# Boulton Paul Defiant



## pinehilljoe (Sep 26, 2016)

Why was the Defiant put in production and why did last as long as it did? When it rolled out it was slower than the Hurricane and Spitfire. CinC Fighter Command did not like it. Any thoughts?


----------



## nuuumannn (Sep 26, 2016)

This question has been covered a number of times in this forum, but here's a brief response; first you have to examine why it was designed and built in the first place, then take a look at the changed circumstances behind its actual use. What it _wasn't_ designed to do was mix it with single seat fighters, so that then leads you to what it _was_ designed to do.

It was a bomber destroyer and in 1935/36 when the idea was produced, no one thought that Germany would invade France and be able to use single seat fighters to escort bombers into British airspace. Also, the gun turret at that time was a new innovation and only the British had workable ones they could put on aircraft, and they put them on everything. It was seen as the most effective means of bringing gun fire to bear on a moving target. Defiants were to dive down upon unescorted bomber formations, splitting them up and stragglers were to be taken out by single seat fighters; that was the idea.

The reality was that when the war started the low speed and acceleration of the type was well known, but FC needed useable aircraft, so the two squadrons (yep, only two) of Defiants over France and the BoB had to be counted among available fighters, even though they were used in scenarios they were unsuited for, like offensive sweeps over the continent. They would have been better used in the north of England and Scotland in their intended role as interceptors, where the threat of single seat fighters was lessened because of the distance the bombers had to fly to reach these areas.

When Defiants intercepted unescorted bombers, they proved their worth, but the appearance of large numbers of single seat fighters meant that they were always out numbered and so, by comparison to the numbers deployed, only around three, six or nine at any one time, losses were high. Bear in mind that three aircraft shot down out of six is not a lot of aircraft lost, but comparatively, it's fifty percent of forces deployed!

The thing about the Defiant that almost all critics of the type overlooks is that it was a very good night fighter, within the limitations of the technology of the day. Between the end of August 1940 and late 1942, when they were retired, Defiants shot down more enemy night bombers than any other type and they equipped some thirteen (a source I have quotes 15/16) night fighter units. Its unique characteristics (two sets of eyes fore and aft, a 360 deg traversable gun turret, good endurance, faster than the Blenheim) meant that it was ideal for the role, and along with the Blenheim pioneered the service use of air interception radar, although it only made one successful intercept using it.

As a night fighter, Defiant pilots and gunners suffered high losses in training, although this was the same among Blenheim and Beaufighter squadrons as pilots flew into unseen obstacles at night, getting used to the different circumstances of night flying.

So, to sum up, of a front line fighter career of some three years, seven/eight months was served as an indifferent day fighter, whereas two years was served as a successful night fighter. Also, besides the fact that the concept had its flaws from the start, the Defiant was a very well engineered and well designed aeroplane and the perception that is held about it today was not shared universally at the time.

This is just a brief overview and I'm sure others here will go into greater detail, as opinion is (naturally) split about it here.

Reactions: Like Like:
9 | Informative Informative:
5 | Like List reactions


----------



## fastmongrel (Sep 27, 2016)

Excellent evaluation of the Daffy nuuumannn

Reactions: Agree Agree:
3 | Like List reactions


----------



## parsifal (Sep 27, 2016)

it should also be noted that whilst they were not successful as a day fighter, as a night fighter they enjoyed quite a bit of success for quite a while

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Capt. Vick (Sep 27, 2016)

I never knew of its nocturnal success


----------



## stona (Sep 28, 2016)

I think that the initial response has answered the question admirably.
I have little to add, except to clarify that the use of turret armament on British fighters dates back to Ludlow-Hewitt (after he was appointed Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (DCAS)) in 1933/34. There was a real concern at the demonstrable lack of fire power of British fighters in WW1, and concerns that they would not be able to bring sufficient weight of fire to bear on enemy bombers, in order to shoot them down.
Ludlow-Hewitt envisaged to methods of attack, sporadic 'close in' attack and sustained 'lie off' attack. To carry thes out he postulated four different fighter types and the Defiant most closely resembles what he designated a 'Type W', that is 'the two seater with improved stern armament'. At this time the Air Member for Supply and Research was a certain Hugh Dowding, and he broadly accepted Ludlow-Hewitt's findings.
It was Dowding, now the Deputy Director of Operations and Intelligence (DDOI) who suggested a single engine two seat turret fighter in October 1934. In June 1935 Courtney (now the DCAS) asked Ellington (ex-AOC-in-C Air Defence Great Britain, now Chief of the Air Staff) to cancel the various twin turret and 'no allowance' fighters in favour of the single engine turret fighter.
I'm sorry about all the strange positions that existed in the Air Staf/Air Ministry, but it is pertinent that a relatively small group of senior officers were making many of the decisions, the results of which would be rigorously tested a few years later.
The Operational Requirements Committee discussed a draft 'Air Staff Requirement for a Single Engine Two-seater Day and Night Fighter' on 3rd April 1935. The results of the meeting, and the eventual production of the Defiant, reflect the desire to have a multi seat fighter, whilst no viable tactics for its use had been agreed.
The Air Staff Requirement called for a fighter which
_"can bring fire to bear from a moveable battery of at least four machine guns over the upper hemisphere...; thus conferring on it the ability to attack from below and behind, below an in front, or on the flank of an enemy formation, at the same time enabling the batteries of all fighters to be trained on the target simultaneously while in formation."_
The lack of forward armament was due to the belief that it was
_"Undesirable to split the armament"_
even though earlier turret aircraft, like those of the 'Novel Fighter Competition', did have fixed forward armament, indeed two were rejected because their turrets could not be fixed forward to reinforce this!
Cheers
Steve

Reactions: Informative Informative:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## fastmongrel (Sep 28, 2016)

Timing was also aginst the Defiant. In 1938 it was a pretty awesome aircraft not many were faster or had a heavier armament. 109s in 1938 were going to be the B/C/D models with a top speed iirc of 290mph and either 2, 3 or 4 light machine guns. By the time it had got into service in 1940 it flew too slow and climb was very poor also armament had raced ahead.

It just goes to show building a specialist aircraft can catch you out if the enemy hasnt read the script.


----------



## stona (Sep 28, 2016)

fastmongrel said:


> It just goes to show building a specialist aircraft can catch you out if the enemy hasnt read the script.



The RAF wasn't planning to meet escorted bombers at all, and certainly not escorted by single engine fighters. It is hard to overestimate today the shock of the fall of France then.

The very suggestion in the Operational Requirements Committee of attacks from 'below and in front' shows that the presumed targets were unescorted bombers with minimal forward firing armament. Only a mad man would attempt to attack a fighter with forward firing armament in this manner, by putting himself in just about the most disadvantageous tactical position imaginable 

Cheers

Steve


----------



## yulzari (Sep 29, 2016)

It was a 'no allowance' fighter with the guns locked forwards and inclined. The turret had special provision for this and the pilot had a firing button. Sadly the sight and training for this vanished as staff changed and the wartime crews knew nothing of how this would work. 

In the night fighting role ground RDF would ideally place the Defiant within a couple of miles of the target and the RDF set let the pilot close in until one of the two of them had visual contact and then the Defiant would be placed in a relatively blind spot and roughly matching speed to the target. Giving the gunner a stable position to give it sustained fire even as the target began to react. The pilot RDF was less than ideal (though clearly workable) but by the end of 1941 the Defiant was being replaced by night fighters with a faster closing speed in a stern chase, greater endurance, room for a better RDF for a dedicated operator and cannon firepower to deal with bomber's armour. Even then it went on to meet the great need for a high speed target tug for AA and fighter and gunner training. Even briefly serving with the USAAF in that role.

Had it been given the proper pilot's sight, a worked out tactical system and appropriate crew training it would have done far better in the fighter on fighter role. For which it was never designed. The only mystery left in the Defiant story for me is why it was not deployed in the North in it's intended role to deal with unescorted bombers instead of the escort rich skies of the South. Often missed is it's successes over France and (OT) the sterling dive bomber work of it's inferior Blackburn counterpart the Roc in the defence of Dunkirk. Without the dive bombing of the FAA Albacores and Rocs the ground defences of Dunkirk could have given way earlier.

Reactions: Informative Informative:
4 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Sep 29, 2016)

It's a good job the RAF overcame its infatuation with no allowance shooting in time, so that no such fighters were 'on the books' at the start of the war.
In parallel with the quest for firepower, in which the Defiant had it origins, was a quest for speed, in which the Spitfire and Hurricane had their origins. In the quest for firepower manoeuverability was not considered important (the 'Type W' being a case in point) as this was not required for the anticipated tactics to be used by turret and no allowance fighters. They were to formate on enemy formations and bring their firepower to bear. This is just about the only way no allowance shooting can work, the optimal no allowance position being astern and below the target. 
With hindsight we now know that this was not the way air warfare developed and it was in fact the fast, manoeuverable, fixed guns fighters that would dominate on all sides. These had been envisaged earlier, but to employ, in Ludlow-Hewitt's description of a 'Type Z' fighter, 'fire shock action'.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## Venturi (Sep 29, 2016)

It is striking how the Brits were ever so enamored of the naval style action, in the formative decades of aviation.


----------



## stona (Sep 30, 2016)

Venturi said:


> It is striking how the Brits were ever so enamored of the naval style action, in the formative decades of aviation.



Not just the British, though they certainly did. We tend to forget that the Wright brothers' first flight had occurred in the life times of the decision makers of the mid 1930s, just thirty years earlier, some were already serving in one of the Services at the time the Flyer staggered into the air. They were far closer to that milestone than we are to them, or than we are to another milestone, the moon landing.
It is evident in the terms of the period. Everybody referred to bomber fleets, the Germans called some higher formations 'Luftflotten' which is self explanatory, and came up with a class of aircraft called 'zerstorer'.
Cheers
Steve

Reactions: Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## fastmongrel (Sep 30, 2016)

You have to remember a lot of the RAF senior officers had been in the *R*oyal *N*aval *A*ir *S*ervice before the RAF was formed from the Army and Navy air services in april 1918.

Also the Royal Navy was the Senior Service it had been around in one form or other since King Alfred the Great in 890. The RN had a massive presence in British life it was for a long time the biggest employer in the world outside of the Chinese Civil Service and from about the early 1700s till 1945 the biggest Navy in the world.

Reactions: Informative Informative:
3 | Like List reactions


----------



## Shortround6 (Sep 30, 2016)

It wasn't just aircraft. Some of the writings about tanks mention fleets of tanks and formations. It took a while for the firing on the move nonsense to die down and and firing from cover/concealment and quick moves from one firing position to another to take-over. 
Firing on the move required either really low speeds or technology that didn't exist at the time.


----------



## stona (Sep 30, 2016)

Several times between,say, the early 1700s and the end of the Napoleonic wars a century or so later, Britain's defence spending peaked at over 20% of GDP. A very large percentage of this would have been spent on the Royal Navy.

For perspective, nowadays, few NATO members actually spend the target of 2% of GDP on defence. Last year just Greece, Estonia, Poland and of course the USA and UK surpassed that figure. The average for European NATO members was just 1.43%, still better than Canada's 1.00%, talk about relying on big brother (USA 3.62%) 

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Agree Agree:
2 | Informative Informative:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## tomo pauk (Sep 30, 2016)

stona said:


> ...
> It is evident in the terms of the period. Everybody referred to bomber fleets, the Germans called some higher formations 'Luftflotten' which is self explanatory, and came up with a class of aircraft called 'zerstorer'.
> Cheers
> Steve



Plenty of aircraft were referred as 'ships' in the USAAF manuals...

Reactions: Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## BiffF15 (Sep 30, 2016)

Tomo,
I have noticed the same thing watching USAAC/USAAF Training Films on YouTube.
Cheers,
Biff


----------



## Clave (Oct 1, 2016)

The Defiant was also used for Air Sea Rescue (dropping dinghies) and as a target tug for gunnery practice (with turret removed)


----------



## pbehn (Oct 1, 2016)

Everyone borrows words when something is new "pilot" and "squadron" were naval terms before aviation started.


----------



## AnkitaMishra (Apr 6, 2017)

nuuumannn said:


> This question has been covered a number of times in this forum, but here's a brief response; first you have to examine why it was designed and built in the first place, then take a look at the changed circumstances behind its actual use. What it _wasn't_ designed to do was mix it with single seat fighters, so that then leads you to what it _was_ designed to do.
> 
> It was a bomber destroyer and in 1935/36 when the idea was produced, no one thought that Germany would invade France and be able to use single seat fighters to escort bombers into British airspace. Also, the gun turret at that time was a new innovation and only the British had workable ones they could put on aircraft, and they put them on everything. It was seen as the most effective means of bringing gun fire to bear on a moving target. Defiants were to dive down upon unescorted bomber formations, splitting them up and stragglers were to be taken out by single seat fighters; that was the idea.
> 
> ...




The main problem here is, that it was used in situations when mixed with enemy single and twin engine fighters and by crews it was claimed that with huge succes  Of course, it was disaster all the way with low number of real kills and high number of destroyed and damaged Defiants by enemy fire.


----------



## AnkitaMishra (Apr 6, 2017)

"It was a bomber destroyer and in 1935/36 when the idea was produced, no one thought that Germany would invade France and be able to use single seat fighters to escort bombers into British airspace."

This is of course total nonsence.

It was predicted that France will be attacked by Germany and when Defiant will be used it could probably be attacked by enemy fighters. Defiant supporters predicted that it will be successful.

I dont know if anybody predicted that Defiant could be mixed with long range fighters like Bf 110C, but this was also possible at the end the 1930s. We need to know original documents to make any final statements towards Defiant expectations in combat.

Reactions: Informative Informative:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## buffnut453 (Apr 6, 2017)

It was accepted that Germany would attack France. It was totally unforeseen that France would be overrun at all, let alone the lightning collapse that came to pass. The expectation was that any German offensive would be stalled, leading to a repeat of the static trench warfare of 1914-18. Maybe that expectation was foolish but, numerically, the French army was more than sufficient to absorb and successfully respond to a German offensive. What changed was the tactics which drove through French positions, with resultant collapse in morale.

Reactions: Agree Agree:
3 | Like List reactions


----------



## Shortround6 (Apr 6, 2017)

AnkitaMishra said:


> "It was a bomber destroyer and in 1935/36 when the idea was produced, no one thought that Germany would invade France and be able to use single seat fighters to escort bombers into British airspace."
> 
> This is of course total nonsence.
> 
> ...



While documents would be very helpful we also have to remember that the aerial landscape was changing at a very rapid pace. And British development was a bit on the slow side. From initial requirement to combat use in 1940 took about 5 years for the Defiant. 
When the prototype Defiant first flew less than a dozen Bf 109s had been fitted with DB engines. Bf 110 production was at a creeping pace with Jumo 210 engines while they waited for DB 600 series engines in late 1938. The British were overtaken by events. Slow development/testing combined with orders being placed _before _testing was completed meant large amounts of materials and tooling was already in the production pipeline. 

From wiki so subject to correction. " On 28 April 1937, an initial production order for 87 aircraft was received by Boulton Paul for the P.82; as this was prior to the first flight of the prototype, the aircraft had effectively been ordered 'off the drawing board'

"By January 1940, over half of the original production batch had been completed.[9] Beyond the initial production order in April 1937, follow-on orders had been issued for the type; in February 1938, an additional 202 Defiant Mk I aircraft were ordered; three months later, another 161 aircraft were ordered.[9] In December 1939, yet another 150 aircraft were ordered, raising the overall total to 513. In 1940, this rose to 563 Defiant Mk Is on order, while a further 280 were ordered under a rearranged manufacturing plan issued in mid-1940"

Basically you had 450 Defiants on order before the First production example flew. 

Even in 1938 the bulk of the 109s produced used Jumo 210 engines (and 235-270 ? liter fuel tanks) and were armed with four or fewer 7.9mm MGs. 

People had little doubt the Germans would attack France, the doubt was how far they could advance and how close they could push the airfields used to attack England.

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## GregP (Apr 9, 2017)

As for naval terms, aircraft were saddled with port and starboard, instead of left and right, pilots and squadrons, as mentioned above, and even echelon formations from the Navy.

At least the relief tube wasn't a Navy term, and neither was bomb bay. Plenty of people used to shimmy out onto the catwalk to relive themselves when flying B-17s. I'd be VERY surprised if other bombers didn't do the same.

One wonders about bomb-bay relief in a P-51 for a 7- hour mission! Hopefully there was a something other than "wet-the-floorboard!"

And nobody had to climb the mast!


----------



## stona (Apr 9, 2017)

AnkitaMishra said:


> I dont know if anybody predicted that Defiant could be mixed with long range fighters like Bf 110C, but this was also possible at the end the 1930s. We need to know original documents to make any final statements towards Defiant expectations in combat.



I have posted exactly that sort of information in another thread...somewhere. The documents I posted included a discussion of the tactics to be employed by the Defiant against bombers, tactics that could never have been considered in the presence of escort fighters.

The Bf 109 had a radius of operation of barely 150 miles (basically flying there and back and not indulging in any high demand combat flying). Nobody had envisaged the fall and surrender of France, it certainly wasn't considered in any of the RAF's 'War Plans', and nobody expected the Luftwaffe fighters to be operating from bases on the Channel Coasts of France and the Low Countries.

The first Bf 110s entered production in April 1938 just eight months AFTER the Defiant prototype first flew. British pre-war development times were long, which is why the type didn't enter production until mid 1939. Hindsight is a wonderful tool.
The DB 601 powered Bf 110 C variant did not begin to reach operational units until the summer of 1939, around the time the Defiant entered production.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Apr 9, 2017)

It's probably worth mentioning that as of 29th June 1940, following earlier losses, the Luftwaffe could field 357 Bf 110s and that by the end of September it would have lost 235 of these destroyed (214 by enemy, that is British, action) representing 66% of initial strength. Operating in heavily contested enemy airspace against a well organised defence revealed the shortcomings of the Bf 110 in its intended roles. The Defiant was not the only fighter type unable to survive in the hostile aerial environments of the Battle of Britain. Coincidentally, both enjoyed some success as night fighters.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## Shortround6 (Apr 9, 2017)

Actual performance of production military aircraft in the late 30s was often secret, even pictures sometimes took a while to surface so unless there was a very good spy network capabilities were often unknown. And with 3-5 year development cycles getting caught short was all to often an occurrence if you were designing to what your opponents already had vs what you thought they _might have 3-5 years down the road. 
_I am actually hard pressed to think of a _single_ aircraft that was designed as a *response* to another aircraft already in service during WW II. Modified or improved versions yes, but an all new aircraft?


----------



## stona (Apr 9, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> I am actually hard pressed to think of a _single_ aircraft that was designed as a *response* to another aircraft already in service during WW II. Modified or improved versions yes, but an all new aircraft?



I don't think that there were any. The pace of development precludes it. It may have been a factor in the 'concept-less' ordering by the RLM of aircraft off the drawing board?
The Defiant was not the first, and it won't be the last, weapons system that was proven incapable of meeting expectation once it was tested against a real, live enemy.
Cheers
Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## pbehn (Apr 9, 2017)

During the full period of the Battle of Britain the LW lost all of its front line strength (in numbers) of Bf110s. The strength at the end of it represented how many had been produced in the same period. However the same is pretty much true for RAF single engined fighters. The difference is that the British were more than replacing losses in machines and most importantly were achieving their aim of thwarting their opponent. A twin engined heavy fighter had its uses but escort fighter wasn't one of them.


----------



## stona (Apr 9, 2017)

The RAF made a net gain of 261 Hurricanes and 175 Hurricanes between 6th July and 2nd November 1940. Production far outweighed losses with the exception of a few weeks in August/September. The loss of 537 airmen, mostly pilots, was a much bigger problem for the British. Here the advantage of fighting over friendly territory was vital. It has been calculated that 501 Squadron, which fought for most of the period in 11 Group, sustained 47% casualties (nineteen killed, eleven wounded), but, had those shot down who returned to the squadron not been able to do so, this figure rises to an unsustainable 72%. For example, the squadrons top scorer, James 'Ginger' Lacey, baled out and survived to fight again no less than three times during this period!

The best figures for losses on both sides are those in 'The Battle of Britain Then and Now' (page 705 of my edition). The RAF lost 1,023 aircraft, the vast majority single engine fighters, the Luftwaffe 1,887 of which 873 were Bf 109s or Bf 110s. Just about every source will give slightly different numbers, but the overall result is always similar.

The Bf 110 losses were over 2/3 of initial strength, but actually close to 100% (some give 94%) of operational strength at the beginning of the Battle. Operational ready rates for the Bf 110 were not great following the campaigns prior to the BoB.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## pbehn (Apr 9, 2017)

stona said:


> The RAF made a net gain of 261 Hurricanes and 175 Hurricanes between 6th July and 2nd November 1940. Production far outweighed losses with the exception of a few weeks in August/September. The loss of 537 airmen, mostly pilots, was a much bigger problem for the British.


That was precisely my point. Dowding insisted on a base minimum of 500 single engined fighters with pilots, the LW actually destroyed that many or killed/injured that number of pilots. In numbers the RAF was stronger and the LW weaker, pilot skill and training is a different issue. As far as the Bf110 is concerned it cost much more to build and operate than a Bf109 and none of the extra cost was justified by results

Reactions: Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Apr 9, 2017)

Luckily for Fighter Command it only operated two squadrons of Defiants, Nos. 141 and 264 during the Battle. They *claimed* 22 Luftwaffe aircraft, but for the loss of 28 aircrew, a figure made worse by the Defiant's crew of two. To put that negative ratio in perspective, the average Hurricane squadron* claimed* 5.7 aircraft for every pilot lost and the average Spitfire squadron 7.4. 
If we accept the total Luftwaffe losses as 1,887 aircraft and Fighter Command aircrew losses at 537 the actual overall ratio is about 3.5 aircraft destroyed for each pilot lost, so the claims are unsurprisingly optimistic. The more important figure is that for every RAF aircrew killed the Luftwaffe lost nearly 5, with many more captured and removed from the fray.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## buffnut453 (Apr 9, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> I am actually hard pressed to think of a _single_ aircraft that was designed as a *response* to another aircraft already in service during WW II. Modified or improved versions yes, but an all new aircraft?



I agree. The only one that comes close might be the Westland Welkin specifically designed for high-altitude interception...but that's still more of an operational capability gap than it is a direct response to an adversary aircraft. Of course one could argue that the Welkin was simply an "improved" version of the Whirlwind.


----------



## swampyankee (Apr 9, 2017)

The Defiant was the result of a bad specification, in the same way as were the Blackburn Roc, the Bell Airacuda, and the Messerschmidt Me110. Of the three, only the Bell aircraft was discarded before it entered combat. The Me110 had value in roles where maneuverability was not so important, such as night fighting, but the Defiant wasn't able to carry the radar needed to be a completely effective night fighter, at least in 1940 and 1941.

As an aside, please don't claim that a twin-engined fighter could not be competitive in 1940: I think that the specifications of the Whirlwind showed that a twin-engined fighter could be effective in air combat, but only if that was the main design goal. If I remember, the goal of the specification for the Me110 was as an escort aircraft to ward off enemy fighters, analogously to destroyers in naval usage.

One of the problems with any discussions of this sort is that the errors in specification -- which are largely responsibility of the using services -- are conflated with errors in execution.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Ascent (Apr 9, 2017)

During the Battle of Britain it wasn't just new build aircraft the RAF were getting, they had a very efficient repair organisation putting aircraft back into the air that had received significant damage. It meant many fighters that might have been constructive losses were back in the air before the end of the battle.

Reactions: Optimistic Optimistic:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Apr 9, 2017)

The Specification for the Defiant is only 'bad' with hindsight. In the early and mid 1930s the RAF had severe doubts about the the effectiveness of fixed gun fighters, even with eight or ten machine guns, against formations of bombers.
Salmond, then AOC-in-C Air Defence of Great Britain clarified the issue in 1933 when he wrote

_"I would suggest that the fixed gun single seater, which is the cause of this pessimism, was designed in the first instance rather for the needs of air fighting in France in 1916-18 than for the purpose of home defence fighting."_

In order to break up enemy formations in the short time available Salmond suggested that

_"the design of the home defence fighter and the tactics employed should be such as to produce the maximum of fire effect in the minimum time."_

To get the concentration required would require the attacking aircraft to make their attack in formation, and this ruled out fixed gun fighters, because

_"A pilot cannot aim a gun and at the same time accurately maintain his position in formation."_

It is these perfectly reasonable arguments, at the time, which led to the development of the specifications which would result in the Defiant. By April 1935 the Operational Requirements Committee were discussing 'Air Staff Requirements for a Single Engine Two-seater Day and Night Fighter'. The resulting Air Staff requirement showed the quandary resulting from the desire to have a multi seat fighter in conjunction with a failure to agree viable tactics for its use. The Requirement called for a fighter which

_"..can bring fire to bear from a moveable battery of at least four machine guns over the upper hemisphere...; thus conferring on it the ability to attack from below and behind, below and in front, or on the flank of an enemy formation, at the same time enabling the batteries of all fighters to be trained on to the target simultaneously while in formation."_

The draft F.9/35 was approved by Ellington and circulated to industry that month, a full specification followed in May, and the Defiant was ordered in 1938. By the time it entered service two years later, viable tactics for its employment had still not been worked out, and the rapid development of aircraft elsewhere had rendered it virtually useless as a day fighter.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Informative Informative:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## Shortround6 (Apr 9, 2017)

The trouble with this theory was that it rather ignored all the experience of WW I. Quite a few fighters had flexible guns even if not turrets operated by a second crewman but the weight penalty of the second crewman almost always negated the advantage of gun flexibility vs the single seat fighter using fixed gun/s. 
Britian's most successful 2 seater, the Brisfit, was only successful when flown as a fighter 'with a sting in its tail ' rather than depending on the rear gun/s as the primary means of attack. And quite a few of these F2b's had two guns in the rear and only one fixed gun out the front.
The F2b also used a more powerful engine than well over 90% of the single seat fighters. 
Perhaps if the Defiant had been powered by an early Griffon? 

One also needs to consider ALL likely targets, not just ones favorable to the concept. For instance the Defiant would have probably been successful against a bomber like the Whitley but of rather limited use against a fast bomber like the Do 215, this assumes the use of similar engines in the interceptors and the bombers.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Apr 9, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> The trouble with this theory was that it rather ignored all the experience of WW I.



Not in this context. Fixed gun fighters in WW1 engaged other aircraft in much the same way as they would do in WW2, but this was not expected to be the case when fighters were confronted by the large and heavier bomber formations expected by the 1930s. The RAF's emphasis, _in the context of a home defence fighter,_ which would be expected to engage these bomber formations, was on achieving a sufficient weight and concentration of fire to shoot them down in the short time available. This is why a second crewman to man the guns while the fighters made a formation attack, flown by the pilots, was considered imperative. The concept of turret fighters, not just those with the Defiant midships turret configuration, dates back to the early 20s, only becoming practical in a single engine aircraft in the 1930s. Most if not all the earlier proposals (I haven't checked) were twins. 

In the 1930s two principal factors drove British fighter design, the quest for firepower and the quest for speed. The Defiant was the result of the former, the Spitfire and Hurricane of the latter. 
The submission of a Hawker monoplane fighter, which would become the Hurricane, was a direct result of the Director of Technical Development's (I think it was Henry Cave at the time) 1934 decision that both Hawker and Supermarine developments should be dealt with, meaning financed, as part of the ongoing high speed research programme.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## AnkitaMishra (Apr 9, 2017)

buffnut453 said:


> It was accepted that Germany would attack France. It was totally unforeseen that France would be overrun at all, let alone the lightning collapse that came to pass. The expectation was that any German offensive would be stalled, leading to a repeat of the static trench warfare of 1914-18. Maybe that expectation was foolish but, numerically, the French army was more than sufficient to absorb and successfully respond to a German offensive. What changed was the tactics which drove through French positions, with resultant collapse in morale.



I DONT THING, that this expectation have anything to do with Defiant and its tactics when used with Spitfires support on 13th May 1940 on the battlefield. On this day, nobody knows, that Belgium and France will collaps soon. Defiants were belived to survive under the protection of 8-gun fighters, but they failed misserably on the very first occasion.


----------



## AnkitaMishra (Apr 9, 2017)

stona said:


> I have posted exactly that sort of information in another thread...somewhere. The documents I posted included a discussion of the tactics to be employed by the Defiant against bombers, tactics that could never have been considered in the presence of escort fighters.
> 
> The Bf 109 had a radius of operation of barely 150 miles (basically flying there and back and not indulging in any high demand combat flying). Nobody had envisaged the fall and surrender of France, it certainly wasn't considered in any of the RAF's 'War Plans', and nobody expected the Luftwaffe fighters to be operating from bases on the Channel Coasts of France and the Low Countries.
> 
> ...



I was talking about real combat experience and engagements. On 13th May 1940 Defiants were supported by Spitfires from 66 Squadron and involved in combat with Me 109s. They failed misserably! This is the exact confirmation of believe, that Defiants could survive being protected by single engine fighters towards enemy fighters. RAF Staff believed in it even after Dunkirk! Defiant was withdrawn from daylight combat area only after 28th August 1940 disaster number x.... This is how stupid RAF high officers were and how they believed in Defiant effectivity. Its just like now with politicians, they did not want to confess to big mistake and failure. If you beat politician in his head, he will confess, otherwise NOT


----------



## AnkitaMishra (Apr 9, 2017)

stona said:


> The RAF made a net gain of 261 Hurricanes and 175 Hurricanes between 6th July and 2nd November 1940. Production far outweighed losses with the exception of a few weeks in August/September. The loss of 537 airmen, mostly pilots, was a much bigger problem for the British. Here the advantage of fighting over friendly territory was vital. It has been calculated that 501 Squadron, which fought for most of the period in 11 Group, sustained 47% casualties (nineteen killed, eleven wounded), but, had those shot down who returned to the squadron not been able to do so, this figure rises to an unsustainable 72%. For example, the squadrons top scorer, James 'Ginger' Lacey, baled out and survived to fight again no less than three times during this period!
> 
> The best figures for losses on both sides are those in 'The Battle of Britain Then and Now' (page 705 of my edition). The RAF lost 1,023 aircraft, the vast majority single engine fighters, the Luftwaffe 1,887 of which 873 were Bf 109s or Bf 110s. Just about every source will give slightly different numbers, but the overall result is always similar.
> 
> ...




Sorry but this is complete nonsence. RAF FC combat losses during July-October period were close to 1430 fighters FB/Cat 3! Of course, many of them were soon Re-Cat 2, but still with those originaly categorized as FB/Cat 2, losses were tremendous. The real advantage was great repair system of CRO. The true is that RAF fighter losses were much greater than Jagdwaffe and even higher than whole Luftwaffe combat losses. Problem for Luftwaffe was how to quickly replenish those lost planes, because severely damaged machines were transported to Germany by train for factory repair. I would love to write book about it, but unfortunatelly in our country corruption is such, that I was denied to do it. My project at Charles university was denied in favour of someone else.

Reactions: Dislike Dislike:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## AnkitaMishra (Apr 9, 2017)

stona said:


> Luckily for Fighter Command it only operated two squadrons of Defiants, Nos. 141 and 264 during the Battle. They *claimed* 22 Luftwaffe aircraft, but for the loss of 28 aircrew, a figure made worse by the Defiant's crew of two. To put that negative ratio in perspective, the average Hurricane squadron* claimed* 5.7 aircraft for every pilot lost and the average Spitfire squadron 7.4.
> If we accept the total Luftwaffe losses as 1,887 aircraft and Fighter Command aircrew losses at 537 the actual overall ratio is about 3.5 aircraft destroyed for each pilot lost, so the claims are unsurprisingly optimistic. The more important figure is that for every RAF aircrew killed the Luftwaffe lost nearly 5, with many more captured and removed from the fray.
> Cheers
> Steve




Sorry, but your counting is based on virtual numbers. There is no such number as 1887 Luftwaffe planes lost in reality. It was badly counted by Cornwell and he knows it.

If you want to start discussion about real numbers, first look into Narrow Margin. The real kill/loss ratio in Hurricane and Spitfire squadrons was close to 1:1. Defiants did not destroy nearly any known plane during the Battle of Britain, not even the best known Dornier from the museum. Mabye, it should be finally counted after 76 years by British historians but their quality is very bad, unfortunatelly  I like only few of them, otherwise it is....sad.


----------



## stona (Apr 9, 2017)

If you care to examine the source I quoted, many authors, edited by Winston Ramsey, you will find 134 pages listing all Luftwaffe losses between the beginning of July and the end of October 1940, gathered from many sources, including of course those of the Germans. You are free to challenge the numbers, but you will need some good sources and several years of research.

Fighter Command had some reservations about the Defiant from the beginning. There were no proper tactics devised for a turret fighter, and Dowding obviously doubted that those suggested would work in the long run (if at all). Before the type even reached a squadron Dowding was wondering what to do with it, and asked that assessments be made of it.







The results of those trials were very unpromising. Indeed, the conclusion was that the Defiant should be relegated to 'night use only'.
This was in January 1940, long before the Battle of Britain.






That the aircraft was ever used in daylight following this assessment was unfortunate, but not stupid. It was a numbers game, Fighter Command also counted its Blenheim squadrons as part of its overall establishment. There is an argument that the Defiant should have been officially withdrawn from day light operations earlier than it eventually was, but in reality it barely flew in the BoB, following losses in France.

You really cannot bandy about accusations about the quality of British historians, or the competence of RAF officers with no evidence whatsoever to support such claims and expect to escape unchallenged.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
5 | Dislike Dislike:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Apr 9, 2017)

In the ten days of intensive operations, which account for 25% of RAF and 24% of Luftwaffe casualties, the kill ratio in favour of the RAF was always positive, varying from 1:1 to 3.6:1. Average for the ten days, 1.8:1.

Reactions: Dislike Dislike:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## swampyankee (Apr 9, 2017)

stona said:


> The Specification for the Defiant is only 'bad' with hindsight. In the early and mid 1930s the RAF had severe doubts about the the effectiveness of fixed gun fighters, even with eight or ten machine guns, against formations of bombers.
> Salmond, then AOC-in-C Air Defence of Great Britain clarified the issue in 1933 when he wrote
> 
> _"I would suggest that the fixed gun single seater, which is the cause of this pessimism, was designed in the first instance rather for the needs of air fighting in France in 1916-18 than for the purpose of home defence fighting."_
> ...


The general concept of a bomber destroyer was certainly not unique, as witnessed by the Bell Airacuda, and multi-seat fighters were fielded by several air forces, but I think that the RAF, which wrote the spec, was somewhat guilty of wishful thinking in assuming that a bomber destroyer would not need to deal with escorts, especially as their most likely enemy was less than 500 km, by air, from London.


----------



## Shortround6 (Apr 9, 2017)

What I meant was fighters such as the Vickers FB5




And F.E.2b




Had been tried and found wanting even for attacking observation balloons and German reconnaissance aircraft compared to fixed gun fighters. There were others with similar configuration.
The B.F.2b




Had trouble defending itself against single seat fighters when flown in formation and depending on the rear gun/s for defense. When flown as a "fighter" using the front gun and mixing it up with the attackers it gained a rather formidable reputation.

The RAF had Hawker Demons with power turrets from about the end of 1936. One wonders if they ever conducted any experiments with a "formation" (say 6 or more) Demons intercepting a formation of bombers (6 or more) using gun cameras or some sort of recording devices to actually see if this scheme was practical. AS in trying to coordinate the fighter formation (radios? hand signals?. wing wagging? ) while attacking the "bombers" and what happens if the bombers do something as simple as a 30-45 degree turn away from the fighters?
Attacking a formation of bombers that are 100mph slower than the fighters may offer a good chance of success but attacking a group of bombers that are flying at close to the speed of the turret fighters really limits the attack possibilities. Neither side can operate at full speed (limited by slowest aircraft of the _formation 

ARRRGH, system ate the rest of the reply twice, will post later. _

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## swampyankee (Apr 10, 2017)

Shortround, the RAF may very well have done that and ignored the results as unimportant or the result of the limits on the rules of the exercise.


----------



## Shortround6 (Apr 10, 2017)

Thank you.
The turret fighter as a defense against bombers would only work, under suitable conditions, until the attacking bombers had turrets to shot back with. Perhaps a narrow window of opportunity? Depending on your enemy/s NOT to develop their own turrets and/or heavy aircraft guns doesn't seem like good planning either.
French Leo 451 bomber. 




Top speed about 4mph slower than a Defiant. And trading "broadsides" of .303 bullets and 20mm cannon shells doesn't sound like the best idea either. 
The Defiant II was first delivered in Aug of 1941, the Same month that saw the delivery of 14 B-25Bs with both top and bottom twin .50 power turrets (the bottom turret was a dud against maneuvering fighters), well over 100 B-26s (no letter) had been delivered with a twin .50 top turret and Sept, 5th 1941 would see the first B-17E fly with top turret, belly turret (periscope sight, not ball turret), manual twin .50s in the tail and more manual single, 50s sticking out in assorted directions. Yes these are allied aircraft but show that the British did NOT have a lock on power turrets and that _assuming _that Britain's enemies would NOT be able to develop power turrets during the time to took to design, build and bring the Defiant (and Roc and.....) into service was a gamble. Yes the Germans failed to develop power turrets in a timely fashion but that had more to do with doctrine than engineering capability. 
Yes this much more of a test rig than planned operational aircraft but shows the extent of British thinking along these lines. 




and this 1/2 scale flying model 




of the Boulton-Paul P.92/2




Four 20mm guns in a turret. 

There was an awful lot of time, money and effort expended on a _theory _that doesn't seem to have a lot of actual testing done before committing to hardware. And not a lot done to explore alternatives (like holding gunnery training/camp more than once a year?) so the pilots would actually be better shots. 
I don't know about the gunnery training but actual bomb training was a once a year event. Squadrons moved to the bombing range/s from their home bases and conducted exercise for a one or two week period and then back to home base for another year without dropping full sized bombs. Perhaps not even 20lb training training bombs when flying from home bases?


----------



## pbehn (Apr 10, 2017)

The time wasted on theories that didnt work was not confined to the pre war years. The big wing theory persisted until about 1941 I believe.


----------



## Shortround6 (Apr 10, 2017)

If not longer, but if the basic weapon/s (airplane-guns-sights, etc) are not too biased or compromised then you can change tactics (stop trying to use the big wing) without having to change production, If you have compromised the weapons to suit the theory (cruiser tanks and infantry tanks or turret fighters) then you have to design and build new weapons to go along with the change in theory/doctrine/tactics. 

I will grant that using hind sight makes flawed theories easier to pick out or criticize but looking back to WW I and then to the 1930s, it sure seems like a lot of what was learned (or at least known about even if not popular) was thrown away and new/untested weapons/tactics/theories were adopted in many areas of warfare.

BTW it didn't all stop in WW II, some weapons/theories of the 1950s almost defy common sense. At least the amount of time, money and effort put into some of them _without even decent test results. _The love affair with unguided rockets for bomber interception for one.


----------



## pbehn (Apr 10, 2017)

The problem with theories is that people of high rank attach their egos to them. The claims of the big wing were accepted even though there was absolutely no evidence to support them. If they had shot down 40 or 50 bombers over London there would be some wrecks on the ground. It was all too difficult to accept and tell those at the top, much easier to get rid of Dowding and Park. As others have said, if the turret fighter was tested against bomber formations or single engined fighters then the results would be conclusive but they would also probably be ignored.


----------



## wuzak (Apr 10, 2017)

They were so in love with the concept of the turret fighter they fitted the Mosquito prototype with a dummy turret





And built a turret fighter prototype, W4053


----------



## Shortround6 (Apr 10, 2017)

And the Beaufighter had one installed. 





However the night fighters had a somewhat different reason. The flying in formation and firing broadside tactic was forgotten. Instead the turret was supposed to offer more opportunity for engagement, either allowing for off angle or for a longer duration burst at a fleeting sighting.
The early radars had a minimum distance after which they blanked out. They would get the nightfighter to within several hundred yds of the target after which the crew had to visually spot the target. All too often the target was to one side or the other of nose or higher or lower or both higher and to one side making it very difficult to bring the fixed guns to bear. Doing a 360 turn to try to approach the target again often meant loosing the target/contact. The number of contacts/sightings well exceeded the actual firing opportunities in the early days.


----------



## ChrisMcD (Apr 10, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> Yes these are allied aircraft but show that the British did NOT have a lock on power turrets and that _assuming _that Britain's enemies would NOT be able to develop power turrets during the time to took to design, build and bring the Defiant


I am sure the Brits did not think they had a lead in powered turrets since the Bolton Paul turret in the Defiant was based on licenses purchased from SAMM aka Societe d'Applications des Machines Motrices


----------



## wuzak (Apr 10, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> However the night fighters had a somewhat different reason. The flying in formation and firing broadside tactic was forgotten. Instead the turret was supposed to offer more opportunity for engagement, either allowing for off angle or for a longer duration burst at a fleeting sighting.



I don't believe that the Mosquito turret fighter prototype was a night fighter. Certainly not at that stage.


----------



## pbehn (Apr 10, 2017)

wuzak said:


> I don't believe that the Mosquito turret fighter prototype was a night fighter. Certainly not at that stage.


Everything I have read about it said it was a mock up to satisfy someones requirement. In every field of combat a turret armed mosquito eliminated all the designs advantages. The turret weighed more than the bomber versions bomb load.


----------



## wuzak (Apr 10, 2017)

pbehn said:


> Everything I have read about it said it was a mock up to satisfy someones requirement. In every field of combat a turret armed mosquito eliminated all the designs advantages. The turret weighed more than the bomber versions bomb load.



They mocked up a turret on the original prototype, W4050.

They also built a turret fighter prototype, W4053, with a functional turret. But the turret did not function all that well in flight, even getting stuck in flight with a passenger aboard (John de Havilland).

Sometimes it has been suggested that the turret was for defence on the bomber version, but the weight is too much, as you noted, and the turret cuts into the bomb bay space.


----------



## pbehn (Apr 11, 2017)

wuzak said:


> Sometimes it has been suggested that the turret was for defence on the bomber version, but the weight is too much, as you noted, and the turret cuts into the bomb bay space.


I can imagine the conversation when the turret version was completed. "Here is your turret armed bomber" ...."Oh that is interesting, where do the bombs go".


----------



## Airframes (Apr 11, 2017)

"Ah, well. Well alter the fuselage, extend the wings, add a couple more engines, and call it Lancaster !"


----------



## swampyankee (Apr 11, 2017)

The USAAF's non-functional hypothesis was that bombers flying in close formation could successfully defend themselves against fighters operated by pilots willing to press home attacks. They even tried to develop "escort bombers," the YB-40 variant of the B-17 and the YB-41 variant of the B-24, an idea that was, in some ways, even more bonkers than the Defiant.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Shortround6 (Apr 11, 2017)

Yes and no. It was sort of an admission that the self defending bomber idea wasn't working. While "escort bombers" are sort of an extension of the self defending bomber in terms of hardware they are an attempt to cobble together _some sort of escort _in a short period of time using existing bits and pieces. First operational use of the YB-40 was in May of 1943 which is before the P-47 got drop tanks. Only 10 (?) operations/missions were flown before the idea was discarded vs hundreds of Defiants built after the basic idea was shown not to work.


----------



## swampyankee (Apr 11, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> Yes and no. It was sort of an admission that the self defending bomber idea wasn't working. While "escort bombers" are sort of an extension of the self defending bomber in terms of hardware they are an attempt to cobble together _some sort of escort _in a short period of time using existing bits and pieces. First operational use of the YB-40 was in May of 1943 which is before the P-47 got drop tanks. Only 10 (?) operations/missions were flown before the idea was discarded vs hundreds of Defiants built after the basic idea was shown not to work.



I think -- and this is, rather obviously, benefiting from hindsight -- that a serious analysis of data would have shown that the bombers' self-defense armament was much less effective than it had been considered pre-war (in this, the USAAF came to the same sort of optimistic conclusion as did most navies about the effectiveness of their ships' anti-aircraft armament) , and that increasing armament did not reduce casualties or even aircraft losses. The YB-40 was a logical extension of the flawed idea that bombers with defensive armament could effectively defend themselves from serious fighter opposition.

I think the utility of bomber defensive armament is pretty clear from its near complete abandonment post-ww2.


----------



## tyrodtom (Apr 11, 2017)

If the massed firepower of the bomber formations was so ineffective, the Luftwaffe sure went to a lot of trouble to develop weapons that enabled them to attack the formations while staying out of the range of that ineffective firepower.
R4M, 40 mm cannons and bigger, mortar tubes mounted on the wings, bombs dropped from above the formations, and fighters so fast ( Me 163 & 262 ) no gunner could would likely get a sight on them .

One bomber by itself, no matter how heavily armed was dead, but a massed formation of armed bombers was a problem of a whole different level.

I think the heavily armed bomber fell out of favor after WW2 because with nuclear weapons, massed formations was a thing of the past.
Though a lot of the early generation jet bombers still retained a tail gun.


----------



## Shortround6 (Apr 11, 2017)

swampyankee said:


> I think -- and this is, rather obviously, benefiting from hindsight -- that a serious analysis of data would have shown that the bombers' self-defense armament was much less effective than it had been considered pre-war



B-17D The Earlier C had four .50s and one .30





B-17E in production before Pearl Harbor. 




Double the number of guns, two power turrets. 10 .50 cal guns ? 
The "G" had 13 guns and 3 powered twin mounts. 

The self defense armament increased considerably from what it was prewar. The fighters just got a lot better too. 




> I think the utility of bomber defensive armament is pretty clear from its near complete abandonment post-ww2.



That took quite number of years. granted the B-36 was essentially a WW II design but a tail position was used on the B-45, B-47, B-48, B-52. B-58. Russian TU-16 had 3 gun positions on early versions.


----------



## buffnut453 (Apr 12, 2017)

tyrodtom said:


> If the massed firepower of the bomber formations was so ineffective, the Luftwaffe sure went to a lot of trouble to develop weapons that enabled them to attack the formations while staying out of the range of that ineffective firepower.
> R4M, 40 mm cannons and bigger, mortar tubes mounted on the wings, bombs dropped from above the formations, and fighters so fast ( Me 163 & 262 ) no gunner could would likely get a sight on them .
> 
> One bomber by itself, no matter how heavily armed was dead, but a massed formation of armed bombers was a problem of a whole different level.
> ...



The defensive firepower of USAAF heavy bombers was ineffective in that it didn't provide sufficient protection to enable sustained operations. USAAF heavy bomber losses prior to the advent of long-range fighters were deemed unsustainable, as evidenced by the active consideration of switching to night bombing. Thus it seems pretty self-evident that the defensive firepower of the B-17 and B-24 were, indeed, ineffective.

The Me163 and Me262 were both in development long before the US entered the war so you can't argue that they were a specific response to the defences of USAAF heavy bombers. The Me262 concept had been around since before the outbreak of war in 1939 while the Me163 design started that year and first flew in early 1941.

As to the other developments you cite, some were desperation measures while the heavier cannon and R4M align with the general thrust of air-to-air weapon development that continues to this day - hit the enemy at longer range with fewer munitions. Given that Germany was, by 1944, struggling to defend itself, efforts to kill bombers more efficiently are just a logical evolutionary step.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## swampyankee (Apr 12, 2017)

I think that the USAAF was worried about the efficiency of bomber defense before WWII, as evidenced by the complex FCS of the B-29. 

I wonder, though, if they analyzed the casualty rates as the bombers got more and more heavily armed. For example, getting rid of the waist gunners would probably free up 750 lb of payload, probably a fifth of the bomb load of a B-17, so fewer bombers would be needed for the same effect on the target and there would be fewer casualties, as the aircrew would be smaller. Indeed, unless the loss rate increased by as much as 10% there would be fewer casualties of all kinds.


----------



## stona (Apr 12, 2017)

swampyankee said:


> I wonder, though, if they analyzed the casualty rates as the bombers got more and more heavily armed. For example, getting rid of the waist gunners would probably free up 750 lb of payload, probably a fifth of the bomb load of a B-17, so fewer bombers would be needed for the same effect on the target and there would be fewer casualties, as the aircrew would be smaller. Indeed, unless the loss rate increased by as much as 10% there would be fewer casualties of all kinds.



I think the issue with this perfectly logical argument can be summed up in two words...maximum effort. The mirror of the argument is that, If the waist gunners had been deleted, then more ordnance could have been carried to the targets by the same number of aircraft, but that losses may have risen due to the reduction in protective firepower. I don't think the idea that the USAAFs would have operated fewer bombers is tenable.
The British removed just about everything they could from their bombers in order to maximise the bomb/fuel load, and were loathe to add anything (like extinguishing systems for fuel tanks) without convincing evidence that they would substantially lower losses.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## tyrodtom (Apr 12, 2017)

While the Me 163 and Me 262 might have been in development before American entered the air war, the armament they chose to arm the Me 262 with was surely chosen with bombers in mind. 
And the point defense capability only of the Me 163 , ( short range, very limited endurance) made it useful for what else but against massed bombers ?


----------



## stona (Apr 12, 2017)

tyrodtom said:


> And the point defense capability only of the Me 163 , ( short range, very limited endurance) made it useful for what else but against massed bombers ?



This is what it became, because of those limitations, though the endurance was more limited than the engine developers had led the RLM to believe. There was, as you say, nothing else it could do.
The early versions, that is those built prior to US involvement in the war (and after), were experimental aircraft. They were not designed to fulfill a particular role.
The ultimate point defence interceptor, designed and built specifically to target bomber formations in daylight, was the Ba 349. The programme for this was only approved after the Me 163 was axed, leaving a surplus of HWK 509 bi-fuel motors with no obvious use.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## buffnut453 (Apr 12, 2017)

tyrodtom said:


> While the Me 163 and Me 262 might have been in development before American entered the air war, the armament they chose to arm the Me 262 with was surely chosen with bombers in mind.
> And the point defense capability only of the Me 163 , ( short range, very limited endurance) made it useful for what else but against massed bombers ?



The Me262's armament wasn't vastly superior to what was being fitted to Spitfires, Tempests and Typhoons and even the Meteor in 1944. Yes the Mk108 was a heavier calibre but it had a slower muzzle velocity and a lower rate of fire than the Hispano 20mm cannon fitted to RAF aircraft. Those aircraft weren't intercepting massed bomber formations.

As previously stated, the armament of the Me262 simply shows a standard evolution of aircraft armament rather than any specific development effort driven by your alleged effectiveness of USAAF heavy bomber defensive weapons.


----------



## stona (Apr 12, 2017)

The reason that the Germans were fitting heavier calibre cannons to all their fighters, including the Me 262, was because of the need to destroy American bombers. The evolution of the armament of the Luftwaffe's daylight fighters, all of them, was driven by this imperative. Some of them were fitted with even larger flak cannon. Despite the limitations of the 30mm cannon it was possible to score the few hits required to down a bomber, though hitting a smaller, faster, manoeuvring fighter might be tricky. It's also why the Me 262, and other aircraft, were fitted with R4M rockets and other exotic systems.
The lack of any such need was why the Americans stuck with heavy machine guns and the British with various combinations of machine guns and 20mm cannon, or 20mm cannon. The Anglo-Americans never saw the need to fit something like the 50mm BK 5 cannon to any of their fighters, what would they have used it for?
Cheers
Steve


----------



## Shortround6 (Apr 12, 2017)

Well, there was a tendency to develop bomber killing armament. Now we can argue about wither it was developed to combat single bombers/small formations or large formations.
The MK 108 was a compromise weapon. It didn't have the range to "stand off' and trade shots with bombers But then even the MK 103 couldn't even do that with any real chance of success. That is to say the chances of scoring hits or enough hits at such range with amount of ammo the plane could carry would be less than one bomber shot down per fighter (or several fighters) intercepting.
The Move to the 30mm cannon came when the Germans concluded (rightly or wrongly) that it would take 750-1000 rounds of 20mm ammo fired by an *average pilot* to bring down a 4 engine bomber since it took 15-20 20mm hits. and such ammo capacity was pretty much beyond the capacity of a single engine fighter. 30mm guns needed 2-3 hits and with a similar hit percentage (2%) the ammo needed was within the capacity of a single engine fighter. 

Even the big German guns only were rated as having an _effective range _of 800 meters while _max _ranges went beyond that. Ratings were for use against bombers and while the .50 cal may NOT have had an effective range of 800 meters against aerial targets it rather depends on the definition of effective. With dozens of guns firing from a formation the total amount of projectiles in air was large, luck (statistics) played a part. 

The only weapon to see service that I can think of, for use against formations, was the German 21cm rocket. It was fired from beyond the effective (or at least practical) range of the .50 cal guns with the intention of breaking up the formation so the fighters could attack single aircraft or at least small groups.

BTW even the 5cm BK 5 was rated at an _effective range _of 800 meters. Sighting problems may have as much to do with max ranges as ballistics.


----------



## swampyankee (Apr 12, 2017)

stona said:


> I think the issue with this perfectly logical argument can be summed up in two words...maximum effort. The mirror of the argument is that, If the waist gunners had been deleted, then more ordnance could have been carried to the targets by the same number of aircraft, but that losses may have risen due to the reduction in protective firepower. I don't think the idea that the USAAFs would have operated fewer bombers is tenable.
> The British removed just about everything they could from their bombers in order to maximise the bomb/fuel load, and were loathe to add anything (like extinguishing systems for fuel tanks) without convincing evidence that they would substantially lower losses.
> Cheers
> Steve


Then they could have operated the same number of bombers for greater effect. The question, which may be unanswerable, is whether loss rates would increase without the waist gunners, and, if so, how much.


----------



## Shortround6 (Apr 12, 2017)

The waist gunners were often left home in the last year of the war or fall of 1944 through spring of 45. But that was long after the escort fighters were flying the whole distance and after the Luftwaffe presence in the air had diminished considerably.

Reactions: Informative Informative:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## pbehn (Apr 12, 2017)

True SR but by the spring of 1945 Lancasters were performing daylight missions.


----------



## tyrodtom (Apr 12, 2017)

The B-17 and B-24 armament wasn't ineffective IMO, it just wasn't effective enough to be the bomber's only means of protection.
All that added crew and weight weren't just there for morale of the pilots and bombardier.

The Luftwaffe wasn't decimated by any means by their return fire, but you don't have to read many pilot's accounts to find out most dreaded exposing themselves to all those .50 cals.

I think I remember a chart shown on this forum that showed that the waist gunners were the least effective gun position, while being the most likely wounded and killed.


----------



## pbehn (Apr 12, 2017)

On the unescorted raids I think the LW suffered 10% complete losses and 20-30% damaged in some way, it was enough to stop unescorted dayliht raids by the USAAF but also for the LW to think about their equipment and tactics.


----------



## stona (Apr 13, 2017)

pbehn said:


> On the unescorted raids I think the LW suffered 10% complete losses and 20-30% damaged in some way, it was enough to stop unescorted dayliht raids by the USAAF but also for the LW to think about their equipment and tactics.



Not as bad as that. The raids generally cited as those that changed American perceptions of the ability of unescorted (or partially escorted) bombers to defend themselves are usually the Schweinfurt-Regensburg raid of 17th August 1943, and it's follow up to Schweinfurt on 14th October.

The 17th August raid was a two part affair. Luftwaffe losses on the first raid (Regensburg) were 9 fighters of the 404 that sortied. As a percentage of those that made contact with the Americans, 197 fighters, this is about a 4.5% loss rate. 27 B-17s were destroyed or damaged beyond repair.

Losses on the second raid (Schweinfurt) were c.38 aircraft of the 468 which sortied. 244 made contact with the Americans, losses as a percentage of that number were about 15% *BUT* two factors influenced this number. First the US escort fighters had intervened, they claimed 16 Luftwaffe fighters, (which was a bit optimistic) and secondly 21 of the aircraft lost were night fighters operating by day, a role in which they proved very vulnerable. Losses of day fighters to US escorts *and* bombers were only about 7%. 39 B-17s were lost or damaged beyond repair, 17% of the total sorties

On the 14th October raid the Luftwaffe destroyed or fatally damaged 67 B-17s. 882 Luftwaffe fighters sortied and 672 made contact with the Americans. Of that number 53 were lost, about 8%, but this represents a stunning victory for the Luftwaffe and both sides knew it. It could have been worse, the weather saved the bombers from a further mauling as they withdrew.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Informative Informative:
3 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Apr 13, 2017)

I'll just add that, as I've said before, the destruction of Luftwaffe fighter forces in Europe and the establishment of Allied air superiority, prior to 'Overlord' was the one unequivocal victory of the combined bomber offensive and though many from all Allied nations contributed, the lion's share of the credit must go to the Americans. Whilst in no way diminishing the contribution of the bomber crews, without whose sacrifices there would have been no victory, it was the US fighter forces that delivered the victory. It was they that destroyed the vast majority of the Luftwaffe fighters, shot down in their efforts to attack the bombers, and harried anywhere else they could be found.
Cheers
Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Agree Agree:
2 | Informative Informative:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Apr 13, 2017)

AnkitaMishra said:


> "It was a bomber destroyer and in 1935/36 when the idea was produced, no one thought that Germany would invade France and be able to use single seat fighters to escort bombers into British airspace."
> 
> This is of course total nonsence.
> 
> ...



Here we have someone expressing his opinion, which he is entitled to do, but confusing it with facts.

In 1933, when the new FO1 (Williams) who replaced Maund (who left the Air Staff to take command of the A and AEE) pointed out that the aircraft selected by the committee reviewing the Novel Fighter competition did not meet the requirement to be

_"...able successfully to engage fighters as well as bombers, in as much as they are somewhat restricted in rear defence."_

Geoffrey Salmond took a different view. Writing in support of a turret fighter concept submitted by ADGB he stated

_"Defence, however, should not be allowed to play too important a role in the design of home defence fighters, *since enemy fighters are not likely to operate frequently or in force over our defended zones.* In addition defence against enemy fighters is provided by the 'interceptor' class of fighter."_

My bold.

At the time (February 1933) Salmond was Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, he would become Chief of the Air Staff in April, not only did his opinion reflect the prevailing view of the RAF, it carried some considerable weight.

The turret fighter was not expected to be attacked by enemy fighters in the areas in which it would operate. It was also somehow to be defended by the interceptor fighters. All the turret fighter concepts were to be zone fighters. By the time the war started the interceptor/zone fighter categories had been blurred into one, but the Spitfire and Hurricane were the resulting aircraft. In 1940 these fighters were not likely to escort the Defiants 

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## AnkitaMishra (Apr 15, 2017)

stona said:


> In the ten days of intensive operations, which account for 25% of RAF and 24% of Luftwaffe casualties, the kill ratio in favour of the RAF was always positive, varying from 1:1 to 3.6:1. Average for the ten days, 1.8:1.



No it wasnt, you have to research it, not copy paste from RAF primary source. Real kill/loss ratio was passive. During daylight RAF FC destroyed like 1218 enemy aircraft lossing like 1430 FB/Cat 3. Of course, as I said, many hundreds of those were repaired by CRO and depots, but its cost a lot of worthy deficiency material and manpower. With severely damaged plane you could do two things, salvage for spare parts ot repair/reconstruct it. Beaverbrook ordered the second option! CRO did a lot of great work doing just that.


----------



## AnkitaMishra (Apr 15, 2017)

stona said:


> If you care to examine the source I quoted, many authors, edited by Winston Ramsey, you will find 134 pages listing all Luftwaffe losses between the beginning of July and the end of October 1940, gathered from many sources, including of course those of the Germans. You are free to challenge the numbers, but you will need some good sources and several years of research.
> 
> Fighter Command had some reservations about the Defiant from the beginning. There were no proper tactics devised for a turret fighter, and Dowding obviously doubted that those suggested would work in the long run (if at all). Before the type even reached a squadron Dowding was wondering what to do with it, and asked that assessments be made of it.
> 
> ...


I like those primary sources, but you missunderstand my statement. I am war historian and I am doing long term research based on primary and secondary sources. And, yes I would love to have much more sources! Thank you. I have results, but unfortunately not published yet. Propaganda is still dominating even in 21st century. And not only in history. I am not saying that Peter Cornwell do not have real numbers now, but those in his book are incorrectly counted!

I researched losses from RAF FC and those are definitely incomplete and wrong. I do not have his current unpublished work, so I can only base my knowledge on 2011 version of Battle of Britain Then & Now. This book is full of mistakes and ommisions considering RAF FC. Sorry state. 

Daylight actions by Defiants were unsuccessful from the very start, so it was stupid to continue this madness till the end of August 1940. So, I am right calling RAF Staff members supporting this policy stupid. Dowding was probably against it from the start and he was, as usual, right!

I am also right about British historians, because I have to read them even now, when I am writting those words here. It is horrible to research based on British books... Those books are so badly researched that I am realy stunded by this. I dont know how they could be paid for such a bad job  Again, sorry state. More to say, many books are full of propaganda, like the danger of German invasion and many more. There was no danger of German naval invasion from the start. Churchill and his saff knew it. Hitler did not have any means to maintan any invasion attempt. It would be suicidal.

The danger of RAF defeat in the air war was nearly zero from the start, because Luftwaffe was weak. There was serious situation at the begging of September 1940 for Fighter Command, but nothing to worry about considering Luftwaffe intelligence knowledge and ULTRA, Y Service on the British side. British staff members knew that they can not be defeated in short term air war. What stunned them was bad RAF FC kill/loss ratio.


----------



## stona (Apr 15, 2017)

You are full of crap, and revisionist crap at that and I won't be entering into a numbers game with you. I couldn't even if I wanted to, as I will be away in the Baltic States and Finland for the next three weeks 

Nobody seriously thinks that a German invasion was possible, WITH HINDSIGHT. Some didn't think so at the time, but some did. If you choose to conflate the myth of the Battle of Britain with the historical facts, that's your problem.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
3 | Dislike Dislike:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## AnkitaMishra (Apr 15, 2017)

stona said:


> You are full of crap, and revisionist crap at that and I won't be entering into a numbers game with you. I couldn't even if I wanted to, as I will be away in the Baltic States and Finland for the next three weeks
> 
> Nobody seriously thinks that a German invasion was possible, WITH HINDSIGHT. Some didn't think so at the time, but some did. If you choose to conflate the myth of the Battle of Britain with the historical facts, that's your problem.
> 
> ...


Your problem is that you are not historian and definitely not polite. I will not insult you, because I am much more smarter than you. Have a beautiful day.


----------



## pbehn (Apr 15, 2017)

AnkitaMishra said:


> Your problem is that you are not historian and definitely not polite. I will not insult you, because I am much more smarter than you. Have a beautiful day.


I am sure you will know that all records contain errors. The more stress an organisation is under the more errors there are. How do RAF records in 1940 compare to LW records in 1945?


----------



## fubar57 (Apr 15, 2017)

AnkitaMishra said:


> Your problem is that you are not historian and definitely not polite. I will not insult you, because I am much more smarter than you. Have a beautiful day.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Funny Funny:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## pbehn (Apr 15, 2017)

AnkitaMishra said:


> Again, sorry state. More to say, many books are full of propaganda, like the danger of German invasion and many more. There was no danger of German naval invasion from the start. Churchill and his saff knew it. Hitler did not have any means to maintan any invasion attempt. It would be suicidal.
> 
> The danger of RAF defeat in the air war was nearly zero from the start, because Luftwaffe was weak. There was serious situation at the begging of September 1940 for Fighter Command, but nothing to worry about considering Luftwaffe intelligence knowledge and ULTRA, Y Service on the British side. British staff members knew that they can not be defeated in short term air war. What stunned them was bad RAF FC kill/loss ratio.


Churchill and his staff did not know there was no danger of invasion, how could they? Certainly not by ULTRA. Barges were being assembled and attacked in France and Belgium. We can now say that any invasion with or without air superiority would have failed but we can also say that Hitler would lose in Russia, Mussolini would lose in Africa and Japan would lose in the far east. Our wisdom in hindsight does not prevent those events.

You know now the strength of the Luftwaffe, the British certainly didnt know that in 1940, they had no idea of their losses upto 1940 just an estimate, also they had no idea of German production and training. Similarly Hitler and his staff had no idea of RAF losses and production/training. Throughout the battle the British tended to over estimate the capability of the LW and the Germans tended to underestimate the RAF which in the end meant their high command were sure only 50 fighters remained when in fact it was over 500.

You are saying that now we know that Dowding and Park could not be defeated because Dowding and Park did what they did. That was not clear in 1940, if the defence of the UK had been entrusted to Leigh Mallory the RAF could have been swept from the skies in two weeks. Leigh Mallory proved this himself when he wargamed the Battle of Britain using his tactics and lost. If air superiority had been lost over Kent and south east England then an "invasion" may well have been a symbolic gesture to get the government to sue for peace.

Edit: Ultra came into being in 1941


----------



## wuzak (Apr 15, 2017)

AnkitaMishra said:


> I am war historian and I am doing long term research based on primary and secondary sources.



Aren't secondary sources books/articles/etc that refer to primary sources? That is, the secondary source has no direct knowledge of the subject, but has used one or more primary sources to build a picture?


----------



## stona (Apr 16, 2017)

AnkitaMishra said:


> I am war historian and I am doing long term research based on primary and secondary sources. .



Well when you consult your sources as a historian you will be aware that after the mauling of No.141 Squadron on 19th July, when the Battle of Britain is considered by most to have barely started, the only other Defiant Squadron was withdrawn. The Battle of Britain is a British construct, and we decide the dates. German historians in particular (yes, I know some of them too) take a different view, which is fine, but here we are talking the British definition. I don't have the Form 540/541s (Operations Record Books) for Nos. 141 or 264 Squadrons to hand. Maybe you can look them up in your next visit to our National Archives, I'm sure you are a frequent visitor in your research and will be aware of the prohibitive cost of having items copied and forwarded by the staff when you can't go in person. Neither squadron subsequently took any more part in the BoB than the Blenheim and Whirlwind squadrons, also operational, so stupid of those RAF officers. Dowding withdrew the Defiant in July and they were officially relegated to a secondary role in August.

I have decided to challenge you to a numbers game, you have three weeks to figure out an answer, while I am away from my library. I have chosen Battle of Britain day as an example, mainly because the numbers are substantial and it is, coincidentally, a Sunday today too. I will post all the losses from both sides for that day. I would like you to show me which ones the RAF has omitted, or failed to admit, and which ones for the Luftwaffe are over claims or otherwise incorrect. If by some stroke of luck the incompetent British historians have somehow got this day correct, then feel free to post the detailed numbers for any other day for me to challenge.

This may take a while while I consolidate my sources, see my next post.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## stona (Apr 16, 2017)

Here are the British losses, I've bolded those aircraft destroyed or subsequently written off to make it easier to add up.


15th September 1940, RAF losses and damaged aircraft. Not all are due to enemy action (nea)!!!

1 Squadron (Northolt)* Hurricane P3080, Hurricane P3876, Hurricane L1973 *

19 Squadron (Duxford) Spitfire R6991 (repairable), *Spitfire X4070, Spitfire P9431*

25 Squadron (North Weald) Beaufighter R2067 (nea)

41 Squadron (Hornchurch) *Spitfire 9324 *

46 Squadron (North Weald) Hurricane N2599 (repairable)

56 Squadron (Boscombe Down) Hurricane P3660 (nea)

73 Squadron (Debden) *Hurricane P3865*

92 Squadron (Biggin Hill) Spitfire R6767 (repairable), Spitfire P9513 (repairable), *Spitfire R6606*

213 Squadron (Tangmere)* Hurricane P3113 *

229 Squadron (Northolt) *Hurricane N2537*

238 Squadron (Middle Wallop) Hurricane L2089 (repairable), *Hurricane P2836*, Hurricane P3920 (repairable), Hurricane P3462 (repairable), Hurricane P3833 (repairable)

242 Squadron (Coltishall) Hurricane V6576 (repairable), *Hurricane P2884*, Hurricane P3515 (repairable)

249 Squadron (North Weald) *Hurricane ????? *

253 Squadron (Kenley) Hurricane V 6698 (repairable)

257 Squadron (Debden) Hurricane P3642 (repairable), Hurricane ????? (repairable)

302 Squadron (Duxford) *Hurricane P2954*, Hurricane P3935 (repairable)

303 Squadron (Northolt) Hurricane P2903 (repairable),* Hurricane P3939*, Hurricane V7465 (repairable), Hurricane L2099 (repairable), Hurricane V6673 (repairable), Hurricane R2685 (repairable), Hurricane V6684 (repairable), *Hurricane P3577*

310 Squadron (Duxford) *Hurricane R4085, Hurricane R4087*

501 Squadron (Kenley) Hurricane V7433 (repairable), *Hurricane P2760*

504 Squadron (Hendon) *Hurricane P2725*, Hurricane L1913 (repairable), *Hurricane N2481, Hurricane N2705*

602 Squadron (Westhampnett) Spitfire X4412 (repairable)

603 Squadron (Hornchurch) *Spitfire X4324, Spitfire R7019*

605 Squadron (Croydon) *Hurricane L2122, Hurricane L2012*

607 Squadron (Tangmere) *Hurricane V6688*

609 Squadron (Warmwell) Spitfire K9997 (nea/repairable), *Spitfire R6690*, Spitfire R6922 (repairable)

611 Squadron (Digby) Spitfire P7303 (repairable). 

The total destroyed or written off is 28. The usual figure for this day is 29, but this includes the Boscombe Down Hurricane which was not on operations at the time of its loss.

What other losses do you think the RAF incurred on this day which have been missed or willfully ignored by incompetent British historians who buy into the propaganda of the Battle of Britain?

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Agree Agree:
1 | Informative Informative:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## pbehn (Apr 16, 2017)

I think historians today attach much more importance to precise figures than people at the time did. All Dowding and Park were concerned with was how many aircraft they could get in the air the next day. An error of one or two in a day or twenty even fifty overall may interest historians in a quest to present the truth, I doubt it was of the same interest to those at the time. There are few battles in history where all the combatants and their machine numbers are known it is a lot of information, some of which may be wrong or uncertain simply because we use terms like damaged and wounded. The issue for Dowding was always pilots, experienced front line pilots always had a plane to get in to.


----------



## stona (Apr 16, 2017)

At Park and Dowding's level this may be so, but at a group or squadron level every aircraft had to be accounted for and that's why we have a very accurate picture of the RAF losses on this day, and any other. 

The Luftwaffe operated a reporting system whereby losses were reported to the office of the Luftwaffe's Quartermaster General. These returns, which were essentially a means of acquiring replacements, are probably less accurate than an RAF squadron's ORB. I'm not about to enter a debate about these returns here, Francis Mason did a lot of work on this in the 'early years'.

As far as the Battle of Britain figures are concerned, the variations are usually a small number and due to factors like the one I mentioned above, where a Hurricane, performing mock combat at Boscombe Down crashed. It was an RAF loss, but nothing to do with the Luftwaffe!

In my next post of German losses I have again excluded losses like this, for instance a Do 18 flying boat which crashed on take off all by itself, with no help from the RAF 

My numbers still fall within one or two of the generally accepted figures.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## stona (Apr 16, 2017)

German aircraft lost and damaged on operations and due to enemy action, 15th September 1940, with werknummer when known.
Wetterkundungs Staffel 51, *He 111 (6938)*
Stab JG 3.* Bf 109 E-4 (5205)*
I./JG 3. *Bf 109 E-4 (0945) *possibly not due to enemy action,* Bf 109 E-4 (1563)*
1./JG 3. *Bf 109 E-1 (2685)*
3./JG 3. *Bf 109 E-4 (1606)*
1./JG 27. Bf 109 E-4 (6249) 30% damage, *Bf 109 E-4 (6232)*
2./JG 27. *Bf 109 E-1 (6147), Bf 109 E-1 (3875)*
7./JG 51.* Bf 109 E-4 (3266)*
9./JG 51. *Bf 109 E-4 (2803)*
Stab I./JG 52. *Bf 109 E-4 (3182)*
I./JG 53. *Bf 109 E-4 (6160)*
1./JG 53. *Bf 109 E-4 (5197),* Bf 109 E-4 (5111) 15% damage
2./JG 53. *Bf 109 E (????)*
3./JG 53. *Bf 109 E-4 (1590), Bf 109 E-1 (3619), Bf 109 E-4 (1345)*
III./JG 53. *Bf 109 E-4 (5251), Bf 109 E-4 (1174)*
Stab I./JG 77. *Bf 109 E-4 (3759)*
1./JG 77. Bf 109 E-1 (4847) 25% damage
3./JG 77. *Bf 109 E-4 (4802)*
5./KG 2. *Do 17 (2678), Do 17 (2304) *Do 17 (1135) repairable
7./KG 2. Do 17 (2539), Do 17 (1153) both repairable
8./ KG 2. *Do 17 (2539), Do 17 (2549), Do 17 (4245),* Do 17 (3432) repairable,* Do 17 (3440)*
9./KG 2.* Do 17 (3405), Do 17 (3230)*
4./KG 3. *Do 17 (3294), Do 17 (3457), Do 17 (2881),* Do 17 (2879) 40% damage
5./KG 3. *Do 17 (1176), Do 17 (3458), *Do 17 (2649) repairable, *Do 17 (4200)*
6./KG 3. Do 17 (3470) 50% damage, Do 17 (4237) 15% damage
II./KG 4. He 111 (3086) 30% damage
1./KG 26.* He 111 (6985),* He 111 (5609) 20% damage, He 111 (5612) 20% damage
6./KG 26. He 111 (5612) 20% damage
6./KG 30. Ju 88 (4020) 40% damage
II./KG 51. *Ju 88 (????)*
Stab KG 53 *He 111 (3140)*
3./KG 53*. He 111 (3140), He 111 (5481), *He 111 (5494) 35% damage
II./KG 53. *He 111 (6843), He 111 (5718), He 111 (2771)*
III./KG 53. He 111 (3340) 40% damage
8./KG 55. He 111 (2815) 25% damage
9./KG 55. *He 111 (1586)*
1./KG 76. Do 17 (2364) 60% damage,* Do 17 (2361)*
2./KG 76. Do 17 (2524) 60% damage
3./KG 76. *Do 17 (2651)*
8./KG 76.* Do 17 (2578), Do 17 (2555)*
9./KG 76.* Do 17 (2814), Do 17 (3322)*
13./LG 1. *Bf 110 C-3 (????), Bf 110 C-3 (????)*
14./LG 1.* Bf 110 C-3 (????)*
1./LG 2. *Bf 109 E-7 (2061)*
3./LG 2. *Bf 109 E-7 (2058)
*
As per my post of RAF losses, I await some concrete evidence that these losses, close to the generally accepted number are incorrect. This time the blame might not be entirely due to incompetent British historians promoting the myth of the Battle, but rather to incompetent German book keepers, noting as damaged or destroyed aircraft which were in fact completely serviceable.

Anyone is entitled to express an opinion, but they then have to back it up with some facts. Someone's opinion is not as valid as someone's facts. Your opinion might be that the earth is something over 6,000 years old, but my facts would discount this. My opinion would be that you're a f**king idiot 

I don't want a reply expressing again an opinion, I want some alternative facts which can then be tested in the normal way. A certain poster is acting like an opposition politician, full of negatives but with no positives. It is not okay to attack the reputation of a respected historian without any evidence at all to support a contrary view.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## pbehn (Apr 16, 2017)

stona said:


> At Park and Dowding's level this may be so, but at a group or squadron level every aircraft had to be accounted for and that's why we have a very accurate picture of the RAF losses on this day, and any other.


Steve, when you impose that requirement you will get a record that accounts for what happened. In life people make mistakes, transpose numbers, dont notice a change that they should. I saw this happen throughout my career in industry where even computer systems which theoretically couldnt "lose it" did. In all cases a solution was found which was a best guess at the true situation and documents adjusted to fit. This is a separate discussion from my part because it doesnt matter at all in the overall picture. In terms of the progress of the Battle of Britain you could ignore machines completely and purely record trained and experienced air crew. The picture would be slightly different but overall basically the same.


----------



## stona (Apr 16, 2017)

The recording of serial numbers/werknummern by both sides left much to be desired. Many of the surviving records, particularly German, can be very difficult or impossible to read. Nonetheless, a squadron ORB, which is basically no more than a 'summary of events' (Form 540) and 'work carried out' (Form 541) is a pretty accurate record of a squadrons operations and losses. The forms are usually far less bureaucratic than the Luftwaffe quartermaster general returns. The Form 541 tend to be quite dry. This is a detail from 141 Squadron






We can identify precisely who flew which aircraft and when, same applies to any lost


Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Informative Informative:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## pbehn (Apr 16, 2017)

I have no difficulty accepting mistakes being made, in the summer ground crews were working around the clock in temporary facilities while the enemy were trying to kill them.


----------



## stona (Apr 16, 2017)

When I was looking for that example from a Defiant squadron's operations book, I rediscovered the Form 540 (summary of events) for 141 and 264 Squadrons for July 1940. I didn't know I had digital copies on this computer. It will save my new friend AnkitaMishra a trip to TNA 

The first action that 141 Squadron saw after leaving Turnhouse on 12th July was the combat of 19th July. Only 9 of the Defiants made the patrol line, 20 miles south of Folkestone at 5,000ft. They were set upon by a superior number of Bf 109s and we all know that 6 were shot own, only 3 returned to Hawkinge. 4 pilots and 6 air gunners were recorded that day as killed or missing. 4 Bf 109s were claimed, they actually got 1, that of Fw. Heilmann of 9./JG 51, who died the next day having written off his damaged aircraft in a crash landing on his return to base. The same day the squadron was released from operations and the CO, Squadron Leader Richardson flew to Northolt for a conference at Fighter Command. The following day, 20th July, the squadron was still released from operations, and on the 21st orders for a move far from the Battle, up to Prestwick in Scotland were received.
The other Defiant squadron carried out convoy patrols on 20th and 21st July, had a visit from the AOC 12 Group on the 22nd, he handed out a few gongs. 264 squadron was based at Duxford at this time, not in 11 Group. On the 23rd the squadron was also moved out of harm's way, to Kirton in Lindsey, up in Lincolnshire, not far from Scunthorpe.

Far from stupidity, I would suggest that Sqn.Ldr. Richardson and his seniors at Fighter Command immediately understood that the Defiant was not suitable for the sort of combat taking place in the BoB, which anyway ran contrary to the design concept behind the type, and acted accordingly, and quickly.

Why let the facts, as recorded in the squadron ORBs, get in the way of a good prejudice?

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Informative Informative:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Apr 19, 2017)

For forum members who might be unfamiliar with RAF record keeping (not of course my friend the 'real' historian AnkitaMishra, who has gone strangely quiet, having failed to post a single fact or number from any sort of source, however he likes to qualify them) I am posting the portion of the 141 Squadron 'Summary of Events' for the days around the 19th July disaster. Despite the sober and matter of fact style of the document, which one would expect, it gives a real impression of just how quickly the 'stupid' RAF officers reacted to remove the squadron and the Defiant from the front line in SE England and over the Channel.











Prestwick is near Glasgow in Scotland, where there was no chance of the Defiants meeting Bf 109s, or any other hostile single engine fighter.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
3 | Like List reactions


----------



## fubar57 (Apr 19, 2017)

Nice Steve. Noticed no codes or serial numbers mentioned, the norm it seems. Odd that a higher up didn't request this info for book-keeping purposes.


----------



## buffnut453 (Apr 19, 2017)

Serial numbers or codes (seldom both) were usually included in the annex that documented specific missions. Unfortunately, the quality of record keeping varies greatly across the RAF when it comes to F540s because it was normally a secondary duty. Even within the same unit, it is often clear when one officer takes over responsibility of the F540 because the quality can change quite markedly. Similarly, if the CO isn't really interested in admin details, he'll likely take less interest in the F540...which usually results in the F540 officer taking less interest in his secondary duty.


----------



## stona (Apr 19, 2017)

Very true. Also serials or codes were more likely to be noted in the 'tasks carried out', the other form that comprised the ORB. The summary of events was just that, and sometimes obviously completed retrospectively.
The most pertinent fact in the extract above is that the squadron CO flew to Northolt to a conference with his seniors at Fighter Command on the evening of the day of the disastrous action. It is clear that it was suspected that there was a serious issue with the Defiant, something had to be done quickly, and it was.
Cheers
Steve (from Helsinki)


----------



## nuuumannn (Apr 20, 2017)

AnkitaMishra said:


> Of course, it was disaster all the way with low number of real kills and high number of destroyed and damaged Defiants by enemy fire.



Well, considering my initial post, all you are doing is just repeating rubbish published by others about a subject you know little about. The official claims for the period of the Battle of Britain was 19 E/A claimed for the loss of 11 Defiants. As a day fighter, the total balance was 86 (or 88) E/A claimed for 32 lost to all causes, including accidents. These are, of course official records from the time and don't take into consideration research carried out since the war.

The question as to why the Defiant was kept as a day fighter for as long as it was is easy to answer; the British had their backs to the wall - FC needed fighters and on paper including two Defiant squadrons, even Gladiator squadrons was better than not having them at all. Bearing in mind the type's weaknesses, perhaps it would have been prudent for the type to have been based in Scotland, where single seat fighters did not have the range to counter it. But, as it is so easy to look back with hindsight and question the decisions made at the time, all we can do is speculate.

There is a good little monograph about the Daffy as a day fighter by Allied Wings; No.8, by Phil Listerman and Andrew Thomas and they've taken the leg work out of the statistical side of researching the Defiant's record, and the authors quote the files accessed for the information presented. Also, check out Air Britain's The Defiant File by Alec Brew, who is the Boulton Paul Heritage Society's researcher who has listed the fate of every Defiant built from the RAF's Aircraft Movement and Accident Cards, which are kept at Hendon, as well as operational records.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Jul 25, 2017)

pbehn said:


> The more stress an organisation is under the more errors there are. How do RAF records in 1940 compare to LW records in 1945?



That's a very good point. Peter Cornwell has noted that RAF records for the campaign in France are _'fragmentary in nature'_.

Regarding the records of the Air Component of the BEF, one official account explains that
_"what survives...is entirely inadequate as a basis for an accurate account, and the historian in search of fuller documentary material...is regretfully referred to an indeterminate spot at the bottom of Boulogne harbour."_

To add to the problem many squadron ORBs were completed retrospectively from log books, personal memories or whatever else was to hand for the crucial months of May and June 1940, the pressure under which units were operating during the rapid German advance precluding normal book keeping practice.

Of course, none of this will have effected the famous historian who has now gone rather quiet in this thread 

Cheers

Steve


----------

