# Battle of Coral Sea... Action Report: USS Yorktown (CV-5)



## Lucky13 (Feb 9, 2009)

*Battle of Coral Sea
Action Report: USS Yorktown (CV-5)
Captain E. Buckmaster to Admiral Chester A. Nimitz*

CV5/A16-S/(CCR-10-hjs) May 25, 1942. 



From: The Commanding Officer. 
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET. 

Via: The Commander, Task Force SEVENTEEN. 

Subject: Report of Action of Yorktown and Yorktown Air Group on May 8, 1942. 

Reference: (A) Article 874, U.S. Navy Regulations. 

Enclosures: (A) Photographs of Attack on Japanese Carrier on May 8, 1942. 
(B) Diagram of Approximate Disposition and Movements of Forces during Attack of May 8, 1942. 
(C) RADAR Plot of Contacts of May 8, 1942. 
(D) Executive Officer's Report of Action dated May 19, 1942, and addendum dated May 25, 1942. 
(E) Track Chart of U.S.S. Yorktown on May 8, 1942. 
(F) Yorktown Air Defense Doctrine. 
(G) Copy of Information on Damage Control, dated May 20, 1942. 
(H) Copy of War Damage Report, dated May 20, 1942. 
(I) List of Pertinent Dispatches Received and Transmitted by this Vessel on May 8, 1942. 
(J) Photographs of Personnel Burned by Bomb Explosion. 
(K) Diagram of Boiler Feed Line. 


In accordance with the requirements of reference (a), the subject report is forwarded herewith. In order that the submission of this report may not be unduly delayed, it is being forwarded direct to Commander Task Force SEVENTEEN, with a copy to Commander Task Group 17.5, Yorktown's immediate superior in command during the action. 
This report has been compiled from information received from many persons. In an endeavor to give a true picture of these data are given as received without changing them to read exactly alike. For this reason apparent inaccuracies will be found, such as the number of planes attacking, and the number of near bomb misses. 

In the case of the Air Group each pilot and machine gunner was interrogated separately and his story was recorded immediately on his return from the attack. This was done before he had an opportunity to talk with anyone else, and perhaps inadvertently have his story colored by others. The report was then compiled from these records. 

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*NARRATIVE *

*A.* At 0000 (minus 11 zone time) on May 8,1942, this ship was a part of Pacific Fleet Task Force SEVENTEEN commanded by Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, U.S. Navy. The composition of the Task Force was as prescribed in Commander Task Force SEVENTEEN Operation Order Number 9-48 of May 1, 1942. At mid-night the force was on course 180°T, speed 20. It was known that enemy forces were at sea, operating to the northward of this force. 

*B.* At 0116 course was changed to 270. At 0625 Lexington launched scouting group to search for and locate the enemy. At 0800 the ship's position was: Latitude 14°-25S, Longitude 154°-31E. At this time the wind was from 112° T, 19 knots. Sea was smooth, visibility 30 miles. These conditions held with slight variations, throughout the entire day. 

*C.* At 0828 was informed by Lexington that one of her scouting planes had sighted 2 carriers, 4 heavy cruisers, and 3 destroyers; that the position of the scout was unknown, and that Lexington was trying to get radio contact with him. At 0835 intercepted a contact report from a Lexington scouting plane: "Contact- 2 carriers, 4 cruisers, many destroyers bearing 006 - 120 miles, speed 15 at 0820" The position given was from Lexington's "Point Zed." At 0847 a message was received from the Lexington: "Enemy bearing 028°-175 miles." 

*D.* The ship went to General Quarters at 0545 and remained at General Quarters until after dark that evening. The ship control party in the island structure was composed as follows: The Captain at the Conn on the navigation bridge and in the pilot house, assisted by three officers, one checking to see that orders to the engine main control and wheel were carried out, and one on each wing of the bridge outside of the pilot house to assist in reporting the approach of enemy planes and torpedoes. The Navigator was in the Conning Tower with steering, main engine, and whistle controls. The Captain gave his orders regarding rudder and main engines to the Navigator through the Conning Tower slits, duplicating these orders by talker on the J.V. battle telephone circuit. The Executive Officer was in Battle II which, in this ship, is at the after end of the bridge level platform, distance about 120 feet from the pilot house. 
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*E.* The chronological sequence of the major events leading up to, during, and immediately following the action is as follows: 

G.C.T. LWT/LCT 
1355(7th) 0055 Monaghan left formation to proceed on duty assigned. 
1416 0116 Changed fleet course to 270, speed 20. 
1840 0540 Flight Quarters. 
1845 0545 General Quarters. 
1925 0625 Lexington launched search group. 
0655 Sunrise. 
2024-32 0724-32 Launched first Combat Air Patrol and 8 VS Anti-torpedo patrol. 
2032 0732 Changed fleet course to 125, speed 14. 
2100 0800 Position: Latitude 14°-25S, Longitude 154°-31E. 
2120 0820 Lexington plane made contact. 
2147 0847 Contact report received from Lexington: "2 carriers, 4 cruisers, many destroyers bearing 028, distance 175 miles." 
2148 0848 Message received from Commander Air, Rear Admiral A.W. Fitch in Lexington to launch entire group including torpedo planes. The Commanding Officer recommended a change in Point Option so that the fighters, when launched, would have a shorter distance to go to escort VT. Point Option was changed. 
2200-15 0900-15 Launched attack group, armed as follows: 
6 VF - MG's. 
17 VB - 1 - 1000 lb. bomb each. 
7 VS - 1 - 1000 lb. bomb each. 
9 VT - 1 - Torpedo each. 
2208 0908 Rear Admiral A.W. Fitch was designated as Officer in Tactical Command. 
2208-30 0908-30 Lexington launched attack group. 
2223 0923 Set Material Condition Afirm. Changed speed to 23 knots. 
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G.C.T. LWT/LCT 

2230 0930 Changed course to 125. 
2241-43 0941-43 Launched 4 VF - second Combat Air Patrol. 
2244-45 0944-45 Landed first Combat Air Patrol. 
2248 0948 Radar contact, shadower 335, 25 miles. 
2304 1004 Speed 15. 
2307 1007 Changed course to 115. 
2308 1008 Signal was made - Enemy aircraft bearing 060. Drained gasoline system above tanks. 
2315 1015 Shadower shot down by Yorktown VF. 
2330 1030 Changed course to 028. 
2339 1039 Yorktown Attack Group sighted enemy CV on course 020. 
2340 1040 Position was adjusted on Lexington so that she would not be in the sun from Yorktown and interfere with fire against enemy planes coming in out of the sun. 
2355 1055 Radar contact, large group of enemy planes bearing 020 - 68 miles. 
2357 1057 Eased Condition Afirm sufficiently to start ventilation blowers and air ship as air below was becoming very foul. Men standing by any openings. 
2358 1058 Radar bearing of enemy planes 020 - 40 miles. 
2400 1100 Stopped blowers and reset Condition Afirm. 
May 8 
0002-04 1102-04 Launched 4 VF. All serviceable planes are in the air. 
0006 1106 Radar reports large group of enemy planes 20 miles from ship. 
0011 1111 Enemy torpedo planes, distance 15. 
0012 1112 Changed fleet course to 125, speed 20 knots. 
0013 1113 Flank speed, 25 knots.


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## Lucky13 (Feb 9, 2009)

From this point it is impossible to give an accurate chronological record. The quartermaster and Captain's writer on the bridge performed their duties in an excellent manner under fire, but part of the time they were avoiding bomb fragments. 

When the action opened at 1118, the wind was 085, 18 - 20 knots. The sea was smooth, visibility 30 miles. These conditions prevailed during the action. 

Torpedo planes indicated that they would use this ship for a target when about 8,000 to 10,000 yards away. It was evident then that the enemy would engage both carriers simultaneously with VT and dive bombers. No high altitude horizontal bombers appeared. Own SBD anti-torpedo patrol planes made an earnest effort to break up the torpedo attack, but were immediately attacked by escorting VF. Four out of eight planes were lost almost at once. When it was apparent that the attack would get in, A.A., fire was opened at 1118. By this time, the VT had separated into attack groups outside effective range of anything but 5". Three planes dropped torpedoes from the port quarter, followed closely by four on the port beam (this was the direction from which they had come from their own CV.) When the first three torpedoes struck the water, full right rudder was applied, and the engine room given orders for emergency flank speed. About this time the two carriers commenced drawing apart due to maneuvering. The Astoria, Portland, Chester, and four destroyers, Russell, Hammann, Aylwin and probably Dewey remained with this ship and formed a circular AA screen at 2000 yards. Their AA fire was accurate and heavy at the critical times, and they made the enemy planes' approaches difficult. It is not possible to praise too highly the anti-aircraft fire and magnificent ship handling of these cruisers and destroyers. Although an irregular zig zag employing full rudder was used these ships kept excellent station and in an endeavor to protect the carrier made no effort to avoid torpedo attacks. 
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The ship was steadied on a course parallel to the second three torpedoes sufficiently long to allow them to run past the port side close aboard. The planes in these groups had been under continuous fire by all ships in their vicinity. Four were seen shot down from the first group, but three drops were completed. Of the planes which had been on the port beam, one plane was set afire and crashed after dropping torpedo and another dove into the water before dropping. The torpedoes of the first group were not observed close to the ship. 

The remaining VT had rounded the stern about 8000 to 10,000 yards out. The next drop was made on the starboard quarter, the ship being about 90° right of the original course. A left turn was made to present the stern and the ship steadied stern to dropping point. These planes were under heavy fire and dropped well out. Two of their torpedoes were observed to run down the starboard side. One plane crashed. 

One VT made an approach parallel to the starboard side from stern to a point forward of the beam. 5" bursts were kept between him and the ship and he was under heavy 1.1 fire. His speed, with a torpedo aboard was remarkable, appearing to be at least 200 knots. When he turned toward the ship, he was blanketed by all guns and dropped at about 2000 yards but escaped in a violent left chandelle. The ship had been turned right when he turned toward the ship and the torpedo ran across the bow. 

At 1124 the dive bombing attack commenced. All dives were made across the deck generally from port to starboard at first, commencing out of the sun. The point of aim appeared to be mainly the bridge or island structure. All planes were held under heavy fire. The course was changed with hard over rudder, generally under the dive or toward the direction from which it started; only one bomb hit was received. There were six near misses on the starboard side between the bow and the bridge - two very close; one hit at 1127; at least two very near misses on port quarter and two or three on starboard quarter. These latter lifted the ship and raised the screws clear of the water. One of the near misses on the starboard bow touched the edge of the catwalk, just abaft #3 5" gun, and fragments from another near the starboard bow pierced the side in many places above the water line. 

During the latter part of the dive bombing attack, several reports were received of torpedo planes attacking on both quarters and astern. It is believed that some of these reports were made on planes rendezvousing after dropping. 

The bomb hit was on the flight deck, near frame 106, about 23 feet forward of #2 elevator and about 15 feet from the island. Recovered fragments indicate that the bomb was probably a 12" projectile. It pierced the flight deck making a hole about 14" in diameter, which was immediately covered by a metal plate. It went down through #5 Ready Room, the hangar deck, and second deck on an angle toward the starboard side. It then hit a beam and stanchion and angled back to port piercing the third deck. A description of the damage is appended as enclosure (H). 

When this bomb exploded, fire was reported in #9 fireroom. It was later found out that this report was caused by dense smoke, gas fumes and a flareback in the burners due to concussion. All lights were extinguished. Boilers #8 and #9 were secured and, because personnel were being overcome by gasses, firerooms were abandoned. Distant controls were operated to secure blowers. Number 7 boiler was secured by order of the Engineer Officer since, in the existing condition, superheat could not be used. Two condensers were reported salted. To a question by the Commanding Officer as to speed available, Main Control replied 24 knots. When asked if the ship should slow, the answer was, "Hell no! We'll make it!" and at no time did the speed drop below 24 knots until signalled from the bridge.
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G.C.T. LWT/LCT 
0031 1131 Radar out of commission. Attempted to inform Lexington on Fighter Circuit; no answer. Notified Lexington by visual signal and TBS radio. Since Lexington's Fighter Circuit radio transmitter was apparently dead, broadcast to all fighters, "Radar out. Protect the Fleet." 
0033 1133 Steadied on course 250. 
0034 1134 Came right to 035, into the wind. 
0040 1140 Speed 18. About this time the attack was completed although some guns were still firing at planes rendezvousing within range. 
0041 1141 Heard Lexington again on Fighter Circuit. Returned control of fighters to Lexington. 
0041 1141 Landed 1 VF (Lexington plane). 
0050 1150 YE homing transmitter out of commission due to carrying away of upper bearing of antenna shaft. 
0055 1155 Landed 4 VF from Combat Air Patrol. 
0100 1200 Position: Latitude 14°-47S, Longitude 155°-09E. 
0115 1215 Landed 8 VF from Combat Air Patrol. 
0122 1222 Radar back in commission. Notified Lexington. (At 0500, May 9, 1942, the Radar antenna was blown off its base by the wind. On examination it was found that the rivets holding the antenna yoke to its pedestal had been sheared during the action. 
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When this occurred, the Radar yoke had apparently settled back into normal position and, when repairs had been made to the antenna, it continued to function until the wind took it off its pedestal.) 

G.C.T. LWT/LCT 
0130 1230 Launched 3 VF for Combat Air Patrol. 
0131 1231 Landed 1 VF from Combat Air Patrol. Commenced landing attack group. During landing an SBD-3 airplane, Lieutenant(jg) F.B.Moan, U.S.N., pilot, R.J. Hodgens, Sea2c, U.S.N., passenger, hit the island structure in full flight. Flaps would not work and both pilot and passenger had been wounded. They will both recover. This plane had 22 bullet holes in fuel tanks. It was a total wreck and was later pushed over the side. 
0200 1300 Completed landings; took course 060, speed 20, to close Lexington. Throughout the rest of the day, Combat Air Patrols were maintained over the formation. 
0200 1300 Number 7 and 8 boilers back on the main steam line. 
0212 1312 Number 9 boiler back on the main steam line. 
0300 1400 Seven unidentified VT planes heading directly toward the ship on starboard beam, altitude 4,000 feet. Planes were on correct return bearing but did not make recognition signal in answer to 20 challenges. 
0303-04 1403-04 Opened fire on planes for a short time until they were identified as Lexington planes. It was ascertained later that no recognition signal was made because of lack of fuel. 
0310 1410 Directed by Lexington to take over Fighter Director as his Radar was out of commission.


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## Lucky13 (Feb 9, 2009)

G.C.T. LWT/LCT 
0318 1418 Course 200, speed 25. All ships in position except Dewey recovering plane personnel from Yorktown plane which had landed in water ahead of her. Damage to plane during attack prevented landing aboard. 
0325 1425 Lexington reported YE homing transmitter inoperative. 
0330 1430 Set Material Condition Baker. 
0345 1445 Lexington broke Five Flag. Lexington - "There has been a serious explosion." 
It had been known that during the action that the Lexington had sustained two or more torpedo hits and several bomb hits. However, she had appeared to be steaming easily and having no apparent trouble. Smoke seen issuing from Lexington under flight deck. 
Lexington - "This ship needs help." 
Lexington - "Standby." 
0347 1447 Lost all radio communications with Lexington. Took control of all Lexington aircraft radio circuits. 
0435 1535 Commenced landing Lexington planes still in air, 6 VP and 10 SBD's. 
0500 1600 Temporary repairs effected to YE antenna. Changed speed to 20 knots. 
0511 1611 Lexington, "Fire is not under control." 
0522 1622 Lexington seen to be abandoning ship. Cruisers and destroyers picking up personnel in the water. This ship with two cruisers and two destroyers maneuvered in vicinity until sundown. 
0600 1700 Launched 7 VF for Combat Air Patrol. 
0626 1726 Dewey rejoined formation. 
0718 1818 Sunset. 
0720 1820 Landed all aircraft. 
0747 1847 Course 225, speed 14. 
0805 1905 Set Condition of Readiness III.
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G.C.T. LWT/LCT 

2000 Position: Latitude 15°-S, Longitude 155°-22E. 
2027 Rescue ships rejoined formation. 
2037 Course 185, speed 20. 

*DAMAGE INFLICTED ON ENEMY *


*1. By Air Group.*

*A.* One large CV hit with three torpedoes and six 1,000 lb. bombs. (Probable additional hits: 1 torpedo; 3 - 1,000 lb. bombs.) 

*B.*Planes shot down: 
Confirmed 
22 VF, Type 00 and 97. 
3 VB, believed to be type 99 Navy dive bombers. 
1 VT, type 97. 
1 VP, four engine patrol plane, type 97. 
Unconfirmed 
2 VP; 1 VSB. 

*C.*Enemy planes damaged: 
20 VF, Type 00 and 97. 
1 VS, Type 99, Navy dive bomber. 

NOTE: There may be some duplication in planes shot down and planes damaged. 


*2. By AA Gun Fire by Yorktown and Screening Vessels*
Planes observed to crash near Yorktown: 

8 - VT; 5 - VB; 0 - VP. 

It was impossible for personnel of this vessel, all being busily engaged in fighting, to make a definite statement as to the number of enemy planes shot down. It is believed, however, that Yorktown and her Screen shot down at least half the enemy planes which attacked this vessel. 

*AIR*

*1. Air Group *

*A. Task Organization of Air Group.* 
Air Group Commander, Lt.Comdr. Oscar Pederson, USN. 

VT-5 - 9 TBD's - Lt.Comdr. J. Taylor, USN. 
VS-5 - 13 SBD's - Lt.Comdr. W.O. Burch, jr., USN. 
VF-42 - 14 F4F-3's - Lt.Comdr. C.R. Fenton, USN. 
VB-5 - 17 SBD's - Lieut. W.C. Short, jr., USN. 



*Weather. * 
Yorktown was operating to the south of a frontal zone in an area of light haze with one to three tenths cumulus, base 1500 feet and top 6000 feet, visibility was 12 - 17 miles, winds were E. to ESE. 17 - 23 knots. 

At the enemy position, a frontal area, which had been in our vicinity the day before, gave squally weather. The visibility varied from 2 to 15 miles. Winds were ESE, 15 - 20 knots. Cumulus, Alto-cumulus, and Cirrus clouds covered the area. The cloud cover and squally weather aided one CV to avoid attack but it also helped our planes to escape enemy fighters. 


*C. Attack Group.*

At 0828, on May 8, received word that a Lexington scout had made contact with an enemy force consisting of 2 CV's, 4 CA's, and many DD's. At 0847, received message from Lexington stating enemy bearing 028°, distance 175 miles. At 0848 received orders from Commander Air to launch the Attack Group. Commenced launching at 0900, completed launching at 0915. The Attack Group consisted of 6 VF, 7 VS, 17 VB, and 9 VT. The VS and VB planes were armed with Mark 13 - 1,000 lb. bombs, fuses Mark 21 and 23, and the torpedoplanes with Mark 13 Mod. 1 torpedoes set to run at 10 feet. The VS and VB planes, escorted by 2 VF, proceeded toward the contact, climbing to 17,000 feet enroute. The dive bombers sighted the enemy force at about 1032. It consisted of 1 BB (Ise class), 2 CV's, 3 CA's, and 4 CL's or DD's on course 190°, speed 20 knots, disposition as shown in enclosure (B). The weather was unsettled with some rain squalls and a broken lower layer of clouds at 2000 to 3000 feet. 

At 1049 the planes were near the enemy ships and commenced circling waiting for the torpedo planes to arrive and take position for the attack. While the planes were circling 1 CV headed for a large rain squall; the other turned into the wind and commenced launching planes, and some of the ships commenced firing their AA guns. At 1058 the torpedo planes were in position and a coordinated attack by dive bombers and torpedo planes was commenced. The dive bombing attack was made from 17,000 feet, down wind, altitude of release 2,500 feet. The CV maneuvered violently to avoid the attack. It was observed that 6 certain bomb hits, and a probability of 5 more and many near misses were made. The planes encountered considerable AA fire and were attacked by Zero fighters, both in the dive and on the pull out. It was noted that the fighters would attack until the planes joined up, then would desist. The numerous low clouds in the vicinity were used to good advantage to furnish protection when pursued by enemy fighters. In the ensuing action after the attack, VS-5 shot down 4 fighters and damaged 4; VB-5 shot down 7 and damaged 5. The dive bombers were again seriously handicapped by the fogging of their telescopes and windshields; unless the weather is clear, the telescopes and windshields will invariably fog during a dive from high altitude. It is imperative that some action be taken on this as it greatly reduces the bombing efficiency of the SBD's.


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## Lucky13 (Feb 9, 2009)

The Torpedo Squadron proceeded to the contact point and commenced their approach from a SE direction. As the dive bombers commenced the attack the carrier commenced turning to the left and then reversed the turn sharply to the right; it was during this turn that the torpedo planes dropped. The torpedo planes approached in a close echelon of divisions, with the planes in each division in column; on reaching the attack point the planes of the division turned simultaneously towards the CV and from this point on each pilot made an individual run. The AA fire from the CV and other ships was very heavy during the approach and attack. The retirement, to avoid enemy aircraft, was made to the eastward into a large cumulus cloud. Of the nine torpedoes dropped, three or possibly four hit the objective, and three others were seen to make erratic runs. 

The last two pilots of the Torpedo Squadron to attack, stated that the first torpedo struck the port bow and laid it open from the waterline to the flight deck. The second and third torpedoes hit between the bow and the midships section. The area on the port side from the bow aft for about 50 to 100 feet was one mass of flames from the waterline to the flight deck. The flame was exceptionally intense. It looked like that from an acetylene torch, and appeared to be coming from inside the ship. Another small fire was burning at the starboard quarter. When the carrier was last seen, about 15 minutes after the attack, the fires were burning fiercely. It is believed probable that this carrier was so badly damaged that it finally sank. 

It is estimated that the enemy had a Combat Air Patrol of at least 15 to 18 Zero fighters over the two CV's. A major factor in keeping our losses to a minimum was the close proximity of two large cumulus clouds into which our planes flew as soon as they completed their attack. 

The escort fighters for the torpedo planes drove off an attack of six Zero fighters during the approach, 
and permitted the torpedo planes to make their drops unmolested by enemy aircraft. During the attack the escort fighters shot down three Zero fighters and probably one VSB. One enemy VTB was shot down while returning from the attack. The VSB escort fighters were greatly hampered in carrying out their mission by the necessity of conserving fuel, having had to climb to altitude with the bombers. On the return trip, the fighters attacked two enemy dive bombers, one of which gave out a puff of smoke and commenced gliding towards the water, leaving a small trail of vapor. It is not known whether or not this plane crashed. 


*D. Anti-Torpedo Plane Patrol* 
At 0730, on May 8, 1942, on orders of Commander Air, launched 8 SBD's of VS-5 to form an Anti-Torpedo Plane Patrol. This patrol attempted to intercept the enemy torpedo planes, but they were too fast for them as the VT planes were making their diving approach when sighted. The patrol was then attacked by a large number of Type 97 and Zero fighters. In the melee that followed, they shot down 4 fighters confirmed, 4 more probable and damaged 7 others. In the engagement, four of the SBD's were shot down by enemy aircraft and the remainder returned badly damaged by enemy fighter gunfire. This was a splendid example of courage and devotion to duty; although outnumbered, and opposed by faster and more maneuverable aircraft, they were not outfought. 


*E. Combat Air Patrol.* 
Fighter Director control was in Lexington. At 0724 launched the first Combat Air Patrol. At 0804 an unidentified plane was picked up on the Radar screen bearing 320°, distance 18 miles. Fighters were vectored out but did not make contact (see enclosure (C)) and it disappeared off the screen at 0811. At 0831, another unidentified plane was picked up coming in from bearing 083°, distance 30 miles. Fighters were vectored out but did not make contact. This plane disappeared off the screen at 15 miles, it is believed that it may have been a friendly plane as it never was picked up going away. At 0941 launched a relief Combat Air Patrol and landed the first group. At 1008 an enemy four engine patrol bomber was sighted by the Yorktown lookouts bearing 040° and flying at a low altitude. A section of Yorktown fighters was vectored out and shot it down. 

Enclosure (C) shows the track of the enemy attack group. The account below is that of how the enemy attack was met by the Combat Air Patrol insofar as it could be compiled from radio logs, Radar Plot, and the accounts of Lexington and Yorktown pilots. At 1055, the Radar screen showed a very large group of enemy planes approaching the formation, bearing 020°, distance 68 miles. At 1059 all planes on Combat Patrol were recalled to the vicinity of the carriers. At 1102 launched four additional VF, making a total of 8 VF from the Yorktown and 9 VF from the Lexington on Combat Air Patrol. The designation of each of the two-plane sections was as follows: 

Lexington - Agnes Red (3 planes) and White, Doris Red and White. 

Yorktown - Wildcat Red, Blue, Orange and Brown. 

At 1102, 5 VF (Agnes Red and White) were vectored out on 020°, distance 30 miles, Angels 10. Later, Agnes White was told to go low to intercept torpedo planes. Agnes Red made contact with the enemy force about 20 miles out, being 1000 to 2000 feet below the enemy. One of these pilots stated that there were about 50 - 60 planes, stacked in layers extending from about 10,000 to 13,000 feet, approximately one third of them being fighters. At the lowest level were the torpedo planes, then fighters, then dive bombers, then fighters. Agnes Red attacked 

the enemy formation while they were about 15 to 20 miles from the Fleet. Agnes White, as shown from the radio log, attacked torpedo planes at 1116 about 4 to 5 miles from the Fleet. At 1108, 4 VF (Wildcat Red and Blue) were vectored out on 020°, distance 15 miles and Angels 1. Upon reaching this position and not sighting anything, instructions were requested. They were informed by Lexington Fighter Director that the force was being attacked, and were ordered to return, climbing to 10,000 feet. 

They returned after the attack was over, but were able to attack some enemy planes in the vicinity, shooting down one Zero fighter. One of the two remaining Lexington sections (Doris Red) was told to orbit overhead; he climbed to 12,000 feet and attacked the tail end of the enemy formation. Wildcat Brown and Orange were kept over the ship at about 8000 to 10,000 feet. The Orange section was not able to intercept the enemy before they attacked, but did shoot down one Zero fighter, and one dive bomber who had already released his bomb. The Brown section attacked a formation of dive bombers as they commenced their dive, and went down with them, shooting down one dive bomber before it dropped its bomb and another after release. 

A resume of the above shows that only three of the Combat Air Patrol intercepted the enemy prior to delivery of the attack, at about 15 to 20 miles from our carriers. The others were not in position to attack until after the enemy had commenced or finished his attack. The Yorktown Combat Air Patrol shot down 4 Zero fighters and three dive bombers, and damaged 4 fighters and 2 VSB. A Combat Air Patrol and Anti-Torpedo Plane Patrol was maintained for the remainder of the day. 


*F. Lexington Planes.*
Due to the breakdown of the Lexington, the following Lexington planes landed on board this ship:

6 F4F-3's and 13 SBD's. They have been retained on board. 


*G. Summary of Damage Done by Air group.* 
*Damage Inflicted on Enemy.* 


*1.*One large CV damaged, and possibly sunk, by three torpedo hits, six 1000 lb. bomb hits, a probability of three more hits, many near misses, and one additional probable torpedo hit. 

*2.*Shot down the following number of planes: 
22 VF - Type 00 and 97. 
3 VB - Believed to be Type 99 Navy dive bombers. 
1 VP - Four engine patrol plane, Type 97. 
1 VT - Believed to be Type 97.

NOTE: 2 additional fighters and 1 VSB were probably shot down but were not seen to crash. 



*3.*Damaged the following number of planes: 
20 VF - Type 00 and 97. 
1 VB - Type 99, Navy dive bomber.

NOTE: There may be some duplication between the number of planes shot down and the planes damaged. 



*H. Damage Suffered by Air Group.*

*1. Personnel missing in Air Action:*
6 Pilots. 
6 Rear Seat Gunners.


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## Lucky13 (Feb 9, 2009)

*2. Personnel Wounded in Air Action:* 
4 Pilots. 
3 Rear Seat Gunners. 


*3. Planes Missing in Action:* 
2 F4F-3's (Pilots recovered) 
7 SBD's (One pilot and gunner recovered) 


*4. Planes damaged in Action:* 
1 TBD - Bullet hole in right wing.

3 VF - One had about 10 holes in fuselage, five of which passed through the emergency fuel tank and were stopped by the armor. One bullet hole in main fuel tank. One through the vacuum tank and one along left side which hit the instrument panel. This plane will require a major overhaul. 
One had about 30 small caliber hits in tail and fuselage. Required major overhaul. 

One had one small caliber hole in left wing.


18 VSB - One was so badly damaged that it crashed on landing and was a total wreck. 
Three require major overhaul, due to numerous 20MM and 7.7 MM hits. 

The remainder of the planes had anywhere from 1 to 26 hits in the fuselage, empenage, wings, gas tanks, and armor.

*Leak Proof Gas Tanks:* 
A total of 20 self-sealing tanks was hit: 

Three by one hit. 
Eight by two hits. 
Four by three hits. 
Four by four hits. 
One riddled by a direct hit on wing by a 20 MM explosive shell. 

The only tank to develop a leak in the air was the last mentioned, which leaked badly. Two others developed leaks later in the day. 

*Armor.* 

The armor in six planes was struck with one to three small caliber bullets. In no case was the armor pierced.



*I. Ammunition Expended:* 
VS-5 dropped 7 1000 lb. bombs, Mk. 13; fuses Mk. 21 and 23. 
VB-5 dropped 17 1000 lb. bombs, Mk. 13; fuses Mk. 21 and 23. 
VT-5 dropped 9 torpedoes, Mark 13, Mod. 1, set to run at 10 feet. 
Expended 32,610 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition. 
Expended 4,660 rounds of .30 caliber ammunition. 

NOTE: Three torpedoes made erratic runs.




*J. General Comments:* 

*1.* The conduct of the Air Group personnel can not be praised too highly. In the space of five days they made five attacks on enemy forces, three on May 4th, and one each on May 7th and 8th. Despite the many hardships and dangers involved, the pilots and other personnel lost none of their enthusiasm, high morale, or aggressive spirit. Their performance was an outstanding exhibition of courage, determination, and will to victory. 


*2. Enemy Tactics:* 

*A.Ships:*
The enemy ships repeated their tactics of May 4th and 7th. The ships of the formation scattered to obtain plenty of sea room, and attempted to avoid the attack with individual AA fire and violent maneuvers. 

*B. Aircraft:*
The Japanese fighter planes invariably make a high side or high rear approach when attacking our planes. They then try either to get on the tail or pull sharply away to regain altitude for another attack. They seem reluctant to attack a formation of VSB, especially if it has completed its attack and is well closed up. 

*3. Own Fighter Tactics:* 

*A. Against 00 Fighters:* 
The Japanese Zero fighters are equal to the F4F-3's in speed and climbing ability and can outmaneuver them. It is therefore imperative that our fighters maintain an altitude advantage from which they can dive, attack, and zoom back to altitude to launch another attack. 

It is believed that the Zero fighter has neither armor nor self-sealing fuel tanks, nor is it as rugged as our planes. Most pilots were amazed at the quickness with which the Zero fighters caught on fire when given a short burst in a vital area. 

The lesson that impressed itself most on the fighter pilots on May 8th was, "Do not become separated from your formation." The planes that did become separated were so busy maneuvering to get Jap fighters off their tails that they had time for nothing else. The Japanese seem much more eager to attack strays than formations. It can not be repeated too often that planes must stay together and furnish mutual protection, for the stray plane is a lost plane. 


*B. VF Escort for VT:* 
The following method of protecting VT planes during their approach, attack, and retirement is recommended. At least 4 to 8 VF, depending on the opposition expected, should be assigned as escorts. They should take position up sun from, and at least 5000 to 6000 feet above the torpedo planes. From this position they can readily observe any attack coming in and can dive down and break it up before it develops sufficiently to interfere with the VT. It is essential that the escort maintain a good altitude differential otherwise they are helpless in breaking up an attack that starts from above. 


*C. VF Escort for VSB:* 
For the dive bombers, the crucial points in a dive bombing attack are just before the push over, and the short period between the time of pull out and rendezvous. The VF should take position 2000 to 4000 feet above the dive bombers, up sun, where a good view can be had. As the dive bombers approach the push over point, some of the escort fighters should commence a steep spiral descent around the dive path and down to 4000 to 5000 feet to protect the pull out. The number of fighters staying up or going down depends entirely on the situation. It is essential, if maximum protection is to be given, that the fighters know the direction of pull out and rendezvous point. 


*K. Fighter Aircraft:* 
In the engagement of May 8th, the fighter escorts were seriously hampered by their lack of range. It is essential that a long range fighter be provided as escort for Torpedo and Dive Bombing planes. An escort fighter cannot do his best, nor perform his mission successfully if he must worry continuously about his gasoline supply and thus be afraid to use full throttle while engaging the enemy. It is hoped that additional tanks for the F4F-3's will alleviate this situation. 

It is believed that the proportion of fighters to other types assigned to a carrier should be greatly increased. Each carrier should have a minimum of 27 fighters; 36 would be none too many if we are to engage Japanese carriers on equal terms. It seems probable that about 50% of the planes on the Japanese carriers were fighters. The lack of fighters was felt keenly on May 8th, when some 30 to 35 fighters had to be divided up to protect two Attack Groups and two carriers simultaneously. As a consequence, they were outnumbered at both places, and at neither place were they able successfully to accomplish their mission. While the 6 fighters sent in with the Yorktown Attack Group did an excellent job, it is felt that the main factor that prevented heavy losses to our planes was the close proximity of a large number of low cloud formations which afforded ideal coverage after the attack. 

It is estimated that the enemy had 15 to 18 fighters on Combat Air Patrol over his carriers, and about 24 to 30 escorting his attack groups. The above figures are approximations made from pilot estimates. Due to the fact that the Lexington and Yorktown Air Groups attacked at different times, the escort fighters for each group were outnumbered at least 2 to 1. 

It is understood that the VF Squadron on the Yorktown class is to be increased to 27. Two carriers in company, each with this number of planes, will allow enough for both an escort for the attack group and a Combat Air Patrol, but the number on board should not be allowed to fall below 27. The best defense against an air group attack is a vigorous fighter offensive before the attackers are in sight of the carrier. 


*L. Fighter Direction:* 
It is believed that fighters should be vectored out at least 30 miles to meet the enemy, and if no Radar altitude reading is available, and the day be clear with unlimited ceiling, they should be sent out at about 20,000 feet. 

The fighters making the first contact must broadcast immediately the enemy's altitude and the composition of his force. It is imperative that all fighter pilots be indoctrinated to report contacts with enemy planes before attacking; this is of the utmost importance if the enemy group is large.


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## Lucky13 (Feb 9, 2009)

*M. Anti-Torpedo Patrol:* 
Not having sufficient fighters for an Anti-Torpedo Patrol, SBD's were used as an expedient.

The Japanese torpedo planes passed high over this patrol and at such high speed as to preclude interception. 


*N. Torpedo Planes:* 
From the experience gained by VT-5 in the attacks of May 4th, 7th, and 8th, certain factors became apparent insofar as Material, Personnel, and Tactics are concerned: 


*1. Material:* 
As previously stated in the report on the engagement of the 7th, it is essential that a torpedo plane must be fast, have a long range, the ability to dive, and sufficient gun power to defend itself. In connection with this, a torpedo must be developed that can be dropped at high speed and from a height of 200 feet. 


*2. Personnel:* 
Torpedo plane pilots must be given every opportunity to make practice drops against a maneuvering target, and to observe the torpedo run. This will bring out clearly to the pilot: (a) the relative slowness of the torpedo after striking the water, (b) the great amount of lead necessary for a beam or close to beam shot, and (c) the large effect of small errors in target course and speed if torpedo is dropped at long range. The practice of carrying and dropping dummy torpedoes is considered useless and a waste of time except for brand new pilots. 


*3. Tactics:* 
In the recent engagements the Japanese screen has scattered instead of closing in to support the ship being attacked. This is, however, no indication that their screen will not close in on future attacks. Closing-in tactics would be an excellent counter to our system of attack. Due to the slow speed and low altitude of drop required for the Mk. 13 torpedoes, our planes are forced to come in low and slow. In the event that the Japanese change their system and put a heavy cordon of ships around their large vessels, it is doubtful that a successful torpedo attack could be launched by TBD's without the loss of the major part of the squadron. 

In order to inflict the maximum damage on a maneuvering ship it is essential that the torpedo and dive bombing attacks be coordinated so that the dive bombing attack starts just before and continues through the torpedo attack. This has the following advantages: 


*A.* It provides mutual support and forces the enemy to divide his fire. 

*B.* The spray and smoke from close misses will partially obscure the torpedo planes from the target, and the concussion will reduce the accuracy of the AA fire. 
With the present type of torpedo planes it is essential that they be furnished with fighter protection. It is considered that on the attack of May 8th VT-5 would have suffered severe losses from enemy aircraft if the TBD's had been unescorted. While it is understood that TBF's are being provided, and that the present type torpedo is being modified to allow for dropping at higher altitudes and greater speeds, the need for these has been so clearly emphasized by the Battle of the Coral Sea that it is again urgently recommended that immediate steps be taken to replace the TBD's with TBF's.


*O. Torpedoes:* 
In recent operations against enemy forces, VT-5 has had occasion to drop 41 torpedoes; of these, 32 were Mark 13, and 9 were Mark 13 Mod 1. All of the Mark 13 Mod 1 made erratic runs. The reason for this is unknown. They were inspected carefully before use and apparently were in perfect condition. Photograph No. 9 of enclosure (A) shows what may be two erratic torpedo tracks. 


*P. Anti-Aircraft Fire:*
The anti-aircraft fire encountered by the dive bombers has been relatively light; the Japanese ships seem to devote their main efforts against the torpedo planes. 

The Japanese method of scattering when attacked from the air works against them insofar as AA fire is concerned. The ships spread too far apart to furnish mutual support. As a consequence, although the volume of AA fire is large, the range is too great to be effective. This was shown in the torpedo attack on the 8th, when the torpedo planes were subjected to heavy fire from 4 CA's and the CV, yet all planes returned. 


*2. Air Department Activities in the Carrier:* 
The principal activities of the Air Department have been covered in the narrative. 

In order to present a picture of aircraft attrition which may be expected during continuous active operations, the following tabulation of losses incurred during the period 4 - 9 May, 1942, including additions to the strength of the Air Group by aircraft on which repairs had been completed up to May 13, is here included: 


*A.* When orders were received at about 2100, May 3, 1942, that the Yorktown Air Group would attack the enemy at Tulagi on May 4, there were the following aircraft and spares available for operation: 
VB - 15 operative 3 spares (SBD's) 
VF - 17 operative 2 spares (F4F-3's) 
VS - 15 operative 2 spares (SBD's) 
VT - 12 operative 1 spare (TBD's) 



*B.* During the three attacks on Tulagi on May 4, no spares were used. Aircraft were lost or damaged as listed: 
VB - Lost - none. 
Damaged, - no longer serviceable - none. 
Damaged, - 1. Repairs made.

VF - Lost - 2. 
Damaged, - no longer serviceable - none. 
Damaged, - none.

VS - Lost - none. 
Damaged, - no longer serviceable - none. 
Damaged, - 2. Repairs made.

VT - Lost - 1, landed in water. 
Damaged, - no longer serviceable - none. 
Damaged, - 1. Repairs made.




*C.* After repairs during the day and night of May 4, the following aircraft were available: 
VB - 18 operative (SBD's) - no spares. 
VF - 16 operative (F4F-3's) - 1 spare. 
VS - 17 operative (SBD's) - no spares. 
VT - 11 operative (TBD's) - 1 spare. 

*D.* During the period 5 - 6 May, aircraft were damaged as follows: 
VB - none (SBD) 
VF - none (F4F-3) 
VS - none (SBD) 
VT - 1 (TBD) 

*E.* On the morning of May 7, the following aircraft were available: 
VB - 18 operative. 
VF - 17 operative. 
VS - 17 operative. 
VT - 10 operative. 

*F.[/]b During the attack on an enemy carrier and other operations on May 7, aircraft were damaged or lost as follows: 
VB - Lost - 1. 
Damaged, - no longer serviceable - none. 
Damaged, - none.

VF - Lost - 2. 
Damaged, - no longer serviceable - 1. 
Damaged, - 2. Repairs made.

VS - Lost - none. 
Damaged, - no longer serviceable - 2. 
Damaged, - 2. Repairs made.

VT - Lost - none. 
Damaged, - no longer serviceable - 1. 
Damaged, - 3. Repairs made.

G. On the morning of May 8, the following aircraft were available: 
VB - 17 operative. 
VF - 14 operative. 
VS - 15 operative. 
VT - 9 operative. 

H. During the attack on enemy carriers and other operations on May 8, aircraft were damaged or lost as follows: 
VB - Lost - 2. 
Damaged, - no longer serviceable - 4. 
Damaged, - 4. Repairs made.

VF - Lost - 2. 
Damaged, - no longer serviceable - 3. 
Damaged, - 2. Repairs made.

VS - Lost - 5. 
Damaged, - no longer serviceable - 1. 
Damaged, - 4. Repairs made.

VT - Lost - none. 
Damaged, - no longer serviceable - 1. 
Damaged, - 2. Repairs made.

I. The following is a summary of aircraft damaged or lost during the attacks and other operations on 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 May, 1942. 
VB - Lost - 3. 
Damaged, - no longer serviceable - 4. 
Damaged, - 5. Repairs made.

VF - Lost - 6.* 
Damaged, - no longer serviceable - 4. 
Damaged, - 3. Repairs made. 
*Includes 1 VF landed on Lexington.


VS - Lost - 5. 
Damaged, - no longer serviceable - 4. 
Damaged, - 8. Repairs made.

VT - Lost - 1. 
Damaged, - no longer serviceable - 3. 
Damaged, - 6. Repairs made. 

J. Upon completion of attacks on May 8, the following aircraft were available: 
VB - 10 operative. 
VF- 7 operative. 
VS- 5 operative. 
VT - 8 operative. 

K. The losses in percentage of planes is as follows: 
VB - 44.4% losses. 
VF - 63.1% losses. 
VS - 70.6% losses. 
VT - 23.0% losses. 

L. On May 13, upon completion of extensive repairs, engine changes and exchanges, fuel tank changes, surface changes, etc., the following listed aircraft were available: 
VB - 11 operative. 
VF - 9 operative. 
*VS - 8 operative. 
VT - 9 operative. 
*(Plus one in Australia) 

M. In addition to planes listed above, the following Lexington planes landed on board this ship on May 8 while the Lexington was in distress: 
VF - 5. 
*VS - 8. 
*VB - 6. 
* Included are one VS and one VB plane both of which have since been damaged and are no longer serviceable.*


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## Lucky13 (Feb 9, 2009)

*3. Summary of Observations and Comment - Air. *

*A. Bombs and Bomb Fuses.* 

*1.* During both attacks on Japanese carriers 1000 lb. heavy case bombs were carried by all dive bombers, fused with Mark 21 and Mark 23 one-hundredth second fuses. During both attacks aircraft were on the flight deck, and were seen to take off, by the bombing group while awaiting the arrival of the torpedo planes. It is recommended that consideration be given to the launching of a division of bombers, equipped with light case 1000 lb. bombs with Mark 19 fuses, to precede the coordinated attack at highest possible speed, with the objective of rendering the enemy flight deck inoperative; or to arm the first division of the striking force with light case 1000 lb. bombs with instantaneous fuses, with the object of launching a partial attack ahead of the coordinated attack. 

*2.* It is believed that greater effect would be obtained from the 1000 lb. heavy case bomb if a fuse were available which would permit penetration of three to four unarmored decks before detonation. This fuse would be desirable for use against all Japanese vessels except Battleships. It is presumed that the heavy case bomb will not break up during such penetration, and in view of the destructive effect of a 12" projectile as observed in this vessel, it is considered that our bomb with such a fuse would be extremely effective. 

*3.* Pending the development of an AP bomb for dive bombers, it is believed that our present heavy case bombs will destroy any type of ship, other than a heavily armored ship, if given a delayed fuse as recommended above. It is believed also, that either light case bombs with instantaneous fuses or heavy case with one-hundredth second fuses will assist greatly in permitting the relatively unopposed approach of our torpedo planes in case of attack on a heavily armed and armored ship. It is open to question whether or not an AP bomb dropped from a dive bomber will penetrate a heavily armored deck, since the bomb will have a relatively low velocity on impact. It is possible that heavy AP bombs are primarily a weapon of the horizontal bomber. 


*B. Tactics of Enemy Aircraft:* 

*1.* It is apparent that the enemy uses land-based aircraft (four-engine patrol seaplanes) for the majority of his scouting. Based on information available on May 8, 1942, our force is believed to have been located by a four-engine VP who sent MG's until shot down. No other contacts are known to have been sent. 

*2.* The enemy attack group appeared on the Radar screen at a distance of 68 miles and came directly on without changing course or use of evasive tactics of any sort. The group flew in a stack formation consisting of VT, VF, VB and VF, at an altitude between 11,000 to 15,000 feet. The VT group with their VF commenced their high speed glide approach from about 10 miles, the VB continuing on at altitude. The VT attack was completed before the dive bombers commenced their attack. Torpedoes were dropped at high speed (estimated 200 knots) after breaking a 30° glide at varying altitudes of from 150 to 350 feet or higher. Range at dropping 700 to 1000 yards. 

*3.* All dive bombers came in from up sun, and released at extremely low altitudes of from 1000 to 500 feet. The ship at this time was maneuvering with the wind on the port bow. It is possible that the bombers used, as a point of aim, either the bridge or the anti-aircraft control director, since four bombs passed within a few feet of that point and exploded just clear of the ship in the water to starboard. All dives were noted to be relatively shallow, angles varying from 50° to 60°. 

*C. Armor and Self-Sealing Tanks:* 

The effectiveness of the armor and self-sealing tanks in the SBD is all and more than was expected. VTB and VF received relatively few hits. Many VSB planes on being landed aboard were found to be completely riddled. One SBD plane landed with 22 bullet holes in his self-sealing tanks. The armor showed numerous hits including a 20 MM explosive bullet hit. The remainder of this airplane was similarly riddled, and both pilot and passenger had received arm and leg wounds from machine gun bullets. 


*2.* An item of extreme importance was noted in connection with the self-sealing fuel tanks. SBD's with bullet holes in the fuel tanks, when put in the hangar and drained, will not thereafter hold gasoline. Tanks with bullet holes in them must be kept filled. Tanks with several holes in them, when maintained full and in service, did not leak throughout several days' further operation. 

*D. Ship and Air Group Notes:* 

*1.* Flexibility of handling returning planes, with the object of launching repeated attacks rapidly would be increased if a doctrine for diverting planes from one carrier to another for reservicing should be placed in effect. This would be particularly valuable where one of the two carriers operating together is damaged. A further feature could include a signal for all damaged planes to land on one carrier and serviceable planes on another. 

*2.* Shortly after the attack several planes were successfully landed aboard while turning sharply, and with a strong wind (20 to 25 knots) as much as 45° on the bow. 

*G. GUNNERY: 

1. The Gunnery Officer exercised control of the anti-aircraft batteries from "Air Defense" on top of the pilot house. The system of control used departs somewhat from the conventional, and it is considered excellent. A copy of the Air Defense Doctrine is appended herewith as enclosure (F). 

2. At 1118 Japanese torpedo planes were sighted on port beam and quarter at a range of about 7,000 yards. Opened fire immediately with four 5" guns of port battery. About 30 seconds later opened fire with all automatic guns that were able to bear, consisting of three 1.1 mounts, twelve 20 MM guns and four .50 caliber guns. This attack continued until 1121 and apparently consisted of nine planes. Seven were observed to drop torpedoes at distances varying between 500 and 3000 yards. Four of these planes were observed to crash in the water near the ship, but three of the four dropped torpedoes. One was in flames several seconds before the torpedo drop. 
At 1123 another torpedo attack commenced from port beam and quarter with the same guns firing as on the previous attack. This attack continued until 1128 and apparently consisted of nine planes. During this period the ship was changing course radically and the relative bearing of the approach shifted from the port quarter to the starboard quarter. All guns that were able to bear were firing continuously. Nine planes were observed to drop torpedoes during this period but it is believed at least three of these torpedoes were from planes attacking the Lexington. These torpedoes were dropped from ranges varying between 1500 and 4000 yards. Four of these planes were observed to crash in the water near the ship, but three of the four dropped torpedoes. 

At 1128 a dive bomber was sighted diving at the ship from the sun sector on port beam. Four 5" guns, three 1.1 mounts, twelve 20 MM guns and fourteen .50 caliber guns started firing immediately. The diving attack continued from same general direction until 1132 and apparently consisted of 18 planes. Two of these planes were observed to make a dive on Lexington, climb to about 2000 feet and dive on Yorktown. Fourteen planes from the diving attack dropped bombs. There was one direct hit, twelve near misses and one which fell about 300 yards on port beam, from a plane whose wing had been shot off. Five planes from this attack were observed to crash in the water. 

The angle of dive of these planes was about 50° to 60°. Bombs were released at altitudes varying from 500 to 1500 feet. The planes seemed to continue in the dive after releasing the bomb and pulled out close to the water. 

All bombs dropped except two appeared to be of the same size, probably the same type that struck the ship. One near miss on port beam and another near miss on starboard quarter appeared to be about the size of our own 1000 lb. bomb. 

The 5" guns were fired at torpedo planes in automatic, director controlled. Against the dive bombers the intention was to fire in local control with 2 second fuse setting. Two of the four guns remained in automatic and director control because of faulty communications. However, the controlling director was trained on the dive bombers with fuse knob locked at a 2 second fuse. The barrage effect should have been approximately the same in either case. 

The 1.1 mounts opened fire on torpedo planes with sight control using sight angle setting of 1050. The pointers and trainers had been drilled to shift to tracer control when smoke obscured target through the sight, and to lean outward from the pointer's and trainer's seats in order to see around the smoke of gun blasts. This system of firing was used throughout the torpedo attacks. The same method of firing was employed against dive bombers except an initial sight angle setting of 1015 was used. 

The 20 MM guns used sight control throughout the torpedo and diving attacks with a 50 knot lead against torpedo planes and a zero lead against dive bombers. 

The .50 caliber guns used tracer control throughout the attacks, 

A. Ammunition expended during the Combined Torpedo and Diving Attacks was as follows: 
Eight 5"/38 cal. guns 404 rounds. 
Four 1.1 Mounts 2906 rounds. 
Twenty-four 20 MM guns 7900 rounds. 
Eighteen .50 cal. guns 15600 rounds.*


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## Lucky13 (Feb 9, 2009)

*B.* Material Casualties to Armament during Action were as follows: 

*The 5" Battery *

Gun Casualty Action Taken

*1* Plug failed to close. Plug was closed with rawhide mallet. 

*3* Plug failed to close on many shots. Plug was closed with rawhide mallet. 

*5 * Rammer failed to retract completely. Retracted by hand. 
Several firing circuit failures. Fired by percussion. 
The window of deflection dial was broken by gun blast from adjacent gun. Renewed window glass after attack. 
Powder case ruptured by bomb fragments. Thrown overboard. 

*6* Powder case loaded without projectile. Plug opened by hand and gun reloaded. 

*8* Failure of all electrical power to rammer motor on second salvo due to broken fuse on rammer motor panel. Gun was loaded using hand rammer.

The 1.1 Mounts 
Gun Casualty Action Taken

Mt. I Broken recocking lever on #4 gun. Renewed recocking lever after battle. 
Several misfires. Recocked gun and continued firing. 

Mt. II Stoppage due to improperly clipped ammunition. Replaced clip and continued to fire. 
Several misfires. Recocked gun and continued the fire. 

Mt. III Six misfires. Recocked gun and continued the fire. 
Three repeated misfires. Gun was unloaded immediately. 
The breach mechanism locked in rear position. The magazine out-out was forced to "Down" position by leg of first loader. The out-out was released. 

Mt. IV Broken extractor spring. Retracted with screw driver. Replaced breech block and continued firing. 
Broken recocking lever. Recocked by forcing firing out-out to rear with thumb pressure. Continued firing. 
Several misfires. Recocked guns and continued firing. 
Guns jammed when foamite extinguishers were turned on to fight bomb fire and sprayed mount and clips. Cleaned out foamite and continued firing. 

Gun Casualty Action Taken

All Mounts Numerous minor stoppages that were corrected immediately. Necessary action taken. 

The 20 MM Guns 
19 Ruptured cartridge. Renewed barrel and continued firing. 
28 Broken hammer. Renewed hammer and continued firing. 
All Numerous minor stoppages that were corrected immediately. Necessary action taken. 

The .50 Caliber Guns 
All Numerous minor stoppages that were corrected immediately. Necessary action taken. 


*C.* There were a few minor wounds to personnel at gunnery stations from bomb splinters and burns from gun blasts of adjacent guns. In no case was battery performance affected. 
The gunnery personnel functioned smoothly and efficiently on every station. There was no sign of confusion or "Buck Fever." Apparently the only fear among the personnel was a fear that there would not be enough Japanese planes to go around. 


*3.* That this ship came through a concentrated torpedo and bombing attack, receiving only one direct hit, was due in great measure to the accurately directed and smothering volume of gun fire from our screen and our own AA batteries. It would appear to be a conservative estimate that approximately half of the total number of aircraft which attacked this vessel were destroyed in that manner. 

During the operations of the past four months no opportunity has presented itself for conducting formal gunnery practices, and "All Hands" gunnery drills, as such, have been reduced to a minimum. The Gunnery Department has stood continuous condition watches, and the watch has been exercised in the repelling of simulated air attacks several times daily, every possible opportunity being taken to allow guns' crews actually to fire the guns either at balloon targets or on "Burst" practices. These drills contributed greatly toward alertness and toward the building up of the high state of morale and proficiency which were evidenced by the guns' crews in battle. 


*H. ENGINEERING:* 

*1.* The Engineering Department both in material and personnel functioned in an exemplary manner throughout the action. 
The chronological sequence of events in the Engineer Department follows: 

LCT 
0545 General Quarters. Manned all engineering battle stations, all boilers on the line; main steam cross connections closed in superheater firerooms.

0555 Set Condition Afirm.

0600 #1 and #2 main generators paralleled forward, #3 and #4 generators paralleled aft, "Loop" split.

1112 Ahead full speed 20 knots, 183 rpm. Maneuvering to avoid approaching enemy torpedo planes.

1113 Ahead flank speed 25 knots, 231 rpm. 

LCT 
1122 All engines ahead emergency full speed, cut in all burners, opened throttle wide, ship reached speed of over 30 knots, 285 rpm within two minutes. Maneuvering with hard right and hard left rudder during torpedo attack, average speed of all shafts checked at 285 rpm.

1128 Bomb exploded at fourth deck starboard side over forward engine room at frame 107. Main steam lines vibrated excessively for a few seconds then steadied, and held without leaks. Overhead insulation, two 200 watt lamps and reflectors torn loose from sockets, dirt and dust dropped on control platform, starboard side. Salinity indicators #1 and #4 condensers showed 3 grains salt when water carried over from superheater boilers. Salt started to clear within a few minutes - held speed. 
From bomb explosion #7, #8, and #9 firerooms incurred heavy shock and concussion that extinguished fires in #8, and #9, and filled these firerooms with smoke and gas; lighting was out, and crews were forced to abandon firerooms, partially overcome. Fuel oil cutout valves and feed stop check valves were secured in firerooms before vacating. Blowers were secured from remote control station. #9 fireroom erroneously reported fire when crew noted explosive flash pass blower duct. 


1130 Firerooms #8 and #9 secured.

1131 Secured #7 boiler. Speed reduced to 25 knots, 231 rpm. Lost vacuum on #3 generator, #4 generator took over electric load aft. Investigation disclosed stop button on #3 main generator circulating pump was jarred open by shock from explosion.

1135 Paralleled #3 and #4 generators. 

LCT 
During this period main engine control was unable to establish communication with Repair V (Engineering Repair Party). Bomb had passed through and exploded under space in which repair party was stationed, killing 37 men, and wounding and stunning the remainder of this group. All light, power, and I.C. circuits were destroyed in this area. Lieutenant M.E. Ricketts, U.S. Navy, Officer-in-Charge of Party, turned on valve of fire plug, partially led out hose, and directed water into compartment below, where fire was raging, before he died.

1145 Attack completed. Slowed to 20 knots. Boiler repair party investigated superheated firerooms and cleared them of smoke and gas. Reported no damage. Lighted off #7, #8, and #9 boilers.

1245 Cut superheater boilers in on main line. 

*I. COMMUNICATIONS:* 

All communications, both visual and radio, functioned smoothly and uninterruptedly throughout the action. 
The Communication Officer exercised communication control from Air Plot, maintaining communications with the Captain via battle telephone, messenger, and "Talk-Bak" between Air Plot and Pilot House. This departure from the standard system of having the Communication Officer with the Captain is made because it is felt that by having the Communication Officer in Air Plot, in direct supervision of the vital aircraft circuits, he is in a better position to see the development of the air tactical situation and to maintain intelligent control over all external communications than he could be if he were in the Pilot House. 

The following circuits were manned throughout the day: 


1. Task Group Commander's Circuit. 
2. Task Unit Commander's Circuit. 
3. Warning Net. 
4. Yorktown Air Group Search and Attack Circuits. 
5. Lexington Air Group Search and Attack Circuits. 
6. Combat Patrol (Fighter Director) Circuits. 
7. T.B.S. (75.5 Mc) Circuits. 
8. Primary and high frequency Fox Schedules. 
9. Wellington - Suva intercept. 
10. Two circuits on Allied shore based aircraft. 
11. Several circuits on enemy intercepts.


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## Lucky13 (Feb 9, 2009)

All our own aircraft circuits were controlled from Air Plot and were backed up by additional operators in Main Radio. The warning net was manned in Air Plot and had loudspeaker outlets to the Pilot house and the Signal Bridge. The T.B.S. super-frequency circuit was manned in Flag Plot and in the Signal Shelter, and had a receiver manned in Air Plot (Radar Plot). 

To provide emergency communications with aircraft, two aircraft transmitters and receivers, powered from storage batteries, were set up; one in Air Plot and the other in the ex-direction finder station aft on the port side. 

*2.* The principal damage suffered during the battle was the failure of the CXAM Radar due to the breaking loose of antenna elements from frame, and the Radar's complete breakdown later in the day because of the earlier shearing of rivets which hold the antenna yoke down to the pedestal. Until the wind blew the antenna off the pedestal on the morning of May 9, it was not known that this latter casualty had been suffered. 
The only other serious casualty was the putting out of commission of the YE homing transmitter, due to the breaking of the upper bearing of the antenna shaft. This casualty had been given jury-rig repairs by mid-afternoon. 

There were no radio receiver casualties. 

Three receiving antenna on the forward part of the island structure carried away and were repaired immediately. In both transmitter rooms there were frequent openings of relays and inter-locks, and several tubes were jarred out of their sockets due to the shock of bombs, but these were adjusted immediately. 

A tube in the transmitter in use on the Fighter Director circuit failed due to the shock of own gun fire. While repairs were being effected the aircraft transmitter installed in Air Plot was used on this circuit. 

*3.* The super-frequency (T.B.S.) circuit was invaluable for rapid communications in action. Radar reports were broadcast on this circuit and were paralleled by flag hoist. 

*4.* At 1400, as noted in the chronological narrative, seven Lexington VT planes approached the ship in bombing formation, at 4000 feet altitude, on the starboard beam. Although challenged repeatedly they did not make the recognition maneuver. (It was found out later that these planes were almost out of fuel, and their leader felt that he could not afford to waste fuel in maneuvering.) This failure in communications with friendly aircraft which were acting suspiciously, caused them to be fired on by our own guns. They identified themselves by radio, and were identified visually as they turned away.

*J. SUPPLY DEPARTMENT:* 

*1.* In aviation storeroom C-402-A, which was wrecked and flooded as a result of the bomb hit, the following materials in general were destroyed or damaged: 

*A. Plungers and Cylinders for Modifying Arresting Gear.* 
At least 2 cylinders are damaged. All were immersed in salt water. Even if judged fit for use by visual examination, all will require machine shop check to insure that they are so. 


*B. Aviation Expeditionary Gear:* 
A large amount of this is damaged beyond repair. 

*C. New Sound Powered Telephones:* 
Probably all damaged beyond repair. 

*C. Spare Cables and Parts for Arresting Gear and Barrier Catapult Bridles:* 
A large amount damaged beyond repairs. 

*D. Various General Items:* 
Mostly damaged beyond salvage. None require immediate replacement.

*K. MEDICAL DEPARTMENT* 

*1.* During the battle of May 8, casualties sustained on board were as follows: 40 killed, 26 seriously injured, 3 of whom have died since the battle; 40 minor injuries not requiring admission to the sick list; and 1 officially listed as "Missing in Action." 

*2.* When the battle was imminent and the enemy planes approaching 60 miles away, all preparations were made for receiving the injured. All hands at dressing stations were instructed to lie down on the deck, with faces covered, until their services were needed. Added to the regular equipment at the dressing stations were the following time-saving and valuable items: 

A. Tannic acid powder in a gallon jug, with a gallon jug of distilled water for preparing a fresh 5% solution of tannic acid. 
B. "Flit Guns" for spraying burns. 
C. Cocaine in castor-oil for eye burns. 
D. Powdered sulfanilamide. 
E. 300 sterile dressings packed in 1 gallon tin cans. 
F. Wooden ply-wood splints for fractures, 5 feet long and 4 inches wide. 
G. 8 zipper-type stretchers. 
H. Blood plasma. 

The main dressing station in the sick bay was nearest to the scene of the explosion and received the majority of the injured. Almost all of the serious cases brought to the dressing stations had already received ½ grain of morphine; this was indicated by a tag tied to the man's wrist. To expedite the work, definite corpsmen were designated to do definite things, such as preparing the burned surfaces for treatment, spraying with the solution of tannic acid, giving patients water, etc. 

At the main dressing station 17 cases were treated for shock and burns; 4 cases of wounds, multiple; 6 cases of wound, gunshot; 1 compound fracture, left leg, and possible fracture of lumbar vertebra; 1 simple fracture, rt. femur, and gunshot wound; 1 wound, eye; 2 fractures, simple, calcaneus. The fracture cases suffered also from burns. Two cases required surgical operations but as there was no extreme emergency it was decided to delay the operations until after dark when there was less danger of another bombing attack. These operations were performed that night. 

At the other battle dressing stations the following listed numbers of cases were treated: 

*Station:* 
#1 30 cases for minor injuries. 
#2 8 cases, including a splinter wound of the abdomen, and a compound fracture of the leg. 
#4 6 cases of severe burns. 
#5 15 cases, including 7 serious burns and 3 seriously wounded. 
Those seriously burned and otherwise seriously wounded were evacuated to the sick bay as soon as the firing had ceased.

The Junior Medical Officer went to the scene of the explosion but was unable immediately to gain entrance on account of fire and smoke. As soon as he was able to get in he supervised the rescue of those who showed evidence of life. 

*3.* Of the 66 killed and seriously injured all except 14 were severely burned, and the majority of those killed were mutilated. The dead were evacuated to the propeller repair room on the 01 deck, on the stern. Due to the mutilated condition of the bodies, to the fact that we expected to be engaged in battle on the following day, and for reasons of morale, it was decided to bury the dead at sea that night. The work of identifying, finger printing, and preparing the dead for burial at sea was finished at 0200, May 9. Of the 40 dead, 21 were immediately identified by means of identification tags; the tags of the remaining 19 could not be found. 
Funeral services were conducted by the Ship's Chaplain and the burial at sea was completed at 0240. 

*4.* Eight zipper stretchers, designed by Yorktown Senior Medical Officer, and manufactured on board, were used continuously in preference to the Army or Stokes stretcher. These stretchers are light, can be passed through escape hatches easily, and the zipper feature saves time in securing a patient or a body in the stretcher. 

*5.* Most of the injured men were in damage control station #5 where the bomb exploded. They were either sitting or standing on the deck. Those behind a small partition received only minor injuries. One man fully clothed, with a long sleeved jumper, was sitting with his arms folded on his knees and his head resting on his arms, and with trousers rolled up. His only burns were around his ankles. His hair was singed but the skin was not burned. Those that wore jumpers buttoned up, with short sleeves, were burned on the face and arms. Most of the men had on regulation blue chambray shirts with short sleeves, and received second and third degree burns on the arms and face. There were no burns below the waist line except where the trousers were rolled up, or where the skin was not protected by hair. Photographs of men seriously burned, showing the effect of having areas of skin exposed, are appended as enclosure (J). 

*6.* During the battle several of the seriously shocked and wounded men became hysterical. The calm and reassuring attitude of the trained medical personnel had a soothing effect on these injured men.


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## Lucky13 (Feb 9, 2009)

*RECOMMENDATIONS* 

The issue of short sleeved shirts for wear on board ships should be discontinued for the duration of the war. Likewise, the wearing of shorts should be definitely banned in all ships when in a zone of active operations. The uniform, "undershirts" should never be allowed when action is probable. All surface vessels should be provided with light weight flash-proof clothing in sufficient quantities to outfit the entire ship's company. It should be mandatory that these be worn, together with cotton gloves, and with socks pulled up over trouser legs, when action is imminent. 

Repair parties and dressing station personnel should be dispersed as much as possible consistent with their duties, this dispersal to include placing them on various deck levels. When delayed action fuses are employed, explosions are apt to occur in compartments normally occupied by engineering repair parties. 

When men are required to remain at battle stations over long periods of time, as on this occasion during the entire day, it is mandatory that drinking water be available throughout the ship. It is recommended that portable drinking fountains, equipped with hand operated pressure pumps to produce water "fountain", be procured and provided to all ships. 

*3.* DEFICIENCIES 
Deficiencies which appeared or which have made a sore pronounced impression as a result of the action of May 8 are here summarized: 

*A. AIR:* 

*1.* Insufficient number of fighters. In view of the large numbers of fighters in Japanese carriers, and in order that a carrier air group may deliver an attack protected by own fighters, while leaving sufficient fighters with the carrier to protect the force of which he is a part, it is imperative that the fighter complement of carriers be increased immediately to at least 27. Due to the limited availability of carrier deck space, and to simplify administration, it is recommended that all VSB planes be included in one squadron. A suitable and recommended complement of squadrons, pilots and aircraft for the Yorktown type carrier is as follows: 

*a.* Complement pilots VF
27 VSB
27 VT
12

*b.* Spare pilots
Total pilots 6
33 6
33 4
16

*c.* Complement planes 27 27 12

*d.* Spare planes in overhead
Total planes 9
36 9
36 4
16

Grand total planes - 88. 

*e.* After receipt of TBF planes and a certain amount of operating experience it may be deemed advisable to increase the operating allowance of TBF to eighteen.

*2.* All haste should be made in delivery to carrier groups of torpedo planes capable of high speed, long range, ability to dive, and sufficient gun power for their own defense. 

Torpedoes must be capable of being dropped at high speed and from and altitude of at least two hundred feet. 

Torpedoes themselves should be high speed and should be equipped with magnetic exploders if such exploders can withstand the shock of dropping. 

*3.* Means must be developed and incorporated into all dive bombers to prevent fogging of sights and windshields. 

*4.* While the rearming of SBD's with 1,000 pound bombs and machine gun ammunition was accomplished expeditiously, the rearming of planes with torpedoes was entirely too slow. Additional hydraulic lift trucks are essential for more rapid handling of torpedoes. The rearming of fighters is somewhat slow. The doors require about 5 minutes to open. Decrease in the time necessary to rearm the VF is desirable. The rearming of the F4F-3 airplane requires the opening of 78 Dzus fasteners. If the guns are to be inspected an additional 62 fasteners must be opened. 

*5.* No method existed in Yorktown prior to this engagement for putting a CO2 pressure test on the gasoline distribution system after action. 
Such a system has subsequently been installed by ship's force, and it is recommended that a like system be installed in other carriers if not already provided. 

*B. RADAR:*

*1.* The casualty to this vessel's CXAM Radar might have been disastrous had there not been another carrier present whose Radar was still functioning. Although Fighter Direction can be taken over by other Radar equipped vessels, or the carrier can still direct fighters, (with a considerable reduction in effectiveness), by utilizing reports from other Radar equipped vessels, it is obvious that neither of these alternate systems can be as effective as is Fighter Direction from a carrier utilizing own Radar information. It is vital that all carriers be equipped with two search Radars.

*2.* The makeshift Radar plot in this vessel, wherein all functions of Radar Plot are attempted to be accomplished in a corner of Air Plot, again showed itself, during the air attack of May 8, to be woefully inadequate to enable complete use to be made of all the information which the combined Radars of own and other ships are capable of furnishing, or even to use with full effectiveness information which can be furnished by this vessel's one Radar. In order that Radar Plot may properly perform its function it must: 

*A.* Be, in itself, a complete unit. 

*B.* Have sufficient room to allow the Fighter Director and his plotting and communication assistants to perform their functions without mutual interference. 

*C.* Be so isolated as to be relatively free from spectator interference and from noise interference from other activities. Both spectator and noise interference are unacceptably great with Radar installed in a corner of Air Plot. 

*D.* Have its own radio communications, capable of transmitting or receiving on any aircraft circuit, and on a superfrequency circuit with other search Radar equipped vessels and with other Fighter Directors. 

*E.* Be provided with interior communication channels connecting to Signal Bridge, look-outs, Flag, and important ship and fire-control stations. 

*F.* Be contiguous to Air Plot and have means for actual physical, conversational communications with Air Plot. 

*G.* Be provided with plotting facilities sufficient to allow two simultaneous Radar plots to be run: one search plot, and a Fighter Director (tracking) Plot. 

*H.* Have sufficient blackboard and extra chartboard space to allow a complete picture to be maintained of the situation of our own aircraft and of the general and immediate tactical situation. 

It must be recognized that the importance of Radar Plot in carriers is comparable to that of the Plotting Room in battleships. 

It is of the utmost urgency that this vessel be afforded the first available opportunity for alteration of the island structure to provide an adequate Radar Plot served by adequate interior and radio communications. 

*C. COMMUNICATIONS:*

*1.* In order for Fighter Direction to be effective, free use must be made of radio communications between the Fighter Director and the Combat Patrol. In order that the Fighter Director may have complete Radar information at his disposal, it is mandatory that Radar information be supplied him instantly and unreservedly from Radar Plots in other ships as well as from his own Radar. Both these necessities make it vital that there be developed and made available to the Fleet immediately, superfrequency voice radio equipment for use on a Radar information circuit and between the Fighter Director and the Combat Patrol. The aircraft equipment should be capable of reliable communications, both reception and transmission, up to a distance of at least 50 miles, provided the plane is at sufficient altitude. 
Such radio equipment would be extremely useful in all types of ship-based aircraft, (1) for rapid and secure communication with the inner air patrol, (2) to provide an additional means of aircraft identification, and (3) to provide a means of communication which is urgently necessary for the conduct of training exercises at sea. 


*2.* Due to the disabling of Yorktown's YE antenna and, later, to the complete loss of communications in Lexington, there was a period of several hours on May 8, when homing by means of YE was not available to the air groups. 
The delivery of YG homing transmitters to carriers and cruisers should be expedited.


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## Lucky13 (Feb 9, 2009)

*3.* On the night of May 7, 2 enemy carriers were heard communicating with their aircraft in the air by means of high frequency (CW) radio. The aircraft were in the immediate vicinity of this Task Force. It appears probable that the carriers were within 150 miles of our own force but, because of the frequency being used, no bearings could be taken of the transmissions by any vessel of this force. In order to remedy this serious defect in our means of obtaining radio intelligence of the enemy, every effort should be bent toward developing and making available at the earliest moment reliable high-frequency radio direction finders capable of being installed and operated on board ship. 

*4.* The present aircraft recognition system, as set forth in paragraph 5231, PAC 70, is cumbersome, inadequate, and easily compromised. The Fleet System should, while retaining the approach bearing and recognition-by-maneuver feature of PAC 70 for the use of single seat fighters, have incorporated into it the basic principles of the effective British-U.S. system: 

*A.* That the burden of effecting recognition of aircraft is on the aircraft. 

*B.* That, until the recognition of friendly identity of the aircraft is acknowledged by a surface vessel, the aircraft may not come within gun range without subjecting itself to gunfire. 

*C.* That an approaching aircraft should identify itself to the nearest surface war vessel in a disposition. 

*D.* That that vessel, prior to making the signal to an aircraft acknowledging its friendly identity (a come-on signal), must make flag hoist (paralleled by TBS broadcast, if equipped with TBS) notifying all ships present that the aircraft on true bearing _____ is friendly. 

*E.* That aircraft must not, under any circumstances, approach a formation of friendly vessels in a threatening formation or at a threatening altitude. 

All aircraft except single-seat fighters should be equipped with effective Aldis lamps, and it is recommended that all aircraft be provided with Mark VII (smoke) recognition signals for use in an emergency, also that the use of these signals be incorporated into the aircraft recognition system.

*D. ENGINEERING:* 

*1.* The explosion of an armor piercing bomb immediately above the forward engine room emphasizes the urgent necessity for the accomplishment, at the first available opportunity, of the below listed authorized engineering alterations which are designed to increase engineering damage control effectiveness: 

*A. Yorktown Alteration CV112K34:* 
"Modify Boiler Feed System by Installation of 6 Gate Valves." 
For brevity, this modification is shown in sketch, enclosure (K). If the bomb hit had ruptured boiler feed lines in number 9 fireroom the only available remaining source of feed water would have been cold water suction from the forward surge tank by means of emergency feed pumps, thus reducing the ship's speed to a maximum of 15 knots. 

*B. Yorktown Alteration MCV46B:* 
"Install 4" Cross-Connection with Cutout Valve between #3 and #5 fireroom." 
From an inspection of the auxiliary steam line it is evident that a bomb hit in #4 fireroom would disable all engine room steam auxiliaries and thus "Kill" the ship. 

*C. Yorktown Alteration MCV46E:* 
"Install Quick-Closing Remote Control Valves for Main Steam Line Cross-Connection in Forward Engine Room." 

*D.* The following additional alterations, which are being requested, are likewise considered to be of vital importance, and are here recommended: 

*1.* Install remote control operating gear to boiler feed stop and check valves to permit securing boiler feed water from third deck. 

*2.* Install in all center firerooms individual fuel oil cutout valves to the adjacent wing firerooms. This would permit securing individual wing boilers from the center firerooms, an additional safety feature to that now installed which permits the securing of an athwartships row of 3 boilers with a quick closing valve. 

*2.* The killing or stunning of the entire engineers' repair party in the compartment above which the bomb exploded demonstrated conclusively that even if any personnel were left alive in an engineering space in which a bomb exploded they could not be relied upon to control the damage within the space, but that all correctional operations must be handled from adjacent spaces which are intact. It is therefore mandatory that provision be made for securing engineering machinery by remote control whenever possible.

*E. GUNNERY:* 

*1.* The number of magazines available for 20 millimeter guns (10 per gun at present) was inadequate. This deficiency would have caused a considerable reduction in the volume of fire if the action had lasted a few minutes longer. Each 20 millimeter gun should be supplied with 24 magazines. 

*4. CONDUCT OF PERSONNEL:* 
The conduct in battle of the entire ship's Company of the Yorktown and her Air Group was worthy of the highest traditions of the Naval Service. 

With full realization that we were but beginning a long and arduous task, every Officer and Enlisted Man, with tireless energy, unquenchable enthusiasm, grim determination, and high courage, gave of himself in full measure to the successful accomplishment of our mission. 

I can have no higher honor than to have commanded them in battle. 



E. BUCKMASTER. 

CC to: CTG 17.5 (Less enclosure (A)) 

*Enclosure D
CV5/A9-8/A15-3 
DK(11-Bt) U.S.S. YORKTOWN May 19, 1942. * 



*From: The Executive Officer. 
To: The Commanding Officer.* 

Subject: Noteworthy Incidents Occurring During Engagement on May 8, 1942, and in the Operations Leading up Thereto Involving Individual Instances of Personnel Deserving Praise - Report of. 

Reference: (a) Article 948, U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920. 



*1.* In accordance with reference (a), the following report of noteworthy incidents and conduct of personnel is furnished: 

*A.* The conduct of the crew of this vessel during the torpedo and bombing attack of May 8, 1942, was exemplary. Every member of the crew remained at his battle station during the engagement and functioned as at a normal drill. In some instances where officers and men were not needed at their assigned stations, they voluntarily assisted at nearby stations where their services were badly needed. 

*B.* The efficient manner in which all departments functioned showed the results of many months of training. 

*C.* The conduct of the flying personnel in the squadrons was exemplary. Recommendations for awards in special cases will be made direct to the Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Yorktown, by the Squadron Commanders. 

*D.* The action of the following named officers and men are to be especially commended: 



*Commander W. D. Davis, (MC), U.S. Navy 
Senior Medical Officer*
The test of battle showed that Commander Davis (MC), by his appreciation of the special problems of the Medical Department in action, had organized his department to be able to handle these problems with great efficiency. During and after the battle, he not only demonstrated his personal skill and knowledge as a physician and surgeon, but, by vigorous and intelligent direction of his entire department was responsible for the saving of many lives and for the alleviation of suffering of numerous wounded men. 
Commander Davis (MC) should be recommended for the Navy Cross. 

*Commander I. D. Wiltsie, U.S. Navy*
Commander Wiltsie, the Navigator, distinguished himself not only by his calm and expert handling of the ship in battle under your direction, but by constant and expert application of his ability as a navigator contributed greatly to the success of the three attacks made by the Air Group on enemy forces at Tulagi May 4th and the attacks on enemy carriers on May 7th and 8th, 1942. 
Commander Wiltsie should be recommended for the Navy Cross. 

*Commander C. E. Aldrich, U.S. Navy*
Commander Aldrich, by his sound judgement in planning, training, and organizing, brought his Damage Control Organization and Material into the crucial test of battle in a high state of readiness. During and after the battle he, by his calm, thorough, and expert direction of damage control, was directly responsible for the early isolation and extinguishing of a raging fire and for the reduction to an absolute minimum of other damage resulting from a bomb explosion and for immediate and complete control of underwater damage resulting from many near misses. 
Commander Aldrich should be recommended for the Navy Cross.


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## Lucky13 (Feb 9, 2009)

*Commander R. J. Arnold, (SC), U.S. Navy*
The ability of the Yorktown and her Air Group to maintain the state of material readiness necessary to the successful accomplishment of the Air Group attacks against the enemy on May 4th, 7th, and 8th, and to the ship's ability to so successfully meet the enemy's intense air attack on May 8th, was due in no little respect to Commander Arnold's foresight, specialized knowledge of aircraft material, and the application of that knowledge to the procurement of necessary supplies and spare parts and to the organization of his department so as to make the supplies and spares readily available under all conditions. In battle, Commander Arnold, not being required at his regular station in the armored coding room, due to the presence of several coding officers attached to the staff of Rear Admiral Fletcher, took station in an exposed position on a machine gun battery where he served throughout the action as a member of the ammunition loading party. 
For his distinguished service in the line of his profession as Supply Officer, and for his conspicuous gallantry in action at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty, I recommend that Commander Arnold be recommended for the Navy Cross. 

*Commander M. E. Arnold, U.S. Navy*
Commander Murr E. Arnold, U.S. Navy, the Air Officer, by his careful planning and organization, untiring energy, and by the sound application of his expert knowledge not only to the administration of the Air Department but to the operations of the Air Group as well, was largely responsible for the success of the Air Group's operations at Tulagi on May 4th and against enemy carriers and enemy aircraft on May 7th and 8th. As you know, Commander Arnold personally made the detailed plans of the air operations against Tulagi on May 4th as a result of which, by three repeated attacks, at least eight enemy vessels including one heavy cruiser or seaplane carrier, one light cruiser, two transports, one destroyer, and three patrol gun boats were sunk. In battle on May 8th, under heavy bombing and torpedo attack, Commander Arnold calmly attended to his business of supervising the servicing of aircraft on board and maintaining the flight deck and arming crews in readiness for receiving and rearming the ship's Air Group. 
Commander Arnold should be recommended for the Navy Cross. 

In battle on May 8th, under heavy bombing and torpedo attack, Commander Arnold calmly attended to his business of supervising the servicing of aircraft on board and maintaining the flight deck and arming crews in readiness for receiving and rearming the ship's Air Group. 
Commander Arnold should be recommended for the Navy Cross. 

*Lieutenant Commander C. C. Ray, U.S. Navy*
Lieutenant Commander Ray, the Communication Officer, by his understanding of the peculiar communication problems of carriers and carrier aircraft and by his careful planning and organization of the Communication Department to the end that those problems should be solved, was directly responsible for the establishment and maintenance of many lines of communication vitally essential to the success of the operations of the Air Group and ship during the engagements with the enemy on May 4th, 7th, and 8th. In battle on May 8th, he calmly supervised the all-important "Fighter Director" and "Search and Attack" radio circuits, supervised the immediate repair of the damaged Radar and various transmitting circuits, and by his example inspired the men of his department to carry out their duties calmly and efficiently. 
Lieutenant Commander Ray should be recommended for the Navy Cross. 

*Lieutenant Commander Oscar Pederson, U.S. Navy, 
Commander, Yorktown Air Group*
Lieutenant Commander Pederson, the Air Group Commander, because of his previous training and experience, was kept on board during the Air Group's actions on May 4th, 7th, and 8th to act as Fighter Director. In that capacity, he successfully directed our fighters to intercept and shoot down an enemy four-engined patrol bomber on the morning of May 8th. Shortly thereafter, Lexington assumed the duties of Fighter Director, and Lieutenant Commander Pederson served in the capacity of relief Fighter Director until Lexington Radar and radio communications became inoperative on May 8th, at which time he again resumed direction of the fighters. Prior to the date of Lieutenant Commander Pederson's assuming the duties of Commander Yorktown Air Group on April 25, 1942, he was Commander, Fighting Squadron FORTY-TWO. The brilliant performance of that fighter squadron in action during the strenuous period of 4 - 8 May, 1942, reflects great credit on Lieutenant Commander Pederson's training and leadership as Squadron Commander. 
I recommend that for these demonstrations of outstanding performance of duty, Lieutenant Commander Pederson be awarded a letter of commendation by the Secretary of the Navy. 


*Lieutenant Commander J. F. Delaney, U.S. Navy*
Lieutenant Commander John F. Delaney, U.S. Navy, Engineer Officer of this vessel, by his thorough knowledge of engineering and his sound and thorough training of the Engineer's Force brought his plant and force into battle in a high state of readiness; by his calm judgement and superb leadership in action, when the explosion of an aerial bomb in the compartment directly over his head had killed the majority of his Engineer's Repair Party, put three boilers out of commission, and salted two condensers, he was able to keep the ship's speed sufficiently high (never less than twenty-four knots) to enable the Captain successfully to maneuver to avoid continued aerial bombing and torpedo attacks. One hour and forty-five minutes after the bomb hit, he reported the engineering plant back in full commission and ready to make full power. 
Lieutenant Commander Delaney should be recommended for the Navy Cross. 

*Lieutenant Commander Ernest J. Davis, U.S. Navy*
Lieutenant Commander Ernest J. Davis, Gunnery Officer of this vessel, by his clear thinking, sound judgement, thorough understanding of the problems of anti-aircraft gunnery, and his knowledge of his men and his extraordinary ability to instill into them an aggressive, fighting spirit, brought his gunnery department into battle in a high state of readiness. In battle, when heavily attacked by enemy carrier dive-bombers, torpedo planes, and fighters, he directed the ship's batteries against the enemy attack so that every attacking plane was vigorously opposed by gunfire, and many were destroyed. His intrepidity, in directing the batteries, by means of the flight deck loud speaking system, from his exposed position on top of the pilot house, in a calm, clear voice, no different from his normal manner of speaking during gunnery drills, was not only an inspiration to the guns' crews and to all who heard him, but was a great aid to the Captain in maneuvering the ship to avoid bombs and torpedoes. 
Lieutenant Commander Davis should be recommended for the Navy Cross. 

*Lieutenant Ralph E. Patterson, U.S. Navy*
Lieutenant Ralph E. Patterson, U.S. Navy, was the senior officer of the Repair Parties. Through his direction, the parties were organized at the scene of the damage and the work was coordinated. His orderly reports to Central Station kept the Damage Control Officer constantly in touch with the whole situation. Lieutenant Patterson personally helped care for the dead and injured. Without thought for his personal safety, he entered the damaged compartment which was filled with smoke and fire and directed the work of extinguishing the blaze and repairing the damage. It is strongly recommended that he be promoted to Lieutenant Commander for temporary service and that he be given a letter of commendation by the Secretary of the Navy.


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## Lucky13 (Feb 9, 2009)

*Lieutenant N. A. Campbell, U.S. Navy*
Lieutenant N. A. Campbell, performed his duties in an outstanding manner during the period 4 - 8 May, 1942 while this vessel and her Air Group were engaged in intermittent action with the enemy. As Landing Signal Officer, he executed his duties in a very cool deliberate manner under extreme conditions of stress in bringing damaged planes on board safely, landing planes while the ship was heeled over and turning sharply, and, landing several VF planes on board at night with pilots who had never qualified at night on a carrier or had any night field training. His performance of duty reduced to a minimum the damage to planes incident to carrier landings and thus he contributed greatly toward maintaining the efficiency of the Air Group. 
It is recommended that he be awarded a letter of commendation by the Secretary of the Navy for his outstanding performance of duty in the line of his profession. 

*Lieutenant A. N. Wilson, Jr., U.S. Navy*
Lieutenant A. N. Wilson, Jr., performed his duties in an outstanding manner during the period 4 - 8 May, 1942, while this vessel and her Air Group were engaged in intermittent action with the enemy. As Flight Deck Officer, he executed his duties so efficiently that he greatly contributed to the effectiveness of the striking power of the Air Group. His initiative and leadership during this prolonged period of stress is to be highly commended. 
It is recommended that he be awarded a letter of commendation by the Secretary of the Navy for his outstanding performance of duty in the line of his profession. 

*Lieutenant Milton E. Ricketts, U.S. Navy (Deceased)*
It is recommended that Lieutenant Milton E. Ricketts, U.S. Navy (Deceased), be post-humously cited for the Navy Cross for his heroic action in endeavoring to extinguish the fire when a bomb passed through and exploded just beneath the space in which his battle station was located. Lieutenant Ricketts, in charge of the Engineering Repair Party, his men all killed, wounded, or stunned, himself mortally wounded, opened the valve on nearby fire plug, partially led out the fire hose and directed a heavy stream of water into the fire before dropping dead. This was the first hose put on a critical fire, and Lieutenant Ricketts' prompt and heroic action undoubtedly prevented its rapid progress to that of more serious proportions.


*Lieutenant A. C. Emerson, U.S. Navy*
Lieutenant A. C. Emerson, performed his duties in an outstanding manner during the period 4 - 8 May, 1942, while this vessel and her Air Group were engaged in intermittent action with the enemy. As Hangar Deck Officer, he executed his duties so efficiently that he greatly contributed to the effectiveness of the striking power of the Air Group. His prompt action in rendering necessary assistance on May 8th when an enemy bomb struck the ship and exploded below decks is particularly commendable. His initiative and leadership during this prolonged period of stress is to be highly commended. 
It is recommended that he be awarded a letter of commendation by the Secretary of the Navy for outstanding performance of duty in the line of his profession.

*Lieutenant (jg) J. E. Ferree, U.S. Navy*
Although Lieutenant (jg) J. E. Ferree, was on the sick list at the time of the action, and had been for a period of several days preceeding it, he, as Radio Material Officer of this vessel was directly responsible for the ship's going into battle with the radio material in such excellent condition that it was able to stand the effects of a bomb hit, several near misses, and of heavy gunfire with negligible failures. 
It is recommended that he be awarded a letter of commendation by the Secretary of the Navy for outstanding performance of duty in the line of his profession. 

*Lieutenant (jg) H. O. Vogel, U.S. Navy*
Lieutenant (jg) H. O. Vogel, by his leadership, energy, example, and expert knowledge of visual communications, was able to go through the strenuous operations of the four (4) days preceeding and through the action of May 8th with a flawless performance in the handling of the visual signals of this ship and of the Task Force Commander. 
It is recommended that he be awarded a letter of commendation by the Secretary of the Navy for outstanding performance of duty in the line of his profession. 

*Lieutenant (jg) John E. Greenbacker, U.S. Navy*
Lieutenant (jg) John E. Greenbacker's performance of duty as Officer-of-the-Deck during the strenuous operations which reached a climax in the battle on May 8, 1942, was of the highest order. On May 8th, at general quarters, he alternated with the Assistant Navigator as relief Officer-of-the-Deck when it became necessary for the Navigator to be relieved. During the battle, he assisted the Captain in conning the ship by keeping him informed, from his station on the starboard wing of the bridge, of approaching bomb and torpedo attacks on the starboard side of the ship and of the position of the ship in relation to the torpedoes which had been dropped. His assistance to the Captain was invaluable. 
He is recommended for award of a letter of commendation by the Secretary of the Navy for outstanding performance of duty in the line of his profession. 


*Lieutenant (jg) C. E. Gill, U.S. Navy*
Lieutenant (jg) C. E. Gill's performance of duty as Officer-of-the-Deck during the strenuous operations which reached a climax in the battle on May 8, 1942, was of the highest order. On May 8th, at general quarters, he alternated with Lieutenant (jg) J. E. Greenbacker as relief Officer-of-the-Deck when it became necessary for the Navigator to be relieved. During the battle, he assisted the Captain in conning the ship by keeping him informed, from his station on the port wing of the bridge, of approaching bomb and torpedo attacks on the port side of the ship and of the position of the ship in relation to the torpedoes which had been dropped. His assistance to the Captain was invaluable. 
He is recommended for award of a letter of commendation by the Secretary of the Navy for outstanding performance of duty in the line of his profession. 

*Ensign N. L. Tate, U.S. Navy*
During the action of May 8th, Ensign N. L. Tate, was stationed at the alidade on the starboard wing of the bridge for the purpose of reporting to the Captain true bearings of attacking aircraft and approaching torpedoes. He performed his duties under fire in a calm and capable manner, rendering invaluable assistance to the Captain in avoiding enemy aerial bombs and torpedoes. 
He is recommended for award of a letter of commendation by the Secretary of the Navy for outstanding performance of duty in the line of his profession. 

*PARTON, Earnest Edison, 267-94-92, CQM(AA), U.S. Navy*
During the action on May 8th, PARTON, Earnest Edison, CQM(AA), was stationed at the alidade on the port wing of the bridge for the purpose of reporting to the Captain true bearings of attacking aircraft and approaching torpedoes. He performed his duties under fire in a calm and capable manner, rendering invaluable assistance to the Captain in avoiding enemy aerial bombs and torpedoes. 
He is recommended for award of a letter of commendation by the Secretary of the Navy for outstanding performance of duty in the line of his profession and it is recommended that he be advanced to the rating of Chief Quartermaster, Permanent Appointment. 


*Carpenter Boyd M. McKensie, U.S. Navy*
Carpenter Boyd M. McKensie, in charge of a repair party, was the first man to go into the darkened, smoke-filled compartment which had been wrecked by the explosion of an aerial bomb and where fire was raging. With no thought for his personal safety, he personally cared for the dead and injured, fought fire, directed his men, and made repairs far into the night. Carpenter McKensie's ability and knowledge of his profession and ship were of inestimable value in making repairs so that the ship could function normally under adverse conditions. His periodic reports to the Damage Control Officer served to keep him informed of the situation and enabled the whole department to function more efficiently. 
Carpenter McKensie is strongly recommended for the award of a letter of commendation by the Secretary of the Navy and for promotion to the rank of Chief Carpenter for temporary service. 

*Boatswain Edmund R. Crosby, U.S. Navy*
Boatswain Edmund R. Crosby, was the Officer-in Charge of a repair party. He proceeded with his party to the smoke-filled compartment which had been wrecked by the explosion of an aerial bomb and where fire was raging and directed them in extinguishing the fire and caring for the dead and injured. He made tours of the ship, reporting damage and casualties. He procured equipment and directed his men in using it. He assisted in making emergency repairs far into the night. 
Boatswain Crosby is recommended for the award of a letter of commendation by the Secretary of the Navy and for promotion to the rank of Chief Boatswain for temporary service.


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## Lucky13 (Feb 9, 2009)

*Radio Electrician Vane M. Bennett, U.S. Navy*
Radio Electrician Vane M. Bennett, as aircraft radio material officer, radio material officer for special super-frequency equipment, radar material officer, and radar operator in action, performed his duties in an outstanding manner in the strenuous days leading up to and culminating in the battle on May 8, 1942. When at 11:31 on May 8, the CXAM radar became inoperative, he immediately and correctly diagnosed the trouble as being located at the antenna array, and unhesitatingly proceeded to the exposed radar platform on the foremast where, during the height of the attack by dive bombers, fighters, and torpedo planes, exposed to machine gun fire and fragments from own anti-aircraft fire, he successfully effected repairs to the radar antenna. 
Radio Electrician Bennett is recommended for the award of a letter of commendation by the Secretary of the Navy and for promotion to the rank of Chief Radio Electrician for temporary service.

*TINDELL, James Rush, 271-62-48, CRM(PA), U.S. Navy*
During the strenuous operations immediately preceeding and culminating in the battle of May 8, 1942, TINDELL, due to the illness of the Radio Material Officer, acted as Radio Material Officer of this vessel. During the actions, the Communication Officer had occasion to call him by telephone on numerous occasions. He was completely calm and, by his keeping the main transmitters of the ship in continuous state of readiness to operate, demonstrated technical knowledge and leadership to a high degree. 
TINDELL is recommended for the award of a letter of commendation by the Secretary of the Navy and that recommendation be made to the Navy Department for a waiver of his physical disability (defective vision) and that, on the strength of his superb performance in battle, he be again recommended for promotion to the rank of Chief Radio Electrician for temporary services. 

*BROOKS, Loyn Russell, 368-22-61, EM1c, U.S. Navy*
BROOKS was stationed with the Engineer Repair Party in the space through which the bomb passed and under which the explosion occurred. Although suffering from severe shock and light burns, he refused to go to the Sick Bay for examination, but carried on with the Electrical Repair Party and was instrumental in effecting temporary repairs to electric circuits in the damaged area. 
BROOKS is recommended for the award of a letter of commendation from the Secretary of the Navy for outstanding performance of duty in the line of his profession and it is recommended that he be advanced to the rating of Chief Electrician's Mate, Acting Appointment. 

*DAVIS, Raymond Clarkinstin, 375-39-46, WT1c, U.S. Navy*
DAVIS, a member of the Boiler Repair Party, at the risk of his own personal safety, entered smoke and gas filled boiler rooms eight and nine to investigate the extent of damage, and largely through his efforts the super-heater boilers were back on the line approximately one hour after the bomb hit. 
He is recommended for the award of a letter of commendation from the Secretary of the Navy for outstanding performance of duty in the line of his profession and it is recommended that he be advanced to the rating of Chief Watertender, Acting Appointment. 


*NEILSON, George Robert Jr., 337-36-27, F1c, U.S. Navy*
NEILSON, with disregard for his own personal safety leaped into the space where a fire was gaining headway, had fire hose passed to him, and arrested the progress of the fire for sufficient time to allow Boiler Repair Crews to pass through the area for investigation of boiler damage and to re-man eight and nine firerooms. 
He is recommended for award of a letter of commendation from the Secretary of the Navy for outstanding performance of duty and it is further recommended that he be advanced to the rating of Watertender Second Class. 

*STOWE, Thomas Edward, 504-06-50, Sea2c, V-6, U.S. Naval Reserve*
STOWE was in Sick Bay as an ambulatory post-operative appendectomy patient. Disregarding the fact that he had been out of bed only a few days, he worked until 0200 the morning after the attack in the Sick Bay. 
He is recommended for award of a letter of commendation from the Commanding Officer for outstanding performance of duty and it is further recommended that he be advanced to the rating of Seaman first Class. 

*ADAMS, Leo Ronald Joseph, 201-55-76, MM2c, U.S. Navy*
ADAMS was admitted to the Sick Bay with mild burns of the legs. Seeing others more seriously injured, he rendered valuable assistance in the Sick Bay during and after the engagement disregarding for the time his own injuries. 
He is recommended for award of a letter of commendation from the Commanding Officer for outstanding performance of duty and it is further recommended that he be advanced to the rating of Machinist's Mate First Class. 

*FOSTER, Raymond Scott, 385-69-56, RM1c, U.S. Navy*
FOSTER's station in battle is radioman in charge of Radio III (Emergency Transmitter Room). In that room are located two (2) of the transmitters used for aircraft circuits. During the action of May 8, 1942, FOSTER demonstrated by keeping the equipment on his station in operation at all times, a thorough knowledge of his profession as well as leadership in a high degree. 
He is recommended for award of a letter of commendation from the Commanding Officer for outstanding performance of duty in the line of his profession and it is recommended that he be advanced to the rating of Chief Radioman, Acting Appointment. 

*ATTAWAY, Alvin Austin, 283-29-84, RM1c, U.S. Navy*
During the battle of May 8, 1942, ATTAWAY, whose battle station is in the Radar Control Room, when the Radar became inoperative at 11:31, proceeded voluntarily and without hesitation to the exposed Radar Platform with Radio Electrician Bennett where by his skill and cool calm performance of duty under fire was of great assistance in placing the Radar back in commission. 
He is recommended for award of a letter of commendation from the Commanding Officer for outstanding performance of duty in the line of his profession and it is recommended that he be advanced to the rating of Chief Radioman, Acting Appointment. 

*DESPOSITO, Harry Joseph, 380-13-94, RM1c, U.S. Navy*
DESPOSITO, as radioman in charge of the aircraft radio repair shop, during the battle on May 8, 1942, and during the strenuous operations leading up thereto, performed his duties in an outstanding manner in keeping the aircraft radio material of the Yorktown Air Group in perfect operating condition. He demonstrated an excellent knowledge of his specialty and a calm performance of duty in action, during which time he continued to make adjustments and repairs on aircraft radio equipment. 
He is recommended for award of a letter of commendation from the Commanding Officer for outstanding performance of duty in the line of his profession and it is recommended that he be advanced to the rating of Chief Radioman, Acting Appointment. 

*RINEHART, Jack Kay, 393-29-22, RM3c, U.S. Navy, and, 
WRIGHT, Francis Bill, 400-23-87, RM3c, U. S. Navy.*
RINEHART and WRIGHT, during the battle of May 8, 1942, and the operations preceding were stationed in Air Plot as primary voice radio operators on aircraft circuits. For a sterling performance of duty in control of these difficult and fast moving circuits, they are recommended for awards of letters of commendation from the Commanding Officer for outstanding performance of duty in the line of their profession, and it is recommended that they be advanced to the rating of Radioman, Second Class. 

*ROTUNNO, Joseph Michael, Jr., 223-78-39, RM2c, U.S. Navy, and, 
LEWIS, Raymond Osborn, 279-71-27, RM3c, U. S. Navy.*
ROTUNNO and LEWIS, during the battle on May 8, 1942, and the action leading up thereto, were stationed in Air Plot in control of Aircraft Voice and Key Radio Circuits. For their sterling performance of duty on these important and difficult circuits, they are recommended for awards of letters of commendation from the Commanding Officer for outstanding performance of duty in the line of their profession. 


DIXIE KIEFER


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## Lucky13 (Feb 9, 2009)

*Addendum to Enclosure D
CV5/A9-8/A16-3 
DK(11-Sr) U.S.S. YORKTOWN May 25, 1942. 



From: The Executive Officer. 
To: The Commanding Officer. * 

Subject: Noteworthy Incidents Occurring During Engagement on May 8, 1942, and in the Operations Leading up Thereto Involving Individual Instances of Personnel Deserving Praise - Report of. 

References: (a) Article 948, U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920. 
(b) Executive Officer, U.S.S. Yorktown, Confidential letter CV5/A9-8/A16-3 DK(11-Bt) of May 19,1942. 


*1.* Reference (b), my report to you of incidents occurring during the engagement of May 8, 1942, was made somewhat hurriedly, in order that you might submit your lists of recommendations for awards to Commander Task Group 17.5 (Rear Admiral Aubrey W. Fitch) prior to his leaving this Task Force. It appears now that there were some names of officers and men who performed their duties in an outstanding manner which were inadvertently left off my original report to you; and there are some additional cases which, as a result of the completion of Heads of Departments' investigations, have been reported to me since the submission of my original report. It is requested, therefore, that this report be appended to my report dated May 19, 1942, to make my official report to you complete. 

*2.* The actions of the following named officers and men are considered to be especially praiseworthy, and are recommended for awards as indicated below: 

*A.* The following named officers are recommended for the award of a letter of commendation from the Secretary of the Navy: 
Lieutenant John D. HUNTLEY, U.S. Navy, Assistant Gunnery Officer and Control Officer, Forward 5" Director. 

Lieutenant Huntley, during the battle of May 8, 1942, as Control Officer of the forward 5" director, through his coolness and presence of mind under fire, maintained an effective anti-aircraft fire against various Japanese torpedo and dive bombing attacks. The guns controlled by this director shot down at least three (3) torpedo planes. 

Lieutenant John R. WADLEIGH, U.S. Navy, Control Officer, After 5" Director. 

Lieutenant Wadleigh, during the battle of May 8, 1942, as Control Officer of the after 5" director, through his coolness and presence of mind under fire, maintained an effective anti-aircraft fire against various Japanese torpedo and dive bombing attacks. The guns controlled by this director shot down at least four (4) torpedo planes. 

Lieutenant, junior grade, Edward A. KEARNEY, Medical Corps, U.S. Navy, Junior Medical Officer. 

Upon the explosion of the bomb which hit this ship during battle on May 8, 1942, Dr. Kearney went immediately to the scene of the explosion and tried to enter the burning compartment. As soon as he could enter, while the compartment was still blazing and full of smoke, he did enter and, under difficult conditions, made immediate examinations to determine which of the men were still alive. He personally directed the rescue of those who showed any signs of life, and immediately rendered medical attention which undoubtedly resulted in saving the lives of several men who were seriously burned or otherwise seriously wounded. 

Gunner Maurice E. WITTING, U.S. Navy, Ship's Gunner, and Aviation Ordnance Gunner. 

During the past seven (7) months, Gunner Witting has performed the combined duties of Ship's Gunner and Aviation Ordnance Gunner. He was responsible for the high state of readiness for action of the ship's armament, as witnessed by the performance during the battle of May 8, 1942. Gunner Witting supervised the preparation for firing of 41 torpedoes and 125 1,000 pound bombs dropped on Japanese ships from 4 to 8 May, 1942. As far as can be determined each bomb and torpedo functioned perfectly. During the battle on May 8, 1942, Gunner Witting received a leg wound from a bomb splinter and in spite of this painful injury remained at his station throughout the battle. 

*B.* It is recommended that the following named enlisted men be awarded a letter of commendation by the Commanding Officer, and be advanced to the next higher rating: 

*AIR DEPARTMENT*
BESHORE, Edward Arthur 283 06 10 AM2c U.S.N. 
BOOTEN, John Donnelly 337 57 11 AM2c U.S.N. 
COLLIER, Horace Laster 346 57 11 BM2c U.S.N. 
LEWIS, Joseph Pierce 261 99 22 Cox U.S.N. 
MANKEDECK, John William 328 73 91 Sea1c U.S.N. 
VANACORE, Anthony James 402 61 30 Sea1c U.S.N. 
PETTIPAS, Edward James, Jr 400 91 67 Sea1c U.S.N.R. 

The above named men, by their outstanding performance of duty in their ratings in connection with the handling, upkeep, and repair of the airplanes of the Yorktown Air Group during the past six (6) months and, particularly, during the period of intermittent action with the enemy on May 4 - 8 May, 1942, have contributed greatly to the ability of the Air Group and the Airplane handling group to maintain themselves in the high state of readiness which was evinced by the success of their operations. 


*SUPPLY DEPARTMENT*
MILHOLIN, Robert Blair 321 43 79 SK3c U.S.N. 

Milholin's battle station is in the Radar Control Room as first relief Radar operator. As such, he actually operated the Radar for many hours during the periods of action with the enemy, May 4 - 8, 1942, while the fighters were being directed against the enemy by means of Radar observation. By his skill and his devotion to duty, he contributed much to the defense of this force and to the detection and destruction of enemy aircraft. 

*GUNNERY DEPARTMENT*
ROLFE, Raymond Arthur 
first powderman on 5" gun #5. 207 27 61 Sea1c U.S.N. 

During the battle on May 8, 1942, the first shellman of this gun injured his hand and had to leave the gun platform. The gun captain was knocked down by a bomb explosion before he could reach the gun platform. During this period Rolfe, with remarkable presence of mind and coolness in action continued to load both powder and shell, thereby maintaining an uninterrupted fire from the gun. 

VODICKA, Charles Frank 
rammerman on 5" Gun #5. 316 60 69 Cox U.S.N. 

During one period during the battle on May 8, 1942, while this gun was firing in local control at torpedo planes an order was received to shift the gun into director control. The first shellman attempted to remove the shell with a fixed fuse setting from the loading tray. At the same instant Vodicka started to ram the load. The first shellman's hand was caught between the rammer spade and shell. Vodicka, with great alertness and coolness of mind, retracted the spade instantly, preventing serious injury to the first shellman's hand and possible material casualty to the gun. 

NEWMAN, William Henry 
Gunner's Mate at 5" Group IV. 325 02 98 GM1c U.S.N. 

All electrical power failed to rammer motor on gun #8 after the second shot with a shell seated in the gun, thus making it impossible to load a powder case by hand. Newman, with great presence of mind, immediately realized the situation. He trained and elevated the muzzle of the gun up to the edge of flight deck and, by means of section handle, was able to unseat and remove the projectile. He thereafter supervised the loading and ramming by hand of this gun, keeping it in operation. 

MOORE, Wilford (n) 
trainer on 5" Gun #8 279 71 83 Sea1c U.S.N. 

Moore, in spite of the fact that he had been burned and knocked from his seat three times by blast of the adjacent gun, refused to leave his station and would allow no one to relieve him of his duties. 

NERBY, Theodore Bernhardt 
rammerman on 5" Gun #8. 328 74 03 Sea1c U.S.N. 
SPEARS, David Owen 
second powderman on 5" Gun #8. 659 06 80 Sea2c U.S.N.R. 

Nerby and Spears displayed unusual coolness and presence of mind under fire. They were of invaluable assistance to the Gunner's Mate in repairing a serious casualty to the gun and thereafter ramming the gun loads by hand. 


*CONSTRUCTION DEPARTMENT*
CARPENTER, William (n) 342 27 13 Ptr3c U.S.N. 

Carpenter was a member of No. 4 Repair Party and was on patrol in the living compartments during the action. He was in the Marine Compartment when the bomb struck the ship. After the explosion he grasped the situation quickly and proceeded to the third deck and entered the damaged compartment which was dark and filled with smoke. He guided two injured men to safety and returned to the compartment to fight fire and repair damage. He was severely burned but continued his efforts until ordered to sick bay by his superior officer.


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## Lucky13 (Feb 9, 2009)

UPCHURCH, Clyde Davis 261 81 45 SF1c U.S.N. 

Upchurch was a member of No. 4 Repair Party. Immediately after the ship was bombed he proceeded to the damaged compartment, fought fire, assisted in the care of the injured and dead, and made emergency repairs. The compartment was dark and full of smoke, live electrical cables were hanging about, and debris made progress exceedingly difficult. Later Upchurch worked about eighteen hours, sometimes in four feet of water, making repairs and keeping submersible pumps in operation. 

HOOK, Norris Keanon 261 98 08 SF1c U.S.N. 

Hook was a member of No. 2 Repair Party who, when directed by superior authority, led his men to the scene of damage and fought fire, cared for the injured and dead, and made emergency repairs. He was called upon to proceed to various parts of the ship to effect emergency repairs and his knowledge of the ship and his skill in his work kept countless items of machinery, ventilation, plumbing, and drainage functioning normally during an extremely difficult period. His ability as a welder served to make permanent repairs in the shortest possible time. 

OAKLEY, Edgar Litchfield 380 37 81 1st Mus U.S.N. 

Oakley was a member of No. 1 Dressing Station Party and senior stretcher bearer of the ship. During action when hospital corpsmen were occupied with care of injured personnel, Oakley personally supervised the removal of the dead to the after mess hall and later to the after partial deck. He has been commended by the Senior Medical Officer for his valuable assistance in a task which required intelligence and courage. He continued his assistance until far into the night. It is believed that his conduct and efforts were beyond the call of duty.

VANDER, Paul Edward 234 02 66 SF1c U.S.N. 


Vander was a member of No. 3 Repair Party. When directed by his superior he led his men to the scene of damage and fought fire and made repairs in a dark compartment filled with smoke. He assisted in removing the injured and dead and worked far into the night effecting emergency repairs. 

*MEDICAL DEPARTMENT*
HARNED, Robert Wilford 368 27 97 PhM1c U.S.N. 
EDWARDS, Charles William 265 72 35 PhM1c U.S.N. 
DE LISLE, Paul Francis 403 87 07 PhM2c U.S.N.R. 
HELLER, Warren (n) 403 67 90 PhM2c U.S.N.R. 
ABARR, Joe Waugh 321 28 26 PhM2c U.S.N. 

These pharmacist's mates during and after battle on May 8, 1942, by their expert technical knowledge and ability, their complete devotion to duty, and their untiring labor, greatly assisted the Medical Officer in their treatment of the many burned and otherwise wounded men, and, later in preparation of the dead for burial. Each of them, at some one of the several battle dressing stations, on his own initiative, when the Medical Officer in charge of his station was occupied with the more extreme cases, took charge and directed the administering of first aid and thus aided greatly in succor to wounded and suffering men. 

*3.* It is recommended that each of the following listed officers and enlisted men be awarded a letter of commendation from the Commanding Officer: 
Lieutenant (jg) Donald S. SCHEU, U.S. Navy. 

Lieutenant (jg) Scheu was stationed in central station as Assistant Damage Control Officer during action with the enemy. He had played a prominent part in the organization and instruction of the Damage Control Party and by his thorough knowledge of the entire damage control organization of the ship, was able to take immediate and intelligent action which undoubtedly did much to prevent further damage and spread of the fire which resulted from explosion of the bomb which struck the ship. 

Ensign Ralph B. CONLEE, U.S. Naval Reserve. 

Ensign Conlee, serving as Stability and List Control Officer in Central Station, performed his duties in a highly commendatory manner. After the action, he was detailed by the Damage Control Officer to proceed to the scene of the damage and there was of great assistance in making repairs and caring for the dead and wounded. 

Ensign Marvin O. SLATER, U.S. Naval Reserve. 

Ensign Slater, serving as assistant to Damage Control Officer and First Lieutenant in Central Station, performed his duties in a highly commendatory manner. After the action, he was detailed by the Damage Control Officer to proceed to the scene of the damage and there was of great assistance in making repairs and caring for the dead and wounded. 

*SHIP CONTROL PARTY*
The following listed men, comprising your ship control party in the Pilot House and in the Conning Tower, as you know, performed their respective duties in an outstanding manner: 

BURGER, Joseph John 
B.M. of the Watch. 350 85 56 CBM(AA) U.S.N. 
BENNETT, Floyd Harvey 
J.X. talker (Bridge). 392 94 23 CY(PA) U.S.N. 
STATCHEN, Henry John, 
Captain's Writer. 207 05 06 CY(AA) U.S.N. 
SCOTT, William Stanley 
J.X. talker (Conning Tower). 287 20 10 Y1c U.S.N. 
KISER, Howard Kenton 
Helmsman (Conning Tower). 265 90 54 QM2c U.S.N. 
SHINE, James Henry 
Q.M. of the Watch (Bridge). 238 66 69 QM3c U.S.N. 
ROY, William Glen 
Photographer. 268 37 40 P2c U.S.N. 
HARBERT, Martin Winfred 
J.A. talker (Bridge). 355 92 93 Y2c U.S.N. 
MEYERS, Arthur Elbert 
J.A. talker (Conning Tower). 382 08 13 Sea1c U.S.N. 
CHARTIER, Joseph George 
J.L. talker. 300 14 32 Sea1c U.S.N. 
OGDEN, Nathan Herman 
J.V. talker. 385 86 37 Sea1c U.S.N. 
BAGINSKI, Theodore John 
Captain's Orderly. No. 298827 PFC U.S.M.C. 

*HOSPITAL CORPS*
WILSON, James Eli 243 31 61 CPhM(PA) U.S.N. 
BARBARICK, Lewis Victor, Jr. 356 00 54 PhM1c U.S.N. 


These two men have been praised highly by the Senior Medical Officer for their devotion to duty and their technical skill in attending the wounded. 



DIXIE KIEFER


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## Lucky13 (Feb 9, 2009)

*Enclosure H
CV5/S88/A9/(CEA-50-swg) U.S.S. YORKTOWN May 20, 1942. 
c/o Postmaster, 
San Francisco, Calif. *




From: The Commanding Officer. 
To: The Chief of the Bureau of Ships. 

Subject: War Damage Report. 

Reference: (A) BuShips Conf. Ltr. C-EF13/A9(374) C-S81-3 C-EN28/A2-11 dated October 28, 1941. 

Enclosures: (A) Report of Damage from Direct Bomb Hit. 
*(B)* Diagrammatic Sketches Showing Path of Bomb and Compartments Damaged. 
*(C)* Photographs of Direct Bomb Hit. 
*(D)* Report of Damage from Near Bomb Misses. 


*1.* In compliance with reference (a) the report on damage sustained by this vessel in action on May 8. 1942, is submitted. 

*2.* Enclosure (A) lists information regarding the only direct hit sustained. Paragraphs and subparagraphs are lettered and numbered to correspond with reference (a). 

*3.* Enclosure (B) consists of sketches showing the path of the bomb and compartments damaged by the direct hit. 

*4.* Enclosure (C) consists of photographs taken the following day of the damage sustained by the direct hit. Area included in each photograph and position of photographer are indicated in each photo. 

*5.* Enclosure (D) lists information regarding damage to the vessel from near bomb misses. A supplementary report covering in more complete detail the damage sustained by near misses will be forwarded as soon as the vessel is drydocked and a careful inspection of the hull below the waterline can be made. 

*6.* It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impractical to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than secret. 
The urgency of delivery of document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator, therefore, authorizes the transmission of this document by registered trans-Pacific mail and by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States. 


*E. BUCKMASTER. 



Copy to: 

OpNav 
ComCarPac 

*

*Enclosure A 
DIRECT HIT BY BOMB*

*1.* The bomb was a delayed action, armor-piercing type. Estimated weight: 800 lbs., estimated diameter: 12 inches. From an examination of the bomb fragments, the bomb appears to have been of the projectile type. 

*2.* The bomb was released by a dive bomber. Altitude of release: 1500 ft., angle of dive: 60° from the horizontal. 

*3.* The location of bomb impact was on the flight deck at frame 108, 6 feet, 7 inches to the starboard of the centerline. 

*4.* After impact the bomb passed through the flight deck and gallery deck leaving a hole 14 inches in diameter in both decks. It passed through the gallery deck two feet abaft the door 02-107-1, access to No. 3 Ready Room. It continued to pass through the hangar and pierced the first, second, and third decks exploding mid-way between the third and fourth decks at frame 107 in compartment C-402-A, aviation storeroom. As the bomb passed through the second deck it hit the corner of the inboard and after vertical bulkheads of the forward engine room access trunk. This deflected the bomb inboard about four feet from the vertical, through the second deck hole considerably breaking its fall. Previously the bomb was traveling forward and outboard. 

*5. *The thickness of deck pierced by the falling bomb was: 
*A.* Flight deck - 3" pine plus 0.1" steel plate (4 lb.), 
*B.* Gallery deck - 0.23" steel (9 lb.), 
*C.* Main or hangar deck and stringer 1.1" (45 lb.), 
*D.* Second deck - 0.25" (10 lb.), and 
*E.* Third deck - 0.25" steel (10 lb.). 

A total thickness of 1.68" of steel deck plating. 

*6.* From the point of first impact to the point of detonation the bomb dropped a vertical distance of 50 feet. The point of detonation was estimated to be about 3 feet above the fourth deck, forward engine room overhead. 

*7.* The detonation was of "high order". 

*8.* When the ship received this direct hit all compartments were in material condition "Afirm". 

*A.* Effect of Impact - A clean hole with plating bent downward was left in the flight and gallery decks. The impact on hangar and second decks left jagged holes measuring 15 inches fore and aft and 2 feet thwartships. After passing through the second deck the after inboard corner of forward engine room access trunk was dished in approximately two feet and ruptured for a vertical distance of five feet. 

*B.* Blast Effect - Since the fourth deck was dished down yet showed no marks on paint or plating of actual bomb contact, it is assumed the detonation occurred between the third and fourth decks. The blast caused the following damage to decks: 

*1.* Fourth deck - The armored deck, 1½" S.T.S. was dished downward for an area of 40 square feet but not ruptured. This area of the deck is the forward engine room overhead. 

*2.* Third deck - A hole 6 feet in diameter was blown out completely. Around this hole the deck was turned and peeled upward for an area of 35 square feet. The entire third deck in compartment C-301-1L was bulged upward. This bulge extends along the third deck forward to frame 98 and aft to frame 130. 

*3.* Second deck - One hole 4 feet in diameter was blown up at frame 107, 8 feet inboard of bomb impact hole. The entire deck in C-201-L was bulged upward with the bulge extending forward to frame 103 and aft to frame 115. Hatch 2-107 remained securely held by its dogs but the scuttle was blown up and the top forward was blown off. 

*4.* First or hangar deck - The deck was not ruptured by the blast. Hatch 1-107 was blown out of its dogs and thrown up one foot, remaining in that position. The deck was bulged across the entire breadth from frame 100 to frame 115. 

*5.* The flight and gallery decks were not affected by the blast.

*The blast caused the following damage to vertical bulkheads on fourth deck:* 

*1.* The inboard bulkhead of forward engine room access trunk, 30 lb. plate, shattered and completely blown outboard. 

*2.* After bulkhead of laundry storeroom B-9-5AT, 7.5 lb. plate, shattered and completely blown forward. 

*3.* Watertight door 4-101, access to Disinfector Room B-411-K blown inboard completely of its dogs and hinges. 

*4.* Large watertight door 4-118-1 access from C-402-A to C-408-1A blown completely out and aft. 

*5.* The pressure passing further aft and into C-408-1A blew the large hatch 2-119 up out of its dogs and hinges and was thrown about 15 feet up into No. 2 elevator pit.


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## Lucky13 (Feb 9, 2009)

*6.* 
The transverse bulkheads in C-201-L and C-301-L at frame 106 and 112 were badly bulged forward and aft respectively but were not ruptured. All doors in these bulkheads though badly warped, remained secured by their dogs and were not jammed. The after transverse bulkhead of the forward engine room ventilation trunk was ruptured at junction of bulkhead with the third deck. 
The blast wrecked the ship's service store, soda fountain equipment, laundry issue room, ship's service office, and engineer's office, all located in C-301-1L. Bunks, lockers, and drinking fountain were wrecked by the blast in the Marine Compartment, C-201-L. 

*C. Splinter Effect* - An estimated 80 percent of the bomb fragments covered the area between the third and fourth decks with a major portion piercing the laundry storeroom, B-9-5AT after bulkhead - 3/16" thick, after bulkhead of B-417-T 3/16" thick, inboard bulkhead of C-401-T 3/4" thick, and inboard and forward bulkheads of B-9-1 air intake. Four fragments pierced the after bulkhead of B-413-1E, 20 feet forward of detonation point. The starboard bulkhead 3/4" thick of forward engine room vent trunk was pierced by one splinter. In C-402-A the starboard and port bulkheads 25 lb. S.T.S., defeated all splinters. The only transverse bulkheads pierced abaft the point of detonation were the forward bulkhead 1/4" thick of the cold storage space, pierced by one splinter 44 feet from the detonation point, and the forward bulkhead 3/4" thick of trunk C-407-T. The hangar deck of .41" plate defeated all fragments passing up with the bomb blast, a vertical distance of 22 feet. Of the splinters that did not pass up the second deck blast hole but traveled upward, an estimated 80 percent were defeated by the second deck 1/4" plating 13 feet from the detonation point. The transverse bulkhead at frame 112 in C-301-L was not hit by any splinters, but the forward bulkhead of this space, number 8 fireroom intake trunk .16" plate, was pierced by several splinters. Two splinters piercing number 8 fireroom intake trunk traveled forward through number 7 fireroom intake trunk into passage B-413-3L, 20 feet from detonation point. The shell plating on the second and third decks was not pierced by any splinters. Several drain lines in C-402-A and B-9-5AT were pierced. Two firemain risers and three damage control risers in C-402-A were not pierced or ruptured although their lagging was pierced. 

*D. Incendiary Effect* - In the storeroom C-402-A where the bomb burst, a fire was immediately started among the crated stores, consisting of expeditionary gear, rags, and target sleeves. This fire was brought under control quickly. The flash upward passed up to the hangar overhead causing a small paint fire directly above the bomb impact hole. This was quickly extinguished. The flash failed to ignite the paint in C-402-A, C-301-L and C-201-L. Although a very dense smoke resulted from the explosion, the fire started was of minor nature and quickly extinguished. 

*9.* The bomb explosion produced a dense black smoke and noxious gases. The major portion of smoke and gas were confined to the compartments pierced by the bomb. All doors in surrounding transverse bulkheads remained intact and closed preventing spread of smoke through the second and third decks. All the smoke vented up the bomb hole and the Number 2 elevator pit into the hangar. Since all hangar roller curtains had been left open for the attack the smoke vented freely from the hangar. Since the air intakes for number 7, 8, and 9 firerooms had been ruptured, these three firerooms were filled with dense black smoke and explosion gases and men were forced to abandon the firerooms. 

*10.* Action taken to localize effects - Since the ship's shell had not been pierced nor ruptured by the explosion, fire and internal flooding were the major effects to immediately control. Prompt action by the hangar repair party in quickly using fire hoses down through the bomb hole in the hangar and No. 2 elevator pit quickly brought the fire below decks under control. The Engineer Repair Party, Repair 5, located in C-301-L was completely wiped out with the exception of several wounded men. The Midship Repair Party, Repair 4, sent a fire party with rescue breathers into the smoke filled damaged compartment, C-301-L, cleared the wreckage and personnel casualties, then sent a man through the bomb hole down into C-402-A where he extinguished the smoldering stores. The sprinkler damage control system in C-402-A though badly twisted and ruptured by splinters assisted in quenching the storeroom fire. 
The bomb pierced the general and battle lighting and power cables for the damaged compartment, so that the damaged area was in darkness. Searchlights were rigged with long leads to provide necessary lighting. The damaged circuits caused several repairmen to suffer slight shocks until the circuits were cut at the Distribution Board. 

Three damage control risers and one firemain riser running through C-402-A, were cutout in the forward engine room since distant control reach rods from the third deck were jammed. 

After fire hoses were secured, water to a depth of four feet covered the fourth deck in B-411-E, B-9-5AT, C-402-A, and C-408-1A, a fore and aft distance of 152 feet along the fourth deck. Using six submersible pumps the water was drained out in 10 hours.

*NOTES ON EQUIPMENT: *

*1.* The new type A Rescue Breather assisted materially in aiding the quick work of the fire parties below deck. 

*2. *The light portable electric submersible pumps, Northern Pump Company, operated very well. 

*3.* A 2-1/2" air driven portable pump, the only one on board was used to assist the electric submersible pumps, and was discovered to be much more efficient than the latter. It is recommended that 10 of the pumps be added to the allowance list and distributed to the lower deck repair stations. 

*4.* Anti-Flash clothing should be worn during battle by all personnel below decks as well as topside. 

*5.* Rubber Boots should be furnished fire parties to prevent electric shocks. 

*6.* Compartment lighting switch panels should be painted a color distinctive from that of the surrounding bulkheads. 

*GENERAL NOTES: *

*1.* Time and date: 1127, May 8,1942. 

*2.* Geographic Position: Coral Sea 
Latitude: 14° 45' S 
Longitude: 155° 10' E 


*3.* Course: Various courses to dodge bombs and torpedoes. 
Speed: 30 knots before damage 
25 knots after damage 


*4.* Drafts: Forward - 24'8" 
Aft - 29'9" 

*5.* State of sea: Moderate swell. 

*6.* Weather: Blue sky with detached clouds. 
Visibility: 30 miles. 

Damage Sustained by Machinery and Equipment Under 
Cognizance of the Engineering Department.

*DIRECT HIT BY BOMB: *

*BLAST EFFECT:* Paragraph 3-B(8-b) of reference (a). 

*1.* No. 2 elevator control drive shafting was sprung and gear boxes damaged. 

*2.* The foundation stiffening brackets on No. 7 and No. 8 forced draft blowers were cracked or broken loose from bulkhead. 

*3.* Numerous small leaks and weeps developed in economizer tubes of No. 7, 8, and 9 superheater boilers. This condition previously existed but has been considerably aggravated as a result of bomb hit. 

*4.* The distant control operating gears to main steam stop valves in forward engine room were damaged as follows: 

*A.* Starboard stop - out of line but still operative. 

*B.* Center stop - demolished above 4th deck, including shafting, gears, gear boxes, pedestal and wheel. 

*C.* Port stop - sprung out of line, wheel shattered, gear box pedestal bent. 

*5. *All overhead insulation and light fixtures were broken loose and hangar supports from main and auxiliary steam lines were sprung, from frames 106-112 starboard side forward engine room. 
SPLINTER EFFECT AND FIRE: Paragraph 3-B(8-c and d) 

*Lighting*

*1.* Lighting system 4th deck was destroyed from frames 106 to 130. Print #CV5-S64-022. 

*2.* Lighting system 3rd deck was destroyed from frames 106 to 130. Print #CV5-S64-025. 

*3.* Lighting 2nd deck - all lighting circuits in compartment C-201-L including feeders to hangar deck circuits amidships were destroyed. Print #CV5-S64-028


*Power*

*4.* 3rd and 4th decks: 
Circuits 13-F-437; 14-F-437; 15-F-437; 16-F-437 forward from panel #31. Print #CV-S62-01572 and 01575. Circuit F-452 and F-154 print #CV-S62-01575. 

*5.* 2nd deck: 
All power cable was badly damaged in compartment C-201-L, Print #CV5-S62-01578.


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## Lucky13 (Feb 9, 2009)

*Interior Communications*

*6.* 2nd deck: 
FC-14 and 15. Print #CV5-S65-0432. 
C-FW-11. Print #CV-S65-0430. 

*7.* 3rd and 4th deck: 
All 1-MC wiring C-402-A. Print #CV-S65-0328. 
Circuits 1-MC-159-157-188 and 1-MC2. Print #CV5-S65-0328. 

*UNDERWATER EXPLOSIONS:* 

*SHOCK EFFECTS: Paragraph 3-C(8) of reference (a). (Near Misses)* 

*Gyro Compasses*

*1.* Both the forward and after compasses started to oscillate erratically but soon settled on bearings that varied 3°. In approximately 3 hours the forward compass settled to normal operation though the north-south level showed slight unbalance. The after compass developed bearing trouble in the south rotor indicated by excessive heating, high rotor current, and high frequency hum. The south rotor assembly was replaced by a reconditioned spare rotor which draws excessive current in one phase. The transmitter assembly on after compass has two short circuited segments to bridge an open circuit in the winding. Rotor bearings in both compasses have approximately 20,000 operating hours and though constant attention was required prior to May 8, 1942 to insure reliable operation, their reliability is now questionable until completely overhauled and balanced in the laboratory. 

*Pneumercators*

*2.* Fifty fuel oil tank pneumercators on the port side were shattered and rendered inoperative.

*FRAGMENTATION: Paragraph 3-C(14) of reference (a) 


Degaussing Coils*
*1.* M-Coil (M-1-2-3) severed at frame 18. 
F-Coil (Group 1) severed at frame 5. 
F-Coil (Group 2) severed at frames 16 and 17. 
Print #CV5-S62/2-4 


*Enclosure D
UNDERWATER EXPLOSIONS 
*It is estimated that there were eight bomb explosions in the water very close to the vessel during the same attack the direct hit was made. Though the ship was considerably shaken by each "near miss" only in the case of two "near misses" has there been any visual determination of damage to the ship. This is noted below: 


*1.* One "near miss" from a bomb of weight estimated between 500 and 1000 lbs. released by a dive bomber exploded below the surface about 20 feet outboard of the hull abreast frame 110, port side. The three outboard fuel tanks, B-30-F, C-4-F, and C-16-F, extending from frame 99 to frame 117, and filled with fuel, developed leaks to the sea. Investigation by a diver revealed that the outer plating had been sprung and pushed in at the first riveted lap joint below the armor belt. The major damaged area of this 25 lb. shell plating extends from frame 109 to frame 115, a fore and aft length of 24 feet. Rivets in the lap joint in the damaged area are either sheared or blown completely out. The detonation wave from this explosion broke the oil tight seal in the manhole plate for C-4-F causing slight oil leakage to the fourth deck at frame 106, where the manhole is located. A sketch of damage to the shell, view from outboard below the waterline, is attached to this enclosure. 

*2.* One "near miss" from another bomb released by a dive bomber exploded instantaneously on contact with the surface, 50 feet outboard abreast frame 20, starboard. The vessel suffered no damage below the waterline from this near miss but bomb splinters struck the ship's starboard side in the area of frame 20. The splinters caused the following damage: 

*A.* The ship's shell was pierced by one splinter leaving a three inch hole five feet above the waterline at frame 22, compartment A-403-A, electrical storeroom. The thickness of the shell plating pierced was 5/8". The result was minor flooding, 4 inches of water on the compartment's deck. 

*B.* The ship's shell, 5/8" thick, was pierced once by a splinter at frame 15, 21 feet above the waterline. 

*C.* One splinter pierced the gallery walkway and severed the adjacent gasoline line at frame 20, 48 feet above the waterline. No gasoline fire resulted since the line had already been drained. 

*D.* One splinter pierced the M coil of the exterior degaussing cable severing several wires at frame 18 starboard, 44 feet above the waterline.


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## stug3 (May 8, 2013)

USS Yorktown (CV-5) operating in the vicinity of the Coral Sea, April 1942. Photographed from a TBD-1 torpedo plane that has just taken off from her deck. Other TBD and SBD aircraft are also ready to be launched.


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## stug3 (May 8, 2013)

From Battle of the Coral Sea

USS Lexington (CV-2) during the action, seen from USS Yorktown (CV-5), 8 May 1942.
Large number of planes on deck and low sun indicate that the photo was taken early in the morning, prior to launching the strike against the Japanese carrier force. Yorktown has several SBDs and F4Fs on deck with engines running, apparently preparing to take off. Lexington, whose silhouette has been altered by the earlier removal of her 8-inch gun turrets, has planes parked fore and aft, and may be respotting her deck in preparation for launching aircraft.







View on the flight deck of USS Lexington (CV-2), at about 1500 hrs. on 8 May 1942, during the Battle of the Coral Sea. The ship's air group is spotted aft, with Grumman F4F-3 fighters nearest the camera. SBD scout bombers and TBD-1 torpedo planes are parked further aft. Smoke is rising around the after aircraft elevator from fires burning in the hangar.






Destroyers alongside USS Lexington (CV-2) to assist in the carrier's abandonment, after she had been mortally damaged by fires and explosions during the afternoon of 8 May 1942.
Photographed from a cruiser (probably USS Minneapolis). Note SOC scouting plane, with a damaged wingtip, on the cruiser's port catapult.






The crew of USS Lexington abandon ship. The destroyer alongside is taking off the sick and wounded while the able-bodied are sliding down ropes and being picked up by small boats. Not a man was lost in abandoning the ship.






A heavy explosion on board USS Lexington (CV-2) blows an aircraft over her side, 8 May 1942. This is probably the "great explosion" from the detonation of torpedo warheads stowed in the starboard side of the hangar, aft, that took place just after the ship's Commanding Officer, Captain Frederick C. Sherman, left Lexington.
At left is the bow of USS Hammann (DD-412), which was backing away with a load of the carrier's survivors on board.






Burning and sinking after her crew abandoned ship during the Battle of Coral Sea, 8 May 1942.
Note planes parked aft, where fires have not yet reached.


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 18, 2013)

Thanks Lucky and Stug. Great and historic material.


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