# The 3 Fighters



## PeanutNavy (Oct 1, 2011)

Which one would you go for? The american P-51, The british Messerschmitt. Bf-109, or the Supermarine British Spitfire? Well the design of the spitfire does look fancy, so are the others, maybe the p-51 because that would probably have the best equipment, I maybe would go for the P-51.


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## evangilder (Oct 1, 2011)

"British" Messerschmitt???


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## Tangopilot89 (Oct 1, 2011)

Hi PeanutNavy, you just need to edit that post a bit. 

They were all good in their own right, but for me it's a toss-up between the P-51 and the Spitfire. If I had to choose, I'll go for the latter. The Spitfire did have its flaws, but it was and still is a beautiful aircraft. I won't deny the Mustang was brilliant though and possibly is the best 'all rounder' of the three.

Welcome the forum by the way!

Andy


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## Lighthunmust (Oct 1, 2011)

I vote for the "British" Messerschmitt BF-109. How can it lose it has the best of both Worlds?! Everyone knows mixed breeds are better than temperamental pure-breds.


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## Messy1 (Oct 1, 2011)

I would say no to the 109 simply because of the high loss rates of this aircraft during take offs and landings. In this poll, I had to go with Mustang.


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## evangilder (Oct 1, 2011)

You can compare stats, charts and performance characteristics and that will give a theoretical winner, but it still comes down to the man in the cockpit. It was often as simple as who saw who first. How many downed aviators were heard to say "I didn't see that coming"? So who would "rule" would depend on the pilot.


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## Lighthunmust (Oct 1, 2011)

Messy1 said:


> I would say no to the 109 simply because of the high loss rates of this aircraft during take offs and landings. In this poll, I had to go with Mustang.



Be careful Messy1! You may be kicking over a hornet nest. Trust me I know!


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## Readie (Oct 1, 2011)

Lighthunmust said:


> I vote for the "British" Messerschmitt BF-109. How can it lose it has the best of both Worlds?!



Ummmm.....


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## Njaco (Oct 1, 2011)

oh no, not another one of these threads.....

My vote is for the British Bf 109 with an American pilot.


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## drgondog (Oct 1, 2011)

It always goes to the tactical objectives with these three. 
If you want a tactical footprint with the largest area - projected well over enemy territory you have only one choice. 

If you wish the best point defense with balance of firepower and climb and overall performance both the 109 and Spit should be superior over the 51.

If you want performance, range and load for fighter bomber or long range recce, there is only one choice.


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## Readie (Oct 1, 2011)

Njaco said:


> oh no, not another one of these threads.....
> 
> My vote is for the British Bf 109 with an American pilot.



Fear not Chris, its not. Hence my 'whistle'...

I vote for an American BF109 flown by a Welshman.

Cheers
John


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## syscom3 (Oct 1, 2011)

evangilder said:


> You can compare stats, charts and performance characteristics and that will give a theoretical winner, but it still comes down to the man in the cockpit. It was often as simple as who saw who first. How many downed aviators were heard to say "I didn't see that coming"? So who would "rule" would depend on the pilot.



But it seemed some aircraft had the advantage more times than naught.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 2, 2011)

one on one it is always going to be the pilot or who saw who first.

one thousand on one thousand over several months and performance differences count. 

And then we are back to can all three do the same job or more correctly the same _number_ of jobs/missions.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Oct 2, 2011)

Well I would take the "British" Bf 109 only because the Messerschmitt is my favorite aircraft.

In the end though it is the aircraft with the better pilot. The Mustang had one thing that neither had though. It had the range to take the fight wherever it was needed. 

P.S. I should edit the poll to say "German Messerschmitt Bf 109", but then it would kind of take away the humor of this thread, so I wont. I think the forum needs some humor...


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## PeanutNavy (Oct 2, 2011)

I always did think the p-51 was the best wwii aircraft in the world, is it? And the spitfire is my favorite, but i'm still going for the p-51.


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## Readie (Oct 3, 2011)

PeanutNavy said:


> I always did think the p-51 was the best wwii aircraft in the world, is it? And the spitfire is my favorite, but i'm still going for the p-51.



Think of the P51 as a spin off from the Spitfire and you are on the money PNN


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## Rogi (Oct 3, 2011)

I'll also vote for the British Bf-109 with American pilot and Russian Pit Crew.


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## riacrato (Oct 4, 2011)

Out of the three the Mustang is obviously superior to the other two in most aspects and overall balancing. Should be noted it's also a few years younger so somewhat unfair to compare two ageing designs against it. Unless you'd compare Mk IX, Bf 109 G and P-51*A*. That'd be more interesting.


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## Readie (Oct 4, 2011)

riacrato said:


> Out of the three the Mustang is obviously superior to the other two in most aspects and overall balancing. Should be noted it's also a few years younger so somewhat unfair to compare two ageing designs against it. Unless you'd compare Mk IX, Bf 109 G and P-51*A*. That'd be more interesting.



If you could take the parts of the 3 aircraft in question to make one fighter, which parts would you all choose?

Engine
Armament
Climb
and so on.

Cheers
John


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## parsifal (Oct 4, 2011)

I would vote for the british Me 109...if Messherschmidt is making planes for Britian in 1939, who are making fighters for the Germans????? Maybe a He 100, or He 112? Hawker, Supermarine AND Me on the same team.....now that would be an awsome team......


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## stona (Oct 5, 2011)

PeanutNavy said:


> I always did think the p-51 was the best wwii aircraft in the world, is it? And the spitfire is my favorite, but i'm still going for the p-51.



It was in Europe,if you needed to fly a long way and have a decent fighter. If you got involved in a turning fight with either of the other two you would probably be glad of a parachute! All three machines had strengths and weaknesses.
It's horses for courses.

Timewise it's fair to compare them. They are all 1930s,pre war,designs,The P-51 is only three years younger than the Spitfire.

If I was going into a dogfight I'd take the Spitfire. If I took my Spitfire on an escort mission I'd run out of fuel before I got to the fight! I'd be happy to take on a P-51 in a Bf109........you can see what's happening here.

Cheers
Steve


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## riacrato (Oct 10, 2011)

The NA-73X flew for the first time in octobre 1940, more than 4 years after the K5054 and more than 5 years after the first Bf 109. 5 years was a lot back then.


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## Marcel (Oct 11, 2011)

Can we have a german P51 please? I would vote for that


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## drgondog (Oct 12, 2011)

Anybody that chooses the P-51B/C/D automatically compliments their respective Bomber Command forces in daylight. Far superior choice due to the tactical footprint and equal/near equal performance at all altitudes..


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## riacrato (Oct 12, 2011)

I chose P-51 and I don't compliment the respective bomber force. I base my choice solely on performance and cost effectiveness.


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## Readie (Oct 12, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Hawker, Supermarine AND Me on the same team.....now that would be an awsome team......



There was collaboration Michael. If it had been left to the engineers and not a certain lunatic you may have had the plane you describe.
Cheers
John


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## parsifal (Oct 17, 2011)

Against whom? The Soviets I suppose.....


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## davebender (Oct 19, 2011)

*Short range. Me-109.*
The Me-109 and Spitfire are about evenly matched if you pick models produced during the same time frame. Both aircraft are overall superior to the P-51 in aerial combat at most altitudes. Production cost breaks the tie. The Me-109 was dirt cheap to mass produce.


*Long Range. P-51.*
No contest as the Me-109 and Spitfire were both short range aircraft.

This category means more then bomber escort. The P-51 had enough endurance that it could loiter over an area using only internal fuel. Once the drop tanks were gone Spitfires and Me-109s had to complete the task at hand and then return to base.


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## Readie (Oct 21, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Against whom? The Soviets I suppose.....



Not necessarily. There was 'sharing' aka nicking of ideas in the 30's.


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## drgondog (Oct 21, 2011)

The other obvious advantage the Mustang had over the other two - related to range - was the ability to travel anywhere in Germany on a tactical basis and raise havoc over rear area airfields, rail and barge traffic. No lw pilot could feel truly secure taking off and landing - ditto for relative security of locomotives and barges in the logistics chain.


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## nuuumannn (Oct 22, 2011)

RNZAF P-51D, because the war was over by then and boy, those young guys had a lot of fun blatting round the vast empty New Zealand skies.


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## Glider (Oct 23, 2011)

I went for the P51 because it could do something the others couldn't, i.e go a long way from home and take on anyone on an equal basis


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## davebender (Oct 23, 2011)

Not during 1939 to 1943, when the war's outcome was decided.


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## Glider (Oct 24, 2011)

I would suggest that few people in 1943 knew how the war would be resolved, only that Gerrmany wouldn't take the UK. A solution similar to China/Taiwan was more than possible, with Germany hanging on to Europe (China), the UK staying free (Taiwan) and Russia at a stalemate, i,e a draw. Remember that we are looking back with far more accurate information than the people had at the time.

I would argue that it was the 1943/44 period that decided the outcome of the war so the importance of the P51 is still valid


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## davebender (Oct 24, 2011)

I agree the P-51 was important. So was the Fw-190D9 and many other late war aircraft. However their importance pales in comparison to aircraft such as the Me-109 and Spitfire which fought the war from beginnng to end and in ever increasing numbers.


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## Glider (Oct 24, 2011)

Its only my view but in terms of importance to the ending of the war no fighter could match the importance of the Mustang. In many ways it was a major influence, if only for its range which gave it a unique strategic edge. 

Don't get me wrong, if I knew I was going into a battle with these aircraft I would happily fly the Spitfire, but if I was commanding a battle I would go for the Mustang. Its range gave it far more options from a strategic perspective than the others.


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## parsifal (Oct 26, 2011)

Difficult to see how fighters were critical to the outcome of the war, except with one or two exceptioons. Spits contributed to the critical victory in 1940, whilst P-51s achieved a further victory in 1944. What battle of strategic significance did the Me 109 win in the interim? They lost (despite inflicting heavy losses) over france in 1941-2, lost over Africa and the med, lost in the East (to the extent of being unable to stop the Russians), were withdrawn from Italy in 1943, did not make any showing of importance over france in 1944, and lost over germany in 1944-5. Whats significant about anything they did after 1940????????


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## Njaco (Oct 26, 2011)

They covered the Balkan campaign fairly well in 1941. Even when pitted against other 109s.

They won the first year or so over Russia. At least until 1942.


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## riacrato (Oct 26, 2011)

Lost '41 in the west? Hardly.Moreover they won 1940 over the whole west of Europe and 1939 over Poland didn't they?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Oct 26, 2011)

I believe he is refering to BoB...


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## riacrato (Oct 26, 2011)

The way I read it he thinks the Bf 109's contribution prior BoB wasn't significant enough, whereas the Spitfire's contribution in the BoB was. Granted the BoB was a pure air battle, I don't think the bigger picture would've changed that much with the RAF only operating Hurricanes. To see whatever happened in '41 in the air over western europe as a defeat of the LW or the Bf 109 in particular is extremely misleading, to say the least.


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## parsifal (Oct 28, 2011)

I am not claimig the 109 was not a capable aircraft or that it did not win victories. The key to my statements is the word "strategic". What, of strategic importance, did the me 109(or in fact, most fighters) actually achieve. There are not many events that it can be said they made a big difference.

People have zeroed in on the me109, but remeber i didnt isolate or single out the Me109 as anything unusual or peculiar. But it seems we are fixated on the me109 for reasons i dont understand, so i guess I will have to respond

Despit its obvious capability as apotent fighter, what did the Me 109 actually achieve? it has been suggested it was responsible for the victories in France and the low countries in 1939-40. I disagree. The fighter opposition was so weak in those countries that the Germans could have fielded just bombers and achieved the same outcomes. The fighters added froth and frill to the German victory, but the actual work was done by their flying artillery. There is one exception that i am prepred to concede......the defence of the bridges at Sedan, where the 109s were critical in defeating the allied interdiction attempts. even here, it may well have been the efforts of the flak forces that were critical compared to thyose of the fighter arm. 

Some may argue that the 109s were critical in defending the german bombers. Well, to an extent, yes, but losses to german bomber forces remained heavy despite these efforts. the LW lost over 36% of its force structure in the six weeks of the french campaign....over Poland losses amounted to over 500 aircraft, most on combat operations, but around 40% to non-combat reasons. 

Over britain, the Germans were effective, but they still failed to achieve anything of strategic importance. Things of strategic importance were, however, inflicted on them. They failed to achieve the neccessary air superiority to finish off the brits. The RAF remained a potent threat to the Lw, and shot down a lot of German aircraft to boot. The defeat over britain began the long slow steady slide to defeat for the LW.

The claim that the LW actually won their battles over france in 1941 is also untrue. The LW did not stop the RAF from mounting its attacks, and could not retaliate in kind. Losses for the RAF were heavy, no argument about that, but by years end, the RAF had achieved air superiority over most of western europe despite these losses. Before trying to argue, 'no they didnt" it would be wise to understand just what the term "air superiority actually means. The British did not enjoy "air suopremacy" which is a different concept, but they could conduct operations over france and western europe (except for Germany) with a fair degree of impunity. by comparison, and applying the theory correctly, the germans only enjoyed air parity. what this means is that they could inflict heavy losses on the RAF, but not heavy enough to claim superiority, they could undertake a limited number of mission types, but not all types of missions, and they had lost control of certain key areas of airspace, like those areas close to the channel and southern England.

In Russia, despite the impressive tallies chalked up by the german fighter pilots, they were largely irrelevant to the outcome. Russian aircrew were so badly trained at that time that no fighters in the eeast would have made no difference. Stukas could operate with virtual impunity for the first year of the war. The German fighters, moreover, had virtually no impact on reducing losses fior the LW. It was the conditions, rather than the opposition that caused the majority of the losses in that first year of the war. 

So, to reiterate, victories there were a plenty for the 109, but strategic victories were virtually nonexistent. and, as i said, finding strategic victories for any fighter is actually difficult to find. they are a rare bird.


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## nuuumannn (Oct 28, 2011)

Rogi said:


> I'll also vote for the British Bf-109 with American pilot and Russian Pit Crew.



Hell No! The Russians would drink all the glycol and steal the fuel to sell on the black market, the Americans would complain about the tiny cockpit and lack of space for putting their lunch boxes and if the Bf 109 were British it would have only machine guns for armament and would be entirely made of wood!


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## nuuumannn (Oct 28, 2011)

...And before ya know it, some smartie pants is going to refer to the wooden fins on later Bf 109s... Betcha.


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## riacrato (Oct 28, 2011)

The Bf 109 was the main workhorse of the German fighter force from day 1 until the end of WW2. So unless you deny the LW fighter force any strategic importance it is, by this fact alone, of strategic importance.

You say the outcome of the battles prior BoB would've been the same without the Bf 109. Debatable. Replace all Spitfires in the BoB with Hurricanes and the outcome would also have been the same. But to you the Spitfire is significant whereas the Bf 109 is not? 

You say the LW didn't "win" in the west in 1941, did the RAF "win"? There was no battle with strategic outcome over France in that timeframe it was all in all a pretty useless bickering that achieved nothing for either side in the strategical sense (except psychologically), but the RAF devoted significantly more resources and suffered significantly more losses. I won't even bother to challenge or discuss your defintions and points of view on who had air superiority / supremacy / whatever as that factor alone is useless unless you can exploit it effectively. Which the RAF clearly couldn't in 1941. And the "failure" of the LW to completely stop RAF operations (which wasn't their declared goal anyways), has much more to do with a) the little threat those operations posed at the time and b) the much more important front to the east that needed support. The fact that most of the fighter force could be removed without much worry (at that time at least) can be interpreted either way: As a success of the remaining (Bf 109-equipped) JG or as a failure of the RAF to conduct operations with any meaningful tactical or strategical outcome.

No Bf 109s in the east would first of all mean many more Soviet fighters, attackers and bombers not being destroyed in the first few weeks of the war. I would have to guess how many of the over 30.000 IL-2s built were shot down by Bf 109s (not even counting bombers, recce and other planes) but I have a feeling that the number is significant enough to say the Bf 109 had a strategic impact over that front. Even the Jabo support that is usually forgotten was of some importance.


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## Glider (Oct 28, 2011)

If I could throw in my tuppence worth.

I believe that without the Me109E the air battle prior to the BOB may well have resulted in a different outcome. The French and even the Poles believed that the Me 109 B-D were not a significant danger and the 109E made a significant difference to the Battle for Europe.

I also believe that the 109 in numbers made a significant strategic difference in the East until the Fw 190 arrived upon the scene. From then on in the Fw was a better aircraft for the war against Russia. That was also the case in 1941/2 in France. The RAF didn't have a major concern about the Me109, it was the FW190 they were worried about.

Its also true to say that in the Middle East the 109 made a difference as it was much better than the Hurricane and P40 it was up against, until the Spitfire arrived upon the scene. Once that happened, RAF losses dropped dramatically and the balance of power changed.

As for the Strategic value of the Spitfire. Its main claim was that it stopped the Luftwaffe getting a techincal advantage from the BOB to the end of the war. Initially against the Me109 and later the Fw190. The Spitfire also gave the RAF a priceless but often forgotten strategic advantage, namely PR. From early in the war it flew over Europe and parts of Germany almost at will, even in daylight, recording every move the Germans made in Europe. There were Me109 PR versions but they had serious losses and the Luftwaffe were often stopped almost completely from completing their missions

The Spitfire was also a better GA aircraft, not a great one I grant you, but better than the Me109 and that flexibility in itself is a strategic advantage.


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## parsifal (Oct 28, 2011)

Actual losses in Il-2s/Il-10s 1941-5 were about 10700: 533 in 1941, 1,676 in 1942, 3,515 in 1943, 3,347 in 1944 and 1,691 in 1945. According to Westermann ('Flak - German Antiaircraft in WWII) at least 35% of losses were due to the activities of the flak units on the Eastern Front. Sturmoviks suffered particularly badly at the hands of the flak arm because of the way they were used....flying low and in tight formation is a good way to get yourself shot down by flak. Sturmoviks had an average airframe life of only 26 sorties which equates to about 2-3 months flying on average. After that they tended to be no longer airworthy. That suggests in turn a relatively high attrition rate to non-combat causes. Possibly the attition rate might be 30-40% per month to non-combat sources. By comparison Allied non-combat attition was about 15-20% and German attrition on the eastern front was about 25-30% of the force structure every month (some airframes were repaired and returned). So if Westermans exhaustive study is even half right,m and the Soviets were suffering about 30% losses to other sources that leaves about 25-30% due to enemy (german) aircraft. Thats about 3-4000. however roughly half the fighters on the eastern front were FW190s. If we assume an even split of Soviet IL-2 losses between the Fw and Me units,m then the Mes were responsible for the loss of around 1500-2000 Il-2s and Il-10s during the war. A far cry from the claimed 30000.

Even German records dont claim that many losses. In 1943 the claimed total losses were 6900,m whilst in 1944 they claimed to have destroyed 7100. This number includes flak claims. So unless something really magical happened in 1942 and 1945 there simply is no possibility of 30000 Il-2s being bagged by the 109s on the eastern front. 

now to shoot down that force of Sturmoviks along with the other Soviet Bombes that were lost the Luftwaffe had to make substantial committments on the eastern front and had to suffer exceptionally heavy attritional losses in the process. When Hitler turned his forces east in 1941, about 65% of the Luftwaffe was committed to the attack. There was a slight reduction towards the end of the year as forces were transferred west to counter the threats posed by the british on the western front and southern fronts. But even so,m for most of 1942,m about 50% of the LW was operating in the east. this continued into 1943,m at about 40% of the force structure. In 1944 and 45 it dropped to about 30%. The fighters committed to the Eastern Front were rather less than that.....in 1943 there were about 400 fighters on the eastern front and around 800 on the west,m over Germany and in the South. If we assume 25% of the fighters were deployed on the eastern front we would not be too far out. If 25% were deployed there, then roughly 25% of fighter losses are going to be suffered on that front. whilst the Soviets were less effective at shooting down the LW the weather and terrain was harsher so losses to other causes was higher....much higher

I do not know the precise extent of LW losses on the eastern Front. I do know that the Germans claimed to have destroyed 77000 Soviet Aircraft but Krivosheev only admits to 46000. The Soviets claim to have destroyed 52000 LW A/C due to combat to which should be added about another 30% or so due to non-combat attrition. Extrapolating we will find around 35-40000 LW aircraft lost on the eastern front to destroy around 46000 plus maybe another 20000 to noncombat causes for the Soviets. 

If you look at the issue in those terms all of a sudden the vaunted superiority of the Jagdwaffe and indeed the effectiveness of fighters to achieve a strategic advantage becomes highly questionable. oh they are needed alright but only because the opposition is bound to have them. But for the eastern front,m the fighters of either side never dominated the battlefield. They inflicted some losses but not catastrophically so. The Russians realized this halfway through the war and proceeeded to only put enough effort into the air battle as to keep losses tolerable. They were never interested in achieving air superiority after 1943. They just wanted to bomb the crap out of the Germans and keep the german fighters off their backs long enough to do that. The distances the scarcity of forces enabled them to do just that....which is why fighters on the eastern front were not strategically relevant. Necessary,m like air and petrol,m b ut they were never going to achive anything of strategic significance


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## riacrato (Oct 29, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Actual losses in Il-2s/Il-10s 1941-5 were about 10700: 533 in 1941, 1,676 in 1942, 3,515 in 1943, 3,347 in 1944 and 1,691 in 1945. According to Westermann ('Flak - German Antiaircraft in WWII) at least 35% of losses were due to the activities of the flak units on the Eastern Front. Sturmoviks suffered particularly badly at the hands of the flak arm because of the way they were used....flying low and in tight formation is a good way to get yourself shot down by flak. Sturmoviks had an average airframe life of only 26 sorties which equates to about 2-3 months flying on average. After that they tended to be no longer airworthy. That suggests in turn a relatively high attrition rate to non-combat causes. Possibly the attition rate might be 30-40% per month to non-combat sources. By comparison Allied non-combat attition was about 15-20% and German attrition on the eastern front was about 25-30% of the force structure every month (some airframes were repaired and returned). So if Westermans exhaustive study is even half right,m and the Soviets were suffering about 30% losses to other sources that leaves about 25-30% due to enemy (german) aircraft. Thats about 3-4000. however roughly half the fighters on the eastern front were FW190s. If we assume an even split of Soviet IL-2 losses between the Fw and Me units,m then the Mes were responsible for the loss of around 1500-2000 Il-2s and Il-10s during the war. A far cry from the claimed 30000.
> 
> Even German records dont claim that many losses. In 1943 the claimed total losses were 6900,m whilst in 1944 they claimed to have destroyed 7100. This number includes flak claims. So unless something really magical happened in 1942 and 1945 there simply is no possibility of 30000 Il-2s being bagged by the 109s on the eastern front.
> 
> ...


 
1. I never claimed the LW (let alone the Bf 109) shot down 30000 IL-2s.
2. The rest had little to nothing to do with the significance of the Bf 109.


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## parsifal (Oct 29, 2011)

Ah, so now you do want to talk to me....

You did say "_I would have to guess how many of the over 30.000 IL-2s built were shot down by Bf 109s (not even counting bombers, recce and other planes) but I have a feeling that the number is significant enough to say the Bf 109 had a strategic impact over that front_".....now you dont have to guess, Me 109s were responsible for the destruction of about 1500 IL-2.....so the committment of up to 65% of the LWs fighters (at the beginning of the war....overall it was about 30% of their fighter strength) was able shoot down 5% of the total production run of IL-2s. 

How is that of strategic importance??

Oh, and my statements were never specifically about the Me109, yours were. my statements were about the ability of fighters generally to win strategic advantage. One of your responses was that the me 109 was able to win strategic advantage, and you implied that they achieved that by shooting down large numbers of IL-2s on the Eastern Front. You made that claim by "guessing". I just relieved you of the need to guess....


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## riacrato (Oct 29, 2011)

I never said the Bf 109 claimed or destroyed 30,000 IL-2. Period.

You relieved me of my need to guess with your "guesstimation"? Hardly.

The nature of the fighter aircraft will always place it in a secondary role in a war that is fought mostly on the ground, that doesn't mean they are not of strategic significance.


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## parsifal (Oct 29, 2011)

My figures arent guesses, the losses for il-2 are taken from Krivosheev. The figures for LW committment to the east is from a couple of sources, but the primary one is Hayward. My figures for German flak achievments comes from Westermann, who has written the best english work on the LW flak arm to date. 

The only figure I have had to extrapolate is the division between Me109s, and the rest of the german fighters committed to the East. If you want to claim all 7000 or so of the IL-2s shot down by German aircraft as being attributable to me 109s, go ahead, but if you want to apply logic to the problem, you will concede that only a proportion of those losses are attributable to Me109s. The logical thing to do, when you have a large sample, is to split the losses proportionally, and since 109s were about 50% of the SE fighters on the eastern Front, it seems perfectly reasonable to me to attribute half the kills to them.

Or are you going to argue about that as well and try and say that is not logical to do that. If you have figures for 109 victories over Il-2s for the eastern front, I invite you to shut me up and produce them. if you dont, then dont try and argue that logical extrapolation of the known fact is somehow equivalent to your gratuitous "guesswork'. Or that somehow, my logic is "highly questionable" as you claimed some posts earlier. If you have facts produce them, if not, I suggest you leave the kitchen before your fingers are burnt. 

I never said that fighters were not necessary, or not of strategic importance. What I claimed, is that fighters with one or two notable exceptions did not generally achieve strategic advantage. read the words carefully and understand the difference between the words you are attempting to attribute to me, and what i am actually saying. fighters dont win strategic victories, they just avoid strategic defeats. There is a difference, a big one. they were needed to avoid dfeat, but they seldom could achieve victory or significant strategic advantage. i did not single out the germans, or the Me 109, you did. You started this dialogue by attempting to claim that Me109s were responsible for the victories in the west, that somehow I was singling out the Me 109 and no others, and then stumbled blindly into a discussion about the eastern front, mouthing generalities and near political slogans without knowing the slightest facts about what you were actually talking about.

Didnt you.....

Now your position has changed. I see you are now saying they play a secondary role to other aircraft in achieving victory. that I can agree with. At last you are starting to look at the issue, and not the man, and using the grey matter between your ears to think about the problem. 

Now, if you apply that position, which you have arrived at, hooray for that.....which is, that fighters, by themselves cannot achieve victories, they play second fiddle to other aircraft, then what were the germans exactly thinking in 1944 when they all but abandone production of bombers, so as to concentrate on fighter production. If they thought about the issue even a little, they would have realized that their production choices could not deliver them victory. the best they could hope for was a little time gained, but for what??????

As I said at the beginning of this little discussion, there is no strategic advantage for building fighters. Or at least mostly no advantage


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## tomo pauk (Oct 29, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Actual losses in Il-2s/Il-10s 1941-5 were about 10700: 533 in 1941, 1,676 in 1942, 3,515 in 1943, 3,347 in 1944 and 1,691 in 1945. According to Westermann ('Flak - German Antiaircraft in WWII) at least 35% of losses were due to the activities of the flak units on the Eastern Front. Sturmoviks suffered particularly badly at the hands of the flak arm because of the way they were used....flying low and in tight formation is a good way to get yourself shot down by flak. Sturmoviks had an average airframe life of only 26 sorties which equates to about 2-3 months flying on average. After that they tended to be no longer airworthy. That suggests in turn a relatively high attrition rate to non-combat causes. Possibly the attition rate might be 30-40% per month to non-combat sources. By comparison Allied non-combat attition was about 15-20% and German attrition on the eastern front was about 25-30% of the force structure every month (some airframes were repaired and returned). So if Westermans exhaustive study is even half right,m and the Soviets were suffering about 30% losses to other sources that leaves about 25-30% due to enemy (german) aircraft. Thats about 3-4000. however roughly half the fighters on the eastern front were FW190s. If we assume an even split of Soviet IL-2 losses between the Fw and Me units,m then the Mes were responsible for the loss of around 1500-2000 Il-2s and Il-10s during the war. A far cry from the claimed 30000.
> 
> ...



If I'm reading this right, VVS their satellites have, as of summer 1945, some 19000 IL-2s on disposal, since, out of produced 30K, there was a loss of 10700, both in combat operationally? BTW, the Fw-190 appeared at East some 15 months after Barbarossa started - perhaps the ratio of flown sorties was 3:2 in Bf-109's favor, not 1:1?


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## parsifal (Oct 29, 2011)

Not sure how many Il-2s were available at the end of the war. You may be right to give some weighting towards the 109 because of its longer service.

I have some figures somewhere on Soviet air strength at the end of the war somewhere. might not be able to get a completely accurate number, but we would have figures on strike aircraft. Given that the majority of Soviet strike aircraft were either Lend Lease, Pe2s, Il10s, Il2s and a few Tu2s we can at least get an idea of how many Il-2s were left at the end. 

According to Ellis, the VVs had about 17000 A/C on strength. Moyhnihan ("Claws Of the Bear") puts their frontline strength at well over 25000 a/c

This link may also be of some help

Íåêîòîðûå ñòàòèñòè÷åñêèå ìàòåðèàëû ïî èçó÷åíèþ èñòîðèè Âòîðîé ìèðîâîé âîéíû


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## tomo pauk (Oct 29, 2011)

FWIW, Soviets have produced, from (mid?)1941-(mid?)45, some 120 000 fighters , bombers and attack planes (37K just of those), while receiving (correct me if I'm wrong) ~ 20 000 LL planes of the same category. That makes 140K received. Now we subtract the number of available planes just post war (17K, or 25K+) and arrive at 123K, or 115K planes lost one way or another.
Attack planes make almost 25% of planes received (in 3 'combat' categories), so does it mean that those same attack planes make out 25% of all losses? If so, that's some 30K lost in that category.


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## parsifal (Oct 29, 2011)

Youve forgotten trainers in your totals. Soviets produced 157000 aircraft of all types during the war. 

Trying to reverse engineer losses by looking at total numbers produced and then strengths at the end of the war doesnt work very well. as an example, US produced 324000 airplanes, and ended the war with about 60000 a/c on strength. they gave away about 50-60000 as Lend Lease. one could say if we were to base our calculations on numbers produced and numbers left at the end of it, that the US lost 200000 aircraft during the war. That however is known to be wrong. in Europe (which absorbed by far the majority of losses) USAAC losses to enemy action were about 20000. they lost another 18000 to non combat related causes. In the continental US they lost about 9500 a/c, mostly in training accidents. In all of the rest of the world they lost 4500 in combat, and about 5000 in non combat related incidents. if you add all of that up, total losses come to about 59000 a/c lost. What happened to the other 140000 US aircraft. The answer is....i dont know.

Same thing happens when you look at all the nationalities. Germany for example produced 189000 a/c during the war. most histories concede they lost at least 60000 a/c due to combat, and about another 50000 to noncombat related causes. that leaves 79000 aircraft unnaccounted for. were there 79000 aircraft in the LW, or even in the reserve stores at the end of the war. Answer is no. Where did they go. Havent a clue, but neither do i think they fell out of the sky as losses. 

Krivosheev says the soviets lost 46000 aircraft during the war. I dont think he includes losses to non-combat causes in that total. if the Soviets suffered a similar attrition rate as the germans to non-combat related causes, then they are likely to have lost about another 30-35000 aircraft making a total of about 75-80000 a/c lost during the war. With the 20000 Lend lease aircraft thrown in, they should have 100000 a/c at the end of the war, but instead they have maybe 30000. What happened to the other 70000....same as the Americans, I dont have a clue. its just one of those statistical anomalies that I have never been able to answer.


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## Njaco (Oct 30, 2011)

> ...responsible for the victories in France and the low countries in 1939-40. I disagree. The fighter opposition was so weak in those countries that the Germans could have fielded just bombers and achieved the same outcomes.



I'm not sure I agree totally with this. In 1940, the Low Countries and France had effective fighters in the D.520, Fokker G1 and Fokker DXXI as well as few capable pilots. Unescorted LW bombers would have been hit hard. Rotterdam was hit only AFTER the skies had been swept clean of defending fighters.



> There is one exception that i am prepred to concede......the defence of the bridges at Sedan, where the 109s were critical in defeating the allied interdiction attempts.


And the attacks on the Maas by RAF Battles in May 1940 were decimated by Bf 109s and 110s.

The Bf 109 did its part very well in the early part of the war. But after 1942 and with the Fw 190 introduced, I think it was more of a band-aid on a gaping flesh wound.

parsifal, would you consider the air component of the Channel Dash as a successful strategic victory?


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## parsifal (Oct 30, 2011)

Njaco said:


> I'm not sure I agree totally with this. In 1940, the Low Countries and France had effective fighters in the D.520, Fokker G1 and Fokker DXXI as well as few capable pilots. Unescorted LW bombers would have been hit hard. Rotterdam was hit only AFTER the skies had been swept clean of defending fighters.
> 
> 
> And the attacks on the Maas by RAF Battles in May 1940 were decimated by Bf 109s and 110s.
> ...




The Germans, like everyone else needed fighters , so in that sense they were of strategic importance. But the question is, did they achieve strategic advantage? Given the heavy losses sustained by the germans during the BOF and the Low countries, its hard to say they were needed to reduce losses. The majority of losses, when you factor in non-operational losses and flak losses, appear to occur regardless of fighters being there.

To me achieving an advantage of strategic proportions, the fighters would need to demonstrate they could deny airspace to an enemy at a lower cost than that which was meted out on themselves. Because most losses occur regardless of enemy action, this cannot be achieved, whatever the fighters are doing, and regardless of how good the fighters actually are. they are needed to avoid catqastyrophic losses, but they cant achieve one sided victories themselves (except if the enemy doesnt have them, and this almost never happened) .

I would consider the battles alsong the Maas the same part of the engagement I mentioned earlier.

The Channel dash is a hard classification. In many ways it was a retreat made out to look like a victory. If the british had managed to actually sink or disable one of the BCs it would have been an even bigger loss for the Germans than it actually was. In any event people forget what actually happened....the Gneisenau got back to port, went into refit, got bombed, and never went back to sea. Scharnhorst transferred to Northern Germany, became part of the fleet in being that certainly tied down resources, but did not achieve much of worth after thqat redployment. 

So, applying the test of "was anything of strategic significance achieved, I would have top reluctantly say no. Reluctantly, because the other side of the coin is that on that day, viewed in isolation, the LW fighters were very effective at taking a piece of sky above the BCs and denying it to the British. It that narrow sense it was a victory, though I hesitate to call it a strategic victory, when it was working to achieve a defeat. 

I have thought of another battle where fighters achieved a strategically important result. This time it was in the pacific, in the marianas in 1944. it was the battle tyhat destroyed the japanese carrier fleet, and allowed the establishgment of bomber bases that could hit Japan and broke the martianas barrier. A strategically important result


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## Tante Ju (Oct 31, 2011)

Njaco said:


> I'm not sure I agree totally with this. In 1940, the Low Countries and France had effective fighters in the D.520, Fokker G1 and Fokker DXXI as well as few capable pilots. Unescorted LW bombers would have been hit hard. Rotterdam was hit only AFTER the skies had been swept clean of defending fighters.



I agree - LW enjoyed a great level of air superiority in Poland, France, Yugoslavia and Greece, and Russia 1941. German fighters achieved this airsuperiority, which was key to German success in this campaigns. Fighter ensure own bombers can strike hard into enemy land, and enemy bomber cannot. Up to about 1943, German bomber could strike target hard, and enemy bomber cannot. I think this is summary of effectiveness of German fighter force very well. 

Also unescorted German bombers - people forget how serious German air force losses were over France. Heavier than over England actual. So if one say there was no effective opposition in air - he is very wrong.

Also needs to think very careful about why there was very few British bomber seen in daylight over Europe through war.. German clearly had air superiority over Europe until about 1943, fighter were important in this. Then it slowly began to change. First they lost it in one front, than another front too, then in 1944 everywhere.


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## Glider (Oct 31, 2011)

Tante Ju said:


> I agree - LW enjoyed a great level of air superiority in Poland, France, Yugoslavia and Greece, and Russia 1941. German fighters achieved this airsuperiority, which was key to German success in this campaigns. Fighter ensure own bombers can strike hard into enemy land, and enemy bomber cannot. Up to about 1943, German bomber could strike target hard, and enemy bomber cannot. I think this is summary of effectiveness of German fighter force very well.
> 
> Also unescorted German bombers - people forget how serious German air force losses were over France. Heavier than over England actual. So if one say there was no effective opposition in air - he is very wrong.
> 
> Also needs to think very careful about why there was very few British bomber seen in daylight over Europe through war.. German clearly had air superiority over Europe until about 1943, fighter were important in this. Then it slowly began to change. First they lost it in one front, than another front too, then in 1944 everywhere.



I agree with a lot of this apart from the last paragraph. No 2 Group flew regular missions over Europe with pretty light losses. They were well escorted and were often the bait to try and get the Luftwaffe to attack, but even so they could and often did fly more or less at will. Although rarer the main force sometimes took part in daylight missions. On 17th October 1942 94 Lancasters undertook a daylight raid on Le Creusot 300 miles inside France, no Lancasters were lost. You would be hard pressed to find any German raid in daylight that flew so far behind the front line.

Taking todays date as a marker.

In 1941 there were anti shipping flights no contact was made
In 1942 17 Bostons bombed power stations in France 1 was lost. A small force of 14 Wellingtons bombed Emden and Essen in Germany, 1 was lost 
In 1943 there were no daylight raids

In 1942 the number of daylight raids was larger than most people realise.

In the week either side of the 31st October 1942 there were daylight raids on 9 of these days. They were small raids granted, but the point is made that the RAF flew over France and Germany in daylight on a regular basis. Pick any day as a reference point in 1942 and a similar picture will emerge.


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## parsifal (Oct 31, 2011)

This is the problem with claiming the LW fighters reduced losses for theur bombers.......they didnt. The LW suffered losses of roughly 36% of their force structure in the BoF. Moreover, if you delve a little deeper than that, and compare the deep penetration, unescorted raids carried out by the LW to the shorter ranged escorted raids there is little difference in the loss rates. Most of the time, incidentally LW fighters werent even escorting the bombers in France, they were flying patrols over their own skies to deny the airspace to enemy strike aircraft. In this they were highly successful, but then Allied bombers were hardly of any strategic significance. There were about 200 french bombers at the beginning of the campaign and some further bomber numbers under RAF control. RAF bombers were mostly used to attack strategic targets in the Ruhr, with no results.

So, over france the German bombers operated generally without fighter escort, and suffered roughly 36% losses during the 5 week campaign. Compare that to the BOB, where the bomber forces of the LW were as heavily escorted as was possible. There were two distinct phases in the BoB, as far as the LW fighters were concerned, one where they operated free range, using the bombers essentially as bait,, and one where they were tied to close escort, with orders to provide direct close protection to the bombers, in order to reduce their losses

AFAIK, there was little difference in the loss rates for the German bombers in either phase, it didnt matter whether the fighters were flying aggressively or defensively the bombers were still suffering more or less the same loss rates. if we take a step back and say the Bob was different to the BOF, because during the BoB German bombers were escorted, and largely in the BoF they were not, there is not much difference in the loss rates. just looking roughly, during the Bob total losses (Fighters and Bombers) amounted to about 1800 aircraft over roughly 12 weeks, thats about 75% of the commencing force structure. If we adjust those figes down to equate to the 5 weeks of the BoF the loss rate is roughly 31 or 32% of the force structure. The efforts of the german fighters amounted to less than a 4-5% reduction of losses. If we look at the flip side, and look at the allied loss rates of aircraft lost in the air, loss rates are not much different either.

I'll say it again, fighters were needed as a defensive measure, but consistently failed to reduce losses for most situations, consistently failed to deny airspace to an enemy, and consistently fail to achieve numerical losses different to the losses suffered by their own side. They were necessary, but unable to achieve significant strategic advantage. Applies to everyone, not just the Germans

Bitter pill I know, but look at the numbers unemotively and you will come to the samer conclusions yourselves.


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## tomo pauk (Oct 31, 2011)

German (day) fighters consistently denied German air space for RAF USAAC prior 1944 (and inflicting greater losses than receiving them, between Germany and Atlantic, same time frame). They were instrumental in swithing RAF bombers from day to night attacks, IIRC.
RAF fighters were extracting a major toll at LW bombers - denying the air space for LW that is.
The amount of losses to VVS bombers (and fighters) in 1941-42 was horrendous, wasn't it? 
The ability of USAAC long-range fighters to achieve air superiority over German soil is well proven, too.

One can just imagine the horror for German ground forces, had the Stormovik's were to roam free. Those received rear gunners from 1943 on (with cost for numbers produced) - LW fighters were seen as a considerable threat I assume.


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## parsifal (Oct 31, 2011)

To determine whether germany held air superiority over europe we first of all need to understand what the various states of air control are

These are the accepted states as defined by NATO

_"Air supremacy" is defined as the condition when the enemy air force is in-capable of effective interference. Through the complete destruction of the enemy air forces, this condition is the ultimate goal of an air campaign. Yet, this condition may be difficult or even impossible to achieve. It may occur however, through the establishment of a diplomatic "no-fly zone". Under the condition of air supremacy, the air commander employs all of his aircraft at will. 

"Air superiority" is defined as the condition when the conduct of all types of operations is possible at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the enemy. This is a necessary and obligatory condition to attain success in combat and overall victory in a war. The most efficient method of attaining air superiority is to attack enemy aviation assets close to their source at maintenance and launch facilities, early warning and C2 sites, and ground-based air defense sites. 

"Local air superiority", which is purely geographic in nature, is characterized by well timed air attacks to coincide with enemy aircraft downtime, re-turning sorties, aircraft rearming, or gaps in air defense coverage. This condition may also occur in sectors across the theater of military operations where the the enemy may not have adequate assets available to ensure air superiority. In certain situations or against certain enemies, local air superiority for a specified period of time may be a more realistic goal. 

"Air parity" is defined as the functional equivalency between enemy and friendly air forces in strength and capability to attack and destroy some targets. Under the condition of air parity, where neither side has gained superiority, some enemy capabilities affect friendly ground forces at times and places on the battlefield. Air parity manifests itself to the commander primarily in the amount of fixed-wing aircraft used for direct support of ground forces. More aircraft are dedicated to interdiction and strike missions to gain air superiority. _
Usually determining the state of control of the air is done on a theatre by thatre basis. For World War II there is some disagreement about what constituted a theatre, but in my opinion for the ETO generally, we can probably define the TOs as follws

1) Western Europe: France, Low Countries British Isles

2) Central Europe: germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Austria

3) Balkans Southern Europe: Italy (except Sicily), Greece (except Crete), Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Yugoslavia

4) Eastern Front: Romania, USSR

5) Northern Europe

6) North africa and the middle east

There may be some debate about what constitutes a theatre, and im happy to listen to other suggestions

If a nation commits innsufficient forces to make a difference, or no forces, or its forces are ineffective, it cannot be said to hold any level of control of the skies

now, applying the theory to german control of the air what deductions can we make. specifically what is the situation viz western Europe it cannot be established that the germans held air superiority over the region, because they could not undertake all manner of operations with much prospect of success. That had been disputed in the BoB and eventually lost. They did enjoy elements of air parity but only to a limited extent. they could undertake air denial operations to a limited extent but with the forces available, would not have been able to mount effective attacks against enemy (ie allied) ground targets, either of a tactical or strategic nature). So, by defintion they were not exercising air superiority. Neither were they exercising local air superiority. they had some elements of air parity, which are sometimes referred to as air denial,. unofficially. Auir denial means the ability apply to a limited extent some ability to inflict losses so as to deny a limited area of airspace to some enemy operations 

However the degree of that air denial in western europe is limited, as Glider points out. The losses to the RAF in terms of daylight operations were tolerable to low, and as time progressed the LW were less and less able to limit the range of missions that the RAF could undertake over occupied western euriope. all kinds of missions were undertaken by the RAF in western Europe....including transport, fighter bomber, bomber, naval interdiction naval strike. Less and less were the germans able to impede these missions, by day or night. In some parts of Western Europe, namely over the British Isles, thye Allies had achieved Air supremacy. you cannot have an opponent exercising air supremacy over critical parts of a front where you yourself are claimimg air superiority. the two terms are anthema to each other, when control to that level is being exercised by opposing forces. It might be possible to separate Britain from the rest of western Europe, but this would seem very arbitrary given that the force projections in Britain could affect operations in the rest of the geographical unit so dramatically 

Over Central Europe it was a different story. The concentration of fighters was sufficient to make losses prohibitive, forcing the British to divert some of their operations to night bombing. even here, however the control of the air was not complete...german fighters were unable to completely deny all daylight operations, as the activities of the Mosquito intruders and the PRU forces clearly demonstrate. Even more conventional heavy bombers were able to operate in daylight....not sure, but werent the dambuster operations carried out in daylight?

Elsewhere, with the exception of the eastern front, and perhaps the southern front, Axis control was tenuous at best. In those areas one could, at best argure they enjoyed either local superiority or air parity, depending on how you want to view the situation. On the eastern front, for example, I would tend to classify Axis control of the skies as local superiority. They could take and dominate a section of the front, right through until 1943, but overall, had lost total air superiority by December 1941. For a time thereafter they maintained air parity, before losing that as well. At Kursk and over the Kuban in 1943, they were challenged, and ultimately lost even the ability to gain local air superiority. Thereafter German fighters could simply not inflict enough casualties to matter. whilst the russians also found it difficult with their skillsets and equipment to wrest complete control of the air, they were able to achieve air parity and local air superiority as required. Ther were no instances of Soviet air offensives being stopped after Kursk, and it is simply propaganda to claim that Sturmovik losses were excessively heavy. they were heavy, but not excessively so, and more to the point required the expenditure of resources for the germans intrying to stop them that they simply could not afford. german fighters and flak (which accounted for about 35% of Soviet losses) managed to shoot down 46000 Soviet aircraft during the war, whilst losing approiximately 35000 of all types of their own. Moreover, despite all that effort and loss, they failed to make any appreciable effect on the Soviet efficiency and ability to complete ground support missions or take military objectives.

Once again we are reduced to asking ourselves where is the clear strategic advantage being won solely by fighters. with a few notable exceptions, they werent. Fighters, like rifles and bread were essential to force projection, bu seldom were decisive in their own right


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## Glider (Nov 2, 2011)

Well put and hard to argue against


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## parsifal (Nov 2, 2011)

Thanks. Just so we are clear....fighters are indispensable, so in that sense I have to concede that they have strategic importance. But thats not the point(s) that I made, or responded to. In summary, if you will grant me this indulgence I think the points (some still in contention are

1) Fighters, whilst essential, generally dont or cant achieve a significant strategic advantage, except in exceptional circumstances, such as when the enemy does not have fighters, or fighters that are inneffective. Whilst fighters can tip the balance of losses for an attacker, most of their losses are inherent 9things like landing accidents, weather effects, flak, airframe fatigue and the like. Of course fighters inflict losses, but they are not the major determinat of losses, That shocks and alarms many peoiple. Moreover, except in exeptional circumstances, the side using fighters do not generally suffer a lower attrition rate. case in point, look at the Eastern Front. Despite being on the strategic defensive and committing at least 30% of their available fighters, with a far higher skills base, overall, there is not much difference in the loss rates of the Soviets or the LW. You cannot shoot down a lot of enemies, usually, without suffering a lot of losses yourself. It just doesnt work that way

Moreover, and finally producing lots of fighters when you are economically weaker might be forced on you, but of itself is not a winner. Germany was never going to win her defensive battle in 1944 by building nothing but fighters. her losses were always going to aat least equal those of the allies, as it turned out they exceeded those of the Americans in particular.....a fantastic rap for the P-51s combatting the LW, because that is something that should not have happened

2) Germany did not hold air superiority over any front from late 1941 on. On secondary fronts they might, or on maion fronts they might achieve local superiorities. Their air force remained potent, but applying the definition of air superiority they simply did not have it, because they could not undetake all manner of missions to all parts of each front. Whilst the allies and the Soviets had difficulty in doing that (as reflected in the losses they suffered), they could at least undertake such missions over a greater proportion of each front. Thats the issue so many people miss about the battles over France in 1941.....it was about being able to do things despite the wishes and efforts of the enemy. Without that vital first step, nothing else in the air was possible. The RAF could do it, the LW could not, its about as simple as that......it was slightly different and slightly later in the East, but a description of what had occurred by 1943 is perhaps that the russians could complete thei8r primary mission (ground support) at tolerable losses and achi8eve their intention (an advance on the ground), whereas the LW could neither significantly affect the ground battle, nor could it stop the Soviets from doing their thing....

3) As a generalization (a dangerous thing perhaps) fighters dont reduce losses strategically for a friendly bomber force, unless the escorting fighters massively outnumber those of the intercepting CAP. They do however, increase the losses of an enemy bomber force, unless that bomber force is massively escorted (another way of saying what I said in the first place) . Both sides found this to be the case during the war. perhaps also if the training levels or equipment quality is madssively different a stratyegically significant reault is possible.


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## Njaco (Nov 2, 2011)

> Just so we are clear....fighters are indispensable......



If my laptop hadn't crashed yesterday, that was one point I was gonna make. And #2 I totally agree with and was actually my argument!


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## tomo pauk (Nov 3, 2011)

Sorry for a late reply, have had some network issues.



parsifal said:


> To determine whether germany held air superiority over europe we first of all need to understand what the various states of air control are
> 
> ...
> Usually determining the state of control of the air is done on a theatre by thatre basis. For World War II there is some disagreement about what constituted a theatre, but in my opinion for the ETO generally, we can probably define the TOs as follws
> ...



If we say: southern Poland is a region, or, Belgium is a region, than yes - Germans have won maintained air superiority over may regions of Europe. They we unable to win air superiority over UK, but we all know that. Many factors played their role over UK skies, one of them was inability of LW's main fighter to perform a job as an air-superiority fighter. Another one is that Germans were outproduced in the crucial days, in both fighter and pilots/crews.



> They did enjoy elements of air parity but only to a limited extent. they could undertake air denial operations to a limited extent but with the forces available, would not have been able to mount effective attacks against enemy (ie allied) ground targets, either of a tactical or strategic nature). So, by defintion they were not exercising air superiority. Neither were they exercising local air superiority. they had some elements of air parity, which are sometimes referred to as air denial,. unofficially. Auir denial means the ability apply to a limited extent some ability to inflict losses so as to deny a limited area of airspace to some enemy operations



Saying that "Neither were they [LW]exercising local air superiority.", without stating the area is confusing; if it's the Channel, the local air superiority was most times in German hands than not. 



> However the degree of that air denial in western europe is limited, as Glider points out. The losses to the RAF in terms of daylight operations were tolerable to low, and as time progressed the LW were less and less able to limit the range of missions that the RAF could undertake over occupied western euriope. all kinds of missions were undertaken by the RAF in western Europe....including transport, fighter bomber, bomber, naval interdiction naval strike. Less and less were the germans able to impede these missions, by day or night. In some parts of Western Europe, namely over the British Isles, thye Allies had achieved Air supremacy. you cannot have an opponent exercising air supremacy over critical parts of a front where you yourself are claimimg air superiority. the two terms are anthema to each other, when control to that level is being exercised by opposing forces. It might be possible to separate Britain from the rest of western Europe, but this would seem very arbitrary given that the force projections in Britain could affect operations in the rest of the geographical unit so dramatically
> 
> Over Central Europe it was a different story. The concentration of fighters was sufficient to make losses prohibitive, forcing the British to divert some of their operations to night bombing. even here, however the control of the air was not complete...german fighters were unable to completely deny all daylight operations, as the activities of the Mosquito intruders and the PRU forces clearly demonstrate. Even more conventional heavy bombers were able to operate in daylight....not sure, but werent the dambuster operations carried out in daylight?



Lumping together what RAF was able to do in 1940, '41, '42 and '43, while taking in account air space from Manchester to Berlin, is hardly an analysis.
The LW day fighters made RAF paying big price for day bomber sorties, from Channel east, thus forcing the RAF to go for night bombing. Stating naval interdiction/strike as arguments for highlighting LW's inability to seal the skies from Atlantic to Berlin, in the time LW turned East, is self defeating. As for 'separating GB from W. Europe' - when Germans turned East, LW's goal was to hold RAF east from France, and they have had decent success in doing so.
Germans failed to produce a 'Mosquito' of their own, so Ju-88 had to attack Bari. Dambuster operation was conducted during night.



> Elsewhere, with the exception of the eastern front, and perhaps the southern front, Axis control was tenuous at best. In those areas one could, at best argure they enjoyed either local superiority or air parity, depending on how you want to view the situation. On the eastern front, for example, I would tend to classify Axis control of the skies as local superiority.



By 1942, UK is outproducing Germany, Italy and Japan combined, in planes that is; LW is training far less pilots, too. In 1941, Soviets have built at least as much planes as Germans, let alone in after that. US planes are available as early as 1941, both for RAF VVS. That LW was able to achieve any kind of air superiority seems quite a feat - by summer of 1941 they have less than 1000 fighters in combat units. That's perhaps 4-5 per one km of front line at East.



> They could take and dominate a section of the front, right through until 1943, but overall, had lost total air superiority by December 1941. For a time thereafter they maintained air parity, before losing that as well. At Kursk and over the Kuban in 1943, they were challenged, and ultimately lost even the ability to gain local air superiority. Thereafter German fighters could simply not inflict enough casualties to matter. whilst the russians also found it difficult with their skillsets and equipment to wrest complete control of the air, they were able to achieve air parity and local air superiority as required. Ther were no instances of Soviet air offensives being stopped after Kursk, and it is simply propaganda to claim that Sturmovik losses were excessively heavy. they were heavy, but not excessively so, and more to the point required the expenditure of resources for the germans intrying to stop them that they simply could not afford. german fighters and flak (which accounted for about 35% of Soviet losses) managed to shoot down 46000 Soviet aircraft during the war, whilst losing approiximately 35000 of all types of their own. Moreover, despite all that effort and loss, they failed to make any appreciable effect on the Soviet efficiency and ability to complete ground support missions or take military objectives.



VVS was enjoying perhaps 2:1 superiority in numbers by Kursk battle - should we expect that LW owns air space over the front line? With Soviets flying, for example, 1000 fighters 1000 bombers/attackers vs. 500 defending fighters, even a ratio of losses 2:1 in LW favor is hardly to stop VVS operation cold.



> Once again we are reduced to asking ourselves where is the clear strategic advantage being won solely by fighters. with a few notable exceptions, they werent. Fighters, like rifles and bread were essential to force projection, bu seldom were decisive in their own right



Fighters are a part of a military force, I can agree with that.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 3, 2011)

(2nd part)



parsifal said:


> Thanks. Just so we are clear....fighters are indispensable, so in that sense I have to concede that they have strategic importance. But thats not the point(s) that I made, or responded to. In summary, if you will grant me this indulgence I think the points (some still in contention are
> 
> 1) Fighters, whilst essential, generally dont or cant achieve a significant strategic advantage, except in exceptional circumstances, such as when the enemy does not have fighters, or fighters that are inneffective. Whilst fighters can tip the balance of losses for an attacker, most of their losses are inherent 9things like landing accidents, weather effects, flak, airframe fatigue and the like. Of course fighters inflict losses, but they are not the major determinat of losses, That shocks and alarms many peoiple. Moreover, except in exeptional circumstances, the side using fighters do not generally suffer a lower attrition rate. case in point, look at the Eastern Front. Despite being on the strategic defensive and committing at least 30% of their available fighters, with a far higher skills base, overall, there is not much difference in the loss rates of the Soviets or the LW. You cannot shoot down a lot of enemies, usually, without suffering a lot of losses yourself. It just doesnt work that way



Again, if 500 defenders shoot down 300 (out of 2000 dispatched) attackers, with a loss of 150 to his own number, how long is defender bound to last as a force? We have the same T-34 vs. any-panzer issue: T-34s will suffer more casualties, but Soviets will advance.



> Moreover, and finally producing lots of fighters when you are economically weaker might be forced on you, but of itself is not a winner. Germany was never going to win her defensive battle in 1944 by building nothing but fighters. her losses were always going to aat least equal those of the allies, as it turned out they exceeded those of the Americans in particular.....a fantastic rap for the P-51s combatting the LW, because that is something that should not have happened



Covered above - Germany was doomed after it failed to defeat Soviet Union, let alone when USA got fully involved. 
By 1944, it was too late for another 1000 of 109s/190s (even if those could be fueled piloted properly) to revert the outcome



> 2) Germany did not hold air superiority over any front from late 1941 on. On secondary fronts they might, or on maion fronts they might achieve local superiorities. Their air force remained potent, but applying the definition of air superiority they simply did not have it, because they could not undetake all manner of missions to all parts of each front. Whilst the allies and the Soviets had difficulty in doing that (as reflected in the losses they suffered), they could at least undertake such missions over a greater proportion of each front. Thats the issue so many people miss about the battles over France in 1941.....it was about being able to do things despite the wishes and efforts of the enemy. Without that vital first step, nothing else in the air was possible. The RAF could do it, the LW could not, its about as simple as that......it was slightly different and slightly later in the East, but a description of what had occurred by 1943 is perhaps that the russians could complete thei8r primary mission (ground support) at tolerable losses and achi8eve their intention (an advance on the ground), whereas the LW could neither significantly affect the ground battle, nor could it stop the Soviets from doing their thing....



As for LW vs. RAF in 1941 at West, RAF was in possession of several:1 advantage in numbers of planes. No wonder they ventured into airspace above German-held territory, while LW was barely able to return the favor (low flying 190s). The number of fighters LW could muster per km of Eastern front was 1:several, at a good day, hence no wonder VVS command was pushing it's bombers to find a hole in LW 'wall'. The definition of 'tolerable losses' is not the same for VVS and other air forces anyway.



> 3) As a generalization (a dangerous thing perhaps) fighters dont reduce losses strategically for a friendly bomber force, unless the escorting fighters massively outnumber those of the intercepting CAP. They do however, increase the losses of an enemy bomber force, unless that bomber force is massively escorted (another way of saying what I said in the first place) . Both sides found this to be the case during the war. perhaps also if the training levels or equipment quality is madssively different a stratyegically significant reault is possible.



There is a poor job, and there is a bad job. Than there are good tools and bad tools. Plus, as you stated, the numbers. USAAC employment of numerous P-51 in 1944 was the example of a good tool doing a good job. LW employment of 109 in BoB was a barely-adequate tool doing a good job (until tasked with close escort - a bad job), without having a numerical advantage. 
If a fighter can contest defenders even at 1:1 ratio, the bomber force will and did suffer less losses, since all the defending force can throw themselves onto bombers. As USAAC's 8th foound out the hard way.


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## parsifal (Nov 3, 2011)

The trouble Tomo is in the detail of your reply. Defining a region is difficult i agree, but trying to exclude britain from western europe is more arbitrary than my approach. Aircraft based in England, could, and did, affect what was happening in france and flanders, and vice versa. My opinion in defining what is a region, is to think about the main bases of operations, and the geogrphical extent that they could affect surrounding areas. From a British perspective, despite numerical advantages, they could not, for example (at least until very late) affect directly what was happening in Poland, for example. But trying to define Belgium as a separate area, when clearly the control of its skies depended on activities of surrounding areas (including those in England) is too arbitrary, and serves no purpose.

Now, you claim that Germany controlled the skies over the Channel and the french coast more often than they didnt. If that were true, then the germans held air superiority, trouble is, its just not true. You also claim that casualties over france for the RAF were prohibitive. If the germans controlled the skies over the channel and the french coast, why didnt they undertake bomber and other non-fighter operations. allied shipping losses in the channel, for example, shrank from a respectable total of about 700000 tone in 1940, to about 50000 tons in 1942. and this was not a case of huge numbers. There were relatively few antishipping units in the Lw in 1940, and relatively few in 1942....no real change in numbers. The anit-shipping units had been moved to other, less demanding fronts by 1942, but if the Germans had control of the skies over the channel it seems inconceivable that they would not try and exploit that advantage at some point. The anti-shipping units that they did possess in the region (KG 40) were actually forced to move away from their operational areas because of RAF activity, and never undertook operations close to the French coast, or the Channel. if the germans controlled these skies, as you claim, why didnt they? why were they forced to make long over watrer flights to areas wher allied fighters could not reach? . 

Moreover, the germans were unable to protect their battlesquadron (Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, later Prinz Eugen) from RAF day or night airborne attack. if they controlled the skies over the Channel and the french coast "most of the time", why did they allow thjis to happen, to the eventiual point that these assets too had to be removed from the To 9with the eventual permanent diablement of one of the BCs) .

Looking at the issue in reverse, Allied losses on Axis shipping in the coastal waters off france steadily rose. There was never a lot of it, but it certainly rose as the war progressed. That further tends to disprove your claim that the Germans controlled the airspace. They had the ability to inflict some losses using their fighters, and that was about it. that is not a measure of air superiority. its a measure of air denial 

But even here, your claims that British daylight raids over occupied western euriope were being decimated aere just not supported by the facts. Sure, the fighter losses were heavy, but thats because FC, to get the LW to rise up and fight, had to deliberately place themselves at tactical disadvantages.....put up bait so the Germans would come out and fight. galland himself in his book admits to this, and this goes a long way to explaining why FC (of which only a portion was ever employed in cross channel operations) was so roughly handled September to December '41.

The operations of the bomber groups making these daylight intrusions, principally Coastal command and 2 Gp, did not in fact suffer heavy losses. Some of this admittedly is because they didnt commit many bombers, but the loss to sotie rate for 2 Gp was lower than BC generally (which was mostly operating at night at this time). 

Saying that the RAF had a great numerical advantage is also not quite looking at the situation properly. there were quite a number of occasions when raids and operations over France did see the RAF putting more aircraft into the operation than the LW, but it is simply untrue that the entire RAF was pitted against just two JGs. As previously alluded to, the RAF, to get the LW to come up, had to place itself deliberately at disadvantage to get them to even come up. the LW only would fly if the situation was tactically favourable to them. 

But in any event, we are back at this point of equating losses to control of the air, which is fundamentally wrong. This is not the sole determinant of air superiority. The losses had to be worse than tolerable in order for it to be said that the RAF was denied access to those skies. Clearly they were not intolerable losses....the RAF kept coming back, suffering losses in daylight operations over france of around 2% (whilst their night bombers generally were suffering attrition rates of around 5%). In addition to inflicting prohibitive losses on the RAF (which they clearly failed to do) the germans would also have needed to be able to fly any and all manner of missions in that TO. Something they also could not do. 

Again, air superiority has not much to do with losses. Except if those losses cause a curtailment of operations. The germans were forced to curtail their operations, I find no evidence of the RAF being forced to curtail their operations over France in 1941. Once again, all i can do is suggest you go back to the theory and work out what the term air superiority actually means.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 4, 2011)

> parsifal said:
> 
> 
> > The trouble Tomo is in the detail of your reply. Defining a region is difficult i agree, but trying to exclude britain from western europe is more arbitrary than my approach. Aircraft based in England, could, and did, affect what was happening in france and flanders, and vice versa. My opinion in defining what is a region, is to think about the main bases of operations, and the geogrphical extent that they could affect surrounding areas. From a British perspective, despite numerical advantages, they could not, for example (at least until very late) affect directly what was happening in Poland, for example. But trying to define Belgium as a separate area, when clearly the control of its skies depended on activities of surrounding areas (including those in England) is too arbitrary, and serves no purpose.
> ...


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## parsifal (Nov 4, 2011)

Lots to disagree on I can see. a few minor points. The shipping losses in the channel and around the british isles were achieved, in the main by FKX units, which had ben formed prewar. Very few successes were scored by units not trained in naval strike operations. There were a few units in FKII that had received similar training, and that was about it. In 1942, when Luftlotte IV formed a specialist anti shipping unit (I think it was called Flieger fuhrer Meer.... of about three squadrons) for operations designed to blockade Sevastopol, it took nearly three months to get these units up to standard.

Air units untrained in anti shipping operations were not that successful. 

In addition to the units of FKX, and some units of FKII, there were the units of KG40 that had operated from early 1940. these units too participated in sinking shipping around the british isles.

After the bulk of the Luftwaffe transferred to the east (it wasnt 80%......around 2900 of the Luftwaffes overall strength of 4200 frontline forces were transferred, the rest stayed in the west and on the southern fron to combat the British), they left behind FKX which transferred all but two Gerschwaders to the South where they nearly sank the Illustrious. The other two Geschwaders remained in western Europe for the very purpose wea re talking about....anti-shipping operations. They found they could not operate, because the germans could not provide sufficient protection for them. First, they moved about 100 miles to the south away from RAF interfernce, then they were shipped out of the theatre altogether.....to Norway where they were attached to LFV. 

The other bomber unit unit that i know of left in France was KG40. this unit in the Summer of 1940 had started operations in the coastal waters around the british isles. That was fine whilst the germans held air superiority , but once it was lost air superiority over the channel, these units were soon forced to refocus their efforts away from the coast.

You keep saying that BC was forced to operate at night, and this was due to the efforts of the German fighters. That was true over germany, and for BC, but the majority of effort over france was not undertaken at night, and not by BC. you do understand that dont you. it was undertaken by 2 group, which eventually became 2TAF, and Coastal command. And these formation did not suffere catastrophic losses. they in fact suffered lower loss rates than BC, which was operating at night (sometimes over france, but also and mostly over Germany). But then you say that you didnt say that, so i guess the raf was not suffering lprohibitive losses over western Europe (which does not in this case include germany). 

As for _Until mid 1942 not a single Spitfire was operating away from GB, while wast majority of LW fighters was either in Eastern , or Med front. RAF has way more bombers than LW, in area between Rhine and Ireland. What should be the 'proper way into looking at situation'_?"_to place itself deliberately at disadvantage to get them to even come up", was RAF expecting that LW commanders will suddenly believe that only 2-3 fighter wings are against them, in 1941-42, as if they have no radars? My take is that "placing deliberately at disadvantage..." stuff is either pie in the sky, or some kind of apology for the 'rough handling from Sept-Dec 1941'._ 

its no apology. It was the price needed to be paid in order to produce the situation and control that which the British were seeking. And they achieved it, something dismissed and misunderstood to an alarming degree. Read Gallands book where he says quite a bit about this , but most relevantly _"their (the JGs) element was to attack, to track, to hunt and to destroy the enemy. Only in this way can the eager and skilful fighter pilot display his ability to the full. Tie him to a narrow and confined task rob him of his intiative and you take away from him the best and most valuable qualities he posseses; aggressive spirit, joy of action and the passion of the hunter'_. I understand that in postwar interviews galland confirmed that all these were denied the german forces on the western front after June. partly as you say because of the trasnfer of forces, but conjointly because of the activities of the RAF. 

John Foreman, in his book "1941 Part 2 - The Blitz to the Non-Stop Offensive", says in his conclusion "(by the end of 1941) the air war had come full circle ...the british forces were firmly on the offensive having fought hard and won air superiority over western europe, including the channel, the british Isles and the French Coast......their opponents were now fighting a totally defensive war in the west, and were never to regain the initiaitive, and never able to challenge allied air superiority." evidently Foreman doesnt agree with you either. 

As for spitfires not being deployed outside of Europe, why would they. they were not needed outside of Europe, and would have represented an unnecceary drain on supply. Spitfires were a dedicated , specialized fighter not thought suited at that time to any multi role functions like the hurricane, which for 1941, excelled at it. Moreover there were doubts at the time of the spitfires ability to operate from rough strips, and take off from carriers....concerns not so acutely held for the more docile Hurricanes. There is no evidence of excessive losses in the med for the hurricane equipped formations. 

I have the details of losses in shipping and will dig them out in a day or so


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## Glider (Nov 4, 2011)

Re the question of Air Superiority there is no question that the RAF No 2 Group and at times elements of Bomber Command could and did operate at will over Europe. The examples I gave were proof of that, if you want to pick any other day of the year I will do a similar exercise, I don't think that I can be fairer than that. Some were pin pricks others significant. The 94 aircraft Lancaster raid (unescorted) 300 miles behind the front line is clear evidence of the weakness of the German defences. 

What would have happened had this been repeated we will never know. My guess is that the Luftwaffe would have reacted and soon losses would have climbed signficantly. But it doesn't alter the fact that the German forces in place at the time, were not strong enough in numbers or organisation. This raid was unexpected, well planned and lets be honest, the RAF got away with it.

This brings us to the Channel Dash. It was also well planned, totally unexpected and this time the Germans *didn't *get away with it. Both Battle Cruisers were seriously damaged. Not by bombs or torpedos dropped by Torpedo / Level / Dive bombers, but by mines dropped by the RAF. In other words the Luftwaffe had the strength to protect the Ships directly but didn't have the strength to keep the passage clear. Its also worth remembering why the Dash took place in the first place. It was because the ships were being attacked on a regular basis and taking damage in the French ports. Again the Luftwaffe didn't have the power to stop the attacks taking place, even in their own ports sometimes against unescorted bombers which were only armed with LMGs. RAF losses were often high, what else would you expect considering the strength of the defences but they still got through. 

I certainly agree that its unreasonable to expect the Luftwaffe to increase their attacks on the UK at a time when most of their forces had been transferred to Russia. 

BC aircraft were mainly used in Night Bombers that cannot be questions but without a fighter to escort them what else would you expect. There was a need to attack German cities and that could only be done in numbers at night. All airforces who tried long range attacks in daylight had to supply long range fighters or switch to night raids. There is no shame in that. However the daylight raids by No 2 Group grew in strength and were never really hindered by the Luftwaffe. The vast majority of the losses were to Flak not fighters. These No 2 Group raids shouldn't be dismissed, the Mosquito, B25, Ventura and Bostons carried loads similar to those carried by Luftwaffe bombers 

I have already said that the Luftwaffe lacked the forces to bomb the UK due to transfers to Russia but its worth remembering that they almost completely failed in their PR missions. Its almost true to say that the UK coast only 25 miles away was a closed book to the Luftwaffe. 

I also agree with you when you say _that LW was not present at the West in 1941 in numbers as it was in 1940_. 
However I also say that this decrease, reduced the ability of the Luftwaffe to control the air.


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## Tante Ju (Nov 4, 2011)

Glider said:


> Re the question of Air Superiority there is no question that the RAF No 2 Group and at times elements of Bomber Command could and did operate at will over Europe. The examples I gave were proof of that, if you want to pick any other day of the year I will do a similar exercise, I don't think that I can be fairer than that. Some were pin pricks others significant. The 94 aircraft Lancaster raid (unescorted) 300 miles behind the front line is clear evidence of the weakness of the German defences.
> 
> What would have happened had this been repeated we will never know. My guess is that the Luftwaffe would have reacted and soon losses would have climbed signficantly. But it doesn't alter the fact that the German forces in place at the time, were not strong enough in numbers or organisation. This raid was unexpected, well planned and lets be honest, the RAF got away with it.



Yes complete true, but is this suffice to say air superiority? Because sometime formation was lucky and got away with it? This happened through war on all sides, even 1945 there were German aircraft over Britain and not caught.. but it would be foolish to say they had air superiority over Britain, in 1945, because some of their raid slipped through the defense net.. nor it is fair to conclude: defense net was weak. No system is perfect. 

If I use an analouge, I find it for example strange that people say RAF had air superiority over Britain, because it met German bomber raids, most of time, caused losses - but far from always. In event the losses did not stop or prohibit a single raid, or not very too many. This is is similiar case as in 1941 over France IMHO, but for two similiar cases, how can one draw different conclusions? If being capable of causing senstive loss over Britain in 1940 means air superiority for the RAF, surely being capable of causing senstive loss over France in 1941 means air superiority for the LW.. 



> This brings us to the Channel Dash. It was also well planned, totally unexpected and this time the Germans *didn't *get away with it. Both Battle Cruisers were seriously damaged. Not by bombs or torpedos dropped by Torpedo / Level / Dive bombers, but by mines dropped by the RAF. In other words the Luftwaffe had the strength to protect the Ships directly but didn't have the strength to keep the passage clear. Its also worth remembering why the Dash took place in the first place. It was because the ships were being attacked on a regular basis and taking damage in the French ports. Again the Luftwaffe didn't have the power to stop the attacks taking place, even in their own ports sometimes against unescorted bombers which were only armed with LMGs. RAF losses were often high, what else would you expect considering the strength of the defences but they still got through.



I do not understand - how were an air force supposed to fight mines? No air force was capable doing this 100% perfection. I think you draw too big conclusions from small facts.. 

But it is enjoyable interesting discussion!


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## Glider (Nov 4, 2011)

Tante Ju said:


> Yes complete true, but is this suffice to say air superiority? Because sometime formation was lucky and got away with it? This happened through war on all sides, even 1945 there were German aircraft over Britain and not caught.. but it would be foolish to say they had air superiority over Britain, in 1945, because some of their raid slipped through the defense net.. nor it is fair to conclude: defense net was weak. No system is perfect.


There is a world of difference difference between a raid slipping through during a battle such as the BOB when the defences are at the point of being swamped by other attacks. Compared with a good sized raid getting through when there are no other actions in progress. The infrastructure at least was missing to cope with such a raid, one that would have taken approx 1 1/2 hours to reach safety *after *dropping their payload (allowing for a 200mph cruise speed). The German forces had plenty of warning and cannot claim to control the air, plus of course the other raids that took place if raids like that could get through.


> If I use an analouge, I find it for example strange that people say RAF had air superiority over Britain, because it met German bomber raids, most of time, caused losses - but far from always. In event the losses did not stop or prohibit a single raid, or not very too many. This is is similiar case as in 1941 over France IMHO, but for two similiar cases, how can one draw different conclusions? If being capable of causing senstive loss over Britain in 1940 means air superiority for the RAF, surely being capable of causing senstive loss over France in 1941 means air superiority for the LW..


Towards the end of the BOB a number of German raids were turned back before reaching their targets, the RAF controlled the air over the UK. 



> I do not understand - how were an air force supposed to fight mines? No air force was capable doing this 100% perfection. I think you draw too big conclusions from small facts..


Easy. The Germans knew what route the Vessels were going to go and steps should have been taken to patrol those routes. They didn't and the Battle Cruisers were badly damaged by weapons dropped by the RAF. The Luftwaffe didn't have the strength to protect the vessels.



> But it is enjoyable interesting discussion!


That I do agree with but I would appreciate your views on the lack of opposition to the No 2 Group raids and why the vast majority of the losses were to AA fire, if the Luftwaffe were in control of the air. Also your views on the lack of PR missions which penetrated over the UK when the RAF ones operated with much success over Europe and Germany, by day and night.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 6, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Lots to disagree on I can see. a few minor points. The shipping losses in the channel and around the british isles were achieved, in the main by FKX units, which had ben formed prewar. Very few successes were scored by units not trained in naval strike operations. There were a few units in FKII that had received similar training, and that was about it. In 1942, when Luftlotte IV formed a specialist anti shipping unit (I think it was called Flieger fuhrer Meer.... of about three squadrons) for operations designed to blockade Sevastopol, it took nearly three months to get these units up to standard.
> 
> Air units untrained in anti shipping operations were not that successful.
> 
> ...



Think that we can agree about some issues here:
-LW units that participated at, among other things, the attacks vs. Channel shipping, were far more numerous in summer 1940, than a year after
-LW fighter force that needed to achieve air superiority over Channel were doing their job in the mentioned period in 1940, but not in summer 1941, since in 1941 they were present there at 1/4 of the strength a year before



> You keep saying that BC was forced to operate at night, and this was due to the efforts of the German fighters. That was true over germany, and for BC, but the majority of effort over france was not undertaken at night, and not by BC. you do understand that dont you. it was undertaken by 2 group, which eventually became 2TAF, and Coastal command. And these formation did not suffere catastrophic losses. they in fact suffered lower loss rates than BC, which was operating at night (sometimes over france, but also and mostly over Germany). But then you say that you didnt say that, so i guess the raf was not suffering lprohibitive losses over western Europe (which does not in this case include germany).



Finding a proper adjective to attack to the term 'RAF losses in second half of 1941' seems like quite a task. Whatever we call them, you've stated that FC was rougly handled in that time, and mr. Brooks, apparently a well read member of this forum, stated: 
_Leigh-Mallory could never see the folly of sending fighter pilots to their deaths, in the useless "Rhubarbs." It took the likes of Johnson to get it stopped._



> As for _Until mid 1942 not a single Spitfire was operating away from GB, while wast majority of LW fighters was either in Eastern , or Med front. RAF has way more bombers than LW, in area between Rhine and Ireland. What should be the 'proper way into looking at situation'_?"_to place itself deliberately at disadvantage to get them to even come up", was RAF expecting that LW commanders will suddenly believe that only 2-3 fighter wings are against them, in 1941-42, as if they have no radars? My take is that "placing deliberately at disadvantage..." stuff is either pie in the sky, or some kind of apology for the 'rough handling from Sept-Dec 1941'._
> 
> its no apology. It was the price needed to be paid in order to produce the situation and control that which the British were seeking. And they achieved it, something dismissed and misunderstood to an alarming degree. Read Gallands book where he says quite a bit about this , but most relevantly _"their (the JGs) element was to attack, to track, to hunt and to destroy the enemy. Only in this way can the eager and skilful fighter pilot display his ability to the full. Tie him to a narrow and confined task rob him of his intiative and you take away from him the best and most valuable qualities he posseses; aggressive spirit, joy of action and the passion of the hunter'_. I understand that in postwar interviews galland confirmed that all these were denied the german forces on the western front after June. partly as you say because of the trasnfer of forces, but conjointly because of the activities of the RAF.



We can take Galland's word for it. 
We can also agree that tactical possibilties/opportunities are shrinking when the enemy enjoys a disproportional advantage in numbers. Germans did have home turf advantage, not too dissimilar to what RAF enjoyed back in BoB days. 



> John Foreman, in his book "1941 Part 2 - The Blitz to the Non-Stop Offensive", says in his conclusion "(by the end of 1941) the air war had come full circle ...the british forces were firmly on the offensive having fought hard and won air superiority over western europe, including the channel, the british Isles and the French Coast......their opponents were now fighting a totally defensive war in the west, and were never to regain the initiaitive, and never able to challenge allied air superiority." evidently Foreman doesnt agree with you either.



Mr. Foreman says that RAF won air superiority over 'W. Europe, including the Channel, GB and French coast'. If that means that RAF was in charge of the airspace west from GB, than it says nothing - LW was never there anyway. RAF was not in possession of air superiority over Low countries, Norway, 95% of France - as they were not back in 1940. So mr. Foreman thinks it's great achivement that RAF was able to wrestle the air superiority away from LW over Channel and a (how big part?) of French coast, without admitting (at least in the quote) that enemy is suffering a multiple:1 disadvantage in numbers? If RAF has air supeiority over French coast, how come submarine pens in La Rochelle elsewhere are not turned to rubble?
Think mr. Foreman has a rather big bias. 



> As for spitfires not being deployed outside of Europe, why would they. they were not needed outside of Europe, and would have represented an unnecceary drain on supply. Spitfires were a dedicated , specialized fighter not thought suited at that time to any multi role functions like the hurricane, which for 1941, excelled at it. Moreover there were doubts at the time of the spitfires ability to operate from rough strips, and take off from carriers....concerns not so acutely held for the more docile Hurricanes.



My mention of Spitfires remaining in the UK was just to picture the dis-balance in available fighters from summer 1941 on, in the are between Rhine and Ireland....



> There is no evidence of excessive losses in the med for the hurricane equipped formations.



..but since you've asked, here is what JoeB has to say (WW2-era USN aircraft vs. the Luftwaffe - how would they fare? - Tanknet - Page 2, post #35) 

_And Hurricane v Bf109E over Malta in 1941 was 0:35, ..... (Hurricane's record later v 109F's over Malta was actually better, though still several:1 against) _

..plus the losses ratio vs. IJA/IJN (also by JoeB, mentioned in Whirlwind thread), in 1942, of typically 4:1 in Japanese favor



> I have the details of losses in shipping and will dig them out in a day or so



That would be neat.


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## parsifal (Nov 6, 2011)

_-LW units that participated at, among other things, the attacks vs. Channel shipping, were far more numerous in summer 1940, than a year after_


No, not correct, at least for the strike elements that carried out the actual attacks. Obviously you either were not listening, or just dont want to acknowledge. The attacks on British shipping in the North Sea were mostly (overwhelmingly) undertaken by specialist anti shipping units of the LW...mostly FKX, with some units of FKII also trained for that purpose. There were also units of the newly formed KG 40 attacking shipping around the british Isles....their deep penetration raids into the Atlantic proper didnt start until after July. A year later these units had been transferred, not because the channel was not a target rich environment, but because the gernmans had lost control of the skies over the water. 

its a furphy that the attacks themselves were undertaken by general Luftwaffe formations. 

The attacks were more numeropus, the reasons for the change is because of the loss of control of the skies over the water, not because untrained LW formations were participating in 1940, and not participating in 1941. 

It had been the intention of the LW to maintain attacks in the coastal waters around Britain in 1941. They initially retained two full Gerschwaders for that purpose, plus KG40. KG40 was forced to attack deep into the Atlantic, whilst the bomber groups were transferred BECAUSE THEY COULD NOT UNDERTAKE THEIR MISSION. 

_Mr. Foreman says that RAF won air superiority over 'W. Europe, including the Channel, GB and French coast'. If that means that RAF was in charge of the airspace west from GB, than it says nothing - LW was never there anyway. RAF was not in possession of air superiority over Low countries, Norway, 95% of France - as they were not back in 1940. So mr. Foreman thinks it's great achivement that RAF was able to wrestle the air superiority away from LW over Channel and a (how big part?) of French coast, without admitting (at least in the quote) that enemy is suffering a multiple:1 disadvantage in numbers? If RAF has air supeiority over French coast, how come submarine pens in La Rochelle elsewhere are not turned to rubble?
Think mr. Foreman has a rather big bias. _

Foreman is considered a good source by most. suggest you have a look at him before dismissing him as biased. He has some critical things to say about conduct of operations by the british, and he doesnt putll any punches as to where and how losses were being suffered by both sides. 

Trying to argue that the Briish were not having a significant impact on german control of the skies over Western Europe is just not supported by the facts. Whilst the channel was of only passing interest to the germans, it was a critical issue for the british. It was a major toute for coastal trade around Britain, and more importantly control of the channel prevented any significant movement of German naval or mercantile traffic. The oft quoted channel dash by the Km in early '42, ignores why they had to be moved....they were under constant and increasingly effective attack and could not undertake work up, post refit or indeed any sort of prepratory training. they were stuck, completely bottled up in port, unable to move. 

The germans did not control all of france, they controlled a little over half of it, with the deepest part at the belgian border being about 120 miles. RAF was directly disputing all along the coast, including belgium, to a depth of about 30 miles. The main limitation was of course the limited range of the RAF fighters , but 30/120 plus the entire channel and most of the North Sea is not insignificant, at least from a British POV. You see, as usual, I find it necessary to point out that continental european views of what is important is just not applicable to the british, and it was thjis essentially continental centric view that lost germany both world wars. For the british, it was critical to retain control of the seas , including the local seas, to the north, east and south of Briain (plus of course those bits to the west, which, contrary to what you are saying, the germans did challenge). 


Trouble with claiming the RAF had a big advantage in numbers is once again a misrepresentation of what was happening. Oh they had the numbers, but the trouble is they (the british) could use them....deploying in Britain is not deploying over france . there were significant exceptions, but the LW generally avoided battles where it was an obviously one sided affair. I can only repeat what I have said to you three or four times now, air superiority has very little to do with loss rates, except if those loss rates affect the conduct of operations. Air Superiority is about who is able to do what in th air space (and on the ground). if i can get you to accept that then you will at last have an understanding of what air superiority actually is... 

_And Hurricane v Bf109E over Malta in 1941 was 0:35, ..... (Hurricane's record later v 109F's over Malta was actually better, though still several:1 against) _

Dont know about the Far East, except that Hurricane loss rates against the japanese fighters in 1942-3 were no worse than Spitfire loss rates in 1943.

Over Malta, saying that 109e losses were a fraction of Hurrican losses is a total misrepresentation. In fact most of the aircraft sent to Malta were Spits. a total of 719 aircraft (not all of them fighters, but mostly Spits and Hurris) were sent to the island of which about 320 were lost in air combat, and a further 80 or so on the ground or whilst taxiing. In exchange they destroyed (confirmed) 552 Axis aircraft , all but 185 were German. moreover the airframes committed to attacking the island amounted to over 2000 machines...so whilst 719 airccraft are engaging 2000 enemies, shoot them down at roughly a rate of two for every one they lose, you want quibble about how many 109e to Hurricanes were lost....give me a break. And this was under conditions where maintaining even any presence on the island was done under the most difficult conditions, for reasons that had little to do with gaining air superiority 

For the record, over ceylon where the IJN was engaged by Hurricanes, 29 aircraft (half of them Fulmars, were engaged by around 150 zekes (will check and confirm tonite) ....I wonder why they lost aircraft at a rate of 4:1?????


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## parsifal (Nov 6, 2011)

January 1941

1.1.– 31.1.1941 waters around Great Britain Ger Airplanes sow altogether 481 air mines in British coast waters; focal points are the Thames mouth, Cardiff, Milford Haven and the Mersey estuary (liverpool) on the west coast as well as the Humberestuary on the east coast. In the zone of the Thames mouth losses to mines begin on the at the 2.1. the freighter Pinewood (2466 BRT), on the 6.1. the tug Lion (87 BRT), on the 8.1. the Strathearn (683 BRT), on the 16.1. the Trawler Desiree (213 BRT), and at the 24.1. the freighter Corheath (1096 BRT). On the west coast sinkings begin on the 10.1. with the Freighter Middlesex (9583 BRT) in Nells Point, on the 12.1. the Trawler Strathrye (212 BRT) in the irish Sea, on the 15.1. the Verklappungsschiff Mancunium (1286 BRT) near liverpool, on the 19.1. the Kümo Diana (312 BRT) südl. of Cardiff and on the 26.1. the niederl. 
Freighter Beemsterdijk (6869 BRT) westl. Smalls skirt. neasr the east coast sunk on the 22.1. the small auxiliary warships Luda lady and St. Cyrus in the Humberestuary. — Damaged in the Thames mouth at the 1.1. the fleet tanker Attendant (1018 BRT), and on the 26.1. the Catford (1508 BRT), before Cardiff on the 9.1. the Dorset Coast (848 BRT),on the 11.1. the tanker British Fidelity (8465 BRT), on the 12.1. the Norwegian motor ship Tijuca (5498 BRT), on the 22.1. the cool ship Jamaica Planter (4098 BRT) and on the 28.1. the large tanker chalkboard mountain (13640 BRT), and on that 16.1. near Milford Haven of the navy tug Romsey. 

I]4.-of 5/1/1941
Aerial war RAF Bomber Command attacks by 54 airplanes in Brest liegemde Ger. warships (among other things admiral of hip).
Hudson bombers sink the Norwegian freighter Snyg (1326 GRT) outside the port 

2.– 5.1.1941 aerial warfare England night attacks of the German Air Force on Cardiff, Bristol and Avonmouth with 350 t explosive bombs and 2600 (won. Brandschüttkästen???). In Cardiff, Hole de (5252 BRT) is damaged. 

5/1/1941
The North Sea
The Ger. outpost boat V306/Fritz Hinke sinks on a mine with Ijmuiden

7./ 8.1.1941 North Sea / channel unsuccessful attack by KM S boot (flottille?) against Convoy near the Thames mouth. The 1st Schnell Boote flottille (Kptlt. Birnbacher) S 101 (Oblt.z.S. Christiansen) southeasternly of Lowestoft sinks Steamer h h. Petersen (975 BRT). — Offensive mine operation "Renate" of the torpedo boats wolf and Kondor before Dover. On the retreat, wolf (Oblt.z.S . Peter †) sinks near Dünkirchen on mines, that were laid by RN Coastal vessels (_(I think MTBs)_. 

8/1/1941
The North Sea / English Channel
the torpedo boats Wolf and Condor before Dover. On the return to Dunkirk (these ships are sunk Wolf (Oblt.z. See of Peter †) before Dünkirchen on the mines which were laid by aircraft of the CC (source says laid by RN minesweepers, but barnett (“Engage the enemy more closely”) says it was from air laid mines 

10/11-1-41 Air attack heavier German aerial warfare England on the harbor by Portsmouth. In the Vosper shipyard, the fast boats are destroyed MTB 37, MTB 39, MTB 40, MTB 74, MTB 75 and MTB 108(II). 

11.– 12.1.1941 aerial warfare England 278 dt. Airplanes throw altogether 299 t explosive bombs and 1421 Brandschüttkästen (incendiaries???) on London in 2 successive nights. The ship traffic is not damaged. 

11.– 18.1.1941 Kattegat on the 11.1. the Swedish freighter Bertha (1216 BRT) is lost to air laid mine by the RAF near Copenhagen, the German freighter breach lake (688 BRT) near Malmö, and on the 18.1. the German freighter Godfried Bueren (4648 BRT) southwesternly of Laesoe. 

12.– 30.1.1941 Norway near the west coast of Norway Allied 9th U flottille operates other and among other things includes the niederl. O. 21 and O. 23.

15./ 16.1.1941 aerial warfare Germany 76 bombers of the RAF attack Wilhelmshaven. The attack counts also the battle ship placed not yet in service Tirpitz and delays negligibly its Commissioning. 

16.– 18.1.1941 aerial warfare England attacks of the German Air Force on the harbors of Avonmouth and Swansea. At the same time 4 freighters are damaged

23/24-1-41 Operation Rubble was a British blockade running operation in which five Norwegian merchant ships escaped from Sweden to Britain. The ships involved were Norwegian steamships Elizabeth Bakke (5450grt), John Bakke (4718grt), Tai Shan (6962grt), Taurus (4767grt) and the Ranja (6355grt). In addition to their cargoes also on board were many British and Norwegian sailors who had been in Sweden following the failure of the Allies' Norwegian campaign. The ships left Gotenburg on the 23rd of January and ran the German blockade of the Skagerrak. They narrowly avoided being intercepted by the two German battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau who were just starting Operation Berlin in the Kattegat. The ships navigated the North Sea with various warships being despatched from the UK to act as escorts. These escorts included HMS Naiad, Aurora, Edinburgh Birmingham and the destroyers Escapade, Echo, Electra. The John Bakke and the Ranja were both under attack from the Luftwaffe when the cruisers found them. The ships reached Kirkwall in the Orkneys on the 25th January 1941.

The ships successfully delivered approximately 18,600 metric tons of materiel including ball bearings, machine tools, spare parts, iron, ingots, and steels of various qualities. The operation was directed by George Binney who was a temporary attache to Stockholm representing the UK Ministry of Supply. He was on steamer Tai Shan. This operation was the first of a series which also included Operation Performance, Operation Bridford and Operation Moonshine.

23./24.1.1941 canal offensive mine enterprise SWb "Wagner" before that roasted. Canal coast on the line Orfordness Scheveningen with the Minenlegern Roland (Kpt. Bentlage), Cobra, emperor and Skagerrak, secured through destroyer Richard Beitzen (KKpt. v. Davidson) and T boats lake eagle (Kptlt. Kohlauf) and Iltis (Kptlt. Jacobsen). Subsequently Richard Beitzen, lake eagle and Iltis transfer through the canal back after Brest (shrinking 28.1.). 

26.– 30.1.1941 Norway mine ship group "north" (FKpt. v. beautiful mark) with the mine ships fir mountain, Brummer, queen Luise and Hanseatic league city Danzig leads to the north extension the "west rampart" -barriers, secured through the torpedo boats T 12 and falcon and the mine searchers M 15 and M 22, of Stavanger out of at the 26./27.1. the defensive mine enterprise 20 "Pomerania" through. — In the next night the same group puts, secured of the torpedo boats T 5 and T 9 in place of of falcon, the mine barrier 21 "or

26.– 30.1.1941 Norway ally submarine operations: On the 26.1. Cachalot lays a barrier of 50 mines before the Björnsund, no success. Attacks of Sunfish and Sealion before Kristiansand and Stadlandet remain unsuccessful. 

30./ 31.1.1941 North Sea Coastal Command sows mines in the Elbe Estuary resulting in the loss of Ger Fährschiff king mountain Prussia (2530 BRT) on the 30.1 and on the 31.1. the Danish freighter Maja (2203 BRT)

31.1.1941 Great Britain the battle ship Queen Elizabeth leaves the navy shipyard Rosyth. the conclusion of a 3 year overhaul similar to that undertaken on her near sisters Warspite and Valiant. 

Germany had to build an average of 200000 tons of shipping every year just to make good the losses she suffered. Most losses were in the Baltic, but a significant amount of shipping was lost along the Atlantic coastline as wll, most due to the operations of Coastal Command


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## parsifal (Nov 7, 2011)

February 

Apologies for the poor translation 

1.– 15.2.1941 9th sub flottille (Sunfish and Sealion) (Cdr. Bryant) patrols off Norwegian coast. , on the 1.2. an attack on a convoy is unsuccessful. On the 5.2. the norweg. Route steamer Ryfylke (1151 BRT) is missed by a toreedo attack but is sunk by gunfire. 

1.– 19.2.1941 Biskaya Allied sub ops, Tigris (LtCdr. Bone) on the 12.2. sinks the Vichy Steamer Jacobsen (523 BRT), , and on the 19.2. the Guilvenec (3273 BRT), enroute from Nantes to North Africa. Snapper is lost on the 11.2 west of Ouessant through depth charge attacks by KM minesweepers M 2, M 13 and M 25 . It is replaced the U boats Unbeaten, O. 21 and O. 23. 

1.– 28.2.1941 waters around Great Britain German airplanes lay more than 1000 air mines in British coastal waters; focal points are the Thames mouth, Cardiff, Swansea and liverpool on the west coast as well as the Tyne- and especially the Humber on the east coast. – Through mine hits the following are lost: on the 4.2. the freighter Gwynwood (1177 BRT), on the 16.2. the wheel steamer Southsea (825 BRT) and on the 26.2. in the harbor of cover the Ladeprähme Brackelier, in the Bristol channel on the 14.2. the tanker Empire otter (4670 BRT), near Cardiff on the 20.2. the ore freighter fort Medine (5261 BRT) and on the 28.2. the Kümo Cabenda (534 BRT), in the Lyme bay at the 17.2. The Kümo Ben purely (156 BRT) and at the 23.2. the navy supply ship Shoal Fisher (698 BRT), Trawler Thomas Deas (276 BRT) and on the 27.2. the Minesweeper Trawler Remillo. Damaged outside Cardiff at the 8.2. the belg. Henri Jaspar (5780 BRT), near the Tynem estuary on the 19.2. Fulham II (1596 BRT) and near liverpool at the 27.2.. Cape Clear (5085 BRT). 

2.– 27.2.1941 North Sea German airplanes sink the following ships: near Harwich on the 2.2. The Sultan (824 BRT), near Ramsgate on the 3.2. the Minesweeping Trawler Arctic Trapper (352 BRT), east of Dundee on the 7.2. the navy supply ship Fisher (575 BRT),) in the Moray Firth on the 11.2. the Trawler Eamont (227 BRT) and John Dunkin (202 BRT), near Peterhead on the 16.2. the Minesweeping trawler Ormonde (250 BRT) and east of Harwich on the 27.2. the freighter Old Charlton (1562 BRT). Damaged: on the 10.2. near Great Yarmouth the. Benmacdhui (6809 BRT), on the 13.2. before Whitby the Westcliffe hall (1900 BRT), on the 19.2. the tanker Athelsultan (8882 BRT), on the 26.2. near Cromarty the Empire Steelhead (7744 BRT), and on the 27.2. east of Harwich the Blacktoft (1109 BRT). 

3./ 4.2.1941 North Sea minelaying ops by mine ship group north (FKpt. v. Schönermark) with Tannenberg and Brummer as 2nd part of the north extension the "west rampart" -barriers off the norweg. Coast. Eascort provided by the 1st and 2nd Torpedo Boote flottille and Torpedoboote Falke. 

4.2.1941 aerial warfare France British air attacks on Channel Harbours heavily damages the Ger Supply Tanker Forbach (7908 BRT) near Le Havre _(I think in fact this ship was wrecked so badly that she never sailed again)_ , the small tanker John A. Essberger (739 BRT) in Brest is sunk. 

5./ 6.2.1941 North Sea in an attack bythe 2nd S flottille with S 30, S 33, S 34, S 54, S 58 and S 59; carried out between Ipswich and Newcastle on the FN. 101 S30 (Oblt.z.S. Feldt) sinks Freighter Angularity (501 BRT). 

General Situation 6.2.1941 / Hitler Directive Nr 23 is released. "Guidelines for the warfare against the engl. economy". The Directives states the objective is to increase the effect on the enemy shipping by increased use of submarine and arborne antishipping forces. On the other hand the outline of the attacks is not supposed to be heavily dependant on the air component because other tasks will require other priorities for the air force. Also outlines that the LW will be needed in other TOs _(not mentioned, but east and south)_ . Therefore the directive specifies that the air attacks are to concentrate predominantly against such goals, whose destruction has an (_immediate_) effect in tonnage warfare, like the attacks on coastal shipping. Hitler specifies that attacks on land targets in the blitz are to target and concentrate on terror attacks on residential districts with secondary emphasis on attacks against factories and manufacturing plants the coasts, (_this bit I could not decipher) _ ...[no kriegsentscheidender success is to be expected" on the other hand]. 

15.2.1941 Norway HM Submarine Cachalot (LtCdr. Newton) lays a mine barrier (50 mines) near the Vestfjord (Lofoten) and makes an unsuccessful torpedo attack against a steamer. 

19.2.1941 North Sea attack by the 1.S-Flottille with S 28, S 39, S 101 and S 102 into the Thames mouth. S 102 (Oblt.z.S. Töniges) sinks the Freighter Algarve (1355 BRT). 

19.– 21.2.1941 aerial warfare England the LW drops 112 t explosive bombs and 1091 incendiaries with 125 airplanes on successive nights on Swansea. Extensive damage to the port is reported 

19 - 27.2. 1941 North Sea Coastal Command mining ops. mine hits cause the following losses for the germans: in the Ems estuary on that 19.2 the steamer Enak (180 BRT), in the Elbe on the 26.2 the fish steamer Schaumburg-Lippe (200 BRT) and in the Außenjade on that 27.2 the steamer Adele Ohlrogge (1371 BRT). 

20.2.1941 Channel an airplane of the KG. 2 sinks east of Lizard Is in a night attack the Freighter Rigmor (1278 BRT)

21./ 22.2.1941 aerial warfare Germany RAF bomber Command bombs Wilhelmshaven _(with 35 Wellingtons and 14 Hampdens) _. 

22./ 23.2.1941 Norway out of Bergen mine ship group proceeds north with Brummer (KKpt. of von Schönermark), Cobra and Queen Luise, escorted by the 5th M flottille, and lays the mine barrier 23 "Swine" as 3rd part of the north extension the "west rampart" barriers in the maritime area between Shetland islands and Korsfjord. 

25.2.1941 Germany Commissioning of the battle ship Tirpitz (52,600 t) in Wilhelmshaven. 

25.2.1941 France admiral Darlan, representative and designated successor to marshal Pétains, is given the direction of the Foreign ministry, interior ministry and navy ministry in Vichy. 

25.2.1941 North Sea S 30 (Oblt.z.S. Feldt) sinks the HM Escort destroyer Exmoor near Lowestoft. 

25./ 26.2.1941 Channel the Torpedo Boote Iltis (Kptlt. Jacobsen) and jaguar (Kptlt. Hardstone) "Augsburg A" carry out mining ops near Eastbourne. 

25./ 26.2.1941 RAF by Bomber Command on Brest, bombers of the type Avro Manchester are used for the first time. 

26./ 27.2.1941 North Sea in an attack by the 1.S-Fl. S 28 (Kptlt. Wisely) sinks Freighter Minorca (1123 BRT) near Cromer. 

28.2.1941 / Germany Hitler overrides Goring on the formation I. /KG 40 under the BdU (see 7.-31.1.41) and arranges the assembly of a "fleiger Fuhrer AtlantiK" in Lorient and a "Fleiger Fuhrer north" in Stavanger with the (_primary)_ task of the reconfication over Atlantic, North Sea and European North Ocean. 

28.2./ 1.3.1941 aerial warfare Germany air attack of the RAF bomber Command on Wilhelmshaven.


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## parsifal (Nov 7, 2011)

March 1941

Norway / radio clarification
Operation "Claymore": More successfully brit. Thrust against Lofoten, besides, important kryptologische documents are carried off. Involved units: Destroyer Somali (Capt. Caslon), Eskimo, Tartar, Legion and Bedouin and the landing ships Queen Emma and Princess Beatrix with 500 men Kommando-Truppen aboard. Cover forces: Light cruisers Edinburgh and Nigeria. The submarine Sunfish serves as a "control point". 

Damage to the Axis includes the fishing processing factories at Stamsund, Henningsvaer, Svolvaer and Brettesnes which are destroyed, as well as Axis merchant ships Hamburg (5470 GRT), Felix Heumann (2468 GRT), Pasajes (1996 GRT), Eilenau (1404 GRT), Bernhard Schulte (1058 GRT), Gumbinnen (1381 GRT) and Mira (1152). Norwegian . Fishing vessel Myrland (321 GRT) is captured, and 213 Germans and 12 Norwegians are arrested, 314 Norwegians go voluntarily with the RN to England. — However, this is only the officially widespread part of the history which covers a lot of other important success: Somali succeeds in putting the coastal defense boat NN 04 out of action and boarding her. To the Enterkommando important key documents fall in the hands, which brit. Clarification headquarters Bletchley park enable to decipher the Ger. radio traffic with the code » home bodies of water « for the time from the 13th to the 23.2nd and for different days after the 20.3 (cf 21.4.-10.5.).

(I mention the Lofoten raid because if the Germans held air superiority off the Norwegian Coast it would not have been possible to carry out this mission)

8/3/1941

S101 and 102 sunk by air laid mines in the north sea[/I][/I]




3.3.1941 RAF bomber Command attacks harbor plants in Rotterdam, Calais and Brest. Damage described in German records as "Moderate"

6.3.1941 Channel offensive mine enterprise "Augsburg" before Eastbourne by KM torpedo boats jaguar and Iltis.

7.3.1941 Norway mine ship Gp north consisting mine ships Brummer, Cobra and queen Luise, undertake a further stage of the "westwall Mine barrage, completing the mine barrier 24 "Wollin" ca. 50 sm east of the Shetlands as 4th and most northern part of that extended "west rampart" -barriers 

The 1st S flottilles grasp 7./8.3.1941 North Sea before Cromer and Southwold (Kptlt. Birnbacher) with S 26, S 27, S 28, S 29, S 39, S 101, S 102, the 2nd S flottille (Kptlt. Petersen) with S 33, S 36, S 30, S 55 and the 3rd S flottille (Kptlt. Kemnade) with S 31, S 57, S 59, S 60 and S 61 shadow and attack Convoys FN. 26 and FS. 29 which are escorted by HM Korvetten Sheldrake and Puff. Forewarned by British aerial recon, the Brit ships defending and successfully force aside the boats of the 2nd S flottille. In the combats against FN. 26 S101 sinks (Oblt.z.S. Christiansen) the Brit Norman Queen (957 BRT), S 28 (Kptlt. Wisely) sinks the Brit Corduff (2345 BRT), S 27 (Oblt.z.S. Büchting) sinks the brit the Rye (1049 BRT), S 29 (Oblt.z.S v. me stream) sinks the the Dotterel (1385 BRT), at the FS. 29 S 102 (Oblt.z.S. Töniges)sinks the the Togston (1547 BRT), S 61 (Oblt.z.S. of Gernet) sinks the the Boulderpool (4805 BRT) and S 31 (Oblt.z.S. Meyer) sinks the Kenton (1047 BRT). 

7.3.– 18.4.1941 Biskaya/Atlantic combat with the Submarines Otus, Olympus, Pandora and Tuna and the Dutch O. 21 and O. 23 are used to the protection of HG- and OG convoys west of the Biskaya. At the 7.3. Porpoise misses (LtCdr. Hopkins) in the Biskaya a submarine (probably U 97). In the same period and to the 18.4. the submarine Thunderbolt, Porpoise, Tribune and Talisman are used to the protection of SC- and HX convoys

10./11.3.1941 aerial warfare France RAF bomber Command attacks Le Havre. First use of 6 Halifax- bombers of the 35th Sqn RAF. No recorded losses. some sources say this was a daylight raid 

10./11.3.1941 Norway the Minenlayers queen Luise and Cobra of the 5th M flottille, complete the the mine barrier 17a "Pregel" which complete the extension the "west rampart" -barriers to north. KM considers the putting of the mine barriers in the North Sea area is locked first of all. The mine ships transfer to overhaul in shipyards and subsequently into the Baltic Sea. (this assumption by the KM is wildly optimistic) 

12.– 15.3.1941 North Sea out of the convoy FS. 32 S 28 sinks (Kptlt. Wisely) at the 12.3. sinks Brit Trevethoe (5257 BRT). the destroyer Worcester manages to force away some S boats of the convoy FS. 37. At the 14./15.3. the destroyers Holderness Versatile and Vanessa screens off 2 S-boat-torpedoes. 

13.3.1941 aerial warfare England in the dt. Air attack on Liverpool centering on the port. Some ships in the harbour are attacked and sink. Freighter Buenos Aires (5644 BRT) sinks and heavily damages 7 further ships with 45,114 BRT, under that the fast motor ship used later with Maltas convoys imperially star (12,427 BRT) and the tankers Delphinula (8120 BRT), el Mirlo (8092 BRT), Elax (7403 BRT) and Scottish Chief (7008 BRT).


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## tomo pauk (Nov 7, 2011)

Hi, parsifal,
Thanks you for posting the data about shipping losses. About the discussion in this thread:
We've touched many subjects here, and while we agree on some, we disagree on many more. Since it's unlikely that we would reach some major agreement, I'll refrain from further posting in this thread. Please, do not consider this as a sign of my disability to challenge your, or your sources' views, but, again, merely as a sign of my will to avoid a discussion that's unlikely to produce any major change of our views opinions about the subjects we've discussed.

Cheers


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## parsifal (Nov 7, 2011)

Im still working through the loss sheets for the Axis in the Atlantic Coastal waters. Do you want to see the remainder of that data?


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## tomo pauk (Nov 7, 2011)

Of course, guess the other members would've appreciated it too.


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## parsifal (Nov 7, 2011)

14 - 03.20.1941 
North Sea 
14.3. British bombers sink at position (14.3. a reference to the KMs grid referencing system) the German freighter Wirma (3232 GRT) north of Juist. Merchant Vessel norwegian Varangnes Esbjerg (2228 GRT) sinks off the Norwegian coast after collision with patrol boat Ger V 1106. British torpedo planes of the RAF Coastal Command (probably Beaforts) put two torps into the Borkum and Ger Widar freighter (5972 BRT) and before the Ameland Block Breaker and also sink Stolzenfels (7512 GRT).


03/16/1941 
Waters around the UK 
In air raids in the west of Britain ger aircraft, especially the He 111 KG.27, in St. George's Channel sink the motor tanker Rotula (7981 GRT), the Port Townsville (8661 GRT), the Dutch. Prins Frederik Henrik (1288 GRT) the day before damaged British Empire Frost (7005 GRT) in the Bristol Channel the Castle Hill (690 GRT) in the English Channel at Lands End the norwegian Nurgis (700 GRT)and the the Aberdeen trawler (163 tons), Sunk also in the Irish Sea, the Dutch. Perseus (1307 GRT), the British Stan Leigh (1802 GRT), Bianca, the trawler (174 tons) and Exeter (165 GRT) north of Ireland at 16.3 Lady Lillian's Ocean Going Trawler (581 GRT). 

Damaged in air raids on the St. George's Channel, the Empire Simba (5691 GRT), on 10.3. the Norwegian Bur (4343 GRT) and the Dutch. Libra (391 GRT), and in the Bristol Channel on 13.3. the British Ngatira (525 GRT). 

In air raids in the North Sea sink Ger aircraft of X. Fl.-Korps and the K.Fl.Gr.706 at 3.3. vor Lowestoft the minesweeping trawler Cobbers (276 GRT) and the Flashlight (934 GRT) Artemisia (6507 GRT). Damaged east of the Aberdeen- tankers in ballast Atheltemplar (8949 GRT) north of Kinnaird Head, the Forthbank (5057 GRT) east of Cromer the Br Essex Lance (6625 GRT) and at the front of the Humber estuary, the Norwegian Tyr (4205 GRT). 

18.3.1941 North Sea attack of the 1st S flottilla with S 26, S 29, S 39, S 55, S 101 and S 102 into the Humber mouth. S 102 (Oblt. zS Töniges) sinks the french Daphne II (1970 BRT).

19.3.1941 RAF Bomber Command attacks Bremen and Wilhelmshaven . The fast steamer lying in Wesermünde, the Bremen (51731 BRT) is destroyed by fire. At position 18./19.3. air attacks of the RAF on Kiel and Wilhelmshaven. In Kiel, the Germania shipyard is damaged, but damage to U-Boat production is slight. 

19./20.3.1941 LW attacks on London (heaviest attack since the 29.12.1940) sets fire to and destroys Freighter Nailsea Meadow (4962 BRT) and severely damages Larrinaga (5780 BRT). Both ships were at anchor at the tiome of their attack

22.3.1941 Biskay start of a (massive???) operation. U-boat-assemblies against a breakthrough of the battle ships multitude Scharnhorst and Gneisenau to Brest. In the following subs are involved Torbay, Tuna, Taku, L 26, L 27, H 31, H 32, H 33, H 44, H 50, Undaunted, Sealion, Sturgeon, Sunfish, the Polish Sokol, and the Dutch O. 9, O. 10 and O. 24. 

23.3.1941 (following successful location by aerial recon....i think????) North Sea attack by 1st (Kptlt. Birnbacher) and 3rd S flottillas (KKpt. Kemnade) against the convoy FS. 41 near Great Yarmouth. The 1st S flottilla with S 26, S 29, S 39, S 55, S 101 and S 102 misses the convoy. An attack by S 61 (Oblt. zS of Gernet) and S 31 (Oblt. zS Meyer) on the destroyer Worcester fails.

27.3.1941 Biskaya. Minelayer (Minenleger) Abdiel and the Minenlege destroyers Intrepid, impulsive and Icarus of the 20th destroyer flottilla lead under the cover through the 5th Destroyer flottilla (Capt. Lord Louis Mountbatten) with the destroyers Kipling, Kashmir, Kelly, Kelvin and Jackal on a minelaying operation that establishes fields "GV", "GX" and "GY" in order to prevent a return of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. They are too late, these ships are already in Brest harbour. 

29.3.1941 North Sea LW Airplanes of the X FK sink the armed yacht Mollusc (598 BRT), near the Hebrides, the Nor. Leo (1367 BRT), near the Orkneys Trawler Elmira (197 BRT), at the at the Firth of the Forth, the Somali (6809 BRT) and at Lowestoft the tanker going in ballast Oiltrader (5550 BRT) and before the Humber estuary, the Trawler Kimberley (190 BRT). The Dutch Alioth (5483 BRT) is damaged through air attack. 


29.3.1941 waters around Great Britain in air attacks in western Great Britain dt sink. Airplanes in the St. -Georgs-Channel that set fire ("roasted"????) . Millisle (617 BRT), (and sink) at posn 22.3. the St. Fintan (495 BRT) and at the 26.3. the Kabelleger Faraday (5533 BRT), in the Irish Sea (irises lake???) at pos'n 27.3. the Meg Merrilies (642 BRT) and in the Bristol channel the London II (1260 BRT), at pos'n 28.3. the Dutch Antwerp (364 BRT) and that roasted. Trawler Kestrel (75 BRT), at the 29.3. the Trawler Exeter (165 BRT). Damaged at the 22.3. the Norw. Inger (1418 BRT) (in "Smalls skirt"????) at pos'n 26.3. the Norw. Knoll (1151 BRT) in Lundy Iceland. 

In air attacks in the Channel, Ger Airplanes sink in (country End???) at pos'n 20.3. the Pol. Cleszyn (1386 BRT) and outside Plymouth the tug (tractor???) Sir Bevois (338 BRT) and the Marinetrawler Asama (303 BRT) and Gullfoss (358 BRT). 

31.3.1941 RAF Bomber Command attacks the battle ships lying in Brest with 109 bombers unsuccessfully


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## parsifal (Nov 8, 2011)

April 1941

[4.6.1941 The Bay of Biscay at this time was dominated by Brit Subs and wre concentrated on the port of Brest. Older brit boats H. 31, H. 32, H. 50 and Dutch. Boats O. 9 and O. 10 were withdrawn due to defects and fuel shortages. They were replaced by Brit. U-boat Tigris (LtCdr. Bone) which sank after several Torpedo attacks, on the escort tanker Thorn (ex-norw. Ruth 5486 GRT) (Transcribers note: carrying fuel for the Battle squadron) , The ship was sunk by torpedo and artillery. - The RAF Bomber Command carried out further attacks in Brest targetting the german BATTLESHIPS scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Bristol Beauforts of the RAF Squadron 22 obtain a torpedo hit in Brest on the battle ship Gneisenau (Comment...thats allowed since I am doing the translating....seems very strange, considering the claims of air superiority, air superiority, for the LW at this time!!!!!!)

4.9.1941 Baltic Sea / North Sea the swed. Lidingö (5895 GRT) damaged by brit. air laid mines. (The last mines laid by the LW were in February. Ship found and assisted in shallow water freighter will be salvaged and towed to malmö for repair. Air mine degausser (Transcribers Note: or minesweeper ...I am not sure) also saves the small fuel tanker Sund (517 GRT) in the Elbe river

8.4.1941 RAF bomber Command flies a heavy attack on Kiel. Targets are varied, but most important are among other things the admiral Hipper and admiral Scheer

11.4.1941 In another air raid of Brest, RAF bomber Command obtains 4 bomb hits on the battle ship Gneisenau (where is german air superiority??????)

04/13/1941 BC and 2 Gp carry out renewed attacks on the Ger battleships at Brest. Attacks are also made to the submarine base and the airfield at Lorient forcing the FW 200s to redeploy to Merignac near Bordeaux, the new base for the the long-range bombers of the type Fw 200-equipped I / KG .40 of the "Atlantic pilot leader" (Col. Harlinghausen). (Translators Comment: Doesnt look like air superiority for the germans to me.....a redeployment of a strategically important asset further out of the operational zone is not a mark of an air force in control of those skies....).

14/04/1941 LW air attacks at Falmouth on the FF sloops Conquerant and Suippe, with the latter destroyed 

14.4.1941 Destroyer Mansfield (KKpt. Ulstrup) makes a high speed run from Lerwick (Shetland) into the Lopphavet (north Norway) and destroys a fish factory in the Öksfjord

16./17.4.1941 air raid on London, England. 681 Ger a/c drop 890 t HE and incendiary bombs 151 t. (i believe the docklands were heavily damaged....again) 

04.17.1941 Mining operations by the 1st North Sea S-Flotilla (Kptlt Birnbacher) from Cromer (42 mines), the 2nd S-Flotilla (KKpt Petersen) at Cross Sands lightship (24 mines) and the 3rd S-Flotilla (Kptlt Kemnade) before Haisborough sand (32 mines) are laid, but with no immediate success. 

At this time, in the same area, these flotillas attack a nearby convoy whilst this operation is still in progress attacks by Ger 2nd flotttila, S 41, S 42, S 43, S 55 and S 104 on a British convoy from Great Yarmouth FS.64 S 43 (Oblt.zS Feldt) sinks the British Effra (1446 GRT) and S 104 ( Oblt.zS Roeder), the Dutch. Nereus (1298 GRT), S 55 (Lt.zS Howaldt) and S 42 (Oblt.zS Meentzen) jointly attack and torpedo the British Eskburn (472 GRT) and Ethel Radcliffe (5673 GRT). 

The 3rd S-Flotilla with S 35, S 34, S 61, S 31, S 60 and S 58 is engaged briefly by three British MGB shifted on the 6/4/41 (??) to Felixstowe MGB Flotilla.

4.19.1941 Submarine blockade of Brest reduces submarines blocakding Norway to just the Free French Minerve (Oblt. Sonneville) sights a convoy off Stavanger, but is unable to inflict any damage. 

19. /4.20.1941 aerial war England 712 German bombers drop 1026 t of HE and 153 t incendiary bombs on London.

21.- 4.24.1941 Heavy LW air raids on Plymouth-Devonport . 354 German aircraft throough 3 consecutive nights drop a total of 403 t HE and 92 t incendiary bombs. The Destroyer Depot ship Maidstone (688 GRT) is damaged by a hit in the engine room.

4.22.1941 In the Porsangerfjord German Munitions ship, norw. Freighter blenheim (1807 GRT) explodes and sinks killing 138 German soldiers.

22.- 4.24.1941 Baltic sea the German freighter Obra (ex-dan. Jylland, 551 GRT) stumbles onto a minefield laid by BC near Greifswald. Other casualties are suffered, including the German Freighter LAVINIA (968 GRT) at LIGHTSHIP Kiel 

24. /4.25.1941 RAF Bomber Command strikes Kiel and Wilhelmshaven, damage described by Germans as slight.

24.- 4.29.1941 North Sea He 115 of the 3. /K. fl.gr.506 strikes near Sunderland. Sinks the the brit. Patia Katapultschiff (catapult ship???) (5355 GRT). 

Further air strikes by German aircraft, are carried out, principally by Ju88s of 1. /K. fl.Gr.506, east of Dundee . sinking the the brit. Bolius and spot the Marie Dawn (2157 GRT) This unit undertakes strike near Great Yarmouth , the brit. Empire Strait (2324 GRT) is damaged. During the attack on a convoy near the Tyne river, the brit. Kalua with (722 GRT) is sunk, the brit. Corglen (2822 GRT) and norw. Askeladden (2498 GRT) are both severely damaged.

4.29.1941 minelaying by of the 3. S-flotilla (Kptlt. KEMNADE) outsidee Hammond Knoll (24 mines) is unsuccessful (no details given) 

l. S-Fl. (Kptlt. Birnbacher) with S 26, S 27, S 29, S 39, S 40 and S 55 into the sea area nordwest of . Cromer S 26 (Oblt.z.S. Fimmen) and S 29 (Oblt.z.S. v. mirbach) attack convoy EC.13 and sink The brit. Ambrose Fleming (1555 GRT).

28.4.1941 waters around Great Britain use of air mine: German airplanes sow more than 450 air mines. Focal points are the Thames, Tyne, Humber and Mersey Estuaries. – Casualties from German air laid mines include: at position 7.4. Elisabeth (945 BRT) the armed yacht Torrent (336 BRT), at the Humber the tanker going in ballast Ahamo (8621 BRT), at Harwich the norw. Profit (1608 BRT), and at Milford Haven the Dutch Minesweeping trawler Caroline. — Damaged at Aberdeen Melrose Abbey (1908 BRT) and at live pool the Dutch Virgo (397 BRT). 

Other German aircraft armed with bombs sink: at St. Abb`s Head the Mineweeper trawler Cramond Iceland, east of the Humber estuary the Fermain (759 BRT), East of Scotland the Cairnie (250 BRT), North of Cromer the Salvus (4815 BRT) and west of whale(???) the Trawler Whitby (164 BRT), east of Aberdeen the Rattray Head (496 BRT) and the St. Clement (450 BRT), southeast of Lizard Rocks the Minesweeping trawler Rochebonne, at Eddystone lighthouse Dudley Rose (1600 BRT) and the norw. Tanker busts (5187 BRT), at the pos'n 12.4. the belg. Freighter Arbel (901 BRT), north of the Hebrides the norw. Favorite (2826 BRT) and an American Freighter (1548 BRT), Anglesea rose (1151 BRT) and the norw. Bolette (1167 BRT). — (this vessel was damaged) Damaged, (the following were sunk) northeast of Harwich the Glenfinlas (7572 BRT), in the humber estuary the Chaucer (5792 BRT) east of Wick (Scotland) of the tanker British Workman (6994 BRT), west Hartlepool the "however" (huh?) hall (1516 BRT) in the Humber estuarythe Cormarsh (2848 BRT). 

On that 12th and 13.4. Germans Airplanes in the Bristol channel attacked (and except where noted, sunk) Dartford (4693 BRT) and baron Belhaven (6591 BRT), at position 17.4. He of 115 the K.Fl.Gr.406 in the Bristol channel attacked Tanker Scottish Musician (6998 BRT) (damaged I believe)


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## nuuumannn (Nov 9, 2011)

Parsifal, fascinating posting; always thought provoking. I'm really enjoying reading this.

I've just a couple of points to add, totally off topic though. The Channel Dash, for the propaganda coup that the KM claimed that it was, was really an admission of defeat because the ships were being attacked so frequently by the RAF. Moving them north basically sealed their fate; Keeping them at Brest was wholly advantageous for the role for which they were being used, as commerce raiders (both ships as a pair sank the greatest tonnage of any KM surface vessels; individually the _Admiral Scheer _sank the highest tonnage) for which direct access to the North Atlantic was much less hazardous than going through the North Sea around the UK and Iceland, as they had to once in German ports.

_Gneisenau_ never sailed again under her own power; whilst being modified to take the same twin 15 in gun turrets as fitted to the _Bismarck_ and _Tirpitz_, she (actually 'He'; German warships were always male, not traditionally female) was again bombed and was moved further east. Both _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ were classified by the KM as battleships; the Brits have always classified them as battlecruisers, but the intention was always that they were to be refitted with 6 X 15 in in place of the 9 X 11 in guns. Interestingly, _Gneisenau_'s removed 11 in gun turrets still survive, high up a cliff face in Norway.

Tomo, regarding the Hurricane losses in the Far East; we've covered this before. The reasons why the Japanese had such a big success rate had little to do with the individual aircraft types being used. The Allies had no form of early warning, inexperienced pilots, they faced overwhelmingly superior numbers and they suffered from lack of supplies or replacement equipment. Kiwi ace Geoff Fisken later claimed that the Brewster Buffalo was easily a match for the Mitsubishi Zero when the tubby fighter's advantages were exploited.

Nighty night folks


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## parsifal (Nov 9, 2011)

May 1941

5.2.1941 North Sea the german picket boat V 808 / Hindenburg sunk by Coastal Command

5.3.1941 North Sea LW aircraft near the North sea Wash sink the Norw. Sitona (1143 BRT) and Trajan (1347 BRT). Further air attacks in the Humber estuary leave the Royston (2722 BRT) and the Mine sweeper trawler Susarion on fire. . 

4./5.5.1941 RAF Bomber Command attacks the KM warships in Brest harbour with 93 airplanes. 

7.5.1941 LW Air attacks against brit harbours and shipping stepped up. LW suffer a serious setback, when in one of the first uses of the the new BM 1000 aerial mine, one mine falls on land, and does not detonate. Because also its detonation- mechanism is damaged, the mine can be defused and examined. 

7.5.1941 after the radio traffic of a Ger. Weather observation ship Munich are intercepted, RN carries out a board capture and search of the ship. Under leadership of VAdm. Holland with the cruisers Edinburgh, Manchester, Birmingham and the destroyers Nestor, Bedouin, Eskimo and Somali move to the position of WBS 6 near the Jan Mayen island. In bad visibility German ship is surprised, the destroyer Somali (Capt. Caslon) goes along side and captures important key documents, v. a. that "weather short keys 1940", an extraordinarily valuable source for so-called. "Cribs". The documents are brought on board the (HMAS) Nestor at Scapa Flow and permit the RN in the month of June to decode the radio traffic "of waters domestic after the key" (i think that means "able to decode the Domestic Traffic signal code, or something similar) . The newly introduced key "kernel fleet" on the other hand, used for fleet operations, never is broken because it is not used frequently enough. 

5.8.1941 LW undertakes heavy and highly effective air raids over Liverpool resulting in the loss of 18 British merchant ships with GRT of 35,605 grt, including the brit. (Ex-dan.) freighter Europe (10,224 GRT) and the brit. Munitionstransporter Pakistan (7649 GRT). The explosions from this ship cause further damage. A further 25 ships with 92,964 grt will be seriously damaged, including the brit. Tanker San fabian (13,031 grt), the Destroyer Hurricane (???) , is heavily damaged, not returning to service until until January 1943 . 69 Of 144 Loading docks are damaged, temporarily decreasing the transshipment capacity of the port to a quarter of ful capacity - On the 3. /4.5 . With 204 aircraft bombing raids on Belfast. From the 5.-7.5 improved night attack capabilities with 618 aircraft on Glasgow-Clydeside . By German air raids in May, 2120 dead and 5207 injured of the Brit. Civilian population. Germ. Aircraft sink outside dartmouth the brit.Jean-frédéric Geleitfahrzeug (ex-french, 329 t).

9.5.1941 RAF bomber Command raids hamburg and Bremen with 359 airplanes, the heaviest raid to date on on Germany. — German night defenders amount to 120 airplanes on cover. 157 Explosive bombs and 540 Incendiaries (Brandschüttkäsen???) are dropped

11.5.1941 LW delivers one of its last heavy air attacks with 507 airplanes on London. Approximately 200 fires, (5 covers????) and , 35 factories destroyed or heavily damages. — RAF bomber Command attacks Hamburg with 110 airplanes - light damage. 

10./11.5.1941 North Sea a night air attack on the mine ships Cobra and Versailles transferring after shipyard refit time (and/or Indienststellung????) from Rotterdam to Swinemünde is unsuccessful 

16.5.1941 Brit. A/C hit German shipping in the North Sea the Norwegian coast near Feiestein UJ 173/ Mob Fd 32: In the attack, UJ 179 is hit and heavily damaged, it is eventually repaired and returned to serrvice. Torpedo airplanes in the Germans bay north of Norderney the Coastal Command hits and sets fire to Swedish ore freighter Ossian (1796 BRT) and German freighter Boltenhof (3307 BRT) Attacks are carried out by Blenheims which also bomb the norw. Steamer Gol (displacement not given but other sources suggest about 2000GRT) in Attelnos (Norway). The ship is run ashore to prevent a loss

18.5.1941 North Sea Numerous attacks LW A/C of the X. Fl. corps and the K.Fl.Gr.706 on the ship traffic at the English east coast: Humber estuary Tanker British Statesman (6991 BRT) and San Roberto (5896 BRT) and the freighter Tower Field (4241 BRT) (damaged) must be brought in. At the 12.5. ships in ballast of are set on fire. Fowberry tower (4484 BRT), near the Humber estuary Richard de Larrinaga (5358 BRT), this ships sinks. . At the Tyne Estuary Loitinge (2468 BRT) damaged . At posn 17.5. the Royal Navy supply ship is s sunk on its return voyage from Scapa Flow, south of Aberdeen. this ship is naemed Archangel (2448 BRT) and eventually sinks near Moray Firth. North of Blyth. Eskburn (472 BRT) is bombed and damages.

1-27.5.1941 waters around Great Britain LW A/C of different units carry out anti-shipping attacks in the Bristol- and St. Georgs-channels. West. of Newquay (Cornwall) the Tregor (222 BRT), off the island of Bardsey (whale) the Trawler forts Rona (203 BRT), in Bishops skirt the Hegerin (483 BRT), Milford Haven the Matronna (2846 BRT) and off Newquay the norw. Royksund (695 BRT). He 115 the 1./K.Fl.Gr.406 west of Newquay sink the armed navy yacht Viva II (521 BRT) and damage by fire outside Milford Haven Motor ship Caithness (4970 BRT). 

1-31.5.1941 In waters around Britain LW airplanes sow 275 aerial mines in british coastal waters; priorities are v. a. the Thames estuary and harbor on the west coast. Some mines are laid in the Thames estuary on 19 and 30.5 . The brit. Winkfield (5679 GRT) and Westavon (2842 GRT) are lost to these mines, whilst the the brit. Dixcove (3790 GRT) is damaged on the 19.5.


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## nuuumannn (Nov 10, 2011)

Prsifal, To add to your post No.85; on 10.05.41 Rudolf Hess arrived over Scotland, parachuting from his Bf 110 and landing near Eaglesham, south west of Glasgow. 

When Winston Churchill first heard this revelation, he was on his way out for the night and his response was; "...Hess or no Hess, I'm off to see the Marx Brothers!"


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## parsifal (Nov 10, 2011)

I had forgotten about hess's little trip. Thanks for reminding me

What my intention with all this work is to show a couple of things really. I wanted to show that there was a lively amount of activity both by mercantile forces and air forces. Both sides were putting considerable effort into force projection. Both sides were inflicting losses on each other. There was importance to controlling the coastal waters around Europe for both sides. For the british, the waters around Britain were particularly important. Control of these coastal waters gave a pathway for invasion, in either direction, more immediately the British were suffering rupturing losses to their merchant marines in the near waters of Britain. It was a priority to stop this.

For germany, the control of the coastal waters was mostly about freedom of action for their naval forces. Secondly, they too seemed to have considerable reliance on seaborne traffic, and even though they were suffering fewer losses, they simply couldnt afford the loss rates they were suffering. 

On the basis of what was happening, between January and May 1941, I would have to say neither side and air superiority over the oceans, but both were making more than just an incidental effort towards trying to achieve just that. I plan to continue this detailed analysis of losses through to the end of 1941, to see just how much change occurred in the "Battle of the Atlantic Coast". We will see who was left in control of the "region" and know if that level of control constituted "air superiority" by the scale of losses they were inflicting and suffering. If there is no improvement in loss rates into 1942, it may be that neither side had control of these seas from the air.....we will see however.


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## nuuumannn (Nov 10, 2011)

Parsifal; It's fascinating reading nevertheless. You have lined yourself up a considerable workload and I applaud your efforts. The Hess reference was not to point out what you had missed, but that May 1941 was full of interesting/intriguing activity; the sinking of the _Hood_ and _Bismarck_ too, but these were certainly not coastal and don't warrant inclusion in your list.

Beside this, Hess was actually tracked on radar at RAF Ouston and plotted as Raid 42, and as he crossed the UK coast was spotted by the Observer Corps. As his flight path took him closer to the west coast of Scotland, a (not sure, maybe more) Defiant was scrambled from RAF Ayr, but did not manage to intercept the lone Messerschmitt. Apparently a Czech Hurricane pilot remembered some time after the incident that he was recalled to base after intercepting a lone Bf 110 that afternoon, but by the time Hess reached Scotland it was already night fall. He landed (parachuted) at around 22:35 and surrendered himself as "Alfred Horn". Strange little man.


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## parsifal (Nov 10, 2011)

June 1941 (Part I of II)

1.6.1941 North Sea and Baltic Sea the newly set up dt. 4th S flottille (Kptlt. Bätge) merges with the older boats S 19, S 20, S 22, S 24 and S 25 in Rotterdam. Simultaneously transfer that 1., 2nd and 3rd S boat flottillase out of its North Sea bases into the Baltic Sea after Swinemünde to the preparation of the operations in the expedition against the Soviet Union. 

2.6.1941 RAF Bomber Command attacks the Wilhelm-canal. 

2.6.1941 LW receives reports mid East coast of an aircraft carrier with escort, believed to be the HMS Indomitable. Because the He115s of 3./Kü.Fl.Gr.506 do not respond, a single He of 111 the torpedo school of the Air Force in Großenbrode is the only aircraft to attempt attack. no results. He115s eventually join the attack In the attack, the "carrier", with is found in reality to be Marmari, 7924 BRT) which is damaged by a torpedo hit. The ship is attacked the next night in an attack by the newly formed 4th S Flotille (Kptlt. Bätge) through the fast boats S 22 (Oblt.z.S. Karcher) and S 24 (Oblt.z.S v.) with torpedoes, suffers further hits, and sinks — On the same day some Ju of 88 the 1./Kü.Fl.Gr.506 sink the escort. Beaumanoir (2477 BRT) and damage the Trawler Ben Screel (195 BRT). 

3.6.1941 LW A/C nth of Cape Wrath carry out night strikes (Scotland) that sinks Prince Rupert city (4749 BRT). Near to St. Kilda (Hebriden) belg. Trawler John (197 BRT) is also sunk. 

9.6.1941 North Atlantic Fw 200 of the I. /KG 40 NW. of the the Faroe Islands sinks the brit. Fischfrachter Diana (942 GRT) and Finnish freighter Fenix (1894 GRT) bound for Petsamo (almost a friendly fire incident).

13.6.1941 LW air attacks in the Channel sink the following in the channel south of . St. Alban's head, the brit. Dagmar (844 GRT), in the St. Georgs-Channel the brit. Baron Carnegie (3178 GRT) and at posn 13.6 . the brit. St. Patrick (1922 GRT). Also west of the Scillies the brit. Kingstown (628 GRT) is sunk whilst the the norw. Bokn (698 GRT) is damaged by bombing raids near St. Ives (Cornwall).

13.6.1941 In the North Sea an attempted breakout by the Pocket Battleship Lutzow (Kpt.z.S. Kreisch) into the Atlantic, is defeated. From Shortly before midnight at Posn 12.6 night capable search aircraft of Coastal Command (ASV radar equipped I suspect) shadows the keeping the cruisers position and its 5 escorting destroyers Hans Lody, Friedrich Eckoldt, Karl Galster, Z 23, Z 24, in contact, near the Lindesnes lighthouse, 2 hours later Beaufort-Torpedoflugzeuge (Squadron No.42 RAF coastal command) a Beaufort piloted by F/Sgt Loveitt achieved a Torpedo hit amidships. (Note Mission aborted). The torpedo hit causes malfunctions in the ships machinery, and the hull is pierced the cruiser runs into the Baltic Sea back and reaches Kiel in the afternoon where it remains under repair until January 1942

13.6.1941 North Sea LW Attack convoy north of Blyth and sink Royal Fusilier (2187 BRT), the belg. Logger Cor Jesu (94 BRT), south of Aberdeen Queensbury (3911 BRT) and the norw Cable Lawn (4767 BRT) and nörth of Whitby Morwood (2056 BRT). Damaged near Peterthead, the norw. Distance Bank (4333 BRT) the navy transport Thorpebay (2183 BRT) returning empty to Tyne after Scapa Flow, the Trawler Remagio (174 BRT) the Clearpool (5404 BRT) outside Scarborough, at pos'n 11.6. the Westburn (2842 BRT) outside Hartlepool, Dalemoor (5796 BRT) (sunk) and Empire Creek (332 BRT) south. of Aberdeen. 

14.6.1941 The Baltic German Minenschiffe of 2. Group (head Minenschiffsgruppe Nord, FKpt. of Schonermark) consisting of the Tannenberg, Mmer and Hanseatic city of Danzig, and 3. Group (KKpt. d.r. Dr. Ing. K. -F. Brill) Cobra, Kaiser and Queen Luise depart Gotenhafen to the for the the Finnish archipelagoes (tricky tricky....warships deployed from a neutral port.....I wonder if the Swedes had any knowledge of this..... ). 

14.6.1941 RAF Bomber Command attacks with 110 aircraft the German battleships in Brest.

13.6 .1941 Baltic Sea / Arctic Sea transfer Soviet submarines on the Weißmeer-channel of the Baltic fleet transfer to to North -Flotte : K-23 (13.6 . -30.9 . ), K-21 (15.7 . -24.10 . ), S-101, S-102, L-20, L-22 (5.8 . -8.9 . ), K-22 (22.8 . -30.10 . ), K-3 (23.8 . -8.11 . ). (What are the Soviets doing????)

15.6.1941 RAF Bombers west of Texel sink the Ger. Freighter Hans Brage (2095 GRT). 

22.6.1941 LW recon flights into the North Ocean over Zapolyarny. At pos'n 18.6. Soviet Flak batteries open the fire on a LWt. Me 110: The SU Submarine M-176 puts to sea in order to cover Zyp Navolok. 

17.6.1941 North Sea mine operations of the 4th S flottille (Kptlt. Bätge) in the Cross Sands fire ship (10 mines) and Cromer (6 mines). On these mines are sunk probably at position 21.6. Gasfire (3001 BRT) and Kenneth Hawksfield (1546 BRT), at the 23.6. are sunk Cover Trader (717 BRT). In the Humber estuary Korvette Pintail is believed to have hit airborne Mine and sinks. 

19.– 21.6.1941 admiral N. G. Kuznetsov upgrades the Red Navy's war alert status, on the basis of detailed messages over German attack preparations for the The Soviet Baltic and Northern Fleets are ordered to "alarm step 2" by Kutsenov and at pos'n 21.6. and 23/37"alarm step 1" from. Kuznetsovs directive careful instructions are issued to avoid provocation of the Germans to avoid provocation, that could give the German side pretext for an attack. 

19.– 21.6.1941 Baltic Sea in the nights of the 18./19., 19./20. and 20./21.6. the KM put. Mine ships of the 1st group (F.d.MinSch, Kpt. z. S. Bentlage) Prussia, grill, Skagerrak and Versailles as well as 6 boats of the 5th M flottille between Memel and Öland, laying the the mine barriers "Wartburg I—III" (1150 EMC and 1800 explosive buoys), to prevent advances by the Baltic Fleet. Over water military forces into the middle Baltic Sea are on stanby for Soviet break out attempts. At the same time from the evening of 18.6.41 west of Libau sowj. Cruiser Kirov is detected but has disappeared by the time of hostilities. At the pos'n 19.6. the Sovietsj run Submarine S-7 of Tallinn to the Irben Finn. Minenlegers put to sea and lay mine barriers in Manni and Jussarö

20.– 30.6.1941 North Sea / English Channel Lw naval air strikes carried out at night. They sink, at Peterhead the Marine trawler Resmilo (258 BRT), north of of Cromer the Dutcvh. Schieland (2249 BRT), at pos'n 23.6. Trelissick (5265 BRT) is sunk as well as the Marinetrawler Nogi (299 BRT), at pos'n 25.6. Nth of Doggerbank they sink Dashwood (2154 BRT), at Smith`s Knoll the Marine trawler Tranio (275 BRT) and the Dutch Montferland (6790 BRT) and Barrhill (4972 BRT), in the same night before Great Yarmouth the Marinetrawler Force (324 BRT) and at the 29.6. südl. Aberdeen that roasted. Cushendall (626 BRT). Damaged become at the 20.6. in the Thames mouth the Cormount (2841 BRT), at the 21.6. before Hartlepool the Dorine (3176 BRT), at the 21./22.6. before Great Yarmouth the norw. Skum (1304 BRT), at the 23.6. in Immingham that Camroux II (324 BRT) and nördl roasted. Cromer the Tolworth (1352 BRT), at the 25.6. before Hartlepool the Levenwood (803 BRT), at the 29.6. in Smith`s Knoll that roasted. Empire meteor (7457 BRT) and at the 30.6. in Haisborough of the high lake tractors Empire Larch (487 BRT). — In the canal dt damage. Airplanes at the 20.6. in the island Wight that roasted. Tankers Inverarder (5578 BRT), that mounted and brought in becomes after that after Southampton. 

20.6.– 11.7.1941 Norway: KM. 6th destroyer flottille consisting of Karl Galster, Hermann Schoemann, Friedrich Eckoldt, and (from 1.7.) Hans Lody and Richard Beitzen transferred to operate from Trondheim, Narvik and Tromsö and Kirkenes . (They escort supply ships north) The Troßschiff Westerwald (10,848 BRT escorted by the destroyers) is heavily damaged at posn 21.6. in an air attack by the RAF into in the Skagerrak. The new destroyer Z 25 is spotted contacted sth of Haugesund is hit, and is heavily damaged. 

24.6.1941 North Sea / channel the KM. 4th S flottille (Kptlt. Bätge) is transferred from Rotterdam to Cherbourg leaving no fast boat deployment in the North Sea. The redeployment is intended principally to increase attacks on ship traffic in the Channel. 

25.– 28.6.1941 North Ocean Cruiser Nigeria with 3 destroyers Bedouin, Jupiter and Tartar intercept the KM weather observation ship WBS 3/ Tepid Castle (344 BRT), whose weather messages are used to provide location by HF/DF. In thick fog, the Tepid Castle first is tracked down at the 28.6 in the island Jan Mayen and from there is further shadowed by the destroyer Bedouin resulted. Using artillery gunfire the other Ships force the Tepid Castle, directly on to that Destroyer. Ship surrenders (alert signals are jammed) Tartar goes along side for board capture and search. German ship does not scuttle. valuable key documents are recovered. Mostly Radio codes that assist codebreaking efforts at Bletchley Park which increase the ability to permit to decypher the messages out of the key circle "domestic waters" also in the month of July. Yet out of fear that the ULTRA secret might be compromised by future interceptions of this type, , attacks of this type in the future are forbidden.


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## parsifal (Nov 11, 2011)

June (Part II of II)

27.6.1941 Biskay the KM Blockadebreakerr Regensburg (8068 BRT, Kpt. Harder) safely arrives at Bordeaux. from the Japanese port of Dairen in the Japanese occupied Mandschuko. 

27./28.6.1941 Brit. Bombers attack Bremen, Cuxhaven, Emden and Wilhelmshaven. 

30.6.1941 RAF bomber Command carries out a day attack with Halifax bombers on Kiel 

1-30.6.1941 waters around Great Britain, German airplanes lay 600 air mines in British coast waters ; focal points are the Thames and the Humber with respectively more than 200 mines in each area. Mines are also dropped on the west coast before Milford Haven. Losses include the pilot boat nr. 10, in the North Sea east of the Humber mouth the Royal Scot (1444 BRT) and at the "Fischlogger" (????) Audacious, outside Harwich the Minesweeping Sisapon and in the channel south of the isle of Wight the norw. Aia (933 BRT). Damaged near liverpool that Myrmidon (6278 BRT), near Hartlepool Ilse (2844 BRT) and in the Thames mouth the norw. Tanker Leiesten (6118 BRT).


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## parsifal (Nov 11, 2011)

July Part I 

1.– 29.7.1941 waters around Great Britain LW. Airplanes sink in the North Sea north of Cromer the Homefire (1262 BRT), at Flamborough Head the Marinetrawler Akranes (358 BRT), at Sunderland the Snaefell (466 BRT), north of Hartlepool the Fishing Trawler Isabella Fowlie (196 BRT) and NW. the Orkneys the fish steamer Strathlochy (212 BRT) and near the Tyne estuary the Adams it Beck (2816 BRT). Damaged nordwestl. of Cromer out of a south going convoy Birgitta (1303 BRT) and the North Devon (3658 BRT), east of the the Humber mouth the Scorton (4813 BRT), südl. of the Tyne the Elizabete (2039 BRT), NE of Middlesbrough Mine layer Emerald Queen (481 BRT) and at Humber mouth the Umvuma (4419 BRT). 

At the west coast of Great Britain, LW south of Cardiff sink the Lunan (363 BRT), in the Bristol channel the Fowey Rose (470 BRT, through He 115 with air torpedo), NW of Trevose the norw. Svint (1174 BRT) and the Farfield (468 BRT). Damaged west of Pembroke the norw. Tanker Ferncourt (9918 BRT). An attack by 6 He 115 of Kü.Fl.Gr.406 on a convoy in the Strait of. St. Georgs Khannel unsuccessful, a success message of the flyer leader Atlantic over 5 sinking this day, up to the Svint, turns out to be incorrect. 

1.– 31.7.1941 waters around Great Britain German airplanes lay 200+ air mines, almost exclusively in the Thames mouth. Losses to mines are the Collingdoc (1780 BRT) Damaged the auxiliary ship Goldfinch (454 BRT) and in the North Sea westl. Cromer at the 11.7. the River Trent (246 BRT) (_presumably from a mine sown earlier_) .

2.7.1941 heavy cruiser prince Eugen is damaged in a bombing raid of the RAF on Brest through a hit into the fire control center and the command headquarters (60 dead). The attack encounters is a "nerve center" of the ship, the heavy artillery no longer usable. The repairs last – including the necessary final adjustment between fire direction and artillery – to the 4th of February 1942 (!), 8 days before start of the canal breakthrough (Op. "Cerberus", s.d.). (_translators note: RAF raids are increasing in intensity, size and effectiveness. Except fo flak, there has been no LW opposition to these critical raids for some months)_

4.7.1941 Brit. Bombers carry out a day attack on Bremen.

5.– 30.7.1941 Biskaya Submarines operate in the Biskaya against an outbreak of the Km heavy Warships of Brest into the Atlantic and on suspicious french Fishery vehicles. Tigris (Cdr. Bone) sinks the ital. Submarine Bianchi, the poles. Sokol misses at the 7.7. a large ship, and Sealion (Cdr. Bryant) sinks with artillery several franz. Fisherman boat. Also the franz. Trawler St Pierre Robert (162 BRT) is sunk. Tuna (LtCdr. Cavenagh Mainwaring) is erroneously attacked by CC a/c but is missed: at the 10.7. a submarine (U 203 or U 124) are also attacked and damaged. in vain the "pinch" (???) tanker Benno (former norw. Oil Jacob) (is attacked and missed?) The franz. Fish steamer Virgo Fidelis (129 BRT) is damaged through an unexplained detonation under the Keel, is set on beach and becomes a total loss. At pos'n 30.7. Seawolf misses (LtCdr. Raikes) with a torpedo the returning U 562 near Lorient. 

5.– 31.7.1941 North Sea CC air mining operations: Airplanes sink in the Weser mouth Freighter Stig Gorthon (2262 BRT) , in Terschelling the Ger. Freighter Hans Christophersen (1599 BRT) and near Esbjerg. the Ge. Fish steamer Thrilling Strokes (238 BRT), Damaged near the Emsmündung the Ger. Asia (_believed approx 5500 GRT)_ and north of Helgoland the dän. Knut Willemoes _tonnage unknown)_. 

Losses incurred through direct bomber attacks: near Ijmuiden the swedish Ore freighter Aspen (1305 BRT). At pos'ns 7.7. and 19.7. (netherlands coast) the freighters Delaware and Hermann Fritzen (_estimated 7500 GRT combined) _ damaged, but brought in to Hoek van Holland. Also the Ger. Inga Essberger is damaged in the Elbmündung through bomb hits. 

9.– 22.7.1941 English Channel mine operations of the 4th S flottille (Kptlt. Bätge) on the 9., 20th and 22.7 into the maritime areas southeastern and southwestern the isle of Wight are unsuccessful


10.7.1941 _(I could not translate this, but it is something to do with Signals intell....The German entry says: "Die dt. B-Dienst entschlüsselt einen Funkspruch der brit. Admiralität, der wegen der Angabe von U-Boots-Positionen Rückschlüsse auf die »Ultra«-Entzifferung zulässt. Die alliierten Kenntnisse werden jedoch brit. Erfolgen bei der Funkpeilung zugeschrieben und die „Unentschlüsselbarkeit" der Enigma von Experten des deutschen Nachrichtendienstes bestätigt." Anyone who speaks German is welcome to translate for me....._ 

10.7.1941 BC bombs Cherbourg. Supply tanker Schlettstadt damaged. 

12.7.– 1.8.1941 general situation / North Ocean RAdm. Vian flies as a special delegate of that. Admiraly by Catalina to Archangelsk and from there to Moscow. Discussions about the stationing of air and naval forces in Murmansk result initially in the transfer from the biscay station of the Tigris and Trident. More transfers follow

16.7.41 7 Freighters are heavily damaged in a daylight attack by the RAF on Rotterdam _(Comment: English sources say that 4 of these ships totalling about 12000BRT were never returned to service) _


19.7.1941 Biskaya on the basis of "ultra" -information concerning a returning Blockadebrecher British submarines and the Polish submarine Sokol are concentrated before the Gironde estuary. Submarine Tuna shoots (LtCdr. Cavenagh Mainwaring) a torpedo Sechserfächer on the tanker Jacob (8306 BRT) which is being escorted by Mineswepers M 18, M 25, M 27 and M 30: The torpedoes fail, however the escorts fail to recognize the exploding torpedo as a torpedo, they erroneouslty think it an exploding mine detaonation. 

19.– 24.7.1941 Torpedo airplanes of the 42nd Sq. RAF west of Sirevaag sink the the Picket boat NK 08 / (former norw. Whale catcher Firern). Brit. Bombers then sink in Narvik harbour the Ger Vehicle Wandsbek (2388 BRT) and the norw route steamer Vestkyst I (370 BRT) near Skadberg . 

20.– 24.7.1941 Biskaya ger. Battle ship ScharnHorst leads, under escort by the destroyers Erich Steinbrinck, Friedrich it, Bruno Heinemann, Z 23 and Z 24 after four month harbor refit time in Brest for the first time for combat manouvres and practice shoots since March . Upon return to her Berth at La Pallice, the battleship is heavily damaged in a bombing raid by the RAF 

20.– 27.7.1941 Channel at pos'n 20.7. the Ger . Sea Caribbean supply tanker is damaged by RAF Airplanes and forced to return to Boulogne (_heavily damaged....i do not think she puts to sea for at least a year..... _. At pos'n 27.7. KM destroyer transferring from western France to germany for refit is damaged and forced into in Calais (_from RAF air attack_). RN MTB attacks fail to inflict further damage.

22.7.– 4.8.1941 North Ocean RN Carriers carry out attacks against Kirkenes and Petsamo. 22.-25.7. : A task group is formed for the operation in Seidisfjord (Iceland). At the same time the destroyer Achates is heavily damaged through mine. 26.7. : The mine cruiser used as a fast transport for one of the first supply runs to Archangel with the destroyer Anthony as escort _(but initially is the advance element of the TG)_ . Later the Force P follows (RAdm. Wake Walker) with the aircraft carriers Furious and Victorious, the heavy cruisers Devonshire and Suffolk and the destroyers echo, Eclipse, Escapade, Intrepid.

28.7. : (Beölung??) (From the cruiser force?) the destroyers Icarus and Inglefield of detached and meet with the tanker Block Ranger.


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## Glider (Nov 12, 2011)

parsifal said:


> 2.7.1941 heavy cruiser prince Eugen is damaged in a bombing raid of the RAF on Brest through a hit into the fire control center and the command headquarters (60 dead). The attack encounters is a "nerve center" of the ship, the heavy artillery no longer usable. The repairs last – including the necessary final adjustment between fire direction and artillery – to the 4th of February 1942 (!), 8 days before start of the canal breakthrough (Op. "Cerberus", s.d.). (_translators note: RAF raids are increasing in intensity, size and effectiveness. Except fo flak, there has been no LW opposition to these critical raids for some months)_



First I must thank you for the effort going into this, its really interesting.

Re the debate over the control/influence the Luftwaffe had over Europe the last entry is telling.

Thanks again


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## parsifal (Nov 13, 2011)

Thankyou, hope the material is of interest.


Re, the attacks on the Battlesquadron....yes I agree the fact that these attacks by the RAF went unparried and ultimately led to a strategic retreat, and then the permanent loss of one of the battleships is a significant indication that control of the skies over the channel and the French coast was , and had, being lost. Moeover these were strategically significant.


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## parsifal (Nov 14, 2011)

July Part II 

30.7. : Adventure is (detached from the TG) and rendezvous with sowj. Destroyers Sokrushitelny and Gorodetski and escort the british ship to Archangelsk led where it arrives at the 31.7.. The TG divides itself with a carrier apiece and arrives at the launch point (Some time on the 31st) LW recon becomes aware of the british forces at sea . Victorious, launches 20 Albacore torpedo airplanes and 9 Fulmar fighters to the attack which commences on the Ger shipping and naval units lying in Kirkenes. Training ship Bremse and other ships. Through Flak and airplanes of the 6./JG.5, 11 torpedo airplanes and 2 Fighters are claimed . Damages only slight on the attacked ships. 

(_The raid on Kirkenes was a disaster. The Luftwaffe had been alerted and had their Bf 109 and Bf 110 fighters in the air and waiting. Victorious launched two sub flights consisting of a total of 12 Albacores from 827 Squadron, eight Albacores from 828 Squadron, and nine Fulmars from 809 Squadron.The Fulmars, unfortunately, were unable to rendezvous with the Albacore squadrons, who were then left without fighter protection. The Albacores had to attack by flying over the mountains and the fjord rather than attacking from the sea. There were only four cargo vessels within the harbour. The aircraft released their torpedoes quickly to get away from anti-aircraft fire, sinking one 2,000 long tons (2,000 t) vessel and setting another on fire and causing minor damage ashore. One Bf 109, two Bf 110s and one Ju 87 were claimed shot down for the loss of 11 Albacores and two Fulmars with a further eight Albacores damaged. Incomplete German loss records confirm the loss of at least one Bf 110 to a Fulmar and one Ju 87 to an Albacore._

Of Furious, 18 Albacore, 4 Hurricane hunters and 6 Fulmar to the attack start on Petsamo. Because in the harbor no ships are found, the association attacks country goal. At the same time a fighter and a torpedo airplane get lost.

(_The German site is incorect in its information. There were no Sea hurricanres on the Furious. Furious attacked ships in Petsamo launching nine Fairey Albacores from 817 Squadron, nine Fairey Swordfish of 812 Squadron and six bomb armed Fairey Fulmars from 800 Squadron. In the end, the harbour was almost entirely empty and the raiders claimed sinking only one small steamer (approximately 500BRT) and the destruction of several jetties. One Albacore and one Fulmar were lost due to enemy action and one more Fulmar was lost due to engine failure prior to the attack_). 

_Still, in the context of whether the germans held air superiority over the Atlantic coast, it is highly significant that the RN felt sufficiently secure to undertake a raid of this kind. If the Germans held air superiority, as has been claimed in this thread, the RN could not have even considered this attack. note also that the Germans did not attempt any retalitory action against the TG....they could only undertake air denial operations over the target, in a defensive fashion. That is, by definition something other than air superiority..... _

23.7.1941 Channel the German Picket boat V 1508 / rough III SW of. Boulogne is sunk by torpedoes fired by RN MTBs and sinks. 

23.– 24.7.1941 North Ocean the sowj. Destroyers Grozny, Sokrushitelny and the Minenleger Kanin put a defensive barrier with 275 mines in the entrance to the white sea. 

24.7.1941 In the heaviest daylight attack to date in western France, the RAF with 149 bombers again hits the Ger Battle ships Gneisenau (Brest) and Scharnhorst (La Pallice). The Latter receives cause 5 hits, that heavily damages the electric directions of the ship. Fighters (finally) and flak shoot down 10 Halifax bombers _claimed - my English sources give a different view sources _ over La Pallice and erroneously one Fw returning by the clarification flight 200. 

_The English version of this raid is reproduced in wiki, which says, On 24 July, RAF B-17s and B-24s (this is incorrect, the raids were undertaken by Halifaxes....B-17s provided some recon support, and there were no B-24s involved) attacked the ship while she was anchored there. The bombers scored five hits in an almost straight line on the starboard side, parallel to the centerline. Three of the bombs were 454 kg (1,000 lb) armor-piercing bombs, and the other two were 227 kg (500 lb) high-explosive bombs. One of the 227 kg bombs hit the deck just forward of the starboard 15 cm twin turret next to the conning tower. It passed through the upper and middle decks before exploding on the main armored deck, which contained the blast. The joints with the torpedo bulkhead were weakened enough to cause leaking. The second 227 kg bomb fell forward of the rear main battery turret and penetrated the first two decks. It also exploded on the armored deck, though it tore a small hole in it. The explosion caused splinter damage and disabled the ammunition hoists for the 37 mm anti-aircraft guns.

Two of the 454 kg bombs hit amidships between the 15 cm and 10.5 cm gun turrets; both failed to explode and penetrated the ship completely. The first went through each deck and exited the ship through the double bottom, while the other was deflected by the torpedo bulkhead and penetrated the hull beneath the side belt armor. The third 454 kg bomb hit abaft of the rear 28 cm turret, about 3 m (9.8 ft) from the side of the ship. It too failed to detonate, and passed through the side of the hull, which was not protected by the main armor belt. These three hits caused significant flooding and caused an 8 degree list to starboard. The forward and rear gun turrets were temporarily disabled, along with half of her anti-aircraft battery. Two men were killed and fifteen were injured in the attack. Damage control teams managed to correct the list with counter-flooding, and although draft increased by 1 m (3.3 ft), Scharnhorst left for Brest at 19:30. On the morning of 25 July, one of the escorting destroyers shot down a British patrol plane. The ship reached Brest later that day and went into dry dock for repairs. While the damage was being repaired, a new radar system was installed aft, the power output for the forward radar was increased to 100 kW, and the 53.3 cm torpedo tubes were installed. Some sources claim 17 bombers were lost, others as few as six. The defenders lost at least two fighters 
_ 

27.7.– 6.8.1941 North Ocean Brit. Force K (RAdm. Vian) with the cruisers Nigeria and Aurora and the destroyers Punjabi and Tartar depart Scapa Flow to Spitzbergen on another raid of shore installations. Weather station on the bear island is evacuated and destroyed. An attack against from Norway by the LW fails to find the TG


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## parsifal (Nov 15, 2011)

August


1.– 6.8.1941 North Ocean Brit. Force K (RAdm. Vian) with the cruisers Nigeria and Aurora and the destroyers Punjabi and Tartar evacuates and destroys a norwegian weather station on the Bear island being used by the germans. . A planned bombardment of the norweg. Coast is discovered by LW air recon and abandoned. _(finally some evidence of LW air superiority)_ 

1.– 16.8.1941 North Sea LW Airplanes report frequent and strongly exaggerated successes on the English east coast. In the the Tyne estuary the Trident (4317 BRT) and near Cromer the Cordene (2345 BRT) are sunk. Damaged in air attacks at Great Yarmouth the Koolga (1110 BRT), north of Cromer the tankers Gold Shell (8208 BRT), north of Great Yarmouth the Glendalough (863 BRT), east of Sunderland the Eaglescliffe hall (1900 BRT) and near Lowestoft of the navy tug Ness Point. 

2./3.8.1941 Brit. Bombers attack Hamburg and Kiel. 

10.8.1941 Norway / North Sea KM. Auxiliary minesweeper M 1102 / H. A. W. Müller is sunk through air attack near Lindesnes. — 2 dän. Fishing vessels (_about 100 tons each_) are also sunk when they hit air laid mines. — CC carries out an air attack on a Ger. escorted Coastal Convoy V 1506 is sunk. nominally 6. Bombers shot down (unconfirmed) _(in fact there are no recorded losses that day) _. 

11.8.1941 An attack carried out in poor weather near Dungeness by the 4th S flottille (Kptlt. Bätge) on a convoy results in light damage to the Freighter Sir Russell (1548 BRT). KM S 49 (Lt.z.S. Günther) is sunk in spite of bad weather. 

12.8.1941 norw. Freighter Cito (124 BRT) is sunk by a Ger. Mine barrier in the Sognefjord _friendly fire incident) _

13.8.– 4.9.1941 9th U flottille with the french Minerve and Rubis, the Dutch O. 14 and Fr Rubis (Kptlt. Rousselot) operates off western Norway. The Rubis lays mines puts at the 21.8. a mine barrier and sinks the Finn _(unreported but believed to be 2400BRT)_ at the same day Freighter Hogland (4360 BRT) nw of Egeröy. The barrier is eventually cleared by the KM 11th M flottille. 

14.– 26.8.1941 RAF Coastal Command underttakes attacks that sink the freighter Lotte Halm (1193 BRT) north of Borkum. Near Emsmündung the finn Freighter Wisa hits a mine, and is damaged. it is towed to Emden for repairs. NW of Hoek van Holland the Ger Freighter Stadt Emden (_City of Emden_) are hit by bombs from Coastal Command and heavily damaged _(I can find no other references to this ship....i suspect she was scrapped due to the damage she sustained) _. 

17.– 28.8.1941 waters west of Great Britain German airplanes sink south of Kinsale Trawler Juliet (173 BRT) and damage near Blyth the Kindersley (1999 BRT) as well as the tanker Lonovania (8149 BRT) near Milford Haven . 

19.8.– 3.9.1941 North Ocean Brit. Operations in the North Ocean. Force K (RAdm. Vian) with the cruisers Nigeria and Aurora, the destroyers lcarus, Antelope, Tartar, Eclipse, Anthony, the fast Transport Empress of Canada as well as the fleet tanker Oligarch from Scapa Flow with 2000 troops and base personnel to Archangel . _(unsure of the translation herebut i think the Task Group separates and some ships undertake a bombardment of some facitlies in Norway. They then regroup ....at least thats what i think it says....the actual german entry is ....Brit. Operationen im Nordmeer. Am 19.8. läuft Force K (RAdm. Vian) mit den Kreuzern Nigeria und Aurora, den Zerstörern lcarus, Antelope, Tartar, Eclipse, Anthony, dem Truppentransporter Empress of Canada sowie dem Flottentanker Oligarch von Scapa Flow nach Spitzbergen aus, um norweg. und sowj. Kolonien zu evakuieren und die Industrie-Anlagen zu zerstören. Nigeria und Empress of Canada transportieren die 2000 Personen umfassende russ. Kolonie nach Archangelsk, werden dabei ab dem 25./26.8. von Kanin Nos aus von den Zerstörern Sokrushitelny und Grozny geleitet, und vereinigen sich am 1.9. vor Barentsburg wieder mit der Aurora. Zusammen mit 3 von Norwegen kommenden Kohlendampfern, 1 Eisbrecher, 1 Schlepper, 1 Walfang- Mutterschiff und 2 Fangbooten kehrt der Verband am 3.9. nach England zurück.) _ 

They are joined also by the Sov DDs Sokrushitelny and Grozny, and near arentsburg with the Aurora. Together with 3 tramp steamers coming , 1 Icebreaker , 1 tug, 1 Whaling mother ship and 2 "capture" boats, the group returns to England. 

the first Murmansk convoy "Dervish" runs (Capt. Dowding) with 7 trade ships and under security of 4 AS Trawlern, and for some of the time the destroyer Electra, Active, impulsive and the minesweepers Halcyon, Harrier, Salamander depart Hvalfjord (Iceland) from and at pos'n 31.8. receives additional escort from the SU Destroyers Sokrushitelny, Grozny, Kujbyshev, Uritski from Kanin and travelled through the White Sea to Archangel . Distant Cover was provided by RAdm. Wake Walker with the carrier Victorious, the cruisers Devonshire, Suffolk and the destroyers Eclipse, Escapade and Inglefield

20.8.1941 North Sea an attack by the 4th S flottille (Kptlt. Bätge) with S 20, S 48, S 49 and S 51 on a Convoy near Cromer results in S 48 (Oblt.z.S v. me stream) torpedoing poln. Czenstochowa (1971 BRT) and Dalewood (2774 BRT). 

20./21.8.1941 North Sea after weeks of delay, _(and bickering)_ between the KM and the LW over the deployment of the new type FAB XI mine with combined acoustic and magnetic ignition the first air launched mines of this type are deployed. Possibly 1st victim is the Brit Skagerak (1283 BRT) near Harwich

22./25.8.1941 Germany / Coastal warfare on the 22.8. the BdU (???) reports it is necessary in the coastal operations directorate (Skl), that "in view of the reinforced defense and air superiority of the opponent for a decisively successful convoy attack presently about the triple number of boats as earlier". _(I could not understand the full meaning of this diary entry, but it appears to be a decision to reinforce the med with additional U-Boats, given the Allied air and naval superiority in the central baasin at that time. The Axis were at that point on the southern front suffering an absolute drubbing in their convoys to north africa, and saw a key to victory in the deployment of additional U-Boats to the TO. this drew immediate criticism from Donitz, but it does not appear to be the decision of hilter as is so often portrayed )._


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## parsifal (Nov 16, 2011)

September Pt I

Situation general 1.9.1941 / radio clarification the Britons new indicator tables introduce for the long subtraction chalkboards, but a methodical mistake eases the task for the German B service of decoding that "Naval Cypher No. 3" for the convoy control. 

1.9.1941 Channel. Air attack on a KM. Picket boat V 1512. The ship is heavily damaged and escorted to Barfleur 

1.– 30.9.1941 waters around Great Britain LW. Airplanes sow altogether 555 air mines. Results are the Trawler Ophir II (213 BRT) sunk outside the humber estuary, 7.9. and at pos'n 8.9. the auxiliary ship Corfield (1791 BRT); anear Cromer the Birtley (2873 BRT) and in the mouth of the Clyde the tugr Flying Kite (260 BRT), near Harwich the Bradglen (4741 BRT), in the southern St. -Georgs-Channel the Portsdown (342 BRT), in the Thames mouth the tanker Vancouver (5729 BRT) and north of the mouth of the Mersey the Trawler Murielle (96 BRT). Damaged Clyde mouth the tug Atlantic **** (182 BRT), and nördl. Harwich the belg. Tanker Pontfield (8290 BRT), tjhis ship eventually scuttles, Milford Haven the Daltorhall (7253 BRT) and in the Bristol Channel the Oriole (489 BRT). 

2.– 28.9.1941 North Sea / Norway attacks by RAF Coastal Command on ship traffic. In norw. Waters at pos'n 2.9. the Ger Oslebshausen (4989 BRT), in Stavanger with air torpedo the finn. Tauri (2517 BRT), . At the pos'n 17.9. the small norw Tanker Vard is damaged by bombs. — In the sth end of the North Sea at pos'n 15.9. the Ger. Johann Wessels (4659 BRT) is sunk, Narvik isd atrtacked by bombers.´

Sinkings due air mines: At the 2.9. Peter Wessels (135 BRT) is lost as well as the rescue tug the Osterems. At the pos'n 19.9. östl sinks. The Grenaa (Kattegatt) is sunk off Denmark, the fish steamer (262 BRT) is sunk. At the 28.9. the norw. Aspe (xxx BRT) is believed sunk. The Ameland Dorch is lost to an aerial mine hit and sufferes immediate dmage


3.– 11.9.1941 North Ocean / Norway British commandoes undertake a commando raid against Spitsbergen (cf. 19.8.- 3.9.) the cover group leads under RAdm. Wake Walker with carrier Victorious and the cruisers Devonshire, Suffolk on that 3rd and 7.9. with carrier airplanes undertaking 2 attacks against Tromsö. The success remains low. Torpedoes airplanes of the Victorious sink the a norw freighter outside the Vestfjord. Coastal steamer Baroey (424 BRT), In the Commando Raid 30 Ger Soldiers and 120 norw. civilians either surrender or come volumtarily . RAdm. Vian brings cruisers Nigeria and Aurora to the norwegian Coast and interceptsd near the the Porsangerfjord a small Ger. Convoy. The cruisers destroy the artillery school ship Bremse (KKpt. v. Brosy stone mountain †). The transport Trautenfels (6418 BRT) and Barcelona (3101 BRT) with about 1500 men of the 6th Geb. -Div. on board manage to escape. The cruisers escape under cover of bad weather to Scapa Flow on. 

_here is a short English version of this operation.....
Originally a ground force of two battalions had been allocated to the landings, but this was reduced to one on confirmation that the Germans had not yet garrisoned the area. The troops mainly comprised elements of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier A E Potts, with 3 Field Company, RCE attached, a party of Norwegian servicemen based in the United Kingdom. There was demolition and logistic support from British Army units including a detachment from the Kent Fortress Royal Engineers, a unit with demolition experience. This was a total force of 645 All Ranks, including 527 Canadians.

The liner Empress of Australia acted as the troopship, escorted by Force K: two Royal Navy cruisers, HMS Nigeria (flagship) and Aurora and three destroyers: HMS Icarus, Anthony and Antelope; Philip Vian remained in command. The force sailed on August 19.

The troops landed on the 25 August and, as hoped, met no opposition throughout and were enthusiastically greeted by the islanders. When the demolitions at Barentsburg were complete, some 2,000 Soviet miners and their movable belongings and equipment were taken to Arkhangelsk, in Russia, on the RMS Empress of Canada, escorted by Nigeria, where a group of nearly 200 Free French were found waiting. These French had escaped from German prison camps and were duly taken on board for passage to the United Kingdom. Meanwhile, the rest of Force K and the demolition parties had moved on to Longyearbyen.

On 1 September the ships returned from Arkhangelsk and all forces ashore embarked together with some 800 locals and 15 sled dogs. Two radio stations were destroyed which, up to this point, had continued to broadcast normally and even falsely reported fog to deter any German observation planes.

The demolition teams completed all their tasks destroying the mines, equipment not taken away, and 450,000 tons of coal and 275,000 Imperial gallons of fuel, oil, petrol and grease. 1,000 tons of steam coal was left in case needed by Allied ships who may stop there in the future. The only "casualties" occurred when the rearguard at Barentsburg had accessed the vodka stores and had to be carried aboard.

The allied force sailed for the United Kingdom on 3 September, with the three captured colliers, an icebreaker, a whaler, a tug and two sealers. Vian was alerted to the presence of a German convoy. The destroyers continued to escort the convoy to Britain while the two cruisers intercepted the German ships at Hammerfjord on 7 September and engaged its escort, sinking the German training ship Bremse, however three transports managed to escape. During the action, HMS Nigeria's bow was seriously damaged, reportedly by ramming the Bremse, although later analysis suggested that a mine was the cause.

The ships which made the excursion on to Russia had made a 7,000 mile round trip from the United Kingdom

For those interested here is a link that gives details on the landing operations
http://www.lonesentry.com/manuals/commandos/spitsbergen.html_

Operation "Strength" : Carrier Argus, accompanied of the cruiser Shropshire and the destroyers Matabele, Punjabi and Somali, deliveres 24 Hurricane fighters of the 151st Fighter Wing to the the Kola Fjord Murmansk. 24 additional airplanes are delivered dismantled and are transferred by steamer to Arkhangelsk and from there until 11.9. further after Vaenga. Mine cruiser Adventure delivers a load mines to Murmansk

_For more detail on this operation, use this link http://lend-lease.airforce.ru/english/articles/sheppard/hurricanes/index.htm

Relevant part about the operations of the Argus are :

Back on board HMS Argus on 6th September, the pilots were given there final briefings. If there was to be any problems taking off the following day, then the whole mission might have to be abandoned as HMS Argus was extremely low of fuel.
On 7th September the pilots were awoken at 0200. There were problems with fog and the captain had already turned around to get back into clear sea so the Hurricanes could take off. It still meant they had to fly through the fog towards Russia. 
The first six Hurricanes of 'A' Flight, 134 Squadron were taken on deck and assembled. At the end of the 400' runway was a 3 foot high wooden ramp used for the Queen Bee aircraft. A lot of the pilots were quite nervous as this was there first carrier take off and to reduce weight, only six Browning Machine guns were fitted. 
The ramp at the end was also causing a bit of consternation as well. S/Leader Miller in the first Hurricane took off at 0700, skipped over the ramp, dropped and flew off. Next was F/Lt V Berg O/C 'A' Flight in Z5206. Speeding down the flight deck he hit the ramp and damaged his undercarriage and was unable to retract. Sgt B Campbell in BD823, one of the Australians was next and he also damaged his undercarriage. The next three pilots of 'A' Flight took off with no further problems. Following this six came the 6 Hurricanes of 'B' Flight, 134 Squadron, then 6 of 'A' Flight, 81 Squadron and finally 6 of 'B' Flight 81 Squadron. By 08.15 all the Hurricanes were off on there flight to Vaenga, 15 miles NW of Murmansk. 
The problems did not end there, at this Latitude the magnetic compass did not work very well so a destroyer was laid off and pointed the Hurricanes in the direction on Vaenga. The cloud was very low with mist and the flight was at sea level. After about half an hour they flew out into bright sunshine. Twenty minutes later a dark smudge appeared on the horizon which was Russia and little while after that they were circling the airfield at Vaenga. Vaenga was already a well established airfield, even if was only a scraped and flattened area within hilly areas. Flight time was about 70 minutes. The two Hurricanes with the damaged undercarriage were already sitting on there bellies; not a good impression for the Russians but both would be repaired within ten days._

1.– 17.9.1941 North Ocean allied submarine-operations. Operating out of Polyarnoe(????) Trident and Tigris U boots. At pos'n 3.9. the Ger U 566 misses the Trident as she is returning to base. Near Breisund, Tigris sinks (Cdr. Bone) the norw. Steamer Richard With (905 BRT) but misses two convoys in the Lopphavet. 

4.– 8.9.1941 Norway the heavy cruiser admiral Scheer transfers under escort of 3 torpedo boats temporarily to Oslo. Bombers of RAF 2 Group unsuccessfully try to bomb the ship whilst in harbour. However it does return to Swinemünde.


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## Juha (Nov 18, 2011)

Thanks Parsifal!
very interesting, one point re your message #89, Gotenhafen is Gdynia not Göteborg, so no blame to Swedes.

Juha


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## parsifal (Nov 18, 2011)

Thanks, I struggle just to make some sort of translation. any translational corrections are much appreciated


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## Juha (Nov 19, 2011)

Hello
a little extra info on the attacks on Kirkenäs and on Petsamo on 30 July 41 by FAA planes from HMS Victorious and HMS Furious.

The war diary of the Admiral Polar Coast report of attack on the 30th July 41 states that between 30 and 40 British and Russian aircraft attacked Kirkenes and Petsamo, the Germans give the types as Swordfish and Hurricanes. The ship A.S.S Bremse in Kirkenes was reported lightly damaged and no casualties sustained, 8 torpedos were seen to be dropped. In Petsamo the Norwegian steamer Rodvær of 74 BRT was hit by torpedo and sank, damage to the quays are mentioned too. The Germans claimed 31 aircraft destroyed! 25 to fighters, 2 to flak, 2 to the ship M.R.S Bali, 1 to M.A.A 513 and 1 to the motor minesweeper R-152. Four men from R-151 were killed including her captain. Later in the day 17 prisoners were reported to be taken, giving the name of their ship as HMS Victorious. Later on The Germans reported having found the British fleet of '10 units' including 1 or 2 cruisers and 1 or 2 aircraft carriers. At 1310hrs on the 31st a Do18 reported 1 carrier, 2 light cruisers and 3 destroyers at 74 deg. N 28 deg. E, course 330 at high speed. 

IIRC ultimate PoW number was 25

In fact even if Task Group was seen beforehand the attacks on Kirkenäs and Petsamo surprised LW, but Germans were lucky, some 109s and 110s of JG 77 were in air ready to escort a Ju 87 formation to its attack against Soviets.

IMHO the attack had a little connection with the air superiority argument, it was Barents Sea coast and the German land and air units there were operating against SU, not against Western Allies, the big Arctic convoy battles laid still in unknown future.

Juha


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## parsifal (Nov 20, 2011)

Thanks Juha, basically agree, it would be hard to argue that either side held air superiority in the far north. Additional aircraft would have been needed to establish that.

There were no Hurricanes embarked on either carrier, so this is either an error or misidentification , or they were Soviet manned Hurricanes.


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## Njaco (Nov 20, 2011)

[email protected], I would love to change the name of this thread! Great stuff parsifal! I love day-by-day accounts.


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## parsifal (Nov 20, 2011)

Can always uplift the relevant entries and put them in a thread of their own. I would have no objection to that. There is a purpose to all of this, however....basically to show that there was lively activity over the coastal wates of western europe throughout 1941, and also to show the gradual loss of control for the LW. Once I am done with the daily cataloging, I will do a bit of analysis to show that


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## Juha (Nov 20, 2011)

parsifal said:


> ...There were no Hurricanes embarked on either carrier, so this is either an error or misidentification , or they were Soviet manned Hurricanes.



Hello Parsifal
Yes, typical a/c misidentifications
Swordfish = Swordfish Albacore
Hurricane = Fulmar

Juha


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## parsifal (Nov 20, 2011)

September Pt II

4.– 15.9.1941 waters around Great Britain sinking success of LW Bombers : Westl. Great Britain are sunk at the 4.9. in the island Bardsey the Abbas Combe (489 BRT) and the niederl. Tone S. (466 BRT) damaged. In the St. St. -Georgs-Channel lost the Empire Gunner (4492 BRT) and at posn 15.9. the Daru (3854 BRT). — East of the Färoer islands Navy hospital ship Bloomfield (1417 BRT) sinks. 

5.– 12.9.1941 Norway before Utsira the Dutch Submarine O. 14, runs aground, but continues mission. (_ I think the transalation is she is later REPLACED by the FF sub Minerve)..._

6.9.1941 Biskaya the KM. Destroyers Erich Steinbrinck and Bruno Heinemann, that were transferred at the beginning of April to Brest, begin the preparations for transfer back to germany, including laying defensive minefields, and shakedown trials for their machine plants. The auxiliary mine searcher M 4030 is damaged before Brest through mine hit and sinks after the reaching of the harbor. 

7.9.1941 North Sea in the attack by the 4th S flottille (Kptlt. Bätge) with S 48, S 49, S 50, S 52 and S 107 sink convoy off the Norfolk coast Duncarron (478 BRT) (by S-50) and the norw. Eikshaug (1436 BRT) (by S-52). 

7-26.9.41: North Sea Do217s of KG. 2 sink near Lowestoft the Marcrest (4224 BRT) and in Kinnaird Head the fish freighter coming from Iceland Trsat (1369 BRT). Other Ger. Airplanes sink south of the Humber estuary the niederl. Vechtstroom (845 BRT) and the British Prince (4979 BRT). In air attacks dnear Cromer the Stanmount (4468 BRT) is damaged, and near Harwich the Prestatyn Rose (1151 BRT). 

9.9.1941 canal the norw. MTB 54 sinks the KM Picket boats V 202 and V near Boulogne and sinks the steamer Trifels (6198 BRT). Another Picket boat is also damaged through collision with the MTB . 

10.9.1941 Biskaya Blockadebrecher Anneliese Essberger (5173 BRT, Kpt. Bahl) from shrinks of Dairen reaches Bordeaux with a load of 3400 t of rubber.

13./14.9.1941 aerial warfare Western Europe the RAF bomber Command hits the German battle ships in Brest. 

15./16.9.1941 BC attacks ports and shipping in Germany including Hamburg, Bremen, Cuxhaven and Wilhelmshaven. In Hamburg, the Swedish freighter Yarrawonga (4900 BRT) sinks.

15.– 20.9.1941 Mine Sweeper M3823 is sunk in Le Havre by bombs. tug Vulcan (395 BRT) is sunk by a mine hit before near Le Havre and the small freighter Indus (733 BRT) by bomb hit near Vlaardingen. 

16.– 21.9.1941 U 451 runs (Kptlt. Hope man) enroute from Kirkenes to Kiel is attacked by unknown airplane near the Kiel Wash. At pos'n 18.9. it narrowly avoids tightly paterned spread of torpedoes . The aggressor remains unexplained. 


17.– 30.9.1941 North Sea the 4th S flottille (Kptlt. Bätge) patrols off cromer with S 50, S 51 and S 52 east of Cromer. Convoy on. S 51 (Oblt.z.S. Meyer) sinks the freighter Teddington (4762 BRT), S 50 (Oblt.z.S. Karcher) torpedos the and damages freighter Tetela (5389 BRT), In uses in the nights 20./21., 27./28. and 29./30.9. Patrols further south remain without success for the flotilla.

19./20.9.1941 aerial warfare Germany attack of the RAF bomber Command on Stettin. 

21.9.1941 north Norway the German minesweeper R 158 is involved in a collision with harbor protection boat NT 05/ Togo (former norw. Minenleger Otra) It sinks at the 5.11.

29./30.9.1941 aerial warfare Germany air attack of the RAF bomber Command on Stettin and Hamburg. It is repeated in the following night


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## tomo pauk (Nov 21, 2011)

"abgelös" means "replaced" - at least Google Translate thinks so.


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## parsifal (Nov 21, 2011)

Thanks, will graft that into that last translation. Please do join the discussion as you see appropriate.


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## Sagittario64 (Nov 21, 2011)

Id go with the 109. i mean if it went from this in its original form





to this wonderfully honed final model




, who knows what they'll come up with next? plus, you can modify the bejeezus out of it with cannons, rocket-mortars, radar and scanning equipment, and maybe then the x-4 air-to-air missiles if the war continued


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## pbfoot (Nov 21, 2011)

Sagittario64 said:


> Id go with the 109. i mean if it went from this in its original form
> 
> 
> 
> ...


Where might you tuck the radar remember in the 40's they hadn't even thought of the transistor the forerunner of the chip so radar was bulky and req'd a fair size power source meaning a bigger generator/alternator battery etc


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## Sagittario64 (Nov 21, 2011)

sorry i havent looked at this particular model in a long time. its actually radar homing equipment. my bad for saying that its radar. i dont think many night-fighter bf.109s were made, because they are overshadowed by even the focke-wulf ta-154, a failed project
if this model is fictional, please tell me. sometimes fiction gets mixed in with rare types and models that actually existed


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## parsifal (Nov 22, 2011)

October


1.10.1941 aerial warfare Germany night attack by RAF bomber Command on Stettin and Hamburg. 

1.10.1941 English Channel the 3rd R flottille with R 38, R 33, R 35, R 36, R 165 and R 166 is near Dieppe by 8 Hurricanes. R 38, R 33 and R 165 are heavily damaged, the other boats slightly damaged (13 dead, 11 seriously injured). On R 38, the flottille commander Kptlt fall. Rossow, and the commander of the 2nd security division, K. z. S. are killed.

1.– 4.10.1941 Nor T boat Draug tows the the nor. MTB 56 from Scapa Flow until 120 sea miles from the the norweg. Coast. On the night of the 3./4.10. MTB 56 (Lt. Danielsen) enters the Korsfjord aan attacks a Ger. Convoy with M 1101, V 5505 as escort and sinks the the norweg. Tanker Borgny (3015 BRT) by torpedo hit . MTB 56 is subsequently recovered by the Draug and is towed back again to Scapa

1.– 11.10.1941 north polar sea Convoy PQ. 1 foms (29.9.) and sails with 11 trade ships, escorted by the cruiser Suffolk, the destroyer impulsive and the mine sweepers Britomart, Gossamer, Leda and Hussar, from Hvalfjord to Arkhangelsk without enemy contact . For some of the journey time, the convoy escort is joined by destroyers Anthony, Antelope and Escapade. Convoy QP. 1 runs (since 28.9.) with 14 trade ships, escorted by Cruisers London and Shropshire and the destroyers Electra, Active, Anthony and 3 Trawlern from Arkhangelsk to Scapa Flow. In the white sea, sowj reinforce. Sov Picket boat of the white sea flottille near Kola Fjord rwndevous with Mine Sweepers Halcyon, Harrier and Salamander, which are then stationed in north Russia for local escort. 

1.– 31.10.1941 waters around Great Britain LW Airplanes sink the Glynn (1134 BRT) east of Lowestoft, the norw. Rask (632 BRT) south east of Ireland, the niederl. Frieze country (2662 BRT) and Antiope (4545 BRT) north of Cromer, Tanker British Fortunes (4696 BRT) and the Greek Nicolaos Piangos (4499 BRT) east of Felixstowe. Serenity (557 BRT) is damaged nordwestl. of Lundy. 

3.10.1941 RAF bomber Command attacks _(actually I think it was 2 gp in a daylight raid) _ on Rotterdam. The Ger Picket boats V 1106, V 1107, V 1109 and fast boat S 107 are heavily damaged, with light dmage to S 51 and S 52.

10.– 24.10.1941 waters around Great Britain LW lays air mines. Sunk near the Humber estuary the Greeks Kyma (3959 BRT) and in the Barrow Deep sw. of Harwich Empire Ghyll (2011 BRT) Mahseer (7911 BRT) and the Minesweeping Trawler Emilion (201 BRT) and Lucienne Jeanne (264 BRT). Damaged near Orfordness the Icemaid (1964 BRT) and near Milford Haven the naval supply tanker Cordelia (8190 BRT). 

11./12.10.1941 RAF Bomber Command attacks Emden. 

12.10.1941 North Sea after being deployed in the Baltic Sea and a general refit 2nd S flottille transferred (Kptlt. Feldt) leads returns to the Atlantic coast with S 41, S 47, S 53, S 62, S 104 and S 105. Convoy north of Cromer is attacked. S 105 (Lt.z.S. Howaldt) sinks the Chevington (1537 BRT) and S 53 (Oblt.z.S. block) the norw. Freighter Roy (1768 BRT). 

12.10.1941 Nor Steamer Vaagen rammt , whilst being escorted by the Ger Destroyer Friedrich Eckoldt, and the Karl Galster is heavily damaged when in a collision withy the former. Cargo ship and Destroyer transferred to Kiel transfer for repairs. The commander-in-chief, Grossadmiral Raeder orders the arrest of the norw. Captain, on the suspicion, that the collision was an act of deliberate sabotage. 

12./13.10.1941 aerial warfare Germany RAF bomber Command attacks Bremen. 

14.– 20.10.1941 North Sea Coastal Command sinks. UJ 1709 / in a running fight at pos’n 19.10 and the Freighter Barcelona (3101 BRT) near Aalesund, the Swedish freighters Hilda (1237 BRT) and Gunlog (1424 BRT), near the Dutch coast the Norwegian freighter Solskin (372 BRT), and the swede. Ingeren (6123 BRT) westl. of Borkum. 

15.10.1941 channel Submarine L. 27 misses a Ger freighter near Cherbourg. 

18.10.– 4.11.1941 Norway the fr. Submarine Minerve patrols neare Stavanger and misses at near posn 29.10. a tanker. 

20./21.10.1941 aerial warfare Germany RAF bomber Command attacks Wilhelmshaven, Bremen and Emden. 

21.10.– 5.11.1941 north polar sea the Soviets. M U would boot operate-176, Shch-401, Shch-404, Shch-421 before the norw. Polar coast. K-1 (Kpt. 3.Rg. Avgustonovich) puts at the 27.10. a mine barrier before the Mageröy Sund, on that at the 8.11. the dt. Steamer Flottbek (1930 BRT) sinks, and at the 29.10. a mine barrier before Breisund. K-23 (Kpt. 3.Rg. Potapov) a mine barrier puts before Kirkenes, on that at the 5.11. the dt. Mine searcher M 22 damaged becomes and at the 15.2. the norw. Steamers Birk (3664 BRT) lost goes. _previous to this entry, have not been fully documenting Soviet ops in the European Atlantic coastal waters.....might go back and do that )_

23.10.1941 Biskaya of the dt. Mine searcher M 6 decreases to a mine south of Lorient. 

_The Minesweeper M 6; 872GRT 121 crew; is sunk, after hitting a mine at 1245 hrs, south of Lorient., Position 47° 18N 04° 20E, 21 crew lost_

23./24.10.1941 RAF Bomber Command attacks Kiel. 64 airplanes (of 71 started) find target with 1 a/c lost. 

23.– 25.10.1941 canal the German destroyers Z 23 and Z 24 transfer from La Pallice to Cherbourg and enroute via the channel to north Norway. 

24.10.– 6.11.1941 channel Submarine P. 36 on patrol south west of tip Great Britain (Cornwall). _(a silly entry....but anyway)_

26./27.10.1941 RAF Bomber Command attacks Hamburg. 78 airplanes (of 105 started) throw release bombs over target 5 losses _(previously no details have been included in the diary entry....might try to get some)_

31.10./1.11.1941 night attack of the RAF Bomber Command on Hamburg and Bremen. _Intersting side note, this is the first entry that specifies night attack....surely the previous attacks were also night attacks)_


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## parsifal (Nov 25, 2011)

November 

1./2.11.1941 North Sea Coastal Command sink by direct attack the swede. vessels Braheholm (5676 BRT) and westl. of Borkum the Ingeren (6123 BRT). 

2.– 5.11.1941 "ultra" reports final preparations in the westl. Baltic Sea for a planned outbreak attempt of a German Heavy ship, possibly the Tirpitz, into the Atlantic. In German side preparations for 4.-10.11. for a planned Atlantic sortie in the zone of the Denmark strait lead to the precautionary deployment of the the U boats U 431, U 402, U 332 and U 105. Actually however the planned outbreak of the Admiral Scheer must be postponed because of machine damage. — Against the expected outbreak attempt the home Fleet takes (Adm. Tovey) with battle ship King George V, carrier Victorious, positions south of iceland and a rendevous with cruisers and destroyers. The american Task Group TG.3.1. (RAdm. Gaped) with the battle ships Idaho, Mississippi, heavy cruisers Tuscaloosa, Wichita and destroyers Gwin, Meredith, Monssenalso slip morrings from Hvalfjord to the cover of the Denmark strait as well . _very intersting....what would the USN have done if they intercepted any German ships...they already had orders to treat any U-Boat encountered as hostile....would they have fired on surface warships????) _ 

2.– 13.11.1941 waters around Great Britain German mineslaid by a/c sink in the Bristol channel the Excavator Foremost 45 (824 BRT) and at brightenhead. Madjoe (249 BRT), at the Humber River the Picket vessel Ouzel, and the Maurita (199 BRT) and in the harbor of Falmouth the niederl. Joma (372 BRT). 

2.– 15.11.1941 North Ocean Soviet. U-boat-operations off the norweg. polar coast-M 401, M-171, M-172, M-173 and M-175. in the Lopphavet under the control of Shch-421 (Kptlt. N. A. Lunin) 3 unsuccessful attacks . HM Submarine Trident (Cdr. Sladen) sinks in the Svaerholthavet from a convoy the U hunter UJ 1213/ and MRS 3 /Bali. The large Soviet. K boat misses a target at on 3.11.41 at posn 7.11. as does K-21 on the 9th and 12.11. its goals. K-22 operates without success in the Vestfjord. K-21 (Kpt. 3.Rg. Zhukov) puts lays mines in the Söröysund which sinks at the norw. Steamer Bessheim (1774 BRT). 

2.– 24.11.1941 North Sea LW Airplanes sink outside the Humber. Brynmill (743 BRT) and Marie Dawn (2157 BRT), sth the Firth of Forth the Trawler Cradock (204 BRT) and before Scarborough the norw. Victo (3655 BRT), East of Cromer the Marinetrawler Francolin (322 BRT), nördl. of the Humber the Corhampton (2495 BRT) and east of Lowestoft the Bovey Tracey (1212 BRT). — Damaged through air attacks before Great Yarmouth the tankers Agility (522 BRT) the Thyra III (828 BRT), before Sunderland the Gaslight (1090 BRT), before Harwich the norw. Bestum (2215 BRT) and in Great Yarmouth Ardenza (933 BRT). 

3.11.1941 channell Brit. MTB sink near Cap Gris Nez the German transport Ro 19 (. Batavier V, 1573 BRT). (_could not quite get this_...The label Ro 19 is retained yet out of the time of the assembly of vehicles in Rotterdam for the planned landing in England....._I think it means the name was retained for deception purposes in relation to the cross channel attack )_ 

3.– 17.11.1941 North Ocean Convoy QP. 2 (12 trade ships), accompanied by the cruiser Norfolk, destroyers Eclipse, Icarus and 2 Trawlern as well as when local escort protection before Kola, with mine sweepers Bramble, Leda and Seagull runs, without enemy contact from Archangelsk to Kirkwall

4.11. – 4.12.1941 The new submarines Umbra and Tuna in company with french subs Rubia and Minerve patrol near Utvaer and Vestfjord. The flottilla reports no success. Also the franz. 

5.11.1941 North Sea Brit. Bombers sink the easy artillery carrier in the Emsmündung LAT 4/ Kurt Sandkamp (4.11. – 4.12.1941 Norway before Utvaer crosses roasted of the 4.-20.11. the new. Submarine umbra. Before the Vestfjord operates of the 12.11.- 4.12. Tuna. Both boats can indicate no successes. Also the franz. Rubis and Minerve U would boot remain without success. 

5.11.1941 North Sea Brit. Bombers sink the easy artillery carrier in the Emsmündung LAT 4/ Kurt Sandkamp (4.11. – 4.12.1941 Norway before Utvaer crosses roasted of the 4.-20.11. the new. Submarine umbra. Before the Vestfjord operates of the 12.11.- 4.12. Tuna. Both boats can indicate no successes. Also the franz. Rubis and Minerve U would boot remain without success. 

5.11.1941 North Sea Brit. Bombers sink the easy artillery carrier in the Emsmündung LAT 4/ Kurt Sandkamp ("_Artillery carriers", small cargo vessels converted for landing support. The Kurt Sandekamp was approximately 300BRT). My best gues as to why this ship was where it was is that it was being used to provide flak support to seaborne traffic in the Kattegat, or was acting as a picket boat for the germans. Here is a picture of the Ost a near sister_).


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## Juha (Nov 26, 2011)

Hello Parsifal
it’s my understanding that during the attack against the Germn troop convoy on 6/7 Sept 41 the light cruisers HMS Nigeria and HMS Aurora only sunk Bremse and the transports Trautenfels and Barcelona escaped into the fjord in bad visibility 

Juha


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## parsifal (Nov 26, 2011)

quite possibly. I am away from home and dont have access to the Seekrieg online diary. However from memory I think the diary says it esacaped, heavily damaged, was forced to beach itself and then lost. I will check and cross check and get back to you whaen I get home.

Thanks for the tip however....you may well be right.


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## parsifal (Nov 27, 2011)

Juha said:


> Hello Parsifal
> it’s my understanding that during the attack against the Germn troop convoy on 6/7 Sept 41 the light cruisers HMS Nigeria and HMS Aurora only sunk Bremse and the transports Trautenfels and Barcelona escaped into the fjord in bad visibility
> 
> Juha




Hi Juha


was wondering if you could give your interpretation of the relevant "Seekrieg" Diary entry. It says"_RAdm. Vian stößt mit den Kreuzern Nigeria und Aurora am 6./7.9. an die Polarküste vor und trifft dabei vor dem Porsangerfjord auf einen kleinen dt. Geleitzug. Die Kreuzer vernichten das Artillerieschulschiff Bremse (KKpt. v. Brosy-Steinberg †). Die Transporter Trautenfels (6418 BRT) und Barcelona (3101 BRT) mit etwa 1500 Mann der 6. Geb.-Div. an Bord entkommen bei schlechter Sicht in den Fjord. Am 10.9. treffen die brit. Verbände wieder in Scapa Flow ein."_

English sites are allover the place with this engagement. I have already posted one that says both transports were sunk0. Another English site says both transports escaped. This versions is repeated in the WW2 Cruisers entries for both Nigeria and Aurura. 

The SERVICE HISTORIES of ROYAL NAVY WARSHIPS in WORLD WAR 2 by Lt Cdr Geoffrey B Mason RN (Rtd) (c) 2005 HMS AURORA - Arethusa-class Light Cruiser including Convoy Escort Movements Edited by Gordon Smith, Naval-History.Net
See : HMS Aurora, British light cruiser, WW2 states "Carried out surface gunfire attack on German military convoy off North Cape with HMS NIGERIA. (Note: A German naval training ship BREMSE deployed as escort was sunk and two other escorts damaged. The two troopships in this convoy escaped. HMS NIGERIA was damaged possibly after grounding or striking a wreck.)

This site contains an extremely detailed discusson about operations near Spitzbergen

http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/archive/index.php/t-11084.html

It does not mention the loss of the transports as well. The question is, if they were not lost immeditately were they beached as a result of damage or being trapped.....I am quite unsure now. 

I am unsure about what to enter now until i get verification of the Seekrieg enty. What is your take on this?


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## parsifal (Nov 27, 2011)

Though completely off topic, I find the operations surrounding Spi9tzbergen extremely intersting. According to the Naval Ships forum (mentioned above, there were a number of operations after the September raids, firstly that led to the re-establishment of a weather station by the Germans , and secondly concerning the return of the Norwegians to the island. These are events i knew very little about until undertaking this research

"_Operation Fritham 

Preliminaries
After representations by the exiled Norwegian Government to the Admiralty, it was agreed for Norwegian miners to reoccupy the settlements to prevent further deterioration of the mining facilities. The Norwegians thought that only a small force would be necessary which, in order to respect the terms of the Treaty, would be described as a group of patriots returning to their homeland in their own vessels.

Aerial reconnaissance on 5 April, by a Catalina of 210 Squadron, reported no enemy activity, but failed to spot the Banso weather station encampment only ten miles away, from the proposed landing site.

The Operation
On 30 April 1942, the Norwegian tug/icebreaker Isbjorn and the sealer Selis with 85 men, sailed from the Clyde. This was an all Norwegian operation with a Norwegian, Lieutenant-Commander Einar Sverdrup, in command. The 85 men were mainly ex miners from Spitsbergen who had undergone basic military training, but included some British Army and naval officers. They refuelled and loaded more stores in Iceland, leaving on 8 May.

On 13 May another reconnaissance flight by a Catalina of 210 Squadron in the Icefjord area, spotted tracks, radio masts and a Heinkel 111 by some huts. (This was the weather station Banso.) They opened fire on the Heinkel but caused no serious damage, and it was able to take off and return to Norway. The Norwegian ships were warned of possible air attacks, but it is doubtful if the message got through.

The Isbjorn and Selis arrived at the entrance to Icefjord at 20.00 on 13 May, but found the passage to their landing jetty was blocked by ice. Against the advice of the British military officers who wanted to start unloading immediately by relays of sleds, the Norwegian commander ordered the Isbjorn to cut a passage through the ice to the jetty, as it would be easier to unload there.

At 05.00 the next day, a Ju88 was seen flying at low level along Icefjord. The landing party’s fears were confirmed at 20.30 when four Focke-Wulf Condors suddenly appeared without warning over the enclosed fjord. Making several bombing runs over the ships, the Condors sank the Isbjorn and set the Selis ablaze, which eventually sank. Thirteen men were killed including the Norwegian commander and a British officer Lieutenant-Colonel Dan Godfrey.

Nearly all the equipment, arms, ammunition, food clothing, radios and supplies had been lost, being still aboard the unloaded ships. Fortunately for the survivors, after the hurried evacuation of the previous year, there was shelter, accommodation, food, fuel and clothing left behind intact, enabling them to survive in relative comfort. Each day thereafter, the Germans flew a reconnaissance aircraft over the area.

Afterwards
Nothing of what had happened to the expedition could be reported as all the radio equipment had been lost. It was not until German Enigma signals from the Banso weather station were intercepted and decrypted that it was learned that two ships had been attacked and sunk. Aerial reconnaissance was ordered, and on 25 May, 210 Squadron sent a Catalina to look for survivors, and managed to make contact with them by signal lamp, learning of the wounded. 

The same Catalina returned on 28 May at 04.30 packed with emergency supplies and comforts. As they were unable to land due to floating drift ice, everything was dropped with long orange streamers attached for easy location in the snow. A further supply flight on 1 June had to be abandoned because of snow storms. 

The abandoned flight was resumed on 6 June, loaded mainly with arms and ammunition. This time the fjord was sufficiently free of ice to enable a landing to be made. The cargo was unloaded and six wounded survivors taken on board. Another supply flight took place on 15 June, bringing back Lieutenant-Commander Alexander "Sandy" Glen and two Norwegians.

peration Gearbox

When Naval Intelligence received Sandy Glen’s report on Operation Fritham, it was decided that the objectives of Fritham could be achieved by reinforcing the Norwegians in an operation to be called "Gearbox". 

For this operation, the land forces would again be Norwegian, but the transport and supply would be organised and implemented by the Royal Navy. The cruiser Manchester and destroyer Eclipse, under Rear-Admiral Bonham-Carter, were assigned for this and their movements would be disguised by sailing with the First Cruiser Squadron (Rear-Admiral Hamilton) which was providing the cruiser covering force for convoy PQ17. They would sail with them from Seidesfjord, Iceland as far as Jan Mayen Island then head north to approach Spitsbergen from the west.

A Catalina of 210 Squadron was again detailed to provide reconnaissance photographs of the area in and around Icefjord and report on the state of the sea ice in the fjord, and reconnoitre for a suitable safe refuelling location for future PQ convoy escorts. It was also to report on the position of the Arctic ice sheet to the north of Bear Island for PQ17, and take Sandy Glen and another British officer Major Andrew Croft to Spitsbergen. 

Taking off from Akureyri, Icelend on 26 June, the Catalina achieved all its objectives, even destroying a Ju88 on the ground on the way. They returned at 23.30 the next day, having been airborne for over 24 hours. Rear-Admiral Bonham-Carter received the report and photographs only a few hours before he sailed with the First Cruiser Squadron from Seidisfjord.

The Manchester and Eclipse were carrying 60 Norwegian soldiers and 116 tons of equipment and supplies, including anti aircraft guns. Arriving at Barentsburg at 12.30 on 2 July, the men and supplies had to be unloaded in small boats due to the jetty being silted up, taking 120 trips and six hours in all.

When the operation was completed, the two ships joined the Home Fleet of Admiral Tovey, the distant covering force for PQ17.

Later Gearbox operations

After Operation Gearbox was completed, there were further re-supply operations which became known as the Gearbox support operations. When they were combined with another operation they were sometimes given a number such as Gearbox 2, Gearbox 3, etc. to distinguish their actions from the main operation.

8 September 1942 - Re-supply by HMS Jamaica HMS Keppel, HMS Bramham, HMS Mackay, HMS Montrose.

17-18 September 1942 - Operation Gearbox 2 (part of Operation EV, the escort for Convoy PQ18). Re-supply by HMS Cumberland, HMS Sheffield, HMS Eclipse.

19 October 1942 - Operation EZ. Re-supply by HMS Argonaut, HMS Inglefield, HMS Obdurate. 

25 November 1942 - Re-supply by HMS London, HMS Suffolk, HMS Obedient, HMS Obdurate, HMS Orwell.

10 June 1943 – Operation Gearbox 3 (part of Operation FH, escorting corvettes Camellia and Bluebell from Russia). Re-supply by Force R - HMS Cumberland, HMS Bermuda, HMCS Athabaskan, HMS Eclipse.

18 October 1943 - Operation FQ (following the Tirpitz attack). 
Relief force – USS Tuscaloosa, HMS Onslaught, HMS Oribi, HMS Orwell, USS Fitch; 
Covering force – HMS Anson, USS Ranger, HMS Norfolk, HMCS Haida, HMCS Iroquois, HMS Hardy, HMS Janus, HMS Vigilant, USS Corry.

16 June 1944 - Re-supply by HMS Jamaica, HMS Whelp.

15 September 1944 - Re-supply by HMS Jamaica, HMS Orwell, HMS Obedient."_


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## Vincenzo (Nov 27, 2011)

for me seekrieg diary tell that transports escaped


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## parsifal (Nov 27, 2011)

Ive corrected the relvant diary entry. Thank s guys for the help


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## Juha (Nov 28, 2011)

Hello Parsifal
entkommen = escape
Rohwer’s and Hummelchen’s Chronology of the War at Sea 1939 – 1945 (1992), it’s an English edition of the earlier, less extensive edition of the book on which the on-line "Seekrieg" Diary is based. I usually used both the book and the clearly more extensive on-line version together. You have made a great work by picking up and translating the relevant parts of the on-line version plus digging out all the extras.

also the extensive description of the action in Whitley’s German Coastal Forces of World War Two (1992) pp. 161 - 64.

Lastly and especially leastly, hazy recollections on the history of the 6th Mountain Div.

Juha


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## herr81 (Nov 28, 2011)

British Messerschmitt BF-109


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## parsifal (Nov 29, 2011)

November continued

9./10.11.1941 aerial warfare Germany the RAF carries out light attacks on Hamburg, Cuxhaven and Ernden. 

9.– 28.11.1941 North Ocean Convoy PQ. 3 (8 trade ships) runs without enemy contact from Hvalfjord to Archangelsk. 1 ship returns because of ice damage. The convoy stands is escorted at various times by 2 armed Trawlern. cruisers Kenya, the destroyer leaders Bedouin and Intrepid, with support of the sowj. Destroyer Gremyashchi and Gromki an attack against the norw. Polar coast and shoot Vardö. After that they receive the escort for the convoy after Archangelsk. From 23.11. the sowj step. Destroyer Sokrushitelny and RN Mine Sweeper Bramble, Seagull and Speedy act as local escort protection Convoy PQ. 4 (8 trade ships) follows at the 17.11. and encounters together with PQ. 3 at the 28.11. in Archangelsk on. It becomes first of all accompanied of 2 armed Trawlern and of 25.-27.11. of the cruiser Berwick and the destroyers Offa and Onslow. Local escort protection on the last piece of the way through the mine searchers Gossamer, Seagull and Speedy. 

10.– 23.11.1941 North Sea the Swedish ore freighters Vollrath Thamm (5805 BRT) and Hedda (1472 BRT) set sail on the 10.11. and 23.11.respectively for Rotterdam.... north of Borkum they both hit air mines and are lost.

12.– 28.11.1941 North Ocean KM deploy U 752 and U 578 U boots in the entrance to the white sea U 752 (Oblt.z.S. Schroeter) in cape Gorodetskij area locates a small convoy misses the mine layer Jushar but sunk the patrol vesel T-898. at posn 27.11. locates the sowj. Picket Boat ship Briz (former RT-58/Spartak) in Kanin straits forcing it onto the on U 578 who damages it by ramming. 

12.11.– 4.12.1941 North Ocean Sowj. Escort vessels of the the type MO IV operate in the coastal waters in several capacities, and lay mines near Petsamo, Kirkenes and Vardö. 

13.– 14.11.1941 Biskaya the 8th M flottille (KKpt. v. Kamptz) undertaske Minesweeping with boats M 28, M 24, M 26, M 27 and M 32 in order to receive the retreating prize vessel Silvaplana (pinch HSK Atlantis) at arranged position. In place of the belated Silvaplana, the Kota Nopan (pinch HSK comet) appears unexpectedly at the reception position. The Kota Nopan believes attracted itself of hostile units into a trap and rammt M 27 that heavily is damaged. The flottilles led the Kota Nopan subsequently after Royan (Gironde). 

16.– 28.11.1941 North Ocean U-boat-operations at the polar coast. The sowj. K-23 (Kpt. 3.Rg. Does Potapov) operating out of Murmansk (?), puts four small mine barriers between Bergsfjorden and Kvaenangenfjord at the 19./20.11 and shoots bombards Lopphavet with the board gun the norw. Auxiliary mine searcher start. Through garnet gravel, 7 garrison members are wounded. K-3 (Kpt. 3.Rg. Malofeev with the commander of the 1st U-Boot-Div., Kpt. 2.Rg. Gadzhiev on board) is also patrolling the 23.11. two mine barriers in the Reinöy- and Mageröysund areas a ere laid. On the first mentioned barrier goes at the the norw. Steamers Ingoy (327 BRT) is lost. 30.1.1942 of the UJ 1110 / Mob FD 6: Before the Porsangerfjord is lost(Kptlt. Bibeyev with the boss of the 2nd U-boat-Div. Kpt. 2.Rg. Kolyshkin, on board) at the 26.11. a convoy present on east course with 2 mine searchers on, only can assume however a success, do not observe. 

Newly arrived into the North Ocean, U boots Sealion (Lt. Colvin) and Seawolf (Lt. Raikes). Sealion sinks the norw. Tanker Vesco (331 BRT) in the Svaerholthavet. Two attacks of Seawolf at the 22.11. and 24.11. before the Syltefjord fail. Ger freighter Bahia is attacked and damaged near Varberg however later returns to port.

18.11.1941 North Ocean the 8th S flottille newly set up at the 1.11.1941 (Kptlt. Christiansen) transfers with the boats S 42, S 44, S 45 and S 46 to north Norway where the flotilla is based at Tromsö and at Vardö . Because of bad weather, the flotilla suffres frequent damag and breakdown problems, the flottille operates for 6 months with hardly any operational uses. From 24.6.1942, the boats transfer back to Kiel where the flottille is dissolved at the 10.7.1942. 

19.– 26.11.1941 Biskaya the French submarine Rorqual (Cdr. Dewhurst) lays a mine barrier outside La Rochelle, which sinls the the French fish steamer Coligny (600 BRT). At posn 26.11. the britsche submarine P-36 misses a German submarine outside St. Nazaire. 

19./20.11.1941 North Sea attacks by 2nd S Fl. with S 104, S 105, S 41 and S 47 on one roasted. S 104 (Oblt.z.S. vine castle) sinks the navy tanker was Mehtar (5502 BRT) in a Convoy near Great Yarmouth, S 105 sinks Freighter Aruba (1159 BRT) and S 41 the freighter whale thing (2462 BRT). The 4th S flottille discontinued also with 5 boats does not approach the convoy. On British side, the escort destroyer Garth (Oblt. Popp) is damaged through gun fire of the destroyer Campbell. After the attack, S 41 is damaged in a collision with S 47 damaged and must be towed. The flottilla isattacked on its withdrawal by MGB 64 (LtCdr. R. Hichens) and MGB 67 . The MGB capture radio devices and lake cards, from one of the s bootes that are abandoned but do not rescue sinking boat. Also the other German S boats are all damaged through the superior fire of the new MGBs (_the turning tide[?/I]). 

24.11.1941 North Ocean Brit. Association (KAdm. Burrough) with the cruiser Kenya, the destroyers Bedouin and Intrepid as well as the sowj. Destroyers Gremjashchij and Gromkij rendevopuss at the norweg. Polar coast between Nordkyn and Vardö and then proceeds to Vardö, bombarding the port. 

24.11.1941 North Sea attack of the 4th S Fl. (Kptlt. Bätge) on Convoy east of Orfordness with S 50, S 51, S 52, S 109 and S 110: S 109 (Lt.z.S. bosses) sinks Tanker Virgilia (5723 BRT), S 52 (Oblt.z.S. Karl Müller) the niederl. Freighter Groenlo (1984 BRT), S 51 torpedos the freighter Blairnevis (4155 BRT). 

27.11.– 12.12.1941 North Ocean Convoy QP. 3 begins its return home and has no contact with the enemy from Archangelsk to Seidisfjord (Iceland), The convoy haas four freighters escorted by the Minesweepers, Seagull and Speady to the Kola Fjord led. From 28.11. the convoy with 6 further trade ships from Murmansk to Seidisfjord join the convoy, accompanied of the cruiser Kenya (until 3.12.), the destroyers Beduin and Intrepid (until 2.12.) and the mine sweepers Gossamer and Hussar (until 9.12.). 2 ships must reverse because of weather damage. 

Convoy PQ. 5 Sharpshooter (going through), Hazard runs with 7 trade ships and in accompaniment of two mine sweepers , and from Kanin. Bramble and Seagull, without enemy contact from Hvalfjord to Archangelsk. 

28./29.11.1941 North Sea mine enterprise of the 4th S flottille (Kptlt. Bätge) into the maritime area northwesterly of Cromer. Subsequently attack on one contacted Convoy. At the same time S51 (Oblt.z.S. Meyer) sinks the freighter Cormarsh (2848 BRT), S 52 (Oblt.z.S. Müller) the Empire Newcomen (2840 BRT) and S 64 (Oblt.z.S. Wilcke) the tanker Asperity (699 BRT). 

29.11.1941 Norway RAF Airplanes sink at the before Skudesnes the norw. coastal steamer Vindafjord (142 BRT). 

30.11.1941 North Sea the Danish freighters Ester (1272 BRT) and Oluf Maersk (1950 BRT) are sunk by British air attacks. — KM. Raider Komet (KAdm. Eyssen) arrives after 516-days at sea in Hamburg. Result: 6 ships with 31,005 BRT and 2 ships with 21,125 BRT together with disguised Raider Orion._


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## cimmex (Nov 29, 2011)

sorry, but I can't see "three fighters", how can it be that every thread in this forum after at least three pages is totally OT. Moderators here 
are very quick in banning but don't see permanent OT postings.
regards
cimmex


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 29, 2011)

cimmex said:


> sorry, but I can't see "three fighters", how can it be that every thread in this forum after at least three pages is totally OT. Moderators here
> are very quick in banning but don't see permanent OT postings.
> regards
> cimmex



We have let this thris thread continue on its course, because:

1. We have already many threads just like it.

2. The thread was not taken seriously by anyone because of the original post and Poll. In the end however there have been a lot of interesting discussion to come out of this thread (just look at parsifals posts). Is it wrong to the enjoy the interesting discussion that has propped up in this thread. We will never stop interesting discussions. If you do not like the discussion in this thread, then just don't post in this thread. 

If you do not like how this forum is moderated, you are more than welcome to leave. 

Thank you.


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## parsifal (Nov 29, 2011)

Hi Cimmie et al


I apologise for the detour this thread has taken, but it is still relevant to where the discussion had been going before it more or less closed down. It was claimed that the Allies did not have air superiority over the channel or over the Atlantic Coasts. There were some other claims made regarding maritime control of the coastal waters of western europe. The purpose of what im doing is relevant to that, in that it shows, in as much detail as i can find, the extent and effect of air operations and air/sea control. It has grown to a task bigger than I had expected, but still useful. 


I intend to make some sort of analysis of losses raids perhaps sortie rates and the like. This should conclusively show that whilst they took heavy losses, the ability of the allies to project force anywhere on the Atlantic seabord was above questioning.


If there is no further debate at that point, I will open a new thread with all of the relevant bits of information transferred, on Air and Naval operations over the Coastal areas of Europe as an infomration source.

Until then, i am hoping people will be patient with me and enjoy the information I am providing.


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## Sagittario64 (Nov 29, 2011)

I have a question about the legitimacy of the P-51s rule. most of the 109s the p-51s faced against were flown by inexperienced pilots. what if the flying skills of the pilots of the bf.109 and the p-51 were equal? wouldnt the bf.109 have some marked advantages over the p-51?


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## tomo pauk (Nov 29, 2011)

What kind of marked advantages would Bf-109 enjoyed over P-51, in what period of the war?


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## Sagittario64 (Nov 30, 2011)

If im not mistaken, i believe the bf.109 was quite agile for its type. plus, even though the mustang has 6 heavy caliber machine guns, the bf.109s cannon makes one hit far more destructive than a single bullet. if we are talking the 30mm, one hit would be enough to destroy a mustang, and if the bf.109 is as or more agile than the mustang, a pilot of reasonable quality could get in behind the mustang long enough to hit it with the cannon. the bf.109 model i-m referencing is the K-4 or if not then the best of the G-series.


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## Sagittario64 (Nov 30, 2011)

in this aspect im offering the situation p-51 VS bf.109. in war, the advantages i see are in versatility. the bf.109 was able to be extensively modified for destroyer, fighter-bomber, night-fighter, and carrier configurations. the p-51 was an able dogfighter, and just as equally a fighter-bomber, but it had unrealized potential. i think the p-51 could have done more than it was allotted for. but the point still stands that the bf.109 and p-51 are very different airplanes in respect to design and design goal. this is really just my opinion though. personally i believe the p-51 to be equal to the bf.109 in dogfighting, but less able than the bf.109 in terms of versatility(and dependability in terms of that versatility). the bf.109 was the core of the luftwaffe, and it was a very fantastic aircraft. as for its standing against other fighters throughout the war, the only thing i see that made the 109 fail was poor pilot training.


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## drgondog (Nov 30, 2011)

Sagittario64 said:


> in this aspect im offering the situation p-51 VS bf.109. in war, the advantages i see are in versatility. the bf.109 was able to be extensively modified for destroyer, fighter-bomber, night-fighter, and carrier configurations. the p-51 was an able dogfighter, and just as equally a fighter-bomber, but it had unrealized potential. i think the p-51 could have done more than it was allotted for. but the point still stands that the bf.109 and p-51 are very different airplanes in respect to design and design goal. this is really just my opinion though. personally i believe the p-51 to be equal to the bf.109 in dogfighting, but less able than the bf.109 in terms of versatility(and dependability in terms of that versatility). the bf.109 was the core of the luftwaffe, and it was a very fantastic aircraft. as for its standing against other fighters throughout the war, the only thing i see that made the 109 fail was poor pilot training.



The Me 109 never 'failed' - ditto the Mustang. had the Mustang been tasked as a n interceptor of heavy bombers, it would have been very easy to re-install 4x 20mm and immediately escalated its armament above the 109. The Mustang could carry a far heavier load of bombs, napalm or fuel than any configuration of the 109... and it could do this 400-700 miles from its base. 

The 109 was an interceptor, the Mustang was a an air superiority fighter with great performance and range although the 109 (IMO) was a better dogfighter. The problem is that the rank and file USAAF fighter pilot was better trained, better led and in general more aggressive - leading to the lopsided air to air results of the 109 vs the P-51B/C/D/K and we don't even get to the P-51H.


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## parsifal (Dec 1, 2011)

December 1941 Part I

1.– 10.12.1941 Blockadebrechers Portland (7132 BRT, Kpt. Tünemann) and castle country (7320 BRT, Kpt. Schütz)reaches Bordeaux , in journeys from Osaka and Kobe. 

1.– 12.12.1941 North Ocean Convoy PQ. 5 sets out 27.11. with 7 trade ships without enemy contact from Hvalfjord to Archangelsk where it arrives at the 12.12. safe. Convoy QP. 3 sets sail 28.11. with 10 trade ships also without enemy contact from Archangelsk to Seidisfjord (escort groups see 27.11.-12.12.) — the escorts are cruisers Berwick and Kenya and the destroyers Intrepid, Offa and Onslow. embarked are flying personnel of the RAF to Great Britain , that had the order to deliver Hurricanes in north Russia. — Of the 8.-12.12 the cruisers Kent and Kenya convey Foreign Minister Eden and the Soviet. Ambassador May ski from Scapa Flow to Murmansk, to a conference with Stalin in Moscow. (Of the 25.-29.12. turns Eden on board the cruiser Kent to England back). 

1.– 28.12.1941 waters around Great Britain LW Airplanes manage to sink nördl. the Shetlands the Trawler St. Leonard (210 BRT), in the Irish sea the Marinetrawler Milford Earl (290 BRT) and Phineas Beard (278 BRT) near Lunan Bay. Damaged in the irish Sea the destroyers Puckeridge (repair until August 1942), westl. of Bardsey Iceland the tankers Lucellum (9425 BRT) and in the St. -Georgs-channel the niederl. De Ruyter (458 BRT). 

1–. 22.12.1941 North Sea 2nd S flottille (KKpt. Feldt, 1-mal) and 4th S flottille (Kptlt. Bätge, 2-mal) carry out mine operations near area before Orfordness (2.12.), Cromer (4.12.) and the mouth of the Humber (4.12), for the first time with mines of the type LMA and LMB. East of Aldeburgh / Orfordness sink the tanker British Captain (6968 BRT) and at the 6.12. the Greenland (1281 BRT). North of Cromer sinks the Fireglow (1261 BRT). East of the Humber sink the Welsh Prince (5148 BRT), the Dromore Castle (5242 BRT), the Benmacdhui (6869 BRT) and the Greek Stylianos Chandris (6059 BRT). The successes cannot be assigned in all cases with security the mines put by fast boat, it are also air mine hit possible.

3.– 15.12.1941 North Ocean U-boat-operations off the nor Polar coast. Contact with a Ger convoy near Malofeyev, K -3 ( Kpt. Gadzhiev, on board) engages near Rolvsöy with the steamer Altkirch on. The U hunters UJ 1403, UJ 1416 and UJ 1708 counteratttack with depth charges. Kpt. Gadzhiev surfaces because of damages engages in a surface battle and obtains a directl hit to UJ 1708/ and the transport Faröer (470 BRT), The two other escorts, armed only with 4 x 2-cm-Flak 2-cm are forced to retire from the superior firepower of the submarine (2–10 cm, 2–4.5 cm). 

Before the Porsangerfjord, D-3 (Kptlt. M. A. Bibeyev with the boss of the 2nd U-boat-division, Kpt. 2.Rg. Kolyshkin, on board) contacts on the 5th and 6.12. several steamers, but the torpedoes detonate on rocks Outside the Tanafjord Sealion (LtCdr. Colvin) sinks the the small norweg. Steamer Iceland (638 BRT). Near the Varangerfjord, M -171 (Kptlt. Starikov) engages without success a tanker in the convoy on. M-174 lands agents at the Varanger coast. K-2, Shch-402, Shch-403, M-172 and M-176 operate without success. The patrol of K-22 (Kpt. 3.Rg. Kotelnikov with the commander of the U-boat-brigade, Kpt. 1.Rg. Vinogradov on board) is discontinued after mine barriers are laid in the Rolvsöy- and in the Sommelsund, and engages a norweg flagged ship with torpedo and artillery. Fischlogger Veidingen on, that escapes, but sinks from the artillery damage. Shch-421 misses in the Persfjord the norw. Steamer Mimona. 

4.– 8.12.1941 Irish Sea air mines laid by the LW hit sink in the Bristol channel south of Barry on the 4.12. McLaren (2330 BRT) and on the 7.12. the Severn carriers (119 BRT), near Rosslare (Ireland) on the 8.12. the Gertie (341 BRT).

5.– 30.12.1941 Biskaya British U boat operations. Of the 5.-15.12. sub Una observes the German transport Ausmarsch- and in the Biskaya, but the ship escapes. Subsequently, of the 15.12.-2.1., H. 32, H. 34, H. 43, Oberon, Ursula, P. 36, P. 39, the franz. Junon and the niederl. O-10 in the Biskaya undertake extended patrols keeping French bases in and above all Brest, under surveillance . Because of a feared outflow of the heavy KM. Ships in Brest are set up all available allied U boats in the room west of Brest (cf. 22.3.1941). Submarine H. 31 gets lost in these enterprises probably at the 20.12. through mine hit. 

6.– 15.12.1941 North Ocean K-22 (Kpt. 3.Rg. V. N. Kotelnikov) goes at the 6.12. with the commander of the U-boat-brigade, Kpt. 1.Rg. N. I. Vinogradov, and lays on the 9.12. in the Rolvsöy Sound a mine barrier from, and contacts a norw cutter, engages on the surface with gunfire, (however target escapes) but sinks a small escort vessel in Mylingen _further details not given) _.

8.– 23.12.1941 North Ocean Convoy PQ. 6 departs with 8 ships, accompanies of 3 Trawlern (until 12.12.) and subsequently the cruiser Edinburgh and the destroyers Echo and Escapade, without enemy contact from Hvalfjord to Murmansk. The mine sweepers Hazard and Speedy also provide local escort out of Murmansk, contact a German Destroyer (see 17.12.). In Murmansk, 2 remianing freighters in the harbour make a run out of port on the 20.12., in company with 5 other trade ships from Archangel with a sowj. Ice breaker in escort. they get stuck however on the 23.12. in Molotovsk in the ice and must remain through the uberwinter. 


9.12.1941 North Ocean on patrol near Kirkenes KM. Submarine U 134 (Kptlt. Schendel) near Tanafjord erroneously sinks the Ger Steamer Steinbek (2184 BRT).

9.12.1941 North Sea / Biskaya Brit. Bombers sink the German freighter Helder Madrid (8573 or 8777 BRT) and that M 1203 _(est 800BRT)_ near Brest by mine.

9.– 14.12.1941 Norway Brit. Bombers sink on the 9-12th the Norwegian freighter Bjoenn (5509 BRT) in Hustadvika, . Torpedo airplanes sink on the 12.12. near the Nordfjord the Picket boat V 5101/Blitz. On the 14.12. the small freighter Topaz (142 BRT) sinks through by causes unkown (_but it is carrying _) explosive material load (35 ts dynamite) in Haugesund. 


15.– 29.12.1941 North Ocean near the norweg. coast . Sov K boots-1, K-21, M-171, M-172, M-174, Shch-401, Shch-403, Shch-404. on the 16th and 17.12. puts K-1 (Kptlt. Avgostonovich) four mine barriers between Ullsfjord and Lyngenfjord, on which first sinks at the 26.12. the norw. Steamer Kong ring (1994 BRT). On the 18.12. ther is a futile combat between a submarine (K-1?) and the U hunter UJ 1214 near Kvaenangenfjord. On the 21.12. M -174 (Kptlt. N. e. Egorov) near Vardö sinks the Ger. Steamer Emshörn (4301 BRT). on the 22.12. Shch -403 (Kptlt. Kovalenko) near the Porsangerfjord misses the coastal steamer Ingöy. On the 28.-29.12, K -1, Shch-401 and Shch-404 all miss different targets. The size of the attacked targetds are often over-estimated by sowj. U-boat-commanders (_and how is this different from other nationalities 0 _ and detonations on rocks are reported again and again as hits. 

16.12.41 – 9.1.1942 Norway British U boat on picket. On the 16.12.- 9.1. Tigris is located near Utvaer (see operation "Anklet") and on the 23.- 29.12. works in company with Tuna before Stadlandet. 

17.12.1941 North Ocean in an attack at the Kola coast encounters the 8th KM Z flottille (Kpt.z.S. Pönitz) with Z 23, Z 24, Z 25 and Z 27 about 14 sm north of cape Gorodetsky on the arrival of the convoy PQ. 6 . 

Cruiser Edinburgh and destroyers Echo and Escapade to Archangel.

Minesweepers Hazard and Speedy were shceduled to meet the convoy, but on Dec. 17 they encountered the German destroyers Z 23, Z 24, Z 25 and Z 27, which mistook them for Russian destroyers, and an action resulted only in 4 hits on Speedy, which was damaged and forced to return. Leda was then sailed to replace her, and met the convoy together with Hazard on Dec. 19, escorting it to Murmansk with arrival the next day.

At this time, 5 ships had to spend the winter in Russian waters, due to delays in unloading, El Oceano operating under Russian control for a while. She made an independent voyage to Iceland (arrived Febr. 18-1942), after having broken away from the escort when returning to Murmansk for a homeward convoy, causing great anxiety to the British command at Murmansk.

2 ships, Elona and Explorer, returned with Convoy QP 8 on March 1-1942, while Mirlo returned with QP 4, Dekabrist with QP 5.

Interception of the convoy is unsuccessful. 

18.12.1941 North Ocean a LW Ju 88 sinks the sowj. Trawler Navaga (RT-4) in Vostochnaya Liza by aerial Mine. .

19.– 26.12.1941 North Sea mine operations of the 2nd S flottille (KKpt. Feldt) and 4th S flottille (Kptlt. Bätge) operating near the Coast of Cromer (19./21.12), Great Yarmouth / Lowestoft (21.12.) and Orfordness (22.12). successes are to be indicated Lowestoft. Through mine hit and sink on the 23.12. the belg. Leopold II (2902 BRT) east of Lowestoft, on the 23.12. the Greeks. Rokos Vergottis (5637 BRT), on the 24.12. Merchant (4615 BRT) and Stanmount (4468 BRT) nordeast of Great Yarmouth, on the 25.12. the Cormead (2848 BRT) near Lowestoft. The successes cannot be assigned in all cases with rtsinty to mines laid by Schnell Boote it is quite possible some losses are due to mines laid by aircraft . On the 26.12. the Minesweeping trawler Henriette is sunk near the Humber estuary . Damaged near Humber estuary on the 21.12. the Greeks. Nellie (4826 BRT) and before Aldeburgh on the 24.12. Eastwood (1551 BRT).


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## Tante Ju (Dec 1, 2011)

drgondog said:


> The problem is that the rank and file USAAF fighter pilot was better trained, better led and in general more aggressive - leading to the lopsided air to air results of the 109 vs the P-51B/C/D/K and we don't even get to the P-51H.



I agree. I read German memoire and they always press: American pilots are very agressive, they seemed to be everywhere.. much more so than for example British. Or Soviet. I always wondered - German developed a tactical approach, perhaps because of many years of front experience. US pilots got extreme high standard of training, but were relative new, most of them. And it is also seen in front troops, that fresh recruits are very agressive, they do not understand their vulnerability yet... like veterans, who are more cautious. IMHO aggressive spirit of US pilots - attack enemy always, pursuit it, destroy it - was key to success. This is good offensive spirit, also applies imho for US ground troops in Normandy.. by ardennes, less much. What are your thoughts?


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## tomo pauk (Dec 1, 2011)

Sagittario64 said:


> If im not mistaken, i believe the bf.109 was quite agile for its type. plus, even though the mustang has 6 heavy caliber machine guns, the bf.109s cannon makes one hit far more destructive than a single bullet. if we are talking the 30mm, one hit would be enough to destroy a mustang, and if the bf.109 is as or more agile than the mustang, a pilot of reasonable quality could get in behind the mustang long enough to hit it with the cannon. the bf.109 model i-m referencing is the K-4 or if not then the best of the G-series.



No one would dispute the agility of the 109, neither that a cannon is more potent than a HMG. The K-4 was really a great performer, so was the F-4, and late Gs.
It's the time span of P-51 usage that makes 109 loosing much of it's edge. That is apparent for important 10 months of WW2 (Dec 1943 - Sept 1944) that P-51B->K has a firm speed advantage vs the 109. Even in 1943 the 109 doesn't posses any speed advantage vs. P-51/P51-A. The 109 is fine point interceptor, but ill able to project the power over some distance - unlike the P-51 of all the flavors.
I agree that a cannon shell hit will badly hurt the P-51, but so will 109 feel when the burst of MG fire hits home.
The K-4 bridges the speed gap, it is a better climber, but other things remain unsolved.



Sagittario64 said:


> in this aspect im offering the situation p-51 VS bf.109. in war, the advantages i see are in versatility. the bf.109 was able to be extensively modified for destroyer, fighter-bomber, night-fighter, and carrier configurations. the p-51 was an able dogfighter, and just as equally a fighter-bomber, but it had unrealized potential. i think the p-51 could have done more than it was allotted for. but the point still stands that the bf.109 and p-51 are very different airplanes in respect to design and design goal. this is really just my opinion though. personally i believe the p-51 to be equal to the bf.109 in dogfighting, but less able than the bf.109 in terms of versatility(and dependability in terms of that versatility). the bf.109 was the core of the luftwaffe, and it was a very fantastic aircraft. as for its standing against other fighters throughout the war, the only thing i see that made the 109 fail was poor pilot training.



109 excelled in it's principal task, but was ill suited for other. As a fighter-bomber, it's bomb-load was nothing to write home about. Destroyer (bomber destroyer?) - needed for Germany, I'd say it was a good plane. OTOH, Mustang Ia in RAF service was carrying 4 cannons, so P-51 as a platform is not any worse. I'm not sure that any variant of the 109 could be stated as a night fighter, since it did not carry any radar. In order to make the 109 carrier capable, it received wings of greater span - I'd say that plain vanilla 109s were not that suited for carrier operation, not any better than P-51. 

I look at the P-51 basic design as well able to do what ever 109 basic design could (and Spit, for that matter), and then some.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 1, 2011)

Sagittario64 said:


> in this aspect im offering the situation p-51 VS bf.109. in war, the advantages i see are in versatility. the bf.109 was able to be extensively modified for destroyer, fighter-bomber, night-fighter, and carrier configurations. the p-51 was an able dogfighter, and just as equally a fighter-bomber, but it had unrealized potential. i think the p-51 could have done more than it was allotted for. but the point still stands that the bf.109 and p-51 are very different airplanes in respect to design and design goal. this is really just my opinion though. personally i believe the p-51 to be equal to the bf.109 in dogfighting, but less able than the bf.109 in terms of versatility(and dependability in terms of that versatility). the bf.109 was the core of the luftwaffe, and it was a very fantastic aircraft. as for its standing against other fighters throughout the war, the only thing i see that made the 109 fail was poor pilot training.



Do not confuse being modified for many different roles because there was nothing else available with true versatility. 109 carrier version was made because with only one carrier even near completion it made no sense to spend time designing and building a single engine airplane that would be built to a max number of a few dozen aircraft. Not all fighter bombers are equal, just because a fighter plane can carry a bomb (or a few small ones) doesn't mean it is the equal of another fighter plane than can carry bomb/s. Early Wildcats could carry a pair of 100lb bombs, early Zeros could carry a pair of 132lb bombs. Effectiveness of a "fighter bomber" is dependent on many things. How accurately can it place the bombs, the bomb load (1000lbs is better than 200lbs), the range it can carry the bombs (being able to carry 2000lbs doesn't mean much if the plane can't reach the target with the 2000lb load), and even resistance to ground fire. 

A lot of countries used (or tried to) single seat, single engine fighters at night fighters, again more because they had nothing else ( or enough something elses') at the time. Success (or lack of it) could also be measured in the accident rate in addition to combat results. Some countries "night fighters" being nothing more than their slowest landing or easiest to land available fighter. Night fighters to be truly successful in combat in WW II usually needed a dedicated radar operator ( or very, very good electronics or ground handling).

The Americans had enough production capacity that they could build aircraft for specialized roles and not have to modify one airframe into too many different roles.


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## Sagittario64 (Dec 1, 2011)

Ok youre all right. my apologies for being so aggressive. i guess ive heard one too many cocky opinions on the luftwaffe vs the usaaf. not from here though. everyone here gives both sides in the war due credit and respect.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 1, 2011)

Think you are rather opposite from being aggressive.


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## Sagittario64 (Dec 1, 2011)

well maybe not aggressive, but i know my tones werent pleasant.


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## parsifal (Dec 3, 2011)

December Part II

Operation Anklet (_from an english source) LOFOTEN ISLANDS 2nd RAID 26/27th DEC 1941 _

Operation Anklet, 

This was the first time all three services combined their resources to mount an amphibious raid against a defended coast. As Mountbatten said at the outset "... nobody knows quite what is going to happen and you are the ones who are going to find out." The RAF provided air cover for over 7 hours and undertook diversionary raids elsewhere. None of the British ships was hit by enemy bombs but a phosphorous bomb from a disabled British plane hit one of the landing craft resulting in some casualties.

Much had been learned by both sides. Later the Germans over-stretched their Atlantic wall with the deployment of 30,000 extra troops to reinforce the Norwegian sector. Clearly Hitler had taken the bait that Norway might well be "the zone of destiny in this war." The Press Unit had been very active during the raid and some of the most graphic and dramatic photographs in WW2 were taken. These and eye witness reports were later used for morale boosting purposes at a time in the war when there was little good news to cheer about.

The future pattern of sizeable raids and landings had been set.

Summary of Action

Allied Forces: Air- Bomber Command and Coastal Command; Sea - Cruiser H.M.S. Kenya, Landing Ships H.M.S. Leopold and Prince Charles, Submarine H.M.S. Tuna plus four destroyers; Land - No 3 Commando, two troops of No 2 Commando, a medical detachment from No. 4 Commando and demolition experts from No. 6 Commando, a Royal Norwegian Army Detachment.

Axis Forces: Air - Luftwaffe Heinkels, ME 109s and JU 88s. Land - 150 men from 181 Division, 50 troops on leave in the area.

Outcome (positive) - successful destruction of coastal defences, oil and fish factories, radio transmitters, stores, a lighthouse, a power station, 9 merchant ships totalling 15,000 tons and four Heinkels. 30,000 additional German troops deployed to the Norwegian sector taken from other fronts but notably the Atlantic Wall. 150 Germans killed, 98 captured and 71 Norwegians took passage to the UK.

Outcome (negative) - Commandos: 2 Officers and 15 OR killed, 5 Officers and 48 OR wounded, Norwegians: 1 Officer killed and 2 OR wounded, Royal Navy 2 OR killed and 2 Officers and 4 OR wounded and RAF 31 killed (2 Hampden's, 7 Blenhiem's and 2 Beaufighters were lost).

The Army, Norwegian and Naval casualties come from PRO document DEFE 2/83. The RAF casualties come from DEFE 2/83 (for the Coastal Command losses) and Bomber Command losses 1941, W.R. Chorley, Midland Publishing (for the Bomber Command losses).

23./24.12.1941 Biskaya a Sunderland of the RAAF Sq. 10 sights and damages the Ger Provision tanker Benno (former norw. Oil Jacob, 8306 BRT) through near hit with Depth Charge bombs. On the 24.12. the damaged ship is forced into Spanish waters and interned after attacks by torpedo armed Nesaforts of 22 Sqn RAF. _(I believe the spaniards confiscated the cargo and interned the ship....I cannot find any other references to her in the war)_. _ The German war diary says the ship was sunk by 22 Sqn but I actually think this is wrong....though the putcome is the same)_

25.– 31.12.1941 North Ocean deployment of the first Km Uboat wolfpack in northern waters. They concentrate south of the bear island against British Murmansk convoys. On patrol from 25.12. to the 25.1. the group "Ulan" with U 134, U 454, U 584 leads attacks against PQ.7A (see 2.1.42) and PQ. 8 (see 8.-20.1.42). 

On the 26.12. the convoy PQ.7A Hvalfjordur (Iceland) with 2 ships leaves, accompanies of the ASW Trawlern Hugh Whale Poles and Ophelia. In heavy weather beginning on the 28.12. the sowj. Steamer Waziristan, is attacked later by a German military aircraft and on the 2.1. by U 134 (Kptlt. Brosin) and sinks. — On the 31.12. the convoy PQ.7B with 9 ships follows escorted initially by the Trawlern Capes Aragona and Wastwater, they are removed from the Convoy from the 4.1., replaced by the destroyers Icarus and Tartar. Cruiser Cumberland misses the convoy and proceeds (with cargo) independantly to Murmansk. — On the 29.12. convoy QP leaves Murmansk with 4 ships, joined by 13 trade ships from Archangelsk with Seidisfjord as its destination


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jan 21, 2012)

P-51, It has great legs.


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