# Ark Royal vs Bismark



## pinsog (Sep 18, 2010)

Could the Ark Royal have sunk the Bismark, by itself, on the open ocean, given the equipment it had on board at the time of the historical engagement?


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## parsifal (Sep 19, 2010)

short answer is no, the torpedoes carried by the swordfish were not strong enough to penetrate the main belt and underwater protection of the BB.

However Bismarck after that one "lucky" hit was immobilised and needed a dockyard to effect repairs. She needed to be towed to get there ("lucky" because that was the exact aiming point for the swordfish crews....they hit what they were aiming for, so calling it a "lucky" hit sort of dimishes their achievement). 

If the British had allocated two oir three carriers to keep watch on the Bismarck, sinkiung anything that tried to rescue her, the Bismarck would have been forced to either scuttle, or surrender.

In 1945, the Americans used over 200 aircraft to disable and sink the Yamato....so I guess in theory it might be possible for British torpedoes to do the same to Bismarck.


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## pinsog (Sep 19, 2010)

I never thought about "Laying siege" to Bismark once she was crippled. I guess you could have put a few subs out there instead of carriers and done the same thing. If I understood correctly, didn't the Swordfish torpedoes penetrate the armor, just not very well? Could they have set them to run deeper where they would hit at or near the bottom of the ship where armor was the thinnest?


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## parsifal (Sep 19, 2010)

pinsog said:


> I never thought about "Laying siege" to Bismark once she was crippled. I guess you could have put a few subs out there instead of carriers and done the same thing. If I understood correctly, didn't the Swordfish torpedoes penetrate the armor, just not very well? Could they have set them to run deeper where they would hit at or near the bottom of the ship where armor was the thinnest?






Im not an expert on Bismarcks armouring scheme, but it was very good. I know that tordedoes did hit her midships section, and did next to no damage. Bismarcks weak point in her armouring, in common with most capital ships, was near the shafts and rudders, Here ther is insufficient hull bulk to have anything but the most rudimentary protection around some of the most vital parts of the ship,,,,,the rudders and the screws. As it turned out the British torpedoes hit the rudder(or perhaps just forward of it, I'm not sure), and either forced the rudder over to a wheel over position, or kept it ther as a result of German manouvering. The Germans tried desperate measures to restore steeerage, to no avail. Given what is believed to have happened to the rudders, it would have taken a dockyard to repair the damage.

Sub torpedoes are much bigger and heavier than the relatively lightweight airborne types, but I doubt if even they could have penetrated the great ships main belt. She was one tough ship....no doubt about it.


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## RCAFson (Sep 19, 2010)

Here is a cross section of the armour and underwater protection of Tirpitz and HMS KGV:






Ships don't use armour, per se, to defend against torpedoes, but a system of layered compartments that allow the torpedo explosion to dissipate before it can force a hole into the vitals of the ship. Bismarck's system was reasonably effective against aerial torpedoes but repeated hits in the same areas would eventually overwhelm the underwater defence system, leading to flooding of the machinery spaces of the ship, thus sinking her.


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## fastmongrel (Sep 19, 2010)

If Ark Royal had carried on launching strikes and the Swordfish had kept aiming at the vulnerable stern, surely eventually there would have been sufficent hits to knock out the propellors. Then you have Bismark dead in the water and the RN could have done with her what they wanted.


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## Kryten (Sep 19, 2010)

Read an enginnering analysis of the Bismark design a few years ago, apparently its biggest weakness against torpedo attack was in the counter flooding ability to prevent listing, the wide beam of the hull made any counter flooding very difficult to manage and was critical to the ships mobility once damaged!

I cannot however provide a counter argument to this perhaps someone else has a bit more knowledge of the subject?


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## parsifal (Sep 19, 2010)

fastmongrel said:


> If Ark Royal had carried on launching strikes and the Swordfish had kept aiming at the vulnerable stern, surely eventually there would have been sufficent hits to knock out the propellors. Then you have Bismark dead in the water and the RN could have done with her what they wanted.



I would argue thats what happened historically anyway. The question was howeverm, if Ark Royal, withy just 32 Swordfish embarked, had the firepower to kill the great ship by herself....


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 19, 2010)

parsifal said:


> I would argue thats what happened historically anyway. The question was howeverm, if Ark Royal, withy just 32 Swordfish embarked, had the firepower to kill the great ship by herself....



I think eventually it would have been able to as well. You keep it hitting it over and over eventually she is going to crack. To me the real question is if the Germans could have gotten more vessels out to the Bismark in time to save her before the Ark Royal had the chance to do such a thing.


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## parsifal (Sep 19, 2010)

In a sense, if the Bismarckhad survived, she might have proven a big liability anyway. Say she had hung aound for a week, until somehow the germans had been able to tow her back to a French Port. That port would have to be St Nazaire, incidentally as it possessed the only drydock in France capable of supporting the great ships tremendous weioght and beam. In that week, one could expect the Ark Royal (and her relief carriers) to have thrown everything thay has at the ship. Bismarck would have been hit by multiple hits, and suffered a great deal of non-lethal damage. Fixing that damage would probably have taken many months, if not years to repair. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau each suffereed far less damage by bombs mostly, and spent many months repairing at Brest, and all the while were subjected to heavy air attack. If bismarck was there as well, she would have been subjected to even greater sustained attack. I can see her repasir being so delayed as to reduce her to historic interest only. 

Battleships were obsolete by 1941, though no-one had quite realized that at the time of the Bismarcks demise


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 19, 2010)

parsifal said:


> In a sense, if the Bismarckhad survived, she might have proven a big liability anyway. Say she had hung aound for a week, until somehow the germans had been able to tow her back to a French Port. That port would have to be St Nazaire, incidentally as it possessed the only drydock in France capable of supporting the great ships tremendous weioght and beam. In that week, one could expect the Ark Royal (and her relief carriers) to have thrown everything thay has at the ship. Bismarck would have been hit by multiple hits, and suffered a great deal of non-lethal damage. Fixing that damage would probably have taken many months, if not years to repair. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau each suffereed far less damage by bombs mostly, and spent many months repairing at Brest, and all the while were subjected to heavy air attack. If bismarck was there as well, she would have been subjected to even greater sustained attack. I can see her repasir being so delayed as to reduce her to historic interest only.
> 
> Battleships were obsolete by 1941, though no-one had quite realized that at the time of the Bismarcks demise



I can see the same thing happening.


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## delcyros (Sep 19, 2010)

in within the scope of circumstances, I dare to say possible- but unlikely. The TDS was adaequate against aerial torpedoes hitting the sides. Sinking may be possible by bypassing the TDS (repeated hits in the same compartement or hitting below the keel). the former requires extreme luck and at least 8 compartements flooded this way, the latter required magnetic pistols. ARK ROYAL had them but they didn't work properly ( luckily SHEFFIELD was attacked and hit so that the pistols could be replaced by contact ones) and in top of this BISMARCK was equipped with MES and thus save from this type of attack.


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## Nikademus (Sep 19, 2010)

pinsog said:


> Could the Ark Royal have sunk the Bismark, by itself, on the open ocean, given the equipment it had on board at the time of the historical engagement?



Yes, but the chances were less than one would expect. Firstly the # of bombers was small making it more difficult. Generally it takes a large swarm of aircraft to sink heavy armored and armed warships. Yamato is an extreme example being the biggest and most heavily armored BB of her kin, but was attacked by something like 300+ aircraft on her last sortie, all modern types. The torpedoes were bigger and armed with TORPEX warheads, and the USN had learned from experiences with her sister Musashi to focus on attacking one side of the battleship to promote capszation. So pitting one carrier vs a battleship is a chance affair in general. Mass is a key component to overwhelm a ship. The + side of course is that even en-masse, aircraft are cheaper and less costly a proposition vs. another battleship, and thats what doomed the type.

Ark Royal's Swordfish faced poor sea conditions, had reletively modest torpedo payloads and which apparantly were set too shallow allowing Bismarck's armor belt to come into play. Bismarck's TDS (torpedo Defense System) was reletively unsophisticated. Enough torpedoes hitting below the armor belt, or (as historically occured) a hit in a critical spot such as rudders and props can bring even the most powerful warship to a halt.


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## tail end charlie (Sep 19, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> The + side of course is that even en-masse, aircraft are cheaper and less costly a proposition vs. another battleship, and thats what doomed the type.



Another point is that all large battleships were invested with huge national pride losing the Hood or the Bismark affected national pride apart from the huge loss of life. The Bismark had a compliment of 2200, so I suppose keeping the Tirpitz on the edge of going to sea but not actually doing it tied down 2200 trained sailors.

Come to think of it how long could the Bismark stay at sea before it ran out of food?


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## Markus (Sep 19, 2010)

Why not? She was a sitting duck after the first airstrike and could not go anywhere but round in circles. I guess that would have made hits much more likely had Ark Royal attacked again. Then its just a matter of time until the cumulative damage sinks her. Yes, the warheads were not as powerful as 1945 US warheads but I guess BM was not as well protected as Yamato either. 388 lbs. (176 kg) TNT times a dozen, all on one side?


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## timshatz (Sep 19, 2010)

Can the Bismark catch the Ark Royal? Seems the Carrier can always outrun the BB. As such, it becomes less of a question can the BB sink the CV but can the BB absorb the CV's attacks and still run down the CV? I'm inclined to say not. Even if the CV doesn't score a kill shot on the BB, the cumlative affect of the torpedoes/bombs will be enough to at least slow the BB down. And that gives the CV a larger envelope of action versus the BB. 

The Ark Royal may not be able to sink the Bismark, but the affect of the attacks would make the Bismark unable to catch the CV. If, and this is a big if, the BB can even find the CV. The Atlantic is a big place an all the Ark Royal has to do to get away from the Bismark is change direction now and again. Meanwhile, the Ark Royal can park a Swordfish over the Bismark whenever it needs to track it. 

My money is on the Ark Royal in a longish fight. Most likely, the BB never even gets a glimpse of the CV.


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## pinsog (Sep 19, 2010)

AND, no one has really even mentioned the Fulmars dropping 500lb bombs on her also. While definately not BB killers, they would sure tear up the upper works, anti aircraft guns, radar and radio antenna, started fires and killed people. If you managed to destroy all or most of the anti aircraft guns, Swordfish could have pushed their torpedo drops to within a few hundred yards. Can't miss range against a non manuevering target.


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## Markus (Sep 19, 2010)

I´m fairly sure 1941 Fulmars did not carry bombs. A shame, 500 pounders would have made the Fulmar quite useful.


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## RCAFson (Sep 20, 2010)

Markus said:


> I´m fairly sure 1941 Fulmars did not carry bombs. A shame, 500 pounders would have made the Fulmar quite useful.



However the Swordfish was stressed for dive bombing. 

I've read that the Fulmar could carry 2 x 250lb bombs, or a single 500lb bomb on the centre line.


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## parsifal (Sep 20, 2010)

Fulmar mkIIs could do that, AND were equipped with ASV radar. However they were introduced after May 1941


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## delcyros (Sep 20, 2010)

500 lbs GP bombs are unable to defeat main secondary gun positions, or even the armoured weatherdeck. they may hit the superstructures and wreac havoc except where armoured (CT's). 
while traditional, her TDS was effective. much more than many newer, more sophisticated TDS were in action (WASHINGTON's, LITTORIO's, POW's YAMATO 's failed when tested in service). Had BM blundered into AR then the result would have been one carrier sunk. any direct engagement with capitalships killed the carrier (GLORIOUS GAMBIER BAY respectively).


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## Nikademus (Sep 20, 2010)

delcyros said:


> 500 lbs GP bombs are unable to defeat main secondary gun positions, or even the armoured weatherdeck. they may hit the superstructures and wreac havoc except where armoured (CT's).
> while traditional, her TDS was effective. much more than many newer, more sophisticated TDS were in action (WASHINGTON's, LITTORIO's, POW's YAMATO 's failed when tested in service). Had BM blundered into AR then the result would have been one carrier sunk. any direct engagement with capitalships killed the carrier (GLORIOUS GAMBIER BAY respectively).



I don't think one can say that Bismarck's TDS was "more effective" than the other TDS systems mentioned given that it was never seriously tested. The only torpedoes that struck Bismarck prior to her crippling hit in the stern ran too shallow and struck the armor belt near amidships greatly decreasing the blast effect. The stern hit, while a vulnerable place for any warship was particularily so for the class.

Yamato, as mentioned faced far more powerful ordinance (TORPEX has twice the explosive power of the traditional TNT based torpedoes + the warheads were larger) and the torpedoes were set at the proper depth hitting under the armor belt. Under such conditions, Yamato still held up very well. Musashi in particular absorbed more torpedoes than any other battleship and remained afloat for hours thx to superb damage control. A Bismarck class would have surcombed from far less IMO.

Littorio's system actually worked as designed, it might be noted too that her steering gear and props had superior redunancy and spacing built into the design vs. Bismarck's. A disabling hit in VV's stern was repaired at sea (granted, sea conditions were lesser) and the ship resumed under her own power to base.

Prince of Wales TDS was well designed if basic but the spacing proved to be inadequate to contain the blast from a theoretical 1000llb charge. However, like Bismarck, what doomed her was a torpedo hit beyond her TDS system that damaged a prop and caused a runaway situation which loosened stuffing glands all the way back to one of her primary engine rooms causing extensive flooding. Poor damage control exaserbated the flooding as many WT hatches were left open.

Washington was not struck by torpedoes but her sister North Carolina was. This torpedo hit occured abreast turret #1 where the TDS was constrained by the narrowing hull shape and could not obtain full effectiveness. The Japanese torpedo was also far more powerful than the ones that struck Bismarck. Still, NC showed great resiliancey in being able to steam at speed out of the battlefield, her only major damages being her search radar. It was recommended that her #1 turret not fire under any circumstances save a dire emergency lest it weaken the bulkheads further.


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## Kurfürst (Sep 20, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> TORPEX has twice the explosive power of the traditional TNT based torpedoes



How come...?

Torpex was iirc a mixture of 50% TNT and 50% Hexogene or RDX if you like. And though I don't have my terrorist bookie handy, which has the specs, I don't recall RDX in its pure form would be twice as powerful (not to mention there are different criteria to measure the "useful work" of HE) as TNT; a fifty-fifty has even less chance for that. It wasn't a wonder mixture, plus many torps in the war had some kind of mixture with some more-potent-than-TNT rather than pure TNT filling.


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## tail end charlie (Sep 20, 2010)

from wikepedia


"Torpex is a secondary explosive 50% more powerful than TNT by mass[1]. Torpex is composed of 42% RDX, 40% TNT and 18% powdered aluminium. It was used in the Second World War from late 1942. The name is short for 'Torpedo Explosive', having been originally developed for use in torpedoes. Torpex proved to be particularly useful in underwater munitions because the aluminium component had the effect of making the explosive pulse last longer, which enhanced the destructive power. Torpex was used only in critical applications, e.g. torpedoes and the Upkeep, Tallboy and Grand Slam bombs. It was also used in the Operation Aphrodite drones. Torpex has long been superseded by H6 and PBX compositions. It is therefore regarded as obsolete, so Torpex is unlikely to be encountered except in the form of legacy munitions or unexploded ordnance."

I know nothing about explosives but I would expect an explosive specifically designed for torpedos would be more effective than others at the time.


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## Nikademus (Sep 20, 2010)

Kurfürst said:


> How come...?
> 
> Torpex was iirc a mixture of 50% TNT and 50% Hexogene or RDX if you like. And though I don't have my terrorist bookie handy, which has the specs, I don't recall RDX in its pure form would be twice as powerful (not to mention there are different criteria to measure the "useful work" of HE) as TNT; a fifty-fifty has even less chance for that. It wasn't a wonder mixture, plus many torps in the war had some kind of mixture with some more-potent-than-TNT rather than pure TNT filling.



My mistake, I should have said 50% more powerful. A couple sources in my ownership label Torpex twice as powerful but Clay Blair's "Hitler's Uboat-War" and the online navweapons website clarify it specifically as "50% more powerful" than TNT.


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## Bernhart (Sep 20, 2010)

so none of the aircraft available had bombs?


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## RCAFson (Sep 20, 2010)

Bernhart said:


> so none of the aircraft available had bombs?



The Swordfish could carry up to a 1500lb bomb load including at least two 500lb bombs, and as I mentioned was fully stressed for dive bombing.


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## pinsog (Sep 20, 2010)

Was ithe Swordfish any good at divebombing? I had never heard of it being used in that manner.


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## RCAFson (Sep 21, 2010)

pinsog said:


> Was ithe Swordfish any good at divebombing? I had never heard of it being used in that manner.



It was used as a bomber on many occasions, but I don't have specifics. At Taranto 10 of the 21 Swordfish were armed with bombs:
Fairey Swordfish aircraft profile. Aircraft Database of the Fleet Air Arm Archive 1939-1945
However, against most naval targets the weapon of choice would have been the very efficient and reliable 18in torpedo.


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## timshatz (Sep 21, 2010)

Anybody know if the Ark Royal had surface search radar in 1941? If yes, anybody have a clue as to how effective it was?

I'm thinking if the Ark Royal gets the Bismark on it's radar as 25K yards, it can turn around and run for it before the Bismark can get an effective shot in. But it would be close. Wiki says they both have the same top speed.


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## tail end charlie (Sep 21, 2010)

RCAFson said:


> It was used as a bomber on many occasions, but I don't have specifics. At Taranto 10 of the 21 Swordfish were armed with bombs:
> Fairey Swordfish aircraft profile. Aircraft Database of the Fleet Air Arm Archive 1939-1945
> However, against most naval targets the weapon of choice would have been the very efficient and reliable 18in torpedo.



One reason the torpedo attacks on the Bismark were successful is that the Swordfish could fly beneath the level of the the guns. I think trying to dive bomb the Bismark in a swordfish would be suicide. The Yamamoto AA defences were overwhelmed when it was attacked, you cant do that with about 30 biplanes.


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## Nikademus (Sep 21, 2010)

pinsog said:


> Was ithe Swordfish any good at divebombing? I had never heard of it being used in that manner.



On August 13, 1940 a Swordfish on ASW patrol caught the U-64 at anchor in Herjangs Fjord, Norway. The plane "dived" at the uboat and sank it with 2 100lb ASW bombs. [Blair - Hitler's Uboat war vol 1]

This is described by some websites as the first FAA "dive bombing" attack of the war but i don't feel this should be taken too litterally. Blair, among other authors in ASW actions often describe the decent phase of an aircraft that is attacking a sub on the surface as "diving" down onto the target in order to build up speed. This includes level bombers, even the big B-24's used on ASW duty. Most likely the Swordfish executed what would technically be called a "glide bombing" attack which is much shallower than the angles used by dedicated DB's like the Stuka, D3A or SBD. (65 - 80 degrees etc.....a GB attack would be more along the lines of 30-45 degrees)

A glide bombing attack is easier to execute and puts less strain on an airframe. It's not as accurate nor will the bomb get as much momentum for purposes of armor piercing.


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## parsifal (Sep 21, 2010)

tail end charlie said:


> One reason the torpedo attacks on the Bismark were successful is that the Swordfish could fly beneath the level of the the guns. I think trying to dive bomb the Bismark in a swordfish would be suicide. The Yamamoto AA defences were overwhelmed when it was attacked, you cant do that with about 30 biplanes.




Some of the attacking Swordfish operated as divebombers at taranto. They did not suffer very heavy losses. in fact it was the torpedo carriers that took all the losses in that battle IIRC. 


Swordfish were remarkably resistant to AA fire, despite their obviously obsolete technology.


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## parsifal (Sep 21, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> On August 13, 1940 a Swordfish on ASW patrol caught the U-64 at anchor in Herjangs Fjord, Norway. The plane "dived" at the uboat and sank it with 2 100lb ASW bombs. [Blair - Hitler's Uboat war vol 1]
> 
> This is described by some websites as the first FAA "dive bombing" attack of the war but i don't feel this should be taken too litterally. Blair, among other authors in ASW actions often describe the decent phase of an aircraft that is attacking a sub on the surface as "diving" down onto the target in order to build up speed. This includes level bombers, even the big B-24's used on ASW duty. Most likely the Swordfish executed what would technically be called a "glide bombing" attack which is much shallower than the angles used by dedicated DB's like the Stuka, D3A or SBD. (65 - 80 degrees etc.....a GB attack would be more along the lines of 30-45 degrees)
> 
> A glide bombing attack is easier to execute and puts less strain on an airframe. It's not as accurate nor will the bomb get as much momentum for purposes of armor piercing.



Divebombing, in part, is accurate because of the slow speed of the attacking aircraft. This gives more time to aim, and control the attack run better.

The steepness of the dive reduces the margins for error, but requires aircraft that are exceptionally strong to withstand the stresses of pulling out of the dive. 

The swordfish as an airframe was strong....veryu strong. Thi9s is what enabled them to operate in conditions that grounded most other aircraft, and made them the mount of choice in the higher altitudes, such as where the arctic convoys were operated.

So I would argue that that the swordfish was capable of what might be termed 'near" dive bombing attacks. They were no stuka, but they were something better than say a B-25 glide bombing.

I have seen photos of swordfish in dive angles of 50-70 degrees, which is at least comparable fighter Bomber dives.....,


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## Nikademus (Sep 21, 2010)

parsifal said:


> Divebombing, in part, is accurate because of the slow speed of the attacking aircraft. This gives more time to aim, and control the attack run better.
> 
> The steepness of the dive reduces the margins for error, but requires aircraft that are exceptionally strong to withstand the stresses of pulling out of the dive.



Yes, but another important component in a DB attack is momentum. Go too slow and the bomb will not have enough momentum to effect adequate penetration for the bomb type being used. Go too slow, and/or too shallow and you greatly increase vulnerability to AA defenses. Another important component is training. Training is critical when conducting a steep DB attack, more so against a moving target. If you don't have it, and practice it, it'll be a difficult maneuver to pull off, as was the case with the VMSB squadron at Midway flying SB2U's. Due to inexperience they conducted a GB attack vs a traditional full on DB attack.




> The swordfish as an airframe was strong....veryu strong. Thi9s is what enabled them to operate in conditions that grounded most other aircraft, and made them the mount of choice in the higher altitudes, such as where the arctic convoys were operated.
> 
> So I would argue that that the swordfish was capable of what might be termed 'near" dive bombing attacks. They were no stuka, but they were something better than say a B-25 glide bombing.
> 
> I have seen photos of swordfish in dive angles of 50-70 degrees, which is at least comparable fighter Bomber dives.....,



Your probably correct, but I don't personally feel it's practical hence the dearth of definitive examples vs targets at sea. The SW's slow max speed and biplane nature would make it at best an indifferent DB. The 500lb bombs discussed would not be a serious threat to a battleship like Bismarck....certainly not worth the risk. A torepedo, even a weak one is far greater threat and typical Anti ship sorties by SW equipped planes usually used torps. I would also question how many of the SW pilots have full on DB training and/or practice it regularily....hence it was mainly used in it's primary role...a TB and ASW platform, but in the later case it's actions were not typically described as full on "Dive bombing" attacks but standard ASW attacks same as with LB's


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## Markus (Sep 21, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> Yes, but another important component in a DB attack is momentum. Go too slow and the bomb will not have enough momentum to effect adequate penetration for the bomb type being used. Go too slow, and/or too shallow and you greatly increase vulnerability to AA defenses. Another important component is training. Training is critical when conducting a steep DB attack, more so against a moving target. If you don't have it, and practice it, it'll be a difficult maneuver to pull off, as was the case with the VMSB squadron at Midway flying SB2U's. Due to inexperience they conducted a GB attack vs a traditional full on DB attack.



A small nitpick. The sqn. flying SB2U was fully trained and did a dive bombing attack but the Vindicator could not dive as steeply as an SBD. The SBD sqn. was composed of pilots with next to no hours on the SBD and zero dive bombing training.

By the way, even the USN did not regard dive bombers as capital ship killers. Their job was to suppress the triple-A, so the torpedo bombers would have a better chance.


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## Nikademus (Sep 21, 2010)

Markus said:


> A small nitpick. The sqn. flying SB2U was fully trained and did a dive bombing attack but the Vindicator could not dive as steeply as an SBD. The SBD sqn. was composed of pilots with next to no hours on the SBD and zero dive bombing training.
> 
> By the way, even the USN did not regard dive bombers as capital ship killers. Their job was to suppress the triple-A, so the torpedo bombers would have a better chance.



According to Lundstrom's book and Parshall and Tully's Shattered Sword, the Marine pilots flying the SB2U's were also green causing them to conduct the shallower Glide bombing attack.

Yes, USN doctrine of the time considered the torpedo to be the heavy Anti-ship weapon of the carrier. Early on in the war only Enterprise even carried any dedicated AP bombs for the SBD's and only a limited #. These were in actuallity converted 14inch AP shells. Only later in the war was a dedicated AP 1000lb bomb (Mk-33) deployed to the carriers.


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## tail end charlie (Sep 21, 2010)

parsifal said:


> Some of the attacking Swordfish operated as divebombers at taranto. They did not suffer very heavy losses. in fact it was the torpedo carriers that took all the losses in that battle IIRC.
> 
> 
> Swordfish were remarkably resistant to AA fire, despite their obviously obsolete technology.



I think the Taranto raid was done in the dark with flares, not really an option in the middle of the atlantic. In the raid they made the deck was pitching 50ft up and down, hardly conditions for a night landing. I am sure a raid could have been launched to drop bombs but the losses compared to possible success probably wouldnt be worth it.


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## Markus (Sep 21, 2010)

Right, the Vindicators were also from VMSB-241. I did not find much in either book but they would not have given skilled pilots the "wind indicators" and rookies the good planes. 

By the way, what kind of bombs were the 1,000lb bombs used at Midway? SAP or GP?


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## Nikademus (Sep 21, 2010)

Judging by the overall land component battle, I don't think most if not all of them were particularily experienced (Including the fighter defense of Midway).

The SBD's slepped around GP mostly.


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## delcyros (Sep 21, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> I don't think one can say that Bismarck's TDS was "more effective" than the other TDS systems mentioned given that it was never seriously tested. The only torpedoes that struck Bismarck prior to her crippling hit in the stern ran too shallow and struck the armor belt near amidships greatly decreasing the blast effect. The stern hit, while a vulnerable place for any warship was particularily so for the class.



I seriously differ Your opinion. Why? First of all, BISMARCK TDS was seriously tested AND not defeated. It was tested by three torpedohits before the final battle, not two as You say (this is incorrect). One hit by VICTORIOUS airgroup hit the belt and was to shallow (no effect), two from ARK ROYALs airgroup also hit her. One on her stern as mentioned above and the other midships starboard in a proper depth well below the belt. The hit striked the TDS and it worked properly, thus no flooding inboards of the TDS mentioned (for some reasons I can´t explain, Bill Jurens is in possession of the ships flooding controll log, which was rescued by the ships damage engeneerer, handed over to the british. It will be published in Warships International)
Thus BISMARCK´s TDS defeated 18in aerial dropped torpedoes in action.
BUT, BISMARCK was also subject to torpedohits in her final battle. These were standart 21in ones from the cruisers, not the light aerial ones. Again no inwards flooding was caused by them and CAMERON´s diagnoses of the wreckage identified two of these impacts. Submergible remotely controlled drones filmed the adjacent spaces behind and while damage occured to the void and liquid cells, the strengthened bulkhead behind remained intact, thus wreckage analysis could verify survivors testimony in this case.
BISMARCK´s TDS also defeated 21in surface torpedoes. 
Whether or not RODNEY hit her with a 23/4in torpedo could not be verified.
Her TDS was good but the whole system was good as well. A very large portion of the ships dwl was protected by the TDS and the ship had excellent compartimentation and the highest metacentric stability of all BB´s of ww2. That helps dealing with flooding.



> Yamato, as mentioned faced far more powerful ordinance (TORPEX has twice the explosive power of the traditional TNT based torpedoes + the warheads were larger) and the torpedoes were set at the proper depth hitting under the armor belt. Under such conditions, Yamato still held up very well. Musashi in particular absorbed more torpedoes than any other battleship and remained afloat for hours thx to superb damage control. A Bismarck class would have surcombed from far less IMO.



YAMATO´s TDS failed when hit by 21in US non-TORPEX submarine torpedoes in 1943. And the system evidently failed at the joint between the face hardened and homogenious plates (this is a zone of weakness also for SOUTH DAKOTA and IOWA-classes). It also failed when hit by TORPEX augmented, but rather small aerial dropped torpedoes in 1945, there is no indication that it´s TDS defeated a single torpedo in the final battle. That she held up so well was in part caused by the sheer size of the hul (she was doomed to sink from less impacts anyway)l. MUSASHI did not suffered that many torpedoes as usually given credit for. Japanese survivors have been interrogated, the file can be found in the documents put forward by the US technical mission to Japan. I don´t remember the correct number (less than 10) but a case could be made that SCHARNHORST in 1943 at NORTH CAPE was subject to numerically more more powerful torpedoes (all of them were TORPEX augmented DD surface torpedoes) than was MUSASHI in 1944. MUSASHI´s damage controll was poor, she stayed afloat for some time because the damage of the one side partly levelled off the flooding she received from the other side. It was not superior damage controll but inferior tactics which helped the ship to stay afloat for hours. Her counterflooding abilities were considered inferior to deal with the situation.
Could a BISMARCK take this damage? Certainly not but in all cases mentioned (SCHARNHORST, YAMATO, MUSASHI) the ships would have sunk from fewer hit´s as well. BISMARCK has more protected space (as a part of total hullspace), better general damage controll facilities, more stability and thus more flooding tolerances. But it´s not a ship without weaknesses. It´s not a bad system as a whole. And the decision to revert to vertical strengthened bulkheads (after PBB´s and SCHARNHORST-classes inlcined ones) was a good one.



> Littorio's system actually worked as designed, it might be noted too that her steering gear and props had superior redunancy and spacing built into the design vs. Bismarck's. A disabling hit in VV's stern was repaired at sea (granted, sea conditions were lesser) and the ship resumed under her own power to base.


LITTORIO would not take torpedoes very well. At first because the TDS failed in basically every instance, whenever tested and because LITTORIO´s had the for BB worst metacentric stability. It doesn´t help You when hit and heavily compromises any counterflooding attempts.



> Prince of Wales TDS was well designed if basic but the spacing proved to be inadequate to contain the blast from a theoretical 1000llb charge. However, like Bismarck, what doomed her was a torpedo hit beyond her TDS system that damaged a prop and caused a runaway situation which loosened stuffing glands all the way back to one of her primary engine rooms causing extensive flooding. Poor damage control exaserbated the flooding as many WT hatches were left open.



The KGV class´s TDS suffered from a design defect. The TDS itselve is not poor, rather contrary, I rate it good. The problem lies in the gap between armour deck and TDS, there is one full deck level in height uncovered by the TDS and venting always occurs when hit by a torpedo. Thus a powerful enough torpedo could in theory bypass the TDS without defeating the strengthend bulkhead by flooding inboards via this gap and compromising watertightness by venting effects. Again, the whole class has a low metacentric stability, which doesn´t add any good at all.



> Washington was not struck by torpedoes but her sister North Carolina was. This torpedo hit occured abreast turret #1 where the TDS was constrained by the narrowing hull shape and could not obtain full effectiveness. The Japanese torpedo was also far more powerful than the ones that struck Bismarck. Still, NC showed great resiliancey in being able to steam at speed out of the battlefield, her only major damages being her search radar. It was recommended that her #1 turret not fire under any circumstances save a dire emergency lest it weaken the bulkheads further.



It is even more terrible that the TDS failed there. While the explenation is correct, having an inbuildt weakness around the main magazines is simply not acceptable. The TDS is way to narrow where hit. The inclined bulkhead layout also are kind of questionable to me. They gave away in to many cases when tested. 

RICHELIEU has a very promising TDS, it also narrows down (much more than BISMARCK but not as worse as NC) to the bow but this is counterbalanced by the gradually thicker strengthened bulkhead. The ship also has good metaceentric stability. A good layout. The problem I see in the whole system is that only 8 out of 18 compartements are protected by the TDS, so in theory You may end up sinking the ship without needing to defeat the ship´s TDS in the first place...


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## Juha (Sep 21, 2010)

Delcyros
sorry to say, also the twins' (Scharnhorst and Gneisenau) TDS suffered a design defect, look what happened on 8 June 40 when Scharnhorst got one torpedo hit from Acasta, 2500tons water in, C-turret inoperative 48 KIA.

Juha


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## delcyros (Sep 21, 2010)

Juha said:


> Delcyros
> sorry to say, also the twins' (Scharnhorst and Gneisenau) TDS suffered a design defect, look what happened on 8 June 40 when Scharnhorst got one torpedo hit from Acasta, 2500tons water in, C-turret inoperative 48 KIA.
> 
> Juha



That´s correct. The strengthened bulkhead worked as designed and flexed but the inclination of it caused pressure distribution problems and the joint failed. Similar failures are reported from very many inclined bulkhead layouts. Following cassion tests in 1935, the BISMARCK class reverted to the conventional but effective vertical bulkhead layout after the experimentation in the DEUTSCHLAND class PBB´s and the twins. The inclined layout is way better against projectiles but worse when overpressure bubbles are formed.
The BM-class does not share this design defect with the twins.


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## Juha (Sep 21, 2010)

Delcyros
I agree, it is also my understanding that the main reason of the failure of the TDS of Scharhorst on that day was that the main torpedo bulkhead was inclined. Also the lines of twins were rather fine because of the demands of high speed and so near ends of TDS its depth was a bit smaller than what the designers would have put in beamier ship. In BM-class the greater beam allowed vertical bulkhead with adequate depth of TDS.

Juha


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## Nikademus (Sep 21, 2010)

delcyros said:


> I seriously differ Your opinion. Why? First of all, BISMARCK TDS was seriously tested AND not defeated. It was tested by three torpedohits before the final battle, not two as You say (this is incorrect).



Hi,

Designers can't deploy a fully effective TDS either at the stern or bow of a warship as the hull is simply too narrow to provide the same level of protection as it can amidships. I would be doing the Bismarck class a dis-service if i were to use the stern torpedo hit as an example of a "failed" TDS. It is not remiss however to point out that Bismarck's rudder and propulsion setup in the stern was a point of weakness in the design. Hence up to the point of Bismarck's crippling, she had only taken two torpedo hits in the area protected by her TDS. It was also a fair and valid point to refer to a similar situation that impacted the Littorio class, a situation in which the Italian ship proved better able to handle such a hit.



> One hit by VICTORIOUS airgroup hit the belt and was to shallow (no effect), two from ARK ROYALs airgroup also hit her. One on her stern as mentioned above and the other midships starboard in a proper depth well below the belt. The hit striked the TDS and it worked properly, thus no flooding inboards of the TDS mentioned (for some reasons I can´t explain, Bill Jurens is in possession of the ships flooding controll log, which was rescued by the ships damage engeneerer, handed over to the british. It will be published in Warships International)
> Thus BISMARCK´s TDS defeated 18in aerial dropped torpedoes in action.



According to research by William Garzke, the 2nd torpedo hit did result in tearing damage to the torpedo bulkhead's welding seams resulting in minor progressive flooding beyond it. Based on what appears to be your definition of "success" for a TDS, this would represent a "failure". Overall though i agree, the TDS did perform adequately up to this point. I did not comment on the subsequent torpedo salvoes at Bismarck because they occured after the action vs. KGV and Rodney at that point they were firing at a wrecked hulk, already severely damaged. Still, Garzke and Dunn consider the damage caused by these hits to have been substantial in the sinking of the ship.



> BUT, BISMARCK was also subject to torpedohits in her final battle. These were standart 21in ones from the cruisers, not the light aerial ones. Again no inwards flooding was caused by them and CAMERON´s diagnoses of the wreckage identified two of these impacts. Submergible remotely controlled drones filmed the adjacent spaces behind and while damage occured to the void and liquid cells, the strengthened bulkhead behind remained intact, thus wreckage analysis could verify survivors testimony in this case.
> BISMARCK´s TDS also defeated 21in surface torpedoes.



This has not been conclusively determined. "Cameron" is not a naval design expert nor was he able to full examine all of Bismarck's damage. The Wikipedia article I assume your drawing this from cites Cameron's opinion based on the images he was able to view makes for good fodder to reintroduce the theory that Bismarck's citadel was impenetrable but is ultimately unconvincing. In contradiction to this Gazarke's analysis, taking into account these recent expeditions, actually suggests that Bismarck was more vulnerable to torpedoes than shellfire.



> Her TDS was good but the whole system was good as well. A very large portion of the ships dwl was protected by the TDS and the ship had excellent compartimentation and the highest metacentric stability of all BB´s of ww2. That helps dealing with flooding.



Torpedo defensive "coverage" is fairly standard for post WW1 battleship class vessels. I agree Bismarck's compartmentalization was good and was similar in respect to that of the modern USN designs in that it precluded the use of a central longitude bulkhead separating port and starboard spaces greatly reducing the threat from capsizing.

I think you meant to say "Metacentric Height" (GM), not "metacentric stability". Your correct in that it was highest in Bismarck. This was not necessarily a good thing. The Germans favored a high GM to provide stability in the face of battle damage but some naval design authors like Garzke consider the GM of the class to have been too high resulting in over-stiffness which caused some unpleasant rolling characteristics and at worst, would impede her gunnery efficiency. Either way this has little to do with a discussion regarding the ship's TDS. GM concerns designers in regards to overall stability irregardless of the TDS specifics and is also equally of concern for creating a good gunnery platform. British designers were well aware of this and favored a lower GM in order to create a better gunnery platform.



> YAMATO´s TDS failed when hit by 21in US non-TORPEX submarine torpedoes in 1943. And the system evidently failed at the joint between the face hardened and homogenious plates (this is a zone of weakness also for SOUTH DAKOTA and IOWA-classes).



Yamato's TDS proved more vulnerable than the designers planned for due to a weakness in the joint between the primary belt armor and the torpedo bulkhead. However what you fail to mention is that the significance of this weakness is dependant on location of torpedo hits and will not factor greatly (or at all) in all situations. Your claim that every torpedo hit resulted in "TDS failure" is inaccurate and vague. I have detailed info on both ship's demise. I would be interested in seeing your data on these torpedo hits.
Further, the connection with SODAK and Iowa's TDS is not accurate because the designs were not identical to Yamato nor was the metallurgy issue the same. There was no 'weak joint' as was the case with Yamato. 

The two USN designs were constrained by the naval treaties in place at the time and the designers emphasis was on defeating 16 inch shells. Hence, the prior 5 layer elastic TDS defense of earlier 'Standard' type USN BB's was dropped in favor of a more ballistically rigid defense scheme designed to counter diving heavy shells.

Caisson tests later revealed that this was not as ideal vs. torpedo hits vs the system used in North Carolina but partial compensation was effected by adjusting the liquid load/void arrangement of the TDS. In the case of SoDak, torpedo damage would remain a concern as being a 35k treaty battleship of cramped design (to counter 16 inch gunfire on a fixed displacement), she was more vulnerable. Iowa was less vulnerable given her increased displacement and less cramped design as North Carolina. To reitterate, North Carolina did not have the integrated inclined internal belt/TDS interior most bulkhead you are alluding too and criticizing. (Note as well that the internal torpedo bulkhead attached to the internal belt was only one of multiple bulkheads)



> It also failed when hit by TORPEX augmented, but rather small aerial dropped torpedoes in 1945, there is no indication that it´s TDS defeated a single torpedo in the final battle.
> That she held up so well was in part caused by the sheer size of the hul (she was doomed to sink from less impacts anyway)l. MUSASHI did not suffered that many torpedoes as usually given credit for. Japanese survivors have been interrogated, the file can be found in the documents put forward by the US technical mission to Japan. I don´t remember the correct number (less than 10)



I would love to see this evidence. In the meantime information I have suggests at least 11 torpedo hits + 10 bomb hits and 6 near misses, some of which caused flooding for Musashi. Yamato took 13 torpedo hits, 8 bomb hits and an unknown number of near misses. Citing the size of the hull alone is not justified based on the analysis i have read on both ship's demise. These were against torpedoes with a TNT equivalent of at least 900lbs. 

(continued)


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## Nikademus (Sep 21, 2010)

delcyros said:


> but a case could be made that SCHARNHORST in 1943 at NORTH CAPE was subject to numerically more more powerful torpedoes (all of them were TORPEX augmented DD surface torpedoes) than was MUSASHI in 1944. MUSASHI´s damage controll was poor, she stayed afloat for some time because the damage of the one side partly levelled off the flooding she received from the other side. It was not superior damage controll but inferior tactics which helped the ship to stay afloat for hours. Her counterflooding abilities were considered inferior to deal with the situation.



Please make the case.



> Could a BISMARCK take this damage? Certainly not but in all cases mentioned (SCHARNHORST, YAMATO, MUSASHI) the ships would have sunk from fewer hit´s as well. BISMARCK has more protected space (as a part of total hullspace), better general damage controll facilities, more stability and thus more flooding tolerances. But it´s not a ship without weaknesses. It´s not a bad system as a whole. And the decision to revert to vertical strengthened bulkheads (after PBB´s and SCHARNHORST-classes inlcined ones) was a good one.



I'm not sure i understand what you mean by "more protected space" Bismarck's armor scheme was based on an older incremental type armor scheme that covered more of the ship with areas of light and medium armor on the idea that small and medium caliber shell threats had to be accounted for as well as heavy shells. In the closer WWI and pre-WWI combat environments this was justified but as shell technology progressed it became increasingly difficult to protect the bulk of a ship from the heaviest shells due to weight constrictions. Worse, medium and light armor could exaserbate a situation vs. heavy BB shells because the armor is too thin to prevent penetration but is thick enough to initiate fuse action ensuring that the shell detonates inside the ship vs. passing through the hull. This factor was recently determined to have had substanial impact on the loss/disablement of the HIJMS Kirishima at Third Guadalcanal when facing the modern 16inch shells from USS Washington. Here the ship's older "Incremental armor design" led to multiple detonations of 16 ship shells aboard ship that in an All or Nothing scheme would have caused less damage because the shell would have passed through the unarmored sections without exploding. (As was the case with the bulk of the shellfire that struck South Dakota in that same action)

The solution to the challenge of bigger, more effective heavy BB shellfire, first deployed by the USN during the Dreadnought Era was the "All or Nothing" armor scheme designed to give maximum protection against BB primary armaments at the expanded ranges expected in WW1 and post WW1 combat. This scheme embraced the idea that only the most vital parts of a warship would be armored and those sections would receive the maximum thickness possible to protect against heavy shellfire. This meant that less vital areas (who's loss/flooding would not endanger the ship, usually outside the protected citidel) had no armor protection or at most splinter protection. Yamato (and all other modern BB designs, except in the case of Germany) embraced this weight saving technique in order to maximize protection against battleship heavy shells.

So to say Bismarck had "more protected hull space" doesn't mean all that much. I don't agree that Bismarck had superior damage control based on evidence I've seen and as for the "stability" issue, I'd wager that Bismarck would be a tough ship to sink outright vs gunfire as demonstrated (the converse being that in terms of disabling her, she proved quick to take out...part of the price she paid for having the older deck armor scheme that emphasised vertical protection at shorter gun ranges with the primary armor deck placed lower than in other WW2 BB's so that it's slopes could reinforce the armor belt)

Against torpedoes, as mentioned, Gazarke's work suggests the ship was vulnerable to torpedo damage. I seriously doubt the class could take as much torpedo damage as a Yamato given the warhead sizes she faced during her last battle. (equivalent to 900lb TNT)

If you want to talk most protected buoyancy/hull protection vs BB shellfire, you'll find that the KGV class had top marks in that regards.



> LITTORIO would not take torpedoes very well. At first because the TDS failed in basically every instance, whenever tested and because LITTORIO´s had the for BB worst metacentric stability. It doesn´t help You when hit and heavily compromises any counterflooding attempts.



I beg to differ on the failed every time instance though if you have some specific info on the subject I'd be interested in seeing it. You keep mentioning GM (Metacentric Height) in your analysis of side protection systems.....I respectfully suggest though that you read up on the subject of GM (Metacentric Height) before making any more of these assertions.



> The KGV class´s TDS suffered from a design defect. The TDS itself is not poor, rather contrary, I rate it good. The problem lies in the gap between armor deck and TDS, there is one full deck level in height uncovered by the TDS and venting always occurs when hit by a torpedo. Thus a powerful enough torpedo could in theory bypass the TDS without defeating the strengthend bulkhead by flooding inboards via this gap and compromising watertightness by venting effects. Again, the whole class has a low metacentric stability, which doesn´t add any good at all.



KGV's TDS had several design flaws which indicated that the theoretical 1000lb charge resistance was overrated. Battle experience did indicate that the protection system was not deep enough if the deck above the TDS was ruptured resulting in flooding in those less compartmentalized spaces. Yes, torpedo blasts always "Vent" but not always in any one direction or predictably. A variety of factors impact this. Various studies on PoW's action do not all agree or can fully determine exact damage in all cases. It would appear that the SPS functioned adequately in some cases, in others not. Further, cumulative damage from prior attacks also factored into the reduction of the SPS's effectiveness as did crew damage control mistakes. Irregardless, the crippling hit occurred beyond the SPS but in the stern section.



> It [NORTH CAROLINA] is even more terrible that the TDS failed there. While the explanation is correct, having an inbuildt weakness around the main magazines is simply not acceptable. The TDS is way to narrow where hit. The inclined bulkhead layout also are kind of questionable to me. They gave away in to many cases when tested.



I'm not sure what "inbuilt weakness" you are referring too. Unless you are designing a battleship like a modern supertanker, it is impossible to provide the same space requirements of a TDS system abreast the forward most turret vs. amidships. This is simple fact. Bismarck was no different here. I'm not sure what test cases you are referring too. The USN did perform Caisson tests on the SoDak and Iowa which had a different internal SPS but i'm not aware of such for North Carolina. Can you provide some details?

In fairness to your point, it is true that the torpedo hit revealed weaknesses in modern USN TDS systems. This was acknowledged by BeauOrd. However, it is also true that USN designers, unlike the KM designers were far more constrained in what they could do due to the Washington Naval Treaty limiting BB displacement to 35,000 tons Standard, the Germans were able to ignore displacement limits and greatly inflate the size of the Bismarck to accomidate their cumulative requirements. THe USN (and UK and French), Faced with such steep windfalls they had to balance balistic protection vs. torpedo protection and compromises and sophisticated approaches were attempted. Further, as documented in Garzke and Dunn's work "United States Battleships 1935-1992" with supporting material from Norman Friedman's "US Battleships", the torpedo hit suffered by the North Carolina occurred at the most vulnerable location of the TDS, where the hull constricted it's depth. Still further, the torpedo warhead was more than double the strength of the warheads used against Bismarck, equivalent to 960lbs of TNT. This was far in excess of the TNT load the class was designed to face at the optimal depth of it's TDS, and more than that designed into Bismarck. All in all BeauOrd was not unhappy with NC's performance in 42. The ship, despite heavy structural damage was able to continue steaming at high speed (for a short period) and remained combat viable with restrictions. This after absorbing a charge greater than the 700LB theoretical she was designed to absorb at her SPS's optimum point much less where the actual hit occured.




> RICHELIEU has a very promising TDS, it also narrows down (much more than BISMARCK but not as worse as NC) to the bow but this is counterbalanced by the gradually thicker strengthened bulkhead. The ship also has good metaceentric stability. A good layout. The problem I see in the whole system is that only 8 out of 18 compartements are protected by the TDS, so in theory You may end up sinking the ship without needing to defeat the ship´s TDS in the first place...



Richelieu arguably had the best designed TDS of all the WW2 BB designs. Again I'm not sure what you mean by "only 8 of 18 compartments" protected by the side protection system. The citadel (primary compartments...including magazine and propulsion spaces) were protected by the side protection system as in all other WW2 battleships. I think you are again confusing the nature of the "All or Nothing" protection scheme employed by all major naval powers post WW1 with the exception of Germany.


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## RCAFson (Sep 22, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> KGV's TDS had several design flaws which indicated that the theoretical 1000lb charge resistance was overrated.



From what I've read it seems that the KGV TDS was tested full scale with an actual 1000lb charge. The TDS worked as planned and prevented a breach of the inner bulkhead.


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## skeeter (Sep 22, 2010)

Just my two cents worth. Bismark was shipping water through a shell hit and was running down at the bows, but I do not know if it was from the Prince of Wales or the Hood. She had to reduce speed and in so doing, this aided in the effort to find her in time before she came within range of a defending umbrella of German aircraft. Didn't the Ark Royal embark Blackburn Skua dive bombers at the time? These could carry up to five hundred pound bombs. Would five hundred pounders have been able to penetrate her armored deck? I don't know about the torpedos of the time in question, but I do know that nowadays, they set them to go off under the hull, cracking it and breaking it effectively in two.


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## Nikademus (Sep 22, 2010)

RCAFson said:


> From what I've read it seems that the KGV TDS was tested full scale with an actual 1000lb charge. The TDS worked as planned and prevented a breach of the inner bulkhead.



Full details on _Job #74_, the pre-build testing of the KGV classes Side Protection System do not appear to be available according to naval designer/historian D.K. Brown but the gist of it was yes, this test series, using a scale mock appeared to indicate that the SPS would withstand up to a 1000lb charge of TNT "in theory." The scale mockup was 72ft long and 50ft deep with internal compartments fitted out to BB and CA standards of the time.

The first series of trials for #74 involved a sandwich system on one side and a modified d'Eyncourt bulge on the other. Overall beam was 100feet. Sandwhich was 20feet deep to the holding bulkhead which were of two thicknesses of 35lb plate. Outboard compartment was of air, to allow venting from gasses to expand freely. Next was a liquid layer (water, later oil) to spread pressure load evenly and stop fragments from the torpedo and thick bulkhead + outer hull. It was 'expected' that the thick bulkhead would distort and leak so a watertight compartment was provided inboard to help contain this. A 1000lb charge was exploded against the mockup resulting in a hole 25ft x 16ft in the outer plating. It destroyed the two intermediate bulkheads a length of 36 feet and deflected the main protective bulkhead 18 inches inward which resulted in some damage to the innermost bulkhead. The test vs. the bulge was less successful, the main bulkhead being ruptured. A later trial using modified holding bulkheads failed through the welds. Overall though the test seemed to validate the sandwich design.
[Source: D.K. Brown "Nelson to Vanguard: warship design and development 1923-45]

Unfortunately the test of real combat indicated that the SPS performance was less than what was indicated in Job 74. (The torpedo warheads used by the G3M/G4M force was 330 lbs for example) Brown notes that a primary difference between test and combat came from the damage due to the hits on the prop shafts which resulted in the opening up of a large underwater volume of the ship to the sea resulting in severe flooding.

There were three hits on the SPS itself. A port side hit near Frame 206 might have caused flooding in the aux machinary space but it was also possible it was a result of the shaft damage from the prior attack. The protection at Frame 236 "worked well" [Brown], but because the void spaces had been filled as a counterflooding measure, the system could not prevent flooding following the hit.
According to Brown, Job 74 appeared to have overvalued the system (aka 1000lb charge resistance) but should in theory have contained 330lb charges well enough. (assuming a fully intact system) The prop hits of course, which did the fatal damage fell outside the SPS protection scheme.


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## Nikademus (Sep 22, 2010)

skeeter said:


> Just my two cents worth. Bismark was shipping water through a shell hit and was running down at the bows, but I do not know if it was from the Prince of Wales or the Hood. She had to reduce speed and in so doing, this aided in the effort to find her in time before she came within range of a defending umbrella of German aircraft. Didn't the Ark Royal embark Blackburn Skua dive bombers at the time? These could carry up to five hundred pound bombs. Would five hundred pounders have been able to penetrate her armored deck? I don't know about the torpedos of the time in question, but I do know that nowadays, they set them to go off under the hull, cracking it and breaking it effectively in two.



Hit came from Prince of Wales. 500lb bombs would not have done much against Bismarck. (In terms of stopping or sinking her) The ship employed a bomb armor deck above the main armor deck at a thickness of 50mm. While this scheme made the class vulnerable to plunging shellfire, in the case of bombs like a 500lber it would likely initiate fuse action on a 500lb if it didn't stop it outright, resulting in detonation of the weapon on reaching the main armor deck which was 145mm thick over the magazine spaces and 130mm thick over the Machinary spaces.


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## pinsog (Sep 22, 2010)

How many classes of torpedoes did the British have? 18 inch aerial and how many more? How much did each weigh? How much weight was the Swordfish capable of carrying?


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## delcyros (Sep 22, 2010)

There were multiple torpedo sizes in service by the british as of ww2. But FAA bombers usually carried 18in ones of different marks, such as the Mk XII introduced 1937 with a 388lbs TNT charge, the Mk XIV introduced 1938 with 375 lbs TNT charge. Later on, airplanes dropped TORPEX augmented torpedoes with greatly increased warheads, the MK XV (introduced 1942) had 545 lbs TORPEX.

Nikedamius, please feel free to continue our part of the discussion on this thread:



> http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww2-general/best-world-war-two-warships-3592-48.html



I will respond, but am away from my books now, so be patient with the answer.

best regards,
delc


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## RCAFson (Sep 22, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> Hit came from Prince of Wales. 500lb bombs would not have done much against Bismarck. (In terms of stopping or sinking her) The ship employed a bomb armor deck above the main armor deck at a thickness of 50mm. While this scheme made the class vulnerable to plunging shellfire, in the case of bombs like a 500lber it would likely initiate fuse action on a 500lb if it didn't stop it outright, resulting in detonation of the weapon on reaching the main armor deck which was 145mm thick over the magazine spaces and 130mm thick over the Machinary spaces.




500lb bombs alone would have a tough time sinking Bismarck, but in combination with torpedo hits could have caused a fatal combination of damage. Torpedo hits could reduce the freeboard to allow flooding via 500lb bomb created holes in the deck or ship's side.


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## parsifal (Sep 22, 2010)

500 lb bombs wont sink a capital ship, but they can cause a lot of damage to the upper works, and reduce the combat efficiency of the ship, to say nothing of inflicting casualties on the AA crews and any other crew working on the upper deck. A ship is just an inanimate pile of metal, but it is crewed by human beings, with all the frailities that goes with that. If the ship is taking damage from torpedo hits, and also suffering damage topside, ther is a natural tendency for the crew to at least become panicky, excercise poor judgment to damage control issues, and the like. This happens to every ship under sustained attack, especially when under attack from multiple threats. I believe the crew of the bismark suffered from that problem during her last fight....at the end the crew had no fight left in them. So dropping 500 lb bombs on a ship like the bismark is far from a waste of time....in my opinion.


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## Nikademus (Sep 22, 2010)

pinsog said:


> How many classes of torpedoes did the British have? 18 inch aerial and how many more? How much did each weigh? How much weight was the Swordfish capable of carrying?



alot at the time of the Bismarck battle. More still later in the war. 

24.5" Mk 1 - charge 743LB. Carried by BB Rodney.

21" Mk 2 - charge 400lb An older WWI design.

21" Mk 4 - charge 445lb another WWI design

21" Mk 5 - charge similar to Mk 4. WWI design

21" Mk 7 - charge 740lb. Post WWI design, originally an O2 enriched design, later converted to compressed air only. (Per Cambell, 198 expended up to 9/44 during WW2

**

18" Mk 7 pre-WWI design - 320lb charge

18" Mk 8 pre WWI design - similar to Mk 7. originally designed for sub use, converted to aircraft weapon

18" Mk 11 - charge 465lb

Torpedoes built 1939+

21" Mk 9 - charge 750lb

21" Mk 10 - charge 661lb

21" Mk 11 - charge 710lb

18" Mk 12 -charge 388lb 

Swordfish carried 18 inch types of torpedoes. The 388lb Mk-12 was typical of the ordinance carried by the type. Late in the war an improved Mk 12 was introduced with a warhead of 545lb TORPEX


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## Kurfürst (Sep 23, 2010)

Hi Nikademus,


Rather good discussion so far!



Nikademus said:


> Please make the case.
> 
> I'm not sure i understand what you mean by "more protected space" Bismarck's armor scheme was based on an older incremental type armor scheme that covered more of the ship with areas of light and medium armor on the idea that small and medium caliber shell threats had to be accounted for as well as heavy shells. In the closer WWI and pre-WWI combat environments this was justified but as shell technology progressed it became increasingly difficult to protect the bulk of a ship from the heaviest shells due to weight constrictions. Worse, medium and light armor could exaserbate a situation vs. heavy BB shells because the armor is too thin to prevent penetration but is thick enough to initiate fuse action ensuring that the shell detonates inside the ship vs. passing through the hull. ... Richelieu arguably had the best designed TDS of all the WW2 BB designs. Again I'm not sure what you mean by "only 8 of 18 compartments" protected by the side protection system. The citadel (primary compartments...including magazine and propulsion spaces) were protected by the side protection system as in all other WW2 battleships. I think you are again confusing the nature of the "All or Nothing" protection scheme employed by all major naval powers post WW1 with the exception of Germany.



I think he means the lenght of the citadel on the Bismarck vs. the other Treaty Battleships. Bismarcks citadel and TDS run at something like 70% of the hull, protecting a lot more buoyancy than typically found on other Battleships (typically 50-60%). Ie. indeed Richelieu's protection was extremely good, both from the ballistic and the anti torpedo POV, (I too very much like the class) _where it extended protected the ship_. But while the vitals were offered good protection, it came at the price of not offering any protection to much of the ship, and this would lead to increased flooding at the soft ends of the ship when hits were suffered in that region. 

German battle experience of World War I at Skagerrak indicated the dangers of this with the loss of the battlecruiser Lützow, which was lost to progressive flooding due to large caliber shell hits to the bow while it tried to reach back to base, albeit it was slow enough that most of the crew could be saved - even when both magazines and machinery was intact. The lesson was clear, and both the Scharnhorst and Bismarck classes featured long and extensives citadels covering 70% of the ship hull, and lot of reserve buoyancy to prevent this happening. The same goes to Yamato classes, for example, that was lost to this reason - even though the ship had extraordinary protection in its citadel, it didn't help when shells and torpedoes hit outside it, and there was a larger chance of this happening. You can't just expect that shells will do the courtesy of always hitting your protected areas, its a bit akin to expect the enemy in land war to always manouver into your killzones, rather than trying to flank you. The vitals safe is important, but if the ship is lost to flooding in the meantime it can prove somewhat irrelevant.

Now, regarding the "old incremental type of armor", with lighter plating to protect against small and medium caliber hits - I guess here you refer to the 145mm upper side belt on Bismarck, in the same fashion as on the Bayern class of WW1 - it certainly worth to look at how German capital ships evolved from the Scharnhorst to the Bismarck. It wasn't just taking the Bayern and using its scheme for Bismarck. 

On Scharnhorst they completely took a step aside from the WW1 designs, using only a 50 mm upper side belt against small caliber shellfire, and a rather thick main belt of 350mm, and also, triple turrets. On Bismarck they changed both of these features, and it was certainly no accident. Actually the use of triple thickness upper side belt on the Bismarck was a very good feature, even saving weight for added protection. 

It allowed for example shaving off some 100 mm from all four barbettes, which could be now just 220mm thick below the armored top deck, since even if shells passed through the 145mm upper side belt (not to mention the main belt) had no chance of penetrating the barbettes inside the ship except for suicidal distances - certainly a lot better protection than a single 320mm (iirc) barbette would offeron Scharnhorst. The fact that the 145mm belt also offered protection up to heavy cruiser sized guns and smaller for the whole citadel (fires!) and augmented the protection of the main armored deck was an added bonus.

Regarding the closer combat ranges of World War I, it is of course true, and most Treaty battleships protection scheme was optimized for much longer combat ranges with thick main decks. On the other hand, if you look at the practical combat ranges found in World War II (10 - 26 000 yards), and compare them to the Immunity Zones of the various designs, you will find that aside from Yamato, it is the Bismarcks that find themselves in a most convinient situation: their vertical ballistic protection was the best of the lot, and their admittedly weaker horizontal protection was just_ good enough_ for these ranges. It certainly looks to me that German naval designers got it fairly what the optimal IZs were: just about anywhere between point blank and out to 26-28 000 yards, the only way to KO a Bismarck class was to get a soft kill on it, which was not particularly easy either due to generously protected bouyancy, a large and well divided hull, and the redundancy offered for the armament (ie. four main turrets, three directors vs the usual three and two). And that redundancy is important, I always felt that the other designs would, somewhat naively expect that naval combat, with shells of size of a small car in the air at supersonic speeds, can be somehow fought while remaining nice and clean, and without a scratch. On the contrary I think its a bloody business, damage to the ship WILL occur, and it is going to be messy when it does. I think its a more realistic approach to accept the inevitable, but make sure that when it occurs, it effects the ship overall combat capability the least. That's my major grief with the Richeliue's, whose design and looks I like otherwise very much - what if a turret just jams? What if somebody just pops out the fog at 12 000 yards distance and begins to fire? What if the bow and stern are flooding, and the upper works is on fire from small caliber hits..? What if the tactical circumstances are just unfavourable, ie. you would need to fire to targets to the stern? IMHO the problem with such designs is that they expect that everything will happen just the way the designers wanted them to happen, ie. ideal tactical situation that suits the ship, with shells landing nicely where protection is offered against them. But few battle plan survives the first contact with the enemy..


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## Nikademus (Sep 23, 2010)

Kurfürst said:


> I think he means the length of the citadel on the Bismarck vs. the other Treaty
> Battleships. Bismarcks citadel and TDS run at something like 70% of the hull,
> protecting a lot more buoyancy than typically found on other Battleships
> (typically 50-60%).



Hi,

Bismarck's heavy belt armor covered 68% of her hull at the waterline which compared favorably to other designs (constrained by Treaty) at the time she was being built. It did not reflect any particular area of superiority however. The point is that it's standard in WWII BB's to protect the vital area of the ship (usually called the "citadel"), which covers the ship's primary armament and machinery spaces. Where things can vary more is depth of protection and in armor thickness. These were areas of strength of the KGV class for example, which had a deep and uniform belt of BB level protection topped by her primary armor deck (placed higher as was general practice except in the case Germany where the deck remained lower slung in order to reinforce the belt). The only variance in this belt was that thickness was greater abreast magazine spaces vs. machinery spaces. Thus KGV's "protected buoyancy" (against heavy shellfire) was greatest in comparison to other BB's. In the case of Yamato (oft mentioned here), her designers placed great care in regards stability and subdivision in the face of damage. The citadel was relatively compact as part of a requirement to maximize armor protection. The ship was designed to retain positive longitudinal stability even if the bow and stern sections were flooded. Ultimately length of armor belt is irrelevant if the belt is vulnerable to the shellfire faced from a primary opponent type.



> Ie. indeed Richelieu's protection was extremely good, both
> from the ballistic and the anti torpedo POV, (I too very much like the class)
> <I>where it extended protected the ship</I>. But while the vitals were offered
> good protection, it came at the price of not offering any protection to much of
> ...



This is a basic concept of an All or Nothing protection scheme. The idea is to protect only the critical areas of a battleship and that with the thickest armor possible, leaving the non-critical areas unprotected. The ends of a BB, along with light superstructures, if damaged would not threaten the safety of the ship. Richelieu's citadel was intentionally concentrated in order to increase protection against heavy shellfire. 



> <BR><BR>German battle experience of
> World War I at Skagerrak indicated the dangers of this with the loss of the
> battlecruiser LÃ¼tzow, which was lost to progressive flooding due to large
> caliber shell hits to the bow while it tried to reach back to base, albeit it
> ...



Lutzow's condition was caused by a number of factors. The progressive flooding was a result both of shell damage and due to many piercings of critical bulkheads which negated somewhat the otherwise very good sub-division of the ship and exacerbated damage control efforts. Another factor in Lutzow's loss was the large bow torpedo flat, a typical feature of WWI era German capital ships. This large space, if compromised would reduced bouyancy reserves in the bow area. Lutzow eventually was scuttled because the ship's trim had been so radically altered by the forward flooding that movement was next to impossible but she was not in danger of actual sinking up to that point. This decision to scuttle is questioned in some quarters as the ship's buoyancy reserves were far from exhausted and the ship (arguably) could have been saved. Had Lutzow's bow area been unprotected, the shells would have had a greater chance of passing through the narrow hull section without detonation. Instead, the medium/light armors ensured detonation increasing structural damage and contributing to the loss of the ship. This makes Lutzow a case demonstrating how medium and light armors can be detrimental to a warship when struck by heavy shells.



> The lesson was clear, and both the Scharnhorst and
> Bismarck classes featured long and extensives citadels covering 70% of the ship
> hull, and lot of reserve buoyancy to prevent this happening.



Citadel length is determined in part by the size of the machinery and primary armament, and is also influenced by the hull form requirements for speed. Finally armor thickness requirements impacts Citadel length. "Reserve Buoyancy" is a product of the overall armor scheme's depth as well as its length, not just the armor belt. 

(continued)


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## Nikademus (Sep 23, 2010)

Kurfürst said:


> The same goes to
> Yamato classes, for example, that was lost to this reason - even though the ship
> had extraordinary protection in its citadel, it didn't help when shells and
> torpedoes hit outside it,



Both ships of the Yamato class suffered fatal damage to their vitals.



> . Actually the use of triple thickness upper side belt
> on the Bismarck was a very good feature, even saving weight for added
> protection.



I wouldn't agree with that. The weight of this multi belt system resulted in reduced thickness to the primary armor belt. Eliminate the middle/upper belt and one can maximize the primary belt protecting the ship's waterline and increase its depth. The German designers compensated for this somewhat by keeping the armor deck low in a turtleback design reflecting their view that a typical North Sea engagement would be relatively close. The slopes reinforced the belt making the ship very resistant to veridical fire. The cost of the lower deck armor was more exposure of topside systems to damage and reduced protected buoyancy in the event of major flood damage. Hood, a WWI vintage design suffered a similar weakness. She had 3 belts, heavy, medium and light on the same theory that closer ranged combat required greater full hull coverage against a variety of ordinances. As a result of this requirement, her heavy belt was shallow and modern convention holds that the fatal hit inflicted on her was caused by a heavy shell penetrating her mid-belt (7") which was fully vulnerable to 15inch shellfire. The UK was aware of Hood's weakness but the ship was too advanced to alter and instead of a single deep belt of maximum thickness capped by a singular strong armor deck, she retained the incremental scheme of her predecessors. Unmodified, it proved fatal to her during WWII.



> <The fact that the 145mm belt also
> offered protection up to heavy cruiser sized guns and smaller for the whole
> citadel (fires!) and augmented the protection of the main armored deck was an
> added bonus.



The 145mm belt was employed to keep medium caliber shells from entering the spaces above the battery deck (protecting uptakes and ammunition handling spaces). The designers were convinced that potential close encounters with DD's and cruisers made this provision necessary (and thus absorbed critical weight that might have been put into the primary belt.) The upper belt did not prove to be proof against UK 152mm and 203mm shellfire.



> <BR><BR>Regarding the closer combat ranges of World War I, it is of
> course true, and most Treaty battleships protection scheme was optimized for
> much longer combat ranges with thick main decks. On the other hand, if you look
> at the practical combat ranges found in World War II (10 - 26 000 yards), and
> ...



Bismarck's protection scheme made her very resistant to close in vertical fire at the expense of greater vulnerability at expanded ranges to plunging fire and helps explain why she stayed defiantly afloat against the short range fire she was subjected too. An additional con of this was that close in fire deflecting off the lower armor deck slopes would increase topside damage and contribute to the ship being made combat ineffective, as occurred. The primary armament proved suprisingly vulnerable to heavy BB shellfire; One 16in hit took out half of Bismarck's primary armament. As a class the ships proved very tough, but the tradeoffs were evident as well. 



> It certainly looks to me that German naval designers got it fairly
> what the optimal IZs were: just about anywhere between point blank and out to
> 26-28 000 yards, the only way to KO a Bismarck class was to get a soft kill on
> it, which was not particularly easy either due to generously protected buoyancy,
> a large and well divided hull, and the redundancy offered for the armament



Bismarck was disabled rather quickly by Rodney and KGV. She proved difficult to _sink_ however which has led to a long standing and silly argument about "Sunk vs Scuttled." To me it's irrelevant....the ship was stopped and wrecked. The USN for example, couldn't have cared less whether or not Haruna or Kirishima were scuttled vs. sunk. The only thing that mattered was that the ships sank. As mentioned, light/medium armor does not provide "protected buoyancy" against heavy shellfire or medium shellfire on some cases. Bismarck's armament was driven primary by what the Germans considered the optimal organizational effect a traditional four turret (2 guns each) offers. The penalty paid here was increased weight which resulted in a longer and heavier citadel. Had a three gun/three turret armament been opted for, weight would have been saved, an additional gun barrel would have been obtained and the primary belt armor could have been shortened, saving more weight allowing it to be thickened. The "large hull" was a product of the rather bloated nature of the design which continually increased in size as requirements were piled onto it. The German designers could do this because they were not contrained by the Washington Treaty. The Italians were also guilty of flagerantly exceeding these limits.


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## pinsog (Sep 23, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> alot at the time of the Bismarck battle. More still later in the war.
> 
> 24.5" Mk 1 - charge 743LB. Carried by BB Rodney.
> 
> ...



Great info. How much did each of these torpedoes weigh? What was the Swordfish max payload? Can the heavier ship launched torpedoes be airdropped, or modified to be airdropped or are aerial torpedoes special?


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## Nikademus (Sep 23, 2010)

pinsog said:


> Great info. How much did each of these torpedoes weigh? What was the Swordfish max payload? Can the heavier ship launched torpedoes be airdropped, or modified to be airdropped or are aerial torpedoes special?



24.5in Mk 1 = 5700lb

21in Mk 2 = 3100lb (approx)

21in Mk 4 = 3206lb

21in Mk 5 = 3828lb

21in Mk 7 = 4106lb

18in Mk 7 1548lb

18in Mk 8 = ? (prob 1550lb approx)

18in Mk 11 = 1500lb

21in Mk 8 = 3452lb

21in Mk 9 = 3732lb

21in Mk 10 = 3571lb

21in Mk 11 = 3632lb

18in Mk 12 = 1548lb


The swordfish is generally described as being able to lug around 1500lb's of ordinance.


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## parsifal (Sep 24, 2010)

_Yes, but another important component in a DB attack is momentum. Go too slow and the bomb will not have enough momentum to effect adequate penetration for the bomb type being used. Go too slow, and/or too shallow and you greatly increase vulnerability to AA defenses. Another important component is training. Training is critical when conducting a steep DB attack, more so against a moving target. If you don't have it, and practice it, it'll be a difficult maneuver to pull off, as was the case with the VMSB squadron at Midway flying SB2U's. Due to inexperience they conducted a GB attack vs a traditional full on DB attack._
Hi Nikademus

Actually aircraft speed has no impact on the maximum speed of an object, that’s a function of the terminal velocity of the projectile. Only if the aircraft was travelling faster than the terminal velocity of the bomb would aircraft speed result in the bomb falling faster than its terminal velocity, and even then, only if the bomb was not dropped with sufficient altitude to decelerate back to terminal velocity before impact. An aircraft releasing a bomb at a speed less than a terminal velocity will reduce the time needed to reach terminal velocity, but in no way affect that maximum terminal velocity. The question therefore is whether either the Swordfish, or the Stuka are travelling at above terminal velocity.

A free-falling object achieves its terminal velocity when the downward force of gravity (Fg) equals the upward force of drag (Fd). This causes the net force on the object to be zero, resulting in an acceleration of zero. 

I don’t know what the terminal velocity for a bomb would be typically, but for a speed skydiver, its close to 650mph . All the delivery aircraft travelling at a speed less than this will do is enable the projectile to reach that terminal velocity faster, not that the projectile will actually travel faster

I think what this means is that a swordfish dropping a bomb, and wishing the bomb to reach its terminal velocity before impact, would need to release its bomb earlier than say a Ju-87/ if we assume the dive speed for a Ju-87 to be 200 knots and the dive speed of the Swordfish to be 100 knots, it will take the bomb released by the Swordfish an additional 4 seconds to reach terminal velocity. In that 4 seconds the Swordfish will have travelled 222 metres. That means the release altitude of the Swordfish is 222 metres above that of the Stuka. Given the greater accuracy that comes with a slower descent, I don’t think that would make any difference to bombing accuracy, and absolutely no difference to the penetration capabilities of the bomb, since the bomb would hit the ground at the same speed

As far as training is concerned, the FAA swordfish sqdns did have some prcatice at divebombing, particularly the air groups working on the Ark Royal . Probably not as much as the SG crews operating with FKII, but enough to qualify as being proficient.


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## Kurfürst (Sep 24, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> Hi,
> 
> Bismarck's heavy belt armor covered 68% of her hull at the waterline which compared favorably to other designs (constrained by Treaty) at the time she was being built. It did not reflect any particular area of superiority however. .... Where things can vary more is depth of protection and in armor thickness. These were areas of strength of the KGV class for example, which had a deep and uniform belt of BB level protection topped by her primary armor deck (placed higher as was general practice except in the case Germany where the deck remained lower slung in order to reinforce the belt). ... Ultimately length of armor belt is irrelevant if the belt is vulnerable to the shellfire faced from a primary opponent type.



Hi Nik,

I gotta disagree at here somewhat since your example narrows the types of damage that can be suffered - to reverse your thesis, the belt is still valuable if it stops the enemy shellfire. The ca. 15% longer/larger belt/citadel of the Bismarck - compared to Treaty designs represented a protected box of some 36 meters in length and the same 30-36 meters in width worth of protected buoyancy, or an equivalent of _6500 tons_ of seawater that is NOT within the ship, quite an amount and explains why Bismarck was so damn hard to sink - she had massive reserves in her. I would not call that irrelevant. A

As this was an extra volume - compared to Treaty and post-Treaty BBs - which was completely safe from flooding from a large number of enemy guns at just about any range, and it could still keep out major caliber shells at long range. If that belt wouldn't have been there, the ship would have been considerably more vulnerable to flooding from any guns hitting her (pardon, him!) there - and that includes the literally thousends of secondary fired on her during her last battle. 

Frankly I don't get why it would be more relaxing to have water pouring in from small caliber hits outside a rather small citadel - which is BTW just as unprotected in practice against flooding from heavy (14-16 inch) shells on even the KGV which as you note had rather thick belt at 356 mm. As per Okun's article which probably well-known to you, even that thick belt could be holed ("Navy Limit") out 23 800 yards - at the top of the battle ranges for a BB in WW2. Even at the magazines very it is extremely thick in comparison, we are still talking about vulnerability at 21 500 yards against the German (French, Italian etc.) 38cm guns. So what's the point? Thick belts might have worked during WW I, but by World War II, the guns were simply too powerful and belts no longer offered much protection anyway...



Nikademus said:


> This is a basic concept of an All or Nothing protection scheme. The idea is to protect only the critical areas of a battleship and that with the thickest armor possible, leaving the non-critical areas unprotected. The ends of a BB, along with light superstructures, if damaged would not threaten the safety of the ship. Richelieu's citadel was intentionally concentrated in order to increase protection against heavy shellfire.



I am aware of the concept, but all I can say is because of the factors mentioned just above, it only works if the armor thickness is thick enough to keep shells out. And only Yamato had that, and she was a 70 000+ tons design.. so much about being displacement efficient. 

As for the safety of the ship due to its soft ends, yes it does not directly endangering the ship, if the ship otherwise have sufficient protected buoyancy, but Bismarck's (where the shell passed through the bow BTW!) as well as Lutzow's case demonstrates, it is a problem. The less the chance for that problem, the better. 




> Had Lutzow's bow area been unprotected, the shells would have had a greater chance of passing through the narrow hull section without detonation. Instead, the medium/light armors ensured detonation increasing structural damage and contributing to the loss of the ship. This makes Lutzow a case demonstrating how medium and light armors can be detrimental to a warship when struck by heavy shells.



Indeed I agree that light armor that cannot achieve anything else but to ensure the detonation of the shell inside the ship is useless and adds nothing to the protection of the ship. However the idea that the ends of the ships are sacrificial in their nature and need no protection at all does not seem to have been much accepted with designers - some splinter protection had to be provided, since for every shell hitting the ship's bow or stern there are probably ten that explode nearby, and their sizeable splinters can hole the ships normal plating - if it does not offer some ballistic protection at all - and cause flooding just the same.


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## Kurfürst (Sep 24, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> I wouldn't agree with that. The weight of this multi belt system resulted in reduced thickness to the primary armor belt. Eliminate the middle/upper belt and one can maximize the primary belt protecting the ship's waterline and increase its depth.



There was no "middle" belt on the Bismarck (that was a feature of WW1 battleships). Roughly 800 tons of armor went into the top 145 mm belt, which as noted, alone allowed some 250 (one deck) to 500 tons of armor (two decks worth) saved on the barbettes (which thus could be shaved down from 340 mm to 220mm below the top deck, as opposed to the Scharnhorst class, where the barbettes were full thickness all the way down. As an added bonus, instead of the 13.4" thickness worth of ballistic protection, the barbettes below the deck offered a ballistic resistance equivalent to a 27" thick barbette(!!) due to the top belt's decapping effects, as seen on the Italian VV class's decapping plates. Further the top belt reinforced the main armor deck, made it unnecessary to heavily armor the barbettes/ammunition uptakes of the secondaries. Assuming these latter were of 4 meter diameter and would be armored to 145mm thickness instead of 20mm down for one deck height (assumed 2 meters height), we are talking about another 300 tons saved. I am not going to calculate the savings in the main armored deck.

And there's absolutely no doubt that the upper side belt on the Bismarck was major weight saver, which is why they decided to go that way, instead of repeating the Scharnhorst's thin 50mm top belt and thick barbettes.




> The German designers compensated for this by keeping the armor deck low in a turtleback design reflecting their view that a typical North Sea engagement would be relatively close. The slopes reinforced the belt making the ship very resistant to veridical fire.



Yup!



> The cost of the lower deck armor was more exposure of topside systems to damage and reduced protected buoyancy in the event of major flood damage.



I don't quite get this - how did the placing of the main belt reduce protected buoyancy?

Placing the main armored deck at the waterline instead at the top of belt did indeed expose one extra deck (the one behind the main belt) to enemy plunging fire - yes but there was nothing of vital importance to the ship's combat capability. The messing halls, crew quarters and laundry room might look messy if hits went there, but at the same time the vitals - magazines and machinery - were absolutely safe behind the main belt, if hits occured there, at any range. Any hit on the main belt would be rejected into the upper works, as you are well aware, and make mess of the laundry room but at least the ship doesn't go kaboom or to a full stop. But to me an equivalent weight of armor that is spent on the main deck is better spent if it performs triple function (1 as a simple main armored deck, 2 reinforcing the main belts protection 3 making seperate splinter protection for the magazines unnecessary), and protects against both short- and long range gunnery.

IF the main armor deck, on the other hand, would be placed on the top of the belt, the laundry room would be rather safe from high angle plunging fire, as are the magazines and machinery, but now additional splinter protection is neccessary for the magazines (as on the KGV), since once the belt is penetrated, or even pieces start to fly off it from the impact, the whole ship is endangered. Its again 

Now, the sad part is, again that even the thickest belt couldn't hold projectiles out. Even if we would use the KGV's thick belt _the magazines_ would be vulnerable to belt hits out to 21 000 yards or so. I would preserve that instead of the laundry, because of the magazines go, the laundry goes too.



> The 145mm belt was employed to keep medium caliber shells from entering the spaces above the battery deck (protecting uptakes and ammunition handling spaces). The designers were convinced that potential close encounters with DD's and cruisers made this provision necessary (and thus absorbed critical weight that might have been put into the primary belt.)



That was probably a consideration too, but the change of the design from the Scharnhorst to the Bismarck shows that the weight saving potentional (see the most obvious barbette savings) was realized. They could keep just the same light top plating as on Scharnhorst if they wanted to (which was more or less proof against small caliber shells already), so the advantages of using triple the thickness must have been obvious, evidenced by the reduction in barbette thickness reduction.



> The upper belt did not prove to be proof against UK 152mm and 203mm shellfire.
> 
> 
> > Don't be silly, a 145 mm armor plate is was certainly proof against UK (or anyone else's) 152mm shellfire.
> ...


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## Kurfürst (Sep 24, 2010)

Part III.



> Bismarck's armament was driven primary by what the Germans considered the optimal organizational effect a traditional four turret (2 guns each) offers. The penalty paid here was increased weight which resulted in a longer and heavier citadel. Had a three gun/three turret armament been opted for, weight would have been saved, an additional gun barrel would have been obtained and the primary belt armor could have been shortened, saving more weight allowing it to be thickened.



I disagree on that, it did not impose any weight penalty worth speaking of - using triple turrets would have meant less turrets yet, but at the same time much larger barbettes with heavier turrets on them. Three gun / three turret was not news to the Germans - they used them on the Deutschland and Scharnhorst already, and the thing goes back to WW1 Austo-Hungarian and Italian battleships. Three triple turrets were considered for the Bismarck, but lost in favour to four turrets, and I'd wager they had a good reason for that, and also for keeping this layout for the next class (H).

The citadel's length was determined not only by the number of turrets, but also size of the magazines underneath - and you certainly need a larger magazine to accommodate munition for nine guns rather than eight. Out of curiosity I did some calculation with this, comparing Bismarck's four turrets and barbettes with the three on the Vittorio Veneto (which has very similiar armouring characteristic, making it an ideal comparison). I don't recall there was any weight advantage. Either you opt for an extra gun, or you opt for an extra turret and better overall layout. Considering the rather high rate of fire of the Bismarck's guns (up to 3/minute is claimed, which might be a bit theoretical, but even if 1/8 higher rate was realized, there was no reduction in overall firepower), the layout was hardly disadvantageous from any point of view.



> The "large hull" was a product of the rather bloated nature of the design which continually increased in size as requirements were piled onto it. The German designers could do this because they were not contrained by the Washington Treaty. The Italians were also guilty of flagerantly exceeding these limits.



Yes but at least they came up with good ships in the end.


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## tail end charlie (Sep 24, 2010)

I dont know whether it was actually necessary to penetrate the hull to disable a ship. Many ships lost all or most of their command with a single hit to the bridge, it took very few hits to wreck any radar or radio transmitters.

Having been almost deafened in an empty oil container when a guy dropped a hammer I cant imagine what being in a steel structure being hit by tons of explosive would do to the men inside. I read an account of the Battle of the River Plate and although the Graf Spee wasnt seriously damaged the crew were shocked by the experience.


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## Nikademus (Sep 24, 2010)

Kurfürst said:


> Part III.
> 
> 
> > The ca. 15% longer/larger belt/citadel of the Bismarck - compared to Treaty designs represented a protected box of some 36 meters in length and the same 30-36 meters in width worth of protected buoyancy, or an equivalent of 6500 tons of seawater that is NOT within the ship, quite an amount and explains why Bismarck was so damn hard to sink - she had massive reserves in her. I would not call that irrelevant.
> ...


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## Nikademus (Sep 24, 2010)

parsifal said:


> _
> 
> Actually aircraft speed has no impact on the maximum speed of an object, that’s a function of the terminal velocity of the projectile.
> 
> As far as training is concerned, the FAA swordfish sqdns did have some prcatice at divebombing, particularly the air groups working on the Ark Royal . Probably not as much as the SG crews operating with FKII, but enough to qualify as being proficient._


_

Hi,

I believe there was some influence as some calculations i've seen for DB delivered protectiles included both speed and height as a requirement to effect a set estimated penetration. Cambell's work on WW2 weapons includes these figures (300kt dive....release at at least 6500ft etc) Level bombers can only utilize height to influence potential penetration effect. I agree that in the SW case they'd probably have to release higher than a Val, Stuka or Dauntless to compensate for this. 

I'm skeptical on the level of proficiency in regards full DB'ing on ships maneuvering at sea. All the examples i've seen have been against non-moving targets which, no offense to the FAA, but would not require as much proficiency as attacking a moving target. Given the light weight of the bombs used I have a hard time seeing the SW pilots spending any appreciable time practicing DB tactics, at least not till later in the war with the Barracuda arriving._


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## Nikademus (Sep 24, 2010)

tail end charlie said:


> I dont know whether it was actually necessary to penetrate the hull to disable a ship. Many ships lost all or most of their command with a single hit to the bridge, it took very few hits to wreck any radar or radio transmitters.
> 
> Having been almost deafened in an empty oil container when a guy dropped a hammer I cant imagine what being in a steel structure being hit by tons of explosive would do to the men inside. I read an account of the Battle of the River Plate and although the Graf Spee wasnt seriously damaged the crew were shocked by the experience.



WW2 battleships were more vulnerable to "soft kill" (also called "mission kill") vs. earlier eras. New technology such as radar and electronic assisted fire control devices could at best only be given splinter protection. South Dakota was a good example of this. She was never seriously threatened by the damage received but was rendered deaf and blind by all the hits in the superstructure area.

Graf Spee was scuttled because her captain was tricked by the British into believing that a superior force awaited the ship just over the horizon from River Platte. (including the battlecruiser Renown) Rather than subject the crew to certain death, he chose to scuttle and spare the crew.


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## renrich (Sep 24, 2010)

Actually, the Graf Spee had substantial damage and her captain probably made the correct decision to scuttle. Her system for fitering fuel and lubricants was wrecked as well as the system for obtaining fresh water. She had been hit by perhaps more than 30 shells and holed below the water line. A battle between Graf Spee and the two British CLs, seriously impaired and the CA, Cumberland, would have been truly between the "crippled and the arthritic" but the Graf Spee would almost certainly have not made it home with other Allied units speeding to the scene.

The electronic equipment in WW2 ships was subject to disablement by relatively light damage. The Salt Lake City, CA25, at the Komondorskis, lost much of her electronic capabilities from the concussion of her own ten gun eight inchers, firing the equivalent of eighty salvoes.


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## Nikademus (Sep 24, 2010)

I agree, Spee had substantial damage. The point I was making was that her scuttling had more to do with Langsdorff's accessment of the situation vs. other factors. He was also ignorant of Exeter's damage which was equally substantial. If he'd known he was only facing the two CL's, I believe he would have tried breaking out. However with intel that substantial forces awaited him outside the harbor....he chose to scuttle.


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## parsifal (Sep 24, 2010)

_I believe there was some influence as some calculations i've seen for DB delivered protectiles included both speed and height as a requirement to effect a set estimated penetration. Cambell's work on WW2 weapons includes these figures (300kt dive....release at at least 6500ft etc) Level bombers can only utilize height to influence potential penetration effect. I agree that in the SW case they'd probably have to release higher than a Val, Stuka or Dauntless to compensate for this._

In order for this to be true, there would have to be no actual or effective terminal velocity, or alternatively the aircraft dropping the bomb would need to have a dive speed greater than the terminal velocity. Doesnt matter who is trying to say it, its breaking the laws of physics to try and say otherwise. An inconvenient truth, but a truth nevertheless. 

Put in its simplest form, a projectile free falling through the air reaches a point where the potential energy being converted to kinetic energy by the fall, is being matched perfectly by the drag of the falling object. Unless that falling object has access to additional energy, it cannot go faster than that. If an object is droped from already "falling" aircraft, but that aircraft is not travelling more than the terminal velocity of the bomb, then the terminal velocity of the bomb cannot be increased. 

_I'm skeptical on the level of proficiency in regards full DB'ing on ships maneuvering at sea. All the examples i've seen have been against non-moving targets which, no offense to the FAA, but would not require as much proficiency as attacking a moving target. Given the light weight of the bombs used I have a hard time seeing the SW pilots spending any appreciable time practicing DB tactics, at least not till later in the war with the Barracuda arriving._

The FAA undertook its first bombing missions with Swordfish in April 1940, in the Norwegian campaign. Ark Royal then continued to train, presumably this included bombing training, for a couple of months before being attached to Force H. I comparison, the aviators of the FAA had spent years training at dropping torpedoes. My opinion is that they were the best trained torpedo bomber squadrons in the weorld by May 1941. Not even the Japanese could match their profiiciency. They were so good, they could hit moving targets, in poor weather, at night, and not only that, could hit a specific part of that target, wityh a high degree of accuracy. I dont beleive there was anyone else in the world who could hope to match that skill .

Given that capability there is little wonder that they tened not to use bombing as a technique against ships. Though they did tend to so whilst based on Malta, and attacking Italians, agin at night.

The profiency of the Swordfish groups in divebombing really did not reveal itself fully until the swordfish began to be used in ASW operations. hitting a fast moving submarine, again often at night, demands skill far in excess of hitting a regular surface ship. The Swordfish groups were doing that quite regulalry, from about 1942 onwards. Whilst it would be a strech to say they were exceptional at D/B techiques, I think it can be convincingly argued that they were proficient.


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## Nikademus (Sep 24, 2010)

parsifal said:


> _
> In order for this to be true, there would have to be no actual or effective terminal velocity, or alternatively the aircraft dropping the bomb would need to have a dive speed greater than the terminal velocity. Doesnt matter who is trying to say it, its breaking the laws of physics to try and say otherwise. An inconvenient truth, but a truth nevertheless.
> 
> Put in its simplest form, a projectile free falling through the air reaches a point where the potential energy being converted to kinetic energy by the fall, is being matched perfectly by the drag of the falling object. Unless that falling object has access to additional energy, it cannot go faster than that. If an object is droped from already "falling" aircraft, but that aircraft is not travelling more than the terminal velocity of the bomb, then the terminal velocity of the bomb cannot be increased.
> _


_

I'll concede the point as i'm not enough up on physics to sound halfway intelligent.  Perhaps the speed and height calcs are included in order to ensure the bomb obtains terminal velocity just as a level bomber will bomb higher in order to ensure adequate velocity.





The FAA undertook its first bombing missions with Swordfish in April 1940, in the Norwegian campaign. Ark Royal then continued to train, presumably this included bombing training, for a couple of months before being attached to Force H. I comparison, the aviators of the FAA had spent years training at dropping torpedoes. My opinion is that they were the best trained torpedo bomber squadrons in the weorld by May 1941. Not even the Japanese could match their profiiciency. They were so good, they could hit moving targets, in poor weather, at night, and not only that, could hit a specific part of that target, wityh a high degree of accuracy. I dont beleive there was anyone else in the world who could hope to match that skill .

Click to expand...


I'd argue the point on the Japanese matching it, at least in standard daylight ops given their track record. I don't doubt however that the FAA torepdo squadrons knew their jobs as well but torpedo bombing was their primary task after all which is my point. Dive Bombing, while the SW was technically capable of it to a degree was not the plane's primary attack role and the ASW examples I still believe are more a case of glide bombing vs. out and out dive bombing. A number of USN pilots were cross trained in regards fighters and dive bombers. Technically they were "proficient" but given the lack of practice in comparison i would not rate them as capable as full time DB pilots.

Clay Blair's books on the Uboat war are full of Air ASW examples and just last night again, while reading it i observed another instance where a plane (this time a Catalina) was described as "diving down" on a surfaced uboat and attacking with great skill and proficiency. The evidence based on ASW attacks is IMO not enough to warrent granting a swordfish squadron nor it's pilots full "Dive bomber" status in the same vein as a Ju-87/SBD/D3A._


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## delcyros (Sep 24, 2010)

I really dislike the idea to sidetrap the discussion with quotes and responses, which doesn´t add anything than a spirited up discussion. 
SO my response to the valididty of the BISMARCK´s TDS and the related other BB´s TDS is in part a summery of the problems, in part direct responses. I will try to avoid direct quotes and concentrate on the facts of the discussion in order to make reading and following up the development of the discussion easier.

Part of the discussion was the efficieny of the TDS with problems raised by myselfe to the effectiveness of other modern BB´s TDS and that of BISMARCK in comparison. Contrary to the opinion of Nikedamius, I rate BM´s TDS rather good and made a case out of this with reference to the three hits sustained by the ship before the final action.
NIKEDAMIUS referred to the TDS of LITTORIO and the Pugliese type of protection which was considered rather unorthodox (actually invented by a british designer in the dreadnought period but never implemented in BB design before the modernization of italien Dreadnoughts in the 20´s 30´s). It must be stressed here that the LITTORIO class was about the same tonnage as was BISMARCK, both nations didn´t designed their BB´s with congruence to the 35,000ts stand. limit.
I seriously doubt that the example of VITTORIO VENETO at MATAPAN from an british aerial torpedo is comparable to the experience of BISMARCK. At first, the hit occurred at a different spot. It´s true that the hit occurred at the stern (close to the rudders) but in BM´s case, the rudderengine was directly exposed to blast effects, in VITTORIO´s case it was not. Other than that, little flooding occurred in case of BISMARCK from the stern hit and the contemporary second torpedohit abreast the engine spaces (contained by the TDS), while VITTORIO VENETO soon shipped a total of ~4,000 ts of floodwater from this single torpedohit aft (including counterflooding). The high GM of BISMARCK didn´t made counterflooding necessary. Also, the machine room was temporarely affected in the italien case (speed limited to 19 kts), not so in BM´s case. Judging from this, the effect of an aerial torpedoe was much more pronounced in the VITTORIO VENETO than were two hits in case of BISMARCK, indicating a less effective torpedo damage containment system in the modern italien battleship, enforced by the lower design GM.
The wide stern of the italien BB allowed a three rudder system (one main flanked by two auxilary ones) instead of the twin arrengement of the BM but in the italien case, the rudder itselfe was not blocked in a turning position (only jammed) while in BM´s case, and according to wreckage analysis conducted by Ballard and Cameron, not only the rudder engines were jammed. There is a good reason to believe that also one of the rudders was blocked mechanically and turned by the blast effect. This has drastic consequences to the ability how to repair. And these conducts were endangered by the conditions of BISMARCK´s sortie. While the crew of VITTORIO was able to conduct repairs in calm water (allowing to use divers for repair) without beeing shadowed or engaged by enemy forces, BISMARCK´s crew had to deal with raising seas and a DD night attack. Finally, while VITTORIO returned under the air umbrella of italien and german airforces to Taranto ( a distcance of approx. 400 mls), the BM had to operate under enemy airspace (provided by VICTORIOUS ARK ROYAL) a good 700 mls away from Brest.
To sum up,
[A] The effect as a measure of flooding and interference with the propulsion machines of TT hits was more pronounced in the VITTORIO VENETO (and the sister ship LITTORIO grounded from only three hits at the air attack of TARANTO)
* The effect as a measure of the ability to steer was more pronounced in the BM (but the hit was at a different spot as well). 
[C] The conditions of repair are not comparable and conclusions cannot be drawn since BM had no opportunity to repair the damage before her final battle by means of it´s own (trials with divers were abandoned because of the seastate).

I would also liek to refer once more to the 2nd torpedhit sustained by the BISMARCK in this event. NIKEDAMIUS mentioned that according to W. Garzke, the hit resulted in tearing damage to the TB´s welding seams, resulting in minor progressive flooding beyond it.
I challange Garzke and his interpretation. It is wrong from two points: At first, when he wrote this, there was no wreckage analysis aviable, which could support his speculation and survicors testimony point to different behavior of the TB (which again later was confirmed by wreckage analysis conducted with video documentation of the torpedo bulkhead). Secondly, BISMARCK´s torpedo bulkhead was not welded. According to the BAUBESCHREIBUNG SCHLACHTSCHIFF F the torpedobulkhead of BISMARCK (and TIRPITZ for that matter) was rivetted and not welded, because it was feared that seams of welds may fail under 
stress. The HINDENBURG class was scheduled to have welded torpedobulkheads, not the BISMARCK class. W. Garzke made a mistake.
Garzke and Dunn also made a mistake in considering the effects of the final torpedoattack to be substantial in the sinking. This was in part driven by an attempt to proove that the measures of the german crew to scuttle the ship had little to do with the sinking and only hastened the event. Subsequent research on the other hand indicated that the ship had enough buoyoncy reserve to stay afloat for at least two days when the torpedoing was carried out by RODNEY and DORSETSHIRE, assuming progressive cumulative flooding takes place. The TBD was not defeated by torpedoes according to Göde´s and other accounts. Flooding happened, which is in congruence with the flooding of larger outboard hull sections (void cells outside the holding bulkhead), which indeed would happen if a TT strikes the TDS. 
CAMERON is no naval architect, but so is GARZKE. Both have an historical and technical interest in the matter and from what I can tell You, both, Garzke and B.Jurens have his opinion in high regard. They don´t reject it because he is no naval design expert, his documentation on the wreckage is the best done so far.

I am convinced You don´t fully understand the values of high metacentric height for the margin of stability.
The BISMARCK class didn´t favoured a high GM for gunnery issues, this is counterproductive (the KGV and LITTORIO class both had a deliberate low metacentric height for a pleasant gunnery platform). They 
favoured a high GM because it makes onesided wateringress less effective on the developing list to this side.
See Campbells statement on metacentric height in german ww1 designs (deliberately done in order to have more options once flooding occurred) or some articles publicly aviable on the navweaps site.

Another point of discussion refers to the YAMATO´s TDS. As I said,
ANY main bulkhead beeing of dissimilar material is a cause of errors and failures. In YAMATO´s case this is the joint between the upper and lower main belt. Beside of the problem of having an even and longitodinal joint through basically the whole citadell of the ship, the material is dissimilar. The main torpedobulkhead is made of face hardened armour grade material. This armour is not designed to flex, it will give away after the brittle face is destroyed and has a very rigid structure. The lower belt is made from homogenious armour grade material and designed to flex under the blast effect of a torpedohit. Both materials do not act in the same way when exposed to blast effects, allowing the joint to create a zone of fracture and gaps under blast stress. This design charackteristicum is identic in modern US BB´s other than the NORTH CAROLINA class and the planned but unbuildt MONTANA class. The SD class was constrained by the limits of the WNT, the IOWA class (with an identic system), however, was not.
Under the same conditions, with a blast involving the joint zone of both armour types, the joint will fail unless the blast is small enough to be contained by the lower homogenious part of the belt without beeing flexed.

I will also use this opportunity to explain the torpedo hits sustained on MUSASHI.*


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## delcyros (Sep 24, 2010)

The relevant document is
US technical mission to Japan
No. S-06-2
Reports of damage to japanese warships, artcile 2 (42p.)
YAMATO(BB), MUSASHI(BB),
SHINANO (CV), TAIHO (CV).
Issued january 6th, 1946.

The report contains conclusive evaluation of other reports, inclusing USSBS Interrogation reports No. 32, 35,47, 133 and 149.
I quote from p. 17:


> 3. When this investigation was started, there was little data aviable. That which was aviable was fantastic and completely out of proportion with the charackteristics of the ship, the events which caused YAMATO´s loss, and those involved in the loss of SHINANO. For example the Chief of Staff to the OTC in command reported in USSBS interrogation report No. 149 that she had been hit with 18 torpedoes and 40
> bombs -deriving this information, he said, from survivors. Again, the action report briefed in Article, this report, lists 21 torpedohits. Yet MUSASHI did not sink until about four hours after the end of the last and most vicious attack made against her. It appeared that the well known trait of magnifying disaster had had full rein, with no questions asked by any office of the Naval Ministry.
> 
> 4. Fortunately, the Executive Officer and the Chief Engeneer were made aviable for interrogation. Both had personal notebooks filed with many details of MUSASHI´s loss. Both had interviewed many survivors. Both officers also reported 21 torpedohits, but it turned out that the Executive Officer had assisted in preperation of the action report referred to in (3). Nonetheless, both officers appeared unusually intellegent and well-informed. oncerning ten of the hits, they were able to furnish comparatively large amount of detailed information. On the other eleven they could give absolutely no details, despite the facts that the Executive Officer had received almost all damage controll reports and kept notes of the rports, and that the Engineering Officer was in the machinery spaces almost the entire period of action.





A narrative about the standarts and draft of MUSASHI as well as the details of the action and damage involvd follows. On p. 20f. it goes on with the final attack of the last and most vicious wave:



> 23. Fatal damage was done by torpedoes. Both Captains reported ten hits. Two of these were reported as duds, striking at frame 140 port. While identifying a dud torpedohit in the midst of a heavy air attack offers ground for speculation, the matter was not pressed beyond determining that they had been reported presumably by eyewitnesses. No flooding inboard of the holding bulkhead was reported, in any event.
> 
> 24. Of the remaining eight torpedoes, four were quite well identified by flooding reported by the Chief Engineer and Executive Officer. The first was at frame 75 port, in way of turret No.1 magazines. The magazines on the two lower levels were flooded. This hit was reported by the Executive Officer to have hit in the same area as a hit in the fourth attack (which was not assessed as a hit because no flooding was known by either officer). The second certain hit was near frame 125 port, flooding No.8 firerooms immediately, No. 12 fireroom was flooded more slowly. The third certain hit was near frame 145 port, flooding the port outboard engineroom quite rapidly, altough personal escaped. Again, the Executive Officer believed this hit to be in the way of a previous hit from the second attack (which was not assessed as a hit because no inboard signs of damage were recalled by the Chief Engeneerer). The fourth certain hit was near frame 105 starboard, in way of AA magazines immediately forward of the machinery spaces. Magazines of two lower levels were reported to have flooded.
> 
> ...



A narrative of the counterefforts undertaken to righten up the ship follows, evnetually, these efforts *prooved to be fruitless due to progressive flooding forward*. It should be noted that the TDS coverage was way to low to protect these areas properly and counterflooding measures were very limited once the first measure was initiated.



> B. Discussion
> 
> 32. Aircraft torpedoes with warheads containing 600 lbs Torpex were employed against MUSASHI. The depth settings employed are largely unknown but a few were set quite shallow. It is doubtful if any were more shallow than the submarine torpedo, which struck YAMATO in December 1943 (from section I it will be recalled that the depth of this hit, located by the puddle area on the armour, was about four feet). Therefore, all hits other than duds should have caused some inboard flooding.
> 
> ...



There were also nine certain hits on YAMATO mentioned in the report. To state that MUSASHI was the ship with most damage received by underwaterdamage ever is therefore grossly incorrect, when no more than a total of 6,000 lbs TORPEX was involved in the sinking of the ship (evenly placed starboard and port).
Considering the example of SCHARNHORST returns an equal number of torpedohits sustained by the ship, but these were generally DD or CL based weapons and correspondingly had in between 750 and 805 lbs TORPEX each instead of 600lbs. It should also be noted that the YAMATO class is roughly twice the size of SCHARNHORST.


---------------
addendum to the mods:
maybe it is possible to extract the posts with non ARK ROYAL vs BM relevance into an independent thread?


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## renrich (Sep 24, 2010)

I believe that Cumberland, a fresh CA was waiting outside for Graf Spee along with Ajax and Achilles.


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## RCAFson (Sep 24, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> Hi,
> 
> I believe there was some influence as some calculations i've seen for DB delivered protectiles included both speed and height as a requirement to effect a set estimated penetration. Cambell's work on WW2 weapons includes these figures (300kt dive....release at at least 6500ft etc) Level bombers can only utilize height to influence potential penetration effect. I agree that in the SW case they'd probably have to release higher than a Val, Stuka or Dauntless to compensate for this.
> 
> I'm skeptical on the level of proficiency in regards full DB'ing on ships maneuvering at sea. All the examples i've seen have been against non-moving targets which, no offense to the FAA, but would not require as much proficiency as attacking a moving target. Given the light weight of the bombs used I have a hard time seeing the SW pilots spending any appreciable time practicing DB tactics, at least not till later in the war with the Barracuda arriving.



I would suspect that the preferred weapon of the Swordfish would always be the torpedo, as long as any remain in the magazine, and/or the target is accessible via a torpedo attack. "Stationary" targets were often laying behind anti-torpedo nets or in restricted waters where a torpedo attack was not physically possible, and then a DB attack would come to the fore.


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## tail end charlie (Sep 24, 2010)

renrich said:


> Actually, the Graf Spee had substantial damage and her captain probably made the correct decision to scuttle. Her system for fitering fuel and lubricants was wrecked as well as the system for obtaining fresh water. She had been hit by perhaps more than 30 shells and holed below the water line. A battle between Graf Spee and the two British CLs, seriously impaired and the CA, Cumberland, would have been truly between the "crippled and the arthritic" but the Graf Spee would almost certainly have not made it home with other Allied units speeding to the scene.
> 
> The electronic equipment in WW2 ships was subject to disablement by relatively light damage. The Salt Lake City, CA25, at the Komondorskis, lost much of her electronic capabilities from the concussion of her own ten gun eight inchers, firing the equivalent of eighty salvoes.



That was the point I was making, Graf Spee had not received a hit which penetrated the armour protecting her vitals like magazine and engines but that was enough to cripple her as a fighting ship. 

There were many reasons for the decision to scuttle her, her position was impossible. The ships which he knew were outside Montivideo (apart from the propaganda about Renown and Ark Royal) merely had to shadow until a battle fleet cornered Graf Spee. One thing that affected Langsdorf was the condition of his crew who were very young, they were shaken by the encounter and that was with 6 and 8 inch shells. Langsdorf had conducted a fantastic campaign sinking many merchant ships with no real loss of life but he wasnt a nazi fanatic and not the type to impose a suicide mission on his crew. 

Several of his prisoners attended Langsdorfs funeral who had won their greatest respect, he was a man from a different era.


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## RCAFson (Sep 24, 2010)

Kurfürst said:


> Hi Nik,
> 
> I gotta disagree at here somewhat since your example narrows the types of damage that can be suffered - to reverse your thesis, the belt is still valuable if it stops the enemy shellfire. The ca. 15% longer/larger belt/citadel of the Bismarck - compared to Treaty designs represented a protected box of some 36 meters in length and the same 30-36 meters in width worth of protected buoyancy, or an equivalent of _6500 tons_ of seawater that is NOT within the ship, quite an amount and explains why Bismarck was so damn hard to sink - she had massive reserves in her. I would not call that irrelevant.
> 
> ...



The KGV class had extensions to the belt forward and aft of the main belt, and the deck armour was also extended forward and aft of the main belt, so her protected length was greater then the length of the citadel.

Obviously Bismarck's belt did not make it "completely safe from flooding from a large number of enemy guns at just about any range" since 2 of the 3 14in hits by Prince of Wales caused heavy flooding on Bismarck and left her "_...listing 9 degrees to port and her bow lost 2 metres of freeboard..._". Bismarck's inefficient use of armour left her main belt armour being too shallow and a 14in shell dived under it to cause damage to Bismarck's machinery spaces and cause a 9 degree list.

When Bismarck was sunk the RN battleships were pounding her a close range, in a heavy sea and it was difficult for the shells to strike below the waterline and sink her.


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## pinsog (Sep 24, 2010)

When the last of Bismarcks guns fell silent, why didn't the British battle group cease fire and send in the destroyers and or light cruisers to finish her with torpedoes?


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## tail end charlie (Sep 24, 2010)

pinsog said:


> When the last of Bismarcks guns fell silent, why didn't the British battle group cease fire and send in the destroyers and or light cruisers to finish her with torpedoes?



pinsong

that is pretty much what happened, there has always been a discussion as to whether she was sunk or scuttled

from wiki

Bismarck continued to fly her ensign. With no sign of surrender, despite the unequal struggle, the British were loath to leave Bismarck. Their fuel and shell supplies were low, a demonstration of how difficult it was for a battleship to sink a similar unit, even in an unbalanced engagement; however, when it became obvious that their enemy could not reach port, Rodney, King George V and the destroyers were sent home. Norfolk had no torpedoes left, so Dorsetshire launched three 21-inch (533 mm) torpedoes at comparatively short range, which may have hit Bismarck. The battleship's upper works were almost completely destroyed but her engines were still functioning, although Johannes "Hans" Zimmermann, a boiler room stoker who survived, confirms that salt water had entered the boiler feed lines causing the engineers to reduce speed to seven knots, fearing an explosion,[51] and the hull appeared to be relatively sound; therefore, rather than risk her being captured, survivors have said the order to scuttle and then abandon ship was given. Many of the crew went into the water, but few sailors from the lower engine spaces survived. As Captain Lindemann was presumed killed with all officers after the bridge was hit by a 16-inch (410 mm) shell, it is unclear whether he could have given the order to scuttle.


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## parsifal (Sep 24, 2010)

The British were in a hurry to finish her off because of fuel concerns. Most of the Destroyers had already turned back, and my best guess is that the british simply did not believe they had completely overpowered her so quickly. If the heavy units left the scene, they would do so for several daysbecause of the fuel issue. So the BBs basically rolled up, emptied their magazines into the bismarck asnd then pulled back.


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## RCAFson (Sep 24, 2010)

parsifal said:


> So the BBs basically rolled up, emptied their magazines into the bismarck asnd then pulled back.



AFAIK, KGV and Rodney only fired about a 1/3 of their main armament ammo at Bismarck.


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## renrich (Sep 24, 2010)

The Graf Spee had only cruiser type armor and it was penetrated many times during the battle. Reportedly her boiler room was penetrated by an eight inch shell from Exeter.


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## tail end charlie (Sep 24, 2010)

renrich said:


> The Graf Spee had only cruiser type armor and it was penetrated many times during the battle. Reportedly her boiler room was penetrated by an eight inch shell from Exeter.



The Graf Spee was a pocket battleship using welded construction and diesel engines which allowed more armour and heavier guns 11 inch and 5.7inch against the exeters 8 and Ajax and Achillies 6inch. The Exeter was quickly out of the battle and the ajax and achillies were also heavily damaged. 

The point I was making was that even the biggest battleship could be rendered almost useless with a few hits. For example one hit on a turret on exeters front turret didnt penetrate the turret but killed almost everyone on the bridge and rendered the turret inoperable. The basic thinking about ships didnt change substantially from Trafalgar to 1939 bigger guns more and fire power which could be rendered useless with one lucky hit from the enemy or a small advance in armour piercing (time delay) shells (like at jutland)


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## pinsog (Sep 24, 2010)

tail end charlie said:


> pinsong
> 
> that is pretty much what happened, there has always been a discussion as to whether she was sunk or scuttled
> 
> ...



Yes, I was aware of what happened. My question was, why would they continue to fire at Bismarck with naval cannon after they had disabled her weapons, when they could have fired torpedoes into her from point blank range. If I had been in charge, I would have ceased fire and ordered all of my destroyers to make torpedo runs from 5 or 600 yards, all on one side. Just seems to me like this would be a more effective way to sink her than naval gunfire would be.


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## Kurfürst (Sep 25, 2010)

RCAFson said:


> The KGV class had extensions to the belt forward and aft of the main belt, and the deck armour was also extended forward and aft of the main belt, so her protected length was greater then the length of the citadel.



Its a bit a matter of defintition, but as far as I am aware, this was only splinter protection, generally not considered protected lenght (since it doesn't really offer protection).



> Obviously Bismarck's belt did not make it "completely safe from flooding from a large number of enemy guns at just about any range" since 2 of the 3 14in hits by Prince of Wales caused heavy flooding on Bismarck and left her "_...listing 9 degrees to port and her bow lost 2 metres of freeboard..._".



That's why I said large number of guns, and not all kind of guns. 



RCAFson said:


> Bismarck's inefficient use of armour left her main belt armour being too shallow and a 14in shell dived under it to cause damage to Bismarck's machinery spaces and cause a 9 degree list.



Appearantly the King George V class's use of belt armor was even more inefficient, since even though they used a very deep and thicker belt, at much greater expanse of weight, Bismarck's 15" shells was still capable of diving under it and cause similiar flooding, despite the shell not exploding properly. That's lucky because KGV's internal bulkhead was somewhat weaker than on Bismarck.

As for the 14" hitting the German ship under the belt, it didn't damage or get into the machinery rooms. The 45mm torpedo bulkhead contained the explosion, but iirc some weld seams broke and water poured in. The design itself seems quite sound to me, the workmanship on the welds less so - appearantly a common problem of the era.

As a result one of the four electric generator room was flooded, however it was of little consequence since the ship had 200% reserves in that regard (redundancy again!). IIRC after the battle water was pumped out, and the leaks contained, the generators re-started again, but later a torpedo hit the same damaged spot and tore up the welds again, and the generator room was flooded again.


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## Kurfürst (Sep 25, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> Kurfürst said:
> 
> 
> > Part III.
> ...



I am afraid you are the one being incorrect here. Okun:

"The bow of the BISMARCK was essentially unarmored except for very thin 0.787" (20 mm) Wh deck plating at the fourth deck level below the waterline extending about a third of the way toward the bow from the forward armored transverse bulkhead of the Citadel and light belt plating at the waterline to reduce the chance of fragments causing leaks. This level of protection of the bow was normal for ships of that period - some had no reinforcement at all of the bow area."



> I never said there was a middle belt on Bismarck. Hood was used as an example demonstrating the weight penalties of having multiple belt's of varying thicknesses and the restrictions it imposes on primary belt armor depth and thickness, as well as demonstrating the added vulnerability to modern heavy shellfire.



Agreed, but I think the analouge between Hood and Bismarck is a bit far fetched - Hood was simply underarmored, Bismarck wasn't.



> The designer's insistance on provisioning an upper belt of 145mm cost weight and took away displacement that might have been used to thicken the primary belt.



Yes it might have been used to thicken the primary belt, of course! But then the same if not more armor weight would have to be added to the barbettes, the secondary turrets barbettes, and the main armored deck to compensate for it. As it already explained, the use of the high 145mm belt was more weight efficient in the overall protection scheme of the ship.



> This belt would be of no use against heavy shellfire and as mentioned the upper belt's function in keeping out medium caliber shellfire proved to be an overestimation as well.



As noted the 145mm rendered the barbettes below the oberdeck virtually immune to the largest shells calibers, and it was also immune to the secondary guns of British battleships and the main armament of British vessels up to cruisers, while still providing adequate protection against 8" calibres.



> Reducing barbette thickness behind such a belt does not compensate for a singular thicker layer of armor.



The Italians politely disagree - the use of seperate 70mm decapping belt with a 280mm belt behind it proved to offer considerably higher ballistic protection than equivalent weight and thickness found on certain other designs of the era.

The French also seem to disagree here as they used a - albeit much thinner - turtle deck behind their belt armor to provide additional protection, much like Bismarck did.



> Seperate layers of armor thicknesses are weaker balistically than one single thickness. The same principle applies to deck armor. A single homogenous layer of deck armor is stronger than either two seperate decks who's thickness equals that of the single deck that consists of two layers of armor sandwiched together.



Its true _for homogenous_ armor, ie. the type used on the decks. But only for them, and without considering other factors - yawing induced by penetrating several layers of armor etc.

Vertical armor used on naval vessels was face hardened however, with the surface of the armor hardened to extreme levels, designed to shatter projectiles nose on impact, grossly reducing penetration capabilities or even breaking up the projectile and rendering it inert. For this reason projectiles were built with a sacrificable armor piercing cap, designed to be shattered by the face hardened top layers of armor, so the actual nose of the AP projectile can do the penetration. 

As an anti-anti solution, the Italians started using seperated decapping plates (70mm seperate plates outside the main armor belt) on the 1930s VV battleships. It was designed to strip the AP projectile from is armor piercing cap, so when it actually hit the main armor (280mm thickness), it would shatter on impact. 
Bismarck's 145mm when hit would perform the same function, it would certainly strip the AP projectile of its AP and ballistic cap, and slow it down a bit, and the round would shatter on impact when actually hitting the barbette - down to ranges of 5000 yards or so as per Okun's FACEHARD program.

This is an equivalent of the protection offered by single 30" face hardened plate, but using much less weight.



> This is not supported by any research I have read including Garzke and Dunn's extensive study of the class (Axis Battleships of WWII) I would be interested in seeing evidence to support this declaration.



I suggest then to turn to George Elder, he lurks on several naval boards. 

In any case, the theory that Germans would only use a 145mm belt because of their fear of destroyer attacks distressingly lacks evidence. The Scharnhorst class was already adequately protected against such threats with a 50mm top belt, and there wasnt any serious need to triple its ballistic protection, if destroyers were a concern.

Compared to the Scharnhorsts, the Germans added 95mm thickness to the top belt (50 -> 145mm) on one deck level height, and then shaved off some 120mm from four barbettes (from 340mm down to 220mm below the oberdeck) on two deck levels height, and yet got much better barbette protection, apart from the other benefits.

Now assuming one deck on the Bismarck was 2 meter (somewhat irrelevant as the same is assumed for the barbettes), the math goes as follows:

Added armor weight of upper side belt: 170 m (citadel lenght) x 2 m (assumed height of one deck) x 2 (as they are on both sides) x .095 = 64 m3. 
This is the volume. To get the added weight, multiply with 7.8 (density of steel, ton per cubic meter for those metrically challanged  : ca. 500 tons added.

Now, 120 mm was shaved off from four barbettes, each 10 meter in diameter.

Volume is roughly 2rPhi x 4 (number of barbettes) x 4m (decks) x 0.120 = 3.14 x 10 x 4 x 4 x .120 = 60 m3. To get the weight reduction, as above, 60m3 x 7.8 t = 470 tons.

So balance sheet:
+ 500 tons added to the top belt
- 470 tons shaved off from the barbettes
- and unknown amount but probably quite substantial amount that didn't need to be added to the main armor deck, the secondary barbettes.

*Result*: barbettes below the Oberdeck are now completely safe from even the largerst caliber shells due to decapping effects (tell the Italian designers they weren't), the protection offered by the main armored deck is boosted, the whole citadel is completely immune up to 6" as has reasonable protection against 8" shellfire up to around 15-16 000 feet (a small window, as only the top belt becomes vulnerable, but the top deck and the main belt is still safe).

Of course it can be suggested that the guy who designed both Scharnhorst and Bismarck simply didn't thought of this and randomly drew lines, took away armor and put it elsewhere at Wilhelmshaven or whereever but I simply do not buy it.


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## Kurfürst (Sep 25, 2010)

Part II.



> > any hit on the main belt would be rejected into the upper works, as you are well aware, and make mess of the laundry room but at least the ship doesn't go kaboom or to a full stop.
> 
> 
> 
> Where data and power transmission systems are located as well.



If you mean fire control data, the forward communications tube was behind a 220 mm thick armored barbette of 1 meter in diameter, running from the station down to the main armored deck. Good luck with that after going through the belt, bouncing back from the main armored deck. The FC rooms (two of them, one aft, one fore) were under the main under deck.

The rear one was the same, but of 50mm thickness, certainly enough to keep fragments out, and keep it safe - an issue only if the forward FC post already fallen out (in practice, neither of the three FC stations were lost to this, but to direct hits on the FC towers). 

I am cuirous about what kind power transmission systems were located there, and were vulnerable. I doubt power for the main turrets were exposed in this manner - they had local, electrically driven hydraulics. I absolutely doubt anyone would have designed the electric lines in the most complicated manner, to run above the main armor deck, when it could be lead simply and perfectly safe under the Panzerdeck and through the barbettes. It would seem like a major design failure, especially from a Navy that was there at the largest dreadnaught battle ever at Jutland.



> Placing the deck armor on top of the primarry belt increases the area of protected bouyancy against heavy shellfire. A splinter deck underneath the primary armor deck (as provisioned on USN battleships) was an integral part of the A/N system as it was meant to catch any fragments resulting from shell impacts on the primary armor deck...either shell fragments and/or deck armor fragments keeping the below spaces intact.



Yes but to stop shell fragments you need to spread additional 20-30mm worth of armor over a very large area (as decks are far larger in area than belts). Essentially wasted weight as it performs no other function.. And there's still the kaboom problem when something big hits the main belt at normal battle ranges, say, near the magazines..? 

What is there between the top and bottom of the main belt that's worth protecting from plunging fire? 



> Don't be silly, a 145 mm armor plate is was certainly proof against UK (or anyone else's) 152mm shellfire.



See Garzke and Dunn (Axis Battleship of WWII) for more information.[/quote]

Please see Okun for more information. 

"This armor is proof against all fragments and all nose-fuzed high explosive projectiles, even if they make a direct hit in most cases. At longer ranges it was proof against most cruiser guns, especially those firing large-cavity base-fuzed Common or Semi-Armor-Piercing (SAP) projectiles without armor-piercing caps, as did a great many cruiser guns at the time. Note that the British used such an uncapped Common projectile (CPBC) in their 6" (152 mm) cruiser guns, but they also used an unusual compromise 8" (203 mm) projectile that was an SAP design with an armor-piercing cap added (SAPC), which gave a rather good capability against medium-thickness face-hardened armor such as the BISMARCK's upper side hull at near right-angle impact, though it broke up against heavier armor or at high obliquity."

The following tables based on Okun's ballistic model show that the German 15cm naval gun mounted on the Bismarck, of roughly comparable ballistic performance to the British one, but firing uncompromised AP shells, had a capabilty to pierce Bismarck upper side belt at below 8000 yards distance. But it just does not occur to me economical to get within 8000 yards near a 50 000 ton battleship in a cruiser, hoping to get some lucky hits on the upper side belt with 6" guns...

So kindly show me a 6" gun that could be expected to penetrate a 145 mm face hardened plate at any reasonable range.



> > I disagree on that, it did not impose any weight penalty worth speaking of - [3 tripple vs 4 twin]
> 
> 
> 
> That is incorrect. See Garzke Dunn, Friedman, D.K Brown. for more details.



I am afraid you are incorrect here - see Jack Brower for more details. Triple three gun turrets were considered for Bismarck at around March-April 1935. They were dismissed on the basis of additional weight. 

Also look up the weight of the barbettes and turrets of Vittorio Veneto (3x3) vs Bismarck (4x2). You will be surprised. For example Littorio's barbettes were 13 m wide - vs 10 meter for Bismarck - to accomodate the larger triple turrets (1595 t each ) with similiar protection as Bismarck's turrets (1052 t). 

That's 3 x 1595 = 4785 t vs 4208 t for turrets alone, so Bismarcks four turrets actually weight less  than Littorio's three. Of course there is an extra gun - for 500 tons extra (ie. the whole weight of the damned upper side belt of Bismarck), in an by all likelihood more cramped turret with lower rate of fire.

As for the barbettes - we talk about 1/4 fewer barbettes of some 1/3 greater diameter. When you consider citadel lenght - again 3x13m long barbettes vs. 4x10 meter long barbettes. Nothing's for free, and the math goes deeper than 3 turrets < 4 turrets. 

PS: I promise this is my last wall o text in this thread. I guess we covered it very well already.


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## delcyros (Sep 25, 2010)

Was BISMARCK´s armour protection system based on an older ww1 scheme? Superficially, one may get the impression, there is a comparably thick upper side belt (not as thick as ww1 grosse Kreuzer or Linienschiffe), a main armour deck with slopes and a comparably thick armoured weatherdeck. But the similarities are ending here. By intention, the ww1 german armour scheme tried to keep the projectile out of the entire hull (hence an up to 250mm thick upper side belt on BAYERN, which would be impenetrable unless suicidal close ranges are established or more modern shells are introduced, which was the case in german and austro-hungarian navies since 1912, in the RN during 1918 but not in the USN or RM or FN until the 20´s). The main armour deck in the BAYERN´s is only 30 to 50mm thick and not able to deflect major calibre projectiles striking at an angle less than 70 deg. It was meant as splinter protection, only.
In the BISMARCK class -on the other hand- deliberate studies of the all-or-nothing armour scheme (known since 1914 in the department K of the german navy) and the abilities of modern penetrators showed that "no amount of side amrour is powerful enough to stop modern APC unless it is enforced by a slope behind" (HOYER 1940). The main armour deck and the slopes were thicker, made from full grade armour material (and both, the slopes and main deck was made a bit harder than other Wh applications, ca. 250 BHN instead of 225 BHN) and deliberately in order to break uncapped projectiles when striking it. This makes penetration in an fit to burst condition less likely when penetration is possible. A great departure from ideas formulated in ww1. The less height of protection due to the lower placed armour deck is compensated by a minutelike subdivision of the spaces above and a larger extension of the protected area, called citadell towards both, bow stern. In addition to this protection against major calibre HE and medium calibre APC is given to the citadells upper part with the 50 to 80mm thick armoured weatherdeck and the 145mm KC/n face hardened upper side belt (contured 0 to 35 degrees, vertical midships, inclined at the ends of the citadell, where the main turrets are), followed by a 30 to 75mm thick splinter bulkhead behind.
A case could be made that this scheme may trigger the fuze of a major calibre APC, which otherwise would went out of the ship unexploded. But this depends on the exact nature of the fuze. In case of US and british fuzes, which deleted the double plate sensitivity and required a single, thick plate to trigger the fuze this may be the case. With german fuzes it´s not. They had single double plate sensitivity with graze function, meaning that any projectile striking a deck (even unarmoured) would usually trigger the fuze of an APC and many cases when two plates in short succession (even unarmoured) are penetrated would trigger the fuze as well. From that perspective, they expected enemy shells to behave like their own ones. AoN does depend on the fuze action, not on the strength of the own protective system. And in many cases the protection is not maximazed against major calibre impacts. The Immune Zone for the emebedded vitals (machinery spaces, ship centrals and magazines) of BISMARCK is much larger correspondingly and interestingly extends from very short range to medium range. AoN scheme´s provide protection for comparably long ranges, only. The experience of BISMARCK with the engagements at Denmark Street and her final battle proove that the designers choice to protect the mebedded vitals between 5000 yards and ~28000 yards* was a correct one, a protection in between 20000 and 30000 yards could have been made possible with AoN but decisive engagements happened at closer range. It may be possible to disable her with gunfire on the exposed vitals (turrets, CT) but this applies to basically every battleship. Even non penetrating hits may disable turrets.

*) based upon cassion tests carried out 1935 with a 1:1 installation of the ships armour protective system onboard former Pre Dreadnought SMS HESSEN. The ship was fired upon with the old 38cmL45 SK C/13 and the new 38cmL52 SK C/36 using APC L4,4 at distances between 1000m and 25000m. Neither via the deck nor via the sides could major calibre gunfire reach the vitals. The details to these tests are missing, from original documentation I only know the results but we would like to see shell by shell details as well.


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## renrich (Sep 25, 2010)

My sources say that the Graf Spee's maximum armor thickness was around 3-3.5 inches. The 5.9 inch guns she carried had only splinter shields and could easily be put out of action by six inch guns or even smaller. My sources say that the engine room spaces of GS were penetrated by an 8 inch shell from Exeter and that was how the fuel and lubricant filtering system was badly damaged.


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## Nikademus (Sep 25, 2010)

Hi,



delcyros said:


> I seriously doubt that the example of VITTORIO VENETO at MATAPAN from an British aerial torpedo is comparable to the experience of BISMARCK.



The stern area represents the Achilles Heel of a warship in general. Designers can only do so much in this area and there efforts therein and the difference in performance makes VV and Bismarck's experience very comparable. To say they hit in a different location is a straw man as few if any warships suffer hits in the exact same location as one another. Bismarck's stern proved more vulnerable given she contained a design flaw in the stern, one that impacted German warships of that period in general. The close proximity of her rudders to each other provided little redundancy and the triple screw arrangement which made steering efforts either bereft of the main rudders or with the rudders damaged practically impossible. (i.e. the ship had problems with directional stability unless it had a fully functional rudder) The similarity of Bismarck's stern damage to torpedo hits that struck Prinz Eugen and Lutzow supports the contention that part of the stern itself collapsed onto the rudders. 

VV, also struck in the stern area makes for a valid comparison. The ship' designers stressed longitudinal separation of the props and rudder and also provided redundancy in the form of two aux rudders. So right off the bat, the situation would have been different even had a torpedo struck in the same spot as Bismarck (the aux rudders and four prop arrangement would have allowed a much better chance for aux steering) That VV suffered more flood damage was a natural consequence of the fact that the hull in the stern area containing the props was larger in comparison to the small lateral area of Bismarck's stem (where that ship's torpedo hit occurred) and is ultimately irrelevant. Neither ship's safety in terms of sinking was threatened. GM had nothing to do with a need or no need for counter flooding The critical factor in both cases was mobility. Bismarck was made immobile and would most likely have remained so even had Luthjens agreed to try to blow off the damaged equipment illregardless of the sea state. The calmer sea state was a helpful factor for VV but the greater redunancy and lateral seperation of her props and primary rudders with provision for aux steering also factored. 



> I would also liek to refer once more to the 2nd torpedhit sustained by the BISMARCK in this event. NIKEDAMIUS mentioned that according to W. Garzke, the hit resulted in tearing damage to the TB´s welding seams, resulting in minor progressive flooding beyond it.
> I challange Garzke and his interpretation. It is wrong from two points: At first, when he wrote this, there was no wreckage analysis aviable, which could support his speculation and survicors testimony point to different behavior of the TB (which again later was confirmed by wreckage analysis conducted with video documentation of the torpedo bulkhead)




Garzke and Dunn re-analyzed Bismarck and her loss after the ship was found and filmed. This analysis does take into account the recent expeditions to Bismarck on the ocean floor. They also take into account crew survivor stories. . You continue to emphasis "wreckage analysis" (i.e. video documentation) to prove that Bismarck's TDS was never penetrated. Examining a wreck under the ocean is what a former associate of mine (Author Richard Worth) once likened to navigating a funhouse with a little flashlight. Yes, the entire wreck is "visible" however much of the hull is not open to detailed inspection. Despite this, you continue to claim that "wreckage analysis" shows that none of the torpedo hits penetrated the TDS and that “crew accounts” refute Garzke and Dunn’s analysis. Both counts are wrong. But's its clear to me that your not going to take my word for this so rather than waste more time on it, I'll just quote Mr. Worth's post from 4 years back regarding Cameron's expedition, wrecks on the ocean floor in general and such with. He worded it better than I've come up with thus far and I grow weary of having "CAMERON" pushed into my face, so henceforth I will not comment in detail on his "wreckage analysis" further.

_
I'm sure there are any number of war wrecks on the ocean floor without any obvious fatal damage. As I pointed out previously, Bismarck's scuttling damage is not visible either. 
In the Bismarck photo thread, someone recently posted a nice picture showing the wreck with an ROV hovering over it. The entire wreck is clearly visible. If only that were a realistic depiction! In reality, inspection of the wreck is somewhat akin to navigating a fun house with only an Itty Bitty Booklight to see by. What little is visible tends to be disorienting. And as mentioned already, much of the hull is not open to inspection anyway. A portion of the starboard (?) side below the waterline is visible, with the outer plating missing. This in itself caused some debate as there was difficulty in determining exactly what was visible beyond the missing hull shell--was it the torpedo bulkhead or the bulkhead for the fuel blister? I believe they decided it was the torpedo bulkhead. 
_
[author Richard Worth -aka "Tiornu"] commenting on Bismarck's discovery and war wrecks in general in 2006.



> . Secondly, BISMARCK´s torpedo bulkhead was not welded. According to the BAUBESCHREIBUNG SCHLACHTSCHIFF F the torpedobulkhead of BISMARCK (and TIRPITZ for that matter) was rivetted and not welded, because it was feared that seams of welds may fail under
> stress. The HINDENBURG class was scheduled to have welded torpedobulkheads, not the BISMARCK class. W. Garzke made a mistake.



Garzke and Dunn "Axis Battleships of WWII"

_ With the progressive increase in the use of electric arc welding in German warship construction, the Bismarck and Tirpitz were 90-95% welded. Welding was used in some connections in the non-heat-treated armor plate, since a special electrode for this type of armor steel had been perfected. In both ships, the entire hull and all the non-face-hardened armor plate, *with the exception of the torpedo bulkhead and the lower armor deck, * were welded. The structure the principle decks was also welded. *Seams and butts were welded.* _

It would appear the authors made no error after all. You are correct in that the "H" class battleships were to have fully welded torpedo bulkheads as part of their design.



> Garzke and Dunn also made a mistake in considering the effects of the final torpedoattack to be substantial in the sinking. This was in part driven by an attempt to proove that the measures of the german crew to scuttle the ship had little to do with the sinking and only hastened the event.
> Subsequent research on the other hand indicated that the ship had enough buoyoncy reserve to stay afloat for at least two days when the torpedoing was carried out by RODNEY and DORSETSHIRE, assuming progressive cumulative flooding takes place.



I don't think they made a mistake at all. The crux of your argument continually orbits around the original two 18in torpedo hits before the crippling third 18in hit. The authors concluded based on crew interviews, design study and other evidence (including the expeditions) that the Bismarck's SPS was "adequate" against these weapons with minor leakage reported after the torps struck, aided in part by the armor belt. They go on to conclude that the SPS was inadequate vs. the 21 inch torpedoes and that they made substantial contributions to the ship's sinking. In these instances you claim that "wreckage analysis" proves that none of these hits did much either which is baloney as is the accusation that the authors are trying to play up "Scuttled" vs. sunk. 
(continued)


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## Nikademus (Sep 25, 2010)

> CAMERON is no naval architect, but so is GARZKE.



James Cameron is an accomplished film director and producer. His documentary on Bismarck is an excellent piece of work. Mr. Cameron however, as stated, is not a naval architect nor professional historian. His examination of Bismarck is NOT the all encompassing analysis that you continually repute it to be. 

William Garzke Jr. graduated with a degree in Naval architecture and Marine engineering. He further gained a Masters in applied mathematics and was indeed employed as a naval architect. 

Robert Dulin is a US naval academy graduate and has won honors for his detailed study of the Yamato class battleships. Both Mr. Dulin and Professor Garzke have studied battleship design , construction and these ship's operational careers for over three decades. Yes, I do place them in high regard. That's why I made the investment to obtain their works.



> Another point of discussion refers to the YAMATO´s TDS. As I said,
> ANY main bulkhead beeing of dissimilar material is a cause of errors and failures



The defect in Yamato’s TDS was not due to two different materials being in close approximation to each other. It was defective because of the joint itself, the design of which permitted the armor belt above it to rotate under explosive loads, driving the supporting structure through at the joint through the longitudinal bulkhead inboard of the armor belts. This defect was not present in SoDak or Iowa.




> The relevant document is
> US technical mission to Japan
> No. S-06-2
> Reports of damage to japanese warships, artcile 2 (42p.)
> ...



Thx for the document. I went back and checked Garzke/Dunn who's analysis post dates this report. I'll reiterate that Mr. Dunn graduated from the US naval academy and did an extensive study of the Yamato class. In researching for their book I'm sure historical documents like the one you cited were factored into it, particularily those created by prior USN investigators.

It appears too that I made an error in a previous post. The number of hits from torpedoes, based on Garzke and Dunn's work appears to be 20 vs. Musashi, not 10. 

1027 - Frame 130 starboard
1138 - Frame 85/102/140 port
1217 - Frame 60 starboard
1253 - Frame 70/70 (port/starboard)/110/138 starboard /40 port
1445 - Frame 60/75/125/140x3/145/165 port /80/105 starboard

total 20. In addition there were 18 near misses from bomb hits, some of which added to the hull damage/flooding. 
Yamato suffered 13 hits (11 certain, 2 probable) and at least 8 bomb hits.
1245 Frame 8 port
1259 Frame 123/150/192(probable) port
1342 Frame 123/131/142/148(probable) port/ 0125 starboard
1359 - 1402 
133/153/211 port/150 starboard

Note the placement of the torpedo hits on Yamato. All but 2 to port. This is a direct reflection of the prior experience the USN had with Musashi which absorbed twice the amount of ordinance over an extended period of time before succumbing to progressive flooding. By concentrating on one side of the ship they were able to nearly halve the amount of ordinance needed in a shorter period of time. The above experience also meshes with Russell Spur's account of Yamato's last sortie in comparison and relation to Musashi.



> To state that MUSASHI was the ship with most damage received by underwater damage ever is therefore grossly incorrect, when no more than a total of 6,000 lbs TORPEX was involved in the sinking of the ship (evenly placed starboard and port).
> Considering the example of SCHARNHORST returns an equal number of torpedo hits sustained by the ship, but these were generally DD or CL based weapons and correspondingly had in between 750 and 805 lbs TORPEX each instead of 600lbs. It should also be noted that the YAMATO class is roughly twice the size of SCHARNHORST.


***
Scharnhorst was struck by 340kg warheads. About 749LB of TORPEX. However before the coup de’grace being administered by cruiser and destroyer attack, the Scharnhorst, mostly disabled and wrecked at this point and moving at only 5 knots had only been struck by 4 confirmed torpedoes. 2 more may have occurred as observed by the DD’s during the coup de' grace period which would most likely have struck the armor belt directly given how low in the water the ship was sitting. She may have been struck by more as she was foundering but it can't be confirmed. I don’t see how this concentrated pulse of damage against a crippled ship hardly puts her in the same league as Yamato.


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## Nikademus (Sep 25, 2010)

Kurfürst said:


> I am afraid you are the one being incorrect here. Okun:



You said: "However the idea that the ends of the ships are sacrificial in their nature and need no protection at all does not seem to have been much accepted with designers "

Taken as a whole, yes your statement is incorrect. In an All or Nothing design (which Bismarck was not) the ends are considered sacrificial as they do not threaten the primary function and safety of the ship (Steering gear an exception of course) The armor deck in some A/N designs covers the ship beyond the citidel to some degree, for example the KGV class primary deck armor terminates at the forward armored bulkhead in front of A turret. Two decks down there is seperate section of deck armor to frame 65 (100mm) from Frame 65 yo 41 it thins to 62mm stretching to 9 providing light protection from bombs. Others, like Yamato had no deck armor forward of the citidel. Richelleu's primary deck armor terminates at Frame185 where it completes the roof to the forward primary armored bulkhead. Like KGV, the ship has a light 40mm stretch of deck armor from Frame 185 to 233 offering a small degree of protection from any exploding HE ordiance from above. Dunkerque's primary armor deck terminates at Frame 165 in front of A turret over the primary forward armored bulkhead. There is no armor protection from there to the bow. Littorio's deck armor thins to 70mm in front of A turret and terminates at Frame 199. From Frame 199 to 230(bow) there is no armor. Common factor in all these examples....the primary (main) armor deck thicknesses begin at the forward armored bulkhead representing the forpart of the armored citidel, completing the armored box meant to defend the ship against it's primary advesary type. (another BB's primary armament)



> The Italians politely disagree - the use of separate 70mm decapping belt with a 280mm belt behind it proved to offer considerably higher ballistic protection than equivalent weight and thickness found on certain other designs of the era.



The Italian layered belt was an interesting experiment, one they placed great faith in. Tests against the system were mixed. 2 heavy shells were stopped, the third passed through. However this 'layered' belt still represents a single armor system comprising mulitple armor layers in contact with each other (also descried as a 'sandwich' armor combo) which is a different proposition vs. a shell passing through one seperate and independant layer of armor and then facing another seperate and independant layer a set distance away with no contact or mutual support. You quoted "Okun" multiple times so I know your aware of his views on this.

The Italian solution of multiple layers within a single armor system touches upon two imposing theories on armor resistance when the layers are in contact with each other (as was the case with the Italian layered belt, designed to encourage decapping). Theory 1 is negative - that with when you have a total thickness made up of two separate layers in contact, that as the projectile penetrates the outer plate, armor is pushed away with less sheer resistance opposing motion along the contact area. Theory 2 is positive - that the projectile must break two plates, where the initial energy may significant, and the back-up plate (or plates) support resistance of the first plate against plugging. British tests suggested that "layered" armor might prove stronger vs. a single layer armor of equal thickness. USN tests against layered deck armor suggested the opposite. According to Lorin Bird and Robert Livingston, combining the two theories layered armor (or sandwhich armor, however you want to term it), offers armor resistance from equal to near equal thickness should equal or slightly exceed total thickness, whereas resistance from unequal plates _in contact_ would be based on 50% to 70% of the thinner plate plus greater thickness. Of additional note, British tests suggested an 11% increase (vs. panzer layered armor) while USN tests indicated resistance was 7.5 to 12.5% less than the total combined thickness. The prewar Italian test for what would become Littorio's layered armor belt as mentioned, returned mixed results.




> The French also seem to disagree here as they used a - albeit much thinner - turtle deck behind their belt armor to provide additional protection, much like Bismarck did.



The French primary armor deck was placed on top of the belt. A lower armor deck was fitted in order to provide an additional layer of protection and to reinforce/buttress the armor belt. A teritary purpose was also to cover the steering gear. The French were most concerned circa 1935 about the threat of high level bombs and this influenced their design decisions. It was a good system but proved vulnerable to 16inch plunging fire which was able to more easily defeat the two seperate and unsupported armor thicknesses more easily vs. had they had a primary armor deck of one single thickness.




> Vertical armor used on naval vessels was face hardened however, with the surface of the armor hardened to extreme levels, designed to shatter projectiles nose on impact, grossly reducing penetration capabilities or even breaking up the projectile and rendering it inert. For this reason projectiles were built with a sacrificable armor piercing cap, designed to be shattered by the face hardened top layers of armor, so the actual nose of the AP projectile can do the penetration.



None of which changes the fact that a single layer of armor is provides more resistance vs. seperate multiple layers. The italian example represents a single belt of armor which happenes to be made up of different materials in order to promote the idea of de-capping, which is not an exact science. They did not place a single thinner belt on the outer hull, followed by one or more "belts" internally to promote the shattering and breaking up of the shell. As mentioned their solution had merit but did not prove 100% effective in tests nor was the system tested in battle. The US and UK took a more conventional approach to 'decapping' with face hardened armor. The latter in particular approached the issue from a quality persective and worked to increase the effectiveness of their Cemented Armor (CA) for the KGV class. It's been estimated that this armor, vs. heavy caliber shells was 25% more effective than it's contemporaries. The USN developed heavy FH armor that proved best against medium caliber shellfire but suffered scalability issues against larger shells making it less effective than desired 



> If you mean fire control data, the forward communications tube was behind a 220 mm thick armored barbette of 1 meter in diameter, running from the station down to the main armored deck. Good luck with that after going through the belt, bouncing back from the main armored deck. The FC rooms (two of them, one aft, one fore) were under the main under deck.



The slope created by the low armor turtleback will help direct shells up into upper decks and superstructure. A battleship's systems are not all located under the primary armor deck. It is true that these systems (including radar and optical fire control systems) can't be fully protected on any battleship and soft kill/disablement is a viable alternative to outright sinking via catastrophic damage. The low slung armor belt also reduced, as mentioned the actual protected bouyancy of the ship.



> Yes but to stop shell fragments you need to spread additional 20-30mm worth of armor over a very large area (as decks are far larger in area than belts). Essentially wasted weight as it performs no other function.. And there's still the kaboom problem when something big hits the main belt at normal battle ranges, say, near the magazines..?



Stopping shell fragments is an important consideration independent of how high or low the deck is placed. The Americans introduced this feature into their battleships on the correct acknowledgement that plunging shellfire is not a simple matter of rejection or penetration. Often armor spalling occurs even in situations where the shell itself is rejected. In other situations a partial penetration might be effected. Placing the armor deck higher, in addition to increasing the area of protected buoyancy also allows more solid protection of critical spaces from plunging fire. The lower splinter deck of SPS (Special Treatment Steel) thus enhances the protective effect provided by the primary armor deck.




> So kindly show me a 6" gun that could be expected to penetrate a 145 mm face hardened plate at any reasonable range.



The ranges in which the British cruisers defeated it was apparently considered reasonable.



> I am afraid you are incorrect here - see Jack Brower for more details. Triple three gun turrets were considered for Bismarck at around March-April 1935. They were dismissed on the basis of additional weight.



I did.....per Brower's text; "*Nine* 380mm guns in triple turrets were also considered because it would have meant an increase over the desired set displacement." This sentence does not refute Garzke's design commentary.



> Also look up the weight of the barbettes and turrets of Vittorio Veneto (3x3) vs. Bismarck (4x2). You will be surprised



No, not surprised because the weight savings issue is not a simple matter of comparing turret weights. A 3 turret design allows weight savings overall when all factors are considered, and allows armor to be increased. Littorio's turrets to use one example were more heavily armored than Bismarck's and contained an additional gun barrel. Naturally they were heavier one for one vs. one of Bismarck's, hence your simple math exercise.


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## RCAFson (Sep 25, 2010)

Kurfürst said:


> Its a bit a matter of defintition, but as far as I am aware, this was only splinter protection, generally not considered protected lenght (since it doesn't really offer protection).
> 
> 
> 
> ...




The belt extensions on the KGV class ran along the waterline and tapered from full belt thickness 4.5 to 5.5in thick, so this was more than splinter protection. 

The German 15in shell that dived under Prince of Wales belt was a dud, and if the fuse had functioned properly as Delcyros states: 



> _In case of US and british fuzes, which deleted the double plate sensitivity and required a single, thick plate to trigger the fuze this may be the case. With german fuzes it´s not. They had single double plate sensitivity with *graze function*, meaning that any projectile striking a deck (even unarmoured) would usually trigger the fuze of an APC and many cases when two plates in short succession (even unarmoured) are penetrated would trigger the fuze as well._



it would have had it's fuse triggered upon hitting the water and exploded long before it got to PoW's hull. As it was the shell was had very little remaining momentum and caused very little flooding on PoW.

It is pretty obvious that flooding machinery spaces on ships damages them and Bismarck suffered flooding into her main machinery spaces, and this was because a 14in shell dived under Bismarck's shallow belt. The hit caused a generator room to flood completely and caused flooding into a boiler room, which later flooded completely:


> _
> The second shell struck the port side of Bismarck somewhere below the 320-mm main side belt in compartment XIV (in way of the fore bridge tower). This shell defeated the side protective system and exploded against the 45mm torpedo bulkhead. Fragments from the explosion penetrated the bounding bulkhead of the portside cable ways and the main transverse bulkhead between the forward port turbo-generator compartment and the port boiler room. The turbo-generator room quickly filled with water. The boiler room flooded at a much slower rate through tears in welded seams in the main subdivision bulkhead. These leaks were controlled by plugging the torn welds with canvas hammocks.7 _


Bismarck's Final Battle - Part 1

However, despite their supposedly superior fuses many of the 8 and 15in hits on Prince of Wales were duds.


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## delcyros (Sep 26, 2010)

I don't consider german fuses to be superior, neither do I treat aon schemes beeing superior. in fact, additional splinter protection to the ship ends was refitted in many newer design ( VANGUARD). to be fair, grace funtions on fuses rarely statisfied designers expectations at obliquities ranging from 70 to 80 deg. the diving hit was no dud either, the projectiles fuse acted like designed. which hit on POW with 15 or 8in ones stroke enough armour to trigger the fuze else and making a path wnding in the ship without projectile damage involved? when you dig deeper, you loose argumentative ground in explaining non detonative impacts as duds in this case.
with regards to the 145mm upper side belt and it's effectiveness against cruiser fire, it's absolutely safe against british 8in and 6in projectiles. these were either common (6in) or soft capped SAP (8in). KC/n would always shatter the projectiles nose unless a hard cap is employed against it, resulting in inert charges and a ca. 1/3 increase in relative plate thickness. At any but very close distance, projectiles don't come through and if they do, the nose of the projectile will be shattered, the body broken in parts to be contained by the splinter bulkhead behind. for me at least, this is a very efficient protection.
what are Garzke's sources for MUSASHI's case beeing subject to 20 tt hits? He needs to dig out sources and a profound discussion to reject primary source evidence such as cited above. particularely because the source points in itselve to wrongly circulated damage conditions of this ship. I am interested to see his evidence.


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## delcyros (Sep 26, 2010)

Splinter plates and their effect on major calibre projectiles lateral fragmentation (except the heaviest nose and base pieces) have been studied by Nathan Okun in his misc. armour article. therfore, against small filler (2-3,5%) APC, a splinterproof plate of at least 0,0805 cal thickness is required when the projectile detonates in 5 cal distance to the plate. this ramps up linearely to 0,12 cal thickness at contact. judgimg from his results, i consider the so called "splinterdeck" employed in US fast BB's with only 0.5 to 0.75 in thickness STS totally inadaequate in stopping major calibre projectile lateral fragmentation. At least 1.25 in and better 2.0 in STS are required to provide splinterprotection.


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## delcyros (Sep 26, 2010)

Face hardened plate qualities differed considerably with the nations. US class A used a ver deep ultra hard face, which was made in an attempt to damage US projectiles, which by the standarts of this time were vietually indestructable. unfortunately, this created a fracture zone with the ductile back layer with correspondingly large scaling effects. against major calibre (11in and larger) shells this meant that the effective stopping power was lower than most other nations face hardened armour. The british CA had a very thin facelayer and against major calibre impacts it had very good stopping power, but not as good as is suggested here(25%), the advantage over us class A is more like 10% for 14 in projectiles. German KC/n was in the middle of both but closer to british CA than to US class A. tests against captured plates from TIRPITZ showed very good plate resistence to british 15in APC, with one plate having a very similar but lower resistance compared to british CA and four plates having a slightly better resistence. Italien Terni CA finally had the best 35% deep face layer and superior resistence to major calibre impacts. the difference acc to Nathan Okuns misc. armour properties is about 5 to 8% better than british CA or german KC/n.
it should be therefore correct to say that the italiens had an qualitative approach as well in top of their unique plate arrangement.


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## Kurfürst (Sep 26, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> None of which changes the fact that a single layer of armor is provides more resistance vs. seperate multiple layers.



Its not a fact, but repeating a the simple nonsense - otherwise you would be saying that armor designers are simply out of their minds when they use spaced, sandwiched armor etc. I don't think they are aiming at creating_ less effective_ systems.



> The italian example represents a single belt of armor which happenes to be made up of different materials in order to promote the idea of de-capping, which is not an exact science. They did not place a single thinner belt on the outer hull, followed by one or more "belts" internally to promote the shattering and breaking up of the shell. As mentioned their solution had merit but did not prove 100% effective in tests nor was the system tested in battle.



That's seems like a rubber argument to dismiss the whole idea of shattering projectile - ironically all ships vertical armor still used face hardened armor just to promote this silly idea..!

In any case, the crux of the arguement wheater the use of the upper side belt was weight efficient. 

Now, you cannot really argue it added weight because it just didn't - as seen before, the tons that went into allowed the same weight shaved off from the main barbettes. It came at no extra weight and presented many benefits in armor deck, scondary and main batterie barbette protection, plus effective protection against medium calibre shells. 

Now if I understand correctly, you are arguing that the use of a 145 mm KC plate on the upper side belt and the use of a 220mm KC NA on the barbette (365 mm in total) was, as opposed to Okun's calculations, less effective in ballistic protection than a single 340 mm thick barbette? (In addition there seem to be a 30 mm splinter belt too near the magazines). 

It would seem to me that in the worst case scenario, its at least as effective, given the weight speed and stability penalties imposed by the upper side belt would more than just compensate for the penalties of a multiple armor layers vs a single one.

However as you noted Italian tests showed that in two out of three cases, the 70 mm outer plate distanced 250mm from the main face hardened plate succeeded in stripping the projectile of its AP cap, which subsequently shatter on impact on the main face hardened plate. Now Bismarck's outer plating was double the thickness, and there were much more space between it and the barbette plus another 30 mm splinter belt. Given that all factors are much more beneficial for decapping the projectile, I'd say it would work even better than the Italian system and the projectile would simply shatter on impact.



> The US and UK took a more conventional approach to 'decapping' with face hardened armor.



Well its a way of saying they were some 50 years behind the Germans and Italians in that regard. 



> The latter in particular approached the issue from a quality persective and worked to increase the effectiveness of their Cemented Armor (CA) for the KGV class. It's been estimated that this armor, vs. heavy caliber shells was 25% more effective than it's contemporaries.



I think delycrios already addressed this. In any case, neither US or UK vertical protection systems could not provide adequate protection for the vitals, so arguing about the details is a bit moot.



> The slope created by the low armor turtleback will help direct shells up into upper decks and superstructure. A battleship's systems are not all located under the primary armor deck. It is true that these systems (including radar and optical fire control systems) can't be fully protected on any battleship and soft kill/disablement is a viable alternative to outright sinking via catastrophic damage. The low slung armor belt also reduced, as mentioned the actual protected bouyancy of the ship.



Let's make it clear what situation we are talking about - rounds that successfully penetrate the main belt near the waterline - otherwise they simply can't hit the turtleback slope located behind the belt, and the shell still has considerable energy to be bounced towards the superstructure before the fuse sets it off, ie. short range hits. 

In this case, what do you think is the preferable end results? 

a) The shell is directed up into upper decks and superstructure by the turtledeck present, and possibly ruining some of the non-vital systems of the ship
b) The shell happily continues straightly into the machinery or magazines and then it explodes there, as there's no silly turtle deck to stand in its path and deflect it upwards in a most stupid manner

You seem to be arguing that b) is preferable to a)..



> Stopping shell fragments is an important consideration independent of how high or low the deck is placed. The Americans introduced this feature into their battleships on the correct acknowledgement that plunging shellfire is not a simple matter of rejection or penetration. Often armor spalling occurs even in situations where the shell itself is rejected. In other situations a partial penetration might be effected. Placing the armor deck higher, in addition to increasing the area of protected buoyancy also allows more solid protection of critical spaces from plunging fire. The lower splinter deck of SPS (Special Treatment Steel) thus enhances the protective effect provided by the primary armor deck.



Here you seem to be arguing that stopping shell fragments or armor spalling from plunging fire is more important than stopping entire shells effectively entering into the machinery or magazine spaces through the belt. I tend to disagree with your priorities.  Yes splintering and spalling can be an issue, but its minor one compared to full sized shells going off effectively inside the ship, plus there is no reason why low mounted decks could not mount splinter protection below, too, if someone is very concerned with that issue.



> The ranges in which the British cruisers defeated it was apparently considered reasonable.



You seem to have been stating that the upper side belt was supposedly vulnerable to 6" cruiser fire, now you switched the arguement that it was vulnerable to 8" guns, which is supposed to 

Sorry but there's no point of arguing any further - despite asked several to support the notion you presented with something, you could not deliver anything. 

The upper side belt was safe from 6" cruiser fire, as per Okun and the physical realities of this world.



> I did.....per Brower's text; "*Nine* 380mm guns in triple turrets were also considered because it would have meant an increase over the desired set displacement." This sentence does not refute Garzke's design commentary.



Of course it does. It very much reads to me that three triple turrets were considered for Bismarck vs four twin turrets, and eventually they choose the same because four twin turrets were weighting less. 
You claimed they weighted more. Which has been proven incorrect.



> Littorio's turrets to use one example were more heavily armored than Bismarck's and contained an additional gun barrel.



Where on Earth you get they were more heavily armored than on Bismarck. Ie.

Littorio vs Bismarck turret thicknesses:

350mm / 360 millimetres (14 in) HG turret faces
200mm / 220 millimetres turret sides
200 / 180 (forward) or 150 vs 130-150 mm (aft) roofs

Simply what you claim that they were "more heavily armored" is completely incorrect - especially considering things like the many gun openings of the closely packed guns weakening ballistic resistance.



> Naturally they were heavier one for one vs. one of Bismarck's, hence your simple math exercise.



They were heavier because they had to be 30% larger to accomodate a single gun. Each turret of Littorio weight some 500 tons more, and its not due to the extra gun per turret, which weighted about 100-120 tons at best. Each barbette of Littorio had to be 30% larger on the same account, and thus was 30% heavier and longer as well. 



> No, not surprised because the weight savings issue is not a simple matter of comparing turret weights. A 3 turret design allows weight savings overall when all factors are considered, and allows armor to be increased.



As proven above, the notion that using three triple turrets vs four twin turrets would be more weight efficient has no merit, in effect the opposite is true. At this point You would need to support your statement with something more substantial than simply repeating it I believe.


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## Njaco (Sep 26, 2010)

Some really great info here - makes a great thread. And I have to give kudos to you guys for keeping it civil. Great stuff!!


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 26, 2010)

Njaco said:


> Some really great info here - makes a great thread. And I have to give kudos to you guys for keeping it civil. Great stuff!!



I agree Chris. As someone who has great interest in Naval topics, but no great knowledge to go along with it, I am thoroughly enjoying this thread. I just hope it stays civil.


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## renrich (Sep 26, 2010)

I too am enjoying this thread, especially because the main participants seem to be well informed. I don't claim to be well informed at all but I am looking at a 1944-45 Janes and it appears that the main armor belt of the hull of comparably sized BBs with three turrets is shorter than that of the BBs with four turrets. Obviously the main armor belt is trying to protect the magazines below the turrets and since the four turrets cover more horizontal distance than the three the armor belt has to be extended. 

Could that be the reason that the BBs with three triple turrets have less total weight in armor than those with four?


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## delcyros (Sep 26, 2010)

The solution to the answer is not that easy my friend.
The turret and associated equipment is heavier for a three gun turret than for a twin but the difference is a bit less than the 2/3 rule may suggest in the first place. Nevertheless, three triple turrets using the same level of protection are heavier than four twin turrets. 
Your point however touches another true incident to the problem. Three triple turrets require less length of the citadell, despite larger magazines than four twin turrets. The reason is the distance between turrets, there need to be a gap for the installation. This gap is required by structural considerations of the deck stiffness. Any barbette cuts a hole in the deck, which weakens the structure. Holes are tolerable to a certain degree but need to be compensated for with reinforcements of the main structural members and frames there.
In an entirely AoN scheme, a short citadel is a desirable design feature, efficiently using weight by reduction of space requirements of the citadel and shorter coverage of the main belt and deck.
In the german case, however, things are different.
Altough triple and even quad turrets were considered by the W-Office, the discussion finally concluded on twin ones. The idea behind is explainable. 
Due to the belt-slope combination, and the low placed armour deck, the protected buoyancy below it would be somehow less than other contemporary designs. On the other hand, at the expected battle distances, the slope was felt to be important in defeating enemy gunfire. It augments the protection of the citadel via the sides and reduces the possible exposure through the deck by plunging fire to only about one third of the entire beam opposed to it´s full area in conventional designs. But in order to provide the required degree of protected buoyancy, the length of the citadel needed to be increased.
Therefore from a design point of view, the designers of the BISMARCK class were not forced to adopt triple or quad turrets (they had experience with triple turrets of the PBB´s, CL´s and ´twins, so they should know about their merits and problems as well from own and recently made experience) and they had the larger space requirement anyway provided by the protective scheme to utilize twin turrets. The four twin turret layout was considered to have saved some weight as opposed to a triple turret layout (citadell reduction was considered to be undesirable with the protective scheme employed in this class)This had the benefit that larger areas of the ship were under armour in prospect of superior enemy naval forces (particularely cruisers).
Finally, W-office considered the advantages of twin turrets over triple ones and emphasize was put on the fact that hoist design would have been less complicated and rate of fire correspondingly higher than in a 38cm triple turret. Given that expected ranges were rather medium than very long in the North Atlantic environment, these ideas are reasonable.

A triple turreted ship would require an entirely different armour scheme as well to utilize any weight gain.


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## RCAFson (Sep 26, 2010)

Here's the armour layout of Bismarck:






Technical Layout - Armour - Armour Layout - Bismarck (Large)

Imagine removing the after 15in turret and shortening the belt and deck armour accordingly. I used the above drawing and measured the length of the belt and the weight reduction that would result from a triple layout, based upon armour weighing 40lbs per square ft for each inch of thickness. I calculated that the belt and deck armour weight could be reduced by about 1400 tons, if the belt was shortened by 78 ft. Additionally about 300 tons would be saved by lowering the height of the remaining after turret barbette by about 12.5 ft. So a triple layout would save about 1700 tons. 

Another thing to note is the very inefficient use of armour on the turret faces as the 180mm thick angled front face would be very vulnerable to almost any battleship calibre hit. 

Bismarck's armour layout is very inefficient and seems to resemble a WW1 layout.


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## Kurfürst (Sep 26, 2010)

RCAFson said:


> So a triple layout would save about 1700 tons.



Place Littorio's very similiar triple turrets, each weighting 500 tons more than Bismarck's twin turrets and you already lost 1500 tons from that 1700 ton.. Now enlarge barbettes by 30% (Bismarck main turret diameter: 10 meter, Littorio: 13 m), and you are already in minus... and a ship with a shorter protected citadel.

A shorter ship with just three 38 cm twin turrets is much more interesting IMHO, as that 1700 tons could go, for example, into armor. You would have relatively lightely armed, but fast and very well protected ship, possibly more ideal for a typical WW2 naval operation.


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## tail end charlie (Sep 26, 2010)

Kurfürst said:


> A shorter ship with just three 38 cm twin turrets is much more interesting IMHO, as that 1700 tons could go, for example, into armor. You would have relatively lightely armed, but fast and very well protected ship, possibly more ideal for a typical WW2 naval operation.



I am amazed at the technology and calculations that went into all these ships but I can hardly think of one successful use of a battleship. It seems to me after every engagement which resulted in any sort of hit at all they had to go into port for lengthy repairs. even in the first world war there were very few real engagements....I may be wrong becasuse I havnt studied it that much but I cant think of a real achievement by a battleship, apart from crippling another battleship.

I am surprised at Germany who revolutionised the use of aircraft in land operations didnt build carriers instead of battleships. But that is probably 20/20 hindsight.


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## renrich (Sep 26, 2010)

I seem to remember also that there are some advantages in the four twin turrets from a gunnery POV. Spotting salvoes and correcting aim.


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## RCAFson (Sep 26, 2010)

Kurfürst said:


> Place Littorio's very similiar triple turrets, each weighting 500 tons more than Bismarck's twin turrets and you already lost 1500 tons from that 1700 ton.. Now enlarge barbettes by 30% (Bismarck main turret diameter: 10 meter, Littorio: 13 m), and you are already in minus... and a ship with a shorter protected citadel.
> 
> A shorter ship with just three 38 cm twin turrets is much more interesting IMHO, as that 1700 tons could go, for example, into armor. You would have relatively lightely armed, but fast and very well protected ship, possibly more ideal for a typical WW2 naval operation.




Huh?

Littorio 15in triple = 1570 tons x 3 = 4710 tons
Bismarck 15in twin = 1035 tons x 4 = 4140 ton
= + 570 tons
so a reduction of 1700 tons in armour weight and an increase of 570 tons in turret weight = a net reduction of 1130 tons in weight. 
Germany 38 cm/52 (14.96") SK C/34
Italian 381 mm/50 (15") Model 1934


Also Littorio's triple turrets are quite heavy, the RN Nelson class triple 16in weighed 1480 tons while the USN triple 16in 45 calibre weighed about 1420 tons while Hood's 15in twin turrets weighed 880 tons. All of these turrets had thicker face armour than Bismarck's turrets.

British 16"/45 (40.6 cm) Mark I
USA 16"/45 (40.6 cm) Mark 6
http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNBR_15-42_mk1.htm


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## delcyros (Sep 27, 2010)

RCAFson said:


> Here's the armour layout of Bismarck:
> 
> 
> Another thing to note is the very inefficient use of armour on the turret faces as the 180mm thick angled front face would be very vulnerable to almost any battleship calibre hit.
> ...



Hardly a very inefficient layout under the conditions described above. It shows drastically different thinking with regards to how to provide protection to the embedded vitals and has only superficial similarity with older schemes. 
The glacis of the turrets is 180mm thick, angled back by 68 deg but that was considered to be proof against the battleships own 38cmL52 guns fired from 0 to 22,000yards distance (at ca. 0 to 10000 m the glacis has a larger target area than the 14.6in armoured turret face, decreasing with increasing angle of fall at larger distances) and correspondingly just enough to stop many major calibre guns. For example US 14/45 14/50 (altough not 16/45 used in the COLORADO class- it was not sure at design closing stage that the NC class get´s 16in guns instead of 14in ones proposed for this class in quad turrets), british 14in/45 and 15in/42 (but not british 16in/45 used in the two ships of the NELSON class) and french 13in/50 and 13.4in/45.
From that perspective the turret glacis may be considered to be a bit on the thin side but just thick enough. I attach the GKdos 100 penetration table and the striking velocity/ angle of fall chart used for the german SK 38cmL52 C/36 compared against face hardened armour KC/n and the vharts for the 38cm´s striking velocity and angle of fall (corrected for the 68 deg. angled facet).
All the aforementioned guns have slightly less powerful penetration capabilities and thus the result can be applied to them as well.

The myth that the glacis can be penetrated by almost all ww2 battleship guns at all distances stems from an older version of Nathan Okuns computational program facehd, which suggested this result. Primary sources like the one shown above decisively contradict these results, I don´t know if the problem was recitified in the version 6.1 by him.

Also it should be mentioned that test results of german KC/n captured from the construction yard and from the wreckage of TIRPITZ after the end of hostilities and forwarded to british and US services had shown a surprisingly high difference in plate quality. While other plates usually have a quality of 0.96 (N. Okuns terminology), the plates for medium thickness (180mm, not much used except for the glacis) showed in US and british ballistic tests results of slightly over 0.8 (basically ww1 quality, only from rejected plates captured at the yards) and 1.1 respectively (captured plates from TIRPITZ), this tends to indicated that the calculations of facehd with 0.96 fixed quality parameters may actually understate plate performances of this very thickness range. It may be possible, but this needs to be researched further, that Krupp´s quality controll didn´t went south as suggested by Okun (producing both, better and worse plates than normal) but that Krupp delivered plates deliberately with improved performances for this rather critical area of installation with some plates of the lot not fullfilling the requirements and falling short of it. The improved performance is explainable by the thickness of the plate. The hardeneing process of the cementated face for thicknesses in between 120mm and 180mm can be controlled more carefully with the best results typically achievable at 6in thickness (judging from earlier experiences from many manufacturer of Krupp type naval armour plates, my personal observation).


I am not sure about other BB´s turret vulnarability but KGV´s vertical turret faces appear to be optimized for long to very long ranges, as they are rather thin and only 12.75in thick. Since the turret face is always directed to the enemy ship and target angles are neglectable, this appears to be a serious defect to me. It can be penetrated by BISMARCKS guns out to nearly 28,000 yards with italien 38cm guns beeing able to effectively penetrate the turret face out to 34,000 yards (both well beyond typical ww2 fighting ranges) and even SCHARNHORST´s rather light guns (the lightest of all ww2 major calibre guns) has a reasonable chance to defeat the turrets out to 16,000 yards (which, according to the experiences drawn fromt the conflict in the North Atlantic theatre must be considered in within typical fighting range).
The french quad turret was armoured up to 16.9 in thick. This is massive armour in comparison to british or the german examples, still the german gun should be able to defeat the turret face out to 20,000 yards and Hoyers contemporary comments about french thick face hardened armour plates reflect disappointing resistence when hit by german major calibre projectiles in ballistic tests carried out after material for the ALSACE was captured by the germans in 1940.
US BB´s of the period used very thick homogenious armour made by thick chunks of class B homogenious armour laminated over a second plate made of STS full armour grade construction material. The single layer aequivalent is less than a single plate of class B from the same thickness but not by much. The faces were leaning back about 40 degrees in order to give generally improved resistance to major calibre impacts. The level of protection is difficult to assess but it should be substantial. Homogenious armour penetration with armour piercing capped projectiles is a difficult problem to predict and no generalizations are possible at the moment. For uncapped projectiles one might use M79APCLC for projectiles with similar properties. This program suggest a very good protection based upon projectiles striking it without caps (which never is the case).
The real world performane of their turret faceplates may or may not fit these computations. Originally, the NORTH CAROLINA WASHINGTON should receive 16in class A turret faces but when plates were delivered BuOrd rejected them on base of samples of the lot repeatedly failing proof tests. Class B plates were substituted for them before construction had to be delayed but these ultra thick homogenious plates also fall short of expectations (striking velocities always have been less than expected for major calibre ballistic tests, indicating some kind of scaling problem) and reportedly have been more brittle than other applications of US class B homogenious armour. Anyway, in direct comparison to US class A they appeared to be ballistically better in this thickness range and were used anyway for them and the successive US fast BB´s.


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## delcyros (Sep 27, 2010)

> Lutzow's condition was caused by a number of factors. The progressive flooding was a result both of shell damage and due to many piercings of critical bulkheads which negated somewhat the otherwise very good sub-division of the ship and exacerbated damage control efforts. Another factor in Lutzow's loss was the large bow torpedo flat, a typical feature of WWI era German capital ships. This large space, if compromised would reduced bouyancy reserves in the bow area. Lutzow eventually was scuttled because the ship's trim had been so radically altered by the forward flooding that movement was next to impossible but she was not in danger of actual sinking up to that point. This decision to scuttle is questioned in some quarters as the ship's buoyancy reserves were far from exhausted and the ship (arguably) could have been saved. Had Lutzow's bow area been unprotected, the shells would have had a greater chance of passing through the narrow hull section without detonation. Instead, the medium/light armors ensured detonation increasing structural damage and contributing to the loss of the ship. This makes Lutzow a case demonstrating how medium and light armors can be detrimental to a warship when struck by heavy shells.



These ideas can be challanged from very many perspectives.
[A] ammo tactics:
By the time of her demise, in summer of 1916, practice in naval engagement still asked for using common or even HE ammo instead of AP (LÜTZOW on her own basically depleted her base fused HE ammo outfit in the battle of Jutland against enemy ACR, BC and BB´s). Using medium levels of armour protection effectively 
removed this thread.
* shell technology
In 1916, only Germany and Austro-Hungary used reliable delay fused, had capped armour piercing projectiles. The british along most navies were using soft capped armour piercing projectiles with instantious fuse delay. The delay action was unpredictable and passing htrough the rigid structure of a ship or even the watersurface may trigger the fuse in british APC. The all-or-nothing scheme doesn´t work in this environment when You cannot count on the inert fuse action. Rather contrary, an armour thickness of at least 0.25 cal thickness was considered necessary to reduce penetrations by major calibre projectiles to the size of the shell (instead of large chunks of metal cut out and displaced with very large wateringress following), which translates to around 80 to 100mm against 13.5 and 15in rounds. A discussion can be found in many contemporary primary sources. To armour the bow accordingly meant a reduction of vulnarability to flooding.
[C] torpedo damage
In addition to serious shell damage, LÜTZOW received a torpedohit in the bow by HMS FALMOUTH 18:25 from 5,500 yards which compromised the watertight integrity of the adjacent sections. Altough J. Campbell refuses this hit (without discussing it or citing evidence against it) in his outstanding book, it was claimed by both, FALMOUTH and surviving crewmembers of SMS LÜTZOW to have struck the bow. Correspondingly, it appears in the german post Jutland discussion of the damage received by LÜTZOW.
[D] damage distribution
The damage distribution of the ship greatly enhances flooding of the bow. Successive damage to the principal holding bulkhead was caused by an attempt to flee the area of fighting with a speed faster than was advisable after the flooding had been brought under controll already.
[E] large torpedo flat
The large torpedo flat actually saved SEYDLITZ. It didn´t doomed LÜTZOW but worked against it but when undamaged as in case of SEYDLITZ, it provided enough buoyancy reserve to keep the bow aflot, while the rest of it is already subject to flooding. This design feature is common to all period BB´s and BC´s, not just german ones.

Finally, the idea to provide armour protection to the bow as well is a rather good idea by ww2 standarts. Altough no BB scale protection has been applied. The example of BISMARK at Denmark Street when hit by a british 14in APC in the bow demonstrates that the projectile went through the 60mm Wh inclined armoured plating, through 20mm deck and exited the other side through the Wh armour plating without detonating.
Either this hit was a dud (60mm ALWAYS ensure triggering the fuse, regardless of obliquity in the band between 0 and 70 deg) or the fuse delay meant that the projectile exploded after passing through the whole bow. With 0.035 sec. nominal fuse delay this indeed may have happened and in this case -despite the damage associated with the event- demonstrates that armour triggering the fuse does not always means that the projectile detonates inside the ship rather thin bow and stern area. The level of armour protection applied to it´s bow just provides protection of the bow versus near misses, blast and splinters and a wide range of light guns (including CL fire) from aceptable distances while it is not thick enough to slow down the projectile enough that it bursts inside the hull.
-Note: Nathan Okuns article on the armour protection of BISMARCK was written long ago. I know that Mr. Okun is well aware of the mistakes he made in his article (SD´s decapping plate, f.e. or the failing to mention BISMARCK´s 60mm armoured belt of the bow, or the 30 to 75mm armoured splinterbelts and so on) and wouldn´t repeat them. He unfortunately has little time to his disposal but will continue to work on a revised version.*


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## delcyros (Sep 27, 2010)

Another note on layered armour protection.
It appears that yawing of the projectile was also been considered to be a factor of importance. This was studied by italiens and germans in the early 30´s and it appeared that both made a habit out of it.
Even the US considered these effects in 1940 and found that the 1.5in armoured weatherdeck in top of the main armour deck of their BB´s induce yawing on the test projectiles which increased the striking velocity necessary to defeat the main armour deck well beyond the level necessary to defeat it without passing through the bomb deck (despite the projectile loosing it´s cap and weight in the process). Whether or not this equates the striking velocity required for a single deck with an additional 1.5in thickness or not, I don´t know.
Anyway it was found that harder armour (at best face hardened US class A) worked best against these yawed projectiles.

It´s also definetely not the case that layered armour layouts provide less protection than a single layer one. In addition to possible damage received by penetration through the first armour plate, slowing down noticably, maybe induce yawing and loosing any covers, other effects also apply to the projectile if it hits face hardened armour behind. Once uncapped, a projectile striking face hardened armour behind will always be shattered, resulting in nose damage, making penetration more difficult (resulting to a mere 1/3 increase in relative thickness of the next plate) and inert cavity (at best a low order detonation which is about one third as powerful as normal detonations). Thus effect of the projctile is greatly reduced.
This seems to have been the case for german Panzerdeck armour as well, which was harder than normal Wh applications (250 HN instead of 225 HN) at the expanse of reduced ductability. It was expected that only uncapped projectiles would be able to strike the Panzerdeck or it´s slopes and the harder armour greatly increased the damage to the projectile, making intact penetration (in a condition fit to burst) less likely when penetration becomes possible. 
These ideas were unknown in ww1 and reflect a departure from older armour philosophies.


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## parsifal (Sep 27, 2010)

IMHO the armouring schemes of German ships were very good, and made the right choices as to what compromises needed to be made as far as the individual ships are concerned. Engagements beyond about 20000 yds against moving targets were next to unknown....the record is either the Scharnhorst or the Warspite, at around 27000 yds. Armouring for protection beyond these ranges was pretty much a waste of time. OTOH plunging fire was far more dangerous than hits onto the side, which invariably brought the round up against the main belt, and hence the thickest, most well protected parts of the ship. German steel treatments were also very good.

However, these technical advantages did not make up for poor handling of the German (and Italian) ships. Because of her numerical inferiority, the Germans were always very wary about engaging in stand up fights with the Allies. Some of this caution came from Hitlers interference, some from an inate conservatism within the KM leadership itself. The Germans convinced themselves from before the war that they could not win, evidently not paying a great deal of attention to the inherent advatages of concentration, surprise and initiative that is more or less conferred onto a nation with the luxury of a sea denial strategy at its fingertips, as opposed to sea control, (a wholly far more difficult and resource hungry excerceise)....and then proceeded to follow a strategy that ensured that outcome for failure. Bismarks experience refelected that sad situation perfectly. Deciding correctly to concentrate on mercantile warfare, the Germans failed to realize prewar that an all battleship force was the wrong force to undertake such a strategy optimally. They failed to appreciate the possibilities of carrier borne mercantile warfare, so successfully undertaken by Ryujo in the Indian ocean in 1942, They failed to appreciate the vulnerability of capital ships to carrier borne attack, lagging badly when compared to such countries as Britain, or even France. And despite all the grandiose claims being made here about the relative invulnerability of German heavy ships, one should not forget that it was a lowly obsolete biplane aircraft, that sank, or disabled no less than 5 Axis battleships that I can think of off the top of my head, and didnt seem to have too much difficulty in overcoming these uber armour schemes with a lowly 18 in torpedo, carrying a 388 lb TNT warhead


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## delcyros (Sep 27, 2010)

I agree. Tactically, the RN utilized it´s potential in a very aggressive and effective manner. Able to risk and exploit tactical situations. This shouldn´t be underestimated. Having a superior quantity is one thing but to use the right part of it at the right time and the perfect place in the right way is a quality of it´s own and deserves our credit.


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## Nikademus (Sep 27, 2010)

Kurfürst said:


> ]Its not a fact, but repeating a the simple nonsense - otherwise you would be saying that armor designers are simply out of their minds when they use spaced, sandwiched armor etc. I don't think they are aiming at creating_ less effective_ systems.



A good example of nonsense would be your last sentence as well as your continued intentional jumbling of two different armor concepts.



> That's seems like a rubber argument to dismiss the whole idea of shattering projectile - ironically all ships vertical armor still used face hardened armor just to promote this silly idea..!



This seems like verbal wordplay. 




> In any case, the crux of the arguement wheater the use of the upper side belt was weight efficient.




Actually the crux of the argument is that the Germans spent displacement on a belt of medium armor that helped bloat the classes design weight and limited the main belt's thickness. 



> However as you noted Italian tests showed that in two out of three cases, the 70 mm outer plate distanced 250mm from the main face hardened plate succeeded in stripping the projectile of its AP cap, which subsequently shatter on impact on the main face hardened plate.



You continue to use an example of layered armor to prove the alleged effectiveness level of two separate and independent armor thicknesses. Two entirely different situations.




> Well its a way of saying they were some 50 years behind the Germans and Italians in that regard.



Considering the US and UK designers managed to largely adhere to a 35,000 ton imposed tonnage limit yet field battleships with equal or more guns and equal to heavier armor (part of which was due to the weight savings incurred by using triple and quadrupple turret designs), i'd say it was the UK/US designers who were ahead. 




> I think delycrios already addressed this. In any case, neither US or UK vertical protection systems could not provide adequate protection for the vitals, so arguing about the details is a bit moot.



So you claim. The UK adopted to a degree the US "immunity zone" concept but in Tennant's book on the KGV class it goes on to explain that the British perceived the role of the main armor belt to be the breaking up of heavy shells on impact and/or penetration reducing the level of overall damage. This was a continuation of their design philosophy dating back to before WWI



> Here you seem to be arguing that stopping shell fragments or armor spalling from plunging fire is more important than stopping entire shells effectively entering into the machinery or magazine spaces through the belt. I



Actually i was correcting your misperception on the role of the splinter deck in the USN version of the All or Nothing system.




> You seem to have been stating that the upper side belt was supposedly vulnerable to 6" cruiser fire, now you switched the arguement that it was vulnerable to 8" guns



Show me where i "switched" the argument.



> Sorry but there's no point of arguing any further -



Then don't.



> Of course it does. It very much reads to me that three triple turrets were considered for Bismarck vs four twin turrets, and eventually they choose the same because four twin turrets were weighting less.



wrong. Per your online source, they were discounted because with the extra gun worked into the design it would have meant (allegedly) that the overall displacement of the ship would have to be expanded....an ongoing issue with the Scharnhorst and Bismarck classes.



> You claimed they weighted more. Which has been proven incorrect.



Again you misquote me. I relayed Garzke, a naval architect by profession, who stated that a 3 x triple arrangement costs less weight to the overall design vs. a four x twin gun design. The online source you goggled does not refute this. 




> Where on Earth you get they were more heavily armored than on Bismarck. Ie.
> 
> Simply what you claim that they were "more heavily armored"




Bismarck turret:

Face plate 14.17in
Sides 8.66in
back plates 12.76
Roof Plates (fore/aft) 7.09/5.12

Littorio turret:

Face plate 14.96
Sides fore/aft 7.87/5.12
Back plates 14.96 - 11.81
Roof plates 7.87




> They were heavier because they had to be 30% larger to accomodate a single gun.



And because they had thicker armor. As already mentioned by RCAFson, Littorio's turrets were rather on the heavy side, a symptom of that nation's issue with weight creep in the overall design. US triple turrets were lighter, yet sported bigger guns. Individually they were also heavier than Bismarck's twin but also carried much thicker armor, made possible by use of triples in the overall design, which on the whole was also less bloated than Bismarck.



> As proven above, the notion that using three triple turrets vs four twin turrets would be more weight efficient has no merit, in effect the opposite is true. At this point You would need to support your statement with something more substantial than simply repeating it I believe.



At this point you would need keep isolating the individual turret weights of the Littorio vs. Bismarck and continue ignoring that a four twin vs. 3 triple in terms of weight involves more than just the sum of the turret weights.


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## delcyros (Sep 28, 2010)

> Garzke and Dunn re-analyzed Bismarck and her loss after the ship was found and filmed. This analysis does take into account the recent expeditions to Bismarck on the ocean floor. They also take into account crew survivor stories. . You continue to emphasis "wreckage analysis" (i.e. video documentation) to prove that Bismarck's TDS was never penetrated. Examining a wreck under the ocean is what a former associate of mine (Author Richard Worth) once likened to navigating a funhouse with a little flashlight. Yes, the entire wreck is "visible" however much of the hull is not open to detailed inspection. Despite this, you continue to claim that "wreckage analysis" shows that none of the torpedo hits penetrated the TDS and that “crew accounts” refute Garzke and Dunn’s analysis. Both counts are wrong. But's its clear to me that your not going to take my word for this so rather than waste more time on it, I'll just quote Mr. Worth's post from 4 years back regarding Cameron's expedition, wrecks on the ocean floor in general and such with. He worded it better than I've come up with thus far and I grow weary of having "CAMERON" pushed into my face, so henceforth I will not comment in detail on his "wreckage analysis" further.



As far as I understand, Garzke, Jurens et al. attended the ITN expedition to BISMARCK HOOD in 2001. Their "Marine Forensic Analysis of HMS HOOD and DKM BISMARCK" article does not take into account any of the findings of the recent Cameron expedition but include material from the older Ballard expedition.
The article is a nice scientific product but not a scientific ANALYSIS by the standarts of science it meants to be. No primary source material was proposed in the article and conclusions are written without discussion. It´s a brief scientific article but no analysis. I am sure that the material to proof exists in form of video documentation but it is not as complete or exhaustive as You think.
In fact, Garzke and Jurens themselve admitted that the documentation of CAMERON on the site is "MUCH more reliable", I quote on Mr. Jurens:



> 1) Someone suggested that Mr. Cameron's presentation was more reliable than that of the previous 2001 ITN expeditions. This is not true. Mr. Cameron's credentials regarding analysis are, if not impeccable, very good indeed. He is bright, knowlegeable, and a very keen observer. His observations are MUCH more reliable and extensive than those presented via the 2001 ITN expedition. He had much better equipment, spent much more time on the wreck, and -- in contrase to some of those on the 2001 expedition -- is really quite technically competent and knowledgeable. Sadly, the results of the 2001 ITN expedition to Hood and Bismarck were severely compromised by post-expedition censorship accompanied by the imposition of imaginative "conclusions" regarding the evidence actually observed, especially regarding Hood. One must, however, remember that the Cameron television productions are not intended to present a highly rigorous scientific analysis. Rather than speculate, Mr. Cameron has sought out (and attended to) the opinions of experts in the marine forensics field.



In fact, Mr. Cameron sought out for the advise of experts in marine forensics for the interpretation of the material examinied. His documentation brought to public the video documentation of the wreckage in better detail than any expedition so far. Not surprisingly given the fact that he had more money to start with, resulting in much better equipment (such as ROV´s going INSIDE the ship via holes on the lower hull to document damage to the main bulkhead, something which never has been done before), more time on the wreckage site, more exhaustive documentation of the damage with video (including hit by hit documentation for the first time), a larger crew including naval marine forensic experts. And his findings weren´t compromised by post expedition censorship.


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## delcyros (Sep 28, 2010)

A note on the displacement of the battleships considered.
Off all BB´s laid down after the end ww1, only the NELSON-class, the SHARNHORST-class and the DUNKERQUE-class adhered to the 35,000 ts stand. limit.
All other BB´s did not.
You may quibble about the margin but there is little difference how LITTORIO, RICHELIEU and BISMARCK ended up with (in within about 1,000 ts to each other) and the difference to KING GEORGE V as completed in standart tonnes is in within only 3,650 ts.(38,030 ts stand. as opposed to 41,673 ts stand.) The two US fast BB´s fall in between them but more closer to the first group than to the british BB, this means that the distance in displacement towards BISMARCK is in all but the case of KING GEORGE V much narrower than to the official limit of 35,000 ts stand, which was not adhered by them except for the classes mentioned above.


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## Kurfürst (Sep 28, 2010)

Dear Nik, 

your last reply has little merit, as you seem to have reserved to repeating in an increasingly aggressive but overall, unconvincing manner what you posted earlier.



Nikademus said:


> Actually the crux of the argument is that the Germans spent displacement on a belt of medium armor that helped bloat the classes design weight and limited the main belt's thickness.



Appearantly you have trouble seeing the forest from a tree - the belt, viewed as a whole sysem, already provided better protection to the ship vitals than any other. In sharp contrast the KGV, even when wasting abhorrent amounts on armor a thicker belt, achieved nada by doing so.
Its a bit like the joke that the surgery went very well, though the patient died. 



Nikademus said:


> You continue to use an example of layered armor prove the alleged effectiveness level of two separate and independent armor thicknesses. Two entirely different situations.



At least according to you it seems, but you seem to be rather alone with this notion.



> Considering the US and UK designers managed to largely adhere to a 35,000 ton imposed tonnage limit yet field battleships with equal or more guns and equal to heavier armor (part of which was due to the weight savings incurred by using triple and quadrupple turret designs), i'd say it was the UK/US designers who were ahead.



Well US designers did pretty well in designing a bit more compromised ships that were inferior in some aspects but with overall with a very good blend of characteristics, especially considering the different operational enviromen. 
The UK designers on the other hand succeed in building ships which had but half the operational range of the Bismarck they couldn't keep up anyway, and in battles usually lost some 40% of their "weight saver" quadrupple turrets that were so overcomplicated in order to save weight and were offered such low level of protection that actually raises the question why were they protected at all..? Getting six guns for the price of ten doesn't quite seem to me as deal of century to me, rather then a case when someone wants to get so much and gets nothing in the end.
Funniest part of all, the UK designers eventually reverted to a similiar 4x2 layout on their next battleship class as on the Bismarck's. 

As for the use of "heavier" armor, IMHO it speaks volumes about the ineffiency of its use on UK and US battlships, since at practical battle ranges, Bismarck was better protected (actually immune for vitals), whereas US or UK battleships were vulnerable to enemy guns at most ranges.



Nikademus said:


> Again you misquote me. I relayed Garzke, a naval architect by profession, who stated that a 3 x triple arrangement costs less weight to the overall design vs. a four x twin gun design. The online source you goggled does not refute this.



I don't recall quiting an online source. I have quoted Brower's book, in addition I have shown and proved that the Germans decided against triple turrets because they would add to the weight of the ship, and not decrease it, as you suggest. The figures for turret weights and dimensions came from Campbell, again not an online source.



Nikademus said:


> And because they had thicker armor.



Nope, Littorio as has been shown had entirely compareable armor protection as Bismarck's turret. 
That's why I used it as a comparison in the first place - similar guns in a similarly protected turret.
The reason why Littorio's turrets are heavier is simple because they have to be much larger to mount three guns instead of two. Littorio's triple turret's had a barbette diameter was 13.19 meter vs 10 meters on Bismarck twin 38cm and 11 meters on the H-classes twin 16" guns.
Its a simple fact that to armor larger surfaces, you will need more armor, which is making it heavy.

You simply keep repeating something you can't prove.



Nikademus said:


> As already mentioned by RCAFson, Littorio's turrets were rather on the heavy side, a symptom of that nation's issue with weight creep in the overall design.



Unfortunately turret weight has little to do with chauvinism but the type and number of guns used.



> US triple turrets were lighter, yet sported bigger guns.



Bigger guns, huh? Oh, well, let's take a lookie via Campbell:

US 16"/45, 1430 tons triple turrets, gun being 18.694 m long, 97 tons each (without breech), muzzle velocity a modest 701 mps
Italian 15"/50, 1595 tons triple turrets, gun being 20.720 m long, 111 tons each, muzzle velocity - 850 mps

German 38 cm/52, 1050 ton twin turrets, gun being 19.630 m long, 111 tons each, muzzle velocity a 820 mps
German 40.6 cm/52 (16"),1452 ton twin turrets. Guns being 21.130 m long, 160 tons each, muzzle velocity a 810 mps

The pattern is clear. Powerful guns of high ballistic performance (such as the Italian or German high velocity guns) are heavier, longer, and as a result require a larger dimensioned turret (the gun needs to be balanced, recoil issues etc.). More guns in a turret require a larger turret of course, and a larger turret is heavier, all things equal.

It is obvious that the US main turret designs saved weight by compromising the guns ballistic performance. Therefore, its a silly example to compare the Italian 15" with the highest muzzle velocity of them all, vs. the US 16" which is a howitzer by comparison. 

Unlike you claim that they mounted 'bigger guns', the US 16" is actually the smallest and lightest of all of them. Of course this is not news - howitzers require lighter, smaller carriage than field guns, too.



> Individually they were also heavier than Bismarck's twin but also carried much thicker armor, made possible by use of triples in the overall design, which on the whole was also less bloated than Bismarck.



Well I guess "less bloated" is a PC word in your vocabulary for a "compromised" design. The Bismarck class was, of course, much less compromised than US Battleships, which had to sacrifice several good aspects that the Bismarcks or Vittorio Venetos possesed in one package - speed, high velocity guns etc.

Your argument about is a bit like when an ugly girl boasts about being virtuous, even if its out of necessity. 



> At this point you would need keep isolating the individual turret weights of the Littorio vs. Bismarck and continue ignoring that a four twin vs. 3 triple in terms of weight involves more than just the sum of the turret weights.



Now, THAT would be a complete misrepresentation of what I have been saying. My analysis was NOT, repeat, NOT limited to the consideration of the turret weights. I have already shown, with a practical example, I have taken into total 
- turret weights
- barbette weights, and 
- neccessary citadel lenght (ie. lenght belt and armor deck).

These show convincingly that four triple turrets have no advantage over four twin turrets, in fact the opposite seems to be true. The advantage of having one less turret seems to have been more than outweighted by the fact that larger dimensioned turrets are required, with larger diameter barbettes.

As opposed to this, you have been unable to present any evidence at all, apart from keeping repeating the same. It makes a very unconvincing argument, and a case closed as far as I am concerned.


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## Kurfürst (Sep 28, 2010)

To give some idea of the relative size of turret and barbette size of Littorio's tripe and Bismarck's twin 38 cm turrets:


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## Nikademus (Sep 28, 2010)

Kurfürst said:


> As for the use of "heavier" armor, IMHO it speaks volumes about the ineffiency of its use on UK and US battlships, since at practical battle ranges, Bismarck was better protected (actually immune for vitals), whereas US or UK battleships were vulnerable to enemy guns at most ranges.



Sure she was.



> I don't recall quiting an online source. I have quoted Brower's book, in addition I have shown and proved that the Germans decided against triple turrets because they would add to the weight of the ship, and not decrease it, as you suggest. The figures for turret weights and dimensions came from Campbell, again not an online source.



The only thing you said was "see Brower" whose commentary regarding triples vs twins consisted of one sentence and did not say what you claimed it to say, nor did it refute Garzke's design commentary.



> Nope, Littorio as has been shown had entirely compareable armor protection as Bismarck's turret.



If you can't read english.



> Bigger guns, huh? Oh, well, let's take a lookie via Campbell:
> 
> US 16"/45, 1430 tons triple turrets, gun being 18.694 m long, 97 tons each (without breech), muzzle velocity a modest 701 mps
> Italian 15"/50, 1595 tons triple turrets, gun being 20.720 m long, 111 tons each, muzzle velocity - 850 mps
> ...



I believe i said "bigger", not heavier. The USN 16in Mk6 was a special lightened version of the older 16in Mk 5/8 gun, the latter which weighed in at 117 tons. Despite the lighter weight, this gun still fired a bigger shell than Bismarck with a bigger chambric volume vs. the German weapon. Shells fired were either a 2700lb or 2240lb shell. Lighter gun weight per barrel + additional weight savings for the overall BB design by use of triples allows for equal or more armor and firepower on a smaller displacement. If it makes you feel better the 16in weapons of the Iowa class weighed in at 133 tons, heavier than Bismarck's. 



> It is obvious that the US main turret designs saved weight by compromising the guns ballistic performance. Therefore, its a silly example to compare the Italian 15" with the highest muzzle velocity of them all, vs. the US 16" which is a howitzer by comparison.



Indeed. a chamber life of 395 rounds vs. 180-210 rounds for the German weapon and a whopping 90 for the Italian. All this with excellent vertical penetrative capabilities and much superior horizontal penetrative capability in comparison to the German and Italian weapons. Thats some compromising on the ballistic performance.





> Well I guess "less bloated" is a PC word in your vocabulary for a "compromised" design.



Nope. Boated means bloated.





> Now, THAT would be a complete misrepresentation of what I have been saying. My analysis was NOT, repeat, NOT limited to the consideration of the turret weights. I have already shown, with a practical example, I have taken into total
> - turret weights
> - barbette weights, and
> - neccessary citadel lenght (ie. lenght belt and armor deck).



All you've given is turret weight on the Littorio. You threw in vague assumptions regarding the weight of the barbettes.



> As opposed to this, you have been unable to present any evidence at all, apart from keeping repeating the same. It makes a very unconvincing argument, and a case closed as far as I am concerned.



Why do you keep coming back then?


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## parsifal (Sep 28, 2010)

Guys

This is a very good discussion so far, but i fear it is beginning to lose some objectivity, as people allow thei emotions to take over. We are all entitles to opinions. We are not re-fighting the war here.

I tend to approach these discussions from an operational results point of view rather than fropm a pure technical srgument. Operational results cannot be easily refuted, and are obvious to even the most casual observer. These are some of the observations I think worth stopping and thinking about.

There is is no doubt the Royal Navy feared the potential of the Bismarks as a battleship. The ship must herefore be considered as a very powerful battle unit. If it was any sort of paper dragon, the British would not have expended so much energy hunting her down and sinking her. And denigrating her capabilities in the end also denigrates the capabilities of those ships that faced her. 

I think it also true that when the test came she showed a number of nearly contradictory qualities. On the one hand she proved very difficult to sink, and may in fact have been scuttled rather than sunk. I think this demonstrates very clearly her protection insofar as hull intergrity was concerned. 

However, and on the other hand, her main armement and ability to retaliate was short lived. She ceased resistance with her main guns after only 35 minutes from memeory, and even though she may have been a sitting duck at the time of her demise, this only serves to clarify that her protection of her upper works, and her combat systems was prone to failure due to damage. She might be unsinkable, but she was certainly very stoppable, as the initial torpedo hits on her demonstrate, and the gunnery action further shows.

Similarly Scharnhorst showed that her biggest asset was her speed, once this was removed, she was fairly easily disabled. Again it took a while to sink her, but as an offensive unit she was defeated in fairly short order. 

Whether British modern Battleships would fare any better, its hard to say. The older battlewagons fared quite well against the Italian battleships, including the new ones, so I find it a little strange that we are now saaying British Battleships are outclassed. The Brit heavies did quite well at North Cape, deid well enough agaiunst the Bismark, and generally were able to intimidate the Italians at will after taranto, at least whilst they BBs and carriers in the Med. 

So INO it is neither true to say she was a dud, or a paper tiger, nor is true to claim she was unstoppable, or vastly superior to her allied contemporaries. She was a great ship, with great power, but she had weaknesses just like any other ship...


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## Glider (Sep 28, 2010)

Nicely put.


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## Nikademus (Sep 28, 2010)

parsifal said:


> So INO it is neither true to say she was a dud, or a paper tiger, nor is true to claim she was unstoppable, or vastly superior to her allied contemporaries. She was a great ship, with great power, but she had weaknesses just like any other ship...



Agreed.


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## Nikademus (Sep 28, 2010)

Hi,



delcyros said:


> These ideas can be challanged from very many perspectives.
> 
> [A] ammo tactics:
> * shell technology
> *


*

Pre-WWI, and arguably, during WWI, incremental armor designs had merit from several angles. Factors included expected range, rate of fire of main armaments, and quality of AP shells and a persisting faith in the power/virtue of HE type shells. Lastly UK shells pre-Jutland proved to be even more unreliable than the UK figured (except to John Jellicoe) thx to oversensitive bursters and the use of Lyddite. 

The USN viewpoint was considered by Friedman to take a longer view on the future of naval warfare in which ranges would open up (as they did at Jutland compared to pre-WWI expectations) and where Capital Ships would be threatened by bigger, improved shells capable of disabling/crippling such a warship with a few penetrative blows. Without resorting to ships of huge displacement, the only logical recourse was to do what the USN did…maximize armor over the vitas at the expense of non-vital areas. Post WWI other navies such as the UK had to go the same way, even more so in the light of naval treaties that limited maximum displacement. The German ships were stoutly built and well armored but in light of Cambell’s analysis it was also equally apparent that the UK defective shells played an equal and vital role in the survival of the German ships that were heavily hit. Proper ‘Greenboy’ type shells by the UK would have made the medium and light armors of the German ships more a liability vs. an asset. USN experience vs costal defenses are cited by Friedman as supporting USN views on damage to unarmored portions of the ship.




[C] torpedo damage
In addition to serious shell damage, LÜTZOW received a torpedohit in the bow by HMS FALMOUTH 18:25 from 5,500 yards which compromised the watertight integrity of the adjacent sections. Altough J. Campbell refuses this hit (without discussing it or citing evidence against it) in his outstanding book, it was claimed by both, FALMOUTH and surviving crewmembers of SMS LÜTZOW to have struck the bow. Correspondingly, it appears in the german post Jutland discussion of the damage received by LÜTZOW.
[D] damage distribution
The damage distribution of the ship greatly enhances flooding of the bow. Successive damage to the principal holding bulkhead was caused by an attempt to flee the area of fighting with a speed faster than was advisable after the flooding had been brought under controll already.

Click to expand...


Campbell does state the claimed torpedo hit was incorrect. If Campbell dismisses it however I by default remain skeptical as to the validity of this alleged hit. I've seen no other source suggest it. Agreed that Lutzow's maintaining of high speed too long contributed to her loss.




[E] large torpedo flat
The large torpedo flat actually saved SEYDLITZ. It didn´t doomed LÜTZOW but worked against it but when undamaged as in case of SEYDLITZ, it provided enough buoyancy reserve to keep the bow aflot, while the rest of it is already subject to flooding. This design feature is common to all period BB´s and BC´s, not just german ones.

Click to expand...

I’d have to say this is making a virtue of a weakness. Seydlitz’s survival was trigger thin and luck (and sea state) played a large factor in her survival. Another factor in her survival appears to have been lack of flooding above the main armor deck. Yes….underwater torpedo rooms were common to most pre and WW1 designs. Emphasizing my point, modern BB’s post Nelson class pretty much eliminated this feature because they were viewed increasingly as a weak point in a capital ship’s underwater defensive scheme while the chances of successfully torpedoing another BB were slim to none.



Finally, the idea to provide armour protection to the bow as well is a rather good idea by ww2 standarts. Altough no BB scale protection has been applied. The example of BISMARK at Denmark Street when hit by a british 14in APC in the bow demonstrates that the projectile went through the 60mm Wh inclined armoured plating, through 20mm deck and exited the other side through the Wh armour plating without detonating.

Click to expand...


I’d say the larger factor here that worked in favor of Bismarck was the narrow width of the bow. Fortunately the shell worked correctly in regards AP.*


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## Nikademus (Sep 28, 2010)

delcyros said:


> A note on the displacement of the battleships considered.
> Off all BB´s laid down after the end ww1, only the NELSON-class, the SHARNHORST-class and the DUNKERQUE-class adhered to the 35,000 ts stand. limit.
> All other BB´s did not.
> You may quibble about the margin but there is little difference how LITTORIO, RICHELIEU and BISMARCK
> ended up with (in within about 1,000 ts to each other) and the difference to KING GEORGE V as completed in standart tonnes is in within only 3,650 ts.(38,030 ts stand. as opposed to 41,673 ts stand.) The two US fast BB´s fall in between them but more closer to the first group than to the british BB, this means that the distance in displacement towards BISMARCK is in all but the case of KING GEORGE V much narrower than to the official limit of 35,000 ts stand, which was not adhered by them except for the classes mentioned above.



I wouldn't call it quibbling and Scharnhorst and Dunkerque were not 35,000 ton designs. Scharnhorst was originally slated to be 26,000 tons, which in 35 was increased to 31,053 as issues surfaced. While the USN and UK's final completed 35k battleships did exceed the set limit (Standard displacement) they were largely compliant while in the German and Italian case, the design requirement flagerantly dispensed with the design requirement. (Bismarck "design" was finalized at 41,000 tons for example but crept up to 44,734 on completion) 


Scharnhorst - 1934 design 26,000 tons
1935 mod 31,053(31,132) GN 
full load displacement /37,224/37,303 Scharnhorst 39,019 war overload 1943

Bismarck - 44,734 design 49,628 battle load (48,626 full)

KGV 38,031 standard 42,237 full load (1940)

PoW 44,786 full load

North Carolina 36,600 standard 44,800 full load
(1942)

South Dakota 
38,664 tons standard (44,519 full load) (34,563 light ship)

Iowa (45,000 ton escalator clause invoked)
48,425 standard 57540 full

In the French case, the design displacement of 37,832 did baloon to 42,875 under normal load conditions, 47,721 full load.


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## RCAFson (Sep 28, 2010)

delcyros said:


> A note on the displacement of the battleships considered.
> Off all BB´s laid down after the end ww1, only the NELSON-class, the SHARNHORST-class and the DUNKERQUE-class adhered to the 35,000 ts stand. limit.
> All other BB´s did not.
> You may quibble about the margin but there is little difference how LITTORIO, RICHELIEU and BISMARCK ended up with (in within about 1,000 ts to each other) and the difference to KING GEORGE V as completed in standart tonnes is in within only 3,650 ts.(38,030 ts stand. as opposed to 41,673 ts stand.) The two US fast BB´s fall in between them but more closer to the first group than to the british BB, this means that the distance in displacement towards BISMARCK is in all but the case of KING GEORGE V much narrower than to the official limit of 35,000 ts stand, which was not adhered by them except for the classes mentioned above.




U.S. battleships: an illustrated design history, By Norman Friedman, p278 states the standard displacement of KGV as 36,730 tons and Washington as 36,600 tons. I'm sure that all ships gained weight as the war progressed.


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## delcyros (Sep 28, 2010)

There are different figures aviable. KGV´s design was finalized with a design standart weight of 36,730 ts, such as suggested by the source You mentioned. This in fact means that it was designed (and thus intended) to become a treaty violation. However, when completed, she was measured to be slightly over 38,000 ts standart and I took this figure to be representative. It can be found in Garzke Dulin as well as in other sources. The displacement then went up to more than 39,000 ts stand. due to wartime additions.

Correspondingly, WASHINGTON´s design displacement was 36,600 ts stand. This is not the displacement when she was completed. It also should be stressted that US definitions of standart weight used by measuring the ships when commissioned (only partly equipped, lacking RPC and firecontroll gears) would not be tolerated by britishor german officials. There is no need to overblow the case, You know- everyone cheated a bit here.

The displacement of BISMARCK given above by NIKEDAMIUS refers to her post AVKS upgrade state in 1940 with metric tons (stand. is measured in long tons as You know, which is a bit less), neither how she was designed (intended to be with 41,670 ts) nor how she was completed (B&V measurings). The case of TIRPITZ also shows that the weight of this class massively grew in wartime.


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## tail end charlie (Sep 28, 2010)

In all this discussion about armour it occurred to me that the man who fires the guns is almost in the safest part of the ship while the captain is in one of the most dangerous. A bit like putting a wing commander in a balloon above Biggin Hill to direct activities.


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## delcyros (Sep 28, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> The USN viewpoint was considered by Friedman to take a longer view on the future of naval warfare in which ranges would open up (as they did at Jutland compared to pre-WWI expectations) and where Capital Ships would be threatened by bigger, improved shells capable of disabling/crippling such a warship with a few penetrative blows. Without resorting to ships of huge displacement, the only logical recourse was to do what the USN did…maximize armor over the vitas at the expense of non-vital areas. Post WWI other navies such as the UK had to go the same way, even more so in the light of naval treaties that limited maximum displacement. The German ships were stoutly built and well armored but in light of Cambell’s analysis it was also equally apparent that the UK defective shells played an equal and vital role in the survival of the German ships that were heavily hit. Proper ‘Greenboy’ type shells by the UK would have made the medium and light armors of the German ships more a liability vs. an asset. USN experience vs costal defenses are cited by Friedman as supporting USN views on damage to unarmored portions of the ship.



These viewpoints as outlined above by N. Friedmann are difficult to share from an US Naval point of view. In fact, I remain to be highly sceptical about it´s validity in a sense of in this regard intentional engeneering at all. ut let me explain my problems with Friedmann´s thesises: 
The arguments recaptured by Yourselfe circle around two points:
[A] increasing battleranges in future naval warfare.
* improved future shell technology.

Note that the all-or-nothing scheme was invented by the US during the design process of the NEVADA-class, a ship from the 1912 building program, with the basic armour design finalized even late in 1911.
By that time, no Jutland experiences are aviable and the US considered decisive ranges to be 6,000 to 8,000 yards. Hardly a long range. US shell technology is poor with soft capped APC using instantious fuse delay. Most navies put emphasize on HE and common projectiles to deliver a harder blow to the enemy. These projectiles -even if big like the british 15in ones- hardly are able to penetrate medium (half calibre) armour in a condition fit to burst at any obliquity. But they do wreac havoc in soft parts of the ship. So for most of the "future conflict", which by the point of view from 1911 design environment of this class certainly was not world war 2 but the GREAT WAR to come, the scheme adopted was inadeaquate and weigth inefficient (in fact, thinner armour but larger coverage would project effective protection against period projectiles over a larger area of the whole ship, thus improving it).
I don´t think that Friedmann explains the -for the period- heavy deck armour of this class either. While longer ranges were expected, the NEVADA class and it´s successor were given guns limited to an elevation with 15 degrees, which renders any deck penetration through plating larger than splinter protection rather impossible (the fuses do not make it intactly through by ww2 some navies introduced special graze fuse sensitivity to adress this problem, which were intended to work at obliquities larger than 70 degrees but neither of them worked reliably in service).
Even if You admit ultra long term planning, how did the USN developed in ww1? Not so much in this regard, the shells stayed the same, elevation of the guns was not improved. Even after the end of ww2, it took really a while for these ships to become what Friedmann thinks the USN was planning from the begin with them:
The guns weren´t modernized until the 30´s to+30 deg. elevation, >20 years after the armour design was closed.
And US shells didn´t overcome the problems until the introduction of the VD7F variable delay fuse accepted 1928 into services, which became standart in 1931, again, 20 years after the design of the armour arrangement of NEVADA finalized.
Do You really think US designers were deliberately designing their capital ships not for THE future conflict but one in a distant future with very many variables occuring in the time in between? 
And why then took it so long (almost quarter a century) to make them fit a-o-n long range doctrines?

After reading Campbell multiple times, I don´t confess that Your assess with the GREENBOY shell is correct. Altough it may have been desirable to have it, it doesn´t remove the medium armour problem. This projectile still had a defective fuse with a very unpredictable fuse delay. Exact ballictic test for the projectile with an inert filler were good but service tests with armed shells returned disappointing results, ranging from instantious to ultra long fuse delay randomly when hitting under identic conditions, compare the BADEN trials of 1921 well after the end of ww1. The japanese, which copied the MkV GREENBOY design still had the same problems during their TOSA trials with unreliable fuse delay and the much discussed diving hit, starting their own research project into diving shells appears to have been one of these faulty fuses with ultra long delay, while other shells burst on plates when penetration should be possible, indicating no fuse delay at all. 
In Jutland these shells would have increased damage in some cases and reduced damage in other cases. You can roll a dice for the result, it´s a random function. I don´t think this would have helped the british side in general, the results may be different, to the worse or good, however. It should also be stressed that it was the Jutland shock to give the necessary impetus, which eventually lead to the design of this projectile family in the first place, it was not a step by step evolution.
What really would have helped the british side, and Campbell is explicit in stating this multiple times, would be a more stable propellant to prevent or delay catastrophic magazine conflagrations such as experienced by at least five large british warships in the battle.*


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## RCAFson (Sep 28, 2010)

delcyros said:


> There are different figures aviable. KGV´s design was finalized with a design standart weight of 36,730 ts, such as suggested by the source You mentioned. This in fact means that it was designed (and thus intended) to become a treaty violation. However, when completed, she was measured to be slightly over 38,000 ts standart and I took this figure to be representative. It can be found in Garzke Dulin as well as in other sources. The displacement then went up to more than 39,000 ts stand. due to wartime additions.
> 
> Correspondingly, WASHINGTON´s design displacement was 36,600 ts stand. This is not the displacement when she was completed. It also should be stressted that US definitions of standart weight used by measuring the ships when commissioned (only partly equipped, lacking RPC and firecontroll gears) would not be tolerated by britishor german officials. There is no need to overblow the case, You know- everyone cheated a bit here.
> 
> .



LOL, KGV wasn't completed until late 1940. Washington wasn't completed until mid 1941, and war started (and thus treaty restrictions ended) in Sept 1939. Of course there was weight increases due to such things as radar additions and light AA growth and other various and sundry causes, but if war had not occurred it seems likely that the treaty would have been scrupulously observed by the RN and USN as it was prior to Sept 1939.


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## delcyros (Sep 28, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> I’d say the larger factor here that worked in favor of Bismarck was the narrow width of the bow. Fortunately the shell worked correctly in regards AP.



Then it´s still a design factor of the ship and that´s my point. The long -for the period- waterline belt terminated not far away fromt the bow, where the hull was narrowed down a lot, correctly as You say. This made a habit of using the a-o-n principles of period projectiles (and more concrete, it´s fuse delay) against them. A shorter citadel couldn´t have done the same thing. Armour at the bow- as long as it isn´t strong enough to apprciably slow the projectile down in penetration may fuse it without consequences in a way of provoking inboard high order detonations. The hull there is narrow enough to "allow" some armour without compromising a-o-n principles and the projectile likely exits it before it has a chance to go up high order.




> Campbell does state the claimed torpedo hit was incorrect. If Campbell dismisses it however I by default remain skeptical as to the validity of this alleged hit. I've seen no other source suggest it.



He sais so. But he also knows about it and that it was claimed officially by FALMOUTH in his narrative. What he doesn´t do- and that puzzles me- is giving details to it or a discussion why he comes to his quite substantial reconsideration of the validity of the hit. He doesn´t cite any sources against it and he doesn´t explain why. In other cases he is very careful to explain them with range issues (5,500 yards means well inside the range of the TT) or wrong settings. But not so in this case. Therefore his rejection is based on nothing else than his athoritative (and therefore dogmatic) statement. Don´t take me wrong, I highly regard his work, other than most (even recent) books on this subject he had access to sources from both sides and spent a long time in the Bundesarchiv at Freiburg.
I have reposted a survivor statement (primary source) to this hit, found originally in the Freiburg Archive but circulated in period public press around (particularely in the english press with a bad translation and some addenda not found in it originally) from a crewmember aboard SMS LÜTZOW confiming, both place and time over there on the navweaps board some time ago but I think You may also find it online as well (at least the english translation of it) and that causes me to reiterate the question.
You have a tactically possible hit (in within the technical limitations of range, context and setting of both, the torpedo and the target ship) when one ship involved carried out a torpedo attack from quite close range and infact claimed to have hit LÜTZOW in the bow with it. And then You have surviving crewmembers from aboard the other side confirming the event. Finally, You see a damage picture which, agreed is obscured by many shell hits but not in contradiction to this event. If anything, it would have supported the chain of events.

-and then Campbell comes with one sentence dismissing the event without explaining why these sources should be ignored. I am not statisfied with this reconsideration and in fact, it rings some bells in my head.


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## delcyros (Sep 28, 2010)

Turret weight, triple and twin ones.

My two cents on the issue.
I consider it problematic to compare inter national turret designs owing to different engeneering solutions behind. A weight comparison should at least stay in the same national ballpark.
Based upon the known weights for turrets, including their revolving structure below, the mounts and armour plates (but NOT the barbette and it´s associated weight or the ammunition weight of the magazine below) I found a not so worse fitting curve, attached below.
Judging from it, let´s take a hypothetical test 38cmL50 twin turret (I don´t want to obscure our example with real turrets from BADEN or BISMARCK, it should only be treated as an example), the red curve shows that it would weight in about 1,000 metric tons each. That makes for 4,000 ts for a four turretted, eight gun battery.

It´s a simple example so far, if You both agree so far, I will continue to extrapolate the weight for a corresponding german 38cmL50 triple turret.


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## parsifal (Sep 29, 2010)

I often daydream a bit to think what might have happened if the Germans had not attempted to build a battleship navy. Specifically I consider the following to be interesting possibilities


1) The Germans did not build their Bismarck class, and instead used these resources to build carriers and light escorts, such as the Type M Light Cruisers. Very roughly speaking, the cost per tonne for battleship construction is roughly twice as great as carrier construction

2) The Germans embarked on a true carrier development program from 1932, and allowed their FAA to develop unfettered.
This would realistically mean the germans would go to war with four carriers, each carrying around 50 aircraft (with wing folding. The operational types would probably be Me 109T (with folding wings), Fi167 and Ju87T 


3) The existing Light Cruisers were sold, and replaced by more heavily built true Light cruisers with long range, relatively light weight main armament (say 6 x 6in), and an efficient AA suite 

4) The heavy cruisers were built along th lines of the Spees, but with 8" guns. This type of ship might be armed with 6 x 8", have a displacement of around 17000 T, and be armoured better than the Spees. They would have a range of around 12000 NM, and a top sped of just under 30 Knots. 

4) The destroyersd were built with long range tanks, lighter armament and a DP AA weapon. This would probably have meant AA destroyers with long range and better sea keeping abilities. Typically I would see German DDs armed with 4 or 5 x 4.1 and a range of 6-8000 NM. These ships might have a effective sea speed of around 28 knots, have much reduced top weight and a torpedo brioadside of at least 8 x 21in 

5) With this sort of force structure and with the same expenditure of resources as historicali, I can see the germans going to war with three or four carriers, the two Scharhorsts, the Pocket battleshipss , probably 5 heavy cruisers and about 10 Type Ms. The germans would probably have about 40 Long range destroyeres 

The quid pro Quo is that the British would not build their KGVs. Roughly this would enable them to build a further 10 Light carriers with air groups, and to modernize the FAA equipment. The RN would go to war with something like the rejected Gloster fighter design, a better development of the Skua, and some development of the Albacore.Because of the age of the british battlefleet, the british would probably be forced to build at least two of its KGVs

This would have led to a totally different war, and I think, a very intersting one for the historians. Not sure if the final outcome would have been different, but I think the germans would have possessed a far greater potential for upset than following a traditional battleship strategy


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## Glider (Sep 29, 2010)

Its an interesting thought. Some years ago I went to a lecture and his basic premise was that, if a ship is too important to lose then its of no practical good and simply a drain on resources.

His main time period was around 1912 when the South American countries were almost bankrupting themselves to build one Battleship when they would never have used them as they were to important to risk. The same basic rule applies to the German Navy who were not really allowed to use them if there was a chance of them being sunk.


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## parsifal (Sep 29, 2010)

The questiuons that arise from this concept are numerous. Firstly, is it a relaistic estimate of german capability, unfettered by a mania to build a battlefleet? Secondly, is it a relaistic estimate of what they might get if they exchanged their BBs for lesser warships. Thirdly if they could create such a weapon, how best to use it?


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## Glider (Sep 29, 2010)

The first thing to do would be decide the limits of what you want to achieve. Personally I would ditch any idea of operating surface ships in the N Atlantic. Its one big trap as one lucky hit would reduce the chances of getting home to almost nil. Even if the voyage is a huge success, you still have to get home and there are some obvious choke points where the RN would concentrate its vessels.
This leaves the N Sea up to Norway. I would concentrate my building on a standard average DD something like a faster Hunt with 4 x TT and 6 x 4in DP. These to be supported by LC similar to the Nurenburg but slightly larger with more AA guns.
These could be built in some numbers and be used to escort and strike at British convoys in the area. They are big enough to deal with the light forces in the area and shold the RN send anything larger would be vulnerable to AA attack.


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## Njaco (Sep 29, 2010)

Who exactly in the Kreigsmarine hierachy didn't think that carriers had a place in modern warfare? I mean, didn't they see the RN building carriers, the USA building carriers, even the IJN? With such an emphasis on the Luftwaffe and divebombing in the 30s I would think that they would incorporated aircraft with their surface fleet more substantially.


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## Nikademus (Sep 29, 2010)

delcyros said:


> There are different figures aviable. KGV´s design was finalized with a design standart weight of 36,730 ts, such as suggested by the source You mentioned. This in fact means that it was designed (and thus intended) to become a treaty violation. However, when completed, she was measured to be slightly over 38,000 ts standart and I took this figure to be representative. It can be found in Garzke Dulin as well as in other sources. The displacement then went up to more than 39,000 ts stand. due to wartime additions.



As 'completed' the USN and UK ships were only slightly above the agreed on limit of 35,000 tons, which represents to me an honest effort to enforce the spirit of the treaty. Wartime weight additions are irrelevent as at that point as the nations were at WAR, the Escalator Clause was in effect and the US and UK were fast becoming allies. In contrast the Germans (and the Italians) deliberately violated the Treaty and designed warships with a standard displacement far in excess of the 35k limit which balooned further on completion. To claim that "oh everybody cheated so its ok" is a straw man. Its akin to saying "No harm...no foul!"


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## Nikademus (Sep 29, 2010)

delcyros said:


> Then it´s still a design factor of the ship and that´s my point. The long -for the period- waterline belt terminated not far away fromt the bow, where the hull was narrowed down a lot, correctly as You say. This made a habit of using the a-o-n principles of period projectiles (and more concrete, it´s fuse delay) against them. A shorter citadel couldn´t have done the same thing. Armour at the bow- as long as it isn´t strong enough to apprciably slow the projectile down in penetration may fuse it without consequences in a way of provoking inboard high order detonations. The hull there is narrow enough to "allow" some armour without compromising a-o-n principles and the projectile likely exits it before it has a chance to go up high order.



Unless the shell doesn't act as you predict and in fact is set off by said armor....or if a smaller caliber shell strikes it. 



> He sais so. But he also knows about it and that it was claimed officially by FALMOUTH in his narrative. What he doesn´t do- and that puzzles me- is giving details to it or a discussion why he comes to his quite substantial reconsideration of the validity of the hit. He doesn´t cite any sources against it and he doesn´t explain why.



I don't choose to see conspiracies just because Campbell didn't elaborate on this detail. I've seen this same kind of reverse logic used to attempt to cast doubt on other highly statistical laden works. (Clay Blair is probably the best example.) A book can only be so big. For you to expect him to fully investigate each _claim_ of a hit with mounds of detail is unreasonable. Lots of people made claims during the war. This is an air sub-forum after all. We all know about claims made by one side and the other. Much of the time they are in fact proven to be incorrect. Just because a Lutzow survivor claims a torpedo hit the ship doesn't necessitate that it occured. (This reminds me of the Canberra controversy) I agree that Campbell's work is excellent, considered by many to be the definitive analysis of the battle. Hence i give him the benefit of the doubt regarding the claimed hit on Lutzow and his statement that it was not correct in lieu of more substantial and convincing evidence.


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## Nikademus (Sep 29, 2010)

delcyros said:


> These projectiles -even if big like the british 15in ones- hardly are able to penetrate medium (half calibre) armour in a condition fit to burst at any obliquity. But they do wreac havoc in soft parts of the ship. So for most of the "future conflict", which by the point of view from 1911 design environment of this class certainly was not world war 2 but the GREAT WAR to come, the scheme adopted was inadeaquate and weigth inefficient (in fact, thinner armour but larger coverage would project effective protection against period projectiles over a larger area of the whole ship, thus improving it).



Hi,

I believe i also stated that at the time around WWI, incremental armor designs still had merit because the ranges of the time and the state of AP shells, combined with a persisting belief in the value of HE shells validated them to a degree. Further, costs to field armor of the required (or at least adequate) thickness had not hit the ceiling yet in terms of overall displacement with a notable exception of deck armor whose thicknesses were on the verge of being inadequate.

Per Friedman, the logic of the A/N system was that at "Very long ranges" the principle attack device would be the AP shell which could hit anywhere on a ship. HE would be useless against heavy armor (deck or belt) so only the heaviest armor was worth using. RN practice at the time, as mentioned thought HE would be extremely effective, based on part on their observations of Tsunshima and used considerable levels of medium armor as a result. This belief was not supported by the results of Jutland same as they were for the Germans. Ranges at Jutland and in other small skirmishes also confirmed the USN forward view that battle ranges were or soon would greatly expand.



> I don´t think that Friedmann explains the -for the period- heavy deck armour of this class either. While longer ranges were expected, the NEVADA class and it´s successor were given guns limited to an elevation with 15 degrees, which renders any deck penetration through plating larger than splinter protection rather impossible (the fuses do not make it intactly through by ww2 some navies introduced special graze fuse sensitivity to adress this problem, which were intended to work at obliquities larger than 70 degrees but neither of them worked reliably in service).



That was the whole point. The USN fielded battleships as early as 1914 with deck armor all but completely proof against any forseeable opponent. While no deck armor was penetrated at Jutland it was a very near thing on more than one occasion. Post WWI saw the victorious RN saddled with a large battlefleet that was not only worn out but now largely vulnerable. In the post WWI era the US deck schemes did not require substantial upgrading. 

Your argument that USN shell technology was deficient and therefore disproves the USN's long view on protection does not make any sense to me. Did the RN's issues with it's shell techology somehow invalidate it's forward looking decision to convert to oil fuel over coal? Postwar, The RN adopted the A/N scheme as did most other nations along with deck armors greatly augmented over the WWI designs with the exceptions of the USN Standards who's deck armor was considered sufficient that subsequent and currently building designs incorporated much the same level of protection through the South Dakota I class. Built Standards did not require massive armor upgrades in the 1920's and remained first class vessels though that decade and into the 1930's. You say shell technology remained imperfect but none the less it was still substantially improved as the Baden tests also showed and nations had to react to this and build stronger, newer battleships to counter it as well as conduct expensive upgrades on those units deemed worthy of it.




> After reading Campbell multiple times, I don´t confess that Your assess with the GREENBOY shell is correct.
> 
> Altough it may have been desirable to have it, it doesn´t remove the medium armour problem. This projectile still had a defective fuse with a very unpredictable fuse delay. Exact ballictic test for the projectile with an inert filler were good but service tests with armed shells returned disappointing results, ranging from instantious to ultra long fuse delay randomly when hitting under identic conditions, compare the BADEN trials of 1921 well after the end of ww1.



Disapointing results? The Baden trials of 1921 revealed overall a much improved performance of the British AP shell. I'm sure how this disproves what i wrote? The shells among other things directly penetrated the frontal glasis of one of Baden's turret's...a clean penetration.(13 3/4 inch) True it burst while 2/3rd through the armor but the nose ended up inside the turret and considerable damage was done to the roller path as a result. Another cleanly penetrated the 13 3/4 barbette armor of X Turret. Another penetrated cleanly the 10in upper belt at a 14.5 degree angle, and burst 38 feet later against the funnel casing, having also gone through a 1.2in bulkhead and a 1/2 inch deck along the way. The boiler room below ended up being sprayed with fragments. The 14inch conning tower did resist a hit at a 30 degree angle. IIRC, only 3 UK shells penetrated heavy armor at Jutland. Had they used Greenboys, they might very well have disabled and/or sunk more German captial ships. Conversely, had the Germans focused on AP vs AP/HE mixtures, they might have gotten better results as well as only in two cases did the shells burst inside properly. The others all burst while either holing or displacing armor. With more stable powder and flash protection, it's possible none of the British BC's would have been result under such a perfomance. [DK Brown - Grand Fleet]
Brown also goes on to state that the Baden trials showed that the new British shells would penetrate thick armor and the new fuses made possible bursts up to 40 feet beyond the point of impact. They don't seem too defective to me.

The Japanese motivaiton for developing the Type 91 was indeed their observations regarding the potential threat of diving shells. They were the only nation to actively pursue this and deploy a shell designed to do so. Seperate issue.



> In Jutland these shells would have increased damage in some cases and reduced damage in other cases. You can roll a dice for the result, it´s a random function.



No, it isn't. A shell has it's greatest chance to do damage if it cleanly penetrates armor and bursts inside. This was the true lesson of Tsunshima, and that of Jutland. A shell that bursts outside of armor expends most of it's energy outside leaving the vitals intact. Structural damage may result and you might eventually disable the ship but in general it will take far more of these types of hits in comparison to shells that are penetrating vitals protected by heavy armor.



> What really would have helped the british side, and Campbell is explicit in stating this multiple times, would be a more stable propellant to prevent or delay catastrophic magazine conflagrations such as experienced by at least five large british warships in the battle.


[/quote]

Cambell was explicit in stating that the UK was lucky that more of it's barbettes and turrets were not penetrated given the tendancy for it's powder to ignite violently. The USN, as far back as the immediate post Jutland era was correct in pointing out that it was the powder and it's handling arrangements that were of most importance in the loss of the 3 British BC's, not the armor arrangement. This didn't change it's viewpoint on the All or Nothing concept...in fact it validated it in conjunction with better damage control and powder handling arrangements. (for example the use of flash tight baffles inside magazines.) Jutland also did not result in a major modification of the USN A/N scheme in the Standard class BB's because they it already maximized armor in those critical locations.


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## parsifal (Sep 29, 2010)

Njaco said:


> Who exactly in the Kreigsmarine hierachy didn't think that carriers had a place in modern warfare? I mean, didn't they see the RN building carriers, the USA building carriers, even the IJN? With such an emphasis on the Luftwaffe and divebombing in the 30s I would think that they would incorporated aircraft with their surface fleet more substantially.



A better question was who in the KM did see a role for carriers.The provision of carriers in the "Z" Plan was one of its weakest aspects. I think by 1946 it called for only two to be added to a fleet that if allowed to grow unchallenged, would have otherwise have eclipsed most other navies.

The Germans suffered from a number of problems in the development of carriers and carrier aviation. The first was a complete lack of design experience. This was reflected in their Graf Zeppelin which was a mish mash of contradictory ideas and suffered as a design because the Germans were unable to grasp what was important in carrier design and what wasnt. Though there was a slow and gradual increase in interest in carriers, there never was a "guderian of the Navy" to take hold of the issue and run with it. KM leadership was very conservative, and in their procurement policy this was reflected in their mania to stick with what they knew...They knew battleships, so thats what they wanted to build.....they also knew subs, and pursued a policy of submarine development. My opinion is that during WWI they never really got the cruiser or destroyer requirements wuite right, and this carried forward (with different problems) into WWII. Destroyers for example were probably too light in WWI, there appears to have been a reaction in Post War, and the result was that German DDs were grossly over-armed, over complex, to the point they were barely seaworthy. In cruiser development there were a plethora of problems....the Nurnbergs were too light, the Spees suffered a poor armour layout, the Hippers were too short ranged. 

In respect of carriers, the second problem was the aircraft control issue. Goring controlled all the major airborne assets, and refused for a long time to put much effort into carrier aircraft development, and refused to give up even the tactical control of carrier borne assets. This would have had to be addressed in order for the germans to have any hope of developing carriers. 

If the Germans had built carriers, they would have had the opportunity to expeiment with how to use them...ie as their primary strike weapon, not as a support element to the battle line, and much more than just a scouting element. They would have reaqlized the value of grouping carriers over having a single carrier working by itself. I believe that carrier task forces were within the grasp of the germans to develop, and these making short foreays into the western approaches, to dislocate the defences, and allow U-Boats into the Convoys once so dislocated, would have just about brought England to her knees, unless the Brits developed an effective counter in the pre-war period....ie carriers of their own, with more competent aCAGs and aircraft types.


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## Nikademus (Sep 29, 2010)

Don't see how things could have turned out much differently. According to James Corum, Raeder the CiC of the Kreigsmarine was a firm believer in the primacy of the battleship in war and that it was he who convinced Hitler regarding this on the basis of International prestige being identical to the scale of it's naval strength. The weakness of the Z-plan was that it was meant to be completed by 1947. War came far earlier than Raeder and co. were told. Four carriers were preposed under the plan but their exact role was vague....being more "prestige" items than anything else. Priority for CV's was actually below that of CL's. 

Interestingly, it was the Luftwaffe, not the KM that was responsible for most of the naval aviation and naval air doctrine development. It only grew slowly however from 1936 - 39 (for example by 37 there were only four coastal airgroups in service) A protocol signed between the navy and the Luftwaffe in Jan of 1939 specified that the KM would have it's own air arm by 1941, consisting of 9 x long distance squadrons, 18 coastal recon squadrons, *12 carrier squadrons* and two onboard observation squadrons. The navy's point of view [per Corum] was that naval avaition's primary role was to serve as a patrol and recon force, and an auxillary arm of the fleet vs. a true striking force.

A major problem re: strike force was the lack of reliable air dropped torpedo, it not having been developed by the late 1930's. Eventually much of these would be supplied by the Italians, contriubting to a torpedo shortage on their part. 

A completed carrier or two might have made things more lively for the RN but ultimately they had the assets to counter it.


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## delcyros (Sep 29, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> As 'completed' the USN and UK ships were only slightly above the agreed on limit of 35,000 tons, which represents to me an honest effort to enforce the spirit of the treaty. Wartime weight additions are irrelevent as at that point as the nations were at WAR, the Escalator Clause was in effect and the US and UK were fast becoming allies. In contrast the Germans (and the Italians) deliberately violated the Treaty and designed warships with a standard displacement far in excess of the 35k limit which balooned further on completion. To claim that "oh everybody cheated so its ok" is a straw man. Its akin to saying "No harm...no foul!"




Hardly "slightly above". They cheated. In fact the designed (not the completed!) displacement was already 5% over the limits imposed in the Treaties. -like everybody did. To say that they at least tried to make an honest effort to enforce the spirit of the Treaty is wrong. Everybody expected Japan not to ratify the Treaty and thus assumed orrectly that the escelator Clause takes place. You may say that the escalator Clause was in effect before the ships were advanced enough but this applies to BSIMARCK´s design as well. In fact, Germany didn´t violated the Treaty, it was not a signatory nation to it. Germany was bound to the AGNA, which didn´t qualify the limits other than very broad generalizations and opened lots of gaps to avoid limits. And the Treaty was canceled by Hitler soon after anyway.


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## delcyros (Sep 29, 2010)

wrt to Campbell LÜUTZOW´s Ttorpedohit, don´t shift around the responsilities. 
Your accusation of "conspiracies" is not only a factual mistake but the most unhonest way to avoid dealing the problem in indirectly accusing me to prefer strange theories.
The fact remains that the TT hit appears in both, german and british primary and contemporary sources. That You don´t read them, may have to do with Your neglect of them in favour of secondary sources. They can be found well BEFORE J. Campbells work on this topic (Hadeler, citing RMA files). If anything, he was challanging it with his rejection of events. It´s not that a conspiracy appeared and found evidence for something "new" happening out there. Rather contrary, he said something DID NOT happen, and he didn´t substantiate his case. Many other authors also have challanged details in his book (Brooks in the hit distribution, f.e.) but nobody asked why he made such a drastic reconsideration of the well established torpedohit inspite of contrary evidence.


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## delcyros (Sep 29, 2010)

> Per Friedman, the logic of the A/N system was that at "Very long ranges" the principle attack device would be the AP shell which could hit anywhere on a ship. HE would be useless against heavy armor (deck or belt) so only the heaviest armor was worth using. RN practice at the time, as mentioned thought HE would be extremely effective, based on part on their observations of Tsunshima and used considerable levels of medium armor as a result. This belief was not supported by the results of Jutland same as they were for the Germans. Ranges at Jutland and in other small skirmishes also confirmed the USN forward view that battle ranges were or soon would greatly expand.
> [...]
> The USN fielded battleships as early as 1914 with deck armor all but completely proof against any forseeable opponent. While no deck armor was penetrated at Jutland it was a very near thing on more than one occasion. Post WWI saw the victorious RN saddled with a large battlefleet that was not only worn out but now largely vulnerable.



Unconvincing. As I stated above, Jutland experiences and small skirmishes are experiences not aviable to the USN while it was developing the AoN scheme. Friedman´s logic that the principle attack device would be AP at very long range is not convincing either. Even at close range, HE will be useless against heavy (and even medium) armour. As a matter of fact, HE is useless against ANY measure of armour protection larger than splinter plating, regardless of range. RN specifications at that time in consideration asked the projectiles to inflicting wrecking effects on the ships hull plating of the waterline area, in order to increase wateringress for a more quicker sinking. This can be done easier from close range than from very long ones.
Even after ww1, practices in Navies inlcuding Germany and Japan asked to usemajor calibre HE at long range against AoN armoured ships with the specific idea to aim for the unprotected parts of the ship and wreck heavoc there. 
Why You do think that the GF battleships were vulnarable 1919 to 1929? Against whom? Against the HSF, sitting around in Scapa Flow? Against the USN, which still hadn´t developed a capability for effective long range firing, let alone think of endangering the decks of the GF ships owing to low main gun elevation and defective fuses?
The vulnarability of the GF and other old ships is not a function deriving from ww1 or it´s outcome but subsequent step by step eveolution and improvements starting not before another decade passed after the end of ww1.

I don´t question that the AoN armoured US standarts ended up beeing very valuable units in the mid 30´s owing to their schemes. But I don´t buy Friedman´s thesis that this was all pre planned. I rather think this happened accidently and when recognised to fit ongoing developments in guns, shell technology, armour and firecontroll, was exploited skillfully.


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## delcyros (Sep 29, 2010)

Wrt to the BADEN trials conducted 1921. I can read between the lines. The material as a convolution of primary sources is aviable online, so everyone can draw his own conclusions from them.
It has been cited for evidence for superior shell technology of the GREENBOY projectiles with both, armour piercing and fusing as well as obliquity behavior greatly superior to anything else. Brown is a good example for a basic failure in understanding the problems exposed by the trials in english secondary sources (even recent articles in Warship International dealing with them).

I will adress that seperately, dealing with strikes on heavy armour first (350mm KC plate = 13.78in = 0.9187 cal. thickness for the 15in APC):



> _The shells among other things directly penetrated the frontal glasis of one of Baden's turret's...a clean penetration.(13 3/4 inch) True it burst while 2/3rd through the armor but the nose ended up inside the turret and considerable damage was done to the roller path as a result._


No. Here You mix up the results from two different shells. Round No. 9 hit the Barbette of turret X and round No. 14 hitting the 13.78in turret face of "B".
The shell completely made it through the plate (no burst, while 2/3 through), and was found inside turret with nose resting against left girder of right gun-slide. The center position sight and apparatus in its immediate vicinity was damaged but the shell had very little momentum after passing the plate. No damage to the roller path. Resultant netto obliquity was 16.22 deg (angle of fall: 12 deg, corresponding to a range somehow less than desired) with 1550 fps striking velocity.
The impact was very close to the joint of the frontal plate and it´s glacis with joint effects involved (effectively making the plate less capable than it would have been otherwise). The Impact obliquity was to low for the desired range but in within tolerable limits of shell and context differences.
Both imply a somehow better than usually expectable result as they tend to make penetration easier as compared to the conditions simulated with this shot.
BUT: The plate nevertheless damaged the projectile and importantly it´s fuse (blind) so that the projectile effectively became a dud. 
By definition, the shell was able to completely pass the plate ballistically but not in a condition fit to burst inside (US NBL). The obliquity involved means low obliquity (at his netto obliquity even soft caps may work). GREENBOY APC has been unable to penetrate a near calibre thick plate (0.9187 cal. thick) in a fit to burst condition at low obliquity. Whether or not it would have been able to penetrate a normal 350mm KC plate completely was a very narrow thing with two critical circumstances playing in favour of the shell impact condition and against the plate.



> Another cleanly penetrated the 13 3/4 barbette armor of X Turret.


No. Refferring to shell No. 9. Instead of penetration through, it burst in holing while 2/3 through the plate with parts of the projectile found inside and outside. Lesss than 1/3 of the projectile made it through (only it´s nose and shoulder, body pieces and base pieces were not found inside the barbette). Considerable damage was done to the roller path. Some damage was caused to machinery in the pocket between girders where the nose of the shell was found.
Resultant netto obliquity was 11 deg (again less than would be expected at the simulated range), striking velocity was 1,550fps.
By definition, this is no penetration. It is a burst in holing or by US definition a partial penetration. Typically followed by low order detonation or duds with most of the effects outside. While the impact obliquity was even less than for the Round No.14, the partial penetration suggests that one should be careful in counting the full penetration of No.14 as representative for it´s impact condition. The obliquity involved means low obliquity (at his netto obliquity even soft caps ALWAYS work). GREENBOY APC has been unable to completely penetrate a near calibre thick plate (0.9187 cal. thick) at low obliquity. 
In addition to this, Round No.10:a 15in CPC failed to penetrate the barbette armour of "B" turret at 12 deg. netto impact obliquity.



> The 14inch conning tower did resist a hit at a 30 degree angle.


Correct. Hit No. 15 failed to penetrate but burst in contact with the 13.78in armoured conning tower. GREENBOY APC has been unable to perforate (making a hole through) a near calibre thick plate (0.9187 cal. thick) at high obliquity. 

There is another 15in APC hit at high obliquity. Shell No. 6 from the second series conducted in august hit the plate joint of the 350mm barbette armour of "A" turret at 32 deg. resultant obliquity and failed to make a hole (burst on impact with some local effect on the plates). GREENBOY APC has been unable to perforate (making a hole through) a near calibre thick plate (0.9187 cal. thick) at high obliquity. 
It should be noted that plate edges and their joints as mentioned above are much weaker than to hit the middle of a plate.




> IIRC, only 3 UK shells penetrated heavy armor at Jutland. Had they used Greenboys, they might very well have disabled and/or sunk more German captial ships.



Under the comparisons for impact as such outlined above, not a single UK (...or german for that matter...) shell penetrated heavy armour at Jutland (280mm or more, matching about 0.92 cal. thickness plates for the british 12in gun, thus beeing "near calibre thick" or heavy plates). GREENBOY shells wouldn´t have changed that to a large degree as they are unable to defeat heavy armour in a condition fit to burst or to defeat it at high obliquity which often is involved when target angles are factored in. Even had they had this ability (which evidently is not the case) there is armour behind the main belt in the german ships.
With regard to near calibre thick penetration capabilities, not a single projectile of the BADEN trials made it through the 0.92 cal. thick plates in a condition fit to burst behind, even while the involved obliquity was either very low (in whiches case the projectile may partially penetrate) or high (in whiches case not even a hole was made). The idea that these shells can penetrate near calibre thick plates at obliquity AND stay in a condition fit to burst is wrong, as these shells had a very hard time to get through the plates (never able to burst high order behind them) at low obliquities and failed to even make a hole when high obliquities are involved. It should also be stressed that Krupp KC/a is considered to be a comparably poor quality face hardened armour by the standarts of ww1 (from personal communication with Nathan Okun).

Two and maybe three UK shells penetrated medium armour (150 to 260mm) at Jutland, but more to these and the corresponding Baden trial results for medium thickness range plates later.


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## Nikademus (Sep 29, 2010)

delcyros said:


> Hardly "slightly above". They cheated..



Yes, slightly above. No cheating as the 35k *designed* displacement was adhered to. That the ships weighed in with Standard displacement so close to the 35k limit set by the treaty was a credit to their respective services. By definition "Cheating" would qualify the German and Italian designs which even on _paper_ in the German case, exceeded the 35k limit. The Italian design on paper specified 35,000 tons but the resultant ship flagerantly exceeded this limit. Both Friedman and Garzke concur on North Carolina and KGV's standard displacement.


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## Nikademus (Sep 29, 2010)

delcyros said:


> wrt to Campbell LÜUTZOW´s Ttorpedohit, don´t shift around the responsilities.
> Your accusation of "conspiracies" is not only a factual mistake but the most unhonest way to avoid dealing the problem in indirectly accusing me to prefer strange theories.
> The fact remains that the TT hit appears in both, german and british primary and contemporary sources. That You don´t read them, may have to do with Your neglect of them in favour of secondary sources. .



I made no claim of any conspiracy. The suggestion of such, indirectly, was yours given that the crux of your argument against Campbell revolved around "suspicion" on why he didn't elaborate on what he labeled a claimed hit.

That Falmouth claimed a hit and a German crewer claimed there was a torpedo hit on Lutzow is to me, insufficient evidence in the face of Campbell's research, plain and simple. Research that involved the records of both navies. Call it negect if you want. I call it healthy skepticism backed by other examples of contradictory accounts such as the Canberra incident. The ironic part is that even were I to credit such a torpedo hit....it wouldn't change my viewpoint on the weak point created by underwater torpedo flats in regards to a Capital ship's underwater defense....as such I have no agenda on the matter.


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## Nikademus (Sep 29, 2010)

delcyros said:


> Unconvincing. As I stated above, Jutland experiences and small skirmishes are experiences not aviable to the USN while it was developing the AoN scheme. Friedman´s logic that the principle attack device would be AP at very long range is not convincing either. Even at lose range, HE will be useless against heavy (and even medium) armour. As a matter of fact, HE is useless against ANY measure of armour protection larger than splinter plating, regardless of range.



This supports the USN viewpoint in regards A/N protection. Only AP shells are the major threat if facing heavy armor. Thus providing maximum armor to those critical areas against AP shells is the best recourse of action. Prior too and during WWI, both systems could compete somewhat (US Standards has the edge in deck armor and armament protection but belt armor was comprable) but post WWI, with imporved shells and navies dispensing with using HE against Battleships......A/N was the only cost effective means to pursue and the RN realized it and incorprated the scheme in post WWI designs.



> Why You do think that the GF battleships were vulnarable 1919 to 1929? Against whom? Against the HSF, sitting around in Scapa Flow? Against the USN, which still hadn´t developed a capability for effective long range firing, let alone think of endangering the decks of the GF ships owing to low main gun elevation and defective fuses?



Post WWI, the USN passed the RN in fire control due to technological developments. Coupled with the lessons learned by the 6th BS attached the RN, USN battleships were more than capable of delivering ordinance at Jutland ranges or higher. Post WWI, the victorious naval powers continued to exist and evolve with each other victorious navy as a potential enemy as well as ally. Are you suggesting that with the end of WWI there was no need for navies to exist at all?



> The vulnarability of the GF and other old ships is not a function deriving from ww1 or it´s outcome but subsequent step by step eveolution and improvements starting not before another decade passed after the end of ww1.



If i'm understanding you correctly.....i believe this is what i've been saying all along. The USN realized first that the future of naval combat (BB vs BB) would entail longer ranged combats with the resultant increase in plunging fire and that AP shells would be the primary threat to a battleship. With the max size of their battleships fixed they had to come up with an armor scheme that gave their ships the best chance to resist these AP shells...hence All or Nothing protection which gave maximum armor thickenss to the vitals while leaving non vital systems unamored. No displacement wasted on "medium" or "Light" armor as that would have either reduced heavy armor thickness or necessitated a bigger ship.



> I don´t question that the AoN armoured US standarts ended up beeing very valuable units in the mid 30´s owing to their schemes. But I don´t buy Friedman´s thesis that this was all pre planned. I rather think this happened accidently.



You cannot be serious.


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## Glider (Sep 29, 2010)

Its interesting stuff that is going on here. Can I ask if any copies of the Baden Trials anywhere on the Web?

Thanks again to all those participating


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## Nikademus (Sep 29, 2010)

delcyros said:


> Wrt to the BADEN trials conducted 1921. I can read between the lines. The material as a convolution of primary sources is aviable online, so everyone can draw his own conclusions from them.





> It has been cited for evidence for superior shell technology of the GREENBOY projectiles with both, armour piercing and fusing as well as obliquity behavior greatly superior to anything else. Brown is a good example for a basic failure in understanding the problems exposed by the trials in english secondary sources (even recent articles in Warship International dealing with them).



Its not just a citation. It's a fact...unless your suggesting that the whole thing was rigged....pictures and all. The tests proved conclusively that the British had seriously improved their AP and CPC shells in comparison the the abysmal performance of those shells at Jutland.



> No. Here You mix up the results from two different shells. Round No. 9 hit the Barbette of turret X and round No. 14 hitting the 13.78in turret face of "B".



Your correct in that I did mix up the descriptions in regards to the 2/3rd through and burst. My error.....but not DK Brown's. However it doesn't disprove anything i've written in regards to the new shells greater AP effectiveness vs. their Jutland predecssors. 

For the record:


From report ADM 186/251 

Round 9.

Target: Barbette armour of “X” turret.
Shell: 15 in. A.P.C.
Fuze: 16 D.
Filling: 70/30 Shellite.
S.V.[striking velocity]: 1.550 fps [472 mps].
Delay: 3 ft.
Nature of burst: E.O.
Point of impact: 3 ft. 9 in. from top edge of fixed armour and 25 ft. 9 in. from midship line forward. 
Angle of impact from normal: Vertical, 11 deg.; horizontal, 0 deg. Resultant from normal, 11 deg.

*The [13 ¾ in.] armour was completely penetrated*, a hole 17 in. diameter being made in it. 
Apparently the shell burst when it was two-thirds of its way through the armour and the nose of the shell as far as the shoulder was found inside barbette 23 ft. from outer edge of entry hole.
Considerable damage was done to the roller path.
Some damage was caused to machinery in the pocket between girders where the nose of the shell was found.

*Round 14.*

Target: Front plate of “B” turret.
Shell: 15 in. A.P.C.
Fuze: 16 D.
Filling: 70/30 Shellite.
S.V.: 1.550 fps [472 mps].
Delay: Blind.
Nature of burst: Blind.
Point of impact: Front plate of turret midway between the guns.
Angle of impact: Vertical, 12 deg.; horizontal, 11 deg. Resultant, 18 deg. 40 min.

*Shell completely perforated armour*, making holes of 18 in. in diameter flaked off to 36 in. by 48 in. outside and 24 in. by 36 in. inside.
Shell was found inside turret with nose resting against left girder of right gun-slide.
The center position sight and apparatus in its immediate vicinity was wrecked.
The shell was eventually exploded by a gun-cotton charge with the following result.
*The sound of the burst was indistinguishable from that of the gun-cotton detonating, and degree of rapidity of burst was therefore difficult to estimate. Thick black smoke was emitted from all holes in the gun-house.*
The left rammer (main cage to transport wagon) was unshipped and damaged.
The nose of the shell and a large part of the body were found lying on a platform 2 ft. below the burst, and two large fragments were lying where the shell had been. Part of the base weighting 30 lb. went through the main cage trunk and was found lying in the gun-house just near of this trunk. Other fragments were found lying about the gun-house and working chamber, but no other serious damage could be found.

More importantly:

This trial shows that A.P.C. will penetrate 13 ¾ in. [350mm] plate where C.P.C. will fail. Round 15 was fired at an angle of 60 deg. which serves to determine by comparison with round 14 the angle of impact at which perforation of 13 ¾ in. armour may be expected.
The performance of A.P.C. shell as regards penetration would appear to be satisfactory.

From DK Brown:

3 x 15in APC rounds were fired through the 7in battery armor, at least one of which hit and nearly penetrated the 7 3/8 barbette beyond. CPC shells were fired against the decks and *caused very severe blast damage*. It seems to have been concluded that the new generation of shells would penetrate thick armor and the new fuses would explode them about 40 feet beyond the point of impact. The filling, Shellite in the APC, Trotyl in CPC would explode violently causing severe damage. _This conclusion at least contributed to the adoption of the 'all or nothing' system of protection in the new NELSON class battleships. 





Under the comparisons for impact as such outlined above, not a single UK (...or german for that matter...) shell penetrated heavy armour at Jutland (280mm or more, matching about 0.92 cal. thickness plates for the british 12in gun, thus beeing "near calibre thick" or heavy plates). GREENBOY shells wouldn´t have changed that to a large degree.

Click to expand...


Don't agree based on my reading of the original report and Brown and Campbell's comments as well as comments from Author Richard Worth on trying to compare Jutland shells to Greenboys. Fact remains that at Jutland only 1 hit cleanly penetrated "heavy armor" out of 17 hits (Campell disqualifies 4 based on 1 being HE, 3 more glancing off due to high oblicity) Minimum thickness defined as "heavy armor" was 10 inches. Of these 13 hits, more than half *7* burst outside armor without holing with the resultant energy of the shell bursts venting outside the protected area. 4 more holed the armor with the effect of shell burst venting outside. Only 2 hits that holed the armor vented part of their blast inside the target armor. Such a poor performance was as critical if not more critical than the generally heavier armor protection of the German capital ships. Replace those shells with the more effective Greenboys, its not implausible to consider that the British might have scored better in ship kills than they did. To suggest that the trials were "disapointing" is not supported by any source that i have read including D.K. Brown's "Grand Fleet"_


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## Nikademus (Sep 29, 2010)

Glider said:


> Its interesting stuff that is going on here. Can I ask if any copies of the Baden Trials anywhere on the Web?
> 
> Thanks again to all those participating



There's a healthy debate and info from this site:

1921 firing trials against Baden - Naval History Forums


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## Glider (Sep 30, 2010)

Many thanks, that no 14 hit looks pretty scary


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## RCAFson (Sep 30, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> Post WWI, the USN passed the RN in fire control due to technological developments. Coupled with the lessons learned by the 6th BS attached the RN, USN battleships were more than capable of delivering ordinance at Jutland ranges or higher. Post WWI, the victorious naval powers continued to exist and evolve with each other victorious navy as a potential enemy as well as ally. Are you suggesting that with the end of WWI there was no need for navies to exist at all?



I doubt that the USN surpassed the RN in surface fire control until well after the Tizard mission which gave the USN access to microwave radar technology, and technical assistance in producing working sets.


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## delcyros (Sep 30, 2010)

You have read the account on the BADEN trials, Nikedamius, so why You are unable to understand them needs explenation. They perfectly fit the problems I outlined above. 
The trials are the data, the interpretation is what can be questioned in Your part.
I consider terminology a very important thing. If a projectile can pass a plate without beeing able to detonate in proper distance and reliably behind it, it´s not of much use in achieving decisisve results against enemy battleships. In case of the barbette hit, it did not completely penetrate as You imply. It gives contrary evidence, I quote from the report:



> Apparently the shell burst when it was two-thirds of its way through the armour and the nose of the shell as far as the shoulder was found inside barbette 23 ft. from outer edge of entry hole.



By any naval teminology standarts, this must be considered a PARTIAL PENETRATION instead of a COMPLETE PENETRATION You, Brown and even the author of the report likes the projectile to be. It did not completely penentrate but burst in holing. A complete penetration requires 100% of the projectile to pass the plate (_US naval nallistic limit_, german _Grenzdurschschlag_, the british have a similar definition with 3 out of 5 shells in a row making it 100% through), otherwise it´s only partial. You have to be careful in choosing the right definition.

And You can repeat bolding up that the shell that indeed completely penetrated the turret face (100% of it came through but in a blind condition, as I said) was eventually blown up by a guncotton charge, but this has nothing to do with the shell striking this armour. It was blown up later on after the projectile was found blind resting there as a seperate event in order to assess what a high order burst could have done in regards of damage to the interior of the turret. The shell itselve penetrated not in a condition fit to burst, it´s fuse broke. 
And then You have to consider opbliquities for these impacts, which are very low for the two cases cited. At obliquity, they failed to even hole the armour. Would an older type of shell have been able to reach these results? Considering that these two tests against heavy armour were carried out such low obliquities when both, the new hard AP-caps and the old soft ones usually work, they probably would have done the same to it, with a higher likelyhood of burst in holing or burst on impact. Neither shell is able to penetrate heavy armour and burst reliably behind. THE BADEN TRIALS DO NOT SUGGEST SUCH AN ABILITY TO THE GREENBOY SHELL. 



> 3 x 15in APC rounds were fired through the 7in battery armor, at least one of which hit and nearly penetrated the 7 3/8 barbette beyond. CPC shells were fired against the decks and caused very severe blast damage. It seems to have been concluded that the new generation of shells would penetrate thick armor and the new fuses would explode them about 40 feet beyond the point of impact. The filling, Shellite in the APC, Trotyl in CPC would explode violently causing severe damage



Ever checked the fuse delay actions of the BADEN trials for APC striking medium armour (this is armour in the thickness range of 0.472 cal. to ~2/3 cal thickness)? They are unpredictable. While the new shell is able to penetrate medium armour in a condition fit to burst reliably, the fuse delay is way to unpredictable and the official report mentions this. 

nominal fuse delay for the projectiles with 16D fuse was 0.025 sec.

against 7in:
Round No. 4 (APC) was a 22 deg impact, burst 38 ft. implying 0.025 sec. delay
Round No 11 (SAPC) was 28 deg impact, burst 20 ft, implaying 0.013 sec. delay
Round No.12 (APC light) was 27 deg impact, followed by a low order burst 30 ft. later, implying 0.021sec delay
Round No. 16 (APC) was 18 deg impact, burst 53 ft. behind, implying 0.037 sec delay.
Round No. 2 of 2nd series (SAPC) was 5 deg. to normal, burst 7 ft., implying 0.005 sec. delay 

Thus instead of the desired reliable fuse delay, half cal. thickness armour could be reliably penetrated but the fuse delay varied from nearly instantious (Type 16ND non delay fuse action also showed 6 to 10ft delay, implying a minimum delay time of 0.005 to 0.006 sec.) to ultra long 0.037 sec. and the impact condition does not explain for this variance.

Now look for impacts on 10in armour:

You quoted:
Round No. 15, striking it at 14 deg and burst 38ft. behind, implying 0.035 sec delay
but why don´t You also consider this one as well?
Round No. 8, striking it at 18 deg and burst 7ft behind, implying 0.006 sec delay


Again the variance ranges from instantious delay action to longer than desired delay action at almost identic conditions of impact. That Brown states that the new GREENBOY shell would detonate 40ft from impact is an error, which can be disprooved by the analysis of the trials conducted on SMS BADEN (Round No. 2, No. 8, No. 11, No. 12 No.16). Fuse delay action of the 16D fuse used in these rounds was far from statisfying and unpredictable in it´s length. It may have been basically non-delay in one case and to long in the next. 
How does the medium thickness armour tests compare with Jutland?
The old shells judging from Jutland´s experience showed at least 2 similar events: a 15in APC defeating the barbette armour of DERFFLINGER and burst directly behind, which was 2/3 cal. thickness (10.23in). The condition of impact and result are similar to the Round No. 8 from the BADEN trial. And another 15in APC defeating the upper side belt of VON DER TANN and bursting a distance behind, which was about half cal. thick plate -most of the time, however, older shells burst on impacting medium armour thickness ranges.
So if there is an improvement of the new shell, it does not necessarely mean that the armed GREENBOY APC had the capability to go up high order behind heavy armour, even striking at low obliquities. Against medium armour, the new APC can penetrate at medium and low obliquities but the variance in delay action is larger than desired, one third of the projectiles had to short fuse delay, one third had to long a delay. 
Thus the real improvement of the new APC was in the medium thickness armour range, some area when older shells from time to time also achieved good results. Fuse delay, however remained to be unpredictable until the late 20´s. Older shells burst on armoru because of rapid compression of the charge, though, before punching through it even if penetration would have been possible for a dud.


Addendum:
I must add that my term "disappointing" with regards to the result is not meant to be a recapture of the contemporary views on the matter. I use it on my own, after reading so much of this projectile and it´s super-abilities (even Nathan Okun stated informally that GREENBOY APC have the ability to defeat near calibre thick armour and burst reliably behind at high obliquity according to those trials) that I found the results as reported in ADM 186/251 disappointing. The contemporary view was that the fuses were working with disappointing reliability but that the projectile had progressed far enough not to burst on impact as was the case earlier (caused by a wrong british specification what the projectiles had to fullfill, not because Britain was unable to produce better shells).


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## Nikademus (Sep 30, 2010)

delcyros said:


> Addendum:
> I must add that my term "disappointing" with regards to the result is not meant to be a recapture of the contemporary views on the matter. I use it on my own, after reading so much of this projectile and it´s super-abilities (even Nathan Okun stated informally that GREENBOY APC have the ability to defeat near calibre thick armour and burst reliably behind at high obliquity according to those trials) that I found the results as reported in ADM 186/251 disappointing. The contemporary view was that the fuses were working with disappointing reliability but that the projectile had progressed far enough not to burst on impact as was the case earlier (caused by a wrong british specification what the projectiles had to fullfill, not because Britain was unable to produce better shells).



Rather than waste time with a lengthy reply regarding the selective interpretations you are using re: the test itself as well as the actual Jutland results, I think what you wrote here pretty much sums up the difference of opinion. While you consider the results "disapointing", I view the results as a substantial improvement over the performance of the heavy shells hitting heavy armor at Jutland (and medium armor too for that matter) I doubt anyone, Nathan Okun included ever ascribed "super-abilities" to the GB shells. That they behaved like true APC shells vs. HE shells as was the case at Jutland seemed clear to the Admiralty and to subsequent authors, the persons studying the report over at KM Bismarck site, and Nathan Okun. More importantly, not to be lost amidst this quibbling over what makes a penetration a penetration, and which round was more relevent vs. another, is the salient fact that the tests were instrumental in the RN's decision to adopt A/N as it's future protection scheme as the newer quality shells clearly demonstrated that medium armor types were of little value vs. heavy shells.

The lengthy thread on the trials over at KMBismarck has been posted for those who are interested in it and the below links to a copy of the actual 1921 report. Readers can make their own judgements.


Warship - Google Books


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## Kurfürst (Sep 30, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> As 'completed' the USN and UK ships were only slightly above the agreed on limit of 35,000 tons, which represents to me an honest effort to enforce the spirit of the treaty.
> 
> 
> 
> ...


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## Milosh (Sep 30, 2010)

Germany ignored the Versailles Treaty which limited its naval force to:

German naval forces will be limited to 15,000 men, 
6 battleships (no more than 10,000 tons displacement each), 
6 cruisers (no more than 6,000 tons displacement each), 
6 destroyers (no more than 800 tons displacement each)
12 torpedo boats (no more than 200 tons displacement each). 
No submarines are to be included.

Germany was never affected by the Washington or London treaties; its naval construction was limited under the Treaty of Versailles, the peace treaty that ended World War I.


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## Nikademus (Sep 30, 2010)

Kurfürst said:


> And to claim that Germany deliberately violated a Treaty it didn't sign in the first place is a lie. Germany could, legally, build any size of Battleship



Per the terms of the Anglo-German Treaty of 1935, Germany agreed to limit maximum size of new battleship construction to 35,000 tons.


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## RCAFson (Sep 30, 2010)

Kurfürst said:


> This needs some correction from the legal POV.
> 
> Germany was a non-signatory state for the Washington Treaty. Neither she was signatory of the Second London Naval Treaty which was signed on 25 March 1936 - and neither were Japan or Italy. Therefore the limitations did not apply to her.





> 1. In the Agreement of 1937 both contracting Governments were bound to a mutual exchange of information, which was to take place annually, within the first four months of every calendar year, and was to contain details of the building programme. According to Document 23-C, the Navy violated this obligation in so far as it gave the figures for the displacement and the draught of the battleships Bismarck and Tirpitz, which were being built at the beginning of 1938, as too low, namely as 35,000 tons instead of 41,700 tons. *That this violation of the treaty occurred is openly admitted by Raeder*, but again it is not such a serious violation as the prosecution contends, that is, it is not a violation which shows proof of a criminal intention. This is clear from the detailed evidence I have presented and from the testimonies of witnesses which I need not repeat here; it will be sufficient if I refer to the absolutely convincing expert testimony of shipbuilding director Dr. Suechting, which I have submitted as Raeder Exhibit No. 15. According


Trials of German Major War Criminals: Volume 19

Germany did commit treaty violations and Raeder admitted it. Germany also violated the Versailles 10,000 ton limitaion to build the pocket battleships.


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## delcyros (Oct 1, 2010)

the definition of displacement was not specified in the Versailles Treaty. the fist PBB, at least way designed accordingly (and in agreement with both, france and britain) and does not represent a treaty violation. before B was completed, the Treaty was already canceled.


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## parsifal (Oct 1, 2010)

delcyros said:


> the definition of displacement was not specified in the Versailles Treaty. the fist PBB, at least way designed accordingly (and in agreement with both, france and britain) and does not represent a treaty violation. before B was completed, the Treaty was already canceled.



Illegally. The German Navies violations of its treaty was proven to the best standards of International law at nurnberg. This subsequent denial of german war guilt (with respect to exceeding tonnage limits) is simply eroding your credibility in an otherwise highly engaging debate 

Whether or not the allies also exceeded their treaty limits is open to question, and debate, because it has never been proven one way or another


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## delcyros (Oct 1, 2010)

Back to Versailles. It is indeed the fact, that no definition of displacement was given in the Treaty text. What is the relevance of 10,000ts? Long tons? metric tons? and for what condition of displacement according to our understanding? Light? standart? normal? deep displacement? The variance may make up the difference between 10,000ts and 16,000ts.
Former practice in the Reichsmarineamt through and before ww1 was to use a displacement called "Konstruktion", which would have been quite a bit higher than what Washington Standart is defined to be, and more close to our "normal" displacement (including half fuels and other liquids).
By 1922, when the definitions of the WNT were formulated, the RMA went along with the idea to formulate an own definition, based towards the Standart definition but more tight than it (and in fact a tad bit closer to our understanding of "light" displacement) in order to exploit the gap in the Treaty text. This was called "Typen-Verdrängung". In april 1923, the RMA informed the french and british marine attachee in Germany to use it for future calculations (by that time, they had the CL of the K-class in mind) and they agreed upon. 
By the time they designed the Panzerschiff A (later to be called DEUTSCHLAND before beeing renamed LÜTZOW), the Typenverdrängung was used along the older definition (Konstruktion) in some cases.
When Admiral Zenker and Ministerialdirektor Dr. Ing. h. c. Preße had to decide about the new vessel at april, 11th, 1928, the official Typenverdrängung of "A" was 10,000ts and thus Treaty compliant. It was designed to be Treaty compliant by the standarts of it´s time.
When the ship was commissioned in december 1933, the ship ended up to be measured with 10,567t (metr- not long tons!) standart, which would well correspond to the official Typenverdrängung. Later additions in the 30´s and in wartime bloated up the displacement like many other ships.
"B" and particularely "C" were not completed before the situation changed and Germany got rid of the strict bounds of Versailles.

A much more valid case could be made for Treaty violation with regards to smaller classes of vessels than the Panzerschiff.


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## delcyros (Oct 1, 2010)

double post.



> More importantly, not to be lost amidst this quibbling over what makes a penetration a penetration, and which round was more relevent vs. another, is the salient fact that the tests were instrumental in the RN's decision to adopt A/N as it's future protection scheme as the newer quality shells clearly demonstrated that medium armor types were of little value vs. heavy shells.



You call it quibbling, but I call it precise differentiation. It is necessary because You made up the case that with MkVa GREENBOY, the GF certainly would get more ship kills at Jutland than it got historically. That´s speculation and I don´t buy it for many reasons. In order to do this, the projectile had to burst high order behind armour (compare the 15in APC hit inside the with medium armour protected barbette of DERFFLINGER). You say it can do that against heavy armour and this is not the case. There was not a single high order detonation when impacting heavy armour in any of the four APC and one CPC used in the trials (Schleihauf´s article gives EO definition (blind or low order burst) for fuse action for both "penetrations" -I already pointed out that only one complete penetration happened through the glacis of the turret (at somehow favourable conditions) and a partial one through the barbette, neither case was in a condition fit to burst. 

And medium armour? At first, You have to consider that medium armour was at risk against the old shells as well. This is demonstrated by Jutland. Granted, the newer shells showed more reliable penetration but the delay action was not. The old shells would have non delay (including to move up to 10ft behind armour before detonation), the new ones had unpredictable delay. No obliquity tests were carried out against BADEN with medium armour thicknes range. And other than true fighting ships, BADEN was devoid of crew, equipment and parts of it´s side protection system (upper coal bunkers emptied), which allowed projectiles to travel longer time inside the hull.
How to extrapolate that against Jutland?
Probably LÜTZOW would have been battered, but survived. Historically, the non delay action when impacting light armour of the old shells in the foreship causes considerable holes in the light armour plating (much larger than the projectile area), particularely above the armour deck there (3 x 13.5 in hits between 16:00 and 16:15, another at 18:19 and four 12in hits between 18:26 and 18:34) and on the weatherdeck. When a projectile explodes while pressing up against a plate, it transmits more of its blast effects into that plate, as well as trying to push the fragments through the plate more forcefully as they will not decelerate as rapidly with the explosive blast pressure on their rear side. The result is a larger hole and more fragments through the plate for a given plate thickness that is penetrable. Correspondingly, these holes allowed later a lot of wateringress to come down into the ships foreship, when the foreship settled deeper. By experiences drawn from the unreliable delay time of the 16D fuse You may guess that 3/8 hits behave like historically, and the other with either normal or ultra long fuse delay would simply pass through the hull of the foreship without detonation inside or on the hull, just leaving a few calibre sized holes (the armour plating is thick enough to reduce the size of the hole to about calibre size unless a contact or non delay high order explosion happnens like historically with the so called "defective" old shells). The result would have been less critical for LÜTZOW with less associated flooding and less cumulative wateringress later that day.
Other cases could be made against or for the shell, but the GREENBOY APC does not automatically translates into a higher sinking rate. This cannot be stated generally, rather it has to be discussed case for case.


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## Kurfürst (Oct 1, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> Per the terms of the Anglo-German Treaty of 1935, Germany agreed to limit maximum size of new battleship construction to 35,000 tons.



Unfortunetly, this is complete bollocks, as the AGNT has no such in it.


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## Kurfürst (Oct 1, 2010)

parsifal said:


> The German Navies violations of its treaty was proven to the best standards of International law at nurnberg.



Uhm..."best standards of international law" and reference to the Nürnberg trials in the same sentence seem to me, as a lawyer, a contradiction within the same sentence. 




> This subsequent denial of german war guilt



Huh? Are you lost a bit and trying to play the inquisition here? Only facts can be denied, and while delycros has well formulated and more importantly, well supported post, you seem to present only "declarations" of facts, and make up for the lack of supportive evidence for it with your usual ad hominem attacks.

Get back in the line buddy, as nobody made you arbiter here over "facts" and "war guilt"..


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## Markus (Oct 1, 2010)

The disarmament clauses of the ToV were dying when the Deutschland was laid down as France, the UK and others had failed to hold up their end of the deal as specified by the ToV:

"In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow."

At the end of the 20´s the Allies admitted Germany had fullfilled it´s obligations but they were not willing to start disarming themselfs anywhere near the level Germany had to. That gave Germany the moral and legal right to arm itself in the same manner as all its neighbours. Which the German government announced in 1932 and the UK´s governent accepted in 1935. 

And the ToV neither defines displacement or a ton. 10k (long) tons light could be 12k standard.

Read for yourself:

The Avalon Project : The Versailles Treaty June 28, 1919

Anglo/German Agreement of 1935


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## delcyros (Oct 1, 2010)

I want to come back to the discussion of twin versus triple turrets.

For german Krupp naval turrets I got some additional figures from Johow-Förster (1928):

-all figures only for turret and it´s armour (not Barbette armour!) as well as the revolving structure and gears below but without magazine weights.

15cmL60 triple turret: 148.2 t (only splinter protection)
15cmL55 twin turret: 108 t. (better armour protection)

28.3cmL52 triple turret: 600 t. (sub cal. armour protection)
28.3cmL54 triple turret: 750 t. (super cal. armour protection)
28.3cmL50 twin turret: 445 t.

35.56cmL50 triple turret (design 1928): 1050 t.
35.56cmL50 twin turret (design 1928): 740 t.

and from my guess basing on a graphical solution I would get:
38cmL50 triple turret: 1450 t.
38cmL50 twin turret: 1000t.

From this perspective, yes there is a nominal weight saving per barrel using triple turrets. But the effected total weight for 3x3 instead of 4x2 still is always larger:
3x3 15cm: 444,6 t.
4x2 15cm: 432,0 t.

3x3 28,3cm: 2,025 t. (assuming average level of turret protection, in between PBB twin)
4x2 28,3cm: 1,780 t.

3x3 35,56cm: 3,150 t.
4x2 35,56cm: 2,960 t.

3x3 38cm: 4,350 t.
4x2 38cm: 4,000 t.

Bottomline is that the four twin turrets always requires less weight than three triple turrets of the same type of gun with identic levels of protection (barbettes and magazines not included). BUT:
assume You would install two triple turrets and one raised twin turret (for an eight gun main battery in three turrets) the math looks different and this is where the slightly more efficient weight factor comes from -it stems from an weight for each barrel of the main battery:

15cm: 404 t.
28,3cm: 1,794 t.
35cm: 2,840 t.
38cm: 3,900 t.

But such an installation was never done to warships. BISMARCK with 3 x 3 38cm guns would likely have required a larger displacement instead of the alleged weight safings suggested by some authors. You then have to add magazine weights and barbette weights. A case could be made for better stability as only one superfiring turret and the associated topweight is necessary in a 3x3 scheme, but I doubt that this was considered to be a problem with a better margin of stability than any other BB ever buildt. Typically, You may end up with one barrel more, a shorter citadell and less protected space. It might have been an attractive idea for purely A/N armoured schemes, but as mentioned above, Germany passed over the A/N era and preferred the spaced array with large protected area for it´s choosen thread scenario. Therefore it was not really an option to reduce the protected space (particularely because the low placed armour deck required additional length of the citadel to fullfill the minimum protected space requirement).
Indeed all design criteria are carefully choosen, this certainly is not reflective for an approach without knowing .
[+]The low armour deck and slopes provide near immunity against shellfire from close to medium or (depending on attacking projectile) long range 
[+]the lower deck meant that the citadell needs to have a larger coverage 
[+]a high margin of stability and good subdivision was choosen so that even flooding above the armour deck does not affect drastically
[+]the larger citadell meant larger TDS coverage and armoured hullprotection against GP bombs and small to medium gunfire
[+] the larger citadel terminated close enough to the bow stern that the beam narrows down enough so that splinterproof armoubelts /decks can be applied to them without fearing that APC having their fuse triggered by them will go up inside the hull. They would rather pass it.


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## Nikademus (Oct 1, 2010)

delcyros said:


> You call it quibbling, but I call it precise differentiation. It is necessary because You made up the case that with MkVa GREENBOY, the GF certainly would get more ship kills at Jutland than it got historically.



I call it quibbling.......more so given that I did _not_ say that the GF "would certainly" have gotten more ship kills at Jutland. My exact words were:

"_Had they used Greenboys, they *might* very well have disabled and/or sunk more German captial ships._" This viewpoint is echoed by William Schleihauf at the conclusion of his report on the Baden trials. So much for necessity.


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## delcyros (Oct 1, 2010)

That William Schleihauf echoe Your viewpoint does not automatically support Your position. To retreat on an authoritative statement when aviable evidence does not agree is a very questionable approach and not methodology (Popper anyone?). Beyond that, Mr. Schleihauf made mistakes in his article, such as not beeing firm in definitions and not doublechecking the primary source he is working with (there are mistakes in the original document, like the 18 deg. resultant obliquity for the hit on the turret face, while the horizontal and vertical impact angle was specified with 11 12 deg, thus resultant obliquity was wrongly calculated in the first place and should be 16.2 deg instead of 18 ). Also, he should have read Campbell more carefully, so that he don´t miss the second effective penetration through medium armour at Jutland.
He however also stated the inconsistent delay pattern of the type 16D delay fuse and the poor effect behind the plate (often undergoing low order detonations), which is literally what the ADM also states.
His conclusion is much more careful than Yours. Instead of speaking about disabled and sunk ships, he states that more damage becomes possible. 
Anyway, my point was that not the shell but the propellant caused problems.
By the way, why do You think that naval nations gave up using HE at long range post ww1 in order to validate A/N?


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## Nikademus (Oct 1, 2010)

delcyros said:


> That William Schleihauf echoe Your viewpoint does not automatically support Your position.



It shows your quibbling to good effect, which you tried incorrectly to justify by saying I said that use of Greenboys would have resulted in more German losses.
[/quote]



> To retreat on an authoritative statement when aviable evidence does not agree is a very questionable approach and not methodology (Popper anyone?).



No retreat....a correction of your misquoting of me and backing that statement by showing it's conformity with the author of the report. 



> Also, he should have read Campbell more carefully, so that he don´t miss the second effective penetration through medium armour at Jutland.



I think it's you that should read Campbell more carefully as it clearly demonstrates the poor preformance of the pre-Jutland shells. 



> He however also stated the inconsistent delay pattern of the type 16D delay fuse, which is literally what the ADM also states.
> His conclusion is much more careful than Yours. Instead of speaking about disabled and sunk ships, he states that more damage becomes possible.



His conclusions were certainly more careful than yours.....the report confirms that the Fuses were still too inconsistant but worked. They were not _defective_ as you claimed. "More damage" could certainly have led to more disabled and/or sunken ships. This is not in conflict with the author's conclusion. 



> Anyway, my point was that not the shell but the propellant caused problems.



My point was that the new shells preformed much better than the Pre-Jutland shells.....a view in agreement with the author of the Baden report, the RN Admiralty, and other acredited authors. According to you, Nathan Okun also concurred.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Oct 1, 2010)

*I can already see where this is going to go. The same parties are always are already starting to get out of line.

This is the one and only blanket warning that will be given...*


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## Nikademus (Oct 1, 2010)

My apologies if I violated Forum rules. 

I will cease and desist on this thread.


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## jim (Oct 1, 2010)

Someone talked about treaty of versailles violation .This criminal treaty was very soon broken by its own creators ,by the Franco-Belgian invation of Ruhr in 1921-23 . 
You talked about the nurberg trial. You mean the trial that in order to convict the germans used laws that did not exist at the time of the crime? Dont get me wrong . The criminals deserved their convictions. (So did bomber Harris)That trial proved that if you are a defeated admiral you got automaticaly 10 years in prison. 
About if allies cheated. I read from Conways: 1922-1946 North Carolina 37484t standart South Dakota 37970 standart as completed. And its doubtful if they were fully equiped . Cruiser "Wichita " entered serviced with reduced secondary armament in order to be "legal" Of course it was very easy to install the additional weapons. That was the way the allies respected the treaties . Japan and Italy openly did not sign the treaties .
Hitles germany was hitlers germany, but that does not erase other nations illegal actions and crimes. In our days,We should judge both sides with the same criteria.


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## delcyros (Oct 1, 2010)

my apologies, too.

Nikedamius, it´s not necessary nor do I like the idea that Your exit our discussion. For most part of it, it was informative, we do have different positions but I´m fine with that.

The discussion now has moved far away from the original topic caused by the lengthy excurse about different protective tds´ and general armour schemes and shell tech. I doubt that a Swordfish carries a GREENBOY so the point is interesting, but the discussion is unnecessary and misleading to the question of the thread.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Oct 1, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> My apologies if I violated Forum rules.
> 
> I will cease and desist on this thread.



No one violated any forum rules yet. I just know from experience how these discussions among some of the "parties involved" ends up, and see the beginnings of it already. Therefore I am just letting everyone know, before it gets out of hand.

*Please feel free to continue posting in this thread. It is a very informative thread, especially for someone with very little Naval knowledge like myself. I just want to see it stay civil.*


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## renrich (Oct 1, 2010)

I, like Chris, would also like for the discussion to continue. My good friend, delcyros, always has very well informed posts on naval matters and nikademus seems to know his stuff also. I am learning much of interest.


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## vikingBerserker (Oct 1, 2010)

I agree, I've learned quite a bit from this thread, might not agree with some of the stuff but I have certainly learned much.


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## parsifal (Oct 1, 2010)

Its a greawt debate. For the guys in the thick of it, hats off to both of you. It would be great if we had had some kind of poll about this, but then what even would be the question.


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## RCAFson (Oct 1, 2010)

jim said:


> Someone talked about treaty of versailles violation .This criminal treaty was very soon broken by its own creators ,by the Franco-Belgian invation of Ruhr in 1921-23 .
> You talked about the nurberg trial. You mean the trial that in order to convict the germans used laws that did not exist at the time of the crime? Dont get me wrong . The criminals deserved their convictions. (So did bomber Harris)That trial proved that if you are a defeated admiral you got automaticaly 10 years in prison.
> About if allies cheated. I read from Conways: 1922-1946 North Carolina 37484t standart South Dakota 37970 standart as completed. And its doubtful if they were fully equiped . Cruiser "Wichita " entered serviced with reduced secondary armament in order to be "legal" Of course it was very easy to install the additional weapons. That was the way the allies respected the treaties . Japan and Italy openly did not sign the treaties .
> Hitles germany was hitlers germany, but that does not erase other nations illegal actions and crimes. In our days,We should judge both sides with the same criteria.



The USN and RN did not cheat on the treaty and exchanged factual information on the displacement of their ships with the other treaty signatories. However, as has been pointed out the treaties expired when WW2 was declared. 

Yes, the USN's Wichita and many other RN ships had to be completed with a reduced armament to be treaty compliant and this shows that the RN and USN did comply!!! Germany on the OTOH published false figures for their warship displacement and violated the VT and/or the AGNT, and used these treaty violations to gain an illegal advantage over the other treaty signatories. When Graf Spee fought the Ajax, Achilles and Exeter all the RN ships had their reduced secondary armament still in place. Japan signed the original WNT and the follow up LNT then grossly violated its terms by exceeding the allowed tonnage and tonnage per ship, as did Italy.

The relevant treaties:

Washington Naval Treaty - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 1922, and included Japan and Italy.

London Naval Treaty - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 1930, and included Japan and Italy.

Second London Naval Treaty - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 1936, and did not include Italy and Japan.

An example of IJN cheating:
Mogami class cruiser - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The AGNT:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-German_Naval_Agreement

a relevant clause from the above:

The German Government favour, the matter of limitation of naval armaments, that system which divides naval vessels into categories,* fixing the maximum tonnage and/or armament for vessels in each category*, and allocates the tonnage to be allowed to each Power by categories of vessels. Consequently in principle, and subject to (f) below, the German Government are prepared to apply the 35 per cent. ratio to the tonnage of each category of vessel to be maintained, and to make any variation of this ratio in a particular category or categories dependent on the arrangements to this end that may be arrived at in a future general treaty on naval limitation, such arrangements being based on the principle that any increase in one category would be compensated for by a corresponding reduction in others. If no general treaty on naval limitation should be concluded, or if the future general treaty should not contain provision creating limitation by categories, the manner and degree in which the German Government will have the right to vary the 35 percent. ratio in one or more categories will be *a matter for settlement by agreement between the German Government and His Majesty's Government* in the United Kingdom, in the light of the naval situation then existing.


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## tail end charlie (Oct 1, 2010)

RCAFson said:


> When Graf Spee fought the Ajax, Achilles and Exeter all the RN ships had their reduced secondary armament still in place.



When the Graf Spee fought the Ajax Achillies and Exeter the Graf Spee was scuttled which means to me much of the theorising (before and after) about firepower and armour was way off the mark.


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## Juha (Oct 2, 2010)

Hello TEC
to me the question of River La Plata action and its consequences is very complicated. Much depended on the orders under which the commanders fought, on their actions and personalities, ammo used, traditions and lastly but not leastly, where it was fought. GS was veeery long way away from the nearest friendly base, were it would have got proper repairs. And there were many enemy ships hunting her between La Plata and Germany.

Juha


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## renrich (Oct 2, 2010)

When the "pocker battleships" were launched the question was, how to counter them? They were faster than almost all the ships which could outgun them and outgunned any ship which could catch them. The simple answer which was proven at The Plate was that several cruisers, if well handled, could defeat them. The Spee had to concentrate her 11 inch guns to try and disable the CA because of her 8 inch guns. She did disable Exeter but her 5.9s which were only broadside guns could not effectively counter the two CLs. Once the CA was disposed of, the eleven inchers could fend off the CLs but by that time Spee had been damaged fairly severely.

Probably an encounter between two County class CAs or two Pensacola class CAs would have had the same outcome. The Exeter was a very "light" heavy cruiser with only six-eight inch guns and the two CLs were rather small but very efficient CLs.


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## Markus (Oct 2, 2010)

Sort-of. Wasn´t pocket-BB doctrine calling for steering away from cruisers to use the 11" guns´ range advantage as long as possible? But AGS steered towards the three cruisers. IIRC she had misidentified them as one CL and two DD.


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## tail end charlie (Oct 2, 2010)

With regard to the Graf Spee, it encountered 3 small or medium cruisers which hit her with 8 and 6 inch shells and caused enough damage to reneder her un sea worthy. I know there were many factors involved with the GS but since she would always be fighting a running battle shouldnt she have had more guns facing backwards?

My point was almost every Battleship big or small seemed to suffer damage large or small which rendered them unserviceable for months or years. I must confess I dunt understand all the posts here about armour and armament on here but it seems to me to make a ship able to withstand any shell and torpedo attack it would be so heavy slow and costly it would be useless or too expensive to lose.


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## renrich (Oct 2, 2010)

The Graf Spee was a compromise like all ships. Her armor was only cruiser like and IMO her armament design was faulty. Her 5.9s were behind splinter shields and their traverse was limited to less than 180 degrees. Since the Spee correctly took on the CA with her heavy armament, that left the two CLs who separated from the CA to only be engaged by four 5.9s at most at any one time. Four guns against sixteen. IMO she should have mounted a triple 5.9 as in Nurnberg superimposed in gunhouses over each main battery turret and had her 4.1 AA guns heavied up to 5 inch dual purpose guns. She then could have engaged the CLs with three guns each and the 5 inchers would have been able to contribute also. The 5 inchers would have been adequate for sinking merchantmen also.


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## Glider (Oct 2, 2010)

Unfortunately she would also have been much larger and heavier, which have defeated the whole concept before it started.


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## tail end charlie (Oct 2, 2010)

renrich said:


> The Graf Spee was a compromise like all ships. Her armor was only cruiser like and IMO her armament design was faulty. Her 5.9s were behind splinter shields and their traverse was limited to less than 180 degrees. Since the Spee correctly took on the CA with her heavy armament, that left the two CLs who separated from the CA to only be engaged by four 5.9s at most at any one time. Four guns against sixteen. IMO she should have mounted a triple 5.9 as in Nurnberg superimposed in gunhouses over each main battery turret and had her 4.1 AA guns heavied up to 5 inch dual purpose guns. She then could have engaged the CLs with three guns each and the 5 inchers would have been able to contribute also. The 5 inchers would have been adequate for sinking merchantmen also.



Renrich you are describing the single action of the river plate and its all true. However every increase in armour and guns turrets and torpedo protection is more weight which means more power bigger engines etc etc etc. The ships that the GF sank could have been sunk by any ship carrying one 5 inch gun. The whole thing seems to lead to a massive ship costing a fortune and manned by thousands of skilled men which can only be repaired in one or two places.


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## Glider (Oct 3, 2010)

Personally I would have simply dropped the 5.9 and 4.1 guns plus the torpedos and replaced them with a uniform Heavy AA gun in the 4.5 - 5in range.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 3, 2010)

The Graf Spee pre-dated the the 9 gun cruisers and their turrets (or the design) may not have been available when the Graf Spee was designed/built.

The Weight of even the Koln type Triple turret was over 5 times greater than the single mount guns so for the weight of 2 triple turrets you could have 10 single mounts with change left over.

Mounting the triple turrets in superfiring positions would mean a longer hull and more hull weight. 

Mounting the triple turrets in superfiring positions means that they are at least a deck height higher than the single mounts and that affects the ships stability. Something else would need to be cut, the ship made wider or ballast carried in the bottom to restore stability, or a combination.

Upping the the AA armament gives same problems.

The Graf Spee's were built to a treaty limit of 10,000 tons. They were supposed to be replacements for the old Deutschland pre-dreadnaughts. While the class was over weight by at least 20% the lack of experience with welding, diesel engines and such items as aluminum furniture/fittings by foreign navies made it hard to call "foul".
adding 40-60 feet of length, a bit more beam and extending the length of the armor belt would have pushed things a bit too far. Other naval architects may have strongly suspected the Graf Spee's were over weight as it was but not be able to prove it. using the 'improvements' as given would have pushed things into the unbelievable with any excuse range. 
The Design and construction of these ships pre-dates Hitler's rise to power and while the Weimar Republic may have chaffed under the Versailles Treaty they may not have been willing to push things as hard. Or perhaps the lack of response to these treaty violation helped embolden Hitler later?


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## renrich (Oct 3, 2010)

Leipzig was launched in 1929 with triple 5.9s. Deutschland was launched in 1931 so triple 5.9 mounts design must have been available. I am (obviously) no naval architect but if one looks at the profile of the pocket BBs there looks like there is room between the eleven inch turrets fore and aft for a superimposed triple mount gunhouse before encountering the main superstructure without having to lengthen the ship. I specifically mention gunhouses rather than turrets for the 5.9s in order to save weight. The Pensacolas used gunhouses rather than turrets in order to save weight at the sacrifise of protection and they had triple eight inchers over twins. No question that there would have been more weight up high but the Pensacolas and the Deutschlands were remarkably similar as far as physical dimensions and it looks like that the switch might have been doable. The ammunition arrangement for the 5.9s would have been simplified also.


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## delcyros (Oct 3, 2010)

Only DEUTSHLAND and SCHEER fall under the rules of Versailles. By 1932, it was considered to be rejected for substantial parts when Germany retreated it´s delegations from the Geneve Peace talks and the signing of a Treaty with the US, Britain, France and Italy at dec., 11th, 1932, which ended the naval rules of Versailles (From this point onwards, Germany was entitled to buildt any ships under the same conditions like the aformentioned nations).

Admiral SCHEER was also affected by this but the plans closed already and only light improvements to the superstructure (larger CT, more AA and controll) could be made on this ship laid down summer 1931.

Consequently, the plans for the third ship, already approved for with the first rate early in 1932 were not fully closed and only little work begun on Panzerschiff C (later to be known GRAF SPEE), laid down in oct. 1932. Therefore, the ship could become much larger from this point on (it was considered for a moment to drastically improve armour protection and install High pressure Steam turbines for a higher speed instead). Altough the changes were substantial (better armour protection, new TDS and belt with better splinterprotection generally), the new situation was not fully exploited. 
The ship was Treaty compliant when redesign was affected to it.

superfiring triple 5.9in turrets certainly are a possibility. I would rather drop them completely, install a different armour scheme and put a uniform 8.8cmL71 AAA on it´s sides. Instead of triple turrets, I would have preferred quad turrets, which were considered...


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## Shortround6 (Oct 3, 2010)

You are correct on the timing of the triple 5.9 turrets. My mistake and I apologize.

I am not sure about the 'room' you speak of. On two of the ships the space to the rear of the forward turret was occupied by an armoured conning tower with a large rangefinder mounted on the roof. The space just forward of the rear turret was occupied by an anti aircraft mount which can be shifted to space left by removal of side 5.9 in guns. But just forward of that is the aft fire control station with another large rangefinder. A third rangefinder was mounted on the foretop. These rangefinder/firecontrol stations/directors could control either/both the 11in guns or the 5.9s and allowed for the engagement of multiple targets (up to the number of directors) at the same time. Eliminating directors in favor of center line guns may actually decrease the ships ability to fight multiple opponents. 
The American distinction between gun mounts and turrets may be an exercise in semantics. Both types had roller paths and shell hoists. The main distinction seems to be the distance down into the ship each went and the powder handling arrangements. The "mounts" seem to have located the powder handling rooms much higher in the ship or relied on hand passage of powder from lower down to the powder hoists/powder rooms. The "turrets" had broken powder hoists ( two non-connecting powder hoists) to bring the powder up from deep in the ship. 
The Royal Navy 4.7in gun houses on the L&M classes were actually on center pivots with non-rotating shell and powder (case) hoists, not quite the same thing. 

The weight of the American "mounts" is given as 437 tons for a triple and a twin compared to the 600tons for the German triple 11in turret (rotating weight). the weight of a Koln turret is about 134 tons (rotating weight) and a max armour of 30mm. Protection isn't going to get much lighter than that.


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## renrich (Oct 3, 2010)

SR, not a problem on the timing of the triple mounts. I have done a lot of study on the Pensacolas since one of my uncles was a CGM(chief gunner's mate) on CA25, Salt Lake City, when PH occurred through 1943, when he was transferred to New Jersey, I think. In Janes the housings on the main guns of CA24 and CA25 are called gunhouses while in later cruisers they are called turrets. The main difference I can see is that the gunhouses have only 1.5 inch armor. They are also called gunhouses in Leipzig which have 2 inch armor. Perhaps the difference between gunhouses and turrets is the thickness of armor. It is surprising to me about the similarity in size between the Pensacolas and the pocket BBs. The BBS have a slightly greater beam by about four feet and look beamier longitudinally but they are almost the same length. IN fact, in the movie, "Pursuit of the Graf Spee" the Graf Spee copies a picture of a US cruiser in Janes to disguise herself with an extra funnel and it is a Pensacola. In pictures I have there looks like there is room behind A turret by relocating the range finder and behind Y turret by relocating the AA gun for the triple 5.9s.

It seems to me that the pocket BBs were designed for the guerre de course with their long range and relative high speed and heavy armament but light armor. Therefore they must have expected that they would have to face multiple cruisers in battle. Those broadside 5.9s would be more than adequate to sink merhant ships but are very awkward when facing warships with their limited traverse if the main guns are being used against a single target. In a stern chase against two CAs, the two CAs would only have to contend with one triple eleven inch turret and possibly two 5.9s and they were County Class, they would always have eight- eight inch guns bearing and with their superior speed could sheer out and perhaps bring more guns to bear.

Incidently, if one is interested in WW2 cruiser pictures, google USS Salt Lake City and because she had such a distinguished battle record, there are a number of web sites with many interesting photos including some when she was in action.


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## delcyros (Oct 5, 2010)

DKM GRAF SPEE´s armour concept is alongside ideas formulated in the interwar period with A/N schemes beeing considered to be important. She is well armoured and protected for a cruiser of her period, while many contemporary cruisers lack either armour thickness or coverage.

The idea behind her concept was to keep shells out of the ship´s vitals or- in case of the embedded vitals- if that´s not possible to detonate them in the main bulwark space with the major longitudinal armoured torpedo bulkhead behind acting as a splinter catcher thus providing additional protection to the vitals.

Most contemporary cruisers had insufficiant armour protection in the three main areas of protection:

(A) underwater protection
(B) protection of the embedded vitals (ship controll, magazines and machinery spaces)
(C) protection of the exposed vitals (comm tubes, conning towers, firetops, barbettes and turrets)

[A] underwater protection:
Except for the longitudinal major seperating bulkhead provided to the japanese heavy cruisers starting with MOGAMI, no other cruiser employed a full blown anti torpedo defense consisting of longitudinal armoured bulkheads. In DEUTSCHLAND, these were made from Nickel Steel armour and couldn´t be put down to the ships bottom owing to weight considerations (and this in fact created a zone of weakness) and terminated at the joint with the double bottom. The system was unsound against torpedoes but it was also designed to augment the rather light 50-80mm thick main armour belt and when beeing torpedoed by HMS SPEARFISH in april 1940, the whole stern collapsed and she shipped some 1,300ts of water. The torpedo hit outside the TDS but it remains unlikely that such a massive blast could be contained by the narrow TDS amidships. It was tested in june 1941 when she suffered another torpedohit by a Bristol Beaufort. Despite the rather light warhead of this torpedo, the TB bulged in (as designed) but the lower joint failed echoing the design weakness of the bulkhead mentioned above, allowing much water to flood the port machinery spaces. 
It may be questioned whether or not a full blown TDS is benefitial on a cruiser sized ship like DEUTSCHLAND, generally but the RMA sticked to the idea. The next ship SCHEER had a slightly thinner bulkhead (40mm) made from a new and extra ductile new Ww material, but still running not down to the bottom of the ship. Only GRAF SPEE had a 45mm Ww bulkhead reaching from the main armour deck down to the bottom of the ship (inclined 15 deg). I already mentioned that inclined bulkheads tended to fail on real life impacts (which is why RN, the DKM, the FN and the USN abandoned them in their last designs).

Nevertheless it represented some kind of protection not aviable to any cruiser at her own time. Effectively, the armoured bulkhead also catched diving projectiles (only japanese cruisers had main belts which in theory could do this, running down highly tapared, to the ships bottom). 

* protection of the embedded vitals
Main belt protection of GRAF SPEE was strong. The 100mm thick belt extended for a height of two decks or 4.7m (15.5ft) and covered the whole citadell externally while beeing inclined 12 deg. In addition there were splinterproof bulkheads running both, behind (TDS) and in top of the belt (40mm thick for two deck heights).
In contrast to this, the side belt of other Treaty Cruisers varied between 3in and 4in (only locally at the magazines, sometimes not externally but internally like in the COUNTY´s), with the coverage beeing very small (in japanese cruisers the height coverage was aviable for less than 5ft instead of the more than 15ft in the GRAF SPEE, rendering any kind of belt hits unprobable in the first place).
The armour decks were 40mm (1.57in) thick over the machinery spaces and 70mm (2.75in) thick over the magazines, which compares favourably with period contemporaries which typically showed figures of in between 1.0in and 1.5in for the machinery spaces and 1.5in - 2.25in for the magazines respectively (PENSACOLA-class, NORTHHAMPTON-class, NEW ORLEANS-class, TRENTO-class, COUNTY class, TAKAO-class, MYOKO-class). Only the french ALGERIE and the italian ZARA-class cruisers approached or exceeded that level of protection in some areas (100-150mm main belt, 70-80mm over magazines, 25mm over machinery spaces) but both fell short in others. Japanese cruisers of this period typically had that level of thickness (4 to 5in belts) but the coverage was very low, often less than 5ft for max. belt thickness before taper began to reduce it and the deck armour was light (~30mm). There was no additional protection with internal splinterbelts provided to any of these designs except for ALGERIE.

[C] protection of the xposed vitals
The CT of GRAF SPEE was 150mm (5.91in) thick, which compares favourably against all but the newest CA designs (typically 3 to 4in except for the newest US designs which tended to have up to 7in armoured CT´s). Her Barbette´s were armoured 130 to 140mm thick (5 to 5.5in), a good level better than the 1 to 3in typically found in Treaty cruisers (with the exception of ZARA and the BALTIMORE-class) and while most other cruisers of her period had extremely thin turret protection (1in typically in japanese, british cruisers and old US cruisers, 3-4in in italian and french cruisers and 5in in the newest ZARA-class and BALTIMORE´s), GRAF SPEE´s main turrets were provided with 145mm (5.7in) to 170mm (6.7in) thick armour.

The most critical component in her fighting against cruisers is that it´s main battery could defeat any of them with HE rounds (typically able to defeat 1.75in US STS aequivalent of armour with lateral fragmentation in some 3 ft. distance and able to defeat up to 4in of armour with HE/common at contact, which puts all of the aforementioned designs at risk through turret and /or deck perforation), while a truly modern hard capped, small filler APC was necessary to deal with the very sound armour protection system of GRAF SPEE. These didn´t contributed to the effect behind the plate in the same way like HE did, for comparison: An 11.13in HE shipped some 48.06lbs of high explosive, while an 8in APC contained typically 3 to 4lbs of high explosive. The damage GRAF SPEE traded the few time it engaged with it´s main battery prooved that it wasn´t even encessary to hit them, one turret of HMS AJAX was rendered unservicable by splinters while beeing straddled by 11.1in HE and straddles or shorts ruptured the hull of HMS EXETER in many places. The decision to armour Treaty cruisers weight efficiently A/N was putting them at risk here. More armour applied to larger surfaces may have helped moren than a thick but eventually to narrow main belt and GS wouldn´t need to use APC against them, putting the soft or lightly armoured parts of the ships at risk of the nondelay HE or short delay HE/base fused. This allows the PBB to overpower a cruiser. It requires a well protected ZARA- or a BALTIMORE-class cruiser to force a PBB to shift entirely to HE/base fused or APC.*


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## Juha (Oct 5, 2010)

Hello Delcyros
IMHO its a bit odd to compare, according to You, post-treaty ship to smaller and older treaty cruisers and anyway, New Orleans class had 9 × 8 inch/55 caliber guns, 8 × 5 inch/25 caliber guns and 8 × .50 caliber machine guns, and armour 3-5 inch belt, 1.25-2.25 inch deck, 1.5-8 inch turrets, 5 inch barbettes (6.5 inch barbettes in CA 38) and 5 inch CT and that in treaty hull. Or better still USS Wichita, commissioned 16 Feb 39, nearly 600t overweight after it got its 7th and 8th 5”/38 DP guns (+200t ballast), 4”-6” belt on 0.63” STS, 2.25” deck, 7” barbettes, 8”-1.5” turrets, 6” CT with 2.25” roof. So not a big difference in protection between AGS and the smaller Wichita but AGS’s deeper belt. 

On the hit that disabled Ajax rear turrets, all British and Commonwealth sources I have read speaks on one hit, not a near miss, which disabled both rear turrets, Y was only jammed. The most exact I have seen is:
CHAPTER 4 — The Battle of the River Plate | NZETC
The Royal New Zealand Navy CHAPTER 4 — The Battle of the River Plate

_CHAPTER 4 The Battle of the River Plate

…The Ajax received her first direct hit at 7.25 a.m. when an 11-inch delay-action shell struck her after superstructure. It penetrated 42 feet, passing through several cabins and then the trunk of ‘X’ turret, wrecking the machinery below the gunhouse and finally exploding in the Commodore's sleeping quarters, doing considerable damage. A part of the base of the shell struck ‘Y’ barbette1 close to the training rack and jammed the turret. Thus, this hit put both the after turrets and their four guns out of action. It also killed four and wounded six of the crew of ‘X’ turret..._

Juha


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## Juha (Oct 6, 2010)

On AGS protection, according to Koop’s and Schmolke’s Pocket Battleships of the Deutchland class (2000) AGS had only 80mm belt incl 12 deg, and that was fairly deep, with the narrow 50mm belt under it the whole belt was deep. Horizontal armour was according the book 17mm upper deck plus 20-40mm armoured deck. So according to that info late US treaty cruisers had more or less same armour protection but thicker but narrower belt, so IMHO AGS hasn't very strong protection for 14.890t standard displacement ship. Because AGS armour wasn’t adequate against US 118kg AP shells, I would say that it would have been hard pressed against Wichita.

Juha


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## Glider (Oct 6, 2010)

Juha said:


> On AGS protection, according to Koop’s and Schmolke’s Pocket Battleships of the Deutchland class (2000) AGS had only 80mm belt incl 12 deg, and that was fairly deep, with the narrow 50mm belt under it the whole belt was deep. Horizontal armour was according the book 17mm upper deck plus 20-40mm armoured deck. So according to that info late US treaty cruisers had more or less same armour protection but thicker but narrower belt, so IMHO AGS hasn't very strong protection for 14.890t standard displacement ship. Because AGS armour wasn’t adequate against US 118kg AP shells, I would say that it would have been hard pressed against Wichita.
> 
> Juha



A fair comment but of course shells fly in both directions and one hit by an 11in, is almost certain to do significant damage as penetration is almost guaranteed.


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## delcyros (Oct 6, 2010)

Koop/Schmolke based his data of the AGS belt on Breyer. This information is already outdated with new primary sources found in the Bundesarchiv. Researcher from the Gröner circle have unearthed documents of the original Baubeschreibung and it gives firm evidence of 100mm Wh/n.A. instead (with plates treated to a very hard tensile strength of 96 Kg/mm³ or 275 BHN). This and other armour improvements also perfectly explain the difference in armour weight between SCHEER and GRAF SPEE. The 100mm main belt of AGS covered 2/3 of it´s waterline length, ranged from frame 29 to 148 and was inclined by 13 degrees (DEUTSCHLAND: 12 deg and SCHEER: 14 deg).
The lower armour deck was only 20mm thick between the 40mm thick splinterbulkheads and under the 20mm locally armoured weatherdeck. It was 40mm thick between splinterbulkhead and main torpedo bulkhead and 30mm from there out to the main belt. Around the main turrets, 70mm thick plating has been applied on the main armour deck to cover the magazines. 

It should also be mentioned that only the PBB´s, HIPPERs and post WICHITA-class US CA applied face hardened armour to their respective exposed vitals, rendering them almost immune to the usual capped common projectiles in service in the navies (particularely british 8in SAP / SAPC and 6in CPC and japanese soft capped AP). This resembles a very strong armour protection by the standarts of any cruiser. I considered the WICHITA-class CA towards the BALTIMORE´s.
Older US CA were not splinterproof against the 11.1in projectile in turret and deck protection. 1.5in US STS (armour deck, CT deck turret decks) can be handily defeated by 11.1in HE projectiles without penetration, while 8in APC are not able to inflict damage other than by pure penetration and 8in HC is of no use at all. The thickest main armour protection 5 to 8in US class A is useless against 11.1in APC effective penetration unless very long distances are achieved (acc. to GKdos100 penetration graph for the 300Kg L3,7APC in excess of 23,000 yards against KCn). Against newer CA´s, the PBB would probably have shifted to either APC at long range and base fused, capped HE (good against the relatively thin deck protection of cruisers) at shorter distances. Against normal Treaty cruisers such as seen in the River Plata engagement, nose fused HE or base fused HE would be perfectly ok (AGS almost depleted her main ammo outfit except for the APC rounds).

Thanks for the pointer on River Plate. It was ACHILLES whiches turret was damaged by a near miss/straddle, not AJAX.


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## Juha (Oct 6, 2010)

Hello Delcyros
Also Koop/Schmolke claimed that their info is based on originals in Bundesarchiv. Anyway, Exeter's 8" were able to knock out both the water and the oil purification plants of AGS,especially the loss of later was fatal and forced the retreat to Montevideo. So if a British 116kg SAPC could do that IMHO US 8"118kg AP could do that also, saying nothing on US 152kg 8" APs which Baltimores had.

None of Achilles turrets were knocked out during River Plate, all 4 functioned to the end of the battle but its main director was momentally knocked out, 4 KIA plus 3 WIA by shell fragments from a 11" near miss.

IIRC already New Orleans-class had Class A armour instead of Class B used in older US CAs

Hello Glider
of course 11" was much deathlier but on the other hand 9 8" had clearly higher ROF than 6 11"

Juha


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## delcyros (Oct 6, 2010)

The 203,4mm (8in) SAP hit from EXETER penetrated the 40mm upper splinterbulkhead and wrecked an auxilary Diesel engine behind, situated close to the funnel base which drove the oil preprocessing (preheater) plant below the armour deck, not the plant itselve. The penetration may be done by any 8in gun or even 6in if properly delay fused. The damage was repaired by the damage controll crew in Montevideo by fixing cables to another aux. engine. 
The immideate impression of danger was large from this hit but after examinations were held it was found to be repairable. Impression of recent authors and mine as well was that this hit ultimately doomed the ship but this is an error. The timeline of the letters and communiquès send by Langsdorff makes that abundantly clear, the plant was repaired.
Damage to GRAF SPEE in the action was therefore insignificant and mostly superficial (except for two 6in CPC hits in the unprotected upper forecastle, which made high speed cruise in open waters questionable and would have required a welded fix in the first place) and didn´t threaded either her ability to navigate nor her ability to drive fast, nor her ability to shoot effectively. Altough one must agree that the hit distribution heavily engaged the aiming point, thus the CT without knocking out either firecontroll or rangefinders. Altough three 6in CPC hits were also made on the main turrets, they had little effect. There was no flooding in the ship after the end of the action and all fires were all put downl.

-Koop/Schmolke didn´t had access to the Baubeschreibung, The Gröner circle already published it´s findings and Koop/Schmolke accordingly have agreed to use them in their post 2005 editions of their book (not sure if this is already implemented). There was no 80mm thick main belt on AGS.

Any 8in armed cruiser is at disadvantage when trading hits with a PBB, except maybe in a surprise, close range knivefight, when the higher rate of fire may carry the day (here the four each additional broadside 5.91in and 4.1in mixed battery is no sluch either in trading rapid hits). Tests carried out against the target ship HANNOVER in 1934 showed that any hit with 28.3cm inside the embedded vitalia will knock the machinery out of service, unlike lighter projectiles such as 15cm and 20.3cm. The PBB is thus constantly able to overpower a single cruiser unless multiple cruisers with good skill or excellent tactics are employed against it.


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## Juha (Oct 6, 2010)

Hello Delcyros
thanks for the clarification, On 8" shells, now it's of course clear that effect of a 11" shell was clearly bigger than thet of 8", but KM didn't have US 152kg shells for their tests, but it had clearly better penetration power than older US 118kg AP shell.

Checked the use of Class A armour in US CAs, Wichita was the first to which it was used.

Juha


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## delcyros (Oct 6, 2010)

The effect of an APC in confined spaces such as inside the ship is directly related to the size of the explosive charge (5.03lbs in case of the US 8in Mk 21 super heavy APC) and the bodyweight of the shell (272lbs in case of the Mk21) which adds about 1/3 to 1/2 of it´s weight for lateral sideways directed fragmentation. The weight of any nose coverings or AP-caps do not add as they are destroyed by prior impact (substract them from the total weight). Compared with the relevant figures known for the 11.1in APC (14.55 lbs high explosive and 538 lbs body weight), it doesn´t look like the 8in superheavy can even hope to close the gap in detonative effect. One might argue whether weight for splinters or explosive ordenance delivered is more important, british tests showed that the amount of explosive is much more important than weight and their findings are valid also in US tests.
While the effect behind plates is much better for an 8in Mk21 compared to the lighter 8in Mk18, both are significantly inferior in this regard to larger projectiles, like the 11.1in (which may also choose to use either base fused HE with 35.3 lbs HE or nose fused HE with 48.06lbs HE content to further augment effect on target).

The heavier Mk21 projectile also reduced the muzzle velocity by 200 fps with new 8in guns, this makes penetration through vertical surfaces weaker (belts, CT, turret barbettes) but there might be a range of distances, when the better energy retention partly offsets the lower initial velocity in a way that equal or almost equal striking velocities are reached. At 20,000 yards f.e., the lighter 8in APC has a striking velocity of 1227 fps and an angle of fall of 24.4 deg while the superheavy mk 21 has 1248 fps striking velocity and a somehow steeper angle of fall (25.7 deg). Generally spoken, side penetration performance is traded for deck penetration performance a slightly more pronounced destructive effect on target.
Note that it is MUCH more difficult for an 8in gun to hit something at -say 20,000 yards- than for a larger BB type of projectile.


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## renrich (Oct 6, 2010)

A minor point Del but a question? With the heavier MK 21 projectile, even though the MV might be decreased, could the down range velocity be better because of a higher ballistic coefficient?


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## Juha (Oct 6, 2010)

Hello Delcyros
as I wrote, of course 11” was clearly more destructive than 8” shell, but from USA 8"/55 (20.3 cm) Marks 12 and 15
US 152kg AP could still penetrate 5” side armour from 24.400y and 2” deck armour from 18.400y so IMHO AGS had no immune zone against it, Baltimore being faster it could dictate the fighting range at least as long as it machinery is intact. So both ships could hit other’s vitals. So IMHO much depended on luck. And AGS 5.9”s and 4.1”s did not get even one hit during the River Plate Battle, even if Ajax and Achilles came rather close during some periods of the battle. I don’t see much difference in duel between AGS and same sized CA, against smaller ones yes, but that’s normal, I’d say that HMS Belfast, the last of RN pre-war CL was more powerful than Nürnberg, KM’s last CL, bigger ships simply tended to be better armed and armoured than smaller ones.

Juha


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## delcyros (Oct 12, 2010)

> With the heavier MK 21 projectile, even though the MV might be decreased, could the down range velocity be better because of a higher ballistic coefficient?



It does my friend. From ca. 19,000 yards onwards, the striking velocity is equal or better for the heavier Mk-21 projectile. Still, this is accompanied with a more steep angle of fall and hence a worse impact obliquity condition, which partly cancels out any benefit from the higher striking velocity at this range (against vertical armour, not so when engaging deck armour). With the american ap projectile designs, with very tough hardened bodies and sheath hardeneing employed, it probably is the better solution because their projectiles are much better penetrators at high obliquity than were average ww2 ones.



> US 152kg AP could still penetrate 5” side armour from 24.400y and 2” deck armour from 18.400y so IMHO AGS had no immune zone against it, Baltimore being faster it could dictate the fighting range at least as long as it machinery is intact. So both ships could hit other’s vitals. So IMHO much depended on luck. And AGS 5.9”s and 4.1”s did not get even one hit during the River Plate Battle, even if Ajax and Achilles came rather close during some periods of the battle.



The mk-21 APC can penetrate medium armour such as employed on AGS belt/barbette/turret and CT. However, the penetration figures are for vertical armour and new guns (thus without any gunwear) and 0 deg target angle. AGS belts are made from a tougher version of Wh (same as employed on the BISMARCK class main armour deck plates) and tilted back 13 deg. This impact condition would be difficult to penetrate from 20,000-21,000 yards onwards with a gun showing light gunwear and the projectile would then have not enough residual velocity and fuse delay remaining to defeat the torpedo bulkhead behind and thus would have been unable to reach the vitals at distances much above 20,000 yards via the side protection system. It may have been able to reach the machinery spaces via deck (but only via penetration of the 40mm part of it, which is a rather small area to hit) at 18,000 yards but may from ca. 23,000 yards defeat any horizontal deck of AGS (including magazine area).
The penetration of it´s splinters is 0.64 to 0.94in, which would be insufficiant to do much damage below the main deck.

The penetration ability of the 8in superheavy is somehow comparable to the 28cmL4,4 Sp.gr.m.Bdz. (base fused HE), which would have been the choice for AGS. It can defeat any of the CA´s vertical armoured surfaces out to 25,000 yards and from 22,000 yards onwards any of it´s decks. In addition it´s splinter ability ranges between 1.25in and 1.50 in for the base fused HE and put´s several spaces at risk (including main armour deck above the machinery spaces), particularely for a projectile reaching the space below the deck via sides or deck penetration in the first place. The time of flight figure is shorter (32.1 sec vs 37.2 sec at 20,000 yard) and would therefore allow a faster firing cycle at long range. The impact obliquity is less steep and while this gives away deck penetration it increases the dangerspace behind the target and thus makes hitting it more probable in the first place. A long range engagement with a single cruiser is a real don´t do against a PBB.


The destructive effect on target, owing to the larger bursting charge and the heavier body weight for splinter production is about 5 to 15 times* higher for the 11.1in base fused HE compared to an 8in AP. In this regard it´s more the competetion of a handgranade versus a .5cal BMG API cannon ball.


*) depending on whether You factor in explosive beeing more or less important compared to weight.


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## tail end charlie (Oct 12, 2010)

I was watching some old footage yesterday of carriers in rough seas, at times they were like a cork going up and down. If the Bismark and Ark royal met it would probably be in the North Sea. Would heavy seas affect a battleships guns aim before a carriers ability to launch or vice versa, did anyone record how many days flying was impossible?


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## Juha (Oct 12, 2010)

Hello Delcyros
Quote: ”_ The penetration of it´s splinters is 0.64 to 0.94in, which would be insufficiant to do much damage below the main deck_.”

My bet is that a 8” AP shell bursting inside a magazine could do lot of damage. And Portland's hit on Hien showed that they could wreck also machinery.

Quote: “_The time of flight figure is shorter (32.1 sec vs 37.2 sec at 20,000 yard) and would therefore allow a faster firing cycle at long range_.”

Only during ranging, if even then, when range was found, one could, if he wanted, fire at max RoF, which was higher for 8”, until one lost the range.

Quote_:"However, the penetration figures are for vertical armour and new guns (thus without any gunwear) and 0 deg target angle. AGS belts are made from a tougher version of Wh (same as employed on the BISMARCK class main armour deck plates) and tilted back 13 deg..."_

Thats why I gave the 5" (127mm) penetration distance, not 4" (102mm).

On the effects of 11”, now they easily knocked out lightly protected RN turrets, 1” protection, but IIRC Exeter’s engine spaces and magazines were unharmed even after 7 hits and numerous near misses. Same in Norfolk, hit in X-turret barbette knocked the turret out and its magazine was flooded as precaution but the hit which went trough the side and exploded on main deck over an engine room made no material damage inside the engine room and had no effect on the speed of Norfolk. Smoke from the fire in compartments on the main deck which was the result of that 11” hit forced some of engine room personnel to wear gas-masks until the fire was put out but that also had no effect on Norfolk’s speed and it could continue the battle and could follow Scharnhorst during its high speed retreat and participate also the final phase of the battle. So RN armour scheme idea, whatever we think its cleverness, seemed to have worked as planned, even if ships lost part/most of their firepower, critical spaces remained untouched. But in Exeter case structural damages in fore part of hull forced in the end speed to be dropped to 18knots. But IMHO even weakly protected treaty cruisers as Norfolk were rather resilient ships. On the other hand IMHO RN’s idea that 6” cruisers could smother stronger ships by avalanche of 6” shells from shortish range didn’t work as advertised at River Plate. 

Juha


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## delcyros (Oct 12, 2010)

It doesn´t take that much to disable a turret. All You need is a sufficiantly heavy projectile striking it at sufficiantly high velocity and that´s all. You don´t even need to penetrate the armour -damage inflicted by shock, spalling or plastic deformation will jam the turret, it´s roller path or throw the installation out of alignment for the remainder of the action. It may be repairable in within a few hours but that doesn´t help in the heat of a battle. AGS shrugged off three rather light 6in CPC from it´s main turrets during the action but their residual velocity was to low to inflict spalling damage or shock. Had they hit them at closer distance with higher impact force, these turrets would have been rendered unservicable or temporarely jammed. But as it was, the protection was up to the task.

The random distribution of the hits made sure that EXETER survived, not the armour protection employed in this ship. Had there been a hit on the armour deck then the splinters would have sprayed the machinery spaces below. Similarely, the hit distribution on AGS mainly centered around the CT, well above the dwl.

In order to detonate inside the magazines, a projectile either needs to come from close range or from very long ones. A surprise encounter in the night may fullfill the first one but the second one is difficult to sustain for any CA against a PBB. A detonating hit inside the magazines need to destroy a sufficiantly large number of protected magazine cases or protected brass cases in the PBB to have any effect. A hit in adjacent spaces doesn´t inflict the degree of splinterdamage to seriously threaten the magazines. Even with a direct hit, RPC/38 is a very slowly burning propellant and 5lbs of high explosive isn´t that much to trigger a rapid conflagration involving masses of propellant charges.
Once again, shells are flying both sides. In this condition, a penetrating hit into the vitals not necessarely INSIDE the magazines but also NEARBY with an 11.1in delay fused HE is all what´s needed to lit up the magazines. While US propellant is also slowly burning it is stored in silk bags with lots of them in ready rooms and handling rooms during action. Protected cases for the bags can be found in the magazines. There is no armoured bulkhead seperating the main magazines from the machinery spaces other than a single .75" STS frame,which is piercable by 11.1in fragmentation in considerable distance to the blast and these fragments still have residual energy to rip up the protected cases with the powder bags.

Protectionwise, behind the main armour of AGS is internal armour to limit -or prevent- the direct effects from impacted plates, including splinters produced by either the plate or the projectile. There is very little behind the armour in other CA´s to limit the damage. Also the ability to carry on damage is much compromised when the main belt is either not really exposed or hittable (IJN designs) or when a light list may bring the armour deck into the waves with virtually no protection above it. A straddle on AGS with 8in APC has no effect on the waterplane, while a straddle with 11.1in HE may create a number of problems and riddle the ship´s hull outside the main belt.

Rapid fire was not to be ordered until the range had been found and stabilized (requiring repeated straddles in succession) At long range this gives the PBB kind of an initial advantage (better ballistic properties of it´s projectiles thus shorter time of flight, thus faster firing cycle, better firecontroll gears and less dispersion allows a quicker fix on target, thus openeing rapid fire sooner than the opponent). It´s the close combat when the higher rof of an 8in really start to take over any advantages of the larger gun.
It takes a good deal of critical 8in hits to silence AGS but it doens´t take a lot of critical 11.1in hits to either silence or blow up a cruiser. How would You fight AGS in a single BALTIMORE?


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## renrich (Oct 12, 2010)

I believe that a single CA would have to be very lucky to defeat a PBB, in a good visibility daylight battle. That is the reason I said in an earlier post that the answer to PBBs was multiple cruisers. I believe also that the British theory on CLs was that encounters, not necessarily with PBBs, would be at night or in very poor visibility conditions and the high rate of fire with many six inch guns at closer ranges would be preferable to lower rates of fire from less guns from CAs.

The CLs at the Plate had to get close to do any damage, as Del has demonstrated. In the movie, Admiral Harwood was said to have said, "We might as well be bombarding with snowballs, lets get closer." and then, as they got closer and began to register hits, "What price snowballs now!" Maybe movie hyperbole but it does illustrate the problem. The problem also now was the the CLs closing the range made it easier for AGS to hit them also and they had to withdraw. All the British cruisers were fortunate that they were not disabled like the Exeter ultimately was.

I believe the USN theory was that CAs were the answer, because in the better visibility of the Pacific, they could stand off out of the range of torpedoes and pound the enemy. In the event, with most battles taking place at night, the Japanese torpedo expertise made the USN pay heavily. The first US CAs, the Pensacolas, launched in 1929, had torpedo armament that was subsequently removed and the later designs had no torpedoes. Given the performance of American torpedoes in the first years of the war, torpedoes on CAs might have been excess baggage.


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## Juha (Oct 12, 2010)

Hello Delcyros
Quote: “_How would You fight AGS in a single BALTIMORE_?”

Much would depend on tactical situation. Now my military training was that of Pioneer/Combat Engineer squad leader, and that decades ago and heaviest weapon of which fire I have directed was that of squad light mg, so I tended to leave naval tactics to professionals. I have very limited knowledge on USN tactical doctrines but because Wichita served in escort duties in 42 in Arctic, I guess that USN figured out best tactics for it against a PBB, but I have no idea what they were. Anyway IMHO it would be best to fight outside the best range for PBB, either longer or nearer.

Quote: “_A detonating hit inside the magazines need to destroy a sufficiantly large number of protected magazine cases or protected brass cases in the PBB to have any effect_.”

My bet is that the likehood is that a detonation in a magazine would have forced Germans to flood the magazine and so the hit would have knocked out ½ of PBB’s main turrets and all turrets in one end of the ship with all the tactical consequences. What would have been the effects of a 8” hit on PBB’s engine room, I have no idea but 6” hits disabled aux. cruiser Kormoran’s diesel engines completely.

On 11” shells, IMHO they weren’t terrible effective historically as Norfolk showed. Especially that 11” shell that exploded above an engine room without any material damage in the engine room or any effect on Norfolk’s speed. They did clean work on very lightly protected RN cruiser turrets and on Glorious, but CVs were “eggshells with tremendous firepower”. If one compared them to 15” shells for ex British at Mers El Kebir or Bismarck’s hit on Hood, 15" were real ship killers 11" not even reliable mission killers. IMHO PBBs were ingenious and revolutionary design when completed but were made obsolete fairly soon by advancements in radar and communication technologies and massive increase in aircraft carriers. They were simply too slow, when better radars made it very difficult to outfox a shadowing CL or a/c in bad visibility their utility diminished rapidly.



Hello Renrich
British preference of CLs didn’t seem to rely on bad weather. When London Naval Treaty forced a CA building holiday and Mogamis turned RN away from small cruisers (RN had began to build small cruisers because it saw that it needed a max number of cruisers for trade protection duties and because of the fixed total cruiser tonnage meant that one got more hulls if they were smaller) they after some studies concluded that well protected CLs could overwhelm CAs even if 8” gun had longer range and heavier punch because of higher RoF of 6” gun. RN CLs didn’t even had 6” APs, only Common (and HE for shore bombardments). Aim was clearly to wreck the superstructures of CA. That RN really believed that was shown that when the CA building holiday ended and other big navies began again build CAs RN didn’t and continued to built only big CLs. And because the potential enemies of GB in late 30s were Italy and Japan besides Germany, I really doubt that RN would have counted solely on bad weather combat in Pacific and in Med. That the rationale was at least partly flawed was shown in Med where Italians often tried to disengage. Because their CAs were at least as fast as RN big CLs the latter could only pursuit under long range 8” fire, only hope to get near Italians were technical problems in Italian ships or lucky hit by FAA torpedo bombers. In Arctic there were some cruiser actions in bad weather and in Pacific, where RN’s big CLs didn’t participate any surface actions, night combats were norm because of effectiveness of a/c there.

Juha


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## RCAFson (Oct 12, 2010)

renrich said:


> A minor point Del but a question? With the heavier MK 21 projectile, even though the MV might be decreased, could the down range velocity be better because of a higher ballistic coefficient?



I don't think the Mk21, the 335lb shell was in service until 1943 or so.


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## parsifal (Oct 12, 2010)

Ive always subscribed to the view tht AGS won the action, and lost the battle. Though I confess that I did not have the detailed knowledge of the actual hits and damage, the secondary sources that i have read, suggest the Langdorf had the game in his hands, and did not realize it. The British TG exited the engagement with heavy damage, the AGS with only light damage, and as Dels very detailed posts indicate, quite repairable. I subscribe to the traditional view that the AGS was scuttled because the Germans believed that the RN was waiting for them in great strength, just outside the harbour. It was not scuttled because of "ireparable damage"

The PBs were a solution to getting a great deal of firepower to sea, with moderate protection. Their great advantage was their range and firepower....their protection was good, but not invulnerable. There speed was also at best only adequate. They would have been far more dangerous if their speed was 3 or 4 knots more than it was...ie about 30-32 knots

I dont believe the british cruisers were up to the task of defeating her in 1939. I am not so sure about how the AGS would have fared against the heavier cruisers of the later war period......


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## tail end charlie (Oct 12, 2010)

parsifal said:


> Ive always subscribed to the view tht AGS won the action, and lost the battle. Though I confess that I did not have the detailed knowledge of the actual hits and damage, the secondary sources that i have read, suggest the Langdorf had the game in his hands, and did not realize it. The British TG exited the engagement with heavy damage, the AGS with only light damage, and as Dels very detailed posts indicate, quite repairable. I subscribe to the traditional view that the AGS was scuttled because the Germans believed that the RN was waiting for them in great strength, just outside the harbour. It was not scuttled because of "ireparable damage"
> 
> The PBs were a solution to getting a great deal of firepower to sea, with moderate protection. Their great advantage was their range and firepower....their protection was good, but not invulnerable. There speed was also at best only adequate. They would have been far more dangerous if their speed was 3 or 4 knots more than it was...ie about 30-32 knots
> 
> I dont believe the british cruisers were up to the task of defeating her in 1939. I am not so sure about how the AGS would have fared against the heavier cruisers of the later war period......



As long as there was either Ajax or Achillies at sea and able to make full speed the Graf Spee had lost. GS was a surface raider her job was to sink merchantmen, taking on the RN wasnt a sensible proposition. Even if GS had left the harbour she couldnt have made it back to Europe without a further confrontation, the game was up.


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## parsifal (Oct 13, 2010)

tail end charlie said:


> As long as there was either Ajax or Achillies at sea and able to make full speed the Graf Spee had lost. GS was a surface raider her job was to sink merchantmen, taking on the RN wasnt a sensible proposition. Even if GS had left the harbour she couldnt have made it back to Europe without a further confrontation, the game was up.



I agree that AGS position was severely threatened whilst shadowers remained in her wake, however it was definately not a foregone conclusion that she was lost if shadowers were present. RN heavy units (principally the Ark Royal and the Renown) were more than a week distant, and would have been very short of fuel on arrival. The Ark Royals CAG was lacking in experience as far as night operations were concerned, and would not have been as efficient as they were when attacking the Bismarck.

All the AGS had to do was to put to sea, and put the hammers down. Two days later the Ajax and Achilles would have needed to break off for lack of fuel....and AGS disappears again into the South Atlantic. I see the chances for her survival as very good actually. Her loss at the hands of her own crew was a totally avoidable loss IMO.


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## Juha (Oct 13, 2010)

Hello Parsifal
Yes, also I think that AGS won the action but that was a kind of Pyrrhic victory. Some of the damage forced Langsdorff to flee to Montevideo and fleeing to neutral harbour with shadowing ships still following means that he was located and more powerful enemy ships were to be sent there. What was the damage that forced Langsdorff to Montevideo. It must be something that was not repairable by ship’s own mean. One was probably the hole in stem another was probably the damage to the auxiliary boilers or to their stacks. On the latter info from numerous posts from much more knowledge persons than I to one discussion board, a bit clip and paste.

Quote: _“…However, the fuel, which had been bought from the US in the summer of 1939, caused numerous complaints from Langsdorff due to water and particulate contamination. It would also appear the microbial contamination was present as well. This meant the fuel could not be burned without going through proper filtration (the usual fuel filters and the centrifugal separators). These were powered by high pressure steam from auxiliary boilers and these had been put out of action by splinters from a hit. Besides fuel filtration, these auxiliaries also provided steam for the lube oil filtration system, heating (which though academic in the tropics would be good to have for the trip home), fresh water production, and fire fighting. At the beginning of the action the ready to use tanks had about 16 hours of burnable fuel and the damage to the boiler piping was such that in port repairs would be necessary...”_


Quote: _“And this is what I’ve got from Joseph Gilbey's latest book Kriegsmarine: Admiral Reader’s Navy: a broken dream (c) 2005 

I will provide the full relevant quote at page 126:
" Spee's main engines used diesel fuel stored in bunkers around the hull. The raw refinery diesel needed treatment before feeding the engines. A separating system routinely pre cleaned the fuel and deposited it in six ready tanks, situated close to the engines. The fuel separators used high-pressure steam to function. Two auxiliary boilers and a network of valves and tubes generated the steam. The Hilfskesselraum (boiler- room) that produced the steam lay between decks, aft of the funnel. Unfortunately the Hilfskesselraum lay above the armored deck. Exeter's early 8-inch hit had wrecked the boiler-room - in effect shutting down the separating system."

Professor Eric Grove, the well known specialist, wrote in "The Price of Disobedience": 

At 0736 hrs, Graf Spee re-engaged Ajax and Achilles on the port side. Both ships claimed hits, but the Germans only recorded one 6-in. hit on the hull of the ship from port. It hit the cutter on that side of the ship before detonating in the ventilation hatch to number three engine room. This was quite a serious hit which damaged the chain hoist to the port 5.9-in. armament and inflicted heavy splinter damage on the auxiliary boiler stack

Professor Grove later adds: The key auxiliary boiler that supplied steam to the distilling plant for fresh water and the fuel and lubricating oil purifier(was also out of action 

Sir Eugen Millington Drake inquires about on page 307 of his masterpiece, The Drama of Graff Spee: " With regard to the auxiliary boiler, the Chief Engineer, Commander Klepp wrote to me explaining that it was above the armoured deck and that is supplied steam not only to the distilling plant (for producing fresh water) but also to the plant for purifying both fuel and lubricating oil; and that neither of these two plants themselves were damaged but only this auxiliary boiler which was, however, essential to the functioning of both.

(....) this damage consisted consisted mainly in numberless holes caused by splinters in the funnel of this boiler and, in any case, could be repaired with the means on board. This was in fact done by the Saturday." …”_

That means on 16 Dec, ie a day before the scuttling, so much latter than the 16 hours time limit for purefied fuel.

So sometimes on 16 Dec was the earliest possible time to AGS to break out but was the hole in the stem repaired by then? And British play with their merchant ships meant that outbreak had to be done in daytime 17 Dec, again IIRC. IIRC Ark and Renown were to arrive on 19 Dec. My guess is that there would have been good chance that Ark's planes would have found AGS ifit had succeeded to slip away from Force G ships. And Renown was effective ship gunnerywise.

HMS Cumberland reported to Harwood at 2200 Thursday the 14th. 

Juha


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## renrich (Oct 13, 2010)

I don't know why this is being ignored by most of youall posting on this subject but it is my impression that Cumberland had arrived from the Falklands to join Ajax and Achilles. Cumberland was a 10000 ton, County Class. She was full sized, unlike Exeter, with eight, eight inch guns. Knowing something of the RN and it's tradition, I am sure that Cumberland would have pitched in along with Ajax and Achilles and it is absolutely problematic about whether AGS would have survived that encounter, much less eluded all pursuers to reach Europe. There were a number of Hunting Groups assembled already to intercept her, one on the US, southeast coast.

I am sure there was an encounter between a CL, perhaps Sheffield, in the Arctic Sea, against a PBB, (Lutzow?) where the weather was terrible and the RN caught the PBB by surprise, deluged her with six inch shells and the German Raider withdrew in the bad visibility. Perhaps Del can relate that episode.


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## tail end charlie (Oct 13, 2010)

My point is that the role of AGS had changed from a surface raider to persued ship. Whether she could have made it back to Europe or not is debateable but I have not read anything about her resuming singing merchantmen, in that respect the RN won.


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## Juha (Oct 13, 2010)

Hello Renrich
yes, Cumberland was one of County class CAs and it joined Ajax and Achilles and arrived straight from Falkland, so its fuel situation must have been good. It was one of Kents and had got thicker side armour, 4½", around its machinery spaces during its late 30s refit. So now Force G had 2 extra 8" guns but it also had 2 less 6" guns (IIRC the crew of Ajax had succeeded to free the jammed Y turret but its X turret was still disabled) when compared to situation on 13 Dec. and it prepared to action when AGS moved out of Montevideo harbour on 17 Dec.

Sheffield and one other CL surprised Hipper when it and Lutzow plus some 6 KM DDs attacked convoy JW51A. RN CLs hit Hipper thrice and one hit put out one of its boiler room and sunk one KM DD, forcing Germans to retreat. Sheffield, Belfast and Norfolk, the latter was a County class CA, fought Scharnhorst during its attack on JW 55 and shadowed it after two brief gunnery duels when Sch. retreated straight to the approaching RN battlegroup including BB Duke of York and CL Jamaica.

Hello TEC
Yes, even if RN cruisers got worst of it on 13 Dec but AGS couldn't disable Ajax and Achilles so much that it could have freed itself from them

Juha


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## tail end charlie (Oct 13, 2010)

Juha said:


> Hello Renrich
> 
> Hello TEC
> Yes, even if RN cruisers got worst of it on 13 Dec but AGS couldn't disable Ajax and Achilles so much that it could have freed itself from them
> ...




Juha

IMO the strategy of a pocket battleship hadnt been thought through and was like many things changed by aircraft. AGS needed fuel ammunition and supplies which can be supplied in a port or by vessel. In a port her wherabouts are known to the RN and using vessels at sea means the supply vessels are as valuable as the AGS herself.


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## delcyros (Oct 13, 2010)

Ammunition and fuel. Logistics and a well mislead tactical perception lead Langsdorff decision to scuttle AGS. Officially, it was considered an avoidable loss but avoidable is just one possibility out of many involved here.
The crux for AJAX ACHILLES was their respective ammunition state. During the battle, both CL´s emptied up their magazines at a rapid rate. In the evening, they already tried to conserve ammunition and only shadowed AGS. Both cruisers had mainly nose fused HE remaining, a few inert drill and some inert practice rounds left in their magazines next to a negliable amount of CPC. CUMBERLAND still had a near full outfit to it´s disposal and AGS was full on APC but dpleted it´s base fused HE and most of the nose fused HE outfit. Thus it would have needed to direct it´s APC against CUMBERLAND with much less splintereffects than the base fused HE to be used before against EXETER. Altough there were enough fuel and ammunition supply ships in the south atlantic at that time, Langsdorff needs to rendeveauz with them in the first place and he needs to escape Harwood before trying to do this.

A problem may occur in terms of tectical awareness for the british side. AGS alone had a functioning radar gunlaying set onboard (river plate was the first case of radar aided gunfire in a naval encounter) and appearently it was also used in the night to track other ships or to screen in front of AGS for shipping. This gives a tactical advantage in dark nights, in which AGS may use this capability to slip through, avoiding any contact. Once broken, contact is difficult to reestablish but then again, ARK ROYAL may have been the critical factor to find AGS in the open ocean again. 
Langsdorff also expected RENOWN to be there and this ship is a PBB-killer.


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## Juha (Oct 14, 2010)

Hello
AGS’ ammo state after 13 Dec action:
full stock of 2 and 3,7cm
423 rounds of 15cm
378 rounds of 28cm
2470 rounds of 10,5cm 

Ajax had expended 823 rounds, a bit over half of its 6” ammo (it had 200rpg), during the action. All I could find easily on Achilles’ expenditure was that its X turret used 287 rounds and that altogether it had expended some 1200 6” rounds. So Ajax had appr. 777 6” rounds left and Achilles only some 400. My understanding is that RN CLs carried normally only CPCs (plus few drill and practice rounds), HEs were carried only if there was possibility for some shore bombardment tasks.

British sailings of merchant ships had ensured that AGS had to leave from Montevideo in daylight of 17 Dec, but its right to stay expired at 8pm, so late in the day, in fact only appr one hour before sundown. So Langsdorff would probably had possibility to loiter just outside Montevideo until sundown, after that much depended on weather, moon state, effects of lights on land etc. But because AGS’ Chief Gunnery Officer had thought that he had seen Renown and Ark from the foretop on 15 Dec IMHO the decision to scuttle was logical.

Juha


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## delcyros (Oct 14, 2010)

Up to the begin of war, these cruisers carried 150 rpg but they had space to carry up to 200. In fact, that much was carried by them at the begin of the action. But most of these 50 rounds composed of drill and practice rounds. ACHILLES, beeing the more battle capable of the two CL´s fired 1248 rounds ruing the action, and may have as much as 352 rounds remaining (44 rpg), most of them must have been practice or drill ones. At high rate of fire, this corresponds to 7-8 minutes of firing time. 
AJAX had still quite considerable amounts of ammunition and three turrets aviable (one barrel not servicable, which makes it effectively a five gun cruiser).
CUMBERLAND was undamaged and had a full ammo outfit. Altough she was given a nice 4.5in very shallow belt, her overall protection was not better than that of EXETER. But APC hitting her would likely pass the entire ship before exploding, except if they hit the few armoured surfaces beforehand.


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## Nikademus (Oct 14, 2010)

parsifal said:


> The PBs were a solution to getting a great deal of firepower to sea, with moderate protection. Their great advantage was their range and firepower....their protection was good, but not invulnerable. There speed was also at best only adequate. They would have been far more dangerous if their speed was 3 or 4 knots more than it was...ie about 30-32 knots
> 
> I dont believe the british cruisers were up to the task of defeating her in 1939. I am not so sure about how the AGS would have fared against the heavier cruisers of the later war period......



The British 8in gun cruisers would have been dangerous opponents for an isolated Panzerscheiff. A key point iis that when it comes to surface raiding, the 'raider' is acutely more sensitive to damage vs. the defenders due to isolation and geography. A single damaging hit of signifigance could seriously impair the raider's ability to continue it's mission, or worse, evade counter-forces and make it home. The reality of this is apparant in Langsdorff's actions. AGS was only struck by two 8 inch shells from the weakest of British treaty heavy cruisers in a setting that favored the German in terms of visability, sea state and range yet still suffered a substanial (if repairable) hit. Often in naval warefare it's the unexpected consequences of damage that gets a ship. A 2nd generation CA would have been more dangerous still, particularily a New Orleans class or better. The PSch still has the firepower edge but would be forced to use armor piercing ammo and hope for a critical hit while not recieving one in return. 

The PSch design was ultimately a political statement as much, if not more so than any set naval purpose. They fully succeeded in that they caused such a stir that poplular press' of the time labeled them "Pocket Battleships", a term never used by the Germans themselves. As genuine raiders....they were less optimal. (Personally, more speed with a more conventional cruiser armament would have been better IMO) The advent of genuine fast battleship designs made the concept obsolete and as the British demonstrated at RP, the non-hysteria laden solution to the "more powerful than any ship it couldn't outrun bugaboo" was simply multiple "inferior" warships. (on a one by one comparison point. (coupled with these German ships, the Scharnhorsts and reputed Japanese ultra heavy cruiser designs....the USN would complete two Alaska class "Large cruisers" aka "Battlecruisers" but cancel the other 4). The Germans acknowledged the changed reality by canceling the remaining PSch designs and building much heavier designs.

 Had Langsdorff realized immediately what he was facing his best course of action would have been evaison, if possible. (I think everyone knows that of course....just mentioning the obvious in the face of all the paper comparisons of warship strengths) His mission was commerce raiding, not taking on the RN. Even sinking one or more cruisers, while a nice propaganda piece would do little to alter the balance of naval power.


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## renrich (Oct 14, 2010)

Nik, I enjoyed your post. I don't see how the AGS could have avoided an engagement with the Brit CA and CLs. I believe that AGS was sighted early in the morning with very good weather and visibility and Harwood was hoping (expecting) to sight her. If the AGS had chosen to retire the Brits had the speed advantage and tactically a stern chase would have put the AGS at more of a disadvantage than what, in the event, actually happened.

Actually, the AGS was in somewhat the same tactical situation as was Von Spee during the Falkland Island battle. He faced an enemy that had the speed advantage in good weather with the whole day available to run him down. The big difference being gun power.


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## Nikademus (Oct 14, 2010)

Hi,

Yes...given the speed edge, it would have been challenging for AGS to evade prior to nightfall at least. The British could have chosen to shadow though the risk therin would have been losing their querry. Even with radar, the Bismarck at one point managed to elude her shadowers at night. 

The situation was somewhat similar to AGS's namesake with the notable difference that the pursuers in that case had both the speed and firepower advantage and could run down their weaker adversaries and bombard them at a range where they retain a substantial edge. (Though requiring practically their entire shellrooms to acomplish the job). The Faulklands Island battle was unique in that it was the one pure case whereby Fisher's whole Dreadnought Armored Cruiser (aka the "Battlecruiser") concept worked as envisioned...the warship more powerful than anything it couldn't outrun, hunting and destroying weaker cruiser type ships. In the larger picture the BC concept was flawed in that once the other Nation or Nations replied with a similar type, you just ended up with two contests vs. one (Battlefleet vs Battlefeet and BC fleet vs BC fleet) The only difference being that the BC fleet was a bit more "expendible" than the other hence we got two major BC vs BC engagements during the war to one BF vs BF engagement. 

The similarity comes from the situation the "raider" faces when he knows there are naval forces lurking nearby in pursuit. Even in decisive victory over Craddock at Coronel, the shell rooms of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were partially emptied and the odds against them in future engagements increased further. Spee was fortunate in having no appreciable damage but the thought provided him little comfort. There's a famous quote he made afterwards while at a neutral port after having been given a boquet of flowers...."Thank you....these will look lovely over my grave" (or some such similar)


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## renrich (Oct 14, 2010)

To me, a stern chase would have been very interesting. It would have taken some time for the Brits to overtake the AGS and to get into range for the eight inch guns of Exeter and even longer for the six inch guns. In the meantime the AGS would have probably used her aft triple turret to engage Exeter at long range. If her gunnery had knocked out Exeter before Exeter could reply, then the two Brit CLs would probably have been reduced to shadowing. If she could not disable Exeter and all the Brits got into range then the CLs could have probably been able to work undisturbed.

Actually, that may have been the proper tactic for Langsdorff. I do understand that at first the Germans misidentified the British ships thinking they were a weaker group than they actually were. Perhaps a fatal mistake.


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## Juha (Oct 14, 2010)

Hello Delcyros
thanks for the exact number of rounds fired by Achilles.

Hello TEC
yes, better planes, increasing number of aircraft carriers, better communications and greater number of radar equipped ships alongside with the new fast BBs made PBB concept obsolete. IMHO better solution for commercial raider would have been faster, say 34-35knots CL with long endurance. It could have run away from proper warships and 6" armament was enough to handle merchant ships. Of course advantagements in planes and in communication technology would have made also them obsolete fairly soon. On ammo supplies, I don’t know has KM any supply ship with 11” ammo in Southern Atlantic, IIRC Tacoma didn’t carry them and Altmark carried only oil and provisions for AGS’ crew.

Juha


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## Juha (Oct 14, 2010)

Hello Renrich
AGS spotted Force G earlier than they saw her. The first observation of AGS was the smoke which was generated when AGS began to accelerate to engage Force G. But most probably forenoon recon flights by the floatplane/amphibians of Force G would have found her.

Juha


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## Nikademus (Oct 14, 2010)

renrich said:


> To me, a stern chase would have been very interesting. It would have taken some time for the Brits to overtake the AGS and to get into range for the eight inch guns of Exeter and even longer for the six inch guns. In the meantime the AGS would have probably used her aft triple turret to engage Exeter at long range. If her gunnery had knocked out Exeter before Exeter could reply, then the two Brit CLs would probably have been reduced to shadowing. If she could not disable Exeter and all the Brits got into range then the CLs could have probably been able to work undisturbed.



Hi,

Agreed, a dedicated chase would have made things interesting. Langsdorff would have been faced with the quandry of spending precious ammunition in the hopes of a lucky hit at long range vs. conservation. Using only one turret would make it even more difficult but course changes to bring all main guns to bear would help the British in catching up/maintaining contact.

Conversely, the British would have to work up to full speed and choose between evasive manevers to help throw off the German aim vs. the need to close the distance. Most likely a combination of both for both sides depending on the situation. A long battle would probably ensue. 

The Komandorski Islands battle gives us an idea of how such would go as does the Java Sea engagement. (aka alot of shells over a long stretch of time for a few hits) In the Komandorski fight (a long range fight between 16,000 - 24,000 yards), Salt Lake City had about 200 8in shells fall within 200 yards of her but only 5 actually hit. Of these 5 hits only 1 was signifigant, and that only because the ship's DC teams made a critical error. In turn she fired about 832 8-in shells, emptying her aft magazine in the process and didn't score a single hit. 

The Japanese had two 8-inch gun cruisers (total 20 x 8-in). AGS, depending on the exact circumstances might be firing at long range with as little as 3 guns. Main gun ammo can't be replaced.....you need to keep a reserve for the home trip in addition to the primary mission. Makes for a great wargame scenario. 

Me, i'd probably use my main guns sparingly at long range in a stern chase to back the cruisers off and make them alter course to evade, buying me some searoom and time and try to out-last them and break contact during the night.



> Actually, that may have been the proper tactic for Langsdorff. I do understand that at first the Germans misidentified the British ships thinking they were a weaker group than they actually were. Perhaps a fatal mistake.



Given how events panned out....it was a fatal error!


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## parsifal (Oct 14, 2010)

_The British 8in gun cruisers would have been dangerous opponents for an isolated Panzerscheiff. A key point iis that when it comes to surface raiding, the 'raider' is acutely more sensitive to damage vs. the defenders due to isolation and geography. A single damaging hit of signifigance could seriously impair the raider's ability to continue it's mission, or worse, evade counter-forces and make it home. The reality of this is apparant in Langsdorff's actions. AGS was only struck by two 8 inch shells from the weakest of British treaty heavy cruisers in a setting that favored the German in terms of visability, sea state and range yet still suffered a substanial (if repairable) hit. Often in naval warefare it's the unexpected consequences of damage that gets a ship. A 2nd generation CA would have been more dangerous still, particularily a New Orleans class or better. The PSch still has the firepower edge but would be forced to use armor piercing ammo and hope for a critical hit while not recieving one in return. 

The PSch design was ultimately a political statement as much, if not more so than any set naval purpose. They fully succeeded in that they caused such a stir that poplular press' of the time labeled them "Pocket Battleships", a term never used by the Germans themselves. As genuine raiders....they were less optimal. (Personally, more speed with a more conventional cruiser armament would have been better IMO) The advent of genuine fast battleship designs made the concept obsolete and as the British demonstrated at RP, the non-hysteria laden solution to the "more powerful than any ship it couldn't outrun bugaboo" was simply multiple "inferior" warships. (on a one by one comparison point. (coupled with these German ships, the Scharnhorsts and reputed Japanese ultra heavy cruiser designs....the USN would complete two Alaska class "Large cruisers" aka "Battlecruisers" but cancel the other 4). The Germans acknowledged the changed reality by canceling the remaining PSch designs and building much heavier designs._
I don’t disagree that ultimately surface raiding proved a failure, because the units undertaking the raiding were invariably operating in an isolated fashion, were outnumbered, and vulnerable to damage. But this was not the product of the ship undertaking the mission, it was the inherent risk required for a nation heavily outnumbered having to take risks to get anything at all out of their surface fleets. And the nation undertaking the raiding is strategically pursuing a policy of “sea denial”, whilst the nation undertaking the movement of goods across the ocean is pursuing a policy of “sea control”. 

The great attraction about se denial is that it generally requires a great deal of resources to bring to heal, and can operate against an enemy numerically superior, but dispersed, and therefore individually weaker. This was precisely the scenario faced by the AGS. She was being hunted by no less than nine hunting groups at the time of her demise, representing an enormous investment by the allies in time, money and personnel. She had achieved massive dislocation trade and the shipping of goods. Far in excess of the 50000 tons of shipping she actually sank. It was not until the advent of the CVE that the concept of the surface raider became obsolete, and even then, did not disappear entirely. In the post war environment, the Russians adapted the surface raider concept to a new post war world. Sure, it is not as effective as the sea control strategy so ardently pursued by the western navies, but then, neither the Russians nor the Germans enjoyed the luxury of naval supremacy. It is essentially the strategy of the weaker opponent…it has inherent weaknesses as a strategy, but it is still the best strategy to be pursued by he who lacks the necessary strength to usurp control. The only other strategy available, really, was that of the “fleet in being”, which is what the germans did after the loss of the Bismarck (with one or two opportunistic exceptions) .

Whilst I agree that a single 8 inch cruiser was a dangerous opponent to an isolated Panzerschiff, it would have been outgunned and the odds heavily against it. Call the Pocket battleships a political statement if you like, but I believe they were designed for a purpose, and that purpose was the very thing you term “bugaboo”….to defeat anything smaller and faster than it and be able to outrun anything big enough to kill it. The fact that Exeter was a six gun 8 inch cruiser, only diminishes its probability per salvo of hitting, not its killing power so much. At the ranges likely to occur for an engagement each salvo would be lucky to achieve even a single hit out of every 60 or so rounds fired off. Having an 8 gun broadside as opposed to a 6 gun salvo only increases the odds of achieving a hit by 25%, nothing else. If it takes 32 mins to fire off those 60 rounds with a 6 gun broadside, this time only reduces to 28 mins for an eight gun broadside. Big deal….thats an insignificant effect in my book, especially if you consider the following. If the PB can start to engage effectively some 6-8000 yards further out than the 8in guns of the cruiser (please note I don’t have access to my reference material where I am posting at the moment, so these figures are rubbery at best), and the rate of closure for the cruiser on the PB is effectively 3 knots per hour. The cruiser will have been under fire for more than an hour before it could effectively shoot back. That’ means that the PB would have fired off approximately 700 rounds before being fired back on. If the germans have a similar statistical probability of a hit (a BIG assumption I know) she can expect to have hit her opponent 11 times before an effective retaliation can be made. On that basis, I fail to see how it can be argued that in theory the PBs were not a good design. 

The fact that Langsdorf screwed the pooch, and was more interested in getting full broadsides in, and “closing with the enemy” should not colour this debate. If I had been in his shoes, I would have been far more cautious at the out set. Getting the floatplane airborne for a start would have been a great help. Once the British TF was identified, I would have turned and run like hell, accepting a single turret broadside rather than two and maintaining the range for as long as possible. For the Exeter to be effective she had to get therange down to below 19000K. If the AGS spotted her at 24K and turned away immediately she would have had time to try and get a lucky shot in. Ammunition expenditure was not as big a problem for her as one would expect, because of the supply ships supporting her.

If you want to talk about “bugaboo” I think all this inference about the New Orleans being far superior to British heavy cruisers is the real bugaboo. They were superior, make no mistake, but one only has to examine their performances in the opening months of the pacific to see just how limited these ships were as well. Take away the advanced radars being introduced by that stage, and I don’t see a significant advantage at all. The newer Bostons may have a great advantage, but the new Orleans class were a flawed design in my opinion, and not much better than the brit treaty cruiser, judging by their losses and performance in 1942.


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## Juha (Oct 15, 2010)

Hello Parsifal
A couple question
Quote:_ "Having an 8 gun broadside as opposed to a 6 gun salvo only increases the odds of achieving a hit by 25%, nothing else."_

True, but when every hit might achieve significant damage, is that increase insignificant?

Quote; "_If it takes 32 mins to fire off those 60 rounds with a 6 gun broadside, this time only reduces to 28 mins for an eight gun broadside_."

Why so low rate of fire? Historically at least RN used far higher RoF

And RN considered 6 gun broadside minimum acceptable in 30s, just because smaller group mede hit probability unacceptable low during long-range engagements. That decided the sizes of Cathedral and Arethusa classes.

Quote:"_That’ means that the PB would have fired off approximately 700 rounds before being fired back on_."

Impossible by rear turret alone, AGS carried 630-720 11" rounds altogether according to Koop Schmolke.

Juha


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## tail end charlie (Oct 15, 2010)

I am not an expert but isnt some of this being wise after the event? If AGS has 700 of 11" caliber shells how many of those would the captain reasonably use on three cruisers not knowing if a group of battleships and cruisers is just over the horizon. If using just 25% takes out 1 cruiser then taking the other 2 out may leave him at sea facing a larger opponent with almost nothing. As long as AGS was being followed by even 1 small cruiser re supply at sea would be impossible.


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## parsifal (Oct 15, 2010)

Hi Juha

In answer to your questions

_True, but when every hit might achieve significant damage, is that increase insignificant?_

Thats the problem, at ranges above approximately 19000 yards not many of those hits are going to do much to AGS's armouring scheme. Conversely, nearly every hit by the AGS main armament is going to wreck something on Treaty cruisers of any description. 

_Why so low rate of fire? Historically at least RN used far higher RoF_

I just assumed an an ROF of 3 rounds per minute, because it would be nearly impossible to achieve the theoretical rof in the scenario I would attempt to generate as the captain of the raider. If AGS operates fine by her bow, and the RN is trying to close range as fast as possible, they (the RN) will spend much more time with at least half their armament unable to fire because the angle to the bow is too fine. In the situation I am envisagingthe RN cruisers will be flat out reaching their optimum rof, because most their guns wont be able to fire, most of the time. 


_Impossible by rear turret alone, AGS carried 630-720 11" rounds altogether according to Koop Schmolke._

They would not be firing just their rear turret. If the forward turrets could be trained to say 20degrees off the aft centreline, and the Exeter is kept dead astern , then all the AGS has to do is every time she want to fire is alter course 20 degrees off the base course, and she has a full broadside. She does not need to hove to completely. Her firing might not be as accurate that way, but she will keep the range for longer.

We practised that manouvre till the cows came home. I dont see why the AGS could not do the same

The Brit cruisers, on the other hand, cannot afford this luxury. Their number one priority has to be get the range down, Because they are in a stern chase situation, they have to nearly heave to every time the rear turrets want to fire. Every time they do that, they lose time, time they cannot afford


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## parsifal (Oct 15, 2010)

tail end charlie said:


> I am not an expert but isnt some of this being wise after the event? If AGS has 700 of 11" caliber shells how many of those would the captain reasonably use on three cruisers not knowing if a group of battleships and cruisers is just over the horizon. If using just 25% takes out 1 cruiser then taking the other 2 out may leave him at sea facing a larger opponent with almost nothing. As long as AGS was being followed by even 1 small cruiser re supply at sea would be impossible.



It is being wise after the event, and my reference to firing 700 rounds is not actually saying they would fire off 700 rounds. I am sayinhg that had langsdorf sought to keep the range, rather than doing what he did, he would have had plenty of time to pour some real hurt onto those pursuing British cruisers. In short, i dont think they would have been able to maintain their shadowing mission


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## Nikademus (Oct 15, 2010)

parsifal said:


> I don’t disagree that ultimately surface raiding proved a failure, because the units undertaking the raiding were invariably operating in an isolated fashion, were outnumbered, and vulnerable to damage. But this was not the product of the ship undertaking the mission, it was the inherent risk required for a nation heavily outnumbered having to take risks to get anything at all out of their surface fleets. And the nation undertaking the raiding is strategically pursuing a policy of “sea denial”, whilst the nation undertaking the movement of goods across the ocean is pursuing a policy of “sea control”.



Yes, hence my comment that a design more optimized for such a purpose would have been preferable. A optimal raider whose' primary target is unarmored and possibly unarmed merchants does not require 11 inch guns to be subdued. The prescence of such a raider or worse, a group of raiders (like the wolf pack concept employed by U-boats) will still require great resource commitment on the part of the defender to counter. This in fact became the primary reason why Donitz continued the Uboat war from 1943 onward despite the acknowledgement that the returns vs. losses were unfavorable.




> Whilst I agree that a single 8 inch cruiser was a dangerous opponent to an isolated Panzerschiff, it would have been outgunned and the odds heavily against it. Call the Pocket battleships a political statement if you like, but I believe they were designed for a purpose, and that purpose was the very thing you term “bugaboo”….to defeat anything smaller and faster than it and be able to outrun anything big enough to kill it.


I never said they wern't designed for a purpose. The primary purpose was political, a statement of Germany's determination to get out from under the shackles of Versailles. The naval purpose was commerce raiding. The ship's succeeded in that they caused quite the sensation when deployed due to their very heavy armament which caused panic and stress in many quarters due to the idea that they could defeat anything they could not outrun, with the exception of the three surviving British battlecruisers. Even professional naval circles grew concerned. Technical minded men tend to think along lines of strength vs. weakness on a ship for ship basis. The Panzerschieffs in fact sparked a new naval arms buildup with the French laying down the Dunkerque class in 'response' to the PzSchf, which in turn sparked a response from Italy etc etc. The USN also responded eventually though more so to reports of ultra powerful Japanese cruisers and the Scharnhorsts.

However....ultimately it was not Dunkerque, Alaska or any other ship whose design included a specific response to a ship type that sank AGS. It was three individually weaker ships. Hence yes, i term the panic revolving around the "faster than anything it couldn't outgun" a bugaboo caused mainly by organizations outside the militaries of the world. The ships were a concern....but as some historians later concluded, the non-panicy, less expensive solution was to simply compensate with the resources at hand, not build expensive ships to one-up the new design, none of which ultimately faced or sank a Panzerscheiff. All this belies the concept of the Commerce Raider. Thats the political part. 

I don't recall saying the PzSchf was a "bad design"....what i said was that for her primary "Naval" function....aka 'raiding', her design was not optimal. But in the end an optimal commerce raider would not have made as big a splash on the world scene. The UK has always faced the prospect of inferior naval powers responding with a commerce war. Even during the War of 1812, despite overwhelming naval superiority, Yankee privatieers caused a good amount of grief to Britian's merchant fleet. Germany building a series of smaller, commerce raiding cruisers with large endurance, great speed and a more typical cruiser armament that is more than adequate in dealing with the merchants of the world as well as defending against enemy cruisers, would have alarmed the British government but her response would have been the same.....more cruisers and the building of fast battleships. 



> If you want to talk about “bugaboo” I think all this inference about the New Orleans being far superior to British heavy cruisers is the real bugaboo. They were superior, make no mistake, but one only has to examine their performances in the opening months of the pacific to see just how limited these ships were as well.


What I said was that a 2nd generation cruiser, such as NO class vessel would be a more formidable threat. I don't agree that the Savo Island debacle discredits the NO as a a class. It did expose weaknesses, most of which were not integral to the design itself. It is a noted irony that the losses hit the USN's theoretically best class suffered the worst during the fight but that only emphasises the point that in actual warfare, outside of paper studies, its often circumstances and damage that get a ship, not what the engineers and drafters predict. For example subsequent study of the battle by the US BeauOrd cited the overabundance of ready ammo and flamable materials, particularily in the vacinity of the aircraft hangers as primary factors in the losses of the ships present. (Astoria was the best example). Quincy and Vincennes' primary loss factor was torpedoes, but the aiming of such was aided by the bright fires started on the ships. Underwater protection was seconded to shellfire protection in the class....a neccessity given the tonnage restrictions under which the designers worked. However compensations to protect bouyancy and power were worked in as well.

The performance of Boise, (a CL but also a 2nd generation cruiser with heavier armor and thus similar in relation to the 1st generation treaty cruisers), and San Francisco (a NO class vessel) yielded much better results in the test of combat, in spite of the latter's point blank experience with a 14in armed battleship firing high incendiary ammo at her. She was struck at least 45 times from all gun-types and hit by a crashing airplane earlier in the day which started severe fires. All of the damage and the over 20 fires started during the night battle were brought under control and the ship survived. Boise survived a diving shell hit into her primary magazine while even more impressively, the cruiser Savannah survived a smart bomb hit of the same type that sank the battleship Roma over in the Med Theater. Subsequent further night actions in 42 showed that USN heavy cruisers and 2nd generation light cruisers in general had a very good chance of surviving one, even two powerful torpedo hits. Overall I think they showed great durability given the ordinances and situations they faced. New Orleans herself ate a Long Lance which caused a secondary ammo explosion tearing off her entire bow between Turret 1 and 2. The ship survived with her intact bulkheads limiting progressive flooding. Sister ship Minneapolis ate two LL's and survived. The NO class as a whole, with the exception of Tuscaloosa all suffered major war damage. Only during Savo, The USN's greatest blue-water debacle, were ships of the class lost. (Quincy, Astoria, Vincennes). Would any other cruiser have faired better? All ships have flaws, but 'flawed design' as a whole? I don't agree.


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## Nikademus (Oct 15, 2010)

tail end charlie said:


> I am not an expert but isnt some of this being wise after the event? If AGS has 700 of 11" caliber shells how many of those would the captain reasonably use on three cruisers not knowing if a group of battleships and cruisers is just over the horizon. If using just 25% takes out 1 cruiser then taking the other 2 out may leave him at sea facing a larger opponent with almost nothing. As long as AGS was being followed by even 1 small cruiser re supply at sea would be impossible.



Most definately! Hindsight makes brilliant generals and admirals of all of us. Thats why i mentioned that the River Platte battle makes for an excellent wargame scenario. Gifted with such hindsight as knowing the strengths of the OPFORCE, I know what strategy i would employ. It might work....but then again it might not, but i know i won't repeat Langsdorff's error in mistaking two CL's for two DD's. I also know that its probably not a good idea to split fire unless the situation is dire. Sadly...i am not doing nearly as well in my current play by email as 1/2 of the empire of Japan. I'm short of hindsight there.


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## Juha (Oct 15, 2010)

Hello Parsifal
Quote:” _at ranges above approximately 19000 yards not many of those hits are going to do much to AGS's armouring scheme _“

I would say on the contrary, the AGS’ side armour became progressively more invulnerable when range increased but decks became penetraterable around 22,000y (by 118kg US AP) or 20,500y (by 152kg US AP). I’m talking on US ammo because the discussion between Delcyros and I on PBB vs Wichita/Baltimore and because I don’t have in hand penetration table for RN 116kg SAPC.

Quote:” _I just assumed an an ROF of 3 rounds per minute, because it would be nearly impossible to achieve the theoretical rof in the scenario I would attempt to generate_”

Nothing wrong in that 3rpm but problem seems to be in your math 

Quote: “_If it takes 32 mins to fire off those 60 rounds with a 6 gun broadside_” 

Now with 3rpmpg to fire 60 rounds would take only 3min 20 sec, ie significantly less.

Quote:” _The Brit cruisers, on the other hand, cannot afford this luxury. Their number one priority has to be get the range down, Because they are in a stern chase situation, they have to nearly heave to every time the rear turrets want to fire. Every time they do that, they lose time, time they cannot afford_.”

Not necessarily, because the cruiser ought to anyway zigzag to confuse enemy’s fire control. And if PBB’s fore turret could fire 20degrees off the aft centreline, why cruiser’s aft turret(s) would not be able to fire some 20degrees off the fore centreline?

And anyway, being faster the cruiser might have some degree of choice when to engage, that of course depends on general tactical situation.

Juha


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## tail end charlie (Oct 15, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> Most definately! Hindsight makes brilliant generals and admirals of all of us. Thats why i mentioned that the River Platte battle makes for an excellent wargame scenario. Gifted with such hindsight as knowing the strengths of the OPFORCE, I know what strategy i would employ. It might work....but then again it might not, but i know i won't repeat Langsdorff's error in mistaking two CL's for two DD's. I also know that its probably not a good idea to split fire unless the situation is dire. Sadly...i am not doing nearly as well in my current play by email as 1/2 of the empire of Japan. I'm short of hindsight there.



Nikademus ive never played a war game but Ive seen them on television, they should build absolute cockups into the rules It seems to me the bigger the ship or fleet the easier it was to be missed or wrongly identified/classified. Langsdorf used to rely on it when approaching merchantmen as I remember, his ability to sink ships without killing anyone or them sending a warning must count as a plus on his tactical nous.


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## renrich (Oct 15, 2010)

Nik, a minor point but I think I have a correction for you. At the Komandorski Battle, I have to defend my uncle's cruiser. He was the CGM in charge of the five inch guns and he told me of firing at the Japanese spotter plane. However you stated that SLC expended more than 800 rounds of eight inch and got no hits. I had always thought that SLC got several hits on the Japanese CAs. There is a very good article online by Vincent P O Hara which says the following:
At 0850, with her 16th salvo at 16000 yards, SLC hit the Nachi. One eight inch shell hit the compass bridge, killing 11 men and wounding 21. A second shell hit the main mast, Two minutes later an eight inch shell hit the aft aircraft deck of Nachi, killing two and wounding five and causing all power to be lost to the main battery which was out of action for 30 minutes. At 1148 Nachi was hit again blocking her number one turret. Apparently, very early in the battle, SLC thought other hits had been obtained because of fires seen on one of the Japanese CAs but they must have been caused by near misses. SLC was hit four times with one shell being a dud but was damaged fairly significantly with two deaths. SLC expended 806 round of eight inch and 95 rounds of five inch.

My uncle told me that the SLC expended all the ammo for the two aft turrets and had to move eight inch rounds from the forward magazines to the aft. At the end, she was firing HE because all AP had been expended.

IMO, the Pensacola Class CAs are superior to the early County Class CAs, primarily because of more efficient bollers which give them better range. Radius of action- 13000 miles at 15 knots with 1500 tons of fuel versus Rad of action- 10400 miles at 11-14 knots with 3400 tons of fuel. The Pensacolas were also pretty resistant to battle damage with Pensacola badly damaged at Tassafaronga, including being torpedoed and the Salt Lake City being damaged at Cape Esperance and Komandorski Islands. They were in the thick the whole war and were retired after the war. Two more eight inch guns also.


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## Nikademus (Oct 15, 2010)

renrich said:


> Nik, a minor point but I think I have a correction for you. At the Komandorski Battle, I have to defend my uncle's cruiser. He was the CGM in charge of the five inch guns and he told me of firing at the Japanese spotter plane. However you stated that SLC expended more than 800 rounds of eight inch and got no hits. I had always thought that SLC got several hits on the Japanese CAs. There is a very good article online by Vincent P O Hara which says the following:



Hi,

Yup....there are varying accounts in regards to the hits and number that were scored. Your correct on the O'Hara article online and reading it the other day reminded me of the conflicting accounts so last nite and this morning i brushed up on it. Friedman's book on US cruisers says 5 hits were scored on the SLC (OHare says four, another listed 6) In regards Nachi, Dull's Battle History of the Japanese navy quoted two x 8inch hits on Nachi while Ohare listed 3 while the Wiki article cited 6inch hits from the Richmond on Nachi.

Pulling out Lacroix's definitively mind numbing book on Japanese Cruisers of WWII, he states that in the course of the action, Nachi was hit by 5 x 12.7cm shells that killed 14 and wounded 27 in total. 3 struck around 0350; 1 struck the compass bridge damaging electical circuits for the fire control. The second shell damaged one of the struts of the mainmast. The third hit the aircraft deck aft damaging the catapult, killing 2 and wounding 5 in the torpedo room below. At 0648 Nachi recieved the fourth 12.7cm hit on the starboard front size of turret one, blocking it and killing one man and wounding another. The fifth and final 12.7cm hit (time unknown) occured near the signal platform to starboard causing light damage.

Given the amount of damage detail i've pulled out of Lacroix's book on each Japanese cruiser that fought during the war, my personal view is to lean towards that direction in terms of credability. Even allowing for the SLC's claimed 8inch hits though, the results of the battle were typical of a long range engagement (alot of shells for very few hits)

I used to not think much of the County's, being focused on immediate stats like armor and such but in later years i've learned to appreciate their other qualities. They had excellent freeboard for example that would serve them well in the stormy N. Atlantic and their turrets were roomier than the cramped turrets of the Pensacola and Northhamptons with individual gunlaying capability and high elevation.


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## renrich (Oct 15, 2010)

Actually, when I started thinking about a stern chase between AGS and the Brit cruisers, I was reminded of the Komandorskis since I was very familiar with because of my uncle's involvement. A cruiser size ship traveling at 25-28 knots, end on, at 16000-20000 yards and chasing salvoes must be a difficult target. In a book I read, written by a crewman on the DD, Dale, at the Kormandorski, the writer was very critical of McMorris and the Richmond, because he said the Richmond stayed well in front of SLC, out of range of the enemy gunfire. I don't suppose the Richmond would have accomplished much though by staying back because her guns most of the battle did not have enough elevation to have the range to be effective.

A stern chase with AGS would have probably been a long drawn out affair.


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## Nikademus (Oct 15, 2010)

tail end charlie said:


> Nikademus ive never played a war game but Ive seen them on television, they should build absolute cockups into the rules It seems to me the bigger the ship or fleet the easier it was to be missed or wrongly identified/classified. Langsdorf used to rely on it when approaching merchantmen as I remember, his ability to sink ships without killing anyone or them sending a warning must count as a plus on his tactical nous.



"cockups" are built into the Storm Eagle Studios games "Jutland" and "Distant guns" (the later simulates the naval aspect of the Russo Japanese War). In addition to damages impairing one's ability to control, increasing use of micromanagement controls on a per ship level can lead to formations getting disrupted and impairing command and control. Getting out of visual sight of a division leader can lead to loss of control (for the player) Basically more is less which is how it should be for the C/O of a squad/fleet etc.

Older wargames like Warship and Battlecruiser from SSI incorprated hardware cockups from damage and weak armor/fluke hits. Great fun.


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## Nikademus (Oct 15, 2010)

renrich said:


> Actually, when I started thinking about a stern chase between AGS and the Brit cruisers, I was reminded of the Komandorskis since I was very familiar with because of my uncle's involvement. A cruiser size ship traveling at 25-28 knots, end on, at 16000-20000 yards and chasing salvoes must be a difficult target. In a book I read, written by a crewman on the DD, Dale, at the Kormandorski, the writer was very critical of McMorris and the Richmond, because he said the Richmond stayed well in front of SLC, out of range of the enemy gunfire. I don't suppose the Richmond would have accomplished much though by staying back because her guns most of the battle did not have enough elevation to have the range to be effective.
> 
> A stern chase with AGS would have probably been a long drawn out affair.



Being able to talk to a reletive who was there must have been extremely cool. Closest i've gotten is my GF's paternal Grandmother, whose' husband was a career RN man. She (the GF) constantly reminds me of how much i would have loved talking him up about his service days. Sadly, he passed before she and I became an item. I have talked extensively to her grandmother about her experiences as a volunteer nurse during the Blitz and her time in Malta during the war. 

What job did your uncle have onboard the SLC?


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## renrich (Oct 15, 2010)

Nik, I had the privilege to have six uncles who served in WW2. Two had joined the Navy in the thirties after high school and by the time of PH were both serving on CAs, Salt Lake City and Chicago. As you may know, SLC was escorting Enterprise and Chicago was escorting Lexington both not far from PH on Dec. 7. Both uncles were Chief Gunner's Mates, which is the highest enlisted man's rating. It is generally known that the Chiefs run the Navy. The uncle on the SLC was responsible for the secondary armament of the ship, the 5 inch-38s, the 1.1s and later 20 mms and 40mms. The one on the Chicago had the same job.

Among other missions the SLC was on the Doolittle Raid with Enterprise, Cape Esperance and Komondorski. His guns may have shot down two Japanese bombers during a raid on the Marshall Islands early in 1942 and were heavily involved during the night short range battle of Cape Esperance. The uncle on Chicago was in the Coral Sea Battle and was in Chicago at Savo Island, where the Chicago was the only Allied cruiser to survive although heavily damaged including being torpedoed. I had many conversations with them when they were alive.


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## fastmongrel (Oct 15, 2010)

Why did Langsdorff think he was engaging a light cruiser and 2 destroyers. I wouldnt have thought there would be destroyers chasing him, werent RN destroyers a bit short on endurance for that job. Was there a destroyer flotilla based anywhere near the Plate.


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## Nikademus (Oct 15, 2010)

I believe he thought that there might be an escorted convoy in the near vacinity.


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## Juha (Oct 15, 2010)

IMHO Fastmongrel asked a good question. I doubt that there were RN DDs anywhere near, nearest possible base would have been Falklands, Capetown or Ascension are very far away and even Falklands so distant from anything very important needing DD patrols that it was improbable DD base. Because RN had nothing better anywhere near it was OK for clearly longer ranged cruisers.

Juha


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## tail end charlie (Oct 15, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> "cockups" are built into the Storm Eagle Studios games "Jutland" and "Distant guns" (the later simulates the naval aspect of the Russo Japanese War). In addition to damages impairing one's ability to control, increasing use of micromanagement controls on a per ship level can lead to formations getting disrupted and impairing command and control. Getting out of visual sight of a division leader can lead to loss of control (for the player) Basically more is less which is how it should be for the C/O of a squad/fleet etc.
> 
> Older wargames like Warship and Battlecruiser from SSI incorprated hardware cockups from damage and weak armor/fluke hits. Great fun.



I mean real C*CK UPS like the charge of the light brigade or the swordfish sent to attack the Bismark attacking the Sheffield cruiser but due to another C*CK up the magnetic detonators dont explode. Or for another example can you build in to a war game something a captain knew absolutely nothing about like the Blucher being finally sunk by a 1901 battery of shore launched underwater torpedoes.


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## Glider (Oct 15, 2010)

It is a good question. One of the reasons why the RN had so many small cruisers was to cover the long sealanes. Escorts were in very short supply and woulld have been concentrated in the N Atlantic and on routes to the Med.

Why he didn't launch the seaplanes when first spotted to confirm the tactical situation is one of those unknowns. One of the RN Cruisers launced the Fairy Fox for a similar mission and to help with the spotting of the guns so it was possible.


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## RCAFson (Oct 15, 2010)

fastmongrel said:


> Why did Langsdorff think he was engaging a light cruiser and 2 destroyers. I wouldnt have thought there would be destroyers chasing him, werent RN destroyers a bit short on endurance for that job. Was there a destroyer flotilla based anywhere near the Plate.



IIRC, it was because he mis-identified Exeter as a light cruiser (given her silhouette he may have though she was an Arethusa-class and so by comparison the Ajax and Achilles would have seemed to be destroyers, especially as they were further away at the time of the sighting) and the other two as destroyers. 
Arethusa:





Exeter:


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## Juha (Oct 15, 2010)

BTW max range for 8” AP
Wichita 29,800 yards (27,250 m)
Baltimore 30,050 yards (27,480 m)
County/Cathedral classes 30,650 yards (28,030 m)

Juha


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## renrich (Oct 15, 2010)

RCAFson, I believe your pictures are mislabeled with the top picture which is labeled Exeter being actually Arethusa and the bottom picture being Exeter. Very nice pictures though, and handsome ships. My original Janes 1942 has a nice photo of Exeter after refit for the frontispiece.


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## RCAFson (Oct 15, 2010)

renrich said:


> RCAFson, I believe your pictures are mislabeled with the top picture which is labeled Exeter being actually Arethusa and the bottom picture being Exeter. Very nice pictures though, and handsome ships. My original Janes 1942 has a nice photo of Exeter after refit for the frontispiece.



The bottom picture is Exeter, as I put the labels at the top.

Anyways, there is a strong similarity and as Exeter was was approaching close to bow on, it would have been difficult to see the funnel separation.


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## tail end charlie (Oct 15, 2010)

renrich said:


> RCAFson, I believe your pictures are mislabeled with the top picture which is labeled Exeter being actually Arethusa and the bottom picture being Exeter. Very nice pictures though, and handsome ships. My original Janes 1942 has a nice photo of Exeter after refit for the frontispiece.



Zounds renrich youve made the same mistake as Langsdorf but RCAFson only got it right because he posted the pics in the first place


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## Juha (Oct 16, 2010)

Hello
before the British saw AGS it had already rightly identified Exeter but had thought that the 2 CLs were DDs, Germans had intelligence info that Exeter and 2 H-Class DDs were escorting a small convoy from Montevideo. And by checking from Roskill, I found out that at least on Sept 1 1939 RN South American Command had also 4 DDs under its command.

Juha


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## renrich (Oct 16, 2010)

I don't see a label for Arethusa and if my post is read carefully I said that Exeter is the bottom picture. It would be easy to mistake one cruiser for another, though. I believe that Juha has cleared that up. Engaging A small CA with two DDs is a different proposition than a CA with two CLs.


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## davparlr (Oct 16, 2010)

renrich said:


> Among other missions the SLC was on the Doolittle Raid with Enterprise, Cape Esperance and Komondorski. His guns may have shot down two Japanese bombers during a raid on the Marshall Islands early in 1942 and were heavily involved during the night short range battle of Cape Esperance. The uncle on Chicago was in the Coral Sea Battle and was in Chicago at Savo Island, where the Chicago was the only Allied cruiser to survive although heavily damaged including being torpedoed. I had many conversations with them when they were alive.



Good that you got to talk to them. I missed opportunities to do so. I hope you recorded the conversations or wrote them down.

A lot of mistakes were made by commanders at Savo Island and many lives were paid. It was a stomach punch to the Allies after Midway. An inquiry was conducted but only one commander was to be reprimanded, Captain Bode of the Chicago, who shot and killed himself when he learned of it. Your uncle must have left the Chicago shortly as it was sank a few months later. The Navy recovered with a vengeance and the battle of Guadalcanal was won. Those were dark times when the fighting was vicious and the outcome was still thought to be in the balance. The Guadalcanal period is one of my favorite periods to read about, where Allied Navy, Marine and Army warriors fought with disadvantage and great courage and grit to bring to a halt the Japanese onslaught in the Pacific. After this period, the war in the Pacific was never in doubt, only the price in lives that needed to be paid.


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## renrich (Oct 16, 2010)

Unfortunately, I have only my memory to rely on regarding my converstions with them. By the time I realised how valuable their remembrances would have been, they were out of pocket or had passed away. Some of our family get togethers right after the war were hilarious though, with those two sailors, who were known to take a drink, telling sea stories. My uncle Jack on the Chicago told about once an accident with a 1.1 where it would not quit firing and shot off a piece of the Chicago. After Chicago limped back to Australia, following Savo, the Aussies who heretofore had been very friendly ostracized the crew of Chicago because it was said that Chicago abandoned Canberra. Of course they needed to find a scape goat for Savo and Bode was it.

That particular uncle accepted a commission(?) as a warrant officer after Savo and was transferred out before Chicago was sunk at Rennel Island. He wound up in China involved with geurrilla warfare I think but he was very close mouthed about that phase of his career. He normally was about 6' 3" and about 210 pounds but came back from China weighing about 160 pounds.


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