# What Went Wrong At Boeing



## MIflyer (Sep 18, 2019)

Attached is one man's analysis of what went wrong at Boeing. He has asked for maximum distribution of this, so here it is.

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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 18, 2019)

Good article - one comment;

"In other words, we should put *safety conscience civilian engineers back in charge of both building planes and regulating them*. Otherwise, planes fall out of the sky."

*"safety conscience civilian engineers WITH A STRONG AVIATION BACKGROUND IN EITHER DESIGN OR OPERATIONS back in charge of both building planes and regulating them"*

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## MIflyer (Sep 18, 2019)

True! The "this stuff is just like computers and we can manage it the same way" approach, has, shall we say, its drawbacks.

I think one problem we have in many fields is the rise of management as a profession in its own right. Studying,management is worthwhile. Studying nothing but management and thinking you can manage anything is a big mistake.

Used to be, you learned how to do something as a young man and in so doing learned now to manage it. Now, managers who only know management theory do things like decide to offshore activities to lighten their own load.

P.S. I have a BS in Mech Engineering and a Masters in System Management. .

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## soulezoo (Sep 18, 2019)

A very damning paper indeed.


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## mikewint (Sep 18, 2019)

OH GEE WHIZ GOLLY!!! So big companies actually do not put safety and human life above all things including their profits. That is impossible to believe.

After one year of production (1972) several Ford Pintos had been involved in rear-end collisions. NTSB accident investigations in many of the cases revealed that victims had few, if any, trauma injuries as a result of the impacts, but had burned to death when the cars exploded into flames. Some had been trapped inside the cars due to the body buckling and doors becoming jammed shut.

Anybody think that that surprised Ford? 
Ford had first conducted rear-end collision tests on the Pinto in December 1970, months after it was already in production. Initially, 11 crashes were conducted, and in all but three of them, gas tanks ruptured and burst into flames. In the three tests that didn't result in fires, the cars had prototype safety devices that engineers had developed while working with suppliers.

#1 was the use of a rubber bladder/liner produced by the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company. Despite rupturing the exterior of the tank, no fuel was spilled, and no fire resulted. It was estimated that the unit cost of bladders would have amounted to $5.08 per car.

#2 was an extra steel plate attached to the rear of the car just behind the bumper, isolating the tank from direct contact during impact. It was estimated that this part could have cost up to $11 per car to install.

#3 was a rather simple plastic insulator fitted on the differential that would keep the bolts from ever making contact with the fuel tank. Cost of this item was less than $1. This $1 plastic part was added to all Canadian Pintos because Canadian government regulations required that cars sold in Canada had to pass much stricter crash tests than those sold in the US

Ford senior management was of course fully aware of all these problems. They had been listed in a secret company memo circulated to all senior management.
Here are the highlights of the memo on the altar worshiping the Almighty Buck:

1. With expected unit sales of 11 million Pintos, and a total cost per unit to modify the fuel tank of $11, a recall would have cost Ford $121 million.

2. But, using mathematical formulations of a probable 2,100 accidents that might result in 180 burn deaths, 180 seriously burned victims, and 2,100 burned-out vehicles, the “unit cost” per accident, assuming an out-of-court settlement, came to a probable $200,000 per death, $67,000 per serious injury, and $700 per burned-out vehicle, leaving a grand total of $49.53 million.

3. Allowing the accidents to occur represented a net savings of nearly $70 million.

4. Therefore, a human life was mathematically proven to be worth less than an $11 part.

Ford continued to build and market the Pinto without modifications until news of the memo broke. It led to criminal charges, an avalanche of lawsuits, and a recall of all Pintos; the mess went on for years. Not to mention the fact that Ford got some of the worst press an American car company has ever received.

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## MIflyer (Sep 18, 2019)

In my masters program, one of the professors, a Phd with a long history with the automotive industry (and also a P-51 pilot in WWII) said,

"You people in the aerospace industry don't realize what it is like in the auto industry. People will kill literally to save a nickel, 5 cents, in the production process."

One of the things I like about Toyotas is that I do not get the impression that they were trying to save 5 cents.

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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 18, 2019)

I work on the Defense side of things, totally different animal. Thankfully...


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## mikewint (Sep 18, 2019)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Defense side of things, totally different animal.



I really really hope that that is true but personally I remember the "precision instrument, self-cleaning Colt M-16" . Wonder how many were killed as their corroded M-16s jammed in combat. I also remember cases of the new LAWs that one after another failed to fire or simply bounced off their targets.
Or the F-4 Phantoms without a cannon 'cause no body gonna dogfight anymore.
Recently: 
Thousands of soldiers received dual-ended Combat Arms earplugs, especially those deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan in the early 2000s.
But in 2016, a Moldex-Metric Inc. whistleblower lawsuit against 3M said the dual-ended Combat Arms earplugs were defective. The lawsuit accused 3M of fraud and said the company had sold the product to the military for more than a decade without informing the government of the defect.

In 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice reached a $9.1 million settlement with 3M to resolve allegations that the company “knowingly sold the dual-ended Combat Arms Earplugs, Version 2 (CAEv2) to the United States military without disclosing defects that hampered the effectiveness of the hearing protection device,” according to a Justice Department press release.

Ramin Kohanbash, who owned a New Jersey-based supply company called California Surplus. He had gotten a $20 million contract to supply the US military with a variety of specialized uniforms, including parkas that were designed to hide a soldier from enemy night vision goggles.
The Justice Department alleges that Kohanbash conspired with other members of his company to outsource their orders to to China, sending uniform samples to China, where they were copied and produced. He also arranged for the items to be labeled as though they were produced legitimately.
Between 2013 and 2018, Kohanbash and his associates sold the gear to other wholesalers, and that 200 counterfeit uniforms ended up in the hands of US Air Force members in Afghanistan. The Military Times notes that the real parkas would have had a “near-infrared technology woven into the fabric,” which the counterfeits lacked. Other products included hoods which were touted as “permanently flame resistant,” but which actually weren’t.


Consider seven contracts for $2.5 billion worth of Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) inserts bought between 2004 and 2006. IBA consists of a vest that holds a series of inserted plates designed to stop bullets and other fast moving objects.
On two contracts, the Army's Project Manager Soldier Equipment (PM SEQ) didn't perform tests to find out the velocity at which a projectile would penetrate plates because they said they weren't concerned about the design. On six out of seven contracts, PM SEQ simply didn't do weather and altitude tests on the inserts or substituted less. The PM SEQ Director of Technical Management stated that the more rigorous tests would take longer and the inserts needed to meet the "urgent wartime operational requirement" for body armor.
In addition PM SEQ didn't always test the right size insert plates on about 30 percent of tests. About half of the inserts tested for humidity and temperature weren't tested in the right temperature range.
The most recent report is only the latest in a series of investigations carried out by the Defense Department's Inspector General on body armor testing. In March 2008, the IG found 13 body armor contracts where proper testing wasn't performed. Following a request from Rep. Louise Slaughter, the IG dug deeper into the 13 contracts and found a series of problems with quality assurance. A year later, the Army recalled 16,000 of the ceramic plates.

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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 18, 2019)

You comparing apples to oranges, and not what I was referring to. Most testing of military aircraft today is a decade long process. Testing, and lots of testing...

And the F4 without cannon had nothing to do with McDonald Douglas, but what the Air Force or Navy’s requirements were.

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## MIflyer (Sep 18, 2019)

Well, the USN set the requirements for the original F4H missile-armed interceptor, and never added a cannon to theirs. They thought that missiles were the best way to defend the Fleet and their original concept for what became the F-111B was for something along the lines of an A-6 armed with AIM-54 missiles.

In the case of the M-16 the problem was that the Army invented a requirement for a higher muzzle velocity - essentially out of thin air. Remember that the AR-15 was a USAF innovation and the Army felt that McNamera had jammed it down their throat. It Just So Happened that muzzle velocity requirement meant that the powder had to be bought from Olin, the Army's long time supplier, rather than the nitrocellulose propellant that the gun was designed to use. The higher muzzle velocity meant the M-16 fired a a much higher cyclic rate, beyond what it had been designed to handle. The Army-specified powder also was much dirtier than the original nitrocellulose. The excessive cyclic rate and dirtier powder led to jamming.

One thing I am not sure I understand in the article is how the defense-style management approach was brought to the airliner business. I think what they mean is that the politically-driven selection of suppliers to broaden the base of support was used, so that the FAA could not interfere with with the process too much for fear of POing too many Congressmen.

Note that the 737 Max experience was a near duplicate of MDAC's Delta III program. They modified the Delta II radically and convinced the USAF that it was no big deal, just a mod to a reliable rocket. Then they used the Delta II guidance software, which no doubt saved a lot of time and money. The first Delta III blew itself all over the sky when the guidance software proved to be inadequate. The second Delta III had a upper stage failure. And that was the end of the program.


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## Barrett (Sep 19, 2019)

I'll jump in with comments on two counts:

Ref. the gunless Navy F-4. I knew Swede Vejtasa tolerably well, and he was the BuOrd (or NavWeps, etc) delegate who viewed the F4H mockup. Swede of course was an old-timey gunfighter and asked, "Where's the gun?" He was informed by brassy & tweedy Experts that dogfighting was over, because Everybody Knew that missiles were the future. Now, Swede talked slow(ly) sometimes but he thought fast. He knew that AAMs were still immature technology (this was 54-55) and had lots and lots and lots of growth to finish. (Decades, in fact.) But he was too much a gent to say I TOLD YOU SO.

Ref. management: Ed Heinemann was vocal on the subject. He held that things headed south when Aviation became Aerospace, and more specifically "Things went to hell when accountants and lawyers took over." His assessment was not limited to Douglas.

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## MIflyer (Sep 19, 2019)

I worked on the USAF F-4 and the funny thing about it was where the air conditioning packs were. And it had packs, not a single pack, one on each side of the nose.just aft of the radome.

The correct place for an air conditioning pack on a fighter of that design is just aft of the cockpit, close enough to get bleed air from the engines and ram air from the intake ducts and easily able to blow cool air to the cockpit and avionics. But when they revised the F3H design into the F4H they decided to remove the 20MM guns that were on the F3H and replace them with Sparrow missiles. So they needed a radar operator, Sparrows not being Fire and Forget. That extra crewman took up the space where the air conditioning pack would have gone and they gave the air conditioning guys at AiResearch the place where the cannons would have been placed. So, without enough space for one pack they built two strange looking smaller ones, one for the cockpit and a less powerful one for the avionics. Ram air came in through two scoops where the muzzle for the guns would have been and was exhausted to the rear and downward, where the empty shell casings would have fallen. 

Trying to come up with ducts to do tests of repaired heat exchangers was a challenge that I had to accomplish.

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## mikewint (Sep 19, 2019)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Most testing of military aircraft today is a decade long process


Chris agreed and depending upon what kind of testing I would agree that the people doing that work are cognizant of the fact that this is a warcraft in combat at some point. However my point was that even though the aircraft has been tested and found combat ready, at some point a component is going to fail and have to be replaced. That's when these money hungry sub-contractors come into play:

During the 1991 Gulf War an F-18 jet launched off the U.S. carrier Theodore Roosevelt on a combat mission that was cut short less than an hour later after a jet engine gearbox failed. The $40-million plane lurched out of control and crashed into the Persian Gulf, according to a confidential Navy investigation report. The pilot ejected and was later rescued.
The faulty gearbox was produced by Lucas Aerospace, a British firm that pleaded guilty last month to 37 counts of criminal fraud, admitting that it supplied defective gearboxes, bypassed required inspections and falsified test records at plants in City of Industry and Park City, Utah. When federal agents searched the firm’s plants, they found 81 gearboxes ready for delivery--all with defective parts.
After paying a record $18.5-million criminal fine, Lucas officials insisted that the gearboxes performed up to Navy requirements and never caused a safety problem. But prosecutors said in interviews that Lucas’ frauds were particularly egregious and triggered not only the Persian Gulf incident but scores of other flight emergencies

From approximately April 2010 through January 2014, the DoD issued purchase orders to Boggs & Associates for a variety of military parts and components used on various military weapons systems including aircraft, vehicles and vessels. The parts were required to meet certain military specifications. The majority of these parts are considered critical application items. A critical application item is defined as an item essential to weapon system performance or operation, or the preservation of life or safety of operating personnel, as determined by military services.
Boggs knowingly supplied non-conforming parts to the DoD through purchase orders issued by the Defense Logistics Agency.
The Agency’s testing center found that parts from 30 different purchase orders were non-conforming. Specifically, the parts were made from unauthorized substituted material, were dimensionally defective, used unauthorized inferior fittings, not heat treated properly, not plated properly and/or did not pass specified testing requirements

Ross Hyde, 63, has been charged in federal court with making false claims about the type of aluminum he provided under a contract for aircraft landing gear. His latest company, Vista Machining Co., has supplied the Pentagon with parts for tanks, aircraft and other military equipment — mostly hardware and machined metals — since 2008. But inspectors said many of his products were cheap replacements, some illegally obtained from China, which he tried to hide from the government. Hyde billed the government $12,897 for a part that he falsely claimed used a superior type of aluminum. In fact, he substituted a weaker and less expensive variety of the metal. The contract was for aircraft landing equipment, according to a federal contract database. Vista also used vendors not authorized to receive "technical data that discloses critical technology with military and space application." The Fort Worth company had obtained quotes from approved vendors but instead chose low-bidders from Chinese companies, the agency said. In one case, Vista paid another company to "grind off" a marking indicating the part was made in China, the agency's report said.

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## nuuumannn (Sep 19, 2019)

This article has been doing the rounds by Matt Stoller:

Boeing’s travails show what’s wrong with modern capitalism | Matt Stoller – Newswire Report

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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 19, 2019)

mikewint said:


> Chris agreed and depending upon what kind of testing I would agree that the people doing that work are cognizant of the fact that this is a warcraft in combat at some point. However my point was that even though the aircraft has been tested and found combat ready, at some point a component is going to fail and have to be replaced. That's when these money hungry sub-contractors come into play:
> 
> During the 1991 Gulf War an F-18 jet launched off the U.S. carrier Theodore Roosevelt on a combat mission that was cut short less than an hour later after a jet engine gearbox failed. The $40-million plane lurched out of control and crashed into the Persian Gulf, according to a confidential Navy investigation report. The pilot ejected and was later rescued.
> The faulty gearbox was produced by Lucas Aerospace, a British firm that pleaded guilty last month to 37 counts of criminal fraud, admitting that it supplied defective gearboxes, bypassed required inspections and falsified test records at plants in City of Industry and Park City, Utah. When federal agents searched the firm’s plants, they found 81 gearboxes ready for delivery--all with defective parts.
> ...



Sorry Mike - but this is cherry picking. No doubt there have been many defense contractors, especially mid-sized subcontractors who have done some extremely underhanded things but this is more the exception than the rule. Understand that in this day the money hungry sub-contractor comes under a lot of scrutiny and government oversight. Shenanigans still occur but I think that many of these folks will play nice as they now know what will happen to them if they are caught.

Now with that said, this is on an a different level than what the OP put out. The playing field is a lot different when building commercial aircraft.

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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 19, 2019)

mikewint said:


> Chris agreed and depending upon what kind of testing I would agree that the people doing that work are cognizant of the fact that this is a warcraft in combat at some point. However my point was that even though the aircraft has been tested and found combat ready, at some point a component is going to fail and have to be replaced. That's when these money hungry sub-contractors come into play:
> 
> During the 1991 Gulf War an F-18 jet launched off the U.S. carrier Theodore Roosevelt on a combat mission that was cut short less than an hour later after a jet engine gearbox failed. The $40-million plane lurched out of control and crashed into the Persian Gulf, according to a confidential Navy investigation report. The pilot ejected and was later rescued.
> The faulty gearbox was produced by Lucas Aerospace, a British firm that pleaded guilty last month to 37 counts of criminal fraud, admitting that it supplied defective gearboxes, bypassed required inspections and falsified test records at plants in City of Industry and Park City, Utah. When federal agents searched the firm’s plants, they found 81 gearboxes ready for delivery--all with defective parts.
> ...



Your barking up the wrong. None of the things you describe have anything to do with the manufacturer (i.e., Boeing, Lockheed, etc.). At the time of selection, a quality product was provided. Believe me, the selection process is rigorous. Now if the provider started providing a sub standard quality product after selection (as in the cases you have provided) then they are held accountable as they should.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 19, 2019)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Sorry Mike - but this is cherry picking. No doubt there have been many defense contractors, especially mid-sized subcontractors who have done some extremely underhanded things but this is more the exception than the rule. Understand that in this day the money hungry sub-contractor comes under a lot of scrutiny and government oversight. Shenanigans still occur but I think that many of these folks will play nice as they now know what will happen to them if they are caught.
> 
> Now with that said, this is on an a different level than what the OP put out. The playing field is a lot different when building commercial aircraft.



Ding, ding, ding. 100% correct.

The program I work, none of that would even fly.


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## Builder 2010 (Sep 19, 2019)

I wrote a letter to the Editor at Aviation Week several years ago that was published. What triggered the letter was an interview with the CEO of Boeing where he stated that they were no longer going to develop innovative airplanes like the 787 because they cost to much to develop and have too much risk. They were going to manage to share price. The result of this is the 737 Max. In my letter I stated that the company that gave us the 707 and the 747 would never have built them today. And I also said that they were in a death spiral. These deaths take a long time, but they are inevitable. I said that if I was a young engineering graduate I wouldn't touch Boeing with someone else's 10 foot pole. I would go work for Space X or Blue Horizon. And tonight in a discussion with an engineering professor at University of Louisville I find that my prediction was dead on. All young grads are looking to work for those two companies. Which would you want, a company that's shooting for Mars or shooting for higher share prices?

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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 20, 2019)

mikewint said:


> Lucas Aerospace, a British firm that pleaded guilty last month to 37 counts of criminal fraud, admitting that it supplied defective gearboxes, bypassed required inspections and falsified test records


So what's new? Back in the 80s, our airline ran Fokker F27s and Shorts SD30s, so we were stuck with Lucas parts on 2/3 of our fleet. Expensive, troublesome, not ergonomic, and prone to failure. Our SD30s had PT6 - 45s, and our 1900s had - 65s, which were essentially the same engine, just running at different temperatures and power outputs. The - 65s used Lear Siegler starter/generators at $13K a pop, which generally lasted 1500-2000 flight hours, failed incrementally, generally avoiding emergency situations, AND could be rebuilt in our own shop. The Lukes on the - 45s, OTOH, cost $41K each, seldom went more than 5-600 hours, had a way of failing suddenly and spectacularly, then had to be packed off to Montreal for an exchange unit. On American designed airplanes, both -# PT6s used Lears, but the Short was originally type certificated in the UK and by manufacturer spec Lears were not approved on it. Messy job changing out a Luke, as they tended to ooze a toxic black gunk over everything. "Prince of Darkness" strikes again!
Cheers,
Wes

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## soulezoo (Sep 20, 2019)

Lucas = the original inventors of darkness.

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## jetcal1 (Sep 20, 2019)

Military or commercial, if a company is poorly managed or has corrupt management faulty product will emerge. Remember Koito Industries Ltd.? 150K plus faulty seats! From a subsidiary of Toyota, a quality icon.
And, let's not forget the factor of disgruntled employees such as when the union at American Airlines was recently admonished by a judge to stop the work slowdowns. 

And keep in mind this is nothing new. (Brewster Aeronautical Corporation.)


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## mikewint (Sep 20, 2019)

Joe and Chris, I bow to both of your expertise in aviation but IMHO a single bad cherry can bring down and kill multiple people. So you can test and produce the most perfect product and It may operate better than perfect and then mechanics install defective part XXX. So cherry picking, agreed, but those bad cherries are, at times, responsible for the mechanical failure of the aircraft and the death of all on board. 
My point in picking Defense contractors was, that if it happens in the military then how much more common is it in the civilian arena. Some sub-contractor is supplying parts for all of those big commercial aircraft. I don't think that fraud is confined to JUST military contractors.



FLYBOYJ said:


> Shenanigans still occur but I think that many of these folks will play nice as they now know what will happen to them if they are caught.


Joe, the reality is quite the opposite: While small contractors are often barred by the Pentagon from doing business with the Government for several years the large contractors, on which the Pentagon relies most heavily, have never faced anything but temporary suspensions of their right to compete for contracts. The suspensions usually last a few months and inflict little, if any, financial pain. Suspensions are almost always limited to a specific company division.
Twenty-five of the 100 largest Pentagon contractors have been found guilty of procurement fraud in the last seven years, some more than once. Yet not one has been barred from Government contracting.
Just in the last two years there have been 16 cases filed involving 14 of the largest weapons makers. They include Boeing, Grumman and Teledyne, which made payoffs to obtain confidential Pentagon documents; Rockwell International and Emerson Electric, which overcharged the Government, and Fairchild Industries and Northrop, which failed to test certain weapons components or falsified the test results.

The Pentagon, when faced with a big procurement scandal and pressure from Congress and the public to act against a contractor, sometimes quietly presses a company to make changes in its operations or in its management. After a series of scandals involving the General Dynamics Corporation during the late 1970's and early 1980's, the Pentagon put pressure on the company in various ways, including a brief suspension. The company brought in an outsider, Stanley C. Pace, as its new chief executive with a mandate to clean up its operations and image. Pentagon Policy

The Pentagon says its policy is to use suspension and debarment only to protect the Government and the taxpayer from further fraud, and not as punishment. Punitive action, it adds, is properly limited to the judiciary.
"The current system is working," said Eleanor Spector, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Procurement. "We have the tools to suspend or debar the companies involved, and anything that smacks of punishment should be the role of the courts."

While the fines imposed in court cases are often substantial, many legislators and experts contend they do little to insure that contractors will not continue to cheat.
"Corporate executives who persistently engage in this kind of theft from taxpayers ought to know they will not just pay a fine that often doesn't cover the cost of correcting the fraud, or throw an underling to the prosecutors," said Representative George Miller, a California Democrat who has proposed legislation that calls for debarment for a company after two convictions in five years.

Mr. Miller and other supporters of stricter sanctions point to a recent case involving the Northrop Corporation.
Northrop was indicted last year on charges of falsifying test results on missile and aircraft components. The Pentagon suspended the division of the company responsible for the tests. But because the suspension applied only to direct purchases by the Government, it did not interrupt the division's work supplying a component to the companies that assemble the Harrier jet for the Marine Corps.
Although Northrop pleaded guilty to the test-fraud charges earlier this year, the Pentagon is now considering rescinding the ban altogether.

In half of the 16 cases involving large contractors in the last two years, the Pentagon took no action against the company. In the other cases, companies or their divisions were suspended for a period of months from receiving new contracts while the Pentagon sought assurances that they were operating responsibly.

In some cases, the companies lost a chance to win large new contracts during their suspensions. As often as not, however, the suspensions had little effect. Teledyne Inc.'s electronics division was suspended last year for six months, after it was implicated in a Pentagon bribery scandal. Despite the suspension, the company was allowed to continue making its products and shipping them to the Government under existing contracts.

After admitting to trafficking in confidential Government documents, the Boeing Company's office near Washington was suspended for three months starting last November, and personnel from that office were barred from dealing directly with the Pentagon.
Boeing assigned people from other offices to deal with the Pentagon, and, since the suspension did not affect any manufacturing plants or specific programs, there was no direct impact, a Boeing spokesman said.
Some companies do not even suffer the inconvenience of a suspension. The Emerson Electric Company pleaded guilty in May to four felony counts related to overcharging the Pentagon for some electronics components. The company paid a $40,000 criminal fine and a $14 million civil settlement but was not suspended.

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## mikewint (Sep 20, 2019)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> None of the things you describe have anything to do with the manufacturer (i.e., Boeing,


According to the Federal contractor misconduct data base from 1995 to present BOEING has had: 
*70 instances of misconduct since 1995 | $1,459.4M in penalties*
9/7/2012 Investigation of 2007 F-15 Midair Breakup
Boeing Company $1,000,000
9/29/2004 Delivering Military Aircraft Containing Russian Titanium (Berry Amendment Violation)
Boeing Company $7,400,000
9/29/1998 Defense Services to Russia and Elsewhere (Arms Export Control Act Violation)
Boeing Company $10,000,000
9/2/2008 Inflating the Price of B-1 Bomber Towed Decoy System
Boeing Company $4,000,000
9/1/1997 777 Aircraft Program (Unallowed Costs)
Boeing Company $6,000,000
8/3/2000 Roby v. Boeing (Defective Chinook Helicopters)
Boeing Company $54,000,000
8/2/2000 Aircraft Quality Control Problems
Boeing Company $1,241,000
8/13/2009 Defective Work and Overbilling on KC-10
Boeing Company $25,000,000
8/13/1998 Defective Pricing
Boeing Company $1,850,000
8/11/2009 Quintana v. Boeing (KC-135 Labor Overbilling)
Boeing Company $2,000,000
7/29/2013 Redd et al. v. Goodrich Corporation et al. (Product Liability)
Boeing Company, Rolls-Royce PLC Pending
7/28/2010 December 2008 Hornet Jet Crash
Boeing Company Pending
7/26/2013 Quality Control Violations on Model 777 Airplanes
Boeing Company $0
7/2/2008 USA v. Lesnik (Unauthorized Possession of Defense Information)
Boeing Company $0
7/17/2009 Bogota, Colombia Forced Landing Lawsuit
Boeing Company Pending
7/16/2007 KC-135 and RC-135 Aircraft Parts Overbilling
Boeing Company $1,093,236
7/13/2012 Delays in Providing Explosion Prevention Guidance
Boeing Company $0
7/11/2019 Earl et al. v. Boeing (Conspiracy to Conceal 737 Max 8 Defects)
Boeing Company Pending
6/7/2012 Allison v. Boeing, et al. (Airplane Crash)
Boeing Company, United Technologies Corporation Pending
6/30/2008 Exceeding Limits on Purchases From Foreign Suppliers
Boeing Company $3,000,000
6/27/2011 Improperly Installed Oxygen Systems on B-777 Airliners
Boeing Company $1,050,000
6/27/2011 Duwamish Waterway Jet Fuel Spill
Boeing Company $107,543
6/22/2015 Woods, et al. v. Boeing (Contaminated Cabin Air)
Boeing Company Pending
6/21/2019 Pilot X v. Boeing (737 Max 8 Pilot Class Action)
Boeing Company Pending
5/9/2017 Damage to Air Force One Oxygen System
Boeing Company $0
5/7/2009 Petersen v. Boeing (Saudi Pilot Training Program Lawsuit)
Boeing Company $100,000
5/3/2011 Contract Pricing Problems at Corpus Christi Army Depot
Boeing Company $1,600,000
5/20/2013 Satellite Parts Kickbacks
Boeing Company $0
5/16/2003 Defective Apache Helicopter Fuzz Busters
Boeing Company $3,325,000
5/15/2006 Illegal Hiring of Government Officials and Improper Use of Proprietary Information
Boeing Company $615,000,000
5/12/2014 July 2013 Asiana Airlines Crash
Boeing Company Pending
4/9/2019 737 Max 8 Crashes Shareholder Litigation
Boeing Company Pending
4/20/2002 April and December 2000 V-22 Osprey Crashes
Boeing Company, Textron, Inc. $0
3/4/2003 Arms Export Control Act Violation (Transfer of Rocket Data to China)
Boeing Company $6,000,000
3/30/2001 Wedgetail Project (Arms Export Control Act Violation)
Boeing Company $4,200,000
3/28/2019 737 Max 8 Crashes Civil Litigation
Boeing Company Pending
3/28/2006 Arms Export Control Act Violation (QRS-11 Gyrochip)
Boeing Company $15,000,000
12/22/2015 Settlement of Pending and Potential Enforcement Cases
Boeing Company $12,000,000
11/14/2001 Machine Tools Export Violation (China)
Boeing Company $2,120,000
10/16/2013 October 2010 American Airlines Flight 1640 Emergency Landing
Boeing Company $2,271,652
1/20/2012 Improper Billing on the Chinook Helicopter Program
Boeing Company $4,392,780

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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 20, 2019)

mikewint said:


> According to the Federal contractor misconduct data base from 1995 to present BOEING has had:
> *70 instances of misconduct since 1995 | $1,459.4M in penalties*
> 9/7/2012 Investigation of 2007 F-15 Midair Breakup
> Boeing Company $1,000,000
> ...



And if you actually researched those you would see that the majority where not the direct result of Boeing itself. I challenge you to do so...

Boeing is the responsible party and takes the consequences.

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## jetcal1 (Sep 20, 2019)

mikewint said:


> According to the Federal contractor misconduct data base from 1995 to present BOEING has had:
> *70 instances of misconduct since 1995 | $1,459.4M in penalties*
> 9/7/2012 Investigation of 2007 F-15 Midair Breakup
> Boeing Company $1,000,000
> ...

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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 20, 2019)

mikewint said:


> According to the Federal contractor misconduct data base from 1995 to present BOEING has had:
> *70 instances of misconduct since 1995 | $1,459.4M in penalties*
> 9/7/2012 Investigation of 2007 F-15 Midair Breakup
> Boeing Company $1,000,000
> ...



Ditto Chris' response - additionally, you have to look at each division and in some cases individuals who were involved in these situations. I've seen dozens of cases where a Prime contractor took the hit for a rogue employee, with that individual either not knowing he/she was committing a crime or actually committing a crime on their own initiative.

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## mikewint (Sep 20, 2019)

Chris, wish I had the expertise to do that. Boeing and other large corporations have herds of lawyers on tap whose only job is fending off and mitigating lawsuits. So if I see things like: 
7/26/2013 Quality Control Violations on Model 777 Airplanes
Boeing Company $0

7/2/2008 USA v. Lesnik (Unauthorized Possession of Defense Information)
Boeing Company $0

I'm going to assume that Boeing was acquitted of those charges but on the other hand when I see: 
8/3/2000 Roby v. Boeing (Defective Chinook Helicopters)
Boeing Company $54,000,000
It would seem that for Boeing to fork over $54 million they were guilty, i.e.:

On August 28, 1990, the Army accepted delivery of a remanufactured CH–47D helicopter (“Aircraft 89–0165”).   The next day, Boeing submitted a claim for payment to the Government, in the form of a $4.1 million invoice for Aircraft 89–0165.   On January 11, 1991, after fifty-six flight hours, Aircraft 89–0165 suffered the failure of a defective flight-critical transmission gear 1 and crashed during a low-level contour flight over the Saudi Arabian desert as part of Operation Desert Shield.   Aircraft 89–0165 and its contents were totally destroyed at a loss of at least $10 million.   The Army replaced Aircraft 89–0165 with a new CH–47D helicopter that cost almost $13 million.

On May 22, 1995, Relator Brett Roby (“Roby”) filed a qui tam action under seal pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) on behalf of himself and the Government, alleging that Boeing and its supplier, Speco Corp. (“Speco”), had violated the FCA by making false statements about the manufacture and sale of defective transmission gears to the Army via Boeing's remanufactured CH–47D helicopters.   Speco manufactured the gears that Boeing installed into the CH–47D helicopters before their delivery to the Army. On April 30, 1997, the Government intervened and filed an Amended Complaint against Boeing, which was unsealed on May 1, 1997.

In its Answer, Boeing denied the allegations of FCA violations and raised a total of twelve affirmative defenses.   Specifically, Boeing claimed:  (1) that the HVIC, included by regulation in the helicopter contract, barred the damages sought under the FCA and (2) that consequential damages were not available under the FCA. On August 3, 2000, before trial, the parties reached a settlement under which Boeing made an immediate payment of $25 million.   The settlement did not include the FCA claim arising from the Saudi crash;  an additional payment of $15 million is contingent upon the outcome of this appeal. We look first to the language of the FCA, which holds a defendant liable for a civil penalty “plus 3 times the amount of damages which the Government sustains because of the act of that person.”  31 U.S.C. § 3729(a).   The allegedly fraudulent act in this case is Boeing's “false [ ] represent[ation] that the helicopters conformed to contract requirements and fail[ure] to disclose their faulty manufacture to the United States Government.”   J.A. at 87 (Am. Compl. at ¶ 3).3  Because of this false claim, the Government sustained the loss of Aircraft 89–0165.   Therefore, the Government argues that Boeing is liable under the FCA for treble damages as well as a civil penalty. Although the loss of Aircraft 89–0165 occurred after Government acceptance and resulted from the defective Speco gear, it was actually caused by Boeing's initial misrepresentation that the helicopter conformed to contract requirements.

And just as an aside, it would seem that my "one bad cherry" argument is once again evidenced and it cost Boeing dearly

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## mikewint (Sep 20, 2019)

*In this particular incident, I think Boeing should have stood it's ground. *

Investigation of 2007 F-15 Midair Breakup
According to a Department of Defense Inspector General (DOD IG) report, Boeing agreed to provide $1 million in replacement parts for its F-15 fighters in a confidential settlement over a November 2007 incident in which an F-15C Eagle broke apart in midair. An investigation into the incident found that Boeing provided “defective or non-conforming” parts to the Air Force. According to the DOD IG’s summary of the investigation, the accident was caused by the failure of the upper-right longeron, a thin strip of material to which the aircraft’s skin is attached. The contract required the longeron to be .10 inches thick, but the investigation found that Boeing-supplied longerons varied in thickness from 0.039 to 0.073 inches.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 20, 2019)

Mike go read through everything you just posted. There is a difference between “Boeing” and “Supplier”. Boeing however pays the consequences for its suppliers. Thats the point. Additionally many of the ones you posted above, were the results of individuals not the company, but again the company pays the consequences. For instance if I inadvertently land in a foreign country with my work laptop, Boeing is in trouble for Arms Export Control Act Violation because of the info on it.

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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 20, 2019)

mikewint said:


> *In this particular incident, I think Boeing should have stood it's ground. *
> 
> Investigation of 2007 F-15 Midair Breakup
> According to a Department of Defense Inspector General (DOD IG) report, Boeing agreed to provide $1 million in replacement parts for its F-15 fighters in a confidential settlement over a November 2007 incident in which an F-15C Eagle broke apart in midair. An investigation into the incident found that Boeing provided “defective or non-conforming” parts to the Air Force. According to the DOD IG’s summary of the investigation, the accident was caused by the failure of the upper-right longeron, a thin strip of material to which the aircraft’s skin is attached. The contract required the longeron to be .10 inches thick, but the investigation found that Boeing-supplied longerons varied in thickness from 0.039 to 0.073 inches.



Who the supplied the parts to Boeing? 

I highly doubt your information is correct anyhow. Can you provide a link. Do you know how thick 0.039 to 0.073 inches. There is no way that made its way onto an aircraft.


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 20, 2019)

mikewint said:


> The contract required the longeron to be .10 inches thick, but the investigation found that Boeing-supplied longerons varied in thickness from 0.039 to 0.073 inches.





DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Who the supplied the parts to Boeing?
> 
> I highly doubt your information is correct anyhow. Can you provide a link. Do you know how thick 0.039 to 0.073 inches. There is no way that made its way onto an aircraft.



Specifics needs - depending where on the aircraft they are located they could be tapered, very common in aircraft construction. 

Additionally there could have been a Material Review Board (MRB) action where those parts were deemed acceptable by an engineer.

BTW Mike - I'm sure you heard of the $600 toilet seat? I was involved in the post media hype investigation. What was never mentioned is Lockheed actually overcharged the government something like $35 per unit and that was a clerical error. The seat was part of the toilet unit that went on the P-3. It looked something like this.







It was reinforced fiberglass and had to be fire resistant IIRC. Once could compare it to a fiberglass fender for a Corvette






I see these currently running between $350 and $1700

Add in the testing and inspection cost and this whole fiasco was nothing but a red herring.

BTW - IIRC Lockheed paid back the government for the $35 per unit error.

So don't believe all those internet articles you're fishing around for, many of them do have a twist at the end of the day!!!

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## Shortround6 (Sep 20, 2019)

As I remember (and could be wrong) the 600 dollar pricing was also because the toilet cover was out of production. The government ordered a small number (like 2?) in one fiscal year and the molds had to be taken out of storage, cleaned, set up, the parts made and the molds put back in storage. Had the government ordered twice as a many parts the cost per part would have been much lower even if the total spent was a bit a higher.

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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 20, 2019)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Specifics needs - depending where on the aircraft they are located they could be tapered, very common in aircraft construction.
> 
> Additionally there could have been a Material Review Board (MRB) action where those parts were deemed acceptable by an engineer.



True, did not think of either of those.


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## MIflyer (Sep 20, 2019)

That F-15C longeron was manufactured in 1979, when Boeing was not involved with the F-15. As a former ALC engineer I'll admit that a manufacturing error of that magnitude was shocking. Admittedly, due to the shape of that part it would have been hard to spot without at least the kind of First Article Inspection that we used to do at the ALC for new suppliers.

As for the toilet seat, not only was it a unique part, not one you could buy at Home Depot, if you checked on a comparable part for an automobile you likely would not find it any cheaper.

Then there was the famous $400 hammer. Now go look at the Federal Govt test requirements for that hammer, including the right to audit your company's books from top to bottom and it's a wonder it only cost $400.

The real kicker was one I found in 1981. We asked for a quote on buying new rocket engine igniters for some older missiles; a special production run would be required. The price, $100K for a box full, was not that bad. Then I looked at the details. The specification said to put it in a cardboard box and stick a couple of P-38 can openers in there, lest we miss WWIII because no one had a can opener handy. The cost for those two can openers would have been $3000. You could buy two of the same kind of thing at K-Mart for $2.00. What the bidding company did was go out and get quotes for each of the items required. For Mil-Spec C-Ration can openers the minimum order quantity from the manufacturer probably was something like 10,000 each. So that went into the bid.

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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 20, 2019)

MIflyer said:


> That F-15C longeron was manufactured in 1979, when Boeing was not involved with the F-15. As a former ALC engineer I'll admit that a manufacturing error of that magnitude was shocking. Admittedly, due to the shape of that part it would have been hard to spot without at least the kind of First Article Inspection that we used to do at the ALC for new suppliers.



And that is a good point as well. Boeing did not merge with McDonald Douglas until 1997. Still though at that point, once Boeing took over, they take all responsibilty.

Everything around here is still named after McDonald Douglas. “Phantom Blvd”, “James S. McDonell Blvd.”, etc...


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## MIflyer (Sep 20, 2019)

A friend of mine got "fired" by none-other than Mr Mac. He worked for NASA and went to St Louis for some discussions on the Gemini program. He asked a McDonnell engineer for a copy of a drawing. The engineer told him to have a seat; he'd go get the drawing and be back soon. My friend sat down, saw a newspaper and picked it up to read a bit while he waited on the drawing. Mr Mac came by in his golf cart, saw him reading the paper and ordered, "Fire that man!"

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## jetcal1 (Sep 20, 2019)

mikewint said:


> *In this particular incident, I think Boeing should have stood it's ground. *
> 
> Investigation of 2007 F-15 Midair Breakup
> but the investigation found that Boeing-supplied longerons varied in thickness from 0.039 to 0.073 inches.





mikewint said:


> *In this particular incident, I think Boeing should have stood it's ground. *
> 
> Investigation of 2007 F-15 Midair Breakup
> According to a Department of Defense Inspector General (DOD IG) report, Boeing agreed to provide $1 million in replacement parts for its F-15 fighters in a confidential settlement over a November 2007 incident in which an F-15C Eagle broke apart in midair. An investigation into the incident found that Boeing provided “defective or non-conforming” parts to the Air Force. According to the DOD IG’s summary of the investigation, the accident was caused by the failure of the upper-right longeron, a thin strip of material to which the aircraft’s skin is attached. The contract required the longeron to be .10 inches thick, but the investigation found that Boeing-supplied longerons varied in thickness from 0.039 to 0.073 inches.



Great. Assuming it was still underspec, (What were the limit's?) it was still past it's design life and was made by another company prior to a merger.

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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 20, 2019)

Shortround6 said:


> As I remember (and could be wrong) the 600 dollar pricing was also because the toilet cover was out of production. The government ordered a small number (like 2?) in one fiscal year and the molds had to be taken out of storage, cleaned, set up, the parts made and the molds put back in storage. Had the government ordered twice as a many parts the cost per part would have been much lower even if the total spent was a bit a higher.


 Not true about being out of production. this happened during the early 1980s, the P-3 was in full production at the time, about 10 - 20 a year being built


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## jetcal1 (Sep 20, 2019)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Not true about being out of production. this happened during the early 1980s, the P-3 was in full production at the time, about 10 - 20 a year being built



Yes, but the seat might have been a one time build (production run) and stored. We see "lifetime" buys (That aren't.) in aerospace all the time.


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 21, 2019)

jetcal1 said:


> Yes, but the seat might have been a one time build (production run) and stored. We see "lifetime" buys (That aren't.) in aerospace all the time.


I hear ya but no - the vendor was manufacturing them for both production and spares. As stated I worked on the program and actually had to inspect a few of these and audit the vendor's facility. I don't remember their name but they were located close to Burbank where the P-3 was being built at the time.

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## mikewint (Sep 21, 2019)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> I highly doubt your information is correct anyhow. Can you provide a link.


Chris for the first case the information I posted came from the Federal Court of Appeals decision. I also noted in my post that the part in question did NOT come from Boeing *BUT *as the appeals court noted in its decision holding Boeing responsible:
*Although the loss of Aircraft 89–0165 occurred after Government acceptance and resulted from the defective Speco gear, it was actually caused by Boeing's initial misrepresentation that the helicopter conformed to contract requirements.*
From:
*United States Court of Appeals,Sixth Circuit.
UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Brett ROBY, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. BOEING CO., Defendant–Appellant.
No. 00–4157.
Decided: September 12, 2002*

The second comes from: http://s3.amazonaws.com/fcmd/docume...ng_-_F-15_Midair_Breakup_DODIG.pdf?1428681803
Which is the Inspector General US DoD Semi-annual Report to the Congress pp. 44-45


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## GreenKnight121 (Sep 26, 2019)

MIflyer said:


> I worked on the USAF F-4 and the funny thing about it was where the air conditioning packs were. And it had packs, not a single pack, one on each side of the nose.just aft of the radome.
> 
> The correct place for an air conditioning pack on a fighter of that design is just aft of the cockpit, close enough to get bleed air from the engines and ram air from the intake ducts and easily able to blow cool air to the cockpit and avionics. But when they revised the F3H design into the F4H they decided to remove the 20MM guns that were on the F3H and replace them with Sparrow missiles. So they needed a radar operator, Sparrows not being Fire and Forget. That extra crewman took up the space where the air conditioning pack would have gone and they gave the air conditioning guys at AiResearch the place where the cannons would have been placed. So, without enough space for one pack they built two strange looking smaller ones, one for the cockpit and a less powerful one for the avionics. Ram air came in through two scoops where the muzzle for the guns would have been and was exhausted to the rear and downward, where the empty shell casings would have fallen.
> 
> Trying to come up with ducts to do tests of repaired heat exchangers was a challenge that I had to accomplish.



Strange - given that the design that went into production as the F-4 Phantom was one of several DIFFERENT *clean-sheet *designs!
*None were "revised F3H designs"*, they were start-to-finish designed for the new aircraft - they HAD to be, as the F3H was subsonic, and the F4H (F-4) was intended to be a Mach 2 fighter... creating vastly different stresses and heating issues, with significantly different aerodynamics (shapes), requiring a very different internal layout of structural members.

Did some of the basic philosophy of "what is the best place for this" from one bleed over to the other? To some degree - but at that time all aircraft manufacturers placed mission-critical (missiles, in this case) first, in the best positions for those - and secondary equipment went wherever they could stuff it. Yes their general layout was somewhat similar... but so was the Supermarine Scimitar of the RN.

And as for the Sparrow - while the RIO improved the effectiveness of the Sparrow armament (and of almost everything else the F-4 did), it was NOT required for Sparrow capability!

Just over half of all F3H Demons (239 F3H-2 & 80 F3H-2M to be specific, 319 total) had full Sparrow missile capability - as single-seaters! Including the two prototypes, 299 F3H s were built without Sparrow capability.


F3H-2M Demon with four AIM-7 Sparrow air-to-air missiles about 1958:


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## Barrett (Sep 27, 2019)

I was fortunate to know Ed Heinemann well, and his ultimate compliment was "He's an aircraftsman." Which he defined as someone who lived, breathed, ate & slept Aviation. He insisted that things started going south about the time that Aviation became Aerospace. "Things went to hell when the accountants and lawyers replaced the Aircraftsmen." And he was not speaking only of Douglas.

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## MIflyer (Sep 28, 2019)

Well, engineers may start with a "clean sheet of paper" but that does not mean they empty their minds. Look at the attached, from the book F3H In Action.


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## fubar57 (Sep 28, 2019)

https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/boeing-737ng-cracks-1.5301397


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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 28, 2019)

MIflyer said:


> Well, engineers may start with a "clean sheet of paper" but that does not mean they empty their minds. Look at the attached, from the book F3H In Action.
> View attachment 554380


Wow, they were going to almost bury the RIO back there, near as bad as the Radar Attack Navigator in the A5. But back then most "scope dopes" were enlisted radar operators, just a technical aid to the pilot, not a fully integrated member of a combat team with procedural functions in all phases of flight. And scopes had visibility issues in bright light. At least that's history as related by some old timers in the F4 community back in my day. Some of the Marine squadrons that occaisonaly stood hot pad duty at our station had grey haired 2nd lieutenant RIOs who'd flown for years as sergeants before being commissioned.
Cheers,
Wes

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## MIflyer (Sep 28, 2019)

My thoughts exactly! Barf City! Of course the WWII airborne scopes - even though the ground test Oscope for radars (I have one out in the garage) had rubber cones over them for the operator to seal out the light (Double Barf City!). It's not as bad at the B-58, where they gave everybody but the pilot windows on each side about the size of a pair of sunglasses (but they did give them a printer). Or the B-52, where there are no windows at all. But that GIB would not be of much use in spotting bogies outside of his scope.

Of course, any version of the F3H or F-4 did not even recognize the concept of checking your six!


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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 28, 2019)

MIflyer said:


> Of course, any version of the F3H or F-4 did not even recognize the concept of checking your six!


Of course not, they were only supposed to be interceptors, not fully fledged air superiority fighters. That was the Crusader's job. An interceptor going after Backfires or Kitchens doesn't have six o'clock worries, right?
Cheers,
Wes


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## MIflyer (Sep 28, 2019)

Well, the F-8 did not have the best rear view around, either. In fact, he could not even see his own wing. 

Of course the 102 and 106 could not see behind them, for the same reason. Nor was the F-5 all that great in that respect, either. A friend of mine got on the tail of a couple of ROK F-5's at 35,000 ft and stayed there. It took them a bit to figure out he was there and, unable to outturn him, dove for the deck.

Boy were THEY in trouble when they got home! You see, my friend was flying a B-52.

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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 28, 2019)

MIflyer said:


> A friend of mine got on the tail of a couple of ROK F-5's at 35,000 ft and stayed there. It took them a bit to figure out he was there and, unable to outturn him, dove for the deck. Boy were THEY in trouble when they got home! You see, my friend was flying a B-52.


I always wondered what they meant when they said they "gave the plane a good buffing"!


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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 28, 2019)

MIflyer said:


> Well, the F-8 did not have the best rear view around, either. In fact, he could not even see his own wing.


Well, I never saw many F8s when I was in the nav, but the occasional transient that visited our tropical island paradise all had eyebrow mirrors on their canopy bows, and were reputed to have tailcone radars. There was always some interesting conversation when a single seater pilot ventured into Phantom territory.
Cheers,
Wes


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## davparlr (Oct 1, 2019)

I have quite a few comments to make on this very interesting topic. In my younger days, I flew a modern, for the time, aircraft for the Air Force, the C-141 which had full autoland capability. Then I spent about 20 years of my life working on the B-2 bomber from proposal to bombs over Kosovo, mainly as responsible engineering manager for the hardware and software design requirements, specifications, subcontractor selection, suplier test requirements, and installation of about 30 to 40 million 1980 dollars’ worth of equipment (about 90% of the equipment shown on my signature pix instrument panel). I also had to work with Boeing quite a bit (Boeing built more of the B-2 than Northrop built). As such I have a lot of opinions but I am going to limit them.

While there are always hiccups, cheating, and short cutting, I fully believe, for the most part, that American military equipment is the best in the world.
I also felt that, again by a significant most part, all the people I worked with, Northrop, subcontractors, and government, wanted to provide a quality well tested product for the AF. Yes, subcontractors, and Northrop, wanted to make money, this is capitalism after all, but quality was rarely an issue.
I never cared much for Boeing, in that they were quite expensive. The government paid much more for an installation in the Boeing portion that for a similar installation in the Northrop portion.
I think the Boeing’s stunning failure with the 737 Max was a problem endemic to the commercial airplane industry. Boeing was not the only aircraft with the problems of uncontrolled perturbations of flight controls. The A3xx also had several problems with uncontrolled pitch commands, which luckily occurred at altitude that allowed the crew to mitigate, but not solve, the problem. Another Airbus was lost because the crew could not correct for an inadvertent initiation of Go Around on final, causing the aircraft to stall and crash. The procedures for cancelling Go Around was complex and not trained for. We had a single button for cancelling autopilot. What happened to that button? Maybe explained by the following paragraph.
I think there is a danger in the process of aircraft designers and operators as they move towards totally automated aircraft and prematurely depending on the aircraft systems to ensure safety of the aircraft over the admittedly more prevalent pilot error. Already aircrews are encouraged to let the aircraft do the flying. Autopilot functions are probably now embedded in the flight control computers thus making them difficult to override. One of the main factors the Korean Air crash in Korea was, quoted from Wikipedia, “inadequate training on the planning and executing of visual approaches”????! As mention previously, a China Airline A300 was lost when a pilot accidently engaged go-around, they manually overrode the throttles but where incapable of overriding the autopilot pitch up with flight control input. Recognizing the danger, and not knowing how to disengage go-around auto function, they initiated a go around by releasing forward pressure on the controls and pulling back thus additionally adding nose up command to what the autopilot command was already doing and the aircraft stalled and crashed.
The pathway to the outstanding safety of modern commercial aircraft is littered with many grave sites. I would have hoped with all the simulation and computer technology available today, that the pathway to future safe aircraft would not have those grave sites. Apparently that is not happening.
Even though the C-141 had full autoland capability, I never operationall flew any type of coupled approach. I always flew manual penetrations, approaches and landings.

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## XBe02Drvr (Oct 1, 2019)

davparlr said:


> Even though the C-141 had full autoland capability, I never operationall flew any type of coupled approach. I always flew manual penetrations, approaches and landings.


Naval Aviators have been avoiding the autoland built into their planes for generations now. When I was in, in the early seventies, the F4 had a highly touted autoland system, but pilots wouldn't touch it with a ten foot pole. And RIOs would threaten to punch out if a pilot even talked about trying it. And it's real world reliability, according to the maintainers, wasn't anything like its advertising.
Cheers,
Wes


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## MIflyer (Oct 2, 2019)

Talking about mistakes companies have made, both Lockheed and the USAF made a big mistake with the C-141. When C-141 production ended (Lockheed proposed a bomber version as the production wound down), Lockheed asked the Air Force what they wanted to do with the production tooling; after all, it was Air Force property. The Air Force responded that they had no further requirement to build any more C-141's and thus did not need the tooling. Lockheed replied that it needed to be paid to store the tooling and if the Air Force was not going to fund the storage they would destroy the equipment, which they did. 

Not many years later the Air Force and Lockheed both rued the day they every let the 141 tooling be destroyed. Needless to say the C-5A turned out to be less of a wonder than had been envisioned and the costs were so high that the Air Force could buy many fewer than they had planned. They would have liked to have bought more C-141's, but that option was gone. Lockheed also realized that a commercial C-141 would have sold well, while their attempts to build commercial C-5A's were a complete failure.


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## BobB (Oct 3, 2019)

MIflyer said:


> Talking about mistakes companies have made, both Lockheed and the USAF made a big mistake with the C-141. When C-141 production ended (Lockheed proposed a bomber version as the production wound down), Lockheed asked the Air Force what they wanted to do with the production tooling; after all, it was Air Force property. The Air Force responded that they had no further requirement to build any more C-141's and thus did not need the tooling. Lockheed replied that it needed to be paid to store the tooling and if the Air Force was not going to fund the storage they would destroy the equipment, which they did.
> 
> Not many years later the Air Force and Lockheed both rued the day they every let the 141 tooling be destroyed. Needless to say the C-5A turned out to be less of a wonder than had been envisioned and the costs were so high that the Air Force could buy many fewer than they had planned. They would have liked to have bought more C-141's, but that option was gone. Lockheed also realized that a commercial C-141 would have sold well, while their attempts to build commercial C-5A's were a complete failure.


Running C-5 & C-130 production concurrently didn't leave much room for storing C-141 tooling in place so it would have had to have been disassembled enough to move outside for storage. That's a lot more expensive than storing in place on the shop floor and means more work refurbishing if the tooling is ever put back into use. C-141 received FAA certification as L-300 and was pitched to airlines but nobody bit.


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## jetcal1 (Oct 3, 2019)

BobB said:


> Running C-5 & C-130 production concurrently didn't leave much room for storing C-141 tooling in place so it would have had to have been disassembled enough to move outside for storage. That's a lot more expensive than storing in place on the shop floor and means more work refurbishing if the tooling is ever put back into use. C-141 received FAA certification as L-300 and was pitched to airlines but nobody bit.


I remember going by the Lockheed Marietta plant in the late 80's and being aghast at the condition of the tooling that was being "stored" outdoors.


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## fubar57 (Oct 3, 2019)

https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/boeing-737-1.5307170


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## FLYBOYJ (Oct 3, 2019)

jetcal1 said:


> I remember going by the Lockheed Marietta plant in the late 80's and being aghast at the condition of the tooling that was being "stored" outdoors.


That's common - I worked for Lockheed in Burbank and that was done all the time for superseded and obsolete tooling. Also consider some tooling belongs to the government and the contractor may be directed to store it in such a manner.

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## davparlr (Oct 3, 2019)

BobB said:


> Running C-5 & C-130 production concurrently didn't leave much room for storing C-141 tooling in place so it would have had to have been disassembled enough to move outside for storage. That's a lot more expensive than storing in place on the shop floor and means more work refurbishing if the tooling is ever put back into use. C-141 received FAA certification as L-300 and was pitched to airlines but nobody bit.


When I was flying the line in the early 70s, it seemed like we were flying aircraft parts all over the world to support static display C-5s. It quickly picked up the name "Queer Albert", please excuse the language but that is what it was called. I'll let you figure that out (hint, the C-5 could lower the fuselage to assist loading/unloading). Anyway, the AF came around looking for pilots to transfer the the C-5 program. Given the fact that 30 day TDY (temporary duty) rules was waived for C-5 crews, I don't know anyone who bit into that.

The C-141 was a work horse from the beginning. Sometimes it was hard to get off home base due to complexity of equipment, but once the gear was up it was very reliable and, typically, it would flawlessly bring you home (although more good C-141s broke in Athens than any other place. Conversely, More bad C-141s took off from Incerlik, Turkey than any other place!) Complexity include radios, 2 UHF, 2 VHF, 2 HF, nav equipment, 2 VOR, 2 TACAN, 2 ADF, Loran, Doppler radar for ground speed and drift, Doppler nav computer, dead reckoning computer, weather/nav radar, autopilot, flight director computer, yaw dampener for Dutch Roll, and others. Needless to say, we had loads of communications and navigation equipment which is great for flying all over the world. Loved the drift indicator on approaches.


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## jetcal1 (Oct 3, 2019)

FLYBOYJ said:


> That's common - I worked for Lockheed in Burbank and that was done all the time for superseded and obsolete tooling. Also consider some tooling belongs to the government and the contractor may be directed to store it in such a manner.


Some of the on base "junkyards" weren't much different. (We found a F-106 nose wheel/tire assembly at NAS Miramar.)


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## MIflyer (Oct 4, 2019)

Attached is a NYT article I just received, written by a well known pilot, son of an even better known pilot.



.


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## XBe02Drvr (Oct 4, 2019)

MIflyer said:


> Attached is a NYT article I just received, written by a well known pilot, son of an even better known pilot.


Well, he doesn't seem to be obsessed with political correctness, does he? I guess as long as Boeing's around, stick and rudder will still be stick and rudder and the third world will continue to be.


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## MIflyer (Oct 4, 2019)

"Well, he doesn't seem to be obsessed with political correctness, does he?"I

Clearly he does not meet the established standards of the NYT!

We have a lot of those Third World Guys training at our airfield. I fly as soon after sunrise as possible, so I can avoid them.


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## XBe02Drvr (Oct 4, 2019)

MIflyer said:


> We have a lot of those Third World Guys training at our airfield. I fly as soon after sunrise as possible, so I can avoid them.


I used to hate flying into KHPN, Westchester County, just outside NYC. The pattern was full of 3rd world students in Cherokees dodging between the airliners and corporate jets; sky blind, unintelligible on the radio, and arrogant about right of way conflicts. Many were the offspring of UN diplomatic personnel, and held a rather aristocratic view of their station in life.
Cheers,
Wes


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## michael rauls (Oct 4, 2019)

MIflyer said:


> True! The "this stuff is just like computers and we can manage it the same way" approach, has, shall we say, its drawbacks.
> 
> I think one problem we have in many fields is the rise of management as a profession in its own right. Studying,management is worthwhile. Studying nothing but management and thinking you can manage anything is a big mistake.
> 
> ...


This is a huge problem at my place of employment. Most of the supervisors are fresh out of college and have never actually worked in the trucking industry. The ensuing and unescasery meltdowns are often quite spectacular.

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## MIflyer (Oct 21, 2019)

The FAA has asked Boeing to explain instant messages between two Boeing employees regarding concerns with the original certification of the 737 MAX that the company turned over to the Department of Transportation on Thursday. According to the FAA, Boeing discovered the communication several months ago. The messages were sent in 2016.


“The FAA finds the substance of the document concerning,” the agency said in a statement. “The FAA is also disappointed that Boeing did not bring this document to our attention immediately upon its discovery. The FAA is reviewing this information to determine what action is appropriate.”


It has been reported that the messages referred to a problem with an automated system on the MAX that made it difficult to control. FAA Administrator Steve Dickson sent a letter to Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg asking for an immediate explanation for the contents of the document and Boeing’s delay in bringing it to the FAA. Boeing issued a statement on Friday saying it originally provided the document to “the appropriate investigating authority” earlier this year. The FAA says it has shared the document with relevant congressional committees. The 737 MAX has been grounded since March following the fatal crashes of Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302.

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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Oct 21, 2019)

The pilot in question was talking about the simulator, and he thought the sim was having simulator issues.

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## XBe02Drvr (Oct 21, 2019)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> The pilot in question was talking about the simulator, and he thought the sim was having simulator issues.


As I read it, it seemed the question was: "Is the simulator behavior in fact an accurate depiction of the aircraft's actual inflight behavior, and if so, is this acceptable?" (doubtful??) Smells like gun smoke to me.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Oct 21, 2019)

XBe02Drvr said:


> As I read it, it seemed the question was: "Is the simulator behavior in fact an accurate depiction of the aircraft's actual inflight behavior, and if so, is this acceptable?" (doubtful??) Smells like gun smoke to me.



From my understanding the sim was having issues and he initially determined the sim had glitches and was told it was being repaired.


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## XBe02Drvr (Oct 21, 2019)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> From my understanding the sim was having issues and he initially determined the sim had glitches and was told it was being repaired.


Any self-respecting simulator *should* develop "glitches" if somebody tries to program something as outlandish as MCAS into it!

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## MIflyer (Oct 21, 2019)

I guess you are referring to this:

_In the November 2016, message exchange, 737 chief test pilot Mark Forkner — Boeing describes him as a "former employee" — writes that MCAS is "running rampant in the sim on me," a reference to a flight simulator in which it was being tested at the time. "I am levelling off at like 4000 feet, 230 knots and the plane is trimming itself like crazy. I'm like, WHAT?" he said.

He quipped, "granted, I suck at flying, but even this was egregious."_

Forkner said he "basically lied to the regulators (unknowingly)" based on the simulator experience though the co-worker is quick to counter, "it wasn't a lie, no one told us that was the case."


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## PWR4360-59B (Oct 23, 2019)

The older planes were not over loaded with electronic flight control systems. And usually had cables connecting the pilots controls to the control surfaces. Not having redundant mechanical back up systems is where all aircraft manufactures went wrong.


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## XBe02Drvr (Oct 23, 2019)

PWR4360-59B said:


> Not having redundant mechanical back up systems is where all aircraft manufactures went wrong.


In this day of mass production of supercheap microchips, electronic solutions are actually cheaper than aircraft grade mechanical ones. Fuel economy comes at the cost of negative stable airframes that rely on computer driven active "stability" to maintain an artificial "equilibrium". Next time you're watching a video of F18s hitting the boat in rough seas, notice the rate at which the stabilators are flipping up and down, and even going cross control. You don't actually think the pilot is doing all that, do you? Any good ball flyer aims for "steaddy...steaddy...nice an' steaddy". The FBW makes all the tiny corrections before the pilot detects a deviation.
Cheers,
Wes

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## nuuumannn (Oct 24, 2019)

I'm reading all this with considerable interest and it is talk that pops up in our crew room at work, but from a basic look from outside the company, it appears that the venerable 737 design has been stretched to its limit and its time to consider a clean sheet aircraft. Rumour has it that the new mid-range aircraft Boeing are umm-ing and ahh-ing about might be based on a warmed over 767? Boeing, let the engineers do their jobs and start from scratch on an entirely new airframe. Boeing does entirely new stuff really well - the firm has a history of it.


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## Dash119 (Jun 15, 2020)

MIflyer said:


> In the case of the M-16 the problem was that the Army invented a requirement for a higher muzzle velocity - essentially out of thin air. Remember that the AR-15 was a USAF innovation and the Army felt that McNamera had jammed it down their throat. It Just So Happened that muzzle velocity requirement meant that the powder had to be bought from Olin, the Army's long time supplier, rather than the nitrocellulose propellant that the gun was designed to use. The higher muzzle velocity meant the M-16 fired a a much higher cyclic rate, beyond what it had been designed to handle. The Army-specified powder also was much dirtier than the original nitrocellulose. The excessive cyclic rate and dirtier powder led to jamming.



The Army changed several of the specifications for the AR-15 primarily because it was it was designed outside the normal in-house procurement chain. It was the first infantry weapon to be developed completely out of the purview of the U.S. Army Ordinance Corp. In addition to the powder change and attendant cyclic rate increase, the rifling was changed. All of these changes to the very reliable AR-15 led to the less than reliable M-16A1.

The AR-15 was not a USAF innovation, but was developed independently by Eugene Stoner of the ArmaLite Corporation. He demonstrated the AR-15 to Curtis LeMay, a hunting and firearms enthusiast. at a private non-military gathering. LeMay was so impressed he ordered the AR-15 for SAC's Security Forces. A demonstration of his authority as head of SAC to be able to purchase such a weapon outside the normal procurement chain. Within the U.S. Army, some members of the Special Forces also carried the AR-15 as was their choice.

So while I am willing to lay some of the blame for the poor performance of the M-16A1 at the feet of the Colt Firearms Corporation, who produced the weapon under a license from ArmaLite. In my humble opinion, the real culprit behind the failure of the M16A1 was the U.S. Army Ordinance Corp and it's inability to just get past "Not Invented Here".

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## BobB (Dec 13, 2020)

jetcal1 said:


> I remember going by the Lockheed Marietta plant in the late 80's and being aghast at the condition of the tooling that was being "stored" outdoors.


It turned out that storing the C-130 "plaster masters" outside in Georgia didn't work out as well as in southern California.


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## WARSPITER (Dec 13, 2020)

MIflyer said:


> True! The "this stuff is just like computers and we can manage it the same way" approach, has, shall we say, its drawbacks.
> 
> I think one problem we have in many fields is the rise of management as a profession in its own right. Studying,management is worthwhile. Studying nothing but management and thinking you can manage anything is a big mistake.
> 
> ...




Bingo!!

I contract to various businesses and see this change all the time. When I go to a business with a manager who has years of experience it is easy if there is a problem.
We solve it. When I go to businesses who hire people to manage in their early twenties because they have completed a bachelor of business degree it is more a case
of them telling me why it is not their problem. One even said she was going to call head office to complain because I went in to ask to see the store room (as instructed)
just to inventory what was there - why complain - because it was inappropriate for me to ask her ?? In other words I am the manager so I don't .... something ??

One unfortunate example of sales/marketing managers getting control of product line policy (deadly) was Hewlett Packard. From years in computing HP (high price) was
always amongst the best. Yes, not cheap but definitely a case of getting what you paid for. Computers and printers were solid stuff that was also kept up to date.

In the early 2000's the dark side crept in - to keep the share price up was easy - downsize - lose many of these expensive time wasters such as the R & D people. Thousands
of experienced workers were cast off. This improved the bottomline and allowed the marketers to do more advertising. Cheaper production meant more sales so it
all looked good to share holders and resulted in higher salaries for the marketers. Excellent. 

The problem was they went for the blind of market share. Get a higher share and you have more customers thus squashing the opposition. Unfortunately those customers
started finding other stuff that worked for less and higher end customers started finding better stuff that cost more but kept working. In other words the marketers had 
put HP into what the computer industry calls the race to the bottom. The only thing that matters in that case is that you are the cheapest. Going cheaper requires certain
obvious trade offs and as soon as someone else goes cheaper you are basically in trouble. I remember computers that retailed for $1500 having a build price then of 
$1470. A $30 gross profit. To share holders it still looks good as revenue of X billion dollars looks pretty good. Trouble is revenue ain't profit.

HP have since gone back to more sane practices but the damage is taking a long time to sort. many engineers etc will work for less at other companies with a different
mindset because they want long term job security plus somewhere that lets them achieve.

I don't know if there is something of this problem with Boeing but I hope whatever it is can be sorted. I have always found the story of the insistence of what went into
the 747 (safety/ backup systems etc) to be a good starting point for anyone wanting to know how to give themselves a good start with product development.

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## MIflyer (Dec 13, 2020)

WARSPITER said:


> One unfortunate example of sales/marketing managers getting control of product line policy



And the odd thing was, that HP then had TERRIBLE product support! They literally did not have a phone number you call all unless you wanted to pay for that privilege. Sales and marketing might have been in charge, but they were avoiding the whole job.

At work we had a HP color laserprinter and when the toner cartridges got down to about 30%they started leaking all over everything. I wanted so much to call them and say "Pardon me, but WTF?" but there was no way to do that.


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## WARSPITER (Dec 13, 2020)

Bingo again.... shame really.


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## jetcal1 (Dec 13, 2020)

BobB said:


> It turned out that storing the C-130 "plaster masters" outside in Georgia didn't work out as well as in southern California.



Based on the size? I'd guess it was for C-141. I was just amazed there was zero effort made for preservation or corrosion control.


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## MIflyer (Dec 13, 2020)

jetcal1 said:


> Based on the size? I'd guess it was for C-141. I was just amazed there was zero effort made for preservation or corrosion control.



The 141 tooling was USAF property, and they told Lockheed they did not want to pay to have it stored safely. Lockheed even proposed a bomber version of the C-141 to try to keep the line open. Several years later, when the C-5A was found to be too expensive and too complex to be the "everything" airlifter, the Air Force was wishing it could have bought some more 141's.

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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 13, 2020)

MIflyer said:


> The 141 tooling was USAF property, and they told Lockheed they did not want to pay to have it stored safely. Lockheed even proposed a bomber version of the C-141 to try to keep the line open. Several years later, when the C-5A was found to be too expensive and too complex to be the "everything" airlifter, the Air Force was wishing it could have bought some more 141's.



Thats a common theme with all military aircraft lines...


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## BobB (Dec 17, 2020)

jetcal1 said:


> Based on the size? I'd guess it was for C-141. I was just amazed there was zero effort made for preservation or corrosion control.


Think of what happens to plaster when left outside in the rain. The masters were ruined so there was no way to check whether the tooling still matched the plaster masters. The C-130 nose section tooling was suspected of having been damaged during shipment from California to Georgia because there were problems with parts not fitting well. All the tooling is government owned so if they don't fund preservation, there isn't any. Even if the space isn't needed for something else, Lockheed can't store old tooling inside a building unless it pays rent for the space (Marietta is Air Force Plant 6 and once an area in a building is vacated and roped off as deactivated, the AF stops charging rent on the space). When there is a need for some old tooling and it is found to still exist it is often because it was "abandoned in place" by the govt and Lockheed just shoved it outside because there was no budget to scrap it, preserve it or anything else. Someone who had worked in Tooling at the start of C-5B production said they had to spray threaded adjusters with Kroil then soak rags in Kroil and wrap them around the threaded joints so they would soak for days with the Kroil penetrating and they would finally manage to break them loose. In the late 1980's there might have been some forgotten C-141 tooling still outside but most of that had been scrapped. There also could have been C-130 tooling as there was extra tooling left over from the high production rates of the 1960's. Some of that was stored inside. The govt does try to decide what tooling is likely to be needed for future spares and preserve it. Selected C-5 tooling was sent to Davis-Monthan so it could be stored outside without preservation. There was no budget to catalog where it was stored so when a tool is needed for spares someone has to walk around until they find it.

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## FLYBOYJ (Dec 17, 2020)

BobB said:


> The C-130 nose section tooling was suspected of having been damaged during shipment from California to Georgia because there were problems with parts not fitting well.


I worked for CALAC (1980-1990) when did this occur? Early in the program?


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## jetcal1 (Dec 18, 2020)

BobB said:


> Think of what happens to plaster when left outside in the rain. The masters were ruined so there was no way to check whether the tooling still matched the plaster masters. The C-130 nose section tooling was suspected of having been damaged during shipment from California to Georgia because there were problems with parts not fitting well. All the tooling is government owned so if they don't fund preservation, there isn't any. Even if the space isn't needed for something else, Lockheed can't store old tooling inside a building unless it pays rent for the space (Marietta is Air Force Plant 6 and once an area in a building is vacated and roped off as deactivated, the AF stops charging rent on the space). When there is a need for some old tooling and it is found to still exist it is often because it was "abandoned in place" by the govt and Lockheed just shoved it outside because there was no budget to scrap it, preserve it or anything else. Someone who had worked in Tooling at the start of C-5B production said they had to spray threaded adjusters with Kroil then soak rags in Kroil and wrap them around the threaded joints so they would soak for days with the Kroil penetrating and they would finally manage to break them loose. In the late 1980's there might have been some forgotten C-141 tooling still outside but most of that had been scrapped. There also could have been C-130 tooling as there was extra tooling left over from the high production rates of the 1960's. Some of that was stored inside. The govt does try to decide what tooling is likely to be needed for future spares and preserve it. Selected C-5 tooling was sent to Davis-Monthan so it could be stored outside without preservation. There was no budget to catalog where it was stored so when a tool is needed for spares someone has to walk around until they find it.



Not surprised at all. DoD in general and the accountants in particular are not incredibly efficient in regards to tooling. (I'd been victimized by the Granite City navy facility that controlled tooling more than once.)


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## BobB (Jan 16, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> I worked for CALAC (1980-1990) when did this occur? Early in the program?


First C-130 was built in Burbank, then tooling was shipped via the Panama Canal to Savannah, Georgia and on to Marietta about 1954. Old timers said that people complained for years about parts on the nose section not fitting properly and suggested that the tooling may have been damaged in shipment but management insisted that there was no problem. When management finally agreed to have the tooling checked, the plaster masters had all deteriorated from outside storage so there was nothing to check the tooling against. Within the past twenty years, the area around the crew entry door was scanned so that an accurate 3D CAD model could be constructed and the area redesigned to eliminate fit problems. If you ever worked C-130's and thought the crew entry door emergency jettison was Mickey Mouse, the story was that the flight crew said they wouldn't fly without an emergency exit and the door jettison system was designed "overnight" so they could get first flight done.

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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 16, 2021)

BobB said:


> First C-130 was built in Burbank, then tooling was shipped via the Panama Canal to Savannah, Georgia and on to Marietta about 1954. Old timers said that people complained for years about parts on the nose section not fitting properly and suggested that the tooling may have been damaged in shipment but management insisted that there was no problem. When management finally agreed to have the tooling checked, the plaster masters had all deteriorated from outside storage so there was nothing to check the tooling against. Within the past twenty years, the area around the crew entry door was scanned so that an accurate 3D CAD model could be constructed and the area redesigned to eliminate fit problems. If you ever worked C-130's and thought the crew entry door emergency jettison was Mickey Mouse, the story was that the flight crew said they wouldn't fly without an emergency exit and the door jettison system was designed "overnight" so they could get first flight done.


Great info and sounds like like something that would have happened during that period. I was a supplier QA rep on the P-3 and we had tooling issues later in the program after the production of the aircraft was moved from Burbank to Palmdale and a whole bunch of senior people retired. We were building P-3s for the Australians and they were pointing out fit issues at the bomb bay doors and between the elevators and horizontal stabilizers. Turned out several form blocks for structural components were made against outer mold lines in lieu of inner mold lines on tooling drawings and those assembling these components were hand fitting them to make them work. I was in a meeting with tool designers and inspectors who actually made these items and it was almost comical watching them argue with each other on errors that were made 20 years earlier.

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## BobB (Jan 17, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Great info and sounds like like something that would have happened during that period. I was a supplier QA rep on the P-3 and we had tooling issues later in the program after the production of the aircraft was moved from Burbank to Palmdale and a whole bunch of senior people retired. We were building P-3s for the Australians and they were pointing out fit issues at the bomb bay doors and between the elevators and horizontal stabilizers. Turned out several form blocks for structural components were made against outer mold lines in lieu of inner mold lines on tooling drawings and those assembling these components were hand fitting them to make them work. I was in a meeting with tool designers and inspectors who actually made these items and it was almost comical watching them argue with each other on errors that were made 20 years earlier.


You might be amused to hear that when the P-3 tooling was moved to Marietta, management decided that it all needed to be repainted in a different color. There were all sorts of handwritten notes on the tooling about how to make things work and they all got painted over. But it looked really good with the new paint.

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## MiTasol (Jan 17, 2021)

WARSPITER said:


> Bingo!!
> 
> I contract to various businesses and see this change all the time. When I go to a business with a manager who has years of experience it is easy if there is a problem.
> We solve it. When I go to businesses who hire people to manage in their early twenties because they have completed a bachelor of business degree it is more a case
> ...



The other thing that is involved in the above story is that the bean counters were heavily involved and the same problem occurs in some airlines. Thirty odd years ago during the 737 hush kit project one airlines data assessors ordered turbine blades part number x which cost several hundred dollars each. The bean counters found that they could get part number y blades for about 1/10 of that price and so ordered them and had them identified as hush kit turbine blades in such a manner that the engine shop did not realize that they had been provided with bogus parts.
Two or three catastrophic in-flight engine failures caused a rapid investigation and all the modified engines to be grounded until redone with the correct parts. Multiple aircraft grounded through lack of engines and massive loss of customer confidence etc due to all the cancelled flights. And many millions in destroyed engines and doing the job again but properly.
Another airline has multiple incidents, including a 747 running out of runway because the bean counters prohibited the use of thrust reverse and certain brake settings, in order to significantly reduce operating costs. No risk analysis was done. Same when they changed to a new lighter life raft on their 737's in such a way as to result in the crew not being able to tell if a raft was fitted. That was discovered when a Captain who was meticulous opened the stowage to check instead of looking through the peep hole before an international over-water flight. The yellow that the previous crews had seen was the insulation batts above the empty container, not a raft. Again no risk analysis.

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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 17, 2021)

BobB said:


> You might be amused to hear that when the P-3 tooling was moved to Marietta, management decided that it all needed to be repainted in a different color. There were all sorts of handwritten notes on the tooling about how to make things work and they all got painted over. But it looked really good with the new paint.



OMG!!! Too Funny! I remember they couldn't get the nose radome to fit, and this occurred out of nowhere. For weeks they blamed the subcontractor (Canadair) but in the end it was discovered the guy who installed the radomes for 10 years just retired and he took his secrets with him.

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## special ed (Jan 18, 2021)

At our Kodak annual meeting 1973 was the time I saw the down turn in corporate health. As a flunky, of course there was little I could do, but my job. The bean counters took over and the instructions were "Make one more call a day and use less gas doing it". I was in field service of Kodak equipment and the national speed limit was 55mph. The corporate answer was smaller cars but we had the same parts, manuals and tools. I'm not sure what Kodak sells today.


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## FowellBox (Jan 18, 2021)

My only involvement with Boeing was on a joint British and Netherlands order to build parts for the Apache attack helicopters that were ordered for the MoD (Ministry of Defence).
We were inundated with Boeing engineers who just wanted to inspect the girly calendars on the workshop walls, apparently not allowed in the US of A.
We were to make the left and right air intakes and were supplied with previously used moulded patterns, the drawings and a pair of intakes from store.
Absolutely nothing matched the drawings so we were instructed to use the pair from stores as they were known to fit. Not only weren't they to drawing but they didn't match each other, given that they were opposite hands.
We eventually managed to make them, not just for the UK & Netherlands order but also as spares for US forces.
Brian


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## special ed (Jan 18, 2021)

In the mid 80s Kodak introduced a family of blood analysers (and a color copier) in an effort to save the company, I suppose. The blood analyser had extremely small orifices which needed to be kept clean with very fine drill bits. Similar to todays plastic modelling tools. The smallest was finer than a cats whisker, so when the units were introduced to Europe through Germany, some drill bits were sent along "just in case they not available there." We had a picture on the wall of the classroom of a rod with two holes drilled through it. We were told this was the response. They sent back the finest bit with instructions to check it with a microscope.


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## jetcal1 (Jan 18, 2021)

BobB said:


> You might be amused to hear that when the P-3 tooling was moved to Marietta, management decided that it all needed to be repainted in a different color. There were all sorts of handwritten notes on the tooling about how to make things work and they all got painted over. But it looked really good with the new paint.


Par for the course!


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## jetcal1 (Jan 18, 2021)

FLYBOYJ said:


> OMG!!! Too Funny! I remember they couldn't get the nose radome to fit, and this occurred out of nowhere. For weeks they blamed the subcontractor (Canadair) but in the end it was discovered the guy who installed the radomes for 10 years just retired and he took his secrets with him.


Fred Factor


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