# WW2 Aviation Mythbusters



## FLYBOYJ (Dec 5, 2011)

We have had some good discussions regarding certain claims made over the years that were taken as "facts" on face value and when researched turned out to be myths, fabricated stories, or unsubstantiated stories. The purpose of this thread is to identify and discuss those claims and either validate them as fact or pass them off as a myth, kind of a "Myth Busters" of this site.

I'll begin by listing a few of my favorites. Discuss these or bring up your own. Let games begin but remain civil while being firm!

1. The Flying Tigers NEVER fought against the Zero (A6M).

2. The term "Gabelschwanzteufel" or "Forked Tail Devil" was never used by Luftwaffe pilots to describe the P-38.

3. Robert L. Scott (God is my Co-Pilot) was NEVER a Flying Tiger.

4. The USS Arizona DID NOT have a bomb go down its smoke stack during the Pearl Harbor attack.


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## cimmex (Dec 5, 2011)

I’m not sure about “Gabelschwanzteufel”. About1975 the grandfather of my wife who stayed as soldier in southern Italy used this term when he talked about his adventures during the war. I cannot imagine that he had this word from a book after the war. It sound more like a 
common word of a infantry solder who was attacked by P-38s
Regards
cimmex


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## FLYBOYJ (Dec 5, 2011)

cimmex said:


> I’m not sure about “Gabelschwanzteufel”. About1975 the grandfather of my wife who stayed as soldier in southern Italy used this term when he talked about his adventures during the war. I cannot imagine that he had this word from a book after the war. It sound more like a
> common word of a infantry solder who was attacked by P-38s
> Regards
> cimmex



Great info! This sounds more like the truth rather than the term coming from the Luftwaffe, at least you heard this from an actual combat veteran!


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## mikewint (Dec 5, 2011)

very cool thread FBJ, Read Scotts book as a young kid and watched the movie. from Belden, Jack (1942-08-20). "Chennault Fights to Hold the China Front". Life: pp. 70. 
Scott was executive and operations officer of the Assam-Burma-China (Ferry) Command, forerunner of the famous Air Transport Command flying the Hump from India to China to supply the Kuomintang government. When the commanding officer left for China on June 17, Scott was actually left in command of the operation for several days. Anxious to get into combat he had obtained the use of a Republic P-43 Lancer, actually assigned to the Flying Tigers by Claire Chennault, with which he flew at least one high altitude mission over Mt. Everest. Scott began flying missions *with* the Flying Tigers, flying a P-40 as a single ship escort for the transports and flying ground attack missions. During this period, he frequently repainted the propeller spinner in different colors to create the illusion of a much larger fighter force in the area than a single aircraft becoming, in effect, a "one-man air force".
Is flying WITH the same as BEING ONE OF?


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## FLYBOYJ (Dec 5, 2011)

mikewint said:


> very cool thread FBJ, Read Scotts book as a young kid and watched the movie. from Belden, Jack (1942-08-20). "Chennault Fights to Hold the China Front". Life: pp. 70.
> Scott was executive and operations officer of the Assam-Burma-China (Ferry) Command, forerunner of the famous Air Transport Command flying the Hump from India to China to supply the Kuomintang government. When the commanding officer left for China on June 17, Scott was actually left in command of the operation for several days. Anxious to get into combat he had obtained the use of a Republic P-43 Lancer, actually assigned to the Flying Tigers by Claire Chennault, with which he flew at least one high altitude mission over Mt. Everest. Scott began flying missions *with* the Flying Tigers, flying a P-40 as a single ship escort for the transports and flying ground attack missions. During this period, he frequently repainted the propeller spinner in different colors to create the illusion of a much larger fighter force in the area than a single aircraft becoming, in effect, a "one-man air force".
> Is flying WITH the same as BEING ONE OF?



Yes, saw that! At this time he was actually in the AAF and was never shown as a real member of the AVG. Here's a site listing members, looks pretty complete.

Flying Tiger Association Unit Rosters


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 5, 2011)

How about the myth that the 332nd "Tuskegee Airmen" never lost a bomber. 

Hollywood seems to be running with that one now, and many people refuse to see that it is only a myth.


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## FLYBOYJ (Dec 5, 2011)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> How about the myth that the 332nd "Tuskegee Airmen" never lost a bomber.
> 
> Hollywood seems to be running with that one now, and my people refuse to see that it is only a myth.



Good one! I was going to bring that up. Check out that Wiki has (with references)

_On 24 March 1945, during the war, the Chicago Defender said that no bomber escorted by the Tuskegee Airmen had ever been lost to enemy fire, under the headline: "332nd Flies Its 200th Mission Without Loss";[50] the article was based on information supplied by the 15th Air Force.[51][52]

This statement was repeated for many years, and not publicly challenged because of the esteem of the Tuskegee Airmen, until 2004 when long-time Tuskegee admirer William Holton conducted research into wartime action reports.[53] Alan Gropman, a professor at the National Defense University, disputed the initial refutations of the no-loss myth, and said he researched more than 200 Tuskegee Airmen mission reports and found no bombers were lost to enemy fighters.[53] The Air Force conducted a reassessment of the history of the unit in late 2006.[53] The subsequent report, based on after-mission reports filed by both the bomber units and Tuskegee fighter groups, as well as missing air crew records and witness testimony, documented *25 bombers shot down by enemy fighter aircraft while being escorted by the Tuskegee Airmen*.[54]

One mission report states that on 26 July 1944: "1 B-24 seen spiraling out of formation in T/A (target area) after attack by E/A (enemy aircraft). No chutes seen to open." A second report, dated 31 August 1944, praises group commander Colonel Davis by saying, he "so skillfully disposed his squadrons that in spite of the large number of enemy fighters, the bomber formation suffered only a few losses."[55] William Holloman, of Tuskegee Airmen Inc., a group of surviving Tuskegee pilots and their supporters, a Tuskegee airman who taught Black Studies at the University of Washington, and who chaired the Airmen's history committee, was reported by the Times as saying his review of records confirmed bombers had been lost.[53] According to the 28 March 2007 Air Force report, some bombers under 332nd Fighter Group escort protection were even shot down on the day the Chicago Defender article was published.[51]_


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## mikewint (Dec 5, 2011)

the Arizona "bomb down the smoke stack" is a pretty well known myth though how it got started is questionable since the actual evidence is indisputable. there were 4 bomb hits. The last bomb hit at 08:06 in the vicinity of Turret II, likely penetrating the armored deck near the ammunition magazines located in the forward section of the ship. Not enough of the ship is intact to judge the exact location. About seven seconds after the hit, the forward magazines detonated in a cataclysmic explosion, mostly venting through the sides of the ship and destroying much of the interior structure of the forward part of the ship. The explosion killed 1,177 of the crew touching off fierce fires that burned for two days.
There are two theories about the cause of the explosion. The first is that that the bomb detonated in or near the black powder magazine used for the ship's saluting guns and catapult charges. This would have detonated first and then ignited the smokeless powder magazine which was used for the ship's main armament. Alternatively, the bomb penetrated the armored decks and detonated directly inside one of the starboard magazines for the main armament. The surviving physical evidence is insufficient to determine the cause of the magazine explosion.


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## tyrodtom (Dec 5, 2011)

I think the myth of the bomb down the smoke stack might have started from the famous film of the Arizona's magazine blowing, it shoots a tremendous shot of smoke out of one of it's smokestacks, some people probably mistook that for evidence that a bomb went down the smokestack and exploded.


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## vikingBerserker (Dec 5, 2011)

I like this thread!


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## Milosh (Dec 5, 2011)

The Bf109 was fitted with MG151 cowl guns and a Mk103.


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## parsifal (Dec 5, 2011)

I'm intrigued about the Flying Tigers and the Zero. I accept that the AVG never flew against the Type 0 before December 1941, but I do know that Chennault is credited with submitting a report on its flying qualities. If his men never saw it, and the report was submitted, where did he get his information from?


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## Vincenzo (Dec 5, 2011)

Chinese?


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## FLYBOYJ (Dec 5, 2011)

parsifal said:


> I'm intrigued about the Flying Tigers and the Zero. I accept that the AVG never flew against the Type 0 before December 1941, but I do know that Chennault is credited with submitting a report on its flying qualities. If his men never saw it, and the report was submitted, where did he get his information from?


Got the info from the Chinese when they flew against it in northern China before WW2 offically started.


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## FLYBOYJ (Dec 5, 2011)

_On 13 September 1940, the Zeros scored their first air-to-air victories when 13 A6M2s led by Lieutenant Saburo Shindo attacked 27 Soviet-built Polikarpov I-15s and I-16s of the Chinese Nationalist Air Force, shooting down all the fighters without loss to themselves. By the time they were redeployed a year later, the Zeros had shot down 99 Chinese aircraft_


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## vanir (Dec 5, 2011)

Milosh said:


> The Bf109 was fitted with MG151 cowl guns and a Mk103.



I got this one. Price made the mistake of putting a photo of the first 109K prototype with the old 605D/C3 test motor and it had a couple of MG151. It wasn't flown afaik, just a mock up. Anyway he published it in the 60s and the caption reads 109K. Everyone thought the real 109K we know were the G10 back then, people heard of the K from German vets but few seemed to know what one was.

You should see the size of de beule on that thing, you wouldn't have seen out the cockpit very well. They must've stuck outwards a foot from the plane each, gigantic breech bulbs in the cowl (think of the G6 bulges and add a seriously thick spacer under them to get the idea). I think it the reason for the mockup was to demonstrate to the RLM that they couldn't put MG151 in the slim 109 nose.
Anyways what happened as far as the armchair experts went is fairly obvious, but it was dispelled in the 70s when the late war 109s were better understood. Still it persisted occasionally, the K with the cowled 151.

The MK103m did get tested for the 109K, in a ground frame mockup testbed with a 605D2 engine iirc. The recoil was too harsh and kept tearing the frame apart, but it was okay with a heavier 603 engine/frame.
So it was never fitted to single 109, even as a test. Never happened.

How harsh is the MK103 recoil on a small fighter? When they tested them under the wings in Fw190 service trials, because they didn't fire synchronised to each other they yawed the plane so much, that not only didn't the pilot hit much of the target on any pass, but he almost crashed especially if the plane wasn't perfectly level and he didn't concentrate completely on fighting recoil-instability. On one pass as I recall he was on a slight bank so the recoil on the port wing almost stalled him right into the ground and gave him hell of a fright.
It was actually already being installed on the forthcoming model, some dozen or so units were actually fitted at the time of the service trials and major serial fitment was underway, this kind of changed things and it was cancelled from production with no further examples for the rest of the war. Just that small batch in 43. Baugher talks about this in his really nice blogs on the series.


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## vanir (Dec 5, 2011)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Got the info from the Chinese when they flew against it in northern China before WW2 offically started.



One of the funny things I heard about that (uh-oh I'm rumour mongering in a thread designed to prevent it), was that he got accused of turning native by listening to the Chinese reports himself. Popular myth goes that rejection of the Chinese reports on the Zero as fantastic and unreliable were part of the split between conservative elements in the AC/DoD and Chenault. True or False?


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## evangilder (Dec 5, 2011)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Good one! I was going to bring that up. Check out that Wiki has (with references)
> 
> _On 24 March 1945, during the war, the Chicago Defender said that no bomber escorted by the Tuskegee Airmen had ever been lost to enemy fire, under the headline: "332nd Flies Its 200th Mission Without Loss";[50] the article was based on information supplied by the 15th Air Force.[51][52]
> 
> ...



Still losing only 25 bombers during that time is pretty impressive. Like a lot of popular myths of the time, a lot of things were taken at face value without question. Later review and research disproves these things.

Joe, you forgot to mention your research on the "greatness" of the Zero and it's myth of being darn near invincible early in the war versus the F4F.


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## buffnut453 (Dec 5, 2011)

FLYBOYJ said:


> _On 13 September 1940, the Zeros scored their first air-to-air victories when 13 A6M2s led by Lieutenant Saburo Shindo attacked 27 Soviet-built Polikarpov I-15s and I-16s of the Chinese Nationalist Air Force, shooting down all the fighters without loss to themselves. By the time they were redeployed a year later, the Zeros had shot down 99 Chinese aircraft_



13 September 1940 was before WWII started?


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## Milosh (Dec 5, 2011)

It actually goes further back than that vanir. Green had them in his 1950s Famous Fighters book.


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## vanir (Dec 5, 2011)

I've heard a lot about Green, respected for effort but apparently led the charge on a wide array of misconceptions. One of the authors at LEMB actually broke it down once, describing no less than two generations of widely distributed publications whose entire reference material criss crosses and ultimately traces back to some erroneous assumptions by Green, showing the domino effect of inaccurate research by a single published author.


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## tyrodtom (Dec 5, 2011)

Chennalt was Chiang Kai-Shek's chief aviation advisor from, I think, 1937 and heard Chinese reports of the Zero's success over Chungking, and other engagements in 1940. They ran rings around the I-15's and I-16's the CAF was flying, he would not of had exact figures, but he did know the Zero was quite a advance on what the Japanese had been flying. He passed on what information he did have and it wasn't believed.


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## vanir (Dec 5, 2011)

One of my favourite wartime myths is the tremendously successful propaganda on the fictional He-100D fighter. When the British Ministry found out they did not exist in 41 they'd been receiving kill claims for the He-100 by RAF fighter pilots for about six months


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## parsifal (Dec 5, 2011)

Has anyone ever seen that chennault report? If it says something like "My boys were flying against this new aircraft of the japanese and its really scary!!!!" or words to that effect, then we either have an American general telling porkies (which i doubt) or, the myth is not a myth after all


would love to see that report.....


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## Njaco (Dec 5, 2011)

Myth - The Luftwaffe NEVER had a bomber that flew across the Atlantic almost to New York and returned.


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## Capt. Vick (Dec 5, 2011)

Njaco said:


> Myth - The Luftwaffe NEVER had a bomber that flew across the Atlantic almost to New York and returned.



Amen brother! Let's bury this one!


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## GregP (Dec 5, 2011)

I think the "bomb down the stack" on the Arizona comes from the fact that the ship's armor belts preclude a magazine incursion unless the bomb came through the stack and the ignition occurred that way. The armor belts were well able to take a hit from any bomb a Val or Zero could carry, and that lends credence to the "bomb down the stack," as otherwise the explosion is not really explainiable.

Battleship armor belts are a very well known commodity and they WORK.

So ... if there was no bomb down the stack, how did the armory ignite and explode?

Not saying there HAD to be a bomb down the stack, but if there wasn;t, what could the true explanation be? 

Please don't suggest a sailor was smoking in the armory and dropped his lighter ...


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## mhuxt (Dec 6, 2011)

There's a number involving the Mosquito. First and foremost is one which I*think* may also go back to Green. It's the one where He 219s shot down six Mossies in the 10 days following the initial five-kill sortie in 1943. The first Mossie to fall to a 219 came in May 44.

The other part of the myth is that the Mossie was "untouchable" up to that point. The first Mosquito shot down air-to-air was in December '41, the first to fall air-to-air at night was at the end of July 1942.

There's others, will double-check my facts on those ones.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 6, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Has anyone ever seen that chennault report? If it says something like "My boys were flying against this new aircraft of the japanese and its really scary!!!!" or words to that effect, then we either have an American general telling porkies (which i doubt) or, the myth is not a myth after all
> 
> 
> would love to see that report.....



At some point General Chennault was retired from The US Army and acting as adviser/high ranking officer of Chinese air force was he not? In which case the Chinese ( or other nationality mercenary) pilots would have been "his boys" well before the AVG showed up.


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## buffnut453 (Dec 6, 2011)

How about "The AVG were in combat against the Japanese months, if not years, before America formally entered the war". That's a classic myth.


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## kettbo (Dec 6, 2011)

GregP said:


> I think the "bomb down the stack" on the Arizona comes from the fact that the ship's armor belts preclude a magazine incursion unless the bomb came through the stack and the ignition occurred that way. The armor belts were well able to take a hit from any bomb a Val or Zero could carry, and that lends credence to the "bomb down the stack," as otherwise the explosion is not really explainiable.
> 
> Battleship armor belts are a very well known commodity and they WORK.
> 
> ...





Technically speaking, Belt armor defends against hits to the side of the ship.

IIRC, the Arizona Deck armor was sufficient for normal bombs from the Val. Thing was, the IJN modified some 14" naval projectiles for use by level-bombing Kates.
Remember, deck armor works against shells in the longer ranges of a ships calculated Immunity Zone. Shells would hit the deck at 35*-45* or so at the limits of their gunnery control. Entry angles could be greater at extreme ranges where chance of hit would be nil but penetration possible. The IJN calculated their modified shells striking at greater numeric angles (closer to vertical than normal gun trajectory means less armor to go through the closer to vertical to vertical) and determined that they could penetrate the deck armor.


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## Siegfried (Dec 6, 2011)

cimmex said:


> I’m not sure about “Gabelschwanzteufel”. About1975 the grandfather of my wife who stayed as soldier in southern Italy used this term when he talked about his adventures during the war. I cannot imagine that he had this word from a book after the war. It sound more like a
> common word of a infantry solder who was attacked by P-38s
> Regards
> cimmex



What is unbelievable about the term Gabel-schwanz-teufel or fork tailed devil is it is an extremely long and awkward word of no use in a time critical situation. By the time someone has burbled out "Actung Gabelschwanzteufel" the warning is pointless and he is already caughing up blood Arrrrh! It is however more believable than the melodramatic 'whispering death' and 'whistling death' which were clearly fabrications of allied propaganda; the fact that these terms please the afficianados of these allied aircraft suggests this is so. 

Gabelschwanzteufel is also somewhat descriptive.


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## GrauGeist (Dec 6, 2011)

Whistling Death and Forked-Tailed Devil were nicknames I am familiar with coming from Pacific Theater vets (my Uncles and thier cronies) and I was always under the impression that these were names given to those machines by _our_ guys...

Name one peice of military hardware that does NOT have a nickname (clean or otherwise)...lmao


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## GregP (Dec 6, 2011)

I think the AVG WERE there months before the US joined the second world war, but the first actual combat was 10 Dec 1941, which is 3 days after the war started for the U.S.A.

So they were THERE months before but not actually fighting before the war started. Still, the difference is important as I believe the average American (assuming he knows what the AVG is ...) believes they were fighting the Japanese before the war was officially started.

So, good call on this myth!


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## GregP (Dec 6, 2011)

We have been told by Pacific Vets that "Whispering Death" WAS a name given to the Corsair by the Japanese. It was done because the Corsair could dive on ground targets with reduced throttle and the only sond heard was the whispering whine of the supercharger. When our F4U-1 Corsair (the oldest one flying) flies, it sometimes can do the same thing when the pilot throttles back.

In fact, Tom Camp's FM-2 Wildcat does the same thing, only he comes by at cruise power. First you hear the engine, then the supercarger as he passes over the top of you.

In the case of the Corsair, the supercarger is the dominant sound only when the aircraft is well throttled back. Otherwise, the dominant sound is the R-2800 song of power. It may have many characteristics, but the R-2800 DOES sound powerful, and it is, in spades.

Whether or "Whisting Death" it was REALLY a name conferred by the Japanese is someting I can't confirm. I can only say I have heard it said by vets. How many of them ever met a Japanese soldier during WWII is another story, so it also could have been simple American propaganda. Maybe we could hear from some Japanese members on this one? The Japanese had nicknames for many things, but I am not sure they included American fighters!l 

The Americans (and all Allies) had CODE names for enemy aircraft, but rarely common nicknames. It might be the same for the Axis, too. I DO know the Germans called the Ilyushin IL-2 a nickname ... the "Cementer" becasue it was so hard to shoot down and seemed to be made of cement! That is from numerous combat accounts. Maybe or maybe not for the Americn fighters ... but, of course, the P-38 was an unusual-looking airplane, so maybe it DID have a nickname.

Perhaps some German members could chime in here ...


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## wuzak (Dec 6, 2011)

Surely "Whispering Death" is teh Bristol Beaufighter, not the Vought F4U Corsair?


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## tomo pauk (Dec 6, 2011)

The myth about P-39s in VVS service destroying German tanks with their 37mm, or used to bomb Germans.
Even the mostly cited books here ('America's 100 thousand' and 'Vee's for victory') have fallen for it. OTOH, those were written in late 1990s, before many 1st hand accounts of P-39s were known in the West.


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## Edgar Brooks (Dec 6, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> It is however more believable than the melodramatic 'whispering death' and 'whistling death' which were clearly fabrications of allied propaganda.


Wrong; "Whispering Death" was the name given to the Beaufighter by the RAF personnel who flew it; it had nothing to do with propaganda.


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## buffnut453 (Dec 6, 2011)

I thought the Corsair was "Whistling Death" because in a dive the air passing through the wing root intakes created a whistling sound. Or is that another myth?


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## buffnut453 (Dec 6, 2011)

Here's a classic for you:

During a vertical dive, a Spitfire/P-47 (take your pick, I've heard this one related to both aircraft types) broke the sound barrier.


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## Njaco (Dec 6, 2011)

Edgar is right. Its the Beaufighter.


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## rochie (Dec 6, 2011)

then there is Douglas Bader having his tail chewed off by a BF 109, research suggests it might have been blown off by Buck Casson for a blue on blue kill and the pair may have made up the collision story in POW camp


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 6, 2011)

evangilder said:


> Still losing only 25 bombers during that time is pretty impressive.



Agreed, it is absolutely impressive. These pilots did an amazing job and served their country with distinction (even though we did not treat them as equals). That says a lot in my opinion. 

My problem is that if you care about the true history and point out the fact that they did in fact lose bombers, people get offended. We have even had people come into this forum and accuse people of being racist because they stated the fact that they did lose bombers.


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## Njaco (Dec 6, 2011)

BoB myth;

Galland did NOT say "I want a squadron of Spitfires."

What he said on 2 September was: 

"Ich bitte um die Ausrüstung meines Geschwaders mit Spitfire." ("I should like an outfit of Spitfires for my squadron.")


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## Shortround6 (Dec 6, 2011)

P-40 was _designed_ to be a ground strafer in 1938.

The USAAC _ruined_ the P-39.


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## rochie (Dec 6, 2011)

Njaco said:


> BoB myth;
> 
> Galland did NOT say "I want a squadron of Spitfires."
> 
> ...


always wondered if he meant it or was just trying to get a reaction out of his boss ???


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## pbfoot (Dec 6, 2011)

I wonder if it would be possible to "solve" one myth at a time everynody seems to be tossing a whole bunch out there and they are all good


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## tyrodtom (Dec 6, 2011)

rochie said:


> always wondered if he meant it or was just trying to get a reaction out of his boss ???



I always though it was just Galland's way of talking back. Goering had just chewed some butt, and had actually suggested that too many bombers were getting shot down because of cowardice of the Luftwaffe fighter pilots. So i'm sure there were some very pissed men listening, Galland among them.

I wonder if Galland was ever asked about the Spitfire request in any of his post war interviews ?


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## Edgar Brooks (Dec 6, 2011)

rochie said:


> then there is Douglas Bader having his tail chewed off by a BF 109, research suggests it might have been blown off by Buck Casson for a blue on blue kill and the pair may have made up the collision story in POW camp


It was said that Bader never spoke to Casson, while they shared the camp, and the "collision" story depends on how you feel about Bader's character. He was either so arrogant, that he refused to admit to being shot down, or he was so thoughtful that he didn't want Casson to be known, for the rest of his life, as "the man who shot down Bader." You pay your money, and you take your choice; "Bader's Last Flight," by Andy Saunders is worth a read, and there's a 2006 TV programme "Who Downed Douglas Bader?" around, somewhere.


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## FLYBOYJ (Dec 6, 2011)

buffnut453 said:


> 13 September 1940 was before WWII started?


It was in the Pacific


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## GrauGeist (Dec 6, 2011)

I recall talking to a family friend who actually flew a Corsair in the Pacific (VMF-212), and he explained the guys called it "Whisteling Death" because of the noise of the air passing over the oil coolers when the plane was in a high-speed pass or especially a dive...

And that's "Whisteling" and not "Whispering Death", there was nothing "Whispering" about a Corsair unless it was parked on a ramp somewhere...lmao


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## vanir (Dec 6, 2011)

The Beaufighter got called "whispering death" for the sleeve valve cylinders. Corsair was "whistling death" for the oil cooler intakes. Easy to confuse the two.

I've seen Galland talking about Göring. He absolutely hated the man, he thought he should've been retired from service in favour of his political career back in 1938, he said so once. He didn't believe it responsible to try doing both at once but Göring wasn't even doing that, when he wasn't blowing his own trumpet in Prussia, he was stoned and having party attendees picked up by gestapo buddies for slights. You know the satirical stalag 13 style quip "send him to the russian front," Göring actually did that to Wilcke over an argument.
Pretty argumentative combining various heresay in such a statement I realise, it should be taken at face value of little genuine worth.


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## fastmongrel (Dec 6, 2011)

The Luftwaffe started bombing London (and lost the Battle of Britain) because the RAF bombed Berlin.


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## rochie (Dec 6, 2011)

Edgar Brooks said:


> It was said that Bader never spoke to Casson, while they shared the camp, and the "collision" story depends on how you feel about Bader's character. He was either so arrogant, that he refused to admit to being shot down, or he was so thoughtful that he didn't want Casson to be known, for the rest of his life, as "the man who shot down Bader." You pay your money, and you take your choice; "Bader's Last Flight," by Andy Saunders is worth a read, and there's a 2006 TV programme "Who Downed Douglas Bader?" around, somewhere.


got the book, saw the tv program but thanks


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## riacrato (Dec 6, 2011)

Tanks in Normandy being destroyed by heavy machine gun bullets ricochetting off the ground and penetrating the "soft underbelly".


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## Siegfried (Dec 6, 2011)

rochie said:


> always wondered if he meant it or was just trying to get a reaction out of his boss ???


I think this was a reaction to the requirement that the fighters close escort in formation the bombers. In these circumstances any advantage in speed, acceleration, corkscrew climb or tactics the Bf 109 had developed was lost and only turning radious would seem citical.

It was disasterous tactic that cost the Me 110 but also the Me 109 dearly. I believe the USAAF made the same mistake for a time.

The Me 110 in particular had poor acceleration and could not get to a suitable speed in time.


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## Siegfried (Dec 6, 2011)

GrauGeist said:


> Whistling Death and Forked-Tailed Devil were nicknames I am familiar with coming from Pacific Theater vets (my Uncles and thier cronies) and I was always under the impression that these were names given to those machines by _our_ guys...
> 
> Name one peice of military hardware that does NOT have a nickname (clean or otherwise)...lmao



I thought the rumour is that the japanese used these terms? I'd rather think that any japanese soldier using such defeatest demoralising language would be up for a little bit of discipline.


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## Siegfried (Dec 6, 2011)

Edgar Brooks said:


> Wrong; "Whispering Death" was the name given to the Beaufighter by the RAF personnel who flew it; it had nothing to do with propaganda.



Now that I find even more incredulous. I can't possibly immagine some sergeant pilot strapping himself into his 'whispering death' to give the nips some curry. If anything it was going to be called a "Beau". Limguistically it just doesn't sound english at all. It sounds like someone trying to feign an oriental style.

I wasn't really whispering either, perhaps a little quieter using youtube video. The turbochargerd aricraft were likely the quietest of aircraft.


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## Edgar Brooks (Dec 6, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> Now that I find even more incredulous. I can't possibly immagine some sergeant pilot strapping himself into his 'whispering death' to give the nips some curry. If anything it was going to be called a "Beau". .


The word is "incredible," which means "unbelievable," which means that you are incredulous, but not all pilots were sergeants; there were some officers who'd had university and public school education, and flowery language would have been second nature to them. If you're wondering how I know, I live within 25 miles of Oxford, and have heard, back in the 1950s, their posh, superior, accents.





You'll find it on page 90 of "Beaufighter at War," published in 1976, written by, and about, pilots of the Beaufighter. I can recommend research; you can find out a lot of truths that way.


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## Siegfried (Dec 6, 2011)

evangilder said:


> Still losing only 25 bombers during that time is pretty impressive. Like a lot of popular myths of the time, a lot of things were taken at face value without question. Later review and research disproves these things.



It certainly is impressive, is it a statistically exceptional for similar missions flown in similar circumstances in the same region (the MTO I think mainly?) by other groups? I haven't the resources or the inclination to do the analysis. IQ tests were extensively used in the selection process so if anything we can argue that IQ tests predictive values is at work yet again.

The problem here is that some people wish to demonstrate or mythologise some superhuman performance that will underline some social point. It just showed these men were willing and capable of loyally carrying out their duty. One can't realistically expect more given the complex circumstances. Notable is a suprising casualty rate these men paid.


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## FLYBOYJ (Dec 6, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> It certainly is impressive, is it a statistically exceptional for similar missions flown in similar circumstances in the same region (the MTO I think mainly?) by other groups? I haven't the resources or the inclination to do the analysis. IQ tests were extensively used in the selection process so if anything we can argue that IQ tests predictive values is at work yet again.
> 
> The problem here is that *some people *wish to demonstrate or mythologise some superhuman performance that will underline some social point. It just showed these men were willing and capable of loyally carrying out their duty. One can't realistically expect more given the complex circumstances. Notable is a suprising casualty rate these men paid.



Hollywood and politicians...

Trying to avoid getting political here!


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## davparlr (Dec 6, 2011)

kettbo said:


> Technically speaking, Belt armor defends against hits to the side of the ship.
> 
> IIRC, the Arizona Deck armor was sufficient for normal bombs from the Val. Thing was, the IJN modified some 14" naval projectiles for use by level-bombing Kates.
> Remember, deck armor works against shells in the longer ranges of a ships calculated Immunity Zone. Shells would hit the deck at 35*-45* or so at the limits of their gunnery control. Entry angles could be greater at extreme ranges where chance of hit would be nil but penetration possible. The IJN calculated their modified shells striking at greater numeric angles (closer to vertical than normal gun trajectory means less armor to go through the closer to vertical to vertical) and determined that they could penetrate the deck armor.



I am not even sure they knew how it happened for a long time. It all occurred so fast and so violently. The rumor probably started when some big shot, or reporter, said, "how could that happen?" and the answer was "I don't know, a bomb must have went down the stack!" Not much was known about the ship until much later, maybe 1983 when a survey was done. They did not even know the No. 1 turret with guns was still on the ship.

If you ever get a chance, go to the memorial. It is a moving experience.


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## GrauGeist (Dec 6, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> I thought the rumour is that the japanese used these terms? I'd rather think that any japanese soldier using such defeatest demoralising language would be up for a little bit of discipline.


There are a number of rumors regarding the Japanese and "nicknames" for Allied aircraft (as seen in this thread)...

Knowing the strict disclipline of the Imperial Japanese Army Navy, I find it VERY unlikely that the Japanese would give such a impressive name to an enemy that suggests fear, loathing and thier own demise.

One of the few exceptions I have heard of, was from several American vets of the European theater, where from about Normandy onwards, would refer to any German tank they encountered as a "Tiger" because they were truly spooked and wary of the real deal, and took no chances.


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## renrich (Dec 6, 2011)

I think a myth that might have been put to bed by "The Shattered Sword" was that the flight decks of the Japanese CVs when the SBDs from Yorktown and Enterprise began their dives were covered with planes beginning to be launched. I believe the truth was that they were below on the hangar decks being rearmed.


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## Edgar Brooks (Dec 6, 2011)

GrauGeist said:


> There are a number of rumors regarding the Japanese and "nicknames" for Allied aircraft (as seen in this thread)...
> .


If you go back a page, you'll find that I've found the genuine origin of "Whispering Death." I knew that I had it somewhere.


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## model299 (Dec 6, 2011)

renrich said:


> I think a myth that might have been put to bed by "The Shattered Sword" was that the flight decks of the Japanese CVs when the SBDs from Yorktown and Enterprise began their dives were covered with planes beginning to be launched. I believe the truth was that they were below on the hangar decks being rearmed.



I've got that book, and you're right. IMHO, what excacerbated the whole deal for the IJN was that all servicing of aircraft was done below decks. They NEVER did that on the flight deck. The author stated it was because "That's the way the Combined Fleet did things." Because of that, after the initial hits, the hanger decks filled with avgas fumes due to broken fuel supply lines. Things reached a boiling point, and the rest, as they say, is history.


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## Njaco (Dec 6, 2011)

The largest Tiger / Panther tank battle was Kursk.


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## GregP (Dec 7, 2011)

The War Materiel Board ruined the P-39.


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## phas3e (Dec 7, 2011)

The Corsair Whistles in a Dive for sure (it may be a Supercharger or something but its there), I heard it last January during a very impressive display at Masterton New Zealand by Keith Skilling.


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ooC9vilBjgI_


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## varsity078740 (Dec 7, 2011)

How about-Colin Kelly sank the Haruna. Some myths also say he crashed into it after his crew bailed out


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## michaelmaltby (Dec 7, 2011)

"... The War Materiel Board ruined the P-39."

It did. 

MM


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## renrich (Dec 7, 2011)

Good call, varsity. Colin Kelly, in a B17 was supposed to have sunk the haruna which was not even in the area. In fact, there were no BBs present when that was supposed to have happened. It may have been a CL that was damaged, not sunk.


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## Readie (Dec 7, 2011)

1) "The modifications required for carrier service make naval fighters inherently inferior to land-based fighters."

2) "The bomber will always get through." 

3) "The Fairey Swordfish flew so slowly that naval anti-aircraft guns couldn't track it."

4) "The Polish air force was wiped out in the first two days of World War Two." 

John


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## model299 (Dec 7, 2011)

varsity078740 said:


> How about-Colin Kelly sank the Haruna. Some myths also say he crashed into it after his crew bailed out



A related myth had Capt. Richard E. Fleming crashing into one of the aft turrets of the Mikuma during the Battle Of Miday. The last I saw it, an informational display at the South St Paul airfield named in his honor, Fleming Field, perpetuates this myth. Please do not misunderstand. His actions were no less heroic, and he fully deserved the posthumas Medal Of Honor he recieved. He just never crashed into the ship.

That's supposed to be the wreckage of his aircraft on the aft upper turret. Actually, it's probably what's left of the aft torpedo launcher that landed there.


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## tyrodtom (Dec 7, 2011)

That # 3 on the Swordfish, I somewhat familiar with 70's AA, they may have a maximum slew rate, but they don't have a minimum. In other words the barrel can only be moved so fast, but slow movement of the barrels are no problem, and i'd bet WW2 naval AA is no different.
Now they might have a problem with how much to lead the target, seeing as how light AA in that era wasn't radar directed ( Was It ?) So if they crank in the lead for a target going 140 Kts. and it's only going 100, they're going to be shooting ahead of the aircraft .


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## iron man (Dec 7, 2011)

riacrato said:


> Tanks in Normandy being destroyed by heavy machine gun bullets ricochetting off the ground and penetrating the "soft underbelly".



To elaborate on this one...

The effectiveness of Allied tac air _against *hard armoured *targets in general _during the fighting in Western Europe.

See Niklas Zetterling: "Normandy: 1944" if you want it from the "horses mouth".

Total myth. 
Against soft skinned/horse drawn columns, caught on a route march with little or no available cover? Devastating. See Falaise.

Against armoured vehicles (AFV's and SPW's) maneuvering on the field or in a similar route march situation?

The analysis referenced (and supported by German AAR's) in Zetterling speaks volumes.

Well worth reading.


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## parsifal (Dec 7, 2011)

I admit i always thought that the predictors on the bismarck and Tirpitz had a minimum setting of 100 knots , but the Swordfish had a max speed of 80 knots when loaded. The Germans rectified this error in 1942. 

I cannot confirm this as myth or not, but it is mentioned in Campbells book and I believe on the Nvaweapons site.


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## Denniss (Dec 7, 2011)

More Bf 109 myths:
The Bf 109A was skipped and production started with the B-version
The Bf 109D was equipped with DB 600 engines
The Bf 109 F-4 was barely faster than the F-2
The Bf 109 G-6 reached only ~620 km/h top speed


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## fastmongrel (Dec 8, 2011)

parsifal said:


> I admit i always thought that the predictors on the bismarck and Tirpitz had a minimum setting of 100 knots , but the Swordfish had a max speed of 80 knots when loaded. The Germans rectified this error in 1942.
> 
> I cannot confirm this as myth or not, but it is mentioned in Campbells book and I believe on the Nvaweapons site.



I reckon this is a myth in the mid 30s when the Bismark was designed virtually every torpedo bomber was a relatively slow biplane and even the fastest monoplane torpedo bombers could only drop there fish at around 100 knots max because the torpedo wouldnt take the water entry shock of anything faster. 

Maybe just maybe the Royal Navy knew what it was doing using biplanes in the North Atlantic and maybe just maybe the German gunners werent the supermen the internet would have us believe.


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## Readie (Dec 8, 2011)

parsifal said:


> I admit i always thought that the predictors on the bismarck and Tirpitz had a minimum setting of 100 knots , but the Swordfish had a max speed of 80 knots when loaded. The Germans rectified this error in 1942.
> 
> I cannot confirm this as myth or not, but it is mentioned in Campbells book and I believe on the Nvaweapons site.





"The Fairey Swordfish flew so slowly that naval anti-aircraft guns couldn't track it." - 

ALL the attacking Swordfishes in the 'Channel Dash' incident were shot down, mostly by AA fire. 

John


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## Readie (Dec 8, 2011)

"The Polish air force was wiped out in the first two days of World War Two." 

The air force had secretly deployed to reserve airfields on 30th August 1939, and continued flying combat operations until the surrender

"The bomber will always get through." 

This seems to have originated from war games and air defence exercises conducted during the early 1930's. Without the benefit of radar to direct fighters, the chances of a fighter standing patrol catching a bombing raid on the way in was found to be very slim. Consequently, many countries invested heavily in AA guns and searchlights to defend cities. The radar-assisted integrated air defence network pioneered in Britain during the late 1930s was fully vindicated during the Battle of Britain, and broke the myth. 

"The modifications required for carrier service make naval fighters inherently inferior to land-based fighters. We don't need naval aviation." 

This myth was not disproved until the introduction of the F6F Hellcat in 1943. 

"Air power alone can win wars." 

This myth was propagated by US Army Air Corps General Billy Mitchell in the 1920s. He managed to convince many Americans and was instrumental in the development of long range bombers such as the B-17. However, a decisive conclusion to a war normally requires the occupation of the enemy's territory. The Gulf War, for example, required a ground campaign - however brief - to apply the decisive blow. Arguably, Operation Allied Force begins a new trend, whereby a successful air campaign forces the enemy to accept a negotiated, (and thus unopposed), occupation of his territory.

John


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## buffnut453 (Dec 8, 2011)

Readie said:


> "Air power alone can win wars."
> 
> This myth was propagated by US Army Air Corps General Billy Mitchell in the 1920s. He managed to convince many Americans and was instrumental in the development of long range bombers such as the B-17. However, a decisive conclusion to a war normally requires the occupation of the enemy's territory. The Gulf War, for example, required a ground campaign - however brief - to apply the decisive blow. Arguably, Operation Allied Force begins a new trend, whereby a successful air campaign forces the enemy to accept a negotiated, (and thus unopposed), occupation of his territory.



Interestingly, I think we see echoes of this thinking in the movement of B-17s to the Philippines in late-1941. There were people in Washington who genuinely believed that the threat presented by these aircraft would force Japan to accede to America's political demands...of course we know how successful that was.

So, having crossed the streams and linked this thread to the Pearl Harbor-Hari Kari thread, I'll now duck out of the way. We will now return to our regularly-scheduled programme.


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## Edgar Brooks (Dec 8, 2011)

Myth:- Mitchell said that Spitfire was "A bloody silly name." He didn't; he said that it was "Bloody silly, naming it after a failure," referring, of course, to the 224.


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## vanir (Dec 8, 2011)

> How about "The AVG were in combat against the Japanese months, if not years, before America formally entered the war". That's a classic myth.



I think that myth got sparked by the unusual manner the AVG was set up, which was before Pearl but they didn't enter action until after. The area was controlled by two warlords, colonial British interests, the Thai wanted independence, the Yellow River Valley...Chinese communists but this is circumstantial, chinese communism in reality split with soviet postwar because it is more like nationalism than communism, but in '36 they needed soviet support against the Japanese since the Americans/League was backing the corrupt and largely defunct kuomintang, got some great research on this and there's a lot to it, Chenault was really in the deep end politically over there and I don't think Washington really had any idea what was going on.

Anyway so about July41 what Washington and the Pentagon decided was that servicement would resign their commission in US military to serve with Chenault officially as mercinaries paid for by the Chinese. Of course the US gave the money to the Chinese to pay them, this was all just so that it looked okay on paper if the Japanese wanted to negotiate or the Yellow River Valley, which was the true provincial government from about 1932, in case they kicked up an international stink and the League found it convincing. They needed plausible deniability. As it happened the first Tomahawks they got were from the British, not the US, more of this plausible deniability but all that got tossed out the window after Pearl.

So even when the AVG was going into action, it wasn't part of the US really, and they felt very abandoned and alone out there, a little bit mercinary, and most importantly they did not have to recognise or practise any formal chain of command. They liked that bit.

So for them it still felt the same, America at war or not. Over there, it wasn't like you could drive down the shop and order a tacos, stop and buy the paper and see the difference of being at war. Those guys were in the middle of the jungle thinking about curbing the Japanese Imperialism that was entirely getting away from itself. The attack on Pearl did no more for them than confirm their fears, they were already enacting to combat the threat.

It is as if they went into action just prior to the US formally entering the war. They would've still felt like they were. They would've if Pearl didn't happen, the AVG was going into action one way or another.


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## FLYBOYJ (Dec 8, 2011)

vanir said:


> It is as if they went into action just prior to the US formally entering the war. They would've still felt like they were. They would've if Pearl didn't happen, the AVG was going into action one way or another.


Very true and just for the record, the AVG's first combat was 20 December 1941.


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## vanir (Dec 8, 2011)

Readie said:


> "The Fairey Swordfish flew so slowly that naval anti-aircraft guns couldn't track it." -
> 
> ALL the attacking Swordfishes in the 'Channel Dash' incident were shot down, mostly by AA fire.
> 
> John


One of the surviving crewmen of the Bismarck said the problem with the Swordfish was that they flew at wave top height so that a lot of the time they were concealed by ocean swell, but this served a secondary purpose too, almost none of the guns on the Bismarck were capable of enough negative elevation to target them, only small guns. So what they did was fire some big guns into the water ahead of them at (presumably plunging fire, I've no visual concept of this myself, just what he said). They've splashed aircraft trying this tactic before like that, it was a common tactic in Europe apparently.


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## Messy1 (Dec 8, 2011)

The Garand clip myth-
Allied soldiers used to throw empty M1 Garand clips onto the ground to fool enemy soldiers into exposing themselves thinking the Allied soldier's gun was empty. Just watched a new show on The Military Channel called Triggers last night and the Garand was the topic of the show. The host and a historian mentioned the tactic of throwing a empty clip. Is this totally false, or is there some truth to this myth.


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## vanir (Dec 8, 2011)

Only thing remotely like that I've heard myself from German vets is the sound. They sometimes listened for the sound it makes when ejecting, it was very loud and very distinctive. Germans aren't stupid though, you wouldn't see an empty mag laying on the ground and leap up in front of an enemy barrel thinking you'll be fine would you? I'd call someone an idiot for doing that, or stare down at his body saying, yeah I knew that was going to happen.

Hard to believe large numbers of internationally respected professional infantry would be that stupid.


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## Messy1 (Dec 8, 2011)

I myself would not risk my own life waiting for that distinctive ping sound. I would believe there might be some truth to it though. I imagine tens of thousands of soldiers lost their life by making foolish mistakes on both sides.


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## Readie (Dec 8, 2011)

Two more myths and the truth.

*"Parachutes will only make pilots abandon the fight too soon." *
In fact parachutes were widely used in World War One by balloon observers. The static-line type parachutes then available were not suitable for abandoning out-of-control aircraft.
*
"Heavily armed twin-engined 'destroyer' fighters can easily match single-engined fighters."* 
In the period before World War Two, several designs of 'destroyer' fighter were flown. The most well known being the Messerschmitt Bf110, Westland Whirlwind, and Fokker G-I. These aircraft were usually intended as roving bomber escorts, designed to achieve air superiority over enemy territory. In the Battle of Britain, the Bf110 proved a complete failure, needing single-engined fighter escort itself! Only the P-38, in the vast Pacific Theatre, came close to the idea, and that was a very different type of aircraft.

John


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## Shortround6 (Dec 8, 2011)

I don't believe either the Whirlwind or the P-38 were intended to be "destroyers", from the american camp the Bell Aircuda was. The French certainly had one or more aircraft in that camp as well as perhaps the Japanese Ki 45 Nick?


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## tyrodtom (Dec 8, 2011)

No matter how you throw a Garand clip on the ground, it's no going to make a sound anything like what the Garand makes when it ejects that clip. Plus it would depend on where the American has his replacement clip, it only takes about a second to insert the new clip, and the bolt goes forward on it's own.

How about the myth about allied troops waiting for MG-42 crews to change barrels, then they charge the mg site?

I fired a MG-3 ( a modern 7.62 version of the MG-42) in the 1970's while in the Army in Germany, even I could change the barrel in less that 10 seconds, the barrel comes out sideways, you can do it from the prone position. The Bundeswehr crew could do it in half of the time I took. How much of a charge could a Army platoon manage in 5-6 seconds ? How would they know if the MG-42 crew is changing barrels, or just took a pause in their shooting ?


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## Vincenzo (Dec 8, 2011)

i think this is an other myth "In the Battle of Britain, the Bf110 proved a complete failure, needing single-engined fighter escort itself! "


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## FLYBOYJ (Dec 8, 2011)

Vincenzo said:


> i think this is an other myth "In the Battle of Britain, the Bf110 proved a complete failure, needing single-engined fighter escort itself! "


I think the statment that the BF 110 "needed a single engined fighter escort itself" could be looked upon as an exaggeration, but during the BoB the Bf-110 was a total failure within its initial role. From memory I think the Luftwaffe had about 240 -110s at the start of the BoB, I believe over 200 were lost by the fall of 1940. I'll have to do some research to find the exact numbers.


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## Vincenzo (Dec 8, 2011)

afaik the 110 was not bad in free fighter mission the heavy trouble come with near escort mission. w/o doubt a twin engined fighter has ever trouble vs single engined fighter if they are of same level of "state of art"* (110 was good v/s less capable single engined fighter)

* this is not more valid with jets


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## FLYBOYJ (Dec 8, 2011)

Vincenzo said:


> afaik the 110 was not bad in free fighter mission the heavy trouble come with near escort mission. w/o doubt a twin engined fighter has ever trouble vs single engined fighter if they are of same level of "state of art"* (110 was good v/s less capable single engined fighter)
> 
> * this is not more valid with jets


While I agree, bottom line during the Battle of Britian, the Bf-110 got mauled. Herman Goring's nephew was even shot down in one. It served well in other roles but the BoB showed its weaknesses.


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## Readie (Dec 8, 2011)

FLYBOYJ said:


> While I agree, bottom line during the Battle of Britian, the Bf-110 got mauled. Herman Goring's nephew was even shot down in one. It served well in other roles but the BoB showed its weaknesses.



Talking of Herman..

*"Adolf Galland rated the Spitfire so highly he told Goering 'Give me a squadron of Spitfires'."* -

Here's a quote from his book The First And The Last:

"The theme of fighter protection was chewed over again and again. Goering clearly represented the point of view of the bombers and demanded close and rigid protection. The bomber, he said, was more important than record bag figures. I tried to point out that the Me109 was superior in the attack and not so suitable for purely defensive purposes as the Spitfire, which, although a little slower, was much more manoeuvrable. He rejected my objection. We received many more harsh words. Finally, as his time ran short, he grew more amiable and asked what were the requirements for our squadrons. Moelders asked for a series of Me109's with more powerful engines. The request was granted. 'And you ?' Goering turned to me. I did not hesitate long. 'I should like an outfit of Spitfires for my group.' After blurting this out, I had rather a shock, for it was not really meant that way. Of course, fundamentally I preferred our Me109 to the Spitfire, but I was unbelievably vexed at the lack of understanding and the stubbornness with which the command gave us orders we could not execute - or only incompletely - as a result of many shortcomings for which we were not to blame. Such brazen-faced impudence made even Goering speechless. He stamped off, growling as he went."


John


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## Siegfried (Dec 8, 2011)

parsifal said:


> I admit i always thought that the predictors on the bismarck and Tirpitz had a minimum setting of 100 knots , but the Swordfish had a max speed of 80 knots when loaded. The Germans rectified this error in 1942.
> 
> I cannot confirm this as myth or not, but it is mentioned in Campbells book and I believe on the Nvaweapons site.



The myth basically isn't true in anyway shape or form.

Bismark had 4 predictors for the 8 sets of twin 10.5cm heavy FLAK guns.

The were two forward predictors port and starboard and two rear predictors. All four were meant to be the same.

The forward ones were very advanced: they were triaxially stablised and the they were fully tachyometric measureing speed and position and calculating an complete firing solution and shell bursting time. The rear predictor were meant to be the same type but due to agreements with the soviet union they were removed and given to the Soviets in order that Germany might meet her commitments. Germany's food and raw materials were in part paid for by those directors. So Bismarck went on her maiden mission with less advanced, temporary biaxial predictors.

The actual state of Bismarks Armanet and gunnery can be read in a report created only a month before here voyage:

AVKS Tests aboard Battleship Bismarck. 
KBismarck.com - On-Line Archive - Armament Information

Page 46 explains a very serious problem which might have been fatal if not rectified.

Basically Bismark had the following heavy FLAK

Forward mountings (4): Dop. L. C/31 
Aft mountings (4): Dop. L. C/37 

The latter were brand new mountings, while the former were 8.8cm guns fitted with 10.5cm guns, the ne mounts had different rates of traverse and it seems some bugs that prvented the rear guns firing at low flying aircraft.

As far as Radar goes, the Bismark was as good as any in the world at the time, better than anything the USN had at the time. Its radar did have some level of integration into the FLAK eg range could be passed as well as bearing. Latter Seetakt radars were very tightly integrated and offered full anti aircraft blind fire capabillity, including height, with the FuMO 26 radar.

If there was a weakness it was that the 2.0cm C30 guns which fired at about 220 rpm per barrel and usually in single or duel mounts had not yet been replaced with the 2.0cm quad C38 FLAK vierling which fired at 480 rpm/barrel that Tirpitz received. These guns had excellent ballistics.

Another weakness was the 3.7 cm/L83 (1.5") SK C/30 which fired on 30 rpm per barrel from their twin gyro-stabalised mount. This gun had excellent ballistics but the ROF was poor.

Of course the vissibillity was poor and the Germans gunners had trouble seeing and ometime lost the Swordfish between the waves.

I would say any, effectively unescorted ship, might have suffered the same fate whether German, British or US as ship AAA had not been seruously upgraded.


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## Siegfried (Dec 8, 2011)

fastmongrel said:


> I reckon this is a myth in the mid 30s when the Bismark was designed virtually every torpedo bomber was a relatively slow biplane and even the fastest monoplane torpedo bombers could only drop there fish at around 100 knots max because the torpedo wouldnt take the water entry shock of anything faster.
> 
> Maybe just maybe the Royal Navy knew what it was doing using biplanes in the North Atlantic and maybe just maybe the German gunners werent the supermen the internet would have us believe.



Bismarck likely did as well in the circumstances as other navies ships would have. They faced poor visibillity, and armement and systems that had not been fully debugged at a time all navies were upgrading their FLAK including the Germans. Tirpitz nearly quadroupled throw weight.

One year latter PoW suffered a single torpedo hit dropped by twin engine bombers, that had her dead in the water within 25 minutes, listing and with all gun turrets out of action bar one that was trained manually. She was sunk by only 4 torpedoes. PoW did shoot some of her attackers down, but she also had the benefit of good weather and calm seas.


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## parsifal (Dec 8, 2011)

bear in mind however that the Bettys and Nells that attacked the PoW were much faster than the Swordfish that attacked the bismarck. Also there were just 15 attackers against the the German battleship versus more than 50 attackers attacking the two RN battlewagons.

The specific events of bismarcks loss are as follows. The Swordfish attack took place at 2047. Bismarck was hit by a torpedo amidship which caused no damage. But then she was hit by a torpedo in the starboard rudder area. According to the rudder indicator, the rudder was jammed at 12º or 15º to port (the sources disagree here). Despite German anti-aircraft fire being very intense none of the Swordfish aircraft were shot down.

The different sources about the history of the Bismarck are disagree about what actually happened during the last air attack against the Bismarck. The outcome of my research seems to state the fact that: 

1. Accounts differ as to the number of torpedo hits (two or three) and the order in which they occured. 

2. All the sources agree that Bismarck turned to port when the fatal torpedo came towards her. 

3. The Bismarck's rudder indicator indicated that the rudder was jammed either 12° or 15° to port. They disagree about that too. 


Eleven topredoes were fired at her, it seems possible that three hit her. Thats a hit to launch ratio of 27%. Despite having a defensive flak umbrella described as heavy and despite the swordfish crews being hampered by poor weather and visibility (the fatal hit was delivered at 2047, in conditions of poor visibility and high winds), the fifteen attackers still managed to achieve either two or three hits (3 being the more likley) . the crews were aware they could not penetrate the main belt, they had to hit aft of the main belt. it is a credit to the crews that they managed this against a target moving at 20 knots, under either 12 or 15 degrees helm over (thats a violent manouvre for a battleship). It also means that the flak, despite its heavy barrage weight and sopbistication, failed at the very moment it was needed. 

In sumary, what conclusions can we draw about Bismarcks flak effort in that battle. it was heavy, but it was neither accurate or effective: there were no losses to the Swordfish attackers, and the swordfish achieved a high hit to launch ratio, suggesting the the flak failed in the even more crucial task of throwing the attackers off aim. A year later tirpitzs 4.1 in batteries were effective in somewhat similar conditions, with quite a few swordfish lost.....what changed (the Light AA did not effectively engage in either battle, torpedoes were launched from too far away for them to be considere effective) for this top occur??? 

So, in effect, bismarcks fate was sealed by a single torpedo hit, the same as the POWs

Now, looking at the POWs experience. Around 11:40 AM, seventeen torpedo-equipped G3Ms arrived with nine attacking Prince of Wales and eight attacking Repulse. While the latter ship survived unscathed, Prince of Wales sustained a hit where its outer port propeller shaft exited the hull. Thats a hit to miss ratio of just 5.88% about 1/5 as good as the Swordfish crews achieved on the bismarck , in weather and visibility conditions far more suited to attacking. claims vary, but conservatively 4 of the 9 attackes are credited with being shot down in this attack. Causing severe flooding, the damage also slowed the ship to 16 knots and led to an 11.5 degree list. The hit also cut electrical power which left pumps inoperable and many anti-aircraft mounts unable to traverse. 

At 12:20 PM, Force Z was hit by approximately 53 attackers. Prince of Wales took three torpedo hits to its starboard side from G4Ms flown by the Kanoya Air Group. Kanoya aircraft also struck at Repulse and attacked both sides of the ship. Bracketed, it was hit by four torpedoes. 

Thats a total of 7 hits from 53 attackes, or a hit to launch rate of 13%. Thats against a much reduced flak effort, and against a ship no longer able to manouvre (similar to the bismarck predicament). Once again, however the RNs flak effort, if measured by the hit to launch ratios of the attacking japanese, was significantly bette than bismarcks shooting. Hard to account fo this better performance. I am doubtful that the FAA crews were much better trained than Matsunagas betty and nell crews. There were different weather condition, but the intensity and size of the japanese attacks were much greater, and the speed of delivery much faster. 

Lacking anti-torpedo blisters, Repulse quickly began to flood and Captain William Tennant ordered abandon ship. Capsizing, it sank at 12:33 PM. Clinging to life and limping along on one propeller, Prince of Wales came under a bomb attack eight minutes later. Taking one hit, it slowly began rolling to port. Coming alongside, Express began removing the ship's crew. At 1:18 PM, Prince of Wales capsized and hit the destroyer as it sank. Though taking minor damage, Express survived

The only comparable situation between the two battles occured in the initial part of PoWs attack. At that point, the 17 attackers of the Kanoya air group achieved 1 hit out of 17 launches, in conditions more suited to the attack

To be honest, no real conclusions can be drawn about the relative advanatages and efficiency of the respective flak efforts. The statistical samples are simply too small to draw conclusions from. However Bismarck flak effort on the day of her demise was not impressive, and m,arkedly less effective than POWs effort the following December. it was heroic, but it was not impressive. Neither were her passive defensive arrangements all that good. she was disabled by the same number of hits as the PoW.


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## gjs238 (Dec 8, 2011)

Messy1 said:


> The Garand clip myth-
> Allied soldiers used to throw empty M1 Garand clips onto the ground to fool enemy soldiers into exposing themselves thinking the Allied soldier's gun was empty. Just watched a new show on The Military Channel called Triggers last night and the Garand was the topic of the show. The host and a historian mentioned the tactic of throwing a empty clip. Is this totally false, or is there some truth to this myth.


 I have a Garand. The distinctive sound is from the clip being ejected, not from the clip falling on the ground.


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## ToughOmbre (Dec 8, 2011)

gjs238 said:


> I have a Grand. The distinctive sound is from the clip being ejected, not from the clip falling on the ground.



Got an M1 Garand also. True. The sound is from the enbloc being ejected. And I doubt that anyone could hear the "ping" of the clip in the heat of battle anyway.

TO


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## GrauGeist (Dec 8, 2011)

I'm with TO on that point...during a gunfight, you're not going to hear much with all that noise going on and on top of that, your ears will be ringing like mad (and everyone else's, for that matter) so any high-pitched "plink" sound will be seriously muffled


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## vanir (Dec 8, 2011)

I've not a gun collection or anything but I've been in a few knife fights and things like that in my youth, and you'd be surprised what you hear and notice, even your vision does strange things. Your brain is'n't functioning in any way to which civilised people are normally accustomed, which is good and bad. For things like hearing a pin drop in the middle of a thunderstorm, surprisingly good. Things like knowing who the real enemy is, not so good.


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## krieghund (Dec 8, 2011)

The Pearl Harbor attack myth.... goes like this......Roosevelt knew that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl but the government needed a "Lusitania" incident to get us into the war. The isolationists had a strong following and an 'event' was needed to wake up America. My father who served in the US Army and secured the PI related this to me that this 'conspiracy theory' was talked about during the war. It was during a time in my youth when he introduced me to his friend that was a survivor of the "Bataan Death March" but at the time I didn't understand why he was mum on his experiences but very vocal about his captors! He too related this suspicion about Pearl Harbor.

What about the story of Coventry and the Enigma device?


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## vanir (Dec 9, 2011)

Keep in mind here some things I'm paraphrasing, recalling from memory or speculating, I may have some errors in details, ie. I'm not trying to start a political debate and anything political can immediately become a debate, it is inherently argumentative and very much depends on perspective.

I find it hard to wrap my head around geopolitical conspiracy theories, I think they're the myth. It's a logical fallacy that they be anything more than opportunism explained retrospectively, but that human sociology has patterns among complex evolutionary diversity principle.

After Pearl everything was simple. We grew up in that so we don't know without researching, if it was ever different. It was, Japan wasn't the all round bad guy, just the one the old Colonials didn't like because it lobbied from 1931 the european withdrawl of treaty ports from the chinese mainland. When it attacked china, it attacked these european treaty ports. Look them up, other than the Yellow River Valley action against the Chinese Communists, and a border skirmish with the Kuomintang, every chinese city attacked or bombed or "warcrimed" was a european or US treaty port: sovereign territory like an embassy, and essentially a western-legal way to rape asian natural resources at low cost for profitable long distance cargo, the entire economy of India and the subcontinent was utterly destroyed within thirty years this way, it almost never recovered but was a leading power in the region prior to then, an example of the western impact in Asia by the mid-thirties.

Basically the west was convening in their own western courtrooms deciding what was legal and illegal to do to asia, and then called themselves righteous basically doing whatever they wanted: making money mostly. Who doesn't want to be rich, right? British Marines Colonels became lords renting out their services to the treaty holders, they were actually used as mercinaries by private companies which was what started the whole Boxer revolution and sparked off the Kuomintang. Even they hated us, they stole an estimated 85% of all US wartime funding for the personal wealth of corrupt officials, hundreds of millions, tens of billions in current US dollars (ref. Boyne). The entire US war effort in China amounted to making a bunch of criminals that were once part of those corrupt treaty ports and made them possible in the first place, then you made them billionaires.

The Japanese were retro to the point of barbaric in some senses under military leadership at this time, however they weren't just crazy. They were genuinely and rationally angry with Europe, the US and all foreign colonial interests in the Asia Pacific. They wanted you out. Most of Asia did. So, war.
I'm not saying they're right or wrong, it's not a moral issue in that sense, I'm just saying they weren't exactly the bad guys until the propaganda departments got involved. They were just, kinda thugs and we were all sick of thugs governing nations. But politically speaking, at the time it wasn't a matter of black hats and white hats, it really depended on which country you were standing to define who were the bad guys and who were the good guys. The Thai considered the Japanese the good guys. The Philippine Prime Minister formally asked US military forces to leave the island six months before the war. You refused.

In mid 41 McArthur threatened the Japanese in international media completely out of turn. It's in his record, he was written up for it. He said, If the Japanese attack the Philippines I will bomb Tokyo the next day with my Fortresses. If they try to invade...I'll stop them dead in their tracks on the beaches." (paraphrasing, one of you probably has the article on disk, I'm stretching my memory on much more than general themes)
It got printed and unfortunately the Japanese believed him and claimed he spoke for Washington. The US ambassador naturally assured them he didn't but the damage was done and US DoD knew the Japanese had assessed the capabilities of the B-17 and that it could indeed reach Japanese islands at light loads.

It was imho a single incident which most greatly influenced the war, Mc Arthur had been sent out there because he was annoying and he became an even bigger liability. He was pompous, arrogant and offensive, putting him in the Philippines was as far as Japan was concerned another slap in the face. They felt they were being treated like a joke, it was going to cost them impoverishment.


Oh I'd say Washington knew war was coming. They did everything to make sure it did certainly. But any particular official would as gladly have turned in a corrupt brother and made his fortune that way, than he would kill some Japanese for a dollar, I mean say if you could make it legal or even heroic. Kind of goes with the territory in bureacracies, ask the Romans.
Japanese knew that.

US authorities didn't know it was going to be Pearl, there's no paper trail and yet declassified Naval Intelligence reports to the contrary. Burden of proof here. But they did suspect the Philippines was going to be attacked and a battlefront would exist across the central/north Pacific. This is demonstrable by the actions being taken, reinforcement of atoll bases and supply dumps at the time of Pearl.
Also the security at Pearl was customised against sabotage, not a battlefront. At a battlefront you don't pen your ships of the line, or aircraft for that matter in rows and clusters. But you definitely do this for a rear staging area.
The clear and present inferrence is an attack on the Philippines was expected.


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## vanir (Dec 9, 2011)

listen, let me lighten up the American role here, plus the fact McAthur wasn't necessarily such a bad pill for the Japanese to swallow. See, the extremely important game changer here to remember is that Tojo's influence right from the start was such that he was in a position to use the military as a whimsical political tool. Everyone was scared of him, and the emperor relied on others to be his eyes and ears, those others were too scared to say much.
It's a game changer. And hey, they killed a lot of people rampantly, you can't go around doing that.


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## krieghund (Dec 9, 2011)

vanir said:


> listen, let me lighten up the American role here, plus the fact McAthur wasn't necessarily such a bad pill for the Japanese to swallow. See, the extremely important game changer here to remember is that Tojo's influence right from the start was such that he was in a position to use the military as a whimsical political tool. Everyone was scared of him, and the emperor relied on others to be his eyes and ears, those others were too scared to say much.
> It's a game changer. And hey, they killed a lot of people rampantly, you can't go around doing that.



Agreed, I believe its just an Urban Legend and people pull coincidences to prove their point (It does raise you eyebrows though) but the US formally got into the war and the rest is history which of course is written by the victor.


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## Siegfried (Dec 9, 2011)

Vincenzo said:


> afaik the 110 was not bad in free fighter mission the heavy trouble come with near escort mission. w/o doubt a twin engined fighter has ever trouble vs single engined fighter if they are of same level of "state of art"* (110 was good v/s less capable single engined fighter)
> 
> * this is not more valid with jets



I believe the Me 110 did well against the Polish Airforce, even besting the Me 109 and I suspect it performed acceptably during the Battle of France. This was at a time the aircraft must have been muich faster than opponenents.

However during the BoB it came up against aircraft of equivalent speeds and better manouverabillity.

What is important to consider is WHAT a "zerstoerer" actually was conceived to be. It was not meant to be an escort fighter or air superiority fighter.

The original specification called for a 3 man aircraft. The Zerstoerer was meant to penetrate at high speed into enemy airspace then shoot up airfields using its powerfull forward firing gun armament supplimented by bombs. With the airfield immobilised level bombers would follow shortly thereafter. It was also meant to be an instrumented "bad weather fighter" able to keep fighting in poor conditions or at night. Using its powerfull forward firing guns it was also intended to rapidly destroy enemy bombers. Fighting single engined fighters in contested airspace was never part of the spec. The Designers ( I think Lusser and Voigt and Messerschmitt) realised a 3 man aircraft would be overly heavy and sluggish and so they submitted a non conforming lighter 2 man version and won the contract. 

In terms of power to weight ratio, acceleration, wing loading the Me 110 was too far behined its single engined opponents because of the enlargment of the airframe to meet other requirments (such as having 2 crew) even if it matched them in speed.

The rear gunner did help but generally in a turnining fight the enemy fighter ends up somewhat behined and BELOW so the rear gunner can not get his guns through the target, nor can he aim with the high g-loads or reload his clips. This is the reason for the remote control rear cheek guns on the Me 210/410 and the Ar 240/440.

The simple solution for the Luftwaffe would have been to get the drop tanks issue sorted. They had been using drop tanks since the spanish civil war on Heinkel fighters.

An attempt to produce a twing engined longer range fighter with power to weight, wing loadings equal to single engined fighters was the FW 187 but the Luftwaffe didn't get the concept and was driven by fear of shotages of DB600 series engines in anycase so the Me 110 ended up being misused. The tendancy to make aircraft 'multi role aircraft' and thereby ruin them for any specific role was evident even then.


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## Siegfried (Dec 9, 2011)

I would argue that the attack by Bettys and Nells on PoW, Repulse and her destroyer escorts (force Z) was divided over time: about 3 waves divided over two ships meant that never more than 9 aircraft had to be dealt with simultaneously, the same as Bismarcks situation.

The speed advantage of the Nell vs Swordwish was was marginal, torpedo release limits dictated attack speed and while the Japanese torps were best in this area they still restricted the aircraft. The swordfish's manouverabillity may even have outweighed its slowness and the Nells physical size made it a bigger target to hit. In anycase the attack profile involved a dive that tended to trow of FLAK. AFAIKT PoW hit its attacker AFTER they had released their weapons and were crossing the bow or egressing the target area.

Bismarcks three radars were out of action, PoW Air defense radars bar one was out of action. Bismarcks radar failed due to shell shock after engaging Norfolk just like PoW died from shell shock after engaging Bismarck. A few issues hadn't been resolved yet on both sides. Had Bismarks radars been working her defense may have been better against the swordfish.

The FuMO 23 radar had a beam width of about 6 degrees but by carefully maximizing returns an opperator could get a bearing to within 1 degree. He could also get range to 70m and pass this on to the predictors via telemetry. Obviously this is not really excellent but it is better than optical ranging. So I think

Latter Seetaks added a type of lobe switching that greatly increased accuracy and some versions added height finding. Bismarks radar/FLAK integration was already there but somewhat crude.


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## Juha (Dec 9, 2011)

Vincenzo said:


> afaik the 110 was not bad in free fighter mission the heavy trouble come with near escort mission. w/o doubt a twin engined fighter has ever trouble vs single engined fighter if they are of same level of "state of art"* (110 was good v/s less capable single engined fighter)
> 
> * this is not more valid with jets



More or less agree with Vincenzo and Siegfried on 110, it did well in Poland and against Wellingtons around Helgoland in 1939, also in France in May-June 40 it didn't perform poorly, in fact it had positive exchange rate against Hurricanes in France IIRC. Only when forced to act as close escort during the BoB losses became heavy, 110 wasn't good turner and its acceleration wasn't too good. 

Juha


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## Juha (Dec 9, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> The myth basically isn't true in anyway shape or form.
> 
> Bismark had 4 predictors for the 8 sets of twin 10.5cm heavy FLAK guns.
> 
> ...



Hello Siegfried
IIRC the situation was that according to the Soviet-Germany treaty Germany had to show the two rear Flak director towers to Soviet specialists. Not willing to show their latest technology to the Soviets Germans installed the older model directors to the two rear positions. That might also be reason for the older 105mm mountigs, but I have not positive recollection on that.

Juha


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## Siegfried (Dec 9, 2011)

Juha said:


> Hello Siegfried
> IIRC the situation was that according to the Soviet-Germany treaty Germany had to show the two rear Flak director towers to Soviet specialists. Not willing to show their latest technology to the Soviets Germans installed the older model directors to the two rear positions. That might also be reason for the older 105mm mountigs, but I have not positive recollection on that.
> 
> Juha



I doubt that would work, the forward directors were very distinguishable from the rear ones and anyone, including the notoriously suspicious soviets, would've noticed. In fact Bismark almost had to surrender her A and B main turret range finders to the Soviet Trade agreement however Zeiss delivery schedule managed to keep the deadlines anyway.


The main problem was that the after port and starboard batteries were controlled primarily by the two after directors which in the case of Bismarck, were unstabilized, twin axis directors installed as a stopgap measure until the proper ones could be manufactured and fitted. The German government, in keeping to its obligations under the Soviet-German trade agreement, had provided the Russians with four of their most modern FlaK directors--the two after ones from Bismarck, and the two foreward ones from Prinz Eugen. Thus Bismarck and Prinz Eugen each went to sea with a pair of inferior directors which were not fully integrated into the FlaK fire control system. Prinz Eugen later received two fully stabilized triaxis directors to replace those sent to the USSR, while Tirpitz was completed with hers. 

In the Tirpitz this deficiency of the rear directors and the rear gun bugs was corrected and all eight 10.5cm double mounts were of the same L/37 type and the radar is improved with lobe switching and better integraion with FLAK as well as the more powerfull FLAK vierling C/38 mounts and guns replacing the twin C/30, quadrouples fire power.

On 09 March 1942: Shortly after 0900, while en route to Trondheim, the Tirpitz is attacked by 12 Albacore torpedo planes of the 817th and 832th Squadrons from carrier Victorious. The battleship successfully avoided all torpedoes and shoots down two Albacores. Others were hit too.


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## vanir (Dec 9, 2011)

I have a real weird thing about the BF-110. There was a point where I really tried to climb inside the head of Göring on the zerstörer concept. Willy Messerschmitt has some comments about it on the public record. He said, Göring's new concept was unrealistic in fighter design terms and would result in an aircraft type that could perform no role very well, because it compromised upon each of them. Willy cited the French experience in the interwar arms race with Britain. This had been their result of defence budget cutbacks yet still trying to compete as a major power. The Amiot is point in fact, shot down almost to the very last plane within its combat debut.

Okay so the postwar appraisal of the BF-110 IMHO is in serious misapprehension to begin with. Göring never intended this plane as a fighter, no way. It was an attack plane, more closely related to a Blenheim than it is to a P-38.

Here is Göring's zerstörer requirement: to follow the bombers in close escort, to raise crew morale, to accelerate ahead of the bomber stream above enemy territory and to dive upon the enemy intercept force, either shooting them on the ground with heavy cannon or as they climb to stage for intercept with banks of machine guns.

It wasn't a fighter. And the role that best fits its original specification is the same one it had the most success with as a day fighter: the fast attack force on the eastern Front 41-42. They did very well there and were such a tremendous airframe for it the lead squadrons (stab staffeln) of stuka geschwader frequently transitioned to them in preference over the Ju-87, it almost guaranteed their survival on close support missions in those conditions and era, it was very well suited to it. Look them up, almost all switched in 41.

The problem with the BF-110 over england was being used how it wasn't intended, not how it was. It was being used as a long range bomber escort. This was not its job. It manoeuvred well, but like all twin engines its stability is its biggest issue in fighter combat, it cannot be tossed around like a piece of paper and fighters need to. The P-38 had this problem but not as pronounced because it was so overpowered for its weight. Same with the Mosquito. They were exceptions, not like other twin engine heavy fighters.
They are attack planes, Göring was stoned a lot, but still had a galactic IQ. The heavy fighter/attack plane had never really been conceived of so neatly before this.


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## Readie (Dec 9, 2011)

Legends, myths and Warbirds- spitfirepilots.com

Some more legends to read about on this link.

And these...

*"RAF Battle of Britain fighter pilots were mostly upper-class former public schoolboys."* 

In fact, of the 2900 fighter pilots who fought in the Battle of Britain, ("The Few"), only 200 went to public (i.e. private) school. The bulk came from humble or grammar school backgrounds and 20 per cent were of foreign nationality - including Czechs, Poles, Americans and Canadians.
[*The origins of this myth go back to the early days of the RAF*. In the 1920s and 1930s it was widely believed that only public schoolboys provided the right material for military officers and the RAF recruited accordingly. When the Auxiliary Air Force was established in 1924 for reservist pilots, the only people who could afford to join where wealthy young men who didn't need to spend six days every week at work. Thus the Aux AF became a social club for a certain class of people. With the rapid expansion of the RAF in the 1930s, the formation of the Volunteer Reserve introduced a new social class of pilots - the non-commissioned officer, (NCO). The VR strongly attracted young working men who wanted to learn how to fly - for free. With the coming of war, the initial strength of the RAF was built around a core of experienced regular officers, supplemented by the members of the Auxiliary Air Force and large numbers of Volunteer Reserve 'Seargent Pilots'. The popular British wartime propaganda film 'The First of the Few', about the origins of the Spitfire and its role in the Battle of Britain, made with the help of Auxiliary and Regular Air Force pilots, was one of the first vehicles for the public schoolboy heroes myth.]

*"The Battle of Britain was virtually unwinable for the Luftwaffe.*" 

Recently is has become fashionable for revisionist historians to say that the RAF couldn't have lost the Battle of Britain, or that the Luftwaffe had almost no chance of winning. They argue that, overall, the Luftwaffe had fewer fighters than the RAF in the Battle, and therefore the RAF wasn't really outnumbered. Since Operation 'Sealion' (the German invasion of Britain) depended on the defeat of the RAF to succeed, they argue that the invasion threat was never serious. In fact, as RAF pilots were only too aware, the Luftwaffe could easily achieve local air superiority over their targets in southern England, and the RAF shortage was in pilots not aircraft. Had the Luftwaffe used better offensive tactics - as demanded by the aircrews themselves - such as allowing the escort fighters to roam more freely from the bombers, then German losses could have been lower and attacks more effective. Knocking out British RDF (radar) stations and systematically destroying RAF fighter bases would have severely limited RAF Fighter Command's ability to effectively defend Southern and Eastern England. If the sudden change in Luftwaffe tactics to area bombing of cities hadn't been made, (in reprisal for small scale RAF raids on Berlin), the RAF would have been forced to progressively retreat north and west, with an increasingly serious pilot shortage. In this case, peace talks with Germany would be highly likely, and Churchill wouldn't have remained Prime Minister for very long.
*
"Since the Luftwaffe didn't consider that a distinct 'Battle of Britain' took place, the battle had no effect on the overall course of the war - other than to give the Americans an unsinkable aircraft carrier."*

"If Britain had given up the struggle in...1940, at least half of the German [army] divisions in the west, plus the crack Afrika Korps, (10 per cent of German Panzer strength), plus nearly all of the aircraft based in western Europe and the Mediterranean would have been used against Russia [in the summer of 1941]. To these should be added the German airborne forces which would not have been decimated in Crete in May 1941. The result would have been a crushing German victory in 1941 or 1942 and a Nazi dominated Europe..." - Christopher Dorne, BBC History Magazine, July 2000.

John


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## pbfoot (Dec 9, 2011)

Readie said:


> Legends, myths and Warbirds- spitfirepilots.com
> 
> Some more legends to read about on this link.
> 
> ...


Possibly but what make up was the senior staff


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## Readie (Dec 9, 2011)

British upper class twits I should imagine Neil...
John


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## Nig (Dec 9, 2011)

I like the myth that night fighter pilots ate a lot of carrots and it improved night vision. This was perpetuated to cover up radar and how effective it was in night fighting. The best bit of propaganda ever; we still believe it today.


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## Juha (Dec 9, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> I doubt that would work, the forward directors were very distinguishable from the rear ones and anyone, including the notoriously suspicious soviets, would've noticed. In fact Bismark almost had to surrender her A and B main turret range finders to the Soviet Trade agreement however Zeiss delivery schedule managed to keep the deadlines anyway.
> 
> 
> The main problem was that the after port and starboard batteries were controlled primarily by the two after directors which in the case of Bismarck, were unstabilized, twin axis directors installed as a stopgap measure until the proper ones could be manufactured and fitted. The German government, in keeping to its obligations under the Soviet-German trade agreement, had provided the Russians with four of their most modern FlaK directors--the two after ones from Bismarck, and the two foreward ones from Prinz Eugen. Thus Bismarck and Prinz Eugen each went to sea with a pair of inferior directors which were not fully integrated into the FlaK fire control system. Prinz Eugen later received two fully stabilized triaxis directors to replace those sent to the USSR, while Tirpitz was completed with hers.



IMHO that would have worked. Of course the Soviets would have noticed the difference but one should only show the treaty and notice that we will show all which was agreed on but no extras, sorry. On the directors, one important point was that the older type was open topped and that had influence on work performance in the Northern Atlantic.

Juha


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## jipi (Dec 9, 2011)

"Douglas Bader, after being shot down, and having lost his 2 artificial legs in the fight, had 2 new parachuted by a british bomber allowed by Goering to fly over Germany."

Bader actually got 2 new artificial legs parachuted by a british bomber, but it was during a bombing.

A french "legend" said the french air force shot about 1000 planes during the battle of France.

Recent studies show that the number of french victories was around 350...


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## parsifal (Dec 9, 2011)

> I would argue that the attack by Bettys and Nells on PoW, Repulse and her destroyer escorts (force Z) was divided over time: about 3 waves divided over two ships meant that never more than 9 aircraft had to be dealt with simultaneously, the same as Bismarcks situation.



To answer this statement, i referred to "The Rising Sun - The Decline and Fall Of the Japanese Empire 1936-45" John Toland Bath Press 1990, 937 pages. I also used Pacific War John Costello, New york, 1981, 741 Pages; Naval Weapons Of WWII John Campbell Conways Maritime Press 1985, 402 pages, and for Aircracraft Data I used "Encyclopedia of Aircraft in WWII"Paul Eden and Soph Moens, SDilverdaler Books 2002, 1152 Pages. i also used some Internet sources and one or two other sources for more detailed information. For the RN strikes I used mostly Corelli Barnett

The attacks on PoW and Repulse

The first attack, which consisted of two squadrons, one of which attacked the Prince of Wales, and the other attacked Renown was by either 17 Nells or 18 Bettys. ( aircraft attacked each Battleship in a single wave, attempting to bracket the shipsby attacking in waves at right angles to each other. Commander Takao commanding one of the squadrons, described how his unit was left largerly unscather whilst the other squadron, attacking the other ship (the PoW) was engulfed and badly affected by AA fire the 9 Bettys occurred at 11:07, and saw 9 Betty bombers of the Genzan Air Corps concentrate their attacks on the Repulse and about 9 attacking the PoW. This group of 18 aircraft attacked in one wave. Takao states that all of the flak was concentrated on one group, resulting in the loss of 4 aircraft, but there was virtually no interference on the second group. the second group approached the PoW and Repulse I think from astern, in a cloud bank, that allowed them to get to within 2 miles before they needed to emerge from that cloud. Torpedos were launched at 1800 yards (approximately). The attack laste all of 4 minutes. There was little opportunity to use Light AA fire against this attack, thoough it did occur. 

Another Group in the 2nd wave that attacked after midday under the command of Lt Iki, also attacked as a single group of nine aircrafdt, attacking at the same time. agains the Japanese used anvil tactics to maximise the chances of a hit , concentrating thjis time on the Repulse. Launch ranges were the same at 1800 yds. 

Becasue the Japanese launched at the range that they did, there was not a lot of opportunity for the Light flak to engage. There was some, but not much....perhaps all of 30 seconds. The Japanese tactics of attacking simultaneously for those early attacks limited the engagement time for the british flak . 

The Swordfish attacks against the bismarck are not comparable, because the british attacked in echelon (more or less singly). The British did this because with the limite numbers of aircraft they wanted to maximise the chances of crippling the ship. Corelli Barnett describes the attack on the bismarck as follows: "At 2035 the strike force reached the Sheffield, which informed them by aldis lamp that the bismarck bore 110* distant 12 miles . At 2040 the Swordfish flew on toward that target, in six subflights in line astern. 

As the 15 swordfish neared the bismarck they ran into a thick bank of cloud . This forced each sub flight to approach indepently and attack separately". According to Barnett, the attacks by the Swordfish on the bismarck took half an hour, whereas the attacks by the Japanese, whilst overall lasting several hours, tended to be short sharp, high internsity attacks lasting obly a few minutes. 

The swordfish aircraft , unlie the japanese closed to about 700 metres before launch. this subjected them to some Light Flak fire, moreso than the Japanese suffered 



> The speed advantage of the Nell vs Swordwish was was marginal, torpedo release limits dictated attack speed and while the Japanese torps were best in this area they still restricted the aircraft. The swordfish's manouverabillity may even have outweighed its slowness and the Nells physical size made it a bigger target to hit. In anycase the attack profile involved a dive that tended to trow of FLAK.




Ah no, not correct. The Nell had an attack speed of 150 mph, the Swordfish about half that. it was the speed of the aircraft not the torpedo release limits that dictated exposure times. The Type 91 Mod 2 aerial torpedoes used against the PoW and Repulse had an effective max range of 2000 yards, a drop speed of 300 knots and a max launch height of 400 feet. The British MkXII torps used against the Bismarck had a top launch speed of 150 knots amax launch height of 300 ft and a max effective range of 1500 yards 



> AFAIKT PoW hit its attacker AFTER they had released their weapons and were crossing the bow or egressing the target area.



That does not line up with the reports given by Lts Takao and Iki. Both these commanders reported that most of the flak was fired from as early as possible. I agree that it is hard to determine if the aircraft losses were before or after launch, but firing on the Jpanese began well before launch, and appears to be quirte effective given low hit to launch percentages. 




> Bismarcks three radars were out of action, PoW Air defense radars bar one was out of action. Bismarcks radar failed due to shell shock after engaging Norfolk just like PoW died from shell shock after engaging Bismarck. A few issues hadn't been resolved yet on both sides. Had Bismarks radars been working her defense may have been better against the swordfish.



Quite possibly given the relatively better performance of the tirpitz a year later. However, this does not explain the relatively poor showing of the bismarcks flak in her final battle. Fact remains there were no losses to the FAA, and hit to launch percentages are high



> The FuMO 23 radar had a beam width of about 6 degrees but by carefully maximizing returns an opperator could get a bearing to within 1 degree. He could also get range to 70m and pass this on to the predictors via telemetry. Obviously this is not really excellent but it is better than optical ranging. So I think
> 
> Latter Seetaks added a type of lobe switching that greatly increased accuracy and some versions added height finding. Bismarks radar/FLAK integration was already there but somewhat crude


.

We would have to assess the effectiveness of Tirpitzs flak shoots again FAA aircraft later in the war, which is not appropriate here. I have my dooubts that tirpitz was markedly better against the second generation FAA aircraft of the war, such as firefly or Avenger.


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## Siegfried (Dec 9, 2011)

I would question the accuracy of Tollands article in some regards.

The Swordfish did not attack at 75mph. In fact they entered a dive iniiated from about 4000-5000 yards that gave them considerable speed and helped them evade an attack. 

The 15 swordsifish did not approach to 700m, that was at least the track run length of the torpedo the closest they got was about 1000m.

They swordfish did not attack individually, they attacked in flights of 3 though as some got seperated and they attacked individually of course this tends to split the defences.

The Swordfish disappeared between waves and could often not been seen.

The reason that "light flak" was not used much by PoW was not so much the 1500m range that the Japanese used to release their torpedos but that the that the light FLAK was the 40mm Pom Pom which had a low muzzle velocity and desultary ballistics not better than the 20mm C38 used on German quad guns. The 40mm Boffors was an infinetly better weapon.

Tirpitz repelled the 12 Alabacore Torpedo bombers in March 1942 and sot down 2 by that time she had the following advantages over Bismark
1 4 modern triaxial directors instead of just two proiperly integrated into the FLAK system.

2 Her 8 triaxially stablised heavy FLAK gun mounts were all of the same type and fully debugged.
3 Her concentration of light FLAK had been increased by subsituting twin 2.0cm guns with a new type of gun with twice the rate of fire in a quad mount and increasing the number of mounts.
4 Her radar was far more deeply integrated into her FLAK systems.
5 Her 3 Seetakt radars now had precision direction finding due to a type of lobe switching and could detect the bearing of a target to within a fraction of a degree though they could not yet provide elevation data.

One 'myth' is that the allies had vastly better radar, blind fire radar and systems than the Germans did or rather than Bismarck did at that time.

The reality however is that these miracle allied devices only came in to service much latter in the war when the Germans had also introduced some of them.

PoW was unable to defend itself; the bomber may havd been faster but she had the advantage of calm seas, good visibillity (except for partial could cover for the level bombers on one run)

The extreme torpedo parameters you cite are not simultaenous and require tight constaints: a release at low altitude requires a slower release for instance as does one at high altitude.


The kind of radar systems needed to repell torpedo bombers did not exist in the RN or KM in the first half of the war. That only 4 torpedoes sunk PoW is remarkable when one considers that Bismarck needed to be scuttled after a dozen hits.


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## FLYBOYJ (Dec 9, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> I would question the accuracy of Tollands article in some regards.
> 
> The Swordfish did not attack at 75mph. In fact they entered a dive iniiated from about 4000-5000 yards that gave them *considerable speed *and helped them evade an attack.



Can you tell us what "considerable speed" is?

From memory, a Swordfish drops its torpedo at a very slow speed, even in a dive you're not looking at much more than 100 mph. It had a top speed of 139 mph, and with a torpedo under it's belly it wasn't flying even close to that speed, so enlighten us!


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## Juha (Dec 9, 2011)

A dozen torpedo hits on Bismarck?
the 9 torpedoplanes fron Victorious during the night 24-25 May got one midship hit, on 26 May the 15 Swordfish from Ark Royal got 2 hits, CA HMS Dorsetshire hit her twice IIRC, that makes 5 torpedo hits.

And PoW was hit by 6 or 7 torpedoes. And there are torpedo hits and torpedo hits, the first hit on PoW happened at the worst possible place, near a propeller shaft strut, that hit had catastrophic consequences. There were also some serious design flaws in the torpedo defence system of PoW, that’s true.

Juha


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## Edgar Brooks (Dec 9, 2011)

Also, the cocks had been opened, and the scuttling charges fired, before Dorsetshire hit Bismarck.


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## parsifal (Dec 9, 2011)

I dont think ther is any argument that the bismarck was tough ship,,, tougher than the PoW. However this toughnes did not save her, and she was disabled with far less aircraft, using less effective torpedo ordinance. 

What the two events plus the experiences at Pearl and Taranto did was to prove the basic obsolescence of Battleships unsupported by air cover. Ther was no such thing as an impregnable defence for Battleships.

That applies to both the allies and the Axis fleets. Arguing that this defensive system, or that defensive system was impregnabale, or vastly improved is a nonsense when you break down every engagement against undefended battleships. Sometimes losses were higher, sometimes the attackers missed, the germans in protecting their last remaining battleship (the tirpitz) were particulalry good at this. But then Tirpitz was, as a generalization not used except as a"fleet in being" which gave special and significant advantages to the Germans, which I suspect were more significant than her technological improvements.

I think the Allied experiences were more relevant to the development of Naval Warfare in the latter part of the war. Battleships were relegated to act as part of the screen, providing AA support to the new capital ships, the carriers. Here their inherent stability and heavy firepower were significant. Sth Dakota is credited with the greatest number of victories in a single day....14 a/c shot down (for which she received a unit citation). by far the most important role for flak until the arrival of the kamikaze was to break up attacks and decrease the accuracy of the bombers. CAP was at least as important in defensive measures, and really came into its own fighting the Kamikazes. 

All of this is interesting, and gives some indication as to the capabilities and future directions of the fleet defence problem in the war. It still doesnt explain why the bismarcks effort was so poor in comparison to later efforts by the germans themselves, or the Allied examples that been chosen. sure, there were some mitigations, like the poor weather, but IMO the flak from the Bismarck should have been more effective than it was. Bad weather is even more of an issue for the aircraft flying in it than the flak firing at those aircraft, yet the Swordfish achieveed a hit ratio far higher than anything we have looked at yet. It gets back to this issue....was the low speed of a swordfish something the Germans had not accurately taken into account at that stage? What caused this debate was johns claim that the the speed was not an issue. if not, what was the issue that made the Bismarcks shooting so poor as it was.


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## Siegfried (Dec 10, 2011)

Juha said:


> A dozen torpedo hits on Bismarck?
> the 9 torpedoplanes fron Victorious during the night 24-25 May got one midship hit, on 26 May the 15 Swordfish from Ark Royal got 2 hits, CA HMS Dorsetshire hit her twice IIRC, that makes 5 torpedo hits.
> 
> And PoW was hit by 6 or 7 torpedoes. And there are torpedo hits and torpedo hits, the first hit on PoW happened at the worst possible place, near a propeller shaft strut, that hit had catastrophic consequences. There were also some serious design flaws in the torpedo defence system of PoW, that’s true.
> ...




PoW was hit by only *4 torpedos * not 5 or more. The wreck has been investigated, you are using older out of date sources.

Bismarck was hit by a minimum of 6 with over 9 claimed. Non threatened her hull integrity. 

She was scuttled when she no longer had reasonably functioning weapons to fight back.

Here is a list of all known/possible torpedo hits (not counting claims by Vian's destroyers ) as may by Jose' Rico who runs the KBismarck forum.

24 May. Midnight. Hit by one 18 inch MK XII torpedo on the starboard side, amidships. 

26 May. 2047-2115 hours. Hit by two (or three) 18 inch MK XII torpedoes. One torpedo (or two) hit the port side amidships, and another hit the stern in the starboard side. As a result of this attack both rudders jammed at 12º to port. Lütjens only reported 2 hits but Müllenheim-Rechberg always said that he heard 2 hits before the final hit in the stern. 

27 May. 0958 hours. Possible torpedo hit to port. Rodney claimed a hit; the Germans deny it.

27 May. 1000 hours. Possible hit to the starboard side. Claimed by Norfolk; the Germans deny it.

27 May. 1022 hours. Hit on the starboard side by two 21 inch MK VII torpedoes fired by Dorsetshire from 3,000 meters (3,280 yards).

27 May. 1037 hours. Hit on the port side by one 21 inch MK VII torpedo fired by Dorsetshire from 2,200 meters (2,400 yards). 

27 May. 1039 hours. Bismarck sinks.


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## Juha (Dec 10, 2011)

Hello Siegfried
my source on PoW was Garzke's and Dulin's Battleships. Allied Battleships in WW II (1990 corrected and updated edition), the survey of the wreck was made in 1966 IIRC, so what was your source?

Juha


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## Siegfried (Dec 10, 2011)

parsifal said:


> I dont think ther is any argument that the bismarck was tough ship,,, tougher than the PoW. However this toughnes did not save her, and she was disabled with far less aircraft, using less effective torpedo ordinance.
> 
> What the two events plus the experiences at Pearl and Taranto did was to prove the basic obsolescence of Battleships unsupported by air cover. Ther was no such thing as an impregnable defence for Battleships.
> 
> It still doesnt explain why the bismarcks effort was so poor in comparison to later efforts by the germans themselves, or the Allied examples that been chosen. sure, there were some mitigations, like the poor weather, but IMO the flak from the Bismarck should have been more effective than it was. Bad weather is even more of an issue for the aircraft flying in it than the flak firing at those aircraft, yet the Swordfish achieveed a hit ratio far higher than anything we have looked at yet. It gets back to this issue....was the low speed of a swordfish something the Germans had not accurately taken into account at that stage? What caused this debate was johns claim that the the speed was not an issue. if not, what was the issue that made the Bismarcks shooting so poor as it was.



Bismark's FLAK system was quite capable of taking on any aircraft of any speed. The claim that her computers were unable to take into account the Swordfish's slow speed is simply not true. 

The Bismarcks FLAK predictors (the two forward ones) were among the most advanced in the world at the time and her systems more advanced than the RN's HACS. They were triaxially stabalised (not just biaxially), they had optics to accuately measure azimuth, elevation and range of target referenced to gyroscopic north and taking into account the ships considerable 30 knot speed. This tracked information was converted from spherical co-ordinates to cartesian by an analog computer and then the velocity in 3D measured. The system was what is called fully *"tachymetric"* in that it not only measured the position of the target but its speed as well. These conversions were usually done using 3D cams for ballistics, trigonometric data with the x,y,z co-ordinates and u,v,w speeds represented as shaft turns. The position of the aircraft could then be *'synthesised'* for any time in the future, (ie the system was 'synthetic'). Ballistics data encoded on to cams (eg superelevation and shell flight time) was then used to obtain a firing solution: an intitial estimate allowing for time to set the fuze and load the shell was entered into thr system and this told us where the aircraft would be in x seconds time. This point was aimed for and the flight time used to setr the fuse and set a firing time. The solution was conveted to spherical co-orindates and passed to the guns which were also physically triaxially stablised guns.

2 The problem was that bismark had only 2 of the 4 intended directors (temporarily) since the advanced ones were sent to the USSR this allowed the 15 swordfish respite from the more effective directors.

3 The 4 rear FLAK turrets MAY have had a technical problem that prevented them from firing at low or surface targets: it was an alignment isssue that bugged the new powr controlled rear 4 10.5cm flak.. See the AVKS 700 report.

So Bismark basically went to sea with the whole rear half of her FLAK not fully functional due to an inferior temporary director, a new FLAK mount with teething issues that prevented half her guns firing at low flying or surface targets and incomplete integration of the FLAK with the radar especially with the rear, more elemental directors.

4 In addition here twin 2.0cm C30 FLAK had not been yet upgraded to quad 2.0cm C38 FLAK guns which had 4 times the rate of sustained fire.

5 Finally the high level of radar integraion and high level of radar accuracy required was not yet in place. No navy had this though the RN had been very foresightfull in pushing type 282 radars into its pom pom directors at the time these lacked high precision and lobe switching.

Radar needed to be dramatically improved with range accuracy better than 10 meters. The German Wurzburg D was close to this in mid 1941 but not generally fitted to ships. It was likely around 1943-44 the neccesssary radar performance started to become available.


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## Siegfried (Dec 10, 2011)

Juha said:


> Hello Siegfried
> my source on PoW was Garzke's and Dulin's Battleships. Allied Battleships in WW II (1990 corrected and updated edition), the survey of the wreck was made in 1966 IIRC, so what was your source?
> 
> Juha



Several surveys since then, including publications in the royal institute of maritime architects.
Try:

http://www.pacificwrecks.com/ships/hms/prince_of_wales/pow-stern-damage.pdf


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## vanir (Dec 10, 2011)

One of the KGV crew said that their biggest problem was that the KGV (and all ships in the class) were still being run up to full working status. They weren't quite there yet, and he said the entire RN was quite a bit intimidated by the fact the Bismarck hadn't been at sea for very long and was not only completely run up to battlefield prowess, but the gunnery was élite. He said they straddled every ship bearing on it without too much trouble by the second volley, the KGV withdrew when one of the turrets lost action (malfunction, problems with the rangefinders on all of them too, other details you people know more than me). The impression I got was that he, speaking for the RN as he claimed was very scared of that ship.

You guys know way more about this than me, so excuse me if I'm piping in with extreme ignorance.


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## pbfoot (Dec 10, 2011)

vanir said:


> One of the KGV crew said that their biggest problem was that the KGV (and all ships in the class) were still being run up to full working status. They weren't quite there yet, and he said the entire RN was quite a bit intimidated by the fact the Bismarck hadn't been at sea for very long and was not only completely run up to battlefield prowess, but the gunnery was élite. He said they straddled every ship bearing on it without too much trouble by the second volley, the KGV withdrew when one of the turrets lost action (malfunction, problems with the rangefinders on all of them too, other details you people know more than me). The impression I got was that he, speaking for the RN as he claimed was very scared of that ship.
> 
> You guys know way more about this than me, so excuse me if I'm piping in with extreme ignorance.


Its pretty easy when you have only one ship


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## FLYBOYJ (Dec 10, 2011)

Here's a page with Swoardfish info.

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ot...h/request-fairey-swordfish-manuals-19907.html


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## parsifal (Dec 10, 2011)

Hi siegried


Well, if the Bismarcks AA suite was markedly inferior to her theoretical, or likley AA suite, we will need to have a look at the flak performance of her near sister, Tirpitz, on the few occasions that she was attacked. We may have to accept the inherent innacuracy of the situations that she was attacked in port, with all the land based assistance she derived from that, since there were only a few occasions when she was attacked at sea. 

The RAF attacks in 1942

During 1942, there were four attempts made by the RAF to attack and sink the Battleship Tirpitz.

The first was on 30/31st January 1942 when Stirling aircraft from 15 and 149 Squadrons, along with Halifaxes from 10 and 76 Squadrons participated in 'Operation Oiled', an attack against the Tirpitz as she lay in Fættenfjord in Norway.

Flying from an advanced air base in Scotland (RAF Lossiemouth), seven Stirlings from 15 and 149 Squadrons took off at 0030 hrs. Weather conditions were not good with cloud from sea level to 20,000 feet. One of the Stirlings reported having seen the mast tops of Tirpitz, but was unable to gain sufficient height in order to drop it's bomb load. All the Stirlings returned safely to base. The Halifaxes, four from 10 Squadron and five from 76 Squadron started taking off at 0204 hrs. All four of the 10 Squadron aircraft had to return to base before reaching the target due to lack of fuel. The five 76 Squadron Halifaxes reached the target area, but weather conditions prevented them from locating the target. All aircraft returned to base with the exception of one 76 Squadron Halifax which ditched in the North Sea just off the coast from Aberdeen. The crew were all uninjured and were rescued by the Aberdeen Lifeboat.

On the night of 31 March 1942 34 a/c from BC and Coastal Command attacked the ship whilst she lay in asenfjord near Trondheim. 6 aircraft failed to return. The details of these losses are as follows:

From 10 Squadron:
W1043 ZA-F flown by Squadron Leader F D Webster DFC and crew and W1044 ZA-D flown by P/O Blunden and crew. No contact was had from either aircraft after leaving base, however, research shows that both these aircraft were shot down in the Hemnefjord area.

From 35 Squadron:
R.9438 TL-H, flown by F/Sgt Bushby and his crew. This aircraft had made it back over the North Sea almost to Shetland from the Tirpitz, but crashed in to cliffs at Fitful Head on Shetland killing all the crew.

R.9496 TL-L, flown by F/Sgt Archibald and crew, and W1015TL-P, flown by F/Sgt Steinhauer and crew were reported as missing. What happened to them was not observed by any other Squadron members, however, locals in Norway witnessed both these aircraft crash.

From 76 Squadron:
R9453 MP-K flown by Squadron Leader Burdett and crew were last heard from en route back to base passing over Sumburgh and are believed to have ditched in the sea somewhere off Sumburgh Head.

Despite their best efforts, little or no effective damage had been inflicted on Tirpitz during the March 30/31 attack.

As can be seen from the following map giving the positions of the aircraft lost in this raid, Tirptiz's defences had no impact on these losses


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## parsifal (Dec 10, 2011)

In April 1942 there were two attacks on consecutive nights made by Halifaxes from 10, 35 and 76 Squadrons, and Lancasters from 44 and 97 Squadrons on the nights of 27/28th April and 28/29th April.

The attack on the 27/28 April cost 5 a/c. again however there is little evidence to support that Tirpitz was active in the defence. as the attached digram shows, she was heavily defended by land based defences, and subsequent PRU overflights showed no signs of near misses or hits. BC had completely missed the target. 

The next night the same crews made another attempt the next night. Again the tirptiz played no active part in the defence, as the aircraft were subsequently found to have bombed Lofjord, some 5 miles to the North of the target. two aircraft were lost in this attack


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## parsifal (Dec 10, 2011)

At 0917 on 9 March 1942 Tirpitz was attacked by the strike force of 12 torpedo-carrying Albacores under the command of Lieutenant-Commander W. J. Lucas from the aircraft carrier Victorious. The attack failed and 2 Albacores was shot down. . Much chastened but undamaged, Tirpitz continued at full speed for the shelter of Vestfjord/Bogen, where she arrived later the same day, while the remaining Albacores returned to Victorious.

The details of this attack are worth noting. The attacking air group was severely lacking in training, and attacked from downwind, and astern. The headwinds were recorded as "strong". i estimate above 40 mph headwinds with that description. The closing speed was, in any event below 50mph for the attacking Albacores, which made the attackers extremely vulnerable. the lack of training meant the attackers were not low enough to take advanatage of the rough seas. Torpedoes were the newer Mk XV which had roughly twice the explosive power of the pld Mk XIIs, and a launch range of about 1750 yds. It is believed the Albacores launched at about 1400 yds....considerably further out than the Ark Royals CAG. 

However, in credit to the tirpittzs AA crews they did shoot down two a/c and there were no torpedo hits. I would argue the lack of hits was more likley the low level of training for the crews more than enything, but the a/c losses are undeniable. very hard to say and highly debataebale that the tirpitz's AA suite had anything to do with his however. 

The attack from first engagement took about 20 mins to complete. The attacking albacores, because of their very slow rate of closure, spent a long time within the firing zone of the battleship. I would dispute that the AA fit had much to do with the improved kill rate of the tirpitz that day

Ther was never another opportunity to attack the tirpitz at sea. All subsequent attempts were made whilst she was in harbour, with all the additional protection that afforded her. 

Perhaps the best reaction as to the effectiveness of the tirptiz's defences can be gleaned from Admiral Ciliax's reaction. he was thoroughly shaken by the experience, and displayed a marked reluctance to risk the great ship again in similar circumstances. Hitler henceforth would not allow German heavy ships to operate at sea if Allied carriers were known to be about.


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## parsifal (Dec 10, 2011)

03 April 1944: At 0528, Tirpitz is attacked by 40 bombers from the carriers Victorious, Furious, Emperor, Searcher, Fencer, and Pursuer. She is hit by 10 bombs of 225 kg and 4 of 775 kg. 132 dead and 316 wounded. 

By 1944 tirpitz presented an exceptionally difficult target. She was firmly ensconced behind multiple torpedo nets, and was birthed close to cliffs in a very narrow fjord. There were numerous smoke generators to hide her. in additin to the 68 guns of her own defences she was protected by well over 100 shore based guns, land based radar and searchlights

The bombers on this occasion was the Barracuda....attack speed 172mph, able to carry 2000 lbs of bombs, able to act either as a a torpedo bomber, level bomber or divebomber. 

The air plan for the attack was complex. 2 strikes were to be made by 2 wings of 21 Barracuda torpedo dive-bombers, No. 8 wing normally in Furious and No. 52 wing in Victorious, but to meet the requirements of the flying programme it was necessary to use both carriers simultaneously. In order that the wings should fly together 1 squadron from each wing had to be exchanged between the carriers, so for this operation 827 squadron was housed in Victorious in place of 831 squadron who went to Furious. To obtain the maximum effect on Tirpitz it was decided to use 4 types of bomb. 11 aircraft were each to carry three 227 kg (500 lb) SAP, 5 aircraft one 726 kg (1,600 lb) AP, and 5 aircraft either three 227 kg (500 lb) MC or 272 kg (600 lb) A/S bombs. Released from above 1,067 meter (3,500 feet) the 726 kg (1,600 lb) AP bombs were calculated to pierce the battleship's armoured deck, from 610 meter (2,000 feet) the 227 kg (500 lb) bombs should pierce the upper deck and do serious damage above the armoured deck, the 227 kg (500 lb) MC bombs were primarily for effect against personnel manning the AA guns and were therefore carded in the first aircraft to attack in each strike, and the 272 kg (600 lb) A/S bombs would have the same effect if they hit or if near misses should do underwater damage. In the actual attack 9 aircraft of the first strike carried 227 kg (500 lb) SAP and seven 726 kg (1,600 lb) AP and in the second strike 13 aircraft carried 227 kg (500 lb) SAP and only 3 carried 726 kg (1,600 lb) AP. Because of the light wind at take-off only two, not three, 272 kg (600 lb) A/S bombs could be carried per Barracuda.


Victorious was also to fly off 10 Corsairs with each strike to act as fighter escort for the Barracudas and because she was operating more aircraft than she was designed to do the first strike had to be parked on deck for some time prior to take off, an undesirable necessity as the deck was very wet and spray and sleet were freezing on it. Detailed briefing of all the air-crews had been carried out while at sea on 1 April.


At 0416 the first of the Corsairs of 1834 squadron took off from Victorious, followed 8 minutes later by the Barracudas of 827 and 830 squadrons (No. 8 Wing) from the 2 fleet carriers. At the same time 20 Wildcats took off from Searcher and Pursuer and 10 Hellcats from Emperor (800, 881 and 882 squadrons) while Seafires from Furious and Wildcats from Fencer formed a protective umbrella over the force. By 0437 the aircraft had formed up and headed 120° for their target.

As the strike was approaching her, Tirpitz was weighing anchor before going to sea on more post-repair trials. The second anchor was coming in when it was seen that the smoke screen ashore was beginning and 32 aircraft were reported as heading south at a distance of 69 kilometer (43 miles). The alarm was sounded, guns manned and at 0528 the first aircraft were in sight while only a very thin smoke screen covered the fjord. No fire had been observed as the aircraft had flown over a destroyer and merchantman in Lange Fjord but flak began to interfere with the attackers some 5 kilometer (3 miles) from their target. As Tirpitz first sighted the aircraft they were beginning their attack. The Corsairs remained at 3,048 meter (10,000 feet) to cover the Barracudas against counter-attack but the Wildcats and Hellcats came in low over the hills, straffing the battleship with 0.5 machine-gun fire as the Barracudas began their bombing dives at 0529. The attack was made in 2 columns along the fore-and-aft line of the target as practice had shown that errors of range exceeded errors of line. The bombs were meant to be dropped from a height above 914 (3,000 feet) meter to ensure the penetration of the armoured deck but in their enthusiasm and determination to achieve accuracy most of the pilots dived much lower than this. The attack lasted exactly 1 minute. There were 6 direct hits and 3 probable hits and the battleship's upper deck was left bloody with wounded men.

As the first strike were attacking the second strike were taking off. 19 Barracudas from 829 and 831 squadrons (No. 52 Wing), 10 Corsairs from 1826 squadron, 19 Wildcats from 896 and 898 squadrons and 10 Hellcats from 804 squadron. At 0537 they formed up and made for Tirpitz whose smoke screen was visible when they were still 64 kilometer from the target. This proved to be no deterrent. At 0635 the Hellcats again attacked the battleship's AA positions on flak suppression while the Wildcats sprayed the unprotected bridge and upper deck with bullets for a minute before the Barracudas came in to the attack. By 0637 it was again all over, 8 definite and 5 probable hits being claimed, but the 726 kg (1,600 lb) bomb which hit the bows failed to explode. The fighters followed the example of their predecessors by again shooting up the German ships and shore installations as they presented themselves on the return flight. There was no interference from the German Air Force. By 0758 all the aircraft had landed back on their carriers except for 2 Barracudas shot down, 1 in each strike, and 1 damaged Hellcat deliberately ditched. British casualties were 9 killed.

Vice-Admiral Moore had planned to repeat the attack on the next day but in view of the damage caused to Tirpitz and the fatigue and reaction of his air-crews after so successful an attack he revised his original intention and ordered a return to base. By 1630 6 April 1944 most of the force was back in Scapa Flow, with only Searcher, who had an engine defect, and the fleet oilers and their escorts remaining to come safely home some 10 hours later.

Given the above results...just two aircraft hit by flak, and 14 confirmed hits from 40 aircraft, I do not concur that the tirpitz displayed a marked improvement over ther bismarck in her defensive arrangements. perhaps we should add this to the list of myths in this thread. Compared to the performance of the Soth Dakota in a similar time period....14 kills, the performance of the tirpittz was positively miserable


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## Siegfried (Dec 10, 2011)

parsifal said:


> . Compared to the performance of the Soth Dakota in a similar time period....14 kills, the performance of the tirpittz was positively miserable



If the smoke generators are working the attack aircraft can't see the Tirpitz and the Tirpitz can see them. In this case the smoke generators had been switched on too late and did more to protect the aircraft than the tirpitz.

The Tirpitz's claims are solid. The practice of straffing and FLAK suppression had become common. Extra armouring to protect the FLAK crews aboard Tirpitz had been placed but not delivered and so many of the Tirpitz's FLAK crew were killed. Sth Dakotas claimed kills no doubt need to be taken with a grain of salt. USAAF B-17 gunners once claimed over 100 kills when precisely 2 aircraft had been lost; this tends to happen with multiple gunners firing at the same target and claiming the same kill. I say the claim is on the nose.

Attacks against Tirpitz on 22 August cost 2 Barracudas and 4 corsairs.

In December 1944, the Sth Dakota's battery was upgraded, with 72 20mm and 72 Bofors. Sth Dokota original AAA armament was weak: much weaker than the earlier Bismarck's.


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## parsifal (Dec 10, 2011)

> Sth Dakotas claimed kills no doubt need to be taken with a grain of salt



The claim for 14 kills is already an adjusted figure for the South Dakota, based on a study made after the action itself. It can be considered as accurate a tally as can be achieved. The claimed figures were 26 shoot downs. Moreover, this exceptional day was nowheree near her late war AA update. She achieved this tally during the Battle Of Santa Cruz.....26 October 1942


"The first enemy attack was concentrated against the Hornet. South Dakota operated near the Enterprise to provide her protective fire against the attacking aircraft. At 1045 Task Force 16 was attacked by a group of dive bombers. Approximately an hour later the task force was again attacked, this time by some 40 torpedo bombers. A third aerial assault was made with both dive bombers and torpedo bombers, coming in at 1230. South Dakota suffered a 550 lb (250 kg) bomb hit on top of her number one turret. When the action was broken off that evening, the American forces retired toward Nouméa, New Caledonia. The South Dakota was credited with downing 26 enemy planes. She had fired 890 rounds of 5 inch, 4000 rounds of 40mm, 3000 rounds of 1.1 inch and 52000 rounds of 20mm ammunition during the action. Captain Gatch made the following assessment of the relative effectiveness of each weapon type in bringing down enemy aircraft during the action: 5 inch: 5%, 40mm and 1.1 inch: 30% and 20mm: 65% 

Sth Dakotas effort is not comparable to the long range efforts by either Bismarck, Tirpitz or Force Z. The Japanese on that day were pressing home their attacks with fanatical determination, closing to point blank range in an attampt to get to the carriers. They succeeded in one instance by sinking the Hornet, they failed against the enterprise. Despite that her efforts are impressive, and demonstrate, by operational results that her AA suite and Fire Control arrangements were far superior to anything any of the other combatants possessed, including the Germans. 




> In December 1944, the Sth Dakota's battery was upgraded, with 72 20mm and 72 Bofors. Sth Dokota original AAA armament was weak: much weaker than the earlier Bismarck's.



Thats interesting. The record set by BB57 occurred in October 1942, just 10 days after she had been declared operational in the Pacific. At that time she had 40x 40mm or 1.1 in, and 40 x 20mm plus her as built 5/38 AA suite. She did not have the later AA directos that were also fitted later in the war. 

Even with, as you describe it "_an AA suite far weaker than the Bismarcks_", she outperformed the German ships (ie both Bismarck with, as you claim her inferior AA directors, and Tirpitz with, as you claim her improved AA arrangements) ships by many orders of magnitude. On the day of her record, Enterprise survived an attack by close to 100 attackers, determined, well trained, and fanatical. bismarck was hit 15 attackers and missed every one of them, allowing the attackers to close to 731 yards in one case (and an average of 1000 yds before release according to you). In the case of Tirptiz, in two seprate incidents, one at sea, and one with another 100 guns to support her own effort, she shot down 4 aircraft out of 92 possible targets, travelling more slowly. 



> The Tirpitz's claims are solid



How? There is no evidence to this point to support that. For all the effort put into her, we currently have a score of 4 a/c for her gun crews. There were destroyers in both the USN and the RN with better tallies than that. I have the details of her September efforts and will post them separately once I have dug them out

I am amazed that you would cling so stubbornly to the claim she (the Tirpitz) was an effective AA platform even when confronted with evidence like this. sure, in theory she had an impressive AA defence, but its the results you need to stop and have a glance at. Her efforts in the field are not good. Neither were her sisters. Despite all the sophistication that you talk about, and the expense that you dont, she was not very successful at all in conducting AA defences.


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## Juha (Dec 10, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> Several surveys since then, including publications in the royal institute of maritime architects.
> Try:
> 
> http://www.pacificwrecks.com/ships/hms/prince_of_wales/pow-stern-damage.pdf



Thanks for the interesting link, still better one is this http://www.pacificwrecks.com/ships/hms/prince_of_wales/death-of-a-battleship-a-re-anlaysis.pdf

So it seems that there was only 4 torpedo hits plus damage from several near misses. But as I wrote the first hit, on port side near stern, was into worst possible place and had catastrophic consequences, as shown by the fact that even if PoW got 3 more hits on her starboard side it capsized to port even if the effectiveness of her starboard side anti-torpedo system was weakened by counterflooding before the 3 hits.

Juha


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## parsifal (Dec 10, 2011)

The last carrier strikes

In mid July the home fleet again went to sea to attack the tirptiz. The carriers Formidable, Furious and Indefatigible launched a strike consisting of 44 Barras, escorted by 38 Corsairs and hellcats, and a further 10 Fireflies. 

Tirpitz was now protectred by well over 150 guns located onshore, in addition to her own armament. There were also additional smoke generators. 

In this raid the germans had had good advance warning and shrouded the entire fjord in smoke obscuring the target completely. There weree no bomb hits, and two Corsairs were hit by flak. I do not where these hits occurred, and who was most likley to have bagged these kills, but given the proportion of land based guns to those onboard the battleship, one should assume at least one of the lost a/c were shot down by the land based flak. 

Between 31 July - 1 August 1944 Tirpitz carried out exercises at sea for the last time, with the 4th Destroyer Flotilla, the destroyers Z29, Z31, Z33, Z34 and Z39.

Three weeks later the Fleet Air Arm returned to the fray with a series of attacks under the operational codename "Goodwood I, II, III, IV", using 5 aircraft carriers, Indefatigable, Formidable, Furious, Nabob and Trumpeter.

The first 2 attacks were carried out on 22 August 1944 (Operation "Goodwood I" and "II") 1944. Just after noon, Barracudas and escorting Corsairs ( a total of 84 aircraft) failed to repeat the success of Operation "Tungsten" as low cloud prevented them from reaching the target but Hellcats bombed through the cloud and claimed 2 hits. In the early evening a further 6 Hellcats from Indefatigable attacked Tirpitz and again claimed 2 hits with 227 kg (500 lb) bombs. The morning sortie had also attacked other shipping and had damaged 2 small supply ships as well as Tirpitz's sea-planes which were moored nearby.

Both sides were optimistic in their claims. In fact no hits were obtained by the Hellcats but the British losses were only 1 Barracuda and 1 Hellcat whereas the Germans had claimed no less than 12 aircraft to have been observed shot down. However the escort carrier Nabob was torpedoed by a U-boat but managed to return to harbour, while the CAP shot down 2 Blohm und Voss 138 flying boats that ventured too close to the carrier task force.

I think it reasonable to assume a 50/50 split in the kills between the land based and ship based flak. Thats one additional loss to the tirpitz's guns 

In the afternoon of 24 August 1944, Barracudas, Hellcats, Corsairs and Fireflies from Indefatigable, Formidable and Furious took off in the heaviest attack (Operation "Goodwood III") made by the Fleet Air Arm. The 33 Barracudas all carried 726 kg (1,600 lb) AP bombs, the 10 Hellcats each a 227 kg (500 lb) bomb, and 5 of the 24 Corsairs carried 454 kg (1,000 lb) AP bombs, the remainder with the 10 Fireflies being detailed for antiflak duties. At 1547 the German defences gave an aircraft alarm and the smoke screen was started. The aircraft approached from all directions at heights from 1,981 meter (6500 feet) to 3,048 meter (10,000 feet), diving low into the attack. This was a technique devised out of the lessons of Operation "Tungsten" which made the directing of AA fire very much more difficult for the gunnery control on board Tirpitz. Despite the smoke screen 2 hits were scored for the loss of 2 Hellcats and 4 Corsairs. A 227 kg (500 lb) bomb landed straight on the top of "B" turret dishing its top and temporarily damaging the elevating gear of the starboard gun and destroying the quadruple 2cm AA mounting on it. The other hit was to prove to be the Fleet Air Arm's greatest disappointment. A 726 kg (1,600 lb) AP bomb hit just forward of the bridge on the port side and penetrated not only the upper deck but the armoured deck below, finally coming to rest in No. 4 Switch Room on the lower platform deck, having gone through 14,6 cm (5¾ inches) of decking, mostly armoured steel. It failed to explode and when the Germans finally removed the explosive there was only 45 kg (100 lb) instead of 98 kg (215 lb). Had this bomb exploded it would have wrecked the main fire control room and the switchboard room as well as causing serious flooding. Of this attack the German records state:


"The attack on 24 August 1944 was undoubtedly the heaviest and most determined so far. The English showed great skill and dexterity in flying. For the first time they dived with heavy bombs. During the dive bombing, fighter planes attacked the land batteries which, in comparison with earlier attacks, suffered heavy losses. The fact that an armour-piercing bomb of more than 699 kg (1,540 lb) did not explode must be considered an exceptional stroke of luck, as the effects of that explosion would have been immeasurable. Even incomplete smoke screening upsets the correctness of the enemy's aim and it has been decided from now on to use it in wind strengths up to 9 meters/second (8.2 yards/second) irrespective of possible gaps".

The Germans also ordered a reduction in the required time of notice for smoke from 10 to 7 minutes.

Gales and fog alternated for the next 5 days until 29 August 1944 when another heavy attack (Operation "Goodwood IV") of 60 aircraft was launched from Formidable and Indefatigable. 4 of the 7 Hellcats flew in with target indicators but the Germans had sufficient warning and the battleship was completely obscured by smoke. The aircraft bombed blindly and although they thought they had 2 hits in fact they had none. 1 Firefly and 1 Corsair were lost. Again, hard to know who to give the credit for the kills, plus the smoke undoubtedly hampered the flak gunners without radar direction. But it hampered the those guns on land less than it did the gunners on the tirpitz, and it was smoke, not AA that was proving the greatest hindrance to the FAAs efforts. 

So ended the Fleet Air Arm's attacks against Tirpitz. The effect had been very considerable and since the X-craft attack in September of the previous year the battleship had been rendered virtually useless on a more or continuous basis. At a cost of 17 a/c, about half of them not shot down by Tirpitz, the great ship had been unable to go to sea for more than 7 months. 

But had German strategy and tactics not been bedevilled by the internecine feuding between the Navy and Luftwaffe, so that no fighter cover was ever provided to protect Tirpitz, the outcome might have been very different. When eventually fighters were allocated for this duty it was to be too late.


so, in total, Tirpitz was responsible over a 2 year period for shooting down an estimated 10 aircraft, possibly as high as 19, if her guns were 100% responsible for all losses. A total of 292 aircraft had come within her flak zone, so she was overall able to inflict a loss rate of about 0.3%. Again, that is not a good outcome for her, and does not justify the huge expense lavished on her (except it tied down huge RN resources as well) and certainly does not lend any credence to the claim that her flak arrangements were equal or superior to anything the allies possess. Quite the opposite in fact. In terms of disrupting attacks she had suffered a total of 18 hits out of approximately 150 deliveries. Thats quite low, but still potent, but cannot be compared to conventional combat because of the peculiar situation the Tirpitz was in....she had massive shore based flak support, smoke detectors, favourable (defensive) weather, and formidbale terrain to help her defences.


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## DonL (Dec 10, 2011)

This above AAA discussion is more then childish and hasn't anything to do with an sophisticated analysis about different AAA philosophy's of different Navies with flaws and technologie advantages!

USA and German AAA armament off capital chips WWII!

USA AAA armament

5/38
From ballistics an average (more to poore) gun with very good turrents (high training rates) and a very good rate of fire for this caliber!
The amazing highlight was the VT-fuzes and this was the technology advantage of this gun compare to all other nations and all other AAA guns. To compare the the 5/38 against other nations AAA guns without the mention of the VT-fuzes, is to compare apples with pebbles. With MT-fuzes it is average, with VT-fuzes it is excellent. One major flaw was the efficiency at high altitude, the efficiency limit against high altitude bomber was at 6000m (ballistic efficiency).
Against the Japanese it was totaly ok, but against a Do-217 with a Fritz-X, this weapon would be over it's limit and without effect,even with VT-fuzes.

40 mm/56
Best overall midrange AAA of WWII. Good ballistics, good rate of fire, good trainings rates. 
One single flaw was the allied ammo with only 0.068 kg TNT, that's not enough bursting charge for a secure kill on an a/c.
German mineshell (average munition on german capital ships since 1944)for the Bofors was 0,370 kg Nitropenta, much more fatal for an a/c.

20 mm/70
Good ballistics, good rate of fire, good trainings rates, average bursting charge (

German AAA arment:

10.5 cm/65 SK C/33 L. C/37
From ballistics one of the best AAA guns in naval service WWII, with good turrents (triaxial mounting, average to good training rates) and an average rate of fire for this caliber! Effective to 7500m high altitude. No VT-fuzes were introduce in WWII.
Germany had developed VT-fuzes at March 1945 and VT-fuzes were in production but never inroduced at KM AAA's

3.7 cm/L83 SK C/30 
Good ballistic, average training rate, very powerfull shell (0.360kg Nitropenta),* the worst rate of fire *from all AAA guns in this category!

2 cm/65 C/38
Good ballistic, good training rate, very powerfull shell (0.022kg Nitropenta), good rate of fire.
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Later since 1943

4 cm/56 (1.57") Flak 28 (Bofors 40mm)
Best overall midrange AAA of WWII. Good ballistics, good rate of fire, good trainings rates. 
One single flaw was the allied ammo with only 0.068 kg TNT, that's not enough bursting charge for a secure kill on an a/c.
German mineshell (average munition on german capital ships since 1944)for the Bofors was 0,370 kg Nitropenta, much more fatal for an a/c.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

To the above dicussion:
To my opinion BS (Bismarck) would never be allowed to operation Rheinübung with it's AAA armament.
Many things would be explained from Siegfried. To claim that the AAA armamen of Tirpitz isn't better then Bismarck is simply bogus.
You can't compare a single ship in a harbour, with a task force on open sea with the advantage of VT-fuze!
At sea Tirpitz did a good to average job, that's it!

The introduction of the the 3.7 cm/L83 SK C/30 was a very big mistake, that was reported at 1936 to the KM! Nothing happened, even though the germans were well aware of the 4 cm/56 (1.57") Flak 28 (Bofors 40mm), guaranteed after the occupation of austria, because there were several 4 cm/56 (Bofors 40mm) AAA captured, but the KM showed no interests. To my opinion the KM was well aware of the Bofors 40mm much earlier because Bofors was a piece of Krupp and Krupp was well aware of the Bofors 40mm AAA gun.

Many to all problems of the german AAA armament of capital ships were home made! The technologie (for all weapons above) was developed till 1938, but the KM was to stupid to recognize this, and so it was 1943/44 till all capital ships were equiped with the best possible AAA armament and all major flaws were sorted out.

To compare the AAA performance of german capital ships with USA capital ships, Prinz Eugen would be a much better choice then Tirpitz!
First PG (Prinz Eugen) was not a fleet in being, the ship was permanent at missions from early 1944 till April 1945, with a trained crew at sea and the AAA armament was the same from radar to weapons except that Tirpitz didn't get any Bofors weapons.
The AAA efficiency of PG was legendary at the baltic sea, she scored several IL2 and Pe-2 Bomber in many missions. She claimed at one mission 9 killed shots to enemy bombers. She defend more then one time the whole task force with her AAA efficiency. She defend many times german harbour's with her AAA efficiency. PG was the most efficiencied AAAb german capital ship and showed, what is possible, when all flaws were disabled, and all "advantages" came to work.

To make this clear PG was also benefit, from the low altitude of USSR bombers, just as the USA capital ships from the japanese bombers!

And I make this clear, all other argumetation are simply bogus!


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## Greyman (Dec 10, 2011)

jipi said:


> "Douglas Bader, after being shot down, and having lost his 2 artificial legs in the fight, had 2 new parachuted by a british bomber allowed by Goering to fly over Germany."
> 
> Bader actually got 2 new artificial legs parachuted by a british bomber, but it was during a bombing.



I think this one's pretty much true. The Germans contacted the British and told them they could fly over and drop Bader some legs. This the British did, but in doing so also decided to have the bombers hit the base at the same time.


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## Greyman (Dec 10, 2011)

*Myth: *_The Hurricanes during the Battle of France used a spread-out harmonisation pattern._

In fact they used as tight of a group as possible throughout. Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons based in Britain, however ...


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## parsifal (Dec 10, 2011)

> This above AAA discussion is more then childish and hasn't anything to do with an sophisticated analysis about different AAA philosophy's of different Navies with flaws and technologie advantages!



Dont know about SG, he is trying to sing the technological praises of the German ships the same as you. All very interesting, but the the proof of the pudding is in the results. i have analyses what was achieved by all that investment. For the tirpitz, about 12 aircraft over two years with 10 of them over a 7 month period. Not a lot to show for all that trouble. 



> The amazing highlight was the VT-fuzes and this was the technology advantage of this gun compare to all other nations and all other AAA guns. To compare the the 5/38 against other nations AAA guns without the mention of the VT-fuzes, is to compare apples with pebbles. With MT-fuzes it is average, with VT-fuzes it is excellent.



Which overlooks a crucial point in the preceding discussion. The Sth Dakotas best day occurred on the 26th October 1942, some 6 months before the introduction of the VT fuse. She achieved that score with her prewar FC arrangements using MT fuses and 1942 style radars. There were no whiz bang ultra high tech weaponary used to achieve that score. The targets were higher performance than those used against the tirpitz at sea in 1942 



> One major flaw was the efficiency at high altitude, the efficiency limit against high altitude bomber was at 6000m (ballistic efficiency).



Not sure how much difference this actually would make, but we could try and take a look at USN AA efforts in the Med to see how the gun performed against the LW high level bombers. High level bombers operating with conventional ordinance are not much of a threat against a moving target. An FX bomb is a different proposition, but then, the delivery vehicle is outside range of the 5/38 anyway. 

I was trained using the 5/54. There were no complaints about it high altitude performance....



> Against the Japanese it was totaly ok, but against a Do-217 with a Fritz-X, this weapon would be over it's limit and without effect,even with VT-fuzes.



Quite possibly, but we would need to look at specific combats to determine that. might not be possible with the resources we have. 



> 10.5 cm/65 SK C/33 L. C/37
> From ballistics one of the best AAA guns in naval service WWII, with good turrents (triaxial mounting, average to good training rates) and an average rate of fire for this caliber! Effective to 7500m high altitude. No VT-fuzes were introduce in WWII.



I can agree with all of that, but the results of this gun are disappointing even when comparing to non-VT armed Allied AA. 



> To my opinion BS (Bismarck) would never be allowed to operation Rheinübung with it's AAA armament.
> Many things would be explained from Siegfried. To claim that the AAA armamen of Tirpitz isn't better then Bismarck is simply bogus.



I didnt. I agreed in fact that tirpitz's AA was better than Bismarcks. What i said was I couldnt understand why Bismarcks AA effort was so bad, not that tirpitz was bad. Then there was the claim that tirpitz 's AA was equal or superior to Allied AA. No allowance made by the claimant for VT or improved directors or better radars....just a barefaced claim that the AA technology fitted into the tirpitz was superior to anything the allies had. It was me that tried to compare apples to apples by choosing a midwar enegagement by BB57 and comparing that to a late war series of engagements with Tirpitz. 

When you compare Tirpitzs performance to Sth Daks, there is no comparison, The US ship is far more efficient. We can do that for other similar ships and will reach the same conclusion. The facts are the facts. 



> You can't compare a single ship in a harbour, with a task force on open sea with the advantage of VT-fuze!
> At sea Tirpitz did a good to average job, that's it!




I agree, but Sth Dakotas effort on the 26th October was more or less a single handed effort. Other ships in the TG contributed, but the lions share of the kills were done by BB57 all on her own. In comparison the Tirpitz whilst in harbour had tremendous land based support as well as the support of other ships as well moored near to her on several occasions (for example at the time of the strikes 3 april 1944, she had 5 destroyers moored within 3 km of her). During the single at-sea strike against her, she had 4 DD involved as her escort. 

Claiming that Tirpitzs effort at sea was average to good is simply ignoring the numbers and the situation. She managed to shoot down 2 a/c out of 12, flying too high to get cover from the waves closing more slowly than they should (about 50mph). that is not good, its Bl**dy terrible. 



> Many to all problems of the german AAA armament of capital ships were home made! The technologie (for all weapons above) was developed till 1938, but the KM was to stupid to recognize this, and so it was 1943/44 till all capital ships were equiped with the best possible AAA armament and all major flaws were sorted out.



No argument that German AA efforts for her heavy ships were improving as the war progressed. I agree. The claim was they were better than the allies. Operational results dont support that. Allied AA was markedly superior to German, the results speak for themselves...with or without VT fuses, individually or as a group. 



> To compare the AAA performance of german capital ships with USA capital ships, Prinz Eugen would be a much better choice then Tirpitz!
> First PG (Prinz Eugen) was not a fleet in being, the ship was permanent at missions from early 1944 till April 1945, with a trained crew at sea and the AAA armament was the same from radar to weapons except that Tirpitz didn't get any Bofors weapons



Why is it more comparable? when Sth Dakota joined the Pacific Fleet she had been operations for a little over a month. Before that she had spent many months being rebuilt. Her crews would have been as raw as donkey do-do in many respects.

By comparison, when the tirpitz engaged the Fleet Airm in 1942 she had been commissioned for over 6 moths. her crews were fuly worked up, as were Bismarcks for thjat matter. 

In April 1944 when Operation Tungsten was initiated against her, it was the same crews that went back to the ship. They had nearly as much time to get ready as BB57 had for Santa Cruz.... 



> The AAA efficiency of PG was legendary at the baltic sea, she scored several IL2 and Pe-2 Bomber in many missions. She claimed at one mission 9 killed shots to enemy bombers. She defend more then one time the whole task force with her AAA efficiency. She defend many times german harbour's with her AAA efficiency. PG was the most efficiencied AAAb german capital ship and showed, what is possible, when all flaws were disabled, and all "advantages" came to work.
> 
> To make this clear PG was also benefit, from the low altitude of USSR bombers, just as the USA capital ships from the japanese bombers


!

We dont have any solid information to gauge her actual performance against claimed performance. If you could give specific dates of the actions you want looked at, we mighht be able to look somewhat into it (probably using the Seekrieg war diaries I expect). Claims versus actual kills is tricky. Sth Dakota claimed 26 kils on the 26 October, post action research suggest 14 kills. During the attacks on the tirpitz in July or august she claimed 12 FAA a/c shot down when in fact she shot down 2. Prinz Eugen might claim 9 kills, that means almost certainly she shot down less than 4. 




> And I make this clear, all other argumetation are simply bogus!




A very brave claim indeed. You have mentioned nothing about radar direction, Fire Control, explosives used, new technologies by both sides. But fundamentally, you are dismissing operational research....research into actual combats and the reults achieved as "bogus"....Why??? Is it because the results achieved cant live up to the hype?


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## DonL (Dec 10, 2011)

You have something misunderstood!

I never ever claimed that german capital ships, had a better AAA armament then USS capital ships!
My intention was to show, the the KM capital ships could reach a much better performance then Tirpitz as a fleet an being!
Also one problem of the operation Rheinübung were the fuses, they were not enough sensitive to the Swordfish! That problem was solved at the operation cebereus! I would never claim that PG was as good as USA ships in task forces with VT-fuzes!
PG was legendary for her performances at baltic sea, that's different from the atlantik! What I want to show is, that the german AAA wasn't bad, it had it's flaw's with no doubt! But when this flaws were rejected, PG was a very very effectiv AAA plattform!


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## parsifal (Dec 10, 2011)

> I never ever claimed that german capital ships, had a better AAA armament then USS capital ships!



I didnt say it was you who made that claim, it was another memeber, Siegfried



> My intention was to show, the the KM capital ships could reach a much better performance then Tirpitz as a fleet an being!



Again what you are claiming is different from what Siegfried was claiming. his claim, with no qualification was that the tirpitz AA suite was superior to anything the allies fielded. I simply pointed out that looking at the theory is fine, but the results dont support that. Tirpitz's best day is about 1/4 as good as the best day for Sth Dakota, and Sth Dakota did that without a great deal of new whiz bangery 



> Also one problem of the operation Rheinübung were the fuses, they were not enough sensitive to the Swordfish!




Which is fine and something I didnt know. The original "myth" was that the slow speed of the Swordfish made them invulnerable. i accepted that, but simply pointed out that Bismarcks effort was still very poor in her final action, and wanted to know why. Ive was then told it was because half her directors had been pulled out and replaced with dud ones. i was then told that all that had been solved in the tirpitz and by 1944, she could outshoot and outdance any Allied ships. Oh really!!!!! so i went away and had a look at actual results for her as well. Turns out, she did better than the Bismarck, but nowhere near as good as some Allied ships (with or without VT fuses) . i poinmted to BB57 as an example, and got all this dirty laundry thrown at me in a hissy fit. 



> That problem was solved at the operation cebereus! I would never claim that PG was as good as USA ships in task forces with VT-fuzes!



Thats another strike worth looking at, but I tend to agree, the two BCs and their TG of escorts shot the Swordfish that attacked them out of the sky from memory. But that was not the issue. My issue is not about german AA generally. mine was in response to the claim that the Tirpitz was superior to any allied ship in her AA suite. Her performance does not support that. 



> PG was legendary for her performances at baltic sea, that's different from the atlantik! What I want to show is, that the german AAA wasn't bad, it had it's flaw's with no doubt! But when this flaws were rejected, PG was a very very effectiv AAA plattform!




I can only repeat what i said a minute ago. We would need to look at the specific engagements, and try and find a reasonably reliable source to verify the claim. it may be true, or it may be one of the myths we are talking about. We dont have the information to verify at this minute. Give us specific dates, and engagements, and we can then assess the veracity of the claims.


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## Juha (Dec 10, 2011)

IMHO Don's analyze was good
All I'd like to add is that Germany conquered countries which had 40mm Bofors manufacturing facilities straight from the begining of WWII, at least Poland, Norway and Holland, so they had early on both war booty 40mm guns and also production facilities for them.
On Prinz Eugen, it was remarkable how she and Scheer could operate and give fire support to the hard pressed Heer in 44-45 while VVS had more or less air superiority over the area, the KM ships had to rely mostly on their AA fire for protection against Soviet air threat.

Juha

addum: Forgot one question, US 40mm shell vs German 37mm and 40mm shell. While light case Minen shell produced powerful blast for its size the effectiveness of an airburst didn't depend solely on blast but also on fragments it produced, too light fragments didn't necessarily produce sufficient damage to structures and lost their speed more rapidly than heavier fragments. Of course also their initial velocity for given power is higher. Finns and Germans found out that 20mm Minen or HE, these were contact fused shells, wasn't very effective against armoured Il-2s and both added more AP shells to their AA gun mixture when firing at Il-2s, IIRC Finns used 50-50 mixture against Il-2s. So was the high HE content 37-40mm shells in fact optimum against well protected late war a/c?


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## parsifal (Dec 10, 2011)

what analysis? so far we have a description of the gadgets that might have been fitted, plus a claim that one ship was exceptional. Ive read about Prinz Eugens Fire Support Missions on the Eastern Front as well, but there is a specific, unsupported claim that she was "very very efficient" at shooting down Soviet A/C. Time for you KM Ra Ra boys to name names, dates and places so we can get stuck into analysing the claims. It might not be possible to pin the numbers down, but lets give it a try....


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## DonL (Dec 10, 2011)

You should understand that I'm not Siegfried!

What I have written can be simply recognize at the "Kriegstagebuch" of PG!
To all of you, I don't ever claim that german AAA armament could match USS VT-fuzes with the support of of USS task forces!

I simply claim that PG was the most developped AAA ship of the KM and did an amazing job (from the view of the KM/PG) at the baltic sea and was more then 1 and a 1/2 year at permanent missions and the VVS couldn't manage to take out this ship! Also Lützow and Scheer were also in action and could manage with there much much improved AAA to avoid any damage! That are hinsights of the technology explanation I claimed!

Again parsifal that's a challenge, you were on the way to show how poor the the german AAA were, without any explanation to the circomstances, that's the same to claim how poor BS was at her last battle, with a rudder at 45 degree and no chance to be a stable gun plattform, even with only 9 knots speed! You all neglect how she performed against Hood and POW at Denmark Sraight, when she was a full functional battleship! I have said this before and I do this again, BS last battle showed nothing and to claim anything out of this battle with the full circumstances are nothing more then to provoke! What BS is able to do was shown at the real fight of the Denmark Straight, 2 days ago!


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## Juha (Dec 10, 2011)

Hello Parsifal
I meant Don's analyze on the guns and ammo used. I have read a couple books on naval operations on Baltic Sea years ago, and recall the ability of PE and Scheer to operate even under fairly constant VVS air attacks in same small area for several days duration while shooting coastal targets. I cannot remember exact days but at least early 45 maybe also in very late 44. In the end PE had to withdrawn because of the wear of its 8" barrels and lack of bunker oil, Scheer was in better position because its Diesel engines, the Diesel oil situation wasn't so critical in spring 45. In the end VVS begame so frustrated on situation that they demanded USAAF strikes against Swinemünde which was used as a base by those fire support ships, maybe even BC's hunt of Lützow was at least partly motivated by Soviet demands even if I don't have any recollection on that.

JUha

Juha


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## parsifal (Dec 11, 2011)

> What I have written can be simply recognize at the "Kriegstagebuch" of PG!
> To all of you, I don't ever claim that german AAA armament could match USS VT-fuzes with the support of of USS task forces!



Okay, I have no issue with this.  The claim that was made was that the tirpitz (in 1944) was superior to any allied ship. She wsnt. The only other issue that i have is that Tirpitz's AA was not even as good as some of the claims made pre-VT fuse for the Allies. As for the german effort generally, nobody can make any claims until we look at the spefic battles, perhaps on a random sample basis and see what comes up. Until then, anything anybody says is unsupported opinion 



> I simply claim that PG was the most developped AAA ship of the KM and did an amazing job (from the view of the KM/PG) at the baltic sea and was more then 1 and a 1/2 year at permanent missions and the LVV couldn't manage to take out this ship! Also Lützow and Scheer were also in action and could manage with there much much improved AAA to avoid any damage! That are hinsights with the technology explanation I maked!



You can make the claim, and you can postulate (guess) as to reasons, but until we look at a good representative sample of engagements, we cannot draw any conclusions, either way



> Again parsifal that's a challenge, you were on the way to show how poor the the german AAA were, without any explanation to the circomstances, that's the same to claim how poor BS was at her last battle, with a rudder at 45 degree and no chance to be a stable gun plattform, even with only 9 knots speed!



Sorry but no. i made no comment whasover about bismarcks last battle. I made the observation that her AA failed, and was surprised that the traditional reason given was now branded a myth. From there there were claims about tirpitzs fantanstic performance which are now disproven. I think we are now both in agreement about that. I have not made any other claims or insinuations. I analysed the PoWs and Replulses experiences, in the pacific, 



> You all neglect how she performed against Hood and POW at Denmark Sraight, when she was a full functional battleship! I have said this before and I do this again, BS last battle showed nothing and to claim anything out of this battle with the full circumstances are nothing more then to provoke! What BS is able to do was shown at the real fight of the Denmark Straight, 2 days ago


!

The only claim that can be made is that the bismarcks AA failed her, allowing a small pathetic bunch of Biplanes hard pressed to even catch her get to within 1000 yds of her, and place one torpedo, that should have done nothing to her in exactly the right spot to totally disable her. You guys are now saying her AA was nearly non-operational at the time, and Siegfried has tried to say that the tirpitz functioned much better. In point of fact Tirpitzs effort was better, and was improving, but still fell far short of satisfactory against the allies (with or without VT fuses), and cannot be said to be much better....now we have another KM champion but you guys wont produce the circumstances for analysis. I say, bring it on lets have a look and see just how good she is, this new champion of yours.....


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## parsifal (Dec 11, 2011)

Juha said:


> Hello Parsifal
> I meant Don's analyze on the guns and ammo used. I have read a couple books on naval operations on Baltic Sea years ago, and recall the ability of PE and Scheer to operate even under fairly constant VVS air attacks in same small area for several days duration while shooting coastal targets. I cannot remember exact days but at least early 45 maybe also in very late 44. In the end PE had to withdrawn because of the wear of its 8" barrels and lack of bunker oil, Scheer was in better position because its Diesel engines, the Diesel oil situation wasn't so critical in spring 45. In the end VVS begame so frustrated on situation that they demanded USAAF strikes against Swinemünde which was used as a base by those fire support ships, maybe even BC's hunt of Lützow was at least partly motivated by Soviet demands even if I don't have any recollection on that.
> 
> JUha
> ...




I get your position more clearly now, thanks. I agree that ther are many valid an good points in DonLs posts, but you cannot expect me to take on face value that Prinz Eugen was this wonder ship at AA when we dont have specific events to look at. Perhaps the LVV didnt try that hard to get her....perhaps she bombarded mostly at night, perhaps the aircrews had training issues. Perhaps not, perhaps the Eugen was all that was claimed of her, maybe more. Fact is we have no idea, because we have no incidents to look at....no representative samples to analyze. thats what i am pushing you guys to provide.....samples that we can look at and assess


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## DonL (Dec 11, 2011)

Very interesting your answer but as always you don't get it!

I know Juha for a long time, I have read his answers about naval war about more then 5 years and what I can say with security, he isn't a KM boy!
If you use google, you should tipp Prinz Eugen Kriegstagebuch and there are more then enough answers!
The performances of the AAA of ADS(Admiral Scheer), Lützow and PG (Prinz Eugen) are well documented at the I-net.
We have no new champion, I only have explained the development, flaws and advatges of german AAA's through the war compare to US capital ships, but at anytime you are not able to get it, or do some research on your one.

You have claimed so many stupid issues about german ships, Bismarck at her last fight and SH ( Scharnhorst at North Cap) that I'm very tired to mention it all. You have even claimed that the GB 14"/45 Mark VII is less powerfull then the USA 12"/50 Mark 8, what is totaly ridiculous!
Alone from the physiks it is impossible but you can look here------------->
Naval Gun Armor Penetration Tables
United States Naval Gun Armor Penetration Tables
Britain Naval Gun Armor Penetration Tables

Do some research and get some information and one hint, you should read less victory historical books, that would help very much to improve your historical knowledge!


Edit:


> Which is fine and something I didnt know. The original "myth" was that the slow speed of the Swordfish made them invulnerable. i accepted that, but simply pointed out that Bismarcks effort was still very poor in her final action, and wanted to know why. Ive was then told it was because half her directors had been pulled out and replaced with dud ones. i was then told that all that had been solved in the tirpitz and by 1944, she could outshoot and outdance any Allied ships. Oh really!!!!! so i went away and had a look at actual results for her as well. Turns out, she did better than the Bismarck, but nowhere near as good as some Allied ships (with or without VT fuses) . i poinmted to BB57 as an example, and got all this dirty laundry thrown at me in a hissy fit.



This whole post is absurd and absolutley not logical!

If you had done some research you would know that the 2cm C38 and the 3,7cm/83 SK C/30 are shooting without ignition advance assembly. Only the 10,5 cm was shooting with ignition advance assembly! But the difference between the triaxial mounting and biaxial mounting with different training rates and the different radar systems/operators make it more then logical, that Bismarck can't score any hits with the 10,5cm without luck! This problem and the problem with the no sensitive fuses of the 2cm and 3.7cm were the *real problems* of Bismarck. 

With all truth the AAA of Bismarck was bad, even worse, against a swordfish totaly helpless, against more solid a/c perhaps a little better, but as I mentioned above, Bismarck had not be sent out with this **** of an AAA armament. That's a fact and very well documented!


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## Siegfried (Dec 11, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Thats interesting. The record set by BB57 occurred in October 1942, just 10 days after she had been declared operational in the Pacific. At that time she had 40x 40mm or 1.1 in, and 40 x 20mm plus her as built 5/38 AA suite. She did not have the later AA directos that were also fitted later in the war.



Lumping in the USN's 1.1 (1.1 inch) inch with the 40mm Boffors would be bizzare: if The 1.1 was not only a much smaller gun with much poorer ballistics: it had a very low rate of fire of 100RPM. This weapon was considered a failure. The weapon would not even count as effective as the 20mm Oerlikon. I won't say its ballistics was bad, it wasn't, its performance in terms cadence and its bulk mad this an anvil.

Of course you are comparing a **** commisioned 2 years after Bismark about 1.5 years after her maiden voyage and 4 months after Tirpitz's lone fight with the Albacore Torpedo bombers.

The Sth Dakota or the carrier task groups was not attacked by '100 fanatic japanese' aircraft compared to (Under trained Albacore crews). Many were intercepted by the task forces combat air patrol.

The claim of 14 aircraft shot down is as on the nose as the 26 shot down is likely nonsense. I'd like to see the workings of the adjusted claim. I doubt they even marry against Japanese losses.

Noteworthy is that your claim of superior fire control doesn't make sense. The most effective weapon was the 20mm Oerlikon. It was aimed by hand, it did not use any fire control unless you count the latter introduction of a gyro reflector sight, which the Germans also used.

The much vaunted US 5 inch DP guns For Mk 37 directors were not superior to the German ones and in anycase are attributed only 5% of claims.

The 40mm Boffors is clearly a standout weapon expecially when combined with the lead computing remote sight and the RPC mount. Most of these things AFAIKT were NOT ready by Santa Cruz.

For the Germans vissibillity was an extreme issue not faced in the pacific.


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## parsifal (Dec 11, 2011)

DonL said:


> Very interesting your answer but as always you don't get it!
> 
> 
> 
> ...


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## DonL (Dec 11, 2011)

> I dont understand this tirade. For the record your comments relate to this extract of my previous post
> 
> Which is fine and something I didnt know. The original "myth" was that the slow speed of the Swordfish made them invulnerable. i accepted that, but simply pointed out that Bismarcks effort was still very poor in her final action, and wanted to know why. Ive was then told it was because half her directors had been pulled out and replaced with dud ones. i was then told that all that had been solved in the tirpitz and by 1944, she could outshoot and outdance any Allied ships. Oh really!!!!! so i went away and had a look at actual results for her as well. Turns out, she did better than the Bismarck, but nowhere near as good as some Allied ships (with or without VT fuses) . i poinmted to BB57 as an example, and got all this dirty laundry thrown at me in a hissy fit.
> 
> ...



The swordfish is more a WWI design of an a/c. It isn't solid, it is stringed with "paper" as WWI a/c's and if you would have done some research, then you would know that all swordfish from the attack of BS were "heavily" damaged and were striked many times, but without an ignition of the fuses, because the stringed "paper" wasn't hard enough to ignition the fuse. So your conclusion is right but also wrong, the swordfish's got many hits but without fatal damage! Now you can claim the AAA from BS were shooting bad, but that's not the real explanation!



> I have no idea what you are talking about here. In this thread, I have not metioned or analysed the big guns even once. If not this thread, which one are you specifically referring to. if you have an issue in another thread, why not raise it in that thread, instead of in another thread, where all it will do is stir up a fight.
> 
> Moreover i dont think I have ever made that claim. I think the claim was whether the Alaska class could beat the Scharnorst. from memory that discussion, which included Soren (so more than a year ago?) claims were that the Scharnhorst could actually better an Iowa. If you want to post a late reply on that thread, or start a new one, happy to participate. otherwise, why dont we just stick to the issues raised in this thread.
> 
> Oh, I have never done this before, but call me stupid, or any other abusive name again even once more and I will report the post. I will leave it up to the mods to decide if either one of us, or both of us are in the wrong, but please take note: I have tried to show you the utmost courtesy in this thread, and will continue to do so. We have had our moments in other threads, but it is not appropriate to bring those fights into yet another thread. that is unfair to the other members and is bl**dy juvenile. I am asking you, just once, keep the personal attacks out of it, and keep focussed on the issue.


http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww2-general/scharnhorst-vs-alaska-21877-4.html#post596391

It was a discussion between you, me and Kurfürst, but Soeren wasn't involved and you have claimed many many stupid things about german capital ships similar to this thread!



> i see that you are telling me to go and do the research. if you already have examples, why not share them with us.
> You have explained the theory behind the KMs AA development, now it is time to produde the operational examples to back up the claims that you are making



I'm not your researcher! If you claim somthing be sure that it is right!


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## parsifal (Dec 11, 2011)

> Lumping in the USN's 1.1 (1.1 inch) inch with the 40mm Boffors would be bizzare: if The 1.1 was not only a much smaller gun with much poorer ballistics: it had a very low rate of fire of 100RPM. This weapon was considered a failure. The weapon would not even count as effective as the 20mm Oerlikon. I won't say its ballistics was bad, it wasn't, its performance in terms cadence and its bulk mad this an anvil.



I agree with everything here, but just point out that the source i was using presented the data in that format. Some of BB57s armement was still the 1.1" in October '42



> Of course you are comparing a **** commisioned 2 years after Bismark about 1.5 years after her maiden voyage and 4 months after Tirpitz's lone fight with the Albacore Torpedo bombers.



Yes, true, but we are also comparing an action where the attacking aircraft have a huge speed and significant firing range advantage over both the Albacores that fired at Bismarck and Tirpitz. We are also comparing Tirpitzs 1944 efforts to South Dakotas 1942 efforts. ive got no complaints or rationalizations doing that. 



> The Sth Dakota or the carrier task groups was not attacked by '100 fanatic japanese' aircraft compared to (Under trained Albacore crews). Many were intercepted by the task forces combat air patrol.



If you are right, when you think about it makes it even more decisive in its superiority. If the South Dakota was only shooting at say 50, but managed to shoot down 14, that makes her effort even more significant, not less.

Cross checking my original source with David Browns Carrier Operations In WWII -Vol II The Pacific Navies December 1941-Feb 1943  (London 1974), where it gives quite a bit of detail on the battle and the effects of the CAP. 

Enterprise was the Fighter Direction Ship, but although 38 Fighters were airborne it proved impossible to sort out the incoming Japanese strikes from the the outgoing US strikes. Enterprise was at this time in the cove of a heavy squall (which also reduced her AA effectiveness).

The Fighter Direction Officer managed to eventually overcome the incessant radio chatter of the US CAP, and vectore 8 of VF-72s aircraft onto one group (headed for Hornet), these aircraft managed to shoot down several attackers they were (largely inneffective) in breaking up the strike.

At 1010 15 vals and 12 kates made a well co-ordinated attack on the hornet......

At page 123 Brown describes that Hornet was dead in the water with a destroyer alongside when Sth Dakota detected a large strike about 60 miles out. All strike and CAP aircraft (including CAP from Hornet) had just completed recovery.....(there was no CAP airborne at that moment). 

At 1100 Enterprise detected the 1st wave of the strike reported by Sth Dakota. It contained 44 aircraft, and were 26 miles from the carrier. There were only a few fighters airborne (less than 10) , when the order was given to strike all aircraft below decks and flood the AVGas lines with CO2. 

At this juncture I-21 fired a torpedo at the Enterprise, hitting (and eventually sinking) the Destroyer Porter. This had the the unforunate effect of distracting the lookouts of most of the screen. Only Sth Dakota, which was on the opposite side of the carrier and did not see the the torpedo hit remained alert to the airborne attack developing. 

Whilst the CAP concentrated on the kates, the 24 vals involved in this initial attack were hit by Sth Dakota. three bombs hit (hit to launch ratio of 12.5%). no less than 14 of these attacking Divebombers were claimed as shot down by the Sth Dakota (of the total 26 that she claimed). It is believed that in fact she shot down 8 of the attackers, the remainder being shot down by the carrier itself

14 of the B5Ns broke through the CAP (meaning all but one of them , the remaining 5 a/c were escorting zeroes) which split and attempted an anvil attack on the carrier. 7 of this group were shot down, all of which were claimed by Sth Dakota, but with 11 ships in the screen, and the strike coming from two directions and losses incurred in each group, it was impossible for the battleship to have shot down all of them. It is generally believed that she did shoot down no less than 3 of these attackers.

There were other attacks through the day including a number of attacks on the batleship iteslf after that, but the hits on the carriers precluded any further CAP. According to DANFs the initial claims of 26 a/c shot down were later revised down to 14. The figures I have given are adjusted losses that I know of....there were others in the battle. 

But the important thing is that CAP was not a primary deterrent or killer in this battle for the Japanese....it was flak. 



> The claim of 14 aircraft shot down is as on the nose as the 26 shot down is likely nonsense. I'd like to see the workings of the adjusted claim. I doubt they even marry against Japanese losses.
> 
> Noteworthy is that your claim of superior fire control doesn't make sense. The most effective weapon was the 20mm Oerlikon. It was aimed by hand, it did not use any fire control unless you count the latter introduction of a gyro reflector sight, which the Germans also used.



I agree that the 26 number is suspect, no less so than tirpitzs claim of 12 shot down inpoace of the actual 2, or this latest one of 9 for Prinz Eugen raised by Donl , but the source for 14 is from DANFs, and several other sources. Brown mentions 11 losses in the main attack, whilst Polmar gives a figure of 14. Most people agree that 14 is the nearest we can get to the final number. 

in relation to this battle, i made no claim as to superior control. That came later. US fire control was good for its AA fire, but the most significant advances came in 1944. 

The Japanese lost a total of over 90 aircraft that day, the majority to combat, and the majority to flak. Since Sth Dakota was the only ship (along with the carrier) to initially engage, and was basically holding an entire flank for the carrier, and since the carriers AA was basically knocked out after the initial wave, it seems perfectly reasonable to me the kills that have been attributed to BB57 



> The much vaunted US 5 inch DP guns For Mk 37 directors were not superior to the German ones and in anycase are attributed only 5% of claims.



There were no Mk 37 directors in this fight. i never claimed the Mk 37 was superior to anything, and never claimed the mk 37 had anything to do with this tally. Infact I was at pains to point out this record was achieved without special whiz bag gadgets. I said that Sth Dakotas performance was superior to anything the tirpitz achieved. that should be obvious by now. 



> The 40mm Boffors is clearly a standout weapon expecially when combined with the lead computing remote sight and the RPC mount. Most of these things AFAIKT were NOT ready by Santa Cruz.



Dont know, could find out, but its not relevant either. We were comparing Sth Dakotas performance with the tirpitz. Your claim was that Tirpitz was superior to anything the allies put to sea. fair enough. But why then, in October 1942 did BB57 shoot down more aircraft in a singler day than the tirpitz did in two years. 



> For the Germans vissibillity was an extreme issue not faced in the pacific.



err true, but then there were other issues at work in the pacific, like the superior performance of the Japanese ordinance and a/c that one would think would balance that issue up more or less. And i see this as just a deflection to your original claim that the tirpitz outperformed all Allied ships in 1944. Please show me how that is....


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## Edgar Brooks (Dec 11, 2011)

DonL said:


> The swordfish is more a WWI design of an a/c. It isn't solid, it is stringed with "paper" as WWI a/c's and if you would have done some research, then you would know that all swordfish from the attack of BS were "heavily" damaged and were striked many times, but without an ignition of the fuses, because the stringed "paper" wasn't hard enough to ignition the fuse. So your conclusion is right but also wrong, the swordfish's got many hits but without fatal damage! Now you can claim the AAA from BS were shooting bad, but that's not the real explanation!
> 
> If you claim somthing be sure that it is right!


Between wars design, in fact, and the aircraft were covered in fabric, not paper. It's Irish linen, a superior form of Egyptian cotton, and the underlying structure is solid metal, or wood. Some Swordfish were hit, and got away with not having anything major damaged (one had 180 holes,) so it would be nice if these hysterical overtones were put away where they belong.
A Bismarck officer said that some of the aircraft dropped their fish from as low as 2m, and they often disappeared from view between the waves, and he commented on the bravery of the crews who seemed to behave as if they never expected to see a carrier again.
One Swordfish crew member said that he didn't mind the fire going above and below (so Bismarck could lower her armament sufficiently); it was the fiery balls, nipping between the mainplanes that upset him.


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## fastmongrel (Dec 11, 2011)

Well done another thread descends into petty name calling and deliberate misreading and misquoting of posts. 

Reported because I am getting pretty sick of interesting threads being ruined.


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## Siegfried (Dec 11, 2011)

parsifal said:


> The claim that was made was that the tirpitz (in 1944) was superior to any allied ship. .....


NO one made this claim. Some elements however were.


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## Siegfried (Dec 11, 2011)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Can you tell us what "considerable speed" is?
> 
> From memory, a Swordfish drops its torpedo at a very slow speed, even in a dive you're not looking at much more than 100 mph. It had a top speed of 139 mph, and with a torpedo under it's belly it wasn't flying even close to that speed, so enlighten us!



The pilots notes give a maxium allowable speed of 130 knots: 150 mph which is little more than the 139mph maxium speed. They weren't working their way at 75-85 mph the entire way to target. Accounts of pilots from both Victorious and Ark Royal talk of entering dives repeatedly.

The attack strategy of the Swordfish was to dive from over 5000ft down to 18ft and release. If you read the pilot accounts you are struck by the following
1 Pilots diving through clouds often starting at 7000ft and not breaking though till 700ft.
(pilots had a rough idea where the Bismark was since many had radar)
2 The pilots all talk of accurate FLAK that would come at them the momment they left cloud and sometimes even when they were in cloud.
Obviously accurate is a relative term but enough to recive shrapnel or to see and feel nearby explosions. 
3 The drop height and speed was so low that the observer was waving his hands beside the pilots eyes to time the release of the torpedo so that it would not crash into a trough adn be damaged or hit a breaking wave crest.
4 Burkard Freiherr von Müllenheim-Rechberg, who was in one of the main directors, noted that the gun aimers often could not see the Swordfish which came in low in high sees with a shifting and pitching deck. The Swordfish were often below the freeboard of the ship.

This low flying seems to have been the primary advantages of the Swordfish, much harder to deal with than a faster moving aircraft due to its abillity to exploite the atlantic weather.

So in general long range AAA gunnery was thwared by clouds while at shorter ranges visibillity and sea state provided a degree of protection.


The Bismarks main FLAK directors and heavy 10.5cm were triaxially stabalised. The 3.7cm guns were stabalised and derived rate information from traverse to calculate lead.

There weren't enough 2.0cm guns, that's for sure, and the 3.7cm guns needed an immroved cadence.

To deal with the swordfish would have required a radar that wasn't available till 1943 likely the FuMO 26 which from its high post on the 3 main directors could track the range, bearing and elevation of an airborn target accuratly and provide blind fire settings to the heavy FLAK. It's probably this radar which gave the Prince Eugen is effective FLAK capabilities againalst the Soviets Airforce.

Another radar, proably could have been ready in 1944 was the FuMO 231 euklid which had a 1.5m conical dish and a 25cm wavelenght. It was held up when time was wasted testing captured magnetrons. There was also a system called retting which was a centrimetric radar fitted to quad 20mm guns, it was derived from an AI radar FuG 246.

Comparing the AAA situation in the Nth Atlantic vs the pacific is I think inapproprate given the "passive" oceans calmer seas and much better visibillity.


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## Njaco (Dec 11, 2011)

I'm gonna give everyone a warning to be civil or infractions will be given. If you have a beef about another thread, take it there.

Lets get back on track with "Aviation' myths.

and before anyone says so, I realize I went OT with the Kursk comment. Won't happen again.


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## Readie (Dec 11, 2011)

Back to Myths....

Here are three that may interest you.

*"Put enough guns on a bomber and it will fight its way to the target without escorts." *

Unfortunately, the more guns and ammunition it carries, the smaller it's bomb load, hence more missions are required to destroy a given target, which gives the enemy more chances to attack the bomber, which requires more guns to defend itself.... 

*"Malta was defended by three Gladiators named Faith, Hope and Charity." *

Actually four Sea Gladiators (named Faith, Hope, Charity and Desperation), of 261 Squadron RAF, were involved in the early air-defence of Malta. Later supplemented by a few Hurricanes. The basis of much exaggeration. 

*"The Japanese Zero fighter was a copy of a Western design." *

Quite the contrary, as it had many technical innovations and was a completely original design. 

John


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## evangilder (Dec 11, 2011)

I'm going to go one further. The next personal attack that takes place in this thread will result in a 30 day ban. If you are getting frustrated on a subject, either walk away or go take a walk. There is NO reason to let a discussion degrade into personal attacks, which is a sign that your own argument is weak. 

Now calm down everyone, this is supposed to be an intelligent discussion.


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## parsifal (Dec 11, 2011)

Air Superiority is about the number of losses you take. That’s a part of it, but a minor part. The important bit about Air superiority is the freedom and capability to do what you want to do, where you want to do it , at tolerable costr


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## Readie (Dec 11, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Air Superiority is about the number of losses you take. That’s a part of it, but a minor part. The important bit about Air superiority is the freedom and capability to do what you want to do, where you want to do it , at tolerable costr



Interesting point Michael, I was thinking about the WW1 'Fokker scourge' when I read your post. Would AS also include a techical advance that gave one side 'the edge' ?
John


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## Milosh (Dec 11, 2011)

Readie said:


> *"Malta was defended by three Gladiators named Faith, Hope and Charity." *
> 
> Actually four Sea Gladiators (named Faith, Hope, Charity and Desperation), of 261 Squadron RAF, were involved in the early air-defence of Malta. Later supplemented by a few Hurricanes. The basis of much exaggeration.



I understood it was a media invention > Faith, Hope and Charity. The 4th aircraft was called 'Desperation' but this was first used in the 1980's..


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## Readie (Dec 11, 2011)

Milosh said:


> I understood it was a media invention > Faith, Hope and Charity. The 4th aircraft was called 'Desperation' but this was first used in the 1980's..




That's right.
Faith Hope Charity

John


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## parsifal (Dec 11, 2011)

Readie said:


> Interesting point Michael, I was thinking about the WW1 'Fokker scourge' when I read your post. Would AS also include a techical advance that gave one side 'the edge' ?
> John



if the theory is applied correctly, Technical development, can affect the level of Air Superiority. A qualitative edge in the fighters that causes a massive increase in losses, or increases in Bomber ranges or accuracy can all affect the equation.

Air Superiority is mostly about "control", and control translates to being able to do stuff. Fighters either enable your aircraft to be able to do stuff, or prevent or make it cost prohibitive for your opponent to do the same.


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## tyrodtom (Dec 11, 2011)

The USAAC tried a experiment on the heavy armed bomber approach. The B-40, a B-17 fitted with at least 18 .50's, with versions up to 30 guns, also versions with bigger than .50 cal. in some positions. Because of the extra turret drag a higher throttle position had to be used to keep up with the regular B-17's, so range was less. After the main formation had dropped it's bombs the B-40 couldn't keep up at all with the lightened B-17's. 
One B-40 was damaged by flak, and then shot down by a Luftwaffe fighter. Not a success, no matter how you measure it. With the faults it had evident from the beginning, I wonder why they even tried it in combat. I guess it was the desperate times .


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## Njaco (Dec 11, 2011)

yep, YB-40s really didn't work.


Another myth:

There never was an Italian pilot who flew a captured P-38 and attacked bombers and then had a 'classic' dogfight.

http://forums.wildbillguarnere.com/...5-the-strangest-aerial-duel-of-world-war-two/


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## Edgar Brooks (Dec 11, 2011)

Milosh said:


> I understood it was a media invention > Faith, Hope and Charity. The 4th aircraft was called 'Desperation' but this was first used in the 1980's..


No it wasn't; there were six Gladiators, N5520 was "Faith," N5531 was "Hope," and N5519 was "Charity." Also flown were N5522, N5524 N5529. 
"Desperation" was a Phantom (one of four,) in the Falklands after the war with Argentina; the other three were given the F, H, C names because the Flight no., given to the Phantoms, was the same as that given to the Gladiator Flight in Malta. Desperation is just a manifestation of RAF black humour.
The Malta names were not a "media invention"; they came from a chance remark by Corporal Harry Kirk, who saw the three flying together, and felt that they reminded him of a brooch, sporting three hearts, owned by his mother, which had the names engraved on it. The report, about him, appeared in the "London Star" newspaper in March 1958.


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## Vincenzo (Dec 11, 2011)

there were more Sea Gladiator ,six were that on hand the day of italy declaration of war. take in the count the june 13th came first 3 hurricanes


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## Milosh (Dec 11, 2011)

Group Captain George Burges disagrees.

“Thus it was only during our training period, before the war started for us, and for only about the first week or ten days of the war period that the population ever saw three Gladiators in the air together – from then on it was two and sometimes only one. *During this period none of us ever heard the aircraft referred to as ‘Faith, Hope and Charity’ and I do not know who first used the description.* Nevertheless, the sentiment was appropriate because the civil population certainly prayed for us and displayed such photographs as they could get hold of. There is no doubt that the Gladiators did not ‘wreak death and destruction’ to many of the enemy, but equally they had a very profound effect on the morale of everybody in the island, and most likely stopped the Italians just using the island as a practice bombing range whenever they felt like it.”


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## Siegfried (Dec 11, 2011)

Edgar Brooks said:


> Between wars design, in fact, and the aircraft were covered in fabric, not paper. It's Irish linen, a superior form of Egyptian cotton,
> 
> One Swordfish crew member said that he didn't mind the fire going above and below (so Bismarck could lower her armament sufficiently); it was the fiery balls, nipping between the mainplanes that upset him.



Linen (Flax which also supplies linseed) is a plant the grows in Europe, you rot the stems to get at the fibre. The Irish do this in bogs. Cotton, is a different plant. Egyptian cotton is known for its length of fibre. If you are a bit posh you buy cotton with high strand counts.

One bizzare aspect of the whole Bismarck AAA performance is the repeated claims by allied flyers that her fire was accurate. They remark on how they were often found instantly while emerging from clouds and though the guns were directed by radar. A catalina was driven of and Swordfish and Fulmars acting as contact aircraft kept a great distance. * Yet she shot down nothing *(apart from Fulmar with splash from her main gun) so this is somewhat puzzling. 

The RN certainly was thinking: they were adding GRUB (gyro rate unit boxes) to improve their HACS (High Angle Control System) and Type 285 ranging radar which was available for the heavy AAA at the time of Denmark straights.

They used the same radar, now called Type 282, to range for the pom pom with a lead computing director and remote power control however at the time of the Battle of the Denmark straights Type 282 radar was not fitted to any ships and the ranging was still optical and the Mk IV director and mount was not remote power control but was 'follow the pointer'. But I think this wasn't enough.

I believe no Navy in the world possesed adaquet equipment to have driven of the Swordfish at that time (April 1941). The USN, known for its heavy AAA armament was not yet in the war at the time and wouldn't be for 18 months.

To do that what was required was full blind fire radar capabillity with highly accurate range measurment, moreover it needed to be integrated not only into the heavy FLAK but the medium and light. The Kriegsmarine had blind fire for the heavy FLAK in 1942 with flakleit-g on the main director of the prinze eugen in 1942 (funny owls ear antena) and latter replaced in 1943 with FuMO 26 which had a sort of phase steering for height finding.

You also need circuits that can measure range as accuratly as possible; better than 10m to set the fuzes.

By the time the USN entered the war the Tirpitz had greatly improved her FLAK as had every other navy. The USN benefitted from European experience.

A big improvement on the allied side was the 40mm boffors which had outstanding high velocity ballistics and a good rate of fire unmateched by any gun. The gun when aimed by a primitive director away from the gun smoke that compensated for parrallax and computed lead using a target at 4000 yards assumption. The gunner used tracer to sprinkle that target. The gun mount and its crew were rotated by remote power control. It finally filled the gap bwtween heavy FLAK and the 20mm equipment.


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## Edgar Brooks (Dec 11, 2011)

Milosh said:


> Group Captain George Burges disagrees.”


I don't really care; how many Group Captains speak with corporals on a friendly one-to-one basis? If you have proof that Kirk wasn't there, didn't say it, and his mother never owned a brooch, we can look for a different reason.


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## Readie (Dec 11, 2011)

Back on topic..

*"Stable aircraft are safe aircraft." *

A high priority was put on stability with early World War One aircraft, but it was eventually realised that such aircraft produced poor pilots who couldn't cope with extreme flying situations when they occurred.

*"Carrier-borne fighters require an observer/navigator for safety." *

It was assumed that a fighter pilot would be unable to find his way back to the aircraft carrier without a navigator in the back seat pointing the way. This inevitably led to large heavy slow naval fighters such as the Fairey Fulmar. Fortunately, the Sea Hurricane and Wildcat were available to plug the gap.


John


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## pbfoot (Dec 11, 2011)

Edgar Brooks said:


> how many Group Captains speak with corporals on a friendly one-to-one basis?.


Why wouldn't they , I know the RAF is pretty snobbish but I can't say the same for other air arms I've been associated with


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## Readie (Dec 11, 2011)

pbfoot said:


> Why wouldn't they , I know the RAF is pretty snobbish but I can't say the same for other air arms I've been associated with




Stanford Tuck was a gent and had the manners to treat everyone he came across well.

Its not snobbery Neil, its basic manners.

John


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## Edgar Brooks (Dec 11, 2011)

pbfoot said:


> Why wouldn't they , I know the RAF is pretty snobbish but I can't say the same for other air arms I've been associated with


The article doesn't actually say that he was a corporal in the RAF; if he was Army, there'd be even less chance of them meeting.


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## GrauGeist (Dec 11, 2011)

How about the story where the Italians are flying a captured P-38 to bait attack Allied bombers!


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## pbfoot (Dec 11, 2011)

Always curious about the Eagle Sqn as for there make up , what percentage of the pilots were RAF and what percent were RCAF ,


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## Njaco (Dec 11, 2011)

GrauGeist said:


> How about the story where the Italians are flying a captured P-38 to bait attack Allied bombers!



Thats the one I was talking about! A Captain Rossi!!!


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## buffnut453 (Dec 11, 2011)

Edgar Brooks said:


> The article doesn't actually say that he was a corporal in the RAF; if he was Army, there'd be even less chance of them meeting.



Hi Edgar, 

The Gp Capt rank post-dates Burges' time in Malta where he was a lowly Flt Lt who flew the Gladiators in combat. As such, he'd have communicated with junior ranks on a daily basis, particularly those line crews responsible for preparing and maintaining the aircraft he was about to fly. It seems he has no recollection of any aircraft being named Faith, Hope and Charity but others disagree. Perhaps Burges was too busy staying alive to worry about such trivialities as the naming of aircraft...or perhaps he forgot...or perhaps they never were known as Faith, Hope and Charity. In truth, I don't think we'll ever disentangle the reality from the propaganda. 

Irrespective, it was a damn fine show by all concerned on Malta (IMHO).

Cheers,
Mark


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## pbfoot (Dec 11, 2011)

I'm going from memory but IIRC there were 4 aircraft Sea Glads in crates they made 3 and left the 4th for spares . and wasn't one of them jerry rigged with an extra gun and possibly props from a Blenheim


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## Edgar Brooks (Dec 11, 2011)

On 27th. November, 1941, Pilot Officer Charles Palliser noted, in his logbook, that he'd flown "Faith" on a Met Flight. In 1943, as he left Malta, Lt-Col H.E.C. Weldon R.A., who'd commanded the British AA garrison, wrote ,"Looking down I saw below us Hal Far, with its memories of Faith, Hope and Charity." Also in 1943, Gloster Aircraft Co. named the Gladiators as F, H, C in their advertisements in "The Aeroplane." The booklet "The Air Battle of Malta," printed by HMSO, in 1944, includes the names in its narrative.


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## pbfoot (Dec 11, 2011)

There were 6 Sea Glads as mentioned earlier but never more then 4 servicable usually just 3 as they had been assembled out of crate . they were flown by non fighter pilot types . Onewas also mounted with the larger Blenheim engine it also had 6 mg with 2 over the wing ala 1st war . Other names given were Blood Sweat Tears or Freeman Hardy and Willis and lastly Pip Squeak and Wilfred


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## Vincenzo (Dec 11, 2011)

For clear
the 10th june there were the N: 5519, 5520, 5522, 5524, 5529, 5531, they were all assembled before of italian declaration of war.
19, 20, 24, 31 were the original for the fighter flight, when 24 got damage (was repaired before of italy war declaration) were add 22 and 29.

i was in wrong the Hurricane came to malta the 13th june were only fo refuel and continued to Egypt
the first Hurricane for Malta (P2614 and P2645) came 21st june. The Sea Gladiator in the first 12 day of war kill a S.M. 79. The Sea Gladiator flight on Malta until 28th december 1941, for meteorologic missions, last combat mission was on 25th january 1941.
in the 1940 also the Sea Gladiator of Eagle flight fightning in the malta air space


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## MacArther (Dec 11, 2011)

pbfoot said:


> Always curious about the Eagle Sqn as for there make up , what percentage of the pilots were RAF and what percent were RCAF ,



Here here! I've always wondered about this squadron, but there is scant info on it in my collection. The best I've got was that they existed......I realllllllly need better books.


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## parsifal (Dec 12, 2011)

Another myth....the german Army was a highly motorized force. In fact 80% of the german Army consisted of unmotorized Infantry.


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## parsifal (Dec 12, 2011)

Monty was prevented capturing the Panzer armee Afika by unseasonal rains following his victory at Alamein.


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## parsifal (Dec 12, 2011)

controversial....Seafires in 1945, in the pacific, opperating from the fleet carriers, had a staggeringly high accident rate


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## parsifal (Dec 12, 2011)

One of my favourites....no tigers were knocked by the Allied AT fire in the whole of Normandy. They all ran out of petrol or were otherwise just abandoned.

I believe that one was started by one of our very own former members.....try and guess which one...


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## wuzak (Dec 12, 2011)

Readie said:


> *"The Japanese Zero fighter was a copy of a Western design." *
> 
> Quite the contrary, as it had many technical innovations and was a completely original design.
> 
> John




Howard Hughes would have disagreed.

But then he thought Lockheed stole his twin boom design for the P-38.


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## jim (Dec 12, 2011)

parsifal said:


> One of my favourites....no tigers were knocked by the Allied AT fire in the whole of Normandy. They all ran out of petrol or were otherwise just abandoned.
> 
> I believe that one was started by one of our very own former members.....try and guess which one...


 
Respect the former member! He can not answer to you!!!! That s elementary behavior !


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## wuzak (Dec 12, 2011)

tyrodtom said:


> The USAAC tried a experiment on the heavy armed bomber approach. The B-40, a B-17 fitted with at least 18 .50's, with versions up to 30 guns, also versions with bigger than .50 cal. in some positions. Because of the extra turret drag a higher throttle position had to be used to keep up with the regular B-17's, so range was less. After the main formation had dropped it's bombs the B-40 couldn't keep up at all with the lightened B-17's.
> One B-40 was damaged by flak, and then shot down by a Luftwaffe fighter. Not a success, no matter how you measure it. With the faults it had evident from the beginning, I wonder why they even tried it in combat. I guess it was the desperate times .



My understanding is that the YB-40s were more than capable of keeping up with the main bomber stream on the way to target, but once the main force had dropped their bombs they were simply too heavy and not fast enough.

One B-17E was converted to use Allison V-1710s instead of the Wright R-1820s, producing a noticeable, if not significant, performance gain. After initial combat reports some thought was given to using V-1710s on the YB-40s, but that died when the concept was abandoned.


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## wuzak (Dec 12, 2011)

It is often thought that the 8th AF idea of the day bomber always getting through was a mantra carried forward from Billy Mitchell.

I believe that Mitchell was a proponent of gaining air superiority before pumelling the opposition from the air. Mitchell did not believe in the self defending bomber.


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## Readie (Dec 12, 2011)

parsifal said:


> controversial....Seafires in 1945, in the pacific, opperating from the fleet carriers, had a staggeringly high accident rate



Shall I ?

Shall I?

Ummmmm 

John


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## Readie (Dec 12, 2011)

Two more...

*"The Norden bombsight could put a bomb in a pickle barrel from 10,000 feet." *

An obvious exaggeration, but an indication of the improvement in accuracy possible in skilled hands. Unfortunately, the sight required a clear view of the target from a considerable distance away, a long straight run to the target and accurate knowledge of ground wind conditions. A situation taken for granted in the clear air of California, but sadly not possible in cloudy European skies. Add a nineteen year old bomb-aimer, and the 8th Air Force's move to daylight area bombing was inevitable.

*"The Miles M.52 supersonic research aircraft was 90% complete when cancelled in 1946." * 

In fact construction had barely started. The authoritative book 'Project Cancelled' says that "...90 per cent of the detail design had been completed, assembly jigs were finished, the component assembly programme was well advanced and the augmentor fan had been built." Which is not the same thing as 90% complete.

John


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## parsifal (Dec 12, 2011)

jim said:


> Respect the former member! He can not answer to you!!!! That s elementary behavior !



No, I dont respect him, or his crackpot theories . Havent mentioned his name, and its his tough luck given that he got himself banned (nothing to do with me). the number of times he blind sided me in his time in this place I am going to show him the same respect as he showed me in his time here


Edit:

plus one thing I forgot....it is quite funny to think about those days from this point


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## Readie (Dec 12, 2011)

parsifal said:


> controversial....Seafires in 1945, in the pacific, opperating from the fleet carriers, had a staggeringly high accident rate




Seafire LIII - 887 Sqn FAA HMS INDEFATIGABLE 1945


SLt G J "Spud" Murphy destroyed 2 A6M5s Zeroes during a raid over Odaki Bay, Japan on 15 Aug 1945 in this aircraft. On returning to INDEFATIGABLE, the pilots learned that a cease fire was to take effect from 0700 the following morning and that 6 long years of war was finally over.

The engagement, by Seafires of 887 and 894 Sqns, escorting Avengers of 820 Sqn, was the final British aerial victory of WW2 and resulted in 8 confirmd kills, 3 probables and 4 damaged. 

*Just as the first confirmed victory of the war had fallen to the Fleet Air Arm, so had the last.*


Very fitting

John


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## Siegfried (Dec 12, 2011)

parsifal said:


> One of my favourites....no tigers were knocked by the Allied AT fire in the whole of Normandy. They all ran out of petrol or were otherwise just abandoned.
> 
> I believe that one was started by one of our very own former members.....try and guess which one...



There is some basis to this:

The 17 pounder could under no circumstances penetrate the frontal armour of the Tiger II using any ammunitiin.
The 17 pounder when firing APDS at the front of a Panther had only a 25% chance of penetrating at 500 yards. This is
according to British tests using captured Panthers.
The Tiger I might be about the same as the Panther in protection, though slope effects greatly helped the panther.


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## parsifal (Dec 12, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> There is some basis to this:
> 
> The 17 pounder could under no circumstances penetrate the frontal armour of the Tiger II using any ammunitiin.
> The 17 pounder when firing APDS at the front of a Panther had only a 25% chance of penetrating at 500 yards. This is
> ...



LOL


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## michaelmaltby (Dec 12, 2011)

".... The 17 pounder could under no circumstances penetrate the frontal armor of the Tiger II using any ammunition. ..."

Who shot Michael Whitman ....? and where ...?

MM
Proud Canadian


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## vanir (Dec 12, 2011)

wuzak said:


> My understanding is that the YB-40s were more than capable of keeping up with the main bomber stream on the way to target, but once the main force had dropped their bombs they were simply too heavy and not fast enough.
> 
> One B-17E was converted to use Allison V-1710s instead of the Wright R-1820s, producing a noticeable, if not significant, performance gain. After initial combat reports some thought was given to using V-1710s on the YB-40s, but that died when the concept was abandoned.



You guys had one of those at Port Moresby. Went all the way to rabaul to do some recon. Got attacked by zeros all the way back. Apparently it was severely altitude restricted by all the gun weight, the zeros were having a field day, but it shot most of them down and returned to base with a lot of holes and a few dead crew iirc. It was on Dogfights.


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## vanir (Dec 12, 2011)

michaelmaltby said:


> ".... The 17 pounder could under no circumstances penetrate the frontal armor of the Tiger II using any ammunition. ..."
> 
> Who shot Michael Whitman ....? and where ...?
> 
> ...



I heard this from a tanker on a dvd documentary iirc, told the tale of two Koenigtigers that led about a hundred Berlin refugees past a line of forward entrenchments at the river beachead by the russians very late in the war.
At one point they were crossing an open field across the sights of an infantry antitank battery, which fired and scored several hits and gained no effect. The tanks rolled on. The tanker said the russians then called a general artillery strike from their rear positions onto the field, which erupted in smoke and explosions from things like 10-15cm guns. When it all cleared most of the refugees were of course dead, one tiger was knocked out by the tracks but the crew was okay and exiting. The second continued rolling along.

Nice qualifier for a myth. But I usually note at the time if something was well referenced or not, and I remember this as a convincing tale, despite the tale itself being somewhat incredible. War vets say odd things though, I saw this decorated Russian General sit and claim point blank that one time the German attack was so brutal that he literally saw his mens hair turn white in front of his eyes. He refused to admit he was using a colloquial, he claimed it was quite literal like magic.
They say odd things sometimes, but went through hell. It's fair enough. In one sense everything's always true if someone had a lot of feeling for the experience, even if it means something else sort of.


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## wuzak (Dec 12, 2011)

vanir said:


> You guys had one of those at Port Moresby. Went all the way to rabaul to do some recon. Got attacked by zeros all the way back. Apparently it was severely altitude restricted by all the gun weight, the zeros were having a field day, but it shot most of them down and returned to base with a lot of holes and a few dead crew iirc. It was on Dogfights.



I think that was a standard B-17 - maybe an F.

By you guys do you mean Aussies?


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## Milosh (Dec 12, 2011)

Readie said:


> Two more...
> 
> *"The Norden bombsight could put a bomb in a pickle barrel from 10,000 feet." *
> 
> ...



John, why don't you just provide the link to the site you are getting these from?


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## vanir (Dec 12, 2011)

No I mean the 5th (?), one of Mc Arthurs. Nah it was heavily modified with something like double the number of normal fifties, specifically for long range recon. They went on about it a bit in the episode.


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## Readie (Dec 12, 2011)

Milosh said:


> John, why don't you just provide the link to the site you are getting these from?




Because their are loads on it and I did not want to swamp the thread.
The myths are quite interesting I think.
Just google 'Aviation Myth's if you want to see for yourself.
They are cut and pasted unaltered.
Cheers
John


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## Denniss (Dec 12, 2011)

michaelmaltby said:


> ".... The 17 pounder could under no circumstances penetrate the frontal armor of the Tiger II using any ammunition. ..."
> 
> Who shot Michael Whitman ....? and where ...?
> 
> ...


Wittmann was in a Tiger I


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## Shortround6 (Dec 12, 2011)

Perhaps the tank discussion could go to another thread? 

There already seems to be a fair amount of confusion that requires too much explanation to be be put into this thread.


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## michaelmaltby (Dec 12, 2011)

My bad .... Tiger I's were of course known push-overs .. 

MM


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## vanir (Dec 12, 2011)

Good point. How about, that Germany's aviation industry was more technologically advanced than other belligerant powers. There was certainly a fright for it at the time for the Allies, but in reality the technical departments of all the major nations were pretty much én par. Most issues were industrial in nature.


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## Readie (Dec 12, 2011)

vanir said:


> Good point. How about, that Germany's aviation industry was more technologically advanced than other belligerant powers. There was certainly a fright for it at the time for the Allies, but in reality the technical departments of all the major nations were pretty much én par. Most issues were industrial in nature.



True enough, a lot of the better ideas were inadvertently shared in pre war Europe. German visitors at Rolls Royce and vice versa.

John


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## buffnut453 (Dec 12, 2011)

Edgar Brooks said:


> On 27th. November, 1941, Pilot Officer Charles Palliser noted, in his logbook, that he'd flown "Faith" on a Met Flight. In 1943, as he left Malta, Lt-Col H.E.C. Weldon R.A., who'd commanded the British AA garrison, wrote ,"Looking down I saw below us Hal Far, with its memories of Faith, Hope and Charity." Also in 1943, Gloster Aircraft Co. named the Gladiators as F, H, C in their advertisements in "The Aeroplane." The booklet "The Air Battle of Malta," printed by HMSO, in 1944, includes the names in its narrative.



But none of that indicates that the names were applied during the combat use of the Gladiators. It's entirely feasible that the F, H, C names came into being in the period Jun-Nov 41 as a propaganda boost given that, by then, it was clear that Malta would not be taken. Thus it seems reasonable that the statements of Burges and others can be aligned.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 12, 2011)

vanir said:


> Good point. How about, that Germany's aviation industry was more technologically advanced than other belligerant powers. There was certainly a fright for it at the time for the Allies, but in reality the technical departments of all the major nations were pretty much én par. Most issues were industrial in nature.



Good call. 
It was really the application of air power that Germany was ahead of most countries, in most of the categories. My claim applies for pre-1942 era, though.


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## Edgar Brooks (Dec 12, 2011)

buffnut453 said:


> But none of that indicates that the names were applied during the combat use of the Gladiators. It's entirely feasible that the F, H, C names came into being in the period Jun-Nov 41 as a propaganda boost given that, by then, it was clear that Malta would not be taken. Thus it seems reasonable that the statements of Burges and others can be aligned.


Believe what you want.


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## iron man (Dec 12, 2011)

vanir said:


> Good point. How about, that Germany's aviation industry was more technologically advanced than other belligerant powers. There was certainly a fright for it at the time for the Allies, but in reality the technical departments of all the major nations were pretty much én par. Most issues were industrial in nature.


Sorry, I disagree. 
To the point, I would propose the fact that German science held a significant lead on the WAllies in the field of transonic/hypersonic aerodynamics. Germany built the first high transonic wind tunnel (in the mid-30's) and the facilities connected with the University of Gottingen defined the "state of the art" by war's end.

America's first such facility did not not become operational until July 1942. Privately funded (the "powers that be" steadfastly refused to invest in such infrastructure ), it could achieve Mach 2.5, although only in a 9" x 9" (81 in/sq) area. 

When the research facility at Penemunde was over run at war's end, a fully functional Mach 5 (i.e. true "hypersonic") wind tunnel was discovered...

By the end of the war, the NACA folks were certainly "catching up" in some respects. The post-war _union of all the research done on "both sides of the fence"_, allowed for the quantum leap in US/British aircraft designs which characterized the late 1940's and early 50's. German science (and technology transfer) also played an undeniable role in the design work at the various bureaus in the USSR. Due to the nature of the Soviet regime, much of this story will likely never be fully told, at least in an academically supportable manner.

Of particular note is the work of one Adolf Busemann, the man responsible for the swept wing, and the initial definition of the "area rule" principle.

Here's a link to a very well researched dissertation looking at the topic you've raised. It is extensively footnoted for those who wish to use it as a springboard for further research.

LINK


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## Milosh (Dec 12, 2011)

Readie said:


> Because their are loads on it and I did not want to swamp the thread.
> The myths are quite interesting I think.
> Just google 'Aviation Myth's if you want to see for yourself.
> They are cut and pasted unaltered.
> ...



I did see for myself. That is why I asked about posting a link.


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## pbfoot (Dec 12, 2011)

buffnut453 said:


> But none of that indicates that the names were applied during the combat use of the Gladiators. It's entirely feasible that the F, H, C names came into being in the period Jun-Nov 41 as a propaganda boost given that, by then, it was clear that Malta would not be taken. Thus it seems reasonable that the statements of Burges and others can be aligned.


I agree and personally like the other names that were also assigned Pip, Squeak and Meredith which were popular characters in a then Brit newspaper cartoon.


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## Readie (Dec 12, 2011)

iron man said:


> Sorry, I disagree.
> To the point, I would propose the fact that German science held a significant lead on the WAllies in the field of transonic/hypersonic aerodynamics. Germany built the first high transonic wind tunnel (in the mid-30's) and the facilities connected with the University of Gottingen defined the "state of the art" by war's end.
> 
> America's first such facility did not not become operational until July 1942. Privately funded (the "powers that be" steadfastly refused to invest in such infrastructure ), it could achieve Mach 2.5, although only in a 9" x 9" (81 in/sq) area.
> ...



.

There are many many pioneers in all countries that one could say contributed directly and indirectly to modern aircraft design.

John


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## pbfoot (Dec 12, 2011)

The 1st page in Iron mans article is incorrect in stating the Meteor was the only Allied combat jet ....was not the P80 in Italy and I'm sure if needed which it wasn't would have gone against 262


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## DonL (Dec 12, 2011)

Only 45 P80 were built till the end of WWII and only 4 were at Europe!

2 in England 2 in Italy! Hardly combat ready!


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## pbfoot (Dec 12, 2011)

DonL said:


> Only 45 P80 were built till the end of WWII and only 4 were at Europe!
> 
> 2 in England 2 in Italy! Hardly combat ready!


only need one, then why do we always babble about the DO335 and the Horten etc etc etc


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## DonL (Dec 12, 2011)

With all respect,

who had told that the Ho 229 and the D0 335 were combat ready in this forum? 

They were in development nothing else!
Both birds were in no single combat mission but from the Do 335 were 40 planes produced and from the Ho 229 only 3 and only one is ever flown.


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## michaelmaltby (Dec 12, 2011)

".... The account of the German jet program begins with a young Doctoral student freshly minted from the University of Göttingen in 1935."

The Nazis were securely in charge of the levers of power by then ...... so did Nazi science get the jet engine "right" and Frank Whittle get it "wrong" ? ... is that _your_ personal conviction, Iron man.

Curious, not judgmental 

MM


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## FLYBOYJ (Dec 12, 2011)

DonL said:


> Only 45 P80 were built till the end of WWII and only 4 were at Europe!
> 
> 2 in England 2 in Italy! Hardly combat ready!



The 4 aircraft were actually YP-80s and were sent to Europe in order to demonstrate their capabilities to combat crews and to help in the development of tactics to be used against Luftwaffe jet fighters. 45 P-80As were delivered by May 1945, there were another 250 P-80As on the production line during that period part of an inital 500 plane order. The two sent to Italy actually flew combat sorties.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 12, 2011)

As far as who was ahead it rather depends on exactly which aspect of technology one is referring to. The were just over a dozen wind tunnels in the US at the start of the war, by the end there were around 40. While none may have been Mach 5 tunnels ( or even Mach 3) they must have been contributing something to aerodynamic knowledge. You also need metallurgy and production ability. Not just the ability to make a new alloy but the ability to make it quantity consistently. When making large aircraft the ability to make large pieces is also very helpful rather than using many small pieces to make sub assemblies. New welding or fabrication techniques allow new shapes or construction features to be used on a mass production basis. 
Even simple things like mass produced plain bearings so roller bearings do not have to be used can make a difference. 
There are many things that go into overall aviation technology besides cutting edge research.


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## michaelmaltby (Dec 12, 2011)

"... The two sent to Italy actually flew combat sorties." 

That's interesting.

MM


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## Messy1 (Dec 12, 2011)

Here's one-
The Hellcat was designed using data received from studying the Koga's Zero that crashed in the Aleutian Islands. I believe the final design of the Hellcat predates Koga's crash by many years, and the final testing and design was approved and ordered about the same time the Zero was recovered in Alaska.

_The F6F contract was signed June 1941, first flight June 1942. Koga crashed June 1942._ FlyBoyJ's correction to my post. Thanks!


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## Vincenzo (Dec 12, 2011)

FLYBOYJ said:


> The two sent to Italy actually flew combat sorties.


AFAIK this is not true


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## Siegfried (Dec 12, 2011)

michaelmaltby said:


> ".... The 17 pounder could under no circumstances penetrate the frontal armor of the Tiger II using any ammunition. ..."
> 
> Who shot Michael Whitman ....? and where ...?
> 
> ...



Michael's *Tiger I* was either destroyed by aircraft or shot through the SIDE by an AT gun at fairly close range. His tank trundled of with only 7 others, deep into enemy territory with exposed flanks and inadquete numbers, he was taking over from a commander he considered to inexperienced. The odds were against him. There was no particular courage or ingenuinity required to opportunistically ambush the exposed tigers, which were taking an audacious risk some tacticians have condemned as foolhardy due to inadquet reconaisance.


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## FLYBOYJ (Dec 12, 2011)

Vincenzo said:


> AFAIK this is not true


TRUE

Tail numbers S/N 44-83028, c/n 1007 S/N 44-83029, c/n 1008 were deployed to the 1st Fighter Group at Lesina Airfield, Italy, Joe Baugher gives references to this fact in his web site. Those 2 aircraft survived their deployment, one crashed stateside, one was later converted into a drone.

As far as what type of sorties flown? Nothing too dangerous considering that no Luftwaffe jets were anywhere close to Lesina.


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## DonL (Dec 12, 2011)

> You also need metallurgy and production ability. Not just the ability to make a new alloy but the ability to make it quantity consistently. When making large aircraft the ability to make large pieces is also very helpful rather than using many small pieces to make sub assemblies. New welding or fabrication techniques allow new shapes or construction features to be used on a mass production basis.



But it is a very big differince if you have the ability but not the chance because of the lag of ressources!

Look at the timeline of the Jumo 004*A* jet engine, when it was ready to go in mass production, but had no chance because of the lag of ressources and must be converted to a Jumo 004B without saving ressources!

Ability to do something but not have the possibility is a very big difference!


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## Siegfried (Dec 12, 2011)

parsifal said:


> LOL



20-Pounder (firing M3 APDS) 287 mm (at 90°, range 1000 meters) 
85 mm D-48 (firing BR-372) 185 mm (at 90°, range 1000 meters) 
8.8 cm PaK 43 (firing PzGr 40/43) 193mm (at 60°, range 1000 meters) 
90 mm M3 (firing M304) 195 mm (at 60°, range 914 meters) 

Tiger II *CAN NOT be penetrated by ANY of the above*. The 17 pounder 
couldn't even pentrate the 80mm/55 degree glacis of the Panther reliably at point blank
let alone the 150mm/50 degree of the tiger II. 

This is because of the 'slope' effect. The tables I have indicate 
that the slope effect reducece penetraion by at least 0.44 (ie 2.25 
times) Hence the Tigers front glacis of 150mm is equal to 340mm. In fact 
the US Army when using HVAP (Tungsten Cored Amunition, High Velcity 
Armour Piercing) reckoned it was 3.3, hence not even the Panther could be penetrated. 

Here is the Tiger II armour. 
a/ Lower front glacis: 100mm, angle from vertical -50; 1/cos(angle)= 
1.557; path 155mm. 
Slope effect factor about 2.25-2.5 gives a 90 degree equivalent of 
225mm to 250mm. 

b/ Upper front glacis; 150mm, angle from vertical +50; 1/ 
cos(angle)=1.557 path 233mm. 
Slope effect factor about 2.25-2.5 gives a 90 degree equivalent of 
337mm to 375mm. 

You'll note that the US Army used a 3.3 slope effect factor for 
evaluating the Panthers 80mm 55 degree glacis with HVAP. 

********************* 
17 Pounder APDS vs. Panther Glacis - Battlefront Forum 

"During August of 1944, the U.S. conducted firing tests on 3 captured 
Panthers using a variety of guns and ammo, including 17 pounder APDS. 

The ammo proved to be wildy inaccurate. Of 13 shots aimed at the 
Panther glacis at 200 and 300 yards, only 7 hit the target. 1 
penetration occurred. "

*Only 1 of 7 glacis hits penetrated at 200 and 300 yards. *

The inaccuracy and inability to consistently penetrate were attributed 
to unbalanced rounds due to uneven shedding of sabot pieces. 

British observers noted that in earlier trials at Balleroy, 2 hits out 
of 4 on the Panther glacis penetrated at 700 yards. 

British penetration data for 17 pounder APDS is at 30°, using U.S. 
HVAP slope effects the 700 yard penetration at 0° would be 245mm. 

The Panther glacis armor is 80mm @ 55° which is equivalent to 268mm at 
0° using U.S. firing test HVAP slope effects. 

If 17 pounder APDS penetrated Panther glacis on half the hits at 700 
yards, this may approximate the ballistic limit and the 
armor quality vs. APDS would be (245/268), or 0.91 when penetration = 
effective armor resistance. 

This analysis suggests that 17 pounder APDS can be modelled with U.S. 
firing test HVAP slope effects, which exceed CM figures. 
The results also support the theory that APDS was inconsistent and 
could vary widely in accuracy and penetration, 
sometimes failing to penetrate at 200 yards and then penetrating on 
half the hits at 700 yards. 
*********************** 
Note panther was *moving from 80mm to 110mm armour by 1945. *
with a new more armoured turrer using a coaxial recuperator to reduce
size and increase armour.

APDS was a dodgy product. The Germans had it as well though they didn't fire
Tungsten cores, ordinary steal had to do.


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## tyrodtom (Dec 12, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> Michael's *Tiger I* was either destroyed by aircraft or shot through the SIDE by an AT gun at fairly close range. His tank trundled of with only 7 others, deep into enemy territory with exposed flanks and inadquete numbers, he was taking over from a commander he considered to inexperienced. The odds were against him. There was no particular courage or ingenuinity required to opportunistically ambush the exposed tigers, which were taking an audacious risk some tacticians have condemned as foolhardy due to inadquet reconaisance.



From that statement it seems you think war is some kind of game where you fight "fair". Tank warfare consist of basically ambush tactics whenever possible, if you're presented with a side shot, you take it. It takes courage just to stay on a battlefield and take your chances. 
The western allies at that time had no tank that could go toe to toe with a Tiger I, Michael Wittman knew that, but i'm not going to be juvenile and suggest that Wittman was less courageous for taking advantage of that superority.


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## FLYBOYJ (Dec 12, 2011)

Messy1 said:


> Here's one-
> The Hellcat was designed using data received from studying the Koga's Zero that crashed in the Aleutian Islands. I believe the final design of the Hellcat predates Koga's crash by many years, and the final testing and design was pproved and ordered about the same time the Zero was recovered in Alaska.



The F6F contract was signed June 1941, first flight June 1942. Koga crashed June 1942.


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## Messy1 (Dec 12, 2011)

Thanks for the correction FlyboyJ. That even makes my post all the more the more true. I still read articles where the Hellcat is listed as being built to counter the Zero, and info taken from Koga's Zero was used to modify the Hellcat design.


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## pbfoot (Dec 12, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> Michael's *Tiger I* was either destroyed by aircraft or shot through the SIDE by an AT gun at fairly close range. His tank trundled of with only 7 others, deep into enemy territory with exposed flanks and inadquete numbers, he was taking over from a commander he considered to inexperienced. The odds were against him. There was no particular courage or ingenuinity required to opportunistically ambush the exposed tigers, which were taking an audacious risk some tacticians have condemned as foolhardy due to inadquet reconaisance.


Here yeah go my young friend , Pt 1 of new series . new in the sense its less then 2yrs old on the end of Wittman . I'll ruin the ending for you he was taken out by a shot from a tank of the Royal Sherbrookes . Its a CSI type show and well done for a guy like me that knows nothing about armour guns ships stc

_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3uCKhIkAgec_


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## parsifal (Dec 12, 2011)

Another myth, from the same local source....it ran something like "the germans won the battle of britain.....they achieved all that they had set out to do, ran out of targets and moved onto bigger and better battles".....

the guy was delusional


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## parsifal (Dec 12, 2011)

Or this one it went something like this...."later model Bf 109s had a range in excess of 1400 km....700 out one way and 700 back". If i tried hard enough Im sure i could find this gem. Someone pointed out that would allow escorted raids to Scotland (I think that was the country mentioned). He had no problem with that.

I know, I know, there is some truth to it (yeah right).....


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## FLYBOYJ (Dec 12, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Or this one it went something like this...."later model Bf 109s had a range in excess of 1400 km....700 out one way and 700 back". If i tried hard enough Im sure i could find this gem. Someone pointed out that would allow escorted raids to Scotland (I think that was the country mentioned).  He had no problem with that.
> 
> I know, I know, there is some truth to it (yeah right).....



Could probably be done on a super lean mixture setting and flying no faster than 150 mph


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## vinnye (Dec 12, 2011)

I think that the RAF would have loved the 109's flying at 150mph!


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## bobbysocks (Dec 12, 2011)

maybe if they caught the jet stream or one hell of a tail wind! 

watched that michael wittman episode....they make a pretty strong argument for the tank kill. i dont know if a tiger ever was taken out by a frontal shot....but that is irrelevant.


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## vinnye (Dec 12, 2011)

tyrodtom said:


> From that statement it seems you think war is some kind of game where you fight "fair". Tank warfare consist of basically ambush tactics whenever possible, if you're presented with a side shot, you take it. It takes courage just to stay on a battlefield and take your chances.
> The western allies at that time had no tank that could go toe to toe with a Tiger I, Michael Wittman knew that, but i'm not going to be juvenile and suggest that Wittman was less courageous for taking advantage of that superority.



There is no doubt in my mind that Wittman was brave and tactically astute.
He did have some comfort in the knowkedge - as stated above, that the Western Allies did not have a tank (or gun) that could take a Tiger on from the front.
Therefore, it was prudent for any allied tank crew (or German in many case) to use terrain and cover to their advantage!
The Sherbrookes used their cover to the best effect - to take on the Tiger from the side / rear, where they knew they could at least hope to damage the beast!
I believe other Tigers were engaged and destroyed by a Firefly - in cover in a wood from the other side of the formation of Tigers.
Wittman was known for seizing opportunities -outside Villers was a classic example. He saw a column of British armour moving along a single track road - unable to manouevre because of the terrain, and shot he lead and tail vehicles, then proceeded to shoot up the rest of the column! Not all of these vehicles were tanks - many were not armoured - if my memory serves!
That was confidence and ability - and a bit of luck!
He was also a little lucky when he drove through Villers - as he passed a British take parked off the main road (which he did not see) - but the gunner was out of the tank relieving himself. This tank tried to folow Wittman to take him from the back - but he had already gone down the road and turned round! The result of this is predictable!


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## Vincenzo (Dec 12, 2011)

FLYBOYJ said:


> TRUE
> 
> Tail numbers S/N 44-83028, c/n 1007 S/N 44-83029, c/n 1008 were deployed to the 1st Fighter Group at Lesina Airfield, Italy, Joe Baugher gives references to this fact in his web site. Those 2 aircraft survived their deployment, one crashed stateside, one was later converted into a drone.
> 
> As far as what type of sorties flown? Nothing too dangerous considering that no Luftwaffe jets were anywhere close to Lesina.



it is well knewn that 2 yp-80 go in 1st FG, is well knewn that they fly over italy, but that fly combat mission give me where is the reference


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## Denniss (Dec 12, 2011)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Could probably be done on a super lean mixture setting and flying no faster than 150 mph


Entirely possible with 200 to 210 mph.


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## Juha (Dec 12, 2011)

Hello
Finnish experiences with 109G was that the most economic speed was not useable because of the flooding of exhaust gases into cockpit at that speed.

Juha


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## parsifal (Dec 12, 2011)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Could probably be done on a super lean mixture setting and flying no faster than 150 mph



I need to find the quote. What you are descibing is really a ferry range configuration. That is entirely plausible. But that wasnt the context of the conversation (at last thats my memory of it). I think you were there FB.....it was one of those memorable sessions where everything just went pear shaped.....

I am bringing these up humourously. Lord knows we need a bit of that around here at the moment. it all seemed so important at the time.....


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## michaelmaltby (Dec 12, 2011)

"... I am bringing these up humorously. Lord knows we need a bit of that around here at the moment. it all seemed so important at the time....."

Caution, my friend, the "humor" envelope awaits .... 

MM


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## vikingBerserker (Dec 12, 2011)

Perhaps if you tied one to 2 European Swallows.......

I'll show myself out.


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## pbfoot (Dec 12, 2011)

And in all seriousness my Toyota Echo has a greater range then either the 109 or Spit and I ain't joking


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## michaelmaltby (Dec 12, 2011)

".... a greater range then either the 109 or Spit ..."

But not a Zero .... 

MM


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## iron man (Dec 12, 2011)

michaelmaltby said:


> ".... The account of the German jet program begins with a young Doctoral student freshly minted from the University of Göttingen in 1935."
> 
> The Nazis were securely in charge of the levers of power by then ...... so did Nazi science get the jet engine "right" and Frank Whittle get it "wrong" ? ... is that _your_ personal conviction, Iron man.
> 
> ...



I prefer to use the phrase "German science"...particularly in the case of a discussion such as this. Herr Busemann was world renowned within the international aerodynamic science "community", long before the "_machtergreifung_" handed the reins of the Reichstag to Hitler and the looney tunes.

The paper I've cited is not my work Michael; the statements, research and conclusions reached, are those of a man who has dug long (and deep) for an appraisal of the effects (as with respect to "Paperclip") of "German science" on the postwar aviation developments in the western aerospace industry.

As to me? I'm not talking about propulsion systems here (although I will grant that there is a significant amount of aerodynamic engineering contained within the discipline; especially as with regard to jet engines)...I'm talking about pure aerodynamic research, and the subsequent effect on Western postwar* airframe *designs. 

If pushed for a comment on the "Axial/Centrifugal" debate, I'll offer this up. By the early 1950's, centrifugal engines were increasingly banished from front line aircraft coming off of the production lines. While they have their merits, their cumbersome profiles and significant disadvantages with respect to power/weight ratios made this shift a "when"...not an "if". Axials are a whole different engineering ballgame. They are many times advanced beyond the (relatively speaking) _simplistic _Whittle engines. 

Fruition of axials was far beyond the metallurgical capabilities of late WWII-era Germany. The fact remains that the research behind the BMW 003 reached fruition postwar in the SNECMA Atar. 
This is the most directly "derivative" example, but "Paperclip" scooped up every German scientist they could get their hands on and the postwar records are only now being declassified in many cases. As the calendar pushes forward, we can expect further revelations, with respect to the effects that these "war prizes" had upon the postwar aerospace industry within the UK. 

This _may well _rewrite that which is currently perceived as "common knowledge" when it comes to this matter.


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## FLYBOYJ (Dec 12, 2011)

Vincenzo said:


> it is well knewn that 2 yp-80 go in 1st FG, is well knewn that they fly over italy, but that fly combat mission give me where is the reference


 I used the Joe Baugher site and he gave references. I have found him to be very fair and accurate

http://www.joebaugher.com/usaf_fighters/p80_3.html


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## FLYBOYJ (Dec 12, 2011)

Denniss said:


> Entirely possible with 200 to 210 mph.


 That means no advancing the throttle, no evasive maneuvers, straight and level. Perfect for a ferry flight, not practical in combat


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## pbfoot (Dec 12, 2011)

iron man said:


> The paper I've cited is not my work Michael; the statements, research and conclusions reached, are those of a man who has dug long (and deep) for an appraisal of the effects (as with respect to "Paperclip") of "German science" on the postwar aviation developments in the western aerospace industry.
> 
> .


But why would I even pay attention to a paper in which there is a blatant error on the 1st page , I know squat about engines and area rule but as a person with limited knowlwedge I would hope that the man doing this would be thorogh , it make every else after a non factor to me . I'm sure this guy Busemann was a smart cookie but thats all I can say


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## FLYBOYJ (Dec 12, 2011)

iron man said:


> If pushed for a comment on the "Axial/Centrifugal" debate, I'll offer this up. By the early 1950's, centrifugal engines were increasingly banished from front line aircraft coming off of the production lines. While they have their merits, their cumbersome profiles and significant disadvantages with respect to power/weight ratios made this shift a "when"...not an "if". Axials are a whole different engineering ballgame. They are many times advanced beyond the (relatively speaking) _simplistic _Whittle engines.


What's your definition of a "front line aircraft?" Fighter? Bomber? Can you consider a helicopter a "front line aircraft" because by the end of the decade (1950s) these fat little balls of impellers found their way into numerous helicopters and in a composite configuration, into aircraft, and they were just as, if not more advanced than their larger cousins. In their cumbersome profile, they actually offer a superior power to weight ration when applied to a different application.


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## mhuxt (Dec 12, 2011)

Thanks for posting the link to that program on Wittman. A voice in my head reminds me not to believe everything I see on TV, all the same even it that was schlock, it was skillful and well-presented schlock.


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## Juha (Dec 12, 2011)

Hello Siegfried
On 17pdr APDS ammo
Penetration ability against sloped plate, in this case 17pdr against the 80mm thick glacis plate of a Panther: From US 12th Army report on the tests at Isigny
...
(6) In contrast to the results obtained in this test with 17pdr SABOT, in firing conducted by First U.S. Army at Balleroy on 10 July 44, 5 rounds were fired at the front plate of a Panther tank at 700 yards. Examination of pictures of this firing indicates that the first round struck the mantlet, the second between the track and the nose plate, the third at the junction of the nose and glacis and penetrated. The fourth and fifth were fair hits on the glacis and both penetrated. The conflict between these results and those obtained by the board is explained by Col. A. G. Cole, Deputy Director of Artillery, Ministry of Supply. Col. Cole witnessed part of the test and states that the ammunition lot furnished the board had not been proof fired. He further states that, in his opinion, the lot is of sub-standard manufacture and if proof fired would not have been accepted."

So 17pdr Sabot used in Isigny was most probably sub-standard, so it's rather useless to draw too much from it on the behaviour of 17pdr Sabot. Those used at Balleroy penetrated 60% of cases and both which hit the glacis penetrated. So odds were that 17pdr APDS shot would penetrate the glacis of Panther from 700y, Tiger was holed even by normal APCBC 17pdr shot up to some 1500y head on if the shot hit, problem was that 17pdr wasn't very accurate beyond 800y, 77mm was more accurate and could pierce Tiger frontal armour at least up to 1000y, but Tiger II had too good frontal armour for British A/T and tank guns.

Juha


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## Vincenzo (Dec 12, 2011)

FLYBOYJ said:


> I used the Joe Baugher site and he gave references. I have found him to be very fair and accurate
> 
> Lockheed YP-80A Shooting Star


 ty for the link unlucky in the years i found various errors in baugher page, also they remains usefull


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## FLYBOYJ (Dec 12, 2011)

Vincenzo said:


> ty for the link unlucky in the years i found various errors in baugher page, also they remains usefull


I've seen mentioned elsewhere. Again, maybe a "milkrun" but I think ther's enough evidence to say that the P-80 did fly a very limited number of combat missions during WW2


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## Denniss (Dec 12, 2011)

FLYBOYJ said:


> That means no advancing the throttle, no evasive maneuvers, straight and level. Perfect for a ferry flight, not practical in combat


Why not, using most economical cruise speed while flying to a navigation mark and waiting for rendezvous with other fellows or on a bomb run and still over friendly area. A lot of areas to use most eco cruise and not max cruise.

BTW the second document shows the Spits having both shorter range and less endurance than the Bf 109G. Even with a larger drop tank they have less range. I assume the 90 imp gal drop tanks was a ferry tank or was it used in combat?
The Spit XIV consumed a lot of fule on fast cruise but eco cruise was either better than the LF IX or it had more internal fuel.


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## FLYBOYJ (Dec 12, 2011)

Denniss said:


> Why not, using most economical cruise speed while flying to a navigation mark and waiting for rendezvous with other fellows or on a bomb run and still over friendly area. A lot of areas to use most eco cruise and not max cruise.


And if you're jumped by fighters?


Denniss said:


> BTW the second document shows the Spits having both shorter range and less endurance than the Bf 109G. Even with a larger drop tank they have less range. I assume the 90 imp gal drop tanks was a ferry tank or was it used in combat?
> The Spit XIV consumed a lot of fule on fast cruise but eco cruise was either better than the LF IX or it had more internal fuel.


We're not talking about the Spit nor were my comments made about the Spit. The -109 had a constant speed prop and any abrupt attitude changes will cause additional fuel consumption. Although you can theoretically fly the aircraft this extended range, it doesn't mean its going to work unless you're going on a one way mission.


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## parsifal (Dec 13, 2011)

What were the longest combat missions flown by say the me 109g (any number) that were operationally flown. Not ferry or airfield transfers....talking combat flights of some description. 

Maybe ther is some truth to this "myth"


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## Denniss (Dec 13, 2011)

I assume the longest range combat flight of a Bf 109 was a recon mission, they had special long range Bf 109G with two 300l underwing drop tanks. Those were known as the G-4/R3 and G-6/R3. Those aircraft would have a range in excess of 1000 miles and a combat radius of 400-500 miles


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## MacArther (Dec 13, 2011)

Readie said:


> Seafire LIII - 887 Sqn FAA HMS INDEFATIGABLE 1945
> 
> 
> SLt G J "Spud" Murphy destroyed 2 A6M5s Zeroes during a raid over Odaki Bay, Japan on 15 Aug 1945 in this aircraft. On returning to INDEFATIGABLE, the pilots learned that a cease fire was to take effect from 0700 the following morning and that 6 long years of war was finally over.
> ...



The one I heard was:
Aug. 15, 1945. Navy Lt. Cmdr. T.H. Reidy, commander of VBF 83 and flying a Vought F4U Corsair, records the last confirmed US air-to-air victory of World War II while hostilities are still officially declared, as he shoots down a Nakajima C6N1 Saiun reconnaissance aircraft at 5:40 a.m. local time over Tokyo. Five minutes later, the war officially ends.

Of course, I don't have any of my materials with me so I can't even come close to verifying this.


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## MacArther (Dec 13, 2011)

Dunno if this fits here, but anyway.....

I've always heard it claimed that Allied Medics (the ones with the Medic Cross on them) were not permitted to carry a weapon. Is this true? If so, was it always followed to the letter?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 13, 2011)

FLYBOYJ said:


> I've seen mentioned elsewhere. Again, maybe a "milkrun" but I think ther's enough evidence to say that the P-80 did fly a very limited number of combat missions during WW2



Combat Air Patrols are combat missions, are they not? 

Just because there are no enemy to engage, does not mean they were not flying a combat mission.


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## parsifal (Dec 13, 2011)

Denniss said:


> I assume the longest range combat flight of a Bf 109 was a recon mission, they had special long range Bf 109G with two 300l underwing drop tanks. Those were known as the G-4/R3 and G-6/R3. Those aircraft would have a range in excess of 1000 miles and a combat radius of 400-500 miles




Okay, thats the theoretical capability (albeit for a specialised role....I assume you have no issue with saying the Spitfires range is equal to that of its PRU units). Thats not th4e question though. What are the known ranges flown by 109s on combat missions. For example, we know 109s during the BoB flew some missions to London.....a range of about 120-150 miles. I also know that on the eastern Front 109gs were regulalry flying out 180-200 miles on Patrol missions and Intercept missions. I know also that the 109fs and gs stationed in Sicily and Sardinia could not reach the Pedestal convoys as they passed Corsica....a distance of just over 200 miles (from memory). So, are ther better examples of 109s operating at range for a specific mission?


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## Edgar Brooks (Dec 13, 2011)

The Spitfire IX used the 30-gallon 90-gallon tanks for combat patrols, but was suppose to jettison them, before going into action.
There was a 170-gallon ferry droptank, which gave the IX a still-air range of 1380 land miles, which meant that the IX could (just) reach Malta, from Gibraltar, on a calm day; the problem was having to keep well south of occupied Europe/Corsica/Sicily, and flying a circuitous route.
Eventually it was decided to fit an extra 30-gallon tank behind the pilot (had to be emptied first,) and the first two IXs arrived 10/10/43, with 43 47 gallons spare. Full throttle was used all the way, and they started at 12,000', climbing to 20,000' over Tunis.


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## Juha (Dec 13, 2011)

We have had a thread on max range operations by Spitfire units: http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/longest-spitfire-raid-wwii-16182.html
which shows that especially Spitfire Mks VII and VIII were not strickly speaking very shortlegged though not Mustangs or Zeros either. I'd also like to have info on max range ops by 109F-G units, have asked info on that earlier from those who had claimed that 109F-G had in fact excellent range, but never got any other answer that LW had no need for long range fighter ops, which IMHO isn't true. Finns' experience was that 109G-2s and G-6s were fairly short legged but we have here long distances and had experience on Brewster B-239, which was denavalized carrier fighter with 600ltr fuel capacity, and Hawk 75A which had max internal fuel capacity of 613ltr, so 50% more than in 109. 

Juha


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## FLYBOYJ (Dec 13, 2011)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Combat Air Patrols are combat missions, are they not?
> 
> Just because there are no enemy to engage, does not mean they were not flying a combat mission.



My point!!!


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## vanir (Dec 13, 2011)

I think a total of 700 litres with the droptank is good for the fairly streamlined 109, but the problem was in much of the areas it frequently operated, the pilot was required to climb over lots of mountain ranges, and then had vast expanses of enemy territory to skirt. Boyne's analogy of the Luftwaffe being like a quilt being used to cover a bed that is too big, pooling resources to one section of the Front just uncovered another section of the Front, it's my favourite characterisation of the Luftwaffe. Performed its job superbly but had no real chance from the start.

So between a mountainous Europe/Med and operational conditions the popularism that LW pilots celebrated the extra range of the 190 seems to make sense. Think of bad weather too, fighter groups get blown off course just like everyone else and rather frequently, war doesn't wait for good weather sometimes. Extra range is good there.

Northwest Europe, the channel Front and low countries, we think of that all the time in the west when we think of Messers over Germany but they're called the low countries for a reason. Everywhere else, 90% of the sphere of the 109 was quite mountainous terrain, lending way to vast marshlands, forests then more mountains. A lot of fuel is spent on the climb, especially if you have to do it when you're heavy.


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## Edgar Brooks (Dec 13, 2011)

Sorry, but I can't see the relevance of that; standard operating height, for fighter sweeps, was 20,000'+, and no European mountain comes within 4,000' of that, so all fighters found the need to climb at some stage (just after crossing the enemy coast, in 1941-4, in the RAF's case.) No fighter Squadron is going to go in at low level, unless they're on a strafing/bombing run, and they would expect to have high top cover, somewhere above.


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## michaelmaltby (Dec 13, 2011)

"... The paper I've cited is not my work Michael".

I know, Iron man, and I understand your preference for German science .... but you must know that no body was getting funding for anything in 1935 Germany that didn't meet certain 'criteria'. I have the greatest admiration for German achievements .... but also for the very practical Frank Whittle ... which came from the flight line not cloister .

Best wishes for the season.

MM


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## Vincenzo (Dec 13, 2011)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Combat Air Patrols are combat missions, are they not?
> 
> Just because there are no enemy to engage, does not mean they were not flying a combat mission.



flying over naples in april '45 it's no the way for find enemy


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## FLYBOYJ (Dec 13, 2011)

Vincenzo said:


> flying over naples in april '45 it's no the way for find enemy


Its not but if hostilities were still in effect and naples was considered part of a "theater of operations" (which it was) that was a combat mission... From Wiki for what it's worth;

_There the 1st Fighter Group received two YP-80A jet fighters (serials 44-83028 and 44-83029) sent to the theater for operational testing ("Project Extraversion"). Although the jets were marked for combat operations with easily identifiable tail stripes and the letters 'A' and 'B' on their noses, and flown on* two operational sorties by the 94th FS, neither saw combat before the end of the war*._

Here's a couple threads from another forum with some interesting information.

http://forum.armyairforces.com/1st-FG-and-the-Lockheed-YP80A-Shooting-Star-m94873.aspx

http://www.britmodeller.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=71485&mode=threaded


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 13, 2011)

Vincenzo said:


> flying over naples in april '45 it's no the way for find enemy



Not the point. It is still a combat air patrol. The continent was still a combat zone.



FLYBOYJ said:


> Its not but if hostilities were still in effect and naples was considered part of a "theater of operations" (which it was) that was a combat mission...



Ditto, I bet those pilots were still logging combat time.


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## Juha (Dec 13, 2011)

Edgar Brooks said:


> Sorry, but I can't see the relevance of that; standard operating height, for fighter sweeps, was 20,000'+, and no European mountain comes within 4,000' of that, so all fighters found the need to climb at some stage (just after crossing the enemy coast, in 1941-4, in the RAF's case.) No fighter Squadron is going to go in at low level, unless they're on a strafing/bombing run, and they would expect to have high top cover, somewhere above.



On the Eastern Front, which was very important to Germany, much of the air fighting happened lower level than in the West

Juha


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## Hop (Dec 13, 2011)

> BTW the second document shows the Spits having both shorter range and less endurance than the Bf 109G. Even with a larger drop tank they have less range.



If you do the maths you'll see the Spitfires in that document are cruising at higher speeds, in some cases much higher.


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## Edgar Brooks (Dec 13, 2011)

> On the Eastern Front, which was very important to Germany, much of the air fighting happened lower level than in the West


"Northwest Europe, the channel Front and low countries," were what the poster quoted; as far as I'm aware, they were not on the Eastern Front.


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## vanir (Dec 13, 2011)

Edgar Brooks said:


> Sorry, but I can't see the relevance of that; standard operating height, for fighter sweeps, was 20,000'+, and no European mountain comes within 4,000' of that, so all fighters found the need to climb at some stage (just after crossing the enemy coast, in 1941-4, in the RAF's case.) No fighter Squadron is going to go in at low level, unless they're on a strafing/bombing run, and they would expect to have high top cover, somewhere above.


And yet when you take off at München, Bavaria and fly any direction other than north, you'll have to make 12000 in about 12000 from the airfield. Mountains kind of go up sharply. Airfields among them. It's like that from Bavaria to the Black Sea. Know why they called Poland's Pripet Marshes unpassable? Because south is all mountain, swamps in the middle, you have to go north along the Baltic.
England isn't Europe mate, it's off in the north sea somewhere. I told you that you guys only see the low countries when you look at europe. Think Czechsolovakia, Hungary, North Italy. Remember those interwar Swiss Alp races? The whole point of them is that they thoroughly tested an airplane's mettle for militaries, rather than the popular pole racing which is at 100 feet. And lots of planes failed, the 109 Udet flew in that race broke its engine over those mountains.

At several airfields you do literally have to orbit in a climb before you go anywhere. It burns fuel. You'll find yank fighter group reports in north Italy in 45 talking about having to climb near the airfield before going anywhere, I know that without even looking it up, test me on it. The relevance is that it burns fuel. You have to do this in the Balkans, you have to do this around southern Romania, you have to do this in Bavaria, in northwest Czechsolovakia, in southern Poland, in Hungary, etc.

And remember we're talking about planes which have much closer performance to a modern civvy job than they do a modern jet fighter. They don't exactly climb spritely, takes like half an hour for combat height from brakes off as opposed to 2-3min.

Do you know why combat on the Eastern Front was at such low alt? Aside from the guts of the battlefronts being across all the swamps and fields, it was the proximity of the airfields to each other. They just plain didn't have the space to climb very high before meeting the enemy, and staging over the airfield for climb and formation meant your troops were being attacked with IL2s while you were scared of russian fighters, and vice versa. It went with the territory, and was a similar air war in some respects to North Africa.
And you're using this as an example of Messers not having to worry about altitude in assessing general service ranges. Right. Only the USSR wasn't the sovereign territory they should ultimately defend.


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## bobbysocks (Dec 13, 2011)

all these "range" finding are what they would be "in a perfect world"... flying in a vaccum, as you will, type of environment. when you set up a flight plan you have to take into consideration of a minor thing like "winds aloft". then you will pick the altitude that afford you the best flight. if you have a 20 to 50 mph (A) head wind or (B) cross wind you will be either (A) flying that much slower and really burning fuel or (B) making a course correction that in effect will make you fly 10-15-20% or more further. conversely if you have a tail wind...you can really kick @$$. i do not know what the prevailing winds aloft are over the channel....i did actually look but and all i could find was current data and that all suggested almost a direct cross wind over the british isles....in short you would probably stand a better chance from norway than you would from northern france if these wind streams are typical. 

plus i am going to say these ac are all "sterile"...no ammo or bombs, no extra weight at all. stripped to determine a baseline for specs. like prototypes of fighters that didnt have the armor or armament and exceeded speeds of their war versions. 

so essentually withthe right winds in a stripped down ac you can get there...but then what? give someone the finger and fly back home??

Free Weather Data from Meteorologica weather superstore (meteorologica.co.uk)


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## FLYBOYJ (Dec 13, 2011)

vanir said:


> Do you know why combat on the Eastern Front was at such low alt? Aside from the guts of the battlefronts being across all the swamps and fields, it was the proximity of the airfields to each other. They just plain didn't have the space to climb very high before meeting the enemy, and staging over the airfield for climb and formation meant your troops were being attacked with IL2s while you were scared of russian fighters, and vice versa. It went with the territory, and was a similar air war in some respects to North Africa.



I'd also bet dollars to donuts that a good percentage of the time there was a layer of cloud cover that actually limited or even prohibited combat at higher altitudes. Even during heated battles, you have to be pretty careful about punching into a cloud bank unless you know exactly where you are and the height of the terrain around you.


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## parsifal (Dec 13, 2011)

Were the aircraft involved in the Stalingrad airlift ever provided with fighter escort. If so, where were those fighters based and how far were they flying in those missions? 

I have a book at home that gives some details on this. I suspect, but cannot confirm right at this minute that escort for the transports was seldom provided. I wonder why not. From memory, after the encirclement, operations were mostly conducted from a minor airfield about 150 miles distant from the sw of the city. Most fighters were based further away than that I think about 250 miles or so. 

I do know that the VVS chewed into unescorted transports mercilessly. If escort was available, it should have been there. I suspect it was too far for them to undertake that mission.

I will try and confirm this stuff tonite.


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## Siegfried (Dec 13, 2011)

Juha said:


> Hello Siegfried
> On 17pdr APDS ammo
> Penetration ability against sloped plate, in this case 17pdr against the 80mm thick glacis plate of a Panther: From US 12th Army report on the tests at Isigny
> ...
> Juha



I am trying to desist from making to many OT posts. I don't start them, I just respond. The point I am making is that the 17 pounder and APDS are both myths in terms of performance. They could be resisted with ordinary armour. Even if the APDS round was well made it still had significantly higher dispersion and was prone to shattering or deflecting from sloped armour and often failed. So you had a round whose higher velocity and lower fall off advantages were completely wiped out by the rounds very high dispersion: it thus had lower accuracy at range than an ordinary round. The US HVAP was much better in practical use; it didn't shatter, didn't disperse and the sticky high friction nose cap swung the round around to penetrate sloped armour. The Germans had no use real practical use for a weapon such as the 17 pounder: it was so heavy at several tons it needed a tractor to place so one may as well go the whole hog and use an 88mm gun which offered reliable penetration and accuracy at range. The 75mm gun of the Panther 7.5 cm KwK 42 was of the same performance and class but few were mounted on trailers. The 17 pounder and APDS were powerfull, but they were also exaggerated.


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## Edgar Brooks (Dec 13, 2011)

vanir said:


> And yet when you take off at München, Bavaria and fly any direction other than north, you'll have to make 12000 in about 12000 from the airfield. Mountains kind of go up sharply. Airfields among them. It's like that from Bavaria to the Black Sea. Know why they called Poland's Pripet Marshes unpassable? Because south is all mountain, swamps in the middle, you have to go north along the Baltic..


And when you'r crossing the enemy coast you have to make 20-30,000' immediately or get shot down by the light flak


> England isn't Europe mate, it's off in the north sea somewhere.


 I suggest you speak to European politicians about that, *mate*, and "somewhere" is 26 miles, which an athlete can cover in 90 minutes, a Spitfire in 6.


> I told you that you guys only see the low countries when you look at europe.


 Don't tell me what I see. Some of us have had a fairly comprehensive education, in fact we no longer think that Australia is peopled only by convicts.


> Think Czechsolovakia, Hungary, North Italy. Remember those interwar Swiss Alp races? The whole point of them is that they thoroughly tested an airplane's mettle for militaries, rather than the popular pole racing which is at 100 feet. And lots of planes failed, the 109 Udet flew in that race broke its engine over those mountains.


Relevance? The Spitfire never indulged in pole racing.


> You'll find yank fighter group reports in north Italy in 45 talking about having to climb near the airfield before going anywhere, I know that without even looking it up, test me on it. The relevance is that it burns fuel. You have to do this in the Balkans, you have to do this around southern Romania, you have to do this in Bavaria, in northwest Czechsolovakia, in southern Poland, in Hungary, etc.


And, as I said, when crossing the Channel


> And remember we're talking about planes which have much closer performance to a modern civvy job than they do a modern jet fighter. They don't exactly climb spritely, takes like half an hour for combat height from brakes off as opposed to 2-3min.


Twaddle; the Spitfire climbed at over 4000'/minute at full throttle, so could reach 20,000' in less than 10 minutes


> Do you know why combat on the Eastern Front was at such low alt? Aside from the guts of the battlefronts being across all the swamps and fields, it was the proximity of the airfields to each other. They just plain didn't have the space to climb very high before meeting the enemy, and staging over the airfield for climb and formation meant your troops were being attacked with IL2s while you were scared of russian fighters, and vice versa. It went with the territory, and was a similar air war in some respects to North Africa.


 I have no interest in the Eastern Front; the discussion concerns (or it did, until you started shifting the emphasis) the petrol consumption over Northern Europe. My contention is that, since the participating aircraft had to reach (at least) 20,000', the land topography has no bearing on the conversation.


> And you're using this as an example of Messers not having to worry about altitude in assessing general service ranges.


I'm doing no such thing; you're the one twisting my words. What I said was that Spitfires had to climb to the same height as the German fighters, at the same rate, so saying that their petrol consumption was less critical is a complete fabrication.


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## bobbysocks (Dec 13, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Were the aircraft involved in the Stalingrad airlift ever provided with fighter escort...... I do know that the VVS chewed into unescorted transports mercilessly.



This in my understanding this is where the LW lost the biggest wealth of its seasoned pilots. Herman the horrible, because of the LWs success at supplying the troops at Demyansk by air promised he could do the same at Stalingrad. the magnatude of this operation was much larger and so more pilots were needed. its easier to put a less experienced pilot in a single seat fighter by himself than in a multi engine ac loaded to the max. many veteran pilots were shifted from units or as instructors to supply stalingrad and then to air lift out. but in Demyansk the VVS wasnt as strong as it was in Stalingrad and the LW took some heavy punishment. in the few theings i have read i dont recall there being any escorts available.


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## Denniss (Dec 13, 2011)

Hop said:


> If you do the maths you'll see the Spitfires in that document are cruising at higher speeds, in some cases much higher.


May be but they still have less range than the most often as "short-ranged" claimed Bf 109.


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## Njaco (Dec 13, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Were the aircraft involved in the Stalingrad airlift ever provided with fighter escort. If so, where were those fighters based and how far were they flying in those missions?
> 
> I will try and confirm this stuff tonite.



JG 3, I believe were mostly involved. Parsifal, if you check the thread "This Day In Europe...." during that time, I tried to post air operations over Stalingrad.


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## pbfoot (Dec 13, 2011)

Denniss said:


> May be but they still have less range than the most often as "short-ranged" claimed Bf 109.


They both have very little range, but its very common knowledge that the brakes on the 109 were better but the Spitfire was more comfortable , however the the defogger on the Spit was inferior to the 109 but that being said the landing light was better on the 109 but the Spit had a far superior nav lights . Then we move to fit and finish the Dzus fasteners on the Spit were better but that may be because they were made in the States . However the Spit had more legroom but that may be because it had to fit North Americans and Australians rather then just the dwarfish Europeans


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## parsifal (Dec 13, 2011)

Thanks, i will have a look later. Any idea of what the round trip for the fighters might have been....they would have needed to fly to the re-supply airfield, pick up their charges and then escort them some or all the way to Stalingrad, before returning.

If we can do that we can get a snapshot of the operational range of the fighters involved, under those conditions. 

I can tell you this much.....if the fighters are 109s, it wont be 700 clicks


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## parsifal (Dec 13, 2011)

In relation to the "no tiger was destroyed in combat" claim, Juha might remember better than I (because if i remember correctly, he was witness to that debate as well), but if memory serves me, it was a claim made for both Tiger Is and Tiger IIs. The debate even claimed no losses (from combat) as late as the ardenne offensive as I recall.

I could be wrong, I am working from memory. I raised the issue as a bit of fun really, it was a heavy duty debate at the time which in the finish got out of hand. I laughed because it looked intially that not much has changed in 3 years.


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## bobbysocks (Dec 13, 2011)

parsifal said:


> at the time which in the _finish_ got out of hand.


 yeah, you got to keep those Fins on a short leash or they will get all carried away.


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## Aaron Brooks Wolters (Dec 13, 2011)

Njaco said:


> Thats the one I was talking about! A Captain Rossi!!!


If I'm not mistaken, I believe I remember reading that story in Martin Caiden's book Flying Forts. So he may be the one who started that rumor.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 13, 2011)

Denniss said:


> May be but they still have less range than the most often as "short-ranged" claimed Bf 109.



This has been gone over before, comparing a 109F-4 to a Spitfire V the the 109 does get better "mileage" most of the time, it varies with speed and altitude, occasionally the Spitfire is better. Most of the time the difference is well under 10%, barely enough for bragging rights and of no real difference for operations.


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## GrauGeist (Dec 13, 2011)

Yep, that story was pure fiction although there was a captured P-38 the Italians had, but they ruined the engines with thier llow quality fuel


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## parsifal (Dec 13, 2011)

You would think the first thing to do with a captured ac would be to analyse the fuel.....

My extremely limited knowledge on this subject is that lower octane rated fuel is the same as standard versus super grade petrol, well, kind of. 87 grade standard burns quicker its ignition is more of a bang rather than a burn. Super grade petrol (which is 95 octane rating from memory), has lead added to it that acts as an ignition retardant. It has a longer, slower burn cycle, so that more of the power stroke of the piston is actually under power, and hence accelaration. This in turn generates more power at the drive point, which in a car is the flywheel in a plane is the prop hub. 


thats how my schoolboy mechanics understands the process at least. If the wrong fuel is put into an engine rated and tuned for a higher rated fuel, it doesnt take long before pistons have holes burnt in them, valves are burnt as fuel ignites prematurely (and unburnt fuel ignites in the exhaust ports due to inadequate fuel/air mixing) and cranks tend to get broken from the jerky violent running of the engine . 

At least thats my elementary understanding of fuel octane ratings and engines. if Im right, that means the engine had to be left running very rough for some time until it sh*t itself. Why would you do that


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## Milosh (Dec 13, 2011)

Yes the Bf109 had great range. That is why some (between 15 and 60) of the lightened Bf109s that took off from Prague were recalled when the bombers turned north and were out of range during the Rammkommando Elbe mission. Then there was the 15 from Stendal were never given a target and returned to base due to fuel shortage.

On the Spit Performance site I believe there are some graphics which show the Bf109 had a combat range of 130mi.


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## wuzak (Dec 14, 2011)

Edgar Brooks said:


> Twaddle; the Spitfire climbed at over 4000'/minute at full throttle, so could reach 20,000' in less than 10 minutes



Indeed.

Spitfire LF.IX (Merlin 66):
Rate of climb at Sea level: 4620 ft/min
Rate of climb at full throttle height in M.S. supercharger gear: 4700 ft/min at 7000 ft
Rate of climb at full throttle height in F.S. supercharger gear: 3860 ft/min. at 18,000 ft
Rate of climb @ 30,000 ft: 2125 ft/min. 
Time to 10,000 ft: 2.15 mins. 
Time to 20,000 ft: 4.75 mins. 
Time to 30,000 ft: 8.4 mins. 
Height at which rate of climb is 1000 ft/min: 37,100 ft
Time to reach above height: 12.9 mins.


Spitfire HF.IX (Merlin 70):
Rate of climb at Sea level: 4390 ft/min.
Rate of climb at full throttle height in M.S. supercharger gear: 4530 ft/min. at 11,900 ft.
Rate of climb at full throttle height in F.S. supercharger gear: 3480 ft/min. at 24,700 ft.
Rate of climb @ 30,000 ft: 2600 ft/min. 
Time to 10,000 ft: 2.25 mins. 
Time to 20,000 ft: 4.85 mins. 
Time to 30,000 ft: 8.05 mins.
Height at which rate of climb is 1000 ft/min: 38,000 ft
Time to reach above height: 12.6 mins.

These numbers are corrected to maximum boost of +18psi. Later in the war they were allowed +25psi. 

The Mk XIV was similar - less than 5 minutes to 20,000ft, around 8 minutes to 30,000ft.


The ability to climb quickly was the basis for the defence system for the Battle of Britain. If it took an half hour to get to combat altitude then the RAF would have been much less succesful in the BoB.


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## Siegfried (Dec 14, 2011)

FLYBOYJ said:


> And if you're jumped by fighters?
> We're not talking about the Spit nor were my comments made about the Spit. The -109 had a constant speed prop and any abrupt attitude changes will cause additional fuel consumption. QUOTE]
> 
> I'm not so sure about that, the latter Jumo and DB engines had a "Kommandogeraete" or "control apparatus" that handled prop pitch, engine rpm, prop overspeed in a dive and mixture settings in single throttle control. This was similar to the one famously used on the BMW 801. The Me 109's abillity to retain reasonable range in the face of massive weight and engine power increases with no increase in fuel tankage seems to relate to the very good fuel efficiency of the engine.
> ...


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## vanir (Dec 14, 2011)

They got the range improvements on the later Daimlers by playing with blowers, not the integrated aeromechanical screw system (ahem "kommandogerät"), which is hydraulic and mechanical and still subject to getting tossed around a little bit by ambient pressures.
The retained throttle-twist prop pitch manual adjustment on every 109, 190 or 152 ever made, it wasn't for a backup on the ca. Aug41 autoscrew adoption (F4 onwards, might've been trialled on late F2/3 examples but I don't believe was standardised until F4). It was for vets who set it better than the auto system. Pilot request, thank Mölders for that. I believe one of the RAF write ups on a captured 109G mentioned a skilled pilot could squeeze improved performance using the handy throttle twist prop pitch adjustment, and commented on how great the option was.

The ASB engine superseded the DB engine over cruise range. They got it from the blower. Same with 605A vs 601A, actually the throttle altitude compensated for the higher fuel burn rate. It evened out on the range despite power increase using the same 400 litre capacity, it had a longer ranging normal cruise condition. The DB motor did exactly the same thing, 1.5ata military burns more fuel than 1.42ata military in the 605A-late, but the DB cruises with a lazy 100hp more at a thousand metres higher using about the same fuel consumption and rpm, it's got a better blower for ranged cruise, just floats the alt easier.

A lot of blower development of 42-45 for the Daimler 605 was all about cruise performance for ranging operations without increasing the weight of the aircraft. They needed more military power, and more cruise range on the same fuel load, those were the priorities. Oh and to do it all in synthetic fuels. I'm personally surprised the RLM didn't just ask for a partridge in a pear tree.


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## Siegfried (Dec 14, 2011)

bobbysocks said:


> This in my understanding this is where the LW lost the biggest wealth of its seasoned pilots. Herman the horrible, because of the LWs success at supplying the troops at Demyansk by air promised he could do the same at Stalingrad. the magnatude of this operation was much larger and so more pilots were needed. its easier to put a less experienced pilot in a single seat fighter by himself than in a multi engine ac loaded to the max. many veteran pilots were shifted from units or as instructors to supply stalingrad and then to air lift out. but in Demyansk the VVS wasnt as strong as it was in Stalingrad and the LW took some heavy punishment. in the few theings i have read i dont recall there being any escorts available.



Jenkoschenk made the commitment to air lift, when he checked his figures he realised the capacity of the SB 500 air supply parchute container was not 500kg but that the 500 refered to only the bomb shackle used. Von Richthoffen also said that it wasn't possible. It was more than just the parachute supply container issue of course. Jenkoschenk tried to correct his mistake but Goering wouldn't let him. Hitler had in a speach said that "we shall not retreate from this place" and was politically motivated not to retract his words and relieved that the airlift wouldn't force a tactical retreat.

The Ju 52's were worn out, engines couldn't develop full takeoff power which restricted load, their opperational availabillity was restricted, there was a pilot shortage, a sever one, as these men had been lost of Damyansk and Crete (due to enigma decrypt revealing specific drop zones). We thus had several women pilots supply Stalingrad.

The Ju 52 was also not up to the task: the Ju 252 could have opperated from far more distant airfields safe from Soviet attack, carried more load per movement thus relieving the congestion issue as well as of load quickly due to its trappoklappe rear loading ramp and sped through danger zones. The Ar 232's range was slightly better than the Ju 52 but it had far far better takeoff and landing performance than the Ju 52 and exceptional rought airfield abillity due to its 22 'millipeed' wheels it could cross ditches of several meters. It could have used very small rough improvised fields. Only a handfull of these aircraft were available as they had been relegated to low priority development or had not been allocated the higher grade engines they needed.


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## vanir (Dec 14, 2011)

FLYBOYJ said:


> I'd also bet dollars to donuts that a good percentage of the time there was a layer of cloud cover that actually limited or even prohibited combat at higher altitudes. Even during heated battles, you have to be pretty careful about punching into a cloud bank unless you know exactly where you are and the height of the terrain around you.



Mate that's precisely the kind of thing I was trying to say. That whole environment thing, I'm no great pilot but I've flown some planes a long time ago, and if I learned one thing is that complex evolutionary diversity is really complex.

Nowadays when I see something in history that doesn't make sense, especially when professionals have been doing or saying it, nowadays I tend to think I've got it wrong. Not they did.


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## vanir (Dec 14, 2011)

wuzak said:


> Indeed.
> 
> Spitfire LF.IX (Merlin 66):
> Rate of climb at Sea level: 4620 ft/min
> ...



riiiight, so initial climb is sustained climb now. nice to know but you might want to mention it to the war vets who say it took about half an hour to climb to combat altitude in a midwar fighter. It's on dvd.


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## Hop (Dec 14, 2011)

> riiiight, so initial climb is sustained climb now. nice to know but you might want to mention it to the war vets who say it took about half an hour to climb to combat altitude in a midwar fighter. It's on dvd.



If you look at a Spitfire manual, you'll see an engine rating called "maximum climbing 1 hour limit". It was set at 2,850 rpm, 12lbs boost. If you go to Spitfire Mk VIII Performance Testing you will see the climb figures for that engine rating. 

20,000ft was reached in just under 6 minutes, 25,000ft in just under 8, 33,000ft in 12 minutes.


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## FLYBOYJ (Dec 14, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> FLYBOYJ said:
> 
> 
> > And if you're jumped by fighters?
> ...


You proved my point in your answer. Even with any type of auto pitch or mixture control, you will still change RPM/ mixture settings that will also change fuel consuption. This system is very similiar to what is used in modern general aviation aircraft that have fuel injection and a constatnt speed prop. To maximize range one would have to fly straight and level with limited climbs or dives and hope they have a good tailwind.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 14, 2011)

There is also a difference between a "combat" or intercept profile climb and a long range cruise climb. A slower climb will use almost the same fuel as the fast climb to reach a certain altitude but the plane will cover more horizontal ground. There is also a difference between a single ( or 2-3) planes taking off and climbing and 12 or more planes trying to take-off, form up and fly in formation.


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## parsifal (Dec 14, 2011)

so, is it safe to come out of the trench and say that whilst it is a myth that the 109 had a combat radius of 700 km for normal combat operations (as a fighter), it certainly could undertake ferry operations and/or recon operations at much greater ranges, quite possibly the 700 mentioned by our esteemed former member?

Or do we still have peope claimimg it possible to fly a 700k combat mission?????


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## pbfoot (Dec 14, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> The Ju 52's were worn out, engines couldn't develop full takeoff power which restricted load, their opperational availabillity was restricted, there was a pilot shortage, a sever one, as these men had been lost of Damyansk and Crete (due to enigma decrypt revealing specific drop zones). *We* thus had several women pilots supply Stalingrad.
> 
> .


Hmmmm whats with the we


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## buffnut453 (Dec 14, 2011)

The start of the Fourth Reich?

I'll get my coat!


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## wuzak (Dec 14, 2011)

vanir said:


> riiiight, so initial climb is sustained climb now. nice to know but you might want to mention it to the war vets who say it took about half an hour to climb to combat altitude in a midwar fighter. It's on dvd.



You can figure out that to 20,000ft the average climb rate is just over 4000ft/min, whereas the peak was 4700ft/min at 700ft for the LF IX falling to 3860ft/min at 18,000ft. The HF IX had lower peak climb rates, but at higher altitudes - 4530ft/min at 11,900ft, and 3480ft/min at 24,700ft.

These are climbs at combat power.

If it took a half hour to climb to fighting altitude during the BoB the RAF was lost.


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## cimmex (Dec 14, 2011)

Sorry, BoB period means Spitfire MkI or MkII
The relevant data are:
Engine
Merlin XII: 
Horsepower
1175 (1050 at 13,000 ft)
Max Speed: 357 mph at 17,000 ft
Range; 500 miles max, 395 in combat
Ceiling: 37,200 feet
Rate of climb: 2.995 feet/minute
Time to 20,000 feet 7 minute
Source:
Supermarine Spitfire Mk II

regards
cimmex


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## FLYBOYJ (Dec 14, 2011)

parsifal said:


> You would think the first thing to do with a captured ac would be to analyse the fuel.....
> 
> My extremely limited knowledge on this subject is that lower octane rated fuel is the same as standard versus super grade petrol, well, kind of. 87 grade standard burns quicker its ignition is more of a bang rather than a burn. Super grade petrol (which is 95 octane rating from memory), has lead added to it that acts as an ignition retardant. It has a longer, slower burn cycle, so that more of the power stroke of the piston is actually under power, and hence accelaration. This in turn generates more power at the drive point, which in a car is the flywheel in a plane is the prop hub.
> 
> ...



Good points! Even before that you should make sure that fuels and any other liquids pose no health threats and then start examining the liquids within the aircraft. To be even more detailed, you could look at residual grease on control cables and within wheel bearings. It's amazing what you can learn about your opponent's manufacturing and operational capability just by examining the smallest things.


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## fastmongrel (Dec 14, 2011)

Could it be that the half hour to combat height was the time needed for the RAF 12 Group Big Wings to form up and get to the fighting height. If a single Spit took half an hour to get to combat height then the LW would have dropped its bombs and be over the channel before they were intercepted.


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## Siegfried (Dec 14, 2011)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Good points! Even before that you should make sure that fuels and any other liquids pose no health threats and then start examining the liquids within the aircraft. To be even more detailed, you could look at residual grease on control cables and within wheel bearings. It's amazing what you can learn about your opponent's manufacturing and operational capability just by examining the smallest things.



You can find quite a lot of Allied fuel intelligence analysis files at http:/www.fischer-tropsch.org Basically the Germans had two major fuels: B4 which was a nominal rating of 87 octane and was dyed blue and C3 which had several ratings depending on period. It was initially rated around 94/115 and latter became 95/125 and latter 96/130. It was dyed 'green'. These were synthetics but there was also C2 which was a mineral oil version of C3.

In 1943 allied fuel intelligence (usually from examining drop tanks, crashed aircraft or captured drums) picked up the big increase in C3 rating and speculated that this was preperation for a powerfull new engine.

This gives a flavour of one of
http://fischer-tropsch.org/Tom Reels/Linked/A5464/A5464-0638-0654 Item 6A.pdf the reports

B4 fuel was produced by pressurising a coal/tolulene slurry at 700 atmospheres with hydrogen. The special alloys and turbo-compressors were quite an achievment. An gasoline was distilled of (as well as tolulene for backfeeding) and this gasoline, of about 72-77 octane was enhanced with TEL to about 87 octane. C3 was produced by adding about 20% pure iso-octane.

Iso-octane was produced by passing syn-gas over a chromium catalyst that produced iso-butanol, this was dehydrated over aluminium choride to iso-butylene which was polymerised to iso-octane.

A serious supply bottleneck for the Germans was that they iso-butylene was also needed for production or buna-n and buna-s synthetic rubber.

Allied 100 octane fuel relied on two processes:

1 the Houdry catalytic cracking process developed in the United States, which produced 100 octane.
2 the alkylation, which was used to produced Britains 100/130 (initially it was made from exotic imported fuels).

US 100 octane was not focused on the rich mixture rating as US aircraft were interested in range.

Cracking, at least thermal cracking was not applicable to the german hydrogenation product while the alkylation plants the Germans started building in about 1940 could not be completed during the war, a few started opperating in 1943 but they soon came under bombing attack in early 1944. This forced a big disruption in German engine plans, as the engines all had to be configured to be able to run on 87 octane.

The rating of C3 fuel as 96/130 means two things:

The 96 rating means that when a fuel is tested and compared with a muxture of pure octane heptane consisting of 96% octane and 4% heptane is tested in a standard variable
compression engine it start pre-igniting knocking at the same ratio.

There can not be a test fuel of greater than 100% octane so fuels with greater knock resistance can be given a PN or performance number. Normally a fuel is burned stoichiometrically at 14.2 part of air to 1 part of fuel by mass for complere combustion. By running the mixture rich (about 13:1) the 'octane' or rather Performance Number can icrease knock resitance.

The 2nd number in 96/130 indicates that 130% of the power of a pure octane fuel can be generated. Unsuprisingly this is associated with a 30% increase in supercharger boost pressure to increase the amount of air.

A standard atmosphere is 14 psi. A Merlin with a boost of 14psi has an absolute pressure of 28psi. A German would refer to this as 2 ata (atmospheres) while and amercian would refer to it as 60 inches (of mercury) with 30 inches equaling 1 ata.


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## bobbysocks (Dec 14, 2011)

parsifal said:


> You would think the first thing to do with a captured ac would be to analyse the fuel.....
> 
> My extremely limited knowledge on this subject is



everything you want to know about AVGas and were afraid to ask....its not only the octane rating but the way its manufactured and the additives...

http://www.eaa.org/autofuel/autogas/articles/1Autogas vs Avgas.pdf

http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/0/5abbef4b4ef9830c862569ba006f6e01/$FILE/AC91-33A.pdf


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## mhuxt (Dec 14, 2011)

The Germans also did a number of analyses of the octane rating of captured allied fuels, using their own "Oppauer Verfahren" or Oppau Process.

I haven't translated a full description of the process itself, but it basically used a small motor with three small fuel containers. Warmed up the motor on the motor's standard fuel, then tested response against a known standard fuel to set a benchmark, then switched over to the fuel to be tested, which was then compared to the standard.

The result was a continuous octane-rating curve against the full range of air-fuel mixtures. 

They also tested 150-octane fuel against C3 knock limits to determine the relative performance of both fuels under supercharging. They didn't have large enough samples to undertake this test against other captured fuels.

Interestingly, they identified 150-octane as an American fuel, as they recovered it from P51-Ds. This gives the lie to some internet grognards who insist 2 TAF was the only unit to use 150.







Note the B4 is there for comparison and originally appears on a separate document which compares it to standard C3.






Here's the knock limits curve.






The Germans believed the 150 fuel would run at 2.7 ata, which corresponds quite accurately to + 25lbs boost.

Interestingly, one of their concerns was the high octane content at lean mixtures, which they believed would aid the US escorts in long-range missions. Will dig out the orginal quote later - being yelled at to shut the computer off now.

Edit - For the sake of keeping the thread on-topic, there's the myth that C3 was as good as 150-octane. It clearly wasn't, according to the Germans' own tests. There's also the myth, in some quarters as noted, that only 2 TAF used 150. That's also incorrect, again according to the Germans' own reports.

Reactions: Like Like:
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## tomo pauk (Dec 14, 2011)

Amazing stuff, to say at least


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## parsifal (Dec 14, 2011)

glider knows heaps on this issue, particularly the RAF usage of the higher grade fuels


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## Njaco (Dec 14, 2011)

parsifal said:


> glider knows heaps on this issue, particularly the RAF usage of the higher grade fuels



and there are NUMEROUS other threads devoted to it.


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## mhuxt (Dec 14, 2011)

Made a brief edit to the above in an effort to stay on-topic for the thread.


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## Siegfried (Dec 15, 2011)

mhuxt said:


> The Germans also did a number of analyses of the octane rating of captured allied fuels, using their own "Oppauer Verfahren" or Oppau Process.
> 
> I haven't translated a full description of the process itself, but it basically used a small motor with three small fuel containers. Warmed up the motor on the motor's standard fuel, then tested response against a known standard fuel to set a benchmark, then switched over to the fuel to be tested, which was then compared to the standard.
> 
> ...



Can you explain what the units are in the first 3 curves? I understand the last one: it is the knock limit pressure given in units of mm of mercury.
what are the 00Z units?

As far as C3 being as good as 100/150 it clearly wasn't, however it seems that "C3" was not a constant formulation whic would leave scope for it to be improved. We know the Germans were experimenting with high octane additives such as triptane and aniline.

While 100/150 was a British formulation (and I believe it was really 110/150 which is why the Germans though it would extend escort range) there was an American formulation known as 115/145 (again note the US emphasis on the lean side). So called standard 100/130 was closer to 102/130 from recollection.


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## mhuxt (Dec 15, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> Can you explain what the units are in the first 3 curves? I understand the last one: it is the knock limit pressure given in units of mm of mercury.
> what are the 00Z units?
> 
> As far as C3 being as good as 100/150 it clearly wasn't, however it seems that "C3" was not a constant formulation whic would leave scope for it to be improved. We know the Germans were experimenting with high octane additives such as triptane and aniline.
> ...


 

OOZ is the "Oppauer Oktan Zahl", or Oppau octane number, which I believe, based on the testing method, iis closer to MON than to RON.

As for the changes to C3, all I can tell you is the curve in the graphs represents the C3 the Germans themselves chose for comparison on the date given.

I have not completed my translation of the report, nor of the description of the Oppauer Verfahren, both of which are in the Fischer-Tropf archive.


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## Juha (Dec 15, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> I am trying to desist from making to many OT posts. I don't start them, I just respond. The point I am making is that the 17 pounder and APDS are both myths in terms of performance. They could be resisted with ordinary armour. Even if the APDS round was well made it still had significantly higher dispersion and was prone to shattering or deflecting from sloped armour and often failed...The 75mm gun of the Panther 7.5 cm KwK 42 was of the same performance and class but few were mounted on trailers. The 17 pounder and APDS were powerfull, but they were also exaggerated.



Yes, this is OT so only a short comment. I have not seen overstatements on 17pdr performance, it could knock out Tiger with its normal APCBC from any angle up to 1800m, if it hit. It's true that usually many forgot to say that 17pdr wasn't as accurate as US 75mm and 76mm gun, but because it could penetrate Tiger's armour anywere, it was usually enough to hit somewhere into the hull or turret of Tiger, or PzIV or StuG. So it was adequate against Tiger up to say 1000m which was usually enough in ETO. I agree that British WWII APDS ammo is usually overrated, it was clearly more inaccurate that APCBC, but was still useful if one had to engage Panther head on, IMHO one had a somewhat better chances to hit and penetrate Panther's frontal armour with APDS than with APCBC. But that was only reasonable situation when there was benefits from use of APDS in 17pdr. IIRC Germans manufactured only 150 7,5cm Pak L/70 guns.

Juha


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## Siegfried (Dec 15, 2011)

Juha said:


> Hello Parsifal
> I meant Don's analyze on the guns and ammo used. I have read a couple books on naval operations on Baltic Sea years ago, and recall the ability of PE and Scheer to operate even under fairly constant VVS air attacks in same small area for several days duration while shooting coastal targets. I cannot remember exact days but at least early 45 maybe also in very late 44. In the end PE had to withdrawn because of the wear of its 8" barrels and lack of bunker oil, Scheer was in better position because its Diesel engines, the Diesel oil situation wasn't so critical in spring 45. In the end VVS begame so frustrated on situation that they demanded USAAF strikes against Swinemünde which was used as a base by those fire support ships, maybe even BC's hunt of Lützow was at least partly motivated by Soviet demands even if I don't have any recollection on that.
> 
> JUha
> ...



The seetakt series of radars was poorly understood. It is erroneously stated that the Germans (or japanese) didn't have blind fire capabillity and In fact they did likely beating the allies in this area by a few months. Around 1943 the Prince Eugen received its upgraded FuMO 26 radar which measured bearing to an object to within 0.1 degree, measured the height (elevation angle) and also accuratly measured range of both a surface or airborn target. The system was integrated with the FLAK directors.

Also there would have been wide spread use of gyro lead computing sights for 2.0 and 3.7cm FLAK. AFAIKT the main method of securing a hit for all combatents was the use of tracer by this time.


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## marshall (Dec 15, 2011)

Very nice thread guys.

I think I read almost all post in it.

During reading I saw this:



Readie said:


> Seafire LIII - 887 Sqn FAA HMS INDEFATIGABLE 1945
> 
> 
> SLt G J "Spud" Murphy destroyed 2 A6M5s Zeroes during a raid over Odaki Bay, Japan on 15 Aug 1945 in this aircraft. On returning to INDEFATIGABLE, the pilots learned that a cease fire was to take effect from 0700 the following morning and that 6 long years of war was finally over.
> ...



and I would say that the first confirmed victory of the war would go to the Polish Air Force, at least in Europe. 1 September 1939 around 7 o'clock in the morning, Wladyslaw Gnys, flying P.11c, shots down two Do 17E from KG 77.


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## parsifal (Dec 15, 2011)

I think John was referring to the first and last British aerial combats


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## Readie (Dec 15, 2011)

marshall said:


> Very nice thread guys.
> 
> I think I read almost all post in it.
> 
> ...




I meant the British Airforce. I did mention that in the post but, I should have made it clearer.

John


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## pbfoot (Dec 15, 2011)

Readie said:


> I meant the British Airforce. I did mention that in the post but, I should have made it clearer.
> 
> John


I believe he ended up in the RAF and after the war moved to Beamsville Ont about 15 miles away so he has RAF ties


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## marshall (Dec 15, 2011)

Readie said:


> I meant the British Airforce. I did mention that in the post but, I should have made it clearer.
> 
> John



Sorry, apparently I misunderstood, still need to work on my English.


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## buffnut453 (Dec 15, 2011)

"So he has RAF ties"

All the best people do!


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## buffnut453 (Dec 15, 2011)

"Still need to work on my English."

Me too!


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## Juha (Dec 15, 2011)

marshall said:


> Very nice thread guys.
> 
> I think I read almost all post in it.
> 
> ...



In fact IIRC Gnys kills were first non-German ones, the first kill went to a Ju 87 pilot, his name might have been Neumayer, who had just before shot down Gnys' leader.

Juha


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## marshall (Dec 15, 2011)

Juha said:


> In fact IIRC Gnys kills were first non-German ones, the first kill went to a Ju 87 pilot, his name might have been Neumayer, who had just before shot down Gnys' leader.
> 
> Juha



You are right Juha, though his name was Frank Neubert.


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## Readie (Dec 16, 2011)

marshall said:


> Sorry, apparently I misunderstood, still need to work on my English.



Don't be sorry. Its my fault for not being clear.
Like your picture. Spitfires are so beautifull.
John


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## Juha (Dec 17, 2011)

marshall said:


> You are right Juha, though his name was Frank Neubert.



Hello Marshall
thanks for the correction, it has been years ago when I read on the combat and a short bio on Neubert. Oh, at least I remembered that there is something new (neu) in his name.

Thanks
Juha


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## marshall (Dec 17, 2011)

Readie said:


> Like your picture. Spitfires are so beautifull.
> John



I agree, and the one on the avatar is the Spitfire from Battle of Britain Memorial Flight which actually took part in BoB. And I have to say that I quite often change avatars as I can't decide what plane I like more. 





Juha said:


> Hello Marshall
> thanks for the correction, it has been years ago when I read on the combat and a short bio on Neubert. Oh, at least I remembered that there is something new (neu) in his name.
> 
> Thanks
> Juha



Before I posted I've checked his name, so don't think I have such a good memory.

Another interesting thing about Frank Neubert and Wladyslaw Gnys is that they met after the war and become friends. Neubert wrote a letter to Gnys but hesitated to send it for a long time, eventually he did send the letter and Gnys send him invitation to his home in Canada (Beamsville) and they have met on 31 August 1989, almost exactly 50 years after they were fighting above Poland.


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## Siegfried (Dec 17, 2011)

marshall said:


> You are right Juha, though his name was Frank Neubert.



He shot down a PZL with a Stuka?


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## Juha (Dec 17, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> He shot down a PZL with a Stuka?



Yes, he shot down Cpt. Medwecki's P-11c.

Juha


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## marshall (Dec 17, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> He shot down a PZL with a Stuka?



Yes. Neubert's flight was attacking Cracow and two PZL P.11c fighters piloted by Mieczyslaw Medwecki and Wladyslaw Gnys were scrambled to intercept the bombers. Medwecki was shot down few moments after take off. Medwecki was shot in the liver and tried to do a forced landing but crashed. Gnys managed to escape and do a patrol flight. On that flight Gnys encountered two Do 17s and shot them down.


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## renrich (Dec 17, 2011)

Some historians declare, and I tend to agree, that WW2 began in China in 1938. Given that the first air to air kills were probably by a Japanese AC.


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## Vincenzo (Dec 17, 2011)

why in 38? was not 37 when started the war in china?


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## pbfoot (Dec 17, 2011)

Italy invaded Ethiopia in 35


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## Gixxerman (Dec 17, 2011)

Readie said:


> *"The Battle of Britain was virtually unwinable for the Luftwaffe.*"
> 
> Recently is has become fashionable for revisionist historians to say that the RAF couldn't have lost the Battle of Britain, or that the Luftwaffe had almost no chance of winning.
> They argue that, overall, the Luftwaffe had fewer fighters than the RAF in the Battle, and therefore the RAF wasn't really outnumbered. Since Operation 'Sealion' (the German invasion of Britain) depended on the defeat of the RAF to succeed, they argue that the invasion threat was never serious. In fact, as RAF pilots were only too aware, the Luftwaffe could easily achieve local air superiority over their targets in southern England, and the RAF shortage was in pilots not aircraft. Had the Luftwaffe used better offensive tactics - as demanded by the aircrews themselves - such as allowing the escort fighters to roam more freely from the bombers, then German losses could have been lower and attacks more effective. Knocking out British RDF (radar) stations and systematically destroying RAF fighter bases would have severely limited RAF Fighter Command's ability to effectively defend Southern and Eastern England. If the sudden change in Luftwaffe tactics to area bombing of cities hadn't been made, (in reprisal for small scale RAF raids on Berlin), the RAF would have been forced to progressively retreat north and west, with an increasingly serious pilot shortage.
> ...



I've not seen too many revisionists at work here John, so I'm not sure I go along with this.

Wiki mentions the historian James Corum and he does make a very fair point about the 'weather window'.

The Stephen Bungay book (The Most Dangerous Enemy.........I'd recommend as an excellent read if you've not had the pleasure) does argue that alternate Luftwaffe tactics might have won the BoB for them, he especially mentions using the Me110 as a fast fighter-bomber intruder to make pin-point attacks on various high value targets (and as you mention radar especially).
He also talks about whether a more limited and local air superiority around the SE coastal area was possible and if that would have been sufficient to enable invasion (although that also brings in the variable not seen at that time, the Royal Navy and the Luftwaffe having to take that on).

But Bungay does show with each sides production and training schedules that the RAF did not come close to defeat - even during the airfield attack phase of the battle, and that with their loss rates they were on a hiding to nothing *doing what they were doing*.
German production at this stage is surprisingly low.

It's worth mentioning that it was largely only 11 group suffering the majority of losses, even with rotation this was far from the bulk of the RAF.
It also has to be remembered that German intelligence during the battle was utterly hopeless (perhaps surprisingly so given that at that stage they had been doing so well) and the British intelligence services were starting to make serious inroads with Ultra.

I would agree that to say there is no way the Luftwaffe could ever have won the BoB is a silly claim to make........but given how things were on each side (and standing head and shoulders above everything about the BoB - besides the RAF having adequte numbers of trained fighter pilots and machines largely the equal or, arguably, at that stage a little better than anything the Luftwaffe had - was the worlds first modern radar equipped fully integrated air defense system _and above all it was properly understood operated as such_) I think it is fairly difficult to see how the Luftwaffe could have truly won without one 'projecting' modern radically different tactics to it. 

I say this not meaning to minimise or down-play the damage and danger or the terrible mauling Britain took during those dark days. ....or do similar to the young men on the German side and their courage and skills.

In fact I'd say that this (in reverse) is a well known myth (_the RAF came within a hair's breadth/a few days/week or couple of weeks of losing the BoB_) 



parsifal said:


> One of my favourites....no tigers were knocked by the Allied AT fire in the whole of Normandy. They all ran out of petrol or were otherwise just abandoned.



This reminded me of something I'd read.
I've mentioned the book before but in 'The Final Hours: The Luftwaffe Plot Against Goring' by Johannes Steinhoff, in the preface he makes an interesting and rather scathing remark concerning one of his fellow inpatients inthe hopspital he was at, a member of a Tiger crew who had also had his face largely burned off.
"Not all Tigers destroyed thousands of Russian tanks".

So many myths.....


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## Siegfried (Dec 17, 2011)

Gixxerman said:


> The Stephen Bungay book (The Most Dangerous Enemy.........I'd recommend as an excellent read if you've not had the pleasure) does argue that alternate Luftwaffe tactics might have won the BoB for them, he especially mentions using the Me110 as a fast fighter-bomber intruder to make pin-point attacks on various high value targets (and as you mention radar especially).
> So many myths.....



That was the orginal role and specification of the "Zerstoerer" concept. The othe roles were bad weather fighter and bomber destroyer (over own territory). Fighter escort was not one of its orginal specs and had a spec been issued for a long range or twin engine fighter I'm sure the engineers would have come up with something completely different.

As far as the german tanks 'knocked out' at normany goes, it is true they mostly ran out of fuel or broke down.

Jarymowycz's work also includes a table of causes for German tank losses (time period not specified but probably relates to NW Europe 1944-45):

Gunfire.........................43.8%
Abandonment.....................18.3%
Mechanical.......................4.0%
Self destruction................20.7%
Air Attack.......................7.5%
Hollow-charge Rounds.............4.4%
Mines/Miscellaneous..............0.9%

If one takes ababonment and self destruction one ends up with 39% losses, mostly due to fuel. The Air attack figures are higher than British estimates which rank at around 4%.


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## Juha (Dec 17, 2011)

Hello Siegfried
firstly 39% isn't over 50%
secondly, many tanks were abandoned, either simply left behind or demolished by the crews before they continued on foot because of Germans were surrounded, for ex in Falaise pocket or the end of KG Peiper. Or because of the retreat routes were blocked, for ex. on the left bank of Seine, Allied AFs had knocked all the bridges down and hindered badly possible ferries.

Juha


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## parsifal (Dec 17, 2011)

A lot would also be abandoned because they had suffered some failure as well, such as a lost track, or a pentration of one of the hydraulic lines or engine bay area or any other myriad of failures that might occur. Some would run out of fuel, for sure, but to lump all losses "abandoned" to this cause (running out of fuel) is overoptimistic

which illustrates the point of the original myth in spades........


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## tomo pauk (Dec 17, 2011)

If someone can asses why could Bf-110s play the major role in the BoB by employing a pin-point attacks, that would be most welcomed.
Another thing about the way LW fighter arm should have been employed: can anybody explain how the Bf-109Es would've conducted a real 'frei-jagd' over UK, to keep RAF on it's heels? Not just above SE England, of course.


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## buffnut453 (Dec 17, 2011)

Gixxerman,

It all depends what you mean by "winning the Battle of Britain". IMHO, the Luftwaffe didn't need to destroy the entire RAF Fighter Command - they just needed to dislodge 11 Gp from the forward airfields in East Anglia. Had they achieved that goal, there would have been no substantive fighter defences in front of London. Under such conditions, it's entirely feasible that Churchill would have faced a vote of no confidence which, had he lost, might have brought a new government that was more disposed towards reaching accommodation with Hitler.

There's much "what iffery" about my comments but they are within the bounds of reason.


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## marshall (Dec 17, 2011)

tomo pauk said:


> If someone can asses why could Bf-110s play the major role in the BoB by employing a pin-point attacks, that would be most welcomed.



From what I remember from Bungay's book RAF had biggest problems when Bf 110s damaged some radar installations and did some surprising attacks on key air bases of 11th Air Group(though Germans didn't know that). He elaborates that using Bf 110s all the time during the battle for this task and not to escort the bombers would be most useful for Germans.

But that's just from the back of my head.


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## Siegfried (Dec 18, 2011)

Juha said:


> Hello Siegfried
> firstly 39% isn't over 50%
> secondly, many tanks were abandoned, either simply left behind or demolished by the crews before they continued on foot because of Germans were surrounded, for ex in Falaise pocket or the end of KG Peiper. Or because of the retreat routes were blocked, for ex. on the left bank of Seine, Allied AFs had knocked all the bridges down and hindered badly possible ferries.
> 
> Juha



Throw in mechanical failure and 44% of tanks were not lost due to enemy action but fuel/logistics issues which is a greater proportion than lost to gun fire. Peiper and his troops ran out of fuel and supplies and abandoned for that reason nothing to do with routes being blocked. Rockets/Typhoons had almost no impact: even at Falaise under heavy bomber bombardment. The tanks were dug out and continued on their missions. Allied air power murdered thousands of horses and made resupply during the day difficult. Greater emphasis on driving range in the tanks might have made a big difference to German tank readiness. Tanks listed as lost to abandonment clearly have NOT been lost to enemy action.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 18, 2011)

If a tank is damaged by the enemy action, unable to move, and it's spare parts can't get to that tank (since enemy prevents logistics efforts), methinks enemy action has a lot to do with the abandonment.


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## Edgar Brooks (Dec 18, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> Throw in mechanical failure and 44% of tanks were not lost due to enemy action but fuel/logistics issues which is a greater proportion than lost to gun fire. .


I'm glad that I had a less imaginitive maths master than yours obviously was; 39 + 4 = 43, not 44%


> Peiper and his troops ran out of fuel and supplies and abandoned for that reason nothing to do with routes being blocked.


Which was due to Allied aircraft stopping the supplies getting through.


> Allied air power murdered thousands of horses and made resupply during the day difficult.


Typical emotive tosh; you cannot murder an animal.


> Tanks listed as lost to abandonment clearly have NOT been lost to enemy action


Then how do you explain reports, from pilots of rocket-firing Typhoons, that crews baled out, when they saw them lining up for an attack, and headed for cover? You can massage figures as much as you like, but those have clearly been abandoned due to enemy action.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 18, 2011)

Edgar Brooks said:


> Typical emotive tosh; you cannot murder an animal.



My wife would beg to differ...


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## Juha (Dec 18, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> Throw in mechanical failure and 44% of tanks were not lost due to enemy action but fuel/logistics issues which is a greater proportion than lost to gun fire. Peiper and his troops ran out of fuel and supplies and abandoned for that reason nothing to do with routes being blocked...Tanks listed as lost to abandonment clearly have NOT been lost to enemy action.



First of all, US troops had first stopped the point of KG Peiper and then captured Stavelot behind it, so no supplies got through. Then US troops defeated all German attempts to recapture Stavelot to reopen the supply route of the KG so Peiper decided to give up Stoumont and concentrated his KG at La Glaize. He waited there for help but the other KGs of 1.SSPzD could not get through the US forces, so KG Peiper had no other option that abandon its vehicles and trek through hills to the German lines. Notice that they didn't march along the road they had came, because it was blocked by US troops but sneaked through hills at night. So IMHO KG Peiper's AFVs were lost because of the actions by US forces.


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## fastmongrel (Dec 18, 2011)

If you have run out of fuel because a Typhoon or P47 blew up the fuel tanker then that tank has been destroyed just as effectively as if it had been directly hit by said aircraft. A modern army can function for a few days without food and water whilst losing propotionate effectiveness the longer it is without supplies. Without fuel or ammunition it is simply a group of men in uniforms it ceases to be an army. 

A tank any tank from the 1st world war on is a supply and maintenance black hole that needs constant refilling it also needs regular down time for servicing or its efficency plummets. You cant check and alter track tension whilst in combat or at constant risk of a ground attack aircraft finding you. This is why you see so many pictures of tanks abandoned with a track off, often its not due to direct enemy action its simply because a harried exhausted crew had no time to get the big tools out and adjust the track.

In modern terminology it is known as "Mission killed" in soldier speak it is known as "we are fuc***".


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## fastmongrel (Dec 18, 2011)

Juha said:


> First of all, US troops had first stopped the point of KG Peiper and then captured Stavelot behind it, so no supplies got through. Then US troops defeated all German attempts to recapture Stavelot to reopen the supply route of the KG so Peiper decided to give up Stoumont and concentrated his KG at La Glaize. He waited there for help but the other KGs of 1.SSPzD could not get through the US forces, so KG Peiper had no other option that abandon its vehicles and trek through hills to the German lines. Notice that they didn't march along the road they had came, because it was blocked by US troops but sneaked through hills at night. So IMHO KG Peiper's AFVs were lost because of the actions by US forces.



Hit the nail square on the head there Juha


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## fastmongrel (Dec 18, 2011)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> My wife would beg to differ...



My missus would also beg to differ anyone who kills one of our menagerie will have a mad Latvian coming after them with a carving knife


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## Siegfried (Dec 18, 2011)

tomo pauk said:


> If a tank is damaged by the enemy action, unable to move, and it's spare parts can't get to that tank (since enemy prevents logistics efforts), methinks enemy action has a lot to do with the abandonment.



If a tank was immobilised by AT fire, or HEAT rocket then it would be listed as lost to enemy action even if the crew survived and it didn't brew up. It would not be listed as abandoned or self destructed.

There are seperate listings for mines, AT hits, RPG, mechanical failure. Parsifal seeded the meme that abandoned or self destroyed meant immobilised by enemy action. Those tanks were recorded under gunfire, mines, Hollow charge rounds or mechanical failure. The categories are clear.


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## Siegfried (Dec 18, 2011)

Juha said:


> First of all, US troops had first stopped the point of KG Peiper and then captured Stavelot behind it, so no supplies got through. Then US troops defeated all German attempts to recapture Stavelot to reopen the supply route of the KG so Peiper decided to give up Stoumont and concentrated his KG at La Glaize. He waited there for help but the other KGs of 1.SSPzD could not get through the US forces, so KG Peiper had no other option that abandon its vehicles and trek through hills to the German lines. Notice that they didn't march along the road they had came, because it was blocked by US troops but sneaked through hills at night. So IMHO KG Peiper's AFVs were lost because of the actions by US forces.



This rather beats about the Bush. Peipers tanks were not defeated in battle, or destroyed by enemy action: they were abandoned for supply starvation, the supply issue being fuel.

The fact that they were cutoff from supplies is a result of US air superiority intefering with what was a critical supply situation anyway as much as US Army action. Had the Luftwaffe been able to maintain local air superiority a certain amount of fuel and ammunition would have been air dropped in parachute containers.


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## Njaco (Dec 18, 2011)

Gixxerman said:


> I've not seen too many revisionists at work here John, so I'm not sure I go along with this.
> 
> Wiki mentions the historian James Corum and he does make a very fair point about the 'weather window'.
> 
> ...



While I may agree with the notion that the RAF - as a WHOLE -weren't going to lose the BoB, 11 Group sure came close to extinction (especially that first week of September) which would have hampered RAFs ability to continue BoB. Production and aircraft numbers were rolling along for England but those planes were being distributed throughout the kingdom - they would definately NOT be concentrated along the east coast of Britain.

And not all those Spits and Hurris were being funneled into 11 Group. And even if they were, you still needed pilots which was a premium.


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## buffnut453 (Dec 18, 2011)

On the subject of killing tanks, I've posted something like this before so I'll do it again ('cos I like repetition).

When I was a lad in uniform, there were different types of "kill" associated with heavy armour. The two I distinctly remember were the M-Kill for mobility kill and K-Kill for total destruction. I believe there was also a term associated with destroying the main armament (could have been A for armament or perhaps W for weapon - can't remember clearly 'cos they were pretty rare).

As others have noted, tanks are a huge logistics drain. They can be great in battle but getting them there and keeping them supplied is bluddy hard. Turning a tank into a smoking hole in the ground isn't the only way to eliminate an armoured capability. Looking at a tank formation as a target system (which includes logistics), one can try to take out each individual tank but they are hard targets because they're hard to find and very difficult to kill completely. The logistics chain is a much, much softer target - the fuel for several tanks can be eliminated by a single shot which blows up a tanker - and it's easier to find because fuel tankers drive on roads.


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## Milosh (Dec 18, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> The fact that they were cutoff from supplies is a result of US air superiority intefering with what was a critical supply situation anyway as much as US Army action. Had the Luftwaffe been able to maintain local air superiority a certain amount of fuel and ammunition would have been air dropped in parachute containers.



Just like at Stalingrad.


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## Edgar Brooks (Dec 18, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> The fact that they were cutoff from supplies is a result of US air superiority intefering with what was a critical supply situation anyway as much as US Army action..


 Allied, please; however much contempt you might have for the RAF and British Army, there were many other countries involved, all with a deep loathing for the Nazi regime.


> Had the Luftwaffe been able to maintain local air superiority a certain amount of fuel and ammunition would have been air dropped in parachute containers


But they weren't, so it wasn't, so it's rather academic, isn't it?


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## parsifal (Dec 18, 2011)

As always, the voice of reason and balance NJ. Where did you find the hraphical representation?


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## Edgar Brooks (Dec 18, 2011)

Njaco said:


> While I may agree with the notion that the RAF - as a WHOLE -weren't going to lose the BoB, 11 Group sure came close to extinction (especially that first week of September) which would have hampered RAFs ability to continue BoB. Production and aircraft numbers were rolling along for England but those planes were being distributed throughout the kingdom - they would definately NOT be concentrated along the east coast of Britain.


No, it didn't, because 11 Group was not a rigid organisation, and Squadrons, once exhausted, were moved out, and replaced by other Squadrons who'd had a chance to rest, reform, and replenish their numbers. From 8-8 to 7-9, there were 34 Squadron movements between various Groups. As an example, 8-8, 41 moved from Hornchurch to Yorkshire, then returned to Hornchurch on September 3rd, 54 going in the opposite direction each time.
Only one airfield was put out of action for (and only just) more than a day; the reason for pulling back from the likes of Lympne was their proximity to the Channel, which meant they had to fly away from the fight in order to gain enough height. One of (if not the main) reasons for 11 Group's struggle was 12 Group's failure to cover for 11 Group while they were intercepting the Germans at the coast.


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## Njaco (Dec 18, 2011)

Well, Park did complain that those squardons transferring in at times were not as effective as others (I just read this either here or a BoB book I'm currently reading).

As for the airfields, that 3 Sept date was part of "The Bad Weekend" where numerous A/F were being clobbered.

By the morning of 7 Sept.:


> Six out of seven sector airfields were heavily damaged. Another five advanced airfields were also destroyed. Telephone and communication lines were disrupted or totally destroyed and the general destruction was confusing the handling of squadrons in the air. The fighter losses from the day before again exceeded aircraft production. And Fighter Command could call upon only about 700 pilots.



http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww2-general/day-battle-britain-25360-14.html

As concerning the "Big Wing", there were 2 problems:

1.) At times it took far too long for the squadrons to form up in time to engage the LW,
2.) On Park's directive they were to protect 11 Group airfields but several times they went looking for the enemy and left the airfields to fend for themselves.

My point is still that RAF 11 Group was close to being destroyed by 7 September - in men and material and location. We may disagree but that is what my opionion is.


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## parsifal (Dec 18, 2011)

Thought this site might be useful in determining Tiger losses 

Tiger Tank Battalions during WWII - Page 2

According to this site, the following losses in Normandy are noted

For the 503rd Heavy Tank Bn, The 3rd company was caught in a bombing attack in July 1944, and all of its Tigers were destroyed or damaged.
The details are as follows

22 April 1944 22 Tigers are lost in action or destroyed by crew (in the Hube Pocket, most Tigers being destroyed by crew) (easyern Front) 
May 1944 Tigers turned over to s.Pz.Abt. 509 and transferred to Ohrdruf (WK IX) to be rebuilt 
11-17 June 1944 Rebuilt with 33 Tiger I's, 12 Tiger IIs 
26 June-7 July 1944 Transferred to France 
18 July 1944 3./ is bombed during Operation Goodwood, but only two Tigers are lost, one burnt out and the other was flipped over by a near miss. 13 Tigers lost during the day to all causes 
20-29 July 1944 3./ ordered to Mailly-le-Camp for re-equipment with Tiger IIs 
12 August 1944 3./ entrains for Paris 
mid-August 1944 Most of 3./ destroyed by Allied fighter-bombers, all of the rest of the Abt. is destroyed during the retreat from Normandy, only 2 Tiger IIs of 3./ on strength 

Schwere Panzer Abteilung (Funklenk) 301 - sPzAbt (FKL) 301

....The 301st was first reported on the Western Front by the LXXXI Armee Korps on November 1944 as having 31 Tigers (27 operational) and 66 BIV (61 operational). Four Tigers were lost before the 301st was engaged in the Ardennes Offensive 

Schwere SS-Panzer Abteilung 101

....The leading elements of the 101st reached the front in Normandy on 12 June 1944, six days after the Allied landings. By the end of June, the 101st had lost 15 of its 45 Tigers, and was pulled out in July to refit with the Tiger II. The 101st still had 25 Tigers of which 21 were operational on 7 August 1944, but these were all lost during the retreat in August, the remnants of the 101st being ordered back to the training grounds to rest and refit, in Senneläger, with the Tiger II on September 1944.

From this website, the following losses in action were reported ...Tiger I Information Center - Unit Histories

13 June 1944 3 Tigers are lost in action ("112","121" and "222"?) 
15 June 1944 5 Tigers are lost in action (4 by aircraft/bombing raid) 
16 June 1944 1 Tiger is lost in action ("111") 
24 June 1944 2 Tigers are lost, 2 written off 
27 June 1944 1 Tiger is lost in action 
28 June 1944 3 Tigers are lost in action 
3 July 1944 1./ turns over its last 3 Tigers to 3./ and transfers to Paderborn to re-equip with Tiger IIs 
7 July 1944 2 Tigers are lost, written off 
19 July 1944 1 Tiger is lost in action 
20 July 1944 1 Tiger is lost in action 
-18 August 1944 1./ entrains for Normandy, detrains 30 km north-east of Paris with 14 Tiger IIs 
8 August 1944 7 Tigers are lost in action ("007" and "214 " are among them, Wittmann killed) 
14 August 1944 1 Tiger is lost in action 
16 August 1944 1 Tiger is lost, destroyed by crew 
18 August 1944 1 Tiger is lost, destroyed by crew 
19 August 1944 1 Tiger is lost in action 
24 August 1944 1 Tiger is lost in action 
25 August 1944 Absorbs 2 Tiger IIs of s.SS-Pz.Abt. 103, 2 Tigers are lost, destroyed by crew 
27 August 1944 2 Tigers are lost, 1 lost in action ("221"), 1 destroyed by crew 
29 August 1944 1 Tiger is lost in action 
30 August 1944 5 Tigers are lost, 1 lost in action, 4 destroyed by crew, 2./ and 3./ have no tanks left 

Schwere SS-Panzer Abteilung 102

.....Ordered to the front in Normandy, the first seven trains unloaded west of Paris on 27 June 1944, however, the threat of attacks from the fighter-bombers was sufficient to delay their arrival at the front until 7 July. On 20 July, the 120nd still had 42 Tigers of which 17 were operational.

7 July 1944 28 operational tanks, but 3. Kompanie still hadn't reached the front 
9 July-1 August 1944 Subordinated to 10. SS-Panzergrenadier Division Hohenstauffen 
10 July 1944 5 Tigers are lost in action (2 by aircraft) 
11 July 1944 1 Tiger is lost in action 
26 July 1944 1 Tiger is lost in action 
2 August 1944 Transferred to sector of 9. SS-Panzergrenadier Division Frundsberg with 38 Tiger I's, 1 Tiger is lost in action 
3 August 1944 3 Tigers are lost in action 
4 August 1944 1 Tiger is lost, destroyed by crew 
5 August 1944 1 Tiger is lost in action 
13 August 1944 1 Tiger is lost in action 
14 August 1944 2 Tigers are lost in action 
16 August 1944 2 Tigers are lost, destroyed by crew 
17 August 1944 1 Tiger is lost in action 
18 August 1944 1 Tiger is lost, destroyed by crew 
19 August 1944 6 Tigers are lost in action 
20 August 1944 1 Tiger is lost, destroyed by crew 
21 August 1944 4 Tigers are lost, destroyed by crew 
22 August 1944 4 Tigers are lost, destroyed by crew 
25 August 1944 3 Tigers are lost, destroyed by crew (one sank in river crossing) 
28 August 1944 1 Tiger is lost, destroyed by crew (sank in river) 
30 August 1944 4 Tigers are lost, destroyed by crew 
1 September 1944 All tanks lost during the retreat from Normandy 


(note these losses are not complete for the formations, even in the time period of June-August 1944)... 
XXXXXXX

I am not claiming these numbers to be 100% correct. however this material comes from an enthusiast site with a distinct "pro-Tiger Bias" But even these guys are not attempting to say that no Tigers were lost in Combat....

The Saumur Tank Museum Intranet site has published research data on German tank losses in Normandy, based on Allied analysis of tanks they found in field and data from Operation Goodwood.

For first month of Overlord,

48% by AP
7% by HEAT
9% by HE
1% by mines
10% by aircraft

The most amazing statistic is the percentage of panzers that were knocked out, by tank type. This statistic was computed by comparing tank losses to available tanks.

The PzKpfw IV, Panther, Tiger and StuG III all lost the same percentage of available vehicles during the first month. While CM threads often talk about the vulnerability of PzKpfw IV, due to light frontal armor, tank survival chances in a PzKpfw IV were equal to a Panther or Tiger. 

Further research indicated that the Tiger tank was more efficient than Panther in terms of kills per tank compared to losses.

M-Kenny state that :
"This is a complicated area of Research. It is influenced by what months you use for the figures. Usually August is the cut-off point but the bulk of the German losses did not appear on the books until September. By carefully picking your date/percentage/area/definition of loss and excluding the German Stugs it is possible to show not a single German tank was lost due to Allied action!
For instance using German loss figures for the retreat in August (when abandonment was high) and applying the same high rate to June and July (when abandonment was low and AP kills were high)will give a skewed picture of reality.
Overal Normandy losses would be circa 3000:2000 Allied v German. Thus it is important we exclude a good number of the German losses so the myth of the high kill ratios can be continued....."


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## Njaco (Dec 18, 2011)

Sorry for the double post. I found it.

"The Battle of Britain": by Roy Conyers Nesbit pg 151

"A disagreement between two of the RAF's Group Commanders broke out on August 26 when Park wrote to Dowding complaining that the squadrons sent from No. 12 Group under AVM Leigh-Mallory, under the rotation system, were of poorer quality than those sent from No. 13 Group under AVM Saul. He statewd that three squadrons sent from Saul had shot down 43 aircraft at the cost of four of their own, while the two sent from Leigh-Mallory had shot down only 17 enemy aircraft but lost 13 of their own number. On the following day, Park wrote complaining that 12 Group was failing to respond when asked to patrol airfields of 11 Group."


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## kettbo (Dec 18, 2011)

buffnut453 said:


> On the subject of killing tanks, I've posted something like this before so I'll do it again ('cos I like repetition).
> 
> When I was a lad in uniform, there were different types of "kill" associated with heavy armour. The two I distinctly remember were the M-Kill for mobility kill and K-Kill for total destruction. I believe there was also a term associated with destroying the main armament (could have been A for armament or perhaps W for weapon - can't remember clearly 'cos they were pretty rare).
> 
> As others have noted, tanks are a huge logistics drain. They can be great in battle but getting them there and keeping them supplied is bluddy hard. Turning a tank into a smoking hole in the ground isn't the only way to eliminate an armoured capability. Looking at a tank formation as a target system (which includes logistics), one can try to take out each individual tank but they are hard targets because they're hard to find and very difficult to kill completely. The logistics chain is a much, much softer target - the fuel for several tanks can be eliminated by a single shot which blows up a tanker - and it's easier to find because fuel tankers drive on roads.




F-Kill, Firepower
Yes, tanks are hard to kill, trucks full of gasoline and ammo are easy to kill
The war was pretty much decided by the late fall of 44; Western Allies closing in on the German border, Much of Italy captured, USSR steadily pushing west


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## tomo pauk (Dec 18, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> If a tank was immobilised by AT fire, or HEAT rocket then it would be listed as lost to enemy action even if the crew survived and it didn't brew up. It would not be listed as abandoned or self destructed.
> 
> There are seperate listings for mines, AT hits, RPG, mechanical failure. Parsifal seeded the meme that abandoned or self destroyed meant immobilised by enemy action. Those tanks were recorded under gunfire, mines, Hollow charge rounds or mechanical failure. The categories are clear.



A plane fires a woley of rockets, that destroy sprocket wheel, so the tank is immobilised. Since the unit cannot receive any sprocket wheels (due to enemy action that is just destroyed supplies sent), and the enemy ground forces are narrowing down on the tank unit, the tank is blown up in order to prevent capture. 
My question: under what causes is the lost counted - blown up by own crew, or destroyed by enemy action?

Hi, marshall,



> From what I remember from Bungay's book RAF had biggest problems when Bf 110s damaged some radar installations and did some surprising attacks on key air bases of 11th Air Group(though Germans didn't know that). He elaborates that using Bf 110s all the time during the battle for this task and not to escort the bombers would be most useful for Germans.
> 
> But that's just from the back of my head.



That way of using a fast plane to bomb enemy assets, before enemy fighters can react, points that they were used very much in 'Schnellbomber' fashion. 
The Bf-110 was one of the least numerous planes in BoB, so their effect, even when employed in such a fashion, would've been rather limited, and applicable mostly on areas near coast line? Anyway, much better usage than forcing them to do close escort.


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## Njaco (Dec 18, 2011)

parsifal, I really don't remember where I got that...one of the sources at thestart of the BoB thread.


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## Juha (Dec 18, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> This rather beats about the Bush. Peipers tanks were not defeated in battle, or destroyed by enemy action: they were abandoned for supply starvation, the supply issue being fuel.
> 
> The fact that they were cutoff from supplies is a result of US air superiority intefering with what was a critical supply situation anyway as much as US Army action. Had the Luftwaffe been able to maintain local air superiority a certain amount of fuel and ammunition would have been air dropped in parachute containers.



In fact LW tried to drop some fuel (1.5 tons?) and some ammo to Peiper, but dropped almost all into Stoumont, which was already recaptured by US troops, so they helped US forces. In any case you have interesting oppinion. 

Juha


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## parsifal (Dec 18, 2011)

> In fact LW tried to drop some fuel (1.5 tons?) and some ammo to Peiper, but dropped almost all into Stoumont, which was already recaptured by US troops, so they helped US forces. In any case you have interesting oppinion.




Interestiong information Jha. 

I wouldnt call it an interesting opinion as such. You and I have seen this opinion and approach many times before. Which is why its kinda funny really


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## mhuxt (Dec 18, 2011)

Some reference was made earlier in this thread (or another?) to the RAF's reliance on the Spit V into 1944. Sorry, can't remember the exact wording.

I used the OOB in Foreman's Fighter Command War Diaries to whip up a quick map of Spitfire squadrons on 1 January 1944. Numbers don't seem to tell the whole story. FC's reliance on the V was more pronounced in the quiet sectors up north, far less so on the channel coast.

The numbers indicate the number of squadrons in the location (rough location for obvious reasons) - red is Spit V, green is Spit IX, blue is XI, black is VII and XII, the lighter colour I meant to use didn't show up.






As noted, that's the situation at the start of January. By the end of the month, 6 of the Spit V squadrons had converted to the IX, including two of those in the south.


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## Grounded (Dec 18, 2011)

Is it true that only two types of US aircraft got into the air 12-7-41, at Pearl, P36 and P40? I've heard some P36 pilots got off the ground to fight. I've also heard the P40's did not..??


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## tyrodtom (Dec 18, 2011)

Lts. Welch and Taylor took off from Haleiwa auxiallary airfield and engaged the 2nd wave attackers, both in P-40B's.

Only something like 6 or 7 aircraft managed to take off, not sure, but I think all the rest were P-36's.


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## FLYBOYJ (Dec 18, 2011)

Grounded said:


> Is it true that only two types of US aircraft got into the air 12-7-41, at Pearl, P36 and P40? I've heard some P36 pilots got off the ground to fight. I've also heard the P40's did not..??


P-40s and P-36s both participated in intercepting th attacking Japanese. P-36s shot down 2 Zeros for the loss on one and P-40s shot down several zeros, google George Welch


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## Siegfried (Dec 19, 2011)

Juha said:


> In fact LW tried to drop some fuel (1.5 tons?) and some ammo to Peiper, but dropped almost all into Stoumont, which was already recaptured by US troops, so they helped US forces. In any case you have interesting oppinion.
> 
> Juha



I think you have an agenda not an opionion.

Myth 1: Allied aircraft busted large numbers German tanks. This is indeed very much a myth, rockets were to inaccurate, tanks survived nearby bombs.
Myth 2: Most German tanks were abandoned due to fuel starvation. This myth is indeed more or less true. Approximatly half (I call half between 45% to 55%) tanks simply ran out of fuel, amunition etc and were abandoned. Its highly likely given the sever logistcs problems around Normandy.

Both are backed by citations and facts.

You want to make an irrelevant argument that Peipers tanks were "destroyed" by allied action because the supply route was cuttoff. In this instance that 'may' be true but in general the Germans faced logistical issue worsened by allied air power. And no, Peipers tanks were not destroyed in battle so both my above arguments are still correct even in the Peiper case.

You mockingly note that 1.5 tons of Parachute container fuel was inadveratantly dropped on Stoumont in a resupply effort, this is perhaps 3 parachutes from 1 or 2 Ju 52 at most. Do you find the fact that On February 22, 1944, Nijmegen was heavily bombed by American planes, causing great damage to the city centre. The American pilots thought they were bombing the German city of Kleve, they however killed hundreds of Dutch. March 3, 1945. Over 500 inhabitants of the suburb of Bezuidenhout, a suburb of The Hague, Holland, were killed when Allied bombers missed their intended target, the V-2 launching sites in the Hague Forest and dropped their bombs on Bezuidenhout.

The German transport pilots at least have an excuse given the total allied air dominace.


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## Gixxerman (Dec 19, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> Myth 1: Allied aircraft busted large numbers German tanks.



I don't know if this one has been mentioned before but after the war the US Historical Research Division made a very detailed report on the experience of German arms after the war, their big interest being (for obvious reasons) the experience of the German forces against the Russians.

As far as air to ground combat goes they specifically mention the 'Falaise Gap' and 'The Bulge' and confirm in the introduction that there was a very high degree of over-claiming by allied aircrew for knocking German tanks out by rocket bombs (and speculate, because they worked in a vacuum and could not verify the situation in the east, that there is every reason to expect that something similar undoubtedly went on on the German side too).

The report is distilled down into the book 'Spearhead For Blitzkrieg: Luftwaffe Operations In Support Of The Army, 1939 - 1945' it's well worth a read if you haven't already seen it.


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## parsifal (Dec 19, 2011)

> Myth 1: Allied aircraft busted large numbers German tanks. This is indeed very much a myth, rockets were to inaccurate, tanks survived nearby bombs.



Per my post #372, I count approximately 25 Tigers out of roughly 160 total losses attributed to air strikes. Thats about 15% of total Tiger losses. these figures come from the websites i posted, which appear to be well researched and corroborated 




> Myth 2: Most German tanks were abandoned due to fuel starvation. This myth is indeed more or less true. Approximatly half (I call half between 45% to 55%) tanks simply ran out of fuel, amunition etc and were abandoned. Its highly likely given the sever logistcs problems around Normandy.




According to the sources I posted, less than half were destroyed by crew, and reasons for emolition are generally not given anyway. the majority of tiger losses appear to be from enemy action. 



> Both are backed by citations and facts.



Okay, so what are they?


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## pbfoot (Dec 19, 2011)

The number of axis tanks destroyed by airpower was in the singles digits percentage wise if my memory and recent documentary are accurate .


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## parsifal (Dec 20, 2011)

perhaps overall, but the sample I have (which is four independant Tiger Battalions) the figures for tanks lost pushes the percentage through the 10% barrier. 

To be fair I think the numbers lost to airpower for this sample are skewed by losses sustained in one particular event. I think it was 13 July, one of the battalions was detrainng near Paris, was hit by either a medium or Heavy bomber strike. I dont have the details, but more than 10 tanks were destroyed in that single attack. it appears that many tanks were incinerated by an intense fire that engulfed the train as it unloaded. 

If that rather freakish event is not considered, the loss rate to airpower for the tigers falls to below 10%.


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## gjs238 (Dec 20, 2011)

Yeah, but what about the P-51 "tank buster" in Saving Private Ryan?!

(just joking)


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## Juha (Dec 20, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> I think you have an agenda not an opionion.
> 
> Myth 1: Allied aircraft busted large numbers German tanks. This is indeed very much a myth, rockets were to inaccurate, tanks survived nearby bombs.
> Myth 2: Most German tanks were abandoned due to fuel starvation. This myth is indeed more or less true. Approximatly half (I call half between 45% to 55%) tanks simply ran out of fuel, amunition etc and were abandoned. Its highly likely given the sever logistcs problems around Normandy.
> ...



I don’t have an agenda, but you seem to have.

On your myth 1, I haven’t see a message on this thread which had claimed that the myth is true. so we all to seem accept that it is more or less myth, but IMHO there is more thruth in that myth than you seem to believe, see Parsifal’s post #372, also read for ex Jentz’ Panzer Truppen Vol 2 and look for ex p. 197, there is Oberst Schanze’s report, which shows that Jabos hit Panthers, in fact numerous Panthers of PzBrig 112 12-13 Sept 44, that was during the battle at Dompaire and all participants, the French, the Germans and of course the P-47 pilots agreed that fighter bomber strikes against the Panthers of 112. PzBr were very effective. So there are exceptions to the rule that the effects of Allied air attacks on panzers were always heavily exaggerated.

On the Myth 2, I beg to disagree, many of the panzers and StuGs lost in Falaize pocket were abandoned because the Polish Armoured Division was sitting on their retreat route and after desperately trying to get through while bludgeoned by Allied air attacks and artillery and compressed to smaller and smaller area by other Allied ground troops, the Germans eventually gave up abandoned their vehicles and tried to get out on foot. Succeeding to put one’s own troop to tactically decisive points on the ground and so to force the enemy to attack them along predictive routes is called tactical/operational skill. Most of the AFVs that were not caught in Falaise pocket had to be left on the left bank of Seine, because of Allied AFs had destroyed all the bridges and Allied ground forces had arrived to Seine on both sides of the Germans. Also a classical example of use of superior manoeuvrability to force enemy to unattainable position It is better to use one ability to manoeuvre to force the enemy to abandon its equipment than try an head on attack and take also own losses while destroying enemy, all sides knew that and that was one of the key points of also German military thinking, and for ex Blitzkrieg tactics.



Siegfried said:


> You mockingly note that 1.5 tons of Parachute container fuel was inadveratantly dropped on Stoumont in a resupply effort, this is perhaps 3 parachutes from 1 or 2 Ju 52 at most. Do you find the fact that On February 22, 1944, Nijmegen was heavily bombed by American planes, causing great damage to the city centre. The American pilots thought they were bombing the German city of Kleve, they however killed hundreds of Dutch. March 3, 1945. Over 500 inhabitants of the suburb of Bezuidenhout, a suburb of The Hague, Holland, were killed when Allied bombers missed their intended target, the V-2 launching sites in the Hague Forest and dropped their bombs on Bezuidenhout.
> 
> The German transport pilots at least have an excuse given the total allied air dominace.



That only proofs that you have an agenda I just stated a fact directly related to the discussion, namely The KG Peiper, and clearly a new fact to you. Nothing mocking in that, that you took it as so, only tells on your attitude. And that was all the Germans dropped. Your examples had nothing to do with the topic, any more than the fact that LW bombed Frieburg, a German town, in early 1940 in error.

Juha


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## Njaco (Dec 20, 2011)

Lets stop the sarcasm.

"To Win the Winter Sky" is a day-by-day account of the Bulge through to Jan/Feb and gives numerous instances of 2 Tac AF hitting German armour. A good read.


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## pbfoot (Dec 20, 2011)

parsifal said:


> perhaps overall, but the sample I have (which is four independant Tiger Battalions) the figures for tanks lost pushes the percentage through the 10% barrier.
> 
> To be fair I think the numbers lost to airpower for this sample are skewed by losses sustained in one particular event. I think it was 13 July, one of the battalions was detrainng near Paris, was hit by either a medium or Heavy bomber strike. I dont have the details, but more than 10 tanks were destroyed in that single attack. it appears that many tanks were incinerated by an intense fire that engulfed the train as it unloaded.
> 
> If that rather freakish event is not considered, the loss rate to airpower for the tigers falls to below 10%.


I erred and was thinking only of Typhoons and such neglecting heavy bombers


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## Siegfried (Dec 20, 2011)

pbfoot said:


> I erred and was thinking only of Typhoons and such neglecting heavy bombers



Thousands of heavy bombers dropped several thousand tons of bombs on Panzrs in the Normandy area. Most of the tanks were simply dug out and continued on. At most they were delayed by a day.

Myth of Combat Aircraft destroying tanks 

Modern literature on WWII is replete with accounts of devastating air strikes on tank units. There are many stories about dozens or even hundreds of enemy tanks being destroyed in a single day, thereby destroying or blunting an enemy armoured offensive. These accounts are particularly common in literature relating to later war ground attack aircraft, most commonly the Soviet Ilyushin II, the British Hawker Typhoon, the American Republic P-47, and the German Henschel Hs 129. All these aircraft have the distinction of being called ‘tank-busters’ and all have the reputation for being able to easily destroy any type of tank in WWII. 

Now what's the truth? 

Case 1 - Normandy

During Operation Goodwood (18th to 21st July) the 2nd Tactical Air Force and 9th USAAF claimed 257 and 134 tanks, respectively, as destroyed. Of these, 222 were claimed by Typhoon pilots using RPs (Rocket Projectiles).

During the German counterattack at Mortain (7th to 10th August) the 2nd Tactical Air Force and 9th USAAF claimed to have destroyed 140 and 112 tanks, respectively.

Unfortunately for air force pilots, there is a small unit usually entitled *Research and Analysis *which enters a combat area once it is secured. This is and was common in most armies, and the British Army was no different. The job of The Office of Research and Analysis was to look at the results of the tactics and weapons employed during the battle in order to determine their effectiveness (with the objective of improving future tactics and weapons).

They found that the air force’s claims did not match the reality at all. In the Goodwood area a total of 456 German heavily armoured vehicles were counted, and 301 were examined in detail.* They found only 10 could be attributed to Typhoons using RPs (less than 3% of those claimed).* Even worse, *only 3 out of 87 APC *examined could be attributed to air lunched RPs. The story at Mortain was even worse. It turns out that only 177 German tanks and assault guns participated in the attack, which is 75 less tanks than claimed as destroyed! Of these 177 tanks, 46 were lost and only 9 were lost to aircraft attack. This is again around 4% of those claimed. When the results of the various Normandy operations are compiled, it turns out that no more than 100 German tanks were lost in the entire campaign from hits by aircraft launched ordnance.

Considering the Germans lost around 1 500 tanks, tank destroyers and assault guns in the Normandy campaign, less than 7% were lost directly to air attack.(8) The greatest contributor to the great myth regarding the ability of WWII aircraft to kill tanks was, and still is, directly the result of the pilot’s massively exaggerated kill claims. The Hawker Typhoon with its cannon and up to eight rockets was (and still is in much literature) hailed as the best weapon to stop the German Tiger I tank, and has been credited with destroying dozens of these tanks in the Normandy campaign. According to the most current definitive work only 13 Tiger tanks were destroyed by direct air attack in the entire campaign.(9) Of these, seven Tigers were lost on 18th July 1944 to massive carpet bombing by high altitude heavy bombers, preceding Operation Goodwood. Thus at most only six Tigers were actually destroyed by fighter bombers in the entire campaign. It turns out the best Tiger stopper was easily the British Army’s 17pdr AT gun, with the Typhoon well down on the list.

Indeed it appears that air attacks on tank formations protected by Flak were more dangerous for the aircraft than the tanks. The 2nd Tactical Air Force lost 829 aircraft in Normandy while the 9th USAAF lost 897.(10) These losses, which ironically exceed total German tank losses in the Normandy campaign, would be almost all fighter-bombers. Altogether 4 101 Allied aircraft and 16 714 aircrew were lost over the battlefield or in support of the Normandy campaign.(11)




P. Moore, Operation Goodwood, July 1944; A Corridor of Death, Helion Company Ltd, Solihull, UK, 2007, 
N. Zetterling, Normandy 1944, J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing Inc, Winnipeg, Canada, 2000, 
F. Crosby, The Complete Guide to Fighters and Bombers of WWII, Anness Publishing Ltd: Hermes House, London, 2006, p. 365. Also M. Healy, Kursk 1943, Osprey Military, London, 1993, p. 56.
D. M. Glantz, J.M. House, The Battle of Kursk, Ian Allan Publishing Ltd, Surrey, UK, 1999, p. 349.
T. L. Jentz, Panzer Truppen, The Complete Guide to the Creation and Combat Deployment of Germany’s Tank Force: 1943-1945, 
M. Healy, Kursk 1943, Osprey Military, London, 1993, p. 66.
D. M. Glantz, J.M. House, The Battle of Kursk, Ian Allan Publishing Ltd, Surrey, UK, 1999, p. 276. According to Glantz and House, these are admitted Soviet tanks totally destroyed but the number is probably higher. In addition a similar number were probably recovered as repairable.
Tank Forces in Defense of the Kursk Bridgehead, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Volume 7, No 1, March 1994,


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## parsifal (Dec 20, 2011)

I dont think I would disagree that aircraft as a means of killing tanks directly is overrated, however, there are still a number of issues that make the effort well worth the while. 

Firstly, for some units at least, German tank losses from the point of manufacture to frontline did exceed 10%, in fact was closer to 15%. Dont know if that was a statistic that applies across the board, but it did apply to certain key heavy tank formations that deployed to western Europe in 1944. These arent claimed losses, incidentally, they are admitted losses by the Germans. 

Secondly, according to Jarymowycz (great book incidentally) a significant reason for many losses for German tanks were mechanical failures At least a portion of these breakdowns are going to be the result of near misses by air strikes. If a tank breaks down, because it has suffered a mechanical failure due to a near miss, that is still a loss to airpower in my book.

Thirdly, many of the losses due to abandonment, if not due to mechanical failure, are lost due to supply shortages. German armies in the Normandy campaign were starved of resources mostly through the efforts of the allied air forces. And most of that effort was due to the impact on the European rail network. Though an indirect effort some of those tanks listed as lost to abandonment were lost to air power, because they could not get the supplies they needed to keep moving and fighting.

Fourthly, according to german accounts, airpower made movement to and around trhe battlefield extremely difficult. This meant that tanks could often not manouvre properly in the face of a developing threat on the ground. Unable to move, they succumbed to ground fire of various kinds. Airpower in this situation was assisting the ground combat by denying the germans one of their primary means of defence....their ability to move and react. 

Fifthly, many German tanks were lost because their routes for retreat were cut off. For example, many bridges across the Seine were blown, leaving no escape. Some attempts were made to ferry tanks across the river....most were lost to air attacks.

Lastly, many tanks that might otherwise have been produced were lost due to the efforts in the strategic bombing campaign. Resources were forced to be diverted to air defence, civil defence, and outright damage and disruption to the overall industrial complex. USSBS esimates over 40% of potential production was lost due to strategic bombing in 1944 alone. 

The indirect impacts of airpower were considerable. Almost impossible to quantify as a percentage, but airpower played a key role in delivering victory to the allies in the west at tolerable cost. Airpower, more than a means of direct attrition on German tanks, was a force multiplier for the allies. My opinion is that it probably increased the effectiveness of allied armies by 25-50% overall.


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## parsifal (Dec 20, 2011)

Accounts by the german commanders themselves are worth noting 

Bayerlein: left a remarkable account of the effects of the COBRA bombing and ground assault on his command. In response to postwar interrogation he wrote: 
We had the main losses by pattern bombing, less by artillery, still less by tanks and smaller arms. 
The actual losses of dead and wounded were approximately: Air 50%, Artillery 30%, other 20% 

According to Jarymowycz, other German commanders interviewed postwar, attributed their armour losses as follows

Guderian: (eastern front) 60-70% Mechanical failure, 15% AT fire, 5% artillery, 5% mines, 5% other, Total 90-100%

Dietrich: (West Front) Mechanical 30%, Air 10%, AT 15%, Tanks &TD 45%, Artillery negligible. Most feared Tanks and TDs 

Hausser: During Movements to the zone of combat 30% of tanks are lost to mechanical failure, Considering the remainder as 100%, losses were as follows: 15% Mechanical breakdown, 20% Air Attack, AT (and tanks) 50%, 15% by artillery. Hausser agreed with Dietrich, most feare Allied weapons were their tanks and TDs.

Adjusting Hausser to a single percentage, the following figures are deduced

Mechanical breakdown 35%, Air Attack 15%, Tanks TD AT 38%, Artillery 12% 

Jarymowycz then tabulates his findings in his table 13-3, which has previously beeen posted, and which is challenged by quite a few other people. If we make our own analysis of the German commanders opinions, we arrive at the following loss by cause proportions (averaging): 

Mechanical:	35
Air: 21
Tanks/TD/AT:	31
Artillery: 12
Other: 1
TOTAL: 100%


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## Juha (Dec 20, 2011)

Hello Siegfried
I can agree with almost all you wrote in your message #392 
Two minor notes of tone, 
1)in fact 13 Tigers means better than average % of losses caused by a/c on AFV, because there were only 3 Tigers battalions participating Normandy Campaign and sSSPzAbt 101 was a bit understregth at the beginnig, 102 arrived in July as did sPzAbt 503. Without digging out my best Tiger source (Tigers in Combat I II) I'd say some 120-130 Tigers participated.
2) AFVs were only one of the targets to FBs, much effort was used against transports and bridges, not to say against other front line targets. 

But otherwise I more or less agreed. I usually get little agry when I see an article on Mortain counter-attack in Aeroplane. They usually tended to forget that there was US 30th Div with 2 TD battalions, one of which was more or less overrun, which fought hard to hinder German attack, it really wasn't purely AF show.

Juha


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## Juha (Dec 20, 2011)

Parsifal
thanks for the info on German opinions.

Juha


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## Njaco (Dec 20, 2011)

> During Operation Goodwood (18th to 21st July) the 2nd Tactical Air Force and 9th USAAF claimed 257 and 134 tanks, respectively, as destroyed. Of these, 222 were claimed by Typhoon pilots using RPs (Rocket Projectiles).





> They found only 10 could be attributed to Typhoons using RPs (less than 3% of those claimed). Even worse, only 3 out of 87 APC examined could be attributed to air lunched RPs.



Well, we can give you that..... if you are only counting losses by RPs.

_" The 378th Squadron dropped *napalm and bombs* on Bourcy itself which was discovered to harbour 15 trucks and five tanks. In all the Group claimed 84 motor vehicles and 12 tanks....Thunderbolts of the 354th FG ranged far enough west to send tanks of the Panzer Lehr Division scurrying for cover.....Tanks and trucks were hit with *napalm and fragmentation bombs* near Forrierres; the 356th bombed and strafed another group of ten tanks and twenty trucks near Nassonge....."_
December 23, 1944 from "To Win the Winter Sky" by Danny S. Parker, pg 231-232

It wasn't only RPs.

There was also this comment from the same book....

"_It was not unusual for a report of enemy armour from an outpost to be followed within minutes by a covey of P-47s to hit the German tanks." _


> 'This is better hunting than the Falaise Pocket', one fighter pilot radioed, 'and that was the best I ever expected to see.'


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## Just Schmidt (Dec 21, 2011)

Readie said:


> Talking of Herman..
> 
> *"Adolf Galland rated the Spitfire so highly he told Goering 'Give me a squadron of Spitfires'."* -
> 
> ...



Gallands supposed preferrence for spitfires seem to stem from qoting out of context from this meeting, often supporting the quoters opinion that the spitfire was THE best fighter in 1940.

I only recently found it with context in James Hollands The Battle for Britain which, some shortcomings apart, do a great job for contextualising that conflict on many levels (I've found only a few outright factual errors over nearly 800 pages, though I might disagree somewhat on the strategic outlook). Then there is of course his claim that Bf 109 E was the best fighter during that conflict (and that is of course a reason for supplying the wider context). It's good features was good climb, accelleration and (instant) dive and its armament. (Please be aware that I am not intending to start over again the whole cannon-mashinegun argument here, I'm only condensing his argument).

Apparantly the meeting took place on 6th of september (the cronology can be a little messy oftentimes) but the rendering differs somewhat from what Galland is quoted for. Of course there are inherent possibilities of misrepresenting when accounts are translated from german to english to (in this case) norwegian, but others than Galland might have referred from the meeting, and details often differs when memory serves).

The order goes:

Göring berates the fighter pilots for not protecting the bombers adequately.
He asks for the needs of the luftwaffe, and Galland wish for his sqadron to be equipped with spitfires (note that the translation might give rise to the squdron-squadronS disagreement which have surfased in this thread).
After that Galland explains that the spitfires' greater manouverability at slower speeds makes it a better (I assume close-) excort fighter.
Having no answer to that, Göring growls and leave.

Only difference to the qute seem to be that here Gallands rationalisation comes last, but I'm glad for both renderings as they supply the context thereby puncturing a myth.

Another interesting aspect is that Luftwaffe was grappling with some of the same problems as the 8th airforce in 44 as to how best protect bombers/ attain air superiotrity, close escort or frie jagd.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 21, 2011)

Just a nomenclature tidbit: German word 'Geschwader' can be found many times as an equivalent of English 'Squadron'. But the 'Staffel' is 'Squadron'; Geschwader is operational equivalent of 'Group' in RAF, or 'Wing' for USAAF. 
So if/when Galland asks that his Geschwader is to be outfitted with Spitfires, he speaks about ~100 (as Readie quoted in his post) planes, not just 12 or 16.

In naval forces, Geschwader is indeed an operational equivalent of Squadron.

Wing for RAF USN is equivalent of Group in USAAC USMC.


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## Juha (Dec 21, 2011)

Good post, JS
Yes, there seems to be misunderstandings on what Galland meant with his request. Have seen the Galland’s explanation before but it’s good that Holland retell it in his book. Have not seen the book, but what I have seen in his blogs he seems to have limited technical understanding, which can be seen for ex in his armament arguments.

Juha


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## Juha (Dec 21, 2011)

Siegfried said:


> Even worse, *only 3 out of 87 APC *examined could be attributed to air lunched RPs.



Now that also bothered me a bit because I think that why to waste RPs to an APC when 4 Hispanos should be able to knock it out to say nothing on possible occupants, so I looked in my copy of Gooderson's book, not found that info but noticed that on the page 114 there was a table that shows around Mortain area of the 23 examined APCs 7 was destroyed by rockets, 4 by Cannon/MG fire, 1 was abandoned intact, 3 were destr by US Army and 8 were lost to unknown reason. None was destr by Germans. So almost half of the ACs were destr by air attacks, a bit highher number than I expected but not much because open topped lightly armoured vehicles were vulnerable to air attacks. I was more surprised that RPs had destr more APCs than a/c cannon/mg fire.

Also noted that earlier a team had found abandoned Panthers with full fuel tanks and ammo, so as I wrote earlier, not all abandoned AFVs were abandoned because of lack of fuel and more important is to notice that German forces outside the pockets usually had fuel to manoeuvre, so the lack of fuel inside a pocket was usually caused by the tactical situation as is usual sooner or later among surroudered forces.

Juha


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## cimmex (Dec 29, 2011)

another myth
I’ve found this in one of Glostermann’s books: Joke between Tempest pilots, ”the landing speed of a Tempest is higher than the cruising speed of a Spitfire”.
cimmex

Reactions: Creative Creative:
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## vikingBerserker (Dec 29, 2011)

This is a pretty interesting thread.


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## Messy1 (Dec 29, 2011)

Found this link on another forum listing 99 Facts from WW2. Thought it might be of interest in this discussion. I did not want to start a whole new thread just tp post this link, it seemed relevant to me. Maybe we can go through these 99 facts and label them as fact or myth.
99 Fascinating Facts about World War II


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## bobbysocks (Dec 29, 2011)

good link messy! thanks


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## marshall (Dec 29, 2011)

Messy1 said:


> Found this link on another forum listing 99 Facts from WW2. Thought it might be of interest in this discussion. I did not want to start a whole new thread just tp post this link, it seemed relevant to me. Maybe we can go through these 99 facts and label them as fact or myth.
> 99 Fascinating Facts about World War II




I have read it and spotted one mistake, when writing about casualties the author writes about Russia and Russians in context of Soviet Union and Soviet Union citizens and that is wrong because those are two different things. Soviet Union was made of many countries not only Russia.


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## pbfoot (Dec 29, 2011)

I'm a little shy of it as it seems to use some shady sources like Ambrose


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## R Leonard (Dec 29, 2011)

Re #70 on this list. 

I would hazard a guess that there were considerably more personnel loses associated with the sinking of USS Arizona then with USS Indianapolis.


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## bobbysocks (Dec 29, 2011)

R Leonard said:


> Re #70 on this list.
> 
> I would hazard a guess that there were considerably more personnel loses associated with the sinking of USS Arizona then with USS Indianapolis.



seems you would hazard correctly. just did a quickie look around ( and not in wiki )....USS Arizona lost 1100 of her crew according to the one site while the USS Indy lost 883. Now maybe it was the greatest loss of life AFTER Pearl....


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## marshall (Dec 29, 2011)

According to wiki:

USS Arizona 1177,

USS Indianapolis 880,

and the quote from wiki about USS Indy "...which led to the greatest single loss of life at sea in the history of the U.S. Navy".

Maybe there is a difference if the ship is at sea or at the harbour...


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## vikingBerserker (Dec 29, 2011)

Pretty interesting.


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