# Brazil Air Crash



## Gnomey (Oct 4, 2006)

You have probably all heard about the air crash in Brazil where are full loaded 737 came down in the Amazon Rainforest with no survivors. It seems it had a mid-air collision with a Business Jet, attached is an article by one of the passengers on that jet (published on the NY Times website).

BBC NEWS | Americas | Amazon crash pilot passports held
BBC NEWS | Americas | Amazon plane 'black boxes' found
BBC NEWS | Americas | Brazil mourns air crash victims

It is in a zip because the word document was to large to upload, just extract to read.

NY Times Article: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/03/b...en=e400a2a6d73b9dca&hp&ex=1159934400&adxnnl=0


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## FLYBOYJ (Oct 4, 2006)

Been reading this today. Both aircraft were at 37,000. The biz jet allegedly had its transponder off, but was talking to ATC and ignored an order to descend to 36,000 (ATC would of really bitched bout this since they were in "A" airspace, Airspace above 18,000 feet). Bottom line I can't see how ATC would allow this, even in Brazil. Something is really fishy here.....


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## Matt308 (Oct 5, 2006)

I read that they are contemplating charging them with manslaughter. Ooof. Why would they have their transponder off in Class A airspace? It is an ICAO requirement and is not MEL deferrable.


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## FLYBOYJ (Oct 5, 2006)

Yep!


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## pbfoot (Oct 5, 2006)

The fact it happened in a remote part of Brasil where radar coverage would be possibly non existent I'm not sure but I have worked in areas where there was no radar for the ACC 's Not too different then flying Oceanic when separation of traffic is maintained by time and altitude. did the transponder pack it in or was the lateral and verticle separation comprimised by false reporting by the aircrew or a screw up by ATC it all happens. Remember that all ATC's work without radar more then you might think.


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## FLYBOYJ (Oct 5, 2006)

pbfoot said:


> The fact it happened in a remote part of Brasil where radar coverage would be possibly non existent I'm not sure but I have worked in areas where there was no radar for the ACC 's Not too different then flying Oceanic when separation of traffic is maintained by time and altitude. did the transponder pack it in or was the lateral and verticle separation comprimised by false reporting by the aircrew or a screw up by ATC it all happens. Remember that all ATC's work without radar more then you might think.


True, but ATC was in communication with them and allegedly told them to decend from 37,000 to 36,000 ft. With that statement made, how did ATC know they were at 37 if they didn't have radar coverage?


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## k9kiwi (Oct 6, 2006)

By asking.

ATC is in voice contact, no radar, asks for altitude and gets told. Also possibly from last known altitude if they had their transponders on at all during the flight.


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## FLYBOYJ (Oct 6, 2006)

k9kiwi said:


> By asking.
> 
> ATC is in voice contact, no radar, asks for altitude and gets told. Also possibly from last known altitude if they had their transponders on at all during the flight.


And they would also asked about the transponder (which the aircraft would of gotten a squawk code prior to departure considering they were on an IFR flight plan). If the aircraft was in an area where there was no radar coverage, then the transponder being on or off is a non issue, but considering Brazilian Authorities brought it up it seems that there is something not right here. There should be ATC Tapes of the whole situation, I'd like to hear what they have to say....

The point here if they were flying in "A" airspace, they would of filed a flight plan and would of received a squawk code prior to take off. Had that transponder been turned off or not transmitting ATC would of been asking immediately what the problem was. If radar contact was not possible, then this statement about the transponder being off is a smokescreen...


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## FLYBOYJ (Oct 6, 2006)

k9kiwi said:


> By asking.
> 
> ATC is in voice contact, no radar, asks for altitude and gets told. Also possibly from last known altitude if they had their transponders on at all during the flight.


In most places you are not flying in "A" airspace without radar contact (Pb did mention that there are some areas where radar contact is unavailable).


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## pbfoot (Oct 6, 2006)

I might be a little out of date but isn't 2000 ft the verticle separation at high level can;t recall giving fl360 the instruction probably would or should be worded "callsign descend to or climb to fl 360 immediatly for traffic avoidance" and did the light guy have his altimeter set at standard or 29.92 and who cleared both aircraft to fl370 initially and the fact the light guy was on a ferry flight from factory did the a/c have a snag


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## FLYBOYJ (Oct 6, 2006)

pbfoot said:


> I might be a little out of date but isn't 2000 ft the verticle separation at high level can;t recall giving fl360 the instruction probably would or should be worded "callsign descend to or climb to fl 360 immediatly for traffic avoidance" and did the light guy have his altimeter set at standard or 29.92 and who cleared both aircraft to fl370 initially and the fact the light guy was on a ferry flight from factory did the a/c have a snag


I think it's 1000'. And good points there - I see no rational reason why the guys in the corporate jet would of switched off their transponder. I think someone really screwed the pooch and it's easy to blame the living....

The plot thickens...


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## Gnomey (Oct 6, 2006)

FLYBOYJ said:


> I think it's 1000'. And good points there - I see no rational reason why the guys in the corporate jet would of switched off their transponder. I think someone really screwed the pooch and it's easy to blame the living....
> 
> The plot thickens...



Unfortunately that is the case. Yep, I am now interested to see where this goes.


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## Matt308 (Oct 6, 2006)

It was 2000ft (at least in US). But in Class A and RVSM, it is now 1000ft. Don't know about Brazil. Also, nobody has mentioned TCAS. I see lots of talk about transponders, but the aircraft transponder can be Mode A, Mode C or Mode S. Each mode provides different information about the aircraft and flight profile. ICAO requires an Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) for some operations. In the US, TCAS is required and is the means of compliance. With TCAS (depending upon revision), both aircraft would have received either (worst case) a Traffic Adviosry (TA) instructing pilots of traffic location for situation awareness or a Resolution Advisory (RA) instructing pilots for coordinated maneuvers.

Irrespective, each aircraft certificated under Federal Regulation Part 25 (JAR 25 for the Europeans) would be required to have a cockpit voice recorder in accordance with the operating rules. The voice recorder has 2 hours of continuous recording of all PTT initiated communication, as well as area mic of the cockpit environment.

If ATC instructed either aircraft for a flight level change, it will be in crash survivable memory for the 737 and will certainly be on the Embraer. Assuming the 737 VCR did not survive (unlikely), recordings may be lost still. The only way that the Embraer might not have the recording is if the recorder was faulty (it happens more often than you think) or the pilots pushed the cockpit intitiated bulk erase feature. While that would be an aggregious act by the pilots, it has been done before.


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## pbfoot (Oct 6, 2006)

I tend not to guess to much about air incidents I've guessed wrong more then once something sounds screwed up with ATC if the aircraft were at the same altitude and in the same vicinity you would instruct both aircraft to change altitude one up ...one down and determine the cause of the conflict later "pull the tapes" all the search radar tapes and voice tapes but there are so many variables and we have access to about 25% of the info


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## Chief (Oct 6, 2006)

Is there a draw back to having the transponder on the whole flight? Just wondering.


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## FLYBOYJ (Oct 7, 2006)

Chief said:


> Is there a draw back to having the transponder on the whole flight? Just wondering.


ATC knows where you are at all times by having it on - basically it's the law to have one in class "A" airspace (above 18,000 feet) or within a 30 mile ring of a class "B" airspace (airspace around a "Big" airport), explained in simple terms....


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## FLYBOYJ (Oct 7, 2006)

pbfoot said:


> I tend not to guess to much about air incidents I've guessed wrong more then once something sounds screwed up with ATC if the aircraft were at the same altitude and in the same vicinity you would instruct both aircraft to change altitude one up ...one down and determine the cause of the conflict later "pull the tapes" all the search radar tapes and voice tapes but there are so many variables and we have access to about 25% of the info



You hit the nail on the head my friend!


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## FLYBOYJ (Oct 7, 2006)

This in today...

RIO DE JANEIRO (AFP) - Six days after a mid-air collision over the Amazon jungle killed 154 people in Brazil's worst air tragedy, a raft of key questions about what caused the disaster went unanswered. 

A small business jet, with two US pilots, and a GOL airline's Boeing 737 collided; the smaller plane managed to land safely, but the GOL jet's passengers and crew perished on the jungle floor.

Brazilian authorities on Wednesday detained two US pilots to face possible manslaughter charges. Joseph Lepore and Jan Paladino were the pilot and co-pilot of an Embraer Legacy 600 business jet that collided last Friday with a Boeing 737 belonging to GOL airline at 11,200 meters (37,000 feet).

A judge in Mato Grasso state, where the GOL plane crashed, ordered their passports confiscated.

GOL revised the death toll in the crash from 155 to 154 people killed, saying it had counted one passenger twice.

Investigators want to know why the Legacy's anti-collision system failed to work, *and why the pilot had turned off the plane's radio*.?????

The radio was working, for they used it to issue a mayday call and eventually to find the military airport they landed at. According to police, the pilot was out of the cabin when the radio signal was interrupted.

Among the looming questions: Was the tragedy a result of pilot error by someone flying the Legacy? Was it caused by a Brazilian air traffic controller? Or was there a mechanical malfunction?

Authorities believe only the full investigation, which they said should take about 90 days, will tell.

The Boeing's "black boxes" were found seriously damaged, and were sent to Canada to be examined by experts.

Lepore and Paladino have been questioned twice by Mato Grosso police. They made their emergency landing at the Serra do Cachimbo military base there.

In Washington, the State Department said the United States was following the probe.

"We have been in touch with the Brazilian Government about this issue and also have been, through our consular officials, talking with the individuals involved," said Tom Casey, a State Department spokesman.

"But my understanding is they are not charged with any criminal violations. This is simply part of a standard procedure that the Brazilians are applying under their law as they proceed with the investigation," he said.

Other questions up in the air include: Why did the anti-collision system not work at the moment of impact? Why did the system start working again later? Why was the Legacy in the air route reserved for the GOL jet? Why did communication between the Legacy and the control tower in Brasilia fail?

According to the flight plan, the Legacy left from Sao Jose dos Campos, in Sao Paulo state, ans was supposed to drop to 36,000 feet on its way into Brasilia headed for Manaus, capital of Amazonas state, where it was supposed to have a stopover en route to the United States.

The pilots told police they lost contact with the Brasilia control tower minutes before the impact, raising the hypothesis of a problem with the Brazilian-made Legacy's anti-collision system.

Embraer, which makes the Legacy, on Thursday declined to comment on an ongoing investigation. 

Meanwhile, some 200 Brazilian troops remained on the ground picking through bits and pieces of the aircraft and recovering victims' remains, in an operation that is slow and difficult in the jungle. Remains of about 50 people have been moved out so far, authorities said Thursday.


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## Matt308 (Oct 7, 2006)

Does Brazil rely upon ATCRBS and Primary Radar or is Brazil an ADS-B country? Hmmm. I can't believe only the latter, but perhaps over the jungle? Lots of space.


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## evangilder (Oct 7, 2006)

Mysterious stuff. The wording on this question kind of made me laugh: "Why did the anti-collision system not work at the moment of impact?" If they collided, then it wasn't working _before _the impact either!


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## Gnomey (Oct 7, 2006)

evangilder said:


> Mysterious stuff. The wording on this question kind of made me laugh: "Why did the anti-collision system not work at the moment of impact?" If they collided, then it wasn't working _before _the impact either!



Yep! I am beginning to think that someone or a number of people ****ed up big time somewhere and this was the result.


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## pbfoot (Oct 19, 2006)

I found a bit more on the story apparentlly the the Legacy *was not being tracked on radar *and was following his flight plan he had been cleared to fl370 and upon making a turn had descended to fl360 as per flight plan . This info was released after reviewing the radar tapes . I'm going to guess that the radar tapes are possibly from the brasilian air defence radar


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## FLYBOYJ (Oct 19, 2006)

pbfoot said:


> I found a bit more on the story apparentlly the the Legacy *was not being tracked on radar *and was following his flight plan he had been cleared to fl370 and upon making a turn had descended to fl360 as per flight plan . This info was released after reviewing the radar tapes . I'm going to guess that the radar tapes are possibly from the brasilian air defence radar


INTERESTING! I haven't heard much on this lately.


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## pbfoot (Oct 28, 2006)

here is another tidbit:

Did Not Notice Legacy's Transponder Was Inactive
An unidentified Brazilian air traffic controller, working at the center responsible for directing traffic in the area where a Gol airlines 737 and a private business jet collided last month, told Newsday controllers had more than an hour to notice the smaller aircraft's transponder wasn't working at the time of the fatal accident that claimed 154 people.

The controller -- who stressed he was not involved in directing the planes involved in the accident -- also says controllers had plenty of time to notice the planes were on a collision course, even without the avoidance equipment.

"It is always our responsibility to maintain the separations," said the controller. "In this case, when you don't know the altitude, it is very dangerous." "I would have preferred to move them laterally, but it is always our responsibility to keep them separated."

As Aero-News reported, authorities have said controllers at two centers -- Brasilia, where the controller interviewed by Newsday works, and Manaus -- had directed the aircraft to the same altitude of 37,000 feet. All onboard the 737 were lost; amazingly, those onboard the bizjet, an Embraer Legacy 600 on a delivery flight to the US, survived after the plane's pilots executed an emergency landing.



Those pilots -- Americans Jan Paladino and Joseph Lepore -- had their passports immediately after the accident, and are still being held in Brazil. The two men say they were operating under control of the Brasilia center.

The Legacy's transponder apparently failed some time before the crash. The failure was not noticed by the pilots, or by controllers.



"Airspace Control [personnel] should have the main responsibility for monitoring and controlling aircraft," said Renato Claudio Costa Pereira, a retired Air Force major general who led the International Civil Aviation Organization for six years until 2003. "Transponders and TCAS [electronic collision avoidance equipment] are to be used as a last resort in any traffic conflict emergency."

A spokesman for the Brazilian Air Force, which oversees all air traffic control operations in the country, declined to comment


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## FLYBOYJ (Oct 28, 2006)

BINGO!! A Smoking Gun!

There is no reason for these seemingly professional corporate pilots to risk their career by "purposely" turning off their transponder while in A airspace. I'm sorry but I have to say they were the easy scapegoats becuase they came out alive and because they were Americans.....


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## Matt308 (Oct 29, 2006)

They found the orange boxes. Not sure if they found FDR, CVR or both. Anyone heard anything about content?


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## Matt308 (Nov 1, 2006)

While just rumour, I have it on fairly good source that the Legacy pilots may have been "goofing around". Nothing to back that up, but those are the rumblings at the office.

If true, they are in deep kimchee.


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## FLYBOYJ (Nov 1, 2006)

Matt308 said:


> While just rumour, I have it on fairly good source that the Legacy pilots may have been "goofing around". Nothing to back that up, but those are the rumblings at the office.
> 
> If true, they are in deep kimchee.



Off the top I find that unlikely...

There was no report of anything unusual happening except their transponder not functioning. - I think radar might of been able to track them "squawkless" and if so would of shown changes in altitude in excess of IFR requirements...


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## Matt308 (Nov 1, 2006)

Don't know. But with lots of critical equipment "off" seems strange. Folks from our office are involved in investigation. But what I noted above is PURELY rumour.

Their VHF radio was also off. Not sure what that means as there is not an OFF button on the audio control panel for a particular radio that I'm aware of for TSO-C37/C38 equipment installed in Part 25 airplanes. It may be that they were (1) either not monitoring VHF1, VHF2 and/or VHF3 or (2) they were not monitoring proper ATC freq.

Too many plain silly deviations from normal operation to be comprehensible.


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## pbfoot (Nov 1, 2006)

A search radar should be able to track a primary target meaning the actual reflection of the radar off the aircraft skin rather then the secondary which is the transponder but it depends on so much such as the gains on the radar mti degrades the signal ,atmospherics 
But it still boils down to whether the ATC instruction caused the conflict or disobeying the instruction. It is not uncommon to control IMC procedurally or without radar


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## FLYBOYJ (Nov 1, 2006)

Based on what was already posted I think the ATC guys screwed the pooch...


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## Matt308 (Nov 2, 2006)

I guess we'll have to wait for the tapes. They still claim they attempted to contact the Legacy airplane four times. We'll see.


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## Matt308 (Nov 3, 2006)

Seattle Times - World Report Friday November 3, 2006

"The flight recorder transcript from the executive jet involved in Brazil's worst air disaster shows its American pilots were told by air traffic control to fly at the same altitude as a Boeing 737 before the planes collided over the Amazon rainforest, a newspaper reported Thursday.

Pilot Joseph Lepore was told by the tower in Sao Jose' dos Campos to maintain an altitude of 37,000 feet as he flew the jet beyond Brasilia' on a northwest path to Manaus, the Folha de S. Paulo quoted the transcript as saying. That altitude contradicted the pilots' filed flight plan as well as established norms, which reserve odd-numbered altitudes for southbound flights.

The Defense Ministry was not able to confirm the report."

Given that the flight recorder sources from the Audio Control Panel and not from the radios directly, this would seem to indicate that the claims of the controllers attempting to contact the Legacy aircraft are false. The only way to conclusively tell if this were so, would be to obtain the ground recordings too. However, as FBJ noted, it certainly does not look like that scenario is going to play out. It seems highly unlikely that the Legacy pilots would be monitoring ATC, accept and act upon a flight level change, and then cease monitoring the same channel.

This does raise some interesting questions that are likely to be raised in civil courts. ATC controls the airspace and has a primary job of maintaining separation. The airspace has well known and published procedural means of maintaining differing flight levels for airspace users (even/odd flight levels depending upon direction traveled). And pilots are ultimately responsible for the continued safe flight and landing of their aircraft. These roles and responsibilities have often times been challenged in the past.


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## FLYBOYJ (Nov 3, 2006)

Bingo!


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## Gnomey (Dec 8, 2006)

US pilots charged in Brazil crash
The Brazilian authorities have charged two United States pilots with endangering air safety following the country's worst aviation disaster.

BBC NEWS | Americas | US pilots charged in Brazil crash


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## Matt308 (Dec 8, 2006)

Damn! I thought they just released them!


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## Matt308 (Dec 8, 2006)

Sorry N-6-0-0-X-L has been translated by the forum to be N60L.

This information from G1 > Colunistas > Entrelinhas

Control of Air traffic 
At 15:51 o'clock (schedule of Brasília), there was the last bilateral contact of N60L with the Brasília Center. (Freq. 125.05 MHz) 
At 15:55 o'clock, N60L flew over the vertical of VOR of Brasília, maintaining the level of flight 370 and entering in the airway UZ6, without to request or to receive any instruction of the Brasília Center. 
At 16:02 o'clock, there was the loss of information of the secondary radar with N60L, that introduces to the controller, accurately, the altitude information. 
Among 15:51 (schedule of Brasília) and 16:26 (schedule of Brasília), there was not any contact attempt, nor on the part of N60L, nor on the part of the Brasília Center. 
At 16:30 o'clock (schedule of Brasília) there was momentary loss (2 minutes) of the contact primary radar with N60L, that transmits to the controller the geographical position of the aircraft. 

Starting from the 16:26 (schedule of Brasília), the BR Center accomplished seven calls: 
16:26 
16:27 
16h30min40 
16h30min56 
16:32 
16:34 
16h53min39 

At 16:38 o'clock (schedule of Brasília) the Brasília Center lost the contact primary radar definitively with N60L, until it transfer for the Amazonian Center. 
At 16h53min39 (schedule of Brasília), the Brasília Center made the last call, blindly, informing N60L to call the Amazonian Center, supplying two frequencies: 123.32Mhz and alternative 126.45Mhz. 

Flight of N60L 
N60L, at 16h48min16 o'clock (schedule of Brasília), it began a series of 12 calls to the Brasília Center: 
16h48min16 
16h48min40 
16h49min33 
16h50min08 
16h50min28 
16h50min48 
16h51min08 
16h51min24 
16h51min41 
16h52min10 
16h52min42 
16h52min59 

At 16h53min39 o'clock (schedule of Brasília), N60L got to hear Brasília's Center last call, blindly, guiding to call the Amazonian Center, without getting to copy the frequencies. 
At 16h53min57 o'clock (schedule of Brasília), N60L answered to the Brasília Center asking so that they were repeated the decimals of the first informed frequency, because he didn't get to copy them. The Center didn't receive this message. 
After this moment, N60L accomplished more seven calls to the Brasília Center: 
16h54min16 
16h54min40 
16h55min00 
16h55min43 
16h56min41 
16h56min53 
16h55min16 
At 16h56min54 o'clock (schedule of Brasília) it happens the collision. 

General Considerations 
Not happened any loss of contact radar for the Amazonian Center with the flight 1907, until it transfer for the Brasília Center. 
There are no request registrations of N60L to the control organs, to accomplish level change, after having reached the level of flight 370. 
There are no registrations of any instruction of the control to N60L, in the sense that level changes were accomplished, after the last contact bilateral good happened between that aircraft and the Brasília Center. 
The aircrafts were, in the airway UZ6, in opposite directions, in the level of flight 370. 

The system TCAS (System embarked to avoid Collision in Flight), existent in both aircrafts, it didn't emit any warning of alert of traffic or of instruction for evasive action, for the respective crews, in the sense of avoiding the collision. 
There was not manifestation, for none of the crews, regarding a possible previous visual perception of the approach of the aircrafts. 
It didn't happen any action attempt or it maneuvers evasive, in agreement with the existent data in the flight tape recorders. 
At 16h56min54 o'clock (schedule of Brasília) there was a COLLISION, possibly, between the left wing of N60L and the left wing of the flight 1907. 
The flight 1907, after the collision, was uncontrollable to the pilots, beginning immediate dive until the soil. 
The tape recorders of flight data (CVR and DFDR) of the flight 1907 had it operation interrupted to 7887ft of altitude. 
After this moment, N60L accomplished 09 (nine) calls to the Brasília Center: 
16h57min47 
16h58min09 
16h58min47 
17h02min40 
17h03min11 
17h03min41 
17h03min50 
17h04min03 

At 16h59min50 o'clock (schedule of Brasília), approximately three minutes after the collision, the Amazonian Center started to receive information of the secondary radar, with precise altitude needs and identification code allocated N60L. 
At 17h00min30 o'clock (schedule of Brasília), the Amazonian Center accomplished a call to N60L, without obtaining answer. 
At 17h01min22 o'clock (schedule of Brasília) N60L tried to establish communication with the Amazonian Center, through the Polar 71, requesting coordination to accomplish a landing in Test Field Brig. Veloso. 
At 17h02min10 o'clock (schedule of Brasília), the Amazonian Center started to receive information of the secondary radar, originating from of the change of the code transponder of N60L, for 7700 (EMERGENCY). 
At 17h03min11 o'clock (schedule of Brasília) N60L, after the collision, declared EMERGENCY, without getting communication with the Brasília Center, and it began procedures to accomplish an emergency landing. 
The Amazonian Center accomplished more four calls to N60L, without obtaining answer: 
17h10min41 
17h10min50 
17h11min00 
17h12min44 

At 17h13min16 o'clock (schedule of Brasília) the Polar 71 established communication with the Amazonian Center declaring the situation of EMERGENCY of N60L. 

Accomplished actions 
Recovery of the data of the registrars of flight of N60L and of the flight 1907. 
Interviews and medical examinations with the crew members of Legacy. (02/10) 
All requested the data registered by the Control of Air traffic, relative the occurrence. (02/10) 
Tests preliminaries of equipments in the Legacy (07/10/06). 
Verification of the wreckage of the 737-800, in the place of the accident. 
Reading and processing of the data of the flight registrars, of both aircrafts, except the voice registrar (CVR), of the flight 1907, in TSB Ottawa, Canada. 
Preliminary analysis of the recordings and transcriptions of the communications between the aircrafts and control organs. 
Verification of the equipments of the wreckage of the flight 1907. 
Send of the voice registrar (CVR) of the flight 1907 for the Laboratory of TSB, Ottawa, Canada. 
Verification of the data, relative the visualization radar, registered by the organs of control of the air space, with works accomplished in the dependences of CINDACTA 1, in Brasília, and in the dependences of CINDACTA 4, in Manaus. 

Next actions 
Analyses of the equipments of radio and navigation, communication, transponder and TCAS, of the aircrafts, they be accomplished at laboratory. 
Interviews with the controllers of Air traffic. 
Relative works to the air traffic, they be accomplished in the USA, to invitation of FAA, for analysis, among other subjects, of the norms and prerequisites for American pilots fly in the exterior. 
Works and interviews with the operators. 

Summarize of the current situation 
Collects of data still given no completed and initiate analyses for focal points, among other, related the: 
Operation of Transponder and equipments of radio and navigation of the aircraft N60L; 
Knowledge and preparation foreseen the pilots of N60L, for the accomplishment of the flight in Brazil; 
Relative aspects to norms and procedures of the Control of Air traffic, now in use in Brazil and in the world; 
Systems and equipments of communications and system of surveillance of the Control of Air traffic. 
In the moment, any conclusion will be premature 
Recommendations can be emitted, before the final conclusion of the investigation process. 
Data factuals and recommendations of flight safety, will be informed to the public.


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## pbfoot (Dec 8, 2006)

I thought all the transcripts would have been in the language of ATC english with maybe the exception of the crew chat of the GOL that transcript sounds convoluted .


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## Matt308 (Dec 9, 2006)

And according to ICAO Annex 6 you are right Pb. This is only internet...stuff. However, it is insightful to follow the supposed timelines.


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## pbfoot (Jun 2, 2007)

A little update
Sat, 02 Jun '07

Lepore, Paladino Due In Court In August
Two US pilots and four air traffic controllers were indicted by a Brazilian judge Friday, on manslaughter-related charges stemming from a September 2006 midair collision that killed 154 people onboard a Gol Airlines 737.

The Associated Press reports Judge Murilo Mendes accepted charges made by a federal prosecutor last week. The decision has not been published yet in the official Brazilian newspaper Diario Oficial, according to court spokesman Fabio Paz. When that happens, those indicted will have five days to appeal the charges.

As ANN reported, an Embraer Legacy 600 piloted by Joseph Lepore and Jan Paladino clipped the 737. The bizjet was able to made an emergency landing with its wingtip missing; the 737 crashed into the Amazon jungle following the September 29 accident.

Both pilots have denied any wrongdoing in the accident. The two aircraft collided at 37,000 feet, an altitude normally reserved by ICAO guidelines for eastbound aircraft. Lepore and Paladino were flying on a northwesterly heading, and wouldn't normally have been at that altitude... but Paladino said they were flying at an altitude assigned by ATC, adding, "Air traffic controllers have responsibility to manage that traffic."

"We were compliant with all regulations," Paladino said in a December interview. "We were doing exactly what we were supposed to be doing, and we just experienced, automatically, just a jolt out of nowhere."

Lepore and Paladino were detained in a Rio de Janeiro hotel for over two months following the accident. They were allowed to leave Brazil in December, but not before being charged by police for "endangering air safety." Both men are expected to appear before a Brazilian court for interrogation on August 27.

Air traffic controllers Jomarcelo Fernandes Dos Santos, Lucivando Tiburcio De Alencar, Leandro Jose Santos De Barros and Felipe Santos Dos Reis will appear before the court the next day.



Both pilots and three of the controllers face charges similar to involuntary manslaughter for their alleged roles in the accident, and face 1-3 years in prison if convicted. A fourth controller is charged with the more serious crime of knowingly exposing an aircraft to danger.

Joel Weiss, the attorney for the pilots, stressed the judge's decision Friday "has nothing to do with guilt or innocence," but rather whether or not the prosecutor's allegations should be presented before the court.



"The pilots' conduct was completely competent throughout the flight and cannot be fairly characterized as criminal," Weiss told the AP. "The allegations against the pilots are inaccurate, and the pilots are innocent."

An investigation into the accident is still ongoing


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## DOUGRD (Jun 3, 2007)

Remember a couple of years ago when that Russian Pax jet collided with the trash hauler? Their TCAS told them one thing and ATC told them different. They elected to trust ATC rather than their TCAS and turned and/or decended right into the cargo a/c. Makes you wonder?


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