# Which aircraft would you cancel?



## Koopernic (May 22, 2015)

History shows many promising aircraft that were cancelled. It also shows many that received a huge injection of resources that was taken from other programs but themselves had poor combat records or were problematic. These aircraft came at an opportunity cost: draftsmen, engineers, test pilots, wind tunnel testing time and factory floor space were all taken up.

Which would you cancel?

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## GregP (May 22, 2015)

I assume you are talking WWII or just after.

For the U.S.A., I'd cancel the P-39 without the turbocharger, would try to add the turbocharger to the P-40 or go with the P-40Q in lieu of other P-40's, and probably cancel the P-61 and but buy the 2-stage P-63.

For the Germans, I'd get control of R&D and develop a successor to the Bf 109 / Fw 190 while NOT builing hundreds of prototypes that went nowhere. I would NOT spend ANY resource on rocket planes, but would go with one of the strategic bombers like the Me 264, He 177/277.

For the British, I'd probably cancel the Boulton-Paul Defiant as impractical, the Roc and Skua on performance, the Botha for same, the Sterling for same, and would increase Spirfires while cutting down Hurricanes after the Spirfire was developed and shown to be good. I bet Hawker could have built some in lieu of more Hurricanes.

Of course, this is all with "hindsight." There's more, but hindsight has pretty good vision. If I were in the service at the time, things might not have been so clear.

Cancelling things is easy when you know what's going to happen.

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## kool kitty89 (May 22, 2015)

GregP said:


> For the British, I'd probably cancel the Boulton-Paul Defiant as impractical, the Roc and Skua on performance, the Botha for same, the Sterling for same, and would increase Spirfires while cutting down Hurricanes after the Spirfire was developed and shown to be good. I bet Hawker could have built some in lieu of more Hurricanes.


Maybe cancel the Typhoon and put an emphasis on Hawker just building more Spitfires (and Hurricanes). Maybe drop the Saber entirely in favor of more Merlins and actually get the Spitfire Mk.III into service with better all-around performance than the Mk.V?


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## Greyman (May 22, 2015)

Fairey Battle


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## Edgar Brooks (May 22, 2015)

Me109, Me110, Ju52, Ju87, Ju88, Dornier 217, Heinkel 111.
Bingo, no WWII.

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## tomo pauk (May 22, 2015)

Battle - maybe after 500 produced?
Roc is a given here, produce more Skuas instead. Not sure that Albacore is such a great idea, better go with a monoplane instead. Botha also needs to go.

USA - axe the P-63 and P-75, produce P-51 instead. The P-40Q does not add anything for Allied war effort late in war, Curtiss would need to sort out their production of P-47G. 

SU - cancel the Su-2.


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## Shortround6 (May 22, 2015)

Without using the retrospectroscope some planes are harder to cancel than others, we also have to stick to a somewhat consistent time line. 

But some aircraft _should_ have been no brainers. Like the Botha, Bigger wing than a Blenheim, fatter fuselage with extra crewman, about 1 ton heavier (20%) _empty_ and using the same size engines (granted a sleeve valve version but still?) what miracle did they think was going to happen to give it decent performance? 

There is some excuse for the Skua, it might not have been a very good fighter but without it the RN is left with the Swordfish as a dive bomber. Theory behind the Defiant may have been flawed. Using that theory for the _much_ slower Blackburn Roc is really expecting your enemies total co-operation to get it to work. Some flying boats were about as fast as the Roc. 

The Battle gets a bit of a bad rap. Used for something it wasn't really intended for (tactical support), it couldn't do it's original job either without horrendous losses due to changing conditions, when spec'ed and first issued interceptors had two machine guns. It was the plane that equipped and trained the rapidly expanding RAF and commonwealth forces. Without it you need several thousand crew trainers of a slightly different type. You don't get another 2000 single engine combat planes or 1000 twins and leave training command trying to use Gypsy Moths as crew trainers. 

Planning for the British is complicated (much like the other nations) by engine development. 
The Vulture first runs in May of 1937. 42.5L
The Sabre first runs in Jan of 1938. 36.6L
The Centaurus first runs in July of 1938. 53.6L
The Griffon first runs in Nov of 1939. 36.7L

Now which engine is _likely_ to give you much more power than a Merlin or Hercules and _when._
The Vulture and Griffon _should_ have been the low risk/fast development engines. The Vulture turned out to more troublesome than anticipated and the Griffon was late before being put on hold. 

Stopping the Sabre might have saved millions but building thousands more Hurricanes was probably not a good idea (most/all showing up in 1942-44?).


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## rochie (May 22, 2015)

The F6-f,the F4u Corsair would of done the job !


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## Elmas (May 22, 2015)

rochie said:


> The F6-f,the F4u Corsair would of done the job !




At night, having to land on a carrier with, say, beaufort 8, douglas 7, personally I would have certainly choosen to have some very soft anatomical formations of my body inside an F6F than on a F4U.....


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## wiking85 (May 22, 2015)

With hindsight the He177, Me163, He162, Me210 (before tooling, just wait for the 410), Ta-154, He-219, Ju288 (before it started tooling and its engine), and Ju290.


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## rochie (May 22, 2015)

Elmas said:


> At night, having to land on a carrier with, say, beaufort 8, douglas 7, personally I would have certainly choosen to have some very soft anatomical formations of my body inside an F6F than on a F4U.....



Given those conditions the pucker factor Sat in either would of been rather high


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## Marcel (May 22, 2015)

The Koolhoven FK.58


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## GrauGeist (May 22, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> Maybe cancel the Typhoon and put an emphasis on Hawker just building more Spitfires (and Hurricanes). Maybe drop the Saber entirely in favor of more Merlins and actually get the Spitfire Mk.III into service with better all-around performance than the Mk.V?


I would perhaps rethink that, since the Tiffy was a beast and could be compared to the Thunderbolt in regards to ruggedness, warload and being capable of scouring the enemy from the face of the earth.

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## davebender (May 22, 2015)

They are resource hogs and 1930s Germany didn't have enough resources to go around. That includes Ural Bomber, Bomber A and Bomber B (including 24 cylinder engine programs).

Instead Germany should go full speed ahead on less costly DB603 engine / Do-217 bomber combination. It will satisfy most German heavy bomber requirements at a cost they can afford.

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## Glider (May 22, 2015)

For the UK So many where do you start, 

Botha, Albacore, Fulmar, Roc, Sterling, Whitley, Warwick, Albemarle, Battle, Defiant, Lerwick, Sea Otter, Albecore

The scary thing is that they all entered production, there not prototypes, the waste of resources is huge


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## kool kitty89 (May 22, 2015)

Cancel XP-72 development on the drawing board and continue the preceding XP-47J program. (even without the hindsight of the XP-72's problems, the limited usefulness of a heavier aircraft with higher wing loading and much greater fuel consumption would seem unattractive, especially with the shift in emphasis towards long range escort capabilities -with the P-47J actually improving on all those qualities compared to the existing P-47D)





Shortround6 said:


> Now which engine is _likely_ to give you much more power than a Merlin or Hercules and _when._
> The Vulture and Griffon _should_ have been the low risk/fast development engines. The Vulture turned out to more troublesome than anticipated and the Griffon was late before being put on hold.
> 
> Stopping the Sabre might have saved millions but building thousands more Hurricanes was probably not a good idea (most/all showing up in 1942-44?).


Saying what to cancel without also suggesting alternate development for alternatives (rather than nothing and just more of existing engines) is a bit tricky. Arguing for ONLY Merlin and Hercules production has a lot of drawbacks and the existing Griffon was a bit late in development even without delays.

If you open things up to including more conservative mass production adaptations of the R engines, omitting some of the advances (including reduction in frontal area) the Griffon targeted, it very well may have expedited production.

Doing to the Buzzard what the Peregrine did for the Kestrel, more or less. (except development timeline is a bit different with the Buzzard having little interest and racing-specific R seeing much greater development but not being engineered with mass production in mind)




GrauGeist said:


> I would perhaps rethink that, since the Tiffy was a beast and could be compared to the Thunderbolt in regards to ruggedness, warload and being capable of scouring the enemy from the face of the earth.


Range, altitude, and dive performance were all lacking compared to the P-47. The Typhoon's wing was the big limiting factor and while the more advanced airfoil of the Tempest obviously added a great deal, a more conventional (but still thinner) airfoil section would have made plenty of sense on an earlier design ... but I wasn't delving into that given the context of cancellation and not specifically adding alternative developments. (still, something more akin to the Spitfire's wing, but larger, would be much more useful ... or P-47's ... among others -plenty of middleground between the Spit's thin airfoil section and the Hurricane and Typhoon's as well as more compromises for lower lift lower drag airfoils than the spitfires, offering easier use of thicker sections as well -for capacity and strength- without going to the point of the Typhoon; the P-39 seems to have made a reasonable compromise with a NACA 0015 section used at the root)

But even with all of that said, the wing is really the issue not just on the Typhoon, but also what limited the Hurricane's potential for growth compared to the likes of the Spitfire, 109, and even P-40. So there's a fair argument for a heavy redesign to the Hurricane's wing while retaining enough commonality on the overall aircraft to have production advantages over the Typhoon or even shifting to spitfire production. The Hurricane should have been even easier to adapt to the Griffon than the Spitfire as well, but regardless of that a more efficient wing that was still quite large in area/volume could have made the Hurricane much more capable with the Merlin alone. (from armament to fuel capacity making it a much more flexible and better performing long range intruder/fighter bomber as well as a more competent fighter)


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## l'Omnivore Sobriquet (May 22, 2015)

*B-32 Dominator*, eventually...
Apart from that...

Hinsight gives a false advice. It is really at decision time that this "what do you cancel" challenge should be thought about. Something like the Me-163 Komet is absolutely impossible to cancel, at decison-making time... Forget about later historical insight.

The case could be made that an obvious battle winner like *the Stuka* could well have been cancelled, at decision time, forgetting later history : had it met a Lufwaffe-brand opposition, including flak. By mid-war dive-bombing was obsolete, because of AAA mainly. Well modern AAA was indeed pionneered by Lufwaffe's flak as early as 1940 (Fairey Battles, Bréguet 693s...), so the case could be made that Ju-87 was a weird choice right from the start... Add a strong 1940-brand opposition of swarms of Messerschmidtts on top...

I read a long list of British "should have been cancelled" planes... but again this is too easy. I notice that the *Sworfish *is absent from this list... Historical hinsight again. Of course.. But had the Swordfish contribution been limited to one experience like the escape of Scharnhorst 'n Gneisenau (to pick something telling), I could hear the loud cries here, about "utter nonsense" et al.

It's all too easy to pick, war proven successes, or failures. 
Two years before they go to fight, this is the challenge.
And it's all too hard a thread too contribute, this, really.. 
Cruel.
I don't wan't to cancel any.

Okay... I could barely admit that, eventually, in 1945, a transonic dive-bomber without air-brakes bound to be operated at almost zero hight, Henshel *Hs-132* wise, could be an idea prone to reconsideration.
But that's the maximum I will allow.


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## GrauGeist (May 22, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> Range, altitude, and dive performance were all lacking compared to the P-47. The Typhoon's wing was the big limiting factor and while the more advanced airfoil of the Tempest obviously added a great deal, a more conventional (but still thinner) airfoil section would have made plenty of sense on an earlier design ... but I wasn't delving into that given the context of cancellation and not specifically adding alternative developments. (still, something more akin to the Spitfire's wing, but larger, would be much more useful ... or P-47's ... among others -plenty of middleground between the Spit's thin airfoil section and the Hurricane and Typhoon's as well as more compromises for lower lift lower drag airfoils than the spitfires, offering easier use of thicker sections as well -for capacity and strength- without going to the point of the Typhoon; the P-39 seems to have made a reasonable compromise with a NACA 0015 section used at the root)
> 
> But even with all of that said, the wing is really the issue not just on the Typhoon, but also what limited the Hurricane's potential for growth compared to the likes of the Spitfire, 109, and even P-40. So there's a fair argument for a heavy redesign to the Hurricane's wing while retaining enough commonality on the overall aircraft to have production advantages over the Typhoon or even shifting to spitfire production. The Hurricane should have been even easier to adapt to the Griffon than the Spitfire as well, but regardless of that a more efficient wing that was still quite large in area/volume could have made the Hurricane much more capable with the Merlin alone. (from armament to fuel capacity making it a much more flexible and better performing long range intruder/fighter bomber as well as a more competent fighter)


However, the Tiffy was the only British aircraft that could get down and meet the Fw190 on it's own terms early on AND it was comparable to the P-47, like I said, in it's warload - meaning it was a brutal ground attack aircraft, leaving no stone unturned.

The GA contributions made by the Typhoon made it an invaluable weapon in the British war chest, in spite of it's limited range. Add to that, it being a formidible adversary in a gunfight along with it's ability to absorbe damage on a level of the P-47 adds to it's value.

There were a great deal of other aircraft that the British fielded, that could have been done without, but saying they didn't need the Tiffy is like saying the U.S. had no use for the P-47.


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## Koopernic (May 22, 2015)

GrauGeist said:


> I would perhaps rethink that, since the Tiffy was a beast and could be compared to the Thunderbolt in regards to ruggedness, warload and being capable of scouring the enemy from the face of the earth.



So rugged its tail broke off, it never was faster than the Fw 190 at any altitude despite the boasts, fancy engine and best fuels and I doubt 4 Hispanos are much more powefull than 4 Mg 151/20 plus a pair of Machine guns. It didn't even offer much range.  Napiers would be better utilised making 2 speed Merlins which might have improved the Spitfire V. It might justify itself in leading to the tempest V but you didn't need to produce it.

Think of the long range spitfire viii that might have been built as well.

Interestingly it was cancelled, twice. Once was rescinded when the Fw 190 appeared.

You might have gotten two spitfires for every typhoon.


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## GregP (May 22, 2015)

Hi Koopernic,

For a thread I originally didn't think would generate much interest, this is turning out very interesting. You never know, and that's why we read them all ... to see what gets generated.

Got any more great ideas?

I have to disagree with the "P-40Q couldn't add much" idea, but that's OK. It looks like none of us would do exactly the same thing. That's why the people in power at the time made all the difference ... they did what THEY thought was right.


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## Koopernic (May 22, 2015)

wiking85 said:


> With hindsight the He177, Me163, He162, Me210 (before tooling, just wait for the 410), Ta-154, He-219, Ju288 (before it started tooling and its engine), and Ju290.



I can see reasoning behind all of those except the Ju 290. It was possibly the longest ranged maritime patrol aircraft of the war albeit a transport. How would you support the German navy?


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## Starfighter91 (May 22, 2015)

Salve,

from the german side,

the Ju 288 with it's engines (Jumo 222 and DB 604X), FW 191, Me 210 and 410, Me 209, Me 309 and Me 163.
The He 177 with four gondulas would be the most advanced bomber till the B29, the Me 410 was simply crap!


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## davebender (May 22, 2015)

Soviets thought otherwise. Historical Red Army reports often complain about damage inflicted by Luftwaffe dive bombers due to lack of inadequate VVS fighter cover.


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## kool kitty89 (May 22, 2015)

l'Omnivore Sobriquet said:


> *B-32 Dominator*, eventually...
> Apart from that...
> 
> Hinsight gives a false advice. It is really at decision time that this "what do you cancel" challenge should be thought about. Something like the Me-163 Komet is absolutely impossible to cancel, at decison-making time... Forget about later historical insight.


Using it as a research aircraft and refraining from mass production could have still made sense and fit a real-world timeline, though. That and a shift of emphasis towards jet powered derivatives of the airframe. (easier if Heinkel's class 1 engines hadn't been canceled and quite possibly a more practical -and earlier- design than the He 162)



> The case could be made that an obvious battle winner like *the Stuka* could well have been cancelled, at decision time, forgetting later history : had it met a Lufwaffe-brand opposition, including flak. By mid-war dive-bombing was obsolete, because of AAA mainly. Well modern AAA was indeed pionneered by Lufwaffe's flak as early as 1940 (Fairey Battles, Bréguet 693s...), so the case could be made that Ju-87 was a weird choice right from the start... Add a strong 1940-brand opposition of swarms of Messerschmidtts on top...


It may have made more sense for the Navy ... had Germany allowed a naval air arm, with or without carriers.




Koopernic said:


> I can see reasoning behind all of those except the Ju 290. It was possibly the longest ranged maritime patrol aircraft of the war albeit a transport. How would you support the German navy?


The Ju 252 should have had higher development/production priority, but yes the 290 was a useful large transport.

Investing more in correcting the Fw 200's faults as a patrol aircraft would have helped too ... and giving the Navy their own air arm to coordinate. For that matter, Naval He 111s probably would have had a longer useful life as maratime patrol aircraft than over-land bombers.

For that matter, the Bf 109T and aformentioned navalized Ju 87 likely would have had longer, more successful service lives there than on land too. (and superior to British counterparts -especially if the 109T's larger wing facilitated fuel expansion)



Koopernic said:


> So rugged its tail broke off, it never was faster than the Fw 190 at any altitude despite the boasts, fancy engine and best fuels and I doubt 4 Hispanos are much more powefull than 4 Mg 151/20 plus a pair of Machine guns. It didn't even offer much range. Napiers would be better utilised making 2 speed Merlins which might have improved the Spitfire V. It might justify itself in leading to the tempest V but you didn't need to produce it.


That, and even without Typhoon development I seriously wonder how well the old Hurricane fuselage would have coped with a new high speed/low drag wing. The rear fabric/stringer arrangement already allows for adaptation to a bubble canopy perhaps more easily than any contemporary fighter and the issues with flamability should have been addressed with metal stringers replacing the wood and aluminum skin or flame retardant dopant. (I'm not sure if the early hurricanes still used nitrocellulose dopants, but that would be a huge fire risk for sure)

More focused development on the Griffon would have aided development of higher performance Spit and Hurricane derivatives earlier on too. (and an earlier Griffon coupled with a clipped wing Spitfire probably would have countered the Fw 190 better than the Typhoon ... clipped wing Spit III with overboost might have as well)




GregP said:


> I have to disagree with the "P-40Q couldn't add much" idea, but that's OK. It looks like none of us would do exactly the same thing. That's why the people in power at the time made all the difference ... they did what THEY thought was right.


P-40Q was a bit late in general and a bulged hooded canopy introduced earlier on probably would have been close to as good or better in some respects without going so far as to redesign the fuselage.

Compared to the P-39, though, the P-40's slightly larger size may have given more potential for a reasonable turbocharger arrangement (unlike the YP-37 attempt) particularly with the liquid intercooler the P-38 eventually introduced. To make it really useful, more fuel would be needed, though and the larger wings of the P-40 compared to the P-39 should have been able to carry more, at least if redesigned. (ie around the time of the P-40D/E redesigns, but more extensive wing modifications with compartments for fuel cells) The P-40's fuselage and center section tanks already carried more than the P-39's total capacity, so extending internal fuel closer to that of the P-51 might have been possible.


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## Shortround6 (May 22, 2015)

Glider said:


> For the UK So many where do you start,
> 
> Botha, Albacore, Fulmar, Roc, Sterling, Whitley, Warwick, Albemarle, Battle, Defiant, Lerwick, Sea Otter, Albecore
> 
> The scary thing is that they all entered production, there not prototypes, the waste of resources is huge



The trouble with lists like this is that there sometimes no good alternatives. 

I don't think any one is really going to argue in favor of the Botha but what are you going to replace the Fulmar with? 

Please remember that the guy in the rear seat operated the radio _gear_ (not _just_ the radio) that allowed the plane to home in on a locator beacon on the carrier. It may be doubtful if any single seat fighter could have done that _at the time. _

Sterling? Having the bad luck to have _both_ production lines bombed by May of 1941 rather slowed production and service use. 

Whitley had 9 squadrons in service in Sept of 1939. What else was ready? keep using biplanes until the Lancaster shows up? 

The Sea Otter didn't waste much in resources. Sort of a Walrus MK III. Take an old Pegasus off the rear of the wings and stick a newer Mercury engine on the front, Make the bow a little more pointy. If you needed several hundred more planes than the existing Walruses anyway why not build a better version rather than build the 1933 Walrus in 1943-44. 

If you were trying to rescue downed aircrew form the sea the Biplane Walrus/Otter made more sense than trying to use Kingfishers. At least you could fit a few more rescued personnel *inside* the airplane. Hanging onto a wing while taxing for miles in the tropics is one thing. Doing it on the North Sea in the Fall or Spring (let alone winter) is something else.


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## GregP (May 22, 2015)

We'll have to disagree on that one,Kool Kitty, but that's OK. If we agreed on everything, it wouldn't be much of a discussion.


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## Edgar Brooks (May 23, 2015)

Koopernic said:


> So rugged its tail broke off,.


Ah, yes, that famous old saw, which is always trotted out when the Typhoon is mentioned. From 29-7-42 to 24-5-43, the Typhoon suffered 19 accidents, in 3 (only) of which the tail unit broke off, and 7 lost tailplanes, elevators or rudders. There were, in fact, more wing/wingtip failures than tail unit failures. By 1944, 1 failure every 7700 hours had gone out to 1 every 18000 hours, and it was decided that the cause was elevator flutter, largely caused by three-blade propellers. 


> it never was faster than the Fw 190 at any altitude despite the boasts, fancy engine and best fuels and I doubt 4 Hispanos are much more powefull than 4 Mg 151/20 plus a pair of Machine guns.


It was also designed pre-war, before the Fw190 was even known about, and how could MG151/20s have been fitted into any British aircraft? 


> Napiers would be better utilised making 2 speed Merlins which might have improved the Spitfire V.


It was tried, with the Merlin XX in the Spitfire III, but it involved major airframe changes, which didn't apply to the Merlin 45-series.


> It might justify itself in leading to the tempest V but you didn't need to produce it.


Try telling that to the inhabitants of coastal towns, who regularly saw attacks by bomb-carrying 190s; it's easy to sit, safe at home, 70 years later, and pontificate solely about the aircraft, but the government/Air Ministry had the safety of the civilian population to think about.


> Think of the long range spitfire viii that might have been built as well.


There was no "long range" Spitfire VIII.


> Interestingly it was cancelled, twice. Once was rescinded when the Fw 190 appeared.


No, it wasn't; two versions, with different engines, were cancelled, but the Air Ministry were continually pushing for the Sabre-powered variant.


> You might have gotten two spitfires for every typhoon


And you might not, since you would have needed to persuade an obdurate Sidney Camm to produce somebody else's design. Also, by 1944, there was no shortage of Merlin-powered Spitfires, which is why so many IXs were given away to Russia

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## Glider (May 23, 2015)

Koopernic said:


> So rugged its tail broke off, it never was faster than the Fw 190 at any altitude despite the boasts, fancy engine and best fuels and I doubt 4 Hispanos are much more powefull than 4 Mg 151/20 plus a pair of Machine guns. It didn't even offer much range. Napiers would be better utilised making 2 speed Merlins which might have improved the Spitfire V. It might justify itself in leading to the tempest V but you didn't need to produce it.
> 
> Think of the long range spitfire viii that might have been built as well.
> 
> ...



The Typhoon was a lot faster than the 190 at low altitude which is what counts for a GA role and it carried a greater variety of weapons. Re the guns when operating as a GA aircraft the FW190 normally only carried 2 x 20mm and to cap it all the Typhoon was continually up armoured. As a GA fighter the Typhoon didn't have to apologise to anyone.

edit by RAF standards the Typhoon had a decent range


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## Greyman (May 23, 2015)

Koopernic said:


> ... it never was faster than the Fw 190 at any altitude despite the boasts ...



Quick estimates - mostly based on data from over at the great WWII Aircraft Performance website.

It's not pixel-perfect to the data but the idea is there:







The faster Typhoon is post upgrades: sliding hood, whip aerial, new exhausts, cannon fairings, etc.


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## wiking85 (May 23, 2015)

Koopernic said:


> I can see reasoning behind all of those except the Ju 290. It was possibly the longest ranged maritime patrol aircraft of the war albeit a transport. How would you support the German navy?



Fw200; there were so few Ju290 and there were twice as heavy that they made virtually no sense to invest resources in. Keep the Fw200 as a pure recon aircraft. Of course I would also suggest they build the Do26 instead due to its use of diesel engines, being a sea plane, and having huge range.

Ideally the He177 would have replaced the Fw200, but it had serious issues that we are not presupposing would be fixed, so simply getting rid of it and using the engines and materials to make more Ju88s would be better (DB605 engined Ju88s....what would that be like?).


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## Glider (May 23, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> The trouble with lists like this is that there sometimes no good alternatives.
> 
> I don't think any one is really going to argue in favor of the Botha but what are you going to replace the Fulmar with?


Buffalo or Wildcat or a proper single seat fighter with the range needed. Or accept the Fulmar as a stop gap and design a single seat fighter instead of the Firefly.


> Please remember that the guy in the rear seat operated the radio _gear_ (not _just_ the radio) that allowed the plane to home in on a locator beacon on the carrier. It may be doubtful if any single seat fighter could have done that _at the time. _


You certainly could be right about that but the Japanese and USN managed to find a working solution.



> Sterling? Having the bad luck to have _both_ production lines bombed by May of 1941 rather slowed production and service use.


Then let the Sterling have a redesign to increase its altitude and do without the Halifax. The RAF didn't need three four engine bombers.


> Whitley had 9 squadrons in service in Sept of 1939. What else was ready? keep using biplanes until the Lancaster shows up?


I would suggest that you build more Wellingtons and add the Hampden to the list. 



> The Sea Otter didn't waste much in resources. Sort of a Walrus MK III. Take an old Pegasus off the rear of the wings and stick a newer Mercury engine on the front, Make the bow a little more pointy. If you needed several hundred more planes than the existing Walruses anyway why not build a better version rather than build the 1933 Walrus in 1943-44.


I couldn't think of anything the Sea Otter could do that the Walrus couldn't so that is why it was on the list.


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## fastmongrel (May 23, 2015)

Glider said:


> Buffalo or Wildcat or a proper single seat fighter with the range needed. Or accept the Fulmar as a stop gap and design a single seat fighter instead of the Firefly. You certainly could be right about that but the Japanese and USN managed to find a working solution.



The Japanese and US in the Pacific didnt often fly in North Atlantic/Norwegian Sea type weather or at night. If the Firefly had come along when it was supposed to in 41 we would be talking about what an awesome aircraft it was but by 44 it couldnt do anything a Corsair/Hellcat couldnt do.

That I think is the problem with a lot of the aircraft mentioned in this thread by the time they got into service WWII had left them behind.


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## parsifal (May 23, 2015)

For the RAF

Battle and Defiant

For the RN 

Cancel the order for the Buffalo and martlet I , concentrate on the Fulmar. At least it was ready shot down 114 enemy a/c for the loss of three, and operated from carriers from Day1. Those US imports whilst having greater potential later in the war (at least for the Martlet) could not operate from a carrier, leaked fuel everywhere, had limited multi role capability (a must in the early war for the RN after losing 1/3 of its carrier forces. 

LW

Me 309, Me 210 and 410, Ar240, Ju 290, Me 163, 

Japan

A7M, their 4 engine bombers, J1N, probably the Ki45, and the large Bomber destroyers they developed at the end of the war. 

US

Probably the B-32, but I dont know enough about it to be sure, either the F6F or the Corsair....not both, but one. As greg points out, probably some models of the P-39. 

Soviet

blah, too hard


Italian

Blah even worse


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## Elmas (May 23, 2015)

Breda 88, first of all....

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## tomo pauk (May 23, 2015)

Hard not to agree with that 

Cancelling out the P-39 does not bring much, and takes away plenty; those bore the brunt of air fighting probably more than P-51s, P-47s and P-38 combined before 1943 ended. No P-39 means VVS suffers even more losses and makes less kills vs. LW. 

I agree that Battle should be cancelled, but maybe after 500 produced examples; what should Fairey build instead? The Spitfire produced by Boulton Paul instead of the Defiant should make sense - same powerplant, twice the firepower, half the crew, lower drag and weight for better performance, no turret means cheaper faster production, can carry cannons unlike the Defiant.

Re. Sydney Camm not willing to produce other people aircraft - others did it, since the costumer wanted so. Mr. Camm was a designer anyway, not the owner of the conglomerate?


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## fastmongrel (May 23, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> Re. Sydney Camm not willing to produce other people aircraft - others did it, since the costumer wanted so. Mr. Camm was a designer anyway, not the owner of the conglomerate?



Very true if Hawkers refused to build what the Air Ministry wanted who were they going to build for. Plus the shadow factories and the tools and workers in them didnt belong to Hawkers they simply ran them on Air Ministry contract.


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## stona (May 23, 2015)

Handley Page Halifax, as soon as the Lancaster came on line. 
Accept some lost production for total number of heavy bombers (as Harris, unlike the bean counters at the Air Ministry, was prepared to do) and go for the best heavy bomber available.

On the German side I find it difficult to choose particular types. A rationalisation of the numerous programs was needed and this would have led inevitably to the cancellation of many types. This plethora of production already hamstrung German aircraft production in the late 1930s and was a product of the system, not the war. The Ta 154, Me 163 and He 177 stand out as a particular waste of resources.

Cheers
Steve


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## gjs238 (May 23, 2015)

How about the Vultee A-31 Vengeance?


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## tomo pauk (May 23, 2015)

Build more of these.


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## GrauGeist (May 23, 2015)

stona said:


> ...The Ta 154, *Me 163* and He 177 stand out as a particular waste of resources.


While the Komet wasn't as successful in it's intended role as they hoped, it actually did provide a great deal of research information in a realm of aviation that hadn't been achieved before.

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## stona (May 23, 2015)

GrauGeist said:


> While the Komet wasn't as successful in it's intended role as they hoped, it actually did provide a great deal of research information in a realm of aviation that hadn't been achieved before.



It did, but that is hardly what the Luftwaffe needed in 1944/5. All that research and development, then about 300 aircraft built...for what? You could say the same about other projects like the V-2.

What the Luftwaffe needed was fighters that could oppose the Anglo-American assault by day and night. The Me 162, Ba 349, Ta 154 and others were not the answer. 

Cheers

Steve


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## Edgar Brooks (May 23, 2015)

fastmongrel said:


> Very true if Hawkers refused to build what the Air Ministry wanted who were they going to build for.


The only problem with that theory is that the Air Ministry wanted the Typhoon, so the question's completely academic; yet again you're using 20:20 hindsight on an aircraft which was ordered 2.5 years before the war started. It was originally given 12 Browning .303" (hence the thick wing everyone decries) to enable it to shoot down the expected onslaught from heavily-armoured German bombers, with cannon following once the Hispano was being built and was acceptable. 
YOU/WE all know that France ceased to be a force in mid-1940, but that wasn't even contemplated in 1937, so talk of cancelling the Typhoon because of (allegedly better) fighters attacking from there, is way off beam. The defenders of this country needed aircraft armed with (at least) 4 cannon, which could defeat bombers' armour; any thought, in 1937, of coming up against fighters more manoeuvrable than the Me110 would have been dismissed as sheer fantasy.


> Plus the shadow factories and the tools and workers in them didnt belong to Hawkers they simply ran them on Air Ministry contract.


The Hawker Group owned Hawker, Gloster, Armstrong-Siddeley and Avro (all bought by Tommy Sopwith, in fact,) their factories and the machine tools, and paid the workers' wages; the Air Ministry's only involvement was to issue contracts and provide Resident Technical Officers as overseers.


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## Shortround6 (May 23, 2015)

Glider said:


> Buffalo or Wildcat or a proper single seat fighter with the range needed. Or accept the Fulmar as a stop gap and design a single seat fighter instead of the Firefly. You certainly could be right about that but the Japanese and USN managed to find a working solution.



Now we are not just canceling production programs, we are changing doctrine, tactics and training to suit _our_ view of the problem. As has been mentioned, the RN was anticipating operating in worse weather conditions than the US and Japanese Navies. The radio homing beacon on the carrier was considered a _secret_ at the time (it operated in such a way that would be extremely difficult for an enemy to home in on it unlike many other "homing" beacons in use at the time. This means that the _capability_ of the homing system was rarely mentioned and in fact the actual duties of the rear seat man were glossed over or misrepresented. 



> Then let the Sterling have a redesign to increase its altitude and do without the Halifax. The RAF didn't need three four engine bombers.



Maybe not but when the Stirling production lines were being built and the first Sterlings being delivered The RAF didn't _have_ three four engine bombers. It had two. First Stirling Squadron got it's first few planes about one month _before_ the contract was signed to even build the first 2 Lancaster prototypes. 1st Lancaster prototype makes it's first flight about 1 month before Stirlings go on first operational raid. 1st operational bombing mission by Lancasters is 13 months after the combat debut of the Sterling. And BOTH Stirling production lines had been hit by bombs in Aug of 1940 taking out 11 aircraft on the production lines (almost a squadrons worth) and delaying production by weeks if not a few months. 



> I would suggest that you build more Wellingtons and add the Hampden to the list.



Kind of the same thing. Sounds good using the retrospectroscope but in actuality Whitleys made up about 1/3 of the RAFs heavy/medium bomber strength in 1939. And which Wellingtons? The MK Is weren't really all that good. 
The Whitley was _always_called a night bomber even if the crews couldn't find the right country at times. The Wellington was day bomber for several months in 1939 until Bomber command had to face the fact that it couldn't survive in daylight. You don't get the Hercules engines until the MK III and you don't get the four gun tail turret until well over 3300 Wellingtons are built. 
A Whitley could carry a 4500lb bomb load about 33% further than a Wellington MK I could.
Killing the Whitley means giving up the best 'bomb truck' (not necessarily the best bomber) the British have in 1939 and 1940 and for a good part of 1941 in regards to numbers. 



> I couldn't think of anything the Sea Otter could do that the Walrus couldn't so that is why it was on the list.



SO do you build the 292 Sea Otters or do you build an additional 292 Walruses? 

According to one website "The new aircraft was also faster, could fly farther and handled better in the water that its predecessor." 
The last bit might be more important than the first two, it depends on how much better it was in the water. 
BTW the Otter could also carry four 250lb bombs instead of the Walruses six 100lb or two 250lbs bombs.


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## kool kitty89 (May 23, 2015)

GregP said:


> We'll have to disagree on that one,Kool Kitty, but that's OK. If we agreed on everything, it wouldn't be much of a discussion.


On the P-40Q ... the major benefit over the P-51 would be suitability of the 2-stage allison. So it's more a matter of whether the P-63 or P-40Q is more useful, and ignoring the shortcomings of the P-63 tied directly to low emphasis on fuel capacity. (lots of empty space in the wings that might have been engineered for fuel tank age had that been a priority -ie had the design goals been similar to the P-51)

That and I've argued before that the P-76 shouldn't have been canceled with its greater parts commonality with the P-39, earlier development/flight testing, and luck of lack of prototype crashing early on. Speed wasn't as good at the XP-63, but critical development time would be more the issue, and ability to grow along with the 2-stage allison developments. 





Shortround6 said:


> I don't think any one is really going to argue in favor of the Botha but what are you going to replace the Fulmar with?
> 
> Please remember that the guy in the rear seat operated the radio _gear_ (not _just_ the radio) that allowed the plane to home in on a locator beacon on the carrier. It may be doubtful if any single seat fighter could have done that _at the time. _


The defiant? Remove the turret but retain a second crew position with the added electronics. Might have been closer to the Firefly in performance even with just the Merlin. (griffon power should have made it a more genuinely competitive fighter while still allowing the second seat if necessary -ie if not supplanted by more heavily automated equipment late war)



> Sterling? Having the bad luck to have _both_ production lines bombed by May of 1941 rather slowed production and service use.


Plus the Stirling is a better example of forced misguided development imposed by the Ministry rather than a design meriting foregone development. Not allowing the original, longer, thinner wing to be used wouldn't be that much different from not allowing the Manchester to be converted to the Lancaster or forcing a defensive armament on the Mossie.





Glider said:


> Buffalo or Wildcat or a proper single seat fighter with the range needed. Or accept the Fulmar as a stop gap and design a single seat fighter instead of the Firefly. You certainly could be right about that but the Japanese and USN managed to find a working solution.


If you're doing that, just go with a properly Navalized Sea Hurricane pre-war and stick with it until the Seafire can replace it. (or not ... given the potential advantages of deck handling and landing accidents in spite of the performance limits)

But you still won't be able to fulfill what the Fulmar did.


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## kool kitty89 (May 23, 2015)

Edgar Brooks said:


> Ah, yes, that famous old saw, which is always trotted out when the Typhoon is mentioned. From 29-7-42 to 24-5-43, the Typhoon suffered 19 accidents, in 3 (only) of which the tail unit broke off, and 7 lost tailplanes, elevators or rudders. There were, in fact, more wing/wingtip failures than tail unit failures. By 1944, 1 failure every 7700 hours had gone out to 1 every 18000 hours, and it was decided that the cause was elevator flutter, largely caused by three-blade propellers.


How does that compare with the Hurricane's early operational record?



> It was tried, with the Merlin XX in the Spitfire III, but it involved major airframe changes, which didn't apply to the Merlin 45-series.


The impression I've always gotten was that it was the Hurricane II and various multi-engine bombers (and the Beaufighter) getting priority for the Merlin XX that prevented the Spitfire III from entering production.

Surely, the modifications needed for the XX series were less than the 60/70 series, let alone Griffon, both of which were adapted and pressed into service as soon as possible. (and neither the Hurricane nor P-40 seemed to have trouble adapting to the Merlin XX)




Glider said:


> The Typhoon was a lot faster than the 190 at low altitude which is what counts for a GA role and it carried a greater variety of weapons. Re the guns when operating as a GA aircraft the FW190 normally only carried 2 x 20mm and to cap it all the Typhoon was continually up armoured. As a GA fighter the Typhoon didn't have to apologise to anyone.


But how would a Spitfire III in low gear with overboost compare?

And, granted, not available until 1942, but the Allison engined Mustang was faster at low altitudes as well. (P-39 was available sooner though and may have outpaced the Typhoon at low alt with overboost -or once WEP was officially cleared)

Ground attack/FB ability is a separate issue, but possibly one the Mustang could have fared very well in as well. (it managed well enough employed for GA as the A-36)

Non-turbocharged P-38s may have been better for sheer speed as well as fighter/bomber duties, but I don't think we need to go over production delays and shortages with that type again. (it was covered rather well in the discussing regarding producing more P-38s in place of P-40s and P-39s -even if the value was seen for an aircraft nearly 2x as expensive, the production capacity simply wasn't there early enough -unless the XP-38 doesn't crash and they gain a year in development along with a properly optimized unturbocharged version with counter-rotation, ejector exhaust and ram intake optimization on par with the P-40/P-51)




wiking85 said:


> Ideally the He177 would have replaced the Fw200, but it had serious issues that we are not presupposing would be fixed, so simply getting rid of it and using the engines and materials to make more Ju88s would be better (DB605 engined Ju88s....what would that be like?).


More BMW 801 powered Ju 88s would be better ... the value of 605 powered Fw 190s has been disputed before at least without C3 or WM/50. (dubious replies regarding whether weight and drag reduction would be enough to make a DB-605A powered 190 competitive -or more useful than a 109G)

And on that note, cancel the Ju 188, 288, and 388 and focusing on more direct derivatives of the existing Ju 88 (and more on making it faster and better performing -maybe modifying the bomb bay to make external racks less necessary- and less emphasis on making a bigger bomber). Concentrate on the Do 217 as the big/heavy twin engine bomber.






parsifal said:


> Cancel the order for the Buffalo and martlet I , concentrate on the Fulmar. At least it was ready shot down 114 enemy a/c for the loss of three, and operated from carriers from Day1. Those US imports whilst having greater potential later in the war (at least for the Martlet) could not operate from a carrier, leaked fuel everywhere, had limited multi role capability (a must in the early war for the RN after losing 1/3 of its carrier forces.


I don't believe the RN ever ordered the Buffalo ... they did trial the version purchased/repossessed by the RAF, but those were all de-navalized. A proper, carrier capable Buffalo Mk.I may have been far more useful on RN carriers than it was historically in the middle east. (possibly a better performer than the Martlet)







tomo pauk said:


> I agree that Battle should be cancelled, but maybe after 500 produced examples; what should Fairey build instead? The Spitfire produced by Boulton Paul instead of the Defiant should make sense - same powerplant, twice the firepower, half the crew, lower drag and weight for better performance, no turret means cheaper faster production, can carry cannons unlike the Defiant.


I'm not sure the Defiant is that worth being written off, but development limited to turretless operation would be the focus for sure. The larger, thicker wing of the Defiant may have been more suitable for cannons than the hurricane while still having overall drag characteristics better than the Hurricane and possibly better than the spitfire considering the weight and wing area. Maybe a better candidate for fighter-bomber conversion than the Hurricane (especially with the Griffon), but the hurricane still had advantages in manufacturing infrastructure that kept it in production so long historically.

In any case, single-seat defiant derivatives may have had enough merits to not simply throw them away in favor of Spitfire production.



> Re. Sydney Camm not willing to produce other people aircraft - others did it, since the costumer wanted so. Mr. Camm was a designer anyway, not the owner of the conglomerate?


Gloster was also a Hawkwer-owned by that point, so there were obviously non-Hawker designs being developed/produced ... though I suppose still ones owned by them. (ie the Gloster F.5/34 and F.9/37 projects might not have conflicted so much -actually, as a multirole interceptor and fighter-bomber, and with only the Merlin and Hercules available, the Gloster twin might have been a better development path than the Typhoon as well, had the ministry showed interest)

And all that said, I still think the Hurricane itself may have had more development potential ... especially considering it ended up staying in production for so long. Investing in heavier modifications/improvements to that machine may have been far more worthwhile than the typhoon in the end. (ie it may not have been better than the typhoon, but at least better on the whole than the existing combinations of Hurricane II/IV and typhoons)




GrauGeist said:


> While the Komet wasn't as successful in it's intended role as they hoped, it actually did provide a great deal of research information in a realm of aviation that hadn't been achieved before.


Hence my suggestion that it simply shouldn't have entered mass production. Investing more in adapting the airframe to alternate powerplants would have been much more useful. (while the rocket engine development was useful in its own right and good for pushing the high speed limits of the airframe)


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## EKB (May 24, 2015)

Greyman said:


> Quick estimates - mostly based on data from over at the great WWII Aircraft Performance website.
> 
> It's not pixel-perfect to the data but the idea is there:
> 
> ...





374 mph at sea level on just 2200 bhp? That cannot be linked to any aircraft from A&AEE trials. 

The two serials speed checked at Boscombe Down (R7700 and R8762) never came close to going that fast at rooftop height, and in both cases the high speed was found to be less than 400 mph. Well below the figures advertised by the makers.

Late build Typhoons were slower on average than previous models. The added racks, rails and other external bits to carry bombs, rockets, and drop tanks also produced more wind resistance.


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## parsifal (May 24, 2015)

would that not also apply to FW adversaries, given the german propensity to increase war load at the expense of all performance considerations?

Wasnt the first employment of the typhoon to hunt down FW hit and run raids across the channel. After solving the bugs was this assignment not successfully carried out.

I suspect yet another example of over critical anti- british sentiment rising yet again.

Care to share with the rest of us you national background or technological preefernces before we all start jumping to conclusions?


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## parsifal (May 24, 2015)

would that not also apply to FW adversaries, given the german propensity to increase war load at the expense of all performance considerations?

Wasnt the first employment of the typhoon to hunt down FW hit and run raids across the channel. After solving the bugs was this assignment not successfully carried out.

I suspect yet another example of over critical anti- british sentiment rising yet again.

Care to share with the rest of us you national background or technological preefernces and expertise, along with your references for the above statement before we all start jumping to conclusions?

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## Greyman (May 24, 2015)

EKB said:


> 374 mph at sea level on just 2200 bhp? That cannot be linked to any aircraft from A&AEE trials.
> 
> The two serials speed checked at Boscombe Down (R7700 and R8762) never came close to going that fast at rooftop height, and in both cases the high speed was found to be less than 400 mph. Well below the figures advertised by the makers.
> 
> Late build Typhoons were slower on average than previous models. The added racks, rails and other external bits to carry bombs, rockets, and drop tanks also produced more wind resistance.



The information is from here - Typhoon IB Performance Data

Here is the relevant bit:


> _Tests at Gloster on a repaired aircraft with a whip aerial and sliding hood fitted have given the following level speeds corrected on the basis of A. A.E.E. Res.170.
> 
> M.S. M.P.A	398 m.p.h. at 8,800ft
> _



With that I simply placed the curve from Typhoon Ib R8762 over the given point.

The very early (12 x Browning) Typhoons were very fast. A&AEE test of one gives 396 mph at 8,000 feet and 410 mph at 20,000 feet.

The later Typhoon Ib's were definitely faster than the earlier Ib's. Check out the Typhoon page above - it goes through the upgrades.

A&AEE ran a test on a different aircraft (similar to R.7700) and determined that the effect of faired bomb racks on a Typhoon Ib was approximately 15 mph.

According to data sheets, Mk.III rocket rails took about 10 mph off - but that doesn't seem like enough to me. I'm somewhat sceptical.


*EDIT:*
With regards to the rails issue, I should say I don't necessarily _disbelieve_ the data on the sheet, it's just that it's entirely possible that there are more factors at play than just the rocket rails when looking at the different speeds.


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## Edgar Brooks (May 24, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> How does that compare with the Hurricane's early operational record?)


The Hurricane had more than 3 years of peace in which to iron out any problems. The (Browning-armed) Typhoon prototype first flew in March 1940; the (cannon-armed) second prototype first flew 15-5-41, with the first aircraft delivered in June, and the first Squadron formed in early September. some might think that was a little rushed. 


> The impression I've always gotten was that it was the Hurricane II and various multi-engine bombers (and the Beaufighter) getting priority for the Merlin XX that prevented the Spitfire III from entering production.


The (now cannon-armed) Hurricane desperately needed upgrading in 1940, the Spitfire II was faster than the Mk.I, and the Merlin 45 was available in early 1941, in plenty of time for the Mk.V and the expected resumption of the Battle of Britain. The Merlin 45 would also fit into the same airframe as the I/II, while the XX needed changes to the engine compartment and u/c geometry (also later introduced on the Vc.)


> Surely, the modifications needed for the XX series were less than the 60/70 series, let alone Griffon, both of which were adapted and pressed into service as soon as possible.


4" longer nose on the III, and a 9" longer nose on the IX, and the conversion to the Mk.IX was as a result of the appearance of the Fw190, which wasn't around when the Mk.V (which could cope with the 109F) appeared.


> And, granted, not available until 1942, but the Allison engined Mustang was faster at low altitudes as well.


Wasn't faster than the Spitfire IX at combat altitude, though, was it?


> (P-39 was available sooner though and may have outpaced the Typhoon at low alt with overboost -or once WEP was officially cleared)


Might have is guesswork, not history.


> In any case, single-seat defiant derivatives may have had enough merits to not simply throw them away in favor of Spitfire production


.
They weren't; it was the Whirlwind that the Spitfire/Seafire replaced, and, without major modifications, i.e. a completely new wing, the Defiant could not carry similar armament to the cannon-armed Spitfire.


> the Gloster twin might have been a better development path than the Typhoon as well, had the ministry showed interest)


Two engines, where one would do, never sat well with the Ministry.


> And all that said, I still think the Hurricane itself may have had more development potential


It didn't; the Merlin XX was as big an engine as it could take. The Hurricane was also a deathtrap for pilots, if the wing tanks were holed, since the cockpit's open framework drew the flames straight in, and onto them.


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## EKB (May 24, 2015)

parsifal said:


> would that not also apply to FW adversaries. Wasnt the first employment of the typhoon to hunt down FW hit and run raids across the channel..




The tip-and-run FW 190 raiders of 1943 do seem to have out-paced chasing Typhoons on a regular basis. The rocket Typhoons of 1944 were certainly slower and less maneuevrable:

*August 1944*
_“ Immediately, our aircraft are refuelled and rearmed. We are ordered off again to the Lisieux area, where convoys are said to be escaping under cover of a swarm of Me109s. Well, well! The Luftwaffe is back! I hope that we can meet them after firing our rockets—a dogfight with full load is no piece of cake.
Before take-off I warn my pilots that, should the Messerschmitts bounce us, they must turn towards the German fighters and keep right down on the deck. Low down we don’t have to worry but it would be suicidal to climb towards them:—the rails of our rockets would be a handicap in that manoeuvre.”_

See p.136
Charles Demoulin. *Firebirds!: Flying the Typhoon in Action.* 
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1986.






parsifal said:


> After solving the bugs was this assignment not successfully carried out.




Could you pinpoint for us the exact date in which these bugs were solved? 

There were many problems with the Typhoon and Tempest, but the most serious defect was the Napier Sabre engine. A quick look at the unit history of No. 247 Squadron shows that the safety record was abysmal:

*1st March 1943.* 
Typhoon Mk.I DN445. Engine failure after take-off, force landed near High Ercall. 
Sergeant. J. H. Berry injured.

*26th July 1943.* 
Typhoon Mk.I DN338. Engine failure, force landed 1m SW of New Romney. 
Flying Officer R. F. Murray OK.

*24th September 1943.* 
Typhoon Mk.I JP653. Engine failure, ditched off Dymchurch. 
Flight Lieutenant C. E. Brayshaw OK.

*4th October 1943. *
Typhoon Mk.I JP729. Engine failure, force landed at New Romney. 
Flying Officer J. B. Watchorn killed.

*5th January 1944.* 
Typhoon Mk.I JP850. Engine failure, crash landed at Itchel Manor, Odiham. 
Flying Officer A. S. Aitchison OK.

*3rd February 1944.* 
Typhoon Mk.I JP927. Engine failure, ditched 2 mi S of Selsey. 
Flying Officer R. Walker-Lutz OK.

*15th February 1944.* 
Typhoon Mk.I JP381. Engine failure, crashed 1m S of Flers. 
Flight Sergeant C. E. B. Eckel evaded capture.

*28th February 1944.* 
Typhoon Mk.I JP730. Engine failure, pilot baled out 3m N of Sark. 
Warrant Officer P. S. W. Daniel killed.

*16th March 1944.* 
Typhoon Mk.I JP672. Engine failure, force landed 1m S of Arundel. 
Sergeant S. R. Ryen OK.

*5th April 1944.* 
Typhoon Mk.I MN294. Engine failure, wheels up landing at Dunsfold. 
Sergeant E. A. Bolster OK.
*
26th April 1944.* 
Typhoon Mk.I MM979. Engine failure, force landed 12m NE of Ferndown. 
Pilot not identified.
*
26th April 1944.* 
Typhoon Mk.I MN299. Engine failure, force landed 1m N of Ferndown. 
Sergeant S. R. Ryen OK.

*18th July 1944.* 
Typhoon Mk.I MN597. Engine failure, crashed at B.14 Amblie. 
Sergeant S. R. Ryen killed.

*22nd September 1944.* 
Typhoon Mk.I JR208. Engine failure, force landed S of Helmond. 
Flight Sergeant J. A. D. Meechan.

*4th November 1944. *
Typhoon Mk.I EK135. Engine failure on ferry flight, force landed 7m NE of Louvain. 
Warrant Officer S. R. Thomas OK.
*
8th November 1944.* 
Typhoon Mk.I EK133. Engine failure on take-off, force landed at Eindhoven rail yards. 
Flying Officer D. C. Orriss OK.

*9th November 1944.* 
Typhoon Mk.I JP937. Engine failure, crashed at Niewchirke on ferry flight. 
Flying Officer W. Osborne killed.

*19th November 1944.* 
Typhoon Mk.I EJ991. Engine failure, force landed SW of Someren. 
Flying Officer F. K. Wiersum OK.

*27th November 1944.* 
Typhoon Mk.I PD618. Engine failure on ferry flight, force landed near Brussels. 
Flying Officer F. K. Wiersum OK.

*29th December 1944.* 
Typhoon Mk.I MN253. Engine failure on take-off, wheels up landing at B.78 Eindhoven. 
Flying Officer G. M. Hill OK.

*3rd February 1945.* 
Typhoon Mk.I MN471. Engine failure, force landed 15m SE of Münster. 
Flight Lieutenant E. A. McGee PoW.
*
7th March 1945.* 
Typhoon Mk.I RB450. Engine fire on start up at Warmwell, to Taylorcraft for salvage.

*17th April 1945.* 
Typhoon Mk.I R8932. Engine trouble, force landed at B.110 Achmer. 
Flight Lieutenant L. R. Barnes OK.
*
26th April 1945.* 
Typhoon Mk.I SW513. Engine failure, force landed 5m SW of Boizenburg. 
Warrant Officer G. E. T. Lawley OK.

See p.153-155
David John Marchant. *Rise From the East: The Story of No.247 (China-British) Squadron Royal Air Force.* Turnbridge Well: Air-Britain Historians Ltd., 1996. 





parsifal said:


> I suspect yet another example of over critical anti-british sentiment rising yet again.





So the British test pilots at Boscombe Down were anti-British? 


*March 1943* - _At the end of 1942, there were only Nos. 1, 56, 266 and 609 Squadrons testing the Typhoon in action, 486, 183 and 198 were still being converted to the Tiffy and, like the others, experienced many difficulties in overcoming its faults. 
The truth at that time was that the long-awaited fighter, the one planned to replace the Spitfire, was in fact a cruel disappointment for the RAF. Although by far the fastest from ground level to 10,000 feet, the Typhoon lost most of its power at altitude where much of the combat took place. This was an insurmountable set-back for, even with its supercharger, the huge engine of over 2200 hp could not compensate for the seven tons it had to move about the sky—against a mere 3.5 tons for the Spitfire.
Then there was, at that time, its rather bad habit of losing its ailerons in a steep turn and, for good measure, the tail rivets would not stand the stress of a power dive. To add to those problems, the Napier 24 cylinder sleeve-valve engine suffered from a mysterious malady and had an average life of about five hours before it packed up without warning. 
It took months to find the remedies and, as far as the engine was concerned, although the cylinder valves causing the trouble were changed more often, and even replaced by another kind of steel, the reliability was never up to the standard of Rolls Royce engines in the Spitfires. No wonder that many pilots asked to be posted back to fight on Spitfires rather than to die accidentally on Typhoons … 
Last but not least of its vices, the aircraft had to be held hard with full rudder to counteract the torque and oxygen had to be on at all times because the cockpit filled with exhaust fumes! These may have been minor troubles compared with the others, but nevertheless they required even-tempered pilots to put up with them.”_

See p.37-38
Charles Demoulin. *Firebirds!: Flying the Typhoon in Action.* 
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1986.


*April 1944 *-_“ Slowly the new Tempests were ferried in and the Typhoons went. My letter 'R's engine had completed its 240 flying hours which was considered fantastic; fifty hours was the norm at that time for the Napier Sabre engine. I was told they were taking it back to the makers to investigate and find out what the difference was. I reckoned it was the driver.”_


*July 1944* - _“ The Air Officer Commanding, Air Vice Marshall Harry Broadhurst also paid us a visit, and took up a Tempest to try out his new super plane. Unfortunately the Sabre engine played up with it’s old tricks. After sputtering and coughing on take-off, he was glad to get down on earth safely.”_


*October 1944* - _“ We were still having a good deal of trouble with the engine oiling up. The Napier Sabre didn’t really like idling. It was far happier when we were chasing V1s at full bore when serviceability was the best ever. At Volkel there were miles of brick laid perimeter tracks. The ground off the tracks was soft, as Joe Hindley found to his cost when he ran off the perimeter track and the plane tipped up on its nose. This meant that you had to taxi slowly and with a good deal of care. This in turn meant that unburned oil collected around the sleeve valves of the engine, and when you opened up for take off, great blobs of oil came back from the exhausts. At best obscuring the windscreen, at worst causing the engine to cut.”_

See p.151, 166, 184
Ron Pottinger. *Soldier In the Cockpit: From Rifles to Typhoons in WWII.* 
Stackpole Books, 2007.





parsifal said:


> Care to share with the rest of us you national background or technological preefernces and expertise, along with your references for the above statement




A&AEE flight test results for Typhoons R7700 and R8762 are online for everyone to see. You know where to find it.


________________

_“ The Vulture was so bad that it was scrapped in a decision taken at a meeting at Langley attended by, among others, Sydney Camm and senior officials of Rolls Royce . . . The decision was made also to concentrate on the Typhoon with the Sabre; but had it been known how little development had been done on this engine, and the problems which were to come, I wonder whether it would have been proceeded with?
The Typhoon was basically a magnificent aeroplane, very strong structurally. But the main problem was the engine. There was sleeve wear. Sleeves broke, pistons broke, and oil poured out of the engine, blinding the pilot. Another engine trouble was cooling. The oil in the engine had a circulation of 3,000 gallons an hour, and the temperature guage used to go off the clock.”_

Philip Lucas
Chief Test Pilot
Hawker Aircraft Ltd.
(1939-1946)
________________


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## GrauGeist (May 24, 2015)

Looking at this nice and long dissertation that EKB posted regarding the ills of the Typhoon shows us that perhaps ALL of the aircraft of WWII should have been cancelled.

If we discount an aircraft based on things like leaking oil, that would eliminate several radial types. Aircraft force landing because of engine failure...well, that would eliminate several other types. I could probably fill several pages in this thread with MACR listing P-47 and P-51 engine failures.

How about the P-39's sudden and deadly flat-spin?
How about the Corsair's reputation for being fatal to new pilots?
The P-40's passion for overheating while on the ramp?
The P-47's tendancy to fight the pilot with it's engine torque?

So we cancel the Typhoon and what shall we challenge the Fw190 with in a low-level fight? Surely not the Hurricane...

And during the push inland after the Normandy landings, what heavy ground attack aircraft do we use? Was the Spitfire capable of carrying 2,000 pounds of bombs?

And without the Typhoon, there would be no Tempest...

All the contributions to the war effort made by the Typhoon would leave a vacuum if it were removed from the timeline. It may have had problems, but it's contributions far outweighed it's negatives.


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## stona (May 24, 2015)

As above.
Given the problems that the Fw 190 encountered in early operations and development, should that have been cancelled too? Same for any number of WW2 types.
Cheers
Steve


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## gjs238 (May 24, 2015)

Could a Rolls-Royce Griffon powered aircraft have performed these tasks with less fuss?


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## GrauGeist (May 24, 2015)

gjs238 said:


> Could a Rolls-Royce Griffon powered aircraft have performed these tasks with less fuss?


You mean besides the Spitfire?


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## parsifal (May 24, 2015)

Havent studied the Typhoon losses in enough detail to be that sure, but by comparison, all German types also suffered reliability issues.....if you apply the same logic as is being applied to the tiffy here.

As an example, the Germans crossed in Russia in the last week of 1941 with just under 2700 a/c, not including those of her allies. She had suffered several hundred losses by the end of July, mostly to ground fire and accidents. That still does not explain the attrition rates being suffered by the LW. By the end of July, effectives were down to under 1000 a/c. Does that mean they had lost 1500 a/c in 40 days. No, it does not. It means all aircraft, regardless of type, suffer a certain rate of failures and breakdowns, and the more intense the usage, the higher the unserviceability rates. A high rate of usage means a low serviceability rate. There are no exceptions. Some types are more difficult to keep airborne than others, and some suffer a higher rate of loss than others. I dont think anyone could argue that the Tiffy did not suffer from breakdowns when it was being used. But ive not heard any evidence to suggest it suffered a higher loss rate, or any evidence that it could not do the job it was given to do. That includes chasing hit and run raids by FW 190s. 

This line of argument you are attempting really starts to take on a farcical aspect if i wanted to be cynical and compare the uncomparable. In NW Europe, during periods of normal usage, Typhoons, undertaking the most difficult of tasks.....ground support, had an average life expectancy of just under 6 month. By comparison, a P-51, in 1944, had a life span of around 8 months. German fighters over the Reich could expect to last how long? a month? two? In the East, the LW attrition rate skyrocketed in winter from around 15% per month to nearly 40% per month. Does that mean that German aircraft are half as good as allied? Of course it doesnt. I only mention it to try and pusuade you that your logic is flawed. You are approaching this in a totally cockeyed, or more likely one eyed approach.


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## gjs238 (May 24, 2015)

GrauGeist said:


> You mean besides the Spitfire?



Yes


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## Shortround6 (May 24, 2015)

I do like the like the bit about the Typhoon weighing 7 tons. " the huge engine of over 2200 hp could not compensate for the seven tons it had to move about the sky—against a mere 3.5 tons for the Spitfire."

Flight test for the Typhoon R7700 says it weighed 11,070lbs. 


and test for R8762 doesn't seem to give a weight. 

however other test reports give;

Typhoon 1A. R.8198.......10,402lbs
Typhoon 1A. R8199........10,100lbs
Typhoon 1A. R.7577.......10,350lbs
Typhoon 1B. R.7646.......10,300lbs
Typhoon 1B R.8222........10,630lbs
Typhoon 1B J.R.333........11,295lbs

The Data sheet (27/6/44) gives 11,400lbs as the max weight ( I believe that is without bombs.) either somebody is using rather different "tons" or something is way off. 

I am not a real fan of the Typhoon. It didn't do what it was supposed to do, whatever it's contributions wound up being, and the true cost of the Sabre engine program has never been reveled. That is actually two different things. The Typhoon being the airframe is responsible for the thick wing which hurt performance and a fair amount of the structural failures (harmonics with the engine/prop being shared). The engine maker is certainly responsible for the engine woes, including the less than predicted performance at altitude? Poor supercharger plus thick wing really put the wammy on predicted performance. 
Unfortunately some programs took on a life of their own as too much got invested in them too soon. Much like the Whirlwind, parts/materials are ordered months in advance of actual use and parts for hundreds of aircraft are already in the supply pipeline makings canceling a program difficult.

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## GrauGeist (May 24, 2015)

I too, am not a huge fan of the Typhoon...however, in seeing the historical timeline and the contributions made by each aircraft during the war, I find it difficult to see any other RAF aircraft that could fill in the void if the Tiffy were removed from the line of events.

Yes, it had a thick wing, because it was to have been armed with 12 .303 MGs...in the end, it wound up with 4 20mm cannon...

From Normandy onward, there were only two Allied aircraft that the Wehrmacht truly loathed: the P-47 and the Typhoon. A Mustang or a Spitfire would make the German's put their heads down or dive for cover, but the effective and relentless attacks made by groups such as the 2 TAF during key battles even won admiration from Eisenhower.

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## Glider (May 24, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> But how would a Spitfire III in low gear with overboost compare?


To be honest I don't know, but I thought the Mk III maxed at 385 which would be less than the Typhoon but am more than happy to be updated on this as its an area I am not sure of. However no SPit matched the Typhoon as a GA aircraft and cannot see that changing.


> And, granted, not available until 1942, but the Allison engined Mustang was faster at low altitudes as well. (P-39 was available sooner though and may have outpaced the Typhoon at low alt with overboost -or once WEP was officially cleared)


There doesn't seem to be a lot between the P51A and the Typhoon, but the P39 didn't come close to the Typhoon. I know of one test which gave the P51a a remarkable speed but that was factory fresh with specially sanded finish. With normal wear it seems to have a speed of approx. 370 at about 4 to 5000 ft. The Typhoon seems to have similar performance.


> Ground attack/FB ability is a separate issue, but possibly one the Mustang could have fared very well in as well. (it managed well enough employed for GA as the A-36


First and foremost I do believe that the GA role is the issue for the Typhoon. It had limitations as a fighter but it was the RAF's main GA aircraft. Understandably A lot is made of the A36 as an attack aircraft but I always have one question in the back of my mind and that is, if it was as good as its cracked up to be, why didn't they carry on building them? presumably there was a reason.


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## tomo pauk (May 24, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> ..
> Non-turbocharged P-38s may have been better for sheer speed as well as fighter/bomber duties, but I don't think we need to go over production delays and shortages with that type again. (it was covered rather well in the discussing regarding producing more P-38s in place of P-40s and P-39s -even if the value was seen for an aircraft nearly 2x as expensive, the production capacity simply wasn't there early enough -unless the XP-38 doesn't crash and they gain a year in development along with a properly optimized unturbocharged version with counter-rotation, ejector exhaust and ram intake optimization on par with the P-40/P-51)



Get Vultee to produce that (non turbo P-38), instead of the Vengenace - per gjs' question re. Vengeance's future?



> I'm not sure the Defiant is that worth being written off, but development limited to turretless operation would be the focus for sure. The larger, thicker wing of the Defiant may have been more suitable for cannons than the hurricane while still having overall drag characteristics better than the Hurricane and possibly better than the spitfire considering the weight and wing area. Maybe a better candidate for fighter-bomber conversion than the Hurricane (especially with the Griffon), but the hurricane still had advantages in manufacturing infrastructure that kept it in production so long historically.



If we really want a cannon-armed fighter powered by 1-stage Merlin, stick two cannons on the Spitfire as historically  Four cannons on a single-stage Merlin means quite a big drag weight. Hurricane also have had thick wings (and of greater area than Daffy), maybe even thicker than Defiant. Thin wings were the key to Spitfire's performance, Spitfire was smaller, the Daffy was with wider fuselage because of the turret, so it would be hard pressed to emulate Spitfire's performance on same engine.
The Defiant have had fuel tanks in the wing, those should be relocated in the fuselage (assuming the Daffy is now 1-seater), the weapon bays with extras will be needed to have the guns/cannons installed. 



> In any case, single-seat defiant derivatives may have had enough merits to not simply throw them away in favor of Spitfire production.



Single seat Defiant is a recurring theme, I've even sqetched a long-range fighter based on it. However, once we recall how even the Spitfire was in performance disadvantage in a good part of 1941 and 1942 vs. LW, having yet another aircraft that has 10-20 mph disadvantage does not much good for the RAF and the Allies.


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## Shortround6 (May 24, 2015)

GrauGeist said:


> Yes, it had a thick wing, because it was to have been armed with 12 .303 MGs...in the end, it wound up with 4 20mm cannon...



It also housed 77imp gallons of fuel in each wing root. About as much as the Mustang. Except the max thickness was a 30% of cord and not further back like the Mustang

3 view.







Guns are well outboard and by the ejection ports staggered. Wing only had to be thick enough to pass one belt over the gun as the next belt was behind the first belt. 

Also note that the landing gear is _behind_ the front spar and the wheel well sucks up a fair amount of the volume where the wings are thickest instead of being in the leading edge kinks and fuselage like a P-51. With the re-designed Tempest wing some of the volume for fuel went away despite the wing being 28% bigger than the Mustang wing. 

Not trying to say which was better, just that the thick wing because of 12 small machineguns doesn't seem to hold up. Building Typhoons in late 1944 and into 1945 seems a bit strange with the First Tempest flying 2 September 1942 and first production Tempest flying in June of 1943. Good enough attack plane by that time or they still don't want to take the hit to production to fully convert all production lines? Both?

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## fastmongrel (May 24, 2015)

Sir Sydney Camm designed a long line of beautiful and high performing (often above specification) Pilots aircraft from the Hawker Cygnet in 1924 to the Hawker Siddeley P1127 Kestrel (which became the Harrier) in 1963. I think he can be allowed one design that didnt live up to expectations.


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## Shortround6 (May 24, 2015)

To be fair to Sir Sydney Camm most of the other British designers believed the boffins at the research establishment that said thick wings were no problem. Beaufighter was _supposed_ to do 370mph. The Firebrand was off by 32mph. Defiant? some of the bombers? Something a bit off with the Fairey Firefly? About 20mph faster than a Curtiss SB2C-4 despite a wing 77% as big, a V-12 engine vs the radial and a skinner fuselage with no bomb bay? 

One designer making a "mistake" is one thing. Many designers being off by a large margin pretty much all at the same time (with a few years) on a variety of aircraft means something wrong with the basic drag _assumptions_ they were working with. 

Perhaps they were hearing what they wanted to hear as the thick wing/s were lighter than a thin wing AND offered high lift at low speed giving good short field performance (much prized by the Air Ministry) without resorting to the "trick' flaps.


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## Edgar Brooks (May 24, 2015)

EKB said:


> Could you pinpoint for us the exact date in which these bugs were solved?
> There were many problems with the Typhoon and Tempest, but the most serious defect was the Napier Sabre engine.


I can only pass on what I was told, about 30 years ago, by a former Napier engineer; he said that the main problem was that the groundcrews couldn't resist tinkering with the engine, to "improve" the performance, as they'd always done. 
"Once we'd persuaded them to leave the engines at the factory settings, the problems were solved."


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## tyrodtom (May 24, 2015)

Edgar Brooks said:


> I can only pass on what I was told, about 30 years ago, by a former Napier engineer; he said that the main problem was that the groundcrews couldn't resist tinkering with the engine, to "improve" the performance, as they'd always done.
> "Once we'd persuaded them to leave the engines at the factory settings, the problems were solved."



That's pretty much the standard response you'll get from any factory engineer, aviation, or automotive.


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## Shortround6 (May 24, 2015)

There was a 'story' that it got to the point that 'unauthorized' settings being used on a Sabre engine could lead to disciplinary action. Of course the factory men were going to claim it was all the squadrons mechanics fault and the squadron mechanics were going to say they would not have messed with the engines if they ran right in the first place 

However there is more than a grain of truth in the fact that mid to late war engines running on late 100/130 fuel (high lead) and high boost limits are going to be a lot less tolerate of mis-adjustment than earlier engines. AS engines were operated closer to their limits control settings needed to formed by careful experimentation in almost laboratory settings, not gut feelings or hanger talk about "what 'arry over in #23 squadron did."
And 'adjustments' made on the ground could turn into time bombs when the engine shifted into high supercharger gear in flight.


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## wuzak (May 24, 2015)

GrauGeist said:


> So we cancel the Typhoon and what shall we challenge the Fw190 with in a low-level fight? Surely not the Hurricane...



The Spitfire XII.

Cancel the Firefly, build more Spitfire XIIs for low level work and Seafire XVs for naval duties.

Of course the Spitfire couldn't do the ground attack job that the Typhoon could.

But if the Typhoon was cancelled early, would that necessarily mean the end of the Tempest? Certainly cancelling the Sabre would do that, but would Hawkers and Camm get on with the improved Typhoon if the Sabre was still going to be available?

And if the Sabre is cancelled, what will Napier build?


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## DerGiLLster (May 24, 2015)

For the Germans strictly, I would cancel the disaster rocket planes such as the Me 163, and halt production of the piston planes and channel a lot of resources and research into the jet engine in order to mass produce jet fighters out on the front. Had production of the Bf 109 and the Fw 190 halt with all the focus going toward the Me 262, the air battle would be radicalized and there would most likely have been combat with the Gloster Meteor and the P-80 Shooting Star.


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## GrauGeist (May 25, 2015)

Cancelling the Bf109 and the Fw190 isn't nessecarily going to expedite the Me262's development or the development of the Jet engines. Plus, you can't just throw all your eggs in one basket and pray the Me262 is going to solve the losing airwar against the Allies.

The Fw190 and Bf109 remained formidable adversaries right up to the last days of the war...it was experienced pilots that Germany was in dire need of.


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## Edgar Brooks (May 25, 2015)

tyrodtom said:


> That's pretty much the standard response you'll get from any factory engineer, aviation, or automotive.


Doesn't mean it has to be untrue, unless you want it to be; 20 years after the events, what would be his purpose?


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## gjs238 (May 25, 2015)

wuzak said:


> And if the Sabre is cancelled, what will Napier build?



Merlins for heavens sake - Merlins.


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## tomo pauk (May 25, 2015)

Having the Sabre/Typhoon/Tempest in the game makes the RR/Vickers-Supermarine try harder, hence better Spitfires.



Shortround6 said:


> It also housed 77imp gallons of fuel in each wing root. About as much as the Mustang. Except the max thickness was a 30% of cord and not further back like the Mustang



The fuel was in four wing tanks, two were indeed in the leading edges, two were behind the well of the U/C strut (cutaway)



> Guns are well outboard and by the ejection ports staggered. Wing only had to be thick enough to pass one belt over the gun as the next belt was behind the first belt.



+1 on this.


> Also note that the landing gear is _behind_ the front spar and the wheel well sucks up a fair amount of the volume where the wings are thickest instead of being in the leading edge kinks and fuselage like a P-51. With the re-designed Tempest wing some of the volume for fuel went away despite the wing being 28% bigger than the Mustang wing.



Typhoon did not carried any fuel under the pilot (like the Fw 190, Hellcat, P-40, P-51, Bf 109, IIRC Zero, P-47 etc) and/or in the remainder of the fuselage (like the Spitfire, Hurricane, P-51 in 1944+, Bf 109, Tempest, Ki-61, P-47). Soviet fighters, Ki-61 and Ta 152 also have had fuel tanks between the two main spars, with main U/C housed in front of the front spar.

For the Tempest, a fuselage tank of 76 imp gals was added, but the starboard leading edge tanks was dispensed with, so initially the fuel quantity was a bit greater than of Typhoon. From Summer of 1944, that LE position was used for a fuel tank of ~30 imp gals, that brought total internal fuel to ~190 gals (sheets show either 188 or 192) and range to 1770 miles with 2 x 90 drop tanks and with 41 gal of reserve fuel accounted for. Unfortunately, that kind of Tempest was not around in early 1944.

edit: for the earliest Tempest II aircraft, there is a note that says there were some aircraft without even the single leading edge tank (because the Tempest I have had radiators in the LE?)

edit2: sheet for the LR Tempest V


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## tomo pauk (May 25, 2015)

DerGiLLster said:


> For the Germans strictly, I would cancel the disaster rocket planes such as the Me 163, and halt production of the piston planes and channel a lot of resources and research into the jet engine in order to mass produce jet fighters out on the front. Had production of the Bf 109 and the Fw 190 halt with all the focus going toward the Me 262, the air battle would be radicalized and there would most likely have been combat with the Gloster Meteor and the P-80 Shooting Star.



I'd disagree with this. Bf 109 and Fw 190 were not ideal fighters, but were among the best fighters of the world (sometimes the best), with a big number of aerial victories, and were instrumental many LW and Wermacht victories. Cancelling out these does not help out with having the workable Me 262 in numbers in, say, 1943. Cancel the V2 instead, that was the money hole.

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## stona (May 25, 2015)

It's simpler than that. Without the Fw 190 and Bf 109 the Luftwaffe would lose the air war months earlier making the Me 262 and other upcoming designs irrelevant.

I happen to agree that a concentration on developing the one game changing aircraft the Germans had in the Me 262 makes sense, but this was done historically. The Me 262 was afforded the highest priority codes in the German armaments industry, but it was still too little and too late.

Cheers

Steve

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## tyrodtom (May 25, 2015)

Edgar Brooks said:


> Doesn't mean it has to be untrue, unless you want it to be; 20 years after the events, what would be his purpose?


 It may be true.
But that it's the reply commonly given by any company representative when their products don't do well in the field, that sort of takes the bite out of it.


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## gjs238 (May 25, 2015)

The thing is, if we can engage the retrospectroscope and move forward development of the Me 262, then why can't we do the same for the P-51 and get fully escorted bombing underway earlier?
 Just sayin'...


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## GrauGeist (May 25, 2015)

gjs238 said:


> The thing is, if we can engage the retrospectroscope and move forward development of the Me 262, that why can't we do the same for the P-51 and get fully escorted bombing underway earlier?
> Just sayin'...


That's the point that's often overlooked...when a new weapon is introduced to the battlefield, there is always a response from the other side.

*IF* the Me262 developed sooner, and performed as hoped (and/or the He280, for that matter), it would have forced the accelerated development of the P-59, P-80, XP-83 and the FH Phantom from the U.S. alone. Britain had their own jet programs and would have also reacted the same, by accelerating their Meteor and Vampire programs.


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## Shortround6 (May 25, 2015)

My dad worked at Colt during the Veitnam War, he was an engineer that figured out _how to make the gun._ They told him they wanted 8 or 9 or 10 parts in a sub-assembly and he figured out how to start with blocks of metal or castings or whatever and turn them into the finished part/s. He had nothing to do with how the _gun_ was designed or what modifications were needed to get it function reliably. All he knew about that is what some other engineer, in a totally separate dept if not building _might_ tell him at lunch or on a visit to the dept where my dad worked. Machine operators would know even less. There aren't that meany parts in an M-16 compared to an aircraft engine. Just because somebody worked at the company at the time, even if they were an engineer, doesn't mean they were working on the problems the engine had. 
Mr. Brook's friend/acquaintance might very well have been working in the dept/group tasked with solving the reliability problems. Or he could have been in charge of the coolant pump/s and drive/s and piping and had no idea what the control box ( boost limiting/rpm/altitude,throttle setting, etc) for a single lever (or even two lever) power control did or didn't do. Or he might have been in charge of connecting rod production. If sleeve valves were failing he would know about but not what was done to solve it (unless at the lunch table)Not all engineers are 100% interchangeable.

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## Greyman (May 25, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> But how would a Spitfire III in low gear with overboost compare?



Added in the Spitfire XII information from WWII Aircraft Performance and Spitfire III information from (I think) an RAE chart.






With its Merlin running +16 boost the Spitfire III would probably be similar to the Fw190A3 speeds there - as would the low-altitude 1943 Spitfire V (post upgrades and running +18 boost).


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## pbehn (May 25, 2015)

I would ditch the Battle in favour of any merlin engined single seat fighter that Fairey could produce either their own or Hurricane/Spitfire. I would not ditch the Typhoon jus make the spec for a griffon engine long range 4 cannon design. The defiant also could be ditched but if not ditched it should never have been used in combat within range of LW single engined fighters, it should have been kept in Northern England and Scotland freeing up Huricane spitfire squadrons for the real battle in the south.


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## parsifal (May 25, 2015)

GrauGeist said:


> That's the point that's often overlooked...when a new weapon is introduced to the battlefield, there is always a response from the other side.
> 
> *IF* the Me262 developed sooner, and performed as hoped (and/or the He280, for that matter), it would have forced the accelerated development of the P-59, P-80, XP-83 and the FH Phantom from the U.S. alone. Britain had their own jet programs and would have also reacted the same, by accelerating their Meteor and Vampire programs.



I agree. If we are going to engage in this type of daydreaming and not degenerate into pointless fantasy scenarios, it should be on the basis of already available technologies and more importantly, historical types already in service. Choices already available and on the shelf, even if in prototype (but must be plausibly ready except final production approval). 

Otherwise it degenerates very quickly

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## kool kitty89 (May 25, 2015)

Edgar Brooks said:


> Wasn't faster than the Spitfire IX at combat altitude, though, was it?


The point was comparison to the 190 and Typhoon, not Spitfire IX. And while the performance at military power for the Mustang I and IA may have been less, with WEP (or overboost prior to formal WEP rating) it's a different story below 10,000 ft. (especially below 6,000 ft) The Mustang II/P-51A was in the same boat comparing military to WEP, though with higher FTH, not as much power down low and critical altitude for level speed just above 10,000 ft.



> Might have is guesswork, not history.


Bigger issue is the RAF simply disliked the P-39, they employed overboost plenty on P-40s, so it would have become relevant had they adopted the P-39 more heavily.



> It didn't; the Merlin XX was as big an engine as it could take. The Hurricane was also a deathtrap for pilots, if the wing tanks were holed, since the cockpit's open framework drew the flames straight in, and onto them.


Weren't solutions for that already employed on later Hurricane models? (including firewalls)

And my comments regarding the Hurricane were also largely regarding its continued historical production for practical/volume reasons and possibly compromises to improve the design without totally shutting down production. Hawker also had Gloser, and if not just building more spitfires, Gloster's F.5/34 design had better drag characteristics than the Hurricane and high speed handling characteristics than the Spitfire plus better cockpit visibility. Hawker putting more resources into developing a Merlin powered derivative of that design may have supplanted Hurricane production. (A Taurus version would be bad in hindsight given that engine's problems and the weight of the Hercules might make it tougher to adapt than the Merlin, but perhaps worthwhile as well)

That of course, aside from twin-engine development, which is the only other practical option for heavier fighters with the Griffon not available sooner and the Saber unreliable.







GrauGeist said:


> How about the P-39's sudden and deadly flat-spin?
> How about the Corsair's reputation for being fatal to new pilots?


Both of those were seriously problems that should have been caught earlier in testing and addressed sooner in the P-39's case, and seriously limited the Corsair's carrier suitability in general. Though, in both cases, I do wonder if wing slats (or even fixed slots) would have been worthwhile solutions. The P-39 may have had other solutions including nose ballast, but I believe tip-stall was still a bit harsh regardless of actually entering a spin. (and one of the issues complicating landing on both aircraft)

In the F4U's case, with the carrier landing requirement, wing slots ahead of the ailerons might have been enough to address the dangerous tip-stall and wing dropping tendencies. (take-off and turn performance may have improved as well, though at the expense of some added drag -at least in the case of fixed slots)

Other than that, the problems with the F4U as a useful carrier aircraft also should make it one of the more attractive potential export designs. (a land based Corsair in place of the Typhoon would have been extremely useful both as a counter to the 190 threat and especially adapted into the fighter-bomber role)



> So we cancel the Typhoon and what shall we challenge the Fw190 with in a low-level fight? Surely not the Hurricane...


Again, Merlin XX powered spitfires. Less/no need for the cropped LF Mk.V as well. (putting those cropped merlins on Hurricane ground-attack aircraft may have been more useful)



> And without the Typhoon, there would be no Tempest...


Unless development continued and only production was canceled. Including potential Griffon powered derivatives (possibly sooner) if the Sabre was canceled and Griffon expedited.






stona said:


> As above.
> Given the problems that the Fw 190 encountered in early operations and development, should that have been cancelled too? Same for any number of WW2 types.


No, but using alternate engines certainly wouldn't have hurt, especially during the prototype stage. A DB-601N or E powered 190 prototype may have developed to totally supplant demand for that engine with the 109 once production could switch over in large enough volumes.

The landing/ground accident rate on the 109 was higher than the 190 as well as being more difficult to fly and having poorer cockpit visibility, and short of altering the 109, the 190 makes an attractive replacement for those reasons.





Glider said:


> There doesn't seem to be a lot between the P51A and the Typhoon, but the P39 didn't come close to the Typhoon. I know of one test which gave the P51a a remarkable speed but that was factory fresh with specially sanded finish. With normal wear it seems to have a speed of approx. 370 at about 4 to 5000 ft. The Typhoon seems to have similar performance.


The Mustang I should be faster than the P-51 at low alt, but I haven't seen any formal reports actually USING WEP in tests as that rating came later. (akin to WEP on the P-40) The P-51A's figures do include WEP though, with critical altitude for 1,480 HP at 10,400 ft at which height it managed 415 MPH, and 380 mph at 1000 ft. (the earlier 8.8 supercharged Allison of the P-51, A-36, and Mustang I should have given significantly higher speed at that level under the same conditions up to around 5,000-6,000 ft -I'm not positive exactly where the power curves converge)

The A-36/P-51/Mustang I should also have been better at V-1 chasing than the P-51A or P-51B all using WEP/overboost.



> First and foremost I do believe that the GA role is the issue for the Typhoon. It had limitations as a fighter but it was the RAF's main GA aircraft. Understandably A lot is made of the A36 as an attack aircraft but I always have one question in the back of my mind and that is, if it was as good as its cracked up to be, why didn't they carry on building them? presumably there was a reason.


Not as good for GA as the P-47 and merlin P-51s were more valuable as escorts.


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## kool kitty89 (May 25, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> Get Vultee to produce that (non turbo P-38), instead of the Vengenace - per gjs' question re. Vengeance's future?


Still have the problem with Lockheed's own development and mass production tooling lagging for any model making that scenario more difficult.



> If we really want a cannon-armed fighter powered by 1-stage Merlin, stick two cannons on the Spitfire as historically  Four cannons on a single-stage Merlin means quite a big drag weight. Hurricane also have had thick wings (and of greater area than Daffy), maybe even thicker than Defiant. Thin wings were the key to Spitfire's performance, Spitfire was smaller, the Daffy was with wider fuselage because of the turret, so it would be hard pressed to emulate Spitfire's performance on same engine.


The idea is more to be a better Hurricane rather than a better Spitfire, and I haven't been able to find information on the actual airfoil section used on the Defiant. It's BIGGER than the Spitfire's for sure, but I'm not sure of the thickness.

The P-40's wing was also thicker than the spitfires, but had pretty good drag characteristics. (the P-40 itself may have been a better fighter/fighter-bomber option than the Hurricane as well, but that would likely mean setting up licensed P-36 production pre-war and adapting it to the Merlin and/or Hercules independently of the Americans)
I'm more or less just looking for the Defiant to be a British P-40 equivalent on the whole, cleaner than the hurricane, larger and sturdier than the spitfire, and longer ranged than either. Or ... perhaps if the British had retrofitted a Merlin to their import Hawks earlier on as they later did with their Merlin Mustang prototype there would have been a demand for shipping Curtis airframes overseas and fitting them with British engines. (still not very practical and didn't happen with the Mustang either -as much as the Merlin XX might have helped it)

A griffon powered Tornado/Typhoon may have managed all of that better, though.



> Single seat Defiant is a recurring theme, I've even sqetched a long-range fighter based on it. However, once we recall how even the Spitfire was in performance disadvantage in a good part of 1941 and 1942 vs. LW, having yet another aircraft that has 10-20 mph disadvantage does not much good for the RAF and the Allies.


Until the engineering disparity the Mustang brings, long range aircraft are pretty much limited to being poorer performers than any single-engine counterparts and twin engine development was lacking. (and also had disadvantages)

The P-47 and Corsair might have been the earliest large, single engine exceptions, though. Getting drop tanks into service early enough would be a big factor though. (especially if Republic had invested in designing their own high capacity, pressurized belly tank early on) Lockheed seems to have been one of the few manufactuers to really put emphasis on an array of high capacity, streamlined drop tanks.





Shortround6 said:


> One designer making a "mistake" is one thing. Many designers being off by a large margin pretty much all at the same time (with a few years) on a variety of aircraft means something wrong with the basic drag _assumptions_ they were working with.
> 
> Perhaps they were hearing what they wanted to hear as the thick wing/s were lighter than a thin wing AND offered high lift at low speed giving good short field performance (much prized by the Air Ministry) without resorting to the "trick' flaps.


There was also a ton of room for compromise. The 15% thickness ratio on the Whirlwind or the likes of the P-40 or P-39 or P-39 or P-47's, or BF-109, or Fw 190 wings all fit in between the very thick wings Hawker was using for its fighters. The F4U used a thick root section, but tapered down to a thinner airfoil profile fairly quickly outboard of that and Gloster's F.5/34 wing used a fairly thick root (NACA 2218 I believe) but tapered down far more than either the Hurricane or Typhoon.

And good short field performance would have been aided much sooner by use of variable pitch propellers ...





wuzak said:


> But if the Typhoon was cancelled early, would that necessarily mean the end of the Tempest? Certainly cancelling the Sabre would do that, but would Hawkers and Camm get on with the improved Typhoon if the Sabre was still going to be available?


With the Saber and Vulture canceled, the Typhoon potentially moves onto the Griffon which gets much more development priority than it did historically (ie Perigrine and Vulture canceled, Merlin and Griffon emphasized).

Beyond that, Gloster's Twin engine developments become a lot more attractive if you've only got the Hercules and Merlin in priority development. (say if everything else is canceled to streamline production)

And with the Griffon in service earlier, you have single stage Griffon spitfires to counter the 190 threat too.



gjs238 said:


> Merlins for heavens sake - Merlins.


And Griffons. 




gjs238 said:


> The thing is, if we can engage the retrospectroscope and move forward development of the Me 262, then why can't we do the same for the P-51 and get fully escorted bombing underway earlier?
> Just sayin'...


Except, unlike the Me 262, accelerated P-51 development and official USAAF support could have meant all the P-40's Merlins going to Mustangs instead, and no Allison P-51 at all, or a turbocharged Allison P-51.


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## Shortround6 (May 25, 2015)

The problem with most of these "improved" Defiant schemes seems to be the rather large number of modifications needed. AS in take off the engine and cowl from the firewall forward, detach the tail somewhere aft of the turret and unbolt the landing gear legs. Replace everything else and still call it a Defiant. 

Defiant used the wing space just outboard of the landing for fuel. Right were you would put wing guns. Simply yanking the turret and sticking a big fuel tank back there doesn't work because it is well aft of the center of gravity. The fuel tank in the fuselage needs to go either were the pilots cockpit is or just under it. Move the pilot back several feet? New internal wing structure for gun bays? people what to use thinner airfoil for more speed, Ths means not only new ribs but possibly new spar caps or heavier wing skins or something to get the strength back up after the making the wing thinner. 

A Defiant II was over 20mph slower than MK IIA Hurricane with both using the same engine. Getting rid of the turret is NOT going to turn it into a Spitfire. 

The Fairey Battles most important contribution to the RAF and Commonwealth air forces was as a trainer. It doesn't matter how many more "single engine fighters" using Merlins you build if your bomber crews train by running about the airfield with arms outstretched yelling "_vroom, vroom_". Besides, just how many more fighters do you want powered by Merlin IIIs with two pitch props? Canceling Battles in 1938-39 does NOT get you Spitfire Vs or Hurricane IIs.

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## GrauGeist (May 26, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> Except, unlike the Me 262, accelerated P-51 development and official USAAF support could have meant all the P-40's Merlins going to Mustangs instead, and no Allison P-51 at all, or a turbocharged Allison P-51.


Well, that's news to me...I always understood the P-40 to use the Allison V-1710


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## EKB (May 26, 2015)

GrauGeist said:


> Well, that's news to me...I always understood the P-40 to use the Allison V-1710



_
“ P-40D AC40-360 was modified with a Rolls Royce built Merlin 28 and began flight testing on June 30, 1941. Production models of the Packard V-1650-1 were not available until January 1942. Interestingly, other than simply being a suitable airframe for the available Merlin’s, one of the primary reasons given for the Production Board to insist on this installation was to free Allison V-1710’s for use in the critically needed P-38’s and Bell P-63’s. 
The Army Air Force felt that the Allison powered P-40N was superior to the Packard Merlin powered P-40, but because of the time necessary to convert Packard to all two-stage Merlin production, some 3,500 single-stage V-1650-1 engines would be available. In order to utilize these U.S. allocated Merlins, the Curtiss aircraft company was directed to produce the Merlin powered P-40F and P-40L aircraft.”_

See p.318
Daniel Whitney. *Vee’s For Victory: The Story of the Allison V-1710 Aircraft Engine 1929-1948* 
Schiffer Publishing, 1998


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## GrauGeist (May 26, 2015)

Ahh yes, the Packard V-1650 "Merlin" (not RR Merlin) in the P-40F and some P-40L variants...

Otherwise all others had the Allison V-1710 series

By the way, we were discussing production, not a prototype...


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## rochie (May 26, 2015)

Seems to me after reading this thread, the Typhoons biggest problem was the RAF roundels it wore !

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## tomo pauk (May 26, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> Still have the problem with Lockheed's own development and mass production tooling lagging for any model making that scenario more difficult.
> ...



Then there is something about multiple types of aircraft built by Lockheed (eg. Hudson, Ventura, Lightning all in the same time in Burbank, plus B-17s in the Vega factory), while the Vultee was not in great commitment for any 1st line aircraft. Get Vultee produce only non-turbo P-38 and that's it. The non-turbo Lightning are flying already in 1941, so there is very little of development needed there.


> There was also a ton of room for compromise. The 15% thickness ratio on the Whirlwind or the likes of the P-40 or P-39 or P-39 or P-47's, or BF-109, or Fw 190 wings all fit in between the very thick wings Hawker was using for its fighters. The F4U used a thick root section, but tapered down to a thinner airfoil profile fairly quickly outboard of that and Gloster's F.5/34 wing used a fairly thick root (NACA 2218 I believe) but tapered down far more than either the Hurricane or Typhoon.



Hawker was using 19% thick (at root) wings for the Hurricane and Typhoon, that is more than 20% thicker than aircraft you mentioned; I'm not sure that wing profile series chosen for the two fighters was of the most modern type either. Another thing that held Hurricane down was the huge wing area for the power installed, while the Typhoon could've used a bit more area for a bit better altitude 'behavior' The wing of F4U did not tapper so fast, it was still 15% at the weapon bay?


> Beyond that, Gloster's Twin engine developments become a lot more attractive if you've only got the Hercules and Merlin in priority development. (say if everything else is canceled to streamline production)



Maybe. Re. the Air Ministry not wanting to buy two-engined aircraft when 1-engines was around: they signed the contract for Whirlwind, Beaufighter (erstwhile as a day fighter?) and Lightning.



> Except, unlike the Me 262, accelerated P-51 development and official USAAF support could have meant all the P-40's Merlins going to Mustangs instead, and no Allison P-51 at all, or a turbocharged Allison P-51.



That should've been one nifty aircraft for 1942/43, the Mustang with single stage Merlin.


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## stona (May 26, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> Maybe. Re. the Air Ministry not wanting to buy two-engined aircraft when 1-engines was around: they signed the contract for Whirlwind, Beaufighter (erstwhile as a day fighter?) and Lightning.



Whirlwind, relatively few (116) built amongst complaints that it used two engines to lift four cannon, the same as the 'Hawker fighter' which became the Typhoon would on one. That illustrates the original point.

Lightning, never saw service with the RAF. The order for 500 odd 'Lightning IIs' was cancelled.

Beaufighter is the exception, proving a versatile and useful aircraft, but hardly as a fighter and hardly comparable with a Spitfire, Typhoon or Tempest. It showed some of the advantages of a twin engine design in the roles in which it became competent.

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (May 26, 2015)

The original point was, for the development of the Gloster twin-engined fighter: "Two engines, where one would do, never sat well with the Ministry." In the time the Gloster twin was flying, and also the Whirlwind, there was no single engine in production that could both lift 4 cannons and provide enough performance to match what was offered by lighter armed fighters of the time.
The Typhoon was promised as a 450 mph (460 mph? wuzak - help) fighter, why produce a fighter that can do 360 mph? Typhoon might have had one powerplant, but that is two power sections coupled, with common set of accessories, so saying it is 'one engine' might raise an eyebrow. The Vulture, another engine for the Hawker fighter, was sometimes called 'double Peregrine' (it was not really).



> Lightning, never saw service with the RAF. The order for 500 odd 'Lightning IIs' was cancelled.



Lightning I and II was ordered by the AM. We can discuss pros and cons of the 'P-38 minus' and P-38, but it featured prominently in both British (both I and II) and French (only Mk.I) plans for purchase.



> Beaufighter is the exception, proving a versatile and useful aircraft, but hardly as a fighter and hardly comparable with a Spitfire, Typhoon or Tempest. It showed some of the advantages of a twin engine design in the roles in which it became competent.



It was planned to produce Beaufighters in the factory (factories?) currently producing Spitfires - looks like the AM was sufficiently impressed by 4 cannons on-board, plus LMGs, plus the promise of 370 mph that was 40-50 mph too optimistic? 
That is not to take away from Beaufighters capabilities for roles other than a day fighter, of course.


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## kool kitty89 (May 26, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> The problem with most of these "improved" Defiant schemes seems to be the rather large number of modifications needed. AS in take off the engine and cowl from the firewall forward, detach the tail somewhere aft of the turret and unbolt the landing gear legs. Replace everything else and still call it a Defiant.


Regarding the suggestion as an alternative to the Firefly: wouldn't mounting hispanos in underwing pods avoid the issues with relocating the fuel tanks? (potentially with a smaller number of .303 brownings still able to fit elsewhere)

Given the turreted Defiant's performance was significantly better than the Fulmar's, it seems like there was a great deal of room for maintaining that edge without a drastic airframe redesign.





tomo pauk said:


> Then there is something about multiple types of aircraft built by Lockheed (eg. Hudson, Ventura, Lightning all in the same time in Burbank, plus B-17s in the Vega factory), while the Vultee was not in great commitment for any 1st line aircraft. Get Vultee produce only non-turbo P-38 and that's it. The non-turbo Lightning are flying already in 1941, so there is very little of development needed there.


Or cancel the P-38 and task Bell with developing the non-turbocharged P-38 derivative (given they'd be competing for the same engines anyway and development timelines were fairly similar for both aircraft at that point). The P-40 was ready for mass production significantly earlier than other American fighters, and pretty well irreplaceable early war. (with greater emphasis on the P-51, it could/should have displaced the P-40 sooner than historically and be better suited for the V-1650 than the P-38 was -no counter rotation, possibly additional modification to cowling and mounts, etc -and the P-38 being already designed for turbocharging as well, so better suited for the V-1710 in either configuration)



> Hawker was using 19% thick (at root) wings for the Hurricane and Typhoon, that is more than 20% thicker than aircraft you mentioned; I'm not sure that wing profile series chosen for the two fighters was of the most modern type either. Another thing that held Hurricane down was the huge wing area for the power installed, while the Typhoon could've used a bit more area for a bit better altitude 'behavior'


Those wings are indeed very thick, that was my point. Supermarine used a very thin (for the time) 13% maximum thickness and reasonable compromises in thicker, stronger wings that were easier to build, and easier to fill with internal stores should have been very possible, practical and attractive. (and what the majority of other air forces had on their fighters wings)

I believe the Hurricane used a modified clark Y or clark YH airfoil. Not particularly efficient, but easier to build and part of the overall expediency in the Hurricane's design. It's also why I pointed to there being so much room for improvement on the Hurricane beyond the more modest redesigns seen with the Mk.II's wings. And with the wing root section more integral to the fuselage and landing gear, the overall airfoil section could still potentially be adjusted by adding leading and trailing edge extensions while more heavily altering the wing outboard of those points. 

And, again, other than just building spitfires, the gloster single and twin engine ptototypes would have been major projects in Hawker's ownership to consider developing further and replacing the Hurricane in production.



> The wing of F4U did not tapper so fast, it was still 15% at the weapon bay?


Thanks for that information, but that would still be significantly thinner than the Typhoon's case, wouldn't it?




stona said:


> Whirlwind, relatively few (116) built amongst complaints that it used two engines to lift four cannon, the same as the 'Hawker fighter' which became the Typhoon would on one. That illustrates the original point.


Engine power isn't what kept the Spitfire and Hurricane from mounting 2 or 4 cannons sooner, it was completely down to the reliability of the cannons themselves when mounted in those wings. Further development of both the wings, mounts, and cannons was necessary before that became really practical on the Spitfire V and Hurricane IIC.




tomo pauk said:


> The original point was, for the development of the Gloster twin-engined fighter: "Two engines, where one would do, never sat well with the Ministry." In the time the Gloster twin was flying, and also the Whirlwind, there was no single engine in production that could both lift 4 cannons and provide enough performance to match what was offered by lighter armed fighters of the time.
> The Typhoon was promised as a 450 mph (460 mph? wuzak - help) fighter, why produce a fighter that can do 360 mph? Typhoon might have had one powerplant, but that is two power sections coupled, with common set of accessories, so saying it is 'one engine' might raise an eyebrow. The Vulture, another engine for the Hawker fighter, was sometimes called 'double Peregrine' (it was not really).


The bigger issue there is the Whirlwind gaining preference over the Gloster design (which did make its first flights later) and decision not to keep the competing designs in parallel development. It's guesswork here, but the Gloster design seems like it would have been more straightforward to continue development with than the Whirlwind, particularly given the overall size and wing design (more likely able to actually supplant the Beaufighter in many of its duties -and more of the duties anticipated before the real performance limits of the Beaufighter were seen) but the upward firing cannon arrangement would need to be modified and internal fuel capacity would been to be increased for long range use. (not that the existing fuel would make it worse than the Typhoon or even Whirlwind)

It should have been easier to adapt to merlins than the whirlwind was, and I believe Gloster's 'Reaper' twin merlin powered heavy fighter project was derived from the F.9/37 design. 



> Lightning I and II was ordered by the AM. We can discuss pros and cons of the 'P-38 minus' and P-38, but it featured prominently in both British (both I and II) and French (only Mk.I) plans for purchase.


American shift in policies regarding turbocharger export combined with shortages of P-38s in general pretty much nixed the potential there anyway. Even had the Lightning I been deemed satisfactory, unless P-38 production could have been ramped up dramatically sooner, it wouldn't have been viable for export.

My other point was that if the Sabre was outright cancelled early war, the Gloster twin engine designs become more attractive from Hawker's and Air Minstry's points of view, with accelerated development of the Griffon being the only real caveat for a Tornado/Typhoon derivative. (and possibly unattractive there in terms of performance with the existing wing -a Griffon powered Tempest might have been more appealing, but short of accelerated development of both engine and airframe that wouldn't be in service until mid/late 1943)


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## stona (May 27, 2015)

The Lightning is a complete red herring. It never saw service in the RAF and the order was cancelled. The Air Ministry showed interest in a lot of different aircraft that were never manufactured or purchased...so what?

The Beaufighter got lucky, performing roles other than its original intended role rather well. It was not the only aircraft to do this.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (May 27, 2015)

I am not sure where the fascination with single seat aircraft that need Spitfires to fly top cover for them comes from while the Spitfire seems to get little attention. 
For all of 1942 and a good part of 1943 the turbo P-38 was the _Best_ US fighter available in any numbers at all. It certainly had flaws but ripping out the turbo is like throwing the baby out with bath water. The reason the P-38F Gs had 1325hp engines is because they used 7:48 supercharger gears and depended on the turbo for altitude performance. Even if the inter-coolers left something to be desired. The later P-38s used 8:10 supercharger gears on their 1425hp engines. 
Using 8:80 supercharger gears or 9:60 gears would have hurt take-off power and still not given the power wanted at even 15-20,000ft let alone higher.

BTW British canceled their order for Lighting IIs (with turbos) in Aug of 1942.


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## tomo pauk (May 28, 2015)

I don't think that anybody is claiming that 'P-38 minus' will be equal to the P-38 for all the missions, nor that Lockheed should produce the 'minus'. Having a second source of production allows for a number of capable fighter-bombers to be produced, that would offer far better RoC, payload and combat radius than P-40 or P-39. It should be also a bit faster than those two. The take off power can be 1325 HP even with 1-stage V-1710 (8.80:1 S/C gearing) from mid 1942 on, as with P-40K. 
Having a second source hopefully also means that Lockheed can have an easier time to introduce the modifications earlier.


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## Shortround6 (May 28, 2015)

The problem is that it won't equal the P-38 for most missions. It will strictly a low altitude machine. It also requires a lot of foresight, an awful lot of foresight. It could take Allison 2-3 years to get a _version_ of the V-1710 from initial concept to production with a number of changes along the way. Engine used in the P-40K was first 'proposed' in 1938 but since the 100/130 fuel needed for the 1325hp take-off rating didn't exist (and wouldn't until some time in 1941) I don't know what the anticipated power ratings were. The F4 engine (-73) used generally beefed up components, gained 35lbs and used the pressurized water coolant system (30% Glycol as antifreeze) which allowed for much better heat transfer from the existing cooling system. 
So _when_ can Allison promise the -73 engine?
Lockheed built 207 P-38s in 1941, 128 of them in Nov and Dec. To get any real number of 'P-38 minus' aircraft in 1942 you need to sign contracts well back in 1941 if not late 1940. It could take around year from first _production_ to the 500th with next 500 only taking a few months. This is one reason production lines were not shut down/changed over on whims. Vultee has been mentioned but even they had production problems. The Vengence dive bomber was mostly produced in the Stinson Factory in Nashville Tenn. and by Northrop as the Vultee main factory was busy building BT-13 trainers. 
Now in the fall of 1940 or very early 1941 do you _know_ when the -73 engines are going to start showing up? Do you _know_ what the power ratings will be? Will they be running on 100 octane or 100/125 or 100/130? 
First P-38E is delivered late Oct or early Nov of 1941, there were 2000 changes between the D and E. production of the D was 23 in July, 26 in Aug, 12 in Sept and only 3 P-38s were built in Oct as the switch is made, something like 1000 P-38s are on order. Lockeed manages 54 Es in Nov and 74 in Dec and 116 in Jan of 1942. 
Which P-38 is the 'P-38 minus' based on?

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## EKB (May 28, 2015)

stona said:


> The Lightning is a complete red herring. It never saw service in the RAF and the order was cancelled. The Air Ministry showed interest in a lot of different aircraft that were never manufactured or purchased...so what?
> 
> The Beaufighter got lucky, performing roles other than its original intended role rather well. It was not the only aircraft to do this.




In late 1942 the British again sought to purchase P-38 Lightnings after RAF Beaufighter squadrons suffered heavy losses during the anti-shipping war in the Bay of Biscay. By that time the USAAF had none to spare. From E. R. Hooton, _*Eagle in Flames*_, p.55: 

_“ On 20 July Leutnant Stöffler claimed two Wellingtons, and by the end of August seven victories had been recorded (Coastal Command had lost a total of 26 aircraft in the Bay during this period), encouraging representations from Raeder which led Hitler to demand a Zerstörergruppe. A Stab V.(Z)/KG40 was formed under Hauptmann Korthals at the beginning of September, but two months elapsed before it reached establishment, and even by the end of the year there were only 27 aircraft (eight fell to enemy action). As a stop-gap the nimble Ar 196 floatplanes of 5./BdFlGr 196 were pressed into service, claiming eight victories to 6 September. 

The British reacted by introducing two squadrons of Beaufighters, the heavyweights first clashing on 8 September when Leutnant von Hoensbroech claimed a victory, but the biggest threat to the Beaufighters came from the Fw 190s of 8./JG 2, which claimed most of the 17 Beaufighters which Coastal Command lost by December despite Fighter and Army Co-operation Command sweeps over JG 2’s bases, leading Coastal Command to seek P-38 Lightnings.”_


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## tomo pauk (May 28, 2015)

A quick look at the manual for the P-38D, E, F G shows that P-38D E were rated for 19000 lbs for take off (includes 2 x 300 gal drop tanks) in 1942, still with take off power of 2 x 1150 HP. Granted, 600 gals of external fuel is a bit pushing it on such take off power, but still. So the early 1941 'F' series of engines (1150 HP for take off) should do.
At 15000 ft, the P-38F was making 380 mph on 1325 HP (3000 rpm at 47 in Hg) and 350 mph on 1000 HP (2600 rpm and 38 in Hg). The 'P-38 minus', with ram effect and exhaust thrust calculated in, should be at some 1250 HP at 15000 ft - 370 mph? And a bit better with 'faster' supercharger that is available in second half of 1942.


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## kool kitty89 (May 28, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> At 15000 ft, the P-38F was making 380 mph on 1325 HP (3000 rpm at 47 in Hg) and 350 mph on 1000 HP (2600 rpm and 38 in Hg). The 'P-38 minus', with ram effect and exhaust thrust calculated in, should be at some 1250 HP at 15000 ft - 370 mph? And a bit better with 'faster' supercharger that is available in second half of 1942.


Wouldn't omitting turbos and intercoolers also save on weight? (assuming P-38J style fuel tanks weren't added)


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## stona (May 29, 2015)

EKB said:


> In late 1942 the British again sought to purchase P-38 Lightnings after RAF Beaufighter squadrons suffered heavy losses during the anti-shipping war in the Bay of Biscay. [/I]



But they didn't purchase them. What exactly is your point ?

It was not within the power of the British Air Ministry to cancel production of the P-38. It was within its power to cancel orders for the type, and that's what it did.

Steve (confused and still seeing red herrings)


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## Shortround6 (May 29, 2015)

You have timing and program momentum affecting decisions. 

A very simplified time line of British involvement goes something like:

Feb 1940-fabrication of on the 13 YP-38s is started.

March 1940, the British order 143 model 322s without turbos.

June 5 1940, US Approval is given for an additional 524 Lighting MK 2s for the British.

Aug 30 1940 the US orders 607 more P-38s than it had on order originally. 

Sept 16 1940 First flight of a YP-38. 
April 8 1941, British test a YP-38 at Wright Field Ohio, informally.
AUg 1941 sees 5 of the British 322s roll out the door, this does not mean _delivered_ to the British. 
Dec 1941 sees first British 322 _arrive_ in England. 
April 1942 has 3rd 322 arrive in England. 
July 1942 has the 4th (and last) 322 arrive in England.
Aug 1942 sees the British Cancel the Lightning IIs. 

There was over a two year difference between the placing of the initial orders and the Delivery of the aircraft, Had more of the 322s actually been sent to England. The British _need_ for fighters had changed considerably in that time. By the end of Sept 1942 about 500 Typhoons had been delivered, Mustang Is were in Service as were Spitfire IXs, even if not in large numbers. The American need for fighters had also changed considerably. Planning was already under way for the North Africa invasion. Those 524 British Lighting IIs *were built*, the production line did not shut down for months or workers go home. The air frames were given different numbers and designations.

From Joe Baugher's website " Twenty-eight other British-ordered aircraft were completed as P-38F-13-LO for the USAAF, 121 as P-38F-15-LO, 174 as P-38G-13-LO, and 200 as P-38G-15-LO." 

When we talk about _canceling_ Program A or program B we should be aware how much time and money may have already been invested in such programs. Much like the Whirlwind. Decision to cancel was take months before a single one showed up in a service squadron yet they considered that enough _material_ had already been assembled to a make it worthwhile to build 114 of them. material is not sheet aluminum that can be used on most anything but things like extrusions, forgings, landing gear legs, and other parts specific to a certain air frame. Cancel too late in the program and you have a lot of very expensive scrap and thousands of wasted man hours, not xxx numbers of an alternative airplane. 

Coastal Command may have _wanted_ P-38s to meet a temporary need but in 1942 and most of 1943 the US was practically rationing P-38s to it's own units. In Jan of 1943 General Kenney of 5th Air Force in the SW Pacific is placed on a replacement schedule of 15 P-38s a month. In Feb he is told that due to the situation in North Africa not to expect _any_ until the summer. Kenney gets more planes after a personal trip to Washington but is told he will get no personnel for pilots and ground crew.
One wonders what the effect would have been if the British _had_ taken delivery of even 1/2 of their Lighting IIs ? 

US planners in particular had to be planning very far down the road as even planes sitting on the ramps outside the factory doors were weeks if not months from actually going into combat.


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## EKB (May 29, 2015)

stona said:


> But they didn't purchase them. What exactly is your point ?




1) That RAF Coastal Command asked for P-38 Lightings but didn't get them.

2) That the Mosquito was not a solution for contending with the Fw 190 problem. 




stona said:


> It was not within the power of the British Air Ministry to cancel production of the P-38. It was within its power to cancel orders for the type, and that's what it did.




Different time, Different day. There is no evidence that the British Air Ministry tried to block a Coastal Command request for P-38s.


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## GrauGeist (May 29, 2015)

EKB said:


> 2) That the Mosquito was not a solution for contending with the Fw 190 problem.


The Mosquito wasn't designed as a fighter nor was it designed with the Fw190 in mind...


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## EKB (May 29, 2015)

GrauGeist said:


> The Mosquito wasn't designed as a fighter nor was it designed with the Fw190 in mind...




I know that but the RAF employed the Mosquito as a fighter, with varied success, for both day and night operations.


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## buffnut453 (May 29, 2015)

EKB said:


> That the Mosquito was not a solution for contending with the Fw 190 problem.



According to this post (based on Shores' "Fighters Over Tunisia"), neither was the P-38. Seems like the Lightning suffered 2.85:1 kill deficit to the Me109 and 4.33:1 to the Fw190.


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## GrauGeist (May 29, 2015)

I've mentioned this before in another discussions, but a close family friend who was a Luftwaffe pilot (flew the Bf109 for the entirety of the war), said that of all the American fighters, the Lightning was the least of their concern.


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## Shortround6 (May 29, 2015)

It would be interesting if the P-40 or P-39 even made his list? 

One can certainly understand the that between the P-38, P-47 and P-51 the P-38 being at the bottom of the pile. But in 1942 and early 1943 it was pretty much the P-38 or the P-39/P-40 and even the US wasn't dumb enough to think that the P-39/P-40 could survive against the Germans without help. 

The 109 may have been able to evade the P-38s but the same could not be said of the German bombers and transports in North Africa, the Med and Italy.


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## Edgar Brooks (May 29, 2015)

EKB said:


> 1)There is no evidence that the British Air Ministry tried to block a Coastal Command request for P-38s.


The Air Ministry wouldn't have had to "try." Since they were responsible for the production, purchase, and allocation of all airframes, if they said "no," Coastal Command would have gone without (as they did.)


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## EKB (May 29, 2015)

buffnut453 said:


> Seems like the Lightning suffered 2.85:1 kill deficit to the Me109 and 4.33:1 to the Fw190.




By that logic, the Spitfire was not the answer to German fighters.


The Luftwaffe had a 4:1 kill ratio vs. RAF Fighter Command during the second half of 1941. More importantly, the RAF had far more combat experience than the USAAF. 

Several Luftwaffe pilots have credited the P-38 for out-performing German fighters. But very few American pilots who served in North Africa had any previous contact with the enemy. 



“ the pilots who fought them said that the Lightnings were capable of appreciably tighter turns and that they would be on your tail before you knew what was happening. The machine guns mounted in the nose supposedly produced a concentration of fire from which there was no escape. Certainly the effect was reminiscent of a watering can when one these dangerous apparitions started firing tracer, and it was essential to prevent them from manoevering into a position from which they could bring their guns to bear …”

Johannes Steinhoff, JG 77 
_______________________

“ the P-38s could turn inside us with ease and they could go from level flight to climb almost instantaneously. We lost quite a few pilots who tried make an attack and then pull up. The P-38s were on them at once. They closed so quickly that there was little one could do except roll quickly and dive down, for while the P-38s could turn inside us, it rolled very slowly through the first 5 or 10 degrees of bank, and by then we would already be gone. One cardinal rule we never forgot was: avoid fighting a P-38 head-on. That was suicide. Their armament was so heavy and their firepower so murderous, that no one ever tried that type of attack more than once ”

Franz Stiegler, JG 27 
_______________________

“ The P-38 was equal to our Bf 109G in performance and far superior in range ”

Herbert Kaiser, JG 77
_______________________

“ All we could do is admire the P-38s rate of climb. We simply couldn't keep up in our Fw 190A-8s ”

Willi Reschke, JG 301
_______________________

“ The P-38 had its positive attributes which we respected. At higher altitudes it was faster and could out-turn both the Focke-Wulf 190 and the Messerschmitt 109. It was faster in a dive, but this was probably due to it being a heavier aircraft. Our instructors stressed that American pilots were well-trained and very aggressive. Leutnant Anton 'Toni' Hafner was one of the veteran pilots I flew with, scoring 204 aerial victories before he was killed in October 1944. Toni said that the P-38 was a hard fighter to combat and was equal to the Me 109 in maneuverability. He respected the Lightning's nose armament, pointing out it was deadly when behind you. Toni was quite amazed at the beating it could take and remain flying, but the bottom line was: he always respected his counterpart, always!”

Horst Petzschler, JG 3


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## GrauGeist (May 29, 2015)

I truly wish I would have had the foresight to ask him better, detailed questions (along with all the other family and friends) but I never did...I was young and just assumed these guys would always be around. 

However, I do recall his discussions when all the guys were sitting around BS'ing and he apparently was one of the lucky guys, as he was stationed in western Europe from the start and saw action briefly in the MTO. If he ever encountered a P-40 (which was my favorite plane back in those days), he never mentioned it.


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## EKB (May 29, 2015)

GrauGeist said:


> I've mentioned this before in another discussions, but a close family friend who was a Luftwaffe pilot (flew the Bf109 for the entirety of the war), said that of all the American fighters, the Lightning was the least of their concern.




Ah yes, we have another man with no name story. Perhaps you could identify your "close family friend" along with the combat unit he served with. 

Have a nice day.


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## tomo pauk (May 29, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> Wouldn't omitting turbos and intercoolers also save on weight? (assuming P-38J style fuel tanks weren't added)



The B-series turbos weighted some 135-145 lbs (link). Deleting two of them per each 'P-38 minus' saves 270-290 lbs, plus some plumbing and controls/regulators. However, the '(turbo-)supercharging' group in the P-38J weight breakdown is at 613.5 lbs. So we'd probably save some 400-450 lbs vs. earlier aircraft, and those ~600 lbs vs. later aircraft. We should also save a bit of drag because the top of the nacelle would've been devoid of small air intakes, just covered with sheet metal. Also the ram air intake would've gone from the side of the boom to the top of the engine. 
Once the engines with 1200-1325 HP for take off are to be available, we'd might also add leading edge fuel tanks; fuel system of the P-38J was at ~506 lbs empty, with capacity for 410 US gals.


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## EKB (May 29, 2015)

Edgar Brooks said:


> The Air Ministry wouldn't have had to "try." Since they were responsible for the production, purchase, and allocation of all airframes, if they said "no," Coastal Command would have gone without (as they did.)




Can you point us to the Air Ministry record showing that they, and not the USAAF, rejected an RAF Coastal Command request for Lockheed P-38s.


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## GrauGeist (May 29, 2015)

EKB said:


> Ah yes, we have another man with no name story. Perhaps you could identify your "close family friend" along with the combat unit he served with.
> 
> Have a nice day.


EKB, while I can appreciate your participation, I don't particularly appreciate your comment.

I come from a family with a tremendously long line of military service and they had a wide range of friends who likewise served. If I am making a statement about aircraft performance, I can quote a great uncle directly, who flew the P-38 (and P-39 AND P-36) with the Army Air Corps (later Army Air Force/USAF) and *if* the conversation dictates, I may (at my disgression) post his name (as I have in the past).

In this particular case, I was just passing on a sentiment and not statistics/specifications and such, so there is no need to post his name or his JG for your benefit, I leave his name out of the discussion out of respect to him and his family. The same can be said for a former co-worker of mine who was a SS Panzergrenadier.

If my answer isn't what you're looking for, well...too bad...

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## buffnut453 (May 29, 2015)

EKB said:


> By that logic, the Spitfire was not the answer to German fighters.
> 
> 
> The Luftwaffe had a 4:1 kill ratio vs. RAF Fighter Command during the second half of 1941. More importantly, the RAF had far more combat experience than the USAAF.



You're comparing 2 different operational theatres with very different operating environments which makes any direct correlations impossible, indeed it's irrelevant to the point you originally made. I deliberately picked Tunisia because it's in the Mediterranean which is where you cited the P-38 would be the answer to the German fighters in that specific theatre. Clearly, the P-38 wasn't the answer in that theatre.


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## Glider (May 29, 2015)

buffnut453 said:


> You're comparing 2 different operational theatres with very different operating environments which makes any direct correlations impossible, indeed it's irrelevant to the point you originally made. I deliberately picked Tunisia because it's in the Mediterranean which is where you cited the P-38 would be the answer to the German fighters in that specific theatre. Clearly, the P-38 wasn't the answer in that theatre.



I totally agree with this summary


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## Shortround6 (May 29, 2015)

Edgar Brooks said:


> The Air Ministry wouldn't have had to "try." Since they were responsible for the production, purchase, and allocation of all airframes, if they said "no," Coastal Command would have gone without (as they did.)



Air Ministry didn't have to say no very loud. I may be reading the story wrong but it looks like the request for P-38s came at the end of 1942 (or beginning of 1943?) which a number of months _after_ they (Air Ministry) had "canceled" the order for MK II Lightnings (relinquished to the Americans _might_ be a better term) so the Air Ministry had no Lightings to give Coastal Command and very little likelihood of getting any. Unless they could show an overwhelming need their 'request' would have gone to the bottom of the lend lease stack and delivery scheduled for months if not a year down the road.


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## Shortround6 (May 29, 2015)

buffnut453 said:


> You're comparing 2 different operational theatres with very different operating environments which makes any direct correlations impossible, indeed it's irrelevant to the point you originally made. I deliberately picked Tunisia because it's in the Mediterranean which is where you cited the P-38 would be the answer to the German fighters in that specific theatre. Clearly, the P-38 wasn't the answer in that theatre.



The US had the choice of 3/4 fighters for use in North Africa. The P-38s of several types which people claim were not the answer. They had the P-39, does anyone think they were the answer in North Africa? They had Allison powered P-40s, not seen at the time as being the answer. And they got the vast majority of the Merlin powered P-40s as they were _thought_ at the time to be a _better_ answer than the Allison powered models. Which may not be saying much. 

That leaves the P-38 with essentially green pilots to protect the other American planes (fighter bombers, medium bombers and whatever heavies are in theater) and do the long range intercepts/patrols with F-5s doing photo recon. 

The P-38 groups in England had only started going operational in the beginning of Sept 1942 and were being yanked from operations by the end of Oct to get ready for North Africa. 

Now how many people believe that the same number of P-39 or P-40 squadrons with pilots of the same experience would have done any better against the Germans in North Africa?


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## Edgar Brooks (May 29, 2015)

EKB said:


> Can you point us to the Air Ministry record showing that they, and not the USAAF, rejected an RAF Coastal Command request for Lockheed P-38s.


Rather difficult, since Commands did not deal with the U.S.A.A.F., so a direct request was not, nor could be, made. Any requests were put through government channels to the British Air Commission, who actually dealt with the American administration. 
The BAC requested 524 Lightning Mk.II, in August 1942, but the request was cancelled, so the U.K. only ever received 24 Mk.I which were reported as having "certain nasty aerodynamic habits," plus a single P-38J, 44-23517, which was transferred in-theatre (U.K.)


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## EKB (May 29, 2015)

buffnut453 said:


> You're comparing 2 different operational theatres with very different operating environments which makes any direct correlations impossible, indeed it's irrelevant to the point you originally made.
> 
> I deliberately picked Tunisia because it's in the Mediterranean which is where you cited the P-38 would be the answer to the German fighters in that specific theatre. Clearly, the P-38 wasn't the answer in that theatre.




Your reply is mistaken in every respect. 


1) The Bay of Biscay is not in the Mediterranean ocean. 

2) In late 1942, No. 8 Staffel of JG 2 was based at Brest, France - not in Tunisia.

3) By his own account, Willi Reschke was based in Germany when JG 301 clashed with P-38s. By his own account, Horst Petzschler was based in Germany when he was shot down by a P-38.


I don't understand your comment about "operating environments". Coastal Command escort or fighter patrols was mainly low level work to protect the strikers and/or attack surface targets. Many pilots who flew both P-51 and P-38s with the 9th Air Force gave a frank comparison of the two aircraft in the fighter-bomber role - good luck finding even one who voted for the Mustang as better.


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## EKB (May 29, 2015)

GrauGeist said:


> EKB, while I can appreciate your participation, I don't particularly appreciate your comment.
> 
> I come from a family with a tremendously long line of military service and they had a wide range of friends who likewise served. If I am making a statement about aircraft performance, I can quote a great uncle directly, who flew the P-38 (and P-39 AND P-36) with the Army Air Corps (later Army Air Force/USAF) and *if* the conversation dictates, I may (at my disgression) post his name (as I have in the past).
> 
> ...





All Prose Must Be Spare and True!


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## Juha (May 29, 2015)

Glider said:


> For the UK So many where do you start,
> 
> Botha, Albacore, Fulmar, Roc, Sterling, Whitley, Warwick, Albemarle, Battle, Defiant, Lerwick, Sea Otter, Albecore
> 
> The scary thing is that they all entered production, there not prototypes, the waste of resources is huge



Hello Glider
I mostly agree but Fulmar did some good work against Italians in MTO and RN needed something to replace Skua, Sea Gladiator climbed rather well but was even slower than Fulmar and lacked range. Fulmar had loiter time and lots of ammo, so it could fly long CAP sorties and so partly compensate the lousy rate of climb, escort strike a/c and act as a recon plane. Ans the Sea Otter, I don't know much on it, other than was designed as a successor of Walrus and had somewhat better performance which didn't mean much. But British needed a ASR amphibian, was there any other candidates and RN probably wanted a amphibian catapult plane. Over 200 were built, so not so big consumer of resources.


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## kool kitty89 (May 29, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> You have timing and program momentum affecting decisions.
> 
> A very simplified time line of British involvement goes something like:
> 
> ...


Indeed, hence my initial comments regarding all that being moot with the P-38's existing development timeline. They'd need about a year earlier in timing there to really make this feasible. (otherwise you end up with Lightnings of any sort reaching England in number scarcely before the Mustang I)

Same problem with supplemental non-turbo P-38s for use anywhere. By the time the testing is done and production capacity is there, you've lost most of the advantages of a turbo-less P-38 anyway. Aside from maybe optimizing it as a moderately lower cost (maintenance included), lighter weight alternative to the P-38J/L for use as a low/medium altitude fighter, fighter/bomber, and intruder aircraft with better range and load than the P-47. (plus potential as a ground attack aircraft with cannon armament, especially interesting if the M9 37 mm cannon was fitted with rather useful anti-armor performance as well as ballistics and flight time better matching the .50s and better air to air/soft target accuracy than the low velocity M4 or M10 -and the P-38 should be heavy/powerful enough to carry it, unlike the P-63)

Timing is one of the big things that makes a V-1650-1 (or Rolls Royce Merlin XX) powered Mustang also impractical. Unless they'd started testing a single-stage Merlin prototype version of the P-51 and making production plans for it pretty much from the outset, it wouldn't have been fielded in time to make much/any difference.





EKB said:


> Several Luftwaffe pilots have credited the P-38 for out-performing German fighters. But very few American pilots who served in North Africa had any previous contact with the enemy.


Sustained turning ability and ability to turn into a high-speed stall without spinning (due to balanced toque and gyroscopic stability effects) were very useful aspects of the Lightning from what I understand. The high lift airfoil, high aspect ratio wing, and twin prop wash (and maneuvering flaps) all helped with this in spite of the high wing loading and without the loss in lift:drag performance at high angles of attack suffered by the use of slats on the 109. (albeit pulling into a high-speed stall would intentionally be forcing excess drag, but without torque roll issues the 109 would have to deal with)

Roll rate and aileron stick forces would be the big limiting factor for the P-38 prior to the hydraulic boosting arriving part way into P-38J production. (the use of a yolk rather than stick may not have helped matters there either, and I know it made the already cluttered instrument panel more difficult to see)





tomo pauk said:


> The B-series turbos weighted some 135-145 lbs (link). Deleting two of them per each 'P-38 minus' saves 270-290 lbs, plus some plumbing and controls/regulators. However, the '(turbo-)supercharging' group in the P-38J weight breakdown is at 613.5 lbs. So we'd probably save some 400-450 lbs vs. earlier aircraft, and those ~600 lbs vs. later aircraft. We should also save a bit of drag because the top of the nacelle would've been devoid of small air intakes, just covered with sheet metal. Also the ram air intake would've gone from the side of the boom to the top of the engine.


You should also be able to retain the smaller oil coolers and radiators of the P-38D-H, reducing drag somewhat there, and with the weight reduction concentrated to the outboard nacelle/wing portions, there should have been an appreciable improvement to roll rate as well.



> Once the engines with 1200-1325 HP for take off are to be available, we'd might also add leading edge fuel tanks; fuel system of the P-38J was at ~506 lbs empty, with capacity for 410 US gals.


Older engines (aside from the long-nosed C series of the Lightning I and Tomahawk) should get up-rated take-off and emergency ratings as well, bringing the older V-1710-39 (F3R) of the P-40D and E up to par with the later 8.8:1 supercharger engines like the -73 (F4R I believe) though the maximum WEP boost pressure eventually ended up higher on the -73 in terms of official USAAF/Allison specs. (overboosting in the field went further, but how much detriment to engines there was is unclear; it might be notable that in their cautionary citations towards overboosting, Allison cited only the 60" Hg boost limit for the 8.8:1 supercharged engines including the -39 and -73, rather than a lower value specific to the older -39, though they did mention the use of 66" and 70" pressures in the field was risky had had not -yet- been cleared by testing while 56" was a more solid limit for the 9.6:1 engines due to detonation issues -at least with 100/130 fuel used in tests -I haven't seen any mention of testing with late war 100/150 fuel)

Fuel system wise, the weight gained on the P-38J over H would be more significant to consider. (if it's relatively small, then the added capacity would easily outweigh any light-load performance advantages, aside from potentially producing both and allowing field retrofits like the P-39N did -except being long vs very long range rather than short vs medium range)





Shortround6 said:


> Air Ministry didn't have to say no very loud. I may be reading the story wrong but it looks like the request for P-38s came at the end of 1942 (or beginning of 1943?) which a number of months _after_ they (Air Ministry) had "canceled" the order for MK II Lightnings (relinquished to the Americans _might_ be a better term) so the Air Ministry had no Lightings to give Coastal Command and very little likelihood of getting any. Unless they could show an overwhelming need their 'request' would have gone to the bottom of the lend lease stack and delivery scheduled for months if not a year down the road.


By that time, I believe any of the follow-on developments of Gloster Twin engine fighters was also discontinued in favor of focusing on their jet projects. (Wiki lists termination in May 1941) Leaving only the Mosquito and Beaufighter. (neither of which capable of performing the single seat fighter roles the P-38 could and Gloster twin might have)




Shortround6 said:


> Now how many people believe that the same number of P-39 or P-40 squadrons with pilots of the same experience would have done any better against the Germans in North Africa?


Certainly not, but 'P-38-minus' aircraft may have done rather well over North Africa, possibly better than the turbocharged instances in some cases (particularly if overboosting was exploited to similar levels as on the P-40 prior to formal WEP ratings).

Another question to pose would be: how well would turbo-less P-38s manage in place of P-40D-Ns and P-39D-Qs (possibly P-63s) if produced on the same number of available engines (ie pretty much exactly half the number of complete aircraft)? The Tomahawk production likely wouldn't change, and perhaps still a run of some Kittyhawks before production could be restructured. (so making the assumption/condition that Lockheed SOMEHOW managed to get the P-38 fully tested and mass production ready to the point of the P-38E by the end of 1940, and contracts for P-40 and P-39 production largely curtailed in favor of greatly accelerated expansion of P-38 production)








Juha said:


> Hello Glider
> I mostly agree but Fulmar did some good work against Italians in MTO and RN needed something to replace Skua, Sea Gladiator climbed rather well but was even slower than Fulmar and lacked range. Fulmar had loiter time and lots of ammo, so it could fly long CAP sorties and so partly compensate the lousy rate of climb, escort strike a/c and act as a recon plane. Ans the Sea Otter, I don't know much on it, other than was designed as a successor of Walrus and had somewhat better performance which didn't mean much. But British needed a ASR amphibian, was there any other candidates and RN probably wanted a amphibian catapult plane. Over 200 were built, so not so big consumer of resources.


Navalize the Hurricane. It won't cover everything the Fulmar can do but it's better in pretty much every useful way except wingspan than the Gladiator. (without introducing folding wing-tips of course)

That or the Gloster F.5/34. Much better armament and performance than the Sea Gladiator on the same engine. (and potentially the same engine as the Skua as well)


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## parsifal (May 29, 2015)

stona said:


> But they didn't purchase them. What exactly is your point ?
> 
> It was not within the power of the British Air Ministry to cancel production of the P-38. It was within its power to cancel orders for the type, and that's what it did.
> 
> Steve (confused and still seeing red herrings)



Dont bite steve. His point is simple. anything british is rubbish. Weve seen this logic before and its impeccable and supreme in its own misguided conviction.

Best to make an addition to the ignore list, because nothing good or intelligent will arise from a conversation with this individual. Thats exactly what im about to do . ive seen enough drivel for the moment

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## GrauGeist (May 30, 2015)

parsifal said:


> Dont bite steve. His point is simple. anything british is rubbish. Weve seen this logic before and it impexxable and supreme in its own misguided conviction.
> 
> Best to make an addition to the ignore list, because nothing good or intelligent will arise from a conversation with this individual. Thats exactly what im about to do . ive seen enough drivel for the moment


And yet it was a Yank that was putting up the biggest fight defending the Tiffy...

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## parsifal (May 30, 2015)

GrauGeist said:


> And yet it was a Yank that was putting up the biggest fight defending the Tiffy...



Fair comment. Id admit that I am guilty of being one eyed at times, and for that I apologise. I think there is a difference between my behaviour and what we are seeing here. At least I will listen, and there have been more than one occassion where ive realised my convictions are misguided.

I never wanted to turn this into international feud of "them and us", but in my book whats happening here is not a rational discussion. Its a flaming session. Probably worked on me....


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## GrauGeist (May 30, 2015)

As for me, I always try and be objective.

Unless I'm in a bad mood, then I hate everything


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## Glider (May 30, 2015)

Juha said:


> Hello Glider
> I mostly agree but Fulmar did some good work against Italians in MTO and RN needed something to replace Skua, Sea Gladiator climbed rather well but was even slower than Fulmar and lacked range. Fulmar had loiter time and lots of ammo, so it could fly long CAP sorties and so partly compensate the lousy rate of climb, escort strike a/c and act as a recon plane. Ans the Sea Otter, I don't know much on it, other than was designed as a successor of Walrus and had somewhat better performance which didn't mean much. But British needed a ASR amphibian, was there any other candidates and RN probably wanted a amphibian catapult plane. Over 200 were built, so not so big consumer of resources.


I don't disagree with much of this the Sea Otter is more like a distraction. Re the Fulmar it did do some good work but I will always see it as a missed opportunity. Keep the ammunition, the range and just make it a single seater. The weight saving alone would have improved the performance by a decent margin and who knows, when the Merlin 60 engines came on stream you might have something that is quite respectable. With the space for the extra ammo you might have 2 x 20mm and 200rpg instead of the 8 x 303, which would also be more than handy.


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## fastmongrel (May 30, 2015)

Glider said:


> I don't disagree with much of this the Sea Otter is more like a distraction. Re the Fulmar it did do some good work but I will always see it as a missed opportunity. Keep the ammunition, the range and just make it a single seater. The weight saving alone would have improved the performance by a decent margin and who knows, when the Merlin 60 engines came on stream you might have something that is quite respectable. With the space for the extra ammo you might have 2 x 20mm and 200rpg instead of the 8 x 303, which would also be more than handy.



Would the Fulmar make much use of a 60 series Merlin. The 2 stages just get in the way below about 10,000ft and a Fulmar has no business being above 10,000ft. Wouldnt it be better to have the Merlin 32 and 4 blade prop used on the Barracuda 1,600hp at 3,000ft and 1,620hp take off rating. That would have climbed well.


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## Shortround6 (May 30, 2015)

Taking the rear seat man out plus the extra radio gear and plating over the rear cockpit isn't going to save enough weight to do much of anything. A Fulmar weighed almost as much empty as a Hurricane IIB (12 machine guns) did loaded. loaded the Fulmar
was over a ton heavier (about 30% more). Leaving a 200lb crewman (with flying togs and parachute) and 100-200lbs of electronics gear on the ground is NOT going to turn the resulting airplane into super-fighter or even mediocre fighter. 

Using a plane with a new shorter fuselage and smaller wing would do the trick.


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## pbehn (May 30, 2015)

Almost every aircraft operational before 1937 should not have been built. The Blenheim was the bees knees when introduced and obsolete at the same time. However without Battles Defiants Blenheims Sterlings and others you dont have any experienced pilots or ground crews. Germany pressed on with many obsolete aircraft through necessity and had no AC to offer in many theatres, ancient transports etc. Russia had many obsolete aircraft in 1941. Easy to criticise the UK who had a war appear quickly and had to do whatever. What was the USA front line strength in September 1939?


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## Shortround6 (May 30, 2015)

pbehn said:


> What was the USA front line strength in September 1939?



Somewhere between pathetic and dismal.......or did you want numbers? 

P-26 fighters were in operational use in 1940, 3 squadrons were operational defending the Panama canal until May of 1941 for example. Granted there were newer planes.


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## tomo pauk (May 30, 2015)

fastmongrel said:


> Would the Fulmar make much use of a 60 series Merlin. The 2 stages just get in the way below about 10,000ft and a Fulmar has no business being above 10,000ft. Wouldnt it be better to have the Merlin 32 and 4 blade prop used on the Barracuda 1,600hp at 3,000ft and 1,620hp take off rating. That would have climbed well.



The Merlin with the 'cropped' S/C, like the 45M, should also come in handy - 1585 HP at 2750 ft, 1230 HP for take off. Available in 1942?


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## Edgar Brooks (May 30, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> Available in 1942?


It's doubtful, since the first three cropped impellers (that I've found) were sent, without having had any prior orders from the Air Ministry, straight out to the Middle East by Rolls-Royce, which caused a few ruffled feathers among the hierarchy. 
According to their records, Supermarine didn't introduce the Merlins 45M, 50M 55M until 1944.


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## Glider (May 30, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> Taking the rear seat man out plus the extra radio gear and plating over the rear cockpit isn't going to save enough weight to do much of anything. A Fulmar weighed almost as much empty as a Hurricane IIB (12 machine guns) did loaded. loaded the Fulmar
> was over a ton heavier (about 30% more). Leaving a 200lb crewman (with flying togs and parachute) and 100-200lbs of electronics gear on the ground is NOT going to turn the resulting airplane into super-fighter or even mediocre fighter.
> 
> Using a plane with a new shorter fuselage and smaller wing would do the trick.



Your correct and that was my intention, design a single seater with the range and weapons of the Fulmar. That was the missed opportunity


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## pbehn (May 30, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> Somewhere between pathetic and dismal.......or did you want numbers?
> 
> P-26 fighters were in operational use in 1940, 3 squadrons were operational defending the Panama canal until May of 1941 for example. Granted there were newer planes.



Shortround ...it was in a way a rhetorical question. Many of the aircraft the UK produced were not up to much in the late 30s but they were certainly better than nothing. I think the Sterling was rubbish in terms of the war I am sure Hitler would have loved 2,300 of them same for the Wellington .

Even with the advances in the thirties and the obsolescence of bi planes Gladiators were still officially in the front line in the BoB due to shortage of long runways in south west England.


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## kool kitty89 (May 30, 2015)

pbehn said:


> Almost every aircraft operational before 1937 should not have been built. The Blenheim was the bees knees when introduced and obsolete at the same time. However without Battles Defiants Blenheims Sterlings and others you dont have any experienced pilots or ground crews. Germany pressed on with many obsolete aircraft through necessity and had no AC to offer in many theatres, ancient transports etc. Russia had many obsolete aircraft in 1941. Easy to criticise the UK who had a war appear quickly and had to do whatever. What was the USA front line strength in September 1939?


Aside from the turret (which could have been pursued even if the Defiant never reached mass production), what does the Defiant bring to the table? Battles, Blenheims, and Sterlings were certainly useful, and the latter would have been more so had development not shifted towards the thicker wing among other detail problems. (either way a better example of 'could have been developed better' than 'should have been canceled' )

The Beaufighter might not have been worth persuing if any good alternatives had remained in development. There's a lot of open-ended questions to Gloster's twin engine developments, but IMO between the F.9/37 and subsequent Reaper derivatives, a gloster heavy fighter would much better compliment the Mosquito's capabilities than the Beaufighter did. (ground attack ability included)

Same for the Whirlwind: the Beaufighter being too large, heavy, and draggy and the Whirlwind being too small and tight a design with Gloster's twin being a rather elegant middleground much closer to the Fw 187 or P-38 (if more limited in initial fuel capacity).






tomo pauk said:


> The Merlin with the 'cropped' S/C, like the 45M, should also come in handy - 1585 HP at 2750 ft, 1230 HP for take off. Available in 1942?


The low-gear of the Merlin XX series should perform similarly and be more widely available while also having better medium altitude performance at the expense of some weight.




pbehn said:


> Shortround ...it was in a way a rhetorical question. Many of the aircraft the UK produced were not up to much in the late 30s but they were certainly better than nothing. I think the Sterling was rubbish in terms of the war I am sure Hitler would have loved 2,300 of them same for the Wellington.


Same for the Do 217 ...



> Even with the advances in the thirties and the obsolescence of bi planes Gladiators were still officially in the front line in the BoB due to shortage of long runways in south west England.


Is that something even the variable pitch prop equipped Hurrican I's couldn't manage? Perhaps lacking a lower altitude geared merlin early on (with increased takeoff power) missed filling that gap as well. (though shorter take-off run may have been yet another attractive aspect of Gloster's F.5/34 and one area retaining the existing Mercury engine configuration would actually be more attractive -also valuable attributes for a carrier borne fighter)

The gloster single and twin engine monoplanes also seemed to be sporting variable-pitch 3-blade propellers significantly earlier than the Spitfire or Hurricane, so that may have been a benefit as well.


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## yulzari (May 31, 2015)

Aggh!! There is no such aeroplane as a Sterling. Never was. Shorts did make a Stirling four engined heavy bomber/transport which was later joined by Avro's twin engined catapultable bomber/torpedo Manchester. Presumably they were attacked by Meserschmidts and Fock Wolfs.

BTW. When Their Lordships ordered the Fairey Fulmar they were quite explicit that they wanted folding wing Spitfires but the Fulmar was all they could get.


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## Shortround6 (May 31, 2015)

pbehn said:


> Shortround ...it was in a way a rhetorical question. Many of the aircraft the UK produced were not up to much in the late 30s but they were certainly better than nothing. I think the Sterling was rubbish in terms of the war I am sure Hitler would have loved 2,300 of them same for the Wellington .
> 
> Even with the advances in the thirties and the obsolescence of bi planes Gladiators were still officially in the front line in the BoB due to shortage of long runways in south west England.



Kind of thought your question wasn't 100% serious but a poke back at the British bashers. Easy for some Americans to criticize the British while forgetting the Americans were well behind them in production in 1938-39. Americans had the _luxury_ of waiting for better designs rather than mass producing P-35s and B-18s and A-18s in order to have hundreds (or several thousand) combat aircraft in 1939/early 1940.


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## pbehn (May 31, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> Kind of thought your question wasn't 100% serious but a poke back at the British bashers. Easy for some Americans to criticize the British while forgetting the Americans were well behind them in production in 1938-39. Americans had the _luxury_ of waiting for better designs rather than mass producing P-35s and B-18s and A-18s in order to have hundreds (or several thousand) combat aircraft in 1939/early 1940.



Not really a poke back just trying to bring some context. The French were thought to be more advanced in aviation during and after WW1 what did they have in 1939. The Russian airforce was huge and had two years more to prepare in 1941 with the added advantage of seeing what did and didnt work how did they fare?. It just seems strange that the only airforce that took the fight to the LW and matched them gets the most knocks.




Yulzari said:


> Aggh!! There is no such aeroplane as a Sterling.


I know its just to wind up those north of the border lol


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## pbehn (May 31, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> Is that something even the variable pitch prop equipped Hurricane I's couldn't manage?



From what I read it was purely geography Devon in South East England has very little flat land so the Gladiator was a stop gap solution. They saw little action as the action was more to the east.


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## pbehn (May 31, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> Aside from the turret (which could have been pursued even if the Defiant never reached mass production), what does the Defiant bring to the table? Battles, Blenheims, and Sterlings were certainly useful, and the latter would have been more so had development not shifted towards the thicker wing among other detail problems. (either way a better example of 'could have been developed better' than 'should have been canceled' )



The defiant was never used in the role it was designed for. It should never have been used where there were single engined escorts. It should have been used to protect the North and Scotland leaving other squadrons to rest recover and train. Having been withdrawn from a role it wasnt designed for it was given another as a night fighter, again it wasnt very good but better than most other options at the time.


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## Shortround6 (May 31, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> Aside from the turret (which could have been pursued even if the Defiant never reached mass production), what does the Defiant bring to the table? Battles, Blenheims, and Sterlings were certainly useful, and the latter would have been more so had development not shifted towards the thicker wing among other detail problems. (either way a better example of 'could have been developed better' than 'should have been canceled' )



Here we enter the realm of the retrospectoscope. A _LOT_ of the British designs were handicapped by a couple of rather (in hind sight) asinine field performance criteria. Even British bombers were required to have what we be called today, STOL performance. Since the mid/late 30s was period of _very_ rapid advancement/competition in flap design even a year difference could make a major difference in airfoil/area selection depending on flap selection. 
The Lockheed 14 Electra first flew on July 29, 1937 and didn't go into service until months later. It was the first _production_ plane to use the Fowler flap. Several other flap designs came into being to either get around patents or to provide similar improvements at lower cost. However, the Avro Manchester was already well into design work with 200 ordered off the drawing board in July of 1937, first prototype flies two years later, July of 1939. As for the Stirling "In June 1937 the S.29 was accepted as the second string for the Supermarine 316 and formally ordered in October". First flight 14 May 1939, First production examples reach a squadron in Aug of 1940. How much time do you want to spend in 1937-38 redesigning the entire wing? AS the war got closer or shooting actually started the RAF got the money to expand airfields and/or the ability to commandeer land and some of the need for short field performance went away but it was too late to make major modifications to aircraft. The other "performance Criteria" was that due to the sod airfields NO aircraft could have tires using more than 38lb/sq in air pressure to avoid putting ruts in the air field. Doesn't matter if it was a 6000lb fighter or a 50,000lb bomber. For the fighters this wasn't too bad (the Whirlwind wound up with an exemption) but it called for some seriously big tires on the bombers and the need to hide them some where when retracted. Again it was a restriction that went away rather rapidly once the shooting started. 



> The Beaufighter might not have been worth persuing if any good alternatives had remained in development. There's a lot of open-ended questions to Gloster's twin engine developments, but IMO between the F.9/37 and subsequent Reaper derivatives, a gloster heavy fighter would much better compliment the Mosquito's capabilities than the Beaufighter did. (ground attack ability included)



Here again we _KNOW_ that the Beaufighter was never going to come close to the 370mph predicted for it. The F.9/37 only flew a bit less than 4 months before the Beaufighter and since the Beaufighter used a lot of components from the Beaufort it was thought it could be in production and squadron service much sooner. Throw in the redesign time to get rid of the Taurus engines and the "better" F.9/37 won't show up until much later (a couple of years?) after the Beaufighter. 



> Same for the Whirlwind: the Beaufighter being too large, heavy, and draggy and the Whirlwind being too small and tight a design with Gloster's twin being a rather elegant middleground much closer to the Fw 187 or P-38 (if more limited in initial fuel capacity).



What was "ideal" vs what could be produced in quantity at the time it was needed. The British rather fell down on some '2nd generation' aircraft (Bristol Brigand, etc) but the idea that they would revert _back_ to a 1937/38 airframe in 1942/43 means they didn't learn _anything_ about aerodynamics or structural design in 4 years. It was less than 4 years between the design of the Douglas A-20 and the Douglas A-26. 



_Is that something even the variable pitch prop equipped Hurrican I's couldn't manage? Perhaps lacking a lower altitude geared merlin early on (with increased takeoff power) missed filling that gap as well. (though shorter take-off run may have been yet another attractive aspect of Gloster's F.5/34 and one area retaining the existing Mercury engine configuration would actually be more attractive -also valuable attributes for a carrier borne fighter)_

The Gloster F.5/34 is going to loose a lot of it's attractiveness once you stick 450-500lbs worth of armor, self sealing tanks and other operational equipment into it, let alone equip it for carrier use. Hurricane Is gained 456 to 1078lbs over the prototype hurricane, part may be metal wing but assuming that service F.5/34s would have the same performance as the prototype is wishful thinking. 



> The gloster single and twin engine monoplanes also seemed to be sporting variable-pitch 3-blade propellers significantly earlier than the Spitfire or Hurricane, so that may have been a benefit as well.



This needs some careful looking at too. they were most likely 2 position props. But a Hurricane with a 2 position prop could take off in about 75% of the distance of a Hurricane with a fixed pitch prop so we had better be sure of which Hurricane the Gloster prototypes are being compared with. The Hurricane and Spitfires with the Fixed pitch props were not only limited by throttle settings for take-off but were limited as to RPM which is sort of a double wammy.


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## pbehn (May 31, 2015)

When criticising the wellesley and Whitley remember they replaced this in 1937.

The Heyford was the first plane to be found (deliberately)by radar in UK and also the firsty RAF plane to carry airborne RADAR

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## kool kitty89 (May 31, 2015)

yulzari said:


> BTW. When Their Lordships ordered the Fairey Fulmar they were quite explicit that they wanted folding wing Spitfires but the Fulmar was all they could get.


Why focus so much on the spitfire when the Hurricane would also have been markedly superior to the Fulmar, had larger production capacity, and had more carrier-friendly flying characteristics?





Shortround6 said:


> Kind of thought your question wasn't 100% serious but a poke back at the British bashers. Easy for some Americans to criticize the British while forgetting the Americans were well behind them in production in 1938-39. Americans had the _luxury_ of waiting for better designs rather than mass producing P-35s and B-18s and A-18s in order to have hundreds (or several thousand) combat aircraft in 1939/early 1940.


If the Americans were in the same position as the British, war involvement/pressure timeline wise, wouldn't the P-36, F2A, and B-23 be more the aircraft to ramp up production of in 1938/39, while investing more heavily in getting the P-40 and B-17 into mass production, and accelerating (or at least increasing funding to) the A-20, Grumman fighters, F4U, P-38, P-39, and P-43/44/P-47 projects. Maybe the Mustang gets more serious consideration too, but then that easily seems like it could still have been a victim of bureaucratic issues as easily as some British designs.

With the need for bomber interceptors on the level of the BoB, might the P-39 and P-38 been pressed into production/service with more compromises? (and more drastic measures taken to alleviate Lockheed's production issues ... perhaps more stringent limits on testing the XP-38 as well, and no trans-american record flight attempt)

Engine development may have accelerated and gotten more serious funding sooner as well ... or the Hyper engine project would have just sapped even more resources. (even so, sheer demand for volume production would have increased funding/spending and development interest and especially been significant in Allison's case with their more limited internal funds)

Might Brewster's management issues and inability to improve production volume or quality be exposed sooner? Perhaps more direct government intervention sooner, second sourced production, or even going so far as to encourage/coerce a merger with Grumman? (the Buffalo really was the only Brewster design to really be a compelling operational aircraft superior to alternatives at the time of its design and introduction)


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## kool kitty89 (May 31, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> As for the Stirling "In June 1937 the S.29 was accepted as the second string for the Supermarine 316 and formally ordered in October". First flight 14 May 1939, First production examples reach a squadron in Aug of 1940. How much time do you want to spend in 1937-38 redesigning the entire wing? AS the war got closer or shooting actually started the RAF got the money to expand airfields and/or the ability to commandeer land and some of the need for short field performance went away but it was too late to make major modifications to aircraft. The other "performance Criteria" was that due to the sod airfields NO aircraft could have tires using more than 38lb/sq in air pressure to avoid putting ruts in the air field. Doesn't matter if it was a 6000lb fighter or a 50,000lb bomber. For the fighters this wasn't too bad (the Whirlwind wound up with an exemption) but it called for some seriously big tires on the bombers and the need to hide them some where when retracted. Again it was a restriction that went away rather rapidly once the shooting started.


I was referring more to the initial plans for the Short Brothers' design using a longer span, higher aspect ratio wing with somewhat thinner airfoil profile that should have allowed for similar take-off performance with better lift/drag, speed, and likely ceiling, but I believe was redesigned due to the Air Ministry's specification setting limits set on maximum span.



> Here again we _KNOW_ that the Beaufighter was never going to come close to the 370mph predicted for it. The F.9/37 only flew a bit less than 4 months before the Beaufighter and since the Beaufighter used a lot of components from the Beaufort it was thought it could be in production and squadron service much sooner. Throw in the redesign time to get rid of the Taurus engines and the "better" F.9/37 won't show up until much later (a couple of years?) after the Beaufighter.


Would it really take that long? I was also suggesting a more favorable situation where the Gloster design was favored over the Whirlwind, but I suppose both cases come down to timing and Gloster themselves never setting up their twin as a direct competitor to the Beaufighter. (the Whirlwind flying sooner and being faster on Peregrines is significant, though Gloster's design seems to have had better handling/control characteristics)

Timing on the shift in engine development priority would obviously be a factor too, and it would have been somewhat more up to luck for airframe designers to focus more squarely on the Merlin earlier. (though given the relative weight of the early merlin and Taurus, Gloster's fighter still should have been easier to adapt than the Whirlwind, especially while still in the development phase -no issues with mass production) Of course, again, timing comes up and the fact Gloster DIDN'T adapt the plane for testing Merlins alongside its Peregrines and Taurus engines meant no compelling test performance for the ministry to go by.

And given the development timeline, first flight, and cost, there might be a better argument for Gloster investing more in development of their single engine F.5/34 anyway. (except even there, the lack of more heavy modifications and alternate engines historically in the critical timeframe diminishes its value)




> What was "ideal" vs what could be produced in quantity at the time it was needed. The British rather fell down on some '2nd generation' aircraft (Bristol Brigand, etc) but the idea that they would revert _back_ to a 1937/38 airframe in 1942/43 means they didn't learn _anything_ about aerodynamics or structural design in 4 years. It was less than 4 years between the design of the Douglas A-20 and the Douglas A-26.


Yet there were many 1935~37 vintage designs that had superior aerodynamic qualities to those developed half a decade later. The P-36, Spitfire, Fw 187 (arguably due to lack of service/development), and Bf 109 all come to mind there. Advancements in radiator, cowling, supercharger, and engine design were more universally significant there. Gloster's F.5/34 of 1937 vintage may also apply there given a fair number of designs being fielded 4 years later.



> The Gloster F.5/34 is going to loose a lot of it's attractiveness once you stick 450-500lbs worth of armor, self sealing tanks and other operational equipment into it, let alone equip it for carrier use. Hurricane Is gained 456 to 1078lbs over the prototype hurricane, part may be metal wing but assuming that service F.5/34s would have the same performance as the prototype is wishful thinking.


Indeed, and comparing it to the Hurricane and Spitfire I prior to said modifications would be more valid. Additionally, the Mercury, Perseus, and Taurus were pretty well dead-end developments, the former two possibly useful very early war but the latter not really at all and the Merlin would be the most straghtforward alternative to expand beyond the F.5/34's original air-cooled requirement. Had Gloster actually adapted the design for the Merlin during testing and (as seems likely) it showed marked sperformance superiority to the Hurricane while retaining the good low and high speed handling characteristics and cockpit visibility, it seems rather likely that a push for Hawker/Gloster production capacity would have been shifted away from the Hurricane and Gladiator and towards the Gloster fighter ASAP.

The overall flying qualities seem to have a lot in common with the P-36, though somewhat lighter and with a thicker wing root it still marks a compromise in aerodynamics between the likes of the Hurricane (or Typhoon) and the exceptionally thin Spitfire wing. (NACA 2218 tapering to 2209 compared to the P-40's 2215 and 2209 and Spit's 2213 and 2209.4 ... to the Hurricane's clark YH airfoil using 19 and 12.2% or 2219 and 2213 for the Tornado/Typhoon -the F4U and F2A both tapered from 18 to 9% as well, though using the higher lift 23000 series airfoil)

It seems like transition from the Mercury to the Merlin might have had similar potential as the P-36's transition to P-40 except for using a lighter base airframe without the more stringent USAAC structural requirements. (ie ALL American fighters were heavy)



> This needs some careful looking at too. they were most likely 2 position props. But a Hurricane with a 2 position prop could take off in about 75% of the distance of a Hurricane with a fixed pitch prop so we had better be sure of which Hurricane the Gloster prototypes are being compared with. The Hurricane and Spitfires with the Fixed pitch props were not only limited by throttle settings for take-off but were limited as to RPM which is sort of a double wammy.


Indeed, my point towards the Mercury engined design possibly reaching mass production was more towards displacing late Gladiator production if at all (or making use of Mercury or Perseus engines -though I suppose use in Blenheims would be significant, operationally and for training, the Lysander more arguably so). But I've likely killed my own argument with the point that a Merlin engined version would be much more valuable and likely more worth production resources than the Hurricane. (at least assuming no serious difficulties or overhead for said production -especially useful if it took less worker/material resources than the Spitfire -again, totally conjecture but a variable to note in any case)


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## wuzak (May 31, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> Why focus so much on the spitfire when the Hurricane would also have been markedly superior to the Fulmar, had larger production capacity, and had more carrier-friendly flying characteristics?



Because the Admiralty though the performance margin the Hurricane had over the enemy aircraft it was likely to do combat with was marginal at best, and even more so when nasalised.


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## parsifal (Jun 1, 2015)

Fulmar had its roots from Air Ministry specification 4/34, which was the same spec as for the battle. In 1938, as the Fleet Air Arm was being re-formed, the Admiralty requested a design for a two seat fighter able to combine three roles in one. It was given three roles, and not one for the simple reason that the FAA lacked enough pilots to field three separate aircraft types for each of the three roles it needed fulfilled. The Admiralty was fully aware that its two seater fighters were not up to standard performance wise against the high performance SE fighters contemporary to it, mostly Me 109s and Spitfires, but the reasoning was that its carriers would never have to operate within the short range of these aircraft. in large measure this was to be shown as a correct assumption, though there were exceptions, most notably 10 January 1941. Fulmars proved to be excellent fleet defence weapons for their time, but were outclassed by the Japanese Zeke. They possessed enough performance to deal with most bombers, had good loiter time, ammunition supply adequate loiter time. They were poor climbers, but manouverable enough to deal with bomber a/c.

They were superior to Hurricanes and Spits in that they could fulfil the multi role functions written into their original specs. By the end of 1940 they could carry bombs, fly blind, undertake observation work and report back to the fleet from a considerable distance and provide an accurate fix on those sightings. S/E a/c could not.

If the RN had adopted specialised a/c like the spit or the hurricane in 1940, firstly they would have ridden into battle with no fighter able to do the job. Secondly, even if they had received specialist fighters, they would have had to reduce the fighter components from about 12 a/c per carrier, to 4 a/c per carrier. They would have needed a fighter, an observation or recce a/c and finally a light bomber, all of which were considered as essential for carrier ops at the time. 4/c were not able to provide a continuous cover for a fleet, whereas 12 had a better chance of doing something useful.

I simply am astounded that people would consider the Fulmar a failure. It was the most advanced fighter ready for squadron service aboard carriers for the allies in 1940. Martlets were at least 8 months away from achieving that, Buffaloes never achieved satisfactory results aboard carriers, at least british ones. It shot down at least 100 a/c by the end of 1940, more than were in frontline squadron service at the time


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## EKB (Jun 1, 2015)

In this forum and others, I have found that any reader who is obsessed with his own national identity will also try to make the thread into a discussion about national identity, rather than aviation. 

The warning signs are always the same: replies from a person who feels a burning desire to wave the flag. He is likely to have a signature that is clearly intended to remind us of his national pride each time that he visits. In keeping with that theme, he will next demand answers about someone else’s national identity. And he will pursue this agenda with the subtlety of a screaming air raid siren. 

Initially this was merely amusing, now it’s just pathetic and sad.


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## GrauGeist (Jun 1, 2015)

EKB said:


> In this forum and others, I have found that any reader who is obsessed with his own national identity will also try to make the thread into a discussion about national identity, rather than aviation.
> 
> The warning signs are always the same: replies from a person who feels a burning desire to wave the flag. He is likely to have a signature that is clearly intended to remind us of his national pride each time that he visits. In keeping with that theme, he will next demand answers about someone else’s national identity. And he will pursue this agenda with the subtlety of a screaming air raid siren.
> 
> Initially this was merely amusing, now it’s just pathetic and sad.


Not sure where you're coming from with this crap but we have folks from all over the world who engage in well-informed and well-rounded discussions about all nation's aircraft and their role in history.

And as far as I'm concerned, your comment is "just pathetic and sad".

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## parsifal (Jun 1, 2015)

I think the comment was for me, but im not English, don't particularly like English. I generally don't approach these discussions from the technical, more towards the operational...ie, the results. Apparently that makes me a shouter....


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## GrauGeist (Jun 1, 2015)

parsifal said:


> I think the comment was for me, but im not English, don't particularly like English. I generally don't approach these discussions from the technical, more towards the operational...ie, the results. Apparently that makes me a shouter....


Your input is always well informed, and if we all liked the same thing, the world would be a boring place.

I am an American, I am not shy about being an American and I think that the U.S. produced some seriously badass machines during the war. But when I am discussing the attributes of one aircraft or another, I look to it's contributions, it's strengths and weaknesses and draw my conclusion from that point. Not by what insignia was painted on it's wings.

I also might suggest to a particular junior member that they should stick to posting quotes from books, because they haven't earned the right to come in here and make comments about other members, especially senior members who have made considerable contributions to the forum...


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## rochie (Jun 1, 2015)

parsifal said:


> I think the comment was for me, but im not English, don't particularly like English. I generally don't approach these discussions from the technical, more towards the operational...ie, the results. Apparently that makes me a shouter....



I will agree with Dave, always find your comments well informed and objective.

Shame the anti british brigade is on the rise again on the forum !

Hope they get bored before I do


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## parsifal (Jun 1, 2015)

that I think is what winds me up and gets me going so to speak. Maybe im wrong, but the logic sometimes is just so patently cockeyed, and nothing can be said or pointed out to persuade from that viewpoint. Its very annoying, and yes can lead to unfortunate clashes.

If ive learnt anything in over 40 years of being interested in this stuff, and life in general, its that you get far more by pointing out the positives in both people and things......kinda "you did this well, but this not so well". people can deal with that. They cant deal so well with "your sh*t, your country is sh*t and everything else in between is sh*t". It doesnt matter what nationality or beliefs you hold, you will get a bad response from that approach. In this case it is also patently untrue that everything about British aerospace was sh*t. It had some big shortcomings, but overall, it was probably the second most advanced aeronautics industry in the world. They had to be getting some things right to achieve that status.

so, to the person who is making the waves, I have this piece of genuine advice. Quit the crap , stop the persistent bad mouthing of the country that fought itself to exhaustion so you could be spoilt rotten and we could stand here and argue without fear. Start giving some sensible and logical issues, stop using derogatory and negative attacks all the time, start to look for the positives you see, and stop being quite so aggressive to people that have been around these parts for a while. Or you can just continue the way you are. Its all the same to me, because Im only reading the posts of the people who i get along with and have respect for.


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## kool kitty89 (Jun 1, 2015)

parsifal said:


> They were superior to Hurricanes and Spits in that they could fulfil the multi role functions written into their original specs. By the end of 1940 they could carry bombs, fly blind, undertake observation work and report back to the fleet from a considerable distance and provide an accurate fix on those sightings. S/E a/c could not.
> 
> If the RN had adopted specialised a/c like the spit or the hurricane in 1940, firstly they would have ridden into battle with no fighter able to do the job. Secondly, even if they had received specialist fighters, they would have had to reduce the fighter components from about 12 a/c per carrier, to 4 a/c per carrier. They would have needed a fighter, an observation or recce a/c and finally a light bomber, all of which were considered as essential for carrier ops at the time. 4/c were not able to provide a continuous cover for a fleet, whereas 12 had a better chance of doing something useful.


Indeed, it's those aspects that were argued rather definitively earlier in the thread and reflected different requirements than what the USN was managing.

It's also why I was suggesting the Hurricane compared to the Spitfire and Sea Gladiator, not claiming it could do what the Fulmar did.



> I simply am astounded that people would consider the Fulmar a failure. It was the most advanced fighter ready for squadron service aboard carriers for the allies in 1940. Martlets were at least 8 months away from achieving that, Buffaloes never achieved satisfactory results aboard carriers, at least british ones. It shot down at least 100 a/c by the end of 1940, more than were in frontline squadron service at the time


The British never got Navalized Buffalos, all their B339s were land based fighters stripped of naval equipment (including tailhook) and unsuitable for carrier landings, otherwise they may have actually been superior to several of the Martlet models. (probably any of the single stage R-1820/1830 powered early models and possibly the heavier F4F derived ones as well -F4F-3 would be the better performer though, maneuverability, visibility, and range aside)

Remember the B339 was based on the F2A-2 and like the Spitfire Mk.II and P-40B, was adapted for self sealing using laminated impregnated fabric/leather material covering the metal tanks. The engine used had 100 less HP for takeoff, but still much better power/weight than the Martlets.

I don't really see Sea Hurricanes being any worse performers than Martlets and potentially available in number sooner. Range/endurance would be the major weak point. (and a major strong point for the Buffalo with double the range/endurance and better all around view for patrol/scouting and overall situational awareness)

Of course, those still wouldn't be able to directly displace/replace the Fulmar and would be more comparable as alternatives to the Sea Gladiator and Martlet. (and while not having folding wings, the relatively short wings of the Buffalo would at least help somewhat, akin to the Gladiator)


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## Edgar Brooks (Jun 1, 2015)

One continual problem, with the Hurricane was balance, and a very touchy CoG. Incidentally, the metal wings were lighter than fabric-covered.
In France, armour couldn't be fitted behind the pilot until the two-blade prop was replaced by a heavier 3-blade. 
In the Sea Hurricane, the weight of the arrestor hook needed a metal prop as counter-balance. 
In the Air Ministry's push to have aircraft Griffon-powered, Camm was willing, even keen, to build a Hurricane, but it required an extra bay between cockpit and rear fuselage, and a raked-forward centre-section to get the wings, and consequently the CoG, far enough forward to act as balance. He was told to forget it, and concentrate on the Tornado/Typhoon.

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## EKB (Jun 1, 2015)

Anyone who bases arguments around un-named/anonymous sources has no business trying to define forum etiquette. 

Any person who posts BS should fully expect to be called out for it. 

Those of you who disagree with reality ought to find a different hobby.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 1, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> Why focus so much on the spitfire when the Hurricane would also have been markedly superior to the Fulmar, had larger production capacity, and had more carrier-friendly flying characteristics?



Once again there is a problem with timing. As has been mentioned British carriers had rather small aircraft capacity (in general 50 aircraft or less for the pre war carriers) so single purpose aircraft were not looked with favor. Granted they had used single seat, short range biplane fighters during the 20s and 30s but then there is only so much you can do with 500hp engines. with 1000hp engines you can consider more options and apparently the RN went for range and endurance so the fighters could be used as recon planes. The radio beacon system also meant that the two seat fighter was not tied to the carrier in terms of radius as much. 




kool kitty89 said:


> If the Americans were in the same position as the British, war involvement/pressure timeline wise, wouldn't the P-36, F2A, and B-23 be more the aircraft to ramp up production of in 1938/39, while investing more heavily in getting the P-40 and B-17 into mass production, and accelerating (or at least increasing funding to) the A-20, Grumman fighters, F4U, P-38, P-39, and P-43/44/P-47 projects. Maybe the Mustang gets more serious consideration too, but then that easily seems like it could still have been a victim of bureaucratic issues as easily as some British designs.



British were planning on ramping up "production" (actually adding dozen of squadrons with the man power that entails ) well before 1939.

From the RAF website " In 1934 42 squadrons existed providing a first line strength of some 800 aircraft. By 1939 this had grown to 157 squadrons and 3,700 aircraft."

If the US had been in a similar position (or even tried for 1/3 to 1/2 the British force) it could not wait for even the '1939 designs", in this case lets consider a plane that first flew in 1939 a 1939 "design" even if actual design work started 1 -2 years earlier. 
From Joe Baughers website on the B-23 "The USAAC was sufficiently intrigued by the Douglas proposal that they issued a change order in late 1938 in which the last 38 B-18As ordered under Contract AC9977 would be delivered as B-23s. Serials would be 39-27 thru 39-64. It was agreed that the usual prototype and service test phases would be skipped, and that all the aircraft would be delivered as production aircraft designated simply B-23." 
" The first B-23 (39-27) was completed in July of 1939,"
"The remaining 37 B-23s were delivered between February and September of 1940, replacing the Northrop A-17As of the 17th Bomb Group based at March Field."
The B-23 differed in a lot of ways from the B-18, one of which was the use of DC-3 wings instead of DC-2 wings but that means most of the engineering work for the wings was already done and the manufacturing tooling existed. 

While the F2A first flew in Dec 1937 the first squadron wasn't issued planes until Dec of 1939. Things didn't go smoothly for a number of reasons. 
"Wind tunnel tests carried out at Langley Field during May of 1938 indicated that the maximum speed of the XF2A-1 could be increased by 30 mph by improving the contours of the air intakes and exhaust outlet ducts, by modifying the fairings around the fuselage guns, and by installing undercarriage wheel covers. Although it was not practical to make all these recommended changes, the XF2A-1 was returned to the factory for an improvement in streamlining, a redesign of the engine cowling, and a reconfiguration of the carburetor and oil cooler air intakes."

Brewster didn't have teh factory space to handle the order and had to buy and equip factory space, The choice was bit short sighted. 

and more changes were made "A revised windscreen and canopy were installed, offering improved vision and head room. A telescopic gun sight was fitted. The radio mast was moved from the port side of the fuselage to the starboard side, and the wing tips were slightly reconfigured. The ventral window was enlarged. The first two F2A-1s were completed with the elliptical tail fin of the prototype, but all subsequent aircraft switched to a redesigned triangular fin with a straight leading edge which faired into the fuselage just behind the canopy."

Quotes from Joe Baugher's website. 



> With the need for bomber interceptors on the level of the BoB, might the P-39 and P-38 been pressed into production/service with more compromises?



the big reason for ordering 500+ P-40s in the Spring of 1939 was that _NONE_ of the other planes would be ready for one to two years. They built 13 P-39s in 1940, 10 of them in Dec. speeding up things by even 6 months gets you nowhere for 1939 and most of 1940. 



> Engine development may have accelerated and gotten more serious funding sooner as well ... or the Hyper engine project would have just sapped even more resources. (even so, sheer demand for volume production would have increased funding/spending and development interest and especially been significant in Allison's case with their more limited internal funds)



The models of engines that would have been placed in production in 1938/39 were not the models that went into production in 1940. And usually greatly accelerated production came at the cost of less research and development. The companies just didn't have enough engineers and many of them did double duty. Helping design the engines/airframes and then helping design the production tooling. AS the plants expanded and added workers (at all levels) the engineering/design depts could be separated better. 



> Might Brewster's management issues and inability to improve production volume or quality be exposed sooner? Perhaps more direct government intervention sooner, second sourced production, or even going so far as to encourage/coerce a merger with Grumman? (the Buffalo really was the only Brewster design to really be a compelling operational aircraft superior to alternatives at the time of its design and introduction)



Perhaps. The first contract for F2As was for 54 planes, Brewster also held a contract for $10 million worth of PBY parts. The contract for the 54 F2A-1 was placed June 11th 1938, Brewster purchases the vacant Pierce-Arrow auto factory on July 29th. Aug 1939 (over a year later) sees the British _start negotiating_ an order for 120 planes. Aug 1939 also sees Poland order 250 Buffaloes, obviously this order goes nowhere. The Americans decide to relinquish 43 Buffaloes to the Finns in Dec 1939. to be replaced by 43 F2A-2s. Belgium orders 40 panes in Dec 1939. England finally places their order for 120 planes in Jan 1940. May 10th sees Belgium fall and France takes over the Belgian order. May 1940 sees Brewster lease a 217,000 sq ft Hanger at Newark airport. The PBY parts contract is finished. June 1940 sees Brewster obtain a an 8 story 482,000sq ft ex-Ford building across the street from the original factory. 
Production starts and stops and change overs are made between the various versions. The US places their final order for 108 aircraft in Jan 1941. 

Now if the US had ordered 500 aircraft all at once instead of planes being ordered in dribs and drabs over 2 1/2 years Brewster _might_ have gotten a lot more serious about finding suitable factory space a lot sooner. But the chances of seeing more than a few dozen aircraft in 1939 are pretty slim unless you move the order date back to months before the June 11th 1938 date.


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## GrauGeist (Jun 1, 2015)

Ohhh...EKB, are you referring to me???


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## kool kitty89 (Jun 1, 2015)

Edgar Brooks said:


> One continual problem, with the Hurricane was balance, and a very touchy CoG. Incidentally, the metal wings were lighter than fabric-covered.
> In France, armour couldn't be fitted behind the pilot until the two-blade prop was replaced by a heavier 3-blade.
> In the Sea Hurricane, the weight of the arrestor hook needed a metal prop as counter-balance.
> In the Air Ministry's push to have aircraft Griffon-powered, Camm was willing, even keen, to build a Hurricane, but it required an extra bay between cockpit and rear fuselage, and a raked-forward centre-section to get the wings, and consequently the CoG, far enough forward to act as balance. He was told to forget it, and concentrate on the Tornado/Typhoon.


This is a better argument for the discontinuation of hurricane development than most of the others I've seen. My comments relating to leading/trailing edge wing root extensions might have gone part way to addressing those issues (along with possible total replacement of the outboard wings) but that wouldn't really help the griffon (or 2-stage merlin) getting nose heavier. Ballast is obviously a bad option as well. 

That said, heavier modifications to the wing as part ot eh Mk.II development might have been more worthwhile. (and perhaps replacing the rear fusalage fabric and wooden stringers with aluminum stringers/skin -or maybe cheaper steel stringers if all aluminum ended up being too light)

Anyway, it still makes me wonder even more about the potential for Hawker/Glosters resources put towards production of the F.5/34 airframe and derivatives thereof. (if converstion to the merlin went at least as smoothly as the P-36 to P-40 -and had been pursued early in development- it may have ended up a compelling replacement on the production line for the hurricane, perhaps enough to forgo production of the Hurricane II at all)


One other thing I'd forgotten about the Hurricane: the steel framework may have been more succeptible to corrosion from salt air and spray than an all aluminum plane. (same problem for the Sea Gladiator)








Shortround6 said:


> Brewster didn't have teh factory space to handle the order and had to buy and equip factory space, The choice was bit short sighted.


This is the big problem, even more so than any internal management issues (in fact, the strain on limited capacity may have exacerbated any management troubles). If they could have secure a second source for manufacturing (as with the earlier SBN), it may have been another matter, but short of that or supplying enough funds to allow Brewster to rapidly expand their own capacity, there's no way the Buffalo could ever cope with war-time production demands. Trying to use Brewster as a second source for Corsairs seems rather ludicrous as well, not just in hindsight but simply after all the messes with delays, low production volume, and quality control issues cropping up when production demands ramped up.

It didn't help that the F2A seems to have been less overengineered for structural strength than most other american aircraft.

Without expanded capacity, it may have been best if the Buffalo had been left as an export-only design, carrier capable or otherwise. (also probably not worth expanding the design beyond the Buffalo Mk.I specs, aside from offering a fully carrier capable counterpart to that model)

As things were, it may have been more worthwhile to keep the F2A-3 in production and canceling the SB2A. (or ever producing the Corsair)




> the big reason for ordering 500+ P-40s in the Spring of 1939 was that _NONE_ of the other planes would be ready for one to two years. They built 13 P-39s in 1940, 10 of them in Dec. speeding up things by even 6 months gets you nowhere for 1939 and most of 1940.


Indeed, there was no substitute for the P-40 ... or P-36 for that matter. Had P-36 orders been undertaken more seriously pre-war and largely replaced all obsolete aircraft (including those stationed at overseas territories), it may have made a good bit of difference for resisting the initial Japanese advance.



> The models of engines that would have been placed in production in 1938/39 were not the models that went into production in 1940. And usually greatly accelerated production came at the cost of less research and development. The companies just didn't have enough engineers and many of them did double duty. Helping design the engines/airframes and then helping design the production tooling. AS the plants expanded and added workers (at all levels) the engineering/design depts could be separated better.


That's another thing. Brewster didn't have the capacity to keep up with F2A development and production, let alone the slough of other designs they were developing (a few of which entered production). Had more effort been focused on the Buffalo alone, it might have made out better than it did.



> Now if the US had ordered 500 aircraft all at once instead of planes being ordered in dribs and drabs over 2 1/2 years Brewster _might_ have gotten a lot more serious about finding suitable factory space a lot sooner. But the chances of seeing more than a few dozen aircraft in 1939 are pretty slim unless you move the order date back to months before the June 11th 1938 date.


Indeed, and it seems more likely/plausible that licensing the F2A to at least one (more capable) second source would have addressed their production capacity issues, especially for aircraft intended for the USN and USMC. Leaving Brewster's own production to primarily cater to export buyers might have suited their limitations better.


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## pbehn (Jun 2, 2015)

Glider said:


> For the UK So many where do you start,
> 
> Botha, Albacore, Fulmar, Roc, Sterling, Whitley, Warwick, Albemarle, Battle, Defiant, Lerwick, Sea Otter, Albecore
> 
> The scary thing is that they all entered production, there not prototypes, the waste of resources is huge




With hindsight things are very easy. We now know that Germany invaded Poland in September 1939 and that France fell quickly in 1940.

It is fair to say the British were in a panic in the late 30s and anything is better than nothing. As others have said cancelling an aircraft doesnt mean getting more of another, the Roc was to be cancelled but production continued with the planes modified as target tugs. Most of aircraft considered better in performance in 1939/40 had Merlin engines so the problem is how to share out the Merlins. There are other political considerations. If the Skua was cancelled in favour of a modified hurricane for example. The Skua was used to protect Scapa flow, if it was protected by hurricanes would these be included in Dowdings last reserve when he turned off the "Hurricane tap". Britains front line strength at the start of the BoB had nothing to do with purchasing and everything to do with Anglo French politics.


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## Glider (Jun 2, 2015)

pbehn said:


> With hindsight things are very easy. We now know that Germany invaded Poland in September 1939 and that France fell quickly in 1940.
> 
> It is fair to say the British were in a panic in the late 30s and anything is better than nothing. As others have said cancelling an aircraft doesnt mean getting more of another, the Roc was to be cancelled but production continued with the planes modified as target tugs. Most of aircraft considered better in performance in 1939/40 had Merlin engines so the problem is how to share out the Merlins. There are other political considerations. If the Skua was cancelled in favour of a modified hurricane for example. The Skua was used to protect Scapa flow, if it was protected by hurricanes would these be included in Dowdings last reserve when he turned off the "Hurricane tap". Britains front line strength at the start of the BoB had nothing to do with purchasing and everything to do with Anglo French politics.



A lot of good comments but some I would disagree with. The Skua wasn't on my list, in fact its one I would increase production of simply because it was quite a good dive bomber and would have done a lot better than the Battle. The Lerwick, Botha, Albermarle, Warwick and Albercore were never going to improve the situation and the waste in design, factory space/tools and production was huge.

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## tomo pauk (Jun 2, 2015)

Just to add that I'd go with Skua production so the FAA can have more dive bombers around. As a land based crate, it won't work unless/until some good fighter cover is provided.


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## pbehn (Jun 2, 2015)

Glider said:


> A lot of good comments but some I would disagree with. The Skua wasn't on my list, in fact its one I would increase production of simply because it was quite a good dive bomber and would have done a lot better than the Battle. The Lerwick, Botha, Albermarle, Warwick and Albercore were never going to improve the situation and the waste in design, factory space/tools and production was huge.



In truth nothing was going to improve anything until night time navigation was mastered, all sides had to learn that bombers didnt get through in daylight without escorts.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 3, 2015)

Glider said:


> The Skua wasn't on my list, in fact its one I would increase production of simply because it was quite a good dive bomber and would have done a lot better than the Battle. The Lerwick, Botha, Albermarle, Warwick and Albercore were never going to improve the situation and the waste in design, factory space/tools and production was huge.



The Lerwick is pretty much a red herring. They only built 21 of them. On a per pound basis you might get 11-13 Sunderlands instead? 

2nd squadron issued Lerwicks (and first and only one to go operational) was flying Singapores.
View attachment 294068


ANd you get into the question of how much material was pre-ordered or being worked into shape before they found out how bad it was. 

The Albermarle kind of shows up several things about British procurement. It shows how desperate they were and shows the uncertainty about the future. Design work starts in 1937/38 with mock ups completed in June of 1938. For context The first Hampden flew in May of 1938 and the first squadron to get Hampdens _starts _to get them in Sept of 1938. 200 Albermarles are ordered in Oct 1938 pretty much from drawing board/mock up. Now from Wiki "The aircraft was always expected to be of use as a contingency, and to be less than ideal." It was planned to use steel and wood construction to save light alloys and be built by firms/shops not normally used by the aircraft industry. Now in 1938/early 1939 nobody _KNEW_ what aluminum production would be like in 1942/43. Nobody _KNEW_ what problems the Hercules would have going into production or what the power levels would actually be in 1942/43. And nobody _KNEW_ how well or how much the British aircraft industry could be expanded in next 3-4 years. The US was about 1 3/4 years from throwing it's own money into massive orders and 3 years away from Pearl Harbor and joining the war. 
For contingency plans to really work you have to do more than put them on paper. You need to stock supplies and/or tools of the type needed for the plan. You have to at least build prototypes to see if it is going to work as needed. Waiting for the day you need it is a poor time to start. A bit like planing for a storm disaster. _Planing_ to buy a generator in case of a power outage caused by a storm is just the first step in contingency planning. Waiting to stand in line behind 50 other people in the rain as the storm approaches is not good execution of the plan. Buying the generator before storm season and having every storm miss you by hundreds of miles _might_ be considered a waste of money and storage space. 
The Warwick kind of got caught in the engine problem the British had. It used a lot of common parts with the Wellington. Outer wings were the same and a good portion of the fuselage was the same, extra plugs being inserted to get the extra length. The Three British "big" engines were all late in development and a bit down on anticipated power. The American replacement, the R-2800, was also down in power from what was needed. BIG twins are not really a good idea as they almost always are under-powered if they loose an engine. Had the Warwick been able to go into service with 2200-2400hp engines instead of 1850hp engines is reputation might be somewhat better than it is now. The Warwick was sort of a low cost/low investment back up to the Manchester. However do to the engine problems (and other war work) it took 35 months to go from first prototype flight to 1st squadron use. At which time it had been passed by.


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## Glider (Jun 3, 2015)

I totally agree about the almost panic situation that British aircraft procurement was in during the lead up to war. However it doesn't stop it being a huge waste of resources. The Lerwick was as you say only produced in very small numbers but the design, testing and production facilities are the same if 21 or 1021 are built and that was the waste. The situation is similar for the vast majority of aircraft on the list. 
Staying with the Lerwick as one example, if you can produce the facilities to build the Lerwick you would be better off with another production line for the Sunderland. The design and testing staff could well have been put to use in other areas of the aircraft industry.

We all know of the various 'backup' designs the RAF had for fighters none of which entered production. For some reason the bomber 'backup' designs seem to have been built resulting in considerable waste.


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## pbehn (Jun 3, 2015)

Glider said:


> I totally agree about the almost panic situation that British aircraft procurement was in during the lead up to war. However it doesn't stop it being a huge waste of resources. The Lerwick was as you say only produced in very small numbers but the design, testing and production facilities are the same if 21 or 1021 are built and that was the waste. The situation is similar for the vast majority of aircraft on the list.
> Staying with the Lerwick as one example, if you can produce the facilities to build the Lerwick you would be better off with another production line for the Sunderland. The design and testing staff could well have been put to use in other areas of the aircraft industry.
> 
> We all know of the various 'backup' designs the RAF had for fighters none of which entered production. For some reason the bomber 'backup' designs seem to have been built resulting in considerable waste.



What would those resources have been put into? Any bomber programme culminates with the Lancaster Halifax but they need the navigation systems and experience of the crews because every plane flew alone at night. As I said before it is easy to judge with hind sight in the late 1930s how could anyone decide what could or would work without trying it? Many things were tried and some failed. I doubt anyone in senior positions in the RAF in 1939 would have believed that the Spitfire would still be at the forefront as a fighter in 1945, the technology for merlin and the griffon was in its favour. Similarly with the Typhoon and Manchester the technology of the Vulture/Sabre was against their prospects.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 3, 2015)

Glider said:


> I totally agree about the almost panic situation that British aircraft procurement was in during the lead up to war. However it doesn't stop it being a huge waste of resources. The Lerwick was as you say only produced in very small numbers but the design, testing and production facilities are the same if 21 or 1021 are built and that was the waste. The situation is similar for the vast majority of aircraft on the list.
> Staying with the Lerwick as one example, if you can produce the facilities to build the Lerwick you would be better off with another production line for the Sunderland. The design and testing staff could well have been put to use in other areas of the aircraft industry.
> 
> We all know of the various 'backup' designs the RAF had for fighters none of which entered production. For some reason the bomber 'backup' designs seem to have been built resulting in considerable waste.



The facility that built the Lerwick already existed. It had built small numbers of 5-6 different flying boat designs by Saunders-Roe over the ten years before the Lerwick showed up. It was used to build Supermarine Walruses and Sea Otters thus freeing up Supermarine for Spitfire production. Saunders-Roe had another works in Beaumaris, Anglesey, and that one did conversion work and serviced RAF Catalina Flying boats. 

The "Bomber Boys" tended to get what they wanted because it was _only_ the bombers that could guarantee the future of RAF as an independent branch of the Military and put it on an equal footing to the Navy and Army. Army co-operation was seen as the path to being placed under overall Army control. Sub hunting and coastal Patrol had the danger of making them subordinate to the Navy. Anti bomber work (bomber interception) was good but it wasn't enough. The RAF had to be seen as a war fighting and war _winning _ force all on it's own in order to gain equal footing and prestige with the other two services. 

I tend not to be too critical of some pre-war designs because sometimes the knowledge just wasn't there yet. How seaplanes handled on the water was still the subject of much experimentation Consolidated went from getting a pretty good plane in the water, the PBY, to an lousy one, the XPB2Y-1






Which had to be changed into this





and still was not 100% satisfactory. 

The Botha is another story, Increasing the size and weight of the aircraft while providing no additional power (?) OK The Taurus engines were expected to be short supply but flying under powered planes isn't going to end well. The poor visibility from the cockpit and observer windows/stations should have been figured out in the mock up stage, that is one reason to do mock ups, to catch 3 dimensional problems that don't show upon flat drawings. A Lockheed Hudson weighed about the same as a Botha but the Botha only had about 85% of the power and that is against Hudsons with 1100hp engines. You don't need a lot of specialized knowledge to know that an 18,000lb airplane with a pair of 750hp for take-off engines is a disaster waiting to happen. Less than 70% of the power of the Hudson for take-off. Throw in the very strong possibility of the Botha not being able to feather the prop on a dead engine and it's production and use was just short of criminal.


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## pbehn (Jun 3, 2015)

Shortround.....excellent post and information but may I add the political imperative. Britain needed to hit back at Germany, planes that could do it and people willing to do it were therefore given priority, sometimes perhaps unwisely. Flying boats were a technology overtaken by time and runways and many countries went down the spruce goose route, maybe you have to build one to realise how impractical they are.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 3, 2015)

Thank you the compliment. Pre Sept 1939 the "bomber boys" got a lot of "stuff" without actually having to hit back at Germany. They did have to get ready and that is were the 2 stage Merlins went (and there weren't that many in 1939). it is were the bulk of the 2 pitch props went and most of the pathetically small number constant speed props. By the winter of 1940 Bomber Command was about the only way to hit back but they still got a bit more than their fair share. 

The Problem I have with some of the pre-war decisions wasn't so much the type of aircraft but the almost blatant disregard for the crews while pursuing production numbers with the zeal of a Russian Factory manager with a NKVD man sitting in his office polishing his gun. 
Botha aside, most British twins were under powered (OK so were many other 1938-39-40 twins) but the HP ratings don't show by how much. Wright had gone to 2 speed superchargers. Armstrong Siddeley had on the Tiger but that was like chrome plating a car with a blown engine. The Mercury used in the Blenheim was rated at 840hp at 14,000ft which is bordering on remarkable. What wasn't remarkable was but certainly understandable was the 725hp they gave for take-off on 87 octane fuel. 
Put that together with 2 position props that won't feather and single engine performance was, shall we say, less than remarkable, as in some British twins could not maintain height on one engine which makes twin engine safety something of an illusion.
Many twins did not have duplicate accessories. One engine having the generator and hydraulic pump making an engine out situation a 50/50 crap shoot. The Hudson at about 18,000-18,500lbs had 2200hp for take-off with a pair of Cyclones. A Wellington on 87 octane had 1930hp for plane that went 26,000-30,000lbs. 

AS for flying boats you are right, time and runways. Without WW II scattering concrete (or at least metal mat) runways thousands of feet long all around the world the Flying boat might have enjoyed another 5-15 years. 

Saunders_Roe came back from the Lerwick with this.


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## nuuumannn (Jun 3, 2015)

Good info as always SR. The Botha has been described as novel, yet fundamentally flawed, which is an apt description. Its badly underpowered engines were only the start of its woes; poor visibility other than forward, although in the A&AEE report on the Botha following trials at Boscombe Down it was stated that if the pilot stands up he can see aft to the tail!; here's some more comments "uncomfortable to fly: bad in pitch and yaw", "poor view from the cockpit makes it useless as a GR aircraft", "deficient in longitudinal stability and there is barely sufficient elevator control" and so on.Apparently the cockpit was subject to filling up with carbon monoxide with the close proximity of the engines. If ever there was an aeroplane that _should _have been cancelled because alarm bells were ringing about it at the time, then it was the Botha.

As for the Albemarle, even AW's own designer was less than interested in it, showing no enthusiasm for continuing its design.

Another aircraft that might have been cancelled if it weren't for the pressures of war was the Halifax. Have we covered that yet?


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## Ottobon (Jun 4, 2015)

I like BF 109s quite a bit, but if canceling them, or atleast reducing Willie Messerchmitts weight with RLM would of let the FW 190C, Fiat G.56, and He 100 develop into actual fighter aircraft i would of happily have seen some of Messerscmitts projects cancelled and or backing reduced if we are strictly talking aircraft. 

In the real world i'd rather the Germans NOT have better aircraft in the 1940s, but it would of been amazing to think of what any of those three aircraft could of developed into.

I suppose if not the BF 109 (not perfect or extraordinary in late war but it was atleast "good enough") then the Me 210 (and therfor 410) if it meant the FW 190C would of been been introduced sooner and thus the Doras somehow even better by late war. If i could have anything it would be a fully developed He 100 though, specifically if they could of somehow maintained the relatively light weight but boosted power a bit. I suppose in that sense the Fiat G.56 may be better as it was basically already fitted with a engine that had room to further improve compared to the He 100 which i have heard came with what was considered a "sick" engine. 


Just really basic opinion i have held for awhile, despite my actual liking of BF 109. 


Feel free to correct me if I'm being silly because i will fully admit i am not a expert on WWII aircraft.

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## SpicyJuan11 (Jun 4, 2015)

Ottobon said:


> I suppose in that sense the Fiat G.56 may be better as it was basically already fitted with a engine that had room to further improve compared to the He 100 which i have heard came with what was considered a "sick" engine.



The G.56 came in 1944, a full 6 years after the He 100 first flew, also the He 100 probably could've been upgraded, albeit with pretty radical changes (something along the lines of the changes from Bf 109E to F or Fw 190A to C/D).


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## Ottobon (Jun 4, 2015)

SpicyJuan11 said:


> The G.56 came in 1944, a full 6 years after the He 100 first flew, also the He 100 probably could've been upgraded, albeit with pretty radical changes (something along the lines of the changes from Bf 109E to F or Fw 190A to C/D).



My point was only that all 3 of those aircraft basically, atleast so far as i can tell, were turned down largely in part because of Willie Messerschmitt fiddling. 

Although again if i am wrong and it was more complicated then that i'd love to learn, working on fairly limited info.

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## nuuumannn (Jun 4, 2015)

> Saunders_Roe came back from the Lerwick with this.



I should interject and state that the Princess was the product of Arthur Gouge, who was chief designer at Short Brothers until 1944, being responsible for the Sunderland family - and the Stirling.


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## Koopernic (Jun 4, 2015)

Greyman said:


> Quick estimates - mostly based on data from over at the great WWII Aircraft Performance website.
> 
> It's not pixel-perfect to the data but the idea is there:
> 
> ...



I have two issue's with it.

Firstly:
No doubt the 'cleaned up Typhoon' was faster but the curves you are showing are a self made extrapolation achieved by shifting a graph from the ww2performance testing website by an amount obtained from a improved Typhoon at one speed point, 8000ft, and assuming the change in speed is the same at every altitude.

Secondly:
The curves don't do justice to the Fw 190;

In late 1943 the Fw 190 series received two quite independent power boosting systems not reflected in the above curves. These systems were the outcome of work done by the Luftwaffe at Rechlin, Focke-Wulf and BMW.

For the Fw 190F (and G) which were the ground attack versions (the former heavily armoured, the latter equipped for long range strike) "C3 einspritzung" was added, this roughly translates as "C3 injection". In this system a fuel line was run to the nose of the aircraft where the engine air intake was and during an emergency the pilot could pull on a knob labelled:

Erhöhte Notleistung (increased emergency power)
Ziehen (pull)
1,65 ata 2700 U/min (1.65ata 2700rpm

and two things would happen: firstly a large portion of the fuel would be diverted from the multi point injection system and a rich mixture was injected into the inlet. The rich mixture increased knock rating but also precooled the air thereby contracting it and allowing the subsequent supercharger to force more into the engine.

A Fw 190F would loose 50km/h when carrying 3 x SC250 kg bombs but with C3 enspritzung 45km/h would be restored. The system had some altitude restriction, ie use below 1200m or so was allowed only. It increased power to nearly 2050ps.

A fw 190 with this system could do 361 mph (for an A8) and 359 (for an A9) at sea level. (adding about 9-10 mph to your curves)

The other system was known as increased boost and was used on the fighter versions. This involved increased boost to 1.57 ata in 1st gear and 1.65 ata in 2nd gear simply by increasing the boost rating (the fuel line was not needed) this increase power from 1700 or so to 1900.

Both seems to have been made possible by the improved rating of C3 fuel which went from about 94/115 to 96/125 by 1943.

The two systems were combined by mid 1944 in Fw 190A8 with BMW 801D2 engines. Production then switched to the Fw 190A9 with the 801TS engine (there was a TQ as well). This engine removed the time restrictions and although no faster at sea level was much faster at intermediate and high altitude.

A clean up of the Fw 190 was also possible, one can imagine removing the cowling guns. 

Do you know of how many cleaned up typhoons' entered service? The performance estimates you claim would suggest a Typhoon was as fast as a Tempest V and suggest that with 150PN number fuel it tool would reach 400mph at sea level. If that is the case, why bother with the Tempest V at all?

If you eliminate this cleaned up Typhoon the figures for the Typhoon show no advantage at all at low altitude and certainly non at high altitude.


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## Greyman (Jun 4, 2015)

Koopernic said:


> Firstly:
> No doubt the 'cleaned up Typhoon' was faster but the curves you are showing are a self made extrapolation achieved by shifting a graph from the ww2performance testing website by an amount obtained from a improved Typhoon at one speed point, 8000ft, and assuming the change in speed is the same at every altitude.



I think the change in speed would be approximately the same at every altitude. Generally the 'shape' of speed curves don't change very much unless there is a power plant change (or the power plant is giving different power/rpm output).

But, as you said: self-made extrapolation (by a complete layman at that).




Koopernic said:


> Secondly:
> The curves don't do justice to the Fw 190;



Entirely possible. I just did a quick glance at WWII Aircraft Performance and grabbed a couple of Fw 190 curves I saw. My intention wasn't to give an exhaustive, comprehensive look at the speeds of the Typhoon and Fw 190 - it was just a response to "_...it never was faster than the Fw 190 at any altitude despite the boasts..._"

Tests during the war and the Luftwaffe themselves thought differently.




Koopernic said:


> Do you know of how many cleaned up typhoons' entered service? The performance estimates you claim would suggest a Typhoon was as fast as a Tempest V and suggest that with 150PN number fuel it tool would reach 400mph at sea level. If that is the case, why bother with the Tempest V at all?
> 
> If you eliminate this cleaned up Typhoon the figures for the Typhoon show no advantage at all at low altitude and certainly non at high altitude.



The page I linked with the Typhoon figures lists the production blocks with some of the manufacturing changes listed. How many were retrofitted in the field I have no idea. A subject I'd like to look in to more in the future.

With regard to the Tempest, keep in mind the Tempest is the Typhoon. It would make sense that if you incorporated many of the improvements that made the Tempest faster to the Typhoon - there would be a similar improvement.

That said there were many more improvements to various aspects of the Tempest, and a good overview can be seen in the Tempest trials at the AFDU. Tempest V Performance Data


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## stona (Jun 4, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> The "Bomber Boys" tended to get what they wanted because it was _only_ the bombers that could guarantee the future of RAF as an independent branch of the Military and put it on an equal footing to the Navy and Army.



This is a misconception. Bomber Command had to fight tooth and nail for everything it got, certainly motivated by that imperative, particularly in the face of such poor results in the first two years of the war.

The 'Bomber Boys' couldn't even keep hold of the men coming from its own OTUs at the very time it was attempting a huge expansion. From April 1941 it had to provide several, repeated, personnel draughts. It provided men to the MTO, to the Atlantic ferrying organisation and also three squadrons to Coastal Command. For the year 1941 of the 17 squadrons raised from Bomber Command's OTUs ALL went to other Commands.

Throughout 1941 Bomber Command saw a steady decline in its capability. Only 41 heavy bombers were produced in 1940 and just 498 in 1941. In August 1941 Bomber Command lost 525 bombers destroyed or severely damaged (more than that years total production) and received just 106 replacements. The '4,000 bomber plan' was really dependant on the availability to the British of US aircraft. The Slessor-Arnold agreement was to supply the British with US bombers from US production at a 50-50 ratio. In April 1941 Arnold agreed that four fifths of US bomber production would go to Britain. In August 1941, at the Argentia Summit, the Americans reneged on the deal, offering just 238 bombers (rather than 800+) with no further deliveries beyond July 1942.

Bomber Command never had enough aircraft. This caused an odd problem, the opposite problem to that the Luftwaffe had in 1940; by the end of 1941 the British had a stockpile of more than two million bombs of all types which it did not have the ability to drop. Monthly production was double monthly expenditure.

You can see why I find the popular 'Bomber Command took precedence over everyone else' trend hard to agree with  
I often read about how resources would have been better spent on Coastal Command, fighting the U-Boats in the Atlantic. I would ask what resources and how was this fight to be carried out? Britain had neither the means nor the technology to fight this battle at the time.

There was also a large political element to the early bombing campaign that certainly helped Bomber Command to fight its corner. The one military promise that Churchill made in his speech on 22nd June following the German invasion of the USSR was _'to bomb Germany by day as well as by night with ever increasing measure'_. On 7th July Churchill sent a telegram to Stalin explaining that the best Britain could offer as direct military assistance to the USSR was bombing which Churchill thought would divert German fighters to the west and ease the pressure on the Soviet front.
Stalin replied, unsurprisingly, that he would prefer Britain to open a second front in northern France or Scandinavia which says more about Stalin's ignorance of the situation in which Britain found herself than it does about his grasp of reality. Nonetheless it was the bombing of Germany that was offered as help and though the RAF still lacked the ability to carry out a meaningful campaign it would do what it could.

Cheers

Steve


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## kool kitty89 (Jun 4, 2015)

Ottobon said:


> I suppose in that sense the Fiat G.56 may be better as it was basically already fitted with a engine that had room to further improve compared to the He 100 which i have heard came with what was considered a "sick" engine.


The DB-605 was the sick engine, the preceding 601 was not and it had 2-300 more horse power to gain and improved altitude performance compared to the versions used on the He 100. (record setting versions aside)


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## Shortround6 (Jun 4, 2015)

stona said:


> This is a misconception. Bomber Command had to fight tooth and nail for everything it got, certainly motivated by that imperative, particularly in the face of such poor results in the first two years of the war.



The 'Bomber Boys' couldn't even keep hold of the men coming from its own OTUs at the very time it was attempting a huge expansion. From April 1941 it had to provide several, repeated, personnel draughts. It provided men to the MTO, to the Atlantic ferrying organisation and also three squadrons to Coastal Command. For the year 1941 of the 17 squadrons raised from Bomber Command's OTUs ALL went to other Commands.

Throughout 1941 Bomber Command saw a steady decline in its capability. Only 41 heavy bombers were produced in 1940 and just 498 in 1941. In August 1941 Bomber Command lost 525 bombers destroyed or severely damaged (more than that years total production) and received just 106 replacements. The '4,000 bomber plan' was really dependant on the availability to the British of US aircraft. The Slessor-Arnold agreement was to supply the British with US bombers from US production at a 50-50 ratio. In April 1941 Arnold agreed that four fifths of US bomber production would go to Britain. In August 1941, at the Argentia Summit, the Americans reneged on the deal, offering just 238 bombers (rather than 800+) with no further deliveries beyond July 1942.

Bomber Command never had enough aircraft. This caused an odd problem, the opposite problem to that the Luftwaffe had in 1940; by the end of 1941 the British had a stockpile of more than two million bombs of all types which it did not have the ability to drop. Monthly production was double monthly expenditure.

You can see why I find the popular 'Bomber Command took precedence over everyone else' trend hard to agree with  
I often read about how resources would have been better spent on Coastal Command, fighting the U-Boats in the Atlantic. I would ask what resources and how was this fight to be carried out? Britain had neither the means nor the technology to fight this battle at the time.

There was also a large political element to the early bombing campaign that certainly helped Bomber Command to fight its corner. The one military promise that Churchill made in his speech on 22nd June following the German invasion of the USSR was _'to bomb Germany by day as well as by night with ever increasing measure'_. On 7th July Churchill sent a telegram to Stalin explaining that the best Britain could offer as direct military assistance to the USSR was bombing which Churchill thought would divert German fighters to the west and ease the pressure on the Soviet front.
Stalin replied, unsurprisingly, that he would prefer Britain to open a second front in northern France or Scandinavia which says more about Stalin's ignorance of the situation in which Britain found herself than it does about his grasp of reality. Nonetheless it was the bombing of Germany that was offered as help and though the RAF still lacked the ability to carry out a meaningful campaign it would do what it could.

Cheers

Steve[/QUOTE]

Thank you but we have a difference in time here. I could still be wrong but the "Bomber boys" were getting their way in the late 30s and first year of so of the war. As the actual conditions of war sank in and everyone realized that the vast (seemingly at the time) number of pre-war bombers (Battles, Blenheims, Hampdens, and early Wellingtons) weren't actually much good at daylight bombing (the bomber was NOT always going to get through) and with new strategic threats cropping up (U-Boat bases in France instead of U-boats having to cross the North sea) AND distance from Germany no longer aiding the aerial defense of Britain and the other theaters opening up (MTO) everybody's (Army and Navy let alone other branches of the RAF) resources were stretched thin. 

Some of Bomber Commands woe's in 1941 are the result of enemy action, both of Short's factories having been hit by bombs in 1940 which not only destroyed about a squadrons worth of planes but delayed production by several months (or up to year, depending on account) this would certainly affect Stirling numbers in 1941. Not sure how many other factories got hit in 1940/41. Delays in Hercules production didn't help Bomber command in 1940-41. There is a lot stuff written about Stirlings getting priority for Hercules engines and that is why Beaufighters got Merlins and why Wellingtons got Merlins (and P W R-1830s) but I don't know if that is true or just a bit of cover for the general shortage of Hercules engines at the time. With Merlins needed for Halifax production I don't know what the trade off was and it might change from month to month. 
Bomber Command wanting things and getting things changed from the Pre-war days. Of course other services had to give up a lot of things they "wanted" to. RN gave up on Lion Class battleships and any new "heavy" cruisers. The RN was lucky they were getting light AA guns for existing ships. A WW I 3in AA gun for a destroyer with the gun captain's wetted finger held high for fire control (an exaggeration) was hardly what was actually needed and was much more in the way of moral support for the crew than any real expectation of shooting down enemy aircraft. 

The argument over more squadrons for coastal command can go both ways. 3-4 squadrons might have made a large difference in the early days but then, as you say, Bomber command didn't have a lot of squadrons to give. However even Whitleys or Wellingtons would have been ever so much better than Ansons. Even if they couldn't close the Atlantic gap (a dream of armchair generals and admirals in many threads) extending air coverage even 200 miles on each side of the Atlantic means about a full days sailing under air cover on each side of the gap. That would have reduced sinkings and THAT is what air cover was about. Not actually killing U-boats. Killing one was sort of bonus and, as you say, needed better technology that came in the later years. Forcing them under water limited their mobility and their vision or ability to detect convoys making them much less effective and that could be done with the technology of the time. It was done in WW I. In late 1940 or a good part of 1941 4 squadrons of twin engine bombers wasn't going to change the bombing campaign over Germany by much.


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## stona (Jun 4, 2015)

I don't agree with that either. There was a wide gap between the strategic vision at the heart of the inter war RAF and the reality of Britain's bombing capability and defence strategy in the 1930s. Imperial air policing (undertaken in ideal weather conditions with little or no opposition and from low level) did little to persuade Britain's military leaders to bank everything on the bomber. Fear of being bombed, particularly once Nazi Germany had been identified as the most likely opponent in the mid 1930s was a powerful spur to alter Britain's priorities in the air to ones that were more defensive. Most here will be aware of the dire prognostications, not just in Britain by the military Joint Planning Committee report of 1934, for the sort of damage and casualties expected to be inflicted by bombing. It was why in 1937 Inskip told the RAF that its role was not to inflict a knock out blow on the enemy (which it couldn't do anyway) but to _"prevent the Germans from knocking us out"._
The Committee for Imperial Defence spelt out guidelines for air strategy which required the RAF to support the navy and army (a bitter pill for the relatively newly independent service), defend the mainland United Kingdom from aerial attack and finally to inflict damage on the enemy's strike force. Instructions were given to prepare for a possible attack on German industry in the Ruhr, but only after political permission was given and *only after the RAF met its other commitments.*
Despite the prevailing feeling within the service that bombing was what the air force should do, the British defence chiefs insisted on a more balanced force. Between 1937 and the outbreak of the war this meant that the lion's share of resources went to Fighter Command, the air defence network and civil defence. Once again the "Bomber Boys" certainly did not get what they wanted.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Jun 4, 2015)

Lions share?

In Sept 1938 16 squadrons had Blenheim Mk 1s in service at home, they may not have been fully equipped with them. By the end of 1939 most (all?) these squadrons had been re-equipped with MK IV Blenheims. and in 1939 some Hurricanes and SPits were getting the two blade propeller.

176 Vickers Wellesley bombers are built between March of 1937 and May of 1938

50 Bristol Bombay bombers. 

178 of the dreaded Hawker Hectors were built Granted not for bomber Command. 

Sept 1939 saw 15 Squadrons regular bomber squadrons equipped with Fairey Battles. 

Out break of the war saw 7 heavy bomber squadrons equipped with Whitley MK IIIs and IVs. The MK Is and IIs already withdrawn for operational service. 

8 squadrons of Wellingtons were in service on Sept 1939 or perhaps 8 squadrons had received Wellingtons which is not the same. 

5 bomber Squadrons had Handley Page Harrows at the start of the war.

10 Bomber squadrons had received Handley Page Hampdens by the start of the war even if some were not declared operational on them yet. 

I think that is around 60 bomber squadrons in Service in Sept or by the end of 1939. (I didn't count the Hectors) 
This does not count the effort going into the next generation of bombers (Manchester, Warwick, Stirling,Halifax). The "Bomber Boys" may NOT have been getting what they _wanted_ but they were far from being a red headed step child begging for scraps. One does not go from a small force of Biplane bombers to dozens of squadrons of 4 engine monoplanes in just a few years and while many of Bomber Command's aircraft in 1939 were unsuitable for the coming war that does not mean they didn't exist or resources were not spent on them. 

There well have been a gap (and a big one) between Bomber Command's Strategic Vision of the 1930s and Britain's bombing capability in 1939 and 1940 but Bomber Command had certainly been building up numbers of squadrons (even if ill equipped) in pursuit of their goal, it is much easier to re-equip squadrons than create them from scratch, especially if you are equipping them with complex aircraft like 4 engine bombers with power turrets.


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## Juha (Jun 4, 2015)

Hello Shortround
Bombays were first transports and only secondary bombers, they were based on the Specification C. something


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## Shortround6 (Jun 4, 2015)

Juha said:


> Hello Shortround
> Bombays were first transports and only secondary bombers, they were based on the Specification C. something



You say potato, I say pototo, you say tamato, I say tamoto. 

The Bombay was designed to a specification that saw the Handley Page Harrow and the Armstrong Siddeley A.S. 23. The A.S. 23 turned into the Whitley. It took 4 years from flight of the prototype Bombay to deliveries of production versions. Why it took 2 years from flight of prototype to even order production examples I have no idea. Had it gone into service in 1937 it would have been no more obsolete as a bomber than the Ju 52s used in Spain. The Stirling had the same requirement to carry 24 troops, at least start. 
By the time the Bombay was built and issued it did make even the Wellesley look good. 
If people don't want to count it fine. 58 Squadrons of Bombers in the fall of 1939?

Bomber Command may not have been getting their dream machines (1935-39 equivalents of the HP V/1500) but they were certainly getting a big piece of the pie.

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## stona (Jun 5, 2015)

By November 1938 there was a complete switch of emphasis to Fighter Command. When Kingsley Wood announced the latest expansion scheme to parliament (Scheme M) he said.

_"I propose to give the highest priority to the strengthening of our fighter force, that force which is designed to meet the invading bomber in the air."_

There had been a complete 'volte-face' from Baldwin's earlier dictum 'the bomber will always get through'. It was not random. Advances in technology, not least in fighter aircraft themselves, now allowed the possibility that the bomber might indeed be effectively opposed, at least in daylight.

Cheers

Steve


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## Juha (Jun 5, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> Y... It took 4 years from flight of the prototype Bombay to deliveries of production versions. Why it took 2 years from flight of prototype to even order production examples I have no idea. Had it gone into service in 1937 it would have been no more obsolete as a bomber than the Ju 52s used in Spain. The Stirling had the same requirement to carry 24 troops, at least start... If people don't want to count it fine. 58 Squadrons of Bombers in the fall of 1939?...



IIRC after Bombay won the production order they found out that Bristol had its hands full with Blenheim production and after a while the production was given to Harland and Wolff in Belfast but it had problems with the production of 7 ? spars wings of the Bombay and that delayed the production still further. And Bombay was a kind of RAF's reply to the LW's Ju 52s.


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## Edgar Brooks (Jun 5, 2015)

The Bombay was in response to a 1931 Air Ministry requirement for a "twin-engine bomber-transport monoplane for use *principally in tropical climates*." An added item was that "The aircraft is to be easy to maintain and repair in the field under desert conditions," which hardly sounds as if it was designed with a view to bombing Germany. The prototype first flew 23-6-35, and spent a year on trials at Martlesham Heath, where tail surfaces and airscrews were changed, and more powerful Pegasus XXIIs and hydraulic turrets fitted.
The A.W.23 (Armstrong-Whitworth, not Armstrong-Siddeley) was loaned to Air Refuelling Ltd., as a tanker aircraft. It was later developed, for a 1936 specification, into the A.W.38 Whitley.
The H.P.51 was withdrawn, but also went to Martlesham Heath and was employed on a variety of tasks. It was developed for a 1935 specification into the H.P.54 Harrow.


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## Juha (Jun 5, 2015)

Yes indeed, the Specs was C.26/31 and Bombays were intended for ME use, but when the war broke out some were kept in the UK to transport supplies and personel between the UK and France. And the factory which produced them was Short and Harland Ltd at Belfast, formed by Short Brothers Ltd and Harland Wolff Ltd who operated the new Government-owned 'shadow-factory' there, and yes, it was the complex wing structure that delayed production at Belfast.


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## merlin (Jun 5, 2015)

stona said:


> By November 1938 there was a complete switch of emphasis to Fighter Command. When Kingsley Wood announced the latest expansion scheme to parliament (Scheme M) he said.
> 
> _"I propose to give the highest priority to the strengthening of our fighter force, that force which is designed to meet the invading bomber in the air."_
> 
> ...



Whilst, on face value, the Government's intention was to strengthen Fighter Command. But that was just the by-product - the real intention, was to delay the 4-engine bomber programme with the huge expenditure that that would entail. After all, if that was in process and War did not happen!? So by buying more aircraft - s/e - it gave the illusion, that the RAF was getting stronger and more powerful. Fortunately, this 'by-product' worked out in Britain's favour.


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## merlin (Jun 5, 2015)

My thoughts:
UK.
AW Albermarle - doesn't exist - the original spec. for a medium bomber using non-strategic materials is fulfilled by De Havilland = Mosquito slightly earlier.
Blackburn (not a success story) - *Roc* (words fail me),either convert back to *Skua*, or at an stage - Bomber Command protest all gun-turret production should be allocated to their aircraft, *Skua* - starts getting replaced in mid-1940 by the Henley, and *Botha* - plenty been said already - why did it get an order!?
Bristol Blenheim - in production too long, should have been replaced earlier.

To be continued - need to feed the cat.


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## pbehn (Jun 5, 2015)

Many of the comments here about Bomber/Fighter/Coastal command merely reflect the changing reality from the theory of waging war with Germany on land in Belgium and France while raiding by air from UK to being surrounded and alone in Europe.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 5, 2015)

what the "bomber boys" were dreaming of was a modern version this.







It was capable (supposedly) of flying to Berlin and back from East Anglia in 1918, 40 built and another 22 in spares before production stopped.

What the "treasury boys" would pay for in the 1930s is another story as shown by the clipping of the wings of the Stirling. 

Just because the "Bomber Boys" didn't get what they wanted didn't mean they didn't get a good share of the budget. Some of the expansion schemes had bomber command getting 50% of the aircraft and since twin engine bombers not only need twice the engines of single seat fighters but the airframes are easily twice as expensive. Even an empty Battle weighed more than loaded Hurricane or Spitfire indicating it it was probably more expensive. 

As of Jan 1st 1940 the British had 43 squadrons of bombers on the list at home. Some were not fully equipped operational. 
9 had Hamptons.
10 had Wellingtons.
8 had Whitleys. (although any with Tiger powered versions were operating as trainers) 
11 had Blenheims.
3 had Battles. 
1 was supposed to have Beauforts
1 had Vildebeests. 

Another 14 squadrons were in France
8 with Battles and 
6 with Blenheims

Overseas saw 9 squadrons in the Mid-east.
6 with Blenheims
2 with Wellesleys
1 with Vincents.

and 8 in India or the Far East.
5 squadrons of Blenheims
2 squadrons of Vildebeests
1 Squadron of Wapitis. 

Please note that the overseas Blenheims (11 squadrons) and 1/2 the ones in France were Blenheim Is which had been replaced (mostly) in home Bomber Command units by MK IV Blenheims or other (Hampden/Wellington?) new bombers when less than 3 years old. There may have been some re-posting of units but that was the net effect. Please note if you add the Units in France to the home units you get 57 squadrons (or 53-54 if you take out a few of the under equipped ones).

What they were _allowed_ to do or what they were _capable_ of doing are different subjects than the amount of money/resources invested in them. But you have to start somewhere and less money invested in Bomber Command in 1936-39 would mean and even slower build up of the bombing campaign in 1941-43. Hw much slower may be subject to debate.


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## merlin (Jun 5, 2015)

To continue:

Fairey - it shouldn't have been too difficult to go from the Swordfish to the Barracuda, missing out the Albacore. The *Battle* could have been short lived, once the Geneva Disarmament talks didn't stipulate a bomber weight, but IMHO production shouldn't have gone on so long - e.g. use the Austin Shadow Factory for Hurricanes. *Fulmar* - short lived, supplanted by the more versatile Sea Henley, and S/Ss. 
Gloster Gladiator - by the start of the war not in RAF service - passed on to the SAAF, IAF.
The spec. for medium range flying-boats is itself cancelled, in future flying-boats will be short-range for air-sea rescue, long-range very-long-range, medium will be catered for by land-planes - so no *Lerwick*. 
*Stirling* - doesn't exist (see previous thread) RAF went for the Boulton-Paul Barnsley instead.
Stranraer - replaced by the Sunderland.

R-R Vulture - cancelled much earlier, after the crash of the Boulton-Paul P.88b powered by the Vulture - cause of the crash was found to be problems to do with the engine, Rolls were told to concentrated on the Merlin Griffon engines(the latter hence becomes available earlier!


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## Juha (Jun 5, 2015)

merlin said:


> My thoughts:
> UK.
> AW Albermarle - doesn't exist - the original spec. for a medium bomber using non-strategic materials is fulfilled by De Havilland = Mosquito slightly earlier.
> Blackburn (not a success story) - *Roc* (words fail me),either convert back to *Skua*, or at an stage - Bomber Command protest all gun-turret production should be allocated to their aircraft, *Skua* - starts getting replaced in mid-1940 by the Henley, and *Botha* - plenty been said already - why did it get an order!?
> ...



I don't have any idea who well Henley could have been adapted for carrier use, so no comment on that but yes, Roc, Albemarle and Botha were waste of meager resources. On Blenheim, the RAF thought that they needed a day light bomber and because the Bristol sleeve-valve radials were running late and had reliability problems Britsh could not developed anything like Boston or even like Baltimore, so there was nothing to replace Blenheim before they got enough Mossies and Bostons. But Blenheim V was a awful mistake.


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## Juha (Jun 5, 2015)

merlin said:


> To continue:
> 
> Fairey - it shouldn't have been too difficult to go from the Swordfish to the Barracuda, missing out the Albacore. The *Battle* could have been short lived, once the Geneva Disarmament talks didn't stipulate a bomber weight, but IMHO production shouldn't have gone on so long - e.g. use the Austin Shadow Factory for Hurricanes. *Fulmar* - short lived, supplanted by the more versatile Sea Henley, and S/Ss.
> Gloster Gladiator - by the start of the war not in RAF service - passed on to the SAAF, IAF.
> ...



But the fact is that Barracuda development ran into problems, skipping over Albacore would have release at least some resource to solve those problems but that would be a risk because while not a great plane Albacore had clearly longer legged than Swordfish and also somewhat faster. Swordfish was hopelessly too shortlegged for FE if something would have boiled over there before Barra was ready and in sqn service with reasonable numbers.
Agree that Battle was produced too long. And lerwick was a failure.


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## fastmongrel (Jun 6, 2015)

The Battle was definitely produced too long as a bomber but what was going to replace it. More Hurricanes or Wellingtons would have been nice in 1940 but were there enough pilots to man them. No good producing lots of aircraft if they sit waiting for the crew, Britain needed pilots more than they needed planes.


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## Glider (Jun 6, 2015)

fastmongrel said:


> The Battle was definitely produced too long as a bomber but what was going to replace it. More Hurricanes or Wellingtons would have been nice in 1940 but were there enough pilots to man them. No good producing lots of aircraft if they sit waiting for the crew, Britain needed pilots more than they needed planes.



This has been debated before so apologies to those who remember but I would replace the battle with the Skua. It was quite a decent dive bomber and better able to take care of itself in the air.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 6, 2015)

Glider said:


> This has been debated before so apologies to those who remember but I would replace the battle with the Skua. It was quite a decent dive bomber and better able to take care of itself in the air.




Fine choice, now build 700-800 more Ansons or Oxfords to act as crew trainers to replace the Battles you aren't going to make. While both of those planes were built by thousands you need the extra 700-800 by the fall of 1940. 

" From August 1939, 739 Battles were stationed in Canada as trainers in the Commonwealth Air Training Plan" and around 300 went to Australia. The 700-800 Ansons/Oxfords may be conservative.

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## stona (Jun 6, 2015)

merlin said:


> Whilst, on face value, the Government's intention was to strengthen Fighter Command. But that was just the by-product - the real intention, was to delay the 4-engine bomber programme with the huge expenditure that that would entail. After all, if that was in process and War did not happen!? So by buying more aircraft - s/e - it gave the illusion, that the RAF was getting stronger and more powerful. Fortunately, this 'by-product' worked out in Britain's favour.



It was not a by-product at all. The intention was to expand Fighter Command and the entire UK defence system (including civil defence) The by-product was the production of aircraft like the Defiant, which bolstered Fighter Command's numbers whilst eventually proving operationally useless* in the role intended for them. *

Expansion of the heavy bomber force was so slow that in June 1942 Harris complained to Churchill in a letter in which he sought to show that Bomber Command might still be a war winning instrument, that his command comprised just 36 squadrons with 548 aircraft *of all types *amounting to just 11% of the strength of the RAF and Fleet Air Arm combined. He also said that half his strength was being used in support of the Royal Navy. In August 1942 he complained to Portal that he had only 22 effective squadrons for bombing Germany. Harris was making excuses. He reckoned that 6 squadrons were _'on loan'_, 6 were re-equipping or forming, 5 were _'unavailable' _(he doesn't specify why) and the 4 Polish squadrons were operationally limited, _'almost useless' _are his words.
Bomber Command had been so ineffective in the preceding three years of war that it was probably saved not by Harris, Portal and some others' forthright and sometimes disingenuous support but more by Churchill's promises to Stalin of a bombing campaign in support of the Soviet Union, particularly as he had just had to explain to Stalin that there would be no new front opened anywhere, let alone Europe, in 1942.

There is a tendency to telescope history with hindsight. The huge and costly strategic offensives carried out by the Anglo-American bombing forces were very much a late war phenomenon, concentrated largely in the last 18 months of the war, not in 1939-43.
From 1937/8 through 1941 the emphasis and expenditure was very much defensive and from this it was Fighter Command that benefited, at the cost of other commands.

The argument that the Battle made a useful trainer must be flawed by the expense. I don't have figures to hand, but find it difficult to imagine that a supposedly front line bombing aircraft would cost less than a purpose built trainer. With hindsight the Battle (and Defiant) should both have been axed, but the decision makers at the time did not have hindsight.

Cheers

Steve


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## fastmongrel (Jun 6, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> Fine choice, now build 700-800 more Ansons or Oxfords to act as crew trainers to replace the Battles you aren't going to make. While both of those planes were built by thousands you need the extra 700-800 by the fall of 1940.
> 
> " From August 1939, 739 Battles were stationed in Canada as trainers in the Commonwealth Air Training Plan" and around 300 went to Australia. The 700-800 Ansons/Oxfords may be conservative.



The problem with the Anson it was a staple aircraft of Coastal Command not a particulary effective anti sub aircraft but it was pretty much all that was available in 1940 for inshore Scarecrow work keeping the U boats submerged. It was in short supply how many of those extra Ansons end up in CC squadrons. The problem with the Oxford is timing it only really got into large scale production just before the war how fast can its production be ramped up to replace all the Battles.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 6, 2015)

Just ran across this for US aircraft costs.

Warbirds and Airshows- WWII US Aircraft Costs

Prices obviously vary a lot from year to year and there is no direct equivalent to the Battle or the Anson. 

But a Beech 18 (C-45 or AT7/11) cost a lot more than a P-40 and about the same as a P-39. 

The Beech 18 was a bit larger and more complicated plane than the Anson. 

The AT-9 and AT-10 were a bit smaller and used Lycoming 295hp engines and the Cessna Bobcat, while a bit bigger than those two used 245HP Jacobs engines. 

Anson I s used 350hp Cheetahs, Anson IIs built in Canada used 330hp Jacobs, Anson IIs used 330hp Jacobs, Anson IVs used Wright Whilewinds and " 1,069 Mk Vs were built in Canada for navigator training; powered by two 450 hp (340 kW) Pratt Whitney Wasp Junior R-985 engines and given a new locally developed wood monocoque fuselage." but that is more than a bit late. 

An Anson weighed Loaded about 80% of what a Battle did without bombs. Granted its tube and fabric construction was a bit cheaper but you had the two small engine and two props (which changed over time from fixed pitch to adjustable).

Part of the problem goes back to timing, The Oxford didn't fly until the Battle was going into service and had factories tooled up for it. Anson flew much earlier than the Oxford but despite beingmade in large numbers for a pre-war aircraft, there weren't enough of them in 1939-40. 
from Wiki "At the start of the Second World War, the RAF had received 824 Ansons and there were 26 RAF squadrons operating the Anson I: 10 with Coastal Command and 16 with Bomber Command.[2] All of the squadrons in Bomber Command in 1939 with Anson Is were operational training squadrons that prepared crews for frontline service. 12 of the squadrons were in No. 6 (Operational Training) Group." 
Once again Bomber Command, while not having what they _wanted_, did have at least a fair share of the resources. 
Trying to add dozens of squadrons per year let alone replacement crews for existing squadrons called for an awful lot of trainers. The Battles may not have been Ideal, but they were there at a time when they were needed.


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## pbehn (Jun 6, 2015)

stona said:


> It was not a by-product at all. The intention was to expand Fighter Command and the entire UK defence system (including civil defence) The by-product was the production of aircraft like the Defiant, which bolstered Fighter Command's numbers whilst eventually proving operationally useless* in the role intended for them. *
> 
> Expansion of the heavy bomber force was so slow that in June 1942 Harris complained to Churchill in a letter in which he sought to show that Bomber Command might still be a war winning instrument, that his command comprised just 36 squadrons with 548 aircraft *of all types *amounting to just 11% of the strength of the RAF and Fleet Air Arm combined. He also said that half his strength was being used in support of the Royal Navy. In August 1942 he complained to Portal that he had only 22 effective squadrons for bombing Germany. Harris was making excuses. He reckoned that 6 squadrons were _'on loan'_, 6 were re-equipping or forming, 5 were _'unavailable' _(he doesn't specify why) and the 4 Polish squadrons were operationally limited, _'almost useless' _are his words.
> Bomber Command had been so ineffective in the preceding three years of war that it was probably saved not by Harris, Portal and some others' forthright and sometimes disingenuous support but more by Churchill's promises to Stalin of a bombing campaign in support of the Soviet Union, particularly as he had just had to explain to Stalin that there would be no new front opened anywhere, let alone Europe, in 1942.
> ...



The defiant was never deployed in its intended role of attacking unescorted bombers.
Bomber command did have some successes against Hitlers build up of barges and various other naval/port targets.
From 1940 to 1941 the UK was under attack. 1937 to 1939 the war hadnt started so everything was theory much of which was borrocks. From 1940 to 43 there was a conflict in North Africa which while not what Stalin wanted was the best the UK and its allies could do at the time. If the Uk and its allies had not contested North Africa Greece Crete and given Germany a completely free hand then maybe Adolf would have had enough to encircle Moscow in Barbarossa.

The Battle maybe did serve as a useful trainer for pilots and ground crew.......if that is the case it just shows what a waste it was.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 6, 2015)

pbehn said:


> The Battle maybe did serve as a useful trainer for pilots and ground crew.......if that is the case it just shows what a waste it was.



Not quite, it also trained radio operators/rear gunners and it trained navigator/bomb-aimers. What is a bit more important is that it trained them to operate as a_ team_. Most of the RAFs bombers in 1939-41 only had 3-5 man crews, there were darn few planes with 6-8 men flying combat at that time. a crew could _start_ in a Battle and after a given number of hours or exercises move over to the Blenheims, Hampdens, Bostons, Marylanders they would be flying in combat. If you have a 3 man core it is not hard to add a 4th man like an extra gunner. 
This is not to say that the Battle was an ideal trainer. It may have been on the expensive side but please compare it to twins with 350-450hp engines and not to Tiger Moths. It was fairly sturdy and forgiving of handling mistakes both on landing and in the air, being strong enough to at least simulate dive bombing attacks. The semi-retracting landing gear.





Also meant that should the low time pilots fail to extend it for landing the plane, coupled with it's low landing speed, might not only save the crew but might be repairable itself. 

How good the Battle was (or wasn't) as a trainer is something of a side issue, many of the adherents to the "scrap the Battle" school want an equal number of Hurricanes or Spitfires or Henleys (?) in place of however many Battles they propose don't get built. They need to take into account that Battles started going to the Training schools a few days to a few weeks before Poland was invaded and if you don't have the Battles you need something else which is going to cut into the allocations of first line aircraft somehow. Now maybe you could not build 1000 Battles and get 500 Hurricanes and 500 Anson instead But if you build only 1000 Huricanes Bomber Command is going to be that much further behind come 1941-42 for trained crews.

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## stona (Jun 7, 2015)

pbehn said:


> Bomber command did have some successes against Hitlers build up of barges and various other naval/port targets.



It rather depends how you quantify successes. Bombardment by the RN did at least as much damage to concentrations of the so called invasion fleet as all the bombing by the RAF. 

Stalin wanted a second front in Europe and this is what he was told in 1942 would not happen. This would have forced the Germans into a huge commitment on a western or south western front, taking the pressure of the Soviet fronts. Instead he got bombing meaning that Bomber Command was reprieved for largely political rather than military reasons.

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Jun 7, 2015)

The reasons holding back the German efforts at the cross channel invasion are mostly known, and cannot be attributed to just one element. One reason for the failures were the extensive demolitions, placement of blockships, mining barrages in the channel, and the like that had occurred during the French campaign. The ports at Boulogne, Calais, Dunkirk, Ostend, Zeebrugge, the entrances to the Scheldt and Rotterdam all were significantly downgraded by allied demolitions at the time of their capture. Because of that, the invasion fleet had to come from many ports from very far away from the the points of assault. moreover, the germans realised it would take days just to get the assault waves out of the ports and organised into some sort of of organization afloat. It would take days to achieve this, and then on average about 3 days to make the actual cross channel passage. The German merchant marine had taken massive losses during the Norwegian campaign....roughly 350000 tons was lost during and in the lead up to the campaign, which in part,, explains the over -reliance on unsuitable river barges. There were virtually no barges (or Schuits) left in Holland, these having made good their escape in May to England, and similar stories applied to the other nations of western Europe. The Rhine Barges simply were never going to work in the open waters of the channel, and with 5 days of advance warning before an actual landing, the 94 available Destroyers (give or take a few) and roughly 100 coastal force vessels (MTBs and MGBs) available to the RN, along with extemporised craft like Armed trawlers and the like, would have made an absolute mess of any invasion fleet. 

None of this was a given in 1939, but by 1940, after the choices the germans had made with respect to their conduct of their campaigns, which gave scant regard to naval issues, they had built for themselves problems of insurmountable proportions. Activities of the RAF over these invasion fleets and ports of embarkation may have had some effect, but was of secondary importance in reality.


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## merlin (Jun 7, 2015)

In 1936 the spec for bombers that would form the four-engine bomber force would made, selections made in early '37. But then look at the make up planned of the RAF - from the Right of the Line p.51/52 " .. in Swinton's words "what as a General Staff you consider is militarily the proper insurance for safety, leaving it to the Cabinet to decide to which the programme should be carried out".
Scheme 'J' (October 1937) proposed a bomber force of 90 squadrons (as compared with 70 in scheme 'F') of which 64 would be heavy and 26 medium. It had, however two snags; first, it involved the mobilization of industry, and even with the lowering stormclouds of 1937 neither the Government nor the nation was yet ready to go that far. Secondly, the Minister for Coordination of Defence recoiled from the cost - and in doing so he used the argument of the knock-out blow to challenge the Air Staff's view of strategy.
The RAF's role argued Inskip, "is not an early knock-out blow ... but to prevent the Germans from knocking us out". He was not, he insisted, arguing for nothing but fighters:
'That would be an absurdity,. My idea is rather that in order to meet our real requirements we need not possess anything like the same number of long-range bombers as the Germans .... the number of heavy bombers should be reduced'.
... he suggested substituting "a larger proportion of light and medium bombers for our very expensive heavy bombers". 
... the outbreak of war found the RAF with too many light bombers of practically no value, Inskip's suggestion would have compounded that disastrous condition. But Inskip was not thinking about tactics and strategy, like too many of his Government colleagues, he was thinking above all - on expense - and in this he received strong support from the Prime Minister, who stressed the need for economic stability once again. So Scheme 'J' was referred back for cuts to make it cheaper"
The next one was 'L' April 1938, it was not until Scheme 'M' (November '38) that a 85 squadron heavy bomber component with 50 Fighter squadrons (after 38 in 'L') - that the heavy bomber programme could really get going - and the programme had a 1942 completion date.

So on the one hand advances in Radar made defence possible, it was cheaper to have more small planes than big expensive ones - because that's what the politicians thought.


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## stona (Jun 7, 2015)

I don't disagree with any of that. I would add that it wasn't just the advances in 'radar' but also advances in fighter technology that made a viable defence possible. Monoplane fighters armed with eight machine guns (in the case of the RAF) which had operational speeds significantly higher than the bombers they were to intercept only became available in the mid 1930s. They were certainly a cheaper option and intrinsically attractive to the politicians of the day.

As for the build up of heavy bombers, Harris admitted in a speech to an army audience (21st Army Group HQ on 14th May 1945) that the RAF's bomber offensive only started seriously in March 1943, and even here he was pushing the date back a little.
By the end of 1943 Bomber Command fielded *36* heavy bomber squadrons (45,330 air crew and 127,914 ground staff over 60 airfields) compared with *60* heavy bomber squadrons (52,476 aircrew and 134,834 ground staff over 81 airfields at the end of 1944. 
At the end of 1941 it had 3 heavy bomber units, at the end of 1942 just 15.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Jun 7, 2015)

stona said:


> At the end of 1941 it had 3 heavy bomber units, at the end of 1942 just 15.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve



Depends on the definition of _Heavy_ bomber. On Jan 1st 1940 10 squadrons with Wellington MK Is and IAs were 'called' Heavy bomber squadrons as were 8 squadrons of Whitleys. Granted not all were operational (or shouldn't have been, Whitleys flying with Tiger engines shouldn't have been allowed to leave English soil). Obviously these old twins were no match for the later 4 engine bombers in capability but reclassifying bombers and squadrons at the stroke of a pen and then claiming lack of "heavy" bombers seems a bit much.


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## stona (Jun 7, 2015)

The figures for heavy bombers are from the 'War room Manual of Bomber Command Operations 1939-1945' (AIR 22/03 at TNA). I can only go with the Command's own classification. In 1940 and 1941 the list contains no units as operating heavy bombers.
I've no idea when a 're-classification' was made, if that was indeed the case. It's probably to do with the number of engines.
Cheers
Steve


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## Shortround6 (Jun 7, 2015)

It may not be "official" but I am using the lists in "The British Bomber since 1914" by Mason. There is always a bit of debate about the Wellington but the Whitley was almost always referred to as a heavy bomber or night bomber in the articles of the time (1940 or before) . 

I would note that the Post war History of Bomber Command (written post war I mean) _BY_ Bomber Command may not be the most unbiased source. Just like any History of the US bombing effort in WW II written right after the war _BY_ the US Air Force might not be the most unbiased source either. Both Air Forces fighting for funding in the post war economic climate.


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## stona (Jun 7, 2015)

The problem is that those figures also match other war time sources, like for example the numbers of heavy bombers within the command reported by Portal to Churchill in late 1942 at a time when he was proposing that by June 1943 the RAF should have 60 heavy bomber squadrons out of a total establishment of 431 squadrons of all types worldwide. 
From some time in 1942, possibly late 1941, generally only four engine types were classified as heavies. This was certainly the case by mid 1942 as evidenced in various documents either specifying RAF strength or proposing future strength. These are not unique to Bomber Command but to the RAF, Air Ministry and the political establishment at large. I don't know whether this was an intentional and sudden change (by a stroke of someone's pen) or just a creep in terminology. I could probably find out but frankly lack the time or inclination to do so  Also I am in Norway and most of my references and sources are in the UK 
What might have been considered a heavy bomber in 1940 was not in 1942.
Cheers
Steve


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## Shortround6 (Jun 7, 2015)

The last is almost certainly true. I am not saying that the Bomber Command out right lied but may have been using the retrospectroscope a wee bit themselves. Applying later definitions to earlier times perhaps? In any case futzing about with programs in 1943/43 is almost too late to do anything. Changing programs or priorities had to be done in 1938-40 to change things significantly in in 1940-42. It taking around two years from even a flight of a Prototype aircraft to service squadron use and often longer. 

Enjoy your time in Norway, I am jealous.


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## Glider (Jun 7, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> Fine choice, now build 700-800 more Ansons or Oxfords to act as crew trainers to replace the Battles you aren't going to make. While both of those planes were built by thousands you need the extra 700-800 by the fall of 1940.
> 
> " From August 1939, 739 Battles were stationed in Canada as trainers in the Commonwealth Air Training Plan" and around 300 went to Australia. The 700-800 Ansons/Oxfords may be conservative.



I don't pretend to know what aircraft were based where and when but I seriously doubt that 739 battles were based in Canada in August 1939 for the BCATP as it wasn't signed until December 1939.

Oxfords were normally used for twin engine training so production would not be changed by the withdrawal of Battles. Battles were normally only used for gunnery and bombing training duties shared with a variety of types including the Lysander. So in theory Lysanders could take the place of the Battle in Canada as there were plenty around and the RAF were looking for things for them to be used for.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 7, 2015)

Glider said:


> I don't pretend to know what aircraft were based where and when but I seriously doubt that 739 battles were based in Canada in August 1939 for the BCATP as it wasn't signed until December 1939.
> 
> Oxfords were normally used for twin engine training so production would not be changed by the withdrawal of Battles. Battles were normally only used for gunnery and bombing training duties shared with a variety of types including the Lysander. So in theory Lysanders could take the place of the Battle in Canada as there were plenty around and the RAF were looking for things for them to be used for.



I doubt all 739 showed up in August of 1939 either. But show up they did in the months that followed. And while over 8000 Oxfords were built it took until July of 1945 to do it. Only about 400 had been delivered by Sept 1939. 

You want a plane to cancel? The Lysander was a prime candidate. Pretty much a failure in all it's "normal" roles it's reputation depends on the 101 agents transported to and recovered 128 agents from Nazi-occupied Europe by No 138 and 161 Squadrons. For 1786 planes built, almost 82% as many as Battles, that seems a rather small return. There were plenty around because after France the RAF couldn't figure out what to do with them either. The Squadrons using them in France suffered about the same casualty rate as the Battles for about the same result. They just didn't attack any high profile targets to get the notoriety in the Press. There crews were just as gallant and just as brave and thrown away just as much using the wrong airplane for jobs given to them. 
ANd it makes a lousy substitute for the Battle as a crew trainer in that it normally held only two men, not three. and the Battle had a bomb aimers station. The bomb aimer laid prone in the belly of the plane under the pilot and used a normal RAF bombsight through a panel in the bottom of the plane. 






The Battle wasn't an ideal training plane but it was available, it was better than _some_ of the alternatives, and it did good service until more specialized trainers could be built in numbers to replace it.


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## merlin (Jun 8, 2015)

Juha said:


> I don't have any idea who well Henley could have been adapted for carrier use, so no comment on that but yes, Roc, Albemarle and Botha were waste of meager resources. On Blenheim, the RAF thought that they needed a day light bomber and because the Bristol sleeve-valve radials were running late and had reliability problems Britsh could not developed anything like Boston or even like Baltimore, so there was nothing to replace Blenheim before they got enough Mossies and Bostons. But Blenheim V was a awful mistake.



A link/website which may be of interest about the Henley:

Hawker Henley Light Bomber / Target Tug

Blenheim replacement: the Beaumont nearly happened, but the Air Ministry kept changing their mind what they wanted, and when the Buckingham came along it was too late - its role was already taken up by the Mosquito. 
On the other hand - the 'Havoc' idea doesn't happen = the RAF has about 280 Boston Mk Is available which gives at least 12 squadrons with reserves.


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## buffnut453 (Jun 8, 2015)

stona said:


> The by-product was the production of aircraft like the Defiant, which bolstered Fighter Command's numbers whilst eventually proving operationally useless* in the role intended for them. *



Sorry Steve but I have to disagree with this statement. The role intended for the Defiant was as a bomber destroyer. It was never intended to go toe-to-toe with single-engine fighters. In many respects, the Defiant concept (flying along the length of a bomber and raking it with fire) was not dissimilar to the Luftwaffe's Schrage Musik. The Air Ministry never envisaged enemy (in this context Luftwaffe) single-engined fighters having the legs to reach the UK because nobody could imagine France falling (a not unreasonable assumption to make). As a bomber destroyer, the Defiant was a reasonable design, particularly against the lightly-armoured Luftwaffe bombers of 1940. Unfortunately, the poor Defiant crews were thrown into a fight for which their aircraft was not designed - aerial combat with single-engined fighters.

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## yulzari (Jun 8, 2015)

buffnut453 said:


> The Air Ministry never envisaged enemy (in this context Luftwaffe) single-engined fighters having the legs to reach the UK because nobody could imagine France falling (a not unreasonable assumption to make). As a bomber destroyer, the Defiant was a reasonable design, particularly against the lightly-armoured Luftwaffe bombers of 1940. Unfortunately, the poor Defiant crews were thrown into a fight for which their aircraft was not designed - aerial combat with single-engined fighters.



Quite so, although I never understood why it was not first deployed in the NW where it could match the unescorted bombers in its intended role. Once fitted with radar it did a fairly solid job as a night fighter with the turret raking fire compensating for the 4x.303 armament.


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## kool kitty89 (Jun 8, 2015)

Juha said:


> But the fact is that Barracuda development ran into problems, skipping over Albacore would have release at least some resource to solve those problems but that would be a risk because while not a great plane Albacore had clearly longer legged than Swordfish and also somewhat faster. Swordfish was hopelessly too shortlegged for FE if something would have boiled over there before Barra was ready and in sqn service with reasonable numbers.
> Agree that Battle was produced too long. And lerwick was a failure.


Would the Battle be at all a missed opportunity to potentially adapt to the torpedo bomber role? Or at least a related airframe following some of the same progression of the Fulmar (particularly the folding wings).



Shortround6 said:


> You want a plane to cancel? The Lysander was a prime candidate. Pretty much a failure in all it's "normal" roles it's reputation depends on the 101 agents transported to and recovered 128 agents from Nazi-occupied Europe by No 138 and 161 Squadrons. For 1786 planes built, almost 82% as many as Battles, that seems a rather small return. There were plenty around because after France the RAF couldn't figure out what to do with them either.


What would those same resources go to instead ... assuming Bristol didn't just build fewer Mercury and Perseus engines and Westland reduced overall production capacity. More emphasis on Whirlwind development might not have been all that practical with airframe teething troubles and engine teething and availability issues both being problematic.

And of the existing aircraft using similar engines, you've got Blenheim, Gladiator, and possibly F.5/34 production. Otherwise it's down to odd stuff like mercury/perseus powered Whirlwind derivatives (if they even fit without major mounting, prop diameter, and CoG issues, there's obviously much added drag ... though still might avoid some of the teething issues of the peregrine powered variant). But then both the Whirlwind and Gloster's own twin prototype came much later than the Lysander, so that really goes back to the previous 3 aircraft and perhaps gearing up Westland to start spitfire production much sooner. (doesn't account for those engines, but at least Westland's production capacity)

Honestly, the F.5/34 seems like the best option, especially compared to Gloster production going to Gladiators or Hurricanes. (plus those radial engined fighters wouldn't be competing with the potentially increased spitfire production capacity if Westland got on that sooner)


And one other thing I forgot to argue for the Navalized Defiant: couldn't a pair of underwing 20 mm cannon pods (and possibly synchronized .303 guns in the nose/fuselage) avoid re-arranging the fuel tanks while allowing the 2-seat arrangement to be retained? Given the sheer performance gap between the Defiant and Fulmar, there seems room for a number of compromises.


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## parsifal (Jun 9, 2015)

Glider said:


> This has been debated before so apologies to those who remember but I would replace the battle with the Skua. It was quite a decent dive bomber and better able to take care of itself in the air.



The skua was a better a/c than the Battle, but Battle losses in those first weeks of May 1940 were heavily affected by the way they were initially used. 103 sqn of the AASF provides a really good insight as to why those initial attacks were so massacred. The RAF flew strikes in , not as individual a/c like the Ju87s, and not leaving the remainder at altitude outside of harms way with adequate fighter escort to keep the 109s off their back. oh no. They were trained to fly in at zero height....hedge hopping, flying in groups of 3 or 6 with no evasive action. The results are predictable and well known. Without adequate escort, and flying in such a predictably vulnerable way, their losses were terrible. If Skuas were ordered to fly that way (or indeed any a/c) they were bound to be shot out of the sky by either the fighters or the flak, which is exactly what happened. 

103 sqn and some other units changed tactics at sqn level from around the 16 May, and the results were immediate, and dramatic. They started to level bomb at altitude, or attack at night, the latter being preferred. Gradually they also realised that if they had altitude they could use speed to help evade enemy fighters a bit, and reduce time in the kill zones of the enemy flak. Losses immediately dropped to levels being suffered by other types used in similar roles.

The trick to getting more out of the Battle wasn't abandoning its production. In 1939-40 it was absolutely essential that it remain in production actually. The trick was to find a way to use it better. It seems blindingly obvious now, but they needed to use height, dispersal, better fighter protection about a rendezvous point, go in singly and get the hell out of Dodge once the bombs were dropped 

The battle was never a type I would like to write home to Grandma about, but it was the way it was used that was more the problem over the actual characteristics of the a/c.


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## stona (Jun 9, 2015)

buffnut453 said:


> Sorry Steve but I have to disagree with this statement. The role intended for the Defiant was as a bomber destroyer. It was never intended to go toe-to-toe with single-engine fighters. In many respects, the Defiant concept (flying along the length of a bomber and raking it with fire) was not dissimilar to the Luftwaffe's Schrage Musik. The Air Ministry never envisaged enemy (in this context Luftwaffe) single-engined fighters having the legs to reach the UK because nobody could imagine France falling (a not unreasonable assumption to make). As a bomber destroyer, the Defiant was a reasonable design, particularly against the lightly-armoured Luftwaffe bombers of 1940. Unfortunately, the poor Defiant crews were thrown into a fight for which their aircraft was not designed - aerial combat with single-engined fighters.



This is true, but there were many sceptical of the entire turret fighter concept in any case. These doubts were being expressed at the highest level before and at the beginning of the war, even before the fall of France which did, as you say, change everything.

On 30th January 1940 Wing Commander Armaments wrote in response to the results of trials with the Defiant at the AFDU and reports from Defiant squadrons that,

_"The position is, therefore, that there is nothing to show whether a section of Defiants have a sufficient speed margin to make an interception under operational conditions, and to carry out an attack on a bomber flying at 230 mph" _

This is a serious reservation and has nothing to do with the presence or otherwise of enemy single engine fighters.

Cheers

Steve


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## buffnut453 (Jun 9, 2015)

Agree entirely, although in fairness even Hurris and Spits struggled to catch some of the faster German bombers that, having had dropped their ordnance, were placed in a gentle, homeward-bound dive. It all depends on the nature of the tactical engagement. A head-on attack by Defiants, with the fighters flying beneath the bombers, ought to have been quite effective, although not the same sustained concentration of fire if the Defiant came up from the rear. 

The Defiant was an interesting concept with a number of shortfalls but I still think it's a stretch to say they were operationally useless in their intended role.


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## stona (Jun 9, 2015)

buffnut453 said:


> It all depends on the nature of the tactical engagement. A head-on attack by Defiants, with the fighters flying beneath the bombers, ought to have been quite effective, although not the same sustained concentration of fire if the Defiant came up from the rear.



This was what Fighter Command had in mind:







The trials referred to are those referred to in my post earlier, which cast the whole concept into some doubt. The trials showed that the poor old Defiant was unlikely to be able to make an interception at all!

Cheers

Steve


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## buffnut453 (Jun 9, 2015)

But, in reality, it did make interceptions and shot down a number of bombers including the Do17 recovered 2 years ago. Undoubtedly, it would have struggled against the Ju88 (although a claim was made against one over Dunkirk) but the slower bombers like the Do17 and He111 still ought to have provided viable targets. Unfortunately, Fighter Command didn't have the structure, or even the tactical ability, to dedicate resources to specific missions - it was case of throwing available resources into the fray, and that proved to be the Defiant's undoing. 

Probably the best locations for the Defiant squadrons were either 10 or 13 Groups where the chance of intercepting unescorted bombers was greatest but instead they were based at Manston, about as far forward as it gets and tasked with convoy patrols right in the sweet spot of German fighter protection for their bombers. Undoubtedly, the Defiant lacked the tactical flexibility that was needed in 1940 and, as schrage musik proved, there were better ways of engaging at night using a similar tactical approach. 

I remain amazed at the courage of the Defiant crews going up day after day and seeing their mates shot down. I believe the leadership of 264 Sqn by Sqn Ldr Hunter was outstanding and his loss must have been sorely felt by the Sqn. He was a courageous and innovative tactical leader who made the most of the poor hand he was dealt.

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## stona (Jun 9, 2015)

The potential limitations were well known to Hunter's predecessor (Squadron Leader Stephen Hardy ) who is the OC No. 264 Squadron referred to here.






It says much for Hunter that when he took over a couple of months later he was prepared to take an aircraft (and concept of aerial combat) that were fundamentally flawed into a fight that he stood little chance of surviving, let alone winning. Of course many others did similar things in other types, but that does not diminish their courage and determination.

If only the decision had been taken sooner to implement the suggestion in the letter's final paragraph.

Cheers

Steve


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## cherry blossom (Jun 12, 2015)

Nobody seems to have suggested cancelling any Japanese aircraft but there does seem to be some slight scope for rationalizing their production priorities. Should they have produced the A5M and the Ki-27, the A6M and the Ki-43, the D3A and the Ki-51 or the J1N and Ki-45? OK, I know that the IJA and the IJN were not very good at cooperation. However, should the IJA have produced the Ki-43, Ki-44 and Ki-61? Could any of those have replaced the J2M? Should the IJN have produced the N1K or could the A6M2-N have sufficed if even that was necessary?

Other comments and suggestions?


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## SpicyJuan11 (Jun 12, 2015)

cherry blossom said:


> Nobody seems to have suggested cancelling any Japanese aircraft but there does seem to be some slight scope for rationalizing their production priorities. Should they have produced the A5M and the Ki-27, the A6M and the Ki-43, the D3A and the Ki-51 or the J1N and Ki-45? OK, I know that the IJA and the IJN were not very good at cooperation. However, should the IJA have produced the Ki-43, Ki-44 and Ki-61? Could any of those have replaced the J2M? Should the IJN have produced the N1K or could the A6M2-N have sufficed if even that was necessary?
> 
> Other comments and suggestions?



Now please, I'm probably totally wrong, but I think the IJN should have cancelled the A6M sooner rather than later.


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## GrauGeist (Jun 12, 2015)

The A6M in all it's variations, remained the backbone of the IJN...you need to have a solid replacement for the A6M and in sufficient quantity before just dropping it. Unfortunately, the IJN didn't have such an aircraft until too late in the war.

For example, the N1K was a surprisingly potent adversary to the Allied fighters, however, it's development and production took much too long, finally getting into service and seeing combat by 1944.

The same can be said for the IJA's potent KI-100, which was actually a modification of the equally potent KI-61, either of which came about much too late in the war.

Simply abandoning one airframe doesn't accelerate the production of it's successor.


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## SpicyJuan11 (Jun 12, 2015)

GrauGeist said:


> The A6M in all it's variations, remained the backbone of the IJN...you need to have a solid replacement for the A6M and in sufficient quantity before just dropping it. Unfortunately, the IJN didn't have such an aircraft until too late in the war.
> 
> For example, the N1K was a surprisingly potent adversary to the Allied fighters, however, it's development and production took much too long, finally getting into service and seeing combat by 1944.
> 
> ...



Yes GrauGeist, I meant that they should have a successor in place sooner, I should've stayed that.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 12, 2015)

The Japanese could have done a lot of things. We are back to not enough engineers. Not enough to develop the Zero _while_ at the same time developing it's successor. The A7M was first proposed (or specification issued) as a replacement for the A6M in fall of 1940. The project had to be put on hold until 1942 while they got the A6M into service and through the first improvements. Starting work in the Summer of 1942 is just too late. For example the F8F Bearcat _started_ in June of 1942 with initial ideas. "The design was completed in November 1943 and an order for two prototypes was placed on 27 November 1943 under the BuAir designation XF8F-1. The first prototype flew on 21 August 21, 1944," 
Any changes the Japanese make have to be done at least two years before the _need_ shows up in order to have any real effect.


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## GrauGeist (Jun 12, 2015)

This is the problem, though...

Wartime saw many airframes pushed through at a crazy pace, but even still, they simply didn't get into combat soon enough. It wasn't just Japan and Germany, the U.S. had several types in the works but arrived too late to see any combat such as the F8F, P-51H, F7F and even the A-1.

It's a difficult task to select an aircraft and remove it out of the historical timeline, because the developing aircraft designs are all influenced by the successes and failures of thier predecessors and the combat environment they served in.

Before the war, there were several theories on how the next war would be fought, such as unescorted heavy bombers, dive bombing and so on. But once the sh!t hit the fan, alot of these theories and concepts were turned on their ear. The Brewster F2 would be a peime example: it was thought to be a very capable fighter and yet, when it saw battle, it came up horribly short...but if we consider it "worthless" and pull it from the timeline, the lessons learned from it's failure would not been passed along to the next design in line.


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## buffnut453 (Jun 12, 2015)

GrauGeist said:


> The Brewster F2 would be a peime example: it was thought to be a very capable fighter and yet, when it saw battle, it came up horribly short...but if we consider it "worthless" and pull it from the timeline, the lessons learned from it's failure would not been passed along to the next design in line.



MUST...NOT...RISE...TO...THE...BAIT!!!

Phew...succeeded!

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## cherry blossom (Jun 12, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> The Japanese could have done a lot of things. We are back to not enough engineers. Not enough to develop the Zero _while_ at the same time developing it's successor. The A7M was first proposed (or specification issued) as a replacement for the A6M in fall of 1940. The project had to be put on hold until 1942 while they got the A6M into service and through the first improvements. Starting work in the Summer of 1942 is just too late. .....



Agreed! However, something has to be cancelled to speed up the A7M development. Jiro Horikoshi started work on the J2M in 1939, which was the year when the Zero first flew, and finally started work on A7M roughly when the J2M made its first flight as described below:

The Design and Development of the Mitsubishi Carrier Fighter Reppu

By Jiro Horikoshi via Martin Caidin

In 1940 the Mitsubishi firm received from the Japanese Navy the preliminary specifications for the 16-Shi carrier fighter which was to replace the Zero. It was intended that the new aircraft, which would not be available in quantity for several years, would become the Navy's standard carrier fighter when the Zero had reached its limit in modification and improvement.

However, in 1940 the Mitsubishi firm was experiencing serious difficulties in the development of the 14-Shi land-based interceptor (J2M Raiden); the company was plagued by a shortage of competent engineering personnel and the lack of a satisfactory engine for the J2M Raiden design. These circumstances delayed the 16-Shi carrier fighter program for at least a year.

With the major problems of the J2M Raiden interceptor solved, the proposed carrier fighter program was again postponed. In the autumn of 1941 I became seriously ill and did not recover until several months had passed. The Navy preferred not to undertake the design project without my active participation.

The first engineering meeting to plan the new fighter was held on 14th April 1942, at the Japanese Naval Air Research and Development Center. In the long interval which had elapsed, the 'plane was renamed the 17-Shi carrier fighter. The lessons of the air war to date played a large part in modifying the original proposals. The naval officers, especially the fighter pilots, present at the meeting, were in high spirits, flushed with the succession of our victories in every theatre of war.

--- end quote ---

The only ways to have speeded up development of a shipboard fighter to replace the Zero were either to avoid diverting Mitsubishi into developing the J2M, for example by either issuing the specification to Kawanishi instead of the N1K specification or by adopting the Ki-44, or to issue a specification for a shipboard fighter to another company. 

The IJN would have still hit the problem that there was no suitable engine available for an A7M for an in service date of early 1944 when it would have been needed. Thus at least one of the 18 cylinder engines developed by 1945 needed to be ready earlier.


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## GrauGeist (Jun 12, 2015)

buffnut453 said:


> MUST...NOT...RISE...TO...THE...BAIT!!!
> 
> Phew...succeeded!


lol...it did prove it's worth in the hands of the Finns, yes...but not for the U.S.: the confidence of it's design and purpose fell short when it was put to the test. Many factors involved in this disaster, such as being pitted against better performing enemy aircraft and their seasoned pilots, green pilots that had trained in techniques from a bygone era, etc.

So for the U.S., it was a failure but if we remove it from the timeline, we'd lose valuable input that helped guide the design of the fighters that succeeded it.


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## SpicyJuan11 (Jun 12, 2015)

cherry blossom said:


> Thus at least one of the 18 cylinder engines developed by 1945 needed to be ready earlier.



This might require a bit fandangling, but what about a license version of the BMW 802? It would have the added affect of not overstraining Japanese engineers even more than they were historically.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 12, 2015)

Actually the way things went what they learned from plane "A" (say the Buffalo) was only slightly applied to plane "B" (F6F Hellcat) and only was in full force on plane "C" (F8F Bearcat) as the contract for the prototype F6F was signed in June of 1941, a full year before Midway, granted this was for the R-2600 powered version. You may find similar progressions. It was not uncommon in the 30s to be ordering (or issuing a requirement) a plane's replacement _about_ the time it entered service leaving little time to actually profit from 'experience'. You had 3 planes in the "pipe". The one being replaced. The one doing the replacing and the future one to replace the one going into service.


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## buffnut453 (Jun 12, 2015)

Actually, I think the greatest contribution of the poor old F2A was to pull the USN out of the myopia that fighters operating from carriers had to be biplanes. Without the (for its day) innovative design, the USN would likely have ordered the original Grumman XF4F-1:






Imagine a squadron of those at Midway or Guadalcanal! And how long would it have taken for a better-performing replacement...would the technology jump go straight to an aircraft of the F6F ilk or would the USN have been getting a Wildcat-class aircraft in 1943?

RATS! I RESPONDED!!!!...resistance was futile!


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## Just Schmidt (Jun 12, 2015)

cherry blossom said:


> Nobody seems to have suggested cancelling any Japanese aircraft but there does seem to be some slight scope for rationalizing their production priorities. Should they have produced the A5M and the Ki-27, the A6M and the Ki-43, the D3A and the Ki-51 or the J1N and Ki-45? OK, I know that the IJA and the IJN were not very good at cooperation. However, should the IJA have produced the Ki-43, Ki-44 and Ki-61? Could any of those have replaced the J2M? Should the IJN have produced the N1K or could the A6M2-N have sufficed if even that was necessary?
> 
> Other comments and suggestions?



With some hindsight they probably should have canselled the Ki-49. But only because we know it wasn't really much of an improvement on the Ki 21. And the Ki-67 should preferrably have become operational earlier even then, but canselling a nakajima is unlikely to help Mitsubishi's designers.

I think the Ki-45 had it's uses, just not in the role it was designed for. I think it was the fastest Japanese aircraft for a short while (apart from the Ki-46). Cansel the Ki-48, and more ressourses can og into the Ki-45 and its successors. DONT cansel the Ki-96, but at least downprioritize the Ki-102. Ki-96 might have become an effective B-29 interceptor (and a better performer generally), and indeed the Ki-108 was in many ways a throw back to it by detour of Ki-102 (minus the turbosuperchargers that didn't reach a state of reliability).

if only i can believe the performance figures for the 96 (630 km/h at 9500 meters) - Green , William and Swanborough, Gordon: "Japanese army fighters: Part 1", Macdonald and janes 1976.

The navy could cansel the J2M, considering that it was build in few numbers and encountered many troubles. But the IJN couldn't even know that the N1K1-J would emerge as a decent alternative. It's perfect hindsight, but Kawanishi obviously had the ability and design capacity to design an outstanding fighter. By canselling the N1K1 they could consentrate on a land fighter, redesigns as moving the wing to the bottom of the fuselage wouldn't be nessessary.

I know that the J2M is supposed to have been the most successful B-29 killer, but I guess (sic!) that it didn't shoot down staggering amounts.
If the navy would have the good sense to use Ki-45's they could cansel the N1N, if they wouldn't miss the range of it too much. Range is the main reason I doubt the Ki-67 could replace the P1Y. Nakajima G5N and G6N did, again as it turned out, achieved little.

But the only part where hindsight isn't heavily applied, is going directly ahead with the Ki-96 instead of redesigning it as the Ki-102.


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## pbehn (Jun 12, 2015)

GrauGeist said:


> This is the problem, though...
> 
> Wartime saw many airframes pushed through at a crazy pace, but even still, they simply didn't get into combat soon enough. It wasn't just Japan and Germany, the U.S. had several types in the works but arrived too late to see any combat such as the F8F, P-51H, F7F and even the A-1.
> .



Valid point GrauGeist but the term too late only applies if the war ends when it actually did. When for example the P 51H was first proposed what was the expected end of the war in the worst case scenario.


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## cherry blossom (Jun 12, 2015)

SpicyJuan11 said:


> This might require a bit fandangling, but what about a license version of the BMW 802? It would have the added affect of not overstraining Japanese engineers even more than they were historically.


You are a sadist! The BMW 802 was a very impressive engine with numerous advanced features such as two stage supercharging with an intercooler and, according to the BMW site, the first use of variable valve timing. However, the design was only started after the 801 entered production, so it was not likely to be ready for operational use from 1/1/1944. At least the fuel injectors for BMW engines were not made by Bosch, so there is some chance that anyone taking a licence to produce a BMW engine would not be sabotaged as Japan was over the DB 601.

Mitsubishi built two 18 cylinder engines using the bore and stroke from the 14 cylinder Kinsei and Kasei, the MK9 and the Ha 104. The MK9 was entering production in December 1944 but B-29 raids prevented many being completed. The Ha 104 was in combat in the Ki-67 by October 1944 but it had a 1372 mm diameter and only gave 1900 hp for take off. However, that was at 2450 rpm and the Kasei with similar cylinders could run at 2600 rpm, so it may have been possible to raise the output. Nakajima produced three 18 cylinder radials. The Homare was ready first but the actual power available has occupied several threads here. The middle one was the Ha 44 and seems to have been magical with 2450 hp at 2800 rpm claimed from 48.1 litres with only a 1280 mm diameter. It would have powered the Ki-87 and Ki-94 but only prototypes of those were constructed. The Ha 217 was actually flown in a Ki-49 test aircraft. It was based on the Mamoru cylinders and may have given 3000 hp from 57 litres. Since the Mamoru never worked reliably, I guess it was a big waste of time. However, Nakajima was thinking of the post-war airline market.

My best hope would be an early Ha 44. The question is whether Nakajima could have produced a genuine 2000 hp Ha 44 in time, starting from the 14 cylinder Ha 41 or Ha 109 of the Ki-44 if they had been asked in 1939-40 when a Zero replacement should have been requested.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 12, 2015)

The biggest mistake (in hindsight) was both the army and Navy designing 'specialized" fighters like "interceptors" (the Ki-44 and J2M) while continuing to build general purpose fighters (Ki-43 and A6M) which roughly doubled the design and development work.

Had the Army built a "general purpose fighter" to replace the Ki-43 using the Ki-44 engines they could have wound up with sort of a Ki-84 lite in late 1942 or early 1943 and _stopped_ building Ki-43s all the way through 1945. 

Had the Navy built a more general purpose Fighter (even if not carrier capable) using the engine of the J2M and a bigger wing (and getting rid of the extension shaft) they too might have had a much more formidable fighter available sooner. An N1K lite if you will.


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## GrauGeist (Jun 12, 2015)

pbehn said:


> Valid point GrauGeist but the term too late only applies if the war ends when it actually did. When for example the P 51H was first proposed what was the expected end of the war in the worst case scenario.


The term "too late" is more of a timing reference in relation to their completion and acceptance into service during the span of the war. Some of the U.S. types I mentioned actually had a relatively short gestation period with the exception of the F8F, which was conceived in 1942. 

Another example of a late-comer to the war would be the B-36, which has it's roots in 1941 and then after a delay, began development in earnest in 1943. Had the timeline of the war extended past it's historical period (let's say that the atom bombs weren't used and the Pacific war continued conventionally), then we most likely would have seen several types, including the B-36 enter into the conflict. However, with the deteriorating situation in Japan (and German, for that matter) in the later years, how much longer would they (Axis) be able to produce and field their newer types?

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## SpicyJuan11 (Jun 12, 2015)

GrauGeist said:


> The term "too late" is more of a timing reference in relation to their completion and acceptance into service during the span of the war. Some of the U.S. types I mentioned actually had a relatively short gestation period with the exception of the F8F, which was conceived in 1942.
> 
> Another example of a late-comer to the war would be the B-36, which has it's roots in 1941 and then after a delay, began development in earnest in 1943. Had the timeline of the war extended past it's historical period (let's say that the atom bombs weren't used and the Pacific war continued conventionally), then we most likely would have seen several types, including the B-36 enter into the conflict. However, with the deteriorating situation in Japan (and German, for that matter) in the later years, how much longer would they (Axis) be able to produce and field their newer types?



That depends on their strategic situations. If Germany (and Japan) are desperately holding on for an extra few months (for example, due to a much less disastrous Bagration), you may see the Horten 229 V3, Me P.1101, and Ta 183 prototypes all fly, and maybe the HeS 011 of you're lucky. Now give the Axis (namely Germany) some strategical breathing room after say a victory in the east for example, and things would be very interesting indeed, or Göring and the RLM will managed to screw it all up


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## gjs238 (Jun 12, 2015)

The planes need pilots and fuel.


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## SpicyJuan11 (Jun 12, 2015)

gjs238 said:


> The planes need pilots and fuel.



Are you implying that in 1945 the German's couldn't spare _three_ pilots and enough fuel for _three_ aircraft?


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## GrauGeist (Jun 12, 2015)

SpicyJuan11 said:


> That depends on their strategic situations. If Germany (and Japan) are desperately holding on for an extra few months (for example, due to a much less disastrous Bagration), you may see the Horten 229 V3, Me P.1101, and Ta 183 prototypes all fly, and maybe the HeS 011 of you're lucky. Now give the Axis (namely Germany) some strategical breathing room after say a victory in the east for example, and things would be very interesting indeed, or Göring and the RLM will managed to screw it all up


If you read personal accounts by Galland and other 262 pilots in the final months of the war, you'll see that they had a reasonable amount of jets in forward areas, but no fuel to mount any sizable offensive, let alone put up any form of solid resistance. It simply wasn't there.

In late April, unless you were in a Me262, Ar234 or an He162, your life expectancy was almost nil and even then, you had a 50/50 chance of being nailed on take-off/landing.

If the war lasted another 6 months, what little bit of Germany that remained would be ashes. There was simply nothing left the Germans could do to stop the thousands of Allied fighters and bombers that roamed freely across the countryside. The Ho.IX, the P.1101 and the Ta187 were amazing steps in Germany's aircraft design and *if* they had been built and fielded even two years earlier, they would have certainly changed the airwar game to a degree...but they would have simply put off the inevitable.

Germany simply could not match the manufacturing power of the United States and they simply had no sizable army left on the ground to stop the Red Army in the east and the growing Allied army in the west.

By May of 1945, Germany was out of fuel, rubber and sources of raw materials needed for manufacturing munitions, aircraft and armored vericles. They had no more food. They were conscripting children and senior citizens to fill the ranks of their army.

They were done.


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## SpicyJuan11 (Jun 12, 2015)

GrauGeist said:


> If you read personal accounts by Galland and other 262 pilots in the final months of the war, you'll see that they had a reasonable amount of jets in forward areas, but no fuel to mount any sizable offensive, let alone put up any form of solid resistance. It simply wasn't there.
> 
> In late April, unless you were in a Me262, Ar234 or an He162, your life expectancy was almost nil and even then, you had a 50/50 chance of being nailed on take-off/landing.
> 
> ...



Yes GrauGeist, but what I said was that you'll see the Ho 229 _V3_, Me P.1101, and Ta 183 _prototypes_ would fly. Perhaps you and gjs238 mistaked this with mass production?


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## GrauGeist (Jun 13, 2015)

The Ho.IX did fly...

V1 flew several times as a glider. V2 flew under jet power for the first time in early February, 1945. Unfortunately, it was wrecked in a crash a few weeks later. V3 was very close to completion when the war ended, this is the Ho.IX that the Smithsonian has.

At least the Bell X-5 proved the P.1101 was a sound design.

Anyway, the point here, is that even if the war lasted a few months more and these prototypes took to the air, what good would it have done?


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## kool kitty89 (Jun 13, 2015)

Just Schmidt said:


> The navy could cansel the J2M, considering that it was build in few numbers and encountered many troubles. But the IJN couldn't even know that the N1K1-J would emerge as a decent alternative. It's perfect hindsight, but Kawanishi obviously had the ability and design capacity to design an outstanding fighter. By canselling the N1K1 they could consentrate on a land fighter, redesigns as moving the wing to the bottom of the fuselage wouldn't be nessessary.


The N1K was never a carrier capable fighter, so either that would need to be added to the requirement, or an additional aircraft would need to be developed. (and either way an earlier engine would need to be used initially, namely the Kasei -as the N1K already used in floatplane form)



cherry blossom said:


> The BMW 802 was a very impressive engine with numerous advanced features such as two stage supercharging with an intercooler and, according to the BMW site, the first use of variable valve timing. However, the design was only started after the 801 entered production, so it was not likely to be ready for operational use from 1/1/1944. At least the fuel injectors for BMW engines were not made by Bosch, so there is some chance that anyone taking a licence to produce a BMW engine would not be sabotaged as Japan was over the DB 601.


Indeed, developing native engines would be much more effective in that context, but prior to the Homare becoming available, the 14 cylinder Kasei would be the best high-powered engine to consider.




cherry blossom said:


> Nobody seems to have suggested cancelling any Japanese aircraft but there does seem to be some slight scope for rationalizing their production priorities. Should they have produced the A5M and the Ki-27, the A6M and the Ki-43, the D3A and the Ki-51 or the J1N and Ki-45? OK, I know that the IJA and the IJN were not very good at cooperation. However, should the IJA have produced the Ki-43, Ki-44 and Ki-61? Could any of those have replaced the J2M? Should the IJN have produced the N1K or could the A6M2-N have sufficed if even that was necessary?
> 
> Other comments and suggestions?


The A5M doesn't seem like it has an obvious alternative for the time, but the A6M itself might have avoided some of its failings had the Japanese begun applying armor and self-sealing fuel systems around the same time the Americans did (based on reports returning from combat over Europe).

Putting emphasis on a successor to the A6M using a more powerful engine (probably the Kasei) would also make sense. 

The IJN on the other hand, missed an opportunity with the V-12 powered Ki-28 with its significant performance lead over the Ki 27 and further potential to develop Kawasaki's high speed, liquid cooled monoplane designs. Had that design been favored, perhaps Kawasaki would have continued or accelerated their inline engine development well before any potential DB-601 license. Copying or improving on the likes of the Hispano 12Y (like the Russians did) would make a good deal of sense, though so might developing a larger, heavier, large displacement design following their older BMW VI derived Ha-9. (similar to what Mikulin did in Russia, moving on with an engine of similar cylinder dimensions but using a cast block and eventually developing much more power -from the AM34 to AM35 to AM37 and AM38, etc)

Admittedly, a fighter of the Ki-28 or Ki-61's size would much better match a smaller, lighter V12 more akin to the Hispano 12Y. Plus, the 12Y had already been designed for a hub mounted cannon and did so with greater design flexibility than the German engines. (Possibly making the Army's Ho-3 20 mm cannon useful on single engine fighters before the Ho-5 even enters production, while also being very interesting for later 30 and 37 mm developments)


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## GrauGeist (Jun 13, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> The N1K was never a carrier capable fighter, so either that would need to be added to the requirement, or an additional aircraft would need to be developed. (and either way an earlier engine would need to be used initially, namely the Kasei -as the N1K already used in floatplane form)


The N1K was intended to be a land-based fighter for the IJN and by that point in the war, at least the IJN was being realistic, because their carrier force was nearly all submerged...


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## Just Schmidt (Jun 13, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> The N1K was never a carrier capable fighter, so either that would need to be added to the requirement, or an additional aircraft would need to be developed. (and either way an earlier engine would need to be used initially, namely the Kasei -as the N1K already used in floatplane form)
> 
> Neither was the J2M I suggest canselling. And the engine was ready for the N1K1-J which was build in some numbers before the redesign into N1K2-J


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## Just Schmidt (Jun 13, 2015)

SpicyJuan11 said:


> That depends on their strategic situations. If Germany (and Japan) are desperately holding on for an extra few months (for example, due to a much less disastrous Bagration), you may see the Horten 229 V3, Me P.1101, and Ta 183 prototypes all fly, and maybe the HeS 011 of you're lucky. Now give the Axis (namely Germany) some strategical breathing room after say a victory in the east for example, and things would be very interesting indeed, or Göring and the RLM will managed to screw it all up



As covered by others, what Strategic assets the germans had left in late 44 was insufficient in any case. Personally I prefer the stalling in front of Moscow as the turning point.

For the Pacific war i honestly believe Pearl Harbour to be the decisive Battle.

Anyway, in 45 Japanese Production was coming to a halt. Many factories were bombed out, some even disabled by earthquakes, and what rmained were at their end run as raw materials were running out. Japan was very much dependent on overseas supplies of a wide range of goods, not only oil. And while its Merchant fleet was racing the carrier fleet to the bottom of the sea, was even on the verge of starvation. Think Great Britain after loosing the Battle of the Atlantic.

To give the Japanese even a slight chance to alter the outcome (while never actually winning the war), they need to have vastly improved over the historical situation aircraftvise at the latest in the beginning of 44.


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## parsifal (Jun 13, 2015)

The J2M raiden was intended to be the defensive fighter once the IJN was to fall back on after the completion of the offensive elements of the IJN plan. It was never intended for the Zeke to remain in production for as long as it did. Its greatest asset was it range and its shock value. It created an aura of invincibility because no one could believe the Japanese could design and build an aircraft comparable or superior in performance to western types, with the range capable of taking the fight right up to to the allies. The Zeke did this on an engine of fairly small capacity, so trade offs were needed, mostly in firepower and protection. These were critical in a defensive fighter, with range playing a less significant role.

The idea the Japanese had was, firstly that after the initial victories, the allies would be forced to negotiate a peace deal with Japan, given the impending victory in Europe. If that didnt eventuate, the contingency plan was to fall back to their older pacific defence strategy. They would swing over to the defensive, fortifying the outer islands and use their subs light forces, mines and frontier air defences to attrition the opposing forces to a point that their own fleet could fight the decisive battle somewhere in the central pacific. If they could win that second round, they could undertake a round of further reinforcement at the frontiers, until the enemy tired, or bled himself white on their defences.

In the context of that thinking, wrong and misplaced as it was, the J2M made perfect sense. It was everything the Zeke was not......powerful, well armed, protected, fast, big engine. That it suffered massive delays and technical glitches was not really the fault of the aircraft, more a function of Japanese over confidence as to their capabilities.

The George was really just cashing in on the massive investment the japanese had made in their floatplane fighter program. The japanese had unique ideas of deploying floatplanes whilst on the attack, to provide immediate cover for landings mostly. It was inherently offensive in thinking, linked to the initial stages of their decisive battle described above. By 1942 it was clear, that for a while (they clung to the notion of winning back the initiative until late 1944) offensive of that ty[e were off the table. Moreover, they had several promising designs like the REX and urgently needed to improve the quality of their air defence fighters. Hence the transformation of the REX to the GEORGE.

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## Shortround6 (Jun 13, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> Indeed, developing native engines would be much more effective in that context, but prior to the Homare becoming available, the 14 cylinder Kasei would be the best high-powered engine to consider.
> 
> The A5M doesn't seem like it has an obvious alternative for the time, but the A6M itself might have avoided some of its failings had the Japanese begun applying armor and self-sealing fuel systems around the same time the Americans did (based on reports returning from combat over Europe).
> 
> Putting emphasis on a successor to the A6M using a more powerful engine (probably the Kasei) would also make sense.



The Japanese had a partial solution to the A6M problem staring them in the face. Stick the Kinsei engine in the Zero airframe in 1942. It had about 15-16% greater displacement ans should offer a similar or slightly less increase in power for only a slight increase in diameter and weight. It was done at the end of the war with the A6M8. 



> The IJN on the other hand, missed an opportunity with the V-12 powered Ki-28 with its significant performance lead over the Ki 27 and further potential to develop Kawasaki's high speed, liquid cooled monoplane designs. Had that design been favored, perhaps Kawasaki would have continued or accelerated their inline engine development well before any potential DB-601 license. Copying or improving on the likes of the Hispano 12Y (like the Russians did) would make a good deal of sense, though so might developing a larger, heavier, large displacement design following their older BMW VI derived Ha-9. (similar to what Mikulin did in Russia, moving on with an engine of similar cylinder dimensions but using a cast block and eventually developing much more power -from the AM34 to AM35 to AM37 and AM38, etc)
> 
> Admittedly, a fighter of the Ki-28 or Ki-61's size would much better match a smaller, lighter V12 more akin to the Hispano 12Y. Plus, the 12Y had already been designed for a hub mounted cannon and did so with greater design flexibility than the German engines. (Possibly making the Army's Ho-3 20 mm cannon useful on single engine fighters before the Ho-5 even enters production, while also being very interesting for later 30 and 37 mm developments)



The Japanese had enough trouble developing the engines they had without trying to fool around with total redesigns of antiques like the Ha-9. The Russians didn't just _tweak_ the Hispano to get the M-105, it took them years and several intermediate steps (engine models) just to get to the 1100hp M-105P version, they also added almost 200lbs of "improvements". Having the Japanese devote 10s of thousands of man hours to developing these engines could only be a benefit to the Allies. 

as far as the Army's Ho-3 20mm cannon goes. 







You are stuck with a Hispano type engine as this thing will NOT fit in a DB style engine tube. 

It had a rate of fire 1/2 to 2/3 that of a Hispano gun.


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## tomo pauk (Jun 13, 2015)

The comparison is size of wing between the Ki 44 and the Oscar&Zeke is interesting - that of the Ki 44 was some 3/4s in the area vs. the early war dynamic duo. Granted, the aircraft were not designed to the same or similar requirements, but we can also consider that Ki 44 was also powered by more powerful engines - either 1-speed Ha-41 (1260 CV at 3700 m) or two speed Ha-109 (most of the Ki 44 produced; 1440 CV at 2700m, 1220 CV at 5200 m). Internal fuel - 128 US gals, per TAIC manual.
So a 'big wing' Ki 44 (~200 sq ft instead of 169), with 150 US gals, same engines, 4 HMGs initially (later 2 cannons + 2 HMGs) should've make plenty of sense? 
The Ki 61 was bigger, with huge internal fuel load (199 US gals), and, as war progressed, improving armament. The 'Ki 61 lite' should be interesting - swap the wing between historical Ki 44 and Ki 61? Or, install the Ha-109 on the Ki 61 to produce the 'Ki 100', the Zero needs the Kasei dearly.
The Raiden with 'plain vanilla' Kinsei (= no ext. shaft) should also be KISS business. The wing is already tad bigger than of Fw 190.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 13, 2015)

The Ki-84 used a wing 4 sq ft _smaller_ than the Ki-43. Keep the 220-230sq ft wing size, just build a plane in between the Ki-43 and Ki-84. Engine in the Ki-43 weighed around 530-590kg depending on version. The engines in the KI-44 went around 630kg for the Ha-41 and around 720KG for the Ha-109. The Homare went around 835kg. Trade a _little_ speed for the Japanese traditional maneuverability and double the guns, it won't maneuver like a Ki-43 but it shouldn't be more than 10-12mph slower than the real Ki-44. 

Of the 5919 Ki-43 built something over 5000 of them were built from Nov of 1942 on. One factory that built over 2600 didn't start delivering until May of 1943. 10 months after LA-5s start to show up and after F4Us are in action for several months.


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## tomo pauk (Jun 13, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> ...
> One factory that built over 2600 didn't start delivering until May of 1943.
> ...


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## Shortround6 (Jun 13, 2015)

Makes keeping the Battle in production until late 1940 look good.


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## kool kitty89 (Jun 13, 2015)

SpicyJuan11 said:


> That depends on their strategic situations. If Germany (and Japan) are desperately holding on for an extra few months (for example, due to a much less disastrous Bagration), you may see the Horten 229 V3, Me P.1101, and Ta 183 prototypes all fly, and maybe the HeS 011 of you're lucky.


The HeS 011 was probably a dead end (it might have worked, but not at the power/efficiency targeted and would be very costly/work intensive tomanufacture due to the precision machined mixed-flow compressor stage). The Jumo 004D and E (including afterburning variants) and BMW 003D (using reaction rather than impulse compressor blading) would be the more realistic engines approaching the 'class II' thrust range.

That and further Me 262 derivatives would also probably be the best bet, had the Germans been in any position to continue production. (engine upgrades would be most likely, be it 004 or 003 derivatives, and possibly adopting the leading edge wing root extension tested on the HG-I)

The 003s going to the He 162 probably would have been more worthwhile mated to Me 262 airframes as well.




GrauGeist said:


> The N1K was intended to be a land-based fighter for the IJN and by that point in the war, at least the IJN was being realistic, because their carrier force was nearly all submerged...





Just Schmidt said:


> Neither was the J2M I suggest canselling. And the engine was ready for the N1K1-J which was build in some numbers before the redesign into N1K2-J



I suppose the better question would be: would an alternate N1K-2 like design (but with the earlier Kasei engine) also be adaptable as a carrier based fighter? (wing loading/stall speed, wheel pressure, and performance with tail-hook equipped and CoG shifts addressed would all come into play)




parsifal said:


> In the context of that thinking, wrong and misplaced as it was, the J2M made perfect sense. It was everything the Zeke was not......powerful, well armed, protected, fast, big engine. That it suffered massive delays and technical glitches was not really the fault of the aircraft, more a function of Japanese over confidence as to their capabilities.


Abandoning the extension shaft arrangement and going for a more conventional short cowling (possibly still using a cooling fan or perhaps resorting to a cuffed propeller to help facilitate a tighter cowling and larger/streamlined spinner) should have saved a great deal of time and difficulty in production and service regardless of sticking with the interceptor requirement. (Curtis and Focke Wulf both attempted extension shaft and odd cooling arrangements for radial engines and abandoned those in favor of more conventional arrangements, with or without fans)






Shortround6 said:


> The Japanese had a partial solution to the A6M problem staring them in the face. Stick the Kinsei engine in the Zero airframe in 1942. It had about 15-16% greater displacement ans should offer a similar or slightly less increase in power for only a slight increase in diameter and weight. It was done at the end of the war with the A6M8.


The Kinsei combined with structural reinforcement (including thicker skin) would be a significant adaptation. (along with armor and self-sealing tanks) You'd lose some range, of course, and CoG shift might be an issue, but it's not all that different an engine change than the F2A saw going from the F2A-1/B.239 to the F2A-2 or Buffalo Mk.I, or what the A6M already dealt with switching to the heavier Sakae models. (making engine and armor changes at the same time would also allow some degree of controlling CoG by using armor plate weight and location as ballast)

There's also the Ha41, but that's a bit larger and heavier still.



> The Japanese had enough trouble developing the engines they had without trying to fool around with total redesigns of antiques like the Ha-9. The Russians didn't just _tweak_ the Hispano to get the M-105, it took them years and several intermediate steps (engine models) just to get to the 1100hp M-105P version, they also added almost 200lbs of "improvements". Having the Japanese devote 10s of thousands of man hours to developing these engines could only be a benefit to the Allies.


But would it be more troublesome than getting the licensed DB-601 into production? This could include avoiding the more extensive changes the Soviets made and remaining closer to the performance range the French managed with development of the 12Y (not 12Z) but possibly making further supercharger improvements or at least implementing 2-speed drive.

Other than that, the Jumo 211 might have been easier to mass produce than the 601 (and the 211F would seem to line up with Ha-40/Ki-61 production) of course they wouldn't have been able to accommodate the Ho-3 in that case, but the Ho-5 would be more attractive once it arrived anyway. (aside from any imported MG 151s ... and precluding any sort of unlikely cooperation between Army and Navy weapons production to allow the Oerlikon based guns to be used)

The Hispano engines seem better for a potential early/pre-war development as a direct follow-on for the earlier Ki-28 fighter design.

Aside, of course, from just shifting to radial engines entirely and focusing more on something closer to the Ki-100 from the start. (or prior to that, an earlier development around the Sakae stemming from the Ki-28 might make for something significantly better than the Ki 43) No possibility of unsynchronized centerline cannons in that case, though.




tomo pauk said:


> The Ki 61 was bigger, with huge internal fuel load (199 US gals), and, as war progressed, improving armament. The 'Ki 61 lite' should be interesting - swap the wing between historical Ki 44 and Ki 61? Or, install the Ha-109 on the Ki 61 to produce the 'Ki 100'


The Ha41 followed by Ha109 seems reasonable for an aircraft of that class, assuming they didn't go for the Jumo engines. (or in addition to those in either case -any 12Y derivatives would probably top out too low to work well on something of the Ki-61's size, but again better for something closer to the earlier Ki 28 )



> the Zero needs the Kasei dearly.
> 
> The Raiden with 'plain vanilla' Kinsei (= no ext. shaft) should also be KISS business. The wing is already tad bigger than of Fw 190.


I think you've got Kasei and Kinsei switched there. (Kasei would be a slightly larger/more powerful engine than the Sakae, the Kasai is in another class entirely and more akin to the BMW 801 or R-2600)


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## tomo pauk (Jun 13, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> ...
> I think you've got Kasei and Kinsei switched there. (Kasei would be a slightly larger/more powerful engine than the Sakae, the Kasai is in another class entirely and more akin to the BMW 801 or R-2600)



Couldn't they named them a bit more differently, those funky people at Mitsubishi  Yep, mixed them up.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 13, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> But would it be more troublesome than getting the licensed DB-601 into production? This could include avoiding the more extensive changes the Soviets made and remaining closer to the performance range the French managed with development of the 12Y (not 12Z) but possibly making further supercharger improvements or at least implementing 2-speed drive.



The French performance range is only good enough to get the pilots killed. You are down 10-20% in power from the DB-601. lets look at the Hispano 12Y again. (and please remember that the Russians were not happy with the 12Y's over haul life/reliability back in 1934 when they got the license. Lets also assume the French ignore what was going on in china and the threat to their own SE Asia Colonies and are greedy enough to sell the Japanese the latest versions. 
Which runs right into another complication. HS had starting using superchargers designed by Szydlowski-Planiol which were much better than their own design. When HS licensed the 12Y-51 to Switzerland it was _without_ the Szydlowski-Planiol supercharger and with the older HS unit. The -51 engine used bigger intake valves and had modifications that allowed it to run at 2500rpm. As built and used by the Swiss it gave 1020hp for take-off at 4.3lb boost and was good for 1030hp at 10,700ft (3250 meters) on 93 octane fuel. It weighed 1146lbs. The Swiss had a "B" version with quite possibly the the S-P supercharger and that engine was good for 1000hp at take-off and 1020hp at 12,300ft (3750meters). 
Best engine before the -51 using a HS supercharger was the -37 with 1050hp for take-off and 960hp at 1250 meters (8.33 supercharger gear) and 7:1 compression in the cylinders. The -33 had a 10.0 supercharger gear, 7:1 compression in the cylinders and offered 960hp for take-off and 955hp at 2250 meters. This require 100 octane fuel. 

Getting the license before that series of engines means getting the version/s without crankshaft dampers and with articulated connecting rods instead of the later concentric yolk rods. 



> Other than that, the Jumo 211 might have been easier to mass produce than the 601 (and the 211F would seem to line up with Ha-40/Ki-61 production) of course they wouldn't have been able to accommodate the Ho-3 in that case,


 The question is why would you want to? the gun is heavy and slow firing and slightly less powerful than a Hispano round. Basically you get a rate of 2/3 that of a Hispano gun used in D. 520 83% of the ammo capacity for the same weight. Sticking a pair of them in a twin engine plane were the rear gunner could get to them to change magazines might have made a decent ground attack or light anti-shipping armament but a single gun in a single engine fighter is depending too much on the golden BB. 




> The Hispano engines seem better for a potential early/pre-war development as a direct follow-on for the earlier Ki-28 fighter design.



The Hispano engine was pretty much a dead end design without a _major_ rework. It was a product of it's time, being sort of the first of a new breed of engine, sharing that with the Curtiss D-12 and RR Kestrel. It helped pioneer the cast block engine but then was caught in it's own success. It was a stretched/enlarged version of the 300hp Hispano V-8 engine and in fact the 12Y used the same bore spacing as the the old 300hp V8 and used some of the same production tooling. Having to design newer high powered versions of engines and yet use as much of the old legacy tooling as possible meant they were going to run into a wall at some point. A company with less money invested in production tooling could strike off in new directions easier.


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## kool kitty89 (Jun 13, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> The French performance range is only good enough to get the pilots killed. You are down 10-20% in power from the DB-601. lets look at the Hispano 12Y again. (and please remember that the Russians were not happy with the 12Y's over haul life/reliability back in 1934 when they got the license. Lets also assume the French ignore what was going on in china and the threat to their own SE Asia Colonies and are greedy enough to sell the Japanese the latest versions.


I was thinking less as a proper alternative to the DB-601 (let alone on an aircraft of the same size/weight as the Ki-61) and more as a smaller, lighter, at least moderately more powerful replacement for the Ha-9. Then again, perhaps that's something Kawasaki should have been working on back with the Ki-10 even before the Ki-28 rather than continuing development of the old BMW-derived V-12.

Unless I'm completely mistaken and the Ha-9 was actually making more power at altitude than the 12Y engines of the mid 1930s. (except even there, with the weight and drag savings on a fighter -and potential for engine mounted cannon, the 12Y still had plenty of advantages)



> Which runs right into another complication. HS had starting using superchargers designed by Szydlowski-Planiol which were much better than their own design.


Couldn't indigenous Japanese supercharger development displace the older Hispano unit too? (aside from just potentially adapting it to 2-speed drive)



> Best engine before the -51 using a HS supercharger was the -37 with 1050hp for take-off and 960hp at 1250 meters (8.33 supercharger gear) and 7:1 compression in the cylinders. The -33 had a 10.0 supercharger gear, 7:1 compression in the cylinders and offered 960hp for take-off and 955hp at 2250 meters. This require 100 octane fuel.


Wiki lists the -33 as using a 5.8:1 CR. (the -36/37 is listed as 7:1)

The 28/29 with 7.2 CR and 920 hp at 3600 m seem to be the best altitude performing engines of the pre-SP supercharger models, though I'd assume required 100 octane fuel as well. (as with any of the higher CR engines)

Of the early engines, in the context of 2-speed driving using the same supercharger, the drs and drs2 altitude ratings seem like one of the better options.


Short of actively replacing the Ha 9 with 12Y derived engines (licensed or reversed engineered from captured examples), switching to Radial engines for follow-on developments from the Ki-28 would make more sense (along with later potential for the Jumo 211 being somewhat easier to manufacture than the 601).

In any case, the Ki-28 nearly managed the Ki-43-I's speed years earlier. 




> The question is why would you want to? the gun is heavy and slow firing and slightly less powerful than a Hispano round. Basically you get a rate of 2/3 that of a Hispano gun used in D. 520 83% of the ammo capacity for the same weight. Sticking a pair of them in a twin engine plane were the rear gunner could get to them to change magazines might have made a decent ground attack or light anti-shipping armament but a single gun in a single engine fighter is depending too much on the golden BB.


I was more just suggesting potential for what the IJA was already manufacturing. Getting the Ho-105 and Ho-5 into service sooner would have been far more useful. (adopting oerlikon FFF or FFL derived guns would probably be faster than the Browning derived 20 mm though) I suppose mounting larger numbers of 7.7 mm guns early-war would have been more effective too, but probably just better to replace those old, relatively slow firing Vickers derived LMGs as soon as possible. (of course the italians had a similar problem, but at least the IJA had a better replacement with the Ho 105 than the .50 Breda)

If the IJA (or Kawasaki themselves) were remotely interested in a centerline cannon armament pre-war, licensing one of the Oerlikon designs really seems like the quickest and more reliable direction to go.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 14, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> I was thinking less as a proper alternative to the DB-601 (let alone on an aircraft of the same size/weight as the Ki-61) and more as a smaller, lighter, at least moderately more powerful replacement for the Ha-9.



Smaller may be correct, lighter may be debatable (at least from a practical standpoint). Moderately more powerful may also be debatable. There is not much information on the Ha-9 engine. we know the parent BMW engine went around 510KG which isn't that far off from the the later 12Y's. Now it is quite possible the Ha-9 porked up a bit over the base BMW but a 40-60kg difference isn't that much to get exited about. 
The Ha-9IIb as used in the Ki-32 was listed at 850hp for take-off, 775hp at sea level and 950hp at 3,800 meters( 12,470ft) by Rene Francillon in "Japanese Aircraft of the Pacific War"
The Ha-9IIa as used in the Ki-10 and Ki-28 was listed at 850hp for take-off, 720hp at sea level and 800hp at 3,500 meters( 12,485ft) same source. 



> Then again, perhaps that's something Kawasaki should have been working on back with the Ki-10 even before the Ki-28 rather than continuing development of the old BMW-derived V-12.
> 
> Unless I'm completely mistaken and the Ha-9 was actually making more power at altitude than the 12Y engines of the mid 1930s. (except even there, with the weight and drag savings on a fighter -and potential for engine mounted cannon, the 12Y still had plenty of advantages)



Advantages seem small depending on which model 12Y, plus you have the cost/trouble of setting up production for an engine with a rather limited future. You can trace the 12Y back through the 12N and then to the 12Lb of 1927. It had already seen quite a bit of development. There was a reason the Allison and Merlin and Jumo 211 and DB 601 weighed several hundred pounds more than a 12Y. The 12Y wasn't strong enough to stand up to making much more power than it was. Both the crankshaft and crankcase were too light.


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## GrauGeist (Jun 14, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> I suppose the better question would be: would an alternate N1K-2 like design (but with the earlier Kasei engine) also be adaptable as a carrier based fighter? (wing loading/stall speed, wheel pressure, and performance with tail-hook equipped and CoG shifts addressed would all come into play)


The Shiden was perhaps one of the best performing, yet least known, fighters of WWII.

In it's land-based role, it would better serve Japan rather than being aboard carrier operations. It had suitable range (over 1,000 miles) and was able to engage Allied aircraft on it's own terms.

So keeping the N1K-J land-based and perhaps try to find a way to ramp-up the J2M for carrier ops and stay with those two as they were top-performers.


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## kool kitty89 (Jun 15, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> Smaller may be correct, lighter may be debatable (at least from a practical standpoint). Moderately more powerful may also be debatable. There is not much information on the Ha-9 engine. we know the parent BMW engine went around 510KG which isn't that far off from the the later 12Y's. Now it is quite possible the Ha-9 porked up a bit over the base BMW but a 40-60kg difference isn't that much to get exited about.
> The Ha-9IIb as used in the Ki-32 was listed at 850hp for take-off, 775hp at sea level and 950hp at 3,800 meters( 12,470ft) by Rene Francillon in "Japanese Aircraft of the Pacific War"
> The Ha-9IIa as used in the Ki-10 and Ki-28 was listed at 850hp for take-off, 720hp at sea level and 800hp at 3,500 meters( 12,485ft) same source.


I had to dig around a bit but finally found this site again WarBirds
It came up years ago in this thread on Japanese engines: http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/engines/japanese-piston-engines-8450.html

The text encoding seems to have changed since 2008 though, there's an old archived version that seems more readable here:
èˆªç©ºæ©Ÿã‚¨ãƒ³ã‚¸ãƒ³ä¸€è¦§ãƒ»æ—¥æœ¬è» (the Ha 9 would be listed under ハ９ there)

Hmm, it seems there's a good deal more on Japanese wikipedia too:
Google Translate

The stroke seems to have been shortened from 190 to 170 mm

The dry weights are listed as 560 kg for the Ha 9-I, 1000 kg Ha 9-II Ko (甲 = shell or carapace), 1000 kg Ha 9-II Otsu (乙), and 580 kg Ha 9-II Hei (丙). 
But wiki omits those middle two values entirely while including the 560 and 580. (so perhaps those excessively high weights are in error?)

There's a few more mysterious V-12 engines listed there too. I believe at least one is a Junkers L88 or L55 derivative (same bore/stroke as the BMW VI) but the ハ２-２ (Ha 2-2) appears to be a Hispano 12Y derivative. (150/170 mm more/stroke, 36L displacement, CR of 6.2:1, T/O power 940 hp at 2300 rpm, 900 hp at 2400 m 2300 rpm listed with a question mark) Given the added weight, lower RPM and the 6.2:1 CR, perhaps it's a development of the HS 12N independent of the 12Y.

No idea what the ハ４ (Ha 4) is, listed as a 41L V12 with 160/170 mm bore/stroke, 1100 hp at 3000 m at 2300 rpm. (also the Ha 21 and Ha 46, and at a real stretch, one or both of those might be related to the Fiat A.30)


The Ha 9-1 seems to fare worse than the 12Y in all categories, but the 3 Ha 9-2 models seem more competitive, if still at very least moderately heavier and significantly bulkier. (ignoring the 1000 kg figures and assuming all are in the 560-580 kg range or slightly heavier) That 950 hp at 3800 m figure for the Ha 9-IIb (or Otsu) also lines up with your information. The Ha 9-II Ko (which should be the IIa) used on the Ki 28 is listed as having 850 hp take-off (2350 rpm), 900 hp at 3170 m (2200 rpm) and 890 hp at 4500 m (2200 rpm), which doesn't match you figures. (which instead seem to line up with the Ha 9-I which that chart does indeed list as 800 hp at 3500 m)

At a rough guess, the 580 kg dry weight for the Ha 9-II Hei (IIc in other nomenclature, I assume) is at least reasonably representative of the other engines (that 1000 kg figures makes no sense as the dry weight) that's still roughly 100 kg in weight over the 12Y, more or less depending on the model. (though, if we're to take that chart as accurate, the possibly 12Y derived Ha 2-2 weighs some 550 kg) The frontal area on the Ha 9 is definitely considerably larger than the 12Y in any case, and the engine is also considerably longer. 

The modest savings in weight combined with drag reduction might more than make up for the power losses over the Ha 9, at least for a fighter (not so much for the Ki 32) Going with the older 1934 vintage 12Ycrs at 470 kg, 835 hp take-off and 860 hp at 4000 m. 



> Advantages seem small depending on which model 12Y, plus you have the cost/trouble of setting up production for an engine with a rather limited future. You can trace the 12Y back through the 12N and then to the 12Lb of 1927. It had already seen quite a bit of development. There was a reason the Allison and Merlin and Jumo 211 and DB 601 weighed several hundred pounds more than a 12Y. The 12Y wasn't strong enough to stand up to making much more power than it was. Both the crankshaft and crankcase were too light.


It seems like adopting the 12Y back in the early 1930s in place of continued BMW VI/IX development might have been better for the likes of the Ki-10 and Ki-28. Then again, it seems like Kawasaki got a fair bit out of the old BMW design as it was. (compared to Mikulin taking the same bore/stroke/displacement and asymmetrical stroke piston with articulated connecting rod arrangement with the cast-block AM34 and ran with that instead -the Ha 9 seems to have managed pretty decent power and altitude performance -if these figures are accurate- while keeping weight much lower than the Mikulin designs)


In any case, it doesn't change that the Ki-28 (with its existing Ha-9 engine) seems to be a superior design to the Ki-27, would have aged much better, likely would have given the Flying Tigers a tougher fight than the Ki-27, and could better pave the way for a replacement better than the Ki-43. (or just going the Ki-61 to Ki-100 route and mating the Ki-28 airframe to a Sakae or possibly Zuisei engine) Actually, a redesign including retractable landing gear might be enough to push speed beyond that of the early Ki-43. (the Ha 102 model of Zuisei, based on that same chart, was rated for 1080 hp at 2700 rpm take-off, 1055 hp at 2800 m 2600 rpm,
950 hp at 5800 m 2600 rpm, weighs 565 kg, and is 1118 mm in diameter) Any of several early-war variants of the Sakae would seem fitting too, if slightly wider and heavier. (the added power would probably cope better with increased weight from armor and armament, etc -though you'd inevitably lose range of need a fuel capacity increase as well)

Beyond that you'd need a new airframe, either with one of the 12~1500 hp class radials, or maybe the Jumo 211. (again, assuming that avoids most of the trouble seen with the DB 601 -if nothing else, the fact the Germans seemed to have more trouble with the DB-600, 601, and 605 compared to the contemporary 211s points to the Jumo engine's favor)


Come to think of it, with the likely added weight of a wing including retractable gear, the added power of the Ha 9-II would probably make things better off than the early 12Y. (better compromise between power/weight/drag ... granted)





GrauGeist said:


> So keeping the N1K-J land-based and perhaps try to find a way to ramp-up the J2M for carrier ops and stay with those two as they were top-performers.


The J2M seems nowhere remotely close to making sense as a carrier based fighter and would be competing with similar engines as the N1K (with both Kasei and Homare being useful on the N1K) so even if the N1K sticks to land only, making more of those over some J2Ms seems a lot more sensible. (a simplified J2M might get into service sooner than any N1K derivative though, but the short range makes it mostly useful for interceptor defense work and possibly close support)

An upgraded/refined A6M with greater emphasis on armament, engine power (ie Kinsei) structural strength, and armor/protection by 1940/41 would be important. A Zuisei powered A5M derivative might work better earlier. Given its earlier availability, having the A6M target the Kinsei from the start would make more sense too.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 15, 2015)

I am not sure why the fascination with the Hispano Suiza engine. It was good and perhaps excellent engine in it's day but it's day was in the late 20s and early 30s. By the late 30s you are flogging a dying horse. It started out in 1924 as a 12 cylinder development of the older large V-8 engine (the was also a 12 cylinder W engine using the same cylinders). This engine was a nominal 450hp engine (max continuous) and could reach 582hp with a 6:1 compression ratio. It weighed 420kg dry but the early ones had no supercharger and no reduction gear. The cylinders were 140mm X 150mm. Over the years they increased the stroke to 170mm (and made the engine 24mm taller) and by changing from dry liners to wet liners found the room for the 150mm bore without changing the cylinder spacing (got to keep that production tooling). They added reduction gears and turned higher RPM and added the supercharger/s ( different impeller sizes for different duties). They did get it up to over 1100hp and that would work out to a theoretical 1400-1500hp at sea level *IF * you could open the throttle that far without blowing the engine up. And that brings us to it's main problem as a late 1930s engine. Without a total redesign it had reached it's limit/s. If the Japanese had gotten a licence in 1933/34 like the Russians did and spent a large sum of money tooling up for mass production (really massive like the Russians) then maybe sticking with it and trying to upgrade it make sense. Buying it in 1938-39 is an act of pure desperation as several engines, if not actually on the open market, have shown how out of date the Hispano-Suiza is. 

Wright took the R-1820 Cyclone from 575hp to 1525hp over around 20 years but at several times threw out _everything_ *but* the bore and stroke. Changing to forged steel crankcases from Aluminium meant new foundry equipment. (and there were at least 3 different steel crankcases) changing the way the cylinder fins were made required a massive investment in new tooling, Cylinder heads changed from cast to forged and so on. 

Japanese went withe DB-601 in an attempt to get a "modern" engine pretty much 'of the box' and and not a collection of parts that needed extensive modification and substitution to bring it up even close to modern standards. 

A Zuisei powered A5M sounds neat but hte Japanese had a real shortage of engineers, the more time spent on updating really obsolete designs like the A5M and K-27 (or Ki 28) is less time they could have used to build more modern/useful planes.

The Japanese were 1-2 years behind the west as it was. Think Zero or Ki-43 over the English channel in the Spring/summer of 1942. They, like the Germans, needed planes the 'average' pilot could use to effect. Not planes that needed great skill (even if they rewarded that skill) to get kills with.


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4DzcOCyHDqc_


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## GrauGeist (Jun 15, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> The J2M seems nowhere remotely close to making sense as a carrier based fighter and would be competing with similar engines as the N1K (with both Kasei and Homare being useful on the N1K) so even if the N1K sticks to land only, making more of those over some J2Ms seems a lot more sensible. (a simplified J2M might get into service sooner than any N1K derivative though, but the short range makes it mostly useful for interceptor defense work and possibly close support)
> 
> An upgraded/refined A6M with greater emphasis on armament, engine power (ie Kinsei) structural strength, and armor/protection by 1940/41 would be important. A Zuisei powered A5M derivative might work better earlier. Given its earlier availability, having the A6M target the Kinsei from the start would make more sense too.


But herein lies the problem:
The N1K-J in it's historical form was heavily armed, fast, long range and capable of not only keeping 1 to 1 with ANY Allied fighter, but in many cases, outperforming them. This proves it's value alone. So why change it?

As for the J2M, it was also a deadly adversary and was already navalized. It's short range may have been seen as a detraction, however, by the time it was in service, the Japanese carrier fleet was no longer in a position to launch long-range attacks, but rather more of a defensive role. You don't need long range to protect the fleet. 

If the Japanese were able to ramp up their manufacturing output and produce more Shidens, then perhaps take the time to modify it's airframe for naval service. But now you're losing precious time with modifications.


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## tomo pauk (Jun 15, 2015)

Dave - the J2M was not navalized, though it was ordered and used by the Navy. The Shinden ('normal' one, not the pusher) with the wing relocated down ASAP should be indeed a fine fighter, but the Homare of 1944 was not the Homare of 1945?

Agreed with SR6 re. Hispano engine - once the DB 601A/Aa is available for the Japanese, the 12Y lost most if all of it's appeal. The Ki-61/DB 605A should be another fine fighter, BTW.


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## Milosh (Jun 15, 2015)

tomo

Shi*n*den ("Magnificent Lightning") - Kyushu J7W 

Shiden ("Violet Lightning") - Kawanishi N1K


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## tomo pauk (Jun 15, 2015)

Whoops -thank you


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## kool kitty89 (Jun 15, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> Without a total redesign it had reached it's limit/s. If the Japanese had gotten a licence in 1933/34 like the Russians did and spent a large sum of money tooling up for mass production (really massive like the Russians) then maybe sticking with it and trying to upgrade it make sense. Buying it in 1938-39 is an act of pure desperation as several engines, if not actually on the open market, have shown how out of date the Hispano-Suiza is.


Yes, after thinking on it more (and as I shifted towards in the conclusion of my previous post), what Kawasaki managed with the Ha 9 was probably good enough to not merit bothering with the HS engine. (licensing and developing that older design may have been more cost effective for them too, and easier to adapt to the mid 1930s Japanese engine manufacturing industry) 

On that thought, it might have also been a bit of a waste for the Soviets to invest so much in the Klimov engines rather than expanding development and manufacturing of the Mikulin types. (2-speed drive and/or an intermediate supercharger setting compared to the AM35 and AM38 should have allowed 1.3~1.4x the power at similar altitude ratings to the Klimov engines, and a greater emphasis on larger/heavier fighters and bombers as well as potential higher powered small interceptors) Admittedly, they'd lose the advantage of the spacious Hispano type hub cannon placement. (and the Mikulin never fielded a hub cannon in combat, though I'd think the large size of the engine would at least allow similar tolerances to the DB 603's arrangement -the Il-2's radiator and armor placement might have mitigated practical installation potential of large cannon in the nose as well)



> Wright took the R-1820 Cyclone from 575hp to 1525hp over around 20 years but at several times threw out _everything_ *but* the bore and stroke. Changing to forged steel crankcases from Aluminium meant new foundry equipment. (and there were at least 3 different steel crankcases) changing the way the cylinder fins were made required a massive investment in new tooling, Cylinder heads changed from cast to forged and so on.


Indeed, several engines did similarly (the 'C' series R-2800 shares relatively little other than bore/stroke and external dimensions the the earlier models). Really, it's not that unlike the transition the Russians made going from the M17 to AM34. (similar bore/stroke/displacement and assymetric cylinder configuration, but a totally new engine)



> Japanese went withe DB-601 in an attempt to get a "modern" engine pretty much 'of the box' and and not a collection of parts that needed extensive modification and substitution to bring it up even close to modern standards.


Yes, and in that context I still think the Jumo 211 would be the more interesting alternative to consider. 



> A Zuisei powered A5M sounds neat but hte Japanese had a real shortage of engineers, the more time spent on updating really obsolete designs like the A5M and K-27 (or Ki 28) is less time they could have used to build more modern/useful planes.


Of those, the Ki 28 seems the most worth the upgrade, but if the modifications were too extensive, it may have been better to just focus on a new design entirely, but stemming from the same emphasis on speed and streamlining. (granted, raw engine power seems to have been an interest too, and certainly an area the Ki 28 had an edge over the Ki 27 and Ki 33 or A5M) Retractable or semi-retractable gear combined with the existing Ha 9 (or another Ha 9 model) might be useful if implemented early enough.

On Mitsubishi's end, putting development emphasis on the A6M would indeed make the most sense and with limited engine production resources, perhaps the Kinsei (and the larger Kasei) should have received higher priority over the Zuisei, and the Ha41/109 over the Sakae (and Homare) on Nakajima's end.



> The Japanese were 1-2 years behind the west as it was. Think Zero or Ki-43 over the English channel in the Spring/summer of 1942. They, like the Germans, needed planes the 'average' pilot could use to effect. Not planes that needed great skill (even if they rewarded that skill) to get kills with.


Not to mention planes where average or exceptional pilots could have a better chance of surviving being shot down (be it bailing out or crash landing -or limping home with extensive damage), especially significant over friendly territory where returning to combat duty would be rather straightforward, or near enough to the front lines of having a chance of evading capture. (even with the ... issues with Imperial Japanese doctrine and sense of honor, there's still a big difference between living to fight another day and living to be captured by the enemy)

That and having enough structural strength in fighters to perform high G maneuvers and manage high speed dives. (maintaining control in high speed dives -particularly ailerons- seemed to be a common, if sporadic problem on several of the aircraft that could withstand dives in the 400-500 mph range too)

An earlier Ki 44 with larger wing and more fuel (a sort of pre-Ki 84 as you suggest) would make plenty of sense as well. (or just a Ki 43 with stronger airframe and Ha41 or Kinsei -with the wing size, you might end up with something closer to the P-36 there though, probably a bit lighter and better power and altitude performance than the contemporary P-36) 



tomo pauk said:


> Dave - the J2M was not navalized, though it was ordered and used by the Navy. The Shinden ('normal' one, not the pusher) with the wing relocated down ASAP should be indeed a fine fighter, but the Homare of 1944 was not the Homare of 1945?


Using the bulkier Kasei should still make reasonable sense too, with later introduction of the Homare and limited production and availability all around. Performance would be somewhat reduced earlier in the war with earlier engine variants, but so would the opponents.

Given the original floatplane N1K and J2M had almost parallel development timelines, there might not have been an advantage to the J2M in production at all either (at least had the N1K been designed as land based from the start). Having 



> Agreed with SR6 re. Hispano engine - once the DB 601A/Aa is available for the Japanese, the 12Y lost most if all of it's appeal. The Ki-61/DB 605A should be another fine fighter, BTW.


Again, the Jumo 211 seems an interesting option, and would you at least agree that production of that engine likely would have gone more smoothly than the DB designs?

I suggested starting straight off with the more advanced Jumo 211F given historical timing for the Ha 40, but the earlier B/C/D might have been useful if tooling started a bit earlier. (with the more primitive early 211 models, tooling and quality control might have been a bit easier to transition to from the Ha 9, though upgrading to the 211F later on might be problematic/wasteful compared to targeting that engine from the start) In any case, given the size and weight of the 211 engines, transitioning some existing Ha 9 based developments to that engine might also have been fairly straightforward. (or at least close enough to begin prototyping with the Ha 9 with specific planning/provisions made for introduction of the newer engine later)


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## GrauGeist (Jun 15, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> Dave - the J2M was not navalized, though it was ordered and used by the Navy. The Shinden ('normal' one, not the pusher) with the wing relocated down ASAP should be indeed a fine fighter, but the Homare of 1944 was not the Homare of 1945?
> 
> Agreed with SR6 re. Hispano engine - once the DB 601A/Aa is available for the Japanese, the 12Y lost most if all of it's appeal. The Ki-61/DB 605A should be another fine fighter, BTW.


Ahh Tomo, yes, you're correct...I messed my post up because the ipad hates this server.

The intention was to say that the J2M was *in development longer and could have been navalized during that time.* 

The first flight by the J2M was in spring of 1942, making it a possible candidate to replace the A6M as the Raiden was a superior performer despite it's shorter range.


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## kool kitty89 (Jun 15, 2015)

GrauGeist said:


> The intention was to say that the J2M was *in development longer and could have been navalized during that time.*
> 
> The first flight by the J2M was in spring of 1942, making it a possible candidate to replace the A6M as the Raiden was a superior performer despite it's shorter range.


With the existing J2M and N1K, it really seems like the latter is far closer to being a practical carrier borne fighter (and the superior land based fighter) while also likely performing better on the whole even if using the same engine. (if not quite as fast, at least having better range and handling)

Now, if you want to change the scenario entirely and nix J2M development in favor of a Kasei powered direct successor to the A6M, then that certainly might have merit too. (except it may have been better to focus Mitsubishi's resources on developing a superior Kinsei powered A6M rather than diverting resources to developing yet another Mitsubishi fighter -it wouldn't be on the level of the late war A6M8 prototype, but something more akin to the A6M5 using an earlier less powerful Kinsei model would be more plausible -more or less with the same sorts of modifications the likes of the F2A, F4F, and P-40 were getting in 1940 -except the Zero also needed further strengthening and thicker skin)


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## stona (Dec 20, 2015)

Way back I said the Halifax should have been cancelled at the earliest opportunity and have just stumbled across some interesting statistics compiled in a report entitled 'Comparison of Aircraft Types'.

Aircraft. Casualty Rate. Bomb Load/Sortie. Bombs Dropped/Missing Aircraft. 'Cost'

Lancaster 3.5% 3.95 tons 112.6 tons 20 man months/ton bombs dropped

Halifax 5.4% 2.20 tons 45.4 tons 60 man months/ton bombs dropped

Mosquito 2.3% 0.68 tons 29.8 tons 20 man months/ton bombs dropped.

Based on all operational sorties from 1st June to 15th September 1943 and a Mosquito bomb load of 4,000lbs.

It's hardly surprising that Harris wanted to ditch the Halifax and shoot Handley Page 

Cheers

Steve

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## pbehn (Dec 20, 2015)

stona said:


> It's hardly surprising that Harris wanted to ditch the Halifax and shoot Handley Page



That is only revealed by statistics, many crews liked the Halifax as it was obviously easier to get out of, they weren't immediately aware how much more likely they would need to.


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## fastmongrel (Dec 20, 2015)

stona said:


> Way back I said the Halifax should have been cancelled at the earliest opportunity and have just stumbled across some interesting statistics compiled in a report entitled 'Comparison of Aircraft Types'.
> 
> Aircraft. Casualty Rate. Bomb Load/Sortie. Bombs Dropped/Missing Aircraft. 'Cost'
> 
> ...



How often did the Mossie carry 4,000 pounds in 43.


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## stona (Dec 21, 2015)

pbehn said:


> That is only revealed by statistics, many crews liked the Halifax as it was obviously easier to get out of, they weren't immediately aware how much more likely they would need to.



The problems associated with escaping from all aircraft exercised the minds of many senior officers in Bomber Command and the Air Ministry following ORS reports on the increase in crew losses in 1 Group following its conversion to Lancasters.
Survival rates for the Lancaster were estimated at 10.9%, for the Halifax 29.4%. Of course you were much more likely to be shot down in a Halifax.
Harris immediately wrote to Saundby in September 1943, asking him to, 
_'write officially drawing attention to urgent need of improvement in escape hatches etc. Far too few crews are getting away with it and bad hatches etc. are the reason." _
Saundby now turned to the scientists, asking Dickins to look into this. He was told it would take_ '2 or 3 weeks' _ for the investigation but in fact it took four months. A detailed study was released in January 1944. It concluded that there was 
_'no doubt that the chances of survival in a Lancaster are significantly lower than in a Halifax and this is thought to be primarily due to the more restricted space within the aircraft and to the poor rear escape hatch'._
There were other reasons. All escape hatches on both aircraft tended to jam. The Lancaster had a greater tendency to break up in flight and this contributed to the relative lack of survivors (though a very few survived because of this). It was also noted that training for abandoning the aircraft needed improvement.
As a result training for abandoning aircraft was increased. Practice parachute jumps were not adopted as ORS reports already showed that crews abandoning aircraft under control (as in fuel shortage or U/C failure) had good results.
The adoption of engine fire warning lights was thought to give crews a better chance of abandoning an aircraft whilst still under control and before the fires got _'out of hand'_
Escape hatches should open outwards. This was considered an impractical modification for aircraft in service, but was adopted on the late Marks of aircraft due to be introduced.
The RAE looked at self sealing fuel tanks for the Lancaster, but the 1000lb weight penalty was deemed too great. It also investigated sub-dividing the large wing root tanks on the Lancaster but I haven't been able to find out if this ever happened.
The much maligned forward escape hatch in the Lancaster was never enlarged but, interestingly, this was not identified as a primary cause of losses in Lancasters in these reports.

The Halifax shouldn't have been maintained or cancelled due to crew survival rates, it should have been cancelled because, compared to the Lancaster, it was an expensive and inefficient means of carrying out the strategic bombing offensive.

Cheers

Steve

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## gjs238 (Dec 22, 2015)

stona said:


> The RAE looked at self sealing fuel tanks for the Lancaster, but the 1000lb weight penalty was deemed too great. It also investigated sub-dividing the large wing root tanks on the Lancaster but I haven't been able to find out if this ever happened.



Did B-17's and B-24's have self-sealing fuel tanks?
What about the medium bombers?


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## Greyman (Dec 23, 2015)

stona said:


> The RAE looked at self sealing fuel tanks for the Lancaster, but the 1000lb weight penalty was deemed too great. It also investigated sub-dividing the large wing root tanks on the Lancaster but I haven't been able to find out if this ever happened.



I'm fairly certain all of the Lancaster's six inter-spar tanks were self-sealing (830 lb. of CIMA 397H I believe).

Oil tanks as well.

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## GrauGeist (Dec 23, 2015)

gjs238 said:


> Did B-17's and B-24's have self-sealing fuel tanks?
> What about the medium bombers?


The B-26 was the first U.S. combat aircraft to have self sealing tanks as a standard feature (1936 - called "Merang cells")
Late B-25A models onward
XB-24B onward
Late B-17C onward
A-20C onward
A-26 production (all post "X" airframes) onward
XB-29 onward

So yes, they did

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## Aozora (Dec 23, 2015)

stona said:


> The RAE looked at self sealing fuel tanks for the Lancaster, but the 1000lb weight penalty was deemed too great. It also investigated sub-dividing the large wing root tanks on the Lancaster but I haven't been able to find out if this ever happened.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve



Are you sure you're not talking about armoured fuel tanks, because according to the Lancaster Pilot's Notes, the tanks were self-sealing?

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## pbehn (Dec 23, 2015)

Does the self sealing material weigh more than the petrol it displaces. I thought the penalty was loss of range?


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## stona (Dec 23, 2015)

I probably didn't express that very well above, apologies for the confusion. The discussion was about fitting _'Bransom fuel tanks'_ which were presumably an improvement on the tanks fitted at that time which were self-sealing. I have not been able to find out what a Bransom fuel tank was, but it must have been heavy, maybe it was armoured? Is this a typo? a company called Branson (presumably not the beardy one) makes fuel cells today.

The suggestion for sub-dividing the large inner tank was to minimise fuel loss if one part was damaged. It was thought of as a means of enabling more damaged aircraft to make it home.

The oil tanks were not self sealing at the time as the other subject of discussion was_ 'the need for self sealing material in oil tanks'_
(Minutes of a meeting between Operational Research Section Bomber Command (ORSBC) and Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) on 8th October 1943.)

On 29th December self sealing fuel hoses were discussed. There were constant efforts to reduce the vulnerability of all Bomber Commands aircraft, but almost all involved some kind of weight penalty and it was this, rather than cost, that Bomber Command often found unacceptable.

Cheers

Steve


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## Greyman (Dec 23, 2015)

stona said:


> The oil tanks were not self sealing at the time ... 8th October 1943 ...



Do you have any more information on this? Everything I have indicates the oil tanks were always self-sealing.

Earliest being AFDU trials on the Lancaster I (April 1942).

Well, earliest being the Manchester in some respects ...


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## Greyman (Dec 23, 2015)

pbehn said:


> Does the self sealing material weigh more than the petrol it displaces. I thought the penalty was loss of range?



Self-sealing tanks means both a weight penalty and a tank volume penalty. Both have a negative impact on range.


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## stona (Dec 23, 2015)

Greyman said:


> Do you have any more information on this? Everything I have indicates the oil tanks were always self-sealing.
> 
> Earliest being AFDU trials on the Lancaster I (April 1942).
> 
> Well, earliest being the Manchester in some respects ...



Just the minutes from that meeting. It seems odd to be discussing, quote, "the need for self sealing material in oil tanks" in 1943 if the tanks were already self sealing. It's possible they were discussing something other than the Lancaster.
I may know more later as the minutes are in a larger file 'Damage to Aircraft by Enemy Action' (AIR 14/1746) in our national archives, a copy of which I am hoping to get sometime after Xmas. It depends on TNA's estimate of the cost of a copy, otherwise I'll be waiting until I can make a visit

Cheers

Steve


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## Greyman (Dec 23, 2015)

stona said:


> I probably didn't express that very well above, apologies for the confusion. The discussion was about fitting _'Bransom fuel tanks'_ which were presumably an improvement on the tanks fitted at that time which were self-sealing. I have not been able to find out what a Bransom fuel tank was, but it must have been heavy, maybe it was armoured? Is this a typo? a company called Branson (presumably not the beardy one) makes fuel cells today.



Doesn't ring a bell with me either. Experimental type? I just have;

CIMA 50T
CIMA 397H
Semape
Sorbo
Sorbo 1​/4​"
ICI
Linatex


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## stona (Dec 23, 2015)

Obviously more investigation is required!

BTW the copy of the pilot's notes I have for the Lancaster, whilst specifically mentioning that the fuel tanks are self sealing, does not mention the same for oil tanks stating simply _'Each engine has its own tank capacity 37½ gallons of oil with 4½ gallons air space.' _ Hardly conclusive either way, but an odd omission if they were self sealing.

Cheers

Steve


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## Greyman (Dec 23, 2015)

stona said:


> Obviously more investigation is required!
> 
> BTW the copy of the pilot's notes I have for the Lancaster, whilst specifically mentioning that the fuel tanks are self sealing, does not mention the same for oil tanks stating simply _'Each engine has its own tank capacity 37½ gallons of oil with 4½ gallons air space.' _ Hardly conclusive either way, but an odd omission if they were self sealing.
> 
> ...



Check the Flight Engineer's insert. It specifies self-sealing there. In my copies anyway.


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## stona (Dec 23, 2015)

Greyman said:


> Check the Flight Engineer's insert. It specifies self-sealing there. In my copies anyway.



Same here, but dated May 1944, which would be quick work if the Lancaster was being discussed in October 1943. 7 months and no mention of a modification? I think the discussion must have pertained to other types, not the Lancaster. 

Cheers

Steve


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## wuzak (Dec 24, 2015)

stona said:


> Way back I said the Halifax should have been cancelled at the earliest opportunity and have just stumbled across some interesting statistics compiled in a report entitled 'Comparison of Aircraft Types'.
> 
> Aircraft. Casualty Rate. Bomb Load/Sortie. Bombs Dropped/Missing Aircraft. 'Cost'
> 
> ...



The Mosquito figures show 0.68 ton per sortie. If that was a short tone it equates to 1,360lb/sortie, and a long ton 1,523lb/sortie. I would suggest that was with the 2,000lb maximum bomb load.

But the interesting figure is the man/months per tone dropped being the same for Mosquitoes and Lancasters.




fastmongrel said:


> How often did the Mossie carry 4,000 pounds in 43.



Never.


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## stona (Dec 24, 2015)

wuzak said:


> The Mosquito figures show 0.68 ton per sortie. If that was a short tone it equates to 1,360lb/sortie, and a long ton 1,523lb/sortie. I would suggest that was with the 2,000lb maximum bomb load.



I agree. Probably a typo in or mis-reading of, the original. 

It would be the long ton (which it would always have written as simply 'ton') used as the unit by the ORSBC and just about everyone else in the UK (and Empire/Commonwealth/Dominions) up until metrication. 

It was only our American friends who knocked 12lbs of the hundredweight and ended up with a short ton 

Before the days of the Health and Safety Executive, 1 cwt (112lbs or 8 stone) was considered the weight that one man could reasonably carry! I distinctly remember coal being delivered in 1 cwt sacks which a single coal man would lift off a lorry (I remember a smallish flat bed), carry through the front gate and tip into the coal cellar.

Cheers

Steve

I understand that the 'short' ton was also used in Canada. You learn something everyday!!


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## tomo pauk (Dec 24, 2015)

stona said:


> Before the days of the Health and Safety Executive, 1 cwt (112lbs or 8 stone) was considered the weight that one man could reasonably carry! I distinctly remember coal being delivered in 1 cwt sacks which a single coal man would lift off a lorry (I remember a smallish flat bed), carry through the front gate and tip into the coal cellar.



The about same weight (50 kg) was also here the 'good measure' - the portland cement came in such wiehgt bags, as well as the wheat flour. Nowadays it is mostly up to 25 kg.


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## wuzak (Dec 24, 2015)

stona said:


> 1 cwt (112lbs or 8 stone)



It is a wonderful system where a hundred weight is not a hundred of anything, but 112....


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## fastmongrel (Dec 25, 2015)

wuzak said:


> It is a wonderful system where a hundred weight is not a hundred of anything, but 112....



Then you have the Long hundredweight of 120 pounds which was used in German speaking areas.

But which pound do we mean. At one time in England you had the Avourdupis, Ell, Troy, Merchant, Tower, London, Yorkshire pounds. Then there was Irish pond, Scottish Trone, French Livre, German Pfund, Russian Funt, Scandinavian Skalpund. I am not surprised the cwt is 112 pounds I am surprised it isnt 6,001 Toads or 143 Eagles.


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## stona (Dec 25, 2015)

wuzak said:


> It is a wonderful system where a hundred weight is not a hundred of anything, but 112....



But the imperial hundredweight is exactly 8 stone ;0

Merry Xmas

Steve


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## Airframes (Dec 25, 2015)

Ah, memories of the CWT (Hundredweight) !
Completely off topic, but as a student, working weekends and summer holidays in the gardening department of an old-fashioned department store (yes, very like 'Grace Brother's', for our UK members!), I used to cart around 1 CWT sacks of peat and fertilzers, and literally throw 1/2 CWT (56 lb) sacks to a friend, who'd catch them and stack them.
Later, I'd jump from an Argosy, Hercules or Andover, wirth my personal equipment weighing more than a CWT !
Nowadays, it takes me all my time to lift a pint glass - but I persevere !!

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## stona (Dec 26, 2015)

More bad news for the Halifax!
I was flicking through my copy of 'The Strategic Air War Against Germany 1939-1945' (as you do) looking for information on the real overall cost to the British economy of Bomber Command's effort, which incidentally is usually hugely exaggerated, and came across some more statistics comparing our bombers.
This time it is man power costs which are calculated for every 1,000 lb of bombs dropped. The calculations take into account not just aircraft production, but maintenance and air crew training.

Lancaster: 9.25 man months/1000 lb bombs dropped

Halifax: 27 man months/ 1000 lb bombs dropped

The Mosquito doesn't look so clever on this scale either: 16 man months/1000 lb bombs dropped. 

Worse is the venerable Stirling: 38 man months/1000 lb bombs dropped.

Cheers

Steve


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## fastmongrel (Dec 26, 2015)

Some of that difference could be Lancasters were only built as bombers and towards the end the RAF got very efficient at dropping big loads. Halifax, Stirling and Mossies were used for all sorts of missions. This might skew the figures


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## stona (Dec 26, 2015)

fastmongrel said:


> Some of that difference could be Lancasters were only built as bombers and towards the end the RAF got very efficient at dropping big loads. Halifax, Stirling and Mossies were used for all sorts of missions. This might skew the figures



A footnote to the table from which I lifted those figures states: 

_'it should be noted that this method of calculation automatically excludes that part of the effort of Bomber Command expended on sea mining, supply dropping etc but included the contribution to the offensive by all Dominion, Colonial and non-British personnel'._

For the Mosquito:

_'A bomb load of 2,000lb is assumed. Some types could carry a 4,000lb bomb'
_

Cheers

Steve

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## LisaM (Jan 3, 2016)

Cancellatons: 

British: Battle (etc) of course. Typhoon (the Spit XII was better). Tempest, unless it uses a Griffen engine, no Sabre.

US: Lots, but especially the P-40 as soon as the Mustang was available and Curtiss forced into making them.

Germany: Just about everything after '41 except the 262. Priorty being on improvements of exsting types and a (Typhoon to Tempest like) 109 upgrade with a new and bigger wing (and no draggy slats) longer fuselage, bulged hood (at least), fixed elevators and ailerons ..and a blasted rudder trimmer, drop the nose guns (for better visibilty) add a wider track u/c, 4 x 200mm cannons outside the prop in the now larger wings. 
Kill the axial flow jet development to concentrate on the easier to make and superior, at the time, centrifugal design.

Most, if not all of those were argued by some at the tmes, but politics and inertia, intercompany rivalry, etc meant everyone making some really sub optimal decisions (especially the Germans who took bad decsion making to whole new levels).


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## pbehn (Jan 3, 2016)

stona said:


> More bad news for the Halifax!
> I was flicking through my copy of 'The Strategic Air War Against Germany 1939-1945' (as you do) looking for information on the real overall cost to the British economy of Bomber Command's effort, which incidentally is usually hugely exaggerated, and came across some more statistics comparing our bombers.
> This time it is man power costs which are calculated for every 1,000 lb of bombs dropped. The calculations take into account not just aircraft production, but maintenance and air crew training.
> 
> ...



Were the figures for the mosquito purely for bombers on bombing missions. Mossies were used for many missions from PR to maritime strike, even those in bomber command were frequently used as target markers. Just saying.


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## GrauGeist (Jan 3, 2016)

LisaM said:


> Germany: Just about everything after '41 except the 262. Priorty being on improvements of exsting types and a (Typhoon to Tempest like) 109 upgrade with a new and bigger wing (and no draggy slats) longer fuselage, bulged hood (at least), fixed elevators and ailerons ..and a blasted rudder trimmer, drop the nose guns (for better visibilty) add a wider track u/c, 4 x 200mm cannons outside the prop in the now larger wings.
> Kill the axial flow jet development to concentrate on the easier to make and superior, at the time, centrifugal design.


You are aware that the only combat jet that Germany possessed by the end of 1941, was the He280?

The Me262 wouldn't be ready for jet flight until summer of 1942, and even then, it was still in prototype stage and it would still be some time before certain adjustments had been made (most important: tricycle gear) and full airframe production would commence by the end on 1943.


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## wuzak (Jan 3, 2016)

LisaM said:


> Kill the axial flow jet development to concentrate on the easier to make and superior, at the time, centrifugal design.



Not sure that the centrifugal jet was intrinsically superior to the axial flow design during WW2. 

The differences between resources and available materials between the countries would mask any advantages either had.

That said, the Metrovicks F2 had more thrust than the equivalent Whittle/Rover/Rolls-Royce jets, and as much, or more, than the de Havilland Goblin/Halford H1. The Metrovicks engine had issues with reliability, but mainly to do with the combustion chambers and turbine - the turbine being axial flow, the same as on the British centrifugal flow jets.


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## LisaM (Jan 3, 2016)

GrauGeist said:


> You are aware that the only combat jet that Germany possessed by the end of 1941, was the He280?
> 
> The Me262 wouldn't be ready for jet flight until summer of 1942, and even then, it was still in prototype stage and it would still be some time before certain adjustments had been made (most important: tricycle gear) and full airframe production would commence by the end on 1943.



Note I said "except the 262".

"The first test flights began on 18 April 1941, with the Me 262 V1 example"
"but since its intended BMW 003 turbojets were not ready for fitting, a conventional Junkers Jumo 210 engine was mounted in the V1 prototype's nose, driving a propeller"
"The V3 third prototype airframe, with the code PC+UC, became a true jet when it flew on 18 July 1942 "
Yep all taildraggers. It was the V5 that introduced a nose wheel.

The HS 280 was initialy in advance but their insistance of using thoir own, even more complicated, engines delayed it until it was cancelled. Might have been a contender/alternative IF the Germans had gone for a cetrifugal jet engine. 
The decision to go for the more complex (at the time) axial flwo killed their jet hopes, in fact it took until the early 50s that the west, wth all their industrial might mastered the axial flow engine enough to match the centrifugal one.

The Mig-15 did not suffer one lttle bit by using its Nene based engine vs the US's in the Korean war after all.


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## wuzak (Jan 3, 2016)

LisaM said:


> The HS 280 was initially in advance but their insistence of using their own, even more complicated, engines delayed it until it was cancelled. Might have been a contender/alternative IF the Germans had gone for a cetrifugal jet engine.



The Heinkel HeS 8 _was_ a centrifugal flow compressor gas turbine.

It also had a radial inflow turbine.


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## LisaM (Jan 3, 2016)

wuzak said:


> Not sure that the centrifugal jet was intrinsically superior to the axial flow design during WW2.
> 
> The differences between resources and available materials between the countries would mask any advantages either had.
> 
> That said, the Metrovicks F2 had more thrust than the equivalent Whittle/Rover/Rolls-Royce jets, and as much, or more, than the de Havilland Goblin/Halford H1. The Metrovicks engine had issues with reliability, but mainly to do with the combustion chambers and turbine - the turbine being axial flow, the same as on the British centrifugal flow jets.



The issue was what could you get into production faster and was reliable. Centrifugal engines leveraged off existing supercharger knowledge and production abilities. For example, the RR Nene was a 5,000lb thrust engine that was more reliable and far in advance of any axial flow ones of the time (late '44).

So from a design and production point of view it was about mastering everything after the compressor.
With an axial flow that part had to be worked out as well and read Stanley Hooker's account of what a sod that was.

Metrovick had their own problems: "However, the F.2 engine suffered from a number of problems that cast doubts on its reliability. These were primarily due to hot spots building up on the turbine bearing and combustion chamber."..... as did later prototypes. The trouble with developing a totally new technology.


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## GrauGeist (Jan 3, 2016)

LisaM said:


> Note I said "except the 262".
> 
> "The first test flights began on 18 April 1941, with the Me 262 V1 example"
> "but since its intended BMW 003 turbojets were not ready for fitting, a conventional Junkers Jumo 210 engine was mounted in the V1 prototype's nose, driving a propeller"
> ...


But even *if* the RLM hadn't ignored the He280 and related engine development and backed it, and *if* the RLM had taken the Me262 seriously, there would still have been a gap in aircraft availability if all other Luftwaffe types were cancelled in 1941.

And the Fw190 remained potent to war's end as did the Bf109. Eliminating those two Luftwaffe workhorses would have left a vacuum. There are a great deal of "wunderwaffe" and dead-end projects I would certainly axe...

But then again, I saw the comment about eliminating the P-40 early on and "forcing" Curtiss to produce additional P-51s. The P-40 was a valuable stop-gap aircraft that bought the Allies time to develop the P-51, F6F, F4U, P-47 along with British types.


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## wuzak (Jan 3, 2016)

LisaM said:


> Metrovick had their own problems: "However, the F.2 engine suffered from a number of problems that cast doubts on its reliability. These were primarily due to hot spots building up on the turbine bearing and combustion chamber."..... as did later prototypes. The trouble with developing a totally new technology.



Except that those components were similar to those used on centrifugal flow gas turbines.


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## Aozora (Jan 3, 2016)

LisaM said:


> Cancellatons:
> 
> Typhoon (the Spit XII was better). Tempest, unless it uses a Griffen engine, no Sabre.



Had the Air Ministry actually gone ahead with cancelling the Typhoon, 2 TAF would not have been nearly as effective as it was between late 1943 and VE-Day; sure, the Spitfire XII was arguably a better fighter, but there was no way that it was a better fighter-bomber. No Spitfire could carry 1,000 lb bombs or 8 to 16 rockets, nor could it carry the same armour protection, or dive as fast. Overall, the Typhoon turned out to be a very efficient fighter-bomber and there was nothing else in the British armoury that could have taken its place. I would, however, argue that one mistake the British did make was to lumber the likes of the Typhoon and Mosquito with heavy, bulky rocket rails; by 1944 zero-length launchers had been proven in operational service and should have been made a priority.


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## Greyman (Jan 4, 2016)

Aozora said:


> No Spitfire could carry 1,000 lb bombs or 8 to 16 rockets, nor could it carry the same armour protection, or dive as fast.



Or strafe as well.
- more stable gun platform
- more ammunition
- better over-the-nose view


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## stona (Jan 4, 2016)

When would the P-40 be cancelled and what would replace the 700+ of them in the MTO in 1942/3?

When would the Typhoon be cancelled, it was in development for a long time, and what would replace it in a fighter-bomber role in 1944/45?

Any cancellations may result in a shortfall. My cancellation of the Halifax would result in less heavy bombers for Bomber Command over the next eighteen months, but those I did have would be better and more efficient. Harris wanted to cancel it and knew the figures. 

I've never read of anyone in Fighter Command, 2nd TAF or the Air Ministry pushing for the cancellation of the Typhoon. Was it's cancellation ever discussed by those operating or expecting to operate it?

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Jan 4, 2016)

For the n-th time - if we want the Curtiss to produce a real performer, they can get the grip (can they?) on production of the P-47G they have the contract. maybe, just maybe go with a 2-stage V-1710 on P-40 airframe when engine is available. 
The SB2C Helldiver II is also a dubious thing, especially the Army version.
For Bell - no P-63, this is where the P-51 production should come in, with 2-stage V-1710 in order not to draw from Packard Merlin production.
B-26 was a problematic bird, perhaps go with B-25 modified to take R-2800 and produce it at Martin?
In lieu of the P-61 night fighter - unles going with turbo R-2800s, stick proper engines on the A-20 so it can perform at altitude. And/or modify the pod of the P-38 so bigger radar can be carried without interference with armament.

For the British, cancelling the Battle make sense after maybe 500 examples produced. No Defiant (sorry, nuumann), no Whirlwind (sorry Shortround6 and tomo pauk) unless it is designed around Merlins, no Welkin (produce more Spitfires instead), obviously no Botha and Albemarle (produce more Blenheims, Mosquitoes or/and Beaufighters), no Albacore (more Swordfishes) and Firefly (more Seafires, really introduce Sea Mosquito).

My hatchet job makes sure that ww2 hardware is far less interesting than historically


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## parsifal (Jan 4, 2016)

> I've never read of anyone in Fighter Command, 2nd TAF or the Air Ministry pushing for the cancellation of the Typhoon. Was it's cancellation ever discussed by those operating or expecting to operate it?



Im not aware of any serious discussions, but still,. it is fair to say that it suffered a protracted development, chiefly because of its engine. Moreover, it had more than its share of problems as a straight up fight, though it more than made up for that as a ground attack machine.


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## stona (Jan 4, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> For the British, cancelling the Battle make sense after maybe 500 examples produced. No Defiant (sorry, nuumann), no Whirlwind (sorry Shortround6 and tomo pauk) unless it is designed around Merlins, no Welkin (produce more Spitfires instead), obviously no Botha and Albemarle (produce more Blenheims, Mosquitoes or/and Beaufighters), no Albacore (more Swordfishes) and Firefly (more Seafires, really introduce Sea Mosquito).



There were very good reasons for producing some of those aircraft at the time. 

For example, If you thought that there might be German tanks on the beaches of southern England in 1940 you would want a cannon armed fighter which means the Whirlwind.

The Defiant's shortcomings were becoming evident as it entered service, but the tactical situation which sounded its death knell in 1940 wasn't anticipated by anybody.

Welkin production was very limited, less than 100 IIRC, and I can't imagine that it impacted Spitfire production adversely at that time.

The Botha was a terrible aircraft and though production was limited (I don't have the numbers to hand) I agree that a total run of zero would have been better.

The Albermarle was another horrible aircraft, but it did find some niche roles and would have to be replaced with something.

The Albacore should never have been ordered, but what alternative did their Lordships have? The Albacore was supposed to be an improvement on the Swordfish so why order more of an earlier type? The only alternative, unrealistic at the time, was to buy something from the Americans.

The Firefly wasn't so bad and did things a Seafire couldn't. The Seafire was really not a suitable aircraft for carrier operations, its range, accident and reliability rates were not good at all, something not lost on their Lordships. I wouldn't want more Seafires, they were nothing more than a stop gap and a reflection of the fact that the FAA didn't have any other competitive British built fighter capable of operating from her carriers.

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Jan 4, 2016)

Even with France fighting on, some basic arythmetics are against Defiant when compared with Hurricane, let alone with Spitfire. It sports half of firepower, while needing twice the crew. It will be more expensive to produce, and less of a performer (not just speed but also the RoC), the performance was also needed for a good bomber destroyer.
Now that we're at it, can the Roc, but Skua makes sense as a dive bomber. An earlier Sea Hurricane perhaps, or more of them?
Welkin's production line still need to be purchased produced, and lines for limited production aircraft's tend to be expensive per that aircraft. better to expand the line for Spitfire at Westlans. Much more produced Spitfires also avoids the 'either better, or more Spitfires, but not both' mantra. 
I've suggested the replacements for Albermarle  Perhaps more Hampdens?

Alternative for the Albacore might be the navalized Battle, or trimmed down Henley, or, as historically, more Swordfishes. More Skuas for bombing. Ultimatively the Sea Mosquito, so no Barracuda.

There is no reason not to have the Seafire equivalent of the Spitfire XII or VIII. Heavier Griffon or 2-stage Merlin alleviates any problem with 29-gal rear fuselage tank the Spit V might encounter, stick the 90 gal drop tank and there is a rangy Seafire. Seafire proved it can be flown against LW and RA fighter oppositon, why wait until 1944 for a fighter that can't?
Plus, one can have those much earlier than the Firefly, a main benefit. 
If the FAA wants the 2-seater fighter really bad, attach the better Merlin, or Griffon on the Fulmar, ; change LMGs for cannons. Available before the Firefly.


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## stona (Jan 4, 2016)

The Seafire was a terrible carrier aircraft. Its undercarriage broke if a rate of descent above 7'/sec was used during the landing, compare that with the 12'/sec designed as standard on all US carrier aircraft. It's deck landing speed was just 1.05 Vse, that's just 3 knots above the stall. American carrier aircraft were designed to land at 1.2 Vse, a much larger margin of error.

Just controlling the landing speed of a Seafire was tricky. It didn't like to slow down and was keen to accelerate, resulting in far too many landings at too high a speed and inevitable accidents. Another unwanted factor was the tendency of the aircraft to float on landing. If a perfect 3 point landing was not made the main wheels touched first, this pushed the nose up as the tail descended, this increased lift and the unfortunate pilot and his charge floated into the safety barrier, a very common cause of Seafire accidents. 

This was compounded by the 'instability effect'. Spitfires and Seafires had a positive angle on the elevator for stable flight. When the pilot cut the power for a carrier landing and the slipstream speed reduced the extra lift generated by this feature also reduced. This caused the tail to fall, the main plane incidence to increase giving more lift, causing the 'float, float, prang' of a popular ditty of the time. Carrier aircraft are generally designed with a negative lift on the tail surfaces in a landing configuration. This means that the 'cut' produces a nose down pitch, if any.

Of course when a three point landing was made it was not how the aircraft had been designed to land on grass fields and a bending force passed up the undercarriage legs (which was not present when the legs were vertical in a grass field 'wheeler' landing) wrenching the undercarriage from its attachment points.

The Seafire's extremely sensitive elevator also caused problems in landing, particularly if a pilot had to make height adjustments late in the approach. The Seafire was particularly prone, specially when landing light, to be sensitive to any gust over the carriers round-down. It would get pushed up above the proper descent path and efforts to overcome this often led to crashes or damage to the air frame due to heavy landings.

Any landing, particularly the required, gentle, three point required for carrier operations was severely hampered by the pilot's inability to see anything over the nose. The air speed indicator was not accurate due to vibration and a poor scale (about one eighth of an inch represented 10 knots) and it was also set at ninety degrees to the pilot's vision as he looked for the deck. If it was raining the Seafire had no windscreen wiper.
Pilots generally stuck their head to port (making a curved approach) and were just able to see some of the carrier deck through the haze of the port exhaust. 

The Seafire IX had a whole host of other problems associated with the increased power of the Griffon. These were only mitigated by the fitting of contra-rotating propellers on the 47.

Basically, what I'm arguing is that the Seafire was an awful carrier aircraft. It had never been designed for such a role and it showed. It was the only competitive fighter the British had which could be converted for carrier operation, so it was. Once in the air it became, almost, a Spitfire and there wasn't much wrong with that. It was the bits either side of being airborne that were the problem 

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Jan 4, 2016)

Thanks for the overview 

I didn't proposed the 2-stage Griffon, that made some 500 HP more than 1-stage Griffon, so the power would be still manageable, and weight lower. There are still options of earlier/more/better Sea Hurricanes, plus the upgraded Fulmar to make things better in 1940-43, unlike the Firefly.


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## LisaM (Jan 4, 2016)

stona said:


> When would the P-40 be cancelled and what would replace the 700+ of them in the MTO in 1942/3?
> 
> When would the Typhoon be cancelled, it was in development for a long time, and what would replace it in a fighter-bomber role in 1944/45?
> 
> ...



Easy P-40 alternative in MTO 42/43? Spitfires. 

Fighter Command was sitting uselessly on 70+ squadrons of them in the UK and fought against any single one being sent out of the country. The Desert Air force did not get a single one until after the Battle of El Alemein despite the slaughtering the Hurricane and P-40 pilots went through from the 109Fs and later 109Gs..... Sholoto Douglas and Leigh Mallory again...sigh...did those two ever do anything right?

No problems about using them as fighter bombers, Park in Malta had being doing that for ages already.... As did the 2 TAF later.


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## tomo pauk (Jan 4, 2016)

OldSkeptic?


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## LisaM (Jan 4, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> OldSkeptic?



Yep..been through a few changes, lol.


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## stona (Jan 4, 2016)

LisaM said:


> Easy P-40 alternative in MTO 42/43? Spitfires.



Where are they coming from. Forget the UK based ones, they were going nowhere. You can free them up with hindsight, but that was a luxury unavailable to those responsible for defending UK airspace at the time.
Cheers
Steve


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## tomo pauk (Jan 4, 2016)

LisaM said:


> Cancellatons:
> ...
> Germany: Just about everything after '41 except the 262. Priorty being on improvements of exsting types and a (Typhoon to Tempest like) 109 upgrade with a new and bigger wing (and no draggy slats) longer fuselage, bulged hood (at least), fixed elevators and ailerons ..and a blasted rudder trimmer, drop the nose guns (for better visibilty) add a wider track u/c, 4 x 200mm cannons outside the prop in the now larger wings.
> Kill the axial flow jet development to concentrate on the easier to make and superior, at the time, centrifugal design.
> ...



Once you're done with enlarging the Bf 109, the DB-601/605 won't cut it, the described aircraft is almost a Fw 190, a fighter aircraft no one would realistically cancel. The slats were not that draggy in the 109, plus they serve the purpose in tight turns.
The Tempest offered not just a bigger wing, it was much thinner.

I like the 200 mm cannons, make it 8 in/203 mm?


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## LisaM (Jan 4, 2016)

stona said:


> Where are they coming from. Forget the UK based ones, they were going nowhere. You can free them up with hindsight, but that was a luxury unavailable to those responsible for defending UK airspace at the time.
> Cheers
> Steve



There was nothing to defend from after the attack on the USSR started. By that point British intelligence (especially R V Jones) knew where any unit was in the west. He told them that he could guarantee at least a couple of months warning before any new bombing attacks started and then proved it later. Heck he predcted to the day when the V1 campaign would start.

it was just Douglas and Mallory being dicks basically and it took Churchill's personal intervention to change that. Shades of it taking Roosovelt's personal ineterventon to finally get more than one squadron of VLR B-24s for the battle of the Atlantic in the teeth of opposition from the USN and USAAF....

You read the history and then you sometimes wonder what side some of the 'air barons' (UK US) were on.


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## parsifal (Jan 4, 2016)

hi Steve

regarding the seafire

There is no denying the aircraft was not an ideal choice for carrier operations, but you are being very unfair in your appraisal in some respects. 

Seafires first went to sea in in the med, aboard substandard CVE platforms for the most part. Aboard ships that could barely make enough speed to get air under the wings, which in turn made demands on the aircraft that US high performance types were never asked to meet. The type went to sea with grossly inadequate development and extremely green aircrews aboard ships unsuited to their performance, in conditions that brought out the worst faults in their conversion.

The overwhelming majority of Seafires during their wartime service were forced to operate from the woolworths carriers, whilst US types mostly operated from their big fleet types, leaving escort carrier ops up to their Wildcats and SBDs

In BPF service in 1945, some of these faults were addressed. The BPF operated mostly fleet carriers, had vastly more experienced aircrews, in weather conditions where headwinds existed and using mostly seafire IIIs. The Seafire was loperated alongside both Corsairs and Hellcats, and in these ops suffered the lowest operational loss rates of the three types by a wide margin.

in addition, it was found the range differences, so often toted as a major reason for the types failure were far less than might be expected. operating with the BPF, Hellcats were found to have an effective operational range of just over 200 miles, whilst the seafire IIIs had effective range of 185 miles, hardly a significant difference. The Corsair did have a worthwhile range advantage, it must be conceded, at 240 miles. But then the seafire was found to be a vastly superior point defence interceptor with its heavy cannon armament and good performance low down, it was ideal as a kamikaze killer 

im not saying this aircraft was ideal, or good, or without serious problems, but your critique is highly selective and not representative of what the type actually did achieve. postwar the Seafire XV and 47s were both classy a/c.


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## stona (Jan 5, 2016)

You can't escape the basic unsuitability of an aircraft designed for grass field operations for operations from a carrier deck. Many of the problems were intrinsic to the design of the aircraft. The development of the later Marks did overcome this to an extent, but they bore little resemblance to the aircraft operating throughout most of the war. 30 Wing set of for the Pacific with Seafire IIIs in March 1945, 24 Wing was already out east with the same type. The first three MK XVs arrived in the PTO (actually in Australia) in November 1945. 
Cheers
Steve


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## GregP (Jan 6, 2016)

Hi LisaM,

The political attitudes of the time being what they were, there was NO WAY a foreign aircraft would be accepted into the inventory as a main fighter. Sure, we flew a few out of interest and they made good mounts, but the U.S.A. at the time was firmly nationalistic. The only reason the Packard V-1650 came about was because it was intended for the UK. Serendipity helped make it into the P-51B and they were smart enough to take it from there, but we would never have made any foreign aircraft a main asset ... at the time.

We still don't. The T-45 Hawk the Navy flies is made by Boeing. The B-57 we flew was made by Martin. Ditto the T-6 is made here, too.

It might have been a good move, and I don't dispute that, but it was never going to get approval in WWII.


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## GrauGeist (Jan 6, 2016)

GregP said:


> ...here was NO WAY a foreign aircraft would be accepted into the inventory as a main fighter. Sure, we flew a few out of interest and they made good mounts, but the U.S.A. at the time was firmly nationalistic.


The USAAF did use several British types:
Spitfires: 4th FG (former VIII FC)
Beaufighter: 414th, 415th, 416th and 417th NFS - 12th AF/9th AF
Mosquito: 416th and 425th NFS, 653rd and 645th BS - 25th BG, 492nd BG, 8th recon/8th WRS - 802nd RG
and the Horsa Glider...

And more recently, the Harrier. While some Hawker/BAE were used for evaluation, the U.S. built version may have been domestic, but it was afterall, a British design...

The B-57 was a license-built English Electric Canberra complete with J65 engines that were license-built RR Avons. Even though it was built in the U.S., it's still British.

And here's a little bit of fun trivia: the Lockheed U-2 was based on a Canberra and guess who Lockheed had help with the modifications? English Electric.


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## stona (Jan 15, 2016)

parsifal said:


> In BPF service in 1945, some of these faults were addressed. The BPF operated mostly fleet carriers, had vastly more experienced aircrews, in weather conditions where headwinds existed and using mostly seafire IIIs. The Seafire was loperated alongside both Corsairs and Hellcats, and in these ops suffered the lowest operational loss rates of the three types by a wide margin.



Let's look at the Seafires at Salerno.

11 Squadrons totaling 106 aircraft were available on the first day. I won't go into details of all operations day by day, just a summarry.

In four days the Seafires flew 713 sorties, shot down 2 enemy aircraft (and 1 P-51) and damaged 4 more.

In this period 32 were destroyed in deck landing crashes, 17 suffered undercarriage failure, 24 suffered distortion of the rear fuselage and 4 suffered engine failures. The first category is a reflection of the aerodynamic unsuitability of the Seafire for carrier operations, the second two reflect the inherent weakness of a light weight interceptor, designed for grass field operations, operating from carriers. The final category could have happened to any aircraft. The problem is that this amounts to a total of 77 of 106 aircraft (near enough 75%) rendered unservicable in four days of operations. 

On the fourth day of operations all 26 available Seafires (not sure what happened to the other 3) left the carriers for the now ready airfield at Paestrum.

Whatever the Seafires did or did not achieve at Salerno they were obviously incapable of long term operations from the available RN carriers at the time. A return of 2 for 77 isn't going to win a war.

The best the Seafire did was probably covering 'Dragoon'. Same carriers but better conditions and,crucially, better training, meant that the deck landing crash rate fell to 1 in 50 landings, better than twice as good as the 1 in 22 of Salerno. 
The inherent weakness of the undercarriage and fuselage, with the need to make almost perfect landings at 3 knots above the stall was never overcome on war time Marks.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Feb 4, 2016)

GrauGeist said:


> The B-57 was a license-built English Electric Canberra complete with J65 engines that were license-built RR Avons. Even though it was built in the U.S., it's still British.



A minor correction as it doesn't change the point you are making one bit.

The J-65 was a licenced Armstrong-Siddeley Sapphire, although modified,(and could be traced back to a Metrovick project) and not an Avon.


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## FLYBOYJ (Feb 4, 2016)

GrauGeist said:


> And here's a little bit of fun trivia: the Lockheed U-2 was based on a Canberra.



TELL US MORE!?!?


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## GrauGeist (Feb 4, 2016)

FLYBOYJ said:


> TELL US MORE!?!?


The story of the U-2 is really a cool evolutionary story...as it was the highly modified B-57 (licensed Canberra) that got the ball rolling. With EE's help, B-57 (RB-57D) project saw the max altitude increase from 48,000 feet to reach nearly 70,000 feet.

Once Lockheed got involved, the U-2 went from the B-57 platform to the (then develping) F-104 platform.

Anyway, the story of the U-2 concept, from start to finish is a great one filled with all sorts of political posturing, arguing between service branches, intrigue and stuff that would make a great movie. It was also the failure of project Rainbow that launched project Oxcart.


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## FLYBOYJ (Feb 4, 2016)

GrauGeist said:


> The story of the U-2 is really a cool evolutionary story...as it was the highly modified B-57 (licensed Canberra) that got the ball rolling. With EE's help, B-57 (RB-57D) project saw the max altitude increase from 48,000 feet to reach nearly 70,000 feet.
> 
> Once Lockheed got involved, the U-2 went from the B-57 platform to the (then develping) F-104 platform.
> 
> Anyway, the story of the U-2 concept, from start to finish is a great one filled with all sorts of political posturing, arguing between service branches, intrigue and stuff that would make a great movie. It was also the failure of project Rainbow that launched project Oxcart.



Ahhh, OK - now I remember reading the same. I believe the U-2 actually flew before the RB-57D as well


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## tyrodtom (Feb 4, 2016)

The U-2 first flew in Aug. 55, the RB-57D first flew in Nov. 55.

The RAF long wing version of the Canberra, PRmk9, was doing missions in 1953, but it had just a 4 ft. extension in wingspan..

I just don't see much evidence of any technology transfer. Two radically different approaches to the same problem.


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## GrauGeist (Feb 4, 2016)

tyrodtom said:


> The U-2 first flew in Aug. 55, the RB-57D first flew in Nov. 55.
> 
> The RAF long wing version of the Canberra, PRmk9, was doing missions in 1953, but it had just a 4 ft. extension in wingspan..
> 
> I just don't see much evidence of any technology transfer. Two radically different approaches to the same problem.


There wasn't a "tech" transfer but the quest of the USAF to obtain a high-altitude PR platform through the RB-57 program caught the attention of Kelly Johnson, who set out to create his own version...


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## pinsog (Feb 4, 2016)

If you want to ditch the P40 in the desert, why not replace it with a P39 that has a 20mm cannon in place of the 37mm, remove the wing guns and some of the armor and turn up the boost on the Allison so it can fight below 12,000 feet just like the Russians did. The Russians thought it was superior to the P40 and the Hurricane. In tests it was considered the equal of the Spitfire below 15,000 feet.


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## FLYBOYJ (Feb 4, 2016)

Actually the U-2 was based on the same specification that created the RB-57D. Now I remember hearing this at a Lockheed Management Club meeting in the early 80s when Johnson was a guest speaker. Learning about the RB-57D, he knew he could build a better aircraft tailored for the mission for both the USAF and CIA.


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## pbehn (Feb 4, 2016)

tyrodtom said:


> The U-2 first flew in Aug. 55, the RB-57D first flew in Nov. 55.
> 
> The RAF long wing version of the Canberra, PRmk9, was doing missions in 1953, but it had just a 4 ft. extension in wingspan..
> 
> I just don't see much evidence of any technology transfer. Two radically different approaches to the same problem.


I thought that the canberra was designed with stubby wings because of the designers previous experience of long thin wings.


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## Capt. Vick (Feb 4, 2016)

Cancel? None! In fact I would approve for production a number of one-offs and also rans. Why? So we would have more kits to build, books to read and pictures to look at!

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## Kryten (Feb 7, 2016)

In WW2 I would cancel the Stirling and make more Wellingtons, the He177 and make anything else!
Post war the Starfighter and save a lot of grief and lives!


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## FLYBOYJ (Feb 7, 2016)

Kryten said:


> Post war the Starfighter and save a lot of grief and lives!



There was nothing wrong with the Starfighter - "OPERATOR ERROR." Look at some of the accidents, almost all *PILOT ERROR*. Once pilots were trained properly and understood it's strengths and weaknesses, it had one of the best safety records in NATO. (The F-100 had the highest accent rate in NATO) It was made into a mini nuclear bomber and the Italians produced it into the 1980s. 


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jyBDEG9dg-Q_


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## GrauGeist (Feb 7, 2016)

Kryten said:


> ...Post war the Starfighter and save a lot of grief and lives!


The F-104 was no different than the F4U or the Bf109 in the respect that it required strict attention to the lessons given to the pilot during training and following those lessons to the letter.

These (and other) aircraft were extremely capable machines *IF* you follow procedure...


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## stona (Feb 7, 2016)

If you are considering cancelling anything as a part of the British Air Ministry/Air Staff you have the following conundrum to solve.
There is pressure to produce as many aircraft as possible. If aircraft A is cancelled in favour of aircraft B there will be a reduction in overall production. The conundrum was solved by phasing out (the phrase used at the time was 'fading out') production of type A gradually, whilst phasing in type B.
The result of this 'fudge' is inevitable. Type A will remain in production for some time after it has become obsolete, at least for front line service, and the introduction of type B will be delayed.
That is exactly what happened time and time again. In the case of my subject for cancellation, the Handley Page Halifax, this was the explicit reason why it was kept in production and not cancelled for more Lancasters. The Halifax never did get 'faded out' and we ended up _eventually_ with less Lancasters than we might otherwise have had. In the shorter term the total number of four engine bombers was maintained. 
Cheers
Steve


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## syscom3 (Feb 7, 2016)

For "end production", I mean no new orders to be placed and the blocks of aircraft in production or assembly, can be completed.

For the USN;
1) End F6F production in Q4 of 1944 and use resources for the Bearcat.
2) Cancel the Tigercat
3) Cancel the Lockheed Ventura's in 1944. The USN/USMC can use B25's to do the same thing.

For the AAF:
1) End B17 production in Q4 of 1944.
2) End B24 production in Q1 of 1945 (because of Pacific needs).
3) End B26, A20 and B25 production by Q3 of 1944. Convert to A26 production.
4) End P39 production for US needs in Q4 1942, and use freed up capacity solely for the Soviets.
5) End P40 production in Q4 1943.
6) End P38 production in Q1 1945.
7) End P47 production in Q4 1944 in favor of the "N" versions.

The following planes were just plain crap and production terminated in Q1 and Q2 of 1943.
Douglas A24, Vultee A31, Curtiss SO3c and C76, Anything Brewster.


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## pbehn (Feb 7, 2016)

stona said:


> If you are considering cancelling anything as a part of the British Air Ministry/Air Staff you have the following conundrum to solve.
> There is pressure to produce as many aircraft as possible. If aircraft A is cancelled in favour of aircraft B there will be a reduction in overall production. The conundrum was solved by phasing out (the phrase used at the time was 'fading out') production of type A gradually, whilst phasing in type B.


Great post but also the UK had a great need for aircraft in general, The Wellington was there at the start and you could say was obsolete when war was declared but 11,500 were produced and they were still finding new uses for it as the war drew to a close. Not producing Stirlings and Wellingtons in favour of Lancastes means you have fewer aircraft overall and you use lancasters to lay mines train crews or sweep for magnetic mines


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## GrauGeist (Feb 7, 2016)

syscom3 said:


> ...Anything Brewster.


Including the license-built Corsairs (F3A Corsair)? 

Also, while the F2A served little or no purpose in the U.S. war effort, it's absense in the Finnish aresnal would have left a huge vacuum.


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## GregP (Feb 7, 2016)

There were a total of 2,578 F-104 Starfighters manufactured, mostly by NATO members.

The poor safety record brought the F-104 to the public’s eye. Erich Hartmann was retired for opposing its deployment.

In Viet Nam, the type flew 2,937 combat sorties in 1965 and 2,269 in 1966 – 1967, for a total of 5,206 combat sorties. 12 were lost. 4 to AAA, 1 to a MiG-19 (actually a Shenyang J-6), 2 to mid-air collision, 3 to SAMs, and 4 operational losses including 3 engine failures. That’s a loss rate of 0.27% to all causes … not too bad in a shooting conflict, and stellar when compared with WWII losses by ANY type.

German losses totaled 110 pilots. Operating in European weather at low altitude in mountainous terrain was vastly different from flying in Arizona in training. Also, the Germans were using it mainly as a fighter-bomber instead of as an interceptor as designed.

The German Air Force lost about 30% of its F-104s. Canada lost 46% of its F-104s. The Spanish Air Force lost none; go figure. In USAF service, the class A (write off) rate was 26.7 (Bowman 2000, p. 21) accidents per 100,000 flying hours (30.63 by 2007), the highest rate of any “Century-series fighter. By comparison, the loss rate of the Convair F-102 was 14.2 (USAF Safety & Inspection Center)/ 100,000 flying hours. 13.69 by 2007.The F-100’s loss rate was 16.25 accidents (Jenkins 2005, p. 46)/ 100,000 flying hours.

So while it might have been OK as an aircraft if maintained correctly and flown correctly, it had a definite high accident rate when compared with almost anything else while being flown by pilots trained to fly it. I’m not sure if that is a red flag for cancellation, but it gets my attention if I’m a pilot assigned to unit about to fly F-104s.

It tells me to learn the systems, fly the numbers, and don’t try stupid things below 300 knots or 10,000 – 15,000 feet, like pulling too hard in a low and slow turn. You can’t do that in a T-38, either, but it has a low tailplane and can at least stay in there under control and wait for the engines to catch up. If you are high enough, you can hang in there and recover. When the T-tail lets go in an F-104, you will lose 30,000+ feet whether you have it or not, according to F-104 pilots, and may or may not EVER recover.

Moral of the story is don’t get heavy-handed and stall it unintentionally; fly the numbers. From all reports, it's an A-ticket ride. There is a private example operated in Arizona and I have been in the pattern with it. I was turning base at Deer Valley and was told I was number 2 behind an F-104 out of 20,000 feet! I was almost ready to turn final when he touched down! If it can't do anything else, it DOES come down quickly when it wants to land. It was a magnificent aircraft, but I had zero desire to climb in the cockpit for a flight s PIC. I DID get to sit in it and look. Lottsa' tiny gauges meaning a super 1950's cockpit.

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## Peter Gunn (Feb 8, 2016)

Not totally on topic but to me the F-104 definitely looks the part of a jet interceptor.


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## FLYBOYJ (Feb 8, 2016)

GregP said:


> There were a total of 2,578 F-104 Starfighters manufactured, mostly by NATO members.
> 
> The poor safety record brought the F-104 to the public’s eye. Erich Hartmann was retired for opposing its deployment.
> 
> ...



Great Info Greg - something else to consider; Many pilots transitioned from the T-33 into the F-86 and then into the F-104. As you know from the guys at Chino, the F-86 is a very easy aircraft to fly with few bad habits. No mach 1+ transition aircraft into the -104 until the T-38 came along. I read somewhere the F-104 killed low time pilots and a few WW2 vets who might have been high on experience but low on learning new things. Here's Joe Baugher's Take on the German F-104 program;

Starfighter with Luftwaffe

"The loss rate of Luftwaffe Starfighters was not all that extraordinary, since the Luftwaffe had suffered a 36 percent attrition rate with the Republic F-84F Thunderstreak, the Starfighter's immediate predecessor. There was nothing intrinsically dangerous about the Starfighter, since the* Royal Norwegian Air Force operating identical F-104Gs suffered only six losses in 56,000 flying hours, and the Spanish Air Force lost not a single one of its Starfighters to accidents."*


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## Shortround6 (Feb 8, 2016)

syscom3 said:


> For "end production", I mean no new orders to be placed and the blocks of aircraft in production or assembly, can be completed.
> 
> For the USN;
> 1) End F6F production in Q4 of 1944 and use resources for the Bearcat.
> ...




I am not at all sure what a lot of this gets you. Especially when you consider that it could take 3-4 months from when a fighter/single engine plane rolled out the factory door and when it reached a combat zone. 

Ending F6F production to build F8Fs gets you what in 1945? 
Please remember that the F6F and F8F did *not *use the same engine. The F6F used the R-2800 B series and the F8F used the "C" series engine and there were (by legend) only about two interchangeable parts between the two. The P-47M and N used the "C" series engine. Chevrolet built 327 "C" series engines in 1944, Ford built none, Nash built none and P & W built only token numbers (test engines basically) of the single stage engines that powered the F8F. 

Canceling the Tigercat gets you basically nothing in WWII. More Panthers after WW II? 

Air Force stopped ordering Ventura's in July of 1942 so the Lockheed factory could build Ventura's for the Navy. By 1944 you are into the PV-2 model with bigger wing and more fuel. Problems with the wing delayed mass production. 

for the Air Force the A-24 is simply a renamed Dauntless dive bomber. Hardly a piece of crap. Only the A-24B was built in an army controlled plant, earlier A-24s came from initial navy orders. Army didn't get any A-25s to even issue to training squadrons until Q2 of 1943 .
More later


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## GregP (Feb 8, 2016)

One of our volunteers (Yuri Vandervood) flew for the Dutch Air Force back in the day. Unfortunately, he passed away about 4 months ago, but he had some great stories of Meteors, Hunters, F-86Ks, and the F-104. He said they used to dogfight with English Electric Lightnings and had great fun for about 5 minutes, after which the Lightnings would slow down and glide in dead stick ... they had run out of fuel! So ... their "dogfight" area was between the two bases, but it was always the Lightnings that ran out of fuel. He allowed that he was shocked at how good a glider the Lightning was.

He said he was inverted, pulling level at about 60,000 feet one day in an F-104 when he realized he wasn't in a "severe environment suit" ... and that if the canopy cracked he was dead from bubbles in the blood. So he rolled upright and started down quickly. He allowed the F-104 was superb at going down, and not too shabby going up, either. He said the Meteor was a wonderful plane to fly ... when both fans were turning. If you got down to one, it wanted to kill you and was fairly persistent at it. You had to talk nice to it and be gentle to make it not happen.

Yuri had a way with words and was a consummate story-teller. He told of riding in our Stearman once and was at 5,000 feet in the middle of a loop when one of our hangar cats crawled up into his lap, sat down, and hung on with claws! He allowed that surprised him quite a bit. It wasn't the unexpected weight so much as the claws in his crotch that got his attention.

I can see it might get my attention, too, if it happened to me.

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## merlin (Feb 12, 2016)

Using the term 'cancel' loosely, I would not have ordered the Short design that became the Stirling, but instead gone for the Bolton-Paul Design, IMHO would've seen service earlier. I would have reduced production of the Battle - Austin Shadow factory instead makes Hurricanes. Again, I would not have ordered the Botha, may have tried the Wellington design as a long-range torpedo-bomber (to be replaced by the Bristol design to P.13/36. This Bristol design is also used to replace the Blenheim (how on earth was in production for so long). And, just in case you wonder what Short's are doing with no Stirling - more Sunderlands, and a military version of the transatlantic S.25 flying-boat.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 14, 2016)

Cancelling the F6F in order for F8F to be produced gains maybe nothing, and looses plenty. As SR6 noted, F8F needs C series of R-2800. It has 2/3rds of firepower of usual F6F, and less fuel on board. Nothing prevents the USN from ordering the F6F-6 from Grumman, that clocked 425 mph in XF6F-6 form, to feature just 4 HMGs and 200 gals of fuel for even better climb. The XF6F-6 was powered by R-2800-18W engine, same as F4U-4.


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## syscom3 (Feb 14, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> Cancelling the F6F in order for F8F to be produced gains maybe nothing, and looses plenty. As SR6 noted, F8F needs C series of R-2800. It has 2/3rds of firepower of usual F6F, and less fuel on board. Nothing prevents the USN from ordering the F6F-6 from Grumman, that clocked 425 mph in XF6F-6 form, to feature just 4 HMGs and 200 gals of fuel for even better climb. The XF6F-6 was powered by R-2800-18W engine, same as F4U-4.



The need for a Kamikazi interceptor was desperately needed by the USN. That's why the Bearcat was needed and pushed into service so quickly. 

By not wasting resources on the Hellcats which were already at the peak of their development and lasting longer than expected, and throwing everything at the Bearcat, we can get it into service faster.

There used to be a member here named Leonard whose dad was a USN test pilot in the 40's (even flew a couple sorties at Midway) and flew all of the Grumman fighters. He said that the Bearcat was better than the Hellcat in several catagories and was the best overall. And that was the opinion of a naval aviator that flew all three.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 14, 2016)

Not to take away from (Ray?) Leonard's father's expertise, but did he flew the XF6F-6? 
The 1st flight was on July 6th 1944, 2 prototypes delivered. USN can have the -6 on the decks in January 1945, looking at F4U-4 that was 1st flew 2 months later, with 1st series produced in Feb 1945. In combat by Feb/March 1945? 
The Bearcat, even rushed as-is, will lag half a year, and it won't do the long range work and sustained air combat patrols as good as Hellcat or Corsair that have more fuel; it also has 33% less firepower, the firepower being one of main features of fleet defender.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 15, 2016)

syscom3 said:


> The need for a Kamikazi interceptor was desperately needed by the USN. That's why the Bearcat was needed and pushed into service so quickly.



Unfortunately many "histories" get the time lines confused. 

Kamikazis, as an organized force or tactic were NOT employed until Oct of 1944. Individual pilots or crews may have crashed their planes (usually already damaged) onto ships earlier (including pilots from several nations) but that October date is significant. 
It is 1 1/2 to 2 years after work started on the F8F, it is two months after the Prototype first flew. 
Until then the F8F was viewed as a much higher performing replacement for the F4F-4/FM-2 rather than a replacement for the F6F. 
US Navy tactics for countering the Kamikazi threat were many and included radar picket ships and CAPs operating at some distance (long endurance) from the carriers, not fast climbing aircraft launched at the last minute. 
Canceling F6Fs in the winter or early spring would have perhaps lead to shortages in early summer? And only a few effective squadrons of F8Fs by the end of the war. 
The Battle of Okinawa was April to June of 1945 and the First F8F squadron was declared operational in May, in the US. Getting more than 2-3 squadrons into operation in time for Okinawa requires shorting the time line form first prototype flight (Aug) to operational service (May) from 8 months to 4-5 months or less. It took 7 months to go from the first flight of a P & W powered F6F to the first operational squadron. (8 months if you count the Wright powered XF6F-1). I am sure there was a sense of urgency in getting the F^F into service in late 1942/early 1943.


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## Gixxerman (Feb 16, 2016)

Just have to say F104 Starfighters are one of the coolest meanest looking planes, especially the German & Italian G/S models with everything loaded up & hanging off, fantastic plane ('the missile with a man in it', wasn't it....and protective 'guards' on the leading edge of the wing cos it was so sharp it could cut you?).


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## Shortround6 (Feb 16, 2016)

pbehn said:


> Great post but also the UK had a great need for aircraft in general, The Wellington was there at the start and you could say was obsolete when war was declared but 11,500 were produced and they were still finding new uses for it as the war drew to a close. Not producing Stirlings and Wellingtons in favour of Lancastes means you have fewer aircraft overall and you use lancasters to lay mines train crews or sweep for magnetic mines



Some bombers (and fighters) saw a LOT of improvement over the years and some saw hardly any. Wellington for example seeing a 83% increase in HP between the prototype and the MK X. 100/130 fuel and later Versions of the Hercules did a LOT to keep the Wellington in service as a viable aircraft in secondary theaters or for secondary missions. 
The Hampden stayed with 1000hp Engines for just about it's entire career. 
Engine supplies also dictated which types stayed in production at times and the problems with the Hercules meant that many British bombers struggled without enough power for too many years. 
Later Hercules engines could offer 20% or more power compared to the early ones on 87 octane and an extra 800hp at altitude on on early Stirling might have done wonders for it's reputation. 
The goal of keeping numbers up kept not only older planes in production too long (and the gap the British had in the medium light/medium bomber field kept the Blenheim in service way too long) ) but also kept some improvements from being implemented as soon as they could have been. The problem with the Halifax's vertical stabilizers and rudders was known but any changes that would delay production were vetoed until the problem became too big too ignore, as in too many lost crews and aircraft as they hunted for a simple "fix" that wouldn't require new tooling. 

Certain planes _should _have been easy to spot as being more than a bit dubious, like the Botha. Simple arithmetic would at least point to it being underpowered to begin with. A full scale wooden mock up (even with one wing left off) should have reviled the visibility problems. 
It took actual combat to show that many prewar assumptions were completely off the mark. The Wellington not being called a night bomber until _after _it failed with tragic results in the fall of 1939 trying daylight attacks. Not even better gun mounts changed that. 

Unfortunately the time to do change over of production was not when many people seem to think it was. Canceling Manchesters and Early Halifax's and Early Stirlings gets you, at best, a bunch of "early" Lancasters powered by Melrin X engines instead of Merlin XX, or perhaps early Hercules engines instead of the Merlins. The better engines don't become available in large numbers until a number of the factories were already tooled up to build Stirlings and Halifax's. Lets remember that BOTH Short factories building Stirlings were bombed in 1940 and delayed Stirling production ( and equipping of more than 1-2 squadrons) by a number of months. This meant the time delay between the Stirling going into large scale service compared to Halifax and Lancaster was shortened by those months making the Stirling look that much worse in comparison. Only 3 squadrons being equipped with Stirling's in 1941 and only 200 being delivered in 1941. If the factories not been bombed perhaps 5-6 squadrons might have been in service by the end of 1941 and dozens more built in 1941.

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## Glider (Feb 22, 2016)

The list of Britsh aircraft that should have been cancelled is significant. Sterling, Botha, Albacore, Lerwick, Hampden, Lysander, Albemarle, Roc, Defiant, Bisley,

Its hard to think of any other nation that spent I don't know how much time, effort and money on the design, development, production and introduction into service of so many designs that achieved so little.


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## stona (Feb 22, 2016)

Glider said:


> Its hard to think of any other nation that spent I don't know how much time, effort and money on the design, development, production and introduction into service of so many designs that achieved so little.



Germany  Maybe without the 'introduction into service bit'. 

As early as 1934 Heinkel alone was building 9 different types and had several others in the design stage.

The RLM's 'Lieferplan Nr. 4' which laid out production plans for the last quarter of 1936 lists no fewer than 30 different types and the plan only covers 1,656 aircraft in total. They were still building 28 types being built a year later.

As examples of German inefficiency ( I know, not exactly the stereotype) Focke -Wulf spent 30,000 engineering hours to develop a sub type of the Fw 58 of which only 60 were ordered.
Ago spent nearly 1 million Reichmarks to modify assembly lines to build just 50 He 46s.

Nobody had a monopoly on inefficiency and the Germans with more centralised control and a brand new industry to develop had less excuse than the British who had neither.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Feb 22, 2016)

Glider said:


> The list of Britsh aircraft that should have been cancelled is significant. Sterling, Botha, Albacore, Lerwick, Hampden, Lysander, Albemarle, Roc, Defiant, Bisley.



List is a bit harsh. Stirling gets a bit of a bad rap for being the first 4 engine British bomber and the fact that both production lines were bombed just as production was starting delayed it's service debut by months. It _should _have gone into action 3-5 months before the Halifax, not one month before. After you have two factories tooled up and producing it gets a lot harder to cancel.

Botha should have been a no-brainer even on the drawing board.

Albacore gets a bit trickier. Canceled when and in favor of what? It should have been and was an improvement in many respects over the Swordfish, enclosed heated cockpit for one thing. It just wasn't enough of an improvement to compete with monoplanes. Taurus engine troubles were a bit hard to foresee. Waiting for the Barracuda might not have been a good option.

Lerwick was canceled fairly soon. Several other countries/companies totally screwed up flying boat bottoms and had to start form almost scratch on new fuselage/hull bottoms. Consolidated Coronado for one. 





Original hull form and "single" rudder. 




as modified.

Not sure what the problem with the Hampden was? But you weren't going to get much else for the investment. A four engine bomber using Pegasus engines is a non-starter. 

Lysander should have been replaced by Austins in 1940. That was a real carry over from the 1930s requirements even if the airframe/wing had innovations. 

Albemarle _might _have been better if introduced sooner but is also an example of conflicting requirement/s and too little design staff. It also ties into the last on the list. 

The Bisley. Only real reason for building the Bisley was the failure of the air ministry and British air industry to come up with a NEW light/medium bomber using modern engines and concepts (see Albemarle) like a 3-5 seat medium bomber/attack plane using Hercules engines. They couldn't build Mosquitos fast enough to equip the numbers of needed squadrons and all to many squadrons had to fight using ole/obsolete aircraft. 

Wholesale cancellations of air-frames and engines already in large scale production could mean the loss of hundreds of airframes or engines during the change over period.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 22, 2016)

Instead of going for Abacore, the torpedo bomber based on the Battle should be a safe bet? If succesful, further development avoids the Barracuda.
Swordfish with a more powerful version of the Pegasus might be a no-risk item, until new TB is available? Some Swordfishes have had the enclosed cockpit.
Hampden was surely no Wellington, but it was still an useful bomber IMO.



Shortround6 said:


> Not sure what the problem with the Hampden was? But you weren't going to get much else for the investment. *A four engine bomber using Pegasus engines is a non-starter.*



Could you please elaborate a bit on the bolded part?



> The Bisley. Only real reason for building the Bisley was the failure of the air ministry and British air industry to come up with a NEW light/medium bomber using modern engines and concepts (see Albemarle) like a 3-5 seat medium bomber/attack plane using Hercules engines. They couldn't build Mosquitos fast enough to equip the numbers of needed squadrons and all to many squadrons had to fight using ole/obsolete aircraft.



Wonder how good/bad would've been the Beaufighter with cannons deleted, with bomb bay instead?


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## Shortround6 (Feb 22, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> Could you please elaborate a bit on the bolded part?



I think we have been over this before. You _could_ build a 4 engine bomber using Pegasus engines but what would you have? 
The Halifax MK I with Merlin X engines was certainly no ball of fire performance wise. With the Pegasus you have less power and more drag. 885hp at 15,500ft for a two speed supercharged engine using 87 octane vs 1010hp at 17,750ft. Cruise in one source is 640hp at 10,000ft for the Pegasus vs 865hp at 13,000ft for the Merlin X.
Trying to build an airframe that could be switched to Hercules engines (Or Merlin XX) at a later date is using the retrospectroscope a little too much. The airframe would be over weight for the Pegasus engines. 
In order to work at all you would have to get around a good number of the mid to late 30s British requirements. Like the ground pressure limit requiring huge tires. Like the residual requirement for large bombers to be emergency troop transports. There was no reason at all for the Stirling fuselage to be 17ft longer than a Halifax fuselage except for internal volume that had little or nothing to do with the size of the bomb-bay. 
Even with a small fuselage you might be able to better the Y1B-17 by a certain amount (first 13 planes without turbos and 930hp at take-off Cyclones) but they only carried five .30cal guns with 1000 rpg bomb load was good, 4000lbs for 2400 miles but waaay less than later 4 engine bombers. cruise of around 217mph at altitudes in the teens doesn't offer much safety either. 





> Wonder how good/bad would've been the Beaufighter with cannons deleted, with bomb bay instead?



Not good. 
A, without relocating the wing (up) there isn't enough room inside the fuselage for a decent bomb-bay.
B, even with a a decent bomb-bay the Beaufighter is still slower than an A-20.
C. While most A-20s didn't have very good _defensive_ guns the Beaufighter either had none or one .303. 
D. Beaufighter needs new nose or position for a bombardier. 
E, Yanking the 20mm guns and ammo is only worth about 1300-1500lbs? A pretty light load for a plane with two Hercules engines.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 23, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> I think we have been over this before. You _could_ build a 4 engine bomber using Pegasus engines but what would you have?
> The Halifax MK I with Merlin X engines was certainly no ball of fire performance wise. With the Pegasus you have less power and more drag. 885hp at 15,500ft for a two speed supercharged engine using 87 octane vs 1010hp at 17,750ft. Cruise in one source is 640hp at 10,000ft for the Pegasus vs 865hp at 13,000ft for the Merlin X.
> Trying to build an airframe that could be switched to Hercules engines (Or Merlin XX) at a later date is using the retrospectroscope a little too much. The airframe would be over weight for the Pegasus engines.
> ...
> Even with a small fuselage you might be able to better the Y1B-17 by a certain amount (first 13 planes without turbos and 930hp at take-off Cyclones) but they only carried five .30cal guns with 1000 rpg bomb load was good, 4000lbs for 2400 miles but waaay less than later 4 engine bombers. cruise of around 217mph at altitudes in the teens doesn't offer much safety either.



I hear what you say about how good/bad was the 1st Halifax. 
However - the RAF did not have any bomber capable to lug those 4000 lbs over 2400 miles until 4-engined jobs came to service two years after ww2 started. Even the reasonably capable Wellington I was good just for 1000 lbs over 2500 miles - four times less than pre-series B-17s. The Wellington with Hercules engines - 1500 lbs over 2040 miles.
The Whitley with Merlins was carrying 4500 lbs over 1645 miles, or 3500 over 300 miles more, still falling after those B-17s. The Whitley with Tigers is worse. 
Hampden - 2000 lbs over 1820 miles.
BTW, neither Hampden nor Blenheim complied much with pre-requisite to carry troops on board.
So if RAF can use the the bombers that can lug 1000-1500 lbs over 2500-2000 lbs, the bomber that doubles or quadruples the bomb load over distance would be welcomed. Not that it would be escaping from good fighters, but than neither of those mentioned can. The 4-engined plane will have far better engine-out capability than 2-engined. The next-gen 4-engined bomber can/will use Merlin/Hercules.



> Not good.
> A, without relocating the wing (up) there isn't enough room inside the fuselage for a decent bomb-bay.
> B, even with a a decent bomb-bay the Beaufighter is still slower than an A-20.
> C. While most A-20s didn't have very good _defensive_ guns the Beaufighter either had none or one .303.
> ...



A - yep, maybe bulged one can help. Flush one could do maybe 4 x 500 ( vs. Blenheim/Bisley 2 x 500)?
B - yes
C - install two-gun turret, as the Blenheim/Bisley received?
D - yes
E - payload of mid-war Beaufighters was also one torpedo (2000+ lbs with shackles/racks) AND 682 imp gals (819 US gals) of fuel - more than the best A-20, so there is plenty of elbow room for payload. Late war Beaufighters carried another 130 imp gals of fuel, plus 2000 lbs worth of torpedo & it's shackles.


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## stona (Feb 23, 2016)

You have to put the design of all the bombers with which the RAF started the war into a historical perspective. All but one (the Blenheim being the exception) were designed at a time when operational requirements were drawn up with a view to a war with France. In the 1920s there were two classes of day bomber, high and medium performance. The Hawker Hart and its derivatives was the prime high performance bomber and equipped 25 squadrons at the end of 1936. Until the end of 1935 the sole representative of the medium performance bomber was a squadron of Sidestrands formed in 1929.
This is our woeful starting point!
New factors were introduced with Japanese aggression in the Far East and the 1935 Abyssinian crisis, primarily a ferry range sufficient to reinforce the Middle and Far East.
It was only the recognition of Germany as a potential enemy in the mid 1930s that led to demands for increased operational range, speed and armament.
The sort of bomber that the Air Ministry was looking to develop in October 1930 was a _'High Speed 1000lb Bomber....twin H or F engines, for home defence work. To carry twice bomb load of present types at great speed or defence.' _This is along way from the Stirling.
To cut a long story short (Maund at the Air Ministry pointed out that using two engines to lift 1,000lbs of bombs was like equipping a Battle Cruiser with 4" guns as primary armament, others objected to the difficulties of shipping a twin engine type (to the Far East)) this was never built.
Fast forward to the 'Multi-Engined Day Bomber Operational Requirements' issued in July 1931 to see just how low the bar was set. Salient points are a range of 600 miles, a bomb load of 1lb per horse power and a top speed of 190 mph at 15,000ft. Nonetheless in September 1931 the AMSR advised that this requirement asked _'for rather more than we can expect to get'. _It was not lost on the Air Staff that such a bomber would have the same performance as a fighter to Specification F.7/30 but with a range of 600 miles carrying 1,000lbs of bombs.
It was at this time that the size limitations which would effect much later bombers were introduced by Salmond who feared that if designers were given a free hand then _'these machines may become so large that we cannot get them into any of our sheds.' _This was incorporated into B.9/32. A much more serious and invariably overlooked limitation on the specification arose from the Geneva Disarmament Conference and a proposal to limit the tare weight of bombers to three metric tonnes. The weight limit finally settled on for B.9/32 was 6,500 lbs.
Fast forward again to March 1934 and another requirement for a night bomber (to replace the Heyford) is under discussion. This bomber would have a range of 1,250 miles (a 500 mile radius of action suitable_ 'for a European war or a war in Afganistan'_). The wing span limitation of 100' was included as, for the first time, was a troop carrying capacity. By July 1934 Specification B.3/34 called for a top speed of 225 mph and clarified the troop carrying ability. The aircraft should be designed_ ' to be entirely suitable for operation as a bomber and, in emergency, as a bomber transport.' _The troop carrying role was very much secondary. We are now only five years from the outbreak of the war.
The B.3/34 specification evolved over the following months and years (given new numbers, simply Specification 1,2,3.) The 'Americanised Specification 3' evolved into B.1/35 in March 1935. Still a 'normal' load of 2,000lbs for 1,500 miles was required but for the first time internal stowage was a requirement for the maximum load of 4,000lb/900 miles.

It is impossible to divorce Air Ministry specifications from bombing policy.
The large jump occurred in specifications for bombers to attack Germany in 1936, three years before the war. The straight forward technical requirements to get the range and speed to attack targets in Germany, by day, inevitably led to much heavier bombers than had been required to bomb Paris. This fueled the discussions about new medium and heavy bombers in 1936, and the search for an 'ideal' or standard bomber in 1937 There was however no big bomber policy. Concerns about the size of a new heavy bomber, what would become the Short Stirling, were first voiced by the Operational Requirements Committee'. The Air Staff stated in reply that_ 'in drafting the requirements they had visualised using the medium bomber as the backbone of the Striking Force supplemented by a certain number of these heavy bombers.'_
The normal bomb load of this generation of medium bombers was reduced below that of the bombers they would replace in the quest for speed. The 1938 Ideal Bomber Study demonstrated the major influence of speed on weight. High speed and powerful defensive armament were considered necessary to implement a bombing policy which had not changed since the 1920s.
The minutes of the 14th meeting of the Bombing Committee, held in April 1937 confirm this.
_"The Chairman opened the meeting by saying that *the subject of night bombing* was now, *for the first time,* before this Committee.'_
At this time plans to fit ventral turrets to Pegasus engined Wellingtons were advanced, allowing them a better chance to defend themselves in daylight. The idea was supported by the Operations Branch because
_'The Pegasus Wellington must form a considerable proportion of our day bombing attack until the Merlin Wellington, Stirling, Halifax and Manchester come into service in quantity.'_
The last three are of course bombers derived from the various 1936 specifications and were to be sent on daylight operations in the hope that the deficiencies of the earlier generation of bombers had been overcome. They had not, and these aircraft would instead form the mainstay of the RAF's night bombing offensive. It was Specification B.12/36 'Heavy Bomber' which produced the Stirling. Amazingly Short Bros. was not even on the list of companies originally asked to tender! Most of the tenders offered Kestrel or even Goshawk powered aircraft, only Supermarine and late comers Short Bros. planned to fit Merlin and Hercules engines.
The Halifax and Manchester/Lancaster both ultimately came as a result of P.13/36, a strange and convoluted specification with roots in a sort of multi role medium bomber, not a heavy bomber at all! From such inauspicious beginnings one of the best aircraft of the war came. The important point is that the specifications for these aircraft were not even issued until 1936.
Once again, hindsight is a wonderful thing 
Cheers
Steve

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## BiffF15 (Feb 23, 2016)

Very Informative Steve!


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## stona (Feb 23, 2016)

Another problem was over optimistic claims for the performance of some of these designs. There was a trend in RAF bomber requirements for ever increasing speed (touched on above). It was seen as essential to limit exposure to fighter attack on daylight raids.
The 'Ideal Bomber' was supposed to cruise at 280 mph.
There was a lot of pressure for P.13/36 (Halifax/Manchester) to specify a 300mph cruising speed and the 275 mph finally specified was a compromise. Speeds far higher than this were attributed to both P.13/36 and B.12/36 designs during development, up to 330 mph being claimed for aircraft in both categories!
When these aircraft finally came into service around 1941 their top speeds were lower than the cruising speeds stipulated in the specifications. 
Trials of the Halifax, without a mid upper turret showed a top speed of 275 mph and a cruising speed of just 210 mph, a full 65 mph slower than the specification.
The Manchester had a top speed of 262 mph and a cruising speed of 225 mph, still 50 mph slower than specified.
I don't have the figures for the Stirling to hand, but they were equally disappointing.
Cheers
Steve


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## Shortround6 (Feb 23, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> I hear what you say about how good/bad was the 1st Halifax.
> However - the RAF did not have any bomber capable to lug those 4000 lbs over 2400 miles until 4-engined jobs came to service two years after ww2 started. Even the reasonably capable Wellington I was good just for 1000 lbs over 2500 miles - four times less than pre-series B-17s. The Wellington with Hercules engines - 1500 lbs over 2040 miles.
> The Whitley with Merlins was carrying 4500 lbs over 1645 miles, or 3500 over 300 miles more, still falling after those B-17s. The Whitley with Tigers is worse.
> Hampden - 2000 lbs over 1820 miles.
> ...



Timing is everything. What you are proposing is a _very _expensive stopgap aircraft of somewhat limited capability. The bigger 4 engine bombers were being worked on from 1936 on (in one form or other). Which company shelves which project to build the 4 engine _lite. _
The Whitley was often referred to as a night bomber even in some pre war articles. It's long range cruising speed was such that on the 'famous' Genoa/Turin raid the Whitleys (after refueling on the Channel Islands) they had to fly a number of hours in daylight in order to have the most time in darkness in the target area. Fortunately France had not yet surrendered so that these daylight hours were spent over French controlled territory. 
The Fall of France changed a lot of things. *Practical* range for night bombers in 1940-41 is rather dependent on how many hours of darkness there are on the night in question times the long range cruising speed. This should have been known back in 1934-36 when the initial specifications for the _4 motor lite_ would have had to been drawn up/issued. 

While the Hampden and Blenheim didn't carry troops. the troop requirement (or desirability) was long standing. Biplane large/heavy bombers had been used to transfer troops in the late 20s or early 30s. Light bombers (two seaters) had obviously not been used as troop transports and the Blenheim and Battle were more replacements for the Hawker Harts than replacements for the Overstrand or older heavy bombers. 
British were also struggling to increase the total number of squadrons during the 30s. See Stona's excellent post. In addition to the 25 squadrons of Harts in service in 1936 and the one squadron of "medium" bombers there were 10 heavy or night bomber squadrons, unfortunately their equipment was little better or perhaps even worse, one squadron of Fairey Hendon monoplanes and 9 squadrons of HP Heyford Biplanes. Some of these were _replacing _Vickers Virginia bombers of which there were 5 squadrons in Jan 1935,all gone by the end of 1936. 
1/2 the number of "heavy" bombers, even if of greater capability means fewer squadrons total. Politicians and armchair generals were often counting squadrons at this time because aircraft capability didn't really vary that much or hadn't for around 15 years. A Hart didn't carry a much different bomb load than a DH 4 or DH 9. The Overstrand went into service in Jan 1935 with a *top* speed of 148mph and a *max* bomb load of 1500lbs, range was 548 miles. Engines were 580hp Pegasus. This compares to a 1918 DH 10 with a pair of 375 RR Eagles that could carry up to 920lbs and had a speed of 124-131mph depending on altitude. 
British did order both the HP Harrow and the Bristol Bombay although deliveries of both took a while. The Whitley was a skinny fuselage (relatively) AS 23 









> A - yep, maybe bulged one can help. Flush one could do maybe 4 x 500 ( vs. Blenheim/Bisley 2 x 500)?
> B - yes
> C - install two-gun turret, as the Blenheim/Bisley received?
> D - yes
> E - payload of mid-war Beaufighters was also one torpedo (2000+ lbs with shackles/racks) AND 682 imp gals (819 US gals) of fuel - more than the best A-20, so there is plenty of elbow room for payload. Late war Beaufighters carried another 130 imp gals of fuel, plus 2000 lbs worth of torpedo & it's shackles.



Are you building a "medium" bomber or an attack plane?
The A-20 was conceived as an attack plane and never had the range of a real medium bomber. On the other hand it was available and being delivered with 1600hp engines in the winter of 1940, not too much latter than when Beaufighters were being delivered. Why jump through hoops with the _Beaubomber _to get a not much different result unless the goal is simply to get an ALL BRITISH aircraft? 
British were getting A-20s (DB-7s) that had been ordered by both the French and British back in 1939 early 1940. 

Perhaps the British could have simply slung a pair of 500lbs under the fuselage of the Beaufighter and another under each wing and accepted the loss of performance due to drag. 
late war A-20s went to 27,000lb gross and could carry 2000lbs inside, four 500lb outside under the wings. had 6 .50s in the nose. a low drag turret (compared to the Bisley turret) with two .50s and a .50 out the ventral tunnel.
It is usually a mistake to use late war capabilities when saying what planes should have been built or canceled 3-5 years earlier.
A 27,000lb A-20 might never have made it off a British 1940 Grass airfield. 

What the British were lacking was a plane somewhere between the A-20 and B-25. Something that could carry 3000lb or so around 1500 miles (more over shorter distances?) at higher speeds than the Wellington or Hampden. They needed this plane in 1941-42 in quantity to replace the Blenheim and Beaufort. Such a replacement was actually in the "works" in that the British had placed an initial order for 25 uprated Hudsons in Feb of 1940 and by May of 1940 this had been modified to 300 Venturas using 1850hp P&W R-2800s. Another 375 were ordered in late 1940. This was also meet by the orders for Martin Baltimores. Unfortunately they were both a little late in coming into service. 
With the General shortage of Hercules engines a twin engine Hercules bomber in addition to the planes already built was probably a non-starter.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 23, 2016)

stona said:


> Another problem was over optimistic claims for the performance of some of these designs. There was a trend in RAF bomber requirements for ever increasing speed (touched on above). It was seen as essential to limit exposure to fighter attack on daylight raids.
> The 'Ideal Bomber' was supposed to cruise at 280 mph......



Goes with the 370mph Beaufighter.


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## stona (Feb 23, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> Goes with the 370mph Beaufighter.


Yep. People often say something was built to such and such a specification without considering how often and by how far the resulting production aircraft fell short of said specification.


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## Glider (Feb 23, 2016)

I agree with the comments on the Sterling but the RAF didn't need three four engine bombers and the Sterling had the worst performance of the three.
Albacore it offered no significant improvement over the swordfish and on that basis alone it shouldn't have been started.
Lerwick again no improvement over the Sunderland, had they used the effort to develop an aircraft that could fill the Atlantic Gap, now that would have been worth the effort.
Albermarle and Bisley again they were never going to offer an increased performance and should never have been started.


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## stona (Feb 24, 2016)

The Stirling was the only production version of a four engine bomber built to B.12/36 and it predated the bombers built to P.13/36, _neither of which were originally intended as four engine bombers. _The Halifax quickly became a four engine design and the Manchester-Lancaster conversion came much later. Cancelling the Stirling, given the destruction of the Supermarine prototype would, at the time, potentially have left the RAF with no four engine bomber at all..
There was no option to cancel the Stirling prior to series production (which due to the intervention of the Luftwaffe caused a later than intended introduction in numbers). It should certainly been cancelled when better aircraft became available, but the Air Ministry were always cagey about accepting an over all reduction in total bomber numbers (or a reduction in numbers of any class of aircraft) and this is why mediocre aircraft were produced for too long.

BTW the troop carrying requirement is often misunderstood. It was included in B.3/34 with the conditions I mentioned earlier. It was however dropped from the requirement after discussions with the aircraft industry and when the DTD admitted that a typical loss of 10 mph in speed would be likely.
The 1936 bomber specifications (B12/36 and P.13/36) stated:

_"Consideration is to be given in design for fitting a light removable form of seating for the maximum number of personnel that can be accommodated within the fuselage when the aircraft is being used for reinforcing Overseas Commands." _

The mandatory requirement was for consideration to be given, which is certainly open to interpretation.

The British were not as profligate as the Germans. I mentioned earlier the 30 different aircraft types being built by the relatively small German aircraft industry for the RLM in the mid 1930s. The British were wary of such a course, but still fell into the same trap. It was the pace of technical advance at this time which drove the numbers up. In 1938 the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff noted.

_"As a result of the introduction of the fast monoplane with relatively high wing loading in 1935, we have been obliged, during the last two years, in order to keep the Air Force up to date, to put out new requirements for every type of aircraft in service... This, of course, has resulted in an abnormal number of new specifications, and we have at present no fewer than seventeen types of aeroplane building that have not yet been tested, and in all but a few instances, not been flown."_

Add that seventeen to those already in production and the number spread across the rather ramshackle inter-war British aviation industry was far too many.

Cheers

Steve


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## fastmongrel (Feb 24, 2016)

Please everybody could we talk about the Short St*I*rling which was named after the Scottish Town of St*I*rling. St*E*rling with an E makes me grind my teeth and I havent got a lot of teeth left


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## stona (Feb 24, 2016)

fastmongrel said:


> Please everybody could we talk about the Short St*I*rling which was named after the Scottish Town of St*I*rling. St*E*rling with an E makes me grind my teeth and I havent got a lot of teeth left


I've got both in my post (two i and one e), or did. I've corrected it now.
Cheers
Steve


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## stona (Feb 24, 2016)

I've been looking at the various specifications to which some of these subjects for cancellation were built and can relate that to my current investigations into the British aircraft industry at large in the pre-war period.
One think is abundantly clear. The Air Ministry had drawn up plans between 1918 and 1934 which envisaged a rapid transformation from peacetime to wartime conditions. By the onset of rearmament, in order to avoid a projected shortage of aircraft in the first year of any war plans existed for groups comprising aircraft and engineering firms. One group would be established to manufacture each of the most important aircraft and aero engines, and only one aircraft from each of the main operational classes would be selected for group production. An Air Ministry organisation would be created to coordinate the output of the different sectors of the aircraft industry. This highly rational plan was predicated on that rapid transformation from peacetime to wartime production. Nobody was equipped with clairvoyance and what none of the planners foresaw was a prolonged intermediate phase, lasting several years, between peacetime and wartime, nor did they expect that a technological revolution in aircraft design would occur at exactly this time.
During this period there were practical and political objections to the implementation of wartime production plans. A State production policy was not developed in any meaningful way. Crucially, and most obviously to anyone looking at the numbers today, targets were defined in terms of front line air force strength, rather than industrial capacity. It wasn't until March 1938 and the 'Anschluss' that peacetime planning was combined with longer term preparations for war.
Scheme L was accepted following the Anschluss. This involved the production of 12,000 aircraft in the next two years, an increase of 170% in the output of military aircraft over that achieved in 1937. This was raised further after the Munich crisis and planning commenced for a War Potential programme for the production of 17,000 aircraft in the first 12 months of a war (projected fairly accurately to commence in October 1939) and then for a capacity of 2,000 aircraft a month by the end of 1941.
I don't have time here to go through the earlier Schemes, but despite some large increases on the existing meagre production, mostly of older types,they pale into insignificance compared with those from 1938 onward.
At the risk of sounding like a broken record, we enjoy a hindsight not afforded to the decision makers in this critical period between 1935 and 1939. Following the Munich crisis of September 1938 you didn't need a crystal ball to see that a war with Germany was imminent, the start of that war was predicted to within one month, but this was simply not so a few years earlier. There were of course concerns about Germany from the mid 1930s, but convincing the government to disburse millions of pounds to develop the aircraft industry and the shadow industries on the back of such concerns was never going to be possible in a free democracy.
Cheers
Steve


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## Shortround6 (Feb 24, 2016)

The Stirling did have the worst performance, but it was the earliest in timing. It went into action over a year before the Lancaster and almost simultaneous with the Manchester. Had both factories not been bombed in August of 1940 The Stirling might well have been in operational use (combat) in the late fall of 1940 before the first Lancaster prototype even flew (and that was with Merlin X engines).

Of the 7 factories that built Lancasters , most took around 6 months to work up to decent or full production (which in some cases was only 15-20 planes per month) after the first went went out the door. 
Canceling the Stirling in the summer or fall of 1940 means a major short fall in bombers in in 1941 ( or even more Manchesters?)
Canceling late 1941 still means a major shortfall. 

The Albacore may have under-performed compared to predictions but the RN got very lucky with the Swordfish, depending on a 1934 biplane with a 690-750 hp engine as the primary attack plane for the carriers with NO replacement possible until 1941-42 would have been totally negligent. The Swordfish was built to a 1933 specification, the Albacore to a 1936 specification ( and it did perform better, handling and control response was a problem). Unfortunately the rest of the world was moving to monoplanes. Fairey had submitted a monoplane proposal at the same time as the Albacore but it was thought the landing speed would be too high. Sometimes you have build planes for the carriers you have, not the ones you wish you had. Part of the Swordfishes longevity was it's ability to operate from converted cargo ships, a requirement/situation that did not exist in the 1930s. 

Lerwick was never intended to be a improvement over the Sunderland. It was intended to be a replacement for the older twin engine bi-plane flying boats. Sunderlands were large and expensive. A smaller, cheaper aircraft was thought to be needed as an accompaniment. The Lerwick was roughly 1/2 the weight of a Sunderland. The Lerwick had handling problems both in the water and in the air and was canceled pretty promptly once this was found out. Another reason for not ordering off the drawing board. But cancelling planes before they were built in order to bridge the "Atlantic Gap" which didn't exist in 1937-39 is really using the retrospectroscope to full advantage. 
I would also note that some of the airbases used to narrow and then fill the gap didn't exist in the late 30s and/or were on foreign soil. Iceland being an independent country and Greenland belonging to Denmark. You also needed some technological development in order to make a plane that could bridge the "Atlantic gap". Simple flying over the Atlantic wouldn't do the job. You needed to be able to patrol for several hours in the gap, you needed a high enough transit speed to get to and from the gap without pushing the crews to a dangerous level of fatigue. Liberator missions were later restricted to a set number of hours rather than by the actual range/endurance of the aircraft. Planes large enough to hold spare crew members in quarters where they are not suffering from the same fatigue effects as the working crew (heated and sound proofing needed) makes the plane even larger and more expensive (means fewer planes built) .

Albermarle and Bisley are somewhat tied together in that they are Blenheim replacements. Albermarle got hung up with a demand for a plane using non-strategic materials which rarely worked well for anybody, the Mosquito being a rare exception. The result might not have been predictable at the time but in hindsight it joined the vast majority of non-strategic material design planes in being overweight and under performing. The Bisley morphed from being a ground attack variant of the Blenheim (armored nose with machinegun battery) to just being the Blenheim MK V. Thoroughly outdated but the production lines were set up, the workers trained and the engines were available and the replacement aircraft for the Blenheim squadrons were slow in coming (Venturas and Baltimores) or not coming at all. The Albermarle had been canceled as a bomber (only 40 built, the rest were ordered as glider tugs and transports) ) several months before the Bisley (MK V) prototypes even flew. In retrospect it would have been better for the crews if the MK V had never been built but the idea of disbanding squadrons was a hard one to go through with in 1941-42. 

The British did make a lot of mistakes in aircraft procurement before and during WW II. Some were judgement and some were a legacy of the economic times of the 20s and early 30s in the British aircraft industry. Too many companies struggled with small orders and hung in by the skin of their teeth. The Domestic market was small for civilian aircraft and modern monoplane retracting gear aircraft required much more drawing/engineering time than the old biplanes. Too few engineers/draftsmen for the number of projects being worked on stretched out development cycles so that some planes were bordering obsolete when they entered service.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 24, 2016)

stona said:


> I've been looking at the various specifications to which some of these subjects for cancellation were built and can relate that to my current investigations into the British aircraft industry at large in the pre-war period.......



Thank you.
I would note or reinforce Stona's comments that it was this obsession with numbers that lead to a lot of the over production of obsolete or unsatisfactory types of aircraft. 
The concentration on "front line air force strength" also wound up biting them in the butt a little bit. The training sector was rather ignored (but not totally) and fortunately, like may air forces, a lot of old/obsolete front line aircraft could and did serve as trainers, target tugs,etc. However, without this influx of obsolete aircraft into secondary roles the actual effectiveness of the front line "numbers" would have been even less than it was. Many people here over the years have proposed canceling the Fairey Battle outright or severally curtailing it's numbers and building Hurricanes (or something else) instead. The true problem in the Battle of Britain was not a shortage of fighter aircraft but shortage of adequately trained fighter pilots.While nowhere need as bad off as late war German or Japanese pilots too many pilots were posted to operational squadrons with little or no time in the type of fighter they were flying, only the most rudimentary of air to air gunnery training and so on. Even pilots with 2-300 hours of flight time in flight school should not have had to learn the basics of air combat "on the job" in a high level combat setting like the BoB. 
They should have known better given the high wastage of pilots in WW I. 
Some on the forum/s want to cancel aircraft that did good service in the training role even if found wanting in combat. Less well trained crews than historically would not accomplish much more (if as much) even with better aircraft. 

It was this obsession with numbers that lead to so many planes (and tanks and.....) being ordered off the drawing board and having too much money, material (how many forgings and specialty items) and man hours invested in the program to shut it down when the aircraft (tank and ....) turns out to be a turkey. Some of the planes could perform secondary functions fairly well if not ideal, others should have been recycled (scrapped) as soon as possible.


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## Conslaw (Feb 24, 2016)

The F6F was good enough to handle any Japanese fighter through 1945 and into 1946. In a perfect world, the A-26 would have progressed fast enough to justify cancelling production of the B-26 and the B-25; but really, due to changing design specifications, Douglas got them into service about as fast as could be expected; and in the meantime the B-26 and B-25 were doing a good job. Replacing the Ventura (really the Harpoon by this point) with the B-25 would not have helped. The larger fuselage of the Harpoon was an important asset in the patrol bomber role. From a Monday morning quarterback position, the B-32 could have been cancelled; but it was hard to know even up to 1944 if the problems with the B-29 were going to be solved within a reasonable period of time.


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## GrauGeist (Feb 24, 2016)

Conslaw said:


> The F6F was good enough to handle any Japanese fighter through 1945 and into 1946...


The Japanese were fielding some very competitive aircraft during the later years of the war and I would be cautious about that statement.

Types like the N1K1, KI-84 and KI-100 were quite capable of besting the F6F and other Allied types.

Two major factors kept the Japanese in check, however. One being the dwindling pilot pool and the other being low production output.


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## stona (Feb 24, 2016)

And sometimes it was just the reality of 200-300 mph aerial warfare not matching expectations at all.

It was specifications issued by the summer of 1935 that resulted in Fighter Command entering the war in 1939 with the Spitfire, Hurricane and Defiant as its three first-line fighters (ignoring the Blenheim).
In the years immediately preceding the war, efforts were made to improve the single seat fighters derived from F.10/35 in terms of speed and fire power. These are outside the scope of this thread. The efforts to improve the turret fighter, particularly a cannon armed version are not, given that just about everybody wants to cancel the Defiant.

The most pertinent factor is and always has been that the turret fighter was conceived as a defensive fighter and that it was expected to intercept unescorted bomber formations. At a meeting of the Air Staff's Operational Requirements Committee of November 1937 it was noted that:
_"During the last war the single-seater pilot was nearly always exposed to attack by other single-seaters and would therefore be more liable to become excited than the home defence pilot who could attack possibly from a range at which the enemy could not hurt him."_
There then follows a pencil manuscript note:
_"Will the Germans have fighter escorts?"_
The answer was presumably that they would not. In May 1939 Saundby (then Director of Operational Requirements) declared, specifically on the subject of turret fighters:
_"Generally speaking they are all intended for Home Defence. i.e. the destruction of bomber aircraft in circumstances in which they are unlikely to meet enemy fighter aircraft."_

The Defiant was a strange beast. It was the result of the cancellation of two other turret type 'fighters', the results of the Novel Competition (November 1932) and Ellington's opinions, Specifications F.5/33 and F.22/33. Three seater, twin turret, cannon armed designs had more in common with the German 'zerstorer' principal.
In May 1936 the argument that had been used to cancel these aircraft was turned on its head when a forward firing capability was deemed important for a turret fighter. Various permutations were discussed, a twin engine defiant with one mid turret equipped with four 20mm cannon with a forward firing capability was initially favoured, then a new high wing monoplane with the turret _'merged into the wing'_ was considered. Eventually a Defiant with one forward firing machine gun was a cheaper option.
F.11/37 (derived from F.18/36) was issued in May 1937, at which time the turret fighter concept was still alive and well.
F.9/37 was issued later that year to Gloster for a twin engine fighter with 2 x 20mm cannon in the nose and a four gun turret amidships. The turret was dropped from the specification before a prototype was built.

In 1938 a review of 'Air Defence Fighter Tactics' by the Air Staff concluded that at the speeds at which bombers were now flying, a single seat fixed gun fighter (meaning Spitfire and Hurricane) could only attack from astern. In consequence the bomber would only need a rear defensive armament, it would be difficult to surprise the bomber and only one or two fighters could attack at a time.The familiar argument about turret fighters was repeated:
_"The moveable gun fighter, by flying on a paralell course to the bomber, can attack it from any direction and so overcome all of these disadvantages."_
It was also argued that for 'air superiority fighting' where the intention was to destroy enemy fighters and Army cooperation aircraft, a moveable gun fighter could act defensively as well as offensively, and thus penetrate enemy territory and withdraw at will, whereas a siingle seat fighter could not. Enemy fighters seem to have slipped minds at this meeting, the posibility of them decimating these intruding turret fighters does not appear to have been considered.
Such was the confidence in the turret fighter concept in 1938 that, given the lack of progress with F.11/37, yet another cannon armed turret fighter proposal was considered necessary. This specification, drawn up in early 1939 was issued as F.2/38. Now things get really odd. At first a return to the Novel fighter, with four 20mm cannon in a nose turret, conceding a limited arc of fire, was considered. Then someone suggested that the turret from B.1/39 might be applicable. B.1/39 was the specification for the Ideal Bomber and implies a midships turret.
Subsequent studies concluded that the new turret fighter would be no better than that already existing (Defiant). The project was redesignated F.26/39 before being abandoned altogether. Not one of the post 1935 requirements I have mentioned above led to a completed turret fighter.

In conclusion, given the RAF and Air Staff's infatuation with the turret fighter concept we are lucky that the Defiant, for all the failings that would be revealed when the war started, was the only one that was built. There were solid plans for many more, some of which would certainly have been far worse, unwieldy and ineffective than the Defiant. Imagine Fighter Command fighting the Battle of Britain with something that looked like a fighter version of the Wellington bomber. There was never any chance that no turret fighter would have been built, or that the Defiant would have been cancelled, given the prevalent thinking of the time.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Feb 25, 2016)

Thank you again for the historical perspective.

It is real easy in hindsight to pick winners and losers, both in hardware and in tactics/techniques/doctrines. 

It is a lot harder to criticize on the basis on what _should_ have been known at the time. 

A lot of what was known dated from WW I or colonial wars. WW I having fixed battle lines and while close air support was tried it was usually part of a set piece battle and missions/targets were selected before take-off or indicated using large marker panels set on the ground. Strategic bombing was tried but the numbers of aircraft and their lifting ability (or lack of) restricted the actual results and glossed over real lessons, like trying to navigate at night. 

The British made plenty of "mistakes" during the 30s but then so did most everybody else. 
Multi purpose planes were very popular because budgets were tight. As long as you weren't in actual combat the fact that the multi purpose planes weren't really good at any one thing didn't really show up. A lot of war games/exercises in the 20s and 30s having rather unrealistic conditions/rules. 
Many nations simply built "modern" versions of what were basically WW I concepts even if design details changed. 
Using the WW I two seater as a "model" many nations were using two/3 seat single engine biplane, sesquiplane, and high wing or parasol monoplane observation, reconnaissance, light bomber/Army co-operation aircraft even though engines were 3-4 times more powerful and structures (or at least frame work) had changed from wood to metal. 
What was unknown or ignored was that these aircraft needed almost total control of the air by their own fighters in order to survive. Unknown was doubtful as even in WW I many missions flown by the two seaters were escorted by single seat aircraft. Or it was assumed that escorting fighters would always be available and not off performing other missions. 
There was a temporary split in performance between bombers and fighters as monoplane bombers were introduced with much higher speeds than contemporary fighters, bombers not needing the maneuverability desired in fighters (acrobatics) a higher wing loading could be used. Once fighter monoplanes were adopted the bombers margin of speed evaporated. Unfortunately this coincided with combat reports from China and Spain suggesting that high speed bombers could evade fighters. What was ignored was that the fast bombers were a generation ahead of the defending fighters (it was only a few years between generations in the 30s and export fighters were rarely the latest generation). and that both China and Spain had relatively poor early warning systems even compared to 1918, few if any sound detectors and a poor telephone systems. 
Mid to late 30s also saw major advances in engine power, propellers, flaps (which could affect wing size) and structure so once again a 1936 design could be head and shoulders above a 1934 design. 
Some air forces/air ministries were better at keeping up with these advances than others but deciding when to buy or mass produce an aircraft vs waiting for the next new item/device was a very careful balancing act. 
Germans built plenty of rather dubious aircraft, the Hs 126 for one. Nothing wrong with the way it flew and *IF* the enemies air force had been destroyed/severely crippled it could perform a number of useful missions but it was nothing more than a modernized Albatross C III in concept and would have suffered losses equal to the Lysanders and Battles (and equivalent french aircraft) if used under the SAME conditions in the Battle of France.


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## stona (Feb 25, 2016)

I'm glad that you apostrophied 'mistakes'. I'm not trying to apologise for some of the decisions that were later proven wrong but nobody really had any idea how large 'fleets' of bombers could be intercepted.

In 1932 Ludlow-Hewitt (later of Bomber Command) wrote a paper which much influenced British thinking. In it he postulated that bomber formations might be destroyed in two ways.
1. By sporadic close in attack
2. Sustained 'lie off' attack.

This then led two what he perceived as four lines of fighter development.
1. Two seater with improved stern armament
2. A single seater with extra heavy fore armament for lay off astern
3. A two seater with swivelling guns forward, possibly with turret, developed for the no allowance position astern and below
4. A high performance single seater fighter for fire shock action.

In the early/mid 1930s it was by no means certain that a high performance fighter with a fixed forward firing armament was going to be the way forward, however obvious that is to us today.
There were very serious concerns about the ability of a pilot to keep formation, still considered vital in air fighting tactics, and aim his guns. The number of fixed armament single seat fighters able to attack simultaneously was thought insufficient to break up the formation and there were doubts about their ability to make more than one brief attack.
There was a strong body of opinion that felt that a separate gunner would always be needed. In one scheme there would be a crew of two, both of whom could serve as a pilot and gunner, which one flew the aircraft at a given time depending on which armament was being used! Things could have been much worse 

There were also well documented concerns about the number and type of guns fighters should employ, whether fixed or not. The quest for fire power had already led to suggestions for 6, 8 and 10 gun fighters long before a certain Ralph Sorley became directly involved, but that's another story.

The issue of cannon armament is also misunderstood. In the first five years of the 1930s the British did not seriously consider smaller calibres of cannon armament because of the terms of the St Petersburg Convention to which the UK was a signatory. This banned the use of explosives in projectiles that weighed less than 400 grams. The Air Ministry was aware of developments of 20mm cannon firing explosive projectiles much lighter than the limit in other countries, but it wasn't until June 1935 that the then Chief of the Air Staff (Ellington) wrote.

_"We should however be clear as to our attitude to smaller calibre guns than the C.O.W. If other powers are ignoring the St. Petersburg Convention in respect of explosive projectiles, are we to do the same?"_

The 11/2 Lb ( 700 gram) projectile of the C.O.W gun did not contravene the Convention. This led to efforts to fit such a cannon to proposed 'No Allowance' fighters which could make long range attacks on bomber formations. No allowance shooting is NOT just zero deflection shooting as I often see it called. It is based on the principle that a projectile fired at an angle to the line of flight of the aircraft carrying the gun will travel at an angle of incidence to the air stream, thus generating lift and flying in a more or less straight line to the target. The British didn't have a high opinion of their pilot's/gunner's skills and were very keen on this method of air to air gunnery.
If a fighter flew below and behind a bomber at the same course and speed and with its guns set at the correct angle, then the gunner would need to make no adjustments for gravity, aerodynamics or relative speed.

The result of all this was proposals (touched on in my post above) for all sorts of weird and wonderful turret equipped fighters and fighters with swivelling guns in the nose and/or wings. 

By early 1935 the Air Staff knew that they wanted a two seat fighter, but there was still confusion about how it should be used. Finally, in April 1935 the Air Staff Requirement called for a fighter which

_"can bring fire to bear from a moveable battery of at least four machine guns over the upper hemisphere... thus conferring on it the ability to attack from below and behind, below and in front, or on the flank of an enemy formation, at the same time enabling the batteries of all fighters to be trained on to the target simultaneously while in formation."_

Forward firing armament, which had so exercised minds on the Air Staff for the previous several years was simply dropped on the grounds that it was_ " Undesirable to split the armament."_
Back in 1932 two of the short listed entries to the Novel Fighter competition had been discarded precisely because their turrets could not reinforce their forward firing guns. In 1933 Peirse (another future bomber man) had argued for a two seat fighter with a four gun turret and two guns for the pilot. In a dogfight the four turret guns would be fixed forward to give a six gun fighter. Now the Air Staff had come up with a horrible compromise, an aircraft with no forward firing armament at all. In 1938 this became the Defiant.

Cheers

Steve_


_

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## parsifal (Feb 25, 2016)

Some perspective is needed regarding the albacore.

it was an aircraft obsolete before it even entered service, but this was a product of just how far the RN had fallen behind with its aircraft development during the lean years in the wilderness under RAF control. In pre-war Britain there was virtually no chance of getting any support from the RAF with regard to technology or production. there were many in the RAF that worked actively to destroy the FAA, mostly by starving it of technology and personnel as much as much as was politically safe to do so.

With the limited resources the FAA could must at the time, it (the albacore) actually represented a triumph of progress, ingenuity and economy. Compared to the predecessor that it replaced, the legendary Swordfish no less, it represented a 26% increase in top speed, a 46% increase in practical cruise speed, a 60% increase in range, and about a 15% increase in airborne endurance. it was a kinder aircraft to the crews (with enclosed cockpits), and no vices that I know of. It enjoyed significant success in the field of battle. I know of no other aircraft that could boast such massive improvements in performance compared to their immediate predecessor. The fact that numerically those improvements simply moved the RNs TSR aircraft from hopelessly obsolete to just laughably so is more an indictment of the way the RAF failed to meet its maritime responsibilities in the build up to war than any actual failing of the albacore


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## Shortround6 (Feb 25, 2016)

The Albacore is also a reflection of the size of the FAA and the size/speed of some of the RN carriers. 

The 7 RN carriers in service before Sept 1939 held about the same number of planes as 3 American carriers (within a dozen anyway) and the US had 5 carriers in service in 1939 not including the Langley (down graded to sea plane tender in 1937 but rated at 36 planes before then. 
The US Navy had independent funding ( and was responsible for Marine Corp Aviation) and had over 480 carrier berths for aircraft (built or building) in 1936. The RN had 240-250 carrier berths for aircraft (built or building) in 1936. 1937 seeing the 4 Illustrious class carriers laid down.
Not trying to do flag waving here but the US had a bigger "investment" in carriers and a bigger need for carrier planes, they also had a different philosophy in that they didn't expect to operate outside of land based air. 
But in 1935-36 when the Albacore specification was being worked on (the Swordfish being a 1933 specification and first flight in 1934) 3 of the 6 RN carriers could not exceed 25 knots and most of them had flight decks 100-200ft shorter than US carrier decks. 
Going to monoplanes was a step into the unknown for carrier planes. The Douglas Devastator First flying in 1935 but not going into production until 1937. First monoplane in service on US Navy carriers so even with full disclosure and sharing of test results the information would be a bit late for the Swordfish replacement. First Japanese "Kate" didn't fly until 1937 and the Japanese weren't exactly publishing week by week updates on it. 
The British could in no way afford two different torpedo planes, one for small/slow carriers and one for the faster/larger carriers. 
I would also note that the Germans went with a biplane torpedo bomber (the Fi 167) for the Graf Zeppelin so the British were hardly alone at this time.

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## nuuumannn (Feb 26, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> Many nations simply built "modern" versions of what were basically WW I concepts even if design details changed.



Yep, and that's why in the mid to late 30s you had aircraft like the Heinkel He 51, Gloster Gauntlet, Avro Anson and so on occupying front line squadrons. Things didn't change much militarily because there was very much a push for peace as most countries statesmen were horrified with the previous war, they were so keen to prevent it from happening again. Military technology and expenditure around the world in the 20s and 30s didn't match civil aviation and in particular the airline industry, which is unique in that it usually the other way round, but modern airliners led the way in terms of advanced technology and drove the pace of advance.



stona said:


> Now the Air Staff had come up with a horrible compromise, an aircraft with no forward firing armament at all. In 1938 this became the Defiant.



In the poor Defiant's defence though - as much as I agree with you, Steve, Defiant units were supposed to work in conjunction with single seaters, not by themselves, against bomber formations, so forward firing armament was not necessary. Also, when the Defiant spec was drawn up, no one in the world had bombers equipped with power operated turrets, so bombers that the Defiant was likely to encounter would have poor defensive armament; a handful of hand held light calibre machine guns. The Germans didn't fit a power operated turret to any of their bombers in service until the Do 217. So, bearing that in mind, was the lack of forward firing armament a hindrance with the aircraft's original role taken into consideration? That also did not hinder it as a night fighter, which in practise proved the turret fighter _without_ forward firing armament _could _work in the environment that it was designed for; against unescorted enemy bombers.


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## stona (Feb 26, 2016)

The turret fighter was a good idea, given the need to destroy large bomber formations, it was just surpassed by tactical developments and the strategic situation confronting the RAF in 1939/40. I've tried to explain, without writing a book, some of the reasons behind its development. The entire concept is commonly rubbished (not here to be fair) as if it was some kind of idiotic aberration resulting from some kind of collective breakdown in the reasoning of the Air Staff, which simply displays an ignorance of the origins of the concept and a lack of appreciation of the struggle that Air Staff's around the world faced, coming to terms with the bomber threat. The way people thought about bombers, and the threat they posed, in 1930-1936 was quite different to how they thought about them in 1940-1945.

As for the deletion of forward firing armament on the Defiant, this was a mistake and should have been recognised at the time. All earlier concepts either had a larger crew and incorporated a forward firing turret or had at least pair of weapons firing forward, usually fixed, often at an angle for no allowance shooting, and usually described as 'for the pilot', which makes it clear who would operate them.
F.9/35 (Defiant) traces its ancestry back directly to the 1st type proposed in Ludlow Hewitt's 1932 review of fighter requirements. It was the then Deputy Director of Operations and Intelligence at the Air Ministry who proposed that a two seat, single engine fighter should be included in the 1935 Experimental Air Programme, believing that the twin engine Novel and Ellington designs would not go into production due to their low performance. That man was none other than Arthur Harris.

In June 1935 the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (then Courtney) asked that the twin engine 'Ellington' fighter be cancelled, suggesting that the new turret fighter planned (Defiant) would do the same job. The 'Ellington' concept had a front turret, upper turret or a combination of both.

There were few voices against a forward firing armament. Back in 1932 one comment on Maund's 'Bright Idea Fighter' did suggest a less than reasoned attitude in some quarters. It was suggested that deleting forward firing armament operated by the pilot
_"removed temptation from the pilot who might otherwise have tried to start his own private war."_

The minutes of the Operational Requirements Committee from the meeting at which F.9/35 was discussed show no mention of forward firing armament at all, though Wing Commander Keith, who attended in his capacity as Head of the Armaments branch wrote later that
_"some hard things were said by several successful single-seater pilots of the first war."_
Subsequently there was a scrabble to produce a turret fighter which would have been a modified Defiant with some forward firing armament, but this came to nothing.

Whilst not wishing to labour the point about early 1930s concepts, they did have a profound effect on the way RAF fighters developed. Just how wrong the Air Staff initially got it is shown by the fact that the two types rejected from the short list of Novel Fighters were the those with eight fixed forward firing guns and those with a midships turret, the very types with which the RAF eventually went to war in 1939!
This also shows that in a very brief period between 1935 and 1939, some also got it almost correct. The RAF started the war with two competitive eight gun fighters and one turret fighter, a hangover from a different era.

The belief that bomber formations could defend themselves against attack by fixed wing fighters, how ever well armed, was not a uniquely British failing. It led to widespread support for multi seat fighters in the belief that only they offered any hope of breaking up bomber formations. The German 'zerstorer' concept is related to this.
We will never know if the Defiant would have been effective against unescorted bomber formations, particularly operating in conjunction with single seat fighters. We do however have an account from Guy Gibson of an attack on his squadron of Hampdens by Bf 110s and Bf 109s. He wrote:

_"[Me 110s] had one gun which can fire sideways. Their mode of attack was to fly in formation with the Hampdens perhaps fifty yards out and slightly to the front, and pick off the outside man with their one gun, aiming with a no deflection shot at the pilot.The bomber boys could do nothing about it; they had to just sit there and wait to be shot down. If they broke away they were immediately pounced on by three Messerschmitt 109s waiting in the background."_

Eight of the twelve Hampdens were lost....makes you think.

Cheers

Steve


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## rank amateur (Feb 26, 2016)

My compliments to all the participants. This is a very educational thread.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 26, 2016)

I would like to add in defense of British procurement (and some other nations) that sometimes the ruthless armchair hindsight schemes of cutting planes A, B, C, D, from production add building more of planes E, F, G and H can be counter productive in the long run.

Many nations not only wanted the best planes they could get at the moment, they also wanted a healthy _competitive _aircraft industry for future projects/production. Sometimes this was accomplished by a _losing _company in a design competition being given a production contract for a rivals design in order to help them stay in business. Sometimes design contracts were sort of 'rationed' with no one company working on more than 2-3 _new _designs at the same time. The Air Ministry (of what ever nation) trying to decide *if *the capacity of the design dept and prototype shop area of certain company/s could handle more work without slowing down both work in progress and having the _newest _design take 6 months longer to fly/get into production than if they went with company "B"s proposal. Sometimes they chose the 2nd best proposal on paper in the interest of trying to get the desired type of aircraft into service a number of months quicker. In the late 30s everybody knew war was coming, they didn't know when so 2nd best in production when the shooting starts looked pretty good compared to 1st best not flying as a prototype yet. It was also the reason for some duplicate programs.

Producing the absolute minimum number of aircraft types is efficient from a production stand point but it means fewer design teams in existence for future projects and once you are down to only 2-3 air-frame makers competitive bidding tends to start going away making each airplane more expensive. Finding the right balance between the number of companies/design teams and the number of projects was a hard one. And if you cut the number of teams your choices for future projects goes way down. The US navy design competition that lead to the Grumman Avenger had 17 different proposals from 9 different companies, Grumman had 3 different proposals in the competition. Navy sorted through them, short listed some and sent those back to the submitting companies for more detailed proposals/plans, and then funded 3 different prototypes.
Cutting your national design capabilities to 2-3 teams cuts down on the innovation in future designs. British aviation industry may very well have had too many separate companies during and after WW II but the _forced _mergers during the 50s and flip-flopping on orders/projects effectively reduced the the British to one Airframe maker and one engine maker. Better hope you like their design/s if you want an all British aircraft because there is no where else to go to.
Mergers were forced in the sense that certain projects _required _submitting companies to merge with another company in order to bid or be considered. In some cases after the mergers were completed the project was canceled outright with no production.


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## stona (Feb 26, 2016)

parsifal said:


> Some perspective is needed regarding the albacore.
> 
> it was an aircraft obsolete before it even entered service, but this was a product of just how far the RN had fallen behind with its aircraft development during the lean years in the wilderness under RAF control. In pre-war Britain there was virtually no chance of getting any support from the RAF with regard to technology or production. there were many in the RAF that worked actively to destroy the FAA, mostly by starving it of technology and personnel as much as much as was politically safe to do so.



It is odd that David Beatty, as First Sea Lord, and with the goal of reclaiming control of the RNAS would meet with Trenchard at the Admiralty in December 1919 and agree a twelve month truce between himself, Trenchard and Wilson (Army) which lost him the best chance of preventing the RAF and Air Ministry retaining control of naval aviation.
He had swung the Admiralty behind the Smuts plan in 1917, but for rather different reasons.
By 1923 Beatty was threatening Bonar Law (Prime Minister) with his resignation if the RNAS was not returned to Admiralty control.
Later that year Bonar Law's successor, Stanley Baldwin, was faced with Admiralty resignations en masse over the issue. It was only the board of enquiry, established by Bonar Law under Lord Salisbury, ruling in favour of continued RAF control that prevented this.
It didn't end there. There was almost open warfare between the Senior Service and RAF for a further two years. The Lord Chancellor, Richard Haldane had to intervene, demanding that the two Services establish a working relationship within three months in order to get the Committee of Imperial Defence working again. This did lead to a compromise (Beatty's deputy, Admiral Roger Keyes stepped in) giving a sort of dual control of the Naval Air Service which lasted until 1937.
Arguments raged on about the existence of the RAF as an independent Service, but following a review of defence spending in 1925 it was confirmed by the Colwyn report of 1926. Trenchard had won his battle and had the support of the previous Secretary of State for Air, now Secretary of State for War who told parliament:
_"The existence of an independent Air Ministry and an independent Air Force to carry out the Air needs of the country is an established part of the programme of every party...the longer the idea remains in existence that the question is an open one the worse it is for relations between the three Services." _
In the next eleven years, up until 1937, inestimable damage was done to naval aviation while it languished under RAF control.
Cheers
Steve


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## stona (Feb 26, 2016)

Between 1923 and 1930 Air Ministry orders averaged just 646 aircraft per year. It was the policy of 'rationing' work between different contractors that kept the industry, now in what has been described as a 'peacetime equilibrium', going.
Most of the airframe manufacturers received at least £1.8 million in this period, a considerable sum, and some (like Supermarine) operated very profitably on such receipts. 

Receiving more than £1.8 million were, Short, Armstrong Whitworth, Blackburn, Bristol, Hawker, A.V.Roe, Supermarine and Westland.

Receiving less were only Boulton Paul, Gloster, Handley Page and Saunders.

There was a drive to consolidation. Vickers purchased Supermarine in 1928. The Armstrong Siddeley Development Company (which included Armstrong Whitworth and Armstrong Siddeley Motors) acquired both A.V.Roe and High Duty Alloys in the same year. It was absorbed into the Hawker Siddeley Group with Hawker and Gloster in 1935.
Many of these companies were not as independent as a list of names would suggest.
78% of aircraf built for the Air Ministry in 1933-1935 were either produced by Vickers, A.V.Roe, or Hawker or designed by Hawker and sub contracted to other firms.

By the early 1930s two firms, Bristol and Rolls Royce dominated the aero engine industry.

De Havilland had captured the private flying market.

Cheers

Steve


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## nuuumannn (Feb 26, 2016)

stona said:


> As for the deletion of forward firing armament on the Defiant, this was a mistake and should have been recognised at the time.



Yet as a night fighter it proved that it didn't _need_ fixed forward firing armament to work efficiently. You haven't actually said _why_ it was a mistake, Steve and to be honest it wouldn't have made much of a difference to the Defiant's fortunes as a day fighter and as a night fighter it would have had a harder time catching up with the bombers it was intercepting.

As we know, adding fixed forward firing armament would have made it heavier, larger and therefore slower (you needed to put the fuel you'd removed from the wings to fit the guns somewhere else, after all) and it was slow enough - that was its biggest fault. The ability of the pilot to fire the turret's guns forward was installed, but without a gun sight and with the angle at which the guns fired when the turret was pointed forward made the idea a bit of a (pardon the expression) hit and miss affair. The turret switch that enabled the gunner to switch firing control to the pilot was not used, if I can remember correctly, being wired off.



stona said:


> Subsequently there was a scrabble to produce a turret fighter which would have been a modified Defiant with some forward firing armament, but this came to nothing.



By whom? BP? Not at the time of F.9/35 - it was specified without fixed forward firing armament as you state and none of the competing designs had fixed guns either - got any further info on that? It wasn't until F.18/40 that such a thing was proposed and that was originally written without a turret as a fixed gun fighter requirement and the turret was introduced in December 1940. BP's idea was a scaled up Defiant with either a Centaurus of Sabre, two or four forward firing cannon in the wings and a turret. A nice model survives with the BP Association.



stona said:


> We will never know if the Defiant would have been effective against unescorted bomber formations, particularly operating in conjunction with single seat fighters.



Actually we _do_ know how effective/ineffective it was against unescorted bomber formations. 27 May 1940, Blue Section (three Daffys) 264 Sqn encountered "a dozen" unescorted He 111s in formation and claimed three destroyed and two damaged. The formation was disrupted and the bombers scattered and sped home.

Two days later 264 claimed a total of 19 Ju 87s, whose escorts were previously engaged with single seaters. This was 264's Day of Glory, which has been proven to have been something of an overestimation, as the squadron claimed 37 e/a without loss on that day, but nevertheless, the airmen at the time felt they'd done what they'd claimed. This wasn't all either; the first losses of Defiants to Bf 109s was a case on 12 May where 264 Sqn was attacking Ju 87s over Holland, while Spitfires were holding off the escorts, and although the Daffys claimed four Stukas, five were shot down by the Bf 109s.

You also have to count its successes as a night fighter in terms of unescorted bombers; this also includes night intruder sorties by Defiant squadrons over Northern France. In one night on one such operation, 11 May 1941, 264 Sqn Defiants shot down three e/a; two He 111s and a Do 17 over France.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 26, 2016)

There are various degrees of independence in large corporations or conglomerates. 

In the US, United Aircraft for instance was the result of the break up (due in-part to anti-trust laws) of the late 20s/early 30s "United Aircraft and Transport Corporation" The transport division becoming United Airlines, Manufacturing east of the Mississippi river becoming United Aircraft and comprising Chance Vought, Sikorsky, P & W and Hamilton Standard. manufacturing west of the Mississippi becoming Boeing Aircraft. 
What is important in the context we are discussing is wither or not these branches or subsidiaries maintained independent design teams and at the time in question (late 30s and 40s ) I believe they did, Now in a certain corporation or group one company or another may specialize in one type of aircraft over another or in a certain customer (Navy vs Air Force or Army) but that doesn't mean they might not at least submit proposals (if nothing else to keep the design teams hand in with latest developments.


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## stona (Feb 26, 2016)

The scrabble for forward firing armament came in 1936 when the Operational Requirements Committee decided that forward firing armament was needed. It was needed originally, back in 1932/3 to engage enemy aircraft other than the bombers, and the bombers themselves in certain scenarios. Remember these would be French, the presence of German escorts years later was another question, which seems finally to have entered the minds of a few on the Air Staff in 1936. They might have been expecting some kind of long range escort/zerstorer by this time, certainly not single engine fighters. 

Two options were initially suggested. The first was a reincarnation of the Ellington type, a three seat twin with a forward firing turret and a midships turret and this was the preferred option. The second option was an extension of the Defiant concept with just one cannon armed midships turret, but it would be a twin, allowing the turret to fire straight ahead. The second option was eventually adopted, it was cheaper, and at Dowding's request a single fixed forward firing machine gun was added. Oddly the reason given by Dowding for needing the single forward firing machine gun was the requirement to engage a single low flying aircraft. Nobody seems to have asked why the turret couldn't do this. The designation of this new turret fighter was F.11/37 and an Air Staff Requirement with that number was issued in May 1937.

All the earlier proposed turret fighters (F.22/33 and F.5/33) had a front turret or moveable forward firing armament. Armstrong Whitworth claimed that they could meet F.9/35 with a front turret and asked if this would be acceptable. Now in a volte-face, making a mockery of the previous three years promotion of turret fighters, the DCAS (Courtney) said that the downward firing capability of a front turret was no longer required. Ellington had earlier argued that a turret fighter, diving on a bomber formation, would need forward and downward firing armament. 
Boulton Paul had bought the rights to the French SAMM turret in November 1935 which gave a ready made midships turret without the time and cost of development and this was certainly attractive to the Air Staff. Ellington finally conceded and the Defiant was ordered as the RAF's turret fighter. 

Operating as a night fighter is an entirely different scenario to acting as a day fighter and bomber destroyer. The specification to which the Defiant was built did not include a night fighting capability. That the Defiant did prove capable (in terms of the time period) in this role was fortuitous and not by design.

If the Defiant had been as capable as some of its earlier successes seem to have suggested it would not have been quickly withdrawn from front line daylight operations.

Cheers

Steve


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## stona (Feb 26, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> .
> What is important in the context we are discussing is wither or not these branches or subsidiaries maintained independent design teams and at the time in question (late 30s and 40s ) I believe they did,



Most did, and I agree 100% that this was very important.

I have some figures for 'Drawing Office Employment' from 1935. A drawing office certainly implies that at least some design work was being carried out. All 19 of the major aircraft companies had a drawing office. They employ numbers from 55 (Armstrong Siddeley) to 328 (Bristol, aircraft and engines).

Numbers must be put into context and there was a severe shortage of design staff as rearmament got underway. In December 1936 Vicker's technical staff numbered 221 and was one of the largest in the industry. The drawing office employed 123 though Sir Robert McLean stated that he would gladly have employed twice that number had they been available.
To put the numbers in further perspective, when Sir Ernest Hives visited Heinkel in 1935 he found that the company employed 600 technical staff.
Pure research in the UK was not done by individual companies but by organisations like the Royal Aircraft Establishment and the National Physics Laboratory, so we must be wary of direct, cross national, comparisons too.

In 1938, when discussing the slow progress of design and development with the Supply Committee, both Frederick Handley Page and Richard Fairey blamed their problems on the shortage of draughtsmen and drawing office section leaders.

Writing in 1946 the Vice-Chairman of Westalnd, Eric Mensforth, agreed.

_"Staffs have undoubtedly been too small; an increase in their size would have allowed of a substantial reduction in the development period."_

The shortage of technical staff and skilled labour would dog the British aircraft industry for years. In the absence of a State policy the onus fell on individual firms to solve the problem. It's another topic on which a book could have been written and far beyond the scope of even a lengthy forum reply 

Cheers

Steve


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## nuuumannn (Feb 26, 2016)

Steve, interesting synopsis of the development of the turret fighter, that which I am aware, but at no time was there ever a thought of fitting forward firing armament to the Defiant or F.9/35 aircraft. F.11/37 was a very different spec and did not involve directly the Defiant as BP developed a new twin engine aircraft. The previous turret fighter ideas, which you mention, (F.22/33 and F.5/33) were superseded by F.9/35 and the promising Boulton Paul Bittern, which pre dated even these specs never saw any form of production or service, which introduced the concept of a barbette armed twin engined bomber interceptor.



stona said:


> Operating as a night fighter is an entirely different scenario to acting as a day fighter and bomber destroyer. The specification to which the Defiant was built did not include a night fighting capability. That the Defiant did prove capable (in terms of the time period) in this role was fortuitous and not by design.



Actually, it did. The original requirement for F.9/35 called for a two-seat day _and _night fighter. The Defiant was intended from the outset to carry out both roles, although we could argue that at the time the British were not, nor any one else for that matter, fully aware of how specialised (the key to the Defiant's success in the role - the fact that it was specialised, perhaps) a night fighter would eventually become - another discussion for another time.

It was not just fortuitous that Defiants became night fighters at all; 264 Squadron also carried out night sorties during its stint as a day fighter unit as was its remit. Their proliferation in the role could perhaps be argued as being fortuitous as it was because the Beaufighter was taking longer than expected to mature - poor performing radar sets, awkward handling in the Mk.II etc, which meant that Defiants were quickly implemented as night fighters in late 1940 and 1941 to bridge a gap, but that doesn't mean that it's _performance_ in the role was fortuitous; it was specialised and intended from the outset as a night fighter and it carried out its duties well.



stona said:


> If the Defiant had been as capable as some of its earlier successes seem to have suggested it would not have been quickly withdrawn from front line daylight operations.



that is true, but simplistically so. It could be argued that those who made the decision not to put them in harms way any longer were aware of their inadequacies before the shooting started and that they should not have placed them in harms way to begin with. A more sensible option would have been to locate the Defiant squadrons - only two by the time the decision was made, of which only one was active, north, where single-seaters would not be an issue and bombers would be operating either with Bf 110s, which Defiants had successfully combatted against, or without escort at all.

The problem with the Defiant spec F.9/35 has been discussed and despite my objections to what you are stating here, Steve, I actually agree that it was at fault to begin with and should not have been able to progress, but it _was_ progressed with and its too easy in hindsight to criticise the decision, but regarding the Defiant, the facts speak for themselves. I can and do provide evidence that much of what is understood about the Defiant is based on pre-conceived notions borne about by ignorance, most of which was generated after the war. Even in this post I have contradicted claims made by you that are incorrect.

It should be remembered that of a two year and six month (time of use by 264 Sqn from December 1939 until May 1942 when the first Mosquitoes arrived to replace the Defiants, although examples remained on squadron strength until the end of 1942) long front line combat career as a fighter, it was a day fighter for only 8 months of that. The rest of that time, 22 months, it served with success, fortuitous or not.


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## stona (Feb 27, 2016)

I don't disagree that the Defiant was not to have forward firing armament. Both the proposals resulting in F.11/37 (a revision of F.18/36) recognised the necessity for forward firing armament. This had been at the heart of all the twin turret fighter designs since 1932 which it is why it is so surprising that F.9/35 did not include it.

Ellington (9/31):
_"We must modify the type of aircraft with which we equip our fighter squadrons and endeavour to design one which will enable the front gun to be worked by a gunner who is not the pilot."_

21st November 1932 saw the issue of the Memorandum 'Suggestions for an Improved Form of Fighter Aircraft' which asked that these suggestions "meet as far as they can"

_(i) Fighters should be able, when in squadron formation or tactically deployed, to open simultaneous fire on hostile formations and to sustain the attack until a decision is reached.

(ii) The armament layout should enable fighters to employ tactics which will deflect the enemy formations from their course and away from their objectives during the action phase.

(iii) The design of aircraft and armament layout should permit action to be joined from as many different directions as possible with minimum of preliminary manoeuvre and loss of time.

(iv)Fighters should be able to successfully engage fighters as well as bombers

(v) An adequate margin of performance is over contemporary bombers is needed both as regards speed and manoeuvrability together with the highest possible rate of climb.

(vi) Ability to operate by night as well as by day and to carry the required equipment of a zone fighter.

(viii) Special attention to be given to the freedom of arcs of fire from obstructions such as tail planes, e.t.c. if movable guns are employed.

(viii) Machine Guns in movable mountings should be capable of being operated under all conditions._

It was articles (iii) and (iv) which gave rise to turret designs, ALL of which had forward firing armament which was a requirement until suddenly abandoned for F.9/35.
When the final short list of four aircraft was reached it comprise two types (an eight gun fighter designed by a Major Thomson of the Armaments Branch nearly made it too). These were.

_(a) Those with a turret mounted to cover the upper hemisphere, or most of it.

(b) An aircraft with a special turret in the nose to enable it to fire not only in the front hemisphere but through a considerable portion of the remaining area._

*The committee considered the most important zone of attack to be the front hemisphere.* It eliminated both entries in class (a) because in one case the upper turret could not reinforce the forward firing guns and in the other doing so compromised the pilot's view aft.
This eliminated any midships turret fighters and left only designs with principally forward firing armament.

We are splitting hairs over day/night fighters. It was almost standard in Air Staff requirement that a night fighting clause was included, even the Spitfire was supposed to be a day/night fighter, but nobody seriously expected anything resembling the night fighting that began in 1940/41 and it was fortuitous that the Defiant was able to perform this role. It was NOT designed for it. All the development of the turret fighter concept envisaged engaging enemy bomber formations by day, flying in formation, something obviously impossible at night. The concept was based on the quest for more firepower and the perceived need to bring the fire of formations of aircraft to bear simultaneously on the enemy formation. It's why the fixed eight gun fighter, proposed by Thomson in 1932, was discarded, they couldn't bring enough guns to bear simultaneously, attacking in small numbers, though future developments would show him to have been remarkably prescient.

With just one midships turret F.9/35 did not really satisfy this obsession with formation attacks. It's why the idea of a twin was revived (as in my post above) and it's why, in an attempt to revive the fixed eight gun fighter, during preliminary discussions preceding F.10/35, the question of traversing guns arose.
This dated back to a suggestion by Group Captain Pattisson at the time of the Novel Fighter competition that
_
"the pilot of a single seater should be enabled to adjust the angle of his guns whilst in flight." _

Later, in 1934 Air Vice Marshal Playfair suggested
_
"remote controlled movable guns in single seaters"_

This possibility was later included in 'Notes on Design and Tactics of ADGB Fighters' in April 1934 by Brooke Popham. The Air Fighting Committee proposed trials to investigate such _"offset"_ guns and to establish whether flank fighters, in formation, could attack without risk of collision. The committee decided that a formation attacking in this way should be limited to three aircraft which defeated the object of the exercise. It was alreay reckoned that fixed gun fighters could attack in pairs or possibly threes.
In January 1935 Verney (Director of Technical Development) minuted Dowding (Air Member for Supply and Research).

_"Wing Commander Keith has brought forward a new scheme for formation fighting which necessitates traversing the wing mounted guns through an arc of about 50 degrees. I have shown the scheme tentatively to the DCAS [Deputy Chief of the Air Staff] who is very interested, as it is evident that it offers a means of greatly increased rate of fire and concentration without the necessity for mounting as many as 8 guns, which may present difficulties"_

The idea was that an entire formation of fighters could aim its guns at a target continuously during an approach on the 'curve of pursuit'. It also offered the possibility of fitting less guns to individual fighters whilst maintaining sufficient weight of fire from the formation.

Experiments were carried out using an experimental aircraft, the Hendy Heck.

This never ending quest to achieve a greater concentration of fire meant that for both F.10/35 (Spitfire/Hurricane) and F.37/35 (cannon fighter) it was

_"contemplated that some or all of [their] guns should be mounted to permit of a degree of elevation or traverse with some form of control from the pilot's seat."_

This wasn't deleted from F.37/35 until April 1936 and was not finally abandoned until Dowding, now AOC-in-C Fighter Command decided that the extra weight was not justified in 1937.
Even then Dowding remained interested in guns that were movable in the vertical plane to allow no allowance shooting. The first draft of F.18/37 (Typhoon/Tornado) stated that

_"The Air Staff are anxious that the guns should be adjustable in elevation from 0 degrees to 15 degrees, if this is possible"_

This suggestion had been removed by January 1938 in the final version of the specification circulated to industry.

Even then F.9/37, issued to Gloster in 1937, specified a twin engine fighter with a four gun midships turret and nose mounted cannon set at a no allowance angle. The turret was deleted but work progressed to a prototype no allowance cannon fighter.

We have got a little of course now, but it is important to understand the even in the period immediately preceding the war debate about both the best type of fighter and what its armament should be, continued. In 1937/38 it was by no means a given that a fixed, wing mounted, machine gun or cannon armament was the best or most efficient. Doubts were still being expressed about the ability of individual fighters to inflict sufficient damage on enemy bombers. These doubts were justified, but other factors enabled the fixed gun fighter to dominate the aerial battles of the coming years.

Cheers

Steve

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## Shortround6 (Feb 27, 2016)

Thank you again for posting this historical perspective.

I would agree that many specifications called for fighters to be both day and night fighters but basically all that meant was that the pilot/crew had a reasonably good chance of being able to take-off and land at night without crashing. 
Exhausts should be placed (or shielded) so as not to cause the pilot to loose night vision, landing speed should be low, landing light and generator/battery should be fitted, landing flares and chutes fitted for emergency landing at air fields that are not equipped with runway lights. 
The night fighter 'equipment' had nothing to do with actually locating an enemy plane or with shooting it down (different armament than day fighter). 
In the early 30s the fitting of even a basic item like a generator was by no means universal and in many cases it was a wind driven generator.


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## yulzari (Feb 27, 2016)

The original Defiant concept was for the turret guns to be able to be set forwards and above the airscrew disk with a no deflection sight for the pilot to operate. Hence the pilot having a button to fire the turret guns IOTL. That the concept was not followed through does not mean that the Defiant was not designed to have forward firing fixed guns. It had them. Just not the sights, doctrine or training. The same weight of fire as a Gladiator or Skua. In night fighting the turret allowed the aeroplane to formate on the target in the best possible position for visual identification and with the least exposure to defensive fire and then attack from that position. The real downside to the turret was the weight and drag. Roughly equivalent to sending in Spitfires to attack Bf109s in the BoB with 500lb bomb under the fuselage.


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## stona (Feb 27, 2016)

yulzari said:


> In night fighting the turret allowed the aeroplane to formate on the target in the best possible position for visual identification and with the least exposure to defensive fire and then attack from that position.



Which turned out to be below and behind, not a million miles away from the Luftwaffe's much later 'Schrage Musik' system

The problem with forward firing armament on the Defiant, and any other single engine turret fighter, was the inability to depress the armament, when facing forward, even to the horizontal, as this would result in shooting into the cockpit or shooting off one's own propeller.
It was a long held belief that the 'forward hemisphere' was the most important to cover in the arcs of fire of whatever armament was fitted and a hemisphere obviously extends below the centre line of the aircraft.
It's why the proposed turret fighters had all previously been twin engine designs and the F.11/37 and then F.9/37 (to Gloster) were both proposed as twins.
Dowding wanted a forward firing machine gun, separate from the turret armament and to be operated by the pilot. This was contrary to the original reason given for not fitting independent forward firing armament to F.9/35, that it was " undesirable to split the armament."
Cheers
Steve


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## Shortround6 (Feb 27, 2016)

Part of the problem may be what was desired vs what was _considered possible _at a given point in time. 
one _possible _hangup. 
Production MK I Defiants got DH constant speed airscrews ( at least in manual of late 1939?), Not sure what the prototype had in Aug of 1937 let alone what the propeller proposed was in 1936. type of propeller really affects take-off distance and adding weight without the variable pitch prop _may_ have pushed the Defiant over the edge of acceptable take-off? At over 1500lbs heavier than a Hurricane MK I (with constant speed prop) and slightly smaller wing adding more weight may not have been looked on with favor. Hurricane MK I added 40-45 yds to the take off-run/ distance to clear 50ft ob. with the addition of about 435lbs. Granted a single .303 Browing and ammo is a lot less but how close to maxing out some of the existing fields was the Defiant? 
A 2nd _possible _hangup. How far along were the drawings or prototype construction? In other words how much delay would have adding the wing gun/s cause? 

The divided armament argument may have included these or not, But goes back to the question of crew co-operation. Is the pilot maneuvering the plane to get the best possible firing solution for the fixed gun or for the turret. How long does it take to switch "mental gears" back and forth in combat as the situation changes? How well can gunner communicate to the pilot his (the gunners) needs/desires as the situation changes and at what point does he relinquish "control" of the fight to the pilot or at what point does he "take over", Tell pilot to quit trying a curve of pursuit attack (or head on attack or....) and position the fighter so the target is within the arc of fire of the turret. current or ex pilots on a committee are going to have certain set of opinions while advocates of the turret fighter are going to have different ones.

Sometimes decisions are made for many reasons. some large and some small. 

Better props and relaxed take-off/landing requirements (longer runways) made adding weight a lot easier in 1939/40 than in 1936/7.


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## stona (Feb 28, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> Sometimes decisions are made for many reasons. some large and some small.



Whilst I agree with all of that I can only say that weight does not appear in any of the discussions which I know of prior to the issue of F.9/35. That doesn't mean it didn't happen. 
I believe that it was the fundamental change in the concept of the turret fighter from a twin to a single engine type which was the basis for the decision to delete forward firing armament. A midships turret on a single engine type could never cover the 'forward hemisphere' for obvious reasons. It was this that resulted in the overturning of several years of thinking about turret fighters, really as a simple economic expedient. The only option would be fixed wing mounted armament of some type and not everyone was convinced that this was the right type of armament for any fighter at the time. It was just easier to delete it and justify it with some nonsense about splitting the armament.

As for control, imagine the problems with some of the earlier concepts in which not only would different armament be brought to bear in different scenarios, but control of the aircraft would pass between two different pilot/gunners (and positions) depending on that scenario.
Ellington (again)

_"What I think is wanted is an aeroplane that can be fought against attack from both the front and from behind in formation; and for this a two pilot aircraft is required, so that one pilot can maintain the place of his aircraft in the formation while the other fights the front or rear gun or guns as the case may be."_

We could have lost the war 

As a BTW this obsession with rigid formation fighting, principally in an effort to multiply the fire power of individual aircraft, which was deemed inadequate, continued to effect the tactics for the fixed gun single seat aircraft at the beginning of WW2. The various rigidly controlled fighter attacks that all RAF pilots learned as part of 'Fighting Area' tactics are a reflection of this.

Cheers

Steve


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## merlin (Feb 28, 2016)

Some interesting historical info here. Re; underemployed design staff - I think that was one of the reasons why Shorts were invited to submit a design - which became the Stirling, on the other hand they could just as easily been engaged in a military version of the S.25 flying boat.
Re: the Defiant - I think with older RAF people there was a danger of being pessimistic over the pressures the pilot would be under as aircraft got faster! Hence, the need for a gunner - because the pilot was too busy trying to fly the plane. Rather than the pilot becoming a glorified taxi driver. Dowding - I remember a post on this forum - wrote in 1939 that he wasn't in favour of the aircraft, though the contradiction here is - why weren't they stationed away from '109' range? Better, to have them in the Midlands, or if down South, then scramble not intercept incoming, but outgoing - to deal with the stragglers - after the 109s had gone.


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## stona (Feb 28, 2016)

Yep, agree that the Air Staff generally seem to have under estimated the abilities of their air crew.

The drive towards two seat fighters was due to a combination of two interlinked factors. The quest for fire power and the need to fly in formation to achieve it.
A separate gunner (or gunners, several three seat aircraft were proposed in the 1930s) was considered essential as the pilot would need to concentrate on keeping the aircraft in place in the formation.
The pilot was not expected to maintain a formation and aim a gun or guns.

With hindsight we know that fighters typically did not attack simultaneously in large formations but much smaller units, between 2 and 4 aircraft in a loose 'formation'. This enabled the pilots of *fixed gun* fighters to aim their aircraft and guns at the same time and is a major factor in the eventual dominance of this type. It was by no means obvious in the mid 1930s.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Feb 29, 2016)

merlin said:


> Some interesting historical info here. Re; underemployed design staff - I think that was one of the reasons why Shorts were invited to submit a design - which became the Stirling, on the other hand they could just as easily been engaged in a military version of the S.25 flying boat.



The S.25 was the Sunderland. 
The S.26 was the "G" class and first flew about 2 months after the first flight of the Stirling so I doubt the Stirling delayed it much at all.
The RAF buying* long* range patrol planes _instead _of bombers is a whole different saga. 
I would also note that _planning _to close the mid Atlantic gap in 1936-37 calls for a tremendous amount of foresight as at that time the RAF was having a great deal of trouble buying planes to close the "coastal gap" let alone the "Western Approaches gap". I would also note that while very long range patrol planes did _help _close the mid Atlantic gap, what really sealed it was the escort carrier. 

Shorts _may _have gotten the contract for the Stirling _because_ they had the most experience with large 4 engine monoplanes, little as that was. First S.23 empire class flying boat flying in July of 1936. About one month after the Handley Page Hampden. Avro's design "expertise" being showcased by the Anson in 1935-36. 

The Stirling was the quick, low risk way to get a 4 engine bomber into production/service. It weighed, empty, almost 4 times as much as a Hampden and about 2 1/2 times as much as an early Wellington. 
The Halifax and Lancaster could both draw on experience gained with the Stirling and both were ordered "off the drawing board"instead of the normal development pattern. Shorts even building a flying 1/2 scale model of the Stirling to check the aerodynamics. While Shorts may not have shared much actual design work with other aircraft companies that doesn't apply to parts suppliers, like landing gear makers, brakes, wheels/tyres, hydraulic suppliers and so on were working the accessories that big planes would need. 
Being "first" usually means a longer development time and having problems that 2nd and 3rd don't have.

Please note that I am not claiming the Stirling was a truly great aircraft or equal of the later bombers. Just that it is a lot harder to be the first type of aircraft in an era and/or country than some people think.

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## merlin (Mar 1, 2016)

Ah yes, my mistake re. S.25. The 'C' Class Empire flying boats were part financed on the understanding (as I recall) the a military version would be based on it - this became the Sunderland. Whilst the 'C' Class was a success to India & Australia, there was a need to compete with the US on the Atlantic. Hence, the design for the 'G' Class - in the normal course of events as part of Government support, a military version would have been also been designed, whereas in OTL civilian 'C' Class flying boats were converted to military use, so were the three civilian 'G' Class aircraft.
So, to me, it seems plausible that the civil & military version gets built (perhaps call it Swansea), Maybe Bombay production is switched there earlier.


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## stona (Mar 1, 2016)

Why was the Hampden produced at all?
The Air Ministry acknowledged that the best aircraft to Specification B.9/32 was the Vickers Wellington. 360 were required under Scheme F. 
The Wellington's geodetic construction required a specialised rolling and milling plant only available at its Weybridge plant. Vickers already had contracts for the Wellesley and could only produce 180 Wellingtons by April 1939. The Air Ministry's options were further limited because geodetic construction was considered so revolutionary that it would have to be 'proved' at Weybridge before any sub-contracting would be permitted.
The Air Ministry's solution was to order the other B.9/32 as well, the Handley Page Hampden and the long term result of this was that resources were split between the two until late 1941.
These decisions were not always taken simply on the basis of which aircraft was the best. This was seldom the overriding reason. Like the decision to produce the Hampden, it could be taken on the basis of which aircraft could be made available in sufficient numbers to fulfill production plans.
If you cancel the Hampden, what replaces it in time to meet the requirements of rearmament and Scheme F? You can't have more Wellingtons.
Cheers
Steve


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## tomo pauk (Mar 1, 2016)

I have the soft spot for the Hampden. Too bad it was not produced in Austin factory, instead the Battles. 
Yes, I know that it would require an 'overhaul' of then-current expension scheme.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 1, 2016)

A very good point.

And once you have one (or more) factories tooled up to make Hampdens and the international situation is getting worse, when do you shut down the Hampden production and re-tool for Wellingtons (or what evers)? 
In Sept 1939 there were 9 squadrons equipped with Hampdens of which only 5 were "declared" operational. The other four were still crew training. 
There were only 8 squadrons of Wellingtons operational in Sept 1939 and those were 'day' squadrons. NONE had been officially declared operational by night. 
There were only 7 squadrons equipped with Whitleys and 4 of them had MK III's with Tiger engines were so far from being satisfactory that they were pretty much banned from long over water flights. 

Any 'scheme' that cuts down total production during this time (or for most of 1940) is running a gamble of more/better aircraft later for fewer at the beginning of the war. 
Had the war started 6 months sooner the British bomber numbers would have been truly pathetic.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 1, 2016)

A lot of the RAFs troubles in the first few years of the war was more due to a lack of _proper _training rather than major defects in the aircraft. 
Lack of gunnery training for pilots, a few days a year at a gunnery range away form the home base doesn't cut it. 
A lack of experiments in air combat (dog fighting) vs the doctrine of formation attacks _might _have shown that pilots could fly and aim at the same time 
Lack of bombing practice for bombers. Lack of navigation practice, both day and night. 
Of course realistic exercises would have shown that many of the RAFs "claims" as to ability were pretty hollow. 
Unfortunately "realistic exercises" like actually flying your night bombers at night increase the accident rate. 

The other main failing was the armament or lack thereof. Inadequately tested bombs. Bombs of the wrong size (common mistake in the 30s) lack of even enough .303 machine guns to equip the planes being built so may planes went to war with Lewis guns taken out of storage. Lack of torpedoes has been mentioned in another thread. Shortage of _good _ammo even for the .303 guns with BoB fighters carrying 37.5% "Ball" ammo. etc.


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## stona (Mar 1, 2016)

Here's some more food for thought for all those keen on cancellations.
British aircraft production was to be organised into Groups (I mentioned this somewhere else). Each group would manufacture a particular type of aircraft and only one type would be ordered from each operational class. There are many reasons this wasn't adopted at the start of Scheme F, as some had hoped, not least because the government had no powers of compulsion and initial expansion of the aircraft industry was financed by private capital giving the Air Ministry much less influence.
Fast forward a few years as the group schemes are supposed to be implemented and the Air Ministry finds that not one but three heavy bombers have flown, Stirling, Halifax and Manchester. The Air Ministry was keen to concentrate production on one model but there was concern that the wrong one might be selected, none had yet been properly tried in combat. The three companies were understandably keen to carry on their own projects.
The result was that groups were organised for all three aircraft. This was an expensive and inefficient way of going about bomber production but it ultimately ensured that Britain produced a great heavy bomber. The intention was to later concentrate on only one design, but for a variety of reasons this never happened. Had the decision been taken in 1939/40 to cancel one of the three it would very likely have been the Manchester which was not showing much promise. No Manchester equals no Lancaster.
Germany gambled everything on one design, the He 177, and look how that ended up.
I post this to illustrate how the precipitous early cancellation of one programme can have unintended effects on other future projects.

It also proved impossible to concentrate production in just one fighter group.
Initially a group was to be set up for the new Hawker fighter (Typhoon/Tornado) which was to replace the Hurricane AND Spitfire in 1941. The engine issues are well documented and it became apparent in 1939 that a Spitfire with a more conventional and proven engine would equal the performance of the Hawker fighter
New expansion schemes announced in 1938 provided for an increase in fighter strength nearly double that of Scheme F. The Air Ministry had to commit resources to fighters already in production. A Spitfire shadow factory (Castle Bromwich) was sanctioned and Supermarine's capacity enlarged. A Hurricane group was set up comprising Hawker, Gloster, two Scottish engineering companies and the Canadian Car and Foundry Company (Montreal).
At the outbreak of war Britain had made a commitment to all three fighters. Once again it was intended that all resources would eventually be concentrated in the new Hawker fighter, but the performance and development of the Spitfire meant that this never happened.
In refusing to standardise airframe production the Air Ministry was doing what it as often been accused of failing to do, putting quality before quantity.
The success of two similar designs might frustrate efforts for concentration, but the failure of other projects did advance the process. It's why companies like Westland, Blackburn, Saunders-Roe, and Boulton Paul spent most of the war building other people's designs.
The group system was revised from time to time, principally between 1939 and 1941, but the five groups established to produce the Wellington, Halifax and Manchester bombers and for the Merlin and Hercules engines, accounted for half the resources of the British wartime aircraft industry.
Cheers
Steve

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## rinkol (Mar 1, 2016)

stona said:


> Here's some more food for thought for all those keen on cancellations.
> British aircraft production was to be organised into Groups (I mentioned this somewhere else). Each group would manufacture a particular type of aircraft and only one type would be ordered from each operational class. There are many reasons this wasn't adopted at the start of Scheme F, as some had hoped, not least because the government had no powers of compulsion and initial expansion of the aircraft industry was financed by private capital giving the Air Ministry much less influence.
> Fast forward a few years as the group schemes are supposed to be implemented and the Air Ministry finds that not one but three heavy bombers have flown, Stirling, Halifax and Manchester. The Air Ministry was keen to concentrate production on one model but there was concern that the wrong one might be selected, none had yet been properly tried in combat. The three companies were understandably keen to carry on their own projects.
> The result was that groups were organised for all three aircraft. This was an expensive and inefficient way of going about bomber production but it ultimately ensured that Britain produced a great heavy bomber. The intention was to later concentrate on only one design, but for a variety of reasons this never happened. Had the decision been taken in 1939/40 to cancel one of the three it would very likely have been the Manchester which was not showing much promise. No Manchester equals no Lancaster.
> ...



The Napier Sabre engine must have been much more expensive than the Merlin/Griffon and,at least in the versions available during the war, left something to be desired in the way of high altitude performance. Presumably the priority assigned to the Typhoon must have owed something to superficial arguments to the effect that, the Typhoon had to offer decisive performance advantages given the availability of almost twice the engine power..

One thing that always mystified me was how it could be that companies such as Blackburn were allowed to continue so long as independent entities.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 1, 2016)

The Typhoon was supposed to make 460 mph, the AM believed Hawker's estimates, while Hawker believed aerodynamicists that saw no disadvantage in thick wing profile. The Sabre never have had more than 40% power than the Merlin of same date - eg. in 1942 it is ~2000 HP vs. ~1500 HP.


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## stona (Mar 1, 2016)

Blackburn ended up building the Barracuda and Swordfish for Fairey and I think the Sunderland for Shorts, none of which were their own designs.
Fairey Aviation was the biggest of the big two in terms of market share into the 1930s, the other being Vickers, and was intimately connected to the Air Ministry and military production. So much so that Sir Richard Fairey had argued that military aircraft construction required so much concentration that civil types could not be produced as well. The civil market was dominated by De Havilland.

Blackburn survived post war to build the Buccaneer, albeit as part of the Hawker Siddeley Group.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Mar 1, 2016)

Blackburn also built what the customer requested. If the customer has some rather bizarre requests is it up to the company to tell them they are wrong (and have them go to another supplier?). 

De Havilland dominated the civil market in part because the British civil market was too small to support more than one major company. 

Costs of sleeve valve engines have remained pretty much a mystery unless recently declassified?


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## stona (Mar 2, 2016)

There was a significant civil market developed by De Havilland by concentrating on relatively cheap, low performance aircraft. Between 1930 and 1934 De Havilland's average annual sales in the civilian market compare closely with those of Vickers in the military market (£500,000 to £580,000). De Havilland also had a significant demand from foreign markets, unlike its military competitors who were building almost exclusively for the RAF, and the companies total production was only limited by the common practice of granting licenses to produce De Havilland products abroad. Some kind of license agreement was often a condition of purchase imposed by foreign governments at this time.
The Wright Corporation was licensed to build De Havilland engines in 1928. Subsidiary companies were established in some Commonwealth/Dominion countries and the USA (Moth Aircraft Corporation of America). Licenses were granted to companies in France and Norway.
In the ten years preceding the war De Havilland produced well over 3,000 civil aircraft in the UK, many more were produced under various arrangements abroad.
In 1924 De Havilland sales amounted to £138,495, by 1935 this had increased to £1,018,318. I would suggest that the company had found a significant and viable market for its civil aviation products and had exploited it successfully.
Cheers
Steve


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## yulzari (Mar 2, 2016)

I will make a controversial offer on what RAF aircraft I would cancel. The Vickers Wellington.

Unable to operate in daylight without fighter cover it was less able to deliver bombs at night than the Whitley (weight for a given range) and used a construction method that could not be readily turned over to stressed skin alternatives. Vickers pleaded that their workforce and machinery could not be so changed and were allowed to carry on making Wellingtons until the war ended but they were quick enough to change when commercial sales demanded stressed skin construction (Viking etc.)

I would give Vickers production over to making Whitleys until a 4 engined successor comes along and then switch to making those. The Whitley was designed as a heavy (for the period) night bomber. Like most night bombers it would probably have been better off with no turrets which translates into some combination of increased range, bomb load or reduced time in the danger area through extra speed/height plus a smaller crew. Any extra performance also increases it's winter bombing range as the length of daylight determines it's maximum safe range. For the same investment in manpower, materials and engines you get a higher bomb load delivered over a wider range.

By late 1943, instead of churning out updated 1937 Wellingtons and occasional Warwicks they could have been turning out Lancasters in quantity. Enough quantity to cover a shortfall whilst Shorts cease making Stirlings and go over to Lancasters and maybe even do the same together to allow Halifaxes to be replaced by Lancasters in production too by 1944.

When you look at the use of Wellingtons in the Mediterranean theatre in 1944/45 they are operating in the same conditions as unarmed Dakotas except over Northern Italy where they are meeting radar equipped nightfighters and relying on RAF Mosquitos and USAAF Beaufighters to meet the threat. Increased Lancaster production would let the same tasks be undertaken with better effect and reduced losses. Even bombing Southern Germany etc. from Italy.

Now the Wellington was not a bad aeroplane but there was nothing it could do that a Whitley could not. I will grant that it looked prettier but the concept was a dead end as the Windsor demonstrated. Also the Whitley was specifically designed to be made in sections by dispersed contractors.

Taking off my hindsight goggles; I am aware that the RAF thought that it could operate Wellingtons unescorted in daylight with the combined defensive fire of a formation and that the Wellington was not ordered as a night bomber. One raid in 1939 blew that idea away.


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## stona (Mar 2, 2016)

With the benefit of hindsight that's not a bad plan, anything to get more Lancasters works for me 

I would like to put the decisions into some historic perspective, I know you are aware that the Wellington was never going to be axed. There were several reasons for this. Prior to the start of Scheme L capital investment and production plans had been formulated largely in isolation. The government gave out contracts an depended on the individual firms to provide the necessary floor space etc to meet them. After 1938 two principle factors changed this. First there was a clarification of long term government requirements and secondly the Air Council Sub-Commitee on Supply was created. This led to much closer relations between the firms and the Ministry. With this a close correlation of investment and production programmes was established.
It was the Supply Committee's discussions with Hawker Siddeley and Handley Page that revealed that the development of the Manchester and Halifax aircraft was going to be longer than previously anticipated and that consequently the weight of bomber production would be borne by the proposed Wellington group. In May 1938 Vickers were unable to release completed drawings for the Wellington to other firms in the group and consequently none of them (Gloster, Armstrong Whitworth, Austin) would commit themselves to Wellington production in 1939. There were other reservations about the tooling and techniques needed for the construction too. As a result of all this only Vickers could supply the Wellington in any significant, though inadequate numbers. There was no way in 1938/9 it could be cancelled.

As a by product of this the Wellington group was reorganised. Gloster was instructed to join Hawker to build the Hurricane. Factory capacity for the new heavy bombers was sanctioned, but until these types could be introduced, Handley Page, Armstrong Whitworth and Austin were instructed to continue building the Hampden, Whitley and Battle.

All Wellington production was undertaken by Vickers-Armstrong, parent company of the two Vickers aircraft firms.
An aerodrome and erecting shops were built at government expense, the highest possible level of component manufacture was sub contracted, the existing Vickers-Armstrong subsidiaries were absorbed for management purposes, Sir Robert McLean was fired and both Vickers Aviation and Supermarine were formally wound up ( the Spitfire became officially the Vickers Supermarine Spitfire.) During 1939 extensive networks were set up to supply assembly factories in Chester and Blackpool. Capacity at the original Weybridge factory was also increased. Excluding sub contractors this all amounted to an increase in the productive floor space for Wellington construction of 450%. Target production for the Chester and Blackpool factories was raised to 150 aircraft a month in 1939.
After all that there was no possibility of the Wellington being abandoned or of it not being produced in sufficient numbers to form a mainstay of Bomber Command until the introduction of the new heavy types.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Mar 2, 2016)

stona said:


> There was a significant civil market developed by De Havilland by concentrating on relatively cheap, low performance aircraft. Between 1930 and 1934 De Havilland's average annual sales in the civilian market compare closely with those of Vickers in the military market (£500,000 to £580,000). De Havilland also had a significant demand from foreign markets, unlike its military competitors who were building almost exclusively for the RAF, and the companies total production was only limited by the common practice of granting licenses to produce De Havilland products abroad. Some kind of license agreement was often a condition of purchase imposed by foreign governments at this time.
> The Wright Corporation was licensed to build De Havilland engines in 1928. Subsidiary companies were established in some Commonwealth/Dominion countries and the USA (Moth Aircraft Corporation of America). Licenses were granted to companies in France and Norway.
> In the ten years preceding the war De Havilland produced well over 3,000 civil aircraft in the UK, many more were produced under various arrangements abroad.
> In 1924 De Havilland sales amounted to £138,495, by 1935 this had increased to £1,018,318. I would suggest that the company had found a significant and viable market for its civil aviation products and had exploited it successfully.
> ...



De Havilland did do a rather good job of it but splitting the British (and to some extent the commonwealth market) between two or more _major _companies would have seen the failure of one of them. At least until the late 30s when contracts for primary trainers became large but then those might be military sales? By the figures you provide during the height of the depression De Havilland was making about 62-63,000 pounds per year in the civil market. Split that in two and see if it is enough for a _major _company to survive. The British did have a number of small companies competing for the 'civil' (private) market and some other companies trying for the commercial market. 
I believe Wright licensed the the Gypsy engine in the late 1920s, Wright was trying to dominate the US market/s at the time and had no engine in the low power class (under 100hp) and their own Challenger engine of 150-180hp was pretty much a disaster. They built (or shipped) 88 Gypsy engines from 1927 to 1934.

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## Shortround6 (Mar 2, 2016)

Something that I tend to harp on (and without hard numbers on British aircraft to back it up) is the poor situation in regards to propellers on early British aircraft. 
At this point in the thread I bring it up because of the suggestion to build Whitleys instead of Wellingtons. Whitleys _as built_ could not maintain height on one engine, an all too common condition for British twin engine aircraft (bombers) in the late 30s and beginning of the war. Now "maintain height" covers a lot of ground as most (or all) twin engine aircraft can not maintain anywhere near their normal service ceiling on one engine. The question becomes *what height they can maintain *one one engine. SOME twins cannot * stay *in the air at all with one engine. They descend slowly (10-200ft per minute) to the ground even with the remaining engine at full power. 
Jettisoning weight does help (dropping bombs, dumping fuel).
As one example of what propellers could do the Boeing 247 airliner had an _absolute _ceiling of 2000ft on one engine using fixed pitch props. Going to variable pitch props increased the absolute single engine ceiling to 10,000ft. 
Granted British bombers had two pitch props or controllable pitch props but it took a long time to get fully feathering props on British aircraft. 
Think of props a bit like a manual transmission on a car. Fine pitch for take-off is like low (1st gear) and coarse pitch is like high gear (4th/5th) Two pitch props have nothing in between while variable pitch props do. With an engine out you are dragging (pushing) the dead engine. With a fully feathering prop it is like putting the car in neutral instead of trying to push/pull it in high gear. 
The British lost a lot of planes and crews because they couldn't make it back to base on one engine. 
Lockheed Hudsons (along with some other aircraft) got the reputation of "old boomerang" on their ability to make it back to base despite battle damage (and engine out situations). the Hudson having a good power to weight ratio and having fully feathering propellers. 

BTW leaving the turrets out of a Whitley really isn't going to do much. Since all there was were nose and tail turrets there was no high drag dorsal turret. Whitley had a high drag wing and that cocked fuselage was certainly no help. Sticking a pointy nose and tail on a Whitley is like putting lipstick on a pig. 

Had the Whitley gotten Merlin XX engines instead of Merlin X and gotten fully feathering props in 1939/40 it _might _have done a bit better.


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## CarlAce (Mar 3, 2016)

*Blackburn Botha, underpowerd, and unreliable.*


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## stona (Mar 4, 2016)

I mentioned above that the Air Ministry, despite objectives to the contrary, avoided standardisation. The dangers inherent in standardisation are illustrated by the series of costly failures, including the Botha, which left the Fleet Air Arm and Coastal Command desperately short of modern aircraft in 1939.
Cheers
Steve


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## Shortround6 (Mar 4, 2016)

Well, when you are ordering aircraft "off the drawing board" it does help to order more than one type so if it is a turkey you have a back-up already in hand. 
Unfortunately for the British the 'back-up' for the Botha was the Beaufort which used an engine that while not quite "off the drawing board" was close to it. 
Using hindsight it became almost a rule in 1950s and 60s that powering a new airframe with a new engine was a recipe for disaster much more often than not. 

I had not heard that the Botha was "unreliable". Under-powered, unstable, and with a poor view for the crew yes.


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## stona (Mar 6, 2016)

I thought this might provide food for thought.

It's a list of aircraft factories introducing new types in 1941/2.* Factory*, previous type, _new type._

*Austin* Battle _ Stirling_
*Short * Sunderland _Stirling_
*Short Harland* Hereford _Stirling_
*A.V.Roe * Blenheim _Lancaster_
*Armstrong Whitworth * Whitley _Lancaster_
*Handley Page * Hampden _Halifax_
*English Electric * Hampden _Halifax_
*Rootes * Blenheim _ Halifax_
*De Havilland* Various _ Mosquito_
*Bristol * Blenheim _ Beaufighter_
*Gloster * Hurricane _Typhoon_
*Westland * Lysander _ Spitfire_

[PRO AVIA 10/311_]_

Cheers

Steve


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## GrauGeist (Mar 6, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> Well, when you are ordering aircraft "off the drawing board" it does help to order more than one type so if it is a turkey you have a back-up already in hand.


The case of the B-29 and it's backup, the B-32, comes to mind.


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## kool kitty89 (Apr 13, 2016)

GrauGeist said:


> The case of the B-29 and it's backup, the B-32, comes to mind.


That case also has the common problem of 'new aircraft with new engine' (or at least unproven engine not yet reliable in mass production).

A safer backup plan would've been a slightly smaller aircraft using the more proven R-2800. (backups targeting yet OTHER unproven engines -like the V-3420, let alone even more problematic super-engines would be equally bad considerations)

In Brittain's case, importing engines as a failsafe would have been an option, and pre-war they had both France and the US to consider (the 14N, R-1820, and R-1830 being the most useful examples, with the 12Y interesting as a Peregrine alternative). The two problems there (monetary cost aside) are integrity of shipping lanes and potential fall of said exporters to the enemy (and political/economic issues bottlenecking supply at the source for other reasons).

Honestly, given how dependent the UK already was on shipping for all sorts of resources (including fuel) and how isolation would pretty much mean inability to fight effectively in any case, that trade-off probably wasn't a serious dealbreaker.

Licensed production could be a consideration too, but given the cost and (especially) time overhead, just placing sufficiently large/consistent enough orders for import (to secure steady production/supply from the source) would likely have made more sense. (this all long before wartime ... let alone lend-lease, of course)

The R-1830 Twin Wasp was only a good replacement for the Pegasus, too wide for most other direct replacements (though slow, high drag aircraft probably wouldn't loose much switching from the Taurus), so the R-1830 was really the best option all around. (imported or licensed or both ... of course there was licensed R-1830 production in the Commonwealth, but that was probably more significant than native British licensed production, atlantic trade of American engines being a lot more straightforward than shipping all the way to Austrialia or New Zealand -Canada would of course have good land access to American engines too) Given its proven design and low frontal area (for a radial engine its size) it seems like the obvious pre-war engine option to supplement British technology.

The R-2800 would be the obvious stop-gap for the Centaurus production delays as well as potentially displacing the Saber in general use as a 2000 HP class engine. (import over licensing still likely made more sense, if not more so due to the newer design and more dire war-time situation in the UK. (the R-2600 may have also been a consideration for supplementing Hercules supply, but given the relatively trouble-free history of that engine -and the R-2600's own problems at times- it's not a significant example where such considerations would have developed into genuine necessity) The R-2800 also developed substantially more during war-time, compared to the R-1830, so any licensed production would have been constantly playing catch up (or stuck making older, less powerful models) in a far less efficient or useful capacity than R-1830 production might. (even sticking with one of the 1200 HP single-stage variants -like what the Aussies ended up building- would have been useful for most/all needs of such an engine, particularly with maritime use -plus even the 2-stage variants didn't have the level of mechanical differences as the R-2800 A vs B vs C series which were largely entirely new engines given the level of changes made)


The R-1830, aside from the obvious fit to the Beaufort (and potentially any other Taurus powered production aircraft) would have made perfect sense on Gloster's F.5/34 monoplane and F.9/37 twin. (both likely taking much less modification than a Merlin refit would -the only other really viable 1000+ HP class engine of the period, and of course would compete for production with other Merlin powered types)


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## Shortround6 (Apr 13, 2016)

Man, you sure do have a love affair going on with Gloster's F.5/34  

To me it seems too good to be true.















20-25mph faster than either the P-35 or P-36 at around 15-16,000ft using about the same power? 
Or about the same speed as a Macchi 200 which had about 50 sq ft less wing area? and had fully enclosed landing gear?
same speed (or within production tolerance of a few %) as a Hawker Hurricane? That could out climb it to 20,000ft by several minutes? 

Or 29mph faster than the Bristol F.5/34 which used the same engine? 





granted the airflow around the Canopy on the Bristol may be a little suspect (or more than a little?) but the landing gear on the Gloster is about as bad as it gets for late 1930s fighter. Seversky giving up on that style by 1939. 

You have two choices, license the the Boeing patent for landing gear and have the wheels rotate 90 degrees to lay flat in the wing (P-36/P-40/Re.2000 style) or redo the wing and have the lading gear retract inward (P-43 style).


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## GrauGeist (Apr 13, 2016)

kool kitty89 said:


> That case also has the common problem of 'new aircraft with new engine' (or at least unproven engine not yet reliable in mass production).
> 
> A safer backup plan would've been a slightly smaller aircraft using the more proven R-2800. (backups targeting yet OTHER unproven engines -like the V-3420, let alone even more problematic super-engines would be equally bad considerations)...


If you're not going to build the aircraft for fear of the engines, then cancel it and continue on with the B-17 and B-24 (smaller aircraft).

The USAAC (USAAF) requested a step foreward in range and load and the B-29 was their choice. It happens that the XB-19 most likely would have been chosen over the B-29 had it not been for project delays.

Interestingly enough, the XB-19 used the V-3420, which is the same engine the XB-39 (B-29 backup) used.


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## kool kitty89 (Apr 14, 2016)

Greyman said:


> Self-sealing tanks means both a weight penalty and a tank volume penalty. Both have a negative impact on range.


This is significantly more true for full self sealing fuel cells rather than the simpler (albeit less effective) method of coating conventional metal tanks in self-sealing material (like linatex or similar). It's possible that some British Aircraft made the compromise to retain this older implementation for weight and fuel capacity reasons.

The P-40C gained weight and lost significant internal fuel capacity switching from the P-40B's self-sealing coated metal tank (the P-40D and E expanded this at the expense of yet greater weight gain). The F2A also suffered significantly when transitioning from its integral wing tanks to the self sealing fuselage tanks introduced in the F2A-3. (whereas the British-compliant B-339 simply took the F2A-2's unprotected tanks and added external self sealing material, adding relatively little weight and at least acceptable sealing and fire resistant qualities -given the serious problems the F2A-3 faced, it may have been a smarter compromise)

American aircraft were generally better protected and overengineered compared to their British and German counterparts, and that goes for even pre-war aircraft as far as excessively stringent structural integrity requirements. (hence their typically greater weight -even the F2A was relatively rugged compared to land-based aircraft, Brewster's own quality control problems notwithstanding -particularly after war broke out and orders exceeded their capacity ... or if not potential capacity, at least real-world capacity limited by severe management issues, shame there wasn't a Naval Aircraft Factory variant like the SBN)


In fact, that leads int one of the best arguments I have for an aircraft that SHOULD have been canceled: the F2A-2 and F2A-3. As soon as Brewester's production capacity began to show trouble (yet again) during the initial F2A-1 (and B.239) run, the USN should have licensed the design and shifted 100% of Naval production to the Naval Aircraft Factory (so the F2A-2 and F2A-3 would be FN-1 and FN-2 or some such) and possibly also considered outsourcing to Grumman for production rather than building the Wildcat at all. (a 2-stage R-1830 powered F2A with reliable production facilities likely would have been more capable than the F4F-3)

Leave Brewster to handle export production exclusively (B.239, 339, 439, etc) and also cancel the F3A Corsair. (if they were too unreliable to produce their own aircraft, there's no way they could be trusted with another firm's, particularly an advanced new generation fighter) Navalized export models might have been a good idea and potentially more useful with the FAA than the land-based Buffalo had been with the Commonwealth. (performance compares well with the Martlet, with some advantages in maneuverability, cockpit visibility, smaller size on deck -without folding wings- higher ammunition capacity, more reliable machine gun mounts, and powered automatic landing gear without the failure to lock the Wildcat/Martlet suffered from -though other failure issues when overladen on hard deck landings prior to the tests revealing reduced tire pressures alleviated this problem) Basically the British could have really used the Buffalo Mk.I with the original small tailwheel and arrester hook of the F2A-2 retained.

Leading into my earlier R-1830 comments (and longer previous post on engine imports). Aside from the high altitude performance of the 2-stage models, even the basic single stage units (used in some Martlets) would have benefitted the F2A more than the F4F due to its significantly smaller size and somewhat lower weight. (the bulky F4F lost rather little when switching to the much wider R-1820, but the F2A had the engine cowling nearly as wide as the fuselage itself, a fair more cylindrical arrangement to the bulkier curve the Wildcat features amidships, so the R-1830 should have had a significant decrease in nose area and drag even with the spinner omitted) All the better if the FAA/RAF focused on the R-1830 as their standard import engine of that size/type (let alone potentially displacing the Taurus entirely).


The F.5/34 was an interesting option for FAA fighter use as well (better flying qualities for deck handling than the spitfire and much better aerodynamics -and shorter wingspan- than the hurricane, let alone other technical -and fire danger- issues the hurricane posed to carrier and pilot alike), but even had it been adopted as such I think the Buffalo could have made a fair complement to it. (both had very nice all-around vision through their canopies as well, particularly important for Naval aircraft)

The F.5/34 is also notable even in its Mercury powered form for at least being a better pre-war option than the Sea Gladiator while using the same engines and production facilities. (albeit obviously with some overhead/delay in tooling up for the new design) And while the FAA had other requirements that demanded the 2-man arrangement fo the Fulmar and Firefly, the fact was they still had a use for single seat fighters and were indeed receiving newly built Gladiators for that purpose pre-war.





stona said:


> Yep, agree that the Air Staff generally seem to have under estimated the abilities of their air crew.
> 
> The drive towards two seat fighters was due to a combination of two interlinked factors. The quest for fire power and the need to fly in formation to achieve it.
> A separate gunner (or gunners, several three seat aircraft were proposed in the 1930s) was considered essential as the pilot would need to concentrate on keeping the aircraft in place in the formation.
> The pilot was not expected to maintain a formation and aim a gun or guns.


I was of similar opinion until the radio technology situation of 1939-1941 was explained properly. A dedicated radio operator (and optional observer) was genuinely useful for the pre/early war period to allow more complex multi-frequency radio installations and consequently more effective long-range operation with proper communication. (even more important for long range duties with small fighter groups, let alone recon or patrol duty)

This was the best justification for the 2-seat Fw 187 arrangement without defensive weapons mounted. (though it obviously still needed more powerful engines to reach its full potential, even the Jumo 210G version was competitive with the 109E and Spitfire I and II at low/medium altitudes, with similar or better speed and superior rate of climb, but lower critical altitude -Czech made pre-war Hispano 12Y's probably would have been enough to make up the difference and make for a faster, better climbing aircraft at all altitudes)

Additionally, for particularly long endurance maritime patrols, a second crewman would be useful for avoiding potentially fatal disorientation/'mesmerizing' situations like some P-38 pilots suffered in the Aleutians. (a maritime patrol/recon variant of Gloster's F.9/37 derived Twin engine fighter project(s) would have similar considerations, or any early-war variant)







Aozora said:


> Had the Air Ministry actually gone ahead with cancelling the Typhoon, 2 TAF would not have been nearly as effective as it was between late 1943 and VE-Day; sure, the Spitfire XII was arguably a better fighter, but there was no way that it was a better fighter-bomber. No Spitfire could carry 1,000 lb bombs or 8 to 16 rockets, nor could it carry the same armour protection, or dive as fast. Overall, the Typhoon turned out to be a very efficient fighter-bomber and there was nothing else in the British armoury that could have taken its place. I would, however, argue that one mistake the British did make was to lumber the likes of the Typhoon and Mosquito with heavy, bulky rocket rails; by 1944 zero-length launchers had been proven in operational service and should have been made a priority.


That's only if there's no proper replacement for the Typhoon ... the Spitfire couldn't do its job, but a twin-engine fighter could have. Either continued development of the Whirlwind (or, more likely somewhat heavy redesign to properly accommodate the merlin AND address the weaknesses of the initial Whirlwinds -malfunctioning slats, lack of fuel crossfeed, etc). The Gloster design may have been easier to adapt with its larger wing and easier potential internal fuel capacity (with functional slats, the Whirlwind likely could have done some good heavy lifting, but fuel capacity would have been a challenge unless perhaps they sacrificed drag, using chin mounted radiators and filled the wings with more fuel tanks in place of the embedded radiators)

Having Napier and Son focus on licensed Merlin or especially Griffon production likely would have made more sense and pursuing the Saber project. (or for that matter, licensed Peregrine production, and avoid the major overhead in Whirlwind redesign, just allow the Peregrine to properly mature as an engine adopting similar improvements to the Merlin while not disrupting Rolls Royce manufacturing efficiency by producing multiple engine types -that's the source of the '1 peregrine costs 2 merlins' context, not a matter of individual cost but loss of efficiency when not producing Merlins and ONLY Merlins) The Peregrine's problems are often exaggerated and likely could have matured in parallel with the Merlin with similar power and altitude performance relative to its smaller displacement. (ie likely upwards of 1100 HP next to the Merlin 45, and short of a 2-stage version, adopting the larger Merlin 45/XX series supercharge and 2-speed drive could have made for pretty decent high altitude performance on the smaller engine)


Or do both the Whirlwind and Gloster twin, with the latter focused more on maritime operations and ground attack with the advantage of more durable R-1830s. (ie a better performing, smaller, lower cost Beaufighter alternative)


Also remember Hawker owned Gloster and ... could/should have been building the likes of F.5/34 and F.9/37 variants in place of the obsolete Hurricane and troubled Typhoon. (and those Merlin XXs going to Hurricane IIs could have gone to bombers ... or the Spitfire III could have been brought to production -and also better matched the early Fw 190 at low altitudes thanks to 2-sped drive, especially with LF style clipped wings) Or, of course, the F.5/34 could have been adapted to Merlin XX power and ended up closer to a British P-40 but probably a fair bit lighter weight and consequently less underpowered. (similar excellent aileron control and roll rate though)

Canada could have been building F.5/37 variants rather than Hurricanes as well. (be it packard Merlin powered like their historical Hurricanes, or R-1830 powered) And would have been a good fit for CAC licensed production alongside their Wirraway. (or DAP alongside the Beaufort)


Hmm ... I suppose there's a rather heavy theme with my arguments: if you cancel something, you need something better to replace it. (either a matter of producing MORE of something else, or something better that was overlooked/abandoned entirely) There's relatively few cases where canceling something outright and replacing it with nothing (and pocketing the wasted resources) was all that useful.





pinsog said:


> If you want to ditch the P40 in the desert, why not replace it with a P39 that has a 20mm cannon in place of the 37mm, remove the wing guns and some of the armor and turn up the boost on the Allison so it can fight below 12,000 feet just like the Russians did. The Russians thought it was superior to the P40 and the Hurricane. In tests it was considered the equal of the Spitfire below 15,000 feet.


The P-40 was easier to fly and maintain, had a better bombload and better maximum range.

The P-39 (more so in some models) was a maintenance nightmare by comparison, had a more cramped cockpit (thanks in part due to the NACA redesign request dropping the originally larger canopy), and had dangerously sensitive CoG issues leading to irrecoverable flat spins when the aircraft was nose-light (ie improperly loaded or after expending some/all ammunition). Replacing the 37 mm cannon with a Hispano would make that issue a bit worse as well. (there may have been other solutions to those problems, but they required further modifications ... the NACA's rear-fuselage/tail lengthening of the XP-39 probably is partially at fault for shifting the CoG rearward as well) The Range issue might have been alleviated by fuel cells in place of the wing guns (and with the 20 mm in the nose, still would have been a competent fighter armament) but wouldn't address the maintenance or spin issues. (similar to the spin issues, the plane also liked to drop a wing at low speeds, complicating landing similar to the F4U and making the rather nice tricycle gear less of a boon to handling on takeoff/landing)


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## kool kitty89 (Apr 14, 2016)

GrauGeist said:


> If you're not going to build the aircraft for fear of the engines, then cancel it and continue on with the B-17 and B-24 (smaller aircraft).


A bomber optimized around the limitations of four R-2800s could have at least approached those new requirements while far exceeding the existing heavy bombers in production. (technically the R-2800C family had the take-off/emergency power to supplant the R-3350 directly ont he B-29, but would have left it too slow at economical cruise settings or too short ranged if using max continuous power -ie not lean mixture)

The only other 'foolproof' engine option would have been a full six R-2800s, definitely within power abilities even using the older B series, some obvious gains to drag over 4 engines, but probably not enough to break it, and definitely enough power at take-off and cruise to meet the full range of abilities the B-29 was expected to accomplish.









LisaM said:


> The issue was what could you get into production faster and was reliable. Centrifugal engines leveraged off existing supercharger knowledge and production abilities. For example, the RR Nene was a 5,000lb thrust engine that was more reliable and far in advance of any axial flow ones of the time (late '44).


Unfortunately, the compressor type used had little to nothing to do with the problems the Germans faced (centrifugal engines have other advantages, like shorter length, better spool up time, and lower weight, though, and Heinkel/Ohain had a rather novel method of sheet metal bladed compressors that avoided the high cost of machined centrifugal impellers like Rolls Royce/Whittle/GE/etc used, let alone their particularly expensive double-sided impeller arrangement).

The problems (like with British engines) were mostly limited to combustion stability and overheating issues. Whittle countered this with gradually improved combustion chamber design and brute-force super-alloys (the initial turbine alloys continued to fail until the super high nickle+chromium content Nimonic alloys were employed). BMW took a while to sort out their annular combustion chamber design, but ended up with an exceptionally long-lasting one made out of only mild steel while Jumo made more modest achievements in this with their 004D. (still much improved over the B)

The 004 was actually an extremely conservative engine design to the point of fault (hence its high weight and poor fuel consumption) aimed at being ready for mass production as soon as possible. This could have paid off if not for the critical issues of vibration the design suffered multiple times (both in the compressor and turbine sections). Part of this was putting so much work into the proof of concept (but impossible to mass produce) 004A. Had they at least used COMMON high temperature alloys (like tons of stainless steel, but not super proprietary stuff) they likely would have caught some of those turbine vibration problems sooner and been able to address them in a reasonable scale of time, making the conservative engineering actually pay off.

By comparison, Heinkel had 1 rather conservative engine (the HeS 8) that also was troubled by combustion stability and hot spot issues as well as relatively poor compressor efficiency (troubles working with the novel axial diffusor arrangement and relatively poor airflow routing through the annular combustion chamber) and one very advanced and elegant engine in the HeS 30 which was mostly slowed by the delay in moving Junkers personnel over from their previous location and them problems with Adolf Muler's arrogance and abrasive personality but it progressed well enough to catch up with competing developments and quite possibly could have reached production before the 004B had it not been canceled in 1942. (though honestly, the project should have stayed at Junkers and the combined Junkers Aircraft team -Wagner/Muler/others who left for Heinkel and Jumo engine team should have developed the two engines in parallel, sharing information and making the best of both worlds to hedge their bets -had both actually reached production at similar times, the Wagner/Muler engine would have produced the same thrust at roughly half the weight and half the frontal area while consuming less fuel and spooling up much faster but taken a bit more machine work to manufacture -the compressor blades had to be machined rather than stamped like the 004's could be, while the Wagner/HeS 30/006/etc Engine was probably still far cheaper than any british engine but a bit more labor intensive -and requiring high speed steel/carbide cutting tools increasingly in short supply- than the 004 or 003).

With the combustion problems involved (and large mass of stainless steel needed for the radial turbine) Ohain probably should have adopted flame cans and an axial turbine to further develop his centrifugal compressor schemes. (particularly borrowing from progress on the HeS 30) 

That said, the HeS 8 actually has an extremely impressive small frontal area and should have scaled up well to an engine more in the Goblin class (and much easier to engineer and manufacture than the HeS 011) so that axial diffusor did have at least some merit. (the post-war Fairchild J44 is an interesting counterpart to compare in that respect, among a few other super-slim single-stage Centrifugal engines) OTOH for a stop-gap, he really should have continued working with the very functional and less troublesome HeS3b and HeS6 and either refining them for reliable mass production (and Heinkel designing aircraft expressly around those engines limitations) and/or further scaling those engines up. (their frontal area was already much lower than Whittle's counterparts, and weight of the HeS-3b wasn't far off from the W.1's weight or thrust values either -the critical shift likely would have been air cooled turbine blades allowing higher power settings akin to Whittle's switch to nimonic blades). Abandoning all more advanced features (axial diffusor, 2-stage centrifugal or axial compressors, and possibly even sticking with the radial turbine -given it worked ... reliably enough for flight testing years ahead of Whittle or any other German engine) would have been the best option for Ohain/Hirth to focus on getting engines into mass production as soon as possible. (the HeS 6 was the best bet IMO, and directly scaled up variants thereof ... given the success it had in 1939 and the massive delays in everything else, it could have meant the He 280 -with corespondignly different engine mount configuration- flying nearly a year earlier and possibly reaching preproduction and operational testing status in 1941) It almost seems like sheer good luck that the primitive combustion chamber arrangement of the HeS 3 and 6 actually worked as well as it did, but equally understandable why Ohain had such trouble with the HeS 8. (the HeS 3 and 6 arranged long jets -almost like blow torches or blow lamps- in a ring inside a big open chamber OUTSIDE the compressor and turbine disks, the diffusor was folded forward and packed in front of the compressor with outlets to the flame jets more or less in line with the compressor hub itself, thus giving the distance between the compressor hub and turbine inlet for combustion to progress with little/no drag or containment and then smoothly flow the exhaust gases inwards towards the radial turbine though a ring of radial stator blades; the HeS 8 used a contorted cramped arrangement that didn't allow such linear airflow around the engine but instead forced it into a much narrower area between the two compressor disks, also increasing engine weight due to the longer shaft between rotors)

See: 
_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z_RSHrGKyDg_


The initial versions also relied on vaporized fuel jets, require starting/warmup on hydrogen before shifting to gasoline/kerosene (very much in common with warmpup periods for blow lamps), though I'd expect use of ether and/or methanol would have worked as well due to the ease of vaporization and lack of smoke. (soot would clock the injectors if kerosene was injected prematurely) I'm slightly surprised Heinkel didn't just run his initial flight tests with methanol or ether, or focused so much on hydrogen for proof of concept but transitioned straight to smokey petrol/kerosene type fuels. (admittedly, pulse jets might have worked better with methanol and/or ether as well -diethyl ether also has a much closer energy density to gasoline or kerosene, vs methanol which is only about half or slightly less on a weight for weight basis -a big deal when in the air and every ounce counts) Ether would have made a good alternative fuel to promote to the RLM as well ... though not as appealing as diesel/kerosene (already in wide use) it nevertheless had other advantages in cost/production. (if nothing else it would have been a reasonable starter-fluid for such jets with vaporizing burners and possibly less corrosive than methanol, but also more of a health and fire risk to the ground crew -nowhere near that of rocket fuel though)

Fuel atomization was the ideal solution, but problematic to achieve. (all engines suffered from this, and Whittle didn't get it working right until Shell Oil's patented atomized burner was implemented) Jumo 004s (at least early models) had to be started with gasoline (or similarly volatile fuels) to aid start-up as diesel or J2 jet fuel wouldn't atomize well when cold.




> Metrovick had their own problems: "However, the F.2 engine suffered from a number of problems that cast doubts on its reliability. These were primarily due to hot spots building up on the turbine bearing and combustion chamber."..... as did later prototypes. The trouble with developing a totally new technology.


Also not a problem with the compressor (for the most part) but the same bottleneck as Whittle and Halford and ... all engines really: combustion and overheating. Metrovick solved it with a similar combination of tricks that Whittle and Halfor did: better turbine alloys and better combustion chambers in more foolproof external flame cans rather than an annular chamber.

That resulted in the reliable (and more powerful) F.2/3 of 1943 with 2700 lbf thrust (equivalent to the goblin I at production level thrust -or late prototype testing as the Vampire and XP-80 used). There was simply a lack of interest in pressing that design into mass production (I haven't seen definitive cost analysis comparisons to the Welland or Derwent -which were rather expensive engines too- but the realistic concerns may have been more to do with quality control and service maintenance with the relatively complex component-heavy Metrovick engines). So rather than readying that successful design for mass production, they simply moved onto the larger, more powerful F.2/4 along with turbofan and propfan arrangements. (which were all even more complex and less attractive for production than the earlier F.2/3)

Do note that the Goblin, an engine decisively LESS complex and easier to manufacture/maintain also suffered delays to mass production entirely due to limited funding/interest (or rather, near complete lack of funding outside of De Havilland's own private efforts). The Goblin was probably the most rational and conservative gas turbine engine design of the war (aside from maybe Ohain's) and in spite of Halfor'd later start than PowerJets/Whittle, the rapid progress could have led to earlier production with decisive government backing of the engine (and Vampire project).

Also note the Goblin was larger and heavier for any given thrust value than the wartime Derwent or (especially) post-war Nene and Derwent V. The same goes for the scaled-up Ghost (same thrust but 38% higher weight and 17% larger frontal area than the Nene, while the Goblin 3 suffered from similar weight discrepancy to the Derwent V -relative to their respective 3300 and 3500 lbf thrust- but wider area gap going between the 43" Derwent and 50" goblin -a 35% increase in area). The Utilitarian nature of the Goblin and Ghost did lend to being very reliable, easier to maintain, and less complex to manufacture, but from a purely technical standpoint they were decisively inferior to their Rolls Royce counterparts.




LisaM said:


> The HS 280 was initialy in advance but their insistance of using thoir own, even more complicated, engines delayed it until it was cancelled. Might have been a contender/alternative IF the Germans had gone for a cetrifugal jet engine.
> The decision to go for the more complex (at the time) axial flwo killed their jet hopes, in fact it took until the early 50s that the west, with all their industrial might mastered the axial flow engine enough to match the centrifugal one.


Heinkel's engines were no more complicated/problematic than BMW or Jumo's (simplier in some ways, more complex in others) and were canceled well before their time and well before the He 280 was abandoned. (granted, the better of the two engines, the HeS 30 would have been an excellent fit for the Me 262 as well)

The He 280 was simply dropped due to being too limited in development potential than the Me 262 using the same engines. The ONLY engines being tested at the time better suited to the 280 than the 262 were the rather modest HeS 8 and even then it's somewhat arguable. (a particularly stripped-down Me 262 might have matched fairly well with ~1300 lbf thrust engines and been of greater use than the existing He 280 variations which were crippled by their limited fuel capacity -omitting fuel tankage, balast-armor, and some of the armament from the Me 262 should have been easier than redesigning the He 280 to carry more fuel -which would have made it heavier anyway)

The HeS 8 would have been a decent engine if it didn't hit so many unexpected delays (that its preceding HeS 3 and 6 did not) or had it been scaled up slightly ... still within Jumo 004 maximum diameter constraints. (the HeS 8 was trying to be a stand-in for the exceptionally compact HeS 30 and while still larger than that engine, managed to be smaller in frontal area than the 004, so a slightly larger original target size/weight could have made it more useful though still necessarily troubled by combustion problems due to the layout used -only way for Ohain to avoid that headache was sticking to the earlier HeS 6 directly and having Heinkel design an aircraft around 37-38" diameter engines ... engines that might realistically be mass produced by 1941, unlike all other options)



> The Mig-15 did not suffer one lttle bit by using its Nene based engine vs the US's in the Korean war after all.


Actually it did. The Mig did well as a short/medium range interceptor with its smaller size and weight combined with good thrust compensating for larger fuselage (and overall less refined design) compared to the Saber. The MiG 15 could have never performed the majority of the Saber's missions due to lack of range and payload capabilities and a larger aircraft able to do so (using the same engine) would have suffered performance penalties.

The P-80 compared to F-84 shows some similar aspects, if not more dramatic given the very streamlined fuselage of the F-84 and particularly heavy weight. (making its speed advantage over the P-80 in level flight, using similar thrust even more impressive, though its lower rate of climb and long take-off run were obvious signs of the lower thrust to weight ratio) The F-84 also had a slightly thinner wing, but of larger area, not too different from the F-86 vs MiG 15 wings. (of course the F-80C was much more competitive with the F-84's range than the MiG vs Saber)

The MiG is a bit closer to the Gloster Meteor Mk.IV or 8 as far as massive thrust to weight ratio overcoming relatively high drag is concerned.


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## Shortround6 (Apr 14, 2016)

GrauGeist said:


> If you're not going to build the aircraft for fear of the engines, then cancel it and continue on with the B-17 and B-24 (smaller aircraft).
> 
> The USAAC (USAAF) requested a step foreward in range and load and the B-29 was their choice. It happens that the XB-19 most likely would have been chosen over the B-29 had it not been for project delays.
> 
> Interestingly enough, the XB-19 used the V-3420, which is the same engine the XB-39 (B-29 backup) used.



XB-19 pre-dates the B-29 by a number of years, The order was placed in Oct of 1935, the mock up inspected in March of 1936. Engine at the time was a 1600hp version of the V-3420. With increased defense spending the army actually got enough money to order a real airplane and Douglas went for the R-3350 engine even before that. Things had gotten so delayed that Douglas wanted out of the contract so their work force could concentrate on other projects (and Douglas was already loosing money on this project).
Army refused to cancel as they considered the XB-19 an engineering study that would gain knowledge for future projects , it was never a serous contender as a production aircraft. The state of the art in structural design had passed it by let alone aerodynamic knowledge. 
The XB-19 was re-engined with V-3410 engines of 2400hp after being handed over to the Army. 
The R-3350 engines in the XB-19 were a very early model that weighed around 300lbs less than the model that went in the production B-29s despite having a two speed supercharger instead of single speed (XB-19 didn't have turbos). Wright had gone back to the drawing board and built a new R-3350 that kept little more than the bore and stroke of the engines used in the B-19.


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## stona (Apr 14, 2016)

You must be wary of cancelling designs willy-nilly. This sort of concentration is what led to the He 177 debacle for the RLM. On the other hand, for rather complicated reasons, the British did not concentrate their designs for different types into one type, though there were plans from time to time to do so, like the 'ideal bomber' programme which thankfully came to nought.

An example for fighters. In April 1939 the deadline for Scheme F meant that individual firms lacked the capacity to fulfil the RAF's requirements. 900 single seat fighters were required under the scheme. Production of the Hurricane would not start until 1937 and Hawker was expected to produce just 600 aircraft by April 1939. The shortfall was made up with a completely different aircraft and 310 Supermarine Spitfires were ordered. This meant that Britain would go to war with two single seat fighters when, in a perfect world, resources would have been concentrated on one. Concentration, in 1936, would have eliminated the Spitfire and Britain would have gone to war without the better fighter and the only one with realistic long term development potential.

An example for bombers. In 1936 none of the three heavies, Stirling, Halifax, Manchester had flown. The Air Ministry wanted to concentrate on one type but was fearful of eliminating a better aircraft. Production groups were established for all three. Had the Air Ministry not placed quality over quantity, and at considerable expense, then the least promising of the three, the Manchester, would have been an early elimination leaving the British without their best bomber of the war in the Lancaster.

With hindsight we can see that some unpromising or even failed designs could have been safely cancelled. The men who wanted to ditch the Lancaster had no way of knowing it would develop into something very different.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Apr 14, 2016)

Canceling the F4F and building F2As would have been a big mistake. The F2A gets it's good reputation from the early _light _versions.
Granted navy requirements porked it up a bit more than was necessary but the F2A was a small plane without a lot of growth in it. It would have hit a wall pretty soon in development no matter what.
The F2A-3 was over 1000lbs heavier _empty _than the XF2A-1 and export 239. The wing gained 172lbs while the airframe as a whole gained 280lbs. This is, in part, due to the powerplant gaining 547lbs. Early planes used engines with direct drive (prop turned same speed as the crankshaft) and single speed superchargers. Later engines (the 1100-1200hp ones) had reduction gears and two speed blowers, they also got propellers about 15in bigger in diameter. Fixed equipment also went up.

An R-1830 with two speed supercharger (not two stage) was about 80-120lbs heavier than the R-1820 used in the F2A-3.

The F2A actually had a rather small wing. While it was 208 sq/ft gross it was only 178 sq. ft. net due to the fat fuselage. This compares to the P-39 with a 213 sq/ft wing gross and 197 sq/ft net. Wing area goes from 97.7% of the P-39 to an actual 90% of the P-39 wing. You can only add so much "stuff" before the wing loading climbs to unacceptable levels.

Given the .50cal MG dislike of being synchronized you have a firepower problem (although not a big one) with two guns in the cowl and a gun in each wing compared to 4 guns in the wings. you are down 6-8 bullets per second total from the wing mounted guns. Sort of like having 3 1/2 guns instead of 4.
Going to six guns is never going to be an option with the F2A.
Maintenance on the F2A could be a real pain in the A**. It used a one piece wing.






Replacing major wing parts was not easy. Note that the landing gear was in wing.


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## Shortround6 (Apr 14, 2016)

"The R-2800 would be the obvious stop-gap for the Centaurus production delays as well as potentially displacing the Saber in general use as a 2000 HP class engine. (import over licensing still likely made more sense, if not more so due to the newer design and more dire war-time situation in the UK. (the R-2600 may have also been a consideration for supplementing Hercules supply, but given the relatively trouble-free history of that engine -and the R-2600's own problems at times- it's not a significant example where such considerations would have developed into genuine necessity) The R-2800 also developed substantially more during war-time, compared to the R-1830, so any licensed production would have been constantly playing catch up (or stuck making older, less powerful models) in a far less efficient or useful capacity than R-1830 production might. (even sticking with one of the 1200 HP single-stage variants -like what the Aussies ended up building- would have been useful for most/all needs of such an engine, particularly with maritime use -plus even the 2-stage variants didn't have the level of mechanical differences as the R-2800 A vs B vs C series which were largely entirely new engines given the level of changes made)


The R-1830, aside from the obvious fit to the Beaufort (and potentially any other Taurus powered production aircraft) would have made perfect sense on Gloster's F.5/34 monoplane and F.9/37 twin. (both likely taking much less modification than a Merlin refit would -the only other really viable 1000+ HP class engine of the period, and of course would compete for production with other Merlin powered types)"

They tried using R-2800s as a stop gap for the Centaurus in the Warwick bombers. It was too small. They did use R-2800s in the Ventura medium bombers. 
Licensing is not always as easy it seems, for instance the British used forged cylinder heads in radial engines before the Americans did because the British couldn't make cast heads as well as the Americans could. Americans went to forged cylinder heads when the desired head designs could no longer be made economically with castings ( at an acceptable scrap rate). If you have to import or license the basic manufacturing technology in addition to the basic engine design things get a lot more complicated. 
Even P & W could only work on so many engines at one time and P & W had decided that not only was the R-1535 (Taurus equivalent) a lost cause for development but that R & D was better spent on the R-2800 and R-4360 than trying for souped up R-1830s. Late R-1830s got trickle down improvements from the R-2800 and hit 1350hp for take-off. Had anybody really wanted them P & W also had the R-2000 for transport use in 1942 and perhaps it could have been used in patrol bombers. 
The 1200hp two speed R-1830 engines went around 1450-1490lbs depending on exact model. While not prohibiting installation in some aircraft the smaller the aircraft the harder it is going to be to switch engines from a 1000-1100lb engine (Mercury), the 1300lb Taurus being a bit easier. A medium sized twin like the Beaufort being a little less sensitive to changes in weights and having the room to move things around to balance the engines. A Beaufort I was about 10,000lbs heavier loaded than a F.9/37 prototype. 
And you may not gain a whole lot. The 1200hp R-1830 2 speed engine was rated at 1050hp at 13,100ft at 2700rpm Military power in the few versions that offered such a rating. It had 1200hp at 4900ft in low gear.


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## stona (Apr 14, 2016)

As far as aero engine (and air frame) production in Britain was concerned, in 1938 it had come very much under government control. The huge investment in the firms and shadow industries by the government as the individual companies became reluctant, or simply refused, to invest anymore of their money gave the Air Ministry/Ministry of Aircraft Production this control. It was the MAP that told Gloster Aircraft that it would be building Hurricanes, not the parent company Hawker.
This resulted in the bulk of British wartime engine production being focused on just two engines. The concentration on the Rolls Royce Merlin (at the expense of the Exe, Vulture and soon Peregrine) and Bristol Hercules was possible, in a way that concentration on fewer air frames was not, as early as 1938/9. In April 1939 the Air Ministry asked Bristol and the shadow committee to erect two completely new factories to produce the as yet unproven Hercules engine. It was a sign of urgency as the war loomed that such a risk was accepted.
Incidentally Napier were only allowed to continue developing the Sabre because the Ministry was aware that the firm was on the point of pulling out of aero engine production altogether and, in Feeman's words, _"it was a most unhealthy position for the Air Ministry to be dependent substantially on two firms only." _With hindsight the Ministry made a mistake continuing the Sabre, but at the time more was at stake than just the technical promise of the engine itself. The contraction of the aero engine sector in the 1930s was a source of ongoing official anxiety and combined with the fundamental tenet that quality was maintained by competition, this is why Messrs Napier and their Sabre were saved.


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## Shortround6 (Apr 14, 2016)

The engine situation was blurry at best. While the Air Ministry may have wanted to save Napier they had no compunction about keeping Fairey and Alvis out. Armstrong-Siddeley had pretty much regulated themselves to 2nd tier without Air Ministry "help". Granted both Fairey and Alvis were more experimental shops than actual factories, and with a world wide empire standard engines make sense from a supply stand point rather than a multiplicity of overlapping types.
DeHavilland and Blackburn having the trainer market sewn up. 
Alvis had invested in a "factory" to build Gnome-Rhone engines but it's capacity was about 10-15 engines a week which is laughable considering future needs and points out that the vast differences in what a "factory" or company could actually make. Factory A not being interchangeable with factory B.
Alvis did do important work in subcontracting and repair during the war with much expanded facilities. But even 100 R-1800s a month wouldn't have done much to change things and then you need to find some firm/s to handle the work that Alvis did do.


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## stona (Apr 14, 2016)

Yes.
The structure of the groups was designed to allow Bristol's parent factory and Rolls Royce Derby (and to a limited extent RR Crewe which occupied a sort of intermediate position in the RR structure with no equivalent in the Bristol structure) to become, in Hive's words about Derby,_ "a huge development factory rather than a manufacturing plant."_ 
The shadow plants were built and designed for mass production using unskilled labour. This applies to the two Bristol shadow factories and Bristol Accrington and to the RR plant at Glasgow, Ford Manchester and of course Packard across the pond. The British shadows obviously didn't have the research and development capabilities, or staff, of the parent companies, though what Packard got up to I don't know. 

There were of course many other shadow factories producing components, the Air Ministry encouraged a minimum of 35% sub-contracting. Within a few miles of where I sit in Birmingham was a plant managed by Rover Aero producing engine parts for Bristol engines. It was previously a market garden and is now covered in the post war housing of Acock's Green!

Cheers

Steve


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## stona (May 13, 2016)

I was revisiting "The Wooden Sword - the untold story of the gliders in WWII" by Lawrence Wright, which is a brilliant and sometimes very funny account of just that, when I came across something the Defiant would have been good at, had the need arisen.






Cheers

Steve


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## Jugman (May 14, 2016)

The problem With the B-29 was NOT the fault of the R-3350 but, in fact, the engine nacelles. The cowling on the B-29 had very poor cooling characteristics and rather high drag. It was built up into a single unit that had to be removed as a single unit,This made any kind of maintenance task far more difficult than need be. All the "what ifs" that focus on changing the engines of the B-29 with a different model neglect this fact. It is not automatic the a different engine would bring a better installation with it.

Really the biggest problem the R-3350/B-29 faced is that it did not meet the deadline expectations of the bureaucrats and politicians at the top. Considering The hurried development schedule, the lack of proper flight testing etc. that the R-3350 went though it's really a wounder that the B-29 and R-3350 programs were not in far worse shape than they actually were.


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## FLYBOYJ (May 14, 2016)

Jugman said:


> The problem With the B-29 was NOT the fault of the R-3350 but, in fact, the engine nacelles. The cowling on the B-29 had very poor cooling characteristics and rather high drag. It was built up into a single unit that had to be removed as a single unit,This made any kind of maintenance task far more difficult than need be.


Many aircraft of the period (and into the post war years) featured a "QEC" nacelle where the engine was changed as a single unit. I've seen Fifi up close and briefly worked around P-2Vs many years ago (3350s in a QEC unit) and I don't see any maintenance task made more difficult by this. If you have specifics, I'd like to hear about them.

Some QECs for comparison.


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## FLYBOYJ (May 16, 2016)




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## GrauGeist (May 16, 2016)

Great shots, Joe and is a reminder that the airwar wasn't all about the pilots or their rides, but the guys behind the scenes keeping them in the air.

Perhaps not as glamorous, but just as important.

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## Jugman (May 16, 2016)

Let me clarify. Here is one Fifi's cowlings -from Dave Miller's Photobucket page-.
http://i377.photobucket.com/albums/oo219/b2924crewchief/IMG_3444.jpg
As can be seen the cowl ring and cowling frame is a single structure. Late war aircraft had a "split" cowl ring allowed the cowling to be removed with out taking the propeller off first. The removable side panels did not offer full access to cylinder rows. The nacelle access panels to accessory compartment were rather small as well. Dave's Photobucket page has a lot of great photos of Fifi. Dave Miller's Library


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## FLYBOYJ (May 16, 2016)

Jugman said:


> Let me clarify. Here is one Fifi's cowlings -from Dave Miller's Photobucket page-.
> http://i377.photobucket.com/albums/oo219/b2924crewchief/IMG_3444.jpg
> As can be seen the cowl ring and cowling frame is a single structure. Late war aircraft had a "split" cowl ring allowed the cowling to be removed with out taking the propeller off first. The removable side panels did not offer full access to cylinder rows. The nacelle access panels to accessory compartment were rather small as well. Dave's Photobucket page has a lot of great photos of Fifi. Dave Miller's Library



I see nothing there no worse or no better than about a half of dozen other QEC radials I've been around, and all this had little to do with the B-29 having a QEC. The one photo I showed had a guy with half his torso inside the side panel. QECs actually made maintenance easier as everything was basically ready to bolt on once one engine was removed. Granted, the one piece cowl was a bad idea. Your original statement about the B-29 QEC "this made any kind of maintenance task far more difficult than need be" is very far reaching and would be more dependent of the the "configuration" of the QEC rather than a QEC itself. You also have to consider *what kind of maintenance you're talking about *(preflight inspections, changing spark plugs, inspecting or adjusting rocker arms, timing mags, etc., etc., etc.....


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## pinehilljoe (May 20, 2016)

Its hard not to decide without the use of hind sight. Thankfully the US had the resources to produce 10s of thousands of planes and still spend money on what would turn out to be dead end projects. In the heat of war who knew which design would be classic and which would be a dud. 

The one "what if" I like to think of is if the USN had put more funding into the Corsair and had it in production to be in the Fleet in time for Midway. First flight in May 1940, put more money into development and what if the Corsair were deployed on Carriers in time for the Midway and the Early Soloman's Carrier Battles.


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## Greyman (Jun 7, 2016)

stona said:


> Obviously more investigation is required!



In reference to our self-sealing oil tank discussion on page 15:

_In reply to an enquiry dated 12 July 1943, a letter was sent to Air Ministry giving details of all known strikes on self-sealing oil tanks, together with remarks on the efficiency of the self-sealing covers. It was pointed out that operational experience gave little evidence to contradict the experimental results obtained at R.A.E. which showed that the self-sealing on an oil tank could rarely expected to be of value. There was considerable discussion with R.A.E. and M.A.P. on this matter, and when later it was felt that the saving in crude rubber, of which supply was critical, would be substantial, this section recommended the substitution of a crash proof felt covering in place of self-sealing cover. This was agreed and put into service.
_
- Operation Research in Bomber Command, Air Historical Branch, Air Ministry​

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## stona (Jun 7, 2016)

This is an illustration of the almost mundane work done by the various ORS. They concluded that it was simply not worth fitting self sealing oil tanks. The Pilot's Notes obviously contain an erroneous description of the 'crash proof' covering as 'self sealing'.
It also explains the discussion in 1943 at which the idea of self sealing oil tanks was mooted before the 'crash proof' compromise was finally arrived at.
Cheers
Steve


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## Greyman (Jun 7, 2016)

The May '44 Pilot's Notes might not necessarily be in error - as we have no concrete data on how quickly the 'self-sealing' oil tanks were changed over to 'crash-proof'. 

Even if the change at the factories was immediate it would take time for the majority of Lancasters, Halifaxes and Stirlings to have the new tank coverings.


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## stona (Jun 7, 2016)

I don't believe that they were ever self sealing. The discussion about the possibility wasn't until 1943, then Bomber Command's ORS and other bodies would have investigated before making recommendations, this was absolutely standard practice. That recommendation was that the use of materials to make the tanks self sealing, when there was little evidence to support the contention that this was even necessary, could not be justified. I don't have that report, I'd be surprised if it didn't mention the weight too, as just about every other one I've seen which might lead to the addition of equipment to a bomber does!
The tanks were to be made 'crash proof' rather than self sealing, though how exactly felt achieved this I don't know.

In flight fires, and the means of preventing or extinguishing them, exercised the minds of the scientists of Bomber Command's ORS throughout the war. In every case when an emergency/safety system was proposed a compromise was arrived at. These usually traded off weight, cost and other penalties, like delays in production as yet another modification was introduced, against the number of aircraft (and crew) which might be saved. Some hard choices were made. The Lancaster's forward escape hatch never did increase in size, despite pressure from the top (including Harris) that it should.

Returning to the original premise of this thread,in early 1943 a comparison of losses between the Lancaster and Halifax III was undertaken. This showed that in February and March of that year the Halifax suffered roughly 40% and 30% higher losses than the Lancaster. Given the lighter bomb lift of the Halifax the ORS stated that the_ "relative usefulness of these to aircraft may be given as 1:2.6"_
It was this that led to Harris' 'Top Secret and Personal' letter to Freeman (copies to the Secretary of State and Chief of Air Staff) in which he made the case to cancel the Halifax and manufacture more Lancasters. It wasn't a letter based on bias or opinion but hard statistics.
There are well known reasons why the Air Ministry persevered with the Halifax, understandable at the time, but it was a mistake. Fewer but more useful bombers, in the Lancaster, would have been a better decision and the Halifax should have gone. Unfortunately the men at the Ministry and in Parliament tended to look at the total numbers and feared a reduction in overall numbers of heavy bombers which would have been inevitable as production switched from Halifax to Lancaster.

Cheers

Steve


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## Greyman (Jun 7, 2016)

stona said:


> I don't believe that they were ever self sealing.



Every indication is that they were from the beginning. The ORS investigation and meeting you mentioned were about self-sealing tanks in service at the time.


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## stona (Jun 7, 2016)

Could be, at least reading your post above. I don't have access to any of my books at the moment. 
Why were they still described as 'self sealing' in the later pilot's notes? Maybe they never got properly edited. Anyone whose looked at similar documents for the successive marks of any aircraft will see how that can happen 
Cheers
Steve


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## Greyman (Jun 7, 2016)

stona said:


> Could be, at least reading your post above. I don't have access to any of my books at the moment.
> Why were they still described as 'self sealing' in the later pilot's notes? Maybe they never got properly edited. Anyone whose looked at similar documents for the successive marks of any aircraft will see how that can happen
> Cheers
> Steve



Entirely possible, or the modification ended up not being carried out, or not at an appreciable scale. I think Occam's Razor would point to the notes not getting the small edit.

Found another document (5 Dec '41) dealing with Lancaster II armour proposals and it specifies oil tanks have Semape self-sealing protection.


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## GrauGeist (Jun 7, 2016)

On page 152 of "The Science of Bombing: Operational Research in RAF Bomber Command" by Randall Thomas Wakelam, it covers the meeting by Dickens and Lovell with the staff of the Structural and Engineering Department of the RAE. During this meeting, they reviewed the issue of self-sealing oil and fuel tanks for the Lancaster, and the decision was made to test 100 Lancasters with the Bransom Tank system, which would, by the way, add 1,000 pounds to the aircraft.
On the subject of the Oil Tank, it was decided to apply armor plate as protection instead of self-sealing covers, because "the statistics that support the need was insignificant."


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## stona (Jun 7, 2016)

I've never been able to find out what a 'Bransom' tank actually was. It was bloody heavy! 
Subsequently it was decided that the inner wing fuel tanks were too big and should be sub divided, but I'm not sure that happened either. The large tanks meant that loss of fuel from one would reduce the aircraft's endurance to the point where it was unlikely to return home.

I've seen the report which recommends armour for the oil tanks but then there is the references to self sealing tanks and the mention of the self sealing material.
It is often difficult to establish which recommendations were in fact implemented from the minutes of the meetings or the ORS reports.

Cheers

Steve


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## Greyman (Jun 7, 2016)

My guess is the Bransom tank system is the system that added the fire extinguishing and inert gas equipment to each petrol tank. Though from what I can add up this would only come to about 600 lb.


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## stona (Jun 7, 2016)

The inert gas for the fuel tanks and Methyl Bromide extinguishers _for the engines _rather than tank bays weighed in at 500lb according to the minutes of a September 1943 meeting with the CEngO and other big wigs. It is reasonable to suppose that a similar system with extinguishers in the tank bays would be of similar weight, so 600lb does not seem unreasonable.
I think that the Bransom tank system may have included some armour.
Cheers
Steve


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## Greyman (Jun 7, 2016)

Numbers I come across (all estimates near as I can tell):
300 lb - nitrogen equipment for tanks
300 lb - methyl bromide equipment for tank bays
200 lb - methyl bromide equipment for engines


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## buffnut453 (Jun 7, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> Canceling the F4F and building F2As would have been a big mistake. The F2A gets it's good reputation from the early _light _versions.
> Granted navy requirements porked it up a bit more than was necessary but the F2A was a small plane without a lot of growth in it. It would have hit a wall pretty soon in development no matter what.
> The F2A-3 was over 1000lbs heavier _empty _than the XF2A-1 and export 239. The wing gained 172lbs while the airframe as a whole gained 280lbs. This is, in part, due to the powerplant gaining 547lbs. Early planes used engines with direct drive (prop turned same speed as the crankshaft) and single speed superchargers. Later engines (the 1100-1200hp ones) had reduction gears and two speed blowers, they also got propellers about 15in bigger in diameter. Fixed equipment also went up.
> 
> ...



I agree with your comments about growth potential in the F2A. A significant proportion of the weight increase in the later marks was due to installation of armour plating and self-sealing fuel tanks. Entirely agree that the F2A-3 was very much overweight but the -2 wasn't so bad, and in operation steps could be taken to reduce the weight depending on mission and role (as the Aussies did with their aircraft in Singapore). The F4F was clearly a better aircraft...but it had some opportunity to learn from the mistakes of it's slightly older Brewster competitor.

Regarding the one-piece wing, presumably that failing would also apply to other types of a similar construction methodology...like the P-40? Yes, I know it's not a Navy aircraft but the problems of battle damage repair in a combat zone aren't too terribly different.


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## stona (Jun 7, 2016)

Greyman said:


> Numbers I come across (all estimates near as I can tell):
> 300 lb - nitrogen equipment for tanks
> 300 lb - methyl bromide equipment for tank bays
> 200 lb - methyl bromide equipment for engines



That adds up perfectly with the numbers I have.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Jun 7, 2016)

buffnut453 said:


> Regarding the one-piece wing, presumably that failing would also apply to other types of a similar construction methodology...like the P-40? Yes, I know it's not a Navy aircraft but the problems of battle damage repair in a combat zone aren't too terribly different.



Part of the repair problem with the F2A was that the original fuel tanks were built integral with the wing. Front and rear spars were the front and rear walls of the fuel tanks. On the P-40 the fuel tanks were separate components that could be dropped out of the wing structure. Fuel tanks fit in empty spaces between wheel wells. Fuel tank repair was easier. Not really easy as panels had to taken off to reach tanks but easier than F2A. 




P-40 wing, while often shipped in one piece, could be split in the middle. P-40 sat on top of the wing or at worst, wing was recessed into the bottom. F2A was a mid wing plane with a one piece wing. 






You need a couple of extra feet of height to get the fuselage off the wing. Not impossible, just a bigger pain in the ass.


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