# July 26, 1941. Build the Far East Air Force.



## davebender (Feb 10, 2012)

July 26, 1941. 
The USA begins a massive military build up in the Philippines.

31 July 1941. 
US Army Chief of Staff George Marshall issues public statement that it was now US policy to defend the Philippines and that Philippine defense was to take the "highest priority".

Your mission (should you decide to accept it): Build the Far East Air Force.
.....19th (heavy) bombardment group must be included. Part of the U.S. effort to intimidate Japan.
.....Three additional heavy bomber groups will be sent during the spring of 1942. They are outside the scope of this discussion.
.....Remaining aircraft types must be readily available during August to November 1941.
.....FEAF had priority during the fall of 1941. Feel free to use aircraft historically shipped elsewhere.
.....Size matters. Smaller aircraft require less shipping space, airfield construction effort and logistical support. Many large aircraft means FEAF will have fewer total aircraft.
.....Most American and Philippine pilots were green as grass during 1941. It would be helpful to pick aircraft types that are easy to fly and maintain.
.....Clark Airfield has paved runways. That's the primary B-17 airfield. A secondary heavy bomber airfield is under construction on Mindanao at the Del Monte Pineapple Plantation. 
.....All other airfields will initially have grass runways. They are often muddy. It rains a lot in the Philippines.
.....Big Mac was barely on speaking terms with the USN during 1941. So these aircraft will all be operated by the U.S. Army or Philippine Army.

Production data for many aircraft types can be found here.
US Warplanes

Historical FEAF composition can be found here.
Far East Air Force, United States Armed Forces, 8.12.1941


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 11, 2012)

IMHO Forget the airplanes. Just demand the idiot USA Supply Corp send the oxygen production plant that was ordered in the summer for the P-40B, Es and P-35s. Then get back up SCR RADAR stations operating and start doing fighter direction raid drills with the existing Iba RADAR station using the aircraft on hand practicing rigid comm discipline so your aircraft know their assignments and don't go cowboying off to where they think the action is. Develop more dispersal fields and harden the RADAR sites. Also send enough 50 cal ammo to allow gunnery trainng. Start training the pilots to do boom and zoom tactics. After all that, then send more P-36C or P-40B or C aircraft as soon as possible. Strip 2 x .50's out of the P-40Es on hand. I think the Clark Runway was turf. Haven't been able to find a definite confirmation of that.

With respect to bombers... In December real world, you are already nearly maxed out with facilities at hand. I think it was 34 B-17 D C? You've sent half to Del Monte site in Late November, early December awaiting the arrival of your next squadron. Rush said suplemental squadron and the development of De Monte with at least a squadron of new arriving P-40s in reserve there as well. Rush multiple A-24 squadron deployments to the PI with pilots trained to use them (preferrably USN trained) 

Big Mac was barely on speaking terms with anyone but his yes man Southerland and noone wanted to talk to him.

Make Brereton subordinate to Hap Arnold only. Yea, like that would happen. 

Finally, accept the unpleasant fact that even after all these efforts, the FEAF is just an IJN IJA speed bump....


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## davebender (Feb 11, 2012)

I disagree. 

- FEAF was not outnumbered.
- FEAF had plenty of airfields for aircraft dispersal and more could have been built during the four months available. Grass runways don't take long to establish.
- Four months is plenty of time to establish airfield defenses and put secure communications systems in place. 
- FEAF had 7 radar sets. That's plenty for Luzon if properly employed.
- Properly flown P-40s and A-20s were as good or better then Japanese aircraft during December 1941. You've got four months for additional pilot training.
- If P-40s lack oxygen, .50cal ammo or anything else it's because FEAF didn't make it a priority. 4 months is plenty of time to ship this material from San Francisco.
- By 1940 the Philippine Army Air Corps had about 100 pilots and 500 ground crew trained to USAAC standards. With modern aircraft the six PAAC squadrons could be a significant factor for defense of their homeland. 

IMO the key is to replace Brereton with someone more competent and do it early. The new FEAF commander should be in the Philippines by mid August 1941. The FEAF commander must have the nuts to do the right things rather then becoming a yes man for Big Mac.


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## tyrodtom (Feb 11, 2012)

Come on Dave, we've all played this game before. No mater what anyone post, you're gonna rip into it.

The Phillippines of the 40's wouldn't have had many usable open areas you could use for airfields. It was either jungle ( big trees) or cultivated land ( very wet rice paddies) Either would take a lot of equipment, and in the rice paddies a lot of fill, to bring even up to 40s standards for aircraft use. PSP and gravel was used for such later in WW2, don't think it was very availiable in 41.

But I guess i've got to agree with you, most of the problem were lack of training for too much of the forces involved, and a command that spent too much time with their heads up their lower intestines.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 11, 2012)

davebender said:


> I disagree.
> 
> - FEAF was not outnumbered.
> - FEAF had plenty of airfields for aircraft dispersal and more could have been built during the four months available. Grass runways don't take long to establish.
> ...



Having recently read Edmund's and Shores' account of that espisode, (after coming to this problem with views very similar to those you express)

I have come away with the impression that Brereton was actually a pretty decent commander. He tried to implement the necessary training but was foiled by poor logistical support and inertia on the part of Mac and Southerland. My opinion of Mac improved slightly. (it couldn't have gotten much lower, quite frankly) but my opinion of Southerland who apparently (according to Kenney) fancied himself an aviation expert, is below rock bottom. Shores does a great job listing the Japanese order of battle before the PI campaign. I'll check that since I believe much depends on the ability of Japan to wage a war of attrition given the historical modifications you are suggesting. After December 8, Japanese forces were still facing something like 70 or so fighter aircraft (vitually all the operational P-40Es survived the initial debacle on the 7th). But these had been effectively reduced to none by months end (if not sooner). Ferrying in P-40's from Oz would have probably resulted in loss of over 50% of assets (that appears to have been the experience during the Java campaign (according to Bartsch). Hell it was hard just to get _wheels in the wheels_ out of Darwin starting from the staging base at Amberly. It is a most interesting and provocative propositon though.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 11, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> Come on Dave, we've all played this game before. No mater what anyone post, you're gonna rip into it.
> 
> The Phillippines of the 40's wouldn't have had many usable open areas you could use for airfields. It was either jungle ( big trees) or cultivated land ( very wet rice paddies) Either would take a lot of equipment, and in the rice paddies a lot of fill, to bring even up to 40s standards for aircraft use. PSP and gravel was used for such later in WW2, don't think it was very availiable in 41.
> 
> But I guess i've got to agree with you, most of the problem were lack of training for too much of the forces involved, and a command that spent too much time with their heads up their lower intestines.



The PI is indeed a somewhat less than benign enviroment in which to attempt expansion on a big scale. In both its meteorolgy and ecology. There was also a relatively primitive indigenous industrial base (providing inadequate repair facilities for damaged A/C). This appears to have been less a factor in Java which apparently enjoyed a more developed manufacturing base. Even that didn't help much because the IJN IJA were moving in Jungle Blitzkrieg fashion, which even Bataan's persistence didn't slow. The PI rapidly became progressivly more isolated, whatever you put in there has to make do without further logistical support once the bullets start flying. Achieving a perfect logistical base and backlog of supply is difficult under the best of circumstances. It seems likely that some other horseshoe nail would have surfaced during the campaign that would have proven fatal to efforts to hold out much longer. They had to keep fighting well past August 1942 to hope for resupply and that may be a very Optimistic schedule depending on the survivability of USN carriers to achieve. The USN was very resistant to the concept of multi-carrier ops that gave the IJN superiority in early engagements.

e.g. Logistical failings: Early P-40 shipments to Oz were delivered without the Glycol needed for their Allisons.


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## davebender (Feb 11, 2012)

That isn't necessary. 

24 Nov 1941. Pensacola convoy departs San Francisco for the Philippines.
7 cargo ships plus naval escort.
7th (light) bombardment group with 52 x A-24 dive bombers (i.e. SBD)
18 x P-40E aircraft. These were replacements. No aircrew.
600 tons of munitions.
9,000 drums of aviation gasoline.
340 motor vehicles.
2 light field artillery regiments equipped with 24 x 75mm field guns each.
A bunch of ammunition and other supplies.
.....Historically scheduled to arrive in the Philippines 14 January 1942. That's not exactly pushing the speed envelope. Non stop steaming distance from San Francisco to Manila was about 25 days. If this small convoy had been dispatched during August 1941 it would have been in the Philippines at least two months prior to the Japanese attack.

5 to 6 Dec 1941. Reinforcement convoy to the Philippines departs San Francisco.
SS President Johnson. 
SS President Garfield.
SS Etolin.
…..218th Field Artillery Regiment.
…..35th Pursuit Group HQ squadron.
…..35th Pursuit Group Maintenance section.
…..70th Fighter Squadron, 35th Pursuit Group. 20 x P-40E. (some sources say P-36)
Same problem as the Pensacola convoy. Why wasn't this small convoy dispatched from San Francisco during August 1941?

16 Dec 1941. Convoy of 2 cargo ships departs San Francisco for the Philippines.
122 x P-40E replacement aircraft. Plus aviation supplies.

Same problem times three. 

The U.S. Military had 529,201 tons of shipping in the Pacific as of 30 Nov 1941. The above three convoys required a total of 12 ships which probably totaled less then 100,000 tons. Someone who understood the difference between vital cargo and nice to have cargo would have dispatched this material to the Philippines NLT September 1941.

Personally I would have equipped 7th (light) bombardment group with A-20s rather then A-24s but what really counts is getting them to the Philippines ASAP. They would provide FEAF with aircraft able to sink anchored IJA troop transports.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 11, 2012)

A-20s! great Idea! I got the impression reading about Java that the A-24's struggled after reaching Java and didn't contribute a lot to the outcome but don't know the details.

I think there were pilots embarked in one of the ships in the Pensacola convoy. Just please don't forget to include the oxygen plant, the glycol and for God's sake, get rid of those outboard .50s in the P-40E!


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 11, 2012)

Looks like 90 A6M and 72 Ki-27s based on Formosa plus those aboard whatever CV assets (in addition to the already Commited Ryujo) they chose to employ at the expense of other ops. So about 162 Formosa Based fighters and 16 A5M on the Ryujo for a total of 178. That's roughly twice as many fighters of all varieties as available in the PI on December 7. The thing about the Pensacola convoy going directly to the PI is that it would require CV escort, else even the diminutive Ryujo would have posed a serious threat to ts survival. Consdering the very effective use if IJN flying boat recon throughout the Pacific theater, that could have been very dangerous.


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## davebender (Feb 11, 2012)

26 July 1941.
USAFFE military build up begins.

17 Oct 1941.
USN orders all U.S. merchant ships in Asiatic waters to put into friendly ports.

You've got 2 1/2 months before merchant ships heading to the Philippines are required to travel in an escorted convoy.


24 Nov 1941. Admiral Hart relayed Navy Department message to Gen MacArthur
MESSAGE TEXT (STARK TO HART):
THE CHIEF OF STAFF IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE ESTIMATE PRESENTED HEREWITH AND REQUESTS THAT YOU INFORM THE SENIOR ARMY OFFICER IN YOUR AREA COLON CHANCES OF FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF UNITED STATES DASH JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS ARE VERY DOUBTFUL PERIOD THIS SITUATION TOGETHER WITH STATEMENTS OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND MOVEMENT OF THEIR MILITARY AND NAVAL FORCE INTIMATE IN OUR OPINION THAT SURPRISE AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN ANY DIRECTION INCLUDING ATTACK ON PHILIPPINES OR GUAM IS A POSSIBILITY STOP THIS INFORMATION MUST BE TREATED WITH UTMOST SECRECY IN ORDER NOT TO COMPLICATE A TENSE SITUATION OR PRECIPITATE ACTION END STARK).

Even after this message was received military convoys had only a single cruiser plus a single ASW vessel for escort.

Get the led out and FEAF aircraft reinforcements won't require CV escort.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 11, 2012)

To be fair, you did specify all these meaures are implemented in advance of 12/7/41. You built a very large (high) speed bump. That's not gonna just go away. The initial outcomes would arguably have been of course very different

Hell, the Dec 8 PI results should have been different *even without all those measures*, just not different enough to have made a major difference in the ultimate outcome.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 11, 2012)

I knew this was going to turn into one of Mr. Benders "lets replace the B-17s with A-20s" threads. 

I have posted this in another thread this morning but I will copy it here. 

There was also a production line at Douglas- El Segundo. The US was NOT awash in A-20s as these were, as previously stated, mostly contracted for aircraft that were being delivered as fast as possible and NOT planes built on speculation sitting around on lots waiting for buyers like a big car lot. The best that might be done would be to defer deliveries on currant production for more aircraft to be delivered later. 

One reason for the US not using the A-20 a great deal was it's short range. See the following,

http://www.zenoswarbirdvideos.com/Im...0/A20FOICa.pdf

And please note that normal fuel capacity for an A-20 was 400 US gallons or very close to it. Depending on model there were auxiliary tanks above the bomb bay and for ferry flights a tank that would fit in the bomb bay. Use of the auxiliary tanks requires overload take off or reduced bomb load or both. 

Also note that even 340 gallons of fuel (after allowing for warm up and take off) is only good for 710 miles range at just under 170mph true airspeed under 10,000ft. and that use of maximum continuous power (not even military power) more the quadruples the fuel consumption per minute. 5 minutes at maximum continuous is worth 55-60 miles of slow speed cruise. Military power could be 6.5 gallons a Minute? or 5 minutes equaling a 1/2 hour or just under of low speed cruise depending on altitude? 

Basically, the A-20, while able to perform some roles very well is also limited to a combat radius (without the use of the auxiliary tanks) shorter than a P-47 without drop tanks. 

It is around 250 miles from Clark Field to the Northern tip of Luzon and around 600 miles from Davao to Manila.

to add to this the A-20 had a stall speed of just over 100mph at 20,000lbs. Not as bad as the B-26 but still a hot plane in 1941. It is going to need about the same runway as a B-17. It introduces a new engine to the Philippines with the associated spare parts and training problem. 

For a History of PSP see:

http://140.194.76.129/publications/eng-pamphlets/ep870-1-42/c-3-4.pdf

It was NOT available during the fall of 1941. 

While Grass runways don't take long to establish they don't work real well with heavy aircraft or perhaps one should say with aircraft that have pressure tires or high weight per sq in of contact patch. 

The fast construction of a number of airfields is going to be limited by the availability of construction equipment. The transportation network of 1941 Philippines is rather sketchy, number of railroads, highways etc. Inter Island traffic is not only by boat but many large moves are even on the same Island are done by by boat along the coast. Moving construction equipment form one location to another is not going to be quick. Using troops as "shovel brigades" means they are not doing military training. 

Realistically, while more supplies could have gotten there earlier, any change in aircraft is going to be basically taking them from somewhere else, like the Panama Canal zone, one or two squadrons at a time.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 11, 2012)

damn! That ice-cold water was a shock!


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## varsity078740 (Feb 11, 2012)

A couple of points I'd like to make.

1. Clark's runways were sod. Nichols' were paved.
2. The no oxygen story is a myth. Read the pilots accounts of practice intercepts of B-17s at 20,000 feet in Bartsch's
"Doomed..."
3. What good would P-36Cs have been? They'd be no more effective than the P-35As.
4. You can have all the airfields you want but they're useless without modern AA protection for low, medium and high 
altitudes and a decent warning system.
5. FEAF was indeed outnumbered, especially if you only count first line aircraft which eliminates all the observation
aircraft, the B-18s, P-35AS and A-27s. The JNAF was able to hit Clark with over 50 bombers, besides what they used at
Iba on Dec. 8th. The famous quote made by a pilot at Clark just before the bombs fell "because we don't have that many"
rings true.
6. In retrospect, if anyone should have be replaced prior to Dec. 8th it was Major Grover, the CO of the 24th PG. He 
screwed up big time and was never taken to task.

Duane


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## Shortround6 (Feb 11, 2012)

I just did some quick checking on google maps so the figures are a little rough but it looks like around 950 miles from the Northern tip of Luzon to the southern tip of Mindanao and over 600 miles from the Western tip of Palawan to the east side of Catanduanes Island. 
It is about 900 miles from Leningrad to Kiel and the Baltic is very seldom more than 200 miles wide. 

Just because a plane did good service in the Baltic in the anti shipping role does not mean it is a good choice for the Philippines especially with a very limited number of bomber airfields to support it.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 11, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> There was also a production line at Douglas- El Segundo. The US was NOT awash in A-20s as these were, as previously stated, mostly contracted for aircraft that were being delivered as fast as possible and NOT _*planes built on speculation sitting around on lots waiting for buyers like a big car lot*_. The best that might be done would be to defer deliveries on currant production for more aircraft to be delivered later.



Note to self, Remember to advise Dave, prior to his next time-machine visit to 1941 to convince DAC management to institute an A-20 and A-24 Bazaar lot where potential customers might come in and select the airplane of their choice with whatever options they desire. 

Now that's what I call a bazaar notion 

Duane, see below:



varsity078740 said:


> A couple of points I'd like to make.
> 
> 1. Clark's runways were sod. Nichols' were paved.
> 
> ...



Thanks,

OC


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## JoeB (Feb 11, 2012)

varsity078740 said:


> A couple of points I'd like to make.
> 
> 1. Clark's runways were sod. Nichols' were paved.
> 2. The no oxygen story is a myth. Read the pilots accounts of practice intercepts of B-17s at 20,000 feet in Bartsch's
> ...


I generally agree with those points, would note:
3. I agree P-36 v P-35 wouldn't have been a huge difference but some measureable difference in favor of the P-36.
4. Yes and also stuff like dispersal, camouflage (including dummies), revetments etc. After the initial JNAF attacks through Dec 10, both JNAF and JAAF continued attacking the US fields on Luzon for up to a few weeks before physically capturing them, claimed in their reports many more US a/c destroyed on the ground, but actually destroyed *zero* additional a/c. Relatively quickly implemented measures by the USAAC to better hide and protect the remaining a/c reduced ground losses to nothing. The larger initial force might still have suffered some ground losses, but could suffered a lot fewer with comprehensive airfield defense measures especially passive ones. And while AA, radar and integrated warning and control were not what they should have been a/o Dec 8, passive airfield defense was almost zero, with the important exception that 1/2 the B-17's were dispersed to Del Monte on Mindanao (a field the Japanees didn't even know of until weeks later, and they couldn't reach from Formosa anyway) and so escaped destruction. But IMO passive airfield defense was the most glaring deficiency of all, and would have required much less knowledge of the future to remedy, as opposed to some of the other suggestions.
5. The respective orders of battle of bombers and fighters (not including recon, flying boat, utility, observation etc on either side) were as follows:
JNAF 21st and 23rd Air Flotilla's on Formosa: 90 Type 0 Fighters, 24 Type 96 Fighters, 81 Type 1 Land Attack, 36 Type 96 Land Attack. All but the Type 96 Fighters could reach central Luzon from Formosa; the Type 96's were used for local defense and saw no action. Also Ryujo's small air group of Type 96 Fighters and Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes was only used briefly v Davao and encountered no FEAF a/c.
JAAF 5th Air Division on Formosa: 72 Type 97 Fighters, 18 Type 97 Heavy Bombers, 27 Type 99 Twin Engine Light Bombers, 27 Type 97 Light Bombers. The fighters couldn't reach, and bombers had limited capability v central Luzon from Formosa; the bombers were initially used in unescorted strikes v northern Luzon until they and the fighters leapfrogged to fields in N Luzon around a week after the campaign started, and FEAF was already crippled.
FEAF: nominal squadron strength of 54 P-40E's, 18 P-40B's and 18 P-35A's, though 107 total P-40's and 48 P-35's in inventory, 35 B-17C/D's (all refitted to 'D' standard)

So the FEAF was outnumbered overall, but in the key area of fully modern fighters able to operate immediately over central Luzon the Zero and P-40 forces were close in size. The FEAF lost that near parity with the heavy losses of P-40's, especially on the ground, in the initial raids. After that, no plausible number of B-17's, or A-20's for that matter, were going to accomplish much v the largely intact Zero force, and as it was even the remaining P-35/40 force was mainly used for recon and limited strike, generally avoiding the JAAF Type 97 Fighter force once it was established on Luzon. Interestingly though, after early January 1942 all but one company of Type 97 Fighters was withdrawn, and the Zeroes were also gone, so the P-35/40 remnant became again close, perhaps even slightly superior, in number to the Japanese fighter force facing it.

Joe


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 11, 2012)

JoeB said:


> I generally agree with those points, would note:
> 3. I agree P-36 v P-35 wouldn't have been a huge difference but some measureable difference in favor of the P-36.
> 
> *see above:*
> ...



Shores counts 72 Type 97 (Ki-27) fighters on Formosa and seems to believe these were the planes that occupied the airfield near Vigan, in Northern Luzon early in the battle. Do you have a source to resolve the discrepency? Not that I think that particular component significantly changes the scale. Just wondering...

When you say "*initial*" do you mean the first day? One of the enduring myths of the battle seems to be that most of the P-40s were knocked out the first day which according to Edmunds and Shores didn't happen. The losses amounted to about 20-25% (which is still high and not to diminish the nature of the tragedy) mainly the P-40Bs of the 20th and probably spares. But clearly a fair number of P-40s survived the first attacks on the 8th.

OC


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## tyrodtom (Feb 11, 2012)

Did those P-40's survive undamaged, or with different degrees of damage?


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 11, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> Did those P-40's survive undamaged, or with different degrees of damage?



Good question, I believe the ones that survived were mainly airborne but that doesn't tell much. As I interpreted what I read, the P-40s that survived were operational until put out of that conidition by subsequent raids and combat. As I understand it, a lot of the airborne P-40s were milling about in a state of airborne confusion on the 8th and didn't actually engage any enemy aircraft.


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## JoeB (Feb 11, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Shores counts 72 Type 97 (Ki-27) fighters on Formosa and seems to believe these were the planes that occupied the airfield near Vigan, in Northern Luzon early in the battle. Do you have a source to resolve the discrepency? Not that I think that particular component significantly changes the scale. Just wondering...
> 
> When you say "*initial*" do you mean the first day? One of the enduring myths of the battle seems to be that most of the P-40s were knocked out the first day which according to Edmunds and Shores didn't happen. The losses amounted to about 20-25% (which is still high and not to diminish the nature of the tragedy) mainly the P-40Bs of the 20th and probably spares. But clearly a fair number of P-40s survived the first attacks on the 8th.


By initial I mean the JNAF attacks in central Luzon through Dec 10. There were no encounters between FEAF fighters and JAAF fighters until Dec 12 (Buzz Wagner's lone attack probably against 50th Flying Regiment at Aparri in N Luzon where he claimed several on the ground, none in the air in his initial reports though later he was also credited with aerial victories; the Japanese records for those operations didn't survive, the 50th's CO was quoted in the Japanese official history* as recalling that a single Type 97 was burned on the ground in that attack; the a/c had flown in on the 11th). And the first contact of any kind between FEAF and JAAF was Dec 10 (Type 97's, from Batan Isl between Formosa and Luzon, intercepted B-17, one Type 97 forcelanded; lone P-40 attacked formation of Type 99 Twin Lights, one Type 99 downed and the P-40). 

So, the PI air campaign divides itself fairly neatly between a short initial period to Dec 10 when a 90 plane Zero force mainly facilitated the neutralization of a FEAF containing a similar number of P-40's (somewhat more in inventory, though somewhat fewer in active squadron strength) and the JAAF and particularly its fighter force was largely irrelevant; then a much longer period where a relatively small remnant of the FEAF fighter force mainly faced JAAF fighters based on Luzon but was mainly serving as recon and light strike a/c and avoiding fighter combat; the remnant of the B-17 force quit the PI for DEI and Australia not long into the campaign as well. 

Of course JNAF bombers achieved a lot of the actual destruction Dec 8-10, but could have fared very differently without escorts, or at least it's much more plausible to 'what if' a situation where the FEAF could have 'upped its game' to effectively counter such a/c if unescorted. Even in China in 1937 JNAF Type 96 Land Attack often suffered heavy losses in the initial long range operations beyond the reach of their fighters, to the likes of Chinese Boeing 281's (ie P-26's) and Curtiss Hawk biplanes; and the Type 1 Land Attack's performance wasn't hugely greater, especially considering the P-40's superiority to 1937 Chinese fighters.

The Zero force with its ability to operate over central Luzon directly from Formosa was the key to the swift neutralization of the FEAF, and it's hard IMO to come up with a plausible 'what if' to change that story completely, though better airfield defence, especially passive measures, could have at least stretched out the process. Yet, that Zero force was not significantly, if at all, numerically superior to the modern fighter component of FEAF.

*Sensi Sosho vol 34; in some cases 'Bloody Shambles' co-author Izawa adds info about other periods from other Japanese sources, photo's from other sources too, but for PI campaign virtually every item of Japanese info in Shambles seems to be directly from Senshi Sosho, and SS has a few additional things omitted in Shambles. Also Shambles has a fair number of mistakes and omissions from US side of PI campaign as can be seen from Bartsch's more in-depth books. Still a great book overall of course, Shambles.

Joe


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 11, 2012)

Great stuff Joe, 

I kinda thought you might mean the _initial phase_ of the campaign as opposed to just the raids on the 8th. Of course, I have to add Bartsch's _Doomed _to my growing list of books to buy. I doubt our local library has a copy, and also to finally procure Shores' volume II. Here's a link to Edmunds in the event you haven't previously seen it. 

THey fought with what they had: the story of the Army Air Forces in the ... - Walter Dumaux Edmonds - Google Books

OC


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## davebender (Feb 11, 2012)

That only matters for heavy bomber units.

Light bombardment squadrons are supposed to sink IJA troop transports. Which means they should operate from airfields located near the best landing beaches. Average mission distance should only be about 100 miles.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 12, 2012)

Which would be fine and dandy if you had airfields conveniently located within 100 miles of most potential landing beaches. Especially airfields with 3000+ ft runways which you need to get an A-20 into the air. Add about another 1000ft to clear a 50 ft tree. 

And that is at normal gross weight. that same 4000ft to the trees is good for a B-17 at 50,000lbs. 

Even with a extra couple of months you are not going to get multiple (as in a 1/2 dozen or more) bomber airfields built. You not only need the grass runway but you need fueling facilities, maintenance facilities, bomb storage? and you need to be able to supply these airfields.

Your idea used to be using A-20s to replace all but a handful of the B-17s. You are biasing the defense of the Philippines on one mission, performed by one aircraft. And that aircraft not only cannot reach Formosa, it can't even reach parts of the Philippines from bases in the Philippines and make it back to it's base.

Edit> If the Japanese could reach Clark Field then any airfield north of Clark was subject to attack.


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## varsity078740 (Feb 12, 2012)

The more I study this subject, the more I realize that much of what was published years ago regarding FEAF was wrong. Sometimes there was exaggeration, other times minimalization. Newly found photos crop up all the time giving us a more accurate description of what was going on prior to the attack. In 2002 I had the opportunity to spend around two weeks with a number of Bataan vets while on a trip to the PI for the 60th anniversary of the fall of Bataan. Among them were former enlisted men from the 17th Pursuit, 28th Bomb Squadron, and 7th Material Squadron and the 34th Pursuit Squadron. The men from the 28th and 7th were at Clark on Dec 8th and gave me some insight into the actual condidtions there. Among other things, it turns out that there were a number of decoys there including P-40, P-35, B-18 and B-17, all built by Filipino contractors. There were a number of revetments built which actually minimized damage to the B-17s from bombing,
the majority being destroyed by strafers. There's an excellent site that has some great shots of Clark prewar including pics of the decoys. The site is run by the son of a POW who was at Clark and was in the same squadron as one of the vets I met on my trip. Check it out. www.alyoung.com/MyFathers_Captivity/Images/


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## davebender (Feb 12, 2012)

Sinking enemy troop transports before they can unload is the only defensive measure guaranteed to defeat an amphibious invasion. So yes, I'm biased towards that mission.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 12, 2012)

But you cannot guarantee the sinking of those transports due weather or darkness. You cannot strike the invasion sites (a least many of them) from bases beyond the reach of Japanese air power. You cannot reach some of the further Philippine Islands. you cannot interdict shipping (or even try to) in most of the South China sea or even, from any historical bases, in parts of the Sulu sea. You would be depending on just a handful of B-17s for long range reconnaissance or Navy flying boats. You cannot use the A-20s as emergency transports. You need 2-4 times the number of A-20s to deliver the same tonnage of bombs even to targets within their their limited range. 
While the defense of the Philippines was a gamble, going for the A-20s is an all or nothing roll of the dice. *IF* they sink enough of the transports you win. If they don't you have a much less capable air group with which to fight the rest of the battle.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 12, 2012)

The DB-7A was credited with pretty low attrition rate during the Battle of France. The planes being with R-1830s aboard, unlike the newer versions that had R-2600s. So, even when contested with a formidable LW of 1940 (plus its thousands of light Flak), plane fared well. 
The most likely opponent at Philippines, Zero, was slower than Bf-109E-3 from BoF. Actually, A-20 was as fast as Zero down low, topping 340 mph at it's best altitude. Of course, the Japanese Flak to encounter might be only from ships, just a trace when compared wit what LW had in France 18-20 months ago. 

By the tame Japanese have disembarked, their positions are known, and obviously closer to the airbases the US bombers might be based when compared with ships that might sail at open seas. Advantage to the defender.

One might say that 50 Beaufighters would be of better use to the CW forces in Malaya than those two battleships.


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## JoeB (Feb 12, 2012)

varsity078740 said:


> The men from the 28th and 7th were at Clark on Dec 8th and gave me some insight into the actual condidtions there. Among other things, it turns out that there were a number of decoys there including P-40, P-35, B-18 and B-17, all built by Filipino contractors. There were a number of revetments built which actually minimized damage to the B-17s from bombing,
> the majority being destroyed by strafers.


Varsity, 
that's very interesting, but the link didn't work when I tried it. 

Joe


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## varsity078740 (Feb 12, 2012)

I'm facinated by all this talk about A-20s taking out ships in a late 1941 context. Pilots weren't trained in anti ship tactics
and skip bombing methods later used in the Bismark sea hadn't been invented yet.

Duane


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 12, 2012)

varsity078740 said:


> In 2002 I had the opportunity to spend around two weeks with a number of Bataan vets while on a trip to the PI for the 60th anniversary of the fall of Bataan. Among them were former enlisted men from the 17th Pursuit, 28th Bomb Squadron, and 7th Material Squadron and the 34th Pursuit Squadron. The men from the 28th and 7th were at Clark on Dec 8th and gave me some insight into the actual condidtions there. Among other things, it turns out that there were a number of decoys there including P-40, P-35, B-18 and B-17, all built by Filipino contractors. There were a number of revetments built which actually minimized damage to the B-17s from bombing,
> the majority being destroyed by strafers. There's an excellent site that has some great shots of Clark prewar including pics of the decoys. The site is run by the son of a POW who was at Clark and was in the same squadron as one of the vets I met on my trip. Check it out. www.alyoung.com/MyFathers_Captivity/Images/



Wish I had known more about the FEAF campaign when I was in the PI in '74, 82, and 83... I made a trip out to Corregidor island by Banka boat and saw the death march memorials lining the highway on the east shore of the Bataan Pensula but could have seen so much more. None of the books I've been reading lately were written and of course the internet didnt exist then. The damage due to the IJA shelling on corrregidor was impressive: concrete blocks the size of houses overturned on top of big guns if my memory serves. Everything I saw at Clark was new. 

Duane, your link doesn't seem to work.



varsity078740 said:


> I'm facinated by all this talk about A-20s taking out ships in a late 1941 context. Pilots weren't trained in anti ship tactics
> and skip bombing methods later used in the Bismark sea hadn't been invented yet.
> Duane



The one squadron that might have done some good was the 27th Bomb Group (light) of 54 A-24's whose aircrew ended up in the PI without their mounts. The dozen planes or so that got to Java don't appear to have fared well or contributed much, being flown by relatively untrained replacement pilots (assuming Edmunds is correct). He claims Navy VB experienced pilots reached out with an offer to train the pilots but the USAAF refused their assistance and apparently the Navy Brass also nixed the idea too. 

That might be the most promising part of Dave's suggestion, assuming an alternate history that reunites the original pilots with their aircraft. However, just getting the planes and pilots together wouldn't be enough. The A-24s, like their companion 18 P-40s on the Pensacola convoy arrived in Oz sans some critical components that made their numbers irrelevant. An apparently herculean effort to work around these shortcomings was undertaken. I assume the original crews of the A-24s were better trained than the ones that ended up flying the dozen or so that appeared to have gotten into combat in Java. 54 arriving in the PI appears a goodly number but their survival would have depended on _*a chain of what-ifs that had to play out perfectly *_in the modified time line. In the end, I still think there was little that could be done, beyond delaying the inevitable. As pointed out elsewhere in the forum. The people involved had to shake off a peacetime mindset. A logistical base had to be built almost from scratch and assets both human, facilties and hardware had to be created to fight the long war. It seemed that what ever could go wrong did go wrong. The combination of logistical difficults, mind set, and unfavorable initial conditions created to deep a hole.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 12, 2012)

The DB-7 with the R-1830 engines had, according to one source, 205 US gallons of fuel. One model of the DB-7 had the R-2600s and still had 205 gallons. the DB-7B is supposed to have had the R-2600s and 394 gallons. These planes were intended to be high performance, _short ranged_ planes that took part in the land battle much like a Stuka. Thinking that they are medium bombers with a funny name is a mistake 

Initial B-25s with R-2600 engines carried 912 gallons but when fitted with self sealing tanks and armor fuel capacity dropped to 694 gallons. Lockheed Hudson's carried around 630-640 US gallons in the wings for their R-1830s.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 12, 2012)

Now that we are talking about the other US bombers, I wonder how well would've fared? Maryland, or Hudson, in 'defend the PI' assignment? Maryland (with different name) fared pretty good in French hands back in 1940.


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## varsity078740 (Feb 12, 2012)

JoeB said:


> Varsity,
> that's very interesting, but the link didn't work when I tried it.
> 
> Joe



Try this:

Photos - My Father's Captivity


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 12, 2012)

works. Thanks.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 12, 2012)

The Hudson might be the only real alternative. The last of a 150 plane order for Maryland IIs was completed in April of 1941 and the first Baltimore doesn't roll out until late 41. Whatever is sent has to be on board ship in Aug/Sept in order to be delivered, assembled, test flown and then trained with in time to do any good at all. Just about any other "medium" bomber is available in too few numbers to really do anything. 38 B-23 built, few dozen early B-25s may be available as are few dozen early B-26s but the high stalling speed would probably rule the B-26 out from grass runways.


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## davebender (Feb 13, 2012)

Without proper training it wouldn't matter if FEAF were equipped with F-15Es. They would still fail to intercept IJN airstrikes and bombs would still fail to hit anything besides the ocean. Then half the fighters would be destroyed on the ground after Gen. Brereton orders pilots to lunch en mass. 

So let's assume competent leaders who know how to train aircrew are part of the package.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 13, 2012)

From what I've read, assuming all supply problems solved and A-24 aircraft early arrival, A situation is produced wherin the probably 18 or so grounded P-40Bs destroyed at Clark could have provided an AVG-similar high altitude intercept capabilty especially if all aircraft are flown from camouflaged secret bases. The A-24s should provide a potent offensive punch at virtually any point on Luzon flying from either Clark or Nichols. I believe the 1,000 pound bomb radius was about 225 miles and 500# pound range used for CV searches was closer to 300 miles. I can't recall whether these ranges are in nm or sm. WRT to secret airfield construction, the Dutch were apparently able to build, fairly quickly, well hidden airfields from rice paddy and jungle environment. The A-24's could have enjoyed the lower altitude capabili escorts of the P-40Bs bringing the zeros into a somewhat more favorable engagement situation where many would be focused on countering the A-24s. Of course this is still assuming ideal circumstances where you are only able to catch the transports * in dayilight, in good weather, nearer to shore and before they've unloaded* . To be be more robustly effective you need a good antishipping bomber with longer legs (add about another 100-150 miles for one day grace) or airfields appropriately fashioned nearer all the potential beachheads which in reality were VERY widely separated.

Each beachhead distributed airfield would need to be able to handle about 18 fighters and about as many A-24s, with no less than a dozen of each continually being operational. That means installing a far better communication system than existed at the time. A lot of wire stringing or very reliable wireless voice comm. Add a few miles for denavalized weight lightening.


Apology for the continous editing if anyone is attempting to keep up... 

 again!! Found the SBD range reference.... I am assuming, based on published numbers (Lundstrom Fletcher book) 175 and 225 nm that max combat radius was 200 and 260 sm with the 1942 CV battles providing the basis for the estimate.


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## davebender (Feb 13, 2012)

These would be little more then forward area arming and refueling points.

Long range search aircraft such as the PBYs of Patrol Wing 10 typically provided one to two days warning of approaching IJA troop transports. That gives you time to ferry A-24s and their P-40 escorts to the correct forward area airfield. Until then A-24s remain hidden away in a secure location. You don't piddle them away trying to sink Japanese warships.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 13, 2012)

davebender said:


> Long range search aircraft such as the PBYs of Patrol Wing 10 typically provided one to two days warning of approaching IJA troop transports. That gives you time to ferry A-24s and their P-40 escorts to the correct forward area airfield. Until then A-24s remain hidden away in a secure location. You don't piddle them away trying to sink Japanese warships.



Good points, of course you want to hit them as early as possible when weather allows.

I should add, that researching the A-24 range issue in USN published data confirms for me the desirability of using actual operational mission examples for such quantities.


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## JoeB (Feb 13, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> The A-24s should provide a potent offensive punch at virtually any point on Luzon flying from either Clark or Nichols. I believe the 1,000 pound bomb radius was about 225 miles and 500# pound range used for CV searches was closer to 300 miles. I can't recall whether these ranges are in nm or sm.
> ... Found the SBD range reference.... I am assuming, based on published numbers (Lundstrom Fletcher book) 175 and 225 nm that max combat radius was 200 and 260 sm with the 1942 CV battles providing the basis for the estimate.


Somewhat strangely, since the USN quoted a/c speeds in kts, all official USN data for their a/c ranges in WWII era are in statute, ie land, miles. Even when authors quote US WWII naval a/c ranges in nautical miles, they are often mistakenly assuming the official ranges are nm, rather than correctly converting the official land mile ranges.

The SBD-5 without drop tanks had similar characteristics to the SBD-2/3 which USN used in 1942 and which equated to early A-24's. The SBD-5's official radius with 1000# bomb was quoted in the original document "Airplane Characteristics and Performance" dated June 1 1944 as 240 statute miles. However this assumed highly conservative reserves for carrier operations (which are given in detail in the document). A land based SBD could be expect to safely range farther, especially in a mainly overland flight, as from a Luzon base against transports unloading just offshore.

Note though that we have a reality check on Army A-24's v Japanese shipping only a few months later in the DEI. They managed to sink one Japanese transport, a relatively unusual event for the Allies in that portion of the war, and avoided interception by Zeroes. But on one of the two missions their P-40 escort was almost wiped out by Zeroes. Eventually the A-24's also would have suffered heavy losses to Zeroes (as they eventually did in New Guinea, after which the USAAF swore off the a/c for use in areas with enemy fighters).

IMHO some 'what ifs' have a hard time dealing with the basic reality that Japanese air units at this stage of the war were just better trained and prepared than US Army ones. Switching around the types of a/c might gain another bomb hit here or there but isn't going to change anything dramatically. The bottom line is that the modern US Army fighter force could not stand on equal terms with the Zero force. This was repeatedly demonstrated in encounters over the early months of the war beyond the PI; it applied as much or more for the other Allied fighter arms in action at the time (RAF, Dutch). And there was a strict ceiling on what bombers could accomplish in face of enemy fighter superiority. 

OTOH if you magically assume USAAF competence typical of around a year later, even B-17 units will score hits against ships in low altitude strikes, including at night (as B-17's did in several cases in Solomons in late 42-early 43), besides P-40 units standing up to Zeroes on at least roughly equal terms (though still no better than that); and IJN AA was even more deficient against such attacks in Dec 41 as a year later. But it's unrealistic. The USAAC of Dec '41, trying desperately to expand in size from a quite small force even in 1940, just wasn't the USAAF of spring 1943. It was necessarily cutting lots of corners on material and training readiness to build raw numbers, and its leaders were still subject to a peacetime mentality, in particular to systematically underestimating a potential opponent about whom they knew almost nothing. Frankly the latter tendency still has slight echoes even now, 70 years later, which makes it all the more ironic to assume the USAAC of then could have understood and countered Japanese capabilities. There was no alternative to US forces learning hard lessons about the Japanese in defeat, IMO.

Joe


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## JoeB (Feb 13, 2012)

delete double post


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 13, 2012)

An excellent summary Joe! I was remiss in not adding the poor quality of VP operations at that stage of the war which didn't really improve substantially until the later half of 1942 with the maturation of black cat operations and better aircraft communications ID organization.... the latter sounds like it would require a pretty simple fix but it took a while to incorporate. 

As you and others have more eloquently ponted out, the USA just wasn't ready for war in any of he many ways it needed to be as a nation and it took almost a year for the shock of PH and war to wear off. Looking at the USA's military capability as only specificaions on paper fails to reveal just how unprepared it was beyond numbers and strategy. How could the US force of modern cruisers have been beaten so badly at Savo Island? On paper it makes no sense whatsoever, considering the USN had search and fire control RADAR in its favor. Nearly a year after PH, the USA didn't know how to fight with the weapons it had, let alone with the ones it hoped to develop.It had yet to absorb just how good were the weapons and skill of its opponent. This despite the fact it had been warned by Chennault about the Zero and by Hart (I believe) about the Long Lance.


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## davebender (Feb 13, 2012)

Which is why they shouldn't be piddled away on missions that aren't important. The light bombardment group(s) should be at 100% strength 22 Dec 1941 when 27 Japanese troop transports steam into Lingayen Gulf. Destroy those transports and the battle is won, even if it costs every aircraft in FEAF.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 13, 2012)

Dave, 

Let's look at a successful example of this kind of an operation and try to extrpolate back in time. The date is November 16, 1942. Enterprise dive bombers and those from Henderson field have searched for and found the 11 transports carrying 7,000 troops and their dozen or so surface escorts (mainly DDs) they have been expecting, all heading South to reinforce the IJA Guadacanal garrison. The IJN convoy is cyclically covered by perhaps 6 zeros from the nearby Junyo or from land based staged through Buka. Recall that this action occurs after the IJN's big deck carriers have had their air wings savaged during the battle of Santa Cruz so they are not able to play a role. The USN/USMC strike includes roughly 2 dozen aicraft (SBDs and TBFs) covered by 8 F4Fs and 4 Army P-39s. They were able to fataly damage 3 transports while losing none of their own US aircraft although some were damaged. Therafter the full weight of the combined Cactus and Enterprise strike force (over 40 VB with as many escorts) was felt as they apparently fataly damaged or sunk another 4 transports even though protected by a number of zeroes. But let's only consider the results of that first strike of the day. 

On December 22nd, 1941, the Japanese approached Lingayen Gulf with 76 transports carrying 80,000 IJA soldiers covered by a force of Formosa roughly 200 land and carrier based fighters which had apparent access to airfields in Northern Luzon if needed. Yes, the zeros would have been attrited by the air battles over Luzon, but they must have had replacements in the pipeline becaue their factories were building aircraft and they had interior lines of supply. Also, if things hadn't gone their way. They could ultimately call on 6 big deck carriers with over 100 fighters to cover their invasion fleet. Even if they hadn't been piddled away, it seems to me the odds are hugely stacked against them. Based on what happened a year later under far more benigh circumstances, they could take out perhaps a dozen of the 76 ships. That would have been a severe blow to the IJ forces but I don't think a fatal one. And the USAAF strike aircraft are being attrited with every attack they make. That's my devils advocate take on the situation. I wish it weren't so but that's how it looks to me. I think I mentioned I started out a week or so ago thinking something could be done to reverse the historic outcome and salavage some kind of victory from the disaster. I don't think that now... 

_What if _is a fun thing to do but in this case it just seems to be hopeless without some kind of miracle like a Pro-Phillipine version of the Divine Wind. 

PS: If you contest the smaller landings in the North and South you may prevent them from obtaining those smaller beachheads but you also attrite you small force of bombers which diminishes your ability to contest the main assault.

OC


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## davebender (Feb 14, 2012)

> On December 22nd, 1941, the Japanese approached Lingayen Gulf with 76 transports carrying 80,000 IJA soldiers


Where are you getting these numbers? The IJA assigned a low priority to the Philippine operation. IJA 14th Army that invaded during December 1941 was in fact just a weak infantry corps.

IJA 48th Infantry Divsion.
Landed at Lingayen Gulf using 27 troop transports.
Personnel and equipment at full strength but the unit was green as grass, having been raised on Formosa during 1940. LTG Homma considered this to be his only first rate ground combat unit.

IJA 16th Reserve Infantry Division.
Landed at Lamon Bay. As one would expect of a reserve unit this division had older equipment and personnel. Physical fitness and training were not up to active duty division standards.

IJA 65th Garrison Brigade.
Not part of the invasion per se. It was supposed to assume garrison duty after the U.S. surrender. However Japan transferred 48th Infantry Division to Java 14 January 1942, leaving Gen. Homma desperately short of infantry. So these military police were forced to participate in the Bataan operation.

Destroy IJA 48th Infantry Division by sinking their transports and the Japanese invasion of Luzon will be derailed. The relatively weak IJA 16th Reserve Division would be outnumbered 10 to 1. Even someone as inept as Big Mac can win that fight.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 14, 2012)

Chris Shores: Bloody Shambles. page 193 says 76 transports, plus two cruisers and 20 destroyers... Is he wrong? Of course if it's a total of about two dozen transports, taking out half may could make all the difference in detering further aggression.

OTOH, He states they proceeded down the gulf in three columns the first of which started landing the first of the total of 3.5 divisions you cite. This seems to correspond with the Guadacanal situation where a smaller force also approached in three columns. 

Where are your numbers coming from? Let's compare perhaps there's more here than I believed.


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## davebender (Feb 14, 2012)

*IJA 14th Army OOB.* As of 8 December 1941.
14th Army, Southern Expeditionary Army, Imperial Japanese Army, 8.12.1941
16th (Reserve) Infantry Division.
48th Infantry Division.
65th Garrison Brigade.
36 x Ki-27b fighter aircraft.
38 x M95 light tanks.
32 x M89 light tanks.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 14, 2012)

Which numbers? Chris Shores for the transports and the aircraft previously posted on Formosa and other sources for IJN carriers (I _*almost*_ know those without looking them up)

You've just listed another 36 Ki-27s I hadn't included in my totals! I haven't even been thinking about the ground forces, just focusing on USAAF assets and IJA IJN air assets in theater. One factor I found out about last night that could have hypothetically turned the tables, was the presence of the 27 USN submarines lying beneath Manilla bay!!! That's a lot of subs if only their torpedos had worked. Game over.


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## davebender (Feb 14, 2012)

36 Ki-27s were assigned to IJA 14th Army. 

What other Ki-27s are you counting? Aircraft, naval vessels, troops transports and IJA divisions assigned to support operations in Malaya (the priority Japanese operation) weren't available in the Philippines. In fact IJA 14th Army had to give up part of what little they had during January 1942 for higher priority operations elsewhere. From mid January to mid March 1942 the Japanese were badly outnumbered on Luzon. If Big Mac had shown any initiative at all he could have attacked from Bataan and overwhelmed the tiny IJA force containing him.


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## varsity078740 (Feb 14, 2012)

OK. I won't take a back seat to anyone on this thread when it comes to a knowledge of the ACTUAL history of what went down with the FEAF in the PI in '41-42. But these what'ifa, would'a, could'a, should'a scenarios are being taken to the extreme. History is what is. It seems to me IMHP that this thread has become a competition about who knows the most about troop strength , how many A/C were on hand and the performance of a number of aircraft that were never slated to go to the PI
in Operation Plum or any other effort to reinforce the PI prior to Dec. 8th. It was a combination of limited
resources, human error and bad luck that contributed to what happened in the PI on Dec. 8th. BUT, the bottom line is that the PI were lost regardless of what the FEAF could have done before or after the the initial attack.

Duane


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 14, 2012)

Somehow, I thought you meant there was another 36 aircraft in cargo holds for unloading. Sorry. But our numbers still don't agree.

According to Shores there were about 37+ Ki-27s operating out of small airstrips at Appari and Vigan in Northern Luzon after the 11th. According to Shores these were a portion of the 72 Ki-27s based on Formosa (the 24th Sentai at Hengchun and 50th Sentai at Chaochou each with 36 Ki-27s) both assigned to 14th army support. Some portion of these had flown in from Formosa via the small airfields on the recently captured Batan or Camiguin Islands. 

So I come back to the total fighter aircraft available being about 200 comprised of a mixture of A6M (90) and Ki-27 (72) on Formosa, A5M (28) including 12 on Formosa and 16 on the Ryujo). 

This compares to the number of fighters (about 176) Shores' seems to believe were available for operations in Indo China. That doesn't sound like a minimum effort in the PI, especially of you assume the big deck carriers were operating somewhere to the East of the PI and DEI to shield their Eastern flank. 

Shores' claims about 400 IJN (150+) IJA (260+) fighters were available for all ops to the South (PI, Malaya ultimately DEI) of the home islands. 

What is/are the source for a total of 36 Ki-27s supporting 14th army? Maybe Shores' is incorrect.


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## davebender (Feb 16, 2012)

> According to Shores there were about 37+ Ki-27s operating out of small airstrips at Appari and Vigan in Northern Luzon after the 11th.


That's plausible as it's only one more Ki-27 then was assigned to 14th Army on Dec 8, 1941. Apparently they received 1 more replacement then what was lost in combat. Those were the only aircraft assigned directly to 14th Army during December 1941.

During March 1942 the IJN assigned a 23rd Air Flotilla detachment to Luzon.
.....18 dive bombers. Probably Vals.
.....9 fighters. Probably Zeros.

Japanese 14th Army had no other naval aircraft in direct support. 11th Air Fleet bombed the Manila area from Formosa during the first week of December 1941 for the purpose of destroying American submarines and heavy bombers. After that task was accomplished those aircraft were transferred to the East Indies and eventually New Guinea.

Aircraft from CVL Ryujo were used only to cover amphibious landings. As of 20 December 1941 IJN Ryujo airwing consisted of 12 fighter aircraft and 16 torpedo bombers. That single fighter squadron isn't going to stop or even seriously hinder a mass attack escorted by a couple squadrons of P-40 fighter aircraft.


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## JoeB (Feb 16, 2012)

davebender said:


> 1. That's plausible as it's only one more Ki-27 then was assigned to 14th Army on Dec 8, 1941. Apparently they received 1 more replacement then what was lost in combat. Those were the only aircraft assigned directly to 14th Army during December 1941.
> 
> 2. During March 1942 the IJN assigned a 23rd Air Flotilla detachment to Luzon.
> .....18 dive bombers. Probably Vals.
> ...


But your basic scenario is a hodge podge of unrealistic what if assumption (that the FEAF would hide its strength until the Lingayen Gulf landings) put together with the actual lesser Japanese air strength by that time because *they knew the FEAF had been largely neutralized*.

Even assuming (unrealistically IMO) that the FEAF could have had any number of *properly trained and ready* A-24 units, they would have been used to counter the landings in Northern Luzon Dec 10, just as the B-17 force was, and the suriviving fighters too. I doubt a realistic size and capability A-24/P-40 force would have inflicted devastating damage on even that smaller Northern Luzon force. But in any case, the Japanese would have time and resources to realign things to meet that threat, by keeping the Tainan and 3rd Air Groups around (ie the landbased Zero force on Formosa, mainly transferred out by the time of the Lingayen landing and not supporting it), and even bringing in a/c from the main carrier force or that force itself, if FEAF resistance proved effective enough. 

But again, the thing that's hardest to plausibly 'what if' your way around is the manifest inability of USAAF P-40 units to meet Zeroes on anything like even terms in Dec 41-Mar 42, at least. A-24's covered by P-40's have the P-40's stripped away by Zeroes, then eventually fall prey to Zeroes. And a sudden springing of a huge trap at Lingayen, after allowing the Japanese to land unopposed in north Luzon (and Legaspi in the south), is totally unrealistic.

As far as historical order of battle items:
1. Both 24th and 50th Flying Regiments were on Luzon at the time of the Lingayen landings. Japanese Monograph No.11 states that 20 and 24 Type 97's from the two regiments provided air cover to the approaching convoy Dec 21. As of early January the total strength of the two regiments is given in Sensi Sosho 34 as 73 with 50 a/c serviceable. Meanwhile from Dec 8 to Jan 7, 4 and 12 Type 97's of the two regiments were 'damaged', though the cause of only a few of those loss/damage cases is known (1 burned on ground by Buzz Wagner Dec 12, 2 disappeared in weather over Lingayen Dec 22, one lost in accident Dec 27). The complete records of those units didn't survive, unlike relevant JNAF records which did.

2. The JNAF bombing component brought back to Luzon in March consisted of 18 Type 1 Rikko of the Takao Air Group, which bombed Corregidor in support of JAAF 'heavy' (ie Type 97, 'Sally') bomber units. They flew their first mission March 24 and their last April 17; two Type 1's were downed by AA fire from Corregidor over that period (source is Takao group's original combat reports, it's not mentioned in "Shambles"). A Tainan AG Zero detachment accompanied them but the few remaining FEAF a/c were avoiding contact. 

The JNAF deployment to Luzon more relevant to this discussion was the detachment of the Tainan AG sent to Legaspi in southern Luzon from Dec 14, initially 9 a/c later reinforced. They remained until early January, and besides one air combat with FEAF (they lost a Zero to a P-35A Dec 23 per their and FEAF's records, misreported in 'Shambles' as possible Phil AF P-26 victory Dec 24) also strafed Del Monte, and virtually wiped out the USN floatplane detachment at Bataan, increasing the American impression of a strong Japanese fighter force throughout the PI, despite their small number.

Anyway again, these Japanese strengths were based on needs. If the FEAF fighter force had survived longer in greater number, it could have slowed other Japanese operations by requiring more fighter strength, especially JNAF, to be kept against Luzon. But that's what the Japanese would have done. And a grand surprise trap Dec 22 by a previously undetected FEAF force is just pure fantasy, not how military organizations or operations work in real life.

Joe


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## davebender (Feb 16, 2012)

Have you looked at Japanese resources vs operation plans for December 1941? Japan had essentially no reserves at all. A serious defeat anywhere would have been catastrophic. 

If 1941 Japan had doubts about seizing Malaya and the Philippines with the historical forces allocated it would probably deter them from attacking in the first place. Japan would back down concerning their plans to control all of China. The U.S. military build up on Luzon would have achieved its objective.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 18, 2012)

varsity078740 said:


> OK. I won't take a back seat to anyone on this thread when it comes to a knowledge of the ACTUAL history of what went down with the FEAF in the PI in '41-42. But these what'ifa, would'a, could'a, should'a scenarios are being taken to the extreme. History is what is.



Duane, 

I am happy to defer to many knowledgeable folks in this forum, and have learned a great deal in the short time I have been hanging out here. I also think Dave's exercise has more value than you allow. I see it as a form of intelectual gaming. A _thought experiment_ to illuminate factors that might have contributed to the historical defeat. It may seem silly considering the wealth of literature on the subject, but I believe this kind of a discussion also creates an opportunity for education that may be a little more participatory or interactive than the passivity of sitting in a chair and reading. More often than not, this kind of discussion frequently leads to valuable literary recommendations. So far, the discussion of supporting literature has been a little disappointing.



varsity078740 said:


> It seems to me IMHP that this thread has become a competition about who knows the most about troop strength , how many A/C were on hand and the performance of a number of aircraft that were never slated to go to the PI
> in Operation Plum or any other effort to reinforce the PI prior to Dec. 8th.



I think you are correct that that the original objective of the thread, (as I understood it): _defining a hypothetical FEAF that might have prevented the fall of the PI_, has digressed a bit into an accounting of ground IJA ground forces that diverges from the original intent. However, it seem to me that defining the IJ USAAF air order of battle is a necessary initial exercise that provides a context for defining the _hypothetical force_ necessary to counter the invasion of the PI. Establishing the number of ships transporting the invasion force helps define the necessary requirement for success. Beyond that, it may become a basis for unhelpful contention and further digression.



varsity078740 said:


> It was a combination of limited resources, human error and bad luck that contributed to what happened in the PI on Dec. 8th. BUT, the bottom line is that the PI were lost regardless of what the FEAF could have done before or after the the initial attack.
> 
> Duane



I think you have correctly summarized the causal history, but in doing so also oversimplified a very complex situation, any element of which might be worthy of discussion. It's hard to argue with your last sentence but I don't think we (at least I don't) learn much by accepting it as a final, limiting statement. 

Given all the cited problems encountered during the 1941 PI campaign were some factors more damaging than others? Was defeat simply the result of a poorly defined FEAF aircraft fleet requirements/capabilities?


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## tomo pauk (Feb 18, 2012)

Great attitude, so far from I-know-all escapades frequently encountered here (coming sometimes also from yours truly).


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## JoeB (Feb 18, 2012)

davebender said:


> Have you looked at Japanese resources vs operation plans for December 1941? Japan had essentially no reserves at all. A serious defeat anywhere would have been catastrophic.


I'm quoting details of Japanese strength and deployments in the campaign including info directly from the records of Japanese air units involved, and you're asking me if I've ever looked into the subject, really?

It's hard to tell if you're basically confused or trying to confuse. The intial Japanese raids (Dec 8-10) in PI were supported by a force of around 90 Zeroes (Tainan and 3rd AG). This force suffered only light losses and was quickly mainly deployed to the southern PI and DEI to support further operations there. If OTOH the FEAF had proven harder to neutralize, the further operations might indeed have been delayed, but that Zero force could instead have been retained to support the Lingayen landings, and/or just spend more time to neutralize the FEAF figther force.

And as well, the main Mobile Force carrier unit was not committed to any operation in this period, besides Soryu and Hiryu supporting the seizure of Wake ca. Dec 23. At least the other 4 carriers, or all 6 if accepting some delay, could have been used to support PI operations, or their fighters could have been detached to land bases to do so, if necessary. The Mobile Force in fact served as a mainly uncommitted reserve from its return from the Hawaii operation until its commitment to the Indian Ocean operation in April 1942. In the meantime it only supported the seizure of Rabaul (it was massive overkill against that then lightly held Allied outpost), and some raids as part of DEI campaign (most notably v Darwin in Feb) and helping to mop up Allied shipping trying to escape Java at the end of that campaign.

So in summary, the set piece idea you keep harping on of an FEAF force able to inflict serious damage on the Lingayen landing convoy ca. Dec 22, v just the two Army fighter regiments covering it, has a gaping hole: the fighter cover was limited to just those two Army regiments and not the IJN's considerable available Zero force, because there *wasn't* a serious FEAF anymore by Dec 22, and the Japanese knew it. 

A more capable FEAF would still have had to overcome the Tainain/3rd AG Zero force, reinforced with Mobile Force's Zeroes if necessary. Those forces wouldn't have pulled away from PI if the FEAF P-40 force hadn't proved so easy to neutralize. And the P-40 units showed no signs of being able to contend with the Zero units on even terms, in PI or different units in DEI campaign in subsequent weeks either. Increasing strength of FEAF strike units would be useless because of the basic weakness in fighter unit quality/readiness to protect them, as well as unrealistic due to the same weaknesses as plagued the USAAC/F generally at the beginning of the war (lack of training in new types flown, lack of unit cohesion, bugs in new a/c types such as the P-40E's of FEAF).

I think you might do well to read up more on these early campaigns.

Joe


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## JoeB (Feb 18, 2012)

davebender said:


> Have you looked at Japanese resources vs operation plans for December 1941? Japan had essentially no reserves at all. A serious defeat anywhere would have been catastrophic.


I'm quoting details of Japanese strength and deployments in the campaign from Japanese language sources about the campaign, and you're asking me if I've ever looked into the subject, really?

It's hard to tell if you're basically confused or trying to confuse. The intial Japanese raids (Dec 8-10) in PI were supported by a force of around 90 Zeroes (Tainan and 3rd AG). This force suffered only light losses and was quickly mainly deployed to the southern PI and DEI to support further operations there. If OTOH the FEAF had proven harder to neutralize, the further operations might indeed have been delayed, but that Zero force could instead have been retained to support the Lingayen landings, and/or just spend more time to neutralize the FEAF figther force.

And as well, the main Mobile Force carrier unit was not committed to any operation in this period, besides Soryu and Hiryu supporting the seizure of Wake ca. Dec 23. At least the other 4 carriers, or all 6 if accepting some delay, could have been used to support PI operations, or their fighters could have been detached to land bases to do so, if necessary. The Mobile Force in fact served as a mainly uncommitted reserve from its return from the Hawaii operation until its commitment to the Indian Ocean operation in April. In the meantime it only supported the relatively less important seizure of Rabaul (against which it was overkill), and some raids as part of DEI campaign (most notably v Darwin) and helping to mop up Allied shipping trying to escape Java at the end of that campaign.

So in summary, the set piece idea you keep harping on of an FEAF force able to inflict serious damage on the Lingayen landing convoy ca. Dec 22, v just the two Army fighter regiments covering it, has a gaping hole: the fighter cover was limited to just the two Army regiments and not the IJN's considerable available Zero force, because there *wasn't* a serious FEAF force by Dec 22. 

A more capable FEAF would still have had to overcome the Tainain/3rd AG Zero force, reinforced with Mobile Force's Zeroes if necessary. Those forces wouldn't have pulled away from PI if the FEAF P-40 force hadn't proved so easy to neutralize. And the P-40 units showed no signs of being able to contend with the Zero units on even terms, in PI or different units in DEI campaign in subsequent weeks either. Increasing strength of FEAF strike units would be useless because of the basic weakness in fighter unit quality/readiness to protect them, as well as unrealistic due to the same weaknesses as plagued the USAAC/F generally at the beginning of the war (lack of training in new types flown, lack of unit cohesion, bugs in new a/c types such as the P-40E's of FEAF).

I think you might do well to read up more on these early campaigns.

Joe


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 18, 2012)

JoeB said:


> But your basic scenario is a hodge podge of unrealistic what if assumption (that the FEAF would _*hide its strength until the Lingayen Gulf landings *_put together with the actual lesser Japanese air strength by that time because *they knew the FEAF had been largely neutralized*.



Joe, I didn't get that (about a Lingayen Gulf surprise attack), but maybe I missed something. It seems to me a reasonable argument supposes the historical battle must procede from the December 8 attack, but contested with the FEAF forces defined by the thread participant with plausibly camoflaged fields to make the force more resistent to attrition. I do get the impression that Dave diminishes the importance of IJ Air force reinforcement which seems to hobble Japan with the same logistical limitations as USAAF forces in the PI. I would envision it to be an intense battle of attrition weighted heavily in favor of an IJ Air force able to replenish its losses.



JoeB said:


> Even assuming (unrealistically IMO) that the FEAF could have had any number of *properly trained and ready* A-24 units, they would have been used to counter the landings in Northern Luzon Dec 10, just as the B-17 force was, and the suriviving fighters too. I doubt a realistic size and capability A-24/P-40 force would have inflicted devastating damage on even that smaller Northern Luzon force.



According to Bartsch, the A-24 group that arrived in the PI (sans aircraft) was comprised of well trained and I infer, high time pilots. They weren't the rookies that comprised the bulk of the pilots in some of the Pursuit squadrons. And yes, I wouldn't expect them to hide but rather to engage at the first hint of an invading force where ever it occurred. There were many more airfields in the PI than I previously realized (Bartsch again) and I believe resisting each landing could have been a possibility if the A-24 force or some other with antishipping attack capability, had been in place. 54 A-24's is equivalent to 3 squadrons of Dauntlesses and that same amount proved to be fairly devastating at Midway 6 months later. I know this might provoke a discussion of why and how that number achieved such success but that's another discussion. however, it must be said that three squadrons is also a number that can be attrited to ineffectuality fairly quickly. 



JoeB said:


> But again, the thing that's hardest to plausibly 'what if' your way around is the manifest inability of USAAF P-40 units to meet Zeroes on anything like even terms in Dec 41-Mar 42, at least. A-24's covered by P-40's have the P-40's stripped away by Zeroes, then eventually fall prey to Zeroes. And a sudden springing of a huge trap at Lingayen, after allowing the Japanese to land unopposed in north Luzon (and Legaspi in the south), is totally unrealistic.



I think this might be diminishing the quality of the P-40E a little too much. My main concern with respect to the P-40 is its unsuitability as a high altitude interceptor. Encountering zeros while escorting A-24's at probably 15-20,000 feet is a different matter and may play more to the (few) strengths of the P-40E, (armor, its diving ability and its heavy armament) That seemed to work during the Java campaign although it doesn't seem to have been a game changer. It does seem to have allowed the P-40Es to survive Zero encounters and score some (very) limited success there.



JoeB said:


> As far as historical order of battle items:
> 1. Both 24th and 50th Flying Regiments were on Luzon at the time of the Lingayen landings. Japanese Monograph No.11 states that 20 and 24 Type 97's from the two regiments provided air cover to the approaching convoy Dec 21. As of early January the total strength of the two regiments is given in Sensi Sosho 34 as 73 with 50 a/c serviceable. Meanwhile from Dec 8 to Jan 7, 4 and 12 Type 97's of the two regiments were 'damaged', though the cause of only a few of those loss/damage cases is known (1 burned on ground by Buzz Wagner Dec 12, 2 disappeared in weather over Lingayen Dec 22, one lost in accident Dec 27). The complete records of those units didn't survive, unlike relevant JNAF records which did.
> 
> 2. The JNAF bombing component brought back to Luzon in March consisted of 18 Type 1 Rikko of the Takao Air Group, which bombed Corregidor in support of JAAF 'heavy' (ie Type 97, 'Sally') bomber units. They flew their first mission March 24 and their last April 17; two Type 1's were downed by AA fire from Corregidor over that period (source is Takao group's original combat reports, it's not mentioned in "Shambles"). A Tainan AG Zero detachment accompanied them but the few remaining FEAF a/c were avoiding contact.
> ...



Great stuff and an interesting source which I might add somewhat redeems the discussion wrt the paucity of sources to date.


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## JoeB (Feb 18, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> I think you have correctly summarized the causal history, but in doing so also oversimplified a very complex situation, any element of which might be worthy of discussion. It's hard to argue with your last sentence but I don't think we (at least I don't) learn much by accepting it as a final, limiting statement.
> 
> Given all the cited problems encountered during the 1941 PI campaign were some factors more damaging than others? Was defeat simply the result of a poorly defined FEAF aircraft fleet requirements/capabilities?


In the big picture I would actually agree with varsity's 'final limiting statement'. This is an airplane discussion board, and I'm a WWII airplane fan too, but you have to look at the basic seapower situation to evaluate the big picture of first PI campaign. As long as the US Pacific Fleet was crippled, or anyway wasn't going to sortie quickly and in strength to relieve the PI, the US position in PI was hopeless. Eventually the US force there would run out of fuel and munitions (although if it could hold large physical areas of the PI it could feed itself, unlike the actual situation where the main force was backed into Bataan then largely starved into defeat).

The FEAF could conceivably have inflicted more serious losses on the Japanese invasion convoys at Aparri (N Luzon) Legaspi (S Luzon) and eventually the larger Lingayen Gulf landings (though never would have allowed the first two only to 'spring a trap' on the third: totally unrealistic). But in fact the Japanese were not that critically short of merchant type shipping at that stage of the war, and captured a good deal as they advanced. So FEAF delaying Japanese plans by causing heavier shipping losses and/or forcing JNAF units to dwell on Luzon longer is plausible. But FEAF 'defeating' the Japanese seizure of PI: not plausible. Only the main force of the USN could have done that by being ready to, then successfully executing, a decisive fleet action to relieve the PI. And that just wasn't going to happen after the PH attack; it's an interesting 'what if' whether the USN could have pulled it off *without* there having been a PH attack.

If you read personal recollections of many PI veterans, it was common knowledge among them that relief from the US by sea was their only real hope. And their morale was sustained by the belief that it would still happen, however impossible we know that was with hindsight.

Joe


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## JoeB (Feb 18, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> 1. I didn't get that (about a Lingayen Gulf surprise attack), but maybe I missed something. It seems to me a reasonable argument supposes the historical battle must procede from the December 8 attack, but contested with the FEAF forces defined by the thread participant with plausibly camoflaged fields to make the force more resistent to attrition.
> 
> 2. According to Bartsch, the A-24 group that arrived in the PI (sans aircraft) was comprised of well trained and I infer, high time pilots. They weren't the rookies that comprised the bulk of the pilots in some of the Pursuit squadrons. And yes, I wouldn't expect them to hide but rather to engage at the first hint of an invading force where ever it occurred. There were many more airfields in the PI than I previously realized (Bartsch again) and I believe resisting each landing could have been a possibility if the A-24 force or some other with antishipping attack capability, had been in place.
> 
> 3. I think this might be diminishing the quality of the P-40E a little too much. My main concern with respect to the P-40 is its unsuitability as a high altitude interceptor. Encountering zeros while escorting A-24's at probably 15-20,000 feet is a different matter and may play more to the (few) strengths of the P-40E, (armor, its diving ability and its heavy armament) That seemed to work during the Java campaign although it doesn't seem to have been a game changer. It does seem to have allowed the P-40Es to survive Zero encounters and score some (very) limited success there.


1. The Lingayen landing was the third on Luzon. The FEAF put its maximum (then remaining) effort on the smaller landing at Aparri in northern Luzon Dec 10, then had very little left for the landings at Legaspi in southern Luzon Dec 12, or the bigger landing at Lingayen Gulf the 22nd. This same pattern must be assumed IMO to have a remotely realistic scenario. So, even if the A-24's score significant success against the Aparri landings (covered by relatively limited numbers of Army Type 97's and Navy 0's) the Japanese can adjust to that by keeping the bulk of Tainan/3rd AG's deployed v PI which they didn't in actual history...because it was apparent the FEAF was neutralized.

2. But lack of individual pilot total hours wasn't most of the problem with USAAC units in this period. It was stuff like the historical problem with A-24 deployment: didn't have their planes, or, hadn't trained intensively in *those* types, which might prove to have bugs, as the recently received P-40E's did (gun chargers, rendering the armament useless in some early combat sorties). IMO it's totally unrealistic to compare such units to USN VS/VB squadrons of summer 1942, which had been cohesive units flying the same a/c in pretty intensive training for months before the war, then stepped up after Dec '41, and also those units had shakedown combats in the carriers raids v Japanese islands in early 1942. In fact it encapsulates the whole issue IMO, as I stated it earlier: if you assume unit effectiveness of USAAF units typical of late 42-early 43 (the USN had a headstart on them in readiness, since they weren't expanding hand over fist in 1940-41 like the Air Corps was), many things are possible. But the Army air units of late '41 just didn't have those capabilities. Individually competent pilots, yes, but high level of combat effectiveness as units: they proved repeatedly that they did not.

3. The kill ratio of P-40 units in the DEI campaign v Zeroes was considerable *worse* than that in the limited number of actual P-40/Zero combats in the PI, around 1:7 v perhaps 1:3+ (actual causes of Zero losses in the early raids, AA, P-40 or other, are hard to determine even with detailed Japanese records, most of the a/c lost were only known not to have returned). And in the brief sampling of P-40/A-24 teaming in the defense of Java, the A-24's did sink one Japanese transport w/o being intercepted on one mission, but a P-40 escort force was largley wiped out defending them on the other mission. Another book by Bartsch covering this period is "Every Day a Nightmare" but the basics are in "Bloody Shambles". Also in a slightly different context against mostly land targets, USAAF A-24's supported by RAAF Kittyhawks/USAAF P-39's in New Guinea in spring/summer 1942 proved at high risk to Zeroes. The USAAF swore off the plane after an A-24 force with P-39 escort was virtually wiped out, in July 1942.

Joe


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## varsity078740 (Feb 18, 2012)

In the 1930s the Army concluded that the War Plan Orange strategy for defense/relief of the PI was untenable. Consequently the was little or no effort to modernize the what eventuall became FEAF. That changed abruptly when the political and military decision was made to turn the PI into a base for offensive missions against the Japanese homeland. The idea was to intimidate the Japanese and make them think twice about striking the PI. The War Department put the cart before the horse and decided to rush all available heavy bombardment to the PI without a splinter of the infrastructure required to support them. Brereton was shocked at the total lack of facilities to the support the B-17s already there when he arrived in Nov. '41. It was the same situation for other A/C(and pilots) that arrived prior to Dec 8th. More avaiable A/C on Dec. 8th would just have created a more target rich enviroment fot the Japanese. The FEAF failed because the overall
defense policy for the PI was a failure waiting to happen.

Duane


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 18, 2012)

The 1941-42 PI campaign has been discussed nearly to ad nauseum. Yet it still evidently facinates... 

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/po...aaf-debacle-philippines-dec-1941-a-29897.html and, 

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/po...s-far-eastern-campaign-1941-1942-a-31741.html

I came aboard the forum with a preconception (From reading Costello and Layton mainly) that Mac should have been tarred and feather run out of town on a rail for his performance or lack thereof. Fortunately, I benefited greatly from forum members who knew more info than my limited reading provided. (Renrich especially!) Reading Bartsch: "_*Doomed...*_", the real cuprit has been identified and search parties have been dispersed to find his cemetery and gravesite for intended urination on his plot. 

Here is a timeline that may help identify the culprit:
Prior to 10/41: The *3rd* Pursuit Squadron (PS) (~ 12 pilots) has been in the PI since 1919 (!!) now with *22 P-26A*s. Loss of PI to IJ aggression assumed.
10/23/40: SecNav Knox announces plan to update the PI speedbump with the *17th* and *20th* PS, to be equipped with *57 ex-Swedish P-35A*s.
11/23/40: ~ 12 of 20th PS's pilots (pre class *40-H*) arrive PI, 
12/5/40: ~12 of 17th PS's pilots (pre class *40-H*) arrive PI
2/10/41: 24 pilots (class *40-H*) arrive PI on Etolin. 5 to 17th PS, 6 to 20th PS 5 to 3rd PS, soon begin training in A-27 P-26
3/31/41: 52 of planned 57 P-35As arrive in PI
5/4/41: BGen H. Claggert arrives PI assumes command of PI Dept. AF with CoS H. George, with PS background. 
5/6/41: Buzz Wagner becomes CO of 17th PS Joe Moore CO of 20th PS.
5/8/41 USAT Washington delivers 39 Pilots (Class *41-B*) to PI. 8 each to each of the 3 PSs.
~ 5/15/41: training begins: _*3-4 hrs in A-27, 10-15 hrs. in P-26A, 50-55 hrs. in P-35A (gunnery formation flt), before transition to promised P-40B*_
5/17/41: _*31 P-40B fighters arrive in PI*_. (_*Without prestone coolant, O2 Production equipment and .50 cal. ammo necessary for flying fighting)*_. A/C divied among squadrons as: 25 for 20th PS, 2 each for 3rd and 17th PS.
6/24/41: President Pierce arrives in PI with 96 pilots (68 of class *41-C * 28 of class *41-D*, the latter completed fight training 5/30), 22 going to the 3rd PS, 21 going to the 17th, 20 to the 20th PS. 
~ 6/30/41: Most class *41-B* pilots nearing completion of P-35A training phase. 
7/2/41: 3rd PS (12 P-35As + 7 P-26As) and 20th PS (14P-35As + 6 P-26As) move A/C to Clark AB 17th PS (13 P-35As + 7 P-26As) moves A/C to Iba Airfield for gunnery training.
3rd PS 20th PS class *41C* -D pilots begin training syllabus, 
*~7/7/41 Prestone coolant arrives, allowing P-40B transition training for 20th PS. * 
~ 7/15/41: 3rd PS 20th PS class *41-B* complete training syllabus despite training delays due to Typhoon/Monsoon weather. 
~ 7/15/41:,3rd 17th PS safety rules officially undermined, with command assuming recent arrivals possessed equivalent training as prior pilots; leads to an epidemic of crashes. Losses in aircraft pilots ~ combat.
~ July 31, 1941: *20th PS begins to transition to P-40B A/C*. Castoff P-35As slowly replaces training losses in 3rd PS.
~ 8/1/1941(?): oxygen production plant ordered from states, never arrives...
~ 8/26/41, 3rd PS Integrates class *41-C* *-D* pilots into squadron flights as wingmen for senior pilots, 20th PS separates squadron into operational (senior pilots) and training halves. 
~ 8/31/41 20th PS equipped with 25 P-40B A/C
~ 9/7/41: 17th PS class 41-C -D pilots commence gunnery training at Iba
9/11/41: C Flight (6 P-40B A/C) fly to 27,000 ft. 
9/16/41: 24th Pursuit Group formed; comprised of 3rd, 17th 20th PS.
~ 9/15/41: 17th PS adopts two ship elements based on RAF reports. 20th PS commences night flying training operational recon missions.
_*9/29/41: 50 P-41E aircraft arrive in PI: *_
10/17/41: 17th PS begins receiving first of 25 assigned P-40E A/C. 
10/18/41: 3rd PS to Iba field for gunnery training. 20th PS class *41C* *-D* pilots begin transition to P-40B.
10/23/41: 10 class *41-G* pilots arrive and commence training at HQ squadron training unit. 
~10/30/41: Hank Thorne assumes command of 3rd PS. 
11/4/41: *Maj. Gen. Lewis Brereton arrives PI to assume command of FEAF.*
11/6/41: Brereton issues new max effort training schedule with 40% of flight time to be night ops (?)
*11/8/41: 3rd PS receives last of 25 P-40E allotment*. Squadron Ops officer judges the P-40E to possess *"the flying qualities of a streamlined safe."*
11/20/41: Experienced pilots of the 27th BG(light) and the 21st (13 pilots) 35th PS (15 pilots) arrive PI on the President Cooldge.
11/25/41: *24 P-40E arrive in PI*. Slated for 21st PS.
11/26/41: 34th PS inherits 12-15 cast-off P-35As of the 17th PS. 21st and the 3rd PS when latter’s Gunnery training phase completed.
11/27/41: War emergency operations instituted, training essentially suspended: Squadrons placed on alert due to snoopers detected overflying PI airspace. All aircraft armed and readied for immediate scramble. Amount of .50 cal ammo available sufficient for two full P-40E loads.
*12/6/41: 21st PS begins receives allotment of 20 P-40E with 2 more due 12/8/41*. 16 B-17s sent to Del Monte airfield on Mindanao

There are almost certainly errors in this time line compilation, mainly from Bartch, _Doomed at the Start_ Edmunds _They Fought With What They Had_. I stopped it when the available aircraft had finally been distributed to their units and the invasion was imminent with Pursuit squadrons on alert and B-17s 

I am pretty sure two-ship elements became more widely adopted but not sure of the timing or order in which that occurred. Corrections will be appreciated


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## Shortround6 (Feb 18, 2012)

Thank you for the time and effort going into that time line.

It highlights some of the problems with expanding the FEAF very much (without stripping other areas of pilots and planes, like the Panama canal).

Any aircraft type except for the B-17 (or B-24) has to go as deck cargo. Planes have to knocked down, crated, loaded on ships and sailed to the Philippines where they have to unloaded, uncrated and reassembled and test flown before issuing to squadrons. This means that there is a 5-6 week period ( at best) BEFORE Dec 8th were anything in route will arrive too late. There is also the 5-6 week delay after July 26 it takes for anything even already at the docks to get to the Philippines and start to be used, either for training or airfield construction. As far as airfield construction goes even the best, most on the ball commander has just about 3 months from the earliest possible delivery of non local equipment and materials to get working air fields by Dec 8th. Depending on which Islands one wishes to place some of the auxiliary airfields the equipment/materials may require transhipment to smaller ships from the larger ocean going ones. The Philippine road network was none too good and easy transportation of large equipment or large amounts of supplies to areas removed from the major cities would be difficult. The US Army managed to get a SCR-270 mobile radar unit stuck in a swamp where it had to be destroyed. 
There was also no large pool of experienced (or even high time) pilots to pull from with out leaving other units almost entirely in the hands of low time fliers. 

There is no doubt that more _could_ have been done but even increasing the effectiveness of the force by 50% just adds a few days or a week to the final outcome.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 19, 2012)

JoeB said:


> you have to look at the basic seapower situation to evaluate the big picture of first PI campaign. As long as the US Pacific Fleet was crippled, or anyway wasn't going to sortie quickly and in strength to relieve the PI, the US position in PI was hopeless. Eventually the US force there would run out of fuel and munitions (although if it could hold large physical areas of the PI it could feed itself, unlike the actual situation where the main force was backed into Bataan then largely starved into defeat).



Totally in agreement. That's why I brought up the 25-29 USN subs in theater earlier (numbers depending on your source). Their inconsequential employment or failure to make a contribution proportionate to their numbers may be the single greatest contributor to the rapidity of the defeat and an indication of just how unprepared the USA was for war. Of course, the subs did play a major role in the evacuation of Corregidor but if I understand correctly, that's not exactly the role MacArthur was anticipating them to play. He evidently saw them as his first line of defense without understanding the Navy's prewar doctrine on their use. When that defense failed to produce, the rest quickly followed. At best, the outcome could only be delayed by the forces available. 

*IF* the subs had been deployed effectively and *IF* their torpedoes had worked, I think the IJN invasion might have been somewhat crippled at the start. But the PI has a VERY long coastline to defend. Even 29 subs are likely to have been challenged to cover all bases effectively. Spread too thin, they provide a porous line of defense with minimal impact capability, concentration allows greater impact but leaves larger defensive holes. Subs are essentially manuevering, intelligently-directed mine fields (which hadn't been deployed either except for Manilla Bay) and the IJN had a lot of destroyers to force them to remain submerged and minimize their abiility to manuever. As you say this is an aircraft forum. 



JoeB said:


> The FEAF could conceivably have inflicted more serious losses on the Japanese invasion convoys at Aparri (N Luzon) Legaspi (S Luzon) and eventually the larger Lingayen Gulf landings (though never would have allowed the first two only to 'spring a trap' on the third: totally unrealistic). But in fact the Japanese were not that critically short of merchant type shipping at that stage of the war, and captured a good deal as they advanced. So FEAF delaying Japanese plans by causing heavier shipping losses and/or forcing JNAF units to dwell on Luzon longer is plausible. But FEAF 'defeating' the Japanese seizure of PI: not plausible. Only the main force of the USN could have done that by being ready to, then successfully executing, a decisive fleet action to relieve the PI. And that just wasn't going to happen after the PH attack; it's an interesting 'what if' whether the USN could have pulled it off *without* there having been a PH attack.



Inflicting heavier shipping losses is not terribly helpful unless you have a clue as to what you are hitting. Blunting the tip of the IJ spear by preferentially hitting those transports containing the assault troops and equipment in the van should have consequences. The problem is, that's also the part that will be most aggressively defended and it needs to be targeted and successfully engaged. That's not going to be easy. B-17s won't be particularly helpful (More flawed prewar doctrine) and subs tend to have a myopic view of the battle space. P-40 strafing or even bombing is a mere annoyance that will be readily countered. I'll address your insightful comments on the P-40 and A-24 situation in another post. 

I don't believe we could have beaten the IJN and fought our way to the PI in 1941-42. They knew how to use concentrated carrier based air, the USN was very resistent to adopting a similar concentration of its own carrier forces and of course there was the difference in contemporary aircraft quality. Wake Island relief being a classic example with three carrier task forces acting totally independent of one another. Like its view of submarines in warfare, the USN viewed carriers as essentially providing battle fleet scouting support and was not yet fully appreciative of their strike capability when emolyed collectively which is astonishing considering the lesson it has been taught by the IJN at Pearl. 



JoeB said:


> If you read personal recollections of many PI veterans, it was common knowledge among them that relief from the US by sea was their only real hope. And their morale was sustained by the belief that it would still happen, however impossible we know that was with hindsight.
> 
> Joe


There was almost certainly a lot more realism present among the troops stuck in the PI in 1941 than there may be in this thread (With no insult intended to anyone posting here!), but I suggest that some of that came as a result of the rapid and utter collapse of the primary (and ineffectual) deterents: The USN's Asiatic sub fleet and FEAF.  But, I think they themselves knew they were fighting a losing battle for time even before the first bomb fell. At least that's the impression I get from reading Bartsch.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 20, 2012)

JoeB said:


> 1. The Lingayen landing was the third on Luzon. The FEAF put its maximum (then remaining) effort on the smaller landing at Aparri in northern Luzon Dec 10, … very little left for the landings at Legaspi in southern Luzon Dec 12, or the bigger landing at Lingayen Gulf the 22nd. … the Japanese can adjust … by keeping the bulk of Tainan/3rd AG's deployed v PI which they didn't ... because it was apparent the FEAF was neutralized.



I agree with your first point without reservation. 



JoeB said:


> 2. But lack of individual pilot total hours wasn't most of the problem with USAAC units in this period. It was stuff like the historical problem with A-24 deployment: didn't have their planes, or, hadn't trained intensively in *those* types, which might prove to have bugs, as the recently received P-40E's did (gun chargers, rendering the armament useless in some early combat sorties).



The dreadful quality and condition of the 27th BG’s A-24 aircraft did pose a significant problem. You reminded me of the problems Bartsch described with the A-24s when they were unpacked in Australia. Your comments also provoked me to question differences in the A-24 Banshees and USN Dauntless. The A-24 Banshee was NOT the SBD-2 or 3 Dauntless successfully used by the USN. The army's first batch of A-24s meant for the PI and shipped to Oz lacked armor, self-sealing tanks and bullet resistant windscreens. The army apparently assumed it was obtaining denavalized SBD-3s but evidently received -3A models which were essentially upgraded -2s, without the -3’s standard protective equipment). All the USN -2s were retrofitted to -3 protective standards when they went to war. By some accounts, the -3A nomenclature denoted a weapons upgrade to the nose mounted twin .50s and the flex .30s. The A-24s were decrepit after a 2-month period of intensive flying in the Louisiana Manuevers held late summer, 1941. Only about 50% of the 52 bombers were flyable when initially assembled and that only after considerable reworking and rehabilitation. Only about a dozen of these could be made ready for transfer to Java. As might be expected for the low numbers, these did not have an impact on the campaign, but its pilots, apparently brought south from the besieged PI, did demonstrate some skill and daring in the pitifully few numbers committed. In any event, I can't imagine an early arrival in the PI of these derelict aircraft could have been a significant factor in the Japanese invasion of the PI. 



JoeB said:


> IMO it's totally unrealistic to compare such units to USN VS/VB squadrons of summer 1942, which had been cohesive units flying the same a/c in pretty intensive training for months before the war, then stepped up after Dec '41, and also those units had shakedown combats in the carriers raids v Japanese islands in early 1942. In fact it encapsulates the whole issue IMO, as I stated it earlier: if you assume unit effectiveness of USAAF units typical of late 42-early 43 (the USN had a headstart on them in readiness, since they weren't expanding hand over fist in 1940-41 like the Air Corps was), many things are possible. But the Army air units of late '41 just didn't have those capabilities. Individually competent pilots, yes, but high level of combat effectiveness as units: they proved repeatedly that they did not.



I originally said:

"54 A-24's is equivalent to 3 squadrons of Dauntlesses and that same amount proved to be fairly devastating at Midway 6 months later."

I suspect you misunderstood my meaning. I certainly was not suggesting the skill of the three 27th Bomb Group squadrons was comparable to that of VB-3 and 6 or VS-3 and 6 either at Midway or perhaps more appropriate, the contemporary island raids of Fletcher and Halsey or Wilson Brown's raid on Lae and Salamaua over the Owen Stanley Range, March 10, 1942. I merely meant that the potential destructive power of three dauntless squadrons could be considerable. I am happy to clarify my meaning. Of course, making that statement I was assuming the A-24s were just denavalized USN SBDs which they weren’t and that 1,000 lb naval ordnance was available which it wasn’t.
OTOH, considering that a fair amount of flight time is devoted to perfecting carrier landing technique and over-water navigation skills in working up any navy carrier based squadron, an army squadron comprised of reasonably experienced pilots (having transitioned to a new aircraft) might have spent comparable time in bombing practice and developed skills perhaps roughly comparable to that of newly created VB-8 or VS-8 pilots assigned to the newly commissioned Hornet. These squadrons had only recently transitioned to SBD aircraft from their Curtiss SBC biplanes. Operational training for the Hornet squadrons was curtailed by the Doolittle raid and effectiveness apparently diminished. At Midway, it took VB and VS 8 about 2-3 days of combat missions and bombing to begin operating effectively. Both the USN and USA squadrons also apparently shared the experience of the 1941 Louisiana Maneuvers. The few A-24 pilots flying in Java appear to have come up to speed reasonably fast on the two missions they flew in Java. 



JoeB said:


> 3. The kill ratio of P-40 units in the DEI campaign v Zeroes was considerable *worse* than that in the limited number of actual P-40/Zero combats in the PI, around 1:7 v perhaps 1:3+ (actual causes of Zero losses in the early raids, AA, P-40 or other, are hard to determine even with detailed Japanese records, most of the a/c lost were only known not to have returned). And in the brief sampling of P-40/A-24 teaming in the defense of Java, the A-24's did sink one Japanese transport w/o being intercepted on one mission, but a P-40 escort force was largely wiped out defending them on the other mission. Another book by Bartsch covering this period is "Every Day a Nightmare" but the basics are in "Bloody Shambles". Also in a slightly different context against mostly land targets, USAAF A-24's supported by RAAF Kittyhawks/USAAF P-39's in New Guinea in spring/summer 1942 proved at high risk to Zeroes. The USAAF swore off the plane after an A-24 force with P-39 escort was virtually wiped out, in July 1942.
> 
> Joe


With respect to kill ratios determined from IJN Zero vs. USAAF P-40 combat for all encounters occurring during the DEI campaign. That appears to follow Bartsch, but I choose (perhaps arbitrarily) to consider only the results of combat encounters that occurred between USAAF pilots who launched with the sole intent of engaging any enemy A/C. That produces a somewhat different result than the one you cite. Based on Bartsch’s account, I do not include any victories or losses during the debacle over Darwin where even the so-called top-cover P-40s were orbiting oblivious to the A6M threat. I do include every encounter from February 1 through March 1, 1942 that occurred between Japanese A/C and the pilots of the USAAF composite 17th Provisional Pursuit Squadron based at Ngoro field. The tally for that period as presented by Bartsch appears to be: 9 USA victories vs. 12 losses. Not counted are the Nell destroyed on 2/5, Buel’s fatal 2/15 Mavis intercept or the Val destroyed on 2/19, over Darwin. 
I believe the success the USAFF pilots achieved on 2/18 when downing 3 G4M Betty A/C while probably damaging a number of others was representative of the 17th’s increased,(albeit temporary) effectiveness. An indication might be seen in the three instances when IJN bombers retired after jettisoning their bombs when sighting P-40 interceptors during the following week. The Bali A-24 escort mission on 2/21 does not appear to have been wiped out. It apparently lost 4 P-40s shot down out of 16 aircraft committed. A fifth ran out of gas and ditched. 
Based strictly upon Bartsch’s description, it appears to me these USAAF pilots, flying inferior aircraft, were yet managing to be, at least temporarily, somewhat effective in the face of daunting opposition using the few strengths of their outmatched aircraft to at least survive encounters while inflicting some telling damage on their opponents. The 7 KIA of the composite squadron based at Ngoro field for one month of combat are comparable to the 5 33rd PPS KIAs lost over Darwin in one day on 2/19. 
_*Looks like air-to-air P-40 vs A6M loss ratio was about 2.75:1, so roughly similar to that in the PI for this composite unit composed of many PI vets*_.
That’s just my opinion. To be fair, I haven’t performed the same analysis for the PI. 
I am assuming the July New Guinea mission you are citing is that of July 29 (or 26 depending on source), 1942 and consisted of 7 (some say 5) A-24 Banshees from the same flawed batch of 67 A-24s that arrived in Australia during Jan Feb 1942. Without the standard protective equipment on most contemporary combat aircraft and having lost the cover of their escorting P-39s, these vulnerable Banshees were attacked and destroyed. 
The USAAF subsequently used remaining A-24 upgraded A-24A (presumably the SBD-4) most frequently as a service aircraft and A-24B Banshee (equivalent to a combat ready USN SBD-5) with some success in combat from mid-1943 until mid-1944.


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## davebender (Feb 20, 2012)

A good example of piddling away FEAF aircraft on an unnecessary operation.

Japan seized the Aparri, Luzon airfield with two infantry companies. USAFFE doesn't need air support to wipe out such a tiny IJA force.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 24, 2012)

The aircraft being piddled away was partly a leadership problem, partly a logistics and maintenance problem. In far too many engagements, the P-40's six 50's didn't all work. In too many cases none of the 6 worked, while in other instances only one or two operated properly and then only initially before quiting. That situation seems to have gotten worse with time. The dry season apparently played havoc with air operations contributing to dust-obscured vision-related take off and landing accidents that accounted for as many losses as one would expect in combat. Although squadron level leadership appears to have been competent, Leadership at Group and above appears to have been horrific and seems to have suffered due to an extended state of shock. Launches were ordered when safety conditions were marginal, objectives questionable and with low probability of success. In short, I have the impression of assets and lives not so much piddled away, as squandered.

On December 8, Group Commander Grover located at Clark, drew the 3rd Pursuit Squadron away from Iba to protect Manilla (Mac's HQ?) preventing the squadron from protecting their own base at Iba containing the high-value RADAR early warning asset. He then assigned the P-40Es of the 17th and 21st PSs based at Nichols field to defend Manilla (once again, Mac's HQ?), both squadrons subsequently spent the first day of battle orbiting Manilla Bay making no contact with the enemy, probably due mainly to poor communications, nonexistent after Clark was hit. 

It's interesting that the career of Grover flourished, after this less than stellar performance. He went to Austalia with Mac and ascended to Brigadier General, while Brereton got away as quickly as possible from Mac and then chose to go to India rather than with Mac to Oz. 

It seems to me, the problem with the FEAF was not type or numbers of aircraft assets but rather bad logistical support (that buck stopped at Army Quartermaster General LTG Edwin Gregory) and very thin maintenance support wrt the P-40E's 50 cal guns and engine problems. Grover's handling of his P-40B E assets appears to have bordered on negligence, ordering night intercepts under the worst of conditions on aircraft whose altitude he didn't know and path was only predicted based on an assessment of target. The PI in 1941 was a helluva place to experiment with the difficult problem of night intereception without RADAR.


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## davebender (Feb 24, 2012)

IMO that's a leadership problem. So are malfunctioning .50cal machineguns. If the FEAF commander had been doing his job he would kick as much arse as necessary to get the important problems fixed. Organizing a party for B-17 aircrew can wait until later.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 24, 2012)

But Brereton only arrived on November 4rth. That's not much time considering that there was virtually no extra ammo for testing the guns, let alone fixing the logistical shortfall in ammo. The logistical problem dates back to the original shipment of P-40Bs May 17th. I am sure there are folks in the chain of command to be blamed but which ones? Presumably commanders earlier than Brereton.


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## buffnut453 (Feb 24, 2012)

While I agree that FEAF (like AHQFE in Singapore) should have done more to ensure the guns worked and that sufficient ammo was available to get pilots to a high degree of gunnery proficiency, the problems of .50 cal failures were far more widespread than just FEAF. Pretty much every fighter equipped with .50 cals had major gun reliability issues in the period thru the end of 1942 including the F4F, Buffalo, P-40 and early P-51 variants.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 24, 2012)

You can organize a party to keep morale up much quicker and easier than getting ammo and parts from the west coast thousands of miles across the Pacific Ocean. One ton of .50 cal Ammo won't even fill up the ammo boxes of 5 P-40Es once so even bringing it in by air in any significant amount doesn't look good. Add in normal packaging weight to the Bare belts and it just gets worse. 
While a party may sound frivolous it may mean better morale and men who will work harder and longer hours if needed because they WANT TO rather than trying to beat them into better performance.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 24, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> While I agree that FEAF (like AHQFE in Singapore) should have done more to ensure the guns worked and that sufficient ammo was available to get pilots to a high degree of gunnery proficiency, the problems of .50 cal failures were far more widespread than just FEAF. Pretty much every fighter equipped with .50 cals had major gun reliability issues in the period thru the end of 1942 including the F4F, Buffalo, P-40 and early P-51 variants.



I have read of that problem being indeed widespread, however, reading Bartsch, I get the impression the problem was far worse in FEAF P-40s than I recall reading anywhere else. As an example, in one instance, a ground-pounder senior NCO examines the guns of a pilot's P-40 and declares the problem to be a mis-installed solenoid (which he promptly fixes) makes me wonder if there wasn't an additional maintenance issue that aggravated the problem. Perhaps this was due to the generally more relaxed peacetime attitude that appears to have been embraced at all levels.


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## buffnut453 (Feb 24, 2012)

The Buffalos in Singapore also suffered from solenoid problems. There wasn't just one problem, though. Each installation had its peculiarities (eg ammunition feed trays etc).


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## Siegfried (Feb 24, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> The Buffalos in Singapore also suffered from solenoid problems. There wasn't just one problem, though. Each installation had its peculiarities (eg ammunition feed trays etc).



Electrical problems come from people thinking that to make a reliable connection all you need to do is screw a wire into a terminal. It takes a tradesman, technician or studious engineer to get the craftsmenship right in regards to wire protection, ferrules, plating material compatibillity, terminal re tightening, etc. Likewise with hydraulics. You need someone who can obsess about gaskets, flanges and most of all cleanliness.


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## davebender (Feb 24, 2012)

USAFFE was created July 26, 1941. Someone had to be in charge of FEAF before Brereton arrived. That person had over 4 months to fix logistical shortfalls. Plenty of time for cargo shipments to reach Manila from San Francisco.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 24, 2012)

BGen. Henry Clagett, Commander, Phillipine Department Air Force assigned in early May. He was relieved by Brereton upon the creation of the FEAF, November 1941. 

Biographies : BRIGADIER GENERAL HENRY B. CLAGETT

From that website:

In April 1941, he was ordered to duty in the Philippine Islands where he was commander of the Army Air Forces until a month before Pearl Harbor when the command was taken over by Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton. From:

During the _*summer of 1941*_, he flew to China and parts of Southeastern Asia where he _*conferred on strategy and defense with Nationalist Chinese*_, British and Dutch commanders. In November, General Brereton named him commander of the Philippines interceptor force of pursuit planes. 

I would expect such a conference to have raise the issue of the new IJN super fighter (the A6M) Chennault had observed over China in 1940. Was it? Did he consider have an opportunity to discuss Chennault's proposed tactics? Did he fail to relate what he learned and if he was made aware of the information, what did he do with it?


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## tomo pauk (Feb 24, 2012)

Think that Chennault never encountered Zeroes, let alone before 1942?


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 24, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> Think that Chennault never encountered Zeroes, let alone before 1942?



True AFAIK, (its been debated here, but I think not yet proven unless I missed some relevant thread), but Channault had seen and reported on them in 1940 in China. He knew the A6M was "_out there_" in the IJN "quiver" and the Ki-43's were good enough to know the A6M was not a fluke. I think the real problem with US willingness to absorb this new reality, lay in inherent racism that persisted in the West and sustained a belief that the Japanese just couldn't field a credible air force whether army or navy. I am pretty sure a few realized what the US was up against but the widespread and persistent belief that US aircraft were encountering Bf-109s in the Far East, persisted until mid-1942. That suggests a reluctance to accept the truth that I am at a loss to understand otherwise.


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## davebender (Feb 24, 2012)

When did he return? 

When USAFFE was created (July 26, 1941) he should have caught then next flight back to Manila to take charge of the huge airpower expansion.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 24, 2012)

Well I think that's pretty much what he was doing I doubt he was in China very long. It's interesting that around that time (Mid summer) MacArthur asked for present reinforcements of:

1. 10 more pursuit squadrons
2. 7 medium bombardment squadrons
3. 3 heavy bombardment squadrons

In 3 months:

1. 3 more heavy bombardment

In 6 months:

1. 3 Pursuit squadrons
2. 2 medium bombardment squadrons
3. 4 heavy bombardment squadrons

That's about 260 fighters, 16 heavy bombers, and aout 150 medim bombers. 

A month later, Clagett himself, apparently requested a total of 27 pursuit squadrons, 30 heavy bombardment squadrons, and 18 light bomber squadrons! 

That's about 540 P-40s and P-39s, 600 B-17s and 360 A-24s or A-20s. 

That's more than 25% of fighters, about 100% of the heavy bombers production in the next few months, and almost 50% light bombers in the USAAF before December 31, 1941.



I think that's the FEAF you wanted to build. But think of the airfields needed to support it and the logistics train needed to provide it necessary supplies and human resources.


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## davebender (Feb 25, 2012)

> 1. 10 more pursuit squadrons
> 2. 7 medium bombardment squadrons
> 3. 3 heavy bombardment squadrons
> In 3 months:
> ...



I think in terms of Air Force Groups.
.....4 heavy bombardment groups.
.....27th Light Bombardment Group. A-24 dive bomber. Convoy 4002.
.....35th Pursuit Group. P-40E. Convoy 4002.
.....Pursuit group equipped with 53 x P-39D. Departed San Francisco 18 Feb 1942.
.....B-24 long range transport group. 15 Dec 1941. Plans made to dispatch 80 B-24 transport aircraft to Philippines.


Plus a steady stream of replacement P-40s. I assume the 125 P-40s on SS President Coolidge and SS President Polk would have upgraded existing fighter units (including PAAC) to the P-40E. They would then receive 35 or 40 new P-40s each month to replace losses.
Pensacola Convoy and other Convoys


> Casey to Evatt Washington, 17 December 1941
> Cablegram 1163
> Most Secret
> 
> ...



IMO an air force expansion of this magnitude requires a senior Army Air Corps General in charge from July 26, 1941 onward. Someone who can stand up to Big Mac and ensure that air groups have all supporting bits and pieces including AA protection for airfields. It appears to me that Clagett and (later) Brereton were overwhelmed by the task and pushed to the sidelines by Gen. MacArthur.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 25, 2012)

The simplest solution would be to take Mac out of the PI, bring in Chennault in April 41, let him build FEAF, then send him back to China in the Fall of 1941 and bring back Mac..That's about as likely as anything else we've been discussing.


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## buffnut453 (Feb 25, 2012)

But Chennault was not a USAAF officer at that time....and he would have taken a huge pay cut to do what you're suggesting.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 25, 2012)

I don't think its a realistic solution, I just think someone of Chenault's knowledge and organizational ability would be needed to build a FEAF able to do the job... 

OK.. If we can't recruit Chennault, how about building a time machine go back and collect some hair from the floor of his barbershop, go forward in time to clone him, and then take our clone back to the PI and set him to task. That might work swell until he read what the chinese were paying Chennault prime. 

Of course if we could just find someone as capable as Chennault that might work too. and involve no pesky paradoxes.


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## pbfoot (Feb 25, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> OK.. If we can't recruit Chennault, how about building a time machine go back and collect some hair from the floor of his barbershop, go forward in time to clone him, and then take our clone back to the PI and set him to task. That might work swell until he read what the chinese were paying Chennault prime.
> 
> Of course if we could just find someone as capable as Chennault that might work too. and involve no pesky paradoxes.


How about his kid who was a Light Colonel USAAF , I believe was CO of a Squadron up in the Aleutians


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 25, 2012)

Any candidate has to be as insightful as Chennault in adapting tactics to meet the threat and as knowledgable in awareness of the nature of the threat. He must be able to organize a non-RADAR based early warning system that is less vulnerable than the electronic one. He must be able to manage the arrival of personnel so that pilots and maintenance crew don't sit around idly waiting for planes. How about Eddie Rickenbacker? He's got an origanizational background from running an airline and a military pursuit background. He'd have to be activated as a general officer...


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## davebender (Feb 25, 2012)

If we want something besides a historical result then we need to think outside the box.

IMO Robert Stanford Tuck was one of the best fighter pilots produced by any nation. He did good work for RAF Fighter Command during the BoB. Then Britain squandered him (and many other experienced Spitfire pilots) strafing minor targets in France.
Robert Stanford Tuck: World War II RAF Ace Pilot


> The Duxford Wing was led by Tuck over France until October 1941, when he was taken off operations. Along with fellow ace Adolf 'Sailor' Malan, Group Capt. Harry Broadhurst, leader of the Hornchurch Wing, and three highly decorated Bomber Command pilots, Tuck was sent to the United States to share his expertise with Britain's allies.
> 
> Tuck returned to England in December 1941


Wing Commander Tuck was sent to the USA during 1941 to share his expertise. Let's accept the British offer. From August 1941 onward the Philippines had top priority. The U.S. Army Air Corps will request him by name to assume command of 5th Interceptor Command in the Philippines. That gives him control over all fighter aircraft in the Philippines. I suspect Wing Commander Tuck would be thrilled to have this assignment rather then strafing targets in France. 

Among other things Wing Commander Tuck knows from actual combat experience how to intercept enemy air raids using data from ground based radar. When IJN bombers appear over Clark airfield they will be bounced out of the sun by 24th Pursuit Group P-40s. Talley Ho! 8)


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 25, 2012)

Yes, it appears to be a possible solution, but would Tuck with his RAF and Eurpoean war experience repeat the Darwin Spitfire V experience? Knowing about European fighter direction may not translate well to the Far East. Would he be victim of the same european-ethnocentrism that hampered American, British Dutch preparation for the inevitable conflict? Would he share the belief that the greatest threat to USAAF P-40s were IJAAF and IJN flown Bf-109s? The thinking in that conclusion escapes me. Where did these Bf-109s come from? Did they materielize out of thin air? was there suddenly an IJN carrier based version shared by the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine? It appears rumors were sustained and confirmed by observation. The USAAF pilots apparently believed so strongly that they couldn't have been beaten by anything but Bf-109s that when they flew and encountered A6M's they 'saw' and reported Bf-109s. How do commanders who don't know what they are facing; or worse assume an enemy possessing a far more inferior capability, properly prepare forces to face the real threat? In other words, we are back to a Channault-like surrogate. It is just possible Chennault was unique in terms of capability, position and knowledge. If you want to think out of the box... How about recruiting a high ranking officer of the Chinese Air Force who had worked with Chennault enough to know the business? I don't know of such a person, but that doesn't mean they didn't exist. It just may be an indication of my lack of exposure to historical accounts written in Chinese. No a CAF officer wouldn't work. Americans wouldn't listen to or believe in such an officer...

Is there a free agent clause that would allow us to hire an IJN officer? same problem...


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## davebender (Feb 25, 2012)

Wing Commander Tuck would be in the FEAF fighter control center giving orders to his P-40 squadrons. He may screw up but I tend to think he knew what he was doing. He certainly couldn't do much worse then what happened historically.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 25, 2012)

davebender said:


> Wing Commander Tuck would be in the FEAF fighter control center giving orders to his P-40 squadrons. He may screw up but I tend to think he knew what he was doing. *He certainly couldn't do much worse then what happened* historically.



I may be selling him short based on the confusion and terror that suffused that day, but it seems to me that would be a most difficult feat to accomplish with even a modicum of professional savy! 

I worry there was a second player pulling the strings behind (on the telephone with) Grover during the first day's battle, doing some _back seat driving_. My guess would be his buddy Southerland.


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## davebender (Feb 25, 2012)

Werner Baumbach - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia







> He received the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords (Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes mit Eichenlaub und Schwertern) for the destruction of over 300,000 gross register tons (GRT) of allied shipping



This is the guy I want commanding FEAF bombers. After a couple months of his training we shouldn't have any problem sinking anchored IJA troop transports.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 25, 2012)

The Pearl Harbor attack had a huge impact on the public consciousness and especially on that of the military. My first military watch, when first asigned to my squadron was attended by the comment of the more senior person I was relieving who said to me in parting:"No Pearl Harbors while you are on duty." That moment stands vivid in my memory because, as my first active duty watch, it summarized the potential responsibility of the position I had assumed. This comment to me was made in 1971 some 30 years after the event!.

Even so, I think there are more lessons in human nature and the response of leadership in times of crisis, that may be learned from the PI FEAF debacle than from PH. The problem is the lessons from the PI experiences are difficult to confront and absorb without wanting to turn away from the effort. While there are certainly many instances of legitimate _heroism_ and _*grace under pressure*_, there are also instances of shear panic and terror when faced with incomprehensible threats. I suspect only effective and visibly interactive leadership can prevent fear from becoming the overwhelming defining characteristic of forces in combat. Chennault prepared his pilots with both a grounded realistic assessment of what they faced but also fortified them with the knowledge and skill in how to overcome it. I don't believe Mac Arthur did that from what I've read. It seems to me he remained a remote figure to his forces throughout his compaigns but then I am not qualified to judge because I have only the hollywood deptiction upon which to base that opinion. _However such characteristics suggest a leader who may perform well when circumstances favor victory but who may perform more poorly when at a significant disadvantage._ It's difficult to factor in the uncertainty of the Inchon landings into that overly simplistic picture...


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 25, 2012)

davebender said:


> Werner Baumbach - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> View attachment 193861
> 
> 
> This is the guy I want commanding FEAF bombers. After a couple months of his training we shouldn't have any problem sinking anchored IJA troop transports.



Definitely "_Out of the box_!"


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## JoeB (Feb 25, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> Think that Chennault never encountered Zeroes, let alone before 1942?


Chennault, as special representative of Chiang Kai-shek and sort of quasi-leader of the Chinese Nationalist AF, knew of Japanese use of the Zero over China from July 1940, at first small trial quantities of Model 11's, then eventually a couple of small 'air groups' (much smaller than the early Pac War ones of 45 or so a/c) equipped with Model 21's in 1941. But all JNAF fighters were withdrawn from China just before the Pac War. And, Chennault's idea of combating Japanese fighters with diving hit and run tactics was mainly a product of observing some (though limited) success in such tactics by Chinese and Soviet piloted I-16's in China v JNAF Type 96's in the late 30's. When the Zero was used over China, it was faster than its opponents and preferred hit and run tactics itself; in fact this was standard IJN fighter doctrine as of December 1941. And the Zero totally dominated its opposition over China in 1940-41, total real losses on Chinese side not clear (v 100+ claimed by the Japanese), but there's no documented case where Chinese fighters downed any Zeroes at all in that period. They mainly quit coming up in 1941. So nobody had learned to deal with the Zero prior to December 1941.

The *AVG* never encountered the Zero, by any reliable evidence; it's contradicted pretty clearly by known Japanese force dispositions. The AVG encountered Army Type 1 Fighters in a couple of early missions in Dec 1941 as the units being used in the Malaya campaign (including the first two Type 1 units, 59th and 64th Fighter Regiments, just then introducing the type to combat) flew some missions v Rangoon in Burma. In the middle of its career the AVG encountered exclusively Type 97 Fighters of regiments commited to the invasion of Burma. But then eventually the 64th was also posted to this theater (where it remained almost the rest of the war) and this resulted in several more AVG P-40 v Type 1 combats, with the AVG successful more than not.

The Type 1 OTOH was not met by US fighters anywhere outside China/Burma until a year after the AVG first had: Dec 25 1942 the 11th Regiment's Type 1's appeared over New Guinea. The 11th along with the 1st Regiment first showed their Type 1's over Guadalcanal in January 1943. In both New Guinea and the Solomons, there were still Zeroes around and/or the Allied units there had often seen real Zeroes, as had the 22nd BG whose B-26's were intercepted by 59th Regiment Type 1's in a few unescorted missions over the eastern DEI (where that unit was posted after the initial campaigns) at same time the 22nd was encountering Zeroes over New Guinea. It seems that the same units encountering Type 1's and real Zeroes helped to firmly nail down the realization that they were two different types (although to the end of the war, individual Allied pilot reports of encountering 'Oscars and Zeroes' were often a mistake on one count or the other...or both).

Joe


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## davebender (Feb 25, 2012)

Britain and/or Australia may have bomber pilots able to sink ships. Tough to determine as Allied maritime attack pilots operated in an environment where targets were few and far between. 

German, Italian and Japanese bomber pilots had the opposite problem. Enemy merchant ships were more numerous then sand on the seashore. You will get plenty of target practise if you survive awhile.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 25, 2012)

So the demonstrated antishipping dive bombing expertise lay in either the Luftwaffe, the IJN, the USN, and perhaps one squadron of army A-24's


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 25, 2012)

Ooops forgot my family connection.. The Italians

and the FAA gets an honorable mention for its world class skill in torpedo attacks, which of course is shared by the aforementioned players.


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## varsity078740 (Feb 26, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Yes, it appears to be a possible solution, but would Tuck with his RAF and Eurpoean war experience repeat the Darwin Spitfire V experience? Knowing about European fighter direction may not translate well to the Far East. Would he be victim of the same european-ethnocentrism that hampered American, British Dutch preparation for the inevitable conflict? Would he share the belief that the greatest threat to USAAF P-40s were IJAAF and IJN flown Bf-109s? The thinking in that conclusion escapes me. Where did these Bf-109s come from? Did they materielize out of thin air? was there suddenly an IJN carrier based version shared by the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine? It appears rumors were sustained and confirmed by observation. The USAAF pilots apparently believed so strongly that they couldn't have been beaten by anything but Bf-109s that when they flew and encountered A6M's they 'saw' and reported Bf-109s. How do commanders who don't know what they are facing; or worse assume an enemy possessing a far more inferior capability, properly prepare forces to face the real threat? In other words, we are back to a Channault-like surrogate. It is just possible Chennault was unique in terms of capability, position and knowledge. If you want to think out of the box... How about recruiting a high ranking officer of the Chinese Air Force who had worked with Chennault enough to know the business? I don't know of such a person, but that doesn't mean they didn't exist. It just may be an indication of my lack of exposure to historical accounts written in Chinese. No a CAF officer wouldn't work. Americans wouldn't listen to or believe in such an officer...
> 
> Is there a free agent clause that would allow us to hire an IJN officer? same problem...


 
The Bf-109 story was by and large a propaganda ruse thought up to deflect the racist question of how we could have been so soundly defeated by an "inferior" race. It was easy for pilots to belive the stories that on Dec. 8th Bf-109s were shot down and "blonde, white pilots" were captured.

Duane


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 26, 2012)

varsity078740 said:


> The Bf-109 story was by and large a propaganda ruse thought up to deflect the racist question of how we could have been so soundly defeated by an "inferior" race. It was easy for pilots to belive the stories that on Dec. 8th Bf-109s were shot down and "blonde, white pilots" were captured.
> 
> Duane



I agree that propaganda and racism played an important role in this myth. But, what I find most fascinating about this phenomena is its persistence into late 1942 despite observations by presumably well trained professionals. I believe the later advent of the Tony was regarded by some as confirmation of their early presence in theater. It seems to me a cautionary tale of the fallibility of human perception when combined with their own predjudices. In other words people tend to see what they believe they will see not what's actually there. On the one hand you have FEAF pilots being pursued by A6M's and initially mistaking them for T-6s (an understandable mistake based on similarity in the forward aspect). OTOH, mistaking a radial engine nose and extended bubble canopy for an inline (no matter how _streamlined_ the A6M may have appeared) and blended canopy seems a difficult mistake to make on the surface. Not having experienced the drama of an actual aerial duel to the death, it may reveal the level of fear that may attend such an encounter.


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## davebender (Feb 26, 2012)

Dive bombing offers a better chance for survival vs defensive AA fire. So you use it when attacking warships. Sinking warships is a job for the USN, not FEAF.

You don't need dive bombers to sink merchant vessels. The Germans emphasized skip bombing during 1939 to 1943 with excellent results. Accuracy was as good or better then dive bombing and almost any aircraft could employ this method of attack. Even converted Fw-200 airliners and Fw-190F fighter-bombers. FEAF P-40Es could employ skip bombing with 500lb bombs. All they need is proper pilot training.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 26, 2012)

davebender said:


> Dive bombing offers a better chance for survival vs defensive AA fire. So you use it when attacking warships. Sinking warships is a job for the USN, not FEAF.



Of course true but a primary tactical purpose of dive bombing in a coordinated torpedo attack was to dilute enemy ship's AA between two sets of targets in different directions, with bombs whose purpose was to destroy the topside AA during the final stage of the torpedo attack. As you might imagine, such perfect timing was only rarely achieved. The IJN accomplished such attacks nearly to perfection on a few occasions. The USN more rarely. Also, the IJN typically used a mix of HE, AP and SAP bombs so, even thought there weren't necessarily as heavy as those in the USN inventory they sometimes tended to inflict more damage than might be expected. Early in WW2, the USN relied pretty much on 500 1,000 lb. HE which turned out to be reasonably effective at knocking out a CV's flight capability but less effective at putting a large vessel under except in unusual circumstances such as at Midway. This was also aggravated by the faiure of the second generation of Mark 13 aerial torpedoes. After the original Mark 13s were used up at Coral Sea, USN torpedo attacks are said to have been relatively unproductive until about 1944. 




davebender said:


> You don't need dive bombers to sink merchant vessels. The Germans emphasized skip bombing during 1939 to 1943 with excellent results. Accuracy was as good or better then dive bombing and almost any aircraft could employ this method of attack. Even converted Fw-200 airliners and Fw-190F fighter-bombers. FEAF P-40Es could employ skip bombing with 500lb bombs. All they need is proper pilot training.



The FEAF actually had some success using P-40's as bomber and _*dive bombers *_during the Linguayan Gulf landings and later during the Bataan phase of the campaign. At an airfield on Bataan, they rigged up a _*P-40something*_ (an ingenious fusion of a P-40B with a P-40E engine) that also included something akin to an SBD dive-bombing rig, where the bomb was forced to rotate out from the fuselage to miss the prop arc during release. It apparently worked pretty well.


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## davebender (Feb 26, 2012)

August 1941 FEAF cannot bomb accurately in any manner with any type aircraft. Nor can FEAF conduct an effective CAP over their own airfield. They must master the basics before attempting something as complex as coordinating two different bombing attacks against the same targets.

In any case it's pointless to speak of torpedo bombing with the crappy USN supplied topedoes of 1941. If you want two different attack methods then use A-24 dive bombers plus skip bombers.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 26, 2012)

davebender said:


> August 1941 FEAF cannot bomb accurately in any manner with any type aircraft. Nor can FEAF conduct an effective CAP over their own airfield. They must master the basics before attempting something as complex as coordinating two different bombing attacks against the same targets.



Don't misunderstand me, I wasn't suggesting FEAF should attempt, let alone train, to do what the Navy practiced for sinking a warship. Dive bombing with 250-500 lb bombs should do the job for transports quite nicely. Just making a digressive observation that DB served two complementary purposes. The first, you pointed out: increasing the odds of the pilot surviving, which it continued to do down to this day (or at least it did until about 1975 and the advent of stand off precision weapons). The second purpose: to dilute and suppress the AA so other aircraft can attack with a greater probability of success and survival. With FEAF (at its best after December 8 ), there were no other aircraft doing anything but additional bombing or dive bombing. 

August 1941, many to most of the pilots had about 200 hours in stateside trainers. Doesn't suggest a lot of expertise in just about anything. The guy who pulled it off in March was a high-time pilot, commander of the 21st Pursuit Squadron on Dec. 8 ,1941 ... Organizationally, in August 41, FEAF dive bombing wouldn't have worked very well, but there were certainly individuals who could pick it up or do it in a pinch, later on...



davebender said:


> In any case it's pointless to speak of torpedo bombing with the crappy USN supplied topedoes of 1941. If you want two different attack methods then use A-24 dive bombers plus skip bombers.



Actually the torpedoes used in 1941 were apparently much better than the ones used later. The mod 0, Mark 13 was purported to be pretty good (scoring something like 3-5 hits on the Shoho) until the stocks ran out about May 1942. the mod 1 that replaced it was a total failure. In any case, I didn't mean to suggest the use of torpedoes by FEAF.


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## davebender (Feb 26, 2012)

Perhaps so but fighter pilots have 4 months to train before the bad guys arrive. During those 4 months pilots will receive at least 200 additional training hours and it will all be with their wartime units and wartime equipment. Building that critical unit cohesion which produces effective military units.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 26, 2012)

davebender said:


> Perhaps so but fighter pilots have 4 months to train before the bad guys arrive. During those 4 months pilots will receive at least 200 additional training hours and it will all be with their wartime units and wartime equipment. Building that critical unit cohesion which produces effective military units.



Would certainly see that as a requirement for having some greater success in defending the PI. The newly arrived green pilots were apparently getting a canned fighter aircraft training course consisting of about 65-70 hours before they began flying with their respective units: 5 hours in a T-6, 10-15 in a P-26, then about 50 hours in a P-35 before transitioning to the P-40. That process appears to have taken about 2 months. of course it was very little to no gunnery training and virtually no interception training. Fighter tactics appear to have been largely confined to dogfighting techiques and much time spent on day and night formation flying (???). Some of the CO's were converting their organizations from 6 plane flights made up of two 3 plane elements to 6 plane flights comprised of three, 2 plane elements sarting in September '41.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 26, 2012)

davebender said:


> Perhaps so but fighter pilots have 4 months to train before the bad guys arrive. During those 4 months pilots will receive at least 200 additional training hours and it will all be with their wartime units and wartime equipment. Building that critical unit cohesion which produces effective military units.



50 gallons an hour (low estimate) x 200 hours X 50 pilots = 500,000 gallons of fuel plus 50 engines approaching the end of their useful life if not a few already trashed. 

At least the mechanics will be well trained 

"The wet season starts in June, peaks in July to September, and peters out in October."

This flips for the eastern seaboard but the monsoon season just might affect the training schedule, especial on those grass airfields.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 26, 2012)

As I recall reading in Bartsch, the weather did seriously impact training. But of course it had already suffered a 5 week delay due to logistical shortcoming (lack of gycol coolant) In the end, it always seems to come down to logistics... 

The real meteorological problem seems to have arisen during the dry season. The fields didn't stay nice and grassy, but became a nasty dust bowl whose contents became airborne with the first aircraft launched and obscured the vision of all subsequent pilots who crashed frequently. Many losses of aircraft both before and after December 8th.


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## Freebird (Feb 27, 2012)

davebender said:


> If we want something besides a historical result then we need to think outside the box.
> 
> IMO Robert Stanford Tuck was one of the best fighter pilots produced by any nation. He did good work for RAF Fighter Command during the BoB.



Unlikely that the US would be putting a Brit in charge....



oldcrowcv63 said:


> Yes, it appears to be a possible solution, but would Tuck with his RAF and Eurpoean war experience repeat the Darwin Spitfire V experience? Knowing about European fighter direction may not translate well to the Far East. Would he be victim of the same european-ethnocentrism that hampered American, British Dutch preparation for the inevitable conflict? Would he share the belief that the greatest threat to USAAF P-40s were IJAAF and IJN flown Bf-109s?(



The British were under no such illusion, the conference of late 1940 early 1941 understood that there was considerable danger from Japanese aviation.
They didn't seem to underestimate the Japanese pilots, nor did they expect Bf-109s



davebender said:


> [ Werner Baumbach - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> 
> This is the guy I want commanding FEAF bombers. After a couple months of his training we shouldn't have any problem sinking anchored IJA troop transports.



Since the British Canadians had an officer exchange program, maybe Hitler will agree to one with the US? 



oldcrowcv63 said:


> So the demonstrated antishipping dive bombing expertise lay in either the Luftwaffe, the IJN, the USN, and perhaps one squadron of army A-24's



None have demonstrated proficiency in antishipping dive bombing except the Luftwaffe, however they have come to realize that DB are very vulnerable to interception AA.



davebender said:


> Britain and/or Australia may have bomber pilots able to sink ships. *Tough to determine as Allied maritime attack pilots operated in an environment where targets were few and far between.*
> 
> German, Italian and Japanese bomber pilots had the opposite problem. Enemy merchant ships were more numerous then sand on the seashore. You will get plenty of target practise if you survive awhile.



Not correct at all. 
Germany has lost 38% of merchant ships of 7,000 tons or more (66 of 181) by the end of 1941, and 45% of ships 5,000 - 7,000 tons. (70 of 159)
During WWII air-laid mines were the single most effective method of sinking German cargo ships (by tonnage) followed by FAA/Coastal Command air attack.
1940 was the worst year for German merchant sinkings (5,000 tons+), with 65 ships lost.


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## davebender (Feb 27, 2012)

IMO logistics during August to November 1941 is a matter of competent leadership. 

There was no shortage of American shipping in the Pacific. If the FEAF commander orders an adequate supply of fuel, spare parts, .50cal ammunition, pierced metal planking to improve airfields during the rainy season, aircraft oxygen equipment etc. on July 27, 1941 there's no reason this stuff shouldn't arrive during September 1941.


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## davebender (Feb 27, 2012)

> 1940 was the worst year for German merchant sinkings (5,000 tons+), with 65 ships lost.


You've proven my point. Werner Baumbach sank that much shipping tonnage all by himself.


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## tyrodtom (Feb 27, 2012)

davebender said:


> IMO logistics during August to November 1941 is a matter of competent leadership.
> 
> There was no shortage of American shipping in the Pacific. If the FEAF commander orders an adequate supply of fuel, spare parts, .50cal ammunition, pierced metal planking to improve airfields during the rainy season, aircraft oxygen equipment etc. on July 27, 1941 there's no reason this stuff shouldn't arrive during September 1941.


 Marston mat, or PSP wasn't invented till Nov. 41.


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## Freebird (Feb 27, 2012)

davebender said:


> You've proven my point. Werner Baumbach sank that much shipping tonnage all by himself.



Uh no actually, supposedly he sank about 40 ships. Sinking a few heavy ships (warships, liners etc) will bring up the total.
It also includes French Soviet ships which were much more poorly defended.
Germany was never able to sink 40% - 45% of major British shipping throughout the war, let alone before 1942. It wasn't as big a deal for Germany, but it would be for Japan.


Regardless, if you are looking for actual plausible things that might have been done in 1941, putting a Nazi in charge (most of whose notable exploits would occur in the futue), is pretty far out there.




The key question I have though - in July 1941 does anyone in the US military or USAAF realize that any problem exists at all? 
Or do they just expect that the B-17s will bomb the Japanese military into rubble? 

The theory that the B-17 groups didn't need any escort was obviously flawed, but this fact wouldn't truley be hammered in until after the Schweinfurt raids, when it was finally accepted that day bombing over enemy-controlled airspace required major fighter escort.
So in 1941 unless there was someone in US command who believed this, it's inevitable that the US will keep planning building up B-17 forces for unescorted raids over Formosa etc.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 27, 2012)

freebird said:


> None have _*demonstrated proficiency i*_n antishipping dive bombing except the Luftwaffe, however they have come to realize that _*DB are very vulnerable to interception AA.*_



You may not have seen the 1932 flick "Helldivers" with Clark Gable and Wallace Beery 

The Japanese took it to heart and when the SBDs were falling upon their carriers at Midway, some sources report Genda as looking up and exclaiming "Helldivers!"

During the prewar years three countries were building and training in the technique using dedicated, purpose-built dive bombers: 

Germany: He 50
Japan: Aichi D1A2 
USA: F8C 

From wikipedia:

"As planes grew in strength and load capability, the technique became more valuable. By the early 1930s, the technique was clearly favoured in tactical doctrine, notably against targets that would otherwise be too small to hit with level bombers. In the 1920s the US Navy ordered the first custom dive bomber aircraft, the Curtiss F8C Hell-Diver biplane (not to be confused with the later SB2C Helldiver). The Imperial Japanese Navy followed by ordering the Heinkel He 50 in 1931, which they developed into their own Aichi D1A."

There may have been other countries engaged in this activity but this seems to be the forefront of the movement.

Prior to WW2, the Navy adopted Dive bombing as a cultural paradigm (perhaps in the way the IJN adopted the aerial torpedo attack) It was practiced as an integral part of its advanced training curriculum. The training paid off in the USN's early pacific island raids. 

Dive bombing is the least vulnerable method of attacking warships and practiced expertise was sought through to the modern era. 
Dive bombing was a tactic in heavy use throughout Vietnam. It remained a cultural staple of the USN...


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## davebender (Feb 27, 2012)

> Dive bombing is the least vulnerable method of attacking warships and practiced expertise was sought through to the modern era.


I'm all in favor of dive bombing. If I get to run the Philippine Army Air Corps from 1936 onward as Big Mac did they would be dive bombing experts by 1941.

However July 26, 1941 is too late to acquire dive bombers and learn how to employ them effectively. FEAF needs readily available aircraft and simple operational doctrine. 

P-40E skip bombers are about as simple as it gets. 
.....Approach speed of 200 mph.
.....Altitude of 150 feet.
.....Bomb(s) released 250 yards from the target.
.....Bombs have an 8 second fuze delay to allow the bomber to clear the blast area.
.....Accuracy against moving merchant / transport ships of about 25%.
.....No fancy bombsight required. Get the speed, altitude and bomb release distance correct and you will get hits.
.....This method was combat proven by mid 1941. Just read British reports about attacks on their shipping.

A fully loaded P-40E requires only a 1,000 foot runway. And that runway can be rather crude.

After bombs are gone P-40Es are relatively fast. Faster then an A6M2 @ 150 feet. So they don't require escort while returning to base.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 27, 2012)

davebender said:


> P-40E skip bombers are about as simple as it gets.
> .....Approach speed of 200 mph.
> .....Altitude of 150 feet.
> .....Bomb(s) released 250 yards from the target.
> ...



But typically enjoyed a top cover P=40 when possible during FEAF bombing of IJN Transports.

Skip bmbing is certainly a good tactic, perhaps easier to learn, as is glide bombing, a bit more vulnerable perhaps because it trades speed for accuracy in the glide. The neat thing about skip bombing (and dive bombing) is as you point out, you don't slow down *much* to do it. You also have a decent sized target at which to aim. Keeping up the attacking aircraft's speed, made the IJN torpedo attacks more deadly than those of the early USN practitioners. I believe if either the IJN or USN had been able to develop a higher speed torpedo attack profile, the technique would have remained in favor for far longer than the it did.


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## davebender (Feb 27, 2012)

> high speed torpedo attack profile, the technique would have remained in favor for far longer than the it did.


Light flak effectiveness was increasing by leaps and bounds during 1939 to 1945. When weapons like the 40mm Bofors and 3.7cm Flak 43 were coupled with radar directed fire control even a 400 mph torpedo run would be little short of suicide. That's why Germany and the USA were developing weapons and bomb sights that allowed bombers to remain outside light flak range.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 27, 2012)

davebender said:


> A fully loaded P-40E requires only a 1,000 foot runway. And that runway can be rather crude.



If we are going to discuss this can we please keep the fantasy numbers out of the discussion?

1000ft of runway is for a P-40 at fully loaded *WITH A 20MPH HEADWIND* without the head wind it needs 1600ft of *PAVEMENT*. 1750 ft of soft runway.

These numbers are for sea level and O degrees C (32degrees F), While the Philippine airfields may or may not be very high they are certainly not at freezing even in December. 
85 degrees F needs just about 30% more runway than 32 degrees. 

A fully loaded P-40 at 1500ft altitude and at 85 degrees could need 3900ft from start to clear a 50 ft tree line if there is no wind. 

http://www.zenoswarbirdvideos.com/Images/P-40/P-40TOCLC.pdf


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## oldcrowcv63 (Feb 27, 2012)

davebender said:


> Light flak effectiveness was increasing by leaps and bounds during 1939 to 1945. When weapons like the 40mm Bofors and 3.7cm Flak 43 were coupled with radar directed fire control even a 400 mph torpedo run would be little short of suicide. That's why Germany and the USA were developing weapons and bomb sights that allowed bombers to remain outside light flak range.



Of course, that's correct, Radar directed, rapid fire, medium calber, long range AA would limit the success probability pf any such low level attacks and ultimately even those of dive bombers. in additions to weapons and bomb sights, delivery techniques were also modified to minimize time in the threat envelope. The writing was on the wall a bit sooner for aerial torpedo attacks than for the other methods and weapons.


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