# bf110 exchange ratio



## steve51 (Sep 12, 2010)

It's common knowledge that the bf110 performed poorly during the Battle of Britain, but it seems to have done much better over Dunkirk against British fighters. Looking in 'Battle of France, Then and Now', the bf110 had a slightly positive exchange ratio against Hurricanes and Spitfires. There is some uncertainty in the numbers due to several engagements involved bf109s being with the bf110s and the fact that some reasons for losses are conjecture, but the much maligned bf110 seems to have held it's own.

My question is why did they fare so badly a few months later over England.


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## tail end charlie (Sep 12, 2010)

steve51 said:


> It's common knowledge that the bf110 performed poorly during the Battle of Britain, but it seems to have done much better over Dunkirk against British fighters. Looking in 'Battle of France, Then and Now', the bf110 had a slightly positive exchange ratio against Hurricanes and Spitfires. There is some uncertainty in the numbers due to several engagements involved bf109s being with the bf110s and the fact that some reasons for losses are conjecture, but the much maligned bf110 seems to have held it's own.
> 
> My question is why did they fare so badly a few months later over England.



In a way you may have answered your own question, in France they can pick the moment to attack or run, because of range the RAF couldnt really persue them. A damged hurricane would be a victory in France but could land in the BoB and vice versa for the Me110.


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## Njaco (Sep 12, 2010)

That and tactics. If used as a fighter with free range its strengths were probably much better but when strapped to escorting bombers, it was meat on the hook.


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## davebender (Sep 12, 2010)

For the same reason RAF Circus raids fared so badly over France during 1941 to 1943 even though escorted by large numbers of Spitfires. 

A defender with radar and a decent fighter control system will always have a serious advantage over the attacker. The defender will typically land the first blow from a superior altitude or by attacking out of the sun. He then has the choice to extend away (continuing his dive) or conducting a zoom climb for another pass.

If the attacker has AWACS aircraft then it levels the playing field. Now both sides get the benefit of a radar directed fighter control system. However AWACS weren't available during WWII.


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## steve51 (Sep 13, 2010)

Gentlemen,

Thank you for your comments. Taken together, all the reasons given answer my question, particularly the advantage of the defense combined with ground direction. The point that the German fighters were tied down with escort duties during the BoB brings up something that a newcomer like myself also noticed about the operations over France. It seems that the Germans, indeed all the combatants, frequently sent out their bombers without escort. I assume this gave the fighters on all sides freedom of action. I was surprised how often British and the other allies engaged unescorted German bombers.


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## Juha (Sep 13, 2010)

Hello Steve
IIRC during early combats in North Africa Vokes filter Hurricane Mk Is and Bf 110Cs/Ds fought a draw, if in their combats there were winners they were usually those who saw their opponents first.

Against Spits 110s were clearly more underdogs but the combats were not necessary entirely one-sided- On 8 Oct 43 7 Spit Mk Vs from 453 Sqn fought against 8 Bf 110G-2s from II./ZG 1 SW of Scilly Islands, end result was 5 110s and 2 Spits lost.

Juha


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## lesofprimus (Sep 13, 2010)

In all probability it was the rear gunners hitting their mark rather than pilot kills Juha...

Gotta agree with Dave and Jaco, nature of the combats themselves dictated the loss ratios... There were some really REALLY great 110 fighter pilots in the BoB, but as escorts they found themselves in some bad times...


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## Juha (Sep 13, 2010)

Hello Les
one of the Spit was probably shot down by a reargunner/reargunners at the beginning of the combat, he went missing, the other, whose engine failed just after the combat and who was later picked up by a DD didn’t know whether the tracers flying around his plane at the end of his attack on a 110 originated from the rear guns of the 110 he claimed destroyed or from unseen 110 behind him. But from other pilots stories it was clear that 110s fought aggressively and sometimes got behind Spits. The leader of German formation, the Gruppenkommander who was lost in the combat, was a ace with 12 kills.

And after all, it doesn’t make difference to 110 exchange rate, whether the kill was achieved by the pilot or by the AG/WO.

Both in NA and during the 8 Oct 43 combats neither side had the advantage of fighter control and on 8 Oct and several times in NA both sides were unburdened by escort duties. But of course the nature of combat, the tactical situation at the beginning of the combat, tactics used and the pilots' abilities had great influence on outcomes.
 
Juha


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## Jerry W. Loper (Sep 13, 2010)

There is an Osprey Duel series book by Tony Holmes about Hurricane vs. Bf-110 coming next month; maybe it will shed some light on this subject.


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## delcyros (Sep 13, 2010)

The exchange ratio of the Bf-110 was positive at the BoB as well. "common knowledge" indeed appears to be a "common myth". Also factoring in that the Bf-110c was the worlds most effective bomber interceptor platform in 1940 may explain why the exchange ratio was that positive. From known losses and kills such as analysed by danish author 
Christer Bergström, Luftskrid over kanalen (2006)


* Spitfire: 550 confirmable kills 329 losses -exchange ratio is 1.7: 1
* Hurricane: 750 confirmable kills 603 losses -exchange ratio 1.2: 1
* Bf 109 780 confirmable kills 534 losses – exchange ratio 1.5: 1
* Bf 110 340 confirmable kills 196 losses – exchange ratio 1.7: 1

The Bf-110 suffered from a negative exchange ratio only when forced to close escort orders in late august and early september 1940. Before and after this time (when these orders were lifted again), the exchange rate was very positive in favour of the Bf-110 as was the mean average from august to oct.


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## Nikademus (Sep 13, 2010)

steve51 said:


> It's common knowledge that the bf110 performed poorly during the Battle of Britain, but it seems to have done much better over Dunkirk against British fighters. Looking in 'Battle of France, Then and Now', the bf110 had a slightly positive exchange ratio against Hurricanes and Spitfires. There is some uncertainty in the numbers due to several engagements involved bf109s being with the bf110s and the fact that some reasons for losses are conjecture, but the much maligned bf110 seems to have held it's own.
> 
> My question is why did they fare so badly a few months later over England.



Situations different. During the BoB, you had large #'s of planes being tracked (including the 110 escorts) so as others have alluded, they would be faced by massed fighters swarming to their position. Without the ability to choose the time and place of the engagement and being tied to the bombers, the 110's strengths were largely nulled. (good turn of speed and excellent forward firepower)

Over NA as with France, the numbers were more sparce and 110's could operate more freely without as great a risk and there was no established early warning net to have to deal with. 110 was not totally helpess as a fighter but ultimately it was it's press that it failed to live up too thx largely to Goering. It shone as a night fighter and ground support aircraft. It just was not an ideal air superiority fighter. P-38 had similar issues till the design matured in the J/L series (and reflected in the early ratio exchanges, at least over NA for both types.)


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## Jerry W. Loper (Sep 13, 2010)

delcyros said:


> The exchange ratio of the Bf-110 was positive at the BoB as well. "common knowledge" indeed appears to be a "common myth". Also factoring in that the Bf-110c was the worlds most effective bomber interceptor platform in 1940 may explain why the exchange ratio was that positive. From known losses and kills such as analysed by danish author
> Christer Bergström, Luftskrid over kanalen (2006)
> 
> 
> ...



If those statistics are accurate, the Bf-110 did better against British fighters than the Bf-109 did.


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## Nikademus (Sep 13, 2010)

delcyros said:


> * Spitfire: 550 confirmable kills 329 losses -exchange ratio is 1.7: 1
> * Hurricane: 750 confirmable kills 603 losses -exchange ratio 1.2: 1
> * Bf 109 780 confirmable kills 534 losses – exchange ratio 1.5: 1
> * Bf 110 340 confirmable kills 196 losses – exchange ratio 1.7: 1



How is "confirmable" defined?


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## Milosh (Sep 13, 2010)

Isn't Christer Bergström Swedish?


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## Jerry W. Loper (Sep 13, 2010)

Milosh said:


> Isn't Christer Bergström Swedish?



Christer Bergstrom's statistics are starting to look kind of fishy. The RAF's own records state that it lost a little over 900 fighters during the Battle of Britain, but Bergstrom's stats credit Bf-109s and Bf-110s alone with 1,120 Brit fighters, not counting any downed by any other type German A/C.


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## Juha (Sep 13, 2010)

Hello
Yes, Christer is Swede. Those numbers are not necessary fishy, because RAF lost (Cat 3) 1603 operational types between 1 July and 31 Oct 40 for all reasons, that is figure for the whole UK based RAF not only the losses of FC

According one article by Francis K. Mason LW lost 591 109s and 261 110s between 1 July and 31 Oct 40. I have also seen figures 610 109s and 235 110s. According to BoB Then and Now Mk V LW lost 873 109s and 110s.
According to LW figures LW lost 663 109s, of which 502 to enemy actions, 98 on operations but not because of enemy actions and the rest 63 were non operational losses.
According to John Alcorn article in AM July 2000 Spits shot down 529 LW a/c, incl. 282 109s and 80 110s and Hurris 656, incl. 222 109s and 128 110s. There were also 34 LW losses to S.E. fighters which he could not allocate to specific FC sqn and 37 LW planes shot down by other RAF a/c mostly by Blenheim fighters. So LW losses in fighter vs fighter combat (excl. possible losses to Blenheim fighters and to Defiants) were 504 109s and 208 110s. IIRC Christer says that his 110 losses incl only 110s in fighter role, ie not fighter bombers or recon planes. I wonder how he had been able to exclude FC losses to fighter-bomber 110s, especially to those on return trip.
According to Alcorn FC lost 830 fighters (excl. Blenheim fighter losses but incl. Defiant losses) in air.
IMHO the biggest problem is to differentiate the losses to 109s from the losses to 110s when both types made claims in same area at same time.

Juha


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## steve51 (Sep 13, 2010)

Gentlemen,

The impression that I'm getting from this discussion is that the bf110 could hold it's own against early mark Spitfires and Hurricanes. It was the tactical environment of the BoB that negated the bf110's strengths. It seems that it's safe to say that it wasn't truly outclassed in performance until the Spitfire V was introduced.


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## JoeB (Sep 13, 2010)

Jerry W. Loper said:


> If those statistics are accurate, the Bf-110 did better against British fighters than the Bf-109 did.


By my count in the book "Battle of France-Then and Now", that wasn't quite true in BoF, but the overall ratio's of the two German types v British fighters were pretty similar.

Iin BoF:
Hurricane dest by Bf109 v Bf109 dest by Hurricane: 151:74, 2.04:1
Spitfire dest by Bf109 v Bf109 dest by Spit: 32:24, 1.33:1
Total 1.87:1
Hurricane dest by Bf110 v Bf110 dest by Hurricane: 63:37, 1.7:1
Spitfire dest by Bf110 v Bf110 dest by Spitfire: 15:6, 2.5:1
Total 1.81:1

As was mentioned about this book (and like any other such book or accounting) there are a few judgement calls others might count differently, but OTOH it's a very detailed book; this is counting bottom up from fates of individual a/c, not just totals presented to the reader. (and there's the inverse consideration compared to the Bergstrom book, I've had people say these numbers are 'fishy' when compared to all-cause losses of British AF in France, but there were also a lot of combats w/ UK based RAF fighters during the BoF campaign).

This was not as true in later campaigns. As Juha pointed out, Bf110 v Hurricane in early Western Desert was around even, and the Germans quickly gave up using 110's as escorts over Malta (without a large absolute number of losses, but they clearly figured it wasn't working). Whereas, 109E had a consistent few:1 ratio v Hurricane in Western Desert and a completely one sided kill ratio over Malta. As we've discussed before, the Greece campaign was an exception were Hurricane did well v 109E, but taking total results of Med theater in 1941 the 109E did considerably better v the Hurricane in kill ratio than it had in BoF and BoB; but 110 never even matched its 1940 daylight fighter results v the British in any later campaign. 

Joe


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## parsifal (Sep 13, 2010)

There have been pretty good discussions about RAF/LW loss rates in the following thread:

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/bf-109-vs-spitfire-vs-fw-190-vs-p-51-a-13369-50.html

I think the loss rates being quoted for the Me 110 just before and just after the BoB are close to correct. However it would be incorrect to then conclude that the Me 110 was a competitive type to S/E fighters. .

In the abovementioned thread I posted the loss rates for the LW in the period April to June 1941, which revealed some interesting trends. In April the fighter to fighter exchange rate was about 1.83:1, which is consistent with the figures being given in this thread. The overall exchange rate however was closer to 1.44:1.

By June, however, after the majority of the LW had transferred to the east, the exchange rates had vastly improved for the RAF in terms of fighter combats, where the exchange rates were down 1.42:1. Overall the RAF was by then losing more bombers which affected the overall exchange rates rather badly.

A common error in the battles over France in 1941 was that the RAF outnumbered the LW. The truth is that it was usually the other way around, and heavily so. The LW could, and did choose whether it would rise to fight, so the RAF had to present raids that were often inadequately escorted, so as to offer enticement to the LW to come up and fight.

Foreman was the source for the above analysis. He gives daily loss sheets and accounts of every action. I have not yet collated the loss rates and successes, for individual types, but having read the full account now, I can say that for daytime combats, the Me110 was completely outclassed in these battles. The overwhelming losses for the RAF in these daytime battles were, firstly, non-combat losses, followed by losses to S/E LW fighters (me109s mostly) followed by German flak. RAF fighter losses to T/E fighters were virtually non-existent. Perhaps 10 out of the 207 lost in April, and 5 or 6 lost in June. It was a different story in Bomber versus T/E fighters actions, and different again in the night intruder actions where the Me 110s were beginning to go. So something happened to the me110 between October 1940 and the following year. It was no longer an effective fighter to take on S/E fighters. 

Not related to this discussion, but it seems that in the months after June 1941, there was yet another twist in the course of the Battle. Reduced to just two JGs with which to defend, one would have expected LW loss rates to go up, but it was quite the reverse. Between July 1941 and December, the RAF lost 528 fighters to 128 (roughly) LW fighters. I think that was due to two factors. The two JGs left in the west after June were about the most experienced fighter Geschwaders in the LW, whilst at that time RAF training reached a new low. The exchange rate improved slightly in 1942, but really did not turn around until the latter part of 1942. 

Here are the summary of the losses for April and June, which I posted in the abovementioned thread. 

1) April 7-30, 1941 

RAF: 207 Fighters, 273 Other 
LW: 113 Fighters, 221 Other

Ratio of RAF losses to LW losses
Fighters 1.83:1
Others 1.23:1
Overall 1.44:1


2) June 1941

RAF: 169 Fighters, 225 Other 
LW: 119 Fighters, 134 Other

Ratio of RAF losses to LW losses
Fighters 1.42:1
Others 1.68:1
Overall 1.55:1


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## davebender (Sep 13, 2010)

> 110 never even matched its 1940 daylight fighter results v the British in any later campaign.


How many Me-110s were employed in the daylight fighter role after 1940? I'd hazard a guess not many. From mid 1940 onward most Me-110 units were converted to night fighters, photo recon and light attack. It's not surprising that Me-110s in such units fared poorly when jumped by day fighters. A-20s and Beaufighters in light attack units didn't fare too well in air to air combat either.


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## parsifal (Sep 13, 2010)

davebender said:


> How many Me-110s were employed in the daylight fighter role after 1940? I'd hazard a guess not many. From mid 1940 onward most Me-110 units were converted to night fighters, photo recon and light attack. It's not surprising that Me-110s in such units fared poorly when jumped by day fighters. A-20s and Beaufighters in light attack units didn't fare too well in air to air combat either.



I dont know, but judging by their losses over france, quite a few were shot down by the RAF. They were at least airborne in the dayligt actions at that time


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## JoeB (Sep 13, 2010)

davebender said:


> How many Me-110s were employed in the daylight fighter role after 1940? I'd hazard a guess not many. r.


Exactly the cases I referred to . Bf110's met Hurricanes by themselves in early Western Desert and Malta (both cases no 109's around at all for awhile), and occasionally in later parts of North Africa/Med campaigns time to time; day fighter or fighter/bomber Bf110 units. They didn't do nearly as well as 109's did, in contrast to the 1940 campaigns where, contrary to conventional wisdom, they often did about as well.

Joe


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## steve51 (Sep 14, 2010)

parsifal,

Does your source list how many bf110 were lost on the channel front during 1941? A list of the claims for the Biggin Hill Wing for all of 1941 lists only 3 bf110, the last on April 6.


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## Juha (Sep 14, 2010)

Hello Dave
Quote:” How many Me-110s were employed in the daylight fighter role after 1940?”

Let’s see, at least Z Staffel in North, meaning Norway, from June 41 operated from Northern Norway and Northern Finland.
In East:
I and II/SKG 210, later I and II/ZG 1. As SKG 210 it was fighter-bomber unit but flew also fighter missions. In 42 as ZG unit it flew fighter, fighter-bomber and ground attack missions. When II/ZG 1 operated around Brest in Sept-Nov 43, it flew day fighter missions.
I and II/ZG 26, fighter and ground-attack missions.

In Med: III/ZG 26, fighter and ground-attack missions.

In 43 ZG 76 was reformed for Reich Defence and flew at least at the beginning was equipped with both 110s and 410 s.

At least those.

Juha


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## davebender (Sep 14, 2010)

That's another way of saying "light attack". An Me-110 loaded with bombs and operating at low altitude is not a daylight fighter.

Don't get me wrong. I am no fan of the historical Me-110 design. The Fw-187 was superior as a long range daylight fighter. The Ju-88 was superior as a light bomber and night fighter. That leaves Germany with no good reason to produce the Me-110 except that Goering liked the aircraft. However comparing kill ratios of a light attack unit vs a daylight fighter unit does not provide an accurate picture of Me-110 capability when operating in the day fighter role.


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## Juha (Sep 14, 2010)

Dave
who is comparing kill ratios of a light attack unit vs a daylight fighter unit. At least I or JoeB aren't.

Juha


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## delcyros (Sep 15, 2010)

I think it is fair to say that the -110 did well against Single engine, Fighter opposition as of 1940. From a statistical Point of view and much better than many books make us believe. I don't think it did any better than the -109 and this Point isn't touched by the sample. The higher survivability rate of the -110 over England is explainable by -109 Defekts (Range) and does not occur in other samples. The -110 was effective in the fighter Role when used to it's strengths. It wasn't easy cannon fodder or outclassed per se. Underestimating it is One Case but neglecting the Statistics another One.


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## Juha (Sep 15, 2010)

Hello Delcyros
I agree that 110 was clearly better fighter in 1940 than its popular image is in English language literature and that it did very well during BoF. But how well it did during BoB is a little more difficult to gauge. It depends the statics one use.

I f we look Alcorn figures, FC lost 830 S.E. fighters in air, which IMHO probably means in air during oper sorties because RAF lost 1140 fighters Cat 3 between 1 Jul and 31 Oct 40 for all reasons, and shot down 504 Bf 109s and 208 Bf 110s, altogether 712. It is IMHO very probably that the bombers shot down at least around 100 British fighters, so fighter vs fighter combat (excluding Blenheim fighters) results were not far from even according to Alcorn’s year 2000 revised figures. Now the problem is how to weed away the bomb-carrying 110 fighter-bombers and recon planes. But IMHO even with that reduction LW fighters didn’t got overly positive exchange rate. The other problem is the Cat 2 planes, but that is a very complex question.

Juha


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## Juha (Sep 15, 2010)

Hello again
did same calculations by using info from Wood’s Target England (1980) and Wood’s and Dempster’s The Narrow Margin (1961). RAF lost 1092 fighters Cat 3 between 10 Jul and 31 Oct 40 and between 1 Aug and 30 Sept 40 RAF lost in combat 705 out of 802 Cat 3 S.E. fighters lost for all reason during that time frame. So 87,9% of fighters lost during that timeframe were lost in air combats. If we used that % to the 1092 we got 960. Now it is entire possible that in July and in Oct 40 % of losses due the accidents were clearly higher than during busier times of Aug and Sept and worse weather during Oct also increased the % of losses due accidents but the figure 130 (960-Alcorn’s 830) is rather high. I don’t have time to look that more carefully just now.

Juha


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## davebender (Sep 15, 2010)

I think losses caused by accidents go up during intense combat operations. Helmut Lent's accident at Paderborn on October 5, 1944 shows all the problems that combat can cause.

Pilot fatigue.
Helmut Lent was a busy man during 1944 and not just from flying operational missions. As commander of NJG3 he had to attend meetings and process a mound of paperwork in addition to finding the time for shooting down 110 enemy aircraft.

Bomb damage to airfield.
Lent had to divert to an emergency runway due to the primary runway being bombed just prior to his arrival.

War emergency measures leading to safety shortcuts.
The emergency runway at Paderborn would probably not be considered acceptable under normal conditions as an electric cable stretched across the approach lane.

Equipment / maintenance personnel fatigue.
As if he didn't have enough problems already, the port motor of Lent's Ju-88G quit when he was on final approach.

RAF and Luftwaffe pilots participating in the Battle of Britain would have to deal with problems of this type.


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## Nikademus (Sep 15, 2010)

I think the context of the 110 performance is being lost somewhat in this narrow statistical interpretation, at least as far as the BoB is concerned. The point made by most BoB authors was not that the Bf-110 was a "bad plane" but that it failed to live up to the high expectations as a fully fleshed out Long Range fighter. Georing is quoted for example as saying that the Zerstoerers were the "tip of the spear" in regards to his Jagdwaffe and would essentially pave the way for victory against Fighter Command. This proved to be a false assumption. It was also noted that early Bf-110 "successes" over Poland and France were due in part to the less intense nature of those theaters giving a false sense of confidence (in some...others in the Luftwaffe remained skeptical).....a fact which would seem to be born out by subsequent performances post BoB. (again....not uniformly "bad", but ultimately disapointing in the context from which the 110 design was envisioned)

In the BoB....the 110's failed to be able to fully protect the bomber streams and according to multiple authors, had to often "circle the wagons" themselves in order to defend themselves against marauding 1E British fighter swarms. No doubt these Luftberry circles could and were quite dangerous to attempt to penetrate and probably accounted for more than a few UK pilots. It's also been written that 110 formations often needed 109 escort themselves. All this would impact the statistics being bandied about. What's getting lost in translation is that while the 110's were busy defending themselves, successfully or not, the Bombers were getting hit by other bombers and leaving the bulk of escort defense to the overworked and short legged 109's.


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## delcyros (Sep 15, 2010)

Who can fully protect the bomber streams? How many bf-110 Gruppen were active over England and how many bombers had they to protect? I don´t think that many authors are correct in their assesment of the bf-110´s ability to provide cover when judging on these samples in a negative way. It never was in the realm of the -110c´s Gruppen possibilities.
Goring is quoted for saying many idiotic things, about basically every single sidearm of the Luftwaffe: the bombers (Dunkirk will be destroyed by our bombers alone), fighters (defense of the Reich) and transport forces (air bridge over Stalingrad is easily possible). But it´s always the -110c which catches the attention.
I have also read that -110c pilots used the lufberry circle but if You dig deeper into it it appears that the tactic was not that a bad choice for a plane with a rear gunner covering the plane behind and a very hevay frontal armement covering the plane in front of You. Particularely if forced to slow close escort. Only once at BoB did a Bf-110c Gruppe required escort by Bf-109 Gruppen and that was when in late august they were forced to close escort orders. Here it suffered a negative exchange ratio (~0.6 : 1 if I remember correctly) but when allowed to Freie Jagd it could and did effectively deal with Spitfire Hurricane in hostile airspaces with exchange ratio´s sometimes (not regularely) reaching 3:1.
I am not going to say that the Bf-110C was the better plane but it was a significantly more capable if flown to it´s tactical performance envelope than BoB does imply.
Limiting dive speed on the 110C was 750 Km/h vs. 700 Km/h for the Bf-109E and ca. 650 Km/h for the Hurricane. The 110C has a significant cruise speed advantage over the Hurricane and while the climb rate is in within the same range, the Hurricane achieves it´s best climb at a much lower speed and steeper climb angle and thus may be outzoomed by a 110C driver in a climb duel who uses the superior excess speed at equal climb rates. In close escort situation, the Bf-110c couldn´t benefit from any of it´s advantages (zoomclimb, cruise speed, dive top speed) but heavily exposed all it´s weaknesses, most notably the low acceleration, low maneuverability (initially when rolling, otherwise it´s a very credible turner) and large target size. In the High Escort or Fighter Sweep role, the Bf-110c was a deadly platform.


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## Nikademus (Sep 15, 2010)

delcyros said:


> Who can fully protect the bomber streams? How many bf-110 Gruppen were active over England and how many bombers had they to protect? I don´t think that many authors are correct in their assesment of the bf-110´s ability to provide cover when judging on these samples in a negative way. It never was in the realm of the -110c´s Gruppen possibilities.



I find this to be a bit evasive to be honest. Of course no escort fighter scheme can fully protect a bomber stream. It is also equally apparant that some fighter types are better at this critical mission than others. The "many authors" include Peter Townsend who fought in the Battle. I think his comments regarding the Zerstorer preformance have merit.



> Goring is quoted for saying many idiotic things, about basically every single sidearm of the Luftwaffe: the bombers (Dunkirk will be destroyed by our bombers alone), fighters (defense of the Reich) and transport forces (air bridge over Stalingrad is easily possible)



Implying that Goering was simply an idiot does not alter the fact that great expectations were made of the 110 in it's upcoming role in the BoB. Fact remained that the Luftwaffe had to fall back on the 109's to attempt to properly protect the bombers.



> I have also read that -110c pilots used the lufberry circle but if You dig deeper into it it appears that the tactic was not that a bad choice for a plane with a rear gunner covering the plane behind and a very hevay frontal armement covering the plane in front of You.



You missed the point i was making. It doesn't matter how effective the circle is in regards to preventing 110 losses or upping the score against UK pilots who chose to attack it. The point is that a 110 Gruppe or Staffel can't protect it's charges while its busy protecting itself. Given that FC prioritized the German bombers, such a tactic not only left the prinicple target undefended or underdefended but surrendered the initiative to the RAF. The vectored interceptors could choose whether or not to attack the luftberry circles. More often than not they went after the bombers.



> In the High Escort or Fighter Sweep role, the Bf-110c was a deadly platform.



Under the right conditions, which apparantly did not include Luftflotte 5's siutation as it pertained to the BoB. However in subsequent operations and Theaters the 110 shone in other roles such as night fighter and ground attack. In fighter vs fighter roles it's successes were more limited and often incurred a negative overall ratio of exchange with the partial exception of Russia during the early stages of the fighting. Even there however it was in ground support that the 110's proved most valuable.


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## davebender (Sep 15, 2010)

I find that difficult to believe for the simple reason that so few Me-110 day fighters participated in the BoB. Let's look at September 15, 1940 since that OOB is readily available on the web.

Document-49: Fighter Command Order of Battle Sept 15th 1940
It appears to me that 90 Me-110 day fighters were available on this date. How do you achieve a decisive result with 90 long range escort fighters when the RAF defenders have several times that many Spitfires and Hurricanes plus the advantage of ground control radar?


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## Nikademus (Sep 15, 2010)

In July near the start of the Battle 160 110's were listed available with LuftFlt 2 and 3 alongside 650 109's. After the August battles, 110 involvement was reduced (like the Stuka) as shown by the Sep 15 link you posted

The primary role envisioned for the 110 as a long range fighter was to clear the way for the mass bomber streams for the upcoming battle. In this role it was expected (by some, such as Goering) to be able to perform as good as a 1E bomber as early results seem to indicate it could. In reality the 110's had to as described, circle the wagons and protect each other's tail vs those said 1E fighters when they appeared en mass to challenge the Luftwaffe strikes leaving the bomber streams to fend for themselves or call in the 109's. In Luftflotte 5's case the only escort available was the Zerstorer, and the Air Fleet's debut against Northern England was a disaster.


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## tail end charlie (Sep 15, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> The primary role envisioned for the 110 as a long range fighter was to clear the way for the mass bomber streams for the upcoming battle. In this role it was expected (by some, such as Goering) to be able to perform as good as a 1E bomber as early results seem to indicate it could. In reality the 110's had to as described, circle the wagons and protect each other's tail vs those said 1E fighters when they appeared en mass to challenge the Luftwaffe strikes leaving the bomber streams to fend for themselves or call in the 109's. In Luftflotte 5's case the only escort available was the Zerstorer, and the Air Fleet's debut against Northern England was a disaster.




Much is made at times of the inexperience of RAF pilots, but what experience had Bf110 or any LW pilot of attacking targets protected by radar controlled modern single engined fighters. I suspect they had as much to learn in different ways as the RAF in the early days of the BoB.


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## Juha (Sep 15, 2010)

Hello Dave
In peace time 100% of losses are non-combat type, also in areas where there is no combats during wartime, simple as that. So when we talk about how big part of losses were combat related, IMHO very probably during intensive fighting their proportion was bigger than during quieter periods.

And on 13 Aug 40 LW had 315 110s of which 242 were serviceable in units ready participating attacks on GB.

Juha


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## Nikademus (Sep 15, 2010)

tail end charlie said:


> Much is made at times of the inexperience of RAF pilots, but what experience had Bf110 or any LW pilot of attacking targets protected by radar controlled modern single engined fighters. I suspect they had as much to learn in different ways as the RAF in the early days of the BoB.



The mechanics of fighter vs fighter are the same whether there is radar or no radar. What was different in the BoB was that radar, along with other tools allowed the RAF to position more fighters where they needed to be thus ensuring that the incoming strikes would require a more determined defense by the escort fighters. As such under these conditions, the 110's weaknesses were exposed to a greater degree within a short space of time same as the weaknesses of the Ju-87 were exposed.


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## Juha (Sep 15, 2010)

Hello Delcyros
if your exchange rates are from Christer’s book, I’d treat them with some caution. because at least in net discussions he had a habit to be selective with his “facts” .

For ex
in a tread in The Forum of the 1.Jagdmoroner Abteilung
http://www.1jma.dk/topic.asp?TOPIC_ID=3371
Actual losses in the Battle of Britain 

which no seems to went to cyber cemetery but on which on this board there was a thread on Christer’s “original” interpretation on RAF’s Cat 2 damage classification.

On 04 July 2004 : 22:00:20 message

Christer had opinion when trying to proof accuracy of 109 pilots claim during the BoB, 

Quote: “The twin-engine Me 110 crews with their rear gunners were just as notorious for huge overclaims as any bomber crews of any air force.”

On the other hand when he tried to proof the effectiveness of Bf 110s he tended to forget Bf 109s, 

see: Skalman.nu Forum • Visa tråd - Bf 110 - ett misslyckande?
Forumindex » Militär teknikhistoria » Bf 110 - ett misslyckande?

Christer Bergström	Från: Sverige 11 Feb 2007 19:52

…John Foreman skriver i sin bok ”Fighter Command War Diaries”, vol. 2, sid 44, om det uppdrag som ZG 26 flög den 28 september 1940: ”Det sista anfallet genomfördes mot 10 Groups område när en stor formation närmade sig Southampton. Denna visade sig bestå av Bf 110r och de invecklades i strid med tre Hurricane-Squadrons utanför Selsey Bill. Hurricaneplanen fick stora problem med dessa tvåmotoriga jaktplan. Trots brittiska anspråk på tre förstörda och en skadad, gick inte en enda Messerschmitt förlorad. De tyska flygarna lyckades skjuta ned inte mindre än sex Hurricanes, där fem av piloterna också gick förlorade.”…


The problem is that The BoB Then and Now Mk V allocated only one Hurricane plus one badly damaged, which force-landed back at base, a/c repairable, to Bf 110s and 5 to Bf 109s and one damaged because it run out of fuel. 

So I have my doubts on Christer’s rates and after a short extra study on BoB losses I now tentatively think that FC S.E. fighters vs 109s and 110s during the BoB ended something like 750 vs 712 lost, so when bomb carrying fighter-bombers and recon planes were deducted, something like 745 vs 680, ie 1,1:1. I still think that 109E was more effective than 110, so maybe 1:1 for 110 but that is only an opinion. 

Juha


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## tail end charlie (Sep 15, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> The mechanics of fighter vs fighter are the same whether there is radar or no radar. What was different in the BoB was that radar, along with other tools allowed the RAF to position more fighters where they needed to be thus ensuring that the incoming strikes would require a more determined defense by the escort fighters. As such under these conditions, the 110's weaknesses were exposed to a greater degree within a short space of time same as the weaknesses of the Ju-87 were exposed.



Nikademus


what I meant was prior to the BoB fighters patrolled or escorted. During the BoB the Luftwaffe were met by interceptors who knew how high they were and approximately where they were going before they took off, that must be a huge advantage. As you said the LW had to learn new tactics for new conditions (difficult when the head honcho is a buffoon) that isnt the fault of the plane or the pilots.


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## Nikademus (Sep 15, 2010)

tail end charlie said:


> Nikademus
> 
> 
> what I meant was prior to the BoB fighters patrolled or escorted. During the BoB the Luftwaffe were met by interceptors who knew how high they were and approximately where they were going before they took off, that must be a huge advantage. As you said the LW had to learn new tactics for new conditions (difficult when the head honcho is a buffoon) that isnt the fault of the plane or the pilots.



True, but remember that Dowding's objective were the bombers, so even in cases where the defenders knew the approx altitudes of the defending fighters, this did not automatically mean that the escorts would defend or attack at a disadvantage or be the target. It also does not automatically mean the scrambled fighters will gain altitude advantage in time in all cases. 

Detection and vectoring of defending interceptors itself does not automatically present the escort fighters with a radically different situation vs. an escort formation facing an enemy bereft of radar direction. What it ensures is that the bomber streams and the escorts wil bel opposed and/or opposed strongly more often than not and reduces the need for constant patroling or CAP'ing. Once the two enemies spot each other however, the mechanics remain the same at which point it does come down to pilots, planes and tactics.


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## tail end charlie (Sep 15, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> True, but remember that Dowding's objective were the bombers, so even in cases where the defenders knew the approx altitudes of the defending fighters, this did not automatically mean that the escorts would defend or attack at a disadvantage or be the target. It also does not automatically mean the scrambled fighters will gain altitude advantage in time in all cases.
> 
> Detection and vectoring of defending interceptors itself does not automatically present the escort fighters with a radically different situation vs. an escort formation facing an enemy bereft of radar direction. What it ensures is that the bomber streams and the escorts will opposed and/or opposed strongly more often than not and reduces the need for constant patroling or CAP'ing. Once the two enemies spot each other however, the mechanics remain the same at which point it does come down to pilots, planes and tactics.



I agree compeletely however the vectoring when it worked correctly would also give the interceptors a hight advantage. I remember reading that Bader disobeyed orders so that he would meet the bomber stream coming out of the sun (obviously the sun is in a different position in the afternoon).

IMHO it is difficult to seperate the effect of the environment the LW were fighting in vis a vis changing orders, objectives methods of escorting, types of raids etc etc from the actual hard statistics of machines available, used and lost.

Just reading the day by day history posted here I was staggered to read that the LW never discovered radar wasnt effective over 20,000 ft.
In other books I have read that they knocked out several radar stations and for a while "blinded" the chain home systems in places. However they didnt perform any systematic probing or really determined attacks to knock out 3 adjacent transmitters to create a "hole". 

As with many parts of the conflict I think we were lucky that people who knew what they were doing were over ruled by people who didnt.


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## davebender (Sep 15, 2010)

> In July near the start of the Battle 160 110's were listed available


That still isn't very many. The U.S. 8th Air Force employed over 800 long range escort fighters during the February 1944 "Big Week". If the Luftwaffe had 800 Me-110s available for the BoB I think RAF Fighter Command would be in for a rough time.


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## tail end charlie (Sep 15, 2010)

davebender said:


> That still isn't very many. The U.S. 8th Air Force employed over 800 long range escort fighters during the February 1944 "Big Week". If the Luftwaffe had 800 Me-110s available for the BoB I think RAF Fighter Command would be in for a rough time.



If anyone had 800 of any fighter in the BoB it would have been important. The war showed that both performance and numbers were important. If the Big week was met with groups of 800 LW fighters it might have been big monday.


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## Milosh (Sep 15, 2010)

davebender said:


> That still isn't very many. The U.S. 8th Air Force employed over 800 long range escort fighters during the February 1944 "Big Week". If the Luftwaffe had 800 Me-110s available for the BoB I think RAF Fighter Command would be in for a rough time.



Feb 20 1944 - first Big Week mission

94 P-38s
73 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-51s
668 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-47s

These 167 *long* range escort fighter are split among:

- 417 B-17s are dispatched to Leipzig/Mockau Airfield, and aviation industry targets at Heiterblick and Abnaundorf
- 314 B-17s are dispatched to the Tutow Airfield
- 272 B-24s are dispatched to aviation industry targets at Brunswick, Wilhelmtor and Neupetritor

Feb 25 1944 - last Big Week mission

73 P-38s 
139 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-51s
687 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-47s

These 212 *long* range escort fighters are split among:

- 268 B-17s are dispatched to aviation industry targets at Augsburg and the industrial area at Stuttgart
- 267 B-17s hit aviation industry targets at Regensburg and targets of opportunity
- 172 B-24s hit aviation industry targets at Furth and targets of opportunity

The P-47s are short/medium range fighters barely able to cross the border into German air space.

For other Big Week missions see, USAAF Chronology:


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## davebender (Sep 15, 2010)

That only holds true for early model P-47s. The P-47D-15 carried 375 gallons of fuel internally plus a 150 gallon belly tank. By March 1944 P-47s were flying all the way to Berlin.


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## Milosh (Sep 16, 2010)

davebender said:


> That only holds true for early model P-47s. The P-47D-15 carried 375 gallons of fuel internally plus a 150 gallon belly tank. By March 1944 P-47s were flying all the way to Berlin.



How many P-47D-15s were there? The combat radius of the P-47 with 2x75 gal drop tanks (150gal) was about 375mi, still a few miles short of Berlin.


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## parsifal (Sep 16, 2010)

According to Deighton there were 280 Me 110s on strength in LFs 2, 3 and 5 as off 20 July. Not sure how many were allocated to LFs 1 4.

On the 1st July 11 Group only possessed a little over 300 Hurricanes and Spits. Given the claims being made here about the superiority of the Me 110 over the Spit and the Hurricane, the question begs why could it not defeat them even with Me109s to support them, let alone doing the job on their own. And why had so many been lost in less than two months.

And this claim that the LW was outnumbered in any category of aircraft is yet another post war myth being put out by the post war german apologists in their attempts to distort the facts and hide the truth that they lost the battle. Facts are that over the operational area the Germans always outnumbered the British by large margin overall , and in the case of the Me 110 came close to parity. Despite this, the germans still couldnt win. 

I'll answer my own question.....because as a long range escort fighter the 110 was outclassed by the Spits and Hurricanes operating as interceptors, and because they consequently suffered loss rates far in excesws of their replacement rates.


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## Juha (Sep 16, 2010)

Hello Parsifal
first of all at the beginning of BoB, the 110s of Lfl 5 (a Stab plus a Gruppe) weren’t to operate against 11 Group but against 12 and 13 Group. Secondly, the fight was very bloody, in fact the only participant which lost over 100% of its first-line strength on 10 July 1940 was FC but all suffered very heavy losses. I don’t have monthly production figures on Bf 110 for the time of the BoB but IIRC the production of 110 in 1940 was appr. 1200, so appr. 100 per month, so it covered at least the total losses. The number of zerstörer diminished not only because of the losses but also because of a number of ZGrn were converted to NJGrn

Juha


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## davebender (Sep 16, 2010)

That statistic is meaningless. We need to know how many Me-110s were assigned to day fighter units. Me-110 night fighters, recon aircraft and attack aircraft like those assigned to Erprobungsgruppe 210 are not day fighters.


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## Milosh (Sep 16, 2010)

davebender said:


> That statistic is meaningless. We need to know how many Me-110s were assigned to day fighter units. Me-110 night fighters, recon aircraft and attack aircraft like those assigned to Erprobungsgruppe 210 are not day fighters.



I'll let you crunch the numbers.
Luftwaffe Campaign Orders of Battle


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## Juha (Sep 16, 2010)

Dave
my numbers in my message #37 happened to be the numbers in Zerstörer units. You probably can figure out what that means by yourself. Try to do some serious study on the subject. So it is easier to understand what others write and you don't need to write those ignorant meaningless comments.

Juha


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## Kurfürst (Sep 16, 2010)

parsifal said:


> And this claim that the LW was outnumbered in any category of aircraft is yet another post war myth being put out by the post war german apologists in their attempts to distort the facts and hide the truth that they lost the battle.



Its a simple fact that Fighter Command had more aircraft, more aircrew and flew far more fighter sorties than the Germans during the Battle, apart from other inherent advantages of the defender.

Nobody can help you if you can't get over the simple facts and create a childish distortion of reality for yourself...



> Facts are that over the operational area the Germans always outnumbered the British by large margin overall , and in the case of the Me 110 came close to parity. Despite this, the germans still couldnt win.



These are simply not facts but wishful fantasies of a partisan... if what you would be saying would be true, it describes the British commanders as absolute and utter fools, having the aircraft for the job but not using them, and when using them (see relative fighter sortie numbers - the Brits flew about twice as many) they didn't use these assets where they were needed (i.e. near German formations).

Of course thats assuming that the childishness about the RAF FC being outnumbered would be true. Of course it weren't. The historical reality was that the British for once in the war acted properly, they geared up fighter production to sufficient levels to absorb the punisment the Luftwaffe had for them in store for the summer. They had the assets and used those assets properly to prevent the Luftwaffe from gaining total and undisputed air supremacy; although the other part of the truth is that it came at very serious loss in pilots and material, and at no point theyl couldn't effectively stop German air operations.


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## tail end charlie (Sep 16, 2010)

Kurfürst said:


> Its a simple fact that Fighter Command had more aircraft, more aircrew and flew far more fighter sorties than the Germans during the Battle, apart from other inherent advantages of the defender.
> 
> Nobody can help you if you can't get over the simple facts and create a childish distortion of reality for yourself...
> 
> ...



The luftwaffe choose the point of attack and so have a local superiority the RAF had to defennd the whole of the UK. If the RAF engaged the figters one for one who would be shooting down the bombers.

All RAF accounts I have read said they were outnumbered while the Luftwaffe pilots remarked that the RAF were always there not in high numbers but always there. it was a feature of the high commands that they didnt know the numbers of the opposition the British overestimated German numbers and production while the Germans did the opposite.


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## Milosh (Sep 16, 2010)

Tell me Kurfurst how many fighters from 10, 12 and 13 Group could participate in the air battles over south east England?

What are the sortie numbers for the 4 Groups in FC?

Read some combat reports and there was *always* more German a/c than RAF fighters participating in the air battles.


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## tail end charlie (Sep 16, 2010)

Milosh said:


> Tell me Kurfurst how many fighters from 10, 12 and 13 Group could participate in the air battles over south east England?
> 
> What are the sortie numbers for the 4 Groups in FC?
> 
> Read some combat reports and there was *always* more German a/c than RAF fighters participating in the air battles.



Since the Bf110 had two engines and two crew wouldnt it have to be substantially superior to a single engined fighter to justify deployment except where a single engined plane couldnt do the job like over the N Sea


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## Kurfürst (Sep 16, 2010)

tail end charlie said:


> The luftwaffe choose the point of attack and so have a local superiority the RAF had to defennd the whole of the UK.



That assumes it was always the *whole* Luftwaffe concentrating on a single point - it simply wasn't so. They had a lot of diversionary raids in the first place, and the typical employment during most of the summer were consisting of a groups of of bombers, typically a Wing or two, escorted by a number fighters, all groups attacking their seperate targets at the same time or in intervals, while the RAF engaged those raids seperately with a number of squadrons intercepting each. 

Even at maximum effort, seventy years ago, when the LW started Verdun-like operations by attacking targets in London, there were about 300 bombers escorted by 600 German fighters. And that was when the Germans threw everything they had at London. The big picture was, and this is beyond dispute, that the RAF FC flew a lot more fighter sorties during any period then German fighters, and about as many as German bombers and fighter sorties combined. How on Earth they were outnumbered then when they had just as many planes in the air as the Germans is a mystery..

IF, and that's a big if which I personnally doubt very much they were regularly outnumbered, then simply the British Air staff did a very poor job a C&C.



> All RAF accounts I have read said they were outnumbered while the Luftwaffe pilots remarked that the RAF were always there not in high numbers but always there.



That's pretty typical of any combat account by pilots. Pilots overestimated the number of enemies by a factor of two to three, and claimed equally more enemies shot down. Their subjective perception in the heat and stress of combat, and the objective reality of how many were there and how many actually went down were two rather different things.


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## Kurfürst (Sep 16, 2010)

Milosh said:


> Tell me Kurfurst how many fighters from 10, 12 and 13 Group could participate in the air battles over south east England?



Well how many enemy aircraft did they claim again..? Absolutely NONE, riiiiiight...


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## tail end charlie (Sep 16, 2010)

Kurfürst said:


> Even at maximum effort, seventy years ago, when the LW started Verdun-like operations by attacking targets in London, there were about 300 bombers escorted by 600 German fighters. And that was when the Germans threw everything they had at London. The big picture was, and this is beyond dispute, that the RAF FC flew a lot more fighter sorties during any period then German fighters, and about as many as German bombers and fighter sorties combined. How on Earth they were outnumbered then when they had just as many planes in the air as the Germans is a mystery..
> 
> .



This is bizzarre, when those operations were mounted the RAF were pairing spifies and hurricanes for the spitfires to attack the fighters and the hurricanes the bombers 900 in total by your figures. I repeat if it was only fighter against fighter then no one was stopping the bombers which was the whole point of intercepting. 600 fighters was close to the front line strength of the RAF which had to defend the whole of the UK not just london. During attacks radar didnt work in land so many sorties were flown which met nothing and many were flown to protect the airfields of squadrons scrambled to intercept.

Radar didnt have the resolution to give exact numbers so Park would always err on the side of caution, if ever he over committed he could be open to a massacre on the ground.


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## delcyros (Sep 16, 2010)

exaggeration in numbers to be read in combat records is a normal occurance and doesn´t tell us anything. You have to compare the sortie number of BOTH SIDES instead of concentrating on the british side with sorties combat records. The latter only tell us subjective in comparison to objective points.
I don´t trust assesments of pilots who participated in the BoB either. They are subjective and tell us informations from their rather limited perspective but don´t return the whole picture, which lies way beyond their scope. They can´t do that for a number of reasons. Wh have to widen the scope of interest from the local level to the level beyond local events but still in a very shorttermed timeframe (what happened else on that day?) before jumping to general conclusions. 
Even assuming an even exchange ratio between -110 and Spit / Hurricane in hostile (for the -110) airpsace - And I believe that Bergström is correct and the exchange ratio was positive instead- that wouldn´t even come close to support the idea that the Bf-110c over England was outclassed by Hurricane and Spitfire. An even exchange ratio would imply a competetive environment. The term "outclassed" does not apply here and is used by many authors in a wrong context. Even an exchange ratio of 0.5 to 1 is still not "outclassed", compare the actions with Spitfire Zero over Darwin.


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## Milosh (Sep 16, 2010)

Kurfürst said:


> Well how many enemy aircraft did they claim again..? Absolutely NONE, riiiiiight...



Thanks for confirming that about 1/3 of FC did not participate in the air battles over south east England.

That gives the Germans about a 5:1 numerical advantage (German fighters + bombers vs RAF fighters) over south east England.


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## Kurfürst (Sep 16, 2010)

Interesting thought. Care to extend and verify it?


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## Juha (Sep 16, 2010)

On exchange rate fighter vs fighter, I counted from Hooton’s Eagle in Flames, combat losses 1 July-6 Oct 40 109s and 110s (regrettably incl. Jabos) 675 vs 790 FC S.E. fighters. 35 BC bombers failed to return from daytime operations over Western Europe (excl. Germany) during BoB. Of CC losses, max 53 was shot down by fighters, realistic number much lower, because many simply went missing, some in areas with only slight possibility of meeting a 110. The figure incl. those shot down 109s based in Norway, which are not usually incl LW’s BoB strength. So IMHO no chance that 109 and 110 fighter exchange rate vs S.E. FC fighters was much better than 1:1.2 even if we suppose that bombers shot down only appr. 60 fighters. IMHO realistically something like 1:1.15 against FC S.E. fighters and max 1:1.25 RAF as whole, there were also a few TC a/c lost to LW fighters, all of which I can recall now to 110s.

ADDITION:From Hastings' Bomber Command one sees that 52 BC bombers failed to return from daytime operations, incl those against Germany, between 1 Jul and 31 Oct 40. That doesn't change my analyze because the hyphotesis, that bombers shot down only 60 is most probably badly too low. For ex on 15 Sept Price in his BoB Day writes that out of 28 British fighters shot down on that day 13 were shot down by LW fighters, 6 by LW bombers and 9 were lost to unknown reasons. Also on 29 Sept over the Irish Sea 9 He 111s shot down 3 Hurricanes out of the first 6 to attack. That is the best result of German air-gunners I can recall but air-gunners did often good job.

Juha


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## Juha (Sep 16, 2010)

Hello Kurfürst
Quote:"and at no point theyl couldn't effectively stop German air operations. "

How about forcing LW to stop massive daylight raids against London.

Juha


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## Milosh (Sep 16, 2010)

Kurfürst said:


> Interesting thought. Care to extend and verify it?



You can start here for German numbers, Luftwaffe Campaign Orders of Battle

Kampfgruppen - 1482
Stukagruppen	- 365
Schlachtgruppe - 39
Jagdgruppen	- 976
Zerstrergruppen - 244

total 3106 in Luft 2, 3 and 5. Subtract ~250 for Luft 5, so around 2850 bombers and fighters.

RAF Aug 13 1940 
# Spitfire - 226
# Hurricane - 353 

total 579

Since you agree that 1/3 of FC se fighters did not participate in the air battles over south east England, that gives 382 opposing the 2850 LW bombers and fighters. 5:1 was being generous as the ratio is 7:1.

On Sept 7 1940 there was 
# Spitfire - 223
# Hurricane - 398 

total - 621

which leaves 410 facing the bombers and fighters of Luft 2 and 3. I'll let you do the math for this date.


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## delcyros (Sep 16, 2010)

How many Luftwaffe bf-109 -110 were shot down by Flak operating in hostile airpsaces over England? How many were lost in landing/taxiing/starting accidents? Finally, how many were lost to non operational issues (returned to factories for overhaul/repair, send to other units, expired service lifetime and so on)?
And what are the corresponding figures for RAF units, including non RAF squads involved. By the way, there were actions involving long range bf-110 in the North Sea up to Scapa Flow and beyond in long range sea patrol. I could imagine that CC encountered some either long range -110 or long range float planes (usually Do-18/-24, but only a very limited number in action).


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## delcyros (Sep 16, 2010)

Milosh said:


> You can start here for German numbers, Luftwaffe Campaign Orders of Battle
> 
> Kampfgruppen - 1482
> Stukagruppen	- 365
> ...



That´s a very selective information. The Schlachtgruppen were not in action over England but they are counted as well. The RAF strength as of aug. 1940 certainly included a number of bombers therfore as well? Blenheim fighters maybe? -Or Defiant fighters? Gladiator fighters? FAA units anyone? hmmmm...
Finally, how many of the Luftwaffe strength was servicable at any given day?


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## davebender (Sep 16, 2010)

Only at night. During the daytime the RAF only had to defend territory that was within the operational radius of a Me-109E. That's a relatively small area.


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## Nikademus (Sep 16, 2010)

Luftwaffe total strength and servicability, Battle of Britian (Luftflt 2,3,5) OOB, 8/10/40 (number in ( ) denotes servicable)

Fighters (1E) :813(702)
Fighters (2E) :319(261)
Bombers (2E) :1360(998 )
Dive Bombers :406(316)
LR Recon :113(78 )

(source: Hough, Richards "Battle of Britian")

On the eve of the battle (7/20/40) they estimate 700 Hurricanes and Spitfires vs. 1,089 109's and 110's. German servicability was roughly estimated at '3/4' aka around 75%. Fighter Command, the principle force that would defend against the onslaught had "high servicability" (?? i'd wager high means 80-90%)


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## Juha (Sep 16, 2010)

Hello Delcyros
British AA . It is usually estimated that British AA shot down 100 planes, most of them bombers.
According to Hooton, LW lost 78 109s and 110s from front-line units in accidents between 1 Jul and 6 Oct 40, FC lost 74 fighters in accidents during same timeframe, those were of course not incl. Hooton’s combat loss figure in my previous message. On CC losses I included those lost S of Ireland but not those N of Ireland, difficult to image 110 crews taking one way trip there in hope that they might pump up a British plane before running out fuel. Of course included were those CC losses which went missing over North Sea or over Norwegian Sea, over Channel etc.

I have not figures at hand on those 109s and 110s lost in second-line formations or before they were delivered to units, I have some NJG losses, but of course I didn’t incl. them to my earlier numbers.

On RAF figures the losses of RCAF, PAF etc sqns serving under FC are of course incl. According to BoB Then and Now Mk V FC lost 1023 a/c during the BoB incl Blenheims for all reasons incl accidents etc also a few friendly fire cases, victims usually Blenheims.

CC suffered also losses to Flak during its attacks against ports.

Juha


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## Juha (Sep 16, 2010)

Dave
again you are wrong. FC had to be ready to defend whole of GB, there were even few attacks against Northern Ireland. 15 Aug showed that that was a right thing to do. Also there were attacks on coastal convoys along GB eastern coast, so the convoys also needed fighter cover.

Juha


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## davebender (Sep 16, 2010)

The Luftwaffe wasn't forced to stop air raids, daylight or otherwise. Luftwaffe losses during the BoB were typically less then what RAF Bomber command incurred for a similiar size attack. Britain decided results were worth the cost and just kept bombing for 6 years straight. Germany decided results were not worth the cost so they halted the bombing campaign after only a few months.

If the Luftwaffe were RAF Bomber Command....
The Do-217 which entered service during late 1940 would receive a high production priority. Several JG worth of the new longer range Fw-190s and Me-109Fs would be assigned specifically for bomber escort. Aircraft, crew, fuel and supplies for this sustained bombing program would take priority over almost every other military program. Allied nations like Hungary and Romania would be required to contribute substantial resources to the ever increasing German strategic bombing effort. During 1942 the Do-217 would be superceded by the He-277 (those troublesome He-177 coupled engines being discarded early on in order to get the new bomber into production quickly). Half the engines for the new He-277 would be produced in allied nations.

Meanwhile the German Army and supporting tactical air forces would be about half historical size due to the bombing campaign eating up so much of wartime production.


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## Juha (Sep 16, 2010)

Dave
in your opinion, why LW stopped the massive daytime air raids against London after 15 Sept, if it wasn't because of losses inflicted by FC?


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## tail end charlie (Sep 16, 2010)

davebender said:


> Only at night. During the daytime the RAF only had to defend territory that was within the operational radius of a Me-109E. That's a relatively small area.



Dave

I dont know what you mean, If the RAF didnt have coverage for the whole of the UK with fighters then those areas not covered would be as vulnerable to daytime bombing as the whole of the UK was at night. The area covered by an Me109 was admittedly small but included the outskirts of london and a huge number of vital airfields and factories. If fighters were taken south from North england Scotland and N. Ireland it would leave huge areas of vital industry vulnerable to unopposed daylight bombing which even in 1940 could be devastating.

Whereas London was an important target and needed to be defended there were much more vital areas in the north which needed defending.


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## tail end charlie (Sep 16, 2010)

davebender said:


> The Luftwaffe wasn't forced to stop air raids, daylight or otherwise. Luftwaffe losses during the BoB were typically less then what RAF Bomber command incurred for a similiar size attack. Britain decided results were worth the cost and just kept bombing for 6 years straight. Germany decided results were not worth the cost so they halted the bombing campaign after only a few months.



Dave 

At the time in 1940 the LW daytime losses in aircraft were exceeding their production. Daylight raids needed ever more protection within the limited radius of Bf109s which were down to about 400 servicable planes by the end of daylight raids. the night bombing of UK was stopped eventually by the invasion of Russia


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## Nikademus (Sep 16, 2010)

Juha said:


> Dave
> in your opinion, why LW stopped the massive daytime air raids against London after 15 Sept, if it wasn't because of losses inflicted by FC?



Flagging morale, as immortalized by Oberleutnant Ludwig Franzisket's sardonic comment on 15 Sept.."_Here come those lasty fifty Spitfires!_" 

Hitler's announcement very shortly after that day postponing SeaLion indefinatley sealed the deal.


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## Juha (Sep 16, 2010)

One detail, according to Price of the 28 Spits and Hurris lost over SE England on 15 Sept 40 13 was shot down by LW fighters, 6 by LW bombers and 9 lost for unknown causes. So LW bombers clearly weren’t toothless on that day.

Juha


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## Glider (Sep 16, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> Luftwaffe total strength and servicability, Battle of Britian (Luftflt 2,3,5) OOB, 8/10/40 (number in ( ) denotes servicable)
> 
> Fighters (1E) :813(702)
> Fighters (2E) :319(261)
> ...



If it helps Fighter Command Records for the 10 August have servicable fighters as being

Blenheim - 60 
Spitfire - 245 
Hurricane - 382 
Defiant - 22 
Gladiator - 2 

Most of the Blenhiem fighters at this stage would be night fighters so you are looking at 627 1st rate SE fighters. If anyone wants to add the Defiants and Gladiators then they can. These figures arfe of course for the whole of fighter command.


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## tail end charlie (Sep 16, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> Flagging morale, as immortalized by Oberleutnant Ludwig Franzisket's sardonic comment on 15 Sept.."_Here come those lasty fifty Spitfires!_"
> 
> Hitler's announcement very shortly after that day postponing SeaLion indefinatley sealed the deal.



Nikademus
In fairness to Hitler and Goering (the guys often get a bad press) the Luftwaffe did destroy the RAFs frontline strength from sept 1939 to sept 1940, its just that British industry/RAF made more aeroplanes and trained/imported more pilots. For Adolf and Hermann not to consider that Britain would increase AC production is, frankly, silly (there I go again).


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## davebender (Sep 16, 2010)

The entire UK would be protected. However areas outside of Me-109 range need only be protected by second rate fighter aircraft like the Gloster Gladiator and Bristol Beaufighter.


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## tail end charlie (Sep 16, 2010)

davebender said:


> The entire UK would be protected. However areas outside of Me-109 range need only be protected by second rate fighter aircraft like the Gloster Gladiator and Bristol Beaufighter.



The Gladiator would get minced by an Me110 and as far as I remember we only had two squadrons the beaufighter wasnt available until 1941. The North sea is a large area the fighters protecting it must be faster than the bombers by a substantial margin even with radar.


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## parsifal (Sep 16, 2010)

_How many Luftwaffe bf-109 -110 were shot down by Flak operating in hostile airpsaces over England? _

Unknown, but very, very few. In the whole of the british isles, on the eve of the battle, there were 1200 heavy and 582 light AA guns. The majority of the heavy guns were wwI types, with insufficent performance to seriously challenge the Luftwaffe. Over a third of the guns were immobile, and a further third (roughly) sent to distant locations like Scapa to protect RN fleet bases. 

By comparison the German flak defences at this time numbered at leat 9200 guns. Yet German flak against strategic targets was not a major factor until the latter part of the following year, after the introduction on a wide scale of RDF to the flak defences. 

In the whole of 1940, the British flak defences brought down a total of 440 german aircraft, according to westermann. Conversely, in January of 1941, German flak accounted for just 13 British BC aircraft. In April, British losses to flak were just 36 aircraft, whilst total loses amounted to over 200 with a further 200 or so damaged.

General Pile comments in his book that in 1940, the equipment of British AA Defenders "were suficient in quality to threaten the bombers of anything but the bombers of twenty years previously" 

How many were lost in landing/taxiing/starting accidents? Finally, how many were lost to non operational issues (returned to factories for overhaul/repair, send to other units, expired service lifetime and so on)?

A huge percentage, as was being lost by the RAF under similar circumstances. During the Phoney war, the LW was losing, on average, 5-7% of its force structure every month to accidents and non-combat related courses. I expect the RAF was suffering a similar attrition rate

_And what are the corresponding figures for RAF units, including non RAF squads involved. By the way, there were actions involving long range bf-110 in the North Sea up to Scapa Flow and beyond in long range sea patrol._

Me 110s were not equipped with LR tanks until the following April, which caused a great deal of consternation to the squadrons Of Coaastal Command detailed to suppress German shipping of Norway. Blenheims were used mostly in this role, without a great deal of success, and operated beyond the effective range of Me110s operating without the LR tanks. Once these were fitted, the convoy escorts were able to reach the operating areas of the attacking CC aircraft, and inclict heavy losses on them, for virtually no loss to themselves. 

Me 110s were not considered an effective long range maritime escort aircraft, even by the LW until the fitting of these tanks. 

_ I could imagine that CC encountered some either long range -110 or long range float planes (usually Do-18/-24, but only a very limited number in action)._

True, but they were deadly once given the range capabilities to attack the CC aircraft. ]


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## parsifal (Sep 16, 2010)

davebender said:


> The entire UK would be protected. However areas outside of Me-109 range need only be protected by second rate fighter aircraft like the Gloster Gladiator and Bristol Beaufighter.




So are you admiting the Me 110 could not compete even with Gladiators and Blenheim 1Fs??? If so, how can you then argue with a straight face that the me110 was superior to Spifires and Hurricaners when operating as an escort fighter.

The Me 110 could have an effect when not operating as a bomber escort. It was 30 Mph faster than a hurricane, and packed a heavy forward firing armament. It dove well. It climbed like a dog and turned even worse. Thos two factors made it unsuitable as a bomber escort, and of only limited value as an interceptor. In the battles over France in the following year, it had virtually no impact despite several occasions of being committed quite heavily in the circus battles that developed over Northern France at the time.


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## RCAFson (Sep 16, 2010)

tail end charlie said:


> The Gladiator would get minced by an Me110 and as far as I remember we only had two squadrons the beaufighter wasnt available until 1941. The North sea is a large area the fighters protecting it must be faster than the bombers by a substantial margin even with radar.



I suspect that the Gladiator would do OK as the Fulmar did against the Me110, but an effective defence against even unescorted bombers was needed, and only the Hurricane and Spitfire could provide it. The Luftwaffe did launch a raid from Norway and Denmark against the supposedly defenceless Northern UK and it got shredded so bad, despite the presence of the vaunted Me-110, that they never tried it again: 



> . _It was the calm before the storm. August 15th saw the heaviest fighting of the whole battle...
> 
> For some time now the Germans had been waiting for this moment—the moment when the weather would be right for a concerted onslaught by all three Luftflotten. This, it will be remembered, was how they had planned to open the intensive phase of their campaign. While Luftflotte 2 attacked the south-east, and Luftflotte 3 the south, Luftflotte 5, in Norway and Denmark, would operate against the north-east. The British fighters would thus be engaged
> 
> ...


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## tail end charlie (Sep 16, 2010)

RCAFson said:


> I suspect that the Gladiator would do OK as the Fulmar did against the Me110, but an effective defence against even unescorted bombers was needed, and only the Hurricane and Spitfire could provide it. The Luftwaffe did launch a raid from Norway and Denmark against the supposedly defenceless Northern UK and it got shredded so bad, despite the presence of the vaunted Me-110, that they never tried it again:



RCAF son I have read that report before but as it said the attack was decimated (in the main) by Spitfires/Hurricanes they had to call other squadrons from scotland to help though. Where blenheims were used (as it states) they were less effective. Once the LW cross the coast Radar doesnt work so it is a question of eyesight, the gladiator and blenheim were slow they just couldnt catch an attacker. Doing OK against the Bf110 is one thing it has to evade the Bf110 and get the bombers which is a different thing altogether.

I live in Teesside (mentioned in your quote) and there were much more sophisticated defences than used in many other areas because the petrochemical and steel industry was vital, it was also involved in the early days of the Nuclear programme. The whole area had smoke generators by day and false targets (fires in the country) by night + the usual air balloon and flak.


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## davebender (Sep 16, 2010)

I'd be curious to know exactly what weapons are included in that 9,200 guns. 8.8cm heavy flak didn't even hit mass production until 1940. 2cm and 3.7cm weapons are useless against high flying level bombers.

Historical German Flak Production.
Production Stats on German Tube-fired Weapons 1939-1945


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## RCAFson (Sep 16, 2010)

tail end charlie said:


> RCAF son I have read that report before but as it said the attack was decimated (in the main) by Spitfires/Hurricanes they had to call other squadrons from scotland to help though. Where blenheims were used (as it states) they were less effective. Once the LW cross the coast Radar doesnt work so it is a question of eyesight, the gladiator and blenheim were slow they just couldnt catch an attacker. Doing OK against the Bf110 is one thing it has to evade the Bf110 and get the bombers which is a different thing altogether.
> 
> I live in Teesside (mentioned in your quote) and there were much more sophisticated defences than used in many other areas because the petrochemical and steel industry was vital, it was also involved in the early days of the Nuclear programme. The whole area had smoke generators by day and false targets (fires in the country) by night + the usual air balloon and flak.




From other accounts it seems that the Northern German force consisted of:

_"... 72 He IIIs, 21 Me 110s and a decoy of Heinkel 115C Floatplanes coming in from the north) and a formation of 50 Ju 88s from KG 30 based in Denmark. "
_ and losses were:

_"23 German aircraft were shot down which included 8 He111s, 8 Bf110s and 7 Ju88s."_
http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/0026.html

AFAIK, no RAF fighters were lost. Doesn't really support the claim that the Me-110 was some kind of wunder flugzeugen, does it?


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## tail end charlie (Sep 16, 2010)

RCAFson said:


> From other accounts it seems that the Northern German force consisted of:
> 
> _"... 72 He IIIs, 21 Me 110s and a decoy of Heinkel 115C Floatplanes coming in from the north) and a formation of 50 Ju 88s from KG 30 based in Denmark. "
> _ and losses were:
> ...



Well no, but to be fair I dont know what quality the pilots were. Also everyone on the German side were told that they would be unopposed. The Bf110s were initially identified as bombers because they had long range tanks, I think the escorts got "windy"


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## RCAFson (Sep 16, 2010)

tail end charlie said:


> Well no, but to be fair I dont know what quality the pilots were. Also everyone on the German side were told that they would be unopposed. The Bf110s were initially identified as bombers because they had long range tanks, I think the escorts got "windy"



It seems as though the Me-110 got badly hurt whenever it met Hurricanes or Spitfires on anything like equal terms. The idea that the Me-110 was a match even for the Hurricane is a bit ridiculous.


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## tail end charlie (Sep 16, 2010)

RCAFson said:


> It seems as though the Me-110 got badly hurt whenever it met Hurricanes or Spitfires on anything like equal terms. The idea that the Me-110 was a match even for the Hurricane is a bit ridiculous.




Thats what I think too although the stats are interesting in places. The fact of ariel combat is that it rarely is one fighter against another. One fighter must be protecting or attcking something and vice versa. Fighters didnt just take off to attain superiority. The Bf110 was never designed to escort and was as good at it as I suspect a mosquito would have been. I still think as an escort it would mince a gladiator or blenheim. I still find it hard to believe that a blenheim was considered to be a fighter in anything but the name someone gave it.


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## Njaco (Sep 16, 2010)

While I am not advocating that the Bf 110 was even a close match for Spits or Hurris I am surprised at how ..ummm...well they did at times against the RAF.
 
Concerning that 15 August battle, this is what I had posted from several sources in BoB thread....

"Meanwhile the rest of the Bf 110s did their best to protect the bombers. Oblt. Uellenbeck ordered the remaining five aircraft of 2./ZG 76 to attack the British fighters and led the squadron into the battle, hitting one of the Spitfires and causing it to trail smoke. Outnumbered, the Bf 110s formed a defensive circle and tried their best to get back to base. Oblt. Gordon Gollob's 3./ZG 76 managed to stay with KG 26's bombers but after a few minutes combat with the British, the squadron was down to only four aircraft. One of those missing was Fw. Linke who managed to re-cross the North Sea on one engine and land at Jever. He was finally credited with the destruction of two Spitfires."

And I know about claims and such but it is interesting that several 110s got in some licks and that OKL would even award any claims to 110 pilots.


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## parsifal (Sep 17, 2010)

davebender said:


> I'd be curious to know exactly what weapons are included in that 9,200 guns. 8.8cm heavy flak didn't even hit mass production until 1940. 2cm and 3.7cm weapons are useless against high flying level bombers.
> 
> Historical German Flak Production.
> Production Stats on German Tube-fired Weapons 1939-1945



I looked at your source which is put together by a person with nowhere near the credentials of westermann. Not sure how or why Jason Long (if its the jason Long that I know, he is a mediocre wargame designer, that often makes things upm, to be brutally honest). 

To give further details from Westermann, on Page 83 that as of 01 September 1939, the toal flak forces and searchlight forces had a numerical strength of 2628 88mm and 105 mm guns, and 6700 20mm and 37mm guns. Dont know where this notion that the Flak 18 did not enter service until 1940., it actually was in service from 1935.

The Germans added another 6700 artillery pieces in 1940, of which over 80% were Flak guns.


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## Juha (Sep 17, 2010)

Hello RCAFson
110s beated Hurricanes in France 1940 and in NA during early phase, before 109s arrived, Bf110 vs Vokes Hurricane Mk I combats resulted appr. even losses. If there was a winner it was usually the one who saw his opponent first.

Juha


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## Kurfürst (Sep 17, 2010)

Juha said:


> Dave
> in your opinion, why LW stopped the massive daytime air raids against London after 15 Sept, if it wasn't because of losses inflicted by FC?



In which fantasy land did they stop bombing London after the 15 September..?

Date: 18th September 1940

Weather: Bright and squally.
Day: London and Merseyside bombed.
Night: Heavy damage to London.

Date: 19th September 1940

Weather: Showery.
Day: Reduced activity, attacks mainly over Thames Estuary and East London.
Night: Raids on London and Merseyside.

Date: 20th September 1940

Weather: Fair with bright periods, showery.
Day: One major fighter sweep towards London, otherwise reconnaissance only.
Night: Raids concentrated on London.

Date: 23rd September 1940

Weather: Fine.
Day: Fighter sweeps towards London.
Night: Attacks on London and Merseyside.

Date: 24th September 1940

Weather: Early morning fog in northern France. Channel cloudy with haze in the Straits and Thames Estuary.
Day: Tilbury and Southampton raided.
Night: Continued bombing of London and Merseyside.

Date: 25th September 1940

Weather: Fair to fine in most areas. Cool.
Day: Bristol and Plymouth bombed.
Night: London, North Wales and Lancashire attacked.

Date: 26th September 1940

Weather: Mainly fair to cloudy.
Day: Supermarine factory at Southampton attacked and wrecked.
Night: Raids on London and Merseyside.

Date: 27th September 1940

Weather: Fair in the extreme south and south-west. Cloudy in the Channel with light rain over southern England.
Day: Heavy attacks on London and Bristol.
Night: Further raids on London, Merseyside and the Midlands.

Date: 28th September 1940

Weather: The Channel, Straits and Thames Estuary cloudy otherwise generally fair to fine.
Day: Raids on London and the Solent area.
Night: Continued attacks on London.

Date: 30th September 1940

Weather: Generally fair but cloudy with light winds.
Day: Fighter sweeps towards London, but few bombs dropped.
Night: London attacked.

Date: 1st October 1940

Weather: Mainly fair, but generally cloudy.
Day: London is the main target with additional raids on Southampton and Portsmouth.
Night: London, Liverpool and Manchester are the main targets.

Date: 2nd October 1940

Weather: Blue skies during the day with cloud building up later.
Day: Fighter sweeps on south-east London and Biggin Hill.
Night: London once again is the main target. Manchester, Usworth and Aberdeen also raided.

Do I need to go on...?


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## delcyros (Sep 17, 2010)

RCAFson said:


> From other accounts it seems that the Northern German force consisted of:
> 
> _"... 72 He IIIs, 21 Me 110s and a decoy of Heinkel 115C Floatplanes coming in from the north) and a formation of 50 Ju 88s from KG 30 based in Denmark. "
> _ and losses were:
> ...



Aug-15 (North)I/ ZG76 used improvised drop tanks and removed the rear gunners. Close escort orders were given.
Subsequent research on this day revealed both: Less Bf-110 were lost than claimed here (seven recorded to be lost, one of them to non operational causes) AND three FC planes crashlanded outside the airport (records are existing for two FC pilots bailed out), another two beeing written off with damage (but returned to airport). 12 Whitley bombers were destroyed during the bombing of Driffield.
It couldn´t be verified that no RAF fighters were lost in the action. And it is one sample, does it make the result significant and representative for the whole battle? For the timeframe of close escort orders, the bf-110 still had an exchange ratio of 0.6 to one and this sample confirms that or is in the right ballpark (=0.5:1). 
Nobody here or anywhere else sais that the bf-110 was a "Wunderflugzeug". The discussion circles around whether or not the bf-110 was outclassed as a dayfighter. I wonder how the Spitfire would do in the same situation? Flying with degraded ability at the edge of it´s range, facing a number of more maneuverable fighters. There is one example: Darwin. Results are somehow comparable to the Bf-110´s experience of the single event mentioned by You. Does it make the Spitfire outclassed by the Zero? I don´t think so. The Spitfire/Hurricane outclasses an Ar-196, a Ju-87, a Morane Ms406 or something along these lines but the Bf-110 is still competetive. This actually appears to be indicated by the exchange statistic between both types on a wider scope than a single, local event.

Btw, thanks Juha, Kurfürst and Parsifal for Your responses. I greatly appreciate Your inputs.


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## Kurfürst (Sep 17, 2010)

tail end charlie said:


> Dave
> 
> At the time in 1940 the LW daytime losses in aircraft were exceeding their production.



In which type, specifically? 109 production, even without considering the ones returning from repair centres, was exceeding their losses (all kinds); its probably the same for the bomber force, though I don't have monthly production for them in these months, from the beginning till the end of the frontline bomber strenght remained rock steadily at around 1400 or, with a few dozen more bombers on strenght than with what they started the campaign. 

Perhaps its true for 110s..? As told previously, the 110s were pretty successfull in downing enemy planes, whatever the 'conventional wisdom' is. Being a relatively small force however, they suffered a very high ratio of losses compared to SE fighters.


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## Milosh (Sep 17, 2010)

13 Aug 40

*Kampfgruppen - 1482 / 1008* (on hand / serviceable)
Stukagruppen	- 365 / 286
Schlachtgruppe - 39 / 31
*Jagdgruppen - 976 / 853*
Zerstrergruppen - 244 /189
Nachtjagdgruppen - 91 / 59
Seefliegerstaffeln -	240 / 125 

7 Sept 1940

*Kampfgruppen - 1291 / 798*
Stukagruppen	- 174 /133
Schlachtgruppe - 59 / 44
*Jagdgruppen - 831 / 658*
Zerstörergruppen -	206 / 112
Fernaufklärungsstaffeln - 191 / 123
Seefliegerstaffeln -	52 /	33 

There certainly is no rock steady strength or even an increase in numbers with front line units.

Kampfgruppen went from 1482 / 1008 on Aug 13 to 1291 / 798 on Sept 7. A decrease of *191 / 210*. 
Jagdgruppen went from 976 / 853 on Aug 13 to 831 / 658 on Sept 7. A decrease of *145 / 195*

If production was exceeding the losses, then why did the strength of bombers and fighters decrease? Not even enough spare parts could be supplied to keep a/c flying.



German a/c production numbers can be found here, Aircraft Industry Report Exhibits


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## Juha (Sep 17, 2010)

Hello Kurfürst
Quote:” In which fantasy land did they stop bombing London after the 15 September..?”

Now we all know how difficult it is to you accept that British did something right. Now what your think the word DAYTIME means?

Because the meaning of the word is well known I only comment the relevant dates on your list.

18 Sept, attack wasn’t pressed home
OK, on 27 Sept LW tried to attack London, but during the morning raid, most were forced to turn back but some a/c penetrated to London. So fairly well done by FC.
Noon attack was driven off, this raid consisted mainly fighters.
Afternoon attack, only about 20 out of about 80 bombers reached London area. So FC did fairly well.
28 Sept, in the morning 25 a/c out of 120-150 attacking got through, during afternoon only a few managed to bomb Hastings, NOT London.
On 1 Oct none got over Central London.

So IMHO FC contained pretty well those few big daytime attacks LW tried to make against London after 15 Sept 40.

Juha


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## Juha (Sep 17, 2010)

Hello Delcyros
what is the source of your 15 Aug info, according to BoB Then And Now Mk V only one Hurri of 605 Sqn was written off because of force-landing after the air combat against the He 111/Bf 110 raid, no info was it damage d by the 110s or by the appr 60 He 111s. There was also another force landing, but that a/c was repairable and plus one came back to Drem slightly dam. Also one 79 Sqn Hurri returned to its base dam, but also it was repairable. 

On 110 losses both BoB Then And Now Mk V and Vasco Cornwell in their Zerstörer agree that 7 110s were lost, one of which total loss after crashlanding because of combat dam. 2 returned damaged.

So 7 lost vs one Hurri which was lost after forced landing after combat. So 7:1 or 7:0 depending the reason of Hurri force-landing.

Juha

ADDITION: Forgot to mention, that in all lost and dam 110s there had been 2 man crews, so after all they carried WO/AGs. But I agree that the 15 Aug combat wasn't representative because the problems with the aux fuel tank, and that is mentioned in all books I have read on that combat IIRC.


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## Glider (Sep 17, 2010)

Milosh said:


> 13 Aug 40
> 
> *Kampfgruppen - 1482 / 1008* (on hand / serviceable)
> Stukagruppen	- 365 / 286
> ...



When you also consider the RAF figures of servicable aircraft for the same dates:-

Fighter Command Serviceable Aircraft as at 0900 hours, 13 August 1940
Blenheim - 71 
Spitfire - 226 
Hurricane - 353 
Defiant - 26 
Gladiator - 2 
Total - 678 

Fighter Command Serviceable Aircraft as at 0900 hours, 7th September 1940
Blenheim - 44 
Spitfire - 223 
Hurricane - 398 
Defiant - 20 
Gladiator - 9 
Total - 694 

Detail from http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/calendar.html#evntaug

RAF fighter strength had increased slightly whilst the German fighter strength was down by approx 20-25%. With figures like that the writing was on the wall.

Kurfurst, can you tell us where you get your figures to support your posting as there seems to be a significant difference?


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## davebender (Sep 17, 2010)

"In Service" and "in mass production" aren't the same thing. Small numbers of modern 8.8cm Flak18 were in service as soon as the weapon was accepted by RLM. 

Production Stats on German Tube-fired Weapons 1939-1945
1939. 183 x 8.8cm Flak produced. 
15 weapons per month is not mass production.

1940. 1,130 x 8.8cm Flak produced. 
This is mass production.


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## Milosh (Sep 17, 2010)

davebender said:


> "In Service" and "in mass production" aren't the same thing. Small numbers of modern 8.8cm Flak18 were in service as soon as the weapon was accepted by RLM.
> 
> Production Stats on German Tube-fired Weapons 1939-1945
> 1939. 183 x 8.8cm Flak produced.
> ...



Am 1. September 1939 waren vorhanden:

* 6.072 Stück 2-cm-Flak 30 und 38
* 1.030 Stück 3,7-cm-Flak 18 und 36
* *2.459 Stück 8,8-cm-Flak 18 und 36*
* 64 Stück 10,5-cm-Flak 38

Lexikon der Wehrmacht - Fugabwehrwaffen (Flak)


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## tail end charlie (Sep 17, 2010)

Kurfürst said:


> In which type, specifically? 109 production, even without considering the ones returning from repair centres, was exceeding their losses (all kinds); its probably the same for the bomber force, though I don't have monthly production for them in these months, from the beginning till the end of the frontline bomber strenght remained rock steadily at around 1400 or, with a few dozen more bombers on strenght than with what they started the campaign.
> 
> Perhaps its true for 110s..? As told previously, the 110s were pretty successfull in downing enemy planes, whatever the 'conventional wisdom' is. Being a relatively small force however, they suffered a very high ratio of losses compared to SE fighters.



The production figures I saw were for 1940 Bf109 = 1868 and for 1941 = 2628 That is 5.1 and 7.2 per day.

Answers by others give the actual fall in front line strength


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## Nikademus (Sep 17, 2010)

tail end charlie said:


> Nikademus
> In fairness to Hitler and Goering (the guys often get a bad press) the Luftwaffe did destroy the RAFs frontline strength from sept 1939 to sept 1940, its just that British industry/RAF made more aeroplanes and trained/imported more pilots. For Adolf and Hermann not to consider that Britain would increase AC production is, frankly, silly (there I go again).



Hi,

The point however, made by the authors (and all the others who's work i've studied thus far on the Battle) is that the signifigance of Sept 15 (such that it's called Battle of Britian day) is that it represented the Luftwaffe's last major effort to establish full dominance over FC. As the author's of the OOB figures i previously posted pointed out, that FC only shot down 1/3 of the numbers they thought they did at the end of the day didn't matter. What mattered was that they'd survived again, and bloodied the Luftwaffe in the process (and by bloodied, that includes damage, harassement and wounding of crews). 

The signifigance of the "Last 50 Spitfires" cannot be overstated in regards to failing Luftwaffe morale. These men had been giving their all at a grueling pace for weeks and on the eve of each major thrust, they were being continually told that with just one more major effort, final success would be there's and all the effort and sacrifice of past days would be justified....the enemy was on the ropes....their last reserves of aircraft thinning out etc etc. Yet here again on Sept 15 the bomber streams and their escorts were facing masses of interceptors (aka The "last 50" spitfires) who's fighting spirit and determination were still in place. Too often people focus on statistical information and discount the human factor in warfare. In the end airforces, like armies are made up of people. People arn't robots and their mental conditions, if not quantifiable are still critical elements of an effective fighting force.

After Sept 15 (according to some authors), Luftwaffe morale cracked. The bomber crews had lost faith in the escorts being able to protect them and the fighter crews were demoralized in the face of an enemy that refused to be humbled or beaten and was clearly not on it's Last 50 Spitfires as they were continually being told. (and despite all their efforts and successes would get berated after the battles) The fighting would continue after Sept15 and more lives on both sides would be spent....but Sept15 for many marked the day that the Battle as a whole was won. Hitler's cancellation of Sealion is seen as further proof of this.


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## Nikademus (Sep 17, 2010)

tail end charlie said:


> . The Bf110 was never designed to escort and was as good at it as I suspect a mosquito would have been.



Actually it was designed to escort. The entire long range fighter concept revolved around the question (aka problem) of how to extend fighter coverage to a bomber force.


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## Juha (Sep 17, 2010)

Hello Dave
if you have had studied many statistics on production for LW, you might have noticed that fairly often the 1939 production figures in fact means production between 1 Sept-31 Dec 39.

Juha


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## Kurfürst (Sep 17, 2010)

tail end charlie said:


> The production figures I saw were for 1940 Bf109 = 1868 and for 1941 = 2628 That is 5.1 and 7.2 per day.



Newly accepted (ie. new production w/o repair centres) Bf 109s between 29 June 1940 and 31 October 1940:

E-1: 45
E-1/B: 110
E-3a: 75
E-4: 47
E-4/N: 20
E-4/B: 211
E-4/BN: 15
E-7: 186
F-1: 9
Total: 718

From RLM Delivery reports.

Total destroyed in the same period:

To enemy action: 502
Accidents in operations: 98
Accidents outside the scope of operations: 63

Total: 663

Via Wood and Dempster, drawing from LW Quartermaster reports.

Add to that that there were substantial reserves of 109 from existing production before the Battle - just take a look at lossse. Whatever the reason was for the Germans not to deploy their fighter reserves to frontline, it certainly not production - that was more than sufficient. Perhaps they considered that it was enough to maintain the numbers of those units that actually fought. Another thing to consider is the "statistical losses" - ie. these strenght figures relate to role, ie. day fighters and so on. But during the Battle some Gruppen were re-designated as Night Fighters and were withdrawn to Germany. Naturally these no longer show up in the Day Fighter statistics.



tail end charlie said:


> Answers by others give the actual fall in front line strength



The problem is that it comes from a poster who has been banned from here three times already and has zero credibilty. I suspect the figures are for the aircraft deployed against Britain - but for example see Murray for the actual frontline strenght of bombers, they certainly did not fall but remained constant through the battle, even slightly increasing to 1423 by the end of October, starting from something like 1393 in the end of June. These figures of Murray are of course for the entire LW. It has to be noted that not all strenght was deployed against Britain.

Fact of the matter is, the Luftwaffe started its air attacks on Britain at around July 1940 and did not stopped them until May 1941, when they re-deployed their forces against the USSR, regardless if some people want to believe they all the sudden were "forced" to stop it in September, or in October, they simply didn't, and came back the next day and the day following, as weather permitted, naiively ignorant of that the Battle has supposedly "ended".


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 17, 2010)

davebender said:


> "In Service" and "in mass production" aren't the same thing. Small numbers of modern 8.8cm Flak18 were in service as soon as the weapon was accepted by RLM.
> 
> Production Stats on German Tube-fired Weapons 1939-1945
> 1939. 183 x 8.8cm Flak produced.
> ...





Milosh said:


> Am 1. September 1939 waren vorhanden:
> 
> * 6.072 Stück 2-cm-Flak 30 und 38
> * 1.030 Stück 3,7-cm-Flak 18 und 36
> ...



2,459 8.8 cm Flak 18/36 were not produced in 1939. They were on hand in 1939. 

Flak 18 production started in 1928. Major production started during the Spanish Civil War.

In 1939 only 138 Flak 18/36 were produced, however the Germans already had 2,459 Flak 18/36 in the inventory when the war started on 1 Sept. 1939.


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## parsifal (Sep 17, 2010)

Thought this analysis might be of interst:

For the overall strengths of the whole air force, including those elements not actively engaged in the battle, Ellis gives the following Monthly subtotals. 

Explanation: XX/YY = RAF/LW

August 1940: 2913/3015
December1940:	2916/2805
June 1941:	3106/3451	

Ellis gives the following information with regards to serviceable strengths for both the RAF and the LFs 2 3 of the Lufwaffe at selected dates

July 6 1940
SE Fighters: 644 /760*
TE Fighters: (?)/220*
Ground Attack:	(?)/280*
Level Bombers:	(?)/1200*
*: At this date serviceability was only about 50% of the figures given, due to the state of the airfields in Northern France. 

July 20 1940:
SE Fighters: 658 /656
TE Fighters: (?)/168
Ground Attack:	(?)/261
Level Bombers:	(?)/998

August 10 1940:
SE Fighters: 749 /805
TE Fighters: (?)/224
Ground Attack:	(?)/261
Level Bombers:	(?)/998

September 07 1940:
SE Fighters: 746 /623
TE Fighters: (?)/129
Ground Attack:	(?)/180
Level Bombers:	(?)/772

September 28 1940:
SE Fighters: 732 /275
TE Fighters: (?)/230
Ground Attack:	(?)/276
Level Bombers:	(?)/750

Deighton confirms the catastrophic loss in serviceability for Me109s. He lists the serviceability of the JGs as 238 as of early October. 

Ellis provides further figures on the whole of the Luftwaffe at selected dates. These numbers are totals, but don’t include reserves (if there were any):

June 1940: 1107 (SE) F, 357 (TE)F, 453 Ground Attack, 1380 Bombers, 357 Trans
September 1940: 932 (SE) F, 181 (TE)F, 483 Ground Attack, 1420 Bombers, 365 Trans
December 1940: 832 (SE) F, 241 (TE)F, 482 Ground Attack, 1330 Bombers, 415 Trans

With regards to numbers of sorties flown and bomb tonnages dropped, the Luftwaffe showed a dramatic loss of efficiency:
Sorties/tons dropped
Sept: 7260/7044, Oct: 9911/9113, Nov (c) 6000/6510, Dec 3844/4323 

With regard to outright losses, Ellis provides the following statistics. Numbers in brackets show non combat losses (accidents mostly) where available, and included in the totals:
RAF: Fighter/Other, Luftwaffe SE fighter/TE Fighter/Ju87/Bomber/Other 
10-30 July RAF: 75(27)/8(1), LW: 40(2)/9(3)/8(2)/108(29)/6(1)
31 July to 27 August:	RAF: 284(30)/30(7), LW: 160(29)/108(6)/58(2)/248(51)/21(9)
28 August to 01 October:	RAF: 471(32)/12(5), LW: 300(35)/100(6)/10(10)/335(68)/28(18) 
02 October to 31 October:RAF: 174(57)/11(7), LW: 136(24)/26(12)/4(4)/190(64)/19(9)

In that period, the following se fighters were delivered to the RAF/LW
June: 446/164, July 496/220, Aug 476/173, Sept 467/218, Oct 469/144

Just comparing losses to additions, I calculate the Luftwaffe to have undergone the following changes to its SE Fighter OB in that July/October period

July: +180, August: +13, Sep -82, Oct +8

Overall, its true that more aircraft joined the LW than were lost, however this does not translate to a corresponding increase in frontline/operational strengths for the Fighter arm And we have not looked at what happened to the other types in Luftwaffe service. Compared to the net increases occurring in the RAF including reserves, Luftwaffe gains in numbers were trifling, and when serviceability rates were considered, losses were catastrophic.


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## Kurfürst (Sep 17, 2010)

Juha said:


> Hello Kurfürst
> Quote:” In which fantasy land did they stop bombing London after the 15 September..?”
> 
> Now we all know how difficult it is to you accept that British did something right.



Spare me of your verbal diarrhea and concentrate on the facts please.




Juha said:


> Now what your think the word DAYTIME means? Because the meaning of the word is well known I only comment the relevant dates on your list.



Let's concentrate on the facts again. You lost connection so much with reality that you started to spout absolute nonsense, which was firmly shown to be of that nature. 

Just to brush your memory a bit, you have stated:

"LW stopped the massive daytime air raids against London after 15 Sept"

I've shown that just about every day after your silly claim, they kept coming, as the detoriating weather permitted, or went after other targets just the same, regardless of the resistance FC could, of course, still show.

So if you prefer to present again your usual partisan reaction of stubbornly hanging onto your previously stated fantasy, pretending that what was made very clear in my previous post did not happen, its your problem then. 



> So IMHO FC contained pretty well those few big daytime attacks LW tried to make against London after 15 Sept 40.



Ok, so that's your opinion. At least we can agree that your earlier comment about the LW suddenly disappearing from over London after the 15 was absolute rubbish.


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## Kurfürst (Sep 17, 2010)

parsifal said:


> September 28 1940:
> SE Fighters: 732 /*275*
> TE Fighters: (?)/230
> Ground Attack:	(?)/276
> ...



Actual Luftwaffe SEF strenght and servicibilty on the 28 September:

Single engine fighters - 28.09.40

1132 Bf 109s on establishment, 920 on strenght, 712 servicable (77,4%. Fighter command's servicibilty rates were around 65% at the same period).

So either Ellis and Deighton made a typo, or they were on some kind of mushroom when they wrote it.
But I suppose Ellis made a typo, and Deighton, who used only secondary sources, copied his mistake.


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## parsifal (Sep 17, 2010)

we have this discussion before, perhaps you recall, and when questioned as to why they (the germans) would find it necessary to switch from daylight attacks to night bombing attacks, if those serviceability rate were correct, and abandon their original directive of destroying the RAF as a viable force in SE England, your reply was less than convincing to me. As I recall, your reply was along the lines "oh, they achieved all that they set out to do, and simply moved on to different targets". Effectively, you were claiming the battle as a german victory. 

I beg to differ. 

Moreover, I think you know the quirks in the official LW records concerning serviceability rates, but arent fessing up as to the impact those quirks have on discussions like this.

So I would prefer Ellis and Deightons research over your propaganda anytime i am afraid, particularly in the light of your belief, previously stated that the germans won their battle and achieved all that they set out to do


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## Kurfürst (Sep 17, 2010)

And unless you manage to quote me, I will assume you are, becoming desparate again, resorting to your favourite tactic of lies and strawman arguements 

re: "quirks in the official LW records" - what "quirks"?  

This frankly reads to me: I've made it all up from my fantasies, now they bang my head with the actual reports, so it must be some kind of weird conspiracy, people 70 years ago falsifying their report to their superiors, risking court martial just to prove ME wrong in internet discussion of great global importance...


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 17, 2010)

Alright guys I can see where this is going!

Keep it civil or else...


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## parsifal (Sep 17, 2010)

I can find your previous posts with a little searching, no problem, but to save time, why not aswer the following question now

Who won the battle
Did the germans achieve the aims of their battle plan
why did the Germans switch from daylight attacks to night raids
did the germans cease daylight attacks on RAF installations and if so, why 

That way, if you have a changed position we dont have to go through this endless process of recrimination and name calling


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## tail end charlie (Sep 17, 2010)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Alright guys I can see where this is going!
> 
> Keep it civil or else...



Gentlemen 

Much of this part of the discussion was started by my statement as follows.

*At the time in 1940 the LW daytime losses in aircraft were exceeding their production. Daylight raids needed ever more protection within the limited radius of Bf109s which were down to about 400 servicable planes by the end of daylight raids. the night bombing of UK was stopped eventually by the invasion of Russia *

"At the time" was the period around the 15th of September which was the point of discussion. From the figures in the day by day history by Najco are the totals damaged and destroyed 

Date.......RAF........Luftwaffe 
Sept

11.......... 29...........25
12............2...........13
13........... 3...........10
14 ..........14 ..........14
15...........36...........99
16.............5..........18
17.............8........... 8

Of course the figures are open to dispute and argument about what is damaged and what is destroyed but so far I havnt seen anyone disputing that history. The losses on the 15th were completely unsustainable at 99 per day which is why Germany had to change tactic. The tactic behind the raids was a final blow to finish the RAF off with a final mass battle but the 15th September showed that the Luftwaffe was in the greater danger. They were unsustainable for the RAF too but it wasnt their choice.

Many of the figures quoted are for months or more which averages out days of high loss with days where flying was impossible. My point was that as a strategy it had to be abandoned the LW could not sustain losses of planes (and also pilots/crew) of 99 per day nor anything like it. You could average the losses suffered by the USAAF at schwinefurt to make them reasonable in a two month period.

As there are personal issues of which I have no knowledge I will duck out of this discussion, I feel my point was valid and has been sidetracked into minutae. However I think the answer to this is that Sealion was cancelled officially on the 17th September 2 days after the disasterous raid of the 15th raids after the 17th were for a different objective.


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## Kurfürst (Sep 17, 2010)

parsifal said:


> I can find your previous posts with a little searching...



Then do so. Until then, my comments stand.



parsifal said:


> Until then, why not aswer the following question now..



Because you brought it up, the burden of proof is upon you, and finally because I am not playing your games which only aim to sidetrack the question at hand. 



> That way, if you have a changed position..



I can't change a position I haven't made. When you run out of arguments and facts, you went back to the same old routine, ad hominem discrediting by stating a nonsense and then crediting it to me and using fancy words like 'propaganda'
As usual you are trying to drag down other to the mud, but unfortunately for you, I do not play this game. If you dug a hole for yourself, get out there by yourself..


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## tomo pauk (Sep 17, 2010)

Despite the usual outbursts, very informative thread. Thanks, fellas.


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## Nikademus (Sep 17, 2010)

well on a lighter note......I actually have a soft spot for the Bf-110. It's a cool looking plane....especially with the shark mouth art....and I just love saying the word "_Zerstorer_"


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## Nikademus (Sep 17, 2010)

Some exchange estimates (fighter vs Fighter only) for my cool _Zerstorer_

*France/Ger 1939 -40 eve of Blitzkrieg*

110 kills:

2 x H-75A
1 x MS-406

110 losses:

5 to Hurricane
2 to H-75A
1 to MS-406

*Greece and Yugoslavia 1941*

110 kills:

7 x Hurricane
1 x Blenheim IF
1 x Y-Fury
1 x Y-Hurricane

110 losses

4 to Hurricane
3 to Y-109
2 to Y-Fury


*Malta 1941-42*

110 kills:

2 x Beaufighter
1 x Sea Hurricane

110 losses:

10 to Hurricane
1 to Sea Hurricane
1 to Beaufighter
1 to Fulmar 

*Iran 1941*

110 losses:

2 to Gladiator

*North Africa 1940-42 *

110 kills:

18 x Hurricane
8 x Tomahawk
1 x Beaufighter

110 losses

32 to Hurricane
15 to Tomahawk
7 to Kittyhawk
3 to Beaufighter
1 to Blenheim IVF

*Tunisia campaign 1943*

110 kills:

7 x P-38
1 x P-40
3 x Spitfire
1 x Beaufighter

110 losses:

5 to Spitfire
1 to Beaufighter
11 to P-38
1 to Kittyhawk
1 to Mosquito

sources: Christopher Shores and friends.


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## Juha (Sep 17, 2010)

Hello Kurfürst
now because none of the 18 Sept raids were massive, usually only small number of Ju 88s with massive escort attacking targets SE of London. Only substantial bomber attack was that of III/KG 77, so one Gruppe, which lost 9 of its planes.
27 Sept, morning attack was made by 15 Ju88s of I./KG 77 with heavy escort, 4 Ju 88s were shot down and the others never reached London, hardly a massive attack or successful. If we call 80 bomber attack massive, afternoon attack counts, II. and III./KG 77 lost 8 Ju 88s. LW would have been very happy in 43-44 if it had succeeded deflect 75% of 8th AF bomber formation from its target. IMHO that only shows that FC could effectively hinder LW operations.
28 Sept, 120-150 a/c, a Gruppe of Ju 88s at most with very heavy fighter escort, main purpose was to ambush fighters which worked very well, 16 to 4 to Germans, but a massive bomber attack on London?

So in 2 weeks one attack, if we can called a attack of appr 80 bombers, of which only 25% got over their targets, massive. Hardly “just about every day” but lets others decide which of us “prefer to present again ones usual partisan reaction of stubbornly hanging onto your previously stated fantasy”.

Juha


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## Juha (Sep 17, 2010)

Hello Nikademus
I also have a soft spot for 110, IMHO it was a better plane than its popular image in English speaking nations implies. And cool looking plane. With or without shark mouth it looks a bit like hunting shark. It had looks of a killing machine, just like its little brother.

And thanks again for your victory/loss info!

Juha


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## parsifal (Sep 17, 2010)

_Then do so. Until then, my comments stand_.

I can and will do that, but your comments arent very informative at this point. I would have thought you would jump at the opportunity to clarify what it is you believe are the correct answers to the questions I have posed to you? 


_Because you brought it up, the burden of proof is upon you, and finally because I am not playing your games which only aim to sidetrack the question at hand_. 

This is not a court of law....ther is no "burden of proof". Its a discussion board, wher people make plain their views on subjects. I made a statement, you made another statement, neither of which are conclusive or helpful. I would have thought you would want to clear up your actual beliefs on these questions. That way, whatever you said, or did not say, in the past is largely superceded, (or confirmed) by a more recent statment that you can make

I am not trying to sidetrack the issue at all or play games with you . And neither am I trying to use flaming tactics to derail the discussion. I am trying to give you the opprtunity to clearly state what it is you believe, within the direct context of this thread. You have the invitation to state your case I dont understand why you find that so offensive. I cannot be fairer than that. I would therefore ask you to provide your views on the four simple questions that I have asked of you. There can be be no fairer or more direct method of determining what it is you believe than to ask you. 

_I can't change a position I haven't made. When you run out of arguments and facts, you went back to the same old routine, ad hominem discrediting by stating a nonsense and then crediting it to me and using fancy words like 'propaganda'
As usual you are trying to drag down other to the mud, but unfortunately for you, I do not play this game. If you dug a hole for yourself, get out there by yourself._

I havent dug any holes. You said what you said. But that is the past. Now you are saying you didnt say it. Why not clear the whole thing up by making plain to the rest of us what it is you really believe are the correct answers to the questions I have posed to you? I am offering you the oportunity here and now to put your opinions on the table in whatever form you want, and clear this up. you are refusing. Which is odd to me, to put it mildly.


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## Milosh (Sep 17, 2010)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> 2,459 8.8 cm Flak 18/36 were not produced in 1939. They were on hand in 1939.
> 
> Flak 18 production started in 1928. Major production started during the Spanish Civil War.
> 
> In 1939 only 138 Flak 18/36 were produced, however the Germans already had 2,459 Flak 18/36 in the inventory when the war started on 1 Sept. 1939.



'*Am 1. September 1939 waren vorhanden:*' translates as '*1 September 1939 were present:*' or 'onhand', so I don't know where you got the idea that I was saying there was 2459 Flak 18/36s produced in 1939.


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## RCAFson (Sep 17, 2010)

The Bf110 must have cost at least twice as much as a SE fighter and, in 1940, represented the pinnacle of German aircraft technology yet it was soundly defeated by the Hurricane, an aircraft which was a decidedly low tech, low cost, approach to building a monoplane fighter.


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## Glider (Sep 17, 2010)

Kurfürst said:


> Actual Luftwaffe SEF strenght and servicibilty on the 28 September:
> 
> Single engine fighters - 28.09.40
> 
> ...



Thanks for the information Kurfurst. I notice from the evidence that you put forward that the establishment of fighters and fighter pilots was 1,132 machines and pilots. You correctly state that there were 712 servicable me 109's that is unquestionable but I also notice that the Luftwaffe only had 676 pilots, around 60% of their establishment. 

I also notice that when you compare the Luftwaffe figures with the pre BOB figures as at 26th June you see a marked reduction in the strength of the Me 109 fighter fleet.

Establishment
June 1171 fighters and pilots 
September 1132 fighters and pilots a drop of 39 aircarft/pilots

On Strength
June 1107 aircraft
September 920 aircraft a drop of 187 aircraft

Aircraft Servicable
June 856 aircraft
September 712 aircraft a drop of 144 aircraft

Pilots Present
June 1126 pilots
September 917 pilots a drop of 209 pilots

Pilots Ready
June 906 pilots
September 676 pilots a drop of 230 pilots. Of all the criteria this is probably the most important and the %age fall is really scary, being close to a quarter.

So clearly there was a massive drop in strength of both the pilots and aircraft of Me109 between June and September resulting in a number of units being at around 2/3rds of their original strength.
However, there is one interesting feature and that is there are more servicable aircraft than pilots. On the front line RAF squadrons there were more pilots than aircraft even at the height of the battle in the darkest days.
So what is the explanation for the difference in the Luftwaffe, if it isn't that the above figures include the reserves?

I don't know the reason, do you have any information


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## steve51 (Sep 17, 2010)

Thank you Nikademus for those loss rates in several theaters. Along with those, we know from JoeB that the bf110 downed 78 British fighters during the Battle of France while losing 43. During this discussion only Delcyros mentioned bf 110 exchange ratios in the BoB of 340 victories for 196 loses, per Bergstrom. I take it that some are skeptical of these numbers. Are there generally accepted figures for bf110 exchange ratios during the BoB? 

Also, occasional unpleasantness notwithstanding, this has been a very informative thread. Thank you all.


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## fastmongrel (Sep 18, 2010)

I also like the look of the Bf110 but even after reading this thread and some books and the internet I am still a little confused as to what the exact mission the Luftwaffe planned for the 110. I know what it ended up doing but what exactly was its original mission or werent things thought through so much in the days before accountants got there sticky fingers on the world.


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## Kurfürst (Sep 18, 2010)

fastmongrel said:


> I also like the look of the Bf110 but even after reading this thread and some books and the internet I am still a little confused as to what the exact mission the Luftwaffe planned for the 110. I know what it ended up doing but what exactly was its original mission or werent things thought through so much in the days before accountants got there sticky fingers on the world.



Frankly I don't think they ever figured it out.. the book by Mankau and Petrick is very interesting, as it details the pre-war thinking about how to employ this kind of fighter - and interestingly enough, even in the mid-1930s, they already considered the "battering ram" and long range escort fighter mission essentially a suicide mission. 

So no, they don't seem to have been very keen about the idea from the start, and no, there weren't any high hopes placed for it acting as an escort; it was hardly a nasty surprise, as common Anglo-Saxon authors suggest, that the aircraft would work in that role. 

It seems to me that the doctrine for the plane a sort of jack of all trades, like the destroyers of the navy. Let us not forget, that when the 110 (and P-38!) was designed, the engines available were weak, and you couldn't put much on a fighter.. with two engines, the 110 could carry a lot more fuel, ammo, and guns and a rear gunner to boot, following that in World War I these kind of two seat fighters were, AFAIK, considered rather successfull.

As Messerschmitt already choose to develop the 110 into the explicitely multirole 210/410 before the war, I guess the multirole aircraft idea triumphed. In essence that what the 110s did early in the war, when roles were much more rigid: acting as a fighter, a bomber, close support and as a recce aircraft.


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## RCAFson (Sep 18, 2010)

steve51 said:


> Thank you Nikademus for those loss rates in several theaters. Along with those, we know from JoeB that the bf110 downed 78 British fighters during the Battle of France while losing 43. During this discussion only Delcyros mentioned bf 110 exchange ratios in the BoB of 340 victories for 196 loses, per Bergstrom. I take it that some are skeptical of these numbers. Are there generally accepted figures for bf110 exchange ratios during the BoB?
> 
> Also, occasional unpleasantness notwithstanding, this has been a very informative thread. Thank you all.



The Hardest Day, by Price has a nice breakdown of losses for one day, 18 Aug 1940. On that day the Luftwaffe lost 17 Bf110 aircraft to fighters, although GF may have shared in two kills, while only 3 Hurricanes and no other types were lost to bf110s. Two Hurricanes were lost to bomber defensive fire and several RAF fighters were lost to fighters of unknown types.


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## parsifal (Sep 18, 2010)

steve51 said:


> Thank you Nikademus for those loss rates in several theaters. Along with those, we know from JoeB that the bf110 downed 78 British fighters during the Battle of France while losing 43. During this discussion only Delcyros mentioned bf 110 exchange ratios in the BoB of 340 victories for 196 loses, per Bergstrom. I take it that some are skeptical of these numbers. Are there generally accepted figures for bf110 exchange ratios during the BoB?
> 
> Also, occasional unpleasantness notwithstanding, this has been a very informative thread. Thank you all.



I think Bf 110 loss rates were higher than that, per my post quoting Ellis and Deighton. I think Me 110 losses were in the ordrer of 260 to 300, for the three months July to October. I do not think the claims for losses on FC aircraft can be so neatly split away from losses to other sources. Firstly, overclaiming by both sides was so bad that the claimed enemy losses need to be basically ignored. That forces one back to the recorded losses by each side, and so often aircraft were shot down by an unseen enemy, or due to an unklnown cause that its really meaningless and impossible to try and say this many aircraft were shot down by this particular weapon system. All we do know is that FC losses compared to JG and ZG losses were about 1.83 to 1, however into that equation must also be considered that FC aircraft were being ordered to concentrate on attacking the bombers.

I think grossly skews the statisitical sample. Britain was fighting for its life, and Dowding knew he had to hurt the bombers first, and try and deal with the Fighters as best he could. Complicating the British problem was that the British could not afford to get into a stand up fight with the Luftwaffe. This meant they had to attack with limited numbers, to reduce the risk of heavy losses to themselves

This means the battlefield in 1940 was anything but a level playing field on which to judge the relative merits of the aircraft. There were strategic imperatives that skewed the British effort, and made their task much more difficult. 

The Germans began the task correctly, by allowing their fighters to operate in a free ranging capacity. Whilst this was happening, the Me 110s could play to their strengths, using speed, diving and heavy firepower to good advantage, whilst the british fighters were busy concentrating on the bombers. Similar tactics could be used by the the 109 crews. 

The problem with this approach was that it left the German bombers dangerously exposed. They lacked the performance , protection and defensive armament to be so left unguarded. What the germans needed was more fighters....some to range freely and some to protect their own. There simply were too few to do both jobs. As bomber losses mounted, and servicability rates fell (which is something being hotly contested at this moment), the germans had to try and protect their bombers more directly. For the me 110 this played against its strengths, and forced it to fight more in areas where it was relatively weak....turning fights, with lots of climbs....yielding the initiative to fighters more manouverable than it. 

In my opinion better ideas on the capability of the Me110 as a fighter can be found in the following year, wherer the British again met it in their sweeps of Northern Europe. Though the British still had to yield numbers (otherwise the germans would refuse to come and fight....the fighter sweeps of Northern France had to be structured so that the Germans would take the bait and rise to fight) ther were several occasions where numbers of Me 110s became involved in Day fighting. In these situations, the British fighters primary mission was to enagage the Luftwaffes fighters, with only a few fighters generally assigned to protect the bombers. The results were at least a little more on equal terms. Though usually outnumbered in the inidividual combats, at least the British fighters were now able to engage directly the German fighters as fighters themselves and not bomber destroyers. They suffered two main disadvantages. they were usually outnumbered, and their aircraft were just as range limited as the 109s were in the previous year. And crucially, in my opinion, the German pilots retained a significant experience advantage over the british.

I previously posted the exchange rates in another thread, from memeory, the exchange rates against German fighters was still not good, though it appears (but cannot be certain, given the inherent gaps that occur when attributing losses to type) the 109s were very succesful, the 110s less so, much less than during the BoB. For the record, the exchange rates against German Fighters in April were 1.68:1 whilst in June they were down to 1.44:1. Some clue as to what was happeing to the Me 110 as a Day Fighter can be seen by the numbers of Me 110s available for barbarossa. By that stage there were less than 100 available for operations in the East


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## fastmongrel (Sep 18, 2010)

Interesting Kurfurst I wonder if it was a case of Messerschmitt saying I can build an aircraft with these performance figures the Luftwaffe liking it and then trying to work out what they could do with such an aircraft. It wouldnt be the first time the military made up a role for something simply because the weapon looked and performed so good. 

Your analogy of a Destroyer as the jack of all trades is a bit off though. Destroyers of the time had 2 missions, protect the heavy fleet units against other destroyers and submarines, attack the enemy fleet. Later on in the war defence against aircraft was added to the role of the larger destroyers. Destroyers didnt have the range, armour or armament to do anything else particulary well. A cruiser I think would be the better analogy, almost as fast as a destroyer with better guns and range . Faster than a battleship and with the ability to work independently. A modern destroyer has grown to take the place of the cruiser.


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## Hop (Sep 18, 2010)

> Single engine fighters - 28.09.40
> 
> 1132 Bf 109s on establishment, 920 on strenght, 712 servicable



I don't think anyone disputes that the Luftwaffe began to recover once they scaled back their attack on Britain.

13 August - JG strength 976 on hand, 853 serviceable

12 August - 8 September the Luftwaffe flew 3,650 fighter sorties a week, and lost 111 fighters a week (figures include BF 110s)

7 September JG strength 831 on hand, 658 serviceable

9 September - 29 September the Luftwaffe flew 1,500 fighter sorties a week, and lost 50 a week. (again includes 110s)

28 September JG strength 920 on hand, 712 serviceable

It's clear that the effort of August and early September was unsustainable for the Luftwaffe. Their lower level of attacks after that was sustainable.


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## Hop (Sep 18, 2010)

Serviceability rates from Logistics and the Battle of Britain by Air Commodore Peter Dye, RAF:


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## Juha (Sep 18, 2010)

Hello Steve
a partial answer because it doesn’t incl BC and CC losses and I think incl ErproGr 210 and possibly recon losses (recon 110 losses were few but especially late in BoB those of Erpro 210 were heavy. Other problem with Erpro is that it also made claims, its most successful pilot, Tratt had 12 kills at the ends of the BoB, later he became the most successful ZG of them all) but gives a clear picture of situation at the eve of the Adlertag.
FC lost 10 Jul – 11 Aug 40 115 a/c destr. (Cat 3) in combat, of which 87 were lost to 109s, 6 to 110s, 13 to bombers, 4 in collisions, 1 to Flak, 1 to friendly fire and 3 to unknown causes. And 47 in accidents. Total 162

LW had lost in combat 72 bombers, 22 Stukas, 61 109s, 27 110s, 18 recon and 16 seaplanes, so total combat losses 216. Plus 85 in accident. So total 301.

So 6 FC fighters were lost to 110s but LW had lost 27 110s in combat. Exchange rate is worse than I expected, BC and CC losses will add some victories to 110s but I doubt that they could give to 110 a positive exchange rate for that period. When I'll have time, I’ll go through 110 losses during the BoB and calculate the pure ZG losses, Erpro losses and recon 110 losses. Then I’ll have clearer picture on 110.

Source: Bungay's The Most Dangerous Enemy pp195 and 199. His figures are based on Peter Cornwell's amended figures

Juha


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## delcyros (Sep 18, 2010)

RCAFson said:


> The Hardest Day, by Price has a nice breakdown of losses for one day, 18 Aug 1940. On that day the Luftwaffe lost 17 Bf110 aircraft to fighters, although GF may have shared in two kills, while only 3 Hurricanes and no other types were lost to bf110s. Two Hurricanes were lost to bomber defensive fire and several RAF fighters were lost to fighters of unknown types.



Again, you keep posting Single events without paying any attention 
To the whole scope of interest. As Long as the BoB is a rather 4 Week Long Episode to your mind -concentrating on the for the FC Best missions and selling them as examples for the Bf-110's true capabilities they are worthless. Selective perception in my Limited View. 
Parsifals Assessment is a very good one, mind to ASK Why?


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## Kurfürst (Sep 18, 2010)

parsifal said:


> I think Bf 110 loss rates were higher than that, per my post quoting Ellis and Deighton. I think Me 110 losses were in the ordrer of 260 to 300, for the three months July to October.




Zestörer losses to enemy action (destroyed), July-October, as per Wood and Dempste via the LW Quartermaster reports:

July: 34 destroyed, 6 damaged
August: 114 destroyed, 32 damaged
September: 81 destroyed, 17 damaged
October: 10 destroyed, 1 damaged

Total: 239 destroyed, 56 damaged to enemy action. (for all four months)

In addition 11 were destroyed on operation due to non-enemy causes, and further 17 outside operations. 3 damaged in accidents on operations, four outside operations.


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## Maximowitz (Sep 18, 2010)

delcyros said:


> Again, you keep posting Single events without paying any attention
> To the whole scope of interest. As Long as the BoB is a rather 4 Week Long Episode to your mind -concentrating on the for the FC Best missions and selling them as examples for the Bf-110's true capabilities they are worthless. Selective perception in my Limited View.
> Parsifals Assessment is a very good one, mind to ASK Why?




+1

Single events are meaningless.


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## Gixxerman (Sep 18, 2010)

Put me down as another who has always thought the Bf 110 looked very mean.
The F variant looks interesting, but I suppose the run-down anticipating the Me 210 kept their numbers small, the pinnacle of the jack of all trades fighter-bomber this type reached (save perhaps for a G without all the NF kit)?

I wonder just how many of these they had at any given time?
I recall being pretty shocked to read that they never had more than 500 Ju 87's operating in all theatres at any one time through out the entire war.
If that sort of 'thin' coverage was normal with most types (the hugely produced Me 109 Fw 190 excepted?) it's no wonder they were so hard pressed in the air in the later stages of the war.


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## Milosh (Sep 18, 2010)

Kurfürst said:


> Actual Luftwaffe SEF strenght and servicibilty on the 28 September:
> 
> Single engine fighters - 28.09.40
> 
> 1132 Bf 109s on establishment, 920 on strenght, 712 servicable (77,4%. Fighter command's servicibilty rates were around 65% at the same period).



Lets look at the Luftwaffe SEF strength and serviceability for June 29 1940 to get a better overall picture of the state of the LW fighters.
Single engine fighters - 29.06.40

Estab. - 1171, Onhand - 1107, Serv. - 856

% of Estab.: Onhand - 94.5, Serv. - 73.1

and compare to the Luftwaffe SEF strength and serviceability for Sept 28 1940

Estab. - 1132, Onhand - 920, Serv. - 712

% of Estab.: Onhand - 81.3, Serv. - 62.9

That is a decrease of 187 onhand and 144 serviceable.

Luftwaffe SEF strength and serviceability for Dec 28 1940

Single engine fighters - 28.12.40
Estab. - 1162, Onhand - 829, Serv. - 586

% of Estab.: Onhand - 71.3, Serv. - 50.4

The Dec. numbers shows the Lw fighters decreasing in number from the pre-BoB numbers with a *-*278 On hand and *-*270 Serv. 

Definitely shows that production, and repair, couldn't keep up with the losses as the pre-BoB numbers could not be attained.

Only in March 1941 did the Onhand (1104) and Serviceable (804) numbers approach the pre-BoB numbers, though the Establishment number had risen to 1324.
Single engine fighters - 29.03.41

% of Estab.: Onhand - 83.4, Serv. - 60.7


On the subject of RAF serviceability, one must remember that at that time a RAF squadron had an establishment strength of ~20 a/c. Of these 20 a/c, the combat flying component was 12 a/c. Even at a 65% serviceable rate this still left 13 a/c for the combat flying component.

In other words, the RAF could still put a full squadron in the air while the Germans could only put between 73.1% and 50.4% of their establishment strength in the air.


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## davebender (Sep 18, 2010)

What's wrong with that? Mass production of a few effective yet inexpensive weapon types allows you to get the most bang for the buck. Just like the USA did with the Sherman tank and the Heer did with the MG34 and MG42 machineguns.


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## Kurfürst (Sep 18, 2010)

Milosh said:


> The Dec. numbers shows the Lw fighters decreasing in number from the pre-BoB numbers with a *-*278 On hand and *-*270 Serv.



Amusing that the greatest decline in strenght only occurs in December, when fighting and fighter losses went down to just about nil isn't it. Yet there are no such drastic decrease in fighting strenght, whereas in the peak of fighting activity, there's no such trend.

There are two (or more) possible answers. 

Yours is that German production, repair centre output and reserves were insufficent to replace the rather miniscule, on daily one or two 109s that were lost on avarage during October, November and December.

The other is that something else was going on - the likely answer is the reorganisation of fighter units, and the preparation to withdraw old types (109E) and replace it with the new type (109F) during a relatively calm period when combat flying was marginal, and many pilots were on Christmas leave.



Milosh said:


> Definitely shows that production, and repair, couldn't keep up with the losses as the pre-BoB numbers could not be attained.



Well keep repeating that if you wish, production and loss numbers have been shown, and the above notion was utterly disproven already. No need to discuss it again. Production alone was sufficient to replace losses, even without the output of repair centres or drawing from the reserves.



> On the subject of RAF serviceability, one must remember that at that time a RAF squadron had an establishment strength of ~20 a/c. Of these 20 a/c, the combat flying component was 12 a/c. Even at a 65% serviceable rate this still left 13 a/c for the combat flying component.
> 
> In other words, the RAF could still put a full squadron in the air while the Germans could only put between 73.1% and 50.4% of their establishment strength in the air.



The comparison is rather meaningless; Squadrons were a tactical unit and the benefit of a full 12 aircraft flight were tactical. The RAF's organisation revolved around a small tactical unit, the Squadron, an independent tactical and operational unit which didn't have organic parent units to draw replacement aircraft from. And in practice RAF FC Squadrons actively engaged in Battle were in pretty rough shape by September, often being wiped out completely in a matter of days and had to be rotated for fresh Squadrons/pilots.

In contrast the German organisation preferred the larger Wing, or Gruppe, consisted of Staffeln, which were merely tactical in their nature but operationally relied on the Gruppe's infrastructure and reserves. In other words, German Staffeln simply drew aircraft from other Staffeln in the Gruppe when neccessary.


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## Kurfürst (Sep 18, 2010)

parsifal said:


> Some clue as to what was happeing to the Me 110 as a Day Fighter can be seen by the numbers of Me 110s available for barbarossa. By that stage there were less than 100 available for operations in the East



Yup. Several units become Night Fighter in the meantime, hence they don't show up in Day Fighter counts.


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## RCAFson (Sep 18, 2010)

delcyros said:


> Again, you keep posting Single events without paying any attention
> To the whole scope of interest. As Long as the BoB is a rather 4 Week Long Episode to your mind -concentrating on the for the FC Best missions and selling them as examples for the Bf-110's true capabilities they are worthless. Selective perception in my Limited View.
> Parsifals Assessment is a very good one, mind to ASK Why?




I happen to own The Hardest Day and it gives a detailed breakdown for that day. Juhu provided the exchange rate for 10 july - 11 Aug: 
_So 6 FC fighters were lost to 110s but LW had lost 27 110s in combat._

On Aug 15 and 18, 24-25 Bf110s were lost and they downed 3 Hurricanes, for certain, but if we credit them with a couple of kills where the Luftwaffe fighter was not identified and give full, instead of partial, credit to GF, then we might get 22 Bf110 losses against 5 kills, for Aug 15 and 18. So the exchange rate for these dates runs from a probable 52 bf110s to 9 FC fighters, to a low of 49 bf110s to 11 FC fighters. 

I'm sorry if it is not very flattering to the Bf110.


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## Milosh (Sep 18, 2010)

Kurfürst said:


> The comparison is rather meaningless; Squadrons were a tactical unit and the benefit of a full 12 aircraft flight were tactical. The RAF's organisation revolved around a small tactical unit, the Squadron, an independent tactical and operational unit which didn't have organic parent units to draw replacement aircraft from. And in practice RAF FC Squadrons actively engaged in Battle were in pretty rough shape by September, often being wiped out completely in a matter of days and had to be rotated for fresh Squadrons/pilots.
> 
> In contrast the German organisation preferred the larger Wing, or Gruppe, consisted of Staffeln, which were merely tactical in their nature but operationally relied on the Gruppe's infrastructure and reserves. In other words, German Staffeln simply drew aircraft from other Staffeln in the Gruppe when neccessary.



Drawing a/c from other staffels to complete another staffel's establishment compliment does not change the overall numbers. That is robbing Peter to pay Paul.

The RAF squadron didn't need organic parent units as there was a reserve of a/c in the squadron to draw from. They had the a/c right there unlike the German unit which had to fly in replacement a/c from wherever.

Examples of RAF FC squadrons being wiped out completely please.


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## Juha (Sep 18, 2010)

Hello Nikademus
take a brief look on your 110 kill/lost list. Interesting to note that before the Battle of France 110 did badly against Hurricanes, during the BoF very well (as the figures JoeB gave, based on Cornwell’s BoF Then and Now), then during the BoB, again based on Cornwall’s figures in BoB Then and Now it did again poorly, Greek/Yug again better etc. Now only during BoF and BoB figures are substantial. IMHO they clearly shows that combat environment had very important effect on combat results.

Mid-1941-42 seemed to have been bad period to 110s but over Tunisia it again did reasonable well. Maybe the F and G subtypes, at least the late-comer II./ZG 1 had the latter, which restored the powerloading of ever more heavier 110s, helped to restore at least partially 110’s air-to-air capacity. Over Tunisia it wasn’t a first class fighter but was still a reasonable dangerous opponent.

Thanks again for your interesting info.

Juha


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## Glider (Sep 18, 2010)

Kurfürst said:


> Well keep repeating that if you wish, production and loss numbers have been shown, and the above notion was utterly disproven already. No need to discuss it again. Production alone was sufficient to replace losses, even without the output of repair centres or drawing from the reserves.



Yes lets look at the production figures.

Total: new production 718

From RLM Delivery reports.

Total destroyed in the same period:

To enemy action: 502
Accidents in operations: 98
Accidents outside the scope of operations: 63

Total: 663

A net gain of 55 These figures exclude aircraft returned from repair but they also exclude:-
a) those that were sent away for repair
b) It also excludes those that were used to replace older aircraft with newer versions 

I don't know how many were sent for repair but a rule of thumb was that for every two lost one was badly damaged. Frankly it doesn't matter how accurate that rule of thumb is, I am as sure as possible that more than 55 aircraft were sent for repair the probably figure is nearer the 200 mark.
Also you have ignored new production to replace older versions or tired aircraft.

These aspects go a long way to explaining why German Me109 strength fell between June and Septrember.


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## davebender (Sep 18, 2010)

The BoB period was only a few months. That's not long enough for aircraft to wear out and/or become technically obsolete.


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## parsifal (Sep 18, 2010)

Kurfürst said:


> Zestörer losses to enemy action (destroyed), July-October, as per Wood and Dempste via the LW Quartermaster reports:
> 
> July: 34 destroyed, 6 damaged
> August: 114 destroyed, 32 damaged
> ...



which confirms that total losses were 267 written off and a further unkown percentage of the 56 damaged. Luftwaffe policy was anything more than 60% damaged was a write off, from memory, but often anything with more than 30-35% damaged spent the rest of its career parked on the side of the tarmac, acting as a target....luftwaffe games with operational rates to keep Hitler happy mostly


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## Milosh (Sep 18, 2010)

Kurfürst said:


> Well keep repeating that if you wish, production and loss numbers have been shown, and the above notion was utterly disproven already. No need to discuss it again. Production alone was sufficient to replace losses, even without the output of repair centres or drawing from the reserves.



You keep repeating that the German were producing enough Bf109s, yet the fact is clearly seen that they could not meet the Establishment number. One would think that one week into a major campaign, Babarossa, the German have enough Bf109s in reserve to meet establishment numbers or at least keep the 'onhand' number lost to attrition > Estab.- 1401, Onhand - 1213, Serv. - 858 and this includes Erg. numbers. In fact, the percentage of serviceable Bf109. 61.2%, was slightly less than at the end of Sept. '40 (62.9%). One would think in a relatively calm period (Jan '41 to June '41) that the serviceability percentage number would increase.

Single engine fighters - 28.06.41
1401 1213 858 

Single engine fighters - 27.09.41
1420 1137 738

The Germans Bf109 production certainly could not keep up with attrition until the lull for the winter.

Single engine fighters - 27.12.41
1420 1233 654

Single engine fighters - 28.03.42
1456 1257 752

Producing an extra 44 Bf109s in 9 months over attrition? That is barely keeping ones head above water and still the Establishment number could not be attained.


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## Glider (Sep 18, 2010)

davebender said:


> The BoB period was only a few months. That's not long enough for aircraft to wear out and/or become technically obsolete.



Not quite. For example in the RAF we had the Mk 1 Spitfires being replaced with Mk II, in the Luftwaffe 109 E1's were being replaced with 109 E3's with cannon instead of MG's. Some were rearmed but most were replaced. 

As for the wearing out that did happen, aircraft have a finite life and the pressure of combat adds significantly to the wear and tear. Some planes would have accumulated damage over the weeks to make them not fit for combat, some will have been overstressed in the heat of battle or suffered structural damage in heavy landings. Also it should be remembered that most of the Me109 aircraft had been fighting for months in the battle for France without any let up in the field. Whereas the vast majority of the RAF aircraft had only started combat from around Dunkirk and were mainly operating from home bases with all the infrastructure support that helps servicability.

There was also the pressure of pilots. It is clear from the link that Kurfurst gave us that the fall in the servicable Me109's was significant and serious, but that the fall in pilots ready for combat was even worse. In September if you only have 676 pilots ready for action, it doesn't matter if you have 717, 850, 950 or 2000 servicable aircraft, you only have 676 pilots to fly them.


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## parsifal (Sep 18, 2010)

Glider said:


> Not quite. For example in the RAF we had the Mk 1 Spitfires being replaced with Mk II, in the Luftwaffe 109 E1's were being replaced with 109 E3's with cannon instead of MG's. Some were rearmed but most were replaced.
> 
> As for the wearing out that did happen, aircraft have a finite life and the pressure of combat adds significantly to the wear and tear. Some planes would have accumulated damage over the weeks to make them not fit for combat, some will have been overstressed in the heat of battle or suffered structural damage in heavy landings. Also it should be remembered that most of the Me109 aircraft had been fighting for months in the battle for France without any let up in the field. Whereas the vast majority of the RAF aircraft had only started combat from around Dunkirk and were mainly operating from home bases with all the infrastructure support that helps servicability.
> 
> There was also the pressure of pilots. It is clear from the link that Kurfurst gave us that the fall in the servicable Me109's was significant and serious, but that the fall in pilots ready for combat was even worse. In September if you only have 676 pilots ready for action, it doesn't matter if you have 717, 850, 950 or 2000 servicable aircraft, you only have 676 pilots to fly them.



and that does not mean that even theoretically they could put even close to 676 in the air at the same time. There is always a only a fraction of these available....some are recovering from illness or injury, some are on leave, some are simply too tired to be reasonably expected to get airborne, some are too green to be considered combat ready, as an earlier post alluded to.

As a rule of thumb, generally you can get about half your pilots airborne at any given time in an extended attritional battle like the BoB. That operational number of 278 is looking better and more realistic all the time......


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## Juha (Sep 19, 2010)

Hello Glider
in fact E-3s were converted to E-4 standard, that was easily done, the main differences being that E-4s had more powerful MG FF M instead of MG FF as a wing cannon and better armour protection. On the other hand IIRC the weapon bay in E-1 wing, in addition of being different, was also in slightly different place than in the later, cannon armament Es. In spite of that there were conversations from E-1 to E-4 and E-7 standards but there were numerous E-1 losses even in late Oct 40. In fact E-1 losses were only second to E-4 losses and much more numerous than E-3 losses. So E-1s were not replaced but used throughout BoB but some were probably converted to E-4 standard during the BoB and many more later.

Juha


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## Glider (Sep 19, 2010)

Hi Juha
Thanks for the additional information. I knew that some were converted which is why I made the caviet, but am certain that some were replaced. 
I was going from a memoir that I read about a luftwaffe pilot who had his mg armed 109 replaced by a cannon armed version during the BOB. He was in many ways upset at losing 'his' mount as pilots do get attached to aircraft and he had set it up just how he liked it. It didn't say (or I cannot remember) what sub type the aircraft was. However the point is that some at least were replaced.


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## Juha (Sep 19, 2010)

Hello Delcyros
you have not answer to my question on your source of your message #95. I guess that it is the Christer’s book. Because the 1050 litre aux tank wasn’t improvised but designed for 110D and because all the lost and damaged 110s of I./ZG 76 on that day had 2 man crews, IMHO not the most reliable source. And of course the bombing of Driffield was done by Ju 88s of KG 30 not by He 111s of KG 26.

Why I ask your source again is because even the only written off Hurricane according to BoB Then and Now Mk V, F/O Passy’s P3827, was according to Bowyer’s A/c for the Few declared as FBO2 meaning A/c suffering battle dam and requiring contractor’s attention and not as written off. The info on other dam FC planes of that combat is identical in both books. I’d like to know if P3827 was first declared Cat 3 and then revalued as repairable or was it other way around. So I’ll ask from RAF specialists which explanation is correct for P3827. If your source gives the construction numbers of those extra losses it claimed to have happened, I’d ask on those at the same time.

Juha


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## Juha (Sep 19, 2010)

Hello Glider
according to BoB T and N Mk V for ex. on 22 Oct 40 of the 109s lost in combat on that day 2 were E-4s and 1 E-1.

Juha


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## parsifal (Sep 19, 2010)

Kurfürst said:


> Yup. Several units become Night Fighter in the meantime, hence they don't show up in Day Fighter counts.



Only partially true. There were some Staffeln that had converted toi the Nightfighter role, but at this stage (1940-41) the workhorse of the Night Fighter forces was the Ju-88C. Prior to that there had been a few Bf 109Ds. There were also a smattering of D-17s converted to the role

Me 110s were sometimes used in the night Intruder role, mostly during the early part of the blitz. 

Part of the reason for the low turnout of Me 110s on the Eastern Front was its employment on other fronts. By June 1941, it was being used principally in the anitshipping and convoy escort role. Its principal areas for deployment were the Med, where about 40 were depployed from January1941, and Norway, with an unkown number deployed (but about 40, as per the Med). 


I can look up the actual numbers, but this means that if 80 were deployed to the East, 40 to the med and 40 to Norway, and around 30 to the night defences, you have roughly 190 on strength, give or take. I could do this properly, but could care less to be honest


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## parsifal (Sep 19, 2010)

Kurfürst said:


> _Amusing that the greatest decline in strenght only occurs in December, when fighting and fighter losses went down to just about nil isn't it. Yet there are no such drastic decrease in fighting strenght, whereas in the peak of fighting activity, there's no such trend_.QUOTE]
> 
> There is another possibility not being considered here....that the losses and damaged units suffered in the previous months were not showing up in the daily returns as quickly as they should have. Aircraft with less than 60% damage might be listed as available in October, and then quietly re-assesed as not repairable and written off in December. Hitler usually flew into a rage whenever he was told about low serviceability rates, and the Luftwaffe, like most German service arms , became very adept at hiding unpalatable truths from their fuhrer, and not written off until the end of the quarter after the fighting was no longer relevant, and therefore of no interst to the little corporal.
> 
> ...


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## Kryten (Sep 19, 2010)

It's not that well documented (if at all) that when a new model of a plane became operational how long it took to filter down to all the front line units, consider the logistical requirements of training airframe fitters and mechanics, organising spares parts and repair facilities and actually delivering the planes from a factory that may well be bombed over night!

and thats before you even get round to converting pilots over to the new type!

It must have a been a nightmare in reality and is testament to all the "pen pushers" without who the front line pilots would have been grounded!


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## Juha (Sep 19, 2010)

Hello
to give a clearer picture on the how common various 109E subtypes were latein 1940.
Based on the losses reported, any damage, between 16 Sept and 31 Dec 40
E, meaning no info on subtype 27
E-1 156
E-2___3
E-3___0
E-4 251
E-7__41

Juha


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 19, 2010)

Milosh said:


> '*Am 1. September 1939 waren vorhanden:*' translates as '*1 September 1939 were present:*' or 'onhand', so I don't know where you got the idea that I was saying there was 2459 Flak 18/36s produced in 1939.



Where did I say you said that? I was only putting the two statistics together based off what you posted and based off of what davebender posted. *Note how I posted both davebender's and your posts together?*

Don't get your panties in a wad, no one was trying to insult you and put words in your mouth. Don't always think you are being attacked. This is a discussion board...


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## Glider (Sep 19, 2010)

Juha said:


> Hello
> to give a clearer picture on the how common various 109E subtypes were latein 1940.
> Based on the losses reported, any damage, between 16 Sept and 31 Dec 40
> E, meaning no info on subtype 27
> ...



Thanks again. I had no idea so many of the early Me109's were still in service so late on.


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## Maximowitz (Sep 19, 2010)

parsifal said:


> Me 110s were sometimes used in the night Intruder role, mostly during the early part of the blitz.



The only unit flying intruder missions over Britain in 1940/41 was I./NJG 2, using Junkers 88C's and a few Do 17Z-10's.

No Me 110's were used as night intruders.


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## Milosh (Sep 19, 2010)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Where did I say you said that? I was only putting the two statistics together based off what you posted and based off of what davebender posted. *Note how I posted both davebender's and your posts together?*



Pardon me. My panties aren't in wad. I'm cool.  All I was asking for was an explanation.

Where did you say that? Here:


> 2,459 8.8 cm Flak 18/36 were not produced in 1939. They were on hand in 1939.



I hope you can understand my confusion when my post said 'on hand' and you said the above.



DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Don't get your panties in a wad, no one was trying to insult you and put words in your mouth. Don't always think you are being attacked. This is a discussion board...



Yes, that is very good advice.


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## Glider (Sep 19, 2010)

Juha said:


> Hello
> to give a clearer picture on the how common various 109E subtypes were latein 1940.
> Based on the losses reported, any damage, between 16 Sept and 31 Dec 40
> E, meaning no info on subtype 27
> ...



Thanks again. I had no idea so many of the early Me109's were still in service so late on and people complain that the 8 x LMG was below par as a weapon load.


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## Juha (Sep 19, 2010)

Hello Glider
yes, E-1s were used in combat ops right to end of 40. My numbers overstate its importance a bit, because they incl those damaged or lost during training of the new pilots/recently to JGn arrived pilots.

To the defence of 109E-1, it carried 3000 rounds vs 2400rds in British 8mgs fighters. So it had longer firing time, appr 25 sec to 4mgs and after the wing mgs ran out of ammo, it still had appr. 30sec worth of ammo to its 2 cowling mgs. Now 2 7,92mm mgs was really a light armament against late BoB FC fighters (with armour and self-sealing fuel tanks) for a average shooter but still better than nothing.

Juha


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## fastmongrel (Sep 19, 2010)

Juha said:


> To the defence of 109E-1, it carried 3000 rounds vs 2400rds in British 8mgs fighters. So it had longer firing time, appr 25 sec to 4mgs and after the wing mgs ran out of ammo, it still had appr. 30sec worth of ammo to its 2 cowling mgs. Now 2 7,92mm mgs was really a light armament against late BoB FC fighters (with armour and self-sealing fuel tanks) for a average shooter but still better than nothing.
> 
> Juha



Surely 30 secs of ammunition is too much. From reading and watching first hand accounts it was rare to fire for more than 4 secs at a time and even the RAF fighters with 14 secs of ammunition dont seem to have been suffering from running out of ammo. For an interceptor you dont want to be bringing too much ammunition back because that would mean you have been trying to climb to the battle with excess unneccesasary weight.


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## Juha (Sep 19, 2010)

Hello Fastmongrel
the ammo for the cowling mgs was 1000rpg, so worth of appr 55sec (25+30) firing time, rof of cowling mgs were slightly lower than that of wing mgs because of syncronosation. Maybe some pilots missed their E-1s just because its wing weapons had that 25sec firing time vs only 6½ sec of the 20mm MG FF/MG FF M. On FC pilots, they ran out of ammo at least sometimes.

Juha


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## The Basket (Sep 19, 2010)

You can never have too many rounds.

It is surprising how badly armed the E-1 was.

Seems like an error....I remember one person saying that 8 .303s was obsolete by 1940...not as obsolete as 4 7.92mm guns.


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## davebender (Sep 19, 2010)

> 2,459 8.8 cm Flak 18/36 were not produced in 1939. They were on hand in 1939.



How did Germany manage to get 2,459 modern 8.8cm flak weapons into service before the weapon entered mass production?


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## davebender (Sep 19, 2010)

Actually I think it's a matter of weapons availability. Germany did not yet have a modern and reliable 20mm aircraft cannon in mass production so they had to make do with machineguns.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 19, 2010)

Milosh said:


> Pardon me. My panties aren't in wad. I'm cool.  All I was asking for was an explanation.
> 
> Where did you say that? Here:
> 
> ...


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## Nikademus (Sep 19, 2010)

fastmongrel said:


> I also like the look of the Bf110 but even after reading this thread and some books and the internet I am still a little confused as to what the exact mission the Luftwaffe planned for the 110. I know what it ended up doing but what exactly was its original mission or werent things thought through so much in the days before accountants got there sticky fingers on the world.



The Bf-110 project came from a 1934 general request by the Luftwaffe for the development of a "destroyer aircraft" or a multi-purpose fighter bomber that would have long range, heavy armaments, fast speed, and all-weather capability. This program received high priority for funding and development [Corum: _The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War 1918 - 1940_ ]

To elaborate from Corum's study;

_ The creation of the Messerschmitt Bf-110 Heavy Fighter illustrates the interesting and innovative approach to operational doctrine shown by the Technical Office. In 1934, the Technical Office called for the development of a twin engine fighter that would be fast, heavily armed, and possess great range. It was to be a multi-purpose aircraft, capable of serving as a reconnaisance plane, a fighter-bomber, and *most important, as a long range escort to bombers.* Due to the lack of engines, the development of the Bf-110 was somewhat slower, but by 1936 there were prototypes ready for testing. The early models of the Bf-110 had impressive characteristics: long range, a maximum speed of 283mph, and heavy armament of two 20mm cannons and five machine guns. In the words of aircraft expert Eric Brown, the Bf-110 was a well designed aircraft "that placed Germany out in front in strategic fighter development. _

Later, Kesselring, who strongly supported a program to produce a long range heavy bomber, pushed through a major change in Luftwaffe doctrine to greater emphasis fighter development and production. This was a process that consisted of two parts; the light fighter plane, single engined with high speed and night instrument flying capability, a one to one and a half hour endurance and moderate armament (The Bf-109 met these requirements)

The 2nd part was the "heavy fighter" which became the Bf-110 which was to have long range (3 hours endurance), instrumentation for night flying, very heavily armed to fullfill the primary roles of interceptor, long range bomber escort and long range recon. It's secondary mission was to serve as a light bomber capable of low level attack. (hence the fitting of bomb racks and a bombsight)
[source Corum]

It appears to me, that the Luftwaffe had a very definate idea of what roles the Zerstorer was to fill within the operational and tactical doctrine of the developing German airforce, same as they did for other types in development at the time. To suggest that the brains behind the Luftwaffe had no idea what to do with the plane *or* that one of it's principle roles was *not* long range escort are without merit. A driving factor in 2E fighter development in general was to attempt to solve the quandry of 1st generation 1E designs which as a group tended to be short legged prior to development of drop tanks or innovative designs that combined weight saving 'and' drop tanks such as the A6M. The secondary nature of missions that would fall under the "fighter bomber" mission are supported in other works on the BoB such as Collier's that document the debut of "Test Group 210" which pioneered the "Jabo" (fighter bomber) concept for the Luftwaffe in 1940. Apparantly there were some within the Luftwaffe (interestingly he mentions Kesselring as one of them) which doubted or even scoffed at the notion of 109's and 110's with bombs slung under their fusilages. Its easy to forget that the "Fighter Bomber" concept only reached maturity during the war.

So what went wrong then with the 110? While looking good on paper and while possessing definate strengths, ultimately the technology of the current period was not up to producing a truely or FULLY competetive 2E fighter...one that could meet a modern 1E equivilent plane on equal terms in most if not all situations. Specifically, the 110, while posessing great speed as has been repeatedly mentioned, was also saddled with poor maneuverability and poor acceleration in comparison to it's first real challenges (the Hurricane and Spitfire). As such it was most dangerous in situations where it had a speed and height advantage allowing bounce situations....but if it bled off energy and/or altitude, it was at a distinct disadvantage vs. these 1E's. 

As one can asertain from Corum and other author's, this hindsight situation was not readily apparant prior to the war nor during the initial onset of hostilities. The BoB represented the first real test of the Zerstorer and it came up wanting as a result of the previous attributes mentioned. This was not a suprise to some in the Luftwaffe who had serious doubts regarding the heavy Zerstorer's chances against a lighter more nimble 1E opponent. The Wikipedia article (pause for laughter yes.....) mentions an interesting mock-combat between a 109 and a 110 which the 109 won hands down leading to the 109 pilot warning the Zerstorer pilots that they could expect a similar challenge from the 1E defenses of the English. If true, it was a prophetic statement. The 110 would find a 2nd life in less intensive theaters (kind of similar in retrospect to the situation of FAA fighter designs such as the Fulmar) and in alternative roles in which the 110's strengths could be best utilized (mainly night fighter and ground attack support). The plane's fast speed did give it a 2nd lease on life as a pure fighter on the Ost Front though according to Bergstrom, it's greatest contribution remained in the ground support role.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 19, 2010)

davebender said:


> How did Germany manage to get 2,459 modern 8.8cm flak weapons into service before the weapon entered mass production?



They were being produced from 1928 onwards. Go back and look at the links that Milosh provided.


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## tail end charlie (Sep 19, 2010)

I found this on the net which makes some interesting points .......note I didnt write it.

Events were now leading to a confrontation between the Luftwaffe and the RAF, in which the Bf 110 would suffer heavily. Consequently, sharp criticism of the aircraft, and by extension the entire class of twin-engined fighters followed, well beyond what is justified by the actual events. 

It is as well to start by looking at the performance parameters. The Bf 110C-4, a common model at the time, was powered by two 1,100 hp Daimler-Benz DB 601A engines, and had a normal loaded weight of 6,940 kg; so its power loading was 3.15 kg/hp. The Hurricane Mk.I weighed 2,924 kg loaded and was powered by a 1,030 hp Merlin Mk.III engine, giving a better power loading, of 2.84 kg/hp. The Spitfire Mk.I, powered by the same engine, was lighter because of its more advanced structure, and the normal loaded weight of 2,812 kg resulted in a power loading of only 2.73 kg/hp. 

The Bf 110C-4 was claimed to be capable of a maximum level speed of 562 km/h at 7,000 m altitude, and 473 km/h at sea level. British test pilots, flying a captured C-5 reconnaissance version at lower weights, measured only 547 km/h at 6,700 m, so perhaps the German figures were too optimistic, but such variations between individual aircraft were common and the test aircraft had been assembled from two wrecks. This was still considerably faster than the 508 km/h at 5,400 m and 409 km/h at sea level of the Hurricane Mk.I, and competitive with the 557 km/h at 4,570 m of the Spitfire Mk.IA. The German fighter also performed reasonably well in the climb, with an initial rate of climb of 670 m/min, somewhat inferior to the 770 and 740 m/min attributed to the Hurricane and Spitfire. Nevertheless it could climb to 5,500 m in 7 minutes, while the Spitfire Mk.IA needed 6.85 minutes to 4,570 m (and the Hurricane 6.3 minutes). 

During the battle of Britain, 100-octane fuel was used by RAF fighters. By allowing the Merlin to run at higher pressures and generate 1,200 hp, this considerably improved their performance, especially in climb. That came as an unpleasant surprise for the Luftwaffe. Nevertheless, in terms of performance the Bf 110 appeared competitive enough. Its weakness in combat against the RAF fighters was its manoeuverability, which was good for an aircraft of its size, but no match for the opposition it faced. The wing loading of the C-4 model, 181 kg/m2, was considerably higher than the 123 kg/m2 of the Hurricane and the 125 kg/m2 of the Spitfire, and this resulted in a larger turning circle. The handling of the Bf 110 was quite good at normal speeds, with effective controls and generally pleasant flying characteristics. However, the controls heavied up considerably at higher speeds, and the ailerons were almost immovable in fast dives. But this, it must be said, was a weakness of all fighters at the time, German and British alike. 

Overall, the characteristics of the Bf 110 implied that the Zerstörer were at a serious disadvantage whenever they were forced into a defensive position. Their speed and firepower served them well when they made hit-and-run attacks, exploiting their good climb and dive characteristics, while declining to engage in turning combat. Most fighter-versus-fighter combat during battle was of short duration anyway, typically less than half a minute; long dogfights were very rare because they left those who engaged in them in a very vulnerable position, low and slow, and too preoccupied with their target to watch their rear. 

When flying Freie Jagd fighter sweeps at high altitude (above 6,700 m) over Southern England, the Zerstörer units demonstrated that the Bf 110 was indeed a dangerous opponent, and could be more than a match for the Hurricane. Unfortunately for the Germans, this was not the pattern of the battle to come. Fighter Command soon decided to avoid contact with the fighter sweeps, and concentrate its attacks on the bomber formations. Then, flying at low and medium altitude, and robbed of the advantage of surprise by radar and the advanced command-and-control system of Fighter Command, the German crews often found themselves at a serious tactical disadvantage. This, of course, also handicapped the Bf 109, but the nimbler single-engined fighter could extract itself from an unfavourable situation with much more ease. The normal reaction of Bf 110 crews was to seek safety in a Lufbery circle, a defensive formation in which fighters fly a ring pattern, each covering the rear of the one next ahead in the formation. While an effective tactic, this could only be maintained for as long as the fuel reserve allowed, and the RAF fighters waited above for an opportunity to strike. 

Indicative of how just badly things could go wrong was an attack on Croydon on 15 August 1940. This attack was executed by bomb-carrying Bf 110s and Bf 109s of Erprobungsgruppe 210. Serious damage was done to airfield, but while still in its attack run at low level the Germans were bounced by a superior number of Hurricanes. They found temporary protection in a defensive circle, but finally had to make a break for home; the RAF fighters immediately fell onto their targets, shooting down seven out of the twenty-two strong enemy force. 

The Bf 110 also had to take on the role of escort fighter for the bombers, because the fuel capacity of the Bf 109 allowed it only a short stay over England. But the German escort tactics were flawed. (Arguably, they were not much more flawed than some other attempts to provide bomber escort, such as the early efforts of the USAAF.) Too many fighters were ordered to fly close escort, in formation with the bombers; in that position they could do little to defend the bombers and became vulnerable targets themselves. The error was made worse in early September: Against the strong opinion of the fighter leaders, they were ordered to stay closer to the bombers, and even to break off combat with enemy fighters if the bombers were threatened. The Bf 110 turned out to be unsuitable for close escort missions, and losses were heavy. 

That said, the often-repeated story that the Bf 110s themselves had to be escorted by Bf 109s is a myth. Tactically, this would have made no sense. The only Bf 110s that were really escorted by single-engined fighters were the fighter-bombers of Erprobungsgruppe 210, which were otherwise too vulnerable with their combat loads, or when making their attacks at low level. Perhaps this, or maybe the complex organisation of the escort fighters around a bomber formation (including formation flying distant cover, close cover, and top cover) gave raise to the story. 

Anyway, the failure of the Bf 110 as an escort fighter was just one more nail in the coffin of a doomed operation, but as they had been a much-propagandized part of the German air force, it became symbolic. Its importance should not be exaggerated, for at the height of the battle, Bf 110s were less than 12% of the Luftwaffe's available force, and only just over a quarter of the fighter force. There were many more important factors that doomed the German attempt to subdue Britain to failure: It had seriously underestimated RAF strength, and ignored the importance of the radar and command-and-control network. The available bomber strength was insufficient, and in turn the fighter strength fell short of the requirement to provide escorts in a 2:1 ratio. Aircraft production and crew training lagged behind the RAF. Intelligence and target identification were very poor, so that many bombs were wasted on targets of little importance, and enemy losses strongly overestimated. The range of the Bf 109E was too short, the use of drop tanks was neglected, and the available bombers had small bomb loads and weak defensive armament. Last but not least, the operation itself was handicapped by two conflicting goals, preparing for an invasion by destroying the RAF and forcing Britain to come to a negotiated peace by bombing, and neither was a realistic war plan. 

The catalogue of failure should not obscure that the Bf 110 had also found a role in which it was very effective, that of a fighter-bomber. This was especially so in the hands of Erprobungsgruppe 210, a unit that specialized in precision attacks on targets such as airfields, radar stations, and shipping. At the beginning of the battle it operated a number of Bf 110C-6 with a powerful MK 101 30-mm cannon in a fairing under the fuselage, but operational and technical problems lead to the removal of this weapon. The occasional heavy losses demonstrated the need for air superiority on such operations, but a series of successful attacks also confirmed the effectiveness of the aircraft in this role. The large Messerschmitt fighter still had a long and generally successful career ahead of it.


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## Nikademus (Sep 19, 2010)

Juha said:


> Hello Nikademus
> take a brief look on your 110 kill/lost list. Interesting to note that before the Battle of France 110 did badly against Hurricanes, during the BoF very well (as the figures JoeB gave, based on Cornwell’s BoF Then and Now), then during the BoB, again based on Cornwall’s figures in BoB Then and Now it did again poorly, Greek/Yug again better etc. Now only during BoF and BoB figures are substantial. IMHO they clearly shows that combat environment had very important effect on combat results.
> 
> Mid-1941-42 seemed to have been bad period to 110s but over Tunisia it again did reasonable well. Maybe the F and G subtypes, at least the late-comer II./ZG 1 had the latter, which restored the powerloading of ever more heavier 110s, helped to restore at least partially 110’s air-to-air capacity. Over Tunisia it wasn’t a first class fighter but was still a reasonable dangerous opponent.
> ...



Yes, combat environment is critically important and is part of the reason why static kill ratios never tell the whole story. The Hurricane has probably the most variable kill ratio of any modern plane. It was one of the key players in the BoB.....won the vaunted ratio in Greece against the same plane type that later handed it it's worst kill ratio exchange in it's history (and possibly all of WWII....a five month 34:0 exchange rate). In the Fledgling Eagles summary, a major factor was that only at the tail end of this period did the RAF have any signifigant clashes with the Luftwaffe....leading to an early 110 defeat, and vice versa, a Hurricane defeat by 109's that got a couple good bounces on them prior to Blitzkreig. 

As Shores mentions in his books covering the Mediterranian, the 110 found new life as a fighter in less intensive theaters. Given the less intensive day to day fighter vs fighter clashes, it had more opportunities to score a small positive ratio but in general....if it met large scale determined 1E fighter opposition, it faired more poorly as indicated in the North Africa figures. It's speed edge and good pilots gave it an edge on the Ost front during the first year as long as it kept it's speed up. It was of course, against bombers that it was most dangerous. Here's the full picture estimate for the plane in the Theaters i listed previously;

*France/Ger 1939 - 1940 (eve of Blitzkreig)*

110 kills

4 x Blenheim
11 x Wellington
1 x Anson
2 x H-75A
1 x MS-406

110 losses

5 to Hurricane
2 to H-75A
1 to MS-406
1 to Anson
3 Operational

I hope to start Battle of France: then and now this month so i can compare and expand.

*North Africa 1940-42*

110 Kills

18 x Hurricanes
1 x Beaufighter
8 x Tomahawk
2 x Blenheim
5 x Maryland
1 x Beafort
1 x Sunderland
1 x Hurricane PR
1 x Boston
4 x Liberator
2 x B-24
1 x Hudson
1 x Bisley

110 losses

1 x Ground
16 to AA
15 Operational
32 to Hurricane
15 to Tomahawk
7 to Kittyhawk
3 to Beaufighter
1 to Blenheim IVF
1 to B-24
2 to Liberator
1 to Murauder


*Tunisia 1943]/b]

110 Kills

7 x P-38
1 x P-40
4 x B-17
1 x F-4 
3 x Spitfire
1 x Beaufighter
1 x Beaufort


110 losses

1 on Ground
2 Operational
5 to Spitfire
1 to Beaufighter
11 to P-38
1 to Kittyhawk
1 to Mosquito


Yugoslavia/Greece 1941

110 kills

1 x Yugo Fury
1 x Yugo Do-17
1 x Yugo Hurricane
1 x Ju-88 (friendly fire)
7 x Hurricane
1 x Blenheim
1 x Blenheim IF


110 losses

3 to Yugo Bf-109
2 to Yugo Fury
21 to AA
9 Operational
4 on Ground
4 to Hurricane
1 to Gladiator
1 to Maryland

Malta 1941-42

110 Kills

1 x Sunderland
1 x Blenheim IVF
1 x Z-506B (Friendly fire)
2 x Beaufighter
1 x Beafort
2 x Blenheim
2 x Wellington
2 x Maryland
1 x Sea Hurricane

110 losses

2 to AA
3 Operational
10 to Hurricane
1 to Sea Hurricane
1 to Fulmar
1 to Beaufighter
1 to Liberator
1 to Blenheim


Iran 1941

110 Kills

No verified kills recorded

110 losses

12 Operational
2 to Gladiator*


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## Glider (Sep 19, 2010)

The Basket said:


> You can never have too many rounds.
> 
> It is surprising how badly armed the E-1 was.
> 
> Seems like an error....I remember one person saying that 8 .303s was obsolete by 1940...not as obsolete as 4 7.92mm guns.



I think that was me, never mind. I will now retreat and hang my head in shame.


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## tail end charlie (Sep 19, 2010)

Glider said:


> I think that was me, never mind. I will now retreat and hang my head in shame.




Ha Ha Ha Glider I always believed that the 109 had a cannon firing through the propellor based on no better evidence than the "commando picture library" cartoon books which always showed it firing after all what else would that hole be there for?


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## RCAFson (Sep 19, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> The Hurricane has probably the most variable kill ratio of any modern plane. It was one of the key players in the BoB.....won the vaunted ratio in Greece against the same plane type that later handed it it's worst kill ratio exchange in it's history (and possibly all of WWII....a five month 34:0 exchange rate).



Of course during the time that the Me109 was scoring those 34 kills, the Hurricane continued in its primary mission of destroying incoming bombers, and still, IIRC, eaked out an overall positive kill ratio.


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## The Basket (Sep 19, 2010)

I too like the Bf 110.

It was much better than the Bf 210.

I remember reading somewhere that production was stopped so the 210 can be made...

Then restarting again when the 210 was a dog.

Those crazy guys.


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## Juha (Sep 20, 2010)

Hello Dave
Quote: “Actually I think it's a matter of weapons availability…”

I doubt that a bit, but it is a possibility, E-1s and E-3s were produced side by side from 1938 onwards. And they needed MG FFs also to 110Cs and Ds.

Juha


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## Juha (Sep 20, 2010)

Hello Nikademus
Thanks a lot again for your very interesting info!

A lighter note, again Anson was shown to be dangerous opponent, 1:1 against Bf 110 : ).

Juha


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## Juha (Sep 20, 2010)

Hello Basket
after all 4 rcmgs was rather standard fighter armament at the beginning of WWII, some had even lighter, for ex early I-16 (Typ 4, 5 and 6 had only 2 fast-firing 7,62mm ShKAS ) and Japanese Ki-10, Ki-27 and A5M had also only 2 rcmgs.

Appr. 1/3 of 109E production was E-1s/E-1/Bs.

On Me 210, Messerchmitt AG succeeded to fix at least the worst problems of 210 and the later longer fuselage 210s were acceptable planes. Hungarians built DB 605 engined 210Cs and were satisfied with it, it also had the longer fuselage and other mods that fixed the instability of 210. Also for ex RAF had its failures in a/c, for ex Botha and Lerwick. Also resurces spent for ex to Albemarle and Warwick were IMHO mostly wasted.

Juha


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## Juha (Sep 20, 2010)

Hello TEC
I remember also those menacing 109s with 5 flashing guns from Siivet, Finnish edition of Ace or something like that cartoon book. But not all what one read of them was misinformation, so already in 1963 I learned that one cannot successfully turnfight with Ki-43 whose combat flaps were extended even with Spitfire. 

Juha


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## The Basket (Sep 20, 2010)

It was a point. On another thread....a certain member had said that the 303s were obsolete and 8 303s were obsolete...By 1940...

Forgetting to mention the weaker armament standard on his current particular cherished machine...

It was a comment which I thought was worthy of comment.

Still do.

I know the royal air force had its misses...but the Bf 210 was a full on effort aircraft which failed..which meant the 110 had to be kept going.well.past.its bedtime. The 110 is a vastly important combat type...the Luftwaffe were very lucky to have a versatile machine in its ranks.

the aircraft you mentioned are unimportant and didn't alter the war one bit.


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## Maximowitz (Sep 20, 2010)

The Basket said:


> I know the royal air force had its misses...but the Bf 210 was a full on effort aircraft which failed..which meant the 110 had to be kept going.well.past.its bedtime. The 110 is a vastly important combat type...the Luftwaffe were very lucky to have a versatile machine in its ranks.



There's considerably more to the 210/410 story than that. The issues are quite complex.


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## Juha (Sep 20, 2010)

Hello Basket
IMHO it is good to remind others that there were also significant number of E-1s around, no doubt of that.

It’s true that 210 was designed to be crucial to LW, it was planned that it would replace both 110 and Ju 87. But to say that Botha and Lerwick were unimportant is a bit misleading, because they were, with Beaufort, which ran into troubles with its Taurus engines, were planned to replace most of CC pre-war types, Ansons, Londons, Stranraers and Wildebeests. Now the failure of them was partly covered by ordering more Hudsons but still meant that those old and inadequate planes had to serve longer than planned and surely cost lives of many merchant marines, not to speak on the fact that the torpedosqns in Singapore in Dec 41 were still equipped with Wildebeests when Japan attacked. Albemarle was a more like a backup plane and the long and troublesome development of Warwick only meant that Wellington was kept in production longer. Luckily Wimpy was a good plane and that wasn't a catastrophe.

Juha


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## Juha (Sep 20, 2010)

Hello Maximowitz
+1 

Juha


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## The Basket (Sep 20, 2010)

Maximowitz said:


> There's considerably more to the 210/410 story than that. The issues are quite complex.



Not really.

Germans expected the Me 210 to work out the box...that is complex.


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## tail end charlie (Sep 20, 2010)

The Basket said:


> Not really.
> 
> Germans expected the Me 210 to work out the box...that is complex.



I think everyone expected things to work straight away, many of the early planes in the war were good from the start they were all much better than the interwar designs. However towards the end of the war making big jumps in power and performance became harder and harder. Designers coming up against problems that were harder to solve and some problems they didnt even think of.


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## davebender (Sep 20, 2010)

The Me-210 prototype didn't fly until September 1939. By then Germany was fighting WWII. Like many weapons systems in many nations the Me-210 was rushed into production without adequate testing because it was needed ASAP. Without a war raging aircraft like the Me-210, Typhoon and B-29 would have their teething problems fixed before being placed into production.


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## Frantish (Sep 20, 2010)

It is pretty much covered here, but will toss my hat in.

As long as 110's did not engage in turn fights, and work in team, and of course engaged with position advantage they dominated.

The center line weapons arrangement was lethal to range (not unlike P-38).
And it was slightly faster then just about any allied fighter in the area except Spitfire and I believe Dewotine 520.

OTOH, it would be in trouble if Hurri got on its tail close enough, that is if the speed difference was close, the 110 could not pull away fast enough before it suffered performance degrading damage.


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## Nikademus (Sep 20, 2010)

RCAFson said:


> Of course during the time that the Me109 was scoring those 34 kills, the Hurricane continued in its primary mission of destroying incoming bombers, and still, IIRC, eaked out an overall positive kill ratio.



Not during this period i'm afraid. It was tough time for the defenders.

Hurricane kills (during this period)

6 x Bf-110
12 x Ju-87
4 x Ju-88
2 x He-111
1 x Cr-42


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## Frantish (Sep 20, 2010)

double post


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## RCAFson (Sep 21, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> Not during this period i'm afraid. It was tough time for the defenders.
> 
> Hurricane kills (during this period)
> 
> ...



OK. thanks, but what time frame, exactly are we talking about?


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## Maximowitz (Sep 21, 2010)

The Basket said:


> Not really.
> 
> Germans expected the Me 210 to work out the box...that is complex.



Not really. 

There was a lot of politics involved and a constant moving of the goalposts by the RLM during the design phase. Creating an aircraft while the requirements of said machine are changed on an almost weekly basis is a recipe for disaster.


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## parsifal (Sep 21, 2010)

I find it perplexing that the Hungarians, who produced quite a few of the me 210s were always very happy with them, whereas the LW were very unhappy….were there any differences.

Whereas the 210 was seen as a failure, the 410 was seen as quite successful. I dont get that. Visually, its hard to tell the difference between the two, and I don’t think all that much needed to be done in order to fix whatever problem the 210 had. 

People are saying the 110 was a cool looking aircraft. For looks alone I prefer the pugnacious looks of the Beaufighter or the Hornisse. To me the 110 looks effeminate, without the curvy grace of the Spitfire or the 109


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## Maximowitz (Sep 21, 2010)

parsifal said:


> I find it perplexing that the Hungarians, who produced quite a few of the me 210s were always very happy with them, whereas the LW were very unhappy….were there any differences.
> 
> Whereas the 210 was seen as a failure, the 410 was seen as quite successful. I dont get that. Visually, its hard to tell the difference between the two, and I don’t think all that much needed to be done in order to fix whatever problem the 210 had.
> 
> People are saying the 110 was a cool looking aircraft. For looks alone I prefer the pugnacious looks of the Beaufighter or the Hornisse. To me the 110 looks effeminate, without the curvy grace of the Spitfire or the 109




You make a good point. The Hungarians were indeed very happy with the 210 - and so were more than a few German pilots, including Johannes Kaufmann, who was disappointed to return to the Bf 110.

One of the problems with the 210 was the inexperience of the crews who struggled to convert to the type.

However, this thread is about the Bf 110.... best not to derail it.


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## Milosh (Sep 21, 2010)

Didn't the Hungarian built 210s have the extended rear fuselage?

One way to tell a 210 from a 410 is the engine nacelles. The back of the spinner on the 210 is even with the nose while on the 410 it is in front of the nose. Not always possible to see in photos though.


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## Kurfürst (Sep 21, 2010)

parsifal said:


> I find it perplexing that the Hungarians, who produced quite a few of the me 210s were always very happy with them, whereas the LW were very unhappy….were there any differences.
> 
> Whereas the 210 was seen as a failure, the 410 was seen as quite successful. I dont get that. Visually, its hard to tell the difference between the two, and I don’t think all that much needed to be done in order to fix whatever problem the 210 had.



Oh, they were quite different. The troublesome series were the first 210s, the 210A, pressed into service by the RLM's pressure without aduquate testing. Everyone knew it had troubles, but some blockhead in the RLM probably got a fixation on delivery schedules.

Mtt fixed its handling cons after a while, adding long fuselage, larger tail, and leading edge slats which the first ones didn't have. That was the 210A (lang) long version. 210C was that fixed version, but with DB 605s, we produced that as 210Ca, with "a" standing for "foreign" version. The Germans simply moved to the 410, which was basically the same but with 603s.



> People are saying the 110 was a cool looking aircraft. For looks alone I prefer the pugnacious looks of the Beaufighter or the Hornisse. To me the 110 looks effeminate, without the curvy grace of the Spitfire or the 109



Basically you say its like those tall, skinny model chicks without... features. And I agree.


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## The Basket (Sep 21, 2010)

J


Maximowitz said:


> Not really.
> 
> There was a lot of politics involved and a constant moving of the goalposts by the RLM during the design phase. Creating an aircraft while the requirements of said machine are changed on an almost weekly basis is a recipe for disaster.



The point that I am making which you them made yourself....

Somehow the Germans believed the Bf 110 was so vital that a modern replacement had to be built..and it would go into production straight away.

This is not clever. That don't mean the 210 or the 410 couldn't have its bugs ironed out...it does mean that a disaster that didn't need to happen happened. 

If you look at the Fw 190 program which also went bad...no big deal...give it another year and fixed.

It was the unreality of the 210 project...not the metal.


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## Maximowitz (Sep 21, 2010)

The Basket said:


> J
> 
> The point that I am making which you them made yourself....
> 
> ...



Unreality? Who knew the Zerstorer concept was fatally flawed? There were doubts, but no proof at the time a replacement for the Bf 110 was considered, the Battle of Britain had yet to be fought. As I mentioned in the above post, most of the problem was the inexperience of the crews, not the airframe. Once the fuselage was increased in length the major problem was solved.


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## The Basket (Sep 21, 2010)

You're missing the point.

The original prototype was flawed which led to the fallout.

Not the fix. As other posters have noted...only after fixes were made was the 210 ok.

And you said yourself....the 110 has not seen combat or even matured as a design and yet its replacement was top priorities.

That don't make sense to me. Replacing the 110 and modernizing is ok but how the Germans did it was not right.


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## Maximowitz (Sep 21, 2010)

The Basket said:


> And you said yourself....the 110 has not seen combat or even matured as a design and yet its replacement was top priorities.
> 
> That don't make sense to me. Replacing the 110 and modernizing is ok but how the Germans did it was not right.



And there you have it. The problem was the concept, not the aircraft itself. Replacing the Bf 110 was pointless, the 110/210/410 series should have been terminated in 1941 and all resources given to the development of the far more useful Ju 88 series.

Far too many chiefs and not enough Indians ruined the Me 210/410. When there was a purpose for it the aircraft wasn't there. When it was there the role had gone.


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## Njaco (Sep 21, 2010)

I agree with Max. It was the concept. First flight of the 210 was September 2, 1939 - well before the destroyer concept was tested or proven to be flawed.

and 410 is best looking of all 3!


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## Glider (Sep 21, 2010)

I admit that I have alwys thought of the Me 210/410 as a strike aircraft not a destroyer, with its internal bomb bay and good performance it was pretty well designed for the role. However it seemed to me to be forced into roles for which it wasn't suited for i.e. bomber destroyer for which it payed the price. Had you forced the Mosquito into a bomber destroyer role against escorted bombers it would have had a similar lack of success.

If the RAF had been using the Me 410 in the Far East it had a significant chance of achieving a lot more than the Mosquito. It was fast enough to stay out of most trouble, had fewer blind spots and of course rear firing guns to defend itself and a respectable bomb load. Then a lot of people would have considered it to be a fine aircraft.

I cannot help but feel that its reputation was due to the situation it found itself in, as much as any performance or design issue.


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## davebender (Sep 21, 2010)

> First flight of the 210 was September 2, 1939 - well before the destroyer concept was tested or proven to be flawed.


The Me-210 / Me-410 was a very different aircraft. It was intended as a light bomber right from the beginning complete with bomb bay, dive brakes and Stuvi 5B bombsight. 

If not for the night fighter mission I think the Me-110 Zerstorer program would have died an eary death. Meanwhile the Me-210 / Me-410 light bomber program would continue.


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## Nikademus (Sep 21, 2010)

2/41 - 6/41


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## The Basket (Sep 22, 2010)

That's the problem with forums like these.

All hindsight...

The British had the Beaufighter which was considered more successful...even though similar to the 110.

I certainly consider the 110 successful and achieved much.

Just not the unrealized dreams of the 1930s.


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## davebender (Sep 23, 2010)

> Beaufighter which was considered more successful...even though similar to the 110


More successful in what role? Certainly not as a day fighter or night fighter.


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## Kurfürst (Sep 23, 2010)

IMHO a bit too much emphasis is placed on fighter vs fighter engagements... but fighters are built to fight bombers and other aircraft, that is their role first and foremost, fighting enemy fighters is just a necessary evil of the process.

Fighter pilots make movies, bomber pilots make history.


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## Glider (Sep 23, 2010)

davebender said:


> More successful in what role? Certainly not as a day fighter or night fighter.



As a strike aircraft and in particular anti shipping missions I would say that the Beaufighter has a clear advantage. 
As a day and night fighter they were both pretty similar. Later versions of the 110 had a better performance but the Beaufighter did well in the day fighter role over the Bay of Biscay. So its a case of swings and roundabouts in the fighter role.


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## tail end charlie (Sep 23, 2010)

davebender said:


> More successful in what role? Certainly not as a day fighter or night fighter.



The beaufighter was designed with a similar idea to the 110 and like the 110 went into other roles, it performed well as a nightfighter and in anti shipping ground attack.


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## The Basket (Sep 23, 2010)

The Beaufighter is not considered the 'failure' the Bf 110 is...

Even thou similar...

Maybe the dogfighter role tarred the 110 any glory it got.


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## parsifal (Sep 23, 2010)

davebender said:


> More successful in what role? Certainly not as a day fighter or night fighter.



Its a debateable subject, admittedly, we would need to look at the performance details of each aircraft. Each held advantages over the other. the Beau had superior firepower with ten 20mm cannon, plus a rear gunner. The 110 was faster, I am not sure about turning, climbing or diving. It is also debateable as to which aircraft was more stable in the air, though the Beau had a tendency to swing on takeoff.

As to radar, its a no contest. British AI radar held a very large technological edge over German sets until the very end of the war. Moreover, radar was being fitted to Beaufighters, long before anything similar was being done to the 110. From memory, the earliest AI sets were being fitted and used in an operational capacity from the latter part of 1940. They began to achieve meaningful results from early 1941, as the LW bomber losses over Britain clearly show. 

By comparison, German airborne radar was not fitted and used operationally until the latter part of 1941. Moreover whilst british radar has its share of critics, it was generally able to produce clearer images and had better ranges than German equivalents until later in the war. The Germans IMO had superior passive detection systems, and the operarations of their radarless intruders in the 1940-41 period indicate good pilot efficiency.

So I reject the flippant remarks by both sides in this debate. It cannot be stated easily that the beau was superior to the 110 without further investigation, and neither can it be stated that the 110 was better than the beau for the same reasons


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## Glider (Sep 23, 2010)

10 x 20mm?


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## fastmongrel (Sep 23, 2010)

4 x 20 mm in the nose and 6 x .303 in the wings. 10 x 20 mm would have been major overkill


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## davebender (Sep 23, 2010)

That strikes me as a strange weapons mix.

Nose mounted weapons are inheritly more accurate and 4 x 20mm cannon provide plenty of firepower. So why add the weight of 6 rifle caliber machineguns and ammunition in the wings? The same weight could be used for something more useful like fuel or armor.


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## buffnut453 (Sep 23, 2010)

davebender said:


> That strikes me as a strange weapons mix.
> 
> Nose mounted weapons are inheritly more accurate and 4 x 20mm cannon provide plenty of firepower. So why add the weight of 6 rifle caliber machineguns and ammunition in the wings? The same weight could be used for something more useful like fuel or armor.



IIRC the 303s were often used for aiming purposes - they were set to converge where underwing rockets would strike. I suppose they could also be used for sighting the cannons in a similar fashion.


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## davebender (Sep 23, 2010)

That explains why you might have a single machinegun loaded with tracer ammunition in each wing. But why 3 machineguns in each wing?


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## buffnut453 (Sep 23, 2010)

Valid question. My original answer was probably more based on how the weapons system was used rather than what it was originally specified to accomplish. Given the age and evolutionary nature of the Beaufighter design, I suppose the MGs were there to provide longer firing duration - the use of them for aiming was a beneficial side effect for a specific mission (rocket attacks). The other mission specific useful side effect was suppression of crew in anti-shipping sorties - the 303s kept the sailors' heads (craniums not toilets!) down while the cannons did the more serious damage.


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## Glider (Sep 24, 2010)

As a strike aircraft the retention of 6 x mg had a number of advantages namely increasing the firepower and the spread of the firepower. Infantry and soft vehicles are vulnerable and it helps keep the heads down of the AA gunners. In reality the mg's were often removed and replaced by additional fuel tanks or the installation of rockets.

It’s also worth remembering that the first Beaufighters had drum fed cannon and the poor observer had to reload the guns. In a combat that could take time or be physically impossible, and the mg's were a useful backup.


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## parsifal (Sep 24, 2010)

thanks for the correction guys......i did know that, but suffered a brain fart when i posted that last comment


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## Juha (Sep 24, 2010)

Hello
Glider is right and to return the thread subject, same goes to Bf 110, also in it, at least in B and C models, one of the duties of the WO/AG was reloading the MG FF/FF M cannon, there were 2 spare 60 rounds drums per cannon. 110G-2 got belt-fed MG 151/20s, but I cannot remember were ever those MG FF Ms in Es and Fs beltfed. IMH0 at least 3 crew F-4 nightfighters should have had some other system than manual reloading.

Juha


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## fastmongrel (Sep 24, 2010)

davebender said:


> That explains why you might have a single machinegun loaded with tracer ammunition in each wing. But why 3 machineguns in each wing?



It wasnt 3 in each wing iirc correctly it was 4 in the right wing and 2 in the left wing. Originally there was to be 4 in each wing but 2 were replaced by what looks like large navigation lights





.


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## Kurfürst (Sep 24, 2010)

parsifal said:


> Moreover whilst british radar has its share of critics, it was generally able to produce clearer images and had better ranges than German equivalents until later in the war.



Any specs or details - range, power, frequency, detection angle etc?


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## parsifal (Sep 24, 2010)

Probably not to the standard you would be happy with, but i didnt just make that stuff up. Plus ther are plenty of people her who know heaps more than I about the technical specs. To me the sets are a means to an end....a "black box" aimed at detection and to assist in achieving good interceptions.

Main information source for me is Bill Gunstons Night Fighters - A development combat history Stephens Cambridge 1976

The contemporary to the first operational German AI sets were the centimetric AI Mk VIII which first entered service in May 1941, and were in mass production by about October 1941. 

Gunston gives a detailed account of their development, and quite a few of the technical specs for the unit. Operationally however, he gives a very clear account of their capabilities...."The biggest advance with the new set was that it could be used at low level: previously all AIs were almost useless below 5000 ft. The new fine beam settings scanned the whole sky ahead of the fighter, and possessed the best angular resolution of any airborne set available in the world at that time. Resolution was excellent, and error margin less than 1%. The limiting factor was no longer the equipment, it was the crew proficincy.......Maximum range varied with target speed, and size, as well as the weather (like any radar) but was never less than 6 miles even against fighter sized aircraft, and more generally in the range of fifteen miles. ninimum range was a mere 100 yards. Beam width was an impressive 45 degree arc".

Regarding German efforts in radar technology, Gunston comments"German prowess in ground based radars was thus unquestioned, but what about AI? Work in this field started years later than in Britain, and was generally not inspired, compared to the pioneering work done by TRE with their magnetron. It was in December 1940 that Kammhuber ordered Telefunken to begin work on an AI radar, and their answer was an intersting compromise. They chose a wavelength of 62cm (compared to less than 10cm in the AI Mk VIII) and a power output of 490MHz, and used a bulky and draggy aerial system comprisingfour double pairs of dipoles, in an array carried on struts, on the fighters nose. Under ideal conditions (and the installation was found to give unpredictable and variable results) the two display scopes gave useful readings at ranges out to 2-3.5 miles, and down to 250 yards. Similar to the wearlier AI MkIV, the new radar gave frequent spurious blips, and high degree of distortion. Serviceability rates were also very low. Unlike the RAF Night Fighter Crews, most Luftwaffe NJG pilots at this time scorned their new equipment, and frequntly showed an attitude of outright hostility toward it. This was in stqark contrast to the meticulous acceptance program undertaken by TRE for the MkVIII installation, which was enthusiastically accepted and used by the RAF crews. 

(The original) FUG 200 sets began pre-production installation in July 1941"....


I cant find Gunstons assessment of the search beam width, but it was narrow....perhaps no more than 25 degrees


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## Kurfürst (Sep 24, 2010)

Good stuff!  Thanks!

I remember reading something about phase controlled(?) radar of the 110s, what was said about it is that was in principle a forerunner of the system used on the F-16.. I know very little about the soul of actual radar stuff, but to me it seems that the primary difference of operation - apart from frequency - was that the German radar scanned the whole horizont all the time, while the British sweeped the radar head in circles with an electric motor.


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## davebender (Sep 24, 2010)

Now that's really strange! Apparently you need to be British to appreciate this weapons arrangement.


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## Juha (Sep 24, 2010)

Hello fastmongrel
you are right but the light is IIRC the landing light.

Juha


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## tail end charlie (Sep 24, 2010)

davebender said:


> Now that's really strange! Apparently you need to be British to appreciate this weapons arrangement.



Detailed research showed that pilots instinctively pulled to the left when firing so the right side was loaded more heavily for the recoil to balance it out.


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## Glider (Sep 24, 2010)

tail end charlie said:


> Detailed research showed that pilots instinctively pulled to the left when firing so the right side was loaded more heavily for the recoil to balance it out.



I wold love to think that was the reason but would tend to go with the 'where do we have the room' theory. A plane the size and weight of the Beaufighter isn't going to be that impacted by a couple of machine guns in particular when the 20mm's are blazing away.


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## fastmongrel (Sep 24, 2010)

I cant see 9 tons of Beaufighter being disturbed by anything short of a 57mm firing. Its a big old lump of aircraft I havent seen a 110 and a Beau side by side in a museum but having seen them both the Beau is about 20% bigger and heavier. The 110 looks like a fighter the Beau looks like a light bomber.

Both good aircraft that seemed to be loaded heavier and heavier throughout there life and never quite having enough power to become a great aircraft. The Beau coul have used the more powerful Centaurus or Gryphon engines to give it a bit more zip.


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## tail end charlie (Sep 24, 2010)

Glider said:


> I wold love to think that was the reason but would tend to go with the 'where do we have the room' theory. A plane the size and weight of the Beaufighter isn't going to be that impacted by a couple of machine guns in particular when the 20mm's are blazing away.



I was of course joking, but the thought for the joke came from reading it was upset whhen firing the cannon, the plane would dip with the recoil and the shells fell short of the target. So far as I know it was as someone else said planned to have 8 machine guns but took two out for other things. As with the spitfire the machine guns were so the plane wasnt defenceless when the cannon drums emptied.


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## tomo pauk (Sep 24, 2010)

In 'HP per kilo' category, Beaufighter was not in disadvantage vs. contemporaries (Ju-88, A-20, B-25, Pe-2). And it was a great aircraft.


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## NZTyphoon (Sep 24, 2010)

parsifal said:


> Regarding German efforts in radar technology, Gunston comments"German prowess in ground based radars was thus unquestioned, but what about AI? Work in this field started years later than in Britain, and was generally not inspired, compared to the pioneering work done by TRE with their magnetron. It was in December 1940 that Kammhuber ordered Telefunken to begin work on an AI radar, and their answer was an intersting compromise. They chose a wavelength of 62cm (compared to less than 10cm in the AI Mk VIII) and a power output of 490MHz, and used a bulky and draggy aerial system comprisingfour double pairs of dipoles, in an array carried on struts, on the fighters nose. Under ideal conditions (and the installation was found to give unpredictable and variable results) the two display scopes gave useful readings at ranges out to 2-3.5 miles, and down to 250 yards. Similar to the wearlier AI MkIV, the new radar gave frequent spurious blips, and high degree of distortion. Serviceability rates were also very low. Unlike the RAF Night Fighter Crews, most Luftwaffe NJG pilots at this time scorned their new equipment, and frequntly showed an attitude of outright hostility toward it. This was in stqark contrast to the meticulous acceptance program undertaken by TRE for the MkVIII installation, which was enthusiastically accepted and used by the RAF crews.
> 
> (The original) FUG 200 sets began pre-production installation in July 1941"....
> 
> ...



According to  Gebhard Aders the search angle of the FuG _202_ Lichtenstein BC was 70°, Frequency 490 MHz, range 3,500 metres (11,480 ft) with a minimum resolution range of 200 m (656 ft). Where German equipment scored was in its modular construction ( way ahead of the British) and weight- 24 kg (53 lb).

The later FuG 220 Lichtenstein SN-2, which wasn't jammed by Window until after July 1944, had a search angle of 120°, Frequency range 73/82 or 91 MHz, later expanded to a range of 37.5 to 118 MHz. Range = 4 km to 300 or 500 m (2.5 miles to 984 or 1,640 ft) weight =70 kg (154lb)

Ader's comments on the later 110 night fighters are interesting "With the G-4 series the Bf 110 had reached the zenith of its development...The standard armament of Bf 110 night fighters delivered from June 1944 onwards consisted of 2 x MK108 in the upper and 2 x MG151 in the lower nose section and an oblique armament of 2 x MG/FF. On account of the powerful explosive effect of its ammunition - as a rule a burst of only 15 rounds sufficed to bring down a four-engined bomber...On the other hand...Its low muzzle velocity (the MK 108 ) meant that the pilot had to approach the enemy aircraft very closely and accept the risk of damage to his own aircraft from debris...some pilots asked for the MK 108 cannon to be removed from their aircraft..."
"The Bf 110 may have been classed as obsolete, but in the hands of good pilots this aircraft remained a deadly weapon right up to the end of the war. This is particularly noticeable when the victory claims submitted by I./NJG 1 (He 219) and II./NJG 1 (Bf 110) from June 1944 onwards are compared. Operating at the same time and under the same conditions the pilots of II./NJG 1 regularly shot down more bombers than the He 219 crews."

On the He 219: "In June [1944] a few He 219As were flown operationally by II./NJG 1, but the pilots - all old Bf 110 hands- were not at ease with the _Uhu_. They found that its performance was not significantly better than that of their usual mounts...After the high altitude performance of the He 219A-2 and A-5 series had proved inadequate for intercepting Mosquitoes in June and July Heinkel delivered the A-6...Basically a He 219A-5 minus 50 kg (110 lb) of armour plating and with armament reduced to 4 x MG 151 guns this lightened version was powered by DB 603L engines...and were fitted with GM-1 nitrous oxide injection system. These measures promised a straight and level maximum speed of 615 km/h at 10,000 m (382 mph at 32,810 ft) altitude. In practice tests revealed that the He 219A-6...was extremely unstable at such altitudes, and had to be banked very carefully in a wide turn to avoid a stall...in any case: the He 219A-6 was never used as a "Mosquito hunter".


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## davebender (Sep 24, 2010)

1944 German Fighter Production
German aircraft production during World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
2,513 Ju-88
128 Me-110

It appears to me the Me-110 ended production at the beginning of 1944. By mid 1944 most night fighter units should have converted to the Ju-88G.


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## NZTyphoon (Sep 24, 2010)

davebender said:


> 1944 German Fighter Production
> German aircraft production during World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> 2,513 Ju-88
> 128 Me-110
> ...



Did you mean 1945?
Aders: 
September 1944 -167 Bf 110s built
December 1944 - 61
February 1945- last 17 built

Ju 88s
June '44- 285
August - 306
October- 255
November -339


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## Milosh (Sep 24, 2010)

davebender said:


> 1944 German Fighter Production
> German aircraft production during World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> 2,513 Ju-88
> 128 Me-110
> ...



I posted a very good link to German a/c production awhile back, so why don't you use instead of Wiki?
Aircraft Industry Report Exhibits

http://www.ordersofbattle.darkscape.net/site/sturmvogel/images/ussbs/exiii-cpt1.gif
http://www.ordersofbattle.darkscape.net/site/sturmvogel/images/ussbs/exiii-cpt2.gif


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## Juha (Sep 27, 2010)

Hello
I asked from those who know more than me on FC a/c and yes, the only Hurricane, which was written off on 15 Aug 1940 according to BoB Then and Now Mk V, F/O Passy’s P3827, following combat against KG 26 and I./ZG 76 off the NE coast of England, was after all later repaired and subsequently served in 4 different units before it was SOC 18 Dec 44.So the total losses in combat off NE England on 15 Aug 40 were LW: 7 Bf 110s plus 8 He 111s vs RAF 0. 2 FC Hurricanes were substantially damaged (Cat. 2) after forced-landings outside their base. 2 Bf 110s returned to Norway with wounded but were repairable.

Juha


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## Juha (Nov 1, 2010)

Hello Delcyros,
You asked the number of LW planes shot down by British AA and in my message #70 I wrote: ”British AA . It is usually estimated that British AA shot down 100 planes, most of them bombers.”

Now that seems to be only a half-truth because I came across two figures; 221 for the whole BoB and 196 between 1 July 40 and 30 Sept 40.

Juha


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## Kryten (Nov 1, 2010)

Would claims by AA batteries be more accurate than by Ait to Air?

I ask this because if your static on the ground and your target goes down in flames then theres little ambiguity I would have thought?


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## Colin1 (Nov 1, 2010)

Kryten said:


> Would claims by AA batteries be more accurate than by Ait to Air?
> 
> I ask this because if your static on the ground and your target goes down in flames then there's little ambiguity I would have thought?


What if your target high-tails it out of visual range in flames?

I don't think there's much difference between an air to air and a ground to air if you didn't see it go down - you're relying on third party confirmation either way.


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## Juha (Nov 1, 2010)

Hello
the numbers I gave are not claims but research results of historians. Baldwin's and Routledge's.

Juha


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## Kryten (Nov 1, 2010)

Juha said:


> Hello
> the numbers I gave are not claims but research results of historians. Baldwin's and Routledge's.
> 
> Juha



What would be interesting there would be the number claimed by the air defence compared to the numbers actually recorded in this reaserch?


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