# Stalingrad, Paulus and the 6th Army?



## Lucky13 (Apr 8, 2013)

Not knowing what kind of person and officer General Paulus was, what if he had ignored Hitler when he first wanted, what should he, what could he do next, to save his men and as much of his equipment?

What the next move?


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## parsifal (Apr 8, 2013)

The obvious answer is to redirect all the available resources to a breakout attmpt. This is the usual a;terante history often trotted out by the pro-German apologists, as they struggle with the reality that their army was defeated by an army they consider to be infereior in every way except numbers. 

I dont share that view.

Whilst a breakout may well have gotten ^A out of the pocket, there are two problems with the whole concept. the first is that the Russians will follow the Germans, with the result that there will be additional encirclements outside the city. STAVKha had reserves ready for just such an eventuality. The problem for the Germans, having lied to all their allies and left them short of vital equipment and manpower, the satellite armies defending the flaks of ^A were simly not secure. the Russians could choose further enciclements at any time. 

Moreover, an attempt at a breakout would very likely bring about a more rapid demise of ^A, and if enything in the winter of 1942-3, the ^A had to hold for as long as possible and tie down as many reserves of the Red Army as possible. If not even bigger portions of the heer was likley to be lost to further encirclements near Rostov. Much is done nowadays to try and hide the sheer military incompetence that was the hallmark of that final great offensive by the germans. but it was a dud, from top to bottom, thgought up by a madmen, and executed by slavish yes men, for the most part. in my opinion. the people who paid the price for that incompetence was the common German (and Axis) soldier.


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## rochie (Apr 8, 2013)

wonder if Paulus withdrew from the city would he have had the manpower and or time to take on each of the Soviet thrusts one at a time ?

given he had intel on them coming that is !!!!


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## Lucky13 (Apr 8, 2013)

When was the first time, Paulus asked for permission to retreat?


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## vinnye (Apr 8, 2013)

I believe the 6th Army was always going to be in trouble because they had weakened the flanks of the German troops and tanks, and left Rumsnian and Italian troops who did not have the anti tank capability required. So when the Russians attacked these flanks - Paulus was going to have to retreat immediateley or be trapped. We know that he was given assurances that a break in was planned and he would be re-supplied by air - which never happened.


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## rochie (Apr 8, 2013)

vinnye said:


> I believe the 6th Army was always going to be in trouble because they had weakened the flanks of the German troops and tanks, and left Rumsnian and Italian troops who did not have the anti tank capability required. So when the Russians attacked these flanks - Paulus was going to have to retreat immediateley or be trapped. We know that he was given assurances that a break in was planned and he would be re-supplied by air - which never happened.



i agree but just wondered given enough warning could Paulus have avoided a disaster and actually succeeded on the Volga or was the opposing force just to strong no matter what


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## vinnye (Apr 8, 2013)

I dont think thta having 2 elite divisions moved from the East to the mobile reserve for defence against an Allied invasion in France, or moving LW units to combat the Allies MTO operations, would have helped the situation. But, even with those forces - the sheer weight of numbers that the Russians were able to deploy would have eventually overwhelmed the Axis forces.


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## fastmongrel (Apr 8, 2013)

It seems madness to have fought in Stalingrad in the first place. What would have been the best plan for the 6th that would avoid getting bogged down in a built up area.


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## davebender (Apr 8, 2013)

An army commander shouldn't ask for permission to retreat while conducting a mobile operation. He fights the battle to the best of his ability. If that means tactical withdrawal to avoid encirclement then so be it.


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## stona (Apr 9, 2013)

davebender said:


> If that means tactical withdrawal to avoid encirclement then so be it.



Not for an army commander in nazi Germany.

Cheers

Steve


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## vinnye (Apr 9, 2013)

With most armies - there would have been room for some autonomous decision making at the frntline, but with Adolf - it could end your life.
I have read that Manstein had advised Hitler against an attempt to breakout, and changed his mind in his memoirs!


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## davebender (Apr 9, 2013)

Baloney. German army commanders maneuvered their forces as they saw fit right up to summer 1944. Rommel is a good example of this. His Afrika Korps mostly ignored both Hitler and OHL. He received a field marshal baton for his actions, not execution.

Paulus was a political suck up. That's why he sat in Stalingrad asking Hitler for permission rather then doing what needed to be done.


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## stona (Apr 9, 2013)

Rommel's sitiation in North Africa was entirely different from Paulus' and others in Stalingrad. That comparison reeks of Bologna sausage.
Hitler had taken a personal interest and was issuing orders himself. There was an immense political facet to this operation,it was not purely military.Even if you are a Field Marshall you have to obey orders from the man who is not only your Commander in Chief but also the Head of State.
Critcism of the Fuhrer's plans got you sacked (ask Halder or List). The consequences of disobeying an order might be more serious.

There may have been some merit in Hitler's orders. What would have been the consequences of a 6th Army withdrawal? There's a "what if" of epic proportions 

Cheers

Steve


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## tyrodtom (Apr 9, 2013)

During WW2 the Wehrmacht had 17 field marshalls, 10 were relieved by Hitler.
During WW2, 84 generals were executed on Hilers orders.
I'm sure soneone on this forum can provide a breakdown of the reasons for all those executions and reliefs .
All are not in connection with the July plot, nor after July 44.
And that's just Field Marshalls and Generals. What about lower field grade officers ?

That doesn't sound like Wehrmacht commanders had much independance of action to me.


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## DonL (Apr 9, 2013)

stona said:


> Rommel's sitiation in North Africa was entirely different from Paulus' and others in Stalingrad. That comparison reeks of Bologna sausage.
> Hitler had taken a personal interest and was issuing orders himself. There was an immense political facet to this operation,it was not purely military.Even if you are a Field Marshall you have to obey orders from the man who is not only your Commander in Chief but also the Head of State.
> Critcism of the Fuhrer's plans got you sacked (ask Halder or List). The consequences of disobeying an order might be more serious.
> 
> ...



I disagree!
Rommel had got the same order then Paulus! Hold the frontline or die!

Rommel had the nuts, the military knowledge and was the man on location which could assess the situation and disobeyed, because his military knowledge said no to the situation and he wanted to save the life of his men and his army.

This is from primary sources:
Directly after Rommel dictated the order to retreat for his Army, he dictated a letter to his wife and son with best wishes, because he thought (and has written this at the letter) he will be executed for this order.

Many things are hanging on the man at location, his will and his charism and Rommel revolted because he knew he was right and Hitler's order wrong from his military knowledge. He had the nuts to save his army and he was well aware what could be happened.

If Paulus had the same nuts and charism he had 12-20 hours to retreat and revolt against Hitler and his order and General von Richthofen and General von Weichs had both helped him.
A retreat of 12-20 hours at the situation of Stalingrad couldn't be holded and it had saved the 6th Army.

Parsifals arguments are wrong from the military viewpoint. Paulus had 2 fresh (100%) break through divisions at the south west and 50km to the german frontline outside the circle (20-23 November). All he needed was air supply of fuel and ammo and General von Richthofen was able and willing to organize this, also General von Weichs commander of the Heeresgruppe B was also willing to help him.


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## tyrodtom (Apr 9, 2013)

Did they actually get the order, "hold or die " ? 
Or did they get the order to hold, and the or else die was understood as the penalty for failure to obey ?


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## DonL (Apr 9, 2013)

Hold and no retreat!


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## tyrodtom (Apr 9, 2013)

Any military organization expects it's orders to be obeyed, and has harsh penalties when this isn't done. 

But there is a difference between attempting to carry out a order and failing, and not attempting to carry out the order.

The Russians shot a lot of men for the first variation, but very few for the second, because nobody dreamed of doing the second.
In the IJA, if you failed, it was expected you'd apologize with your death.
In the Wehrmacht, what was the usual result ?

Paulus doesn't appear to have the imagination to think of a alternate, or the personal nerve to stand up to a order that he must have known wasn't sound.


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## parsifal (Apr 9, 2013)

posibly the two men - rommel and paulus represent two extremes of the same coin, but hitlers interference in operatinal matters is undenaible, and he took a particular interest in the Eastern Front.

Hitler may noit have executed every general that defied him, but he did shoot or kill quite a few nevetheless. He also sacked many for exercising good military judgement. Some of the more prominent that come to mind include Guderian, List, Rundstedt, and Model. In the context of the 1942 offensive, Hitler had made very clear what he wanted. Paulus had to have been influenced by that.

The case relating to Rommel was different. in the first instance the chain of command was unclear. Rommel could, and did, often appeal directly to hitler and OKW, but he was actually subordinate to Commando Supremo, so could claim that his orders were from one or the other as it suited him. He was on Furlough at the time of Alamein, so could also claim ignoirance of hitlers orders at the time he instructed DAK to begin preparations for withdrawal. Finally Hitler did eventually rescind his hold fast order (which had been improperly issued anyway), and Rommel could arghue that his actions up to that receission were preparatory only.

There is no comparison to paulus's situation. Nevertheless paulus was given orders to prepre for a breakout, but in the finish permission to undertake that breakout were never given. by that time it was obvious that a breakout would cost the wehrmacht more than what it was worth in saved lives, so serving up the 6A as a sacrifice to save the rest of AGS was a necessary price to pay.

Having said that, after Stalingrad, many german commanders did decide to act unilaterlally to withdraw from perilous situations as they needed to. but to try and say it was not without risk or that hitlers influence was not real, is simply denying facts. Manstein undertook several withdrawals unilaterally before it cost him his job...a case of one too many withdrawals.

Its somewhat Hitlers fault, but it also is a fault in the german command system. German training tended to not deal with retreats very well. You cannot blame hitler solely for that....whilst german officer training was extremely thorough and of very high quality, the training for retreats had been deleted in 1935, and not ever reinstated. Consequently, when the germans were forced to reteat from a batlle, such retreats tended to be in the nature of uncontrolled fleeing, rather than controlled withdrawals. 

Its a more complex situation than people are acknowledgeing here.....


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## DonL (Apr 9, 2013)

> Any military organization expects it's orders to be obeyed, and has harsh penalties when this isn't done.
> 
> But there is a difference between attempting to carry out a order and failing, and not attempting to carry out the order.
> 
> ...



Such things didn't exist at the Wehrmacht till 20 July of 1944.
After the assassination Hiltler went havoc.
If you wern't a good Commander you got your displacement.
A very prominent issue was the fall von Sponeck, he retreated against a direct order from von Manstein (Dezember 1941, halfisland Kertsch) an revolted against a direct order to hold without retreat. From a military viewpoint his action was right and saved his Korps and he could hold a reduced frontline against the attacking Red Army.
For disciplinal reasons he was brought to military court and got 7 years of jail, von Manstein protested heavily against the judgment, but defended his decision to get him to military court for disciplinal reasons.

The situation at 20-23 November at Stalingrad was very confusing but there were two assessments from Heeresgruppe B General von Weichs and Luftflotte 4 General von Richthofen for an instantly break out of the 6th Army south west. Also General von Seydlitz wanted to break out.
Paulus offers him the commando that he can give the order to break out (25 November) but he also didn't have the nuts.

*All location* commnaders and their assessments (von Richthofen, von Weichs, Hoth and Paulus) was, to break out south west, this was the military situation for the commanders at location and to my opinion they had the best military overview on location.
Even General von Weichs Heeresgruppe B had on the Telex the break out order for Paulus, but Hitler was faster with his hold and no retreat order.

Now the location commander (Paulus) is in charge what to do and to me he had done the easy way, against his better military knowledge and against all military assessments of all the other local commanders, because he hasn't had the nuts and the charism to go the hard way for himself, but the better way for his men and Army.

Edit:


> There is no comparison to paulus's situation. Nevertheless paulus was given orders to prepre for a breakout, but in the finish permission to undertake that breakout were never given. by that time it was obvious that a breakout would cost the wehrmacht more than what it was worth in saved lives, so serving up the 6A as a sacrifice to save the rest of AGS was a necessary price to pay.



Pure speculation without substance and against the assessments of von Weich and von Richthofen.


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## parsifal (Apr 9, 2013)

What part are you claiming is pure speculation and what evidence do you have, in English (no partisan pro-gemran apologies please) that can verfy your claims that what im saying is bogus.


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## DonL (Apr 9, 2013)

I have presented my sources in an other (older) thread.
Prominent and respected military commanders like Hoth, von Weichs and von Richthofen (which were all on location) gave assessments (20-23 November) for an instantly break out of the 6th Army south west and to their opinion, which I highly respect, the 6th Army could have been saved through such a breakout.

Till this point in time the Red Army had not achieved any *primary* goal at a moving operation against the Wehrmacht. The Red Army achieved good results at attrition battles, but not on operations where the red army was at the initiative.
After Stalingrad the red army lost every self initiative operation (Rostow, Charkov etc...)till Kursk from their primary goals.
So where are the arguments the red army could win a break out battle against the 6th Army with the *total loss* of the 6th Army.
Highly respected commanders had an other opinion and they were on location at the battle.

PS: Is this a new personal battle between us because I'm not your opinion?
Why do you make personal insults against me?


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## parsifal (Apr 9, 2013)

And in any event this whole sub-debate is based on the false predication that the germans were able or capable of an effective breakout. They were not. manstein was only able to commence his attempted relief of 6A December 12 (Winter Storm), but this had stalled, almost as soon as it had begun. Four days later the Soviets launched "Little saturn" which further consolidated and deepned the ring surrounding the city. if Pauluis had attempted a breakout, ther would have been the opportunity for the Soviets to decrease pressure in certain parts of the encirlcment and increase forces committed to the envelopment prongs. And that is without taking into account the huge reserves that remained uncommitted. 

There was never any chance for the Germans to relive Stalingrad, and even less chance of 6A effecting a breakout from the city. 6A was doomed once they became enmeshed in the urban fighting


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## DonL (Apr 9, 2013)

That's your opinion.
The opinion of von Weichs, von Richthofen, Hoth and Paulus was an other at 20-23 November. You can read their opinion in their assessments.


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## parsifal (Apr 10, 2013)

Ther was no effective counterrattack force as at 20 November, and no preprations were ready before 12 December. Manstein was the man on the spot, and he initially did not support a breakout, because of the expected losses ^A would suffer in men and equipment, also because he believeed that the forces were at hand to effect a relief operation fromoutside the pocket. There were no such forces, and as Manstein rightly points out, there was insufficient transport resources within the pocket to undertake the operations proposed by Paulus and his mates. Mantein was right to hold back on the relief effort and order ^A to remain where it was, until he was better prepared. In the finish, of course Mansteinunderestimated the depth and strength of tyhe Red Army reserves, and the effects of the weather. That makes him wrong too, but less so than the men you mention. a breakout by 6A unassisted, or with minimal assistance was liklley to transform a statis battle into a mobile battle, which the russians were bound to win, which was their assessment and contingency planning. 

in any event I am not relying on "opinion so much, as the opinions by men which at that stage were better placed and more rational in their appraisal than those men you are referring to. i have the greatest respect for Richthofen in particular, but, he, like many in the German command system were losing touch with reality by that stage. The aqssessments and capabilities put forward by Stavkha were far more realistic, and pointed to them making contingency plans in the event of an attempted breakout early on. By the time Manstein was ready, it was all too late anyway. if the 6A had broken out, it would have lost its heavy equipment in the process, and then be hunted down in the open steppes as Stavvkha predicted.

There was no escape.


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## DonL (Apr 10, 2013)

You are telling not the truth Parsifal.

After the assessments of von Weichs, von Richthofen and Hoth no counterrattack force was needed, to their opinion the 6th Army could break out, right on their own with air supply.
Also von Manstein wasn't the man on the spot (20-23 September) and you knew this very well. Manstein was on the spot 26 of September and before (till 24 September) at the Leningrad frontline thousand miles away.


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## parsifal (Apr 10, 2013)

According to Otto Chaney ("Zhukov") one of the briefing sessions given by Zhukov and Vasilevski (the principal architects of "Uranus") on November 13. At that briefing, attended by Stalin, "_Zhukov and Vasilevski advised that it was expected that the 6A would attempt a breakout and the germans would amass as much of the locally available forces as possible to effect a breakout. This was expected and anticipated, and in some regards was greeted with some relish as fully 40% of available forces were to be kep back to cover such an eventuality. An attempted breakout by 6A would, in the opinion of Zhukov only serve to expedite the demise of that army, as operations would transform from a static battle to a mobile situation.

It was expected that the Germans would transfer part of their r4eserves fro around Vyazama to form a relief force for the southern group of armies. Though sufficient reserves were ready for such an eventuality, It was agreed that to prevent or diminish such reinforcement, the Soviet Kalinin and Western Fronts….'

Zhukov stated" the Stalingrad operation, in all respects, and for all eventualities is adaptable and ready for all reasonable eventualities that the Germans are capable (of )…

Stalin was in full agreement, and very happy with the preparation report. But he gave the following instructions "Fly to Stalingrad tomorrow. Check one more time on the readiness preparations_". 

Zhukov did this, and as expected was satisfied. There were no major changes, though the commander of the lead 4th Mech Corps did write a letter expressing his concerns about the offensive. This letter was shown to Stalin, who was so confident in the operation, that no changes were proposed. Volsky kept his life and his job, despite his public concerns. He was later decorated for his role in the operation.

On the conduct of the offensive operations themselves, Chaney makes a number of illuminating observations.

"_On the morning of November 19, soviet artillery began to Soviet offensive. The attacks were led by elements of the SW and Don Fronts (committed to the offensive at this stage were 18 Inf Divs, 8 tank Brigades , 2 Mech Brigades, and 9 Cav Divs supported by at least 10 Artillery Divs.; In reserve were more than 60 Divs). Just before 9am, the supporting artillery shifted to deep targets and the assaults began. SW Front, led the attack and penetrated the defences of Rumanian 3A in 2 places, virtually destroying two divisions at the critical point of breakthrough before lunch.

By days end, the Rumanian 3A sector almost in its entirety was in deep crisis and Soviet breakthrough formations were clear of the front area and quickly on the move. The attacks were so swift and so successful that only three of the 18 divisions were needed for mop up operations. In the meantime, Major generals Rodin's 26 tank Corps broke through at Perelazovski, inflicting a huge defeat on the Rumanian 53 Corps. Once Perelazovski had been captured 26 corps wheeled south to link up with elements of the Stalingrad Front which were exploiting the outstanding breakthroughs and allowing the lead assault elements a short respite. The next day the first significant German elements were soundly defeated as they attempted a counterattack. In a bold move, 26th Corps, took advantage of darkness to seize a vital bridge across the Don, intact, near Kalach. The germans mistook the Soviet flying column as their own, local commanders having completely under-estimated Soviet grasp of mobile operations. The Soviets crossed this vital bridge unopposed, consolidated, fanned out and signalled for the remainder of the main force to cross. The Germans retreated in complete disarray, and with heavy losses. 

21st Army having ripped into Rumanian 13th and 15th Divs at the frontier, sent its mobiles groups (consisting of 4th Mech and 3rd Gds Cav XXX, poured through the hole that had been formed and exploit the penetrations that had been made. – 'just as as we had taught them to do" wrote Manstein. In co-ordionation with 5th Tank Army, the breakthrough group was ordered to destroy the gathering enemy (German) reserves HQ and rear area units, cut off their withdrawal routes to the west and southwest and block the routes of the expected deep reserves. By 22 November, the Group was to link with the Stalingrad front near Sovetski, SE of Kalach, and from there o await further orders. 

On 23 November 4th mech spearheaded an increased tempop of operations by leading a further assault against further gathering of german reserves readying for counterattack. Soviet reserves were now puring into the salient in anticipation of an expected 6A breakout attempt, and/or German attempted break in. The Soviet high command was determined that such attempts would fail. 26th corps attacked the Germans at Kmayshin, who were prepring for a counterattack, and defeated them heavily. In four days the Soviets had closed the ring and heavily reinforced their positions. They were ready and able to meet any possible German reaction to the encirclement, such that such attempts at relief were likely to fail. 

Stavkha fully expected the germans to mount some form of counterattack, and had organised their forces and their reserves to meet such an eventuality. Mansteins assessment was that in the critical days of late November the Soviets had the strength, the training and the organization to defeat the entire Army Group A. and 6A with a quick thrust to Rostov_."

I would suggest that the reason that the Soviets did not unleash this additional offensive until 16 December was firstly because 6A remained in place and resisting, and secondly for four days after December 12, they had to contain and defeat the German break in attempts.

I fail to see how, on the basis of the above, anyone can seriously argue that breakout, or break in attempt(s) could have any real chance of success. The Soviets were too well prepared, too numerous, and too well deployed and led to be defeated in this operation. A breakout attempt was what they expected, and wanted. If it had been attempted, it would have been a disaster for the whole of AGS


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## stona (Apr 10, 2013)

_"Pour encourager les autres"_ To encourage the others.

It's good to execute a senior commander from time to time! Remember poor old Admiral Byng,executed after the Battle of Minorca,technically for breaching "The Articles of War". Basically he was over cautious and didn't do the job he was sent to do.
For that he would be shot,not hanged,on HMS Monarch in Portsmouth harbour.

As Voltaire wrote (in Candide) referring to the incident.

"Dans ce pays-ci, il est bon de tuer de temps en temps un amiral pour encourager les autres..." 

Cheers

Steve


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## Juha (Apr 10, 2013)

DonL said:


> I disagree!
> Rommel had got the same order then Paulus! Hold the frontline or die!
> 
> Rommel had the nuts, the military knowledge and was the man on location which could assess the situation and disobeyed, because his military knowledge said no to the situation and he wanted to save the life of his men and his army.
> ...



IMHO the question is much more complicated, German troops NW of Stalingrad were under very heavy pressure and needed time to withdraw even close to Stalingrad, also the panzer reserves of 6th A were committed there (most of 14th and parts of 16th PzDs). Many German officers thought that it would have been too "Napoleonic" not to wait them and of course those mechanical troops operating there used much of 6th A's meager fuel reserves there. And while 29th Inf(mot) was fully eguipped, 16th was not, its PzBatt was clearly understrenght, 34 modern tanks (Pz III lg and 75 and IV lg) + 8 Pz II an 1 BefPz vs 50 modern + 7 Pz II and 2 BefPz in 29th. Soviets were clearly better than Germans had predicted as shown in the NW of Stalingrad, 22., 14. and 1.Rom.PzDs made far less impact on the Soviet northern pincer than Germans had counted for. 29th Mot stopped, at least according to Germans, the inner part of Soviet southern pincer but there is no certainty that 6th A would have been able to retreat some 80km through mostly open steppe.And on fuel IIRC even just before Christmas Paulus complained that he didn't have enough fuel (after 1 month of air supply) for a breakout towards Manstein's relief force, in other words much shorter distance.

Juha

PS, on Rommel vs Paulus. Now Rommel was one of Hitler's favorite, ex-commander of his Heer life guard. He was also one of those generals whom Goebbels had made an all German hero, so even from propaganda/moral reason he had more leverage than Paulus. Secondly, NA was a sideshow, Eastern Front was the main front and Hitler was very very keen on the Southern part of it in 42, so much that after sacking the commander of AG A in early Sept 42, he remote control it by himself up to Soviet counter-offensive at Stalingrad.


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## vinnye (Apr 10, 2013)

I agree - Rommel was well liked by Hitler and had been used as a figurehead for propoganda purposes - Von Paulus was not either as far as I know. This and Rommel's shrewd use of the un-clear chain of command and orders - meant he would in all probability get away with a retreat.
Didn't Sepp Dietrich disobey Hitler and get away with it?


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## Juha (Apr 10, 2013)

On those retreats, much depended on the commander.
Early Feb 43 Hitler gave an order that Kharkov must be held at all cost against the objections of th CG of Armeeabt. Lanz, Mountain Troops Gen. Lanz. In mid Feb. 43 the CG of SSPzCorps, Hausser, anyway withdrew his Corps out of city against a direct order from Lanz, to whom the Corps was subordinated. Now Hitler went ballistic but he didn't sack Hausser but he sack Lanz. 

Juha


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## parsifal (Apr 10, 2013)

manstein was not too popular over that incident either, but he survived as well....for the moment


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