# What if allies would insist on fighting at Dunkirk for three months?



## donkeyking (Jan 22, 2011)

From 26 May 1940–4 June 1940, allies evacuated 330,000 of 400,000 from Dunkirk. Whatever it is not a bad result from the current point view. But in evacuation, allies had to abandon huge heavy weapons and equipment. These troops couldn’t fight again in short time because of without these weapons. At last French government surrendered on 14 June 1940 after 10 days Dunkirk evacuation.

My question is whether there is a better option. What if allies would insist on fighting at Dunkirk for three months?

Could they insist for 3 month around Dunkirk like the battle of Anzio?

If they insist for 3 months in Dunkirk, could France stand longer?

Is there other better choices than evacuation of Dunkirk? 

Thanks

Donkeyking


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## davebender (Jan 23, 2011)

I don't think so. It's not a matter of numbers. On paper French 1st Army Group which included the BEF and Belgium field army were easily a match for their German opponents. 

The 1940 German Army had superior operational doctrine, leadership and training. The same crucial advantages Britain had over Argentina during 1982 and the USA had over Iraq during 1990. If French 1st Army Group tries to fight it out in Belgium they will probably get beaten, losing personnel in addition to equipment.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 24, 2011)

donkeyking said:


> My question is whether there is a better option. What if allies would insist on fighting at Dunkirk for three months?
> 
> Could they insist for 3 month around Dunkirk like the battle of Anzio?



There is the logistics question. Even if (big if) the Allies can stand up to the Germans tactically, the 300,000 man army would have to be supplied.
Depending on when or how big the area is when the stand is made, is there enough port capacity in the perimeter to allow this (roughly 100 tons of supplies per division per day).
Can the RAF keep control of the air long enough (more than the time of the evacuation) to allow the supply ships to dock and unload without too many being sunk. 
Is there a rail, road network to distribute the supplies or enough motor transport. 
Food, fuel and ammunition all have to brought in and distributed.
If it's turns into a WW I type "siege" artillery pieces can use hundreds of shells per day each.


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## davebender (Jan 24, 2011)

The Port of Antwerp is huge and it's in an ideal location for supporting military operations in Belgium.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 24, 2011)

davebender said:


> The Port of Antwerp is huge and it's in an ideal location for supporting military operations in Belgium.



Was Antwerp inside the perimeter of the Dunkirk area when the decision had to be made? 
Or was Antwerp in German hands on May 15th after the Dutch surrendered?


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## davebender (Jan 24, 2011)

On May 10, 1940 French 1st Army Group (including the BEF) intended to fight for control of Belgium. The Port of Antwerp was available for supply purposes.

If French 1st Army Group cannot hold on the Dyle River they cannot hold Dunkirk either. There is no further decision to make except how to evacuate as many soldiers as possible.


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## mikewint (Jan 25, 2011)

Been meaning to put my $0.02 in the pot.
The Germans made many mistakes but this was their first and a big one. As the German army attacked through Belgium into France the Panzers could not believe the speed of their advance nor the lack of resistance as they simply by passed strong points. The German generals kept waiting for the hammer to drop and as days passed felt that they were being sucked into a trap. Guderian's and Rommel's rapid advance had put their into a narrow corridor. A decisive French/Allied attack could have cut off these troops. Blitzkreig was not a German concept nor was it called for in any operational plan
The allied surprise attack 22 May (Battle of Arras) initially successful was eventually stopped but the Germans, now convinced that hundreds of tanks were about to destroy their elite forces panicked. Von Kluge wanted to halt and von Rundstedt agreed. von Brauchitsch German commander in chief disagreed. the dispute went to Hitler who countermanded von Brauchitseh after Goering assured him that the Luftwaffe could and would block any evacuation.
The resulting 3 day halt and the Luftwaffe's failure allowed the Dunkirk evacuation to succeed.
While the loss of equipment was a blow to the allied forces it was not a serious as the loss of trained troops. The US resupplied the British and in a short time those trained troops were ready to fight again.


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## davebender (Jan 25, 2011)

> US resupplied the British and in a short time those trained troops were ready to fight again.


What about the rest of French 1st Army Group? The BEF was a smaller loss then the cream of the French Army. The German victory at Dunkirk ensured that France was doomed.


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## pbfoot (Jan 25, 2011)

I disagree with one small point , I think the BEF although trained in basic military skills , were an army trained for the 1st war , the Germans were schooling them in combined arms.


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## mikewint (Jan 25, 2011)

The Germans had also expected a WWI war and had prepared for one. The French and BEF could have stopped the Germans cold many times. Sept 1939 the Siegfried line was lightly defended and had no tanks but Gamelin chose to advance only 5km into Germany before withdrawal (battle of the Saar) he chose to wait for allied forces to build. He chose a static defense and although warned by Georges he (Gamelin) viewed the Ardennes as impassable sending his 10 weakest less trained divisions to guard them.
The German Army, contrary to what the blitzkrieg legend suggests, was not fully motorised. Just 10 percent of the Army was motorised in 1940 and could muster only 120,000 vehicles compared to the 300,000 of the French Army. The British also had an large contingent of motorised forces. Most of the German logistical tail consisted of horse-drawn vehicles.
Only half of the German divisions available in 1940 were combat ready, often being more poorly equipped than their equivalents in the British and French Armies, or even as well as the German Army of 1914. In the spring of 1940, the German army was semi-modern. A small number of the best equipped and "elite divisions were offset by many second and third rate divisions".
When Heinz Guderian and Rommel disobeyed his direct orders and continued his advance after the Meuse bridgeheads Gamelin withdrew to guard Paris leaving the Panzers an open path to the coast
When Gamelin was sacked and replaced by Weygand more mismanagement followed. Weygand arrived on 17 May, stating his first priority as supreme commander was to get a good night sleep and to cancel Gamelins offensive on the German corridor. He followed that by 3 days of official visits before reinstating Gamelins original attack order.
However the opportunity had been lost because by that time the German infantry had caught up with the Panzers and consolidated their gains.
Finally Weygands Line (Hedgehog tactic) was too late with allied forces trapped in Belgium.
By this point Weygands was looking for an armistice.
With all the lost opportunities French Forces were doomed and only the German Halt order saved the BEF


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## Freebird (Jan 25, 2011)

davebender said:


> The Port of Antwerp is huge and it's in an ideal location for supporting military operations in Belgium.



And it can't be used.



Shortround6 said:


> Was Antwerp inside the perimeter of the Dunkirk area when the decision had to be made?
> Or was Antwerp in German hands on May 15th after the Dutch surrendered?



Antwerp is still in Allied hands *but* Antwerp is unusable in 1940 (as in 1944) unless all of the Scheldt is free of enemy artillery.







On the map above, dashed line is the position as of 14 May, solid line is 16 May

By about 14 May, the Germans have units that can fire on Antwerp docks, or ships entering

Map below, positions from May 16 - 20


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## davebender (Jan 26, 2011)

> Antwerp is still in Allied hands but Antwerp is unusable in 1940 (as in 1944) unless all of the Scheldt is free of enemy artillery.


You cannot fight for long without a supply line. If we postulate a scenerio start date of 14 May 1940 then French 1st Army Group's highest priority should be to push the German Army out of artillery range of Antwerp.


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## Freebird (Jan 26, 2011)

davebender said:


> You cannot fight for long without a supply line. If we postulate a scenerio start date of 14 May 1940 then French 1st Army Group's highest priority should be to push the German Army out of artillery range of Antwerp.



At point in the war, there was nobody in the French command that knew what was going on or was capable of doing anything about it even if they did.
The Antwerp sector is help by the Belgian army, which is in no position to hold back the Germans, let alone push them back.
There was never any intent to use Antwerp as a supply port, it was too vulnerable.
In fact, even if the BEF/French had held Antwerp the entire Scheldt, the Luftwaffe would have prevented any shipping

The French leadership had a real problem with poor communications. On 14 May, it wasn't evident there was a crisis, as the 9th Army has fallen back, but is along the Meuse River. But by 16/17 May, the 9th has been shattered, and the Panzer Corps are racing West. At this point, the result is all but inevitable. The French 1st 2nd armies, engaged with the German armies and facing east, and being non-mechanized do not have the ability to wheel and attack the German spearhead. (additionally, they are behind the Sambre Ainse rivers respectively)


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## davebender (Jan 26, 2011)

> nobody in the French command that knew what was going on


French 1st Army Group was commanded by Gaston Billotte. If General Billotte doesn't know what's going on then the battle is lost before the first shot is fired.


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## mikewint (Jan 26, 2011)

Then, Dave, your battle is lost:
In 1939 Billotte was 64 and ready to retire. He was assigned the northern French sector adjacent to Belgium assuming that the Germans would repeat their WWI attack through Belgium. While the Germans did indeed attack this sector on 10 May it was a feint while the real attack was through the Ardennes. Billotte did not realize this at the time.
12 May- Billotte was assigned to coordinate all operations of the French, Belgians, and British. He had little staff and no experience in this area and burst into tears when informed of his new duties. He failed to co-operated effectively with Lord Gort and with King Leopold.
18 May- Billotte told Gort "I am shattered and can do nothing against these Panzers"
20 May- the British government, alarmed at the situation, sent the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Edmund Ironside, to confer with Gort and Billotte. Ironside later wrote: "I found Billotte and Blanchard all in a state of complete depression. No plan, no thought of a plan. Ready to be slaughtered. Defeated at the head without casualties... I lost my temper and shook Billotte by the button of his tunic. The man is completely beaten." Ironside effectively took over the co-ordinating role from Billotte and organised an unsuccessful attack southwards towards Arras in the hope of checking the German advance.
21 May- Billotte had a staff meeting with Weygand who found Billotte demoralized and depressed. Returning from this meeting Billotte's staff car was in an accident and Billotte died two days later. General Henry Pownall, Gort's chief of staff stated "With all due respect, he's no loss to us in this emergency"


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## davebender (Jan 26, 2011)

Why was the BEF in Belgium on May 10th, 1940 if that battle was already lost? They should have relocated to someplace they could do some good.

The Dutch fought a hard but hopeless battle. The Netherlands is excellent defensive terrain. Move the BEF to Holland and the Dutch have a chance to prevail. Operation Market-Garden in reverse. In this case you need to hold the Port of Rotterdam.


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## mikewint (Jan 26, 2011)

The French Seventh Army failed to block the German armored reinforcements from the 9th Panzer Division, which reached Rotterdam on 13 May. That same day in the east, following the Battle of the Grebbeberg in which a Dutch counter-offensive to contain a German breach had failed, the Dutch retreated from the Grebbe line to the New Water Line. The Dutch Army, still largely intact, surrendered in the evening of 14 May after the Bombing of Rotterdam by the Luftwaffe. Heinkel He 111 bombers of Kampfgeschwader 54 destroyed the centre of the city. The Dutch Army considered its strategic situation to have become hopeless and feared further destruction of the major Dutch cities. The capitulation document was signed on 15 May. 
As to the BEF, it was composed of only 13 Divisions 3 of which had not been formed prior to the campaign. The French had 117 Divisions, the Belgians 22 divisions and the Dutch 10 divisions. The BEF considered itself to be a minor player and as such, unfortunately, subjugated itself to French command. Enter the 67YO Gaimlin, 64YO Billotte, and eventually Weygand whose first priority as supreme commander was getting a good night sleep
German Army Group B, led by von Bock, assaulted the BEF on 14 May. As Army Group B pushed the Allied forces back toward the French frontier, the German Army Group A, led by von Rundstedt, invaded France through the Ardennes.
The offensive by Army Group A cut communications between French and British commands and after approaching Sedan the German group turned northwards. On 10 May 1940, The Netherlands and Luxembourg surrendered and by 19 May were overrun. The push by Army Group A toward the coast combined with the approach of Army Group B from the Northeast left the BEF surrounded on three sides by 21 May. The British forces attempted to stop the offensive and launched counter-attacks including at Arras on 21 May. The BEF was unable to repel the Germans and Gort ordered that the BEF should withdraw to Dunkirk to facilitate evacuation.
As to the French, you forget the sorry state of French leadership both political and Military. Could Weygand have inspired French troops to resist another 3 months. And remember the BEF was only 13 divisions to begin with


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## davebender (Jan 27, 2011)

French 7th Army was well equipped with armor and motorized infantry. If they couldn't contain a German secondary attack while operating on excellent defensive terrain then the situation was hopeless. How could the BEF expect to make a stand at Dunkirk or anywhere else?


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## mikewint (Jan 27, 2011)

The German army that attacked France and the low countries consisted of:
Army Group A – von Rundstedth 45.5 divisions 7 of them armored. This is the main group attacking through the Ardennes.
Group B – von Bock 29.6 divisions 3 of them armored. This is the Group attacking through the low countries in order to lure the northern allied units into a pocket.
Group C – von Leeb 18 divisions. The group was to prevent flanking attacks from the east.
Thus the German army consisted of just 93 divisions while France alone had 117 divisions.
The attacking German army was vastly outmanned and out gunned but they had three major decisive factors in their favor:
RADIO communication. All panzers were equipped with radios. This allowed armor to respond quickly to changing battlefield conditions. Commanders could control entire formations for massed firepower. Additionally radio allowed army units to co-ordinate with air units. Fliegerleittrupps were attached to all panzer unit and had their own transport. The Luftwaffe kept one Ju88 squadron and one fighter squadron ready for immediate takeoff. When called the Luftwaffe could respond with air support within 15 to 20 minutes.
MOBILITY - The German army was formed around highly mobile offensive units consisting of artillery, infantry, engineer, and tank formations. Panzer units were self-contained and could operate for 3 – 4 days without resupply. German tank crews consisted of 5 men with each having a specific duty which they could concentrate on. French tank commanders doubled as Loaders requiring them to split their attention between directing the tank and firing the main gun.
AUFTRARSTAKTIK – German officers were expected to use their own initiative to achieve their commanders intensions and as such had direct control of all supporting arms making them highly adaptive to changing battlefield conditions. The BEF had a centralized command structure thus an officer had to call division to request artillery fire support


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## donkeyking (Jan 27, 2011)

Shortround6 said:


> There is the logistics question. Even if (big if) the Allies can stand up to the Germans tactically, the 300,000 man army would have to be supplied.
> Depending on when or how big the area is when the stand is made, is there enough port capacity in the perimeter to allow this (roughly 100 tons of supplies per division per day).
> Can the RAF keep control of the air long enough (more than the time of the evacuation) to allow the supply ships to dock and unload without too many being sunk.
> Is there a rail, road network to distribute the supplies or enough motor transport.
> ...



Hi Short

I know there would be a huge logistic problem if they want to fight in Dunkirk. But it is not only for Allies but also for German. And then there would be some advantages in allies.

The first, allied navy can support their army. The British and France has a lot of battleships and cruisers, and they have a lot of huge guns which are much bigger and more effiective than WW I type "siege" artillery. The other important thing is these navy guns dosn't have logistic problem like guns on land.

The second, German tanks were light in 1940 and not good to break through heavy defencing areas. And then BEF were very good at defencing. 

The third, every effort would be paid if they had stood for three months in Dunkirk.

French wouldn't feel they were abandoned by British, they would continue to fight.

The German wouldn't dare to attack Paris from north of France with full strength if 400,000 troops were still in Dunkirk. 

Italy,Hungry and Romania wouldn't dare to join Axis if France hadn't collapsed.
So maybe the WWII would be end in 4 years as WWI, maybe shorter


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## mikewint (Jan 27, 2011)

As far as naval support is concerned, Six British and three French destroyers were sunk, along with nine large boats. In addition, 19 destroyers were damaged. Over 200 of the Allied sea craft were sunk, with an equal number damaged. The Royal Navy claimed the destruction of 35 Luftwaffe aircraft from ship's gunfire during the period of May 27 to June 1, and damage to another 21 aircraft.Winston Churchill revealed in his volumes on World War II that the Royal Air Force played a most important role protecting the retreating troops from the Luftwaffe. Churchill also said that the sand on the beach softened the explosions from the German bombs. "Between 26 May and 4 June the RAF flew a total of 4,822 sorties over Dunkirk, losing just over 100 aircraft in the fighting." The bad weather that kept the Luftwaffe grounded for much of operation also kept losses from being higher than they were. The RAF claimed 262 Luftwaffe aircraft destroyed over Dunkirk. The RAF lost 177 aircraft from all causes from May 26 to June 4, while the Luftwaffe lost 240 aircraft, on the Western Front, from all causes during the same time frame. Fighter losses, from units based in France and the UK from May 10 to June 4 was 432, while total RAF losses from all causes during all of May and June was 959, of which 477 were fighters. 
Major ships lost: The Royal Navy's most significant losses in the operation were six destroyers:
Grafton, sunk by U-62 on 29 May;
Grenade, sunk by air attack off the east pier at Dunkirk on 29 May;
Wakeful, sunk by a torpedo from the Schnellboot (E-boat) S-30 on 29 May;
Basilisk, Havant and Keith, sunk by air attack off the beaches on 1 June.
The French Navy lost three destroyers:
Bourrasque, mined off Nieuport on 30 May;
Sirocco, sunk by the Schnellboote S-23 and S-26 on 31 May;
Le Foudroyant, sunk by air attack off the beaches on 1 June.


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## donkeyking (Jan 28, 2011)

Thanks Mike, your information is very appreciated


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## davebender (Jan 28, 2011)

The BoB would happen over Dunkirk rather then over England. The RAF won't have the advantage of ground based radar and Me-109s won't arrive in the battle area low on fuel.


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## mikewint (Jan 28, 2011)

Dave, I miss your point on that post. The advantage would be to the Germans and the RAF would have lost the very things that allowed them to win the BoB. 
The British, plain and simple chose to cut their losses and extricate their troops. Churchill did order a return to remove some French troops which were repatriated and within a couple of week became POWs anyway


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## davebender (Jan 28, 2011)

I wouldn't go that far. I think the odds would be even if Britain employs a bit of military common sense during the BEF retreat.

If Britain intends to retain a bridgehead on the channel coast it should be at Calais rather then Dunkirk. That way Britain has airfields located within about 30 miles. Luftwaffe airfields won't be located any closer to the seaport.


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## who were the allies (Jan 28, 2011)

donkeyking said:


> From 26 May 1940–4 June 1940, allies evacuated 330,000 of 400,000 from Dunkirk. Whatever it is not a bad result from the current point view. But in evacuation, allies had to abandon huge heavy weapons and equipment. These troops couldn’t fight again in short time because of without these weapons. At last French government surrendered on 14 June 1940 after 10 days Dunkirk evacuation.
> 
> My question is whether there is a better option. What if allies would insist on fighting at Dunkirk for three months?
> 
> ...




Who pray tell were the "allies" in 1940? France was resolved to surrender Russia had a non aggression pact and the United States was resolved to find out which way the wind was blowing. Who exactly were the "allies" who would keep a conflict going for 3 months?

At the time of Dunkerque the "Allies" were Britain and its commonwealth France was suing for surrender before the Nazis crossed the border.


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## donkeyking (Jan 28, 2011)

davebender said:


> The BoB would happen over Dunkirk rather then over England. The RAF won't have the advantage of ground based radar and Me-109s won't arrive in the battle area low on fuel.



Dave
Of course, They wouldn't get help of chain home radars, it would be an main disadvantage. But if allies were still in Dunkirk, Luftwaffe couldn't move their air base to the north of France as BOB. Their air base would be still in Germany. When Luftwaffe had come to Dunkirk from Germany, they would still be low on fuel as BOB.

The secondly, French planes would join RAF to continue to fight. 

By the way, some French coast(include Dunkirk) could be covered by chain home in 1940 summer. They could provide high altitude service.


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## Arsenal VG-33 (Jan 28, 2011)

who were the allies said:


> Who pray tell were the "allies" in 1940? France was resolved to surrender Russia had a non aggression pact and the United States was resolved to find out which way the wind was blowing. Who exactly were the "allies" who would keep a conflict going for 3 months?
> 
> At the time of Dunkerque the "Allies" were Britain and its commonwealth France was suing for surrender before the Nazis crossed the border.






Care to explain then, how on Earth did 92,000+ French soldiers get killed between May 10 and June 24 of that year?


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## Shortround6 (Jan 28, 2011)

Arsenal VG-33 said:


> Care to explain then, how on Earth did 92,000+ French soldiers get killed between May 10 and June 24 of that year?



traffic accidents?


Just kidding. The French troops were let down and sacrificed by their leaders to no purpose. Poor weapons, poor tactical concepts, poor leadership, poor command decisions. 10 years or more of bad high command came home with a vengeance in less than 7 weeks. And it came on the poor soldiers who lost their lives trying to delay the Germans to give their officers time to come up with a plan. There were exceptions but on average the high command seemed incapable of planning lunch let alone dealing with a fast paced battle or campaign.


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## Arsenal VG-33 (Jan 29, 2011)

Shortround6 said:


> traffic accidents?
> 
> 
> Just kidding. The French troops were let down and sacrificed by their leaders to no purpose. Poor weapons, poor tactical concepts, poor leadership, poor command decisions. 10 years or more of bad high command came home with a vengeance in less than 7 weeks. And it came on the poor soldiers who lost their lives trying to delay the Germans to give their officers time to come up with a plan. There were exceptions but on average the high command seemed incapable of planning lunch let alone dealing with a fast paced battle or campaign.



You realize that the above is an equally apt and accurate description of the BEF in 1940 as well? 

Nevertheless, I'm more interested in the sources for _who were the allies _incredible display of historical illiteracy.


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## davebender (Jan 29, 2011)

> if allies were still in Dunkirk, Luftwaffe couldn't move their air base to the north of France as BOB


If the Allies attempt to hold Dunkirk that's where German air attacks will take place. Not over England. The Luftwaffe would establish forward airfields just out of artillery range from the Dunkirk perimeter.


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## mikewint (Jan 29, 2011)

Field Marshal The Rt. Hon. John Standish Surtees Prendergast Vereker, 6th Viscount Gort, VC, GCB, CBE, DSO Two Bars, MVO, MC was a pretty decent officer. 
As Chief of the Imperial General Staff (C.I.G.S.), Lord Gort advocated the primacy of building a land army and defending France and the Low Countries over Imperial defence after France had said she would not be able on her own to defend herself against a German attack.
On 2 December 1938 Gort submitted a report on the readiness of the British Army. He observed that Germany, as a result of the acquisition of Czechoslovakia, was in a stronger position than the previous year and that as a result of the government's decision in 1937 to create a "general purpose" army, Britain lacked the necessary forces for the defence of France.
On 21 December Gort recommended to the Chiefs of Staff that Britain would need to help France defend Holland and Belgium and that for that purpose the British Army needed complete equipment for four Regular army infantry divisions and two mobile armoured divisions, with the Territorial army armed with training equipment and then war equipment for four divisions
Following the Phony War, the 1940 German breakthrough in the Ardennes split the Allied forces and communications between the British Expeditionary Force and the French broke down, and on 25 May 1940 Gort took the unilateral decision to abandon his orders for a southward attack by his forces. Gort's command position was difficult, serving under French high, theatre, and army group command while also being responsible to London. Withdrawing northwards, the BEF together with many French soldiers were evacuated during the Battle of Dunkirk.
Gort is credited by some as reacting efficiently to the crisis and saving the British Expeditionary Force. Others hold a more critical view of Gort’s leadership in 1940, seeing his decision not to join the French in organising a large scale counter-attack as defeatist. Yet Gort had seen and worked under the miserable French leadership. Personally I think that under the circumstances he was correct in saving his own troops


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## davebender (Jan 30, 2011)

The British Government should have given this some thought before signing a military alliance with France.


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## Arsenal VG-33 (Jan 30, 2011)

mikewint said:


> The British, plain and simple chose to cut their losses and extricate their troops. Churchill did order a return to remove some French troops which were repatriated and within a couple of week became POWs anyway



One of the dirty little secrets regarding the evacuated French troops was that they were disarmed upon their arrival in England, either at Dover or Ramsgate. Most elected to return to France because the battle was still on and they fully expected to see more action. Unfortunately, when they were returned (Mostly to Cherbourg) their weapons had not been returned to them, thus they landed without a single weapon among them, though I've read that some of their officers had their service pistols after managing to hide them from british confiscation parties. 

Three excellent books I have touch on this little known episode:
"*Lightning War, Blitzkrieg in the West,1940*" by Ronald e. Powaski
"*The Fall of France*" by Julian Jackson 
"*Dunkerque 26 Mai-4 juin 1940 - La Bataille des Dunes*" by Eric Lefevre
(on page 109 of this book, there is a photo of British troops disarming the newly arrived French troops, and another photo of a few British military police examing a large stack of confiscated French rifles.)

From "*Allied Armour of World War Two*" by Ian V. Hogg, has indicated that the missing French weapons were instead sent to Scotland where they were later issued to exiled Polish troops for training.


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## Arsenal VG-33 (Jan 30, 2011)

davebender said:


> French 7th Army was well equipped with armor and motorized infantry. If they couldn't contain a German secondary attack while operating on excellent defensive terrain then the situation was hopeless. How could the BEF expect to make a stand at Dunkirk or anywhere else?



Giraud's 7th Armee actually made good headway into Holland and several serious and sharp engagements occured there. Research by historian David Lehman shows the French troops/tanks engaged from the 7th Arm. to on tough actions, particularly in Breda, and made good use of the terrain as well. The problem lay in constant German air support, combined with the fact that there were few modern AA betteries within both French and BEF forces. German tactical airpower ruled the day, and by the end of that day it savagely mauled major elements of the Allied forces. This was a doctrinal failure on both the part of the French and British.



> The British Government should have given this some thought before signing a military alliance with France.



Without that military alliance, France could (perhaps should?) have stay out of declaring war on Germany altogether. Disregarding whatever mutual policy both France and UK had with Poland, the UK declared war on Germany first, France followed the day after. Time is what the French military needed to become more evenly matched in terms of military and industrial output, so can be inclined to say that allowing the UK to go it alone for while may have been beneficial? 

Personally speaking, the biggest mistake French military planners made just before the outbreak of war, was to assume they had allies, and forget the UK altogether.


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## Arsenal VG-33 (Jan 30, 2011)

mikewint said:


> Gort is credited by some as reacting efficiently to the crisis and saving the British Expeditionary Force. Others hold a more critical view of Gort’s leadership in 1940, seeing his decision not to join the French in organising a large scale counter-attack as defeatist. Yet Gort had seen and worked under the miserable French leadership. Personally I think that under the circumstances he was correct in saving his own troops



Gort has the benefit of three things: 

1-There was admittedly poor leadership from the French high command that was for the most part completely caught out of balance due to outdated doctrine. 

2-German doctrine completely caught the BEF caught out of balance due to outdated doctrine. 

3- Because of points 1 and 2, Gort (and much of the BEF command for that matter) managed to pass the blame of his own failures onto the French. 

His role in withdrawing and evacuating the BEF can be seen, in hindsight, as a good thing in saving the BEF, but what is inexcusable, was that by the time the Admiralty had informed hi that the BEF would be withdrawn, Gort told his French counterparts that there was the "possibility" of such action, though he fully well knew what he inteded to do. This allows Gort the fail-safe arguement by stating that he had given warning to the French command while not actually stating that it was going to happen. Gort was a porfessional soldier with a long career, so why the break of protocol? I believe that Gort's decision to not come fully clean was clearly intended to force the French and perhaps even the remaining Belgian in protecting his withdrawal. More than a few European historians suspect this may have been the motive. The fact is, for much of the entire Dunkirk withdrawal and evacuation, from Lille to Dunkirk, almost the entire defensive rearguard and perimeter was held by the French, often conveniently omitted from myth which became Dunkirk. Without that rearguard, _everything_ would have failed.

In this respect, I feel Gort should be roundly criticized.


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## Freebird (Jan 30, 2011)

Oh lordy, where to start on this thread. 




davebender said:


> Why was the BEF in Belgium on May 10th, 1940 if that battle was already lost?



That was the plan that was developed to pivot forward and defend Belgium, the Dyle/Meuse line is much more defensible than the French/Belgian border.
Sadly, the Belgians tried to remain neutral until the last minute, which prevented proper defensive preparations at the Dyle line.

If the battle was already lost (due to poor deployment preparations) the British didn't *know* that until it was too late to do anything about it.



davebender said:


> They should have relocated to someplace they could do some good.



Not unless they had magic carpets to make the relocation.
The major river bridges were blown or captured, rail ships under Luftwaffe attack, and the roads in Belgium Northern France were clogged with refugees fleeing westward.
They couldn't get into Holland even if they wanted to. 



davebender said:


> The Dutch fought a hard but hopeless battle. The Netherlands is excellent defensive terrain.



Not against Luftwaffe attack



davebender said:


> Move the BEF to Holland and the Dutch have a chance to prevail. Operation Market-Garden in reverse. In this case you need to hold the Port of Rotterdam.



Not without those magic carpets mentioned earlier. 
Rotterdam would be useless without air superiority, which they didn't have.



donkeyking said:


> The first, allied navy can support their army. The British and France has a lot of battleships and cruisers, and they have a lot of huge guns which are much bigger and more effiective than WW I type "siege" artillery. The other important thing is these navy guns dosn't have logistic problem like guns on land.



The battleships would be sitting ducks to the u-boats, which couldn't be protected unless the Allies have control of the channel, which they don't.

Also battleships _*do*_ have logistical problems, barrel wear shortage of HE ammo.



donkeyking said:


> The second, German tanks were light in 1940 and not good to break through heavy defencing areas. And then BEF were very good at defencing.


The third, every effort would be paid if they had stood for three months in Dunkirk.[/quote]

They would have been short on supplies and crushed by superior German firepower.
What then?



donkeyking said:


> French wouldn't feel they were abandoned by British, they would continue to fight.



Debatable. Maybe not


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## Freebird (Jan 30, 2011)

Arsenal VG-33 said:


> German tactical airpower ruled the day, and by the end of that day it savagely mauled major elements of the Allied forces. This was a doctrinal failure on both the part of the French and British.



correct.



> Personally speaking, the biggest mistake French military planners made just before the outbreak of war, was to assume they had allies, and forget the UK altogether.



Agreed, no country should completely depend on another, best to have alternate plans if things change.

Just as it was a huge mistake for the British to depend on the America's naval power to defeat the Japanese in 1941, which they were unable to do.


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## davebender (Jan 30, 2011)

1939 German light bomber production (Ju87 and Ju88) was negligible. Only about 200 aircraft. 

1940 German Light Bomber Production
German aircraft production during World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
603 x Ju-87B
1,816 x Ju-88A.
...............................
2,419 for all of 1940. Approximately 1/3rd (production during Jan, Feb, Mar, Apr) would be operational by May 1940. Subtract requirements for Norway, training units etc. and I suspect Germany had only about 500 CAS aircraft available to support the 100 or so Heer divisions employed in the west during May 1940. 5 CAS aircraft per army division is hardly overwhelming air support.


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## mikewint (Jan 31, 2011)

The quantity of the Allied troops was fine. The quality was not. Britain and France had been largely unprepared for war, and the training of their conscript armies was abysmal. In Britain, ammunition shortages had the notorious result of each recruit being allowed only five rounds in total for rifle training. The French conscripts were more badly trained still. Fortunately, the small British Expeditionary Force had many professional troops rather than recent conscripts.
By contrast, the Germans side had had much more intensive and elaborate training. Accurate, full-scale mockups of crucial fortifications were built in Germany, and troops rehearsed their attacks until perfect.
Their first great mistake was relying on the Maginot line, the highly fortified border between France and Germany. In the first world war it would have been impregnable. In the second world war, concentrated attack eventually breached it, but more significantly, the Germans attacked first through Belgium and Holland instead, rendering it not just worthless but a handicap, as it required large numbers of French troops to occupy it. 
The second great mistake was the attempted defense of Holland and Belgium. Relying on neutrality to protect them, the Low Countries had not heavily fortified their frontiers, and did not allow Allied troops to enter, even for reconnaissance, until actually invaded. "He who defends everything, defends nothing" was Frederick the Great's famous saying, but this concept was ignored. British and French troops abandoned their defenses on the French-Belgian borders and advanced into Belgium, with the intention of resisting the German Panzer divisions in unfortified, open, unfamiliar territory.
Thus the scene was set for the great disaster. Poorly trained troops, many of whom had fired only five shots in their lives, commanded by officers using obsolete tactics, stationed in inadequate defenses in unfamiliar territory; prepared to defend themselves against the combined firepower of the Panzer divisions and the Luftwaffe. 
With the benefit of hindsight, it's always easy to look back and declare authoritatively what should have been done, especially since your ideas will never actually be tested by the enemy. In the case of the Battle of France, because the armored assault tactics were new, it was not clear how to defend against them.
In 1940 it was not clear that air superiority would be such a decisive factor in a ground conflict. It was expected that strategic bombing would be more effective than it was. It was not known that urban areas could provide effective resistance to tank assaults, as happened in Stalingrad. The critical weakness of paratroop attacks, that they are vulnerable during and immediately after their descent, was not certain. The importance of fortifying positions all around, rather than relying on a line that faces one way only, was underestimated. The potential of radio communications, and the inability of traditional couriers to cope with rapidly moving fronts, were not accepted. 
When faced with the first effective use of new tactics by an enemy, it is easy to be appalled in hindsight that they were not anticipated. In practice, it takes time and experience to develop and deploy defenses. In the Second World War neither Poland, Belgium, Holland, France nor Russia, were at first able to resist the combination of armored divisions and air superiority. With fewer mistakes, the German attack could have been made more costly for them, and the battle more protracted. However, without the crucial factor of experience, it is doubtful that the final outcome of the Battle of France could ever have been different. 

On the 22nd of June France surrendered to the Germans. Fighting continued for a few days before dying out. German casualties were only 27,000 dead, 100,000 wounded. French military casualties about 100,000 dead, 200,000 wounded. Worse was to come for the French: about 400,000 civilians would die in bombings and in forced-labor camps under the German occupation, and another 100,000 military would die during and after the liberation. In the cruelest cut of all, 1,147 French sailors would be killed by their British allies at Mers-El-Kebir on the 3rd of July, when the British decided they would destroy the French fleet themselves, rather than risk it falling into German hands.

Armour: 
In May 1940 France had over 3,000 tanks, and in terms of numbers, quality and firepower they were generally superior to those employed by the Germans. Tactically, however, the French were definitely inferior, and with one or two exceptions the handling of this valuable force was uninspired and wasteful. The basic armoured unit was the tank battalion, comprising a staff, three tank companies and a reserve company (in all, some 45 to 60 tanks). There were 39 tank battalions in 1940 and for tactical purposes they were twinned to form tank battalion groups. At the outbreak of war only five battalions had received the latest tanks (the Somua S-35 and Char B-1 models) while the rest still retained a variety of modern and semi-obsolete types. In addition to the battalion groups there were also 11 independent tank companies.
Between January and May 1940, four reserve armoured divisions were formed and placed at the disposal of the General Headquarters. These divisions absorbed a number of the above-mentioned tank battalions and companies. Armoured fighting vehicles were also to be found in the cavalry divisions undergoing mechanisation, in five light cavalry divisions which were also still not completely mechanised, and in the reconnaissance groups. All these formations combined horsed cavalry, motor-cycle troops, armoured cars, tanks, and infantry mounted in cross-country vehicles.

French Air Force
The Air Force had suffered considerable neglect between the wars, and its performance in 1940, with machines which were in general much inferior to those of the enemy, was not impressive. Indeed, according to French sources, only 420 modern fighters and 31 heavy bombers were serviceable when the Germans struck in May.
Total French front line strength on 10 May 1940 was 1,604 aircraft (764 fighters, 260 bombers, 180 reconaissance planes, 400 liaison aircrafts).
Total strenght of the French Air Force together with Aviation Colonaile: 1,200 fighters, 800 reconaissance planes, 1,300 bombers.


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## rgallant (Feb 1, 2011)

Why would competent commander penny pack his airforce that way, you may no like the Germans and they were certainly no uber army as many want them to be but they were not morons.

They applied airpower like everything else, maximum strength to the attack. not 1 plane here 2 planes there.

As I understand it a staffel ran about 12 aircraft, so assume 25% down for what ever reason and we have nine so 2 flights of 4, I would expect that to be the minimum force tossed into an attack.




davebender said:


> 1939 German light bomber production (Ju87 and Ju88) was negligible. Only about 200 aircraft.
> 
> 1940 German Light Bomber Production
> German aircraft production during World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> ...


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## mikewint (Feb 1, 2011)

17 August 1940 
Single-engined fighters 787 
Twin-engined fighters 219 
Night fighters 63 
Fighter-bombers 119 
Dive-bombers 294 
Twin-engined bombers 960 
Four-engined bombers 7 
Long-range reconnaissance aircraft 185 
Short-range and army cooperation aircraft 135 
Coastal aircraft 162 
Transport aircraft 226 
Total 3157 

31 May 44 
Single-engined fighters 1063 
Twin-engined fighters 151 
Night fighters 572 
Fighter-bombers 278 
Ground attack aircraft 352 
Night harassment aircraft 305 
Twin-engined bombers 841 
Four-engined bombers 97 
Long-range reconnaissance aircraft 153 
Short-range and army cooperation aircraft 210 
Coastal aircraft 123 
Transport aircraft 719 
Kampfgeschwader 200 (misc. aircraft} 65 
Total 4928 

From 1940 to 1944 the Luftwaffe had only grown by 1771 total aircraft. Yet Hitler chose to open a two front war. Too little spread too thin. The German forces were always under strength, they fielded what forces they could.


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## Freebird (Feb 8, 2011)

davebender said:


> 1939 German light bomber production (Ju87 and Ju88) was negligible. Only about 200 aircraft.
> 
> 1940 German Light Bomber Production
> German aircraft production during World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> ...



So you've estimated that there were 600 Ju88's, 200 Ju87's from Jan-May 1940 + 200 from 1939, or about 1,000 bombers.


Dave, you've badly underestimated the # of light bombers available.
They didn't *only* use Ju87's Ju88's for tactical support. The He111 Do17Z were much better suited for tactical use than similar British twin engine craft like the Wellington, Hampden Whitley bombers.
You also havn't taken into account production from 1936-1939
The actual numbers are much more than 500 available aircraft for tactical support




> *By 19 September 1938, the Luftwaffe had received 579 Dornier Do 17s*. During 1939-1940, some 475 Dornier Do 17Z bombers, 100 Dornier Do 215s, an updated variant of the Do 17, were built.


Dornier Do 17 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



> *German production for the Luftwaffe amounted to 808 He 111s by September 1939.* According to Heinkel's memoirs, a further 452 were built in 1939,


He111, 756 built in 1940, giving a total of about 1,750 by May 1940
Heinkel He 111 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



> By 1 September 1939, 360 Ju 87 As and Bs had been built by the Junkers factories at Dessau and Weserflug factory in Bremen. *By 30 June 1940 697 Ju 87 B-1s and 129 B-2s plus 105 R-1s and seven R-2s had been built*.


Junkers Ju 87 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



> the Bf 110 entered service in 1939 as the Bf 110C, powered by two 1100 hp (820 kw) DB 601A engines. Production was set up on a massive scale, and by the end of the year some 500 Bf 110s were flying operationally. *Owing to the limited aerial opposition the Bf 110C was largely employed in the ground-support role*. Production during 1940 had risen to 1,083 machines


Messerschmitt ME 110


So the actual number of aircraft would be by May 1940:
~1750 - He111
~1000 Do17Z
~600 Ju88's
~850 Ju87's
~850 Me110C's
+ some various other aircraft, Hs123, Ju86 etc

= By May 1940 the Germans had built some 5,000 bomber attack aircraft, excluding single seat fighters


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## ivanotter (Feb 13, 2011)

The entire "blitz krieg" concept was to smash/capture the BEF. In that Germany failed.

Hitler wanted to attack in the west in October/November 1939. This would have been even more "fun" to speculate on as the BEF was not up to full strength in France.

Would that have 1) been posible? 2) succeeded?

Ivan


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## mikewint (Feb 13, 2011)

Ivan, That "Blitzkreig" was a German operation concept in 1940 is not correct.
Rapid and decisive victories had been pursued by armies well before the Second World War. In the German wars of unification and First World War campaigns, the German General Staff had attempted _Bewegungskrieg (Movement War), _similar to the modern perception of "Blitzkrieg", with varying degrees of success. In the First World War these methods often succeeded in achieving tactical breakthroughs, but the operational exploitation took time as armies lacked motorisation, could not move quickly, and sometimes failed to achieve a decisive victory altogether. The development of tanks, aircraft, and more importantly, motorised infantry and artillery, enabled the Germans to implement these old methods again with new technology in 1940. The combustion engine solved the problem of operational level exploitation.

When dealing with "Blitzkrieg" as a concept, things become complicated. It is seen as an anomaly and *there is no explicit reference to such strategy, operations or tactics in the German battle plans. **There is no evidence in German military art, strategy or industrial preparation that points to the existence of a thought out "Blitzkrieg" tendency*. _Evidence suggests that the German Reich was preparing for a long sustained war of attrition, not a quick war of manouevre. _Hitler's miscalculations in 1939 forced him into war before he was ready, and under these circumstances the German General Staff reverted to attempting to win a quick war, before the economic and material superiority of the Allies could make a difference, although *this was not their original intention*. It was only after the defeat of France in 1940, that the German military pursued a "Blitzkrieg"-kind of warfare to achieve its ambitions in Europe. German historian Karl-Heinz Frieser stated:

"The campaign in the west was not a planned campaign of conquest. Instead, it was an operational act of despair to get out of a desperate strategic situation. What is called "Blitzkrieg thinking" did not develop until after the campaign in the west. It was not the cause but rather the consequence of victory. Something that in May 1940, had come off successfully to everyone's surprise, was now to serve the implementation of Hitler's visions of conquest in the form of the secret success."


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## ivanotter (Feb 13, 2011)

OK, well. I used the word Blitz krieg as the commom denominator, but you are probably right, it is not a new concept. WWI (late) saw the appearance of the storm troops, etc.

that said, refering to Len Deigthon;s book, the plan was to move rapidly and catch the BEF. That was not achieved.

Whether the manstein concept, in 1939, would have been a possibility or whether it would have been an improved Schliesen is a good question.

October/November is not good in Europe for war of movement; hence the generals balked at that idea.


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## mikewint (Feb 13, 2011)

Ivan, forgive me if I sound pedantic but "catching the BEF" was never part of the German plan. Please read many of my earlier posts. The BEF comprised only 10% of the allied forces and was the least of the German worries. The only reason the Germans were able to cut France in half was due to Rommel and Guderian disobeying their orders. By 17 May, Rommel claimed to have taken 10,000 prisoners and suffered only 36 losses. Guderian was delighted with the fast advance, and encouraged his Corps, the XIX, and containing the 1st, 2nd and 10th Panzer Divisions to head for the channel, continuing until fuel was exhausted. However the success of his commanders on the ground began to have effects on Hitler who worried that the German advance was moving too fast. Halder recorded in his diary on May 17 that "Fuhrer is terribly nervous. Frightened by his own success, he is afraid to take any chance and so would pull the reins on us ... [he] keeps worrying about the south flank. He rages and screams that we are on the way to ruin the whole campaign." Through deception and different interpretations of orders to stop from Hitler and von Kleist, the commanders on the ground were able to ignore Hitler's attempts to stop the northern advance to the sea.
The only thing that prevented the German from trapping the BEF was the 23 May Halt order. On 23 May, Günther von Kluge proposed that the German Fourth Army, which was poised to continue the attack against the Allied forces at Dunkirk, should "halt and close up." Seeing the Allies were trapped in the city, Gerd von Rundstedt agreed with von Kluge. In the German Fourth Army diary it is recorded on 23 May "will, in the main, halt tomorrow [May 24] in accordance with Colonel-General von Rundstedt's order." General Walther von Brauchitsch, commander in chief of the German Army, disagreed with his colleagues and wanted to continue the attack against Dunkirk by putting the Fourth army under Bock. Bock was busy and Halder agreed with Von Rundstedt and with von Kluge to stop action against Dunkirk. The disagreement went to Hitler, who overruled Brauchitsch and agreed with stopping action against Dunkirk. Hitler's error wasn't in making the command to halt the German army but in allowing the orders already drawn up by the German generals to stand. It appears that Kleist also agreed with the halt order, which Hitler "rubber-stamped".


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## ivanotter (Feb 13, 2011)

Give me a chance to read up on a few things before I talk from memory of reading some books, etc. I could make a total fool out of myself.


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## mikewint (Feb 13, 2011)

Not trying to sound like an expert here because I'm far from that but you might check out this thread from the begining. No one was more surprised at their rapid success than the Germans. Which was due primarily to the very poor French military command. After the German invasion of Poland, the Supreme Commander of the French Army, Maurice Gamelin, suggested during that month that the Allies should take advantage of the fact that Germany was tied up in Poland by using the Low Countries as a spring board to attack Germany. This suggestion was not taken up by the French government.

Just after the 1 September 1939 invasion of Poland, French soldiers advanced along the Maginot Line 5 kilometres (3.1 mi) into the Saar which was called the Saar Offensive. France had employed 98 divisions (all but 28 of them reserve or fortress formations) and 2,500 tanks against German forces consisting of 43 divisions (32 of them reserves) and no tanks. They advanced until they met the then thin and undermanned Siegfried Line. The French army would easily have been able to penetrate the mere screen of German forces present had they continued with the offensive, but they preferred to force the Germans into the offensive role and withdrew to their own lines in October.
The entire Frence invasion could have easily been aborted long before it even began but the French and allied forces entered into the Phoney War period instead


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## ivanotter (Feb 20, 2011)

A few comments:

Shirer’s “The rise and fall of the third Reich” mentions that “Fall Gelb, as the operation was called, had been hastily concocted in the fall of 1939 by the Army High Command under the pressure of Hitler’s order to launch the offensive in the West by mid-November”.

Whether it was an improved Schlieffen or not, is a good point. However, the clear objective was the drive on the channel ports.

In mid-November, the full force of the BEF was not deployed as of yet.

Wiki:
“””””“The First deployment was completed by 11 October 1939 at which point 158,000 men had been transported to France.[11] The "War Secretary" Leslie Hore-Belisha said "158,000 had been transported across the Channel within five weeks of the commencement of the present war. Convoys had averaged three each night and the B.E.F. had been transported intact without a single casualty to any of its personnel."

By 19 October the BEF had received 25,000 vehicles to complete the first deployment. The majority of the troops were stationed along the Franco-Belgian border and along the Maginot Line. 

Over the next few months troops, materials and vehicles continued to arrive in France and Belgium and by 13 March 1940 the BEF had doubled in size to 316,000 men.[13] By May 1940 the BEF order of battle consisted of 10 infantry divisions in three corps (I, II, and III), 1st Army Tank Brigade, the BEF Air Component RAF detachment of about 500 aircraft and the Advanced Air Striking Force (AASF) long-range RAF force. These forces were led by the General Headquarters (GHQ) which consisted of men from Headquarters Troops (1st Battalion Welsh Guards, 9th Battalion The West Yorkshire Regiment and the 14th Battalion The Royal Fusiliers), the 1st Army Tank Brigade, 1st Light Armoured Reconnaissance Brigade and HQ Royal Artillery 5th Infantry Division.”””””””

Shirer: “In the first phase of the campaign, at any rate, he (Hitler) planned not to knock out the French army but to roll it back and occupy the Channel coast, thus cutting off Britain from its ally”.

Shirer: “At the end of November, the Allies added a scheme to rush General Henri Giraud’s Seventh Army up the Channel coast to help the Dutch north of Antwerp in case the Netherlands was also attacked. Thus a German attempt to sweep through the Belgium – and perhaps Holland – to flank the Maginot line would be met very early in the game by the entire BEF, the bulk of the French Army, the 22 divisions of the Belgians and the ten divisions of the Dutch”.

It was to avoid such a head-on clash and at the same to trap the British and French armies that would speed forward so far that Manstein proposed a radical change in Fall Gelb.””

Mike, I surely think that a part of it all was to trap the BEF from a military point of view. Now, it is possible that from a political point of view, Hitler changed it a bit.

On Blitz Krieg: Len Deighton: The word Blitz Krieg has been attributed to Hitler, Time magazine and Liddel Hart…..Lightning fast war had been an essential part of prussian military thinking since long before Bismarck.

Mike, I fully agree that the run-up to Blitz Krieg was coming from both the shock troops of WWI etc. and that the early Fall Gelb was rather pedestrian. Only with Manstein’s ideas did the whole thing become feasible.

The question is then: Did Manstein envisages a situation where he could trap BEF? I believe so as the idea was the move to the Channel ports. Hitler may have seen this as ending the war, at least as far as UK was concerned.

THAT I think is the conclusion. Mansein gave Hitler the tool, Hitler saw the political possibilities of trapping the BEF. 

Deighton: “Manstein provides three possible reasons for Hitler’s decision to halt the tanks. First, he wanted to keep his armor intact for the coming battle in central france. Second, Goring deserved a chance. Third (less credible) Hitler believed that a compromise peace with the British would not be possible if he destroyed their army.

After the event Hitler himself gave many different reasons for this decision” extract: heavy rain of 26 and 27 May made the Flanders marshes. 28 may Guderian agreed to that. He said that infantry was more suited for that kind of battle.

In any event:

“It is difficult to believe that Hitler had evolved any strategic reason for sparing the BEF. As recently as 24 May, Hitler’s directive No 13 had begun to be put into effect. “Next goal of operations is the annihilation of the French, British and Belgian forces….During this operation the task of the Luftwaffe is to break all enemy resistance in the encircled parts and to prevent the escape of the British forces across the Channel”.

That should make it clear that the idea was to trap the BEF.

Now, again Deighton: And yet before we declare Plan Yellow to be the only successful blitzkrieg, it is worth looking at the declared objectives of that offensive. One stated aim was to engage and defeat the strongest possible part of the Allied armies. Hitler had specifically ordered the annihilation of the BEF and that it should be prevented from escaping across the Channel. The Germans had failed in that endeavor.

Comments?

The more fun question to ask really is:

If Hitler had carried out the attacks on France and belgium in November 1939 AND only a par to fthe BEF was in France, wold it have changed the outcome insofar as a peace with UK was concerned?

Could it have been pulled off in November 1939 as the plan at that time was far more modest? rather pedestrian really.

if Hitler had only managed to push back the french and not really getting to any war with the UK (BEF hardly there) what then? stalemate in Europe?

Ivan


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## ivanotter (Feb 20, 2011)

...and I fully agree with your conclusions re the original thread. 

Supply and other logistics would have been rather impossible, etc.

On German mobility: The panzers were impressive, but the German army was still very much horse and leg driven.


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## mikewint (Feb 20, 2011)

Ivan, I'm not sure where you are headed with that post. Lets look back at history:
On 6 October, Hitler made a peace offer to both Western Powers. Even before they had had time to respond, on 9 October, he also formulated a new military policy in case their reply was negative: Führer-Anweisung N°6,
This plan was firmly based on the seemingly more realistic assumption that Germany's military strength would still have to be built up for several more years and that for the moment only limited objectives could be envisaged. They were aimed at improving Germany's ability to survive a long, protracted war in the west. Hitler ordered a conquest of the Low Countries to be executed at the shortest possible notice. This would stop France from occupying them first, and prevent Allied air power from threatening the vital German Ruhr area. It would also provide the basis for a successful long-term air and sea campaign against the United Kingdom. There was no mention in the Führer-Directive of any immediate consecutive attack to conquer the whole of France, although as much as possible of the border areas in northern France should be occupied.
While writing the directive, Hitler had assumed that such an attack could be initiated within a period of at most a few weeks, but the very day he issued it he was disabused of this illusion. It transpired that he had been misinformed about the true state of Germany's forces. The motorized units had to recover, repairing the damage to their vehicles incurred in the Polish campaign and further more ammunition stocks were largely depleted.
Franz Halder, the chief of staff of the German Army, presented the first plan for Fall Gelb on 19 October, the pre-war codename of plans for campaigns in the Low Countries: the Aufmarschanweisung N°1, Fall Gelb.
Aufmarschanweisung N°1 was based on an unimaginative frontal attack, sacrificing a projected half a million German soldiers to attain the limited goal of throwing the Allies back to the river Somme. Germany's strength for 1940 would then be spent; only in 1942 could the main attack against France begin. 
On 29 October, Halder proposed a second operational plan, Aufmarschanweisung N°2, Fall Gelb, featuring a secondary attack on the Netherlands.
General Gerd von Rundstedt, the commander of Army Group A, disagreed with it. Its fundamental flaw was that it did not conform to the classic principles of the Bewegungskrieg, or "maneuver warfare” that had been the basis of German operations since the 19th century. A breakthrough would have to be accomplished that would result in the encirclement and destruction of the main body of Allied forces. The logical place to achieve this would be in the region of Sedan.
On 10 January, a German Messerschmitt Bf 108 made a forced landing at Maasmechelen, north of Maastricht, in Belgium. Among the occupants of the aircraft was a Luftwaffe major, Hellmuth Reinberger, who was carrying a copy of the latest version of Aufmarschanweisung N°2. Reinberger was unable to destroy the documents, which quickly fell into the hands of the Belgian intelligence services. On 30 January, Aufmarschanweisung N°3, Fall Gelb, was issued which essentially conformed to the earlier versions.
On 2 February, von Manstein's plan was brought to Hitler’s attention. On 17 February, Hitler summoned von Manstein, General Rudolf Schmundt (the German Army's Chief of Personnel) and Alfred Jodl to attend a conference. Hitler sat and listened, abandoning his habits of interrupting and launching into monologues. In the end, he agreed to all of von Manstein's suggestions. The next day he ordered the plans to be changed in accordance with von Manstein's ideas. They appealed to Hitler mainly because they offered some real hope of victory. Hitler recognized the breakthrough at Sedan only in tactical terms, whereas von Manstein saw it as a means to an end. He envisaged an operation to the English Channel and the encirclement of the Allied armies in Belgium, which, if carried out correctly, could have a favorable strategic outcome.
Aufmarschanweisung N°4, Fall Gelb, was issued on 24 February. The bulk of the German officer corps was appalled by the plan, and they called Halder the "gravedigger of the Panzer force".
Even when adapted to more conventional methods, the new plan provoked a storm of protest from the majority of German generals. They thought it utterly irresponsible to create a concentration of forces in a position where they could not possibly be sufficiently supplied, while such inadequate supply routes as there were could easily be cut off by the French. If the Allies did not react as expected, the German offensive could end in catastrophe. Their objections were ignored. Halder argued that, as Germany's strategic position seemed hopeless anyway, even the slightest chance of a decisive victory outweighed the certainty of ultimate defeat implied by inaction.
Fast forward to 13 May, the German XIX Corps forced three crossings near Sedan, executed by the 1st, 2nd and 10th Panzer Divisions, reinforced by the elite Großdeutschland infantry regiment. Instead of slowly massing artillery as the French expected, the Germans concentrated most of their air power (as they lacked strong artillery forces) to smash a hole in a narrow sector of the French lines by carpet bombing and by dive bombing.
The disorder that had begun at Sedan spread down the French lines. At 19:00hrs on 13 May, the 295th regiment of 55th Infantry Division, holding the last prepared defensive line at the Bulson ridge, was panicked by the false rumor that German tanks were already behind its positions. It fled, creating a gap in the French defenses, before even a single German tank had crossed the river. This "Panic of Bulson" also involved the divisional artillery. The Germans had not attacked their position, and would not do so until 12 hours later, at 07:20 on 14 May. Still, the French had several hours to launch a counter offensive before the Germans consolidated the bridgeheads, but failed to attack soon enough.
Recognizing the gravity of the defeat at Sedan, General Gaston-Henri Billotte, commander of the First Army Group whose right flank pivoted on Sedan, urged that the bridges across the Meuse be destroyed by air attack. That day every available Allied light bomber was employed in an attempt to destroy the three bridges, but failed to hit them while suffering heavy losses. Some 44 percent of the Allies bomber strength was destroyed.
Heinz Guderian, the commander of the German XIXth Army Corps, had indicated on 12 May that he wanted to enlarge the bridgehead to at least 20 kilometers. His superior, Ewald von Kleist, ordered him on behalf of Hitler to limit his moves to a maximum of 8 kilometers before consolidation. On 14 May at 11:45, von Rundstedt confirmed this order, which implied that the tanks should now start to dig in. Guderian was able to get to von Kleist to agree to "reconnaissance in force", by threatening to resign. This vague terminology allowed Guderian to advance forward effectively ignoring von Kleist's order to halt. 
On 15 May, in heavy fighting, Guderian's motorized infantry dispersed the reinforcements of the newly formed French Sixth Army in their assembly area west of Sedan, undercutting the southern flank of the French Ninth Army, which collapsed, and surrendered en masse. The 102nd Fortress Division, its flanks unsupported, was surrounded and destroyed on 15 May at Monthermé bridgehead by the 6th and 8th Panzer Divisions. The French Second Army had also been seriously mauled and had rendered itself impotent. The Ninth Army was giving way because they also did not have time to fortify their lines. Erwin Rommel had breached its defenses within 24 hours of its conception. This allowed the Rommel to break free with his 7th Panzer Division. Refusing to allow his division rest and advancing in light and darkness, the Ghost division advanced 30 miles (48 km) in just 24 hours.
On 23 May, Günther von Kluge proposed that the German Fourth Army, which was poised to continue the attack against the Allied forces at Dunkirk, should "halt and close up.” Seeing the Allies were trapped in the city, von Rundstedt agreed with von Kluge. In the German Fourth Army diary it is recorded on 23 May "will, in the main, halt tomorrow [May 24] in accordance with Colonel-General von Rundstedt's order.” General Walther von Brauchitsch, commander in chief of the German Army, disagreed with his colleagues and wanted to continue the attack against Dunkirk by putting the Fourth army under Bock. The disagreement went to Hitler, who overruled Brauchitsch and agreed with stopping action against Dunkirk.
Thus, I find no deliberate plan to isolate the BEF, nor any deliberate plan to conduct the war in the manner in which it actually happened. Due to several fortuitous circumstances and German officers disobeying their direct commanders the battle of France would have played out much differently as would Dunkirk had the Germans not halted for 3 days.


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## ivanotter (Feb 21, 2011)

I think we might be heading for a common conclusion, Mike.

1) The concept of blitzkrieg was a development, not a revolution (I agree)

2) The first case yellow plans were not particular daring, more improved Schlieffen (faster moving right flank). I agree

3) Only late in the day did the Manstein plan get traction. I agree

4) The destruction of BEF or at least entrapment was an opportunitic chance, hatched in May. We cannot ignore fuhrer directive 13, spellign it out.

5) I can see that it was not the stated aim prior to the invasion (thansk Mike)

Is this a fair representation?

It just also shows one thing: Hitler did not have a "blue print" for the war, but was an opportunistic gambler in many ways.

Ivan


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## michaelmaltby (Feb 21, 2011)

".... Hitler did not have a "blue print" for the war, but was an opportunistic gambler in many ways"

That more or less sums it up. On the other hand - the Mein Kampf writings were a blueprint of objectives - the racial superiority stuff.

MM


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## ivanotter (Feb 21, 2011)

Michael, yes.

It is actually amazing that the only "blue print" was the ramblings in Mein Kampf.

Apparantly Raeder tried to show what could happen in a real geopolitical war, but his ideas were dismissed.

Compared to Brooke: First we stop them in N. Africa, then we open the med, saving us 1 million tons n transport. Then we invade Italy, getting some divisions busy, THEN we invade the continent.

it nearly came out like that.

what a difference. Churchill was probably just as opportunistic but had a better grasp of it all.


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## michaelmaltby (Feb 21, 2011)

"... Churchill was probably just as opportunistic but had a better grasp of it all."

Certainly. He was probably the most experienced (rounded) politician-leader in WW2. Just yesterday I was looking at photos of him crossing the Rhine with Monty (albeit an uncontested section) in 1945, just before the British crossing. Ike had been by for a conference and when he left Churchill and Monty did a little recon (for the cameras  and for morale). Seeing the pictures I was struck by just how "edgy" he was.

By contrast, Hitler was a WW1 runner and Stalin was a Georgian terrorist-bankrobber.

MM


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## ivanotter (Feb 21, 2011)

Churchill was a charater of note. on one hand challenging his generals to think "out of the box" but still not overstepping the line. providing objectives, big picture etc, but maybe not really clear on it himself. Still doing a lot on the fly, probably.

opportunistic, but still listening.

Hitler was still fighting WWI I think. No real objectives and very pedestrian in the outlook. He was still figthing france, but I don;t think he got the idea that they could *conquer *France. Same with the UK. 

I have an interesting book, Stalins' War, input from his generals. Different picture. The generals acknowledged his grasp of strategic situations.

Ruthless in the extreme.

There is another book, Alliance, showing how little Roosevelt actually cared for Churchill. Roosevelt comes out as extremely self-centered. The "special relationship" was a bit of a one-way street.


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## mikewint (Feb 21, 2011)

Ivan, Ok, you open another can of worms here Good Old Winston Churchill, apologies ahead of time if I offend any one. Agreed he did a fantastic job in WWII but his record is hardly one to aspire to. Let's begin with WWI:
In 1914, young Winston Churchill was First Lord of the Admiralty. He was itching to get into WWI but it was primarily a land war. There had only been one major navel battle: Jutland. Before the Ottoman Empire had even entered the war, in October 1914, Churchill had ordered the naval bombardment of the Dardanelles. Like most British, Churchill considered the Turks to be inferior opponents with old munitions and guns that could not stand up to British firepower. In Feb. 1915 and again in March a combined British and French force sailed up the Dardanelles to bombard the Turkish defenses. The Turks easily push back the attack with British losses of 700 dead, 3 battleships sunk, and 3 others badly damaged. The vice admiral in charge of the attack told Churchill that he could not silence the forts without an infantry assault. And so was born the Gallipoli campaign.
General Ian Hamilton requested 150,000 troops Lord Kitchener allowed only half that number faced with the bloodbath on the western front. Only one veteran division, the 29th was sent. The Royal Naval division sent by Churchill was a hodgepodge of irregulars and marines. Green and untried volunteer soldiers from Australia and New Zealand 700 miles away in Egypt being trained to fight in France were co-opted.
In the predawn darkness of April 25 the landings began. At Helles the British delayed until 8AM and tried to land in broad daylight in front of Turkish guns dug in 50yds away. Of the first 200 troops only 21 made it to the beach. On V and W beaches 950 Lancashire Fusiliers landed. By nightfall 500 were dead and British losses equaled over 2000.
As to the ANZAC troops, they were to land at the Gaba Tepe headland; instead, they landed a mile further up the coast at what would be known as Anzac cove. By sheer force of will the ANZAC troops made it 1500 yards inland but a Turkish counter-attack drove them back. One Fifth of the ANZAC forces died that first day. Hamilton requested evacuation but was rejected by Churchill. Turkish, British, and ANZAC troops built trenches; sometimes only 10yds apart mostly out of corpses. By May 4 the Turks had lost 14,000 men and the ANZACs almost 10,000 men.
As the summer months wore on disease (flies drawn by the rotting corpses covered every surface), thirst, and lack of food took their toll. On Aug 6th in a last ditch attempt to break the stalemate the British landed troops further north at Suvla Bay. The Turks were caught completely off guard but Lieutenant General Stopford moved too slowly to exploit the landings and Turkish reinforcements made it to the high ground and the British were again stopped and the war of attrition continued. In the beginning of September, Hamilton again requested evacuation but Churchill removed him from command in October. Lord Kitchner visited in November and ordered the evacuation. Before this could begin, a massive rain and snow storm hit the battlefield. Hundreds more drowned in the shallow trenches that caved-in and flooded and thousands died of exposure, frostbite, and illness.
Churchill was held accountable for the debacle and lost his position in the War Cabinet and was excluded from the government.
Because of the conditions at the time casualties can only be estimated but most sources give:
British – 119,696 Australian – 26,094 New Zealand – 7571 Turkish – 218,000


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## mikewint (Feb 21, 2011)

Churchill strikes again - At the end of WWI the British had effectively won the war in the mid-east using large forces from India and adventurers such as T.E. Lawrence. But, with Britain shattered by the loss of manpower and money from the European campaigns the ability and will to simply move in and claim the mid-east was lacking. Furthermore the Balfour Declaration in 1917 supporting Jewish claims for a sovereign state had angered many Arabs and many in the Colonial Office who were pro-Arab. Had the British realized that the rumored oil reserves in the region held the key to world power for the next century they might have acted differently.
Sir Mark Sykes, appointed by Lord Kitchener in 1915 as his personal representative to determine the future of the Mid-East worked tirelessly to establish British control of the region. His plan made sure that local leaders would be on the side of the British matching aspiring leaders to their ethnic regions. Unfortunately Sykes died suddenly in 1919 and Lloyd George could find no one to take on his position. Sadly he turned, in the end to the man who became Colonial Secretary in 1921, Winston Churchill.
Churchill had no time or patience for any of this. He wanted the army demobilized, Arab rebellions put down, Egypt, the Suez Canal, and the route to India remain British, Syria-Lebanon left essentially to the French who refused to give up their colonial influence, and the rest of Arabia which had no particular value, dealt with as quickly as possible.
The British had take Baghdad in 1917 and set up a British protectorate. The British proved to be highly efficient tax-collectors and strong opposition arose. The Ottoman Turks had divided the region into three provinces along ethnic lines centered on Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra in an attempt to keep the warring Sunni and Shiite populations apart. Baghdad had a sizable Jewish and Assyrian Christian population plus the Kurds who strongly opposed the British. By 1920 they were in full revolt.
Churchill was not the least bit interested in working out what to do with whom: “I do not understand this squeamishness about the use of gas. I am strongly in favor of using poisoned gas against uncivilized tribes.” Led by some young general poison gas was used regularly across the region to put down the revolt.
Wing Commander Harris (notable in later life for the firebombing of Dresden) also noted: “The Arab and Kurds now know what real bombing means. A full sized village can be wiped out within 45 minutes.” Even in 1940 Churchill was buying huge stocks of chemical weapons for use in Germany. Churchill stated: “It is absurd to consider morality on this topic when everybody used it in the last war without a word of complaint from the moralists or Church”
In March 1921, Churchill held a 10-day conference in Cairo in which he handed over all of Arabia to local strongmen in return for their support of Britain, with no thought given to local population’s ethnicity, religion, or desires. Ibn Saud was one such strongman. He was given the heart of Arabia to reinstate the House of Saud. Two Hashemite brothers from Mecca, Faisal and Abdullah were made kings of Iraq and Transjordan. The three former ottoman provinces of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra were thrown into Iraq and the Kurds lured in with promises of self-rule. In order to create borders that could be easily protected for the two new kingdoms, the conference gave a large portion of Saudi Arabia (west of the Euphrates) to Iraq. In return Ibn Saud was given control of Kuwait.
So every time you look at today’s Mid-East mess say thank you Winston. Rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iraq remains. Three times Iraq has laid claim to Kuwait, the last time leading to the Gulf War. Churchill’s total lack of interest in laying down sensible borders resulted in the predicted conflict between the Shiites and Sunnis which was further complicated by the presence of the Kurds. The British imposition of a total outsider as king plus their failure to establish any proper governmental system led to a series of coups leading to Saddam Hussein and the second Gulf War.


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## michaelmaltby (Feb 21, 2011)

".... He was probably the most experienced (rounded) politician-leader in WW2."

Do you have an alternative leader-candidate for this position, mikewint ...? That's MY claim and I stand by it. The only US candidates in recent times are Teddy Roosevelt and Ike. And Ike wasn't in THIS competition until after WW2.

Right man, right place, right time ... all the rest of it was just "preparation". 


MM


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## Glider (Feb 21, 2011)

First time I heard anyone trying to blame the 2nd Gulf War on Churchill


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## RabidAlien (Feb 21, 2011)

That region has been at war with itself for thousands of years. The only effect Churchill might've had would be to stir up the embers and toss a little kerosene on the flames. Had he done nothing, there would still be conflicts over there today.


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## ivanotter (Feb 22, 2011)

Correct in every way on Churchill. A character of note.

Also remember he was a new subaltern in the battle at Omdurman (sorry for the spelling), the last cavalry attack.

After that, as any good gentleman, he resigned his commission to become a journalists and went off to South Africa for the 1899-1902 stuff.

and at the Rheine, he made sure they all had a lot of coffee (or booze more likely) before visiting the siegfried line. Brooke guessed it, yes, Churchill had a leak on the siegfried line!

All of that said, without Chruchill to probe and prod his generals, they may have fought a more "classic" war and might just have stuffed it up, at least into a stalemate. He was a thinker after all. 

Churchill also had a hand in the invention of the tanks. At that time the navy had its motor division (sic!) with armoured cars. When the army got all toffee nosed on the tanks, Churchill pushed it through as a navy project, until such time as other's could run with it.

I think he was good at delegating things but also keeping important stuff himself.

His major advantage could have been to see what was important and what was urgent.

Iraq turned out to be a mess, haunting us to this day.

He probably solved more problems than he created, but that is not to say that he did not have some massive mess-up's here and there. Strangely enough, not because of not acting. That he surely did.

And he came of good stock, his (great * x) grandfather was Mallborough


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## ivanotter (Feb 22, 2011)

On Iraq, etc: Yes, they have been fighting there for some years prior to Chruchill. His solution might have worked if he had separated the Kurds out, etc. But that is probably another different thread and more a WHAT IF thing


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## mikewint (Feb 22, 2011)

MichaelM - as to WWII I would tend to agree with you though I also find that historical events create vacuums which in turn can create personalities to step into those vacuums.
Churchill was certainly a colorful individual whose quotes are legend. He was also a product of his times when the British Empire was remaking the world into England.
The Mideast has always been a powder keg but willy-nilly drawing borders forcing incompatible elements together under some non-local strongman is a recipe for disaster which carries over into our own time.


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## ivanotter (Feb 23, 2011)

Back to the thread:

Whether they would liek to fight n for another 3 months, Doubtful if it would be possible at all.

Ivan


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## mikewint (Feb 23, 2011)

Ivan, I think you and I are in almost total agreement. With the aging French leadership in charge and the BEF allowing them to lead there is no hope. Further more without the 3 day halt order the BEF AND their equipment would have been lost.
Could the allied forces have won? Again yes but only with a total change of tactics starting with the battle of the Saar


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## ivanotter (Feb 24, 2011)

Mike, I think it is as close to agreement as anything.

I agree that Hitler only late in the day (directive 13) thought about crushing the BEF.

He could only have been stopped with the Saar's offensive.

Mike, what is your opinion if Hitler had invaded in October/November as he had wanted to? BEF not fully deployed and the wheather a bit foul in W. Europe?

How well could he have deployed the troops from Poland? Logistics? did they have enough supplies for another campaign?

Also, at that time it was an improved Schlieffen, not Manstein's concept.


Ivan.


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## mikewint (Feb 24, 2011)

The Schlieffen Plan was the German General Staff’s early 20th century overall strategic plan for victory in a possible future war where it might find itself fighting on two fronts: France to the west and Russia to the east. The First World War later became such a war with both a Western Front and an Eastern Front. The plan took advantage of expected differences in the three countries' speed in preparing for war. In short, it was the German plan to avoid a two-front war by concentrating their troops in the west, quickly defeating the French and then, if necessary, rushing those troops by rail to the east to face the Russians before they had time to mobilize fully.
The idea of the plan was to win the two-front war by first quickly beating France again in the west – the plan scheduled 39 days for the fall of Paris and 42 for the capitulation of France – before the "Russian Steamroller” would be able to mobilize and descend upon East Prussia. The plan depended on Germany's ability to quickly mobilize troops and invade France before France could fully mobilize its troops to defend itself, and then to turn on Russia, seen as the slowest of the three to mobilize, before the Russians were ready.
Following the retirement of Schlieffen in 1906, Helmuth von Moltke became the German chief of staff. He disagreed with at least some of the Schlieffen Plan, thinking it to be too risky. He made two major modifications:
1. He pulled significant numbers of troops away from the main force entering France from the north, in order to fortify the forces in Alsace-Lorraine, and the forces at the Russian border.
2. He decided not to enter through the Netherlands, instead sending troops through Belgium and Luxembourg only.
Moltke’s weakening of the German right, the defense of Alsace-Lorraine, and the transfer of three army corps and one cavalry division from the western front to help contain the Russian advance into East Prussia, all contributed to the failure of the German army to break through the Allied forces at the Marne. Without that breakthrough, the plan was destroyed.
Moltke also chose to send 80,000 more men to the east to assist with the Russian invasion against the advisement of General Ludendorff (two days before the reinforcements arrived the Germans had destroyed the Russians at Tannenberg). Ultimately Moltke reassigned 250,000 men (an entire army's worth) from the right-wing assault before finally abandoning the Schlieffen Plan. Repulsed by the left wing of Moltke's forces near Sarrebourg, the French retreated to the hills around the city of Nancy. Rather than sweeping around them and enveloping the French armies and Paris itself from the east, Moltke opted to directly attack their reinforced positions around Nancy which ended in an unmitigated failure.
The Germans had seriously underestimated a number of factors:
1. Belgian resistance: Although the Belgian army was only a tenth the size of the German army, it still delayed the Germans for nearly a month,
2. The effectiveness of the British Expeditionary Force: The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was small, numbering only 75,000 at the start of the war. The British were almost annihilated several times, but they managed to delay the Germans long enough for French and British reinforcements to arrive. While the BEF was forced into retreat throughout the month of August, it provided enough resistance against the German First Army under Alexander von Kluck to help induce the German general to break off the Plan. Instead, von Kluck turned south-east towards Compiègne, showing his flank to the Garrison of Paris under Gallieni, making possible the "Miracle of the Marne".
3. The speed of Russian mobilization: The Russians moved faster than expected, gaining ground in Eastern Prussia more quickly than the Germans had planned for. This caused the Germans to pull even more men from their main force, in order to reinforce the Eastern Front. This proved counterproductive, since the forces pulled from the Western Front were still in transit during the German victory at Tannenberg where the German 8th Army destroyed the Russian 2nd and eventually the Russian 1st Army. While on the weakened Western front battles were being lost for Germany.
4. The French railway system: Because of the delays caused by the British and Belgians, the French had more time to transfer troops from the border to Alsace-Lorraine. The Germans greatly underestimated how well they would be able to do this, especially with the extra time they were granted by the slowing of the German forces. By the time the Germans got into France, the French were there waiting for them.
5. Logistical shortcomings: Schlieffen does not appear to have devoted much attention to logistics when he evolved his great Plan. He well understood the difficulties likely to be encountered, but made no systematic effort to solve them. Had he done so, he might well have reached the conclusion that the operation was impracticable. Even if the battle of the Marne gone in Germany's favor, there is every reason to believe that the advance would have petered out. The prime factors would have been the inability of the railheads to keep up with the advance, the lack of fodder, and sheer exhaustion. The Schlieffen Plan was logistically impracticable.


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## mikewint (Feb 24, 2011)

As to your second question:
After the Polish campaign the Germans were in no position to invade anything. Hitler had badly underestimated the Allied response to his and Russia's invasion of Poland. He had not expected a declaration of War by the allied forces. While he had prepared for that possibility and prepared for it, that plan could not be implemented as he had also been deceived by his Generals as to the state of German troops at the end of the Polish invasion.
German casualties (8082 to 10572 killed, 27,278 to 30322 wounded and 3404 to 5029 missing) were very low compare to Polish casualties. The Germans lost some 993 to 1000 armored fighting vehicles (mainly destroyed by anti-tank guns), 370 to 400 artillery pieces, 697 to 1300 airplanes (damaged and destroyed) along with 11000 motor vehicles. According to the German sources only 89 PzKpfw I, 83 PzKpfw II, 26 PzKpfw III, 19 PzKpfw IV, 5 command tanks, 7 PzKpfw 35(t) and 7 PzKpfw 38(t) were completely lost. In addition, the Polish Navy sank 2 destroyers, 2 minelayers (some sources state that only one vessel was sunk) and damaged numerous other vessels including the SMS Schleswig-Holstein a pre-dreadnought battleship that had fired the first shots of WWII when it fired upon the Polish fortress at Westerplatte.
Some 70000 to 120000 Polish soldiers escaped to Hungary and Romania, 20000 to Latvia and Lithuania, majority eventually making their way west to continue fighting under General Wladyslaw Sikorski. On September 30th, Polish Government in Exile was established in Paris.
In general, the Polish Campaign proved to be a very challenging campaign for the Germans. It demonstrated the speed and power possessed by Panzers and Panzer Divisions. It also demonstrated that the time of large armies made up of foot-infantry and cavalry was over. At the same time, it provided Germans with real experience of using armor in combat conditions. Germans also learned that tanks were not suited for combat in build up areas (e.g. heavy losses suffered in Warsaw) as well as that well organized anti-tank defenses are very dangerous. The Polish Campaign also proved that PzKpfw I and II were unsuitable to be used as frontline combat tanks and should be completely replaced with heavier PzKpfw III and IV. During the course of the campaign, Light Divisions proved to be unsuccessful being to weak to perform the tasks of either regular infantry or motorized infantry.
Thus the German's desperately need time to regroup, repair and rearm. The allied forces gave them that time: The Phony War period


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## ivanotter (Feb 24, 2011)

Mike,

it would also be my initial take on a french campaign in October/November 1939.

On the Schlieffen plan: I believe tat Schlieffen on his death bed begged them to keep the right wing strong. Exactly what Moltke did not do.

I also read somewhere that the centre and the right of the right wing would have had to march distances that simply could not be achieved for the plan to be a success.

On the polish campaign: I have the numbers somewhere, but the amount of armour vs foot soldiers (horse as well), was apparantly surprisingly small. I have some numbers somewhere.

Have you got a take on that as well?

the period of the "sitz krieg" instead of "blitz krieg" Phoney war), well, did france actually do anything to improve anything?

After all, BEF increased from some 120,000 to some 350,00 (thereabouts).

I also perceive that the German generals appreciated the pause to assess the Polish campaign. 

HOWEVER, if they had attacked immediately, what kind of resistance would they have met? 

If it was just an improved Schlieffen, disaster again (IMO)
Manstein's plan in 1939: ?

Not so sure on this one.

Comments anybody?

Ivan


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## ivanotter (Feb 24, 2011)

All, 

I wrote a nice little "what if.." on the alternate history web site:

*Nuclear war in Southern Africa*

Now, I don't want to turn this into another alternate history web site, and the story plays out in the 1986/7.

Obviously, SA having the bomb. They (sort of) said that it would be used if anybody threatened the republic (Cuba via Angola and SW Africa/Namibia).

I wrote a little scenario where I only changed a few things from the actual history.

Would anybody be interested in giving it some fair comments?

I have attached it as a zip folder.

Advise? should I put it up here? is it worth reading?

I am obviously very proud of it.

Ivan


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## mikewint (Feb 24, 2011)

Ivan, again not sure where you are going with this. Check my post #70 the Germans were in no position to attack anyone after the Polish campaign. However back to the initial invasion.
The German forces for the invasion of Poland with the codename Fall Weiss were divided into Army Group North (consisting of the German 3rd and 4th armies) and Army Group South (consisting of the German 8th, 10th, and 14th armies, and the Slovakian Army Group Bernolak
.Germany had 11 tank divisions compared to Poland’s 1; Germany had 40 infantry divisions compared to Poland’s 30; Germany four motorized divisions compared to none in Poland; Germany had one cavalry brigade compared to Poland’s eleven. 
In terms of air power, the Germans had 850 bombers and dive-bombers and 400 fighters. The Polish Air Force numbered 210 bombers and 150 fighters – though many of these were obsolete and clearly no match for the modern Luftwaffe that destroyed the Polish Air Force within two days of the first attack.
According to the Franco-Polish military convention, the French army was to start preparations for the major offensive three days after mobilization started. The French forces were to effectively gain control over the area between the French border and the German lines and were to probe the German defenses. On the fifteenth day of the mobilization (that is on September 16), the French army was to start a full-scale assault on Germany. The preemptive mobilization was started in France on August 26 and on September 1 full mobilization was declared.
Due to a low birthrate, which had declined during World War I and the Great Depression, France had a severe manpower shortage relative to its total population, which was barely ½ that of Germany. To compensate, France had mobilized about ⅓ of the male population between the ages of 20 and 45, bringing the strength of its armed forces to 5,000,000. Only 2,240,000 of these served in army units in the north. The British contributed a total strength of 897,000 men in 1939, rising to 1,650,000 by June 1940. In May, it numbered only 500,000 men, including reserves. Dutch and Belgian manpower reserves amounted to 400,000 and 650,000 respectively.
A French offensive in the Rhine valley began on September 7, four days after France declared war on Germany. Then, the Wehrmacht was occupied in the attack on Poland, and the French soldiers enjoyed a decisive numerical advantage along the border with Germany. However, the French did not take any action that was able to assist the Poles. Eleven French divisions advanced along a 32 km line near Saarbrücken against weak German opposition. The French army had advanced to a depth of eight kilometres and captured about 20 villages evacuated by the German army, without any resistance. However, the half-hearted offensive was halted after France seized the Warndt Forest, three square miles of heavily-mined German territory. The attack did not result in any diversion of German troops.
On September 12, the Anglo French Supreme War Council gathered for the first time at Abbeville in France. It was decided that all offensive actions were to be halted immediately. Maurice Gamelin ordered his troops to stop "not closer than 1 kilometer" from the German positions along the Siegfried Line. Poland was not notified of this decision. Instead, Gamelin informed Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły that half of his divisions were in contact with the enemy, and that French advances had forced the Wehrmacht to withdraw at least six divisions from Poland. The following day the commander of the French Military Mission to Poland General Louis Faury informed the Polish chief of staff, General Wacław Stachiewicz that the planned major offensive on the western front had to be postponed from September 17 to September 20. At the same time, French divisions were ordered to retreat to their barracks along the Maginot Line. The Phony War had begun.


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## ivanotter (Feb 25, 2011)

My point exactly Mike,

The French offensive was not particular fantastic. It might have been, but it wasn't. BEF was only starting to deploy.

Were the forces in the west too few and to badly led to have offered serious resistance *even *if the depleted German army should fall on them?

THAT I am not too sure on.

Ivan

PS: Did you read my alternative time line?


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## mikewint (Feb 25, 2011)

Ivan, when you state "French offensive" I'm assuming you are speaking of the Saar Offensive. Simply put, On 7 September Eleven French divisions advanced along a 32 km line near Saarbrücken against weak German opposition. The French army had advanced to a depth of eight kilometers and captured about 20 villages evacuated by the German army, without any resistance. However, the half-hearted offensive was halted after France seized the Warndt Forest, three square miles of heavily-mined German territory.
As to your second question In fact, the allied forces were, on paper, far superior to their German opponents There were 117 French divisions in total, of which 104 divisions (including 11 in reserve) were for the defense of the north. The British Army contributed only 13 divisions, three of which had not been organized when the campaign began. Some 22 Belgian and 10 Dutch divisions were also a part of the Allied order of battle. British artillery strength amounted to 1,280 guns. Belgium fielded 1,338 and the Dutch, 656. France had 10,700 pieces. This made a total of around 14,000 artillery pieces. Although the Dutch, British and Belgians had barely any amour, the French had a powerful force of 3,254 tanks.
The French Army was of mixed quality. It had in its order of battle some formidable units, particularly the light and heavy armored divisions (DCR and DLM), and several professional infantry divisions. However, a lot of divisions were composed of reserve soldiers, above 30 years old, and were ill-equipped. A serious qualitative deficiency was a lack of anti-air artillery, mobile anti-tank artillery and radio communication systems. This was despite the efforts of Gamelin to produce mobile artillery units. French anti-tank guns were better than their German counter-parts, being able to destroy any German tank, including the Panzer IV, but some units, particularly in the Sedan area where the main German amour attack took place, were ill-equipped and composed of reserve soldiers. The French had the most powerful tanks in the world in 1940, with the Somua S35 Cavalry tank and the Renault B1bis Heavy tank, both being able to destroy all German tanks with their 47mm gun, and also being able to resist shots from German tanks and AT guns thanks to their thicker amour. Unfortunately, the French armored divisions did not have air support as the Germans did, and many French tanks were destroyed by German Stukas, or, even worse, ran out of fuel during combat. Unfortunately for the French, in 1940, French military theoreticians still considered tanks as infantry support.
In operational terms, the French did not seem to give much thought to armored units as offensive weapons. Although some people, such as Colonel de Gaulle, tried to convince French High Command, during the 1930s, of the necessity to form amour divisions supported by aviation and infantry, military conservatism prevented these "new ideas" from emerging. French High Command was still obsessed with holding the front like in 1914-1918. The state of training was also unbalanced, with the majority of personnel trained only to man static fortifications. Little training for mobile actions was carried out between September 1939 and May 1940.
Germany had mobilized 4,200,000 men for the Army, 1,000,000 for the Luftwaffe, 180,000 for the Kriegsmarine, and 100,000 of the Waffen-SS. When consideration is made for those in Poland, Denmark and Norway, the Army had 3,000,000 men available for the offensive on 10 May 1940. These manpower reserves were formed into 157 divisions. Of these, 135 were earmarked for the offensive, including 42 reserve divisions. Thus just 93 divisions began the offensive.
The German forces in the West in May and June deployed some 2,439 tanks and 7,378 artillery guns, including materiel reserves committed. In 1939–40, 45% of the army was 40-years-old, and 50% of all the soldiers had just a few weeks training. The German Army, contrary to what the blitzkrieg legend suggests, was not fully motorized. Just 10% of the Army was motorized in 1940 and could muster only 120,000 vehicles compared to the 300,000 of the French Army. The British also had an "enviable" contingent of motorized forces. Most of the German logistical tail consisted of horse-drawn vehicles.
Only 50% of the German divisions available in 1940 were combat ready, often being more poorly equipped than their equivalents in the British and French Armies, or even as well as the German Army of 1914. In the spring of 1940, the German army was semi-modern. A small number of the best equipped and "elite divisions were offset by many second and third rate divisions".
So could this German Army continue after being mauled in Poland into the face of fresh Allied divisions? Highly unlikely


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## ivanotter (Feb 26, 2011)

Mike,

I also think it would be a "dead-end" if Germany attacked in October/November 1939.

Even the wheather was against it. No wonder the German generals balked at that idea.

That said, Could superior "grip" and battle methodology have "won the day"? any chance at all?

Ivan


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## parsifal (Mar 1, 2011)

The ability of the BEF and the Fr 1st and 7th armies to mount an effective defence around the channel Ports is really a micro study of the wider problems faced by the Allies in 1940. The defenders were afflicted by a number of issues that in reality made any defence against modern tactics impossible. 

So much has been written about that campaign in 1940, and about the reasons for defeat, yet much of this analysis is still flawed in my opinion. The reasons for defeat are perhaps more easily understood, if we look at the reasons for german success, since many of the reasons for victory, have, as their fip side, the reasons for the allied defeat. 

I think the key to the German success was their grasp of modern tactical doctrine, which just happened to also be married to a good operational plan (the Ardennes offensive). In direct contrast to this was the French concept and planning. Their plans were weak, because they overestimated the terrain effects of the Ardennes, and failed to take into account the manpower limitations of their frontline forces. Exacerbating this was the French concept of the “continuous line”, a tactical concept just waiting to be defeated by mobile tactics and formations. The French did intend to undertake offensive operations, but their concept of offensive warfare was linked to the concepts of warfare that applied in 1918, and not 1940.

What exacerbated all this was that whereas the Germans in their mobile formations (and to an extent even their leg Infantry formations) had grasped and were implementing all arms warfare the allies (both the British and the French) had failed to do so. Whereas the German military operations, in particular the co-ordination between the ground and air assets were highly co-ordinated in the German experience, in the Allied experience, this was nearly non-existent. Moreover this took a long time for the allies to correct….long after the end of the campaign. 

What the allies could do, was to fight a static war of attrition. Whilst the battle remained fluid, and the allies clung to outmoded concepts of war, the Germans were always going to achieve the upper hand, both strategically and tactically. On those few occasions where in the early part of the war when the allies were not strung out in thin lines with dispersed and disconnected forces, they were quite effective in defence, such as the defence put up in front of Calais, and in 1941, in front of Tobruk. 

Moreover, it was the French who worked out part of the equation in mounting a successful defence. They worked out how Infantry should behave when confronted with a mobile armoured opponent. Rather than attempt suicidal withdrawals to the next “defensive position”, under Weygand, they realized, forlornly and far too late, that the best defence for the infantry was to stay put. Dig in. hedgehog, continue to resist, and await relief and restoration of the line by the defences own mobiole armoured reserves. But in 1940, the allies never possessed the combined arms formations, built around their armour, with the necessary skills to mount a successful counterattack. The allies lacked the necessary ingredients to do this until much later….the training, the leadership, the equipment, the management. The Russians successfully combined armoured reserves with god Infantry tactics, in their defences around Kursk, the so called Pakfronts. The British used similar concept somewhat less successfully at Alamein….they called the defensive element Hedgehogs.

In 1940, there was no possibility of the allies successfully defending their enclave, because they lacked the defensive doctrine and the counterattack capability to do so. If the allies had hung around, they would have lost the manpower as well as the machinery of war. And from there they would have lost the war…..


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## mikewint (Mar 1, 2011)

Parsifal, pretty much total agreement. If the French had actually mounted the Saar chapaign I think things would have gotten pretty hot for the Germans and Poland might not have fallen. The German high command was also not much different than its French counterparts and had also expected a long drawn out war. Had a few German Generals like Rommel and Guderian not ingored their orders Dunkirk would probably not occured. The Germans were as much surprised by their quick victories as the allies.
What is even more surprising is that the whole concept of a mobile war, the indirect approach was pioneered by Liddell Hart an Englishman after WWI


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## parsifal (Mar 1, 2011)

Whether the French could have mounted a successful offensive in the Saar in 1939 is a difficult question. On the one hand its very hard to justify their inaction, since this played into german planning to a tee. However there were a number of factors that make mounting such an attack very difficult to justify from a French perspective at the time. 

Some of the issues worth looking at…..

The borders between France and her bohemian neighbours had been redrawn in 1815 after waterloo and had heavily disadvantaged the French, to deter any French aggression through that location. It was, up to that time an historical invasion point into southern Germany. The redrawn frontiers meant the Germans held all the high ground in the region, and greatly facilitated German defensive arrangements. 

At the outbreak of the war, the French had the largest peacetime army, the equivalent of about 20-25 Divs. However this was largely irrelevant, as all the belligerents immediately implemented their mobilization plans. Unfortunately the German mobilization had started, in secret, some time before the war broke out, and in any even was more efficient than any of its opponents. I have read that German mobilization was largely completed by the end of September, whereas, the french were still mobilizing into November. For the record, the british did not complete their pre-war mobilization until January 1940, and it was not a general call up a occurred in Germany and France. 

At the outbreak of the war, fully 10 Divs of the French army were serving overseas in her empire. The French did not dare to pull these troops out without replacement (and these formations contained the best manpower and equipment of the French army). The majority of the rest were merely cadres for the 84 divs in the mobilization army….only about 5 divs were at the frontier, and nearly all of these were serving as fortress troops….in other words immobile. Contrary to many postwar accounts the French at the very beginning were outnumbered by the germans in the Alsace area….about 9-11 landswehr divs faced about 5 fortress divs. If the French had committed their interior cadre formations to the battle, they still would have needed to wait about 3 weeks to deploy, and they would have lost most of their irreplaceable regulars….those men who provided the cadres for the citizen call up….the fillers needed to flesh out these cadres. This would have destroyed the French army.

So, the equation does not look good. The French at short notice might have ben able to scrape together 5 mobile Infantry regiments for an immediate attack, by combing out the regiments from their fortified regions. They would have initially faced perhaps 6-8 German Infantry regiments. However, whereas the germans could pull in reserves from adjoining sectors, the French could not, since their other frontier forces lacked any mobility, and they had no interior reserves really. And the germans were defending behind rivers and on hilltops. Tactically, the French had no mines, no mine detection equipment, were short of barbed wire, and telegraphs, had no radios….their tank formations lacked mobile maintenance capability and their supply system was heavily linked to railheads, of which there were none through the Saar gap ,


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## ivanotter (Mar 2, 2011)

Parsifal Mike: 

Good comments. I think we have beaten this to death in any way, shape and form now.

I thought the French had more troops for the Saar. Thanks for that insight all.

Ivan


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