# Blackburn Skua was it that bad?



## fastmongrel (Nov 2, 2009)

The Blackburn Skua always seems to be in peoples lists of worst aircraft of WWII but was it really that bad as a dive bomber. It seems to have had similar performance figures as other contemporary dive bombers and going on what I have read it was the first aircraft to sink a major warship during combat. The only problems I can see was it could only carry a 500 pound bomb and the engine was a bit underpowered. Was it a flawed aircraft in any way or has it just had a bad press.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 2, 2009)

Probably just bad press. 

It was powered by an engine that was just too low powered. If it had an engine that could have been developed to give 1200hp or so (about a 33% increase) it might be remembered a bit differently. 

It doesn't seem to have aquired quite the reputation of the Brewster dive bomber or the last Curtiss as being unpleasant to fly.


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## Thorlifter (Nov 2, 2009)

From what I know about it, it was a good plane in the right element. It could handle its own against bombers or other dive bombers, but against newer fighters, it was a sitting duck.


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## fastmongrel (Nov 2, 2009)

Shortround6 said:


> Probably just bad press.
> 
> It was powered by an engine that was just too low powered. If it had an engine that could have been developed to give 1200hp or so (about a 33% increase) it might be remembered a bit differently.



Doing a bit of research (okay reading wikipedia) it seems there was a larger 26.8 liter 1635 cubic inch Perseus 100 engine that produced 1200 horsepower. It doesnt say if it was contemporary with the Skua though probably post war I think, most war time engines seem to have used roman numeral engine numbers.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 3, 2009)

Skua was the best carrier-capable dive bomber when introduced, and it gave a good account despite having a low powered engine. I don't recall any bad press about Skua - was that maybe about Roc that was not up to the task of carrer-borne fighter?

As for 'better Skua', RN had a couple of more options to upgrade (=change) the engine: Taurus (1000+ HP) and early Hercules (around 1300HP) do come in mind.


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## parsifal (Nov 3, 2009)

Skuas performed most often as fighters, and in this role were quite effective. though it would be foolhardy to mix it with a first line figter, it did perform quite well in places like the med.

Perhaps it was not responsible for large losses to the enemy, but iet provided valuable fleet defence, at a time when the RN needed all the aircover it could lay its hands on


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## tomo pauk (Nov 3, 2009)

parsifal said:


> Skuas performed most often as fighters, and in this role were quite effective. though it would be foolhardy to mix it with a first line figter, it did perform quite well in places like the med.
> 
> Perhaps it was not responsible for large losses to the enemy, but iet provided valuable fleet defence, at a time when the RN needed all the aircover it could lay its hands on



So, the RN could've used a better performing planes in the 1st half of war after all. 
Good to know


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## Juha (Nov 5, 2009)

Hello Tomo
Taurus has reliability problems even in late 1940 so it was unacceptable engine for a single-engine carrier plane at that time.

Juha


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## tomo pauk (Nov 5, 2009)

That leaves us with Hercules. 
Not bad, since it was feasible for 1939 (Beaufighter was airborne in July 39 with those). If we decide to have only 1 crew member in order to save weight, the resulting plane would weight almost same as Skua. So 1270HP would've had to deal with 2500-2700kg empty weight. Later, engine power climbs to 1350 (1940) to 1700HP (later in war). 
So we don't need Roc, Sea Hurricane, Seafire, Fulmar, Firefly (yuck for later two). 

Not bad for an ugly duckling


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## Juha (Nov 5, 2009)

Hello Tomo
IIRC also Hercules run into difficulties and was running late but of course one could change priorities but on the other hand RAF desperately needed Beau in late 40 and for a while after that and Mk II, with Merlins, wasn't very successful. IIRC, also Wimpy Mk II was problematic, which made Wimpy Mk III, Hercules powered, very important.

Juha


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## Freebird (Nov 5, 2009)

Considering that it was developed in the late 30's, before the advent of the Me109E or Spitfire, it performed quite well indeed in it's role. It replaced some slow biplanes in the FAA, like the Sea Gladiator. It was reasonably comparable with the early WWII Italian fighters like the CR 32 or CR 42, with which it would have had much more chance for interaction in the Med


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## tomo pauk (Nov 5, 2009)

Actually, Skua was a late 1930s design, contemporary of 109, or Hurricane. It was a good dive bomber, but FAA realy needed a better fighter. Moreso since their planes were fighting in Norway France too.
The Italian air threat was more in shape of bombers (eg. SM-79 was faster then Skua/Roc/Fulmar trio) , while MC-200 was the main fighter back in 1940.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 5, 2009)

Juha said:


> Hello Tomo
> IIRC also Hercules run into difficulties and was running late but of course one could change priorities but on the other hand RAF desperately needed Beau in late 40 and for a while after that and Mk II, with Merlins, wasn't very successful. IIRC, also Wimpy Mk II was problematic, which made Wimpy Mk III, Hercules powered, very important.
> 
> Juha


Why was RAF desperately needed Beaufighters in late 1940?

EDIT: I see, you probably mean the night-fighter variant. Well, the Merlin XX with 1300HP was ready in summer 1940, so that would do for Beau.


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## buffnut453 (Nov 5, 2009)

Always had a soft spot for the Skua ever since, as a nipper, I found an old Novo kit of the aircraft (along with a Tupolev SB-2) in a newsagent's in Wales. I think as a dive bomber it was quite adequate in the role, and as such was very much "of its time". As a fighter, it was much less successful but then designing an aircraft with mixed roles from the outset often seems fraught with problems, presumably due to the number of design compromises required (eg Skua, Fulmar, Tornado GR1), whereas bolting on new roles to aircraft that excel in one role often seems more successful (eg Mosquito, F-15E, P-47 etc). It's also worth remembering that the requirements for naval aircraft in the UK have often been somewhat bemusing (to whit the Firebrand - a single seat fighter that can launch a torpedo...and why would anyone want to do that???).


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## Freebird (Nov 5, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> Actually, Skua was a late 1930s design, contemporary of 109, or Hurricane. It was a good dive bomber, but FAA realy needed a better fighter. Moreso since their planes were fighting in Norway France too.
> The Italian air threat was more in shape of bombers (eg. SM-79 was faster then Skua/Roc/Fulmar trio) , while MC-200 was the main fighter back in 1940.



Contemporary perhaps, but the Skua is a 2-seat Fighter/bomber, so comparing it to an Me109E or Spitfire is like apples oranges. 

The Skua was a good, versatile aircraft, but it was never intended to operate agains land-based fighters.

From "History of War"



> Blackburn Skua
> 
> In the pre-war years it was believed that the new generation of high performance fighters then under development would not be able to operate from aircraft carriers. It was also believed that naval aircraft needed two crewmen to cope with the complexity of navigation over water, inevitably increasing the weight of the aircraft.
> 
> Blackburn Skua Finally, there was a tradition of multi-purpose aircraft, designed to make the best use of the limited capacity of each aircraft carrier. In the case of the Skua it was designed to perform as both a fighter and a dive bomber, not entirely compatible roles.



It was a compromise between a straight bomber/TB (the Swordfish,) too slow to be used as a fighter, and a straight fighter with limited or no ability as recon/diveB.

If you compare it with theNorthrop A-17 the two aircraft are quite similar, and it was a good bit faster than the Devastator.

The Skua would be very capable as a fighter against the type of aircraft that it was expected the RN might encounter, the Japanese Mitsu G3M, or the Italian SM 81/79. If the British had the Hermes with a dozen Skuas available to sail with the Repulse/PoW, it is unlikely in the extreme that the Japanese would have been able to sink them.


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## parsifal (Nov 5, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> Why was RAF desperately needed Beaufighters in late 1940?
> 
> EDIT: I see, you probably mean the night-fighter variant. Well, the Merlin XX with 1300HP was ready in summer 1940, so that would do for Beau.



Actually the need for a long range twin was more extensive than that. Beaifighters were needed to protect convoys from Condors, there was of course the need for night fighter defences. Beaifighters were also needed as strike fighters, providing long range escort, and a very effective ground attack and sea interdiction role.

About the only thing the beau did not do, and this is not as a result of any design shortcoming, was use as an air superiority fighter.

In my opinion the beau was a success where the Me 110 was a failure, it was a far superior design in every respect


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## riacrato (Nov 5, 2009)

How so. It performed well when not engaged by single engine fighters (just like the 110) and was in big trouble whenever that happened. Pretty similar.


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## parsifal (Nov 5, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> Actually, Skua was a late 1930s design, contemporary of 109, or Hurricane. It was a good dive bomber, but FAA realy needed a better fighter. Moreso since their planes were fighting in Norway France too.
> The Italian air threat was more in shape of bombers (eg. SM-79 was faster then Skua/Roc/Fulmar trio) , while MC-200 was the main fighter back in 1940.



In Norway the Skua was still effective, even when faced with the prospect of an Me 109 equipped force. You are looking at the problem in an essentially continental fashion, that is that the fleet defence fighter has to take and hold control of the skies in which it operates. this is a fundamentally flawed appraisal of the the fleet defence role. All that had to be done in fact was for the fighter to survive the enemy escorting fighters, and to engage the attacking bombers so as to break up or disrupt their attacks. This was done time and again by the FAA most famously during the pedestal convoys, but it happened all the time. and while a better fleet defence fighter would have been a "nice to have" option, it was never essential to the completion of the RNs task, and infact would have been a distraction to the development of land based air fighhters, which did have the responsibility for air superiority 

The fighters you deride were actually very effective in this capacity. Fulmars sucesfully carried out this mission against Me 109 escorted attacks in the med, for example, losing very few aircraft, and very effectively protecting the ships they were attached to. 

it never ceases to amaze me just how ignorant people from non-maritme nations are as to the role and significance naval power has on European affairs throughout history. By extension carrier based air power is the miodern day extension of that influence.


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## Freebird (Nov 5, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> Actually, Skua was a late 1930s design, contemporary of 109, or Hurricane. It was a good dive bomber, but FAA realy needed a better fighter.



Sure, but even with some modern fighters, because of the small capacity of RN carriers, the FAA still needed multi-role aircraft for bombing, that could still be used as fighter defence against bombers



tomo pauk said:


> Moreso since their planes were fighting in Norway France too.



Fighting in France? The FAA was never designed for extended fights near land, but to provide air superiority away from land, or raids against ports ships



tomo pauk said:


> The Italian air threat was more in shape of bombers (eg. SM-79 was faster then Skua/Roc/Fulmar trio) ,



The bomber was of very limited danger to capital ships unless using torpedoes, in which case the Skua was perfectly able to match the Italian or Japanese bombers in 1940.

The Fulmar was as fast as a SM 79, and while the Skua was slower, it was optimised for a much lower altitude, I don't think the SM 79 was faster at sea level. Does anyone have a speed comparison of a Skua vs a Nell or SM 79 at sea level?

And further, a squadron of Skua's defending a fleet against bombers on a Torp attack could stay at altitude, and dive down on the TB's as they closed in for the attack.



tomo pauk said:


> while MC-200 was the main fighter back in 1940.



And out of range for operations in the central Med


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## buffnut453 (Nov 5, 2009)

freebird said:


> If the British had the Hermes with a dozen Skuas available to sail with the Repulse/PoW, it is unlikely in the extreme that the Japanese would have been able to sink them.



Alternatively, if Adm Phillips had woken up when he sighted the Japanese reconnaissance aircraft shadowing Force Z and asked for air support from Singapore, where a whole squadron of Buffalos was on immediate readiness with 2 more standing-by, the ships wouldn't have been sunk...at least not on 10 December 1941.


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## Freebird (Nov 5, 2009)

buffnut453 said:


> Alternatively, if Adm Phillips had woken up when he sighted the Japanese reconnaissance aircraft shadowing Force Z and asked for air support from Singapore, where a whole squadron of Buffalos was on immediate readiness with 2 more standing-by, the ships wouldn't have been sunk...at least not on 10 December 1941.



No argument here - the whole mission was a fiasco, from Churchill overruling the Admiralty to send 2 capital ships on a mission without proper escort, or the ridiculous adherance of the RN to radio silence even after sighting IJN aircraft. 


Nonetheless, the Skua would have been more useful on the Force Z mission than just straight fighters


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## parsifal (Nov 5, 2009)

riacrato said:


> How so. It performed well when not engaged by single engine fighters (just like the 110) and was in big trouble whenever that happened. Pretty similar.




Similar, but not the same, and sufficiently differnt to label the 110 a failure and the Beafighter a success. everything about the Beau was "better" when compered to its german counterpart. It was more heavily armed, a better climber, could turn better, seemed to absorb punishment better. The differences are not that great, i admit, and the Beau was never going to do well in a single engined environment, but my opinion is that it could complete its mission better than the 110.


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## riacrato (Nov 6, 2009)

Calling the 110 a failure is just wrong considering what it did as a nightfighter. And in that role I would actually take it over a Beau. Not to say the beau is a bad plane, it wasn't, but it performed so similar to the 110 that you just can't call one a success and the other a failure.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 6, 2009)

parsifal said:


> ...
> 
> it never ceases to amaze me just how ignorant people from non-maritme nations are as to the role and significance naval power has on European affairs throughout history. By extension carrier based air power is the miodern day extension of that influence.



It never ceases to amaze me just how arrogant people can be.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 6, 2009)

freebird said:


> Sure, but even with some modern fighters, because of the small capacity of RN carriers, the FAA still needed multi-role aircraft for bombing, that could still be used as fighter defence against bombers
> 
> *Agree. Skua with Hercules on board would be even more suited for both tasks. *
> 
> ...



If the


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## parsifal (Nov 6, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> It never ceases to amaze me just how arrogant people can be.



Your right TP, I shouldnt have said that, i do apologize


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## Juha (Nov 6, 2009)

hello
IIRC Eric Brown didn’t have altogether positive opinion on Skua, but I cannot remember much from his article in one old Air International, only that Skua tended to drop hard on its main wheel when throttle was cut during carrier landing. I don’t have time now to try to dig out the article.

And IIRC Sea Gladiator was developed when RN found out in late 39 that the prewar idea to fight out bombing attacks using only naval AA wasn’t very good idea after all. because Skua was underpowered and poor climber they needed something better for interceptor role and Sea Gladiator was developed as a stop gap measure while Sea Hurricane and Seafire were developed.

Juha


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## tomo pauk (Nov 6, 2009)

parsifal said:


> Your right TP, I shouldnt have said that, i do apologize



No problem.


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## JoeB (Nov 6, 2009)

The concept of a/c like the Skua and Fulmar was overtaken by events. It was a basically mistaken concept by the time of WWII. I don't see the reason to deny this obvious fact, just to support the 'underdog' a/c all the time. Carrier operation in early WWII had to avoid, or just skirt as shallowly as possible, the range envelope of single engine fighters based on large land masses. That was actually true in the Pacific too, not just in Europe, untill carriers became vastly more numerous later in the war. Only small island bases with limited complements of fighters, and limited means to protect or disperse the a/c on the ground, could be attacked by carriers at reasonable risk until the much larger carrier forces of 1944.

But, the actual nature of carrier ops, even avoiding large forces of landbased singles, and with the introduction of radar, proved that the Skua/Fulmar type two seater was not optimal, but rather a higher performance single like the Sea Hurricane or Wildcat (Martlet). The Skua in particular had serious issues intercepting even various bomber types though it sometimes succeeed. I'm mystified by the claim that a few of them would have saved the POW and Repulse; those were numerous bombers coming in at varied altitudes, challenging intercepts for a Skua. Even a Hermes worth of higher performance planes, say Wildcats, would have inflicted heavier losses on the attacking a/c but probably not saved the ships. Lexington's larger complement of F4F's shredded an unescorted attack by Japanese Type 1's (Betty) v Lexington in 1942 near Rabaul (where Butch O'Hare won the Medal of Honor), but that was a much smaller force of level bombers only, the attacking 4th Air Group had no torpedoes at Rabaul, and near misses and near suicide crashes were scored as it was.

Joe


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## parsifal (Nov 7, 2009)

JoeB said:


> The concept of a/c like the Skua and Fulmar was overtaken by events. It was a basically mistaken concept by the time of WWII. I don't see the reason to deny this obvious fact, just to support the 'underdog' a/c all the time. Carrier operation in early WWII had to avoid, or just skirt as shallowly as possible, the range envelope of single engine fighters based on large land masses. That was actually true in the Pacific too, not just in Europe, untill carriers became vastly more numerous later in the war. Only small island bases with limited complements of fighters, and limited means to protect or disperse the a/c on the ground, could be attacked by carriers at reasonable risk until the much larger carrier forces of 1944.
> 
> But, the actual nature of carrier ops, even avoiding large forces of landbased singles, and with the introduction of radar, proved that the Skua/Fulmar type two seater was not optimal, but rather a higher performance single like the Sea Hurricane or Wildcat (Martlet). The Skua in particular had serious issues intercepting even various bomber types though it sometimes succeeed. I'm mystified by the claim that a few of them would have saved the POW and Repulse; those were numerous bombers coming in at varied altitudes, challenging intercepts for a Skua. Even a Hermes worth of higher performance planes, say Wildcats, would have inflicted heavier losses on the attacking a/c but probably not saved the ships. Lexington's larger complement of F4F's shredded an unescorted attack by Japanese Type 1's (Betty) v Lexington in 1942 near Rabaul (where Butch O'Hare won the Medal of Honor), but that was a much smaller force of level bombers only, the attacking 4th Air Group had no torpedoes at Rabaul, and near misses and near suicide crashes were scored as it was.
> 
> Joe



Joe

98% of the time I agree with your positions, but this is one time i will have to respectfully disagree. Whilst the low performance of the FAA aircraft was a definite disadvantage, your assertion that British Carriers were not in the "thick of it" from the beginning is just not supported by the facts. British carriers were able to enter enemy controlled airspace, particularly in the central basin, time and again, with relative impunity. The paucity of numbers was what prevented them from achieving air superiority, but this did not generally stop them from completing the crucial mission of achieving sea control of any area the RN needed to control (possible exceptions being the closed seas like the Adriatic and Baltic). This was a direct result of the carriers contribution to the RN force capability. They had an effect on all manner of operations, to a very significant degree. I would say that without the British carrier operations of 1940-41, the outcome of the war would have changed completely

I would suggest your comparisons of RN operations to those that occurred in the Pacific by the USN is not a valid comparison, The mission profiles were fundamentally different, as were the conditions under which the two navies were operating......


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## JoeB (Nov 7, 2009)

parsifal said:


> I would suggest your comparisons of RN operations to those that occurred in the Pacific by the USN is not a valid comparison, The mission profiles were fundamentally different, as were the conditions under which the two navies were operating......


I don't see where I was saying 'British carriers weren't in the think of it' or what that is supposed to mean, even. British carrier doctrine very logically was that carriers would not approach within range of large landmasses containing numerous high performance fighters. This was actually not totally different in the Pacific. USN carriers didn't operate within single engine fighter range of large landmasses either until 1944, when they had become more numerous than any navy's carrier force in 1939-43. The definitions of effective and numerous single engine fighters and their range obviously varied. Axis fighters were typically very short ranged, and the ETO/MTO contained relatively few small 'islands' with limited numbers of fighters* nor any enemy carriers, which the Pacific did contain. That was different, but the basic idea that a TF's of a few carriers could not approach large land masses with lots of fighter bases was pretty universal. And this was the basis of British carrier doctrine and the concept of a/c like the Skua and Fulmar. An additional component of that concept was the pre-war idea that even unescorted bombers would be difficult to detect and intercept, so a single purpose single seat fighter wasn't so worthwhile. This proved wrong in WWII. Radar could enable higher performance singles to intercept unescorted bombers, and the carrier fighthers might also sometimes have to engage land based singles.

In Med operations the Regia Aeronautica coordinated its operations notoriously poorly with Italy's naval needs, so British carriers had some extra scope of operation even fairly near land. But when German a/c arrived that became much less so. Only in pretty extreme cases would RN carriers operate within range of Bf109 bases, then only barely. For example in the Pedestal Convoy to Matla in Aug '42, desperate situation, an RN carrier TF came close enough to Malta to encounter effective escort by Bf109's and the results were hits on one of the British carriers. But even in those operations, the 109's and Italian fighters were usually operating right at the edge of their effective radius. Any closer would have been foolish for the carriers, just based on numbers of a/c on each side. But in those situations, a/c like the Sea Hurricane and Martlet were by far preferable (though Fulmars particpated in those operations, Skua's were gone). The single engine two seat low performance scout/fighter a/c was just the wrong concept.

*though there were examples especially v the Vichy French where, actual island or not, there were small isolated detachments of French fighters with which one or few carriers worth of fighters could reasonably contend. Same with the Torch operation in Morocco, small enough French air contigent for the entire carrier force of US Atlantic fleet to deal with, but using a relatively high performance single seat carrier fighter. Something like a Fulmar was the wrong concept of a/c for that sort of operation.

Joe


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## Freebird (Nov 7, 2009)

JoeB said:


> The concept of a/c like the Skua and Fulmar was overtaken by events. It was a basically mistaken concept by the time of WWII. I don't see the reason to deny this obvious fact, just to support the 'underdog' a/c all the time. Carrier operation in early WWII had to avoid, or just skirt as shallowly as possible, the range envelope of single engine fighters based on large land masses. That was actually true in the Pacific too, not just in Europe, untill carriers became vastly more numerous later in the war. Only small island bases with limited complements of fighters, and limited means to protect or disperse the a/c on the ground, could be attacked by carriers at reasonable risk until the much larger carrier forces of 1944.



Are you suggesting that the carriers carry ONLY fighters for defence? Unless you are, then the carrier has to have some attack/bomber aircraft. Of the available aircraft in 1940 the Skua makes the most sense on a small carrier, until the arrival of Sea Hurris as a better multi-role aircraft. The Skua can make bombing (or dive) attacks, yet can be used as fleet defence in a pinch, unlike the FAA's TBs, Swordfish or Albacore. It's easy for the USN, with a capacty of 80 or 90 aircraft, you could carry 24 Dauntless, 24 Devastator 36 F-4 (or such) But with the RN's very limited carrier capacity multi-role aircraft make much more sense.



JoeB said:


> But, the actual nature of carrier ops, even avoiding large forces of landbased singles, and with the introduction of radar, proved that the Skua/Fulmar type two seater was not optimal, but rather a higher performance single like the Sea Hurricane or Wildcat (Martlet). The Skua in particular had serious issues intercepting even various bomber types though it sometimes succeeed.



Again, I'm not suggesting that the carrier have ONLY Skua's, obviously some SeaHurri's or Martlets would be needed as well. If the Hermes was being sent out with Force Z to attack Japanese shipping, probably the best mix would be Sea Hurri and some Swordfish, but if only Skuas were available, then better than nothing.


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## Freebird (Nov 7, 2009)

JoeB said:


> I'm mystified by the claim that a few of them would have saved the POW and Repulse; those were numerous bombers coming in at varied altitudes, challenging intercepts for a Skua. Even a Hermes worth of higher performance planes, say Wildcats, would have inflicted heavier losses on the attacking a/c but probably not saved the ships.



Absolutely disagree with you here. There was no problem of "varied altitudes", as ONLY the torpedo attacks (at sea level obviously) were of any great danger. Both ships were earlier hit by both 250 500 lb bombs, with no critical damage. The Repulse evaded 3 TB attacks, (by combing), and only on the 4th attack did the Japanese get a hit, by making TB runs from 3 directions at once. As she was hit, there were only a few IJN aircraft left, if they had missed it would be too late to return for another attack. The Japanese were able to set up these attacks with almost complete impunity, due to the lack of fighters the RN's weak AA. Had the British had Hurricanes the Japanese would almost certainly have broken off the attack. The Skua may not have shot down many Japanese bombers, but they could certainly disrupt the TB attacks, it's pretty hard to hold straight level as someone is pumping lead into your tail. 



JoeB said:


> Lexington's larger complement of F4F's shredded an unescorted attack by Japanese Type 1's (Betty) v Lexington in 1942 near Rabaul (where Butch O'Hare won the Medal of Honor), but that was a much smaller force of level bombers only, the attacking 4th Air Group had no torpedoes at Rabaul, and near misses and near suicide crashes were scored as it was.
> Joe



And almost ANY bombing hit is bad news against a US carrier, wheas it would be little problem for the BB's BC's. (Hermes may have been hit, but the other 2 ships would likely survive) It is also easier for the bombers to attack from altitude. The British fighters would ONLY have to prevent the TB's from making a multi-directional TB attack which the ships couldn't comb.


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## parsifal (Nov 7, 2009)

Joe


You raise the very valid point that British carriers would not generally operate within range of land based fighters. true enough, though it is by no means a universal rule. British carriers often operated within range of Axis fighters, be they German or Italian. And for precisely the reasons you bring sorward, ie the range that such actions occurred, the socalled second rate British Naval Fighters were able to give far better than they received, simply because the fighters they were engaging could not hang around, and as a result could not engage in either the numbers, nor could they press home tactical advantages they might otherwise enjoy. 

But it was not the poor performance of the British fighters that determined whether or not carriers, or ships could operate for extended periods in Axis airspace. it was numbers, or more correctly the lack of them. British carriers were far too few, and their CAGs far too small to be abale to stan up to Axis land based air and duke it out with them. This would have been just as true if they had been equipped with first rate fighters, as the fighters they actually were given.

And even though the second string fighters given to the Royal Navy appeared to be a tactical handicap, this was more illusory than real. Because of the small numbers, and because these older, leess effective types were at least available, pushing the Skuas, Sea Glads and Fulmars into the fray at least allowed fighter defence to be available, and at no cost to the high performance fighters (Spit and Hurricanes so urgently needed elsehere at that time. If Britain had poured resources into fileding 1st line fighters for her carriers, she would have gone to war with no carrier based fighters, and a large block of 1st line land based fighters would have been diverted away from fighter command


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## tomo pauk (Nov 7, 2009)

For the sake of discussion, would it be better if Fairey produced Sea Hurricanes instead of same number of Fulmars and Fireflies? They used same engines (until Fireflies reciived Griffons) , so land-based Hurricanes would be produced as they were historically.


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## fastmongrel (Nov 7, 2009)

Did Hawkers or any other manufacturer ever build a folding wing Sea Hurricane or was it not thought worth the effort spending development money on an aircraft that was going to be replaced pretty soon by better aircraft.


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## Freebird (Nov 7, 2009)

JoeB said:


> The concept of a/c like the Skua and Fulmar was overtaken by events. It was a basically mistaken concept by the time of WWII. I don't see the reason to deny this obvious fact, just to support the 'underdog' a/c all the time.
> Joe



You don't supply any data or theories to support this "obvious fact"?  The fact that carrier doctrine was to avoid engagement with land based fighters does not invalidate the concept.

Further, you refer to "the concept of a/c like the Skua and Fulmar", and yet these are two different types of aircraft. 
And even if true it's pretty hard to predict " obsolete concept by the time of WWII" when the Skua was designed in 1934.

So lets take these 3 aircraft separately:

1.) The Skua. This was a perfectly good aircraft. For an aircraft introduced in 1937 it's hardly a surprise that it was obsolete by 1941. It was NOT designed as fighter/recon as you seem to imply, it was designed as a Dive bomber, with a secondary capability as a fighter. It performed quite well as a DB, and was adequate as an emergency fighter, provided that it didn't engage enemy first line fighters. It was withdrawn from FAA service in 1941.

Let's look at a hypothetical RN carrier complement of 36 aircraft in late '39 or early '40. Neither the Sea Hurri or Martlet are available yet, the RN fighters would be Sea Gladiators. If the carrier had:

12 Sea Gladiators
12 Sea Skua
12 Swordfish

It would be able to launch an airstrike of 24 aircraft, and had 12 fighters for protection, with an additional 12 Skuas to assist in the defence in an emergency (capable against slower aircraft like the SM 81 or Ju 87) 

Since neither the Sea Glad or Swordfish had the range of the Skua, it would also be useful as a scout/recon for the carrier.

In answer to the original question - "Was the Skua that bad?" No.
It was equal or better in performance than the comparable US aircraft in service in 1937 - 1940, the Northrop BT-1 or the Douglas TBD-1


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## Freebird (Nov 7, 2009)

The Fulmar: Unlike the Skua which was a DB with some limited fighter capability, the Fulmar was just a plain fighter, and it was indeed a failure. 

It was introduced only a half year before the Sa Hurri on RN carriers, and although it had a better range, it had less than half the ceiling, much slower climb rate, could only carry a 250 lb bomb, and was about80 (!) mph slower (yikes!)




tomo pauk said:


> For the sake of discussion, would it be better if Fairey produced Sea Hurricanes instead of same number of Fulmars? They used same engines, so land-based Hurricanes would be produced as they were historically.



In answer to your question, probably not. The Fulmar started coming off the assembly line in 1940, and the British were desparate for any aircraft available, and as soon as possible. So to delay for perhaps 3 - 6 months to re-tool would not be a good idea. The aircraft were still useful later on as night fighters, where the second crewman could operate the radar, and many Fulmars were converted to NF. In 1940 the RN still needed aircraft to replace the Sea Glads, and since no Hurris could be spared until after the BoB (1941), that's why the Fulmar was put on board carriers in summer 1940

Otherwise I would have switched from producing Fulmars to Fireflys at the earliest possible date.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 8, 2009)

Firebird,
If I understand you correctly, it was easier for Fairey to build a new type of fighter, then to produce Sea Hurricanes? What type of retooling would be needed if we completely erase Fulmar from Faireys history? And then: why on earth would you want Fireflies, and what those had to offer when compared to Martlets, Sea Hurries, Seafires or Corsairs?


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## parsifal (Nov 8, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> Firebird,
> If I understand you correctly, it was easier for Fairey to build a new type of fighter, then to produce Sea Hurricanes? What type of retooling would be needed if we completely erase Fulmar from Faireys history? And then: why on earth would you want Fireflies, and what those had to offer when compared to Martlets, Sea Hurries, Seafires or Corsairs?




Fireflies were actually more useful than their limited peformance might suggest. For a start they were a very effective carrier borne night fighter, and because they carried two crew could operate in conditions of poor weather far more effectively than single man aircraft.....compared to the RN, USN night and poor weather operating abilities were very limited, and this could be decisive in the poor conditions of the far northern atlantic (not a single American carrier operation ever took place on the northern route to Russia whereas the RN provided carrier based air cover on a regular basis to the Murmansk convoys). They also had a very useful strike capability, and were far more survivable than any other strike aircraft. With a crew of two, they were able to find targets very accurately in these poor visibility conditions 


Now, with regard to your theory about Sea Hurricanes in place of Fulmars, Hurricanes only became availble to the FAA after they were obsolete in the RAF. Ther was absolutely zero chance of even a single Hurricane being available for carrier operations until well into 1941. Moreover the ability to operate such high performance aircraft on and off carriers was not realized as possible until after the emrgency landings and takeoffs during the Norwegian campaign and also during the Malta re-supply operations. Even then it took some time to realize that SE fighters could operate and navigate effectively. Until well into 1941 normal procedure required the Hurricanes being flown to Malta being guided to the destination by the two seat Fulmars (if at all possible). Britain was slow to realize that in normal weather conditions single seat types could operate over water. Although I hasten to add that the Brits still found their two man aircraft useful in the often soupy conditions they were forced to operate in...RN aircraft demonstrated many times their superior ability to operate in poor weather conditions and at night, something facilitated by the two crew configuration.... 

It was only after the RN started to "americanise" its carrier doctrines that single seat aircraft became useful. This meant that night operations and poor weather operation capability was abandone in favour of the massed daylight strike approach being used to great effect in the Pacific. However it also meant a loss of flexibility and capability, as the ability to operate at night and in poor weather, such as the RN demonstrated in its great victories at Taranto and against the Bismarck was greatly reduced after 1942, after the RN started to adopt the "mass production" pilot training techniques of the USN


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## tomo pauk (Nov 8, 2009)

parsifal said:


> Fireflies were actually more useful than their limited peformance might suggest. For a start they were a very effective carrier borne night fighter, and because they carried two crew could operate in conditions of poor weather far more effectively than single man aircraft.....compared to the RN, USN night and poor weather operating abilities were very limited, and this could be decisive in the poor conditions of the far northern atlantic (not a single American carrier operation ever took place on the northern route to Russia whereas the RN provided carrier based air cover on a regular basis to the Murmansk convoys).
> 
> *Could you please post some facts about
> a) night kills of Fulmars Fireflies
> ...



.


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## parsifal (Nov 8, 2009)

_Could you please post some facts about
a) night kills of Fulmars Fireflies
b) succesful poor weather attacks conducted by same two planes_

Certainly 

Fireflies were in a totally different class of aircraft to either the hellcat or the Corsair. They had the capacity to carry up to 2000 lbs of offensive stores to a range of 1300 miles, which is more than 3 times the effective range of either US aircraft. As standard they were fitted with ASH air to surface radar that allowed strikes to be undertaken whilst flying "blind" and this indeed was the way these aircraft were flown in their strikes against the Tirpitz and against the Carolines and off the Japanese Home Islands

The Firefly NF MksI and II installed AI MkX airborne radar for night fighting. A total of 177 were built for this purpose, with a further 37 converted to the purpose. . I have no records for the numbers of enemy night time intruders shot down by these aircraft, but the RN relied on them completely for their night time defences. They were used to shoot down night launched V-1s in the blitz 


The Firefly's notable feats include the part it played in the attacks against the German battleship Tirpitz, and on Japanese oil refineries in Sumatra. Fleet Air Arm Fireflies also saw action during the Korean War, operating from carriers against Communist ground targets. 


The first operational sortie of the Fairey Firefly was in July 1944, when 1770 squadron flew from HMS Indefatigable and took part in the Barracuda led dive bombing attacks against the German battleship Tirpitz lying at anchor in Kaa Fjord, Northern Norway. In January 1945, the same squadron was involved in the first major action by the Fleet Air Arm against the Japanese, when the oil refineries in Sumatra were set ablaze with rockets. 


Night-fighter Fireflies were first issued to 746 Squadron, Night Fighter Interception Unit, in May 1943. Based at Ford, the NFIU flew alongside the RAF's FIU, developing night-fighter tactics. Flying from RAF Coltishall during late 1944, NFIU Fireflies undertook night patrols to counter V1 flying bombs air-launched over the North Sea by Luftwaffe He111s. 

In June 1945 Fireflies of 1771 Squadron, operating from HMS Implacable, took part in attacks in the Carolinas, while in July 1772 squadron aircraft, from HMS Indefatigable, were flying strikes against shipping and ground targets in the Japanese home islands, becoming the first FAA aircraft to fly over the Japanese mainland. On 24 July, 1945 aircraft from 1772 Squadron became the first British aircraft to fly over Tokyo. undertaken in the night hours.

_Corsair's and Hellcat's pilots would disagree with such asumption, along with 10 other type's pilots_.

Im sure they would, however Corsairs and Hellcat pilots were not night trained to the same degree as the RN, were not fitted with ASH radar, and lacked the range to be effective in the strike role, except perhaps for direct strikes in Ground support and the like 

Says who? 
With Blackburn, Fairey, Boulton Paul Gloster NOT making Roc, Sea Gladiator and Fulmar, but instead Hurricanes/Sea Hurricanes, FAA suddenly has more planes than it could actually use. Not to mention that Yougoslavia Belgium received Hurricanes in 1939/40.


There were any number of reasons as to why the hurricane could not enter naval service before it did. These included:

1) a refusal of the RAF to relase the type whilst it was still needed for front line fighter duties. To an extent this was justified, as hiving off land based fighters for fleet defence when other types were in production and fulfiling the task adequately anyway, would reduce the available numbers to the land based forces for no real benefit except an increease in the performance of the fighters that was uneccessary. 
2) A failure to appreciate by the RN that single seter aircraft could operate from carriers (to an extent this was justified given the early war doctrines of the FAA up to 1942
in the 
3) Additional developmental work would be needed to strengthen the airframe, and navalise the basic airframe of the Hurricane, as the british found out when they rushed the Spitfire into service some time later, with inadequate development work done on the type 


_Now what Swordfish achievements have to do with FAA purchasing hi-performance fighters early enough?_

None really, except that the total domination of the central basin up to 1941 would not have been achieved, because the carriers carying the stringbags would not have been able to enter those waters when they did (due to a lack of fighter cover) . they would have been stuck in port, waiting for the high performance fighters that you mentioned, which in any case would have been strictly day fighters only, and unable to strafe enemy airfields in the same way as Fulmars because of a lack of night capability and range basically.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 8, 2009)

Actually, the MK II Fulmar was as fast or faster than a MK I Hurricane at sea level. Couldn't climb for crap though

Had 80% more range and carried almost 50% more ammo. 

For a good expanation of the Skua's history (good and bad) see. It aslo describes the duties of the second crewman.

Blackburn Skua

Please note the Skua was basicly out of production by the start of 1940. 

The Skua was a high performance aircraft when it was purchased (the order for 150 being placed in July of 1936). Even if you changed the factroy to make Hurricanes in 1938 you would still need the Merlins to fit in them.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 8, 2009)

Parsifal,
I've asked you to provide some data about succeses of Fulmar/Firefly during poor weather, yet you provided none of that. Of course, the most interesting part is how many V-1s were shoot down by Firefly.

Now even if we agree that Fulmar with radar was a great thing, it falls behind contemporaries when we talk about plain simple tasks Corsair Hellcat performed daily. Even as night fighters they could compere with Fulmar NF. And if Corsair's range is not enough, then just how enough is enough?

As for (Sea) Hurricanes (for the n-th time): RAF, we don't your Hurricanes. We would build our own instead, since Fairey will not build Fulmars. They use the same engines and MGs after all. 



> (about conection between Swordfishes h-perf fighters)
> None really, except that the total domination of the central basin up to 1941 would not have been achieved, because the carriers carying the stringbags would not have been able to enter those waters when they did (due to a lack of fighter cover) . they would have been stuck in port, waiting for the high performance fighters that you mentioned, which in any case would have been strictly day fighters only, and unable to strafe enemy airfields in the same way as Fulmars because of a lack of night capability and range basically.



Okay. 
For the 1st part, Sea Hurricanes would be available since Fairey would build them. So everything would be the same.
For the 2nd part, we still lack hard data about real successes Fulmars made, and it proves nothing about Fulmars day-fighting apabilities. 

And please, could you verify this:


> They [Fireflies] had the capacity to carry up to 2000 lbs of offensive stores to a range of 1300 miles, which is more than 3 times the effective range of either US aircraft.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 8, 2009)

Shortround6 said:


> ...
> 
> Please note the Skua was basicly out of production by the start of 1940.
> 
> The Skua was a high performance aircraft when it was purchased (the order for 150 being placed in July of 1936). Even if you changed the factroy to make Hurricanes in 1938 you would still need the Merlins to fit in them.



I have no problem with Skua dive bomber, as one might find out in my 1st post in this thread. Actually, I'd build them even more, until something better is not available.
However, I see no point in Roc, Sea Gladiator, Fulmar, Firefly. That's why I've proposed Hercules-engined, no-rear-MGs Skua to be fleet fighter. Also, Fairey would build Sea Hurricanes instead of Fulmars in my scenario.


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## Freebird (Nov 8, 2009)

parsifal said:


> Fireflies were actually more useful than their limited peformance might suggest.



In fact, far from having "limited performance", the Firefly was in most every category better than the Helldiver.  



tomo pauk said:


> Freebird,
> And then: why on earth would you want Fireflies, and what those had to offer when compared to Martlets, Sea Hurries, Seafires or Corsairs?





Well, do you consider the Helldiver to be a failure? Because the US built more than 7,000 of them, and the Firefly's performance was similar or better than the Helldiver.

Why not a:

*Corsair?* Was not available for carrier operations until mid-44 at the earliest, while the Firefly came out in 1943. The Corsair could not fit in the newer (Implacable class) carriers.

*Martlet*? - The Marlet carried no bombs, and had only MG vs 4 x 20mm for the Firefly, very effective shooting down bombers.

*Sea Hurricane*? The Sea Hurri was 20 mph faster, but had only half the bomb load, and 1/3 the range

*Seafire?* Only half the range and 1/4 the bomb load of a Firefly


And *ALL* of the above lacked the second crewman needed to operate early radar sets, and photo recon equip - both important missions that the Firefly carried out.


See my poll here: http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/polls/best-1943-carrier-bomber-non-tb-21612.html
For Firefly vs. Helldiver vs. Judy


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## Freebird (Nov 8, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> .
> 
> Now even if we agree that Fulmar with radar was a great thing, it falls behind contemporaries when we talk about plain simple tasks Corsair Hellcat performed daily.
> 
> And please, could you verify this:



Tomo, the Fulmar, Corsair Hellcat are nowhere near contempories - The Fulmar came out in 1940, the Hellcat in 1943 and the Corsair in 1944. it's hardly a surprise that a 1944 fighter is far better than a 1940 one. 



> They [Fireflies] had the capacity to carry up to 2000 lbs of offensive stores to a range of 1300 miles, which is more than 3 times the effective range of either US aircraft.



Yes, that is correct. 

The Firefly is a contempory though, but not of the Hell*Cat* but of the Hell*Diver*
Should the USN have scrapped the 7,000 Helldivers as they were useless? "I see no point in Firefly"

Here is the comparison of the Firefly Helldiver



freebird said:


> 1.) Firefly (Fairey Firefly mk.1)
> 
> Speed: 319 mph @ 17,000 ft
> Ceiling: 29,000 ft.
> ...


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## tomo pauk (Nov 8, 2009)

freebird said:


> In fact, far from having "limited performance", the Firefly was in most every category better than the Helldiver.
> 
> Well, do you consider the Helldiver to be a failure? Because the US built more than 7,000 of them, and the Firefly's performance was similar or better than the Helldiver.
> 
> ...


.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 8, 2009)

freebird said:


> Tomo, the Fulmar, Corsair Hellcat are nowhere near contempories - The Fulmar came out in 1940, the Hellcat in 1943 and the Corsair in 1944. it's hardly a surprise that a 1944 fighter is far better than a 1940 one.
> 
> *Typo, it should be Firefly.*
> 
> ...



.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 8, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> I have no problem with Skua dive bomber, as one might find out in my 1st post in this thread. Actually, I'd build them even more, until something better is not available.
> However, I see no point in Roc, Sea Gladiator, Fulmar, Firefly. That's why I've proposed Hercules-engined, no-rear-MGs Skua to be fleet fighter. Also, Fairey would build Sea Hurricanes instead of Fulmars in my scenario.



Again, it depends on requirements and how much you know about the future.

The Roc was a definite turkey and since it was later in timing than the Skua, couldn't dive bomb and may not have had the navagation equipment of the Skua one doesn't even have to decry the turret fighter concept to see the last of it. But since none were actually used on carriers it doesn't change anything in RN capability if they are replaced. 

With only 98 Sea Gladiators built (and 38 of them an interm model) they achieved fame beyond their numbers. With a fair number of deliveries in 1938 and final deliveries in early 1939 there doesn't seem to be much scope for changing Gloster to Hurricane production much earlier than was done in WW II. Gloster delivering their first MK I Hurricane in November of 1939 out of a contract of 500. This production block was finished in April of 1940. All with metal wing. 

While a Hercules-engined, no-rear-MGs Skua might be a better aircraft than the existing one it still would have been a target for 109s. The Empty weight of the Skua was just a few hundred pounds less than a loaded 109. Adding about 500lbs worth of Hurcules and the much larger propeller is going to do strange things to the balance/CG. pulling the rear gunner and radio equipment from behind the CG isn't going to help things. With a wing bigger than the wing on P-47 the resulting aircraft is never going to be competive with a 109 even with 1300-1400hp. By the time you are done you might as well have started with a new airframe. 

The Fulmar is a bit more questionable. Does a carrier fighter need 450 miles of range or 750 miles of range?
Did the navagational aids (radio direction finder) the rear seat man operated justify the weight and bulk? Or as some of them were used in the Indian Ocean does the longer range radios they were re-equiped with for patrol work ( see range) help justify their existance?

I think I will stay out of the Firefly arguement.


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## parsifal (Nov 8, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> Parsifal,
> _I've asked you to provide some data about succeses of Fulmar/Firefly during poor weather, yet you provided none of that. Of course, the most interesting part is how many V-1s were shoot down by Firefly_.
> 
> So, the fact that the FAA adopted it a their principal night fighter defence, using the latest irborne interception radar is not relevant. Interesting rebuttal........basically your saying that you know better than the Royal Navy's procurement machine
> ...


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## Freebird (Nov 8, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> .
> 
> Who ever said anything about Helldiver?? I was questioning capabilities of Fulmar/Firefly as a fighter.



*Because it is not a fighter!~!!!!* It is a Fighter-bomber, and you ALWAYS lose perfomance as a fighter to be able to carry ordinance. The Firefly was as capable (or better) than a Helldiver, yet also capable as a fighter vs every Italian or Japanese twin engine bomber, or B6N, Stuka, He-111 etc. You just can't compare a fighter-bomber's performance to a single engine fighter, as it wasn't intended to go up against it.  




tomo pauk said:


> On the contrary. RN received Corsairs in early 1943,


 ?? Please provide some data as to when the orsair was operational on a RN arrier in early 1943. The 1833, 1834 sqd embarked in Dec 1943 on British carriers, departing Jan 1944 for the far east. These were the first operational corsairs on RN carriers



> In December 1943 the squadron embarked on HMS Illustrious as part of the 15th Naval Fighter Wing, sailing in January 1944 to Ceylon for the Eastern Fleet.



Fleet Air Arm 1833 squadron profile. Squadron Database of the Fleet Air Arm Archive 1939-1945



tomo pauk said:


> Fireflies were operational in June '44.



First squadron operational in the UK sept 1943


FleetAirArmArchive said:


> 1770 squadron. The squadron formed at Yeovilton as a 2-seater fighter squadron with 12 Firefly Is in September 1943. The first operational Firefly squadron.





tomo pauk said:


> Clipped-wing Corsair fit in nicely.


 No, it didn't


> Implacable: the height of the lower hangar was lowered by 2 feet so that both hangars had an overhead clearance of only 14 feet. The result was very cramped accommodation spaces, and a restriction on the type of aircraft that could be operated - *the hangars were too low for Corsairs,* and due to the unavailability of Hellcats the ships were compelled to carry short-range Seafires.



HMS IMPLACABLE aircraft carrier profile. Aircraft Carrier Database of the Fleet Air Arm Archive 1939-1945

Martlet? - The Marlet carried no bombs, and had only MG vs 4 x 20mm for the Firefly, very effective shooting down bombers.



tomo pauk said:


> Nice. A 1943 fighter that's only as fast as 1939.


 It is not a fighter!!!




tomo pauk said:


> Seafire was operational 2 years before, and would eat Firefly for breakfast. Same for Zero. Hell, Me-109E would tear it apart.
> The Hellcat need to be added for comparison, a much better fighter then Firefly.



I don't know how else I can try to explain The Firefly is not a fighter!!  It is a Fighter Bomber. It is not designed to best single seat fighters, it was designed as a 2 seat bomber/recon with some capability as a fighter.




tomo pauk said:


> Again, the Firefly as a bomber is another ball game.




Can you please explain then why the US would build 7,000 Helldivers, which had the same or inferior performance as a bomber to a Firefly?


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## parsifal (Nov 8, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> Parsifal,
> _I've asked you to provide some data about succeses of Fulmar/Firefly during poor weather, yet you provided none of that. Of course, the most interesting part is how many V-1s were shoot down by Firefly_.
> 
> So, the fact that the FAA adopted it a their principal night fighter defence, using the latest irborne interception radar is not relevant. Interesting rebuttal........basically your saying that you know better than the Royal Navy's procurement machine
> ...


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## Freebird (Nov 8, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> I see no point in Sea Gladiator, Fulmar,



So what exactly would the FAA be using in 1938, 1939 1940???

Remember, that building Hurricanes was not the only problem, it is that the testing of Hurris aboard RN carriers was not complete until the end of 1940, until that time they did not even know if a Hurricane was feasable of board carriers. In the meantime they badly needed fighters.


You cannot use the standard that "a Fighter bomber is not as capable as a fighter", because it is a trade off - you lose some performance for the ability to do multiple jobs with one aircraft.

Suppose you were to consider the pickup truck

1.) A pickup truck is slower than a Corvette
2.) A pickup truck carries less than a Dump Truck

3.) Therefore nobody would ever buy a pickup truck, because it it is slower than a sports car, and can't carry 20 tons of cargo. 

But if fact people do buy pickups.  It will never be as fast as a Ferrari, but it can carry a few hundred kilos of cargo, yet still small enough for driving around the city


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## tomo pauk (Nov 8, 2009)

As stated above, it was typo to said Fulmar instead Firefly in the post #44.

Next, since FAA made so many mistakes in deciding what planes should and should'nt be in their carriers, why should choosing some of them for NF role be regarded as holy grail? We still lack the hard info about what exactly Fulmars/Fireflies killed during night bad weather. And I don't know if more hillarious is statement about Hurri pilots being guided to Malta by Fulmars (how would they be able to found something smalled then island, in a sea bigger then Med?) or that Fireflies were tasked to kill V1s (since they made zero kills at He-111 missile-carriers anyway).

And was this a mistake on your behalf:


> According to the FAA website, the lowly Fulmar, air am site *is credited with 2/3 of the total kills by the FAA *.


..since the FAA website says:


> The Fulmar played important roles in the early defense of Malta and the defense of Ceylon, and went on to account *for nearly 1/3 of the aircraft shot down by the FAA in WWII*



Almost forgot: you've provided zero facts/numbers about combat range of Fulmar, Firefly, Corsair Hellcat...


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## tomo pauk (Nov 8, 2009)

freebird said:


> So what exactly would the FAA be using in 1938, 1939 1940???
> 
> *Perhaps you will note in my previous posts that I have no objections for the top-performing plane for 1938 to mid 39 (=Skua) and that I recomend upgrading the skua until something better is at disposal. *
> 
> ...


.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 8, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> And I don't know if more hillarious is statement about Hurri pilots being guided to Malta by Fulmars (how would they be able to found something smalled then island, in a sea bigger then Med?)



How about if the Fulmars, even if the back seater wasn't a trained navigator had a longer ranged radio than the Hurricanes and probalby had a radio direction finder that could home in on radio beacon?

Not so hillarious. 

For carrier use the fact that after a 4 hour flight the carrier could be 60-80 miles (slow carrier)from where the pilot took off ment that some sort of radio navigation aid was needed to get the planes back on board. Just like electronic of all sorts, these navagation aids may have gotton smaller, lighter and aiser to use as the war went on so that what a single seat fighter could be fitted with in 1943-44 was not the same as what could be fitted in 1940.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 8, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> And adding bomb racks to Hurri is no brain surgery.



No it is not but expecting a bomb equiped Hurricane to be able to perform carrier bomb strikes is evidence of a temporary brain fart. 

1. We seem to be talking about the MK I Hurricane here, 880hp for take-off using 87 octane fuel. Lets strap a couple of 250lb bombs to this puppy and see how well it gets off the carrier deck.
2. THe Hurricane had a range of about 425miles when clean. Not at all great for a carrier plane. Straping a pair of 250lb bombs to the plane is going to give you a really short ranged strike fighter. 
A Strike plane that cannot reach the enemy carrier while the enemy strike planes can reach your carrier doesn't sound like a good deal. Or having to come that much more into the range of land based air in order to launch a shore strike.

Switching to 100 octane does help the take-off but does zilch for range.

the MK II Hurricane (which is the one that actualy carried bombs) with it's MK XX engine doesn't start to show up until the late summer/fall of 1940 and the bomb racks don't show up until 1941. While the bomb racks might not be a big problem getting the 2 speed supercharger engines with their higher take-off power to lift the heavier load from the carreir decks might be. And you still have the range problem.

You still might have a bit of a problem fitting the 1939-40 nav-aids in the Hurricane.

US Navy still had Grumman F3F-23 biplanes on board at least one carrier in the summer of 1941

As to the Brain fart thing, I have hade more than a few of my own


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## Freebird (Nov 8, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> Almost forgot: you've provided zero facts/numbers about combat range of Fulmar, Firefly, Corsair Hellcat...



The numbers quoted earlier were from my book "Complete WWII Aircraft" Military Press, NY



> *So what exactly would the FAA be using in 1938, 1939 1940???*
> 
> Perhaps you will note in my previous posts that I have no objections for the top-performing plane for 1938 to mid 39 (=Skua) and that I recomend upgrading the skua until something better is at disposal.



Wrong - The Sea Gladiator out-performed the Skua as a fighter in 38 39, the Fulmar out-performed the Skua in 1940, and had a better range than the Sea Glad.


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## parsifal (Nov 9, 2009)

So it is obvious that we have reached an impasse about the issue. On the one hand we have the historical situation that saw the Gladiator, Skua, Fulmar and later the Firefly introduced. On the other hand we have the assertion that the RN would have been better off if it had waited until the Hurricane was available for service. In the case of the Firefly, the argument is slightly different, basically it runs that the Fleet air marm made a mistake to order and construct the Firefly, and would have been better off just sitting back and relying on the hellcat and corsair production.


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## parsifal (Nov 9, 2009)

The Skua

The Blackburn Skua was a fighter/dive-bomber used by the British Fleet Air Arm in the early years of World War II. All but forgotten now the Skua was flown in combat over Norway, the beaches of Dunkirk and in the Mediterranean. It gained the distinction of being the first Fleet Air Arm aircraft to shoot down a German aircraft in World War Two (a Dornier Do Flying boat on 26th September 1939) and also being the first aircraft to sink a major warship in wartime when Skuas sank the cruiser Königsberg in Bergen harbour on 10th April 1940. The Skua was also the first aircraft to carry out an interception of an enemy aircraft controlled by shipbourne radar. 
Specification:
Engine: Bristol Perseus XII nine cylinder, sleeve valve, air cooled radial engine rated at 815 hp (could give a higher power rating of over 900 hp for 5 mins on emergency boost).
Max Speed: 225 mph at 6,700 ft, 204 mph at sea level.
Service ceiling 20,500 ft (reached in 43 mins), the Skua had a very poor rate of climb.
Total fuel: 163 imperial gallons, giving a maximum range of some 760 miles (an endurance of over 4 hours).
Armament: Four Browning .303 machine guns in wings with 600 rounds per gun (nearly double the number of rounds-per-gun of a Hurricane or Spitfire). One Lewis .303 machine gun in rear cockpit (whenever possible the gunner would try to replace this with a Vickers "K" gun which was more reliable and had a higher rate of fire). One 500 lb semi-armour-piercing bomb(SAP) or one 500 lb armour-piercing (AP) or one 250 lb general purpose (GP) bomb recessed under fuselage and held in a bomb crutch to swing it clear of the propeller in dive bombing attacks. A "light series carrier" bomb rack could be fitted under each wing. Each carrier could hold 4 x 20 lb Cooper bombs or incendiaries or 2 x 40 lb bombs or incendiaries. 
The 500lb AP and SAP bombs was only used against armoured warships, for attacks on merchant ships and ground targets the normal bombload was a 250 lb bomb in the fuselage recess and either 20lb or 40lb bombs on the light series carriers. The 250 lb bomb had only a little less explosive content than the 500lb SAP and AP bombs (the extra weight of the latter was down to the casing, needed to punch through armour). If used against ground targets the SAP and AP bombs would often bury themselves deep before exploding, reducing the blast effect. The small and largely ineffective 100 lb anti-submarine (AS) bomb could also be carried in the fuselage recess.

The Skua prototypes used the well tried Bristol Mercury engine but use of these engines in the huge Blenheim bomber programme meant that production Skuas had to use the new Bristol sleeve valve Perseus engine. There is no evidence that the Perseus engine as used on the Skua was particularly unreliable in itself, but the new sleeve valve technology must have made maintenance more difficult and the Perseus's small production run must have made spares hard to find as the war years rolled by. The spin characteristics of the Skua were bad enough to prompt the fitting of an anti-spin parachute in the tail to aid recovery. 
When reading histories of the Fleet Air Arm in the Second World War you often find naval writers blame the lacklustre performance of the Skua on the RAF and Air Ministry who effectively ran the Fleet Air Arm and controlled its supply of aircraft until 24th April 1939. Meanwhile writers in the RAF camp blame the Skuas poor performance on the specifications laid down by the Admiralty, particularly for it having to share the role of fighter and dive bomber. It is interesting to note that both the USA's Dauntless dive bomber and the Japanese Aichi "Val" dive bomber are often praised for their ability to act as fighters in an emergency! It is also worth remembering that when Skuas joined the Fleet Air Arm they went to fighter squadrons which operated a mix of Hawker Nimrod single seat fighters and Hawker Osprey two seat fighter-bombers. There is no doubt that the FAA found the Osprey with its dual-role, longer endurance, and top speed only a little lower than its single seat stable-mate, a much more useful aircraft. A lot of the enthusiasm for "multi-role" aircraft in the FAA seems to have come from the pilots themselves, rather than the Admirals (see Geoffrey Till's book "Air Power and the Royal Navy 1914-1945"). The Skua was designed with a very specific task in mind, the sinking of enemy aircraft carriers, for which its single 500 lb bomb would have been more than adequate (only Britain developed and deployed aircraft carriers with armoured decks during World War II). The role of fighter was secondary (see chapter 9 of Peter C. Smith's "Dive Bomber! An Illustrated History" for details of how the specification for the Skua was drawn up). In combat however the Skua was forced to be used as a fighter much more often than as a dive bomber. Off Norway and in the Mediterranean its performance as a fighter was often better than might be imagined just looking at its modest speed in level flight. Its long endurance meant it could loiter at altitude (once it got there, it had a very poor rate of climb) and dive onto its victims. 

It was actually the pilot who was responsible for navigation and who had the maps in his cockpit. Having said that the TAG was essential to the pilot finding his way back to the carrier; the Skua carried an ingenious device that picked up radio signals from a rotating beacon on the aircraft carrier. This allowed to TAG to work out the bearing of the carrier and thus the Skua could find its way home even if the carrier had to change position because of enemy action. To work out the bearing the Telgraphist-Air gunner (TAG) in the Skua had to know the rotational speed of the beacon on the carrier (this made it extemely difficult for the enemy to use the same signals to home in on the carrier). The whole process was complicated, and could never have been done by the pilot, hence the need for a second crewman. Having said that a navigator (called an Observer in the wartime FAA) could be carried on a Skua for the purposes of finding the way to a target - For example the raid on the Königsberg and the flight to find the SS Fanad Head were both led by Skuas with an Observer, rather than a TAG, on board.

The Skua was built to Specification O.27/34 issued in 1934, two prototypes were ordered in 1935 and the first prototype (K5178) did not fly until nearly two years later on 9th Feb 1937. In October of that year it went for handling trials at A.&A.E.E. Martlesham.The second prototype (K5179) did not fly until 4th May 1938, and the first production Skua (L2867) flew on 28th August 1938. A total of 190 Skuas had been ordered as far back as July 1936, even before the first prototype had flown. Thus production was started a full two years after the order. However deliveries were prompt after that and over 150 had been delivered by the time War started, with all but one being delivered by the end of 1939. This meant that the Skua was very much a "new" aircraft when it first went to war and its pilots were still finding their way in this big metal monoplane aircraft with retractable undercarriage and enclosed cockpits, all a novelty to British carrier pilots of the time. 

One thing that should never be forgotten when considering the Skua is that it was custom-designed for operation from aircraft carriers. Its wings folded back to lie alongside the fuselage so that the aircraft could fit onto the lifts of even the oldest of the Royal Navy's carries. The small floor-space required by the Skua meant more could be carried aboard. The Skua was also built to float on water if ditched, with water-tight compartments to give the necessary bouyancy, and there was a dingy in a compartment in the rear fuselage; released by pulling a cable (although it didn't always work - see "Oh Calamity!")

The Skua had a major disadvantage in that it been designed without any armour protection for the crew or self-sealing fuel tanks to cope with bullet and shrapnel holes. An armoured windscreen and some armour plate behind the pilot was provided for combat squadrons in late 1940, but the poor TAG in the rear seat had no such protection and faced being roasted alive by the blow-torch flames of a burning fuel tank blown back by the airflow. It is reported that before each combat mission the TAG had to sign for a small bag which contained corks of various sizes with which he was expected to plug any bullet holes in the fuel tank!
Considering the small production run of only 190 aircraft the number of combats the Skua was involved in is phenomenal. See the "Norway" "Mediterranean" and "Dunkirk" pages for more details
So, the Skua was designed as a Divebomber, and happened to be pressed into service as an emergency fighter as an exigency of war. Hurricane MkIs converted to Sea hurricanes could not have carried bombs, could not possess the necessary range, (Skuas had an operational range of 750 miles, to the hurricanes 425 mile range) lacked the navigational refinements and would have basically halved the air complements for british carriers at the beginning of the war (wing folding may have , been introduced later, but as a 1939 emergency measure, one would have to reasonably assume that they would not have wing folding) 
On the other hand, there is little argument that as a day fighter, the Hurricane would have been far superior. Its just the little detail that the specification to which the Skua was designed could not be met by the Hurricane….it was an aircraft with a different role…


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## parsifal (Nov 9, 2009)

The Fulmar
The specifications for this type show a marked improvement in comparison to the Skua
General characteristics
•	Crew: Two 
•	Powerplant: 1× Rolls-Royce Merlin 30 liquid-cooled inline V-12, 1,300 hp (970 kW) 
Performance
•	Maximum speed: 272 mph at 7,250 ft (438 km/h at 2,200 m) 
•	Range: 780 mi (1,255 km) 
•	Service ceiling: 27,200 ft (8,300 m) 
•	Initial rate of climb: 366 m/min (1200 ft/min)
•	Wing loading: 28 lb/ft² (137 kg/m²) 
Armament
•	8 × 0.303 in (7.7 mm) Browning machine guns wing-mounted, and occasionally 1 × .303 in (7.7 mm) Vickers K machine gun in rear cabin 
•	2 × 100 lb (45 kg) or 250 lb (110 kg) bombs 

The Fulmar, a navalised version of the P.4/34 was submitted to meet Specification O.8/38 for a two-crew fleet defence fighter. As it was not expected to encounter fighter opposition, high performance or maneuverability was not considered important but long range and heavy armament were. The provision of a navigator/wireless operator was considered essential for the long, over-ocean flights which would be required.
Looking much like its sister, the Battle, the Fulmar prototype was aerodynamically cleaner and featured a folding wing that was 16 in (41 cm) shorter than its bomber lookalike. The prototype P.4/34 K5099 first flew on 13 January 1937 at Fairey Aviation's Great West Aerodrome (now London Heathrow Airport) with Fairey test pilot Chris Staniland at the controls. After the first flight tests, the tail was revised, being raised 8 in (20 cm).
The first prototype Fulmar acting as "flying mock-up" was powered by a 1,080 hp (810 kW) Rolls Royce Merlin III engine. With this engine, performance was poor, the prototype only reaching 230 mph (370 km/h). With the Merlin VIII engine - a variant unique to the Fulmar and with supercharging optimised for low-level flight - and aerodynamic improvements, speed was improved to 255 mph (410 km/h), which, owing to the desperate need for modern fighters, was considered adequate. As a simple derivative of an existing prototype, the Fulmar promised to be available quickly and an initial order for 127 production aircraft was placed in mid-1938 [3] and the first example flew from Fairey's facility at RAF Ringway near Manchester on 4 January 1940 and the last of 600 Fulmars was delivered from Ringway on 11 December 1942
The first squadron to be equipped with the Fulmar was No. 806 Squadron FAA in July 1940 and this squadron began operating from HMS Illustrious shortly afterwards. The Fulmar was not well matched with land-based fighters. The Navy had specified a two-seat machine, feeling that a navigator was needed to cope with the challenges of navigating over the open ocean. As a result, the Fulmar was far too large and unwieldy when it came into contact with single-seat, land-based opposition, as it did in the Mediterranean Theatre. Yet its long range was useful at times as evidenced in the 1941 chase of the German battleship Bismarck where Fulmars acted as carrier-borne spotters, tracking and trailing the fleeing battleship. 
First seeing action on Malta convoy protection patrols in September 1940, the sturdy Fulmar was able to achieve victories against its far more agile Italian and German adversaries. By the autumn, Fulmars had shot down ten Italian bombers and six enemy fighters, while giving top cover to the Swordfish raid on Taranto.
Fulmars played a prominent role in the ill-fated raid on Kirkenes and Petsamo in July 1941.
By 1942, the Fulmar was being replaced by single-seat aircraft adapted from land fighters such as the Supermarine Seafire or by American single seat fighters such as the Grumman Martlet. It saw useful service in nighttime roles as a convoy escort and intruder and was used to train crews for the Fairey Barracuda. On the other hand, its flight characteristics were considered pleasant, its wide undercarriage provided good deck handling capacities and it had excellent fuel capacity and range. Fulmars were used in long-range reconnaissance after they were withdrawn as fighters. Most Fleet Air Arm fighter aces scored at least part of their victories in Fulmars, for example, Sub Lieutenant S.G. Orr, finished the war with 12 confirmed air victories, as the third-highest scoring pilot in the FAA.
At one time, 20 squadrons of the FAA were equipped with the Fulmar. It flew from eight fleet aircraft carriers and five escort carriers. No. 273 Squadron RAF operated them for some months in 1942 from China Bay, Ceylon, seeing action against Japanese forces during the raid on 9 April 1942 ; though about half the squadron personel were Navy. Fulmars destroyed 112 enemy aircraft, which made it the leading fighter type, by aircraft shot down, in the Fleet Air Arm during the Second World War. The Fulmar ended its front line operational career on 8 February 1945, when a Fulmar MK II night-fighter from No. 813 Squadron had a landing accident at the safety barrier on HMS Campania and was written off .
Approximately 100 Fulmars were converted to a night fighter variant, but had limited success in this role. 
Once again, the Hurricane option is not realistic because it could not meet the multi-role specification 08/38. The Hurricane once again lacked the range and the navigational capabilities to undertake all of the required mission undertaken by the Fulmar. It did possess superior fighter performance but would have lacked wing folding in the early versions if we postulate an availability from 1939. That basically halves the aircraft availability from British carriers which would have had disastrous impacts on operations. That and the short range, inability to undertake the spotting role, and a complete lack of adequate range makes the type wholly inappropriate for the type of fighting the RN was engaged in 1939. far from enhancing the capabilities of the RN, these shortcomings would have lead to even heavier losses and the likely defeat of the alliance as a result


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## parsifal (Nov 9, 2009)

The Firefly 

The Firefly followed the same formula as the Fulmar, but was much more powerful and useful. Designed to N.5/40 - a merger of N.8139 and N.9139 - it was a clean stressed-skin machine with folding elliptical wings housing the four cannon and with the trailing edge provided with patented Youngman flaps for exceptional manoeuvrability and to used use at low speeds and in cruise. Unlike the installation on the Barracuda, these flaps could be recessed into the wing.
The pilot sat over the leading edge, with the observer behind the wing. The main wartime version was the Mk 1, widely used from the end of 1 943 in all theatres. Fairey and General Aircraft built 429 F.1s, 376 FR.Is with ASH radar and then 37 NF.2 night fighters. There followed the more powerful Mk Ill, from which derived the redesigned FR.4 with two-stage Griffon and wing-root radiators. There were 160 of these

Designed to Admiralty Specification N.5140, calling for a two-seat reconnaissance strike fighter, the Fairey Firefly represented a considerable advance over the company's earlier Fulmar. A cantilever low-wing monoplane of all-metal construction, it had a conventional tail unit, retractable tailwheel landing gear and accommodation for the pilot and navigator/radio-operator in separate enclosed cockpits. Power was provided by a 1,730 hp (1290 kW) Rolls-Royce Griffon IIB engine, but later production Firefly F.Mk 1 aircraft had the 1,990 hp (1484-kW) Griffon XII. The first of four development aircraft was flown on 22 December 1941, and the first production Firefly F.Mk 1 aircraft were delivered in March 1943. A total of 459 of this version was built, 327 by Fairey and 132 by General Aircraft under sub-contract. The addition of ASH radar beneath the engine identified the Firefly FR.Mk 1, of which 236 were built, and a number of Firefly F.Mk Is modified to Firefly FR.MK 1 standard had the designation Firefly F.Mk IA. A Firefly NF.Mk 11 night-fighter version was developed, but when it was realised that its AI Mk 10 radar could be pod mounted beneath the engine, as with the ASH radar of the Firefly FR.MK 1, the planned 328 aircraft programme was cancelled. Instead, 140 Firefly FR.MK Is were modified on the production line to Firefly NF.Mk 1 configuration, the 37 Firefly NF.Mk IIs that had been built being converted back to Mk 1 standard.

Fireflies entered service first with No. 1770 Squadron at Yeovilton, Somerset, on 1 October 1943. Later embarked on HMS Indefatigable, they were active in operations against the German battleship Tirpitz in Norway during July 1944. They also saw action against Japanese oil refineries in Sumatra, in attacks on the Carolines and against shipping and ground targets in the Japanese home islands. In 1950, after war broke out in Korea, Firefly Mk 5s were operated from Australian and British light fleet carriers, and in 1954 the type was in action in the ground-attack role in Malaya. Just over two years later the Firefly was retired after 13 years of valuable service. 
Specifications (Fairey Firefly AS.Mk 5)
Type: Two Seat Naval Reconnaissance Fighter / Anti Submarine Strike Aircraft
Design: Fairey Aviation Design Team 
Manufacturer: The Fairey Aviation Company 
Powerplant: (AS.Mk 5) One 2,250 hp (1678 kW) Rolls-Royce Griffon 74 12-cylinder Vee piston engine. (Mk I up to No 470) One 1,730 hp (1290 kW) Rolls-Royce Griffon IIB 12-cylinder Vee liquid-cooled; (from No 471) 1,990 hp (1485 kW) Griffon XII. (Mks 4-7) One 2,250 hp (1678 kW) Griffon 74 12-cylinder Vee piston engine.
Performance: (AS.Mk 5) Maximum speed 386 mph (618 km/h) at 14,000 ft (4265 m); cruising speed 220 mph (354 km/h); service ceiling 28,000 ft (8534 m). (Mk I) Maximum speed 316 mph (509km/h); initial climb rate 1,700 ft (518m) per minute; service ceiling 28,000 ft (8534 m). (Mk 4) Maximum speed 386 mph (618 km/h); initial climb rate 2,050 ft (625 m) per minute; service ceiling 31,000 ft (9450 m).
Range: (AS.Mk 5) 1300 miles (2092 km) on internal fuel. (Mk I) 580 miles (933 km) on internal fuel. (Mk 4) 760 miles (1223 km) on internal fuel.
Weight: (AS.Mk 5) Empty 9,674 lbs (4388 kg) with a maximum take-off weight of 16,096 lbs (7301 kg). (Mk I) Empty 9,750 lbs (4422 kg) with a maximum take-off weight of 14,020 lbs (6359 kg). (Mk 7) Empty 11,016 lbs (4997 kg) with a maximum take-off weight of 13,970 lbs (6337 kg).
Dimensions: (Mk 4 - 6) Span 41 ft 2 in (12.55 m); length 37 ft 11 in (8.51 m); height 14 ft 4 in (4.37 m); wing area 330.0 sq ft (30.66 sq m). (Mk I - III) Span 44 ft 6 in (13.55m); length 37 ft 7 in (11.4 m); height 13 ft 7 in (4.15 m).
Armament: (Mk I) Four fixed 20 mm Hispano cannon in wings and underwing racks for up to two 1,000 lbs (454 kg) of bombs or sixteen 60 lbs (27 kg) rocket projectiles. (Mk 4 and 5) usually similar to 1 in most sub-types. (Mk 6) no guns, but underwing load increased to 3,000 lbs (1362 kg) and varied. (Mk 7) no guns, but underwing load remained at 3,000 lbs (1362 kg) and equipment changed.
Variants: Firefly F.Mk 1, Firefly FR.Mk 1, Firefly F.Mk IA, Firefly NF.Mk 11, Firefly NF.Mk I, Firefly T.Mk 1, Firefly T.Mk 2, Firefly T.Mk 3, Firefly F.Mk III, Firefly F.Mk IV, Firefly FR.Mk 4, Firefly TT.Mk 4, Firefly Mk 5, Firefly Mk 6, Firefly FR.Mk 5, Firefly NF.Mk 5, Firefly AS.Mk 5, Firefly AS.Mk 6, Firefly TT.Mk 5, Firefly TT.Mk 6, Firefly, AS.Mk 7, Firefly T.Mk 7 ASW, Firefly U.Mk 8, Firefly U.Mk 9.
Avionics: AI Mk X radar, ASH Scanner, sonobuoys.
History: First flight 22 December 1941; first production F.1 26 August 1942; production FR.4. 25 May 1945; final delivery of new aircraft May 1955.
Operators: United Kingdom (RN), Canada (RCN), Australia.
Number Built: ~1533

In this case the case is made that the Firefly was not as effective as the later war US Hellcats and Corsairs. Yet once again, we find that the Hellcats and Corsairs would have been unable to meet the design specification N5/40. It is worth noting that the design specs for the Firefly were issued before the Hellcat or Corsair were available, so it would have been an enormous leap of faith not to initiate the design and production of the firefly at a time when neither US type was available . Moreover, neither US type could fulfil the multi-role mission assigned to the Firefly. Neither the Hellcat or the Corsair could undertake the all-weather missions of the Firefly, could not undertake long range strike missions. They could undertake the night fighter role but it is a mute point as to how effective either the Brit or the US types type and were since by the time they were operational as night fighters, the opposition had ceased to be numerous. I have read, but cannot confirm of several night interceptions of He11s by Fireflies over the North Sea, so it should not require too much argument to establish the types credentialas as an effective night fighter….


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## tomo pauk (Nov 9, 2009)

Parsifal, could you please divide the excerpts from the sources and your views/opinions? Like wrapping them to quote tags or something?


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## parsifal (Nov 9, 2009)

I take it you have not much to say. These are excerpts from various sources, but are my own work as the text is not original. There is therefore no need to use quotes, as they are not quotes perse, rather an amalgam of multiple sopurce material 

I want to see you try and say the Hellcat and Corsairs were superior to to the Fulmars and Skuas in 1940 just one more time......


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## tomo pauk (Nov 9, 2009)

parsifal said:


> So it is obvious that we have reached an impasse about the issue. On the one hand we have the historical situation that saw the Gladiator, Skua, Fulmar and later the Firefly introduced. On the other hand we have the assertion that the RN would have been better off if it had waited until the Hurricane was available for service. In the case of the Firefly, the argument is slightly different, basically it runs that the Fleet air marm made a mistake to order and construct the Firefly, and would have been better off just sitting back and relying on the hellcat and corsair production.



I'm posting to the warfare forums for about a decade. I also try to learn about warfare for last 30 years. During that time, I've seen people question quality of German Russian tanks, Allied tanks, Italian Japanese planes, partisans, scouts, ships, stategies and tactics. And many people made valuable points about the shortcomings, while proposing something both better and available for the era.

Yet, the only thing that stands beyond any sort of criticism is RN policy of purchase, esp in 1935-45 time frame.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 9, 2009)

parsifal said:


> I take it you have not much to say.
> *Well, there you are wrong.*
> These are excerpts from various sources, but are my own work as the text is not original. There is therefore no need to use quotes, as they are not quotes perse, rather an amalgam of multiple sopurce material
> 
> I want to see you try and say the Hellcat and Corsairs were superior to to the Fulmars and Skuas in 1940 just one more time......



Parsifal, since I've said TWICE that I've made typo ONCE, should I take this like personal or something?
Still no numbers about Fulmar/Firefly night bad weather kills...


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## tomo pauk (Nov 9, 2009)

freebird said:


> Can you please explain then why the US would build 7,000 Helldivers, which had the same or inferior performance as a bomber to a Firefly?



Now why would I explain why US bought Helldivers, and why anybody would do that in this thread?
And could you please quote your post in this thread that states combat ranges of Faireys, Corsair Hellcat?


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## merlin (Nov 9, 2009)

Well I thought Parsfail's posts #61, 62, 63 were very good and informative, and I too have that excellent 'Dive Bomber' book.

Whilst some have advocated Sea Hurricanes for a multi-role function - even before it was used as a fighter-bomber OTL. I think a more plausible alternative scenairo would have been Hawkers putting forward a Skua replacement in the form of a Sea Henley i.e. Fighter Dive-Bomber. 
Shouldn't be a problem putting guns in the wings, and while any naval additions may degrade max speed from the 290+ mph, it will be much faster than a Skua, while range was nearly 200 miles more. Indeed, it could negate the need for the Fulmar.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 9, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> Yet, the only thing that stands beyond any sort of criticism is RN policy of purchase, esp in 1935-45 time frame.



Oh, I think one can criticise the RN policy of Purchase in that time frame. After all the Roc was not exactly a steller idea

But since it was never used on a carrier substituting something else wouldn't have made much difference to historical operations.

The Fairey Albacore was another plane whose time had come and gone before it entered squadron service. While the crews that manned it did good service It was time for the Naval Air Service to be looking at a monoplane torpedo bomber. THe thing is that it would have to be purpose built and not an adaptation of an existing airframe. The specification that lead to the Barracuda was issued about one year after the Albacores specification. As to why it took 6 years to go from specification to service use of the Barracuda, maybe somebody elese knows. 

The whole Blackburn Firebrand story needs a little explaining.

When looking at Naval aircraft one has to keep in mind the Naval requirements. And just because a land plane was used from carriers doesn't mean it was a good idea. Please look at the Grumman Wildcat and a Hurricane. Similar powered engines. Similar sized wings. Yet the Wildcat is a rather heavier aircraft. Landing gear and structure had to deal with higher vertical velocity landings. The Wildcat carried much more fuel. The Wildcat had a heavier radio/comm gear intallation. Then we get to the folding wing part.
Also please note that the Wildcat isn't ordered into production until Aug of 1939 and the first production plane isn't delivered until Aug of 1940. This is the fixed wing version. 
A "TRUE" Sea Hurricane built from the start to incorperate Naval requirements is going to have even less performance than the Sea Hurricanes they did get. While such a plane would have better performance than the Fulmar is it going to be good enough to make much difference against land based 109s? Especially in 1939-40 using the MK III Merlin engines.


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## buffnut453 (Nov 9, 2009)

Folks,

Interesting discussions but the pivotal issue appears to have been a predilection in the FAA for mult-role, or at least multi-purpose, aircraft. This was perhaps driven by the relatively smaller size of the RN's aircraft carriers compared to those of America and Japan, or maybe by the pre-war political tug-of-war between the Admiralty and the Air Ministry over who "owned" aircraft operating from aircraft carriers (the latter ultimately won the argument until, if memory serves, 1939 when the Admiralty took charge again - it would be interesting to view these political machinations with the issuance of specifications for the Skua, Roc, Fulmar, Firefly etc). 

KR
Mark H (LKBS)


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## parsifal (Nov 9, 2009)

I dont think anyone here is saying the RN FAA was beyond criticism. Of the "big three" naval powers, Britain FAA was the least well prepared.

But what does draw criticism are these simplistic comparisons that dont lookat the unique situations that the RN was fightiung under. It is not valid to compare the operational requirements of the pacific navies to those of the RN. The situations and the requirements were so different as to make comparisons meaningless. The need for high performance combat machines at just about any cost was a luxury that could not be adopted in the Atlantic. The weather, the closed nature of the seas, the paucity of carrier numbers made other issues just as, if not more important. And then, if you add into the mix the peculiarities of the RN itself, you tend to get rather strange results. Oh and one more thing to note....insofar as the FAA was concerned, it was not its own master until 1937. The procurement machine that you want to attackj was actually controlled by the RAF until 1938 IIRC.

So what were the shortcoming of the FAA. I would say numbers mostly, followed by some faulty doctrines. The lack of high performance is obvious as well. But the FAAs strengths were enough to cancel out its shortcomings, and it eventually won decisively...


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## Juha (Nov 11, 2009)

Hello Shortround
at least one reason to long development history of Barracuda was that it was torpedo bomber/dive bomber, again one of those multi-purpose a/c for RN. Also Swordfish and Albacore could dive bomb but the double role was more difficult for a monoplane and so complicated the development.

Juha


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## Nikademus (Nov 12, 2009)

Here's some info on loss/success for the Fulmar in the Med 40-42 based on my study of Shores' two books on Malta.

lost - 40

1 - D-520
3 - CR-42
1 - MC-200
1 - MC-202
1 - RE-2001 (or 109)
3 - FAA
5 - Ground (air attack)
1 - AA
1 - Z-1007bis
6 - S-79
1 - Z-506B
1 - Z-501
1 - Ju-88
3 - Ju-87
11 - op losses

Kills - 67

5 x Z-1007bis
4 x BR-20M
15 x S-79
5 x S-84
1 x S-81
13 x Z-506B
9 x Z-501
5 x Ju-87
8 x Ju-88
1 x Ju-52
1 x Bf-110


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## Terry McGrady (Nov 12, 2009)

Nikademus said:


> Here's some info on loss/success for the Fulmar in the Med 40-42 based on my study of Shores' two books on Malta.
> 
> lost - 40
> 
> ...



Hi Nikedamus 
I've come up with much the same . Factoring out the Operational losses and AA and destroyed on ground , the Air to Air combats are nearly 3 to1 in favour of the Fulmar . Not Bad for an A/C that was developed from a Light Bomber
Cheers
Terry McGrady


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## Nikademus (Nov 12, 2009)

no, its not bad. The Fulmar did provide valuable services during it's deployment on carriers in the Med and should not be discounted. At the same time, it's limitations were also on display, increasing as time went by. It's limited climb and speed made it tough to intercept speedy bombers and of course against single engine fighters, it was at a severe disadvantage. However coupled with decent FD, it's weaknesses in changing it's vectoring could be compensated for somewhat....emphasis on somewhat, for example during Pedestal it was confined primarily to sealevel/low level interceptions because it simply couldn't get to altitude fast enough either from patrol, or taking off from the carrier as reinforcements to intercept in time. Additionally, it's very large size and unwieldly nature also made it more vulnerable to enemy bomber return fire as well as enemy fighters. An additional positive mentioned, important for the British given the large # of unblooded pilots shiped, was the generous ammo coupled with alot of MG's

Overall it might be said that the design philosphy embraced the assumption that carrier fighters by default would compare unfavorably to land based fighters thus attributes other than pure performance vs. enemy fighters might be stressed or at least focused on. This gave the plane a limited scope and a shelf life but it wasn't a "bad" plane per se. On land, at Malta, the plane was quickly relegated to night ops due to it's vulnerability to fighters.


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## parsifal (Nov 13, 2009)

Great summary, and agree pretty much in entirety. 

The argument that has raged over this thread is whether the RN would have been better off with adopting the Sea Hurricane earlier, rather than developing the Fulmar.

In one sense the SH was better, namely in combat performace. However in terms of range, nav ability, strike and recon capability, I think the SH was unable to do the task, or would have done it poorly. Given the limited capacity of Brit carriers, multi role functionality was considered essential in RN carrier doctrine....

Was this a valid position for the RN to adopt???? i think that it was


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## tomo pauk (Nov 13, 2009)

Hi, Nikademus,
Could you please provide some info about the distances between kills/intercepts and carriers (from wich Fulmars were flown)? And some info about Sea Gladiators would be greatly appreciated.


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## Nikademus (Nov 13, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> Hi, Nikademus,
> Could you please provide some info about the distances between kills/intercepts and carriers (from wich Fulmars were flown)? And some info about Sea Gladiators would be greatly appreciated.



UK carriers generally flew patrols around the carrier's immediate vacinity in section strength (3 aircraft....sometimes 4) These would be given titles by color aka "Blue section", "Yellow section", "Red section" etc etc. These sections were controlled by the home carrier and vectored onto contacts detected by radar. Sometimes a standing patrol might make a visual contact first but usually radar would detect them first. Combats often occured within visual sight of the carrier and convoy/escorts which during the really hairy times meant that UK fighters might have to fight through and/or watch out for their own AA. For some of the larger raids, assuming availability, any leftover fighter planes would be in ready condition and would be scrambled and vectored. Assigned patrol height varied initially......it might be as low as 2000 feet or as high as 13-15k. Wartime experience + availability of more powerful navalized aircraft saw the Fulmars assigned to low alt patrol sections due to their poor climb and speed. Sea Hurricanes would take the high patrols.

Against unescorted bomber opposition or the lone snooper, the Fulmars were effective though against the speedier bombers like the Ju-88 catching one was difficult and advance vectoring very important. During one notable action a Fulmar crew was shagrinned to see a Ju-88 with a damage to an engine still out hauling them as it made it's escape. 

After Illustrious was badly damaged, Malta became home for section of 806 Fulmars. Initially, these operated during the day, patroling and scrambling to intercept enemy contacts. Initially they didn't do too bad but after the Luftwaffe showed up, general "Fulmar" policy was for the big planes to remain around the fringes of a raid and to try and pick off stragglers, leaving the infighting to the speedier, more nimble Hurricanes. Little success was acheived because they were too slow to have much chance of catching a speedy Ju-88 or Bf-110 fleeing the scene [Shores]

Fulmar daylight ops came to a prompt end after the first 109E's showed up right from day one. March 2, 41 a notable day as the full section of Fulmars got jumped by a Kette of 109's that thankfully only made one slashing pass,badly shooting up all three planes which promptly made emergency landings. Amazingly none of the three pilots were wounded.

Sea Gladiator.

Including the planes based during the earliest days of the fighting on Malta, Sea Gladiators scored approximately 11 kills 40-41. None were lost in combat as far as I can tell.

7 x S-79
2 x S-81
1 x Z-506B
1 x Z-501


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## tomo pauk (Nov 14, 2009)

Thanks a lot, Nikademus.


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## Vincenzo (Nov 14, 2009)

for full report to Gladiator operation on Malta can see here Hkans Aviation page - Gloster Gladiators and Fiat CR.42s over Malta 1940-42

my count 
6 or 7 S.M. 79 (one crashed on landing not sure for enemy fighter damage)
1 S.M. 81
1 Z. 501
1 Z. 506
1 M.C. 200
1 C.R. 42 
1 Ju 88

for 1 (sea) Gladiator


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## VG-33 (Nov 15, 2009)

Hello,

About Skua, i never inderstood why the Stuka was intended to be the terror of the sky, but Skua a bad one in general litterature...

Yes, Skua was carrying less bombs maybe, but had more resistant to groundfire air cooled engine, retracting gear, and was able to operate from carriers.

If something should have been bad, it's not the plane itself but the programm specification O27/37.

I wouldn' t qualify it *bad*, rather *obsolete*. Remember that it was expressed in 1933 and published in 1934!
The Skua was designed in 1935, first flew in 37 and first went to regiments at 1938th end.

Why the hell dit it takes 5 full years, i don't know! But for 1935 it was an advanced plane.

I'm amused by some your previous posts. Like use a more powerful engine, just like that: give me the salt please. Did anywone glanced on Skua's airframe stress calculations, is there any proof that it had potentiality to withstand more weight and more power ? 
If yes, that means it was really a weak thought and bad concieved plane: overweighted and not optimised.
In fact i have to much respet for chef-engeener GE Petty to suppose that. The fact is that a dive plane have to support high structural efforts combibed by hy dynamic pressure and high G forces. A good dive bomber is a just enough calculated one, with small margins and evolution capabilities, since it's naturally heavy from the mainstream.


BTW. It remembers me the programm request that led to the Potez 630. The french engeeners made the best that could do a reconnaissance plane with two 2 500-700 hp engines. But was it possible to make a good plane with such a weak engines, by *drastic economy* measures?

I think, since the RNAS was integrated to the RAF, the Air Ministry giving credits in prior to FC or BC, the RN always had that financial means problem. So why the O27/37 request, a plane that could do everything. A cheap solution. But cheap solutions are always costly by technical and human losses in the real war...

Regards


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## tomo pauk (Nov 15, 2009)

Hello VG,
Since all planes that mattered (not only in WWII) received stronger engines during their careers, there is no reason that Skua would be unable to be upgraded as such. 

A agree with your view on RN/FAA specifications.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 15, 2009)

Vincenzo said:


> for full report to Gladiator operation on Malta can see here Hkans Aviation page - Gloster Gladiators and Fiat CR.42s over Malta 1940-42
> 
> my count
> 6 or 7 S.M. 79 (one crashed on landing not sure for enemy fighter damage)
> ...



That makes 12 (13?) kills against 1 loss. Not bad at all.


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## VG-33 (Nov 15, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> Hello VG,
> Since all planes that mattered (not only in WWII) received stronger engines during their careers, there is no reason that Skua would be unable to be upgraded as such.
> 
> A agree with your view on RN/FAA specifications.



Fighter, bombers maybe. They are not submitted to the same efforts. You increase power (bigger engine), means you increase speed, means you increase weight, means you decrease admissible G-number. It's as simple.
If you (your plane) cannot withstand enough G anymore, you can't recover from a dive without breaking your plane. It's even simplier.

Either you need to reinforce and restress your plane, either design another one.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 15, 2009)

VG-33 said:


> Fighter, bombers maybe. They are not submitted to the same efforts.
> 
> *Most of the fighters found themselves carrying bombs, some even dive bombing (P-51, F4U). So their loads were much greater then of their early series, yet managed not to blow themselves in mid air.*
> 
> ...



.


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## VG-33 (Nov 15, 2009)

AFAIK, P-51 ...no, rather A-36 Invader was frankly bad on the dive bomber rule (from Jeff Ethell), F4U not so good (from Aéronavale pilots). But it is not the question.

If they managed not to blow themselves in the air, does not prouve the Skua did. It's at least as big but much lighter.


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## Civettone (Nov 15, 2009)

VG-33 said:


> Like use a more powerful engine, just like that: give me the salt please.


  That was funny !! 


Kris


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## Shortround6 (Nov 15, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> Hello VG,
> Since all planes that mattered (not only in WWII) received stronger engines during their careers, there is no reason that Skua would be unable to be upgraded as such.



Define "stronger engine" please?

The incease from a 2000hp P-47 to a 2800HP P-47 was only a few hundred pounds (mostly for the paddle blade propeller), Likewise even going from a Spitfire MK I to a MK IX involves only a few hundred pounds for the two stage Merlin and another 100-200lbs for the 4 bladed prop. 

Many aircraft recieved uprated versions of their original engines, some aircraft reciived alterantive engines that were somewhat close in weight. How many planes got engines that were 50% heavier than the original engines. I am talking about planes that were in service, not a prototype that could be reworked to accept a bigger engine when the original proved not up to the task. Especially single engined planes.

Changing from a Perseus to a Hercules is closer to a 600pound change not including the propeller. The Skua weighed 5,490lbs empty according to one book, About 1000lbs lighter than some models of the Dauntless and around 4,500lbs less than the Helldiver with it's R-2600. 

Now maybe the The British could have improved the Perseus more than they did but it was seen as a dead end engine. 1520cu in of aircooled engine was never going to be a war winner. Even if it is re-rated for 100octane fuel and gets the same power per liter as a 1600hp Hercules you have a 1030 HP engine. This is an improvement over the original engine but it is not enough in 1941 and later compared to the other planes in that catagory.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 15, 2009)

Shortround6 said:


> Define "stronger engine" please?
> 
> The incease from a 2000hp P-47 to a 2800HP P-47 was only a few hundred pounds (mostly for the paddle blade propeller), Likewise even going from a Spitfire MK I to a MK IX involves only a few hundred pounds for the two stage Merlin and another 100-200lbs for the 4 bladed prop.
> 
> ...



By stronger I mean more powerful, sorry if I was not clear.

Spit received 60% power increase from Mk.I to Mk.IX. Or 100% increase against Mk.XIV.
Hurricane - some 90% between 1st series and Mk.IV.
Bf-109 - almost 3 (three!) times from B to K.
P-51: 60% up from A to H.
Ju-87: 100% more power already in 1942.
Ju-88: 50% for dive bombers only; 100% difference in power between early series and late war ones
Italian early monoplane fighters received 40-80% more power with DB engines aboard.

The empty weights were also increased to cater for greater power loads.

The Taurus (Albacore's engine) was my prime choice for a 'Skua Mk.II' proposal. It managed to deliver 1000+ HP in 1939, and was in Mercury's/Perseus' weight range.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 15, 2009)

Please note that in the case of the some of the British planes using Merlins much of the increse in HP was from rerating and/or modifying the same engine to use more manifold pressure. Some of the Early Merlins picked up close to 30% this way while using the VERY SAME engine that came in the plane. 

Just what Hurricane had a 1960HP engine? 1030Hp plus 90%?
the Bf109 is questionable. Just how many parts were interchangable between a B model and K?
tail, wings, landing gear?
P-51 does have more power but again there were some airframe changes and the two engines weren't much different in size and weight. Larger radiators, oil coolers and the inter cooler radiator may also have helped balanced the heavier engine and propeller. Later versons had enlarged tail surfaces.

JU 87, Yes an engine change. Differences between an "A" and "B" include aerodynamic and structural redesign. The Fuselage was recontoured, the canopy changed, the vertical tail surfaces enlarged and landing gear changed from a braced set up to a cantliever one. Changes on the "D" model include enlargeing the tail surfaces again and when we get to the D-5 model it is fitted with extended outer wing panes to enlarge the wing area and bring the wing loading back down.

JU-88 enlarged wing and bigger tail surfaces on some of the later models. not to mention structual changes to accomadate the much greater weights.

Can some planes be modified? Sure but some planes were easier to modify than others. 

THe Skua starts as an in between airplane. Because of it's multi-role start it's wing is a little on the small side for a bomber. THis did help keep the weight and drag down for the fighter role. It's engine was first rate in 1937-38 but it's lack of size ment that there was a lack of growth. And the British just didn't have a good alternative. The Taurus offered another 30cu in (1/2 liter) of displacement but used more cylinders and higher RPM to get it's power. And offering 22% more power for 18% more bare weight of engine doesn't look like the way to go for big increases in performance. By the time you figure in the heavier propeller, the larger oil tank. The larger heavier cowl and exhaust systems and the extra fuel to feed it are going decrease the power advantage.
Yes the converted plane will have extra performance but is it going to be enough to make a real difference? an extra 10-20mph isn't going to change much of anything. 
ANd if your engineers are working on this project they are not working on the the Skua's replacement and even with a Taurus the Skua is not going to be a competive airplane in late 1942 and 1943. 

As a Side note, for some reason almost every aircraft intrended to fill the dive bomber role AFTER the Skua, Dauntless, Val, and JU 87 turned out to be a dog, or took so long to develop that it was rendered obsolete in short order.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 15, 2009)

My mistake abut Hurricane, it was 50% increase. Other examples still stand.

I agree that the more HP you add, the more changes to the airframe need to be done. Since we're adding 22% more HP to Skua, changes would be minimal.


> The Taurus offered another 30cu in (1/2 liter) of displacement but used more cylinders and higher RPM to get it's power. And offering *22% more power for 18% more bare weight of engine* doesn't look like the way to go for big increases in performance.



Wrong mathematics about those 18%. 
We need to add the weight difference to the plane's weight and THEN compare weights. So we add 125 kg to Skua's original weight to have 2615 kg for Skua with Taurus. We could add some 50 kg for the accessories you noted, and the result is 2665kg. So the new plane weights under 7% more then old, with power increased 22%.
The resulting plane (Skua Mk.II  )has the same wing loading engine power as Fulmar Mk.I, while being more then 1000 lb  lighter. It has 2 MGs less. 



> Yes the converted plane will have extra performance but is it going to be enough to make a real difference? an extra 10-20mph isn't going to change much of anything.
> ANd if your engineers are working on this project they are not working on the the Skua's replacement and even with a Taurus the Skua is not going to be a competive airplane in late 1942 and 1943.


We can take a look what fighters did have FAA possessed from 1938 to the end of 1940:
Sea Gladiator, 4 MGs, 410 km/h, short range, good climb
Fulmar Mk.I, 8 MGs, 410 km/h, good range, slow climb, only from sept '40
Roc, 4MGs, 360 km/h, good range, slow climb, not used on carriers, 100+ kg heavier then Skua upgraded as above, less HP
Plus the Skuas as 'auxiliary fighters'.

So instead to build Roc (136 pcs built),we (Boulton Paul or Fairey or Blackburn actually) would build Skua Mk.II, some 700 pcs. That way we could also replace Sea Gladiators ( 60 pcs built) and have fighter a tad better then Fulmar I (250 pcs built) half a year before. Since Skua can dive-bomb, we have added value. Also the original Skuas would be replaced. 

And for 1941, the choice numbers available would be much better then for the dark 1940.



> As a Side note, for some reason almost every aircraft intrended to fill the dive bomber role AFTER the Skua, Dauntless, Val, and JU 87 turned out to be a dog, or took so long to develop that it was rendered obsolete in short order


Good call.


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## buffnut453 (Nov 15, 2009)

Shortround6 said:


> As a Side note, for some reason almost every aircraft intrended to fill the dive bomber role AFTER the Skua, Dauntless, Val, and JU 87 turned out to be a dog, or took so long to develop that it was rendered obsolete in short order.



Was that because of poor performance/long development or simply the fact that dive bombing as a means of delivering aerial munitions became obsolete? The onset of high-performance fighters and integrated air defence networks effectively relegated dive bombing to tactical army support where, by the middle of the war, fighter aircraft could deliver a similar payload at similar ranges using shallow-angle dive techniques and still defend itself or be re-roled for fighter missions. Use of fighters to provide tactical ground support also simplified logistics by reducing the number of different aircraft types that had to be maintained in a given theatre.

Just wondering...


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## Civettone (Nov 16, 2009)

I agree that we should be careful about imagining aircraft simply getting a stronger or even heavier engine with only minor alterations. In fact, it goes for all new versions we have in our heads. Although I love to think about these possibilities I am very sceptical about them. 
But ... given the data by Tomo I think the Skua with a Taurus seems to be quite possible.



buffnut453 said:


> Was that because of poor performance/long development or simply the fact that dive bombing as a means of delivering aerial munitions became obsolete? The onset of high-performance fighters and integrated air defence networks effectively relegated dive bombing to tactical army support where, by the middle of the war, fighter aircraft could deliver a similar payload at similar ranges using shallow-angle dive techniques and still defend itself or be re-roled for fighter missions. Use of fighters to provide tactical ground support also simplified logistics by reducing the number of different aircraft types that had to be maintained in a given theatre.
> 
> Just wondering...


That was my thought exactly buffnut !

Also adding that the main reason of existence for dive bombers was their great accuracy, something which was achieved later by better bomb sights. From that point on the Stuka was used more often as a low flying ground support aircraft instead of a tactical bomber as used in the beginning of the war. 

Kris


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## Shortround6 (Nov 16, 2009)

buffnut453 said:


> Was that because of poor performance/long development or simply the fact that dive bombing as a means of delivering aerial munitions became obsolete? The onset of high-performance fighters and integrated air defence networks effectively relegated dive bombing to tactical army support where, by the middle of the war, fighter aircraft could deliver a similar payload at similar ranges using shallow-angle dive techniques and still defend itself or be re-roled for fighter missions. Use of fighters to provide tactical ground support also simplified logistics by reducing the number of different aircraft types that had to be maintained in a given theatre.
> 
> Just wondering...[/QUOTE}
> 
> It may have come from over ambitious specifications. The new generation's of dive bombers were supposed to carry more bombs (often double), fly much faster and have longer range,and as an aside often care much haevier fixed forward firing armament too. All with a single engine that, at times, was NOT the most powerful one available. Enclosed bomb bays were often required and couple all of th above with the landing/take-off requirements of carrier operations AND minimum dimensions and folding wings.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 16, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> I agree that the more HP you add, the more changes to the airframe need to be done. Since we're adding 22% more HP to Skua, changes would be minimal .



Since you are changing froma 9 Cylider engine to a 14 cyl engine the changes may not be minimal, they may be doable but may require moving the firewall back and a redesigned nose to fit the smaller diameter engine(might actually improve the view over the nose).



tomo pauk said:


> Wrong mathematics about those 18%. .



They were for the weight of the bare engine.


tomo pauk said:


> We need to add the weight difference to the plane's weight and THEN compare weights. So we add 125 kg to Skua's original weight to have 2615 kg for Skua with Taurus. We could add some 50 kg for the accessories you noted, and the result is 2665kg. So the new plane weights under 7% more then old, with power increased 22%.
> The resulting plane (Skua Mk.II  )has the same wing loading engine power as Fulmar Mk.I, while being more then 1000 lb  lighter. It has 2 MGs less. .



That is 2 MG less per side. 4 guns total firing forward vrs eight. And same power loading does not mean equel speed. A 20mph increase in speed means the "super Skua" can reach a whopping 245mph. Better yes but really enough to make a difference? Climb might be a bigger improvement but since you are starting from 1580 FPM even a 33% increase only gets you to just over 2,000 FPM. Might make bomber interception easier but doesn't really do much against fighters. 
Did the Skua's have self sealing tanks or any armour? Something to consider if planning continued production of an improved model. 



tomo pauk said:


> We can take a look what fighters did have FAA possessed from 1938 to the end of 1940:
> Sea Gladiator, 4 MGs, 410 km/h, short range, good climb
> Fulmar Mk.I, 8 MGs, 410 km/h, good range, slow climb, only from sept '40
> Roc, 4MGs, 360 km/h, good range, slow climb, not used on carriers, 100+ kg heavier then Skua upgraded as above, less HP
> ...



When Sea Gladiators stopped production only 51 Skuas had been built and while monthly production was increasing (with 30 Skuas being delivered in the last two months of Gladiator production) I think that with the overlap any talk of replacing Gladiator production with Skuas was just going to result in few fighter available in the fall of 1939. 
Replacing the ROC with Skuas probably would have been a good idea. After that things get iffy. THe Super Skua might not have been much better a fighter than the Fulmar even if it was a better dive bomber.


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## fastmongrel (Nov 16, 2009)

Was the Douglas Skyraider ever used as a dive bomber. It was specified to be stressed for dive bombing but I dont know if it was ever built as such. It seems to have been the last multi purpose carrier plane I think it carried out every misssion possible apart from the fighter role. 

So far I have come across the following missions
Close air support with guns bombs and rockets
level bombing
Torpedo bombing
Reconnaisance
Search and Rescue
Transport (passengers and cargo)
Airborne Early Warning
Anti Submarine (with radar, MAD, Sono bouys, homing torpedoes and Nuclear depth charges)
Electronic warfare (jamming enemy radar)
Target Towing

Even an unmanned drone for collecting radiation samples after nuclear bomb tests


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## tomo pauk (Nov 16, 2009)

Shortround6 said:


> Since you are changing froma 9 Cylider engine to a 14 cyl engine the changes may not be minimal, they may be doable but may require moving the firewall back and a redesigned nose to fit the smaller diameter engine(might actually improve the view over the nose).
> *
> The smaller front section of engine would also lessen the drag.*
> 
> ...


People, sorry if the stuff I wrote looks like hair spliting. There was a great numbers of better performing planes that could be produced for FAA in 1st (dark) half of war, had the brass requested that from the industry*. Improved Skua is just one of them. 

*The excuse "carrier-based fighters would not be engaged against land-based fighters" seems so shortsighted, since performance of mid-30s bombers was equal or better then of FAA fighters until 1941.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 16, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> People, sorry if the stuff I wrote looks like hair spliting. There was a great numbers of better performing planes that could be produced for FAA in 1st (dark) half of war, had the brass requested that from the industry*. Improved Skua is just one of them.
> 
> *The excuse "carrier-based fighters would not be engaged against land-based fighters" seems so shortsighted, since performance of mid-30s bombers was equal or better then of FAA fighters until 1941.



I am not sure if it was the British only who suscribed to this view, at least for a few years in the 30s. It was considered that the Carrier planes would always be at a disadvantage compared to land based fighters. THis is in therory and assumes that both planes have equel engines and equel armament. THe Carrier planes are always going to be heavier due to the heavier structure needed for catapulting and for arrestor landing. Also the vertical sink rate on landing was usually higher meaning a higher impact loading . If a bigger wing was needed for a lower stalling speed that would also hurt both top speed and climb. If a more compact plane was needed for storage reasons Then something else would hav eto "give" on the "sea" fighter. Again this is "therory" and assumes that a whole bunch of things be the same between the "land" fighter and the "sea" fighter which, seeing as how the opposition was going to be from differrent countries let alone designers, was never going to the case in real life. Or that planes in combat might actually be a few years apart in design age which really throws some assumtions out the window.

You might also want to check out a few mid-30s bombers.

Handley Page Heyford - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

70 ordered in 1935-36

JU 52 bombers were still used against Warsaw in 1939, even a Roc could catch one of them.

And the french: Amiot 143 - bomber

Granted there were faster and better bombers in the mid thirties but it was a time of very rapid change and a single year of delay in the process of drawing board to squadropn service could be the differnece in being remembered as a great ( or at leat good) warplane and a failure. 




tomo pauk said:


> The main idea was to avoid producing a prime example of unsuccessful fighter (=Roc) and not producing another fighter of questionable abilities (=Fulmar).



I don't think anyone is going to argue about Roc but the Fulmar may be another story. The Taurus was not the most reliable of engines in late 1939 and 1940 and while well streamlined radials were made during the war it was a just a bit after the Skua or Super Skua would have had it's day. Advantage in streamlining would have to go to the Fulmar unless quite a bit of work was done. Not impossiable but the more work that has to be done the longer it is going to take to ge the Super Skua into squadron service. And without the benifit fo 20/20 hindsight nobody at the time could have predicted that the Barraccuda would have take so long to get into service. 

Some sources say the early model Sea Hurricanes (fully converted) topped out at just under 300mph. Another claims the Sea Gladiator was 8mph slower than the Land version and took 1/2 minute longer to reach 20,000ft. Sea Gladiator was 267lbs heavier when empty and 670lbs heavier loaded (heavy raft?


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## VG-33 (Nov 17, 2009)

buffnut453 said:


> Was that because of poor performance/long development or simply the fact that dive bombing as a means of delivering aerial munitions became obsolete? The onset of high-performance fighters and integrated air defence networks effectively relegated dive bombing to tactical army support where, by the middle of the war, fighter aircraft could deliver a similar payload at similar ranges using shallow-angle dive techniques and still defend itself or be re-roled for fighter missions. Use of fighters to provide tactical ground support also simplified logistics by reducing the number of different aircraft types that had to be maintained in a given theatre.
> 
> Just wondering...



Hello;

I'm not sure of that. High peformance fighters were rather bombing in gliding dive (45-65°), rather than in shallow dive (65-90°). You need air brakes to stabilize speed *and* trajectory. By definiton and unfortunately a good dive bomber was a slow plane; just like a torpedo launcher, to perform slow but accurate attacks like SBD and Stuka. Pe-2 or Tu-2 were for instance average divers since they were launching bombs to high (2500-3500m ) instead of 1000-1500 for Stuka or Skuas. And at much higher speed (800-900 km/h) instead of 550-650 km/h.
So for your fast fighters. If there were some effisciency, it was because of numbers and saturation affect, not precision.

Regards


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## tomo pauk (Nov 17, 2009)

800-900 km/h for Pe-2 Tu-2 when diving? Perhaps you could point to some sources?

Also, "shallow dive" would be around 30 deg dive. From 60-90 deg it's "steep dive".

Fighter-bombers in WW2 could never attack the ground target with both accuracy and power as dive-bombers could.


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## buffnut453 (Nov 17, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> 800-900 km/h for Pe-2 Tu-2 when diving? Perhaps you could point to some sources?
> 
> Also, "shallow dive" would be around 30 deg dive. From 60-90 deg it's "steep dive".
> 
> Fighter-bombers in WW2 could never attack the ground target with both accuracy and power as dive-bombers could.



Tomo,

I agree with your definitions of shallow dive but I disagree that fighters using shallow dive techniques were not as accurate. If that was the case, why were there no new dive bombers designed after around 1943(ish)? I believe shallow dive attacks are still in use by the RAF as a means of delivering high-accuracy attacks on pin-point targets when LGBs or other precision weapons are unavailable or tactically unviable. As for the power - I presume you mean weapon load? How about the Mosquito, then? That could deliver easily the same weapon load as a dive bomber and yet hold its own in air combat. The P-51 and P-47 were both capable of carrying quite a heavy bomb load and, unlike Stukas etc, didn't need air supremacy to be effective.

KR 
Mark


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## tomo pauk (Nov 17, 2009)

The main reason could be found in your last sentence


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## Shortround6 (Nov 17, 2009)

They did need air supremacy to be effective. 

If intercepted on the way to the target it is quite true they (the fighter bombers) could drop bombs and defend themselves but that means the bombing mission is not done and the intercepting fighters have done their job even if they don't shoot down a single plane. They have stopped the bombing mission and defended the target. 

If not intercepted they could do the job but how do you KNOW that you won't be intercepted? Use escort fighters or establish air supremacy before you under take bomber missions with fighters. 

Dive bombing may have lost is attraction as AA defenses were built up. Compare AA outfit of a 1940 ship to a 1944 ship or the AA outfit of a 1940 army division (infantry or aromured) to a 1944 division.


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## VG-33 (Nov 17, 2009)

> tomo pauk said:
> 
> 
> > 800-900 km/h for Pe-2 Tu-2 when diving? Perhaps you could point to some sources?
> ...


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## Freebird (Nov 19, 2009)

VG-33 said:


> Hello,
> 
> About Skua, i never inderstood why the Stuka was intended to be the terror of the sky, but Skua a bad one in general litterature...
> 
> ...



When the original specification was issued, the Skua was as fast as the latest "enemy" fighters, the Italian CR 32 and the Japanese Kawasaki Ki-10.


Blackburn couldn't afford to build new aircraft "on spec", as they were already fully engaged with other projects, and the Air Ministry wouldn't realease Merlins for some un-ordered project in any event.

What role did you imagine for the "Super Skua"?

You should remember that the fall of 1940 was desperate times for the British, they had more urent needs to fill.
There were 4 projects under way with the FAA, at least 2 of which Blackburn participated in.

1.) A new topedo bomber to replace the Albacore. (spec 1937) This was the Barracuda, which was awarded to Fairey, but Blackburn was also helping with this project. The first Barracuda prototype flew Dec 1940, with production beginning in Feb/Mar 1942

2.) A new FB/DB/recon aircraft to replace the unimpressive Fulmar as recon, with added functions of DB. This was a 1940 spec, which was the 1943 Firefly

3.) An immediate need for single seat fighters. The Hurricane was already being tested on RN carriers, it would go into service in early 1941

4.) A single seat strike fighter (spec 11/1940) This project WAS awarded to Blackburn, (Blackburn Firebrand) so the Blackburn engineers would have been busy with this project, rather than some "on spec" improvements to the Skua.

It wasn't really until the summer of 1940 after the first real British combat during the war (Norway, Dunkirk) that the FAA had a good idea of what planes were inadequate, and what future development should look like. 

As Blackburn had submitted a proposal the 1937 spec (Barracuda) obviously the Air ministry felt that Fairey had the better design. It is not clear that the "Super Skua" would be better than a Barracuda, and also doubtful that it could be ready before the Barracuda in any event.

As for a Super Skua replacing the Firefly, as Faiery had won the competition in 1940, obviously it was considered superior. I also doubt that the (improved) Skua would be adequate without a major re-design, as it was the retractable flaps that allowed the Firefly to operate well at both low and high speeds.
Do you imagine that a Merlin engined Skua could operate up to 320 mph? And how much e-design would be needed for the higher stresses?


At the end of the day, I don't see how a better aircraft could be produced quicker, at least not from a 1940 standpoint. And 1n 1938-1939 the procurement of naval aircraft was handled by the RAF, who were urgently concerned with upgrading RAF aircraft, the needs of the Royal Navy were low priority. (as the existing aircraft were considered adequate, operating away from land)




> *Blackburn Firebrand*
> Work on the B-37 Firebrand proceeded slowly. An unarmed prototype first flew on 27 February 1942,[1] the armed Firebrand F Mk. I second prototype flying on 15 July of that year.[2] The Sabre engine was also used in the Hawker Typhoon, a fighter already nearing production, and was earmarked for that aircraft. A new engine was needed, along with airframe improvements to handle it; along with these modifications it was deemed appropriate to convert the Firebrand into a strike fighter capable of carrying torpedoes, bombs, and rockets as well as engaging in air to air combat. Only nine production F Mk. I aircraft were built.
> 
> The first strike variant, the Firebrand TF Mk. II (B-45), flew on 31 March 1943, and was an adaptation of the Mk. I. It incorporated slightly wider wingspan that allowed carriage of a torpedo between the retracted main landing gear. Like the Mk I, the TF Mk. II only saw a very limited production of 12, and was followed by the Firebrand TF Mk. III with the Bristol Centaurus VII radial engine. After the first flight on 21 December 1943, problems arose: the new engine produced more torque than the Sabre, and rudder control was insufficient on takeoff. The TF Mk. III was determined to be unsuitable for carrier operations, and work began on an improved airframe that would be better-suited for the Centaurus. The aircraft had killed two test pilots and, although after six months' modification Dennis Cambell did manage the first successful deck landing, the type was generally regarded as one of the war's worst aircraft


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## Shortround6 (Nov 19, 2009)

Something to remember when considering "what ifs" is not only how long it actually took to go from drawing board to squadron service but that not all companies had equel resources in engineers and draftsmen.

England did have a very good aircraft industry but until rearmament got truely under way (and this took several years into the war) it was a lot of rather small companies. Even during the war and into the fifties the English companies were not that big.
Someone once commented that during the late 40's to early 50's Boeing had more engineers in it's landing gear dept than Avro, Handly Page and Vickers had all together working on 3 different "V" bombers. 
This last maybe an exageration but no one designer or engineer, no matter how talented, could get a concept PLANE to production without dozens if not hundreds of other engineers doing the detail calculations and drawings for an metal combat plane of WWII. 
Of course no hundred average engineers pulled in of the street could design a great aircraft either without knowledge and passion about what they were doing. 

In 1930's England many of these companies also had to move from small shops that had built airplanes made of wood and fabric by the dozen (or fewer) in the late 20's to metal framed,fabric covered planes built, in many cases, in single digits in the early 30's with the Depression to trying to fill orders for hundreds of all metal airplanes in brand nes factory buildings while training hundreds if not thousands of new workers.


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## parsifal (Nov 19, 2009)

I just fail to see the need for high performance fighters, (with all the delays and teething problems that brings) when the existing crop of mediocre fighters were able to fulfil all th missions expected of them. Fleet defence is not the same as air superiority, and the Skua and the Fulmar (and indeed, the sea Gladiator) fulfilled that role in spades. 

What was missing for the FAA until well into 1942, was numbers. The RN suffered very badly from a shortage of both planes and pilots, so any delay in supply of either, or any conversion to types likely to increase attritional non-combat losses (like narrow tracked high performance fighters) is simply working counterproductive to the RNs primary mission at that time. At that time, the RN was engaged in maintaining the war winning strategy of keeping the germans blockaded. They did not need to go gallavanting around the oceans near to europe to do that. 

A complication was of course malta, where the %RN was forced to come close to the enemy shores, but here range was still more important than performance. If the carriers could be kept out of range of the enemies land based fighters, then the enemies bombers had to fight it out with the low performence fighters of the RN. even against axis fighters the RN did not do too badly, because the long endurance of its fighters enabled it to increase availability at the critical points over their task forces as they battled their way to Malta and other outposts. Shorter ranged, but higher performance fighters would have reduced that availability, because of shorter rangge and endurance. 

Lastly, the limited deck capacities of the RN carrier fleet dictated multi-role capability. Without that the ability to put up credible numbers in the fleet defence role would have been even less than it was.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 20, 2009)

parsifal said:


> I just fail to see the need for high performance fighters, (with all the delays and teething problems that brings) when the existing crop of mediocre fighters were able to fulfil all th missions expected of them. Fleet defence is not the same as air superiority, and the Skua and the Fulmar (and indeed, the sea Gladiator) fulfilled that role in spades.
> 
> *Hi-perf fighters could do both things - fleet defense air superiority. So that choice is better then a 1940 design that lack some of main assets of a fighter: speed climb rate.*
> 
> ...



.


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## parsifal (Nov 20, 2009)

_Hi-perf fighters could do both things - fleet defense air superiority. So that choice is better then a 1940 design that lack some of main assets of a fighter: speed climb rate._
The only designs of high performance fighters available to the RN in 1940 would have been land based fighters lacking in wing folding and endurance. Without wing folding the numbers able to be carried would have dropped to about half that actually carried. If the RN had been forced to wait whilst wing folding wa s developed, it would have fought the cruacial battles of 1940/41 without any fighters 

_Aha, so let's stuck our precious scarce pilots in a slow unwiedly fighters so Germans have no trouble shooting them up, while they would have trouble catching their bombers._

It was not just numbers of pilots that were short, it also a shortage of airframes. Historically the Germans had very little success in shooting down FAA fighters, even on those few occasions when the RN was operating within fighter range of the Luftwaffe.

The advantage of the Fulmar (at least) was its endurnace. This was crucial in the fleet defence role. Whereas single engined fighters, like the Hurricane might have an hour or so endurance, the Fulmar might have 4 hours. If the aircraft turnaraound rates on a carrier were an hour (a typical figure) the Hurricane force of say twenty fighters, could maintain a continuous patrol of 10 fighters. The Fulmars could maintain a continuous patrol of 16.7 fightersw.

Moreover, if the Task Force being protected was a convoy heading for Malta, whilst the Carriers held back to provide some distant air cover, the equations gets even worse. If the form/flight time is twenty minutes to the TF to be protected, and the Hurricanes are providing the cover, and it takes the hour to turn round the fighter on the carrier, then each fighter is going to provide topcover for 120 minutes per day (8 hours) Attacking aircraft can easily penetrate a screen like that....all they need to do is loiter for a bit and wait for the short ranged fighters to run out of petrol before delivering their strike.....even if they attack, the ability of the short ranged fighters to vector is going to be very limited.

By comparison, the Fulmar force could provide continuous cover for over 6 hours out of the 8 that the target is to be protected in a given day. 

Fulmars did on occasion have some trouble catching German bombers, but their record speaks for iteself. To the end of 1940, a force that did not exceed 50 aircraft (and most of the time was a lot less than that, had managed to shoot down something like 60 enemy aircraft, whilst losing no more than two or three in combat themselves....few aircraft can claim such a favourable exchange rate 

_At that time, the RN was engaged in maintaining the war winning strategy of keeping the germans blockaded. They did not need to go gallavanting around the oceans near to europe to do that. 

If they really assumed that they would be like 1000 miles away all the time, that's wishful thinking. _


Like the first world war, the biggest single factor in the defeat of the Germans was the crippling blockade that stunted the german economy and prevented her access to world markets. Without the Carriers, that would not have been possible

As previously explained, Fulmars did not generally suffer badly becuase of their low performance, Their endurnace allowed them to concentrate and loiter when on CAP for much longer, and this allowed them to concentrate their numbers

They were the primary scouting aircraft of the RN. They assisted in the attacks on the bismarck and at matapan, as w3ell as at Taranto, by acting as Pathfinders. Spitfires and Hurricanes could not undertake this role.

Little known, the RN Carriers sank or disabled a large amount of Italian merchant shipping. Fulmars assisted in that effort


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## Glider (Nov 21, 2009)

To a degree the Fulmar was a missed opportunity in that had they designed it as a single seat fighter whilst keeping the range the weight saving would have been considerable and its performance, in particular the climb improved. I am not saying it would be the equal to a 109 or a Spitfire but it would have been a lot better than it was.

The strange thing was that between the wars the RN used a lot of single seat fighters without any problems and its a shame they seemed to forget this in the late 30's.


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## parsifal (Nov 21, 2009)

what was needed was a high performance fighter that did not sacrifice endurance. The RN would also have had to develop float plane cruisers to fulfil the scouting role

In 1941 the only navy in the world that posessed such a force structure was the IJN. And even though it was rapidly brought to ground by the USN, in December 1941 it was the most well trained and equipped navy in the world and its naval air arm peerless. The only criticism I would level against it was its lack of night capability

The zero was designed to a philosophy that initially listed the priorities as 

1) Endurance
2) Speed
3) Agility
4) Firepower

This priority list was contained in a pre-war report submitted by Lcdr Shibata, one of the IJNs leading pilots, and the commander of the flight training school. However this priority list was rejected by Mitsubishi, and eventually settled on a priority of 1/3/2/4 in theur design. Nevetheless, endurance always remained the number one design priority for the Japanese, and in this they were absolutely correct. Of course the low engine power of the zero dictated lightweight, unprotected construction, which led to its early demise. If the Japanese had possessed engines of higher power, they would have improed the strength and armour protection IMO 

If the Brits had sat up and taken some notice of this thinking, then perhaps their programs might have turned out differently. But until 1938, naval aviation was controlled by the RAF, which wasnt all that interested in the needs of the RN. It was assumed that carrier based aircraft would inherently be of lower performance, and that two place aircraft were neded for overwater spotter roles, for which the Fulmar was expected to fulfil as well as pure fighter roles. Perhaps they could have gone to war with a Zero/Jake equivalent. But the thnking at the time was that all the airborne assets had to be on the carrier, and that dictated aircraft with a multi-role function

The very worst thing the Brits could have done in that 1937-39 period was to change late and then try and rush a single engined high performance fighter through and abandon the types they had in the pipeline at that time. If they had done that, they would have gone to war with Fairey Flycatchers and the like. An unmitigated disaster in other words. The quicker they got fighters into service, the better


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## tomo pauk (Nov 21, 2009)

Glider said:


> To a degree the Fulmar was a missed opportunity in that had they designed it as a single seat fighter whilst keeping the range the weight saving would have been considerable and its performance, in particular the climb improved. I am not saying it would be the equal to a 109 or a Spitfire but it would have been a lot better than it was.
> 
> The strange thing was that between the wars the RN used a lot of single seat fighters without any problems and its a shame they seemed to forget this in the late 30's.



Agree. 
Single-seater 'Fulmar' would've been a great asset for FAA.


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## fastmongrel (Nov 21, 2009)

Was the Fulmar always flown as a 2 seater or whilst at sea away from Admiralty eyes were unofficial modifications carried out. 

If you took away the observer and stripped all the equipment for the observer ie seat, oxygen system and instruments if he had any I assume he operated the radio. How much weight could have been saved

I am thinking if they could have lost say 250 pounds would that have improved the climb rate and made the aircraft a bit more nimble.

Also as the Fulmar did most of its work at sea level up to about 10,000 feet would clipping the wings as was done to low level Spifires have made any difference to performance.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 21, 2009)

Stripping equipment out of a plane helps but not to anywhere near what leaving it out of a new design does.

In a "rubber" plane (one on a drawing board) 1 pound of equipment which equels payload is actual worth about 3-4 lbs in gross weight. 

Clipping wings might gain 4-8mph but would have to be balanced against higher take-off and landing speeds.

THe real question is whither any of these improvements or alternatives would have actually made any real difference. Clipping the wing of a Fulmar and getting the 265mph top speed up to , say 271 mph, vrs a 109 doing 300-320 mph depending on altitude (and no the FUlamar isn't going to fight at above 10,000ft, it doesn't have to) isn't raly going to change the outcome of very many fights. 
Changing the climb rate from under 1300fpm ( Or just over for a MK II) by a few hundred fpm isn't even going to be noticed by fighters climbing at over 3000 fpm. 

Please try looking at the performance figures for a Sea Hurricane MK I , There was more than one version and in the worst case ( most converted for sea duty) speed was under 300mph.


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## Glider (Nov 21, 2009)

I was taught that as a rule of thumb adding 1 pound to a design added 10 to the take off weight.


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## SeaSkua (Dec 4, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> Agree.
> Single-seater 'Fulmar' would've been a great asset for FAA.



Why would it be any BETTER than a SeaHurricane ?


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## ausadfd (Dec 4, 2009)

Blackburn Skua was it that bad?
The Blackburn Skua always seems to be in peoples lists of worst aircraft of WWII but was it really that bad as a dive bomber. It seems to have had similar performance figures as other contemporary dive bombers and going on what I have read it was the first aircraft to sink a major warship during combat. The only problems I can see was it could only carry a 500 pound bomb and the engine was a bit underpowered. Was it a flawed aircraft in any way or has it just had a bad press.


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## Altea (Dec 4, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> Agree.
> Single-seater 'Fulmar' would've been a great asset for FAA.



I should say I completly desagree both with you and Glider.
At time they were concieved due poor navigation means and instruments a secund crew member *was not a luxury* to perform navigator tasks in the middle of the sea. The performance loss due to the secund crew member was fully awared by the navy from the mainstream, and accepted...
I disn't see any GPS in 1940!

Regards


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## Glider (Dec 4, 2009)

Altea said:


> I should say I completly desagree both with you and Glider.
> At time they were concieved due poor navigation means and instruments a secund crew member *was not a luxury* to perform navigator tasks in the middle of the sea. The performance loss due to the secund crew member was fully awared by the navy from the mainstream, and accepted...
> I disn't see any GPS in 1940!
> 
> Regards



On the other hand the USN and the IJN had operated siingle seat carrier fighters for years without any major problems. Indeed the FAA had operated Hawker Nimrod single seat fighters since 1931 (and sold some to the IJN).
So I must disagree with the idea that a second crew member was a requirement for navigation. All the experience showed that single seat fighters operated with success at sea.


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## Civettone (Dec 4, 2009)

But wasn't the Fulmar designed for long-range/-endurance missions? Something which was new for carrier borne fighters? 

Also ... the main advantage the Fulmar had was that it could easily be derived from an existing aircraft, the Fairey Battle. If you start changing more then the main advantage disappears and one could just as well have designed a complete new aircraft. But then you would have it operational months later.

Kris


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## dunmunro1 (Dec 4, 2009)

The Fulmar was much slower than most Axis fighters at higher altitudes but the Fulmar was optimized for low altitude performance:

f4f-4 emergency power, 2000ft = 251 knots
f4f-4 emergency power, 10000ft = 259 knots

F2A-1 emergency power, 2000ft = 232 knots
F2A-1 emergency power, 10000ft = 237 knots

F2A-2 emergency power, 2000ft = 248 knots
F2A-2 emergency power, 10000ft = 256 knots

Hurricane 1, overboost 2000ft = 253 knots
Hurricane 1, overboost 10000ft = 280 knots

Fulmar 2 = 230kn at 2000ft, 231kn at 10000ft. (Full power w/o overboost)
AFAIK, the Merlin XXX in the Fulmar 2 was rated at 9lb boost and ~1280 hp with full power and 1360 hp with 12lb overboost, so we might see at 5 - 10 knot speed increase for the Fulmar 2 with overboost, at 2000 and 10000 ft and an even greater increase for the Fulmar1 with overboost.

Axis aircraft (max speed with emergency power)


G3M2 Model 22, 202 kt at 4,180 m (Nell - much slower at lower altitude maybe 190 knots at 2000ft)
G3M3 Model 23, 224 kt at 5,900 m

G4M1-11, 208kt at 2000ft, (Betty)
G4M1-11, 218kt at 10000ft,

A6M2-21, 2000ft = 240 knots
A6M2-21, 10000ft = 265 knots

Bf109e-4, 2000ft, 262kt
Bf109e-4, 1000ft, 284kt

Ju88 A4 , 2000ft = 216 knots
Ju88 A4 , 10000ft = 227 knots

The Fulmar2 also carried 1000rpg ammo, and had nearly 50sec of firing time. We can see that while the Fulmar was generally outclassed by Axis fighters, the differences at low altitude are not that great, and at low altitude it was generally faster than most early war Axis bombers, which would be slower than the above if loaded.


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## Glider (Dec 4, 2009)

I hate to admit that only the British could take a big, slow, unmanoeverable, vulnerable light bomber and say, hey, lets turn this into a fighter.

Clearly range and ammunition supply are a significant boon to a naval fighter but no one will persuade me that with the right spec to aim for, the designers couldn't have done better than the Fulmar.

Take the Defiant, remove the rear turret and use some of the space for fuel, give it some guns in the wing and that should do. It had a decent low level performance and was designed to take the weight of a turret. No one is expecting a world beater but it would have been an improvement on the Fulmar.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 4, 2009)

+1



Glider said:


> On the other hand the USN and the IJN had operated siingle seat carrier fighters for years without any major problems. Indeed the FAA had operated Hawker Nimrod single seat fighters since 1931 (and sold some to the IJN).
> So I must disagree with the idea that a second crew member was a requirement for navigation. All the experience showed that single seat fighters operated with success at sea.



+1


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## Shortround6 (Dec 4, 2009)

Glider said:


> I hate to admit that only the British could take a big, slow, unmanoeverable, vulnerable light bomber and say, hey, lets turn this into a fighter.
> 
> Clearly range and ammunition supply are a significant boon to a naval fighter but no one will persuade me that with the right spec to aim for, the designers couldn't have done better than the Fulmar.
> 
> Take the Defiant, remove the rear turret and use some of the space for fuel, give it some guns in the wing and that should do. It had a decent low level performance and was designed to take the weight of a turret. No one is expecting a world beater but it would have been an improvement on the Fulmar.



Maye they could have done better than the Fulmar but unless you do a total redesign on the Defiant the Defiant wasn't going to make it. 

1. The wing loading on a Defiant was about 17-18% higher than the Fulmar. A bit of turning ability plus that ever important take-off and landing speed for a carrier aircraft. Defiant's wing had less area than Hurricane.
2. Both the main fuel tanks (104Imp.gal) and the Aux tanks (54IMP Gal) were in the wings. Installing a worthwhile wing armament means cutting way down on the fuel, which isn't that great to begin with. 
3. You can't put the fuel were the turret was, too great and change in the CG as the fuel is used. You can move the pilot back a few feet and put the fuel tank were the cockpit used to be but that sure doesn't help the pilots forward veiw.
4. Redesigning the the Defiant for "proper" Naval use means not only the hook and catapult gear but a folding wing and landing gear that can absorb the greater vertical impacts. More weight=less performance advantage. 

5. and the biggie for the BRITISH NAVAL fighter. At the time they were concieved the Skua and the Fulmar used a radio beacon finding system to lead the fighter back to the carrier. THe rear seater wasn't a "navagator", he was the guy who operated this electronic equipment. No amount of training the "pilot" to use plotting boards and navagation excerisizes was going to replace this system.

6. Do not confuse short range good weather operations with long range or long duration patrols in less than good weather. 

I wonder why, after years of operating single seat fighters with "no trouble" the British devised this radio beacon system?
Heavy lobbing by the electronics industry?


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## Civettone (Dec 4, 2009)

Shortround6 said:


> 5. and the biggie for the BRITISH NAVAL fighter. At the time they were concieved the Skua and the Fulmar used a radio beacon finding system to lead the fighter back to the carrier. THe rear seater wasn't a "navagator", he was the guy who operated this electronic equipment. No amount of training the "pilot" to use plotting boards and navagation excerisizes was going to replace this system.


Awesome! I didn't know that. 
Just shows once again that it is very easy for us to judge aircraft designers or policy makers but without all the information and background they had it is very risk for us to "recommend" improvements.

Kris


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## tomo pauk (Dec 4, 2009)

Yet the Japanese purchased in late 30's the single seater fighter that dwarfed anything in range, the A5M "Claude". And there are no reports that the planes got lost over vast Pacific.

There was really something faulty in FAA purchase policy/politics.


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## Glider (Dec 4, 2009)

Shortround6 said:


> Maye they could have done better than the Fulmar but unless you do a total redesign on the Defiant the Defiant wasn't going to make it.
> 
> 1. The wing loading on a Defiant was about 17-18% higher than the Fulmar. A bit of turning ability plus that ever important take-off and landing speed for a carrier aircraft. Defiant's wing had less area than Hurricane.


 The Fulmar's wing loading was lower than almost any single engined fighter but it didn't do it any good in combat.


> 2. Both the main fuel tanks (104Imp.gal) and the Aux tanks (54IMP Gal) were in the wings. Installing a worthwhile wing armament means cutting way down on the fuel, which isn't that great to begin with.


 True but the P94 (max speed 350mph+) had 12 x LMG or 4 x 20mm and 4 x LMG so the guns could be fitted.


> 3. You can't put the fuel were the turret was, too great and change in the CG as the fuel is used. You can move the pilot back a few feet and put the fuel tank were the cockpit used to be but that sure doesn't help the pilots forward veiw.


 You can move the pilot back a little. In the combined space for the pilot and gunner there is a fair amount of area to play with to find the right position. Pilot and fuel could be fitted


> 4. Redesigning the the Defiant for "proper" Naval use means not only the hook and catapult gear but a folding wing and landing gear that can absorb the greater vertical impacts. More weight=less performance advantage.


 True to a point but you are losing the weight of the gunner and turret so any weight gain is likely to be marginal.


> 5. and the biggie for the BRITISH NAVAL fighter. At the time they were concieved the Skua and the Fulmar used a radio beacon finding system to lead the fighter back to the carrier. THe rear seater wasn't a "navagator", he was the guy who operated this electronic equipment. No amount of training the "pilot" to use plotting boards and navagation excerisizes was going to replace this system.


The UNS and IJN managed so why not the FAA. If its a bit of kit then buy it from the US, if its training then do the training.



> 6. Do not confuse short range good weather operations with long range or long duration patrols in less than good weather.


 I am not



> I wonder why, after years of operating single seat fighters with "no trouble" the British devised this radio beacon system?
> Heavy lobbing by the electronics industry?


No idea but equally I am not aware of the pre war FAA of the IJN or the USN having any problems, are you?


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## parsifal (Dec 4, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> Yet the Japanese purchased in late 30's the single seater fighter that dwarfed anything in range, the A5M "Claude". And there are no reports that the planes got lost over vast Pacific.
> 
> There was really something faulty in FAA purchase policy/politics.



A5Ms were not designed to undertake the Spotting role. They could not find a target, pinpoint its position by navigational fix and then report that position to the carrier.

Fulmars had a multi-role function, so, yet again, replacing it with a single purpose fighter would have the effect of reducing the strike capability by forcing an even greater proportion of the Swordfish and Albacores into that role.

There is every chance that the Bismark might have escaped id not for the spotting and navigational abilities of the Fulmar


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## tomo pauk (Dec 4, 2009)

parsifal said:


> A5Ms were not designed to undertake the Spotting role. They *could not find a targe*t, pinpoint its position by navigational fix and then report that position to the carrier.
> 
> *So they couldn't find target? *
> 
> ...


Again, the FAA purchase policy/politics emerges beyond criticism.


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## dunmunro1 (Dec 4, 2009)

When the Fulmar began carrier service, in the Fall of 1940, its opposite numbers were:

IJN- A5M
USN - F3F and F2A

By July 1941 the FAA was also deploying the Sea Hurricane for carrier defence.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 4, 2009)

dunmunro1 said:


> When the Fulmar began carrier service, in the Fall of 1940, its opposite numbers were:
> 
> IJN- A5M
> USN - F3F and F2A
> ...




.


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## dunmunro1 (Dec 4, 2009)

The IJN did not complete their conversion to A6Ms until late 1941, and the AFAIK, the A6M did not enter carrier service until mid 1941 and the A5M was still aboard some of the light carriers after Dec 1941. On the whole I think the Fulmar was superior to the F2A, given the Fulmar's low altitude optimization. The FAA realized that they needed a higher performance fighter than the the Fulmar and planned to replace the Fulmar with the Firefly. If the Firefly had entered service in 1942, as planned, we might now have a much different opinion of two seat naval fighters. 

I suspect that the Fulmar would have entered service sooner, if not for the dislocation caused by the fall of France and the Battle of Britain.


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## Civettone (Dec 4, 2009)

It seems that other countries also went for two-person fighter aircraft on their carriers (the American FF-1 or French Villiers II) but did replace them with single-person fighters. Britain replaced some of their naval fighters with the two-person Fulmar but replaced that again by a single-person one.
That is indeed a bit odd. I wouldn't say the Fulmar is a real reconaissance aircraft but as a long-endurance patrol aircraft it definitely needed to be able to spot and pinpoint the target. I suppose for that reason the British had the extra guy as a radio beacon operator. I don't think he was merely used to get the fighter back home but also to keep track on the position of the aircraft. So when an enemy fleet or more often enemy bomber aircraft were spotted this guy could pinpoint their position much better. Especially a lone single-person fighter aircraft would be deficient in this. Also coastal aircraft, radar or other carrier aircraft would be of limited use. 
So I think that's where the Fulmar came in. In the end, they did see that having a proper defence fighter would be of more use while still being able to detect enemy bombers though perhaps not pinpoint them as accurately. 

So I think I can also agree with Tomo. The British in the end did give up the Fulmar concept so perhaps if they had come up with a decent single-engined fighter in the same time frame, the Fulmar would not have been needed.

Kris


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## Freebird (Dec 4, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> Yet the Japanese purchased in late 30's the single seater fighter that dwarfed anything in range, the A5M "Claude". And there are no reports that the planes got lost over vast Pacific.
> 
> 
> 
> ...


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## dunmunro1 (Dec 4, 2009)

AFAIK, the Fulmar was designed to meet an RN specification, and the fact that the FAA was nominally under RAF control had little to do with the design. 

Pick another naval fighter in operational service in the Fall of 194O and see if it is superior to the Fulmar.


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## Glider (Dec 4, 2009)

dunmunro1 said:


> On the whole I think the Fulmar was superior to the F2A, given the Fulmar's low altitude optimization.


The only FAA unit to be issued with the Buffalo much preferred this to the Fulmar. Quote from Air War for Yugoslavia, Greece and Cyprus page 141.

_The Buffalo was a delight to fly, very manoeuvrable compared to the Fulmar. At no time did I request that Buffalos be exchanged for Sea Gladiators, but I do remember in the light of the inadequacy of the Fulmars against the CR42 I requested that the Sea Gladiators if not required for other operations be sent to reinforce 805 squadron._

I think the above says it all. Its only fair to add that all the Buffalos went out of service due to a lack of spares for the interrupter gear.


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## parsifal (Dec 4, 2009)

The Facts are that the Fulmar served the RN quite wll and fulfilled its design specs. By the end of 1940, it had destroyed some thing like 60 aircraft, which I think was more aircraft than were present in the frontline squadrons. Thats a pretty impressive score card for an aircraft being argued as obsolete or misguided.

The Fulmar was adopted because of the need for a multi role aircraft, and because at the time of its inception the RN needed a fighter in a hurry and nothing else seemed available at the time. The FAA had only just been re-established as an independant force and did not have access to the high perfomrance single seaters then in service....nothing like interservice rivalry to put the natiojn in danger. The Fulmar was the best to be had quickly, and it was lucky the RN adopted that expedient or the the Fleet would have fought the crucial battles of 1940-41 without fighter protection.

The relatively long range of the Fulmar meant that many of the operations undertaken by the RN could be undertaken outside the effective fighter ranges of the Axis land based air....forcing the axis to attack the RN without adequate fighter protection on many occasions. If shorter ranged single seat fighters had forced the RN to operate closer to the enemy bases, it would have placed the fleet at greater risk than it already was. As it turned out the Royal Navy suffered loss when it failed to observe that policy in January 1941. The long loiter time and range of the Fulmar meant that distant cover could be flown more effectively than by short ranged single seaters. 

Even against single seater fighters, the Fulmar was quite effective. At low altitudes it poor performance was not as marked, and its long endurance meant that it could be positioned and concentrated to a far greater extent than its single seater opponents. Only in those situations where the enemy fighters had the time and endurance to concentrate and position themselves for advantage, was the Fulmar outlclassed....and this just didnt happen in fleet defence situations

The two seat configuration was in some ways mistaken, based on the beleive that over water navigation needed a secennd crew memeber. however, it made sense in the North Atlantic, where weather conditions were often les than optimal. It also made sense to give the Fulmar superior spotting capabilities, which the second crewman did, given the Recon roles the Fulmar was expected to fill


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## Shortround6 (Dec 4, 2009)

AS far as weather goes it was considered that even in the North sea the average visablity was under 20,000yds. 

Electronic navagation and procedures changed an awful lot from the beginning of WW II to the end.


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## dunmunro1 (Dec 4, 2009)

Glider said:


> The only FAA unit to be issued with the Buffalo much preferred this to the Fulmar. Quote from Air War for Yugoslavia, Greece and Cyprus page 141.
> 
> _The Buffalo was a delight to fly, very manoeuvrable compared to the Fulmar. At no time did I request that Buffalos be exchanged for Sea Gladiators, but I do remember in the light of the inadequacy of the Fulmars against the CR42 I requested that the Sea Gladiators if not required for other operations be sent to reinforce 805 squadron._
> 
> I think the above says it all. Its only fair to add that all the Buffalos went out of service due to a lack of spares for the interrupter gear.



Of course this shore based pilot might have formed a very different impression of the Buffalo if he had to fly it on and off a carrier...and then conduct long range missions over the North Atlantic by himself in poor visibility.


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## Freebird (Dec 4, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> Again, the FAA purchase policy/politics emerges beyond criticism.



No, whoever said that? You just havn't proven your point.
The RAF controlled new aircraft specs in 1937 when the Fulmar project began. If it was RN or RAF specs that was at fault, the Fulmar was a bit of a "dud" or at least a rather inadequate aircraft. (but was also all that was available.)



tomo pauk said:


> To find a target for their ship-borne strike planes, RN employed radars on ships, strike CV planes subs. They also employed many types of maritime patrol planes form Coastal command. And yet it castrates the main fleet air-defence air-superiority asset by purchasing the bomber-originated fighter, in order to have yet another plane that could spot a target. Is that a viable decision or what? .



Ok, for spotting "over the horizon" in the central Med or mid-Atlantic, shipborne radar is out of range unless they are probably within 20 - 40 miles (in '40 - '42} There are no Coastal Command aircraft available in the mid North Atlantic in 40-42, and pretty thin in every other ocean. Gibraltar Alexandria are out of range, Crete is Nazi occupied, and Malta has very limited capabilities in 41-42 due to the Axis blockade. What long-range radar equipped "strike CV planes" were you talking about in 40' - '42? 



tomo pauk said:


> Could we agree that was the way FAA was admitting that converted bomber is not suitable for air defense air superiority tasks?



No. The Fulmar was certainly inadequate in many ways, as I have said. However the "Improved Fulmar" (AKA Firefly) was the *best, most capable carrier DB/fighter-bomber in 1943* (IMHO)



Civettone said:


> So I think I can also agree with Tomo. *The British in the end did give up the Fulmar concept* so perhaps if they had come up with a decent single-engined fighter in the same time frame, the Fulmar would not have been needed.
> 
> Kris



Not at all.

Let's not get confused here - Fighters are not the same as fighter bombers! The Fulmar was never intended to be the RN "fighter"

There were 3 basic needs in the RN carrier force:
1.) Fighters
2.) Torpedo-bombers
3.) Dive-bombers/ Recon


1.) Fighters - The US had the Buffalo, Japan had the Zero. By early 1938, the RN had Sea Gladiators on it's carriers:



Aeroflight.co.uk said:


> As a stopgap measure, 38 RAF Gladiators were transferred to the Admiralty and designated Sea Gladiator (Interim). Although they carried hooks, they were not intended for operational use aboard carriers. A further 60 full-standard Sea Gladiators were also obtained. These differed from the RAFs Gladiator IIs in being equipped with catapult spools, arrestor hook and dinghy stowage (between the landing gear legs). Sea Gladiators first embarked in HMS Courageous with 801 Squadron in March 1939.



They also had Grumman Martlets (Wildcats) from the summer/fall of 1940. From the outbreak of war until the fall of 1940 the RN tested Hurricanes for shipboard use, these went into service in the beginning of 1941. The Fulmar was never intended to replace the Martlet/Sea Hurri, but was embarked on board for a different role.

2.) TB - In the summer of 1940, the RN had Swordfish, which although slow were reliable, easy to handle in bad weather. The Albacore had just been introduced, but did not perform as well as expected. However, the much superior Barracuda prototype first flew in Dec 1940, and production began just over a year later. 

3.) DB/Recon - The Royal Navy had a long history of compensating for it's limited space aboard carriers by combining DB/Recon with a secondary fighter role to create the "Fighter-Bomber". Now please remember YOU CANNOT COMPARE A FIGHTER-BOMBER WITH A FIGHTER!!! A fighter bomber was never expected to take on single-seat fighters, that was the job of the Sea Glad/Martlet/Sea Hurri. It's role was to shoot down enemy bombers while the FAA fighters engaged the enemy fighters. The first (WWII-era) FB was the Skua, introduced in 1937. The Fulmar was basically the following plane in the "Fighter-Bomer" role - except it couldn't bomb  (Edit - 1 x 250 lb bomb) and was rather inadequate as a fighter.  

Fighter-Bomber to intercept enemy bombers while the fighters dealt with the enemy escorts -
And that was exactly how it was used by the RN! 



Nikademus said:


> Here's some info on loss/success for the Fulmar in the Med 40-42 based on my study of Shores' two books on Malta.
> 
> lost - 40
> 
> ...



Note - not one enemy single-seater kill for the Fulmars, but they shot down 66 bombers ( 1- Bf 110) for 20 Fulmars lost in the air. (not too shabby as it turned out!)

However the FAA didn't give up on the Fulmar concept - by the Fall of 1940 when it was clear that the Fulmar was outclassed, the FAA put a request for a replacement aircraft. (Nov 1940), the prototype flew just over a year later, and deliveries of the Firefly began just ~28 months after the request. For comparison, the SB2C Helldiver took well over *FIVE* years from proposal to service. 

The Firefly basically fixed all of the Fulmar's problems.

1.) Range 1,364 vs 783 miles
2.) Ceiling 29,000 vs 16,000 feet
3.) Payload 2,000 lbs vs 250 lbs
4.) Dive capability - The Firefly had the Fairey-Youngman retractable flaps for DB ( low-alt) operation
5.) Speed 319 mph vs. 259 mph (and even 286 mph with bombload) Unlike the slower Fulmar, the Firefly could easily catch almost all enemy naval-strike bombers in service in the spring of 1943

Ju 87B - 238 mph
Ju 88A - 280 mph
BR20M - 286mph
Cant Z1007 - 283 mph
SM 79/84 - 267 mph
B6N2 Tenzan - 298 mph
Ki -21 Sally - 302 mph
G4M Betty - 266 mph
Ki -49 - 305 mph

6.) Firepower - To bring down enemy bombers it had 4 x 20mm cannon, compared to the .303's of the Fulmar. If you want enemy bombers shot down *FAST*, (before they bomb your carriers!) then 4 x 20mm is the way to go.


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## Glider (Dec 4, 2009)

dunmunro1 said:


> Of course this shore based pilot might have formed a very different impression of the Buffalo if he had to fly it on and off a carrier...and then conduct long range missions over the North Atlantic by himself in poor visibility.



I wasn't aware of the USN having any problems operating the Buffalo at sea. Have you any examples or comments to support your view?


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## dunmunro1 (Dec 4, 2009)

Glider said:


> I wasn't aware of the USN having any problems operating the Buffalo at sea. Have you any examples or comments to support your view?



I


> nitially serving with VF-3 and USS Lexington's VF-2, this model was a fast, nimble and well-armed fighting plane, *though plagued (as were subsequent F2As) with an overly-delicate retractable landing gear and a maintenance-hungry powerplant*.



USN Aircraft--Brewster F2A Fighters

The USN found the F2A to be unsuited to carrier service which is why they ordered so few.

I should add that the FAA never operated them from carriers either, I wonder why?


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## parsifal (Dec 5, 2009)

One website contained this about the F2A

_In June 1940 VF-3 Fighter Squadron aboard the aircraft carrier USS Saratoga became the first squadron to receive the Navy's first carrier-borne monoplane fighters. In the event, however, the U.S.Navy only kept 11 of these F2A-1s in service, the remaining being ceded to the Finnish Air Force which was fighting a desperate defensive battle against the Soviet Union. During the course of 1939, 43 F2A-2s with a more powerful engine and a few minor changes were ordered to replace the F2A-1s. In 1940, orders started to reach Brewster from European purchasers: 40 B-339s for Belgium; 170 B-339Es series for Great Britain; 72 B-339Ds and 20 of the B-439 variant (with the more powerful 1,200 hp engine instead Of the 1,100 hp model) for the Netherlands East Indies Air Force. Brewster's factory was working at full stretch during the early months of 1940 but serious problems arose during the second half of that year. The most alarming was the U.S.Navy's discovery that the F2A's landing gear was not strong enough to stand up to flight deck landings, even when these were smooth and slow. The second came when the RAF reported from Britain that the Buffalo, as it had been called, fell short of contemporary European fighter performance; the third set. back stemmed from requests for more armor protection from European buyers and from the U.S.Navy (for the F2A-3). This led to an increase in weight and adversely affected the plane's performance: it now suffered from instability and was difficult to handle. There was no easy way of solving these faults: the landing gear had its two weaker struts strengthened but no further improvement was possible without completely redesigning the whole aircraft. _


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## Civettone (Dec 5, 2009)

Although I can agree with most of what has been said about the Fulmar ... I have my doubts about some things.
I believe the second crew member was there for the radio beacon and for an extra pair of eyes. But I do think this was a luxury unneeded both before as after the Fulmar? What aircraft did the Fulmar replace? What replaced the Fulmar? Or the Firefly ?
How come the Americans or French did no longer feel the need to have two-person fighter aircraft in the Atlantic ?

And the Fulmar was a fighter bomber except for the fact that it couldn't carry bombs?? I agree with the notion that the Fulmar was intended to deal with bombers just like the later Firefly but the story of a FB without bombs???

Kris


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## dunmunro1 (Dec 5, 2009)

Yeah, take a look at the last two pictures on this page:

USN Aircraft--Brewster F2A Fighters -- Ground Shipboard Views

Not a good choice for a carrier, and I'm sure that the USN was never happy with the F2A as a carrier fighter.


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## dunmunro1 (Dec 5, 2009)

Civettone said:


> Although I can agree with most of what has been said about the Fulmar ... I have my doubts about some things.
> I believe the second crew member was there for the radio beacon and for an extra pair of eyes. But I do think this was a luxury unneeded both before as after the Fulmar? What aircraft did the Fulmar replace? What replaced the Fulmar? Or the Firefly ?
> How come the Americans or French did no longer feel the need to have two-person fighter aircraft in the Atlantic ?
> 
> ...



The Fulmar replaced the two seat Skua as a fleet fighter. The Fulmar was due to be replaced in 1942 with the two seat Firefly, which could carry two 1000lb bombs and carried 4 x 20mm cannon, but production difficulties meant that the Sea Hurricane, Martlet and Seafire effectively replaced it in the fighter role.

Before radar that 2nd pair of eyes would have been invaluable, but radar really made the single seat fighter possible and while it allowed the carrier to spot enemy aircraft it also enabled it to guide it's own aircraft back to the carrier, since the single seat pilot only had to get within radar range to be vectored back in. You might think that IJN experience proved that single seat fighters were viable without radar, but then look at how many times the IJN carriers were caught by surprise. Even off Ceylon the RAF was able to bomb the IJN flagship before they were detected (they missed) and intercepted. 

I don't know why the Fulmar never carried bombs but most sources state that it could carry two 250lb bombs, and I would guess that if you stripped out 6 guns and 6000 rds of ammo that it might carry two 500lb bombs. I think it boils down to the FAA not facing CVs until after the Fulmar was past its prime, and bombing, rather than torpedoing, non CVs was never very successful. Certainly if all the Fulmars on Ceylon could have attacked the IJN carriers, even with 250lb bombs it might have made a difference.


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## Freebird (Dec 5, 2009)

Civettone said:


> Although I can agree with most of what has been said about the Fulmar ... I have my doubts about some things.
> I believe the second crew member was there for the radio beacon and for an extra pair of eyes. But I do think this was a luxury unneeded both before as after the Fulmar? What aircraft did the Fulmar replace? What replaced the Fulmar? Or the Firefly ?



The Fulmar replaced the Skua (Fighter-bomber/Dive-bomber/Recon) in late 1940, and was itself replaced by the Firefly in 1943 (Fighter-bomber/Dive-bomber/Recon)



Civettone said:


> How come the Americans or French did no longer feel the need to have two-person fighter aircraft in the Atlantic ?



Well, if you look at the "3 parts" of the FAA aircraft group, 1st - fighter, 2nd - Torpedo-bomber, 3rd - Fighter-bomber/Dive-bomber/Recon, the 3rd role was filled from 1937 - 1940 by the Skua, and from 1943 - 1954 by the Firefly. Both aircraft were fully capable Dive-bombers, and *every other* Dive-bomber also had a 2 man crew, the Stuka, Val, Dauntless, Helldiver, Judy, Vengance. 

It is only in the years 1941 1942 that the FB/Recon was filled by the Fulmar, however this lackluster plane could only carry a 250 lb bomb (or 500 lb?) 



Civettone said:


> And the Fulmar was a fighter bomber except for the fact that it couldn't carry bombs?? I agree with the notion that the Fulmar was intended to deal with bombers just like the later Firefly but the story of a FB without bombs???
> Kris



Yeah it's pretty lame all right. 
I have in my reference that it could only carry a single 250 lb bomb, Tomo wrote "500 lb" (2 x 250?) so I'm not quite sure what the exact load was. (But it wasn't more than 500 lb)
In any event, 250 lb bombs were pretty impotent against heavier ships, and without dive flaps it was much less capable than the Skua at this.


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## Freebird (Dec 5, 2009)

dunmunro1 said:


> The Fulmar replaced the two seat Skua as a fleet fighter. The Fulmar was due to be replaced in 1942 with the two seat Firefly, which could carry two 1000lb bombs and carried 4 x 20mm cannon, but production difficulties meant that the Sea Hurricane, Martlet and Seafire effectively replaced it in the fighter role.



Well not exactly. When the Firefly project was started (Nov 1940) the Marlets were already avaiable, and the Hurricanes were just finishing sea tests, and starting to be put on RN carriers. Even if the Firefly had been available by the end of '41, it still wouldn't have replaced Sea Hurri's, as the RN always operated single seat fighters alongside the FB/DB/Recon in WWII

The delay for the Firefly only meant that operation Pedestal was Sea Hurri's Fulmars, not Sea Hurri's Fireflys.

I don't know how they could plan to have the Firefly in 1942, as 28 months for a Dive-bomber launch - service was pretty damn quick. Both the Judy Helldiver took over 5 years (60 months)

Considering that Fairey developed an entirely new method of retractable flaps, it's hard to see how it could be done quicker. It was the retractable F-Y flaps that made possible excellent low speed dive bombing operations, while still allowing the aircraft to get up to 319 mph with flaps retracted.

It was the retractable flaps better streamlining of the aircraft that allowed the Firefly (loaded) to get 27 mph faster with less power (by weight) than the Fulmar

Fulmar (unloaded)= 7.77 lb/hp - 259 mph
Firefly (w/bombs)= 8.23 lb/hp - 286 mph
Firefly (unloaded) = 7.08 lb/hp - 319 mph
Dauntless (loaded) = 10.4 lb/hp - 250 mph


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## dunmunro1 (Dec 5, 2009)

The Fulmar was ordered in March 1938, first flew in Jan 1940, and entered squadron service in June 1940.

The Firefly design was completed in Sept 1939, was ordered in June 1940, and first flew in Dec 1941. However, the first flight was considerably delayed due to production priorities for Merlin engines which put the Griffon on hold, and the general dislocation of the UK aero industry after the fall of France and during and after the Battle of Britain. The f4F was not initially ordered by the UK, but instead they received them by default by taking over French and Greek orders. The early f4F/Martlet was not considered by the FAA to be viable for combat as it did not have armour or self sealing tanks, was not equipped with carrier landing gear and had fixed wings. 

The Sea Hurricane was not ordered until June 1940, and then as a stopgap measure, and unlike the Firefly was not designed to FAA specs. If the FAA would have had the Fulmar and Firefly in large numbers, they would probably have not bothered with fixed wing single seat fighters.


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## parsifal (Dec 5, 2009)

FB

I agree with pretty much everything you have said, but it is untrue to say that the FAA did not rely on the Fulmar as its mainstay fighter defence until well into 1941. It was still frontline material for the RN well into 1942 in fact.

AFAIK the Sea Hurricane was first operational in any numbers in September 1941, and the Martlet whilst available was not in large scale use until about the same time. The RN fought many of its early war battles with the Fulmar, and quite successfully I may say. 

Fulmars did not carry bombs until the latter part of their career, but they are credited with something like 250000 tons of shipping I havve read (but cannot locate the source....I will keep looking)


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## fastmongrel (Dec 5, 2009)

I imagine that in the 3 years before the start of WWII that Hawkers, Supermarine and Rolls Royce were working flat out to try and build sufficent modern fighters for the defence of Great Britain a task which was only completed just in time. Can you imagine the response if the RN FAA had come along and said we want a modern single seat carrier fighter as well. I bet they were told to go away and make do with what they were given. Or in anglo saxon Bugger Off.

I think we all agree that the Fulmar was obsolete as a fighter but it was available in just enough numbers to do the job. There is an old saying "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush". To translate One obsolete Fulmar on a flight deck is better than two modern fighters sitting half built in a factory. 

The fact that the Fulmar did as well as it did shows that the FAA pilots must have been good.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 5, 2009)

dunmunro1 said:


> AFAIK, the Fulmar was designed to meet an RN specification, and the fact that the FAA was nominally under RAF control had little to do with the design.
> 
> Pick another naval fighter in operational service in the Fall of 194O and see if it is superior to the Fulmar.



Nice. I've always loved a choice that is so narrowed down with intention to favor a particular plane.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 5, 2009)

fastmongrel said:


> I imagine that in the 3 years before the start of WWII that Hawkers, Supermarine and Rolls Royce were working flat out to try and build sufficent modern fighters for the defence of Great Britain a task which was only completed just in time.
> 
> *And they still produced 2000+ Battles that used Merlins, plus 1000+ Defiants that also used Merlins. Could we say that was helping the Hawker, Supermarine RR?*
> 
> ...



.


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## dunmunro1 (Dec 5, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> Nice. I've always loved a choice that is so narrowed down with intention to favor a particular plane.


The Fulmar did enter carrier service in the fall of 1940. Why is it unfair to compare it with other carrier borne fighters available at that time?


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## tomo pauk (Dec 5, 2009)

freebird said:


> No, whoever said that? You just havn't proven your point.
> The RAF controlled new aircraft specs in 1937 when the Fulmar project began. If it was RN or RAF specs that was at fault, the Fulmar was a bit of a "dud" or at least a rather inadequate aircraft. (but was also all that was available.)
> 
> *You guys need to agree about who was responsible for FAA planes in late 1930's.*
> ...


.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 5, 2009)

dunmunro1 said:


> The Fulmar did enter carrier service in the fall of 1940. Why is it unfair to compare it with other carrier borne fighters available at that time?



Because it' unfair to compare planes that are about to be fielded with planes that are about to be phased out (F2F and A5M at least; Fulmar (as a fighter) doesn't stand a chance vs. F2A, F4F and A6M).


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## fastmongrel (Dec 5, 2009)

_ Originally Posted by fastmongrel 
I imagine that in the 3 years before the start of WWII that Hawkers, Supermarine and Rolls Royce were working flat out to try and build sufficent modern fighters for the defence of Great Britain a task which was only completed just in time.

*And they still produced 2000+ Battles that used Merlins, plus 1000+ Defiants that also used Merlins. Could we say that was helping the Hawker, Supermarine RR?*

Can you imagine the response if the RN FAA had come along and said we want a modern single seat carrier fighter as well. I bet they were told to go away and make do with what they were given. Or in anglo saxon Bugger Off.

*Who ever said that FAA would steal RAF planes? Fairey could've produced a single-seater fighter that would kick butts INSTEAD of a converted bomber, not ALONG it.
*
I think we all agree that the Fulmar was obsolete as a fighter but it was available in just enough numbers to do the job. There is an old saying "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush". To translate One obsolete Fulmar on a flight deck is better than two modern fighters sitting half built in a factory.

*Fulmar was available in numbers in 1941. By that time much better designs were at hand. So that would be 2 birds in the hand by that time. And for those 4 moths of late 1940 Sea Gladiator would do the fleet defense as good as Fulmar.*

The fact that the Fulmar did as well as it did shows that the FAA pilots must have been good.

*The CREWS were damn good. The two-seat layout required twice the crew, risking twice the casualties, while a beter performing plane would enable even better results.*_

Good points tomo pauk and with the benefit of hindsight I totally agree with you but while we know the Battle was a deathtrap and the Defiant was about as much use as an anvil with wings. In 1937 which I think was probably about the latest a new design of carrier fighter could have been ordered for service in 1940 they were still modern aircraft and were considered vital for the coming war.

With hindsight a lot of aircraft ordered in that period were a waste of time but this only became obvious in 1940

Without cancelling orders already placed I dont imagine there was any spare capacity to start a new fighter and I know for certain there wasnt the spare design staff available. My Grandfather trained as a draughtsman with the electrical engineering company Dick, Kerr Co of Preston Lancashire starting his apprenticeship in 1917. When he finished his training there was no work for him so he retrained as a Pharmacist. In September 1939 if you believe his story he was kidnapped off the street and sent to work for Metropolitan Vickers in Manchester as a draughtsman despite the fact that he had been dispensing pills for the last 14 years. He ended up working on electrical torpedoes and was the only person in his drawing office with the proper qualifications all the others were women who had 6 months training then did the rest of there training on the job.

I believe the Fulmar was designed to meet the same contract that went to the superior Hawker Henly when it lost that order it was modified to meet the FAA specification. Even the changes to become a Recconaisance Fighter took a long time, as you say it was only available in quantity by the end of 1940. For Fairey to go back to the drawing board and start from a clean sheet of paper might have taken even longer.

If I could go back in time equipped with my hindsightscope I would have smacked a few of the crustier admirals on the head and diverted money to Grummans to hurry along the Wildcat/Martlet and got them working on the Hellcat in 1937


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## Shortround6 (Dec 5, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> .And they still produced 2000+ Battles that used Merlins, plus 1000+ Defiants that also used Merlins. Could we say that was helping the Hawker, Supermarine RR?



How many of these planes were produced before the war?

About 50 Defiants were produced by the end of 1939. Even if somebody came in Jan 1st 1940 and shut the factory down, scraped every partly completed airframe in the building and all unused parts and had the plans for a great naval naval fighter rolled up in cases behind him, just how soon do you think the first "NEW" fighter would roll out the door? June? August? 
How long before the factory was even making 20 month? Dec of 1940?

As forthe Battle, about 1000 had been built by the start of the war and they equiped 15 squadrons. WIth more squadrons converting. 

It is all very well to say that these planes shouldn't have been built, and you are right, somebody should have pulled the plug on them before the production totals ever got as high as they did. 

But you have to equip those bomber squadrons with SOMETHING. Going to war in Hawker Harts certainly wouldn't have worked. Any twin engine bomber bigger than an Avro Anson would have sucked up even more resources. Cutting the number of bomber squadrons in half might have allowed for a better bomber but it might not have made the engine supply situation that much better.

And none of this would have made a whole lot of difference to what was available to the FAA in1939-1940.

Scrap the Defiant on the drawing board and build a Naval Hurricane? great, you have 50 as of Jan 1st 1940 many of them either just out the door at the factory or in depot. one to two squadrons working up. 
ANd these would be a MK I Hurricane with no armor, no self sealing tanks, and If you are lucky the DeHavillind bracket pitch prop. It basicily means they they can't take on 109s on a one to one basis.


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## parsifal (Dec 5, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> Because it' unfair to compare planes that are about to be fielded with planes that are about to be phased out (F2F and A5M at least; Fulmar (as a fighter) doesn't stand a chance vs. F2A, F4F and A6M).




well thats a scientific appraisal. The British had the least developed Fleet air arm out of the three big navies. Compared to the F2-A, which could not effectively operate from Carriers I dont think the dsifference is that great as to be able to say "didnt stand a chance"

Against the F4-F-3 and the A6M-1 in the fall of 1940, I would still back the Fulmar....in the soupy conditions of the North Atlantic and with an airgroup of only 20-40 planes. You see, with an air group of that size, and without the multi role capability of the Fulmar, the fictitional American or Japanese carrier (say a shoho or an American CVL) is not going to be able to carry a sufficiently large air agroup of specialized aircraft, to undertake searches, provide effective CAP, and deliver effective strikers as well simultaneously , in the same way as a British carrier could....and it all gets down to the Fulmars multi role capability.

Lets devise a what if scenario against an American CVL, versus say an Illustrious class carrier. the Illustrious class has a CAG of say 36 consisting of 16 Fulmars, and twenty Albacores. The Albacores are night capable and fitted with ASV radar.

Our American opponents have a CAG of 32, generally 16 Fighters, and 16 SBDs. The SBDs have an effective strike range of about 250 miles, and a scouting range about double that if unarmed. The Albacores have an effective strike range of 150 miles. 

The problem for the Americans is that their fighters cannot be used for search, they lack the navigational ability to do that effectively. The Fulmars can. This means that the SBDs have to severely dilute their strength to just locate the British carrier, whilst the British dont. 

Almost certainly the British commander would be well appraised of the location of the US Light carrier whilst the American commander would not. This is because the American carrier commander would almost certainly limit the search range of his SBDs so that they can undertake armed recons to try and surpise the British carrier. The British commander can use his Fulmars to their full range, to keep an eye on the US carrier until dusk. He then closes the range and launches a full strike at full range. Scratch one flat top....and all because the Fulmar was able to do two things and the Single seat fighters in the American inventory cannot.

This concept of carrier warfare does not work when you have CAGS that are larger, as the British found in the Indian Ocean in April 1942. But if you want to compare apples to apples, then try limiting the size of the opposing CAGs and see what happens to your specialized aircraft......


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## tomo pauk (Dec 5, 2009)

The shortcomings of the example :

- it involves a fllet CV vs. light CV. So the RN has the starting advantage here.

-_"The Albacores are night capable and fitted with ASV radar."_ - Is this fact-backed, or another "what-if"?

-_"The problem for the Americans is that their fighters cannot be used for search, they lack the navigational ability to do that effectively"_ - Now this is a stretch. The single-seaters would be hitting Fulmars hard , so there is no much of a recon job here. And even if Fulmars manage to pinpoint the CVL, the ship would not stay at the same spot just to please FAA. In the same time SBDs would be elusive targets for Fulmars.

-_"The Fulmars can. This means that the SBDs have to severely dilute their strength to just locate the British carrier, whilst the British dont."_ - No that much a dilution. All CVL air group would be searching for the CV, making an attack when it's found.

-_"This is because the American carrier commander would almost certainly limit the search range of his SBDs so that they can undertake armed recons to try and surpise the British carrier."_ - The USN commander would do that to please FFA? Still 250ml (SBD armed) vs. 150ml (Albacore armed) makes armed reconnaisance possible.

-_"He then closes the range and launches a full strike at full range. Scratch one flat top....and all because the Fulmar was able to do two things and the Single seat fighters in the American inventory cannot."_ - So again USN commander need to cooperate so FAA could get him. The only capability of Fulmar in this example would be spotting. And the night attack by Albacore at open seas vs. moving target...

I'm sure that we could bend whatever it takes to find a favorable scenario where Fulmar would shine. However, many real examples made it's spotting ability* redundant, and fighter ability barely satisfying.

*I'm not sure about that either - was radar employed to find ships in Fulmar?


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## tomo pauk (Dec 5, 2009)

Shortround6 said:


> How many of these planes were produced before the war?
> 
> About 50 Defiants were produced by the end of 1939. Even if somebody came in Jan 1st 1940 and shut the factory down, scraped every partly completed airframe in the building and all unused parts and had the plans for a great naval naval fighter rolled up in cases behind him, just how soon do you think the first "NEW" fighter would roll out the door? June? August?
> How long before the factory was even making 20 month? Dec of 1940?
> ...



Shotround6, is there something YOU think could be done better re. FAA planes, or you think their purchase policy was/is beyond criticism?


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## Freebird (Dec 5, 2009)

dunmunro1 said:


> The Fulmar was ordered in March 1938, first flew in Jan 1940, and entered squadron service in June 1940.
> 
> The Firefly design was completed in Sept 1939, was ordered in June 1940, and first flew in Dec 1941.
> 
> The Sea Hurricane was not ordered until June 1940, and then as a stopgap measure, and unlike the Firefly was not designed to FAA specs. If the FAA would have had the Fulmar and Firefly in large numbers, they would probably have not bothered with fixed wing single seat fighters.



Sorry, my goof, ordered 5/40 not 11/40. The fact that the FAA changed the requirement specs from '38 39 obviously delayed the process. 



parsifal said:


> I agree with pretty much everything you have said, but it is untrue to say that the FAA did not rely on the Fulmar as its mainstay fighter defence until well into 1941. It was still frontline material for the RN well into 1942 in fact.
> 
> AFAIK the Sea Hurricane was first operational in any numbers in September 1941, and the Martlet whilst available was not in large scale use until about the same time. The RN fought many of its early war battles with the Fulmar, and quite successfully I may say.



Sure the Fulmar was a mainstay of the "Fleet Defence" in '40 '41, but it did operate alongside Gauntlets Hurricanes. I suppose that it was contemplated in early 1940 of having the Fulmar as the primary fighter of the FAA, but it was soon realized that the Fulmar could not perform as well as single seaters. In practice, no FAA Sea Glad squadron was ever replaced by Fulmars (from what I can find) - They were all replaced by Martlets or Sea Hurri's.



FleetAirArmArchive.net said:


> The first of the Sea Hurricanes to see service with the Fleet Air Arm arrived in February 1941 and were operating with front line unit 880 squadron from 15 March 1941. Overseas deliveries commenced with shipping in HMS Furious to 807 squadron at Gibraltar 1 July 1941 (eg V7301, V7623), Many shipped to Simonstown in SS Lt St Lonbert Brie thence to 800 squadron HMS Indomitable in July 1942
> 
> 880 Squadron - Formed January 1941 as a Fleet Fighter squadron with 3 Martlet Is, intended for the still uncompleted HMS Indomitable.
> The squadron was augmented with 3 Sea Gladiators and 9 Sea Hurricane IAs until replaced with Sea Hurricane Ibs in July 1941 the squadron then embarked on HMS Furious that month.


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## parsifal (Dec 5, 2009)

_The shortcomings of the example :

- it involves a fllet CV vs. light CV. So the RN has the starting advantage here_.

Its irrelevant that the british have a CV....its the air capacity that is the important issue. If you want, lets use the Furious

"The Albacores are night capable and fitted with ASV radar."[/I] - Is this fact-backed, or another "what-if"?

Ah yes , its a fact....but I dont care if they were out there looking for the enemy with a flashlight, the facts that the RN carrier based strike aircraft were capable of hiting moving targets at sea at night. Dont believe me, have a look at the operations against the Bismarck, and by the Albacore and Swordfish squadrons on Malta and in the Channel. 

-_"The problem for the Americans is that their fighters cannot be used for search, they lack the navigational ability to do that effectively"_ - _Now this is a stretch. The single-seaters would be hitting Fulmars hard , so there is no much of a recon job here. And even if Fulmars manage to pinpoint the CVL, the ship would not stay at the same spot just to please FAA. In the same time SBDs would be elusive targets for Fulmars._

Exactly how are they hitting Fulmars????If the Fulmars are high initially, and as the F4fs climb to intercept, the Fulmars turn and run, in a long shallow dive. The fighters are not going to catch such fast shadowers. Dont believe me, read up on how difficult it was to intercpt and shoot down such lumbering aircraft as the Mavis....

The British proved just how adept theyr were at night strike time and again, so I dont think the CVL is going to get away from a situation like this very easily at all 

-_"The Fulmars can. This means that the SBDs have to severely dilute their strength to just locate the British carrier, whilst the British dont." - No that much a dilution. All CVL air group would be searching for the CV, making an attack when it's found._

They cant search together...they need to spread out and search in ones and twos. If they wanted to deliever a concentrated strike, they needed to return to their carrier, refuel, bomb up and launch the strike blind, and out of range. Remember the range is beyond 200 miles, beyond the effective strike range of the SBDs, As night falls all the british need to do is to close 50 to 80 miles and launch their own strike. With luck, the US are unaware of the position of the Brit carrier and dont withdraw as night falls


_"This is because the American carrier commander would almost certainly limit the search range of his SBDs so that they can undertake armed recons to try and surpise the British carrier."_ - The USN commander would do that to please FFA? Still 250ml (SBD armed) vs. 150ml (Albacore armed) makes armed reconnaisance possible[/I].


And beyond the effective escort range of the F4Fs. If the the Brit commander is smart he would keep 8 or so of his Fulmars back as CAP protection. 8 would be more than enough to deal with raids of two and three aircraft at a time...it would be enough to deal with 12 or 20 enescorted strike aircraft 


_-"He then closes the range and launches a full strike at full range. Scratch one flat top....and all because the Fulmar was able to do two things and the Single seat fighters in the American inventory cannot." - So again USN commander need to cooperate so FAA could get him. The only capability of Fulmar in this example would be spotting. And the night attack by Albacore at open seas vs. moving target..._
Very possible....happened all the time against merchant shipping, less often against naval targets. Sorry, but its an inherent British advantage

I'm sure that we could bend whatever it takes to find a favorable scenario where Fulmar would shine. However, many real examples made it's spotting ability* redundant, and fighter ability barely satisfying.

The tactics I am describing are the basic tactics the British did actually employ against surface targets....I dont need to bend anything. The Fulmars capabilities were part of that system. It defeated the Axis navies time and again

What real examples are you talking about....I know the Fulmars helped the Swordfish onto the targets at Bismark, Taranto and Matapan (a daylight attack) because they were made for the job

*_I'm not sure about that either - was radar employed to find ships in Fulmar_?
No, not until later, but ASV MkII was fitted in Swordfish from October 1940, and Albacore from early 1941. They were used against Italian and Axis shipping in July 1941 (and earlier than that in the Channel). British were also very profieicent in the use of flares and "painting the target" as the events against teh Bismark and Taranto show 

May I ask what, if any carrier operations experience you have. For the record I served in the operations room of a carrier, I know how they operate, and what they would do.


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## Glider (Dec 5, 2009)

parsifal said:


> well thats a scientific appraisal. The British had the least developed Fleet air arm out of the three big navies. Compared to the F2-A, which could not effectively operate from Carriers I dont think the dsifference is that great as to be able to say "didnt stand a chance"
> 
> Against the F4-F-3 and the A6M-1 in the fall of 1940, I would still back the Fulmar....in the soupy conditions of the North Atlantic and with an airgroup of only 20-40 planes. You see, with an air group of that size, and without the multi role capability of the Fulmar, the fictitional American or Japanese carrier (say a shoho or an American CVL) is not going to be able to carry a sufficiently large air agroup of specialized aircraft, to undertake searches, provide effective CAP, and deliver effective strikers as well simultaneously , in the same way as a British carrier could....and it all gets down to the Fulmars multi role capability.


A couple of obvious questions.
a) If the FAA considered the Buffalo and CR42 to be better than the Fulmar, how on earth do you expect it to beat the Wildcat and Zero?
b) American CVL in 1941? Any names



> Lets devise a what if scenario against an American CVL, versus say an Illustrious class carrier. the Illustrious class has a CAG of say 36 consisting of 16 Fulmars, and twenty Albacores. The Albacores are night capable and fitted with ASV radar.


Albacores with ASV in 1941? Even if they did the swordfish carried either an ASV or a torpedo and I suspect eh Albacore was the same. So make your mind up about the dilution of the strike.



> Our American opponents have a CAG of 32, generally 16 Fighters, and 16 SBDs. The SBDs have an effective strike range of about 250 miles, and a scouting range about double that if unarmed. The Albacores have an effective strike range of 150 miles.


As mentioned before an American CAG of 32?



> The problem for the Americans is that their fighters cannot be used for search, they lack the navigational ability to do that effectively. The Fulmars can. This means that the SBDs have to severely dilute their strength to just locate the British carrier, whilst the British dont.


As you have been in a carrier operation room you will know that with aircraft of this endurance to keep one on station you will need at least three to be dedicated. One on station, one going/preparing to go out and one returning/being turned around.



> Almost certainly the British commander would be well appraised of the location of the US Light carrier whilst the American commander would not. This is because the American carrier commander would almost certainly limit the search range of his SBDs so that they can undertake armed recons to try and surpise the British carrier.


No you wouldn't. Once the target has been found the idea is to keep it in sight. A one plane attack would lose the entire object of the exercise and almost certainly result in the loss of the aircraft.



> The British commander can use his Fulmars to their full range, to keep an eye on the US carrier until dusk. He then closes the range and launches a full strike at full range. Scratch one flat top....and all because the Fulmar was able to do two things and the Single seat fighters in the American inventory cannot.


And the US commander launches all his fighters and dive bombers against the Albacores and Fulmars decimating the attack. I love your plan, if I was USN or IJN all my birthdays will have come at once, brilliant.


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## dunmunro1 (Dec 5, 2009)

The FAA pioneered the use of Air to Surface Vessel (ASV) radar on aircraft, and the FAA's most famous use of radar was to find and strike the Bismarck at 23:30 on May 24th, 1941. The RN planned to use ASV equipped Albacores to find and strike the IJN carriers in April 1942, in the Indian Ocean. This was the ace up the FAA's sleeve and it gave it supremacy for 1/2 of each 24 hour period in the Indian Ocean. ASV equipped aircraft were fully strike capable and could carry a torpedo.

The F2A was never a successful carrier aircraft and the FAA never used it as such, although they had the opportunity to do so. 

The Fulmar flew thousands of carrier based sorties, shot down well over a hundred enemy aircraft while carrier based and served with distinction. How many aircraft did carrier based F2As shoot down...oops none!


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## Glider (Dec 5, 2009)

dunmunro1 said:


> The FAA pioneered the use of Air to Surface Vessel (ASV) radar on aircraft, and the FAA's most famous use of radar was to find and strike the Bismarck at 23:30 on May 24th, 1941. The RN planned to use ASV equipped Albacores to find and strike the IJN carriers in April 1942, in the Indian Ocean. This was the ace up the FAA's sleeve and it gave it supremacy for 1/2 of each 24 hour period in the Indian Ocean. ASV equipped aircraft were fully strike capable and could carry a torpedo.


I admit the part about the ASV aircraft being fully strike capable is new to me. Attached is a photo of the Swordfish with ASV. Can you tell me where the torpedo will go? They did carry rockets and radar but not as far as I am aware torpedo's.



> The F2A was never a successful carrier aircraft and the FAA never used it as such, although they had the opportunity to do so.


It never went into action from a carrier so we don't know how good the F2A would have been. In the USN they were replaced by the Wildcat. The questioins still holds, do you seriously expect the Wildcat or Zero to be worse than the Fulmar? Anything to support that statement would be appreciated.



> The Fulmar flew thousands of carrier based sorties, shot down well over a hundred enemy aircraft while carrier based and served with distinction. How many aircraft did carrier based F2As shoot down...oops none!


 As mentioned the F2A didn't go into action from a carrier as they had been replaced by the Wildcat.


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## Freebird (Dec 5, 2009)

Glider said:


> b) American CVL in 1941? Any names
> 
> As mentioned before an American CAG of 32?
> 
> It never went into action from a carrier so we don't know how good the F2A would have been. In the USN they were replaced by the Wildcat. The questioins still holds, do you seriously expect the Wildcat or Zero to be worse than the Fulmar? Anything to support that statement would be appreciated.



If your point is that the performance of the Fulmar as a fighter is not as good as a Wildcat, Zero (or Sea Hurri) you are certainly correct

I think that perhaps Parsifal's example wasn't very clear. 
Let's take for example a US carrier with a CAG of 78. Early US Pacific carriers - Ranger, Lexington etc were listed with a capacity of 80 -90, but I belive that is taking into account deck park?

Anyways, lets do a hypothetical comparison in summer 1943 to a British carrier (eg Indomitable) with a capacity of 48

US carrier 78 aircraft: 36 Hellcat, 24 Dauntless, 18 Avenger
UK carrier 48 aircraft: 18 Seafire, 18 Firefly, 12 Buccaneer

The US carrier is attacked it can launch 36 fighters for defence. It can launch a strike mission of 42 aircraft.
The British carrier could launch 30 aircraft for a strike (Firefly + Buccanneer) *OR* if defending against a massive enemy strike (like "Pedestal" or a Kamikaze swarm) it can launch up to 36 fighters to defend (Seafire + Firefly), just as many as the US carrier can, even with 30 less aircraft embarked.

Now would it be nice to have a bigger CAG? Sure, but that's what you give up to have armor deck carriers. Considering the fate of the Lexington, Yorktown, Hornet, disabled by bombs, later sunk vs the UK carriers: Illusrious, Formidible Indomitable were all put out of action by bombs, yet were repaired within 6 -8 months. All also took Kamakaze hits with no critical damage, compared to the USS Intrepid - sunk by Kamakaze hit.


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## dunmunro1 (Dec 5, 2009)

Glider said:


> I admit the part about the ASV aircraft being fully strike capable is new to me. Attached is a photo of the Swordfish with ASV. Can you tell me where the torpedo will go? They did carry rockets and radar but not as far as I am aware torpedo's.
> 
> 
> It never went into action from a carrier so we don't know how good the F2A would have been. In the USN they were replaced by the Wildcat. The questioins still holds, do you seriously expect the Wildcat or Zero to be worse than the Fulmar? Anything to support that statement would be appreciated.
> ...


 
ASVII was very similar to ASB radar:





HyperWar: U.S. Radar: Operational Characteristics [ASV--Air-To-Surface Search Sets]

and in fact ASB was copied from ASVII.

ASV was a longwave radar that did not require the parabolic dish carried in the Swordfish Radome in your picture. The swordfish you show is optimized for ASW work where a torpedo was not required.

unfortunately, not many photos of ASVII remain because it was strictly censored.

Here's a model of an ASVII radar equipped Swordfish:

Fairey Swordfish Mk.II by Stu Hurley (Tamiya 1/48)

Note how the radar antennae are nearly invisible.

We know that the F2A was a miserable carrier fighter and the USN dumped it ASAP.

As we've discussed the Fulmar was overdue for replacement by 1942, but the Fulmar did go up against the Zero over the Hermes off Ceylon, and still managed to bag 2-4 kills while losing two aircraft, and some of these losses were probably due to Val rear gunners.

The simple fact is that the Zero lacked armour and SS tanks, and would not have been accepted into RN or USN service (post 1942) and once these are added in, the Zero would have been a real dog, with its 1941/42 powerplant.


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## Freebird (Dec 5, 2009)

Now, lets compare in the winter of 1941/42:

US carrier (78 ) : 30 Wildcat, 24 Dauntless, 24 Devastator
UK carrier (40) : 16 Sea Hurri, 14 Albacore, 10 Fulmar

The British carrier's strike capabilities are badly weakened by the fact that the Fulmar has a very limited bomb capability. However it is still needed to perform the Recon role, as it has almost double the range of a Sea Hurri, and the second pair of eyes is better in the often poor visibility in the North Atlantic. The UK carrier can still defend itself with 26 aircraft, almost as many as the US carrier


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## Freebird (Dec 5, 2009)

fastmongrel said:


> I imagine that in the 3 years before the start of WWII that Hawkers, Supermarine and Rolls Royce were working flat out to try and build sufficent modern fighters for the defence of Great Britain a task which was only completed just in time. Can you imagine the response if the RN FAA had come along and said we want a modern single seat carrier fighter as well. I bet they were told to go away and make do with what they were given. Or in anglo saxon Bugger Off.





tomo pauk said:


> Who ever said that FAA would steal RAF planes?
> .



That is in fact exactly the problem. There were only limited Aircraft production resources in the UK in 1939, and they were all working flat out to produce more RAF aircraft. Fairey was building Battles as quickly as possible, gearing up to produce the Fulmar, and working on an ever-changing fighter design (ultimately the Firefly - 5/40) 

I have no doubt that the RN requested a replacement aircraft from the RAF in 38/39, but it was not as critical as RAF Fighter Command - so it was put on the back burner





tomo pauk said:


> You guys need to agree about who was responsible for FAA planes in late 1930's.



Simple: the RAF



tomo pauk said:


> I'm not saying RN had all oceans covered with LR MP planes. I'm saying that asking a fighter design to do the task other were doing was crippling that fighter.



No, in fact in every case except the Fulmar, (Skua, Firefly) it was a DIVE-BOMBER that was also able to perform as Recon a secondary fighter. With the Fulmar it was Fighter-Recon.

In the Fall of 1940 there was no other available long-range aircraft suitable for Recon



tomo pauk said:


> 1st: Please quote my post where I'm saying anything about "radar equipped strike CV planes".
> 2nd: Please post a fact proving Fulmars used radar to spot ships.



Here is your quote: "To find a target for their ship-borne strike planes, RN employed radars on ships, strike CV planes subs." 

If the RN are trying to locate an Axis convoy or Raider that's 200 - 300 miles away, it's beyond the range of shipboard radar. The SeaHurri Glad are also beyond range. The UK (nor anyone) didn't use subs to spot/search for CV strikes. So the Recon will be done by what "strike CV plane"? What are you are talking about? 



tomo pauk said:


> So Improved Fulmar was also-known-as Firefly? Now that's curious



Yes. the airframe was very similar, which allowed it to be brought into service years quicker. 



FleetAirArmArchive.net said:


> Fairey Firefly - Designed as a two-seat Fleet reconaissance fighter based on the Fairey Fulmar, the prototype first flew on 22 December 1941.





tomo pauk said:


> Please, tell us what was Firefly bombing in 1943, besides UK proving grounds.



It wasn't needed to bomb anything in the summer of 1943, because the Allies had control of the Med, and had land based aircraft operating from Tunisia, Malta Sicily. What was left of the German Italian navy was bottled up in Norway, Italy or was sunk. 

That's a rather irrelevant point anyways. 



tomo pauk said:


> So FAA used one kind of planes to kill fighters and another one to kill bombers. That goes nice along with multi-role capability all right.




Exactly the same strategy that the RAF used in the BoB, the Spitfire tackled the German fighters, while the Hurris went after the bombers.


tomo pauk said:


> .


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## tomo pauk (Dec 5, 2009)

freebird said:


> That is in fact exactly the problem. There were only limited Aircraft production resources in the UK in 1939, and they were all working flat out to produce more RAF aircraft. Fairey was building Battles as quickly as possible, gearing up to produce the Fulmar, and working on an ever-changing fighter design (ultimately the Firefly - 5/40)
> 
> I have no doubt that the RN requested a replacement aircraft from the RAF in 38/39, but it was not as critical as RAF Fighter Command - so it was put on the back burner
> 
> ...


.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 5, 2009)

freebird said:


> If your point is that the performance of the Fulmar as a fighter is not as good as a Wildcat, Zero (or Sea Hurri) you are certainly correct
> 
> I think that perhaps Parsifal's example wasn't very clear.
> Let's take for example a US carrier with a CAG of 78. Early US Pacific carriers - Ranger, Lexington etc were listed with a capacity of 80 -90, but I belive that is taking into account deck park?
> ...



The USN fielded some 200 planes aboard the CVs during Midway battle. If they went to armored deck CVs design pre war, they would've fielded ca. 100. Anyone can do the math, my guess is that the battle would've gone much worse for USN.
We could draw data about other cases US (and IJN) TFs using their planes to good effect.

The opposite case - RN fielding 'open hangar' design: the doubled number of planes would make the attacks to (but not only against) those RN carriers all but impossible.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 5, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> Shotround6, is there something YOU think could be done better re. FAA planes, or you think their purchase policy was/is beyond criticism?



Maybe there was something that could have been done better but these notions of "Just stop producing XXXX and YYYY" and you would magicly have thousands of wonderful planes years before XXXX and YYYY ever reached that total is absurd. 

If you want to criticise policy fine. But do it with a knowledge of why policy was the way it was. 

SBDs were classified as SCOUT bombers. I believe SBDs and Vindicators were the standard Recon planes for American carriers. If this is so then the American Navy did not routinely use fighters for Recon flights. Was the rear seater in a Vindicator or Dauntless solely the gunner or was he also the radio operator?

Late 1930 radios had much different capabilities (much less) than later radios. Many fighter radios were single channel. British BoB radios where 4 channel radios with the channels pre-selected on the ground before take off. The use of morse code allowed longer range than voice transmission. Want to see a fighter pilot trying to tap out messages using a morse code key?

Many of these details are left out of aircraft descriptions (heck, many books/web sites don't even give the altitude an airplane achieved it's "top speed") making it hard to figure out why some planes were designed the way they were. In some cases perhaps the user requirements were too strict, like landing speeds for carrier planes but rememeber that the landing speed is closely related to the take-off speed. American carriers might catapult the first rows of planes from the deck but at some point the remaining planes were expected to fly off. Why? Because you could get more planes into the air quicker and the early planes wouldn't burn as much fuel circling around waiting for the whole squadron/strike group to get air borne and form up. Stike range was the distance the plane with the least fuel could fly. 

And while we are criticising the FAA maybe we can spare a jeer or two for the USN which was still using biplane fighters on at least one carrier in the summer of 1941 and might have had biplane dive bombers on one carrier even later.

Given that nobody in the west really knew what the Japanese had for carrier planes in 1938-40 (except that biplanes were thought to make up a fair amount of their strength) and the Americans were still using a fair amount of biplanes in 1938-1940 and nobody else really had any carriers (OK that French thing) maybe the British could be excused for not making better carrier planes a top priority. 

In England in the late thirties Fighter command had enough trouble getting "goodies" compared to Bomber Command. Bomber command got the first two speed supercharged engines, Tigers, Merlins and Pegusaus, Bomber command had first call on the VP propellers, getting them one-two years before fighter command. Expecting the FAA to make it to the front of the line is asking a bit much.
It wasn't right or very smart but it was that "Bomber Command comes first" attitude which would have to be overcome before the FAA got very far.


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## dunmunro1 (Dec 5, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> The USN fielded some 200 planes aboard the CVs during Midway battle. If they went to armored deck CVs design pre war, they would've fielded ca. 100. Anyone can do the math, my guess is that the battle would've gone much worse for USN.
> We could draw data about other cases US (and IJN) TFs using their planes to good effect.
> 
> The opposite case - RN fielding 'open hangar' design: the doubled number of planes would make the attacks to (but not only against) those RN carriers all but impossible.



The USN used a permanent deck park to achieve much greater aircraft capacity. If the USN had used armoured flight deck carriers which were exact copies of the Illustrious class, they would have been carrying around 60-70 aircraft each, while the Indomitable and Implacable class could have carried 70-85. Yorktown was crippled by Dive bombers using 550lb bombs at Midway and then torpedoed after she became too slow to manoeuvre. An armoured carrier would have survived this attack.

One of the biggest myths of WW2 is that RN armoured flight decks restricted their aircraft capacity to 1/2 that of a USN carrier and this is simply untrue. A carrier's aircraft capacity is limited by its hanger size and the size of the flight deck forward of the crash barrier, and the differences in capacity between Illustrious and Enterprise were determined by these two factors. Of course the RN opted not to use a permanent deck park until later in the war, and their carriers Avgas supply was not designed with such a large capacity in mind, but this had nothing to do with armoured flight decks.


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## Glider (Dec 5, 2009)

dunmunro1 said:


> ASVII was very similar to ASB radar:
> 
> 
> 
> ...


First class information on the Radar that sorts out my confusion.



> We know that the F2A was a miserable carrier fighter and the USN dumped it ASAP.


The USN replaced it as they had a better aircraft.



> As we've discussed the Fulmar was overdue for replacement by 1942, but the Fulmar did go up against the Zero over the Hermes off Ceylon, and still managed to bag 2-4 kills while losing two aircraft, and some of these losses were probably due to Val rear gunners.


My understanding differs against the Zero. On 5th April Fulmars had their first combat against the Zero. One Zero was claimed by Lt Hordern of 806 Squadron but four Fulmars were shot down two from 803 squadron and two from 806 squadron. When the Hermes was sunk eight Fulmars engaged Japanese aircraft and three Vals were claimed by Lt Johnston, Sub Lt Nation and Lt Peirano. Two pilots were killed in this action including Lt Peirano.
This gives six Fulmars lost against three claims for three Val's and one Zero.

Source Royal Navy Aces of WW2 pages 68-69.



> The simple fact is that the Zero lacked armour and SS tanks, and would not have been accepted into RN or USN service (post 1942) and once these are added in, the Zero would have been a real dog, with its 1941/42 powerplant.


This is well known as is the fact that until better aircraft came along the Zero was a very formidable aircraft.


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## dunmunro1 (Dec 5, 2009)

Glider said:


> First class information on the Radar that sorts out my confusion.
> 
> 
> The USN replaced it as they had a better aircraft.
> ...



According to Shores, on the 5th of April three of the Fulmars were caught and shot down as they were taking off (as happened to the Hurricanes and this accounts for the lopsided results), some probably before they could even retract their gear. The fight above Hermes, however, was a fairer comparison, Shores states that there were two flights of Fulmars above Hermes, one with 4 or 6 Fulmars and one with the 8 that you mention.

Bloody Shambles V2, p397-398. ( the 4th Fulmar lost on the 5th may have also been lost as it was climbing away from the airfield, but this is unclear)

Edit: According to the above 4 Vals were lost from the group that attacked Hermes, but I suspect that 1 or 2 were lost to AA fire


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## parsifal (Dec 5, 2009)

_A couple of obvious questions_.
_a) If the FAA considered the Buffalo and CR42 to be better than the Fulmar, how on earth do you expect it to beat the Wildcat and Zero?
b) American CVL in 1941? Any names_

The FAA did not consider the F-2A to be superior to the Fulmar. The report you are quoting are the opinions of one pilot, and you have omitted to include his comments about the inadequate armement, problems in stability, and a few other things.

Suggest you read eric Browns comments on the F2A before claiming as superior to the Fulmar. The Fulmars advantage over the F2A was its relatively heavy amement, and its multi role functionality.

Thirty F2As entereed FAA service in 1940, and shot down nothing (possibly one aircraft) in the ETO. 

In 1940, approximately 60 Fulmars entered service, and by years end had shot down more aircraft than were in service in the FAA, approximately 65, Whose record is superior?

The American CVL is fictional, to compare the capabilities of two CAGs of similar size. If we are going to compare apples to apples, then the two carrier philosophies need to be using similar numbers of aircraft. In large carriers carrying 80 or 90 planes, or where there are multiple carriers in a tassk group, the multi role argument that underpins the Fulmar falls down, its no linger valid. In small scale operations the multi role concept is valid.... 


_Albacores with ASV in 1941? Even if they did the swordfish carried either an ASV or a torpedo and I suspect eh Albacore was the same. So make your mind up about the dilution of the strike_.


Like I said, I dont care if they were using flashlights to find their way, the FAA had the capability to find moving targets at night, and sink them. You should look at the attacks at taranto, on the Bismarck, in the Channel against Axis shipping and from the Malta based swordfish/Albacore squadrons in 1941 to verify that. Trying to deny the capability is like trying to deny night and day. It did happen, it was the capability that set the British FAA apart from its rivals....

_As mentioned before an American CAG of 32?_
Yes, based on the theoretical carrying capacity of an Independance class CVL


_As you have been in a carrier operation room you will know that with aircraft of this endurance to keep one on station you will need at least three to be dedicated. One on station, one going/preparing to go out and one returning/being turned around_.

Not true, it depends on the endurance of the aircraft. Turn around times on the carrier are optimally one hour. If you have short endurance of 1 hour, you eill get the relationdhip you are suggesting (some re-arming, some taking off/landing and some on station....If the endurance is greater than that, the proportion of aircraft that can be on station goes up. 
a
_No you wouldn't. Once the target has been found the idea is to keep it in sight. A one plane attack would lose the entire object of the exercise and almost certainly result in the loss of the aircraft._
I agree with you here, but TP was trying to argue that the SBDs could search AND attack at the same time....they could, but in small numbers, and carrying bombs whilst searching will limit your range. The proper way to go about the battle would be to use your planes for search, once located, recall your seearchers, re-arm and close the range, then launch your srtike. But if your fighters cant undertake your spotting for you, who is going to keep the target position up to date. If your SBDs are allowed to search out to full stretch, they are going to be at least 4-6 hours from initial discovery of the target to arri8ving over the target with bombs. In other words they cant.

The Swordfish/albacores, on the other hand arent burdened by this enormous handicap, because the search function is being undertaken by the Fulmars....this is where mutirole functionality beats specilization hands down....when you have only a few aircraft to do a lot of different tasks...


_And the US commander launches all his fighters and dive bombers against the Albacores and Fulmars decimating the attack. I love your plan, if I was USN or IJN all my birthdays will have come at once, brilliant_.


At night....please do give details of the USN being night capable in 1940-41.....what major warships did they sink by night strike, and how many aircraft could a carrier without effective radar, and planes without night training and night equipment be able to intercept.


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## parsifal (Dec 5, 2009)

Glider said:


> _I admit the part about the ASV aircraft being fully strike capable is new to me. Attached is a photo of the Swordfish with ASV. Can you tell me where the torpedo will go? They did carry rockets and radar but not as far as I am aware torpedo's._
> Are you not familiar with the operations to disable the Bismarck, the attacks on Taranto, th operations of the Malta based Swordfish and Albacores, and the operations of the Channel based Albacores?
> 
> In fact it wasnt just the use of the ASV radar.....This was a part of the sytem, with usulay three out of twelve aircraft fitted with ASV radar and flares...these aircraft would act as pathfinders for the armed element of the squadron, and one within the 6 mile radius of the sets, would illuminate the target with flares, whilst the remainder went into attack.
> ...


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## Glider (Dec 6, 2009)

This might be of interest
Brewster v. Hurricane
[The Air Fighting Development Unit at Northolt filed this report on 5 Nov 1940 after testing a 339B.--DF] 
Pilot's Cockpit - The pilot's cockpit is roomy and comfortable and well laid out, and the design of the hood gives an exceedingly good field of view, especially to the sides and rear. The type of hood itself is to be recommended in that it is very strongly built and operates on robust runners. It is difficult to close at high speed but opens easily at all speeds. The arrangement for raising and lowering the pilot's seat is bad; it is exceedingly difficult to raise when flying. 

Trimming Tabs - The aircraft is supplied with elevator, rudder and aileron trimming tabs operated from the cockpit. These are very effective although rather sensitive and contribute materially to the ease of the control of the aircraft. 

Field of View - For a single-seater single-engined fighter, the pilot's field of view is exceedingly good all around. For taxying, take-o9ff and landing the nose rather obscures the view directly ahead. The view to the rear is far superior to the Spitfire or Hurricane. 

Take-off and Landing - The aircraft has a good take- off, being better than a Hurricane, with a slight tendency to swing to the left. . . . For landing, it has a flat approach, and to approach with comfort a little engine is required. It has a comparatively fast approach but pulls up very quickly once having touched down. The actual touch down is simple. The brakes, which are pedal operated, are very efficient both for taxying and landing. 

Climb and Dive - The climb to 15,000 feet is better than that of the Hurricane, and the aircraft easily out-dives the Hurricane. 

Comparative Speed in Level Flight - [The fighters were flown at the rated heights for the two-speed supercharger on the Brewster's Cyclone engine.] At 6,000 feet the Brewster was approximately 15 m.p.h. faster than the Hurricane; while at 14,700 feet the speeds were practically identical. [If similarly equipped,] the Brewster's speed at 6,000 feet would be approximately the same as the Hurricane, whereas at 14,700 feet it would be approximately 12 miles slower. 

Maneuverability - In the air the Brewster Fighter is very maneuverable, its aileron and elevator controls being positive and lighter than the Hurricane or Spitfire at all speeds. The rudder is definitively heavy, but only a little movement is required for full control. It can easily turn inside the Hurricane. 

Steadiness of aircraft as gun platform - Although the guns were not fitted, it is the opinion of all pilots who flew the aircraft that it should be a steady gun platform.

I also found out that the Buffalo was to wide for the lifts in most RN carriers. This may have had something to do with the reluctance to use it on board ship. It is only fair to say that it seems to lose performance at any altitude but that wasn't the Fulmars strong point either.

To sum up, you go to war in the Fulmar I will take the Wildcat, Zero or even the Buffalo.


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## dunmunro1 (Dec 6, 2009)

_What Eagle squadron thought
[RAF 71 Squadron was formed in September 1940 at Church Fenton in Yorkshire with American volunteer pilots. They were given three Brewsters, which must also have been 339Bs. The squadron leader was Walter Churchill, credited with 4-plus victories during the Battle of France; he filed this report in October. -- Dan Ford]

*It is strongly recommended that this type should on no account be considered as a fighter without considerable modification.*

The wings are not bolted to a centre section but appear to have a common main rear spar located through the fuselage. Changing wings in the event of accidents will therefore be uneconomical and slow.

The elevator is actuated by a push-pull tube. While this is a positive method of operation it is feared than an explosive shell or even a bullet . . . may shatter or collapse it. Experience has proved how much punishment the twin cable can stand without breaking down.

The electric system instead of having dual cables is of the one wire earth return [negative ground] type, which means that a chafed lead may cause fire and will in any case blow the fuse in the given circuit.

The fire power of two .5 Colt and two .303 Browning guns is inadequate.

No reflector sight.

The side panels of the windscreen are at such an angle that it is difficult to see through them.

The armour plated seat is not thick enough or high enough to protect the head. It should stretch from one side of the cockpit to the other. It is submitted that the side panels on the fuselage adjacent to the seat be armour plated in view of the number of arm wounds which have been received in other single seat fighters.

The [primer] is not positive like our Ki-gas and it has a habit of sticking in the off position. It incorporates a rubber gland which perishes and has to be removed.

The undercarriage actuating lever is so small and sharp that it is both difficult as well as painful to operate. . . . The same applies to the flap operating lever. [He didn't like the seat adjustment lever either.]

The top straps of the Sutton harness should be fed through the back of the seat instead of over it. In its present position the pilot is only securely held when right way up. In the inverted position the straps give enough to allow him to hit his head on the hood.

The control column with firing button on top . . . does not give such good firing maneuverability when fighting as the spade grip, with the firing button in the front.

The R/T controls are on the right hand side, necessitating changing hands to operate [the radio], and is so placed that the pilot's elbow hits the seat every time he changes from send to receive.

The oxygen is regulated automatically instead of manually, where the pilot can turn it on a bit more for fighting.

The clock itself is of no value without a trip indicator which this one has not got.

The rudder has only one instead of two control cables. It should have three hinges.

The inertia starter is not so good for quick take-offs as the battery starter.

*There is no automatic mixture control with the supercharger in high gear. There is no exhaust gas analyser by which to judge the mixture control.

There is not automatic boost control. This means that in a battle climb the throttle has to be adjusted continuously in order to avoid exceeding maximum possible boost.*

*The fuel tanks appear to be of the integral type built into the spar. A bullet hole in the tank will therefore mean changing the wings.
*
The flaps are not large enough and only work for 60 [degrees} of travel, with the result that the glide is somewhat flat and the aircraft trundles a long way on landing.

When landing or taxying the tail wheel wobbles on its caster and rips the rubber of the tyre.

As a trainer the aircraft is delightful. It behaves with the ease of a [Gloster] Gladiator and is just as simple to aerobat. So far we have found no vices. _

The aircraft was inadequately armoured and had no SS fuel tanks, and when these were added its performance was seriously degraded.
These aircraft did not have carrier arrestor gear and carrier landing trials were unsuccessful.

Edit: Here's a short history of the 339B:
http://home.att.net/~jbaugher1/f2a_5.html


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## parsifal (Dec 6, 2009)

Glider said:


> This might be of interest
> Brewster v. Hurricane
> [The Air Fighting Development Unit at Northolt filed this report on 5 Nov 1940 after testing a 339B.--DF]
> _Pilot's Cockpit - The pilot's cockpit is roomy and comfortable and well laid out, and the design of the hood gives an exceedingly good field of view, especially to the sides and rear. The type of hood itself is to be recommended in that it is very strongly built and operates on robust runners. It is difficult to close at high speed but opens easily at all speeds. The arrangement for raising and lowering the pilot's seat is bad; it is exceedingly difficult to raise when flying.
> ...



Simple question about the F2-A....if it was so successful and of high peformance, what were its operational results, either in Europe or in Pacific. In the ETO it may have shot down one aircraft. In the Pacific, it might have done better, but the overwhelming appraisal of it as a type was that it was a failure., and that just wasnt because of combat with the Zero....even against combat with the lowly Ki-27 it could not really compete.

Now, opting for the Wildcat in 1940 does a number of things to your force structure. Firstly the production of the Wildcat in 1940 was extremely limited. In the RN the Martlet Is ordered in February 1940, began service delivery in the following November, and undertook very limited squadron service from about the following April (I think).

However the real cruncher with these Martlet Is was their lack of wing folding. Wing folding was not introduced into the F4F until April 1941, and did not reach the RN even in small numbers until the latter part of the year. AFAIK they were not used to any substantial degree, until the following April (1942).

So for most of the the period we are talking about, the Wildcats for the RN are available in limited numbers, or dont have wing folding. This means that roughly speaking your fighter component onboard that fictional US carrier would be halved again. So instead of being able to field 16 bombers and 16 fighters, you will be able to accommodate 16 bombers and 8 fighters, because the non-wing folding fighters take up twice as much space as a wing folding type. 

Now my opinion is that the zero was a superior type but to the end of 1940, only 12 pre-rpoduction types had been delivered. If the zero had somehow been available to the British, they might have been entering squadron service by about June of 1941. They too lacked wing folding (except the tiny wingtip folding mechanism) andd if the wingspan of the F2A was too big for RN Elevators, then so too would the Zero, since the F2A has a span of 35 feet, and the Zero 36 feet 1 inch, and the Fulmar is 46 feet (of course the last two had wing folding).

So even though, in the end, the Wildcat was developed into a superior weapon system to the Fulmar, in the context of 1940-42 it was either not available, or, incorporated non-wing folding making it impossible to stow on RN carriers, and limiting the size of the CAG severely.

I am happy to accept a carrier based fight on those terms at any point June 1940- through to June 1941 which is the period the Fulmar was ascendant.


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## Glider (Dec 7, 2009)

No one is pretending that the Buffalo was a great fighter, however I do believe that it was better than the Fulmar. Both aircraft seem to suffer at even medium altitude. This is a serious handicap in any fighter.
To support my case I have quoted the Only Squadron leader who commanded a squadron which had both aircraft under his command. You chose to put this down as only the opinion of one fighter pilot, which to a degree is true but as he was the only senior officer in this position in the thick of serious fighting I believe his voice is worth listening to. 
I attached the report of the Air fighting development unit. A professional body who support the contention that the Buffalo was very manoeverable at low altitude and handled well being able to turn inside the Hurricane.
Dunmunro has posted what can only be described as a withering report on the Buffalo. The vast majority of these comments are structural and I have no reason to doubt it, as any aircraft that struggles over 10-15000 feet and has a max speed of approx 300 at best is going to get slaughtered by the 109's. But even in this summary they say _As a trainer the aircraft is delightful. It behaves with the ease of a [Gloster] Gladiator and is just as simple to aerobat. So far we have found no vices_. 
You mentioned Eric Brown but cherry picked on one comment whch gave a misleading overall view and didn't comment on the other aspects of his report the summary can be described in his words _"My feeling after flying the Buffalo was one of elation tinged with disappointment. It was a true anomaly of an aeroplane with delightful manoeuvrability but poor fighter performance. Indeed above 10,000 ft. it was labouring badly_." 

You question its success well it didn't fit on the RN carriers which is one significant factor, so you are left with two options:-
a) use it in the West where all parties agree that it would be a sitting duck for the 109 which had learnt long ago not to get into a turning fight with RAF fighters.
b) send it to the far east where it had the same problems as everyone underestimated the Japanese aircraft and pilots. I don't have the bloody Shambles series but my understanding is that maintaining these aircraft was a limiting factor to its success and the report posted by Dunmunro was probably vindicated.

You question its firepower as do some of the official reports, but all I can say is that a lot of aircraft were shot down by 4 x 0.5 hmg. it may have been light by modern western standards but it did the job well enough in most situations. 

You stick with the Fulmar and if you want a combat from a UK carrier I will take the Sea Gladiator. If your not fussy about the carrier I will take any of the other options.


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## dunmunro1 (Jan 9, 2010)

I did this research out of interest:

The Fulmar in action near Crete:

March 19 1941:
10 SM79 and 5 Cr42 intercepted by 3 Fulmars.
"One Fulmar shot down an SM79, and was seen to inflict damage on two more before colliding with a 4th and crashing into the sea...the SM79...crashed...and was destroyed..." Another Fulmar claimed damage to a SM-79. No other Fulmar losses.

March 21 1941:
Two JU-88s attack Convoy MW-6. 2-3 Fulmars intercept and share one kill with ships AA.

March 29:
Here's an account of a JU-88 attack on Formidable in March 1941:

1511: radar detects incoming raid.
1514: 3 Fulmars launched, to join 2 on CAP, which have been drawn away from the CV by another E/A.

~1531: DP AA opens up on 12 JU-88s. One is blown up by a direct hit.

Ju-88s attack but score no hits, and 4 near misses - no damage to CV.

As the last 4 JU-88s commence their attack, they are bounced by the 3 Fulmars. One Ju-88 is shot down and the rest jettison their bombs and turn away. One Fulmar was hit by return fire and crashed while attempting to land on the CV.

April 3rd:
Two Ju-88 attack Convoy ANF-24, a single Fulmar flying CAP intercepts and shipborne observers "...reported that the Junkers was almost certainly shot down."

April 17:
A Fulmar intercepts but fails to damage a recon Ju-88.

Data from Air War Over Greece and Albania 1939-1941
By Alexis Mehtidis


Operation Tiger, a fast convoy that was escorted by HMS Ark Royal close to Malta and subsequently by HMS Formidable to Alexandria, resulting in FAA Fulmars engaging in a number of combats, from May 8-12 1941.

Fulmars from Ark Royal(first day only) engage:
16 Sm79 and CR42 escort
2 SM79 shot down - 2 Fulmars lost

28 Ju87 and 6 BF110
5 Stukas shot down. Out of 7 intercepting Fulmars, 2 Fulmars crash land on CV (these two actions not covered in detail by Shores but Ark Royal only was involved. Other accounts note a mixture of Me-110 and Ju-87 kill claims). Luftwaffe DBs turn away before finding convoy. 

2 Cant 1007 seaplanes claimed by Formidable's Fulmars, (one confirmed by Shores)

3 He111 shot down (original formation size not noted) (confirmed by Shores who notes that actually 4 were shot down and notes each aircraft identity) by Formidable's Fulmars

I recon Ju-88
Shot down (confirmed by Shores but destroyed in crash landing due to damage suffered)

I recon Ju-88 Shot down (damaged according to Shores who notes a 3rd unconfirmed kill claim - maybe confused with he-111 above?)

9 JU-88
2 Ju-88s shot down (Shores states one damaged, one lost)
1-Fulmar lost. (collided with target)

The Fulmars suffered a number of operational Losses leaving Formidable dangerously weakened later in the month. No ship was lost from aerial attack but one Merchant ship struck a mine and had to be scuttled.

(from Royal Navy Aces)



data in brackets above from Air war for Yugoslavia, Greece, and Crete, 1940-41
By Christopher F. Shores, Brian Cull, Nicola Malizia


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## Juha (Jan 9, 2010)

Hello Parsifal
On F2A’s operational records, at least land based in ETO got exceptionally good results, look LLv 24 of Finnish AF 1941-43. And Finnish pilots really loved it, of course it became slow when time went on but as being very manoeuvrable it still had it chances even in 44. And its armament of 3 hmg and one .3mg, Finns converted their planes later on to 4 hmg was at least against protected a/c at least as effective as 8x.303 of Fulmar.

Hello Glider
Thanks a lot for the Buffalo vs Hurricane report!

Very much appreciated
Juha


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## parsifal (Jan 9, 2010)

Hi Juha. 

The F2A performance in Finn service is acknowledged. IContrary to what some think I dont think it was due to poor Soviet performance either. I just think it was a great reflection of the standard of pilots in the Finn AF. Plus they seemed to do better in the cold, and as i understand it the Finn aircraft were lighter than those delivered to the RAF and the RN.

The Finn experiences on the type, and their impressive record does not compensate for the fact that in Allied service and particularly as a carrier based aircraft, the type was a total failure. It could not operate from carriers because of the landing gear problems, and its combat record in both Europe and the Pacific was abysmal, to put it bluntly. In australian service it is viewed with extreme loathing, it cost us many pilots, and contributed materially to the British defeat at Singapore. In my book, based on allied operational experince with the type, it had no saving graces, no real victories, and an attrocious combat record.

Just in case I am not being clear, I have no time for the Brewster Buffalo....


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## Juha (Jan 9, 2010)

Hello Parsifal
yes B-239 was lighter than B-339E (Buffalo Mk I).
Brewster had quality problems, problems with unions, very militant shop stewards etc. Finns also had to make mods on their planes, for ex reseal fuel tanks etc. IIRC we even got some compensations for that from Brewster Co. The undercarriage was on weak side but so was that of Seafire. At least some problems with the undercarriage of USN F2A-1s were because of bad workmanship, navy even suspected sabotage. IIRC the reason that really killed F2A in USN service was the big difficulties to achieve self-sealing to F2A's integral fuel tanks.

Juha


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## buffnut453 (Jan 9, 2010)

parsifal said:


> The F2A performance in Finn service is acknowledged. IContrary to what some think I dont think it was due to poor Soviet performance either. I just think it was a great reflection of the standard of pilots in the Finn AF.
> 
> In australian service it is viewed with extreme loathing, it cost us many pilots, and contributed materially to the British defeat at Singapore. In my book, based on allied operational experince with the type, it had no saving graces, no real victories, and an attrocious combat record.



So, in essence, you are saying that in Finland the Buffalo was rubbish - it was the pilot that won the fight - but in Malaya, where most of the pilots were fresh out of flying training, it was still the aircraft that was rubbish and not the lack of experienced pilots that led to its poor operational record? You're totally ignoring operating enviroment - the Buffalo squadrons were hugely outnumbered (about 3-to-1 in fighters across the entire force (7-to-1 for northern Malaya during the initial Japanese onslaught)), the RAF fighter force had no effective early warning system, and no robust third-line repair capability. But it's still the aircraft's fault that success wasn't achieved?

One other point, exactly how many Australian Buffalo pilots have you contacted? Just wondering where your "extreme loathing" comment comes from because I certainly have not come across such sentiments from any of the contacts I've made after several years of research into the subject. I've corresponded, and met, with pilots from 21 Sqn RAAF, 453 Sqn, 67 Sqn, 243 Sqn, 488 Sqn and 4 PRU and not one of them expressed "loathing" for the type. They recognised that it lacked performance, and that there were maintenance issues but many of the problems were also relevant to other types in service at the time (eg gun firing problems in the P-40 and the Boomerang). 

In terms of pilots killed by enemy action whilst flying Buffalos, there were 13 in Malaya/Singapore (5 Aussies and 8 Kiwis) and a further 7 in Burma (5 Kiwis and 2 Englishmen). Loss rates of 20 pilots across 5 squadrons for 80 days of continuous operations (100 days in the case of 67 Sqn) against a numerically superior adversary doesn't seem significantly worse than, say, loss rates for Hurricanes and Spitfires in the Battle of Britain...and that's with considerably more advantages in terms of early warning and enhanced logistics support.

Sorry for the rant. I'm not saying the Buffalo was great but I would at least like to see some consistency in your arguments.


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## parsifal (Jan 10, 2010)

To try and argue that the the Japanese outnumbere the British 7-1 over malaya during the initial onslaught is simply a distortion of the truth. The initial landings over Khota Baru were covered by just 25 Japanese aircraft, of the yamada detachment, the 25 zeroes that you have previously stated never showed over Malaya, moreover this situation continued for some days afterward, with some assistance from Petes, until airbases in Northern Malaya had been secured for the main force of JAAF. These army formations could not really get into the thick of the fighting until about the 15th December.

By that stage, 15th December, the two Australian squadrons were reduced to being able to put just three aircraft airboprne between them, losses and breakdowns to that point having caused a massive attritiuon rate in the Buffalo equipped units. Later on the 15th an additional 10 airframes arrived, but the Australians were restricted providing standing patrols over the airfield at Ipoh. Effectively, they were not participating in the airbattle outside that confined airspace after that date, so in effect, far from lasting 80 days in the battle, they had lasted 5. 

On the 17th December, the standing patrol was engaged by three "zeroes"' (according to the official history, but i think they were Oscars), After a ten minute battle the enemy aircraft broke off, , but immediately thereafter another decoy force of 3 "zeroes" (again I think Oscars), and managed to lure the entire operational strength of the two squadrons....8 aircraft, into the air. So occupied and engaged, 10 bombers attacked the airfield, untroubled , destroying much of the airfields infrastructure and destroying 3 Buffaloes under repair. . By now short of fuel, the Buffaloes were forced to return to a damaged airfield, and just as the last of them landed , lost another two aircraft, to yet another Bomber force that attacked as they landed.

Two more Buffaloes were lost the next morning, and three damaged by enemy fighters. On the 19th 6 Buffaloes were sent south leaving only 7 from the two squadrons at ipoh. Later that day another another two Buffaloes were lost in yet another battle. Folowing that defeat, 21 Squadron with no aircraft retreated to Sembawang, whilst 453 squadron, with just 5 aircraft, deployed to Kuala Lumpur. Ten more Buffaloes were waiting for them at KL, but 453 was now the only fighter squadron on the whole of the peninsula. 

on the 21st December another Buffalo was lost in yet another desperate fight over the city. The next daythe twelve serviceable Buffaloes were engaged by more than 20 enemy fighters. four buffaloes were shot down (one in a subsequent follow up raid) , two crash landed, and four were severely damaged. I do not know the precise loss figures for the japanese, but the official history lists the enemy as suffering ten confirmed losses....but as Joe has shown repeatedly, claims are consistently overblown, particularly against the Japanese. 453 emerged from this battle with just 3 serrviceable aircraft.

Due to this extremely high attrition rate, 21 and 453 squadrons were temporarily amalgamated and given 16 additional Buffaloes, I believe being the last of the reserve aircraft....The history says, "lessons learned were now applied to the Buffalo in an attempt to give it better performance. Since nothing could be done with the fuel pressure and boost systems, combat at altitudes above 6000 metrews required the operation of a hand pump, as it was impossible to operate the hand pump whilst engaged in combat the operational ceiling was critical. Armament troubles persisted with many jams, and the RT sets were deleted. The subsequent failure of the type with even these field modifications gave final proof that nothing could be done to make the type an effective combat machine". 

By 8 January 21/453 squadron had been reduced to just 6 Buffaloes. On the 12 January the compaosite squadron intercepted a raid by more than 100 Japanese aircraft. Misdirected by the fighter controller, they only managed to intercept one of the attacking groups of 27 Bombers aircraft. However, the Japanese bombers having already dropped their bombs simply opened their throttles and left the Buffaloes well behind. 

Over Singapore, the Buffaloes needed at least 30 minutes warning to climb to 7000 metres, the usual attack altitude for the japanese. They seldom, if ever giot that amount of warning, so their efforts were largely fruitless 

By 13 January, Buffalo strength had climbed back to 14 serviceable aircraft, it was on this day that the hurricanes arrived at Singapore. 

On the 17th January Sembawang was attacked, and three Buffaloes were destroyed, for no claimed Japanese losses . An unknown number of Buffaloes suffered varying degrees of damage. 

The next day, the naval base was heavily attacked, 8 Buffaloes were lost . On the 18th a further buffalo was lost whilst providing escort to bombers attacking enemy forces.

On the 19th, the allies delivered a raid with approximately 8 strike aircraft (Wirraways and Dutch Martin 139s) , escorted by eight Buffaloes, attacked enemy positions on the Muar River. Five bombers were lost, along with a Buffalo. Thereafter I am unsure what happened to the Buffalo in combat.

These efforts were certainly heroic, but to argue that the type was effective is lunacy in my book. In the initial combats it was not outnumbered, as you claim, but it was certainly outflown. I also debate that the pilots of the Australian formations were that badly trained, though the tactics they employed were certainly the wrong. In Europe the British had learned to dogfight with Me109s, but this was precisely the wrong tactics to use against the japanese.

Another source has this to say about the Buffalo in RAAF service. 

"_453 Squadron came into existence at Bankstown on May 23, 1941. The squadron's motto was Ready to strike. It was raised under the Empire Air Training SchemeBritish Commonwealth Air Training Plan. The squadron was deployed to in August 1941, as fears of war with Japan increased. The squadron, along with No. 21 Squadron RAAF No. 243 Squadron RAF and 488 squadron RNZAF, all initially flying the Brewster Buffalo. Following the Japanese invasion of the Malay Peninsular on 8 December 1941, 453 Squadron was deployed to airfields at Ipoh and Kuala Lumpur. The squadron strove to support the ground troops by providing air cover and attacking Japanese troops and transport, but suffered high losses in doing so. The squadron withdrew to Singapore on 24 December with only three working aircraft. In Singapore, 453 Squadron merged with 21 Squadron.

The squadron fought on until 5 February with just six operational Buffaloes. In spite of many mechanical and performance problems the Buffalo squadrons claimed a 2:1 kill ratio against the Japanese_."

However, the claims of 2:1 need to be considered in the light that as a general rule of thumb you need to divide claims by 4 or 5 to obtain the actual losses. JoeB can give a far better accounting than I about the actual losses for the IJN and JAAF over Malaya atr this time, but I can assure you it wont be anything like 2:1 in favour of the Allies...far more likley to be 2:1 against them in fact. 

I am not claiming that the Finns Buffaloes were rubbish, please dont try to force things down my mouth. And whilst inidividual pilots may not have anything too bad to say about the type, the CO was pretty scathig in his appraisal of the type....the above acount is based on his reports (I believe) 

Sorry, but I stand by my opinion that the Buffalo was a total failure as a carrier borne aircraft, and a near total failure as a land based fighter , and I have remained consistent in my position on this from the beginning


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## buffnut453 (Jan 10, 2010)

Parsifal, I have no problem with your position but I do take issue with the inconsistency of your argument (or, indeed, that you didn't answer my questions in your last post).

You state that the Buffalo was a success in Finland because the pilots were experienced and very skilled. However, in Malaya where the pilots were very inexperienced (ie straight out of training) you state that the aircraft was the reason for the Allies failing to gain air superiority. That is an inconsistent argument. Either the pilot is fundamental to overall system performance or he's not but you can't (as you seem to be) selecting which components of the overall system to blame or praise.

You also failed to justify your statement about "extreme loathing". I have corresponded, interviewed and met pretty much all the surviving Buffalo pilots, and I've accessed diaries and other personal records from many who have passed away. None of their testimonies indicate the intensity of feeling that you conjure up.

Finally, as to numbers of opposing forces, I do not dismiss the Zero's role but the key fighters over northern Malaya in early Dec 41 were IJAAF fighters based in Thailand. Their roles were air defence of the invasion fleet and "aerial exterminating action" against RAF fighter and torpedo bomber airfields in northern Malaya (specifically identified as including Alor Star, Sungei Patani and Kota Bharu). The IJAAF had approx 140 fighters available and these were in use from 6 Dec onwards (when they shot down a Catalina), including operations over the airfields noted. This information is derived from Japanese sources which you, apparently, seem to dismiss.

For the record, I'm not re-writing history to paint the Buffalo as an operational success - that patently can't be done. However, the operational failures in Malaya were less down to individual aircraft performance and more due to lack of numbers (4 sqns to defend a country the size of England is inadequate, even if those units were equipped with Spitfires), an inadequate early warning system and general lack of leadership and dynamism from the leadership in Singapore.


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## parsifal (Jan 10, 2010)

453 squadron was formed in March '41, and moved to Malaya in August. It was not newly trained, or a green formation. However it did suffer from using the wrong tactics, employing what had been learned in the air fighting in Europe to an enemy where fighting in the Horizontal plane was the favoured technique.

The JAAF might be listed as being available from 6December (but not in Thailand....sorry but the Japanese did not enter the country until 8December, the first air units entered soon thereafter, but due to the range limitation of the JAAF fighters, they were restricted to unescorted raids and /or raids of the airfields at Alor Star, Khota and Sungei Patani).

You certainly have a penchant for trying to put words into my mouth, when did I say I was ignoring Japanese records? And why are you saying the Japanese occupied Malayan/Thai airfields from the 6th December? 

Regarding the role of JAAF fighters in the first half of December, they basically were not in the front line of combat over central and lower Malaya until after the 15th December, and by that time the Allies had already suffered heavy casualties. Until that time a very significant proportion of the air fighting was borne by the Yamada detachment (which had a starting strength of just 25 aircraft, and were reinforced at some point to about 40 aircraft. They (the JAAF fighters) did affect the fighting in Northern Malaya, but in central Malaya, where losses were occurring from the very beginning, there was basically no involvement by JAAF fighters in that sector until somewhere between the 15th aqnd 18th December. 453 squadron which was initially based at Sembawang, and then Ipoh, and finally KL was not outnumbered 7-1, it was probably closer to 3-2 (in fighter strengths)

As far as your persistance with pilot reports, I never mentioned the views of the Pilots themselves even once. Try widening your horizons and read the official combat appraisals such as the one I used in my previous posts and post-war histories a bit, and see what the general view of the type was, and then tell me the type was held in high esteem and affection. It certainly increased the RAAFs reticence to adopt the Boomerang, which was seen as a similar type aircraft (unfairly in my opinion). You jump to conclusions far too quickly make assumptions and generally try to purport things that I allegedly said or inferred about the pilots which I never did. 

So, having got to that point, are saying, or not saying, the buffalo in allied service was a success. I am not looking for excuses, or rationalization, or some diversionary argument, just a simple yes or no, was it successful as a combat plane or not


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## buffnut453 (Jan 10, 2010)

I'm not saying the Buffalo was a successful aircraft but there is more to the discussion than "the Buffalo was useless".

Per some of your other comments, 453 Sqn WAS green - most of the pilots had less than 100 hrs flying TOTAL, and most of that was on biplanes with fixed undercarriages and no flaps. Not even the Sqn CO or Flt Cdrs had any operational experience until the arrival of Sqn Ldr Harper to replace Sqn Ldr Allshorn - and Harper proved ineffective as a military leader, seldom leading his unit into battle.

Now time for me to eat a spoonful or two of humble pie. For Thailand in my previous post, please read Indochina (got a tad carried away in my response). The IJAAF fighters were based there commencing 3/4 Dec onwards and were used for air defence of the invasion fleet "aerial exterminating action" raids on the RAF airfields. It was IJAAF fighters in Indochina that shot down the RAF Catalina on 6 Dec 41. As for range, a Buffalo in northern Malaya could have reached the IJAAF's forward fighter airfields on Phu Quoc from a base in northern Malaya so why couldn't the Ki-43s do the same in reverse?

From the Japanese Monograph on air operations over Malaya: “When the advance units of the 25th Army lands at dawn (time may be changed according to the moon) the Air Corps will destroy enemy air power in Northern Malaya". Formations participating were to include 3rd and 7th Flight Battalions (minus 27th and 62nd Regiments) which, in fighter terms, equated to the 64th and 59th Sentais - those with Ki-43s. This is not days after the land invasion, this is immediately in concert with the invasion and the fighter units involved were based out of Phu Quoc Island. This is one of the Japanese sources you are ignoring. 

As for the fighting over central Malaya, the IJAAF was involved in multiple attacks on Penang during the period 11-13 Dec. 64th and 59th Sentais were again heavily involved. It was IJAAF aircraft which 453 Sqn encountered on 13 Dec 41. Thereafter, IJAAF focus switched to Ipon and Kuantan etc. Meanwhile, the 12th Air Battalion was stationed at Singora 10-14 Dec 41. How are these actions and movements not in the front line? These, again, are drawn from the Japanese Monograph. 

Finally, I have widened my horizons which is what got me interested in this subject area. All I heard about was how the Buffalo was shot down in droves, that it was largely responsible for the loss of air superiority over Malaya, and hence the loss of Malaya itself. Unfortunatley, there are wider considerations - lack of appropriate tactics, lack of experienced aircrews (less than 100 hrs total in the RAF compared to many pilots with over 100 hrs combat time in the IJAAF and IJNAF), lack of an early warning system etc etc etc. If you're going to claim that pilots loathed their aircraft, then we need to go back to the pilots' reports and not some third hand (and often poorly researched) re-hashing of "accepted wisdom". 

Even the official RAF report on Malaya cited that the Buffalo wasn't a bad aircraft it just wasn't efficient enough to cope with the scale of fighting, and that lack of forces and preparation were key to the loss of Malaya. No Allied fighter could have won over Malaya in 1941. Had 21 Sqn been equipped with Spitfires, they would still have been caught on the ground at Sungei Patani on 8 Dec 41 and repairs to Spits would have been equally difficult because Sungei Patani was a forward operating base without hangarage or adequate repair facilities. Fighter reinforcement for northern Malaya did not occur until 5 days later when 453 Sqn was sent north from Singapore, and even then several aircraft were lost in transit because the pilots became disoriented and lost their way - 3 were written off trying to land in padi fields (but I suppose that's the aircraft's fault again and not lack of maps, pre-war deployment training etc?). 

Again, just for the record, the Buffalo was not a wonderful aircraft. It was mediocre at best. But it certainly was at least as good as a number of other types that operated without the operational constraints, or the widespread castigation, that the Buffalo suffered. The P-36 immediately springs to mind. In performance terms, the Buffalo (as tested by RAF pilots in the Far East - and this was a war-weary ex-67 Sqn Buffalo) performance was on a par with the Hurricane. I've never claimed the Buffalo was great, I'm just saying that it has been overly maligned when other, wider factors contributed in large part to its lack of operational success. And if you're going to say that I'm caveating, well I'm afraid that has to be done. There are so many variables at play in air combat that one must consider wider issues of theatre, opposition, supporting activities etc. This is precisely why the plethora of "best/worst" discussions on this forum usually devolve down to personal opinion because hard quantitative comparison across different theatres is impossible. For example, the Zero was shot down aplenty during the Marianas Turkey Shoot - does that specific engagement make the Zero a useless fighter? Of course it doesn't yet the Buffalo, which performed admirably in Finland is still, in your book, an ineffective fighter. Again, I just want to overcome the illogic in your arguments.


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## parsifal (Jan 10, 2010)

You know, ther isnt that much separating our two opinions, although that will probably cause you to gasp. Juhas posts suggest an aircraft needing some attention before it was combat worthy, and with enough differences in construction as to explain at least some of the different experience. I have read also that cooler climate in the Arctic may have helped the performance of the type there. Add to that that the Russians tended to operate below 6000 metres a lot of the time, and you start to understand why the Finns did better with their Buffalo mounts than we could. 

As for being green, 453 squadron went to war with Buffaloes, they may have trained with biplanes (although once they transferred to an OTU they would have used wacketts or harvards, or perhaps even Wirraways...Im not saying I know, but I am saying they would have been one of the few EATS squadrons not to have finished advanced training on a more advanced type. With 100 hours of training time, they would have been considered somewhat "light on" but following this and after activation they had 7 months of flying in the Buffalo, or at minimum 3 months after the deployment of the squadron to Malaya in August. Tough bikkies that they had an inneffective CO , that happens, but they just are not a green formation in any sense except one....they had no real combat experience. I will grant you that.

If 64 sentai fought battles over Ipoh and KL, or even Butterworth as early as the 11 December, that would be the first time I have ever heard that. Perhaps you are right, but I would certainly like to examine your source material to make that statement. Ive always read that they did not enter the fray over the central peninsula until the 15th 

As far as the Buffalo being able to reach the Indochinese bases, and why the JAAF could not do the same back, I will hazard a guess and say that the JAAF had issues with a shortage Drop tanks. I am unsure about the JAAF, but I do know the IJN suffered a shortage of Drop Tanks in the opening months of the war, and relied on inadequate plywood drop tanks in the opening campaigns that had been rushed to the front line units just prior to the war. It seems very likley to me that the more boorish army aviation might not have drop tanks at all. I would also argue that the Buffalo could only reach Indochina with a drop tank attached to the aircraft, and am not sure if theyr were available to the units in the far east at that time either.... 

The great failing for the Buffalo was that it could not operate effectively at altitudes above 6000 metres, and that means that the tactics worked out to defeat the Japanese, the boom and zoom tactics, could never be adopted by an aircraft like the buffalo. You intimate they are comparable to a Hurricane....Ive read this elswhere, and for me I have a simple answer....not a chance. Even in the pacific, where the Hurricane did not shine too well, the Hurri could at least adopt the tactics of altitude dive, and speed, and carried far greater weight of armamant to make such high speed tactics workable. There was hope for the Hurricane at least, whereas the buffalo was a lost cause from the start...it never had a chance.

And this does not even address the salient feature in the argument....namely, was the Buffalo a success as a caqrrier borned fighter. The answer is no it wasnt, it was an abject failure, lasting about two months or so in carrier operations before being shipped ashore.


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## JoeB (Jan 10, 2010)

parsifal said:


> fighters in that sector until somewhere between the 15th aqnd 18th December. 453 squadron which was initially based at Sembawang, and then Ipoh, and finally KL was not outnumbered 7-1, it was probably closer to 3-2 (in fighter strengths)


The overall order of battle strengths of Japanese and Allies in Far East in Dec 1941 was:
Navy Zeroes: 115
Navy Type 96: 36
Army Type 1: 59
Army Type 2 (pre-production combat trials): 9
Army Type 97: 195
Total: 414
It doesn't count the Japanese carrier fighter sdns, but they were hardly used in the SEA campaigns

Allied:
P-40: 72
P-35: 18
P-26: 12
Buffalo: 112 (RAF, incl reserve a/c)
Brewster, CW-21 and Hawk of KNIL: 83
Wirraway: 89
Total: 386
It doesn't count the AVG about to become operational with around 100 P-40's.

Just to give a solid starting point. The thing with numbers match ups in air operations is that it also typically changed rapidly from losses and reinforcements. In the early Pacific the Allies brought in a lot more replacement a/c much more rapidly than the Japanese did. The Japanese only made replacements within basically the same units for quite moderate combat losses and pretty reasonable operational losses. The Allies had to completely replace their strength almost immediately. 

Also though the Japanese concentrated their forces according to their offensive plan in which they seized and kept the initiative. The Allies had no coordinated plan, no central command until it was basically too late in the initial campaigns. For examle one might chuckle at including Wirraways, far away, but that was an Allied decision to allow themselves to be defeated in detail, and as for quality how is the Wirraway so outclassed by the Type 97 in theory anyway? and the Navy Type 96's were hardly used in combat either.

And, even for a given area and time, just because one side deploys 500 fighters in a theater and the other 250, it doesn't mean that each combat will feature twice as many planes on one side; it's just as likely the typical combat involves similar numbers on each side, but half the missions of the more numerous side are not countered at all by the less numerous side.

And there's no reason to limit the discussion to one particular episode or period within the first several months of the war. The Buffalo for example was used fairly intensively over several months, small scale by say East Front or 1944 Germany standard of course, but not just in Malaya in the first few weeks. So there's no reason to fixate so much on that period. The Buffalo did no better in Burma or as used by KNIL or USMC, all v the Japanese.

As for Buffalo v Hurricane, it's absolutely unsurprising that a head to head analysis would have found the a/c comparable since their combat records v the Japanese were similar, bad for both. The only significant difference was v Type 97 where the Buffaol for some reason did very badly and Hurricane not badly (though still <1:1); v Zero and Type 1 their records were about the same, in range or 1: 4 or 5 kill ratio. The Hurricane continued to have a similarly bad record v the Type 1 through 1943.

The Buffalo was not a successful airplane in the Pacific, nor the Hurricane. The P-36 in brief career with the Dutch was not successful either, though RAF Mohawks (P-36's basically) were reasonably successful against Type 1's in 1943 (around 1:1) definitely better results than Hurricanes flown by the same air arm, in the same circumstances, at the same time. Those are the results. Of course opinions are like you know what, everyone has one and can *always* come up with a theory about why any actual results don't prove anything. 

But as far as Fulmar in the Pacific  cold meat on the table for the modern Japanese fighters, obviously (though there was only one brief actual example, small formation of RAF flown Fulmars basically wiped out by Zeroes w/o loss at Ceylon in April 1942). And I wouldn't like its chances much v the Type 97 either, assuming it was flown by the same units and situations where Buffalo's and Hurricanes couldn't achieve favorable kill ratio v the Type 97.

The Fulmar and Skua were viable planes if they faced unescorted bombers (they could catch) far at sea. In the few cases where fighters were called on to do that in the early Pacific (F4F's effective defence of Lexington against unescorted Type 1 'Rikko' attack from Rabaul Feb '42, where Butch O'Hare won CMOH, is one of the few examples) they, or the Fulmar anyway, might have gotten by. In the actual mission for Allied fighters most of the time in Pacific War 1942 it would have been basically suicide to use Fulmars. Of course you'd be better off in a Buffalo, though results seem to say, much better off in a Wildcat. The simple obvious difference was that highly efficient and aggressive opposing fighter units were usually around in Pacific 1942, usually with plenty of fuel to fight, completely different situation than Med situation where RN carrriers *using sound military judgement* stayed outside or on the edge of the range of short legged landbased Axis fighters, except when the numbers and quality of the Axis fighters was low.

Joe


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## buffnut453 (Jan 10, 2010)

My Japanese material all came from the Japanese Monograph #55. The Buffalo could just reach Phu Quoc and, if memory serves, the Ki-43 had a slightly longer operating range - enough for a hit-and-run strafing raid which is precisely what the 64th and 59th Sentais did. 

453 Sqn underwent "OTU" training _after _their arrival in Singapore. Pilots were sent in batches to fly Wirraways with 21 Sqn RAAF at Kluang, southern Malaya, as were pilots destined for other squadrons converting from multi-engine types to fighters (eg Geoff Fisken). This was not a quick process because only a few pilots could be trained at any one time and there were so many inexperienced pilots that required training before joining one of the Buffalo squadrons. The lack of experience showed in the time taken to get 453 Sqn operational - they were only officially declared on 11 Nov 41 and even then only had one pilot with operational experience (and even that was quite limited). 

The Buffalo could operate above 6000m. The most successful Buffalo pilots used precisely the sort of boom and zoom tactics that you're talking about - read some of Geoff Fisken's accounts of how he fought with the aircraft. The key problem was lack of warning - the Buffalo lacked the sustained climb rate to reach sufficient altitude in time (although, to be fair, not even Spitfires could have made the climb rates demanded by the amount of warning provided). The lack of warning meant the Buffalo was placed in a tactically disadvantaged position in almost every engagement - climbing up to an enemy who outnumbered him (but let's not go around that buoy again). With the loss of the very few RDF sites as the Japanese advanced down Malaya, the RAF was forced to rely on interception of radio transmissions to warn of incoming raids but that only told them the enemy was coming, not where to find him. A proper air defence network with ground observers, trained controllers, adequate radar coverage etc was never established. In fact, the COs of 243 and 488 Sqns were taken from their units during the fighting to lead the Fighter Operations Room in Air HQ because there were no other trained staff who could do the job. 

Other issues with the Buffalo revolved around weapons failure, radios and engines. The weapons and their firing mechanisms were "Government Furnished Equipment" and not installed by Brewster (other GFE items included the radio, which also never worked satisfactorily, and the gun sight). There are several accounts of gun failures in P-40s and other US types because of gun solenoids not being up to the job. This was precisely the problem with the Buffalo. The key question is why did Air HQ not demand sufficient gunnery training to identify the problem with the guns and rectify it before the outbreak of war? As for the engines, several problems were discovered that necessitated extensive work (and two fleet-wide groundings) to rectify but these were issues with the Wright Cyclone and not its installation in the Buffalo. You could criticise Brewster for poor quality control but it's simply impractical to inspect the insides of every engine you receive before installing it in an aircraft. The last fleet-wide grounding of Buffalos occurred immediately prior to the outbreak of war and was entirely due to incorrect machining of one of the Cyclone's interior components (and the RAF only discovered the problem in November 1941...again, one must ask why was this not noticed earlier?).

Finally, the Buffalo was patently not a success as a naval fighter, although again there are wider issues. The undercarriage was undoubtedly weak for the heavyweight F2A-3 but that version was built at the behest of the Navy to further increase its range and not because Brewster decided to put yet more weight into an already plump airframe. It also appears that maintenance practices contributed to the problem - heavy landings would cause slight forward movement of the undercarriage leg which, if it happened often enough, would start to foul the undercarriage bay opening. The offending projections, a row of round-headed rivets on the undercarriage leg would be filed down so the undercarriage would clear. You can guess what happens if you do that a couple of times...however, it shouldn't have happened and the undercarriage certainly was too weak for the -3 (but I'm not so sure the same is true for the lightweight -1). Finally, one must also remember that the USN is a very conservative, and political, organisation. Even through to the F-14, fighters were built for the USN by Grumman (which is partly the reason why the Corsair was dumped on the Marine Corps). Brewster really bucked the trend by offering the XF2A-1 which roundly whupped the biplane offering from Grumman. However, Brewster did themselves no favours by failing to deliver on time, union problems, lack of quality control etc. Ultimately, Grumman got back in the game with the F4F and the rest is, as they say, history although performance-wise the aircraft were quite similar - Marion Carl who flew both types reported that he would have done just as well in a Buffalo as he did in the Wildcat.

As a final postscript, the RN did try to convert the ex-Belgian B339Bs for operation aboard HMS Eagle but they had been de-navalised and the local maintenance units in North Africa didn't have the resources to design and integrate the sort of tailhook the USN would use ('cos the RN typically went for underslung hooks on 'A' frames rather than a hook at the extreme tail of the aircraft. Tests were ultimately abandoned. Ultimately, the lack of a folding wing would have severely limited the Buffalo's utility aboard RN carriers, but it would have been interesting to discover if the RN suffered from the same undercarriage problems as the USN (note that not one belly landing in RAF Buffalos was due to undercarriage failure - all were down to pilot error).


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## dunmunro1 (Jan 10, 2010)

JoeB said:


> But as far as Fulmar in the Pacific  cold meat on the table for the modern Japanese fighters, obviously (though there was only one brief actual example, small formation of RAF flown Fulmars basically wiped out by Zeroes w/o loss at Ceylon in April 1942). And I wouldn't like its chances much v the Type 97 either, assuming it was flown by the same units and situations where Buffalo's and Hurricanes couldn't achieve favorable kill ratio v the Type 97.
> 
> The Fulmar and Skua were viable planes if they faced unescorted bombers (they could catch) far at sea. In the few cases where fighters were called on to do that in the early Pacific (F4F's effective defence of Lexington against unescorted Type 1 'Rikko' attack from Rabaul Feb '42, where Butch O'Hare won CMOH, is one of the few examples) they, or the Fulmar anyway, might have gotten by. In the actual mission for Allied fighters most of the time in Pacific War 1942 it would have been basically suicide to use Fulmars. Of course you'd be better off in a Buffalo, though results seem to say, much better off in a Wildcat. The simple obvious difference was that highly efficient and aggressive opposing fighter units were usually around in Pacific 1942, usually with plenty of fuel to fight, completely different situation than Med situation where RN carrriers *using sound military judgement* stayed outside or on the edge of the range of short legged landbased Axis fighters, except when the numbers and quality of the Axis fighters was low.
> 
> Joe



A formation of Fulmars were caught taking off and 4 were shot down, and at least 3 of them probably still had their landing gear down. This is hardly indicative of anything. Fighting at altitude the Fulmars faired much better (as did the Hurricanes) over Ceylon. However, no one, least of all me, is claiming that the Fulmar was a viable fighter in 1942 against modern single engine fighters. However when introduced it compared favourably to other CV borne fighters and it proved to be effective in combat, as my examples above demonstrate.


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## buffnut453 (Jan 10, 2010)

Thanks, JoeB, for your useful and, as always, insightful input. I agree that the key advantage for the Japanese is they could mass forces locally to meet their operational tempo while the defending forces could not. One must also consider different roles/tasks/operating conditions even within the theatre. For example, the RAF's Mohawks were not regularly engaged by Japanese fighters - in essence the fall of Burma led to a stalemate where the IJA couldn't advance any further but the Allies lacked the strength to re-invade Burma. Such operating conditions are markedly different from those experienced during the Malayan Campaign, indeed Mohawk kills and losses in air combat were both so few as to make statistical analysis really meaningless. 

Your figure for the RAF Buffalos is slightly low - I reckon there were about 145-150 including reserves in Malaya, Singapore and Burma (depending on which date you select and how many were written off before the war in training accidents). However, apart from the Immediate Reserves held by squadrons (typically 4 aircraft above the number of pilots), the reserve aircraft were not operationally ready - they were simply sitting in hangars on Singapore waiting for a Sqn to claim them and then fit all the equipment (gun sight, radio, guns etc) to make them operational. In reality, the RAF never had more than 70 Buffalos available for operations across the 5 sqns that operated the type - and that includes 67 Sqn in Burma. 

Other than the above minor observations, I broadly agree with pretty much everything you've said.


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## parsifal (Jan 11, 2010)

Yes, regarding the Fulmar, by 1942 it had had its day, it was overtaken by the F4F and the Zero by that time. But at the time of its introduction to service....June 1940, both the F4f and the Zero were not in squadron service, or in very limited service, and retained some elementary problems like no wing folding (for the F4F) at that time....there was nothing better that the RN could use in that period, moreover, from a practical standpoint, this situation continued for a very long period.

It could even operate within enemy Me 109 fighter range, provided it remained on the outer rim of that range. Though this was seldom attempted, because being that close was inviting the loss of the precious carriers, provided it could get altitude, and the loiter time for the enemy escorts was limited, it could get some attacks into the attacking bombers, and then run like hell, hoping the enemy fighters might run out of endurance before they caught the poor old Fulmar. This sort of desperate expedient would not have worked against such a long legged and capable aircraft as the zero....it had plenty of endurance

I am not aware of the Fulmar being greatly troubled by the Me 110, though if anyone has information about Bf 110 v Fulmar, it would be interesting


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## dunmunro1 (Jan 11, 2010)

The Fulmar claimed Me110 kills in the Med and had a confirmed kill during the raid on Kirkenes and Petsamo. During that raid 9 Fulmars encountered stiff opposition from both Me110 and 109 fighters over Kirkenes, yet only two of the Fulmars were lost and they claimed 2 Me110s and one 109 in return and I know that they scored at least one confirmed Me110 kill. The Albacores on the Kirkenes strike lost 11 of 20, but some of these were lost to AA although at least 6 Albacores were lost to fighters. An Albacore had a confirmed front gunner kill on a Ju-87. The Petsamo strike met less opposition, IIRC and lost one Albacore and one Fulmar, (another Fulmar was an operational, non combat, loss), both to Me109 fighters, while a Fulmar claimed one Me109 damaged.

I gave a brief account of some Fulmar combats in the Med from March-May 1941 in post 184. The Fulmar met single engined fighters and Me110s on several occasions and yet never suffered massive losses, with the exception of the flight that got caught upon take-off over Ceylon.


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## Vincenzo (Jan 11, 2010)

buffnut453 said:


> In performance terms, the Buffalo (as tested by RAF pilots in the Far East - and this was a war-weary ex-67 Sqn Buffalo) performance was on a par with the Hurricane.



Hi buffnut you know if this comparation test it's available on line?


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## JoeB (Jan 11, 2010)

dunmunro1 said:


> A formation of Fulmars were caught taking off and 4 were shot down, and at least 3 of them probably still had their landing gear down. This is hardly indicative of anything. Fighting at altitude the Fulmars faired much better (as did the Hurricanes) over Ceylon. However, no one, least of all me, is claiming that the Fulmar was a viable fighter in 1942 against modern single engine fighters. However when introduced it compared favourably to other CV borne fighters and it proved to be effective in combat, as my examples above demonstrate.


This is the same mix of contradictions all along. I said the Fulmar was viable against relatively low performance unescorted bombers, which is what almost all its successes were, as have been documented in the thread. In the last part you seem to agree, but in first part seem to suggest Fulmars would have stood any chance against IJN Zero units of 1942 in some other circumstance; not unless some uniquely favorable circumstance. Hurricanes had remarkably few successful combats against Zeroes or Japanese Army Type 1's across an entire 2 year period through the end of *1943*, kill ratio 5:1 in favor of the Japanese fighters and hardly any better for the Hurricane in 1943 than 1942*, especially notable in view of the general trend against the Japanese air arms in 1943. The Hurricane's consistent lack of success against the early war Japanese fighters is one fact making it obvious the Fulmar would have been meat on the table to the same opposition, if flown by the same or similar air arm, as it would have been. And the Zero was of course operational (albeit in small numbers, but a small number dictating the terms of the air war over a large theater, China) in 1940, not a brand new plane in 1942.

*according to each side's loss report, including only combats where both side's losses are known, see Bloody Shambles and Air War for Burma. In 1942, Hurricanes downed 6 Zeroes for 35 air combat losses, 4 Type 1's for 20 losses; in 1943 no Zeroes for 3 losses, 12 Type 1's for 55 losses.

Joe


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## dunmunro1 (Jan 11, 2010)

First off, not stating the tactical situation does little to illuminate the probable outcome of Fulmars against single engined fighters in the period 1940-42 and the for the Fulmar, given the small number of combats recorded, the one SNAFU over Ceylon completely distorts the stats. It seems probable that given the disparity in performance that the Fulmar would come out on the losing end of encounters with single engine fighters, but it also seems likely that it would not be massacred during these encounters.

The Hurricane stats you quote tell us more about the tactical situation than anything else.


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## JoeB (Jan 12, 2010)

dunmunro1 said:


> First off, not stating the tactical situation does little to illuminate the probable outcome of Fulmars against single engined fighters in the period 1940-42 and the for the Fulmar, given the small number of combats recorded, the one SNAFU over Ceylon completely distorts the stats. It seems probable that given the disparity in performance that the Fulmar would come out on the losing end of encounters with single engine fighters, but it also seems likely that it would not be massacred during these encounters.
> 
> The Hurricane stats you quote tell us more about the tactical situation than anything else.


What exactly 'makes it seem likely they wouldn't be massacred'? I don't get that. The Hurricane stats, note again, are over a 2 year period of the war in Far East, early '42 to end of '43. If Fulmars were used in the same actions as the Hurricanes, they would have faced the same 'tactical situation', not one day's situation, 2 years' situation, and been slaughtered, unless we can somehow credibly argue the Fulmar would have been a stronger opponent v Zero and Type 1 than the Hurricane, which doesn't seem credible at all. 

Fulmars could shoot down unescorted SM79's, Ju-87's, He-111, etc. and faster bombers like Ju-88's in certain situations where it could catch them. Fulmars survived one combat with Bf109E's over Kirkenes with some but not disastrous loss because the Bf109's were busy slaughtering the Albacores the Fulmars were escorting. Fulmars mananaged to stay away from Bf109's at the edge of their combat radius on a few Axis escorted missions in the 1942 Med convoy battles, where Sea Hurricanes and Wildcat/Martlets were the main British fighters. Fulmars shot down the odd lesser capability single engine fighter here and there but suffered at least as many losses to them. How does any of this demonstrate that Fulmars would have been in any way viable against an opponent which racked up a 5:1 kill ratio against the Hurricane in a long series of combats over a two year period? (ie. Zeroes and Type 1's). I don't think you've done much to convince, just keep repeating kind of semi- contradictory assertions, sometimes seeming to admit the Fulmar wasn't a viable opponent to modern 1940-42 single engine fighters (yes, obviously), sometimes seeming to say it could have competed against 1942 IJN Zero units (no, obviously).

Fulmars could shoot down obsolescent German and Italian bombers with no or with highly fuel constrained escorts...now which of the possible alternatives (say Sea Hurricane or Widlcat) couldn't also do that?

Joe


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## dunmunro1 (Jan 12, 2010)

JoeB said:


> What exactly 'makes it seem likely they wouldn't be massacred'? I don't get that. The Hurricane stats, note again, are over a 2 year period of the war in Far East, early '42 to end of '43. If Fulmars were used in the same actions as the Hurricanes, they would have faced the same 'tactical situation', not one day's situation, 2 years' situation, and been slaughtered, unless we can somehow credibly argue the Fulmar would have been a stronger opponent v Zero and Type 1 than the Hurricane, which doesn't seem credible at all.
> 
> Fulmars could shoot down unescorted SM79's, Ju-87's, He-111, etc. and faster bombers like Ju-88's in certain situations where it could catch them. Fulmars survived one combat with Bf109E's over Kirkenes with some but not disastrous loss because the Bf109's were busy slaughtering the Albacores the Fulmars were escorting. Fulmars mananaged to stay away from Bf109's at the edge of their combat radius on a few Axis escorted missions in the 1942 Med convoy battles, where Sea Hurricanes and Wildcat/Martlets were the main British fighters. Fulmars shot down the odd lesser capability single engine fighter here and there but suffered at least as many losses to them. How does any of this demonstrate that Fulmars would have been in any way viable against an opponent which racked up a 5:1 kill ratio against the Hurricane in a long series of combats over a two year period? (ie. Zeroes and Type 1's). I don't think you've done much to convince, just keep repeating kind of semi- contradictory assertions, sometimes seeming to admit the Fulmar wasn't a viable opponent to modern 1940-42 single engine fighters (yes, obviously), sometimes seeming to say it could have competed against 1942 IJN Zero units (no, obviously).
> 
> ...



On the one hand you like to quote stats but then on the other hand are quite willing to throw them away when they don't prove your point. The stats say that the Fulmar could stand up to single engined fighters in 1941/42 when we both know that isn't true. Stats lie. The tactical situation is the primary determinant of the outcome of fighter versus fighter combat and fighters, often of dramatically lower performance than their opponents, can achieve very good results when handled well and/or achieve an altitude or surprise advantage. Your oft quoted, "Hurricane in the far east results", demonstrate this. 

BTW, the Ju-88, He-111, Ju-87 and SM-79 were in not in anyway obsolescent when the Fulmar was shooting them down, and in May 1941 constituted the most modern units in the Axis inventory. During this same time frame neither the Sea Hurricane nor the Wildcat was available, and neither became available in sufficient numbers to displace the Fulmar until well into 1942.


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## Vincenzo (Jan 12, 2010)

just a note wildcat (martlet) first fight 25 december 1940


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## dunmunro1 (Jan 12, 2010)

Vincenzo said:


> just a note wildcat (martlet) first fight 25 december 1940



The first G36A fighters that the FAA received were not carrier capable, had fixed wings, and no armour or self-sealing tanks. The first Marlets that went to sea were the Martlet II in August 1941 on the CVE Audacity. The MartletII had a maximum speed of 295mph at 5300 ft, so it was only ~25mph faster than the FulmarII at low altitude and had a top speed of 317mph at 14000ft. Time to 15000ft was 7.5 minutes versus 12 minutes for the FulmarII.


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## Vincenzo (Jan 12, 2010)

F4F-3 either haven't that and were carrier capable.


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## dunmunro1 (Jan 12, 2010)

Vincenzo said:


> F4F-3 either haven't that and were carrier capable.



The Martlet 1 (G36A) wasn't equipped with a tail hook for carrier landings. The versions received by the UK had lower performance engines than the F4F-3, and the f4F-4, in fact also received a lower rated engine, as it only had a single stage supercharger.

Carrier borne Fulmars scored their first kill in Sept 1940.


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## Vincenzo (Jan 12, 2010)

dunmunro1 said:


> The Martlet 1 (G36A) wasn't equipped with a tail hook for carrier landings.



if you writing this in the first reply we save 3 msg.

the engine was that F4F-3A


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## parsifal (Jan 13, 2010)

Dunmunro1 is correct with regard to the martletI....they were not ready in RN service for service aboard carriers until the latter part of 1941, and lacked wing folding until after April 1941 (in US service.....in Brit service I believe the wing folding Martlets started to arrive either at the very end of 1941, or early 1942.

I am less sure about the the Zero, but am willing to bet that through to the end of 1940, less than twenty had entered squadron service, and not one was cleared or ready for carrier operations until well into 1941. The only carrier capable fighter of the same generation as the Fulmar was the Buffalo, and this aircraft was found to be incapable of operating in a carrier borne role.

Much as it irks you guys, the Fulmar was the best carrier borne fighter available to any nationality in production and in widespread service until April 1941. It was competitive until the entry of Japan, and still performed credibly even after that, in the ETO right up to August 1942


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## Vincenzo (Jan 13, 2010)

wait a moment the F4F-3 were embarked in january 41 in USN, 2 carrier on 6 this is enough widespread for the times


p.s. an other 2 carrier have the F2A-2


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## JoeB (Jan 13, 2010)

dunmunro1 said:


> On the one hand you like to quote stats but then on the other hand are quite willing to throw them away when they don't prove your point. The stats say that the Fulmar could stand up to single engined fighters in 1941/42 when we both know that isn't true. Stats lie. The tactical situation is the primary determinant of the outcome of fighter versus fighter combat and fighters, often of dramatically lower performance than their opponents, can achieve very good results when handled well and/or achieve an altitude or surprise advantage. Your oft quoted, "Hurricane in the far east results", demonstrate this.


But you are taking tiny samples of combats and equating them to prolonged consistent situations. I just noted that there is one example of Fulmar v Zero, I did not say that one incident proved much. And obviously the very few brushes of Fulmars with single engine fighters in the ETO/MTO don't prove much, handful of fighter-fighter kills on each side.

The Hurricane situation in the FE in contrast is quite a number of combats involving loss of cumulatively 113 Hurricanes in air combat shooting down 25 Zeroes and Type 1's, over 2 years, in about 17 combats in 1942, and twice that many in 1943. That's is, or should be to anyone objective, a lot harder to brush off as 'statistics lie'. And by inference, unless the Fulmar was a comparable to superior fighter-fighter combat machine to the Hurricane (obviously not) it would have done as badly or worse over the whole long period, against those particular opponents, assuming similar pilots/units, which is a reasonable assumptiong subsituting one British plane for another in British fighter units.

In contrast your logic about the Hurricane seems pretty circular. You seem to assume it was an effective fighter v types like Zero or Type 1, so if it did poorly it must have been some strange (repeated constantly over 2 years in 50+ combats) situation. The simpler explanation is just that 1942-43 IJN/IJA fighter units were more effective than the Hurricane units they met, and that's why they consistently beat them. And by inference those results would have been even more one sided if Fulmars had been substituted in the Hurricane's place.

As far as time of introduction, the Fulmar was not a significantly earlier plane than either F4F or Zero, slightly. And the Buffalo operated as a carrier plane in the USN manageably, as far as just taking off and landing from carriers. Arguing that only Fulmars were available, or had to be used in part even in 1942 is again kind of going around in a circle. That begs the question of why a concept like that was pursued as carrier fighter so that only it was available. That said, all along I have said history shows the Fulmar was a passable carrier fighter v relatively low performance unescorted bombers when it didn't have to face single engine fighters, and that concept did have a realistic basis in likely RN carrier operations when the concept was formed. But again, its near contemporaries among single seat carrier fighters could also do the former, plus meet landbased fighters on more equal terms, generally better than equal terms when it came to the Zero, some cases well into 1943.

Joe


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## parsifal (Jan 13, 2010)

Vincenzo said:


> wait a moment the F4F-3 were embarked in january 41 in USN, 2 carrier on 6 this is enough widespread for the times




Perhaps, but these earlier types were without wing folding, which was not introduced into the type until April 41. They are one of the reasons why the type was used widely by the RN until 1942, and only on a limited scale in 1941. Dont know too much about F4FR usage in the USN, but is also quite irrelevant to the thread topic.


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## parsifal (Jan 13, 2010)

Vincenzo said:


> wait a moment the F4F-3 were embarked in january 41 in USN, 2 carrier on 6 this is enough widespread for the times




Perhaps, but these earlier types were without wing folding, which was not introduced into the type until April 41. They are one of the reasons why the type was used widely by the RN until 1942, and only on a limited scale in 1941. Dont know too much about F4FR usage in the USN, but is also quite irrelevant to the thread topic.

The F4F-3 prior to April 1941 continued to suffer serious developmental problems, leading me to believe it cannot be considered combat ready at that time. The lack of wing folding prior to April 1941 is the obvious problem, but it was not the only one. Inflatable flotation bags were fitted under the wings for ditching at sea, but after the bags spontaneously inflated in flight a few times, leading to crashes, they were abandoned. Electronics included a radio and, at least eventually, a radio direction finder and an identification friend or foe (IFF) unit. 

Two 12.7 millimeter Browning machine guns were mounted on each wing, for a total of four guns. The guns were mounted inboard, close together on each wing, with the inner gun staggered forward slightly. Ammunition capacity was 450 rounds per gun. The first two production machines had twin 7.62 millimeter Brownings in the engine cowling and a single 12.7 millimeter Browning in each wing, but this armament was seen as too light, and no full production Wildcat had cowling guns. 

The Browning guns would prove prone to jamming when the Wildcat finally found itself in combat, even though such problems hadn't been observed during trials. As it turned out, the trials hadn't been conducted with full ammunition loads, and when a full supply of ammunition was provided the ammo belts would shift around in their ammo cases during combat maneuvers, leading to jams. Spacers were quickly fabricated and inserted into the ammo cases, solving the problem. 

Early production aircraft had a 1930s telescopic-style gunsight, but in 1941 production shifted to a deflection-type sight. An armor glass windscreen and self-sealing fuel tanks were also added later. The self-sealing tanks led to some problems early on, since they could shed particles of their lining, leading to clogged fuel lines and aircraft losses. There was a stores rack under each outer wing for a 45 kilogram (100 pound) bomb. 

The folding wing used on the Martlet II had been in the works since March 1940, when the US Navy awarded Grumman a contract to modify the last production F4F-3 with folding wings. Designing the wings so they folded straight up would have been relatively straightforward, but that made demands on the height of carrier hanger decks, and so Grumman came up with an ingenious scheme in which the wings were folded back along the fuselage. The "span" of the folded wings was only 4.37 meters (14 feet 4 inches). 

The modified Wildcat, performed its first flight on 14 April 1941, and was handed over to the Navy in May. It proved overweight, partly because it was fitted with a relatively cumbersome hydraulic wing-folding scheme. Grumman proposed a manual wing-folding scheme to cut weight and the Navy authorized production of the variant with this feature as the "F4F-4", which reached line service after the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942. 

The wing-folding mechanism was actuated by a crank inserted into a socket and turned by the deck crew team chief, with the rest of the team helping the wings along to folded position. Once folded, struts were attached between the wingtips and the tailplane to keep the wings in place. The F4F-4 also featured improvements as dictated by British combat experience, such as more armor and self-sealing tanks. 

Whilst squadron service began in 1940 in the USN, it was not available to the RN until November 1940, when 10 were delivered. The original French and Greek orders were completed by April 1941, but none of these aircraft were useful in a carrier born role for the RN (with its very small CAGs) and so saw only very limited usage at sea on escort carriers and the like. The Maretlet II, based on the g-36B began to enter squadron service in August 1941, did have wing folding and saw quite a bit of service afloat. 

A lot of this post is direct extract from web material.....


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## buffnut453 (Jan 14, 2010)

Vincenzo said:


> Hi buffnut you know if this comparation test it's available on line?



Hi Vicenzo,

I can't find an online reference to the "trial" in the Far East - it was not official but it is recorded (I just can't find which book mentions it at present).

However, I did find a comparison done by the Air Fighting Development Unit in the UK:

http://www.warbirdforum.com/eagle.htm

Scroll down to the part which discusses comparative performance of the Buffalo and Hurricane. In essence, the Buffalo out-performed the Hurricane up to around 15000ft after which the Hurricane had the edge except in a dive. Overall, I'd say honours even between the 2 aircraft.

Hope this at least partially answers your question.


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## dunmunro1 (Jan 14, 2010)

JoeB said:


> But you are taking tiny samples of combats and equating them to prolonged consistent situations. I just noted that there is one example of Fulmar v Zero, I did not say that one incident proved much. And obviously the very few brushes of Fulmars with single engine fighters in the ETO/MTO don't prove much, handful of fighter-fighter kills on each side.
> 
> The Hurricane situation in the FE in contrast is quite a number of combats involving loss of cumulatively 113 Hurricanes in air combat shooting down 25 Zeroes and Type 1's, over 2 years, in about 17 combats in 1942, and twice that many in 1943. That's is, or should be to anyone objective, a lot harder to brush off as 'statistics lie'. And by inference, unless the Fulmar was a comparable to superior fighter-fighter combat machine to the Hurricane (obviously not) it would have done as badly or worse over the whole long period, against those particular opponents, assuming similar pilots/units, which is a reasonable assumptiong subsituting one British plane for another in British fighter units.
> 
> ...



In fact there were two examples of Fulmars versus Zeros, one where the Fulmars were caught taking off, and one where Fulmars intercepted Zero escorted Vals over ther already sinking HMS Hermes.

I reviewed Airwar for Burma, by Shores, et al. Between 10-12-42 and 29-11-43 I found 13 combats detailed where the numbers of Hurricane and Ki-43 fighters on each side were noted. The 13 combats involved 108 Hurricane and 199 Ki-43 sorties. 5 Ki-43s were shot down (2 more seemed likely including one where a IJAAF body was found but these were not confirmed by Shores) and 21 Hurricanes and 2 blenheims. In 8 combats the Ki-43s had a height advantage, while in only 2 combats was this the case for the Hurricanes. Only during 4 combats did the Hurricanes have superior numbers. So a situation existed where the Hurricanes were outnumbered by almost 2-1 by a enemy with a altitude advantage 60% of the time. The results, of course, were entirely predictable and say exactly nothing, about the relative merits of the two aircraft. In many other combats the numbers are not noted, but it is clear that the Hurricane was almost always outnumbered, often greatly so.

The Buffalo did not manage OK in simple carrier operations, and most embarked aircraft suffered LG failure, causing the type to be withdrawn:

_"...For the next 5 days Brown operated south and west of Oahu, mainly seeking to stay out of trouble. Fighting two flew CAP on 9 and 10 December, but thereafter secured on alert status. Paul Ramsey was reluctant to fly his fighters because of defective landing struts. He would note on 11 December just before returning to port that Fighting Two had "*ceased all operations until enemy contact became imminent*." (6) During this cruise 3 more landing struts had failed, and of the 17 F2A-3s currently on strength, there were progressive strut failures in no fewer than 12..."_ The First Team, PH to Midway, p26:

The only CV borne F2A squadron was grounded due to strut failure within 4 days of Pearl Harbour! On the outbreak of war the USN was scrambling to find enough fighters to bring it's CVs up to strength, yet somehow the FAA is suppossed to do without Fulmars... Where, prey tell, would the FAA and the USN have found the needed aircraft in the absense of the Fulmar? The F2A was simply not CV capable as the USN proved beyond any doubt.

It is easy now to decry the 2 seat Fulmar as a mistake, but it was only the introduction of radar, and it's ability to vector carrier based fighters onto attackers, and it's ability to vector single seat fighters back to their carrier, that allowed the single seat fighter to be truely viable. Additionaly the Fulmar proved to be an excellent long range recon aircraft, and was strike capable, although not used in that role. Carrier based Fulmars were shooting down aircraft before the F4F and Zero ever put to sea.


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## buffnut453 (Jan 14, 2010)

Dunmunro,

As I keep on saying, that was the heavyweight -3 version (which the USN specifically requested because they wanted longer range - even though the F2A was much longer-legged than the Hurri or Spit but not compared to the A6M). The F2A-1 and -2 were available earlier (ie in 1940) and did not suffer the same landing gear problems as the -3. If you want to talk about specific combats for the Fulmar, let's also be specific about which problems afflicted which versions of the F2A.

Kind regards,
Mark


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## Vincenzo (Jan 14, 2010)

buffnut453 said:


> Hi Vicenzo,
> 
> I can't find an online reference to the "trial" in the Far East - it was not official but it is recorded (I just can't find which book mentions it at present).
> 
> ...



Thanks


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## dunmunro1 (Jan 14, 2010)

buffnut453 said:


> Dunmunro,
> 
> As I keep on saying, that was the heavyweight -3 version (which the USN specifically requested because they wanted longer range - even though the F2A was much longer-legged than the Hurri or Spit but not compared to the A6M). The F2A-1 and -2 were available earlier (ie in 1940) and did not suffer the same landing gear problems as the -3. If you want to talk about specific combats for the Fulmar, let's also be specific about which problems afflicted which versions of the F2A.
> 
> ...



The earlier versions of the Buffalo were not available either. Brewster was never able to keep up with the demand and only built a total of 178 Buffalos, including prototypes, despite having large outstanding orders, from 1938 to the end of 1940, which was less than Fulmar production in the last 9 months of 1940.

"_Jan '40 - 10 F2A-1 airplanes are in service with the USN squadron vf-3 on Saratoga. Several problems arise, including failures of a weak landing gear_." America's Hundred Thousand, p444.

The armament of the F2a-1 was 1-.3" and 1-.5" mg in the nose, no armour and no SS tanks but an option for 1 additonal .5" MG in each wing. Now, we could suppose that the FAA might have been persuaded to go without the armour and SS tanks, but "_...During the Spring of 1940 the USN decided to install the optional .5" MGs in the wings of the F2A-1. The increased weight of the MGs caused greater stress on the landing gear during carrier landing and VF-3 began reporting LG failures - a problem that would plague the Buffalo throughout it's service career_." The F2A Buffalo in Action, p7.

No version of the Buffalo was ever CV capable, unless you are satisfied with an armament of one .3 and one .5" MG, no armour and no SS tanks. The Zero, of course never had these either, but at least it had a heavy armament, but OTOH, it and the Buffalo didn't have folding wings. So neither would have been a suitable replacement for the Fulmar. 

The Fulmar, on Sept 02 1940, when it began shooting down aircraft while operating from a CV, had folding wings, SS tanks, armour, and 8 x .3" MGs, with 750 RPG. The F2A-1 would have had fixed wings, no SS tanks, no armour, and 1 .3", 1 .5" MG with 600 and 200 RPG, respectively, and presumably had to be landed on nearly empty fuel tanks to avoid LG failure.


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## parsifal (Jan 14, 2010)

Hi Dunmunro

These points and more have been pointed out on repeated previous posts in this thread, but it intereferes with the preconceived views on the combat effectivenes of the Buffalo. I doubt that people will accept anything less than the notion that the F2A was the best thing since sliced bread as a carrier borne aircraft before the introduction of the Zero and F4F, and that the F4F and the Zero were fully operational types prior to April 1941.


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## parsifal (Jan 14, 2010)

JoeB said:


> As far as time of introduction, the Fulmar was not a significantly earlier plane than either F4F or Zero, slightly. And the Buffalo operated as a carrier plane in the USN manageably, as far as just taking off and landing from carriers. Arguing that only Fulmars were available, or had to be used in part even in 1942 is again kind of going around in a circle. That begs the question of why a concept like that was pursued as carrier fighter so that only it was available. That said, all along I have said history shows the Fulmar was a passable carrier fighter v relatively low performance unescorted bombers when it didn't have to face single engine fighters, and that concept did have a realistic basis in likely RN carrier operations when the concept was formed. But again, its near contemporaries among single seat carrier fighters could also do the former, plus meet landbased fighters on more equal terms, generally better than equal terms when it came to the Zero, some cases well into 1943.
> /QUOTE]
> 
> Joe I am surprised that you would attempt to mount an argument like this. The F2A was not a "manageable carrier borne" fighter as the flight test reports from the USN and the RN clearly show. It was a near total failure in fact, and was grounded from the carrier operations within two weeks of the outbreak of war. Previous to that, going back all the way to 1939, it had chalked up just a handful of hours, spending most of its time on shore bases because of the fatal and catastrophic structural defects that prevented it from making hard landings safely from any carrier.
> ...


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## buffnut453 (Jan 14, 2010)

The Buffalo couldn't fit on the RN's carriers and if you read back through my posts, I've never suggested that it could nor that it was a viable replacement for either the Skua or the Fulmar (for that very reason). But it certainly was a contemporary (actually it came out earlier than the Fulmar). One small point, the RAF procured 170 Buffalos - I think you'll find overall production for all variants was somewhat greater than the figure you posted.

I think you'd agree that there's a world of difference between "starting to report" and the example you cited for the -3 where most of a squadron was out of action because of undercarriage problems. There are several inconsistencies here that can only be solved by delving into primary source material...and even then the answers may not be apparent.

Firstly, if the F2A-1 suffered such significant undercarriage problems, why did the USN order the -3 model which was much heavier, carried 4x50cal guns and armour plate and extra fuel and oil, and then put it onboard carriers? Perhaps Brewsters assured the USN that the undercarriage problems had been fixed. Irrespective, procurement of the -3 is an illogical thing to do, particularly if the manufacturer has displayed quality control issues and workforce problems.

Secondly, the undercarriage issue tends to be applied to the entire range of Brewster fighters. As noted in one of the other threads, not one accident involving RAF Buffalos in the Far East was attributed to undercarriage failure. Across 167 aircraft and numerous landing accidents both prior to and during the war, not one of them was due to the aircraft - all were attributed to pilot error. I accept that landing on a carrier is a very different proposition to landing on an airfield but the RAF Buffalos were much, much heavier than the F2A-1s so I would expect any undercarriage weakness to become apparent, particularly given the inexperience of most RAF Buffalo pilots.

As I stated, we'd need to delve into the primary source material not third-hand reporting to determine the nature, causal factors and true extent of the undercarriage problems (and, for the record, I know Jim Maas is an expert in the Buffalo but a book as brief as an In Action volume cannot hope to convey the complexities of the politics, engineering decisions and operational factors). 

Once again, I'm not arguing that the Buffalo could have replaced the Skua or the Fulmar. They were very different types built for very different purposes. Guesstimating how they would have fared in a combat against a particular adversary is feasible but, as you have successfully pointed out, there are wider considerations in delivering a capability (like actually fitting it within the space constraints of the carrier).


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## buffnut453 (Jan 14, 2010)

parsifal said:


> Hi Dunmunro
> 
> These points and more have been pointed out on repeated previous posts in this thread, but it intereferes with the preconceived views on the combat effectivenes of the Buffalo. I doubt that people will accept anything less than the notion that the F2A was the best thing since sliced bread as a carrier borne aircraft before the introduction of the Zero and F4F, and that the F4F and the Zero were fully operational types prior to April 1941.



And you say I put words you YOUR mouth, Parsifal! I have consistently NOT stated that the Buffalo was the best thing since sliced bread. Please, PLEASE start reading what I say and stop inserting blanket, slapdash statements into your post.

The RN doesn't do flight tests - that's the job of A&AEE which always has been a joint organisation...and, for the most part, they praised the Buffalos handling. None of the UK Buffalos _could_ be trialled on a carrier because they were procured by land-based air arms and hence had no arrestor gear. One unofficial trial was attempted in the Middle East (again without arrestor gear being fitted to the aircraft) on HMS Eagle which, unsurprisingly, failed. 

Parsifal, you once stated our opinions aren't too far apart and you're probably right but I'm really tired of sweeping statements that, upon closer inspection with the _actual_ contemporary documentation don't align with received "wisdom". The Buffalo was an operational failure. I make no bones about that. What I'm interested in is _why_ it failed and it's a much more complex area than you seem willing to accept.


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## dunmunro1 (Jan 14, 2010)

buffnut453 said:


> One small point, the RAF procured 170 Buffalos - I think you'll find overall production for all variants was somewhat greater than the figure you posted.
> 
> .



Yes, total production of both the Fulmar and Buffalo was greater, but I only gave to stats to the end of 1940, to show that Brewster didn't have the capacity to meet demand.


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## dunmunro1 (Jan 14, 2010)

buffnut453 said:


> Firstly, if the F2A-1 suffered such significant undercarriage problems, why did the USN order the -3 model which was much heavier, carried 4x50cal guns and armour plate and extra fuel and oil, and then put it onboard carriers? Perhaps Brewsters assured the USN that the undercarriage problems had been fixed. Irrespective, procurement of the -3 is an illogical thing to do, particularly if the manufacturer has displayed quality control issues and workforce problems.



Because Grumman couldn't meet demand either! The USN was so desperate for a modern fighter that they gambled on the F2A-3, but this gamble failed utterly to produce a viable CV based fighter, and most F2A-3 ended up in OTU squadrons.



> Secondly, the undercarriage issue tends to be applied to the entire range of Brewster fighters. As noted in one of the other threads, not one accident involving RAF Buffalos in the Far East was attributed to undercarriage failure. Across 167 aircraft and numerous landing accidents both prior to and during the war, not one of them was due to the aircraft - all were attributed to pilot error. I accept that landing on a carrier is a very different proposition to landing on an airfield but the RAF Buffalos were much, much heavier than the F2A-1s so I would expect any undercarriage weakness to become apparent, particularly given the inexperience of most RAF Buffalo pilots.



When the tail hook engages the arrestor cable, much of the momentum is exerted on the hook and the fuselage but it is easy to see that much of the momentum of the aircraft is also expended as a downward force on the LG. Brewster had a whole year and a half to try and strengthen the gear for the F2A-3 and they couldn't do it.


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## buffnut453 (Jan 14, 2010)

dunmunro1 said:


> Yes, total production of both the Fulmar and Buffalo was greater, but I only gave to stats to the end of 1940, to show that Brewster didn't have the capacity to meet demand.



Sorry, you didn't make the date cut-off clear in your post. I don't disagree - the Brewster factory was set up for low-rate inter-war production schedules not ramp up to conflict or actual war.


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## buffnut453 (Jan 14, 2010)

dunmunro1 said:


> Brewster had a whole year and a half to try and strengthen the gear for the F2A-3 and they couldn't do it.



By that stage, the USN probably had enough Grummans and wasn't going to give any more money to Brewster, and Brewster wasn't going to fix it out of the goodness of their hearts. Harsh business reality? Perhaps. Some of the Brewster leadership weren't necessarily the most trustworthy of individuals.


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## dunmunro1 (Jan 14, 2010)

buffnut453 said:


> By that stage, the USN probably had enough Grummans and wasn't going to give any more money to Brewster, and Brewster wasn't going to fix it out of the goodness of their hearts. Harsh business reality? Perhaps. Some of the Brewster leadership weren't necessarily the most trustworthy of individuals.



The order for 108 F2A-3s was driven by Grumman's own production problems:

_"Jan 21 1941 - The USN orders 108 F2A-3 models to keep the Brewster production line going because the F4F-3 cannot be produced fast enough."_ America's Hundred Thousand, p445 By Dec 1941, the USN still didn't have enough F4F-3s to meet their peacetime needs. 

To the end of 1941, Brewster built 487 Buffaloes of all types. (including exports)
Total production of all F4F models to the end of 1941 was 431. (including exports)
From April 1940 to Jan 1942, Fairey had built about 500 Fulmars.


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## buffnut453 (Jan 14, 2010)

dunmunro1 said:


> Because Grumman couldn't meet demand either! The USN was so desperate for a modern fighter that they gambled on the F2A-3, but this gamble failed utterly to produce a viable CV based fighter, and most F2A-3 ended up in OTU squadrons.



But it's a gamble that makes no sense (aside from the fact that conservative organisations like the Armed Forces seldom gamble when it comes to procurement of equipment). Why start production of the heavyweight F2A-3 when the F2A-2 was available? The -2 still suffered from problems but most of the undercarriage issues had been resolved (in part by beefing up the hydraulic retraction struts but also the simple expedient of increasing tyre pressure) and it was considered by pilots to be the best of the breed. Given this, why overload the aircraft yet again in its -3 form (and even try to put it on carriers). It just doesn't make sense to replace a better aircraft with a worse one. 

But this thread is supposed to be about the Skua so I'll shut up and just say that the Skua was an effective dive bomber of its vintage, and its radius of operation was quite substantial. However, the concept of a combined-role fighter/dive-bomber was seriously flawed but, as has already been discussed at length, viable options for a dedicated fighter were few when examining all the requirements that had to be met, and the timescales within which the aircraft were required. Perhaps the key fault lies in the post-1918 "10 year" rule which effectively stalled defence spending, forcing the sorts of compromises that led to the Skua.


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## parsifal (Jan 14, 2010)

buffnut453 said:


> And you say I put words you YOUR mouth, Parsifal! I have consistently NOT stated that the Buffalo was the best thing since sliced bread. Please, PLEASE start reading what I say and stop inserting blanket, slapdash statements into your post.
> 
> The RN doesn't do flight tests - that's the job of A&AEE which always has been a joint organisation...and, for the most part, they praised the Buffalos handling. None of the UK Buffalos _could_ be trialled on a carrier because they were procured by land-based air arms and hence had no arrestor gear. One unofficial trial was attempted in the Middle East (again without arrestor gear being fitted to the aircraft) on HMS Eagle which, unsurprisingly, failed.
> 
> Parsifal, you once stated our opinions aren't too far apart and you're probably right but I'm really tired of sweeping statements that, upon closer inspection with the _actual_ contemporary documentation don't align with received "wisdom". The Buffalo was an operational failure. I make no bones about that. What I'm interested in is _why_ it failed and it's a much more complex area than you seem willing to accept.



Fair enough about putting words into your mouth, and you do acknowledge the medicrity of the type, I also agree that there were many other factors as well to account for the defeats in the pacific. 

According to the FAA website 30 F2As were acquired by the FAA, but they were rejected for carrier operations and the carrier gear was removed early on. I am not as sure now about this, given what you are saying but would like to see some sort of proof before accepting that the FAA F2As weree not purchased with carrier operations in mind.

The reason I say what I say about your position is that I believe your position about admitting the inferiority of the type is laced time and again with caveats and excuses about why the type should be excused for its part in those failures. The following are just a few examples:

So lets see how you express the inferiority of the F2A relative to its opposition….

At Post 188

_They recognised that it lacked performance, and that there were maintenance issues but many of the problems were also relevant to other types in service at the time (eg gun firing problems in the P-40 and the Boomerang). 

In terms of pilots killed by enemy action whilst flying Buffalos, there were 13 in Malaya/Singapore (5 Aussies and 8 Kiwis) and a further 7 in Burma (5 Kiwis and 2 Englishmen). Loss rates of 20 pilots across 5 squadrons for 80 days of continuous operations (100 days in the case of 67 Sqn) against a numerically superior adversary doesn't seem significantly worse than, say, loss rates for Hurricanes and Spitfires in the Battle of Britain...and that's with considerably more advantages in terms of early warning and enhanced logistics support._

This suggest that you think the F2A to be on par with the hurricane and Spitfire, do you really think this is acknowledging the types problems and inferiority. Sorry, I don’t buy this as being a sincere acknowlewdgement

Again at Post 188, you stated:

_You're totally ignoring operating enviroment - the Buffalo squadrons were hugely outnumbered (about 3-to-1 in fighters across the entire force (7-to-1 for northern Malaya during the initial Japanese onslaught)), the RAF fighter force had no effective early warning system, and no robust third-line repair capability. But it's still the aircraft's fault that success wasn't achieved?_

This looks for all the world like an apology for the aircraft to me….another way of saying…."the aircraft could have won the day, if it wasn’t so badly outnumbered". Yet, such a numerical advantage never existed, at least in strategic terms, until after the type had failed to achieve its stated tasks as a fighter, that is until the Japanese had shot it up so badly that it ceased to be there in the nunbers that it should have been. Your comments about the Japanese outnumbering the Buffalo, from a strategic or force availability point of view are totally spurious, and you know it, but never post any sort of correction to such statements. Your last sentence in this extract is truer than you care to admit, but the way you are saying is disingenuous in the extreme…in reality you are attempting to shift all blame away from your pet aircraft, and not looking at the issue objectively, in any sense of the word

At Post 190 you state

_For the record, I'm not re-writing history to paint the Buffalo as an operational success - that patently can't be done. However, the operational failures in Malaya were less down to individual aircraft performance and more due to lack of numbers (4 sqns to defend a country the size of England is inadequate, even if those units were equipped with Spitfires), an inadequate early warning system and general lack of leadership and dynamism from the leadership in Singapore. _

Another version of “Im not supporting the aircraft, however”…..blaming everything but the aircraft. You indicate elsewhere that there were 145 Buffaloes in Malaya, against approximately 140 Japanese fighters (not including the IJN fighters, and conveniently ignoring that these fighters were not well positioned to participate in the fight until later….I still don’t believe that JAAF appeared over the critical central sector of Malaya until after the 15th, by which time the damage had already been done, and can categorically state that the JAAF fighters were not the mainstay defenders over the invasion convoys….if so it would be the first and only time that they ever undertook this mission….this was always an IJN responsibility, and it was no different at Singora and Khota)

At Post 192 you state

_Again, just for the record, the Buffalo was not a wonderful aircraft. It was mediocre at best. But it certainly was at least as good as a number of other types that operated without the operational constraints, or the widespread castigation, that the Buffalo suffered. The P-36 immediately springs to mind. In performance terms, the Buffalo (as tested by RAF pilots in the Far East - and this was a war-weary ex-67 Sqn Buffalo) performance was on a par with the Hurricane. I've never claimed the Buffalo was great, _

So here we go again….giving lip service to the inferiority of the type, and then proceeding to say it was the equal of the Spitfire, P-36, Hurricanes P-40s (elsewhere), and so on. You protect the obvious flaw in your argument by acknowledging in a cavalier fashion the mediocrity of the type, and then proceed to caveat and protect the type by all sorts of argument. If ever there was an analogy for the “dog ate my homework”, this has to be the aeronautical equivalent…..


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## buffnut453 (Jan 14, 2010)

Ok, here we go...



parsifal said:


> According to the FAA website 30 F2As were acquired by the FAA, but they were rejected for carrier operations and the carrier gear was removed early on.



The Brewsters given to the FAA were all ex-Belgian aircraft that were _never _fitted with arrestor gear because Belgium didn't have any aircraft carriers. 'Nuff said.



parsifal said:


> This suggest that you think the F2A to be on par with the hurricane and Spitfire, do you really think this is acknowledging the types problems and inferiority. Sorry, I don’t buy this as being a sincere acknowlewdgement



I'm not saying the Buffalo was on a par with the Spitfire - I'm saying that 4 squadrons of Spitfires instead of Buffalos could not have changed the outcome in Malaya and Singapore under the given operating conditions. The performance of the Buffalo _was_ on a par with the Hurricane in all aspects apart from armament and high-altitude operation (although neither were necessarily a disadvantage in Malaya against unarmoured Japanese aircraft and operating altitudes typically around 20,000ft, and perhaps even other theatres (eg the Middle East and North Africa), but it certainly would have been a problem in the Battle of Britain). My issue is that other aircraft also lacked armament and high-altitude performance (eg the Mohawk) but they don't seem to attract the bile of the aviation community as does the Buffalo.



parsifal said:


> This looks for all the world like an apology for the aircraft to me….another way of saying…."the aircraft could have won the day, if it wasn’t so badly outnumbered"....Your comments about the Japanese outnumbering the Buffalo, from a strategic or force availability point of view are totally spurious, and you know it, but never post any sort of correction to such statements. Your last sentence in this extract is truer than you care to admit, but the way you are saying is disingenuous in the extreme…in reality you are attempting to shift all blame away from your pet aircraft, and not looking at the issue objectively, in any sense of the word



Strategically, the RAF fighters were massively outnumbered but even operationally they were outnumbered. I've provided Japanese-sourced evidence of IJAAF fighter operations over northern Malaya before your pet date of 15 Dec 41 - you're just choosing not to accept it. The IJAAF could, and did, attack at times and places of their choosing. To be effective, the defending fighters had to be able to engage the enemy. There was one squadron of Buffalos in northern Malaya (21 Sqn RAAF - largely assigned an Army Coop function) plus a section from 243 Sqn when the Japanese attacked. Without adequate air warning and ground controlled intercept, your only real option would be to put all those aircraft up in the air, stooging around trying to find the enemy but the odds of succcess aren't great. In hindsight, perhaps that was a better option than leaving them on the ground where they were caught by IJAAF bombers on the first day of the campaign while the RAF command system sat on its hands. Thereafter, the RAF was in a sorry mess all over northern Malaya. Sorry, but it's all a bit late when your early warning system comprises one of your airman standing at the end of the runway and waving his arms 'cos an enemy raid is approaching - but such was the case for the RAF in December 1941.



parsifal said:


> You indicate elsewhere that there were 145 Buffaloes in Malaya, against approximately 140 Japanese fighters (not including the IJN fighters, and conveniently ignoring that these fighters were not well positioned to participate in the fight until later….I still don’t believe that JAAF appeared over the critical central sector of Malaya until after the 15th, by which time the damage had already been done, and can categorically state that the JAAF fighters were not the mainstay defenders over the invasion convoys….if so it would be the first and only time that they ever undertook this mission….this was always an IJN responsibility, and it was no different at Singora and Khota



Again, you're misquoting me. There were approx 145 Buffalos _in total_ but the reserve airframes were not available for operations so there were never more than around a third of that number with the squadrons. The reserve aircraft lacked guns, gunsights and radios - fitting these GFE items was a squadron responsibility. It took so long to re-equip 21 Sqn because all their groundcrew were in northern Malaya and nobody had the common sense to have reinforcement aircraft being prepped by other units in Singapore. 

You are choosing not to accept the presence of IJAAF fighters over northern and central Malaya despite my citing of Japanese sources which state they were: I can't fight your lack of acceptance on this topic. The Ki-97s _were_ assigned with convoy protection of the invasion force operating initially from Phu Quoc and then, from 10 Dec onwards, from Singora. Again, I can't fight your unwillingness to accept Japanese sources upon which I base this statement. 

The damage that was done by 15 Dec was the loss of air superiority over northern Malaya (ie one squadron had been mauled, mostly by losing aircraft in Japanese bombing and strafing raids due to lack of early warning) which gave the IJAAF free rein to operate over northern Malaya but, as I have indicated, they were already operating over Malaya long before your 15 Dec date.



parsifal said:


> So here we go again….giving lip service to the inferiority of the type, and then proceeding to say it was the equal of the Spitfire, P-36, Hurricanes P-40s (elsewhere), and so on. You protect the obvious flaw in your argument by acknowledging in a cavalier fashion the mediocrity of the type, and then proceed to caveat and protect the type by all sorts of argument.



No, no, no! Again, you're misquoting me. As I've said above, the Buffalo's flying characteristics and overall capability as a weapons system were broadly equivalent to that of a Mohawk or Hurricane NOT a Spitfire . Both the Hurri and the Mohawk were better armed, and the former had a performance advantage at altitude, but otherwise they were pretty similar (eg the AFDU comparison of the Buffalo and the Hurricane - the Buffalo could out-turn and out-dive the Hurricane). The Buffalo was mediocre by late 1941. I keep saying it. I'm not caveating it. But so was the Mohawk as a _fighter_. So was the Hurricane as a _fighter_. Both performed admirably in other roles - close air support, and tactical reconnaissance - but by late 1941 standards both were obsolescent in the fighter role...as was the Buffalo. The Spitfire was a different breed altogether, and far superior in performance (although even the Spit struggled in in its first encounters with Japanese fighters). None of this changes the fact that the Buffalo was an indifferent aircraft, with poor climb performance and a number of maintenance issues (some resulting from the Brewster Corp, some from Wright's, some from GFE (eg radios and guns)).

The Buffalo in RAF service was most definitely a failure as a fighter but in the context of the Malayan campaign I simply ask could anything else have done a better job? Had the Buffalos been replaced, one for one, with Spitfires in, say, August 1941, the outcome of the Malayan Campaign would have been no different because of all the systemic problems - lack of experienced pilots, inadequate training, no real early warning system, and lack of leadership - that plagued the Far East Air Force in 1941. One squadron (plus an extra section) of Spitfires in northern Malaya on 8 Dec 41 would still have been caught on the ground when the IJAAF (or IJN if you prefer!) attacked so the Japanese would still have gained air superiority on Day 1 of the campaign over northern Malaya. Provision of reinforcement aircraft would still have presented problems - availability of radios, guns and gunsights was an issue. Lack of flexibility and aggression in command would have remained a limiting factor because AHQFE was focussed on providing air cover over Singapore so that reinforcements could arrive by sea. The shorter range of the Spitfire would not have improved loss-rates in the appalling northeast monsoon season - several Buffalos force-landed and were wrecked when the pilots became lost in cloud and poor visibility - nor would the narrow track undercarriage have improved accident rates on waterlogged grass airfields. The logistics and spares to keep the Spitfire's cooling system (there were no in-line, liquid-cooled engines in Malaya in 1941) may have further hindered rapid operational deployment to ill-equipped forward operating bases. The pilots were still as untrained, the supporting elements would still have been just as bad. The Buffalo was inadequate as a fighter but in the context of the Malayan campaign, the crucial issue was not aircraft performance - overall unpreparedness (ie systemic problems) and an inabilty to focus a weight of fighter force at critical times and locations were the key drivers. Whether it was margarine or butter was irrelevant - there just wasn't enough of it to cover the bread.


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## merlin (Jan 24, 2010)

After all the debate off-thread, I thought a piece on the Skua may be of interest - taken from Dive Bomber by Peter C Smith p.145

The last operational dive bomber unit with the british forces, other than experimental units, was No 810 squadron, still operating under Coastal Command direction, though sometimes embarking aboard carriers to conduct strikes against coastal shipping and land installations of Norway with the fleet. This was now a hard-flying, tough unit who had developed a sturdy independence and pioneered many new dive bombing innovations off their own backs. They still came up against a wall of ignorance as to how their aircrcraft could be properly employed and suffered much frustrations, being given missions and tasks impossible to carry out in safety. Their end came abrutly when the Luftwaffe attaked their base at St Eval and destroyed many Skuas parked near the control tower. It is on record that many of the crews openly cheered and applauded this destruction of their aircraft, so bitterly did they feel they had been mishandled by their new masters. a sad end to what could have been a potentially invaluable unit.


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## dunmunro1 (Jan 24, 2010)

Here's a list of resources for the Buffalo.

http://www.warbirdforum.com/buff.htm

Regarding the Buffalo versus the Hurricane, the comparison states that similarly equipped that the aircraft would be equal in speed at 6000ft but at 14700 ft, the Hurricane would be 12mph faster. It seems almost certain that these speeds for te Hurricane were with 6lb boost, and that 12lb boost would give the Hurricane another ~30mph at 6000ft and a much higher climb rate.


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## parsifal (Jan 25, 2010)

we have strayed from the original thread topic.....I guess the redefined topic causing such a hot debate is whether the FAA was well served by the Fulmar and the Skua. A subsidiary debate has arisen that the F2A Buffalo would have served the RN better in the carrier role, something I remain totally unconvinced of....

A further argument that arose is whether the RN could have relied on the F4F in the operational state that it existed in June 1940, and in the numbers it was receiving them, to meet its needs in that critical period June 1940-May 1941. I have made my opinions abundantly clear on this claim as well. The F4F ended up being greatly superior to the Fulmar, but at the time the Fulmar was introduced, and the numbers that it was available, the Wildcat was not a satisfactory substitute for the Fulmar


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## merlin (Jan 25, 2010)

Well I did make a comment earlier that the Skua could've been replaced in the FDB role by the 'Sea Henley'.
With the addition of forward firing guns, maybe cannon in a mk II, - no need for the Fulmar. Would initially confuse enemy aircraft - think it's a Hurricane! 
I think a carrier mix of Swordfish, Sea Henley and Marlet, being more effective in say 1941 than OTL.

But, since there was a nil reaction, I assume I must be on some sort of 'ignore' list!


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## Shortround6 (Jan 25, 2010)

A lot of decisions at the time were based on timing and expected production needs/capacities. 

How long would it take to design and test a folding wing for the Henley?
Landing gear suitable for carrier operation?
Who will do the redesign work?



What was the availability of 20mm cannon, not did they exist but how many were being produced per month and did any other aircraft (like the Beaughfighter) have first call on them? were they drum feed or belt?

There might be some argument as to if the Henley would even offer much of a performance advantage over the Fulmar if both are similarly equipped and powered. Fulmars used Merlins that were optimized for low altitude performance while some Henley speed figures are for altitudes 8-9000ft above the Fumars best altitude. Thinner air=less drag. 

If the "naval" Henley doesn't offer much improvement and won't show up in numbers until 3-5 months after the Fulmar it might not be that good a choice.


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## merlin (Jan 25, 2010)

Shortround6 said:


> A lot of decisions at the time were based on timing and expected production needs/capacities.
> How long would it take to design and test a folding wing for the Henley?
> Landing gear suitable for carrier operation?
> Who will do the redesign work?
> ...



The Henley first flew in March 1937 - was in the RAF Hendon display of '37. Likewise, the Skua also flew in 1937, and was also shown at the Hendon display. Therefore doesn't seem too implausible for FAA people to compare the two - Henley had a speed advantage of about 70 mph, and a bigger bomb load. If someone asked - 'Can it carry guns?' Do you think Hawker will say no? Then, when the RAF's interest is only for a 'target-tug' either the FAA will express an interest -'Well if you don't want it as a dive bomber, we may!', or Hawker offer it to the Admiralty as a private venture.
This, could all take place *before* the specification for the Fulmar was issued. Fairey might even be sub-contracted to do the naval version i.e. wing folding, and arrester gear, etc.
Hence, IMHO, to be available to supplant/replace the Skua in mid to late 1940, with the next 'mark' - with bigger engine and heavier armament.
It in turn is replaced by either a Griffon Barracuda, or a Blackburn Firebrand (at least that could have been the expectation).


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## Shortround6 (Jan 25, 2010)

Where does that 70mph difference take place?

there is a 40mph difference in the speed of an early Hurricane between 5000ft and 15-20,000ft. 
If you are comparing the Speed of a Henley at 16-17,000ft to the speed of a Fulmar at 5-7,000ft the Henley is going to look awfully good. It also doesn't have the folding wing, the beefed up landing gear, or the armament provisions. There may be a difference in radio fit. 

For two aircraft that used the almost the same engine ( at least in prototype form) , were both 2 seaters and had wings of almost identical size I am having a hard time figuring out why the Fulamr would be so much slower at the SAME altitude.

SEE: Hawker Henley

It is not the the Henley is a model of aerodynamic cleanliness

of course I don't have my own wind tunnel and I could be wrong.


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## merlin (Jan 25, 2010)

I thought my last post clear enough - the first paragraph was all about the Henley Skua, no other aircraft is mentioned. Therefore, if I make a comment about 70 mph difference - *why* do you think it relates to a different aircraft?
In *Dive Bomber *by Peter Smith (an excellent book if you are interested in dive bombers in WW2) on p.100 in a table of the principal dive bombers at the start of WW2, it gives the Blackburn Skua-II as having a max speed of 222 mph. Tony Butler's British Secret Projects p.73 gives the Henley as having a max speed of 300 mph, and in *The Lion Has Wings *by L F E Coombs p.49 " The Hawker Henley caused a 'stir' in the New Types Park at the 1937 Hendon Pagent. Here was an aircraft with a top speed close to 300 mph able to carry 1,000 lb of bombs" . So according to that I could have said 'about 80 mph'!
Sure, a naval Henley would gain weight - due to arrester gear, folding wing, life raft, better radio etc. But I can still the advantages that the FAA woud gain from such an aircraft, and it would negate the need for the spec that resulted in the Fulmar. If you think otherwise - fine.


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## dunmunro1 (Jan 25, 2010)

Did the Henley have dive brakes? If not, then it wasn't really in the running to replace the Skua. OTOH, it might have replaced the Fulmar, but the prototype Fulmar (P.4/34) was also somewhat faster than the production Fulmar, and lost about 30mph after it was fully navalized.


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## merlin (Jan 26, 2010)

dunmunro1 said:


> Did the Henley have dive brakes? If not, then it wasn't really in the running to replace the Skua. OTOH, it might have replaced the Fulmar, but the prototype Fulmar (P.4/34) was also somewhat faster than the production Fulmar, and lost about 30mph after it was fully navalized.



Dive-brakes? Maybe, maybe not - perhaps the Air Ministry decision not to proceed with the light-bomber requrement means that that part of the prototype development has occured yet. But no doubt if (and they would) the FAA wanted dive-brakes, Hawkers would have them fitted.
The question then, would be with a more effective FDB in the offing, would the FAA still want an eight-gun Fighter (re-con) aircraft - the decision making timing is tight. I can see the Henley having four guns - like the Skua, but not eight - its main duty is a dive-bomber. And according to 'Dive Bomber!' p.51 "with capacity for four 500 lb bombs on underwing racks".
OTOH it gives a window of opportunity, for the FAA to go to single-engine fighters, rather than two-seaters.


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## Waynos (Jan 26, 2010)

In the context of this discussion it might be interesting to note that a Henley prototype was converted to RR Griffon power and was used to test the engine installation for the forthcoming Firefly, so why no Griffon Sea Henleys then, as it was obviously flying first?


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## Shortround6 (Jan 27, 2010)

Some large, sturdy aircraft were used as flying testbeds for engines with absolutely no intention of ever producing such a combination as a production/service aircraft.

First Flights of R-2800 were in a converted Northrop A-17.

Fairly Battles flew with a variety powerplants.

Second seat gave room for an engineer and much more extensive instrumentation than a single seat aircraft would have.


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## Waynos (Jan 27, 2010)

Oh yes, absolutely, but I was wondering, if the Henley was flying with Griffon power as a test bed why was it never considered for production? I am presuming there was a good reason, I just don't know what it is.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 27, 2010)

Waynos said:


> Oh yes, absolutely, but I was wondering, if the Henley was flying with Griffon power as a test bed why was it never considered for production? I am presuming there was a good reason, I just don't know what it is.



Just a wild guess but the Henley used the same type of construction as the Hurricane. A tube fuselage covered with fabric. Perhaps the specs for new aircraft called for all metal?


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## Waynos (Jan 28, 2010)

you might have something there.


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## merlin (Jan 29, 2010)

According to 'wiki' although the first had fabric covered wngs, later aircraft was with stressed-skin

"Although construction of a Henley prototype began as early as mid-1935, with all priorities going to Hurricane development it was not until 10 March 1937 that it was first flown, powered by a Merlin "F" engine; shortly after the competing Fairey P.4/34. Subsequently the aircraft was refitted with light alloy stressed-skin wings and a Merlin I engine, and further test flights confirmed the excellence of its overall performance."

Hawker Henley - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Re: the Griffon, I think the Hurricane wasn't considered for fitting with this engine - it was considered too old a design, and therefore more benefit could be gained from using it on a newer model. It is possible then that a successful Henley may be considered 'worth' the upgrade - depending what the alternatives are, and what gain in performance bomb-load!


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## Shortround6 (Jan 29, 2010)

The wings were all metal the rear fuselage was not. 

while Fabric covered aircraft did serve on carriers for the length of the war, they were older designs that were kept in production. In 1939 before the guns started firing picking a fabric covered plane (even partially) might have been viewed as old fashioned. Once the shooting starts build what is tooled up.


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