# Anti Aircraft Weapons....



## Lucky13 (Sep 20, 2008)

Which were the best anti aircaft guns and systems of WWII?


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## Soren (Sep 20, 2008)

Tough question mate.

I really like the 2cm FlakVierling 38, it was probably the best small caliber AAA gun of the war.

The 3.7cm FlaKzwilling 43 is probably the best AAA gun of the war, having over double the firepower of the 40mm British Bofors AAA gun.

In terms of vehicle mounted AAA guns, well the FlakVierling 38 again, when mouned on the Wirbelwind, featuring all hydraulic traverse elevation and excellent firepower it was a devastating weapon against a/c and esp. infantry. 

God it must have been scary business being under attack by a Wirbelwind firing four 2cm cannons at you from an agile and accurate mounting. At 450 rpm a piece that's a RoF of 1,800 rpm!


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## trackend (Sep 20, 2008)

Although not the best I still thought the 8 barelled pom pom was good for low level ship defence ( 720 2lb rpm) unfortunately they lacked muzzel velocity and tracer rounds so ended up being replaced by the Bofors I think the pom pom should have been developed more.
I always thought the Bofors was a Swedish gun Soren not British


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## Lucky13 (Sep 20, 2008)

Bofors is Swedish, yes....


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## Soren (Sep 20, 2008)

It is indeed, but the British used it as their main AAA gun. But it is Swedish.


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## Airframes (Sep 20, 2008)

And it's STILL used today.....!


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## Soren (Sep 20, 2008)

A vastly improved version, yes.


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## Lucky13 (Sep 20, 2008)

Crikey!


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## Soren (Sep 20, 2008)

Well it's very simple, combine a lot of computer power with a good gun and vupti you've got a modern day AAA gun.


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## Soren (Sep 20, 2008)

I do trust you guys see the difference


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## Airframes (Sep 22, 2008)

Wow! That's impressive! Am I right in thinking that the 'traditional' Bofors 40mm weapon is still in use, in modified form, by some units of various forces, eg, navies? There was one, with modern carriage and laying system, at the place I lectured at until recently. It had been released from British 'War Reserve Stock' only about 3 years ago, I believe, but of course it could have been 'old' stock from the '60'/70's.


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## Glider (Sep 22, 2008)

Its worth remembering that a WW2 vintage L60 was credited with a Mirage during the Falklands


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## SoD Stitch (Sep 22, 2008)

Soren said:


> In terms of vehicle mounted AAA guns, well the FlakVierling 38 again, when mouned on the Wirbelwind, featuring all hydraulic traverse elevation and excellent firepower it was a devastating weapon against a/c and esp. infantry.
> 
> God it must have been scary business being under attack by a Wirbelwind firing four 2cm cannons at you from an agile and accurate mounting. At 450 rpm a piece that's a RoF of 1,800 rpm!



I agree w/Soren; the Wirbelwind was probably the best track-mounted AA gun of the War. I never understood why Germany didn't produce more of those; and why they moved on to the Ostwind, which did have a larger-caliber cannon (3.7 cm), but only had one barrel and, therefore, a much lower rate of fire.


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## timshatz (Sep 22, 2008)

Go with the Quad 40 bofors. Great gun, used, for the most part, as shipboard AA. I think the US Navy considered it the largest machine gun in it's service. I would go with that for a machine gun. Also, I think it used a proximity fuse (not positive but I think the marks later in the war used that fuse).

If you're talking Cannons, there are a ton of good ones. German 88 is legendary, but everyone seemed to have a good cannon in that range (US 90mm and the British 3.7") that had greater range. However, the 88's fame was based on it's versitility. The thing was all over the place. It was used for just about everything. Aircraft, infantry, tanks, you name it.


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## RATHED (Sep 22, 2008)

I might be wrong, but it looks to me that the picture Soren posted IS NOT a Bofors AAA, but rather a 50. cal mounted on a remote controlled APV turret. Notice the grenade launchers, and the muzzel, tipycall M3...


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## CharlesBronson (Sep 22, 2008)

MY choices:

light: MK 103 30 mm jaboschreck

Heavy: 90 mm US gun with proximity fuzes, really deadly.


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## timshatz (Sep 23, 2008)

CharlesBronson said:


> MY choices:
> 
> light: MK 103 30 mm jaboschreck
> 
> Heavy: 90 mm US gun with proximity fuzes, really deadly.



And before that they had an autofuze setter on the 90MM. Gave it a higher rpm than most guns of the same caliber.


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## CharlesBronson (Sep 23, 2008)

Indeed, the good characteristics of the 90mm gun as well other allied designs had been shadowed by the legend of the 88 family, but the fact is most of the spectacular actions of the 88 were against tanks, not aircraft.

The 90mm was definately better .


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## Soren (Sep 23, 2008)

The 90mm M3 was too heavy and cumbersome. The 88mm FlaK18 was light and featured an unrivalled targeting system and optics, which is what made it so successful in both AA AT roles and turned it into a legend.

However the best AA gun of the war was the FlaK 41 which had a RoF of 25 rpm thanks to a new loading system, and on top of that it featured a much higher ceiling than both the US 90mm M1 and the British QF 3.7 inch AA guns.


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## CharlesBronson (Sep 23, 2008)

The 88 is good nobody denies it, but the proximity fuze in the 90 mm make them a lot better for AA purposes. I agree on the weight topic, the 3,7 british was tremendously heavy too, the thing barely can move.


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## Soren (Sep 23, 2008)

Well the proximity fuze has to do with the ammunition, not the gun.


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## Lucky13 (Sep 24, 2008)

How about the 128 mm "Zwilling"?


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## HoHun (Sep 24, 2008)

Hi Stitch,

>[...] and why they moved on to the Ostwind, which did have a larger-caliber cannon (3.7 cm), but only had one barrel and, therefore, a much lower rate of fire.

The 37 mm cannon could engage targets at longer ranges than the smaller calibres, making it a better choice for a Flak supposed to protect other units as the protective envelope was larger.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Juha (Sep 24, 2008)

I agree with HoHun. And 37mm was more effective against Il-2s. Also maybe in the Westwind turret there might have been too little room to fast changes of magazines, after all they hold only 20 rounds, with 450 cyclic rof they didn't last long.

Juha


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## Soren (Sep 24, 2008)

Lucky13 said:


> How about the 128 mm "Zwilling"?



Very effective, but also very heavy and cumbersome, and the RoF wasn't very high.


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## Lucky13 (Sep 24, 2008)

Right....cheers Soren!


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## timshatz (Sep 24, 2008)

For shipboard Cannons, I'd go with the 5"/38. Usually grouped in sets of two, at least later in the war, with a rpm of 15, per gun. Coupled with the proximity fuse, it was deadly.


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## CharlesBronson (Sep 24, 2008)

Images of an 8,8 cm Flak 18 used by the Waffen SS Totenkopf in July 1941 ostfront, tipical of this weapon the gun is performing other than AA task, in this case long range artillery.


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## Erich (Sep 24, 2008)

nothing on the 3.7cm Zwilling > ?

oh the shame


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## Soren (Sep 25, 2008)

I thought I mentioned the 3.7cm Zwilling and its much greater firepower comared to the 40mm Bofors.


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## Juha (Sep 25, 2008)

BTW the monster QF 3.7 inch Mk VI AA gun had a ceiling of over 15000m.

Juha


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## Glider (Sep 25, 2008)

I admit that as an AA gun I thought that the 3.7in was a better weapon than the 88 Flak 36. It fired a heavier shell, to a greater effective altitude, with a better rate of fire and a proximity fuze. 

A powerful combination


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## Erich (Sep 25, 2008)

Soren maybe we are talking the same weapons system then again maybe not ..........this along with the 4-barrel 2cm Flakvierling was the scourge of Allied A/C


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## Theo (Sep 25, 2008)

The Bofors 40mm is still used in the AC-130 gunships and is pretty much the same weapon from ww2.


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## CharlesBronson (Sep 25, 2008)

> BTW the monster QF 3.7 inch Mk VI AA gun had a ceiling of over 15000m.


Hmm, dont think so, the muzzle velocity wasnt high, at list not so high as other heavy AAA of the time.


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## Juha (Sep 25, 2008)

Charles
check for Mark VI, it's a different gun, 3.7in loose liner with RD Rifling into 4.5 inch Mk 2 body
RD meaning that muzzle end was smooth bore. Put on 4.5" AA gun carriage. It was a big bastard and was built only as static version.

Juha

Juha


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## CharlesBronson (Sep 25, 2008)

Oh, I see, sorry I have no data of that in my Ebooks folder .


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## SoD Stitch (Sep 25, 2008)

Juha said:


> I agree with HoHun. And 37mm was more effective against Il-2s. Also maybe in the Westwind turret there might have been too little room to fast changes of magazines, after all they hold only 20 rounds, with 450 cyclic rof they didn't last long.
> 
> Juha



IIRC, there were two soldiers on each side of the turret responsible for loading two of the cannons each, and one gunlayer in the center of the turret, right behind the mount.

Just found out something very interesting: the planned successor to Wirbelwind and Ostwind was a version armed with "four 30mm MK103/28 or MK103/38 guns, capable of firing 1600 rounds per minute. In December of 1944, Ostbau produced only one prototype designated Zerstorer 45 (Destroyer 45) - 3cm Flakvierling MK103/108 auf Sfl PzKpfw IV. Same concept was incorporated into rearming of the Ostwind with two 37mm Flak 43 or Flak 44 guns or 30mm Mauser MK103 cannon. In January of 1945, Ostbau was able to produce one prototype designated Ostwind II (3.7cm Flakzwilling 44 auf Sfl PzKpfw IV) , while 100 were ordered. In 1945, it was decided to utilize obsolete at the time PzKpfw III and mount it with Wirbelwind (designated as 2cm Flakvierling 38 auf Slf PzKpfw III) or Ostwind (designated as 3.7cm Flak 43 auf Slf PzKpfw III) turrets, designated as Flakpanzer III. 90 were ordered but the end of the war terminated the production.Eventually, all of Flakpanzers were to be replaced by newly designed Flakpanzer IV Kugelblitz in the early 1945." (from the website "_Achtung Panzer_").


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## Juha (Sep 25, 2008)

Charles
I myself made a mistake, the original tube was 4.5inch, corrected that in the original message.

Juha


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## Soren (Sep 25, 2008)

The 88mm FlaK 41 has a ceiling of 15000m as-well.


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## Soren (Sep 25, 2008)

Erich said:


> Soren maybe we are talking the same weapons system then again maybe not ..........this along with the 4-barrel 2cm Flakvierling was the scourge of Allied A/C



Those are exactly the guns I mentioned:



Soren said:


> I really like the 2cm FlakVierling 38, it was probably the best small caliber AAA gun of the war.
> 
> The 3.7cm FlaKzwilling 43 is probably the best AAA gun of the war, having over double the firepower of the 40mm British Bofors AAA gun.


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## CharlesBronson (Sep 25, 2008)

Some data on the 8,8 Flak 41.


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## Juha (Sep 26, 2008)

Hello Soren
as I wrote the QF 3.7 inch Mk VI had max ceiling over 15.000m to be exact it was appr 18.000m (59.200feet)

Gilder
very possible, 1/3 heavier shell, rof with autoloader 25rpm, some sources say that with proximity fuse 32rpm (no need to fuse-setting). But lighter 8,8cm Flak was more mobile and more flexible. Much came from that German doctrine for Heavy AA guns was more flexible. But as pure AA gun or fire support gun 3.7 inch had its strong points vs 8.8cm.

Juha


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## Soren (Sep 26, 2008)

Juha,

What weight shell did it fire, and at what velocity ?


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## timshatz (Sep 26, 2008)

Max range and effective range are two different details. Is it possible to get the effective range on these guns or is that too much subject to interpetation?


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## Juha (Sep 26, 2008)

Hello Soren
the gun I was thinking in my message #43 was MarkIIIA with 28,56lb (12,96kg) shell and 2600ft/s (792m/s) mv, but that is shown already in CB's message

Mark VI used same shell but mv was 3,425 ft/sec (1.044m/s). 

Juha


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## Juha (Sep 26, 2008)

Timshatz
you are right but I have seen same ceiling given as effective and max for Flak 41 and time fuzes sometimes restricted effective ceiling. Don't know what were max flight times allowed for proxy fuses. They IMHO should have self destruction mechanism, otherwise misses would pretty dangerous.

Juha


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## parsifal (Sep 26, 2008)

According to Edward B Westermann in his book, *FLAK German Anti Aircraft Defenses 1914-45*, University Of Kansas Press, 2001, the average 88mm ammunition expenditure per kill over the Reich in 1944, was 16000 shells per kill, At approximately 80 RM per shell, that equates to RM 1280000 or $512000 per shoot down. Viewed in those terms, the Flak arm was a most inefficient method of air defence.

By comparison, the US Navy is estimated to have been expending just 550 rounds per kill in the Pacific. This figure applied to the end of 1944. At the beginning of 1944, it was taking about 1500 rounds per kill.

The two figures are not exactly comparable. Whereas the Germans were firing at high altitude targets, which were above the effective ceilings of the 88mm guns being used by the Germans, the Japanese were attacking at low level, using ordinance that required them to fly low, straight and along a very predictable path of approach.

Still, whereas the the US/Allied AA effectiveness was getting better and better as the war progressed, the Germans were getting worse and worse.

Barrel wear in the AA park and the decreasing standards in crew training were having a catastrophic effect on German AA. The effective ceiling of German AA, according to Westermann had dropped to about 24500 ft by mid 1944, because the barrels were so worn and the guns were operating way below spec. The number of burst barrels had increased from about 20 per month in 1942, to well over 300 per month in 1944. 
The poor level of crew training was such that the Germans were basically reduced to barrage fire over aimed fire in 1944. Whereas the majority of flak troops were regular army in 1942, by 1944 they were mostly landswehr...part timers, lacking in the training to be anything but a scare factor in the strategic bombing campaign. They had essentially traded places with the British Flak troops of 1940. in 1940 the British had basically been able to scare the Germans with their AA fire effectiveness. By 1944, it was a very efficient and well equipped force.

A measure of just how badly German effectiveness had sunk is the fact that whilst it was taking 16000 rounds to bring down an Allied heavy bomber in 1944, in 1942 it was only taking the expenditure of about 4000 rounds per kill.

Mind you, achieving a kill by AA is about the least important function of flak. Its most important job was to disrupt the accuracy of the bombers, and to keep them high, and thereby also decrease accuracy. In this area, the Germans were effective until the end of the war


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## timshatz (Sep 26, 2008)

Good post Parisfal. Good points all. To add to it, I think the US Navy's numbers had a lot to do with the proximity fuze. My understanding is it dropped the number of rounds fired for a kill by a third. Kinda close to the numbers you are talking about.

I do remember from working with the 5"/38s back in the 80s that the flight time really went up as the altitude/distance increased over 10,000 yards. By the time you got to the very edges of the range, you were talking a minute or more between firing and detonation. You'd be three drags into a smoke before the shell you fired went off!

I also remember the guns we used jammed a lot. It was a twin mount. One of the tubes had a firing casualty about every 10 rounds. The ammo was old, the guns were old, the ship was old. But firing casualties (slow burns, jamms, screwups in the feed) were more common than thought. Also, the rounds were 50-55lbs each and the charges were about 35lbs each. You could only keep up the "rapid fire" for a minute or two and then it just wore you down. You'd go down to about 10 rpm, per gun.


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## Soren (Sep 26, 2008)

Juha said:


> Hello Soren
> the gun I was thinking in my message #43 was MarkIIIA with 28,56lb (12,96kg) shell and 2600ft/s (792m/s) mv, but that is shown already in CB's message



Yes, that gun had a ceiling of 9,000m.



> Mark VI used same shell but mv was 3,425 ft/sec (1.044m/s).
> 
> Juha



Ok, so that's a 94mm 12.7 kg shell at 1,044 m/s, that explains the high ceiling. 

The FlaK 41 L/74 fired a 88mm 9.4 kg shell at 1,000 m/s. It was slightly less powerful than Krupp's AT Tank (PaK/KwK43 L/71) version of the gun, which was designed around a larger cartridge and fired a 1 kg heavier (10.4 kg [Pzgr.39/43]) APCBC projectile at 1,018 m/s.


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## HoHun (Sep 26, 2008)

Hi Parsifal,

>A measure of just how badly German effectiveness had sunk is the fact that whilst it was taking 16000 rounds to bring down an Allied heavy bomber in 1944, in 1942 it was only taking the expenditure of about 4000 rounds per kill.

Hm, I'm not sure that this is a valid conclusion as in 1944, it also took the Flak 41, which as a new weapon can't have been as badly worn out as the Flak 37 and which had superior ballistic properties, 8500 shots per killed compared to 16000 for the Flak 36/37 (according to Dörfler, "Die schwere Flak"). 

Dörfler also notes that early in the war, there were no radar directors and not even enough searchlights, so that against the RAF night bombers aimed fire had not been possible. It seems Dörfler doesn't agree with Westermann's praise of early-war Flak accuracy.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Soren (Sep 26, 2008)

Agreed Hohun.


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## Erich (Sep 26, 2008)

Soren my comments about the Zwil. 3.7cm is in regard to the two versions manufactured and supplied to the Wehrmacht so it actually depends on which one you state


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## parsifal (Sep 26, 2008)

Westermann argues that the germans reached their peak effectiveness in 1942, because this was the year that the germans began to achieve substantial radar direction for many batteries. moreover the batteries that were radar assisted were not being downgraded by Allied countermeasures. after 1943 Allied countermeasures had a varying, and sometimes devastating effect on german radar effectiveness. 

As for the crew quality, well, that should be readily accepted. up to 1942, the flak arm was, in the main regular army, with an average crew experience of over seven years. however, as the war progressed, many of these highly expereinced crews were sent to the front, some as AA specialists, but most simply as grunts for the infantry. The average crew training was down to about 5 months or less by 1944, so the shooting accurqacy had to be dropping as a result of that.

I confess i have not read your source, but Westermann is pretty convincing. he produces month by month ammunition expenditures, and known losses from AA. He is either making it up, or he knows what he is talking about..... Either scenario is plausible.

Westermann is, incidentally very protective and argues in support of german flak effectiveness. his main argument is that compared to the fighter arm, the flak defences were consistently underrated....
Whilst he confirmns the numbers about ammunition expenditure he does not believe that this is a fair measure of overall effectiveness of the flak arm.

Laslty the "wonder guns" that you are relying on for the defence of the effectiveness of the flak arm, constituted less than 15% of the total number of barrels available to the LW in 1944. Throughout 1944, the lions share of the tube artillery heavy flak units remained the old flak 36 and its various derivatives. Consequently any subjective assessment of german AA effectivesness must be concentrated on the continuing effctiveness of the Flak 36 in the 1944 environment.


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## parsifal (Sep 26, 2008)

In fact the average estimated ammunition expenditure for the 88/41 and the 128 mm were 3200 and 2650 per kill respectively, according to westermann


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## Soren (Sep 26, 2008)

Erich said:


> Soren my comments about the Zwil. 3.7cm is in regard to the two versions manufactured and supplied to the Wehrmacht so it actually depends on which one you state



I only know about one version, the 3.7cm Flakzwilling 43 (An upgrade of the 3.7cm Flak43) 

Which was the other one ?


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## Erich (Sep 26, 2008)

it was a different config, the barrels were side by side, not quite the blow out power by speed, used extensively on Kriegsmarine shipping of all sizes right down to the U-boots and yet still more powerful than a single barrel unit


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## HoHun (Sep 26, 2008)

Hi Parsifal,

>Laslty the "wonder guns" that you are relying on for the defence of the effectiveness of the flak arm, constituted less than 15% of the total number of barrels available to the LW in 1944. 

The point is that with all their improved ballistics and despite their new barrels, they did not come close to the 1942 effectiveness of the Flak 36/37. That is a good indication the 1942 vs. 1944 comparison has a problem somewhere.

For example, the good 1942 results might have been due to the low operating altitudes of the early RAF bombers, while by 1944 the USAAF daylight attacks were coming in at much higher altitudes.

Accordingly, the 4000 vs. 16000 rounds comparison might not indicate any problem on part of the Flak, but just different engagement ranges.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## parsifal (Sep 26, 2008)

Yes, I basically agree, that the RAF was probably operating at lowwer altitudes. The operating altitude of the stirling was a piddling 13000 feet. IIRC the qwellington was 17000, and the halibag and lancs were about 20000 (roughly). The B-24 had an operating altitude of 25000 and the B-17 about 27000. The 88s had an effective ceiling of 26000 in 1942, and about 24500 in 1944. So, whereas the American were operating above the effective flak (well theoretically) the british were not


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## Erich (Sep 26, 2008)

the US never operated above German Flak that is fact ! I have a good friend that was a gunner with a mobil KM Flak Batterie at Kiel during the war.

suggest checking on some German documentation about the Heavy Flak


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## Soren (Sep 26, 2008)

Parsifal,

The FlaK 18/36's were firing at Allied bombers all the way up to 10,000m, right at the border of the max ceiling, and they hit home more than once.


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## parsifal (Sep 26, 2008)

its their effective ceiling as opposed to service ceiling that you need to take into account. Deighton in his book "blitzkrieg" brought this out very well. At a horizontal rage of just 5 km, your 88, with a theoretical vertical ceiling of 33000 ft, was down to 28000 ft vertical, At eight kilometres horizontal range, the effective ceiling had droped to just 25000 ft. But that does ot explain the problem in its full entirety either. Effective ceiling is a combination of factors, with the generally accepted effective ceiling (even by German sources) for the Flak 88/36 being 26000 ft ( which is about 8000 metres).

This is acknowledged in wiki

_Comparatively, the 88 was not as powerful as its Allied counterparts. In the anti-aircraft role it fired a 9.2 kg (20.3-pound) shell at a muzzle velocity of 790 m/s (2,600 ft/s) to an effective ceiling of 7,900 m (26,000 feet) (at maximum 10,600 m, 32,000 ft). Although this was useful during the U.S. daylight raids, which typically took place at 7,600 m (25,000 ft), many aircraft could fly higher than its maximum effective ceiling. _

As henning points out, this has to be accepted as at least one reason for the drop in effectiveness of the flak arm. Its effectiveness dropped to 25% of that achieved in 1942. henning is saying that this was due to the increase altitude of the US Bomber stremas. since the US streams travelled at heights of 26000-30000 ft (geneerally, it follows that the 88s were much less effective at heights about 25000 (or thereabouts) 

I dont fully accept the explanation that the drop in German effectiveness can be attributed solely to the height at which the US bombers were attacking. Its one factor. other factors in my opinion included the barrel wear, the decreasing crew efficiencies, and the decreasing effectiveness of german radar guidance due to allied countermeasures. 

That German AA effectiveness suffered a collapse in 1944 is fairly well documented, if not widely known. The reasons for that collapse are still debated. my opinion is that it was the result of a number of factors.

At a guess, if asked to rate the importance, in a descending order of importance, I would rate them as follows

1)decreased crew training
2)Increased attack Altitudes for the bombers
3)Allied countermeasures to decrease german radar effectiveness
4)Excessive Barrel wear leading to degraded performance of ordinance
5)Possibly, Ultra benefits that allowed flak concentration s to be avoided, to a degree


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## Soren (Sep 26, 2008)

I can agree with much of what you say Parsifal, but I don't believe that barrel wear was really an issue worth talking about. The barrels on the 88 were easily exchangable and were changed after a specific number of rounds had been fired. And as to the quality of the barrels, again it remained unchanged until wars end. 

In short the falling effectiveness of the German Flak arm cannot in any way be attributed to the equipment, but rather the change in the experience of the crew manning it and the increasing height at which Allied bombers began to fly at.

This also explains the reason behind why that there were probably more accidental barrel explosions by 1944 compared to earlier. This phenomenon was most likely to occur when the barrel wasn't kept properly clean, something an inexperienced crew could forget.


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## HoHun (Sep 26, 2008)

Hi Parsifal,

>That German AA effectiveness suffered a collapse in 1944 is fairly well documented, if not widely known. 

Hm, if it's well documented, by which parameters has it been determined?

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Erich (Sep 26, 2008)

it's called dismantling 8.8cm's and removing the installation and sending the guns as AT platforms to the OST.

In fact during 1945 the Flak was about the only thing and with inclusion of the Me 262 units and a few props from JG 300/301 there was no defense against the might Allied armada


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## parsifal (Sep 26, 2008)

well, the amount of ammunition expended per successful shootdown is fairly well known, and the amount needed to shoot down each alied aircraft went up dramatically in 1944. From that basic fact one has to seek an explanation. One has to explain that ammunition expenditure per shoot down went up from around 4000 per kill to over 16000 per kill. Some of this was due to improving allied countermeasures, but surely it is not that hard to accept that some of it was due to falling standards of various kinds within the defenders themselves. 

Germany was trying to withstand attacks from nearly every angle in 1944, why is it so hard to accept that the whole structure was teetering on the brink. This has to be the model that pervades nearly every aspect of german endeavour at the end of the war. It otherwise becomes a variation of the WWI excuse that led to hitlers rise, the so called "stabbed in the back" mentality 

With regard to the barrel wear, the number of accidents went up dramatically, whilst the total inventory did not. I am working from memory, but as I recall, the Flak arm commanded something like 4-5000 guns in 1942. in 1944, it commanded over 10700. Yet disproportionally, the number of burst guns went up from a monthly average of 20 in 1942, to well over 300 per month in 1944. if this does not point to a worn out artillery park I dont know what does


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## Soren (Sep 26, 2008)

Parsifal don't you read what others write ?

The increase in barrel explosions was no doubt caused by the inexperience of the crew manning the guns. It has nothing to do with the quality of the material, rather the maintenance of it. Burst guns usually means one thing: A filthy barrel!


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## parsifal (Sep 26, 2008)

I do read what others write, but that does not mean that it is necessarily true

As for poor maintenance of guns, well, you are sort of right. but only partially. The dirt in the barrel does not lead to the explosion of the gun, the pressures in the block or the barrel do. Now, a dirty barrel as we both know can increase those pressures and are therefore a cause of the explosion, but it is nevertheless the explosion that does the damage, and not the dirt. A gun explosion is caused by the the gun design pressures being exceeded, which may be due to the dirt in the barrel, but can equally be the result of a weakened barrel due overuse (which will cause those tolerances to decrease, without the operators even being aware of the problem). Both have the same effect. And whereas there is hard data that proves that the guns were overused by 1944, there is only anecdotal evidence to suggest that the guns were not being cleaned properly. Sure the crews were more poorly trained, but that does not necessarily mean that they were not cleaning their guns properly. Probably, but not definately. 

So no, dirty barrels do not cause the failure of a barrel, they are a factor that lead to explosion of the barrel. the failure of the gun is caused solely by bursting (either the barrel or some other part of the mechanism) which is the sole cause of failures. Its just whether you want to believe its the result of the gun design tolerances being exceeed due to poor maintennce, or whether the guns tolerances had been lowered as a result of overuse

Excessive use of the LW flak park is well documented. all you need to do is look at the annual or monthly ammunition expenditure rates to find that out. Even thougth the 88 was able to be relined in the barrel, and was very strong (although I suspect that at half the weight of the british 3.7", it simply lacked the mass to absorb sustained punishment of the kind it was subjected to in 1944), I dont think this would help in the area around the block, or stop a bursting barrel, if that barrel had been too weakened by overuse. And the amount of ammunition these guns had fired by 1944 was phenomenal. 


Excessive gun usage leads to a decrease in the tolerances for the weapon, which will decrease its performance. this phenomena, incidentally is based on observations made by the germans themselves.


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## parsifal (Sep 26, 2008)

Erich said:


> it's called dismantling 8.8cm's and removing the installation and sending the guns as AT platforms to the OST.
> 
> In fact during 1945 the Flak was about the only thing and with inclusion of the Me 262 units and a few props from JG 300/301 there was no defense against the might Allied armada



There were flak uits fighting in the west as well, as both frontline forces (opposed Monty in the final Rhine crossings, and elswhere, less well known), and still firing at Allied aircraft as well. Something I am not sure of.....were these "flak" formations at the front, just fighting as Infantry, or were they still mostly equipped with flak weaponary


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## Erich (Sep 26, 2008)

yes understood, but many Flak defenses were set into the Ost being carried on the mobil carriages to support underarmed-AT units against overwhelming Soviet tank support supplying the necessary back up to close the holes punched by Russian armor. Now of course these then increased in size to more than just batteries operated by the Heer, then the LW. this was also the case as the war progressed into LW units aiding trouble spots in Normandie.

whatever you took away from bombed cities the weaker the Flak arm was to become until newer batteries were to be equipped, and some were with either outdated arms or captured equipment


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## parsifal (Sep 26, 2008)

Thankyou Erich, on the basis of what you are saying, then, one would have to add another causal factor to the drop in AA effectiveness, ie a decrease in equipment standards....the good stuff was all at the front, the chaff was left to defend the cities.......I must admit had not thought of that

Do you think it was a major factor, or am i reading too much into it?


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## Erich (Sep 26, 2008)

you also mentioned the use of jamming radar techniques which was vital, more so later war when the Germans lost France and their early warning systems.

a little reflection on some of the bomber vet crews I have interviewed, none wanted to fly over Berlin ever or Vienna due to the 128mm zwillings, they did not know what was planted at these plaes but the Flak was always intense till wars end. The Ruhr gebeit from 43 onward got stronger and stronger with more heavier flak types like the 105mm and single 128mm pieces and these were rail bound - meaning they were mobil. for one raid into a certain firing position and then moved at night to another spot sometimes 15-20 miles distant so dealing with fewer number it could be made to look that the Flak perimeters had increased in dimension and when you think about it they did. 
When my freind served on a KM 8.8cm Flak fun in a batterie of 8 guns outside of Kiel they were first in a planted type position covered with dirt, sandbags and wooden supports within a year they were then placed individually on a mobil dock in Keil harbor and then moved ona weekly basis to throw Allied intel off - again this appeared for the most part that Keil permiter anyway had grown and it had because other caliber Flak weapons were moved in and to the outskirts of the city.

does this make some sense ?

E ~


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## HoHun (Sep 27, 2008)

Hi Parsifal,

>well, the amount of ammunition expended per successful shootdown is fairly well known, and the amount needed to shoot down each alied aircraft went up dramatically in 1944. 

Do we have figures for other years as well? And are there other indicators for the "well-documented collapse of Flak effectiveness in 1944"?

>Yet disproportionally, the number of burst guns went up from a monthly average of 20 in 1942, to well over 300 per month in 1944.

You don't have to look at the numbers of barrels present, but rather at the number of shots fired per barrel. I'd imagine that the fewer barrels in 1942 saw a lot less use than the greater number in 1944, explaining why they had fewer bursts as well ...

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## parsifal (Sep 27, 2008)

It makes a lot of sense

All of the contributions thus far have had value IMO. They are are all valid and good points to an issue that is still not well understood IMO. Even during the war, Milch constantly harped about the inneffectiveness of the flak arm, without relaizing its real purpose and achivements. The actual losses to flak amounted to something like 40-50% of total allied losses, according to westermann,. The real contribution of flak was to force the bombers to fly high, and to bomb les accurately, a lot less accurately. It was a critical role IMO.

The point that you make about shifting assets around would therefore make allied recon and other intelligence extremely important.

I used to work for a guy when I was a teenager, who had been captured on Crete. in 1943 he was woeking in Schweinfurt. He was part of an intelligence gathering ring, and his job was to count trains, and report when a certain factoriy or factories came back into production. other members of the ring had to report on the sate of the defences. Apparently this information was viewed as vital by the 8AF command. I hope so. 8 members of the ring were strung up with piano wire when the germans cottoned onto the leak, .


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## parsifal (Sep 27, 2008)

Hi henning

having trrouble with my connections at the moment

_Do we have figures for other years as well? And are there other indicators for the "well-documented collapse of Flak effectiveness in 1944"?_


Yes, i do, but its in bits and pieces throughout the book. Without attempting to "cherry pick", here are a few examples from westermanns book

1.41 (Over germany western europe)
Shoot downs: 13
Heavy Flak expenditure 154456
Rounds per Kill: 11881

2.41 (Over germany western europe)
Shoot downs: 38
Heavy Flak expenditure 234550
Rounds per Kill: 6339

4.41 (Over germany western europe)
Shoot downs: 31
Heavy Flak expenditure 476907
Rounds per Kill: 10250


4.41 (Over germany western europe)
Shoot downs: 62
Heavy Flak expenditure 282270
Rounds per Kill: 4553

Total for this period

Shoot downs: 144
Heavy Flak expenditure 989035
Rounds per Kill: 8250
Avg No Hvy AA: 3888
Est Year Ammo exp: 2.9 million shells
Calc expediture per gun: 763
Avg Monthly Gun losses: Not known - Negligible

1942
Shoot downs: 409 (April-December)
Heavy Flak expenditure 1, 758 ,700 (April-December )
Rounds per Kill: 4300
Avg No Hvy AA: 4772
Est Year Ammo exp: 2344933 shells (see note below)
Calc expediture per gun: 491
Avg Monthly Gun losses: 23

Note the percentage of total expenditures toward the flak arm in the latter half of 1942 reflected the Fuhrers directive to establish 900x 8gun hvy batteries, 750 Lt batteries 200 searchlight batteries and 25 barrage balloon batteries by the beginning of 1943. Between July and the end of the year, flak weapons consumed 28% of budgetry outlays for all forces, and expenditures for ammunition amounted to 17%, whereas previously in 1941- 42, the figures had been 22 and 15 percent respectively. I have had to estimate flak ammunition expenditure taking this change into account. 

1943
In 1943, 29% of military outlays were spent on flak weapons, and 14% of the budget was spent on ammuniton expenditures. however the ammunition expenditures proved insufficient, as fully 35% of total ammunition expensiture, as a percentage of total armed forces expenditure, amounted to fully 35% for the last two quarters of 1943. this was undoubtedly due to the wholesale adoption of barrage fire defences IMO. 

Shoot downs: 319 (Jan-Jun)
Heavy Flak expenditure 3140000 (Jan-Jun )
Rounds per Kill: 10000
Avg No Hvy AA: 8520
Est Year Ammo exp: 7 to 9 million shells 
Calc expediture per gun: 939
avg gun losses/month: 173


1944
1944 saw the staggering ammunition expenditure of an average of 3.125 million shells per month. Without doubt, according to Westermann, the most ominous shortage faced by the flak arm was ammunition. In the first two quarters of 1944, flak ammunition amounted to 17% of total military expenditures. These represented a decrease from the previous two quarters, when reserve stocks had already been eaten into to dangerous levels. The full effects of the ammunition shortage hit from the fall of 1944 

Shoot downs: 2343 
Heavy Flak expenditure 37500000 
Rounds per Kill: 16000
Avg No Hvy AA: 13500
Est Year Ammo exp: 37500000 
Calc expediture per gun: 2778
Avg Monthly Gun losses: 384 



_you don't have to look at the numbers of barrels present, but rather at the number of shots fired per barrel. I'd imagine that the fewer barrels in 1942 saw a lot less use than the greater number in 1944, explaining why they had fewer bursts as well _

Well yes, but even so a large number of guns failed than either the proportions of guns would suggest. Erich points out that this might be due to the large number of captured guns "drafted" into the flak arm. this is confirmed by Westermann, who says that large number s of Russian 76.2mm and other cpatured weapons were re-chanmbered to take 88mm flak ammunition- this had to be a dangerous practice

Even so the the home produced guns were over-used. In 1944, each of them were, on average fired nearly 3000 times, any that had been in existence previously would have been fired more than 3000 times, which has to be a matter for concern.


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## Soren (Sep 27, 2008)

parsifal said:


> I do read what others write, but that does not mean that it is necessarily true
> 
> As for poor maintenance of guns, well, you are sort of right. but only partially. The dirt in the barrel does not lead to the explosion of the gun, the pressures in the block or the barrel do. Now, a dirty barrel as we both know can increase those pressures and are therefore a cause of the explosion, but it is nevertheless the explosion that does the damage, and not the dirt. A gun explosion is caused by the the gun design pressures being exceeded, which may be due to the dirt in the barrel, but can equally be the result of a weakened barrel due overuse (which will cause those tolerances to decrease, without the operators even being aware of the problem). Both have the same effect. And whereas there is hard data that proves that the guns were overused by 1944, there is only anecdotal evidence to suggest that the guns were not being cleaned properly. Sure the crews were more poorly trained, but that does not necessarily mean that they were not cleaning their guns properly. Probably, but not definately.
> 
> ...



Parsifal there's no need to be anal about the subject. 

The most frequent cause of burst guns is improper cleaning of the barrel, this causes excessive pressure to built up which can cause the gun to fail. Esp. if happens again and again that the crew forgets to clean the barrel, the repeated overpressure the gun is subjected to will lower the tolerances. This is what I suspect happened. The inexperienced crew weren't cleaning the barrels regularly as they should, and this put extra strain on the gun each time it was fired, until finally it would fail. 

Now regarding the British QF 3.7 Inch, it was no more solidly built than the 88mm FlaK 18/36. The difference in weight comes from the different carriages and platforms used, the German went through great work to keep them as light as possible.


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## delcyros (Sep 27, 2008)

> well, the amount of ammunition expended per successful shootdown is fairly well known, and the amount needed to shoot down each alied aircraft went up dramatically in 1944. From that basic fact one has to seek an explanation. One has to explain that ammunition expenditure per shoot down went up from around 4000 per kill to over 16000 per kill. Some of this was due to improving allied countermeasures, but surely it is not that hard to accept that some of it was due to falling standards of various kinds within the defenders themselves.



While I agree that falling standarts, increased altitudes and many more aspects may be traced down in these numbers I would like to stress that without knowledge of the conditions and targets (B-17 and P-47 may be harder to kill than Whitley and Battles?) one has to be very careful not to draw Scheinkorrelations from the database as a result of interpretation. 

From my experiences with meaningful statistic analyses, an appearing statistical relationship between aspect A and B with a high degree of significancy may be related to the influence of another, yet unrevealed aspect C. The established relationship between A and B is in this case virtual and not high (or from a quantitative point of view, the relationship is less pronounced). This is a common way to mess up descriptive statistics when uncritically applied to a databse. A multidimensional factor analysis (Varimax-Kaiser rotation preferred) with screeplot may be used in order to exclude Scheinkorrelations.

Replace the 88mm FLAK by US 90mm guns -do You reasonably expect better or worser results everything else (environmental conditions, ammo, targets, altitudes, firecontroll, crew quality and logistics) beeing equal?


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## ratdog (Sep 27, 2008)

has anyone touched on the wasserfalle?? for those who dont know it was the germans atempt and pretty successful at making a self guided missile


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## delcyros (Sep 28, 2008)

The C2W was still a developmental weapon system by the time it was ordered to be abandoned in february 1945.


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## HoHun (Sep 28, 2008)

Hi Parsifal,

>Yes, i do, but its in bits and pieces throughout the book. Without attempting to "cherry pick", here are a few examples from westermanns book

Ah, thanks a lot for summarizing the addtional data! 

>4.41 (Over germany western europe) [note: probably 3.31 here?]
>Shoot downs: 31
>Heavy Flak expenditure 476907
>Rounds per Kill: 10250


>4.41 (Over germany western europe)
>Shoot downs: 62
>Heavy Flak expenditure 282270
>Rounds per Kill: 4553

This seems to indicate that the effectiveness of the Flak could vary considerably depending on external factors or tactics used, even when crew qualification and hardware quality were identical.

>Shoot downs: 144
>Heavy Flak expenditure 989035
>Rounds per Kill: 8250
>Avg No Hvy AA: 3888
>Est Year Ammo exp: 2.9 million shells

Hm, here I'm confused ... 144 * 8250 = 1.188.000. This does neither match "heavy flak expenditure" nor "est. year ammo exp."

Seems I don't understand how to read your data yet ... could you explain?

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## HoHun (Sep 28, 2008)

Hi Delcyros,

>B-17 and P-47 may be harder to kill than Whitley and Battles?

Good point! Though I meant to warn of over-extending the data too, I had hadn't thought of this particular factor. I'd really expect this to have some kind of impact at least comparing 1942 and 1944.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## HoHun (Sep 28, 2008)

Hi Ratdog,

>has anyone touched on the wasserfalle?? for those who dont know it was the germans atempt and pretty successful at making a self guided missile

We had an interesting and fairly controversial thread on this a while back:

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/players-prolonged-war-12415.html

Might be a good read if you're into this topic 

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## parsifal (Sep 28, 2008)

Soren said:


> Parsifal there's no need to be anal about the subject.
> 
> The most frequent cause of burst guns is improper cleaning of the barrel, this causes excessive pressure to built up which can cause the gun to fail. Esp. if happens again and again that the crew forgets to clean the barrel, the repeated overpressure the gun is subjected to will lower the tolerances. This is what I suspect happened. The inexperienced crew weren't cleaning the barrels regularly as they should, and this put extra strain on the gun each time it was fired, until finally it would fail.
> 
> Now regarding the British QF 3.7 Inch, it was no more solidly built than the 88mm FlaK 18/36. The difference in weight comes from the different carriages and platforms used, the German went through great work to keep them as light as possible.



Wasnt trying to be anal, as you put it, but it is important to follow logical dignostic procedures, in these situations.... If it is said that pink parrots can be better singing birds, does it follow that I have a pink parrot, therefore I have a better singing bird...no, it can be a better singing bird, but not necessarily so. If you are trying to determine a mechanical problem in yopur car, the first thing to do is to locate the problem...does it have spark, does it have fuel, etc. You dont say, it doesnt have spark, therfore it must be the spark plugs.As the posts subsequent to ours point oput, we should not jumpo to early conclusions.


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## parsifal (Sep 28, 2008)

delcyros said:


> While I agree that falling standarts, increased altitudes and many more aspects may be traced down in these numbers I would like to stress that without knowledge of the conditions and targets (B-17 and P-47 may be harder to kill than Whitley and Battles?) one has to be very careful not to draw Scheinkorrelations from the database as a result of interpretation.
> 
> From my experiences with meaningful statistic analyses, an appearing statistical relationship between aspect A and B with a high degree of significancy may be related to the influence of another, yet unrevealed aspect C. The established relationship between A and B is in this case virtual and not high (or from a quantitative point of view, the relationship is less pronounced). This is a common way to mess up descriptive statistics when uncritically applied to a databse. A multidimensional factor analysis (Varimax-Kaiser rotation preferred) with screeplot may be used in order to exclude Scheinkorrelations.
> 
> Replace the 88mm FLAK by US 90mm guns -do You reasonably expect better or worser results everything else (environmental conditions, ammo, targets, altitudes, firecontroll, crew quality and logistics) beeing equal?



cant comment on your analysis techniques when we dont have good data sets of the scale that you would require. all we have are bits and pieces. 

In relation to your suggestion that the target type might have a better or worse effect, as the war progressed, i would agree that there might well be variables at work that affect the outcome. you suggest that it might be harder to hit a P-47 or a B-17 compared to say a Battle or a Whitley.

I would say, that without a doubt it would, but this kind of approach still does not explain the effect. In 1941, with a genenerally less capable force attacking them (Stirlings Halifaxes, Manchesters, Wellingtons, the rounds per kill was twice that in 1942.

In 1942, the force structure attacking germany changed slightly, the main attackers became Halifaxes, Wellingtons, Lancasters, Stirlings, and a few Mosquitoes. Whilst therre was a small change in the attack force, there was a massive increase ihn the AA effectiveness. Now, as you say, there could be any number of reasons for that, and it is very easy then to try and mask the obvious by arguing that we need to look at each and every one of them. i agree that is the most thorough way of doing the analysis, but it also defeatsw the reason for using statistics in the first place. The use of statistics is primarily a crude method of finding the most likley causes, and measuring their effects. 

So, using the statistics as a guide, we know that the firing accuracy of the Germans reached its peak in 1942. There was a small change to the bombing force. There was virtually no change to the defending force...the numbers did not change significantly, the crews did not change substantially, even the ordinance being used did not change all that much. in my opnion ther were two substantive changes the use of the 8 gubn battery, and the introduction of radar guided AA.

In 1943, for the first half at least, there was no wholesale Use of US bombers. The overwhelming majority of AA losses continued to be British. The force structure continued to be very similar as it was in 1942....Lancasters, halifaxes, wellingtons. The Stirlings were beginning to fade, but conversely, the Mnosquito was beginning to be a significant player, with about 10% of Bomber Command being Mosquitos. However, i would argue that the change in the force structure of the attacker, for the first half of 1943, at least, reamined only a minor adjustment to the equation. 

Similarly, the hardware being used by the defenders did not yet change all that much, although I concede that some captured equipment was starting to be used. The allied countermesures (principally window) was not yet being felt. yet despite this, the effectiveness of the defences were already decreasing....what do you suggest. I believe that there is a possible twofold explanation....the aforementioned drop in the quality of the guns (ie the captured equipment), and more importantly the starting of introduction of crews of indifferent quality . However, if you have another explanation I am happy to listen. 

The latter half of 1943, and 1944, saw the introduction of window (and other countermeasures) the entry of the Americans, the rapid increase in ammunition expenditures (and later in the year acute ammunition shortages) , the greater replacement of good crews with indifferent ones, the greater reliance on captured equipment, the introduction of better and higher flying attackers. So your right for 1944, so many variables are on the move that it is difficult to know which one(s) are the dominant factor in the collapse of Flak effectiveness

With regard to your last point about US 90mm guns, I would have to view the issue more carefully than I have, but the generally accepted wisdom is that allied AA was improving as the war progressed, not decreasing as was apparently the case in Germany. I have read a detailed study from the USN (but cannot find it right now), that suggests that they were expending an average of 1500 rounds per kill at the biginning of 1944, but by the end of the year, this had dropped to just 550. This could be misleading, wrong: it certainly is not comparable to the battle problem facing the german gunners


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## parsifal (Sep 28, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Hi Parsifal,
> 
> 
> _Ah, thanks a lot for summarizing the addtional data!
> ...


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## Juha (Sep 28, 2008)

Hello Timshatz
I bothered to look a proper source, Routledge's Anti-Aircraft Artillery 1914-55 (1994) and not only web sites.
The British definition to late war AA gun effective ceiling: the greatest height at which a 400mph target, with Predictor No. 10, could be engaged for 30 sec.
Also rof for 3.7 in Mk IIIA is given as 20 rpm and effective ceiling as 28000ft
and Mk VI 8 rpm max ceiling 52000ft and effective ceiling 42000.
Other info as in my earlier posts.

Juha


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## HoHun (Sep 28, 2008)

H Parsifal,

>So your right for 1944, so many variables are on the move that it is difficult to know which one(s) are the dominant factor in the collapse of Flak effectiveness

In fact, I don't believe that I have seen any evidence to suggest that Flak effectiveness dropped at all.

The increase in the number of rounds required for one kill is an efficiency parameter, so it's not that important if we're talking effectiveness.

The numbers for kills you listed are:

>1942
>Shoot downs: 409 (April-December)

34.1 kills/month

>1943
Shoot downs: 319 (Jan-Jun)

53.2 kills/month

>1944 
>Shoot downs: 2343 

195.3 kills/month

That looks more like a marked increase in effectiveness, not like a collapse.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## delcyros (Sep 28, 2008)

There is considerable need to discuss whether or not the term "collapse of Flak effectiveness" is justified for 1944 as You say. I am inclined to disagree that the statistics given here justify such a claim. You could reasonably say that the german bomber arm effectiveness in the west collapsed or even that the day fighter arm effectiveness showed significant signs of collapse but the Flak? AAA was growing in strength during the whole 1944. Losses by AAA increased with the fourfold over those of 1943 while the number of Hvy AAA was increased by only 59%, this and the avg. ammo exp. is not indicative for a collapse in effectiveness _per se_. 

Some significant factors do also apply to probability evaluation and tactics. According to Pilat, since fall 1943 the 8th USAAF Bomber Command flak officers had perfected a computing system with help of Deveraux Thompson. They had been planning routes into and out of the target area using a computer to determine the effectiveness of any plotted FLAK ground battery against aircraft flying at a given altitude and air speed along various courses in order to minimise Flak exposure times.
The studies of Deveraux and Thompson made it appearent that at the altitudes flown by the Eight Air Forces, German average Flak (88mm Flak 18, 36, 37) was well within firing ceiling but had such a reduced accuracy that it depended largely on barrage fire and large volume of fire to produce kills. Because the probability to hit in the first place was low, a battery´s effectiveness depended largely on how long it could engage a formation. Thompson pointed out that sending a large number of bombers over the same area of defense would be desirable from a loss sensible probability point of view. These and further statistical analysis conducted by the ORS led to the creation of a probability optimised computing methods and the so called Falkometer, helping in reducing exposure.
Such an evaluation was not aviable in 1942.


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## parsifal (Sep 28, 2008)

HoHun said:


> H Parsifal,
> 
> >So your right for 1944, so many variables are on the move that it is difficult to know which one(s) are the dominant factor in the collapse of Flak effectiveness
> 
> ...




The problem with that conclusion is that it takes no account of the sortie rate by the allies. In that period, the average number of sorties went up something in the order of around 2000 per month in 1942, to around 40000 per month in 1944. thats roughly a 20 fold increase, whereas the germans, only achieved a sixfold increase with four times as many guns.

If you look at the numbers of aircraft over the targets and the number of barrels firing at them, and then this apparent increase in loss rates in fact does not point to an increase in efficiency at all. In fact it most definately points to a decrease in efficiency. Which is borne out by the basic statistic that you guys dont want to accept, the amount of ammunition needed to bring down each bomber. 

The reason the loss rates went up, I would suggest,does not compare to the sortie rate for eithe the RAF or the USAAF. The number of sorties went up at a much steeper rate than the number of losses sustained per sortie, either from fighters, or from flak. 

Some of the decrease in efficiency is due to the sheer numbers of bombers being hurled at germany, but to jump to the conclusion that the germans were overwhelmed by numbers simply does not explain why it was taking four times the amount of ammunition to bring down each bomber. Your explanation dodges the very point....why does it take 16000 shells per kill, when in 1942 it only took 4300?????

Some of it can be explained by the increasing effectiveness of the allies (aircraft were superior, and the safety in numbers should not be discounted) , but as i pointed out in some previous posts, this cannot explain some rather curious nuances in the data. Ther were occasions when the quality of the attackers obviously improved, and yet the efficiency in the kill rate would also increase . obviously ther is something else at work, other than the improving efficiency of allied aircraft, or the numbers involved. IMO the conclusion is inescapable...standards in the defence were a factor to consider.

If you dont use ammunition expenditure as a measure of efficiency, what other measure do you suppose we should use I see the division or distinction you are making between efficincy and effectiveness as one of semantics really. Whats the differnce. Are you saying that because ther were more kills, it is more effective. Doesnt take into account the increased number of targets, the increased numbers of barrels.....and does not look at the amount of ammunition needed to bring down each eaircraft. in my view efficency and effectiveness can be used interchangeably. I think your approach suggests that "bigger" equates to "more efficient" If that is the point you want to make, i would have to disagree. To me, the measure of effectiveness/efficiency, is the number of shots needed to bring down each target, or perhaps, the number of guns needed to bring down each target. But for me it seems that measuring the amount of ammunition per kill is a valid way of trying to measure eficiency.


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## pbfoot (Sep 28, 2008)

If you talk to any of the guys flying in the ETO at the time the Flak increased greatly as the size of the Reich shrank , or same amount of guns smaller area

. Most of the pilots were far more concerned about flak then the Luftwaffe in late 44 45


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## HoHun (Sep 28, 2008)

Hi Parsifal,

>>That looks more like a marked increase in effectiveness, not like a collapse.

>The problem with that conclusion is that it takes no account of the sortie rate by the allies. 

"Effect" is the result of something, "efficiency" is the relation of results achieved to effort spent.

If more aircraft were shot down, this means that the Flak achieved greater results and accordingly was more effective.

>whereas the germans, only achieved a sixfold increase with four times as many guns.

Even that's an increase of 50% in the effectiveness of each gun.

>If you look at the numbers of aircraft over the targets and the number of barrels firing at them, and then this apparent increase in loss rates in fact does not point to an increase in efficiency at all. In fact it most definately points to a decrease in efficiency. Which is borne out by the basic statistic that you guys dont want to accept, the amount of ammunition needed to bring down each bomber.

Well, I was refusing to accept the statement that the effectiveness went down, I'd certainly admit that the efficiency - measured by certain parameters - might have decreased.

>Your explanation dodges the very point....why does it take 16000 shells per kill, when in 1942 it only took 4300?????

As it's an efficiency figure only, not an effectivenes figure, I'm not actually obliged to provide an explanation  Delcyros and I have already pointed out some likely factors though, such as the greater damage resistance of the USAAF heavies compared to the 1942 RAF bombers, the greater altitude of the USAAF bombers or the saturation effect of the USAAF bomer tactics.

Efficiency can be measured by various parameters, and shots per kill is only one. If you refuse to take low-probability shots and leave a formation alone when it passes too far off, that will improve your shots-per-kill efficiency, but will deteriorate your kills-per-barrel-per-month efficiency. To achieve the desired strategic goal - maximum damage to the USAAF bombers, and optimal protection for the German population and industry -, effectiveness concerns will override efficiency concerns. The usefulness of Flak is both in the actual damage it does to the enemy, and in the damage to friendly assets it prevents. The latter doesn't leave a trace in the shots-per-kill efficiency, but that only shows that shots per kill are not the ideal measure to judge Flak effectiveness by.

I mean, "well-documented collapse of Flak effectiveness" is a pretty strong verdict, and I had expected some really overwhelming evidence to support that. If it's all just "shots per kill", I'm a bit disappointed ...

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## parsifal (Sep 28, 2008)

Hi del

Thanks for the post. You raise a number of issues, most of which i agree with. to both yourself and Hohun, this has been a most engaging debate which , I hope you guys are enjoying as much as i. My intention is to debate this with the utmost respect and congeniality as possible. but not necessarily agreeing with you guys at every juncture. I would like everybody to come away from the discussion feeling as if they had contributed, and having been respected in the presentation of their views...swe are all adults, and i believe we have a lot of knowledge to contribute to the debate

Anyway, enough of that

_Some significant factors do also apply to probability evaluation and tactics. According to Pilat, since fall 1943 the 8th USAAF Bomber Command flak officers had perfected a computing system with help of Deveraux Thompson. They had been planning routes into and out of the target area using a computer to determine the effectiveness of any plotted FLAK ground battery against aircraft flying at a given altitude and air speed along various courses in order to minimise Flak exposure times.

The studies of Deveraux and Thompson made it appearent that at the altitudes flown by the Eight Air Forces, German average Flak (88mm Flak 18, 36, 37) was well within firing ceiling but had such a reduced accuracy that it depended largely on barrage fire and large volume of fire to produce kills. Because the probability to hit in the first place was low, a battery´s effectiveness depended largely on how long it could engage a formation. Thompson pointed out that sending a large number of bombers over the same area of defense would be desirable from a loss sensible probability point of view. These and further statistical analysis conducted by the ORS led to the creation of a probability optimised computing methods and the so called Falkometer, helping in reducing exposure.
Such an evaluation was not aviable in 1942_.


The reports and techniques that led to the "swamping" of the defences is certainly a factor, even a major one, in reducing losses. It is also quite valid to postulate that the operating altitudes of the bombers for the USAAF were a major factor in reducing losses. I also accept that the bombers in 1944, were often routed to reduce the effects of flak by following the path of least resistance. However, it cannot explain the fundamentals of the numbers presented by Westermann, and fails to explain why the RAF also experienced reduction in losses due to flak effects (admittedly the RAF was also flying higher, but at a typical approach altitude of 15-20000 ft, the RAF never goit out of the effective kill zones of the flak).

Effectively what i derive from your post is that the bombers were avoiding the flak concentrations. Probably true to an extent (corroborated in "Fortess Without a Roof"), but there are limits as to how far this argument can be taken....if the bombers were avoiding the flak, why then the phenomenal ammunition expenditure??? The flak was firing alright...it just was not hitting the target. Why??? Certainly some of it was the result of Allied countermesures. Some of it was due to falling standards in the flak, IMO, but the overall effect was decreased effectiveness in the flak 9whether that decrease in effectiveness was due foreign agency, or by internal failures). The proof of that is the amount of ammunition needed to bring down each bomber. That is still the measure of AA effectiveness used by most armed forces as a measure of firepower effectiveness...how many times do you need to shoot at something before it is destroyed. If datum for effectiveness in 1942 s taken as 1.0, then by 1944 flak effctiveness had dropped to 0.25 of what it was in 1942, on that measure. Cant escape that, unless you deny that ammunition expenditure is not a valid measure of effectiveness, which then brings you into conflict with just about every accepted norm on this sort of issue that I am familiar with.


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## HoHun (Sep 29, 2008)

Hi Parsifal,

>there are limits as to how far this argument can be taken....if the bombers were avoiding the flak, why then the phenomenal ammunition expenditure???

Because the Flak was forced to take low probability shots they to get in any shots at all, and to achieve effectiveness with low probability shots, you have to increase the ammunition expenditure. However, that's not the point - the point is that they were still hitting the bombers. Quite possibly with an overall efficiency reduction due to the manpower and hardware factors you mention, but as long as they hit increasing numbers of bombers, their effectiveness has not collapsed.

>Cant escape that, unless you deny that ammunition expenditure is not a valid measure of effectiveness, which then brings you into conflict with just about every accepted norm on this sort of issue that I am familiar with.

Ammunition expenditure is not a valid measure of effectiveness. Just think of WW1 - machine guns expended immense amounts of ammunition compared to riflemen, but it were machine guns that ruled the battlefield. It's not how many bullets leave the barrel, it's how many enter the target.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## delcyros (Sep 30, 2008)

parsifal said:


> Effectively what i derive from your post is that the bombers were avoiding the flak concentrations. Probably true to an extent (corroborated in "Fortess Without a Roof"), but there are limits as to how far this argument can be taken....if the bombers were avoiding the flak, why then the phenomenal ammunition expenditure??? The flak was firing alright...it just was not hitting the target. Why??? Certainly some of it was the result of Allied countermesures. Some of it was due to falling standards in the flak, IMO, but the overall effect was decreased effectiveness in the flak 9whether that decrease in effectiveness was due foreign agency, or by internal failures). The proof of that is the amount of ammunition needed to bring down each bomber. That is still the measure of AA effectiveness used by most armed forces as a measure of firepower effectiveness...how many times do you need to shoot at something before it is destroyed. If datum for effectiveness in 1942 s taken as 1.0, then by 1944 flak effctiveness had dropped to 0.25 of what it was in 1942, on that measure. Cant escape that, unless you deny that ammunition expenditure is not a valid measure of effectiveness, which then brings you into conflict with just about every accepted norm on this sort of issue that I am familiar with.



Hi Parsifal,
You initiated a controversial discussion for which I owe You a congratulation.
I understand that ammunition exp. figures are a valid instrument of measuring efficiency under more or less equal conditions. But such a comparison left a lot to be desired. F.e. before I try establishing a rate, I need to fix mean and variance in the first place. The weighted, arithmetic mean is dependent on the average rate of all involved in relation to their respective number of cases and useful when the sizes of the involved samples are different -which here undoubtly is the case. In effect, this tends to give the 1944 figure much more statistical weight (meaning: statistical significance) than the 42 figure due to the much higher number of involved cases.
It appears that the 1942 avg. rate is exceptional and basically on the far lower edge of the statistical variance suggested by the whole dataset.
A quite interesting aspect, I agree and it requires more than one explenation.
The 1944 figure -true- is above the weighted arithmetic mean but also better in within the weighted variance.

Our explenation for this 1944 departure from the mean is a multicausal approach for which we have determined a number of possible causes without claiming complete understanding of all causes involved.



> _Certainly some of it was the result of Allied countermesures. Some of it was due to falling standards in the flak, IMO, but the overall effect was decreased effectiveness in the flak 9whether that decrease in effectiveness was due foreign agency, or by internal failures). The proof of that is the amount of ammunition needed to bring down each bomber._



Hennig has pointed to the difference in efficiency and effectiveness and I understand that You mean efficiency here.
The basic problem encountered by myselfe is that now we are leaving statistical ground and entering educated speculation. Before attributing importance to the different causes of the degradation of efficiency established above, we need to quantify the importance of those. This can only be made with the instrument of main component extraction and factor analysis (statistics relative to the family of dimensional reduction in SPSS) and I understand that Westermann unfortunately hasn´t attempted to undergo such anaylsis operations while I don´t have the necessary informations (the ORS statistical report would help here) to conduct one.
The question in how much degrading standarts of the Flak-arm contributed more or less to the reduced efficiency in comparison to other aspects cannot be answered from statistical perspective. 

bets regards,


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## parsifal (Sep 30, 2008)

See below...i re-editedmy original message, and am having problems with my loginI


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## parsifal (Sep 30, 2008)

I follow most of what you both are saying, and most of it does make sense. It certainly makes we want to go back and re-evaluate the contents of Westermanns book. i dont suppose eith of you guys can get your hands on a copy and give me your opinion.

Also, do you receommend any books or refence material that might assist in further understanding this issue. It would not hurt to expand the knowledge a bit i think

Im still not convinced about the eficiency/effectivenes argument, though I think i understand what you are saying.

If i can try and illustrate my point of view....In 1942, if 100 bombers fly over a target, and 48000 rounds are fired at it, statistically that barrage is going to shoot down 12 aircraft. in 1944, that same barrage is going to shoot down 4 aircraft. in my book the 1944 barrage is neither as efficient, nor as effective. We can theorise that the flak is firing further away, or that the bombers are tougher, or that they fly higher, but this is not the issue. the issue is whether the flak is as effective, and as efficient. If, as I think you must agree, it is neither as efficient or as effective, then we should try to find out why.

In point of fact, i dont think its this effecieincy/effectiveness argument that is the issue that divides us...i would be surpised..... The issue I think is trying to determine the factor(s) that led to this decrease in efficiency. Was it a drop in the effectiveness of the defenders, or were the attacker developing technologies, equipment, and techniques that caused the degradation?

My opinion, after going through this process with you guys is differnt to what I took into the debate with me. I concede that there are factors on the allied side that contributed to this drop. however, I still do not see a cogent argument that conclusively debunks the westermann theories. Luftwaffe ground crews were more poorly trained in 1944. Radar guidance was degraded for the germans in 1944. Guns were wearing out, However, it is also quite possible that the defences were thinning, because there were more targets, the bombers were striking deeper into germany....the bombers were more resistant to damage, and were flying higher, where it is obvious that the effectiveness of the heavy flak is degraded. Perhaps the best we can achieve with the information i have presented is to say ther was a decrease in effectiveness (or, if you prefer, efficiency) between 1942 and 1944

You also seem to hint that 1942 might be some sort of statistical aberration, because if you weight the 1944 numbers according to numbers shot down/ammunition expende, it takes on a much higher statisitcal importance. true enough, however, the dataset that are the 1942 figures are large in themselves, so i am doubtfull that we are looking at any sort of "fluke" so to speak


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## delcyros (Oct 5, 2008)

> _I follow most of what you both are saying, and most of it does make sense. It certainly makes we want to go back and re-evaluate the contents of Westermanns book. i dont suppose eith of you guys can get your hands on a copy and give me your opinion._



Unfortunately, I have not Westermann. But I will order it as soon as I can spare the money.



> _Also, do you receommend any books or refence material that might assist in further understanding this issue. It would not hurt to expand the knowledge a bit i think_


Front matters has a number of good articles, I will check my books but am in the moment on excavation quite far from home.



> _If i can try and illustrate my point of view....In 1942, if 100 bombers fly over a target, and 48000 rounds are fired at it, statistically that barrage is going to shoot down 12 aircraft. in 1944, that same barrage is going to shoot down 4 aircraft. in my book the 1944 barrage is neither as efficient, nor as effective._


Basically, from a single battery point of view, this appears to be correct. From a statistical point of view, the number of rounds fired at the 100 bombers would not be identic in both cases. During 1944 more than 3 times as much AAA is deployed and the number of rounds fired would be increased by this and advances in rof (barrage firing requires more output). 



> _You also seem to hint that 1942 might be some sort of statistical aberration, because if you weight the 1944 numbers according to numbers shot down/ammunition expende, it takes on a much higher statisitcal importance. true enough, however, the dataset that are the 1942 figures are large in themselves, so i am doubtfull that we are looking at any sort of "fluke" so to speak_



I wouldn´t call 1942 a fluke but it definetely is not what one would expect in a normal distribution according to basic statistic rules.
What is really necessary here is a mission by mission investigation involving numbers and types of the batteries as well as the ammo expendeture figures deployed against the bombers, the type, horizontal and vertical mean distance, speed and time exposure of the bombers.

A statistical survey of at least 1000 representative cases (=bomber sorties) for each year needs to be established, the more, the better. From this database, I can work out a meaningful factor analysis.

best regards,


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## HoHun (Oct 5, 2008)

Hi Parsifal,

Well, I think the real question is - what conclusions do you draw from the evidence you presented?

Maybe it's just that the "total Flak collapse" (inexact quote) gave me wrong ideas about what you actually meant to convey.

The total sortie loss ratio for 8th Air Force bombers appears to have been 4 - 7 % until October 1943, 3 - 4 % until April 1944, and 1 - 2 % until December 1944. What we would need would be the information which part of these losses was due to flak.

(My data is from the manual to "Secret Weapons of the Luftwaffe", but I think I've seen similar statistics in the Strategic Bombing Survey.)

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## CharlesBronson (Oct 17, 2008)

This is a weirdo, Samaka, _salvenmaschinenkanone_ based in multiple MG 81.


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## B-17engineer (Oct 17, 2008)

Wow wonder how much ammunition went through that.


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## CharlesBronson (Oct 17, 2008)

I dont know the exact figure but must be A LOT


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## B-17engineer (Oct 17, 2008)

Agreed


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## parsifal (Oct 17, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Hi Parsifal,
> 
> Well, I think the real question is - what conclusions do you draw from the evidence you presented?
> 
> ...



Henning have to think about the issue for a bit ....have not forgotten, just want to consider all that has been said before making too much more comment. One thing, the issue is a lot more complex than I had thought


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## HoHun (Oct 18, 2008)

Hi Parisfal,

>Henning have to think about the issue for a bit ....have not forgotten, just want to consider all that has been said before making too much more comment. One thing, the issue is a lot more complex than I had thought

Roger, take your time - I'm looking forward to your response when you're ready 

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## BattleshipNightZ (Jul 25, 2016)

Well, I always liked the British AA guns best. Whilst the Quad Vickers AA gun may not have been the most effective, it was certainly one of the most complex!


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