# Greatest aviation related Blunders of WWII



## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 9, 2012)

A discussion of the blunders/failures made during WW2 that involved aviation related strategy or technology development that had an adverse effect on the perpetrating side. Examples follow:
-	September 1939, Herr Hitler directing the Luftwaffe to neglect air defense infrastructure and related targets in favor of bombing population centers.
-	June 1942, USN BuAer orders essentially all future FM-1 production to revert to the F4F original 4-HMG gun armament but refuses to make the change for subsequent F4F-4 manufacture, retaining Grumman's production of the poor performing F4F-4. 
-	Army chooses a 6-HMG gun configuration for its P-40 D E without an increase in engine power. 
-	Me-262 deployment decision: fighter-bomber or fighter? 
-	Ike chooses to leave his 300 USMC Standard armored Amphtracks in reserve instead of using them to transport troops assaulting the Omaha Beachhead

Oh wait that last one isn’t about aviation…. ignore it.
Pick one these or one of your own choosing…


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## krieghund (Feb 10, 2012)

Mitsubishi's design team under Jiro Horikoshi considered the Mitsubishi KINSEI 4x series engine or the Nakajima SAKAE 12 to install into the A6M1 prototype. They chose the SAKAE series and the rest is history.
Had they chose the KINSEI the aircraft would have upgraded to the KINSEI 54 about the same time they historically trialed the SAKAE 21 in the A6M3. With the excess power of the KINSEI over the SAKAE would the designers been tempted to install protection? The other logical progression of engine upgrades would have been to the KINSEI 62 in 1942 with the designation of A6M8 Model 62. 
As to fuel tank protection effectiveness, in Richard Dunn’s book, “Exploding Fuel Tanks”, one could summarize that self-sealing tanks were over rated. That said, a F4U could sure light up a Zero with no problem yet absorb the Zero’s attack with some success. However, this could be a difference in the armament between the two. What if a F4U was hosing down an opposing force F4U, would the results be similar to the Zero’s fate? Just food for thought.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 10, 2012)

Interesting!


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## Readie (Feb 10, 2012)

Mal,

The LW decision to cease bombing the RAF stations and start area bombing of British cities must rank as one of the all time mistakes in WW2.
British resolve was stiffened and hearts were hardened for the 'whirlwind' that Germany received from Bomber command and the USAAF.
The concept of 'total war' was born with all that that entails.

My second offering is the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. What on earth were they thinking about? Talk about kicking the giant in the balls and then wonder why the A bomb was delivered as the final retribution.

John


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## DonL (Feb 10, 2012)

> The LW decision to cease bombing the RAF stations and start area bombing of British cities must rank as one of the all time mistakes in WW2.



I agree.



> British resolve was stiffened and hearts were hardened for the 'whirlwind' that Germany received from Bomber command and the USAAF.
> The concept of 'total war' was born with all that that entails.



It is totaly equal if the germans had started area bombing of British cities or not. 
The absolutely same amount of bombs would be droped on german cities from 1941-1945!



> My second offering is the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. What on earth were they thinking about? Talk about kicking the giant in the balls and then wonder why the A bomb was delivered as the final retribution.



In consequence no war!
If you want a war and fight the attack of Pearl Harbour was a brilliant plan, the japanese failed the carriers and a third wave.

Edit:
No drop tanks for the Me 109 at BoB


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## rochie (Feb 10, 2012)

what about Germany not mobilising the population for war production of arms until late in the war when it was to late ?

or would that have just meant Germany would 've ran out of raw materials quicker, rather than having lots more Tanks, Aircraft and Guns etc


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## Shortround6 (Feb 10, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> A discussion of the blunders/failures made during WW2 that involved aviation related strategy or technology development that had an adverse effect on the perpetrating side. Examples follow:
> -
> -	June 1942, USN BuAer orders essentially all future FM-1 production to revert to the F4F original 4-HMG gun armament but refuses to make the change for subsequent F4F-4 manufacture, retaining Grumman's production of the poor performing F4F-4.
> -



The decision to keep the 6 gun armament should not have affected performance much. Something seems way out of kilter for early F4F performance. the difference in rounds per gun with a full load of ammo for the 4 gun and 6 gun installations means that the actual difference in armament weight is about 60lbs (not including gun mounts, heaters controls and ammo boxes). performance numbers are given for both the F4F-3 and the F4F-4 here:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-3-detail-specification.pdf 

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-4-detail-specification.pdf

Numbers are given for 3 different loadings but they don't match up well at all. How many of the numbers are from calculations and how many are from flight testing I don't know but just from the weights the F4F-4 is only supposed to weigh 531 lbs more than an F4F-3 but what is really interesting is that an F4F-3 in overload condition weighs 6lbs more (actually no difference at all with weight variations of production aircraft) than an F4F-4 in 'standard" fighter condition yet climbs to 20,000ft in 8.4 minutes instead of the 12.7 minutes by the F4F-4. 

The wing of the F4F-4 is about 300lbs heavier than the wing of the F4F-3. How much is due to the provisions of the extra guns, how much is due to the wing folding (not power) and how much is due to plumbing and reinforcement for the drop tanks I don't know. But taking out 2 guns and associated equipment is not going to lighten up the wing structure by much.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 10, 2012)

One of USAAF blunders was the lack of (combat) external fuel tanks for P-47, severely cutting the planes usability prior 1944.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 10, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> The decision to keep the 6 gun armament should not have affected performance much. Something seems way out of kilter for early F4F performance. the difference in rounds per gun with a full load of ammo for the 4 gun and 6 gun installations means that the actual difference in armament weight is about 60lbs (not including gun mounts, heaters controls and ammo boxes). performance numbers are given for both the F4F-3 and the F4F-4 here:
> 
> http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-3-detail-specification.pdf
> 
> ...



Great summary Short! I've also noticed some inconsistencies in the published numbers. The problem created by the -4 replacement of the -3 is best illustrated by pondering the existence of an intermediate performing -5 with folding wings and 4 guns. I am thinking of a slight modified FM-1. Most simplistically, deletion of the two outboard guns (about 130 lbs) and reduction of the FM-1 ammo load to perhaps 250-300 rpg (total ammo from 1,440 to 1,000 - 1,200 rounds at about 33 lbs per 100 rounds I believe), would have cut its weight by about 200 - 275 pounds. That would have translated to an increased climb rate intermediate between the dog -4 and the more peppy -3. Why important? The F4F was primarlly an interceptor. It's ability to get to altitude was critical. Looking in detail at the last three carrier battles of 1942 and I come away with the strong impression that at Santa Cruz especially, the Hornet's CAP deployment suffered fatally due to its inability to reach altitude by a matter of mere seconds. While Red Hessel's and Rynd's two divisions did what amounted to a _fleet average_ job against the incoming Vals (while absorbing their zero escorts). The two trailing divisions, totalling 7 F4F-4 aircraft missed the initial intercept because they barely missed getting to altitude to encounter the vals. When finally seen the Vals were directly below them and the best they could do was to play catch up ball in a tail chase back to the Hornet. Would it have saved the Hornet? Maybe, but probably not. Hard to say, but the ship would surely have been better defended.

It wasn't the F4F's manueverability as a fighter that caused the difficulty. It was its anemic climb rate which would have been somewhat mitigated in my hypthetical 4-gun F4F-5. Also, the somewhat increased ammo, would still have slightly mitigated the problem encountered by CAP pilots who had run out of ammo in the battle's later stages.


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## Readie (Feb 10, 2012)

DonL said:


> It is totaly equal if the germans had started area bombing of British cities or not.
> The absolutely same amount of bombs would be droped on german cities from 1941-1945!




That's why the LW area bombing was a mistake Don,

My point is that unless the LW carried the early WW2 attacks on Britain through to the bitter end it was a big mistake as eventually Britain ( and America) would gather themselves and deliver pulverising bomber attacks on the German heartland.Goaded on by the general public's desire from revenge.

Now, had the LW just confined itself to attacking the RAF stations would the bomber command / USAAF area bombing campaign have happened?

John


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## pbfoot (Feb 10, 2012)

Can't beat this , 
"Less helpful was the continuing disposition to find ways to continue day bombing when there was only one way that could make it effective - the introduction of a true long range fighter to protect the bombers . Churchill had already percieved this necessity but Portal firmly set his face against it . A long range fighter could never hold its own against a short range fighter , it was this attitude that Churchill said "closed many doors"


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## DonL (Feb 10, 2012)

@ Readie

I have understood you!



> Now, had the LW just confined itself to attacking the RAF stations would the bomber command / USAAF area bombing campaign have happened?



I'm convinced! That is what I wanted to say.

Also if no single bomb from LW Bombers were droped to english cities, the absolutely same amound of bombs as happened would be droped to german cities.
All other arguments are naive to my opinion. The Bomber campaign of the RAF and USAAF had nothing to do with revenge, only to win the war equal by which means!


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## Readie (Feb 10, 2012)

DonL said:


> @ Readie
> 
> All other arguments are naive to my opinion. The Bomber campaign of the RAF and USAAF had nothing to do with revenge, only to win the war equal by which means!



Yes and No Don. 
The Bomber campaign was Britain her allies only way to hit back at Germany in the early - mid WW2 years as championed by Churchill and thoroughly supported by the British public.
To win the war Yes.
Revenge avenging Yes

As a side note, the local newspaper in Plymouth mentions the Plymouth Blitz in every edition. It can be interesting reading to see the pre post war Plymouth pictures but, thats all.

John


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## jimh (Feb 10, 2012)

Ploesti...the first raid.


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## Gixxerman (Feb 10, 2012)

I wonder, I'd like to think that if nobody bombs civilian population centres then that part of the war doesn't happen....but I have a feeling with what went before (Spanish civil war for instance) that either in desperation to retaliate (and perhaps bring the message of what war meant to the civillian populace, over the heads of the political leadership, so to speak) would mean it inevitably occurs.
Pin-point bombing being impossible with the tech of the time the ruin of the enemies means to produce for war being so important.

I don't believe a switch of tactic won or lost the LW the BoB either.
I do not believe they could have won it.
Even with local air superiority over Kent the German forces have no means to guarantee to the degree necessary that the Royal Navy will not intervene disastrously for the German objectives.
The two options that might (and I say might as an outside chance) have worked for them would be 
1) had the BEF been surrounded captured in France, thus forcing the British Gov to negotiate or
2) if German plans had been devised to enable an attack on the UK without pause from the BoF, largely involving the attempt to capture 1 (or more if close enough) large enough airfields to enable the funnelling in of men supplies fast enough to overwhelm an already dazed Britain. Shock surprise here would be the main thing. 

As for the Me 262?
I think it comes down to the fighter/fighter bomber argument being a side issue.
Paramount is always engines that is what slowed everything to the point where it was always going to be too little too late.

The biggest blunder Germany made in aviation otherwise was simply taking on too many wars at once.
That above all guaranteed they could never win.

This was massively compounded by throwing out the world's best nuclear scientists (and, the bit wihich I find beyond belief.....the wider scientific community in Germany must have known these people were gifted prominent in the field, regardless of that ridiculous racial/political mumbo-jumbo - letting them go over to the allied side!) and so, as events were to prove, ensuring they failed to get the bomb and the allies did. 
Thank God.


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## drgondog (Feb 10, 2012)

jimh said:


> Ploesti...the first raid.



Jim - are you referring to Halpro - as a 'wake up call"? - I agree

Two of my other personal favorites include the IJN not launching the thrid strike at POL and Submarine base at Pearl as well as failing to go back to Scweinfurt until Ball Bearing production ceased... question of our resolve to incur the casualties but Speer says we 'shoulda taken the losses'


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## Milosh (Feb 10, 2012)

Not targeting the German power generating plants. There was only a handful that generated most of the power for Germany. Knocking these out would have brought Germany industry to an abrupt stop.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 10, 2012)

The concept of self-defending bomber does seem like blunder.


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## jimh (Feb 10, 2012)

Yes...it was a chain of mistakes that could have easily been averted. It was a well thought out, rehearsed, and planned mission that relied on too few people to execute properly. It was a target that was bombed multiple times during the war...just thought I'd be clear about being the 1st. 

jim



drgondog said:


> Jim - are you referring to Halpro - as a 'wake up call"? - I agree
> 
> Two of my other personal favorites include the IJN not launching the thrid strike at POL and Submarine base at Pearl as well as failing to go back to Scweinfurt until Ball Bearing production ceased... question of our resolve to incur the casualties but Speer says we 'shoulda taken the losses'


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 10, 2012)

Gixxerman said:


> I wonder, I'd like to think that if nobody bombs civilian population centres then that part of the war doesn't happen....but I have a feeling with what went before (Spanish civil war for instance) that either in desperation to retaliate (and perhaps bring the message of what war meant to the civillian populace, over the heads of the political leadership, so to speak) would mean it inevitably occurs.
> Pin-point bombing being impossible with the tech of the time the ruin of the enemies means to produce for war being so important.
> 
> I don't believe a switch of tactic won or lost the LW the BoB either.
> ...



Gix, I tend to agree with you about the first point and for the reason you provide. Lack of bombing accuracy or some sort of navigational error in a high stress combat situation would inevitably result in a 'mistake:' "Gee it looked like a ball bearing factory! How was I to know it was a hospital?"

On the other hand, while I do think the LW could not have won the BoB (mainly because of the redoubtable Hawker Hurricane), it might have extended it and prompted an RAF retreat to the midlands. If that had happened, it might have been harder to protect the RN in the channel. Some LW units were quite good at spoiling the day of an aerially unescorted RN flotilla. It's not a scenario I would have liked to see tested. Whatever the ultimate outcome, it could have been very bloody for both sides.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 10, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> The concept of self-defending bomber does seem like blunder.



And a concept that was given a thorough testing of its validity (or lack thereof) during the 8th Air Force YB-40 operations.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 10, 2012)

IIRC the YB-40 was not able to carry any bombs, due to, perhaps, doubled defensive assets?


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 10, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> IIRC the YB-40 was not able to carry any bombs, due to, perhaps, doubled defensive assets?



That's my understanding as well. I think they tried to fly two ship escorts at various positions in the bomber stream and nothing was found to be sufficiently effective to warrant futher development. I suppose it gets points for imaginative thinking much like the Boulton Paul Defiant?  

Maybe it should be called _thinking with your head in a box_ instead of thinking _outside the box_


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## wuzak (Feb 11, 2012)

The big problem with the YB-40s was that they were as heavy as teh bombers going to target, but heavier returning from the target, and could not keep up. They could not do their role on the return journey and ended up isolated and vulnerable to attack.


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## wuzak (Feb 11, 2012)

drgondog said:


> Jim - are you referring to Halpro - as a 'wake up call"? - I agree
> 
> Two of my other personal favorites include the IJN not launching the thrid strike at POL and Submarine base at Pearl as well as failing to go back to Scweinfurt until Ball Bearing production ceased... question of our resolve to incur the casualties but Speer says we 'shoulda taken the losses'



In regards to Schweinfurt, how long was it before the 8th were capable of returning? They lost a sizeable chunk of aircraft and, probably, more importantly a large number of aircrew. 

Perhaps the mistake was not getting the RAF to follow up - they couldn't that night because they were pounding Peenemünde, but surely would have been able to do the job earlier than the 8th?

Alternatively, missions designed to disrupt repairs to the facilities could have been taken by 8th (or was it the 9th?) AF mediums or RAF Mosquitoes. Perhaps RAF Mossies could even have delivered as much damage in low level raids?


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## tomo pauk (Feb 11, 2012)

One blunder is the the Combined bomber offensive was not that 'combined'? Ie. two daylight attacks at one target, followed by one night attack? In order to avoid predictability the targets would be 'randomized', and then again hit another target both during day night, several times.


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## iron man (Feb 11, 2012)

Milosh said:


> Not targeting the German power generating plants. There was only a handful that generated most of the power for Germany. Knocking these out would have brought Germany industry to an abrupt stop.


This has been examined at some length in the past...iirc, Mierezejewski addresses the issue in "Collapse of the German War Economy" and comes to the conclusion that it was not the _generating plants themselves _that presented the best target, but the _transmission stations _which were located nearby. 

Reason being? 

At the heart of the generation plants proper, one found massive, sturdily constructed machinery; vulnerable...but only to _direct hits_ from HC bombs of the 1000lb+ classes. OTOH, the transmission stations were filled with highly vulnerable systems that could be taken out of service by shrapnel damage from "near misses"...primarily the transformers and complex mechanical relay (switching) networks which controlled distribution to the German "grid". Wrecking _this equipment _would have caused a *severe *crisis. Production of such complex items required "special" resources (and highly skilled tradesmen); _both_ were in _very short supply_. You can't just expand the production level of something that is only being manufactured on a "shoestring" budget (to meet the needs of ongoing maintenance and limited expansion) overnight, just because you suddenly need to replace a dozen relay stations and their attendant transformers. 

This was a missed opportunity (to be sure) but it still would have required a (relatively speaking) _precision _delivery, one that would have "challenged" the "tech" of the times rather severely. 

OTOH, the transportation/coal distribution attacks (which eventually stopped Germany's armamments production in it's tracks)? These could have been pursued much earlier by means of area attacks on the DRG's marshalling yards. Unfortunately, the "precision" component (which sealed the deal; killing the inland waterways and dropping viaducts/collapsing mainline railway tunnels...an exclusively RAF effort, BTW) required daylight air superiority, and thus would not be possible much earlier than historical.

Just my 2c, FWIW.

Cheers, Ron


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## wuzak (Feb 11, 2012)

iron man said:


> At the heart of the generation plants proper, one found massive, sturdily constructed machinery; vulnerable...but only to _direct hits_ from HC bombs of the 1000lb+ classes.



HC bombs? Do you mean MC (Medium Capacity)/General Purpose bombs?

As for the actual High Capacity bombs, I'm not sure that the USAAF actually had any such bombs. The RAF had at their disposal 2,000lb, 4,000lb, 8,000lb and 12,000lb HC bombs.





iron man said:


> At the heart of the generation plants proper, one found massive, sturdily constructed machinery; vulnerable...but only to _direct hits_ from HC bombs of the 1000lb+ classes. OTOH, the transmission stations were filled with highly vulnerable systems that could be taken out of service by shrapnel damage from "near misses"...primarily the transformers and complex mechanical relay (switching) networks which controlled distribution to the German "grid". Wrecking _this equipment _would have caused a *severe *crisis. Production of such complex items required "special" resources (and highly skilled tradesmen); _both_ were in _very short supply_. You can't just expand the production level of something that is only being manufactured on a "shoestring" budget (to meet the needs of ongoing maintenance and limited expansion) overnight, just because you suddenly need to replace a dozen relay stations and their attendant transformers.
> 
> This was a missed opportunity (to be sure) but it still would have required a (relatively speaking) _precision _delivery, one that would have "challenged" the "tech" of the times rather severely.



From the sounds of things, the generating plants would have been good targets for the heavy bombers - B-17s/B-24s and Lancasters - large targets with plenty of area to hit. The transmission station ssounds more like a target for smaller bombers or tactical bombers - such as the Mosquito. The advantage being that they can attack at low altitude and gain a better accuracy rate.




iron man said:


> OTOH, the transportation/coal distribution attacks (which eventually stopped Germany's armamments production in it's tracks)? These could have been pursued much earlier by means of area attacks on the DRG's marshalling yards. Unfortunately, the "precision" component (which sealed the deal; killing the inland waterways and dropping viaducts/collapsing mainline railway tunnels...an exclusively RAF effort, BTW) required daylight air superiority, and thus would not be possible much earlier than historical.



The USAAF did their share of bombing against transportation - as they were directed. The 8th AF had decided to concentrate on oil during the first part of 1944, and had presented the plan to the command, but this was rejected in favour of the Transportation Plan (Portal's?). However, when transportation targets were discounted because of weather they were free to pursue their oil attacks.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 11, 2012)

You guys reminded me that I believe the US (N A) failed to develop an AP bomb in either the 500 or 1,000 pound class. 

Add to that the failure to develop a decent aerially launched torpedo. Wait! Why stop there? How about a decent torpdo of any type. Yes, I know the damned magnetic detonators...


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## wuzak (Feb 18, 2012)

I wonder if the V-1 and V-2 program funding could have been better put to use in getting usable anti-aircraft missiles into service, especially the V-2 program.

The V-2 program took a lot of money and resources for not a lot of results. How many guided and unguided anti-aircraft missiles could have been procured using the same effort? And what effect could they have had on the Alied bombing efforts?


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## Shortround6 (Feb 18, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> You guys reminded me that I believe the US (N A) failed to develop an AP bomb in either the 500 or 1,000 pound class.




US did have the 1600lb AP bomb, which, due to it's thicker walls and nose was actually smaller in diameter than a 1000lb GP bomb. If a plane could lift the weight the 1600lb AP could fit where ever a 1000lb GP could.


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## iron man (Feb 18, 2012)

wuzak said:


> HC bombs? Do you mean MC (Medium Capacity)/General Purpose bombs?
> 
> As for the actual High Capacity bombs, I'm not sure that the USAAF actually had any such bombs. The RAF had at their disposal 2,000lb, 4,000lb, 8,000lb and 12,000lb HC bombs.
> 
> ...



No disrespect intended; my (secondarily supported) hypotheticals are one thing...your last point is 100% at odds with the historical record.


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## wuzak (Feb 19, 2012)

The Transport plan was one of the plans put up prior to the D-Day invasion, another being the Oil Plan proposed by Spaatz. The Transport Plan was chosen by the Allied High Command, and thus the RAF and the USAAF were required to attack the transport infrastructure - which included marshalling yards.

Why would they radar bomb a secondary target and not the primary target?


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## pbfoot (Feb 19, 2012)

Was not the attcak on transportation carried out by 2TAF and 9th AF and not the heavies of BC and 8thAF, theoil plan had been a priority of BC since 1939 except the couldn't hit them and so switched to precision area bombing . Harris had to be pushed and shoved into bombing the POL


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## Milosh (Feb 19, 2012)

iron man, the shock of the exploding bombs would play hell with the bearing of the generators as well as other nasty things to the generators.


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## GrauGeist (Feb 19, 2012)

I believe that the RLM's insistance early on, that all aircraft should be "dive bomb" capable, hindered and delayed otherwise successful aircraft types that the Luftwaffe needed.

Another damaging decision by the RLM, was to ignore the He280's potential along with endorsing Jet Engine development at a time when Germany had ample resources to produce reliable jet engines that performed as intended.


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## syscom3 (Feb 19, 2012)

1) The USAACs criminally slow development of the P38 after Q1 of 1939. And losing the only flying P38 on a cross country publicity stunt was deserving of career ends for some generals.

2) The War Production Boards refusal to allow a 2nd P38 production facility to be built until late in the war when it meant nothing.

3) The USAAFs refusal to produce external drop tanks for use by the P47 and P38 until after heavy bomber losses were to severe to ignore.


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## Freebird (Feb 19, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> The concept of self-defending bomber does seem like blunder.


 
Perhaps the US needed to try fail before understanding this?



pbfoot said:


> Can't beat this ,
> "Less helpful was the continuing disposition to find ways to continue day bombing when there was only one way that could make it effective - the introduction of a true long range fighter to protect the bombers . Churchill had already percieved this necessity but Portal firmly set his face against it . A long range fighter could never hold its own against a short range fighter , it was this attitude that Churchill said "closed many doors"



Portal was still drinking the Trenchard Kool-aid


From the British side:
1.) After the Butte report in the summer of '41 found that bombing effectivness on German targets was next to useless,Bomber Command wasn't redeployed to where it could really make a useful part of the war effort.

2.) Leigh-Mallory's management of the 1941-1942 operations over France. The massive overclaiming (or fraud) was overlooked by the Top Brass, as they didn't want to admit that their plans were a failure. 
Leigh-Mallory reported to Churchill the War Cabinet that they were winning the air battles with the Luftwaffe, when in fact they were losing 4x as many aircraft and at least 8x as many pilots.
Had he been honest enough about the massive disparity vs the Luftwaffe, cabinet might have used this valuable resource in other theaters, where it was desperately needed. (Malaya, Western Desert)


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 22, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> US did have the 1600lb AP bomb, which, due to it's thicker walls and nose was actually smaller in diameter than a 1000lb GP bomb. If a plane could lift the weight the 1600lb AP could fit where ever a 1000lb GP could.



SR, Do you know when this AP Bomb was introduced? The orginal SBD variants would not have been able to carry it. However, the SBD-5 was upgraded to a 1,200 hp Wright 1820-60 engine with deliveries beginning in February 1943. It could apparently carry 2250 pounds with 1,600 # on the centerline station. Sounds like it as made to marry the AP bomb you mention!


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## michaelmaltby (Feb 22, 2012)

Using bombers to flatten Stalingrad (Germans) and Caen (RAF) .... turning both cities into sniper paradise ...

MM


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## A4K (Feb 22, 2012)

The He 177 to be capable of dive-bombing at 400 mph (but not allowing seperate engines) and Me 262s and Ar 234s as bombers, not fighters, have to be among the biggest Luftwaffe blunders.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 22, 2012)

I've read that there was an proposal from BMW to develop the two-stage variant of their 801, but that was rejected, since the new engines would make that one superfulous - wonder if that's a myth? Further info is appreciated in advance


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## parsifal (Feb 22, 2012)

Operationally i see the simulataneous attempt by the LW to maintain air bridges to both Stalingrad and Tunisia as the height of poor judgement. Clearly after Alamein, the Germans should have left Rommel to his fate, and concentrated sll sair assets in trying to keep the eastern front supplied, or at least giving it resources to allow a breakout and a break in to be attrempted simultaneously.

By dissipating limited transport resources the Germans wound up with nothing....worse than nothing, they lost two armies instead of just one. These were the battles that turned the tide and ensured Germany's defeat. with Germany defeated the axis was defeated


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## Siegfried (Feb 22, 2012)

Readie said:


> Mal,
> The LW decision to cease bombing the RAF stations and start area bombing of British cities must rank as one of the all time mistakes in WW2.
> John



I honestly don't think it happened that way. There was no "Area Bombardment" of London or British cities during the BoB. The targets switched to the Docks in support of the u-boat compaign as well as to specific targets within the cities such as transformer substations, oil depots. There was no "area bombardment. Not in London and not in the sense implemented latter by Bomber command. Area bombardment was an specific euphemism for carpet bombing of city centers that compensated for the lack of navigation aids post Butt report. Arthur Harris implemented it, spoke about it with honesty and candour. It was Frederick Lindemann that pushed it against both the moral and tactical objection of many.

The bombing of Conventry, which was probably outside the period that could be regarded as the BoB might loosly be termed area bombardment however it must be noted that certain factories were the specific target and the Luftwaffe had the means to accuratly target them though once it resorted to marker flare bombing much of this was lost. The Luftwaffe used x-gerate, which was about as accurate as Oboe at the ranges and altitudes in question along with marker flare bombing. Coventry was the center of the British machine tool and engine industry and certainly a target. It's been argued plausibly on this site that the besided the primary industrial targets the aim was broadened to destroy housing and prevent reconstruction and manning of factories in this way, though it would be unneccessary to 'broaden the aim point' too much as the housing of he day backed on to the factory walls.

Nevertheless, switching the target from the RAF airfields itself is often regarded as a severe mistake. It can see little to be gained from Bombing the London Docklands to inhibt ship unloading when Liverpool provided an effective alternative port and of course it caused a lot of collateral damage and deaths of innocent civilians living in and around the area and the inevitable escalation of tit for tat that provoked.

So what caused the error? Faulty intelligence? The Luftwaffe didn't know it was on the verge of succeding?

It should be noted that there are alternative views which suggest that RAF fighter production was at such a level that Britiain was in no real danger.


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## johnbr (Feb 22, 2012)

for me it is USA not making the P-38k Germans not making the Arado 440 He 280 with he-006 engine.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 22, 2012)

The US mistakes about (but not only) P-38s are well covered in syscom' post:



> 1) The USAACs criminally slow development of the P38 after Q1 of 1939. And losing the only flying P38 on a cross country publicity stunt was deserving of career ends for some generals.
> 
> 2) The War Production Boards refusal to allow a 2nd P38 production facility to be built until late in the war when it meant nothing.
> 
> 3) The USAAFs refusal to produce external drop tanks for use by the P47 and P38 until after heavy bomber losses were to severe to ignore.



IMO the abundant quantities of P-38s in late 1942 would've had much more impact to the war than a P-38 of really great performance, in late 1943. 

(for 3), USAAF's P-38s were conducting combat sorties with drop tanks from 1942?)


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## GregP (Feb 23, 2012)

I think the biggest aviation-related blunder in WWII for Germany was the decision not to produce a strategic bomber, like the Me 264 or the He-277 or not fixing the Me 109 landing gear issue, take your pick.

For the British, it was not fixing the short range of its fighters.

For the Japanese, it was not figuring out the liquid-cooled engine that ran GREAT in Europe ... the DB 600 series. The Japanese never DID get a liquid-cooled engine aircraft going very well.

For the Italians, it was not figuring out mass production and thinking that perfect aerobatics was the answer to aerial combat! Mostly the mass-production issue.

For the Americans it was not putting a turbocharger into Allison-powered fighters except for the P-38.

For the Russians it was not assasinating Stalin early in the war ... or not letting their pilots think for themselves instead of having them controlled by ground personnell who weren't in the aerial fight at the time.

For the French it was apparently flying any aircraft in WW2.


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## Gixxerman (Feb 23, 2012)

How about Germany not producing the V1 - with range to cover to Portsmouth Southampton - ready to go just 2 weeks earlier than they did?
If they had been able to make up that short space of time begun the campaign against the Southern English ports as the D-day build-up was going at full steam then D-day itself would have been placed in grave danger.

I'd also add in the total failure of LW reconaissance to keep the German command informed that this was happening in S. England.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 23, 2012)

The problem with the V-1 was it's really lousy accuracy. Greater London is over 600Sq miles? The Port Cities were much smaller. A much lager percentage of the V-1s would fallen into the sea or on farmland.


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## Gixxerman (Feb 23, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> The problem with the V-1 was it's really lousy accuracy. Greater London is over 600Sq miles? The Port Cities were much smaller. A much lager percentage of the V-1s would fallen into the sea or on farmland.



For the most part I totally agree with you Shortround6, but that was why I was talking specifically about the timing just before D-day.
The truly vast amount of material gathered ready to go to sea would - I think - have been a perfect target for the V1.

The one proviso being a functioning reconaissance section of the LW before during after the attacks.


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## wuzak (Feb 23, 2012)

Or would dropping them on the invasion beaches been a better idea?

Would teh shorter range allow for better accuracy?


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## tyrodtom (Feb 23, 2012)

wuzak said:


> Or would dropping them on the invasion beaches been a better idea?
> 
> Would teh shorter range allow for better accuracy?


There were more than just allies on the invasion beaches.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 23, 2012)

The Germans were mostly well dug in.


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## renrich (Feb 23, 2012)

The Doolittle raid was a public relations stunt which succeeded but a huge blunder from other points of view. It risked one brand new carrier and another that turned out to be a war winner plus other smaller ships for no significant resultant damage. The Hornet had no chance to work up it's air group while on the wild goose chase which was costly at Midway. The Enterprise was kept from being at Coral Sea. With it's air group present, more damage might might have been done to the IJN and the Lexington might have been better protected.


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## wuzak (Feb 23, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> There were more than just allies on the invasion beaches.



What about after the beaches had been secured by the Allies and were being used to bring in troops and equipment?


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## tyrodtom (Feb 23, 2012)

They started firing the V1 at London one week after D-Day. But London is a big target, some one posted recently 600 sg miles. At that time they were using huge ramps aimed at London. I suspose by the time ramps could have been built aimed at the beaches, they'd be over run. They didn't know where the invasion would be until it happened.
They fired a combined 5700 V1 and V2's at Antwerp, but didn't even manage one death per missile, though all the alerts had to have disrupted operations some.


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## wuzak (Feb 23, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> They started firing the V1 at London one week after D-Day. But London is a big target, some one posted recently 600 sg miles. At that time they were using huge ramps aimed at London. I suspose by the time ramps could have been built aimed at the beaches, they'd be over run. They didn't know where the invasion would be until it happened.
> They fired a combined 5700 V1 and V2's at Antwerp, but didn't even manage one death per missile, though all the alerts had to have disrupted operations some.



But doesn't that count as a blunder?

They knew, for some time, that an invasion was coming in the west.

Why then did they build fixed installations, rather than the mobile launchers they used later? If they had been set up to use mobile launchers from the start they would have provided a more flexible system, and may have proved more valuable - especially if targetted at the invasion beachs and the temporary harbour the Allies had set up.


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## GrauGeist (Feb 24, 2012)

GregP said:


> I think the biggest aviation-related blunder in WWII for Germany was the decision not to produce a strategic bomber, like the Me 264 or the He-277 or not fixing the Me 109 landing gear issue, take your pick...


While the Me264 had excellent potential, Germany did not have a long range fighter to protect it at the time it was being developed.

As for the Bf109's landing gear...the design did allow for a much lower cost in production and maintenance. The fixed tail wheel later on was one step to cure that.


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## GregP (Feb 24, 2012)

Not having a long range fighter is no excuse for not having a strategic bomber if you are taking on the world in 1939. It was one of the Thrid Reich's worst downfalls along with having Adoph Hitler as a chief executive and Goering as any position with command authority.

They STILL might have won of they had a strategic bomber, crews, armament, and gas to fly them, and had been nice to the peoples they conquered ... oh, and ... not having attacked the Soviet Unoin. Bad decision in the extreme. Attacking Russia is like sticking your finger into an ant nest; it hurts. Just try it and see.

GrauGeist, you are local. Why not come out to the Planes of Fame and see me any Saturday? I'd be glad to show you around. Ask for Greg Pascal.


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## Tante Ju (Feb 24, 2012)

GregP said:


> I think the biggest aviation-related blunder in WWII for Germany was the decision not to produce a strategic bomber, like the Me 264 or the He-277 or not fixing the Me 109 landing gear issue, take your pick.



Heinkel He 177 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

But I strongly doubt that it would be that advantage for German. I don't see how a single He 177 can do the same job much better than two Ju 88s or He 111.. you do not get but about half the number of heavy strategic bomber than a twin bomber. If France had not fallen, the He 177 would have importance, because basis from England for example would be further. But in practice, the only difference was that He 177s bombing England could do it even from taking off from Germany, just as He 111s could do the same in 1940 by taking off from France bases..


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## Shortround6 (Feb 24, 2012)

The Germans did have a strategic bomber in 1939. It was called the He 111. Britain's best strategic bomber at the time was the Armstrong Whitworth Whitley. The French had a few dozen strategic bombers in service. These:

http://www.avionslegendaires.net/Images/Gf222.jpg

German's problem was not the lack of a 4 engined big bomber, it was the the size of their industry in relation to what they were trying to do. Every 4 engined bomber in 1939-40 was TWO He 111s not built. No real increase in bombs on target or in targets that could be hit with any worthwhile tonnage of bombs.

The Germans could bomb Belfast from bases in France so even without France "Falling" a good deal of eastern England was in range even if France didn't fall.


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## tyrodtom (Feb 24, 2012)

wuzak said:


> But doesn't that count as a blunder?
> 
> They knew, for some time, that an invasion was coming in the west.
> 
> Why then did they build fixed installations, rather than the mobile launchers they used later? If they had been set up to use mobile launchers from the start they would have provided a more flexible system, and may have proved more valuable - especially if targetted at the invasion beachs and the temporary harbour the Allies had set up.



They knew the invasion was coming, but not where.

Things are developed as they are developed. The long ramps were developed first, the aerial launches and portable ramps were developed as the need come about.

If you look at the V1 and V2 bombardment of Antwerp, which is an example of a closer target. I think it shows neither system was accurate enough to hit the invasion beaches.

Though i'm sure someone will post that they were just a few weeks from developing a missile to do just that with 100% accuracy.


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## Gixxerman (Feb 24, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> Though i'm sure someone will post that they were just a few weeks from developing a missile to do just that with 100% accuracy.



What?
You have doubts?
Didn't you know 'final victory' was imminent ......before everything unfairly stopped that little bit too early denying the world the sight of the true magnificence sheer élan of the technical wonder that was German arms in WW2.

They had bases in the Antartic, flying saucers, a time machine and everything you know......there's a doumentary about the moon bases and the coming return of the Herrenvolk.

(well 'they' hide it in plain sight calling it 'just a film' or 'based on a novel' but some of us know the real truth, the special secrets....)


Honest, it's all true, I read it in a book.


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## Siegfried (Feb 24, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> They knew the invasion was coming, but not where.
> 
> Things are developed as they are developed. The long ramps were developed first, the aerial launches and portable ramps were developed as the need come about.
> 
> ...



Speak of the devil, and here I am.

The V1 guidence system that was about to become opperational was called Ewald II - Sauekirsche. Ewald-II was the pulse transmitter on the missile. Saurkirsche (Sauer Cherry) the receivers in the ground stations. The ground stations were under construction with one completed. I can find the name of the location of the Station in Holland when I get home to my books.


Ewald-II worked by the V1 sending out a single coded pulse on a pre determined frequency at an predetermined time. Three ground stations received this pulse, and transmitted the resultant time of arrivals to one of the three stations. The Three time differences formed the parameters of a simultaneous equation that was used to solve for the exact position of the V1. This technique is called trilateration. Modern GPS works much the same way, though in reverse.

A course correction was transmitted as a single burst to the receiver "Mosel" which was an endless loop magnetic tape (a German invention) which had 5 heads, this decoded the instructions to provide both control and further jam resistance. Ewald-II was a midcouse correction system designed to be resistant to jamming, however if the V1 was used at short ranges and the course correction applied only a short distance, say 10km, before the impact point it would be capable of considerable accuracy. Drift of the V1 using its dead reckoning odometer system seems to have been about 2% so a course correct 10km before target should produce an error of about 200m on top of the 100m or so of radar instruments.

Hence an accuracy of about 300m or so seems achievable iin this situation (short range attack against beachead)

In addition there was the "Radischien" passive radar homming receiver which could home on to Chain Home, Chain Home Low, SCR-270 and Loran stations as well as MAX-P which could home on to allied centrimetric radars. (Originally designed for SAM attacks on to H2S) Radischien was tested against dummy radar targets and got to within 5 m via BV-246 glide bimb

An earlier V1 system "Ewald - Minerva" only used two ground stations, which tracked the Ewald transmitter as it begand broadcasting at various points of the flight via triangulation/durection finding. Initially about 5% of missiles had this system. The idea was to correct for the wind drift of subsequent missiles. Towards the end of the war nearly 50% were equiped with this kit suggesting the Germans were increasingly suspicious of the information they were getting from their agents.

The A to E versions of the V1 had a cruise speed of only 580km/h (361 mph). F version, launched first in march 1945 had a cruise speed of 630km/h (390 mph). These speeds were already at the limits of what a piston engined aircraft running on 100/150 could achive at low altitude.

in the same month, an experimental v1 reached 815km/h using a modified engine with improved fuel injection. such fast missiles would be very hard to intercept, even by jets.

The V1 was about to become a new and potently effective weapon.


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## michaelmaltby (Feb 24, 2012)

".. Speak of the devil, and here I am.. "

On cue, 

MM


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## johnbr (Feb 24, 2012)

Siegfried good post on the V-1 on the V-1.I would have air launch it from day one.On a second jen one put fuel in the wings and and the pabst ramjet engine.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 24, 2012)

Wonder if any of the belligerents was messing with passive radio homing, to produce anti-radiation missile?


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## Gixxerman (Feb 24, 2012)

johnbr said:


> Siegfried good post on the V-1 on the V-1.I would have air launch it from day one.On a second jen one put fuel in the wings and and the pabst ramjet engine.



Obviously I have to rely on what I've read but I have seen it said that airlaunching a V1 at night was a very dangerous prospect for the launching crew.
Apparantly the exhaust flame was highly visible at night patrolling Mossies (also having good radar by this stage - along with the RAF taking the first steps in AWACS) would have been savage against any He111 caught doing so (even if it was a late He 111 H22 model with the Jumo 213's a heap of armour on it).
I'm sure I've also read that the final section of the pulse jet engine glowed a nice cherry red at night after running a while.

The V1 concept as a weapons system is perfectly valid (it is afterall the great grandfather of the modern cruise missile) but the tech of the day left the execution desperately lacking.


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## Siegfried (Feb 25, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> Wonder if any of the belligerents was messing with passive radio homing, to produce anti-radiation missile?



" The BV 246 glide bomb was revived in early 1945 to use the "Radieschen" (Radish) ultra-short wave passive homing device which would home into enemy radars. The new BV 246 had a modified nose to house the "Radieschen", and it acted on the gyroscopic control equipment for the rudders and elevator. Ten of the modified BV 246 "Radieschen" equipped glide bombs were tested on the Unterlüss test range, but due to the new equipment being under development, eight of the tests failed, *although two of the tests were successful, landing within two meters (6 feet) of the target.* Although over 1000 BV 246 glide bombs were produced, none were used operationally."

Radieschien was targeted at radars or navigation aids such as CH, CHL, SCR-270, Loran. It was orginally developed for the Fritz-X fall bomb. There was a radar homming head called MAX-P by Blaupunkt for homming on to the centrimetric H2S/H2X emissions of Allied ground mapping radars and night fighters. Although designed for installation on SAM missiles such as Wasserfall and the HS 297 Schmeterling I see no reason it could not have been adapted to home onto ground based radars.

The BV-246 glide bomb was originally intended to work via radio guidance, presumably a system the same as the Ewald-II system being readied for the V1 but was suspended while guidance work was completed. It was a very elegant looking missile reminiscent of a high performance sail plane. It's glide ratio of 25:1 suggests a luanch from a FW 190 at 8000m (26500ft) would achieve a range of 200km (120 miles). There was also MAX-A (A for Active) which was a version of MAX-P with a transmitter for terminal homming for SAM missiles, it used an 8 segment continious wave magnetron at 5.8cm. MAX-A was complete as a gound based test system. I'd also come across references to an active radar homming anti shipping missile called "Pirat", likely only a projection.

There were also a number of infrared systems such as Kiel and Hamburg which were tested in the nose of aircraft against various targets and in some versions were to be capable of passive infrared homming against ships or blast furnances. In general it was found these system required the complication of gyro-stabalisatio of the seeker head and the more complicated rossette scanning patterns as opposed to conical scanning.

A similar sstem was the USN "BAT" active radar homming glide bomb, used after the European war was over, against Japanese shipping.

The same circuitry used to achieve range gate lock on and then subsquent azimuth/elevation lock on for AAA gunnery radars would have been adapted for use against sea targets. The German Mannheim FuSE 64 radar was capable or range gate lock on by early 1944 so the Germans should have been capable of this type of technology. Having said that, the idea of making a device with nearly 100 vacuum tubes reliable and affordable in war time Germany suggests this would have remained a US weapon only.


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## syscom3 (Feb 25, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> IMO the abundant quantities of P-38s in late 1942 would've had much more impact to the war than a P-38 of really great performance, in late 1943.



In 1939, if the *ONLY* P38 made wouldn't have been crashed and development was continued, there would have been an outside chance for a combat ready version to be in production by mid 1940. 

Wouldn't the air war in Europe and Africa look different if the long legged P38 was flying over Germany in those years of the war.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 25, 2012)

Sys, I'm on the same ship with you re. good numbers of P-39s early up, but 'my year' is 1942, not 1940. That was also the time 1st drop tanks were installed, since the idea was to ship them way above Axis subs.
Within the 2 months after the XP-38 crashed, Lockheed received an order for 13 YP-38s, indicating that people at AAC were confident, if not impressed with plane's abilities. In the book about P-38 by Bodie, it's clearly stated that neither B. Kelsey nor K. Johnson did not feel that crash messed with P-38 programme. If we want P-38s to make anything important in 1940, it's good to remember that both Lockheed Allison were pretty small companies prior 1940, compared with eg. Douglas, Curtiss-Wright P&W. Lockheed was employing as much as 500 people a day, but that's 1941 we are talking. Allison was shipping under 10 engines per month prior May 1940, and in 1940-41 most of them were allocated for P-39 P-40.
So I do not see that really big number of P-38s could've been made prior mid 1941, unless we want to waive 2 of those fighters for each P-38.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 25, 2012)

Tomo, I think the case for earlier P-38's (without the crash) is one wherein production of a war ready bird benefits from earlier experiments that are hoped would have brought to light the compessibilty problem and accelerated earlier fixes no matter how temporary. (I guess I mean an earlier P38F)


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## tomo pauk (Feb 25, 2012)

Your idea has merit, since it was not until Oct 1940 the 1st YP-38 was flying. That leaves ample time for flying tests (20 months) for the XP-38, of course without the crash. So the compressibility heater issues can be identified taken care of even prior US entrance in war?
(P-38F was not equiped with dive flaps, nor with boosted ailerons, and the heater was troublesome even in 1944 - but then, perhaps someone could share some info how the Alaska P-38's pilots fared?)


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## Siegfried (Feb 26, 2012)

Tante Ju said:


> Heinkel He 177 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> 
> But I strongly doubt that it would be that advantage for German. I don't see how a single He 177 can do the same job much better than two Ju 88s or He 111.. you do not get but about half the number of heavy strategic bomber than a twin bomber. If France had not fallen, the He 177 would have importance, because basis from England for example would be further. But in practice, the only difference was that He 177s bombing England could do it even from taking off from Germany, just as He 111s could do the same in 1940 by taking off from France bases..



The Heinkel He 177 could carry 3 times of the load of the He 111, about twice the distance. It could so so with the same number of crew members. Morover it could so so with much more armament notably in the form of a 20mm tail gun, potentially a twin 20mm power driven turret.

The RAF managed to get the Lancaster and Halifax opperational by Jan 1941. The Stirling and Manchester way before then.

The Luftwaffe took nearly 2 maybe 3 year longer to get hold of a somewhat debugged He 177. It was a poor performance. Ernst Heinkel begged for a 4 seperate engined version (He 177B) to be built concurrently. He was no less prescient than AVRO's Chadwick in this regard. 

Had they achieve the same deadlines as the RAF did with Halifax/Lancaster then the Heinkel's first mission could have been a medium altitude attack on Nelson, Rodney and KGV. As the Japanese showed a year latter when they sank KGV sister the PoW hits can be obtained this way. The aircraft would be too concerned twisting to avoid the bombs than the be attack Bismark.

It's clear that with 4 seperate DB601, Jumo 211J or DB605 they would have a very good aircraft. The BMW 801D could easily have been fitted to produce a 330mph aircraft immune to Martlets/Wildcats, Sea Hurricanes and Coastal Command Beaufighters due to its speed.

While I can't see the point in producing a massive strategic bomber force equal to the RAF Halfix/Lancaster and USAAF B-24/B-17 but I do see 2000 or so being used in the maritime reconaisance bomber role, thus freeing up several hundred FW 200 for transport duties. They could also being employed in occaisional night raids and raids into Soviet Territory, using Fritz-X to wreck havoc on factories, Dams, Power station thus somewhat compensating for their small numbers.


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## Vincenzo (Feb 26, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> The RAF managed to get the Lancaster and Halifax opperational by Jan 1941. The Stirling and Manchester way before then.
> .



the first mission of lancaster was on the night 3/4 march 1942, in january 1941 get the first flight. Halifax first mission was on night 11/12 march 1941, Stirling on 10/11 february 41, Manchester on 24/25 february 41


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## Siegfried (Feb 27, 2012)

Vincenzo said:


> the first mission of lancaster was on the night 3/4 march 1942, in january 1941 get the first flight. Halifax first mission was on night 11/12 march 1941, Stirling on 10/11 february 41, Manchester on 24/25 february 41



Whoops, it's obvious I drooped a year in my dates, however with the RAF achieving Manchester and Stirling opperations by early 1941 the Luftwaffe could have achieved opperation of the Ju 89, by then powered by DB601 engines of adaquet power. I beleive it could easily have matched the He 177B with the Lancasters entry into service as a 4 engined aircraft.


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## Elmas (Feb 28, 2012)

By my personal point of view, one of the blunders was the stubborness of Sir W. Churchill and Sir A. Harris in willing to send everything that had more than one engine and could fly to bomb Germany instead to patrol the Bay of Biscay....



Shortround6 said:


> .........................
> German's problem was not the lack of a 4 engined big bomber, it was the the size of their industry in relation to what they were trying to do. Every 4 engined bomber in 1939-40 was TWO He 111s not built. No real increase in bombs on target or in targets that could be hit with any worthwhile tonnage of bombs.
> ......................





Gixxerman said:


> What?
> You have doubts?
> Didn't you know 'final victory' was imminent ......before everything unfairly stopped that little bit too early denying the world the sight of the true magnificence sheer élan of the technical wonder that was German arms in WW2.
> ................
> Honest, it's all true, I read it in a book.



I agree. Some Gentlemen here seem to underestimate rather lightly some other aspects that are rather important to win a war....

In 1944 a Squadron Leader with his wingman of a Spitfire Unit, very short of juice, landed in a 8th Air Force Base, and stopped not far from a bowser that was refuelling a B-17.
They asked to refuel the Spits and the responsible Petty Officer asked of much fuel was required.
When the P.O. had the figure, he searched briefly in his pocket “ _If you are in a hurry take this, here there’s more than enough gas for your plane....”_ said to the British Pilot giving him his Zippo.......
I’m sure that in some Geschwader, first of all the Training Units, even one half of the content of that Zippo would have been more than welcome.....


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## renrich (Feb 29, 2012)

Actually, as far as the US was concerned a successful development and deployment of drop tanks for all AAF and USN fighters pre war would have made a huge difference.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 29, 2012)

Indeed; the P-47 was suffering in that particular field for more than half a year.


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## renrich (Feb 29, 2012)

The short range of the F4F was a real handicap for the Pacific Fleet. Drop tanks eventually helped a great deal.


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## Elmas (Mar 1, 2012)

Gixxerman said:


> What?
> You have doubts?
> Didn't you know 'final victory' was imminent ......before everything unfairly stopped that little bit too early denying the world the sight of the true magnificence sheer élan of the technical wonder that was German arms in WW2.
> ...........



These were found on the walls of the Italian towns occupied by the Nazis, 1943-45:







They say, first page

“_While the V1 repays the Englishmen for the terroristic raids over Europe, Germany has new weapons ready for getting the final victory_”

second page
“_Marching together will continue until the Victory......._”

If they were not so tragical ( not only because millions of people were dying in those years, but also in the sense that there seems that today there are more people that give them credit than it was in those years......) they would be utterly humoristic......


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## Denniss (Mar 1, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> The Heinkel He 177 could carry 3 times of the load of the He 111, about twice the distance. It could so so with the same number of crew members..


No it couldn't. It was capable of carrying twice the load of the He 111H (4 tonnes) at a distance of about 2900km while the He 111H could carry two tonnes at about 2100km. It was able to carry one tonne about 4800km. All km values overall range, not penetration depth/combat range. Max speed is given as 550 km/h in 6.8km but that's just with 30min engine power rating


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## Vincenzo (Mar 1, 2012)

the He 177 could carry 3 times the load of He 111H, for true more could carry 7 ton (2x1800kg and 2x1700 kg). probably could carry the same load of 111H (2 ton) for twice the distance. 
link old thread on 177 http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/heinkel-he-177-data-17353.html


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## HubertCumberdale (Mar 2, 2012)

Hi All, my first post here.

I could add Bomber Command's failure to realise early enough that astral navigation was useless, and on the flip side, once they had excellent radar/radio navigation systems in place, to realise their potential for precision strikes at night. 

I could also add the failure to equip the Fleet Air Arm with decent aircraft. Nice carriers lads, shame about the things they carry!

But really, these are small fry compared to the one big humongous failure of the Luftwaffe to learn any lessons from the attrition of the BoB. 

While the western allies overestimated the Luftwaffe's strength, they recognised that even so it was insufficient to win a decisive battle. So they set about creating production targets that would see a massive expansion in their air forces.

On the other hand, the Luftwaffe, having already found a match in the air force of a small soggy island, then proceeded to go to war additionally against Russia and then the USA as well. All of this with an airforce effectively the same size as it had started the war with, but qualitatively worse off due to aircrew attrition in 1940. The Luftwaffe also learned far too late the value of the fighter, despite the fact that fighter numbers were the limiting factor in how many bombers they could field over southern England in 1940. Indeed, the fighter corps remained the 'black sheep' of the Luftwaffe family throughout the war.

All of this meant that in the crucial air battles of '41-'43, the Luftwaffe would be at a considerable quantitative and increasingly qualitative disadvantage as the war went on. So much so that by D-Day, the Luftwaffe was an irrelevance. Everything else is details.


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## Elmas (Mar 2, 2012)

Denniss said:


> No it couldn't. It was capable of carrying twice the load of the He 111H (4 tonnes) at a distance of about 2900km while the He 111H could carry two tonnes at about 2100km. It was able to carry one tonne about 4800km. All km values overall range, not penetration depth/combat range. Max speed is given as 550 km/h in 6.8km but that's just with 30min engine power rating



Where the Luftwaffe was to find the petrol to refuel a couple of dozens of Squadrons of HE 177s, training included?
I'm very curious about that....


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## Denniss (Mar 2, 2012)

Vincenzo said:


> the He 177 could carry 3 times the load of He 111H, for true more could carry 7 ton (2x1800kg and 2x1700 kg). probably could carry the same load of 111H (2 ton) for twice the distance.
> link old thread on 177 http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/heinkel-he-177-data-17353.html


Yes, it could carry 3x the load of the He 111H and could have twice the range of the He 111H but not at the same time. 3x load but at a greatly reduced range of ~1100km, twice the range may be possible with a load of 2t .


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## syscom3 (Mar 2, 2012)

Elmas said:


> Where the Luftwaffe was to find the petrol to refuel a couple of dozens of Squadrons of HE 177s, training included?
> I'm very curious about that....



Some people have wondered about that too. Heavy bomber ops are fuel intensive, and fuel was not something Germany had in abundance


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## Elmas (Mar 3, 2012)

syscom3 said:


> Some people have wondered about that too. Heavy bomber ops are fuel intensive, and fuel was not something Germany had in abundance



Certainly, but in the battles with this






that someone likes to play in this forum, fuel has not importance whatsoever....


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 3, 2012)

Elmas said:


> Certainly, but in the battles with this
> 
> 
> 
> ...



I think red is about to be flanked by green!  

There is a supposedly old saying about military matters: _*"amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics."*_


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## Dcazz7606 (Mar 3, 2012)

I haven't read every thread but... I think one of the bigger US blunders was not bombing parralell to Allied lines during operation Cobra as requested by the army. They killed a lot of American troops including Gen. McNair. Effects on german troops would have been much worse as well.


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## pbfoot (Mar 3, 2012)

Dcazz7606 said:


> I haven't read every thread but... I think one of the bigger US blunders was not bombing parralell to Allied lines during operation Cobra as requested by the army. They killed a lot of American troops including Gen. McNair. Effects on german troops would have been much worse as well.


same thing here
"On August 8th, Simonds requested the US Air Force to provide aerial bombing support. At 1300, 678 aircraft flew over German positions. The German Flak countered with accurate fire and several aircraft were hit. The leader of a 12-bomber squadron being heavily damaged dropped his bomb load before reaching its target and the other aircraft, reacting automatically did the same. The bombs fell far behind the combat line but in an area that was filled with Allied troops waiting to move up to the front. Some 65 men were killed and 250 wounded from the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and from the 1st Polish Armoured Division, not to mention equipment losses. Major-General Rod Keller, the commander of the 3rd Division was among those injured."
which is a great reason to have every reason to bomb on their own


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## syscom3 (Mar 4, 2012)

The 8th AF had been ordered by SHAEFto bomb parallel. But the 8th BC staff officers refused this order and changed the plans without notification. They were apparently afraid of losses due to the length of time they would be exposed to flak while on the bomb runs.

I think it was borderline cowardice by the staff officers.


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## bobbysocks (Mar 5, 2012)

leaving goering in charge of the lw....


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## Denniss (Mar 7, 2012)

bobbysocks said:


> leaving goering in charge of the lw....


AKA "The Big Fat Man" or "The Snowman"


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## Readie (Mar 8, 2012)

The French's complete lack of an effective fighter to fend of the LW as the German's advanced into France.
And then the cheeky B's blame the British for not defending them..
John


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## tomo pauk (Mar 8, 2012)

French did have far more problems than a lack of a really high-performance fighter. 
They lacked the vision doctrine at high level that would put the planes into a good use. Eg. Germans were issuing 3 sorties per plane per day during BoF, French maybe one? They were lacking a competent system that would detect incoming enemy planes, guiding fighters to intercept them - an MS-406 at 15000 ft is a far better asset than Spit XIV on the ground. The absence of a 25 mile, water filled trench made possible for Germans to park their tanks at the airports, since the French army was also ill suitable (despite their good hardware) to forestall that. 
Any blaming of the Brits for not defending them, if indeed that happened, is ridiculous.


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## Readie (Mar 8, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> Any blaming of the Brits for not defending them, if indeed that happened, is ridiculous.



Its still a bone of contention with the French the fact that the RAF command withdrew from France to preserve our fighters for the perceived BoB to come.

John


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## Denniss (Mar 8, 2012)

The french had indeed some very good fighters but, as with the army and their tanks, they lacked proper strategy/tactics to use them.


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## Milosh (Mar 8, 2012)

Readie said:


> Its still a bone of contention with the French the fact that the RAF command withdrew from France to preserve our fighters for the perceived BoB to come.
> 
> John



Not only the RAF but also the Army which the French claim retreated opening their flank to German assault.


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## Gixxerman (Mar 9, 2012)

Readie said:


> Its still a bone of contention with the French the fact that the RAF command withdrew from France to preserve our fighters for the perceived BoB to come.
> 
> John



I can understand that to a limited extent.....I mean, when you have had such a total utter national catastrophe (which the numbers indicate ought never have happened or at least been quite so bad) then casting around for someone else to blame is not exactly unknown.

Afterall, if you can't shift at least some of the blame, however absurdly, to someone else then all that is left is to stand all alone forced to take absolutely all of the criticisms brickbats.......and as you try to rebuild recover after said total utter national catastrophe that might not be a good thing to be doing or a wise position to place yourself in. 
Particularly if you have a large communist element in your body politic itching to destroy what little is left of that body politic.

Rumours during the war are one thing (and 10 a penny).
My bet is that the postwar French leadership were quite candid about this to the then British Gov too (which explains the muted reactions rather than forceful condemnations perhaps chilled bilateral affairs aone might expect).

We won - and so too ultimately did France - so we could afford to let it be let it go.


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## michaelmaltby (Mar 9, 2012)

From "B of B Turnaround Time" thread, h/t DaveBender:

"... *Sortie Rate*


Per "The Blitzkrieg Myth" by John Mosier.
During the invasion of France Luftwaffe aircraft averaged 3 sorties per day. RAF aircraft averaged 2. *French aircraft averaged 1.*

I have no other source for these sortie rates so I cannot confirm them..."

Speaks volumes ..

MM


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## JAG88 (Jun 19, 2012)

Milosh said:


> Not only the RAF but also the Army which the French claim retreated opening their flank to German assault.



I thought they were more pissed off by, you know, getting shot in the back in their naval bases...

They also seemed to have remembered that in WWI the French Army commander had to go stop the commander of the BEF since he was already heading back for England after the first engagements with the German Army. What was the phrase? "Monsieur le Marechal, the honour of England is at stake!"

Plus, there was the sentiment that England had been systematically undermining French policy regarding Germany.

In any case, put the entire RAF in France and the Luftwaffe would have simply destroyed it, no radar means no GCI, no channel means you will be overrun in short order anyways. The RAF didnt fare well in France either.


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## Tankworks (Jun 19, 2012)

Don't know if this was mentioned before but I look to the obstruction of Harris to allowing diversion of some of the long range heavies to patrol for U-boats. Britain was being starved and the losses incurred in one night-bombing raid would have provided enough aircraft to make a real difference in the U-boat war. Instead the RAF had to wait for Liberators to become avialable, a delay which cost dearly in men and materiel.


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## GregP (Jun 19, 2012)

One of the greatest blunders was put into action by the War Materiel Board in the U.S.A.

They elected tor emove the turbocharger from both the P039 and P-40, relegating them to medium altitudes for their lifetimes, and removing the Allison's high-altiitude abilities except in teh P-38 Lightning. Had they left the turbos in those two fighters, we well might have seena different history of same.


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## wuzak (Jun 20, 2012)

GregP said:


> One of the greatest blunders was put into action by the War Materiel Board in the U.S.A.
> 
> They elected tor emove the turbocharger from both the P039 and P-40, relegating them to medium altitudes for their lifetimes, and removing the Allison's high-altiitude abilities except in teh P-38 Lightning. Had they left the turbos in those two fighters, we well might have seena different history of same.


 
The P-40 never had a turbocharger to begin with.


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## Edgar Brooks (Jun 20, 2012)

JAG88 said:


> I thought they were more pissed off by, you know, getting shot in the back in their naval bases...


They had, in fact, been issued with an ultimatum, to disable, or position, their ships, so that the Germans couldn't use them. Some ships were sailed off to be interred, while those that didn't, due to their senior officers' intransigence, were hit. Gentlemanly behaviour rarely survives, in war.


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## stona (Jun 20, 2012)

Milosh said:


> Not targeting the German power generating plants. There was only a handful that generated most of the power for Germany. Knocking these out would have brought Germany industry to an abrupt stop.



Operation Chastise ?


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## stona (Jun 20, 2012)

wuzak said:


> The V-2 program took a lot of money and resources for not a lot of results. How many guided and unguided anti-aircraft missiles could have been procured using the same effort? And what effect could they have had on the Alied bombing efforts?



One of the unexpected bonuses of the RAF's Peenemunde raid was the death of Dr Thiel,the propulsion specialist also responsible for the Wasserfall anti aircraft rocket system. His killing caused delays and the system never made it into production.
Cheers
Steve


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## Shortround6 (Jun 20, 2012)

GregP said:


> One of the greatest blunders was put into action by the War Materiel Board in the U.S.A.
> 
> They elected tor emove the turbocharger from both the P039 and P-40, relegating them to medium altitudes for their lifetimes, and removing the Allison's high-altiitude abilities except in teh P-38 Lightning. Had they left the turbos in those two fighters, we well might have seena different history of same.



This belongs in the Greatest myth section. 

In the case of the P-39 the "claimed" performance was _never_ proved and unless you think the NACA was a bunch of incompetent idiots ( like some writers and people on the internet) the P-39 had a lot of trouble accepting a turbo *AND* an inter cooler. 

The at the time of the 1939 Army fighter trails had the XP-37 since 1937 and had ordered 13 YP-37s in 1938. As a result of the 1939 fighter trails the Army ordered the P-43 _with_ turbo. Curtiss also had a radial engine P-36 with mechanical two stage R-1830 at the trails and Seversky had several airplanes with superchargers that were more than single speed-single stage. details are confusing and contradictory. The P-40s were ordered without turbos because with the world situation the USAAC needed some sort of fighters and needed them soon. The P-36 was obviously way behind the "world standard" ( Spitfires, Hurricanes and Bf 109s). I have mentioned this before. The army thought the turbo would delay production by at least a year over the normal time to get fighters into production. Adoption of the turbo "models" of the P-40 and P-39 might have meant better aircraft in 1942 but it would have meant 2000 fewer fighters available in the spring of 1942 and a lot fewer pilots trained in high performance aircraft.


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## JAG88 (Jun 20, 2012)

Edgar Brooks said:


> They had, in fact, been issued with an ultimatum, to disable, or position, their ships, so that the Germans couldn't use them. Some ships were sailed off to be interred, while those that didn't, due to their senior officers' intransigence, were hit. Gentlemanly behaviour rarely survives, in war.



They were already positioned in Africa... and I dont see why an ultimatum with a gun to your back makes it any better. The fact that when the day came the French did honor their previous commitments (in spite of the British actions) and sank their ships when the Germans did try to grab them does put the British actions under an even worse light.

I mean, first you desert them and then you shoot them? Thats simply low.


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## nuuumannn (Jun 20, 2012)

> I mean, first you desert them and then you shoot them? Thats simply low



That's also rubbish; as you read from previous pages, that's not what happened. The ultimatum at Oran was unfortune and sad and gave the British no pleasure, but what would you have them do? The Germans most certainly would have found use for those ships. It was either sink them there or risk their use as the Germans used their own heavy units - as commerce raiders. The consequences of that would have been devastating; with the small number of heavy ships the Kriegsmarine had created havoc among convoys from March 1941.


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## JAG88 (Jun 21, 2012)

Feeling bad about something bad that you do, does not exonerate you in any way. "I am sorry, I really felt bad when I stabbed her to death, but I was afraid she might run away with someone else..."

The French had promised not to allow Germany to use their ships and the Germans had agreed to that.

In any case? What is what didn't happen? The desertion? The British did not commit their full strength to the battle and withdrew after Dunkirk, France kept on fighting so they did have a reason to feel deserted.

Being shot in the back is not true? An ultimatum at gunpoint is just that, appearing ready for battle in front of moored ships, boarding/assaulting unsuspecting ships in port, mining the harbour even before said ultimatum expires... that is pretty low, I understand that an "alternative interpretation" of those facts has always been aggressively promoted in the anglo world, but that argument simply does not hold water.

"We had to do it and we felt bad about it." The first part is false, the second is irrelevant.


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## nuuumannn (Jun 21, 2012)

> The French had promised not to allow Germany to use their ships and the Germans had agreed to that.



D'ya really think the Germans would have honoured that? C'mon!

Why should Britain have had to commit their full strength to the Battle of France? Sure, France was an ally, but what were the French doing whilst the British were evacuating from Dunkirk? Capitulating, that's what. France did more harm to itself in its own attitude to the German invasion (and its own unpreparedness) than Britain evacuating could have done. The situation in France was untenable and another influx of troops and several more squadrons of Hurricanes from the UK was not going to make a difference. You also know about the looming Battle of Britain. If I were in Britain's shoes, I wouldn't have stayed either! 

Also, you haven't answered my question about what would you have Britain do regarding the French ships falling into German hands. They most certainly would have used them against British merchant shipping and you're dreaming to think otherwise. Between January and March 1940, four German heavy units (Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Admiral Sheer and Hipper) sank a combined total of 43 ships totalling 261,661 grt. That figure doesn't take into account losses from U-boats or armed marchant cruisers.


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## Francis marliere (Jun 21, 2012)

nuuumannn said:


> Also, you haven't answered my question about what would you have Britain do regarding the French ships falling into German hands. They most certainly would have used them against British merchant shipping and you're dreaming to think otherwise. Between January and March 1940, four German heavy units (Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Admiral Sheer and Hipper) sank a combined total of 43 ships totalling 261,661 grt. That figure doesn't take into account losses from U-boats or armed marchant cruisers.



Germany could not use easily the French ships, for several reasons.

The first is political. Hitler didn't have a great interest in navy. If he tried to catch the fleet, France would not surrender. That means more looses for German armed forces, and more troops to garrison France after the conquest.
It would have been very difficult to size the fleet by force, as the scutling of november 1942 proves.
Germany didn't have the spares and industrial basis for operating a larger, foreign fleet. It would take years before ships could be operationnal (I assume that the French Navy would destroy spares, ammunitions, bases, etc.).
Germany didn't have either the manpower to man ships. Where would Germany find 50.000 trained men to man French ships ?
Germany didn't have enough oil to operate a large fleet.
French ships didn't fit well German's needs. Most ships have close range and couldn't be used as raiders. Old battleships were really obsolete with poor guns, armor and fire control. Submarines were by far inferior to U-boats. Destroyers were poor escorts with weak AA and ASW armament. Richelieu and Jean-Bart were not finished yet and would need a lot of time before they get ready for operation. Only Dunkerque and Strasbourg could be used as Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were. The problem is that these ships were in the Mediterranean and could not exit in the Atlantic. 

Best regards,

Francis Marliere


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## rank amateur (Jun 21, 2012)

Francis marliere said:


> Germany could not use easily the French ships, for several reasons.
> 
> The first is political. Hitler didn't have a great interest in navy. If he tried to catch the fleet, France would not surrender. That means more looses for German armed forces, and more troops to garrison France after the conquest.
> It would have been very difficult to size the fleet by force, as the scutling of november 1942 proves.
> ...



This may all be very true but it is 20 20 hind sight. I don't think the Royal Navy was willing to take the risk. 
.Furthermore, you don't need superior equipment to seriously damage the Allied merchant fleet.


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## stona (Jun 21, 2012)

Francis marliere said:


> Germany could not use easily the French ships, for several reasons.
> 
> The first is political. Hitler didn't have a great interest in navy. If he tried to catch the fleet, France would not surrender. That means more looses for German armed forces, and more troops to garrison France after the conquest.
> It would have been very difficult to size the fleet by force, as the scutling of november 1942 proves.
> ...



Good grief,this beggars belief.
Why would the Kriegsmarine have to operate or maintain these vessels?
As far as anyone knew at the time the French Navy would have operated them for the germans. the Vichy regime was effectively an ally of Germany (despite all the small print) and those ships would have made a big difference to the balance of naval forces in the Mediterranean.

We British remember the resistance put up by Governor General Armand Léon Annet and his forces on Madagascar in 1942 only too well. Operation "Torch" was not initially unopposed either. Vichy French Forces frequently demonstrated that didn't know whose side they were on and we weren't going to mess about taking a chance that could endanger our position in the Mediterranean.

It was only very late in the war that a clear majority of the French decided to back the allies,it had become obvious who was going to win.

The British government regretted at the time the loss of French lives at Oran. War is hell.

As for "abandoning the French" in the Battle of France you need to look at the numbers. France was considered the pre-eminent military power on mainland Europe in 1939/40. The number of British Forces in Europe at the time is tiny compared to the French. The Germans defeated both,but it was primarily a defeat for the French.

How many Frenchman were evacuated from the beaches?


Cheers
Steve


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## Glider (Jun 21, 2012)

Francis marliere said:


> Germany could not use easily the French ships, for several reasons.
> 
> The first is political. Hitler didn't have a great interest in navy. If he tried to catch the fleet, France would not surrender. That means more looses for German armed forces, and more troops to garrison France after the conquest.


This is a big assumption



> It would have been very difficult to size the fleet by force, as the scutling of november 1942 proves.


This I do agree with but for the purposes of this we are assuming that the Germans had they wanted to could have captured some of the ships


> Germany didn't have the spares and industrial basis for operating a larger, foreign fleet. It would take years before ships could be operationnal (I assume that the French Navy would destroy spares, ammunitions, bases, etc.).


This I doubt as althought the ships were scuttled the shore facilities were untouched and I see no reason why that would change.


> Germany didn't have either the manpower to man ships. Where would Germany find 50.000 trained men to man French ships ?
> Germany didn't have enough oil to operate a large fleet.


That I agree but it is quite possible that enought French seaman would have continued the fight for the Germans. There were French units in the German army and I see as an extension of that.



> French ships didn't fit well German's needs. Most ships have close range and couldn't be used as raiders. Old battleships were really obsolete with poor guns, armor and fire control. Submarines were by far inferior to U-boats. Destroyers were poor escorts with weak AA and ASW armament. Richelieu and Jean-Bart were not finished yet and would need a lot of time before they get ready for operation. Only Dunkerque and Strasbourg could be used as Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were. The problem is that these ships were in the Mediterranean and could not exit in the Atlantic.


Again I agree with a lot of this but one or both of the Battle Cruisers, 2-3 cruisers and 5-6 of the modern destroyers could easily have made the difference in the Med.


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## rank amateur (Jun 21, 2012)

stona said:


> Good grief,this beggars belief.
> It was only very late in the war that a clear majority of the French decided to back the allies,it had become obvious who was going to win.
> 
> Steve



Steve, this too is 20 20 hindsight. I'm positive that a very large majority of the French couldn't stand the Germans and hated them for their victory. But they won and it didn't seem very likely to the average person that the British would ever retaliate. All the media were controlled by the Germans who were ofcourse flooding them with propaganda and how trustworthy were the BBC broadcast? And who was this De Gaulle they were talking about. So for the French it was back to normal, going to work and bringing bread on the table, hoping for better times. They didn't know about Stalingrad, they hardly knew about allied victories in Africa. So remembering with 1940, when the Brits suddenly appear in North Africa, it's understandable that they are not immediately wellcome. 

Maybe after the landings in Sicily it might start to dawn that les Bouches were not so invincible.

I seriously don't know what I would have done, had I been there at that time. Ask yourself, would you?


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## stona (Jun 21, 2012)

rank amateur said:


> I seriously don't know what I would have done, had I been there at that time. Ask yourself, would you?



It has got nothing to do with what you,I,or any individual Frenchman would have done. It's about the politics and diplomacy of the Vichy government. It was that government which actively resisted many allied diplomatic and military operations. It argued that this was in the interests of France but all to often these Vichy French interests coincided with German ones.

To think that the French sailors on those ships would not have fought us,just as their brethren in North Africa and other areas did,is naive.

The invasion of North Africa was not a surprise to the Vichy French forces there. Diplomatic moves had been going on for months beforehand in an effort to prevent the landings being opposed. Ultimately they were successful. Resistance was short lived and minimal,there was,nonetheless,some.

I speak French fluently and have lived and worked in the country for several years of my life,anti -French I most certainly am not. I am anti -the rewriting of history to assuage the feelings of a nation which had to endure a very,very difficult period of its long history at this time. 

Cheers
Steve


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## Edgar Brooks (Jun 21, 2012)

JAG88 said:


> The French had promised not to allow Germany to use their ships and the Germans had agreed to that..


A little earlier you said that the French scuttled their remaining ships, when the Germans tried to grab them; rather shows how much value could be placed on German promises, doesn't it?


> In any case? What is what didn't happen? The desertion? The British did not commit their full strength to the battle and withdrew after Dunkirk, France kept on fighting so they did have a reason to feel deserted.


The BEF numbered 316,000, of whom 68,974 were killed, wounded or missing; 198,229 were evacuated (not "withdrawn") from Dunkirk, together with 139,997 French soldiers. After Dunkirk, a further 100,000+ force of the BEF continued fighting in France, until they had to be evacuated in an operation similar to Dunkirk. The RAF lost 931 aircraft, plus 1,526 airmen, in France. You have a strange idea of what constitutes a desertion.


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## Balljoint (Jun 21, 2012)

France, during 1939/40 would seem to be a divided nation. While there was tepid support for the government, there was good deal of vigor amongst the right and left factions. With the Ribbentrop Pact extant, the communists were advised from Moscow to support the Nazis. However, after Barbarossa the factions cleaved and demonstrated bravery and resolve, if not judgment, in fighting for their separate causes.

The Charlemange SS Regiment was among the bravest of the brave fighting on the EF. And the Marquis and other French Resistance groups were also determined and effective against their occupiers.

With such varied positions, and in view of the Vichy perfidy, viewing the French as hostile until proven safe was only prudent.


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## rank amateur (Jun 21, 2012)

QUOTE=stona;910411]It has got nothing to do with what you,I,or any individual Frenchman would have done. It's about the politics and diplomacy of the Vichy government. It was that government which actively resisted many allied diplomatic and military operations. It argued that this was in the interests of France but all to often these Vichy French interests coincided with German ones.

To think that the French sailors on those ships would not have fought us,just as their brethren in North Africa and other areas did,is naive.

The invasion of North Africa was not a surprise to the Vichy French forces there. Diplomatic moves had been going on for months beforehand in an effort to prevent the landings being opposed. Ultimately they were successful. Resistance was short lived and minimal,there was,nonetheless,some.

I speak French fluently and have lived and worked in the country for several years of my life,anti -French I most certainly am not. I am anti -the rewriting of history to assuage the feelings of a nation which had to endure a very,very difficult period of its long history at this time. 

Cheers
Steve[/QUOTE

I'm sorry Steve? I reacted to your "It was only very late in the war that *a clear majority of the French *decided to back the allies,it had become obvious who was going to win". 
If you are talking about the majority you are talking about the all the individual Franchmen not about the politicians with their own opportunistic little reasons. 
Furthermore France had surrenderd so according to international laws, those sailers not resisting the allies, would have constitute to treason.
The distinction between right and wrong is not so clear as certain postwar resistance heroes would like to make us believe. There's a universe of grey between the black and white

BTW it never crossed my mind that you could be anti - French. I myself am not particularly pleased with some of the blatant anti France sentiments I sometimes encounter here. Just don't see the use.


Chrzzzzz


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## buffnut453 (Jun 21, 2012)

rank amateur said:


> Furthermore France had surrenderd so according to international laws, those sailers not resisting the allies, would have constitute to treason.



Is that correct? It was my understanding that Vichy France was established as a non-occupied, self-governing region. To that end, it was for the Vichy Government to decide who to fight and who not to fight - and we clearly know the answer to that question, just as we clearly know that the Vichy government ordered the deportation of Jews to death camps before the Nazis even asked them to. Yes, there are shades of grey but sometimes they are introduced when decisions ought, morally, to be black and white. 

As regards the British decision to attack the fleet at Oran, I'm afraid it makes operational and strategic sense. Europe had fallen and Britain was facing Germany and Italy alone. At that stage, it was unknown how long the Vichy government would last nor how closely aligned it would be with Berlin. Italy clearly had designs on portions of Africa, and the role of the French colonies in that continent was undoubtedly a cause for concern to London. It was equally clear that trouble was brewing in the Mediterranean which was, after all, Italy's back yard. The French fleet simply could not be allowed to remain because it could so easily have become a potent threat in the Mediterranean or elsewhere. 

It must also be borne in mind that London was not aware of some details that Darlan had negotiated with the Germans (although, as noted by others, Hitler had a pretty poor track record as regards keeping his promises of friendship). Finally, Admiral Gensoul refused any of the options laid down by the British and even refused to speak to the RN Captain designated to negotiate. Of greater significance, he only informed Darlan that the British had demanded surrender of the French fleet - he failed to mention the other options that were put on the table. Oran was entirely inglorious but it was necessary. Undoubtedly it could have been avoided but the actions of Gensoul effectively ended any such rosy outcomes.


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## nuuumannn (Jun 21, 2012)

Regarding the invasion of North Africa by the Allies (Torch), Vichy operated warships did go into action against the invasion fleet; the destroyers Brestois, Boulonnais, Fougueux and Frondeur were sunk on 8 November 1942 by US ships.



> The British did not commit their full strength to the battle and withdrew after Dunkirk, France kept on fighting so they did have a reason to feel deserted.



France (as a whole, although there were pockets of resistance) did not keep fighting; by Dunkirk the French leaders realised that it was too late. There was nothing that Britain could have done to change what happened, even with full resources, and you are naive to think that this might have changed things, or that Britain could or should actually commit that much to a lost cause, considering that at the time the British believed that their own survival was at stake. That was the crux of the matter. That's why (C-in-C Fighter Command) Dowding composed the letter requesting that '...not one more Hurricane..." go to France because he feared it would denude his home based squadrons to a dangerous level if/when Britain was attacked - which, we all know is what happened.



> Most ships have close range and couldn't be used as raiders.


 The heavy cruiser Hipper did not have a great range, yet it was successfully used as a commerce raider, although it was not ideally suited for the role.



> Old battleships were really obsolete with poor guns, armor and fire control.


 Dunkerque, Strasbourg and Richelieu were not old ships! In fact they would have been a welcome addition to any modern battlefleet. As we know, the latter was sent to the USA for refit.



> Submarines were by far inferior to U-boats.


 Based on what? The German subs were no better than foreign ones; the secret to their success in WW2 was their application.



> Destroyers were poor escorts with weak AA and ASW armament.


 The Germans had a desperate shortage of destroyers after Norway, where its fleet size of about 22 ships had been reduced by half. If they could have been used, they would have. Also, we know that the Vichy forces would most certainly have used these ships against the Allies given the opportunity.


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## parsifal (Jun 22, 2012)

Whatever the intentions of the vichy regime, and the frenchmen that administered it, the peace treaty had the effect of delivering all of the resources of france to the germans, to be used by them as and when they pleased. If anyone had been betrayed, it was the allies as the terms of the armistice signed by the anglophobic Vichyites was extremely disturbing

Specifically article III of the armistice contained the following provisions

_"In all areas of France, the German Reich is to exercise all the rights of an occupying power. The French government promises to facilitate by all possible means the regulations relative to the exercise of this right, and to carry out these regulations with the participation of the French administration. The French government will immediately order all the French authorities and administrative and military servicesto follow the regulations of the German military authorities and to collaborate with the latter in an obedient and co-operative manner"._

This meant that under the terms of the treaty, the Germans could have at any time demanded the handover of the french fleet. This is unequivocal....you judge a nation by the terms of its existence, and the vichy regime was there for one purpose....to serve and meet the needs of the Nazis. It existed to subvert the democratic ideals of the third republic and to promote the ideas and aspirations of nazi Germany.

That the Allies exercised such restraint on Vichy as to give them the opportunity to surrender or rejoin the fight on the allied side was done out of respect of the french nation as a former allied nation, that had shed blood in the name of freedom. But the regime was unquestionably an enemy of the british after the formation of Vichy, moreover the persons at the head of the new rump state were unquestionably pro German and anti british in attitude, and from a british perspective, not to be trusted.

Laval makes a good case study to gauge the reliability of the new regime

"When Laval was included in Pétain's cabinet as minister of state, he began the work for which he would be remembered: the emulation of the totalitarian regime of Germany, the taking up of the cause of fascism, the destruction of democracy, and the dismantling of the Third Republic."

Laval understood collaboration more or less in the same sense as Pétain. For both, to collaborate meant to give up the maximum support for the nazi regime, short of active participation in the war. however with the progress of time Laval became more and more wedded to the idea of active participation on the side of the nazis. Laval, as vichy's foreign minister in 1940, , was in constant touch with the German authorities, to and constantly attempted to shift the ground in favour of more overt support for the german wear effort. This drew more attention to him for the british and in my opinion heavily influenced Churchills decision at Mers el Kebir. His style made him appear as "the agent of collaboration"; he was "the Germans' man".

The meetings between Pétain and Adolf Hitler, and between Laval and Hitler, are often used as showing the collaboration of the French leaders and the Nazis. Hitler wanted France to declare war on the British, and the French wanted improved relations with her conqueror. Neither happened. However virtually the only concession the French obtained was the so-called 'Berlin protocol' of 16 November, which provided release of certain categories of French prisoners of war. However, on his own intiative laval supported the raising of military volunteer forces and militias to support the germans and fight for them. This too was duly noted in whitehall 

In November, Laval made a number of pro-German actions on his own, without consulting with his colleagues. The most notorious examples concerned turning over to the Germans the RTB Bor copper mines and the Belgian gold reserves. His post-war justification, apart from a denial that he acted unilaterally, was that the French were powerless to prevent the Germans from gaining something they were clearly so eager to obtain.

Laval was dismiossed 13 December 1940, but this did not end his influence or progerman activities. 

Lavals subsequent return to office in 1942, and his positions held in the post December 1942 government show an ever increasing willigness to get into bed with the germans. He was responsible for signing the death warrants of many jews living in France, forced over 500000 slave workers to be deported to germany from France, issued instructions after D-Day to the french people not to co-operate with the allies. 
And laval is really a moderate of the Vichy regime. It was a thoroughly anglophobic regieme, with many of its members hell bent on supporting the germans as far as was possible

In my mind the British actions are completely reasonable and justifiable. And it is the vichy government who did the betraying, not the other way round. Their behaviour saw them abandon the principals of democracy, of the the rule of lawa, in the end, they even abandoned their own people. Arguing that the british were somehow unreasonable in treating these people as enemies of Britiain beggars comon sense in my opinion.

Vichy, and that includes the french Navy, got what they deserved in my opinion


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## Francis marliere (Jun 22, 2012)

stona said:


> Why would the Kriegsmarine have to operate or maintain these vessels?
> As far as anyone knew at the time the French Navy would have operated them for the germans. the Vichy regime was effectively an ally of Germany (despite all the small print) and those ships would have made a big difference to the balance of naval forces in the Mediterranean.



Steeve, the French decision to surrender was not easy to take. A lot of militaries, and especially in the navy who was not defeat and wanted to fight, did want to continue the fight from North Africa. There is no possibility that the French fleet fights for Germany.



stona said:


> We British remember the resistance put up by Governor General Armand Léon Annet and his forces on Madagascar in 1942 only too well. Operation "Torch" was not initially unopposed either. Vichy French Forces frequently demonstrated that didn't know whose side they were on and we weren't going to mess about taking a chance that could endanger our position in the Mediterranean.



What you say looks IMHO a bit anachronic and does not reflect the mindest of the time. France and Britain were at the time colonial powers. They were allied during the 2 world wars but before each war, they were in competition and jaleous of their own colonial empire. French thought at the time that the 'perfidious Albion' would take any opportunity to seize some colonies. Look at the strange and cold relationships between the French governor of New Caledonia and COMSOPAC in 1942. It is incredible now but at the time, D'Argenlieu's priority was to protect NC from US egemony rather than japanese conquest.



stona said:


> As for "abandoning the French" in the Battle of France you need to look at the numbers. France was considered the pre-eminent military power on mainland Europe in 1939/40. The number of British Forces in Europe at the time is tiny compared to the French. The Germans defeated both,but it was primarily a defeat for the French.



Steeve, I never said - and don't believe - that Britain abandoned France. Once the front was broken, there was nothing that could be done and it's a good thing that BEF withdraw and saved whatever could be saved (including thousand of French soldiers at Dunkirk).


Best,

Francis


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## Francis marliere (Jun 22, 2012)

Glider said:


> This I doubt as althought the ships were scuttled the shore facilities were untouched and I see no reason why that would change.



When the fleet was scuttled in toulon, the German were in sight and there was no time to damage the port. If Germany tries to size the fleet during the battle of France, there would be more time to damage the bases.



Glider said:


> That I agree but it is quite possible that enought French seaman would have continued the fight for the Germans. There were French units in the German army and I see as an extension of that.



The French who fought with the SS were not part of French army. There were civilian volunteers making a crusade against communism. That's quite different from French ships operating for Germany.

Best,

Francis


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## Francis marliere (Jun 22, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> As regards the British decision to attack the fleet at Oran, I'm afraid it makes operational and strategic sense.



According to most historian and Royal Navy officers (including Somerville) the attack on Mers-el Kebir (and later against Madagascar) made no operational sense. Churchill wanted a victory to boost British morale and show his resolution. Wether it makes strategic sense or not, I don't know ...


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## Francis marliere (Jun 22, 2012)

nuuumannn said:


> The heavy cruiser Hipper did not have a great range, yet it was successfully used as a commerce raider, although it was not ideally suited for the role.



yes and it was not very succesfull ... Please note that French navy didn't rate very high his own heavy cruisers (except Algerie) at the point that a conversion of the elder ones in carrier was considered at a time.




nuuumannn said:


> Dunkerque, Strasbourg and Richelieu were not old ships! In fact they would have been a welcome addition to any modern battlefleet. As we know, the latter was sent to the USA for refit.



I meant old battleships, not new ones : Bretagne, Provence, Lorraine, Courbet, Paris. Sorry if I was not clear, my English is not good.



nuuumannn said:


> Based on what? The German subs were no better than foreign ones; the secret to their success in WW2 was their application.



Well, the german subs were good and the French ones were not. I don't have any documentation at hand and writes from memory, but I recall that French subs were unreliable, didn't have good batteres and had stability problem : they often surfaced after launching torpedoes (they could not counter ballast quickly enough).[/QUOTE]

Best,

Francis


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## Glider (Jun 22, 2012)

Francis marliere said:


> When the fleet was scuttled in toulon, the German were in sight and there was no time to damage the port. If Germany tries to size the fleet during the battle of France, there would be more time to damage the bases.


That I agree with but it depends when they tried to seize the ships.



> The French who fought with the SS were not part of French army. There were civilian volunteers making a crusade against communism. That's quite different from French ships operating for Germany.


Possibly but there is no denying I am afraid that there were French people who fought for the Germans in the German army, not just in the SS. There were a lot of collaborators who fought against the french resistance and the Vichy forces who fought against the allies.
It isn't a large step to go from fighting in the German Army to assisting the Germany Navy.

I should add that this isn't having a go at the French people, we in the UK had a number of people who supported the German ideals pre war and had we been invaded I doubt that we would have been any different


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## rank amateur (Jun 22, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> Is that correct? It was my understanding that Vichy France was established as a non-occupied, self-governing region. To that end, it was for the Vichy Government to decide who to fight and who not to fight - and we clearly know the answer to that question, just as we clearly know that the Vichy government ordered the deportation of Jews to death camps before the Nazis even asked them to. Yes, there are shades of grey but sometimes they are introduced when decisions ought, morally, to be black and white. QUOTE]
> 
> Yip that is correct. Part of the 2nd Versailles treaty came a whole set of new rules and believe me Vichy was no longer a sovereign state and therefore could not independly decide who to fight.


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## buffnut453 (Jun 22, 2012)

But they could choose not to fight. Sorry to keep banging on about this but I strongly urge a read of "Seduced by Hitler: the Choices of a Nation and the Ethics of Survival" by Adam LeBor and Roger Boyes. While focussing on Germany, it also examines the roles played by neutral and occupied countries. To summarise, even if you claim to be neutral, if you are supporting/helping a regime (including through trade) as evil as the Nazi one then you're plainly on the wrong side of the moral argument. That question equally applies to military leaders at locations around the French empire, and down to the individual soldier. I would have thought the French people would have wanted the entirety of their nation liberated from Nazi rule as rapidly as possible and yet, instead, we have Vichy forces fighting against the Allies. It's all very ugly history.


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## rank amateur (Jun 22, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> But they could choose not to fight. Sorry to keep banging on about this but I strongly urge a read of "Seduced by Hitler: the Choices of a Nation and the Ethics of Survival" by Adam LeBor and Roger Boyes. While focussing on Germany, it also examines the roles played by neutral and occupied countries. To summarise, even if you claim to be neutral, if you are supporting/helping a regime (including through trade) as* evil *as the Nazi one then you're plainly on the wrong side of the moral argument. That question equally applies to military leaders at locations around the French empire, and down to the individual soldier. I would have thought the French people would have wanted the entirety of their nation liberated from Nazi rule as rapidly as possible and yet, instead, we have Vichy forces fighting against the Allies. It's all very ugly history.



Maybe that is the problem, knowledge about the evil Nazi state was not verry common, certainly not in 1940. I think the USSR was seen as a much bigger threat to society. And once you have chosen to follow a certain path it is verry hard to change your ways even in the light of strong arguments to do so.


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## Edgar Brooks (Jun 22, 2012)

Francis marliere said:


> According to most historian and Royal Navy officers (including Somerville) the attack on Mers-el Kebir (and later against Madagascar) made no operational sense. Churchill wanted a victory to boost British morale and show his resolution. Wether it makes strategic sense or not, I don't know ...


Which is the sort of nonsensical tripe, that we get from those desperate to show Churchill as some malign malevolence; nobody ever explains how, if Churchill wanted this mythical victory (how, incidentally, can destroying the assets of a former ally be called a "victory?",) he ordered Cunningham and Somerville to give the French four options:- 1/. continue to fight against the enemy; 2/. sail to a British port, where they would be interned, and the crews repatriated to France; 3/. sail to a French port in the West Indies where the ships could be demilitarised and perhaps entrusted to United States care; 4/. scuttle the ships. Cunningham managed to introduce some flexibility into the orders, and drew up an acceptable solution in Alexandria; Somerville tried, for nearly a whole day, to get a similar agreement, but was ordered (by the Admiralty) to settle the matter before dark; the rest is history.


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## riacrato (Jun 22, 2012)

Glider said:


> That I agree with but it depends when they tried to seize the ships.
> 
> 
> Possibly but there is no denying I am afraid that there were French people who fought for the Germans in the German army, not just in the SS. There were a lot of collaborators who fought against the french resistance and the Vichy forces who fought against the allies.
> ...


Sorry Glider, but I think that is a very weak argument and borderline an insult to the French even if not intended. There were collaboratuers in every single of the occupied countries, for a varying amount of reason. And yes, there were even British SS volunteers, a very small number, but still. It is something that comes very naturally with occupation.


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## stona (Jun 22, 2012)

There's a tendency here to be a bit unfair to the French. Don't forget that per capita the nation that provided the most volunteers to the SS was the Netherlands a nation which also produced a very effective resistance.
Francis is quite correct to point out that the French volunteers were proportionately few and were indeed on an anti communist crusade.
France too produced an effective resistance and of course many Frenchmen fought with the allies under the Free French banner. Remember also how the French people suffered at German hands. The anniversary of the massacre at Oradour-sur-Glane was only a couple of weeks ago.

This does not alter the fact that it was the intransigence of the French leadership that forced the hand of the Royal Navy at Oran. It was also a demonstration by the British,particularly to those across the Atlantic,that we were determined to fight on and were prepared to do whatever that took,however unpalatable that might be.
Firing on the ships and men of an erstwhile ally cannot have been an easy thing to do.It needed to be done and so it was.

Cheers
Steve


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 22, 2012)

From Wiki

An estimated 360,000 non-German volunteers and conscripts served in the Waffen-SS

Albania: 6,500 in the 21st SS Division
Belgium: 13,000 Flemish in the 5th SS Div., 27th SS Div.
Belgium: 6,000 Walloons 5th SS Div., 28th SS Div.
British Commonwealth (English): 100 in the Britisches Freikorps
Bulgaria: 700 in the Bulgarisches Reg.
Croatia (includes Bosnian Muslims): 20,000 in the 7th SS Div., 13th SS Handschar Div., 23rd SS Div.
Denmark: 6,000 in Frikorps Danmark, 11th SS Div.
Estonia: 30,000 in the 20th SS Div.
Finland: 1,500 in a Volunteer Battalion.
France: 9,000 in the 33rd SS Div.
Georgia: 3,000 in the SS-Waffengruppe Georgien
Hungary: 40,000 in the 25th SS Div., 26th SS Div. and 33rd SS Div.
India: 2,500 in the Indisches Freiwilligen Infanterie Regiment 950 or "Tiger Legion"
Italy: 10,000 in the 29th SS Div.
Latvia: 60,000 in the Latvian Legion.
Netherlands: 25,000 in the 23rd SS Div., 34th SS Div.
Norway: 6,000 in the 5th SS Div., 6th SS Div., 11th SS Div.
Portuguese Volunteers attached, mainly, to the Spanish Blue Division (250th Infantry Division)
Russian (Belarusian): 15,000 29th SS Div., 30th SS Div.
Russian (Cossack): 40,000 in the 1st Cossack Div.
Russian (Turkic): 10,000 in Osttürkische SS, Tatarische SS
Romania: 6,000 in Waffen-Grenadierregiment der SS (1st Romanian)
Serbia: 15,000 in Volunteer Corps
Spain: 18,000 in the Blue Division and in the later stages of the war (namely the Battle of Berlin) in two separated companies - Spanische-Freiwilligen-Kompanie der SS 101 and SS 102.
Sweden, Switzerland and Luxemburg: 3,000 5th SS Div., 11th SS Div.
Ukraine: 20,000 in the 14th SS Div.


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## Glider (Jun 22, 2012)

riacrato said:


> Sorry Glider, but I think that is a very weak argument and borderline an insult to the French even if not intended. There were collaboratuers in every single of the occupied countries, for a varying amount of reason. And yes, there were even British SS volunteers, a very small number, but still. It is something that comes very naturally with occupation.



We will have to agree to disagree. French collaboators in particular the Milice Francais were a serious danger to the Resistance. Before this it was known as the Service d'ordre légionnaire during Vichy. There were French Units in the German Army as well as the SS Units and the French Navy did fight against the allies.

I do repeat that I do not believe that the UK would have behaved differently had we been invaded. The vast majority would not have joined but some would and this is not a slight on the French.

I will send you a PM on the other aspect


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 22, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> From Wiki: An estimated 360,000 non-German volunteers and conscripts served in the Waffen-SS



Really interesting stats FJ. I was in Luxembourg last summer visiting some WWII sites. Visiting the Battle of the Bulge and Patton Museum (He's a local hero there having liberated the small country three times) it became apparent that Locals considered as ethnic Germans were conscripted into the Wehrmacht. They were evidently not at all happy about it in general, and apparently some, upon their return from duty, participated with other locals in a resistence effort that played a role in the December 1944 German Ardennes offensive. I was surprised to find that Patton's grave is in Luxembourg in the 3rd army cemetery.


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## stona (Jun 23, 2012)

Glider said:


> I do repeat that I do not believe that the UK would have behaved differently had we been invaded. The vast majority would not have joined but some would and this is not a slight on the French.



We'll never know what choices individuals may have made. Is a wholesale grocer who sell his vegetables to the occupation forces a collaborator or just a business man trying to stay in business and provide for his family? If that same grocer provided a safe house for the Resistance in his premises he is suddenly transformed into a hero of the Resistance! Difficult choices had to be made,not by the body politic but individual citizens. This debate has agonised the French for two generations and descends into some very grey areas.

I recall an interview with a member of the Dutch Resistance. He said that at some time after the German occupation a census was carried out. One of the questions was something like "Do you have any Jewish Grand parents?". Most Dutch people would simply and honestly tick the "No" box. His point was that by innocently doing something as simple as that they were inadvertantly contributing to the annihilation of European Jewry in the holocaust. Harsh,but he has a point.
Since then I have never answered a question asking me my ethnic background on any form.

Unlike any other occupied nation,including Germany,Britain had plans in place to carry on fighting both at home and from overseas. The organisation,weapons caches,communications etc were in place before the supposedly expected invasion.Who knows what would actually have happened. We know with hindsight that the invasion of the British Isles was never going to happen but most (there are some senior exceptions) seem to have accepted it as possible at the time.
We had time to plan it,unlike nations on the European mainland who never expected to be over run in a matter of weeks, and accepted invasion as a possibility. Germany never organised anything like it (the "Werewolf" project amounted to b*gger all) because they had never officially entertained the possibility of defeat.

Cheers
Steve


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