# Admiral Graf Spee: Fight to the death (no scuttling)



## gjs238 (Dec 28, 2011)

What if Hans Langsdorff had come out of the harbor with the intention of giving the best fight possible?
What are the possibilities?


----------



## johnbr (Dec 28, 2011)

I read ed they were all but out of ammo.


----------



## DonL (Dec 28, 2011)

Not out of ammo but less then a half!
Refering to SA shells only!

Something about 300 shells were left to shoot. AGS had shot something about 400 shell at River plates.


----------



## Njaco (Dec 28, 2011)

Still sunk by the British. It seems - to me at least - that the UK was able to marshall Naval resources much better than Germany, hence Graf Spee would be facing more than just Exeter and Co.


----------



## DonL (Dec 28, 2011)

@Njaco

I think gjs238 is refering to the original scenario and this would be Cumberland arriving at 14 December (battle was at 13 December), Achilles and Ajax (both damaged).
So if Langsdorff force the sea there will be this 3 units.
I think, if it will be a fight till the last shell, then it is very speculative! I don't think that a County-class heavy cruiser can do much more then Exeter, because every 11" hit will do massive damage and AGS hat scored some 8" from Exceter without damage to her fighting ability.

So AGS fighting ability after River Plate was full intact (FC, RPC, turrents), if she hit Cumberland first and will do a good shooting, it would be a very hard day for the british force. At the beginning of the fight AGS could outrange any gun from the british force and to my opinion this three cruisers can't sunk her! AGS would shoot all her SA shells, with as much damage as possible and then she would be scutted by her own crew.


----------



## Njaco (Dec 28, 2011)

Thanks for the memory! I was going off the ole grey matter and couldn't remember the other ships. Exeter was damaged and left before Montevideo, correct? I still think that they would have sunk her. To me its quanity over quality as it was on the EF and in the air in the ETO. The British could have pounded her with 3 ships.


----------



## DonL (Dec 28, 2011)

> Exeter was damaged and left before Montevideo, correct?



Excter was the flagship of Harwood's force at 13 December and was highly damaged from AGS! At 13 December Exeter, Achilles and Ajax engaged AGS (Battle of River Plate). So they have done damage to her, but couldn't damage her fighting ability and Exeter was shot near to a wreck and limped to the next harbour. So I highly doubt that Cumberland could perform better and both light cruisers were damaged too!

I don't think they could sunk her!


----------



## vikingBerserker (Dec 29, 2011)

I think if she hit the open water she could have made it, regardless it would have been better to go down fighting then to just sunk your own ship.


----------



## renrich (Dec 29, 2011)

Graf Spee had damage that hampered her fuel supply and damage that in heavy seas would cause a problem if she reached the North Atlantic. Some of her 5.9s were out of action. The British CLs had damage and were low on ammo and fuel but Cumberland was fresh and was more heavily armed than Exeter with two more eight inchers. Harwood would use the same tactics by splitting his forces. The eight inch guns were very effective against the armor of the Graf Spee. The battle would be a close run thing. If the Graf Spee had survived and sank or disabled all the British cruisers she would stii face a long voyage with a number of groups hunting her. If a British cruiser under Harwood had survived and was able to shadow Graf Spee she was finished. Harwood might have decided to shadow Graf Spee until other help arrived but I doubt that given the tradition of the RN.

Exeter was not the flagship, Ajax was.


----------



## davebender (Dec 29, 2011)

That's the real problem. Unless / until the KM Graf Spee fuel system is fixed they aren't going anywhere.


----------



## gjs238 (Dec 29, 2011)

I'm envisioning an offensive rush out of the harbor, inflict as much damage as possible, w/o thought given to escape.
I figure AGS could take out at least one RN ship. Maybe two. Who knows. At the end, ram a RN ship if necessary.


----------



## woljags (Dec 29, 2011)

my Great Uncle Died in the river plate battle,i'm not sure which ship he was on my Uncle would know but the Graf Spee blowed the nose of the ship off


----------



## pbfoot (Dec 29, 2011)

If its the Ajax let me know


----------



## davebender (Dec 30, 2011)

> offensive rush out of the harbor, inflict as much damage as possible, w/o thought given to escape.


KM Graf Spee is likely to run out of fuel just as the battle begins. Now they must scuttle on the open ocean. Same end result but most of the crew die rather then being interned in Uruguay.


----------



## DonL (Dec 30, 2011)

That isn't quite correct!

The fuel system of AGS wasn't damaged! The diesel cleaningsystem was out of order. But first she had cleaned Diesel for one day and second the machinery is functioning without the diesel cleaningsystem but is is dangerous for the machinery!

The fighting ability (FC, rangefinder, RPC) and all guns (5,9" was repaired at 14 December) was intact without any damage!


----------



## Bernhart (Dec 30, 2011)

more people die


----------



## psteel (Dec 31, 2011)

According to O`Hara AGS had something like 16 days of cruising at 24 knots after the battle as it was and the AOE Altmarck was only a couple of days sailing away. These ships had repair facilities that might have solved the long endurance diesel cruise engines. The holes in the bow were more of a problem , but with refill from Altmarck , AGS could spend several months in the Indian Ocean and maybe get some repairs out of `Italian East Africa`, before attempting a run back to Germany.

As to any action _Exeter_ was crippled with no main guns and out of action and spent a year in repair and refit. Ajax fared better but lost both of her rear turrets to a single 11" gun hit and was in repairs for 6 months. Really _Cumberland_ would mostly fight with _Achilles_ and _Ajax_ trailing behind.

As to ammo supply O’Hara reports that AGS had 306 *11" shells left and averaged 9 hits on 405 or 45:1 . Going on that rate the remaining 306 shells should result in nearly 7 more hits, which was the same number of hits that crippled the _Exeter_. In any renewed clash, these hits will be on _ Cumberland_ first and the other cruisers if any left. The German 5.9" guns got no hits on 600 shells, while the 4.1" got 2 hits on 200 shells fired , so they could add to any carnage and if nothing else keep the CLs busy.

One question what about a night escape. AGS had Seeket radar, what did the British have in radars? 

cruisers - Royal Navy (United Kingdom)

Looking at the above site none of the RN cruisers had radar.

Looking at the British side the _Exeter_got 3 hits on 200 shells fired or about 67:1 ,while the CLs averaged 17 hits on 2065 shells or a hit rate of about 121:1. 

Using these rates the _ Cumberland_ with 8*8" guns should get a hit with every 8 salvos while the AGS gets about the same , 1 hit out of every 8 salvos. The CLs should average a hit for every 13 salvos and the German 4.1" flak should get a hit for every side 25 salvos. Mind you, each 4.1" flak could manage a round every 4 seconds if needed.


----------



## DonL (Dec 31, 2011)

@ psteel

very interesting summary.

Some comments.
The 1AO (first artillerie officer) of AGS had made some "small" criticism of Langsdorff in his report back in germany, for his often abrupt change of courses during the fight. He said Langsdorff had direct AGS more as a destroyer then a heavy cruiser and that is was very difficult for the artillerie crew to to get along with this. To his opinion that was one of the main reasons, why AGS couldn't score more hits. He also said that after the battle he and Langsdorff had a long talk about this issue, because the 1AO was realy unhappy with the results (hits on enemy)of the battle.

So it could be in a second battle, that Langsdorff would take more consideration of his SA with perhaps a better score (%) for AGS.



> One question what about a night escape. AGS had Seeket radar, what did the British have in radars?



This is one very important issue! Langsdorff and his officers didn't believe they can escape by night, because it was summer at the south atlantic with realy light nights with a very long optical range.


----------



## Freebird (Dec 31, 2011)

gjs238 said:


> I'm envisioning an offensive rush out of the harbor, inflict as much damage as possible, w/o thought given to escape.
> I figure AGS could take out at least one RN ship. Maybe two. Who knows. At the end, ram a RN ship if necessary.


 
The RN ships have a significant speed advantage over Graf Spee, (32 knts compared to 24 - 26 for AGS ) and they will likely be avoiding direct battle with the AGS, instead they will shadow her, awaiting Force K Force X.



renrich said:


> If the Graf Spee had survived and sank or disabled all the British cruisers she would stii face *a long voyage with a number of groups hunting her*. If a British cruiser under Harwood had survived and was able to shadow Graf Spee she was finished. Harwood might have decided to shadow Graf Spee until other help arrived but I doubt that given the tradition of the RN.



Correct.
Just to give some more details, there were in fact 3 Allied naval groups hunting the Adm. Graf Spee, in addition to other cruisers in the South Atlantic.

*Force K* (from Gibraltar): HMS Ark Royal, HMS Renown HMS Sussex
*Force X* (from Dakar): HMS Hermes, HMS Shropshire and (French battlecruiser) Strasbourg
*Force I* (from Capetown): HMS Eagle, HMS Cornwall, HMS Dorsetshire


At the time of the scuttling, Force K is about 36 hours away, while Force X I are steaming from the Northeast and East. 
Given the long hours of daylight at that latitude (as mentioned above) it would be hard to imagine that the Graf Spee could evade the search aircraft operating from 3 British carriers.

Langsdorff believed that the battlecruiser Renown was already waiting outside the harbour, and was probably a large part of why he decided to scuttle. The AGS would be at a severe disadvantage facing the 15" guns of the faster Renown, not to mention two other heavy several light cruisers


----------



## buffnut453 (Dec 31, 2011)

DonL said:


> That isn't quite correct!
> 
> The fuel system of AGS wasn't damaged! The diesel cleaningsystem was out of order. But first she had cleaned Diesel for one day and second the machinery is functioning without the diesel cleaningsystem but is is dangerous for the machinery!
> 
> The fighting ability (FC, rangefinder, RPC) and all guns (5,9" was repaired at 14 December) was intact without any damage!



It all depends on how you define "fighting ability". In terms of weapons, AGS was intact but a ship with fuel problems that would potentially damage its propulsion unit is not fully combat-ready. Combat will place the greatest stresses on all mechanical components of a ship, thus increasing the risk of a failure even under normal operating conditions. With the fuel cleaning problem, it sounds to me like AGS would be sailing into battle with a propulsion unit that couldn't be trusted to work, and no commander wants to do that.


----------



## renrich (Dec 31, 2011)

No ships got their nose blown off at the Plate. I question strongly if the Graf Spee after being at sea as long as she had could make 28 knots. I don't know what condition the RN ships were in but they would have a significant advantage in speed. The hit summary by Exeter does not really equate with Cumberland since she has two more eight inchers. Since AGS could not sink any RN ships in the first battle, there is little reason to believe she could sink any in a second battle. In a running battle, unlike the first engagement, the Spee will be at a severe disadvantage since only her aft turret could bear with little or no help from the 5.9s. I suspect that Harwood would try to force Langsdorff into that running battle in anticipation of reinforcements from Force K. The aircraft from The Ark could engage a number of hours before the gunships could.


----------



## Juha (Dec 31, 2011)

IMHO AGS had lost some of its fighting power if we look damage it had suffered during the BoRP
Once damage control had made an assessment of the damage received, the following items were found to be damaged beyond repair with the means on board:

Fwd Flak director
Starboard 3,7cm mount
right barrel of Port 10,5cm mount
starboard 10,5cm chain hoist
port #1 15cm hoist
foretop range finder
torpedo tube 2
torpedo spread apparatus
starboard torpedo filling room
Port torpedo training mechanism
catapult traversing gear
spotting plane
steam piping to after part of ship (scavenged to repair fuel and lube oil piping?)
radiators for after part of ship
upper deck fire fighting mains in section X
hole in freeboard section XV (bow)
petty officers baths.

Ammunition available:
full stock of 2 and 3,7cm
423 rounds of 15cm
306 rounds of 28cm
2470 rounds of 10,5cm 

On British side Ajax was in effect 5 6" gun ship, X-turret remained unusable, but Y-turret was freed soon after the battle but one of the forward guns was unuseable because of a technical reason. Both CLs were low of ammo.

Juha


----------



## psteel (Dec 31, 2011)

_Exeter_ was one torpedo hit away from sinking. She was down in the bow ; flooding ; listing and burning from end to end with all main guns destroyed or out of action and limping away at 12 knots. It’s unfortunate Langsdorff lost his cool and ran away from the fight, since this doomed him. His best chance was to use the second half of his ammo to run down the _Exeter_ and sink her. This would force the balance of Harwood’s force to attack and get battered until they were crippled too. Only at that point could AGS escape before the rest of the RN fleet arrived a couple of days later.

Since AGS had been at sea for months her hull was fouled so she could only make 24 knots....but had enough fuel to run for 16 days at that speed. The British Cruisers could only manage that speed for a few days before they would fall out due to lack of fuel and return to port. The purification plant was destroyed by a 6" gun hit , but the AGS could still run on the basic un refined diesel oil. It would foul the engines over time, but not right away. Given the choice of running or death, it would be a worthwhile risk.

At the end of the day naval clashes are determined by command decision, and the near miss that wounded Langsdorff may have influenced his following actions and cost them the battle. Otherwise they had established a clear tactical victory. But without a well planned ‘end game escape clause’, AGS was doomed. 

More importantly this very first major naval battle in WW-II was a test of the main German principle of warship design….to be able to ‘out run what they could not defeat’. It clearly did not work very well for commerce raiders and should have lead to avoiding all enemy combat. That’s why my view is that HSK auxiliary cruisers were far better raiders than super expensive surface raiders.


I already adjusted the salvo/'hit rate for _Cumberland_ for 8 guns over 6, that is why she would have the same hit rate of the AGS. The _Exeter_ salvo/hit rate was more like 11:1 than 8:1.


----------



## renrich (Dec 31, 2011)

Most ships especially cruisers or smaller or "one torpedo hit from sinking." The Spee's engines were in need of overhauling before she left on the cruise. I doubt she could make 24 knots and she had no guarantee that she could make it home even without enemy interference. Juha, I was almost sure that at least one 5.9 was out of action.


----------



## psteel (Dec 31, 2011)

There are many examples of RN DD being hit by two torpedoes and surviving, it all depends on where they hit. While the British would do every thing the could to stop the AGS, but most returning raiders made it home through 1941, without too much difficulty. If AGS lays low in the Indian Ocean with Altmarck for weeks an attempt could be made while a follow on raider attempts another break out....thats the way it was supposed to work.


----------



## Freebird (Dec 31, 2011)

psteel said:


> _Exeter_ was one torpedo hit away from sinking. She was down in the bow ; flooding ; listing and burning from end to end with all main guns destroyed or out of action and limping away at 12 knots. It’s unfortunate Langsdorff lost his cool and ran away from the fight, since this doomed him. His best chance was to use the second half of his ammo to run down the _Exeter_ and sink her. This would force the balance of Harwood’s force to attack and get battered until they were crippled too. Only at that point could AGS escape before the rest of the RN fleet arrived a couple of days later.



Not at all.
If he used up the rest of his ammo on the Exeter, the AGS would be a sitting duck for the larger RN forces on the way, unable to continue the mission, and trying to limp home without primary armament.
What makes you think Harwood would be "forced to attack"? If the Exeter was finished off Harwood would do exactly the same as he did, shadow the AGS while staying out of range of the larger guns.
He did what was the best choice of options, get away to a neutral port, quickly repair battle damage and then try to escape.




psteel said:


> Since AGS had been at sea for months her hull was fouled so she could only make 24 knots....but had enough fuel to run for 16 days at that speed. The British Cruisers could only manage that speed for a few days before they would fall out due to lack of fuel and return to port.



The British cruisers only needed to shadow AGS for 36 hours or so, long enough for Force K (and others) to arrive.
AGS had already made several attempts to engage the Ajax Achillies on the run into Mentivideo, without getting any hits, they could almost certainly shadow the AGS while staying out of range.
The question really is could the AGS evade the Allied warships in the 6 hours or so of darkness, and escape detection by Allied aircraft the next morning.
The Achillies carried a Walrus floatplane, and the Cumberland carried 3, the Ajax had a Seafox floatplane.


> Given the choice of running or death, it would be a worthwhile risk.


He obviously felt that escape in AGS's current condition was impossible, so attempting to sortie could likely doom most of the 1,000 man crew

At the end of the day naval clashes are determined by command decision, and the near miss that wounded Langsdorff may have influenced his following actions and cost them the battle. Otherwise they had established a clear tactical victory. But without a well planned ‘end game escape clause’, AGS was doomed.


----------



## psteel (Jan 1, 2012)

I am proposing he run down _Exeter_ at the end of the battle as he was running south making 24 knots . British never left a ship sinking at that point in the war, they always rushed to the rescue of the fallen ship. In fact when Harwood realized that AGS was closing to finish off _Exeter_ , he ordered both light cruisers to top speed [which was 29 knots in those seas and moderate breeze, and attacked with a deluge of shells. All Langsdorff has to do is to close with _Exeter_ and torpedo her and then use the rest of his ammo to cripple the light cruisers and make good an escape , using a combination of smoke and fire plus failing light and bad weather. The distance would have been much less than 8 nm.

The British reinforcement warships were up to 3000 nm away and would take 2-5 days to get there [ Dec 14-19 reported on this wiki site]. BTW to do that would require them averaging 25 knots which mean most of their warships would arrive with little fuel for any pursuit.

Battle of the River Plate - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

At this time of the year the seas and weather below the 45th parallel was bad and Langsdorff could use the bad weather to escape, since the British have no radar. That’s about 40 hours at 24 knots. If AGS cannot shake off the cruisers there would be another clash with the _ Cumberland _ coming from the Falklands in the south and the cruiser shadowing from the north. This could be a repeat of the plate battle, but the British might also get lucky with a torpedo hit and slow the AGS more, otherwise she should escape into the bad weather of north of the Antarctic seas.

When he meets up with _ Altmark _ and they head to the Indian Ocean or the Pacific and affect temporary repairs..


----------



## The Basket (Jan 1, 2012)

I have always thought the Grad Spee mission to be a fools errand.

No support...no friendly bases against not just the British but also French as well.

To say Langsdorff should have killed his crew in a suicide fight to the death so they can all go to Valhalla is not one I subscribe to.

Maybe Langsdorff was too good a man for such dirty work. We often see Germans as evil Nazis. But Langsdorff was a true hero in my book. And was respected as a decent honourable man.


----------



## vikingBerserker (Jan 1, 2012)

Were there any U-Boats in the area to assist AGS?


----------



## Juha (Jan 1, 2012)

Hello VB
at that stage of war I doubt that there were U-boats so South, but Langsdorff clearly believed that there was a RN sub around, he had reported to the SKL on his action report ¨attack from submarine south of Lobos failed¨, Germans believed that this happened on 1818 Dec 13.

In fact what had sealed the AGS destiny was that in the morning of December 15, 1939, Captain Paul Ascher, Chief Gunnery Officer and third in command, was on watch at the foretop of the Spee. Using the powerful rangefinders and glasses that were supposed to look up to 50 Km in clear weather, he reports he has identified Ark Royal and Renown in the vicinity.

Langsdorff prepares his report to Berlin, the evening of December 15, the one upon which Raeder and eventually Hitler had to decide upon, with the words: Strategic position off Montevideo: Besides the cruisers and destroyers, Ark Royal and Renown. Close blockade at night. Escape into open sea and break-through to home waters hopeless. 

So superior opponent, Renown, and a CV, means at least constant shadowing during daytime or overwhelming air attacks depending on how high or low was Langsdorff’s (and Reader’s and Hitler’s) regard on FAA. After all the unrepairable battle damages had badly reduced AGS’s AA armament, which had been fairly weak from beginning. 

Unnoticed leaving from Montevideo was impossible because of close surveillance by British in Montevideo and the narrow timewindow left between the last allied merchant ship sailing and the end of the time-limit given by Uruguai's Gov. On the other hand numerous sandbanks would have limited manoueuvres of both sides. But all in all Renown with her 15" guns simply was too powerful opponent. In reality she and AR were still far away, but Langsdorff (and Reader and Hitler) had to decide on the info they had.

Juha


----------



## renrich (Jan 1, 2012)

An interesting point about the battle is how history seems almost to repeat itself. In WW1, the German Armored Cruisers, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau along with lighter ships had decimated a Brtiish force at the Battle of Coronel. The commander of the German force was Von Spee. That force was going to raid the base in the Falkland Islands only to find a British force there including two BCs, Invincible and Inflexible. The German armored cruisers were outgunned and were too slow and were sunk. Now in the same vicinity, in a ship named after Von Spee and commanded by a man, Langsdorff, who was in the same mold as the officers of the Kaiser's navy another German raider could have been confronted by a British BC , faster and more heavily gunned. I wonder if Harwood ever revealed what his tactics were going to be if the Spee had come out to do battle with the RN cruisers?

The situation Langsdorff faced at the Plate would make an excellent plot for an alternative history.


----------



## renrich (Jan 1, 2012)

In looking at the track chart of the battle it looks as if Exeter turned to leave the battle at about 07:40. At that time Spee was about ten miles away proceeding at right angles to the Exeter's course after she had turned away. Ajax and Achilles were at that time crossing the Spee's wake while making smoke so as to come out after a 90 degree turn on the port side of Spee. In other words Spee was headed at roughly right angles to the course of the CLs presenting her stern to them. If Spee makes a 90 degree turn to port in order to close the retiring CA she presents her broadside to the CLs and would be more vulnerable to torpedo attack. I suspect that Langsdorff, a torpedo specialist, took that into account as well as that at that time he had only (according to several accounts online) 16 hours of fuel left without effecting repairs in port.


----------



## parsifal (Jan 1, 2012)

> Maybe Langsdorff was too good a man for such dirty work. We often see Germans as evil Nazis. But Langsdorff was a true hero in my book. And was respected as a decent honourable man.




Never a better summation of the man , and a great clue as to why he chose to scuttle rather than go down in a pointless, unwinnable battle. Langsdorfs decision to run for harbour after the first fight was done on the basis that he thought he could get his ship ready for a run home. He was refused permission for sufficient time to do that. If he had then chosen to run from harbour, his ships would have been shadowed until heavy units arrived to finish her off. 

Ther was no escape for this ship once she failed in the original battle. To win she needed to sink or disable all three of the RN cruisers. With even one cruiser on her tail she was a doomed ship. At 22-24 knots, British cruisers had an endurance of about 8 days, more than enough to maintain their shadowing role until help arrived.

Langsdorf scuttled his ship for good reason. He was an honourable man, thoughtful and compassionate. He deserves better from history and his countrymen, rather than being presented with a fools errand that somehow the dhip could be saved.


----------



## psteel (Jan 1, 2012)

renrich said:


> An interesting point about the battle is how history seems almost to repeat itself. In WW1, the German Armored Cruisers, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau along with lighter ships had decimated a British force at the Battle of Coronel. The commander of the German force was Von Spee. That force was going to raid the base in the Falkland Islands only to find a British force there including two BCs, Invincible and Inflexible. The German armored cruisers were outgunned and were too slow and were sunk. Now in the same vicinity, in a ship named after Von Spee and commanded by a man, Langsdorff, who was in the same mold as the officers of the Kaiser's navy another German raider could have been confronted by a British BC , faster and more heavily gunned. I wonder if Harwood ever revealed what his tactics were going to be if the Spee had come out to do battle with the RN cruisers?
> 
> The situation Langsdorff faced at the Plate would make an excellent plot for an alternative history.





Hence my proposal. But you are absolutely right. I often wonder about Grand Admiral Raeder’s strategy, which was essentially an attempt to marry an experience like the first battle of the Falkland’s with Scheer’s battle cruiser sweep later in the war. If the Battle cruiser sweep was timed right it would catch the home fleet 'weakened'.

This was the basis of the surface raider strategy and its obvious that the raider becomes a 'sacrificial pawn'. Hardly an encouraging role for any skipper and crew to be trained for and face. Looking back to WW-I the experiences of the auxiliary raiders should have made more of an impact because they were able to operate on the oceans for months on end and survived fighting for years in both wars. I gather before WW-II Germany possessed 50-70 diesel merchant ships with enough size and endurance to be converted into such roles and since the cost of doing this was less than the cost of an R-boot coastal craft, it should have been a 'no brainer'.


I gather the skipper of the _Ajax_ never understood why Langsdorff didn't run down _Exeter_ and finish her off. The AGS was only 6 miles away while the Light cruisers were 10 miles astern with a 3-5 knot speed advantage.


----------



## renrich (Jan 2, 2012)

Looking again at the track chart, Spee did turn as if to close on Exeter prior to the time Exeter turned away but the CLs had gotten very close and were getting hits and he apparently changed his mind. I read an account of the battle written by a Lt. in Exeter and he did not mention that the Captain of the Exeter was "chasing salvos" prior to the time B turret was hit and most on the bridge were killed. If Exeter was steering a straight course it simplified the gunnery of Spee. One of my uncles was in CA25 in the Komondorski Battle and the CO's ability to "chase salvos" aparently helped Salt lake City to be hit as few times as she was. That battle reminds me a little of The Plate.


----------



## The Basket (Jan 2, 2012)

If Germany had a huge numbers of auxiliary cruisers on the high seas then they would need huge numbers of supply ships and vast amounts of fuel. Germany was a feeble naval power and had zero advantages. It achieved what it did out of all proportion to its real capabilities. 

Raeder was directly responsible for lack of auxiliary cruisers as he didn't know war would start in 1939. The difference between the German auxiliaries in WW1 and WW2 were of course Radar,radio and aircraft which made a big ocean seem a lot smaller. Again ships like the Atlantis achieved because of the crew.

The Graf Spee was outnumbered and far away from home without any support. It was basically stuffed and only knocking out all 3 RN cruisers without damage was its only hope. Langsdorff was in a no win situation. The Admiral Scheer did so well coz it met was the Jervis Bay.


----------



## psteel (Jan 2, 2012)

No argument about Langsdorffs some what impossible situation.

Well German already had these ships and used them through out the war in other naval roles , so the fuel issue and supply is not as big issue as it might first appear. These ships could do 40-60,000 nm @ cruise speed on about 2000-3000 tons of diesel fuel. That means they had an endurance of 1/2 year and until the end of 1942 they were able to make their own way into and out of Germany. So they would not need any more supply ships than Germany had. Infact if it was done well enough these ships could play a duel role of HSK and Uboat supply ship. The HSK code was the last major code the allies cracked and that was not until 1943.


If you want to blame any one for the lack of naval readiness for war, you must place the blame squarely on the C-in-C of the Wehrmacht, Adolf Hitler. He was the one who demanded that the navy be gutted and turned into a coastal defense fleet. It was him who forbade any preperation for war with the UK and it was him who demanded that his admirals and Generals conform to his view that a major war with the big European powers could be avoided until the mid 1940s. It was also his decision in 1935 to abandon the overall argeed upon strategic plan and force a massive change in direction through the 1936 four year plan. Amongst the many problems it created it forced a delay in the naval building program that saw all the warships delayed by an average of 11 months.

Ultimatly it was his change of heart after Munich that dragged Germany into war prematurely, since he had decided that there was no point in waiting any longer for his ultimte struggle with 'American led international Jewry'. This is why many historians see WW-II as "Hitlers War".


----------



## delcyros (Jan 6, 2012)

Langsdorff an officer with background of the Torpedo inspection. He was a torpedo school officer for much of his career.
The command over ADMIRAL GRAF SPEE was his first primary artillery fighting ship command.
Throughout the battle he chaged courses repeatedly, organised speed and set course changes after potential torpedo lanes (which he would have fired had he been the british commander, for sure) and dictated the distances about what he guessed was on the edge of effective torpedoing distance.
All this pretty much ruined the work of the gunnery officer, who preferred a steady course, loosing his firing solutions with every change and had little hope to engage effective rapid fire (order "gut- schnell", requiring at least two successive straddles for confirmed range). That Langsdorff choose his GO´s platform to command the ship from and not the armoured CT probably didn´t made the IGO´s task easier...
With all respect for him as a respective and sensible personality, he handled the pocket battlship like a DD, not like a cruiser armed with capitalship guns.


----------



## psteel (Jan 6, 2012)

Did Germany really have such a lack of trained officers that they had to resort to DD skippers? The same thing happened with the Scharnhorst at North Cape battle, or so I'm given to understand!!!

I gather that the Germans had a couple of Linienschiffe as 'training ships' plus a couple more as heavily armored remote controlled target ships. I assumed this meant they would have a alot of training for atleast cruiser level or higher commanders?


----------



## delcyros (Jan 9, 2012)

It was not uncommon -in all navies- that high performing, selected officers were allowed the opportunity of cross purpose charges to widen their horizon and let other people participate from their skills.
It´s not a question of shortages, the KM naval officers circulated a lot in and out of command of the very few major fleet units.
That´s not saying it always worked out as intended...


----------



## parsifal (Jan 9, 2012)

RN had similar experiences, as did the US and IJN. 

In the case of the RN, Cunningham was a Battleship specialist, that did very well commanding carriers. There were some other officers with similar experiences. 

As a generalization, once an officer achieved flag rank (Commodore in the RN, not sure about the KM, but expect kapitan), his specialization became less important to his command capability...his ability to lead and handle ships in general over his specialization. In the RN, "wavy navy" officers were generally excluded from flag rank commissions, though ther were some exceptions. 

I dont buy the argument that langsdorf lost the battle because he was a destroyer captain. I can understand why he was making rapid and repeated course and speed changes. He knew he had to emerge from the battle with as little damage as possible to his ship, if he wanted to get home. Maintaining a steady course increases the chances of success for his own gunnery, but also increases the chances of success for the RN of hitting him. 

I think the Germans basically fell into this battle by accident. If I recall correctly, The Germans initially identified the British squadron as one cruiser and two destroyers. Langsdorf was also greatly disrupted by Harwoods super aggressive tactics and the splitting of his forces. 

Moreover, a torpedo hit from the "destroyers" was a far greater threat than a gunnery hit. Manouvering to avoid critical hit dfrom this threat (however imaginary it proved to be with the benefiot of perfect hindsight) was the right decision given the information before him at the time.


----------



## psteel (Jan 10, 2012)

I don't think Bey performed well at Narvik and wonder why he was put in charge of one of the last remaining capital ships in the German fleet. I also don't think Langsdorff was aggressive enough as a commander. The risk of the enemy not being what a commander had anticipated was always going to be an issue in any naval clash. What was the expected doctrinal solution in such an event, for the slower moving Panzerschiffe? 

From what I can see he had no choice but to fight it out to conclusion. One may argue he acted on behalf of his crew etc but I think of leaders of other warships like KorvettenKaptain H von Brosy-Steinberg in Sept 1941 off Norway.

Escorting a troop convoy with 1500 mountain troops deploying to Northern Norway, Brosy-Steinberg was skipper of the 2000 ton Gun boat the _Bremse_. She could only make 28-29 knots and much less in the stormy gale that night. His ship was armed with only 4 x 5"guns against two British Cruisers able to make 31-32 knots in good weather and armed with 18 x 6"guns + 16 x 4"flak and torpedoes. Brosy-Steinberg could not run away and had to protect the convoy, so he charged the British Cruisers drawing them away while the convoy escaped. 

Even though both British armored Cruisers had modern ‘director’ fire controls and type 273, 284 290 radars, while the Bremse had none, a confused night battle developed with smoke where the _Bremse_ was lost and mistaken as 3 different counter attacking warships including a DD a F class escort and herself.


----------



## parsifal (Jan 11, 2012)

> I don't think Bey performed well at Narvik and wonder why he was put in charge of one of the last remaining capital ships in the German fleet


.

Why do you think he did not perform very well at Narvik. The first battle he won, the second one he lost....mostly because he was out of ammunition and was faced with a battleship. There was no escape from Narvik once the supply ship was intercepted and sunk. 

As to his command of Scharnhorst, just rember the operational restrictions all KM COs were burdened with. There was far less individual freedom of decision for the commanders at sea.....the KM tended to try and run battles or at least operations from their fleet HQ. Look at what happened to marschall in 1940.....acted contrary to Raeders orders, sank a carrier and two DDs as a result, and stil was court martialled. he should have been treated as a hero.

and then ther is the policy of not engaging equal or superior forces. This cost the KM more than it saved, and severely restricted even further the freedom to make decisions based on local conditions for the commanders on the spot.

Beys command of his ships was entirely consistent with standard operational procedures of the KM. The fact that these procedures were over controlling and flawed in the first place cannot be laid at the feet of the fleet commanders....they are the fault of the high command, extending all the way to Hitlers but including OKM. 



> I also don't think Langsdorff was aggressive enough as a commander. The risk of the enemy not being what a commander had anticipated was always going to be an issue in any naval clash. What was the expected doctrinal solution in such an event, for the slower moving Panzerschiffe?



Id have to disagree with that, in that i dont see the failure as being of Langsdorfs making. Langsdorf was subject to the same restrictions as Bey at North Cape...."do not engage an enemy of the same or superior force". Langsdorfs primary mission was mercantile raiding not sinking elements of the RN. He initially under-estimated the strength of the RN force against him...1 cruiser plus two destroyers, in reality 3 cruisers, and as soon as this became apparent, applied the rules of engagement that were applicable.....use all possible means to disengage. The fact that he is slower does not make it impossible to disengage...just harder.

Langsdorf was acting entirely within the parameters of his standing orders. If you want to blame anybody for his timidity, blame the german admiralty. 




> From what I can see he had no choice but to fight it out to conclusion. One may argue he acted on behalf of his crew etc but I think of leaders of other warships like KorvettenKaptain H von Brosy-Steinberg in Sept 1941 off Norway.



There was no lack of fighting spirit in the KM, and that came out in the performance of their light forces. in particular the successes of their S bootes is worth mentioning. The performance of the bremse is another exemplary example of the KM at its best.

However, rigidly enforced standing orders applied to the commanders of capital ships, and langsdorf was obliged to follow those orders, or risk court martial


----------



## delcyros (Jan 12, 2012)

Langsdorf violated standing orders when he decided to engage a cruiser and two 'DD's' instead of rejecting action when he still had opportunity to do so. He intentionally engaged an element of RN forces instead of a merchant vessel.
A cruiser and 2 DD's would have been dangerous alone for a single raider.


----------



## Juha (Jan 12, 2012)

delcyros said:


> Langsdorf violated standing orders when he decided to engage a cruiser and two 'DD's' instead of rejecting action when he still had opportunity to do so. He intentionally engaged an element of RN forces instead of a merchant vessel.
> A cruiser and 2 DD's would have been dangerous alone for a single raider.



While difinitely true that Langsdorf violated his orders but that very probably changed nothing. The RN cruisers were readying their catapult planes for morning searches when they saw AGS, so even if AGS had turned away when it first saw the cruisers, the catapult planes would most probably have found her a little later.

Juha

Juha


----------



## parsifal (Jan 12, 2012)

> Langsdorf violated standing orders when he decided to engage a cruiser and two 'DD's' instead of rejecting action when he still had opportunity to do so. He intentionally engaged an element of RN forces instead of a merchant vessel.




You are right. I would think however that in his mind, it was an acceptable risk, and must have thought they were defending some high value target like a troop convoy. If he could deal with the Cruiser quickly, he could then turn away and run. Whilst he could not out run Destroyers, they lacked the endurance, spotter aircraft and the like, to maintain a proper shadowing role. If they attempted to close and disable the Spee with torpedoes, there was a high risk they would be sunk by the raiders guns first. From Langsdorf perspective I can see it asd a calculated fairly safe risk

I didnt think a cruiser plus two destroyers would be considered an equal or superior force to s heavier cruiser, but maybe it was.....are there any contemporary guidelines on that sort of thing...... 



> A cruiser and 2 DD's would have been dangerous alone for a single raider.



Ah yes, i agree with that as well, but do you think more or less or about the same threat as 3 cruisers. I would think langsdorf would view the three cruisers as more threat


----------



## barney (Jan 13, 2012)

From Wikipedia: Neutrality restrictions limited Admiral Graf Spee to a period of 72 hours in Montevideo before she would be interned for the duration of the war.

Maybe someone can explain this; how does Uruguay intern a battle cruiser with 11 inch guns if she doesn't want to be interned? This part of the story has always bothered me.


----------



## Shortround6 (Jan 13, 2012)

It was agreed to international rules. If the Graf Spee had shot her way out of Montevideo it is likely that no neutral country would have allowed any German ship to take refuge for the duration of the war. While it wound up making little enough difference as things turned out I doubt that the Germans were willing to give up this benefit that early in the war. 

Remember too that the same rules kept the British from coming in after her. There was no way the Uruguay navy could have kept the British out either. Any future attempt by a German ship to seek 72 hr refuge might have been meet with an invitation by the "host" country to the RN to get the intruder out of their waters.


----------



## parsifal (Jan 14, 2012)

The neutrals were important for reasons other than military. Trade, sanctuary, foreign exchange, diplomacy. Losing the Adm Graf Spee was prefereable to losing credibility among all neutral nations. Germany had enough issues in that department already.....


----------



## delcyros (Jan 14, 2012)

Assuming that Langsdorff expected a light cruiser of the LEANDER class to engage, Heft e Unterlagen zur Bestimmung der Hauptkampfentfernung (GKdos-100), a period primary source suggest a desired range of in between 130hm and 200hm (= 14,200 to 21,870 yard) and expected a significant superiority but warned from more 6in hits at closer ranges.

Assuming Langsdorff expected a heavy cruiser of the SUFFOLK class to engage, the source suggests a desired range of in between 190hm and 260hm (20,780 yard to 28,440 yard) and additionally always keeping a target angle of nearly 40 deg.

It was unknown by then that the RN didn´t fielded APC ammunition for their cruisers 6in and 8in naval rifles but even knowing that after he realised that he had to fight both, the correct range would have been in excess of 190hm, which Langsdorff ignored and choosed to close in early in the engagement. This was a very risky move. From long range, he could mainten a more steady course for longer and let his GO doing his job best to exploit the benefits of the bigger 11.1in naval rifles and C/38k firecontroll gear in long range superiority.
That way he really messed up things. That´s at least what can be read in period primary sources dealing with conclusions based on interrogations of the crew. His AO´s from both, the fore and aft FC stations complained much about this.

The problem I have with his engagement in the first place is that assuming he expected a valuable convoi than he should also have expected more escorts. You don´t run into all escorts seperated from the convoi at once. There were no merchants spotted but I speculate that he may have been looking for the HIGHLAND PRINCESS which was reported in this area three days ago. Assuming he expected a minor element of the RN than he should have known that he was confronted with parts of a task force searching for him and he should have denied contact (in fact he was informed by the B-service about multiple TF´s set up to look for him and he was lucky not to run into the TF formed around ARK ROYAL and DUNKERQUE). That would have been possible by the time, Diesels take only minutes to go from cruise to full speed while some boilers in case of ACHILLES and EXETER needed to be lit up in the first place to make steam for speed. Langsdorff had an initial ID advantage (even assuming he miss ID ´ed) and the Ar-196 float planes were more often than once used to drive off scout planes before off Spain and later off Norway. Radar was only aviable to AGS so he could have made good his escape in the night.


Langsdorff violated standing orders to not engage naval forces and he ignored the suggestions written down in GKdos-100 particularely for such a purpose, he also messed up the gunnery element of the ship and handling a Panzerschiff like a torpedoboat represents a poor substitute for compromising the single most important asset of the Panzerschiff: It´s battleship guns and firecontroll gears cramped in a cruiser´s hull.


----------



## Juha (Jan 14, 2012)

On Arado Ar 196As, one must remember that the 196A-1 of AGS with its one fixed and one flexible 7.9mm mg had much weaker firepower than subsequent subtypes. It was definitely better than the Seafoxes of Ajax, which had one 7.7mm flexible, but the Walrus of Exeter had 2 flexible 7.7mm mgs. So while 196 was better in air combat than the British types it wasn't overwhelmingly so.

Juha


----------



## barney (Jan 14, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> It was agreed to international rules. If the Graf Spee had shot her way out of Montevideo it is likely that no neutral country would have allowed any German ship to take refuge for the duration of the war. While it wound up making little enough difference as things turned out I doubt that the Germans were willing to give up this benefit that early in the war.
> 
> Remember too that the same rules kept the British from coming in after her. There was no way the Uruguay navy could have kept the British out either. Any future attempt by a German ship to seek 72 hr refuge might have been meet with an invitation by the "host" country to the RN to get the intruder out of their waters.



Langsdorff asked for two weeks, the British were insisting on 24 hours. So, it doesn't seem like these rules were cut in stone. Also, orders from German HQ were that the ship should not be interned.


----------



## psteel (Jan 14, 2012)

Supermarine Walrus aircraft profile. Aircraft Database of the Fleet Air Arm Archive 1939-1945



Arado Ar 196 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


Looking at the above sites the Walrus could do 135mph top speed and had a wing loading of ~ 58kg/m², while Arado could make 195mph with a wing loading of 98kg/m². So the arado can attack at will but the Walrus can evade and escape close in gun fire. I would guess the wing rolling of the monoplane Arado would be much better than the Walrus biplane.

Once the Arado gets twin 20mm guns in the A-2 model in late 1939/1940, they could intercept such threats and drive them off. I gather that historically they shot down RAF Hampden bombers in 1940?

With regards to Bey at Narvik, he took command after Bonte had been killed but was slow to muster his forces and counter attack. It happened that the returning two German destroyers in an adjacent fiord ambushed the retreating British DD on their own initiative , sinking two in spite the fact that in this short violent exchange each of the 5 retreating British Destroyer had a malfunctioning torpedo pass under the hull. This could have turned the whole battle, but Bey was 10,000 yards behind and too timid and hesitant to assist his two destroyers fighting the five British Destroyers.

Worse when 'Naval Group West' told him on the 10th April that several British BB/BC were on route and ordered him to regroup his destroyers and lead them home under cover of night, Bey aborted this break when he saw some RN DD at distance and retreated to Narvik port. The British never knew he was breaking out and he could have made good an escape with two of the four functioning Destroyers. Group west ordered him again the next night to break out with the 4 functioning destroyers, but he failed to even attempt this.

Not the kind of leadership you need for a battleship admiral.


----------



## Juha (Jan 14, 2012)

psteel said:


> Supermarine Walrus aircraft profile. Aircraft Database of the Fleet Air Arm Archive 1939-1945
> 
> Arado Ar 196 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> 
> ...



Hello psteel, that is just I was trying to say. From A-2 subtype onwards 196 has potential of being effective anti-shadower weapon, but A-1 lacked firepower to be very effective on that role. Against underpowered one mg Seafox it might be easier but against 2 mgs Walrus it would have been more difficult to utilise blind spots and arado could only count the certain superiority of a fixed gun over a flexible gun and its higher speed.

IIRC Arado 196As were used against CC Whitleys over Bay of Biscay from 1941 onwards.

Juha


----------



## bowfin (Feb 18, 2012)

The Graf Spee wins the battle coming out to sea but doesn't make it home. Too much Royal Navy between it and safety.

The Graf Spee could concentrate on the Cumberland with the 11" guns and the 5.9" on that side exposed to the Cumberland and use the opposite side 5.9" guns to keep what was left of the other cruisers at bay.

Then again, who is to say what shells land where?

The best scenario would have been to finish the first fight before the Cumberland showed up.


----------



## psteel (Feb 20, 2012)

The 11" gun shell hits did fearsome damage to all of the British Cruisers since they had about the same level of protection. It took just 7 such hits to reduce the _Exeter _to a smoldering wreck limping away sinking and AGS had enough ammo to do the same to _Cumberland_ given the hit rate of the first engagement. 

It appears that closer examination of the shooting record of this ship, Langsdorff commanded poorly forcing his FC teams to constantly recalculate firing solutions as he jerked the ship around to avoid illusionary torpedoes. Even though, as a former Torpedo flotilla leader, he knew the RN never pulled enough lead to get a good torpedo firing solution. Its remarked by historians that he was adversely effected by the splinter damage that wounded him. This may also explain why the secondary 5.9" scored no hits on many shots fired.

There is no doubt that Langsdorff failed to finish off these Cruisers enough to make good an escape into the Pacific with the Altmarck for weeks weeks and perhaps find a way to effect enough repairs to cross the Indian ocean and creep back to Germany when the RN is focused on the next breakout action...which was part of the strategy of the surface raider usage.


----------



## Freebird (Feb 21, 2012)

bowfin said:


> The Graf Spee wins the battle coming out to sea but doesn't make it home. Too much Royal Navy between it and safety.
> 
> The Graf Spee could concentrate on the Cumberland with the 11" guns and the 5.9" on that side exposed to the Cumberland and use the opposite side 5.9" guns to keep what was left of the other cruisers at bay.



But you are assuming that the Cumberland would engage the Spee, which it probably wouldn't. 
The cruisers would be more likely to try to shadow the damaged Spee until the Allied Battlecruisers Carriers arrived



psteel said:


> The 11" gun shell hits did fearsome damage to all of the British Cruisers since they had about the same level of protection. It took just 7 such hits to reduce the _Exeter _to a smoldering wreck limping away sinking and AGS had enough ammo to do the same to _Cumberland_ given the hit rate of the first engagement.



They used far more than 7 shells in the enggagement though.
If the figures given above are correct he Graf Spee had used up 60% of the 11" ammo and had failed to sink the Exeter. There's no certainty that they can destroy the Cumberland, nor that they wouldn't suffer some critical damage while doing so.




> There is no doubt that Langsdorff failed to finish off these Cruisers enough to make good an escape into the Pacific with the Altmarck for weeks weeks and perhaps find a way to effect enough repairs to cross the Indian ocean and creep back to Germany when the RN is focused on the next breakout action...which was part of the strategy of the surface raider usage.



Had he tried to finish off the Exeter he risked further damage and torpedo attacks.
As his orders were to avoid contact with the RN, he decided to retire.
Also keep in mind that he had no idea what other British ships were in the area.
20/20 hindsight is great, but at the time he felt his best option was to find a neutral port, quickly make repairs and then escape


----------



## psteel (Feb 21, 2012)

Thats 9 hits on 405 shells out of 711 shells for a hit rate of one for every 45 shells. So the remaining 306 shells should result in about 6.8 hits . Two hit a Britsh Light Cruiser smashing her rear gun batteries while 7 hit Exeter and almost finshed her off. With Exeter was limping away at 16 knots, listing and flooding with all batteries out and fires raging. It would have only taken one torp to finish her off. Given that the AGS had an 8 knot edge in speed she could easily have gotten into firing positions. The Light Cruisers could similarly exceed AGS top speed by 5-8 knots, but they wizely choose not to since they would be smashed by the big German guns.

If the German reports are accurate , it sounds like Langsdorff suffered some kind of 'paranoid anxity attack' after he suffered his wound. Even though he new the RN Crusiers were in very poor position to obtain any torpedo hits, he imagined a number of such torpedoes launched which he then reacted to by jerking his ship around to avoid these imaginary torpedos and also ruining each firing solutions. As I recall Prince Eugen got 5 hits on 165 shells at Denmarck Straits markedly better than AGS at Plate. Thats probably how much difference these impulsive actions cost the AGS at the 'Battle of the River Plate'. But even having said this Langsdorff still had enough stored hits to do the same to Cumberland that he did to Exeter.


----------



## rochie (Feb 21, 2012)

saw a documentary about this the other day and a surviving crew member stated they had 168 main gun rounds left or 1 hours firing as he put it


----------



## Juha (Feb 21, 2012)

psteel said:


> Thats 9 hits on 405 shells out of 711 shells for a hit rate of one for every 45 shells. So the remaining 306 shells should result in about 6.8 hits.



Now AGS had used almost all of its preferable shell-type against cruisers, HEs, most of remaining 11" ammo was AP, which easily went through cruiser without explosing, so were usually less damaging to the target.



psteel said:


> Two hit a Britsh Light Cruiser smashing her rear gun batterie.



Not really, it disabled the X turret and jammed the Y turret but the Y-turret was freed during the same evening, IIRC.



psteel said:


> ...It would have only taken one torp to finish her off. Given that the AGS had an 8 knot edge in speed she could easily have gotten into firing positions...



Much of AGS's torpedo armament was damaged during the battle but I cannot remember when exactly.



psteel said:


> ...If the German reports are accurate , it sounds like Langsdorff suffered some kind of 'paranoid anxity attack' after he suffered his wound. Even though he new the RN Crusiers were in very poor position to obtain any torpedo hits, he imagined a number of such torpedoes launched which he then reacted to by jerking his ship around to avoid these imaginary torpedos and also ruining each firing solutions...



British also fired torpedoes and noted that AGS avoided them with course chages.



psteel said:


> As I recall Prince Eugen got 5 hits on 165 shells at Denmarck Straits markedly better than AGS at Plate. Thats probably how much difference these impulsive actions cost the AGS at the 'Battle of the River Plate'. But even having said this Langsdorff still had enough stored hits to do the same to Cumberland that he did to Exeter.



Now BBs were bigger targets and they didn't try to dodge German fire, so they were easier targets to hit.

Juha


----------



## psteel (Feb 21, 2012)

> Regarding the enemy's tactics, Captain Parry said the ‘outstanding and most satisfactory feature seemed to be a complete absence of the offensive spirit.’ He certainly made skilful use of smoke to conceal himself from the 6-inch cruisers when their fire became effective, while continuing his main engagement with the Exeter. But in the end he retired from the Ajax and Achilles behind a smoke screen without attempting to finish off the Exeter, although he appeared from his subsequent reported statements to have known that she was out of action. ‘The only possible explanation seems to be that he had been severely handled himself. In confirmation, it was noticed that his after turret was not firing for a long time towards the end of the action and that his 5·9-inch gunfire became increasingly ragged and ineffective.’
> 
> Yet, according to the German account of the action, the Admiral Graf Spee had sustained only two 8-inch and eighteen 6-inch hits. One officer and thirty-five ratings had been killed and sixty wounded. ‘The fighting value of the ship had not been destroyed,’ the report said. The main armament was ‘fully effective’, but there remained only 306 rounds of 11-inch ammunition, representing about 40 per cent of the original supply. The secondary armament was effective with the exception of one gun on the port side and the ammunition hoists of the forward 5·9-inch guns. In consequence, only the four ammunition hoists aft were available for use and the forward guns would have to be supplied from aft. More than 50 per cent of the ammunition supply for the secondary armament remained. The engines were available for maximum speed with the exception of defects of long standing in the auxiliary engines.




CHAPTER 4 — The Battle of the River Plate | NZETC


Another report shows that the AGS had 186 shells, mostly AP rounds, but that was after the pursite that consumed atleast 65 more shells. So the 306 figure is accurate. Which suggests she had roughly 1/2 HE and 1/2 AP at the critical jucture, when he chose to run to port. Like I said his poor control of the AGS lowered the hit percentage and had it been more along the lines of the PE all the British Cruisers would have been put out of action, especially if they chose to attack at night since they had no radar, while the AGS did.

Langsdorff may have been an honorable man , but he was not aggressive enough as a wartime commander.


----------



## Juha (Feb 22, 2012)

psteel said:


> ... So the 306 figure is accurate. Which suggests she had roughly 1/2 HE and 1/2 AP at the critical jucture,



Nearer to 1/3 HE and 2/3 AP because AGS used almost exclusively HE shells during the battle. And if it had engaged Cumberland it would have had only very few HEs left and would have had rely on APs.


----------



## Wavelength (Nov 12, 2014)

One of the most common misperceptions about this battle is that Langsdorf charged in resulting in a short range battle throwing the advantages of his heavier artillery away. The secondary literature on this battle is badly in error. 

The primary documents give an entirely different view of Langsdorf’s tactics. Most interesting is the German track chart indicates the following: 

The enemy was reported in sight at 0552 hours range 31,000 meters to its south, south east. The enemy was making 14 knots on course 60* T. 
At 0615 Graf Spee turned from course 140* to course 97*, to clear its arc of fire, accelerating to 24 knots.
At 0617 Graf Spee opened fire on Exeter, range 20,600 meters (22,500 yards).
Exeter turns to its starboard coming around to course 275* (this increases the range)
A &A continue on course 60* for the next few minutes and then turn to course 30* or north east 
At about 0626 Graf Spee turns to course 60* and then to 06* to prevent A&A from crossing it T. Range to A&A still exceeded 16,000 meters at that time. 

German analysis dated Feb1940 point out that Langsdorf made a tactical error at this point by turning north and shifting fire to the light cruisers instead of finishing off Exeter. In the view of the Artillery Research Command he should have turned south at this point and kept the hard hit Exeter engaged. Turning south would have neutralized the two light cruisers for the time being, having them going the wrong direction and placed the Graf Spee in a perfect position to finish off Exeter with both artillery and torpedoes.

The German analysis also point out that Langsdorf missed a second chance to finish off Exeter at 0634 when it re-engaged Exeter from its port side having turned on to course 320*. It quickly scored three more hits on Exeter despite the long range, but it once again shifted fire and turned to course 283*, letting Exeter off the hook. Shortly before this time Graf Spee received a 6” hit from the Ajax from a range of 16,000 meters from starboard to port which exploded in the fighting top. The radar set and the range finder lost electrical power and the cabling was cut to the inclinometer which disabled the RPC. From this point onward Langsdorf sought disengagement. It goes without saying that its shooting fell off.

Up until that time its shooting was really outstanding. Graf Spee’s AO Paul Ascher opened the battle with a classic 400 meter bracket to confirm his firing solution: One just short (causing damage), one just long, and the third straddling. It then hit the Exeter four times in as minutes before shifting fire. When it shifted fire back to the Exeter it hit with the first salvo followed by two more in a just a few minutes. It scored 7 direct hits and 3 damaging near misses on the Exeter before the battle was 15 minutes old.

The services of the range finder, radar set, and the RPC was restored by the time it reached Montevideo.

Even during the historical battle AGS was close to destroying the British force in detail.


----------



## parsifal (Nov 13, 2014)

here are then extracts from the DKM Admiralty, giving details on the information about the ship, the damage suffered, and the main problems being faced by the ship after the battle
Part of the initial communication sent by Langsdorf 14 December 





Further more detailed report received 16 December 1939





AGS was short of ammunition according to its own commander. It had suffered light damage, but that damage affected the ships seaworthiness. There is no mention of damage to the fuel system, but it does mention that seawater was getting into certain compartments. Im not sure which compartments at this stage and Langsdorfs reports dont really reveal the detail 


I accept that there was some sort of damage to the fuel feeder system,. but i cant find a primary source to support that. Id love to know where the notion comes from


----------



## Wavelength (Nov 13, 2014)

I have seen the detailed German damage report caputered after the war ended. It does not list damages caused by each hit. Instead it goes through each system listing any problems and if they have been addressed yet. For example it will go through the condition of the SA (heavy battery) and its supporting systems. Most of the damage had been addressed. There is no mention of the fuel purification system.

There were 15 6” hits and two 8” hits. Almost all caused only superficial damage, although two 6” deck hits on the forecastle left large exit wounds in the port side bow flare, which could have caused see keeping problems in a heavy sea way. The gun systems and the ship’s vitals remained untouched. The one critical hit, on which the battle turned, was the 6” forecastle hit. This affected AGS fighting ability. 

The two 8” hits were scored early. They were scored with Exeter’s 3rd and 4th salvoes. Exeter scored no other hits for the rest of the day. The first 8” hit was a plunging fire deck hit. It passed through an armoured hatch closure before passing through 2 decks and detonating above the main armoured deck. It damaged the fresh water purification system. This may have had an indirect impact on the fuel purification system because steam was used to pre-heat the fuel as part of the fuel purification procedures. The second 8” hit was a dud which passed through the foretop tower cleanly and then bounced off the lightly armoured oberdeck and into the sea.

In 1964 a damage listing by Sir Millington-Drake mistakenly listed a 8” belt penetration on the port side forward. This was in error as was proven by the photographs taken by British agents after Graf Spee arrived in Montevideo and given to Harwood.


----------



## Wavelength (Nov 13, 2014)

My point is that Langsdorf essentially fought a long range battle in keeping with German doctrine at least to begin with. It was going very well up until the 6” foretop hit which handicapped Graf Spee’s firecontrol. Without that Graf Spee was well along to destroying or incapacitating each British unit one at a time. 

The Artillery Research Commands review of the battle determined that Langsdorf had sought battle because he had them in sight and was stalking them with radar for 22 minutes before the British became aware of his presence. He could probably have quietly turned away and avoided any trouble. Maybe he thought he needed to destroy or incapacitate the enemy to prevent them from shadowing him until more powerful units could arrive, given his speed disadvantage? A factor was certainly the misidentification of Ajax and Achilles as destroyers instead of cruisers


----------



## parsifal (Nov 13, 2014)

she had still suffered enough damage for chief engineer Krakenhagen to say it would take two weeks of dock time to repair. that's not light damage. Light damage would take 1 or two days for own crew to repair. I would p[lace that in the category of moderate damage. 

I don't understand some aspects of this situation. Why describe the damage as "Light", yet assess the repair time as two weeks. In the "In this day in Europe" thread Im going through the daily reports for all the navies, and a two week repair time is a fairly extended repair time


----------



## Wavelength (Nov 13, 2014)

I agree, it is a bit puzzling because the detailed damage survey certainly does not describe any heavy damage. One thing about it, they were somewhat dependent upon the yard to provide materials and specialized labor, and the British were putting pressure on to not to provide them anything. I have heard it described that the damaged steam piping could not be repaired in timely way because it required special materials, probably a stainless steel or monel piping, which was difficult to obtain, but once again such is not listed in the damage survey or other documents. They may have been overstating their case to make excuse to buy more time as well.

Regarding the ammo question they used HE during battle (as the doctrine specified) and probably were about out of that. AP is about useless against merchant shipping and not much good against cruisers either.


----------



## Garyt (Nov 13, 2014)

I'd think the Graf Spee would do well against the initial british forces, barring a lucky hit like the one that knocked out her fire control. I think what is sometimes overlooked is that in addition to her 6 x11" guns, she also had the 8 x 5.9" guns, which was roughly the equivalent of an Ajax or Achilles main armament.

The real problem I see is after the battle. If she takes much damage that effects her speed and sea worthiness, running from the other british forces searching for her becomes very tough.



> Regarding the ammo question they used HE during battle (as the doctrine specified) and probably were about out of that. AP is about useless against merchant shipping and not much good against cruisers either.



Against destroyers and merchants it's overkill, but it's only an 11.1 inch gun, and not quite in the same class as the Scharnhorst's 11.1". The cruisers have a good 3-6 inches of belt armor, so overpenetration should not be an issue.


----------



## Denniss (Nov 14, 2014)

Using the 28cm AP shell to punch through a destroyer or cruiser still makes a big hole in their hull with associated damage. It may be sufficient to cause flooding, depending on angle of impact and penetration.


----------



## Garyt (Nov 14, 2014)

> Using the 28cm AP shell to punch through a destroyer or cruiser still makes a big hole in their hull with associated damage. It may be sufficient to cause flooding, depending on angle of impact and penetration.



True Denniss, but if the shell fails to detonate or passes through the vessel prior to detonation, you lose much of the potential damage that could be done. With 1 inch or less of metal, destroyers and merchants vessels do not offer a shell of this type enough resistance to detonate within the vessel with regularity.

Three to six inches though of belt armor definitely gives enough resistance to detonate. One must remember though that these AP rounds were no where near 100% reliable - passing through x inches of armor and both shell and fuse staying intact to effect detonation is no easy task.

As an aside, a Common Round was expected in real rough terms to penetrate armor equal to 1/3 it's diameter, so a common round from the Graf Spee would be expected to penetrate roughly 3.7 inches of armor, which makes cruisers right on the borderline of effectiveness for HE rounds.


----------

