# What if? - Battle of Midway in July 1942 rather than June



## Conslaw (Nov 11, 2012)

I'm reading Craig Symonds' book _The Battle of Midway_. It's pretty good, lots of background material, but I like _Shattered Sword_ better over all. It got me thinking about how things had been different if the Japanese had waited until July 1942 for their Midway operation. Perhaps to include Shokaku and Zuikaku in the operation. Would it have gone better or even worse for the Japanese? What do you think? Why? Follow up question: If you were Yamamoto and had decided to postpone the Midway operation until July, would you still go forward with the Aleutians operation in June?


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## bob44 (Nov 11, 2012)

I think if the Japanese would have waited 1 more month, it would have benefited the US Navy more. The Saratoga would have been available. The carrier aircraft tactics could have been refined/improved since Coral Sea. The Avenger could have replaced the Devastator. Far more build up on Midway.


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## Conslaw (Nov 11, 2012)

The Saratoga is the most likely addition on the American side. Sara arrived in Pearl Harbor on June 6, 1942, the last day of the Midway battle. Apparently the Wasp arrived in the Pacific in June 1942 as well. So in theory, the Americans may have had 5 carriers to go against the Japanese 6. I wonder how many aircraft could have been crammed on Midway. What if there were 20 torpedo-toting B-26s and 20 TBFs? The Japanese would have a hard time defending against A-20 Havocs if they could have been made available as well.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 11, 2012)

The earlier the IJN strikes, the better. Hopefully, with full weight, rather than to disperse it's forces in a try to lure away USN. It was USN they were after (or they should been after), not Midway.


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## VBF-13 (Nov 11, 2012)

> I'm reading Craig Symonds' book _The Battle of Midway_. It's pretty good, lots of backgro und material, but I like _Shattered Sword_ better over all. It got me thinking about how things had been different if the Japanese had waited until July 1942 for their Midway. Perhaps to include Shokaku and Zuikaku in the operation. Would it have gone better or even worse for the Japanese? What do you think? Why?


Quite frankly, I don't think they needed more fleet. What they needed was Midway out of the way, before they met our carriers. Another month would have given us another month to mobilize, too. I'm assuming they catch us the same way in July, i.e., right there on the doorstep with our carriers. Who knows what other resources we'd have been able to bring to bear had we had that extra month? If, on the other hand, you're contemplating catching us unaware in July, I'll say you're underestimating what went wrong for them in June. Had they caught us unaware, they'd have taken Midway out of the fight, before they met our carriers. That striking force they had for that purpose was just that strong. In my honest opinion, anyway. Their battleships, alone, had they had them in range, would have reduced that island to a cinder.


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## davebender (Nov 11, 2012)

That depends on what the IJN do during the month of June 1942.

The Aleutian operation was not connected to Midway so it will happen anyway. CVL Junyo and CVL Ryujo should be available during July for Midway.

The IJN had a bunch of CV capable aircraft operating from airfields on land. The IJN could use those aircraft to bring CV air wings up to full strength.

So...
In theory July 1942 Japan could have 5 CVs at Midway plus two CVLs and they could have full strength airwings. Will that happen? It's probably at least as likely as the USN having every operational CV in the fight.

IMO it's more likely the USN retain Wasp and Ranger in the Atlantic. Meanwhile Japan will not be idle during June 1942. The IJN might take another crack at Port Moresby during June 1942 but this time with 4 CVs and a bunch of battleships (including Yamato) in support. If the USN contest the operation then naval superiority will be determined in the resulting Coral Sea battle and there will not be a major fight at Midway.


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## parsifal (Nov 11, 2012)

IJN was overconfident, simple as that. If they had changed their codebooks as planned, and concentrated their carriers, whether that be 6 carriers as in June, or 9 carriers as in July, and stopped telegraphing their plans via a compromised communications system, I dont see the Americans stopping them. In july the US has the Wasp and possibly some further LBA assets, but they would be facing a theoretical 690 carrier based attackers.


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## bob44 (Nov 11, 2012)

> That depends on what the IJN do during the month of June 1942.


True. Little doubt the Shokaku and Zuikaku could have been there.



> The Aleutian operation was not connected to Midway


Do we know this for sure?

If the Japanese took another go at Port Moresby in June, no doubt they would be much more cautious, and that would again split their Naval force. Weaking the upcoming Midway operations more than likely.


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## davebender (Nov 11, 2012)

Code books have little to do with superior USN intelligence at Midway.

Midway had 31 long range PBY recon aircraft. Enough to completely saturate airspace around the atoll to a distance of 700 miles. The USN knew approximately where all the IJN fleets were a day before the main battle. In fact the USN had so many PBYs that a handful were employed as torpedo bombers and they scored a hit on an IJA transport the night before the main battle. Japan had to rely on ship based recon aircraft with less then half the search radius. It didn't help that IJN shipboard aircraft were down to about 75% of authorized strength even before the battle started.

Why Admiral Yamamoto chose a battle location where the USN had an overwhelming recon advantage has never been explained. Japan could have fought in the Coral Sea where they had long range seaplanes which would level the recon playing field.


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## parsifal (Nov 11, 2012)

IJN chose Midway on the following basis. It was close enough to bring Hawaii under constant surveillance by LR IJN search aircraft. nothing could get in or out without the IJN knowing about it. This was known to be unnacceptable to the USN. Attacking Midway forced the USN to a decisive battle which is what the IJN wanted. Destroy the US carrier fleet and the Americans were much more likley to negotiate a peace.

And Recon, whilst good and valuable, is no subsitute for the intell enjoyed by the USN in the lead up to Midway. The USN was blinded by the change from JN25 to JN25B, which led directly to Savo Island, and that was with the full knowledgge of the wherabout of Mikawas squadron. Knowing the enemy is present is different to knowing exactly what and when they are goiunfg to attack. it completely alters the game and who has the advantage.


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## Conslaw (Nov 11, 2012)

I'll play devil's advocate for the Japanese. If they would have had Shokaku and Zuikaku, and if the Americans would have only added Saratoga, then I think the Japanese would have had a fighting chance at a favorable outcome; but only IF American airpower on Midway wasn't greatly enhanced. If they would have changed their codes between June and July, their odds would be improved. Similarly, applying the light carriers (which were assigned the Aleutians mission) to Midway also would have helped their chances. 

Both sides showed a history of piling on a crippled ship rather than knocking the most ships out of action. The Americans' target selection in the historical Midway battle was much wiser than average. The Shokaku and Zuikaku both showed they could take a lot of damage and survive. All of the Japanese carriers would not be needed for the strikes on Midway. It is therefore unlikely that a surprise dive bomber attack would find them all fueling and arming aircraft. In fact, it is unlikely that all of the carriers would be found at the same time much less hit at the same time. Hiryu was in the same formation as the other 3 carriers, but Hiryu was left untouched in the first attack. Taken altogether, even if attacked by surprise by an American dive bombers from 4 or 5 carriers, it is likely that some Japanese flattops would remain undamaged or barely damaged. These surviving ships could deliver a hard blow with their planes and the orphan planes of sunk sister carriers. For historical proof of the diluting factor of large carrier groups, I offer an example of the Battle of the Philippine Sea (the Marianas battle). When the American carrier airmen finally got a crack at the Japanese carriers in the Battle of the Philippine Sea, the Americans damaged many ships but only sunk one carrier, and the American carrier force in June 1944 was a lot larger than it was in 1942.

The first team of IJN attack pilots were crackerjacks. If they got a clear shot at American carriers, they would likely score an even higher percentage of hits than the American dive bomber pilots scored in the historical battle. If they would have gotten first shot at the Americans, which would have been more likely with more carriers to share scouting duty, they could have scored hits on 4-5 carriers in the first attack alone. 

In a nutshell, if the Japanese had more carriers, it would have diluted the American attacks, with more Japanese carriers surviving the first attack and an even greater proportion of the planes and surviving to make additional attacks. More carriers would have meant better scouting and more chances to find the Americans. (More American carriers would mean that their formations would take up more space, so they would be easier to find anyway.)


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## Conslaw (Nov 11, 2012)

@ davebender, I agree with you. 

When Yamamoto proposed the Midway plan, it was pointed out to him that the plan violated many of the Japanese tenets for fighting the Great Battle. It was expected that the battle would be fought in a location favorable to the Japanese, with Japanese land-based airpower and within useful distance of Japanese ports and repair facilities. It was also pointed out to Yamamoto that even if the Japanese succeeded in taking Midway. The atoll would be almost impossible to defend since it was much closer to Pearl Harbor than it was to Japan. IMHO, anyway you look at it the Japanese battle plan was really stupid, surpassed in idiocy only by the final voyage of the Yamato.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 11, 2012)

Seems to me to be very optimistic to expect Shokaku to be available in July. It didn't come out of repair until mid July and apparently was in a training status until mid August when she rejoined Zuikaku for the Eastern Solomons battle.

At least according to:

Imperial Flattops


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## tyrodtom (Nov 11, 2012)

davebender said:


> Code books have little to do with superior USN intelligence at Midway.
> 
> Midway had 31 long range PBY recon aircraft. Enough to completely saturate airspace around the atoll to a distance of 700 miles. The USN knew approximately where all the IJN fleets were a day before the main battle. In fact the USN had so many PBYs that a handful were employed as torpedo bombers and they scored a hit on an IJA transport the night before the main battle. Japan had to rely on ship based recon aircraft with less then half the search radius. It didn't help that IJN shipboard aircraft were down to about 75% of authorized strength even before the battle started.
> 
> Why Admiral Yamamoto chose a battle location where the USN had an overwhelming recon advantage has never been explained. Japan could have fought in the Coral Sea where they had long range seaplanes which would level the recon playing field.



On Dec.7th 1941 only Naval Patrol Squadron VP-21 was stationed at Midway, yet on 25th of May, VP-44 arrived, May 26, VP-23, May 31st, VP-44, And VP-51 at some point also. 
All these last minute arrivals were just luck I suppose, had nothing to do with the fact that Naval intellegence had broken the codes and knew the IJN was headed for Midway and needed extra patrol coverage in the area to pinpoint exactly where they were so the Navy could counter them.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 12, 2012)

davebender said:


> IMO _*it's more likely the USN retain Wasp and Ranger in the Atlantic. *_



According to Lundstrom in _Black Shoe Carrier Admiral_ Hard Back page 209, Wasp (CV-7) was brought to the PTO on account of the loss of Lexington. Wasp would definitely have been available and in the fight in a July confrontation. King made the decision on May 9. She was in San Diego in late June.

Also It is true that IJN VB was superb but so was USN. The differences are marginal. Just look at the bomb pattern around Akagi depicted in _*Shattered Sword*_ by 3 SBDs (page 253 258 ). It is every bit as compelling a case for excellence as that if the Hiryu VB squadron on Yorktown. IJN had is share of misses as well as hits just as did the IJN. Moreover the max bomb load of a VAL was ~500 pounds while the SBDs typically prefered to attack with 1,000 pounders, so any marginal difference in hit probability would most likely have been offset by damage inflicted. The 1,000 lb hit on the Shokaku's bow at Coral Sea was nearly fatal damage to the ship. (from same web site as above)

"_Final leg home commences - successfully avoiding further submarines en-route; however, with the high speeds and gashed port bow, the ship takes on so much water she nearly capsizes en route.(Note: water entering the shattered bow apparently caused steep lists at speed, but the day or position of greatest crisis has not been found. Presumably in a time of heavy seas.)_"


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## VBF-13 (Nov 12, 2012)

Conslaw said:


> I'll play devil's advocate for the Japanese. If they would have had Shokaku and Zuikaku, and if the Americans would have only added Saratoga, then I think the Japanese would have had a fighting chance at a favorable outcome; but only IF American airpower on Midway wasn't greatly enhanced. If they would have changed their codes between June and July, their odds would be improved. Similarly, applying the light carriers (which were assigned the Aleutians mission) to Midway also would have helped their chances.
> 
> Both sides showed a history of piling on a crippled ship rather than knocking the most ships out of action. The Americans' target selection in the historical Midway battle was much wiser than average. The Shokaku and Zuikaku both showed they could take a lot of damage and survive. All of the Japanese carriers would not be needed for the strikes on Midway. It is therefore unlikely that a surprise dive bomber attack would find them all fueling and arming aircraft. In fact, it is unlikely that all of the carriers would be found at the same time much less hit at the same time. Hiryu was in the same formation as the other 3 carriers, but Hiryu was left untouched in the first attack. Taken altogether, even if attacked by surprise by an American dive bombers from 4 or 5 carriers, it is likely that some Japanese flattops would remain undamaged or barely damaged. These surviving ships could deliver a hard blow with their planes and the orphan planes of sunk sister carriers. For historical proof of the diluting factor of large carrier groups, I offer an example of the Battle of the Philippine Sea (the Marianas battle). When the American carrier airmen finally got a crack at the Japanese carriers in the Battle of the Philippine Sea, the Americans damaged many ships but only sunk one carrier, and the American carrier force in June 1944 was a lot larger than it was in 1942.
> 
> ...


Your conclusion is for the most part conceded. But I still hear you resolving all your variables in favor of the prosecution. Let's just take one such variable and resolve it in favor of the defense; namely, what another month could have done for Midway, assuming, of course, had we had the drop, as we had. That could very conceivably have meant trained dive-bomber pilots in those SBDs, who were accustomed to the blackouts when they pulled out of those steep, high-speed dives, so they wouldn't instead have had to rely on gliding those bombs in. As it was, those initial strikes faced the heaviest fighter-cover, and yet, they still managed to get off several direct hits. Make those aircraft coming in on dive-bombing trajectories, as opposed to those slower, flatter, and more vulnerable glide-bombing trajectories, and now figure the damage inflicted, bearing in mind, a 500-pound bomb, even a 100-pound bomb, smashing into a carrier deck, is very likely going to disrupt, if not cripple, those operations.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 12, 2012)

According to Lundstrom _Black Shoe Carrier Admiral_, Page 300 note 49: Sometime in late June, Nimitz evidently sent King a memo recommending that all marine VF defending island bases replace their F4F and F2A aircraft with P-40F. How long that might have taken is unknown but almost certainly not in time for a July clash at Midway, unless it was accomplished by USAAF Hawaiian based units replacing USMC VF on Midway. Of course, the motivation for that missive was the Midway results so with no June battle there is no mid-June recommendation by CINCPAC. 

On the other hand another shipload of USN castoff F4F-3s, culled from the Hawaiian BATFOR pool, might have been possible to reinforce the Marine VF and replace the F2As. According to _First Team_: When the Sara rendezvoused with the Enterprise and Hornet she had an Air Group of 107 aircraft including replacements. 47 F4F-4, 45 SBD and 15 TBF. By mid June there was no longer quite the shortage of fighters that had plagued the fleet since December 7. I have heard that the IJN apparently tied the invasion of Midway to the lunar cycle so given the 29 day lunar cycle, the time frame of the operation would have been scheduled around July 3. Too early for Shokaku and probably a stretch for Wasp. So with more _modern _land based dive bombers, CV based TBFs both flown by trained pilots and basic parity in CV based aircraft (the additional smaller flight decks would barely have made up the disparity in the larger number of aircraft each USN carrier embarked). It seems to me the USN is still a strong favorite to win the battle (or I should say it is in a stronger position to win than it was in the actual confrontation in June). If the Marines on Midway had been supplied with folding wing F4F-4, then the land based complement could have increased by about 50% without additional crowding. This abundance might have argued more strongly for _escorted _strikes on the IJN fleet which should have proven more effective.


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## VBF-13 (Nov 12, 2012)

One of the tragedies in those Midway strikes is they had dive-bombers they didn't know how to utilize as dive-bombers. Give them another month, I'm suggesting, and it's not inconceivable they'd have had that issue resolved.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 12, 2012)

VBF-13 said:


> One of the tragedies in those Midway strikes is they had dive-bombers they didn't know how to utilize as dive-bombers. Give them another month, I'm suggesting, and it's not inconceivable they'd have had that issue resolved.



With respect to the 18 SBD-2's of VMSB-241, I have to agree. These aircraft had only just arrived on May 29th and the pilots were new to the aircraft. CO Maj. Henderson, took command of that component as a virtual separate squadron while XO Maj. Noris took command of the 12 SB2U-3 Vindicators (aka "Wind Indicators" to the pilots). These pilots had been flying this aircraft since before December 1941 when they made the longest single engine formation flight in history from Ewa to Midway and so were probably reasonable competent in that type by June 4, albeit reinforced by green replacements as the SBDs arrived. Whether the newly arrived SBD-2s (USN castoffs when replaced by fully armored SBD-3s) or the older SB2Us had SS tanks or armor is unknown to me. AFAIK, no Midway based aircraft scored better than a near miss on IJN ships in Nagumo's Kido Butai and that by an SBD during a glide bombing attack on the Hiyru. The SB2Us under Norris attacked the Haruna without scoring a hit. Info from "_A Glorious Page in Our History_"

This may be indicative of the level of skill and experience required to be an effective dive bomber. Time in the cockpit was no substitute for practice on moving maritime targets. How much of such practice the SB2U pilots actually got of that sort during their 5+ month sojourn on Midway Island is unknown but I expect not much. In contrast, both Yorktown and Enterprise SBD pilots were by the time of Midway well experienced and quite effective as their collective performance shows.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 12, 2012)

Some good reading here


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## VBF-13 (Nov 12, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> With respect to the 18 SBD-2's of VMSB-241, I have to agree. These aircraft had only just arrived on May 29th and the pilots were new to the aircraft. CO Maj. Henderson, took command of that component as a virtual separate squadron while XO Maj. Noris took command of the 12 SB2U-3 Vindicators (aka "Wind Indicators" to the pilots). These pilots had been flying this aircraft since before December 1941 when they made the longest single engine formation flight in history from Ewa to Midway and so were probably reasonable competent in that type by June 4, albeit reinforced by green replacements as the SBDs arrived. Whether the newly arrived SBD-2s (USN castoffs when replaced by fully armored SBD-3s) or the older SB2Us had SS tanks or armor is unknown to me. AFAIK, no Midway based aircraft scored better than a near miss on IJN ships in Nagumo's Kido Butai and that by an SBD during a glide bombing attack on the Hiyru. The SB2Us under Norris attacked the Haruna without scoring a hit. Info from "_A Glorious Page in Our History_"


Crow, FWIW, here's the narrative I'm drawing from, as regards those direct hits...

_At 0755 VMSB-241 began its attack. This squadron was divided into two attack groups: one commanded by Maj. Lofton R. Henderson, with 18 SBD-2 planes, and a second under Maj. Benjamin W. Norris with 12 SB2U-3's. Ten of the pilots had joined the squadron only a week before and there had been very little opportunity for training flights.

Only 3 of the pilots had had experience in SBD-type planes. Because of the inexperience of his pilots, Major Henderson had decided to make a glide-bombing attack, rather than attempt to dive-bomb without training.

Between 0610 and 0620 these units took off, minus 2 SBD's which developed engine trouble and an SB2U-3 which was forced to return when a cowling came loose. The 16 SBD's climbed to 9,000 feet en route to their target. At 0755 the enemy was sighted and our planes made a wide circle at high speed to lose altitude. At once a number of Nakajima 97 and Zero fighters attacked and heavy antiaircraft fire was opened from below. Rear seat gunners in our planes sent down 4 Japanese fighters in flames and possibly 2 more. As our planes came in for their glide, Major Henderson's ship was hit and it was obvious that he was badly wounded, so Capt. Elmer G. Glidden, Jr., took the lead. The squadron dove through a cloud, emerging to encounter heavy anti-aircraft fire from a large Kaga19 class carrier which was maneuvering violently below. Bombs were released at 500 feet or less. Three direct hits were seen and several near hits. As our planes returned low over the water they could see her smoking badly. Of the 16 SBD's which engaged in this attack, 8 returned to the base, and of these only 6 remained fit for service. Two were seen to go down in flames, and 1 went out of control before reaching Midway. The pilot jumped and was picked up by a PT boat. Another was forced down 100 miles west of Midway, but both pilot and gunner were rescued 2 days later.

The Battle of Midway June 3-6, 1942._




oldcrowcv63 said:


> This may be indicative of the level of skill and experience required to be an effective dive bomber. Time in the cockpit was no substitute for practice on moving maritime targets. How much of such practice the SB2U pilots actually got of that sort during their 5+ month sojourn on Midway Island is unknown but I expect not much. In contrast, both Yorktown and Enterprise SBD pilots were by the time of Midway well experienced and quite effective as their collective performance shows.


Yeah. That's basically right. Neither would I suggest the training was all that difficult. There were just a number of things the pilots had to become accustomed to in dive-bombing that you didn't want them having had to experience for the first time in a combat-situation.


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## davebender (Nov 12, 2012)

Only if the U.S. allows it, which I doubt. 

B24 bombers based in Hawaii would bomb Japanese occupied Midway 7 days a week, preventing establishment of seaplane and submarine bases. Midway would become just one more IJA regiment stationed on a Pacific island that must be kept supplied while contributing nothing to the Japanese war effort.


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## tyrodtom (Nov 12, 2012)

You're kind of pushing things seeing as how the first US combat use of the B24 was on June 6, 1942, 4 ( four) B24s were staged thru Midway from Hawaiia to bomb Wake Island, but they couldn't find it.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 12, 2012)

VBF-13 said:


> _The Battle of Midway June 3-6, 1942._



Cool, I never saw this combat narrative before but it contains a lot of information I've seen in histories written after the war but before the full japanese story was revealed. Imagine you are in an SBD retiring from the scene where you dropped your egg and saw too many of your buddies enter Davy Jones Locker. You look back and see all kinds of fire and smoke erupting from the ship you just attacked. I would guess its understandable to believe you must have scored a certain hit in its vitals, but most likely, with the benefit of hindsight, you ware watching the flashes and smoke from medium caliber AAA attempting to tag you as you flew by. IIUC, this was a common misinterpretation of both sides who wanted to believe their life risking heroics and sacrifice of their mates was not in vain. To get a very balanced view from both sides of the fence, I suggest _Shattered Sword._ It's one of the most interesting and comprehensive accounts of the battle I've come across. the damage done to the IJN ships is carefully accounted.


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## parsifal (Nov 12, 2012)

davebender said:


> Only if the U.S. allows it, which I doubt.
> 
> B24 bombers based in Hawaii would bomb Japanese occupied Midway 7 days a week, preventing establishment of seaplane and submarine bases. Midway would become just one more IJA regiment stationed on a Pacific island that must be kept supplied while contributing nothing to the Japanese war effort.



Why didnt that happen in the SWPA where B-17s were deployed and the japanese had about 30 fighters to protect their bases. you overestimate the effects of American heavy bombers operating at those sorts of ranges. They were not decisive until much later in the war, and at ranges much less than would have been the case in this scenario. Bombing Midway from Hawaii would stretch even modern age aircraft because of the ranges involved. 

The US would have been unable to control this situation to near the extent that you are suggesting. Even in 1944, when they really did hold decisive air superiority throughout the central pacific, the Japanese operated exceptionally efficient and valuable reconnaisance elements in the face of devastated airfields and massive USN attacks. Have a close look at the long range recon that wa achieved prior to Phillipines Sea in June 1944.


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## Balljoint (Nov 12, 2012)

Two important factors wouldn’t change in a month. The code breaking effort that was so important both in the Pacific and in Europe was in fact decisive. Of course a new code could be a problem, but early chatter by the IJN pretty much gave the game away.

And ironically, in view of Japan’s post war accomplishment, the crappy radios in their planes. Interviews with Japanese pilots almost universally confirm that they used hand signals to communicate because of unworkable radios. Scout planes aren’t of much use if they can’t report what they see.

Given the chancy nature of the actual battle, the most significant effect of a months delay would be picking the dice up for a fresh roll.


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## parsifal (Nov 12, 2012)

> Two important factors wouldn’t change in a month. The code breaking effort that was so important both in the Pacific and in Europe was in fact decisive. Of course a new code could be a problem, but early chatter by the IJN pretty much gave the game away.



Everybody had this problem, Japan was no worse or better than any of the combatants. Advantages derived from radio chatter were helpful, but in no way a substitute for detailed intelligence derived from reading the signal traffic. A few hours or minutes warning of the approaching Japanese tells the commanders virtually nothing and does not give them time to position for a first strike effectively 




> Scout planes aren’t of much use if they can’t report what they see.



Which kinda disproves the basic supposition. The IJN easily had the most efficient aerial recon elements (land based or afloat) of any of the combatants....an advantage they held until the very end. It was sheert bad luck that the US Carriers were not spotted earlier during the actual battle




> Given the chancy nature of the actual battle, the most significant effect of a months delay would be picking the dice up for a fresh roll


.

Agreed


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 12, 2012)

Balljoint said:


> Given the chancy nature of the actual battle, the most significant effect of a months delay would be picking the dice up for a fresh roll.



I certainly wouldn't argue that the battle that transpired on June 4, 1942 was the result of a compilation of fortuitous events which favored the USN in some critical respects. But chance is always a factor in victory and defeat. I think the real flaw in the IJN scheme that sealed their defeat, and what set the USN's teeth grinding at night two months later at Guadalcanal, was the split objective: Island capture and Fleet engagement. US forces had one clear objective, Kido Butai and focused all its forces on destroying that primary strike force. Because of the Island capture objective, the IJN focused half its aerial striking power on the least capable component of the USN/USAAF force arrayed against it. 

Had the IJN not been focused on taking Midway and had it not ignored signs it was steaming into a trap (based on the early PBY attacks on the invasion force and effective submarine recon), it might have found a way to engage the USN carriers under more favorable circumstances. Only two US carriers were likely to be effective in such a confrontation and one of those (the Enterprise) was beset with leadership problems that very nearly neutralized its squadron effectiveness. I believe the Sara had a more experienced air group than Hornet so perhaps it would have provided a less problematic performance in a July battle. 

I have to admit this is a perspective I adopted after reading Lundstrom's _Black Shoe Carrier Admiral_. Attacking even a marginally well defended island posed a serious problem for any carriers employed in invasion support. I believe, assuming intelligence-derived motivation for an additional month's preparation, this strategic flaw would have become even more problematic.


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## VBF-13 (Nov 12, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Cool, I never saw this combat narrative before but it contains a lot of information I've seen in histories written after the war but before the full japanese story was revealed. Imagine you are in an SBD retiring from the scene where you dropped your egg and saw too many of your buddies enter Davy Jones Locker. You look back and see all kinds of fire and smoke erupting from the ship you just attacked. I would guess its understandable to believe you must have scored a certain hit in its vitals, but most likely, with the benefit of hindsight, you ware watching the flashes and smoke from medium caliber AAA attempting to tag you as you flew by. IIUC, this was a common misinterpretation of both sides who wanted to believe their life risking heroics and sacrifice of their mates was not in vain. To get a very balanced view from both sides of the fence, I suggest _Shattered Sword._ It's one of the most interesting and comprehensive accounts of the battle I've come across. the damage done to the IJN ships is carefully accounted.


Quite honestly, Crow, had they not hit a thing, that'd hardly surprise me. While they weren't as vulnerable as the torpedo-bombers, they were pretty darn close. However, this the thing. That narrative actually referenced, not one, but two observations. Only one of those was the smoke, as they were drawing away. The other one was, they got off three direct hits. 

Now, that's pretty exacting testimony. That's not to say it can't be refuted. But, if so, let's see the evidence, what the hell? Bias? Well, yeah, I suppose. If one can't refute the testimony, discredit the source of the testimony. But, I'd think I'd want to see better than that. And, that's all I'm saying, there.

On _Shattered Sword_, you're not the only one who has recommended that book to me. I just hadn't got around to it, yet. But, I aim to.

EDIT: BTW, you do know, the Japanese, besides just being short, are nearsighted? So, what the hell could they see? 

PS: Just kidding!


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 13, 2012)

Considering their chances for success using a glide bomb delivery while facing the full strength of the numerically formidable IJN CAP, a hit would indeed be astonishing. It seems to me, aside from the reports of the Midway pilots and the testimony of the IJN defenders, the most compelling argument for the marine's lack of success appears to come from the surviving USN SBD pilots and crew later that morning. I believe they all reported that the flight decks they individually attacked were undamaged. The Hiryu itself, if it was indeed the target of the marines attack was able to launch an escorted counterstrike almost immediately and with the full weight of its VB component which argues that it suffered little if any damage. Hiryu was in the same vulnerable state as the other three carriers. Three hits should have done her in. Let's assume the Haruna was the target. That's a vessel could indeed have absorbed three hits from the 500 pound bombs carrier by the SB2U-3s and shrugged them off if there weren't in some way well targeted. If the detailed account is correct, it looks like both the Haruna and Kirishima were attacked by Vindicators unsuccessfully and by subsequent USN SBDs as well also without success. Yet even IJN observers on neighboring ships apparently reported her as hit repeatedly. 

Imperial Battleships

After watching my son's 10 year old nephew play baseball near Nara, I can absolutely affirm the prewar reports of asian nearsightedness were just a trifle exaggerated.  I wish I could have fielded as well as he during my brief career in US Little League. 

Not since the civil war has the country paid such a high price for its institutionalized racial prejudices. What we are able to say in jest today was a tragically experienced reset of reality to the USA and its allies.  To steal a _Myth Buster_ phrase: Rejecting reality and substituting one's own can have grave consequences.


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## VBF-13 (Nov 13, 2012)

Crow, did you notice in your link, during the Midway attack, it's reported the Kaga was afire? That's pretty much the account in my link. I agree, though, we have to be discriminating, and have to try, where we can, to see both sides. That's a good website for those ships, and I have it bookmarked.

On the stereotyping, that just came with the times, I think. We were taking Japanese-American citizens out of their homes, then. Throw out the book. This was war. 

PS: Cherish that little nephew. Mine is 16, already. They grow up too quick!


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 13, 2012)

I saw that:

"_When KAGA is set afire, HARUNA briefly closes to assist._" but figured they referred to later that morning when it was hit, most probably by fighter pilot and air group commander McClusky's leading VB-and VS-6 SBDs from Enterprise. The Kaga page seems to indicate that as well: Kaga Tabular Record of Movement | Imperial Flattops | Nihon Kaigun

wrt nephew... He's my son's wife's nephew, so by extension his as well. He's a cute kid and loves Baseball. My own nephews and nieces are all grown, many with their own kids. Spoiling my grandkids is my current favorite hobby. It's also my revenge.


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## Conslaw (Nov 14, 2012)

Let's add a sub-scenario: It is August 1942. Let's say that all six Japanese fleet carriers are sunk in a grand battle at Midway, and the Americans lose two. The Americans have three serviceable fleet carriers in the Pacific, and the Japanese have none. Under this scenario, tell me how the next 18 months play out. Is it game, set, match, USA?


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## parsifal (Nov 14, 2012)

A one sided defeat of the IJN ensures the outcome of the war strategically, but Midway was strategically more important because it avoided defeat for the Us and put a stop to Japanaese expasion on a strategic scale. The US carriers did not wrest the initiaitive from the japanese. the solomons campaign did that, and the large carrier battles notwithstanding, these were less important to the outcome over the vicious battles of attrition that developed over the Solomons. the Japanese lost over 1000 aircrew over Guadacanal, and a large number of ships. it was these losses, particualalry the destroyer losses that forced them on the defensive. 

Also the loss of 6 carriers is not the end of the IJN carrier force, though it is a critical blow. They beagan the war with ten carriers. they lost one at Coral Sea. And four at Midway. They also lost a further one in the Solomons campaign. They added three more carriers from Midway through to December, and took in hand four more ships for conversion. One was sunk before work began (the Mizuho). What you are saying is, "if things went from terrible to catastrophic, would ther be an effect? Ah yes. You are also saying is, "if 6 carriers are lost instead of four, does that decide the outcome to December 1943. no, because from June 1942 until December 1943 Carriers were not strong enough on either side to make a difference.


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## VBF-13 (Nov 14, 2012)

Conslaw said:


> Let's add a sub-scenario: It is August 1942. Let's say that all six Japanese fleet carriers are sunk in a grand battle at Midway, and the Americans lose two. The Americans have three serviceable fleet carriers in the Pacific, and the Japanese have none. Under this scenario, tell me how the next 18 months play out. Is it game, set, match, USA?


The Japanese were too dug in. Before Midway their Navy was basically serving their Army's objectives in the Southwest Pacific, and they were very strong, there. They'd have kept on fighting with everything they had while we were still trying to take those islands back. This was no tennis game to them.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 14, 2012)

Conslaw said:


> Let's add a sub-scenario: It is August 1942. Let's say that all six Japanese fleet carriers are sunk in a grand battle at Midway, and the Americans lose two. _The Americans have three serviceable fleet carriers in the Pacific_, and the Japanese have none. Under this scenario, tell me how the next 18 months play out. Is it game, set, match, USA?



One major change in the solomons campaign is that Fletcher could relax about the impending IJN CV-centered counterstrike that was certain to come sometime in August, and for which he husbanded his fighter assets. His main concern would have been land based air and submarines, the latter of which proved to be more than a threat by the end of August. Thus the USN carriers are likely to have been able to provide more proactive air cover for the lodgement at Henderson field, at least until it became active on August 19. Fletcher would also have been in a position to inflict a heavy toll on the retreating IJN cruiser force that had savaged the USN cruiser screen at Savo Island on August 9. King would have been happier with him and so would Turner. The marines would have lost their shoulder-chip and would have no reason to whine for the next half century about how the navy abandoned them. Other than that, Pars has pretty well summed up the likely aftermath. 

I would expect the IJN would accelerate their CV conversions and building programs to make up losses. I am also assuming that, like the actual battle, most IJN pilots were saved at Midway and the mechs and deck crews were the greatest loss, aside from the CVs. Junyo, Hiyo (assuming it stays healthy) and Zuiho become the core of the IJN CV rebuild program (Hosho probably becomes more a training vessel) which would probably take the IJN about a year or two to recover to a point where it can attempt serious opposition, however, by then The USN has the Essex class on line and the situation is on track to replay a Philippine Sea scenario. At the end of the Guadalcanal, the USN has two surviving fleet carriers (say Enterprise and Sara) and the IJN is rebuilding. That's not a terribly different outcome than what actually happened. Only the accounting is a bit different. While they did have the two big decks, (Sho and Zui) one was heavily damaged and all the air groups were pretty much shattered. So a major rebuild was actually played out. 

The Solomons campaign may go a bit faster without the two major carrier battles and the ever present threat of their interference. Perhaps the USN does a bit better in the surface battles by assigning some of its BB, CA CL cruiser assets to gun duty instead of CV Protection which should have been the job of the CL(AA)s like Juneau, Atlanta, San Juan and San Diego. That might have helped make some of the night-battle outcomes slightly more favorable for the USN (They could hardly have done much worse, except for Cape Esperance and the 2nd Naval Battle of Guadalcanal on November 14-15). Their presence might have provided some measure of protection to the Marines ashore although the surface losses would probably have been higher. Once again, less complaint from the shore component about the legitimate perception of an absent US navy.

However, delay in the Solomon campaign by two months probably means IJ has an operational air field on Guadalcanal. That could pose a problem slowing the initial campaign and making it more like the Midway scenario. Even with its weak carriers in support, that could pose a problem for the US invasion. That probably plays out in a very different set of events but probably doesn't change the end result. Let's see for grins. Junyo, Hiyo and Zuiho bring ~110-120 A/C to support the ~60 A/C on Guadalcanal against the three USN CVs each carrying about 75 A/C for a US total of 225 A/C vs about 180 IJN A/C plus whatever can be sent from Rabaul although by then, there may be intermediate fields in operation. That's kind of interesting.


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## bob44 (Nov 14, 2012)

> Let's add a sub-scenario: It is August 1942. Let's say that all six Japanese fleet carriers are sunk in a grand battle at Midway, and the Americans lose two. The Americans have three serviceable fleet carriers in the Pacific, and the Japanese have none. Under this scenario, tell me how the next 18 months play out. Is it game, set, match, USA?



In this scenario, the Japanese would probably go on the defence. There would be not be the hard, 6 months, fighting for Guadalcanal. The Allies are still very weak and are building up. The Allies would start an offensive in the South Pacific, pushing into NG. The Japanese are going to fight for every inch. Probably will not commit their BB yet. Both sides continue to build up their forces.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 15, 2012)

bob44 said:


> In this scenario, *the Japanese would probably go on the defence*. *There would be not be the hard, 6 months, fighting for Guadalcanal*. The Allies are still very weak and are building up. The Allies would start an offensive in the South Pacific, pushing into NG. The Japanese are going to fight for every inch. Probably will not commit their BB yet. Both sides continue to build up their forces.



IJ would have been extremely reluctant to give up their foothold on Guadalcanal. Their overall strategy, as I understand it, wasn't just to create a ribbon defense made up of fortified island bases as a buffer to attacks on the home islands. They recognized the key to winning the war or a separate peace by concession was isolating and severing the USA and Australian logistical lifeline, that was becoming such a headache in their attempt to solidify their hold on New Guinea. An IJN airfield on Guadalcanal was vital to that role. Draw a 600 mile circle around Henderson field and you'll get the idea. It doesn't create an insurmountable barrier but it increases the time and cost of reinforcement and resupply by forcing the allies to use longer routes. Look how hard IJ forces fought to keep it and how reluctantly they gave it up.


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## Conslaw (Nov 17, 2012)

In the subscenario, where the Japanese have no heavy carriers and the US has 3 (if you include WASP as a heavy carrier), I think Guadalcanal would still be the next US offensive. If I made the decision, I would first conduct another carrier raid on Japan proper for the purpose of keeping assets bundled up in the home islands. Without its carriers, Japan would have a hard time holding onto any objective in the Solomons. Rabaul would be an isolated outpost by Mid 1943, maybe earlier. 

As an offensive force, the Japanese medium carriers had limitations. The Junyo and Hiyo were rather slow at 25.5 knots. The Junyo and the Hiyo each carried 42 active aircraft. The Zuiho carried 30. To match up against an American carrier force with these medium-sized ships, Japan would look for an opportunity to go against a single US carrier.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 17, 2012)

Conslaw said:


> In the subscenario, where the Japanese have no heavy carriers and the US has 3 (if you include WASP as a heavy carrier), I think Guadalcanal would still be the next US offensive. If I made the decision, I would first conduct another carrier raid on Japan proper for the purpose of keeping assets bundled up in the home islands. Without its carriers, Japan would have a hard time holding onto any objective in the Solomons. Rabaul would be an isolated outpost by Mid 1943, maybe earlier.
> 
> As an offensive force, the Japanese medium carriers had limitations. The Junyo and Hiyo were rather slow at 25.5 knots. The Junyo and the Hiyo each carried 42 active aircraft. The Zuiho carried 30. To match up against an American carrier force with these medium-sized ships, Japan would look for an opportunity to go against a single US carrier.



I agree that capture of Guadalcanal would be a prime objective for the US. Assuming the US historical loss of Wasp occurs sometime during the effort to take Guadalcanal, which I would expect to be a much more difficult nut to crack two months later than the actual early August date. I'd expect loss of their fleet carriers would have motivated the IJ forces to accelerate the build-up of their airfield and its defense. As it was, Guadalcanal was a close thing for the US with the forces at hand and the IJN's fleet carriers didn't play that significant a practical role in its numerous attempts to recapture the island, either because they were too valuable to risk or were forced into a mutual retreat due to air group losses. I wouldn't expect a classic CV vs CV confrontation in the scenario. In 1943, the IJN employed a useful tactic in an effort to stem the allied advance up the Solomon Islands, and another in June '44 during the Battle of the Philippine Sea (BPS). They stripped their carriers in '43 to reinforce Rabaul and then used Guam to stage shuttle bombing during the BPS. If the IJN shuttles its air assets as they planned to do during the BPS or staged their air groups out of Guadalcanal with the US down to 2 or even 3 fleet carriers, then, in the absence of phalanxes of F6Fs or F4Us to defend the carriers, the US effort to take Guadalcanal becomes IMHO a very risky proposition.


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## bob44 (Nov 17, 2012)

> There would be not be the hard, 6 months, fighting for Guadalcanal


I was refering to the several naval battles around Guadalcanal.
Without their heavy CV, the Japanese would have to be very cautious with their remaining ships. 
The historic carrier battles that took place at Midway and in the Solomon's seem to show this.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 17, 2012)

bob44 said:


> I was refering to the several naval battles around Guadalcanal.
> Without their heavy CV, the Japanese would have to be very cautious with their remaining ships.
> The historic carrier battles that took place at Midway and in the Solomon's seem to show this.



They were pretty cautious about their surface ships anyway and generally adhered to a strict time table for their forays into Iron Bottom Sound just to get beyond air range of US carriers or Henderson Field. These were mainly at night where the IJN felt very very confident (with good reason). With the airfield in their possession, they would have air cover during the day and so would be safer and more free to act boldly. The Fleet carriers rarely played much of a role in these ventures. The US carriers had to be careful where they positioned themselves due to the extraordinary maritime search capability out of Rabaul which also possessed a significant anti-shipping strike capability. An occupied and defended Guadalcanal airfield should be a more difficult nut to crack for the USN than Midway was for the IJN. Pearl Harbor is over a thousand miles from Midway and therefore out of range of TACAIR assets, while as history showed, the seas around Guadalcanal were in _*escorted*_-strike range of Rabaul.


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## Conslaw (Nov 18, 2012)

Second Sub-scenario: Japanese bring 6 carriers. US brings 4. The luck of carrier battles goes the way of the IJN. They strike first at the Americans and cripple all four carriers. Second strike puts all four on the bottom. (The odds were against this, but it is "WHAT IF".) After this debacle, the closest thing the US has to a big carrier is the Wasp. Not only is there no force to attack Guadalcanal, the shipping lanes to Australia are in serious jeopardy. What happens from here? Do you still dedicate the new Sangamon-class escort carriers to Operation Torch? How far does Japan push this advantage? How does the US come back? 

(By the way, the more I think about this, even the abstract possibility of this outcome happening is probably a good reason NOT to commit the Wasp to Midway even if the ship could have been rushed to the battle.)


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## Vincenzo (Nov 18, 2012)

i would go with a third sub-scenario the japanese had the 4 historical carriers, the operation is in june, the US had only the Enterprise and the Hornet, the Yorktown get too damage in Coral Sea battle for back in action so fast. Could be US carriers go not to defend the Midway?


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## parsifal (Nov 18, 2012)

Actually they have the Saratoga and Wasp. Also the big Santee class Escort Carriers arrived from October, plus in a pinjch the USN could utlise the Ranger. However, this scenario means that the Japanese "2nd Operational Phase" which involved an advance to Fiji and the isolation of Australia, is a likly scenario. However japanese logistics simply run out of puff and by September 1943 the situation is more or less back to historical in the PTO, except that for Australai ther has been such a scare that they will not release their ground forces from Home defence. this has significant effects because the US will need to divert the troops the Autralians provided (2/3 until the end of 1943) to mount their own offensives. More or less cans TORCH and probably HUSKY as well. Significant reinforcement by the RN would be required, which puts PEDESTAL and the Murmansk convoys all in doubt and also means that Alamein might not be the total Axis defeat that it was historically. Depending on what the European Axis do with that breather, there could be significant changes to the final outcome of the war.

I dont understand why so many members believe it a more or less foregone conclusion that the US was going to win the battle. All of the major staff studies of this much observed battle and many writers other than those few that are favoured so much in this place rate the US victory as "against the odds". The Japanese had many advantages, and except for a few critical weaknesses and some plain dumb bad luck should have won the battle, or at least done better than they did.


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## bob44 (Nov 18, 2012)

Interesting turn of events. Taking and occupying Midway, the Solomon's, Fiji. This would stretch Japan very thin. Perhaps delay the war in Europe. 



> I dont understand why so many members believe it a more or less foregone conclusion that the US was going to win the battle



I very much agree. I think Midway was pure luck on the US part, based upon Coral Sea, Eastern Solomons, and Santa Cruz battles.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 19, 2012)

parsifal said:


> I dont understand why so many members believe it a more or less foregone conclusion that the US was going to win the battle. All of the major staff studies of this much observed battle and many writers other than those few that are favoured so much in this place rate the US victory as "against the odds". The Japanese had many advantages, and except for a few critical weaknesses and some plain dumb bad luck should have won the battle, or at least done better than they did.



It's the split objective that made it a losing proposition. The much discussed 'luck' worked both ways and in some instances wasn't really luck at all (e.g. The minimal contribution of VF-6 and Hornet) It could and should have been much worse for the IJN, and less destructive to the USN) The loss of 4 IJN carriers was quite likely considering the situation and the loss of Yorktown was not nearly as likely. 

Bates' War College study has been largely discredited and Morrison's historical account is almost worthless except for a reasonably accurate accounting of events. That alone prompted a number of very inaccurate but very popular histories. Implications and primary causes aren't discussed. Morrison was a historian not a miltiary analyst nor was he technical enough to understand the important role of technology, and unfortunately many post war analysts were heavily biased with an axe to grind and a story to tell: "Spruance walked on water and Fletcher wasn't there." Understand, I am a Spruance admirer not a critic 

Believe it or not, there probably remains more history to be written on that battle. 

The weight of the split objective and its consequences weighed heavily on USN planners for the Guadalcanal operation.

In some respects diagnosis of Midway is similar to the question:

"Did the Spitfire win the battle of Britain as popular culture insists or was it the Hurricane?"

One answer provides a great narative the other is awash in minutia. But which is correct?


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## Conslaw (Nov 19, 2012)

Luck plays a part even when the odds are 100:1 or 1:100, but if I have the opportunity I'd want to set up the game with the odds in my favor. The Japanese imprudently let the US set up the game at Midway. The Japanese were negligent in their handling of codes, and they broke from their own doctrine in setting up a grand battle away from their support structure, effectively giving the US home field advantage. They assumed the US carriers would be out of the immediate area long enough to focus their air strikes on Midway without having any intelligence to back up the assumption. The Japanese appeared to assume that at most the Americans could oppose them with two carriers, and therefore bringing four carriers would be enough. Through extraordinary effort, the Americans were able to get the Yorktown into the battle, and with the planes available on Midway, the US had an aircraft advantage.


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## Conslaw (Nov 19, 2012)

_Shattered Sword_ convinced me that the odds were actually in the Americans' favor. The US was able to knock out all four IJN carriers with almost no contribution from the Hornet air group. (It is arguable how much the sacrifice of VT-8 made in the disposition of Japanese fighters and ship defenses.) The odds should have been against the US. The Japanese could have used their small carriers on this operation, but they chose to use them in the Aleutions. With Shokaku out, they could have at least brought Zuikaku with an air group supplemented by the remnants of Shokaku's, and possibly they could have used the planes earmarked for their Midway base. The Japanese could have allocated only a portion of its forces for the airstrikes on Midway, reserving the rest for locating and striking the American fleet if and when found.


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## tyrodtom (Nov 19, 2012)

Breaking the codes made a great deal of difference.
Plus the US groups got there before the Japanese submarines assigned as pickets around Midway, another big factor seldom mentioned.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 19, 2012)

Conslaw said:


> _*With Shokaku out, they could have at least brought Zuikaku with an air group supplemented by the remnants of Shokaku's, and possibly they could have used the planes earmarked for their Midway base. *_The Japanese could have allocated only a portion of its forces for the airstrikes on Midway, reserving the rest for locating and striking the American fleet if and when found.



I believe Lundstrom (and even Morrison) shows the Zuikaku Shokaku airgroups as worse than decimented. the Shokaku had shot her bolt and the survivors had taken refuge on the Zuikaku. I don't believe there were many operational aircraft left on the Sho. Even with Sho aurvivors the Zuikaku airgroup had to be rebuilt before it could sail and operate. One organizational factor here that is oerhaps unrecognized is that unlike the USN, the IJN aircraft, pilots and support crews were all essentially ship's company. As I understand it, there the squadron organizationaal concept in each navy was quite different. The USN embarked an airwing comprised of independent squadrons that could be assigned readily to any carrier. So for example even if elements of the Tainan air group VF were available, they couldn't just be reassigned. In contrast, the same problem faced the Yorktown on its arrival back at Pearl Harbor. To solve it the USN quickly folded VF-3 into VF-42 and made similar adjustments to the other squadrons. Bottom line within 3 days a depleted Yorktown airgroup was restored to full strength. Rich Leonard can discuss this with far greater authority than I. But as I recall, that aspect of the battle is brought out in Lundstrom's First Team. The air groups of the two IJN carriers suffered significant losses (to combat and fuel starvation) during the twilight battle on the 7th as well as the main battle on May 8th. USN Squadrons were essentially independent entities ith their own support personnel. For the IJN support was provided by the Ship's company. It's my understanding that the Midway complement of 21 A6Ms were used a CAP throughout the battle. I believe Hiryu used its allotment of 3.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 19, 2012)

Conslaw said:


> Second Sub-scenario: Japanese bring 6 carriers. US brings 4. The luck of carrier battles goes the way of the IJN. They strike first at the Americans and cripple all four carriers. Second strike puts all four on the bottom. (The odds were against this, but it is "WHAT IF".) After this debacle, the closest thing the US has to a big carrier is the Wasp. Not only is there no force to attack Guadalcanal, the shipping lanes to Australia are in serious jeopardy. What happens from here? Do you still dedicate the new Sangamon-class escort carriers to Operation Torch? How far does Japan push this advantage? How does the US come back?



This seems a very artificial construct to me with so much based on historical events happening for better or worse after the fact. 
I think a more interesting what if scenario is: What if the IJN recognized the essential value of their existing ribbon defense and put all is efforts into isolating Austratlia. In other words, they did not choose to attempt the Midway operation. What happens after Coral Sea?


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## tomo pauk (Nov 19, 2012)

Great posts, oldcrow


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## Conslaw (Nov 19, 2012)

> This seems a very artificial construct to me with so much based on historical events happening for better or worse after the fact.
> I think a more interesting what if scenario is: What if the IJN recognized the essential value of their existing ribbon defense and put all is efforts into isolating Austratlia. In other words, they did not choose to attempt the Midway operation. What happens after Coral Sea?



If there had been no Midway battle, I think the two navies would have slugged it out in the Solomons. I don't think the US would have landed at Guadalcanal in August, it would have been later. They landed in August because they wanted to take advantage of their interim carrier strength, and they wanted to take the airfield before it became operational. With all of the IJN carriers potentially "out there somewhere", the the USN could not get tied down to static defense of a landing force. The USN would have undertaken more and stronger carrier raids in the short term. Oil shortages would have made the Japanese selective in their fleet deployments.


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## parsifal (Nov 20, 2012)

I have to disagree. The IJN still enjoyed superiority of numbers, equipment, aircrew experience, and range. What they needed to do was find the US carriers earlier. if that had happened, they could have held the US at range, preventing the Americans from effectively hitting them, whilst they attacked and in all probability sank all the US carriers. The IJN achieved this very advantage at both Santa Cruz and later at Phillipine Sea. If it had been achieved at Midway, the result would have been devastating for the Americans


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## Vincenzo (Nov 20, 2012)

from the Midway battle orbat on navweaps
Japanese
planes in the 4 fleet carriers
93 Type 0 fighters
72 Type 99 dive bombers
1 Type 2 recce planes
81 Type 97 torpedo bombers
247 total

US
planes in the 3 fleet carriers
81 F4F fighters
109 SBD dive bombers
44 TBD torpedo bombers
234 total

so the strenght were around the same


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 20, 2012)

While, as usual, I agree with much of what Pars says, especially with citing the advantages held by IJN cv forces and Santa Cruz as the nightmare scenario for the USN, However, I think things might have been a little more complex considering the unstated USN advantages (there were a few). There is also the issue of timing. When does the next battle play out and whose in charge. If Halsey is in charge, things go badly for the USN but the troops get a LOT of battle experience (worst case? IMHO). Spruance does a little better (brains offseting his lack of experience and presumably Halsey's disfunctional staff). Fletcher? The IJN needs to be careful, he's an experienced and wiley old fox and appropriately cautious. 

King wanted a soulthern pacific advance early in the war evidently underestimating the actual IJN capability and skill. It is doubtful the USN will risk more than 3 of its carriers in an operation. Nimitz and King evidently wanted to keep at least one in reserve and preferred to operate two in tandem. Since Yorktown is afloat it can be teamed with Wasp or Hornet while Sara, Enterprise and one of the latter two take on the IJN. The IJN itself, is unlikely to risk all 6 big decks in one operation. I would expect 2 in reserve or refit for which they were all due. 

Before Santa Cruz, the USN had enjoyed two exceptionally devestating radar directed intercepts, it's probably even money that the RADAR gives adequate range and the FDO does his job properly in any given CV vs CV battle. In that event, the VF of 3 USN CVs could inflict some serious harm on an IJN strike. After June 4, TBFs replace the TBDs but with the original flight crews. That's more formidable than the subsequent VT units deployed. Torpedoes still are wanting (I don't know when the improved upgrades begin to arrive). IIRC, AAA Proximity fuses arrive before Santa Cruz and the effects are important. After Eastern Solomons USN VF embarked numbers increase to >30 per big deck. Based on the way each battle played out, I'd say it's roughly even chance who gets the better of who. I'd estimate 55% IJN vs 45% USN chance of coming out on top. Either way who ever wins the other will be serious mauled. JMO


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## parsifal (Nov 20, 2012)

Vincenzo said:


> from the Midway battle orbat on navweaps
> Japanese
> planes in the 4 fleet carriers
> 93 Type 0 fighters
> ...




Doesnt tke into account the very capable floatplane division more or less permanently attached to Car Div 1 and carDiv 2, The USN was forced to use a portion of its CAG as searchplanes. The IJN had 12 floatplanes attached to Tone and Chikuma which had been attached to the carriers since the outbreak of the war. They also had the two fast BBs which had a further 8 floatplanes, all of which had worked closley with the carriers for extended periods and could provide very effective support and co-operation whilst underway. the USN had nothing to compare to that. The land based PBYs were inexperienced and there were severe difficulties in getting them to co-operate effectively with the forces afloat, because they simply lacked the experience to do so, and in any event the land based forces were badly placed to provide that support.

Beyond those immediately available support forces, if one want to think a little laterally, the IJN also had three float plane carriers, carrying 44 lr recce aircraft which had the ability to launch and recover in open seas (these forces were held back with the main body), and the training to undertake searches and lr reporting, whilst underway in open waters, something totally absent in USN floatplane capability. Moreover USN floatplanes were not trained for this (they were meant as artillery spotters mostly and lacked the range to be effective at recon work.

The result of all this is that the in the opening attacks, the USN should have roughly 50-60% less aircraft available for strike than the Japanese. Thats a critical imbalance. 

Why didnt it pan out that way. The USN knew from its codebreaking where and when the IJN would be, and did not need to expend too many resources finding the Japanese. The Japanese got unlucky and sloppy in their searches, and it cost them the battle. If the IJN had changed their codes, and called on11 carriers in July instead of 4 in June (the 11 carriers being Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, Zuikaku, Shokaku, Zuiho, Hiyo, Junyo, Ryujo and Hosho), the result would not have been in much doubt. What the Japanese had to do, however was get over themselves and the victories they had won to that point.


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## Conslaw (Nov 20, 2012)

I really like Crow's scenario of no Midway battle. It certainly opens up countless possibilities. I wonder what other objectives would have brought out the entire US fleet. Samoa? Fiji? Espirito Santo? Noumea?


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## Vincenzo (Nov 20, 2012)

there were also the planes on Midway for the US..... 
others plane avaialble for Japanese
8 Type 96 torpedo bomber (Hosho)
12 Type 96 fighter and 12 Type 97 torpedo bomber (Zuiho)
35 Seaplanes in the Chitose and Kamikawa Maru
a max 31 seaplanes was possible carried from the BB and an other 39 from the CC i've many doubt that actually they loaded the max number of seaplanes

others planes available for US
31 PBY-5 on Midway
6 TBF on Midway
21 F2A on midway
7 F4F on Midway
40 SBD on Midway
16 B-17 on Midway
4 B-26 on Midway

plus the seaplanes in the fleet (max 20)


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## parsifal (Nov 20, 2012)

This is a case of comparing apples and oranges. the forces on midway are not comparable to the forces that were attached to CarDiv 1 and 2. The reason is because of where they were, and their total lack of expereince working with the fleet to provide them with coherent tactical intell. You cannot also include all the Japanese BBs for the same reason. If Recon elements have not worked with carriers, they are worse than useless in providing good intell. The USN carriers had no supplementary sources of intelligence gathering of a tactical nature that they could rely on. They might get lucky here and there and get a submarine report, or an occasional sighting report fom land based air, but not coherent or consistent support


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 20, 2012)

parsifal said:


> This is a case of comparing apples and oranges. the forces on midway are not comparable to the forces that were attached to CarDiv 1 and 2. The reason is because of where they were, and their total lack of expereince working with the fleet to provide them with coherent tactical intell. You cannot also include all the Japanese BBs for the same reason. If Recon elements have not worked with carriers, they are worse than useless in providing good intell. The USN carriers had _*no supplementary sources of intelligence gathering of a tactical nature *_that they could rely on. They might get lucky here and there and get a submarine report, or an occasional sighting report fom land based air, but not coherent or consistent support



Not sure I understand what you are saying here Pars? As you said before and on other occasions, IJN search was very high quality and in general of a higher performance quality than the USN's in terms of range/area of coverage and accuracy of position reports. But the USN PBY's were by training the "eyes of the fleet." and the USN CVs, as I am sure you are aware, did typically launch organic searches (by SBDs at Midway, twice as a measure of insurance). The first search departed in the early morning (~0420) in response to intelligence-based report of two separated groups of IJN CVs and against the possibility that one of the pairs might lie somewhere further North than where they were expected: the location of the two that were subsequently discovered by the PBY before 0600. While the accuracy of some of PBY and later SBD position reports left something to be desired, they got the job done in the sense that, based on their admittedly inaccurate information, enough CV based TACAIR assets found the enemy and got the job done. Had there been more mystery regarding IJN Intentions, that CV launched search would have been more comprehensive probably involving at least 16 SBDs sent out to nearly 250-300 miles, depending on armament, if any. As you say, the IJN had the longer legged scouts, and _*could *_have had an earlier detection.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 20, 2012)

Vincenzo said:


> there were also the planes on Midway for the US.....
> others plane avaialble for Japanese
> 8 Type 96 torpedo bomber (Hosho)
> 12 Type 96 fighter and 12 Type 97 torpedo bomber (Zuiho)
> ...



Vin, I don't often see a chance to correct one of your posts so I'l take the small opportunity you've provided here to do so  : The above list should be 16 operational SBD-2s and 12 operational SB2U-3 Vindicators.


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## parsifal (Nov 20, 2012)

> Not sure I understand what you are saying here Pars? As you said before and on other occasions, IJN search was very high quality and in general of a higher performance quality than the USN's in terms of range/area of coverage and accuracy of position reports.



Yes



> But the USN PBY's were by training the "eyes of the fleet." and the USN CVs, as I am sure you are aware, did typically launch organic searches (by SBDs at Midway, twice as a measure of insurance).



Thgey were not trained to coperate with their carriers to near the standard demanded by the carriers and were in any case land based which invariably meant their search reports were later than they should. What saved the Americans was that they already had strategic intell that gave them the position, the target and the strength of the Japanese on the day of battle. This GREATKy reduced the complexity for them.

Extrapolate if you will what might have happened if the Japanese had not been so sloppy in their preparations on the day of battle and had changed their codes as they had intended.

What this would have done was a couple of things. The IJN would not have made the assumptions they did which in turn made their search arrangements so poor on the day. They (the Japanese) would or should have launched a far more comprehensive search pattern than they did, and received contact details far more timely than they did. 

The USN would, without the benefit of SIGINT have been forced to make far less targetted searches and being land based would have been several hours behind the Japanese, as was shown in the historical results. The Japanese launched their searches far earlier than the Americans....the one thig that saved the US was the late launching of just one search a/c due to mechanical difficulties. 




> The first search departed in the early morning (~0420) in response to intelligence-based report of two separated groups of IJN CVs and against the possibility that one of the pairs might lie somewhere further North than where they were expected:




In other words, the searches undertaken by the Black Cats was a sham, based on the SIGINT they had already received. Launching at 0420 from Midway places the US Searches about 3 hours behind those of the IJN 



> the location of the two that were subsequently discovered by the PBY before 0600. While the accuracy of some of PBY and later SBD position reports left something to be desired,



you can say that again.....



> they got the job done in the sense that, based on their admittedly inaccurate information, enough CV based TACAIR assets found the enemy and got the job done. Had there been more mystery regarding IJN Intentions,



it was the same situation as over Malta....enigma gave the Italian convoy positions away....just to protect the intell, a search a/c was sent anyway (Marylands usually) .

Take away the intell advantage and then re-analyse what the likley outcome would be.....a debacle for the USN because its (landbased) search elements will be late, poor quality and diluted because they wont know exactly where to search for the Japanese 




> that CV launched search would have been more comprehensive probably involving at least 16 SBDs sent out to nearly 250-300 miles, depending on armament, if any. As you say, the IJN had the longer legged scouts, and _*could *_have had an earlier detection


.


Yes, agree


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 20, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Doesnt tke into account the very capable floatplane division more or less permanently attached to Car Div 1 and carDiv 2, The USN was forced to use a portion of its CAG as searchplanes. The IJN had 12 floatplanes attached to Tone and Chikuma which had been attached to the carriers since the outbreak of the war. They also had the two fast BBs which had a further 8 floatplanes, all of which had worked closley with the carriers for extended periods and could provide very effective support and co-operation whilst underway. *the USN had nothing to compare to that.*


True and Fletcher noticed the capability and equipment and advised the USN to make appropriate adjustments based on his experience at Coral Sea. Typically, he was ignored. 



parsifal said:


> The land based PBYs were *inexperienced* and there were severe difficulties in getting them to co-operate effectively with the forces afloat, because they simply lacked the experience to do so, and in any event the land based forces were badly placed to provide that support.



yes, inexperienced but not totally useless. Despite the shortcomings and difficulties they got the basic job done. They got better as the war progressed. Also, the IJN for all their skill and capability had their own problems which hindered their attempts to strike back, including position errors and faulty radios.



parsifal said:


> The result of all this is that the in the opening attacks, the USN should have _*roughly 50-60% less aircraft available for strike*_ than the Japanese. Thats a critical imbalance.



50-60% less aircraft? I don't understand that number. Searches from the duty carrier may involve up to 18 SBDs Rarely more. That's one squadron. half the dive bombing capability of one carrier: one third the striking power, not 50-60 % of aircraft available for a strike. The more carriers present, the smaller the percentage taken from strike capability. Two carriers, one searching squadron out of a total of 6 striking squadrons. Three CVs one of 12. Also, while the IJN favored the Use of LR Float planes it also supplemented them with liberal use of unarmed Kates. AFAIK, searches by ONLY float planes was I believe unique to Midway. The actual number of aircraft available for strike was fairly equal USN CV to IJN CV. 

Are you speaking of during the historic Midway battle or a hypothetical battle in lieu of Midway? At Midway the Yorktown sent out only 10 SBDs, the same group twice, the second time to find and fix the 4th CV reported by Thach on his return to the Yorktown.



parsifal said:


> Why didnt it pan out that way. _*The USN knew from its codebreaking where and when the IJN would be*_, and did not need to expend too many resources finding the Japanese. The Japanese got unlucky and sloppy in their searches, and it cost them the battle. If the IJN had changed their codes, and called on11 carriers in July instead of 4 in June (the 11 carriers being Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, Zuikaku, Shokaku, Zuiho, Hiyo, Junyo, Ryujo and Hosho), _*the result would not have been in much doubt*_. What the Japanese had to do, however was get over themselves and the victories they had won to that point.



The intelligence on the IJN carrier force location is a common misconception only recently corrected. The USN had at least one critcal mistaken notion about the composition and location of Kido Butai. That was the issue of the separated Pair of CVs lurking behind the two that were expected to stage the assault on Midway. Can't argue about the IJN's bad luck or sloppiness of their search. That's stated by Fuchida himself. They (USN) expended enough search assets to make certain of the intelligence. 


I believe Hiyo was commissioned on 31 July 1942, so it probably wouldn't have been available to fight in July. As stated before, Sho doesn't return to service until August. Junyo (21 VF, 18VB 9 VT) would have provided a significant strike capability and the combined assets of the three light carriers could be useful in strike if their air groups could coordinate, which I would expect to be fairly difficult. Starting at Eastern Solomons, Zuiho (air group formerly consisting of 12 VF 6 VT was increased to 21 VF 6 VT at Santa Cruz and contributed mainly to the CAP. Ryujo (air group: 24 VF and 9 VT at Eastern Solomons. I suspect the Hosho with its 8 VB would have been good as a relief flight deck and source of spare VBs. I doubt it would have been found in anything but a reserve status or aerial ASW component for the heavies. Yet even so, 8 CVs with ~425 A/C whether light, medium or heavy, collectively pack a mighty punch. But so do 4 or 5 USN CVs with from ~300 to ~375 A/C plus whatever is based on Midway if that's the July objective.


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## Vincenzo (Nov 20, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Vin, I don't often see a chance to correct one of your posts so I'l take the small opportunity you've provided here to do so  : The above list should be 16 operational SBD-2s and 12 operational SB2U-3 Vindicators.



yes i wrong they were not all SBD, there were 19 SBD and 21 SB2U, 18 and 14 operational for navweaps page but only 12 crew for the SB2U


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## parsifal (Nov 20, 2012)

On June 3, the critical day really Striking Force began launching at 0415 hours, elying on the floatplanes of Tone and Chikuma, and the two BBs. At that stage the two opposing fleets were less than 250 miles distant from each other. Midway was over 300 miles (the USN carriers were 345 miles from Midway....not as sure about the Jpanese, but still over 300 miles) to the south. Unfortunately for the Japanese two of the floatplanes experienced engine difficulties, which delayed their takeoffs until well after 5am. These were the very aircraft tasked to cover the sector containing the US Carriers.

Historically, whilst the PBYs had located the IJN Striking Force shortly before 0600, this information did not reach Fletcher until 0605. Moreover, the report was innaccurate by about 100 miles from the actual position. By 0605 the IJN search aircraft that had taken off on time were about 250 miles into their search arcs. The USN did not commence launch of its strike wings until an hour later, 0702.

The first reports of the US fleets position were transmitted 0720, with amplification reports received over the next hour. There was a problem in the IJN reports....no mention of carriers until 0810. This sloppiness woulod not have occurred if the Japanese had committed more aircraft to the search as they knew they should have

However, if the Japanese had been less sloppy in their staff work (which would have at least doubled the search density), changed their codes as they should have, the USN would have likley have been found from 0630. Since the Japanese already had 95 strike aircraft readied for attack and the USN was still arming, they had at leasty an hour in which to hit the US Carriers before the US would be in position to respond. if the Codes had been changed, the US search arcs would have been far broader, and as a result there is a strong possibility that their time of detection of the IJN would have been much later


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## parsifal (Nov 20, 2012)

> The intelligence on the IJN carrier force location is a common misconception only recently corrected. The USN had at least one critcal mistaken notion about the composition and location of Kido Butai. That was the issue of the separated Pair of CVs lurking behind the two that were expected to stage the assault on Midway


.

A couple of things to respond to here. The PBYs that were launched to "find" the Striking Force were not required to obtain a visual sighting, and neither did they (at least initially). They relied simply on their ASV Radar to confirm the position of the Striking Fordce. Because SIGINT had already predicted the time and location of its arrival, all the PBYs had to do was confirm what the MAGIC guys already had predicted. That explains nicely, incidentally why the PBY reports were so innaccurate. They were relying on distant tracking of "something". it was not until daylight that visual sighting could confirm what was already known. I confess I dont actually know when that visual confirmation occurred. 

The second point is that Fletcher was unnaturally worried about an outflanking manouvre from the North, and this caused him to expend 10 SBDs on an armed recon in that direction. There was no basis to support this, just Fletcher not trusting completely the intell being provided to him, and the sneaking or nagging suspiciion that the Japanese were up to "something".....


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 20, 2012)

parsifal said:


> In other words,_* the searches undertaken by the Black Cats was a sham*_, based on the SIGINT they had already received. Launching at 0420 from Midway places the US Searches about 3 hours behind those of the IJN



Correction, even at Midway, Type 97 Kates were evidently used in recon role. 

You lost me again... Yorktown launches its morning search at 0440 on the 4th, to cover the north out to a mere 100 miles as insurance... IIRC, That was about the same time as the Type 97 Kates from Kaga and Akagi and float planes on search. 

I don't believe the Cat night raiders were launched on sigint although that may have helped them track their quarry. 

The time line for the Black Cat ops:

Morning of June 3rd, day searching PBY detects Occupation Force and misidentifies it as main body. (9 B-17s attack that afternoon based on day sighting)
The Black Cats leave much earlier than the Yorktown's SBDs to attack the Midway occupation force (not Kido Butai). According to Knott, the 4 PBYs depart Midway at 2115 on June 3rd after they had flown in from pearl harbor that afternoon. I don't believe the Black Cats did any searches as they returned to Midway from their attack after the IJN air raid was over.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 20, 2012)

parsifal said:


> . A couple of things to respond to here. The PBYs that were launched to "find" the Striking Force were not required to obtain a visual sighting, and neither did they (at least initially). They relied simply on their ASV Radar to confirm the position of the Striking Fordce. Because SIGINT had already predicted the time and location of its arrival, all the PBYs had to do was confirm what the MAGIC guys already had predicted. That explains nicely, incidentally why the PBY reports were so innaccurate. They were relying on distant tracking of "something". it was not until daylight that visual sighting could confirm what was already known. I confess I dont actually know when that visual confirmation occurred.
> 
> The second point is that Fletcher was unnaturally worried about an outflanking manouvre from the North, and this caused him to expend 10 SBDs on an armed recon in that direction. There was no basis to support this, just Fletcher not trusting completely the intell being provided to him, and the sneaking or nagging suspiciion that the Japanese were up to "something".....



This is the first I have heard of ASV sets on the day searching PBYs. The black Cats were brought in from PH because they could do such an attack with their ASV sets. AFAIK, the PBYs based at and operating from Midway did not have such equipment. Please provide a source for that information. WRT to Fltecher, you've evidently read too many of the histories that discredit Fletcher. Unless you just disagree with the evidence cited by Lundstom, In which case the best we can do is agree to disagree.

The messages sent from Spruance at the return of his strike suggest a more complex situation wrt to the purported pair of stalking CVs

I can probably help with some of the PBY time line. Which as you have pointed out was abysmally incomplete in some cases and very helpful in others. The performance was not systematically good but individuals outdid themselves in some cases. 

First contact:
Addy's PBY at 0534 reports "enemy carriers" with his call sign which presumably should give listeners some idea of where they are. Later at 0552, Chase's PBY is reported by Parshall and Tully in Shattered Sword (page 134) as 'sighting' "Two carriers and BBs, bearing 320, distance 180 mi, course 135, speed 25."

it wasn't all that accurate but it was complete.

It's restated there that almost no pilots reported seeing more than two carriers. My understanding from both books is that intelligence stated that Kido Butai would be split in two elements one supporting the other. Intelligence does not seem to have provided any information as to how close they might be operating.

This separated force is one reason given for Hornet CAG (C-HAG) Ring's Sojourn to the North of the reported KB position.


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## parsifal (Nov 21, 2012)

> This is the first I have heard of ASV sets on the day searching PBYs. The black Cats were brought in from PH because they could do such an attack with their ASV sets. AFAIK, the PBYs based at and operating from Midway did not have such equipment. Please provide a source for that information


. 

Source: David Brown - Carrier Operations In World war II - VolII The Pacific December 1941 to feb 1943 ; London 1984

Although the following is not a direct reference to the search in question, it is the same aircraft on during the same operation.

At Page 166 Brown makes his observationsd with regard to the PBY searches....this account relates to those searches that found the main body, but i firmly believe the methods and equipment described for this part of the operation can be reasonably exytrapolated for the searches undertaken within 24hours for the Striking Force


Browns account relevantly says "At 2115 (june 3rd) as the b-17s returned from their long mission, four PBY-5As of VP-44 took off from Midwayeach armed with a single 21 in torpedo. All had been flown in by the same crews on the same afternoon - a ten hour flight from Oahu. Four hours and 575 miles out from Midway, three of the aircraft detected the enemy transports at distant range of about 100 miles on their ASV radars, and then vectored to the detected enemy force, making down moon glide attacks, as well as strafing the decks of the transports. One torpedo hit, daamging the fleet oiler Akebono Maru, which lost 24 mwen, but remained with the convoy....."

He makes the same references to those aircraft used to locate the Striking Force.

As for both Lundstrom and Fletcher, no I dont think much of either. And I reject the revisionist accounts that have recently tried to paint him in a more sympathetic light. 

Neither do I think much of Nagumo incidentally


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 21, 2012)

parsifal said:


> .
> 
> Source: David Brown - Carrier Operations In World war II - VolII The Pacific December 1941 to feb 1943 ; London 1984
> 
> ...



The reference you cite I've already acknowledged. I want to see those that claim the PBYs searching for the IJN on the 3rd and 4th were equipped with ASV type radar (USN: ASB or less likely ASA) I have searched high and low for any reference to PBYs being typically equipped with ASV in June. My understanding based on a long list of books on the subject and web references, is that ASV production began in the spring and only the 4 PBY-5A aircraft brought to Midway from PH specifically for that night action possessed RADAR. All others did not. The only black cat ops referred to in Knott aside from the 4 participating in the Midway night op are those in the Solomons after August and in the SW Pacific. 

I must admit to being simply astonished at your off-handed rejection/dismissal of Lundstrom. It has been clear to me for over 40 years that there are many mysteries unaddressed by half-knowledgable authors and some much-lauded historians in this field. Only recently have these mysteries come to resolution largely through the efforts of historians doing careful research of previously unexamined contemporary documents from both sides as well as participant interviews. Shattered Sword is another good reference.


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## VBF-13 (Nov 21, 2012)

parsifal said:


> ...not as sure about the Japanese, but still over 300 miles


My chart from _Battle Stations_ (Wise Co., N.Y., 1946) shows them sighted at around 450 out and bombed at around 350 out.

EDIT: Replacing chart; hopefully, this size is readable...


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## parsifal (Nov 21, 2012)

with regard to the radar fitment, Im not saying that i am admantly sure. However it seems very unlikley to me that just four aircraft were radar fitted in June Certainly that runs counter to a number of sources. This is material that I do have...

"In mid 1941, a PBY-2 aircraft 54-P-10, BuNo 0456 belonging to VP-54, was equipped with the first operational radar aboard a US Navy aircraft. The ASV radar equipment used long separate transmitting and receiving antennas mounted on insulated stub supports along the forward hull of the PBY. The British had already put ASV Mark II on their Consolidated Catalina flying boat patrol aircraft, so it was straightforward to mount it on US Navy Catalina’s. The installation was completed at NAS Anacostia, Washington, D.C. NAS Anacostia was the site of the Fleet Air Tactical Unit. They conducted experiments with new aircraft and equipment in order to determine their practical application and tactical employment. NAS Anacostia was a primary training base for naval aviation and the home of all Navy flight test operations until overcrowding caused that mission to be moved in 1943 to Patuxent River. At the time of the radar installation, VP-54 was assigned to Patrol Wing Five, stationed at NAS Norfolk. The VP-54 aircraft was most likely selected because the squadron had aircraft available in the area and was also experienced with working with the British RAF. VP-54 had conducted neutrality patrols in the Atlantic daily, weather permitting, from Newport to Nova Scotia in June 1939 to February 1941, and also from Bermuda, B.W.I. in September 1940 to January 1941.


Commander J. V. Carney, Senior Support Force Staff Officer, reported on 18 July 1941 that British type ASV radar has been installed in one PBY-5 Catalina each of VP-71, VP-72, and VP-73 and two PBM-1's of VP-74. Initial installation of identification equipment (IFF) was made about the same time. In mid-September, radar was issued for five additional PBM-1's of VP-74 and one PBY-5 of VP-71, and shortly thereafter for other aircraft in Patrol Wing 7 squadrons. Thereby Patrol Wing 7 became the first operational Wing of the U.S. Navy to be supplied with radar-equipped aircraft. Its squadrons operated from Norfolk, Quonset Point and advanced bases on Greenland, Newfoundland and Iceland during the last months of the neutrality patrol. Radar introduced both aircrew and ground personnel to a whole new capability for Navy airborne operations. The early installations were awkward due to their long separate transmitting and receiving antennas mounted on insulated stub supports along the forward hull of the PBYs.

No PBY Catalina aircraft in the Pacific was equipped with radar at the time of the 7 December.

However after that re-equipment with SCR521 radar was fairly rapid, and certainly occurred prior to August 1942".

According to one source, one of those “my uncle served in such and such a unit” acconts....This account is describing operations that commenced from May 1942, and goes a follows:..Uncle John was the leading Chief Petty Officer of the unit he was responsible for ensuring that the aircraft were up and ready for action. He made out the sailors work assignments and supervised the repairs on each of the aircraft making sure the planes were fixed and fixed properly. FAW-4 consisted of many VP or patrol squadrons. These Aircraft Squadron's would deploy to the Aleutians from the U.S., and would be stationed along with the HEDRONs on each island. Each a squadron was usually comprised of seven PBY-5a's, later the aircraft were changed over to PV-1 Venturas and then to the more updated PV-2 Harpoon patrol planes. 

Jim Decker a Radioman stationed with my Uncle John described to me the conditions of the patrols. The PBY-5a's would fly out on a patrol "Leg "from eight to anywhere up to thirteen hours, depending on the patrol. The "leg" consisted of a triangular shaped route that extended for several hundred miles. Each plane had a forward-looking SCR-521 ASV radar that consisted of the radar set connected to a "Yagi" antennae located on the wing. Later (from August) a side looking radar was installed in each aircraft, which vastly extended the radar capability of the aircraft. Each radar unit had an operator station located behind the co-pilot. This station consisted of a radar screen with a rubber boot over it. The crew would take turns looking into the screen after an hour or so otherwise the men would get "buggy" from looking at the screen too long". 

This account is entirely consistent with many other sources. Another one of those “discredited” sources that you don’t like, Norman Polmar who co-wrote his book back in the 60s with Minoru Genda., says that ASV radar became operational from April in the North and was used extensively during the battle. Given that the US produced over 3500 SCr 521 sets in 1942 alone, I find it inconcevable that just four aircraft in the whole of the Pacific were fitted with ASV in June.

Sorry if my disdain of Lundstrom surprises you. I get that a lot. but I find him to be annoyingly a headline grabber, a sensationalist that really wants to rewrite history. A lot of his work IS good, I admit, but becaue he has an agenda in his writing, I seldom use him. Shocking I know, probably bad karma as a serious history student, but there it is I guess.


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## VBF-13 (Nov 21, 2012)

parsifal said:


> According to one source, one of those “my uncle served in such and such a unit” acconts....This account is describing operations that commenced from May 1942, and goes a follows:..Uncle John was the leading Chief Petty Officer of the unit he was responsible for ensuring that the aircraft were up and ready for action. He made out the sailors work assignments and supervised the repairs on each of the aircraft making sure the planes were fixed and fixed properly. FAW-4 consisted of many VP or patrol squadrons. These Aircraft Squadron's would deploy to the Aleutians from the U.S., and would be stationed along with the HEDRONs on each island. Each a squadron was usually comprised of seven PBY-5a's, later the aircraft were changed over to PV-1 Venturas and then to the more updated PV-2 Harpoon patrol planes.


That's pretty much how it was, although the Chief Petty Officers also ran the craps games. How were those bankrolled? I shan't say, except that I doubt you'll find that in one of your books.


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## parsifal (Nov 21, 2012)

VB thanks for the map. Its hard to read. But it looks like the Striking Force was down to about 250 miles at the time of the Mcclusky's attack, which means at the time of detection it would be over 300 miles from Midway. Not that that made too much difference in the actual battle....the USN knew where to look, when to loook, and what they were looking for


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## VBF-13 (Nov 21, 2012)

Pars, just replaced the chart, go back a page and see it. This time one can actually read the darn thing. It's a good visual of the "battle tracks." Primarily just wanted to show you were right, though, that Occupation Force was over 300 out from Midway.


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## parsifal (Nov 21, 2012)

Thanks VBF much appreciated. Gotta respect Old Crows knowledge on this subject. he really is encyclopedic on this issue. Doesnt mean we have to agree with everything, and i dont, but I still have great respect for the man and the knowledge he has.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 23, 2012)

Happy post-Thanksgiving to all who observe the occasion and to those who may not. 

Am On travel and having to do this on someone else's computer so I've got to make it brief. 

Pars, my info on introduction of ASV in mid 41 corresponds to yours. From what i can gather, the main focus/priority was the atlantic theater, so those squadrons got it first. One would expect with all the much touted industrial capacity and technical savvy of the USA we would have been on top of the problem and been able to get ASV/B equipment installed ASAP. That appears to have not been the case. I've found a number of web sources that state the PBY installed ASV sets didn't appear in the PTO except in a few cases (such as the Midway op) until mid-summer, ultimately resulting in the black cat ops that began during the Solomons campaign. 

SSP - In Action 062 - PBY Catalina

Page 44 is about as definitive a source as I can find. 

This may appear to be surprising, but compare the USN and RN adoption of the new technology. Sommerville's carrier fleet in the IO in April 1942 had Swordfish and Albacore's embarked, many or all of which were equipped with ASV. The first embarked USN CV aircraft that was equipped and hoped to utilize ASV in an operation was during the Santa Cruz battle in October 1942. One Enterprise TBF-1 flown by VT-10 CO Jack Collette was the only ASB equipped aircraft in the small CV-6 strike group and it was also the first one shot down by a Zuiho-based escort Zero that abandoned its primary mission to attack the Enterprise group on a reciprocal heading. Thus the opportunity to use ASB to provide a critical advantage to the USN at Santa Cruz was stillborn. ONe TBF-1 some 6 months after ASV was common equipment on RN TSR a/c. Where did I learn this interesting story? Lundstrom. (???of course??) 

If you haven't yet read First team, I am envious of the enjoyment you will experience. It is a veritable feast of information for any student of WW2 history. Forget what you get second hand on the forum. That tends to be Lundstrom through a glass darkly. When you say revisionist history, I can only say it can't be revisionist if it's history that for all practical purposes has never before been written except in the most fragmentary and incomplete fashion. Can it be improved upon? I am sure it can, he is not so technical that he get's it all right, but he tackles more technical details than most historians have previously attempted. I suspect much of the hype or media attention surrounding his work is because it is so ground breaking and so influential. Shattered Sword is heavily dependent on Lundstrom and Frank and Hornfischer pay him homage in their work. That praise for Lundstrom is not universal should not be surprising when you consider the vast body of work and professional bias that became the orthodox history of events. The marines revile Fletcher while some historians refused to even mention his name. Only Spruance is recognized to have fought and won the Battle of Midway. Fetcher was not a self promoter. His only response to the bias that pounded his reputation was, when asked who won the battle of Midway was to say, "I won't say who won the battle, but I know who they would have said lost it had it been lost."

As a USN brown shoe I can tell you from experience that Miles Browning was not such an anomaly. Aviation egos are second to none and are behind a long campaign to discredit any non-aviation naval leader who has the temerity to assume command of a carrier group. Mitscher's performance at Midway should have cost him a star but he was an aviator and had friends in the right places. Fortunately for future ops it didn't but that's the crazy culture that is Naval aviation. You never hear about Fletcher's post-Midway Career but there was one and it was essentially successful and as a fighting admiral, he contributed in his own small way to the ultimate allied victory.

This is me being brief?


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## VBF-13 (Nov 23, 2012)

Crow, why is it Admiral Fletcher is so discredited around these parts? I never knew that until I mentioned him, here. I'm sorry for the digression, but I didn't think I should start a separate thread on this. I'd just like to know what you boys think, especially what you think. Are his accounts at Midway just that plum wrong? What is it you boys evidently know that I don't know? Thanks.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 23, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Thanks VBF much appreciated. Gotta respect Old Crows knowledge on this subject. he really is encyclopedic on this issue. Doesnt mean we have to agree with everything, and i dont, but I still have great respect for the man and the knowledge he has.



Thanks Pars. I started studying the Midway battle after reading Lord's *Incredible Victory *before joining the USN. For some reason, it really grabbed my interest and I couldn't read enough to satisfy my curiosity. (like it hasn't fascinated anyone else?) Along the way, I started asking questions the written texts didn't answer or provided answers that just had to be wrong. As an aside, the more I read about Fletcher, the more interested I became in him. The official, historical and popular accounts seemed to be missing some fundamental elements of the story of Midway and of Fletcher as a leader. The more I read the more questions I had. Lundstrom's book was a revelation, answering some questions, confirming some suspicions, while raising some new questions. There's more to the story but let's just say, the Midway battle has been a long held interest bordering on obsession. 

I wouldn't expect you to agree with everything which is why I do my best to provide at least some semblance of justification, as best I can and because I believe, like me, you want the straight scoop which ever way it goes. I hope you know the respect is certainly reciprocated. I've learned something from just about every interaction on this forum including from you Pars and you VB. 

The Fletcher story is complex and my brief rant about ego is far too simplistic, there are certainly other black shoe admirals who weren't vilified to the same extent. His decline evidently began well before the Coral Sea Battle when King regarded him as far too cautious in his abortive attempt to relieve Wake island. Later, King became more convinced of this when he wasn't more proactive in taking the fight to the enemy in the Coral Sea area during the winter of 42. King's feeling was tempered somewhat as a result of the raid made by he and Wilson Brown on IJN fleet elements Lae and Salamua in New Guinea. King blamed him for the loss of the Lexington at Coral Sea and joined the chorus of those aviators who objected to operating their carriers as closely coordinated units for combined CAP defense (similar to IJN doctrine) USN aviation leadership wanted to separate the Flight decks by several 10's of miles to decrease their probability of being detected. (At Midway a combination of the two philosophies were employed. The Fletcher-Fitch tactic employed at Coral Sea didn't work all that well and Lexington was fatally wounded. At Midway the same tactical deployment might have saved Yorktown its own ultimately fatal torpedo wounds. (Yorktown only became submarine bait after the Kates did their deadly and efficient work.) During the Guadalcanal invasion, so many complaints were lodged by the USMC general (Vandergrift) and USN Admiral (Turner) running the invasion, that, despite his largely effective performance at Eastern Solomons, King had had enough. The dissection of these events is a laborious task but worth the read. I recommend Lundstrom's _Black Shoe Carrier Admiral_ and Layton's "_And I was there..._" I think it was for Turner that Nimitz made the famous quote Morrison cites, "Every dog deserves two bites." You get a vivid picture of Turner in Lundstrom's, Layton's, Frank's and Hornfischer's books and I think even Morrison has some things to say about him. 

Pars, anyone interested in carrier aviation has to at least tip his hat to Polmar. Every book on Midway I've read has added some dimension to the story and I appreciate all the contributions. Even Tuleja's.


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## VBF-13 (Nov 24, 2012)

The way I understand the Coral Sea, Crow, Fletcher was the first to engage the enemy, that would be 4 May, responding to intelligence reports of a Japanese landing at Florida Island and transports going ashore. He did well dispatching his planes to there and bombing the heck out of that landing force. On 7 May, when he joined forces with Fitch, Fitch assumed command of that combined task force. Again, they did well, sinking one carrier, and, the next day, in a second two-carrier task force, damaging another carrier. The ledger reads the same on our side, one carrier sunk, and one carrier damaged. However, how does Fletcher get blamed, there? When Yorktown and Lexington combined forces, Fitch was in charge.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 24, 2012)

IIRC, Fletcher was senior and in overall command. I believe he deferred to brownshoe Fitch for air ops. Its been a while ut that's what I recall.


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## VBF-13 (Nov 24, 2012)

You know, Crow, Wake Island wasn't really that strategically important to us at that time. That whole area was under attack. Concurrent with the struggle at Wake, the Japanese were landing troops in the Philippines. I think this Fletcher got a bum rap. Here's a guy who was virtually right in the middle of every major battle through Guadalcanal, and yet he's hardly but a footnote in history. And, when he is, it's usually to discredit him. One doesn't know any better, one wonders how we ever won the War with this guy on our side.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 24, 2012)

Whatever Fletcher did or didn't do at Wake, he avoided a serious butt kicking at the hands of the Kido Butai 2nd cardiv. Critics say it wouldn't have happened cause the Sara was carrying TWO fighter Squadrons embarked. Its own and the Wake marine VMF relief. How could Fletcher lose? Of course critics don't mention Sara's VF-3 with but 12 F4F-3s (some may have been F4F-3As) was at about 2/3rds strength while the VMF was also understrength (~75%) but, perhaps more seriously handicapped, consisted of the same VMF that fought at Midway ~6 months hence, then as later, equipped with F2A-3 Buffaloes. The Wake relief was horribly conceived in a fragmented style reminiscent of the IJN Midway Op but much much worse. It was styled as an operation enjoying the mutual support of three USN carriers (Sara, Lex Enterprise) . However neither of these other two were anywhere close enough to Sara to offer any assistance should it be attacked. Had Soryu or Hiryu scouts found the Sara I suspect they would have made short work of her. The USN sems to have suffered from an early, very serious under estimate of IJN skill and power.


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## VBF-13 (Nov 24, 2012)

I say the same thing, give the guy a break. In the weeks following Pearl, we had our hands full. The Japanese were taking everything in the South Pacific from Hong Kong to Manila, and that remote Island, strategically, was but a stopping-off point for us, a stepping-stone. As a matter of fact, what did the Japanese get out of it? Nothing. It's tragic to let any of our bases go without support, but let's get a perspective.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 24, 2012)

VBF-13 said:


> I say the same thing, give the guy a break. In the weeks following Pearl, we had our hands full. The Japanese were taking everything in the South Pacific from Hong Kong to Manila, and that remote Island, strategically, was but a stopping-off point for us, a stepping-stone. As a matter of fact, what did the Japanese get out of it? Nothing. It's tragic to let any of our bases go without support, but let's get a perspective.



I believe Wake was primarily a refueling stop for China Clipper flying boats and B-17s enroute to the PI before December 7, As I understand it, Wake became part of the IJ ribbon defensive line or buffer. It provided a base for recon out to ~600 mile radius. That's probably at least a day' to a day and a half warning for a task force approaching IJ controlled territory at ~20 knots. With interior lines, Japan might be able to respond to incursions from fleet units staging from its forward bases. During Midway, Wake provided the unbrella under which IJN units could retreat and expect some protection from its own air. IIRC, that radius provided a limit for the daylight pursuit by USN CV units. 

Like some of the other cases of disatisfaction, it wasn't clear from the records that Fletcher made any mistakes but his progress was slower than anticipated (for reasons) and he was criticized for dawdling, spending too much time refueling his escorts. This became a common complaint among the "experts" criticizing his performance in a number of his major fleet actions, espcially Eastern Solomons where he released Wasp to refuel just before the battle. With Wasp, the USN might have bagged one of the big IJN flight decks.


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## VBF-13 (Nov 25, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> I believe Wake was primarily a refueling stop for China Clipper flying boats and B-17s enroute to the PI before December 7, As I understand it, Wake became part of the IJ ribbon defensive line or buffer. It provided a base for recon out to ~600 mile radius. That's probably at least a day' to a day and a half warning for a task force approaching IJ controlled territory at ~20 knots. With interior lines, Japan might be able to respond to incursions from fleet units staging from its forward bases. During Midway, Wake provided the unbrella under which IJN units could retreat and expect some protection from its own air. IIRC, that radius provided a limit for the daylight pursuit by USN CV units.
> 
> Like some of the other cases of disatisfaction, it wasn't clear from the records that Fletcher made any mistakes but his progress was slower than anticipated (for reasons) and he was criticized for dawdling, spending too much time refueling his escorts. This became a common complaint among the "experts" criticizing his performance in a number of his major fleet actions, espcially Eastern Solomons where he released Wasp to refuel just before the battle. With Wasp, the USN might have bagged one of the big IJN flight decks.


Crow, the Saratoga and the Wasp opened the Battle of the Eastern Solomons. That would be 24 August (Japanese spotted, 23 August). One of those squadrons even sank a carrier, the Ryuja. I believe all three of our carriers took on fuel just weeks prior to that, during the Savo Island catastrophe. That must be what you're referring to. That would be 9 August. We were landing at Guadalcanal. We withdrew our carriers and the force we left to protect the landing operations got smashed.


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## VBF-13 (Nov 25, 2012)

At Savo Island, we were conducting landing operations, and there was a lull in the action, and we weren't being bothered. We had a good force of cruisers and destroyers there to protect the landing operations and to screen our carriers, but we knew the Japanese were just North of there, and what if a sub got through? The last thing we wanted was for one of our carriers to get torpedoed when it wasn't even engaged in a fight. That was another reason that was seen as a good opportunity to withdraw our carriers from those waters and refuel them. When our forces there were hit, that was first by carrier planes. Almost concurrent with that, a force of cruisers and destroyers snuck in, and continued the onslaught. Throughout all that, they didn't even know we were landing. Had they known that, they'd have likely advanced with their fleet, and finished us off on the beaches. As it was, they let those beaches alone. Was that a blunder, withdrawing those carriers, under those circumstances? In hindsight, it was. The alternatives, though, were to either let them sit there, and nothing happens, except they use up fuel, or to deploy them Northward, while running out of fuel, in a desperate search of the Japanese fleet. And, I don't know that those alternatives would have been all that brilliant, either.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 25, 2012)

Here is Lundstrom's first analysis of Fletcher's performance at Guadalcanal. This article in Naval History was published 14 years prior to the publication of his book "_Black Shoe Carrier Admiral_" It is in two parts:

Frank Jack Fletcher Got a Bum Rap, Part One | U.S. Naval Institute

Note the reference to the obscure plan and troops for a Santa Cruz occupation force that became folded into the Guadacanal force due to the IJ resistence on Florida Island. 

Wth respect to his 'timid' occupation of the Coral Sea during the winter of 42. What worthwhile targets did he have to attack that justified the risk to the Yorktown? He couldn't move up the Solomons or approach the Indonesian archipelego without exposing his command to danger from prowling IJN carriers until they left for the IO. By then pwereful IJN land based units were already showing themselves to be very dangerous. Lexington's solo raid on Rabaul in early February showed what kind of response such (prematurely) aggressive activities were likely to elicit. Yes, VF-3 did well in repelling the raid, but without the efforts of just one F4F flown by Butch O'Hare, it might have been a very bad day for the USN. 

It took a while for the USN to adopt the view that solo operations were a limiting and very risky idea desite the fact that they were generally '_successful._'

When he was reinforced by Brown in March and later Fitch in May, he became more characteristically and appropriately aggressive.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 25, 2012)

VBF-13 said:


> Crow, the Saratoga and the _*Wasp *_opened the Battle of the Eastern Solomons. That would be 24 August (Japanese spotted, 23 August). One of those squadrons even sank a carrier, the Ryuja. I believe all three of our carriers took on fuel just weeks prior to that, during the Savo Island catastrophe. That must be what you're referring to. That would be 9 August. We were landing at Guadalcanal. We withdrew our carriers and the force we left to protect the landing operations got smashed.



VB, Check six. Wasp had been sent to refuel. Enterprise was Sara's consort during Eastern Solomons and she got hammered by Vals (3 hits) during the exchange. The Lundstrom article above cites both refuelings which were about 2 weeks apart (gives you an idea how fast those suckers burn the black gold). In between which the carriers did a lot of ops burning oil awaiting the arrival of the IJN counterattack which arrived as you say on the 24th. Here is CV-6 afire after the hits.


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## VBF-13 (Nov 25, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> VB, Check six. Wasp had been sent to refuel. Enterprise was Sara's consort during Eastern Solomons and she got hammered by Vals (3 hits) during the exchange. The Lundstrom article above cites both refuelings which were about 2 weeks apart (gives you an idea how fast those suckers burn the black gold). In between which the carriers did a lot of ops burning oil awaiting the arrival of the IJN counterattack which arrived as you say on the 24th. Here is CV-6 afire after the hits.


Crow, something is seriously ajar in our accounts of the Battle of the Eastern Solomons. Let's see if we can't use this opportunity to try and rectify that. My account has an August 24th deployment of aircraft from the Saratoga and the Wasp against the Japanese fleet and the Enterprise and her escorts simply defending against an assault while said deployments were in progress. I even have a photograph of the deck of the Wasp during said deployments, showing aircraft in the air, too, but that I can't show, right now, as I'm nowhere near my scanner. My understanding is that the Enterprise didn't get anything off its deck offensively in that Battle. Only the Saratoga and the Wasp did that. My source for that is_ Battle Stations _ (Wise Co., N.Y., 1946). That source has been by my side since I was a kid, and I've seen it credited, a lot (even by Lundstrom, I believe). Here's the caption under the photograph (it's reproduced, in part). Let's figure this out. See what your sources make of this account:

"On the morning of August 23, 1942, a reconnaissance plane sighted a Japanese transport group, loaded with reinforcements for the Solomon Islands area. During the night our combined force moved North and contact was made the next morning. In the afternoon of the 24th, planes from the _Saratoga_ and _Wasp_ bombed an aircraft carrier and in addition damaged a cruiser and a destroyer. While these attacks were in progress, a flight of about 75 Japanese planes attacked the _Enterprise_ and her escort ships and inflicted some damage on the _Enterprise_."


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 25, 2012)

VBF-13 said:


> Crow, something is seriously ajar in our accounts of the Battle of the Eastern Solomons. Let's see if we can't use this opportunity to try and rectify that. My account has an August 24th deployment of aircraft from the Saratoga and the Wasp against the Japanese fleet and the Enterprise and her escorts simply defending against an assault while said deployments were in progress. I even have a photograph of the deck of the Wasp during said deployments, showing aircraft in the air, too, but that I can't show, right now, as I'm nowhere near my scanner. My understanding is that the Enterprise didn't get anything off its deck offensively in that Battle. Only the Saratoga and the Wasp did that. My source for that is_ Battle Stations _ (Wise Co., N.Y., 1946). That source has been by my side since I was a kid, and I've seen it credited, a lot (even by Lundstrom, I believe). Here's the caption under the photograph (it's reproduced, in part). Let's figure this out. See what your sources make of this account:
> 
> "On the morning of August 23, 1942, a reconnaissance plane sighted a Japanese transport group, loaded with reinforcements for the Solomon Islands area. During the night our combined force moved North and contact was made the next morning. In the afternoon of the 24th, planes from the _Saratoga_ and _Wasp_ bombed an aircraft carrier and in addition damaged a cruiser and a destroyer. While these attacks were in progress, a flight of about 75 Japanese planes attacked the _Enterprise_ and her escort ships and inflicted some damage on the _Enterprise_."



I think the discrepancy is readily resolvable but a bit surprising in its divergence from my own sources. Lundstrom cites TF61 (on August 23rd, all three carriers are acting in concert with Enterprise acting as duty carrier with Wasp as relief (in reserve?) and cites the Sara airwing as the only one providing strike assets to hit the transports which have turned north out of range. The Sara's strike is launched and finding nothing takes refuge on Guadalcanal for the night. At 1830 on the 23rd, at Ghormley's direction with PH Intel sources assuring him all IJN carriers are near Truk, Fletcher detaches Wasp for refueling. On the 24th, the Sara's strike group returns from Henderson by 1100 on the morning and the IJN carriers show up and the battle ensues with Wasp on the sidelines. Frank provides the same info as does Hornfischer. I don't have a copy of Morrison for Eastern Solomons but other texts I've seen seem to confirm this series of events, as does the Lundstrom article I posted earlier. Here is wikipedia: 

Battle of the Eastern Solomons - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia cites four sources (Lundstrom, Frank, Evans and Hammel)

"Fletcher detached Wasp—which was getting low on fuel—and the rest of TF 18 for the two-day trip south toward Efate Island to refuel. Thus, Wasp and her escorting warships missed the upcoming battle." 

Info for the 23rd sounds correct, but the info on carrier vs carrier does not appear to be correct or is at least inconsistent with these other sources. I find the accuracy of earlier sources, (perhaps compiled by PAO offices?) to diverge from the later accounts in proportion to how close they were to the actual events. In other words, the further from the event one gets the more accurate the info seems to become. I suspect that sort of divergence in accounts may give Pars some concern about the veracity of any account. 

Also, for Parsifal, I was looking at Lundstrom for this battle and he cites the CV Based A/C assets dedicated to search and ASW patrol (Inner air Patrol or IAP) as up to 24 A/C for a 180 search and up to 14 A/C for IAP. That's easily your original 60% depletion of the assets available for strike. I stand (actually I am sitting while typing ) corrected. Although, I suspect there may have been an amplification of the assets dedicated by the duty carrier as the practice became common in multi-carrier task groups.


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## davparlr (Nov 25, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Here is Lundstrom's first analysis of Fletcher's performance at Guadalcanal. This article in Naval History was published 14 years prior to the publication of his book "_Black Shoe Carrier Admiral_" It is in two parts:
> 
> Frank Jack Fletcher Got a Bum Rap, Part One | U.S. Naval Institute


 
I smiled when I read the account of the post war historians calculating the fuel for Fletcher and determined he had enough fuel to do the mission. It reminded me of a mission I was on where we were flying into New Jersey from Europe. The weather was predicted to be clear and a million for our arrival time and we had legally planned Dover AFB as an alternate, only about 15 minutes from our destination, McGuire AFB, and loaded fuel accordingly. However, as we approached McGuire a very fast moving front had come down and hit both McGuire and Dover. We flew a missed approach into McGuire and called up Base Ops for directions (typically a problem). They came back and said that their flight planners said we could make it to Otis AFB, in Massachusetts and told us to divert their. My Nav, doing his own calculations said to tell them we could not make it! I immediately told the Nav and Copilot to find the nearest usable field. Luckily the front had not reached Atlantic City and that is were we landed. The point it is that it is amazing what little fuel a desk riding analyst will accept and a crew or Admiral, whose life, or the survival of his ships, are on the line, will not accept. This was the only time I was a bit antsy about fuel in the C-141.

If I remember correctly, the Bismarck failed to refuel at its last stopped which forced it to return to France after it sprung a fuel leak. Had it more fuel, maybe it could have avoided the Brits.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 25, 2012)

I think Fletcher suffered more than most from the post-mortems of armchair admirals. At least that's the impression I get. I assume you landed at NAFEC, near Atlantic City? Bader Field would be kind of small for a 141.  Glad you and your crew made it ok. I assume if Dover and McGuire were socked in, then probably Warminster and Willow Grove were also but they also probably had no ILS. They'd have been a hell of a lot closer than Otis!

I flew into Bader in a 150 for my last cross-country solo for my license 40+ years ago. Just found out it closed 6 years ago.

Didn't know that about Bismarck!


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## parsifal (Nov 25, 2012)

I dont think it was the armchair generals that torpedoed Fletcher. I think hius service record and lack of success did that. The most charitable thing I can say about Fletcher is that at least he didnt lose the war. But he was overcautious and prone to flights of fancy in his tactical commands. The post war wash up of him is unfair, mostly because of Morisons animosity toward him, but Fletcher was effectively demoted by his own peers, which says volumes about his abilities, or lack thereof.

In summary Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher was the US Navy's commander at the pivotal Battles of the Coral Sea in May 1942 and Midway in June 1942. He also commanded in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons in August 1942. These were three of the four great carrier battles of 1942, and there was not another until 1944. By that time Fletcher was commander in the North Pacific. 

In 1909 he gained his first command on the‘USS Dale’ in America’s Asiatic Squadron. In 1914, Fletcher won the Medal of Honour for rescuing refugees on the transport ship ‘Esperanza’ during the occupation of Vera Cruz. During America’s participation in World War One, he commanded ‘USS Benham’ – a destroyer on submarine patrol.

During the inter-war years, America retrenched into a period of isolationism at an international level. Therefore, America’s military tended to be relatively dormant. America was not a member of the League of Nations; therefore she did not participate in anything to do with the League.

In 1930, Fletcher graduated from the Naval War College. One year later he did the same from the Army War College. Between 1933 and 1936, Fletcher was an aide to the Secretary of the Navy and between 1936 and 1939, he was on the staff of the Bureau of Personnel. In 1939, Fletcher was promoted to Rear Admiral and given the command of Cruiser Division III, Atlantic Fleet.

In late 1941, Fletcher was given the command of the ‘USS Yorktown’, an aircraft carrier. The naval hierarchy in America must have held Fletcher in high regard to give him the command of the ‘USS Yorktown’.

In February 1942, Fletcher took part in raids on the Marshall and Gilbert Islands – the first offensive American campaigns in World War Two. Shortly after these campaigns, Fletcher was promoted to Vice Admiral and was given the command of Task Force 17, spearheaded by the ‘Yorktown’ for what was to become the Battle of Coral Sea. Chester Nimitz also gave Fletcher overall tactical command of this battle, including over Task Force 11 commanded by Aubrey Fitch on board the doomed ‘USS Lexington’. While America lost the ‘Lexington’, ‘Sims’ and‘Neosho’, a carrier, destroyer and oil tanker respectively, the Japanese only lost, of consequence, the light carrier ‘Shoho’. The Japanese lost 43 planes in the battle to America’s 33. 

The material losses for America were high, however the battle is viewed as an American victory as the Japanese were stopped from doing what they wanted to do – invading and capturing Port Moresby in New Guinea and thus isolating Australia.

After Coral Sea, Fletcher was with the ‘Yorktown’ at the Battle of Midway fought between June 3rd and June 6th. Planes from the ‘Yorktown’ sank the ‘Soryu’.
It was at Midway that the ‘USS Yorktown’ was sunk – hit by bombs and torpedoes from planes from the‘Hiryu’ and finished off by a torpedo attack by a Japanese submarine. The loss of two carriers in quick succession was balanced by the fact that the Japanese lost four carriers at Midway. America could replace her lost carriers– Japan had a much more difficult task in doing so.

In August 1942, Fletcher was given the command of a task force that was to attack Guadalcanal. Guadalcanal was a battle that saw heavy US casualties on the island. After this, Fletcher was given the command of a carrier force, which included the ‘USS Enterprise’, the ‘USS Saratoga’ and the ‘USS Wasp’. This force was badly damaged at the Battle of the Eastern Solomons in August 1942. Fletcher’s critics believed that he had been too cautious in his tactics.

Between December 1943and 1945, Fletcher was "banished", being placed in command of US Naval Forces in the North Pacific Area. On the surrender of Japan, after the atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Fletcher was put in charge of northern Japan (Hokkaido) and oversaw the occupation there. After World War Two, he served as Chairman on the General Board of the Navy until his retirement in May 1947.

Fletcher's papers were lost in combat, and he refused to reconstruct them from the naval archives. Fletcher also declined to be interviewed by the influential official Navy historian, Samuel Elliott Morrison. So Morrison got his nose out of joint and ignored Fletcher's contributions in his published works, and later historians have picked up on this and followed Morrison's lead.

As a commander Fletcher is generally perceived as a cautious commander of the "old guard". Uninspired but careful is how I would describe him. His "demotion" to the northern pacific reflects what his performance during the crucial battles that he commanded were viewed. There is little doubt, however that his poor relationship with Morison did not help his post war record.


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## Francis marliere (Nov 26, 2012)

"I think hius service record and lack of success did that"

With respect, I do not share your views on Fletcher's "lack of success". He fought the battle of Coral Sea and won (even he Lexington was lost). He fought the battle of Midway and won decisively. He fought the battle of Eastern Solomon and won. He was responsible for the loss of 6 Japanese carriers. I think nobody could have done better.

Best,

Francis Marliere


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## VBF-13 (Nov 26, 2012)

I'm feeling like a young boy who just tried on his first pair of long pants. Crow, I see what you're saying, and I wasn't aware of any of that. Pars, that's one good synopsis of the criticism. It's what I needed to hear. Needless to say, I'll thank you gentlemen both for the much better understanding I have.


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## VBF-13 (Nov 26, 2012)

Francis marliere said:


> "I think hius service record and lack of success did that"
> 
> With respect, I do not share your views on Fletcher's "lack of success". He fought the battle of Coral Sea and won (even he Lexington was lost). He fought the battle of Midway and won decisively. He fought the battle of Eastern Solomon and won. He was responsible for the loss of 6 Japanese carriers. I think nobody could have done better.
> 
> ...


Francis, this is how I see it. Let's start at the beginning. Pearl. What was that about? It was about getting our carriers. Midway. What was that about? It was about getting our carriers. In view of that, is it any wonder that, from a strategic standpoint, i.e., a Nimitz standpoint, we're going to want to err on the side of caution? I think not. Now, look at Fletcher. Fletcher, compared to Nimitz, was tactical. He tactically implemented the strategy. That was his job. His tactics had to be within the parameters of the strategy. Thus, he gets the heat. Somebody show me where Nimitz told Fletcher throw caution to the wind in your tactical imperatives, and I'll eat those words.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 26, 2012)

Francis, your summary is what started me down the path of skeptical reconsideration of the case against Fletcher. VB excellent summary of the situation and appropriate caution exercised by Fletcher. 
Pars, 

is this the source of the above summary?

Vice Admiral Frank Fletcher

VB, My advice is to take Pars summary with more than a grain of salt. It is a poor rendering of history aside from the Biographic account of Fletcher which is, at best incomplete, and at worst inaccurate not to mentioned implicitly biased. The Coral Sea A/C loss numbers are grossly in error: 

IJN started the battle with 127 A/C (139 including those that were inoperable) and ended the battle with 52 A/C with only 39 immediately operable. That's a loss of at least 75 A/C to all causes. ~75% of VT, ~50% of VB and VF from the operable numbers including those lost with the Shoho. Remaining IJN strike capability amounted to 13 VB and 8 VT.

In contrast The US lost 56 from all causes and recovered 50 operational A/C (with another 22 inop) at Battle's end. Strike capability rested with 29 VB 8 VT. Despite her wounded condition, Yorktown still packed a more powerful punch than her IJN counterparts. 

Yes material losses were indeed high even if only counting the Lex and the 34 A/C she took to the bottom. 

With respect to incompleteness of the posted Fletcher bio. consider: 

It doesn't state:

Along with Big Mac, He won the medal of honor in 1915 during the US Vera Cruz op, (although at that time it was more of a distinguished service medal).

In 1928 he applied for flight training but was rejected for poor eyesight. (admittedly, a merely interesting side note.)

The above bio does state:

"_In 1939, Fletcher was promoted to Rear Admiral (6th of his 1906 class to be frocked; my note) and given the command of Cruiser Division III, Atlantic Fleet._"

Crudiv III was a pretty inconsequential command. 4 Omaha class Light cruisers. His performance in that role earned him in June 1940 the command of Crudiv 6 with 4 new CAs of the New Orleans Class. In December of 1941 he was to take command of all Scouting Force Cruisers in the Pacific. In other words, every cruiser in the pacific fleet was to be under his command.

"_In late 1941, Fletcher was given the command of the ‘USS Yorktown’, an aircraft carrier. The naval hierarchy in America must have held Fletcher in high regard to give him the command of the ‘USS Yorktown’._"

He wasn't given command of Yorktown. _He was in command of *TF-17 *with Yorktown as the most important component element._

_"Shortly *after these campaigns*, Fletcher was promoted to Vice Admiral and was given the command of Task Force 17, spearheaded by the ‘Yorktown’ for what was to become the Battle of Coral Sea._"

Clearly an error in the time sequence since TF-17 command came December 30, 1942. He was promoted to Vice Admiral on June 26, 1942 after Midway. 

"_After Coral Sea, Fletcher was *with* the ‘Yorktown’ at the Battle of Midway fought between June 3rd and June 6th._ " 

*With?* He was *in command* of *Both* TF-17 and TF-16."

"_In August 1942, Fletcher was given the command of a task force that was to attack Guadalcanal. Guadalcanal was a battle that saw heavy US casualties on the island. After this, Fletcher was given the command of a carrier force, which included the ‘USS Enterprise’, the ‘USS Saratoga’ and the ‘USS Wasp’. This force was badly damaged at the Battle of the Eastern Solomons in August 1942._"

Let's see, at eastern Solomons, one IJN light CV was sunk in exchange for damage to the Enterprise which was back in action by the following October. 

Badly damaged? with no mention of the Ryujo's sinking. Implying he was in command when the USMC suffered heavy casualties? I'd call that biased reporting of history. I would also say this summary is fairly typical of the "shoot-from-the-hip" criticism of Fletcher that has characterized his WW2 service. Who was Fletcher's strongest supporter? Nimitz. who was his biggest detractor? King. 

"Between December 1943 and 1945, Fletcher was "banished", being placed in command of US Naval Forces in the North Pacific Area." 

This is about as accurate as any of the rest of the bio. He was in combat command for roughly 9 months, was personally subjected to enemy bombs three times. Halsey had lasted half that time before exhaustion. He most certainly wasn't '_banished_' anywhere but in the minds of a few critical, but very influential critics. His reassignment took place near the end of November, 1942 in defiance of Nimitz intention to give him back TF-11 with the Sara and send him back to the S. Pacific. From his Alaskan command (HQ on Adak) he waged a long distance bombing campaign against the Japanese Kurile islands, prototyping with long range USN patrol bombers the anticipated, but short-circuited, B-29 Aleutian campaign and northern island invasion of Japan (operation keelblocks). Near the end, Nimitz was planning on sending him 7 escort carriers and 3 CAs 26 DDs to take the allied fight into the Kuriles and northern Japan.


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## parsifal (Nov 26, 2012)

I dont think Fletcher can be given the credit for the loss of anything like 6 IJN carriers. And his bio whilst not great, still illustrates the point. 

Coral Sea was a pyrrhic victory at the time. Only susbequent events delivered or transformed it into a "strategic victory". Moreover, i agree that at the end the USN possessed greater strength than the IJN. generally accepted losses during the battle were 

The US fleet suffered greater losses in the battle. US losses: 

One carrier destroyed, one damaged, one oiler and one destroyer sunk, 66 aircraft lost, and 543 men killed or wounded. 

Japanese losses: 

One small carrier destroyed, one carrier severely damaged, one destroyer and three small naval ships sunk, 77 carrier aircraft lost, and 1074 men killed or wounded. 

(Mitsuo Fuchido and Masataku Okumiya, Midway. The Battle That Doomed Japan, Hutchinson, 1957 pp 116-7.)

The earlier figures are not necessarily wrong, as these losses for both sides include aircraft lost with ships sunkand from all causes, whilst the earlier figures seem to represent a/c lost in actual combat. losses to all causes, including the out of control fires that engulfed the Shokaku after the battle and very nearly sank her seems a bit of a stretch to be attributable to Fletcher. more pertinntly the Japanese losses were more the reult of poor damage control and poor tactical handling rather than any brilliance displayed by Fletcher. .

A large part of the outcome was due to Japanese complacency and failure of naval intelligence – they underestimated the strength of the forces available to the US, believing that it could only provide one carrier instead of two. Thus, they did not assign to the invasion the full strength that was available to them.

The Japanese also made tactical mistakes – they wasted valuable searching hours while attacking a relatively unimportant target, the tanker. They also lost the gamble involved in searching for their targets during the late afternoon, resulting in the loss of irreplaceable combat-experienced air crew.

The Americans had the advantages of knowing what the enemy were planning, due to being able to intercept and decode their secret signals. The Americans had radar that could identify incoming enemy aircraft in time for them to scramble their own fighters into the air to attack them.

The Americans also had luck during their attack – the two Japanese carriers were about twelve kilometres apart and one was covered in cloud, so the US pilots could concentrate on one, free from the protective guns of the other. They destroyed the Shokaku. This meant also that the Shokaku’s planes, when they returned from attacking the US carriers, had to land on the Zuikaku; but that ship was unable to handle the number of planes arriving, and crew had to push landed planes overboard to allow more incoming ones to land. The Japanese lost 45 of the 72 aircraft operational at the outset of battle on 7 May.

The Allies sometimes needed that luck – as some of their weapons were decidedly inferior. The Devastator Torpedo Bomber, for example, had to fly low and slowly for a long period when coming in to release its torpedoes against the enemy, and in doing so became ‘sitting ducks’ for the gunners aboard the target ship. Then, even if the Devastators were able to release their torpedoes, they were likely not to stay on course, or if they did hit, not to explode!

However attributing the victory to Fletchers brilliance as a commander is a stretch supported by nothing other than misplaced loyalty to the man. I would describe his performance as solid, cautious, and uninspired. 


At Midway, Fletchers command was part of a fleet that sank a further 4 Japanese carriers, and irreparably damaged the Japanese offensive capabilities. that needs to be acknowledged. but how much of the tactical handling for that amazing victory can we give to Fletcher. As a senior commander on the sceneone is tempted to say "a lot" , but in fact I think the battle was won in spite of his performance, rather than because of it. And that is despite his greater level of experience in handling the carriers. His staff, particulalry his chielf of operations (whose name I forget) was the main driving force for the crucial decisions that won the battle . He (fletcher) halved the strike capability of one carrier, sending aircraft off on fruitless searches in the wrong direction. I am sure his apologists will argue that was because he was worred about a flanking attack, however on the day of the battle, this was an action that led to very strong disagreements in Fletchers command. Fletcher showed his real absence of talent when, having located the IJN carriers, he resisted (initially) the recommendation to launch immediately. tis despite having the experience to know that he who strikes first usually wins in carrier warfare. Eventually he was persuaded away from waiting (for the return of the recon elements). The foresight of Fletchers staff and not Fletcher was the reason for the excellent tactical handling of the resources and the reason the American achieved first strike during the battle. 

We can look at the other battles, but the point is, battles were fought and won, in spite of Fletcher, not because of him.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 26, 2012)

Fletcher was pitted repeatedly against the most capable carrier airforce in the world, managing to extract the toll that was eventually unbereable for the IJN. He was solid, he had to be cautious; getting 'inspired' almost cost Bull Hasley his career, and US forces many servicemen lives. 
No admiral/marshall/general of ww2 was performing flawlessly every time. Expecting Fletcher to make perfect victories in 1942 is unfair to the man.


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## parsifal (Nov 26, 2012)

great points and well said tomo. I agree, in case there is any doubt. that is not what is being claimed here. The claim is that he was brilliant, and responsible for the loss of no less than 6 japanese flat tops. Baloney.....


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## syscom3 (Nov 26, 2012)

> ... The foresight of Fletchers staff and not Fletcher was the reason for the excellent tactical handling of the resources and the reason the American achieved first strike during the battle.



The mark of a great leader in any endeavor is in their choice of subordinates and his willingness to listen to them.


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## pinsog (Nov 26, 2012)

I wonder how many carriers Fletcher would have lost if his CAP was made up of Hellcat fighters instead of Wildcats? How many Japanese carriers could her have sunk if he had Avenger torpedo bombers with reliable torpedoes escorted by Hellcats instead of Wildcats? He might have have been the greatest fighting admiral in American history. By the time Halsey was fighting later in the war, the experienced Japanese aviators were mostly dead and they were facing Hellcats and Corsairs instead of Wildcats. BIG difference.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 26, 2012)

USN of 1944 vs. IJN of 1942?


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## Shortround6 (Nov 26, 2012)

Fletcher may have been like Jellicoe in WW I. He may not have been able to win the war but he _could_ lose it in a matter of hours. 

Granted the American's have a better potential to stage a come back, but losing one or two MORE carriers BEFORE Midway would have left the Americans in a very vulnerable position. 

I am not saying he was brilliant but husbanding resources at that stage of game may have been a better strategy than taking big gambles.


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## pinsog (Nov 26, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> USN of 1944 vs. IJN of 1942?



Just fast forward the Hellcat and the Avenger, and make sure our torpedoes work(the torpedoes could have been an easy fix, no excuse for unreliable torpedoes) I know it couldnt be done, I'm just pointing out how easy it should be to win when you have superior equipment.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 26, 2012)

parsifal said:


> However attributing the victory to Fletchers brilliance as a commander is a stretch supported by nothing other than misplaced loyalty to the man. _*I would describe his performance as solid, cautious, and uninspired. *_



I can certainly accept that, with the caveat that the circumstances at the time called for some caution. 



parsifal said:


> "The Japanese lost 45 of the 72 aircraft operational at the outset of battle on 7 May."



Your loss accounting here does not match my sources which state that the IJN lost 12 aircraft (10 VT 2 VB) during the 7th's twilight air battle and 24 (12 VF 6 VT) with the sinking of the Shoho. That's a total of 36 aircraft lost on the 7th. 

Then you cite _72 operational aircraft at the battle outset on the 7th_? IJN started the battle with A/C totals on the evening of the 6th as follows: 56 of 58 operational A/C on Shokaku (18 VF, 18 VB 20 VT) while Zuikaku air group had 53 operational of 63 A/C (19 VF, 17 VB 17 VT) for a combined total of 127 A/C operational on the morning of the 7th. 

Late edit: I think something got deleted in the following in a cut and paste that went awry. not sure what all i wanted to say????

In a classic anvil attack timed with the VB assault, USN TBDs claimed scoring 5 torpedo hits that contributed to sinking the Shoho, perhaps because they were using up the last of the original stock of prewar Mk 13 mod 0's which were reported to be more reliable than the newer issues. That, or perhaps more believable is that this was just a report by overoptimistic USN VT pilots.



parsifal said:


> At Midway, *Fletchers command was part of a fleet* that sank a further 4 Japanese carriers, and irreparably damaged the Japanese offensive capabilities. that needs to be acknowledged. but how much of the tactical handling for that amazing victory can we give to Fletcher. As a senior commander on the sceneone is tempted to say "a lot" , but in fact I think the battle was won in spite of his performance, rather than because of it. He halved the strike capability of one carrier, sending aircraft off on fruitless searches in the wrong direction. I am sure his apologists will argue that was because he was worred about a flanking attack, however on the day of the battle, *this was an action strongly disagreed with by Admiral Brown,* *the real architect of the victory*. it was Brown, thankfully that insisted on sending the remaining strike aircraft off immediately after the Striking Force had been located, _*and not wait for the recovery of those very same aircraft that Fletcher had sent off on a wild goos chase. *_Browns foresight was opposed by guess who. Luckily his more competent shief of staff won that argument....and the rest is history. We can look at the other battles, but the point is, battles were fought and won, in spite of Fletcher, not because of him.



Doesn't the fact that TF-16 and -17 aircraft arrived at over Kido Butai within minutes of each other suggest to you something may be amiss in the description you gave above?

First, whether you realize it or not, you are parroting Bates deeply flawed War College analysis. Bates had an insufficient understand of WW2 carrier ops to render an objective judgements of Fletcher's actions. Who was the war college president when Bates made his report? Spruance. Not that Spruance was overly vain, but I can imagine he would be flattered by a report that cast him in a favorable light especially when there was a strong lobby of officers who had a vested interest in denigrating Fletcher's reputation led by Turner and Towers for two of the most influential.

Why do I say this? check his bio: Admiral Richard Bates Papers 

Spruance proceeded with launch preparations based on Fletcher's command given at 0607: "Proceed southwesterly and attack enemy carriers as soon as definitely located", not on the advice of Browning who did fortunately advise Spruance to wait an hour to launch to shorten the distance to Kido Butai which Fletcher left to Spruance's discretion (Fletcher wasn't a micro-manager). Spruance launched under Browning's untutored (far from brilliant) direction to begin at 0700 as a deferred departure, which entailed a rendezvous over TF-16 of two deck loads of aircraft, the consequences of which were a delay in departure that ultimately fragmented the strike which was released to proceed at 0745 leaving the tardily launched VT-6 TBDs to fend for themselves departing independently at 0806. Fletcher had completed the recovery of his search and 1st CAP by 0645. So just how much time did Fletcher waste waiting for confirmation of phantom CVs which never came? Well, he started turned into the wind at ~0838 to launch of his 17 SBDs and 12 TBDs with 12 escort CAP VF. Launch was completed by 0914. While TF-17 launch may have only been a few minutes faster than TF-16, the biggest difference was in the strike cohesion. TF-17 arrived over the enemy at essentially at the same time. Obviously, waiting to recover the morning search did not delay the launch by 1 minute. Waiting for confirmation of the remaining two carriers was the specific reason for the delay and it cost the US nothing. It did provide the USN forces with a secondary search capability of 10 SBDs that proved critical in finding the last IJN CV. Of course critics of Fletcher recite the litany that he should not have withheld his 17 VS-5 SBDs from the AM strike. They maintain these would certainly have taken out the Hiryu before it hit the Yorktown. Maybe. Many pilots didn't even see the 4th carrier and those in VS-5 might have also piled on Soryu before realizing another IJN CV was lurking on the horizon. That's just what happened to VB VS-6 when McClusky dove on the Kaga, and every SBD in BOTH squadrons piled on. Only Dick Best and two wingmen dove on Akagi, but fortunately for the USN, their aim was impeccable. The reserve SBDs did find the Hiryu and the rest is history. As it was, Yorktown SBDs certainly put down one IJN CV and at worst shared in another.

I think you may be confusing Captain Miles Browning with Adm. Wilson Brown who I believe was occupying a desk in DC at the time of Midway. Browning's eratic performance at Midway almost devastated the Enterprise air wing on the 5th when he came into conflict with the air group commander, the very capable Wade McClusky. Spruance took McClusky's side and all proceeded without incident. Brown, did eventually become an Admiral on his retirement (with Halsey's mentoring which should tell you something) Browning actually WAS indeed removed from command for reason in May 1944 *and banished* to the command and staff college at Leavenworth, Kansas. At least one former shipmate opined "I always knew he'd end up in Leavenworth," meaning the prison and not the college. 

According to Buell, Spruance Biographer, said of Browning, "Browning bungled every aspect of the planning and execution of the second launch (to attack the Hiryu) on the 4th"." He also botched strike planning on the 5th as related above.

Fletcher commanded the entire US fleet at Midway, not just TF-17. Spruance looked to him for orders until the loss of the Yorktown when he deferred to Spruance. From that point on, Spruance commanded. Yorktown's overall performance was superb and exceeded that of the other two US carriers by a comfortable margin, which may be just the result of a more experienced air group and staff or the combination of a sage commander and well run shop and air group. 

To me, to say the battle was won in spite of Fletcher is just plain silly and not supportable by the facts. I believe the victory belonged equally to both admirals who did well, if not perfectly. But once again, here we may just have to agree to disagree. 

Finally FYI: According to Parshall and Tully, Fuchida's book is reported to be considered less than authentic account by the Japanese themselves. domestically 'debunked' is the word they use. from what I understand the debunking was done by veterans of the battle as well as historians. I'd take the time to read Shattered Sword, or Black Shoe before suggesting they are simply apologists revising history.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 26, 2012)

parsifal said:


> great points and well said tomo. I agree, in case there is any doubt. that is not what is being claimed here. The claim is that he was brilliant, and responsible for the loss of no less than 6 japanese flat tops. Baloney.....



Well I certainly didn't mean to claim that Fletcher was brilliant. Or that he was uniquely responsible for the destruction of 6 IJN flattops. If you had asked me whether I meant that I would have said, no. He was however in at least intial command during events that had that result and so, can justifiably claim a share of the credit.


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## parsifal (Nov 26, 2012)

We are not that far from each other in terms of position, I can see. Fletcher certainly got a raw deal in the post war wash up. I dont know if I was quoting Bates, Ive heard of him, but never read him. Saying however that he was "promoted" with his North Pacific assignment, is a real stretch Old Crow. Whether justified or not, whether promised a fleet of CVEs or not, a transfer to the North Pacific after having commanded the only and premier offensive element of the USN for most of 1942, must have left him a bitterly disappointed man. His post war attitudes certainly bear that out.

The USN has been criticised in both the Coral Sea and Midway wash ups as having not pursued the Japanese more aggressively. On both occasions the Japanese were left reeling after the battles, yet managed to escape with most of their forces, to fight another day. i dont know how well founded those criticisms are...in fact I have strong doubts about them, but I also think there was room for the Americans to achieve some greater victory than they did, but that needed an aggressive commander and aggressive tactics....it is significant I think that 2 years later when faced with a similar situation Halsey did not hesitate, ironic that he blew it off Cape Engano. But I think he was reacting to what had happened to Fletcher....castigated by his own peers for timidity, that was a cardinal unforgiveable sin in a service like the USN that marked as its hallmark extreme aggression in its tactical behaviour.

Some of your reply relates to comments i went back and edited....Not sure if it makes a difference to what you want to say, but I thought you might want to know.

Great discussion incidentally


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 26, 2012)

parsifal said:


> We are not that far from each other in terms of position, I can see. Fletcher certainly got a raw deal in the post war wash up. I dont know if I was quoting Bates, Ive heard of him, but never read him.



I agree. I have a copy of Bates, and in looking it over and found a lot of the same points others have subsequently cited. If I get a chance, I'll digitize and post it. It's about 150 pages. ummm, don't know when I'll have a chance to do that.

Wait found it on line:

http://midway1942.org/docs/usn_doc_25.shtml



parsifal said:


> Saying however that he was "promoted" with his North Pacific assignment, is a real stretch Old Crow. Whether justified or not, whether promised a fleet of CVEs or not, a transfer to the North Pacific after having commanded the only and premier offensive element of the USN for most of 1942, must have left him a bitterly disappointed man. His post war attitudes certainly bear that out.



I agree with the foregoing. It must indeed have been a disappointment, but he apparently felt somewhat redeemed when, despite Kings effort to oust him, he had enough high level support to hold on to the assignment and be at the center of the planning for KeelBlock in 1944. I also think there is evidence he was truly exhausted by the end of September and appreciated the chance to be off the hot seat for a change. He couldn't then foresee the long term effect of the critical campaign waged mainly by a certain very influential leader who was attempting (in my view) to obscure his own culpability in tragic events (Turner). His campaign, was aided by some jealous pioneer aviators who believed if only they had been in command of the carriers the war would have been over in 6 months. This campaign was largely successful until the early 60's when Fletcher's screen commander, Adm. Poco Smith published his own account with a more balanced (but not uncritical) view of Fletcher's performance. After the war, Fletcher initially attempted to help Bates and Morrison but realized from early drafts what Bates was doing and how Morrison's history was treating him. Rather than fight another personal war for his reputation (without the aid of his papers lost on the Yorktown), he retired peacefully. With the passing of his generation, and the discovery of new informative documents, it may be possible to have an objective view of those events without the emotional drama that attended the survivors who were so heavily involved. Of course that should always be done with caution as your skeptical concerns about _revisionist history_ are certainly justified.



parsifal said:


> The USN has been criticised in both the Coral Sea and Midway wash ups as having not pursued the Japanese more aggressively. On both occasions the Japanese were left reeling after the battles, yet managed to escape with most of their forces, to fight another day. i dont know how well founded those criticisms are...in fact I have strong doubts about them, but I also think there was room for the Americans to achieve some greater victory than they did, but that needed an aggressive commander and aggressive tactics....it is significant I think that 2 years later when faced with a similar situation Halsey did not hesitate, ironic that he blew it off Cape Engano. But I think he was reacting to what had happened to Fletcher....castigated by his own peers for timidity, that was a cardinal unforgiveable sin in a service like the USN that marked as its hallmark extreme aggression in its tactical behaviour.



These are really good points. The story that I've heard tell is that Spruance was heavily criticized after Midway for his failure to pursue. other say, that's exactly what Yamamoto wanted: a night time surface engagement where his big guns could be brought to bear. Beyond that, heading west would have brought the USN units into the range of Wake aerial coverage. I have also heard that at that time in the war the USN did not have an effective armor penetrating bomb and so its HE explosives were unlikely to have much effect on the IJN heavies. The two surviving CVs certainly retained an effective punch but I think the pilots were wearing out. I think Spruance preserved the victory by remaining cautious. I also agree that Halsey was prompted to his actions at Engano by the over-aggressive entreaties of the naval aviation community as well as his own inclinations. In general, I believe it was God's grace that Fletcher, Fitch and Spruance were in command of the USN CV forces during the first 8 months of the war. If Halsey had been in command, I suspect the result might have been very different and not necessarily better. Despite the Pearl Harbor attack, I don't believe the USN really understood how good the IJN was until after Coral Sea, Midway and the events around Guadalcanal. It was a very dangerous proposition to be recklessly aggressive around the IJN. The thing is, the US didn't need to be recklessly aggressive while the IJN had to be to some extent. The USN just needed to survive long enough for the country's industrial capacity to more than make up losses. 



parsifal said:


> Some of your reply relates to comments i went back and edited....Not sure if it makes a difference to what you want to say, but I thought you might want to know.
> 
> Great discussion incidentally


  is there an smiley face icon for intellectually exhausted? I think we just refought the first year of WW2. Wore me out.


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## Francis marliere (Nov 27, 2012)

Parsifal,

I respect your point of view but don't share it. Your sentence "We can look at the other battles, but the point is, battles were fought and won, in spite of Fletcher, not because of him." is exactly what Fletcher answered when he was asked if he was in command at Midway (something like : I don't know who was in command but I know who would if we had lost). I guess that we can can write that for every commander of every battle (Scott at Cape Esperance, Montgomery at El Alamein, Wellington at Waterloo, ... choose the commander you want to shoot). 
I am sorry but have no time to answer in lenght. I just suggest that you read Lundstrom and make up your own mind.

Best regards,

Francis Marliere


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 27, 2012)

It seems to me many military leaders from that period were forced into a rigorous curriculum of learn to fight or die. Even those touted as the best made ghastly (more or less) mistakes for which they might have been pilloried. Nagumo at PH and MacArthur in the PI in 41, Yamamoto at Midway and Turner at Savo Island in 42, Halsey at Engano in 44. Clark during the entire Italian campaign in 43. Ike in North Africa in 42. (I am not sure of the details of some of these so don't call me to account for disrespecting your favorite leader) The thing is, they all made significant contributions to their cause as well as mistakes in pursuing them. Some were the subject of hagiographies others were cast as goats. What was the real difference? Was it just good PR in the case of the former? or did some leaders so outshine others that we elevate them to the cloud heights. I think there was a broad spectrum of performance from incompetent to brilliant. In the case of Fletcher, I believe he was unjustly labeled as incompetent. I think Pars' word 'solid' is a fair description. he didn't lose the farm during a difficult period. Nuff said. On to a new and captivating thread I hope. But not quite so much. I have to get some work done and you guys are just too much fun to hang out with. Can you imagine if we were all in a room with a couple of cases of beer. _Kirin Ichiban_ for me. Although some say its _Fosters_ for Australian beer, Mate... Pars, If I get to Oz, I'll buy a round for us.

Don't know if Rommel ever made a mistake.(attacking Patton?  ) I've read books but so long ago I can't remember.


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## VBF-13 (Nov 27, 2012)

Not so fast. We hadn't yet considered the big question, namely, what shape would we be in had they got our carriers? One would think, in other words, before one goes calling an admiral yellow, in effect, for erring on the side of protecting his carriers, one would have some kind of grasp on the import of his rationale. Have any of these critics ever seriously considered that question? Maybe, had they, they'd have been forced to have softened up some. Leave that question dark, though, and criticize away, what the hell? The Japanese had tried twice to get our carriers, both in rather elaborate surprise attacks. They evidently had a grasp on the import of the rationale. I'm not hearing any of these critics ever having so much as even considered that question. Convenient for them, sure. Nonetheless, hmmm...


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 27, 2012)

VB, I think there was an abiding belief (somewhat alluded to by Pars) that the brown shoe navy could handle anything the IJN threw at them and come out as winners simply by being the more aggressive. I'll stick my neck out here and say, Santa Cruz was the result of that perspective. Even though Kincaid, a black shoe admiral, was in local command, his decisions were motivated by Halsey. Kincaid carried out Halsey's prime directive expressed in his terse pre-battle command: Attack! repeat Attack! I can't help but wonder if the US had used Henderson's few planes (12 VF, 11 VB and 6 P-39/P-400) more smartly or perhaps staged CV air groups out of the unsinkable landbase which was the prime objective of the battle whether the CV battle might have gone a bit differently. The USN was up against 4 flight decks and Henderson might have mitigated the odds somewhat. The US abundance of PBYs seemed to give it a recon edge which turned out ot be ineffective on the 26th AFAIK. 

To me, the real problem at Santa Cruz was more the abysmal way the USN radar directed Enterprise CAP battle played out. It was as though the USN had learned nothing from the previous three battles and the continuous swapping of escorts ships exacted a heavy coordination penalty. However the bottom line was the IJN's first team was still superb and, given half a chance, was going to draw blood.


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## VBF-13 (Nov 27, 2012)

The Battle of Santa Cruz Island is good support for that theory, Crow, that much I believe. At McDonald's, and have to get back to work. I shall return, though.


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## parsifal (Nov 27, 2012)

Just a bit of changed perspective. As a warame playtester, designer and player (these are not arcade shoot em ups....they usually take 6-8 people at least 200 hours playing time each to complete) I have played a number of simulations of the Pacific War, as both the Japanese and the Allies. There was one game, SPIs grand daddy of em all, "War In The Pacific" (WITP). Its very much the old style of simulation, eight map sections, 500 small scale atoll battle maps, about 5000 counters, scales are each counter represents an individual ship down to destroyer escort (and below that you have multiple ships per counter). Merchant Shipping is represented at 1 counter per 20000 tons. Battalion level ground units. Aircraft are represented at ba scale of 5 aircraft per "unit" (actually pointsd). Each unit of time is a week, consiting of three impulses (about 2 days per impulse) but for carrier battles (and surface battles) the game system uses "telescoping" such that each unit of time can be as short as 5 minuts of battle. This is to maximise the detailing and accuracy as much as possible. There is not too much abstraction...you even get to drive PTs and lay mines 

Calling these things "games" is a misnomer. They are really "simulations", and are sometimes used at military colleges to demonstrate military operations. Sandhurst, for example uses a sim by the famous Richard Berg called "Campaign For North Africa" which is even more detailed (to the point really that as a"game" it is really unplayable).

There have been many games of WITP. Mostly for fun, occasionaly to examine operations as part of a course. A game will usually run for 6 months to a year, and is a great way to learn some basic operations techniques. 


Ive participated in many of these events, both as a "friendly" event, and in competition. Yes there are other weirdos just like me. For WITP, the USN cannot lose (in a historical sense), even if it loses every carrier in its pre-war inventory. However the way the game victory system works, if the USN or IJN does lose too much material, the players win or lose "on points so to speak".

As the USN I found it verydifficult at the start, ironically because pilots were in short supply, and shipping too scarce to put the forces forward that were needed to effectively defend the forward positions. However, barring a one sided defeat of the USN it was usually possible to start inching back the front lines by the latter part of 1942. The IJN usually did better than it does historically. Few times are there any "Midway" style defeats. Even without a defeat like this, however, the very things that bedevil the US at the beginning start to hurt the IJN for the same reasons. They simply cannot produce the pilots they need, and they dont have the shipping to build an effective forward defence network. A "Midway" style of victory for the Americans is rare in the game, but even when it happens, its doesnt make much difference to the timing or outcome of the US counteroffensive. Perhaps an artifical elemen t of the game, but losing badly and being forced back early does allow the Japanese to initiate Kamikazes, and unless the US defences are very tight, these attacks can be devastating....


However, if the Japanese come out or achieve a one sided victory or victories in 1942, this does slow down, but does not stop, the US counteroffensive, usually by up to a year. In Game terms that usually means the Japanesde will win (the assumption I guess being that they get their negotiated peace).

If the US players use their carriers carefully, they can usually avoid these sorts of one sided defeats, but its anything but easy. For the Japanese, the cardinal rule is "keep your carriers together, or in support of each other"


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## parsifal (Nov 27, 2012)

> Don't know if Rommel ever made a mistake.(attacking Patton? ) I've read books but so long ago I can't remember.




Rommel made some monumental stuff ups, most significantly his failure to return air assets to Kesselring after tobruk. Yet he is rightly seen as perhaps thje best land commander of the war for either side. 

Determining whether a commander was "inspired" or "outstanding" as opposed to "solid" or "competent", or "poo" or ""incompetent" can be a subjective excercise. Fletcher is no diferent. I dont see Fletcher in the nsame calibre as Mitscher or Ozawa, Nelson or Cunningham. I see him as having similarities to Jellicoe. I see him as better than Nagumo but not to the extent that he could be seen as "brilliant". I think it was possible for him to have done more, but as you rightly point out, that could be seen as wisdom after the fact. Fletcher fought in those battles and didnt lose the farm, he also bloodied the nose of his opponents. Perhaps we should keep that in mind I guess.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 27, 2012)

I've been interested in AI type simulations for some time. Tried a number of 'games' to see how well they duplicated carrier operations. SSG Carriers at War I II had too many unrealistic flaws but some interesting features but was totally unrealistic. I wasn't terribly impressed by the graphics or user interface. I tried another, whose name I can't remember, although graphics and UI were a bit better it ran very slowly and frequently crashed. Most recently I obtained a copy of HPS Naval Campaigns: Midway and Guadalcanal. These were altogether better but once I got used to the operation, and figured out the game 'features,' by which I mean those quirks in the game that once revealed make it difficult to lose it wasn't as interesting. Also, there was only a bit of randomization of the initial conditions and variables and subsequent movement by the AI. A human running the opposition would have made it far more interesting. Some of the parameter settings like radar ranges were wrong and that was just irritating. It was pretty good as I recall for simulating the launch, arming and recovery cycle. I do believe some of these hypothetical scenarios will be able to be explored with advanced AIs some day.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 28, 2012)

Hope I am not violating a forum policy by posting these website: I have no connection with this company but their game/simulations seem to possess the best fidelity I''ve seen to date: 

HPS Simulations:* Sea Lion

HPS Simulations: Guadalcanal

I had great fun beating the IJN at Savo Island. Of course, I made sure the radar coverage was adequate and began firing as max radar range, just beyond the range of the Long Lance. Both of which are a-historic in virtually every surface battle fought at Guadalcanal. In actuality, According to Hornfischer and Frank, even the USN BB Washington was just inside the range of the Long Lance on November 14, but was undetected during the crucial moments when she first opened up and later when firing on Kirishima. Also many of the Long Lances that were fired appeared to malfunction which contributed to the USN's rather ugly victory that night. Properly used RADAR should have been a game changer for surface forces, but ship and force commanders who knew how to use it properly were rare (almost vanishingly so).


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## davparlr (Nov 28, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> I think Fletcher suffered more than most from the post-mortems of armchair admirals. At least that's the impression I get. I assume you landed at NAFEC, near Atlantic City? Bader Field would be kind of small for a 141.  Glad you and your crew made it ok. I assume if Dover and McGuire were socked in, then probably Warminster and Willow Grove were also but they also probably had no ILS. They'd have been a hell of a lot closer than Otis!
> 
> I flew into Bader in a 150 for my last cross-country solo for my license 40+ years ago. Just found out it closed 6 years ago.
> 
> Didn't know that about Bismarck!


 
Landing at Atlantic City was a whole new adventure. I had a plane load of civilians and rowdy Navy types just getting out of the Navy from Naval Station Rota (Spain). Atlantic city had no customs and, of course, the Aircraft Commander, me, had customs responsibility for everyone on board. I learned early in my flying career not to depend on Operations for any help. The best route was to decide for yourself what needed to be done and tell ops what you were going to do. They almost always agreed as they never wanted responsibility.


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## VBF-13 (Nov 28, 2012)

davparlr said:


> Landing at Atlantic City was a whole new adventure. I had a plane load of civilians and rowdy Navy types just getting out of the Navy from Naval Station Rota (Spain). Atlantic city had no customs and, of course, the Aircraft Commander, me, had customs responsibility for everyone on board. I learned early in my flying career not to depend on Operations for any help. The best route was to decide for yourself what needed to be done and tell ops what you were going to do. They almost always agreed as they never wanted responsibility.


As a trans-Atlantic flight that aircraft must have needed some runway. What aircraft was that?


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## parsifal (Nov 28, 2012)

I confess ive not played those particular games, and am unlikley to, since i rfuse to play many competer games and games that rely on AI as an opponent.

Computer games have their advantages. they allow a player to get really detsailed and close up to the action. they are relatively cheap, and usually reasonably quick to play. And you dont need military training to play most of them, so they do appeal to wider, usually younger audience, though their is nothing wrong with us old guys having a bash.

Some computer games are dedicated grognard pleasers and do do a reasonable job on the Command and Control interface. A very old, but still good example might be the "Harpoon" series, which was based on the USN "Seatag" training system. I dont think it sold because it was complex, had no AI and had no real graphic other than the position maps, though later versions did get a little more visual. 

The main problems with Computer based sims is that they are not usually designed by service personnel, and try to allow the players to be all things. Usually you can be the Admiral, the president, the Kaiser, a pilot, supply officer and any number of other things all at the same time. Consequently, player control over what is happening in the gamne is far too detailed, and the result, whilst enjoyable, is anything but relaistic. 

This is why the best sims for grand strategic sims are not usually computer sims. An operational level boardgmae will abstract the actual combat, but this is actually a better way of managing the probleme,, because it actually decreases the ability of the player to micro-manage battles or campaigns way beyond what anything that was historically possible. Krigspiel wargames can be set up and designed so that "player cheats" can be avoided almost to the point of not being a serious factor. most people dont l;ike a professional sim, because it does not allow them to mess about with things like radar, or which side of the Bridge the lookouts are posted. These events are randomized or abstracted. Depending on the battle, or the situation, the player takes the position of more or less a specific role, usually the surface commander. Really high quality sims can sometimes allow a single player to adopt muti-positional roles in the command system, but creates effective firewalls so that a player cant fudge things because he knows or controls too much.

These sorts of "semi-professional" sims are not common, and are not usually popular. Most people are not serious about wanting to learn the trade, and really have unrealistic and elevated self imagaes when it comes to their belief in their own command capabilities. When they are confronted by their own frailties and shortcomings, exposed by the game, they usually get very grumpy and accuse the game of being 'unrealistic" or "biased". In fact most of thse higher level games are doing a far better job than the arcade style shoot em ups that can be bought for $50-100 at K-Mart. 

The best commercially available simulation on the Pacific war that I know of is the Decision Games "War In The Pacific. With the expansion kits and revised naval combat system (which we dont use....we use our own design, which we think is better anyway), it will set you back about $650. Not cheap. Neither, will you have direct control over the minutae of battles, as you are set in the seat of cvommand, not tactical management. But the results of this sim are far more accurate, and as a result in the end, far more rewarding 

War in the Pacific (second edition) | Board Game | BoardGameGeek


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## davparlr (Nov 28, 2012)

VBF-13 said:


> As a trans-Atlantic flight that aircraft must have needed some runway. What aircraft was that?


I'm not sure of the question but I was flying a C-141 into McGuire AFB, NJ, from Rota Naval Station, Spain.


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## VBF-13 (Nov 28, 2012)

davparlr said:


> I'm not sure of the question but I was flying a C-141 into McGuire AFB, NJ, from Rota Naval Station, Spain.


I just got curious what you landed there. In your first post I was envisioning a smaller aircraft as I don't think you mentioned it was a trans-Atlantic flight.


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## davparlr (Nov 28, 2012)

VBF-13 said:


> I just got curious what you landed there. In your first post I was envisioning a smaller aircraft as I don't think you mentioned it was a trans-Atlantic flight.


Sorry for being confusing.


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## davparlr (Nov 28, 2012)

In my opinion the US Navy was on the edge of a precipice in 1942, faced with a naval juggernaut that was rolling across the Pacific, an enemy that was more powerful, better trained (certainly in night fighting), tough, and better experienced. In order for the Navy to have survived as a fighting force and accomplice the things they did, they needed and got, critical and timely intelligence, although most intelligence, including airborne reports were often flawed, an appropriate balance of aggression and caution, adequate equipment, and brave and capable crews, and importantly, as is true with many encounters, an appropriate application of luck. 

To be critical of operations that was so successful with so little forces without standing aboard the command ship looking at only a few pieces of giant jigsaw puzzle and knowing that just over the horizon could be a piece that you missed that could destroy you, and in doing so open the entire Pacific Ocean to enemy activity is, in my mind, somewhat egotistical (I am not applying this to forum posters). I also find it interesting that Fletcher was castigated and regulated to Northern Pacific forces because of his caution while only a few years later an “aggressive” Halsey was only one uncharacteristically timid Japanese Admiral away from a disastrous invasion force defeat and possible court martial for dereliction of duty, and Halsey later became the Admiral of the Navy. There is a vague point were aggressive behavior turns from victory to defeat as Banastre Tarleton learned at Cowpens, and many other examples. Except for breaking the Japanese code and acting on it, I am not sure there was anything particularly brilliant during this period, but their certainly was competent fighting and leadership.

My thoughts to the all US and Australian Navy officers and men, and all the forces that helped, who held the Pacific line 1942, you stood brave and tall against a powerful force. Thanks for a job well done in a back burner war.


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## VBF-13 (Nov 28, 2012)

You know, it's one thing to understand we'd be in bad shape had we lost our carriers, at that point, and quite another thing to appreciate the significance of same. I think Nimitz had a grasp on the latter. I think Fletcher did, too. As far as Fletcher's critics go, I'll say it, again, I think that's their blind spot. And, yet, they criticize his decisions, that's his whole rationale for same, and they let that alone. What does that say? 

Again, the Japanese appreciated it, though, didn't they?


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## tomo pauk (Nov 28, 2012)

Well put, David. Fletcher's 'fate' resembles Dowding's - great men to be so easily removed from their posts after a job well done.


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## parsifal (Nov 28, 2012)

I was thinking after all this discussion of Fletcher, that perhaps we should start a separate thread "Best or most competent admiral of WWII" I dont think we have ever done that. Maybe a poll. Anyone we would want to nominate. I can think of a few...Donitz, Spruance, Mitscher, Ozawa, Tanaka, Cunningham, Fraser, are a few that come to mind


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## tomo pauk (Nov 28, 2012)

Those people do deserve their own thread.


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## Francis marliere (Nov 29, 2012)

Parsifal,

if you are interested in tactical naval wargames, I suggest that you have a look at Seekrieg 5 which is an excellent game for small size surface actions. Command at Sea is good also. It is easier to manage but does not have the same level of detail than SK5. CaS is better suited for bigger battles such has the Battle of Calabria or carrier battles of the Pacific.

Best,

Francis Marliere


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## oldcrowcv63 (Nov 29, 2012)

parsifal said:


> I confess ive not played those particular games, and am unlikley to, since i rfuse to play many competer games and games that rely on AI as an opponent.



I only play the AI to learn the game operation in anticipation of playing online or to check for fidelity of the play wrt to what I take to be reality. Of course it's occasionally a somewhat more challenging game of solitaire. HPS campaigns do have a LAN and online capability. 



parsifal said:


> Computer games have their advantages. they allow a player to get really detsailed and close up to the action. they are relatively cheap, and usually reasonably quick to play. And you dont need military training to play most of them, so they do appeal to wider, usually younger audience, though their is nothing wrong with us old guys having a bash.
> 
> Some computer games are dedicated grognard pleasers and do do a reasonable job on the Command and Control interface. A very old, but still good example might be the "Harpoon" series, which was based on the USN "Seatag" training system. I dont think it sold because it was complex, had no AI and had no real graphic other than the position maps, though later versions did get a little more visual.



I've seen and heard of Harpoon but never played. We discussed Seatag once before in comparison or contrast to the ENWGS (Enhanced Naval War Gaming System). To the best of my recollection, while SEATAG is said to be a product of the NWC, I'd never heard of it before you mentioned it. I suspect it was used in courses on war gaming but not extensively in the War Gaming department to which I was attached for much of my 8 year affiliation with the NWC reserve unit. Lot's of folks playing harpoon there though.

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/different-strategy-early-se-asian-campaign-33024-4.html, post 49. 

AKAIK, ENWGS has no historical component. More's the pity, although it would be horribly unwieldy (and expensive) running on 1970-80's platforms. Much more could be and is done today on smaller, more capable and less expensive platforms.

With the War Game department, detachments were frequent to run war games at remote sites including Pearl Harbor, Seoul Korea (Ulchi Focus Lens, in 1995 was done on computers with software that upon reflection was probably SEATAG) or to domestic operational and reserve units. It wasn't a matter of being a game expert; we would simply bring a cook book table top game for the unit to play in accord with NWC curricula. When on active duty, we were frequently assigned as analysts in a number of Global and technical war games which provided the opportunity to meet an interesting variety of foreign officers including the RAN, RAAF and RAF as well as ponder the implications of new technology. Don't remember any names except for one RAF Air Marshall, picked up at Logan airport whose name was Harris. Needless to say, I had to ask the obvious question. It was an interesting car ride as his aide had been a weapon's officer on Land Based Blackburn Buccaneers, which IMHO is the finest aircraft British air industry ever produced, after the Spitfire, Mossy, Vulcan, Lancaster, Tornado and perhaps a few others. 

Ooops digression, I was about to say that Global and a number of others were primarily conference or role-playing games, played by flag officers and their staffs on laptops running excel spread sheets and were, with few exceptions, exercises in logistics. One that was not was a western hemisphere game held at the NWC that cast me in the role of a Carrier Task Force commander defending a set of islands off the isthmus of Panama attacked by a more numerous red carrier force. Channeling Fletcher and Spruance produced victory in the (modern) carrier battle.  A singular moment when reading history produced a professional reward.


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## parsifal (Nov 29, 2012)

Ive set up a new thread, best or most competent Admiral


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## Conslaw (Dec 18, 2012)

The Hellcat was already fast-forwarded as much as possible. The first flying Hellcat used a Wright 2600 engine, and by the time it flew toward the end of June 1942, Grumman and the Navy already knew that it would need the additional power of the Pratt Whitney R-2800. The first R-2800 Hellcat prototype flew in August 1942, and the first production Hellcats were turned out in October 1942. By the Spring 1943, Grumman was turning out Hellcats at a pretty fast clip, and the plane was ready for forward deployment by early summer 1943. The Hellcat had comparatively few teething problems. They got it right the first time. Grumman made intelligent compromises to make the Hellcat amenable to mass production. Grumman's sole plant producing Hellcats produced roughly the same number, over 12,000, as three plants producing Corsairs (Vought, Goodyear and Brewster). It should be noted that while Grumman was turning out these Hellcats, it was turning over production of the TBF and F4F to Eastern Aircraft (General Motors). It was also developing two successors to the Hellcat, the F7F Tigercat and the F8F Bearcat. Even with all of this effort, they still turned out a few seaplanes here and there. If only our aviation industry was as efficient with the F-35.


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## Conslaw (Dec 18, 2012)

(post deleted - duplicate)


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## VBF-13 (Dec 19, 2012)

Conslaw said:


> The Hellcat was already fast-forwarded as much as possible. The first flying Hellcat used a Wright 2600 engine, and by the time it flew toward the end of June 1942, Grumman and the Navy already knew that it would need the additional power of the Pratt Whitney R-2800. The first R-2800 Hellcat prototype flew in August 1942, and the first production Hellcats were turned out in October 1942. By the Spring 1943, Grumman was turning out Hellcats at a pretty fast clip, and the plane was ready for forward deployment by early summer 1943. The Hellcat had comparatively few teething problems. They got it right the first time. Grumman made intelligent compromises to make the Hellcat amenable to mass production. Grumman's sole plant producing Hellcats produced roughly the same number, over 12,000, as three plants producing Corsairs (Vought, Goodyear and Brewster). It should be noted that while Grumman was turning out these Hellcats, it was turning over production of the TBF and F4F to Eastern Aircraft (General Motors). It was also developing two successors to the Hellcat, the F7F Tigercat and the F8F Bearcat. Even with all of this effort, they still turned out a few seaplanes here and there. If only our aviation industry was as efficient with the F-35.


If I can further distill this wonderful summary into just one sentence, it's this. Roosevelt knew, perhaps better than anybody, that when Leroy Grumman gets his teeth into something, he doesn't let go, and he goes after it with everything he's got. All these aircraft manufacturers, for example, employed women, in one role or other. Did you know Grumman even employed women as first-line test pilots on the XF6F? Did you know Bethpage, a non-union plant, even employed the disabled? Grumman "got it," and the efficiency of that plant can be attributed directly to that fact. That's in large part why he got this job, and why this F6F happened as it did. That's the kindergarten version of it.


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## parsifal (Dec 19, 2012)

There are some fascinating engineering and design development stories for both sides. The hellcat is one of them. I would also consider the development of the Zero by Jiro Horikoshi and his team to be as fascinating as those for the Hellcat.

The other great success story in my opinion of that early war period was the development of the Wildcat. In early 1940 it was supposedly operational. In point of fact it was anything but. But gradually and methodically, the design team overcame each of these problems, such that by early 1941 it was an effective type.


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## vinnye (Dec 21, 2012)

It seems to me that the IJN would have won the Battle of Midway if they had changed there codes and not handed the USN the oportunity to ambush them.
I agree that the USN had better aerial recon than the IJN in that area - but the IJN also had submarines out scouting and it was more by bad luck on the IJN's part that they did not locate the US carriers in time.
Once the battle had begun, the USN torpedo bombers pulled the Zero's down to sea level to beat them off - leaving no top cover to disrupt the dive bombers. It was also a stroke of good look for the USN that there attack ended up being disjointed as it was this that allowed the dive bombers to follow a IJN destroyer and hence find the un protected carriers.
Like most battles, it is not always the best prepared or larger force that prevails, sometimes you just have to hope lady luck is on your side. At Midway she smiled on the USN!


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## oldcrowcv63 (Dec 22, 2012)

vinnye said:


> It seems to me that the IJN would have won the Battle of Midway if they had changed there codes and not handed the USN the oportunity to ambush them.
> I agree that the USN had better aerial recon than the IJN in that area - but the IJN also had submarines out scouting and it was more by bad luck on the IJN's part that they did not locate the US carriers in time.
> Once the battle had begun, *the USN torpedo bombers pulled the Zero's down to sea level to beat them off - leaving no top cover to disrupt the dive bombers.* It was also a stroke of good look for the USN that there attack ended up being disjointed as it was this that _*allowed the dive bombers to follow a IJN destroyer *_and hence find the un protected carriers.
> Like most battles, it is not always the best prepared or larger force that prevails, sometimes you just have to hope lady luck is on your side. At Midway she smiled on the USN!



No offense Vinnye, but that's the old long-accepted myth restated. It's been published so many times it's become Canon. The SBDs would have gotten through in any event. Proven time and time again. (perhaps the only possible exception being the Akagi which only attracted three SBDs. The Zero CAP, of which many were pulled down to low altitude by the first two squadrons had ample time to ascend to the dive bomber's altitude, if altitude was the only criteria for an intercept. However, lateral positioning also plays an important role and both USN and IJN aviators were saavy enough to avoid the other's defending CAP if at all possible. The Dive bombers would often stalk their targets from other than the threat axis.

If anyone deserved credit for drawing the ZERO cap down (for however much benefit to the USN it may have done) is Yorktown's VT-5 and Thach's 6 escorting F4F's.

I do agree that changing IJN codes earlier would have posed real problems for the USN which at that time was typically keeping two carriers close to PH. The YKTN had to return to PH for repair but that might not have been expedited had IJN code's been changed much earlier instead of (IIRC) right before the battle.

The Yorktown strike which took out the Soryu didn't follow anything but their preflight orders. They didn't need to find the IJN by following a destroyer. They flew essentially directly to the IJN fleet because they took off later with better intel as to its actual location, IIRC. In this case, I think Fletcher's decision to delay launching his strike for about 30 minutes worked to his benefit.


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## syscom3 (Dec 22, 2012)

I would sum it up this way:

"The IJN had no effective control of their fighters once an attack started. Once multiple attacks developed over a period of time, their defenses would be stretched to the breaking point."

Thats what I understood from "Shattered Sword".


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## vinnye (Dec 22, 2012)

Hey Oldcrowcv63, no offense taken.
I was just repeating what I had seen / heard from documentaries. 
I have recently seen that Thatch and his F4F's were jumped by Zeros - and had to defend themselves rather than attempt to protect the SBD's. 
I was not aware that ther IJN did not have control over their fighters once the attacks began!


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## oldcrowcv63 (Dec 22, 2012)

Fortunately the USN had a big brother in the RN/RAF who taught it something about RADAR directed fighter defense. That technology and its implementation tended to somewhat (occasionally) neutralize the otherwise effective IJN VB and VT attacks. Although, in 1942, with the F4F-4, A-Scope display and without height-finding RADAR, The USN defense remained very porous and suffered at the hands of the very skilled IJN airman. By late 1943, that defensive porosity had diminished significantly with the introduction of the F6F, F4U, PPI scope and height setting RADAR (and of course, the attrition suffered by the IJN's first team aviators). The IJN developed RADAR for early warning but as I understand it, never devised a Fighter direction system to defend its high-value targets. 

USN CAP defensive impermeability endured for the most part until the advent of the massed kamikaze raids which finally overwhelmed it. Although the high-value targets seemed to have faired reasonably well, with some notable exceptions.


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## syscom3 (Dec 22, 2012)

The introduction of an effective combat information center with far more disciplined CAP is what put the USN far ahead of the Japanese. 

The CIC which took its modern form as we know it, wasn't a reality until middle 1943. It integrated most of the concepts and ideas that had been purchased with blood during the battles in 1942.


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## vinnye (Dec 22, 2012)

Sir Hugh Dowding was the man who saw the potential of the developing radar technologies just before the onset of the war. Thank god he did!
Without the development of an integrated air defence system we would have lost the BoB and been put out of the war altogether.
Fortunately the US had the foresight to see that these developments would be of significant benefit to them and learned some valuable lessons from our hard earned expereience as well as that of their own. We both benefited from sharing technologies and strategies as well as intelligence. Long may it remain so!


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## parsifal (Dec 22, 2012)

The code reading efforts were critical to the victory, not during the battle, but before it. without it the USN would not have known the timing of the operation, its target, its disposition and its strength. With the codes broken, and virtually all the main signal traffic being read, it allowed the USN to finally concentrate, and greatly simplified the battle problem for them. Superior CAP is something I am not so sure about, at least in the 1942 engagements.....there were some disadvantages to the US system as well, as the excessive chatter at Santa Cruz well demonstrates. The Japanese used the sytems they did, firstly because they relied on the exceptional pilot skills of their aircrew, which among other things possessed very good pilot discipline (no substitute for directed responses, but a partial offset you might say). Secondly ship to craft communications were at best problematic, given the poor quality communications they possessed. The Japanese had to keep their CAP close by if they wanted to control it, and had to rely on the skill and observational skills of the aircrew themselves, but particulalry the flight leaders. 

The peak performance of the Japanese CAP was probably Phillipine Sea, where just 35 surviving aviators, believed to be the very last of the Pearl veterans, fought off more than 200 USN attackers. In failing light they managed to limit the damage to the loss of just one carrier. Far more damage should have occurred, but a combination of light and exceptionally skilled flying by the Japanese limited it to just one carrier


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## Conslaw (Jan 5, 2013)

vinnye said:


> It seems to me that the IJN would have won the Battle of Midway if they had changed there codes and not handed the USN the oportunity to ambush them.
> I agree that the USN had better aerial recon than the IJN in that area - but the IJN also had submarines out scouting and it was more by bad luck on the IJN's part that they did not locate the US carriers in time.
> Once the battle had begun, the USN torpedo bombers pulled the Zero's down to sea level to beat them off - leaving no top cover to disrupt the dive bombers. It was also a stroke of good look for the USN that there attack ended up being disjointed as it was this that allowed the dive bombers to follow a IJN destroyer and hence find the un protected carriers.
> Like most battles, it is not always the best prepared or larger force that prevails, sometimes you just have to hope lady luck is on your side. At Midway she smiled on the USN!



In proposing this hypothetical, I was in part proposing an alternative universe where the Japanese might have had the opportunity to make other choices, and luck might have gone the other way. As you can tell from the majority of the posts - some great ones, by the way - the majority of the commentators believe it wouldn't have made much difference if the Japanese had delayed another month, changed their codes and brought one or two additional carriers to the fray. The Japanese would have bettered their odds if they would have fought their decisive battle on a more neutral ground, such as the Solomons. Indeed, during the Guadalcanal campaign, in their second shot at American carriers in the Battle of Santa Cruz, the Japanese came close to a decisive victory. Only stellar damage control by the crew of the Enterprise, and superhuman performance by Lt. Robin Lindsay allowed for the crews of 57 aircraft to land safely on the bombed-out deck of the Enterprise. After the battle, the Japanese went home to lick their wounds. The Enterprise stayed in the theater, and its planes (mostly flying from Guadalcanal) contributed to the defeat of Japan's last effort to resupply and reinforce its garrison.


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## Conslaw (Jan 7, 2013)

I hate corporate mission statements, but Leroy Grumman's design philosophy summarizes the strengths of the Hellcat beautifully. 

"Grumman will only build an easily produced, maintained and reliable combat aircraft that can be readily mastered by a 200-hour, war-time pilot trained to fly from a carrier, engage in successful combat, sustain combat damage, return to the carrier, and land his aircraft after dark so that he can be available for combat again the next day."


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## RCAFson (Jan 11, 2013)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> The reference you cite I've already acknowledged. I want to see those that claim the PBYs searching for the IJN on the 3rd and 4th were equipped with ASV type radar (USN: ASB or less likely ASA) I have searched high and low for any reference to PBYs being typically equipped with ASV in June. My understanding based on a long list of books on the subject and web references, is that ASV production began in the spring and only the 4 PBY-5A aircraft brought to Midway from PH specifically for that night action possessed RADAR. All others did not. The only black cat ops referred to in Knott aside from the 4 participating in the Midway night op are those in the Solomons after August and in the SW Pacific.



I was just flipping through an online copy of Campaigns of the Pacific War, when I ran across this passage:


> _With prevailing bad visibility the Aleutians early became an experimental and proving ground for
> airborne search radar. The British ASV equipment, hastily manufactured in the United States, was installed
> in the search planes of Fleet Air Wing Four beginning in March 1942. By the date of the Japanese attack
> on Dutch Harbor all the flying boats of that wing were equipped with it. Assisted by this device, search
> ...

Reactions: Like Like:
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## N4521U (Jan 11, 2013)

What if the British hadn't showed the Japanese how to build a carrier, how to fly off and back on to a carrier deck.
What if the British hadn't passed on secrets of big bombs on small planes.

Pearl Harbor might never have happened, and Midway may never have happened. Singapore may never have happened. etc, etc.


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## meatloaf109 (Jan 11, 2013)

What about Perry forcing his way into Tokiyo?


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## RCAFson (Jan 12, 2013)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> The reference you cite I've already acknowledged. I want to see those that claim the PBYs searching for the IJN on the 3rd and 4th were equipped with ASV type radar (USN: ASB or less likely ASA) I have searched high and low for any reference to PBYs being typically equipped with ASV in June. My understanding based on a long list of books on the subject and web references, is that ASV production began in the spring and only the 4 PBY-5A aircraft brought to Midway from PH specifically for that night action possessed RADAR. All others did not. The only black cat ops referred to in Knott aside from the 4 participating in the Midway night op are those in the Solomons after August and in the SW Pacific.



I was just flipping through an online copy of Campaigns of the Pacific War, when I ran across this passage:


> _With prevailing bad visibility the Aleutians early became an experimental and proving ground for
> airborne search radar. The British ASV equipment, hastily manufactured in the United States, was installed
> in the search planes of Fleet Air Wing Four beginning in March 1942. By the date of the Japanese attack
> on Dutch Harbor all the flying boats of that wing were equipped with it. Assisted by this device, search
> ...



You can read it here, page 85:
HyperWar: USSBS: Campaigns of the Pacific War


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## VBF-13 (Mar 16, 2013)

Does anyone know when the Japanese began their planning for Midway?


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 16, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> I was just flipping through an online copy of Campaigns of the Pacific War, when I ran across this passage:
> 
> 
> You can read it here, page 85:
> HyperWar: USSBS: Campaigns of the Pacific War



Good find RCAFson, Clearly my post overreached with "all PBYs." I don't think it changes the perspective on PBY radar at Midway however. Aleutian flying weather is notoriously bad and airborne RADAR was a palliative to the inherent risks. If I was going to prioritize where to put RADAR by geographic region, I'd equip flying boats on antisub patrols in the North Atlantic, perhaps on PBYs flying Atlantic and North Pacific CONUS coastal waters and on PBY's in the Aleutian area, in roughly that oder and for perhaps slightly different reasons in each. More effective suppression of enemy sub activity in the first two and then a combination of crew and asset safety and threat early warning on a lightly defended theater flank. That's my understanding from references. the first RADAR equipped PBYs were operated in the Atlantic.

there remains the issue of bringing in radar equipped (and maybe more extensively trained?) crews to the island before June 4 to augment the results of the day PBY searches with a night strike. The references to the slow adoption of RADAR by the USN are sparse, but there does seem to be a trail (admittedly thin) of evidence that suggests it was slowest in the central and South Pacific Theater. On the other hand, based on the USN's spotty expertise in its use, it may be that they were equipped with RADAR but the crews didn't know how to use the gear.


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## parsifal (Mar 18, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> Does anyone know when the Japanese began their planning for Midway?



Ugaki first raised the necessity of capturing Midway, as well as Johnston and Palmyra as part of the overall containment strategy in January 1942. However not a lot was done until March and April 1942, as Japanese war strategy began to drift a bit after the completion of the first operational phase. I can only guess, but I get the strong vibe that the Japanese were expecting the US to sue for terms - a completely unrealistic appraisal if ever there was one 

Ukagi initially came up with a plan to invade the Midway, Johnston and Palmyra Islands to act as forward bases for an invasion of Hawaii that would precipitate a decisive battle with the US Navy, and which was still at the heart of Japanese naval strategy. Ukagi's rationale was that Japan had to continue the offensive and not merely consolidate its initial gains, as doing so would hand the initiative over to the Allies who could then build their strength up once again and attack. Such a strategy would not only waste the proven effectiveness and technical efficiency of the Imperial Navy but the strategic advantage gained by the initial operations as well. These proposals were rejected by the Senior Fleet Operations Officer, Captain Kuroshima on the grounds that the United States was unlikely to risk the remainder of their fleet to save the islands in question. He offered an alternative plan to shift the strategic focus to the Indian Ocean and a seizure of Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). Ugaki accepted the criticisms of his own plan and while accepting the alternative put forward by Kuroshima, insisted it have a proviso that it be carried out within the context of a joint Axis offensive and timed to coincide with a German offensive in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. Kuroshimas proposal is interesting and bears some justification for a closer look.... 

What might have been a major strategic opportunity came to nothing, as the Germans offered no proposals for joint operations under the new Tripartite Axis agreement signed on 19 December 1941. Even so, the Combined Fleet continued to explore the possibility with wargames aboard the new battleship Yamato but the plan eventually foundered on Army reluctance to provide additional divisions for the assault on Ceylon. The Navy once again returned to Ukagi's option for a strike towards the Eastern Pacific and modified the plan to overcome Army opposition by dropping the ambitious Hawaii invasion and concentrating on the Aleutian and Midway Islands. The planning was given an extra impetus by the limited attacks by the United States on the Marshall Islands, Rabaul, Wake Island, eastern New Guinea and Marcus Island. From the IJNs perspective, it was important that the Japanese lure the remainder of the US Pacific Fleet to battle around Midway and that the Imperial Navy achieve a strategic victory as Yamamoto believed that Japan could then offer peace to the United States from a position of strength. 

Yammamoto was always conscious of the industrial and manpower resources of the United States and that unless victory could be achieved quickly, Japan would eventually be defeated after a long and costly war. Meanwhile, the Naval General Staff had been reviewing a number of options following the Army's veto of the Ceylon operation. Gradually there emerged the view that operations should be mounted to either occupy those areas of Australia that would most likely to be used as bases for an Allied counterattack, or at the very least, isolate them. As a major amphibious attack and occupation of parts of Australia would require a substantial Army force and likely to suffer another Army veto, the Navy decided to examine the more limited option of isolation and seize the island of Tulagi in the Solomon Islands and Port Moresby on the southeastern coast of New Guinea. Alkl these strategies became part of the "2nd operational Phase" series of planned offensives. Historically each of them was defeated.

Yamamoto added Carrier Division 5 to the naval forces assigned to the operation and inadvertently increased the risks to the Midway operation, as both these carriers were assumed to take part in that operation as well. The Combined Fleet plan was finalised and presented to the Naval General Staff on 2nd April. There followed a great deal of heated debate, but Yamamoto once again played the resignation card as he fervently believed that it was vital to draw the American carriers out into battle and destroy them. If they didn't engage then at least the defensive perimeter had been pushed out to Midway and the western Aleutians. The plan was finally agreed by Rear Admiral Fukudome, the Naval General Staff and IGHQ - the Army happy to pass the plan, as it actually required little in terms of ground forces. While the Combined Fleet and the Naval General Staff debated the details, the Doolittle Raid took place, rapidly bringing discussions to a close. As April turned into May, preparations for the operation gathered pace. 

Wargames were held on the Yamato between the 1st and 4th May to test the plans and explore the post-Midway operations, where it was apparent that what has been termed as 'victory disease' affected almost all levels of the senior staff. Such a mindset had its origins in the psychological view the Japanese had of themselves, their history, the samurai tradition and the belief in the divine righteousness of their cause. Such an attitude had warped the Japanese perceptions of the United States to the point where it was believed that there was really nothing to fear from this weak and decadent opponent, ignoring the immense military, industrial and moral potential of the great power. Therefore it was believed that the Japanese held the undisputed initiative in the up-and-coming operation and that the US carriers would only put to sea after the attack on Midway had begun. 

That they might already be at sea and awaiting the Japanese was never really considered and when it happened to be brought up as a possibility to explore different aspects of the battle, it was dismissed and the results (the carriers Kaga and Akagi being sunk) were overturned. The Japanese began serious preparations for Operations MI and AL towards the end of April when the First Air Fleet returned from operations in the Indian Ocean. However, Nagumo had to accept the results of the Battle of the Coral Sea, which despite the victory trumpeted by the Japanese media had left the Shokaku badly damaged and in need of extensive repairs and the Zuikaku had lost a large percentage of her aircrew and had to wait for replacements.


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## VBF-13 (Mar 18, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Ugaki first raised the necessity of capturing Midway, as well as Johnston and Palmyra as part of the overall containment strategy in January 1942. However not a lot was done until March and April 1942, as Japanese war strategy began to drift a bit after the completion of the first operational phase. I can only guess, but I get the strong vibe that the Japanese were expecting the US to sue for terms - a completely unrealistic appraisal if ever there was one
> 
> Ukagi initially came up with a plan to invade the Midway, Johnston and Palmyra Islands to act as forward bases for an invasion of Hawaii that would precipitate a decisive battle with the US Navy, and which was still at the heart of Japanese naval strategy. Ukagi's rationale was that Japan had to continue the offensive and not merely consolidate its initial gains, as doing so would hand the initiative over to the Allies who could then build their strength up once again and attack. Such a strategy would not only waste the proven effectiveness and technical efficiency of the Imperial Navy but the strategic advantage gained by the initial operations as well. These proposals were rejected by the Senior Fleet Operations Officer, Captain Kuroshima on the grounds that the United States was unlikely to risk the remainder of their fleet to save the islands in question. He offered an alternative plan to shift the strategic focus to the Indian Ocean and a seizure of Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). Ugaki accepted the criticisms of his own plan and while accepting the alternative put forward by Kuroshima, insisted it have a proviso that it be carried out within the context of a joint Axis offensive and timed to coincide with a German offensive in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. Kuroshimas proposal is interesting and bears some justification for a closer look....
> 
> ...


All I asked for was a date. 

Excellent, Pars. Really, I enjoyed this read a lot. I was wondering how Midway integrated into the overall strategy. You sure filled that out. 

Just a footnote. While I'm sure you already know this, Shokaku went on only to go down to a sub, two years later. We got Shoho, though, at Coral Sea. Hence, "Scratch one flattop." That's the carrier that report was referencing. 

Thanks!


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## parsifal (Mar 18, 2013)

You cant answer really with one date. One man - ugaki, is not the IJN, and the persauasion of the IJN was a process taking moths. Planning proper was well under way by March/April, but not really finalised until early to mid May. Choice of targets were for the IJN preferred to be Ceylon, but was torpedoed by the Imperial Army's refusal to co-operate. The IJN also favoured capture or isolation of Australia over the Midway operation, and lastly favoured a full on assault of Hawaii over the shadow boxing of isolation. They were forced into Midway essentially by Army intrasnigence. The Army was committed to a China first strategy which in retrospect could have been postponed for a year or so whilst the Americans were more effectively dealt with. In the end the reault would have been the same, but quite possibly at higher cost.

When we have playtessted this scenario, the best strategy we found for the japanese was to put the offensive in China on hold, or even retreat to the port areas temporarily. Midway was best taken in December 1941, using the returning Carriers from Pearl and the SNLF units in the Marshalls. We would hold off on the Wake assault for some time, but maintain seaplane suveillance into the Hawaiian island using a few LR seaplanes. Isolating wake and starving them out is bait that forces the USN to react. React before they are reading too much signal traffic and before they are ready to take on the IJN head to head....probably about January 1942. Sometimes it worked, sometimes not. But it was very tempting for inexperienced US players to try and mount either an evac or resupply of Wake, and provided the Japanese were ready, they could usually spring a trap for the USN....a kind of Midway in reverse. 

Ther is no way for the Japanese to win outright. Any simulation that tries to show that is very wide of the mark. Japanese wartime strategy after the completion of the 1st op phase must be defensive, that means that by about June, ther are no further big assaults. The Japanese player(s) should be in possession of their outer defence perimeter (which includes Moresby anbd possibly Darwin), and be busily digging in as fast as they can. They have to surrender the initiative and conserve their strength. Carriers at truk, ready to react to either a central or southern thrust by the USN. USN will initially be occupied by re-capture of Midway....its just too much of a potential threat. Normally takes about three months, and that in turn delayes their next move, either in the central pacific or southwest, by about 4 months or so, that is about December.

In the meantime, whilst the fortification of the island bases is proceeding, the Japanese need to restart their offensive into China. They can never win outright here either, but establishing a rail link to IndoChina is a partial solution to what is coming.....the US surface and submarine offensive. Getting some resources from SE Asia to North China by rail reduces the strain on the Japanese merechant fleet, and allows a higher level of logistic support to the forward base areaas, and usually reduces shipping losses to subs 9not always though). That means that greater resources can be used for military construction ...more destroyers and more carriers mostly. 

The big showdown almost always occurs in 1944 in "War In The Pacific". There simply is no stopping the Americans as their skill levels and numbers increase. By 1944 even under the most favoiurable conditions for the Japanese, the Americans will be advancing toward the key areas of Saipan and Truk. The Japanese do have to commit their fleet and air forces to a final forward defence battle around either of these base areas. Hopefully there are more Japanese carriers, better trained aircrews, better land based defences, and less US carriers to contend with, but even with all those advantages, its a difficult battle. Its nearly always necessary to initiate Kamikazes as part of your Saipan/Truk defence (ie somewhat earlier than historical), but usually also the improved preparations for this battle will see roughly 4 US carriers sunk in exchange for 8 japanesde carriers sunk or damaged. after the defeat of the "inner defence perimeter, (which is usually completed by December 1944), the Japanese no longer need or can afford carriers. The idea of the simiulation is simply to last until December 1945, (in which case the japanese players are the winner), if you can delay the destruction of the Saipan/Truk/Hollandia line until December 1944, you usually have the whole game in the bag. 

But of course, you can never rely on your opponent doing exactly as you expect, and often the US Players can pull off some kind of upset. Historically Midway is one such upset. it was rightly described at the time as "the incredible victory" which is a description I believe well deserved.


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## Francis marliere (Mar 19, 2013)

Parsifal, I would not say that the Japanese "were forced into Midway essentially by Army intransigence". I agree that many navy projects (most of them silly IMHO), such as the invasion of Ceylan, Australia or Hawaii were cancelled because the army refused to engage troops and shipping. But as far as I know, the strategy on which both army and navy HQ agreed was to isolate Australia by capturing bases in the South Pacific (from New Guinea to Fidiji). Midway was Yamamoto's own project and was opposed, like Pearl Harbor, by many people in the navy. Yamamoto won the day because of his popularity (he threatened to resign) and because of the Doolittle raid.

Best,

Francis Marliere


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## VBF-13 (Mar 19, 2013)

Francis marliere said:


> Parsifal, I would not say that the Japanese "were forced into Midway essentially by Army intransigence". I agree that many navy projects (most of them silly IMHO), such as the invasion of Ceylan, Australia or Hawaii were cancelled because the army refused to engage troops and shipping. But as far as I know, the strategy on which both army and navy HQ agreed was to isolate Australia by capturing bases in the South Pacific (from New Guinea to Fidiji). Midway was Yamamoto's own project and was opposed, like Pearl Harbor, by many people in the navy. Yamamoto won the day because of his popularity (he threatened to resign) and because of the Doolittle raid.
> 
> Best,
> 
> Francis Marliere


Francis, I think a better way of putting it is, they didn't know what they were doing in Southeast Asia, and it was that indecisiveness that left Midway on the table. If they did know what they were doing in Southeast Asia, what business did they have committing those resources to Midway? They would have hit right back with those resources at Coral Sea. Call it Coral Sea Part II. But it was their temporizing in that area that took that option off the table, and, what were they left with, "in the book?" Midway. What the hell? Let's see what happens. Yamamoto got his way there principally due to that indecisiveness and temporizing. As I'm seeing it, that's the straw that really broke the camel's back. Sitting around debating their policy in Southeast Asia was getting them nowhere quick. Doolittle was but a spark.


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## Conslaw (Mar 23, 2013)

N4521U said:


> What if the British hadn't showed the Japanese how to build a carrier, how to fly off and back on to a carrier deck.
> What if the British hadn't passed on secrets of big bombs on small planes.
> 
> Pearl Harbor might never have happened, and Midway may never have happened. Singapore may never have happened. etc, etc.



If you don't want to argue "what if" scenarios, then don't. This topic is for folks who are in to such things.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Mar 23, 2013)

Conslaw said:


> If you don't want to argue "what if" scenarios, then don't. This topic is for folks who are in to such things.



Way to jump on a guy for a post that is almost 3 months old...


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## Conslaw (Mar 23, 2013)

I was reflecting on Vinnye's post arguing that the Japanese would have won the Battle of Midway if they would have changed their codes and not allowed the US to stage an ambush. If the Japanese would have had the surprise factor at Midway, it is likely that they would have been able to take the atoll with their troops. They also would have had better odds in taking on any American carriers that then came to battle, at least compared to what actually happened.

AFAIK, the scenario that the Japanese wargamers didn't model was the possibility that the Americans would refuse the offer of battle at Midway. The Japanese fleet couldn't stick around at Midway. Once the Kido Butai left, it would have been relatively easy for the Americans to retake Midway Atoll. 

I don't think the Americans would have rushed to battle with their only three operational Pacific carriers if they didn't have surprise and a fortified Midway island in their favor. I'm interested in the opinions of our best and brightest on whether the American Navy would have rushed to fight the Japanese at Midway after they had already taken the island group.


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## barney (Mar 23, 2013)

How Fletcher came into command of the CV's, I suggest, amounted to no more than which commander was available to make a rush supply and reinforcement trip to Wake. That trip was a bust but it wasn't Fletcher's fault, the enemy struck and Fletcher was recalled. Once in the command slot he stayed there and became one of the greatest (uncelebrated) heros in the military history of the United States. 

It was believed that the advent of naval aviation required officers in mid career to be positioned so that they would be able to command air units in the near future. The thinking was that any officer in command of air units must be a pilot in order to understand the needs of aviation. The men who enrolled in this program were taking big chances with their naval careers. Anyway, these officers were known as Johnny come lately's or JCL's. Fletcher himself applied but was turned down due to eyesight. So, it is apparent that many navy men appreciated the importance that naval aviation was about to present in the coming war. 

So, now imagine all these ladies in waiting and a black shoe in command. It wouldn't matter how good Fletcher was at his job, they would not be happy. I'm surprised Fletcher stayed at sea as long as he did. So, yeah, with his glowing war record he needed to be “banished” so that the fly boys could have their day. Both the JLC's and the backers of the JLC program had to oppose Fletcher. 

Fletcher was a sea dog but with his exulted rank he wasn't going to be able to go back to his cruisers. It was up and out. I wish he could have been posted to cruiser flotilla command at Guadalcanal. That would have been interesting.


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## VBF-13 (Mar 23, 2013)

Conslaw said:


> AFAIK, the scenario that the Japanese wargamers didn't model was the possibility that the Americans would refuse the offer of battle at Midway. The Japanese fleet couldn't stick around at Midway. Once the Kido Butai left, it would have been relatively easy for the Americans to retake Midway Atoll.


I'd say, look at the broader picture. That will tell you. Why were they there in June? They were there in June because just a month before they for the first time felt the destructive presence of our carriers. Yamamoto was right, there, wasn't he? Coral Sea got that across to them, didn't it? 

So, OK, our carriers never show up. There are a lot of ways they could go from there, with a taken Midway. Their carrier fleet is intact. Another launch on Pearl. While that possibility looms, we're going to be in Southeast Asia with our carriers? I don't know about that. That carrier fleet is going to meet our carriers at Midway. Yamamoto gets his showdown. I don't think there's any other way it figures.


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## Balljoint (Mar 23, 2013)

parsifal said:


> I can only guess, but I get the strong vibe that the Japanese were expecting the US to sue for terms - a completely unrealistic appraisal if ever there was one



As an aside, wouldn’t this delight Hitler if it had occurred?


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 24, 2013)

With respect to the aggressiveness of the US fleet/command and their willingness to do battle in various scenarios I believe psychology of the USN commanders comes in to play. While both Nimitz and King were aggressive commanders, only Nimitz seemed to appreciate the importance of husbanding his fleet assets and committing them under favorable circumstances. In other words, Nimitz seemed to appreciate the concept of _*a fleet in being *_better than King. I also have the impression King took the IJN assault on PH as a personal affront to his apparent racist perspective (a counterpoint to the IJN's Victory disease that lead, directly or indirectly, to a number of USN debacles). With some of these alternate scenarios I think the real danger to the USN fortunes derives from its leadership. Nimitz like virtually everyone else in the USN was subject to bullying by King, until he establishes his own record of successes and (I assume) a political power base (by about mid to late 1942). One gets the impression (reading Lundstrom's _Black Shoe Admiral_), Nimitz was playing sleight of hand games with King in their correspondence to make King believe he was doing what King wanted when in actuality he was doing something else entirely (e.g. CINCPAC's employment of the Battle ships of Task force 1 thru Midway). King's contempt for the IJN's capability in any area seems to me to be the greatest source of real danger to the survival of the US Pacific fleet until late 1943.


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## davparlr (Mar 24, 2013)

Interesting comments. I don't know a lot about Admiral King but I understand he also had a disdain for the Brits such that he ignored their advice on anti-sub tactics which led to the loss of many US ships on the Eastern seaboard.




oldcrowcv63 said:


> I also have the impression King took the IJN assault on PH as a personal affront to his apparent racist perspective (a counterpoint to the IJN's Victory disease that lead, directly or indirectly, to a number of USN debacles).



I think you meant, with a change of parenthesis, "I also have the impression King took the IJN assault on PH as a personal affront to his apparent racist perspective (a counterpoint to the IJN's Victory disease) that lead, directly or indirectly, to a number of USN debacles.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Mar 24, 2013)

Thanks Dav. Yep that's what I meant. I can't substantiate the ASW story but it wouldn't surprise me to find it true. I have heard/read from a variety of sources regarding his anglophobia, but usually in the context of his fear that "his war" would suffer due to Roosevelt's '_misplaced priorities_' on European victory (His view, not mine). I suspect he probably possessed a broader arrogance that distrusted anything he couldn't directly control, especially the British or other allies with whom he was literally forced to play. He also is reputed to have believed that no one was as smart as he, individually or collectively. It might even be fair to say his contempt for the British was only exceeded by his contempt for the Japanese. I believe he suffers in comparison to either Marshall or Arnold among the US senior military leadership.


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## vinnye (Mar 24, 2013)

Regarding Admiral King, from Wiki :
At the start of US involvement in World War II, blackouts on the U.S. eastern seaboard were not in effect, and commercial ships were not travelling under convoy. King's critics attribute the delay to implement these measures to his Anglophobia, as the convoys and seaboard blackouts were British proposals, and King was supposedly loath to have his much-beloved U.S. Navy adopt any ideas from the Royal Navy. He also refused, until March 1942, the loan of British convoy escorts when the Americans had only a handful of suitable vessels. He was, however, aggressive in driving his destroyer captains to attack U-boats in defense of convoys and in planning counter-measures against German surface raiders, even before the formal declaration of war in December 1941.[35]

Instead of convoys, King had the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard perform regular anti-submarine patrols, but these patrols followed a regular schedule. U-boat commanders learned the schedule, and coordinated their attacks to these schedules. Leaving the lights on in coastal towns back-lit merchant ships to the U-Boats. As a result, there were disastrous shipping losses — two million tons lost in January and February 1942 alone, and urgent pressure applied from both sides of the Atlantic. However, King resisted the use of convoys because he was convinced the Navy lacked sufficient escort vessels to make them effective. The formation of convoys with inadequate escort would also result in increased port-to-port time, giving the enemy concentrated groups of targets rather than single ships proceeding independently. Furthermore, blackouts were a politically sensitive issue – coastal cities resisted, citing the loss of tourism revenue.

Ialso recall reading that when the RN began to operate a Task Force in the Far East - King gave orders for the USN to refuse to help them. Apparently, a lot of USN officers would supply anything they could that the RN wanted - as long as King did not find out!


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 27, 2013)

http://vpnavy.com/vp44_1940.htmlnear the bottom of the page:

Probably a reasonably reliable source: although clearly the PATWING managed to find 4 aircraft that possessed ASV radar and could attempt a night strike on the evening of June 3-4: 

*22 May–Jun 1942:* VP-44 transferred to Midway Island to provide combat patrols, joining Catalinas from VPs 14, 23, 24, 51, 72, 91 and 44. There were 32 PBY-5 and 5A aircraft at Midway awaiting the arrival of the Japanese due to decoded intercepts detailing their plans to attack Midway Island. The aircraft were split into two groups—one operating with 22 aircraft from Sand Island, the other with 10 aircraft operating from Eastern Island. Sector searches were flown out to 700 miles from Midway commencing at 0415 each morning. *The squadrons were handicapped at this stage of the war by the lack of radar on the aircraft. All sightings had to be done by the "Mark I eyeball." *On 3 June, Ensign Jewell H. Reid and his crew were the first to spot the Japanese task force approaching Midway.


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