# 1941: Top 3 Allied Bombers



## wuzak (Dec 10, 2014)

A companion thread to Tomo's fighter thread.

Which 3 bombers were the best available (in production and service/combat) for the Allies in 1941.

They could be light, medium, heavy, strategic, tactical, torpedo or dive bomber. Or any other category of bomber I have missed.


----------



## fastmongrel (Dec 10, 2014)

Vickers Wellington
Petlyakov Pe-2
Martin Maryland


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 10, 2014)

A bit too broad of a spectrum if you are trying to compare a Blackburn Skua (or, heaven forbid an Fairey Swordfish) to Wellington, Whitley or Sterling/Halifax let alone bringing in other nations. 

For the Russians you are trying to compare the SU-2 







to the PE-8










And while the SU-2 sure can't do what the PE-8 can do I don't think you want to try using the PE-8 at tree top level attacking army gun positions or supply lines.


----------



## KiwiBiggles (Dec 10, 2014)

If we're OK with the Mosquito B.IV's introduction date of 15 November 1941, then the Mosquito pretty much tops the list.

The Petlyakov Pe-2 is probably up there, if not quite at Mosquito levels.

For heavies it's really an RAF clean sweep. Halifax, Stirling, Wellington.


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 10, 2014)

"The B Mk IV entered service in May 1942 with 105 Squadron." ???

The Petlyakov Pe-2 may be somewhat over rated. 

Some of the Wiki figures are way out of line. It may have been one of the better Russian aircraft in 1941 but that is not saying a great deal. In use it it had some of the same problems as the JU-88, a rather restricted _internal_ bomb load so any bomb load in excess of 6 X 100KG bombs was carried externally with the associated penalty in speed/range. 

I would also note that the top speeds often quoted are _without_ the external bomb gear.
For a great picture of the Pe-2 bomb bay.


----------



## wuzak (Dec 10, 2014)

KiwiBiggles said:


> If we're OK with the Mosquito B.IV's introduction date of 15 November 1941, then the Mosquito pretty much tops the list.
> 
> The Petlyakov Pe-2 is probably up there, if not quite at Mosquito levels.
> 
> For heavies it's really an RAF clean sweep. Halifax, Stirling, Wellington.




105 Squadron received their first Mosquito on 15 November 1941. I don't think the Squadron would have been declared operational with Mosquitoes by the end of 1941. My references are at home, but I think the first operations weren't until 1942.


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 10, 2014)

Letting the Mosquito into consideration for 1941 means a host of American bombers become eligible. The first production B-25C was delivered in Dc 1941, The First B-26A was delivered in Oct 1941 after 201 (?) B-26s. " By November 30, 1941, 42 B-17Es had been delivered." and some of them were at Pearl Harbor.


----------



## wuzak (Dec 10, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> Letting the Mosquito into consideration for 1941 means a host of American bombers become eligible. The first production B-25C was delivered in Dc 1941, The First B-26A was delivered in Oct 1941 after 201 (?) B-26s. " By November 30, 1941, 42 B-17Es had been delivered." and some of them were at Pearl Harbor.



The question is, were any of these better at their jobs than teh Mosquito was at its?

FWIW, I don't think the Mosquito qualifies.

The Boeing does, in an earlier guise - the Fortress I (B-17C) was in operations for the RAF in mid 1941.

What other options are there?
Wellington
Blenheim
Whitley
Manchester
Hampden
Halifax

I'm not up to speed with Soviet equipment.


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 10, 2014)

As far as "combat use" goes the Mosquito, B-25 and B-26 don't really qualify (although a number of squadrons were working up with them) and only the early B-17s do, ( and few non-turbo B-24s) and they weren't very good as bombers _as used in Europe._

A few different types of A-20 do qualify. 

We also have a problem (or at least I do) with the statement "were any of these better at their jobs than the Mosquito was at it's?"
The Mosquito was very good at it's "job" (but it's _job_ even in 1942 was rather restricted as 105 squadron was the _only_ Mosquito _bomber_ squadron for 9 months) but trying to compare planes doing _different_ jobs gets very difficult. Was a Skua a better or worse dive bomber than the Mosquito was pathfinder or target marker? 
It is a bit like saying is a chicken Caesar salad a better salad than a German chocolate cake is a cake


----------



## vikingBerserker (Dec 10, 2014)

No, I'd have to go with the German Chocolate cake 

I'd have to list the B-17 as the B-24 (LB-30) I am really not sure of. The A-20 and if the Mosquito is not allowed the Wellington.


----------



## wuzak (Dec 10, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> The Mosquito was very good at it's "job" (but it's _job_ even in 1942 was rather restricted as 105 squadron was the _only_ Mosquito _bomber_ squadron for 9 months) but trying to compare planes doing _different_ jobs gets very difficult. Was a Skua a better or worse dive bomber than the Mosquito was pathfinder or target marker?
> It is a bit like saying is a chicken Caesar salad a better salad than a German chocolate cake is a cake



What you can do is compare the aircraft to others in its category.

The Mosquito was, arguably, without peer in its category/class of bomber - light to medium bomber.

Not sure that could be said of the Skua....


You are quite welcome to nominate the best 3 of each category if you so desire.


----------



## wuzak (Dec 10, 2014)

It seems the B-26 as the Marauder I started operations for the RAF in 1942. 

The B-25 as the Mitchell I went to an operational training squadron in 1941, but did any actually see combat operations in 1941?


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 10, 2014)

wuzak said:


> What you can do is compare the aircraft to others in its category.
> 
> The Mosquito was, arguably, without peer in its category/class of bomber - light to medium bomber.
> 
> Not sure that could be said of the Skua.....



The Skua was a pretty lousy light/medium bomber. On the other hand it wasn't a _bad_ carrier based dive bomber for 1940/41. Something the Mosquito could never do (unless they built much bigger carriers).

In the Thread on fighters we are comparing planes that went (99% of the time) from 5,000 to 8,000lbs ( the P-47 and P-38, etc weren't really in operation yet) and with 1000-1500hp engines (roughly), and had pretty much the same job with few specialists (like the mig 3). In this thread we have planes from under 8,000lbs to well over 50,000lbs. 700hp to over 5000hp and with practically every job _except_ fighter (although we have a few cross overs like the Skua).

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Dec 11, 2014)

wuzak said:


> The Mosquito was, arguably, without peer in its category/class of bomber - light to medium bomber.



What does that make the B-17 then, in terms of bomb load?

Cheers

Steve


----------



## KiwiBiggles (Dec 11, 2014)

A school of swordfish, of course


----------



## tomo pauk (Dec 11, 2014)

The Wellington with Hercules engines would be a contender here IMO.


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 11, 2014)

stona said:


> What does that make the B-17 then, in terms of bomb load?
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve



Kind of depends on _when_ doesn't it?
First *10* Mosquito bombers (_first_ of which flew in Sept of 1941) were limited to *four* 250lb bombs. 
B-17D which started production in Feb 1941 could hold 4800lb of bombs (eight 600lb bombs ?) 
_First_ B-17E flew 3 days before the _first_ Mosquito _bomber_ which had the short engine nacelles and short span tailplane. 
B-17E was good for *12* 500lb bombs or *8* 1000lb bombs. 
512 B-17Es were built *before* the Mosquito flew it's *first combat mission as a bomber*.
*First* B-17F flew the day _before_ the Mosquito flew it's first combat mission as a bomber. 

It would be quite some time before the Mosquito, extraordinary aircraft that it was, would come close to challenging the B-17 for bomb load carried.

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## parsifal (Dec 11, 2014)

> The Skua was a pretty lousy light/medium bomber. On the other hand it wasn't a _bad_ carrier based dive bomber for 1940/41. Something the Mosquito could never do (unless they built much bigger carriers).



Correct in the context of 1941 , but incorrect in a technical sense. To meet specification N.15/44 for Royal Navy use, de Havilland produced a carrier-borne variant. This resulted in 50 Sea Mosquito TR Mk 33s which featured folding wings, a thimble nose radome and fuselage hardpoints for mounting torpedoes. These were followed by 14 Sea Mosquito TR Mk 37s, which differed in having ASV Mk. XIII radar instead of the TR.33's AN/APS-6.
The Royal Navy also operated the Mosquito TT Mk 39 for target towing. A number of B.Mk XVIs bombers were converted into TT.Mk 39 target tug aircraft. 

Not sure if the type was ever permanently embarked on a carrier, but its successor the Sea Hornet certainly was....postwar.

Sea Hornets were the obvious extension of the carrier borne Mosquito concept, though admittedly a different aircraft. Eric Brown had this to say about the Sea Hornet

And to finish off I can't think of a better way than with some words from Eric 'Winkle' Brown, who was very impressed with the Hornet. Note that Eric is discussing the performance of the Sea Hornet, which was some 800 kg heavier than the F.1.

"


> ...the next two months of handling and deck landing assessment trials were to be an absolute joy; from the outset the Sea Hornet was a winner!" "The view from the cockpit, positioned right forward in the nose beneath a one-piece aft-sliding canopy was truly magnificent. The Sea Hornet was easy to taxi, with powerful brakes... the takeoff using 25 lb (2,053 mm Hg, 51" Hg) boost and flaps at one-third extension was remarkable! The 2,070 hp (1,540 kW) Merlin 130/131 engines fitted to the prototypes were to be derated to 18 lb (1,691 Hg, 37" Hg) boost and 2,030 hp (1,510 kW) as Merlin 133/134s in production Sea Hornets, but takeoff performance was to remain fantastic. Climb with 18 lb boost exceeded 4,000 ft/min (20.32 m/sec)"... "In level flight the Sea Hornet's stability about all axes was just satisfactory, characteristic, of course, of a good day interceptor fighter. Its stalling characteristics were innocuous, with a fair amount of elevator buffeting and aileron twitching preceding the actual stall"... "For aerobatics the Sea Hornet was absolute bliss. The excess of power was such that manoeuvres in the vertical plane can only be described as rocket like. Even with one propeller feathered the Hornet could loop with the best single-engine fighter, and its aerodynamic cleanliness was such that I delighted in its demonstration by diving with both engines at full bore and feathering both propellers before pulling up into a loop!"
> 
> And
> 
> "Landings aboard Ocean had been made without any crash barrier... Yet, in the case of the Sea Hornet, I had felt such absolute confidence that I was mentally relaxed... Indeed, there was something about the Sea Hornet that made me feel that I had total mastery of it; I revelled in its sleek form and the immense surge of power always to hand..." "Circumstances had conspired against the Sea Hornet in obtaining the recognition that it justly deserved as a truly outstanding warplane...in my book the Sea Hornet ranks second to none for harmony of control, performance characteristics and, perhaps most important, in inspiring confidence in its pilot.



Sea Hornets were cleared for carrier operations in 1948, aboard the Implacable and served very well. 

British wartime carriers were well able to handle aircraft of this size. After the war, the 14000 ton Majestics were sold off to friendly nations. These included unmodified straight deck types like the SYDNEY which operated aircraft like the Firefly, a heavier aircraft than the mossie. The Melbourne was a majestic, converted to and angled deck in 1955. She operated Gannets, again a heavier a/c, and then from 1967, Trackers, despite a failing catapult by that stage. If she had been new they could have operated a Sea Mosquito with no problem....except that limited capacity of the British carriers would have been even more limited


----------



## stona (Dec 11, 2014)

I'll rephrase that...operational bomb loads 
Cheers
Steve


----------



## parsifal (Dec 11, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> Kind of depends on _when_ doesn't it?
> First *10* Mosquito bombers (_first_ of which flew in Sept of 1941) were limited to *four* 250lb bombs.
> B-17D which started production in Feb 1941 could hold 4800lb of bombs (eight 600lb bombs ?)
> _First_ B-17E flew 3 days before the _first_ Mosquito _bomber_ which had the short engine nacelles and short span tailplane.
> ...



The Mosquito could have ben ready for service more or less in the guise it was introduced in 1942, at least 2 years before it did. there was no technical reason for its delay. What delayed it was RAF hostility towards its very concept....an unarmed high speed bomber made of wood ran counter to everything the RAF believed was necessary. De Havilland were saying for two years before they did that they could build a war winner, but were constantly denied permission. They eventually received some support from a few very courageous officers in the RAF, and from there were able to force the issue by the sheer brilliance of the design

B-17 was basically a story in reverse. great things were expected of it from its inception in 1934, for which it could not deliver. Dogged persistence eventually got it across the line, in a vastly different form and for a completely different role for which it was originally intended. To me, there is no contest in comparing a thorouighbred like to the mossie to a near broken down hack like the B-17


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 11, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Correct in the context of 1941 , but incorrect in a technical sense. To meet specification N.15/44 for Royal Navy use, de Havilland produced a carrier-borne variant. This resulted in 50 Sea Mosquito TR Mk 33s which featured folding wings, a thimble nose radome and fuselage hardpoints for mounting torpedoes. These were followed by 14 Sea Mosquito TR Mk 37s, which differed in having ASV Mk. XIII radar instead of the TR.33's AN/APS-6.
> The Royal Navy also operated the Mosquito TT Mk 39 for target towing. A number of B.Mk XVIs bombers were converted into TT.Mk 39 target tug aircraft.



And were any of these Mosquitoes capable of dive bombing? 
BTW I don't think ANY of the Mosquitoes were actually posted to the carriers despite the initial order or intent.


----------



## Timppa (Dec 11, 2014)

One in each category:

SBD-3 Dauntless
Boston III
Short Stirling I


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 11, 2014)

stona said:


> I'll rephrase that...operational bomb loads
> Cheers
> Steve





> B-17 was basically a story in reverse. great things were expected of it from its inception in 1934, for which it could not deliver. Dogged persistence eventually got it across the line, in a vastly different form and for a completely different role for which it was originally intended. To me, there is no contest in comparing a thorouighbred like to the mossie to a near broken down hack like the B-17



Gee, a little bit of bias here or what? 



> The Mosquito could have ben ready for service more or less in the guise it was introduced in 1942, at least 2 years before it did



Heavy on the less side than the more, A spring 1940 Mosquito would have had Merlin X engines instead of Merlin XX series engines (Merlin 21s in the early versions) and would have been lucky to get constant speed props and not two position props. A bit of a hit to the performance as not only were the peak power ratings lower on the Merlin X but so were the max cruise and climb ratings.

Merlin X engine was good for 1075hp for take-off and 1130hp at 5,250ft and 10010hp at 17,750ft. on 87 octane fuel. Limits on climb were 2600rpm and 5 3/4lb boost and max cruise was 2600rpm and 4lb boost. 100 octane improved things(1280hp for take-off at 10lb boost) but let's remember than Blenheims were being filled with 87 octane on the inner tanks and 100 octane on the outer tanks. The 100 octane being used for take-off/climb out and emergency while the 87 octane was used for cruise ( with attendant tank switching and possiable mistakes/errors). Supply of 100 octane did get better fast during 1940. 

Merlin 21 was good for the same 1280hp for take off (at 12lbs boost) and had the higher limits of 2850rpm and 9lbs for climb and 2650rpm and 7lb boost for max cruise. 
Merlin 23s were cleared for 14lbs boost for take-off (1390hp) and 14lbs boost in low gear and 16lb boost in high gear (as were the Merlin 21s after a period of time).
Merlin 25s and Packard built Merlin 225s kept the same climb and cruise ratings but were cleared for 18lbs of boost for 1610/1635hp for take-off and combat ratings.
Which engines were the planes carrying 4000lb cookies using? 

The Mosquito may have been a thoroughbred but it needed to fed on grain and not grass in order to get the performance it was noted for. 

AS for "operational bomb loads" both the B-17 and Mosquito had rather restricted bomb bays. The often quoted figure of B-17s carrying only 4000lb to Berlin was because it was an _average_ number. The restricted Bomb bay meant that it couldn't carry a large load of incendiaries as the incendiary bombs were rather bulky for their weight. Planes carrying incendiaries (usually the 2nd or 3rd bomb group to cross the target) often carried about 3000lbs while the planes carring HE bombs on the same raid carried 5000lbs of HE bombs. The Mosquito could carry what weight of _normal_ incendiary bombs? (not target markers).
Yeah, lets compare best possible bomb load for the Mosquito (weigh wise) to that _averaged_ payload of the B-17. 

see: 303rd BGA Combat Missions and Reports

On Mission 60 to Schweinfurt the 303rd BG was carrying 16 250lb incendiaries in each plane. 
Mission 74 each plane carried *12* 1000lb bombs plus incendiaries. to Frankfurt, Germany
Mission 85 Solingen, Germany: 8x500 lb G.P. 20 M47A1 65 lb Incendiaries
Mission 113 Ausburg Germany Group A - 12 x 500 lb bombs
Mission 131 Stedorf, Germany 10 x 100 lb G.P. bombs plus 42 x M47A1 Incendiaries
Mission 155 Berlin Germany Group A - 10 x 500 lb G.P.; Group B - 42 x 65 lb
M47A1 Incendiary bombs

Please note in the last mission that the group B was only carrying 2730lbs of "bombs", but not due to weight problems. 

The B-17 had nowhere near the flexibility of bomb load the Lancaster or some of the other British heavy bombers but the Mosquito, as good as it was, was not a miracle airplane that could actually carry many of the loads normally carried by B-17s, in fact it could often only carry 1/2 to 1/3 of the loads internally even if the racks would allow it.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Dec 11, 2014)

If you take every fifth mission and average the bomb loads you will find that the average bomb load is between 5,000lbs and 6,000lbs. 

This is what I meant by operational bomb load.

A slightly modified Lancaster could carry a 22,000lb Grand Slam bomb, but I'd hardly call that the operational load of the type.

I'm not suggesting that the two engine Mosquito could carry as much as the B-17, which was anyway hamstrung by the weight of its defensive armour and armament, but it could and did carry 4,000lbs operationally and regularly (not in 1941) and that is not so far behind a typical operational load for the B-17.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 11, 2014)

It did by carrying a special single 4,000lb bomb. It's flexibility was even more limited than the B-17s. If the Mission requirement was for large quantities of incendiaries it might take 4 Mosquitoes to carry the same load as a single B-17. 
Without the 4,000lb cookie the Mosquito drops to 2,000lbs pretty quickly (or 3,000lbs with under-wing bombs).
Want to try to put 8 250lb incendiaries in a Mosquito? 1/2 the load the B-17 carried. How about 4 500lb bombs (easy) _plus_ 10 65lb incendiaries? oops, two Mosquitos could carry the eight 500lb bombs but you need a _third_ with appropriate bomb racks to carry the 20 incendiary bombs. 

On the other hand if you _need_ a 4000lb blast bomb the B-17 is no good, the only way it can carry one is outside. Not bad if the target is in coastal France but otherwise it pretty much a no-go. 

The B-17 had trouble carrying the quantities and types of incendiaries wanted for some targets. The B-17 is often over rated by claiming it carry 12,800lbs inside, it could but the load was pretty useless, eight 1600lb AP bombs that each carried only bit less explosive than a 500lb GP bomb. Something like under 300 of these bombs were dropped in Europe during the war but many US aircraft have their max bomb load calculated by using them (P-61 could carry 4).

Plan fact is the Mosquito could not replace the B-17 on a one for one basis and could not do it on a 2 for one basis either using many common bomb loads due to the volume the bombs took up, not the weight. 

Going by weight alone disregards the limits the bomb bays put on various aircraft in regards to flexibility. British sort of had the same problem with some of their bombers in reverse. Lots of little bomb bays/bomb/cells out in the wings that could hold 250lb bombs but once they decided they wanted heavier bombs the bays/cells became so much wasted space. Too small to put the equivalent weight of 500lb bombs in and because the bomb doors were often held shut by rubber bungee cords lighter bombs or small bomb carriers could not be used in those positions.

See: Aerial Bombs

for bombs used (which changed with time) and recommendations as to which type to use on which targets (without after the war studies.)


----------



## stona (Dec 11, 2014)

I wouldn't want to replace my B-17s with Mosquitos. They served entirely different purposes.

The B-17 loads seem to have reduced as they carried more incendiaries, which is hardly surprising. Incendiaries are essential for area raids on cities (whatever euphemisms the USAAF and RAF might have used to describe them) and would eventually comprise 15% of the total weight of ordnance dropped by the 8th AF's bombers during the war. The figure is 21% for Bomber Command, but you can get a lot more of the relatively light and bulky incendiaries, packed in their SBC's, into the cavernous bomb bay of a Lancaster.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## wuzak (Dec 11, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> It did by carrying a special single 4,000lb bomb. It's flexibility was even more limited than the B-17s. If the Mission requirement was for large quantities of incendiaries it might take 4 Mosquitoes to carry the same load as a single B-17.
> Without the 4,000lb cookie the Mosquito drops to 2,000lbs pretty quickly (or 3,000lbs with under-wing bombs).
> Want to try to put 8 250lb incendiaries in a Mosquito? 1/2 the load the B-17 carried. How about 4 500lb bombs (easy) _plus_ 10 65lb incendiaries? oops, two Mosquitos could carry the eight 500lb bombs but you need a _third_ with appropriate bomb racks to carry the 20 incendiary bombs.
> 
> ...



The maximum bomb load for a Mosquito B.XVI was 5000lb - 1 x 4000lb + 2 x 500lb.

After the bulged bomb bay came into effect the Air Ministry wanted to find other was to use the space. One solution was a modified Wellington rack. This could carry 8 x 500lb MC bombs in the Mosquito bomb bay, but for CoG reasons de Havillands recommended against it. The AM's response was to ask if 4 x 500lb and 4 x 250lb but I have no record of a response. 

There is alos the "Avro 6 store carrier" of which there are many references but little evidence. This would have enabled 6 x 500lb bombs internally plus the two externally.

The Mosquito could certainly carry the 400lb and 500lb incendiary bombs, which were similar in size to the 500lb MC bomb. They coudl also carry a pair of 160lb/250lb Small Bomb Containers which had the smaller incendiaries. Not sure on the mid sized IBs.


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 11, 2014)

wuzak said:


> The maximum bomb load for a Mosquito B.XVI was 5000lb - 1 x 4000lb + 2 x 500lb.



And the prototype Mosquito B.XVI first flew in Jan of 1944. about 6-7 months after the last major change to the B-17 started production. 



wuzak said:


> There is alos the "Avro 6 store carrier" of which there are many references but little evidence. This would have enabled 6 x 500lb bombs internally plus the two externally.
> 
> The Mosquito could certainly carry the 400lb and 500lb incendiary bombs, which were similar in size to the 500lb MC bomb. They coudl also carry a pair of 160lb/250lb Small Bomb Containers which had the smaller incendiaries. Not sure on the mid sized IBs.



I never doubted the ability of the Mosquito to carry 500lb incendiary bombs, trouble is without the near mythical "Avro 6 store carrier" (pictures in another thread?) the Mosquito is limited to 4 such "stores" inside the plane. Perhaps two more could be carried underwing with without two much penalty. B-17s made at least one run to Berlin carrying five 500lb M17 incendiaries +three 1000lb GP bombs per plane. Mission no 146 of which the 303rd was a small part. "A total of 610 B-17s and 12 Combat Wings were dispatched against Berlin. 514 attacked the primary, dropping 800 tons of 1,000-lb. M-44 General Purpose and 443.5 tons of M-17 Incendiary clusters by PFF methods with unobserved results."

Now to equal the bomb tonnage dropped by the B-17s on this raid you would need 800 Mosquitoes carrying two 1000lb apiece inside and a pair of 500lb M-17 Incendiary clusters under wing with an additional 162 Mosquitoes carrying six 500lb M-17 Incendiary clusters each. 

This is a 500lb M-17 incendiary cluster so your speed, mileage and bomb stowage may vary from "normal" 500lb bombs.


----------



## wuzak (Dec 11, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> Now to equal the bomb tonnage dropped by the B-17s on this raid you would need 800 Mosquitoes carrying two 1000lb apiece inside and a pair of 500lb M-17 Incendiary clusters under wing with an additional 162 Mosquitoes carrying six 500lb M-17 Incendiary clusters each.



This is the crux of the matter. 

The goal is not to carry as many bombs to target as the B-17s did. The goal is to drop as many bombs _on the target_. Depending on tactics, that may require fewer Mosquitoes.

Then again, raids with large incendiary mixes tended to be more area raids. Something for which the Mosquito was not suited.

In any case, the Mosquito does not, in my mind, qualify as a 1941 bomber.


----------



## bobbysocks (Dec 11, 2014)

from what little i have read about it the boston/havoc was a decent bomber. maybe not a world beater but sufficient for the time....and until something better could come along.


----------



## parsifal (Dec 11, 2014)

B-17s were what they were.....a heavy bomber operating at high altitude plastering bombs on a city in order to flatten that city. RAF used them to a limited extent for spoofing and LR ASW work. Point is, arguing that the B-17 was more flexible than a mosquito because it had the greater choice of bombs has to be one of the most misplaced arguments Ive ever seen in this place.

Mosquito was a far more flexible aircraft than the B-17 could ever hope to be. Lets list some of its capabilities

Low level strike...tick
High level strike...tick
Medium level strike...tick
Rocket and cannon armed ground attack...tick
Close support...tick
Anti shipping...tick
High speed recon...tick
Anti submarine...tick
ship borne strike...potential 
transport...tick
target tug...tick
fighter...tick
night fighter...tick
night intruder...tick
precision (well as good as the technology of the time would allow) bomber......tick


It did all of these with reasonable proficiency

B17s were designed as an anti-shipping weapon, but failed pretty miserably. They failed at ground support, failed at anything involving bombing other than flattening cities at a high altitude, as others have pointed out, were restricted in payload compared to other kindred aircraft.

Using the same list as above, what were the B-17s capabilities?

Low level strike...very poor
High level strike...tick (more than that really...it was outstanding in this role)
Medium level strike...passable
Rocket and cannon armed ground attack...nope
Close support...fail
Anti shipping...fail
High speed recon...nope
Anti submarine...tick
ship borne strike...no potential 
transport...tick
target tug...tick
fighter...nope
night fighter...nope
night intruder...nope
precision (well as good as the technology of the time would allow) bomber......arguable, but I would say no

In case its not speaking clearly enough, I totally reject the contention that the B-17 was a more flexible, or even a more useful aircraft than the Mosquito. you have got to be kidding

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Vincenzo (Dec 11, 2014)

I did some search for a list
allied 1941 bombers 2 engines or more, only operational (corrections and add welcomed)
Whitley
Manchester
Fortress
Beaufort
Blenheim
Boston
Halifax
Hampden
Hudson
Maryland
Stirling
Wellington
Ju 86
Potez 633
Do 17
S.M. 79
Yak-2
Yak-4
SB
Ar-2
Pe-2
DB-3
Il-4
Yer-2
TB-3
Pe-8
A-20
B-17
B-18
B-23
(B-25 not sure)
(B-26 not sure)
Martin 139


----------



## nuuumannn (Dec 11, 2014)

> De Havilland were saying for two years before they did that they could build a war winner, but were constantly denied permission. They eventually received some support from a few very courageous officers in the RAF, and from there were able to force the issue by the sheer brilliance of the design.



Parsifal, whilst a likely story that the myth of the Mossie has hinged on for many years, it's not strictly true. The concept of the unarmed high speed bomber had been discussed in the Air Ministry before de Havilland first proposed their idea and it was agreed on favourably by Ludlow-Hewitt and Liptrot after Volkert of HP had released his 1937 paper on unarmed bombers - Liptrot even producing his own views that were designed to rock the establishment a little. de Havilland toyed around with ideas based on P.13/36 and agreed to the unarmed bomber idea of two crew and wooden construction after they themselves were not happy with any of their own ideas about an Albatross derivative. The Air Ministry was less than enthusiastic about this as well. The problem for GdeH was that the power operated gun turret dominated defence arguments for bombers and B.12/36 and P.13/36 and subsequent aircraft were to be fitted with them. Britain led the world in turret development at this stage and turrets were seen as the best defence for bombers. Boulton Paul played a big part in this with their A Mk.I turret for the Defiant; developed by de Boysson with SAMMS in France, it was more advanced that current British ideas - bearing in mind BP were the first to put a power operated turret into a bomber. Ludlow Hewitt stated as much that the RAF needed a 'Speed Bomber', not an unarmed bomber. 

When GdeH proposed their high speed bomber no one believed his figures; this is where the reluctance to accept it came from, not the fact that it was made of wood or even unarmed. VCAS Sholto Douglas went so far as to propose that it be fitted with a turret, which was actually going to be the production variant and the high speed unarmed aircraft was to be a technology demonstrator and Freeman urged that this unarmed one go ahead as well. Nevertheless, Ludlow-Hewitt was opposed to the Mosquito because of the unarmed aspect of it, but Tedder actually showed his support after early misgivings. Thankfully, owning largely to Freeman, the turret Mosquito as dropped and never built, specifically when Bishop and Walker produced figures that stated performance would drop considerably. The turret idea was re-examined for a night fighter spec re-written in December 1940 calling for a twin engined night fighter with a turret, but GdeH stated it was a dumb idea fitting a turret to the Mosquito. A mock up was fitted to W4050.

The Mossie came to life when Liptrot offered a night fighter requirement to de Haviiland for the design and a reconnaissance version and it was a production order for a fighter variant in July 1940 that kept the project alive. it's also worth remembering that simultaneous to the Mosquito development there was Blackburn's B.28, which was designed as a high speed bomber, initially unarmed, but with the intention of fitting a turret if need be, but from the start, the B.28's multi role aspects were emphasised - a heavy fighter and reconnaissance aircraft as well as a bomber. Bristol had also proposed a fast bomber version of the Beaufighter, which was attracting interest, but was not continued with as Bristol concentrated on the likes of the Beaumont and Buckingham development. Ironically, the Mossie did what the Buckingham was designed to do, but better.

Even by the end of December 1940, the Mosquito prototype had demonstrated its high speed to higher ups in the air staff and they were suitably impressed, but that production was to concentrate on recon and fighter variants first, _then_ bombers. This explains the delay in getting bomber Mosquitoes into service, not a reluctance to accept it. The bomber prototype was initially one of the first batch of recon aircraft built. You also have to remember the Mosquito prototype was hand built and getting it into production took much working out. Trials at high speed revealed issues like excessive vibration when the bomb doors were opened and other snags that needed solving before the bombers could go into production.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## nuuumannn (Dec 11, 2014)

Another thing worth remembering about the Air Staff's attitude toward de Havilland is that by 1938 when the firm was first offering the idea, the company had never built a front line combat aircraft that had entered RAF service (The Airco DH.2,4,9 and 9A and 10 etc were not built by de Havilland, the firm did not exist until 1921/22, these aircraft were designed by GdeH whilst working for Airco), only derivatives of wooden airliners converted into bombers, lots of training aircraft and civilian light machines of wooden construction. You can hardly blame the Air Ministry for not accepting their ideas since the firm's engineers had no experience in such things, particularly not all-metal aircraft, of which the Flamingo was the only sizeable metal machine they had built. This is partialy what makes the achievement of the Mosquito so remarkable.


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 13, 2014)

parsifal said:


> B-17s were what they were.....a heavy bomber operating at high altitude plastering bombs on a city in order to flatten that city. RAF used them to a limited extent for spoofing and LR ASW work. Point is, arguing that the B-17 was more flexible than a mosquito because it had the greater choice of bombs has to be one of the most misplaced arguments Ive ever seen in this place.
> 
> Mosquito was a far more *flexible aircraft* than the B-17 could ever hope to be. Lets list some of its capabilities
> 
> ...



Boy, somebody go their knickers in a twist. 

Please show me the post where I claimed the B-17 was a more _flexible aircraft_ overall? 

What started this was Wusaks post #11
in part " The Mosquito was, arguably, without peer in its category/class of bomber - light to medium bomber."

and Stona's post #14 "What does that make the B-17 then, in terms of bomb load?"

My Post # 17 in part "It would be quite some time before the Mosquito, extraordinary aircraft that it was, would come close to challenging the B-17 for bomb load carried"

Stona's post #19 "I'll rephrase that...operational bomb loads'

and so on with a discussion about the bombloads carried by the two aircraft. 

Nobody but you _brought up_ the other roles, although I replied. SO to you go the honors of bringing up "one of most misplaced arguments Ive ever seen in this place."

I will freely admit/agree that the Mosquito was a much more versatile aircraft overall because I never said it wasn't. 

But the Idea/myth that the Mosquito could carry the *same* bomb load to targets in Europe needs a good going over.


----------



## nuuumannn (Dec 13, 2014)

> "one of most misplaced arguments Ive ever seen in this place."



Here's another, said with tongue firmly planted in cheek - in my experience, that's a pretty big call, SR! 

Three of the best, Wellington, Whitley and B-17 in no particular order, although honourable mention goes to the Maryland and Manchester. I can hear y'all say _Wha_?! And I guess with hindsight its easy to make the case by mentioning the Lancaster, but all the ingredients were already there in the Manchester to make the Lanc work before the Merlins were put in place and Chadwick was already working on a four engined Manchester when the first prototype was being built. The Manchester was a very advanced aeroplane with modern electrical systems, which proved troublesome (British electrics!). There were stability issues with the small fins and the awkward top turret, which caused vibration when rotated, but that was replaced and changes to the Manchester Mk.III (named Lancaster) in the size of fin led to the Manchester Mk.IA, the definitive variant before the Mk.III took precedent in production. Obviously, the engine issues were dogged and were seriously restricting and I don't wish to gloss over the troubles it suffered, the Manchester did have good performance/load carrying capability for a bomber of its day, although the early Forts trump just about everything else (with the exception of the Ju 88 in speed) for speed/range/height at the time.


----------



## wuzak (Dec 13, 2014)

Interesting thought: Part of teh Manchester's problem was that the Vultures had to be de-rated in service, which reduced the ceiling at which they could operate. Would they have worked better with turbos - possibly a pair of B-series turbos or a single C-series would have been needed. Thus the engines would given ~1,800hp to over 20,000ft - a substantial gain over the OTL Vultures. Obviosuly it would have increased empty weight, requiring a reduction in bomb and/or fuel load.

The other issue was that at the time the turbos weren't exactly plentiful, certainly not for foreign powers.


----------



## nuuumannn (Dec 14, 2014)

I think the problems with the short casing bolts was the most serious issue though, also the mating faces between the casing halves didn't line up and because of the short bolts fracturing under load, the casings ripped apart and the flailing interiors tore the entire engine to bits. Once these issues had been solved, the Vulture proved a good engine under test and the Vulture V in the Tornado didn't have the same issues, but Rolls ended production because there was little need for the engine, whereas concentrating on the Merlin and Griffon was more productive since more aircraft operated them. Still, fitting four Merlins was a better option than continuing with the Vulture, regardless of how much better it became after modification. It would be interesting to hypothesise what might have been had Chadwick opted to drop the Vulture engined Avro 679 and go stratight for a Merlin engined Manchester from the start as Handley Page did with the HP.56 powered by two Vultures that was not built, and went for the HP.57 Halifax. Volkert chose this route in 1937 because he had heard that there might be shortages of Vultures further down the line.


----------



## stona (Dec 14, 2014)

The Manchester should be on the list. It flew its last mission on 25th/26th June 1942. By this date the Lancaster was already being delivered in numbers, and crews being converted. It had proven a more than capable, if unintentional, 'stop gap'.

Francis Mason has written:

"_It was not on account of any failure of the Manchester, or of its Vulture engines, that the Lancaster came into being. If an error of judgement occurred it lay in not pursuing the four engine bomber from the outset."_

I couldn't put it better myself. The British, unlike their German counterparts, made a relatively easy recovery from this 'error of judgement' because the Manchester was essentially a very good aeroplane to start with, unlike its German counterpart (the He 177).

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## tomo pauk (Dec 14, 2014)

Main issue both for Manchester and He-177 was the engine choice. Claiming that one was essentially a very good aeroplane, while the other is not is way off the reality. 
The British, ie. Avro, have had, on the other hand, a common sense to admit to themselves that the powerplant chosen is really a self-inflicted wound, and that emerging 4 engined bombers both from UK and USA are better suited for strategic job. Going for 4 Merlins meant an increase of power available, along with better odds with engine-out situation. 
The second Mason's sentence is also true for the He-177:


> ....If an error of judgement occurred it lay in not pursuing the four engine bomber from the outset


----------



## stona (Dec 14, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> The second Mason's sentence is also true for the He-177:



I agree, but without starting another He 177 thread I'll just say that the He 177 was plagued with far more fundamental problems than just a bad engine choice. The Manchester wasn't and the conversion to the Lancaster was relatively straight forward.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## tomo pauk (Dec 14, 2014)

Once the people at LW/RLM/Heinkel/you-name-it pulled their heads from their collective a$$es, the modification that yielded the He-177B was also straightforward. It was also too late to matter, though.


----------



## stona (Dec 14, 2014)

The He 177 B series would have had major modifications from the A series. Much more than a Manchester-Lancaster conversion. The first Lancasters were converted from Manchesters 'on the line'. This could never have happened for a four engine He 177. The He 274 was a better option, at least it ditched the troublesome wing of the He 177.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## wuzak (Dec 14, 2014)

nuuumannn said:


> I think the problems with the short casing bolts was the most serious issue though, also the mating faces between the casing halves didn't line up and because of the short bolts fracturing under load, the casings ripped apart and the flailing interiors tore the entire engine to bits. Once these issues had been solved, the Vulture proved a good engine under test and the Vulture V in the Tornado didn't have the same issues, but Rolls ended production because there was little need for the engine, whereas concentrating on the Merlin and Griffon was more productive since more aircraft operated them. Still, fitting four Merlins was a better option than continuing with the Vulture, regardless of how much better it became after modification. It would be interesting to hypothesise what might have been had Chadwick opted to drop the Vulture engined Avro 679 and go stratight for a Merlin engined Manchester from the start as Handley Page did with the HP.56 powered by two Vultures that was not built, and went for the HP.57 Halifax. Volkert chose this route in 1937 because he had heard that there might be shortages of Vultures further down the line.



The short bolts were on the connecting rods - not normal Rolls-Royce practice, but forced by the design of the master rod. It was this that needed the most work to fix.

Other problems included the crankcase halves moving relative to each other, causing main bearing failures. This was solved using locating dowels.

Another issue was overheating due to poor coolant flow. The reason for this was that two pumps were used, Rolls-Royce finding that one could get starved and thus cavitate. The solution to this was to fit a balance pipe between the two.

The weakness of the master connecting rod was the main outstanding issue for the Vulture. The time and resources required to do this would have distracted from the development of the Merlin and Griffon which was far mor important and affected many more aircraft in production or planned.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## nuuumannn (Dec 14, 2014)

Thanks Wuzak, I read that the Vulture wasn't a Royce design in one of the RRHT books I have, so who was responsible for its conception since it was a departure from normal RR practise? Doesn't say in the book.


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 14, 2014)

Handley Page fought harder against the air staffs requirements (or were a bit later in timing?). The Manchester struggled, in part, due to the air staff requirements. 

The Catapult Idea. Dropped in 1938 (what month?) it was to save money because existing air fields would have to be expanded to operate big bombers. Once they decided to (with war looming larger) to spend the money on airfields and drop the catapult idea the planes under design could drop the structural weight (to some extent) and perhaps change wing size.

British were also calling for the ability to dive bomb from the big bombers, this requirement was also dropped before prototypes flew but _when_ in the design process? Manchester got to drop most of the structural weight but was stuck with the two engine layout. 

Air staff wanted to carry TWO 18in dia. 18ft long torpedoes. This resulted in the space for the looong bomb bays on the British big bombers even though the requirement was dropped. (4 engine bombers or even the Manchester zooming along at 100 ft over the water on a torpedo run???). Depending on plane or designer the space was either wide open or sub-divided lengthwise. 

The ever popular ability to carry 24 troops meant bigger fuselages than needed for a bomber. 

In what order these requirements were dropped or if they were dropped at different times for different aircraft I don't know but they obviously had an impact on ALL the British big bombers to some extent. 

AS did the infamous wing span restriction (not hanger door width but treasury officials trying to limit size/price) and the tire pressure limit (wacking big wheels/tires). 

British (and pretty much everyone else at this point in time) had small design staffs and could NOT throw out large amounts of work after the Air ministry dropped a requirement or two. They could only re-do the fewest number of parts/components that the change in requirement freed them from. 

Another point here is, are we comparing aircraft _as used in 1941_ *or* _what they would later become?_

While the Halifax of would never equal the Lancaster the 1941 Halifax I was a far cry from the later Halifax bombers.


----------



## tomo pauk (Dec 14, 2014)

stona said:


> The He 177 B series would have had major modifications from the A series. ...
> The He 274 was a better option...
> Cheers
> Steve



The He 274 was not a cure to anything, from the get-go for that project (give the, for the Germany of ww2, the cutting edge bomber, to the Farman company to develop??), no mass produced engines for it, but the DB 603 (another self-inflicted wound), the location of the French company too close to the UK (hence too easily bombed, like it happened to the Supermarine factory when they were building the 4-engined bomber prototype). 
The He-177B shared with the He 274 the wrong engine choice - four DB 603s. Meaning that old wing need to be enlarged, ie. another delay.

The Manchester also needed the bigger wing to became Lancaster. 



> The first Lancasters were converted from Manchesters 'on the line'. *This could never have happened for a four engine He 177.*



Depending on how good one's crystal ball was?



> The He 274 was a better option, at least it ditched *the troublesome wing of the He 177*.



The wing was the least of the He-177s troubles.


----------



## stona (Dec 14, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> The He 274 was not a cure to anything, from the get-go for that project (give the, for the Germany of ww2, the cutting edge bomber, to the Farman company to develop??), no mass produced engines for it, but the DB 603 (another self-inflicted wound), the location of the French company too close to the UK (hence too easily bombed, like it happened to the Supermarine factory when they were building the 4-engined bomber prototype).
> The He-177B shared with the He 274 the wrong engine choice - four DB 603s. Meaning that old wing need to be enlarged, ie. another delay.
> 
> The Manchester also needed the bigger wing to became Lancaster.
> ...



A wing extension for the Manchester was already in the pipeline, initially an extension to 90' with a weight penalty of 600lbs to 'substantially improve take off performance'. It was no big deal to develop what was already on the drawing board for the Manchester to the Lancaster. The wing centre section was virtually unchanged.

There was no crystal ball. Avro were working up an improved Manchester in mid 1939. It was designated Type 683 and the Air Ministry expressed an interest in it following the issue of B.1/39. It would have had Merlin Xs and featured the extended wing (as above) and larger tail plane which would characterise the eventual Lancaster.
From this the design developed to a 100' wing span and Merlin XXs in early 1940. February 1940 is when Avro started to refer to the Type 683 as 'Lancaster', though not to the Air Ministry.

Huge impetus was given to the Lancaster project as a result of a proposal in August 1940 that once the initial run of 200 Manchesters was complete, production at Avro and Metrovick should switch to the Halifax. It is not difficult to imagine the reaction of Avro to this suggestion.
Avro's response was to remind the Air Ministry of the progress being made with the Lancaster (as it was now referred to) and the advantages of switching production to this four engine design which shared a more than 70% commonality of parts with the Manchester rather than switching to a completely different and anyway untried aircraft.
The Air Ministry authorised the Lancaster prototype with the proviso that it would have to confirm its potential superiority (over the Halifax) in plenty of time to pre-empt the plans for setting up of Halifax production lines in Manchester.
It did and the rest is history, but only because the four engine Lancaster had been conceived more than two years before this exchange of correspondence with the Air Ministry and _because Avro was ready to manufacture the first Lancaster prototype before the Manchester had been delivered to its first squadron _.

No crystal ball and a simple changeover for which the manufacturer was prepared.

The first Manchester III prototype, BT 308, (no longer Lancaster for security reasons) flew on 9th January 1941, just six weeks after work began to build it. It comprised a standard Manchester I fuselage and standard 22' tail plane complete with the then standard central fin. It was powered by Merlin Xs in Merlin XX cowlings. Details of the Whitley's Merlin engine mounts had been provided to Avro.
By 10th March the prototype was fitted with what would be the standard 39'tail plane and Merlin XXs.

An initial contract for 1,070 Lancasters was issued, production to start following the completion of 200 Manchesters, in fact 44 Manchesters became Lancasters.

The He 177s wing was a problem and was redesigned numerous times.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## tomo pauk (Dec 14, 2014)

Thanks for the overview. 



> There was no crystal ball.



I was referring on how easy (or not) would've been to convert the He 177 to accept 4 individual engines, not the Manchester.


----------



## stona (Dec 14, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Thanks for the overview.
> 
> 
> 
> I was referring on how easy (or not) would've been to convert the He 177 to accept 4 individual engines, not the Manchester.



Well the Germans were really good at doing drawings of all the various versions of all their aircraft, they just weren't so good at realising them.

There was much more cooperation between British aircraft manufacturers (though details of the Whitley V's Merlin engine mountings were provided to Avro by a fellow member of the Hawker Siddely Group) and with the Air Ministry and Ministry of Aircraft Production.

Chadwick didn't want the Merlin Xs on the Lancaster prototype but conceded to the MAP which required all Merlin XXs for the Beaufighter II night fighter, this was the height of the Blitz after all. Nonetheless, as soon as four Merlin XXs became available Avro received them and fitted them to BT308.
Remember that Avro/Chadwick were keen to prove the Lancaster's superiority to the Halifax. Co-operation only goes so far, and they didn't want to produce Halifaxes for Handley Page at their plants. They would have been obliged to if the Lancaster hadn't been the outstanding success that it was.

This kind of co-operative effort, in pursuit of a common objective, seems to have been almost impossible for the various German organisations.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## tomo pauk (Dec 14, 2014)

We've seen that Fairey was strictly against navalizing the Spitfire, so the situation between British firms was not always a honeymoon. 
The wast majority of Lancaster used 'power-eggs' developed by RR. The German engine firms were also offering power egg variants of their engines, more times than not. 



> Well the Germans were really good at doing drawings of all the various versions of all their aircraft, they just weren't so good at realising them.



They realized what they could, it is far easier to draw something than to produce it. Contrary to the UK, Germany have had no another major power or two as allies.
We can see in the book 'British secret projects' that people in the UK were not shy to draw stuff either.


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 14, 2014)

> We can see in the book 'British secret projects' that people in the UK were not shy to draw stuff either



Or the US or Japan or Italy or................

They just don't seem to get as much "press". 

Initial sketches for the Lockheed P-38.


----------



## stona (Dec 14, 2014)

The difference is that German manufacturers were forever drawing unrealisable plans and submitting them to the RLM_ in order to gain or keep lucrative contracts_. 
Many British drawings, you should see some of the stuff Mitchell drew at Supermarine, never left the company premises and eventually archives. I can't comment on the Americans or Japanese.

All designers indulge in 'blue sky thinking', the drawings above illustrate this perfectly. Usually there is some kind of filter between their wilder flights of fancy and the organisations which might actually finance their dream machines.

The Lancaster is a case in point. For much of its development it was a private venture by Avro. A very informal interest, no suggestion of contracts, was expressed by the Air Ministry in an improved, four engine Manchester following the issue of B.1/39, but work was continued at Avro's expense.

It was only in August 1940, five months before the first prototype flew, that the Air Ministry became officially involved, and only in November or December (a bit unclear, needs a bit of investigation) that any financial commitment was made.

There is a fundamental difference in the way the various independent aircraft manufacturers were financed in a democracy like Britain, even during the war, and the centralised system of both finance and control that characterised the Nazi dictatorship.

The British system produced the Lancaster from the Manchester. The Nazi system produced the dog that was the He 177, inefficiently, never in significant numbers, at vast expense and with minimal impact on the air war. It is typical of the He 177 saga that the units trying to operate it never received the tools to service it!

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## bobbysocks (Dec 14, 2014)

stona said:


> The difference is that German manufacturers were forever drawing unrealisable plans and submitting them to the RLM_ in order to gain or keep lucrative contracts_.
> Many British drawings, you should see some of the stuff Mitchell drew at Supermarine, never left the company premises and eventually archives. I can't comment on the Americans or Japanese.
> 
> Steve



you think they played on hitlers facination with "wonder weapons"?


----------



## tomo pauk (Dec 14, 2014)

stona said:


> The difference is that German manufacturers were forever drawing unrealisable plans and submitting them to the RLM_ in order to gain or keep lucrative contracts_.




Not sure that has to do with anything. Designers were trying to do their best, and that does not involve staying at the previous state-of-the-art. Had they opted to do otherwise, the Bf-109 would've emerged as a biplane, and Spitfire would've been the cranked wing, fixed UC aircraft.
It was up to RLM to decide what to fund or not, just like it was the case for the AM in the UK. 



> Many British drawings, you should see some of the stuff Mitchell drew at Supermarine, never left the company premises and eventually archives. I can't comment on the Americans or Japanese.
> All designers indulge in 'blue sky thinking', the drawings above illustrate this perfectly. Usually there is some kind of filter between their wilder flights of fancy and the organisations which might actually finance their dream machines.



Indeed.



> The Lancaster is a case in point. For much of its development it was a private venture by Avro. A very informal interest, no suggestion of contracts, was expressed by the Air Ministry in an improved, four engine Manchester following the issue of B.1/39, but work was continued at Avro's expense.
> It was only in August 1940, five months before the first prototype flew, that the Air Ministry became officially involved, and only in November or December (a bit unclear, needs a bit of investigation) that any financial commitment was made.



Vast majority of the aircraft funded produced was a response to the official AM tenders.


> There is a fundamental difference in the way the various independent aircraft manufacturers were financed in a democracy like Britain, even during the war, and the centralised system of both finance and control that characterised the Nazi dictatorship.
> 
> The British system produced the Lancaster from the Manchester. The Nazi system produced the dog that was the He 177, inefficiently, never in significant numbers, at vast expense and with minimal impact on the air war. It is typical of the He 177 saga that the units trying to operate it never received the tools to service it!
> 
> ...



The British system also produced a number of designs that were dogs, too. The Manchester was one of those. It used plenty of resources, it was never fielded in significant numbers, and it had no impact on war. Luckily, I repeat, the people around it have had common sense to redesign it to accept 4 smaller workable engines instead of 2 bigger and troublesome ones. It dawned too late to the Germans to do the same for the He 177.


----------



## stona (Dec 14, 2014)

British designs were funded privately in response to Air Ministry specifications, though sometimes specifications were written to match an existing design. There was a degree of co-operation, give and take if you like.

The fundamental difference is the way in which German aircraft manufacturers were financed and capitalised. This gave the RLM, or at least the technical office, a much more prominent role in what would or would not be financed. British designers had to contend with their own boards of directors, not always easy.

200 Manchesters were ordered and 166 were completed on time. The remaining 44 became Lancasters. The changeover from Manchester to Lancaster on the two production lines running at the time was quite literally seamless. As Mason has written, the reason more Manchesters were not produced was not due to a failure of the Manchester, it was a very good aeroplane, it was because the development of two engine design was not the correct decision. Chadwick realised this and had been working on the four engine version, to become the Lancaster, since 1939 which in turn led to an easy transition to the best British bomber of WW2.

If the Manchester had been as bad as you seem to be suggesting the Lancaster project would have played out like the He 177 saga, except that the AM/MAP would have pulled the plug on it. The cronyism so endemic to the Nazi system was the only thing that kept the He 177 and any number of other projects, both at Heinkel and elsewhere alive. One of the most insidious effects of this cronyism was the over promotion of incompetent people.
It exerted a baleful influence on the Luftwaffe. You could easily argue that it was the out of date theories of the 'Spaniards' (Legion Condor veterans) that led to the woeful state of communications within the Luftwaffe and Jagdwaffe in particular at the beginning of the war. Why carry a wireless when you could use hand signals or waggle your wings? It worked fine in Spain  

Cheers

Steve


----------



## wuzak (Dec 14, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> Another point here is, are we comparing aircraft _as used in 1941_ *or* _what they would later become?_



Definitely as they were in 1941.


----------



## tomo pauk (Dec 14, 2014)

stona said:


> ...
> 
> 200 Manchesters were ordered and 166 were completed on time. The remaining 44 became Lancasters. The changeover from Manchester to Lancaster on the two production lines running at the time was quite literally seamless. As Mason has written, the reason more Manchesters were not produced was not due to a failure of the Manchester, it was a very good aeroplane, it was because the development of two engine design was not the correct decision. Chadwick realised this and had been working on the four engine version, to become the Lancaster, since 1939 which in turn led to an easy transition to the best British bomber of WW2.



The main shortcomings of the Manchester and He-177 were the same - troublesome engines. Successfully solved when Lancaster became 'alive'; almost successfully solved when DB 606s were substituted with Db 610s.



> If the Manchester had been as bad as you seem to be suggesting the Lancaster project would have played out like the He 177 saga, except that the AM/MAP would have pulled the plug on it.



Bad it was, the redesign solved the problem. 



> The cronyism so endemic to the Nazi system was the only thing that kept the He 177 and any number of other projects, both at Heinkel and elsewhere alive.



The RLM was indeed guilty that it didn't exert a greater control over many programmes, the Me 210 being point in case. The RLM/LW (Udet? Goering?) were also guilty for insisting with the dive bombing requirement for all of the bombers, no matter how big those were; not Heinkel's fault. Don't know whom to blame for going with 2 x 2500 PS engines initially, instead of 4 x 1300, though.


> One of the most insidious effects of this cronyism was the over promotion of incompetent people.
> It exerted a baleful influence on the Luftwaffe. You could easily argue that it was the out of date theories of the 'Spaniards' (Legion Condor veterans) that led to the woeful state of communications within the Luftwaffe and Jagdwaffe in particular at the beginning of the war. Why carry a wireless when you could use hand signals or waggle your wings? It worked fine in Spain
> 
> Cheers
> ...



It was due to the 'Spaniards' the LW introduced finger-four fighter section, much better than the pair or the vic used by other airforces? Not sure that woeful state of communications existed, even in early ww2. 
The over-promotion of wrong people was not endemic to the LW, though.


----------



## nuuumannn (Dec 14, 2014)

> The main shortcomings of the Manchester and He-177 were the same - troublesome engines.



I think comparing the two is fruitless, although they did have a few things in common; engine issues and advanced construction, as well as a convoluted initial specification, but if we must, then the conversion to the Lancaster was relatively trouble free and happened at a time when the conversion was able to make a significant difference to the course of things. I disagree that the Manchester had no impact on the war simply because of the Lancaster. Without the Manchester and P.13/36 and its catapult and other extraordinary requirements, there would have been no Lancaster. Putting the two machines into perspective, the Manchester Prototype first flew on 25 July 1939 and entered service with 207 Sqn in November 1940. It handled well and pilots praised its qualities, its first ops carried out on the night of 24/25 February 1941. The Manchester III first flew on 9 January 1941 and entered service as the Lancaster I with 44 Sqn in December 1941. 

By comparison, the He 177 V1 first flew on 19 November 1939 and the He 177 V6 and V7s went to IV.(Erg)/KG 40 (not sure if that unit designation is right - more knowledgeable LW chaps can correct) on 2 August 1941. The two prototypes proved extremely unpopular among all who flew them. The first production He 177A-1s went to I/KG 40 in July 1942 for operational trials, one particular raid was carried out on 28 August against Bristol. The first of the production He 177A-3s delivered in late 1942 to a training unit, I./KG 50, which was sent to the Russian front for resupply duties. The rest is outside of the scope of this thread, but the point has been illustrated; in just over a two year period, the Manchester went from its first flight to the Lancaster entering service, while the He 177, which flew after the Manchester, within the same time period still had not entered full squadron service in its intended role at all. And that's not mentioning wing spar issues, in-flight engine fires, which of course also plagued the Manchester.

The He 177 had promise, but was plagued with technical issues that were tackled through various modifications, which took place over a considerable period of time. In fact its career is similar in some respects to the early career of the Halifax, which suffered from considerable issues, although not leading to engine fires, but lives were lost through rudder over balance, it's major curse. Between its first flight on 25 October 1939 and the Halifax I entering service in November 1940, the vastly improved Halifax III, which had all the issues of the earlier variants countered, entered service in February 1944 after a considerable number of variants and sub-variants rolling off the production lines in small production numbers as HP desperately attempted to cure the aircraft's many problems.



> The over-promotion of wrong people was not endemic to the LW, though.



Aint that the truth, but the German military and industrial hierarchy did suffer a considerable degree of inflexibility that hampered co-operative efforts between services that, had they not existed, things might have been more fortuitous for them (but thankfully were not for us). Hitler did insist on 'Divide and Rule' and a bunch of sycophants by his side, mind you, there were numbers of those in every military hierarchy.

Anyhoo...


----------



## wuzak (Dec 14, 2014)

nuuumannn said:


> Thanks Wuzak, I read that the Vulture wasn't a Royce design in one of the RRHT books I have, so who was responsible for its conception since it was a departure from normal RR practise? Doesn't say in the book.



While it was departure from normal RR practice in that it wasn't a V-12, it wasn't exactly totally radical. Most of teh features were common to the V-12s of the time - single block and head, parallel valves, etc.

It also wasn't on its own as an X engine. In response to the Curtiss D-12 RR designed the F (became the Kestrel) and the Eagle XVI. The latter was an X-16 of similar displacement to teh Kestrel. Airframe manufacturers preferred the V-12 though Royce preferred the X-16.

At the same time that the Vulture was being developed, Rowledge was designing the Exe - even further from Rolls-Royce's standard practice, being air-cooled, sleeve valve and an X-24.


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 14, 2014)

The Merlin may have been the last "Royce design" as he was a very sick man at the time work started. legend has it that some of 'sketches' were actually drawn in the sand at the sea shore so any/all detail drawings and actual engineering calculations were done by other people although the finished drawings and calculations would be brought to Royce for approval. Royce died the year before the Merlin first ran as the PV.12 so any engine that _started_ design after 1933 had no real connection with Royce.


----------



## nuuumannn (Dec 14, 2014)

Thanks Wuzak and SR, so who was specifically responsible for the design of the Vulture?


----------



## wuzak (Dec 14, 2014)

Arthur Rubbra was involved, but it doesn't sound like he was chiefly responsible.

"In October 1927, Rubbra (who had become known as 'Rbr' in company shorthand) was promoted to 'Designer' where he was further involved with the Buzzard, Kestrel and the new Rolls-Royce R. He also became deeply involved in the Goshawk, Merlin and Vulture projects. In 1934 he was appointed 'Assistant Chief Designer' and in July 1940 he was promoted further to 'Chief Designer Aero Engines'." From Arthur Rubbra - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


----------



## nuuumannn (Dec 15, 2014)

Having just had a hunt through some books away on dusty shelves, I found in _The Magic of a Name, the first 40 years_ by Peter Pugh, the following: 

"In the mid 1930s Rowledge [Arthur John, instrumental in the Napier Lion and RR Exe and Penine - that explains a lot] developed an engine, which was essentially one Kestrel above another, one upside down and both using the same crankshaft. The first prototype ran in September 1937, the second in January 1938 and the third in May 1938. Following lessons learnt, a prototype Vulture II, with a two-speed supercharger ran in September 1938."

Interestingly, following a description of some of the issues relating to cooling and misaligned crank cases, there is the following:

"The Vulture was prone to two sorts of failure. First it tended to throw con-rods, either through lack of oil or because of the mechanical loads on the big ends at maximum rpm. Second, it over heated ad the glycol coolant caught fire. This was not the fault of the Vulture engine itself, but rather of the installation, designed by Avro. The cowling was too close to the engine, and did not allow sufficient ventilation."

The book also mentioned Rubbra being closely involved and there is a quote from him regarding the misaligned joint faces, mentioning stepping of the bolts (stepping? The same as joggling?) and then the fitting of dowels in the casings.

It also goes into some of the issues and crashes suffered by Manchesters during testing, not all of them down to the engine nor the airframe. However, the Air Ministry was not happy with it and Freeman and Tedder went to see Dobson, who talked them into the four engined Manchester. There's that anecdote of Dobson holding a model Manchester, then in front of Freeman and Tedder, removing the wings and fitting a new set with four Merlins. According to Buttler in _British Secret Projects_, the first incarnation of a four engined Manchester appeared in April 1937, before even HP had had the HP.56 design and mock-up conference, where Volkert changed the configuration from two Vultures to four Merlins, although Chadwick at Avro was initially keen on four Hercules. Further investigation led to possibly Napier Sabres or Bristol Centaurus replacing the Vultures in a twin layout.


----------



## stona (Dec 15, 2014)

"Even today I find the issue very frustrating and it becomes exasperating when I read in Jagerblatt, June -July 1985, Adolph Galland's comments in an article entitled '45 Years Ago-At the Channel'. He writes, "Looking back at the Battle of Britain, there was no direct radio communication possible with the bombers, due to the differing frequencies. A situation almost unbelievable, which amongst other things had serious consequences when rendezvous points were missed or escorts/bombers were a little late." When I read this now it turns my stomach when I think of all the frustrations I had with this man when trying to sell good communications to the squadron leaders. He and our other 'Spaniards' were so entrenched in their views that they, collectively, put the Luftwaffe well behind and may even have cost us the Battle of Britain by their inflexibility. Adolph Galland was against progress in all forms of communications within I/JG 433 and later I/JG 52. He could apparently see no reason at all to have Funkgerate (FuG) in a fighter aircraft. Wing signals in the air and a telephone briefing would be sufficient..... What motivated this apparent obstinacy? I don't know but maybe it was a desire to be free in the air, unfettered by a ground based commander or directions from a bomber group. Equally, it could have been a complete lack of foresight; one can still only speculate after such a long time. It still angers me to read comments by a man who, along with his colleagues, was at the root of our poor communications."

Ulrich Steinhilper, Nachrichtenoffizier, I/JG 433 and I/JG 52.

Being a superb pilot and aerial tactician does not necessarily make a man a good technician, or even allow him to grasp the potential of relatively new technologies. Galland had a long term penchant for re-writing history to cast himself in a more favourable light and Steinhilper was not the only old comrade irritated by this.
At the root of this problem was the disproportionate influence the 'Spaniards', mostly relatively junior officers still, exerted over the immediate pre-war and early war Luftwaffe. 

Cheers

Steve


----------



## stona (Dec 15, 2014)

Where does 1937 come from? 

The four engine Avro bomber has its roots in the Type 680, the draft proposal for this was drawn up in February 1939, just before the issue of Specification B.1/39 on 6th March. The Type 680 was discussed informally with William Farren (Deputy Director, Scientific Research at the Air Ministry) before the issue of the specification to which the Type 680 largely conformed.

It was Rolls Royce who suggested that Chadwick might like to fit the new Merlin X to his design, promising 1,150 hp. The Type 683 proposal had Merlin Xs and the extended 90' wing. This 1939 design is really the direct ancestor of what became the Lancaster.

It wasn't until the summer of 1940 that the Air Ministry became seriously interested in Avro's work on the Type 683. Farren had moved to become Deputy Director of Research and Develoment at the newly created MAP in May 1940 and had written to Roy Dobson at Avro encouraging development of the 'four engine Manchester' whilst cautioning that with fighter production being given priority (the Battle of France was about to be lost ) no contract cover was likely in the foreseeable future.

By July 19th Norbert Rowe, Director of Technical Development at the MAP, was writing to Dobson, expressing a keen interest in the four engine Manchester. It is evident from his comments that production of the type is, at the very least, 'on the cards'.
_"I think we will have to watch the weight of the Manchester with four Merlins very carefully during development. In particular I think it is essential to make the very closest estimates we can in the increase in weight over the Manchester as we know it now, since this increase would clearly govern the amount of redesign which is necessary from the stand point of strength and stiffness."_
This was all informal, back channel communication. The Type 683 wasn't formally notified to the Air Ministry until August. It's a very British way of doing things.

It was in November 1940 that Avro was ordered to stop referring to the four engine Manchester as Lancaster and instead use Manchester III. Manchester II was reserved for a Napier Sabre powered version which remained a 'paper plane'. 

Before the first prototype BT308 had flown, at Avro's expense, a contract was issued for four more prototypes, though only long term lead items for the second to fourth prototypes were authorised, pending an initial Service evaluation.
Following the Boscombe Down report on BT308 of 10th March 1941 a new contract was raised. It superseded the old Manchester contract. It allowed for the completion of 156 Manchesters by Avro and 44 by Metrovick, whereupon production would switch to the Lancaster with the least possible _'interruption and delay' _and _'where possible using components previously prepared for the Manchester'_.

Avro Contract No. B69274/40 covered a total of 1,070 aircraft. The Lancaster had arrived.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## tomo pauk (Dec 15, 2014)

stona said:


> "Even today I find the issue very frustrating and it becomes exasperating when I read in Jagerblatt, June -July 1985, Adolph Galland's comments in an article entitled '45 Years Ago-At the Channel'. He writes, "Looking back at the Battle of Britain, there was no direct radio communication possible with the bombers, due to the differing frequencies. A situation almost unbelievable, which amongst other things had serious consequences when rendezvous points were missed or escorts/bombers were a little late." When I read this now it turns my stomach when I think of all the frustrations I had with this man when trying to sell good communications to the squadron leaders. He and our other 'Spaniards' were so entrenched in their views that they, collectively, put the Luftwaffe well behind and may even have cost us the Battle of Britain by their inflexibility. Adolph Galland was against progress in all forms of communications within I/JG 433 and later I/JG 52. He could apparently see no reason at all to have Funkgerate (FuG) in a fighter aircraft. Wing signals in the air and a telephone briefing would be sufficient..... What motivated this apparent obstinacy? I don't know but maybe it was a desire to be free in the air, unfettered by a ground based commander or directions from a bomber group. Equally, it could have been a complete lack of foresight; one can still only speculate after such a long time. It still angers me to read comments by a man who, along with his colleagues, was at the root of our poor communications."
> 
> Ulrich Steinhilper, Nachrichtenoffizier, I/JG 433 and I/JG 52.
> 
> ...



Thanks for the excerpt.
We can recall that 'Spaniards' have established quite a war record, neutralizing the Polish AF, successfully engaged against Norway (despite the most numerous aircraft not having the sufficient range), crushing the Low Countries AFs, winning against the French AF and the RAF's part at the Continent (while helping to neutralize the Polish and Western armies), making the RAF BC to undertake the, inefficient for a good part of the war, night bombing. 
The 'Spaniards' were not ideal people, but stating only what they did bad, while neglecting their successes, means a vastly skewed picture.


----------



## stona (Dec 15, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Thanks for the excerpt.
> We can recall that 'Spaniards' have established quite a war record, neutralizing the Polish AF, successfully engaged against Norway (despite the most numerous aircraft not having the sufficient range), crushing the Low Countries AFs, winning against the French AF and the RAF's part at the Continent (while helping to neutralize the Polish and Western armies), making the RAF BC to undertake the, inefficient for a good part of the war, night bombing.
> The 'Spaniards' were not ideal people, but stating only what they did bad, while neglecting their successes, means a vastly skewed picture.



Nobody is suggesting that they did badly. Steinhilper's point is that they resisted the sort of technological changes that would have been helpful when they came up against a well organised, determined and radio controlled adversary, as they did in the BoB.

The connections in the fuselage of the early versions of the Bf 109 were not standard. Even fitting a radio could prove a difficult task.

Read any Luftwaffe pilot accounts of the battle. The Bombers morse communications seem to have worked reasonably well, but the wireless telephone system used by the fighters was thoroughly unreliable, not tuneable in the air and almost invariably overwhelmed at first contact with the RAF. Several Luftwaffe pilot accounts report that as the system was overwhelmed they had nothing more than a high pitched whistle in their earphones.

For whatever reason the older Luftwaffe officers, including of course the 'Spaniards' did not seem, at the time, to grasp the importance of communications to mounting a successful offensive against a well organised defence. Success often breeds complacency. As that well known intellectual Donald Trump once said, "Sometimes by losing a battle you find a new way to win the war." The Luftwaffe had become accustomed to victories and needed to lose a battle to learn. The lessons were eventually learnt and ground control was later essential for defence of the Reich operations.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## nuuumannn (Dec 15, 2014)

> Where does 1937 come from? The four engine Avro bomber has its roots in the Type 680, the draft proposal for this was drawn up in February 1939, just before the issue of Specification B.1/39 on 6th March. The Type 680 was discussed informally with William Farren (Deputy Director, Scientific Research at the Air Ministry) before the issue of the specification to which the Type 680 largely conformed.



Avro's initial ideas for the four engined Manchester were around earlier than the 680 and B.1/39. This from Buttler in _British Secret Projects Fighters and Bombers 1935 - 1950_;

"As early as April 1937, before the HP.56 was modified with four engines, Roy Chadwick, chief designer at Avro, was giving thought to fitting four Hercules onto the Manchester. Sir Wilfred Freeman (AMDP) also mentioned such a scheme and the first drawings were produced in 1939."

In the section about B.1/39 there is mention of the Type 680, but no mention of earlier gestation. There is also mention of the fact that initially, the first prototype Manchester was to be powered by Hercules engines as a stop-gap and the second with Vultures, but obviously this never happened.

Also, this from the Lancaster Archive online, but no source is quoted;

"Even prior to any formal orders being received for the twin-engine Avro Manchester [1 July 1937 off the drawing board], Roy Chadwick, Avro's Chief Designer, had unofficially proposed a four-engine variant of the Manchester to the Air Ministry. Although, the initial four-engine proposal was not given the total support of either Avro or the Air Ministry. With the Manchester design not fully finalized, a group of six draftsmen were assigned to the project. The Type 683 four-engine variant named Manchester Mk.III was already well under way long before the first Manchester rolled off of Avro's production lines."

Lancaster History

I also remember reading something about it in Leo McInstry's book on the Lancaster, but it was awhile ago when I read it, so can't remember exactly what was said.


----------



## bobbysocks (Dec 15, 2014)

stona said:


> "Even today I find the issue very frustrating and it becomes exasperating when I read in Jagerblatt, June -July 1985, Adolph Galland's comments in an article entitled '45 Years Ago-At the Channel'. He writes, "Looking back at the Battle of Britain, there was no direct radio communication possible with the bombers, due to the differing frequencies. A situation almost unbelievable, which amongst other things had serious consequences when rendezvous points were missed or escorts/bombers were a little late." When I read this now it turns my stomach when I think of all the frustrations I had with this man when trying to sell good communications to the squadron leaders. He and our other 'Spaniards' were so entrenched in their views that they, collectively, put the Luftwaffe well behind and may even have cost us the Battle of Britain by their inflexibility. Adolph Galland was against progress in all forms of communications within I/JG 433 and later I/JG 52. He could apparently see no reason at all to have Funkgerate (FuG) in a fighter aircraft. Wing signals in the air and a telephone briefing would be sufficient..... What motivated this apparent obstinacy? I don't know but maybe it was a desire to be free in the air, unfettered by a ground based commander or directions from a bomber group. Equally, it could have been a complete lack of foresight; one can still only speculate after such a long time. It still angers me to read comments by a man who, along with his colleagues, was at the root of our poor communications."
> 
> Ulrich Steinhilper, Nachrichtenoffizier, I/JG 433 and I/JG 52.
> 
> ...



that had always been my understanding...that there was a spartanistic view when it came to radio communication. the old guard ( who were in the position to make policy ) had the mind set, if it was good enough before there was no need to change it. but the complexion of the war was different. britian was not poland..or spain...by a long shot.


----------



## stona (Dec 15, 2014)

nuuumannn said:


> Avro's initial ideas for the four engined Manchester were around earlier than the 680 and B.1/39. This from Buttler in _British Secret Projects Fighters and Bombers 1935 - 1950_;
> 
> "As early as April 1937, before the HP.56 was modified with four engines, Roy Chadwick, chief designer at Avro, was giving thought to fitting four Hercules onto the Manchester. Sir Wilfred Freeman (AMDP) also mentioned such a scheme and the first drawings were produced in 1939."
> 
> ...



The Manchester originally arose from Specification P13/36 and was called the Type 679. It was never designed to carry four engines. Both Chadwick at Avro and Handley Page had doubts about the Vulture engine. Handley Page expressed these doubts openly to the Air Ministry and was allowed to fit four Merlins to what would become the Halifax, thus making it conform more closely to B12/36. In an interview that Chadwick gave to Air Ministry officials in January 1944 Chadwick, referring to the changeover at Handley Page in 1937, expressed the view that _"he wished that he had similar engines."_ He didn't and he would never have got them at that time anyway.

Chadwick always preferred four engines, but at no time in 1937 was the Type 679/Manchester designed to carry them. Chadwick did ask his design staff to examine the possibility of powering the Type 679 with either four Merlins or four Hercules engines, but that's as far as it got. The four engine version, though Chadwick always wanted it, was not seriously considered until March 1939 and the issue of a new specification, B1/39, not least because the Vulture powered version was showing some promise. Neither the Avro board nor the Ministry men were interested and it would be a stretch of the facts to say that Chadwick designed a four engine version of the Type 679 in 1937.

Chadwick always had Merlins in mind for the Type 683/Lancaster and I've not seen any evidence that any radial engine was considered in the vital 1940/41 period.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## nuuumannn (Dec 15, 2014)

> it would be a stretch of the facts to say that Chadwick designed a four engine version of the Type 679 in 1937.



Yet there are two sources claiming that it originated in 1937, the first of which was carefully researched. None of those sources state that it was a _paper design_ as such, but that Chadwick had discussed it and put the idea out there. Do you have concrete evidence that a four engined Manchester was _not_ considered in 1937?

I'm well aware of the background of P.13/36 and the Avro 679, but the four engined Manchester did not _begin_ with B.1/39. Perhaps and quite likely, the first concrete effort that it might come to fruition was done at that time in the form of drawings to B.1/39, but the idea had been discussed and maybe even put on paper _unofficially_ by then - a back-of-the-envelope sketch, perhaps? Why would that be so hard to believe? If Volkert had had reservations about the availability of Vultures at the time of the HP.56 Mock up conference, why would we automatically assume that the idea could not have crossed Chadwick's mind because the twin engined Manchester was progressed with instead, unlike the HP.56?


----------



## stona (Dec 16, 2014)

nuuumannn said:


> Yet there are two sources claiming that it originated in 1937, the first of which was carefully researched. None of those sources state that it was a _paper design_ as such, but that Chadwick had discussed it and put the idea out there. Do you have concrete evidence that a four engined Manchester was _not_ considered in 1937?



In 1944 Chadwick is on the record as wishing he could have got the same four engines as Handley Page wangled for the putative Halifax, but he didn't and Avro were made aware that they wouldn't have been available. That certainly only left the two engine option open to the Avro board who were financing the project.

McKinstry is the source for the suggestion that Chadwick asked the design team, who were busy drawing up the two engine Type 679, to 'examine the possibility' of attaching four Merlins or Hercules to it, despite being aware that these engines would not be available. Whether or not one of that team did a "back of a beer mat" type of sketch I don't know. That doesn't qualify as designing a four engine version for me, but I don't really want to start a debate on the semantics of what does or doesn't constitute a design 

In February 1939 after Avro and Chadwick heard about the forthcoming Merlin XX and it's potential power and before the issue of B1/39 (though they would have been aware of the outline of the specification unofficially as indeed were other manufacturers) there was genuine interest in reviving the four engine Manchester. Chadwick had always seen this as a better option and it was at this point that serious design work began. This was entirely financed by Avro, but the company, with engines now potentially available, was now prepared to take the risk and foot the bill.

McKInstry doesn't provide much evidence to support even the contention that the design team 'examined the possibility' of a four engine version in 1937. Mason provides a lot of evidence (all sorts of documents and minutes from Avro, MAP, AM) to show that in 1939/40 there was both design work going on at Avro and considerable interest from the Ministries at that time. Avro did receive some conflicting sigmals from the AM and later MAP, but was prepared to push ahead with the project.

It is important not to underestimate the impetus given to the project by the appalling prospect (to Avro) of having to turn over its Manchester production lines to production of a rival aeroplane, one which Avro considered inferior, the H P Halifax.
This prospect did not rear its ugly head in 1937 but in 1940.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## nuuumannn (Dec 16, 2014)

Thanks Steve, but none of the suggestions you offered actually refutes the idea of Chadwick coming up with the idea back in 1937. I trust that Buttler might have found something that not only suggests the year 1937, but also a specific month, April, which leads to a specific source of information. A pity there is no clue as to what this might be. Yes, there was no doubt that anyone in Avro wanted the Halifax to be produced in their factories, but that doesn't mean the idea wasn't there beforehand; that just offers increased impetus to keep the lines producing an Avro product. I should add that at no time have I stated that Chadwick or the drawing office _designed_ the aircraft in 1937, nor do the quotes I offered, but the fact that a four engined Manchester was discussed as early as 1937 should not be ruled out just because Mason does not include it in his take on the aircraft (This is beginning to sound like one of those fruitless arguments where "my historic information is more accurate than yours..." ).

I live in the middle of nowhere in a country on the other side of the world from any archives that might be able to confirm such a claim, so I take what information I have available to hand; granted, it's not always accurate and at times, the validity of some of it is worthy of question, but I suspect that Buttler is a little more informed than I am on the subject.


----------



## stona (Dec 16, 2014)

There is no doubt that Chadwick was interested in a four engine bomber in 1937. I agree with this 100%. The problem was that the engines were not available and that is why Avro proceeded with the two engine version. Chadwick had been at Avro for a long time and was very much respected, but without the backing of the board he could hardly divert any significant resources from the official company programme into his own pet project.

It must be eminently possible that some thought was given to a four engine Avro in 1937, but that is not the same as undertaking a design programme for the type. I don't believe that there is any evidence that a four engine bomber was designed by Avro in 1937. As I said before, whether some sort of conceptual sketches, beer mat outlines, were made I don't know. Blue Sky thinking has already been mentioned somewhere . For me that does not amount to a design in any case. The bomber that was designed in 1937 certainly couldn't mount four engines on its smaller wing. The wing was initially lengthened not to mount more engines but to increase take off performance.

Even later when the Lancaster prototype had been approved by the MAP there were still problems with supply of the engines. Avro were told that no Merlin engines would be spared from fighter production. Chadwick specifically remembered that when Patrick Hennessy at the MAP was told by Sir Wilfrid Freeman that he (Chadwick) required material to finish the prototype, Hennessy replied "He can dig for it."
Chadwick knew where to dig and it was Roy Dobson, who was a personal friend of Ernest Hives, who went digging at Rolls Royce. The initial four Merlins were provided through back channels to Avro with Hives' connivance (which also answers an earlier question). This was in Rolls-Royce's interests too. Hives and R-R was just as disappointed with the Vulture as Avro was, and herein lay a potential solution to the problems of both companies.

EDIT:

The first evidence at Avro for a serious attempt at a four engine bomber, a four engine version of the Manchester, is some calculations done by the design office in late 1938, _not 1937._ These estimated the weight of a four engine Manchester with four Merlin II/IIIs at 27,000lbs and with four Hercules at just over 28,000lbs. The wing extension to the final Lancaster length was not included in the calculations. There was no priority for such a project. No requirement existed for a replacement Manchester and anyway the Vulture installation was returning good figures in wind tunnel testing and provided the cabin heating and hydraulic power requirements of the Manchester with its installation. 

In December 1938 a little more work was done on possible engines, the Merlin III being deemed unsuitable. Rolls-Royce suggested the Merlin IV, and this was to be given serious consideration over the winter of 1938/9. All this came to nothing when a few months later, in early 1939, the Merlin XX was muted as a contender. The story resumes where we started with the Type 680, in February 1939.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## nuuumannn (Dec 16, 2014)

> It must be eminently possible that some thought was given to a four engine Avro in 1937, but that is not the same as undertaking a design programme for the type. I don't believe that there is any evidence that a four engine bomber was designed by Avro in 1937.



If you read my last post _again_, you'll see that no one has suggested they did.



> The first evidence at Avro for a serious attempt at a four engine bomber, a four engine version of the Manchester, is some calculations done by the design office in late 1938, not 1937.



I don't doubt it, but I still accept Buttler's version over yours. Again, I ask you, can you provide _source_ information, Steve that proves that Chadwick _did not_ consider a four engined Manchester in 1937?


----------



## stona (Dec 17, 2014)

I agree that he considered it. He always felt that it was the way to go. Constraints from the Air Ministry and later MAP placed on Avro prevented him from designing it. Why design a bomber with four engines that either didn't exist or were not going to be made available. The Avro board, who were footing the bill, wouldn't have backed it either. 
There is a difference between a designer doodling on a beermat, designing concept aeroplanes, which is free of charge, and a company's design office starting serious design work, employing different engineers, draughtsmen etc which is most definitely not.
Also at this stage the Manchester/Vulture combination was showing some serious promise, the problems were well in the future. Chadwick calculated a theoretical top speed of 341 mph for the type, you can understand the disappointment when it only ever achieved 265mph! This was not entirely down to the Vultures. Not to bang a drum, but this is always a problem with figures for 'paper planes'.

The serious calculations for Merlin or Hercules versions (cited my Mason and McKinstry, I'll check for their source later) were done in late 1938, _after_ Handley Page had got the green light for four engines on their bomber.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## nuuumannn (Dec 17, 2014)

> I agree that he considered it. He always felt that it was the way to go. Constraints from the Air Ministry and later MAP placed on Avro prevented him from designing it. Why design a bomber with four engines that either didn't exist or were not going to be made available. The Avro board, who were footing the bill, wouldn't have backed it either.
> There is a difference between a designer doodling on a beermat, designing concept aeroplanes, which is free of charge, and a company's design office starting serious design work, employing different engineers, draughtsmen etc which is most definitely not.



Finally. I was beginning to think you were refusing to accept it simply because you'd never heard of it before. As posted in the last post and the one before; no one is claiming this, but that it _had_ been contemplated and certainly discussed as early as April 1937. Unless we are able to get hold of the piece of evidence that Buttler had on which to base his claim, we can't be absolutely certain of how far this idea went at that time, but it shouldn't be dismissed just because we didn't know about it before now.


----------



## stona (Dec 18, 2014)

nuuumannn said:


> Finally. I was beginning to think you were refusing to accept it simply because you'd never heard of it before.



Well I did write this a way up this thread:

"Chadwick always preferred four engines, but at no time in 1937 was the Type 679/Manchester designed to carry them. Chadwick did ask his design staff to examine the possibility of powering the Type 679 with either four Merlins or four Hercules engines, but that's as far as it got. The four engine version, though Chadwick always wanted it, was not seriously considered until March 1939"

I think that March 1939 should be changed for "late 1938", as some sort of feasibility study was obviously carried out at that time, but I stand by the rest 

The real design work, with assignation of resources and personnel, didn't start until 1939.

It seems much of the Avro material has been lost over the years, company mergers etc. Much of the information and papers referred to by both authors above is actually the other half of the conversation, so to speak, records and minutes from the various Ministries, preserved in the Public Records.

There is an Avro Heritage Centre based at the old Woodford aerodrome near Stockport, but I've no idea if they retain any archives.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## nuuumannn (Dec 18, 2014)

> The four engine version, though Chadwick always wanted it, was not seriously considered until March 1939



And I also wrote, three times no less, that we know this and are not disputing this. You did state earlier that the four engined Manchester bagan with the 680, which I refute. See:



> Where does 1937 come from? The four engine Avro bomber has its roots in the Type 680



I think we've gone as far was we are going to go with this, don't you?



> There is an Avro Heritage Centre based at the old Woodford aerodrome near Stockport, but I've no idea if they retain any archives.



They do. There's quite a bit of stuff around about the place in places where people might not think to look. Buttler has made the most of his travels and scoured less obvious places and turned up some real gems. When I wrote about Bill Reid's Avro Anson I restoration here in New Zealand, he told me that he approached the Avro Heritage Centre for info on the Anson, particularly photos of the interior, but most of the Chadderton Works - where MH120 was built, records, as well as complete Anson drawings were destroyed in a fire. Oddly enough, there is a largely complete set of Anson I drawings at the RNZAF Museum in Christchurch.


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 18, 2014)

Getting back to the original question it comes down to pretty much British bombers.

The American contenders being pretty much the the early shark fin B-17s, a variety of A-20s (most _without_ r-2600 engines) and few (19) B-24/LB-30Bs being the only planes to actually see any action outside of the US and Pearl Harbor. First 65 B-25s had NO power turrets and only three .30 cal guns and a single .50cal gun. They were pretty zippy though 

None of the Russian bombers were really in the top 3. 
1941 IL-2s lacked the rear seat gunner and were rather vulnerable. 
The DB-3F/IL-4 had a top speed of about 255mph, two 7.62mm mg and one 12.7mg, range with 2200lbs of bombs was 1400 miles. 
They only built about 93 PE-8s during the entire war, how many were built before the end of 1941? and even then there were several different engine installations even in 1940/41. 
The PE-2 had a rather limited internal bomb load. 

One can argue if the first Halifax's were worse than the first Manchester's but the British pretty much get the top three by default.


----------



## nuuumannn (Dec 18, 2014)

Pretty much in agreement SR, although the Halifaxes might not have been worse, they were certainly no better, although they offered greater range and payload carrying ability than the Manchester and what the RAF really wanted by that time was four engined bombers and since the Stirling was not living up to expectations, the Halifax was it. As Steve pointed out earlier, the Hali was the benchmark for the RAF at the time (and what Avro were told the four engined Manchester (groan!) would have to be measured up against), niggling issues aside; HP repeatedly assured the Air Staff that the problems would be fixed so they kept it going, but a really satisfactory Halifax bomber, i.e. what it should have been from the start did not emerge until the end of 1943.

The LB-30 or Liberator Mk.II to the British is certainly worth a mention (forgot about this in my earlier estimation) and although the first were delivered to the RAF in June 1941, in that year there weren't many of them. The LIb II bears the distinction of being the first American bomber to enter service equipped with power operated turrets, although it entered service with the RAF with turrets before the USAAC, sans turrets as the LB-30. The aircraft were built in the USA without turrets and were delivered to Britain for fitting of their armament. These were a Boulton Paul four gun rear turret and BP four gun top turret (a la Defiant) located aft of the wing box, not forward of it like in subsequent B-24s. There was no real US equivalent; the next in line being the B-24C, which, like the mass produced 'D' model had turbosupercharged engines, so had better performance than the Liberator II. These, too, began delivery by the end of 1941.

I'm gonna revise my top three; Wellington, Liberator II/B-24C and B-17, honourable mention to Whitley, Maryland and Baltimore, and Manchester. Wellington for obvious reasons; available in numbers/good range/bomb load/suvivability/defensive armament, Liberator because of its range/defensive armament/bomb load and future potential, downside is there's not many of them, B-17 for its good performance/range/ceiling and potential, but no turrets at this time - speed is good for a big bomber though, better than anything else except the Ju 88. I picked the B-17 over the Whitley despite the latter's turrets because of the former's potential and performance and by 1941 the Whitley had little future. Despite the B-17 example I've included turrets for defensive armament because at the time heavy bombers really needed then, but everyone else was slower than the British to realise this.

Whitley because of availability/range/bomb load/turrets, but slow, Maryland because of its range and performance but cramped, Baltimore because it largely replaced the Maryland in service and rectified some of its inadequacies, Manchester because - do we really need to go into this again?


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 19, 2014)

Well, I did ask about the planes as they were in 1941 or what they would later become and the answer was _as the planes as they were in 1941 _.

For the Liberator, the Liberator II was built and _delivered_ in 1941 but wasn't issued to a squadron until Jan of 1942. That leaves the Liberator I. ( 9 B-24Cs were delivered before the end of the year to the USAAC but never used in combat, only as operational trainers for the B-24D). 
Kind of the same for the B-17. B-17E's were in Hawaii, in transit to the Philippines, on Dec 7th but saw little or no action otherwise until until 1942. 
The Martin Baltimore falls in there too, ordered in 1940, first prototype doesn't fly until June of 1941 and " The first Baltimore Mk I reached the UK in October 1941, and underwent trials at Burtonwood near Liverpool. It entered service three months later, in January 1942, with No.223 Squadron at Shandur, Egypt. At the time this was an Operational Training Unit, but it would soon take its Baltimores into combat. The first operation unit to get the Baltimore was No.55 Squadron, also in Egypt, in May 1942." from this website: Martin Baltimore - Development and Combat Record

The Halifax is a bit better, 5 squadrons had them as of Dec 1941 but the MK II only started leaving the production lines in Sept (EE) and Oct of 1941, the 84 MK Is had Vickers K guns out the side windows and no top turret and Merlin X engines. Of course with no top turret it was actually a bit faster than the MK II.


----------



## stona (Dec 19, 2014)

Bomber Command, and particularly Harris, had a VERY low opinion of the Halifax. After the Lancaster turned up, that's all they wanted in terms of four engine heavies.

Harris wrote a fantastic letter to Sinclair, Secretary of State for Air, in which his opinion of the Stirling, and the Short management, and the Halifax and Handley Page are made very clear indeed.

_"I understand that the Stirling is to go in favour of the Lancaster as fast as the changeover can be achieved. But it will not be fast, or achieved at all with goodwill and good intent, as long as His Majesty's Government balk at the issue of taking the Stirling management away from the incompetent drunk who at present holds our fate in his hands. The Stirling Group has now virtually collapsed. They make no worthwhile contribution to our war effort in return for their overheads."_

So much for Oswald Short and his company, soon to be nationalised.

Next Handley Page and his company.

_"Handley Page is always weeping crocodile tears in my house and office, smarming his unconvincing assurances all over me and leaving me with nothing but a feeling of mounting uncertainty that nothing whatever ponderable is being done to make his deplorable product worth for war or fit to meet those jeopardies which confront our gallant crews. Nothing will be done until Handley Page and his gang are also kicked out, lock, stock and barrel. Unless we can get these two vital factors of the heavy bomber programme put right, and with miraculous despatch, we are sunk. We cannot do this by polite negotiation with these crooks and incompetents. In Russia it would have long ago been arranged with a gun and to that extent I am a fervid communist." _

The Halifax might have been seen as some kind of benchmark in 1941, but how it was viewed by the man running Bomber Command a year later, the letter was dated 30th December 1942, is hardly open for debate.

It is hard to imagine a more intemperate letter sent by such a senior officer to his political master, and it is a reflection of just how strongly Harris felt about the Halifax.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Dec 19, 2014)

nuuumannn said:


> And I also wrote, three times no less, that we know this and are not disputing this. You did state earlier that the four engined Manchester bagan with the 680, which I refute.
> I think we've gone as far was we are going to go with this, don't you?



We'll agree to disagree as I still believe that the Lancaster has roots in the Type 680, a four engine design based on the Manchester/Type 679 which was never designed to have four engines. 

The results of that feasibility study in late 1938 (not 1937 which has never had anything to do with a four engine bomber from Avro) were, a couple of months later, not a four engine Type 679 but a new designation, Type 680, which would become the Manchester III/Lancaster.

I mean how far back in an aircraft's lineage do we need to go? Since the Type 679 was the first bomber Avro had ever designed then of course the Lancaster has some roots in it, but the direct ancestor of the Lancaster still remains the Type 680, designed from the outset with four engines, an extended wing and larger tail plane and fins....just like the Lancaster.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## nuuumannn (Dec 19, 2014)

Nope, the direct ancestor of the Lancaster is the Type 679!

Okay then SR, but since the Liberator II had been delivered in 1941, then again, I'll stay with it because its available next year - forward planning. The B-17E was not available, but the Fortress I was, so that stays. I'll stay with the Maryland and Baltimore since they had been delivered by 1941, but not in service. But the Halifax isn't being included. Too much effort and time to pass before its ready.


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 19, 2014)

They (the British) had a lot more Halifax's in service in 1941 than B-17s, B-24s and Baltimore's combined. The Liberator IIs _started_ to be delivered in Aug of 1941 (after the first one crashed) but "delivered' meant accepted at the Consolidated plant in San Diego. The British had to get them to England and mount the turrets and other operational equipment before issuing them to the user squadrons.


----------



## stona (Dec 20, 2014)

nuuumannn said:


> Nope, the direct ancestor of the Lancaster is the Type 679!



About as much as the Spitfire owed to the Type 224...at least they had the same number of engines.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Vincenzo (Dec 20, 2014)

the operational squadrons with Halifax in '41 were 35th and 76th
none had Baltimore
the 90th had the Fortress
the 120th (Costal Command unit) had the Liberator (the I)


----------



## nuuumannn (Dec 20, 2014)

Sorry SR, was in a hurry when I posted my last post. Yes, you're right, no Baltimore, no Liberator II, but B-24C and Fortress I remain, along with Wellington - this is about which was the top 3 Allied bombers after all. Regarding the Halifax, actually there weren't that many in service in 1941, the first Mk.Is entered service in early November 1940 with 35 Sqn and began flying operations in February 1941, with its first op on the night of 11/12 March. Of seven aircraft, only four reached the target and of those, only three returned home. Halifaxes only flew a handful of operations in 1941 and in small numbers; it's first year of service was marred with problems; temporary groundings, accidents from varying sources, hydraulic issues that caused belly landings, tail wheel failures, which resulted in the tail wheels being locked down, which in turn produced a drop in performance, but cured the failures, and of course, rudder over balance. A total of 84 Halifax Is were produced in three sub-variants, Series 1, of which 50 were built, Series 2, 25 and the rest Series 3. By the end of 1941, less than half the total number of Halifax Is had entered service and even fewer were ready for service. It's just not ready in 1941.

By comparison with another troublesome bomber, the Manchester entered Bomber Command in the same month as the Halifax and flew its first op in February 1941, but by the end of the year, there were more available in squadron service for ops and the Manchester Mk.III was almost ready for its first flight, with examples beginning to be converted on the production line. For that reason alone, the Manchester comes ahead of the Halifax.


----------



## Vincenzo (Dec 20, 2014)

For complete the RAF squadrons with 4 engine bombers
the 7th and the 15th had the Stirling (I)


----------



## Vincenzo (Dec 21, 2014)

USAAF avalability unit with 4 engines bombers the 7th december
2nd, 5th, 6th, 7th, 19th, 29th, 30th, 34th, 39th, 43rd Bomber Groups with 149 B-17, only the 7th and the 19th were a full B-17 Group (they had 70 B-17) some of this groups would be not operational, an other 6 B-17 were in the 38th Recce Squadron.
In the december after the attack the 6th and 19th BG get also some teens of LB-30 (B-24 built for UK within the A and C US model) they go in combat in january '42 so probably operational or near to operational in very late '41.

The Sovied had the 22nd june '41
the TB-3 in the 1st, 3rd, 7th, 250th and 251st heavy rgts and TB-3 and TB-7 in the 14th heavy rgt in all 256 TB-3 and 9 TB-7, in add is probable there was a fleet unit with the TB-3


----------



## Glider (Dec 21, 2014)

The three that I would choose are the Wellington, the Sterling and the Boston. The B17 totally failed in 1941 in RAF service, the Halifax had too many faults it couldn't be relied on in 1941 and the Sterling despite performance mainly altitude issues was reliable and for the day had a good range payload performance. 
The Boston even in its early days had a good performance. It was far from perfect but that wasn't unusual in 1941 and its performance would have given it some protection.


----------



## nuuumannn (Dec 21, 2014)

I've been thinking about the Stirling within this thread; it certainly has merit. Four engines, heavy bomb load, good range, comparable speed to other bombers of the time, power operated turrets, easy to fly, manoeuvrable with a good roll rate for such a big aeroplane; pilots commented favourably about it and compared it to a Gentleman's Carriage, so with all these things, is worthy of inclusion. Its down side is its poor ceiling, which made it flak bait, but it held the line, along with the Halifax until more suitable and less vulnerable and troublesome Lancasters were available in numbers from 1942 on. The addition of armour plating and other equipment introduced during service reduced its rate of climb and ceiling further, but it remained well liked by aircrew, despite a lack of enthusiasm from the Air Ministry. Although not really a criteria for judgment here, the Stirling took a long time to get right for production (there were also delays as materials were diverted from manufacture of fighters around the Battle of Britain time by the Ministry of Aircraft Production) and for some reason it cost more to build than either the Hali or Lanc. Despite this, by the end of 1941, some 150 Stirlings had been manufactured, which gave better availability than the Halifax by a country mile. It was not plagued by any catastrophic mechanical defect, like the Manchester or Halifax either.

Regarding the Fortress, the RAF's experience with the Fort I was disappointing, but one of the principal criticisms by the Americans was the fact that it was sent on individual sorties. It's equipment froze at high altitudes and was criticised for its defensive armament - a big minus. It's worth remembering that the RAF used it on daylight raids individually, which was asking for trouble; it received 20 of 38 B-17Cs built by that time, so wasn't available in large numbers. The Americans also claimed the RAF was using it above its designed operating height and that defensively, the tactics employed could not take advantage of its defensive armament as well as the Americans had planned. 

On the plus side, it had an excellent turn of speed for a big bomber, a maximum of 320 mph at 20,000 feet and cruise of 232 mph at 14,000 feet; putting that into context, this was 1 or 2 mph difference from the _maximum_ speed of the Wellington. Despite its comparatively small bomb load, it did have impressive range of 2,100 mph and a maximum range of 3,160 miles. If it were put to use in a different fashion, it could, or would have been very effective if these attributes were exploited.

Agree, Glider about the Boston, a very practicable and adaptable aeroplane, but is slightly outside the scope of this thread as a bomber at least. By mid 1940 the French had received some 64 (65 in some sources) DB-7s before the country had capitulate; these did carry out combat ops against the advancing Germans though, the ones that arrived in Britain from the French order had to have their throttle movement reversed, the French moved the power levers aft for increased, so this delayed entry into service. The RAF used these 20 examples for training only as Boston Is as they were considered unfit for service. The RAF Boston II was similar to the earlier Boston I but had uprated engines and was used exclusively as a heavy fighter and was named Havoc I as a night fighter in RAF service. The first bomber version in RAF service was the Boston III - the USAAC received the A-20C, which was close to the Boston III in performance and spec - and although the first Boston IIIs/A-20Cs were delivered in 1941, they weren't quite ready for operations until early 1942.

The TB-3 is not worth mentioning; it was considered obsolete in 1939. The TB-7 or Petlyakov Pe-8 is an interesting choice, but is in service in paltry numbers in 1941 - only a small number were available due to engine and production issues. At the time of Barbarossa, only the 2nd Sqn of the 14th heavy Regiment had them in service, but none were ready for combat. Later in the year, as aircraft became available - fourteen in October 1941, night raids were conducted, even against Berlin, but results were unspectacular. It had good bomb load, range and performance and showed much promise though, but I would be reluctant to include it as one of the three best of the year, largely because of low numbers and poor operational availability.

A further rethink from me. Wellington, Stirling and a toss up between Fortress I and B-24C... Hmmm, thing is, neither Fort or B-24 available in numbers and poor defensive armament. Maybe Wellington, Whitley, Stirling? An all-British top three? All available in numbers, relatively trouble free service use in 1941, defensive turrets, good bomb load, good range...


----------



## tomo pauk (Dec 22, 2014)

Since the Flak was managing to bag circa one RAF bomber per night in 1941, the Stirling seem to have no problems with it?


----------



## stona (Dec 22, 2014)

Never under estimate the effect on the morale of the men who flew what we, looking at paper figures, might consider decent aeroplanes. They developed perceptions about which aircraft were most likely to get them killed, hardly something we need to worry about.

Bob Goss, an air gunner who flew on Manchesters wrote that it had such a dismal reputation within Bomber Command that _"a member of a Manchester Squadron was pitied rather than admired". _I could dig up similar comments about the Stirling too.

Of course all these men were judging the types retrospectively against the Lancaster which doesn't fall within this time frame.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 22, 2014)

Just so we are clear on a few things.

This is the B-17 used by the British in 1941:







One .50 out the top, one out each side and one out the bottom in the "tub". No power turrets or assist. One .30 cal in the nose. Even in formation that is pretty weak armament. 

There were only 9 B-24Cs ever built. The B-24Ds were on order and following the B-24Cs on the production line/s. they just aren't delivered until Jan 1942. 

I have no idea _why_ it took the British 8-10 months to use the Boston III in combat over France after the first ones showed up in England. 3-6 months I can understand. Perhaps the diversion of some of the Boston III to Russia after the German invasion slowed the conversion/build up? 

There was *a* squadron flying combat missions in North Africa in Nov/Dec of 1941 but the British (true to form) used small numbers of aircraft per mission _without_ escort and losses were heavy. The Squadron had to pulled out of operations by the end of Dec to recover. 

The Boston III was rated at a 1000lb bomb load over a 745mile range, 2000lbs over 525 miles. A Blenheim could carry 1000lbs about 1400 miles. The Boston offered better survival over areas it could _reach_.


----------



## Vincenzo (Dec 22, 2014)

If the numbers of Halifax were too low also the Stirling numbers are too low, RAF had only 2 squadrons each.

On the Boston i'm not aware of none RAF squadron that used it in MTO in 1941, what's the squadron number?
For my sources the first unit that get Boston was the 88th Squadron in february '41, so i've thinked that this became operational before of end of year but checking this unit stay also with Blenheim until february '42 so it this possible that became operational with Boston only in early '42, someone can check when the 88th became operational on Boston? (i'm aware that the first combat use was in february '42)


----------



## stona (Dec 22, 2014)

The Squadron was only in Bomber Command (2 Group) from July '41 until May '43 when it transferred to become part of the 2nd TAF. It flew on just 62 bombing raids, 15 with Blenheims, 47 with Bostons, whilst part of Bomber Command.

As a Bomber Command unit it received Bostons somewhere between June and October '41, depending which source you believe. As far as I can tell it's _first operational use _was on 12th February'42.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 22, 2014)

Vincenzo said:


> On the Boston i'm not aware of none RAF squadron that used it in MTO in 1941, what's the squadron number?



SAAF squadron 24 according to some sources. 

From RAF - Bomber Command No.88 Squadron

"No. 88 Squadron returned to England in June 1940 - after having seen some very heavy fighting and having suffered heavy losses - and the following year, after a spell with Bristol Blenheims, became the first squadron to be equipped with Douglas Bostons."

"Fairey Battle : Dec 1937-Jul 1941
Bristol Blenheim IV : Jul 1941-Nov 1941
Douglas Boston III and IIIA and IV : Oct 1941 onwards"

4-5 months to go from 1st aircraft delivered to squadron to first combat missions isn't too bad.


----------



## nuuumannn (Dec 22, 2014)

> Just so we are clear on a few things. This is the B-17 used by the British in 1941



SR, yes, it's a Fortress Mk.I Re-read my post. Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress in RAF service



> If the numbers of Halifax were too low also the Stirling numbers are too low, RAF had only 2 squadrons each.



Not necessarily, Vincenzo. There were more Stirlings in reserve since more had rolled off the production line, also the Halifax was suffering many problems in service, so the number of aircraft that were combat worthy were lower than the number of Stirlings, which suffered high losses within their first year of service as a result of their indifferent altitude performance. Like I said, there had been 150 Stirlings built by the end of 1941, but less than half that number of Halifaxes.



> There was a squadron flying combat missions in North Africa in Nov/Dec of 1941 but the British (true to form) used small numbers of aircraft per mission without escort and losses were heavy. The Squadron had to pulled out of operations by the end of Dec to recover.



88 Sqn received Boston IIIs in July 1941 (_Aircraft of the RAF since 1918_ Owen Thetford) or October 1941 (_McDonnell Douglas Aircraft since 1920 Vol One_ Rene Francillon) at Swanton Morley, but did not carry out its first anti-shipping strikes until February 1942. 226 Sqn also operated the type alongside 88 Sqn during the Channel Dash. The first Boston IIIs in the MTO entered service with 24 Sqn, SAAF in November 1941 and were used for reconnaissance ops, suffering heavy losses. After being withdrawn from service in December, the unit returned again on 22 February 1942 and was joined by 12 Sqn SAAF in March 1942. See here: Douglas Boston in RAF Service

"At first No.24 SAAF used its Bostons on _unescorted reconnaissance missions_ in small groups, and suffered very heavy losses. By the end of December the squadron had to be withdrawn to recover. The squadron returned to the fight in 22 February 1942, this time operating with fighter escorts."



> Never under estimate the effect on the morale of the men who flew what we, looking at paper figures, might consider decent aeroplanes.



D'you really think I'd do that? 

"it was undoubtedly well liked by its crews in spite of its reduced rate of climb after some 10,000 lbs of armour plate and equipment had been added to its empty weight" _Shorts Aircraft since 1900_ C.H. Barnes. 

"In service the Stirling was to prove popular with its crews and very manoeuvrable - a useful attribute when it was attacked by German fighters, and one which earned it the contemporary nickname 'the fighter bomber'. _The Hamlyn Concise Guide to British Aircraft of World War Two_ David Mondey. 

"Despite the "disappointing performance" at maximum altitude,[18] Stirling pilots were delighted to discover that, due to the thick wing, they could out-turn the Ju 88 and Bf 110 nightfighters they faced. Its handling was much better than that of the Halifax and some preferred it to the Lancaster. Based on its flight characteristics, Pilot Murray Peden of No. 214 RAF Squadron flatly described the Stirling as 'one of the finest aircraft ever built'." Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Short_Stirling



> I could dig up similar comments about the Stirling too.



So could I, but what option did the RAF have in 1941? The Halifax and Manchester suffered the same, if not worse because not only did aircrews have to put up with what they received during ops, but also the probability of the numerous mechanical failures that both aircraft suffered. The Stirling is worth including as one of the top three bombers in 1941 for the reasons I've stated, Steve and yes, I'm aware of its reputation. The Bomber Command mainstays were the Wellington and Whitley, which, if you had read my post, you'll see I have rated as the other of my top three.


----------



## Vincenzo (Dec 22, 2014)

Shortround6
ok a SAAF squadron this explan because was not on rafweb page, looking info on this i found that the first losses of Boston of 24 SAAF squadron was on 23rd November '41, 24th November, 7th December, 8th January '42 (2 Boston). I found others informations on the 24 SAAF used the Boston in the Crusader offensive so is confirmed that the Boston were operational since the november '41 in only one SAAF squadron

Just for add confusion for the 88 rafweb.org report the first delivery in february (I&II model)

From the statistics on lancaster-archive the Stirling dropped the 7.3% of bombs of the BC in '41 and the Halifax the 3.9%, the Manchester the 2.5%, the Fortress 0,1%, the Wellington 49,1%, the Whitley 17.5%, the Hampden 15.9%. In the western desert i think there were only Blenheim and Maryland (and eventually the 24 SAAF with Boston), in far east there were mainly Blenheims, the Hudson were also common, and i found a flight with Beaufort. i suppose the CC hade nothing more modern of Beaufort and the alone squadron with Liberator.


----------



## stona (Dec 22, 2014)

Vincenzo said:


> From the statistics on lancaster-archive the Stirling dropped the 7.3% of bombs of the BC in '41 and the Halifax the 3.9%, the Manchester the 2.5%, the Fortress 0,1%, the Wellington 49,1%, the Whitley 17.5%, the Hampden 15.9%.



In the context of a total tonnage of bombs dropped by Bomber Command in 1941 of about 30,000. That's still about three times what was dropped in 1939/40.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Vincenzo (Dec 22, 2014)

On the USAAF bombers use for the statistical digest only heavy bomber dropped bombs in december '41 (36 tons), the medium&light first month with drop is in march '42. 
Ever the SD report on hand the 30th november 145 B-17 and 11 B-24, 113 B-25, 143 B-26 and 131 A-20, for the 31st december the numbers are 198, 89, 151, 181, 417.
Of this overseas on 30th nov 61 B-17, 24 A-20 and for the 31st december 81 B-17 and 22 A-20 not other models (of that in the list all the old were not on the list) were overseas 
note: is near sure that the LB-30 were overseas so this is strange


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 22, 2014)

> is near sure that the LB-30 were overseas so this is strange



Not really, The USAAF statistical digest is only going to list US _owned_ aircraft or at the very best, aircraft the US paid for. 

The LB-30s and the early Hovacs/Bostons were paid for by the British (and French) on direct order and had nothing to do with the USAAF. Lend-Lease aircraft _may_ get iffy. They may count in production totals but may not when counting aircraft "deployed" by the USAAF overseas or count for bombs dropped by the USAAF, since they are not being flown by US squadrons or groups.


----------



## Vincenzo (Dec 22, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> . They may count in production totals but may not when counting aircraft "deployed" by the USAAF overseas or count for bombs dropped by the USAAF, since they are not being flown by US squadrons or groups.



I was referring to the LB-30 used from the 6th and 19th US Bomber groups so they were flown to US groups


----------



## Glider (Dec 22, 2014)

Going back to the three that I suggested. 
The Sterling was for its time quite a decent aircraft often used in 1941 on daylight raids and on those raids the Germans considered them to be difficult targets. The B17 wasn't ready for combat missions in 1941. It had far too many problems and when the RAF started to use them the USAAF advisors in discussion with Churchill were urging caution in the use of the aircraft on actual missions. The RAF went ahead ignoring their advice.

The French version of the Boston was in service in 1941, just because the RAF took a fair amount of time getting it tweaked to RAF standards doesn't mean that the aircraft wasn't ready in 1941. Personally I would rather take a French Boston rather than a Blenheim any time.


----------



## stona (Dec 22, 2014)

One might ask what relevance to the strategic bombing campaign any allied bombers had in 1941 given the minute fraction of the eventual tonnage of bombs dropped and the wild inaccuracy of those dropped. In 1941 accuracy was still so bad that one RAF bomber dropped its bombs on an airfield in Cambridgeshire, believing it was bombing an airfield in German occupied Holland!







With the exception of the Halifax, which should have been replaced, that's another story, they all were phased out before the campaign reached a level where it could have any serious impact on Germany.

None of the bombers available in 1940/41 were fit for the purpose of mounting a strategic bombing campaign against one of Britain's continental rivals, which had been the raison d'etre of the RAF in the inter war years. Really the thread is trying to establish which were the 'least worse '.

The 'least worse', operational in 1941, albeit in limited numbers, was the Halifax. That is intentionally faint praise. You can juggle the other contenders mentioned into order depending on the criteria applied. I'd juggle the Whitley, Wellington and Stirling, probably in that order.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## bobbysocks (Dec 22, 2014)

stona said:


> One might ask what relevance to the strategic bombing campaign any allied bombers had in 1941 given the minute fraction of the eventual tonnage of bombs dropped and the wild inaccuracy of those dropped. In 1941 accuracy was still so bad that one RAF bomber dropped its bombs on an airfield in Cambridgeshire, believing it was bombing an airfield in German occupied Holland!
> 
> None of the bombers available in 1940/41 were fit for the purpose of mounting a strategic bombing campaign against one of Britain's continental rivals, which had been the raison d'etre of the RAF in the inter war years. Really the thread is trying to establish which were the 'least worse '.
> 
> ...



be that as it may it was still a real threat that germany took very seriously. i am reading the PDF file of preparing for barbarossa in the technical section. in the report it mentions several times moving training and unit assembly facilities east and out of the reach of enemy bombing. plus one of the early goals of barbarossa was to push the front so far into the soviet union that these bases would also be beyond the operational capabilities of their air force. to me that says it was effective enough.


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 22, 2014)

Glider said:


> The French version of the Boston was in service in 1941, just because the RAF took a fair amount of time getting it tweaked to RAF standards doesn't mean that the aircraft wasn't ready in 1941. Personally I would rather take a French Boston rather than a Blenheim any time.



There were about 4 different Boston/Havocs up until the end of 1941. There were two different P W R-1830 engines used in the the Early DB-7s, one of 1000hp for take-off with a single speed supercharger and one with 1100hp for take-off and two speed supercharger. Some of the early planes didn't have self sealing fuel tanks, and several different self sealing schemes were used. In fact some of the French contract machines had been built with 500 gallon integral tanks and had to be refitted with smaller, self sealing tanks. Most, if not all, of the Early planes were either used for training or converted to night fighters as they didn't have the range to be used as bombers once France fell. Most of the Early aircraft had a single MG in the dorsal position and sometimes a single MG out the bottom rear (supposed to manned by the same gunner using the dorsal gun). 
The Havoc II was the first with the 1600hp Wright R-2600s and there was still a mish-mash of fuel tanks and armament. The Boston III (not a French type) got twin .30 cal guns in the dorsal position and 394-400 gallon fuel tanks which still gave a very short range with the R-2600 engines if any speed was used. Range on 340 gallons was about 700 miles at around 150mph IAS (188mph at 12,000ft?) Range on 340 gallons dropped to 500miles at 221 IAS (274mph true at 12,000ft) and that is at max lean. Going to max continuous shortened the range to 325 miles for 340 gallons. 
Doesn't matter how fast the bomber is if can't reach the target.


----------



## nuuumannn (Dec 22, 2014)

> The B17 wasn't ready for combat missions in 1941.



Not how the RAF were using it, no. the fact that it had good turn of speed - cruise speed as high as the Wellington's maximum and excellent range and height, the latter of which is what the RAF was interested in. These advantages could have been exploited in a different fashion, rather than as a strategic bomber operating alone against heavily defended targets, as the Fortress Is were used.



> The French version of the Boston was in service in 1941, just because the RAF took a fair amount of time getting it tweaked to RAF standards doesn't mean that the aircraft wasn't ready in 1941. Personally I would rather take a French Boston rather than a Blenheim any time.



Yep, I agree, much better aircraft, but the French Bostons were not in service with the RAF as bombers in 1941. The Boston Is, which were French DB-7s were used solely for training and the Boston IIs from French orders became heavy fighter/intruders and primarily night fighters as Havocs. This makes the first RAF operated bomber variant of the Boston the Mk.III, which as we have established did not see operations until early 1942, despite having had deliveries of the type to squadrons in 1941. The Safas in 24 Sqn having used theirs in tactical reconnaissance in December 1941, however.



> None of the bombers available in 1940/41 were fit for the purpose of mounting a strategic bombing campaign against one of Britain's continental rivals, which had been the raison d'etre of the RAF in the inter war years. Really the thread is trying to establish which were the 'least worse '.



Pretty much. The problems that afflicted Bomber Command went beyond the quality of its equipment, though (which is outside the scope of this thread). Be that as it may, this is about what we think were the top three Allied bombers of 1941. As I put a few posts back (after a few perspective changes  ), Whitley, Wellington, Stirling in no particular order; There weren't too many other bombers that had the attributes of these three and were available in numbers.


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 22, 2014)

stona said:


> One might ask what relevance to the strategic bombing campaign any allied bombers had in 1941 given the minute fraction of the eventual tonnage of bombs dropped and the wild inaccuracy of those dropped. In 1941 accuracy was still so bad that one RAF bomber dropped its bombs on an airfield in Cambridgeshire, believing it was bombing an airfield in German occupied Holland!
> 
> None of the bombers available in 1940/41 were fit for the purpose of mounting a strategic bombing campaign against one of Britain's continental rivals, which had been the raison d'etre of the RAF in the inter war years. Really the thread is trying to establish which were the 'least worse '



A little confusion of cause and effect. 
Poor training, tactics and target selection had as much, if not more, to do with the poor results achieved in 1940, 41 and early 42 as the type of bombers used. You could have used a time machine and equipped ALL Bomber Command squadrons with Lancasters during that time period and gotten pretty much the same results. A crew that doesn't know if they are over Holland or England is _not_ going to navigate better with a different type of airplane.


----------



## stona (Dec 23, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> A crew that doesn't know if they are over Holland or England is _not_ going to navigate better with a different type of airplane.



True, they were waiting for the development of various electronic and navigational aids, the bomber stream and Bert Harris 

It doesn't alter the fact that they were all phased out of Bomber Command (with the exception of the Halifax) as soon as was practicable. The Halifax only survived for political and production related reasons, not operational considerations. If Harris had his way by 1943 BC would have been equipped with two types, Lancaster and Mosquito.

Surely the biggest problem for the Whitley, Wellington, Hampden, Stirling and even Manchester was an operational cruising height below 15,000 feet, well below in some cases. This made them all too vulnerable. The Halifax I scraped in a little higher, but still too low.
Operational cruising speeds between 160 and 210 mph left something to be desired too. The Stirling wins on this one (208mph)

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 23, 2014)

> It doesn't alter the fact that they were all phased out of Bomber Command (with the exception of the Halifax) as soon as was practicable.



True but that doesn't mean that they were the "The 'least worse'," in 1941 anymore than the fighters that were used in 1941 were the 'least worse' even if they were phased out as soon as possible in 1942/43 by newer models. Such was the rate of progress in WW II.


----------



## stona (Dec 23, 2014)

A good design can be developed. The Spitfire wasn't phased out in 1941, nor was the Bf 109. 

One of Bomber Command's complaints against the Halifax was that Handley Page proved incapable of carrying out the development promised. The others were already going or gone by this time.

Sinclair was a supporter of the MAP line on the Halifax and a rather optimistic statement by him about the Halifax saying that the men in Halifax squadrons would prefer it to the Lancaster if _"30 or 40 mph speed could be restored to it"_ provoked the following response from Harris.
_"I am convinced, as usual, that Handley Page is covering up behind a mass of verbiage and a lot of pettifogging minor modifications, by which he hoped to postpone either the realisation of the hopelessness of the Halifax or the necessity to switch as far as possible to something better." _

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 23, 2014)

We are back to the "best as _used_ in 1941" or "best _for potential *development*_ in 1941" or a combination of the two?

Granted the Whitley was pretty much a dead end design but it never got a better engine than the Merlin X. The Wellington continued on as a Bomber for quite a few years in the Med but got a *lot* more power as the years went on. Twin 1000hp or 1145hp engines were still quite common in 1941 although the 1375hp Hercules engines came into use in 1941. Going to 1675hp engines later kept it useful even if not first rate. 

The better engines were pretty much siphoned off to the 4 engine bombers and Mosquito. 

2000-2800hp (total) bombers were never going to equal 4600-6700hp bombers so, yes, the twins as heavy bombers were on the way out. But _as used_ in 1941 ???


----------



## stona (Dec 23, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> We are back to the "best as _used_ in 1941"



I think our lists of 'best used in 1941', given that I have no opinion on Soviet bombers, would agree. There are only a handful of contenders and the order can be shuffled depending on the criteria applied, speed, altitude, load, survivability etc. They were all terrible though.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## nuuumannn (Dec 23, 2014)

> There are only a handful of contenders and the order can be shuffled depending on the criteria applied, speed, altitude, load, survivability etc. They were all terrible though.



Whilst I don't disagree with your assessment of strategic bombing - and the Halifax at the time, Steve, I have to ask the question, terrible compared to what? In 1941, ignoring this thread for a minute, the Stirling, Whitley and Wellington, for all their faults were among the best bombers in the world. Yes, the Germans had the Ju 88 and the He 111, Do 17 etc, but they lacked bomb load and adequate defensive armament, for example - need I list every heavy bomber in the world at that time to make my point? You are getting ahead of yourself. The status quo in 1941 was by no means impressive compared to what was to come, but at the time, 1941, what was considered the best was very different to a year later. 

In 1941, hangovers from before the war were still prevalent in service; the Defiant, the Whitley, the Blenheim etc. These aircraft were still front line types and yes, the British were hoping for more in the future - of course, you don't settle for the status quo for long in a technological race during wartime, but until the future arrives, you have what you have. The Whitley and Wellington were advanced aircraft, as was the Stirling, Manchester and Halifax. Unfortunately for the RAF, the newer designs were all proving to be less than what they promised; but in their own way, these aircraft were a big step forward and had virtues - some not so obvious at that time - that would eventually prove themselves. Until that happened though, the older, more established aircraft were the best that there were. Compare them with their Axis contemporaries, analyse their strengths and weaknesses and you'll see that they stack up rather well compared to what everyone else was doing. Terrible is relative.


----------



## stona (Dec 23, 2014)

Again I agree.
The problem I have is that the RAF had decided that it should be capable of mounting a strategic bombing campaign against any continental rival, rather obviously Germany from the mid '30s onwards, and convinced itself and influential people in the government that it could.
It patently could not, given the equipment available in 1939/40/41 and even into 1942 and a lot of men paid with their lives for this and with no effect on Germany at all. That is terrible. Aircraft flying at less than 200mph in daylight were little more than target practice for enemy fighters, as were aircraft flying at 12,000ft for Germany's developing flak defences. 
A lot of men would pay with their lives later too, but at least the campaign in which they perished, whilst not decisive, as some had hoped, did make a major contribution to the ending of the European war in 1945.
Cheers
Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 23, 2014)

> It patently could not, given the equipment available in 1939/40/41 and even into 1942 and a lot of men paid with their lives for this and with no effect on Germany at all. That is terrible. Aircraft flying at less than 200mph in daylight were little more than target practice for enemy fighters, as were aircraft flying at 12,000ft for Germany's developing flak defences.



reverse it;
"given the equipment available in 1939/40/41 and even into 1942 and a lot of men paid with their lives for this and with no effect on _England_ at all. That is terrible. Aircraft flying at less than 200mph in daylight were little more than target practice for enemy fighters, as were aircraft flying at 12,000ft for England's developing flak defences."

_WHY_ were the German results better (if they were) using planes that were, for the most part, no faster, had worse defensive armament and carried smaller payloads on average? 

Blaming the airframes _in use_ is not putting the blame were it belongs. Granted the planes of 1941 would have trouble reaching Berlin with large payloads but the Ruhr was certainly within reach. It is only 256 miles from Norwich to Essen. 

The Whitley could carry 5500lbs over 1300 miles cut it to 1/3 for radius if you want. Early Wellingtons could carry 4500lbs 1200 miles. Hampden could carry 3000lbs 1800miles. 

_ASSUMING_ you can fly and *navigate* at night _without practicing_ or _proper equipment_ let alone drop bombs and hit a target at night is where the big failures lay.

With better training and better equipment (navigation, not airframes) those crews could have achieved much more solid results for their sacrifice.


----------



## stona (Dec 23, 2014)

The German results generally were no better. They exerted a lot of effort on one target (London) initially, which they could find. They then scattered bombs all over it and the neighbouring Home Counties.
The Luftwaffe had many more operational bombers and crews than the RAF in 1939/40, excluding Battles, and I think an argument can be made that the early war Luftwaffe bomber crews were generally better trained than their RAF counterparts.
I have seen it said that in September 1939 the RAF could only field 140 medium or heavy bombers.

The Luftwaffe's most successful raids were carried out using electronic aids (Knickebein, X-Gerat) and pathfinders, both of which the RAF would adopt variations of with much success later.

The problem for the RAF was that the bomber force to a very large extent was designed and trained to operate by day. Having been forced to operate by night put it at a crippling disadvantage from which it took years to recover.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Glider (Dec 23, 2014)

A small word in defence of the Halifax, once the Mk III entered service it was a very effective bomber. It suffers by having the earlier versions compared to the Lancaster I, but if you had to choose between the Halifax II and a Manchester, which would you take?


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 23, 2014)

The Germans did manage to hit the Spitfire factory (perhaps they were aiming at something else?) and managed to hit two of the Shorts factories setting back introduction of the Sterling by a number of months. This among other damage. 

The Germans certainly did not achieve the destruction the British and Americans would inflict on Germany later but the Germans at least realized that swanning about the countryside at night hopping for a break in clouds or good moonlight to illuminate the target wasn't really going to work and tried to come up with some sort of navigation aids. British were trusting to luck and/or the ability to _muddle_ though. Actually the British were depending on astro-navigation and while that worked fairly well from the deck of ship with lots of practice it didn't work so well from aircraft with quickly trained personnel. However pre-war the British "night" bomber squadrons seldom flew at night to prevent accidents and were seldom allowed to fly anywhere except over the British isles so the limitations didn't become apparent. 

While an early adaptation of Pathfinders and electronic aids would not have allowed the early bombers to flatten entire cities (there just weren't enough of them for one thing) there was a wide range of results possible form what was actually achieved by bomber command and what was achieved in 1943/44. Better training and few aids might have easily doubled or tripled the actual damage done if that meant it was still a far cry from what would happen later. 
And even a couple of hundred bombers carrying 2 tons apiece could cause a fair a mount of damage *IF* the bombs were dropped in the right place (or even within a radius of 1/2 mile or so of the target).

Earlier photo recon of bomb damage might have caught the problem much earlier too.


----------



## stona (Dec 23, 2014)

Glider said:


> A small word in defence of the Halifax, once the Mk III entered service it was a very effective bomber. It suffers by having the earlier versions compared to the Lancaster I, but if you had to choose between the Halifax II and a Manchester, which would you take?



The Mk III Halifax was certainly an improvement, but it entered service in late 1943 or early 1944 from memory. It finally had some of the developments that Bomber Command had wanted, but had the MAP been swayed by Bomber Command's arguments in 1941 to cease production of the Halifax and concentrate production on the Lancaster it wouldn't have been missed.

Some squadrons had to convert from the Lancaster to the Halifax. Jim McIntosh, a Canadian serving with No. 403 Squadron didn't want to believe that they would be trading their Lancasters for Halifaxes which he viewed as _"bait for the German defences". _ When the Halifaxes did indeed arrive McIntosh described the new aeroplane as a _"depressing looking beast, square and squat; no lines at all. A feeling of doom now hung over East Moor"._

I've seen it said that some were happy with their Halifaxes, even preferring them to the Lancaster, but in all the many memoirs and accounts I've read that would be a VERY small minority. At least statistically you had a better chance of escaping a Halifax if you did get shot down.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Glider (Dec 23, 2014)

I am not trying to pretend that it was better than the Lancaster but it develop into a decent aircraft and that the Halifax did suffer a poor reputation due to its earlier version being compared to the Lancaster. 
I can also understand why the aircrew would feel negative about going to the Halifax, but It would be interesting to find out how they got on with the Halifax and compare the two.


----------



## stona (Dec 23, 2014)

Lancasters flew 156,192 sorties with 3,431 losses (2.20%). 246 were lost to operational accidents (0.16%)

Halifaxes flew 82,773 sorties with 1,884 losses (2.28%). 199 were lost to operational crashes (0.24%)

A study of four Hamburg raids plus raids on Peenemunde and Nuremberg, a total of six raids, showed that from the 126 Lancasters shot down 13.2% of their crews survived. 

From the 74 Halifaxes shot down 21.9% survived. In this respect the Halifax was better.

13 Stirlings were shot down on the Hamburg and Peenemunde raids, they did not operate on the Nuremberg raid, and from these 24.0% survived.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 23, 2014)

As I see it the trouble with the Halifax is that it took them almost two years to straighten it out. 

The MK III with Hercules engines didn't enter service until Sept of 1943 and then in small numbers. 1944 saw a large number of MK IIIs show up 1284 in the 1st 6 months.
Apparently it took until the Summer of 1943 to fit the bigger tail fins (vertical stabilizers) to the Halifax which went a long way to solving some of it's handling problems. The Late MK II's or IIa's had the bigger fins. 







See this site for production lots and timing; Halifax Technical

2 years and several thousand aircraft (and how many lost crews?) is a bit too long to correct a known handling problem.


----------



## Glider (Dec 23, 2014)

stona said:


> Lancasters flew 156,192 sorties with 3,431 losses (2.20%). 246 were lost to operational accidents (0.16%)
> 
> Halifaxes flew 82,773 sorties with 1,884 losses (2.28%). 199 were lost to operational crashes (0.24%)
> 
> ...



Thanks for this. The numbers are pretty close and can I ask do you know if these loss ratios are from the Mk III onwards?

I agree that two years to correct something is far too long but I would guess that as time progressed and the weights increased the problems may have started to arise.


----------



## nuuumannn (Dec 23, 2014)

> The German results generally were no better. They exerted a lot of effort on one target (London) initially, which they could find. They then scattered bombs all over it and the neighbouring Home Counties. The Luftwaffe had many more operational bombers and crews than the RAF in 1939/40, excluding Battles, and I think an argument can be made that the early war Luftwaffe bomber crews were generally better trained than their RAF counterparts. I have seen it said that in September 1939 the RAF could only field 140 medium or heavy bombers. The Luftwaffe's most successful raids were carried out using electronic aids (Knickebein, X-Gerat) and pathfinders, both of which the RAF would adopt variations of with much success later. The problem for the RAF was that the bomber force to a very large extent was designed and trained to operate by day. Having been forced to operate by night put it at a crippling disadvantage from which it took years to recover.



In the scheme of things, yep, you're right Steve, but comparing aircraft for aircraft, if the RAF operated Ju 88s, G4Ms or any other type available in the environment they did, the results would be no different, likewise the Luftwaffe and Stirlings, Whitleys and Wellingtons. My point is, that the aircraft that the British operated were no worse off than their contemporaries, Bomber Command structure and method aside, so stating they were terrible has to be put into context against the standards of the day. Yes, Bomber Command was at a distinct disadvantage, but only the Luftwaffe had a better bombing force with as much exoperience and as competent equipment as the RAF in 1941. At that time, the rest of the world's air forces, including the United States had a distinctly pre-war bombing force that could not match either the Luftwaffe or Bomber Command in equipment or accuracy. The German bomber squadrons were the most accurate and probably as a result of this, the best in the world thanks to their electronic bombing aids. It took another two years before the RAF bombers were equipped with something similar.



> As I see it the trouble with the Halifax is that it took them almost two years to straighten it out.



It took longer than two years to sort out the Halifax I's many issues and even then the number of variants and sub variants produced along the way to incorporate modifications took time and effort as issues that kept arising kept HP and the Aircraft and Armament Experimental Establishment hard at work and often resulted in the destruction of aircraft and the death of personnel. The Mk.III did not enter squadron service until late 1943 with 466 Sqn (RAAF) and then 35 Sqn (the first to be equipped with the Halifax I in November 1940) with the first deliveries from August that year. There's no doubt the Halifax III was an excellent aircraft, but it took its time in becoming so.

The Halifax III was intended on being an interim only until the arrival of the Halifax IV, which was cancelled, leaving the III as the principal production variant; It incorporated the square fins and glased nose section sans turret that were first fitted to B.II Series 1As, indeed the prototype R9534 was one of those marks modified with Hercules engines. At the time it was modified as an interim, a cure had yet to be found for the issue with rudder over balance and the bigger fins were about to go into service on the B.II.

Here is a section on dealing with rudder over balance from _The Secret Years, Flight testing at Boscombe Down_ by Tim Mason;

"During 1942 and later, the search continued for a solution to the problem of rudder over balance though in view of the establishment's experience on the Mk.Is to be the cause of some unexplained service accidents and operational losses. The worst case considered was failure (and feathering) of the two port engines with the two starboard engines at take off power. The first modification, late in 1941, of reducing the rudder trimmer movement resulted in excessive foot loads until, on reducing speed to 160 mph the rudders violently overbalanced to full travel and the resulting uncontrolled manoeuvre could only be overcome by throttling the starboard engines. 'Noseings' (bulbous nose to the rudders) improved matters such that control could be maintained down to a speed 140 mph with 10 deg bank without over balancing, but with very high foot loads. Further changes, in mid 1942, to the balance tab and rudder tab settings reduced the foot loads to acceptable proportions, but re-introduced a mild tendency to rudder over balance.

It was decided to check the effectiveness of the latest modifications on a representative aircraft. W7917 [a B.II Srs I] arrived in December 1942 from 102 Sqn; on the first handling test flight on 4 February 1943, the aircraft crashed fatally. The top half of one rudder had detached in flight - attributed to a violent over balance leading to loss of control. Further investigation on HR679 (the first production aircraft incorporating the full range of aerodynamic improvements known as the Series IA in service but with rudders similar to W7917). Cautious reduction in speed during steady sideslips caused no indication of over balance until at 120 mph the rudders suddenly moved to full travel of their own volition. The pilot regained control at 150 mph after easing the control column forward; 4,000 ft had been lost in the spiral dive. On second attempt control was regained by opening up the engines on the inside of the spiral. Later tests with restricted rudder movement reduced the speed at which less violent over balance occurred. Cords on the trailing edge were tried but removed after it was foundthat they had no effect on over balance and again made the rudders excessively heavy. HR727 had rudders with smaller balance areas which over balanced at smaller angles; the modification was rejected. It was decided that larger fins was the only effective cure; in the mean time restrictors were fitted in existing aircraft with the original fins and service pilots carefully briefed on the over balance of rudders."



> I am not trying to pretend that it was better than the Lancaster but it develop into a decent aircraft and that the Halifax did suffer a poor reputation due to its earlier version being compared to the Lancaster.



The Halifax III did have advantages compared to the Lancaster I and it is only natural to compare the two, in fact a number of different books and articles in magazines do so. The Halifax VI out performed the Lancaster III, but by the time it had entered service in April 1945, the Avro Lincoln was in production, which had better performance and again the Halifax was second fiddle to an Avro bomber. What would I choose between the Halifax and Manchester in 1941? The Manchester, not least in hindsight because of the Lancaster, bearing in mind that the Lancaster prototype, which had flown at the very beginning of the year, was a modified Manchester and the type was almost ready for service by the end of 1941.


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 23, 2014)

I think they had problems with first aircraft. 






Something about the airflow over the vertical stabilizers "stalling" and either locking the rudder/s hard over or rendering them ineffective?
The plane was considered to hunt directionally and the bigger fins made it a better (more stable) bomb platform. Some sources talk of older bombers being refitted with the bigger fins in the field. 

The early ones were also under-powered and the substitution of Merlin XX engines didn't solve much as the weight went up almost as much as the power.


----------



## nuuumannn (Dec 23, 2014)

Apart from rudder over balance, from the very first Halifax built the aircraft suffered from being overweight and far too draggy. Somewhat disappointingly, the aircraft failed to meet its performance figures as a result and over the next few years alterations were made to the basic design, including more powerful engines and even Griffon and Sabre engined derivatives were considered, but not built. Tha Halifax IV powered by Griffons was to be the major production variant and on paper it offered considerable advantages over even the Lancaster, but was cancelled - by then it was too late in the day for a new Halifax. Throughout the aircraft's career there were changes that were made to its aerodynamics to improve performance losses resulting from in-service weight creep, like removing the front turret altogether, substituting the bulky top turret with a more streamlined four gun turret and so on. there were also issues with its undercarriage right from the start and from early on the main undercarriage was removed and a new design fitted and the tail wheel, a source of trouble, was fixed down instead of retracting, but this incurred a speed penalty. Inefficiencies in altitude were improved with extended wing tips and fitting Hercules engines in the Mk.III.

One issue that occurred that wasn't altogether serious, but more discomforting was that the radio operator's position was directly below the pilot's and dirt from the pilot's boots on the rudder pedals would fall down on top of the radio equipment and the radio operator!


----------



## stona (Dec 24, 2014)

Glider said:


> Thanks for this. The numbers are pretty close and can I ask do you know if these loss ratios are from the Mk III onwards?



I can't find a break down of the numbers by sub type I'm afraid. The numbers are for all sub types for their entire operational periods during WW2.

The numbers are superficially close, but nearly 0.08% on 2.2% is a significant difference. For every 100 Lancasters lost 103-104 Halifaxes were lost. For men taking a 50/50 chance on their lives this did tilt the odds even more unfavourably.

The Halifax also suffered a much higher rate of operational crashes, here classified as crashes in the UK by aircraft setting off or returning from operational missions. This rate fell throughout the war due to many reasons, better training, more reliable aircraft, better air traffic control, better diversion procedures etc. None of this excuses the poor performance of the Halifax, though it does excuse to some extent some earlier types like the Whitley with a 1.43% operational crash rate, compared with the Lancaster's 0.16%.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 24, 2014)

The early British war bombers had a number of things going against them. Like being woefully under powered (imagine modern 6 place light twin with 150-160hp engines and one engine out), two pitch props instead of constant speed (and no feathering of dead prop) and very often bad cockpit layouts. A lot of potential accidents. Halifax and Manchester continued the under-powered condition.


----------



## stona (Dec 24, 2014)

A note on percentage loss rates. The seemingly low numbers can be deceptive in the context of many operational sorties over a length of time. For example, between 7/8th July and 10th November 1941 Bomber Command suffered a 3.5% loss rate by night, 7.1% by day. There were 11,991 night sorties with a loss of 414 aircraft and 1,567 day sorties with a loss of 112 aircraft. 

_This gives a total loss in four months of 526 aircraft, a loss rate of 3.9%, approximately equivalent to Bomber Command's entire front line strength in bombers and crews. _

The bomber offensive as it had been carried out to date was effectively halted as a result of these figures and the evidence of the Butt Report. A new policy was formulated and on 8th January 1942 Sir Richard Peirse was sent of to command the Allied Air Forces in India and South East Asia, not exactly a sacking, thus making room for a new man to carry out this policy.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## nuuumannn (Dec 24, 2014)

If any one is interested, here is a break down of figures similar to Steve's produced by author Jon Lake for an article on Halifax variants; 

"The Halifax flew 36,995 sorties against Germany by night and 10,074 by day, dropping 224,207 tons of bombs (compared to 83,881 and 23,204 sorties and 608, 612 tons for the Lancaster). Bomber Command losses totalled 2,236 compared to 3,936 Lancasters. This gave the RAF a loss rate of one Halifax per 21.05 sorties, and one Lanc per 27.02 sorties. An average Lancaster sortie delivered 5.68 tons of bombs, while a typical Halifax sortie delivered only 4.76 tons. These figures were surprisingly close and represented a great improvement over the Stirling, which suffered one loss for every 10.7 sorties, and delivered only 3.38 tons of bombs per sortie."

"Even in the bomber role, the Halifax played a vital part, dropping 23.5 percent of Bomber Command's total (with the Lanc contributing 63.7 percent). During daylight operations, which predominated during the latter part of the war, the Halifax actually had a better return rate than the Lancster, with 0.56 percent ofthose Halifaxes dispatched being lost, compared to a figure of 0.74 percent for the Lancaster."

This from Harry Fraser-Mitchell in a feature article about the Halifax for Aeroplane Monthly magazine:

By January 1944 nine squadrons were equipped with the Halifax III and losses began to dwindle - 433 Sqn recorded 400 sorties without loss, for example" "Halifaxes, including the new marks VI and VII, were now involved in tactical bombing and made 4,428 sorties for the loss of only 99 aircraft. The Halifaxes of No.4 Group were credited with33 fighters destroyed, a Bomber Command record."

"...in 1943 the loss rate for the Halifaxes of 4 Grp was 485 aircraft in 11,607 sorties, 4.2 percent and in 1944, 402 in 25,464 sorties, or 1.6 percent. Available Lancaster rates indicate 3.4 percent in 1943 and 2.8 percent in 1944."


----------



## Glider (Dec 24, 2014)

stona said:


> I can't find a break down of the numbers by sub type I'm afraid. The numbers are for all sub types for their entire operational periods during WW2.
> 
> The numbers are superficially close, but nearly 0.08% on 2.2% is a significant difference. For every 100 Lancasters lost 103-104 Halifaxes were lost. For men taking a 50/50 chance on their lives this did tilt the odds even more unfavourably.
> 
> ...


Thanks for this. I disagree about the 0.08% being significant in the context of comparing the Lancaster I/III against the Halifax III. A good proportion of those Halifax losses would have been the Mk I and II which were much worse than the Lancaster.


----------



## stona (Dec 24, 2014)

Glider said:


> A good proportion of those Halifax losses would have been the Mk I and II which were much worse than the Lancaster.



Possibly, but it's impossible to draw any such conclusion from the figures. 

Cheers

Steve


----------



## tomo pauk (Dec 24, 2014)

Do we know how many Halifaxes were lost in 1941-42? How much in 1943? 1944-45?


----------



## stona (Dec 24, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Do we know how many Halifaxes were lost in 1941-42? How much in 1943? 1944-45?



I don't have those figures (at least not to hand).
Looking at the losses for squadrons that converted to Lancasters from Halifaxes it is generally the case that the losses for the Halifax are _very much _higher than the losses for the Lancaster. Given that the difference for the two types over the entire war was less than 0.1% this might imply that the high Halifax losses were sustained early in the war, that is before the units converted to Lancasters and whilst they were flying early versions of the Halifax.

This might also explain Harris' passionate and vitriolic dislike of the Halifax and personal contempt for Handley Page himself. When Lancaster squadrons were losing around 2%, Halifax squadrons were losing 5%-6%.

There are however any number of other factors that might skew the statistics.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 24, 2014)

The Big fin MK IIs don't show up until the spring/summer of 1943 and would not become the dominant model (of Merlin powered planes) in use for quite some time (if ever). The MK IIIs start showing up in the fall of 1943. Since the early arrow fin planes are not yanked out of service (and I am not sure how fast or how many were converted in service). Not sure when the Melrin 22 was introduced to replace the Merlin XX. Some time in 1943? 

It would take quite a while for the earlier aircraft to be phased out of service however so an overnight change in the loss rate could hardly be expected. 

Trouble with the idea of shutting down Halifax production and making Lancasters instead was that it wasn't one factory making Halifaxes but five. Handley Page, English Electric, Fairey, Rootes and the London Aircraft Production Group (LAPG).

From Wiki: 
" In parallel with the Shadow Factory scheme, the London Aircraft Production Group (LAPG) was formed in 1940 by combining management of factories and workshops of Chrysler, Duple, Express Motor Bodyworks Limited, Park Royal Coachworks and London Transport. The major activity of the group was the production of Handley Page Halifax bombers for the RAF, ammunition, gun parts, armoured vehicles and spare parts for vehicles. The group was led by London Transport from their works at Chiswick and later at Leavesden near Watford, which had a large purpose-built factory and airfield for production, assembly and flight testing of completed Halifax bombers.[7]

Due to the high priority placed on aircraft production, large numbers of workers were drafted with little experience or training in aircraft production, with over half the workforce eventually being female. At its peak the LAPG included 41 factories or sites, 600 sub-contractors and 51,000 employees, producing one aircraft an hour. The first Halifax from the LAPG was delivered in 1941 and the last, named London Pride, in April 1945"

I have my doubts about how long the one aircraft per hour rate was kept up (one day?) but obviously once large set-ups/organizations were tooled up and running switching to a different type of aircraft could result in months of lost production.


----------



## stona (Dec 24, 2014)

There wasn't an overnight changeover from Halifax to Lancaster, the squadrons changed over a period of time, but there is a marked difference in the losses they experienced flying Halifaxes and those flying Lancasters.

As an example No. 35 squadron flew 717 Halifax sorties as part of 4 Group with a loss rate of 4.9%. They transferred to 8 Group and flew another 1,776 Halifax sorties with a loss rate of 3.7%. In March 1944 it converted to Lancasters and flew a further 2,216 sorties with a loss rate of 1.2%.

No. 405 squadron RCAF converted to Lancasters almost exactly a year earlier. It's Halifax losses at 4 Group had been 6.6%, at 6 Group 7.3% and 8 Group 3.6%. After conversion in March 1943 the loss rate on Lancasters for the rest of the war (2,549 sorties) was just 2.0%.

There are many factors influencing the loss rate, not just the type flown, but the pattern repeats itself across several squadrons, converting at different times.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 24, 2014)

There wouldn't have been an overnight change over from one type of Halifax to another. 

I don't doubt the loss rate was lower for the Lancaster but the loss rate for the early Halifax's was higher than the later ones. Point was that, much as Harris disliked Handley-Page, and I am not getting into the argument as to if he was justified or not, 4 of the Factories that built Halifax's were tooled up and producing by the Spring of 1942. At which point BC is sort of stuck with them. Handley Page started in Oct 1940, EE started producing in Sept 1941, LAPG started in Jan 1942, Rootes started in April 1942. Fairey joined at a low level in Aug, 1942.

Now perhaps they could have stopped Fairey pretty easily (it took Fairey about a year to build around 140 Halifaxes) but trying to switch the other factories over in 1942 would have resulted in hundreds fewer 4 engine bombers available in 1942 and early 1943. Now It shouldn't have taken as long as it did to solve the Rudder problem ( and a few others) but again, _somebody_ was putting production ahead of the _better_ solution by looking for quick fixes that would keep the most production tooling.

Harris could demand all he wanted, he was stuck with the Halifax unless he wanted to retool 4-5 factories and delay the bombing campaign ( or a large part of the 4 engine bomber component of it ) by months if not close to a year. This _may_ be part of his frustration. The first 3-4 Factories/production groups had been tooled up and started production before more than a couple of squadrons had flown the Halifax on operations.


----------



## stona (Dec 24, 2014)

That was precisely the MAP's argument 

I can 'do' some facts and figures after Xmas.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Edgar Brooks (Dec 25, 2014)

According to Bruce Robertson, Bomber Command losses (including Coastal, special duties, and gardening) were :- 1941 - 27; 1942 - 199; 1943 - 713; 1944 - 740; 1945 - 154.
As well as looking at the aircraft factories, don't ignore those producing engines, since they were also capable of gumming up the works; the Spitfire III foundered because the Hurricane II needed all the Merlin XXs, and the 100 Spitfire XIIs were built because there was a shortage of the necessary mark of Merlin, so Griffons had to be used.


----------



## Milosh (Dec 25, 2014)

Aircraft	Total Sorties	Losses	Sorties flown per loss
Lancaster	156,192	3,832	40.76
Halifax	82,773	2,232	37.08

World War II RAF Bomber Command Statistics


----------



## stona (Dec 26, 2014)

Maybe more relevant to look at figures for sorties _flown against Germany_ as the Halifax was eventually spared the more arduous operations.

According to my ancient, yellowing and well thumbed 'Bomber Squadrons of the RAF and Their Aircraft' by Philip Moyes (with a foreword by Arthur.T. "Butch" Harris no less) these for the two types were as follows.

By Night:

Halifax: 36,995 sorties, 1,410 missing (3.8%)

Lancaster: 83,881 sorties, 2,508 missing (3.0%)

That is statistically significant. For every 100 Lancasters lost, 127 Halifaxes were lost.

The Halifax (10,074, 57, 0.6%) did better than the Lancaster by day (23,204, 179, 0.8%) which is probably a reflection of both the type of mission flown and when (late in the war with a rather improved Halifax).

Cheers

Steve


----------



## stona (Dec 27, 2014)

I've just found a January 1943 report which is an indictment of the MAP's decision to persevere with the Halifax and some justification for Harris' desire to get rid of it and convert production to the Lancaster. In 1942, when Harris took over command of Bomber Command, there were only two squadrons of each type operational and the opportunity was missed. There would have been an overall loss of heavy bomber production, but this would have been compensated for by the superiority of the Lancaster had the change been made in the early part of 1942. Harris knew this and was prepared to accept it.

The Bomber Command report comments on this superiority of the Lancaster over other types:

_"A few figures will show the extent of the gap. For every Lancaster lost on operations 68.5 tons of bombs are dropped. Corresponding figures for other types are 30.1 tons for the Halifax and 21.6 tons for the Wellington. Again, for every 100 tons of bombs dropped by the Lancaster, nine aircrew personnel are killed or missing. For other types the figures are Halifax 19, Wellington 23."_

What would you want to fly in?

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Bacon Bacon:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## tomo pauk (Dec 27, 2014)

Edgar Brooks said:


> According to Bruce Robertson, Bomber Command losses (including Coastal, special duties, and gardening) were :- 1941 - 27; 1942 - 199; 1943 - 713; 1944 - 740; 1945 - 154.



A rather poor return for the huge German investment in the Flak arm of the Luftwaffe? By 1941 some 3500+ of heavy (88mm and bigger guns) were deployed in Germany proper and in occupied Western countries, and further thousands of light Flak (20-37mm).
Granted, much more bombers were damaged by Flak, but still a poor return. 



> As well as looking at the aircraft factories, don't ignore those producing engines, since they were also capable of gumming up the works; the Spitfire III foundered because the Hurricane II needed all the Merlin XXs, and the 100 Spitfire XIIs were built because there was a shortage of the necessary mark of Merlin, so Griffons had to be used.



The Hurricane surely needed the Merlin XX to cut the performance advantage the Bf 109 held. Unfortunately, the Bf 109 received not only the more engine power in late 1940-42, but also the aerodynamic refinements, so the performance gap was wider in 1941 than it was in 1940.
It is maybe unfortunate that aerodynamic refinements of the Spitfire III were not incorporated in the serial produced Spitfires?
The Merlin 20 series were also slated for Beaufighter, and later for the Halifax, Lancaster and Mosquito - there were doubts that Bristol will be unable to churn out as many Hercules engines as foreseen to be needed by the AM/RAF planers?


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 27, 2014)

Well, if I was flying in a Wellington squadron I might want to transfer to Halifaxes. 

granted the Halifax is dropping more bombs per sortie so that losses per 100 missions/sorties might be even or actually in the Wellingtons favor. 

I have no idea what the bombs dropped per Whitley or Hampden were (let alone Blenheims) per plane lost or air crew lost per 100 tons dropped (needs 200 sorties by Blenheim but only 3 men per plane).

And for 1941 and good part of 1942 that is the question. Fewer bombs dropped in total and a larger percentage of the lower total dropped by the old twin engine bombers. 
By the end of 1942 there had been only 698 Lancasters built and of the 109 built in Dec how many would have gone from the factory door and into combat before the end of the year? 

LancasterMonlty Production

And the saga of the Manchester: 

"Of the 200 airframes completed as true Manchester's and issued to front line RAF squadron's. A total 77 aircraft were lost on operations and an additional 20 were also lost in various accidents with those squadron's. A further 24 were lost during training flights with non-operational units, such as Conversion Flights. Combined losses therefore, were 121 or 60.50 percent of the original 200 aircraft. From those losses, 33 were directly due to engine failures - 12 on the squadron's, 21 on the training units. A further 28 aircraft lost during operations, were also thought to have been caused due to engine failure. But since the airframes and engines could not be examined there are classified as "Probably Lost Due To Enemy Action""

from Lancaster History


----------



## stona (Dec 27, 2014)

Harris started to campaign in earnest to switch production from the Halifax to Lancaster in late 1942. He met immediate resistance from the MAP. On 11th September '42 John Llewellin (the then Minister) wrote:

_"If we gave the order to change over now, English Electric would produce the first Lancaster about November 1943 *[more than a year later!] *and would not reach peak production until December 1944. Between August 1943 and December 1944 you would lose some 220 bombers. This would probably be the firm that would give the best result. In my view, the changeover is not the remedy. The remedy is to modify the Halifax so as to bring its performance more like the Lancaster's"_

Harris didn't believe him and nor incidentally did the more dynamic Stafford Cripps who would take over his job shortly. Llewellin's remedy took nearly as long to implement as the changeover, and in the meantime men continued to die in an inferior aeroplane. 
Llewellin had the support of Sinclair, but Freeman was more sympathetic to Harris and Bomber Command. His compromise solution was that English Electric should, over the next twelve months, erect additional capacity with jigs and tools to build the Lancaster at its Preston plant. He would write:

_"In this way the time lag should be cut down and the Halifax can go at almost peak rate until the Lancaster is in reasonable production. The shops that are now producing the Halifax would eventually turn on to the Lancaster and we should get the combined output of both."_

This was rejected by the MAP for no good reason. Handley Page were an old client and whereas the suggestion that Avro, the new kids on the block, should produce the Halifax (made in 1940) was acceptable, the idea that Handley Page produce the Lancaster was not. I believe this was a political decision which has a whiff of the sort of cronyism that so bedevilled German aircraft production about it. 

Rootes and LPTB production is irrelevant at this time. Between them they manufactured just 20 Halifax BIIs. Fairey hadn't even started (LK747 a BIII was the first to come from Fairey Aviation).

Cherwell liked his statistics and was also a supporter of the changeover on grounds of efficiency. His department calculated that due to the ease of construction of the Lancaster, and its heavy bomb load, 3.6lbs of bombs were dropped for every factory man hour compared with just 0.95lbs for the Halifax.

Ease of construction is reflected in production figures for 1942 of 516 from Avro with a further 172 from Metropolitan Vickers and Armstrong Whitworth.

Edgar raised a very valid point about engines. The Lancaster II was forced to use Hercules engines whilst the inferior Halifax got the limited allocation of Merlins. As you can imagine this got Harris going again. He wrote to Portal:

"_The Lancaster II has a marked falling off of performance which is not acceptable now and will be still less acceptable in 1943. It has over 200 miles less range in theory and in practice we are already finding that it has some seven hours endurance compared with the ten hours of the Lancaster I. It is slightly slower. It's maximum speed is achieved at 15,000 feet *[which Harris considered lethal]* as compared with the 19,500 of the Lancaster I. The Hercules engine is notoriously unreliable, though this may be got over. The raison d'etre of the Lancaster II is that insufficient Merlin engines are now available to put Merlins in the total production of Lancaster fuselages. But Merlin engines are being used in large quantities in the deplorable Halifax. Therefore in order to overproduce one deplorable type we are virtually wrecking a large proportion of the output of a first class type, the Lancaster I._" 

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 27, 2014)

Hmmmm. 

"It's maximum speed is achieved at 15,000 feet [which Harris considered lethal] as compared with the 19,500 of the Lancaster I. The Hercules engine is notoriously unreliable, though this may be got over. The raison d'etre of the Lancaster II is that insufficient Merlin engines are now available to put Merlins in the total production of Lancaster fuselages. But Merlin engines are being used in large quantities in the deplorable Halifax. Therefore in order to overproduce one deplorable type we are virtually wrecking a large proportion of the output of a first class type, the Lancaster I."

Granted the Short Stirling and Wellington were being phased out in 1943 but how many crewmen were lost flying those planes with the *notoriously unreliable* Hercules engines? And a what altitudes were they cruising at? Max speed bears a relation to cruising speed but this comparison seems a bit contrived. On shorter missions the crews of ALL types of bombers _could_ have used a faster _cruising_ speed that they were instructed to use with a lower causality rate. 

The _large proportion_ of _wrecked_ Lancasters amounted to 300 or so , all built by Armstrong Whitworth at the rate of around 20-25 month when production of Merlin powered Lancasters was running around 156-183 a month. *IF* the first 300 Lancasters built by AW were all MK IIs then at the end of 1943 you had 300 Hercules powered planes out of a total of 2679, 11.1%

It sounds like not enough testing was done and/or not enough information was given to crew and raid planners if a large number of MK II Lancasters ran out of fuel on operations. 

The Lancaster was a better plane but neither really amount to much in 1941 and I am not sure I buy all Harries excuses (unless he was trying to overstate things to shake things up).


----------



## stona (Dec 27, 2014)

The point Harris is making is that the Lancaster II should not have been built at all. The available Merlins should have gone to Lancaster production, even at the cost of Halifax production. The Lancaster II performed badly compared with its predecessor, taking backward steps in aircraft development is difficult to justify in any circumstances, even more so as a strategic bombing campaign began to gather real momentum.
To Harris and Bomber Command_ building Merlin engine Halifaxes and Hercules engine Lancasters was a double negative_. He got poorer performing Lancasters and more of the same old 'deplorable' Halifax

Harris would sooner have had fewer, better, bombers, something which superficially seems uncharacteristic of him but which is supported by copious evidence. He wanted to maximise the tonnage of bombs dropped whilst minimising his losses and in 1942-43 Merlin engine Lancasters were the way to do it. 

Men like Cherwell and Freeman wanted to maximise the tonnage of bombs dropped with the minimum cost in labour and materiel (in the context of the heavy bomber programme) and came to the same conclusion as Harris.

The Halifax should have been dropped in 1942. There was a chance to do it but the opportunity was missed.

Hindsight is something we have the benefit of. Foresight is something that Harris, Freeman and others were able to use but which others like Llewellin and Sinclair lacked in this particular case.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Milosh (Dec 27, 2014)

Halifax could have been used as long range patrol a/c, which CC wanted very badly.


----------



## Glider (Dec 28, 2014)

I do get the feeling that there are some political points being scored in these old papers. I have never heard the Hercules being considered an unreliable engine.
Would I want to convert my airforce from Halifax I and Ii to the Lancaster, definitely. Would I want to go to the trouble of converting the Halifax III to the Lancaster, no definitely no. The difference in performance is too small. Indeed a number of units that converted from the Lancaster to the Halifax did a lot better with the Halifax III


----------



## stona (Dec 28, 2014)

Glider said:


> I do get the feeling that there are some political points being scored in these old papers. I have never heard the Hercules being considered an unreliable engine.
> Would I want to convert my airforce from Halifax I and Ii to the Lancaster, definitely. Would I want to go to the trouble of converting the Halifax III to the Lancaster, no definitely no. The difference in performance is too small. Indeed a number of units that converted from the Lancaster to the Halifax did a lot better with the Halifax III



Definitely a lot of politicking, and Harris was one of the worst offenders. I don't believe the Hercules engine was as unreliable as he was making out either. Even he conceded that it might be fixed. He had a genuine points about the reduction in range its thirst incurred and the lower altitude at which it operated best. 15,000 feet was a lethal height and time after time you can read of crews striving for altitude. Experienced crews ignored the ordered altitude for the stream and flew as high as possible.

I wouldn't swop a Halifax III for a Lancaster either. The problem lies in how long it took to sort the Halifax out. If it had been discontinued in 1942 then the Halifax III would never have been realised and nobody would have noticed or cared.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Milosh (Dec 28, 2014)

Could Lancaster production be increased to compensate for the lost numbers of Halis built if the Hali had been terminated?


----------



## stona (Dec 28, 2014)

Milosh said:


> Could Lancaster production be increased to compensate for the lost numbers of Halis built if the Hali had been terminated?



It could have been minimised following Freeman's plan, whereby English Electric set up parallel Lancaster production lines whilst continuing Halifax production. There would always be some loss of production of Halifaxes at English Electric as resources were stretched. 

The plants building Lancasters would not have been able to compensate for this. The lost production can only be estimated, but neither Harris nor Freeman believed it would have been anywhere near as high as LLewellin's estimate which was, crucially, supported by Sinclair who was the political master of all of them.

It is unfortunate that Freeman was moved to take up a job as Vice-Chief of the Air Staff in late 1940, only returning to what became the MAP in late 1942 (I'd need to check the date). Had he remained as the Air Member for Research and Development and continued at the MAP I'm virtually certain that the Halifax would have been axed.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 28, 2014)

Lancaster production could certainly have been increased, the argument is over how fast and/or how many bombers would NOT have been built during the change over. 

Both planes were built by a large group of factories/assembly shops with lots of subcontracting. At the end of 1942 there were *almost* as twice as many Halifaxes built as Lancasters, by the end of 1943 the numbers were about equal for _total_ production so the Lancaster was being built in larger numbers for most of 1943. Halifax production did increase again in 1944 with the MK III. 
Every factory or manufacturing group needs it own set/s of jigs/fixtures and tooling for a specific aircraft so even if you have the buildings, overhead cranes, floor tracks, scaffolding/ladders, rivet tools etc it can still take months to convert from one type to another. Some of the smaller factories/groups were only building 15-30 4 engine planes per month so while the lost production doesn't amount to a whole lot neither does the gain. 
as an example for the Lancaster 7 'factories' built Lancasters but the 'home' factory built 49.7% of them, Vickers Armstrong/Chester built 235 in 1944/45 or about 3.2%. Of the 7 "factories" only 3 built Lancasters before Sept of 1943. 

English Electric built about 2000 of the 6104 Halifaxes built and could very well have been the most logical factory to convert but it took EE just about 4 years to build those 2000 planes for an average of 41.6 planes per month. The average would be even lower because the 4 years (Sept of 1941 to Sept of 1945) doesn't count the the time it took to tool up to build the first 1-2 planes. 

If someone has production numbers for the Halifax _by month_ it might help.


----------



## stona (Dec 28, 2014)

All good and salient points. English Electric was the logical choice for conversion to Lancaster production in late 1942 because the others( Rootes, Speke and LPTB, Leavesden) were virtually hand building very few aircraft.
It would have been possible to erect Lancaster production line(s) whilst maintaining Halifax production at E.E, Salmesbury. Converting production at Handley Page's parent plant at Cricklewood/Radlett had far more serious political repercussions, and I agree it would have taken longer and entailed more significant loss of Halifax production, but it could have been done.

I will attempt to find Halifax production by month. It's probably secreted in some table in a book somewhere in this house  

It is worth getting numbers in perspective. It is easy to imagine that by late 1942 hundreds of Halifaxes were undertaking missions for bomber command. In fact, throughout 1942, the number sent on any one raid rarely exceeded 40, with the exception of the 'thousand' raids. In the first half of 1943 this rose to 100+ and by mid 1943 it was regularly over 200. Many of these could have been replaced with Lancasters.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Shortround6 (Dec 28, 2014)

A website with some pictures of a factory making Halifaxes: 

Halifax Bomber - Article


----------



## stona (Jan 2, 2015)

I've been looking for production figures by month to no avail.
I have found details and dates for the various contracts issued which makes Harris' desire to ditch the Halifax in 1942 much more viable.

The first contract was issued to Handley Page (obviously) for 100 aircraft, subsequently increased to 199 aircraft, and deliveries from it commenced on 13th October 1940.

Deliveries from the first English Electric contract (200 aircraft) commenced on 5th September 1941.

Fairey's first aircraft, from a contract for 150) were delivered on 27th October 1942, but not even the Air Ministry seems to have had any problem with the idea of converting Fairey to something else.

LAPG (first deliveries 7th July '43) and Rootes (first deliveries 18th July '43) could have been moved to something else had a decision been taken in late 1942 to halt the Halifax.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Shortround6 (Jan 2, 2015)

According to this site

Halifax Technical

LAPG started delivering (entry into service?) in Jan 1942 and Rootes in April of 1942. 

Most sources on LAPG say they completed their first Halifax in Dec of 1941. Rolling out factory door and completing test flying and delivery to service unit might take a few weeks (or month). 

London Aircraft Production (L.A.P.) | Explore 20th Century London

By the first site it *appears* that LAPG delivered 250 Halifaxes by July of 1943. 

Rootes had delivered 150 by March of 1943 and was in the middle of a batch of 100 in July of 1943, took from April to Sept to build the 100?

Fairey _may_ have delivered first Halifax in Aug of 1942. It appears they were working on at least two different sets of serial numbers (?) and the first 10 aircraft used a different set of letters to start the serial number. Second set starts "delivery/entry into service" in Nov 1942 (only 4-5 days late from the 27th Oct) and there were only 10 aircraft in the first set of numbers.


----------



## stona (Jan 2, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> According to this site
> 
> Halifax Technical
> 
> ...



I transposed some contract numbers and delivery dates incorrectly.

To clarify:

LAPG. First contract No. B 124357/40. Deliveries commenced 10 Jan '42 which tallies with above. BB189 was the first aircraft delivered.

Rootes. First contract No. ACFT/637. Deliveries commenced 1 April '42 (DG219)

As for Fairey, its first contract was No. ACFT/891/SAS/ C4 for 150 aircraft. First delivery was 27 Oct '42. Serials D980-999, DK114-151, DK 165-207, DK223-271, all Merlin XX powered B Mk Vs. 

A second contract, No. ACFT/891 was given for a further 200 aircraft, first delivery 13 Aug '43 (LK626, Merlin 22 powered B Mk V) and 20 Jan '44 (LK747 Hercules XVI powered B Mk III). 
From this contract LK626-667, LK680-711 and LK725-746 were Mk Vs. 
LK747-766, LK779-812, LK826-850 and LK863-887 were Mk IIIs.

I hope I've transposed the rather small print correctly this time 

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Shortround6 (Jan 2, 2015)

That Halifax site gives 10 B/MET MK 5 srs 1 Halifax with serial numbers DJ980-DJ999 (20 numbers but 10 planes?) with first going in service in Aug. The DK114-DK151 batch sees first "in service" in Nov 1942 (a week or so is nothing to argue about) but it seems to have take until Jan 1943 for that first set of 10 (?) to be completed so at the rate of only 1-2 bombers per month for the first few months production doesn't amount to much. _Only_ importance is in trying to establish when the factory was "tooled" up and it may be that the first few aircraft were assembled with a large number of parts brought in from other (the existing 4) sources, I don't know but am willing to concede that Fairey's production of Halifax's was minimal until Nov/Dec of 1942. Fairy built about 660 Halifax's (some during the summer/fall of 1945-cargo carriers) total so switching Fairey production was not going to have that big an impact on the availability of Lancasters during 1943 and even a good part of 1944.


----------



## stona (Jan 2, 2015)

Might be a job for someone digging in the Fairey archives, or what's left of them at Westland and the RAF museum. I believe some of the archive was saved by Ian Huntley.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## stona (Jan 3, 2015)

I have come across the data that may have tipped Harris' hand against the Halifax in late 1942. Between March and August 1942 4 Group lost 109 Halifaxes from 1,770 sorties, a loss rate of 6.2%. In the last month, August, the loss rate had been 10.2%.
This was patently not sustainable and led to the virtual grounding of the Halifax squadrons whilst various efforts were made to clean up the airframe. It also seems to have pushed Harris to the point of writing the letter I quoted way back up the thread about Handley Page, both the man and company.
Cheers
Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Shortround6 (Jan 3, 2015)

That points to the problem that was faced. There is no denying the Halifax losses or the fact that they were not sustainable. However there only 346 Lancasters built by the end of Aug 1942 and how many of them had even flown combat missions? 
By the end of 1942 another 352 Lancasters would be added to the total and while Harris certainly wanted more Lancasters, he wasn't going to get them any time soon by converting Halifax factories. The 5th Halifax factory/production group working up at about the time he wrote the letter. I don't know what HP was promising at the time to "fix" the Halifax but they took way too long, justifying Harris's criticism. What HP _may_ have wanted to do vs what he/they were _allowed_ to do may have had some impact/result here also. Trying to keep the triangular fins with small tweaks for production reasons vs redesigning/retooling the fins? Not fitting the longer span wing until the MK III? _IF_ the MAP was obsessed with numbers HP's hands may have been tied (or at least covered in treacle)


----------



## stona (Jan 3, 2015)

The official report into the Halifaxe's performance made in the autumn of 1942 is less than flattering. It said that,

_"...deterioration in the performance of the Halifax II aircraft, consequent upon progressive application of external equipment, has augmented to such an extent that the aircraft has become incapable of meeting concurrently the operational requirements of both high loading and high altitude cruising."_

That's just about an admission that the type was no longer fit for purpose.

It wasn't just the 'application of external equipment' that featured in the long list of problems. Why for example in late 1942 were Halifaxes still having to fly with radiator flaps open (sometimes fully open) to prevent engine overheating, costing 9mph (true) at 15,000ft and lowering the operational ceiling? Rolls Royce had suggested a solution some time earlier. Some squadrons simply cropped the radiator flaps, thus effectively increasing the exit area from the radiator with flaps fully closed. Handley Page were very slow to implement relatively easy solutions and this must have contributed to Harris' frustration. The loss of speed incurred by this problem alone could expose the Halifax to the risk of attack for as much as 40 minutes longer on an eight hour flight and that would increase the loss rate. 

Anyway, to come back to the original topic, all this is why I would be loathe to place the Halifax in my top three, even in 1941 and even given the quality of the other contenders 

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Shortround6 (Jan 3, 2015)

stona said:


> The official report into the Halifaxe's performance made in the autumn of 1942 is less than flattering. It said that,
> 
> _"...deterioration in the performance of the Halifax II aircraft, consequent upon progressive application of external equipment, has augmented to such an extent that the aircraft has become incapable of meeting concurrently the operational requirements of *both high loading and high altitude cruising*."_



Certainly true but only the Lancaster could promise *both high loading and high altitude cruising* as the twin engine planes certainly couldn't and the Short Sterling certainly couldn't. 

And in 1941 those are the planes the Halifax should be compared to, not 1942 Lancasters.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Glider (Jan 3, 2015)

I have done some digging and have concentrated on 6 Group simply because I have the information to split the actual types flown. I did this as its the only way I can be pretty sure that I would be comparing the Lancaster with the Halifax III. 

408 squadron 
Halifax III 1469 sorties 20 losses 1.4% 
Lancaster 1210 sorties, 41 losses 3.4%

415 Squadron (July 1944)
Halifax III 1526 sorties 13 losses 0.9%

419 Squadron (Jan 43 on Halifax II April 44 on Lancaster X)
Halifax 1616 sorties 66 losses 4.1%
Lancaster 2029 sorties 39 losses 1.9%

420 Squadron (Dec 43 on Halifax III)
2477 sorties 25 losses 1.0%

424 Squadron (Dec 43 on Halifax III, \Jan 45 Lancaster I and III)
Halifax III 1,811 sorties 23 losses 1.3%
Lancaster 388 Sorties 5 losses 1.3%

425 Squadron (Dec 43 on Halifax III)
2,445 sorties 28 losses 1.1%

426 Squadron (Jun43 on Lancaster II, April 44 on Halifax III)
Lancaster 579 28 losses 4.8% _note they had very heavy losses in Battle for Berlin which tilt the figures_
Halifax III 2161 sorties 22 losses 1.0%

427 Squadron (May 43 Halifax II, Jan 44 Halifax III, Feb 45 Lancaster III)
Halifax's 2,800 sorties 58 losses 2.1%
Lancaster 239 sorties 1 loss 0.4%

428 Squadron (June 43 Halifax II, June 44 Lancaster X)
Halifax's 1406 sorties 32 losses 2.3%
Lancaster 1677 sorties 18 losses 1.1%

429 Squadron (Aug 43 Halifax II/V, March 44 Halifax III, March 45 Lancaster X
Halifax 2519 sorties 49 losses 1.9%
Lancaster 114 sorties 1 loss 0.9%

Sorry I have to sign off due to time but hope to complete in next couple of days.

In brief the loss ratio between the Halifax III and the Lancaster seems to be very similar but the Halifax Mk II had considerably higher losses


----------



## stona (Jan 3, 2015)

Those figures are pretty typical for the entire time the types served.
I do have them for all the squadrons that operated the Halifax and Lancaster with Bomber Command. In one of the squadron's figures you mention the bias the Battle of Berlin applied to the raw numbers. There are a lot of factors that can skew the figures like this. Not least the type of operations being flown. There were at least two periods during which Halifax squadrons did not operate on the more dangerous missions. _It's why I posted the figures for the two types on raids to Germany as that is a more valid comparison._ Missions to Germany would be likely to encounter similar and more heavy resistance than mine laying or bombing Turin. In other words we can compare the losses on German raids as both types were subjected to similar risk. They were often flying together on the same operation.
Those figures were Halifax: 36,995 sorties, 1,410 missing (3.8%) Lancaster: 83,881 sorties, 2,508 missing (3.0%). This equates to 127 Halifaxes lost for every 100 Lancasters. The only bias here works in favour of the Halifax as the later versions were much improved and did not suffer quite the disproportionate losses of the earlier versions.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## Glider (Jan 3, 2015)

Once the Mk III entered service the restriction on targets was removed. Which is why I tried to differentiate between the versions of the Halifax. The Mk III units generally had very similar losses to the Lanc, those with the Mk II did a lot worse


----------



## stona (Jan 3, 2015)

Glider said:


> Once the Mk III entered service the restriction on targets was removed. Which is why I tried to differentiate between the versions of the Halifax. The Mk III units generally had very similar losses to the Lanc, those with the Mk II did a lot worse



Yes, I agree.

It just makes the overall Halifax losses on raids against Germany even worse. It explains the 6%-10% loss rates the early versions were sustaining. The Mk III reached squadrons towards the end of 1943 and in early 1944, in time for the Battle of Berlin, though Lancasters bore the brunt of it in 1943 and into 1944 when the target was Berlin itself.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## rogerwilko (Jan 3, 2015)

Simplistic question. Why more dangerous to fly at 15,000 feet than 19,000 feet? 88mm guns quite capable at both heights.


----------



## Shortround6 (Jan 3, 2015)

Actually the Heavy AA guns gained considerably with a reduction in height. 







And that is for a plane flying directly over the gun, a similar diagram could be made for planes firing 5,000-10,000 yds to the side of the gun. Put the two together and the lower altitude _can_ mean a lot more shells fired from the same number of guns. 

The guns/projectiles are not laser beams. There is a certain amount of dispersion to the shells this goes up with the square of the range (that is ideal theory, in practice it is a bit worse) so the shells will be dispersing in an area about 60% larger at 19,000ft than 15,000ft. 

You also have a shorter time of flight for the shell which helps in several ways ( less lead on the target is needed) and the since the fuse error is a percentage of the time of flight a shorter time of flight means less fuse timing error (more shells burst closer to the _nominal_ altitude). 

You also have the fact that even the range-finding equipment used by the AA gunners has errors expressed as a percentage of range. For example some Allied Air-borne radar in WW II had a _possible_ error in range ( max distance or scale) of + or - 10%. at closer ranges it may be better but the longer the distance the more errors can creep into the firing solution. Put that together with the fact that the closer the bomber flies to the gun/s the more rounds can be fired and things get pretty bad real quick.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## rogerwilko (Jan 3, 2015)

Thanks for the info. But a saturation barrage you would think to be pretty effective at most practical heights.Anyway the stats are there so who am I.


----------



## tomo pauk (Jan 4, 2015)

At 15000 ft, the aircraft are just within the ceiling of the 3,7 cm Flak shells. Granted, the chances for a direct hit are slim, but the number of shells exploding, at around that altitude (due to the self-destruct mechanism) meant that there was quite a bit of fragments unleashed. 
Fortunately for the bomber crews, the Germans skipped the chance on the more powerful rounds/guns for the 3,7-4 cm caliber range.

edit to add: 
Saturation barrage was some times used when there was no radars around. In most of the times it meant huge increase in rounds expended for an airplane hit or damaged, along with increased barrel wear (meaning less accurate guns). 
Even with radar-guided fire, reasonably new guns and trained experienced crews, it took 4000 heavy shells (88mm and bigger) and further thousands of light Flak shells expended to bring down the allied aircraft. That is for 1942; prior that (= almost no fire control radars) and after (better Allied electronic countermeasures, worn-out guns, experienced crews replaced by levies, Allied bombers flying at more safer altitudes) it was 10-16 thousands of heavy shells per A/C downed. 
Bottom line - it was cheaper for the UK to conduct the night bombing, than it was for the Germany to defend.


----------



## pbehn (Jan 4, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> Actually the Heavy AA guns gained considerably with a reduction in height.
> 
> View attachment 281175
> 
> ...


A Great diagram but the horizontal scale in yards distorts what should be a very pronounced ellipse over the gun.


----------



## fastmongrel (Jan 4, 2015)

stona said:


> Missions to Germany would be likely to encounter similar and more heavy resistance than mine laying



Actually Gardening missions had some of the highest casualty rates of all night missions. Flying close to shore at 180mph at 1500 feet in a straight line often very close to Flak ships to drop Parachute mines was no picnic. Particulary when the dropping run needs to be down the swept channel and who would know better where the swept channel was than the people who swept it.


----------



## Shortround6 (Jan 4, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> At 15000 ft, the aircraft are just within the ceiling of the 3,7 cm Flak shells. Granted, the chances for a direct hit are slim, but the number of shells exploding, at around that altitude (due to the self-destruct mechanism) meant that there was quite a bit of fragments unleashed.
> Fortunately for the bomber crews, the Germans skipped the chance on the more powerful rounds/guns for the 3,7-4 cm caliber range..



Actually;






Granted this is an allied _estimate_ of effective ceilings rather than actual tests but the max ceiling or self destruct height were _vastly_ different than effective height, which is the reason the Germans _tried_ to get the 50-55mm AA guns into service.


----------



## stona (Jan 4, 2015)

fastmongrel said:


> Actually Gardening missions had some of the highest casualty rates of all night missions. Flying close to shore at 180mph at 1500 feet in a straight line often very close to Flak ships to drop Parachute mines was no picnic. Particulary when the dropping run needs to be down the swept channel and who would know better where the swept channel was than the people who swept it.



And yet if you look at Bomber Command's war diaries, usually under 'minor operations' on any particular night, you will see a list of the aircraft which carried out such missions and very often the succinct final phrase, 'no losses' or 'no aircraft lost'.

It's worth remembering that the venerable old Wellingtons and Stirlings were often employed on such operations. From early 1943 the height from which mines were dropped was raised to 3,000ft and later the same year to 12,000ft which took the earlier risk of flying at 600-800ft out of the equation.
It became standard practice by 1944 to drop mines from 15,000ft 'blind' using H2S.

I would have to dig for percentage losses on such operations, but I guarantee that they would be significantly lower than those incurred on missions to Germany, hence my original statement.

Edit: From Feb '42 to May '45 Bomber Command flew 16,240 mine laying sorties.
From April '40 to May '45 467 aircraft were lost on such missions.
If anyone knows how many missions were flown in 1940/41 we can work out a percentage loss. I have the data but can't be arsed to add it up. It's going to be around 2% anyway.


Cheers

Steve


----------



## tomo pauk (Jan 4, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> Actually;
> 
> Granted this is an allied _estimate_ of effective ceilings rather than actual tests but the max ceiling or self destruct height were _vastly_ different than effective height, which is the reason the Germans _tried_ to get the 50-55mm AA guns into service.



Thanks for the graph. 
Maybe we might put the effective ceilings into a perspective - it is one thing to fire at small agile 300 mph fighter bomber, another thing to fire at 180 mph big bombers' stream flying at steady altitude and course? One thing being hit-to-kill, another thing being 'fire the bursts and maybe we can disrupt damage them'?

A page from Westermann's doctoral thesis on the Flak, FWIW:


----------



## stona (Jan 4, 2015)

Which might explain why Harris regarded 15,000ft as 'lethal' ?
Cheers
Steve


----------



## Milosh (Jan 4, 2015)

What was the usual bombing height for medium bombers?


----------



## Vincenzo (Jan 4, 2015)

sea mining total mission 18725 BC - Statistics
you can get the 1940/41 for difference
same site give also a 19025 total BC - Mine Laying Stats
unlucky in this page they don't understand the own data some english speaking can write to they to get a correction


----------



## tomo pauk (Jan 4, 2015)

Milosh - I don't know - the 5th AF was often flying tree-top their B-25s and A-20s. 



stona said:


> Which might explain why Harris regarded 15,000ft as 'lethal' ?
> Cheers
> Steve



I'd agree. The 15000 feet of altitude (absolute) means that 3,7cm still can be used (regardless how inaccurate would it be there), while the heavy AAA have had an easier time to bag or damage an aircraft there than the one at 19000 ft, as noted by Shortround6. 
Even so, the claims for the Flak in mid 1941 vs. RAF were no better than one (one) aircraft per a night, and maybe 2 per a day; 3 RAF aircraft per 24 hours. Granted, for each aircraft claimed there was many aircraft damaged by Flak, and some of these might not return in order to their bases, if return at all.


----------



## stona (Jan 4, 2015)

It seems loss rates "gardening" were typically in the 2-2.5% range, which is a little higher than I guessed but still a lot better than the losses incurred operating against targets in Germany.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## Shortround6 (Jan 4, 2015)

Part of our problem with trying to evaluate "_effectiveness_" is that is doesn't seem to be spelled out in the documents of the time and that some light weapons _effective_ range/ceiling could change by 1-2000 meters by changing the sight/s.

effective being ????% of shells fired being hits? 

And that is a big part of trying to say *what* the 37mm guns were doing at 12,000ft and above _at night_. 
The big guns had follow the pointer dials/indicators like this;






Driven by something like this;






The men responsible for training and elevation of the gun/s simply turned the control wheels to the position/s on the indicators. 
The Search lights and the fire control computer/rangefinder _could_ be connected to a radar unit or use radar generated data for inputs.

The light guns rarely had (unless late in the war?) such indicators and were pretty much local control ( one director did NOT control a battery of guns). Now a battery _could_ be told to fire at such and such an elevation and such and such a direction for barrage fire with the _hope_ that a bomber flew into one of their shells (although the sight/sound of *any* AA gun firing was probably good for moral of any civilians) _or_ could try to fire at a plane caught by a search light. Of course trying to use their daylight sights even with seachlight aid at double or more the _daylight effective_ range/ceiling wasn't going to give very good results. That doesn't mean that they _never_ hit anything or the planes were 100% safe. 
Granted by late 1944 or early 45 the Germans were putting a _few_ radar units on light guns but was certainly not the norm in 1941/42.


----------



## tomo pauk (Jan 4, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> Part of our problem with trying to evaluate "_effectiveness_" is that is doesn't seem to be spelled out in the documents of the time and that some light weapons _effective_ range/ceiling could change by 1-2000 meters by changing the sight/s.
> effective being ????% of shells fired being hits?



Effective, at least for the light AAA, meant also that it managed to do the 'mission kill' - ie. this or that battery fired on the attackers, forcing them to move away from their target (guarded by that AAA unit). Even if this can be listed as hangar talk, it was clearly stated by my instructors when I've served. 



> And that is a big part of trying to say *what* the 37mm guns were doing at 12,000ft and above _at night_.



Since the guns shells are produced, and the crews are standing by, perhaps they might as well fire on the bombers, however inefficient that is?



> The big guns had follow the pointer dials/indicators like this;
> 
> Driven by something like this;
> 
> ...



Thanks.



> The light guns rarely had (unless late in the war?) such indicators and were pretty much local control ( one director did NOT control a battery of guns). Now a battery _could_ be told to fire at such and such an elevation and such and such a direction for barrage fire with the _hope_ that a bomber flew into one of their shells (although the sight/sound of *any* AA gun firing was probably good for moral of any civilians) _or_ could try to fire at a plane caught by a search light. Of course trying to use their daylight sights even with seachlight aid at double or more the _daylight effective_ range/ceiling wasn't going to give very good results. That doesn't mean that they _never_ hit anything or the planes were 100% safe.
> Granted by late 1944 or early 45 the Germans were putting a _few_ radar units on light guns but was certainly not the norm in 1941/42.



I'd say that you're on the money with that civilian moral thing. Like: we fired bursts, scaring the Englishmen made them run for their lives. There was just a few gun-laying radars in 1941, even for the heavy Flak units.


----------



## Glider (Jan 5, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> I'd say that you're on the money with that civilian moral thing. Like: we fired bursts, scaring the Englishmen made them run for their lives. There was just a few gun-laying radars in 1941, even for the heavy Flak units.



I read somewhere that during the Blitz there was a discussion as to what AA gun to put in the grounds of Parliament and one reason for choosing a 2pd was that it made the most noise and would be better for morale.


----------



## stona (Jan 5, 2015)

A battery was positioned at Marston, Oxford during the war. According to family history on the one occasion it actually opened fire the concussion damage to windows and shell fragment damage to roofs prompted letters to the Oxford Mail asking the battery to desist from shooting at passing enemy aircraft and only engage those actually attacking the city, or more likely the Morris plant at Cowley. The enemy aircraft on the occasion in question carried on their merry way 

I've never actually checked the veracity of the story, partly because I'd be disappointed if it were to prove untrue!

It is a tremendous demonstration of the advantages of living in a democracy. It's hard to imagine similar letters to the equivalent newspaper in Heidelberg, assuming the Nazis hadn't already shut it down.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Vincenzo (Jan 12, 2015)

I've googled much so i can give some data and opinion
i start dividing in the category the bombers (that of my list: multiengine land level bombers)
Out of the game categories:
category "Too small for a bomber"
Yak-24 and Potez 633 s the category title i don't think need further comments, it's the same conclusion of the air forces for wich they were designed
category "Too old for 1941"
TB-3, this bomber was in production from 1932 to 1937, surely 5 years earlier would be in the top 3, many bombers of the list not even did the first flight before of TB-3 go out of production.
in game categories:
Small/Light bombers
Blenheim, IV: max bomb load 970 kg, max fuel load 2126 l, max combined load 2130 kg, weapons +6-7,7 mg, rounded max speed 450 km/h a 4,6 km
Boston, III: 1814 kg/ 2750 l/ 2890 kg/ 7-7,7, 540 km/h a 3,8 A-20A: 1089 kg/ 1491 l/ 2160 kg/ +5-7,7, 560 km/h a 3,8 
Maryland, II: 907 kg/ 3055 l/ 2590 kg/ 5or6-7,7, 450 km/h a 3,6 I: 567 kg/ 3055 l/ 2240 kg/ 5or6-7,7, 490 km/h a 4
Hudson, all 612 kg/ 2438 l (SR variant) 3891 l (LR variant)/ 2365 kg (SR), 3410 kg (LR)/ 4or7-7,7, 400 km/h a 2 (slower variant), 460 km/h a 4,6 (faster variant)
Beaufort, I 681 kg/ 3217 l/ 3000 kg/ +8-7,7, 440 km/h a 3
Martin 139, WH-3 2000 kg/ 3300 l/ 3300 kg/ 3-7,62, 390 km/h a 3
SB, M-103A (and later) 1500 kg/ 2410 l/ 2700 kg/ 3or4-7,62, 450 km/h a 4
Ar-2, 1500 kg/ 1450 l/ 2540 kg/ 3-7,62, 510 km/h a 5
Pe-2, 1500 kg/ 1500 l/ 2575 kg/ 4-7,62 or up to 3 replaced with 12,7, 530 km/h a 5 (last block available in '41, earlier faster)


add and corrections are welcome
continue....


----------



## Vincenzo (Jan 13, 2015)

Light bombers not so small
Hampden, I: 2268 kg/ 2973 l/ 3300 kg/ 6-7,7/ 410 km/h at4,7
Ju 86, Z: ??/ ??/ ??/ 3-7,7/ ??
DB-3,B: 2500 kg/ ??/ ??// 3-7,62/ 440 km/h at 4,9
Il-4, : 2500 kg/ 2000 l/ 3900 kg/ 2-7,62, 1-12,7/ 430 km/h at 4
B-25, B: 2268 kg/ 4209 l/ 3250 kg/ 1-7,62, 4-12,7/ 480 km/h at 4,6 25: 1633 kg/ 5057 l/ 4000 kg/ 3-7,62, 1-12,7/ 520 km/h at 4,6
Do 17,Kb: 1200 kg/ ??/ ??/ 2-7,92, 1-13,2, 1-20/ 440 km/h at?
S.M.79, K: 1250 kg/ 3460 l/ 2770 kg (normal load)/ 1-7,7, 3-12,7/ 420 km/h a 4,1


----------



## Vincenzo (Jan 13, 2015)

Medium bombers
Whitley, V: 3629 kg/ 4541 l/ 6370 kg/ 5-7,7/ 370 km/h at 5
Wellington, II: 2041 kg/ 4545 l/ 4500 kg/ 6-7,7/ 410 km/h at 5,3
B-18, 18: 1996 kg/ 3036 l/ 4180 kg/ 3-7,62/ 350 km/h at 3
B-23, 23: ??/ ??/ ??/ 3-7,62, 1-12,7/ 450 km/h at 3,7
B-26, 26: 2177 kg/ 4588 l/ 4800 kg/ 2-7,62, 3-12,7/ 510 km/h at 4,6
Yer-2, M-105: 4000 kg/ 6240 l/ 6680 kg/ 2-7,62, 1-12,7/ 440 km/h at 4


----------



## Shortround6 (Jan 13, 2015)

I think you are over complicating things. 

For the US and Soviets you can short list things pretty quick. 

For instance the Douglas B-18A was last delivered in Jan 1940. The US knew it wasn't up to world standards even in 1939/40. 

" The USAAC was sufficiently intrigued by the Douglas proposal that they issued a change order in late 1938 in which the last 38 B-18As ordered under Contract AC9977 would be delivered as B-23s." from Joe Baugher's web site. 

These 38 aircraft were delivered by the end of Sept 1940. 

First flight of a B-25 was in Aug of 1940 but the first plane _accepted_ by the USAAF wasn't until Feb 1941. 

Listing all the obsolete models, while complete and thorough doesn't change the top ranked planes any. 

The US is a mess to figure out because of only 3 weeks of war in 1941, what do you include and what do you exclude based on "combat" service. The first B-25C contract was approved on September 24, 1940 but the first B-25C wasn't delivered until Dec 1941. There were around 160-165 B-25s built in 1941 but none were deployed outside the Continental US during 1941 and so saw no combat. There were over 200 B-26s built in 1941 but again, none were over seas and none saw combat. 


Kind of the Same with the Russians, listing all the stuff they made from 1933 to 1940 isn't going to change what were the top planes in 1941. 
BTW the IL-4 bomber was simply an DB-3F with a designation (name) change that may have been done in early 1942.


----------



## Vincenzo (Jan 13, 2015)

i know that many bombers of the list are not starter for the challenge but i want give the whole picture. 
the list as the thread was based on operational status not on the combat status, all the US bombers that i listed fly patrol in 1941 so i suppose they were operational, the alone US bomber saw combat were the B-17 and the A-20&B-18 if we count they were target of enemy planes.


----------



## Vincenzo (Jan 13, 2015)

Heavy bombers
Manchester, I: 4695 kg/ 7726 l/ 10250 kg/ 8-7,7/ 430 km/h at 5,2
Stirling, I: 6351 kg/ 12246 l/ 13800 kg/ 8-7,7/ 420 km/hat 3,2
Halifax, I: 5897 kg/ 9463 l/ 10450 kg/ 10-7,7/ 430 km/h a 5,3
Liberator, I: 1814 kg/ ??/ ??/ 6-7,7/ 470 km/h at 4,7
B-17, E: 3629 kg/ 13673 l/ 10400 kg/ 1-7,62, 8-12,7/ 510 km/h a 7,6 D: 2177 kg/ ??/ ??/ 1-7,62 6-12,7/ 520 km/h at 7,6
Pe-8, AM-35A: 4000 kg/ 17000 l/ 14000 kg/ 2-7,62, 2-12,7, 2-20/ 440 km/h at 6,4


----------



## Shortround6 (Jan 13, 2015)

The whole picture is nice but for the US the top 3 bombers in 1941 are pretty much the B-17, B-25 and B-26. Only 9 turbo charged B-24s being built in 1941. 

For the Russians nothing winds in the top 3 allied bombers or even close as far as production aircraft go no matter how much service they may have seen or not seen.


----------



## Vincenzo (Jan 13, 2015)

i starting with my 3 top choice for category (inverse category list order not merit order)
Heavy: Pe-8, B-17E, Halifax I
Medium: too hard
Light not so small: B-25, DB3-F, Hampden I
Small/Light: most were short ranged, that were not short ranged are low on bomb load, the alone with not bad number in both the fields is the "old" Martin 139 WH-3A, the 139 is, take out the TB-3, the oldest bomber operational in thr allies field in 1941 did the first flight in 1932.

luckily there were not russian bomber in 1941 so i can not do the wrong to choice a russian bomber


----------



## Vincenzo (Jan 15, 2015)

i've did my choice for the medium category
Yer-2 M-105R, Wellington II, Whitley V

My choice overall category is the same of heavy category
Restricing the choice to models that were actually common on 1941 so pratically only british and soviet (for clear the following models Whitley V, Wellington IC&II, Blenheim IV, Hampden I, Beaufort I, Hudson I/II/III/V and SB (late models most production was in 39/40) and DB-3F (F was more common in june '41 and was the alone in production) taking out for first all the planes in the small/light category (as my comment on that category post 199) its keep the Wellingtons, Whitley, Hampden and DB-3, so 2 of 3 are sure Wellington and Whitley, the third place is hard Hampden I and DB-3F had similar capability i vote for a draw


----------



## Shortround6 (Jan 15, 2015)

Yer-2 with M105R engines is almost a non-starter. 

The 1941 version (and production stopped in Aug 1941 for this version) used a pair of 1050hp engines in a 11,300kg plane. We quickly run into one of those Russian aircraft problems in which the difference between empty weight and loaded weight are in conflict with listed bomb load and fuel load. Empty weight of the Prototype was 7070kg, empty weight of production version not given. gross weight of prototype 11,330kg, production version 11,300kg to 12,520kg. Max bomb load is 4,000kg. Put in 4 crewmen at 75kg each and at gross weight of 11,300kg you have no fuel, no oil, no ammo for defensive guns (even if the defensive guns were included in empty weight).
Plane was 'supposed' to hold _up to_ 2000kg inside (no break down of types) and pair of 500kg bombs on external carriers. No explination of how you get to 4000kg. 
Fuel tanks were supposed to hold 3950kg of fuel with the possibility of fitting an additional tank holding 659kg of fuel (no location given). 
A range of 4100km is given with a 1000kg bomb load. Certainly not horrible for a 1941 bomber but not what some internet sites would have you believe. 


Defensive guns of the 1941 version were one 7.62 in the nose, one manually aimed 12.7mm mg on top and 7.62 gun firing through a hatch in the bottom.


----------



## tomo pauk (Jan 15, 2015)

Seems like the empty weight of the production Yer-2 was 7500 kg, take off weights being between 12570 and 14150 kg. Per this table (the '1941 *Er-2' model; table from Shavrov's book, translated in Spanish; can be translated): link.


----------



## Vincenzo (Jan 15, 2015)

Shortround6 maybe you are not aware that the Merlin on Whitley and Wellington had 1030 hp a rated altitude, the Pegasus (on Wellington I) had under 1000 hp, the B-23 and B-26 had larger engine 12751500 but this is not w/o price (range).
On the weight data the link give to tomo pauk has similar data of me, i can add the internal 2000 kg bomb load was 4x500 kg (can not load 8x250 but ever 4 they used same racks, they can load also max 12x100kg) the max external load was 2000 kg on 2x1000 kg (or smaller go to 100 kg).
I'm aware that had one of badest defensive capability of its category, but in 1941 you want a radar aimed mg?


----------



## Shortround6 (Jan 16, 2015)

I am aware that the Merlin X engine had 1010hp at _rated altitude_, however rate altitude was about 4,000ft higher than the N-105P. Whitley also had a wing that was about 44% bigger than the Yer-2. Wellingtons wing, while not a lot bigger in area was of a higher aspect ratio. Both were slower planes than the Yer-2 but the Yer-2 wasn't fast enough to make much difference. It was only a bit faster than a Blenheim. 
Problem for the Yer-2 was that the M-105 engines only gave about 1100hp for take-off which meant long take-off runs with large loads. 

I am not sure the B-23 had that much shorter _practical_ range. While it's engines only gave 1275hp at altitude they were good for 1600hp for take-off. Max range was over 4400km and it could fly 2258km with 1800kg of bombs. 



> I'm aware that had one of badest defensive capability of its category, but in 1941 you want a radar aimed mg?



Something between a hand aimed MG and a radar aimed MG would have been nice, I believe they were called _power_ turrets 

None of these bombers could really survive in daylight in enemy territory, the defensive guns just affected how bad the slaughter would be. Any of these bombers would need escorts in daylight (wither or not they actually got them in 1941) and would/should have been night bombers (goes for US B-25 and B-26 too.) 

The Yer-2 may not have been a bad bomber but being in the top 3?


----------



## Vincenzo (Jan 16, 2015)

on the turrets the use of to aim give me a different idea of your phrase, the turret in '41 however were manually aimed, you can had a power for move the turret but is ever the gunner that aim.
Yer-2 is in the top 3 in its category: medium, there are 6 bomber in the category, one is a not starter, the B-18. 
compare the Yer-2 with the other 2 US bombers 
internal bomb load all thre are similar difference under 10%
external bomb load afaik the US bombers had not this capability
guns: Yer-2 had 7.62 guns in nose and hatch e a 12.7 in the dorsal turret, the B-23 had a 7.62 weapon in nose, dorsal and hatch and a 12.7 in the tail, the B-26 had 7.62 guns in the nose and in the hatch, a 12.7 in the tail and a 2-12,7 turret dorsal
speed B-26 is the fastest, they had different rated altiude so the advantage is on 10-20% range, the advantage of B-23 on the Yer-2 is low under 5%. this are on the max speed but probably the order is the same also in cruise speeds
range Yer-2 4100 km with 1000 kg, B-23 2253 with 1814 kg, 4426 ferry, B-26 1609 with 1361 kg, 3541 max (fuel in bomb bay)
this were main performance i see for my choice i'm aware there are many others, i knewn the need of lung runs for take off of Yer, the trouble for the high wing load of B-26, i don't remember nothing on B-23 (but were 38 so in not easy read some on they).


----------



## Conslaw (Jan 29, 2015)

Way back in post #22 Timppa picked these three planes (one in each category:

SBD-3
Boston III
Short Stirling. 

I think the SBD-3 doesn't get its due as a top-3 bomber of 1941. The SBD-3 was the plane that turned the tide in the Pacific, bombing with excellent accuracy in the Coral Sea, Midway and in the battles off Guadalcanal. There wasn't a more accurate bomber in Allied service in 1941. 

The Boston III, being the first version with R-2600 engines is an excellent choice.

I would replace the Short Stirling with the B-17C-D. I think the failings of the early Fortresses were due more to misuse of the plane than to inherent unfitness. The pre-E model Fortresses not only were faster than the later ones, but they had a longer range, and they were used to good effect by the Coastal Command. Given the relative lack of gunpower, the early forts should have either been used for night bombing only or with fighter escort. Since every heavy bomber of 1941 had the same problem, the B-17 shouldn't be knocked down for insufficient defensive guns.


----------



## Shortround6 (Jan 29, 2015)

Something to be considered when looking at the Early B-17s. They just weren't a late model _without_ turrets.

They had a _MUCH_ lower bomb load and a *MUCH* lower gross weight. This means even with the lighter defensive armament they had a lower fuel and bomb load combination. 

empty weight of a B-17C was 30900lbs, Empty weight of a B-17G was 32720lbs.
Gross weight of a 17C with 1700 gals gas and a 2000lb bomb load was 46367lbs. Over load was not to exceed 47500lbs
Gross weight of 17G was 55,000 pounds normal loaded, 72,000 pounds maximum. "Normal" fuel was 2520 gals. Max overload _could hit_ 72,000lbs but 60-65,000lbs was much more common. 

The extra weight can tell you were _some_ of the speed went.

Some performance date for early models: file:///C:/Users/Steve/Downloads/B-17C%20Performance.pdf


----------



## pbehn (Jan 29, 2015)

Seems that all in all allied bombers in 1941 were in a "least worst" scenario I would say B17, B24 and Manchester, not because they were up to much in 1941 but they became good bombers. By night or day the allies didnt have the means to hit anything much in 1941 so pay load and range mean little.


----------



## nuuumannn (Feb 3, 2015)

> Seems that all in all allied bombers in 1941 were in a "least worst" scenario



In hindsight maybe and in comparison to later bombers, but in 1941? What foreign options were there? Compare Whitley, Wellington, Stirling etc with He 111, SM-79, Mitsubishi G3M, Tupolev SB-2, Do 17 etc. Only the British bombers had power operated turrets, which was later to be recognised as essential for bomber defence, the British bombers had relatively long range with useable bomb load and could carry very large loads across shorter distances. Contemporarily, bombers like the Whitley and Wellington were the best in the world at the time. The likes of the B-24, B-17 etc were only at the very beginning of their production and did not have the virtues demonstrated from 1942 on and were available in paltry numbers only. American combat experience was limited to British use of their equipment and the US had a few lessons to learn yet. Comparing the Axis bombers of 1941, we have the likes of Ju 88, Do 217E and Mitsubishi G4M among the best, but only the Do 217 can carry a similar load to the Wellington or Whitley and not as much as the Stirling. Ju 88 of course fastest, but again, poor defensive armament.

Boston III doesn't come into it until 1942; only available in one SAAF squadron in very late 1941 - see earlier in the thread.

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------

