# Motor transport in the German army



## Shortround6 (Aug 16, 2011)

A thread where we can discuss motor transport or lack of it in the German Army in WW II. 

Germany had little or no hope of a totally motorized army. Their motor industry was too small and the army too big. The only Armies that achieved full motorization or came close were the US and British commonwealth nations. 

Pre-war Germany, in spite of it's industry and economy, had a much lower per capita number of motor vehicles than England did and England was well behind the US. Not only does this mean fewer auto factories but it means a lower percentage of service men entering the service know how to drive or have rudimentary mechanical skills.


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## davebender (Aug 16, 2011)

*German GDP*. Measured in millions of 1990 USA dollars.
237,332 1913.
234,778 1933.
374,577 1939.

As you can see, the new German Government elected during 1933 inherited a very sick economy. GDP was actually lower then it had been 20 years earlier! They had no border defenses and practically no military or military-industrial complex. That had all been destroyed during 1919. So Germany couldn't just start mass producing military equipment (including vehicles) during 1933. The new German Government required several years to fix the economy and build border defenses opposite France and Poland. Only then could Germany get serious about the mass production of expensive army hardware.


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## parsifal (Aug 16, 2011)

This is no different to just about every other country in Europe. For the British nett national income relative to the 1913 levels had fallen by almost 25%. For the French vast amounts of the country had been lain waste by the invading Germans. For the fledgling Poles, they had virtually no cash reserves to speak of, had bee forced to fight a costly war in 1921 against the USSR. All the European nations suffered negative growth during the depresion, and most had seriously disarmed by the early 1920s, except for colonial police forces and naval assets. It was in fact Germany that led the charge to re-arm, and had in fact a number of advantages over their opponents. Despite the social dislocation caused by the war, actual damage to the country's infrastructure had been virtually nil. It was in fact the Germans that led the charge to rearmament, and apart from the disheartening leftovers from WWI, her neighbours were in no condition to militarily challenge them. Certainly the strength of the french army in the 1920s and 30s is grossly overrated.

The Germans had a golden opportunity to reorganise their automotive industry in the lead up to war, much as the french and the british did (France however left their run too late), and basically squandered it. They never anticipated the numbers they would need, and because of the shortages in cash reserves in the country, only ever planned for a short war. British cash reserves were similarly stripped out after WWI, but in the lead up to war, they spent what meagre cash reserves they had more in expanding their industrial base and war production capability, rather than actually building the guns themselves. Germany took a fundamentally different view....they built the guns and failed to worry much about expanding the potential. There was never any reall comparative program to the shadow factory system ofr the rationalization programs that occurred in britain, evident in Germany


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## michaelmaltby (Aug 16, 2011)

I agree with Parsifal. Whatever the shortcomings of the German economy in 1933 - they were common to all WW1 participants and not exclusive to Germany. Whatever happened between 1933-1939 was entirely a reflection on Nazi economics - and I would argue (as would Adam Tooze [Economic History of the Third Reich] that Nazis priorities made things worse overall, not more prosperous.

To these points I would add:

The Germans made better use of *railroads* than anyone else because they had done so in the Franco Prussian War and WWI and the country (and western Europe) were well served by rails. Unfortunately - when they went east they ran into the problems of rail gauge incompatibility and the fact that their vast rear was insecure to partisans.

Hitler was determined that _his_ war was going to be short and sweet - no long war of attrition for him. In that view - the Heer marched from the invasion jump-off point, or the rail- head, whichever applied.

The German army had a wide variety of excellent prime movers, and medium trucks like the Opel Blitz. But unlike the Americans, Brits and Commonwealth armies the Nazis didn't see the need to move foot soldiers by truck. Fast Blitzkreig columns were supported by half-tracks, scout cars, motorcycles etc. etc. - but the rank and file of the Heer moved by train and then by foot or horse-drawn.

German war planning was not nearly up to the standards that post-WWII mythology has suggested.  

In passing: I am currently reading William Manchester's book "The Arms of Krupp" and it is very clear that - by and large - the Krupp industrial complex in Essen and the Ruhr was unscathed by the Versailles treaty and the rapacious French "occupiers". When Hitler started to rearm in 1933, the Krupps were ready, waiting and willing. They (Krupp engineering teams) had been building U-boats in Holland, and tanks elsewhere in Europe for some time and it was simply a matter of recalling the Krupp men home for the Fatherland. 

Finally - American, Canadian, British and Commonwealth _agriculture_ was *mechanized *in a way that German agriculture was not. There was still quasi-feudal farming in eastern Germany (and the Nazis liked _the image _of that). Boys from the farms worked by hand or with horses, not with tractors and combines. The state of German food production in 1939 should have caused any clear thinking German leader of back off war planning, but not Mr. H. He thought he was going to "live off the spoils of the land".

Guess what ..... 

MM


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## davebender (Aug 16, 2011)

I disagree.

France and the Soviet Union remained armed to the teeth throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Both nations were hostile to Germany. Hence the German situation was very different from most European nations.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 16, 2011)

As Mr. Maltby says, a lot of this is ongoing history and economics. Part of the motor vehicle useage and development was also related to tax structures and benefits and subsidies that were paid. Many European nations taxed vehicles on the engine size (actually the size of the cylinder bores, stroke was not counted) This kept many car and small truck engines down to much smaller sizes than the US used. When production was adopted for war use many European manufacturers had no (or few) suitable designs to adapt. While the US may have needed new chassis and all wheel drive systems the engines and transmissions had been in production for years. Ford, Chevrolet, and Plymouth all had engines of just around 3.5-3.9 liters being made by the tens of thousands while engines of such size were luxury car engines in Europe. American truck production was much larger in numbers than European truck production during the war. Many places in America were not as well served by railroads. With greater distances to travel and no taxes on the engine size the American trucking industry was a large customer that could support a number of specialty engine makers, not just Mack, but White, IHC and Auto car made their own engines (or had them built) Continental supplied over 30 different car and truck manufactures at one point. Lycoming got their start making engines for Cord and Auburn automobiles and companies such as Hercules and Waukasha had engines from 5 to 10 liters in production for a number of years before the war started along with suitable transmissions, transfer cases, auxiliary gear boxes and axles. many of these big engines were low rpm engines that showed only modest hp improvements over the smaller engines but offered twice the torque (or more) and with the low gearing use could snap light axle shafts. 
The US designed very few new engines (if any) for trucks or tractors during the war. They may have standardized on one or two types of engine for a single type of of truck but with the variety of trucks used there was room for quite an assortment. Non standard trucks tended to get assigned to lend lease.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 16, 2011)

davebender said:


> I disagree.
> 
> France and the Soviet Union remained armed to the teeth throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Both nations were hostile to Germany. Hence the German situation was very different from most European nations.



The Russians did *NOT* remain armed to the teeth. They built a new army practically from scratch. While they had left over rifles and Maxim guns and some odds and sods of horse drawn artillery left over from the czarist days the rest of the Army and Air force was built during the 20's and 30's. While attempting to build the infrastructure at the same time. Russia in the 20s and 30s was trying to build up an economy from the Pre-WW I base. 
Granted the Russians spent a lot of money during those two decades on their military but they had a much smaller industrial base to work with. 

Total economy figures in dollars don't actually give you much to compare. Russia had a large population and and agricultural economy. you can't make tanks out of wheat. Russian Pre- WW I steel production was 1/4-1/5 what Germany's was. few countries had their industries wrecked in WW I they way they were in WW II. Most countries ended WW I in pretty much the same shape, Industry wise as they started. Some were better.


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## pinsog (Aug 16, 2011)

"The German army had a wide variety of excellent prime movers, and medium trucks like the Opel Blitz. "

I would have to disagree with calling the Opel Blitz an excellent military truck. It was 2 wheel drive. It might have been ok as an extreme rear echelon vehicle, confined to paved roads during good weather, but it had no business anywhere there wasn't pavement. It had the same mobility as a standard Ryder rental truck in America, which means it would get stuck in my front yard if the ground was wet. I'm not sure I've ever even seen a pic of one with snow tires, all the pics I ever saw had them wearing street slicks with maybe a set of chains on them. 

Contrast that with America, the only non-all-wheel-drive truck I can think of that was used by the US for front line service was the M20, Diamond T 980 tank transporter, and it was considered "limited standard" while the US tried to get a 6x6 tank transporter fielded to replace it, the M26 Dragon Wagon.

edit: After further study, I see that the Opel Blitz referred to just about anything made by Opel, including some 4x4's. But, in my defense, when you think "Opel Blitz" the 3 ton 2wd is the model that comes to mind. 

Ford built a very simular vehicle(2wd only), and both the Ford and the Opel were dependable vehicles, but without all-wheel-drive I wouldn't consider them fit for combat service.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 16, 2011)

The M20 wasn't really a "front line" truck. At least in the sense of being a "tactical mobile" truck. It could haul tanks from storage areas, docks, work shops to forward deployment areas and bring back broken down ( or battle damaged) tanks from forward areas to rear area maintenance shops. 
It was never intended to haul tanks cross country in poor conditions. 

The US tended to over spec things in some cases. Just because you "CAN" build an armor plated tank recovery truck with all wheel drive doesn't mean you "SHOULD".


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## psteel (Aug 16, 2011)

If you read translated german histories of the rearmament period, as opposed to western versions of this period, the image is quite different. Germany got the armed forces that Hitler wanted them to have, not the one they had planned to build before Hitler got into power.


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## pinsog (Aug 16, 2011)

Shortround6 said:


> The M20 wasn't really a "front line" truck. At least in the sense of being a "tactical mobile" truck. It could haul tanks from storage areas, docks, work shops to forward deployment areas and bring back broken down ( or battle damaged) tanks from forward areas to rear area maintenance shops.
> It was never intended to haul tanks cross country in poor conditions.
> 
> The US tended to over spec things in some cases. Just because you "CAN" build an armor plated tank recovery truck with all wheel drive doesn't mean you "SHOULD".




Well, if you don't consider the M20 Diamond T a forward tactical vehicle, then the US had 0 forward tactical vehicles that weren't all-wheel-drive.


The US over spec-ing a truck in WW2 by adding armor plate(I don't consider all-wheel-drive to be over spec-ing on a tank transporter) is like Bill Gates building another 100 room house: Just because he CAN, doesn't mean he SHOULD, but MONEY and MATERIAL mean nothing, so WHY NOT? The only real downside of the armor plated M26 was, as I understand, it led to some front axle issues. But on the other hand, it weighed enough that it could flat tow a Panther tank without a trailer, so it wasn't all bad either.


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## michaelmaltby (Aug 16, 2011)

".... Germany got the armed forces that Hitler wanted them to have, not the one they had planned to build before Hitler got into power."

Bazinga ...... 

MM


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## michaelmaltby (Aug 16, 2011)

@ PINSOG: 

"... The Diamond T Tank Transporter was a heavy tank transporter, used in World War II and the following years.
Designed as a heavy prime mover for tank transporting, the Diamond T 980 was the product of the Diamond T Company in Chicago. In 1940 the British Purchasing Commission, looking to equip the British Army with a vehicle capable of transporting larger and heavier tanks, approached a number of American truck manufacturers to assess their models. The Diamond T Company had a long history of building rugged, military vehicles for the U.S. Army Quartermaster Corps and had recently produced a prototype heavy vehicle for the US Army which, with a few slight modifications met British requirements and an initial order for 200 was very quickly filled.
The result was the Diamond T 980, a 12-ton hard-cab 6x4[1] vehicle which proved to be one of the most successful and memorable in its class.[citation needed] Powered by an 895 cu in (14.7 l) Hercules DXFE OHV inline six diesel engine[2] developing 185 bhp (138 kW),[2] or the 1,090 cu in (17.9 l) Hall-Scott 440 OHV inline-six gasoline engine (the largest gasoline engine in any WW2 military truck)[2] of 240 bhp (180 kW),[2] and geared very low, it could pull a trailer load of up to 120,000 lb (54,000 kg),[3] and proved capable of the task of moving the heaviest tanks then in service. It had a four-speed manual constant-mesh transmission plus a similar three-speed auxiliary gearbox, for a total of twelve forward and three reverse speeds, and airbrakes.[2] The electrics were 24-volt.[2] Top speed was 23 mph (37 km/h), and with 150 US gal (120 imp gal; 570 l) fuel, maximum range was 300 mi (480 km).[2] Wheelbase was 179 in (4,500 mm), length 280 in (7,100 mm), track 74 in (1,900 mm), and height 100 in (2,500 mm).[2] Steering was manual, with no power assist.[2]
A winch of 40,000 lb (18,000 kg) capacity, chain driven off the auxiliary transmission and intended mainly for hauling damaged tanks aboard trailerswas mounted behind the cab" * [Wikipedia]

Growing up in the early '50's I saw Diamond T's a lot as used by construction companies as a float tractor - with 5th wheel. 
Later in the '60's working on construction we had 2 on site - a water truck and a re-fueler for the Cats. I had never realized that it was only 
rear-axle drive until you noted that just now. I got to drive one (water truck) and they were brutes. May not have been a Dragon Wagon but the 
Diamond T prime mover was much more widely used than the DW. That tells me it wasn't too flawed. 

MM


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## pinsog (Aug 16, 2011)

michaelmaltby said:


> @ PINSONG:
> 
> "... The Diamond T Tank Transporter was a heavy tank transporter, used in World War II and the following years.
> Designed as a heavy prime mover for tank transporting, the Diamond T 980 was the product of the Diamond T Company in Chicago. In 1940 the British Purchasing Commission, looking to equip the British Army with a vehicle capable of transporting larger and heavier tanks, approached a number of American truck manufacturers to assess their models. The Diamond T Company had a long history of building rugged, military vehicles for the U.S. Army Quartermaster Corps and had recently produced a prototype heavy vehicle for the US Army which, with a few slight modifications met British requirements and an initial order for 200 was very quickly filled.
> ...



The M20 Diamond T 980 was a very good design, and only had 2 real flaws: 1. It should have had a powered front axle 2. they should have put a 5th wheel on it and pulled the trailer used by the Dragon Wagon, which would have made flaw #1 not nearly as serious a flaw. As it was used, as a ballast tractor, it had to haul around 12 tons or so of ballast in the body just to get enough traction to pull the full trailer(wagon) with a load. 12 tons is ALOT of extra wieght for a diesel engine putting out 178 hp and 685 foot pound of torque governed at 1600 rpm. The Hall-Scott 440 gas motor was never used in this truck during WW2 by the military, it may have been available in a civilian truck. The Hall-Scott 440 was used only in the M26 Dragon Wagon and rated at 230 hp and 810 foot pounds of torque governed at 2100 rpm.


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## michaelmaltby (Aug 17, 2011)

Fair points all, pinsog.  The ones I encountered were gas powered.

MM


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## michaelmaltby (Aug 17, 2011)

@pinsog:

In hindsight, the Diamond T's I encountered in the 50's and 60's were _not_ the prime mover version, but the wrecker (6x6 drive) seen here:

Interesting link to Diamond T, Reo and Federal prime movers (the latter using 5th wheel) supplied to the Soviets, here:

Engines of the Red Army in WW2 - Diamond-T 980

MM


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## pinsog (Aug 17, 2011)

michaelmaltby said:


> Fair points all, pinsog.  The ones I encountered were gas powered.
> 
> MM


A friend of mine who is 85 now, saw a gas powered M20 back in the late 40's or early 50's pulling a rock crushing unit out of a dam construction site. He said the driver would pull the hand throttle wide open on the hills, get out of the truck and walk along beside it to stretch his legs and smoke a cigarette, reaching up now and then to turn the wheel. After a cigarette, he would get back in the truck and ride for a while.

Armored recovery crews tested the M26 Dragon Wagon, the M20 with the "wagon" type trailer, and the M20 with a fifth wheel pulling the Dragon Wagon's trailer and they preferred the M20 with the 5th wheel over both of the others. 

Personally, I think a Mack NO with a 5th wheel, pulling the Dragon Wagons trailer, would have been hard to beat for moving tanks.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 17, 2011)

Without somebody who had experience with both it may be hard to tell how much of an improvement the M26 was. 

The M20 weighed 26,950lb empty vs the 48,985lbs of the M26. The M20 could be loaded with about 18,000lbs in the ballast box for traction. the M26 may have needed 6 wheel drive considering that the front axle load was 22,950lbs. The M20s unpowered front axle was carrying 11,30lbs loaded. on it's 12.00 X 20 tires. The M25 used 14.00 X 24s. Rear axle loading on the M20 could go to 16,500lbs with the ballast box loaded. it used a full trailer with a front axle. the M-26 could go to 85,985lbs on the rear boogie or 42,992lbs per axle. 

The max towed load of the M20 was 115,000lbs. the max towed load of the M26 was 117,500lbs. Max grade in low gear with towed load was supposed to be 27% for the M20 vs 30% for the M26max speed for the M20 (governed) was 23mph vs the 28mph of the M26. The M20 was supposed to get 2 miles to the gallon, the M26 got 1 mile to the gallon. 

In combination with the 45ton trailer M9 the M20 was rated for transporting 90,000lb loads. The M26 in combination with the 40ton trailer M15 was rated for transporting 80,000lb loads. 

Figures are from Dept of the Army technical manual TM 9-2800-1 Feb 1953.

The M20 had only one 20 ton winch and carried (as standard) little or no tools/recovery gear like oxy-acetylene equipment. 

The M26 may have been a bit faster, 2-5mph, and perhaps the powered front axle made up for the much higher ground loading but as haulers there doesn't seem to that much to chose between them. The 3 winches on the M-26 and the gear make it a better recovery vehicle though. 

The Mack NO, good as it was was a whole class below. It had a recommended Max towed load of 50,000lbs, under 1/2 the tank transporters, and that was on highways. It was recommended that if towing the max load that the payload in the bed be restricted to 10,350lbs instead of the normal 20,897lbs. The M26 could take 60,000lbs on the 5th wheel.


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## davebender (Aug 17, 2011)

You are half correct.

Civilian versions of Opel Blitz trucks produced between 1930 and 1975 were mostly 2 wheel drive. 

The military version of the Opel Blitz 3 ton truck which entered mass production during 1940 was 4 wheel drive. This was Germany's equivalent to the U.S. Army 2 1/2 ton truck.


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## pinsog (Aug 17, 2011)

Shortround6 said:


> Without somebody who had experience with both it may be hard to tell how much of an improvement the M26 was.
> 
> The M20 weighed 26,950lb empty vs the 48,985lbs of the M26. The M20 could be loaded with about 18,000lbs in the ballast box for traction. the M26 may have needed 6 wheel drive considering that the front axle load was 22,950lbs. The M20s unpowered front axle was carrying 11,30lbs loaded. on it's 12.00 X 20 tires. The M25 used 14.00 X 24s. Rear axle loading on the M20 could go to 16,500lbs with the ballast box loaded. it used a full trailer with a front axle. the M-26 could go to 85,985lbs on the rear boogie or 42,992lbs per axle.
> 
> ...



Tow ratings on vehicles, especially this size, really dont mean much. If they need to move something, they loaded it on there and moved it, it weighed what it weighed. The grade difference of 3% is a bit of a joke. The M20 had a low gear of 128-1, less hp and less torque, the M26 had low gear of 320-1, more hp and more torque, plus 6x6 drive. Essentially, when the M20 choked down until the motor quit, the M26 could hook up to it and it's load and drive off with it. The M26 with a powered front axle and pulling a trailer that puts 50% of the towed load over the rear drivers would be light years ahead of a ballast tractor pulling a wagon in any situation. I've seen ballasted trucks spin out on hills wet pavement, not snow, wet pavement. The M26 could flat tow a Sherman tank across a wet muddy field, of course a tracked vehicle SHOULD be used for that, but the M26 could do it. There is NO comparison in any way, shape, form, or fashion between the M20 and M26 in real world performance, the M26 would crush the M20. If they had used the M20 as a semi tractor, pulling the M26's trailer, it would have performed MUCH better. The Mack NO and the M20 were much closer in performance than stats give them credit for, the M20 having a slight edge in hp and torque,(not as much as the M26 had over it) but low gear on the Mack was 181-1 and it was a 6x6. I assure you, a Mack NO would have handled a semitrailer fine with a Sherman tank on it. If you have any doubt, check out the crap that the British army used to move their tanks


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## pinsog (Aug 17, 2011)

davebender said:


> You are half correct.
> 
> Civilian versions of Opel Blitz trucks produced between 1930 and 1975 were mostly 2 wheel drive.
> 
> The military version of the Opel Blitz 3 ton truck which entered mass production during 1940 was 4 wheel drive. This was Germany's equivalent to the U.S. Army 2 1/2 ton truck.



I know they made 4x4's, but they were a small percentage of total production. Just look at all the film/pics on the Russian front. There are always a long string of 2wd trucks being dragged along by either tanks or haltracks.


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## davebender (Aug 17, 2011)

The 4WD Opel Blitz didn't even enter mass production until a year after Britain and France declared war. Production never caught up with demand. Why do you think most German Army transport consisted of draft horses? 

However the 4WD Opel Blitz was the standard German military truck. Most other vehicles were emergency substitutes.


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## parsifal (Aug 17, 2011)

It may have been what they wanted as their "standard military truck", but the truth is that the majority of German MT was ex-civilian and foreign acquisitions. Thats the whole point.....German preparations in their motor pools were attrocious, and despite your claims they couldnt do any better....the difference between a proper military vehicle, produced from say 1937, and the hopeless menagerie of lash ups that they ended up taking to war is a BIG reason for the ultimate german failure. 

And i dont know where you are going by claiming that the majority of german transport was motor transport and not horse drawn. A 1940 "type" Infantry Division which outnumbered the motorized formations by more than 8:1 had 800 motor vehicles attached and over 6400 draft animals attached. By late 1943, the number of motor vehicles per div on the eastern front had sunk to less than 200 for an infantry Div, and the numbers of draft animals were down to 2000 or less. Manpower for a "type" division had dropped from 15500 to around 11000 but the supply services and artillery components....the areas where MT and horse transport were most needed, had remained pretty static. Supply requirements for an infantry Div engaged but not heavily so, had hardly moved at an average of 1900 tons per day. But with 25% of the MT and about 35% of the horses German Infantry no longer possessed anywhere near the mobility that they had in 1939-40.


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## CharlesBronson (Aug 17, 2011)

The motor transport was insuficient to say the list, the most used was the "pferdewagen", horse carriege.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikiped...land,_bei_Targowi_Sawod,_deutsche_Truppen.jpg


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## Shortround6 (Aug 17, 2011)

The German Army started WW II with several million draft horses. There was never any real intention to motorize the entire army. Germany simply didn't have the resources to do so. But of it's opponents only the US and British Commonwealth did have the resources. The British Commonwealth could do so from two angles, a more developed motor industry and and a smaller army. But even the British Commonwealth depended on a lot of help from the US motor industry. 

In a list from March of 1940 there are 483 different bus, truck, tractor, marine and industrial gasoline engines on offer by American companies, that is gasoline and does not include diesels. It also does not include aircraft engines. The Hercules company alone had 49 different engines from a 56cu in 2 cylinder of 13hp to a 935 cu in 6 cylinder of 198hp. 
In 1940 just the top eight car makers turned out 1,993,200 cars. 
Back in 1929 before the depression the top eight manufactures put out over 4 million cars. 

Germany managed to increase truck production 263% from 1934 to 1939 but that means only just under 102,000 trucks in 1939 to go with about 250,000 cars. Germany could have waited two years and made 300,000 trucks each year and still not had enough to equip 100 divisions of foot infantry with a full complement of trucks to haul supplies and artillery let alone try to carry troops. By 1941 Germany had over 200 divisions. The Russian were no better. Even 400,000 trucks is a drop in the bucket compared to the needs of 250-300 divisions.


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## psteel (Aug 17, 2011)

From what I've read the 1942-43 German military inventory on vehicles was ~ ¾ million vehicles; with the lift capacity increasing from ¾ million tons in 1942 to 1.35 million tons in 1943-44. They never had more than ¾ million horses and most of the time around ½ million horse. Wagons were much fewer maybe 1/3 million carts with maybe ¼ million tons lift capacity at the peaks and by the end of the war , they also had about ¼ million bicycles.

Having said this the German railway system employed at least ½ million freight cars through out most of the war and was responsible for transport well over ¾ of all tonnage through out Germany industry and war material to the fronts.


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## pinsog (Aug 18, 2011)

Lets see if I can sum up German motor transport in WW2: 
They didn't have anywhere near as many as they needed.
About 90% of what they had was probably unfit for true military service, because it wasn't all-wheel-drive, unless it was moving things up and down paved roads which in combat are many times few and far between.

Does that about cover it?


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## michaelmaltby (Aug 18, 2011)

"... Does that about cover it? "

Yes and no -- you are omitting the most disturbing factor, that Hitler and his inner circle didn't know the limitations of what they had, and were over-optimistic about the outcome of their endeavor(s).

It is very similar to the irony of Barbarossa - going into Russia without any provision for winter weather clothing. Stalin (it is claimed) did not believe leaked intelligence about Barbarossa because his Comintern agents in Europe could detect no "run" on furs. Stalin couldn't imagine winter war without fur (and such - eg - felt).

You also need to acknowledge the superb use of rail that German planners made. They didn't believe they needed trucks in the quantities and quality that the US, Britain and the Commonwealth understood.

Good thread so far 

MM


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## parsifal (Aug 18, 2011)

Thought this link to Spielbergers book might be intersting

Militarfahrzeuge - German Softskinned Vehicles of WW2

Prior to 1943, Germany was producing roughly 50000 trucks of various kinds per year. According to the USSBS the Germans were seriously underutilizing their limited capacity to produce MT. Quite a number of factories were hived off to produce other things, like aircraft components and bits for tanks. Not all of these vehicles could be sent to the military, about 15000 vehicles per year were needed for civilian purposes, and another 9000 were needed for use by foreign nations. That left around 25000 vehicles per year for entry into the German Armed forces. However, up until June 1941 attrition from the heers (Im not even looking at the other services) ran at about 5000 vehicles lost per month, and of these a consistent 80% were written off for noncombat reasons....they simply wore out, crashed, etc.

Up until Barbarossa , the Heer managed to maintain its mobility by some very desperate measures. They acquired a lot of captured vehicles in France and other parts of Europe (including many vehicles from the BEF, left behind on the Dunkirk Beaches) and received about 40000 trucks of foreign manufacture (mostly French types). Over 100000 civilian vehicles were commandeered for the Army. This allowed the army to enter russia with more or less a ful complement of vehicles, though the quality of the park was patchy. The Germans entered Russia with about 600000 vehicles

Thereafter the rot set in..... attrition rates increased by approximately 2.5 times, to roughly 12000 vehicles per month. There were no other expedients that the Germans could draw on, and in the critical years of 1942 and 1943, German truck production remained around the 50000 mark. From memory production in 1942 ran at about 48000 units, whilst in 1943 production increased to 52000 units. This was nowhere near enough to meet all demands, and as germany started to suffer defeats in the field, her losses in trucks shot up alarmingly. In the first four months of 1944, German truck losses amounted to 109000 vehicles. They produced 111000 trucks for the whole of 1944. The army reached a peak strength of 9.5 million men in mid 1943, but the numbers of divisions just kept exploding. These losses, inadequate production, and explosion of numbers, crushed the mobility issue for the Germans. Adding to all these problems was a relatively low servicieability rate....brought about by the multiplicity of types and their relative fragility

Two things needed to be done to address this. The Germans needed to utilize their full automotive capacity. According to the USSBS actual production never exceeded about 70% of productive capacity. The Germans had to stop wasting their money building Tiger Panther tanks, and put up with amore modest AFV program, so that their Infantry could retain mobility. They also had to adopt a rationalization program 2-3 years beforeee they did, and settle on simplified, sturdy types, much as the Russians had done. If they had done that, attrition rates would have been lower and servicieability ratews increased. 

Individually, ther were some quite good types designed in Germany, but there were never enough, and too little central contraol and planning put into the production system. The German auto industry was allowed to run with far too much autonomy to be considered efficient 

There are a lot of good comments about this issue in Halders Diary as well. He was a good staff officer, if a little conservative, and he knew the poor condition of the German MT arm, and how badly it was rupturing.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 18, 2011)

There is also the flip side of this on requirements.

If 75-80% of the German Army is never going to be fully motorized what is the level of mobility required for heavy guns/equipment? 

What percentage of the French Army was fully (or even partially) motorized?

While the British army managed to be fully motorized by 1939 even if the entire commonwealth wasn't, how big was the British army in comparison to the German army at the time?

What percentage of the Soviet army was motorized in 1939? or in 1941? 

And using what kind of trucks? 

Could the Germans have done better?
Yes, a lot better, but I am not sure how much practical difference is was going to make. 

But only the US was really in a position to field a Fully motorized army that would approach or exceed the size of the Germany army and that took until 1944/45. Even 400,000 trucks to Russia is not going to motorize 400 Russian divisions even if they are smaller than western divisions.


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## mikewint (Aug 18, 2011)

Despite highly ballyhooed emphasis on employment of mechanized forces and on rapid movement, the bulk of German combat divisions were horse drawn throughout World War II. Early in the war it was the common belief of the American public that the German Siegfrieds of Hitler's Blitz rode forth to battle on swift tanks and motor vehicles. But the notion of the mechanized might of the German Wehrmacht was largely a glamorized myth born in the fertile brains of newspapermen. Actually, the lowly horse played a most important part in enabling the German Army to move about Europe.

Public opinion to the contrary, so great was the dependence of the Nazi Blitzkrieg upon the horse that the numerical strength of German Army horses maintained during the entire war period averaged around 1,100,000. Of the 322 German Army and SS divisions extant in November 1943, only 52 were armored or motorized. Of the November 1944 total of 264 combat divisions, only 42 were armored or motorized. The great bulk of the German combat strength—the old-type infantry divisions—marched into battle on foot, with their weapons and supply trains propelled almost entirely by four-legged horsepower. The light and mountain divisions had an even greater proportion of animals, and the cavalry divisions were naturally mainly dependent on the horse.

The old-type German infantry division had approximately 5,300 horses, 1,100 horse-drawn vehicles, 950 motor vehicles, and 430 motorcycles. In 1943, due to the great difficulties in supply and upkeep of motor vehicles in the wide stretches of the Eastern Front, the allotment to divisions in that theater was reduced to approximately 400 motor vehicles and 400 motorcycles, and the number of horses was increased to some 6,300. The 1944-type divisions had about 4,600 horses, 1,400 horse-drawn vehicles, 600 motor vehicles, and 150 motorcycles.

The only fully motorized unit in the old-type infantry division was the antitank battalion. Most of the divisional supply trains were horse drawn, motor vehicles being used chiefly to transport fuel and for the workshop company. A far greater degree of motorization existed among German GHQ troops, the supply units of which were mostly motorized. Motorization of GHQ troops was to a large degree a necessity, since these units included such types of outfits as heavy artillery, for which horse draft would have been a practical impossibility. These motorized GHQ units were assigned to armies, corps, and divisions as originally required.


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## parsifal (Aug 18, 2011)

The British Auto industry produced over 400000 trucks to germany's 320000. On top of that the Canadians produced about 800000 vehicles did thay not. From memory the US produced about 2 million trucks. The difference betwen commonwealth/British production (at least in numbers) and US production is significant, but not as bad as the US/German relationship. 

In terms of numbers, nearly all British and Commonwealth divisions were motorized. There were actually more CW divisions fileded than there were US: 32 British (not counting the Home static Divs), 15 Australian, 35 Indian, 8 or9 Canadian (4 remaining at home), 3 NZ, 5 SA (I think), 3 British equipped Polish Divs, and the equvalent of 1 additional division of exiles. There were also 4 West and east African Divs raised as well as the Palstinian and Jewish formation. Altogether, about 110 Infantry formations (not including airborne). I'm not suggesting these forces could replace the Americans in any way.....they were far too vulnerable to losses to say that, but neither is it accurate to claim the US army was the only motorized, or even the largest motorized force that was fielded by the allies. It was the largest force of a single nationality, but the CW generally would fight as a single force


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## psteel (Aug 18, 2011)

mikewint said:


> Despite highly ballyhooed emphasis on employment of mechanized forces and on rapid movement, the bulk of German combat divisions were horse drawn throughout World War II............ .



I encourage you that If you are going to use some one else’s work, you need to acknowledge this with sources.

German Horse Cavalry and Transport, U.S. Intelligence Bulletin, March 1946 (Lone Sentry)

This is a 1946 US Army bulletin and is hardly the most reliable source. 

According to DiNardo [Mechanized Juggernaut] , the stock of German horses started around 600,000 raising to about 3/4 million for Barbarossa after that figures are incomplete. The million plus figure may refer to the entire Wehrmacht and not the Heer or the number at the end of the war when vehicle stocks plummeted and as many horses and Oxen were used as possible. It seems that 3/4 of the population of horses in eastern Europe/western Russia [>15 million] were consumed as part of the war effort , as well as the axis armies. German population of vehicles was over 3 million at the start of the war and was reduced to something like 1/3 million by the end of the war. Many of these were taken up by the Wehrmacht to replace operational losses.

Hobby


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## Shortround6 (Aug 18, 2011)

I am not trying to discredit the British or Commonwealth contribution but some of the Commonwealth forces were tied down in the far east where they bore more of the weight against the Japanese than the Americans did for a number of years (if not the entire war as far as infantry goes). 
The Canadian production was quite amazing but it was also somewhat limited in scope. few vehicles over the 3 ton category being built. Larger trucks were obtained from the US. The potential of both the US and Canadian production was staggering to people used to pre war figures. The US QMC accepted in June of 1942 62,258 trucks of all kinds. This total was supposedly 16,000 more than the total production of 1939 and 1940 put together. 

Comparisons can get tricky because some figures are for trucks, some are for motor vehicles and some are for military transport vehicles, which could include half-tracks, motorcycles and even buses. 

For instance the US military acquired over 82,000 full tracked commercial type tractors (bulldozers) during the war.


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## michaelmaltby (Aug 18, 2011)

"... The Canadian production was quite amazing but it was also somewhat limited in scope."

That is a fair observation. The bulk of production being CMP (Canadian Military Pattern) Ford and GMC trucks coming from just *2 *plants. Walkerville, Ontario and Oshawa, Ontario. But the ramp-up started in 1939.

A lot of value added came from fully equipped truck bodies - eg - communications trucks (Northern Electric aka Nortel), and machine shop bodies, (Chrysler Canada). Like this:

http://www.o5m6.de/gm_c60x.html

MM


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## fastmongrel (Aug 20, 2011)

michaelmaltby said:


> "... The Canadian production was quite amazing but it was also somewhat limited in scope."
> 
> That is a fair observation. The bulk of production being CMP (Canadian Military Pattern) Ford and GMC trucks coming from just *2 *plants. Walkerville, Ontario and Oshawa, Ontario. But the ramp-up started in 1939.
> 
> ...



It was limited in scope but that was the point design a limited range of chassis which could be fitted with whatever body required set up the production lines and then churn them out by the hundred thousand. I think Canada greatest contribution to the war effort was its magnificent production lines and Canada more than pulled its weight. Unfortunately the humdrum world of production doesnt win medals but it should have done without Canadas production things could have been very hard for the British Commonwealth and Empire forces


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## parsifal (Aug 20, 2011)

I agree completely fastmongrel. If you boil down the german problem, their biggest single problem was the low output, but following close behind, was the high attrition they suffered. they suffered high attrition mostly because of the vast numbers of different types, folowed by the relative frailty of the types they put into service. Not all of them...some were very good actually, but a big proportion of them were just not up to the stresses they were placed under....reult was a high wastage rate.


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## The Basket (Aug 20, 2011)

And another thing....Petrol.

How much fuel are these trucks using? Horse doesnt need gas and that is a good point.


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## parsifal (Aug 20, 2011)

No, but horses cvonsume fodder, which increases the average daily supply consumption of the division by 3-500 tons per day, depending on local feed availability. A 1939 type Div consumed 1900 tons per day of which about 250 tons was fodder. That was calculated for central european conditions, in the desert or the frozen steppe, or when the Div was under constant operational pressure, this requirement went up considerably


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## parsifal (Aug 20, 2011)

Shortround6 said:


> There is also the flip side of this on requirements.
> 
> If 75-80% of the German Army is never going to be fully motorized what is the level of mobility required for heavy guns/equipment?
> 
> ...



In relation to these itemized points;

a) The overwhelming majority of German MT was used for supply haulage, but since the overwhelming consumption of supply was by the artillery component the majority of MT (and Draft animals as well) was linked to the artillery. A 1940 pattern Infantry Bn in the heer had 850 men, each with 11 MT and 177 DA attached. The aretillery regt had 2874 0A attached, and the supply section, servicing the entire Div had 2874 DA attached. Each Infantry regt had about 45 MT and about 600 DA attached

b) French Regular Infantry Divs were motorized to a very simlar extent as the frontline German Infantry Div of 1940. However they also had 10 motorized Infantry divs, with around 2000 vehicles attached. Ther were 63 Infantry Divs in the French Army, plus these 10 motorized formations. If we assume similar rates of mechanization for the french leg Infantry as existed for the german leg infantry, then overall, the french army was at a higher level of motorization.

An Italian Infantry Div has a much lower standard of motorization. It had a total manpower strength of 12624 men. each Infantry Regiment had 3332 men, with 33MT and 220 DA attached. There weere two Inf Regts. A third CCNN Infantry Regt was often attached, 1356 men, 8MT and 202 DAs. The Artillery Regt was 2769 men, with 896 DAs. A further Heavy Mortar Bn was usually also attached with 529 men, 19MT and 80 DA. AT company 229 men, 10MT and 76 DA. Engineer Company 206 men, 10MT. Supply echelon 39 MT ? DA.

c) British Army was the only fully motorized army in 1939 (US army of 1939 was slightly better in motorization to the french Army ( according to Shelby Stantons book on the US Army). It was much smaller than the german Army, but this is misleading. Each British infantry Div had well over 2000 vehicles, but behind this was an LOC 9line Of Communication) element, that greatly expanded. The often quoted TOE figure of 15000 men per British Infantry Div is actually increased to over 55000 men per Div with the LOC elments included. These LOCs were not part of the Corps support structure....this again added about 35000 men, all fully motorized. If we were accurately compare the level of motorization in the british army, to that of the german Army, we would need to multiply the number of Divs by roughly 3, since the MT per Div is not 2000 per Div, but about 6000 per Div with the LOC troops included. That means, in comparable terms, the British fielded in 1940, the equivalent of 30 fully motorized Divs, if measured in comparable terms to those of their opponents. 

d) Soviet motorization in 1941 was quite low, but they did have a large number of so-called motorized divs. I have some details somewhere, and will try and dig the material out soon.


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## psteel (Aug 20, 2011)

German motorised/Panzer divisions TOE had 4000 vehicles through out the war. A German Panzer Army had 50,000 increasing to 60,000 vehicles as the war progressed, while a comparable infantry army had 24,000 vehicles at the start of the war, reducing to about 12,000 vehicles at the end. All these are TOE strengths and the actual numbers were some what below this. At the start of the war actual number should be 90% of TOE while later in the war they might start off a campaign at 1/2 to 3/4 strength but cycle down to 1/3 to 1/4 within a matter of weeks.

In theory if 700,000 German vehicles particpated in "Operation Barbarosa" to semi motorize 144 divisions for the attack, they could have instead mobilized 12.7 x Panzer Armies at full strength or 14 Panzer Armies at 90% of strength [126 divisions] ....in theory.

In practice the Wehrmacht GHQ would have cyphened off at least 100k ,as would the LW. So the practical strength could be around 500k ; enought to mobilize about 9 Panzer Armies at 100% strength or 10 Panzer Armies at 90% strength . Thats 90 motorized/Panzer Divisions at 90% of strength.

But then what do you do with all those horse and wagon units? Mountain divisions are better equipped with such transport instead of vehicles; due to the rugged terrain. Do/should Paratrooper divisions be fully motorized? Do occupation troops need to be fully motorized or could fully staffed wagon units be substituded? Or maybe they should be fully motorized, but a large portion of their motorization substituted for Wagon units so the motorized units could be formed into independant Gross Transport Regiments to help the Panzer spear heads remained as resupplied as possible?


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## Shortround6 (Aug 20, 2011)

There is a theoretical limit as to how far an army can advance before all of it's transport is used up hauling supplies from the supply point to the tip of the army. This point is reached much sooner using horse transport. If you do not haul in the horse fodder an average horse will have to graze for 6-8 hours a day. With thousands of horses per division any local (to the road) fodder/ grazing will disappear in very short order and that is without a scorched earth policy. There were definite tactical and strategic reasons for scorched earth policies when armies depended on horse transport.


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## parsifal (Aug 20, 2011)

Thats true. The average distance to railhead for the german Army, in the early months of 1942 was 180 miles to the supply heads. At that distance , frontline divisions were only just viable, but as 1942 wore into 1943, and the heer took additional losses they were less and less able to undertake any serious forward movement. Defensively there was a partial solution and the german State railways increased the density of operational railways, and distances to supply heads were reduced, but mobility for forward movement, ie offensive action and mass redeployment of the Infantry, became a virtually impossible ask.

German shortages were not just restricted to a decreased vehicle park. By 1943 they were also suffering a serious shortage of horses divisions. 

I would say that because of th4 efforts of the state rail organization, the Germans were able to maintain a static line in most area, but had a significantly reduced capability to undertake ldeep penetration offensive action because of the reduced intrinsis transport for each division. this applieed to both MT and DA. Even though there was a theoretical TOE for vehicles and horses that should have been adequate, the actual situation on the ground was much worse.


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## parsifal (Aug 20, 2011)

I found the motorization figures for Soviet Post 1941 Divs, but not for the much larger pre-1941 divs.

MNain source for this information is a published version by Victor Madej of the "Troop survey And organization of the red Army - 1944", compiled by the Heer Foreign Armies East unit, headed by none other than Gehlen.
As a source, probably not as good as TM30-430, but good enough for what we are doing.

A type Soviet Infantry Div had 1700 DA in 1942, which increased to over 2500 by 1944. it had 143 vehicles attached, which increased to about 250 by 1944. Guards units typically had 10-30% more transport when not equipped for offensive operations. 

Most of the Russian MT was centrally controlled by Stavkha. If an offensive was planned, they would use their truck pools to build up supplies at the front, transporting these supplies from the rail head to front.

A division in the Soviet Army was not a self sustaining formation. It relied on higher echelon formations to provide it with transport and logistic support. In 1942-3, this was mostly supplied directly from their army HQs. However, as 1943 and 1944 wore on, more and more of the Infantry was reformed back into Corps, which took over the logistic support functionj. Though not part of the Div structure, a Div on offensive operations could have a variable amount of MT attached.....typically two or three times its establishment. By 1944, an Infantry Div equipped for offensive operations was two or three times more mobile than its equivalent German Infantry formations, particulalry amongst the guards units.

Soviet supply services however remained the weak link in the Red Army. They were never able to keep their breakthrough formations properly supplied and this caused many casualties to be suffered. 

As 1943 and 1944 wore on


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## ivanotter (Aug 21, 2011)

It is a very interesting topic. Let me side-track for a secons with something on motorised transport:

The "little" war of 1940-41 in Africa, the only theater where the allieds actually scored victories for some time, was run by South Africa.

However, the cahllenges were a bit extreme: Although sitting in Kenya, they had to get an army to with all its ancillary services to grips with its enemy across a terrotory known to be waterless, trakless. Desert turned to mud after an hour of rain, temp of 150 degrees (F), bush, rivers.

The ffrontier stretched fro 1,200 miles from the undrinkable waters of Lake Rudolf to the indian ocean. Territory as large as France and Germany combines. 

(freely quoted fromJames Brown's, "Th War of a Hundred Days).

So, General Smuts called in all the experts and asked: Can it be done? The said yes, and:

A deal was strusk With Ford In Port Elizabeth, SA, giving the total output for exports. Qithi a year 18,349 trucks were asembled and sent North.

Now, On top of, water diviners were employed, because water was needed, roads had to be built, maps had to be drawn, bridges, everything.

Conclusion: it was done, probably the first and (nearly?) only fully 100% motorised army. in 1940!

The result: Somalia and Abyssinia were conquered. Italy out of East Africa, Italian air force decimated.

Ivan


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## michaelmaltby (Aug 21, 2011)

Thanks for that, Ivanotter . 

MM


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## michaelmaltby (Aug 25, 2011)

Useful site: Engines of the Wehrmach:

Engines of the Wehrmacht in WW2

This more than illustrates what a hodge-podge German truck transport really was.  

MM


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## pinsog (Aug 26, 2011)

I read somewhere that German transport vehicles in the North African campaign was something like 90% captured vehicles. I've often wondered if the British could have won that campaign by simply running away and making sure they left no salvageable transport trucks behind. Once you stretch the supply lines out far enough, the poor German army would have simply starved to death without ever firing a shot! Anyway, just a thought.

What amazes me is how much the German army accomplished with the crap they had to do it with, or the equipment they had to do without, however you want to phrase it. It is scary to think what the Germans might have accomplished if they would have had a fleet of say 2.5 ton GMC 6x6's, or maybe a fleet of 4 ton Diamond T 6x6's. The whole army, 1 type of supply truck, well constructed, all-wheel-drive. Scary.


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## parsifal (Aug 26, 2011)

It wasnt 90%, but there were large numbers of captured vehicles used. Your second point i agree with completely. Every time you see people singing the praises of german equipment, treat the statement cautiously. Some equipment was excellent, but the majority was pure chaff. The germans achieved all that they did, mostly because they were damn good soldiers, not because of the equipment they carried into battle.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 26, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Some equipment was excellent, but the majority was pure chaff.



I think that is overstretching it a bit. To say that the majority of the equipment was "chaff" is probably not correct. 

Like any military they had equipment that was great, good, solid and just plain crap.


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## michaelmaltby (Aug 26, 2011)

"..... What amazes me is how much the German army accomplished with the crap they had to do it with, or the equipment they had to do without ...."

Hear, hear. Great point. And lots of German vets would tell you that, I believe. 

MM


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## parsifal (Aug 26, 2011)

Yes, on reflection your right, but surely you would agree that german success in battle was mostly about their personnel with equipment a relatively secondary consideration.. Any nation that can overrun half of Europe with tanks mostly equiped with weapons no larger than a 20mm cannon cant be relying on the equipment, as how nthey use the equipment


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## michaelmaltby (Aug 26, 2011)

".... Any nation that can overrun half of Europe with tanks mostly equipped with weapons no larger than a 20mm cannon cant be relying on the equipment, as how they use the 
equipment..."

This is certainly very true, Parsifal, but must be tempered by the fact that Europe in general was not armed (or committed) for war the way Germany was from 1933, AND, 
German victories were almost always reinforced by the element of surprise. German audacity and elan are to be admired and admonished at the same time -- if that is possible 
.

MM


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 26, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Yes, on reflection your right, but surely you would agree that german success in battle was mostly about their personnel with equipment a relatively secondary consideration.. Any nation that can overrun half of Europe with tanks mostly equiped with weapons no larger than a 20mm cannon cant be relying on the equipment, as how nthey use the equipment



Agreed on all accounts.

I think you have to take into account the armies they were fighting against at the time as well. I also believe it had to do with land warfare doctrine as well.


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## pinsog (Aug 26, 2011)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> I think that is overstretching it a bit. To say that the majority of the equipment was "chaff" is probably not correct.
> 
> Like any military they had equipment that was great, good, solid and just plain crap.



Of course they had some good equipment, the FW190 comes to mind, along with most of their small arms and machine guns. They probably had a good transport truck buried somewhere in the hundreds of different types that they produced in relatively small batches. But what they lacked was a single, mass produced, do everything, all-wheel-drive transport truck like the GMC 2.5 ton, or much better, the Diamond T 4 ton. Germany needed a truck just like one of those 2, in hindsight I would choose the 4 ton, and stop production on all other trucks and just build that one truck. It could do anything asked of it and do it well. Parts comminality would be a huge plus. 

The other thing they should have done was SIMPLIFY things. The Panther could have been great, just quit overengineering the stupid thing(I read once a German hammer has 8 moving parts). Replace the interleaved road wheels with a standard suspension, preferably a Christy suspension like the T34, but anything besides the interleaved suspension would have worked. Then replace the transmission with a standard, manually shifted 5 speed transmission. Simple and durable like a Sherman or T34. German crews would have loved it and it wouldn't have spent the war broke down or frozen to the ground with ice and mud freezing the roadwheels together.


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## parsifal (Aug 26, 2011)

after '42 Rommel wanted to abandon turretted tank production altogether. He wanted to concentrate on Stugs and towed AT guns. He wanted to thicken up the AT defences on the eastern front so much, it would give germany the ability to snot the russians well and truly and then sue for peace.

Rommels strategy was elegantly simple, and might have worked. Tanks are an inherently offensive weapon....Rommel was saying, lets ditch the offensive and get into the right position for a peace settelement


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## pinsog (Aug 26, 2011)

parsifal said:


> after '42 Rommel wanted to abandon turretted tank production altogether. He wanted to concentrate on Stugs and towed AT guns. He wanted to thicken up the AT defences on the eastern front so much, it would give germany the ability to snot the russians well and truly and then sue for peace.
> 
> Rommels strategy was elegantly simple, and might have worked. Tanks are an inherently offensive weapon....Rommel was saying, lets ditch the offensive and get into the right position for a peace settelement



Interesting tactic. Essentially, bog the whole front down into the trench type warfare of the 1st World War. It would have depended on the Luftwaffe to keep air superiority over the front or the towed gun crews would have gotten strafed unmercifully. It would also have depended on the German long range artillery to keep the Russian artillery back far enough that the dug in anti-tank guns couldn't be targeted.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 26, 2011)

pinsog said:


> Of course they had some good equipment, the FW190 comes to mind, along with most of their small arms and machine guns. They probably had a good transport truck buried somewhere in the hundreds of different types that they produced in relatively small batches. But what they lacked was a single, mass produced, do everything, all-wheel-drive transport truck like the GMC 2.5 ton, or much better, the Diamond T 4 ton. Germany needed a truck just like one of those 2, in hindsight I would choose the 4 ton, and stop production on all other trucks and just build that one truck. It could do anything asked of it and do it well. Parts comminality would be a huge plus.
> 
> The other thing they should have done was SIMPLIFY things. The Panther could have been great, just quit overengineering the stupid thing(I read once a German hammer has 8 moving parts). Replace the interleaved road wheels with a standard suspension, preferably a Christy suspension like the T34, but anything besides the interleaved suspension would have worked. Then replace the transmission with a standard, manually shifted 5 speed transmission. Simple and durable like a Sherman or T34. German crews would have loved it and it wouldn't have spent the war broke down or frozen to the ground with ice and mud freezing the roadwheels together.



I don't think I stated otherwise...


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## renrich (Aug 26, 2011)

Many thanks to all of you who have brought up the large role that horses played in the German war effort in WW2(and even more so in WW1) I read somewhere and have lost the reference that more than a million horses died in German service in WW2. For those of us who are horse lovers, those numbers really hurt. A good horse will work himself to death if asked to do so.

I have a friend named Philip, an old now retired rancher from the Gunnison Country in Colorado who told me an interesting story. He was in a division that landed at Omaha Beach ( I think the first day.) As they were moving up off the beach, he saw a two horse team of German horses, still in harness hitched to some sort of equipment. One of the horses was dead and the other appeared to be in shock. Philip could not stand seeing them like that and walked over and cut loose the live horse. The horse was so in shock he just stood still when Philip freed him. A heartwarming but sad story. Incidently, Philip leased horses and wrangled them in the early fifties to the movie company that filmed the John Ford western, "The Searchers" part of which was made near Gunnison ( the winter scenes.)


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## Juha (Aug 26, 2011)

On fully motorized German army, would have been too small for successful 1940 Campaign or at least after it they would not have fuel reserves left, so no Eastern front in 1941, too bad for GB for 41-42, only hope would have been that Stalin would have joined in sometimes later. But of course Germany would have benefited gratly if they had concentrated their production for say 4 types of cars and 3 types of lorries of which two would have been 4x4 or 6x6 types to equip their motorized and mechanized divs.

Rommel's idea was bogus, eastern front was simply too long and 75mm Pak40 too heavy. Soviets would have been anyway able to a breakthrough somewhere and the withdrawal would have mean loss of many of the Paks, especially during winters.

Juha

Addum: IIRC Christie type suspension would not handle well with 45 ton Panther and anyway Christie type suspension was uneconomical in its use of armoured space.


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## parsifal (Aug 26, 2011)

Hi Juha

I dont see how having improved defences for the Infantry is going to make them more vulnerable. By 1943 Heer on the eastern front lacked the mobility to engage in large scale movements of units. They could move portions of their front, but not their whole front. Moreover, as the war progressed and the numbers of vehicles and horses fell, the amount of the front that the germans could move quickly fell. So, because of the decreasing mobility of the major part of their army, they were incapable of engaging in mobile warfare successfully. I d ont see how having a couple of hundreed heavy tanks makes any difference to that situation. However, if they fortified their line, and built up the anti-tank defences, it would give their Infantry the ability to hurt the Russians more during those breakthrough battles. Increased resistance means more time, more time means being able to concentrate a counterattack force better, having a better counterattack force with more AFVs greatly increases the ability of the germans to defeat breakthroughs, or at least contains them. Moreover Soviets only carried limited amounts of supply, and had virtually no tail to support them....if they needed both their assault formations and a sizable proportion of their breakthrough forces to achieve their breakthroughs, and those that made it through the defences for exploitation were short on supplies, because of the severity of the defences, the whole overrun battle on which the Soviet offensives were predicated starts to look very shaky.

I agree that Rommels plan was "bogus" at least to an extent, but it was less "bogus" than spending resources on a few dodgy tanks that cant really assist the Infantry anyway, for an Infantry force increasingly static in character.


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## Juha (Aug 26, 2011)

Hello Parsifal
as I wrote, the Eastern Front was too long, and the side which had initiative could mass overwhelming superiority to the point his choosing, Soviet intelligence was very good, they were experts to cover their attack preparations etc so many times they achieved at least partial surprise in place . time and force of their attacks. And Germans built many fortificated lines in the East, sometimes they had months to fortify their MLR in fact in some areas years, but for ex in Orienbaum, where frontline had been static 2½ years, when Soviet made their attack, they went straight through Germans defensive system. And Germans knew the Soviets skill in producing breakthroughs, they for ex warned Finns in early 44, that Soviets will always break through and that the question wasn’t how to prevent breakthroughs but how to manage situation after breakthroughs. So fixed positions were not the answer.

Juha


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## parsifal (Aug 26, 2011)

Fixed position were never properly developed on the eastern front by the wehrmacht due to logistic shortages....not enough rail capacity, too much money spent on frivolous projects like panther, manpower shortages, and cockeyed policies instituted by the high command. Germany needed to take a reality check at the end of 41 and work on logistics rather than increasing firepower. 

And your response doesnt really get to the issue facing the wehrmacht. By the latter part of '43 they could no longer fight a mobile war....not enough transport to do that effectively. Youve tried to argue in other threads that german Infantry could move 500 km in a day, but this is clearly impossible, especially with the truck and horse drawn resources available. Under conditions of engagement, except if massive losses were to be accepted, they might b able to retreat 10 km per day. if greater retreats were attempted Germany would lose huge amounts of men and material whenever they tried to move further or retreat large sections of their fronbt. The only thing they could do is fight a static line....hedgehog, quadillage, pakfront, call it what ever. The points of resistance simply sat there and resist, holding up the advance, centred around their AT defences (as Soviets say, all defence on the eastern front is an Anti-trank defence), forcing the attacker to spend time and resources to either contain them, or destroy them. The encircled, fortified and properly armed Infantry (with AT guns) defenders sat in place for as long as possible and await relief by a larger reserve of mobile forces centreed around a produceable, cheap SPG like the Stug III rather than impractical behemoths like Panther. Germans could have had 4-5 times as many Stugs as they had Panthers, giving them the ability to have the numbers needed to contain and defeat Soviet breakthroughs, and then relieve their encircled Infantry. This approach was well proven, and would have minimised losses for the defender, maximised losses for the attacker, and contained Soviet breakthroughs far more than they were by attempting to employ wholesale retreats of the entire front. Hitlers stand fast orders, in a perverted way made some sense. What was missing was that his Infantry was not properly entrenched, lacked sufficient AT defences, and the mobile forces continued to be equipped with inadequate numbers of turreted tanks 9an inherently offensive weapon). The force structure and the preparations needed to be chaged to make this policy workable. 

Contrary to what you might think or say otherwise, Germany could no longer afford to think and fight fully mobile wars by 1943-4. They didnt have the transport. Big sweeping movements of the army would always cause massive losses because german Infantry could not move fast enough, and there is nothing so vulnerable as Infantry caught exposed and poorly dug in or not dug in at all.

And for the record, fortifications could have worked if constructed properly, or at least Manstein thought so. As I said, Germany never got the chance to develop these sorts of fixed line defences properly, even if they occupied the ground for an extended period. Hitler in the first instance forbade their construction, because he thought the army would fight less hard if they had fixed defences to fall back to. in the second instance, Germany never poured the resources into building proper fixed line defences. Manstein rightly pointed out that the correct way to build proper defences was not to have a line at all, rather a series of strong points behind a natural obstacle, like a river or a desert....leave your opponent exposed, and channelise their lines of advance.

Saying that defences didnt work, on the eastern front because of the length of the front, is clearly a nonsense. Your assertions about fixed lines not being effective are clearly not views shared by some very prominent and successful generals from both sides, including Manstein, Model and Zhukov. There were many others. And there are many examples of such tactics being eminently successful, but you have to look at the Russian side of the fence to see that evidence. Even where fixed lines were eventually defeated, such as at Odessa and Sevastopol, they were successful in delaying the attacker significantly. What was missing in those instances was an effective counterattack force. In those instances where an effective counterattack force did exist, fixed line defences were essential to ultimate victory. Suggest you go back and have a look at how the russians won at Kursak and in front of Moscow, unless of course you subscribe to the view that it was all the result of the weather that the city was not taken and that in the case of Kursk you give me a Kurfurst style answer and try and argue that the germans weree successful and simply didnt need to attack anymore.


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## Juha (Aug 27, 2011)

Hello Parsifal
Qoute:"Youve tried to argue in other threads that german Infantry could move 500 km in a day"

That clearly shows that a) you have reading difficulties
b) you have a habit of use strawman argument just as Kurfürst

so I'd not argue with you anymore. I just say that read more on battles in July-Aug 43 for ex

I can add that I used a wrong term, what I should have used was defence along fixed lines, fortifications generally used to save blood.

Juha


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## parsifal (Aug 27, 2011)

Hi Juha

We are both getting a little hot under the collar, so perhaps time to cool down a little. Shouldnt use Kurfurst as an example....I dont really think you act like him, and I know that i dont. i know you know your stuff, and I cant believe that you think im a bit of a strawman. Attacking each other does not serve to clarify our different opinions, perhaps we will have to accept different positions here, but I think there is in fact a lot of common ground between our two positions

I dont agree on your appraisal on German Infantry mobility. I went back and checked that other thread. You did respond to my post which said that german Infantry could not undertake a controlled retreat whilst enagageed of more than about 10km per day, except if heavy losses were accepted. Whilst you responded by saying "_I really cannot understand you claim, the maximum speed for 15 cm sFH 18 for motorised towing was 60 km/h, so I’d say that mot. artillery could easily retreat 400-500 km per day, provided it had fuel _", you also claimed that unmotorized Infantry could follow motorised forces at a rate of up to 50km per day. But whilst these were your resposes to very specific claims concerning retreats whilst under fire, you stated that these were rates that apply to unengaged Infantry. This was never the issue under debate, it was alway what German Infantry could do whilst engaged.

So, in order to clear up this misunderstanding, my comments and observations relate to Infantry that is engaged, and operating in conditions and terrain that might be seen as "typical" for the eastern Front. By 1943, that meant for the Germans, operating with insufficient transport, often in marshy or open conditions, often behind rivers, often in heavily forested areas. I would really like you to clarify how far a German Infantry Division might be able to undertake a controlled (ie avoid catastrophic losses) withdrawal on the eastern Front, whilst in an engaged condition with the enemy.

I disagree still with your continued assertion that fortification dont work. or that they simply save blood. Whilst the statement is true, it fails to accept what the effect of properly constructed fortifications could do. Look at Moscow, look at Kursk, look at the german defences at Kuban, there are plenty of examples of defensive sytems not only saving blod, they could also cost the enemy blood, and defeat enemy attacks. They could save on manpower, and render positions more defensible. But to an extent I agree with you. For an opponent really set on taking a piece of ground, a fortification could not completely stop an opponent....you needed a mobile reserve to do that. That is not what you originally claimed. your original claim was that fortifications dont work on the eastern Front because of the distances involved , and that Rommels suggestion was bogus. You never explained how improving th4e defence capabilities of Infantry was bogus, remember Rommel was not advocating a fully static line defence, just to abandon tank production infavour of AT production.... Given all these counterarguments and clarifications, do you still stick to that viewpoint, or do you want to modify your position at all?


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