# Doolittle Raid - Short and Long Term Ramifications



## gjs238 (Mar 20, 2014)

What were the long and short term ramifications of the 18 April 1942 Doolittle Raid?


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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 20, 2014)

As one leader said about the Doolittle Raid (or something similar) - "On Dec. 7, 1941 we got hit over the head with a 2X4 - on April 18, 1942 Japan got a needle shoved through their heart."

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## Shinpachi (Mar 20, 2014)

One of the lessons for Japanese was.... Identification Friend or Foe marking was immediately enacted.
(eg. yellow stripe on the leading edge)


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## davebender (Mar 20, 2014)

A well trained B-25 group was destroyed. Two USN CV task forces were unavailable for over a month.

Seems to me these assets might have been better employed elsewhere. Sinking IJN Shokaku and IJN Zuikaku in the Coral Sea would cause Japan a lot more anguish then trivial damage inflicted on Tokyo.


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## buffnut453 (Mar 20, 2014)

But the loss of carriers could be covered up by Govt censorship. A bombing raid on Tokyo can't be hidden. Yes, physical damage was trivial but the psychological impact on the population who realised, perhaps for the first time, that they could be directly attacked, was surely relevant.


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## Denniss (Mar 20, 2014)

Don't forget the morale boost for all people in the USA and the embarrassment for certain japanese military leaders.


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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 20, 2014)

davebender said:


> A well trained B-25 group was destroyed. Two USN CV task forces were unavailable for over a month.


16 planes lost - and just a few years later we'd be loosing 16 planes a day bombing Germany on a good day!


davebender said:


> Seems to me these assets might have been better employed elsewhere.


 Where in April of 1942? 



davebender said:


> Sinking IJN Shokaku and IJN Zuikaku in the Coral Sea would cause Japan a lot more anguish then trivial damage inflicted on Tokyo.


Not if they were lost in battle.


Denniss said:


> Don't forget the morale boost for all people in the USA and the embarrassment for certain japanese military leaders.



Deniss sees the "Big Picture." 8)


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## GrauGeist (Mar 20, 2014)

That's just it...the raid came out of "nowhere", striking the heart of the Japanese Empire.

A morale booster for the U.S. and an act that would cause the seed of doubt to creep into the Japanese people (and military)


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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 20, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> That's just it...the raid came out of "nowhere", striking the heart of the Japanese Empire.
> 
> A morale booster for the U.S. and an act that would cause the seed of doubt to creep into the Japanese people (and military)



"They came from our secret base at Shangri-La."


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## GrauGeist (Mar 20, 2014)

FLYBOYJ said:


> "They came from our secret base at Shangri-La."


Yep...and from what I heard, it perplexed the Japanese high command trying to figure that out!


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## davebender (Mar 20, 2014)

Government propaganda cannot replace destroyed naval combat power. If Japan loses their two most capable CVs at Coral Sea it will probably force a halt to large scale IJN offensive operations. They certainly cannot risk the entire remaining CV fleet on a single throw of the dice at Midway.


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## GrauGeist (Mar 20, 2014)

davebender said:


> Government propaganda cannot replace destroyed naval combat power. If Japan loses their two most capable CVs at Coral Sea it will probably force a halt to large scale IJN offensive operations. They certainly cannot risk the entire remaining CV fleet on a single throw of the dice at Midway.


Show me where, early in the war, land based bombers were effective against Japanese naval assets. 4 B-26 and 15 B-17 had little or no effect on Nagumo's task force at Midway. The B-17s at the battle of the Coral Sea had little or no effect.

The material damage inflicted by Doolittle's attack may have been easily absorbed by the Japanese infrastructure, but psychological effects were far reaching and delivered far more "bang for the buck" than throwing them away needlessly at Midway or Coral Sea.

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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 20, 2014)

davebender said:


> Government propaganda cannot replace destroyed naval combat power. If Japan loses their two most capable CVs at Coral Sea it will probably force a halt to large scale IJN offensive operations. They certainly cannot risk the entire remaining CV fleet on a single throw of the dice at Midway.


And because of the Doolittle raid manpower and resources were diverted by the Japanese that could have been used else where. With that said, 16 B-25s and the Wasp would not have changed much at Coral Sea (a big "what if") although it would have been nice to have another US carrier in place during that battle. The loss of two Japanese carriers at Coral Sea would not have been as demoralizing as a direct attack on the Japanese mainland 4 months after Pearl Harbor, especially when the Japanese people were told over and over again that they were invincible. Combine B-25s over Tokyo in April and the loss of four Japanese carriers two months totally justifies the loss of 16 B-25s and the diversion of one fleet carrier.

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## Shinpachi (Mar 20, 2014)

From a topic at the time -

On the day, 2 prototype Ki-61s were testing Ho-103 cannon with dummy shells at Mito Flight School. Warrant Officer Ryozaburo Umekawa intercepted a B-25(11th) and shot to confirm white smoke rose. A rare opportunity to test a prototype in combat.

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## GrauGeist (Mar 21, 2014)

Shinpachi said:


> From a topic at the time -
> 
> On the day, 2 prototype Ki-61s were testing Ho-103 cannon with dummy shells at Mito Flight School. Warrant Officer Ryozaburo Umekawa intercepted a B-25(11th) and shot to confirm white smoke rose. A rare opportunity to test a prototype in combat.


I hadn't heard of that before, Shinpachi and yes, it would be a very rare opportunity for a prototype to get a chance at combat. Thanks for the info!


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## Shinpachi (Mar 21, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> I hadn't heard of that before, Shinpachi and yes, it would be a very rare opportunity for a prototype to get a chance at combat. Thanks for the info!



You are welcome, GG.
That was probably the first and last encounter of B-25 and Ki-61.


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## parsifal (Mar 21, 2014)

Short term gains and losses
(from the allied perspective)
Losses

The loss of so many men and maches was unforeseen, and keenly felt. 
two carrier groups were not available at a time they were needed. 


Gains

Air garrisons in Japan were greatly increased, tying down a very significant properttion of Japans slender air assets in home garrison duties. over time the Japanese lost many times more than 16 aircraft in pointless air patrols and training accidents. 

USN confirmed that larger twin engined aircraft could take off from fully operational carriers in wartime conditions. Previously the USN had tested the theory only partially, with reduced fuel loads and no ordinance in 1939. 


Long term Gains and Losses

Losses

Not having the two carriers probably led to the loss of the USS Lexington at Coral Sea

Gains

Increased signal traffic was a bonanza that led to the breaking of the JN25 code (vastly increased signal traffic on lesser cypher security levels), and this in turn led to the victory at Midway. it was an absolute bonanza for the codebreakers.

Provided a clue as to the porous nature of Japans vast new empire

Political backlashes in Japan, goaded the Japanese into bringing forward their second operational phase before they were ready, by demonstrating that the US Carriers were a dangerouys and potent force that posed a direct threet to the security of the Home Islands and the person of the emperor. Japan was goaded into making rash decisions about what they needed to do, and even after Midway dictated their continued offensive, all for unrealistic goals serving the need to "protect the emperor".

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## GrauGeist (Mar 21, 2014)

Another point to consider, regarding the Hornet and Enterprise.

Had the two carriers been involved in the battle of the Coral Sea instead of the Doolittle raid, how do we know they would have been an asset to the battle? At that stage of the war, there was still a huge learning curve and they may have been a contribution or they may have been a casualties.

As a result of the Doolittle raid, it forced Japan's hand and they rushed to expand their "zone" to the west, Midway was just one target, the others being Hawaii, Samoa and Fiji.

As it stands, the Hornet and Enterprise not only started the ball rolling with the Doolittle raid, they were there at Midway _because of it_.

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## Shinpachi (Mar 21, 2014)

Ramifications of the Doolittle Raid
(Excerpts from Japanese Wikipedia)

1. Attack against US mainland by submarines
2. Attack against Midway Island
3. Attack against airfields in China
4. Construction of new airfield for intercept in Narimasu, Tokyo
This was ordered by Hideki Tojo
5. Reconstruction of Tokyo to the fire protection city (eg. removal of wooden houses from the central part of Tokyo)

Episodes 

1. On the day of air raid, Prime Minister Hideki Tojo happened to be in a government aircraft from Utsunomiya City to Mito City for observation. On the way, his plane encountered a B-25 flying toward Tokyo. He shouted "That's American plane! Get back to Tokyo soon!". He was persuaded by his staff to use railroad because his plane might be identified as American one mistakenly under the situation.

2. Lt Col Mitsuo Fuchida being aboard the aircraft carrier Akagi looked for Shangri-La in his chart.

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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 21, 2014)

parsifal said:


> ShoAir garrisons in Japan were greatly increased, tying down a very significant properttion of Japans slender air assets in home garrison duties. over time the Japanese lost many times more than 16 aircraft in pointless air patrols and training accidents.


Many folks forget that these diverted squadrons don't sit idle - they train and patrol and in doing so there is attrition. Assets are spent basically shadow boxing, all this because of the Doolittle Raid.

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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 21, 2014)

Shinpachi said:


> R2. Lt Col Mitsuo Fuchida being aboard the aircraft carrier Akagi looked for Shangri-La in his chart.



Classic!

Fuchida was actually a Commander at the time of the raid

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## gjs238 (Mar 21, 2014)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fire_balloon

Fire balloons launched against US Canadian west coast were another result.


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## gjs238 (Mar 21, 2014)

Shinpachi said:


> 1. Attack against US mainland by submarines



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombardment_of_Ellwood
I believe the 1st Japanese submarine attack on the Continental US predated the Doolittle Raid.
So perhaps the Doolittle Raid was actually a revenge attack?


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## GrauGeist (Mar 21, 2014)

gjs238 said:


> So perhaps the Doolittle Raid was actually a revenge attack?


Yes, it was a revenge attack.

For Pearl Harbor...

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## Shinpachi (Mar 21, 2014)

gjs238 said:


> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombardment_of_Ellwood
> I believe the 1st Japanese submarine attack on the Continental US predated the Doolittle Raid.
> So perhaps the Doolittle Raid was actually a revenge attack?



I think the movie "1941" treated the incident as shocking as Pearl Harbor or the Battle of Los Angeles but it was not our Japanese impression. Sub attack prior to the Doolittle Raid was on the prolonged line of Pearl Harbor. It was renewed after the raid as revenge.

Japanese did not know how effective the balloon bombs were at all as Washington published no reports until the war ended.
Any attempts merely looked better than doing nothing.

Interesting difference of viewpoints.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 13, 2014)

One negative consequence of the raid may be the negative impact on the combat readiness of the new Hornet and its air wing. It's been argued that Hornet's horrible performance at Midway was a direct result of the 31 days spent with its flight deck locked by the presence of the B-25's (March 20 thru April 18). I expect carrier ops were curtailed for longer by time spent testing the concept and in port. A time line is revealing:

1. 2 September 1941: VF-8 is commissioned with about 17 pilots (8 are nuggets). Lt Cdr. 'Pat' Mitchell is assigned as CO, despite having no time in CV fighters and little CV ops experience, none recent. 
2. 6 October 1941: Hornet Air Group os established consisting of VF-8, VB-8, VS-8 and VT-8. 
3. 20 October 1941: Hornet CV-8 is commissioned:
4. Early November, 1941: VF-8 has 10 F4F and an SNJ-3 in which 17 pilots will train. 
5. Mid December 1941: First CV air operations for VF-8
6. 23 December 1941: VF-8 embarks on Hornet with 19 F4F-3 and 2 F4F-3A, VS VB were equipped with Curtiss SBC-4 Biplane dive bombers, number unknown. Apparently even VT-8 had some biplanes along with its TBD-1s. 
7. 28 December 1941: departs Norfolk for one month shakedown cruise in Gulf of Mexico.
8. 2 February 1942. The first two B-25's launched from Hornet's flight deck in a feasibility test 
9. 4 March 1942: Hornet departs for San Diego,
10. 20 March 1942: arrives in San Diego where all biplane types are exchanged for more modern a/c. 
11. 23 March 1942: departs San Diego for carrier qualifications. 
12. 25 March 1942: Hornet returns to San Diego: 
13. 30 March 1942: Hornet departs for Alameda NAS to collect B-25s.
14. 31 March 1942: Hornet arrives Alameda NAS
15. 1 April 1942: 16 B-25s loaded aboard Fight deck. 

So, it looks like the air wing had extremely limited operational-type flight training prior to departure for the west coast and little opportunity for much training in transit until it returned to PH after the Doolittle raid. 

(above info from Lundstrom, First Team)

Here is VB-8 Pilot Clay Fisher's account of the Hornet air group's lack of training. 

The Roundtable Forum

"It takes a lot of time to properly train an air group--carrier qualifying each individual pilot in specific aircraft, etc. Due to our accelerated deployment to the Pacific Fleet and the Doolittle mission, most of the dive bomber pilots received only 8 to 10 hours familiarization time in the SBDs at NAS North Island. We didn’t get to try field carrier landing practice in the SBDs until the Hornet returned to Pearl Harbor after the Doolittle mission. The wind was very gusty and too dangerous to do simulated carrier landing and we had to stop the operation. Also, no dive bombing practice. _*The Doolittle mission robbed the air group of our "spring training.*_"
Within days after the Hornet arrived back at Pearl, we deployed to the south Pacific. On that deployment the fighter pilots got to fly a few CAP flights and the SBD pilots flew just some 200-mile single plane searches. To my knowledge, the torpedo pilots never flew on that deployment. Only a few of the older dive bomber pilots had any experience diving the SBD."

Here is a photo of the Hornet just prior to its deployment to the west coast:

from: USS Hornet Photo Gallery

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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 13, 2014)

Forgot to mention, AFAIK, Hornet missed the initial phase of Watchtower (Guadalcanal operation) due to its being retained in the vicinity of PH for long-overdue air group training. I've also heard that at least one CV would have been held back by Nimitz King in any event. They evidently wanted to keep one in reserve at that stage of the war. Hornet arrived in the Solomons area near the end of August.


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## parsifal (Apr 14, 2014)

wouldnt Enterpise have been affected in the same way?


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 14, 2014)

Nothing like the truncated experience of the new Hornet. 

Commissioned 12 May 1938, Enterprise squadrons had long past integrated with the ship. Like her sister Yorktown (CV-5) and distant cousins, (Ranger CV-4, sisters Sara CV-3 and Lex CV-2 and even relatively new Wasp CV-7) sea trials and work ups were a distant memory. Big E had been operating in the Pacific since May, 1939. For VF-6, transition from the F3F-2 to the F4F-3A had occurred in May 1941. Pilots of VF-6 were generally experienced with few nuggets aboard. Transition to the SBD from BT-1 had apparently also taken place before December 7. Once the war started, the air group had the experience of the raids on the Marshall Islands, Marcus and Wake Island in which to practice their trade. Even during the Doolittle raid, Enterprise air group was operating continuously launching and recovering various air patrols (CAP, ASW) and the usual surface search missions. Unlike Enterprise, Hornet had little opportunity to engage in these most basic carrier operations, let alone experience combat during similar experience-building raids.


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## buffnut453 (Apr 14, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> I hadn't heard of that before, Shinpachi and yes, it would be a very rare opportunity for a prototype to get a chance at combat. Thanks for the info!



Minor diversion to the thread - the IJAAF had a track-record of taking prototypes into combat situations. They took half-a-dozen Ki-44s into Malaya in January 1942 - the Ki-44 being the replacment for the Ki-43 which had, itself, only just entered service.

Normal programming will now resume...


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## parsifal (Apr 14, 2014)

Yes of course, id forgotten how recently before the outbreak of war hornet had been commissioned. 
The Japanese had similar experiences. Both Shokaku and Zuikaku had only been commission a couple of months before the outbreak of war. During the raids on Pearl, it was these two carriers (CarDiv 5) that were tasked with the airfield attacks, as they were considered not experienced enough to be given the more demanding roles of attacking battleship row. These attacks were thought to be exceptionally difficult, because launch angles and heights had to be exceptionally fine, the attacks incredibly co-ordinated and for the Divebombers, the placement of bombs on specific parts of each ship had been carefully worked out. Cardiv 5 lacked the skills to deliver such levels of accuracy.

Shoho was even less experienced, having been commissioned in early 1942. Zuiho had been commissioned at the beginning of 1941, but by the outbreak of the war, her air groups were still incomplete. In the months leading up to Pearl, Zuiho and Rujo had both been combed out to beef up the fleet carriers, along with a comb out of the training schools to make up the CAGs of CarDiv 5. Just prior to the war, CarDiv 4 an 11 (consisting of Ryujo, Zuiho, Shoho and the Seaplane carriers Chitose, Chiyoda, Mizuho, and the merchant seaplane ships Sanuki Maru, Sanyo Maru, and Kamikawa Maru ) were provided with CAGs from yet another comb out, which basically wrecked the ability to train replacements for many months. The air groups that were embarked on these smaller carriers were not equipped with Zekes, and lacked many basic combat skills. it was fortunate for them they were not immediately exposed to heavy combat, although Shoho never got the chance to work up properly before being lost. 

The massive and rapid build up of the Japanese CAGs had decimated the training elements of the IJN, and then this was fatally affecte by the decision just before the war, not to make good the massive drains to experienced instructors that had occurred. Japan wanted a short war, and put everything into the shop front to do it. it wasnt until after Midway that the IJN realized they were in for a longer war, and started to divert some resources back to training. by then it was far too late, and Japans downward nose dive for its air crew was well under way.

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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 14, 2014)

buffnut453 said:


> Minor diversion to the thread - the IJAAF had a track-record of taking prototypes into combat situations. They took half-a-dozen Ki-44s into Malaya in January 1942 - the Ki-44 being the replacment for the Ki-43 which had, itself, only just entered service.
> 
> Normal programming will now resume...



Well maybe not… for half a mo.

Another instance at Midway of deploying the Yokosuka D4Y Judy 'Prototype' is reported to have been used on the Soryu as a recce-bird possibly as a replacement dive bomber on Hiryu, is another example.

based on wikipedia's description, this A/C might actually have been an early production variant and not a prototype.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 14, 2014)

Interesting background info Pars… Hadn't known that before. Thanks!


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## nuuumannn (May 6, 2014)

> based on wikipedia's description, this A/C might actually have been an early production variant and not a prototype.



Yes indeed. Two pre production D4Y1Cs were embarked aboard the _Soryu_ as reconnaissance aircraft, but went down with the ship at Midway. These were fitted with a recon camera in the rear fuselage. The recon variant was ordered into production in June 1942, but production was slow; by March 1943 only 25 examples, including pre-production machines had been built. It wasn't accepted as a dive bomber until March '43 also. By contrast, between 1943 and March 1944, some 589 D4Y1s and D4Y1Cs were built by Aichi and were principally the dive bomber variant. This info from _Japanese Aircraft of the Pacific War _by Rene Francillon.


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