# National Hari Kari - The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour



## parsifal (Dec 4, 2011)

The 70th anniversary of Pearl Harbour and the outbreak of the Pacific War is just about upon us. I thought it appropriate tyo post some kind of tribute and some kind of narrative to describe the events and decisions in the final lead up to the outbreak of war. 

The entries I plan to post are based on John Costello's Book "The Pacific War", taken from the "war warnings" section of the book chapter bearing the same name as this thread. Please feel free to post as you see appropriate, however, in the initial term, I would like to limit the discussion from November 7, when Yammamoto signed Operational order No 2 for the attack on Pearl, through to about the end of December or January. The main concentration is December 7th (US, 8th December west of the IDL). I will also use some parts of David Browns "Carrier Operations "and perhaps Norman Polmars "Carrier Warfare" to flesh out bits of the discussion. But please, feel free to post on this subject area as you see appropriate. 

This was the period of Japanese offensive, when it seemed they could do no wrong. But we should not forget the heroism and sacrifice made by all combatantsin that time frame .....


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## davebender (Dec 4, 2011)

IMO any realistic discussion of the Japanese decision to go to war with the USA should start on July 26th, 1941. That's when President FDR began a massive military build up in the Philippines. Diplomatic brinksmanship that backfired when Japan chose to fight rather then back down unilaterally. 

Perhaps if the USA had agreed to remove heavy bomber groups and long range submarines from Luzon in return for Japan withdrawing from IndoChina they might have brokered a deal. Just as President JFK agreed to remove nuclear missiles from Turkey in return for the Soviets removing nuclear missiles from Cuba. You've got to make a diplomatic concession if you want a diplomatic concession in return.


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## tyrodtom (Dec 4, 2011)

31 P-40's sent in Aug. 41, 50 more in Oct., 9 B-17's in Sept, and 26 more in Nov. They had planned to have 165 B-17's by Mar. 42. I don't think those amount to a " massive " military build up in anyones mind.
The early B-17s when bombed up didn't have the range to threaten anyone ourside of the Phiippines, they could not reach China or Japan and return. The only thing the 165 B-17's were a threat to was if Japan waited till after March 42 to invade the Philippines.


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## parsifal (Dec 5, 2011)

*Nov 5 1941*
24 hours after the Japanese Supreme War Council had decided to that in a months time it would be impossible to launch military operations becuae of the winter weather , prime minister Tojo persuades the Imperial Council into postponing the deadline until December 1 to allow for a final attempt "to solve the problem by diplomacy". To assists the struggling Nomura in this final bid for peace, he sends Saburo Kurusu to Washington as the chief negotiator in the final round of talks. 

Kurusu's detailed knowledge of the US and his American wife were expected to be valuable assets in the negotions. Tokyos last plan for peace incorporated two parts. The first....proposal A called for a complete settlement of the China incident with a limited withdrawal of Japanese Troops. The second proposal, Proposal B was a fall back to buy time with a _modus vivendi_ in which japan would halt further military ops in return for the US supplying a million gallons of Aviation fuel.


The Americans knew of this plan even before it had been submitted, through its MAGIC Intercepts. The president instructed Hull to "strain every nerve" and "do nothing to precipitate a crisis". Fully aware that negotiations now hung by a slender thread, roosevelts aim was to spin the negotiations out for as long as possible. On November 7 he sent a message to Churchillexoplaining that he was moving very cautiously towards meeting Chiang Kai Sheks laterst military demands. he told Churchill that he was counting on time for "continuing efforts to strengthen our defences in the PI, paralleled by similar efforts by you in Malaya, which will increase Japans hesitation towards war."

Neither the President nor Churchill wanted a showdown that would force Japan into war, which would be likley to interefere in the unofficial partnership they had formed in the struggle against Hitler. Yet Churchill for one knew that by urging Roosevelt to adopt a no compromise stance this was more likley to prompt Japan to attack in the Far East against the Dutch and the British. Even though no formal agreement existed at that time, Churchill was confident that the AQmericans would have no alternative to interveneIndeed, this became more and more evident as the collission between Japan and the West became moree and more obvious as that las t month of peace passed. 

Impact was made inevitable by the US to make even the smallest concessions to the Japanese. This refusal to compromise stemmed from two sources, the experiences of Munich in 1938 had completely hardened the Allies and the US to any solutions that involved compromise, and a mistaken belief in the power of the military presence in the far east. the Americans in particular placed far too much emphasis on the PI and Singapore deterrents, and gave too little attention to the exposed fleet position at Pearl.


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## parsifal (Dec 5, 2011)

*November 7*

The pearl harbour Strike Force, after a dress rehearsal involving all six of the participapting carriers, have orders signed by Yammamoto. Known as "Operational Order Number 2" it sets December 8 as Y Day for the attack on Oahu (7 December Hawaii time) 


Contain within the general Operations Orders were the specific orders, which were not released until November 23. They were rather confusingly referred to as "operational order no 3"

The following is an English translation of those orders: 
(Part I)
"23 November 1941
To: Carrier Striking Task Force 
1. The Carrier Striking Task Force will proceed to the Hawaiian Area with utmost secrecy and, at the outbreak of the war, will launch a resolute surprise attack on and deal a fatal blow to the enemy fleet in the Hawaiian Area. The initial air attack is scheduled at 0330 hours, X Day. Upon completion of the air attacks, the Task Force will immediately withdraw and return to Japan and, after taking on new supplies, take its position for Second Period Operations. In the event that, during this operation, an enemy fleet attempts to intercept our force or a powerful enemy force is encountered and there is danger of attack, the Task Force will launch a counterattack. 
2. The disposition of Force will be as shown on Chart 1. 
3. The Operation of Each Force. 
a. General 
While exercising strict antiaircraft and antisubmarine measures and making every effort to conceal its position and movements, the entire force (except the Midway Bombardment Unit) in accordance with special orders will depart as a group from Hitokappu Bay at a speed of 12-14 knots. The force refueling en route whenever possible will arrive at the standby point (42 N, 165 W). In the event bad weather prevents refueling en route to the standby point, the screening unit will be 
[6]. General outline.
MAP: Planned Track of Carrier Striking Force For Pearl Harbor Attack. _(not shown in this article)_[Page 9] 

CHART: Chart 1, Disposition of Forces. 
Task Force 
Classification: Air Attack Force
Commander: 1st Air Fleet Commander
Strength: 1st Air Fleet
1st Carrier Division
CV Akagi
CV Kaga 
2nd Carrier Division
CV Hiryu 
CV Soryu 
3rd Carrier Division
CV Zuikaku 
CV Shokaku
Duties: Air Attacks

Classification: Screening Unit
Commander: 1st Destroyer Squadron Commander
Strength: 17th Destroyer Division
(Nagara Flagship)
18th Destroyer Division
(Akigumo Flagship)
Duties: Screening and escort
Classification: Support Force
Commander: 3rd Battleship Division Commander
Strength: 3rd Battleship Division
(less the 2nd section)
8th Cruiser Division
Duties: Screen and support

Classification: Patrol Unit
Commander: 2nd Submarine Division Commander
Strength: I-19 (Flagship)
I-21
I-23
Duties: Patrol
Classification: Midway Bombardment Unit

Commander: 7th Destroyer Division Commander

Strength: 7th Destroyer Division
(less the 2nd section)

Duties: Midway air base attack

Classification: Supply Force 
Overall Commander: Kyokuto Maru Commander 
Classification: Supply Force (1st Supply Unit)
Commander: Kyokuto Maru Commander 
Strength: Kenyo Maru
Kyokuto Maru
Kokuyo Maru
Shinkoku Maru
Akebono Maru
Duties: Supply

Classification: Supply Force (2nd Supply Unit)
Commander: Toho Maru Inspector
Strength: Toho Maru 
Toei Maru
Nippon Maru
Duties: Supply

ordered to return to the home base. Subsequent to the issuance of the order designating X Day (the day of the outbreak of hostilities), the force will proceed to the approaching point (32 N, 157 W). 

Around 0700 hours, X-1 Day the Task Force will turn southward at high speed (approximately 24 knots) from the vicinity of the approaching point. It will arrive at the take-off point (200 nautical miles north of the enemy fleet anchorage) at 0100 hours X Day (0530 Honolulu time) and commit the entire air strength to attack the enemy fleet and important airfields on Oahu. 

Upon completion of the air attacks, the Task Force will assemble the aircraft, skirt 800 nautical miles north of Midway, return about X + 15 Day to the western part of the Inland Sea via the assembly point (30 N, 165 E) and prepare for Second Period Operations. In the event of a fuel shortage the Task Force will proceed to Truk via the assembly point. 

The force may skirt near Midway in the event that consideration of an enemy counter-attack is unnecessary due to successful air attacks or if such action is necessitated by fuel shortage. 

In this event, the 5th Carrier Division with the support of the Kirishima from the 3rd Battleship Division will leave the Task Force on the night of X Day or the early morning of X + 1 Day and carry out air attacks on Midway in the early morning of X + 2 Day. 

If a powerful enemy force intercepts our return route, the Task Force will break through the Hawaiian Islands area southward and proceed to the Marshall Islands. 

b. Patrol unit 
The patrol unit will accompany the main force. In the event the screening unit is returned to the home base, the patrol unit will screen the advance of the main force and the launching and the landing of aircraft. After the air attacks, the patrol unit will station itself between the flank of the main force and the enemy. In the event of an enemy fleet sortie, the patrol unit will shadow the enemy and in a favorable situation attack him. 

c. The Midway Bombardment Unit 
The Midway Bombardment Unit will depart from Tokyo Bay around X-6 Day and, after refueling, secretly approach Midway. It will arrive on the night of X Day and shell the air base. The unit will then withdraw and, after refueling, return to the western part of the Inland Sea. The oiler Shiriya will accompany the bombardment unit on this mission and will be responsible for the refueling operation. 

d. Supply Force 
The supply force will accompany the main force to the approaching point, carrying out refuelings, separate from the main force, skirt 800 nautical miles north of Midway, return to the assembly point by 0800 hours, X +6 Day, and stand by. 

4. The Task Force may suspend operations en route to the Hawaiian area and return to Hitokappu Bay, Hokkaido or Mutsu Bay, depending upon the situation. 

Commander
Carrier Striking Task Force
Nagumo, Chuichi


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## parsifal (Dec 5, 2011)

Operational Order No 3 (Part II)

"The Hawaiian operations air attack plan has been decided as follows: 

1. The Operation of the Air Attack Forces 

The force will be 700 nautical miles due north of point Z (set at the western extremity of the Island of Lanai) at 0600 hours X-1 Day and advance on a course of 180 degrees from 0700 hours X-1 Day at an increased speed of 24 knots. 

Air attacks will be carried out by launching the first attack units 230 nautical miles due north of Z point at 0130 hours X Day, and the second attack unit at 200 nautical miles due north of Z point at 0245 hours. 

After the launching of the second attack units is completed, the task force will withdraw northward at a speed of about 24 knots. The first attack units are scheduled to return between 0530 and 0600 hours and the second attack units are scheduled to return between 0645 and 0715 hours. 

Immediately after the return of the first and second attack units, preparations for the next attack will be completed. At this time, carrier attack planes capable of carrying torpedoes will be armed with such as long as the supply lasts. 


[7]. General outline.

If the destruction of enemy land-based air strength progresses favorably, repeated attacks will be made immediately and thus decisive results will be achieved. 

In the event that a powerful enemy surface fleet appears, it will be attacked. 

2. Organization of the Air Attack Units 
_not included in translation) _

3. Targets 
a. The First Attack Units 
The targets for the first group will be limited to about four battleships and four aircraft carriers; the order of targets will be battleships and then aircraft carriers. 

The second group will attack the enemy land-based air strength according to the following assignment: 
The 15 Attack Unit: Hangars and aircraft on Ford Island 
The 16 Attack Unit: Hangars and aircraft on Wheeler Field 
The targets of Fighter Combat Units will be enemy aircraft in the air and on the ground. 

b. The Second Attack Units 
The first group will attack the enemy air bases according to the following assignment: 
The 5 Attack Unit: Aircraft and hangars on Kaneohe, Ford Island and Barbers Point. 
The 6 Attack Unit: Hangars and aircraft on Hickam Field. 
The targets for the second group will be limited to four 

Chart 2 
Organization of the Air Attack Units 
1st Attack Units CO Commander Fuchida
1st Group CO do
1st Attack Unit CO do
15 Kates each fitted with a 800-kg Armor Piercing Bomb for
level (high altitude) bombing.
2nd Attack Unit CO Lt Cmdr Hashiguchi
15 Kates-Same bombs as 1st Attack Unit.
3rd Attack Unit CO Lt Abe
10 Kates-Same bombs as 1st Attack Unit.
4th Attack Unit CO Lt Cmdr Kusmi
10 Kates-Same bombs as 1st Attack Unit.
1st Torpedo Attack Unit CO Lt Cmdr Murata
12 Kates each fitted with an Aerial Torpedo, Mark 91.
2nd Torpedo Attack Unit CO Lt Kitajima
12 Kates-Same torpedoes as 1st Torpedo Attack Unit.
3rd Torpedo Attack Unit CO Lt Nagai
8 Kates-Same torpedoes as 1st Torpedo Attack Unit.
4th Torpedo Attack Unit CO Lt Matsumura
8 Kates-Same torpedoes as 1st Torpedo Attack Unit.
2nd Group CO Lt Cmdr Takahashi
15th Attack Unit CO do
27 Vals each fitted with a 250-kg Anti-ground (general purpose)
bomb for dive bombing.
16th Attack Unit CO Lt Sakamoto
27 Vals-Same bomb as 15th Attack Unit.
3rd Group CO Lt Cmdr Itaya
1st Fighter Combat Unit CO do
9 Zekes for air control and strafing
2nd Fighter Combat Unit CO Lt Shiga
9 Zekes-Same Mission
3rd Fighter Combat Unit CO Lt Suganami
9 Zekes-Same Mission
4th Fighter Combat Unit CO Lt Okajima
6 Zekes-Same Mission
5th Fighter Combat Unit CO Lt Sato
6 Zekes-Same Mission
6th Fighter Combat Unit CO Lt Kaneko
6 Zekes-Same Mission

2nd Attack Units
1st Group CO Lt Cmdr Shimazaki
6th Attack Unit CO do
27 Kates each fitted with a 250-kg Anti-ground (general purpose
bomb and six 60-kg Ordinary bombs for level (high altitude)
bombing.
5th Attack Unit CO Lt Ichihara
27 Kates-Same bombs as 6th Attack Unit
Chart 2 (Cont'd) 
2nd Group CO Lt Cmdr Egusa
13th Attack Unit CO do
18 Vals each fitted with a 250-kg Ordinary bomb for dive bombing.
14th Attack Unit CO Lt Kobayashi
18 Vals-Same bombs as 13th Attack Unit
11th Attack Unit CO Lt Chihaya
18 Vals-Same bombs as 13th Attack Unit
12th Attack Unit CO Lt Makino
18 Vals-Same bombs as 13th Attack Unit
3rd Group CO Lt Shindo
1st Fighter Combat Unit CO do
9 Zekes for air control and strafing
2nd Fighter Combat Unit CO Lt Nikaido
9 Zekes-Same Mission
3rd Fighter Combat Unit CO Lt Iida
9 Zekes-Same Mission
4th Fighter Combat Unit CO Lt Kumano
9 Zekes-Same Mission
or five enemy aircraft carriers. If the number of targets is insufficient, they will select targets in the order of cruisers and battleships. 

The Fighter Combat Units will attack the enemy aircraft in the air and on the ground."


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## parsifal (Dec 5, 2011)

operational order Part III

4. Attack Procedure 
a. The First Attack Units 
(1) With the element of surprise as the principle, attacks will be carried out by the torpedo unit and bomber unit of the First Group, and then the Second Group. 

(2) During the initial phase of the attack, the Fighter Combat Units will, in one formation, storm the enemy skies about the same time as the First Group, and contact and destroy chiefly the enemy interceptor planes. 

In the event that no enemy aircraft are encountered in the air, the units will immediately shift to the strafing of parked aircraft as follows: 

1st and 2nd Fighter Combat Units: Ford Island and Hickam Field. 
3rd and 4th Fighter Combat Units: Wheeler Field and Barbers Point. 
5th and 6th Fighter Combat Units: Kaneohe 

(3) In the event that the advantage of surprise attack cannot be expected due to strict enemy security, the 
approach and attack will be made in the order of the Fighter Combat Units, Dive Bombing Units, Horizontal Bombing Units and the Torpedo Attacking Units. 

b. The Second Attack Units 
All units will storm the enemy skies almost simultaneously and launch the attacks. 
Although the general outline of the operations of the Fighter Combat Units corresponds to that of the First Attack Units, the strafing will be carried out according to the following in case there are no enemy aircraft in the air. 

1st and 2nd Fighter Combat Units: Ford Island and Hickam Field 
3rd and 4th Fighter Combat Units: Wheeler Field and Kaneohe 

c. The general outline of attack in the event that enemy aircraft carriers and the main body of the U.S. Fleet are in anchorages outside Pearl Harbor are: 

(1) The organization and targets are the same as mentioned above. The First Attack Units of the First Group, however, will increase the number of torpedo bombers as much as possible. 

(2) Escorted by the Fighter Combat Units, the Air Attack Units will proceed in a group and attack the designated targets in the order of the enemy fleet anchorages and the Island of Oahu. If attacks on the enemy fleet anchorages progress favorably, however, the Fighter Combat Units and the 2nd Group of the First Air Attack Unit will immediately proceed to the Island of Oahu. Upon completion of the attacks, the anchorage attack unit will return directly to the carriers. 

d. Rendezvous for Return to Carriers 
(1) The rendezvous point will be 20 nautical miles at 340 degrees from the western extremity (Kaena Point) of the Island of Oahu. The rendezvous altitude will be 1,000 meters. (If this vicinity is covered with clouds, it will be below the cloud ceiling.) 

(2) The Attack Units will wait at the rendezvous point for about 30 minutes and return to their carriers, after being joined by the Fighter Combat Units. 

(3) While returning to carriers, the Fighter Combat Unit will become the rear guards for the whole unit and intercept any enemy pursuit. 

5. Reconnaissance 
a. Pre-operation Reconnaissance 

Pre-operation reconnaissance will not be carried out unless otherwise ordered. 

b. Immediate Pre-attack Reconnaissance 
Two reconnaissance seaplanes of the 8th Cruiser Division will take off at 0030 hours, X Day, secretly reconnoiter Pearl Harbor and Lahaina Anchorage and report the presence of the enemy fleet (chiefly carriers and the main body of the fleet). 

c. Scouting Patrol 
The reconnaissance seaplanes of the 8th Cruiser Division will take off at 0300 hours and will carry out an extensive search of the waters between the enemy and the friendly forces and the waters adjacent to the two channels situated to the east and west of the Island of Oahu. They will observe and report the presence and activities of the enemy sortie force and enemy aircraft on counter-attack missions. 

d. Before returning to its carrier, after the attack, an element of fighters designated by the Fighter Combat Unit Commander will fly as low and as fast as circumstances permit and observe and determine the extent of damage inflicted upon the enemy aircraft and ships. 

Air Security Disposition No. 1 Method B will be followed from one hour before sunrise until 45 minutes after sunset on the day of the air attack."


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## mikewint (Dec 5, 2011)

Parsifal, absolutely top rate excellent detail sir, as always


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## parsifal (Dec 5, 2011)

Thanks for the compliment, but there are other members with a far greater knowledge that me on particular aspects of this war. I like to think i have a good basic knowledge of the overall events, but there are guys here that know what colour underwear a particular flyer was wearing for a particular combat.

The pearl harbour attack was, in my opinion, the most thoroughly planned operation of the war. As a military exercise it was a brilliant piece of soldiering. as a piece of national policy it was a near disaster, a death sentence. Japans moments of glory were spectacular, and spectacularly brief. they were the mouse that roared...they scared the elephant for a brief moment, and then were crushed under the weight of its muscle and courage


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## davebender (Dec 5, 2011)

4 American heavy bomber groups were enroute to the Philippines as of December 1941. If your numbers are correct that works out to about 40 B-17s per bomber group.

Submarines, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, 8.12.1941
The USN had 29 modern long range submarines based on Luzon as of December 1941. Plus 3 submarine tenders and a submarine rescue ship. I have don't know if this was the planned total or if more were enroute as of the Japanese attack.

Hundreds of fighter aircraft and other reinforcements were also enroute to the Philippines. However I think it was the long range submarines and bombers which Japan considered a threat. From Luzon they had the potential to strike Japanese shipping in the China Sea. 

1941 Japan didn't have the benefit of hindsight. They had to assume USN torpedoes would work and U.S. Army Air Corps bombers were capable of hitting ships at sea.


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## parsifal (Dec 5, 2011)

Its fair to say that the US attached a lot of importance on the deterrent value of their far eastern forces. It was a serious miscalculation. Japans primary concern, was not the miltary deterrents that had been sent to the theatre, it was the resources embargo that had been imposed on her


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## davebender (Dec 5, 2011)

Do you have evidence to support that statement?


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## parsifal (Dec 5, 2011)

*November 7*

Washington: Ambassador nomura arrives at the White House to present Proposal "A". He is seeking a comprehensive settlement. Knowing that the "modus Vivendi" would be Japans next move, Secretary hull stalls. The President rejects an immediate reply by telling Nomura "Nations must think 100 years ahead". 

Proposal "A" is formally rejected on November 14. The US insists on the total evacuation of all Japanese troops from China (_I am unsure if that includes Manchuria, though I think it does_). The Americans make this demand, knowing it would be unnacceptable to the Japanese, they had fought a four year long war, in which casualties exceeded 1 million men. It was simply too high a price for the Japanese to pay for peace. 

The next day (November 15, Bishop walsh's effort to mediate was dismissed by the State Department as naive. Hull also concludes after a meeting with Kurusu, that he (kurusu) is "deceitful". MAGIC intercepts pick up instructions to Japanese Consul Kita, in Honolulu, to submit his "ships report" on a twice weekly basis. (this vital clue was _not_ passed to Pearl Harbour Command)


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## parsifal (Dec 5, 2011)

davebender said:


> Do you have evidence to support that statement?




im re-reading Costellos 740 book that deals with this matter in great detail. The Japanese were unconcerned by the military buildup as it existed in December 1941. Maybe it woulod have changed after further reinforcement, but not in the lead up to the war.


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## buffnut453 (Dec 5, 2011)

parsifal said:


> The pearl harbour attack was, in my opinion, the most thoroughly planned operation of the war. As a military exercise it was a brilliant piece of soldiering.



The Pearl Harbor attack was thoroughly planned and supremely executed all except for the target selections. Leaving the huge oil tanks untouched was a mistake of monumental proportions. The best way to prevent the USN regaining the offensive initiative was to prevent ships from sailing and the best way to do that was to destroy existing oil stocks at Pearl and then interdict, using submarines, any attempts at resupply from the US west coast. Such a strategy would surely have limited the US Pacific Fleet's ability to operate and might have given Japan the 12 months of tactical and operational freedom they had originally sought from the Pearl Harbor attack.

Aside from this, the other key unanswerable question is whether the US would have gone to war had Japan attacked Malaya, Thailand and the Dutch East Indies? Although the US military presence in the Philippines presented a threat to the Japanese flank, that threat was only real if the US decided to go to war with Japan. Even in late 1941, I suspect that continuing isolationist sentiment made it unlikely that Roosevelt would have taken his country to war to protect British or Dutch possessions in the Far East. Japanese leaders were so immersed in a national military inferiority complex, and with perceptions that "everyone was against them" that they failed to notice the lack of any tangible military cooperation between Britain and America in the Far East. This must count as one of the worst political mis-readings of a situation.

Just a few thoughts to keep the thread interesting


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## parsifal (Dec 5, 2011)

re the chances of the US coming to the aid of the British and Dutch. Ther was no formal agreement, but Churchill was very confident that the US would come to his aid in that eventuality. I'm pretty sure Costello deal with this issue some more eslewhere in his book (but its 20 years since I read it). I cant help but believe that had been given such assurances by Roosevelt. Feelings were strong in the US against Japanese aggression across the whole of the Far east. It wasnt the uphill battle for roosevelt to garner support for war in the same way that he had found with Germany.

Thus far ther isnt a right or wrong answer on this, its a matter of opinion. People will have to mostly come to their own conclusions about what might have happened......


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## buffnut453 (Dec 5, 2011)

I did say it was an unanswerable question...but I think Roosevelt would still have had an uphill struggle to convince Congress to go to war if America had not been attacked. Others may differ. That's what makes the discussion fun.

I do stand by my comments about the targeting idiocy of the Pearl Harbor attack, though. 

Cheers,
Mark


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## parsifal (Dec 5, 2011)

buffnut453 said:


> I did say it was an unanswerable question...but I think Roosevelt would still have had an uphill struggle to convince Congress to go to war if America had not been attacked. Others may differ. That's what makes the discussion fun.
> 
> I do stand by my comments about the targeting idiocy of the Pearl Harbor attack, though.
> 
> ...



You can mostly blame the timidity of Nagumo....chance of a lifetime and he decides to call it a day. Genda reportedly was reduced to tears trying to persuade him for a third strike

Still, the damage caused to the fleet was substantial, and threw Us warplans into chaos. i agree completely that destruction of the fuel farm would have been even better


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## parsifal (Dec 6, 2011)

*November 16*

Concealed by strict radio silence, the carriers of the IJN sailed independantly from the Inland sea to avert suspicion. Their destination was the remote Tankan Bay in the Kurile Is. To camourflage their movements, Yammamoto orders their call signs transferred to destroyers. 


*Japanese cypher codes*

This is an extremely complex, and even today, incomplete side of the story. There is no doubt that breaking of Japanese coses provided significant advantages to the Allies, but in the lead up to war, Allied abilities, particulalry in military ciphers were limited. perhaps 10% of Japanese military traffic could be read, and the US in particular lacked the assessment and evaluation infrastructure to take advantage of what intell it was receiving 

JN-25 was the name given by codebreakers to the chief, and most secure, command and control communications scheme used by the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) during and slightly before World War II (it was the 25th Japanese Navy system identified). Introduced in 1939 to replace Blue Code (which dated back to WWI) , it was an enciphered code, producing five numeral groups in the traffic which was actually broadcast. It was frequently revised during its lifetime, and each new version required a more or less fresh cryptanalytic start. New code books were introduced from time to time and new superenciphering books were also introduced, sometimes simultaneously. In particular, JN-25 was significantly changed on 1 December 1940, and again on 4 December 1941, just before the attack on Pearl Harbor. That and the inability of the US codebreakers to even decode callsigns and ship deployments blinded the US sigint effort at a critical moment. It was the Deecember 04/41 edition of the JN-25 system which was sufficiently broken by late May 1942 to provide the forewarning which led to the U.S. victory at the Battle of Midway.

British, Australians, Dutch and Americans cooperated on attacks against JN-25 beginning well before the Pearl Harbor attack. However, the Japanese Navy was not engaged in significant battle operations until late 1941, so there was little traffic available with which to work. Before then, IJN discussions and orders could generally travel by more secure routes than encrypted broadcast, such as courier or direct delivery by an IJN vessel. Publicly available accounts differ, but the most credible agree that the JN-25 version in use before December 1941 was not more than perhaps 10% broken at the time of the attack, and that primarily in stripping away its superencipherment. JN-25 traffic increased immensely with the outbreak of naval warfare at the end of 1941 and provided the cryptographic "depth" needed to succeed in substantially breaking the existing and subsequent versions of JN-25.

The American effort was directed from Washington, D.C. by the U.S. Navy's signals intelligence command, called OP-20-G. It was centered at Pearl Harbor at the U.S. Navy's Combat Intelligence Unit (Station HYPO, also known as COM 14), commanded by Commander Joseph Rochefort. With the assistance of Station CAST (also known as COM 16, jointly commanded by Lts Rudolph Fabian and John Lietwiler) in the Philippines, and the British Far East Combined Bureau in Singapore, and using an IBM punched card tabulating machine (when available), a successful attack was mounted against the JN-25 edition which came into effect on 1 December 1941. Together they made considerable progress by early 1942. Cribs were used by exploiting common formalities in Japanese messages, such as "I have the honor to inform your excellency", the known call signs of various ships and the use of formal, stylized titles which were often in known plaintext format. 

The Purple cipher (also sometimes referred to as AN-1, used by the Japanese Foreign Office as its most secure system, had no cryptographic connection with any version of JN-25, or indeed with any of the encryption systems used by the Japanese military before or during the War. Purple traffic was diplomatic, not military, and in the period before the Pearl Harbor attack, the Japanese military, which controlled Japanese policy, did not trust the Foreign Office enough to tell it much. JN-25 traffic, on the other hand, was limited to military matters, mostly IJN operational ones, from which strategic or tactical information could sometimes be inferred. Nevertheless, decrypted Purple traffic was very valuable, especially later in the war,

JN-39 was a naval code used by merchant ships (commonly known as the "maru code"), broken in May 1940. and again 28 May 1941, when the whale factory Nisshin Maru II visited San Francisco, U.S. Customs Service Agent George Muller and Commander R. P. McCullough of the U.S. Navy's 12th Naval District (responsible for the area) boarded her and seized her codebooks, without informing Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). Copies were made, in a clumsy way, and the originals returned. The Japanese quickly realized JN-39 was compromised, and replaced it with JN-40.

JN-40 JN-25 was replaced by JN-40 (just after Midway), which was originally believed to be a code super-enciphered with a numerical additive in the same way as JN-25. However, in September 1942, an error by the Japanese gave clues to the codebreakers at the FECB, Kilindini. Nevertheless, much of the guadacanal and new Guinea campaigns were fought "blind' by the allies as a result of this new code. JN-40 was a fractionating transposition cipher based on a substitution table of 100 groups of two figures each followed by a columnar transposition. By November 1942, they were able to read all previous traffic and break each message as they received it. Enemy Naval warships and military transport was thus trackable, enabling Allied submarines to successfully attack it.

JN-152A simple transposition and substitution cipher used for broadcasting navigation warnings. In 1942 the FECB at Kilindini broke JN-152 and the previously inpenetratable JN-167, another merchant shipping cypher.

JN-167A merchant-shipping cipher (see JN-152).

In 1942 there was an incident involving the Chicago Tribune that nearly compromised the Allied SigInt efforts. In June 1942 the Chicago Tribune, run by isolationist Col. Robert L McCormick, published an article that implied that the United States had broken the Japanese codes. This was a serious breach of national security. The government at first wanted to prosecute the Tribune under the Espionage Act of 1917. For various reasons, including the desire not to bring more attention to the article, the charges were dropped. Evidently, the Japanese dont read the chicago tribune


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## buffnut453 (Dec 6, 2011)

I heartily recommend "And I Was There" by Layton for an inside view of US code-breaking efforts, the in-fighting between DC and Pearl, and the issue of what intelligence was provided to Kimmel prior to the attack. It's a fascinating insight.

To cut a long story short, DC deliberately (or through incompetence) withheld vital "political" intelligence from Pearl Harbor, including the state of negotiations, the infamous 14-part message that Kurusu was to deliver to Hull at a given time, and "bomb plot" messages that originated from the Japanese consulate in Hawaii to Japan providing details of which USN vessels where were within the harbour. DC sought to control all "radio intelligence" and consistently fought the assessments coming out of Pearl Harbor both before and after the attack. Unfortunately, Pearl got it right more than DC which only exacerbated the problem. It was the team at PH that identified Midway as a target for attack but DC subsequently took all the credit and replaced Rochefort as the PH team lead. Overall, a very messy situation.


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## davebender (Dec 6, 2011)

The Soviet Union did not ignore American nuclear armed missiles based in Turkey. The USA did not ignore Soviet nuclear armed missiles based in Cuba. Israel did not ignore the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq. President Reagan did not ignore a miliary build up on the island of Grenada. 1930s Britain did not ignore an Italian military build up in East Africa. 1967 Israel did not ignore a massive Egyptian military build up in the Sinai. 

Nobody ignores a threatening military buildup on their doorstep. Unless you have historical Japanese documents to prove otherwise I don't believe Japan ignored U.S. heavy bombers and submarines based on Luzon after July 26, 1941.


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## buffnut453 (Dec 6, 2011)

The main focus of Japan's attention was the domination of Thailand and Malaya, and the neutralization of the "fortress" at Singapore as stepping-stones to assaulting the oil-rich Dutch East Indies. The Philippines threatened the left flank of the forces assigned to the Southern Advance. Rearmament in the Philippines was simply more evidence to Japan of a conspiracy against her. The IJA "hot heads" had been promoting the idea of attacking the West long before the rearmament began, so the arrival of additional forces merely provided stronger evidence (to the IJA leadership) of the need to strike sooner rather than later.


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## parsifal (Dec 6, 2011)

There is a difference between ignoring and being unconcerned. The japanese were of the opinion that they did not require the services of First Air fleet to deal with the military forces being built up in the PI and Malaya. they did not believe that they needed to utilize more than 10 divisions of their 50 division army to subdue the far east. More than half their air forces remained in China, Manchuria and the Home islands during the upcoming campaign. They undertook their southern thrust with just two battleships, six other battleships remained in home waters, mostly to conserve japans dwindling stocks of fuel 

Whilst they could not, and did not, ignore the threats posed by the military buildup, they were more than confident that they could deal with the threat. And the record of historical events backs up their assessment.

Beyond that, its up to you to undertake your research and determine if they ignored the threat or went to war because of the threat. There is no evidence that i know of that saw japans decision to go to war as primarily or even partly driven by their fear of the military build ups in the PI and Malaya. What drove them to war were the US led embargoes on strategic materials, particularly oil.


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## parsifal (Dec 6, 2011)

*November 16*
Washington: MAGIC intercept a cable from Tokyo to Nomura advising him "fate of the Empire hangs by a sheer thread....please fight harder"

Four days later, nomura present Proposal "B" to Secretary Hull. Both sides know it is the "absolutely final offer". Through the MAGIC intercepts, hull is convinced it amounts to an utimatum. The president however instructs Hull to give the submission "sympathetic study".

On November 21, the British Joint Intelligence Committee transmitted to its Far Eastern Command its strategic assessment on future japanese reactions. The assessment is basically that if negotiations break down (by that stage assessed as "likely" by the British), the Japanese are not likley to attack Siberia (I believe they derived that from their reading of Soviet Intelligence, which by then was assimilating Sorges reports), or even Malya or the NEI. attacks against the burma road were considered unlikley. However the assessment considered an invasion of Siam as probable.

This assessment was intercepted by by the Us war department (the US was reading british traffic as well as Japanese) and circulated to various military officials


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## parsifal (Dec 6, 2011)

*Richard Sorge the "Ramsay" Spy ring*The spy network built by Sorge was the one that supplied to Moscow some of themost valuable information on both German and japanese intentions. For most of the eight years Sorge spent in Tokyo, the Kremlin regarded Japan as the greatest threat to the Soviet Union. He was so able to cover himself that a japanese reporter described him as a “typical Nazi, arrogant and boastful temper and heavy drinker”. But Sorge was an incredibly talented spymaster and was able penetrate the german diplomentic corps in tokyo, to obtain a great deal of information. His chief source of information was the German embassy and he even managed a little extra curricular activity by seducing the ambassador’s wife.

Sorge was able to predict the Japanese invasion of China in 1937 and the 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union, providing to Moscow the exact date – June 22 – of the beginning of the Barbarossa invasion. Information came to him from high-ranking representatives: the german ambassador General Ott, his friend Scholl and an officer of the Reich Colonel Von Niedermayer. But his timely and accurate information was ignored in the paranoia driven Stalinist Russia. Stalin dismissed the informationas as dubious and dangerous. Not being able to get his hands on Sorge, he shot Berzin, the General Commander of Military Intelligence and head of communications service.

A month after the German armored divisions invaded the Soviet Union.

Sorge couldn’t believe that; after eight years of risk, hard work and sacrifices, Moscow did not believe his information. As always, he didn’t lose his nerve and on July the 2nd 1941 he sent a new message: the japanese army and navy had decided to move their forces in the south-east of Asia in preparation for possible confrontations with the western powers. this offered the opportunity for Soviet troops to concentrate on the Western Front, and led directly to the defeat of the Germans in the battle of Moscow.

In the context of the Pacific war, it is significant to note that a critical element in the Japanese decision to go to war, was that the germans would win against the Soviets. Until December 4 that appeared to be a likley outcome, and if the germans had defeated the Soviets, the outcome in the pacific may well have been different. But partly bewcause of the achievements of this one man, the Soviets were able to redeploy vast numbers of their far Eastern army, and defeat the final German thrusts to take Moscow. Even before the outbreak of war, one of the fundamental pre-requisites for Japans decision to go to war had been checked, and would eventually be defeated.


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## parsifal (Dec 7, 2011)

*November 22* 
MAGIC intercepts reveal Tokyos message to Nomura that the deadline for negotiations had been extended by four days, to November 29. "after that things are automatically going to happen". 

Pearl Harbour Strike Force: Waiting at Tankan Bay, Nagumo receives his operational order to sail on November 26 (this message was intercepted by OP-20-G, but could not be read).


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## parsifal (Dec 7, 2011)

*First Air fleets preprations for the Attack*

"In early 1941, Vice Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto was appointed Commander-in-Chief of Japan's Combined Fleet, and he immediately took issue with the cautious policy of the Japanese Naval General Staff. Yamamoto did not believe that the United States Pacific Fleet would remain idle at Pearl Harbor while Japan attacked and seized America's Philippines, and British and Dutch colonial possessions in South-East Asia. He believed that Japan must cripple the United States Pacific Fleet at the same time as it launched its attacks on countries of South-East Asia. 

With this firm conviction, Admiral Yamamoto began to consider a surprise carrier-launched air attack on the United States Pacific Fleet at its Pearl Harbor base timed to coincide with Japan's military aggression in South-East Asia. Yamamoto instructed Rear Admiral Takijiro Onishi, Chief of Staff of the 11th Air Fleet, to assess the feasibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor by carrier-launched aircraft. Onishi enlisted the assistance of Commander Minoru Genda, a brilliant staff officer and tactician serving with Japan's 1st Air Fleet. Genda studied the problem and came to the conclusion that an attack on Pearl Harbor could succeed if (a) the attack took the Americans completely by surprise, (b) the attack occurred early on a Sunday morning when American defence preparedness would be at a low level, (c) all six of Japan's best aircraft carriers were used, and (d) highly skilled aircrews were used in the attack. To ensure complete surprise, Genda's plan precluded alerting the Americans to their danger by a prior declaration of war.

Admiral Yamamoto's plan for a surprise peacetime attack on the United States Pacific Fleet at Hawaii would involve a strike force which included Japan's six largest and most powerful aircraft carriers. His task was made much easier by President Roosevelt's decision to relocate the United States Pacific Fleet from California to Hawaii. As Yamamoto saw it, the destruction of the American Pacific Fleet would give Japan time to seize the Philippines, Malaya, British Borneo, Burma and the Netherlands East Indies (now Indonesia), and gain access to the oil, minerals, rubber and other resources that Japan needed to sustain its aggressive war machine. He was hopeful that, with its Pacific Fleet destroyed or crippled, the Americans would be willing to accept a peace settlement that allowed Japan to keep its new conquests in South-East Asia.

The Japanese Naval General Staff initially rejected Admiral Yamamoto's plan for an attack on Pearl Harbor as being too great a gamble. They doubted that surprise could be achieved when the strike force would be at sea for two weeks before the attack. Japan had eleven aircraft carriers, and the admirals felt that Yamamoto's plan could put at risk their six best carriers. They also felt that diverting Japan's six most powerful aircraft carriers to Hawaii would leave the southern attacks on the Philippines and British Malaya dangerously unprotected. In the end, Yamamoto only overcame their opposition by threatening to resign.

Although the admirals of the Naval General Staff were reluctantly persuaded by Yamamoto to abandon the policy of defensive naval war in favour of attack, the years of night warfare training and the highly accurate, long range torpedoes associated with the defensive policy would give the Japanese Imperial Navy a significant edge over Allied navies in night actions during the Pacific War. 

*Training for the Pearl Harbor Attack*

Early in 1941, despite the fact that the Chief of the Naval General Staff, Admiral Osami Nagano, had not yet approved a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, Admiral Yamamoto directed that intensive planning and training for such an attack was to be undertaken. 

Japanese naval aircrews had already honed their war skills flying sorties against the poorly equipped and trained Chinese air force and army. However, Pearl Harbor offered special challenges to an enemy force proposing to use air-launched torpedoes. The harbor was comparatively shallow and a large area in the centre of the harbor was occupied by Ford Island. The American battleships were moored on the eastern side of Ford Island. The water area between the battleships and the eastern shore of the harbor was narrow. Japanese torpedoes would have to be redesigned for use in shallow harbor waters, and torpedo aircrews would have to learn to drop their torpedoes with great precision so that they would land in the narrow stretch of water between the eastern shore of the harbor and the battleships. The Japanese aircrews went about this training with great enthusiasm and dedication. By November 1941, they were ready for the attack".


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## parsifal (Dec 7, 2011)

*November 24*

MAGIC reveals that Tokyo is instructing Nomura that as a pre-condition to any agreementthe allies must cease aid to Chiang Kai Shek and lift the oil embargo immediately. Hull seeing this as a hardening of the Japanese position advises the President that the outlook was "critical, and virtually hopeless". the President informs his cabinet "we are likley to be attacked next Monday for the Japs are notorious for attacking without warning" . He cables Churchill "we must all prepre for real trouble, real soon in the Far East"

Significantly, the Allies are expecting an attack in the Far east, but appear oblivious to an attack on the fleet base in Pearl.

However, the Chief of Naval operations flashes a war warning to both the naval commands in Pearl and the PI " SURPRISE AND AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENTS BY JAPAN"


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## parsifal (Dec 8, 2011)

*November 25*

The presidents war council approves a three month Modus Vivendi despite the presidents concern about how to manouver Japan into firing the first shot 

modus vi·ven·di (v-vnd, -d)
n. pl. modi vivendi 
1. A manner of living; a way of life.
2. A temporary agreement between contending parties pending a final settlement.

Modus vivendi is a Latin phrase signifying an agreement between those whose opinions differ, such that they agree to disagree.

Modus means mode, way. Vivendi means of living. Together, way of living, implies an accommodation between disputing parties to allow life to go on. It usually describes informal and temporary arrangements in political affairs. For example, where two sides reach a modus vivendi regarding disputed territories, despite political, historical or cultural incompatibilities, an accommodation of their respective differences is established for the sake of contingency. This sense of the term has been used as a keystone in the political philosophy of John Gray.

Diplomatically, a modus vivendi is an instrument for establishing an international accord of a temporary or provisional nature, intended to be replaced by a more substantial and thorough agreement, such as a treaty. It is usually fashioned informally, and so never requires legislative ratification. Typically armistices and instruments of surrender are modi vivendi

*November 26*


At Dawn the Pearl Harbour Strike Force under the comand of Admiral Nagumo, puts to sea. The final instruction of Yamamoto being "In case negotiations with the US reach a successful conclusion, the task Force will immediately put about and return home". 

In Washington, SigInt reports (unspecified) suggest troop convoys had been sighted south of formosa steaming for IndoChina. These reports were taken by the president as "evidence of bad faith on the part of the Japanese". Stark urges that the b-17s in the PI be used to undertake pre-enptive strikes against the transports (another fascinating what if), but he is overruled. There can be little doubt that the the Allies knew in advance of the attacks in the far east, but equally, theee is little to support any assetrions that they knew in advance of the strike heading for Pearl Harbour. American intell is by this stage routinely either misidentifying the location of the Japanese Fleet Carriers, or returning 'location uncertain" reports. 

Roosevelts new evidence indicates a secret leak from Japans War Plans Division. As a result of this intelligence, Hull was instructed to drop the State Departments counterproposal for a "Modus Vivendi" to resume oil supplies "on a monthly basis for civilian needs".

That afternoon, Hull advises of the US rejection of Proposal "B". Hull issues a strongly worded document tying any relaxation of the oil embargo to japans acceptance ten specific conditions. These were a reiteration of of the open door policy which in turn required as a prerequisite the 'withdrawal of all military , naval, air and police forces from China and IndoChina". 

(One cannot but help to speculate if either proposal "B" or a reduced "Open Door Policy" that involved a temporary ceasefire in China and a withdrawal from Indo China had been suggested)


In Tokyo, Tojo advised his cabinet "This is an Ultimatum", having assumed the ten conditions were indicating that the US was "unyielding and unbending". He saw"no glimmer of hope". Japans embassies and consulates worldwide were warned to destroy codes immediately following the issue of the "war imminent" signal. Such a signal would be hiden in a weather report "NIGASHI NO KESAME", meaning "East Wind Rain". This would indicate hostilities with the west.


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## parsifal (Dec 8, 2011)

*November 27*

The secretary of state receives Hornbecks assessment "the Japanese Government does not desire or intend or expect to have forthwith armed conflict with the United States. Hornbeck suggests "odds of 5:1 that the US will not be at war on or before December 15". However, Hull knew otherwise. telling the secretary of War he had "washed his hands of itall" and that it was now "in the hands of you and Knox - the army and navy". but in an unprecedented move, Marshall and Stark jointly submit a memorandum to the president, "if the current negotations end without agreement, Japan may attack the Burma Road, Thailand, malaya the NEI the PI, the Russian maritime provinces......the most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint is to gain time. Considerable reinforcements have been rushed to the PI, but a desirable strength has not yet been reached". 

This had to come as a shock to the president....his big stick in the PI was now being appraised by his own people as inadequate. I can only guess what went through his mind when told ther was inadequate strength deployed to prevent the outbreak of general warfare in the Far East. 

MAGIC monitorung of the weather warning code prompted an alert radioed to all commands "NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE JAPANESE APPEAR TERMINATED .....JAPANESE FUTURE ACTIONS UNPREDICTABLEBUT HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT. IF HOSTILIES CANNOT, REPEAT, CANNOT BE AVOIDED THE UNITED STATES DESIRES THAT JAPAN COMMITS THE FIRST ACT."

Garrison commander in Hawaii Gen Short receives the alert with the additional instructions "MEASURES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SO AS NOT TO ALARM CIVIL POPULATION OR DISCLOSE INTENT". this additional message is interpreted as a sabotage warning . Fleet commander Kimmel also receives another specific alert "THIS DESPATCH IS TO BE CONSIDERED A WAR WARNING,. AGGRESSIVE ACTION EXPECTED BY JAPAN IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS'. Kimmels interpretation of his message is that Hawaii is under no immediate threat because the appended intell summary suggests that the targets of japanese agreesion will hit the "PI, THAILAND PENINSULA KRA ISTHMUS OR BORNEO". 

In Manila, appended to Macs orders are the following instructions: "SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCURYOU WILL CARRY OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN REVISED RAINBOW 5'. Specifically this requir3ed him to conduct early air strikes and installations within tactical operating radius of the PI bases....." Mac fails ultimately to obey this order, and in fact preparation by the air forces in the PI are fitful and incomplete.


A link to the US RAINBOW 5 warplan

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/misc/rainbow5.html


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## parsifal (Dec 10, 2011)

*November 28*

PoW docks at Colombo enroute to Singapore. The Admiralty briefly considers attaching the old Light Carrier Hermes to acompany her, but rejects this on the grounds of Hermes lack of speed and endurance.

USS Enterprise departs Hawaii for Wake, carrying Marine Corps F4fs for Wake.

In Washington the President attempts to prolong the negotiations by telling Nomura "the US will continue to be patient". Meanwhile, a crisis meeting in Washington was briefed on the latest Intell. Estimates are that Japanese invasion fleets are ready to sail from Shanghai, Formosa, and Hainan, and that other Groups are already at sea. The meeting is advised "a terrific blow to all three western powers in the region is ready to fall. The President accepts the situation, and advises his staff "if either the British or the NEI are attacked by Japanese we will join them. Messages to that effect are sent at least to the British. 

It is agreed to make a last ditch personal plea to the emperor. 

*November 29*

MAGIC reveals a report from Ambassador Oshima that the germans gave gurantees to the Japanese "Should Japan become engaged in a war against the US, Germany of course would jointhe war immediately"

Curiously, Foreign Minister Togo does not seek any public announcement of this gurantee from the Germans. 

In Tokyo Tojo advises his cabinet that there is now no alternative but war or "we'll lose the chance to fight"

Emperor Hirohito requests a meeting of the Jushin Council and Tojos cabinet to discuss Roosevelts offer. The Jushin Council is an advisory body of elder statesman in Japan with no legally binding weight but considerable weight just the same.


The Council includes quite a few moderates, including Prince Konoye, the Maquis Kido and Barons Okada and Wakatsuki . The Maquis had wanted the meeting with the Emperor present, so that hirohito could see the various opinions, but Tojo would not allow this, on the grounds that the Jushin had no legal status in the Japanese Government. A compromise was reached wherein after the meeting the elder stateman and Tojo would lunch with the Emperor and express their opinions. These final manouverings were important, because if the Emperor had expressed opposition to the move to war, Tojo would have been forced to back down. If the Emperor supported hm would be the best for tojo. if the Emperor was silent, Tojo could legally exercise his executive power. 

The meeting began at 9:30 and and continued throughout the day. Ther was a break for the lunch with the emperor, and the meeting continued right through for the rest of the day into the evening

At the luncheon with the emperor, all but two of the Jushin Counci expressed opposition or doubt about the wisdom of going to war. The following is a summary of the main members various comments:

Wakatsuki : "the people have a strong spiritual strength"...." but we must carefully study whether we have the resources at our disposal to succeed in this task....this morning we have listed to the Government explanations, but i am still concerned"

Okada:"I too am not convinced"

Prince Konoye "I wonder if it is necessary to resort immediately to war even if the negotiations have failed to this point. I feel we can find a solution and still keep the status quo. In other words remain in the condition of _gashin-shotan_ (to endure bitter hardship in the short term in the intersts of long term success)

Admiral Yonai: "I am not able to express a concrete opinion, since I dont have the background. But if you will forgive the slang I think that by trying to avoid the _jiri-hin_(slow poverty), we will succumb to the _doka-hin_(fast poverty, or fast death) 

Two Jushin Generals, Abe and Hayashi were in favour of war. 

Tojo tried to stop Wakatake from further comment, but could not. Wakatake asked the Council memebers and the emperor to think it over carefully and only support war if national survival was at stake. He did not think going to war for the sake of a concept....the greater east asia Co-properity sphere, wa worth risking the nation over. 

Tojo was given the final right of reply. He stubbornly reiterated the matter had been discussed in detail at many liason conferences. He strongly advocated that there was no alternative to war at this stage. His hand picked cabinet collegues supported him, except Admiral Nagano who remained silent. Eventually and reluctantly, Nagano spoke....."The zero hour for out attack is December 8". Nagao revealed the surprise attack on Pearl at that point. This was news even to Tojo who had only been briefed to that point about the attacks and prepration in east Asia. 

There followed an intense round of questions, Nagano finally revealed....grudgungly....that the attack was planned as a surprise attack. This evoked opposition from even the Government men, particularly Togo. Restrained at first, he eventually exploded, saying " the Navy plan was entirely unnacceptable, being contrary to all accepted norms and conventions. It was unthinkable for Japan to commit irresponsible acts that were hurtful to the national honour and prestige. One of the Jushin remarked that the Navy entire Japanese nation would be viewed as a bunch of drunk men on their way home from a late night drinking session.....

The meeting and the luncheon adjourned with the Emperor remaining totally silent.


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## parsifal (Dec 10, 2011)

*November 30*

In the North Pacific, the Pearl Harbour Task Force, skirting the regular shipping lanes, and folowing a benbeficially conceling weather front, proceeds to its refuelling dstination. The six carriers are arranged in three ccolumns, and are flanked by their escort. More than 200 miles ahead, their advance scouts (the three submarines of the force) press on to give warning orf any enemy or neutral vessels. There are none reported. Yamamoto had ordered the operation abandoned if the Task Group had been sighted before December 6. 

Churchill cabled Roosevelt urging that the only chance of averting war was for an unequivocal American declaration "that any further agression by Japan will lead to immediate and grave consequences."


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## parsifal (Dec 10, 2011)

*Decdember 1 *

The Admiralty orders the battlecruiser Repulse on passage with PoW to singaporee to divert to Darwin "to disconcert the Japanese and at the same time increase security" The Admiralty still has misgivings over the forward deployment of the two battleships with inadequate aircover. 


*Tokyo*: Adm Nagano and his Chief of Staff Sugiyama visit the emperor. They formally advise him of the official time and date for "Xday". His majesty, without hesitation grants his approval. He knows that his previous days silence in the Jushin Council amounts to approval for the commencement of hostilities. "in for a penny, in for a pound" his assent to the navy timetable is merely maximising the chances of success for the Japanese. 

However it is significant in the post war context. After the Tokyo war crimes trials, US chief prosecutor Joseph Keenan met the emperor, who told him he didnt know Pearl harbour was going to be bombed. From the avilable evidence, however (according to both John Toland and John Costello, he did knowand approve of Operation Z. 

It is also well documented that he issued explicit directives to give the US due notice prior to the attack going in. Evidently he also met and discussed this with Togo that same day. I believe this is what saved him from dismissal and/or the gallows. 

At 2 O'clock Sugiyama flashes a signal to Count Terauchi, the commander of the Southern Army Gp, of just two words HINODA YAMAGATA. The signal is intercepted, but not understood. It is the code word for "The date for commencing operations (HINODA) is December 8." 

3.5 hours later Yamamoto sends a slightly longer communication in the new version of JN-25 to the Pearl Striking Force. It says NITAKA-YAMANOBORI - "Climb Mt Nitaka" . It means "attack as planned on December 8. 

An aircraft carrying IJA Major Tsutomo crashes 50km North of Canton crashes in KMT controlled territory. It is carrying the full Operational orders and OOB for the impending attack. It sends the IJA into a panic, but in the end, nothing comes from this security lapse. 


*Washington*: Roosevelt summons the british ambassador and informs him that US intelligence anticipates an imminent attack on Malaya and Siam. Roosevelt officially assures Halifax that in such an eventuality on any british or Dutch colonial possessions" we should all be in this together". A Poland style blank cheque of assurance to the british and the Dutch, in other words. 

LCdr WJ Holmes, whose job it was in the OP-20-G unit to plot ja[ ship movements reports that the positions of the six IJN Fleet Carriers are somewhere "in Home Waters". The next day (December 2) he admits that in fact he has lost track of them. From then on, until the day of the attack, the daily situation reports are that there is "no information on the wherabouts of the carriers' positions 

*Pearl Harbour Strike Force* With the weather finally clearing, Nagumo order the force to close up and douse all lights.


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