# USAAF philopshy of the heavies being able to defend themselfs



## Jenisch (Jan 5, 2012)

Guys, I was thinking: the USAAF didn't conducted simulated combats with his latest fighters against it's heavy bombers and perceived they would need escort? What exactly was the idea of "self-defense" of the bombers?


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## gjs238 (Jan 5, 2012)

How much of the concept of the self-defending bomber can be credited to (or blamed on) General Billy Mitchell?


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## davebender (Jan 5, 2012)

During 1934 most fighter aircraft were probably still armed with only a pair of machineguns. That's the threat B-17s were designed to handle.

The U.S.A.A.C. mistake was not reacting to increases in fighter aircraft firepower. By 1939 everyone except the U.S.A.A.C. was moving to 20mm or 23mm cannons for fighter aircraft. That should have made U.S.A.A.C. leaders re-think the concept of self defending bombers.


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## Jabberwocky (Jan 5, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> Guys, I was thinking: the USAAF didn't conducted simulated combats with his latest fighters against it's heavy bombers and perceived they would need escort? What exactly was the idea of "self-defense" of the bombers?


 
Self-defending bombers wasn't a USAAF philosophy, but a general combat doctrine that was in place across a lot of airforces (UK, Italian, US, German, Soviet) at various stages between the mid 1920s and the beginning of WW2. Mitchell, Douhet, Spaight, Trenchard and others all developed elements of the theory, at a time when fighters were lightly armed and often no faster than the bombers they were meant to be attacking.

Only the British and the US really had the wealth and the necessary aircraft to pursue the theory, with others abandoning the concept due to their pre-WWII experiences (Spain, Manchuria) or their changing operational/technical/aircraft mix.

The development of the fully powered turret in the 1930s was seen as the ultimate expression of bomber defensive fire and reinforced the concept in the UK and to a lesser extent in the US.

The British pretty much abandoned the concept after their experiences in 1940, with occasional re-runs when the 4 engine heavies entered service. The USAAF was convinced that its higher flying, heavier armed and armoured bombers could do the task, but seemed to be reluctant to learn the same lessons as the British, as its operational concept for strategic bombing was firmly tied to daylight operations. I put the British reluctance to develop a long-range escort fighter in the same category.


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## davebender (Jan 5, 2012)

For all practical purposes Germany abandoned the concept during April 1936 when General Walther Weaver opted for the high speed Bomber A.


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## Jenisch (Jan 5, 2012)

Thanks for the answers.

I already heard that the major problem for the heavies were the "formation destroyers", like the Bf 110, armed with weapons beyond the range of the .50 mg. They would broke the formation to the single-engine fighters finnish the job. Proceed?


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## nuuumannn (Jan 5, 2012)

The concept of bomber defence (defense) was based on covering each other within the box formation with their guns. If the bombers stayed within the box formation , they'd be covered. When the British employed its Fortress Is in the European theatre, they realised their armament was totally inadequate, but I guess the Americans were unwilling to accept British experience. The Eighth Air Force suffered enormous losses to begin with, and its bombers' accuracy left as lot to be desired - all the lessons Bomber Command had already learned had to be learned by the Americans the hard way.


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## Jenisch (Jan 5, 2012)

I keep scratching my head on apparently how the Americans didn't conducted simulated combats if the problem was with conventional fighters. They even had better high altitudes fighters than the LW.

I think they always knew fighter escort was necessary, simply didn't have it. Perhaps they carried out the missions because they belived the Norden was a wonder and would bring a lot of destruction. And I'm skeptical about the frustration with the Norden as well.


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## pbfoot (Jan 5, 2012)

nuuumannn said:


> The concept of bomber defence (defense) was based on covering each other within the box formation with their guns. If the bombers stayed within the box formation , they'd be covered. When the British employed its Fortress Is in the European theatre, they realised their armament was totally inadequate, but I guess the Americans were unwilling to accept British experience. The Eighth Air Force suffered enormous losses to begin with, and its bombers' accuracy left as lot to be desired - all the lessons Bomber Command had already learned had to be learned by the Americans the hard way.


yes but the RAF did not use the same formation as 8th AF nor did they follow protocol on the aircrafts use IIRC .


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## TheMustangRider (Jan 5, 2012)

One of the reasons might have been, as far as I'm aware, of how underrated fighter capability became against the mighty heavy bombers during the late '30s by those pushing in the USAAF for the self-defense bomber.

The fact that the 8th BC entered the air war over Europe relying on high-altitude flying, its Norden bomb-sight; later on is forced to adopt the combat box formation and finally realizes the need for strategic long-range escort fighter support is supporting evidence IMO that some believed fighter opposition would never evolve to be on par with bomber defense capability.


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## pinsog (Jan 5, 2012)

American self defending bombers did work against Japan, and would probably have worked again the Soviet Union and Italy as well.


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## tyrodtom (Jan 5, 2012)

What could simulated combat tell you about the effectiveness of the defensive fire, or how effective the fire of fighters intercepting the bombers could be. There's some things you can only learn by doing the real thing.


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## Jenisch (Jan 5, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> What could simulated combat tell you about the effectiveness of the defensive fire, or how effective the fire of fighters intercepting the bombers could be. There's some things you can only learn by doing the real thing.



Well, it's all about science. The Bf 110 for example, it's poor service record over Britain was not a surprise for many in the LW. They knew the plane was vulnerable to the Bf 109, and therefore would be against the similar British fighters. Even so, the USAAF probably had it's reasons, I just want to understand the historical point of view of them.

About the B-29, different airplane. It's fire system was state of the art, with an early computer that calculated air density, wind drift, target speed, etc. Against the Japanese planes, specially at altitude like it flown initially, it certainly would be capable of hold it's own. Later, with better Japanese aircraft like the Ki-84 and the J2M, and the missions being flown at medium altitude, fighter escort proved necessary. 

Logically, the more independent the bombers were, the best would be. But personally, I think the USAAF always wanted escort for it's wartime bombers. A fighter in escort work can shoot down the enemy more easily and avoid casualities to the bombers. The long range fighter also would clear the enemy from the sky.


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## TheMustangRider (Jan 5, 2012)

pinsog said:


> American self defending bombers did work against Japan, and would probably have worked again the Soviet Union and Italy as well.



Although that's true for the most part, I think it's worth noting that the IJAF and IJN never posed the same level of threat to the 20th BC as did the Luftwaffe to the 8th/15th BCs.
I have some statistics that claim that only 26% of all Japanese fighter defense capability was ever assigned to confront the B-29 threat to the Japanese homelands; if these numbers are close to reality, one can see why more B-29s were lost to mechanical or operational malfunction than to fighter opposition.


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## Jenisch (Jan 5, 2012)

TheMustangRider said:


> I have some statistics that claim that only 26% of all Japanese fighter defense capability was ever assigned to confront the B-29 threat to the Japanese homelands; if these numbers are close to reality, one can see why more B-29s were lost to mechanical or operational malfunction than to fighter opposition.



By the war's end, the Japanese were increasingly interested in Kamikaze missions. They were also building a reserve, both from Kamikaze and conventional planes to the invasion of their island. I think they were waiting their new aircraft, specially the jets to make favourable cost-benefit attacks in the 29's.


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## pinsog (Jan 5, 2012)

Even before the B29, Japanese fighters didn't do real hot against B17's and B24's either. They did some pretty deep missions, unescorted, early and midway through the war.


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## tyrodtom (Jan 5, 2012)

There would have been a long, long wait on the jets, the only jet developed was the Nakajima Kikka, and the prototype first flew on Aug. 7 1945. Everything else was just paper dreams, design studies.


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## Jenisch (Jan 5, 2012)

pinsog said:


> Even before the B29, Japanese fighters didn't do real hot against B17's and B24's either. They did some pretty deep missions, unescorted, early and midway through the war.



This is true to some extent. But the war progressed, the Japanese started to field their new fighters. Certainly, unescorted B-29's against numerous J2M's would be a problem. But escort was probably not needed at all, as the night firebombing proved so effective that the Japanese likely didn't have much of a chance. It was impossible for them to have anything like the Luftwaffe night-fighter force and defense system, and the B-29 was much better than the Lancaster and the Halifax.


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## Milosh (Jan 5, 2012)

Does anyone have drawings of the changes to American bomber formations (8th, 15th AFs) as the war progressed?


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## buffnut453 (Jan 5, 2012)

nuuumannn said:


> When the British employed its Fortress Is in the European theatre, they realised their armament was totally inadequate, but I guess the Americans were unwilling to accept British experience.



Bear in mind that the Fortress I was poorly armed compared to even the B-17Fs that were the workhorses of the 8th AF for the early stages of the daylight bombing campaign. Perhaps the USAAF senior staff believed that the addition of a powered upper turret, tail gunner and ball turret positions, coupled with the box formation (to maximize mutually defensive firepower) would enable unescorted daylight bombing to succeed?


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## MikeGazdik (Jan 5, 2012)

I think if you look at pre-war U.S.A.A.C doctrine, they were grossly wrong on both the self-defending bomber, and the lack of need for a high altitude fighter

This was military politics. The "old guard" that kept antiquated doctrine when times where changing because the weapons being developed were improving.

Some of the forward thinkers, Mitchell, Chenault and the like were chastized for thinking outside of the normal procedure. 

And as far as the U.S. testing thier bombers in mock attacks with thier own fighters, the problem I see is that the dominant pre war bomber, the B-17, flew far higher than what was the front line fighter then, the P-40.


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## TheMustangRider (Jan 6, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> By the war's end, the Japanese were increasingly interested in Kamikaze missions. They were also building a reserve, both from Kamikaze and conventional planes to the invasion of their island. I think they were waiting their new aircraft, specially the jets to make favourable cost-benefit attacks in the 29's.




I am aware of Japan's aircraft reserve for their last stand against their homeland invasion; but given Japan's deteriorating war industries, its stranded shipping lanes giving way to an acute shortage of raw materials and the final devastating fire raids against its most populated cities, I find difficult to believe how the Japanese could have been able to mount an efficient resistance during late 1945, into 1946.


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## Jenisch (Jan 6, 2012)

TheMustangRider said:


> I am aware of Japan's aircraft reserve for their last stand against their homeland invasion; but given Japan's deteriorating war industries, its stranded shipping lanes giving way to an acute shortage of raw materials and the final devastating fire raids against its most populated cities, I find difficult to believe how the Japanese could have been able to mount an efficient resistance during late 1945, into 1946.



Worth to considerate is the Japanese were trying to have an intermediated peace with the Allies by the Soviets. So, their hopes only really finished when the Soviets declared war to Japan.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 6, 2012)

MikeGazdik said:


> I think if you look at pre-war U.S.A.A.C doctrine, they were grossly wrong on both the self-defending bomber, and the lack of need for a high altitude fighter
> 
> This was military politics. The "old guard" that kept antiquated doctrine when times where changing because the weapons being developed were improving.
> 
> ...




I think the often repeated idea that the US was _NOT_ interested in high altitude fighters is one of the great myths of WW II. The USAAC probably spent more time, money and effort on high altitude fighters than any other two countries put together during the 30s. From the 1920s until the start of WW II the USAAC had built about 100 turbo-supercharged fighters, including fifty P-30As. In 1935 nobody else had a fighter of any type could perform at the altitudes the P-30 could. The USAAC knew what tehy wanted but the US industrial base, good as it was could not deliver what the USAAC wanted. The P-40 was never the latest and best, it was what could be delivered the quickest and not be too far behind the rest of the world. With 13 turboed YP-37s (same wings and tail as the P-36/P-40) already being built the USSAC had a pretty good idea was was needed to get a turbocharged aircraft into service and decided the world situation wouldn't wait for a properly sorted out turbo fighter plane (and the P&W two stage wasn't looking real good at the time either) so they went for the P-40 in order to have something/anything to equip the service squadrons with. Unless people think the USAAC should have ordered hundreds or thousands of P-36s and P-35s until the P-38 and P-47 were ready.


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## pinsog (Jan 6, 2012)

MikeGazdik said:


> I think if you look at pre-war U.S.A.A.C doctrine, they were grossly wrong on both the self-defending bomber, and the lack of need for a high altitude fighter
> 
> This was military politics. The "old guard" that kept antiquated doctrine when times where changing because the weapons being developed were improving.
> 
> ...



They weren't grossly wrong on the self defending bomber, it worked fine against Japanese fighters. In fact, I believe Germany was the only country in the world capable of properly intercepting large formations of B17s and B24s. Could the Japanese? No. Could the Italians without German help? No. Could the Russians? No. Could even the British? No. They would have been overwhelmed by sheer numbers alone.

In fact, Germany was the sole power in world in that time period that had any chance at all to do major damage to a self defending American bomber force.


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## gjs238 (Jan 6, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> Unless people think the USAAC should have ordered hundreds or thousands of P-36s and P-35s until the P-38 and P-47 were ready.


Too bad the P-43 didn't pan out.


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## gjs238 (Jan 6, 2012)

pinsog said:


> In fact, Germany was the sole power in world in that time period that had any chance at all to do major damage to a self defending American bomber force.


 And the USA. It seems the US was concerned about bombers over the US, hence all the high altitude pursuit/fighter/interceptor projects.


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## buffnut453 (Jan 6, 2012)

pinsog said:


> I believe Germany was the only country in the world capable of properly intercepting large formations of B17s and B24s. Could even the British? No. They would have been overwhelmed by sheer numbers alone.



And where would these B-17s and B-24s have operated from against the British Isles? And Britain certainly could have intercepted the number of raids the USAAF could generate in prior to mid-1943.


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## pinsog (Jan 6, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> And where would these B-17s and B-24s have operated from against the British Isles? And Britain certainly could have intercepted the number of raids the USAAF could generate in prior to mid-1943.



I'm just saying if the same sized formations of B17s and B24 magicly appeared over England, they could not have handled it. Germany was the sole country in the world at that time, capable of dealing with large formations of self defending American heavy bombers. And after mid 1943, they would have been overwhelmed.

Since we weren't at war with England, there is no use in dragging the debate off topic by wondering where we would bomb them from.


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## pbfoot (Jan 6, 2012)

pinsog said:


> I'm just saying if the same sized formations of B17s and B24 magicly appeared over England, they could not have handled it. Germany was the sole country in the world at that time, capable of dealing with large formations of self defending American heavy bombers. And after mid 1943, they would have been overwhelmed.
> 
> Since we weren't at war with England, there is no use in dragging the debate off topic by wondering where we would bomb them from.


I do believe that just the opposite might the meeting , the Brits pioneered GCI and if anything the USAAF was light years behind and the LW was a tad behind the Brits particularly in Radar


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## Nikademus (Jan 6, 2012)

pinsog said:


> They weren't grossly wrong on the self defending bomber, it worked fine against Japanese fighters. In fact, I believe Germany was the only country in the world capable of properly intercepting large formations of B17s and B24s. Could the Japanese? No. Could the Italians without German help? No. Could the Russians? No. Could even the British? No. They would have been overwhelmed by sheer numbers alone.
> 
> In fact, Germany was the sole power in world in that time period that had any chance at all to do major damage to a self defending American bomber force.



"Worked fine" is IMO far too broad a stroke of the paint brush. The 20th initially respected potential heavy fighter opposition enough to employ very high altitude attacks, These stratosphere heights made interception extremely difficult for the handfuls (with a few exceptions) of interceptors that were thrown up against them. Also by the time the bombardments began the Japanese airforces had been well worn down. It has also been mentioned that the Japanese were hoarding aircraft as a reserve for a massive pulse against the expected invasion of the Home Islands. This makes comparisons with European conditions largely an Apples and Oranges thing.

So while combat losses were minimized by these factors, it was balanced by less than stellar results from the bombing campaign. Hence LeMay's switch to low alt night attacks. Therein lies another point. If the Self Defending Bomber concept was even half right......why didn't LeMay send in the bombers at low alt during the day? 

It is true that Germany's air defense net was light years ahead of Japan's, but not to the point where someone, even a LeMay was going to recklessly fly over enemy territory. They also worked hard to take bases allowing fighter escorts by long range fighters.


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## MIflyer (Jan 6, 2012)

It wasn't so much that the USAAC bombers as envisoned well before WWII were supposed to be "self defending" - it was that they were not supposed to be intercepted at all.

The USAAC saw the famous Pikes Peak test of the first aircraft turbosupercharger as THE key to long range high altitude strategic bombing. When the Y1B-17 came out, equipped with turbosuperchargers, they had a long range bomber capable of carrying a large bombload at altitudes of 25,000 ft (and higher) and at speeds faster than any fighter could attain at that altitude.

The USAAF was the ONLY WWII air force to build ALL of its heavy bombers with two stage supercharging - the GE turbosupercharger combined with the engine's built in mechanical supercharger. 

And neither the Luftwaffee nor the Italians nor the Japanese ever built anything but a few experimental fighters with two stage supercharging.

And at the time the Y1B-17 rolled out radar did not exist. 

A high altitude bomber, as fast or faster than fighters at its operating altitude - and there is no radar to spot it. It would not have to fight its way to the target. The enemy would never see it coming until it was too late to intercept it. It was 1930's Stealth Technology.

And indeed, only one Air Force other than the USAAC recognized this threat and prepared to deal with it by standardizing on fighters with two stage superchargers in the 1930's: The United States Navy. The appearance of the B-17 and then the Y1B-17 was a nightmare for the USN, a realization of their worst fears since Billy Mitchell had sunk those battleships off the Virginia coast (you should see the Washington Times headlines after that event: "Billions Wasted On Battleships!" I have copies of them). First they managed to get USAAC aircraft confined near to shore by edict, then they worked on developing a high altitude fighter that could intercept the B-17's during wargames (the F4F).


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## nuuumannn (Jan 6, 2012)

In the 1930s governments around the world were basing their military aviation strategies on Guilio Douhet's writings about bomber formations swarming over their cities, men such as Trenchard and Mitchell were prophets of this philosophy. Even politicians seemed to jump on the band wagon (bomber formation?) Stanley Baldwin summed up what many thought at the time in his "...the bomber will always get through...' speech, and he was ably supported in the RAF by Chief of Air Staff Cyril Newall, so round the world, the building of bomber squadrons took precedence over fighter squadrons. If you examine the defensive armament of the first generation of monoplane bombers, it was all pretty inadequate; the first generation Fortresses' experience over Europe (my point earlier) proved their inadequacy. This weak defensive armament was considered all that was necessary since it was believed that "...the bomber..."

Oddly enough, although he was vilified for his "Peace in our time", one of the biggest advocates for a strong fighter opposition to bombers was Neville Chamberlain; during the Munich Crisis, on his insistence British factories accelerated fighter construction programmes. Nevertheless, long range escorts, heavy defensive armament, box formations came about by taking a more defensive approach contrary to the widely held pre-war belief about the superiority of swarms of bombers, and actual combat experience.

Even box formations in daylight bombing proved weak against determined interceptors; this is why the RAF went to night bombing (my point earlier about high losses suffered by the Eighth, regardless of what tactics or aircraft being used). As we all know, the US launched several programmes to build a successful long range fighter escort, but the Mustang, designed to supplement and replace the P-40 in service with the RAF (remember NAA were offered by Curtiss to the British Purchasing Commission to build P-40s under licence, but Dutch Kindleburger famously quoted "we can build you a better airplane than the P-40", so legend goes) proved more than adequate with the V-1650 engine.

Against Japan, as Nikademus states, apples and oranges.


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## nuuumannn (Jan 6, 2012)

Another point worth considering, but probably outside of the scope of this thread considering its about defensive armament, is finding the target. The RAF's poor results led them to 'area bombing' and again, the Britsh warned the USAAF about pinpoint attacks, but the Americans were convinced they had the answer in the Norden bombsight, but their navigation to the target was initially as poor as the RAF's, so while they might have had a brilliant bomb sight, if they couldn't find their way to the target, they were stuffed.

It was the Luftwaffe that led the way in this aspect of bombing with their X-Gerat, Y-Gerat and Knickebein equipment in 1940 and 1941 that proved their superiority in finding their targets. It wouldn't be for another two years or more before the RAF and the Americans would achieve the same degree of accuracy in reaching their targets.


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## MikeGazdik (Jan 6, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> I think the often repeated idea that the US was _NOT_ interested in high altitude fighters is one of the great myths of WW II. The USAAC probably spent more time, money and effort on high altitude fighters than any other two countries put together during the 30s. From the 1920s until the start of WW II the USAAC had built about 100 turbo-supercharged fighters, including fifty P-30As. In 1935 nobody else had a fighter of any type could perform at the altitudes the P-30 could. The USAAC knew what tehy wanted but the US industrial base, good as it was could not deliver what the USAAC wanted. The P-40 was never the latest and best, it was what could be delivered the quickest and not be too far behind the rest of the world. With 13 turboed YP-37s (same wings and tail as the P-36/P-40) already being built the USSAC had a pretty good idea was was needed to get a turbocharged aircraft into service and decided the world situation wouldn't wait for a properly sorted out turbo fighter plane (and the P&W two stage wasn't looking real good at the time either) so they went for the P-40 in order to have something/anything to equip the service squadrons with. Unless people think the USAAC should have ordered hundreds or thousands of P-36s and P-35s until the P-38 and P-47 were ready.



You explained it far better than I. I guess I was being to short. But with all that info, explain then why they went with the P-40 when they knew what turbosupercharging would do for the fighter. The U.S.A.A.C went with the turbo P-38, but orginally a defensive short ranged bomber interceptor concept.


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## pinsog (Jan 7, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> I do believe that just the opposite might the meeting , the Brits pioneered GCI and if anything the USAAF was light years behind and the LW was a tad behind the Brits particularly in Radar



Radar doesn't shoot down bombers. Just because you can find them doesn't mean you can shoot them down.


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## buffnut453 (Jan 7, 2012)

But it was primarily GCI that enabled an effective defence against bombers, hence disproving the concept that "the bomber will always get through".


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## pinsog (Jan 7, 2012)

Nikademus said:


> "Worked fine" is IMO far too broad a stroke of the paint brush. The 20th initially respected potential heavy fighter opposition enough to employ very high altitude attacks, These stratosphere heights made interception extremely difficult for the handfuls (with a few exceptions) of interceptors that were thrown up against them. Also by the time the bombardments began the Japanese airforces had been well worn down. It has also been mentioned that the Japanese were hoarding aircraft as a reserve for a massive pulse against the expected invasion of the Home Islands. This makes comparisons with European conditions largely an Apples and Oranges thing.
> 
> So while combat losses were minimized by these factors, it was balanced by less than stellar results from the bombing campaign. Hence LeMay's switch to low alt night attacks. Therein lies another point. If the Self Defending Bomber concept was even half right......why didn't LeMay send in the bombers at low alt during the day?
> 
> It is true that Germany's air defense net was light years ahead of Japan's, but not to the point where someone, even a LeMay was going to recklessly fly over enemy territory. They also worked hard to take bases allowing fighter escorts by long range fighters.



1.B17's and B24's were bombing Japanese targets long before the B29 began bombing mainland Japan. 
2. High altitude bombers vs low altitude fighters is all part of the self defending concept. If fighters are struggling to even get to your altitude they will be easier targets for your defensive guns. 
3. The Japanese airforce was well worn down by the time we started bombing mainland Japan. Correct: hence my statement that they sucked at intercepting self defending bombers. You actually made my point for me. 
4. Lemay didn't send B29's in during the day because he removed all the defensive guns and gunners from them so they weren't self defending bombers any more. They were almost completely UNARMED bombers, except for the tail gunner, I think.


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## pinsog (Jan 7, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> But it was primarily GCI that enabled an effective defence against bombers, hence disproving the concept that "the bomber will always get through".



All England had to defend themselves against were rather poorly defended medium bombers. Big difference between an He111 and a B17 or B24. And there is a big difference between a B17 or B24 and a B29.

Finding them doesn't shoot them down. American tankers had no trouble finding German Tiger Tanks, it was killing them that proved troublesome.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 7, 2012)

MikeGazdik said:


> You explained it far better than I. I guess I was being to short. But with all that info, explain then why they went with the P-40 when they knew what turbosupercharging would do for the fighter. The U.S.A.A.C went with the turbo P-38, but orginally a defensive short ranged bomber interceptor concept.



They went with the P-40 because in the spring of 1939 when the first contract for the P-40 was signed, they figured they could have the P-40 in production in about one year. They figured a turbo-charged airplane was two years away from production. That is start of production, add number of months (8-12 for most fighters) to get to the 500th fighter produced. The P-40 was an exception because in many ways it was a re-engined P-36 and so the "production line" already existed. 

The P-38 was a "long range interceptor" in concept. Long range being 2 hours at near full throttle in the original specification as opposed to 1 hour for the initial P-39 specification.


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## Milosh (Jan 7, 2012)

nuuumannn said:


> Another point worth considering, but probably outside of the scope of this thread considering its about defensive armament, is finding the target. The RAF's poor results led them to 'area bombing' and again, the Britsh warned the USAAF about pinpoint attacks, but the Americans were convinced they had the answer in the Norden bombsight, but their navigation to the target was initially as poor as the RAF's, so while they might have had a brilliant bomb sight, if they couldn't find their way to the target, they were stuffed.



Isn't that because the Brits were bombing at night. Never heard of any problems finding the target during daylight hours.


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## pbfoot (Jan 7, 2012)

pinsog said:


> Radar doesn't shoot down bombers. Just because you can find them doesn't mean you can shoot them down.


no but it does alllow you the luxury of planning your defence , bombing results were diasppointing for both BC at night and the USAAF during the day , surprising that BC had better results at night then day , and at that point the Spitfire was in its glory a short ranged interceptor that I do believe would kicked the P51's butt


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## Alte Hase (Jan 7, 2012)

I think part of the answer why the USAAF had to make its bombers "self-defending" was that its fighters, up until the P-51, were unable to escort the bombers all the way to the target.


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## pinsog (Jan 7, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> no but it does alllow you the luxury of planning your defence , bombing results were diasppointing for both BC at night and the USAAF during the day , surprising that BC had better results at night then day , and at that point the Spitfire was in its glory a short ranged interceptor that I do believe would kicked the P51's butt



The Spitfire was a fine short ranged interceptor at that time, and would have done ok against the Mustang depending on which model was used. But, I think it would have had a more difficult time with B17s and B24s. A dog less trouble killing another dog than it does killing a procupine. I believe B17s and B24s would have been the Spitfires "porcupine".


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## Shortround6 (Jan 7, 2012)

In a number of instances the US "planned" bombers could far exceed the range of the "planned" fighters. The B-17 was built to a requirement for a bomber with 2000 miles of range. The Army built both the B-15 (5000 mile range) and B-19 bombers. The USAAC ordered the B-35 flying wing and the B-36 prototypes in 1941, before Pearl Harbor with the idea of being able to bomb Europe from the US. The B-29 fit in between. At any given level of aircraft and engine development it was always going to be possible to build bombers that could far out range fighters unless you could count of mid air refueling and even that doesn't work while penetrating enemy airspace.


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## pbfoot (Jan 7, 2012)

pinsog said:


> The Spitfire was a fine short ranged interceptor at that time, and would have done ok against the Mustang depending on which model was used. But, I think it would have had a more difficult time with B17s and B24s. A dog less trouble killing another dog than it does killing a procupine. I believe B17s and B24s would have been the Spitfires "porcupine".


I must ask have you ever tried to run a turret in a 17 I have , and with my 5 minutes of using it would be hard pressed to track a kid pulling a wagon , please note I think you are out to lunch on the LW being the only force able to counter the USAAF . I am far from being a RAF best type of guy but personally rank them ahead of the USAAF in a man to man or scenario


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## buffnut453 (Jan 7, 2012)

pinsog said:


> The Spitfire was a fine short ranged interceptor at that time, and would have done ok against the Mustang depending on which model was used. But, I think it would have had a more difficult time with B17s and B24s. A dog less trouble killing another dog than it does killing a procupine. I believe B17s and B24s would have been the Spitfires "porcupine".



Why so? The Luftwaffe didn't have problems shooting down B-17s and B-24s prior to the availability of long-range escorts. Why would the Spitfire have a harder time? By the time the USAAF heavies were available in anything like decent numbers, the RAF was already flying the Spit MkV which had 2 cannon did serious damage to its targets.


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## pinsog (Jan 7, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> I must ask have you ever tried to run a turret in a 17 I have , and with my 5 minutes of using it would be hard pressed to track a kid pulling a wagon , please note I think you are out to lunch on the LW being the only force able to counter the USAAF . I am far from being a RAF best type of guy but personally rank them ahead of the USAAF in a man to man or scenario



If the defensive guns on a B17 or B24 posed no threat, then why would the Germans develop special tactivs to deal with them? ie: head on attacks.

If they were so easy to knock down, why did the Germans go to 4 20 mm cannon? Then to 30 mm cannon? Then rockets? Then even dropping bombs?

When you talk of the RAF over USAAF man to man, are you refering to pilots or aircraft types?


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## pinsog (Jan 7, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> Why so? The Luftwaffe didn't have problems shooting down B-17s and B-24s prior to the availability of long-range escorts. Why would the Spitfire have a harder time? By the time the USAAF heavies were available in anything like decent numbers, the RAF was already flying the Spit MkV which had 2 cannon did serious damage to its targets.



The Spit V did serious damage to its targets??? ME109s and FW190s? A little different from 4 engined US heavy bombers 

If the defensive guns on a B17 or B24 posed no threat, then why would the Germans develop special tactics to deal with them? ie: head on attacks.

If they were so easy to knock down, why did the Germans go to 4 20 mm cannon? Then to 30 mm cannon? Then rockets? Then even dropping bombs?

No one here will change their others minds on this subject, but I maintain that USAAF B17's and B24s would have overwhelmed England flying from mainland Europe. If they didn't, the B29 surely would have.


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## buffnut453 (Jan 7, 2012)

I never said that the defensive guns posed no threat - please stop putting words in my mouth. Tactics change to tackle the threat. As to the armament question, the move towards heavier armament was also replicated in the RAF...and that was without a heavy bomber threat: late marks of the Spit had 4 cannon. It was a general trend that all the major combatants, with the notable exception of the US, followed...and even the US did after WWII.

It is a simple fact that the 8th AF bomber losses in 1942-43 were reaching the level of being unsustainable. Had the USAAF been able to mobilise the bomber formations in 1942 that were achieved in 1944, I agree British defences would have been overwhelmed. But in 1942? With the B-17's pretty pitiful bomb load (for a "heavy" bomber with a 10-man crew)? I don't think so. Also, don't forget that a major part of the offensive force applied against Germany is missing from your scenario - RAF Bomber Command night attacks which, with USAAF bombing in daylight, afforded Germany no respite. The lack of an effective night bombing capability would enable more Brit defences to be focussed on daylight interception and would have afforded scope for recuperation.


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## pbfoot (Jan 7, 2012)

Just to make the scenario a little more realistic the USAAF would in all probability bomb from Iceland and that might be a little far for the B17 to get to the UK with a realistic load , so that leaves the US relying on the B24 and it sure would be easy to hold them back as they would not have a lot of room for feints and doglegs.


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## Glider (Jan 7, 2012)

_Originally Posted by pinsog 

The Spitfire was a fine short ranged interceptor at that time, and would have done ok against the Mustang depending on which model was used. But, I think it would have had a more difficult time with B17s and B24s. A dog less trouble killing another dog than it does killing a procupine. I believe B17s and B24s would have been the Spitfires "porcupine"._

Its a graphic description but I admit to not understanding your arguement. The Spitfire could easily and quickly have been converted to a very effective fighter against bombers. It has been noted that nearly all Spits of the Period could carry 4 x 20mm cannon without modification plus of course all Spitfires could be equipped with extended wing tips to improve performance at altitude. The test reports of the Spitfire V with 4 x 20mm show that handling was almost unaltered a major handicap of the Me109 with underwing cannons.

So now you have a fighter that has a very good altitude performance and heavy firepower. They are at least as good as the Luftwaffe fighters with the firepower of the Fw 190 and the high altitude performance of the Me109, the aircraft that stopped the USAAF offensive until the long range fighter became available. 

Then the P51 and P47 arrive. The only advantage the P47 has over the Spitfire is its dive speed, which is fine, the P47 dives away and leaves the bomber undefended. The P51 has speed or does it? If the RAF were facing this threat then its safe to assume that when the P51 arrive in numbers production of the Mk XIV would have a higher priority and that is a close call.

So at the end of the day the question is :-
If the Me109 and Fw 190 were able to stop the B17/24 before the arrival of the P51, why would the Spitfire fail?

PS in the early stages when the raids were unescorted the Beaufighter and Mosquito had the performance and concentrated firepower to inflict fatal damage to the bombers.


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## pinsog (Jan 7, 2012)

Ok. I'll throw in the towel and say that Britain might have been able to stop B17 and B24 raids.(Personally I still think Britain didn't have the manpower or indutrial power to stand up to USAAF bombing but I will stop arguing) But Japan couldn't. B17's and B24's were able to defend themselves against Japanese fighters. Without German assistance Italy couldn't have stopped them and I don't think the Soviet Union could either.


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## Milosh (Jan 7, 2012)

Would there even be Merlins engines in the P-51 if American bombers were attacking Great Britain? Never mind that, would there even be P-51s?


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## pinsog (Jan 7, 2012)

Milosh said:


> Would there even be Merlins engines in the P-51 if American bombers were attacking Great Britain? Never mind that, would there even be P-51s?



We arent discussing Mustangs. We are discussing self defending bombers. Self defending bombers with escort are not self defending bombers, they are escorted bombers.

Guys, I don't wish to get into the hypothetical of where we would bomb England from or anything like that. It is my belief that Germany was the sole power on the planet that could have defeated the unescorted American heavy bombers. I still don't think England could have stopped them. They would have probably shot alot down, but I don't think they could have stopped the onslaught and brought the bomber offensive to a halt like the Germans would have had we not brought in escort fighters. 

I also maintain that the B17 and B24 operated against Japan early in the war and they held their own against Japanese Zeros(Zero representing whatever single engine fighter the Japanese employed, they were all close enough to that design)

I also believe that the Italians couldn't have stopped them by themselves and neither could the Soviets.

And even though the Germans were able to defend against the B17 and B24, what about the B29? How would the Germans have done against it if we had brought the B29 to Europe instead of Japan?


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## Milosh (Jan 7, 2012)

I was responding to the comments in Glider's post.


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## pinsog (Jan 7, 2012)

Milosh said:


> I was responding to the comments in Glider's post.



My apologies. I simply wish to keep on subject.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 7, 2012)

it rather depends on the year doesn't it? in 1942 and 1943 the Americans are not going to be able to overwhelm the British with shear numbers. Perhaps they could in 1944 but that is when the escort fighters showed up historically so comparisons are hard to make. Without escort fighters to deal with from 1942 on EVERY British interceptor (Typhoons included) would have had four 20mm Hispano cannon making them more effective than even the German 3 cannon gunboat 109s or Fw 190s with the two 20mm MG 151 two 20mm MG/FF armament. Some Fw 190s carried heavier armament but they were a minority. 
How many hundreds of German fighters were used against the American bombers to get the results needed to stop the raids? 
How many British fighters were available during the same time periods? 
Unless the German fighters are 'magic' I don't see how they can stop the Americans using less effective armament per plane than the British and yet the British cannot? 

Getting away form this divergence is is also worth noting that Americans progressively improved the armament of the B-17 and B-24 during the war and that Navy PB4Y-2 Privateers carried 12 .50 cal guns ALL in powered twin mounts, so again the defensive capability of the planes changed over the years even if only a little bit. 
The B-29 could have posed problems for the Luftwaffe in flying several thousand feet higher than the B-17s and flying faster making them more difficult targets for the fighters before even considering the defensive armament. However the The later German fighters may have been improved enough to Handle them if escorts had not been available. 

Japanese difficulties with B-17s and B-24s in the early part of the war may have been due to the light armament of the Japanese planes. By 1944-45 many Japanese planes had armament sufficient to deal with the the B-17 and B-24.


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## wuzak (Jan 7, 2012)

I would also like to suggest that in 1942/43, at least, the majority of the Luftwaffe fighter capability was concentrated on the Eastern Front. Galland even warned the hierarchy about the situation, IIRC.

I'd also suggest that the Luftwaffe's tactics would have differed to the British in the presence of escort fighters. From what I understand the Luftwaffe pilots were ordered to ignore the fighters and concentrate on the bombers. The British would have, I feel, used tactics similar to what they had in the BoB - Spits to tackle enemy fighters and other aircraft to deal with the bombers. That could include Mosquitos, Beaufighters, Typhoons, Tempests (later). Spitfires could have been supplemented by Meteors from 1944...

Maybe if 4 x 20mm wasn't enough to destroy B-17s a few Mosquito FBXIIIs could have bene used in the bomber destroyer role.


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## wuzak (Jan 7, 2012)

pinsog said:


> And even though the Germans were able to defend against the B17 and B24, what about the B29? How would the Germans have done against it if we had brought the B29 to Europe instead of Japan?



By that time the Me262 was in operational service. So I think Germany could have done quite well against B-29, depending on fuel and experienced pilot stocks.


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## Jenisch (Jan 8, 2012)

_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ruE8yhkHke8_

Watching this video, I keep imaginating how would be the hypotetical missions from the US to Germany in the B-36. =D


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## Siegfried (Jan 8, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> _View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ruE8yhkHke8_
> 
> Watching this video, I keep imaginating how would be the hypotetical missions from the US to Germany in the B-36. =D




The B-36A was not a service ready aircraft, being unarmed and also not having a particularly high service or opperational ceiling. The B-36B was a little better in terms of performance, though not particularly the early engine rated versions, this being a 1948 aircraft. Hence the uarmed B-36A, if it had of been armed with say an improvised General Electric System borrowed from the B-29 was still within the upper interception envelope of even ordinary German fighters such as the Me 109K4 and He 162 while the far latter B-36B within the envelope of aircraft such as the Ta 152H-1

Of course if Britain had fallen and if the B-36 was the only means to attack the Reich then it would certainly have been somewhat accelerated, though its hard to see the R-4360 being accelerated.

I suspect the fate of the B-36 in 1946 would have been terrible: bisection by the EMW Wasserfall Surface to Air Missile which was designed to handle a 2G manouvering target at around 48,000ft. Most of the 'ducks were lined up' in terms of guidance for this missile: the Germans having selected beam riding over command guidance due to its resistance to jamming.

From my understanding the B-36's performance was exaggerated by SAC to bluff the soviets, much as the soviets tried to bluff the number of missiles and bombers they had.


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## Glider (Jan 8, 2012)

pinsog said:


> Ok. I'll throw in the towel and say that Britain might have been able to stop B17 and B24 raids.(Personally I still think Britain didn't have the manpower or indutrial power to stand up to USAAF bombing but I will stop arguing) But Japan couldn't. B17's and B24's were able to defend themselves against Japanese fighters. Without German assistance Italy couldn't have stopped them and I don't think the Soviet Union could either.



On the manpower or industrial power point. I think I am right when I say that the UK and Germany produced a similar no of aircraft but the RAF didn't have anything close to the drain on resources caused by the losses on the Russian Front. On the manpower front training was probably similar between the two sides up to 1942/3 which is the period we are talking about, but losses were lower in the RAF so experience was higher within the squadrons.
Its also worth remembering that the 1942 second string RAF fighter, the Huricane was a deadly threat to the unescorted bombers, as they also carried 4 x 20mm cannon.

I can see no basis for your belief that the RAF wouldn't be as effective as the Luftwaffe


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## Milosh (Jan 8, 2012)

Considering the USAAF had 368 1st line B-17s and B-24s on hand vs Germany in Dec 1942, I don't think they would have lasted long in the British skies as the British had ~60 squadrons of fighters. That is ~1200 a/c.


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## pbfoot (Jan 8, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> The B-36A was not a service ready aircraft, being unarmed and also not having a particularly high service or opperational ceiling. The B-36B was a little better in terms of performance, though not particularly the early engine rated versions, this being a 1948 aircraft. Hence the uarmed B-36A, if it had of been armed with say an improvised General Electric System borrowed from the B-29 was still within the upper interception envelope of even ordinary German fighters such as the Me 109K4 and He 162 while the far latter B-36B within the envelope of aircraft such as the Ta 152H-1
> 
> Of course if Britain had fallen and if the B-36 was the only means to attack the Reich then it would certainly have been somewhat accelerated, though its hard to see the R-4360 being accelerated.
> 
> ...


before your Reich could play with its fanciful toys it would be a glass parking lots care of the nuclear weapons


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 8, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> From my understanding the B-36's performance was exaggerated by SAC to bluff the soviets, much as the soviets tried to bluff the number of missiles and bombers they had.


 Not true although it was a maintenance nightmare.


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## drgondog (Jan 8, 2012)

Nikademus said:


> "Worked fine" is IMO far too broad a stroke of the paint brush. The 20th initially respected potential heavy fighter opposition enough to employ very high altitude attacks, These stratosphere heights made interception extremely difficult for the handfuls (with a few exceptions) of interceptors that were thrown up against them. Also by the time the bombardments began the Japanese airforces had been well worn down. It has also been mentioned that the Japanese were hoarding aircraft as a reserve for a massive pulse against the expected invasion of the Home Islands. This makes comparisons with European conditions largely an Apples and Oranges thing.
> 
> So while combat losses were minimized by these factors, it was balanced by less than stellar results from the bombing campaign. Hence LeMay's switch to low alt night attacks. Therein lies another point. If the Self Defending Bomber concept was even half right......why didn't LeMay send in the bombers at low alt during the day?
> 
> It is true that Germany's air defense net was light years ahead of Japan's, but not to the point where someone, even a LeMay was going to recklessly fly over enemy territory. They also worked hard to take bases allowing fighter escorts by long range fighters.



LeMay thought out of the box. He had to fire a protege (Hansel) because the classic 8th/15th AF High altitude precision bombing wasn't working with variable shear jet streams and Japan was even more decentralized than Speer directed Germany.

He studied Japanese conditions versus Germany and noted the following. Japan had far fewer radar controlled AA, had cities with a far higher infrastructure of wooden houses, and had what he believed was not only an inadequate night fighter force, but wholly inadequate fire departments. The reason for bombibg the cities in RAF style carpet bombing with mostly incinderaries was simply the quantitiy of small manufacturing shops within the city and he could kill a LOT of Japanese in the process.

So, strip the 29's, load em up, fly low/medium altitudes to reduce stress on the engines and burn the cities to the ground... which he did.


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## drgondog (Jan 8, 2012)

nuuumannn said:


> Another point worth considering, but probably outside of the scope of this thread considering its about defensive armament, is finding the target. The RAF's poor results led them to 'area bombing' and again, the Britsh warned the USAAF about pinpoint attacks, but the Americans were convinced they had the answer in the Norden bombsight, but their navigation to the target was initially as poor as the RAF's, so while they might have had a brilliant bomb sight, if they couldn't find their way to the target, they were stuffed.
> 
> *This may be stretching several points. The RAF were led to area bombing not just because of finding the target area, bout also because there was no capability to find a specific target in darkness, nor an ability for the bombardier to locate/track and release optically. The lack of 8th AF ability 'to navigate' was largely due to inexperience and inadequate training. LeMay studied the problem and led the lead crew of best squadron navigator/bombadier and pilots to find and bomb the target - with the rest of the squadron dropping on them.
> 
> ...



Americans wer finding targets just fine after several months operations in ETO. Speer was far more concerned about daylight strategic bombing than RAF area night bombing.

Having said this, the RAF developed a better daylight sight than the Norden and achieved excellent results with it during daylight missions after D-Day.


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## pbfoot (Jan 8, 2012)

drgondog said:


> Americans wer finding targets just fine after several months operations in ETO. Speer was far more concerned about daylight strategic bombing than RAF area night bombing.
> 
> Having said this, the RAF developed a better daylight sight than the Norden and achieved excellent results with it during daylight missions after D-Day.


Finding is one thing hitting another , I`ve always been given to understand that the Bomber Command was more proficient at hitting the target


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## drgondog (Jan 8, 2012)

To some of the general comments above:
Yes the USAAF bomber mafia believed that speed and altitude would overcome enemy fighter and AA opposition in the 30's.

Yes the Fortress I was anything but.. the RAF attempted to use the aircraft at 30K+ and had many issues. The lessons learned led to the B-17E which had two power turrets, replaced the 5x.30 cal with 10 x .50 cal and believed that the problem was solved - and convince Arnold that there was no need to waste precious procurement dollars on long range escort fighters.

No, they were not invulnerable to German fighters but it took about 4-6 months before the LW had developed the tactics to become lethally effective against B-17s and the 109 had to be significantly upgraded to remotely approach the Fw 190 as a B-17 killer. Having said this, the B-17 was the very last choice for a LW day fighter pilot to pick as his favorite victim.

Interestingly, the RAF went 'dark' because they couldn't survive daylight bombing for the same reasons the 8th AF nearly threw in the towel in October 1943 - but because the USAAF introduced the Mustang to ETO and stole all of them for the 8th AF daylight ops (sending 354 and 363 to 8th on TDY and took the 357th in return for 358FG P-47s), the 8th ultimately emerged with far fewer losses than the RAF night missions.

I have zero notion that the Spit V or IX would be less effective than a Fw 190 and would give it an edge over the 109 until gondola's with 20mm were kitted - Nobody in a B-17 would say "gee, we will only have Spits to worry about". The 4x20mm version of the Spit IX would be superior to all the Fw 190A series at B-17 altitudes in the context of a.) ability to kill near equally, and b.) have superior Mustang repellant ability at that altitude.


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## drgondog (Jan 8, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> Finding is one thing hitting another , I`ve always been given to understand that the Bomber Command was more proficient at hitting the target



If you compare RAF night bombing results versus USAAF radar controlled PFF bombing in 10/10 cloud cover - yes. Clear visibility Norden versus H2S RAF unequivocally - No.


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## fastmongrel (Jan 8, 2012)

drgondog said:


> If you compare RAF night bombing results versus USAAF radar controlled PFF bombing in 10/10 cloud cover - yes. Clear visibility Norden versus H2S RAF unequivocally - No.



Europe in winter you dont get many clear days. Plus 1940s industry ran on coal so even if the sky is clear you get industrial haze and smog. Its a wonder the USAAF and the RAF hit anything.


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## drgondog (Jan 8, 2012)

The USAAF did not hit targets accurately whenever the clouds obscured the targets - which was mostly the case from November - through February. Bad enough in March and October.


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## Siegfried (Jan 8, 2012)

drgondog said:


> Having said this, the RAF developed a better daylight sight than the Norden and achieved excellent results with it during daylight missions after D-Day.



I don't see that the "SABS" or "Stabalised Automatic Bombsight" had any capabilities or features that were better than the Norden. I worked the same way: gyrostablised the optics, tracked target to established wind drift and ground speed and calculated a bomb release solution. More or less the same thing naval directors had been doing since the 20's.


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## Siegfried (Jan 8, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> Finding is one thing hitting another , I`ve always been given to understand that the Bomber Command was more proficient at hitting the target



The bulk of Bomber commands bombs were miles of target. Even late war with oboe being used to lay markers and a clear night for those markers to be aimed at the majority of bombs fell around 2 miles from target, as soon as there was any cloud accuracy would deteriorate by miles. The accuracy you speak of can only be justified in terms of a few special raids, which are over emphasised because they are so spectacular and also propaganda. Propaganda could could come engineers and companies just trumping their product or it could be organised. Daylight bombing was still the most accurate method by far, so long as the visibillity was very good. Some semblance of accuracy could be maintained at up to 50% cloud cover with simultaneous use of H2X ground mapping radar (a bombardier and radar opperator working together to ofset bomb). Once the cloud cover exceded 50% bombing accuracy deteriorated drastically out to several miles again.

For instance oboe sent a dot/dash sequence to tell the pilot that he was either +/-17 meters from the NOMINAL centerline of his bomb run. In other words the width of the path that was used to guide the pilot was 2 x 17m (ie 34m about 40 yards). This was latter misconstrued as meaning that Oboe's accuracy was +/-17m. In fact the centerline could be of by much greater distances, while wind drift and surveying errors would add for inaccuracies. A good system nevertheless but its accuracy was measured in hundreds of yards not dozens.


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## pbfoot (Jan 8, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> The bulk of Bomber commands bombs were miles of target. Even late war with oboe being used to lay markers and a clear night for those markers to be aimed at the majority of bombs fell around 2 miles from target, as soon as there was any cloud accuracy would deteriorate by miles. The accuracy you speak of can only be justified in terms of a few special raids, which are over emphasised because they are so spectacular and also propaganda. Propaganda could could come engineers and companies just trumping their product or it could be organised. Daylight bombing was still the most accurate method by far, so long as the visibillity was very good. Some semblance of accuracy could be maintained at up to 50% cloud cover with simultaneous use of H2X ground mapping radar (a bombardier and radar opperator working together to ofset bomb). Once the cloud cover exceded 50% bombing accuracy deteriorated drastically out to several miles again.
> 
> For instance oboe sent a dot/dash sequence to tell the pilot that he was either +/-17 meters from the NOMINAL centerline of his bomb run. In other words the width of the path that was used to guide the pilot was 2 x 17m (ie 34m about 40 yards). This was latter misconstrued as meaning that Oboe's accuracy was +/-17m. In fact the centerline could be of by much greater distances, while wind drift and surveying errors would add for inaccuracies. A good system nevertheless but its accuracy was measured in hundreds of yards not dozens.


 How in gods name would wind affect radio beams , thats why they invented rudders


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 8, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> In fact the centerline could be of by much greater distances, while wind drift and surveying errors would add for inaccuracies. A good system nevertheless but its accuracy was measured in hundreds of yards not dozens.





pbfoot said:


> How in gods name would wind affect radio beams , thats why they invented rudders



Pb is spot on. This system was very similar to the first non-precision instrument approach systems and in a cross wind you "crabbed" to compensate for this, just like you would when tracking this aural signal or when tracking an NDB.


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## Siegfried (Jan 9, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Pb is spot on. This system was very similar to the first non-precision instrument approach systems and in a cross wind you "crabbed" to compensate for this, just like you would when tracking this aural signal or when tracking an NDB.



Systems such as Oboe and the earlier German x-geraet gave a measure of ground speed. This could be compared with TAS (true air speed) to estimate head or tail winds which would allow adjustment of bomb release points, in x-gerate this was the purpose of the 3 crossing beams and the 'clock'. The amount of 'crabbing' needed to maintain the flight path could in theory be used to calculate cross winds. If passed back to the base station the designated flight path could in theory be adjusted to compensate. I don't know of this was done very often as it would seem to me that the aircraft crew would need to calculate the deviation from their theoretical compass heading with actual compass heading and pass this back to the base station (cat and mouse in oboe) to make adjustments. I've never heard of a mechanism to do this so it would require a voice link.

Inaccuries would come from low altitude cross winds and errors in the timming circuits; in oboe these even attempted to compensate for the effect of air density or the speed of radio waves but nothing is perfect, especially over long distances.


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## wuzak (Jan 9, 2012)

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I was under the impression that the bulk of RAF Bomber Command bombed visually, with the pathfinders using Oboe to mark the target with flares. A bombing leader would direct the bombing and call in corrections for wind drift or poor marker placement.

The 8th AF inaccuracies were not only to do with target sighting. The fact is that after a few early raids they bombed from within the formation. So as the formation grew, so did the spread of bombs. The 8th AF record of "precision" bombing was less than 20% within a 1000ft radius of the aiming point.


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## Siegfried (Jan 9, 2012)

wuzak said:


> Correct me if I'm wrong, but I was under the impression that the bulk of RAF Bomber Command bombed visually, with the pathfinders using Oboe to mark the target with flares. A bombing leader would direct the bombing and call in corrections for wind drift or poor marker placement.
> .



Oboe was limmited by the radio horizon, one reason a high flying Mosquito was often used. In addition early versions could only control a single aircraft at a time per base station pair. Of course if you need to bomb flares then if cloud cover is around the system can break down as well. In good weather accuracy was still over the 1 mile range!


Beyond the radio horizon only GEE and H2S could help. H2S both 9cm and 3cm was really a navigation aid, as a pure blind bombing device it would in general have to be described as ineffective for most targets. Coastal or very strong esturine features apparently helped.

There were other versions of the Oboe philosophy: GEE-H which reversed the transponder interrogator from aircraft to ground station, Oboe-III which could handle multiple aircraft. A US implementation was Micro-H which could control 50 aircraft at once. These systems became possible to use after d-day when ground stations on the continent could be built.


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## fastmongrel (Jan 9, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> Daylight bombing was still the most accurate method by far, so long as the visibillity was very good. Some semblance of accuracy could be maintained at up to 50% cloud cover with simultaneous use of H2X ground mapping radar (a bombardier and radar opperator working together to ofset bomb). Once the cloud cover exceded 50% bombing accuracy deteriorated drastically out to several miles again.



Never flown over Europe have you. If you had you would realise that 50% cloud cover is probably about the best you can expect for large parts of the year. Even if there was a good fat anti cyclone parked over the target when you factor in industrial haze and smog 50% cloud cover is something bomb aimers would dream about.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 9, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> Systems such as Oboe and the earlier German x-geraet gave a measure of ground speed. This could be compared with TAS (true air speed) to estimate head or tail winds which would allow adjustment of bomb release points, in x-gerate this was the purpose of the 3 crossing beams and the 'clock'. *The amount of 'crabbing' needed to maintain the flight path could in theory be used to calculate cross winds. If passed back to the base station the designated flight path could in theory be adjusted to compensate. I don't know of this was done very often as it would seem to me that the aircraft crew would need to calculate the deviation from their theoretical compass heading with actual compass heading and pass this back to the base station (cat and mouse in oboe) to make adjustments. * I've never heard of a mechanism to do this so it would require a voice link.
> 
> Inaccuries would come from low altitude cross winds and errors in the timming circuits; in oboe these even attempted to compensate for the effect of air density or the speed of radio waves but nothing is perfect, especially over long distances.



Evidently you don't know a lot about using navigation devices like this or in later times devices like an NDB or even a Localizer. In the earlier case the sound was used in lieu of needle or indicator (or in the case of a VOR or Localizer a CDI). The radio wave is a "finite" course or heading and the amount of "crab" would be the difference between the known beam direction and the actual course of the aircraft (the direction the nose of the aircraft is pointing or what is read off the compass or DG) True course vs. true heading - navigation 101. The same principal is used today and yes, crews used this technique when tracking or navigating with LF devices of the day. 

I don't know what you're trying to say about air density - the last time I took physics I don't remember anything about air density effecting LF radio waves in at least this application.


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## pbfoot (Jan 9, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> Inaccuries would come from low altitude cross winds and errors in the timming circuits; in oboe these even attempted to compensate for the effect of air density or the speed of radio waves but nothing is perfect, especially over long distances.


How do you change the speed of radio waves , as far as I know that is the speed of light,


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## Nikademus (Jan 9, 2012)

pinsog said:


> 1.B17's and B24's were bombing Japanese targets long before the B29 began bombing mainland Japan.
> 2. High altitude bombers vs low altitude fighters is all part of the self defending concept. If fighters are struggling to even get to your altitude they will be easier targets for your defensive guns.
> 3. The Japanese airforce was well worn down by the time we started bombing mainland Japan. Correct: hence my statement that they sucked at intercepting self defending bombers. You actually made my point for me.
> 4. Lemay didn't send B29's in during the day because he removed all the defensive guns and gunners from them so they weren't self defending bombers any more. They were almost completely UNARMED bombers, except for the tail gunner, I think.



1. B-17's and B-24's were bombing targets in small packets intermittedly, employing tactics designed to avoid or minimize interception. They did not simply fly in on the notion that they need not worry about fighters. It is still an Apples and Oranges comparison to the mass strategic bombing raids employed over Germany. 

2. The self defending concept was not selective in it's application. It was a theory cultivated by the bomber cliche that defensive fighters were an obsolete concept. You are using specific attributes of that theory to promote the idea that the concept was in fact successful or as you put it "partially" successful dependant on Whom was being bombed. That is a selective and hindsight ridden argument. The SDB concept was universal and indepedant of target nationality. Use of higher altitudes did not eclipse the primary argument that the bombers would be able to ward off swarms of enemy fighters. Japan was more than capable of intercepting planes at 22-24K. The B-29's flew far above that to specifically avoid fighters but ran into problems with bombing accuracy. To say it would work against Japan or Italy under the same circumstances as it was introduced over Japan in late 1944 using B-29's is an argument that cannot be proven anymore than saying if Germany had only had 10 more armored divisions they'd have beaten the Russians. Events don't occur in a Vacuum. A dedicated effort from the get-go of WWII against Japan, or even Italy would have resulted in a response from those countries to the threat.

3. I fail to see how Japan's airforce being worn down mainly by attrition in Theaters outside of Japan and involving a plethera of mission profiles equates to Japan 'sucking' at shooting down bombers over Japan. 

4. LeMay didn't send in the bombers during daylight at low altitude because it would have been cost prohibitive. A B-29 loss was not applicable to a B-17 or B-24 loss due to the expense involved. A single B-29 cost $605,000 per plane. That is nearly 3x that of a B-17. General Hap Arnold noted this difference enough to be quoted as saying that B-29 losses could not be viewed in the same vein as earlier 4E types, but rather that each loss should be equated to the loss of a naval vessel...thus the loss of even a few bombers was something to be avoided at all costs. This included ultra high altitudes for day bombing and night missions at lower altitudes. LeMay....gambling on Japan's night defenses not being as well developed as Germany's ordered the removal of guns in order to maximize payloads per trip as the effort to put so many 29's in the air was a huge problem due to servicability issues, one of the main reasons why LeMay was put in charge. Many of his methods went against the grain of conventional wisdom but he got results.

B-29 missions over Japan in my view are not so much an example of Self Defending bombers but rather the progenitors to the threat avoidance mission profiles of later day bomber tactics due to their complexity and cost which makes even small losses cost prohibitive.


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## Siegfried (Jan 9, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Evidently you don't know a lot about using navigation devices like this or in later times devices like an NDB or even a Localizer. In the earlier case the sound was used in lieu of needle or indicator (or in the case of a VOR or Localizer a CDI). The radio wave is a "finite" course or heading and the amount of "crab" would be the difference between the known beam direction and the actual course of the aircraft (the direction the nose of the aircraft is pointing or what is read off the compass or DG) True course vs. true heading - navigation 101. The same principal is used today and yes, crews used this technique when tracking or navigating with LF devices of the day.
> 
> I don't know what you're trying to say about air density - the last time I took physics I don't remember anything about air density effecting LF radio waves in at least this application.



Sure you can calculate cross wind via the aircraft compass heading and the heading of the beam in consideration of A/C speed, just a bit of trignometry. After carrying out this calculation you can't do anything with it without getting on to a radio telephone to tell the x-gerate opperators on the ground to shift the beam or the Oboe stations to shift the flight path. Both the x-gerate beam and Oboe did not allow the pilots to offset the flight path AFAIKT.

Oboe III did allow free form approaches to target and its possible the path could be controlled from the aircraft rather than from the base station, also GEE-H since the interrogator was on the aircraft instead of the base station.


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## bobbysocks (Jan 9, 2012)

as MIflyer illuded to in his post way back.... the b10 was able to out run and fly higher than the fighter ac of the day....the p26 peashooter...so i guess they figured a b17 would fair the same or better against fighter pursuit. perhaps they also looked at the limited fuel capacity of fighter ac and decided that they bombers would only be in harms way for a short period and they would be able to deal with that. this whole argument was one of Chennault fought for in his early days...but of course "contemporary wisdom" won out and the "bomber will always get there" for lunch bunch prevailed. but not for too long as lessons learned in the skies over europe did prove they may get through but you may also lose a large number of them doing so.


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## Siegfried (Jan 9, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> How do you change the speed of radio waves , as far as I know that is the speed of light,



The speed of light varies inversly in proportion to the refractive index of a substance, moreover the refractive index varies with the frequency under consideration. High density optical glass will slow light down to 2/3rds its speed depending on frequency. It's why you can change the path of light with a lens or prisim.

Radio wave velocity is also varies with the density of materials it propagates through.

The speed of light is constant but only in a vacuum. Oboe was effected by air density and altititude and was adjusted accordingly.


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## pbfoot (Jan 9, 2012)

could be . I failed quantum mechanics and astral physics


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## Edgar Brooks (Jan 9, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> This was latter misconstrued as meaning that Oboe's accuracy was +/-17m. In fact the centerline could be of by much greater distances, while wind drift and surveying errors would add for inaccuracies. A good system nevertheless but its accuracy was measured in hundreds of yards not dozens.


Completely, and utterly, wrong. Oboe's course accuracy had a spread of 35 yards (3 feet more than the wingspan of a Lancaster.) Read the memoirs of Professor R.V. Jones, who states that Oboe was the most accurate radio bomb-aiming system of the war, with an error radius of 120 yards (which is dozens, not hundreds.)
Oboe did not "ride a beam," which is why the Germans took so long to figure it out. The boffins worked out, by triangulation, the position of the target, and the distance of that target from the "Cat" transmitter. The pilot was briefed to fly a curving flightpath (called "Boomerang" by the Germans) at the precise distance from Cat. The transmitter sent a signal to the Mosquito, which amplified it, and sent it back, enabling the operator to work out its precise position with regard to the required flightpath.
The transmitter then continued to send the signal, consisting of either a stream of dots (at 133 per second,) if the Mosquito was too close, or a stream of dashes if too far away; they even allowed for sideways trajectories of the bombs, as they were being released on a curving flightpath, so the Mosquito was briefed to fly inside the line of the target, not directly over it. Knowing the height and speed of the Mosquito, the second transmitter (known as "Mouse") was able to signal (with fives dots and a dash) when the bombs should be released. 
In December 1942, the British set up a test, and (contrary to usual procedure) warned the Belgian resistance that they were attacking the headquarters of Sector 7, in the Novitiate near Florennes. A small force of Mosquitoes was sent, and, within 48 hours, at great risk to themselves, the Belgians had reported back the yardage distances of the bomb falls; one had actually hit the building, which is surely a testament for Oboe's accuracy (if you read the right books, of course.)
Another example of Oboe's proficiency was during "Operation Manna," when aircraft dropped food containers within 100 yards (30 metres) of drop points (not zones) designated by the Dutch resistance.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 9, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> *Sure you can calculate cross wind via the aircraft compass heading and the heading of the beam in consideration of A/C speed, just a bit of trignometry.* After carrying out this calculation you can't do anything with it without getting on to a radio telephone to tell the x-gerate opperators on the ground to shift the beam or the Oboe stations to shift the flight path. Both the x-gerate beam and Oboe did not allow the pilots to offset the flight path AFAIKT.
> 
> Oboe III did allow free form approaches to target and its possible the path could be controlled from the aircraft rather than from the base station, also GEE-H since the interrogator was on the aircraft instead of the base station.


Again re-read what I wrote!!! - this has nothing to do with shifting beams. The beam is set to a given desired heading! When you start drifting you make small heading corrections to get the "center" tone. Eventually thru trial and error you can "crab," adjusting your *"COURSE"* to compensate for the wind drift which will be the difference between the course of the tone and the heading the aircraft is flying. This is the same principle when flying an NDB, the difference here is with an NDB is you have a needle pointing at the "beam." Read the above post as well!


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 9, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> Oboe was effected by air density and altititude and was adjusted accordingly.


 Only at the greatest distances. "Radio Probagation" due to humidity affectes LF radio waves the most at greater distances. If adjustments were made due to air density proagation, they were done so for specific applications. As frequencies were increased in later navigation equipment, propagation was not even a considertion to the crew of the aircraft.


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## Siegfried (Jan 10, 2012)

Edgar Brooks said:


> Completely, and utterly, wrong. Oboe's course accuracy had a spread of 35 yards (3 feet more than the wingspan of a Lancaster.) Read the memoirs of Professor R.V. Jones, who states that Oboe was the most accurate radio bomb-aiming system of the war, with an error radius of 120 yards (which is dozens, not hundreds.)



I have Jones's book, though not on me at the momment but its clear that Jones is allowing his use of lay language to make his point sloppy.

Oboe didn't have an "accuracy" of 35 yards it had a "resolution" of 35 yards. Accuracy is something else. The pilot of the Oboe equiped aircraft received a morse code dot-dash or dash-dot to tell him if he were too far to the left or right (+/-17 yards) of the centerline of the circular bomb run. The centerline of the beam could be further out depending on range.

For instance if the timming circuits of Oboe were 0.05% accurate then they would induce an 100m error at 200km range and a 200m error at 400km range. On top of that the further out you go from the cat and mouse stations the higher you have to fly which adds in further errors from the longer bomb fall.



Edgar Brooks said:


> Completely, and utterly, wrong.



Hah.




Edgar Brooks said:


> .
> the British set up a test, and (contrary to usual procedure) warned the Belgian resistance that they were attacking the headquarters of Sector 7, in the Novitiate near Florennes. A small force of Mosquitoes was sent, and, within 48 hours, at great risk to themselves, the Belgians had reported back the yardage distances of the bomb falls; one had actually hit the building, which is surely a testament for Oboe's accuracy (if you read the right books, of course.) Another example of Oboe's proficiency was during "Operation Manna," when aircraft dropped food containers within 100 yards (30 metres) of drop points (not zones) designated by the Dutch resistance.



In both these cases Oboe was opperating at relatively close range which means less ranging errors and less bomb drift. In addition multiple bombs were dropped. It stands to reason one or two would get close. Yes Oboe could be accrurate but I stand by my point that it was far more inaccurate than the exaggerated triumphalism that the affable RV Jones put in his book. Engineers, Project managers and Sales folks are just as prone to exaggerate the accomplishments of their pet projects a WW2 pilots tended to overclaim.

Brown in his history of WW2 radar states Oboe as achieving a real world accuracy of around 220m. (from memmory) When you consider that Bomber command was then dropping bombs on markers dropped by Oboe it stands to reason that a Lancaster dropping of flares using an Mk.XIV optical bombsight is not going to be any more accurate than a B-17 dropping directly using an optical bomb sight.

The Germans were aware of the technique used by Oboe. Their EG-ON II system worked in exactly the same way using two Freya radar IFF transponders to do the same job as cat an mouse. The main difference was that the commands were passed on to the pilot manualy via voice rather than automatically embedded as morse code into the interrogation pulse.d

It did have advantages as it worked of prepared cards and so could fly an arbitrary non circular approach. As to why it took so long to discover Oboe, that is another story.


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## Siegfried (Jan 10, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Again re-read what I wrote!!! - this has nothing to do with shifting beams. The beam is set to a given desired heading! When you start drifting you make small heading corrections to get the "center" tone. Eventually thru trial and error you can "crab," adjusting your *"COURSE"* to compensate for the wind drift which will be the difference between the course of the tone and the heading the aircraft is flying. This is the same principle when flying an NDB, the difference here is with an NDB is you have a needle pointing at the "beam." Read the above post as well!



OK it could be I'm not getting something, I am an electrical engineer not a pilot so I have some preconceptions.

So if I can do a little thought experiment to nut things out with you.
1 Immagine a Mosquito doing 350mph with a 50mph cross wind flying at 20,000ft (6000m).
2 The angle of the crab relative to the designated essentially linerar flight path will be inverse-tangent(50/250) which is 8.13 degrees).
3 the aircraft crew only have the following information a/ TAS, b/ ground speed, c/altitude, d/ angle of the crab relative to the designated flight path.
4 from the above information they can work out the cross wind (which is 50mph) from 350 x tan(8.13)
5 A bomb released at 20,000ft will take 36 seconds to hit the ground, in fact more like 45 seconds due to terminal velocity.
6 During this 45 second fall a 50mph (22 meters a second) cross wind could push a bomb of course 45 x 22 = 1000m. Of course the bomb will not accelerate to 22m/s immediatly.
AFAIKT a 250kg bomb with a frontal Area of 0.25sqm and a Cd of 0.2 will create a drag of 224 Newtons at 50 mph. From F=ma this should create an acceleration of 1m/s.
So roughly the bomb could be pushed of around 200 by cross wind. I'd have to use a spreadsheet.

The only way I can see that being compensated is to ofset the flight path about 100m.

Oboe crew 'may' have been able to do this if the aircraft transponder incorporated a small *adjustable * delay (say 1 microsecond = to about 150m) that was ofset by the timming circuits in the cat interrogator and computer on the ground. Once having the cross wind the crew could adjust the transponder delay slightly to shift the path of the aircraft to the left or right.

Calulating head wind is a no brainer but cross wind is harder.

Surely there must be an English Boffin with a working Oboe set that could tell us!


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## Siegfried (Jan 10, 2012)

The problem with all of the major combatents attitudes towards bombers is that their stratagy and tactics had not evolved in consideration of radar.

Without radar a raid is discovered only around the time the raid crosses the border, there is little warning. It take a lot of time to assemble all of the reported information. Basically the raid is only intercepted after it has penetrated fairly deeply into the defenders territory. Finally when it is intercepted it will be only by a small number of aircraft as the defenders fighters have not had time to assemble and of neccesity are dispersed.

In this situation the "bomber will always get through" is probably right.

The development of radar completely changed everything. Large well organised fighter waves could be vectored onto the bombers even before they crossed into the defenders territory.

Even if a bomber is as effective at shooting down a fighter as the fighter is the bomber it is a loosing proposition as the bomber costs 4 times as much as the fighter.

In this situation a 270mph bomber opperating against 370mph fighters guarantees interception.

However a bomber penetrating at fast cruise of 330mph will likely evade interception.


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## Edgar Brooks (Jan 10, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> I have Jones's book, though not on me at the momment but its clear that Jones is allowing his use of lay language to make his point sloppy..


Only to someone trying desperately to "prove" how poor British technology was. I, too, have the book, and am intrigued by your "sloppy" jibe, since everyone else that I know, who has also read it, has said how understandable and non-technical the book is.


> Oboe didn't have an "accuracy" of 35 yards it had a "resolution" of 35 yards. Accuracy is something else. The pilot of the Oboe equiped aircraft received a morse code dot-dash or dash-dot to tell him if he were too far to the left or right (+/-17 yards) of the centerline of the circular bomb run. The centerline of the beam could be further out depending on range.


Will you ever get into your head, THERE WAS NO BEAM; the Cat transmitter sent a signal, the Mosquito amplified it and returned it, and Cat calculated, from the time delay, the aircraft's relative position to the desired flight line, and, thereby, the "accuracy" of its relative position; I won't get into accuracy vesus resolution, since that's pure semantics, and designed to fog the issue. There was no "dot-dash," or "dash-dot" signal either (proof, if ever it was needed, that you don't read, properly, others' entries); there was a stream of dots, or a stream of dashes. How, exactly, in 133 pulses per second, could a radio operator tell if the sequence was -. or .-?


> For instance if the timming circuits of Oboe were 0.05% accurate then they would induce an 100m error at 200km range and a 200m error at 400km range. On top of that the further out you go from the cat and mouse stations the higher you have to fly which adds in further errors from the longer bomb fall.


Do you have proof of the existence of these "errors," in the so-called "trimming circuits" (which were back at the transmitter, not in the aircraft) or are you, yet again, using guesswork as "proof?" You are also ignoring the point that it was the Mouse station that calculated the bomb release point, using information on the local conditions sent back from the crew; the aircrew didn't use a bombsight, since it was redundant.


> Hah.


Silly. Sneering signifies a loss of the argument.


> In both these cases Oboe was opperating at relatively close range which means less ranging errors and less bomb drift.


No, it doesn't; bomb drift is caused by the ambient weather conditions, not distance from these shores. Since every target was worked out by the triangulation method, distance made no difference, either, since the position of the target was fixed accurately, and the flightpath worked out from that.


> In addition multiple bombs were dropped. It stands to reason one or two would get close.


Not if your figure of hundreds of yards error is true.


> Yes Oboe could be accrurate but I stand by my point that it was far more inaccurate than the exaggerated triumphalism that the affable RV Jones put in his book. Engineers, Project managers and Sales folks are just as prone to exaggerate the accomplishments of their pet projects a WW2 pilots tended to overclaim.


So your claim, now, is that, 35 years after the end of the war, and having retired, Jones exaggerated the stories for some mythical gain, which only seems to germinate in your fertile imagination. 


> Brown in his history of WW2 radar states Oboe as achieving a real world accuracy of around 220m. (from memmory) When you consider that Bomber command was then dropping bombs on markers dropped by Oboe it stands to reason that a Lancaster dropping of flares using an Mk.XIV optical bombsight is not going to be any more accurate than a B-17 dropping directly using an optical bomb sight.


Or, to put it another way, Lancaster bombsights could be the equal of B-17's bombsights, even at night. And the RAF weren't just dropping bombs on the Oboe markers; they had a Master Bomber, who would direct them onto the best aiming points, and how much "aim-off" to allow, if the markers were inaccurate. Never heard of Brown, but I note that your assertion of "hundreds of yards" error is now down to 250 (7 times the wingspan of a Lancaster,) which is not quite so dramatic.


> The Germans were aware of the technique used by Oboe. Their EG-ON II system worked in exactly the same way using two Freya radar IFF transponders to do the same job as cat an mouse The main difference was that the commands were passed on to the pilot manualy via voice rather than automatically embedded as morse code into the interrogation pulse..


No, it didn't; the Freya transmitters used the old system of beams, while (I repeat, ad nauseam) OBOE DID NOT USE BEAMS.


> It did have advantages as it worked of prepared cards and so could fly an arbitrary non circular approach. As to why it took so long to discover Oboe, that is another story


No, it isn't; without any beams to latch onto, the Germans couldn't figure it out, for months.


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## wuzak (Jan 10, 2012)

Edgar Brooks said:


> Or, to put it another way, Lancaster bombsights could be the equal of B-17's bombsights, even at night. And the RAF weren't just dropping bombs on the Oboe markers; they had a Master Bomber, who would direct them onto the best aiming points, and how much "aim-off" to allow, if the markers were inaccurate. Never heard of Brown, but I note that your assertion of "hundreds of yards" error is now down to 250 (twice the wingspan of a Lancaster,) which is not quite so dramatic.



Yards or feet?

250 feet would be approximately twice the wingspan of a Lancaster, 250 yards would be 6 times.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 10, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> OK it could be I'm not getting something, I* am an electrical engineer not a pilot so I have** some preconceptions.*
> 
> So if I can do a little thought experiment to nut things out with you.
> 1 Immagine a Mosquito doing 350mph with a 50mph cross wind flying at 20,000ft (6000m).
> ...



You're over engineering a simple process. That's why sometimes engineers make crappy pilots!!!!

Read on how to navigate with an ADF and how NDB instrument approaches are completed, then read Edgar Brooks post below on how the system was actually used.


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## wuzak (Jan 10, 2012)

BC also used low level visual marking by pathfinders (Lancs and Mossies), used sky marking flares when the cloud cover was too thick for ground marking and bombed individually.

The Master bomber would also remark the target if the TI was losing visibility. Also, more than one marker would be used for the target.

Only a handful of an 8th AF bomber formation carried the Norden bomb sight. The Norden required a long straight run up to the target, so as soon as there was opposition from the Luftwaffe and flak units the procedure of individually bombing a target was no longer desirable. So the 8th AF bombed in formation, to maintain their defensive box formations on the run in to the target.


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## drgondog (Jan 10, 2012)

Wusak - true the 8th (and 15th) bomber on the lead crews. Having said that, each squadron of 9-12 B-17/24 had a lead bombadier sighting on a specific target. It was'nt as if the Bomb group toggled on one a/c. 

With a decent formation in a staggered box, win tip to wing tip spread was ~2000 feet/666 yards from high to low groups on a maximum effort Group (~50) formation

Another thing to consider when you are watching old film of formations going to target. Usually a Maximum of two Bomb Groups would be tasked for a specific Aiming Point. If so, they would be in trail rather than eschelon so the wing tip to wing tip horizontal spread would be the same over the target.

As you know a multi Task Force effort of say 750 B-17s and B-24s in April 1944 might be tasked to strike 15 separate targets in 7-10 general areas. 

Normally, for Europe one target might be CAVU and another obscured by clouds. For the latter, the Wing CO had the authority to re-direct to another (pre-determined) target, thence to a Target of Opprotunity if secondary was also obscured.

The reason the Scouts were formed in summer of 1944 was to send a small force of Mustangs all the way to the target and report conditions, then fly to alternate and perform same recon - all the time communicating with their assigned task Force CO.


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## Edgar Brooks (Jan 10, 2012)

wuzak said:


> Yards or feet? 250 feet would be approximately twice the wingspan of a Lancaster, 250 yards would be 6 times.


Sorry; got on here first thing in the morning, and hadn't woken up properly.


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## pbfoot (Jan 10, 2012)

drgondog said:


> As you know a multi Task Force effort of say 750 B-17s and B-24s in April 1944 might be tasked to strike 15 separate targets in 7-10 general areas.
> 
> .


As stated earlier they were as a rule less accurate then BC so alls this did is spread the inaccurate bombing over more area. I applaud the USAAF for at least attempting targeted bombing over area bombing but it was the same thing +/- 1000's of feet


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## drgondog (Jan 10, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> As stated earlier they were as a rule less accurate then BC so alls this did is spread the inaccurate bombing over more area. I applaud the USAAF for at least attempting targeted bombing over area bombing but it was the same thing +/- 1000's of feet



As a rule, RAF radar and OBOE bombing probably better than correspondingUSAAF PFF led missions over 10/10 cover. Not so when the target could be acquired optically. Period.


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## Siegfried (Jan 10, 2012)

Edgar Brooks said:


> Only to someone trying desperately to "prove" how poor British technology was. I, too, have the book, and am intrigued by your "sloppy" jibe, since everyone else that I know, who has also read it, has said how understandable and non-technical the book is.



Im quite aware of how Oboe worked, clearly moreso than you, a charitable reading of my post wouldn't have latched on to my obviously accidental use of 'beam' instead of flight path which I had used several times correctly.

As far as Oboe's bombing accuracy is concerned: in combat practice at typical ranges and altitudes it yielded accuracies of CEP 350m. My Source is Louis Browns "A Radar History of WW2: technical and military imperatives page 312 Location 4898 on Kindle; Google books makes this readable on occaision. *This is a factor of 10 greater *than usual, sloppy claim of an accuracy of 34 yards. During demonstartions before TRE officers it was able to show accuracies of 65m at the relatively short range of 130km from Cat. In effect Oboe matched visual bombing from about the same altitude. Accuracies of 34 meters might be possible at extremely short ranges of around 50km.

Ground speed measurements would be obtainable from the 'mouse' transmitter and the bomb release could be advanced or retarded to compensate for headwinds.

Proper compensation of cross winds would firstly require the cross wind to be calculated *and the bomb runs path to be displaced* by some means. Just crabbing sideways into the cross wind is not enough. Visual bombsights like the Norden and Lotfe 7 did the same.

There would be many ways of achieving stable timming circuits; ranging from tapped delay lines, crystals and RC circuits. I'm not aware of what Oboe used. One thing is for sure, such circuits will have some errors.

Oboe most certainly was very accurate but a lot less accurate than boasted once it was used in combat at typical ranges and altitudes.

The Mk.XIV bombsight was not as accurate as the Norden. The Mk.XIV was unable to track a ground target to calculate and then automatically ofset wind drift, a fairly impossible task at night anyway. The Mk.XIV's trick was being able to manouver during the bomb run and to shallow dive bomb. Wind drift had to be entered manually from metereological data.


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## Edgar Brooks (Jan 10, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> Im quite aware of how Oboe worked, clearly moreso than you, .


Really? Then how is it that you referred to "dot-dash" and "dash-dot" signals, when ignorant old me knew that the signals were all dots, or all dashes?


> As far as Oboe's bombing accuracy is concerned: in combat practice at typical ranges and altitudes it yielded accuracies of CEP 350m.


Really? But, in item 80, you said that it was missing by a mile. Ignorant old me agaain, but what's CEP?


> My Source is Louis Browns "A Radar History of WW2: technical and military imperatives page 312 *This is a factor of 10 greater *than usual, sloppy claim of an accuracy of 34 yards.


There's that word "sloppy" again, but the claim is for the accuracy of the line of flight, not the arrival of the ordnance, which is said to have been in the order of 110 yards, not 34.


> During demonstartions before TRE officers it was able to show accuracies of 65m at the relatively short range of 130km from Cat. In effect Oboe matched visual bombing from about the same altitude. Accuracies of 34 meters might be possible at extremely short ranges of around 50km.


I realise that I keep repeating myself, but you said that Oboe had an error of a mile, then 350 metres, now it's 34 metres. A little consistency would go a long way.


> Proper compensation of cross winds would firstly require the cross wind to be calculated *and the bomb runs path to be displaced* by some means. Just crabbing sideways into the cross wind is not enough. Visual bombsights like the Norden and Lotfe 7 did the same.


As I said before, the flight path was already adjusted inside the line of the target, to allow for the outward momentum imparted by the aircraft flying in a wide circle.


> There would be many ways of achieving stable timming circuits; ranging from tapped delay lines, crystals and RC circuits. I'm not aware of what Oboe used. One thing is for sure, such circuits will have some errors.


They also have qualified electricians/technicians, with the training and expertise to discover, and rectify, any faults.


> Oboe most certainly was very accurate but a lot less accurate than boasted once it was used in combat at typical ranges and altitudes.


So it didn't have errors of a mile, then? Perhaps you can give us examples of this in-service inaccuracy?


> The Mk.XIV bombsight was not as accurate as the Norden. The Mk.XIV was unable to track a ground target to calculate and then automatically ofset wind drift, a fairly impossible task at night anyway. The Mk.XIV's trick was being able to manouver during the bomb run and to shallow dive bomb. Wind drift had to be entered manually from metereological data


I think you might find that the crews of the Tirpitz Lutzow (had they lived) might have had a view on the accuracy of the RAF's bombsight. How many German ships were sunk by the Norden sight?


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## bobbysocks (Jan 10, 2012)

"_How many German ships were sunk by the Norden sight? _"

other than the occasional sub pen or straffing barges when did the USAAF really go after axis shipping especially with heavies?


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 10, 2012)

Norden Bombsight Info...

NORDEN BOMBSIGHT


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## Glider (Jan 10, 2012)

Just a couple of observations on the Norden Bomb Sight and that is a number of people like to have a pop at it and say it was overated, but no one has ever tried to claim that any other bomb sight in mass production was a better sight.


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## pinsog (Jan 10, 2012)

Nikademus said:


> 1. B-17's and B-24's were bombing targets in small packets intermittedly, employing tactics designed to avoid or minimize interception. They did not simply fly in on the notion that they need not worry about fighters. It is still an Apples and Oranges comparison to the mass strategic bombing raids employed over Germany.
> 
> So small groups of bombers flying daylight raids into enemy territory with no fighter escort and holding off swarms of enemy fighters aren't considered self defending?
> Just because you have self defending bombers doesnt mean you try to find the biggest group of enemy fighters you can and fly through the middle of them.
> ...



Again, just because your bombers are self defending doesnt mean you purposely expose them to enemy fighters, or for that matter, deny them fighter protection if it is availeable.


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## Edgar Brooks (Jan 11, 2012)

Having done a little checking, it appears that there was little to choose, up to 20,000', between the XIV the Norden; above that the Norden walked away with the honours. This probably explains why Bomber Command usually went in at around 18,000', while the USAAF could go so much higher. 617 probably used the SABS against Tirpitz, which put them in a different league from the users of the XIV. Sorry about that.


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## wuzak (Jan 11, 2012)

Edgar Brooks said:


> Having done a little checking, it appears that there was little to choose, up to 20,000', between the XIV the Norden; above that the Norden walked away with the honours. This probably explains why Bomber Command usually went in at around 18,000', while the USAAF could go so much higher. 617 probably used the SABS against Tirpitz, which put them in a different league from the users of the XIV. Sorry about that.



The bombing height may have been because the RAF heavies didn't have ceilings much higher than that.


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## Siegfried (Jan 11, 2012)

bobbysocks said:


> "_How many German ships were sunk by the Norden sight? _"
> 
> other than the occasional sub pen or straffing barges when did the USAAF really go after axis shipping especially with heavies?



The Norden was in fact designed to accuratly bomb a moving ship and was quite capable of computing a solution for doing so. It didn't just compensate for wind drift but target motion. It could track the target to either determin the targets motion or to determin its own wind drift (it was speed measuring not just position measuring, *the term here is tachymetric*). The whole idea was to sink ships using bombers such as the B-26 well before they got to US shores.

Unfortunatly ships tend to manouver and can thus dodge the bomb. Medium bomber however should have been more capable of the task since their smaller size made them less vulnerable than the huge B-17's that would need to bomb from higher altitudes.

The RAF's Mk.XIV *was not tachymetric*, it couldn't measure the speed of the target to determin wind drift or target motion. The motion had to be entered manually into the computer. However the Mk.XIV (which was *computing* but *not tachymetric*) could manouver right up to the last 10 seconds of the bomb run and it could also bomb in a dive thus making it safer to use. The RAF had the tchymetric SABS-II at some point but due expense, skill levels required and less flexibillity did not use the sight much. Windoffsets could in theory be provided by Pathfinders, Master bombers and Meterological aircraft.

The sinking of the Tirpitz around November 1944 sounds impressive but wasn't quite that impresive. The RAF's SAB bombsight, Luftwaffe's Lotfe and USAAF Norden could all do the job equally at the heights in question. What actually happened was that the RAF sank a ship that was at anchor (after upteen attempts) and whose length was larger than the CEP of their bombsight at the altitude used. Dozens of bombs were in fact dropped to get 2-3hits.

The Tirpitz was undefended by fighters, the smoke generators activated too late so that the smoke probably did more to spoil the aim of the defending gunners than that of the bomb aimers.

If the Tirptiz had of been suprise attacked by He 111 equiped with 2500kg bombs (or B-25's with 2000lbs) and Lotfe bombsights *in 1942* they would have done almost as good a job as the Lancaster with its SABS and 5000kg tallboy bomb in *late 1944*. The key here is the screw up with the identification of the raid by German defenses which had detected the aircraft on radar in good time but failed to indentify them as hostile, the belated activation of smoke screens and the belated scrambling of FW 190 interceptors which if they had of intercepted the unescorted and armament stripped Lancasters would likely have shot down a high percentage of them and quite possibly spoiled the raid. The Reichs defenses were crumbling and in all probabillity teenagers were making the decisions.


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## Edgar Brooks (Jan 11, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> The sinking of the Tirpitz around November 1944 sounds impressive but wasn't quite that impresive. The RAF's SAB bombsight, Luftwaffe's Lotfe and USAAF Norden could all do the job equally at the heights in question. What actually happened was that the RAF sank a ship that was at anchor (after upteen attempts).


7 in fact (including the last) + 7 by the FAA


> Dozens of bombs were in fact dropped to get 2-3hits.


19 actually, and it's a fair indication of how good the Tallboy was that two hits were able to sink her, and the near misses scoured away enough of the bottom to ensure that she turned completely over. 


> The Tirpitz was undefended by fighters, the smoke generators activated too late so that the smoke probably did more to spoil the aim of the defending gunners than that of the bomb aimers.


By the time 9 Squadron bombed, Tirpitz had almost disappeared in smoke, so that is manifestly untrue


> If the Tirptiz had of been suprise attacked by He 111 equiped with 2500kg bombs (or B-25's with 2000lbs) and Lotfe bombsights *in 1942* they would have done almost as good a job as the Lancaster with its SABS and 5000kg tallboy bomb in *late 1944*.


But it wasn't so that's more pointless speculation/guesswork. Like Bismarck, Tirpitz was alleged to be unsinkable, so it's doubtful that bombs half the size of Tallboy would have done much.


> The key here is the screw up with the identification of the raid by German defenses which had detected the aircraft on radar in good time but failed to indentify them as hostile, the belated activation of smoke screens and the belated scrambling of FW 190 interceptors which if they had of intercepted the unescorted and armament stripped Lancasters would likely have shot down a high percentage of them and quite possibly spoiled the raid. The Reichs defenses were crumbling and in all probabillity teenagers were making the decisions


No, it wasn't; it was due to the usual lamentable lack of cooperation between German Commands; nobody had seen fit to tell the Luftwaffe that Tirpitz had been moved, so the fighters set off for her old mooring.


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## Edgar Brooks (Jan 11, 2012)

wuzak said:


> The bombing height may have been because the RAF heavies didn't have ceilings much higher than that.


Pretty close; 22,000', but that was with a maximum bomb load of over 18,000lbs.


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## wuzak (Jan 11, 2012)

FWIW, Tallboy and Grand Slam didn't always drop as accurately as required due to the bomb release mechanism - a chain slung around the bomb's body. Had they been able to use a normal type bomb carrier and release they may have been more accurate.


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## pbfoot (Jan 11, 2012)

the bomb sight is an aid but all the little variables cause it to be just that an aid .except in perfect still air, no winds aloft at all, flown by a perfect pilot with a perfect bombardier with perfect instruments and most of all no distractions like flak or fighters ,


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 11, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> the bomb sight is an aid but all the little variables cause it to be just that an aid .except in perfect still air, no winds aloft at all,* flown by a perfect pilot *with a perfect bombardier with perfect instruments and most of all no distractions like flak or fighters ,



Remember - during the bomb run, the bombardier had control of the plane (at least with the Norton bomb sight)


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## pinsog (Jan 11, 2012)

We all agree that the SDB was a failure against Germany, but what about against Japan? American bombers were very successful defending themselves against Japanese fighters, without escort, all throughout the war.


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## pbfoot (Jan 11, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Remember - during the bomb run, the bombardier had control of the plane (at least with the Norton bomb sight)


I'm aware , alls I'm saying with the technology of the day dropping dumb iron bombs with any accuracy in any weather outside perfect conditions would be a very hard task to accomplish. I'm thinking of all the variables winds aloft , altimeter setting, humidity, even if the aircraft was in the slightest bank or turn would all affect accuracy. Now toss in flak, nerves and fighters


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## Nikademus (Jan 11, 2012)

pinsog said:


> Again, just because your bombers are self defending doesnt mean you purposely expose them to enemy fighters, or for that matter, deny them fighter protection if it is availeable.



that is contrary to the basic principle of the "Self Defending Bomber" concept. Fighters were seen as a wasteful expense by the purists. They were wrong. On the same vein, there is a big difference between exposure and avoidance. If the concept worked as advertised they wouldn't have to avoid by flying in at night, or during twilight/dawn conditions or attempting to go in when the CAP is figured to not be around or lastly at stratosphere heights. In other words the tactics the USAAF often used with their unescorted raids in the Pacific. It would appear they didn't buy the SDB concept and respected the enemy's defense potential. Eric Bergerud's study of the SoPac fighting showed that the Allied air efforts were hardly a cakewalk, and there were multiple incidents of even 4E's suffering signifigant losses. Not on the scale of a Schweinfurst of course, given the smaller sizes and vast terrain of the Theater, but enough for the USAAF to take notice and adjust it's tactics to minimize interception when no escort was available.



> We all agree that the SDB was a failure against Germany, but what about against Japan? American bombers were very successful defending themselves against Japanese fighters, without escort, all throughout the war.



Like in Burma? The lowly Ki-43, probably the most maligned candidant for attacking a 4E (with good reason from a paper point of view) managed to shoot down more B-24's (and one B-29) than they lost. 24 for 18 in trade. Ki-43's also added another 7 Liberators in RAF service in exchange for 3 downed 43's. These were only the verified losses. There was also a good amount of damage and crew wounding to dish out. People tend to look only at losses. But damage and casualties are also part of the equation. The USAAF was always able to replace it's material losses during the war (though as mentioned, the debut of the B-29 heralded the dawn of the uber-expensive military air asset).  The real concern was the life expectancy of the crews.

This from a Theater not known for it's integrated air defense network and having to rely primarily on plane forced into an ad-hoc role with a weak armament for tackling a heavy bomber. Germany, like Japan and Italy was not intially equipped to deal with a sustained strategic bombing campaign both in terms of defense network and based on the existing armaments of their primary fighter force. It evolved into one over time out of necessity. This is not to say that Japan and Italy could acomplish as much as the Germans given their specific limitations....especially Italy, but had they faced the same "what if" that Germany did they would have both reacted, esp with interceptors better armed and suited for knocking down the big bombers. The VVS, which i see your no longer throwing into the mix, was the world's largest airforce prior to Barbarossa. I would certainly not discount their ability to punish bomber formations either and they did have a decent high alt interceptor in the form of the MiG-3. The SDB concept as defined prior to WWII was proven to be no substitute for a conventional escorted attack. It was not conditional based on opponent....nor can one simply summarize that it would have been effective vs. any other opponent except for Germany, and now maybe Britian as you posted earlier. For every action, there is a reaction.


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## pinsog (Jan 11, 2012)

Nikademus said:


> that is contrary to the basic principle of the "Self Defending Bomber" concept. Fighters were seen as a wasteful expense by the purists. They were wrong. On the same vein, there is a big difference between exposure and avoidance. If the concept worked as advertised they wouldn't have to avoid by flying in at night, or during twilight/dawn conditions or attempting to go in when the CAP is figured to not be around or lastly at stratosphere heights. In other words the tactics the USAAF often used with their unescorted raids in the Pacific. It would appear they didn't buy the SDB concept and respected the enemy's defense potential. Eric Bergerud's study of the SoPac fighting showed that the Allied air efforts were hardly a cakewalk, and there were multiple incidents of even 4E's suffering signifigant losses. Not on the scale of a Schweinfurst of course, given the smaller sizes and vast terrain of the Theater, but enough for the USAAF to take notice and adjust it's tactics to minimize interception when no escort was available.
> 
> 
> 
> ...



Just because you have a SDB you dont put it into places to get it shot at on purpose. If you can fly above them you do. If you can go around them you do. If you have to fly through them you have that option because it is self defending. Tell me, if you are in a tank in a battlezone, would you park it on a hill with a big sign on it that says "SHOOT ME"? Of course not. It you are in a battleship, would you cruise up right next to an enemy destroyer or cruiser and say "SHOOT ME, I'M A BATTLESHIP"? No. You engage them with your big guns out of range of their weapons. Same thing with SDB. Fly over, fly around fly through only if you must, but if you must fly through them, at least you have the option.

I didn't say it was impossible to shoot them down, but the Japanese were unable to halt the bomber offensive anywhere at anytime during the war. 

"This is not to say that Japan and Italy could acomplish as much as the Germans given their specific limitations....especially Italy, but had they faced the same "what if" that Germany did they would have both reacted, esp with interceptors better armed and suited for knocking down the big bombers. "

The USAAF burned the entire country of Japan to the ground and then nuked it. At exactly what time does the threat get bad enough to try to shoot them down?


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## Nikademus (Jan 11, 2012)

pinsog said:


> Just because you have a SDB you dont put it into places to get it shot at on purpose.



The concept of the SDB was that it could penetrate enemy airspace irregardless of enemy fighter defenses and bomb the target without the need for fighter escort because it could DEFEND ITSELF. You keep claiming......without anything other than generalized statements, that US bombers flew all over the Pacific and "defended" themselves. Yet I have shown....repeatedly that the USAAF took painful measures to AVOID interception......because of the threat of enemy interception. This flies into the face of the original SDB concept, no matter how you try to quibble over it. A truely self defending bomber as defined by the purists would not need to bomb at night which it often did in the Pacific, bomb during periods of near nighttime for the same reason....again done in the Pacific, or in the case of bombing the Home islands....fly at extreme heights in order to avoid interception and loss....which was done prior to the switch to incendiary low level NIGHT attacks.



> I didn't say it was impossible to shoot them down, but the Japanese were unable to halt the bomber offensive anywhere at anytime during the war.



What bomber offensive are you referring too? The Home Islands? Indeed. By that time the IJNAF and IJAAF were worn down, outgunned and outnumbered and facing a new complex piece of military hardware of which even a single loss hit the taxpayers straight in the wallet. How does this suddenly reverse the long held conclusion that the SDB concept did not have merit under the test of combat?



> " The USAAF burned the entire country of Japan to the ground and then nuked it. At exactly what time does the threat get bad enough to try to shoot them down?



The USAAF SB campaign against Germany started under unique qualifyers. You take that scenario and simply swap out the opponents. Doesn't work that way. Apples and Oranges comparison. Had Japan, or Italy or the USSR faced a US strategic air threat as its primary opponent in a sliding scale of escalation, they all too would have reacted as Germany did. Japan's war however was far different than Germany's war. Your reply to this is to simply say "US bombers were successful whereever they flew in the Pacific...the SDB concept does work" 

Sorry. Don't agree. Said my piece on it. Le' Done.


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## pinsog (Jan 11, 2012)

You said ""This is not to say that Japan and Italy could acomplish as much as the Germans given their specific limitations....especially Italy, but had they faced the same "what if" that Germany did they would have both reacted, esp with interceptors better armed and suited for knocking down the big bombers. "

Japan faced the same thing Germany faced, they didnt do so hot. Their country was burned to the ground and then nuked. The nuclear strikes were like 3 unescorted bombers and they still didn't get intercepted.

Are you saying, if a bomber is self defending and can fly at 30,000 feet at 350 mph and enemy fighters can only fly at 20,000 feet at 300 mph that the bombers should slow down and lower their altitude so they can fly through the enemy fighters?????? 

So the B29 flew high and fast and the Japanese couldn't catch it, nor shoot it down when they did, that means it isnt self defending?

I'm sorry I don't get your thinking here.

Even the toughest main battle tanks on the planet, M1 Abrams, Leapard2, etc, still fight "hull down", does that makes them something besides main battle tanks?

Remember, fighters intercept bombers, SDB don't see a swarm of enemy fighters and say "Oh, we need to fly through that group of enemy fighters. We almost accidently went around them!"


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## Siegfried (Jan 11, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Norden Bombsight Info...
> 
> NORDEN BOMBSIGHT



Interestingly this web page says:

This particular version was typical of what was used toward the end of WWII and throughout the Korean Conflict. This is an M-9B bombsight head (L-9772) manufactured by Lucas Harold Incorporated. The sight head has a Maxon X-1 Reflex Sight and *the tachometer adapter for the Glide Bombing Attachment.*

This means the Norden could be used to glide bomb (shallow dive bomb)!


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## Siegfried (Jan 11, 2012)

Edgar Brooks said:


> 7 in fact (including the last) + 7 by the FAA
> 
> 19 actually, and it's a fair indication of how good the Tallboy was that two hits were able to sink her, and the near misses scoured away enough of the bottom to ensure that she turned completely over.



It took the RAF three raids and 100 superbombs to sink tirpitz, which survived one of the tallboys. The fundemental problem was the Luftwaffe was spread way to thin: not enough fighters and not enough radars. Blaming it on poor interservice communication is fallacious. Systems break down when they are undermanned and under resourced. Not one of the Lancaster riads was intercepted.

The bombing that the RAF did could have been done in 1942 by the Luftwaffe using the Lofte 7 and I daresay a few hits by a 2500kg bomb (the largest the Germans made) from a He 111or Do 217 would be just as effective. The Norden had been available for years earlier though I don't know what the USAAF heavies AP bomb was. The Roma was sunk by only 2 x Fritz-X which is basically an SC1400 (1400kg bomb) with a tailkit and welded on fins.

The fiction that "the Germans" had claimed the Bismark and Tirpitz were unsinkable seems to be the usual propaganda or post war fiction designed to malign Germans as arrogant.


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## Siegfried (Jan 11, 2012)

When did the USAAF develop its 'heavily defended bomber' concept. It is my understanding that the first heavily armed USAAF bomber was the B-17E.

From Joe Baughers website:

"It is often written that the B-17E was the result of initial experience with the B-17C and D during the first months of combat in 1942 in the Pacific against the Japanese. Other sources report that the B-17E had its origin in the negative experience that the RAF had with the Fortress I (B-17C) over Europe in the summer of 1941. Neither view is correct, since the B-17E was first ordered on August 30, 1940, and the first prototype took to the air on its maiden flight on September 5, 1941. "


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## Shortround6 (Jan 11, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> When did the USAAF develop its 'heavily defended bomber' concept. It is my understanding that the first heavily armed USAAF bomber was the B-17E.



While it didn't see service and took about 4 years to build the B-19 may suggest some of the thinking of the USAAC at the time. 

Flightline II - B-19

Factsheets : Douglas XB-19


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## Jabberwocky (Jan 11, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> When did the USAAF develop its 'heavily defended bomber' concept. It is my understanding that the first heavily armed USAAF bomber was the B-17E.


 
'Heavily defended' is a comparative term and the meaning changed as aircraft and other technology developed. Most US 'heavy' bombers of the 1920s through to the early 1930s had a defensive armament of 3 x .30 cal in unpowered mounts. The B-2 Condor had six Lewis guns in three positions. Most of the light bombers had five Lewis guns in three positions.

What really paved the way for later 'self defending' designs were aircraft like the B-10 - which featured power turrets (still 3 x .30s though) and was faster than contemporary fighters. Experimental designs such as the XB-15 and XB-21 of the mid 1930s featured 5-8 machine guns, either .30 or .50, also with several powered turrets.

It wasn't just heavy armament, but speed and altitude as well that were integral parts of the self defending bomber concept. Early B-17s had 5 defensive positions, but they were split between .30 and .50 cal weapons and most positions were unpowered.


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## MikeGazdik (Jan 12, 2012)

Wow, this thread took off into alot of variables. What-ifs aside. The fact that the U.S. HAD to get P-51 escorts to enable the bombers to continue to strike Germany, and attempted to set up bases to escort the B-29's pretty much proves that it was eventually realized that the "self protecting bomber" was a unrealized dream. Once the B-29's switched to night low altitude bombing, it may have minimized the need for escorts , but that was a change in tactics brought on by the realization of a weakness in Japan in defending in such attacks. Had the B-29's continued high altitude daylight bombing, fighter escort would have been an absolute necessity.

And, how much worse would the Battle of Brittain been for Germany if the bombers went without any fighters? 

Bombing at night, be it the RAF, or U.S over Japan, was a period form of stealth.


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## wuzak (Jan 12, 2012)

pinsog said:


> Are you saying, if a bomber is self defending and can fly at 30,000 feet at 350 mph and enemy fighters can only fly at 20,000 feet at 300 mph that the bombers should slow down and lower their altitude so they can fly through the enemy fighters??????
> 
> So the B29 flew high and fast and the Japanese couldn't catch it, nor shoot it down when they did, that means it isnt self defending?



If you fly your bombers so high and fast that the opposition will have difficulty intercepting them, or fly routes to avoid interception, wouldn't it be better to dump the guns, turrets and ammo and have a higher performing aircraft?


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## pinsog (Jan 12, 2012)

wuzak said:


> If you fly your bombers so high and fast that the opposition will have difficulty intercepting them, or fly routes to avoid interception, wouldn't it be better to dump the guns, turrets and ammo and have a higher performing aircraft?



Just because they TRIED to avoid interception doesn't mean they always could. They probably MINIMIZED interception as best they could, but they still needed defensive weapons.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 12, 2012)

wuzak said:


> If you fly your bombers so high and fast that the opposition will have difficulty intercepting them, or fly routes to avoid interception, wouldn't it be better to dump the guns, turrets and ammo and have a higher performing aircraft?



If dumping the guns, turrets and ammo gives you _enough_ better performance it may be worth it. Usually to get both _enough_ higher and faster required a smaller airframe and a smaller bomb load too. Existing designs could not be made to fly high enough or fast enough simply by leaving stuff out. 

The high/fast idea was tried for a number of years in the late 40s and 50s but it didn't sink in for a while that an unmanned missile would always be able to fly a bit higher and faster than a manned bomber.


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## Milosh (Jan 12, 2012)

Didn't the B-29 get rid of some of its defensive guns?


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## Nikademus (Jan 12, 2012)

> Japan faced the same thing Germany faced, they didnt do so hot. Their country was burned to the ground and then nuked. The nuclear strikes were like 3 unescorted bombers and they still didn't get intercepted.



If you say so.

.


> I'm sorry I don't get your thinking here.



I can see that.


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## Nikademus (Jan 12, 2012)

Milosh said:


> Didn't the B-29 get rid of some of its defensive guns?




LeMay ordered the guns removed for several reasons. He was under intense pressure to get results quick, and one of the issues that plauged the command was the servicability problem. Switching to night ops allowed lower altitudes to be selected which eased the strain on the cranky new engines of the plane.....removing 'some' of the guns reduced weight further which also allowed more ordinance to be stuffed into the bombbays to assist with the Blitz. Per Tillman's book on the campaign, he says "most" of the guns were removed to save weight. 

This was part of a planned ten day blitz to support the Okinawa invasion and LeMay planned on using every incendiary present in the Marianas and that the USN could deliver in time for it. More bombloads equalled less missions equalled less time and less flying hours on the Forts and their engines.


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## drgondog (Jan 12, 2012)

The primary objective for LeMay was improving bombing results. The choice of operational altitude was dictated by a strike zone of a.) perceived bombing accuracy (even if the load was incindieries) on a specific area, and b.) zone at which the lighter and more flexible AA effectiveness diminished. 

The operational benefits of engine life/reliability, fuel consumption reduction and increased bomb load were a bonus to the prime mission altitude selection criteria.

IIRC the only defensive weapons were the tail guns - all others, and ammo, were removed.


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## Nikademus (Jan 12, 2012)

I see it as the other way around. The bonus was the increased bomb loads. LeMay was brought in to fix what was percieved as a major problem, and the servicability/abort issue was one of the big ones. He also was, as mentioned, under intense pressure to get results yesterday so he resorted to unorthodox methods including his reasoning that Japanese night defenses would be not a major threat, hence the bombers could fly lower, he could reduce weight by deleting some of the weapons which combined with the lower altitude eased strain on the engines and also...lastly allowed more incendiaries to be stuffed into each bomber for his projected "blitz" He turned out to be correct. The major problem after the first blitz was that he used up every single incendiary in the Marianas and had to stand down until the USN could deliver more!


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## Glider (Jan 12, 2012)

wuzak said:


> If you fly your bombers so high and fast that the opposition will have difficulty intercepting them, or fly routes to avoid interception, wouldn't it be better to dump the guns, turrets and ammo and have a higher performing aircraft?



Tis could be done with smaller aircraft such as the Mosquito but if you want a large payload you need a large aircraft and it becomes impractical. Unarmed recce aircraft worked on the same principle


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## drgondog (Jan 12, 2012)

Nikademus said:


> I see it as the other way around. The bonus was the increased bomb loads. LeMay was brought in to fix what was percieved as a major problem, and the servicability/abort issue was one of the big ones. He also was, as mentioned, under intense pressure to get results yesterday so he resorted to unorthodox methods including his reasoning that Japanese night defenses would be not a major threat, hence the bombers could fly lower, he could reduce weight by deleting some of the weapons which combined with the lower altitude eased strain on the engines and also...lastly allowed more incendiaries to be stuffed into each bomber for his projected "blitz" He turned out to be correct. The major problem after the first blitz was that he used up every single incendiary in the Marianas and had to stand down until the USN could deliver more!



If you read Mission With leMay by McKinley Cantor you will see what LeMay thought about the subject.


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## Nikademus (Jan 12, 2012)

drgondog said:


> If you read Mission With leMay by McKinley Cantor you will see what LeMay thought about the subject.



Thx. I'll note that book for a future read. Barrett Tillman's book on the B-29 campaign also sheds good light on LeMay's role in the evolution of the SuperFort tactics.


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## TheMustangRider (Jan 12, 2012)

MikeGazdik said:


> Once the B-29's switched to night low altitude bombing, it may have minimized the need for escorts , but that was a change in tactics brought on by the realization of a weakness in Japan in defending in such attacks. Had the B-29's continued high altitude daylight bombing, fighter escort would have been an absolute necessity.



Apart from the devastating fire raids unleashed by Le May and 20th BC in early 1945 which proved to be aghastly devastating against major Japanese populated centres; long-range escort fighter protection was indeed needed and employed towards the end of the Pacific war in the form of P-51s operating from Iwo Jima from April '45 onwards.

As far as I know, 20th BC finished the air war over Japan hammering at Japanese industrial centers and communication lines during day-light and consuming Japanese cities during night-time.


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## Rosco P. Coltraine (Jan 12, 2012)

To be fair;

The doctrine (probably mostly the responsibility of Billy Mitchell) dated from the mid-to-early 1930's when fighters were much slower and easier for gunners to target and damage.

What can be faulted is the USAAC/USAAF's adherence to the doctrine long after it was clearly obsolete.


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## wuzak (Jan 13, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> If dumping the guns, turrets and ammo gives you _enough_ better performance it may be worth it. Usually to get both _enough_ higher and faster required a smaller airframe and a smaller bomb load too. Existing designs could not be made to fly high enough or fast enough simply by leaving stuff out.
> 
> The high/fast idea was tried for a number of years in the late 40s and 50s but it didn't sink in for a while that an unmanned missile would always be able to fly a bit higher and faster than a manned bomber.


 


Glider said:


> Tis could be done with smaller aircraft such as the Mosquito but if you want a large payload you need a large aircraft and it becomes impractical. Unarmed recce aircraft worked on the same principle



Well, ok, if you dump the guns and ammo you may not fly muchhigher or faster - but the savings on a B-29 must be measured in tons? Which could be used to allow greater bomb loads, or just make taking off easier and less knife edge.


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## wuzak (Jan 13, 2012)

Rosco P. Coltraine said:


> To be fair;
> 
> The doctrine (probably mostly the responsibility of Billy Mitchell) dated from the mid-to-early 1930's when fighters were much slower and easier for gunners to target and damage.
> 
> What can be faulted is the USAAC/USAAF's adherence to the doctrine long after it was clearly obsolete.



What I have read suggests that Mitchell's bomber ideas revolved around gaining air superiority - which required fighters to destory the opposition.


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## kettbo (Jan 17, 2012)

Unescorted bombers seemed viable in the Pacific, not so good an idea over Germany....daylight bombing over Germany a close-run battle until the long range escorts were available.

Wondering if this was worth all the trouble in the ETO
Largely bad weather, clouds and Toggling on the lead bomber (makes ya wonder if the Bombadier was needed), low percentage of hits
large crew requirements
cost of the show with aircraft, FUEL, related resources...add all the shipping requirements for fuel, bombs, parts, crewmen, food
could this have been better applied elsewhere to win the war?


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## wmaxt (Jan 20, 2012)

The escort issue was defined very much by the availability of fighters being able to fly far enough to accompany the bombers. Speed of fighter was another issue that reinforced the range problem in that the fighter couldn't keep up with some of the advanced bombers, 

The speed issue was also looked at from the point of the attacker. Bombers were getting fast enough that fighters got one quick pass then were not able to get into attack position before their fuel ran low.

It wasn't until the P-38 that an aircraft had both the speed and range to escort bombers to long distance targets - and that was an accident brought about by the need to carry enough fuel to overtake bombers after the first pass (Original specification - to fly 1 hour at full throttle) and the need to get the P-38s to Europe by flying them instead of by ship (Operation Bolero). Before operation Bolero external fuel tanks were forbidden on AAF fighters.

Once the key to long range fighters was known and perfected other fighters, P-47s and P-51s were designed or modified to do the job.

In the Pacific the escort issue was the availability of aircraft for 1943 the were an average of ~250 P-38s available in the whole theater!That increased in 1944 to about ~550 which was hardly enough to do all that was being asked of them. After the P-51 arrived in numbers in Europe freeing the P-38s to go to the Pacific it helped very much. Finaly P-51s and P-47s could be allocated to the PTO. Also b 1945 the Japanese were getting fewer and fewer making escort less important except for strong points and the Island of Japan


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## model299 (Jan 20, 2012)

kettbo said:


> <snip>(makes ya wonder if the Bombadier was needed) <snip>



Toward the end of the European daylight bomber campaign, it was comman practice to have only two to three bombardiers in each group. A lead, with a replacement or two in case lead was lost. All of the other planes released their bombs on lead's signal. This cut down on manpower requirments a bit and also the need for every plane to have a bombsight to fall into enemy hands. (Although I'm quite certain that by this time, the Germans had plenty of captured examples of the Norden on hand.) They would also place the "lead" at various places in the formation. Defensive fighters couldn't just assume the lead bombardier was in the first aircraft.


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## Milosh (Jan 20, 2012)

The German Lofte 7 bomb sight that was based on the Norden bomb sight. The plans were obtained by the Germans pre war.

Lotfernrohr 7 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## pbfoot (Jan 20, 2012)

model299 said:


> Toward the end of the European daylight bomber campaign, it was comman practice to have only two to three bombardiers in each group. A lead, with a replacement or two in case lead was lost. All of the other planes released their bombs on lead's signal. This cut down on manpower requirments a bit and also the need for every plane to have a bombsight to fall into enemy hands. (Although I'm quite certain that by this time, the Germans had plenty of captured examples of the Norden on hand.) They would also place the "lead" at various places in the formation. Defensive fighters couldn't just assume the lead bombardier was in the first aircraft.


There goes the thought of precision bombing , it was area bombing with a fancy name like pre enjoyed automobile instead of used car


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## fastmongrel (Jan 21, 2012)

The RAF precison bombed area targets. The USAAF area bombed precision targets.


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## drgondog (Jan 21, 2012)

model299 said:


> Toward the end of the European daylight bomber campaign, it was comman practice to have only two to three bombardiers in each group. A lead, with a replacement or two in case lead was lost. All of the other planes released their bombs on lead's signal. This cut down on manpower requirments a bit and also the need for every plane to have a bombsight to fall into enemy hands. (Although I'm quite certain that by this time, the Germans had plenty of captured examples of the Norden on hand.) They would also place the "lead" at various places in the formation. Defensive fighters couldn't just assume the lead bombardier was in the first aircraft.



Every squadron had lead crews after LeMay formalized the concept. Usually four squadrons per Bomb Group - each squadron bombing on Their lead ship. They couldn't 'scatter' the lead crews because noboby can look behind them very well to 'bomb' on the Trailing crew or placed somewhere else in the squadron formation... or have to guess where they might be when squadron closed up after losses.

If a squadron lost all designated 'lead' bombardiers they toggled on the formation ahead of them


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## drgondog (Jan 21, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> There goes the thought of precision bombing , it was area bombing with a fancy name like pre enjoyed automobile instead of used car



Not really. Some guys are better than others for specific tasks. The lead crew concept was adopted because some navigators didn't get lost and some bombardiers got very good results. When you consider that factory and assembly and refining complex's were about the size of several squadrons in close formation, then bombing on your best crew made sense - if the objective was as precise as a Catalytic cracker within a refinery as your prime AP, then the lead crew was tasked to use that as their aiming point. 

Pretty impossible at night with hundreds of a/c weaving into a target essentially on their own but doable in tight formation with good visibility and a navigator bomardier who could get you to the target, find the aiming point and control That B-17/B-24 all the way to that target.


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## pbfoot (Jan 21, 2012)

drgondog said:


> Not really. Some guys are better than others for specific tasks. The lead crew concept was adopted because some navigators didn't get lost and some bombardiers got very good results. When you consider that factory and assembly and refining complex's were about the size of several squadrons in close formation, then bombing on your best crew made sense - if the objective was as precise as a Catalytic cracker within a refinery as your prime AP, then the lead crew was tasked to use that as their aiming point.
> 
> Pretty impossible at night with hundreds of a/c weaving into a target essentially on their own but doable in tight formation with good visibility and a navigator bomardier who could get you to the target, find the aiming point and control That B-17/B-24 all the way to that target.


call it whatever you want but its like IMHO of putting lipstick on a pig it area bombing in everything but name


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## Siegfried (Jan 21, 2012)

Glider said:


> Tis could be done with smaller aircraft such as the Mosquito but if you want a large payload you need a large aircraft and it becomes impractical. Unarmed recce aircraft worked on the same principle



Large aircraft can be made fast: those purchasing aircraft simply failed to specify such aircraft: the Mosquito was a private venture and more or less or fluke.


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## buffnut453 (Jan 21, 2012)

Why was the Mossie a fluke? Because it entered service at all or because it performed as well as it did? Just wondering....


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## tomo pauk (Jan 21, 2012)

What is a 'fluke'?


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## Edgar Brooks (Jan 21, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> Large aircraft can be made fast: .


Not if you weigh them down with defensive armament and crew.


> the Mosquito was a private venture and more or less or fluke


That old myth, again; the Mosquito was not a private venture, though de Havilland had to fight tooth-and-nail to get it accepted. Sir Wilfrid Freeman, Air Council Member for Research Development, backed it, and the Air Ministry issued Specification B.1/40 specifically for it.
And a fluke? Now come on, the Mosquito was de Havilland's 98th design, most of the preceding being made predominately of wood, they'd won the England-Australia race with a wooden monocoque-fuselaged twin-engined aircraft, and had built probably the most elegant pre-war 4-engined airliner, also monocoque-fuselaged, and built from wood.


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## wuzak (Jan 21, 2012)

drgondog said:


> Not really. Some guys are better than others for specific tasks. The lead crew concept was adopted because some navigators didn't get lost and some bombardiers got very good results. When you consider that factory and assembly and refining complex's were about the size of several squadrons in close formation, then bombing on your best crew made sense - if the objective was as precise as a Catalytic cracker within a refinery as your prime AP, then the lead crew was tasked to use that as their aiming point.
> 
> Pretty impossible at night with hundreds of a/c weaving into a target essentially on their own but doable in tight formation with good visibility and a navigator bomardier who could get you to the target, find the aiming point and control That B-17/B-24 all the way to that target.



Wasn't the concept of bombing on the lead less about getting the best to do the jon and more about minimising the time the bombers spent over target? After all, with the Norden a long straight flight path to target was required, and if each crew bombed individually they were extremely vulnerable to flak or fighter attack, not to mention the extra time required to do it this way (only the early raids with relatively small formations bombed individually - can't imagine how long it woul dhave taken if they still did it with the 1000 bomber raids of 1944 onwards). The advantage of bombing in formation was that the defensive formations remained in their mutual defensive fire positions.

Some factories may have been sprawling complexes larger than the size of an 8th AF "close" bomber formation. Others were not. Some that were spread out had large amounts of space between sectiosn - like oil refineries.


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## Glider (Jan 21, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> What is a 'fluke'?



A lucky break, something totally unexpected, against all the odds


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## drgondog (Jan 22, 2012)

wuzak said:


> Wasn't the concept of bombing on the lead less about getting the best to do the jon and more about minimising the time the bombers spent over target? After all, with the Norden a long straight flight path to target was required, and if each crew bombed individually they were extremely vulnerable to flak or fighter attack, not to mention the extra time required to do it this way (only the early raids with relatively small formations bombed individually - can't imagine how long it woul dhave taken if they still did it with the 1000 bomber raids of 1944 onwards). The advantage of bombing in formation was that the defensive formations remained in their mutual defensive fire positions.
> 
> *Wuzak - flying formation on lead, and bombing on lead certainly had an advantige of maintaining squadron formation integrity - but the whole objective was to destroy the targets. Period. When the Lead Crew methods were introduced, the Automatic Flight Control Equipment was also introduced and the Bomabdier essentially flew the airplane - taking the ability of the pilot to make evasive manuevers (inckluding deviating from the bomb run out of the pilot's hands.*
> 
> Some factories may have been sprawling complexes larger than the size of an 8th AF "close" bomber formation. Others were not. Some that were spread out had large amounts of space between sectiosn - like oil refineries.



All True. Havind agreed that, there were two approaches. One was to designate a single Aiming Point in the center of that 'sprawling complex', the other was to separate and allocates discreet targets within the complex for one specific Bomb Group.

The latter references were used statistically to judge individual bomb Group bombing accuracy via post bombing recon/BDA. There is a feeling I get from many of the comments, particularly Neil's that 8th AF bombing was of the first type. Not so - If you look at a particular day's mission you will note the multitude of individual sites attacked on any one particular day - too many people have a notion that the 8th went after one general area rather than 20 different plants or marshalling yards or chemical/petro complex's. 

In fact, there might be four general areas - each usuall (but not always) far apart - and each (say Leipzig area with Bernberg, Halle, Halberstadt, Lutzkendorf and Aschersleben - west, northwest and south west of Leipiz, for the 2nd BD on July 7, 1944) hit by One bomb wing comprised of two to four Bomb Groups. On that day, at a different time and a separate course, the other Bomb Divisions would be striking different target regions and targets within those regions.

The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Task Force was assembled over England and stayed together to a point west of Brunswick, where the 1st TF/2nd BD headed southeast, the 1st and 3rd continued toward Berlin then headed south-southeast before they reached Berlin and then headed for Magdeburg, Leipzig, Merseburg, etc, etc - timed to be in the area where the 2nd BD was also headed but 30 and 50 minutes later.

In each of those target areas were multiple single and separate targets which had singular aiming point within that specific plant/complex for one bomb group (out of 33 for that day)

Net - the lead crew tactics evolved because it started as 'every bomb crew bomb on the briefed target, pilots could take evasive action during the bomb run, formations scattered, targets were not found, etc - leading to dismal 'area bombing' equivancy - even when visibity was excellent. Pretty much describes Aug-Dec 1942.


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## pbfoot (Jan 22, 2012)

I understand the principle but can't see how it works . Thats a noble thought to try and hope your lead Nav , or Bombadier find and hit the target but I just don't buy it , at least every bomber in BC attempted to hit target


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## jimh (Jan 22, 2012)

We've been using the Norden at our "bomber camp". The servo system that controls the flight controls during the bomb run is not installed so we have made the PDI or Pilot Direction Indicator operational on the panel. As the bombardier sights in on the target from the IP we maintain a specific airspeed and altitude while the bombardier gives us heading corrections via the PDI. We are using 3,000ft as a hard deck and the bombsight is calibrated at 150mph. When the indices cross within the bombsight it trips the releases on the bomb racks and out they go. While this system works we manually release the bombs. Has the bombsigt been accurate...not really but we get close enough to our 150ft target ring to do damage if we were on an actual mission. What does all this mean? The bombsight got you close, having 100 bombers behind you laid waste to alot of landscape below it. I believe they went to a lead toggalier to reduce crew and redundancy. Why have 100 extra men on a mission that could be accomplished by 1 + a few backups in case of any anomolies. 

jim


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## drgondog (Jan 22, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> I understand the principle but can't see how it works . Thats a noble thought to try and hope your lead Nav , or Bombadier find and hit the target but I just don't buy it , at least every bomber in BC attempted to hit target



It is simple. Those individuals that repeatedly demonstrate superior competencies are selected to lead others in their assigned tasks. 

The RAF picked master Bombers, etc to lead the rest of the RAF to the proper city - but there was nothing past marking the rough center of mass for the ciry they were attacking, based on the visibility provided by descending flare clusters to illuminate the city - and even then there wasn't a mass of formation flying Lancasters to at least achieve a collective footprint of bombs around a small tough target. Nor was the RAF flying in a long straight line over any night target they chose to hit - trying to eliminate being an easy target to find and shoot down by NJG fighters (or searchlight illuminated flak)

Using night bombing by RAF versus daylight, computer aided/optically acquired targeting is a silly comparison - until you take visibility out of the equation.

Every USAAF pilot, navigator and bombadier Tried to hit the target early in their campaign - but pre-lead crew the results were closer to RAF area bombing than subsequent results achieved by lead crew/combat box tight formations under AFCE.

If you believe the RAF achieved better results by daylight bombing against Oil and Chemical Refining targets (as I do) than area bombing the same targets at night, the comparison should work better?


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## pbfoot (Jan 22, 2012)

I'm not saying night was better then day alls I'm stating no matter what you call it or who is doing it , its all area bombing its just the USAAF dressed it up a bit by calling it precision bombing .


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## drgondog (Jan 22, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> I'm not saying night was better then day alls I'm stating no matter what you call it or who is doing it , its all area bombing its just the USAAF dressed it up a bit by calling it precision bombing .



We agree to disagree. Not one airpower - Axix or Allied went to night bombing to get better bombing results. If you look at RAF's major triumphs for accuracy (Tirpitz, Jail Break, etc) all were daylight efforts. Night bombing was a priority because of daylight losses - not bombing accuracy. Ditto Germany over well defended target areas.

Speer was far more concerned about the impact of daylight strategic bombing and said so in his biography. Calling daylight precison bombing area bombing is valid for targets like Dresden, and just about any target under 8/10 to 10/10 cover is Ok, but bombing at, and hitting, targets like bridges, submarine pens, ball bearing/aircraft assy plants, refining plant critical equipment may have an 'area spread' for the hits but the target itself was hit - similar to say, Tirpitz. There were a LOT of misses attacking the Tirpitz but the RAF couldn't hope to do it at night.


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## buffnut453 (Jan 22, 2012)

Drdondog,

I think you and pbfoot are talking past each other. This isn't an argument about whether daylight or night bombing was more or less precise. It's a question of the definition of the term "precision bombing". If only the lead aircraft in a formation has a Norden bombsight, and all other members toggle with the lead, then while there may be some attempt at "precision aiming" by one aircraft, the net result was still "area bombing" because of formation spread, aerodynamic dispersion of the bombs (on top of other errors such as mis-identification of the target by the lead etc).

Just trying to clarify the discussion.

Cheers,
B-N


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## pbfoot (Jan 22, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> Drdondog,
> 
> I think you and pbfoot are talking past each other. This isn't an argument about whether daylight or night bombing was more or less precise. It's a question of the definition of the term "precision bombing". If only the lead aircraft in a formation has a Norden bombsight, and all other members toggle with the lead, then while there may be some attempt at "precision aiming" by one aircraft, the net result was still "area bombing" because of formation spread, aerodynamic dispersion of the bombs (on top of other errors such as mis-identification of the target by the lead etc).
> 
> ...


Thanks for helping me out. I'm just using my knowledge of controlling (ATC ) and my 190 hours of trying to fly sometimes even the best (place finder) navigator messes up . My best navigation story is 2 106's doing a flyby on a small town (wrong town wrong country) one sunday morning


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## wuzak (Jan 22, 2012)

drgondog said:


> Every USAAF pilot, navigator and bombadier Tried to hit the target early in their campaign - but pre-lead crew the results were closer to RAF area bombing than subsequent results achieved by lead crew/combat box tight formations under AFCE.



You sure it's not the other way around?

French observers, for example, praised the 8th AF for their accuracy on the sub pens early in the campaign. Before tactics were changed


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## wuzak (Jan 22, 2012)

drgondog said:


> We agree to disagree. Not one airpower - Axix or Allied went to night bombing to get better bombing results. If you look at RAF's major triumphs for accuracy (Tirpitz, Jail Break, etc) all were daylight efforts. Night bombing was a priority because of daylight losses - not bombing accuracy. Ditto Germany over well defended target areas.
> 
> Speer was far more concerned about the impact of daylight strategic bombing and said so in his biography. Calling daylight precison bombing area bombing is valid for targets like Dresden, and just about any target under 8/10 to 10/10 cover is Ok, but bombing at, and hitting, targets like bridges, submarine pens, ball bearing/aircraft assy plants, refining plant critical equipment may have an 'area spread' for the hits but the target itself was hit - similar to say, Tirpitz. There were a LOT of misses attacking the Tirpitz but the RAF couldn't hope to do it at night.



Possibly Speer was more concerned with daylight bombing because of the targets. Or that the Luftwaffe experienced greater attrition during the day than the night due to teh escort fighters.

I didn't think that strategic bombers were all that effective against bridges?

Do remember that the accuracy of tallboy attacks was compromised by the bomb release system - the bomb was held in place by a chain strap (as was the Grand Slam) which would often not release correctly. Actually more often than not.


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## drgondog (Jan 22, 2012)

wuzak said:


> Possibly Speer was more concerned with daylight bombing because of the targets. Or that the Luftwaffe experienced greater attrition during the day than the night due to teh escort fighters.
> 
> *Speer was concerned about both the targets the 8th AF was concentrating on as well as the increasing effectiveness. He states clearly that had we (8th AF) followed up immediately on the Schweinfurt attack of August 17 1943 it would have been 'disastrous' and he knew 'it was over' when the 8th started the attacks on the Oil Industry on May 12, 1944 in parallel with 15th AF attacks. *
> 
> ...



Understood on Tallboy - same reply. With or without perfectshackle release, the daylight attacks were a more effective approach.

You also said 'You sure it's not the other way around?

French observers, for example, praised the 8th AF for their accuracy on the sub pens early in the campaign. Before tactics were changed"

We were getting Intelligence feedback that our 2000 pound bombs were inadequate to destroy the pens and the best we were able to hope for is to nail subs in drydock or cruch machine shops surrounding the pens. Having said that the Strategic Bombing Survey evidenced increasing accuracy as the war progressed but also concluded the USAAF typical bomb load out of 500 and 1000 pound bombs were projected as less effective that equivalent destruction projections for 2000 pound bombs. 

As to reliability of French observers, one might question relevancy unless they also observed effects at Renault in Paris or Schweinfurt or Bremen shipyards also to establish some comparisons?


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## drgondog (Jan 22, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> Thanks for helping me out. I'm just using my knowledge of controlling (ATC ) and my 190 hours of trying to fly sometimes even the best (place finder) navigator messes up . My best navigation story is 2 106's doing a flyby on a small town (wrong town wrong country) one sunday morning



That might not be a good comparison versus say 12 B-17s with two pilots each and 12 navigators who must by practice and order,record individual Lat-Long and time for waypoints - all essentially checking each other despite the lead navigator's responsibility to perform flawlessly - then compare against typical fighter pilots trying to navigate and fly as one person... with one of the two man system closely observing his lead's wing rather than focus on Navaids.

Not to mention one system of 24 pilots and 12 navigators leisurely flying along at 150 mph IAS while the other two (106 drivers) are steaming along at 450 kts on the deck with little visibility of the big picture? One system can note the approach to the Rhine and see Bingen at the bend, while the other pair sees a Lot of water for an instant - then trying to figure out where they just crossed (was it the Rhine, Old Chap?)


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## drgondog (Jan 22, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> Drdondog,
> 
> I think you and pbfoot are talking past each other. This isn't an argument about whether daylight or night bombing was more or less precise. It's a question of the definition of the term "precision bombing". If only the lead aircraft in a formation has a Norden bombsight, and all other members toggle with the lead, then while there may be some attempt at "precision aiming" by one aircraft, the net result was still "area bombing" because of formation spread, aerodynamic dispersion of the bombs (on top of other errors such as mis-identification of the target by the lead etc).
> 
> ...



Maybe a rocket firing Typhoon firing unguided rockets at a target the pilot sees, acquires in his sights and releases based on that 'picture' is a similar example of area bombing in your example - versus say a master Bomber releasing a flare package over a blacked out area to guide trailing bombers to 'mark an area'. The analogy carried out for the Typhoon squadron is that his squdron mates don't see the target but trust their leader and salvo on the same target. If lead misses by big margin, likely all miss following his lead.

The two BG's of the 8th AF bombing the Merseburg Refinery or Messerscmidt factory at Augsburg - in clear daylight - is far closer to the Typhoon analogy than the master Bomber led 1000 plane raid on the same target metropolis. If Neil chooses to call both examples 'area bombing', he is free to express his opinion..


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## wuzak (Jan 22, 2012)

drgondog said:


> Speer was concerned about both the targets the 8th AF was concentrating on as well as the increasing effectiveness. He states clearly that had we (8th AF) followed up immediately on the Schweinfurt attack of August 17 1943 it would have been 'disastrous' and he knew 'it was over' when the 8th started the attacks on the Oil Industry on May 12, 1944 in parallel with 15th AF attacks.



Yes, but the 8th AF were basically incapable of following up the first Schweinfurt mission. Bomber Command were supposed to, but they hit Peenemunde instead.

The 8th were even less capable fo following up the second raid.

On the first mission some 80 bombs hit the target. From aroun 200 bombers each carrying 8-10 bombs.

Don't forget that Bomber Command also contributed to the old campaign, and in some ways were more effective (ie their bombs did more damage because they were bigger).




drgondog said:


> I used bridges as an example of daylight precision bombing - more likely medium bomber targets but heavies went after them also.



The most effective raids on bridges were, I'm sure, by medium bombers at low levels. 

Did USAAF mediums bomb on the leader? The RAF mediums certainly did not.




drgondog said:


> Understood on Tallboy - same reply. With or without perfectshackle release, the daylight attacks were a more effective approach.



Yes, but they also didn't all just drop their tallboys when their leader did. They all aimed individually.




drgondog said:


> You also said 'You sure it's not the other way around?
> 
> French observers, for example, praised the 8th AF for their accuracy on the sub pens early in the campaign. Before tactics were changed"
> 
> ...



Not a question of the effectiveness of the bombs. I think the USAAF didn't actually hold out much hope for destroying the pens. But it was a beginning to their campaign.

The use of a larger number of smaller bombs is, IMO, an indicator of area bombing. The larger bombs would have been more effective when hitting the target, but they would also require better aiming to maximise the chances of hits. The USAAF load outs used even smaller bombs, as well. For the oil campaign they often used 250lb bombs - in order to saturate the area and get the highest probability of damaging something vital.


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## wuzak (Jan 22, 2012)

drgondog said:


> Maybe a rocket firing Typhoon firing unguided rockets at a target the pilot sees, acquires in his sights and releases based on that 'picture' is a similar example of area bombing in your example - versus say a master Bomber releasing a flare package over a blacked out area to guide trailing bombers to 'mark an area'. The analogy carried out for the Typhoon squadron is that his squdron mates don't see the target but trust their leader and salvo on the same target. If lead misses by big margin, likely all miss following his lead.
> 
> The two BG's of the 8th AF bombing the Merseburg Refinery or Messerscmidt factory at Augsburg - in clear daylight - is far closer to the Typhoon analogy than the master Bomber led 1000 plane raid on the same target metropolis. If Neil chooses to call both examples 'area bombing', he is free to express his opinion..



As the 8th AF all dropped their bombs at once the bombs must fall in an area on the ground - since the bombing formation had length and width.

In your example, if the Tiffy squadron lined up at the target, marked by the leader's rockets, and shot individually with the leader making aiming corrections for each subsequent pilot (for wind or poor marking or whatever) the error would surely be reduced?

If they all salvoed at the same time while flyiing in formation there may be a good chance that one will hit the target, but the probability is that most will miss.


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## drgondog (Jan 23, 2012)

We seem to be bound by a common language introducing many disconnects.

8th/15th AF were both guided by a strategic doctrine that was correct in concept and left a lot to be desired in execution - namely hit critical choke points until they are destroyed. Ball Bearings and Oil/Chemical plants When the RAF followed the same strategy against targets susceptible to a very large swath of bombs or brilliant execution by a few well directed bombers the RAF achieved excellent results - The Ruhr Dams and Hydroelectric centers.

In both cases the target areas as well as key components within the target complex were identified and attacked with great effect. In all of the above examples the targets were well planned and operationally executed and acquired visually - These, by the definition of 'area bombing' as contrasted by 'precision bombing', were Precision Bombing attacks. Today we may drop 100 JDAMs aimed by a single laser designator or directed by GPS and achieved true precision bombing - but in WWII if the consequence of the attacks were to destroy a specific target the philosophical differences between RAF (as represented by Harris in this discussion) and USAAF was a target selection of Berlin versus the Erkner Ball Bearing complex in Berlin.

The latter choices were what kept Speer awake at night (professionally speaking) while the former (area bomb the entire city) kept him awake when he was 'in town'.

Schweinfurt on August 17 and October 14 were not failures per se - they had a dramatic effect on Ball Bearing Production. The failure was the 8th AF inability to swallow the losses incurred and continue attacking Schweinfurt and then Erkner to get past the German store of reserves for maintenance and spare parts, which enabled German industry to continue to supply ball bearings while Schweinfurt was being repaired.

Another failure by 8th and 15th AF planners was failing to concentrate on aircraft and tank engine production versus airframes. Lots of examples why USAAF Strategic Bombing campaign did not succeed to expectations - but nevertheless were far more of a concern to German planners (Speer) than RAF city busting campaigns - with one very notable exception, namely Hamburg in July 1943.

I am equally tired of parsing area bombing definition as you are. My last comments on this subject in this thread are a.) if you want to know what Speer thought about the comparative results of US Doctrine versus British doctrine on the application and effectiveness against german industry, and b.) you want to know how the USAAF execution could have not only been better, but would have shortened the war considerably via better planning and execution - Read Inside the Third Reich (you probably have).

Simply Precision Bombing in the context of American expectations for Norden Bombsight "Pickle barrel bombing" was a fantasy, but the 8th and 15th AF results of being able to place bombs on a specific facory, operations center, critical components within a factory given adequate intelligence AND clear weather was unmatched day in and day out by any airforce in the world. As the bomb pattern was NOT a JDAM capability you may call it area bombing if you wish and then compare similar results of area bombing by RAF at night in comparable destruction of German Industry.


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## drgondog (Jan 23, 2012)

wuzak said:


> Yes, but the 8th AF were basically incapable of following up the first Schweinfurt mission. Bomber Command were supposed to, but they hit Peenemunde instead.
> 
> *They followed up on October 14 - and nearly lost the authority to continue daylight bombing - but according to Speer the damage was severe (reduction by 67%, pg 286 "Inside the Third Reich") and once again threatened German war production capability
> *
> ...



Hindsight from the USSBS agrees your observation - but we once again come short on assumption of area bombing.


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## pbfoot (Jan 23, 2012)

I've tried to determine how many days of VMC weather several German cities get and was unable , so I'll use what little knowledge I have and that it was usually crap compared to North American weather usually less then 5 miles vis and generally overcast so my Litmus test is how many Northern Europeans have a tan.
No european version of the EPA in the 40's so I'm assuming coal (point from another thread) as the major fuel would also cloud matters . So the pickle barrel is clouded by weather condition more often then not


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## drgondog (Jan 23, 2012)

I agree Neil - and said so man times that 'precision bombing' when complete or major cloud cover present was a ludicrous concept for USAAF - with or without H2X..


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## Sagittario64 (Jan 23, 2012)

I dont have enough time to read all these pages so if i repeat an already discussed point, i apologize for it. was the b-17 designed for a role in which hundreds would form the box formations? or was it just suited towards that role later? secondly even though heavier armament appeared on fighters, a 20mm cannon test was found that you need more than 2 dozen hits on average to take down a b-17. so is it that the b-17s defenses were not necessarily centered solely on the heavy defensive armament, but instead more on the strong structural integrity of the b-17?


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## wuzak (Jan 23, 2012)

drgondog, the way it has been described is that the USAAF area bombed precision targets and the RAF precision bombed area targets.

The fact of the matter is that bombing in formation, as the 8th did, resulted in bombs dispersed over an area. If the lead bomber was any good, hopefully the area would be centred on the target.

The 8th did participate in area bombing, but not as often as the RAF.

The effects of Harris' city busting campaign are not immediately obvious. But it did divert a lot of resources into dfending cities at night, prompted the increase in production of flak guns at the expense of other fiield equipment. Just having the air raid sirens go off in the night also disrupted the lives of the public, many of who were in industries helping teh German war effort.

Also, towards the end I believe the 8th basically carpet bombed the synthetic oil plants.


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## drgondog (Jan 23, 2012)

wuzak said:


> drgondog, the way it has been described is that the USAAF area bombed precision targets and the RAF precision bombed area targets.
> 
> *I get the first part and won't quibble much although a USAAF bomadier might. I think 'precision bombing area targets' is an Oxymoron? What unique aspect of Bomber Command attacks on Berlin constituted any part of 'precision' definition? - as contrast with Tirpitz?*
> 
> ...



Nah. Depending on your definition of carpet bombing, that is. They had specific target objectives with military and industrial value worth expending hundreds of thousands of gallons of AvGas or the 8th went somewhere else. The bean counters were involved in the spring of 1945 and intense political pressure regarding any loss of US lives was always a consideration.

Dresden was politicaaly driven to show Stalin 'we truly cared' and many of the airfields and refineries were perilously close to being worthless in April - which is why the 8th stood down on the 25th. Stopping short of Berlin and letting the USSR take it was another example.


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## pbfoot (Jan 23, 2012)

My opinion only . If Harris should have done what he was supposed to do in bombing POL rather then be ordered to do dragging and kicking , he was a pompous ******* that needed a swift kick in the groin


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## Glider (Jan 24, 2012)

Its a view that I have statred before but I can see the reason for hitting targets the size of cities in the first half of the war, the technology simply didn't exist to do better than that, but once the precision raids on the Rocket base and the Dams had taken place the tactics were available. A switch to precision targets such as POL and similar targets at that time could have paid significant dividends at greatly reduced cost.


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## drgondog (Jan 24, 2012)

I agree with both of you. The US 8th AF didn't match monthly bomb drop tonnage with Bombar Command until Novemeber 1943. Had BC been dropping on Ball bearings and engine factories and POL and sustained the Hydroelectric campaign during 1943 - who knows what the tipping point may have been.


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## Nikademus (Jan 24, 2012)

wuzak said:


> drgondog, the way it has been described is that the USAAF area bombed precision targets and the RAF precision bombed area targets.
> 
> The fact of the matter is that bombing in formation, as the 8th did, resulted in bombs dispersed over an area. If the lead bomber was any good, hopefully the area would be centred on the target.
> 
> ...


 

Essentially the case according to Donald Miller. He noted this as a distinct irony. So it was not simply a matter of finding the right choke point and then "precision" bombing it. It was finding the two key choke points and then carpet bombing them repeatedly over and over again with massed bombing raids (to put as many bombs in the general target area as possible) so tha the repair crews couldn't keep up. 

In the end it was simple brute strength that won the day. rinse and repeat....repeat and repeat and repeat.


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