# Gneisenau and Scharnhorst in the Mediterranean?



## Lucky13 (Mar 20, 2014)

What would have happened had Gneisenau and Scharnhorst sailed into the Mediterranean and joined the Italian Fleet in early '41?


----------



## vikingBerserker (Mar 20, 2014)

I think if you add the Graf Zepplin it would have been a very potent force.


----------



## GrauGeist (Mar 20, 2014)

Comiso started a great discussion about the Germans assaulting Gibraltar and there were some great scenarios tossed out there including the DKM Capitol ships moving into the Med...

Just to make it interesting, I even tossed in the "what if" of Imperial Japanese Naval assets joining up.

Anyway, it was a good thread:
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww2-general/german-gibraltar-20392.html


----------



## fastmongrel (Mar 20, 2014)

I think the 9.2" batteries on Gibraltar would have had some fun target practice as they passed. The Strait is only 14 miles wide iirc which is not much more than point blank range for a 9.2". Even at full speed the Twins are going to be in range for up to an hour and I believe Gib had radar by then and would know they were coming. Dont think the radar could do gun control but it certainly could give some ranges. Even at night there were starshell guns that would nicely illuminate the target. A 380 pound 9.2" AP round wont sink the Twins unless there is a miracle shot but expect the superstructures to resemble a scrapyard by the time they are past the danger zone.


----------



## Wavelength (Mar 20, 2014)

They would certainly make the run at night under cover of smoke. The British only had a handfull of prototype 50cm radar sets at that time and these were on the first KGV class battleships.


----------



## davebender (Mar 20, 2014)

Control of Central Mediterranean was determined by air superiority or lack thereof. Battleships were simply targets for land based bombers.

Aegean might be an exception to the rule as Germany had air superiority in that region right up to 1944. Presence of two German dreadnoughts operating under that air umbrella might have forestalled Fall 1943 British invasion attempt before it got started.


----------



## GrauGeist (Mar 20, 2014)

If they were to make a successful pass under Gibraltar's guns, a concerted air attack to keep their heads down would help (perhaps a mix of medium bombers and Stukas). Possible direct hits on the emplacements would probably do little damage to the guns themselves, but the bombs would raise alot of direct dust/smoke as well as do damage to lesser reinforced positions.


----------



## redcoat (Mar 20, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> If they were to make a successful pass under Gibraltar's guns, a concerted air attack to keep their heads down would help (perhaps a mix of medium bombers and Stukas). Possible direct hits on the emplacements would probably do little damage to the guns themselves, but the bombs would raise alot of direct dust/smoke as well as do damage to lesser reinforced positions.


And just where would these bombers fly from ?????


----------



## redcoat (Mar 20, 2014)

vikingBerserker said:


> I think if you add the Graf Zepplin it would have been a very potent force.


What would have been the point of taking an uncompleted carrier ?????


----------



## vikingBerserker (Mar 20, 2014)

Bombers from Italy made it several times, since we are doing a what-if it could not be a stretch for the carrier to have been finished.


----------



## redcoat (Mar 20, 2014)

vikingBerserker said:


> Bombers from Italy made it several times,


 With very small bomb loads, and there was no way Stuka's would have the range.


> since we are doing a what-if it could not be a stretch for the carrier to have been finished.


Yes it would be. The German's had never built or operated a carrier before, it would have taken a considerable time for it to become operational even after it had been completed


----------



## vikingBerserker (Mar 20, 2014)

Actually the air crew was for the most part already trained.


----------



## parsifal (Mar 20, 2014)

getting through would have been a sheer lucky dip. Difficult to see it being successful if the British had a carrier and some search aircraft available. Its hard to see this developing much more differently than Bismarks efforts. If we assume it might follow the BCs run into the Atlantic, so this deserves some investigation

The two ships aborted the operation in December 1940, but finally sailed from Kiel on 22 January 1941. They were spotted en route through the Great Belt and the British Admiralty was informed. Admiral Sir John Tovey sailed with a strong force (three battleships, eight cruisers and 11 destroyers), hoping to intercept the German ships in the Iceland—Faroe Islands Passage. Instead, Lütjens took his flotilla through the Denmark Strait into the Atlantic, where they were positioned to intercept convoys between Canada and Britain.

Convoy HX-106 was intercepted, but the attack was aborted when the escorting battleship HMS Ramillies was spotted. Lütjens had orders to avoid action with enemy capital ships. Fortunately for the Germans, the British failed to make an accurate identification.

After refuelling, the German ships missed convoy HX-111, but happened upon an empty convoy returning to the U.S. Over 12 hours, five ships were sunk but the attack was reported. The squadron moved south to the Azores to intercept the convoy route between West Africa and Britain.

A convoy was sighted but, once again, was not attacked due to the presence of the old battleship HMS Malaya. Instead, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau shadowed it, acting to guide in U-boat attacks.

The two ships moved back to the western Atlantic, sinking a solitary freighter en route. Two unescorted convoys were attacked and 16 ships were sunk or captured. One of these ships—Chilean Reefer—caused problems. It made smoke, radioed an accurate position and actually returned Gneisenau's fire with its small deck gun. Lütjens was uncertain of the freighter's capabilities, withdrew and destroyed it from a safe distance. During this action, HMS Rodney appeared, possibly in response to the radio calls. The German ships bluffed their way to safety while Rodney picked up survivors.

The German ships were ordered back to Brest. They met air and sea escorts on 21 March and docked the next day.


Now assuming that instead of being ordered to Brest, they were instead ordered to try and break into the Med, what sort of forces might they be ranged against 

At this time Force H was generally built around the single carrier Ark Royal, though others were available from time to time. There were generally one or two Battlecruisers (reducing to one after loss of the Hood), and 3 to 4 of the slow battleships. There was either one or two squadrons of LR search aircraft either Sunderlands or Wellingtons I think. There usually about 6-8 cruisers and at least 12 DDs and a whole gaggle of supplort warships. Dover this was not, so there was a high state of readiness and a long approach for the Germans. It is very 

Even if we assume no SIGINT intell, it is very difficult to conceive that the two BCs could approach undetected. If they could not approach undeteted, they risk a full retalitory strike by the RN, including airstrikes from the Ark Royal, which we know were a very capable air gp, and quite capable of hitting the BCs even at night or in poor weather, as the strikes on Bismark attest to. If the BCs are first hit by the 40 or so strike aircraft of the Ark Royal, then engaged by the cruisers and BCS, and then finally by the 3 or four ships of the slow division, I dont give themn much hope of evading or defeating the British.

In a word its a suicide mission.

Beyond that the approaches to Gibraltor on both sides were mined, whilst i was possible for U-bats to pass through, surface warships is a different matter. And of course finally we have the shore batteries that will need to be engaged at short range by the German ships. This is Oscarborg allover again.


----------



## Njaco (Mar 20, 2014)

Lucky13 said:


> What would have happened had Gneisenau and Scharnhorst sailed into the Mediterranean and joined the Italian Fleet in early '41?



Early '41 would have Bismark and Prinz Eugen breaking out into the Atlantic so I don't know why they would even try the Med. If anything, head out into the Atlantic to meet up with Bis and PE and maybe with Hipper become the greatest commerce raiding flotilla ever assembled!

Just my 2 cents.


----------



## Lucky13 (Mar 20, 2014)

Here we use Pence and Pounds mate!

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## tomo pauk (Mar 21, 2014)

Attempt to run the gauntlet vs. Gibraltar would be a suicide mission. Even if the gamble paid off, the twins would be fair game for air power and submarines. And RN wouldn't hessitate for an old fashioned slugging match, in case Germans are interested.
Interestingly enough, the twins are still referred some time as battlecruisers


----------



## fastmongrel (Mar 21, 2014)

Breakneck Battery Gibraltar 1942


----------



## Milosh (Mar 21, 2014)

I will throw in the Channel Dash which was successful. There was mighty big guns at Dover.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## parsifal (Mar 21, 2014)

Milosh said:


> I will throw in the Channel Dash which was successful. There was mighty big guns at Dover.



Thats true, but in the channel the Germans had an opportunity to keep certain areas of the sea passage open and free of mines. They basically knew what parts of the channel they could navigate in. 

Off Gibraltar, it was a declared mine zone with only specific and narrow pathways remaining open only to (friendly) military traffic. The straits were closed to mercantile, neutral and enemy shipping.

This makes it much harder for enemy warships to negotiate the straits quickly, as they did in the channel dash. Not impossible, as Spain was awash with Axis spies and covert agents, but difficult.

There are basically two other ways these minefields might be tackled. First and most obvious, is simply to ignore them and pray to get lucky. Might work, might not. Would depend on luck, mine density current strength (cannot really lay mines where the current is too strong, and cannot lay mines in really deep water, if you dont want them drifting....however during the war mine techniques were developed considerably, such that a mine barrage was eventually laid in the deep water between the Faeroes Icelnad....and was nearly useless too i might add. OTOH, in the Pacific, American minelaying in the Formosan straits and in the channels near Balikpapaan were deadly to Japanese shipping).

The other way is to send in minesweepers and clear a path, which takes time, a lot of time, or, as a rather desperate expedient, send in light ships, that you dont care if you lose, and follow the path they blaze with your valuable ships. This was basically what the Germans did in the channel dash, trouble was, they broke off this close escort stuff too early and either one, or both the Battlecruisers eventually hit mines, off the coast of Holland I believe. The channel dash was not all the beer and skittles it was made out to be post war. 

The other thing is that in the channel, the Search system broke down completely. It didnt in the Atlantic, when Bismark broke out. Once there was a German heavy unit, the British search systems swung into action. There were some anxious moments with bismarck, but eventually she was run down. In the Gib scenario, the German ships have a long run in, in increasingly constricted waters. Chnaces of remaining undetected are basically zero.


----------



## vikingBerserker (Mar 21, 2014)

Could subs have cleared them? I know a few made it through there.


----------



## parsifal (Mar 21, 2014)

At the moment Im looking for evidence of what and how the Axis forced the straits. By far the most common method was by U-Boat, and perhaps 60 boats managed to enter the straits and perhaps 40 Italian boats transferred from the Med to the Atlantic Ports to take part in the Battle Of the Atlantic. So the Straits were somewhat porous to Axis traffic, of sorts, though I do remain very sceptical that getting a Battle squadron past Gib is the same as a U-Boat.

By October 1939, Dönitz had decided to use three Type IXs could be used to intercept the first Allied convoys of the war. U-25, U-26 and U-53 were to rendezvous southwest of Ireland before attempting to force the Straits and attack the convoys in the Mediterranean. Things began to go wrong from the outset when U-25 was diverted to a convoy southwest of Lisbon. After an unsuccessful torpedo attack on a steamer on 31 October, Schultze, U-25's commander, surfaced and proceeded to sink his target with fire from his deck gun. This course of action caused a crack in a vital part of the submarine, obliging the boat to return to Germany.

U-53 ran low on fuel after shadowing a convoy in the Bay of Biscay and was also forced to return.

This only left U-26, which compelled by a combination of unsuitable weather, searchlights and British anti-submarine patrols, abandoned any attempt at laying mines before Gibraltar harbour. The boat however did manage to sail through the Straits while on the surface and claimed but a solitary ship sunk in the Mediterranean. This 'sinking' was not confirmed by post-war analysis. She was one of the few boats to force the straits surfaced. 

U-26 headed back through the Straits, arriving in Wilhelshaven on 5 December 1939; the only U-boat to successfully enter and leave the Mediterrannean in World War II.

This mission was summed-up in the BdU Kriegstagebuch (KTB) War Diary thus:

_It was a mistake to send U-25, U-26 and U-53 into the Mediterranean. U-25 had to return before she ever got there, U-53 did not get through and U-26 hardly encountered any shipping worth mentioning. This patrol shows all the disadvantages of a long outward passage._

As an aside, more than half the attacks in the med by submarines from both sides were carried out surfaced. This was because of the lack of water depth more than anything, but also because many of the targets were so small as to be considered unworthy of a torpedo attack 

With regard to RAF assets, construction of a solid surface runway began in late 1939 and in 1940 the runway was extended to a length of 1,550 yards (1,417 m). The land reclamation commenced towards the end of 1941 along with the construction of an RAF camp at the "North Front", now RAF Gibraltar. 

At the beginning of 1940 the RAF dispatched their first squadron to Gibraltar in response to the "strong possibility of German submarines concentrating in the Strait of Gibraltar and using Spanish port facilities" (just a little late I guess). , loomed large in Admiralty thinking.On the 9th September 1939, No. 202 Squadron RAF was ordered to Gibraltar, loaded to the gunwales with equipment. This squadron started the war equipped with Saro Flying Boats, before coverting Sunderland and later (from the end of 1941) Catalina flying boats. They were credited with the sinking of 9 U-Boats, all but ntwo of which have been positively confirmed post wart. 

Later, On 25 September 1939, No 200 (Coastal) Group was formed as a subordinate formation to HQ RAF Mediterranean in control of No 202 Sqn. The Group's function was the control of Royal Air Force units operating from Gibraltar. In late 1940 the Group was transferred to Coastal Command. Later a combined HQ was formed which commenced operations in early 1942.

U-boat net has an interesting map showing the U-Boat losses in the vicinity of gib. It was considered a very dangerous place for U-boats by Doenitz's command. 

This link gives an interesting Italian perspective on the straits defences. I would say the italians were more successful thjan the Germans art dealing with the straits challenges as a generalization. 

Mussolini's War: Fascist Italy's Military Struggles from Africa and Western ... - Frank Joseph - Google Books

According to Milan N. Vego (Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas) the RN laid about 10000 mins in the waters around Gibraltor. 93 German U-boats attempted the passage into the med, of which 62 were successful, only one one boat ever attempted the escape from the med, and U-Boats are inherently safer in running the gauntlet of a minefiled. Roughly speaking, id say the German Battle squadron would have about a 50/50 chance of not hitting a mine in early 1941. 

Its difficult to pinpoint the exact strength of Force H, as its strength varied almost on a daily basis, moreover as the war progressed, and reliance on carriers increased, more and more the slower battleships were "left at the home port" so are often not included in the accounts of Force H operations. For example, during March, there were three slow battleships generally stationed at Gib, but neither in the operation before or after March 1941, are they mentioned. In a proposed forcing of the strait, however they of course need to be considered.

Convoy "Excess" in January 1941, lists available forces as 1 Carrier, 1 Battlecruiser, 4 cruisers and 14 destroyers. Operation "Substance" lists the forces committed as 1 carrier, 1 battleship, 1 Battlecruiser, 5 cruisers and 21 destroyers. From the middle of March to the middle of July 1 of the Battleships stationed at Gib included a Rodney Class BB.


----------



## fastmongrel (Mar 22, 2014)

If the RN gets enough advance warning they could simply place 2 old Battleships even a couple of Royal Sovereigns in the area and wait. The Twins were very tough but no one in there right mind would risk going up against a 15" shell at virtual point blank range.

It could be done but what a risk for what end. Maybe the Twins get as far as Taranto completely unscathed but you can guarantee they are now bottled up in the Med no way will they be able to do the same trick twice.


----------



## Glider (Mar 22, 2014)

How about a German Admiral given control of the Italian Fleet in the med. There was little wrong with the Italian ships or crews, it was the leadership that was lacking.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## DonL (Mar 22, 2014)

To me the whole scenario doesn't make sense or have any tactical or strategical advantages.

The RM was at the Mediterranean as an axis partner and objective it was a very strong Navy Force, but very halfhearted leaded.

Hitler wasn't at any time realy interested in a strategic war only against GB, with a focal point at the Mediterranean and a war at sea.
Such scenarios only could get in action if Germany didn't invade the SU and only focus at GB.
Then there would be the possibility to invade Malta and with pressure to Spain, Gibraltar fron the spanish side at 1941! Only if Germany and Italy realy focus agressive and with full force/heart on such a war at the Mediterranean/NA, with logistics and Oil two both fleets, air forces and troops, you can realy create pressure on GB and at such a scenario Gibraltar would be a good base for german heavy units for raiding the Atlantic.

Bismarck was hunted down through a lot of luck with this torpedo hit against her controls and to my opinion if the KM had realy had nuts, Tirpitz would be right on her side with Prinz Eugen and then the Rheinübung mission would be a total other game. Also Bismarck was send to this mission without a real functioning AA, through her different AA mountings, Tirpitz, Prinz Eugen, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau didn't have this problem.


----------



## vikingBerserker (Mar 22, 2014)

Very interesting about the AA mounts.


----------



## DonL (Mar 22, 2014)

vikingBerserker said:


> Very interesting about the AA mounts.



Germany 10.5 cm/65 (4.1") SK C/33

Bismarck had a mixture of C/31 and C/37
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had only C/31

Tirpitz and Prinz Eugen had only C/37

Navyweopons are quite incorect with their posting!
But they also incorrect with all of Nathan Okuns claims!


----------



## GrauGeist (Mar 22, 2014)

redcoat said:


> And just where would these bombers fly from ?????


If the Germans were allowed overflights of Spanish airspace, they could hit Gibraltar from southwest occupied France. The He111 and Ju88 had the range to make the round trip, Stukas on the otherhand, would not be able to.

Otherwise make arrangements with the Vichy government to perhaps stage raids from North Africa.

I'm sure that since this is a hypothetical scenario, we can look at possible alternatives to the known historical events/timeline.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## parsifal (Mar 22, 2014)

The possibility of German entry into Vichy North Africa except by overrunning Vichy " Case Anton" style is extremely remote. Historically Vichy viewed its territories in North Africa as its core power base after its defeat in June 1940. it retained the majority of its strength there and steadfastly refused all requests by both the Italians and the Germans to enter its territories. When the Axis did finally move to occupy French North Africa, those parts that could not be occupied quickly joined the allies. We can only expect the french fleet to scuttle itself, But British plans in the event of any action by the Axis in French North Africa were to assist by sending in approximately a Corps equivalent of troops. Coupled with the 12 divisions or so of Vichy troops, already stationed there, and the several hundred aircraft. In addition there was the equivalent of a further 10 divs or so in the colonies elsewhere, all of which would be delivered to the Allies free and gratus. A huge windfall for Britain in early 1941. It places the Axis position in North Africa at great risk 

The same basic situation applies to any significant movement of German troops into the unoccupied zone of metropolitan Vichy. Any such move would be unlikely to be resisted, but it would cause a wholesaler movement of aircraft and possibly even ships to the colonies. It would place enormous strains on the Germans logistically, and in early March 1941, would require the use of yet another mechanized group of the heer, virtually guranteeing a cancellation or still further delay of Barbarossa. If the occupation was attempted with unmotorised forces, the escape of the French fleet, retention of Corsica amd evacuation of large portions of the vichy Army to North Africa, as was planned, was virtually assured

Politically it would be suicide for the germans. Though they could justify intervention in November 1942, on the grounds of "protecting" vichy from further Allied incursions, such justification did not exist in March 1941. To a man, Germany's Allies would view this sort of treachery by the Germans against their friends for the duplicity that it was, and react accordingly. German diplomatic credibility would be totally wrecked if they did this, which is why Franco included the carve up of French colonies as a prerequisite for him entering the war. He knew that it was a price Germany could not realistically pay. 

German intervention of Vichy territory qwould come at a very heavy cost, for not much benefit.


----------



## DonL (Mar 22, 2014)

Nobody has refered to your explanation! My explanation was Vichy and Spain joinn the war on the axis side without any occupation, only cooperation. This is fiction but possible, with a more gifted leader then Hitler!


----------



## GrauGeist (Mar 22, 2014)

Well, the suggestion was the Vichy Government allowing the Germans access to an airfeild for a temporary staging base. There's always the possibility of "strings being pulled" here and there.

Either that or convincing Spain to allow overflights for the operation. Logistically it's not impossible, but the big stumbing block is the diplomatic end of it.


----------



## Njaco (Mar 23, 2014)

ummmm, someone mentioned the Graf Zeppelin being a part of this scenario - hence carrier-born Stukas might do it.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## parsifal (Mar 23, 2014)

now that is a far more realistic suggestion. A carrier battle between the Graf Zeppelin, and the Ark Royal....very interesting

Ark Royal has a nominal air group of 63 aircraft, Graf Zeppelin 38 (estimated). Neither carrier is likely to have a fully authorised CAG, so we should just run through a hypothetical, on the assumption that both have their authorised complements

The first element of the equation to consider is the likelihood of GZ being completed. Unlikely. it had been planned that she would be commissioned at the end of 1940, but in September 1940, a decision was made not to complete her. The Germans still had not solved the catapult problems they were having, neither did they really have an effective air torpedo as yet, though they could have utilised some of the excellent Italian torpedoes if they could swallow their pride to do so. 

On April 29 1940, Raeder recorded "the fuhrer is of the opinion that aircraft carriers with internal combustion engines will not be usable beyond this war". By May, all work had stopped on the carrier, and by June, the germans had already begun stripping the hull out to use such things as they could. However, German interst in her did oscillate, alot. In july all this backward movement was stopped, and the decision was taken, briefly to have her made rady for sea trials, less her cvatapults and aircraft handling equipment.

In my mind the most likley time that Germany may have changed its mind on might be after Taranto. But assuming the Germans were more appreciative of carrier warfare than they were, lets assume they moved to completion on the basis of the prewar arrangements, and not allow themselves to be deviated by doubt about the usage of this carrier. We need to assume also that the Germans could overcome some of the catapult difficulties and aircraft handling difficulties that they faced. GZ still would not realisitcally be able to launch a full deckload given of aircaft given the very limited endurance of her fighter component. With an authorised air component of 12 Me 109s and 26-28 Ju87Ts (Im assuming work on the Fi 167 torpedo carrier would be abandoned, it would not have been ready by March 1941 anyway), the Germans never assumed or planned on escorting their Ju87s to any meaningful extent. 

Assuming the Germans had gone to sea with the SH, GN and GZ in January, there is a high risk this force would suffer a fairly high attrition rate whilst at sea. There is of course some reasoning to say that the TG might position itself near Brest on its return, to receive replacement aircraft. A cruise into the Atlantic for the GZ might give the aircrews and maintenance teams a bit of a chance to work up properly, but it is unrealistic to think that these guys could be comparable to the British Carrier. Its a similar situation to what faced Nelson 140 years earlier. His crews had tirelssly trained and deployed for the whole duration, whilst the opposing Napoleonic fleet was completely green. British gunnery at trafalgar was deadly accurate in comparison, and about twice the ROF. In this latter day Trafalgar, British launch rates would easily be at least double, accident rates a fraction, range superior, ordinance superior, night capable crews, and crews trained to near perfection as far as accuracy was concerned. Witness their perfomance 2 months later over the bismarck. 

The Ark Royal had an actual air group of about 24 Swordfish and 12 Fulmars, though she frequently was carrying another 24 Hurricanes on her decks in Malta relief operations. When operating against the italian fleet in November, she had 12 Fulmars and 20. There were no losses in November and the carrier returned to Gibraltar for further training and receival of additional aircraft. Ive not been able to determine the types just at this stage. In early January the older carrier Eagle was detachewd to the South Atlantic and AR sent to attack Sardinia and Genoa. 24 Swordfish were available for that attack, dont know how many Fulmars. in february the British returned, using nearly 30 Swordfish in strikes again targeting Sardinian infrastructure. Against the bismarck in May, the AR flew off 10 aircraft for Search, retained 4 for ASW, and flew off 14 Swordfish against the great batleship. There were 14 Fulmars embarked as far as I am aware.

So the best estimate I could offer in a realistic scenario, the GZ CAG as follws......probably about 6 Me 109s, and maybe 18-20 Ju87s, versus 14 Fulmars and 30 Swordfish

Assuming the British are the aggressor group, the Germans would have to maintain standing patrols, they might have either 1 or two 109s available, depending on how lucky they were. They would have 2 refuelling and rearming, and 2 either just landing or l returning for lack of fuel. The biggest single strike the Brits had mounted to that point from a single carrier was 16 aircraft. If I were the British flight leader, I would split my Swordfish into four separate elements, wach attacking from one of the four compass points. There would be no escort....the british tended to rely on the cover of darkness to protect their atrike aircraft. The most likely time of attack would be either just before dawn, or just after dusk. Reduced visibility and the ability of the Swordfish to come in at wavetop height would make them a very hard targert for the German fighters, as was shown hgistorically on many occasions. If sea conditions are rough, the stringbags would be ducking in and out of wave cover all the time making it harder than expected for the emils to get a clear shot. There would no diving attacks at this altitude and the fighters are probably forced to operate at reduced speeds to conserve fuel. minimal advance warning because of the very low approach altitudes. a good chance of bagging a carrier in my opinion.

now for my opinion on the Ju87 attacks on the Ark. Allowing for searches, possibly 10 Ju87s available for attack. Would almost certainly need to attack in daylight,and at an approach altitude of about 10K. more time for the Fulmars to scramble. Illustrious had detected the attacking stukas there with about 20 minutes to spare, and with operatinal Fulmars, had managed to get 6 airborne. This was a surprise attack by the germans, and the 6 airborne fighters are believed to have shot down 5 of the attacking raiders, however air defence was generally disjointed and poor. About 30 stukas attacked the carrier and secured 6 hits or near misses. Extrapolating from their, one could expect 2 hits on the Ark Royal . Is that enough to destroy her? I am doubtful of that. Likely ordinance is a 500lb bomb for each Stuka, as the 1000 lbers reduce the range too much , and 2 500 lbs hits is not enough to sink a modern carrier.


----------



## vikingBerserker (Mar 23, 2014)

Not only during the day time, Carrier Stuka Gruppe I./186 actually received some training at night time attacks as well. They were supposed to do a night time attack at some major power plant in or around London which got canceled.


----------



## redcoat (Mar 23, 2014)

vikingBerserker said:


> Actually the air crew was for the most part already trained.


Really ! How many landings and take offs from a carrier had they completed ?


----------



## GrauGeist (Mar 23, 2014)

I would imagine that the Ar196s aboard the escort ships would be better for scouting duties ahead of the Graf Zepplin's task force, keeping the much needed fighters and strike aircraft aboard the carrier unless they wanted to keep a defensive umbrella in place.


----------



## redcoat (Mar 23, 2014)

fastmongrel said:


> If the RN gets enough advance warning they could simply place 2 old Battleships even a couple of Royal Sovereigns in the area and wait. The Twins were very tough but no one in there right mind would risk going up against a 15" shell at virtual point blank range..


The Twins had a standing order if they came across even an old R class RN battleship, it instructed them to "Run away"


----------



## redcoat (Mar 23, 2014)

Glider said:


> How about a German Admiral given control of the Italian Fleet in the med. There was little wrong with the Italian ships or crews, it was the leadership that was lacking.


Actually the main problem for the Italian fleet was fuel oil, the lack of which inhibited the conduct of operations throughout the time the fleet was operating with the Axis.


----------



## parsifal (Mar 23, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> I would imagine that the Ar196s aboard the escort ships would be better for scouting duties ahead of the Graf Zepplin's task force, keeping the much needed fighters and strike aircraft aboard the carrier unless they wanted to keep a defensive umbrella in place.



No doubt, but only really available in calm sea conditions. Carriers can operate in rougher conditions than seaplanes, because the seaplane needs to land on the ocean . You could apply similar logic to the British ships carrying seaplanes, or the seaplanes operating from Gib.


----------



## vikingBerserker (Mar 23, 2014)

redcoat said:


> Really ! How many landings and take offs from a carrier had they completed ?



The exact same number as numerous USN and Maine pilots shipped into combat during WW2, plus they had the added benefit being German naval aviators most (if not all) had extensive experience flying float planes based on ships. If you would like to learn more about their training I would recommend _United States Naval Institute Proceedings - Vol. 93, Nos. 1-3, Jan. - Mar., 1967_ article titled _Hitler's Flattop: The End of the Beginning_ of for a more current (and IMHO better source) _Memoirs Of A Stuka Pilot_ Helmut Mahlke who was actually in the Carrier Stuka Gruppe I./186.

You do understand we are talking theoretical, right?


----------



## fastmongrel (Mar 23, 2014)

vikingBerserker said:


> The exact same number as numerous USN and Maine pilots shipped into combat during WW2,



Dont mess with the Pine Tree Navy


----------



## Glider (Mar 23, 2014)

redcoat said:


> Actually the main problem for the Italian fleet was fuel oil, the lack of which inhibited the conduct of operations throughout the time the fleet was operating with the Axis.


They certainly had a shortage of fuel oil but they did fail to press home an advantage when they had one.



redcoat said:


> Really ! How many landings and take offs from a carrier had they completed ?


My thoughts exactly. USN and RN pilots had at least been trained for carriers and had to do a number of carrier landings before shipping to their combat units.


----------



## vikingBerserker (Mar 23, 2014)

Glider said:


> My thoughts exactly. USN and RN pilots had at least been trained for carriers and had to do a number of carrier landings before shipping to their combat units.




As odd and absolutely insane as it might be, that was not always the case with the USN and Marines and this has popped up at least 3 times in the past 2 months worth of books I've read. If you want the source let me know and I'll go dig it up.


----------



## parsifal (Mar 23, 2014)

who else, other than the FAA at this stage of the war, was capable of hitting a fast moving ship in the half light of twighlight in conditions of poor weather and rough seas. Id hazard a guess and claim....no-one...

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Glider (Mar 23, 2014)

vikingBerserker said:


> As odd and absolutely insane as it might be, that was not always the case with the USN and Marines and this has popped up at least 3 times in the past 2 months worth of books I've read. If you want the source let me know and I'll go dig it up.



I would appreciate that if possible, but its not desperately urgent. I thought the USN used a couple of conversions one was called the Wolverine but I cannot remember the other. There was a third ship that also helped as did (I think) the Ranger later on in the war


----------



## GrauGeist (Mar 23, 2014)

USS Wolverine (IX-64) and USS Sable (IX-81)

The Wolverine had a wooden (Douglas Fir) flight deck while Sable had a steel flight deck


----------



## vikingBerserker (Mar 23, 2014)

Glider said:


> I would appreciate that if possible, but its not desperately urgent. I thought the USN used a couple of conversions one was called the Wolverine but I cannot remember the other. There was a third ship that also helped as did (I think) the Ranger later on in the war



Certainly, more than happy to.


----------



## RCAFson (Mar 29, 2014)

parsifal said:


> now that is a far more realistic suggestion. A carrier battle between the Graf Zeppelin, and the Ark Royal....very interesting
> 
> Ark Royal has a nominal air group of 63 aircraft, Graf Zeppelin 38 (estimated). Neither carrier is likely to have a fully authorised CAG, so we should just run through a hypothetical, on the assumption that both have their authorised complements
> 
> ...



I think you may have confused Ark Royal with Illustrious. Ark Royal typically carried 54-60 aircraft:


> 1939-40 26 Fairey Swordfish, 24 Blackburn Skuas. 1940-41 30 Fairey Swordfish, 12 Blackburn Skuas, 12 Fairey Fulmars. 1941 36 Fairey Swordfish, 18 Fairey Fulmars.
> HMS Ark Royal aircraft carrier profile. Aircraft Carrier Database of the Fleet Air Arm Archive 1939-1945


Note that the Skua would have been a good counter to the Stuka, in terms of destroying Graf Zepplin's flight deck.

Another factor is that having S&G in the Med would have allowed the RN to concentrate more ships in the Med, since there would be less need for forces to cover breakouts into the Atlantic from Norway or France.


----------



## GrauGeist (Mar 29, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> Another factor is that having S&G in the Med would have allowed the RN to concentrate more ships in the Med, *since there would be less need for forces to cover breakouts into the Atlantic from Norway* or France.


The need would still be there, the Bismark and Tirpitz would still remain a real threat if allowed to get loose...


----------



## RCAFson (Mar 29, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> The need would still be there, the Bismark and Tirpitz would still remain a real threat if allowed to get loose...



Yes, but Bismarck was in Germany while Tirpitz was not ready until the fall of 1941. This means that the RN and RAF no longer have to cover the French Atlantic ports. The RN subs and RAF bombers that were covering/attacking these ports can be retasked to cover the approaches to Norway and exits to the Baltic(and even make attacks on B&T in the Baltic), while some of the subs may be redeployed to the Med as well, along with additional aircraft.

If S&G don't make their winter cruise into the Atlantic, it greatly eases the strain on the RN and releases a lot of heavy ships that were covering convoys.


----------



## delcyros (Mar 29, 2014)

parsifal said:


> (...)



I beg to differ on the details. 

The air complement of GZ would have eintailed 43 operational aircraft and requirements called for 50% reserves. These reserves are not included in the number of op. A/C and were expected to be stowed knocked down in parts, only to be assembled in order to replace operational losses. This makes for a total outfit of 64 A/C.
This number appears also to be more in agreement with the hangar area which is given with 5,420m^2 distributed over two hangar levels as compared to about 5,000m^2 for ARK ROYAL.



> Unlikely. it had been planned that she would be commissioned at the end of 1940, but in September 1940, a decision was made not to complete her.The Germans still had not solved the catapult problems they were having,



One should make mention of the fact that the dock used for GZ fitting out was needed for repairs on SCHARNHORST torpedo damages in 1940. Technically, none of the A/C really required the catapult to take off. It was a nice thing to have, particularely for the Bf-109T allowing to take off with retracted gears but not necessary for operation. It appears very reasonable for me to assume that GZ would have been operational by early 1941 had the will be there to do so.



> On April 29 1940, Raeder recorded "the fuhrer is of the opinion that aircraft carriers with internal combustion engines will not be usable beyond this war".


True, however, with "carriers with internal combustion engines" Raeder meant not GZ but a new generation of Diesel engine driven carriers planned, whiches production was unlikely in the war. GZ was steam turbine engine driven and almost finished.



> GZ still would not realisitcally be able to launch a full deckload given of aircaft given the very limited endurance of her fighter component. With an authorised air component of 12 Me 109s and 26-28 Ju87Ts (Im assuming work on the Fi 167 torpedo carrier would be abandoned, it would not have been ready by March 1941 anyway), the Germans never assumed or planned on escorting their Ju87s to any meaningful extent.



Fi-167 was already in procurement. Only fourteen Fi-167 were made but all left the low priority assembly plant in 1940. They would be the primary asset of the carrier. 20 Fi-167A + 13 Ju-87 + 10 Bf-109T. The Fi-167 could take off from an immobile platform with max. payload. The Luftwaffe naval air arm didnï¿½t yet existed but Ju-87 of GZï¿½s carrier strike group actually indeed managed to sink a polish DD in 1939 while still in the training status.

Reserves would be 10 Fi-167, 6 ju-87 and 5 Bf-109T to replace operational losses. Fi-167 and Ju-87 are benign low speed realm A/C, particularely suited for carrier ops. The Bf-109T is not so but modified heavily to approach this function (more than the Seafire).
take off procedure was for an full strength air strike first to launch
6 x Bf-109T on catapult trollies in short ssuccession
then to launch 12 Ju-87 dive bombers with 500 or 250kg bombs on catapult trollies and then to launch
12 Fi-167 torpedo carrying or bomb carrying A/C in conventional rolling deck launch
1 Ju-87 air group commander plane was launched last conventionally (typically not armed with bombs)

A normal strength attack would be
6 x Ju-87 dive bomnbers on catapult
12 x Fi-167 torpedo bombers on catapult
4 x Bf-109T in rolling deck launch (only if air opposition was anticipated)
The remaining A/C, four Bf-109 would remain for air defense, 6 Fi-167 were considered not usable due to previous search flights and provide Ersatz fighter if needed.

What is probably also important, the Fi-167 may carry a 2,204lbs bomb, which is a ship killer and the A/C are generally high performance. Against Swordfish in daylight, even Ju-87 can be used as Ersatz fighter. The Fulmar against Bf-109T is quite one sided, too.

Generally I agree that in terms of carrier operations, GZ would be hard pressed against a night Swordfish attack. I generally also guess that GZ would be better suited in terms of providing attack against convois in the North Atlantic than operating in the confines of the Mediterranean, where land air bases are the primary asset.


----------



## RCAFson (Mar 29, 2014)

delcyros said:


> I beg to differ on the details.
> 
> The air complement of GZ would have eintailed 43 operational aircraft and requirements called for 50% reserves. These reserves are not included in the number of op. A/C and were expected to be stowed knocked down in parts, only to be assembled in order to replace operational losses. This makes for a total outfit of 64 A/C.
> This number appears also to be more in agreement with the hangar area which is given with 5,420m^2 distributed over two hangar levels as compared to about 5,000m^2 for ARK ROYAL.
> ...



The FAA also had the Skua and this was carried by Ark Royal in combination with the Fulmar in early 1941, while the Swordfish could also be used as a divebomber. Assuming that both sides make simultaneous strikes, it seem very likely that an FAA strike of say 12 Skuas and 12 Swordfish would get through GZ's CAP since, AFAIK, the KM had no AW radars in this time frame, while 12 Fulmars directed by radar GCI would be a major problem for a KM strike.

Air combat is generally won by the side that sees their opponent first and has an altitude advantage, rather than being a simple comparison of performance stats.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## parsifal (Mar 29, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> I think you may have confused Ark Royal with Illustrious. Ark Royal typically carried 54-60 aircraft:
> 
> Note that the Skua would have been a good counter to the Stuka, in terms of destroying Graf Zepplin's flight deck.
> 
> Another factor is that having S&G in the Med would have allowed the RN to concentrate more ships in the Med, since there would be less need for forces to cover breakouts into the Atlantic from Norway or France.



No, im not confusing the two ships. The complements shown on the FAA website I am well aware of, but Ark Royal seldom operated to her full capacity. She was in such heavy use, that there was hardly ever a time when the full deckload of aircaft were available. Just as an example, at the beginning of March, 5 Swordfish were detached from the CAG and staged through to Malta, so the numbers dropped from the authorised 36 Swordfish to 31. However soon after this mission she embarked on strikes over Sardinia, with a maximum strike size of 24 aircraft.

Like all carriers, she could seldom count on full availability of her aircraft, to do that she would have needed a big rest and refit, and that was just not going to happen.

At the same time, the GZ could also hardly count on a full deckload being available. Ostensibly she had an aircraft capacity of 40, but one could not expect a full complement, given types like the 109 embarked, even after just a few days of operations. During Torch, in the follwing year, Seafires operating off the Eascort Carriers started operations with something like 90 Seafires operational, 2 days later this was reduced to less than 40, for the unfortunate Seafire the problem was the lack of wind and the short decks, and the green-ness of the crews, something they had a lot of problem with.


----------



## parsifal (Mar 29, 2014)

You are both making the mistake that both carriers would have a full complement. highly unlikley in both cases. Most likley deployment of the GZ would be part of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau sortie into the Atlantic and returning to Brest in March. A two month deployment is going to decimate the GZs CAG. If the TG was to try and force the straits, the logical thing to do would be to swing past Brest first to take on replacement aircraft. Problem of course is training replacement aircrew. With just one carrier, and that carrier being used in active operations, the germans are going to have a very hard time replacing lost pilots. Maybe in that two months they might acquire another 10 pilots that were carrier capable, but thats a guess, and probably very ambitios. The RN in 1939 acquired 32 pilots carrier capable, and in 1940, it was just under 100. This KM would have been akin to the IJN as far as securing pilots.

As far as air groups are concerned, the Germans did plan to use Fi167 in the prewar plans, but didnt in the 1942 revival. The type was never declared fully operational though I am not really aware of any major issues with it. The Rumanians acquired them eventually, and quite liked them. Ive assumed however, that the germans would cut corners and not have them, so as to get the air groups ready earlier. What the Germans planned to do, and actually could do is two different things. ive assumed they trim back their plans for the sir group, so as to at least get something on the carrier and working in time. 

As far as Fulmars not being competitive, thats a claim oftenmade, and not really ever investigated. In the whole of 1941, the grand toal of 3 Fulmars were lost to air combat, none of them to Me 109s, despite having clashed with them on at least 5 occasions that I know of. In those scraps, the germans lost 2 Me 109s to zero Fulmars.

In a dight like this, the Fulmars, as they always did, would basically ignore the 109s,and go for the bombers. Over the Illustrious, a badly co-ordinated fighter defence, saw initially 4 Fulmars shoot down 6 Ju87s. Illustrious was hit 6 times and did not sink. Once the CAG got its act together, the germans were simply unable to penetrate the screen, Me109 or not. Fulmar was an ideal bomber destroyer, and in that role the 109 would have been hard pressed to stop it. Likely the strike would be outnumbered 14 fighters to 4 (if any) with the Fulmars having the benefit of three times the endurance of the 109.

As far as the other details, I am very appreciative of the better details you are providing. Very interesting and much appreciated


----------

