC/38 type which was the only propellant used in World War II. 

I agree with you basic supposition, but cannot see any particulalr range that the 12/50 enjoys such a clear advantage.

If the US ship wanted to get its 5/38s into action, it would need to reduce the range to under 20000 yards. Even then the accuracy of both the 5/38s and the German 15/skc/28s due to the elevations needed in the guns would be very low. 

My gut feeling would be to reduce the range to about 18000 yards, and then hold it from there.....


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## DonL (Nov 27, 2009)

To close the range for Alaska would be her death.

SH would be save under 18000m. No 12 inch shell ( 517kg) will go through the main belt with 350mm and the lower main deck with 105mm. And optic shooting gets better with every meter of shorter distance and the guns of SH would be more powerfull to the 220mm inclined belt too.


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## Glider (Nov 27, 2009)

parsifal said:


> Glider, you keep saying that radar assisted FC was no better than optical in wwii, but the circumstantial evidence does not support that. Why would the USN undertake a study that suggests a far higher level of accuracy when using radar, over using optical guidance, even in clear weather.
> 
> I participated in gunnery training excercises in the '70s in Battle and Daring class DDs, which whilst modernized, were still very much wwii era technologies. I was not a gunery officer, but when we turned the radars off, our shooting accuracy slumped badly. These were still hand worked turrets remember....and they were also laid by hand as well, so I think the correlation to wartime experience is pretty close
> 
> So, what is your background information or experience for saying that optical gunlaying and FC is as good as radar directed gunfire????



The Scharnhorst hit the Glorious a fast moving, evading target about the same size as a BB at a range of about 26,500 yards with her third salvo. By any standards first class shooting with or without radar ranging. Any BB would do well to match that whatever their equipment.

Its also worth noting that the Ardent was hit with the first 5.9in broadside. 

As for my experience I served on HMS Tiger the last 6in cruiser in the RN during firing tests. She normally hit the target with the second or third ranging shell which is not very different from the Scharnhorst. The difference of course was that once whe had the range the ROF destroyed the target in double quick time.
An aside but the Tiger hit the air target (and I do mean hit, not close enough), with the second shell so her radar ranging was at the time, state of the art.


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## parsifal (Nov 27, 2009)

Your experience is very good, and great shooting by the sounds of it. However, I would point out that Glorious was steaming straight and at constant speed at the time she was hit, as she attempted to range a strike against her two pursuers.

"_Gneisenau and Scharnhorst were at 69°00'N, 03°10'E steaming at 19 knots on course 330° when smoke was sighted on the eastern horizon at 1546. Steam was raised for full speed, and course altered to close the enemy. By 1636 Gneisenau was making 30.5 knots and Scharnhorst, experiencing boiler trouble, was making 29. Scharnhorst, initially in the leading position, opened fire on Glorious at 1632, range 28600 yards (26150 meters). Gneisenau opened fire at 1646. Gneisenau's slightly superior speed allowed her to slowly overhaul the Scharnhorst during the action, until she had put the Scharnhorst some 22 cables (4850 meters) on her port quarter. The two ships maintained these relative positions until near the end of the engagement, when Gneisenau reduced speed.

In accordance with instructions from Glorious. Ardent closed the enemy ships flashing a challenge on her searchlight. She was taken under fire by Gneisenau at 1627 and by Scharnhorst at 1630 at a range of about 16000 yards (14600 meters). Ardent withdrew, firing torpedoes, one of which was seen to pass close ahead of the Scharnhorst. Both destroyers made smoke to screen the Glorious. This smoke was effective enough to force the Germans to cease fire from about 1658 to 1720. Ardent made one hit on Scharnhorst with her 4.7-inch guns, but was extensively hit by return fire from the 5.9-inch secondary armament of the battlecruisers, and sank at about 1725.

Glorious received her first hit at 1638 from Scharnhorst's third salvo. The 283mm shell penetrated the flightdeck and burst in the upper hangar starting a large fire.4 Splinters pierced a boiler casing and smoke entered air intakes. This caused a temporary drop in steam pressure from two boilers, but pressure was built up again as the smoke cleared. Further hits were obtained after 1720 as the carrier once again became visible through the smoke of the screening destroyers. At 1656, just before the Germans ceased fire due to screening smoke, a hit on the homing beacon wrecked the bridge, killing the captain and almost all of the bridge personnel. The Executive Officer assumed command of the ship. About 1720 a hit in the center engine room shook the whole ship, which thereafter began to lose speed, develop a starboard list, and commence a slow circle to port. The Germans ceased fire at about 1740, and Glorious sank at about 1810."_

Assuming that Gneisenau was shooting at approximately the same rate, it would seem that the Germans expended 6 full salvoes before registering a single hit. This was against a target that until that point was not zig zagging. Still great shooting, but hardly of the same standards as your analysis suggests. Compared to the radar assisted gunnery of the Iowas, this is just average.

And for every action where their was this above average shooting, there are 6 or 7 instances where the shooting is poor when relying on visual FC. I still dont think it is nearly as accurate as late war Radar assisted FC.


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## parsifal (Nov 27, 2009)

DonL said:


> To close the range for Alaska would be her death.
> 
> SH would be save under 18000m. No 12 inch shell ( 517kg) will go through the main belt with 350mm and the lower main deck with 105mm. And optic shooting gets better with every meter of shorter distance and the guns of SH would be more powerfull to the 220mm inclined belt too.



So you dont think the ability to place a an 1140 lb shell, capable at that range (18000 m) with armour penetration of about 14 inches is going to hurt the German Battlecruiser.

By comparison the the German ship can penetrate about 8.8 inches of plate, which is not quite enough to penetrate the main belt of the Alaska, once the angle of the hit is taken into account, as well as the STS bulkheads on which the Alaskas belt is hung

I think you should check the gunnery tables again.

I do agree that optic shooting gets better as the range reduces, but so too does radar assisted FC. At 18000 metres the Alaska could use her 5 inche guns with a firing cysle on average threee time the rate of the 5.9 inch guns on Scharnhorst.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 27, 2009)

the use of secondary guns at ranges proposed is rather silly.

At these extreme ranges the angle of elevation is 35-40 degress or better and the angle of decent is going to be about 60 degrees meaning the trajectory is going to look like a mortar shot. Time of flight is going to much longer than the Main guns to the same range.

Some Navies did not like the secondary guns firing during long range main battery shoots because of gun gas/smoke drifting across main gun director sight lines. Even if the gas/smoke doesn't totally obscure the target even a thin smoke can make use of the optical range finders more difficult. As can the minor shell splashes. While the director peaple can probably tell the difference between a 6" splash and a 11" splash trying to get clear image of the target with several 6" splashes obscuring it doesn't help. 

Use of secondary guns against a second target is much more useful. You still have the gun gas problem but the secondary splash problem goes away. You also keep the secondary target/s from having an unopposed target shoot which should lower their hit potential even if you don't score any hits.


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## parsifal (Nov 27, 2009)

Shortround, I do basically agree with you, though your angles for impact are a bit overstated. The angles for the 5.9s at range 16K is 11.5 with an angle of fall of 23.5 degrees. At range 21K the angle of fall is 42 degrees. This is easily plunging fire, though not quite "mortar fire as you suggest.

Nevertheless, the Germans found the use of the secondary armament in this battle as interfering with the accuracy of the main armament and ceased using it for a bout 20 minutes after 1700, to facilitate the rapid sinking of the primary target. in other words, the secondary armement was found to be a hindrance overall....though essential to keep the DDs busy.

One other thing I found about this battle.....dealing with the alleged accuracy of fire from the German optical fc arrangements. though indeed they achieved their first hit after only three salvoes, overall, until the Glorious was stopped and reduced to a sitting target, the Germans had expended 387 rounds of 28 cm ammunition from the two ships, to achieve something like 4 hits on the Glorious up to that time. According to the German records the average engagement range of the primary target4 was 24000 yds. The overall shooting accuracy of the german ships using optical means, under ideal conditions was 1.03%. At that same range, the USN reckoned that the Iowa could achieve a firing accuracy against a Bismarck sized target, broadside on, of 10.5%, or 4.5% in an end on situation. Since for most of the glorious engagement, the silhouette of the British ship was somewhere in between, the average number of hits if the fire had been radar controled would have been about 7% (I estimate). In other words, the visula means used by the germans is going to be somewhere between 10 and 25% as accurate as radar assit3ed gunnery, even under ideal conditions.


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## Glider (Nov 27, 2009)

At the end of the day we agree that the Scharhorst hit the carrier with the third salvo. Which was similar to the Tiger using radar fire control. The Alaska would not be zig zagging as she would be firing back so that equals that out. I believe that the difference would not be much, not that optical was as good, and what evidence we have supports that. Radar is vulnerable to damage, that I believe cannot be questioned and once hits are registered its in the lap of the gods as to the final result. If a splinter from an early hit takes out the Alaska radar F/C then all bets are off.

The comments about the accuracy of the firing tends to ignore that the RN used smoke screens to a considerable degree and this obviously hinders optical F/C. I would however agree that the Gneisenau was less accurate than the Scharnhorst which shows what a difference the crew makes.

I am always cautious of theoretical projections of accuracy, if you believe them guided missiles would never miss and I have never seen theoretical projections continue into the real world.


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## parsifal (Nov 28, 2009)

why cant the alaska or the scharnhorst change course and speed during the battle. In any event if you are right, then if one cant manouvre, then surely both cant, and therefore the ability to manouvre or not manouvre will not affect the overall comparison between radar assisted and visual fire

we now have a set of numbers for ammunition expended to hits achieved for optical fire. Now perhaps we should try to get a representative sample of ammunition expended to hits achieved for radar assisted gunnery, and see what the difference might be

During the battle of North Cape, Scharnhorst was targeted by no fewer than 55 torpedoes, 11 of which probably found their mark. More than 2000 shells were fired at her: 446 x 356 mm (14-inch) from Duke of York, 161 x 203 mm (8-inch) from Norfolk, 874 x 152 mm (6-inch) from Jamaica, Sheffield and Belfast, 686 x 133 mm (5.2-inch) from Duke of York and 126 x 120 mm (4.7-inch) from the destroyers.

Of the 446 14 in fired, no fewer than 18 found their mark, at an average engagement range of 18000 metres ( for the battleships). Remember, this battle was fought in terrible conditions, sall things being equal, the british ship should actually have a lower hitting average. But the reverse effect is observed....why??? The ratio of hits achieved by the radar assisted gunnery to ammunition expended is 4.03%, or more than 4 times that achieved by the Scharnhorst/Gneisenau gunnery teams. The range was 25% less, but the weather and sea state much worse. 

Why would the british gunnery be four times more accurate than the Scharnhosts, when all except two of the variables are comparable. Range and radar......And I think the decreased range of the North cape battle is more than offset by the poor weather conditions. That leaves only one variable that is influencing the hit rate....radar


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## Shortround6 (Nov 28, 2009)

parsifal said:


> Shortround, I do basically agree with you, though your angles for impact are a bit overstated. The angles for the 5.9s at range 16K is 11.5 with an angle of fall of 23.5 degrees. At range 21K the angle of fall is 42 degrees. This is easily plunging fire, though not quite "mortar fire as you suggest.



they may be a bit overstated but I think you have given the angles for the 15cm SKC/25 guns from the light cruisers with the triple turrets. these used a much larger charge to get another 85m/s vellocity. Elevations in Campbell's for the Sharnhorsts guns are 22,000 m/35^ and 23,000m/40^ vrs 25,000m/36.3^ and 25,700m/40^ for the cruiser guns. 
Somebody did mention 20,000yds for the 15cm guns to become effective.  

Ranges for the American 5"/38 are given as 14,532m/27^, 15,923m/35^ and 16,640m/45^. or 10 degrees of elevation for the last 717meters of range. 

The page layout in my copy of Campbell's is bit confusing in that it does show a picture of the Graf Spee below the Description of the Cruiser guns with the 15cm SKC/28 description on the next page.


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## Glider (Nov 28, 2009)

parsifal said:


> why cant the alaska or the scharnhorst change course and speed during the battle. In any event if you are right, then if one cant manouvre, then surely both cant, and therefore the ability to manouvre or not manouvre will not affect the overall comparison between radar assisted and visual fire


 I agree with the final section. The point I was trying to make was that zig zagging is a lot different to making a deliberate manouvre during combat.



> we now have a set of numbers for ammunition expended to hits achieved for optical fire. Now perhaps we should try to get a representative sample of ammunition expended to hits achieved for radar assisted gunnery, and see what the difference might be
> 
> During the battle of North Cape, Scharnhorst was targeted by no fewer than 55 torpedoes, 11 of which probably found their mark. More than 2000 shells were fired at her: 446 x 356 mm (14-inch) from Duke of York, 161 x 203 mm (8-inch) from Norfolk, 874 x 152 mm (6-inch) from Jamaica, Sheffield and Belfast, 686 x 133 mm (5.2-inch) from Duke of York and 126 x 120 mm (4.7-inch) from the destroyers.
> 
> Of the 446 14 in fired, no fewer than 18 found their mark, at an average engagement range of 18000 metres ( for the battleships).


This is interesting stuff but of little assistance. We know how many shells were fired at her but have no accurate idea as to how many hit. As to the average range of 18,000 yards I doubt that. The DOY started firing at 11,000 yards. about 30 minutes later the DOY was still at 13,000 yards. 20 minutes later the range was 16,500 yards. 20 minutes later the range was about 18,000 yards. 24 minutes later the range was 19,500 and the DOY ceased fire. The DOY opened fire again at a range of 9,500 yards and the range closed to 7,500 yards. I don't have the time to do the sums but its a lot less that 18,000.


> Remember, this battle was fought in terrible conditions, sall things being equal, the british ship should actually have a lower hitting average. But the reverse effect is observed....why??? The ratio of hits achieved by the radar assisted gunnery to ammunition expended is 4.03%, or more than 4 times that achieved by the Scharnhorst/Gneisenau gunnery teams. The range was 25% less, but the weather and sea state much worse.


 I think this point is covered by the earlier reply mainly the range was about 50%.



> Why would the british gunnery be four times more accurate than the Scharnhosts, when all except two of the variables are comparable. Range and radar......And I think the decreased range of the North cape battle is more than offset by the poor weather conditions. That leaves only one variable that is influencing the hit rate....radar


You keep including the two ships together in your calcs but the Scharnhorst is the vessel in question and she was more accurate than her sister ship. That has been admitted.
The question you keep avoiding is why would the Alaska be more accurate than the Tiger a later ship with more up to date radar and one that I know from firing trials was a very accurate ship?


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## Juha (Nov 28, 2009)

Hello Glider
on the other hand neither Scharnhorst nor Gneisenau were particulately accurate during the action against Renown only 2 months before the sinking of Glorious, Ardent and Acasta, and Scharnhorst fire was reported as inaccurate during Spitzberg raid in Sept 43, but that was some 2½ years later.

Juha


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## Glider (Nov 28, 2009)

Juha
Your right I cannot deny it. Can I claim a bad day at the office?


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## Juha (Nov 29, 2009)

Hello Glider
Of course. All what I tried to say was that there tended to be variations in human actions, at least most of us have better and worse days . And on 9 Apr 40 conditions were really awful, maybe even the fact that SH GN were under 15in fire had some slight effect. But the weather was surely the main factor to gunnery difficulties. And it seemd that Gneisenau got the both sure hits on Renown, nobody knows when the possible 3rd hit on the top of one funnel happened.

Juha


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## Kurfürst (Nov 29, 2009)

parsifal said:


> So you dont think the ability to place a an 1140 lb shell, capable at that range (18000 m) with armour penetration of about 14 inches is going to hurt the German Battlecruiser.



He is right - 14 inches is way insufficient to get some real hurt to the Scharnhorst class - deck arrangements being such as they were, quite similar to the Bismarck - all it can do is to mess up the non-vital areas above the armored deck. Nothing that would compromise the ship's fighting capacity is there, however.



parsifal said:


> By comparison the the German ship can penetrate about 8.8 inches of plate, which is not quite enough to penetrate the main belt of the Alaska, once the angle of the hit is taken into account, as well as the STS bulkheads on which the Alaskas belt is hung
> 
> I think you should check the gunnery tables again.



I did check the gunnery tables, and your comparison of the two guns is questionable... appearantly you took the figures for the US 12" gun _calculated_ using the USN's empirical formula, _which generally produces higher penetration figures for all projectiles_, and compared that the Krupp _live fire test results_ using a _pre-war propellant_, fired at a_ plate with an impact angle of 70 degrees_... tsk-tsk-tsk! 8)

In reality, using _similiar, comparable figures _we get, *at 20 000 yards*, using in both case the USN Empirical Formula for Armor Penetration.

28 cm/54.5 (11") SK C/34 11.47" (291 mm) 1.87" (48 mm)
12"/50 (30.5 cm) Mark 8 : 12.73" (323 mm) 3.02" (77 mm)

The difference in figures for belt penetration are marginal using the same conditions, and more pronounced in deck penetration. 

However, whereas the Alaska's 12" guns must go through a 350 mm belt and thereafter attempt the impossbile, penetrate a high sloped 105 mm deck - even far larger gun calibres didn't have the power for that. OTOH the 28cm guns on the Scharnhorst only have to go through a single 9"/228mm thick belt before the the vitals can be reached. 

This is quite easily possible, for as per the USN formula the 28cm gun can still penetrate a 8.08" (205 mm) belt at 30 000 yards (so a 9 incher is probably vulnerable at 27-28k).



> At 18000 metres the Alaska could use her 5 inche guns with a firing cysle on average threee time the rate of the 5.9 inch guns on Scharnhorst.



To what purpose..? The 5" guns cannot possibly do but superficial damage to the Scharnhorst superstructure or exposed systems like radar etc. They cannot do any harm at all inside the citadel (70% of the ship hull...) due to the rather thick upper side belt and top armored deck - these are impossible to penetrated by 5" using any type of round at most practical ranges (the upper belt becomes vulnerable at sub-10 000 yard ranges).

Not to mention, comparing the secondaries we speak of 12 x 5" guns on one ship, incapable of giving hurt to the other ship vs. the 12 x 5'9" and 14 x 4.1" guns (the latter which you ignored) on the Scharnhorst. The firepower of the secondaries on the Scharnhorst is quite simply much superior, especially coupled with that Alaska's armor is far less extensive than the Scharnhorst, and most of the upper works is vulnerable for both 4.1" and 5.9" guns.


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## parsifal (Nov 29, 2009)

So what is the belt defences of the Scharnhorst. Conways has it listed as 6.75 inches through to 13.75 inches. There was an armoured deck of 3inches, main deck of 2inches, sloped to 4 inches. I dont follow why it is impossible to penetrate this with a weapon able to penetrate 15.5 inches at 15000 yards

Its intersting that you and DONL both claim that the 12/50 with the new AP-18 1140 lb charge with an MV of 2500fps cannot penetrate the main belt of the Scharnhorst. As I said, at that range, with the new round it can penetrate 15.56 inches of armour plate.

By comparison, the 14/45 fitted to the british Duke of York could penetrate 13.2 inches of stell at that range. And this gun was able to penetrate and severeely damage the Scharnhorst out to 24000 yds....

You also omit that the Alaska has a 0.625 STS belt behind the 9 inch main belt and than a 4 in sloped armoured deck designed to protect its vital areas in a similar armoured box manner as the Scharnhorst, as well as a further 1.4 inch main deck as well. 

Alaska is not as well protected as Scharnhorst, particularly in her below the waterline arrangements and in her internal subdivision. However, she possessed an immune zone against the 12 in 1140 lb shell of 18-24000 yards so I am not exaggerating when I say it was also designed to resist the effects of the weaker 28cm weapon at hose ranges as well. 

To support the notion that Alaska was designed to withstand fire from ships like the Scharnhorst, I direct you to an article by Chuck Hawks, who is a prolific and competent historian having written extensively on many aspect of naval warfare

Here is the link if you are interested in learning something

http://www.chuckhawks.com/battlecruisers.htm


Relevantly the article make these comments rehgarding this issue...

"_The 12in guns were a new design; they could penetrate 15in of belt armor at 16,000yds, and 5.5in of deck armor at 30,000yds. This made them effective against all battlecruisers and many battleships. They fired a new, super heavy AP shell weighing 1,140 lbs. Note that the French 13in gun fired an AP shell only slightly heavier at 1200 lbs, and the German 11in AP shell weighed just 700 lbs. The previous American 12in shell weighed 870 lbs. Not only did the new American AP shells have great sectional density, which means that they were heavy for their diameter, they were also much more effective and reliable in use than the German or Japanese AP shells. The secondary and AA battery of the Alaskas was superior to their rivals, both in number of guns, and in performance of the individual guns themselves. By the time the Alaskas entered service, American radar fire control was superior to anything the Axis powers had. This advantage would be particularly apparent at night or in inclement weather. 

These ships did not carry torpedoes. This is in line with the U.S. Navy policy of not equipping battleships and cruisers with torpedoes. While heavy and light cruisers can and did benefit from carrying torpedoes in WW II, they are a detriment on capital ships. Not equipping the Alaskas with torpedoes was the correct decision. Not having the dangerous things on deck would have been an advantage had the Alaska met either the German P class or the Japanese B 64 class in battle. 

The Alaska class was generally well protected compared to the Axis battlecruisers. At it's most favorable point, their armor was adequate to defeat their own 12in AP shells between 18,000 and 24,000yds. Against 8in cruiser fire, their immune zone was 9,500-29,200yds, and against the German 11in AP shell it was approximately 16,600-27,800yds. They would have been quite vulnerable to the 14in AP shells of the Kongo or B 65 type, or the 15in AP shells of the P class, but those ships would also have been quite vulnerable to the Alaska's super heavy 12in AP shells (see below). 

It is interesting to play "what if". Comparing the Alaska to the Axis battlecruisers she might have met, I think she would have done well against most of them. 

American AP shells work better than German AP shells...And as good as German optical fire control is, American radar control is even better. And Alaska doesn't carry any torpedoes to sink merchant ships, so the nasty things can't explode and tear her stern off, or worse. Again, it would probably come down to who gets the first lucky hits, but I'm betting that might just be Alaska. Its ironic to consider that the ships the U.S. Navy refused to admit were battlecruisers, might well have been the best battlecruisers of their generation!"_


Chuck does think that the Scharnhorst may well overpower the Alaska, and I have never said this was not entirely possible, but he does corroborate all that I have been saying...namely that radar assisted fire control was far superior to optical, that the new US 12" gun and its new round were extremely powerful, and that the armouring scheme of the Alaskas was sufficient for her to reduce the range to 18000 yards with a fair degree of safety.....fighting the Scharnhorst would be hard, but I think the odds remain in her favour just the same


Tsk Tsk indeed


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## Vincenzo (Nov 29, 2009)

Parsifal we need noted that the new british 14'' has heaviest projectile and near same MV of new US 12''. and the table on naval weapons page for 14'' it's for average gun (so lowest MV) and for 12" it's for new gun the tables are not build with 100% same method.

p.s. on Hawks article not all it's true


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## parsifal (Nov 29, 2009)

Vincenzo said:


> Parsifal we need noted that the new british 14'' has heaviest projectile and near same MV of new US 12''. and the table on naval weapons page for 14'' it's for average gun (so lowest MV) and for 12" it's for new gun the tables are not build with 100% same method.
> 
> p.s. on Hawks article not all it's true



Hi Vincenzo 

AFAIK the Alaska used the MK 18 shell (ie the 1140 lb version) throughout its operational carreer. In any event the issue being asserted is not what shell is being used or was used by the Alaska, but specifically that the MK-18 "supershell" could not overpower the defensive scheme of the German ship. Clearly avery reputable reference on this round suggests otherwise, but lets not let the truth get in the way of a cherished myth.....

I know that the british shell is the "standard" shell, but nevertheless this standard shell was able to fairly easily overpower the defensive scheme of the Scharnhorst......so why can a gun and a shell with an even higher rating not do that as well? 

What bits of the extract I produced do you think are not true......do I just have to accept your say so, or do you have some alternative sources??? What specifically dont you believe, so that we can examine the evidence and achieve a better understanding of the problem...


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## Kurfürst (Nov 29, 2009)

parsifal said:


> Hi Vincenzo
> 
> AFAIK the Alaska used the MK 18 shell (ie the 1140 lb version) throughout its operational carreer. In any event the issue being asserted is not what shell is being used or was used by the Alaska, but specifically that the MK-18 "supershell" could not overpower the defensive scheme of the German ship. Clearly avery reputable reference on this round suggests otherwise, but lets not let the truth get in the way of a cherished myth.....



Well the only one creating myths around here is you as well as using strawmen arguements. It was quite clearly stated that the 12" shell, for that matter, far more powerful shells are completely incapable of hurting the combination of 350 mm KC n/A plus a backing slope of 105 mm Wh. Nathan Okun did a lenghty analysis of Bismarck's protection scheme (which was 320 mm Kc n/A with 110 mm slope of Wh), the conclusion which I am fairly certain you are aware of was that even the Yamato's 18,1" guns would be needed to put right next to main belt (range=0 yards) to have even a chance to go through both plates and reach the vitals intact, as stated by Okun.

The Alaska class's armor armor composition was quite different, as usual a single moderately thick - compared to US BBs - armored deck upon the top of the side belt, on the scale of that of Scharnhorst, but had no slope backing up the main belt as on the Scharnhorst. 

You changed that to an absolute, that could not overpower the defensive scheme of the German ship - nobody said that. Certainly it was possible to overpower it, especially against the deck, if the range was long enough, ca 23-25 000 yards or greater. The main belt was another matter, as explained above.


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## Kurfürst (Nov 29, 2009)

parsifal said:


> So what is the belt defences of the Scharnhorst. Conways has it listed as 6.75 inches through to 13.75 inches. There was an armoured deck of 3inches, main deck of 2inches, sloped to 4 inches. I dont follow why it is impossible to penetrate this with a weapon able to penetrate 15.5 inches at 15000 yards



Simply because both the main belt and the slopes on the two sides are at the level at the waterline, ie. every projectile that wants to touch the vitals has to pass through the ca 105mm slope or the 80mm deck amidships, at an extremely unfavourable shallow angle, after penetrating the main belt itself.. it simply ain't gonna happen. 



parsifal said:


> Its intersting that you and DONL both claim that the 12/50 with the new AP-18 1140 lb charge with an MV of 2500fps cannot penetrate the main belt of the Scharnhorst. As I said, at that range, with the new round it can penetrate 15.56 inches of armour plate.



Of course it can penetrate the main belt. Problem is, in order to reach into the vitals, the much slowed down projectile, stripped of its AP cap, would also have penetrate the 80mm deck/105mm slope that is still between it and the machinery or magazines, and that at an extremely unfavorable angle. Ain't gonna happen - not even if you place the guns directly against the belt. Sure they will penetrate the belt itself, and then richochet off upwards from the main deck and the slope, doing only non-critical damage in the process.
 
The only way is if the projectile goes through the upper side belt, only 50 mm thick, and still have a steep enough fall and enough momentum to still go through the main deck. And that's a pretty narrow window - but possibly enough to make a lucky hit on Scharnhorst by the DoY, and also prompted German designers to beef up this upper belt to 145 mm on the Bismarcks..



parsifal said:


> You also omit that the Alaska has a 0.625 STS belt behind the 9 inch main belt and than a 4 in sloped armoured deck designed to protect its vital areas in a similar armoured box manner as the Scharnhorst, as well as a further 1.4 inch main deck as well.



There was nothing comparable - Alaska's deck wasn't sloped, nor was it positioned behind the main belt, as was on Scharnhorst and Bismarck.



parsifal said:


> Alaska is not as well protected as Scharnhorst, particularly in her below the waterline arrangements and in her internal subdivision. However, she possessed an immune zone against the 12 in 1140 lb shell of 18-24000 yards so I am not exaggerating when I say it was also designed to resist the effects of the weaker 28cm weapon at hose ranges as well.



The Alaska's never had such level of protection. See Garzke and Dullin:









parsifal said:


> To support the notion that Alaska was designed to withstand fire from ships like the Scharnhorst, I direct you to an article by Chuck Hawks, who is a prolific and competent historian having written extensively on many aspect of naval warfare



Err, its an amateur enthusiast's site.. and his opinion agrees with yours? Well, good for you both. 8)


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## DonL (Nov 29, 2009)

Sorry parsifal,

you are talking about myth but you don't read posts from other members exactly.
Your last two posts are wrong, very wrong.

One last description fom me with a lot examples.

The first thing we have talked about a range 18000m or less. Up from 18000m SH ist vulnerable to the guns of Alaska because of her weak upperbelt! Read the post 3 of this thread!



> I know that the british shell is the "standard" shell, but nevertheless this standard shell was able to fairly easily overpower the defensive scheme of the Scharnhorst......so why can a gun and a shell with an even higher rating not do that as well?



This is totally wrong! Alaska has no shell thats higher rated than the british shell. The only thing for "super shell" ist the heavy weight of this 12in shell nothing more nothing less.

The british 14"/45 (35.6 cm) Mark VII shoot a 1,590 lbs. (721 kg) shell with 2,483 fps (757 mps), the american 12"/50 (30.5 cm) Mark 8 shoot a 1,140 lbs. (517.093 kg) shell with 2,500 fps (762 mps) and the german 28 cm/54.5 (11") SK C/34 shoot a 727.5 lbs. (330 kg) shell with *2,920 fps (890 mps)*.

Penetrationpower is not only shell weight but shell weight + *Muzzle Velocity*
So the Mark 8 is inferior from penetrationpower to the Mark VII. On the other side is the german 11 inch a very good belt penetrator for an 11 in gun because of her very high muzzle velocity but thats also the reason for her poor deck penetration. That are facts parsifal no myths and there is no 12in super shell from the americans only a very heavy shell wth a low muzzle velocity.

Armored Shemes.
SH has the best vertical protection from 18000m less of all Batlleships accept Yamato because of her 170m long and 350mm thick main belt and the 105mm thick *low* main deck. SH and all other german designs have *no* amored box like all other designs. This very good vertical protection is only functioning less than 18000m because of the angle of fall from the shells. Up from 18000m the shell can penetrate the upper belt.

Alaska has a *high* main deck on the main belt of 229mm inclined. So a shell from 18000m or less can penetrate the main belt and goes under the main deck through the ship. 
And this is the difference to SH because a shell that penetrates the main belt must also go through the low main deck and the torpedo bulkhead to go through the ship!



> In reality, using similiar, comparable figures we get, at 20 000 yards, using in both case the USN Empirical Formula for Armor Penetration.
> 
> 28 cm/54.5 (11") SK C/34 11.47" (291 mm) 1.87" (48 mm)
> 12"/50 (30.5 cm) Mark 8 : 12.73" (323 mm) 3.02" (77 mm)



This are the facts from navy weapons parsifal no myths. Or do you think the data of the Mark8 are not true?
This data are with the 1,140 lbs. (517.093 kg) shell with 2,500 fps (762 mps).



> I know that the british shell is the "standard" shell, but nevertheless this standard shell was able to fairly easily overpower the defensive scheme of the Scharnhorst


This was up from 18000m or her turrets and there is no secret that the turrets of SH were a weak point.

So this discussion was for the range 18000m or less!


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## Vincenzo (Nov 29, 2009)

parsifal said:


> Hi Vincenzo
> 
> AFAIK the Alaska used the MK 18 shell (ie the 1140 lb version) throughout its operational carreer. In any event the issue being asserted is not what shell is being used or was used by the Alaska, but specifically that the MK-18 "supershell" could not overpower the defensive scheme of the German ship. Clearly avery reputable reference on this round suggests otherwise, but lets not let the truth get in the way of a cherished myth.....
> 
> ...



US new 12" 1140 lbs 2500 fps (new gun)
UK new 14" 1590 lbs 2483 fps (new gun) 2400 mps (average gun)

easy think that a same condition the british it's best.

for true i write in the article but for the extract:
the penetration data for 12" are a bit best of naval weapons table but maybe right.
330 weight it's 1235 (it's right only slightly heavier at 1200 lbs but why not writing only slightly heavier at 1100 for 12"?)
280 weight it's 727
the new 12" it's longest so it's heaviest
why writing axis BC? when for him the only axis true BC are the Kongo (the other are german pocket BB) 
i've not armour scheme of Alaska but theyr belt give little protection vs own guns only at so long distance that the distance it's a best protection. the belt has near same trouble vs the german 280.
best battlecruiser of their generation sure there aren't other BC in their generation and they are BC only for some people. (BC need fastest of BB the Alaska aren't fastest of Iowa)


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## parsifal (Nov 29, 2009)

Kurfürst said:


> Well the only one creating myths around here is you as well as using strawmen arguements. It was quite clearly stated that the 12" shell, for that matter, far more powerful shells are completely incapable of hurting the combination of 350 mm KC n/A plus a backing slope of 105 mm Wh. Nathan Okun did a lenghty analysis of Bismarck's protection scheme (which was 320 mm Kc n/A with 110 mm slope of Wh), the conclusion which I am fairly certain you are aware of was that even the Yamato's 18,1" guns would be needed to put right next to main belt (range=0 yards) to have even a chance to go through both plates and reach the vitals intact, as stated by Okun.
> 
> The Alaska class's armor armor composition was quite different, as usual a single moderately thick - compared to US BBs - armored deck upon the top of the side belt, on the scale of that of Scharnhorst, but had no slope backing up the main belt as on the Scharnhorst.
> 
> You changed that to an absolute, that could not overpower the defensive scheme of the German ship - nobody said that. Certainly it was possible to overpower it, especially against the deck, if the range was long enough, ca 23-25 000 yards or greater. The main belt was another matter, as explained above.



These are the facts Kurfurst, which even you cannot deny. The Scharnhorsts defensive scheme was defeated by the 14/45 guns of the DOY, including the turrets of the German ship. I dont really care if the main belt was penetrated or not....I happen to think it was penetrated, you obviously think otherwise....all i know is that a shell of lesser power than the 12/50 was able to defeat the Scharnhorst defences, relatively easily. You and any body else can argue all day about the alleged invincibility of these armouring schemes, but in the cold hard light of day the armouring schemes of these ships were not enough to save them. If the Scharnhorst could not withstand the effects of the 14/45 at those ranges, it would not have been able to withstand the effects of the 12/50, with the heavier shell and superior AP capabilities. This is because the 12/50 with Mark 18 shell was superior in AP qualities to the guns actually used to sink the Scharnhorst 

And for the record, Bismarck was silenced very quickly in her last battle, taking less than an hour to be silenced. Though her hull was well protected, her combat capability was knocked out with relative ease in her last fight. So much for the uber defences of the German Battleships....... 

These also are the facts...at 18000 yards, the 12/50 with Mk 18 shell can penetrate about 14 inches of armour plate. Thats enough to penetrate your 350 mm main belt. At that same range the 28cm weapon can penetratre about 8.8 inches of plate, which is not quite enough to assure penetration of the main belt. This is exactly the same situation as the Bismarck....the British BBs had enough power to get to the vitals of the ship, though not the citadel. It was enough to knock the ship out easily and quickly. And there is no reason to suggest that the the higher powered 12 inch round would not have the samer effect.


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## Vincenzo (Nov 29, 2009)

Parsifal the british 14" have not lesser poweer of US 12"

p.s.
and after penetred the 350mm deck you need penetred the 80mm deck in lucky hypotesis.
the hit from the deck are the dangeur.


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## DonL (Nov 29, 2009)

> These are the facts Kurfurst, which even you cannot deny. The Scharnhorsts defensive scheme was defeated by the 14/45 guns of the DOY, including the turrets of the German ship. I dont really care if the main belt was penetrated or not....I happen to think it was penetrated, you obviously think otherwise....all i know is that a shell of lesser power than the 12/50 was able to defeat the Scharnhorst defences, relatively easily. You and any body else can argue all day about the alleged invincibility of these armouring schemes, but in the cold hard light of day the armouring schemes of these ships were not enough to save them. If the Scharnhorst could not withstand the effects of the 14/45 at those ranges, it would not have been able to withstand the effects of the 12/50, with the heavier shell and superior AP capabilities. This is because the 12/50 with Mark 18 shell was superior in AP qualities to the guns actually used to sink the Scharnhorst
> 
> And for the record, Bismarck was silenced very quickly in her last battle, taking less than an hour to be silenced. Though her hull was well protected, her combat capability was knocked out with relative ease in her last fight. So much for the uber defences of the German Battleships.......
> 
> These also are the facts...at 18000 yards, the 12/50 with Mk 18 shell can penetrate about 14 inches of armour plate. Thats enough to penetrate your 350 mm main belt. At that same range the 28cm weapon can penetratre about 8.8 inches of plate, which is not quite enough to assure penetration of the main belt. This is exactly the same situation as the Bismarck....the British BBs had enough power to get to the vitals of the ship, though not the citadel. It was enough to knock the ship out easily and quickly. And there is no reason to suggest that the the higher powered 12 inch round would not have the samer effect.



Whats this parsifal? Do you want to provoke? 
You are talking nonsens in this post.


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## parsifal (Nov 29, 2009)

_you are talking about myth but you don't read posts from other members exactly.
Your last two posts are wrong, very wrong.

One last description fom me with a lot examples.

The first thing we have talked about a range 18000m or less. Up from 18000m SH ist vulnerable to the guns of Alaska because of her weak upperbelt! Read the post 3 of this thread!_
Sorry DONL

Your post is somewhat unintelligible to me, but essentially my point is this, the US 12/50 has the ability to disable the Scharnhorst in exactly the same way as the 14/45 did. Dont really care if the belt could be penetrated or not....though I cant see how it is possible to knock the ship out without it....this is because the 12/50 has superior performance to the of the latter gun notwithstanding your rebuttal below

Sorry if I missed post 3, but the the point here is if the Alaska has the power to overpower the Scharnhorst. According to the Nav weapons site her guns do have that capability 

_This is totally wrong! Alaska has no shell thats higher rated than the british shell. The only thing for "super shell" ist the heavy weight of this 12in shell nothing more nothing less.

The british 14"/45 (35.6 cm) Mark VII shoot a 1,590 lbs. (721 kg) shell with 2,483 fps (757 mps), the american 12"/50 (30.5 cm) Mark 8 shoot a 1,140 lbs. (517.093 kg) shell with 2,500 fps (762 mps) and the german 28 cm/54.5 (11") SK C/34 shoot a 727.5 lbs. (330 kg) shell with *2,920 fps (890 mps)*.

Penetrationpower is not only shell weight but shell weight + *Muzzle Velocity*
So the Mark 8 is inferior from penetrationpower to the Mark VII. On the other side is the german 11 inch a very good belt penetrator for an 11 in gun because of her very high muzzle velocity but thats also the reason for her poor deck penetration. That are facts parsifal no myths and there is no 12in super shell from the americans only a very heavy shell wth a low muzzle velocity._

These are the extracts from the Nav weapons site regarding the respective guns

Firstly the skc/34

Armor Penetration with 727.5 lbs. (330 kg) APC L4,4 Shell
. 
Range Side Armor Deck Armor 
0 yards (0 m) 23.79" (604 mm) --- 
8,640 yards (7,900 m) 18.09" (460 mm) 0.76" (19 mm) 
16,514 yards (15,100 m) 13.18" (335 mm) 1.63" (41 mm) 
20,013 yards (18,288 m) 11.47" (291 mm) 1.87" (48 mm) 
30,000 yards (27,432 m) 8.08" (205 mm) 2.99" (76 mm) 
Note: The above information is from "Battleships: Axis and Neutral Battleships in World War Two" for a muzzle velocity of 2,920 fps (890 mps) and is based upon the USN Empirical Formula for Armor Penetration. 
. 
Range Side Armor Deck Armor 
10,936 yards (10,000 m) 13.70" (348 mm) --- 
16,404 yards (15,000 m) 11.02" (280 mm) --- 
21,872 yards (20,000 m) 8.86" (225 mm) --- 
27,340 yards (25,000 m) 7.64" (194 mm) 

Next the 12/50

Armor Penetration using 1,140 lbs. (517.093 kg) AP Mark 18 Shell
. 
Range Side Armor Deck Armor Striking Velocity Angle of Fall 
0 yards (0 m) 24.48" (622 mm) --- 2,500 fps (762 mps) 0.0 
5,000 yards (4,572 m) 21.34" (542 mm) 0.51" (13 mm) 2,215 fps (675 mps) 2.6 
10,000 yards (9,144 m) 18.23" (463 mm) 1.26" (32 mm) 1,948 fps (594 mps) 6.0 
15,000 yards (13,716 m) 15.56" (395 mm) 2.14" (54 mm) 1,745 fps (532 mps) 11.0 
20,000 yards (18,288 m) 12.73" (323 mm) 3.02" (77 mm) 1,550 fps (472 mps) 17.5 
25,000 yards (22,860 m) 10.52" (267 mm) 4.02" (102 mm) 1,435 fps (437 mps) 25.3 
30,000 yards (27,432 m) 9.08" (231 mm) 5.11" (130 mm) 1,400 fps (427 mps) 32.8 
35,000 yards (32,004 m) 7.35" (187 mm) 7.18" (182 mm) 1,427 fps (437 mps) 44.5 
Note: The above information is from "Battleships: United States Battleships 1935-1992" by Garzke and Dulin and is based upon the USN Empirical Formula for Armor Penetration. These values are in substantial agreement with armor penetration curves published in 1942. 

Finally the 14/45

Armor Penetration with 1,590 lbs. (721 kg) AP Shell
. 
Range Side Armor Deck Armor 
0 yards (0 m) 26.9" (668 mm) --- 
10,000 yards (9,144 m) 15.6" (396 mm) 1.15" (29 mm) 
15,000 yards (13,716 m) 13.2" (335 mm) 1.95" (50 mm) 
20,000 yards (18,288 m) 11.2" (285 mm) 2.85" (73 mm) 
25,000 yards (22,860 m) 9.5" (241 mm) 4.00" (102 mm) 
28,000 yards (25,603 m) --- 4.75" (121 mm) 
Note: This data is from "Battleships: Allied Battleships in World War II" for a muzzle velocity of 2,400 fps (732 mps) and is partly based upon the USN Empirical Formula for Armor Penetration and partly based upon official data. 

Armor Penetration with 1,590 lbs. (721 kg) AP Shell
. 
Range Side Armor Deck Armor 
13,700 yards (12,530 m) 14.0" (356 mm) --- 
15,800 yards (14,450 m) 13.0" (330 mm) --- 
18,000 yards (16,460 m) 12.0" (305 mm) --- 
20,000 yards (18,290 m) --- 2.0" (52 mm) 
20,500 yards (18,750 m) 11.0" (279 mm) --- 
23,700 yards (21,670 m) 10.0" (254 mm) --- 
24,000 yards (21,950 m) --- 3.0" (76 mm) 
28,000 yards (25,600 m) --- 4.0" (102 mm) 
32,000 yards (29,260 m) --- 5.0" (127 mm) 
Note: This data is from "British Battleships of World War Two." This table assumes 90 degree inclination and is based upon theoretical calculations performed in 1935, not actual firing trials. 

As can be seen, according to this site, the 12/50 has superior AP capability over the 14/45. Nothing I can do to contradict that from the US point of view it has superior performance to the standard 870 lb shell originally designed for the gun. Never said they were super shells, just superior 

_Armored Shemes.
SH has the best vertical protection from 18000m less of all Batlleships accept Yamato because of her 170m long and 350mm thick main belt and the 105mm thick *low* main deck. SH and all other german designs have *no* amored box like all other designs. This very good vertical protection is only functioning less than 18000m because of the angle of fall from the shells. Up from 18000m the shell can penetrate the upper belt._

Nevertheless, both the Bismarck and the Scharnhorst were delivered fatal blows at ranges of less than 18000 metres, which sort of contradicts your foot stamping dont you think???? Why would the Alaska be any different, given her guns were superior to the 14/50 in this regard. 


_Alaska has a *high* main deck on the main belt of 229mm inclined. So a shell from 18000m or less can penetrate the main belt and goes under the main deck through the ship. 
And this is the difference to SH because a shell that penetrates the main belt must also go through the low main deck and the torpedo bulkhead to go through the ship_!

No argument that the Alaskas defensive arrangements are inadequate, but as the table extracts above show, the 28cm AP characteristics at range are going to have difficulty with the Alaskas schemeSo I ask you again....how can the DoY with a gun of lesser capability do telling damage on the Scharnhorst except if the armouring scheme was vulnerable....


_This are the facts from navy weapons parsifal no myths. Or do you think the data of the Mark8 are not true?
This data are with the 1,140 lbs. (517.093 kg) shell with 2,500 fps (762 mps)._


The myths that come up again and again, just barely below the surface, is that the german ships were impreganable. that this is an obvious myth is clear for all to see, yet it never ceases to amaze me the denial that goes with al things German. German ships in service proved to be not as well protected as this discussion would suggest.

Therein lies your myth 


_This was up from 18000m or her turrets and there is no secret that the turrets of SH were a weak point_.

As were a lot of other aspects in her design 

_So this discussion was for the range 18000m or less_!

For me the discussion was whether the Alaskas 12/50s have the power to overcome the Scharnhorst. I could not see any great advantage at any particular range, but suggested that if the US ship wanted to bring its 5/38s into play it should aim for a range of about 18000 yards....but was not certain that was such a good idea or not. Seems not after all this discussion and information. Does not alter me from the same basic supposition...that the 12/50 had more than enough power to deal with the Scharnhorst.

Let me make something very clear....i am not saying the fight would be a foregone conclusion, merely that the advantage in my opinion lays with the Alaska, primarily because of the power and accuracy of her gunnery systems.


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## parsifal (Nov 29, 2009)

DonL said:


> Whats this parsifal? Do you want to provoke?
> You are talking nonsens in this post.




Not wishing to provoke anybody, but neither am I going to accept what is essentially propaganda. Dont react well to people using derogatory terms like "talking nonsense" either, when the sources are there to refute neasrly everything that you uber germans say

Are you saying that the Bismarck in her last fight was not silenced easily....its a fact. battle commenced 0854, last salvo from the Bismarck was 0931....knocked out as a battleworthy unit in 37 minutes.....the fact that her hull could then absorb tremendous punushment is academic in my book .

Same basic principals apply to the Scharnhorst


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## Njaco (Nov 29, 2009)

DonL said:


> Whats this parsifal? Do you want to provoke?
> You are talking nonsens in this post.



Lets keep this civil or yet another thread will be closed. Deal with facts and not personal attacks. This is a good thread that is generating a lot of thought provoking info and it would be a shame to close because name-calling became a routine.


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## Glider (Nov 30, 2009)

A couple of observations on the penetration debate that is going on.

It certainly seems that the 12in on the Alaska had a remarkable penetration performance for a gun of its size. However having penetrated the armour you need to do the damage. The 12 AP shell weighs a lot less than the 14in shell about 75% the weight. There has to be a payback for this AP preformance and that is the amount of explosive in the shell. The 12in AP only had about 40% of the explosive of the 14in so the damage each hit will inflict is considerably less. It would be wrong to consider the 12in to have a superior performance than the 14in. Indeed the explosive content of the 11in AP shell was very similar being approx 80% of that in the 12in.

Then you have to consider the basic design of the armour. The USN designed their ships on the all or nothing principle so the vitals were protected leaving the other parts of the ship vulnerable with little or no armour. The Scharnhorst had a more traditional layout and its probable that she could withstand a 12in shell better than the Alaska could take an 11in hit.

To sum up it would be a major assumption to say that because the DOY was able to knock out a part of the Scharnhorst the Alaska would. The damage each shell would inflict would be much less.


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## Juha (Nov 30, 2009)

Hello Glider
I agree with most what you wrote but one idea behind all or nothing armour was that weak armour was sometimes detrimental because not only it doesn’t prevent penetration but it also activate fuzes, so it guarantee detonation of the shell inside a ship. An AP hit on the unarmoured part of a ship might well went through the ship without detonation if it doesn’t hit something fairly substantial. Of course the shell and secondary splinters will do some damage but that is normally less than that produced by detonating shell.

Juha


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## Glider (Nov 30, 2009)

A good point but I believe that they normally went off, there are plenty of things inside a ship that would be sufficient to detonate the shell. It would almost imply that the French unarmoured cruisers were a good idea.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 30, 2009)

parsifal said:


> you uber germans say




Now I am drawing the line. DonL is getting out of hand. Njaco already confronted him. Now I will confront you. You are making it personal now, I will not tollerate that! I will ban both of you! I will not tolerate such talk about anyones nationality. If you don't like Germans, Americans, or anyone else, keep it to your self!

Do you understand?


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## Vincenzo (Nov 30, 2009)

I already write this Parsifal, reading accurate naval weapons the tabel of US 12" and british 14" aren't in same conditions and methods so it's not true that US 12" it's best of british 14"


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## parsifal (Nov 30, 2009)

agree that the 12in AP would probably have less blast effect than an SAP round, or an AP round with more explosive. I dont know what damage a penetrating shell would have, but your right, I think Scharnhorst would stand up to damage better than Alaska.

Having said that, the Scharnhorst is giving up a lot in firepower, and accuracy. Her shells are 727 lbs each to the Alaskas 1140, so if both were using AP rounds because they needed to penetrate to the vitals, both ships would inflict proportionally les damage per hit. If the Scharnhorst hits the main belt at its thickest, it probably wont penetrate (depending on the range, as the above discussion has shown). If it does penetrate, the lack of secondary protection in the US ship will see a lot of damage internally per hit.

Conversely, the Alaska can expect to to hit around four times for every hit achieved by the Scharnhorst (at least thats what it looks like), and each hit is likley to at least penetrate the belt, though as our german friends point out the sloped deck also provides good secondary protection.

So I am not sure who will win a fight of this nature....a lot seems to depend on the luck really and the conditions on the day. Poor weather helps the Alaska, good weather evens things up. The range at which the fight occurs might also affect the outcome, though I havent completely figured out the optimum range for either ship....


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## parsifal (Nov 30, 2009)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Now I am drawing the line. DonL is getting out of hand. Njaco already confronted him. Now I will confront you. You are making it personal now, I will not tollerate that! I will ban both of you! I will not tolerate such talk about anyones nationality. If you don't like Germans, Americans, or anyone else, keep it to your self!
> 
> Do you understand?




Yes of course, its not that I dont like germans...since i have german family members, and am proud of it. . I just let my emotions get the better of me when the discussion gets heated.

My apolgies for allowing that to happen


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## parsifal (Nov 30, 2009)

Vincenzo said:


> I already write this Parsifal, reading accurate naval weapons the tabel of US 12" and british 14" aren't in same conditions and methods so it's not true that US 12" it's best of british 14"



Vincenzo

I understand what you are saying, however it would be most unlikley that the 14/45 would lose approximately 2 inches of armour penetration (roughly the difference between the 12/50 and the 14/45 at the ranges we are talking about). The worn guns are what destroyed the Scharnhorst, so the new guns of the Alaska (remeber she was brand new in 1945) should r4etain that advantage.

Moreover the figures given from the Nav weapons site actually say that the 14/45 penetration tables are calculated values, meaning I think that they are worked out on the theoretical operating pressures and velocities for the weapon. 

If you have different figures from those given in Nav weapons, please share them.

One final thing, the 14/45, once it penetrates wioll do more internal damage, because the shell is heavier

But for the moment we have to disagree, I think the 12/50 has superior AP capabilities over the 14/45


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## Vincenzo (Nov 30, 2009)

ok we have to disagree



parsifal said:


> Vincenzo
> 
> I understand what you are saying, however it would be most unlikley that the 14/45 would lose approximately 2 inches of armour penetration (roughly the difference between the 12/50 and the 14/45 at the ranges we are talking about). The worn guns are what destroyed the Scharnhorst, so the new guns of the Alaska (remeber she was brand new in 1945) should r4etain that advantage.
> 
> ...



no battle with Scharnhorst in '45, not back actual condition in what if scenario, commonly the guns in a ship aren't new (they are new only for the training time).

also the 12" table are calculated

i'ven't, 

p.s. but see here in naval weapons for same conditions calculation http://www.navweaps.com/index_nathan/Penetration_index.htm

versus Ger EFF the 12" a 20k yds 11.8" a 30k yds 8.9" the 14" a 20k yds 15.7" a 30k yds 12.1" (the 280 10.6" and 7.1")


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## renrich (Nov 30, 2009)

As I tried to point out in an earlier post, naval gunfire can have varying results on armored ships, depending a lot on luck. I have read that Exeter was hit seven times by eleven inch shells from Graf Spee. Exeter was not sunk but all guns were out of action. I have also read that German naval shells in WW2 were rather unreliable. Perhaps that explains Exeter's "luck." I have also read that USN shells in WW2 were rather reliable and that the twelve inch AP shell Alaska would be using was very effective. Going back to my handloading days, it would seem to me that a twelve inch shell weighing around 1200 pounds would have an advantage both in sectional density and ballistic coefficient over an eleven inch shell weighing around 700 pounds. Has anyone compared the downrange velocity of the two shells at 20000 yards? Another point is that Scharnhorst may have been carrying torpedoes. My Janes, 1942, does not mention torpedoes but if she was carrying them that could be a serious handicap in a gunfight. Mikuma almost certainly blew up because of the torpedoes she was carrying and Hood may have also. If Graf Spee hit Exeter only seven times at the Plate, it seems reasonable to assume Scharnhorst would not hit Alaska any more often. At any rate, Alaska, with a knot or two advantage in speed, heavier guns and probably superior fire control would appear to have a good chance of defeating Scharnhorst. A lot would depend on sheer luck.


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## Glider (Nov 30, 2009)

Parsifal
_Conversely, the Alaska can expect to hit around *four times for every hit achieved by the Scharnhorst *(at least thats what it looks like), and each hit is likely to at least penetrate the belt, though as our german friends point out the sloped deck also provides good secondary protection._
You do have a sense of humour I will give you that.  HMS Tiger normally hit her ship targets with the second or third ranging shot, average range about 20-22,000 yards at the start of the shoot. Very similar to Scharnhorst, which hit the Glorious with her third broadside at 26,000 yards. How on earth is the Alaska going to do four times better than that? 
The proportional damage done by 11in compared to the 12in is about 80% as its proportional to the explosive in the shell. It isn’t in proportion to the weight of the shell. As a result the Scharnhorst isn’t giving much away in firepower.

Renrich
_If Graf Spee hit Exeter only seven times at the Plate, it seems reasonable to assume Scharnhorst would not hit Alaska any more often. At any rate, Alaska, with a knot or two advantage in speed, heavier guns and probably superior fire control would appear to have a good chance of defeating Scharnhorst. A lot would depend on sheer luck._
The Exeter was a much smaller target and the Scharnhorst carries 50% more guns, plus of course the GS had to keep changing target to deal with the other cruisers. I see every reason as to why the Scharnhorst would hit the Alaska with some frequency. 
I do agree though that luck would play a major part as both ships are capable of penetrating each other.


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## Soren (Nov 30, 2009)

Parsifal,

According to all eyewitness accounts the Bismarck was extremely hard to sink considering how it was being pounded. Many of the British couldn't believe it still floated after the first 30min. 

The British were also lucky that Bismarck had a heavy list to one side, seriously disturbing its' aim. Plus it could only sail circles very slowly, making it a sitting duck. 

Had the Bismarck been fully combat ready there's a good chance that it could've sunk yet another British BB or two. Yes, it was that good.

As for the SH vs Alaska debate, sorry but there's a higher chance of the Sharnhorst scoring the first hit than vice versa.


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## renrich (Nov 30, 2009)

From "The Encyclopedia of Sea Warfare," "Although credited with great ingenuity of design the Bismarck was very conservative in conception, having an armour arrangement considerably inferior to current British and American ideas, and a cumberson arrangement of low angle secondary guns for surface work and a separate anti-aircraft armament. Her deck armor was badly placed to deal with either bomb damage or plunging shellfire and in her last action she was very quickly silenced by British shells." I have also read that "vital communication lines were placed above the armoured deck, unlike the new British BBs," and these were quickly cut. Her hull was penetrated at least twice by shells from POW in that short engagement. Doesn't sound like such a great design to me. In fact if POW had been fully worked up and operational and if the Hood had not been destroyed by a lucky hit, I believe that Bismarck and PE would have been very roughly handled in the first encounter.


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## Juha (Nov 30, 2009)

Hello Glider
Quote:” A good point but I believe that they normally went off, there are plenty of things inside a ship that would be sufficient to detonate the shell. It would almost imply that the French unarmoured cruisers were a good idea.”

I don’t know what was normal but there are many cases when AP shells hitting unarmoured part of a ship went straight through without detonating. For ex vast majority of shells which hit SD somewhere else than on her belt didn’t detonate. And much of the things which would detonate an AP shell were inside the armoured part of any BB, for ex engines and boilers.

On hitting IIRC DoY got a hit on Scharnhorst in her first salvo, and that was on stormy sea in arctic darkness.

Hello Soren
Quote:” According to all eyewitness accounts the Bismarck was extremely hard to sink considering how it was being pounded. Many of the British couldn't believe it still floated after the first 30min…”

Bismarck was hard to sink but I doubt that at least the men of artillery branch were much surprised that it was still floating after 30 min, they knew that the best way to sink a ship by gun fire was long range plunging fire, but the fuel state of RN ships demanded hits soon, so most of RN fire was from rather short distance.

Quote:” The British were also lucky that Bismarck had a heavy list to one side…”

Really, and what was wrong in Bismarc’ks torpedo protection and damage control? What has caused the heavy list and why they had not straightened her during the night by counter flooding?

Juha


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## Marcel (Nov 30, 2009)

renrich said:


> From "The Encyclopedia of Sea Warfare," "Although credited with great ingenuity of design the Bismarck was very conservative in conception, having an armour arrangement considerably inferior to current British and American ideas, and a cumberson arrangement of low angle secondary guns for surface work and a separate anti-aircraft armament. Her deck armor was badly placed to deal with either bomb damage or plunging shellfire and in her last action she was very quickly silenced by British shells." I have also read that "vital communication lines were placed above the armoured deck, unlike the new British BBs," and these were quickly cut. Her hull was penetrated at least twice by shells from POW in that short engagement. Doesn't sound like such a great design to me. In fact if POW had been fully worked up and operational and if the Hood had not been destroyed by a lucky hit, I believe that Bismarck and PE would have been very roughly handled in the first encounter.



That's what I read, too. I read that the Germans were lagging behind in big battleship design having had a standstill in design for about 20 years. The Bismarck indeed proved to be almost unsinkable, but very easy to put out of action because of faults in design.


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## parsifal (Nov 30, 2009)

_You do have a sense of humour I will give you that. HMS Tiger normally hit her ship targets with the second or third ranging shot, average range about 20-22,000 yards at the start of the shoot. Very similar to Scharnhorst, which hit the Glorious with her third broadside at 26,000 yards. How on earth is the Alaska going to do four times better than that? 
The proportional damage done by 11in compared to the 12in is about 80% as its proportional to the explosive in the shell. It isn’t in proportion to the weight of the shell. As a result the Scharnhorst isn’t giving much away in firepower._


Picking one event is hardly choosing a representative sample though I notice from the above that we have now moved from one event to hitting usually every 2nd or third salvo....thats at odds with every observed shoot I have ever studied, or observed, which leads me to suspect it is not the same as wwII examples..... 

If you are going to choose an event, and analyse that sample, you need to look at the whole sample. For the Glorious battle, the Scharnhost/Gneisenau team (and I dont think it valid to try and argue that the two ships were inhernetly different in their accuracy) managed a 1% hit ratio. Thats under ideal conditions. The range for that battle was an average of 24000 yards, for most of the fight. The US undertook a study that revealed at that range for its heavy guns they could achieve, on average an 8% hit ratio, and I picked one example, in poor weather (in which you dispute the ranges) where the hit ratio was 4%. 

Every source I have consulted says that radar assisted gunnery is more accurate than optical, and that includes gunnery in clear conditions, though I concede it is probably a less pronounced advantage when the weather is clear.

You produce an example in the HMS Tiger, which I cannot analyse because there just isnt the data, and then get all huffy because I dont attempt the impossible. You select unrepresentative samples (by picking one incident and trying to pass that off as a "representative sample") and dont acknowledge the frequent occasions that Optical shooting (of any nationality) was attrocious (as radar assisted gunnery could be as well).

If you have the results for the overall shoot (of the Tiger) , and can prove that the average accuracy was as you say, and that the conditions of those shoots are comparable to the wartime conditions, Iwe can have a closer look at this issue. 
But picking one event, ignoring all the times you missed, not producing any empirical or verifiable record, leads to the inevitable for me.....I simply cannot verify or rely on the data, because it appears to be using invalid sampling technique.

So why am I being funny, based on all of that.....


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## Kurfürst (Nov 30, 2009)

Marcel said:


> That's what I read, too. I read that the Germans were lagging behind in big battleship design having had a standstill in design for about 20 years. The Bismarck indeed proved to be almost unsinkable, but very easy to put out of action because of faults in design.



I've read this many times, usually on naval discussion boards where fans argue the superiority of their 'own' design. But there is little behind it - big battleship design, well, there wasn't exactly a battleship building bonanza in any other country either. Basically in the UK they finished only the Rodneys, and in the US, the Lexingtons in the early 1920s - both were conceived during World War I. 

Then, nothing until the mid-1930s when all major naval powers began building new, modern battleships again, at around the same time: the KGVs, Richies, Dunkerque, the North Carolinas and Scharnhorst/Bismarcks.

The Bismarck's alleged flaws in its design making it 'very easy to put out of action' is the same category - it has no factual basis, but its often repeated on discussion boards. The Bismarck's were not particularly more difficult to be 'soft killed', ie. putting out of action than any other BB of their era (turret, conning tower, director protection being avarage and pretty much the same as on other BBs, so just as easy to knock out, if the range was proper), only being more resilent because there were more fire directors (three vs the usual two) and more turrets (four vs the usual three) to be destroyed.


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## timshatz (Nov 30, 2009)

I'm missing the discussion on the HMS Tiger. Didn't she only get in a shooting fight two times, Dogger Bank and Jutland? I think here shooting was terrible at Dogger (3K yards long) and pretty bad at Jutland. And she had the more advanced of the FC setup. 

At least that is what I'm getting from "Castles of Steel" (in the middle of rereading it).


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## Vincenzo (Nov 30, 2009)

timshatz said:


> I'm missing the discussion on the HMS Tiger. Didn't she only get in a shooting fight two times, Dogger Bank and Jutland? I think here shooting was terrible at Dogger (3K yards long) and pretty bad at Jutland. And she had the more advanced of the FC setup.
> 
> At least that is what I'm getting from "Castles of Steel" (in the middle of rereading it).



it's not the Tiger of Jutland battle but a cruiser of '60s


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## renrich (Nov 30, 2009)

I keep hearing about Tiger also and I am wondering which Tiger. I believe WW1 Tiger was not a good gunnery ship. Are youall talking about HMSTiger, the CL in WW2?


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## Glider (Nov 30, 2009)

renrich said:


> I keep hearing about Tiger also and I am wondering which Tiger. I believe WW1 Tiger was not a good gunnery ship. Are youall talking about HMSTiger, the CL in WW2?



HMS Tiger the post war cruiser, later hybrid helicopter carrier. Check posting 29


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## Glider (Nov 30, 2009)

parsifal said:


> Picking one event is hardly choosing a representative sample though I notice from the above that we have now moved from one event to hitting usually every 2nd or third salvo....thats at odds with every observed shoot I have ever studied, or observed, which leads me to suspect it is not the same as wwII examples....


Well against the AMC . Rawalpindi the Schaarnhorst hit with the first, second and third salvo. but I dont know the range. I do know that the Glorious was hit with the third salvo at 26,000 yards.



> If you are going to choose an event, and analyse that sample, you need to look at the whole sample. For the Glorious battle, the Scharnhost/Gneisenau team (and I dont think it valid to try and argue that the two ships were inhernetly different in their accuracy) managed a 1% hit ratio.


I keep hearing this 1% hit ratio but there is nothing to support that statement. Have you got the details? You may complain about my events but they were real events open to comment and review.



> Thats under ideal conditions. The range for that battle was an average of 24000 yards, for most of the fight. The US undertook a study that revealed at that range for its heavy guns they could achieve, on average an 8% hit ratio, and I picked one example, in poor weather (in which you dispute the ranges) where the hit ratio was 4%.


Again we have two problems. 
a) Do you know any study that reflected real life even in modern times. In action people get tense and make mistakes. It has been pointed out that the Scharnhorst performed poorly against the Renown a point I openly agreed with, without question. I am confident no study would have given that outcome. Take more modern times the US AA cruiser that shot down an Iranian Airbus at three miles claiming it was an F14, would that tragic mistake have been on a study? In every study I have seen Napolean would have won Waterloo, Nelson lose Trafalgar and the US lose Midway, the examples are endless
b) What 4%. I am not aware of any example or study that says how may shells hit the Scharnhorst. I do know of one that says how many times the DOY straddled her, but hit no. Can you supply that information that supports your comment. Yes I disagree with your estimate of the ranges involved and add a link that supports my statement. Can you supply a link that supports your estimate. It would be interesting to compare the two. Scharnhorst - The History - Operation "Ostfront" - The Battle off the North Cape




> Every source I have consulted says that radar assisted gunnery is more accurate than optical, and that includes gunnery in clear conditions, though I concede it is probably a less pronounced advantage when the weather is clear.


This I agree with. I disagree with your statement that the Alaska would be four times more accurate.



> You produce an example in the HMS Tiger, which I cannot analyse because there just isnt the data, and then get all huffy because I dont attempt the impossible.


Clearly I don't have copies of the practice shoots but I attach a link that gives general support. The main difference is that they say that the Lion a sister ship, normally hit the air target with the first shell which was one better than we managed.British 6"/50 (15.2 cm) QF Mark N5


> You select unrepresentative samples (by picking one incident and trying to pass that off as a "representative sample") and dont acknowledge the frequent occasions that Optical shooting (of any nationality) was attrocious (as radar assisted gunnery could be as well).


I have selected the only samples of action, if you know of others involving these ships then please let me know. However give me credit for using real live examples not studies.



> If you have the results for the overall shoot (of the Tiger) , and can prove that the average accuracy was as you say, and that the conditions of those shoots are comparable to the wartime conditions, Iwe can have a closer look at this issue.


This I have covered as best I can earlier. Anything after the ranging shot is not valid. By using single shots and with a ROF of 15 RPM a shell was being fired every two seconds and once the range was found any correction that might be needed was almost walked onto the target. Nothing like that could be done during the war where you basically aimed to straddle the target and hope for a hit.



> So why am I being funny, based on all of that.....


I should not have used that phrase and for that I apologise, it will not happen again.


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## parsifal (Dec 1, 2009)

Hi Glider

Maybe we should look at a series of battles to determine the average percentage of hits achieved with and without radar. This is a question for everyone really, as we might get some useful information on an otherwise ugly discussion. 

So what battles do you think we should look at to analyse this issue. Should try to be a good cross section of battles I think, as we might have trouble getting reliable data on all of them


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## Glider (Dec 1, 2009)

Deleted.


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## timshatz (Dec 1, 2009)

Vincenzo said:


> it's not the Tiger of Jutland battle but a cruiser of '60s



Feel better now. That one threw me.


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## Glider (Dec 1, 2009)

timshatz said:


> Feel better now. That one threw me.



I might be old but not that old


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## timshatz (Dec 1, 2009)

Glider said:


> I might be old but not that old



Well, you are a SENIOR member.


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## Glider (Dec 1, 2009)

Ouch


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## parsifal (Dec 11, 2011)

Well this thread has lain dormant for more than a year. It contans some great information, some hard nosed debate, and downright argument. Classic Forum stuff. but one would have thought it dead, except that last night I was blind sided in a cowardly and premeditated attack in an unrelated thread with the following: 




> You have claimed so many stupid issues about german ships, Bismarck at her last fight and SH ( Scharnhorst at North Cap) that I'm very tired to mention it all. You have even claimed that the GB 14"/45 Mark VII is less powerfull then the USA 12"/50 Mark 8, what is totaly ridiculous!
> Alone from the physiks it is impossible but you can look here------------->
> Naval Gun Armor Penetration Tables
> United States Naval Gun Armor Penetration Tables
> ...


!

Well, I have done some research and am ready to debate the subject with the person that calls me stupid and tells me to undertake the research. I refute that I have "said so many stupid issues about German ships". I see that as the argument of a person facing intellectual bankruptcy. I stand by the statements I made, and the observations made about german and allied ships. 

You want fight, but you will get debate from me, I refuse to bow to that childish and bullying level, and will never bow to cowardice, bullying or abuse. if you have the courage and the intelligence, come out and debate the issue. I AM NOT AFRAID OF YOU, AND I REJECT YOUR METHOD OF ARGUMENT. 

I see from the foregoing discussion (ancient history now) that others grudgingly accepted that the 12/50 had greater penetrating power than the 14/45. 

So, bring it on if you have the courage. I am more than willing to debate the issue. Be warned, if you call me stupid again, or get abusive (as you always do) expect consequences, as happened in the other thread. I want debate, discussion, exchange of ideas, not abuse, illtemper and politicised debate.


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## davebender (Dec 12, 2011)

Have you considered switching to decaf coffee?


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## Crimea_River (Dec 12, 2011)

Pay nice kids. Remember, Santa's watching.


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## psteel (Dec 12, 2011)

That discussion was two years ago???? Talk about a pregnant pause .


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 12, 2011)

Play nice. Warnings from other threads will carry over to this one.


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## davebender (Dec 12, 2011)

26 to 27 Feb 1942.
KM Gneisenau seriously damaged in an air raid. The damage was not repaired and the ship never returns to operational service.

25 to 26 Dec 1943.
KM Scharnhorst sunk off North Cape, Norway in a night battle.

29 Jan 1945.
U.S. S. Alaska departs Pearl Harbor on her first war patrol.

So….
By 26 Dec 1943 both Scharnhorst class dreadnoughts were out of service. 13 months before U.S.S. Alaska began its first war patrol. These ships cannot fight each other without rewriting history.

*Point of Departure. March 1942.*
Historically there were tentative plans to rebuild the damaged KM Gneisenau. As part of the rebuild the triple 28.3cm main gun turrets would be replaced with twin 38cm turrets similar to those on the Bismarck class. Let’s assume the rebuild is accomplished and KM Gneisenau completes sea trails by the end of 1944.

*Rebuilt late 1944 KM Gneisenau.*
30 knots. 8,380 miles @ 15 knots.

6 x 38cm main guns. Three twin turrets.
12 x 15cm secondary guns.
14 x 10.5cm heavy AA guns.
…..Dop.L C/37 twin mounts. An improvement over the original C/31 mount.
16 x twin 3.7cm Flak M43 AA guns.
…..A huge improvement over the original 37mm guns.
10 x Flakvierling.
…..A huge improvement over original 20mm single flak weapons.

Rotterheim gun laying radar. 
…..Supposedly resistant to jamming by chaff. 
Aphrodite and Thetis radar decoys.

80 to 95mm armor on deck.
350mm armor belt.
360mm armor on main gun turrets (i.e. similar to KM Bismarck).

*U.S.S. Alaska.*
31 knots. 12,000 miles @ 15 knots.

9 x 12” main guns. Three triple turrets.
12 x 5” DP secondary guns.
56 x 40mm AA guns.
34 x 20mm AA guns.

3.8 to 4” deck armor.
12” armor belt
12.8” armor on main gun turrets.

Hmmm….
KM Gneisenau has more powerful guns. U.S.S. Alaska has more of them.
KM Gneisenau has significantly better armor. I don't think the American ship had a TDS. A serious deficiency if hit below the waterline.
Both ships have good gun laying radar. They can shoot in the dark.

I’d give the edge to KM Gneisenau. However as with all naval battles the side lucky enough to hit first usually wins.


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## parsifal (Dec 12, 2011)

The 15 inch upgrades for the two German Battlecruisers were designed to address the major weakness of the design....their distinct lack of firepowe. They were specifically designed to make the BCs competitive against the Hood, R class and I believe the Alaskas. 

With 6 x 15 in plus a radar upgrade, these ships would be formidable. With 11in guns they are pushing their luck against the Alaskas, which were designed specifically to deal with ships like the Scharnhorst (as well as traditional "treaty" Heavy Cruisers). They had a long range, high penetration gun, high speed, pretty light on defences though. 

I agree with your summation except that a rebuilt Scharnhorst Gneisenau wont have a minior advantage....they would have a major advantage


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## davebender (Dec 12, 2011)

The new gun laying radar might compensate for having fewer main guns with a higher hit probability. Then again it might not. We would need to see some weapon tests with the new gun laying radar.


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## vinnye (Dec 12, 2011)

An up- dated Scharnhorst would in my opinion have been the victor in most encounters.
If you were in the Alaska, you may try to use a small edge in speed to keep the encounter on favourable terms?
Given the lack of support the Scharnhorst would be able to call upon, she would need to keeo the encounter short and sharp - in case other Allied warships were in the vicinity and could intervene.


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## DonL (Dec 12, 2011)

Coming back to this!



> These are the facts Kurfurst, which even you cannot deny. The Scharnhorsts defensive scheme was defeated by the 14/45 guns of the DOY, including the turrets of the German ship. I dont really care if the main belt was penetrated or not....I happen to think it was penetrated, you obviously think otherwise....all i know is that a shell of lesser power than the 12/50 was able to defeat the Scharnhorst defences, relatively easily. You and any body else can argue all day about the alleged invincibility of these armouring schemes, but in the cold hard light of day the armouring schemes of these ships were not enough to save them. If the Scharnhorst could not withstand the effects of the 14/45 at those ranges, it would not have been able to withstand the effects of the 12/50, with the heavier shell and superior AP capabilities. This is because the 12/50 with Mark 18 shell was superior in AP qualities to the guns actually used to sink the Scharnhorst



First to the hits to Scharnhorst!

DoY opened fire at a range of 11,920 yd (10,900 m) and scored a hit on the first salvo. Scharnhorst's foremost turret Anton was disabled after this hit.
At 11920y this hit had taken out every turrent of every Battleship (except perhaps Yamato)ever in service!
After World War II Naval Gun Armor Penetration Tables from the NavWeaps side
Naval Gun Armor Penetration Tables
Britain Naval Gun Armor Penetration Tables

the British 14/45 had the ability to strike through 500mm (20inch) steel in condition fit to burst (Effective Limit EFF)!
No BB ever built had Barbettes that could withstand such a hit at 12000y only Yamato had a turrent face of 650mm, so we don't exactly know if it was the turrent or the barbette wich was hit.
Also the battledistance of the North Cap battle was very exceptional because of the artic conditions. Normal distances in WWII were 16000-30000yards.

Next to the 14/45 and 12/50.

If you want to compare guns, then compare them with the same tools and parameters!
At your post 52 you have shown the data from the NavWeaps side



> Next the 12/50
> 
> Armor Penetration using 1,140 lbs. (517.093 kg) AP Mark 18 Shell
> .
> ...






> Finally the 14/45
> 
> Armor Penetration with 1,590 lbs. (721 kg) AP Shell
> .
> ...



As you can see you have compared the guns with two different formulas! The US 12/50 gun only after USN Empirical Formula and British 14/45 *partly* after USN Empirical Formula and partly after an other formula.

*If you want to compare, then please with the same formula for all comparable guns.*

The World War II Naval Gun Armor Penetration Tables from the NavWeaps side were developed from Nathan Okun to compare (or try to compare with the best possibility) WWII guns against different used steels from different Navys.
This was till now the best work that was done on this issue besides primary sources from real world tests!

http://www.navweaps.com/index_nathan/Penetration_index.htm
United States Naval Gun Armor Penetration Tables
Britain Naval Gun Armor Penetration Tables

As you can see, the Us 12/50 had much less power then British 14/45!
This also very logical, because both guns have near the same muzzle velocity, but the British 14 inch shell has 200kg more weight!
The kinetic energy MJ (Wkin= 1/2 mV²) of the brithis 14 inch shell will always higher, because both guns and shells have near the same angle of fall and striking velocity at the *same* distances.



> These also are the facts...at 18000 yards, the 12/50 with Mk 18 shell can penetrate about 14 inches of armour plate. Thats enough to penetrate your 350 mm main belt. At that same range the 28cm weapon can penetratre about 8.8 inches of plate, which is not quite enough to assure penetration of the main belt. This is exactly the same situation as the Bismarck....the British BBs had enough power to get to the vitals of the ship, though not the citadel. It was enough to knock the ship out easily and quickly. And there is no reason to suggest that the the higher powered 12 inch round would not have the samer effect.



At 18000 yards the german 11/54 had the ability to strike through 300mm (11,8inch) (EFF) US Class A Armor 1935 - 1943, what will be enough for the main belt of the Alaska Class. The US 12/50 could penetrate 323mm (12,7inch) (EFF) German KC n/A 1936 - 1945, what is neither enough for the main belt (without turtle deck), all barbettes (350mm) and all turrents (360mm).

http://www.navweaps.com/index_nathan/Penetration_United_States.htm
http://www.navweaps.com/index_nathan/Penetration_Germany.htm

the last sentence of your quote is simply rubbish!
You can't compare a 16inch shell from Rodney with a 12 inch shell from Alaska. And Rodney did the job to silence Bismarck!



> And for the record, Bismarck was silenced very quickly in her last battle, taking less than an hour to be silenced. Though her hull was well protected, her combat capability was knocked out with relative ease in her last fight. So much for the uber defences of the German Battleships.......


You should rethink your statement.
If we take it very konservativ and KGV and Rodney shot only one full salvo per minute, then we have 19 shells per minute that were shot to Bismarck. 10 minutes 190 shells, 20 minute 380 shells, 30 minutes 570 shells, 40 minutes 760 shells.
Also Bismarck was disabled (control surface at 45 degree) and could only steer by her shafts with 9kn.
Ideal condition for a target practise.


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## davebender (Dec 12, 2011)

That depends on where the battle takes place. Germany had air superiority over Norway. If the weather had been better HMS Duke of York might have been sunk by German aircraft off North Cape. U.S.S. Alaska has the same operational risk.


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## DonL (Dec 12, 2011)

The whole North Cape szenario was exceptional.

Scharnhorst turned off her Radar to make no radar emission, with the hope nobody would detect her.
With a turned on radar, DoY had never ever had the chance to quit the battledistance to 12000y.
Scharnhorst was totaly taken by suprise.

With the knowledge from today, the decision to turn of the radar was simply rubbish.


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## davebender (Dec 12, 2011)

*Luftwaffe units in Norway as of 30 November 1943.*
Luftwaffe in Norway
13 x Ju-87 dive bombers.
40 x Ju-88 dive bombers.
16 x Fw-200 maritime patrol bombers.
16 x Me-110 fighter-bombers.

I don't understand why the German admiral chose to attack in such bad weather. Why not wait until the Luftwaffe could assist?


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## Juha (Dec 12, 2011)

DonL said:


> ...If we take it very konservativ and KGV and Rodney shot only one full salvo per minute, then we have 19 shells per minute that were shot to Bismarck. 10 minutes 190 shells, 20 minute 380 shells, 30 minutes 570 shells, 40 minutes 760 shells.
> Also Bismarck was disabled (control surface at 45 degree) and could only steer by her shafts with 9kn.
> Ideal condition for a target practise.



IMHO not very conservative estimate, you forgot that fairly many barrels missed plenty of salvos, especially on KGV, there are info on that for ex. in the naval weapons site.

Juha


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## Juha (Dec 12, 2011)

davebender said:


> *Luftwaffe units in Norway as of 30 November 1943.*
> Luftwaffe in Norway
> 13 x Ju-87 dive bombers.
> 40 x Ju-88 dive bombers.
> ...



Maybe because that would not have made any difference there was Artic Night at that time, that is about two months long night from late Nov to mid Jan.

Juha


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## Juha (Dec 12, 2011)

DonL said:


> The whole North Cape szenario was exceptional.
> 
> Scharnhorst turned off her Radar to make no radar emission, with the hope nobody would detect her.
> With a turned on radar, DoY had never ever had the chance to quit the battledistance to 12000y.
> ...



Hello Don, my understanding was that Bey ordered radar silence but that was only until the first contact with RN cruisers, the problem was that during the first firefight HMS Norfolk hit the foretop of Scharhorst and put its main radat out for good, the radar on the rear range finder couldn't see to some 60 deg forward sector bacause it was blanketed by superstructure and being lower on the ship had less range.

Juha


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## DonL (Dec 12, 2011)

> I don't understand why the German admiral chose to attack in such bad weather. Why not wait until the Luftwaffe could assist?



forced to, because the KM wanted to proove that the capital ships can do anything.
Hitler had ordered that all KM capital ships should be disabled.



> MHO not very conservative estimate, you forgot that fairly many barrels missed plenty of salvos, there are info on that for ex. in the naval weapons site.



Rodney: 380 x 16inch, 716 x 6inch
KGV: 339 x 14inch, 660 x 5,5inch
Norfolk: 527 x 8inch
Dorsetshire: 254 x 8inch

Edit:
No Juha, after the contact with the RN cruiser it was turned of again. 
You are correct about the hit of Norfolk, but before the end battle started the radar of Scharnhorst was turned of!


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## Juha (Dec 12, 2011)

So only 40 main calibre shells short of your estimate, not bad after all.

Juha


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## parsifal (Dec 12, 2011)

I have to say I am very pleased to be proven wrong. thankyou for the rethink and the information you have provided. It does appear that with these new penetration tables, the penetration rates of the 14/45 are better than the 12/50 (Edit: But I dont agree that they are "much" better....They are a "little" better at best) . I am still unsure that the penetration rates of the skc34 are better than the 12/50, and I am still unsure that at range the Scharnhorst could overpower the Alaska. I note that was your position in your initial posts in this thread.

And the main argument was about whether the gunpower of the Alaskas wa sufficient to knock out the Scharnhorst. The argument about the 14/45 and the 12/50 arose from a claim by Kurfurst (I think) that the 14/45 could not penetrate the german ship. Thats something you are clearly not accerpting at this point. 


I dont agree with your summation about the Bismarcks last fight for the reasons pretty much the same as Juhas. She was a target, but ahe succumbed quickly to the british gunnery in her last fight. Firing cycles are generally not 1 per minute in a gunfight, they are usually somewhat less than that.

Bismarck put up a ferociuos and heroic fight. i dont think anyone is saying otherwise. The issue is whether her armouring not only kept her afloat, but also kept her a battelworthy unit. I dont think that can be claimed, neither do I think it valid to claim she stayed in the fight for long.


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## davebender (Dec 12, 2011)

Night won't prevent a German air attack during 1943. They can locate enemy ships with ASV radar and drop aerial flares. By the fall of 1943 Germany also had guided Hs293 and Fritz X weapons.

Stormy weather is an entirely different matter.


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## Juha (Dec 12, 2011)

No missile carriers were in Norway at that time, and in fact those missiles were not so good against freely manoeuvring ships firing back. I cannot recall any successful LW late war divebombing night attack against heavy warship and don't recall any hits by LW torpedo bombers on Western Allied heavy unit, Italians got one hit on HMS Nelson, Japanese of course had several successes and even night time hits but LW wasn't IJNAF or RA.

Juha


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## parsifal (Dec 12, 2011)

davebender said:


> Night won't prevent a German air attack during 1943. They can locate enemy ships with ASV radar and drop aerial flares. By the fall of 1943 Germany also had guided Hs293 and Fritz X weapons.
> 
> Stormy weather is an entirely different matter.



Do you have ANY examples of LW attacks on Arctic attacks in the winter months above the Arctic Circle. 

I looked at this site (http://www.naval-history.net/WW2CampaignsRussianConvoys.htm4) and couldnt find any evidence of any strikes in winter.'

Might be worth looking at SeeKrieg to see if there are any recods of such strikes.

I am doubtful any exist


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## davebender (Dec 13, 2011)

The objective should be destruction of the merchant convoy. I am confident Hs293 missiles can hit cargo ships whether they are maneuvering or not. So can Ju-87 dive bombers and Ju-88 torpedo bombers. Even Me-109s and Me-110s could hit merchant ships with 250kg bombs.

Ignore HMS Duke of York. It will steam into Murmansk unscratched and without any merchant ships.


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## Juha (Dec 13, 2011)

Hello Dave
so why the Artic convoys after PQ-18 got through with minimal losses? IIRC at least in 42 after PQ-18 they avoided long summer days even if late autumn-winter time sailings meant sailing nearer to Northern Norway because of the ice. So attacking convoys was much more difficult (and costly) than you seem to think.

Juha


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## parsifal (Dec 13, 2011)

davebender said:


> The objective should be destruction of the merchant convoy. I am confident Hs293 missiles can hit cargo ships whether they are maneuvering or not. So can Ju-87 dive bombers and Ju-88 torpedo bombers. Even Me-109s and Me-110s could hit merchant ships with 250kg bombs.
> 
> Ignore HMS Duke of York. It will steam into Murmansk unscratched and without any merchant ships.




The objectives are good, but there was a distinct lack of success for the LW in the Arctic after 1942. One problem for the LW was that was already stretched very thin, so only limited resources could be spared for the theatre.

There were virtually no losses to the 1941 convoys, and no attacks by air were made over the winter. From April 1942 the LW began to enjoy considerable success, culminating in the massacre of PQ17. In April the cruiser trinidad was sunk by a JU88. PQ16 lost 7 ships out of 31 despite increased AA support and CAM ships. PQ17 was a dfeat of the first magnitude. He111s carrying torpedoes sank 3 merchant ships of the covoy on July 1, followed next day after the fateful dispersal order had been given, by 9 others in the following days. In addition 10 ships were sunk by U-Boats. Only 11 ships of the Convoy reached port.

It was an unmitigated disaster, but the forces that the LW could spare for this TO were never going to be able to stem the flow of materiel. In 1943 the allies delivered many times that amount of Lend lease (though not through the northern route) , whilst the size of the LW had stedily shrunk in the Theatre. by 1943 the first carrier escorts for the convoys were appearing, and AA efficiency was vastly improved. In that scenario, the LW, unless significantly reinforced was going to have a minimal effect on the flow of ships. 


PQ18 which followed PQ17 was hit alsmost as badly. Despite being more heavily escorted, including the CVE Avenger, 13 of the 40 ships in the Convoy were sunk. However, German losses in their attacks were not light, 41 aircraft lost and 4 subs. this was as unsustainable for them as the allied losses were for them. And, these were all attacks delivered outside of winter. 

here were no losses in merchant ships for the whole of 1943 and 1944 that I can find. By 1943 the convoys were being provided with aircover, including ASW support, which paid off in a big way from April 1944. Over 30 U-Boats were lost, including 4 to aircraft in April 1944 alone.


In 1945 there was one aircraft sinking, and it was in winter, but the aircraft was carrying a torpedo, not an FX bomb. It occurred on the 23rd Feb, when straggler "Henry Bacon" was sunk by Ju88 torpedo bombers, this was the last ship of the war sunk by German aircraft. 

There simply is no evidence that the LW could hit targets on a regular basis in the winter months. and further, from 1943 onwards the level of protection being provided to the Russian convoys, and the paucity of aircraft available to the germans simply preculdes their effective employment


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## davebender (Dec 13, 2011)

That's putting it mildly. Only 40 Ju-88s to cover all of Norway and most were probably occupied fighting the Soviet Union.

If the German Navy is serious about stopping Lend-Lease shipments to Murmansk an entire full strength Kampfgeschwader must be devoted to maritime attack. However you could probably make do with He-111 torpedo bombers for attacking merchant ships.

German surface warships such as KM Scharnhorst should attack only when a convoy lacks battleship escort.


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## parsifal (Dec 13, 2011)

I think you are understimating the committment level made by the LW. A single KG would represent aa reduction in force committment in 1943-4, at least according to this site: 

Luftwaffe in Norway

moreover the germans had already tried a blockade by air of sea communications, in the med, and eventually failed. Attcks by more than 600 axis aircraft couold not stop the Allies from getting convoys through when they really needed to do that. Costly for both sides, but the allies could afford that kind of battle, not so the LW.

The Germans best bet in the Arctic were their subs, until the middle of '43, but every sub sent to the north was one less in the Atlantic.


The KM surface units were unused resources, in the end they probably represented the best resources to use. In my opinion the Germans should have concentrated on upgrading their AA and radar suites, and used the ships as an integrated force. More balance was needed....more esccorts less heavy ships, although heavy ships are still fine. sending the gneisenau off for a rebuild in 1942 was a mistake.

The other thing needed was true co-operation between the Navy and the Air Force. If proper recon and lr fighter cover had been provided to the KM whilst at sea, it might have stood a chance. LW was never going to play second fiddle to the Navy, however.


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## DonL (Dec 13, 2011)

I'm also very skeptical!

Such a szenario or an air war in the arctic night, is a more a"what if" szenario LW/Germany without a war in the east.

You need very good trained crews as nightfighter and seafighter with very different duties. Pilot, navigator, radar operator and arms operator, this and as parsifal wrote highly integrated aircrafts in numbers. to control the Norway seas.

For the normal LW at 1943/44 to my opinion impossible.

I agree that there is a technical possibility, but you need the aircrafts and very good trained crews and a lot of training and operating experience!


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## Juha (Dec 13, 2011)

davebender said:


> If the German Navy is serious about stopping Lend-Lease shipments to Murmansk an entire full strength Kampfgeschwader must be devoted to maritime attack. However you could probably make do with He-111 torpedo bombers for attacking merchant ships.



KM had no resources for that and as has been said, LW was too streched.



davebender said:


> German surface warships such as KM Scharnhorst should attack only when a convoy lacks battleship escort.



That was what Germans thought they were doing, when operation started, they didn't know that DOY was so near and when a recon plane saw the RN battlegroup (several ships including one large one) LW HQ in Norway didn't react immediately and there was a delay in relaying the info to relevant KM HQ and there there was some delay before the importance of it was understood and the info was sent to Bey on Scharnhorst. It was then too late or Bey didn't even get it before the contact with DOY, I cannot remember exactly which was the case.

Juha


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## Juha (Dec 13, 2011)

DonL said:


> I'm also very skeptical!
> 
> Such a szenario or an air war in the arctic night, is a more a"what if" szenario LW/Germany without a war in the east.
> 
> ...



I agree, Northern Norway made the situation even more difficult, the presence of open sea and the nearness of Arctic icecap made weather rather unpredicted and the mountainous terrain made sudden change of weather to worse even more deadly than in many other areas.

IMHO RN and IJNAF were the AFs that had best trained into night operations against naval targets and IMHO also they would have found the Barents Sea enviroment very challenging during winter.

Juha


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## parsifal (Dec 14, 2011)

what I thought might be interesting would be to "reenact" scharnhorst last battle, but replace the DoY with the Alaska. We would be comparing Scharnhorst as she went into battle with the Alaska as commissioned. We would try to take into account as many of the differencesd as we could.....the various differences in speed and ROF, and of course armour penetration. We would assume hits as historical, and try to estimate any additional hits that may arise as a result of Alaskas higher ROF. We would need to start the battle from the initial moment that Scharnhorst was detected, and then reacted to by DoY to take into account the more rapid closure and ability to hold or control range for th Alaska due to her high speed. 

I am not trying to produce a balanced scenario here. It means that Scharnhorsts options are a bit limited. I am basically trying to substitute Alaska for DoY, factor in her different characteristics and try and see if it had been Alaska in the box seat instead of DoY whether the outcome would have been different. I would not mind your help guys as this wil not be an easy task 

The first thing I think is to get an agreed statement of basic facts of the battle, so I will start by posting from the Arctic Convoys site their version and maps of the battle:

Russian Convoys, 1941-1945
and
Scharnhorst - The History - Operation "Ostfront" - The Battle off the North Cape

If people are basically happy with that as a basic outline from which to "build" our hypothetical scenarion we should proceed I think and see what happens. 



> 26th - The Battle of North Cape and Convoy JW55B - Russian convoys were still sailing in two sections. JW55A left Loch Ewe, Scotland on the 12th and arrived safely with all 19 merchant ships on the 20th. Adm Fraser with "Duke of York" went right through to Russia for the first time before returning to Iceland.
> 
> Convoy JW55B, also with 19 ships, sailed for Russia on the 20th. >>>
> 
> ...


According to Barnett, DoY began steaming on an intercept line at 0939 at 24 knots. Scharnhorst can be more or less treated as a fixed point as we are not going to assume any changes in her course or speed. But it is worth noting that Scharnhorst was steaming basically ssw at nearly 30 knots. DoY was capable of 28 knots but chose (or was forced) to close at 24 knots

First question to consider is, how fast could Alaska have travelled through these seas. as fast as DoY or as fast as Scharnhorst. Why was Scharnhorst able to travel as fast as she did because of her proximity to her home base, or because of her ability to cope with the conditions better

I am inclined to believe that the DoY was forced to move at less than her top speed because of endurance issues. The KGVs only carried 3700 tons of fuel oil which restricted their range to 5,400+ nm at 18 knots . By comparison the Scharnhorst carried ? tons of fuel oil and possessed a range of Scharnhorst: 7,100 nmi at 19 kn. Alaska carried 3619 tons of fuel oil and a range of 12000nm at 15 knots (note American ships were always designed with far greater endurance than British ships, and it was endurance over top speed that usually dictated the top speed of a ship). 

I therefore think that the Alaska wo9uld have been able to close at or close up to her top speed.....thats 33 knots. That means that she could reach engagement range by as early as 2pm in the afternoon, but that may not be to her best advantage. Instead of arriving at the engagement at 1650 (7.3 hours after initial call to action) as the DoY took, the Alaska could arrive at anytime from 1400. that gives her the fleibility to pick an earlier time to commence her attacks if she so chosses 

If we look at the battle map, that places Scharnhorst about 75 miles further to the north than she was engaged historically. It does not give her the Destroyers that had been detached that morning, but if the Alaska goes onto action much before 1500 she will do so in daylight which will deny her surprise and in fact favour Scharnhorsts optics over Alaskas radars. If I were the Alaskas skipper, I would wait till sundown to maximise my radar advantages and maintain surprise on the Scharnhorst. Scharnhorst was completely unaware of the DoY until she opened fire, so one has to assume the same for Alaska.

If Alaska waits for sunset, she will need to wait until at least 1530 before moving on the German ship. So, my best estimate is that the battle would likely commence at 1530, if the Alaska was deployed in place of the DoY. That places battle commencement at roughly 45 miles north of where it actually commenced.

.


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## Glider (Dec 14, 2011)

The DOY was a poor vessel in a high seas, the specification insisted that she be able to fire forwards at 0 degree elevation. As a result she easily took water over the bows and in the sea state in which the battle took place I very much doubt that she would have been able to go full speed.


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## parsifal (Dec 14, 2011)

But do you see any such problem for the Alaska?


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## davebender (Dec 14, 2011)

> when a recon plane saw the RN battlegroup (several ships including one large one) LW HQ in Norway didn't react immediately and there was a delay in relaying the info to relevant KM HQ and there there was some delay before the importance of it was understood and the info was sent to Bey on Scharnhorst


In other words KM command and control was incompetent. So KM Scharnhorst was doomed before the first shot was fired.


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## parsifal (Dec 14, 2011)

so, now we are up to the tricky bit....at what range would the Alaska move to before opening fire. We know that with the very first salvo, the DoY hit the Scharnhorst, but the DoY skipper didnt know that was goinbg to happen, and neither would our hypothetical Alaska skipper. DoY positioned herself for an ideal firing solution.....for the DoY, basically positioned herself in such a way as to minimise the Scharhorst broadside, while maximising her own. She waited until the range was down to 11250 yards before opening fire. at that range her guns had the ability to penetrate 20.2 inches of german EFF steel. Fraser might not have known as much as we do about armouring schemes and armour prenetration rates of his guns, but he would have known that the Scharnhorst was faster than him, and would get away unless he maximised his chances of a deadly hit. He would have been worried about minimising the risk to his ship, hence the careful positioning of his ship would be fairly confident that at that range, his guns could defeat the armour of the enemy ship. 

Alaska would be in a slightly different situation. The ships skipper would be aware of his ships lightweight armouring scheme, and would also be aware of his ships superior speed. Unless the Scharnhorst hits him first, he is going to be able to dictate the range, and to a large extent the ship positioning. German ships throughout the war laboured under very strict rules of engagement which required them to withdraw in the face of an equal or superior enemy. as soon as the Allied Heavy revealed itself the german ship had to withdraw, which means it will have its available boadside time severely curtailed. Scharnhorst has to get lucky and hit the Alaska early, or she faces an uphill battle. Alaska will consistently have a a heavier broadside and a higher ROF than the DoY, as awell as a speed advantage which means she can take and hold the range. This was something initially the DoY could not do. because she was slower than Scharnhorst was initially able to open the range, until hit in the boiler. alaska doesnt have to do that....she can maintain or change the range as necessary, and doesnt have to hope for a hit that will cause loss of speed for the Scharnhorst (though of course that would be an advantage).

Without cheating and looking up the tables on nathan Okuns site before making the call, if I was the skipper I would look at the Scharnhorst main armment an estimate its penetration capabilities and then look at my own. I would work out where the minimal risk for my ship lay, whilst maximising the chances of damage by my guns. Im thinking of aninitial engagement range of 20-22000 yds. athat range the Alaskas guns are going to be able to penetrate 11.1 to 11.8 inches of german armourplate. With that performance, the U ship is not able to penetrate the german belt with every hit, which according to Conways is between 6.25" and 13.75". However some hits would penetrate, and all hits are going to damge, likley to impair the fighting efficiency of the ship. The turrets are 6-14" thick, which means that frontal hits are unlikley to do anything, but elswhere on the turret there is likley to be damage and a risk of the turet jamming if hit 

At that range, the Germans guns could penetrate the 9.9-10.9 inches of US armour plate, which enough just to penetrate the US armouring scheme, though blast effects and damage might still be limited by the continment effect of the armour. Ther is no doubt, however the german ship is better protected, and the US ships has to hope that her superior radar and her higher number of trainable guns will give her a higher hit rate than the Scharnhorst. 

If Scharhorst does hit the US ship, ther is a likelihood of werious damage.


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## parsifal (Dec 14, 2011)

davebender said:


> In other words KM command and control was incompetent. So KM Scharnhorst was doomed before the first shot was fired.



yes, probably true, but once I have done with working through probability scenario for the alaska, we might just briefly consider what the Scharnhorst could do differently that might give her victory. I feel there would be lots of possibilities to be honest


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## parsifal (Dec 14, 2011)

I should also point out that the DoY positioned herself ahead of the Scharnhorst at the beginning of the engagement. Scharnhorst at the commencement of the engagement was bearing due north (roughly) of DoY, whilst her heading was almost due sth. DoY essentially was crossing her T on a heading due East (roughly). The first salvo hit and knocked out A turret of the German battlecruiser. 

If I had been the skipper of the Alaska, with plenty of time to position my ship, I think the best option would be to position the US ship on the northern side of German ship so that she was presenting her stern to my ship. She initially could only respond to me with her aft turret which reduces her broadside weight and hit probability to only 1/3 of her full broadside. Moreover the operational restrictions placed on the scharnhorst ("do not engage enemies equal or superior") means that the most likely reaction of the Schanrhorst would be to continue to head South toward home, thus maintaining that mismatch of firepower. Alaska would turn to follow from one beam to the other, thus enabling more opportunity to present a full broadside more often. If instead of choosing an initial enagement range of 20-22000 yards she picked an intial engagement range of about 13000 yds, she could veer off from port to starboard quarters for longer, thus increasing her firepower advantage even more. Scharnhorst would gradually increase the range as she more or less raced for home, whilst Alaska would be hoping for a hit before the range opened up too far (this assumes that the Alaska want4ed to maximise her broadside all of the time, whilst Scharnhorst was not, and wa sticking to her operatinal restrictions). 

Historically the Scharnhorst turned initially north, and then assumed a base course of approximately east, hoping to draw out of range of the DoY before turning south and heading home . Over th next 80 minutes the range gradually increased to 18000 yds. Thats a relative speed differential of 2.5 knots per hour. Against the alaska, the Scharnhorst could be held at any range of Alaskas choosing (however to hold or close range the Alaska would need to accept periods of a less than full broadside....ie less opportunity to cross the stern on the the beam of the germans ship). Given the operational limits placed on the Scharnhorst, that means that the german ship is simply going to have to turn for home (south) and put up with a reduced broadside that such a course would bring( that is not to say that she ould not periodically heave to to fire broadsides, but that would intermittent, and would be interred with by demonstronstrations by the RN light forces also engaged). Alaska would be firing with either 6 or 9 guns, to Scharnhorst's 3 and occasional 6 or 9 . If the rear turret is knocked out (which i think the Alaska can do), Scharnhorst can only return fire by heaving to every so often to fire her forward guns.....something she would not be keen to do and which casn be interred with by the brit cruisers abnd destoyers. Its not a good tactical situation for the German ship. 

My opinion is that the alaska will win this engagement.

Time now to analyse the "alternative" battle from the german perspective and see what might be done to maximise her chances. This will be harder to envisage, since my opinion is that Scharnhorst was lost mostly by circumstances and restrictions operating outside the control of the ship.


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## Glider (Dec 14, 2011)

Its an interesting theory ut as the range increases so the probability of a hit decreases. The Scharnhorst was a very well protected ship and I would suggest that the Scharnhorst will probably get away damaged. The sea state was high and this would also hinder accurate shooting. To get enough hits to sink the Scharnhorst, then you will need to get close but that of course increases the chances of receiving serious damage or at least sufficient to slow hyou down. You pays your money and take your chances.

The ships were well matched and to be honest, its probably down to the one that gets the first hit on a critical area. As we know that is in the lap of the gods.

PS the Scharnhorst always has the option of getting close and using her 5.9in. They will not penetrate the main areas but with the all or nothing approach of the US they can do a lot of damage, starting fires, damaging fire control radars ect.

PPS where do you get the idea that the Alaska has a consistantly heavier Broadside than the DOY?


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## parsifal (Dec 14, 2011)

> PPS where do you get the idea that the Alaska has a consistantly heavier Broadside than the DOY?



I dont, this seems likes a simple misunderstanding. I am saying that with the Scharnhorst forced to present end on, and the alaska able to present beam on, the Alaska can fire full broadside more often than the German ship (helped along by her speede advantage). Whereas the Alaska will be able to fire 9x 12 in guns more often, and at least 6 x 12in the rest of the time, the poor old Scharnhorst can fire 9x11in fewer times, and 3x11in at other times. Thats a massive imbalance in both broadside weight and number of shells. 


What the Alaska is conceding is protection.....if she gets hit, ther will be relatively more damage IMO.

I agree with your appraisal, but I would claim that there is higher probability of a first hit by the US ship. She has more guns, and I believe her radar to be superior. Germans have the advantage n optics, but thats of limited value in this battle. Its night and appalling weather


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## Juha (Dec 15, 2011)

Hello Parsifal
no need to wait sundown, dawn was still some 3 weeks away on 26 Dec.

Scharnhorst still had its second radar on the rear rangefinder, so moving away from its wooded sector ie the say 30-60deg sector straight ahead of Scharnhorst would mean that if the Scharnhorst used its radar you would lose the surprise.

Juha


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## Juha (Dec 15, 2011)

davebender said:


> In other words KM command and control was incompetent. So KM Scharnhorst was doomed before the first shot was fired.



Not necessarily doomed but was put into unnecessarily risky situation. KM command structures were sometimes overly complicated and the shore HQs at times did a sloppy job, as in this time. Also the co-op between LW and KM wasn't at times very good.

Juha


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## Glider (Dec 15, 2011)

Now I get it, put my lack of divvy to the end of a long day


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## parsifal (Dec 15, 2011)

Juha said:


> Hello Parsifal
> no need to wait sundown, dawn was still some 3 weeks away on 26 Dec.
> 
> Scharnhorst still had its second radar on the rear rangefinder, so moving away from its wooded sector ie the say 30-60deg sector straight ahead of Scharnhorst would mean that if the Scharnhorst used its radar you would lose the surprise.
> ...




I agree, but werent the Scharnhorsts radars switched off before the engagement? And in any event, the allies dont know that the forward radar was knocked out do they, or that the rear radar was still functional. You can only develop a plan when "re-enacting" the battle on the basis of best possible practice with availbale known, or reasonably knwown information. I am assuming that the Allies would know the weakest firing arc of the German ship and other generally known characteristics like maximum speed, but wont know operational practices or states like radars on/off or radars disabled...



I am no expert in radar, but Ive read somewhere that the radar fitted to the Scharnhorst was not as accurate as that fitted to Alaska....we are talking 1940 style radar compared to 1944-5 style radar ( I have better details at home). I am doubtful that in a radar assisted gunbfight, the German ship, with the radar suite she possessed in 1940 will be as accurate as the Alaska....


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## Vincenzo (Dec 15, 2011)

the trouble is we can't compare alaska with a scharnhorst w/o hypothesis, the alaska was not on operation until february '45, at that time no more german battleships were operational so we don't known what radars can get it at time. and afaik alaska was badest of KGVs in heavy sea.


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## parsifal (Dec 15, 2011)

Tactical Possibilities For Scharnhorst

This is by far the more complex and challenging exercise. My opinion is that scharnhorst was lost mostly due to circumstances beyond her control, rather than any weakness of the ship, her crew, or her captain

The main reasons for Scharnhorst loss relate to the following in my opinion 

1) A lack of adequate intell. Mostly this related to the lack of co-operation between the Luftwaffe and the Navy. Far greater recon resources were needed to support the sortie than were provided, and those that were were wasted because information was not passed on to the people that mattered (the guys in the ships) in sufficient time. This suggests a clumsy and slow moving communications arrangements.......there needed to be direct and close co-operation that passed tactical recon from the air recon units to the ships much faster than occurred. 

Early in the war, the Germans had usually taken to sea with detachments of their SigInt service aboard, the socalled B-Dienst, or "B" service. This had proven to be a great benefit to the intell available to the men on the spot....they had specialist radio intercept services immediately available on hand to gain valuable insight into enemy dispositions and strength. I do not believe any B service detachments were provided onboard the Scharnhorst. There were b service detachments assigned to Group North, but not directly to the ship (according to Bekker at least). If I were about to emabrk on such a hazardous mission I would dfinately want a signals intell unit onboard. 

2) The operational restrictions placed on German heavy ships......"do not engage if there are equal or heavier ships opposing" or words to that effect. This was actually a dangerous policy that placed ships at greater risk than ensuring their safety. hard to know how much Hitler was responsible for this insane restriction, but it had already cost one fleet commander his job (Marschall) and probably influenced another (Lutjens) to the poinmt that it affected his operational decisions and decreased the efficiency of his ship usage. 

In the context of this engagement, I dont see reversing or dropping that operational restriction as being consistent with a tactical change. Its an operational change of standard operational procedure.....a strategic shift in the way the KM used its heavy ships. Once the Alaska opens fire scharnhorst has to move to disengage, and thats a major weakness for her. 

3) Operational use of Radar. Germans had this belief that radars needed to be switched off except in battle, to decrease the chances of radio detection. There was no basis for the theory, and it stands in complete contrast to the way the allies applied their radar technology....switched on to maximise detection capabilitiues....

4) Over centralised command structure. The KM tended to try and control battles from its shore based commands. The armchair admirals tended to direct the afloat commanders. This was fine in a setpiece, slow moving battle, but in a highly fluid situation like NordKapp slowed German reaction times down too much. 

SHIP CHARACTERISTICS

In terms of the ship itself, I consider the Scharnhorst to be a 1st rate ship with few weaknesses. Her 11in guns were somewhat of a disadvantage, but conversely their small calibre allowed a high rate of fire. German optics were perhaps the best in the world, and their guns had a reputation for beind hitting and accurate. Their armour plate was also of very high value

If there was a weakness in the Scharnhorst it was probabaly in her radar fit. Germany developed some very high quality ship borne radars towards the end of the war, but in 1943, Scharnhorsts chief radar oufits were 2 sets (fore and aft) of the FuMO26 (fore) and the older 27 type (aft). According to Campbell the FuMO27 set had a bearing accuracy of +/- 0.25to 0.3*. 

The Scharnhorst in the weeks prior to North Cape was equipped with the most update firecontrol set (FuMO26) at the foretop position and a series of radar tests and blind fire gunnery exercises that were carried out in the Fjords. Unfortunately for the Germans, the new radar set at the foretop was destroyed by a direct hit from the Norfolk in the first Skirmish leaving SH 1/2 blind and only with the older FuMO 27 radar aft. Of course once this happened the British had a significant overall radar advantage through the remaining combat scenarios that day as observed by Fraser. 

FuMo26 had a new antenna array that gave less reflection from wavesand better resolution of about 300m, with range usually quoted as 20-25000m with Campbell stating the accuracy as +/- 70m. Bearing accuracy was the same as the FuMO27 at 0.25* 

Despite losing its best radar, the Scharnhorst consistently straddled the Duke of York at ranges from 17,000 meters to 19,500 meters. This would have been impossible without effective radar control from the remaining set. If you’re straddling, you’re already shooting as accurately as you can. The Duke of York scored only about 4 hits over a period of about 70 minutes at ranges from 11,000 meters to 19,500 meters and expended many more salvoes than Scharnhorst to do that. There were, however more hits after Scharnhorst speed had been lostThis doesn’t indicate a comparative accuracy disparity.


Radar does make possible quicker and more consistent straddling at longer ranges. The range accuracy of even the best optical range finders is typically 1% of the range. Radar is much more accurate. The American 40cm Mk3’s accuracy was 0.1% of the range give or take 40 yards. The British 50cm Type 284M’s range accuracy was 120 yards, the FuMo27 was about 300 yards. FuMO26 was about 70 yards

Another advantage of radar over optics is the ability to better determine errors in the MPI of the salvo patterns. This boiled down to the ability to discriminate between the target and the shell splashes. The range resolution of the Mk3 was 400 yards, so echoes of the target and splashes could not be readily determined if they were within 400 yards of each other . The Type 284M was markedly better than the Mk3 with a range resolution of 75-150 meters (easily the most accurate radar of its type in the midwar period). It could be better determined if the MPI wasn’t squarely on the target, and correction could be made, improving the chances. Late war equipment with shorter pulse durations was better yet. Post war advances would have made possible fine corrections in MPI errors easier.

The German Seetakt radar was actually well suited to firecontrol because of its unique methods of measuring and displaying range data. In practice the operator held the pip on the null mark on the CRT and the correct range was continuously displayed, updated, and transmitted directly to the central firecontrol. The operator could zoom in on and closely examine any portion of the time base for observation purposes. But it is simply untrue to say that seetakt was more powerful or had higher resolution than equivalent british radars, mostly because of the centimetric advanantage held by the allies mid-war 

The SH was equipped with special night optics, separate from the regular optics, and it fired star shell to illuminate its targets early during the engagement, along with radar ranging from the aft radar set. The SH seems to have followed the standard German shooting drill. This was to fire a first salvo disregarding exact range, just to warm up the guns and check the bearing track. Cold guns were not expected to range accurately. Then to fire two quick salvoes just short andjust long to confirm the firing solution for range. The Scharnhorst’s 3rd salvo reportedly was a very close near miss right off DoY’s bow. As the range increased beyond the effective range of the night optics, the SH was forced to rely on its aft radar set and it ceased to fire star shell. This was when the SH shooting became uncomfortably accurate. From approx. 17km battle range to 19.5km battle range, the SH consistently straddled the DoY. This was very impressive radar directed shooting considering the conditions.


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## Juha (Dec 15, 2011)

parsifal said:


> I agree, but werent the Scharnhorsts radars switched off before the engagement?



I don't know, I only know that Scharnhorst's radar was switched off before its first firefight with RN cruisers. Don said that it was switched off during its retreat to SSE but IMHO that would have been odd, because Germans knew that the cruisers shadowed it, so IMHO Germans had nothing to gain with radar silence but much to loose. 



parsifal said:


> And in any event, the allies dont know that the forward radar was knocked out do they, or that the rear radar was still functional. You can only develop a plan when "re-enacting" the battle on the basis of best possible practice with availbale known, or reasonably knwown information. I am assuming that the Allies would know the weakest firing arc of the German ship and other generally known characteristics like maximum speed, but wont know operational practices or states like radars on/off or radars disabled.



Now the cruisers claimed hits on Scharnhorst, it well might have been that they had noticed the hit on foretop that knocked off Scharnhorst's main radar, after all the distance wsn't overly long and British used starshells to illuminate Scharnhorst.



parsifal said:


> I am no expert in radar, but Ive read somewhere that the radar fitted to the Scharnhorst was not as accurate as that fitted to Alaska....we are talking 1940 style radar compared to 1944-5 style radar ( I have better details at home). I am doubtful that in a radar assisted gunbfight, the German ship, with the radar suite she possessed in 1940 will be as accurate as the Alaska....



Now IIRC Scharnhorst radar suite was modernized sometime from 41 to 43 and you cannot realistically presume that in dec 43 Alaska would have had its early 45 radar suite.

Juha


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## parsifal (Dec 15, 2011)

> I don't know, I only know that Scharnhorst's radar was switched off before its first firefight with RN cruisers. Don said that it was switched off during its retreat to SSE but IMHO that would have been odd, because Germans knew that the cruisers shadowed it, so IMHO Germans had nothing to gain with radar silence but much to loose.



I am unsure as well as to whether their last remaining radar was on or off prior to the final (third) engagement. One would think logically it would be on, and that might well be assumed by the Alaska in her approach. if the allies had knowledge that the foreward rdf array had been knocked out earlier, then Alaskas approach would have been the same as DoYs...ie, approach from the Scharnhorst "blind spot" that is from her fore quarters. if not the stern approach still has advantages.

In either event the result will be the same, and I think the allies would have expected this response....the Scharnhorst after receiving fire from a heavy unit will turn away from that unit and attempt to shake the allied capital ship as per the standing operational p[olicy of the KM. That immediately reduces the firepower the german ship can bring to bear to the engagement. 



> Now the cruisers claimed hits on Scharnhorst, it well might have been that they had noticed the hit on foretop that knocked off Scharnhorst's main radar, after all the distance wsn't overly long and British used starshells to illuminate Scharnhorst.



Yes, I agree, in which case that information is likley to have been passed to the supporting heavy unit and her battle plan adjusted accordingly. wehich means that alaska would not approach from astern, she would approach from ahead, as did the DoY. But Alaska, by reason of her additional speed, has more options to favourably position herself where and when she likes in relation to Scharnhorst.

But its more complicated than it looks. I have read that the KM had a rather strange policy as to radar usage. They worked on the theory that radar emissions could give away positions of ships, and therefore attempted to minimise their usage of active radars. There is some truth to that I believe. Radars do give off detectable signatures....though I admit i dont understand the science i ahve read in some accounts could "hear" the noise generated by DoYs 284M radar emissions, but did not know who or what, or where they were coming from. The allies also were listening for radar emissions from the Scharnhorst. But I dont know if they were hearing any at the time of the third and main engagement 

The following alternatives need to be considered:

1) If Scharnhorst radar was switched off, and the allies knew about it..... the stern approach is the better option. 

2) If the Allies knew the forward radar was knocked out but didnt know the remaining radar was on or off.....the forequarter approach is the better option. 

3) If the allies dont know the forward radar is wrecked and know the radars are on.... its better to attack from ahead. 

4) If they dont know the forward radar is wrecked, but they still know the radars are off...the stern attack is the better option or off, the stern rear 



> Now IIRC Scharnhorst radar suite was modernized sometime from 41 to 43 and you cannot realistically presume that in dec 43 Alaska would have had its early 45 radar suite.



I agree, but it would at least have the USN Mk III radar, which is the same as that fitted to Sth Dakota and Washington the preceding November in the fight against Kirishima. It may have even had later radar fits, which I dont have access to right at this minute, but will check and get back to you 

Ive given a bit of a rundown on the MkIII capabilities in my post number #127. The American radar has some advantages relative to the type 284M and some disadvantages, but overall, is proabably about the same. Type 284M was probably superior to the FuMO27, and about equal to the FuMO26, though Scharnhorst performance later in the battle kind of challenges that comfortable asumption (many straddles from range 17000 to 19500m). FuMo27 seems to have performed quite well


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## Juha (Dec 15, 2011)

Hello Parsifal
I noticed your post on radars only after I had posted my earlier messages. Without checking my sources it seems to be very solid work.

Juha


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## parsifal (Dec 15, 2011)

Its not all my work...some is, but Ive also used some very good stuff by our friend Del. Credit to him, to be honest. 

We have only one unknown piece of info....what is the likley radar type to be fitted to the alaska if she had been completed in 1943. Im going to assume a septemeber '43 commissioning and see what was the latest radar available to the USN at that time.\\Edit:

From my copy of Campbell and John friedmans article at Nav weapons, I have determined that the most likley surface fire control radar likley to have been fitted to an early Alaska would be either the Mk 8 or the mk 13. 

For comparison friedman reports the Mark 3 (the type used against the Kirishima) as having the following characteristics:

[_Mk 3
War Status: Used by US Battleships, introduced in late 1941 
Installed: Mounted on Main Battery Directors 
Purpose: Fire Control 
Power: 15-20 KW 
Wavelength: 40 cm 
PRF: 1,640 
Transmitter Dimensions: 12 x 3 feet (3.66 x 0.91 m) 
Tracking Range: 40,000 yards (37,000 m) 
Range Accuracy: 40 yards (37 m) 
Bearing Accuracy: 2 mils 
Resolution: 400 yards (370 m) and 10 degrees 
Notes: First USA set to use lobing. 16" (40.6 cm) shell splashes could be ranged at 20,000 yards (18,500 m).

Mark 8
War Status: Used by US Battleships, introduced in l1942-43 
Installed: Mounted on Main Battery Directors 
Purpose: Fire Control 
Power: 15-20 KW, later 20-30 KW 
Wavelength: 10 cm 
PRF: N/A 
Transmitter Dimensions: 10.2 x 3.3 feet (3.1 x 1 m) 
Tracking Range: 40,000 yards (37,000 m) on Battleship sized target 
Range Accuracy: 15 yards (5 m) 
Bearing Accuracy: 2 mils 
Resolution: 400 yards (370 m) and 10 degrees 
Notes: Scanned via pulse-switching. Mark 8 mod 0 could spot 16-inch (40.6 cm) splashes out to about 20,000 yards (18,300 m) and the improved Mark 8 mod 3 could reliably spot 14-inch (35.5 cm) and 16-inch (40.6 cm) fire out to at least 35,000 yards (32,000 m).


Mk 13 
War Status: Used by US Battleships and Cruisers (date of introduction not stated in Nav weapons,, but other sources say 1943-4). 
Installed: Mounted on Main Battery Directors 
Purpose: Fire Control 
Power: 50 KW 
Wavelength: 3 cm 
PRF: 1,800 
Transmitter Dimensions: 8 x 2 feet (2.44 x 0.61 m) 
Tracking Range: 40,000 yards (37,000 m) on Battleship sized target 
Range Accuracy: 15 yards (5 m) 
Bearing Accuracy: 2 mils 
Resolution: 400 yards (370 m) and 10 degrees 
Notes: This radar could discern individual shell splashes from 16-inch (40.6 cm) projectiles out to over 42,000 yards (38,400 m)._

I think it can be safely concluded that the radar fit of the Alaska in 1943 will be better than the type 284M used by the british Battleship.


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## parsifal (Dec 17, 2011)

Ive thought about this problem from the SH's perspective for a couple of days, and whilst the German ship certainly has the technical capability to win this battle, the operational restrictions the Germans placed on the ship usage makes achieving a favourable outcome difficult. 

The allied weakness that would be apparent to the Germans is the convoy itself. Locate the convoy and present a credible threat to it, and the British escorts are forced to stand and fight rather than just mask and shadow the SH. Force them to fight, and you can close the range. Close the range and the probability of hits increases. Since the SH had armouring that could resist the shellfire of the british Light Forces, but the british Light Forces will need a lucky hit to hurt the SH, an opportunity exists for the SH to hurt the Brits quickly, forcing them on the defensive early, and thereby facilitating the KMs escape.


I would also kieep the German squadron concentrated as a single unit, though this would require a reduction of speed from around 30 knots maximum to 26 knots maximum. Having the German DDs there means less chance of a hit on the SH.....the Britissh will be forced to deal with the Germ,an Light ships first which pose a credible threat to the British cruisers, though I concede the risk to the german destroyers is quite high. 

The problem with my tactical is that the germans never really nailed exactly wher the convoyr was. So really the best strategy I can offer is rather lame.....just start to withdraw earlier than they did. 

The conclusion is that SH can only really win with strategic changes to the situation, and this is not because of the capability of the ship, but because of the operational limits placed upon her.


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## psteel (Dec 19, 2011)

_Duke of York_ could not catch _Scharnhorst_ since the Battle cruiser could make 28 knots in heavy seas while the British could only make 24 knots due to the poor sea keeping of there escort destroyers. The German escorts were no better and only managed 25 knots at times, so what kept Bey in the battle was that he could run away from each surprise. In fact he would have gotten away had it not been for a lucky shot from _Duke of York_ at long range that found a weakness in the deck armor; cut through and severed the steam lines cutting speed back to 20 knots. Admiral Fraser admitted as much in his diary. By the time Bey had worked back up to speed, his ship was being battered and guns silenced by BB and several CA/CL fire, while a flotilla of RN DD worked their way in to torpedo range.

BTW the German doctrine on long range detection was to use passive means to avoid giving themselves away. In early trials with surface radar they noticed they could see the enemy radar at greater range than their radar could detect the enemy. So Radar silence was observed. In fact from what I understand German naval radar was designed as fire-control radars to be turned on to get quicker firing solution. This was noticed and the Denmark Straits battle in 1941, when Lutjens used the passive sonar on the _Prince Eugen_ to detect the _Hood_ and _Prince of Wales_ before they maneuvered into firing range. But later when he again used the GHG sonar to elude the shadowing RN Cruisers, Lutjens assumed that they could still see him on Radar even though it was at extreme range [41,000 yards]. In fact they had lost the _Bismarck_ altogether and would not sight her again for 30 hours.

Meanwhile the _Prince Eugen_ made a break out into the North Atlantic , while the _Bismarck_ made its way towards Brest right into the jaws of Force H from Gibraltar. Of course not before the _Bismarck_ had been subjected to several air attacks that crippled her steering and propulsion system. Had it not been for the seriousness of the bow hit and flooding from the underwater hit from _Prince of Wales_, the Bismarck would also have escaped into the Atlantic just like in "Operation Berlin".

Here is an interesting link exploring German Radar development.

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNGER_Radar.htm


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## parsifal (Dec 19, 2011)

> _Duke of York_ could not catch _Scharnhorst_ since the Battle cruiser could make 28 knots in heavy seas while the British could only make 24 knots due to the poor sea keeping of there escort destroyers. The German escorts were no better and only managed 25 knots at times, so what kept Bey in the battle was that he could run away from each surprise.



In fact the rate at which the the range was being opened was a little over 2.5 knots, so in effective speed the Scharnhorst was ony a little over 2 knots faster than the DoY. The was partly because SH had to turn constantly to present her beam so as to fire what remained of her broadside at DoY 



> In fact he would have gotten away had it not been for a lucky shot from _Duke of York_ at long range that found a weakness in the deck armor; cut through and severed the steam lines cutting speed back to 20 knots. Admiral Fraser admitted as much in his diary. By the time Bey had worked back up to speed, his ship was being battered and guns silenced by BB and several CA/CL fire, while a flotilla of RN DD worked their way in to torpedo range.



The converse of claiming the Brits achieved a lucky hit was that despite 70 minutes of consistent straddles from the initial hit, they had only achieved 4 hits on the SH. It could be said that SH was lucky not to have been hit more times than she was. 

SH also was achieving consistent straddles with her broadsides as well, so it is also arguable that she was unlucky not to have achieved a hit within that 70 minutes. 



> BTW the German doctrine on long range detection was to use passive means to avoid giving themselves away. In early trials with surface radar they noticed they could see the enemy radar at greater range than their radar could detect the enemy. So Radar silence was observed. In fact from what I understand German naval radar was designed as fire-control radars to be turned on to get quicker firing solution.



What you have described encapsulates the weakness of the German radar policy. They could not determine, by passive detection the size of the target, its location or its estimated speed. They could only determine that "something" was out there. Meanwhile they would blunder about the ocean, in spectacular fashion, running into traps set for them. Which was the better policy of use.....to switch on your radars and risk giving out vague indicators of your own ship, whilst obtaining detailed information about your enemy, or leaving your radars off and risk blundering into a trap.


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## psteel (Dec 19, 2011)

Initially the speed advantage was 4 knots as reported by O’Hara, later with heavy seas the _Scharnhorst_ could only make 26 knots which may explain the speed discrepancy noted. O’Hara also notes she only occasionally turned to bring Bruno turret to bare, but not long after that only Caesar turret was functioning so there was no more speed loss that way. If anything the gale force wind and seas would have slowed her down.


Just as _Scharnhorst_ was about to escape a shell passed through a 'step' in the armor deck at 20,000 yards and 30-40° to the rear. Normally such a shell would have passed through the outer and inner vertical armored bulkheads, stuck the 80mm main armored deck and ricochet away. But the 'step' presented only another vertical plate of 80mm [ first two plates were 35-40mm each]. So the shell got through. It was a lucky shot since the line to hit was exceedingly short in height even though it ran through the engineering section of the boat.

According to most sites _Duke of York _ got 13* 14" gun hits on _Scharnhorst_ with the expenditure of 446 shells for a hit rate of almost 3%. _Scharnhorst_ got two hits on _Duke of York _ radar mast and another mast hit plus massive splinter damage from near misses on a escorting Destroyer. No record exists of her shell expenditure but it didn't help that Hintze, the skipper of the boat, ordered his twin 4.1" flak crews to armored bunkers for the duration of the battle. Since the RN DD finally brought the _Scharnhorst_ down to 10 knots with a couple of dozen torpedo launched from 2km or less, those guns could have made a huge difference in the out come of that battle. Bey doesn't come across as a competant commander as others have noted. Prior to this command appointed days before , Bey was a Destroyer flotilla leader and not exactly an outsanding one at that.

read more about the action here...

http://www.scharnhorst-class.dk/scharnhorst/history/scharnostfront.html


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## parsifal (Dec 20, 2011)

Ive read somewhere that SH is estimated to have fired about 82x11in shells at DoY equating to an accuracy of 2.43%. But cannot compare SHs firing accuracy to DoYs since DoY achieved most of her hits against a target reduced to 10 knots.

I was wondering if you knew how many shells the DoY fired in that 70 min interval whilst SH was moving at high speed. My guesstimate is that in that 70 min period she might have expended 140-235 rounds with four hits achieved. Thats a comparable situation to thjose achieved SH. If my estimates are correct, DoY firing accuracy against a moving target travelling at high speed is in the order of 1.7-2.85%. That suggests DoYs and SHs firing accuracy are about the same. 

Whilst the DoY was hit, its fighting efficiency was never seriously impaired. Possibly the worst was the one that disabled her radar for a few minutes. 

Dont accept the claim of an impenetrable armour scheme....there is no such beast. All ships armouring schemes can reduce damage, they cannot eliminate it altogether. Even a 6" shell can hurt a battleship, such as actually happened to SH in this fight. My opinion is that even if the main belt of the SH had not been penetrated it could still suffer a great deal of catastrophic damage from each 14in shell hit.


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## psteel (Dec 20, 2011)

From what I've read the intial exchange saw DoY firing 250 shells getting 8 hits for 31:1 shot to hit ratio or 3.2%.

BTW _Scharnhorst_ also hit the Cruiser _Norfolk_ twice putting her in dry dock for 10 months.


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## delcyros (Dec 24, 2011)

During the conditions of the engagement off Norway at North Cape, even non vital, penetrating hits had a great deal of potential to induce flooding of the wingtanks above the armour deck, creating adverse effects on the stability of the overloaden ship. SCHARNHORST would have to rely on it´s compartimentation and excess metacentric stability to counter these effects. This is well possible in good weather, but at the very poor weather off Norway? 

On the other hand, could ALASKA have possibly been able to fire all her main gun turrets in a force 9 gale? I don´t think so.

Additionally, a hit through the boiler hump is possible, a very shallow, 80cm tall vertical hump in the main armour deck (think about an APC penetrating the 45mm upper side belt first (+ it´s backing), then the 30mm splinter bulkhead, then the 6mm middle patform deck and finally the 80mm boiler hump). So it´s possible technically spoken but the target area is not very large (call it Luke Skywalker!) and the fuse delay is rather short with nominal 0.025sec (british fuses).
Some authors have suggested that DoY may have hit this hump off Norway but this cannot be correct as the target angle was close to 90 deg (You don´t physically hit that hump at this acute angle) that is SCHARNHORST was heading directly away from DoY and was making good her escape when the "hit" was assumed. The trajectories and geometries involved in this situation disproove a boiler hump penetration and it appears to have been either a simple mechanical breakdown or shock damage instead from a hit on the funnel base with temporary effect in boiler room one (guess... boiler room one made trouble in each and every action involving SCHARNHORST). The temporary effect is confirmed by survivors, which reported back that full power would be aviable in ten minutes (hardly what You would expect if a 14in APC penetrates into the boiler room and bursts high order). No survivor ever told that a shell was bursting inside the vitals, rather differently, they were keen to point out that they believed the citadel was breached by torpedoes but not by gunfire hits.


I have been using various versions of Facehd in the past with great enthusiasm but rejected the whole program. It suggest´s an accuracy which simply cannot be attained when we try to verify the predicts with real world trials.
That beeing said, SCHARNHORST´s penetration data are aviable via GKdos-100 penetration curves and should be preerred instead (primary source data!). Not sure what to use in case of the US 12in, though but my impression is that Facehd should give good results for US projectiles up to 30/35 deg obliquity. 

SCHARNHORST was not consistently straddled over the 70 minutes chase.


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## psteel (Dec 26, 2011)

Looking at O Hara the time line suggests the incident happened at 18:22 hrs,, while Garzke and Dulin report 'about 1800 hours' Both sources reprt the _Duke of York_ ceased fire at 1824 hrs unaware the _Scharnhorst_ speed had been cut back to 10 knots. O'Hara reports that 20 minutes after 1800hrs the _Scharnhorst_t ceased fire reporting the enemy was firing over radar about 18,000 m away. Both sources suggest the projectile may have penetrated the deck at this 'boiler hump' with shell fragments cuting the steam boiler lines suddenly reducing pressure and speed. While not being a expert , I can imagine that a damage control team with intimate knowledge of this high pressure steam line could effect some kind of repair in the time allotted. Both sources report that after this incident the _Scharnhorst_ could not manage more than 22 knots , when she was able to manage 26-28knots earlier in the sea battle depending on the seas. So whatever repairs were effected they 'seem' to be in the realm of a 'band aid solution'. 

Battle at the North Cape 2

In any event looking at the above web site and connecting the 1824 time line of the _Scharnhorst_ with the 'fire stopped' location of the _Duke of York_ [ The same time two minutes after the reported critical hit?] it looks like a LOS between the two ships describes a 30-40° 'side angle' to any salvoes. Back at 1800 hrs the _Duke of York_ was dead astern of the _Scharnhorst_, but something critical happened to cut speed before the next point.


Anyway thats the info I'm working from.


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## barney (Dec 27, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Tactical Possibilities For Scharnhorst
> 3) Operational use of Radar. Germans had this belief that radars needed to be switched off except in battle, to decrease the chances of radio detection. There was no basis for the theory, and it stands in complete contrast to the way the allies applied their radar technology....switched on to maximise detection capabilitiues....



I was looking at the naval battles around Guadalcanal. Sometimes it wasn't working but most USA combat vessels had radar. Many had the then new 10 cm radar. The trouble was, not all admirals were knowledgeable about radar. I suggest it would be like going to the Grand Generation Center and asking how many old people have I Phones. You'll probably find a sprinkling who do but you would also find people who have never used a cell phone. So, it was with admirals and radar early in WWII.

The result was that naval flotillas were taken into combat under the command of admirals who didn't want radar turned on least they give their position away, admirals who were given constant updates from radar but ignored it while waiting for a visual sighting, to admirals who fought using radar as their main or only source of data.

So, if the Navy had a policy or doctrine on how to use radar it wasn't evident during the contest for Guadalcanal.


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## psteel (Dec 27, 2011)

In the early part of the war both the Germans and Japanese had night vision training/goggles/binoculars and I don't think the allies were aware of this. They were able to exploited the allied lack of night vision and won a number of naval encounters due to this superiority. I don't think the Japanese were well versed in Radar prewar and the Germans due to their strategic situation preferred avoiding active radar to preserve their limited numbers and enhance the advantage of surprise in naval clashes mid war. The Germans also had long range passive sonar that allowed warships to detect enemy convoys and battle groups at significant distances. The trouble is it takes good training to be able to rely on such passive technology. As I pointed out what radar they developed , was to be used for fire control after battle is joined.

One can scoff at this doctrinal approach but 'emcon' or naval radar silence was religion during the cold war. It was the only way to survive.

If you are the allies with lots of warships and already have aircraft carriers with lots of search planes, you already have the remote standoff searching you need to press an offensive naval warfare, leaving your warships to use radar as defensive screens. without much risk of counter attack. That’s obvious! 

Germany lacked these assets even though their 1928 defense plans envisaged the development of an aircraft carrier in the early 1930s. They could never afford to match the allies in numbers, so they had to choose another doctrinal path.


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## Juha (Dec 27, 2011)

barney said:


> I was looking at the naval battles around Guadalcanal. Sometimes it wasn't working but most USA combat vessels had radar. Many had the then new 10 cm radar. The trouble was, not all admirals were knowledgeable about radar...The result was that naval flotillas were taken into combat under the command of admirals who didn't want radar turned on least they give their position away, admirals who were given constant updates from radar but ignored it while waiting for a visual sighting, to admirals who fought using radar as their main or only source of data.
> 
> So, if the Navy had a policy or doctrine on how to use radar it wasn't evident during the contest for Guadalcanal.



The general problem to USN radars in Salomons was the ground returns from nearby islands. USN had visualized open sea encounters not fighting in archipelago before the war. And the specific problem IMHO was personilized to Adm. Callaghan, I might be too harsh but IMHO to put ex- Presidental aide to command a naval TF over an admiral with resent battle experience and a victorious one, wasn't a good policy. OK Callanghan had spent some times as a staff officer, was he Gromley's COS, after his aide duty but still lacked recent command and combat experience. And there was no experience as battle experience.

Juha


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## parsifal (Dec 27, 2011)

In fa c t USN obtained more advanced warning of japanese approaches in the night battles around Guadacanal, than the Japanese received advance warning of them. The breakdown in US performance in the Night battles was mostly about their poor tactical co-ordination of their gunlines and torpedo groups. 


The Japanese, generally were the last to realiuze the presence of enemy forces, but their tactical co-rination and team work was so good, combined with the abilities of their Long Lance torpedoes that they were generqally able to more than compensate for any advantages that radar might give the USN.

Japanese night vision was good, and USN radar did suffer from reflections off land masses, however Japanese night vision was not so good as to outrange or out perform radar, and radar was not so downgraded in its performance as to be outperformed by the nonradar equipped Japanese scouts. But this advance warningt was usually not enough to compensate for the USN lack of night training and poor teamwork in these battles.

There were exceptions, to this, obviously, but as a general rule, radar performance was not the problem in the Guadacanal battles. It was training....


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## barney (Dec 27, 2011)

There were ground returns, there always are with land around, and it seemed it was always Savo Island. Enemy ships kept sailing behind it. The only accounts I am aware of where radar failed was in spotting I-26 on the surface just off a Guadalcanal beach and the fact that the Washington could not see over her stern – there was a blind spot there due to the radar installation. This latter problem, since South Dakota was following Washington, caused Washington some hesitation on which vessel to fire upon.


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## DonL (Dec 28, 2011)

> Both sources report that after this incident the Scharnhorst could not manage more than 22 knots , when she was able to manage 26-28knots earlier in the sea battle depending on the seas.



To the official Royal Navy after action report, SH was first back to 22kn and 5 minutes later back to 26kn in a force 9.
This was plotted from Duke of York.

Im also very very skeptical, that it is possible to repair an impact or shrappnell impacts from a 14" shell at machinery spaces in 20 minutes.


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## parsifal (Dec 30, 2011)

I really dont know if SHs drop in speed was due to enamy action or a machinery failure. I would much prefer to think it was due to British action. The alternative is rather shabby really. If the loss of the ship and 1900 lives was due to machinery failure with no influence on that failure due to Allied fire, that casts a very poor light on German machinery and/or maintenance standards. That is a far worse outcome for the honour of the German Navy and/or the quality of its engineering than a mere defeat at sea. If the claim is true, that is, that the SH simply stopped for no obvious reason and not due to any allied action it means that a number of accusations can be levelled at the German Navy. At least some, or all of them must be true if this theory is correct:

The options to consider seem to be 

1) German ships could not maintain their maximum design speed for long periods. In this regard they were demonstably inferrior to British ships, since the RN ships in this battle were all able to maintain high speed pursuits on the German, but the German could not maintain her high speed withdrawal

2) This was due to either poor engineering in the machinery of the ship, and/or poor maintenance standards by her crew. SH had just completed a refit just weeks before her last sortie, so time since last refit is not a valid reason for her machinery break down.

Either way, a breakdown of the SH machinery is a very serious indictment against KM competency in either basic maintenance and/or machinery design. 

I would much prefer to believe the germans lost this ship due to superior firepower being brought to bear on the ship, and superior tactics being employed by the RN during the engagement. I say this mostly to protect KM reputations rather than any desire to bask in the allied victory.


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## Denniss (Dec 30, 2011)

At least in the Destroyers and Admiral Hipper cruisers the high pressure steam systems were known for multiple problems. Don't know how their reputation from Scharnhorst though.


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## DonL (Dec 30, 2011)

> I really dont know if SHs drop in speed was due to enamy action or a machinery failure. I would much prefer to think it was due to British action. The alternative is rather shabby really. If the loss of the ship and 1900 lives was due to machinery failure with no influence on that failure due to Allied fire, that casts a very poor light on German machinery and/or maintenance standards. That is a far worse outcome for the honour of the German Navy and/or the quality of its engineering than a mere defeat at sea. If the claim is true, that is, that the SH simply stopped for no obvious reason and not due to any allied action it means that a number of accusations can be levelled at the German Navy. At least some, or all of them must be true if this theory is correct:
> 
> The options to consider seem to be
> 
> ...



Sorry but all is not black or white!

First nobody had said that the sudden speed lost of SH could not be through enemy firepower!
The whole issue is, if DoW had punched a 14" through the main armor deck of SH, that exploded in a boiler room!
For this version I'm and other people are very sceptical, through our explanations.
But it is more then possible that a 14" shell cut pipe tubes or a shock impact through a 14" snapped all pipe tubes shut! The same was happening at operation cebereus through a mine.
Also it could be a simple break down through the massive overpowering from 16:50 to 18:20!
SH had increased the range from 11920yards to 22000yards in 1 and half hour and was plotted from DoY constant 2.5 to 4.5kn faster as DoY in a force9!
She was running for life nothing else.
Also it is well known that the high pressure turbines of SH weren't reliable, she had problems with her machinery (boiler room 1) in every single mission of her life!

Next I don't know of any refit at 1943 please can you give a source for this claim?

And I think for a dead Soldier it is more then equal of what reason he has to die!


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## barney (Dec 30, 2011)

For what it is worth,I was reading in the "see more" section of Alf Jacobsen's book, SCHARNHORST, on Amazon, and encountered the chapter 'Death off of North Cape'. Here he states that a 14 inch projectile burst in a boiler room, instantly killing all in the compartment save one. Maybe the problem was just the death of the black gang.


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## parsifal (Dec 30, 2011)

> Sorry but all is not black or white!



I agree



> First nobody had said that the sudden speed lost of SH could not be through enemy firepower!



Del suggested that one possibility was loss of power through simple engine room breakdown. He also suggested that it might be damage from near misses, but then says that DoY was not consistently styraddling the SH.....a necessary precondition for a near miss, or a hit. 



> The whole issue is, if DoW had punched a 14" through the main armor deck of SH, that exploded in a boiler room!
> For this version I'm and other people are very sceptical, through our explanations.



I agree, but that is not the sole claim that I was commenting on. One claim was that the SH had simply had a breakdown in her machinery, independant of enemy action. If so, that would bae a telling indictment of either the reliability and or state of maintenance of the ship. 



> But it is more then possible that a 14" shell cut pipe tubes or a shock impact through a 14" snapped all pipe tubes shut! The same was happening at operation cebereus through a mine.



If the SH was being consistently straddled shock impacts as a theory becomes a very real possibility and a very reasonable explanation for her failure. But apparently she was not being straddled (though that is in direct odds to English versions of the battle), and had been hit just four times up to the time of the alleged engine room hit (and less if this was not a hit at all). So, either the ship was a very fragile piece of technology, or she was being hit and stradlled more times than is being admitted to. 

You guys cannot have it both ways. Either the Scharnhorst and her crew were first class (which is what I believe to be the case), and was hit or near missed multiple times before being immobilised, with each hit having a substantial long term effect on her, or she was a dud ship hit only a few times, and immobilised because of her fragility and unreliability. I dont believe that to be the case for the SH. 



> Also it could be a simple break down through the massive overpowering from 16:50 to 18:20!
> SH had increased the range from 11920yards to 22000yards in 1 and half hour and was plotted from DoY constant 2.5 to 4.5kn faster as DoY in a force9!
> She was running for life nothing else.



All plausible and reasonable, but only serves to underline that just when her speed was most needed, her machinery failed her. One conclusion to draw from that is that her machinery was somewhat unreliable, either due to the design of the ship, or the level of maintenance being lavished on the ship. 

There were no similar breakdowns of RN ships in this battle that I am aware of, and there were many more RN ships involved in the battle. The probability of an RN ship breaking down should be much higher......even the Destroyers were in the fight, wheras one of the reasons the german DDs were not was because of their poor seakeeping ability. 



> Also it is well known that the high pressure turbines of SH weren't reliable, she had problems with her machinery (boiler room 1) in every single mission of her life!



Which confirms that she had a predisposition for machinery unrelaibility. It stands to reason that if the machinery is pushed, and the machinery is unreliable, the chances of a failure under conditions of forcing the machinery, in rough weather, are much higher. But what this also means, sadly, is that the ship was only capable of max power sea speeds for a limited time. This means also that her max sustained sea speed has to be re-evaluated. at what speed could she travel with minimal risk of machinery failure? 



> Next I don't know of any refit at 1943 please can you give a source for this claim?



I have several, some offline, and a couple online. You can find them failry easily if you look.... She was fitted with her new aft radar on the 26th October and had undergone gunnery excercises to test the new radar in the Fjords with her Destroyers around that time. These are called work up excercises and are standard to any ship that has been through a refit period. What did surpise me is the speed that these work up drills were completed....about three days....which is very quick. Was her work up rushed and incomplete???



> And I think for a dead Soldier it is more then equal of what reason he has to die!



Not sure what you are getting at here. There were brave men on both sides in this battle, but I would prefer, from a German perspective that the ship was lost with all her capacities applied to the battle, rather than be lost due to some shabby mechanical failure that was not initially or directly the result of enemy action.


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## psteel (Dec 30, 2011)

DonL said:


> To the official Royal Navy after action report, SH was first back to 22kn and 5 minutes later back to 26kn in a force 9.
> This was plotted from Duke of York.
> 
> Im also very very skeptical, that it is possible to repair an impact or shrappnell impacts from a 14" shell at machinery spaces in 20 minutes.



Hi I was just reading a similar discussion on another board about this very subject. While some claim the above reports, others report that the official speed noted was 22 knots. 

http://warships1discussionboards.yuku.com/topic/18634/Renown-vs-S-G?page=28

Look at posts 270 and 274 and compare the time lines. Apparently no where do the RN reports claim 26knots after the major hit.

Also the Chief engineer in the _"Scharnhorst"_ reported he could only manage 22 knots after this reported hit.

Also the weather reports in the sources suggest `moderate gale` with force 6-7 winds and `heavy swell`. This was the main explanation of the slow speeds of most warships. Initially the British Cruisers and destroyers could only make 24 knots due to the heavy seas, while the Germans DD could only do 25 knots.


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## delcyros (Jan 6, 2012)

Much is possible, but what do we really know?

I have traced down eight machinery breakdowns in boiler room one on SCHARNHORST throughout her career. In fact, this single boiler room gave trouble sooner or later in each and every action: 1.) Northern patrol sortie, 2.) 3.)off Norway twice once in the RENOWN engagement then in the GOLRIOUS engagement -the latter despite the fact that the torpedo hit was astern of C turret nowhere close to boiler room 1 and in the aforementioned action no damage was induced to machinery)
4.) and 5.) During operation Berlin twice boiler room one had temporary loss of all power, 6.) in France it gave once trouble, this time through bomb damage of a near miss, 7.) in the channel dash boiler room one quite working after a mine hit and finally off North Cape 8.).

That´s not counting the problems faced in non-action services. Not sure why this happened to SCHARNHORST always, while her sistership GNEISENAU was free of these troubles, not sure why none of the other boiler rooms of SCHARNHOSRT was that trouble plagued. It may be just bad luck but that´s stretching the probability a bit.

A penetration at the acute angle is unlikely, projectiles regularely get deflected away from an even lightly armoured surface impacting at more than 74 deg and regularely get deflected off water impacting at more than 78 deg. 
Friend Antonio Bonomi wrote to this problem:

"But at 18.00 the angle of the shell falling were around 20-21 degrees from back starboard side ( in absolute measurement versus azimut it would be 69-70 degrees which is 90-20= 70 degrees). Very interesting is to notice how this acute angle changed during the last part of the evaluation at 18.15-18.20. From Scharnhorst track on the official map you can see that HMS Duke of York was following every Scharnhorst course change as obvious too keep a good track record and gunnery solution.
With this logic in mind you can see that the course change to north Scharnhorst made at 18.21 on his track was followed by HMS DoY by a same course change made before her track point at 18.24 and Scharnhorst was still at 20 (or 70 degrees) angle at that point, as the distances were stable and increasing between teh 2 ships so as logic tell us the angle was becoming more acute, as Scharnhorst was sailing away faster than HMS Duke of York.
But suddendly as you can see the angle start increasing at 18.21 and Scharnhorst turned north, slowing down consistently as the angle between 18.21 and 18.24 becomes wider 28 or 62 degrees and immediately after as Harold correctly saw 90 or 0 so the Scharnhosrt now was receiving the shells directly from the stern as I have depicted down below on my example.
Now the point is, are those 20 degrees very acute angle at that distance that was surely more than 18.000 meters ( 180 hectometers ) increasing up to 19.500 meters ( 195 hectometers ) enough to have that falling 356 mm shell penetration were it has been reported ?
Remember that at 18.19 Adm Bey sent a radio message to SKL telling them it was under precise radar fire from more than 18.000 meters ( so the distance is proven ) and Scharnhorst was still sailinng at 26 knots on the rough sea, so her engines were OK at 18.19, apparently.
It seems to me that whatever has happened, it as immediately suddendly stopped Scharnhorst engines, as she broke down the speed very evidently as we can see, .... and again ... it seems no big explosions reported,..... no evident fire on board Scharnhorst noticed from that shells from British ships,... while about many other hits seen landing on board there was visible explosions and fire effects."

and further from his personal communication with Garzke:

"I have spoken personally a lot with Bill Garzke Junior about his book and this reported hit, a very interesting discussion.

The scheme I have created above is an elaboartion in line of concept from the official British Royal Navy battle map I have posted before.

All maps available on printed books are taken out of that Official colour map from Royal Navy I have posted a piece above.
The only ones I know that as published those in low quality on B/W was Winton on his book and Philippe Caresse.
Recently Grove published a book with those high quality coloured ones, much better.
Good information on witnesses reports are on Grove ( prisoner interrogations ) and Jacobsen recent book on 2003.

I will read them again tonight to see what I come out with, I was supposed to do this during my vacation on seaside next 2 weeks writing my new text, but I will anticipate this reading now due to this very interesting discussion going on here with you my friends.

If you check the angles and the relative course thacks of Scharnhorst and HMS Duke of York you will find those relative angles between the 2 ships that of course in reality were never parallel on course 90 of course, I have plotted that just to make it easier to everybody to understand how the shells were landing from the back on Scharnhorst, so with what type of angles.

What you wrote about the German survivors is very interesting and I know some statements already from translated documentaries I have on TV, so I knew their opinions about it.

So if you read carefully :

Matrosenobergefreiter Hubert Witte saw the speed recorder dropping from 29 to 22 knots at 18.20, "just after a shell hit amidships or aft".

Very interesting is the speed felt only from 29 to 22 knots and the fact that the hit was aft or amidships, so no center ship with a penetration, no big visible explosion.
Very important is that the reported time is exact with the KEY moment at 18.20.

than :

Oberbootsmannsmaat Willi Gödde felt a big shock in the ship which at once lost but later regained speed. He gives the time 17.00.

Very important correlation with a hit causing ship shock vibrations and consequently reducing Scharnhorst speed at ONCE ! ( guess why ?? ) and of course later Scharnhorst was going to regain speed, just as Chief Eng. Konig was saying to Hintze, ... '' 'The third turbine ceased to function because of a failure on the steam supply. The engine room staff worked desperately to repair the damage. The chief engineer reported that he hoped the breack would be repaired within 20 or 30 minutes. I heard Kpt Hintze say : Well done engine room. Officers and men, thank you for what you are doing. ''.'',.... so it seems same cause and effect on Scharnhorst machinery, .. and not a permanent damage like a shell penetration on a boiler room ( in fact some British reports talk about a shell cutting a steam pipe and not exploding into a boiler room ( ? ) , as nobody saw a big explosion that was going to be the logic consequence with permanent and very big damages ). 

Matrosengefreiter Günter Sträter also felt a big shock and just afterwards he heard the message "torpedo hit boiler room No. one, spee 8 knots." the problem with that statement is that different authors give different times....

Thsi is another KEY report, as this Matrose Strater correlates the reduction from 22 down to 8 knots with a BIG SCHOCK that somebody thought it was a torpedo hit aside the hull, so NOT a shell into a boiler room and this caused he speed to go down to 8 knots.

As you can read yourself NO German survivor clearly talks about a direct shell hit into a boiler room with explosion reported on command bridge.

Now the British did not see that either although they noticed and wrote about many hit with flames and visible explosions before and after this ' potential one ', I think a hit like that would have caused a very visible result in terms of explosion and consequent fire onboard Scharnhorst, but nothing was seen and many were just carefully observing Scharnhorst thru binocular and rangefinders.

More, Adm Fraser was just ordering a turn south when somebody told him that the radar ( so no visible confirmation as I wrote as the hit was NOT observed by British ) was telling them that Scharnhorst was loosing speed."

Therefore I would guess that a shell hit is the cause of the drop in speed. But not a penetration through the hump but secondary effects, a splinter cutting a steam pipe or severed pipes over the armoured boiler gratings. These things, albeit not penetrating into the machinery spaces, can be really nasty events. It may also be a case of coincidence but I don´t believe in coincidence here. Boiler room one runs out of luck...
F.e. A shell explosion in the uptakes would cause severe, though non-permanent speed loss. When Yorktown had a 250kg bomb detonate in her funnel uptakes, Boiler rooms 2-6 had their fires extinguished and were filled with smoke, rooms 2 and 3 were completely disabled and room 1 had to be secured. Rooms 4, 5 and 6 were brought back online about a hour and twenty minutes after the hit. rooms 7, 8 and 9 were undamaged. Speed initially fell to six knots then she stopped 26 minutes later before eventually working up to 20 knots.
Sounds familar doesn´t it? No penetration was necessary to cause this effect in YORKTOWN and I guess an funnel uptake /base hit may be considered a possibility with more justification than a weird theory about impossible -for the event trajectories...


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## Juha (Jan 7, 2012)

Hello Delcyros
I have difficulties to understand the logic, that because of RN didn't see the hit visually, after all it was the hit achieved at max distance during that battle, it must be happened on/over the armoured deck not under it. Personally I think it is easier to see an explosition on/over an armoured shell than inside it if the explosition isn't big enought to shatter the armoured shell.

Juha


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## delcyros (Jan 7, 2012)

For that to understand You have to know the results of the trials conducted on target ship HESSEN with regard to major calibre hits detonating inside a boilerroom which is operated with 75% load.

Superheated high pressure plants like those employed in ww2 are under constant pressure. 
An 8 in APC detonating inside would wreck the boilers but the damage maybe repaired by means of the ships DC.
11in APC regularely destroyed the plants, lots of fuel fires -the plant may be repaired in a yard but not at sea.
15in APC regularely destroyed the plant irreperably, fuel fires, systemic damage and a new plant needs to be erected to replace the wreckage.

the british 14 AP shell has more HE than the german 15in, that's not repairable.

Bonomi doesn't say that not seeing the effect means there was no hit. But he lists all observations up together. Most important for this question are the testimonies of the survivors:
One spoke of a hit associated with shock amidships or aft
one spoke of schock through a torpedohit
two reported that boilerroom one was off and required 20-30 minutes to return to full power.
one speculated that splinters cut some piping.
none of them said, implied or indicated a penetration into one of the boiler rooms!
That's pure phantasie which is not backed by primary sources. Even the british interrogators believed that the damage was shock and / or splinter induced and represents a temporary loss of power instead of a penetration which would have permanently wrecked the machinery spaces.


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## Juha (Jan 7, 2012)

Hello Delcyros
still I think that Bonomi's logic is off. Argumenting that because of RN didn't notice a hit so there was no hit penetrating inside the armoured shell but there was a hit that exploded outside the armoured shell sounds frankly very unconvincting to me.
IMHO more relevant than the Hessen test is the 15" hit into the Boiler Room 2 of Dunkerque, it wrecked the boiler which it hit and killed (explosion and the steam) all in the room but the other boiler in the room and all auxiliarities remained in full working order. Both Garzki Dulin and Winton write that speed dropped first but soon Sch. again picked up speed and achieved 22 knots because of good damage control work and crossconnecting. That is IMHO possible after a hit knocked out one BR out of 3. Now what really happened I don't know, IMHO hit into a BR, hit bursting above BRs, hit bursting near BRs and disabling temporary some overworking boilers etc are all possible scenarios.

Juha


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## delcyros (Jan 7, 2012)

Would You mind going into the trouble to explain the problem You have with it?
Had it been so- the disagreement beeing because of observation then I could agree but You miss the multiple, independent lines of sensibg the problem, or so I understand You.

Remember, what Garzke and Dulin wrote about the trajectory is fiction, it's not based on primary sources but on a thinking how a projectile at that distance could penetrate into this boilerroom.
This level of reasoning is called 'speculation'.
Someone turned that into a probable hit later and successive authors made a certain penetration out of the case without ever questioning the thesis until the norwegian and german military conducted a simulation based on radar positions of the ships (the very simulation that helped to finally find the wreckage).
Garzke and Dulin didn't analysed the target angle to death but were concerned about how such a penetration could have been possible at this range. Obviously the hump was id'ed as a possibility.the problem is that at 18.00 already the TA was 70 deg and it increased in the following 20 minutes further. 
You don't hit the hump with 75 deg cause You cannot penetrate deep enough to hit it.


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## psteel (Jan 8, 2012)

I don't have a problem with Delcyros explanation. Shrapnel cutting the steam hoses through the boiler hump works for me anyway.

Delcyros I don't understand the post 152. It looks lengthy and refers to other people [Harold?]. Are these passages from another forum or thread?

Also I noted from Garzke and Durlin, that the boilers built for the _Scharnhorst_ where by a different manufacture than those on _Gneisenau _. Also the _Gneisenau _ output was less than _Scharnhorst_ [154,000hp compared to 163,400hp] and the top speed is lower [30.7 vs. 31.65knots]. Since the tremendous increase in power and speed was are result of the new super heated steam plants, a similar plant built to less demanding level, ought to be more reliable?


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## DonL (Jan 8, 2012)

@ psteel




> Also I noted from Garzke and Durlin, that the boilers built for the Scharnhorst where by a different manufacture than those on Gneisenau . Also the Gneisenau output was less than Scharnhorst [154,000hp compared to 163,400hp] and the top speed is lower [30.7 vs. 31.65knots]. Since the tremendous increase in power and speed was are result of the new super heated steam plants, a similar plant built to less demanding level, ought to be more reliable?



All 4 german BB's had Wagner boilers

Gneisenau had 3 turbines from Krupp- Germania, Scharnhorst had 3 turbines from Dschimag-Bremen and Bismarck and Tirpitz had 3 turbines from Blohm Voss. All had Wagner boilers.

Bismarck, Tirpitz and Gneisenau had curtis wheels at the turbines, Scharnhorst didn't have curtis wheels.

The strange thing is, that all classes of ships after 1934 had different boiler-types.
All BB's had the type Wagner boilers.
The Hipper-Class had type Wagner-La Mont boilers.
And Destroyers had Wagner types and Benson types boilers, the Benson type boilers were only at the first class Typ 34 und 34 A.

http://books.google.de/books?id=PsT...wBw#v=onepage&q=Wagner-La-Mont-Kessel&f=false


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## Juha (Jan 8, 2012)

Hello Delcyros
To me the following is illogical:
_Very interesting is the speed felt only from 29 to 22 knots and the fact that the hit was aft or amidships, so no center ship with a penetration, no big visible explosion….Now the British did not see that either although they noticed and wrote about many hit with flames and visible explosions before and after this ' potential one ', I think a hit like that would have caused a very visible result in terms of explosion and consequent fire onboard Scharnhorst, but nothing was seen and many were just carefully observing Scharnhorst thru binocular and rangefinders…More, Adm Fraser was just ordering a turn south when somebody told him that the radar ( so no visible confirmation as I wrote as the hit was NOT observed by British ) was telling them that Scharnhorst was loosing speed…Therefore I would guess that a shell hit is the cause of the drop in speed. But not a penetration through the hump but secondary effects, a splinter cutting a steam pipe or severed pipes over the armoured boiler gratings…_

Because the writer seems to believe that it is much easier to observe far away an explosion inside armoured shell of a big ship than outside of it. Also in heavy seas ships heave constantly so the exact angle of the incoming shell relative to ships structures is difficult to estimate afterwards if the target is lost with very few survivors. So we all speculate and it is very difficult to say anything definite. That if the examination of the wreck didn’t relieve anything definite proofs,

Juha


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## psteel (Jan 8, 2012)

DonL said:


> @ psteel
> 
> 
> 
> ...



Thanks Don.
Yes thats right . I meant the turbines. I gather that Germany didn't have the metalurgy to handle these high temperature/high pressure engine types.

According to Groner , the Benson boilers were particulary bad and those early DD that had them , got replacements built in 1940?


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## delcyros (Jan 9, 2012)

Hello Juha,

now I understand You, thanks for taking the trouble to explaining this.
For my part, I can also not agree that -speaking from the british perspective- not
seeing the effects of an explosion deep inside the vitals would necessarely force the conclusion that
nothing like this happened. That´s probably a weak part in the discussion, mainly caused by the expectation
that the destruction of boilers under pressure may have caused similar effects to those envisioned on HESSEN, a noticable fuel fire, f.e. to be observd from outside. Boiler explosions may have very shocking effects.

But that doesn´t necessarely be the case under all conditions because the fire would be deep within the vitals of the ship, shielded by at least the Pzdeck, the Splitterlängsschott and the main and upper belt from outside observation.

That beeing said, it´s not the prime reason in the discussion either, Bonomi used the word "interesting" in that context and further cites survivors. The testimonies of these survivors reporting from boiler room one which never said something like a penetration happened is in his and my opinion much more weightful than the missing british observation of eventual effects of the hit. 

Altough the Seastate has a fair amount of pitching and rolling on these ship´s fire, the principal reason for the poor hit ratio on both sides,
it´has no effect on a change of the target angle.
The final impact angle is composed of different components:
angle of fall: quite well understood for this range to be 18 deg
target angle: in larger than 70 and not larger than 80 deg
roll: variable (seastate) but typically not more than + or - 4 deg (else bow or stern of the BB´s are completely submerged and DoY would have been unable to fire her fwd battery group)
pitch: variable (seastate) but typically not more than + or -30 deg (else the DD´s are in serious danger of capsizing)

If You assume the best conditions, that are only 70 deg TA and 18 deg aof, the netto obliquity would be 71.02 deg. To much for deep penetration.
If You assume +4 deg pitch, the obliquity raises to 72.37 deg
if You assume -4 deg pitch, the obliquity changes to 69.75 deg
if You assume -4 deg pitch and +30 deg roll the impact obliquity changes to 71.82 deg
if You assume -4 deg pitch and -30 deg roll, the impact obliquity changes to 68.02 deg
if you assume +4 deg pitch and +30 deg roll, the obliquity changes to 70.31 deg

The seastate doesn´t affect rotation of the ship (=target angle). Thus, since it is known that the target angle was larger than 70 deg it´s fairly certain that a penetration at the specific conditions of impact is out of question. The total netto obliquity change at such high target angle´s doesn´t change much from the projectile´s point of view.The fuse delay of british shells was 0.025 sec, the impact velocity at this range varied between 1580 and 1540 fps. It would have been necessary first to defeat the 45mm Wh + 6mm St52 (=48mm Wh single layer) outer hull shell at ca. 70 deg obliquity then the 6mm St52 deck at more than 72 deg obliquity, again a 30mm Wh extra hard splinterbulkhead at ca. 70 deg and the 80mm Wh hump which is 45 to 50ft distant from the hull shell at 70 deg rotational angle. In order to physically hit the hump at 0.025 sec nominal fuse delay You would require either an average velocity of 1800 fps of the projectile or an average velocity in order of 0.035 sec nominal fuse delay, which is much longer than usual (longer than US delays, equal to Krupp Psgr delay) and an average velocity of 1400fps.
That´s really not very likely to expect. Alternatively, a penetration through the 50mm armoured weatherdeck, the the 2.45m interdeck, then the 6mm St52 deck at 70 deg and the hump at ca. 72 is even more complicated and would require 48 to 55 ft delay and is again out of question (the trajectory is also blocked by turret and the armoured rear GCT, which would trigger fuse action of the projectile even earlier). 

The energy consumed to penetrate even thin plating at very high obliquity goes rapidly up. A scaled up, 3in M79 AP-shot to 14in and the weight of the british 14in requires in betwee 800 and 1100fps (depending which formula you prefer) for intact penetration at 72 deg of just the 45mm WH and 6mm St52 plating of the outer hull shell. Assuming the lowest number is correct and the best target angle then the projectile has about 1400fps remaining velocity, which means it will never touch the hump. Further high obliquity penetrations further inboard will cause additional deceleration of the shell. The decapped 14in, assuming it behaves similar to the 3in model shot (=1.67crh nose shape while the 14in had 1.6crh, in the same ballpark at the very least) would require in excess of 1600fps to defeat the final, 80mm "hump" Wh plate, which is a significantly higher velocity than the projectile impacted the first plate with and even for a dud projectile should be excluded unless the armour plate is sufficiantly below acceptance minimum quality or the projectile is sufficiently above reference penetration performance.

Note that we already stretched the probability a bit, since the TA was not 70 deg but more acute than 70 deg, other conditions make the penetration appear an even more improbable event. A projectile may, on the other hand, quite handily pass into the region of the boiler uptakes within the margins of fuse delay and penetration envelope. Similar to one of the hits (round 17 first series of trials IIRC) with 15in done on former SMS BADEN. The funnel uptakes were critical components of a ship, rarely ever put under armour (some early US standarts armoured them as thickly as the CT or main belt, for some reason, I guess) other than the thicker than usual armoured gratings. These armoured gratings were successful in limiting the amount of splinters entering the boiler rooms through the holes but they were unable to provide complete ballistic protection and under direct impact shock in a couple of documented cases gave way (they are not pressure proof).
The damage created by the event in my mind speaks against a penetration and wasn´t observed or reported as such. It very well agrees to shock induced or splinter induced damage created by a projectile exploding at or close to the uptakes.


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## Juha (Jan 10, 2012)

Hello Delcyros
Thanks a lot for the thorough analyze. IMHO there is at least one unsure thing and that is the exact time of the hit, to my understanding we have the sending time of the "Opponent is firing by radar...speed 26 knots" message but before sending it was coded by Enigma and delivered to Signal/coding office, so it describted situation several minutes before the sending time. And I'm not absolutely sure that Scharnhorst didn't jaw in those circumstances, ie if the hit happened while it was turning towards NE, quartering heavy swell. At least smaller ship would have been jawing but of course Scharnhorst was fairly massive ship, so it is possible that it didn't jaw. And of course there is also a possibility of purely tecnical malfunction, after all HMS Sheffield lost the use of one of its main turbines because of gearing failure during the pursuit to south. And from this thread I have learned that Scharnhorst had a history of problems in one of its boiler rooms. These discussions on battle damages are IMHO interesting, one reason, besides its interesting design, of my intrest on Dunkerque is its damages at Mers-el-Kebir. A modern armoured warship which survived major calibre AP hits so that we have exact info on its damages and the effects of the shells.

Juha


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