# Tactics: Spitfire vs Zero



## Njaco (Jul 21, 2010)

Read in a book about some of the tactics pilots used against Zeros including the following....

"Australian pilots knew they could dive faster than the Zero. Therefore, after an initial pass they would dive away rather than risk turning (where the Zero was better) or climbing (when the Zero would catch them). Diving away and round, the Spitfire pilots would then regain height and position for another pass."

I never really considered Spitfire vs Zero combat (I've always been interested in the ETO) but I'm curious about how successful Commonwealth pilots were against the Japanese. I've always placed the Spitfire among the Battle of Britain and the Western Front and this is intriguing to me.

Please, no wing-loading or 100 octane battles here - just want to know how matched the aircraft and pilots were in this theatre.


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## Kryten (Jul 21, 2010)

From what I have read that account pretty much covers it, trying to turn with a zero or an Oscar was not reccomended so get the height advantage and make a pass then get out, if you miss, then you miss, but you can always have another go as your unlikely to be caught!

I suppose thats the biggest problem with building super light agile aircraft, the dive performance suffers!


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 21, 2010)

Keep the speed up, 250 or more...


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## renrich (Jul 22, 2010)

From what I have read the Spitfire was not highly successful against Zeros or other similar Japanese fighters. Early in the war, the tactics used by Spitfire pilots were deficient and later, as tactics improved, the Spitfires were hard pressed to attain altitude advantages, ( because they did not get enough early warning) where energy tactics could be successful.


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## Nikademus (Jul 22, 2010)

Not being able to read French, my account of the Darwin battles remains generalistic . However it is described as following a similar pattern of learning curve as with other airforces when first encountering the plane. Problem was that the incoming Spit pilots were described as ETO veterans so they wern't receptive to the warnings of PTO veterans when told the dos and donts of fighting Zeros. As a result the initial combats did not go in their favor despite the Spit's technical superiority.

In the Burma theater, more widespread use of the Spit was seen and a curious situation developed by early 1944. The Spitfire, demonstrated it's ability to prevent the JAAF from achieving air superiority most of the time over the battle areas (Shores Vol III BS series), and protected transport and ground attack units well.....but at the same time the Ki-43's they were matched up with proved very difficult to shoot down and of course, it was extremely dangerous to dogfight with. This resulted in a stalemate much of the time.

The performance edge of the Spit (particularily the VIII model) was overall so superior that the pilots were able to dictate when and where they engaged. Biggest issue was the plane's short range made it primarily a defensive interceptor so could not be used to try to hunt the JAAF at it's lairs. From a statistical angle, the exchange rate was approx 1.8:1 in favor of the Spitfire.


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## renrich (Jul 22, 2010)

Your point about the range limitations of the Spitfire is well made Nik. Another facet of the Spitfire story in the CBI was that the Spitfire did not apparently take kindly to the operational environment from the point of view that the conditions on the ground were pretty rugged. The photos I have seen of the Spits in the CBI looked pretty scraggly which must have detracted from it's performance plus the liquid cooled engines suffered from glycol leaks and that was a vulnerability issue against the mostly radial engined Japanese fighters.


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## parsifal (Jul 22, 2010)

Joe B provides a pretty convincing argument about Spitfires in the PTO and CBI TOs. In the case of the Spits operating out of Darwin I have had some pretty robust discusssions at times about overclaiming of Japanese aircraft.

Despite some very connvincing arguments, I have to admit I remain somewhat sceptical about Joes arguments at times. I think the main problem is that not all the participating IJN and JAAF units are identified in Joes accounts. 

The air battles over Darwin were the scene where the RAAFs highest scoring Ace (Killer Caldwell) operated. 

Having stuck my neck out with the above statements, there is also no doubt that some pretty bad overclaiming occurred in this theatre, worse than most theatres. Makes me wonder how many of Caldwells kills were real to be honest.


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## Njaco (Jul 22, 2010)

So it would be safe to say that because of range limitations it was used more for defense rather offensive ops (Spitfire I mean)?


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## Nikademus (Jul 23, 2010)

It was used primarily as an interceptor and CAP fighter (The spitfire in particular became the bane of high flying Ki-46 recon craft....nabbing 14 of them over the course of the Burma fighting...usually at 30,000 feet or higher), and as escort for transport runs and covering ground attack missions. It's short range did not suit it for deep penetration missions vs. JAAF airfields.


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## Gixxerman (Jul 23, 2010)

I know films are rarely a credible source for information but I recently obtained the extended Japanese cut of the film 'Tora Tora Tora'.
One of the senior Japanese pilots mentions at the start of the film that he had been to Europe and seen first hand the best German and British fighters (the Me 109 and Spitfire, IIRC) and that the Zero (described in the film at this stage as their new fighter pre Pearl Harbour attack) was superior to both.

Sadly I've not any way of checking if that was based on a historical figure or just invention for the film.

It does look as if the Japanese were rarely impressed by the pre-war early war European ideas on military aircraft design and philosophy (I'm thinking of their look at some German aircraft which they rejected, the Heinkel fighters for instance) although obviously this changed with the late war designs they did like.


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## Colin1 (Jul 23, 2010)

Gixxerman said:


> It does look as if the Japanese were rarely impressed by the pre-war early war European ideas on military aircraft design and philosophy (I'm thinking of their look at some German aircraft which they rejected, the Heinkel fighters for instance)


Ironic given the outward similarities between the Ki61 and the He100 and the fact that the earlier German design could completely outpace the later Japanese one.


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## Nikademus (Jul 23, 2010)

Gixxerman said:


> I know films are rarely a credible source for information but I recently obtained the extended Japanese cut of the film 'Tora Tora Tora'.
> One of the senior Japanese pilots mentions at the start of the film that he had been to Europe and seen first hand the best German and British fighters (the Me 109 and Spitfire, IIRC) and that the Zero (described in the film at this stage as their new fighter pre Pearl Harbour attack) was superior to both.
> 
> Sadly I've not any way of checking if that was based on a historical figure or just invention for the film.
> ...



The Japanese pilots fully believed in their mounts and had a high degree of confidence. At the time the A6M debuted, it was fully comprable to the best designs of the day. It's often not remembered that the major planes of the early era also began as unarmored and without self sealing tanks. Problem for the Japanese were that early combats came too easy for them, which did not highlight the importance of defensive measures, the powerplant limitation did not easily allow for said upgrades and their late start in full scale warefare. Still....they enjoyed a brief window, aided by Allied pre-war notions on what they'd be facing. 

The Ki-43 enjoyed a similar run but it's acomplishments are largely overshadowed because it was routinely identified as a "Type 0" in many battle accounts. Also, by the time it appeared in numbers in the South Pacific, the tide had turned, newer, better planes were present and tactics had been refined coupled with a better operational plan. In Burma though, the Oscar continued to give coniption fits thx in large part to the veterans flying it despite being increasingly outnumbered.


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## Glider (Jul 23, 2010)

Gixxerman said:


> I know films are rarely a credible source for information but I recently obtained the extended Japanese cut of the film 'Tora Tora Tora'.
> One of the senior Japanese pilots mentions at the start of the film that he had been to Europe and seen first hand the best German and British fighters (the Me 109 and Spitfire, IIRC) and that the Zero (described in the film at this stage as their new fighter pre Pearl Harbour attack) was superior to both.
> 
> Sadly I've not any way of checking if that was based on a historical figure or just invention for the film.
> ...



I do know that during the BOB the Japanese in Europe were very impressed with the Spitfire which they believed to have exceptional speed, climb and firpower making it the ideal intercepter. They were also very impressed with the protection of the Me109 and urged the military leaders in Japan to follow the European lead and protect their aircraft (and carriers). As we all know this was ignored until it was too late. The Japanese will have had the opportunity to fly the Me109 but doubt that they would have been able to try a Spitfire.
However the Zero was a remarkable aircraft and they rightly had every reason to believe in its ability.

For more on this try the following thread.
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww2-general/japanese-perpective-battle-britain-8713.html


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## Demetrious (Jul 23, 2010)

Spitfire vs. Zero is an interesting discussion; since the Spit is just about the closest match for the Zero you're going to find. The Spit is an amazing turner, but the Zero is nigh _insane_ in the turn (the figures I remember for flat sustained turning performance is 18 seconds for a 360 in the spit, and 16 for the Zero. Given the nigh infinite variables, consider it a comparative measure.) A similar story in climb performance- the Spitfire is great, the Zero is insane. It's not enough to just say "the Zero is better" in these categories; one must consider exactly how big the Zero's performance advantage is here, because that translates directly to the margin the Zero pilot has to exploit. In turn and climb, that margin is not drastic; turning or climbing won't save the Zero if he let the Spit get a good enough position. 

Where the differences really open up is roll rate and speed. The Zero's Achilles heel was always it's atrocious roll rate. While the Spitfire's roll rate deteriorates rapidly above 300 MPH, the Zero's roll starts out lethargic and becomes almost unresponsive by 300 MPH. The clipped wing Spitfire's roll rate can only be described as terrifying. And in speed, of course, the Spitfire is markedly superior, and since the Zero breaks into itty bitty pieces if it dives past 440 MPH or so, it's ability to exploit altitude is lessened. In short, the Spitfire should be able to keep on top of the energy game. 

Basically the success or failure of the Spitfire in Australia was mostly dependent on how aware it's pilots were of these performance differences. After experience in BoB, they were likely to think they could simply out-turn their foes, which would lead to obvious problems in initial Zero encounters. After they had the Zero's measure, however, things would change rapidly.


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## Glider (Jul 23, 2010)

At the end of the day the best advice is always Simple advice that works and you couldn't do better than FJ's earlier in the thread. Stay above 250 mph and the Zero will be in serious trouble.


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## Nikademus (Jul 23, 2010)

unless its bouncing you from behind.


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## Wildcat (Jul 23, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> It was used primarily as an interceptor and CAP fighter (The spitfire in particular became the bane of high flying Ki-46 recon craft....nabbing 14 of them over the course of the Burma fighting...usually at 30,000 feet or higher), and as escort for transport runs and covering ground attack missions. It's short range did not suit it for deep penetration missions vs. JAAF airfields.



This was also the case at Darwin until the Spitfire wing there was equipped with the MkVIII. This allowed a handful of strike missions to be flown over the Arafura Sea - usually to the Spitfires limit of endurance though. 79sqn RAAF in the Pacific was pretty much the same, the squadron usually provided CAP over places such as Kiriwina and Momote whilst Allied bombers were launching strikes against New Britain. However being closer to the enemy than the Darwin Wing, 79 sqn did carry out fighter sweeps against enemy airfields and installations on New Britain.
The role of the RAAF Spitfires changed late in the war when they were grouped together at Morotai, because of an almost complete lack of Japanese aerial activity, ground attack missions were the order of the day. In this role Japanese airfields, water craft, supply dumps, motor traffic, bridges and troop concentrations in the NEI and Borneo all recieved attention from the Spitfires. When bombs were added to their inventory, dive bombing attacks were also conducted.

It's interesting you mention the Ki-46, as previous to the arrival of the Spitfires at Darwin, they were virtually immune to the P-40 defenders there. I count 9 being destroyed by Darwin Spitfires and a further 2 to Pacific based units. 17 August 43 is a good example, when the Japanese launched four seperate reconniassance flights against Darwin resulting in all four falling to the guns of Spitfires.


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## Freebird (Jul 24, 2010)

Were these encounters mostly Spit 9's? Or with Spit V's?


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## Wildcat (Jul 24, 2010)

Of the ones I mentioned above, 9 Ki-46's fell to MkVc's and the remaining 2 to MkVIII's


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## VG-33 (Jul 24, 2010)

Demetrious said:


> Spitfire vs. Zero is an interesting discussion; since the Spit is just about the closest match for the Zero you're going to find. The Spit is an amazing turner, but the Zero is nigh _insane_ in the turn (the figures I remember for flat sustained turning performance is 18 seconds for a 360 in the spit, and 16 for the Zero. Given the nigh infinite variables, consider it a comparative measure.) .



Just a point, the sustainted ToT is limited by the power available curve. As the sustainted climb. It's sure that keeping it's energy from a dive recovering the Spit could outurn or outclimb the Zero in the "dynamical" (speed decrease) configuration. Sustainted climb and turn rates, can be considered just as "statical" indicators. 

Regards


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## JoeB (Jul 24, 2010)

parsifal said:


> I think the main problem is that not all the participating IJN and JAAF units are identified in Joes accounts.


I’ve never agreed with that argument, but it’s also become less plausible over time. When these discussions first came up, I was quoting mainly Alfred Price's little Osprey book "Spitfire Mark V Aces" and a now defunct website using the same Japanese source, private monograph written for a Western reserarcher by retired Japanese officer (postwar officer, JASDF or JMSDF I dont' recall). But since then Baeza's "Solelil Levant sur l'Australie" came out, and what's more, many original records of the JNAF are now online at the National Archives of Japan website, 'JACAR'. The records of 23rd Air Flotilla say the 202nd Air Group was the only fighter unit on the navy’s raids on Australia, and the 202nd's own 'kodochosho' or ‘tactical operation records', at JACAR, detail each mission where the Spitfires reported meeting Zeroes (except the single mission by Army Type 1's, June 20). They do not reference any other unit (fighter kodochosho on multi-unit missions in Solomons and New Guinea *do* refer to the other units present), and the 753rd AG's (the 'Betty' unit in all the Navy raids) kodochosho also lists the 202nd, only, as their escort on the escorted bombing raids.

With the detail of these sources, there is no longer any plausible argument that Spitfire overclaims against Zeroes represent losses by unknown Japanese units. Saying that’s ‘not certain’ is about the same as saying the Zero overclaims for Spitfires are explained by unknown additional Spitfire units. Show absolute proof other Spitfire units weren’t flying from Darwin besides the known ones… it’s about the same kind of argument, at this point. 

The Spits caused the following loss and damage to Zeroes in the Darwin raids, taken directly from the 202nd's kodochosho except as in ( ), Japanese names are family name first, I didn’t bother figuring out the (scribbled) given names in some cases of minor damage, and Japanese names can often have more than one pronunciation which even native speakers can’t disambiguate 100% certainly from seeing them written in Chinese characters as in these records:
March 2 1943: 21 Zeroes on escort to Taban (?Coomali), a/c of Sea 1C Hihara Hiroyuki (日原弘行) hit 3 times, a/c of PO2C Tsuda Goro (津田五郞) hit twice. JACAR document: C08051650100 pp 1-2
March 15: 27 Zeroes to Darwin on escort, one mechanical abort, PO2C Tajiri Seiji went missing, no damage to other a/c, C08051650100, pp. 49-50 
May 7: 27 Zeroes to Darwin on escort, one mechanical abort, CPO Noda Teruomi(?, 野田光臣)’s a/c was holed 7 times but returned (Price mistakenly reports this as 7 Zeroes hit) C08051650700 pp. 8-9
May 10: 9 Zeroes to Stewart Field on strafing mission. PO1C Sakai Kunio went missing (crashed on Stewart field); CPO Yamanaka Tadao ditched (Baeza has a photo of a Zero leaving the area streaming fuel, taken from the ground); the leader Ens Miyaguchi Morio’s a/c had a fire but ‘use possible’ (repairable); PO1C Yoshida’s a/c was hit once. (Spitfire claims in this one case were quite accurate, 2 destroyed 1 probable) C08051650700 pp. 46-47
May 28: 7 Zeroes to Stewart Field on escort. a/c of PO2C Nishi hit once, that of [illegible] also damaged. C08051650900 pp. 43-44
June 20: (this raid was by the JAAF, suffered one Type 1 Fighter loss in 59th Sentai, per numerous sources)
June 28: 27 Zeroes to Darwin on escort, CPO Noda’s a/c was hit once (see May 7), that of PO2C Okubo Noto (?大久保野藤) 6 times, that of Sea 1C Hasegawa Shujiro 10 times, latter two a/c classed ‘medium damage, use possible’; one pilot was seriously wounded, probably Okubo since he didn’t fly the next mission and the other two did; all three were in the same 3 plane ‘shotai’. C08051651300 pp. 18-19
June 30: 27 Zeroes to Fenton a/f on escort, no loss or damage. C08051651300 pp. 29-30
July 6: 27 Zeroes to Fenton a/f on escort, CPO Ishikawa Tomotoshi mechanical abort, a/c of PO2C Hayashi Takeshi (林武?) hit 4 times, a/c of WO Sakaguchi Otojiro (坂口音次郎) hit once (this is slighty at odds with Baeza who says Tomotoshi’s a/c was damaged in combat and landed wheels up, not what the report seems to say, but Baeza’s info is also that only 26 a/c completed the mission and two were combat damaged) C08051651300 pp. 48-49
Sept 7: 36 Zeroes on escort of Army a/c (2 Type 100 Hq. Recon, ‘Dinah’), PO1C Terai Yoshio went missing, a/c of PO2C Shimazu Masao (島津正雄) was hit 7 times, a/c of PO1C Goto Koichi (後藤庫一) hit 5 times, a/c of Ens. Miyaguchi Morio hit twice, a/c of Sea 1C Ishida hit once. C08051651700 pp. 3-4

So in total, 3 pilots were lost with their Zeroes, one Zero ditched pilot survived, and 15-16 other Zeroes (not clear if Miyaguchi's fire May 10 was due to combat) suffered repairable combat damage. Note that all the Zero losses were not 100% certainly caused by Spitfires, only the May 10 losses, Sakai and Yamanaka’s ditching, were pretty certainly due to Spits, assuming ground fire didn’t punch a hole in Yamanaka’s fuel tank during the strafe. The other two (Mar 15, Sep 7) just disappeared during/after combat with Spits, probably downed by Spits, but the uncertainty is worth keeping in mind if one would quibble about whether certain Spit losses on these missions were 100% certainly due to Zeroes. 

I think it’s useful to list the damaged Zeroes, because it gives a better idea how the Spit overclaims could be so high. The kodochosho for other campaigns also show that Zeroes frequently made it back long distances to base with damage, even fairly well shot up. One factor in Allied overclaims might have been their belief that any Zero they hit was as good as dead, so when sure they hit a Zero, perhaps convinced themselves that they saw a dramatic end to the Zero they didn’t really see, or felt it wasn’t exaggerating to say so even when they knew they hadn’t really seen it, because the Zero wasn’t going to regain its base anyway…but they often did. 

Per Price’s account 26 Spits were lost or probably lost in combat with Zeroes in these same combats, excluding the 2 lost to Army Type 1’s on June 20.

Japan Center for Asian Historical Records(JACAR) National Archives Japan

Joe


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## parsifal (Jul 24, 2010)

Joe

as usual your research is exceelent and formidable. Yet once again, I need to point out that there is a basic an inherent problem in your approach. You are proving that the forest was not cut down by looking at the individual trees, relying on primary records that should be correct, but for a multitude of reasons might not.

The starting point of any hypothesis needs to be what was the big picture. Just how many aircraft were lost by the japanese, and in what theatre and at what times. For example, the USN claims to have shot down 16000 Japanese aircraft 41-45. We know that the Japanese started with a certain number of aircraft, they finished with another number, produced X pilots and Y aircraft. If they were not shot down or killed, what happened to these planes. if your accounts are to be believed, we should all be speaking Japanese at this point because on the face of it the Japanese could never have lost 16000 aircraft. On the face of it, your research suggests they did not even lose 1600 aircraft in this theatre......


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## VG-33 (Jul 25, 2010)

parsifal said:


> Joe
> 
> as usual your research is exceelent and formidable. Yet once again, I need to point out that there is a basic an inherent problem in your approach. You are proving that the forest was not cut down by looking at the individual trees, relying on primary records that should be correct, but for a multitude of reasons might not.
> 
> The starting point of any hypothesis needs to be what was the big picture. Just how many aircraft were lost by the japanese, and in what theatre and at what times. For example, the USN claims to have shot down 16000 Japanese aircraft 41-45. We know that the Japanese started with a certain number of aircraft, they finished with another number, produced X pilots and Y aircraft. If they were not shot down or killed, what happened to these planes. if your accounts are to be believed, we should all be speaking Japanese at this point because on the face of it the Japanese could never have lost 16000 aircraft. On the face of it, your research suggests they did not even lose 1600 aircraft in this theatre......



You speak about the *exhaustivity* of japanese archives i suppose and particulary losses lists. I can just speak for Bernard Baëza works since the question existed from the beginning. Just we can say that they seems to be rather complete with some uncertainly margin of course. I mean the account balance is obtained (near 0) with losses, deliveries, and remining strengh in most of battlefield vicinities he's studied.
It's not always mentionned inhis publications in order not to bother the reader, in favor of action but verifications of course are made in the background...

Might be no 100% accuracy like in all archives of the world, but no main arithmetical incoherences too.

Regards


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## JoeB (Jul 25, 2010)

parsifal said:


> Joe
> 
> as usual your research is exceelent and formidable. Yet once again, I need to point out that there is a basic an inherent problem in your approach. You are proving that the forest was not cut down by looking at the individual trees, relying on primary records that should be correct, but for a multitude of reasons might not.
> 
> The starting point of any hypothesis needs to be what was the big picture. Just how many aircraft were lost by the japanese, and in what theatre and at what times. For example, the USN claims to have shot down 16000 Japanese aircraft 41-45. We know that the Japanese started with a certain number of aircraft, they finished with another number, produced X pilots and Y aircraft. If they were not shot down or killed, what happened to these planes. if your accounts are to be believed, we should all be speaking Japanese at this point because on the face of it the Japanese could never have lost 16000 aircraft. On the face of it, your research suggests they did not even lose 1600 aircraft in this theatre......


With all due respect, I think that line of argument has reached the level of real nonsense. We have the then secret original records of the Zero unit involved in a particular operation, 202nd Air Group. Those detailed records mention no other fighter unit cooperating with them (as such records demonstrably do when it was the case) on those missions, showing the specific encounters that the opposing Allied force recorded. The numbers of a/c mentioned on each mission generally agree with the numbers the opponents reported encounting. The records of the bomber unit on the same mission say that fighter unit was the only escorting them. The records of the next hightest unit, the Air Flotilla of which they were part, also say those two units 202nd AG Zeroes, 753rd AG Type 1 'Rikko', were the ones sent of those missions. And records of overall order of battle say the 202nd was the only Navy fighter unit based within range of Darwin (see Baeza on the flotilla and overall OOB levels).

The second paragraph also makes no sense as saying anything about the specific Darwin raids. Total USN credits amount to 16K OK, so what? It's ridiculous to say we can't account for USN claims v Japanese losses at...say Battle of Coral Sea because we don't know the whole 'forest'. We know which Japanese carriers were there, we have the original handwritten records of the carrier air groups (online, and lots of other records that aren't, which more serious researchers can access in hard copy in Japan). It's just nonsense to say we can't use the records of the specific units involved, which a variety of sources agree were the ones involved, without first doing a whole accounting of all production and losses for the whole war.

And again why isn't it a 'flawed approach' to use the Spitfire unit accounts to determine their losses? The 202nd AG credited its pilots with 101 victories (including 'probables) in those raids. Some were against P-39's, P-40's, Buffalo's and even P-43's defending Darwin in 1943, in addition to Spitfires. Detailed Allied accounts say only Spitfires encountered Zeroes when defending that area in 1943, and only suffered something like 26 losses in air combat to Zeroes. But just turn your approach around... how is looking at the Spit wing's accounts not also trying to 'prove the 101 plane forest was not cut down by looking at individual trees'? Where's the 'proof' those other Allied types didn't also participate, or that only 26 Spits were lost? Where's the big picture of total Allied production minus losses equals ending figure? That hasn't been brought up because it's not really relevant. We have the accounts of the Spit units we know (pretty surely) were the ones involved; same with the Zeroes.

As far as implication of Japanese total losses in the Pacific, you're exatrapolating wildy there from this one series of incidents. The 202nd lost 3 more Zeroes and pilots in just its first combat mission after the Darwin operation, Sept 9 1943, escorting bombers v Merauke, New Guinea against No. 86 Sdn RAAF Kittyhawks. The unit was then wiped out from Dec 1943-spring 1944 at Rabaul and in central Pacific and was deleted from the rolls in July 1944 The Japanese records don't show a consistent story of light losses, or of Allied overclaims as high as those of the Spits (though in some other cases it was as high). The 202nd suffered more heavily even in the 1942 Darwin raids v P-40's than in the 1943 ones.

Joe


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## buffnut453 (Jul 25, 2010)

Joe,

A small point but the Buffalos and P-43s in Darwin were PR aircraft not defensive fighters and, as far as I know, none were ever engaged in or lost during air combat. IIRC one PR Buffalo was destroyed on the ground.

Cheers,
Mark


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## Njaco (Jul 25, 2010)

I knew this would happen. I'm asking for tactics not statistics. I'm curious how the Spit plots fared against the Japanese as I never really considered it. Did the various Mks of Spits yield different tactics against the Zero or did the Zero have a superiority that only good piloting by Commonwealth pilots could overcome it? And YEs I understand that kill ratios can give a perspective on that outcome but, come on, kill claims are ALWAYS suspect and can only give a general idea of the whole picture.

If this thread degrades into name-calling and underhanded sarcasm, I will close it.


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## JoeB (Jul 25, 2010)

buffnut453 said:


> Joe,
> A small point but the Buffalos and P-43s in Darwin were PR aircraft not defensive fighters and, as far as I know, none were ever engaged in or lost during air combat. IIRC one PR Buffalo was destroyed on the ground.


No I don't believe any were engaged in air combat, either, nor any P-39's or P-40's in the Darwin area in '43. But the claims in the 202nd's kodochosho include all those types, in Darwin area '43. The point I'm making is that you, or I, conclude this Japanese impression was mistaken based on published accounts in turn based on the unit records of the Allied fighters which actually did encounter the Zeroes (Spit Wing, as far as 1943 in Darwin area) and higher level Allied accounts saying which units were involved where. But in this particular case we have the same info from the Japanese side; detailed records of the fighter unit involved describing every combat the Allies recorded (except the one JAAF raid we also know), Navy bomber unit records saying the 202nd was their escort, air flotilla records and overall OOB info that also show it was the only fighter unit involved in JNAF operations v Darwin area. So there's no more basis to say other JNAF fighter units were involved than there is to say Buffalo's and P-43's were engaged in combat. In fact there's less basis, because there's nothing even from the Allied side that's inconsistent with the 202nd being the only fighter unit present on the Navy raids. So why is such a different standard of logic and proof applied to similar information from one side v the other? Consistent logic says that each side knew who it was sending up and who didn't come back, but had only unreliable impressions in the heat of combat about who the enemy was sending up and what damage it was inflicting on the enemy. Same with any other case.

Re: Njaco, you asked 'how did the Spitfires do'. I don't see how one could possibly answer that question without settling, to some reasonable degree of certainty, how many Zeroes Spitfires managed to down in the only campaign where those two types met in combat. If it's really true that the outcomes of these combats are seriously uncertain (they aren't, but for argument's sake let's say they were) I don't see how you could possibly say whose tactics worked.

Joe


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## parsifal (Jul 25, 2010)

Njaco

I dont believe that either joe or i are trying to hijack your thread, and i agree with Joe that we need to establish a solid basis of fact in order to move to the questions you put. 

If you are not happy with where we are going with this, say the word and we aill desist. 



Joe

It wa never my interntion to upset you on this issue. But i need to clarify why I am narking you on this issue. 

Firstly, I am not trying to to disrespect you or your research, but I also think you need to sit back just a little and consider what you are saying. I dont know how many different threads I have seen you produce accounts of individual battles that show an immense knowledge on the subject, and are certainly very convincing. I am not one of those that disrespects the efforts of the Japanese. I have a healthy respect for what they achieved. And I do not assert that I have superior knowledge to you on this subject. However the methodology I am suggesting for you to corroborate your findings is valid. Basically it is this.....when there is a hypothesis to analyse, you have to compare that hypotheseis with the known facts. If the known facts are as blunt as the total losses for the war, then we start from there. But usually the set can start from a much smaller starting point than that. Your Coral Sea example is an excellent example of that. We can deduce the total losses, then use the unit records to work backwards, and find out how those losses were sustained. But to undertake research that says that the losses were less than the accepted figure just has to be approached with a great deal of caution. Basing conclusions on unit details over known statistics and then coming to an alternative conclusion as to total losses is wrong, no matter how impressive the research. The only other plausible explanation is that the original statistic (ie the total losses sustained) is wrong, but then that raises a whole bevy of questions about historical facts. If the japanese didnt lose 100 aircraft at Coral Sea, then why wasnt Zuikaku at Midway. If the Japanese duidnt lose 16000 aircraft, then why did they only have 5000 aircraft and no experienced pilots at the end of the war. Historical constants ruin what appears to be a perfectly reasonable hypothesis.

Now, to test the veracity of your research, it would be impossible to check every combat of the war. The set is simply too big to undertake that research. So, in those circumstance, what should happen is what every researcher in other filelds is forced to do, they undertake random sampling from a set of examples where the losses are fairlly certain, and then use that research technique that you are using to see if it arrives at the known result. if it doesnt, for a significant number of the samples, then the statistical error in the technique can be determined. 

To be honest I dont understand why you do not want to subject your research to these control checks. its basic quality assurance when undertaking any of this sort of research. if the results dont tally with the known or generally accepted results, then the error factor in that research can be measured, and a truer more accurate estimate arrived at, or, if the research does stand up, then other reasons for the overall outcome need to be found. Say you found positively that only 50 aircraft were lost at Coral Sea, and ther is just no way this number could be wrong, then clearly the no show by zuikaku at Midway , has to be for other reasons other than the traditionally accepted shortage of aircraft.

This is how hypotheses become accepted facts. Because you refuse to corroborate your detailed research findings against accepted verification methods, people like me are going to continue to annoy you by questioning your findngs, because they remain uncorroborated and unproven. I genuinely apologize for that annoyance, but it is the only way I can suggest for your research to become useful. 

Regards

Michael


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## Njaco (Jul 25, 2010)

I not saying anybody is hijacking and I'm well aware that we must discuss "how many Zeroes Spitfires managed to down in the only campaign where those two types met in combat." But I'm starting to see negative comments calling into question one's research and such. I've seen this happen before. I get real sick and tired of how things go south when one disagrees with anothers opinion. I really don't want that here. Snide comments don't need to be said.

Now, you've just educated me for I was unaware there was only one "campaign" inwhich those types met. Can anyone elaborate further on that and why wasn't the Spit the dominant crate used by Commonwealth or UK forces in that region?


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## buffnut453 (Jul 25, 2010)

JoeB said:


> No I don't believe any were engaged in air combat, either, nor any P-39's or P-40's in the Darwin area in '43. But the claims in the 202nd's kodochosho include all those types, in Darwin area '43. The point I'm making is that you, or I, conclude this Japanese impression was mistaken based on published accounts in turn based on the unit records of the Allied fighters which actually did encounter the Zeroes (Spit Wing, as far as 1943 in Darwin area) and higher level Allied accounts saying which units were involved where. But in this particular case we have the same info from the Japanese side; detailed records of the fighter unit involved describing every combat the Allies recorded (except the one JAAF raid we also know), Navy bomber unit records saying the 202nd was their escort, air flotilla records and overall OOB info that also show it was the only fighter unit involved in JNAF operations v Darwin area. So there's no more basis to say other JNAF fighter units were involved than there is to say Buffalo's and P-43's were engaged in combat. In fact there's less basis, because there's nothing even from the Allied side that's inconsistent with the 202nd being the only fighter unit present on the Navy raids. So why is such a different standard of logic and proof applied to similar information from one side v the other? Consistent logic says that each side knew who it was sending up and who didn't come back, but had only unreliable impressions in the heat of combat about who the enemy was sending up and what damage it was inflicting on the enemy. Same with any other case.
> 
> Re: Njaco, you asked 'how did the Spitfires do'. I don't see how one could possibly answer that question without settling, to some reasonable degree of certainty, how many Zeroes Spitfires managed to down in the only campaign where those two types met in combat. If it's really true that the outcomes of these combats are seriously uncertain (they aren't, but for argument's sake let's say they were) I don't see how you could possibly say whose tactics worked.
> 
> Joe



Joe,

I wasn't arguing, it just wasn't clear from your post. I have no detailed knowledge of IJN or RAAF operations over Darwin, except that 1 PRU was operating from there as a "forward" operating base.

Cheers,
Mark


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## Nikademus (Jul 25, 2010)

Njaco said:


> I knew this would happen. I'm asking for tactics not statistics. I'm curious how the Spit plots fared against the Japanese as I never really considered it. Did the various Mks of Spits yield different tactics against the Zero or did the Zero have a superiority that only good piloting by Commonwealth pilots could overcome it? And YEs I understand that kill ratios can give a perspective on that outcome but, come on, kill claims are ALWAYS suspect and can only give a general idea of the whole picture.
> 
> If this thread degrades into name-calling and underhanded sarcasm, I will close it.



There wern't alot of Spitfire vs. Zero contests outside of Darwin. Spitfires faced the Ki-43 however on many occasions in Burma and India and the two planes had similar characteristics. The tactics used for the best chance of success (or at least not getting shot down......re: the Shores comments about the "tactical standoff" achieved in places in early 1944)

Your point on kill ratios is well made, it gives an idea but it doesn't explain the why and i've seen such ratios used to justify a wide variety of arguments. Ironically the RAF itself was very confused over what was going on in the PTO and CBI theater and sent a troubleshooter in mid 43 to find out why the Hurricane was faring so poorly in the CBI. I'll reprint the exerpt from Wg Cmdr Paul Richie's report below from Shores Vol III....it does touch on tactics and while it is focused on the Hurricane, it would equally apply to the Spitfire. The report is damning in that Ritchie saw no reason why the Hurricane should not at least be competetive given it's similar strengths to other 1st generation Allied warplanes (p40/Wildcat). 

_
"It is considered however, that the Air Staff has played ostrich for long enough in this matter of the respective points of the Hurricane and the 01 [Ki-43]. If everyone, form the pilots to the AOC-in-C is agreed that Japanese fighters have our fighters at a disadvantage in certain circumstances let it be admitted and let steps be taken to avoid those circumstances. No useful purpose can be served by telling the pilots that they have the best equipment in the world, and because they know they have not and will merely regard the Air Staff as a bunch of nit-wits.

Rather let this be our line: The Japanese fighters have good and bad points. Our own fighters have good and bad points. A comparison of the Japanese Army 01 and the British Hurricane makes it obvious from the start that in a certain type of fighting, the Japanese fighter should come off best. On the other hand, in another kind of fighting we should come off best. This is borne out by experience: The Japs can dog-fight better than we can; however, they are more lightly armed and need to get in good long bursts against our heavily armored aircraft before they can shoot them down. Their manoeuvrability enables them to do this if we try and dog-fight them. On the other hand, one short accurate burst from a Hurricane usually causes the disintegration of an 01 - and the Hurricane is faster. All this being so, the obvious thing to do is to work out tactics to give ourselves the maximum advantage. We won't dog-fight. We will only attack from above, diving and firing a short burst before climbing again. If we are caught out and are below the Japs or at their level we will immediately take steps to reverse this situation by diving away and climbing up before attacking again. We will defeat the Japs by cleverness.
_

Ritchie's report was not well received in higher circles in charge of the RAF in the CBI and some of his points were hotly disputed. Shores' notes that Ritchie's arguments mirrored that of Chennaults in 1941. Despite this analysis, the Hurricane would continue to fare poorly in the region till war's end. The spitfire did much better, but arguably not as well as it's technical superiority might have indicated. Using the right tactics certainly is a solid base to start but it isn't always as easly to do in practice and some of the enemy Sentais were very good pilots and they continued to fight competetively against both airforces despite being increasingly outgunned and outnumbered in the region.


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## JoeB (Jul 25, 2010)

parsifal said:


> 1. Your Coral Sea example is an excellent example of that. We can deduce the total losses, then use the unit records to work backwards, and find out how those losses were sustained. But to undertake research that says that the losses were less than the accepted figure just has to be approached with a great deal of caution. Basing conclusions on unit details over known statistics.
> 
> 2. If the japanese didnt lose 100 aircraft at Coral Sea, then why wasnt Zuikaku at Midway.
> 
> ...


1. The fundamental flaw in your argument, though it sounds reasonable in isolation, is that there is no 'accepted figure' for JNAF losses in the 1943 Darwin raids in contrast to what the Japanese records say. Besides the results in the Japanese records, there are only Allied claims, oh and one recovered wreck of a Zero (Sakai's May 10) that the Japaense also recorded as lost. People may 'accept' one sided claims in the everyday sense of the word, but claims are never 'accepted figures' in any serious historical sense. And there's no 'accepted' maximum value of overclaim ratio that means a certain number of claims *must* represent at least some minimum of real losses. Again, the Spit claims v Zeroes over Darwin were highly overstated, more than average in Pacific War, but not the highest overclaims ever seen. 

2. There could have been many reasons Zuikaku didn't show up at Midway as far as the Allies knew during the war. The 'accepted figure' of rough losses of J-aircraft at Coral Sea came from the Japanese after the war, in estimates by officers interviewed by USSBS. It's not in fact vastly at odds with what the carrier groups records say, as naturally it wouldn't be, being from the same basic place.

3. There is no direct interlocking logical connection between the 202nd's detailed records for the Darwin operation, and how many planes the USN downd in the whole Pacific War. But if it's just a matter of generally picturing the situation where one air group could lose only 4 a/c over a few months of low intensity operations but the JNAF/JAAF lost (presumably) some fair % of 16k a/c to the USN in air combat over the whole war, the situation was: Japanese fighter units often suffered a lot more heavily than 202nd at Darwin in 1943, the 202nd itself was wiped out in a few months of combat following the Darwin op; Japanese non-fighters usually suffered worse; the air war got bigger and higher in intensity from the latter part of 43, even the Darwin raids were at a very relaxed pace compared to Guadalcanal campaign (where multiple land and carrier units lost 115 Zeroes in air combat, 188 to all causes Aug 7-Nov 15, per JNAF records) but the Guadalcanal campaign was still small compared to 1944-5 campaigns; the Japanese suffered heavy losses of a/c on the ground, at sea and operationally, especially in the later campaigns. But, in other operations of early war Japanese fighter units often suffered light losses while inflicting much heavier ones on Allied fighters, that is not at all unique to 1943 Darwin.

4. Again back to points 1 and 2. If one chooses to reject what's in the detailed Japanese operational records of the Darwin combats one by one, there is no 'known result' for Japanese losses in the Darwin operation. And this is true in general: very seldom are there 'known results' of losses for the opposing side in particular combats or campaigns other than from the opposing side. And as far as the thing about 'consistency' of combat reports of particular combats with total production and losses of that air arm for the whole war, again, have you checked the 'consistency' of the action by action Spitfire air combat losses at Darwin with total Spitfire V production and losses to all causes for the whole war? I just don't get the logic of that point, and in any case it seems to be applied in an obviously inconsistent manner between sides.

Joe


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## Njaco (Jul 25, 2010)

Are you guys saying that the Spitfire was only operational over Darwin during 1943 in the whole PTO / CBI? Or is that the only time it met the Zero in combat. I'm not very well versed in that area of the war but if this is the case, why wasn't the premire fighter for the RAF used more in that threatre?


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## JoeB (Jul 25, 2010)

Njaco said:


> Are you guys saying that the Spitfire was only operational over Darwin during 1943 in the whole PTO / CBI? Or is that the only time it met the Zero in combat. I'm not very well versed in that area of the war but if this is the case, why wasn't the premire fighter for the RAF used more in that threatre?


As others referred to, the Spifire was used in Burma, but it never met the Zero there. Seafires met Zeroes in at least one real fighter combat on offensive escort mission, the last day of the war. Other claims by Seafires v Zeroes were in close in defense of carriers and quite possibly kamikazes. In the final battle Aug 15 '45, one Seafire was lost v claim of 7 Zeroes destroyed. Only 1 Zero was lost to a Seafire in known Japanese accounts of this action with another pilot WIA by a Seafire but able to land. These accounts are probably complete IMO, but not as certainly complete as in case of the Darwin campaign. The units in question attributed a number of other losses to USN F6F's, which were in the same furball combat at the same time and made numerous claims as well. The Spitfire wasn't used elsewhere in the theater.

Joe


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## Njaco (Jul 25, 2010)

> The Spitfire wasn't used elsewhere in the theater.



Why was that? I would have thought that it would be the main British fighter against the Japanese or were the US fighters handling the situation so there was no need for the RAF?


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## renrich (Jul 25, 2010)

One reason the Spitfire was not widely used in the CBI was it's short range. Also a lot of the Allied use of fighters in the CBI was in the air to ground role which was not really the Spit's forte.


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## Njaco (Jul 25, 2010)

Thanks Joe, Parsifal and Ren. I guess I'm just a bit ignorant about air ops in this area. I had always thought that while the Spit was the main fighter in the ETO for the UK, it would also continue that role in other theatres. Thanks.


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## parsifal (Jul 25, 2010)

To tie this whole discussion back to your original point though, Joes findings about the very poor exchange has to goad the rest of us into working out why there was such a poor exchange rate in the theatre. At the rates Joe is asserting, it was significantly worse than at the beginning of the war, when zeroes were flying against poorer quality pilots, the allies did not have a numerical advantage, had radar, and the best pilots in the RAAF. Apart from exposing Caldwell as a liar, it means that all the tactical concepts we have accepted as transferring the advantage to the allies were not applicable to the Spitfire equipped units.

This is why I was interrogating Joe. He doers not want to say what his material means, but the obvious conclusion to draw is that for the Spitfires in the pacific, and the men that flew them something was wrong, very wrong. 


So, as an adjunct to the original question, one conclusion to draw is that whatever tactics were being employed by the allies, they were not working....


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## Wildcat (Jul 26, 2010)

Njaco said:


> Are you guys saying that the Spitfire was only operational over Darwin during 1943 in the whole PTO / CBI? Or is that the only time it met the Zero in combat. I'm not very well versed in that area of the war but if this is the case, why wasn't the premire fighter for the RAF used more in that threatre?



Apart from the handful of combats over Darwin, RAAF spitfires were never in a position to activley engage Zero's in air to air combat. Because of lack of range, Darwin based Spitfires were restricted to interception missions in that region. The same is true for 79sqn RAAF in the Pacific. It was based at Kiriwina from August 1943, by this time most Japanese aerial opposition was to be found at Rabaul on New Britain and several bases on the North Coast of New Guinea. Both areas outside of the squadrons range. During the big raids against Rabaul in Oct-Nov 43, the squadrons role was that of CAP over Kiriwina as US 5th AF bombers refuelled there, 79sqn did fly sweeps over New Britain at this time however, Rabaul (where the Zero's were), was out of range.
When the now MKVIII equipped Spitfires came together under the RAAF’s 1st TAF at Morotai in late 44-early 45, Japanese aerial opposition was pretty much none existent. The last few months of the war only saw a handful of twin engine types fall to Aussie Spitfires, who were by now employed almost exclusively in the ground attack role.


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## Wildcat (Jul 26, 2010)

Njaco said:


> Why was that? I would have thought that it would be the main British fighter against the Japanese or were the US fighters handling the situation so there was no need for the RAF?



AFAIK apart from some (2?) Australian based transport units, the RAF was represented by only three squadrons in the whole PTO. All three (54, 548 549) were Spitfire units and all based at Darwin. Apart from a few strafing missions flown by these squadrons, 54 was the only one to see aerial combat as part of No1 FW during 43-44. Infact 54 squadron holds the destinction as being the first and last Darwin based Spitfire unit to shoot down an enamy aircarft - both being Ki-46's.


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## Nikademus (Jul 26, 2010)

Njaco said:


> Why was that? I would have thought that it would be the main British fighter against the Japanese or were the US fighters handling the situation so there was no need for the RAF?




Similar reason that the Spitfire arrived late to Malta and N.A. Priority. Fighter Command had first dibs on Spitfires.....then starting in 1942, the Med. received a few squadrons. PTO/CBI remained third priority. Another reason was that up through 1943, the Hurricane was considered good enough (on paper at least) to face the expected opposition in the CBI. That this turned out not to be the case is why Cmdr Ritchie was sent to the CBI to make an accessment. Eventually pilot demands for Spitfires was granted.


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## Nikademus (Jul 26, 2010)

parsifal said:


> To tie this whole discussion back to your original point though, Joes findings about the very poor exchange has to goad the rest of us into working out why there was such a poor exchange rate in the theatre. At the rates Joe is asserting, it was significantly worse than at the beginning of the war, when zeroes were flying against poorer quality pilots, the allies did not have a numerical advantage, had radar, and the best pilots in the RAAF. Apart from exposing Caldwell as a liar, it means that all the tactical concepts we have accepted as transferring the advantage to the allies were not applicable to the Spitfire equipped units.
> 
> This is why I was interrogating Joe. He doers not want to say what his material means, but the obvious conclusion to draw is that for the Spitfires in the pacific, and the men that flew them something was wrong, very wrong.
> 
> ...



Using Shores', I found that the earlier war exchange rate between the K-43 and Hurricane was worse than later in the war over Burma.

SRA/early Burma - (1942) 6.3:1 vs. 5.2:1 in favor of Ki-43

As to the why.....I think training and environment had alot to do with it. Early efforts (Malaya/Sumatra) were hampered by poor organization and lack of early warning. (This impacted the other airforces in the area similarily) Over Burma the wide geographical area allowed many opportunities for ambush on Hurricane patrols and ground attack missions. The tactics that were used are highly suspect, as Col Ritchie's report attests too. RAF pilot drafts tended to be very much on the green side. A similar problem existed in the Med. Arrival of Spitifres coupled with repeated requests for more experienced pilots and squadron leaders co-incided.


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## renrich (Jul 26, 2010)

Using info from Shores, it was stated many times by the British that the Hurricane was not up to defeating the Japanese fighters which would mainly be the Ki43. From what I have read in the BOB, the Hurricane was more suitable than the Spitfire for a turning fight in the horizontal. My guess is that the Spitfire pilots first in combat with Japanese fighters thought they were going against a second rate opponent with second rate AC and that the superb flying qualities of the Spitfire would make it a "piece of cake" They were rapidly disabused of that notion. I believe that the US pilots went through that same cycle, except that they did not have the handicap of being arrogant because they had "vanquished" the vaunted LW in the BOB.


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## buffnut453 (Jul 26, 2010)

The reason the Hurricanes fared so badly in Burma is because in virtually all their tactical engagements with Ki-43s, the Japanese fighters had a great numerical advantage and usually had an altitude advantage as well. Inexperienced pilots and fighting a defensive campaign were more relevant than any supposed arrogance.


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## Nikademus (Jul 26, 2010)

buffnut453 said:


> The reason the Hurricanes fared so badly in Burma is because in virtually all their tactical engagements with Ki-43s, the Japanese fighters had a great numerical advantage and usually had an altitude advantage as well. Inexperienced pilots and fighting a defensive campaign were more relevant than any supposed arrogance.




I'd have to disagree in regards to the Japanese almost always having a numerical advantage in Burma. In regards to altitude advantage, it varied but if the Oscar drivers spotted the British patrol first, they'd endevor to gain alt advantage before engaging. As time went by in the Theater it was the Japanese who found themselves more and more at a numerical disadvantage. It's a common notion that the Japanese were one trick pony drivers, always seeking low speed dogfights. In reality they would attempt bounces/energy attacks if possible. The Ki-43 (like the Zero) had an advantage here in it's quick ability to change it's energy state.


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## buffnut453 (Jul 26, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> I'd have to disagree in regards to the Japanese almost always having a numerical advantage in Burma. In regards to altitude advantage, it varied but if the Oscar drivers spotted the British patrol first, they'd endevor to gain alt advantage before engaging. As time went by in the Theater it was the Japanese who found themselves more and more at a numerical disadvantage. It's a common notion that the Japanese were one trick pony drivers, always seeking low speed dogfights. In reality they would attempt bounces/energy attacks if possible. The Ki-43 (like the Zero) had an advantage here in it's quick ability to change it's energy state.



My statement was drawn from an analysis of every Hurricane -vs- Ki-43 engagement in Burma for the period May 1942-December 1943. The Hurricanes were outnumbered because the Japanese could select the time and location of their attacks and hence concentrate force as required. Therefore, although the RAF outnumbered the IJAAF taken across the Burma theatre, the Japanese were able to concentrate their fighter force which the RAF, due to lack of early warning, could not meet on equal terms. I posted my findings on a discussion of the relative combat effectiveness of Mohawks and Hurricanes in Burma. http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/underappreciated-aircraft-wwii-24094-11.html#post658779


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## JoeB (Jul 26, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> Using Shores', I found that the earlier war exchange rate between the K-43 and Hurricane was worse than later in the war over Burma.
> 
> SRA/early Burma - (1942) 6.3:1 vs. 5.2:1 in favor of Ki-43


I think the most significant point is that the exchange ratio didn't change a lot from 42 to 43, whether higher in one year or other (I found it slightly worse in '43 for Hurricane-only than in '42 but anyway similar in both years). This tends to undermine at least some of the explanations of '42 lack of succes like insecure (from even threat of being over run on the ground) airfields, lack of early warning, numbers* , shock, new opponent etc. But the Darwin Spit results fit in more or less, a bit more puzzling because a superior a/c to the Hurricane but as we all know a/c are only a limited part of the equation, and there's statistical variation; these samples are too small to say 5 v 6 to 1 is significant, though it's extremely statistically significantly different than 1:1 at such a sample size. 

I think one general point is that the narrative of declining Japanese and increasing Allied fighter effectiveness tends to gets oversimplified, and accelerated, as in Japanese fighter turn to pumpkins somewhere around mid 42, way overstated. Units like 64th Sentai in Burma were no less effective in 43 than 42, likewise apparently the 202nd Air Group, at least till it (or a significant levy of its pilots) reached the cauldron of Rabaul at the end of '43. And AVG and USAAF P-40 record in Burma v the Type 1 in 42 and 43 were also similar. In fact if counting USAAF P-38's and P-51A's relatively small but relatively unsuccesful ops escorting raids to Rangoon in late '43, USAAF in '43 in Burma was less successful v the Type1 than AVG had been by my count (though it's still north of 2:1 in USAAF's favor, again just what the sources show, and not trying to intensify the national element of it, just making the point that it didn't change much from 42 through end of 43).

*I also don't agree about numbers favoring the Japanese in '43 in Burma either, many or most combats were at least close in numbers, and inferiority in numbers in a particular engagement is still a puzzling explanation for a very bad exchange ratio by a faster a/c; Bf109F's were consistently heavily outnumbered in Western Desert racking up high kill ratio in their favor often in deliberately small formations; some USAAF P-38 groups likewise sent out 4 plane missions on purpose into hornet's nest of superior numbers of Japanese a/c in 1944 in SWPA. It was selected experienced pilots, for example the P-38 4's might include Bong *and* McGuire, and it was a ballsy tactic, but by no means suicidal. If things got too hot, they'd run. The Spits outnumbered the Zeroes on average in the Darwin ops, though not by a great deal. I doubt numbers is a huge part of the answer here.

Joe


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## JoeB (Jul 26, 2010)

parsifal said:


> Apart from exposing Caldwell as a liar, it means that all the tactical concepts we have accepted as transferring the advantage to the allies were not applicable to the Spitfire equipped units.


I'm not familiar with everything Caldwell ever said, but high overclaims don't necessarily mean lying. The feeling that one must either reject loss evidence in complete detailed, then secret enemy records, or else be calling some pilot a liar for his claims, leads to a lot of illogical arguments about claim v loss research, IME, not speaking particularly of this case or even just WWII. This was the whole longrunning theme of the internet debate between AVG fans and at least one AVG veteran v Dan Ford's book* , or Soviet claims v US losses in Korea; another often bitter debate. The people on one side seem to feel they must either call 'their guys', liars or else insist the old enemy is still trying to torture their beloved homeland with these 'phoney' lowball accounts of his losses. Shooting the messenger can be a compromise position. 

I wasn't born yesterday and of course realize that some overclaims were lies. Lying is part of human nature, especially when it doesn't seem likely you'll be caught in the lie, and a detailed accounting using enemy records must have seemed very remote, if ever considered, by pilots who might be killed on the next mission. But since it's usually impossible to prove the reasons for overclaims, and tends to be a toxic subject, I favor leaving the veracity issue alone, as a rule.

*"Flying Tigers" , or IOW v. Senshi Sosho Vol 34 basically, also Shores et al's main source for Japanese losses in Bloody Shambles 1 and 2, official history of JAAF in the early campaigns, not as ironclad a source as JNAF original unit records, not as many of the Army's survived. Although OTOH research among veterans by people like Shambles co-author Izawa makes it clear there weren't all kinds of 'unknown' additional pilot KIA's besides those mentioned in that book. I see no reason to doubt the basic info in that book, where given in detail; and in any case, what's sauce for the goose... any Allied units or air arms one might compare would all presumably suffer equally from incompletely reported losses in the book, if so in cases where the losses seem to be stated specifically and completely. In some cases losses aren't stated in SS v 34, but Allied losses in those combats obviously shouldn't be counted either in any evaluation of kill/loss. A potential flaw in English language narrative type books is that they often don't just come out and say that: 'no opposing account in this case'. You sometimes have to infer that from the wording, which is usually pretty clear, but not necessarily always.

Joe


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## proton45 (Jul 26, 2010)

This is interesting...


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## parsifal (Jul 27, 2010)

JoeB said:


> I'm not familiar with everything Caldwell ever said, but high overclaims don't necessarily mean lying. The feeling that one must either reject loss evidence in complete detailed, then secret enemy records, or else be calling some pilot a liar for his claims, leads to a lot of illogical arguments about claim v loss research, IME, not speaking particularly of this case or even just WWII. This was the whole longrunning theme of the internet debate between AVG fans and at least one AVG veteran v Dan Ford's book* , or Soviet claims v US losses in Korea; another often bitter debate. The people on one side seem to feel they must either call 'their guys', liars or else insist the old enemy is still trying to torture their beloved homeland with these 'phoney' lowball accounts of his losses. Shooting the messenger can be a compromise position.
> 
> I wasn't born yesterday and of course realize that some overclaims were lies. Lying is part of human nature, especially when it doesn't seem likely you'll be caught in the lie, and a detailed accounting using enemy records must have seemed very remote, if ever considered, by pilots who might be killed on the next mission. But since it's usually impossible to prove the reasons for overclaims, and tends to be a toxic subject, I favor leaving the veracity issue alone, as a rule.
> 
> ...



I think in this case it would have to be state that Caldwell was deliberately hiding the truth. He claimed 6.5 kills whilst based in Darwin, of which I think two were claimed as zeroes. He was the wing commander at the time, so would have had to endorse and sign off on the after action reports, on which the claims were made. It gets worse. I remeber more than 20 years ago trolling through various after action reports at the Australian war memorial and distinctly recall seeing some of the reports from the Spitfire Wing. In those reports there are references to wreckage of downed Japanese aircraft beiung found, confirmed kills, and other similar reports. I forget the numbers of zeroes claimed, but it was a lot. It is reasonable to join the dots and assume that some of the references Japanese wreckage would include references to crashed Zero wreckage. But if your figures are correct, this must all be a fabrication.

There are some subtle indicators that Caldwell was not being truthful in his reports to his superiors. At the time there was considerable disquiet about the losses being sustained by Caldwells command, which just happened to be one of the premier fighter wings in the RAAF. It would be natural under those circumstances for Caldwell, by then a celebrated war hero to gild the lily to protect his reputation. 

After his tour was completed, Caldwell was sent south to take over a training command. He then returned to active duty on Moratai, where he was a leading participant in the "Moratai Mutiny". Because of his wartime reputation his part in this affair was glossed over and he got away with his insubordination. However soo after that he was caught at the center of a whiskey bootlegging operation, supplying sly grog to nearby American units. This time he was court martialled. He was busted down to the rank of Flight Lt which is how he finished the war. His end of the war behaviour displays some telling signs of a disillusioned pilot. There could be any number of reasons for this, but it is at least plausible that his behaviour in Darwin was a factor. 

This was why I was severely qustioning you research and wanted (and still do) to approach the issue from a different perspective to make sure of your assertions. It casts serious dispersions on the top scoring ace of the RAAF in WWII


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## JoeB (Jul 28, 2010)

parsifal said:


> I remeber more than 20 years ago trolling through various after action reports at the Australian war memorial and distinctly recall seeing some of the reports from the Spitfire Wing. In those reports there are references to wreckage of downed Japanese aircraft beiung found, confirmed kills, and other similar reports. I forget the numbers of zeroes claimed, but it was a lot. It is reasonable to join the dots and assume that some of the references Japanese wreckage would include references to crashed Zero wreckage. But if your figures are correct, this must all be a fabrication.


I'll be lazy here and not give the details, but relative number of claimed v actually downed (per Japanese records) a/c was less out of line when it came to the bombers, especially if counting crashlanded bombers (though OTOH the Spitfires were not claiming they caused bombers to crashland 500 miles later in Timor but claiming they'd downed them outright), and pretty accurate as far as claims of lone recon a/c, a typical pattern actually. Overall IIRC it was an overclaim of between 3 and 4:1 which is really nothing special. For fighters alone it is pretty out of line, though again not unmatched even so.

As far as wrecks, the list I gave of all damage with number of hits I haven't seen that in print, but the outright loss data has been in (English language) print for quite awhile. I think we would have heard by now if specific wreck evidence showed outright losses the Japanese didn't record, and we'd be debating whether those specific conflicts in info indicated false wreck evidence or false Japanese records. But I've never heard of it. The only specific wreck evidence claims I know of, for the 1943 campaign correspond to real Japanese losses; K. Sakai's Zero on May 10 '43, and a few bomber wrecks; for example Baeza has a photo of a wreck of Army Type 97 Heavy Bomber (Sally) loaded on a truck, a/c recorded lost in the June 20 raid. Then there's the ground to air photo of Yamanaka's a/c leaking fuel, indicating its likely loss, but again it was recorded as a loss. A lot of the combat was over water, and the two other outright Zero losses the 202nd recorded didn't show up as wrecks, AFAIK.

Coincidentally, both the other examples I gave of bitter claim/loss debates have featured the claiming side's proponents attacking the other side's records by way of supposed wreck evidence. But in AVG's case the claim of verification of 'all' their claims by Allied (Chinese) observors is not backed up by much at all; a lot or even most AVG claims weren't even over China! And w/ Soviets in Korea, not to threadjack into the more complicated answer there, the bottomline is Soviet wreck reports don't establish any losses the US didn't record, not that I've ever found looking at the question quite closely. In fact I know of no case in air war history (though happy to expand my knowledge and learn of one) where solid, specific wreck evidence on one side showed losses the opposing side had failed to record in then-secret records; or even showed that widely accepted orders of battle of one side were actually incomplete.

Joe


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## Njaco (Jul 28, 2010)

Great stuff guys!

Concerning using wreckage as claims - wouldn't that be rather difficult for this theatre as opposed to others based upon the terrain and water areas? Jungle and ocean can hide a lot and my point is I would think it would be VERY dfficult to verify in those conditions. Maybe some leeway is needed here?


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## parsifal (Jul 29, 2010)

In the same way that I am cautious of the allied claims on shoot downs, I must confess that I have my doubts about the veracity of the japanese records, though far less so (since they are recording losses). During the war the Japanese had a very peculiar attitude to losses, they equated it to a loss of honour if they were in command of that formation. I cannot make any informed claims on the 202nd, and am looking for an explanation more than anything. But during the war I can think of some very famous occasions when the records were falsified by the japanese, and this didnt just happen at the top end of town, it occurred even at the tactical level. Some of the occasions that come to mind include withholding the losses at Midway, advising of the capture of Henderson which led directly to Santa Cruz, the faulty reports on gains, AND losses during Yammomotos final air offensive in 1943, and again the same behaviour on Guam by the local air commander during Philipinnes Sea. There are literally dozens of these episodes, so why is it assured that the japanese records are competely honest and correct here? 

A small point Joe, if I could beg your indulgence. You stated earlier that the only unit involved in the fighting over Darwin was the 202 kokutai, yet we have a number of army types being lost over Darwin, the latest being that type 97 you mentioned. I dont get it, how can army bombers be getting lost if there were no army formations over darwin to be shot at?


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## parsifal (Jul 29, 2010)

NJ

We will eventually get to discussing tactics I hope, but I agree, this discussion is very interesting


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## Wildcat (Jul 29, 2010)

parsifal said:


> A small point Joe, if I could beg your indulgence. You stated earlier that the only unit involved in the fighting over Darwin was the 202 kokutai, yet we have a number of army types being lost over Darwin, the latest being that type 97 you mentioned. I dont get it, how can army bombers be getting lost if there were no army formations over darwin to be shot at?



The 20th June raid was flown by Army bombers and 59th Sentai Oscars.


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## Timppa (Jul 29, 2010)

parsifal said:


> But during the war I can think of some very famous occasions when the records were falsified by the japanese, and this didnt just happen at the top end of town, it occurred even at the tactical level. Some of the occasions that come to mind include withholding the losses at Midway, advising of the capture of Henderson which led directly to Santa Cruz, the faulty reports on gains, AND losses during Yammomotos final air offensive in 1943, and again the same behaviour on Guam by the local air commander during Philipinnes Sea. There are literally dozens of these episodes, so why is it assured that the japanese records are competely honest and correct here?



If the Japanese falsified the loss reports sent to their superiors , then where the "correct" numbers come from ?


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## parsifal (Jul 29, 2010)

I expect that eventually the truth comes to the surface, at least for the big foobars. But for the smaller stuff......I dont know. I am waiting for Joe to make comment.


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## Nikademus (Jul 29, 2010)

Midway is a bit of a red Herring for an example of falsification. The sheer scale of the disaster and it's implications to the nation (not to mention the impact it would have had on civilian morale) were the motivators for the cover up. Aircraft losses in tactical and operational enagements do not nearly equate to such a thing and there would be no pressing need for such covert consipiracies. The Japanese airforce was not interested in kill ratios anymore than the British were during the BoB. They were only concerned with mission success. Shores actually commented on the accuracy quesiton in vol3. Overall, he felt the Japanese records and claiming were well documented however, citing as an example the 64th Sentai in Burma who's diligence in claiming and recording losses was laudible. As an example of the exception he cited the 50th Sentai which Shores said you could tell how well the "mission" went by the accuracy of it 's claims. If the mission went well, (aka the escort did it's job), it's claims were fairly on the money (as best as any claim can be). If the escort preformed poorly, their claims proportionally shot up. He called this phenomenum "50th Sentai syndrome" in a rare display of dry humor by the author. Note that this obscuration of "facts" revolved around claims....not recorded losses. The Japanese overall were pretty good with tracking their own equipment. As the war turned badly for them and more inexperienced pilots got into the cockpits it was the success claims that got ridiculous.


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## JoeB (Jul 29, 2010)

parsifal said:


> 1. But during the war I can think of some very famous occasions when the records were falsified by the japanese, and this didnt just happen at the top end of town, it occurred even at the tactical level. Some of the occasions that come to mind include withholding the losses at Midway, advising of the capture of Henderson which led directly to Santa Cruz, the faulty reports on gains, AND losses during Yammomotos final air offensive in 1943, and again the same behaviour on Guam by the local air commander during Philipinnes Sea. There are literally dozens of these episodes, so why is it assured that the japanese records are competely honest and correct here?
> 
> 2. A small point Joe, if I could beg your indulgence. You stated earlier that the only unit involved in the fighting over Darwin was the 202 kokutai, yet we have a number of army types being lost over Darwin, the latest being that type 97 you mentioned. I dont get it, how can army bombers be getting lost if there were no army formations over darwin to be shot at?


1. In none of those cases is it shown that the Navy's own records didn't show what they perceived to have to happened, and perception of one's own losses is naturally accurate (perception of damage done to the enemy is OTOH much more subject to error). The Japanese Navy delayed telling other Japanese govt agencies, notably the Army, about their carrier losses at Midway. But their own combat reports demonstrably record those losses, have the losses of personnel in detail, also losses of a/c in air actions prior to the loss of of all of them when the ships sank. That's how we know that stuff in detail, how else? The USN at the time, in conjunction with USAAF (B-17's etc), claimed a lot more sinkings at Midway than occurred. We're just not used to debating ship sinking claims and losses because Japanese accounts of the actual ship losses were analyzed and basically officially accepted as the reality, by the Joint Army Navy Commission report in the US, in the late 40's. JANAC has some errors since corrected, or still debated in a few minor cases, but actual war time claims of sinkings were much higher.

This is similar to your Coral Sea point before: you are referring to actual results gotten basically *from Japanese Navy records*, stuff that wasn't and couldn't be known from any other source, but then using that to challenge Japanese records. There's a basic logical problem with that argument. 

On the other cases mistaken belief in the capture of Henderson was a typical 'fog of war' episode in land combat nothing to do with the accuracy of air unit records. You'll have to give more info and sources on supposed falsified losses, *in IJN's own then-secret records*, which is what we're reviewing here for 202nd Air Group, not what the Navy said to the Japanese public or Army or Cabinet, re 1943 raids in Solomons.

Allied press release stats during WWII often neglected to mention losses, or fully so, but the losses were in their actual secret records.

2. I wrote repeatedly, the 202nd was the only fighter unit inolved in the *Navy's* raids on Darwin. The Army flew one escorted raid which was intercepted, June 20 1943, without the Navy, according to both, and that raid was also in the list in my detailed post. On one other occasion, Sept 7, 202nd Zeroes, only, flew cover for Army Type 100 Hq Recon planes and fought Spits. The 59th Sentai was the only component of the Army's 7th Air Division within range of Australia that was equipped with single engine fighters (saw considerable fighter-figher action in the early campaigns, then based on DEI from mid 1942). The 7th Div's other fighter unit was the 5th Sentai equipped with Type 2 two-seat fighters (Nick) also encountered by Allied bombers over DEI, but not over Australia. On the June 20 raid, the 61st Sentai lost 2 out of 18 Type 100 Heavy Bomber ('Helen', Baeza's caption says the pretty shredded wreck of one was *mistakenly* ID'd as a 'Sally'), the 59th lost 1 out of 22 Type 1 Fighter (Lt. Kawata Shigeto MIA). Another Type 100 Bomber was destroyed on crashlanding at base, and 2 of 9 Type 99 Twin Engine Light Bombers (Lily) of 75th Sentai were 'good for scrap' after wheels-up landings. The Spits intercepted what they reported as 18 Betty's and 19 Hamps, and later chased what were believed to be Dinah's at low altitude (photo from AA position shows the Type 99's at low altitude), claimed 9 twin engine and 5 fighters destroyed for the loss of 2 Spitfires. Source of raid details is Baeza, other sources (like Hata/Izawa's history of JAAF fighter units) agree on career of 59th Sentai and lack of other Army fighter units in that area at the time.

Joe


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## Wildcat (Aug 2, 2010)

Chris here is a RAAF report dated May 1943 - May be of some interest to you?

source - National Archives of Australia


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## Glider (Aug 2, 2010)

Excellent.


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## Njaco (Aug 2, 2010)

Wildcat, thats awesome!!!


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## renrich (Aug 3, 2010)

Very interesting and it shows why the advice, " Never fight the Zero at below 250 mph is much easier said than done!"


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## parsifal (Aug 4, 2010)

Yes, I agree that Wildcats post is very revealing and interesting. Just remember that the author of this report is none other than Clive Caldwell.....

On the face of it, the advice being given in this memo was either not followed by the Spitfire Wing , or it did not help, since the exchange rates for the Spitfire Wing at this midpoint in the war were considerably worse than the exchange rates at the beginbning of the war, when allied pilots were flying types such as the P-36 and the Buffalo. The most plausible explanations that i can think of are

1) The records on which the verified losses are based have some errors or omissions in them. Joe has emphatically denied this, but still has also confirmed by the very nature of his replies that cross checking of the stated figures cannot (or will not) be undertaken. We are apparently stuck with accepting the losses stated in the japanese records as gospel truth......

2) The Pilots of the Spitfire wing were not following the advice being given in this report

3) There were other reasons at issue that was causing the high loss rate for the Spits. I suspect lack of endurance (and subsequent ditching) might be the main culprit.


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## billswagger (Aug 4, 2010)

> 3) There were other reasons at issue that was causing the high loss rate for the Spits. I suspect lack of endurance (and subsequent ditching) might be the main culprit.



I think it had more to do with the traditional tactics used by the Spitfire pilots.
What Caldwell says was also noticed and utilized by Chanault, but for some reason it took some time for those tactics to make it to the battle field. This is also largely due to training. A pilot trains to dogfight and then is thrown into battle utilizing only what he knows. Its not a surprise that many pilots failed against Zeros, not only Spitfires. I doubt range was such a big issue, or at least would not account for the number of losses seen.
It could be that the Spitfire also loses considerable turning performance at higher altitudes where often it was expected to perform against high flying bombers and Zeros.


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## buffnut453 (Aug 4, 2010)

Further to Parsifal's Point #3, what were the tactical conditions during the engagements? If the Spitfires were at a height disadvantage then it's perhaps not surprising they were bested by the Zeros. As with the thread on the Mohawk performance over Burma, it seems we're examining a relatively small number of actual combats and seeking to extrapolate them into some overall assessment of performance when, in reality, tactical conditions are a vital component. Numbers on both sides and their relative altitudes must be considered. I know nothing about the Spitfire engagements over Darwin but I've seen nothing in the posts thus far which describe where the Spitfires were when they engaged the Zeros. I think that information might prove most illuminating.

Cheers
Mark


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## JoeB (Aug 4, 2010)

parsifal said:


> 1) The records on which the verified losses are based have some errors or omissions in them. Joe has emphatically denied this, but still has also confirmed by the very nature of his replies that cross checking of the stated figures cannot (or will not) be undertaken. We are apparently stuck with accepting the losses stated in the japanese records as gospel truth......
> 
> 2) The Pilots of the Spitfire wing were not following the advice being given in this report
> 
> 3) There were other reasons at issue that was causing the high loss rate for the Spits. I suspect lack of endurance (and subsequent ditching) might be the main culprit.


1. I don't seek to keep picking at this, but you seem to insist, basically mischaracterizing my position as somehow unique to the Japanese. I've already asked you several times, and you never answered: how is this any different than the specific Spitfire losses in these specific operations we accept from their detailed combat reports of the units involved? I still haven't seen the 'cross check evidence', that's any different than Japanese case, the absolulte proof that other Spit units weren't present, or the accounting reconciliation between the losses reported in these specific combats by the Spits, and all Spitfire V production and inventory. Turning around your statement, we're 'stuck accepting the losses in Spit unit records as gospel truth'. No, we're going on the best info available, and in this case quite good info on both sides, original combat reports of the units involved, combined with solid higher level sources on each side saying they were the only units involved (as do the Japanese units reports also state).

In fact we're really tilting slightly in the Spits' favor just from the nature of a lot of their losses. We're talking the Spit combat reports at face value for non-air combat loss causes on missions in contact with the enemy, like prop problems and fuel (see 3, those are *not* counted in the numbes I gave). The pilots generally survived, and could quite plausibly have consciously or subconsicously mischaraterized the cause of their a/c's loss. In the Japanese case there are almost no such ambiguities, we're taking all 4 of the a/c lost by 202nd as combat cause. And, if more Zeroes were really shot down outright as claimed, those pilots would have had to have died. What were their names, and what training classes did they graduate from? (from the well known lists) That's a big logical obstacle that doesn't exist if somebody with the inverse of your attitude were to pointedly ask you to prove that some reported Spit fuel and prop pitch mechanism losses weren't really to Zeroes.

2. This is the big issue with 'boom and zoom' tactics instructions generally. When you make diving slashing passes at good fighter pilots, they will see you coming and turn, especially in an a/c with excellent visibliity like the Zero. Then you have to knock them down at high deflection angle, or you have to turn also. Very few pilots not intensively trained in deflection shooting could do the former reliably. The second leading P-38 ace Tommy McGuire was killed turning at low speed, as was leading P-47 ace of PTO, easier said than done, do as I say not as I do. Also, the Zero wasn't that much tremendously slower than the Spitfire in this practical case to present using hit and run tactics itself, the standard tactic of JNAF fighters as learned in China when the Zero was faster than all opponents, most common Zero tactic reported by F4F's in late 1942. 

Also, the same Zero unit had flown the same missions v Darwin in 1942. In one of those combats a well executed energy attack by P-40's knocked down 5 Zeroes (really). The pilots of the 202nd (some of whom were present in both campaigns) may have thought about this and made adjustments. If we accept the historical fact which unit was involved in this operation both years and think of them as real pilots, it's quite plausible they'd have thought of a better idea how to execute the same mission a year later.

And finally on hit and run tactics, it would seem intuitively that this would be a way to escalate overclaims, staying in direct contact with the target a shorter period of time.

3. Again the losses quoted for the Spits (26 in the combats v the Zeroes) do not include known fuel exhaustion losses, and counting Spit disappearances as non-combat has a big objectivity problem when we're not counting Japanese disappearances as non-combat. A/c which disappear in contact with enemy a/c, for which there are enemy claims, are reasonably counted as air combat losses as a general rule of objective air combat analysis IMO. As to the stated Spit fuel losses we are *not* counting as combat, again this is really a bit in favor of the Spits because we don't absolutely know that those a/c didn't suffer fuel leaks from hits the pilots weren't aware of or didn't mention, IOW we don't absolutely know they weren't like the 'fuel' loss of Zero May 10 (hit in fuel tank, ran out of gas on the way back). I'm not suggesting we add the stated fuel losses of Spits to the air combat category, but I think we're barking up the wrong tree to try to massage down the Spit combat loss number*, if we're to retain any semblence of objectivity.

*except from simply better and more detailed info than Price's account which I'm quoting, that of course would be completely fair, but I doubt he's very far off.

Joe


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## RCAFson (Aug 4, 2010)

To quote one of my earlier posts:



> So you are claiming that the average altitude of the IJAF bombers was the same in during the P40 and Spit defence of Darwin? For example the P40s greatest success was on April 25, 1942 when* 50 P40s* intercepted 24 bombers escorted by *9 Zeros*, with the bombers flying at 14-16000ft. Aces of the pacific, Hess, p13. Yet a year later, 34 Spitfires intercepted a raid where the "numbers were 18 bombers and 27 fighters" with the bombers at 27000ft and the fighters at 31000 ft. http://www.awm.gov.au/cms_images/histories/27/chapters/03.pdf It's pretty obvious that these are completely different tactical situations! BTW the first encounter for P40s against Zeros over Darwin went 10-1 in the Zeros favour...of the course the tactical situation heavily favoured the Zeros, but lets not get into messy details...



The Spitfires usually, were at a rough parity in terms of numbers versus the fighter escorts, while the earlier P40 defence often had an overwhelming advantage in numbers.


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## buffnut453 (Aug 4, 2010)

Sorry for missing that post RCAFSon. Do you happen to know the relative altitudes of the Zeros and Spits in their engagements? This may (or may not) be an interesting avenue of discussion and may shed light on why the Spit didn't do so well against the Zero.


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## RCAFson (Aug 4, 2010)

The general details of the attacks and RAAF/RAF defence can be found here:
http://www.awm.gov.au/cms_images/histories/27/chapters/03.pdf
http://www.awm.gov.au/cms_images/histories/27/chapters/04.pdf

I only know what I can pull from these sources.

For example on July 06 1943:



> _The three squadrons rendezvoused over Sattler at 6,000 feet and, wit h
> Caldwell in command in the centre, were directed by the ground controller
> to make for Batchelor . The enemy was then approaching the coast wel l
> south of Darwin near Anson Bay at a height of 20,000 feet . The slowness
> ...


http://www.awm.gov.au/cms_images/histories/27/chapters/04.pdf

The IJNAF usually flew above the bombers, so the Spitfires could only rarely achieve a useful altitude advantage over the escorts.

The extreme height of these attacks made interception difficult, and hampered the ability of the Spitifires to achieve local numerical superiority, as many aircraft dropped out due to engine problems (by mid 1943 many of the Spitfire engines were reaching the end of their service life) before intercepting and poor GCI hampered tactical coordination. 


Frpm other reading I discovered that the Spitfire V trop was, new, the lowest performing Spitfire of all, and in Darwin suffered from a number of problems when trying to make very high altitude intercepts, as the cannon often froze up, the engines were worn out and the CSU on the props were not engineered for high altitude work and often ran away when the oil froze.

Tthe IJNAF losses recorded above are based upon kill claims, but the RAAF/RAF losses are accurately recorded.


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## JoeB (Aug 4, 2010)

RCAFson said:


> To quote one of my earlier posts:
> The Spitfires usually, were at a rough parity in terms of numbers versus the fighter escorts, while the earlier P40 defence often had an overwhelming advantage in numbers.


 Since you’ve now spread the same misinformation to two threads it has to be corrected even if it's basically off topic on this one. The raid of April 25 1942 saw 11 of 50 P-40’s actually make contact with the Japanese formation which included 14 escorting Zeroes, 9 was the US side’s misestimation. The bombers were flying at 8km (26k ft), which was typical, and one reason for low numbers of P-40’s making contact on several of the raids, see below. See Baeza, pp. 101-103 for the correct details of this raid.

The 49th FG's combats over Australia in 1942, with numbers of fighters present and fighter losses, Darwin area v 3rd AG except as noted. Numbers of Allied a/c in contact includes contact with any enemy a/c in the attacking formation.
Source: Baeza
March 14, 1942 (Horn Island): 12 P-40’s v 12 Zeroes (4th AG); 1 P-40 and 2 Zeroes lost
March 30: 8 P-40’s v 12 Zeroes; 1 P-40 lost, 1 P-40 belly landed
April 4: 9 P-40’s v 6 Zeroes; 2 P-40’s damaged by Zeroes, downed by own AA on approach (right after Zeroes strafed the field)
April 25: 11 (making contact, of 50) P-40’s v 14 Zeroes; 1 P-40 belly landed on a beach, repaired, 1 Zero lost
April 27: 23 (making contact, of 50) P-40’s v 21 Zeroes, 4 P-40’s 
June 13: 10 (making contact, of 36) P-40’s v 33 Zeroes; 3 P-40’s
June 14: 12 (making contact, of 28 ) P-40’s v 25 Zeroes; 1 P-40
June 15: 28 P-40’s v 20 Zeroes; 2 P-40’s
June 16: 16 P-40’s v 24 Zeroes; 3 P-40’s
July 30: 27 (making contact, of 46) P-40’s v 27 Zeroes; 1 P-40, 1 Zero
August 23: 18 (making contact, of 36) P-40’s v 27 Zeroes; 1 P-40, 4 Zeroes*
Total: 174 P-40 sorties in contact w/ 221 Zero sorties; 19 P-40’s downed (including belly landings, not including own AA) v 8 Zeroes downed

The Spit Wing combats in 1943:
Source: Price, Baeza, kodochosho
March 2 1943: 26 Spits v 21 Zeroes (not all in contact either side, but no losses)
March 15: 19 (making contact, of 26?) Spits v 26 Zeroes; 4 Spits, 1 Zero 
May 2: 28 (making contact, of 47) Spits v 26 Zeroes; 14 Spits of which at least 5 were probably directly to air combat
May 10: (Stewart Field strafing) 5 Spits v 9 Zeroes; 1Spit crashlanded, 2 Zeroes
May 28: (Stewart Field) 6 Spits v 7 Zeroes; 2 Spits
June 20: (raid by JAAF)
June 28: 39 (making contact, of 42) Spits v 27 Zeroes; 2 Spits
June 30: 38 Spits v 27 Zeroes ; 5 Spits combat+2 engine failure
July 6: 33 (making contact of 36?) Spits v 27 Zeroes ; 6 Spits combat+ 2 engine failure
Sept 7: 48 Spits v 36 Zeroes; 3 Spits, 1 Zero
Total 242 Spit sorties in contact w/ 201 Zero sorties, 28 Spits air combat loss/crashlanding only** v 4 Zeroes downed

The Spit didn’t prove itself superior to the P-40 in fighter combat in this case, which was my original point on topic in the other thread, as one explanation why the Soviet opinion of the superiority of the P-39 to the Spit V, in another set of specific circumstances, was not totally beyond Allied experience. Note, if you need a lesson in basic logic, that statement doesn’t directly equate to ‘the P-40 proved itself superior in this case’.

* earlier, I said 5 Zeroes lost Aug 23 based on old notes on the Kagero series book “3rd/202nd AG”. Baeza says 4. I checked the kodochosho (C08051626300 pp.31-32). The disagreement might be about a 5th a/c which returned shot up, hit 12 times, …hmm but now that we’re looking at a *US* air unit’s claims maybe we’re not looking for ‘understatements’ of losses in the Japanese records anymore. Let’s call it 4!
**ISTR on an earlier thread *legitimate* debate with real sources by Wlidcat IIRC, not instant google/spamming, which quibbled with this total within a couple of a/c.

Joe


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## buffnut453 (Aug 4, 2010)

Joe,

Thanks for that really useful info - it's a very positive contribution to the discussion. Per my earlier post, do we have any data on the relative altitudes of the Zeros vs the P-40s and Spits in these engagements? I suspect the answer will either be a negative or, at best, limited to a percentage of the total engagements. However, I'd still be interested in learning what part altitude may have played in the engagements.

Kind regards,
Mark


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## RCAFson (Aug 5, 2010)

JoeB said:


> Since you’ve now spread the same misinformation to two threads it has to be corrected even if it's basically off topic on this one. The raid of April 25 1942 saw 11 of 50 P-40’s actually make contact with the Japanese formation which included 14 escorting Zeroes, 9 was the US side’s misestimation. The bombers were flying at 8km (26k ft), which was typical, and one reason for low numbers of P-40’s making contact on several of the raids, see below. See Baeza, pp. 101-103 for the correct details of this raid.



You are neglecting the 8 or 9 P40s lost, against 1 Zero loss on Feb 19.



> The next three weeks passed quietly before the Japanese attempted strike another blow at Darwin, and its defending airfields. By this time, three squadrons of the 49th PG would be ready and waiting for the the attack came on Anzac Day,* 25 April*, celebrated as a holiday Australia to commemorate the part its forces played in the Gallup campaign in 1915. Under the able leadership of Lt Col Paul Wurtsmith the 49th put up 50 P-40s in the early afternoon to intercept enemy bombers detected by radar approaching from the former Allied base Koepang, on Timor Island. One of the P-40 pilots was Java veteran Jim Morehead, leading the Yellow Flight of the 8th PS. He wrote this account of the action that ensued;
> 
> _'Climbing offshore, my flight was to the east, with Capt (Mitche Sims' flight to the west. We were all moving past Melville Island, north the mainland. We were approaching the service ceiling of the P-40, and I was offshore about 25, miles when *I saw a large Procession or enemy bombers below us at about 16,000 ft*. *I had rarely seen their bomber below us before this.* I called Cap Sims and asked if he wanted to make, the attack, or should I. I was nearer the enemy formation than Capt Sims was, and it was logical that I make the attack. To my great relief he said to go ahead. Recently, we had received a report of Japanese pilots doing aerobatics over PorT Moresby, New Guinea, for the benefit of our airmen there. I decided to do the same for the benefit of the Japanese airmen assembled below, and to build confidence in my green troops who, as yet, had seen no combat. As I built up speed in a slight dive, I did a slow roll, and continued rolling into the attack on a quartering angle off the port bow. The Zeros were speeding to cut us off, but they were too late.
> 
> ...


P40 Warhawk Aces of the Pacific, p29-30.

So the above is a first hand account of the April 25 intercept and the pilot makes it very clear that the bombers were not at 26000 ft. 






> _First priority naturally went to the defense of Allied bases, a burden which fell upon the fighter units at Moresby and Darwin.* Over both points the enemy bombers usually came in at 22,000 feet and above, too high for satisfactory interception by P-40's, P-39's, or P-400's, the only fighters available to the AAF in the Southwest Pacific, and their limitations seriously affected Allied operations.*64 During July the P-39 had made contact with enemy bombers only four times in a series of nine raids despite a thirty-minute warning; in sixteen actual contacts it never once enjoyed an altitude advantage and the Zero invariably could outclimb and outmaneuver this fighter, which suffered the additional disadvantage of increased vulnerability because of the location of its motor behind the pilot. The P-40 was somewhat better, but it, too, was outperformed by the more nimble enemy fighters, particularly at high altitudes. Inferior performance of their planes lowered the morale of the pilots.65 It was true that the Allied planes were more rugged and less inflammable, they could outdive the Zero, and if given warning to permit them to reach sufficient altitude they could achieve creditable scores, as they did on 30 July over Darwin when twenty-seven P-40's shot down six Zeros and two bombers at the cost of one P-40.66 But pilots continued to be frustrated, as on 17 August, when for the seventy-eighth time enemy bombers struck Moresby in an attempt to disable their favorite target, Seven-Mile Airdrome. Although defending fighters had received adequate warning, they were unable to intercept.
> _


HyperWar: The Army Air Forces in WWII: Vol. IV--The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan [Chapter 1]

This site has some info as well, but is a bit short on specifics.
Darwin's Few



> Total: 174 P-40 sorties in contact w/ 221 Zero sorties; 19 P-40’s downed (including belly landings, not including own AA) v 8 Zeroes downed
> Total 242 Spit sorties in contact w/ 201 Zero sorties, 28 Spits air combat loss/crashlanding only** v 4 Zeroes downed



What about the bombers? Wasn't shooting down the bombers the whole point of these intercepts?


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## claidemore (Aug 5, 2010)

Good question RCAFson,


> "What about the bombers? Wasn't shooting down the bombers the whole point of these intercepts?"


AFAIK CMIIW, in BoB, the loss ratio in fighters favored the 109 (vs the Hurricane and Spitfire), but the loss ratio in total aircraft (fighters and bombers) favored the RAF. Mission type has a lot to do with it.


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## Wildcat (Aug 5, 2010)

Joe, a minor correction to your figures. The June 28 raid was opposed by only 457 sqn with a total of 16 aircraft, the other squadron's failed to make contact.

To add to the Spitfire losses, here is a list I have compiled from the various ORB's. Take from it what you will.

15 Mar 43
Sgt Cooper - AR620 – 54 sqn – shot down – KIA
F/Sgt Varney –AR619 – 54 sqn – crashed after enemy action – DOW
S/L Thorold-Smith – BS231 – 452 sqn – shot down – KIA
F/O Lloyd – BS293 – 452 sqn – shot down – bailed out – pilot OK

2 May 43
F/O Farries – BR239 - 54 sqn – shot down – pilot OK
F/O Wall - BR572 - 54 sqn – ran out of fuel – bailed out – pilot OK
F/O Taylor – BS220 - 54 sqn – ran out of fuel – crashed short of airstrip – pilot OK
Sgt Spencer – BR536 - 54 sqn – ran out of fuel – force landed on beach – pilot OK
Sgt Cavangh – BR480 - 54 sqn – engine problems (before combat) – force landed on beach – pilot Ok
Sgt Fox – BS221 - 54 sqn – engine problems (before combat) – bailed out – pilot OK
F/O Goldsmith – BR526 – 452 sqn – shot down – pilot OK
P/O Fox – BS225 – 452 sqn – shot down – pilot OK
Sgt Nichterlein – BS226 – 452 sqn – force landed – pilot OK
F/O McNab – BS162 – 452 sqn – shot down – KIA
F/L Makin – BS191 – 452 sqn – force landed – pilot Ok
Sgt Stagg – BR547 – 452 sqn – engine failure – bailed out – pilot Ok
F/Sgt Hardwick – 457 sqn – engine over revved – bailed out – pilot Ok
F/O Gifford – 457 sqn – shot down – KIA

10 May 43
P/O Little – 457 sqn – hit ground whilst dog fighting – pilot Ok

28 May 43
F/O Blake – 457 sqn – shot down – KIA
F/OBeale – 457 sqn – shot down - KIA

20 Jun 43 – JAAF raid
F/O Hughes – JG795 - 54 sqn – force landed on beach – pilot OK
F/Sgt Rowe – BS174 – 452 sqn – shot down – KIA
F/O Mawer – BR548 – 452 sqn – crash landed due to enemy action – pilot OK
Sgt Nichterlein – EE607 – 452 sqn – shot down - KIA


28 Jun 43
F/O Cowell – EE608 – 452 sqn – force landed on beach due to glycol leak – pilot OK
F/O Halse - 457 sqn – engine over revved – crash landed – pilot Ok
F/O Clark – 457 sqn – crash landed after enemy action – pilot OK

30 Jun 43
P/O Wellsman – BR528 - 54 sqn – shot down – KIA
Sgt Laundy – BR490 - 54 sqn – crashed after combat – pilot OK
Sgt Holmes – BR530 – 54 sqn – crashed after combat – pilot OK
F/Sgt Harker – EE670 – 54 sqn – crashed after combat – pilot OK
F/O Lamerton – BR241 – 452 sqn – crash landed due to glycol leak – KIA
F/Sgt Cross – BR456 – 452 sqn – force landed due to enemy action – pilot Ok
F/Sgt Duncan – AR523 – 452 sqn – glycol leak – bailed out – pilot Ok

6 Jul 43
F/O Hinds – BR495 - 54 sqn – force landed due to glycol leak (before combat) – pilot OK
F/Sgt Wickman –JG731 – 54 sqn – shot down – pilot OK
F/L Makin – BS193 – 452 sqn – shot down – pilot OK
F/O Lloyd – BR549 – 452 sqn – shot down – bailed out – pilot OK
Sgt Richardson – BR237 – 452 sqn – engine failure – bailed out – pilot Ok
F/O Hamilton – 457 sqn – shot down – KIA
F/O Robinson – 457 sqn – shot down – KIA
P/O McDowell – 457 sqn – shot down - KIA

7 Sep 43 
F/O Hinds - EF558 – 54 sqn – shot down – KIA
S/L McDonald – LZ884 – 452 sqn – shot down – bailed out – pilot Ok
P/O Tully – 452 sqn – shot down – bailed out – pilot OK


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## Njaco (Aug 5, 2010)

I was thinking the same thing Claide - split between types instead of totals and BoB looks alittle different.


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## billswagger (Aug 5, 2010)

I have yet to locate the actual report, ( National Archives of Australia) but there is a RAAF test out there that shows the differences in performance between the Tropical Spitfire and the P-40, and although the Spitfire was more maneuverable, the P-40 was said to be both faster in level speed and in acceleration up to 16,000ft and easily out dove the Spitfire from tests at 20,000ft. 
At 20kft the Spitfire easily gained the advantage with in a minute of engagement, but in all cases the P-40 had the choice to break engagement by simply diving away. 

In other words, the faster plane is going to control the fight, or at least have a better choice as when to engage and disengage. This seems to have been a true component of the Spit vs P-40 match up, and so i don't see how a Zero vs P-40 match up would be any different so long as the height of the fight was not too high.

The report concluded by recommending that as the large Volkes air filter on the Spitfire cost 20-30mph in top speed, it should be removed in operational service - or at least an alternative found.
There are several comparisons done by the RAAF comparing the Trop Spit and the Regular Spit that also validate this claim although the difference in speed is not as significant. 
In reference to the P-40 reports its possible that the speed advantage particularly in dives was a lot less between the Spitfire and Zero, meaning that pilots had less control over when to disengage as they might using a P-40. 

The problem was getting a plane that could fly high enough to be a useful fighter above 20,000ft and the spitfire was really the only fighter available at the time, but diving to escape was probably less of an option for a Spitfire, my guess. 



Bill


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## buffnut453 (Aug 5, 2010)

Interesting stuff Bill. You're points are exactly in-line with my question about the relative altitudes of the opposing forces during the engagements. The Spit's speed and ability to disengage would be markedly reduced if they were climbing to reach the Zeros. It's all about energy and the ability to convert potential energy (altitude) to speed (kinetic energy) as rapidly as possible. It seems from your post that the P-40 was better able to do this than the MkV Spit with the speed-sapping Vokes filter.

Regards,
Mark


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## parsifal (Aug 5, 2010)

From Wildcats figures I count 46 losses in that three month period. We still do not have any reasons as to why the loss rates were so heavy. That incidentally is more than twwo thirds of the original force structure. I count a total of 654 Spits being delivered, which includes RAAF spits operating in Europe.

At least in late 1942, RAF 54 sqn was also based in Darwin. There were three sqns from the RAAF that I know of.

My source (Lynch, Parnell, Odgers as well as otes taken from Department of defence aircraft status cards from the aircraft historical section of the war meorial) reveals a total of 30 aircraft lost March through to the end of May for the following sqns, 2, 18, 31, 54, 452 and 457. That time period is not the same as Wildcats, which is over a longer period. In that period for operations in the theatre, including offensive operations over enemy territory. I dont think the figures include non-combat losses, but then a ditching due to running out of fuel is classified as a combat loss. The 46 claimed enemy a/c is everything, bombers, fighters, army and navy. For the record, Oscars, Dinahs, Sallies Helens are all Japanese Army types, whilst Bettys, Nells, Petes and Zekes are all Navy aircraft


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## billswagger (Aug 5, 2010)

buffnut453 said:


> Interesting stuff Bill. You're points are exactly in-line with my question about the relative altitudes of the opposing forces during the engagements. The Spit's speed and ability to disengage would be markedly reduced if they were climbing to reach the Zeros. It's all about energy and the ability to convert potential energy (altitude) to speed (kinetic energy) as rapidly as possible. It seems from your post that the P-40 was better able to do this than the MkV Spit with the speed-sapping Vokes filter.
> 
> Regards,
> Mark



I think top speeds can be misleading figures anyway considering most aircraft require at least a minute or two to reach such speeds from a level cruise. In combat there isn't that much time to accelerate in an emergency situation. 
Despite the disparities in speed, the spitfire (as oppose to a P-40) was still more dominant in the vertical which is probably what would make it more competitive as a fighter all around. I think in the case of the Zero vs Spitfire, the performance gap was too narrow so that ultimately the fight resided on positioning and speeds from the start of the engagements. 
Loss records can be telling, but i don't think you could decipher one plane over the other because of the factors mentioned. Its different fighting a 1v1 engagement than having to fight a battle, however it was clear the Zero could out turn the Spit and so turn battles were no longer an option for spit pilots. 

Bill


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## JoeB (Aug 5, 2010)

RCAFson said:


> You are neglecting the 8 or 9 P40s lost, against 1 Zero loss on Feb 19.
> 
> So the above is a first hand account of the April 25 intercept and the pilot makes it very clear that the bombers were not at 26000 ft.
> 
> What about the bombers? Wasn't shooting down the bombers the whole point of these intercepts?


The bombers on April 25 came in at 8km per their own records. In fact only 11 P-40's could make contact. Also in some of the 1943 raids the bomberswere lower by the time they bombed, or the time they left. The basic point you made by insisting on posting that same misleading info on two threads was, that the P-40's enjoyed numerical superiority the Spits didn't, which is simply not true. If you don't acknowledge you had bad info on that point, why should anyone follow you along to some other 'but what about this' type of point, where you also just throw up so more old sources linked from web, then it's up to somebody else to correct those or show how they aren't representative? 

The P-40's in Feb 19 had no radar warning, and opposed large carrier groups. *That's* actually different than the 1942 and 1943 escorted raids (radar installation March 1942). But again, go back to the actual point and stop flailing around throwing everything on the wall to see what sticks. I said the Spit didn't prove itself superior in Darwin defense of '43 compared to '42. So you would either argue that it *did* prove itself superior and explain how, or acknowledge the point. 

If we just want to dredge up every over P-40 v Zero engagement, we'd also have to count engagements in New Guinea and Solomons in late 42-early 43 where the kill ratio was about 1:1 or even a bit better for the P-40's etc. The 49th FG when it moved to New Guinea in fall of 42 for example had about parity ratio with Zeroes, that's still before the Spits (in terms of path of decline of the JNAF fighter force), and no more dissimilar situation to the escorted twin bomber Darwin raids than the Feb 19 carrier raid was. But I didn't count that, because I'm trying to make a serious objective analysis with the best sources I can find, comparing the *closest* (nothing is ever exactly the same) case that exists. You OTOH obviously are 'son' of a particular air arm or family or air arms and trying to be cheerleader for those with whatever links you can find and whateever arguments you can shoehorn in.

Joe


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## RCAFson (Aug 5, 2010)

JoeB said:


> The bombers on April 25 came in at *8km* per their own records.



We have a very clear account from a USAAF pilot who states that the bombers were at 16000ft. The most likely explanation is a translation error and that the *"8"* in 8km should read *"5"* as in 5km, which is about 16000ft. I wonder how many other mistakes have been made?

Also, what about the bomber kills?


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## JoeB (Aug 5, 2010)

parsifal said:


> My source (Lynch, Parnell, Odgers as well as otes taken from Department of defence aircraft status cards from the aircraft historical section of the war meorial) reveals a total of 30 aircraft lost March through to the end of May for the following sqns, 2, 18, 31, 54, 452 and 457. That time period is not the same as Wildcats, which is over a longer period. In that period for operations in the theatre, including offensive operations over enemy territory. I dont think the figures include non-combat losses, but then a ditching due to running out of fuel is classified as a combat loss.


OK, so you don't know what were combat and non-combat losses, and don't even know what the total representes, from this 'cross check'. How does that really verify the specifics of loss causes on particular days in the units records? (see below if that first sentence comes on too strong, I am *not* criticizing the presentation of new info). We are in fact relying on those Spit unit records to count losses exactly by incident and classify their cause.

I've been through this debate in other cases, like for example Korean War where I've done a lot more primary record research than about Pacific War. In fact getting more into reading Japanese books and records was really a spin off for me of learning to read Chinese writing, which I did to better understand captured NK documents from the KW (many men still wrote in mixed Chinese/Korean alphabetic style at that time, not pure Korean alphabets tyle as common now), and Chinese accounts. The Korean debate is very similar, people looking at it with sense of 'ownership' from either Russian or international 'skeptical of the US as part of personal identity' type worldview. How do you *prove* the US units records of particular combats don't just omit losses. There is to some degree a back up 'cross check' of invidual a/c records, but fact is they aren't a perfect duplicate path of proof of each loss and its cause. And why would you believe USAF individual a/c record cards if you really believe then secret unit combat diaries are fudged? There is also the sheer cumulation of the same data appearing in various types of USAF records and reports (mountains of it), but if, rather than just reading Baeza and JACAR online kodochosho, we went in person to the National Institute of Defense Studies in Tokyo, we could almost surely access other record types with same basic story as the kodochosho (this has been shown to my satisfaction by other researchers in other campaigns, like individual record that clarified the cause of loss of a Zero at Midway where it's ambiguous in kodochosho; JACAR is ongoing effort, far from all J records available there).

Same issue here, both with your RAAF 'cross check' and refusal to accept original then-secret IJN unit combat diaries, or anyway tendency to hold them at arm's length like a dead rat (well Joe says, well I guess we 'might' be 'stuck' with this, etc  ) The basic issue to 'other side loss skeptics' in any air war is to show cases where *then secret unit records* are proven to be knowing falsehoods by some other source, when it comes to their own losses, especially outright losses on missions 500 miles from base. I still know of *no* case in any country where that's been shown. And that's basically what we are relying on in either case, RAAF or IJN, USAF or Soviet AF. If real cases of phoney original combat diaries placed in records were common it wouldn't be all that convincing that you (or I or anyone) could find a back up record, by the same people!, showing a somewhat similar number of losses where we weren't sure what it included. That's not to criticize the presentation of additional facts, but I don't see the implied contrast with the Japanese situation. What you presented, what exists AFAIK, in RAAF records is no more immune to absolute skepticism than what's in Japanese records, though unreasonable skepticism in either case IMO, as far as whether those records tell the bulk of the story.

Joe


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## JoeB (Aug 5, 2010)

RCAFson said:


> We have a very clear account from a USAAF pilot who states that the bombers were at 16000ft. The most likely explanation is a translation error and that the *"8"* in 8km should read *"5"* as in 5km, which is about 16000ft. I wonder how many other mistakes have been made?
> 
> Also, what about the bomber kills?


No translation error, as I said the bombers could reduce altitude as they came in for runs, but the fact is only 11 P-40's intercepted. Your point was that P-40's enjoyed 'overwhelmingly numerical superiority' in thos raids and that's a seriously wrong statement. Whatever arguments about who made contact in particular cases (though crystal clear in April 25) case, the 1942 and 1943 interecpting forces enjoyed broadly comparable numerical odds, and it's bending things in the Spit direction to even say that.

We might discuss bomber kills if you show yourself a serious person by admitting you were mistaken about the fighter numbers point you made *twice*. If OTOH you don't believe the info I gave on relative numbers, what's the point of giving other info you ask for?

Joe


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## RCAFson (Aug 5, 2010)

JoeB said:


> No translation error, as I said the bombers could reduce altitude as they came in for runs, but the fact is only 11 P-40's intercepted. Your point was that P-40's enjoyed 'overwhelmingly numerical superiority' in thos raids and that's a seriously wrong statement. Whatever arguments about who made contact in particular cases (though crystal clear in April 25) case, the 1942 and 1943 interecpting forces enjoyed broadly comparable numerical odds, and it's bending things in the Spit direction to even say that.
> 
> We might discuss bomber kills if you show yourself a serious person by admitting you were mistaken about the fighter numbers point you made *twice*. If OTOH you don't believe the info I gave on relative numbers, what's the point of giving other info you ask for?
> 
> Joe



I'm sorry but it is obvious that you made a mistake, and refuse to admit that your source is incorrect. My statement regrading 50 P40s intercepting was based upon information from reputable sources. Now you try to fudge things and state that the bombers reduced altitude, but the simple fact is that the interception was made at 16000ft. Why should we believe the rest of your source when it is wrong about such a fundamental part of the engagement?

In any event, it was the bombers that the fighters were after, so it seems silly to withhold the bomber kills. although hopefully they are accurately recorded.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 5, 2010)

RCAFson said:


> I'm sorry but it is obvious that you made a mistake, and refuse to admit that your source is incorrect. *My statement regrading 50 P40s intercepting was based upon information from reputable sources.* Now you try to fudge things and state that the bombers reduced altitude, but the simple fact is that the interception was made at 16000ft. Why should we believe the rest of your source when it is wrong about such a fundamental part of the engagement?



Please state...


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## RCAFson (Aug 5, 2010)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Please state...



49th Fighter Group: Aces of the Pacific
By William N. Hess.
P13: _"on 25 April - Anzac day - 50 P40s from all three squadrons intercepted 24 bombers, escorted by 9 Zeros, in the largest Japanese raid on Darwin in months...Morehead reported: I took off and climbed to 19000ft and sighted about 24 twin engined bombers escorted by a number of Zeros. The bombers were headed out to sea, and my flight happened to have the altitude on the accompanying flight, so I dived (bombers being at 14000ft) and intercepted the enemy at the tip of Melville Island..."_

The other source was:

P40 Warhawk Aces of the Pacific, by Carl Molesworth, p29-30. In post 73 I quoted an extract from this book as well.


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## parsifal (Aug 5, 2010)

Joe

I wasnt cross checking anything from your posts. I am askingthe question as to why RAAF spitfire losses were so high. I think the posts by Billswagger and Buffnut go some way to looking at why they were not that successful,, as well as your comment about how it is reasonable to expect the zero jockeys with experience to adapt to the boom and zoom tactics.

I think you are over-reacting to my comments about cross checking, and appear convinced that I dont trust Japanese records, and somehow do trust allied records. Its just that your figures dont seem to synchronise with other (secondary) published figures. I was interested in your response, but it obviously hit a nerve I can see.

As far as not knowing the difference between a combat and a non-combat loss, what are you getting at? Sometimes losses can be referred to a operational and non-operational, perhaps its better to describe ditching as a n operational loss?


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## JoeB (Aug 5, 2010)

RCAFson said:


> My statement regrading 50 P40s intercepting was based upon information from reputable sources.


Well you're not *quite* claiming that wrong info is right anymore, that's something I guess, but still two major problems:

-whether or not 'reputable', old purely one sided works by authors like Hess are wrong about a lot of points. I have 'Pacific Sweep' and Hess says basically the same thing in that book. I read the book many years ago, and I accepted the spare statements in it, Hess covers most missions in a few sentences, as provisional facts in the absence of a more complete and detailed treatment. But I surely wouldn't use such a book now as 'reputable source' to challenge the results in a newer study which is describing the missions over several *pages* each from both sides*. I would have to call myself an ignoramus if I did that, that's all I'll say.

-moreover *you* not Hess, cherry picked one mistaken example into a general statement that the P-40's 'often had overwhelming numerical superiority'. Now you seem to want to imply you were only relying on the 'reputable' Hess (to make a generalization he never made), or just tap dance furiously away to any other aspect of the topic you possibly can. 

*one reason Hess' implication that all 50 P-40's intercepted April 25 '42 is obviously wrong is that the Japanese records also don't say they were engaged by lots of P-40's that day.

Joe


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## JoeB (Aug 5, 2010)

parsifal said:


> Joe
> 1. Its just that your figures dont seem to synchronise with other (secondary) published figures. I was interested in your response, but it obviously hit a nerve I can see.
> 
> 2. As far as not knowing the difference between a combat and a non-combat loss, what are you getting at? Sometimes losses can be referred to a operational and non-operational, perhaps its better to describe ditching as a n operational loss?


1. You've said this or something like it several times, but still never explained what other figures exist for the Japanese combat losses over Darwin besides the Allied claims and losses the Japanese reported (as I've given). The figures which have appeared in one-sided English language books are in all cases AFAIK simply what the Allies claimed. Japanese secondary sources have quoted what the Japanese claimed for Allied losses (79 enemy a/c plus 22 probable for 202nd AG in 1943 campaign), same same.

Again if you have in mind, and can show, some set of Japanese loss figures which is independent of what Allied pilots claimed, and different from the Japanese reported losses, my curiosity would be intense, maybe that seems like touching a nerve.  But I honestly can't imagine what that would be, and as covered before, I just don't see any contradiction between known Japanese cumulative losses over the whole war, and losing just a few Zeroes over Darwin in '43: they obviously suffered much more heavily in other campaigns, to other causes (as when their a/f's were in range of Allied strikes, especially) other types of a/c, in many other cases over the whole war. I'm just trying to understand what these 'other figures' are which, it's suggested, call into question what the units records say in some solidly logical way.

2. My only point was that if you don't know what the figures you quoted include (which you seemed to say), then those data might be interesting pieces of the puzzle but hardly prove anything independently of the unit records 

And again, the counts of Spit losses I've given have always excluded known fuel losses as non-air combat, The rub with fuel losses in combat is the issue with the May 10 '43 Zero loss, they could be caused by holes punched in fuel tanks, and pilots might not be aware of it, or this is the sort of case where records actually *might* be fudged a bit (though it clearly says in 202nd kodochosho that that Zero took a hit causing a leak, just like the Allied photo shows), but again I don't know that that happened to any of the 'fuel' loss Spits, so I'm not assuming it.

Joe


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## RCAFson (Aug 5, 2010)

JoeB said:


> Well you're not *quite* claiming that wrong info is right anymore, that's something I guess, but still two major problems:
> 
> -whether or not 'reputable', old purely one sided works by authors like Hess are wrong about a lot of points. I have 'Pacific Sweep' and Hess says basically the same thing in that book. I read the book many years ago, and I accepted the spare statements in it, Hess covers most missions in a few sentences, as provisional facts in the absence of a more complete and detailed treatment. But I surely wouldn't use such a book now as 'reputable source' to challenge the results in a newer study which is describing the missions over several *pages* each from both sides*. I would have to call myself an ignoramus if I did that, that's all I'll say.
> 
> ...



Morehead stated that he intercepted at 14-16000 ft. I can understand that a pilot can be a bit fuzzy about precise details, but his statements seem to corroborate a medium altitude intercept. Again, both sources can't be right. 

I didn't "cherry pick" anything. I picked a date where the P40s claimed to be very successful and where the altitude and numbers were clearly stated. Other altitudes mentioned:

Molesworth:
April 04

10 p40s ( 4 airborne and 6 scrambled) intercept 6 bombers and similar number of fighters. it goes on to state that 2 G4M were shot down at "11000 ft." p28

This and the April 25 combat, are the only one that mention altitude and specific numbers.



Hess:
on page 17 there is also mention of another raid at 23000 ft, but no numbers given.

on page 19 records a combat on June 16th, where 36 P40 intercepted 27 bombers and 15 zeros. A pilot 
recounts that he led his flight to 29000ft to get above the bombers which were at 23000ft.

on page 22, July 30, * bombers at 3000ft and zeros at 5000ft*

page 24, Aug 23, states the bombers were at 25000ft, which is the highest altitude mentioned.


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## parsifal (Aug 6, 2010)

Hi Joe


Your last post to me is a misrepresentation of my point. As I recall it began with me saying I had my doubts about your figures. this is not an isolated position that you have taken. Every time a discussion comes up about Japanese losses, you jump in, boots and all, to say just how wrong the allied claims are, and that Japanese losses are grossly overstated. I am asking the obvious question, after joining the dots from this thread, and others like it where you consistently say just how low Japanese losses really are . if Japanese losses are so low in every sample you care to talk about, is it not reasonable to assume that your research suggests that for the whole war, Japanese losses are being overstated. you have not been willing to go there, I suspect because it exposes your research to the obvious question "well, if losses are so low across the board, where did all the production and new pilots end up????' your reply to that is evasive, and dismissive, "oh it happened somewhere else" Okay, but if not in those sample engagements that you are willing to talk about, then where??? You refuse to go there, for reasons known to yourself.

I then had the temerity to suggest that perhaps your "ground up" reseach methods might be faulty.....a variation of "its easy to miss the foresst because your too busy looking at the leaves". you basically exploded at that point, essentially saying there is no "big picture" to look at. Thats not what other researchers believe, but the discussion seems at that point to reduce to farcical proportions, because you insist that its your way or the highway.....can i suggest that people dont take kindly to that sort of treatment, and further suggest it might be why you encounter so much resistance to your claims despite the obvious depth of knowledge that you possess

Finally after provisionally accepting the figures you suggest, "holding it arms length like a dead rat" as you put it, you seem to lose all self control because I suggest that the japanese records may not be completely accurate. I give parrallel examples of more well known deceptions, not just secret records, and point out that the japanese have a fundamentally different attitude to losses and defeat, equating these outcomes with dishonour. I suggested that it might be possible for such deceptions to occur even at a tactical level, to which your response was basically to say how dare i suggest the japanese records might not be completely accurate and why would they lie in the secret documents. I never said i had alternative records....if you check back on the relevant posts, I asked you if this might be a possibility, and if it was a possibility how that might be addressed. I tend to believe you about the records being unlikely to be wrong, but it remains a possibility, because it has not been refuted, and ther is this irritating thing in the back of my mind concerning the overll loss rates compared to those that you believe in. I never did get anything like an adequate answer to that, but concluded from your response that you could not, and were unprepred in any case to undertake such a further analysis. 

I thought "fair enough Ill leave it at that", and was moving away from further discourse with you, as it was obvious that your discussions with me were not causing you any joy. So I moved away, deliberately avoiding direct conversation with you. That doesnt mean I have to accept your position, or that I need to discuss the issue further with you. You decided however that you wanted to continue this discussion, and start to lecture me about how wrong i am. You may be right, but you dont seem to care that perhaps we have reached the limit of intelligent debate on this issue, and are beginning to move into rough water from this point.


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## Njaco (Aug 6, 2010)

> we have reached the limit of intelligent debate on this issue, and are beginning to move into rough water from this point.



Very well put and lets move on.


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## Freebird (Aug 6, 2010)

parsifal said:


> Joe
> 
> I am askingthe question as to why RAAF spitfire losses were so high.?



Yes I'm curious too.

Joe, what's the crux of your opinion on the Pacific airwar comparing Commonwealth vs US results?

Were the P-40 Wildcat just better aircraft to fight the Japanese vs Spitfire Hurricane?

Or were the CW not as good as US? Inexperienced pilots? Poor training? Poor tactics? 
Poor planning on choice of missions?
What was the reason for the disparity?


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## RCAFson (Aug 6, 2010)

RCAFson said:


> Morehead stated that he intercepted at 14-16000 ft. I can understand that a pilot can be a bit fuzzy about precise details, but his statements seem to corroborate a medium altitude intercept. Again, both sources can't be right.
> 
> I didn't "cherry pick" anything. I picked a date where the P40s claimed to be very successful and where the altitude and numbers were clearly stated. Other altitudes mentioned:
> 
> ...




16
11
23
23
3
25
----
101/6 = 17000 ft average altitude for the 49th FG intercepts, according to the sample given by Hess and Molesworth.

Altitude of Spitfire intercepts:
2 may 20k
28may 20k
20june 27k + 2
30 june 20k
4th july 29 k
------------------
118/6= 20000 average



> _The Spitfire squadrons had lost 44 aircraft in their six months of operations
> *although only 17 of these losses had been directly due to enemy
> action .* By comparison enemy losses at the hands of the Spitfires had bee n
> 63 destroyed and another 13 probably destroyed . The Spitfire squadrons
> ...



http://www.awm.gov.au/cms_images/histories/27/chapters/07.pdf


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## JoeB (Aug 8, 2010)

parsifal said:


> Hi Joe
> 1. Every time a discussion comes up about Japanese losses, you jump in, boots and all, to say just how wrong the allied claims are, and that Japanese losses are grossly overstated.
> 
> 2. if Japanese losses are so low in every sample you care to talk about, is it not reasonable to assume that your research suggests that for the whole war, Japanese losses are being overstated. you have not been willing to go there, I suspect because it exposes your research to the obvious question "well, if losses are so low across the board, where did all the production and new pilots end up????' your reply to that is evasive, and dismissive, "oh it happened somewhere else" Okay, but if not in those sample engagements that you are willing to talk about, then where??? You refuse to go there, for reasons known to yourself.
> ...


1. I don't think it's jumping in boots and all to add information if available, when people even now 65 years on, quote *anybody's* aerial claims in WWII as if facts without reference to the other side's accounts. If you do a comprehensive search you'll find it's by no means limited to Japanese losses. Consistent pattern: everyone once confronted with that truism, claims aren't reliable, says 'oh yeah I know that', but many would still clearly prefer to believe 'their guys' claims were only moderately overstated, and have a degree of personal irritation when others insist it's not the case in a particular situation, from all evidence at least.

2. We've been over this a few times, and I gave examples, that are obvious enough, of Japanese fighter losses a lot heavier than one single Air Group's 4 Zero losses flying a relatively few missions in 6 months over Darwin. The JNAF lost for example 188 Zeroes (to all causes, land and carrier based) in only a 3+ month period at Guadalcanal; 107 of those from landbased units whose average order of battle strength was nowhere near a 100, IOW well over 100% losses v the average strength in a pretty short time, very much in contrast to the typical early 1942 ops, and also in contrast to the 202nd's experience over Darwin. So we just keep going around on this where you say 'well if this was the typical Japanese figher loss rate...' but what it was, was somewhat typical of JNAF fighter ops in early 42, but very atypical ofJNAF fighter ops from late '42 on, and nearly unheard of for '44-45; and again the air war got bigger in '44-'45. That's not vague and evasive, that's the basic well known big picture of the Pacific air war. The Darwin 1943 episode fits in with the early cases, as perhaps the last operation where a JNAF fighter unit had consistent dominance over an Allied one, but it wasn't the first time, and some case had to be last.

As to where did all the JNAF pilots go, the list of 'key' pilot KIA by incident in appendix of Hata/Izawa "Japanese Naval Aces and Fighter Units in WWII" is pretty complete where I've checked it v records, as I have for all of 1942 in New Guinea. The few pilots absent from that list are generally low ranking (hence not 'key'), but their names generally still appear in the lists in same book of each JNAF training class, with (K) parenthetically, later killed. Even in 42-43 period (where surviving JNAF records tend to be pretty complete) the 3 pilot KIA's of the 202nd over Darwin in 1943 are a very small % of the total in the incident by incident list.

3. This is the standing question you haven't answered: *which* researchers ever tabulated losses for the Japanese over Darwin other than either what the Allies claimed or what the Japanese reported (as I've related from published and primary sources)?

4. The whole point is that your supposed other examples do not show any cases where the records themselves tell a clear and specific story, of particular units involved and their losses, but some other source proves the losses were really higher than that. And that's the evidence we have here: detailed original records.

Arguing based on broad statements about countries' cultures is not logically valid IMO. We could as easily say the scrappy Aussies, proud of their military prowess in general, fudged their records of losses because it was unbearable to be on the losing end against the 'Jap' fighters so long after the Americans, whose military prowess the Aussies liked to think was generally inferior to theirs, had apparently been doing better. That would be a blood boilingly ridiculous argument if I were making it seriously, but it's pretty much equivalent to 'the Japanese view of defeat' and extrapolating that to fudged Japanese records you apparently have no evidence of.

You have to show errors in the records by finding independent sources (not Allied claims in 'published sources') of higher losses than what the Japanese units reported. Then you might reasonably go on to national characteristics as among explanations for such a finding. But using broad national characterizations to establish 'facts' is BS, frankly. 

The plain logic remains, *somewhere* a JNAF unit (any air unit) had to write down what actually happened from their POV, surely in terms of their pilots who had been lost, so others in the organization, not other organizations or the public but that same organization, would know, to send them more pilots, to know that pilot couldn't be transferred to Rabaul..because he was dead already!, etc. There's no reasonable basis, that you've given IMO, to believe the kodochosho are anything other than the place where they did that. 

Joe


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## RCAFson (Aug 8, 2010)

What about the bomber losses?


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## JoeB (Aug 8, 2010)

freebird said:


> Yes I'm curious too.
> 
> Joe, what's the crux of your opinion on the Pacific airwar comparing Commonwealth vs US results?
> 
> ...


As in my longer post recently and others before, high losses compared to what?

First, forget RCAF's obfuscation. The original point I made to him was that the Spitfire did not prove itself superior to the P-40 in fighter combat defending Darwin. That's not a statement of the converse, than the P-40 *did* prove itself superior. And now having posted the results of each mission defending Darwin, you can see it was common for either P-40's or Spitfires to go after bombers escorted by Zeroes and suffer losses to the Zeroes without scoring any kills in return (though generally believing they had). Up to the summer of 1942 this sort of result was the rule for JNAF fighters v a variety of Allied fighter opposition. Other P-40 ops in period are not as directly comparable in situation but also not good results. For example 75sdn RAAF in first deployment in March-Apr '42 at Moresby downed 2 Zeroes in air combat for 16 P-40/Kittyhawk air combat losses to Zeroes (source: "Seek and Strike" by Wilson kodochosho*), though OTOH in the few combats in August 1942 75 and 76 Sdn downed 4 Zeroes for 5 Kittyhawks (same sources) and 49th FG in NG in Nov-Dec '42 downed 4 Zeroes for 3 P-40's (Hess kodochosho)

F4F's v Zero contests of course varied case to case to but overall trend was less variable around 1:1 with >100 kills on each side in 1942, in a variety of situations (G'canal defense high altitude, low altitude, carrier battles, F4F escorts v Zero CAP's over convoys in Solomins, etc without appearing to change wildly, numbers tended to be similar on each side).

So it's not so much why did Spitfires do worse as why did they achieve results typical of what most Allied units did ca spring-summer '42 rather than parity situation that began to appear in 2nd half '42 in many other cases. I think most of the specific possible explanations have been mentioned at one time or another, and few if any originally by me:
-Spit intolerant of primitive field conditions, not as rugged as the other types, exactly the Soviet complaint in finding the P-39 preferable for their purposes on their southern front in 1943
-Spit V just generally overrated, one mark of a fighter of which some versions were arguably the best fighter around in their time, at least for short range ops, Spit V not so much. In some circumstances it was perhaps more comparable in practical fighter combat capability to P-39/40 or F4F than the conventional wisdom would hold, with the first point in mind especially.
-F4F specifically turned better, certainly than the P-39/40. If you were going to instinctively turn, and be outturned by the Zero, the Zero would outturn the F4F by less.
-202nd AG experienced and previously generally successful unit, Spit wing not, as a unit anyway
-anti-Zero tactics on paper perhaps generally overrated as a factor in obtaining successful results v Zeroes; easier to say than do, not actually practiced yet by F4F units in 1942. In fact among F4F tactics were deliberate dog fighting (Joe Bauer to his men at G'canal ca. Oct 42 'if you see Zeroes, dogfight em', believing that the hit and run tactics of some of the Zero units then indicated deteriorating pilot quality so they should be closely engaged), and alternatively the 'pin cushion': just don't turn with Zero on tail but jink up and down and rely on the F4F to absorb hits from directly astern, a tough a/c, rapid roll at high speed was the main tactic later enshrined in manuals that was actually frequently used in 1942 in combat.
-not just 'training' in theory but whole personnel structure of 1942 Japanese v US v Brit/CW fighter forces differed. Brit/CW ca 42 tended to consist of some men experienced in real combat leading larger number of relatively poorly trained inexperienced men. The 1942 USAAF, desperately expanding, had a somewhat similar profile except even the experienced men had no combat experience. JNAF of '42 in contrast had an experience profile like a peactime force, with relatively more highly and mid experienced men, some (though fewer than is sometimes assumed) with combat experience in China, and their green pilots were more thoroughly trained than wartime type mass produced newbies of 1942 RAF or USAAF, not to mention their own later on. USN had a similar profile to JNAF except no combat experience. USN and USMC training systems were basically same but USMC had more low hour pilots in combat units in 1942 than USN did; greenest USN pilots on deployed carriers had more hours than greenest USMC at G'canal, and those carrier guys were often the spares and didn't always get to fly combat. 

How this experience profile summary applies to 1943 is a little fuzzier. In general the Spit (and Hurricane) results in Far East in 1943 are more puzzling than the record in 1942.

I don't have a strong opinion on the weighting of those causes. My main problem in all frankness is with what I perceive as obviously situationally dependent arguments by people who have an obvious 'dog in the fight', either about what the results were in the first place, or often ridiculous theories that particular relatively minor variations in situation would cause not only huge changes in results but persistent ones. One side would decide to use a few 1k more feet altitude, and OK that's it...other side would go from achieving parity to getting whipped consistently for months, and so would any other unit. The JNAF could have ruled the Pacific all through '43 and beyond, with their super altitude capable Zero, if only they'd known!  People should try to be serious, objective and grown up, that's the only thing I have a really strong opinion about here.

*Wilson gives Japanese losses for some incidents per US comms intercepts of Japanese radio reports to higher Hq's, he got at US National Archives...they agree well with written Japanese records but latter are aviable for all engagements in that period.

Joe


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 8, 2010)

JoeB said:


> People should try to be serious, objective and grown up, that's the only thing I have a really strong opinion about here.



Folks, while this exchange has been informative and entertaining, JoeB has more than substantiated his position on several occasions and one must accept most if not all of his data is based on cold facts. Please provide tangible historical evidence to either agree or disagree with his information. While none of us are "all encompassing" aviation historians, his data and research should be looked upon as "agenda-less."

My 2 cents - stay away from the stock market and please continue to keep this civil.


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## parsifal (Aug 9, 2010)

FB has asked that where disagreement arises, we should provide examples to back up our alternative positions. Joe has previously also requested this, so I think it needs to be observed.

In preparing this response I need to acknowledge the great knowledge that Joe has on this subject. My point in raising opposition is not that I refute his position, but simply that I have doubts and need explanation to reconcile what are nagging and persistent concerns about reconciling the true nature of the battle. Joes last post to Freebird did go a long way to explaining and rationalizing what was happening, and makes a lot of sense to me. But there was one issue or rather example that he raised that I thought I should respond to.

With regard to the accuracy of Japanese unit records, I should firstly state that in the main I believe Joes position to be correct, however, there are a couple of point on which I have some doubts. Joe at the end of his reply to me used a quasi example of how it was illogical to suppose that a unit might falsify its losses. If it did that it would run into trouble when that unit was due for transfer to say Rabaul. It would appear as unlikely and illogical to falsify the records, as it would not take long for the deception to be exposed. I think that in essence is what Joe was trying to say. But in fact that is exactly what happened, and often. As an amendment to my hypothesis it might not always be so much as a case of deliberate deceit, as a case of a unit simply being unaware of where assets were, or where they had been lost. I have two examples that suggest this. 

Example 1. The source is Japanese Army Operations In the South Pacific: Translated by Steve Ballard, Australian War Memorial. This is a translation of the war history series Senshi Soshu, which I am sure Joe is familiar with. This volume covers from the invasion of Rabaul in January 1942 through to the destruction of the South Seas Force in January 1943. 

After giving some details of the scheduled reinforcements for April 1942, at page 62 the narrative states “_this would seem to indicate that the strategic position of units had been strengthened. However, after re-organization, the strength of the 25th flotilla was quite different from the listed complement_”...further on it suggests that the scheduled reinforcements never arrived. 

There are several ways this anomaly could be explained, but it does clearly indicate that sometimes scheduled reinforcements did not arrive as promised. This was not a phenomena peculiar to the Japanese, but it seem to happen to them more often than for other nationalities. 

Example 2: This is from an admittedly secondary source…”The Pacific War” by John Costello. It is significant, however in that it was one of the first pieces that tended to rely on decrypted intercepts more than unit summaries in compiling the narrative. I think that this suggests that allied estimate and comments about Japanese losses are more accurate than Japanese estimate of allied losses, and it is certainly at least plausible that the Allies knew more about Japanese losses than the Japanese themselves, at times at least. 

Putting all of that aside, however, the narrative include a chapter on the Marianas Turkey Shoot. Commenting on the operations of the 1st Air Fleet, at page 480 it describes how Kurita was advising Ozawa that he had retrieved over 500 aircraft from the dispersal area in the Carolines, and from those units that had been transferred south as a result of the crisis on Biak. In fact over 1/3 of the 500 aircraft he listed as still on the effective list had been lost. Most scholars believe this was a deliberate deceit by Kurita, I am not so sure, but the facts remain, he was no longer in command of the numbers he said he was controlling. I believe that many aircraft had in fact been lost in the long over water flights, many more were destroyed on landing, or shot down. Kurita maintained the delusion, however, sending off unsubstantiated, and what appear to be deliberately deceptive reports of winning the battle and eliminating much American strength. These were not propaganda communiqués they were military reports to superiors and colleagues. 

I believe that a good proportion of this mis-information arose simply from confusion and the stresses of battle, though there may have been an element of the “dishonour with defeat” ethos as well. One thing to note whenever examining Japanese accounts is that far from being a model of super efficiency and self awareness, Japanese military operations, and hence (by extension) military records were examples of confusion and a lack of knowledge about what was really going on. 

Joes accounts are referring to squadron level records, in which it is harder to argue the confusion and ignorance argument. Difficult, but not beyond the realm of possibility


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## RCAFson (Aug 9, 2010)

JoeB said:


> As in my longer post recently and others before, high losses compared to what?
> 
> First, forget RCAF's obfuscation.
> Joe



I had to do a lot of digging around the web to find the answer to the number of bombers shot down by the Darwin Spitfires in 1943:



> JBren1
> 
> (22-Jan-2009 01:19:46)
> 
> ...


Best light-weight monoplane fighter to take on A6M2 fighter? - The Air Forces - NavWeaps Discussion Boards - NavWeaps Discussion Boards - Message Board

So by my count that makes 5 IJN/IJA fighters and 14 bombers lost to the Spitfires.



> Andy01
> (24-Sep-2008 01:41:45)
> 
> I took at look at the numbers to try a get a better picture of what happened:
> ...


Hellcat Vs Zero - Aircraft Carriers - NavWeaps Discussion Boards - NavWeaps Discussion Boards - Message Board

So the Spitfires actually downed more bombers than the P-40s, at least according to the above, which I can't verify since no sources are given. Apparently the Spitfires also downed more recon aircraft, so overall probably more than the p-40s.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 9, 2010)

RCAFson said:


> So the Spitfires actually downed more bombers than the P-40s, at least according to the above, which I can't verify since no sources are given. Apparently the Spitfires also downed more recon aircraft, so overall probably more than the p-40s.



So you're basing this on a post from another board who gives no references for his numbers?

Thanks parsifal!


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## Nikademus (Aug 9, 2010)

freebird said:


> Yes I'm curious too.
> 
> Joe, what's the crux of your opinion on the Pacific airwar comparing Commonwealth vs US results?
> 
> ...




There's no simple answer. Citing a recent thread that touched on Burma in 1943, the RAF itself was puzzled at the disperity in results in comparison to other Theaters and the USAAF experience. Best one can do is theorize. After my own study, I tend to agree with the RAF's "troubleshooter" , w/c Paul Ritchie who felt that training and tactics were largely responsible for the disperity given that on technical grounds there was no real reason why the Hurricane (the focus of the study as it was the primary fighter in the Theater at the time) should suffer such a disparate loss ratio.

Comparisons with the USN/USAAF experience are tricky, especially in the former case. I don't feel its fair to make such a comparison because i consider the USN active VF's (carrier based) to be a small, elite organization compared to the much bigger RAF. USN VF's benefited from the "personal touch" so to speak in that while their pre-war/early war training was not all that much (if at all) better than other organiztions, their gunnery training was much improved operationally courtasy of C/O's such as Thatch, a disciple of proficient gunnery which included deflection shooting. RAF training was accelerated during the course of the war in order to get bodies into the cockpit and has been cited in books by Christopher Shores in more than one case as being a factor in the greater losses suffered by RAF units compared to some USAAF units....even when flying the same plane. Tactics also factored, influencing ratio exchanges in N.A., themselves not all that disparate from the Burma experience until addressed.

Geography and mission profiles also factored and were different in some cases. In 1942, the F4F's had limited types of engagements as i see it. The only sustained campaign involving it was at Guadalcanal, an air campaign that was primarily defensive in nature with the F4F's flying and fighting over their base. Further advantages included knowing pretty much when the enemy had to attack and of course "where". The range to the target was effectively beyond the operational [safe] range of the Zero [often having to fight with drop tanks attached] and contributed to the loss, wear and tear, and exhaustion of the pilots.the activation of the small airfield near Shortlands late in the campaign did little to address this situation. Under these circumstances i'm not suprised the ratio was competetive. Contrary to alot of opinion, i think the fact that the Zero drivers were able to win slightly on the vaunted exchange ratio under these circumstances to be remarkable. Remarkable but ultimately futile....the Japanese could care less about such things....mission success was the goal....and in that they were thwarted continually.

The carrier fights are a seperate type of battle.....and represent one day skirmishes between elite groups of fighter pilots vs. a sustained attritional campaign. This coupled with some advance warning on what they were facing, + their own high level of training spared them the stilted exchange rate suffered by the USAAF and other allied forces at the start of the war (it should be noted that the USAAFFE P-40 drivers did no better than the RAF Hurricane force in Malaya). Still, they suffered a 2:1 exchange in favor of the IJN at Coral Sea, not unreasonable but proof IMO that the IJN VF's were to be taken seriously and that their prowess did not depend entirely on fighting an "unprepared enemy" Further exchanges in the next three carrier battles remained competetive but again largely one day affairs. Under such circumstances between opponents of high skill and training (and experience), a competetive exchange ratio is only to be expected.

1943 is, as mentioned already....more puzzling. The USAAF experience improved while the RAF continued to struggle. Why? ultimately i think rigid tactics coupled with a continued influx of green pilots combined with a more dispersed geographical area and mission profile contributed. In the South Pacific by 1943, the IJNAF had been worn down and continued to fight a two front war based largely in a concentrated area around Rabaul and Bouginaville. While the tap of experienced pilots for Japan had not yet been exhausted this was countered by an increasingly poor tactical and operational situation, facing two air forces that were re-equipping with 2nd generation aircraft and benefiting from increasing logistical support vs. targets closer to their targets vs. the Japanese. Reviewing Eric Bergerud's work on the S.Pac fighting, it was emphasized that while the IJNAF continued to be reinforced with a large number of fighters, the paper strength often listed belied the true situation and helped explain the puzzlement of the Japanese leaders themselves as to why things were not going better.


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## Freebird (Aug 9, 2010)

FLYBOYJ said:


> So you're basing this on a post from another board who gives no references for his numbers?



It's an interesting hypothesis though, one that I had wondered myself.

If Joe or anyone else has different (or sourced) numbers for bomber losses it would be nice to see.

I get the impression that the British/CW placed more importance on protection of airfields than than the US (as the British were protecting their own territorty), the Americans simply concentrated on Japanese kills. Ultimately, this strategy was successful, as attrition wasted the Japanese air forces


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 9, 2010)

freebird said:


> It's an interesting hypothesis though, one that I had wondered myself.
> 
> If Joe or anyone else has different (or sourced) numbers for bomber losses it would be nice to see.
> 
> I get the impression that the British/CW placed more importance on protection of airfields than than the US (as the British were protecting their own territorty), the Americans simply concentrated on Japanese kills. Ultimately, this strategy was successful, as attrition wasted the Japanese air forces


I actually agree...


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## JoeB (Aug 10, 2010)

parsifal said:


> Example 1. The source is Japanese Army Operations In the South Pacific: Translated by Steve Ballard, Australian War Memorial. This is a translation of the war history series Senshi Soshu, which I am sure Joe is familiar with. This volume covers from the invasion of Rabaul in January 1942 through to the destruction of the South Seas Force in January 1943.
> 
> Example 2: This is from an admittedly secondary source…”The Pacific War” by John Costello. It is significant, however in that it was one of the first pieces that tended to rely on decrypted intercepts more than unit summaries in compiling the narrative.
> 
> ...


1. That volume is the Army's history of operations in that period and place. It has some references to the Navy's operations, but is not a statement about Navy's internal information.

2. As I mentioned in previous post, I compared Japanese loss accounts from US comms intercepts, as given in Wilson's "Seek and Stiike" history 75 Sdn RAAF for some incidents, to the kodochosho for same incidents and did not find major disagreements. Same for the more complete treatment in "Revenge of the Red Raiders" by Gaylor et al about 22nd BG, which references various other Japanese records in addition to kodochoso for some of same incidents mentioned in Wilson. Nor have I heard of any other case where comms intercepts info about Japanese losses is seriously at odds with written records, which even under the thesis of 'understated losses' wouldn't logically be the case, since the intercepts are of what local units reported by radio to higher Hq, which would presumably contain the same falsifications if there were any.

3. As with other cases the natural question is, the true figures determined how? quite possibly by seeing later that individual unit records didn't agree with what a commander had reported in aggregate. The discrepancy certainly isn't established by comparing to American claims, nor comms intercepts of the same misleading statemetns. Plus, two other factors enter into that situation and period which don't apply in earlier periods: lack of complete and fully organized record keeping at unit level (we can see in '42 and '43 ops that every engagement reported on Allied side is specifically reported on Japanese side, not true by mid 1944). And, this case is also dealing with overall numbers of serviceable a/c, not specific plane and pilot losses in combat. It can include all kinds of anomalies like existing but unserviceable a/c that don't apply in the more 'grass roots' cases.

3b. Highly incorrect reports of damage inflicted on the enemy not in dispute. That wasn't limited to the Japanese, and in other cases also the extent of overstatement is such to suggest it was at least partly deliberate.

4. IMO it's unlikely beyond a reasonable doubt, nothing is 100% certain, again I don't see why that's beyond the 100% barrier for the Aussie records either. Again, especially wrt mission reports which list each pilot by name on 500 mile each way missions. For the losses in such reports to be seriously inaccurate, more pilots would have to have failed to return. That's the part that's not plausible. For defensive missions there's always more room for debate about a/c recorded damaged and what really happened to them, and that can lead back in to the issue in point 3. Another random example is the first really successful P-39 combats v Zeroes Aug 26 1942 in NG, as the Zeroes took off from Buna. 2 Zeroes each of Tainan and 2nd group are listed as lost or written off, one other 2nd AG machine hit 10 times. That a/c was still there when the Allies took Buna field later in Dec '42, a Model 32, IIRC first 'Hamp' captured. Japanese personal accounts confirm it was the same plane. This wasn't a misreporting, but somebody who wants to strictly credit the P-39 with all possible successes might add it in. But faking the non-loss of a missing pilot seems to me exponentially more difficult and less likely, especially unlikely for the Japanese if we want to do 'the culture thing', to deny someone who died in combat that honor by just losing them in the records. I think it's very close to the 100% certainty mark that the 3 pilot KIA's in 202nd are all there were.

Joe


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## Freebird (Aug 11, 2010)

JoeB said:


> 3b. Highly incorrect reports of damage inflicted on the enemy not in dispute. That wasn't limited to the Japanese, and in other cases also the extent of overstatement is such to suggest it was at least partly deliberate.
> 
> 4. IMO it's unlikely beyond a reasonable doubt, nothing is 100% certain, again I don't see why that's beyond the 100% barrier for the Aussie records either.



From Joe's numbers, there may be some_ minor_ discrepancies, but it seems pretty clear that no matter how you massage the numbers it isn't going to change the end result - the Hurri P-40 lost more fighters than the Japanese did, and the Spit V wasn't much of an improvement over the Hurri, if any. (and may well have fared worse)

Joe, do you have numbers for # of japanese bomber kills in these same missions? Do the numbers match up with RCAF's?

There are some other things I'd like to know about the numbers you posted (28 Spits for 4 zeros, 19 P-40 for 8 zero)
How many of the allied losses resulted in the pilot killed? 
Further, did any of the Japanese pilots make it back to friendly territory?
Were all of these combats over friendly Allied territory?



> The 49th FG's combats over Australia in 1942, with numbers of fighters present and fighter losses, Darwin area v 3rd AG except as noted. Numbers of Allied a/c in contact includes contact with any enemy a/c in the attacking formation.
> Source: Baeza
> March 14, 1942 (Horn Island): 12 P-40’s v 12 Zeroes (4th AG); 1 P-40 and 2 Zeroes lost
> March 30: 8 P-40’s v 12 Zeroes; 1 P-40 lost, 1 P-40 belly landed
> ...


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## parsifal (Aug 11, 2010)

FB 

According to Wildcats earlier post, total Spitfire losses were 46 aircraft. These losses are from March through to the end of July (I think, you can check his earlier post).

According to the source I posted, the RAAF lost 30 Spits end of March through to June.

The figure Joe is posting is actually being conservative viz Allied losses. 


Joe you mentioned the possibility of some creativity on the allied side. In my opinion, I dont think there is any doubt about that. Caldwell after the debacle of the 1st Fighter wing came under a lot of pressure and criticism over the losses. I think if he could hide losses, he would have, judging by his subsequent behaviour.

You misread the intent of my posts. I was not defending the allies, I was merely questioning the accuracy and truthfulness of the reports on which all these conclusions are being drawn. it matters not to me whether they are allied or Japanese, I just believe the Japanese, for whatever reason, had a greater propensity to be innaccurate


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## Wildcat (Aug 11, 2010)

freebird said:


> How many of the allied losses resulted in the pilot killed?


For Spirfire losses and pilot outcome see post 75 on page 5 of this thread



freebird said:


> Further, did any of the Japanese pilots make it back to friendly territory?


Highly doubtful. Japanese aircrew shot down over Northern Australia faced two options - capture or death



freebird said:


> Were all of these combats over friendly Allied territory?


In regards to the Spitfire wing, yes. I believe so with the 49th as well.


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## renrich (Aug 11, 2010)

This thread seems to have moved rather far afield from the original subject so I would like to move it a little further. I believe that many of us have seen the statistics that the Hellcat had a fifteen to one kill ratio in the Pacific and the Corsair had an eleven to one and similar info about all the other types during WW2. We "know" that the Hellcat had 270 losses to EA in the PTO and the Corsair had 189. I am not sure if these numbers came from "Naval Aviation Combat Statistics" published in June 1946, but I feel sure that the numbers about the US losses are fairly accurate. However, after reading Lundstrom, "The First Team" and his other book and reading "Bloody Shambles" which seem to have thoroughly tried to reconcile Allied statistics with Japanese records, I have strong reservations about the number of Japanese aircraft downed by Allied AC in the Pacific and the CBI. These reservations extend to generally accepted info about Axis losses and kills in the ETO.

I guess where I am going with this is that as far as shoot downs are concerned in WW2, I feel pretty confident that the loss figures recorded by the US, Britain, Germany, Japan, Italy of their own aircraft are pretty accurate but I am becoming skeptical about the shootdowns claimed by those countries of their adversaries. In other words, it appears that the air war in the PTO and CBI, especially as far as air to air kills was not nearly as one sided overall as we have been led to believe. Obviously, the kill ratios during 1944-45 Kamikaze raids were one sided but I question the overall number of kills claimed by the Allied fighters during those raids.

Bottom line to me is that during WW2 as a whole the Japanese dedicated fighters competed very well with their Allied counterparts with the Allies having an edge which was not as great as we have been led to believe. I suspect that was true in the ETO also.


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## Freebird (Aug 11, 2010)

Wildcat said:


> For Spirfire losses and pilot outcome see post 75 on page 5 of this thread



Thanks Wildcat!



renrich said:


> This thread seems to have moved rather far afield from the original subject so I would like to move it a little further.
> 
> However, after reading Lundstrom, "The First Team" and his other book and reading "Bloody Shambles" which seem to have thoroughly tried to reconcile Allied statistics with Japanese records, I have strong reservations about the number of Japanese aircraft downed by Allied AC in the Pacific and the CBI. These reservations extend to generally accepted info about Axis losses and kills in the ETO.
> 
> Bottom line to me is that during WW2 as a whole the Japanese dedicated fighters competed very well with their Allied counterparts with the Allies having an edge which was not as great as we have been led to believe. I suspect that was true in the ETO also.



Good points.
I've started a new thread, so that we don't drag this one too far off-topic

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/pilot-claims-vs-actual-enemy-losses-discrepancy-25866.html


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## renrich (Aug 11, 2010)

Many thanks FB!


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## Glider (Aug 12, 2010)

I know that this posting isn't just about Spitfire and Zero tactics but believe it may be of interest. 

There are a number of new pieces of information and personally I found the use of depth charges on land to be novel, to say the least.

I was able to look at the report produced by the RAF when they investigated the air situation in Burma and China. I am afraid the copies I took are not worth posting onto the site. However the following is a summary.

*Japanese Pilots and Tactics*
Para 54 The main Japanese type is the Oscar with a small number of Tojo’s
Para 55 The Japanese seldom fly faster than 200mph to make the most of their agility.
Para 56 Pilots from the JNAF seem to have a slightly higher standard of flying. Recently the Japanese have started to use the finger 4 formation but the no 2’s stay very close to the no 1 which limits the advantage that might be gained.
Para 57 No suicide attacks have been noted
Para 58 The Japanese have been instructed not to attack high flying fighters. When in an attack Japanese tactics have been normal and shooting has been moderate. A deterioration in tactics has been noticed and put down to a general reduction in the quality of the Japanese pilots but there are a number of able experienced leaders.
Para 59 Japanese pilots have often used aerobatics in combat
Para 60 Japanese pilots have used dummy combats to lure fighters away from the bombers they are escorting
Para 61 Japanese no 2’s will sometimes deliberately straggle inviting an attack from the rear whereupon the leader will loop onto the attacker.

*Allied Types*
Para 62 The Hurricane is completely outclassed by the Japanese fighters and is confined to ground attack in which its specialised bombing technique has made it a remarkable success.
Para 63 The Spitfire is a success defensively but limited range prohibits full offensive ability

*Allied Tactics*
Para 66 Allied aircraft avoid in fighting as the Japanese have a clear advantage in manoeuvrability. Allied aircraft (except Hurricane) have the advantage in level and dive speed, zoom and in the case of the Spitfire climb.

*Bombing*
Para 80 Hurricanes attack using a 40 degree dive, 11 second delayed bombs are then released at minimum height pulling out at tree top level. Ony Hurricanes’ can do this type of attack as they don’t gather as much speed in the attack and don’t ‘mush’ when pulling out.
Para 81 Other types do a dive bomb attack 
Para 82 These types of attack can be used due to the almost non existent fighter opposition and light flak.

*Napalm*Para 88 Very effective it was noted that on the Irrawaddy during four months of heavy fighting only 20 prisoners were captured. After a Napalm attack an unprecedented 300 prisoners surrendered.

*Rocket Projectiles*
These are little used in direct support but experiments are in place using delayed fuses to see if they can penetrate bunkers covered with teak. They are very effective against river and other transport targets

*Depth Charges*
These are used on land to clear jungle and camouflage from potential targets. Its effective but gives warning so is only used in certain situations.

*Bazooka Rockets*
These are very ineffective and General Chennault wants these replaced with RP as targets are plentiful in China where there is little cover and movement can be seen


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## renrich (Aug 12, 2010)

Informative post, Glider, thanks to you. The info in your post is backed up in less detail by Shore's book.


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## Wildcat (Aug 12, 2010)

Glider said:


> There are a number of new pieces of information and personally I found the use of depth charges on land to be novel, to say the least.



Interesting post indeed. Although seldom talked about, the RAAF in the Pacific had also been using depth charges against enemy positions, off the top of my head, mainly by Beaufighters. Apparently they were quite effective against native huts in enemy occupied villages. Another improvised weapon used by RAAF Kittyhawks (and a few times by Spitfires) was the dropping of full drop tanks on the enemy. The follow up aircraft would then strafe the tank creating a kind of poor man's napalm attack.
Stockpiles of captured Japanese aerial bombs were also put to good use by Aussie Beauforts!


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## fastmongrel (Aug 13, 2010)

Glider said:


> *Depth Charges*
> These are used on land to clear jungle and camouflage from potential targets. Its effective but gives warning so is only used in certain situations.



How was the Depth charge fused to explode on land, was it fitted with a contact fuse. I cant imagine the depth charge had a fuse pocket capable of taking an airforce fuse.


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## Glider (Aug 13, 2010)

No idea but a contact fuse would be the most logical approach. The other thing I noticed was the use of delay fuses on rockets to penetrate before exploading. In both cases necessity is probably the mother of invention


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