# Bombing Germany



## wuzak (Aug 21, 2016)

A look at the Allied bombing campaign against Gemany, particularly RAF Bomber Command and particularly with respect to area raids against German cities late in the war, such as Dresden and Wurzburg.


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=737PPxhTjUU_


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## stona (Aug 21, 2016)

Obviously I've seen this before, it has stood the test of time well, and is well worth a watch, despite not being the most balanced piece of documentary film making.
I think the most revealing passage is in the last few minutes when Churchill reveals himself as the cynical political animal that he was.
Cheers
Steve

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## Gnomey (Aug 22, 2016)

Interesting video! Agree with stona but still good to watch.


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## Zipper730 (Aug 22, 2016)

stona said:


> Obviously I've seen this before, it has stood the test of time well, and is well worth a watch, despite not being the most balanced piece of documentary film making.


It was more honest than most of them on the subject of deliberately bombing population centers. I'm not going to defend or criticize the morality of the attacks because there would be no point in doing so. 

What I will say is that, while it's an uncomfortable topic, the fact is that pretty much all major nations had espoused the mentality that bombing population centers to target the populations living within them as a means of crushing the public will was acceptable.

I'd also like to point out was that this was actually not something that occurred during the war, it predated it by quite some period of time


> I think the most revealing passage is in the last few minutes when Churchill reveals himself as the cynical political animal that he was.


Yup, Churchill tossed Harris under the bus to save himself.


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## stona (Aug 23, 2016)

It addressed the subject, but said nothing new. The February 1942 Directif sent to Bomber Command and including the self explanatory phrases that operations were to be _"focussed on the morale of the enemy civil population, and, in particular, of the industrial workers"_ is hardly a secret. It glossed over the reasons for the change in policy which are surprisingly complicated and maybe wouldn't make dramatic television.

Accounts of the effects of the bombing will always make for better television. It is very important that we should hear them too. It would be quite wrong to pretend that the awful consequences and suffering of ordinary Germans as a result of the the policies pursued by their government did not happen. One of the Commentators did point out that the Franco-British and Americans had spent a good part of the first half of the twentieth century fighting Germany and they were determined not to do it again. I just feel that the larger context of of the development of the bombing campaign could have been better covered.

As far as Harris being thrown under a bus, along with his entire Command, I agree entirely. This is Churchill at his best or worst, depending on your point of view. The Directif above was agreed by the War Cabinet of which Churchill, as Prime Minister was the senior member, BEFORE Harris took over as C-in-C Bomber Command. Harris carries the can, or has the can tied around his neck, for the area bombing policy, when in fact all he did was carry out his orders to the best of his very considerable ability. Had he been less competent then more than 90% of bombing photographs would not have been taken within three miles of the aiming point by early 1945, compared with the woeful figures for the early years of the war.

Cheers

Steve

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## michaelmaltby (Aug 23, 2016)

"..... I'm not going to defend or criticize the morality of the attacks because there would be no point in doing so. "

I'm not going to defend or criticize the morality of _*WAR*_ because there would be no point in doing so.

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## Capt. Vick (Aug 23, 2016)

It is hard for me not to say, sow the wind and reap the whirlwind. Though I understand innocents will be slaughtered.


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## stona (Aug 23, 2016)

Capt. Vick said:


> It is hard for me not to say, sow the wind and reap the whirlwind. Though I understand innocents will be slaughtered.



You would not be the only one 

_"The Nazis entered this war under the rather childish delusion that they were going to bomb everybody else, and nobody was going to bomb them. At Rotterdam, London, Warsaw and half a hundred other places, they put that rather naive theory into operation. They sowed the wind, and now, they are going to reap the whirlwind."_
Harris

Cheers

Steve


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## Vratrix (Aug 23, 2016)

What I don't understand is,why America did send the b29 and bombed Berlin instead?


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## stona (Aug 23, 2016)

The Americans kidded themselves, or at least pretended publicly, that they were precisely bombing selected targets, at least until after the return of control of the strategic bombing forces from Eisenhower's control after Overlord. It wasn't until September 1944 that what became known as 'Strategic Bombing Directive No.1' acknowledged, in referring to _'important industrial areas'_ that
_'when weather or tactical conditions are unsuitable for operations against specific primary objectives, attacks should be delivered on important industrial areas, using blind bombing techniques as necessary."_
Since any town with an electricity supply, road or rail running through it might be considered important this was an official sanctioning of area bombing by US air forces. They had already been carrying out what were euphemistically described as _'area type raids'_ since the combined bombing offensive began.
Simply attacking 'Berlin' still ran contrary to US doctrine and intent, if not practice.

The B-29 would be no more capable of carrying out precision raids than any other strategic bomber, it suffered exactly the same technical limitations as any other bomber in anything less than perfect conditions. Given US bomber losses and damage suffered in NW Europe it is difficult to see the Americans risking such an expensive weapons system as the B-29 in Europe, when the war was nearly over and the infra structure and support for the other strategic bombing forces was already in theatre.

Cheers

Steve

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## Capt. Vick (Aug 23, 2016)

You didn't need the range of the B-29 in Europe.


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## Zipper730 (Aug 23, 2016)

stona said:


> It addressed the subject, but said nothing new. The February 1942 Directif sent to Bomber Command and including the self explanatory phrases that operations were to be _"focussed on the morale of the enemy civil population, and, in particular, of the industrial workers"_ is hardly a secret. It glossed over the reasons for the change in policy which are surprisingly complicated and maybe wouldn't make dramatic television.


True, but it was an important issue.

Of course, so were these...

Doctrine: Proponents of the use of Independent Air Forces felt that they should be used offensively to bomb population centers as a means of crushing morale. Their motivation was to avoid the massive fatalities encountered in the First World War, and to bring wars to a swifter conclusion. Their convictions were a combination of fanatical (they had an unshakable belief it would work), secretive (they couldn't just tell anybody what they planned to do), and politically motivated (most independent services seek to win the war on their own). These kind of mentalities are very hard to change, and the doctrine becomes almost like a religion, even if a person can be momentarily turned away from it, they have a way of snapping back if things don't work perfectly. Even the Luftwaffe saw the city-busting campaign on Germany as a way for them to "come into their own", despite having a strong emphasis on CAS.

Winston Churchill: Churchill was a proponent of the RAF since 1919 at the very least, and was known for being ruthless in the pursuit of victory (ironically, after the war, he was less vindictive than the United States). It's possible that as early as May, 1940, he wanted to sic the bombers on the German population centers, and by the Battle of Britain, he already was ordering plans to be drawn up for this purpose. In "Bomber Command" by Max Hastings, it was stated that the mass-destruction to be wrought was to Churchill's liking.
United States: Though the USAAF espoused a precision bombing doctrine, it was based around making the maximum use of limited resources during the 1930's, and revolved out of the ship-bombing trials which General Mitchell carried out in the 1920's. There was however, little moral issue to bombing civilians as a goal, and most of the opposition revolved around looking bad from the PR standpoint. That, and the cited goal of destroying industrial objectives was to also destroy morale, and the fact that crushing morale had never been narrowed down to exclude the bulk of the population always made it possible for the idea of city-busting to make a comeback. The increasing size of the bomber force, the inability for bombers to fight their way in and out without fighter-escort and major losses, the lack of suitable escort-fighter (and the stubbornness among bomber-generals to use drop-tanks on escort fighters) until late 1943, as well as the limitations of our bombsights, served to make this all but guaranteed.

Intimidation for the Future: General Cabell (USAAF) generally found the practice to be little more than a baby-killing scheme (that was his wording), and felt that bombing civilians was really more a matter of retaliation and intimidation for the future. While I'm not sure about the retaliation part, but the latter was definitely correct. General Fredrick L. Anderson had said so, and was quoted in the documentary. In context he was talking about Operation Clarion, a low-level bombing and strafing attack on civilians under the pretext of attacking transportation hubs, and said that it was "not expected in itself to shorten the war ... However, it is expected that the fact that Germany was struck all over will be passed on, from father to son, thence to grandson; that a deterrent for the initiation of future wars will definitely result." Many Germans were definitely affected by these attacks and seemed stunned and dazed at the end of the war, and an anti-war sentiment did occur, though the full revelation of Nazi War-Crimes almost certainly played a role, as well as the desire to impose the notion of collective guilt upon the whole of Germany (the mentality was that as long as people could blame others, they would never feel bad about what was done; only if they were forced as a whole society to accept responsibility, could change occur). I cannot say truthfully whether the collective-guilt, denazification, and the revelation of war-atrocities would have done it (maybe, maybe not) without the brutalization that happened. I would like to point out that it did not extinguish the resentment in everybody (most people tend to prefer to put things behind them and fortunately are not terribly vindictive, others however are vindictive to varying degrees and some, as my grandmother said "Hold grudge like Khomeini") for various reasons.



> Accounts of the effects of the bombing will always make for better television. It is very important that we should hear them too. It would be quite wrong to pretend that the awful consequences and suffering of ordinary Germans as a result of the the policies pursued by their government did not happen.


Correct, and to a point, failing to acknowledge this actually just makes people angry.


> As far as Harris being thrown under a bus, along with his entire Command, I agree entirely. This is Churchill at his best or worst, depending on your point of view.


His worst: It shows a lack of moral fiber that is all too often missing in politics. I myself usually operate under the presumption that all politicians (unless proven otherwise) are sociopaths.

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## wuzak (Aug 23, 2016)

I did see another documentary recently about the bombing war, specifically the attacks on targets in France and the collateral damage that came from that. I thought it was going to be highly critical of the British and Americans, but it wasn't that bad. I can't find it on YouTube at the moment, and can't recall the title.

Back to bombing cities and civilians the USAAF had a very active PR department and they cultivated the idea of precision bombing, and may have brushed aside attacks on cities.

I found it interesting that they mentioned Dresden and Warzburg, both attacked in 1945, But they did not mention the attack on Hamburg in 1943, which was far deadlier than those mentioned. Perhaps because it did not fit with the thesis that RAF Bomber Command was not that effective before mid 1944, or maybe because the lateness in the war of the attacks against Dresden and Warzburg made them less valid targets, or not necessary for the war effort.

The attack on Dresden I have seen described as a raid that "went horribly right".

Also of interest to me was that the number of BC attacks on cities in the last 6 months or year (I can't recall which they said) was less than 50%. Which means they were attacking industrial targets more than 50% of the time.


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## stona (Aug 24, 2016)

June '44 to May '45 the percentage of sorties devoted to area bombing by Bomber Command was 39%, well less than 50% and a figure that always surprises people with a more rigid and traditional idea of what Bomber Command was doing in the last year of the war.
The last operation by heavy bombers of Bomber Command was on 25/26 April 1945 and it targeted, appropriately, an oil refinery at Tolsberg (Norway). Area bombing had been offficially discontinued, except in _'exceptional' _military circumstances on 6th April, though the people of Potsdam (14th/15th) and Bremen (22nd) might have wondered exactly what 'exceptional' meant.

It was Churchill who pushed for the bombing of Germany's eastern cities in early 1945. It was he who asked Sinclair, on 25th January, what plans the RAF had made for_ 'blasting the Germans in their retreat from Breslau.'_ Churchill had seen a report from the Joint Intelligence Sub-committee which suggested that the Germans might collapse by mid April ('45) if the Soviet offensives in the East were successful, but might hold out until November if the Germans could consolidate. He was understandably keen to do anything possible to help the Soviets, and it is from this that the assault on Germany's eastern cities, including Dresden, stems.
Sinclair forwarded Churchill's inquiry to Portal, who replied that oil, jet assembly plants and submarines should have top priority but agreed that the Allies should use the available effort
_"...in one big attack on Berlin and attacks on Dresden, Leipzig, Chemnitz, or any other cities where a severe blitz will not only cause confusion in the evacuation from the East but will hamper movement of troops from the West."_
At least Portal was attempting justification by some valid military objective. Churchill was not satisfied by this reply, and made this clear, writing the following morning.
_"I did not ask you last night about plans for harrying the German retreat from Breslau. On the contrary, I asked whether Berlin and no doubt other large cities in East Germany, should not now be considered attractive targets. I am glad that this is under 'examination'. Pray report to me tomorrow what is going to be done."_
It was Bottomley (Portal was leaving for the Mediterranean) who informed Harris of Churchill's desires, issuing an effective order to Harris before consulting the Americans (Spaatz) or the Combined Chief's of Staff.
_"I am, therefore, to request that subject to the qualifications stated above and as soon as moon and weather conditions allow, you will undertake such attacks with the particular object of exploiting the confused conditions which are likely to exist in the above mentioned cities during the successful Russian advance."_
He notified Churchill that the attacks could occur as soon as the moon permitted, after the night of 3/4 February.
Churchill was the instigator of, and was responsible for, the attacks on the cities in eastern Germany, including Dresden.Harris, once again, was just doing what he was told, to the best of his and his Command's now considerable ability. It makes Churchill's volte-face noted in the documentary even more cynical and reprehensible than it might otherwise seem. Unfortunately, television documentaries have limited time and have to retain an audience not necessarily interested in the detail of historical operations but more likely to be captivated by the accounts of aircrew and victims.
Cheers
Steve

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## stona (Aug 24, 2016)

I'd just say that the American Norden, the British Mk XIV and particularly SABS bomb sights were all accurate sights, assuming the operators were well enough trained to programme and use them correctly. They were capable of producing remarkably accurate results in ideal conditions of clear visibility, no opposition and no obscuring of the target caused by smoke screens (often underestimated) and dust/smoke from the bombing itself.

The biggest problem for the British was seeing in the dark. The biggest problem for the Americans was seeing through cloud.

Around the time in question, the last three months of 1944, the 8th AF did 50% of its bombing on H2X through 9-10/10 cloud. In its own recommendations, following analysis of the results for this period, it wrote

_"Consideration should be given to using H2X under 10/10 cloud solely on large area targets_ [a euphemism meaning cities] _and, if possible, increasing our total effort under partial cloud and visual conditions at the expense of our 10/10 effort."_

In fact only 14% of bombing was carried out visually in_ 'good to fair visibility._' Whatever else the Americans could do, they could not control the weather in NW Europe 

Cheers

Steve


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## Zipper730 (Aug 25, 2016)

wuzak said:


> I did see another documentary recently about the bombing war, specifically the attacks on targets in France and the collateral damage that came from that. I thought it was going to be highly critical of the British and Americans, but it wasn't that bad. I can't find it on YouTube at the moment, and can't recall the title.


The RAF seemed to go to lengths to avoid civilian deaths in France most of the time. The USAAF might have been deadlier to the French.


> Back to bombing cities and civilians the USAAF had a very active PR department and they cultivated the idea of precision bombing, and may have brushed aside attacks on cities.


Makes sense, the raid on Munster occurred in October 1943.


> I found it interesting that they mentioned Dresden and Warzburg, both attacked in 1945, But they did not mention the attack on Hamburg in 1943, which was far deadlier than those mentioned.


In terms of death, Hamburg was worse. In terms of surface area destroyed, Dresden was more effective. In terms of percentage destroyed, I have no idea but Wurzburg suffered badly.

What made Dresden and Wurzburg so tragic was that the war was almost over and it seemed more difficult to justify.


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## stona (Aug 25, 2016)

In terms of percentage of population killed Pforzheim was the worst, yet most people have never heard of it.

Bomber Command measured the success or failure of an area raid by the acreage of city destroyed. 

Harris was, as is well known, a firm advocate of area bombing and had to be more or less compelled to undertake the more precise tasks demanded of him in the run up to Overlord and thereafter, though he did undertake them and with some success. Nobody ever asks why? 
Harris had good reason to doubt the ability of his Command to make precision attacks, as demanded by the Oil and Transport Plans. He had figures for bomb lifts required for such targets prepared by Bomber Command's own ORS. These figures were different from those prepared by Zuckermann, one of the main proponents of the Oil and Transport Plans and this led to a good deal of bad feeling and friction at the time and long after the war. Dickins and the men of his ORS did not believe that Zuckermann understood or allow for many operational factors, what in Clausewitzian terms we would call 'friction' or the 'fog of war'. This was introduced into Dickin's calculations as the 'operational factor' to which Zuckermann took exception.

Harris and his ORS argued at the time and long after the war, that Zuckermann never understood that there was a difference between building theoretical models in the laboratory and the application of such models in combat situations.
The ORS made a detailed report on the first 15 Oboe attacks on the rail yards and their findings did support their original contention rather than Zuckermann's. The average bombing error had been reduced to 480 yards (4 and 6 Groups were best with 250 yards and 260 yards respectively) and this had had an effect on the efficiency of the attacks, but the effectiveness, what had actually been destroyed was not as good as had been hoped for. The report concluded that.

_"The result of applying these new parameters is that the overall requirement is increased by a factor of 1.43. The actual weight of attack dispatched on the 11 targets considered in this report was 1.72 times the requirement, or 1.20 times the revised requirement, and even so 4 of the 11 targets required further attention by tactical daylight forces in respect of priority buildings insufficiently damaged. The reason for this excess over the theoretical requirement is that sometimes the priority buildings will be under hit (and the target will require further attack), and sometimes they will be over hit with a consequent wastage of bombs."
_
The most important conclusion is that the bombers could not guarantee specific results for specific raid sizes. That Bomber Command's ORS had a better understanding of operational matters than some of the proponents of the various plans was demonstrated in the debate around the implementation of the Oil Plan.
In December Portal was trying to compel Harris to implement another of Zuckermann's schemes (Oil Plan). Harris was able to remind Portal that his ORS had correctly predicted the requirement for 9,000 sorties per month to knock out the French railway system. On 12th December Harris wrote to Portal to say that his ORS had just completed a study 'into the feasibility of the Oil Plan' and reminding Portal that his ORS had always provided reliable information, concluding with 

"[the ORS said]_ it would take three times the effort estimated by the 'expert' , Mr Solly Zuckermann, to knock out the French marshaling yards, and that is precisely what happened." 
_
Harris resistance to precision attacks was not due to an irrational belief that area attacks and the devastation of German cities would win the war, though he did believe this. 

To destroy a marshaling yard a density of 2,000lbs, 4 x 500lb bombs, per acre was required.
Using Oboe, the most accurate method of attack, the ORS calculated that for a 50 acre yard 11% of bombs would hit the yard. To obtain one short ton per acre 450 tons would have to be dropped. Because 30% of sorties would abort or bomb with a 'gross error' 500 short tons had to be dispatched. This meant an attack by 110 aircraft, somewhat different to the 11 that Zuckermann's simple arithmetic suggested.

Using H2S, and many targets were outside Oboe range, the figures are much worse. To be sure of destroying a 50 acre yard required 14,800 short tons of bombs, for a 500 acre yard 19,750 short tons!
Harris knew that this sort of density, equivalent to 640 tons per square mile, was higher than anything achieved by Bomber Command, even on its most successful raids._
_
The report of the BBSU, on which most post war opinion formed is NOT an independent and balanced report. It certainly contains none of the above. As Sebastian Cox has noted of the authorship of the report.
_
"... the two leading appointments were Air Commodore Pelly as its Head and Professor Zuckermann as Scientific Adviser. Both had a background in SHAEF, and it is hardly surprising, therefore, that the final report of the BBSU strongly reflected the favourable view held in SHAEF of the importance of transportation as a target system in the strategic bomber offensive, especially since Zuckermann had been so influential in putting transportation top of SHAEF's priorities.
The remaining opportunities to introduce a truly independent voice into the BBSU's reports were subsequently lost....This needs to be borne firmly in mind when reading the report." 
_
Food for thought!

Cheers

Steve

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## Frank Stewart (Aug 25, 2016)

michaelmaltby said:


> "..... I'm not going to defend or criticize the morality of the attacks because there would be no point in doing so. "
> 
> I'm not going to defend or criticize the morality of _*WAR*_ because there would be no point in doing so.


The failure to recognize that there are two types of War, moral and immoral is beyond comprehension! A moral war is where you fight to defend and not for gain. An immoral war is an offensive one you start for the purpose of financial, or other gain.
The two types are not equivalent and never have been. One is recognized as a "Just War" and the other is known as an "Unjust War".
The first is noble and good and the other is terrible and vain. Most wars have both elements and depending on who wins are either good or bad. WW-I & II were both good and bad as were most of the wars of the last two Millennia or so. Western Civilization has predominantly fought good wars if you count most of the Crusades, "Pax Britannia" and the three world wars!
So think more and be proud or ashamed of your heritage as required, but own it!


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## michaelmaltby (Aug 26, 2016)

"....The failure to recognize that there are two types of War, moral and immoral is beyond comprehension! "

Perhaps that should read "MY (Frank Steward's) comprehension" 

Rule 1 of war is: Fight to win .... and THAT dictates that the means justify the ends ... which is beyond the pale of morality.


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## stona (Aug 26, 2016)

The most immoral thing we could have done in WW2 would have been to lose it to the Nazi German regime.

Steve

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## Zipper730 (Aug 26, 2016)

stona said:


> It was Churchill who pushed for the bombing of Germany's eastern cities in early 1945. It was he who asked Sinclair, on 25th January, what plans the RAF had made for_ 'blasting the Germans in their retreat from Breslau.'_ Churchill had seen a report from the Joint Intelligence Sub-committee which suggested that the Germans might collapse by mid April ('45) if the Soviet offensives in the East were successful, but might hold out until November if the Germans could consolidate. He was understandably keen to do anything possible to help the Soviets, and it is from this that the assault on Germany's eastern cities, including Dresden, stems.
> Sinclair forwarded Churchill's inquiry to Portal, who replied that oil, jet assembly plants and submarines should have top priority but agreed that the Allies should use the available effort
> _"...in one big attack on Berlin and attacks on Dresden, Leipzig, Chemnitz, or any other cities where a severe blitz will not only cause confusion in the evacuation from the East but will hamper movement of troops from the West."_
> At least Portal was attempting justification by some valid military objective. Churchill was not satisfied by this reply, and made this clear, writing the following morning.
> ...


You'd figure with the RAF's philosophy on winning wars, he'd have just said "Since the Germans suffered a serious defeat, and their morale is low, I figure we can crack their will to fight once and for all by flattening a shitload of cities in rapid succession -- the high death toll, the rapidity of strike to strike, and the helplessness of government to fend of the attacks, should do it."


> Churchill was the instigator of, and was responsible for, the attacks on the cities in eastern Germany, including Dresden.


I thought General Spaatz had revived the idea of Operation Thunderclap, and revised it to include attacks on several cities rather than a huge attack on Berlin?


> Harris, once again, was just doing what he was told, to the best of his and his Command's now considerable ability.


In this case you're correct.


> In terms of percentage of population killed Pforzheim was the worst, yet most people have never heard of it.


I didn't actually know the percentage of the population killed (22% based on the normal population levels), just that 17,600 were killed, 83% of the overall surface area wiped out, and 89% of the city core.


> Harris was, as is well known, a firm advocate of area bombing and had to be more or less compelled to undertake the more precise tasks demanded of him in the run up to Overlord and thereafter, though he did undertake them and with some success. Nobody ever asks why?
> Harris had good reason to doubt the ability of his Command to make precision attacks, as demanded by the Oil and Transport Plans.


Actually as early as 1942, there was an effective raid carried out on a Renault plant in Billancourt. Of course, the raid was carried out at low altitude, and losses might have been steep.


> He had figures for bomb lifts required for such targets prepared by Bomber Command's own ORS. These figures were different from those prepared by Zuckermann, one of the main proponents of the Oil and Transport Plans and this led to a good deal of bad feeling and friction at the time and long after the war. Dickins and the men of his ORS did not believe that Zuckermann understood or allow for many operational factors, what in Clausewitzian terms we would call 'friction' or the 'fog of war'. This was introduced into Dickin's calculations as the 'operational factor' to which Zuckermann took exception.


It's ironic that the USAAF greatly valued Zuckermann's input. I'm not sure if we were anymore accurate or were able to avoid substantial losses owing to day-fighter escort.


> Harris resistance to precision attacks was not due to an irrational belief that area attacks and the devastation of German cities would win the war, though he did believe this.


There were numerous cases he would exaggerate claims of weather conditions to avoid small scale targets, and hit cities, so there was definitely a degree of stubbornness in him. And as I said earlier, there was at least one case where he practically dared Portal to fire him.

He also had a dim view of "panacea targets" like oil, though ironically that would bring Germany to its knees.

As for the other issue of discussion



Frank Stewart & Michael Maltby said:


> .



Actually you're both sort of right.

War is essentially a continuation of politics by other means, and politics is about power: And when things come down to power, it's often down to a matter of luck, force, and cunning (might makes right, which is inherently amoral). If right and wrong is involved, it's in the cause of the war, but not the methods to do it which would be considered objectionable to most human beings.

Regardless the conduct of wars does vary from conflict to conflict for various reasons: Some wars do seem to be "cleaner" than others, and others a great deal "dirtier". Examples of "dirty" conduct would include the following (and this is not in order)

Actual or attempted genocide/extermination of population in captured territory, particularly when surrender has already been achieved
Needlessly sadistic practices: Rape (Japan), sodomy, bayonetting pregnant women (Japan, USSR in Afghanistan), using people for decapitation practice (Japan), attacks targeted at children (i.e. using weapons that look like toys, slitting the throats of children in front of their parents, supposedly these events occurred in Afghanistan)

Enslavement of the conquered populace
Deliberate targeting of non-combatants/civil population

Use of biological warfare agents (they are indiscriminate and know no boundaries; their use would also be considered IMHO to be arguably foolish)

Use of chemical warfare, particularly on non-combatants

Sinking of lifeboats (providing they aren't somehow able to pose a threat -- i.e. sniping at a nearby combat ship)

Other: During one of the many CIA interventions in South America, there was a few cases of people that were hooked up with electrodes so they could be 'controlled' like some kind of marionette (they were fully conscious otherwise), they were basically steered into an area of decent size, and were blown up. This is so fucked up I have trouble even writing it with a straight face.
And I should point out that even in WWII there were numerous restraints that were practiced

Germany: They developed some the deadliest poison gases (the G-series), yet didn't use them
United States, United Kingdom: As a general rule, the practice of shooting up aircrews while in their parachutes was frowned upon. We also refrained from using poison gas, and the U.K. refrained from the use of bioweapons.
There are variables that affect wars that most people do not even think about, and that would include high-finance and war-profiteering

High-Finance: Banks that operate internationally have no loyalty to any particular nation (unless it is convenient to their interests) and see nations, by in large, as appendages to their affairs (even in WWII, this was the case). They often are quite comfortable with funding both sides of a war, which is actually quite lucrative (sociopathic as it is), as it facilitates massive profits, and allows one to determine the winner and loser. Even if no conquest occurs, it's still beneficial as wars are economically wasteful and serve to further indebt nations to them.
War Profiteering: Many companies that were part of war industry were not necessarily totally loyal to the United States (Sperry for example was a multi-national company that the US Navy didn't trust for that reason; Ford sold shitloads of vehicles to Germany), and provided you aren't loyal to any one country, funding both sides can actually be useful provided you are able to avoid being on the losing side. Since companies that specialize in military technology profit from military operations, they will get very powerful in war and conflict, and might even manipulate the system to suit their interest (more wars).
I should point out modern intelligence operations were based heavily on international banking. In the 1800's the Rothschilds* were utilized by the British because they had an elaborate intelligence network that eclipsed even the British government. This of course backfired on the British when they operated in their own interest, and profited handsomely off of it.

Many of the personalities in the OSS (and early CIA) were Wall Street Lawyers and Bankers (Dulles was both), the SOE (Special Operations Executive) was under the control of MEW (Ministry of Economic Warfare).

BTW: I wish to issue a disclaimer, partially because you need a disclaimer on everything you say these days, and secondly because of the fact that the comment about high-finance could easily be a means for anti-semitic folks to justify their positions or even bolster them.

I'm not Anti-Semitic: I don't have any objections to people, as a general rule because of their religion or ethnicity. I usually try to judge people on a case-by-case basis.

There are many bankers such as the Rockefellers who are not Jewish and act the same as the Rotschilds. My opinion that their behavior has nothing to do with their religion, but more by their personality (disorders), and their profession (which tends to attract people who fall into the Dark Tetrad).


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## stona (Aug 26, 2016)

Zipper730 said:


> You'd figure with the RAF's philosophy on winning wars, he'd have just said "Since the Germans suffered a serious defeat, and their morale is low, I figure we can crack their will to fight once and for all by flattening a shitload of cities in rapid succession -- the high death toll, the rapidity of strike to strike, and the helplessness of government to fend of the attacks, should do it."
> 
> I thought General Spaatz had revived the idea of Operation Thunderclap, and revised it to include attacks on several cities rather than a huge attack on Berlin?



As I said Churchill promoted the attacks on cities in eastern Germany in support of the Soviet offensives. Bottomley (acting for Portal) instructed Harris to prepare the attacks WITHOUT consulting the CCS or Spaatz.
It had nothing to do with 'flattening a shitload of cities in rapid succession' something that was anyway impossible. Some of the other attacks in this series were not effective or successful. As someone else has pointed out, we remember Dresden because it went ;horribly right'. This also has nothing to do with the RAF/Bomber Command philosophy on winning the war.

Operation Thunderclap, as originally planned, never took place. It was conceived as a joint Bomber Command/USSTAF attack on Berlin as a response to the V-1 offensive. It was shelved largely because of Spaatz's objections. 
The idea that an attack on Berlin might shock the Nazi government into surrender did begin to gain traction in late January 1945. Air Commodore Bufton (Chairman of the Combined Strategic Targeting Committee, a joint RAF/USSTAF staff) wrote on 22nd January, when the Soviet Offensive in the East was just 10 days old, 
_"German radio has recently shown signs of hysteria in broadcasts to the people, and a heavy air attack on the capital and other big towns now might ruin an already shaky morale."_
This was more wishful thinking, but the British Joint Intelligence Committee was now interested, but quite rightly discounted the effects on morale, preferring to adapt the operation to support the Soviet offensive. The JIC report observed that this version of Thunderclap
_"would create great confusion, interfere with the orderly movement of troops to the front, and hamper the German military and administrative machine."_
This is the report that Churchill saw, and the one that caused him to throw his weight behind this idea, asking Portal what was being done to _'blast the Germans'_.
Meanwhile at the weekly air commanders conference in Paris, the possible use of _"the heavies in the new military situation" _was discussed. Tedder, who had presumably seen or at least heard of the JIC report (from Bufton), asked if the time had come for 'Thunderclap'. Now, finally, Spaatz agreed that the time had come but he
_"felt that the operation should be held in instant readiness, but not ordered either until the Russians were on the Oder in strength, or across it."_
Tedder accepted Spaatz's recommendation, but this was certainly not what Churchill had in mind.
Spaatz was nobody's fool, he did not believe that Thunderclap in any form would end the war, though like everyone else he hoped it might. He did believe that a large raid on Berlin would show solidarity with the Russians and disrupt that cities ability to aid the defence of the eastern front.
On 28th January Spaatz returned to England. He had lunch with Bottomley (standing in for Portal). He did not agree to bomb any eastern German cities apart from Berlin. Spaatz gave Doolittle the following priorities, oil (visual), Berlin (visual or blind), the Ruhr, Munich and Hamburg. The 8th AF's fighters were instructed to cover the bombers, attack oil targets and to _"interrupt traffic from West to East towards Berlin and Dresden." _On the same day the targets for US air forces in Berlin were delivered and included, with typical American optimism, the Gestapo headquarters, the RLM and the Alexanderplatz railway station, all in the administrative centre of Berlin.
It is evident that the British and Americans had rather different perceptions of what Thunderclap should be.
After his meeting with Spaatz, Bottomley saw Tedder in Paris where they agreed to maintain oil as the top priority with attacks on Berlin when good visual conditions allowed, with Leipzig and Dresden next on the list of priorities.
On 31st January Bottomley communicated the new priorities to Portal. The top priority remained the synthetic oil plants, but he went on to say
_"Next in priority for Air Forces operating in the UK is attack of Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden and other associated cities where heavy attack will cause great confusion in civilian evacuation from the east and hamper movement of reinforcements for other fronts."_
The very next day Spaatz read this new list of priorities to the weekly air commanders' conference. No one questioned it and it passed almost by default. This was very much the JIC/Churchillian version of Pointblank, and this is why the raid on Dresden occurred. It was a completely normal raid that went very well (for Bomber Command), it is only its success and the lateness of the date that makes it any more remarkable than dozens of others.

There is more to this, Malta, Yalta, Anderson's heart attack, the Quesada plan/Operation Clarion,attack on Munich (Twining ordered by Spaatz at Marshall's prompting) for much the same reasons as the British wanted to go after Leipzig/Dresden, and much, much more, but I don't have time to write a book 

Cheers

Steve


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## Zipper730 (Aug 26, 2016)

stona said:


> As I said Churchill promoted the attacks on cities in eastern Germany in support of the Soviet offensives. Bottomley (acting for Portal) instructed Harris to prepare the attacks WITHOUT consulting the CCS or Spaatz.
> It had nothing to do with 'flattening a shitload of cities in rapid succession' something that was anyway impossible. Some of the other attacks in this series were not effective or successful. As someone else has pointed out, we remember Dresden because it went ;horribly right'. This also has nothing to do with the RAF/Bomber Command philosophy on winning the war.
> 
> Operation Thunderclap, as originally planned, never took place. It was conceived as a joint Bomber Command/USSTAF attack on Berlin as a response to the V-1 offensive. It was shelved largely because of Spaatz's objections.


What objections?



> The idea that an attack on Berlin might shock the Nazi government into surrender did begin to gain traction in late January 1945. Air Commodore Bufton (Chairman of the Combined Strategic Targeting Committee, a joint RAF/USSTAF staff) wrote on 22nd January, when the Soviet Offensive in the East was just 10 days old,
> _"German radio has recently shown signs of hysteria in broadcasts to the people, and a heavy air attack on the capital and other big towns now might ruin an already shaky morale."_
> This was more wishful thinking, but the British Joint Intelligence Committee was now interested, but quite rightly discounted the effects on morale, preferring to adapt the operation to support the Soviet offensive. The JIC report observed that this version of Thunderclap
> _"would create great confusion, interfere with the orderly movement of troops to the front, and hamper the German military and administrative machine."_
> This is the report that Churchill saw, and the one that caused him to throw his weight behind this idea, asking Portal what was being done to _'blast the Germans'_.


So, he saw the idea and modified it to his purpose?



> Meanwhile at the weekly air commanders conference in Paris, the possible use of _"the heavies in the new military situation" _was discussed. Tedder, who had presumably seen or at least heard of the JIC report (from Bufton), asked if the time had come for 'Thunderclap'. Now, finally, Spaatz agreed that the time had come but he
> _"felt that the operation should be held in instant readiness, but not ordered either until the Russians were on the Oder in strength, or across it."_


The Oder river is the border between Germany and Poland?



> He did believe that a large raid on Berlin would show solidarity with the Russians and disrupt that cities ability to aid the defence of the eastern front.


If I recall somebody in the RAF proposed using the tactical air-forces to bomb and strafe the troops and interdict supplies. However, Churchill didn't want to hear it, and wanted to flatten cities.



> He did not agree to bomb any eastern German cities apart from Berlin. Spaatz gave Doolittle the following priorities, oil (visual), Berlin (visual or blind), the Ruhr, Munich and Hamburg. The 8th AF's fighters were instructed to cover the bombers, attack oil targets and to _"interrupt traffic from West to East towards Berlin and Dresden." _On the same day the targets for US air forces in Berlin were delivered and included, with typical American optimism, the Gestapo headquarters, the RLM and the Alexanderplatz railway station, all in the administrative centre of Berlin.


Actually the February 3, 1945 attack on Berlin was aimed squarely at the city and the population: While targets were placed on the map, specific targets, it was largely a pretext for what they were actually aiming at. 



> This was very much the JIC/Churchillian version of Pointblank, and this is why the raid on Dresden occurred. It was a completely normal raid that went very well (for Bomber Command), it is only its success and the lateness of the date that makes it any more remarkable than dozens of others.


A raid that went horribly right as wuzak stated, and fires were progressing better than even expected by the time the second wave of bomber went over the city, the master-bomber actually gave an order bomb to the left and right of the fires (they were using a fan-type of attack profile to widen out the bomb-track).

I've heard different figures for overall surface destruction: Some sources list 15-16 square miles, others around 2.51 square miles. Regardless the raid was a glowing success in the literal sense.


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## GrauGeist (Aug 26, 2016)

Zipper730 said:


> The Oder river is the border between Germany and Poland?


Before WWII, the German border was actually much further east than the Oder.

Poland ended up with a large portion of German territory after WWII, their borders now being west of the Oder.


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## wuzak (Aug 26, 2016)

Zipper730 said:


> Actually as early as 1942, there was an effective raid carried out on a Renault plant in Billancourt. Of course, the raid was carried out at low altitude, and losses might have been steep.




_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BRKnLO-HJu8_


The RAF's largest bombing raid so far - on Paris - WWII Today

_"The plan called for the massed use of flares and a very low bombing level so that crews could hit the factory without too many bombs falling in the surrounding town. There were no Flak defences. 223 aircraft bombed the target, reporting excellent results. Only 1 Wellington was lost. The main raid lasted 1 hour and 50 minutes."_

_"The raid was considered a great success and the destruction caused in the factory received much publicity. Unfortunately, French civilian casualties were heavy. There were many blocks of workers’ apartments very close to the factory."
_
Bombing from low altitude with little or no opposition would make for much better accuracy, no doubt.


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## stona (Aug 27, 2016)

Special operations like the Billancourt raid are not representative of the main force operations for which I gave extensive data above. In this context they are a red herring.

Churchill always liked Harris to flatten cities, but that is not all that Harris was doing in early 1945. In January Bomber Command dropped about 30% of its tonnage on oil targets and more than 20% on the German marshaling yards which were supporting the Ardennes offensive. About half the tonnage went on area raids. 

In early January Spaatz believed that the diversion of the US 8th AF's effort to tactical bombing in support of the 'Battle of the Bulge' had relieved the pressure on Germany's oil industry. This along with other factors worrying to the Allies (new U-Boats, tank production, etc) caused Spaatz to tell Doolittle, who in turn told Eisenhower, that the US Air Forces should return to strategic bombing as soon as possible. Eisenhower disagreed, given the parlous state of the ground battle, but on 6th January Spaatz gained Eisenhower's agreement that two thirds of the bombing forces could return to strategic bombing with oil as the top priority. He reflected a general feeling in USSTAF that continuing to bomb marshaling yards and other tactical targets west of the Rhine would lengthen the war. On 9th January Spaatz gained SHAEF approval to bomb jet production facilities, visually, on the same priority as oil targets. He was regaining control and directing his forces to attack the targets he wanted to attack.
It is Spaatz's whole belief in the strategic bombing of these pressure points in the German war economy, that had led him not to support Thunderclap as he believed it to be a diversion from the main effort. The British JIC version of Thunderclap was hardly more appealing to him, though it did serve a direct military objective, in support of Russian ground operations, something he had just freed his forces from in respect of Anglo-American ground operations. His agreement to bomb Berlin and order fighter operations against West-East communications was a concession in this context.
The minutes of the 11th January air commanders conference show just how frustrated Spaatz, Doolittle and Anderson were by the diversion of their forces. Anderson noted that the strategic air forces
_"were paying a tremendous price by concentrating on helping ground forces."_
Many targets (oil, ball bearing,aircraft factories, U-boat yards...) would have to be hit again. 
Spaatz and Bottomley agreed 'Directive N0. 3 for the Strategic Air Forces in Europe' on 12th January and issued it on 16th January. It covered all the above, and pandered to the British with the inclusion of _'important industrial areas'_ as priority targets. Portal only agreed provisionally, the Air Staff in Washington asked Spaatz to consider raising the priority of U-Boat related attacks and ground support. In the case of the later they might as well have asked him to cut off his hands. Airmen did not like ground support, they did not, from the earliest days of air power, see it as a job for them, doing the Army's work. By the late '40s support by tactical forces had been conceded, but it was still seen as a diversion for the heavy bombers of the strategic air forces. It was less of a problem in the US than in the UK (with a recently independent Air Force) but it still existed.

The 3rd February raid can not be considered part of Thunderclap as it was not part of a combined Anglo-American round the clock operation as originally conceived. Spaatz had conceded an agreement to attack Berlin, as shown earlier. It is also worth noting that Doolittle objected at length and vehemently to the operation, writing to Spaatz that
_"we will, in what may be one of our last and best remembered operations, violate the basic American principle of precision bombing of targets of strictly military significance..."_
He argued more convincingly that
_"the chances of terrorizing into submission, by merely an increased concentration of bombing, a people who have been subjected to intense bombing for four years is extremely remote."_
Spaatz's reply was somewhat non-committal, prompting Doolitle to ask.
_" Is Berlin still open to air attack? Do you want priority oil targets hit in preference to Berlin if they definitely become visual? Do you want center of city hit or definitely military targets such as Spandau, on the Western outskirts?"_
Spaatz annotated his copy of the message sent in reply.
_"Told Doolitle to hit oil if visual assured: other wise, Berlin - center of the city."_
This makes American priorities quite clear, and Thunderclap, or an unrecognisable, watered down version of it, was not top of the list.
It also makes it clear that, over Doolittle's objections, this was indeed to be an attack on the city in what the Americans euphemistically called an 'area type raid'.

Cheers

Steve

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## Zipper730 (Aug 27, 2016)

stona said:


> Special operations like the Billancourt raid are not representative of the main force operations for which I gave extensive data above. In this context they are a red herring.


I guess the Billiancourt raid was an unusual operation for the RAF (low alt penetration), though I never thought of it as a special operation as generally those were carried out by specialist squadrons.


> Churchill always liked Harris to flatten cities, but that is not all that Harris was doing in early 1945. In January Bomber Command dropped about 30% of its tonnage on oil targets and more than 20% on the German marshaling yards which were supporting the Ardennes offensive. About half the tonnage went on area raids.


That I didn't know, I was just under the impression that after 1944, the RAF just went back to busting cities, and when Dresden was gone, they just kept flattening everything left.


> In early January Spaatz believed that the diversion of the US 8th AF's effort to tactical bombing in support of the 'Battle of the Bulge' had relieved the pressure on Germany's oil industry.


There probably is some truth for this, but fundamentally if you're going to commit to occupying somebody (and the Germans were good candidates), you might as well cover your troops.

I'm surprised heavy bombers would be useful for CAS operations: Sounds like a way to just kill everybody.


> The 3rd February raid can not be considered part of Thunderclap as it was not part of a combined Anglo-American round the clock operation as originally conceived. Spaatz had conceded an agreement to attack Berlin, as shown earlier. It is also worth noting that Doolittle objected at length and vehemently to the operation, writing to Spaatz that
> _"we will, in what may be one of our last and best remembered operations, violate the basic American principle of precision bombing of targets of strictly military significance..."_


At the very least it was a desire to avoid looking bad from a legacy standpoint, at best it was a desire to avoid hitting non-military targets.

As an interesting note, I was under the impression that the raids in 1942 were aimed at either no specific target or merely any target that was available?


> He argued more convincingly that
> _"the chances of terrorizing into submission, by merely an increased concentration of bombing, a people who have been subjected to intense bombing for four years is extremely remote."_


That's a valid point: The RAF pounded the daylights out of them relentlessly, particularly since late 1943.


> Spaatz's reply was somewhat non-committal, prompting Doolitle to ask.
> _" Is Berlin still open to air attack? Do you want priority oil targets hit in preference to Berlin if they definitely become visual? Do you want center of city hit or definitely military targets such as Spandau, on the Western outskirts?"_
> Spaatz annotated his copy of the message sent in reply.
> _"Told Doolitle to hit oil if visual assured: other wise, Berlin - center of the city."_
> ...


It ironically wasn't our first area-raid. Far as I know that was Munster.


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## stona (Aug 28, 2016)

It might have been better to describe the raid on the Renault plant as experimental. Although Gee equipped aircraft were not used the 'Shaker' technique intended for use with Gee was used. It was all an effort to concentrate the bombing in space and time. At Billancourt Bomber Command managed to get 121 aircraft an hour over the target. The attack also benefited from optimal weather and weak defences, none of which were expected over the Ruhr against which Bomber Command had been directed to make its main effort. During March and April, following the Billancourt raid, the Command made eight attacks on Essen, all using the full 'Shaker 'protocol, with Gee, all with poor results. 212 bombing photos were analysed and of them only 22 could be plotted within five miles of the city centre. Billancourt was very much an exception, NOT the rule.

As a slight aside, after the Billancourt raid, the Vichy regime declared a day of national mourning in a pretty cynical attempt to make some political mileage from the event. It was a precursor to the sort of posters put up in Rouen in 1944, after British raids on that city, showing Joan of Arc kneeling on rubble with the caption "Murderers always return to the scene of their crimes."

Harris always liked attacking Germany's cities because he believed that this was the best way to win the war. However, he has been badly treated over his Command's alleged lack of effort against what he described as 'panacea targets'.
Between 1st June '44 and 8th May '45 Bomber Command devoted 15% of its total sorties (22,000 of 155,000) to oil targets and dropped 99,500 tons of bombs on them. Both these figures EXCEED the effort made by the 8th Air Force which devoted 13% of its sorties (28,000 of 220,000) and dropped 73,000 tons of bombs on oil targets between 12th May '44 and 8th May '45. As far as attacks on oil targets, Bomber Command made a substantially greater effort than the 8th Air Force, though reading most histories (Hastings!) you could never know this.

The use of aircraft at all, but particularly a strategic bomber force in a a tactical role (more interdiction than close air support in modern terms, though they certainly did attempt CAS as well, sometimes with disastrous results) was still a contentious subject during WW2, Immediately before the war the RAF, relatively recently independent, deemed any attempt to cajole it into any role in support of the Army as a potential first step on the road to a loss of that hard won independence.

The US Air Forces generally specified a specific, military, target in targeting plans. However, throughout their periods of operations the 8th AF devoted 13% of its bomb load to city attacks, compared with 51% for Bomber Command. The 15th AF dropped only 4% of its bombs on city areas.
This is reflected in the make up of their bomb loads. The proportion of incendiaries is a good indication of the intended target, city/area raids utilise a high proportion of this type of ordnance. The percentage of incendiary ordnance carried by the various forces was 21% for Bomber Command, 15% for the 8th and 2% for the 15th.

Cheers

Steve

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## michaelmaltby (Aug 28, 2016)

Recently read "The German War: A Nation Under Arms 1939, 1945, Soldiers and Citizens" by Nicholas Stargardt. Very interesting perspective on civilian moral after 1942 (Stalingrad). Much material gleaned from Gestapo records of what was overheard by people in casual conversation. Highly recommended.

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## stona (Aug 28, 2016)

By an amazing coincidence I have this book in a paperback version pre-ordered from Amazon.

It does get very good reviews and recommendations, I'm looking forward to receiving it after 1st September.

Not really covering much of the German and British experience of bombing, concentrating more on the lesser known Italian and French experiences is 'Bombing, States and Peoples in western Europe 1940-1945". I give it a conditional recommendation as it is really a collection of essays, edited by Baldoli, Knapp and Overy, and is not a particularly easy read. For those with a serious interest in the title subject there is plenty to enjoy.

Cheers

Steve


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## michaelmaltby (Aug 28, 2016)

I look forward to your impressions of the book when you've read it, Steve.


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## stona (Aug 28, 2016)

It has occurred to me that I nonchalantly referred to an attack using the 'Shaker' protocol, without explaining what that was, and not everyone will be aware of the various attack protocols developed by Bomber Command through the war.

'Shaker' was the first and it was intended for use with Gee equipped aircraft, though this was not the case at Billancourt.
It can be broken down into 3 phases.
1) 'Illuminator' aircraft drop flares over the target (these would normally be the Gee equipped aircraft).
2) 'Finders' drop incendiaries to confirm the target.
3)'Followers', the main force aircraft, bomb the incendiaries.

Other protocols developed as different navigation aids and types of pyrotechnic target indicators (TIs) were developed. What we know as target indicators, familiar from late war footage of bombing raids, were only developed after the introduction of Gee and with half an eye on a path finder force, and were not available for the earlier 'Shaker' attacks. The first TIs were not used until a raid on Berlin on 16th January 1943, nearly a year after the Billancourt raid.

The various attack protocols were given code names after the home towns of various Bomber Command officers. The names of the principle protocols, 'Newhaven', 'Paramatta', and 'Waganui', certainly indicate the cosmopolitan make up of Bomber Command. British and Canadians made up the majority of aircrew, but significant numbers of Australians and New Zealanders (certainly relative to their small populations) meant that the backbone was very much British and 'old' Commonwealth, though men from many other nations served. As a Briton all I can say is that we were very lucky to have them all.

Cheers

Steve

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## wuzak (Aug 28, 2016)

stona said:


> Between 1st June '44 and 8th May '45 Bomber Command devoted 15% of its total sorties (22,000 of 155,000) to oil targets and dropped 99,500 tons of bombs on them. Both these figures EXCEED the effort made by the 8th Air Force which devoted 13% of its sorties (28,000 of 220,000) and dropped 73,000 tons of bombs on oil targets between 12th May '44 and 8th May '45. As far as attacks on oil targets, Bomber Command made a substantially greater effort than the 8th Air Force, though reading most histories (Hastings!) you could never know this.



Interesting stats Steve.

I have _Masters of the Air_ by Donald L Miller which says that the 8thAF did more missions against oil targets than the RAF, but used smaller bombs and thus were less effective than the RAF.

The stats you provided show an average bomb load of 4.5 tons per sortie for the RAF vs 2.75 tons for the RAF.


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## Zipper730 (Aug 28, 2016)

stona said:


> It might have been better to describe the raid on the Renault plant as experimental. Although Gee equipped aircraft were not used the 'Shaker' technique intended for use with Gee was used. It was all an effort to concentrate the bombing in space and time.


I assume 'shaker' was a code-name? 

Regardless, the profile would eventually evolve to use radio-navigation aids, a pathfinder force to drop flares over target, finders to deploy incendiaries, and then the main-force aircraft would begin to bomb.

Was this altered in anyway other than the use of Oboe as well as Gee, and H2S in pathfinders? I remember later on that the RAF would drop explosives first to bust open the building, then incendiaries to light up the insides of the buildings. Or did the main-force drop explosives and incendiaries as described?



> At Billancourt Bomber Command managed to get 121 aircraft an hour over the target. The attack also benefited from optimal weather and weak defences, none of which were expected over the Ruhr against which Bomber Command had been directed to make its main effort.


Which would make it a suicidal mission due to the flak and night-fighters.



> Harris always liked attacking Germany's cities because he believed that this was the best way to win the war.


This is know, but what was not often known was that he was not the only person behind this and Churchill instigated this.



> However, he has been badly treated over his Command's alleged lack of effort against what he described as 'panacea targets'.


I think the issue was that he could have allocated more of his effort to destroying refineries as it would have ended the war faster.



> Between 1st June '44 and 8th May '45 Bomber Command devoted 15% of its total sorties (22,000 of 155,000) to oil targets and dropped 99,500 tons of bombs on them. Both these figures EXCEED the effort made by the 8th Air Force which devoted 13% of its sorties (28,000 of 220,000) and dropped 73,000 tons of bombs on oil targets between 12th May '44 and 8th May '45.


The RAF had bombers that could carry heavier bomb-loads a given distance as well as fundamentally larger payloads.



> The use of aircraft at all, but particularly a strategic bomber force in a a tactical role (more interdiction than close air support in modern terms, though they certainly did attempt CAS as well, sometimes with disastrous results) was still a contentious subject during WW2


Of course the bomber-guys hated being relegated to support the Army, and the accuracy wasn't always very good.



> Immediately before the war the RAF, relatively recently independent, deemed any attempt to cajole it into any role in support of the Army as a potential first step on the road to a loss of that hard won independence.


The RAF from 1939-1941 was in danger of being dismembered.



> The US Air Forces generally specified a specific, military, target in targeting plans. However, throughout their periods of operations the 8th AF devoted 13% of its bomb load to city attacks, compared with 51% for Bomber Command. The 15th AF dropped only 4% of its bombs on city areas.


Makes sense since the USAAF's doctrine was as a rule based more on denial (destroying the ability to fight).



> This is reflected in the make up of their bomb loads. The proportion of incendiaries is a good indication of the intended target, city/area raids utilise a high proportion of this type of ordnance. The percentage of incendiary ordnance carried by the various forces was 21% for Bomber Command, 15% for the 8th and 2% for the 15th.


I thought the RAF was using 50-90% incendiaries?

Cheers



> The various attack protocols were given code names after the home towns of various Bomber Command officers. The names of the principle protocols, 'Newhaven', 'Paramatta', and 'Waganui', certainly indicate the cosmopolitan make up of Bomber Command.


If I may ask what are the nature of these profiles?


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## wuzak (Aug 29, 2016)

Zipper730 said:


> The RAF had bombers that could carry heavier bomb-loads a given distance as well as fundamentally larger payloads.



The point Stona was making was that the _effort_ expended by the RAF on oil targets was proportionally greater than the USAAF's. 

That is, 15% of Bomber Command sorties in the period were against oil targets vs only 13% for the USAAF's.




Zipper730 said:


> Makes sense since the USAAF's doctrine was as a rule based more on denial (destroying the ability to fight).



And, to a degree, denial that they actually aim at cities, or that their military objectives were in the centre of cities and had no hope of hitting the target without damaging large areas of the surrounding city.


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## stona (Aug 29, 2016)

The percentage of incendiaries is by weight. Incendiary ordnance is much lighter than high explosive and the bomb containers relatively bulky, and also incidentally often in short supply.

One of the reasons for the relatively poor showing of the 8th Air Force against oil targets at this time was its diversion to supporting the Army, much bemoaned by Spaatz, Anderson and others.

The principle marking systems I gave above, there were of course variations and developments and in this the Bomber Groups enjoyed some autonomy. For example, It was 5 Group that developed the 'timed run' from indicators placed some distance from the target that would therefore not be obscured by the results of the bombing. This also allowed for 'sector bombing' when each aircraft of a squadron flew its timed run from the markers on a slightly different bearing (usually two degrees), and time for run, which meant that the sixteen aircraft of the squadron bombed a fan shaped sector of thirty two degrees, something that worked to perfection at Dresden.

Anyway the basic protocols were as follows.

NEWHAVEN
1) Flares dropped by Path Finder Force (PFF), blind, using H2S or Oboe (Musical Newhaven) to illuminate target area.
2) Second wave from PFF drop target indicators (TIs) visually using light from flares.
3) Main Force bombs on TIs.

PARAMATTA
1) PFF drops TIs blind using H2S or Oboe (Musical Paramatta). There is no visual identification of the target.
2) Main Force bombs on TIs.

WANGANUI
1) PFF drops parachute TIs using H2S, Oboe (Musical Wanganui) and Broadcast Winds (exactly what it sounds like). This is a blind sky marking technique for use when the target is obscured by cloud.
2) Main Force bombs using floating TIs as the aiming point.

All the systems developed with 'backers up' to remark or adjust the aiming point and the introduction of master bombers who could make any adjustments and instruct incoming crews which markers to bomb on, hence avoiding any markers that fell wide of the target.

Only one of the systems involves any visual identification of the target and this is a reflection of the weather in NW Europe, particularly over the winter months when longer hours of darkness allowed for longer operations, and the everlasting problem of trying to see in the dark.

Newhaven was generally the most accurate. Late in the war PFF Mosquitos would drop the initial TIs, visually, from only 800 ft. If the aiming point was correctly identified it could be marked very accurately. At Dresden the initial TIs went down within 100 metres of the aiming point (the Ostragehege Stadium).

Cheers

Steve

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## stona (Aug 29, 2016)

Zipper730 said:


> Which would make it a suicidal mission due to the flak and night-fighters.



This, in relation to the 121 aircraft per hour at Billancourt and later RAF raids needs some clarification.

There were two principle objectives in concentrating the bomber stream. A concentration over the target was essential to achieve the concentration in space and time needed to create the most destructive of all effects, the fire storm, but the primary driving factor was an attempt to lower losses.
By May 1942 Bomber Command had a fairly complete picture of the rapidly improving German air defence system and it had become obvious that the previous haphazard routing of raids was no longer possible. Harris noted that

_"It was also clear that concentration both in time and space was vital, not only over the target, but on the route as well." _

One of the aims of the famous 1,000 bomber raids was to show that concentration could lower losses. The idea was simply to saturate and thereby overwhelm the defences. The raids did indeed show, in the words of the ORS report, that

"..._there was something to be gained by concentration."_

Harris again, writing of this time (1942).

"[A force of] _250-300 aircraft was wholly inadequate to saturate the then existing defences of a major industrial town of half a million or more inhabitants. But if we attacked with a larger force, supposing we could get one, should we be able to organise it in such a way as to get a really high concentration over the target? It was becoming obvious that the degree of concentration we had achieved thus far was not going to be good enough, but there was no previous experience to show whether it would be practical to put many hundreds of aircraft over a target at a rate of, say, ten a minute; in the past such a concentration would have been thought of as absurd as it was dangerous, for this was six times as high concentration as had been aimed at towards the end of 1941."
_
The most obvious danger of such concentrations was collision. But Bomber Command's own ORS worked out that at the lower concentrations the chance of collision was less than one half of one percent, whereas that of being shot down by fighter or flak was a three or four percent. The chance of collision could be raised significantly as long as it reduced the chance of losses to other causes, because it would still reduce the overall loss rate.
The ORS
_
"..envisaged ten aircraft crossing a given point every minute which meant ten aircraft scattered randomly in a box of sky three miles long by five or more miles wide and nearly two miles deep."
_
Put like that it doesn't seem so bad and in fact collisions were very rare.

Jump ahead to the often discussed raid on Dresden in February 1945 and we find that all 244 aircraft of the first wave bombed between 22.13 and 22.28. In just 15 minutes 881 tons of bombs fell on the central districts of the city, 57% high explosive, 43% incendiary, by weight. This represents about 16 aircraft per minute/976 per hour passing over the aiming point, figures well in excess of those even Harris hoped for three years earlier.
The Americans like to describe the initial air assaults on Baghdad with the phrase 'shock and awe' but they looked like a few party poppers compared to this.

Cheers

Steve
_
_

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## parsifal (Aug 31, 2016)

was there a point in the BC offensive when their switch of some effort to so-called precision attacks like their attacks on oil later in the war, were undertaken in daylight? It seems to me that as the war drew closer to german surrender, the ability of the LW to inflict losses grew less and less. As a percentage of total force committed, the RAF had suffered frightful attrition rates in the first half of 1944. Later, as a percentage of total forces committed this percentage fell right away. Perhaps the RAFs belated switch to more "useful" targets was linked to their need to assess this success to loss rates they were expecting?


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## stona (Aug 31, 2016)

The idea of operating by day as well as night had certainly been raised by Portal and the Air Ministry in early 1944 (maybe even earlier).
Harris was implacably opposed to it, a perspective held since the expensive daylight raids of 1942, and he argued against any daylight operations.
The Air Ministry felt that escorted daylight raids could be effective over the occupied countries and western Germany, and also that there needed to be some capacity for daylight operations, should some 'emergency' arise during the invasion. Night losses were also added to the reasons to shift to daylight operations.
Harris replied that daytime operations would be costly, believing nothing had changed since 1942, and would be no more accurate than night time operations already being undertaken. The only case for daytime tactical operations would be if the Americans, who were trained for these operations, could, for some reason not undertake them. He also believed that there were insufficient escorts and that the British bombers had insufficient fire power to fend off a well executed fighter attack, unlike the Americans who had the tactics and training to concentrate their firepower. British bombers did not fly in a tight formation by day, but a loose gaggle. Finally British bombers operated below 18,000ft where flak was most effective.
Harris' arguments were all valid until, on 6th June, the Luftwaffe failed to materialise. Bomber Command started a series of escorted daylight raids from mid month. The loss rate for these sorties in June and July was just 0.4%.
The bombing over the summer was analysed by Bomber Command's ORS and various tactics developed for daylight operations. Oboe ground marking could be directly transferred from night time operations. Additional techniques were added. The simplest was simply visual bombing, assuming the target was unobscured. Gee-Dead Reckoning was developed, involving either bombing over a Gee fix or making a timed run from a Gee fix. Finally, and most complicated, Oboe and G-H formation techniques were introduced. These were a version of the American 'toggling on the Group leader' system. The leading aircraft would use one of the systems to bomb and everyone else would bomb when he did. These attacks could be delivered regardless of the weather on the ground, but were limited by the range of the device used, and depended on the accuracy of the leader's bombing and the rest of the raid keeping him in sight (remember, no American style formations). The other techniques were dependent on reasonable weather.

Incidentally, even the gaggle did not escape analysis. Sir George Thomson, Scientific Advisor at the Air Ministry argued that by broadening the gaggle from a two to three mile front, thus reducing the tail, losses to flak could be halved. Bomber Command's ORS felt the logic was solid, but a major counter argument came from Fighter Command who felt strongly that fighter escort was more effective on a narrow front. The last word went to the Senior Air Staff Officer, on 8th December '44, and it is interesting for the light it sheds on Bomber Command's opinion of the USAAF tactics at this late stage of the war.

_"I consider that our losses in daylight operations due to flak have so far been extremely light and certainly compare favourably with the Americans.
Groups are doing everything possible to reduce the length of the 'gaggle' in order to entirely eliminate the 'tail' which is what Sir George Thomson is after.
So long as a 'gaggle' is our accepted formation ( a 'gaggle' implying that each aircraft is flying and bombing as an independent unit as opposed to a set place in a fixed formation), I do not think that much more can be done to ensure that aircraft are placed in the best possible theoretical position in regard to freedom from flak. It is largely a question of method and training and I feel that many Americans would gladly give up their set formations for our 'gaggles', but their operational and pre-operational training makes this impossible in the same way that it would be difficult for us to change to their or any other set formations."_

Cheers

Steve

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## Zipper730 (Aug 31, 2016)

wuzak said:


> The point Stona was making was that the _effort_ expended by the RAF on oil targets was proportionally greater than the USAAF's.
> 
> That is, 15% of Bomber Command sorties in the period were against oil targets vs only 13% for the USAAF's.


So basically some either felt they could do more, or felt that Harris was half-assing it?



> And, to a degree, denial that they actually aim at cities, or that their military objectives were in the centre of cities and had no hope of hitting the target without damaging large areas of the surrounding city.


Well, the destruction of the cities often resulted in massive industrial damage. However, the point I was making out since the first page was that basically the populations themselves were the target, industrial sights were not serious objectives.

Harris actually said this several times, and almost leaves me wondering if he wanted this to be made known? One thing that I can say that I respect about Harris was that he generally seemed the most willing to either tell the truth or at least remotely attempt to do so. General LeMay was fairly similar in many respects (LeMay in some ways was more admirable actually, not so much because he was straight forward and direct, but it was because he was willing to fly into battle with his men and take the risk with all of them).



stona said:


> The percentage of incendiaries is by weight. Incendiary ordnance is much lighter than high explosive and the bomb containers relatively bulky, and also incidentally often in short supply.


So they were low density and took up a lot of space in the bays?



> One of the reasons for the relatively poor showing of the 8th Air Force against oil targets at this time was its diversion to supporting the Army, much bemoaned by Spaatz, Anderson and others.


I'm surprised they didn't just use the A-20's, A-26's, B-25's and B-26's to do that and leave the B-17's and B-24's to hit the oil-refineries.

In fact, since the RAF was attacking oil as early as 1940, I'm surprised that the first deep-penetration raids into Germany weren't directed at these targets. While ball-bearings seemed an interesting target, they don't seem to be particularly difficult to manufacture and the Germans seemed to always be building factories even in the wreckage of the rubble the RAF always seemed to create.

Oil on the other hand is either refined from places naturally or made artificially, which seems to require specialized facilities. I'm not sure how much resistance they expected over either target and how much damage you needed to put either out of action.



> The principle marking systems I gave above, there were of course variations and developments and in this the Bomber Groups enjoyed some autonomy.


While this is a little beyond the scope of the discussion, there is something that has been in my mind recently based on a few books I read: When the RAF acquired nuclear weapons, how centralized were they in comparison to SAC?



> For example, It was 5 Group that developed the 'timed run' from indicators placed some distance from the target that would therefore not be obscured by the results of the bombing.


So they dropped the markers slightly long or short, and set it up so they'd drop a certain amount of time after overflying the flare?



> This also allowed for 'sector bombing' when each aircraft of a squadron flew its timed run from the markers on a slightly different bearing (usually two degrees), and time for run, which meant that the sixteen aircraft of the squadron bombed a fan shaped sector of thirty two degrees, something that worked to perfection at Dresden.


And with multiple squadrons, some dropped at the same time, and other at different intervals to stretch out the fan?



> Anyway the basic protocols were as follows.
> 
> NEWHAVEN
> 1) Flares dropped by Path Finder Force (PFF), blind, using H2S or Oboe (Musical Newhaven) to illuminate target area.
> ...


So musical always involved the use of Oboe, blind involved H2S?



> Only one of the systems involves any visual identification of the target and this is a reflection of the weather in NW Europe, particularly over the winter months when longer hours of darkness allowed for longer operations, and the everlasting problem of trying to see in the dark.


Just out of curiosity, when was the first night-vision systems fielded? Basically I'm talking about a system that works by either amplifying existing light a couple dozen/hundred times, or using infrared imaging.



> At Dresden the initial TIs went down within 100 metres of the aiming point (the Ostragehege Stadium).


So that was the start of the fan?


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## wuzak (Aug 31, 2016)

Zipper730 said:


> So basically some either felt they could do more, or felt that Harris was half-assing it?



"Some" may have been trying to talk up their own effort and belittle that of the RAF's.

In any case, the statistic shows that RAF expended a larger proportion of their capability on oil targets than did the 8th AF.


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## GrauGeist (Aug 31, 2016)

The Germans could always managed to get fuel and oil from one source or another, but the ball-bearings were a much needed component in every single machine the German military used - from 88 mounts to U-Boats.


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## wuzak (Aug 31, 2016)

Zipper730 said:


> Well, the destruction of the cities often resulted in massive industrial damage. However, the point I was making out since the first page was that basically the populations themselves were the target, industrial sights were not serious objectives.
> 
> Harris actually said this several times, and almost leaves me wondering if he wanted this to be made known? One thing that I can say that I respect about Harris was that he generally seemed the most willing to either tell the truth or at least remotely attempt to do so. General LeMay was fairly similar in many respects (LeMay in some ways was more admirable actually, not so much because he was straight forward and direct, but it was because he was willing to fly into battle with his men and take the risk with all of them).



The populations worked in the factories, so that had an effect on production as well.

The point I was making, and that you seem to ignore, is that official USAAF histories seem to have whitewashed their involvement in bombing population centres. Even in the war the USAAF would couch their target as a marshalling yard rather than the centre of the city, though the yard was, indeed, in the centre of the city and that the vast majority of bombs dropped in a raid would go nowhere near the yards.


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## wuzak (Aug 31, 2016)

Zipper730 said:


> In fact, since the RAF was attacking oil as early as 1940, I'm surprised that the first deep-penetration raids into Germany weren't directed at these targets. While ball-bearings seemed an interesting target, they don't seem to be particularly difficult to manufacture and the Germans seemed to always be building factories even in the wreckage of the rubble the RAF always seemed to create.
> 
> Oil on the other hand is either refined from places naturally or made artificially, which seems to require specialized facilities. I'm not sure how much resistance they expected over either target and how much damage you needed to put either out of action.



USAAF planners identified ball bearings as a critical product. Destroying ball bearing production in Germany would hinder production of other items, as GrauGeist noted.

What was unknown at the time was that there was a reasonable amount of stock built up, and that the attacks on Germany would leave the 8th AF incapable of repeating the raid in the following weeks.

Many machines that used ball bearings could be redesigned to take plain bearings, and that was also not considered.

btw, a BOAC Mosquito flew to Stockholm the day after the first Schweinfurt raid with a trade delegation which bought up the entire ball bearing production for export from Sweden.

As to oil, I don't think Allied planners fully appreciated the precarious supply situation the Germans had faced since quite early in the war.


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## stona (Sep 1, 2016)

Harris was up front about attacking Germany's workers, he felt that some of his seniors were at least disingenuous about what they had ordered him to do and at worst dishonest, the latter is a charge that could not be leveled at Harris, whatever else you feel about him.

Harris took an almost opposite view to the Americans regarding targeting, but he did, eventually, do what he was told to do. He would write.
_
"From April 1944, for nearly half a year, the German home industrial cities enjoyed a virtual respite from bombing. In the few intervals between demands for assistance to the armies, or for the attack of flying bomb targets, rail centres, oil plants, French aircraft factories, U-Boat bases, etc., or when weather prevented operations over Western Europe, I carried out attacks in Germany in accordance with the current directif. During the period May-September, 1944, however, other commitments absorbed over 85% of Bomber Command's effort. Indeed, for a period of two months, which included D-Day, it proved impossible to attack any German city in strength."_

There is little doubt that Harris at least believed this diversion of effort let the Germans off the hook and lengthened the war. With the benefit of hindsight I think this is not an argument easy to support, but at the time it seemed valid. He continued.

_"As a result, determined efforts by the Nazi leaders to revive vital war production by patching up bombed factories and providing emergency living conditions for thousands of homeless workers made much headway during the spring and summer."_

This is a contention rejected by Zuckermann and the BBSU, but then, to paraphrase the lovely Mandy Rice Davies, 'they would, wouldn't they?'

The truth, as ever, lies somewhere in between.

As far as early attacks, bombing policy was decided by a series of plans, W.A.5 and W.A.6 were the relevant pre -war plans, W.A.8 was formulated after the outbreak of war. All sought to attack Germany's war industries in the Ruhr, Rhineland and Saar. W.A.6 specifically targeted oil, its object was

_"to reduce Germany's war resources of oil as rapidly and completely as possible."_

W.A.8, formulated after the war began was the first to target an abstract objective by advocating large scale attacks by night to cause dislocation and demoralisation.
It was the plans to attack industry and particularly oil which were preferred by the War Cabinet. Unfortunately Bomber Command could not find a city reliably, an industrial plant was beyond its capability.
In June 1940, when efforts to reduce the Luftwaffe were obviously required a new directif gave slightly different priorities.

_i) The industry on which the GAF was dependent
ii) Certain communications targets in the Ruhr
iii) Oil targets_

What is remarkable is just how similar these early (1939/40) British objectives are to those attempted by the Americans several years later. It is important to understand that the evolution of area bombing came as a result of the technological limitations of bombing forces in the early 1940s. Bomber Command could be given all the optimistic directives that could be written, but it could not carry them out.

Early raids were dictated by other priorities, the German Navy, Norway and Denmark, the Battles across the Low Countries and then France, followed by anti-invasion operations. Nonetheless, the first attack on oil targets occurred in May 1940. 

Cheers

Steve

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## bobbysocks (Sep 12, 2016)

michaelmaltby said:


> Recently read "The German War: A Nation Under Arms 1939, 1945, Soldiers and Citizens" by Nicholas Stargardt. Very interesting perspective on civilian moral after 1942 (Stalingrad). Much material gleaned from Gestapo records of what was overheard by people in casual conversation. Highly recommended.



its available via kindle for 20usd. paperback after shipping was almost 16 so for 4 bucks more the ebook looks good. I just sent a free sample to my ipad.


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## bobbysocks (Sep 12, 2016)

wuzak said:


> USAAF planners identified ball bearings as a critical product. Destroying ball bearing production in Germany would hinder production of other items, as GrauGeist noted.
> 
> Many machines that used ball bearings could be redesigned to take plain bearings, and that was also not considered.



yes many could use a standard roller bearing and IF there is one already in production that could be swapped ( ID, OD, load rate, etc ) then its no big deal for the germans. but if there isn't, one has to be engineered and tooling has to be made before it can be mass produced. that can cause considerable delay.


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## wuzak (Sep 12, 2016)

bobbysocks said:


> yes many could use a standard roller bearing and IF there is one already in production that could be swapped ( ID, OD, load rate, etc ) then its no big deal for the germans. but if there isn't, one has to be engineered and tooling has to be made before it can be mass produced. that can cause considerable delay.



I did say plain bearings.

Some German engines may have used rolling element bearings but could have been converted to plain bearings after Schweinfurt.

Arguably hydrostatic and hydrodynamic "plain" bearings are superior in a number of applications.


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## Zipper730 (Sep 12, 2016)

wuzak

*Post #43: 8/31/16*


> The populations worked in the factories, so that had an effect on production as well.


True enough, but far as I know, the Germans could have just pulled workers from one city to another.


> The point I was making, and that you seem to ignore, is that official USAAF histories seem to have whitewashed their involvement in bombing population centres.


Of course, no nation likes to admit they were deliberately killing noncombatants


> Even in the war the USAAF would couch their target as a marshalling yard rather than the centre of the city, though the yard was, indeed, in the centre of the city and that the vast majority of bombs dropped in a raid would go nowhere near the yards.


I suppose it depended on the target, but you make valid points: There were definitely certain raids such as Munster and Berlin that clearly were aimed at the population despite what targets were specified to the air-crews.

*Post #44: 8/31/16*


> Many machines that used ball bearings could be redesigned to take plain bearings, and that was also not considered.


Why was this not considered out of curiosity?


> btw, a BOAC Mosquito flew to Stockholm the day after the first Schweinfurt raid with a trade delegation which bought up the entire ball bearing production for export from Sweden.


Deplete the reserves...


> As to oil, I don't think Allied planners fully appreciated the precarious supply situation the Germans had faced since quite early in the war.


I was doing some research and there seemed to be an impression that the Germans had massive stocks that they didn't really have.

stona

*Post #45: 9/1/16*


> Harris was up front about attacking Germany's workers, he felt that some of his seniors were at least disingenuous about what they had ordered him to do and at worst dishonest


Which was of course true.


> This is a contention rejected by Zuckermann and the BBSU, but then, to paraphrase the lovely Mandy Rice Davies, 'they would, wouldn't they?'


What was there contention again?


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## GrauGeist (Sep 13, 2016)

bobbysocks said:


> yes many could use a standard roller bearing and IF there is one already in production that could be swapped ( ID, OD, load rate, etc ) then its no big deal for the germans. but if there isn't, one has to be engineered and tooling has to be made before it can be mass produced. that can cause considerable delay.


You can't just arbitrarily stop engine production mid-stream and swap bearings and hope for the best. The ball-bearings and roller-bearings were an integral part of the machine's design. The DB6xx series were roller-bearing intensive and any shortage of those specific bearings meant the much needed engine supply slowed to a halt.

Another example: in winter of 1944, production of the Panther tank was slowed as they had to make a conversion from ball-bearings to sleeve-bearings because of shortages. 

Some equipment may have been able to swap out different types, but the ball-bearing was a cornerstone of the German war machine.


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## wuzak (Sep 13, 2016)

Zipper730 said:


> True enough, but far as I know, the Germans could have just pulled workers from one city to another.



Providing they would be doing the same, or similar, work.

And it takes time and money to relocate the workers, meanwhile the factory in their original city grinds to a halt as its workforce has been displaced.


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## stona (Sep 13, 2016)

Zipper730 said:


> What was there contention again?



It was Harris' contention, made in his _'Despatch on War Operations' _that the diversion of his forces to tactical bombing in support of the invasion and away from area bombing gave the German economy respite and allowed a recovery resulting in increased production in 1944. This ran contrary to the opinion of Zuckermann and others at SHAEF and was rejected by Zuckermann in the BBSU report. 
Harris contention was further challenged in the _'Air Staff Memorandum on the Despatch by Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris GCB, OBE, AFC on Bomber Command's Operations 1942/45'_, particularly in the opening paragraphs _'General Observation'_ and in Part III _'Summary of the Bombing Effort and Results'_ and Part IV _'Conclusions'._

Neither the BBSU nor the Memorandum give any alternative explanation for the late war spike in German production, the Memorandum actually asks that a graph demonstrating an_ 'estimated production loss due to bombing'_ produced in Harris' Despatch be_ 'ignored_' as it was based on _'an incorrect hypothesis'._

Cheers

Steve


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## stona (Sep 13, 2016)

While we are on the subject of post war re-assessment of Bomber Command's effort, and Harris' leadership, how about this for disloyalty, also from the Air Staff Memorandum.

_"6. The C-in-C states, in paragraph 3, that his main task was 'to focus attacks on the morale of the enemy civil population, and, in particular, of the industrial workers' through the attack of certain major industrial centres.

7. It will be observed that similar emphasis on the attack on industrial centres is conspicuous throughout the despatch, and it is considered that the C-in-C's brief summary of the Air Ministry's directive of February 1942 tends to obscure the fact that the Air Staff intention was always to return to the bombing of precise targets as quickly as the tactical capabilities of the bomber force, and the improving of night bombing technique, would permit."_

Harris was doing exactly what the directive asked him to do, even concentrating on the areas/cities specified by the Air Ministry. The second half of paragraph 7 is about as close to BS as I've ever seen in an Air Ministry Memorandum, and the authors must have known this.
It is nearly as bad, though not quite, as Churchill's volte-face following the famous raids on Dresden.







Wanton destruction? Webster and Frankland addressed this.

_"neither the Air Staff, nor Sir Arthur Harris can be justly accused of waging war in a different moral sense from that approved by the government. Moreover, it should be made equally clear that at no stage of the war was the area bombing wanton. On the contrary, it was a carefully designed strategic plan intended to contribute to the most rapid and the most economical defeat of Germany."_

Area bombing was NOT an idea that sprang into being in 1942. It was adopted as a result of the inability to carry out anything else, but it predates WW2 and was regularly implemented in WW I.

In 1917 a plan developed by the joint Army-Navy Air Policy Committee entitled 'Long Distance Bombing' suggested.

_"the terrorization of the civilian population through selecting targets that were located in densely populated industrial areas, so that all the bombs which failed to hit the aiming points (ostensibly industries supporting the enemy war effort) would strike at the morale of the civilian population by destroying their lives and homes."_

In September 1918 Sir William Weir, Secretary of State for Air wrote to Trenchard.

_"I would very much like it if you could start a really big fire in one of the German towns...I can think of nothing more terrifying to a civilian population than bombing from a low altitude and I was frequently very apprehensive that the Bosch would do this in London...
If I were you, I would not be too exacting as regards accuracy when bombing railway stations in the middle of towns."_

Sound familiar?

Trenchard's reply would have pleased Weir.

_"I do not think you need to be anxious about our degree of accuracy when bombing stations in the middle of towns. The accuracy is not great at present, and all the pilots drop their eggs well into the middle of the town generally."_

The difference in 1944/45 (compared with 1917/18) was not the targeting but the weight of bombs which could be delivered.

Neither Harris nor the Air Staff invented area bombing with the February 1942 directive, it was something that predated this directive, in British bombing policy, by 25 years.

Cheers

Steve


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## Zipper730 (Sep 13, 2016)

wuzak



> Providing they would be doing the same, or similar, work.
> 
> And it takes time and money to relocate the workers, meanwhile the factory in their original city grinds to a halt as its workforce has been displaced.


The Germans did actually manage to keep rebuilding makeshift factories all over the place, sometimes in the wreckage.


stona

*Post #52: 9/12/16*



> It was Harris' contention, made in his _'Despatch on War Operations' _that the diversion of his forces to tactical bombing in support of the invasion and away from area bombing gave the German economy respite and allowed a recovery resulting in increased production in 1944.


How much did production increase from 1942-1943, and from 1943-1944?



> Neither the BBSU nor the Memorandum give any alternative explanation for the late war spike in German production, the Memorandum actually asks that a graph demonstrating an_ 'estimated production loss due to bombing'_ produced in Harris' Despatch be_ 'ignored_' as it was based on _'an incorrect hypothesis'._


And what was Zuckermann's reasoning behind this?

*Post #53: 9/12/16*



> While we are on the subject of post war re-assessment of Bomber Command's effort, and Harris' leadership, how about this for disloyalty, also from the Air Staff Memorandum.
> 
> _"6. The C-in-C states, in paragraph 3, that his main task was 'to focus attacks on the morale of the enemy civil population, and, in particular, of the industrial workers' through the attack of certain major industrial centres._


The "in particular, the working population", as I understand it was merely added to make it seem a little more acceptable than just bombing civilians for it's own sake.



> Harris was doing exactly what the directive asked him to do, even concentrating on the areas/cities specified by the Air Ministry. The second half of paragraph 7 is about as close to BS as I've ever seen in an Air Ministry Memorandum, and the authors must have known this.


Of course, but politics is like making sausages -- it's best when you don't see the process, and just the product.



> _"neither the Air Staff, nor Sir Arthur Harris can be justly accused of waging war in a different moral sense from that approved by the government. Moreover, it should be made equally clear that at no stage of the war was the area bombing wanton. On the contrary, it was a carefully designed strategic plan intended to contribute to the most rapid and the most economical defeat of Germany."_
> 
> Area bombing was NOT an idea that sprang into being in 1942. It was adopted as a result of the inability to carry out anything else, but it predates WW2 and was regularly implemented in WW I.


Actually before WWI if you count the Zeppelin raids: The plans predated the war.



> In 1917 a plan developed by the joint Army-Navy Air Policy Committee entitled 'Long Distance Bombing' suggested.
> 
> _"the terrorization of the civilian population through selecting targets that were located in densely populated industrial areas, so that all the bombs which failed to hit the aiming points (ostensibly industries supporting the enemy war effort) would strike at the morale of the civilian population by destroying their lives and homes."_
> 
> ...


It sounds exactly like the pretexts used to bomb cities in WWII.


> Trenchard's reply would have pleased Weir.
> 
> _"I do not think you need to be anxious about our degree of accuracy when bombing stations in the middle of towns. The accuracy is not great at present, and all the pilots drop their eggs well into the middle of the town generally."_Of course[/I]
> 
> The difference in 1944/45 (compared with 1917/18) was not the targeting but the weight of bombs which could be delivered.


I'm not so sure about that -- in fact I'm not sure what the CEP was in WWI, so I couldn't compare.


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## stona (Sep 13, 2016)

This is the graph we are supposed to ignore. You can draw your own conclusions about German production, those figures are not in dispute.






I have never seen the argument as to why we should ignore this graph, just the statement that it

_"...is based on an incorrect hypothesis, and must be ignored. Final judgements on the effects of the bombing - a highly intricate subject - can only be made in the light of the British and American Bombing Survey Reports."_

I have previously explained that the British Report is heavily biased, something not seriously disputed today.

The exact bombing errors of WW1 are not relevant. The principle was established of bombing the 'middle of the town generally' a term meaning the same as that used in WW2 'the centre of the built up area'. Portal wrote on 15th February 1942, the day after the directive was issued

_"Ref. the new bombing directive: I suppose it is clear that the aiming-points are to be built-up areas, not, for instance, the dockyards or aircraft factories... This must be made quite clear if it is not already understood." _

The difference, as I said, was not so much accuracy as the weight of ordnance delivered into this area.

Cheers

Steve


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## bobbysocks (Sep 13, 2016)

GrauGeist said:


> You can't just arbitrarily stop engine production mid-stream and swap bearings and hope for the best. The ball-bearings and roller-bearings were an integral part of the machine's design. The DB6xx series were roller-bearing intensive and any shortage of those specific bearings meant the much needed engine supply slowed to a halt.
> 
> Another example: in winter of 1944, production of the Panther tank was slowed as they had to make a conversion from ball-bearings to sleeve-bearings because of shortages.
> 
> Some equipment may have been able to swap out different types, but the ball-bearing was a cornerstone of the German war machine.



production is going to stop anyways if there are no bearings as you noted with the panthers. so, I am not talking about an arbitrary stop but if ball bearings became unavailable due to bombing. if there was a compatible substitute already available then you are looking at a minor hic-cup. there were several instances on automobiles where both a ball bearing and a tapered roller bearing had been designed as suitable replacements to OEM. I would ask the customer which they preferred. if this were the case in Germany then it is just a matter of where the bearings are coming from.


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## GrauGeist (Sep 13, 2016)

I know that outfits like Bower/BCA and Timkin offered alternatives for the option to transition from ball-type bearings to roller bearings...however, this was done in a relaxed time frame in a peacetime market.

In Germany, they didn't have that leisure and, remember, the majority of bearing manufacturing was done in the Schweinfurt area until the area was heavily bombed. There were four primary manufacturers there:
Kugelfischer-Georg-Schäfer
Fichtel & Sachs
Vereinigte Kugellagerfabriken AG
Deutsche Star GmbH

After they raids, the Germans dispersed a great deal of the surviving machinery to other areas, but the output from that time onward was roughly 85% of the pre-bombing capacity.

The result was manufacturing delays all across the board for German equipment manufacturing.


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