# Battle of Gettysburg



## renrich (Mar 13, 2007)

Many historians believe that the Battle of Gettysburg in June-July, 1863, was the turning point in the War Between the States. It was the first battle that General Robert E Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia actually lost to the Union Army although the Union declared the battle at Antietam(we call it Sharpsburg) was a victory. Why did the South lose that battle and if they had won it would the US have sued for peace? I hope this is the correct form to start a new thread and that this has not already been discussed earlier.


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## Senator (Mar 13, 2007)

I believe that, as Historian James McPherson has stated, Lee suffered from the Chancellorsville syndrome. The attack on day 3, Pickett's Charge, crushed his army. Lee believed that his army could do anything. No Union commander had effectively battled him and he launched his army against an anvil. After that army crossed a mile of open ground under fire. It is very possible that the South would have sued for peace. Even if they had not the war would have gone on even longer leading to the U.S. to ask for peace later, from being war weary. The 1864 election may have led to George McClellan's election. At the risk of every Southern calling me dirty names, Lee should have listened to Longstreet.


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## syscom3 (Mar 13, 2007)

Just a quick post before I head to school....

The Confederate cavalry was galloping all over Pennsylvania without providing the necessary recon that Lee needed.

Another reason the South lost was for once, the North fought on the defense and Johnny Reb had to assault the fortifications.

And finally, the most inept of the Union generals in the Army of the Potomic had finally been sent packing and the compatent officers were in positions of authority.


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## renrich (Mar 14, 2007)

Good points all but what if Ewell had taken Culp's hill on the afternoon of the first day. Then the Army of Northern Viginia would not have had to try to take Cemetary Ridge on the third with Picket's division plus others. Do you think if Jackson had been alive and commanding the second corps they would have stopped without taking the high ground on Culps' hill? Actually, Syscom 3, The Union Army fought on the defense during all of the Seven Days, the Confederates were attacking during the last phase of Second Manassas and the Confederate Army was on the offensive at Sharpsburg and the Confederates attacked at Chancellorsville so in 1862 and 1863 in the east the Conferate army was attacking in all but one campaign, Fredricksburg. Do you think that if Longstreet had gotten wound up and attacked earlier in the day on the second day (before the Federals had a chance to fortify Little Round Top) Lee might have broken Meade's army?


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## renrich (Mar 14, 2007)

I don't think that the US would have agreed to an armistice even if the South had won the Gettysburg affair as long as Lincoln was president but I believe you are right that if McClellen had been elected in 1864 along with a victory by the South at Gettysburg there might have been meaningful negotiations between the North and south.


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## syscom3 (Mar 14, 2007)

The confederates were within minutes of smashing the Federal lines twice.

One of them was on the extreme Union left where some brilliant maneuvers by the troops from Maine smashed a confederate attack.

The second was just to the north of that position where the Minnesota regiment charged into an attacking wave of confederates (outnumbered 4 to 1) and stopped them cold, buying time for Hancock to plug the gaps in his line. The Minnesota Rgmt. Took 84% losses in this charge that took 4 minutes. Highest casualty rate of any regiment in the shortest time in western military history.

But, if the Confederate cavalry had kept close to Lee and appraised him of the Union movements, then the battle might have been different.


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## renrich (Mar 14, 2007)

Thank you syscom 3 for your remarks. Yes, the Maine troops on the extreme left of the Union line along with Pennsylvania just to their right kept us from taking Little Round Top but if Longstreet had started his attack earlier in the day as planned Little Round Top was not occupied and we may have flanked the union line and rolled them up like we did at Chancellorsville.


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## renrich (Mar 14, 2007)

I am not sure about those casualty numbers you quoted. My reference states that at Sharpsburg on Sept. 17, 1862, our boys in the First Texas, of Hood's Brigade, took 226 men into battle and lost 186 casualties for a casualty rate of 82.3 percent the" highest casualty rate for any regiment, North or South for a one-day battle during the war." Hood's Texas Brigade went into action that day with 854 and lost 560 killed, wounded and missing-a casualty rate of over 64 percent. When Lee that night asked Hood what had happened to his "splendid division." Hood answered. "where you sent them,sir; but few have straggled. They are lying on the field. My division has been wiped out." Bet you can't guess where I am from? I do remember those Minnesota boys you mentioned and the fine work they did. Just think what would be said today if we ever had casualty rates like that in an American army.


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## syscom3 (Mar 15, 2007)

Renrich, check this out. You will like this web site about the 1st Minnesota:



> Of the 262 men of the First Minnesota, only 47 remained unscathed. Eighty-two percent of the regiment was dead or injured. These were the highest battle casualties suffered by any Union regiment during the War.



The Story of The First Minnesota



> "Hancock got his five minutes, and at least ten minutes more, but at a terrible cost to the First Minnesota. Only about 50 men rallied around the colors on Cemetery Ridge. All the rest were killed, wounded, or missing at this time. Hancock declared, 'I can not speak too highly of this regiment and its commander in its attack as well as its subsequent advance against the enemy, in which it lost three-fourths of the officers and men engaged.' Later he told Senator Morton W. Wilkinson of Minnesota: 'I had no alternative but to order the regiment in... I saw that in someway five minutes must be gained or we were lost. It was fortunate that I found such a grand body of men as the 1st Minnesota. I knew they must lose heavily and it caused me pain to give the order for them to advance, but I would have done it if I had known every man would be killed. It was a sacrifice that must be made. The superb gallantry of these men saved our line from being broken.'"


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## timshatz (Mar 15, 2007)

Not so sure a victory at Gettysburg would've put the South that much further ahead. They had a lot of things riding against them.

-They were far from home with rickety (at best) supply lines. 
- There were very few battles in the Civil War where one side or another was wiped out. The Union troops would've fallen back. Maybe towards Baltimore (down the Emmitsburg Rd) or towards Chambersburg and Lee is faced with the same battle all over again. But this time the North is reinforced and the South is further North. Think of Sherman moving into Georgia and fighting towards Atlanta. 
- If Lee wins at Gettysburg, what then. He is in Union Territory, does he head for Pittsburgh? Talk about going really far from home. Does he head for Phila? Same problem. And to do both he has to ignore the Union Army. Strategically, a victory at Gettysburg almost gives Lee more problems than opportunities.

Lastly, the war wasn't won in the East, it was won in the West. It was Sherman and Grant, marching and burning their way through the South that proved the Confederacy only existed where their armies existed. Lee would have to take and hold Washington,attempting to force the Lincoln Government to negotiate with him. It didn't work in 1812 and it probably would not have worked in 1863.


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## renrich (Mar 15, 2007)

Good stuff Syscom3. The Union battery that was captured that day( the only one so captured) was captured by the Texas Brigade. Of course Longstreet's Corps was not his complete corps because Pickett was still on the road so Longstreet had only Hood and McLaws divisions. Sickles made a big mistake by moving down off of the ridge to the Peach Orchard and wheatfield and paid for it by having his command ruined. Timshatz, your point about no one achieving complete victory in a battle is well taken and probably is the reason that if Lee had won the battle, he couldn't have won the war. However, in spite of his long supply lines his army was living off the land, just as Sherman did in his march to the sea. If Lee had won and marched on Washington, there is no telling what the politicians in DC would have done. All the South wanted was a draw, not victory. The long chance that the war could have been ended in the East in the Summer of 1863 could have only happened because of the series of defeats the Army of Northern Virginia had inflicted on the Army of the Potomac and the resulting panic, pessimism and disaffection toward the war in Washington, KIND OF LIKE TODAY. Certainly would have saved a lot of lives since the Union casualty toll mounted once Lee went on the defensive in 1864.


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## renrich (Mar 15, 2007)

Timshatz, your observation about the Confederate's rickety supply lines was quite accurate. Even when our armies were fighting at home they had a difficult time feeding themselves and their animals. Part of that had to do with a poor railroad system but a lot of it was poor planning and administration. The South actually did a better job of arming it's armies than feeding them. And The South was an agrarian society to boot. Bearcats in a fight but couldn't be bothered about food and fodder. Speaking of fodder, Jackson's supply wagons during the Shenandoah campaign numbered 1500. Can you imagine how much space on a road would be taken up by 1500 wagons and teams?


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## syscom3 (Mar 15, 2007)

Even if the Lee had won the battle, it would still have been a bloodbath for everyone. Lee would have had to retire because his amry would have been spent and not in condition to fight on the offensive.

The political results for the Union would have been incalculable. This loss might have result in a negotiated settlement. But then, it might have been tempered with the north knowing that Grant had won Vicksburg and the Misssissippi was open.

I personally think that the Union was "due" for a victory and the best Lee could have hoped for was a stalemate, perhaps forcing the Union to retire to another defensive position.


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## renrich (Mar 15, 2007)

History supports your position, Syscom. Always fun to "what if" though. I have my copy of " The West Point Atlas of American Wars' out now and am "war gaming" away to see if I can find a way to win this battle. More later.


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## Emac44 (Mar 16, 2007)

What interesting threads and posts about Gettysburg Battle. Gentlemen I am impressed with your wealth of knowledge on the subject of American Civil War and the politics attached. Yes I agree the WHAT IFs are an amazing concept to speculate on. I hope you don't mind me asking question every now and again. Your Civil War fascinates me at times


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## syscom3 (Mar 16, 2007)

renrich said:


> History supports your position, Syscom. Always fun to "what if" though. I have my copy of " The West Point Atlas of American Wars' out now and am "war gaming" away to see if I can find a way to win this battle. More later.



Remember that the Union had a excellent supply "train" and could outlast Lee logistics wise.

After day 3, I dont think the confederate cavalry could have effected the outcome as the Union cavalry was in force and could counter any screens.


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## timshatz (Mar 16, 2007)

The Union's supply train was excellent, as SYS notes. It was based on the Railroad and Sea movement. The Union could repair and, in some cases, lay an (ungraded) railroad in a short time. The South could never come close to equaling, much less surpassing, this ability. This highlights the problems Lee would've faced if he had won at Gettysburg. Every step he moved further into Union territory led him farther from his base without adequate means of contact with that base. Meanwhile, the Union troops were falling back on their Railheads. The same problem occured in WW1, but to a far greater extent due to the size of the armies involved. 

Lee's Army could not conquer and hold territory. It lacked the industrial and manpower resources to hold territory. Both "invasions" into the North were more like raids than true invasions. If the North really wanted to go somewhere and stay there, they could. Once the incompetent generals were moved out of the way and Grant took charge, that point was proven. 

That is the reason most of the war was fought on Southern Territory. The South lacked the means to do it in the north. They could annoy and disrupt the North, but they could not conquer it. It simply lacked the resources.

But the South did not fight a war of conquest, it fought to stay intact as it was. In short, it fought a Revolution to stay the same. It was a goal that was in oposition to itself.


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## syscom3 (Mar 16, 2007)

Emac44 said:


> What interesting threads and posts about Gettysburg Battle. Gentlemen I am impressed with your wealth of knowledge on the subject of American Civil War and the politics attached. Yes I agree the WHAT IFs are an amazing concept to speculate on. I hope you don't mind me asking question every now and again. Your Civil War fascinates me at times



Thanks emac. You're always welcome to ask questions or provide your opinion on the matter.


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## renrich (Mar 16, 2007)

My goodness, Emac, you are most welcome to join in this "fun" we are having. As you can see, I am outnumbered by these two gentlemen in this discussion so if you can offer any help, I would be grateful. However, Lee was almost always the underdog and he managed to prevail on several occasions and us Texans as at Bexar, the Alamo, Goliad and the San Jacinto were heavily outnumbered and we managed to come out on top so I am not disheartened and I know that if our boys can just defeat those people at Gettysburg then the will of the Yankee politicians will be broken and we can negotiate a fair settlement just as Washington did by winning at Yorktown when the other British armies had not been defeated. All kidding aside, I believe that if Stuart had kept Lee apprised of the Union army's dispositions or if Ewell had taken Culp's Hill the first day, the battle would have had a different outcome. Likewise, on the second day, if Longstreet had attacked at eleven in the AM instead of three PM ,Little Round Top would have been unfortified, we would have gotten guns on that hill with a clear field of fire and had the Union lines in enfilade and Picketts Charge would never have taken place.


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## Emac44 (Mar 16, 2007)

Thanks as I said I find your Civil war very interesting. One question I do have. Most battles elsewhere had the same name etc Why at stages were battles known as different names in the Civil War. You have for example Bull Run battles yet it was known as Mannassas Junction as well. Or Sharpsburg is another example. I have never been really clear on that issue. 

Unfortunately Renrich I have to plead as being a neutral observer much like British Army Officers were at Gettysburg.

I have to admit though Southern Commanders had exceptional talent in battle. For example Robert E Lee and it seems to me he had the exceptional ability to gather around him good officers of the calibre of Longstreet and Ewell for examples but not only that he was admired by his own troops as a Commander. Totally different from example like McCelland who was self absorbed and Burnside etc. Lee had the ability no question about it that was lacking in some Northern Commanders greatly. Until such a time when Grant and Sherman came to the fore and it changed dramatically in another direction for the North


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## mkloby (Mar 16, 2007)

Emac44 said:


> Thanks as I said I find your Civil war very interesting. One question I do have. Most battles elsewhere had the same name etc Why at stages were battles known as different names in the Civil War. You have for example Bull Run battles yet it was known as Mannassas Junction as well. Or Sharpsburg is another example. I have never been really clear on that issue.
> 
> Unfortunately Renrich I have to plead as being a neutral observer much like British Army Officers were at Gettysburg.
> 
> I have to admit though Southern Commanders had exceptional talent in battle. For example Robert E Lee and it seems to me he had the exceptional ability to gather around him good officers of the calibre of Longstreet and Ewell for examples but not only that he was admired by his own troops as a Commander. Totally different from example like McCelland who was self absorbed and Burnside etc. Lee had the ability no question about it that was lacking in some Northern Commanders greatly. Until such a time when Grant and Sherman came to the fore and it changed dramatically in another direction for the North



Manassas is the nearby town, Bull Run was a nearby river.

You could talk about Lee's brilliance all day long, but he still ordered a charge against the Yank center. Of course it was smashed and the rebel offensive was over. Perhaps this whole excursion into the North was the south's only shot at a successful outcome to the war. As sys brought up, they hadn't an icicle's chance in hell of emerging victorious in a prolonged struggle due to their piss poor industry and infrastructure... not to mention lack of a notable navy.


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## Emac44 (Mar 16, 2007)

mkloby said:


> Manassas is the nearby town, Bull Run was a nearby river.
> 
> You could talk about Lee's brilliance all day long, but he still ordered a charge against the Yank center. Of course it was smashed and the rebel offensive was over. Perhaps this whole excursion into the North was the south's only shot at a successful outcome to the war. As sys brought up, they hadn't an icicle's chance in hell of emerging victorious in a prolonged struggle due to their piss poor industry and infrastructure... not to mention lack of a notable navy.



Of course Mkloby. And the logistics of such a campaign would doom any army to failure at the time. I know Lee was not always in favour with the Southern Govt or people as his nickname became Granny Lee at one time for being over cautious in some opinions of the day. But ordering the charge by Pickett was a complete disaster of the worse kind in charging a defensive position over 2 miles in open country with cannon and rifle looking down the throat of advancing troops exposed to withering fire used by the Union Army at Gettysburg and a strong defensive position the Union had at Gettysburg. And Stuart off galvanting around the country side and forgetting his Cavalary in enemy territory was the Eyes and Ears of the Army of the South and I am looking at this as an outsider. But definitely applying modern order of battle tactics today one would never be out of touch with your own recon forces as Lee had to endure. But that isn't excusing him one bit Mkloby of course. I feel Lee made a drastic mistake in allowing his opponets to choose the battle ground either by bad management or mistake he had never done before previously. And one mistake only Lee is accountable for in my opinion allowing the enemy to occupy Little Round Top and giving time to fortify the position for up to 4 hours. By refusing Longstreet the opportunity to occupy Little Round Top when no one was on it. Threw away a strategic advantage that defies logic. That would have comprimised Meades Flank and positions of Meades Army. I can not understand why Lee did not pursue this blatant ideal position. I suppose no one else can either

As for an adequate Navy to combat Scotts Anaconda Blockade of Southern Ports and Harbours that in my opinion only signified the lack of fore sight by the Southern Govt and guarantteed failure by the Confedarcy. One has to have control over ones own ports and harbours to bring in supplies and much needed goods for ones Military and Civilian Commerce to equip such an Army of the South. Seems many lessons from the Napoleonic War was forgotten by the South by sheer ignorance or maybe arrogance of some. As for the manufacturing aspect of the South was appalling. For example one Iron Works like Tredgar Foundary couldn't possibley equip the whole of the Confedarcy needs for arms and cannon. Not when it came to an industrial complexes like the North had in comparison that had over abundance of arms and cannon to spare. I have read many quotes from Southerners of the time prior to your Civil War that one Southerner could whip 10 Yankees etc. That by any means is bravado bordering on ignorance and such. but Bravado doesn't win wars. Men Equipment Provisions Supply and a myrid of other things do win battles not self indulged idealistic beliefs of ones own capabilities etc. 

One could even say the difference in Southern Cavalry compared to Northern Cavalary was different as for example early in the war when Stuart used his Cavalary to encircle and capture Union supplies etc was a spectacular feat. But later the Union Cavalary soon learnt to adapt and became the equal of the Southern Cavalary if not more so later in the war. Once again Mkloby this is just my opinion as an outsider looking in. I am sorry Renrich but I have to call it as I see it historically speaking of course. But the benefit of being a neutral observer is this I can be devils advocate and equally score against both sides of the Civil War Scenerio in this debate. for example the North had the logistics they had the manufacturing they had the equipment and they definitely had the edge on man power. Yet the Army of the Potomac had a series of piss poor Commanders And unfortunately an army needs effective command just as much as they need everything else to make an effective army. Until Grant emerged and changed that to a greater degree Mkloby. I hope you see I am trying to be fair for the sake of the debate gentlemen


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## mkloby (Mar 16, 2007)

I agree with just about everything that you said, Emac. The southern insurrection was doomed from the first shots at Fort Sumter. I'm guessing here that the Confederate gov't mentality was similar to that of the Japanese gov't in WWII (well some of the sane ones, such as Yamamoto). Namely, acknowledging a sharp inferiority in terms of US manpower and materiel, yet the strategy was to inflict such losses on Uncle Sam that the US gov't would sue for peace, settling for terms allowing them to maintain most, if not all, of the territory seized.


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## syscom3 (Mar 16, 2007)

MK, there were more than a few southerners who thought that one southern soldier could whip ten yankee's (and vice versa).

Emac, a bit of background for you on why the Northen generals in east were so bad and the ones in the west were so good.

In the prewar years, the best "fighting" generals that were sympathetic to the north were the ones who usually disdained politics and beuracracy. They ended up honing their war skills on the frontier where they settled prior to the outbreak hostilities. They were kept out there by command. The political ones ended up with commissions and remained near Washington and were more suited to fighting the political battles (or were well versed in engineering and logistics) rather than leading troops into battle.

End result was the fighting generals were in the west, and the political generals were in the east.


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## mkloby (Mar 17, 2007)

syscom3 said:


> MK, there were more than a few southerners who thought that one southern soldier could whip ten yankee's (and vice versa).



I'm a little unsure of where you are going with that one? Emac made a comment about reading items stating such. I think perhaps it was the southern way of life that made southerners more "natural" soldiers. I've noticed that to be true in my career. Activities such as shooting, land navigation, tracking, and general "outdoorsmanship" are often already familiar to them, whereas us guys from the northeast are getting our cherries popped with many of these same things.

Pride aside, I do not believe that any rational mind could think that the south had much of a fighting chance of securing it's independence. I really think the only chance of success was in the instance that I stated above, unless God answered their prayers and the British joined the fray.


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## Emac44 (Mar 17, 2007)

Or the Confedarcy was recognised Internationally in part as a new Nation Mk. Yes it may have been that very thing Mk that Southerners were more accustomed to the out door life then their Northern counterpart. And Sys I do recognised what you said but bare in mind quiet a few Southern Officers were in the same frontier regions as well as their Northern Officer bretheren. But I think Southern Officers had more of the common touch in commanding troops as well more accessable to the men they commanded which Northern Officers who had been in the west with their Southern Brother Officers had as well. Definitely different to the Political appointed officers who had all the personality traits of a dead fish who were more likely to think only of themselves their careers and who and which political hack to endorse etc. I would definitely say Sys those Officers who had served in the west either from the North or the South had a rapport with their men whom they commanded which in battle is very important. Build up of trust between the ranks. It works for Australian Military very much so even today Sys. You have Officers NCOs and Other Ranks etc, but a rapport between ranks exsists which makes Australian Soldiers unique in a way because we do not make it a class thing like the English use to do before WW1 and WW2

However that is getting of the point. those political appointed Officers were about as useful as a cold cup of tea and were more like British officers who had gained their Coloncey or generalship due to some one they knew or due to Family connections. Wellington had a whole series of those types of Officers. During Spainish Campaign he soon got rid of them. Some were good others you wouldn't put in charge of a latrine detail. they had no idea about soldiering as then wearing their uniform at some social gathering and that is the impression I have of those Northern Political Appointed Officers Sys and there were a whole cadre of them to select. But the South had its share of them too but they were side stepped not sure why possibley their ideas just didn't jell with other Southerners i suspect Sys who had some intelligence were it counted. 

I remember reading about the Officer who was in charge of Northern Ordinance and Supply. At moment I can not recall his name who vetoed some brilliant ideas for weapons like the repeating rifle which he claimed wasted to much ammunition and the muskets the Army had were sufficient enough for the Army. But to be fair there were some really strange ideas put forward by some lunatic inventors at the time so any new invention was put in the same catergory by this Officer good bad or indifferent. North may have had good logistics at most times but North also had some real issues of war profiteering by individuals who dumped any piece of crap on the Army as well Sys that found its way onto the battle field. Any thing from uniforms to boots Sys poorly made and due to fall apart within a few days of issue and I remember reading some cast cannons had been poorly cast originally and were so badly made they were more dangerous to the gunners then the enemy. But the one Profiteer above all was General Butler who traded coffee and supplies for cotton and tobacco and other contraband with Southerners. A real financial trade exsisted with Butler and he wasn't above looting the odd home here and there earning the Nickname of Spoons Butler. Just because it was illegal didn't seem to deter Butler one bit Sys. Have to admit sys both sides had some real charactors come to the fore during your Civil War. Some were brilliant Officers and administrators had cofidence and the ability to command others on the other hand well lets say kindly of them you would not put them in charge of pigs let alone command in battle


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## Emac44 (Mar 17, 2007)

And I forgot one thing early in the Civil War about the Southern /Yankee whipping thing. Some Southerns decided to bring their personal body slave with them to serve in the Army etc. Sort of like the idea that some British Officers did similar thing during earlier Wars in European Wars bringing their man servant with them. Kind of laid the myth of Southern Superiority to the ridiculous extreme. Fortunately those who brought those slaves with them into Southern Encampments appeared to have disappeared. It makes for bizzare reading to imagine a Slave standing picket whilst the Master was having a snooze in the tent. But I suppose that is one of the bizzare elements of the slave debate at the time. But the one thing I have to mention was the Negro Regiments raised in the North. One in particular the 54th Negro Regiment performed well and was near wiped out attacking Fort Wagner near Charleston. Not only was the 54th had the added problem if captured men would be returned to slavery but White Officers would be hanged by the Southern Govt under Insurrection Laws pertaining to Negro Uprisings in the South. But the Men of the 54th had to endure racial prejudices from officialdon in the Union Army as well which in itself caused problems for the Men of the 54th. But here is the strange part the South tried to raise similar Negro Forces or had Negroes preparing fortifications for the Confedarate Army. some how I can't imagine that would have worked considering if the South had won by some miracle or the War came to a draw when either sided sued for peace that the Negroes in the South would have been totally infused about the idea of a Southern Victory or a Negoiated Peace if it meant they were to remain slaves even after Lincoln's Procolamtion on Slavery was announced. I am sorry if I have mentioned the issue of Slavery but it was part of your Civil War in certain aspects. Trouble was the North prided itself on in parts of being Anti Slave but in other parts it was just as rotten to the core with its own prejudices as the South was in parts. Yet many a Southerner never even considered owning a slave or thought Slavery was doomed eventually any way. One of those qualities of both sides in the Civil War I find intriguing and very much interesting


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## timshatz (Mar 17, 2007)

The South tended to name their battles after the town closest to the fight, the North named them after the water course closest. 

As for the one southerner can whip 10 yankees thing, that one deserves space in the "the japanese can't fly because they were carried on their mother's backs as babies" or "the French will slaugther the Pumpernickels cause the Germans can't do anything but brew beer and wear leather pants" or "the Australians are uncouth drunks who will never be organized into a fighting force".

Those didn't pan out either.


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## mkloby (Mar 17, 2007)

Emac - I think that even if they were recognized internationally as an independent state, it still wouldn't have done them any good initially. Union warships blockaded southern ports and prevented free trade. It would have been a political boon, but that in and of itself would not have prevented Billy Yank from overrunning the south. The whole of the mississippi was in federal hands by 1863, and the southern campaign in the west in general was a complete failure. The only area they ever acheived much success in was the eastern against the Army of the Potomac.

Southern pride and bravado was just not enough.


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## renrich (Mar 17, 2007)

Actually the men in the 54th were practically all free men from up north. Almost none were ex-slaves contrary to the movie, "Glory" which otherwise was an excellent and seemingly authentic movie. E-mac an earlier poster stated the the South tended to name battles after the closest town whereas the North named them after the closest sizable watercourse unless there was not one and then they used the name of the closest town as in Chancellorsville. Actually at Gettysburg Lee asked Longstreet to attack the second day as soon as practicable but Longstreet dallied until late in the day. Hood particularly wanted to swing around to the right and take Meade in the flank. Hood had sent two Texans to scout around the Union left flank and found that to the right of Big Round Top the union flank was open. Longstreet did not want to attack at all but rather to take the whole army, disengage and place it athwart the Union army's route back to Washington and force them to attack where the Confederates had chosen the ground. Longstreet told Hood that Lee had ordered the attack up the Emmitsburg Road (which he mistakenly thought would carry around the Union left flank) and furthermore it was too late to try to get around Big Round Top.


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## renrich (Mar 17, 2007)

Unfortunately for the South, because of the late start for the attack, just as Hood was smashing Sickle's left flank and overrunning the Devil's Den, General Warren, the Army of the Potomac's chief engineer found the Little Round Top with only a signal unit present and he ordered two V Corps brigades and a battery onto it's summit. They got there just before Hood's men did. Actually Hood went down early in the attack. A shell fragment struck his left arm and shattered it from bicep to wrist so his division was leaderless the rest of the day.


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## Emac44 (Mar 17, 2007)

renrich said:


> Actually the men in the 54th were practically all free men from up north. Almost none were ex-slaves contrary to the movie, "Glory" which otherwise was an excellent and seemingly authentic movie. E-mac an earlier poster stated the the South tended to name battles after the closest town whereas the North named them after the closest sizable watercourse unless there was not one and then they used the name of the closest town as in Chancellorsville. Actually at Gettysburg Lee asked Longstreet to attack the second day as soon as practicable but Longstreet dallied until late in the day. Hood particularly wanted to swing around to the right and take Meade in the flank. Hood had sent two Texans to scout around the Union left flank and found that to the right of Big Round Top the union flank was open. Longstreet did not want to attack at all but rather to take the whole army, disengage and place it athwart the Union army's route back to Washington and force them to attack where the Confederates had chosen the ground. Longstreet told Hood that Lee had ordered the attack up the Emmitsburg Road (which he mistakenly thought would carry around the Union left flank) and furthermore it was too late to try to get around Big Round Top.



I do realise that Renrich about Men of the 54th being mostly free born but not all were. However laws in the South came out that kind of put all Negroes Free or Former Slave were to be treated the same if captured under arms and the Officers were to be hanged etc. The significance for me came about with the South trying inducted Negroes as ancilliary units into the Southern Army which I find a bit strange to say the very least but that is getting off the point of Gettysburg


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## Emac44 (Mar 17, 2007)

renrich said:


> Unfortunately for the South, because of the late start for the attack, just as Hood was smashing Sickle's left flank and overrunning the Devil's Den, General Warren, the Army of the Potomac's chief engineer found the Little Round Top with only a signal unit present and he ordered two V Corps brigades and a battery onto it's summit. They got there just before Hood's men did. Actually Hood went down early in the attack. A shell fragment struck his left arm and shattered it from bicep to wrist so his division was leaderless the rest of the day.



However Longstreet as you claim failed to set any men onto Little Round Top and Hood unfortunately was too late . Which ever way you cut it Renrich was a fundaemental error that costs men their lives that could be ill afforded to be lost by the Confedearcy and Picket's charge was sheer lunacy against a well defended postion. But some how I feel Lee in all of this was like a dog with a bone. He could not tear himself away from the battle at Gettysburg and wanted to savour more success but with each passing moment it aluded him. He alone has to bare resonsibilty for such a failure Renrich which I feel it haunted him until the end of the war. Much like Picket who lost his divisions charging the Union Positions it effected Picket dramatically and emotionally and I dare say Lee had similar effects upon his personality. Meade on the other hand who was by far inferior to Lee had at least been given an opportunity presented to him by Lee. Either by Lee under estimating the situation or failure in communication of command at the worse possible time or by chance Meade had at least some commanding officers who siezed this opportunity at Gettysburg. But Lee for all intents and purposes out of character made mistakes Renrich by virtue of allowing the enemy to choose the ground and giving the enemy time to fortify such ground. Little Round Top being a classical error on Lee's part and failure to see it as such. Lee and his commanders though Renrich didn't make errors that greatly at other battles but they did at Gettysburg. I believe Gettysburg just proved one thing Renrich. Lee was human after all and not the Marble Man nickname he got at West Point. However I think Meade after Gettysburg may have been more aggressive as Lincoln wanted him to be in harassing Lee's Army after the battle. But I suppose in Meade's defence Army of the Potomac was in no better shape to pursue Lee after the battle then Lee's Army


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## timshatz (Mar 18, 2007)

I think it might be a bit of a distraction to consider this attack or that hill when dealing with the American Civil War. While an arguement can be made that such and such a hill being taken would've won the battle for the South/North, it misses the point that the war was a conflict of the Industrial Age fought with Napoleonic tactics. As noted, very few (if any, maybe Vicksburg, Fort Donelson or Nashville later in the war) battles resulted in one side or the other being wiped out. Beaten yes, but rarely destroyed. 

As long as the Industrial/Economic base of either side was intact, the war would go on. Only when there weren't enough bodies to put in the units, when the railroads (on either side) could no longer supply the armies and when the factories were destroyed would the war end. That is what happened when Sherman Marched to Atlanta. 

The war started as one of fluid action and tactics and ended up being a war of attrition. In that, it was a foretaste of the First World War.


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## syscom3 (Mar 18, 2007)

Part of this "what if" scenario is what would have happened in the day or two after a hypothetical canfederate assault on any one of three different Union positions.

Just because the Confederates took a position didn't mean they could hold it or exploit the situation.

The superior Union logistics was going to be felt and a withdrawal of Union forces to other defensible positions was a certeinty, and Lee had to have the forces and firepower to dislodge them.


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## renrich (Mar 18, 2007)

Off of the Gettysburg subject but even Nathan Bedford Forrest at Fort Pillow offered the Union commander the opportunity to surrender before the fort was taken by storm with the surety that all of the Union troops including the black troops of which about half the garrison was comprised, would be given full rights as POWs. However the Confederate government did take the position that any runaway slaves that were captured in a blue uniform would be returned to their "owners." Quite a number of the South's officers were in sympathy with the plight of the slaves, including Lee and Jackson. And obviously very few of the EM in the South's armies owned slaves since only about 10 per cent of the South's families were slave owners.


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## Emac44 (Mar 19, 2007)

renrich said:


> Off of the Gettysburg subject but even Nathan Bedford Forrest at Fort Pillow offered the Union commander the opportunity to surrender before the fort was taken by storm with the surety that all of the Union troops including the black troops of which about half the garrison was comprised, would be given full rights as POWs. However the Confederate government did take the position that any runaway slaves that were captured in a blue uniform would be returned to their "owners." Quite a number of the South's officers were in sympathy with the plight of the slaves, including Lee and Jackson. And obviously very few of the EM in the South's armies owned slaves since only about 10 per cent of the South's families were slave owners.



I can agree to that Renrich but the laws exsisted in the South about so called Runaway Slaves etc. Would all have had sympathy towards Negroes caught in Union Blue as Bedford had shown at Ft Pillow? Or taken the time to find out which Negro was free born or former slave who was in Union Blue?. Because I have read Renrich that War Crimes against Negro Soldiers did occur during your Civil War committed by Southerners. I know about the riots in New York due to the Draft and Negroes were hanged by rioters etc. I am sure with Sherman's Bummers War Crimes were committed by them too on Civilians. Don't worry I consider that a Crime too Renrich. you may observe at times Renrich I try and be fair or condemn either side as a devil's advocate in this debate.


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## plan_D (Mar 19, 2007)

This is all very interesting and it's been a pleasure to read. 

I have to say though that I am surprised you have all missed the most important aspects of war at that time, politics. 

After driving the Army of the Potomac back from Richmond in the Seven Days Battles (June 25 - July 1), Lee found confidence to drive into the Union at Cedar Mountain (August 9), Second Manassas (August 29 - 30), and Chantilly (September 1). These losses sent a shiver down the Congress spine and Democrats were calling on Lincoln to seek an armistice and peace negociations. 

These Confederate victories in North Virginia were replicated in Tennessee, as the eastern half of the state was recaptured, Kentucky was taken and the capital Frankfort was captured. As the Northern morale began to collapse peace talks seemed more and more favourable. Lee saw this and invaded Maryland with his exhausted army.

What was more important here was the politics across the Atlantic. If the Confederates had won at Gettysburg; Great Britain and France would have stepped in. Some British polticians already wanted to recognise the CSA as a new nation, only the Prime Minister Palmerston and Foreign Minister Lord Russell advised caution. Even so, both Palmerston and Lord Russell accepted that another Confederate victory would lead Great Britain and France to propose a mediation on the basis of Confederate independance. If the Union refused Palmerston and Napoleon III were ready to recognise the CSA and defend its independace against the Union. 
The reason for this is simple; cotton. The Union blockade, as poor as it was stopping British blockade runners (18% in total), lowered the cotton trade to an unacceptable level for Europe. The French and British were all ready for stopping this and all they needed was one more Confederate victory.

If Gettysburg was won by the Confederates; the Royal Navy would have smashed the blockade to pieces. European supplies would have poured into the Southern States; the old railway of the South would have been improved; and thousands upon thousands of well-trained soldiers would have moved in. On top of that, all European supply of arms to the Union would have been halted. The U.S.A would have been split in two.


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## FLYBOYJ (Mar 19, 2007)

Test...


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## syscom3 (Mar 19, 2007)

PLan_D, the Emancipation Proclimation in 1862 made it impossible for the English to intervene. As long as the war was politically defined as a war against slavery, then the UK was going to stay on the sidelines. Maybe the French, but thats expected from a country of no morals.

As for smashing the blockade? Not in 1863 with the increasing number of monitors being able to sink wooden hulled merchant ships at will.

I dont see any scenario where Gen Lee could have exploited a victory at Gettysburg. One way or another it was going to be a bloodbath for both sides, and Lee simply didnt have the logistics or manpower to exploit a potential victory.

If there was one change in the Army of the Potomac in 1863 as opposed to 1862, it was now an army that was going to fight. If things were going to go bad at Gettysburg, Meade would have moved his forces around to new defensive positions. And as is true for any army of any nation ...."desperate times bring soldiers to fight in desperation". The Union forces were simply going to extract a lot of blood and material from Lee.

And then again, Gen Grant was completely unstoppable in the West. A Union loss at Gettysburg would just mean Grant would have been given command sooner than later.


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## timshatz (Mar 19, 2007)

syscom3 said:


> PLan_D, the Emancipation Proclimation in 1862 made it impossible for the English to intervene. As long as the war was politically defined as a war against slavery, then the UK was going to stay on the sidelines. QUOTE]
> 
> 
> Sys has it pretty neatly summerized. Foriegn countries weren't coming into this fight due to the Emmancipation Proclamation. Before the Proclamation, the argument that the South was fighting a war to be free of the North in the way the Colonies seperated from England. After it, there was no way anyone was going to get involved in a war to continue Slavery. That was the true brilliance of Lincoln. He changed a war to seperate the states into a war against Slavery.


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## renrich (Mar 19, 2007)

Before we stray too far afield from the main subject which is the battle at Gettysburg and could the South have won it and how, let us not get too entangled as to whether and how the South could have accomplished it's war aims. The mission that Lee hoped to accomplish by his invasion of Pennsylvania was twofold. One of it's goals was to move the conflict away from Northern Virginia for a while and relieve the civilian population of that region of the burdens of war. It was hoped that the Army of Northern Virginia could live off of the land while in Pennsylvania and they did, and lived well. The army was happy for a while and well fed. They paid for the food and fodder and were expected to behave in a civilised manner. The other goal was to get Hooker and his army out in the open( Meade had not taken over yet) administer a defeat and then negotiate with a war weary and apprehensive North. It was certainly not beyond reason that Lee could bring off another victory against the Army of the Potomac. He had proven that on several occasions. As Plan D pointed out the politics of the matter were playing a salient role at this time. As a matter of fact, when Hooker discovered that Lee and the bulk of the army were no longer in front of Richmond one of his plans of action was to start an offensive to take Richmond. He was overuled by Halleck and Lincoln and in fact the defenses of Washington were weakened by taking men from them and giving them to Hooker to give him even more superiority of numbers over Lee. I think another point to remember in this discussion is that warfare in that time was not primarily about taking and holding territory but mainly about destroying the foe's army. I think the South was not unreasonable to think that a decisive defeat and destruction of a portion of the Union army might bring about some good results. However, whether or not the war could have been "won" by a victory at Gettysburg is really a part of another thread.


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## timshatz (Mar 19, 2007)

The destruction of the opponents Army was an extension of Napoleonic tactics (line up and have at it guys). Lee was always looking to destroy the Army of the Potomic but did not look at the war making potential of the North as a viable target. Jackson understood it, but the Government of the South shied away from his vision of going North and destroying the factories. 

Lee was the last of the great "Old Style" Generals. A General of manuver. He could get inside the head's of his apponents and convince them they were beaten (even if the Army of the Potomic thought otherwise). When Grant showd up, he ran into a General who really didn't care what Lee did. He was going South. He took the initiative from Lee and never gave it back. Grant was the first of the "New Style" of Generals. These were guys that held onto the enemy and just kept at it, banging away with whatever they could get their hands on. They fought battles of attrition and usually won in the end. 

Lee wins Gettysburg. Sure. Could've happened several times. But he does not and can not destroy the Army of the Potomic. If he gets into the Union rear at Culp's Hill or Little Round Top, he has a force in the middle of a Union Army, disorganized and worn out. The Union Army falls back to Pipe Creek and the whole thing starts all over again but this time with the Union Army stronger (by virtue of being closer to it's bases and reinforcement) and the Army of Northern Virginia weaker (due to battle losses that can not be made up and greater distance to supply). 

The Lost Cause that Faulkner spoke about is a dream that still exists today. In truth, it is a fiction. At Gettysburg, everything was against him. Lee wanted Hooker (Meade) out in the open but in truth, he was the one who was out in the open. He was attacking established defensive lines held by veteran troops. He attacked those lines and pretty much wrecked his army. It is a tribute to the dedication of his men and the character of the man that they both went on after the fight. But that battle, coupled with Vicksburg was the begining of the end of the Confederacy. It was still a ways off, but it was definitely coming. 

In truth, I think Lee should've been fired after Gettysburg. It was not a well fought or imaginative battle plan. It was simply line up and have at it. For the man who was considered the master of tactics, it was really a poor showing.


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## renrich (Mar 19, 2007)

As for the order to execute any white officers serving with black units, that order was rapidly retracted. Back to the battle. It sounds as if emac said that Longstreet made a mistake by not taking Little Round Top. It was a mistake but not out of ignorance of it's importance. His division tried to take it but hard fighting by the Blues( once it was fortified) prevented him from taking it. The point being that if Longstreet had started his attack earlier rather than waiting for Law's Brigade to come up, the hill would have been unfortified and could have been taken without a struggle. Certainly the Union armies had the benefit of better logistical support but, in my opinion logistics were not of primary concern at this juncture. Lee's army was well fed and had plenty of food supplies for at least a few days. They also had plenty of ammunition and would capture more if they destroyed and routed a portion of Meade's army. This would have been similar to Second Manassas where Pope was routed and left Lee in possession of the battlefield.


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## renrich (Mar 19, 2007)

Certainly, if you wanted the war to be over quickly, you would have wanted Lee to be fired after Gettysburg. As a matter of fact Lee tried to resign after Gettysburg and Davis would not accept his resignation. Would you have fired Grant after Cold Harbor? I doubt it. Lee's true brilliance as a tactician and as a leader really shows after Gettysburg in 1864 and early 1865. His leadership at Wilderness, North Anna, Spotsylvania, Petersburg, etc kept the War going long past the time when it should have been over. We have a saying in Texas about great football coaches, "he can take his'n and beat your'n and take your'n and beat his'n." Lee was that kind of general. How long do you think the war would have lasted if Lee had been in command of the Army of the Potomac and McDowell or McClellen or Pope or Burnside or Hooker commanded the Army of Northern Virginia?


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## syscom3 (Mar 19, 2007)

Tim, I disagree with your assesment of Gen Grant. he was a brilliant "maneuverist" style of general when the strategy dictated it.

Do not forget the battle against Vicksburg was nothing but maneuvering all over Missisippi and (small parts of) Arkansas for a few months.

Plus, his maneuvering in Northen Virginia from the Wilderness ultimatly to Petersberg, was nothing but a series of left flanking attacks trying to turn Lee's corners.


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## renrich (Mar 19, 2007)

I apologise to youall who have contributed to this thread. I did not think that we were supposed to be discussing whether the outcome of the battle might have influenced the overall outcome of the war. Upon going back and reading the first post I realise that the question was asked that if the Union lost the battle would they have sued for peace. Pardon me! I thank you for such an informed and spirited discussion.


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## plan_D (Mar 20, 2007)

Do you want us to go through the discussion of the Royal Navy against the USN again, syscom? I don't have to remind everyone that the Royal Navy was larger, better trained and technically superior to the USN with bases in the Carribean, Cuba and Haiti. I understand Americans are very patrotic, but that would be a fight they could not win. 

In 1863, there were hardly any merchant ships attending Confederate ports anyway. It was all British run blockade runners, which the USN only stopped 18% of. But I don't deny history; this did reduce 95% of the cotton trade. 

The Emancipation Proclimation meant nothing, I am sorry to announce. In the first half of 1862, Napoleon III told his foreign minister "Ask the English government if it does not believe the time has come to recognise the South". At this time US Consul in Liverpool; "...we are in more danger of intervention than we have been at any previous period...They are all against us and would rejoice at our downfall." 

In October 1862, Chancellor of the exchequer says in a speech; "Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South have made an army; they are making, it appears, a navy; and they have made what is more than either; they have made a nation." 

Prime Minister Palmerston wrote to Lord Russell that Union "...got a complete smashing...and it seems not all together unlikely that still greater disasters await them, and that even Washington or Baltimore may fall into the hands of the Confederates. If this should happen, would it not be time for us to consider whether in such a state of things England and France might not address the contending parties and recommend an arrangment on the basis of separation?".

Lord Russell replied; "...with a view to the recognition of the Independence of the Confederates." If the North refused "...we ought ourselves to recognise the Southern States as an independent State." 

The English, French and Austrians were all ready to step in on the side of the Confederacy, Emancipation Proclamation or not.


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## timshatz (Mar 20, 2007)

syscom3 said:


> Tim, I disagree with your assesment of Gen Grant. he was a brilliant "maneuverist" style of general when the strategy dictated it.
> 
> Do not forget the battle against Vicksburg was nothing but maneuvering all over Missisippi and (small parts of) Arkansas for a few months.
> 
> Plus, his maneuvering in Northen Virginia from the Wilderness ultimatly to Petersberg, was nothing but a series of left flanking attacks trying to turn Lee's corners.



Sys, agree that Grant did an excellent job at Vicksburg. Same can be said at Fort Doneldson. Also, at Shiloh as well (thought he gets little credit for it). But I do not see Grant as a great (and I am a great fan of Grant) in his capability. I see Sherman as great/brilliant. He was head and shoulders above anybody else except maybe Forrest. 

Grant's greatest attribute was he was unbeatable. His was the type of war the Union could fight. As he put it when he went into the Wilderness, "I intend to fight along this line if it takes all summer". He did just that. He was a competent General who took advantage of what was given to him and used it very well. Plenty of people at the time thought of Grant as a butcher. Interestingly enough, Lee was not one of them. When someone mentioned something to that effect, Lee said, "I think General Grant has managed his affairs very well". Lee understood that Grant had taken away the initiative and would wear down his army to destruction just as he had others before him. 

But Grant was not brilliant. He did not have the vision of the ability of the Confederacy to wage war as being his target. He saw the armies as his target and was competent in his applications. 

Grants was, in the shortest terms, a tough SOB. He would take a pounding and come back again and again. Lose a fight today, move on and fight again tomorrow. I admire his character, his mental toughness and his ability to hide in a crowd. He fought the war in a very workmanlike way. No glory, no sweeping moves for benefit of battlefield strategy. Grant was driven by the need to find the enemy and destroy him. In that, he was a very deadly general.


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## timshatz (Mar 20, 2007)

renrich said:


> I apologise to youall who have contributed to this thread. I did not think that we were supposed to be discussing whether the outcome of the battle might have influenced the overall outcome of the war. Upon going back and reading the first post I realise that the question was asked that if the Union lost the battle would they have sued for peace. Pardon me! I thank you for such an informed and spirited discussion.



No worries dude, interesting thread no matter how it gets turned.


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## timshatz (Mar 20, 2007)

plan_D said:


> Do you want us to go through the discussion of the Royal Navy against the USN again, syscom? I don't have to remind everyone that the Royal Navy was larger, better trained and technically superior to the USN with bases in the Carribean, Cuba and Haiti. I understand Americans are very patrotic, but that would be a fight they could not win.
> 
> In 1863, there were hardly any merchant ships attending Confederate ports anyway. It was all British run blockade runners, which the USN only stopped 18% of. But I don't deny history; this did reduce 95% of the cotton trade.
> 
> ...




Plan D. Not so sure this one is a slam dunk. Couple of points to consider. 

Napoleon 3rd made his statement (going on your notes here) in early 1862. The Emancipation Proclimation was not made until late September of 1862. If the statement had been made in October or so of 1862, the point would be more valid. But I doubt the country that made the expression "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" would go to war to support a regime that existed on slavery. 

The same could be said of the British. Especially the British Navy. To have ships running up and down the coast of Africa on patrol for Slave ships while sending a Fleet of to fight for a regime that was slave based would've been directly contridictory to the policies of the Govt. Recognizing and aiding the Confederacy (openly, not secretly- an open one at that) would've gone against roughly 50 years of British Law and Policy. Keep in mind, England had outlawed Slavery in her country. Now, was it to go to war to support it in another? Unlikely.

As for the British Navy going to war against the US Navy, the math favors the British on the open seas, less so in coast US. The British Fleet was the power above all others in the 1800s when it came to naval matters. It was made for the open sea and to keep the trade routes open. Against that fleet, the US Navy would not be able to do much for long. The Brits had bases, shipe and qualified seamen. Strategic and tactical advantages, plus the fact that the US Navy was occupied with blockading the South, would've mean Union shipping would've been pretty much swept from the seas. 

However, in coastal waters, the advantage is less pronounced. In Union was building a fleet of iron clads based on the Monitor design. These ships weren't particularly good in the open ocean but worked well in close. A wooden hulled ship (of which the British Navy was primarily using) was less useful against such a vessel. Could the Brits break the blockade? Yes. Could they blockade northern ports? Probably not. But it definitely would've been an interesting fight.


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## plan_D (Mar 20, 2007)

Timshatz, you seem to forget here that the comments made by the British government were in October and beyond. It would be nice to imagine that the British were willing to take pride and allow the Union to win the war for what is right, but the British, French and Austro-Hungarian textile trade was suffering due to the Union blockade. 

The British government showed secret and public support for the Confederate cause of independance after their victories over the Army of Potomac. Europe wanted their cotton and even if it meant the U.S.A being split in two. 

I don't know if you're aware or not but the Royal Navy was using off-duty officers to run the blockade runners that supported the Confederates. It, in fact, goes against all sense to assume that Europe would not support a nation that still wanted slavery. As the European populace gave support to the Confederacy, the European powers provided weapons and, as I say, Royal Navy officers crewed the blockade runners. 

I must point out that slavery wasn't abolished in the British Empire until 1833; so at most Royal Navy fleets were not patrolling for 50 years before 1862 as far as I'm aware. 

On the naval conflict; this discussion has been had. 

I admire your realistion at the supremecy of the Royal Navy in the open seas. But I must point out that Britain had been using close blockades for centuries which required coastal vessels. The Royal Navy knew how to operate in coastal waters, and were not solely built and trained for the high seas. 

In the case of ironclads; these were easily dealt with. The Royal Navy had already produced superior weaponary - the HMS Warrior and HMS Black Prince. Both of which were iron-hulled ships whose armoured belts were impervious to any cannon at the time. Both were steam or sail powered and had a screw; which gave it a top reported speed of 17.5 knots. They out-gunned, out-armoured and out-matched anything, anyone could throw at them. 

In the event of a war between the U.S.N and Royal Navy; the blockade would be smashed comfortably. As the only options open to any US vessel against the might of iron hulls was to aim for the rudder or run away. Blockading the ports would have been harder, maybe, in the case of a close blockade. But the Royal Navy would have adopted a stance that had them further off. This would have swept any US fleet or merchantmen from the seas. 

The Royal Navy fleet combined with that of the French Navy would rendered the USN destroyed or worthless by keeping them in port.


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## syscom3 (Mar 20, 2007)

The monitors were of low profile and would have been very difficult to just sweep away contrary to what you think. 

You also think that the British people would rally to support a nation built on slavery and its practice? Ha! Think again, as the abolitionist's in Britain were strong and had the moral high ground. A British intervention to support the south would have been a political blunder of monumental proportions. The PM and Queen knew that and was in no mood to intervene. And even if Britain had decided to interven, it wouldnt have been untill sometime in the fall that they could do anything, all the while the Union scores more victories in the west and regroups.

And you are forgetting we are talking about July 1863. Even if Lee won Gettysburg, he would have been in no position to exploit it. Grant had just opened up the Misssissippi. Theres plenty of "what if's" for Grant to follow up his victory with a march through the southern states along the Gulf and eliminate a few important ports. And that is probably what would have happened had Gettysburg been a failure.


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## timshatz (Mar 20, 2007)

Plan D, the Brits outlawed the slave trade in 1807. Thereafter, they were the only country to really put any teeth into an Anti-Slavery patrol. I am not sure of the specifics of the patrol but I do know a sizeable number of ships were in it (from the British side) while the US committed only a token force (while supplying the majority of the slave runners that tried to avoid the squadrons). A link to some of the details of the story can be found in the following story from American Heritage Magazine:

AmericanHeritage.com / “Nil Disprandum”

Declaring the Emancipation Proclaimation irrelevent would've been going against close to 60 years of English Governmental policy. 

Regarding the affect of the Union blockade and it's ability to force the Europeans into the Civil War, that was one of the theories running around the South on how they could gain recognition. Called "King Cotton", it was believed that the Union blockade would force the factories in Europe into economic hardship and thereby bring the European powers (mostly Britian) into the war on the side of the South. It didn't happen. The factories in Europe did face some hardship but Cotton was supplied from other sources (mostly Egypt) and life went on. 

As far as the Moral stance on Slavery being an inhibitor to European intervention, I agree that most of Europe could probably have cared less what happened to Slaves in America. In truth, most Union people cared less as well. They were neither pro nor anti slavery. It simply didn't concern them. But like the Human Rights movement of today, the Abolitionists were loud in both England and the US. England going to war against the Union for the defacto support of slavery would be about the same as England going to war against Ethiopia today for the support of Somalia (Somalia in this case having some economic reason for a tie to England, which it doesn't but it is meant as a loose example).

As far as the two British Ironclads are concerned, I am sure they were excellent ships. But they were only two ships. The Confederacy had iron clads as well. More than two. In the end, they were swamped by the Union fleets. And I do not doubt the Royal Navy's prowless. But once such a war would've been declared, the trade routes for England (France and the Union) would've been open to attack as well from any number of threats. One only need look at the cruise of the CSS Alabama to see what one steam powered Frigate going on a raiding cruise and avoiding battle, can do. The Union had plenty of ships like that. Privateers operating from foriegn ports is another option.

Lastly, the Union Navy was not a "blue water" navy. It was a coastal and riverine force. The Monitor and others like her fought in the rivers and bays of the Continental US. A "brown water" force. The Royal Navy was the epitome of a "blue water" navy.


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## renrich (Mar 20, 2007)

The political situation in the North was the overiding factor as far as a victory at Gettysburg forcing the US government into negotiations with the CSA. The main concern of Lincoln and Halleck was to defeat Lee, at all costs. That was evidenced by their decision to deny Hooker the right to start an offensive against Richmond and by their weakening of the defenses of Washington in order to reinforce the Army of the Potomac. Because of the fragile political will and spirit in Washington it was imperative that Meade defeat Lee. Therefore, a failure of Meade to defeat Lee would have had severe political ramifications. That was what the CSA's strategy was based on. I believe that Lee realised that this was his last best chance to end the war. Short of breaking the will of the North to continue the war, the South had no chance. It was a long shot but still possible.I think that what ever the North could do with their armies in the west would not be a consideration if Lee had won at Gettysburg. In a situation, as I earlier pointed out, like Second Mannasas where Pope pulled back from the battlefield with his army defeated, he felt like he must preserve what remained of his army rather than stay and fight it out to the last man. He knew that Washington would be in hysterics if his army was destroyed. He stopped to fight on good ground at Chantilly and possibly was saved by a rainstorm. If Lee had ruined 5 or 6 of Meade's corps, Meade would have had to abandon the battlefield in order to preserve the rest of the army. Lee would have moved toward Washington. The morale of the CSA would have been sky high, the newspapers in the North would have been bordered in black and the politicians in Washington would been have fleeing the city. Lee would have not needed to invade Washington, much less occupy it. The CSA already had a note prepared to present to the US government and if negotiations were begun there would have been a truce declared and all hostilities would have ceased. Then, the attitudes of the governments in Europe would have played a role with even possibly Britain playing a role as a mediator. All of this is speculative, of course and a long shot but still possible. The situation today in the war on terrorism is very similar. The only way the US can lose the war is if we lack the will to win.


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## syscom3 (Mar 20, 2007)

Remember Renrich, your scenario depends on Lee NOT taking prohibitive loss's in his victory. An unlikely scenario.


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## davparlr (Mar 20, 2007)

syscom3 said:


> Tim, I disagree with your assesment of Gen Grant. he was a brilliant "maneuverist" style of general when the strategy dictated it.
> 
> Do not forget the battle against Vicksburg was nothing but maneuvering all over Missisippi and (small parts of) Arkansas for a few months.
> 
> Plus, his maneuvering in Northen Virginia from the Wilderness ultimatly to Petersberg, was nothing but a series of left flanking attacks trying to turn Lee's corners.



Grant’s strength was in his tenaciousness, not his tactical ability. I doubt that Grant was ever in a battle where he did not have significantly superior forces, weapons, and provisions available. In addition, as time went on, Grant’s losses were more than made up while his opponent’s losses were not. In these circumstances, he should win, and to his credit, he did (even with this advantage, he did lose battles). None of his predecessors could do this. At Vicksburg, while his raids into Mississippi were effective in freezing what small forces were available to aid Vicksburg, the battle was won by simple siege induced starvation. This was smart (but caused by lack of success in assaults), but not brilliant. In the Wilderness, as was mention earlier, Grant was just using flanking maneuvers. Lee easily anticipated this and effectively countered Grant’s move with a depleted army. The results of this effort was months of stalemate that was a precursor of WWI.

Grant was a bulldog and was successful at it. However, the price was paid by a lot of dead and wounded soldiers. Perhaps Grant’s method was the quickest way to win the war, perhaps there was a better way. We will never know.

As for Lee, surely he knew that the cause was lost as the house was falling in around him. If he had surrendered sooner, more lives would have been saved.

Now if the Union had the same mentality in their media as we have today, the South would now be it own nation. Can you imagine the reaction of the citizens on seeing the thousands of bodies that were a result of Bull Run, Fredericksburg, and the many other battles where Union force struggled? With our type of media, I would imagine that the Union would have agreed to succession long before the battle of Gettysburg ever happened.


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## davparlr (Mar 20, 2007)

timshatz said:


> Lee was the last of the great "Old Style" Generals. A General of manuver. He could get inside the head's of his apponents and convince them they were beaten (even if the Army of the Potomic thought otherwise). When Grant showd up, he ran into a General who really didn't care what Lee did. He was going South. He took the initiative from Lee and never gave it back. Grant was the first of the "New Style" of Generals. These were guys that held onto the enemy and just kept at it, banging away with whatever they could get their hands on. They fought battles of attrition and usually won in the end.



When you have more forces, better weapons, and more provisions, attrition is a no brainer type of victory and indeed is probably more Napoleanic than what Lee did. You only win a war of attrition when you have more resouces to loose. It takes far more flexibility, maneuver, and strategy to hold off a vastly superior enemy for over a year, the way Lee did.

The Civil War was a transistional war linking Napoleanic to the Modern (well at least to WWI). Lee was an advanced general in that he knew how to use both maneuver and battlefield fortifications. His maneuvers in the Wilderness, using a largely depleted army, effectively countered the much larger Union forces crude attemts at flanking, fighting it to a stalemate at Petersburg when, by all rights, it should have been crushed.


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## renrich (Mar 20, 2007)

The Army of Northern Virginia took heavy losses in every battle, even in victory. Some comparisons and these are KIA, WIA and MIA : Seven Days-Union,9796 CSA,19,739, Second Manassas-Union,10,096 CSA,9108, Sharpsburg-Union,11657 CSA,11724, Fredricksburg- Union,10884 CSA, 4656, Chancellorsville-Union,11,116 CSA, 10,746 Gettysburg-Union,17,684 CSA, 22,638. Remember, at Second Manassas, a victory, we had losses of 9108 which amounted to 18.8 per cent of our army. That was in August after the heavy losses in June during the Seven Days yet in September we marched into Maryland, took Harpers Ferry and fought McClellan's 90,000 to a draw with no more than 40,000 men on the field at Sharpsburg. Assuming that we did not do Pickett's charge and had ruined 3 or more Federal corps on that second day, Lee would have had around 55,000 men present for duty and a few thousand more showing up in a few days(stragglers) and would have had a formidable army.


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## syscom3 (Mar 20, 2007)

Some good points davprl.

However, you arent giving Grant credit for his maneuver strategy at various pints in the war.

Take Vicksburg for instance, the events leading up to the seige was nothing but manuevering in the countryside that managed to confuse the confederates, divide up their forces so as to defeat them in detail and finally to try everything possible prior to laying a seige on the city. he even attempted to dig a canal to divert the Misssissippi around the city so as to render the city strategically worthless.

You can sum up his generalship as this: From start to finish, he never lost a battle.


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## timshatz (Mar 20, 2007)

syscom3 said:


> You can sum up his generalship as this: From start to finish, he never lost a battle.



And he never stopped coming after you. That was his true strength. In a couple of battles, he was close to even with his opponent (I think but am not sure it was that way at Doneldson and at Cold Harbor, he had a numerical superiority but not by much). He just took the initative and kept going. 

In truth, he was a scary little guy to have after you. He never stopped, he never gave up and he would try just about anything. 

But, in a different line of thought. Anybody have any idea what a battle between Lee and Sherman would've looked like? Not the early Sherman, and not the late Lee. But when both were in their prime (Sherman in 1864 and Lee in the Spring of 1863). Lee has the services of Jackson and Longstreet. Sherman has Sheridan and Thomas. 

Any thoughts?


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## syscom3 (Mar 20, 2007)

timshatz said:


> .....Anybody have any idea what a battle between Lee and Sherman would've looked like? Not the early Sherman, and not the late Lee. But when both were in their prime (Sherman in 1864 and Lee in the Spring of 1863). Lee has the services of Jackson and Longstreet. Sherman has Sheridan and Thomas.
> 
> Any thoughts?



Sherman was another tenacious bulldog type of fighter. He wanted a win, and wasnt tied down by orthodoxy and tradition to get it.

He and Grant were of the same mold and same way of thinking. perhaps because they were in the same commands for so long.

Total war and total destruction of the opposing Army.


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## syscom3 (Mar 20, 2007)

Lets assume that Lee won Gettysburg, but was bled so hard doing it, he couldnt exploit the situation, allowing Meade to escape and regroup ready to block Lee's advances.

What should the Union do in the west? Send Grant eastwards to take Chatanooga? Or send him along the Gulf coast to take out the ports, and cut Florida off from the Confederacy?


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## Bernhart (Mar 20, 2007)

Have to mention Burfords part at beginning of the battle too, would have been a very different fight had he and the union Calvary units didn't hold up the confederates until more of the army showed up.


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## syscom3 (Mar 20, 2007)

Bernhart said:


> Have to mention Burfords part at beginning of the battle too, would have been a very different fight had he and the union Calvary units didn't hold up the confederates until more of the army showed up.




Good point.

It seems that lee's best chances were on Day 2 of the battle. If he was going to win, he had to do it on that day.


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## renrich (Mar 20, 2007)

Buford did a good job with two brigades of cavalry along with some guns holding off Harry Heth until Reynolds with I Corps and Howard with XI Corps could get on the field. Then Ewell began to arrive and along with elements of Hill's Corps they pushed the Federals hard. By the end of the day Reynolds was dead and the two Blue corps had lost 50 per cent. Then Ewell should have taken Culps hill. It commanded Cemetary ridge and if Ewell had taken it as Lee asked him to do and as Trimble pleaded with him to do the South could have rendered Cemetary Ridge untenable, they would have had the good ground and the next day the Federals would have been attacking up hill. That was a possible opportunity to win the battle the first day. If as Syscom postulates Lee beats Meade but is so weakened he cannot pose a threat to Washington ( which I don't see happening) then the strategy in the West can go as it did and the War is lost for the CSA. Mind you I don't say it is a foregone conclusion if Lee prevails over Meade that the South gets an armistice out of the US. I only say the South had two possibilities to win at Gettysburg, one the first day and on the second day. Ewell had lost a leg in the Shenandoah and some of his fire seemed to be missing thereafter. If Jackson had been leading his Corps then Culp's Hill may have been taken but he was gone. How unlucky could the CSA be to lose two of it's best generals in combat, Albert Sydney Johnston in 62 and Jackson in 63, not to mention Longstreet being disabled( by friendly fire) for months in 64. I don't believe that Sherman on his best day could have taken the measure of Lee in any battle if the armies were anything like evenly matched. It wasn't until J E Johnston was replaced by Hood ( with one arm useless and one leg missing and living on Laudunum) that Sherman's march to the sea began to really click.


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## davparlr (Mar 20, 2007)

syscom3 said:


> Some good points davprl.
> 
> However, you arent giving Grant credit for his maneuver strategy at various pints in the war.
> 
> Take Vicksburg for instance, the events leading up to the seige was nothing but manuevering in the countryside that managed to confuse the confederates, divide up their forces so as to defeat them in detail and finally to try everything possible prior to laying a seige on the city. he even attempted to dig a canal to divert the Misssissippi around the city so as to render the city strategically worthless.



Grant expected to take Vicksburg quickly, but soon realized it would be tougher than he figured. He tried a foolish attempt at a canal which wasted a lot of time. He did send out wise and successful raids throughout the Southern areas around Vicksburg which worked well indeed, although the Southern forces in the area were probably too small to stop Grant in any event. The South had 30-40,000 troops verses Grants 70,000. The capture of Vicksburg was a big event and fatally wounded the South. Kudos to Grant.



> You can sum up his generalship as this: From start to finish, he never lost a battle.



I can’t sum that up reasonably. At the Wilderness, Grant, with 102,000 troops was surprised by Lee with 61,000 troops. After hard fighting, Grant withdrew from the field with 18,400 casualties (Burnside lost his job when he lost 12,653 soldiers at Fredericksburg and withdrew from the field). Since Grant’s plan was to wear Lee down by attrition, why did he just continue to fight here? The answer, of course, was that Lee’s lines were too well defended to achieve success, so he had to move somewhere else. Since Grant withdrew from the field, I would call this a tactical defeat (like just about every other battlefield loss).

Unlike previous generals and stuffed with a flow of incoming cannon fodder, Grant moved to flank Lee. Lee anticipated this move and beat Grant to Spotsylvania Court House. Again, Lee with only 52,000 troops met Grant who had 100,000 troops. Again, after severe fighting, Grant, with 18,000 casualties, withdrew from the field. In my eye, this was another tactical loss.

Grant moved again to flank Lee, but at Cold Harbor, Grant with 108,000 troops met Lee, who had anticipated this move also, with 62,000 troops. I suspect even Grant would consider Cold Harbor a defeat and something he regretted. He withdrew from the field with 13,000 casualties compared to the 2,500 for Lee. After these three battles, Grant gave up the attempt to attack Richmond directly and directed his attention to Petersburg. He was finally able to outflank Lee, although Petersburg turned into a different war.

In all fairness, Lee lost nearly 29,000 troops in these three battles, losses he could not sustain, but I believe that this campaign did not end up in a manner Grant had planned. I believe he fully expected to beat Lee and take Richmond directly and these three battles ended up with a defeat of that plan.

In the end, Grant was a great general who understood what it took to defeat of the South, and deserves the honor (and he was also an honorable victor). I would not consider him one of the four or five greatest generals who ever lived, as the History Channel portrayed him once.


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## davparlr (Mar 20, 2007)

timshatz said:


> But, in a different line of thought. Anybody have any idea what a battle between Lee and Sherman would've looked like? Not the early Sherman, and not the late Lee. But when both were in their prime (Sherman in 1864 and Lee in the Spring of 1863). Lee has the services of Jackson and Longstreet. Sherman has Sheridan and Thomas.
> 
> Any thoughts?



Actually, It probably would be more appropiate and interesting for Sherman to meet Jackson at both their heights. Both were a different breed although as a commanding general, I would trust Jackson more, not because of his incredible military ability, but for his loyality.


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## mkloby (Mar 20, 2007)

davparlr said:


> Actually, It probably would be more appropiate and interesting for Sherman to meet Jackson at both their heights. Both were a different breed although as a commanding general, I would trust Jackson more, not because of his incredible military ability, but for his loyality.



Hmmm... Jackson's loyalty...


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## plan_D (Mar 21, 2007)

In Great Britain itself slavery was banned in 1807 but it wasn't banned throughout the Empire until 1833. 

syscom, you seem so sure that Great Britain would not support the Confederacy. You seem to be forgetting that Britain was supporting the Confederacy throughout the war; I have already stated that they supplied weapons, military advisors and they crewed the blockade runners. This, in itself, provides proof that Europe was willing to support the Confederacy. 

Moniters were designed to fight on the coast or in rivers; in the case of stopping a Royal Navy blockade they're pointless. All the Royal Navy needed to do was stay out in the open waters and catch the shipping before it got to the coast. 
The USN, if maintaining a blockade, would be forced to fight as the Royal Navy would aim to break the siege. Whether the Royal Navy just provided heavy escort for any large merchant fleet or went out hunting the Union blockading ships, the blockade would be broken. 

The _Warrior_ class was only two ships but, Tim, the Royal Navy had 22 iron-clads laid down in 1863 and 5 sailing. Three of those were iron-hulled and considered superior to anything else sailing at the time, HMS _Warrior_, HMS _Black Prince_ and HMS _Achilles_. _Achilles_ being faster and more stable than the _Warrior_ class. 

In 1862, British shipyards were even building two ships for the CSA. These were seized by the Royal Navy and became the _Scorpion_ class. The _Scorpion_ were iron-clad turreted ships superior most of the Union navy. The CSS Alabama was even built in Britain. 

While Britain at the time was actually sending out mixed signals (nothing is clear cut in history), I believe the only reason Europe didn't step in was because the higher end of the political system was cautious. The Union knew they would, the Confederates knew they would and a lot of Europe thought it was going to happen - but I seriously believe Gettysburg made Britain, France and Austria think there was no point.


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## davparlr (Mar 21, 2007)

mkloby said:


> Hmmm... Jackson's loyalty...



Jackson had devoted loyalty to Lee. The real issue is Sherman, who, I understand ,tended to try to undermine Grant and did some things that really made Grant angry.


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## syscom3 (Mar 21, 2007)

davparlr said:


> Jackson had devoted loyalty to Lee. The real issue is Sherman, who, I understand ,tended to try to undermine Grant and did some things that really made Grant angry.



I have never heard anything like that. If that was true, then why did Grant allow him unrestricted command of his forces after he (Grant) was made commanding general?


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## timshatz (Mar 21, 2007)

syscom3 said:


> Sherman was another tenacious bulldog type of fighter. He wanted a win, and wasnt tied down by orthodoxy and tradition to get it.
> 
> He and Grant were of the same mold and same way of thinking. perhaps because they were in the same commands for so long.
> 
> Total war and total destruction of the opposing Army.



Sherman, to my mind anyway, was a guy who could find a weak spot. Same with Lee. Had good vision. I think Sheridan and Jackson had that same "go in for the kill" instinct. 

Would've been an interesting fight.


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## timshatz (Mar 21, 2007)

davparlr said:


> Jackson had devoted loyalty to Lee. The real issue is Sherman, who, I understand ,tended to try to undermine Grant and did some things that really made Grant angry.



Grant didn't see the war in the same terms as Sherman. That was where Sherman was way ahead of Grant. Grant went after and destroyed every army he went up against. Sherman could and would ignore the opposing army. His target during the Atlanta Campaign was not the Confederate Army but the South's will to fight. When Hood moved west after Sherman took Atlanta, it opened the road for Sherman. He could now go where he chose and prove to the South that their Armies could not protect them.

Grant didn't see the point of Sherman's March and worried he would be cut off and destroyed. That's what bugged Grant.


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## timshatz (Mar 21, 2007)

Plan D. A lot to comment on but have short time to work with so I'll just focus on Britian supplying the South. They were also supplying the North. It was common sense from the British perspective to make a buck (Okay, a pound) on the war by selling to the combatants. It was common then, it is common now. 

But there is a big difference between selling to a side and joining them. I agree with the perspective that the sypathies of England were with the South but think there is big difference between hoping someone will win and sending your own people to fight in the war. For all concerned, the American Civil War stayed just that. Europe took advantage of it by making money and, in the case of France, taking control of Mexico. But in the end, the Europeans recoginized it as an American affair and not really their problem (an attitude that would permiate American Politics some 50 years later when Europe had it's first Modern Civil War and Woodrow Wilson got re-elected on the slogan, "He kept us out of the war").


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## mkloby (Mar 21, 2007)

davparlr said:


> Jackson had devoted loyalty to Lee. The real issue is Sherman, who, I understand ,tended to try to undermine Grant and did some things that really made Grant angry.



I was thinking of loyalty on a larger scale...


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## davparlr (Mar 21, 2007)

mkloby said:


> I was thinking of loyalty on a larger scale...



I think I got Sherman mixed up with one of the Navy commander, probably Porter, who did not like Grants plans. I do think Sherman did do some things that irritated Grant, however.




timshatz said:


> Grant didn't see the point of Sherman's March and worried he would be cut off and destroyed. That's what bugged Grant.



It was very risky. Sherman was lucky that the South at that time was already depleted of forces and materiel. Had the Confederates be able to engage Sherman in any kind of lenghty fight, Sherman would have quickly run out of ammunition. He could have then been stuck a long way from his base in dire straits.


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## timshatz (Mar 21, 2007)

davparlr said:


> It was very risky. Sherman was lucky that the South at that time was already depleted of forces and materiel. Had the Confederates be able to engage Sherman in any kind of lenghty fight, Sherman would have quickly run out of ammunition. He could have then been stuck a long way from his base in dire straits.



You are seeing it the way Grant saw it. Having Sherman's Army cut off and destroyed doubtless kept Grant awake more than one night. Especially when Sherman dropped from site (which in this case means telegraph contact) and went off toward the south east/east. But that is the true brillance of Sherman.

It was very risky. So was running your Panzer divisions through the Ardenne. So was landing at Inchon. But it was a master stroke at the heart of the enemy. It broke their backs, as the other master strokes did.

He understood the South lived only on it's Armies. The real base of the war for the South was the people. When letters started arriving in camps throughout the South telling the soliders that the Yankees were burning houses and farms, the morale of the Rebel soliders would suffer. So goes the Army. So goes the South. So goes the Confederacy.


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## syscom3 (Mar 21, 2007)

The reason Sherman made his march was his knowing that there wasn't any confederate forces who could stop him, and the land was rich in booty to supply his troops.


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## timshatz (Mar 22, 2007)

syscom3 said:


> The reason Sherman made his march was his knowing that there wasn't any confederate forces who could stop him, and the land was rich in booty to supply his troops.



Yeah, Sys, read the same thing. Nothing but militia and some calvary. Nothing to slow him down. Definitely a major part of his reasoning.


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## Invasion63 (Jan 2, 2010)

The South lost Gettysburg for several reasons. The most important reasons were Pickett's charge and the ratio of Confederate to Union soldiers. Pickett's charge was an attack on an open field and it was uphill. In terms of the amount of people, the Confederates were well behind in number. Unlike other battles in which the Union attacked the South, this battle was the other way around. The Confederates decided to invade Pennsylvania and not only did they have less soldiers, but they had far from the 3:1 ratio that the invading side needs. To answer your last question, I don't think it was likely at all that the Union leaders would have sought after a peace negotiation. They were aware that foreign intervention was no longer a threat and that the small Confederate army that had suffered tons of collateral damage was struggling. In fact, I recently interviewed James McPherson and he made it clear that he felt that a peace negotiation was an invalid reason for invading the North. This is why I disagree with one of the things that "Senator" said a couple posts earlier. He wrote, "Even if they had not the war would have gone on even longer leading to the U.S. to ask for peace later, from being war weary." It was the South that didn't want the war to go on longer. That was part of Lee's strategical plan. He knew the Confederates couldn't last long.


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## Invasion63 (Jan 2, 2010)

Can anyone help me understand why Lee invaded Pennsylvania in late June of 1863? Didn't he realize that the amount of soldiers he needed was not the amount of soldiers he had? Didn't he realize he would cut off his communications and possible route of retreat? Were there other options to such an ambitious choice?


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## syscom3 (Jan 2, 2010)

Invasion63 said:


> Can anyone help me understand why Lee invaded Pennsylvania in late June of 1863? Didn't he realize that the amount of soldiers he needed was not the amount of soldiers he had? Didn't he realize he would cut off his communications and possible route of retreat? Were there other options to such an ambitious choice?




Lee knew exactly how many soldiers he had and what he had to do.


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## renrich (Jan 2, 2010)

He invaded Pennsylvania for twofold reasons. He thought that if he could get the Army of the Potomac out in the open he could defeat it and that defeat might cause the North to negotiate a peace with the South. Another reason was to take the war away from Virginia for awhile and give the civilian population a chance to recover. He felt he could feed his army off the Pennsylvania farms. This is my theory but I believe that after the winter of 1862-63 and the privations his army and particularly his animals, (horses and mules) suffered, because of disease and poor nutrition, Lee knew that another winter would see the Army of Northern Virginia practically without transport and therefore unable to move very far and fast. The Southern armies were growing weaker and the Union armies were growing stronger.


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## Njaco (Jan 3, 2010)

Invasion63 said:


> Can anyone help me understand why Lee invaded Pennsylvania in late June of 1863? *Didn't he realize that the amount of soldiers he needed was not the amount of soldiers he had*? Didn't he realize he would cut off his communications and possible route of retreat? Were there other options to such an ambitious choice?



and how many times did Lee win a battle with an inferior force? He knew what he had and what he faced.


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## renrich (Jan 3, 2010)

Lee drove McClellan back at the Seven Days despite being outnumbered. He defeated Pope at Second Manassas while outnumbered. He fought McClellan to a draw at Sharpsburg outnumbered two to one. He was outnumbered by Burnside at Fredricksburg and won and by Hooker at Chancellorsville and won. The Army of Northern Virginia was almost always outnumbered but seldom defeated. I expect that Lee felt that at Gettysburg with about 70000 that he actually had an advantage over Meade's 90000 or so.


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## davparlr (Jan 3, 2010)

At this time Lee was feeling his army could not be beaten by the Union forces and that a successful invasion of the North had several advantages, some already mentioned. A victory at Gettysburg would have changed the complexion of the war. First, politically, it could have been disasterous for Lincoln when the war was not popular to start with. Lee probably was aware of this and may have been his goal. Second, a victory by the South and Lee, having already defeated Meade, loose in the country with a possilble threat to both Washington and New York, would certainly have caused Grant to be recalled no matter how many men Lee had or where Meade had established a defensive line, since he had demonstrated an ability to defeat Union forces no matter what the odds. Even if Lee could not have advanced deeper or to Washingtion, perception would have been everything.


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## diddyriddick (Jan 4, 2010)

Invasion63 said:


> Can anyone help me understand why Lee invaded Pennsylvania in late June of 1863? Didn't he realize that the amount of soldiers he needed was not the amount of soldiers he had? Didn't he realize he would cut off his communications and possible route of retreat? Were there other options to such an ambitious choice?



There are many reasons, I. The one he sold Davis on was that it would relieve some of the pressure on Vicksburg.


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