# Greatest disaster for Royal Navy



## The Basket (Jun 30, 2019)

What was the worst moment for the Royal Navy during World War 2?

Loss of the Hood? 
Loss of Force Z? 
Loss of Glorious? 
Loss of Royal Oak? 
Ceylon raid by the IJN in 1942?

Even the Italian frogmen attacks in Alexandria Harbour?


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## Mad Dog (Jun 30, 2019)

The Basket said:


> What was the worst moment for the Royal Navy during World War 2?
> 
> Loss of the Hood?
> Loss of Force Z?
> ...



I would have to say the loss of Force Z because it had the biggest immediate impact. Whilst the losses of _Hood_ and _Glorious_ were big blows, they had relatively little impact on the immediate course of the War. In _Hood's_ case, the _Bismarck_ was a goner regardless, the RN's surface fleet was so dominant in the Atlantic that it was just a matter of time. _Glorious_ was returning from the abandoned Norwegian campaign and had little part to play in the coming Battle of Britain. And the Ceylon Raid did little more than cement the IJN's overall hold of the Western Pacific caused by the loss of Force Z. The loss of Force Z, however, meant the IJN could operate with virtual impunity off Malaysia, ensuring the eventual fall of Singapore.

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## The Basket (Jun 30, 2019)

The loss of the SS Automedon may have been the greatest disaster for the Royal Navy and Commonwealth in general. 

This was caused by the auxiliary cruiser Atlantis which shelled and captured her. 

They found top secret documents that gave the strength of British forces in the Far East and pretty much said the Royal Navy will do nothing if faced with A Japanese force and would not be able to send reinforcement. 

This was a very damaging turn of affairs which gave the Japanese the green light.

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## pbehn (Jun 30, 2019)

I thought that the loss of the Hood was nothing really in military terms but a lot in propaganda terms because it had been used in a lot of propaganda previously.

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## The Basket (Jun 30, 2019)

All that flag waving meant that Hood did not get the refit she needed and was in poor shape to take on Bismarck.

The loss of Hood was the single highest loss of life from a RN single warship although the loss of Glorious plus Acasta and Ardent was higher. 

The loss of the Lancastria was in the thousands but this wasnt a warship.

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## fastmongrel (Jul 3, 2019)

The German code breaking department B-Dienst broke the BAMS (British and Allied Merchant Ships) codes which meant Doenitz regulary knew the exact positions of Atlantic convoys and could dispose the few U-Boats at his command to the right places to intercept convoys.

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## Glider (Jul 3, 2019)

Mad Dog said:


> I would have to say the loss of Force Z because it had the biggest immediate impact. Whilst the losses of _Hood_ and _Glorious_ were big blows, they had relatively little impact on the immediate course of the War. In _Hood's_ case, the _Bismarck_ was a goner regardless, the RN's surface fleet was so dominant in the Atlantic that it was just a matter of time. _Glorious_ was returning from the abandoned Norwegian campaign and had little part to play in the coming Battle of Britain. And the Ceylon Raid did little more than cement the IJN's overall hold of the Western Pacific caused by the loss of Force Z. The loss of Force Z, however, meant the IJN could operate with virtual impunity off Malaysia, ensuring the eventual fall of Singapore.


I totally agree with this summary. The loss of a single ship is rarely a disaster in strategic terms for the RN as they had replacements or the loss was a small part of an overall plan. But as Mad Dog points out, Force Z was the plan, and with it, everything else went.


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## The Basket (Jul 3, 2019)

Force Z was a stab at gunboat diplomacy when Japan had the bigger gunboat. 

I am not sure how much the Royal Navy knew about the threat they were facing apart from the obvious propoganda. 

But sending PoW and Repulse was always going to end badly. The war had left battleships behind and Pearl Harbour, Taranto, the Swordfish attack on Bismarck and even the Skua bombing and sinking the Koningsberg showed the Battleship as vulnerable. 

When an airplane considered as mundane as the Skua is sinking major warships then Force Z is just folly.


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## nuuumannn (Jul 3, 2019)

The Basket said:


> When an airplane considered as mundane as the Skua is sinking major warships then Force Z is just folly.



It might have been worse, or better for the British, depending on how matters played out. The carrier HMS _Indomitable_ was supposed to accompany the PoW and Repulse, but she ran aground in Jamaica, thus ensuring that the ship wasn't able to reach Singapore to play any part in the action. The posibility of air cover over the British units might have changed the scenario advantageous to the British. Or it could have also meant the loss of another carrier. We can only surmise.

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## The Basket (Jul 3, 2019)

Force Z was a deterrent which never worked. 
Japanese were considered weak and so their threat was vastly underestimated. 
Admiral Phillips view on air power was not positive. 
Fair enough it was a few bombers then yes it could survive but not wave after wave. And air power had yet to sink a fully operational battleship and PoW was as modern as it gets. So maybe hubris was not misplaced. 
Oddly the air power offered was Brewster Buffaloes! 

Even if not sunk the 2 ships would have faced IJN surface units such as cruisers and destroyers and 2 Kongos. So even a sea engagement would have been a tough ask. 

Maybe a Kongo v PoW is a win for PoW but the destroyers would have fired long lances until empty and that would have not ended well either.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 3, 2019)

Thinking of Parsifal on this one

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## nuuumannn (Jul 4, 2019)

The Basket said:


> Oddly the air power offered was Brewster Buffaloes!



Still, the Buffalo was more than a match for a Japanese twin engined torpedo bomber. The problem was the British ships maintained strict radio silence until it was too late, around 12pm, and the Buff units were unawares of what was unfolding. The torpedo attack began at around 11am. 243 Sqn scrambled two Buffaloes and 453 sent ten. By the time they arrived, both ships had been sunk.


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## GrauGeist (Jul 4, 2019)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Thinking of Parsifal on this one


I was just thinking about Michael and what his input might have been, as I was reading the thread...

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## The Basket (Jul 4, 2019)

Force Z was a political force not a military. 
So the idea was a bit of gunboat diplomacy and the Japanese would run for the hills rather than line up behind the bomb sight. 

Force Z was publicly notified for this end which meant the Japanese were waiting. 

But a modern fully operational battleship at sea had never been sunk before. And the Japanese aircraft are made from bamboo and Britannia rules the waves. So don't need no air power. 

Would have to do more reading of what fighter escort the bombers had. But since they were made from bamboo too then hardly as issue. 

Force Z entered a shooting gallery. And the results are pretty obvious today.


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## buffnut453 (Jul 4, 2019)

The Japanese bombers attacking Force Z had no escorting fighters. That said, presence of RAF fighter defences would likely have prompted escorts for subsequent waves. The key question is how much attrition could the Buffalos have inflicted before they either ran out of time or were engaged by (likely) A6Ms. 

The question of air cover remains confused. It seems AHQFE informed Phillips that they could not guarantee air cover from airfields in northern Malaya which Phillips duly misunderstood as an inability to provide any air cover. In fact, 453 Sqn at Sembawang had been placed on immediate stand-by in case Force Z requested fighter cover. Also, at Kallang, Buffalos of 243 Sqn were able to respond if needed. Unfortunately for the sailors of Force Z, the RAF received no request until it was too late.

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## The Basket (Jul 4, 2019)

The Buffaloes could have been a big blocker so not necessarily shooting down but their presence could have stopped coordinating torpedo strikes. So the bombers would have been more likely to miss and run for home. Would need to find out if IJA fighters were about to see if they could be called in. 

But as soon as it was a shooting war then Force Z should have beat a very hasty retreat Although in the Royal Navy not a good idea. The PoW captain was almost court martialled for cowardice against the Bismarck so running twice would have been a slight issue. 

Nelson touch and all that.


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## GreenKnight121 (Jul 5, 2019)

nuuumannn said:


> It might have been worse, or better for the British, depending on how matters played out. The carrier HMS _Indomitable_ was supposed to accompany the PoW and Repulse, but she ran aground in Jamaica, thus ensuring that the ship wasn't able to reach Singapore to play any part in the action. The posibility of air cover over the British units might have changed the scenario advantageous to the British. Or it could have also meant the loss of another carrier. We can only surmise.



This bit of "everybody knows" is simply wrong.

While HMS Indomitable was certainly scheduled to join Force Z in Singapore, the grounding made no difference whatsoever to her availability to be sunk with POW and Repulse.

That is because she was not scheduled to actually arrive in Singapore until long afterwards - most likely in early January 1942!

This document gives much info about dates and times of travel... Eleven months aboard HMS INDOMITABLE - royalnavyresearcharchive

Indomitable had traveled to Jamaica to conduct training before heading to Singapore... she ran aground on *2 Nov. 1941. *

After repairs in Norfolk, USA, she arrived back in Jamaica on *24 Nov. 1941* - *a delay of 22 days.*

She departed the Caribbean for Cape Town South Africa from Trinidad on 17 Dec. 1941. That's 23 days of training etc. 

She arrived at Cape Town on 31 Dec. 1941, and left on 2 Jan. 1942.

She arrived in Aden on 11 Jan. 1042, then in Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast on 14 Jan. 1942 - 28 days travel from Trinidad to where she picked up 50 Hurricanes & personnel for Singapore.

She made the Cocos Islands on 25 Jan. 1942. That is as far east as she went before returning to Ceylon (Sri Lanka).

So, remove the 22-day delay from running aground, and we see that she would likely have arrived in Cape Town, South Africa on *9 Dec. 1941... thousands of miles from Singapore. *

*Since Force Z left Singapore the day before (8th) and was sunk on the 10th, there is no way that the grounding in any way "saved" Indomitable - OR robbed Force Z of air cover.*

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## nuuumannn (Jul 5, 2019)

GreenKnight121 said:


> *Since Force Z left Singapore the day before (8th) and was sunk on the 10th, there is no way that the grounding in any way "saved" Indomitable - OR robbed Force Z of air cover.*



*All right then. *

My understanding of the situation after reading Sea Flight by Hugh Popham. Indeed he states the following on page 78: "On December 7th 1941 the Japanese let loose their carrier borne aircraft on Pearl Harbour, the mainAmerican naval base in the Pacific, on Oahu in the Hawaiian Islands; and three days later Prince of Wales and Repulse were sent to the bottom of the Gulf of Siam while attempting to intercept a Japanese force of the Malayan coast. Did we have an uneasy feeling that but for that inexplicable error of navigation off Palisades we should have been there to give the two battleships the air-cover for lack of which they were sitting ducks to the Jap [_sic_] bombers and torpedo craft?"

Down the bottom of the same page: "If we did, we were right. In Vol III of The Second World War, Winston Churchill writes (p.524): "It was decided to send the first instalments of our Far Eastern Fleet both the Prince of Wales and the Repulse, with four destroyers, and as an essential element of the modern armoured aircraft carrier Indomitable. Unhappily the Indomitable was temporarily disabled by an accident." What might have happened if we had been there makes exciting guesswork."

So you can see why I might have thought this.



> This bit of "everybody knows" is simply wrong.



Don't be so presumptuous. That's not why I posted it. I did however find this in the wake of you refuting my statement.

"Contrary to post-war accounts, _Indomitable_ was not allocated to Force Z. Neither Admiralty plans during the period, nor the secret session of the Parliament of the United Kingdom on 19 December concerning the loss of Force Z, nor the 7 December tabulation of current and intended fleet strength in the Far East, allocate the carrier to the Eastern Fleet. The carrier did not receive any orders to this effect prior to grounding in Kingston, Jamaica, on 2 November, at the start of a three-week work-up. Joining Force Z by 8 December would have required no grounding and abandoning the work-up."

From here: Force Z - Wikipedia


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## The Basket (Jul 6, 2019)

I would say that the light reading of Force Z I done always implied that a carrier should have been there but for the damage to Indomitable made this not happen. 

That would have offered 21 fighters of 9 Sea Hurricane and 12 Fulmar. 

Kamikaze attacks such as the Acasta and Ardent against Scharnhorst and Gneisenau
And the almost court martial of Captain Leach shows that running is not part of the plan even when odds are against you.


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## K5083 (Jul 7, 2019)

The loss of all those cruisers and destroyers and the Island of Crete in the same timeframe as the Bismarck action was more serious than any loss of capital units. Battleships were for headlines. Smaller units dominated the med outside of shore-based air. The damage to the two QE class battleships by maiale was serious too, but the Italian big units achieved nothing from their opportunity, so the impact of it was diminished.

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## GrauGeist (Jul 7, 2019)

A couple questions regarding HMS Indomitable.

First of all, if she was off Jamaica in November, could she have made it in time to join Force Z?

Also, since she was on her first tour, how experienced was her crew, both ship-board and pilot-wise.

And lastly; it is my understanding that during November/December, she had a compliment of 12 Martlets, 22 Sea Hurricanes and 16 Albacores. How well would those have stacked up against the land-based IJN fighters and bombers?


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## Freebird (Jul 7, 2019)

Mad Dog said:


> I would have to say the loss of Force Z because it had the biggest immediate impact. Whilst the losses of _Hood_ and _Glorious_ were big blows, they had relatively little impact on the immediate course of the War. In _Hood's_ case, the _Bismarck_ was a goner regardless, the RN's surface fleet was so dominant in the Atlantic that it was just a matter of time. _Glorious_ was returning from the abandoned Norwegian campaign and had little part to play in the coming Battle of Britain. And the Ceylon Raid did little more than cement the IJN's overall hold of the Western Pacific caused by the loss of Force Z. The loss of Force Z, however, meant the IJN could operate with virtual impunity off Malaysia, ensuring the eventual fall of Singapore.



I would have to disagree, the loss of Force Z does not allow the IJN to "operate with virtual impunity off Malaysia" as they could do that already. Conversly, the survival of Force Z (or even a successful interception of a Japanese convoy ) doesn't save Malaya, or even have much impact on Japanese naval operations. 

The loss of Glorious has a far bigger strategic impact, with lasting effects for years.



The Basket said:


> Force Z was a deterrent which never worked.
> Japanese were considered weak and so their threat was vastly underestimated.
> Admiral Phillips view on air power was not positive.
> Fair enough it was a few bombers then yes it could survive but not wave after wave. And air power had yet to sink a fully operational battleship and PoW was as modern as it gets. So maybe hubris was not misplaced.
> ...



Basket's points are correct.
Since Force Z's purpose is to dissuade Japan from attacking, once war comes the correct thing to do would be to withdraw them, or offer them as carrier escorts to the Americans.

However, suppose they'd survived, what offensive role could they have played in the Far East?


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## The Basket (Jul 7, 2019)

The loss of Glorious and Courageous so early was certainly a greater loss than Hood or Royal Oak. Even if not used in the carrier role but in a aircraft transporter role then they were sorely missed. 

I remember reading somewhere that after convoy HX84 met the Admiral Scheer then all convoys were cancelled for 5 days. This was a greater threat to Britain than a loss of a individual ship. 

Also the fact that Royal Navy was not fully prepared for submarine warfare was a vital and biggest mistake in my opinion.


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## Glider (Jul 7, 2019)

Freebird said:


> Since Force Z's purpose is to dissuade Japan from attacking, once war comes the correct thing to do would be to withdraw them, or offer them as carrier escorts to the Americans.
> 
> However, suppose they'd survived, what offensive role could they have played in the Far East?


The answer to you last point is I believe in your first point, as they would have been valuable carrier escorts. The POW was modern with (for the time) comprehensive radar and AA weapons. The Repulse would have needed a refit before taking the front line in a similar role but even as she was, she took a lot of damage before the end.

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## Freebird (Jul 7, 2019)

GrauGeist said:


> A couple questions regarding HMS Indomitable.



Sure. 



GrauGeist said:


> First of all, if she was off Jamaica in November, could she have made it in time to join Force Z?



Yes, absolutely.
The geniuses on Wikipedia haven't yet figured out that the Earth is spherical, in pronouncing that HMS Indomitable, even leaving Jamaica on Nov 3rd (day of accident) couldn't possibly have made it to Singapore in time.  (via Durban obviously)

In fact, it's only 27 days to Singapore, via Panama and Fiji. 
if she'd left Jamaica on Nov 5th or 6th, stopping for a day or two at Fiji (or Cairns, Australia) to refuel, she'd arrive at Singapore on Dec 3rd or 4th, only a day or two after the rest of Force Z.



GrauGeist said:


> Also, since she was on her first tour, how experienced was her crew, both ship-board and pilot-wise.



Surprisingly, a very experienced crew, especially airgroup.
The silver lining in having her two sister ships disabled in the Med early in 1941, the FAA had a surplus of veteran squadrons waiting to embark on carriers.
Her 1941/42 embarkment:

*800 squadron* (Fulmar, formerly Skua) Formerly on Courageous, Ark Royal & Victorious, one of the most experienced squadrons, participated in the sinking of Konigsberg at Bergen, strike on Scharnhorst at Trondheim, attacked French fleet at Oran and hunted Bismarck in May 1941.
*806 squadron* (Skua/Fulmar/Hurricane) Formerly on Illustrious & Formidable, veterans of Norway, Dunkirk, Matapan & Crete
*880 squadron *(Martlet) - Formerly on Furious, participated in the raid on Petsamo
*827 squadron* (Albacore) Formerly on Victorious, also Channel operations.

Captain Harold Morse formerly commanded heavy cruiser HMS York (1936-39) Minesweeping command (1939-41) and Indomitable (July 1941-42)
Capt. Harold Edward Morse , DSO of the Royal Navy (RN) - Allied Warship Commanders of WWII - uboat.net

So overall, an experienced commander with a veteran air group, not at all a "green" crew



GrauGeist said:


> And lastly; it is my understanding that during November/December, she had a compliment of 12 Martlets, 22 Sea Hurricanes and 16 Albacores. How well would those have stacked up against the land-based IJN fighters and bombers?



Reasonably well, considering that any IJN mission escort would be operating from Cam Rahn bay...
The IJN long range bomber could perform search & strike unopposed, but trying to coordinate an escorted strike hundreds of miles from base is going to be tricky.
IJA air cooperation with the IJN was crap, so combined operations are unlikely.

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## Glider (Jul 7, 2019)

Freebird, excellent information as ever


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## GrauGeist (Jul 7, 2019)

Good info, thanks!


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## The Basket (Jul 7, 2019)

PoW and Repulse even in dock would have been a powerful advesery. A bit like Tirpitz so the IJN couldn't just let them be a threat so I fully expect the IJN to attack them in any port. 

The fleet in being concept so the IJN would at least need 2 Kongos and a Nagato or Fuso on 24 hour station in case they came out. Which could have been done when the American battleships were still on the bottom of Pearl Harbour in early 42.

The Indian ocean raid by the carriers in April 1942 towards Ceylon would be a dicey prospect if Nagumo knew he had 2 big gun capital ships behind him. 

So based on Port Arthur and Pearl Harbour pretty obvious that they will go all in to sink them. 

Repulse v Yamato? Yikes.


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## redcoat (Jul 7, 2019)

The Basket said:


> But sending PoW and Repulse was always going to end badly. The war had left battleships behind and Pearl Harbour, Taranto, the Swordfish attack on Bismarck and even the Skua bombing and sinking the Koningsberg showed the Battleship as vulnerable.
> 
> When an airplane considered as mundane as the Skua is sinking major warships then Force Z is just folly.


All the capital ships sunk by aircraft before Force Z were stationary in harbour, The sinking of Force Z was the first time any capital ship was sunk solely by air power while at sea.


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## The Basket (Jul 7, 2019)

Technically USS Nevada wasn't stationary. 

HMS Nelson took an ariel torpedo which could have been worse in September 41 and as mentioned at Crete a number of cruisers were lost and even the Warspite was damaged by a bomb which put her out of action. 

The Swordfish were willing to torpedo Bismarck again but this wasnt allowed. So the Bismarck could have been the first ship sank by air power. 

So by December 1941 it was very clear the vulnerable nature of warships at sea. Force Z was a total disregard of everything learned in the last year.


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## Mad Dog (Jul 7, 2019)

Freebird said:


> …...However, suppose they'd survived, what offensive role could they have played in the Far East?


OK, suppose Phillips decided not to sortie without air-cover, and the Buffalos of 435Sq RAAF and 488Sq RNZAF have an early Christmas amongst the unescorted Japanese level- and torpedo-bombers. Remember, the Japanese bombers were all low on fuel when the made their attacks, attacked in several small waves, and none above 11,500ft, so even the Buffalos would have been able to shoot them down or drive them off. Then Force Z scarpers back to Singapore intact.
At that point, it's highly likely they would have been withdrawn from Singapore pretty soon after, either to Ceylon or Darwin. One option is to consider what would have happened in the defence of Java if Phillips and Force Z are still around. Instead of the Battle of the Java Sea being fought by a mix of Allied cruisers under Dutch command, we'd have a battleship and a battlecruiser to add to the party. If _HMS Hermes_ has been attached then we also have some carrier support, though it's more likely that _HMS Indomitable_ would have joined Force Z by then, as originally planned. 
That also makes it unlikely that the Dutch Admiral Doorman would have been leading the ABDA Command cruisers into action. Doorman had no naval combat experience and made a series of bad decisions in assuming what the Japanese would do. The USN's 59th Destroyer Division won at the Battle of Balikpapan because they acted under US orders _without _the distraction of the ABDACOM structure/interference. 
So we have_ Indomitable_'s Sea Hurricanes for air-cover during the Battle of Makassar Strait, preventing the cruiser fleet being forced to retreat, leading to the Japanese invasion force being attacked by a fleet with two big-gun ships plus torpedo-bombers form _Indomitable_. The presence of Force Z would have given the Japanese a headache as they were still busy defeating the Americans in the Philippines. 
If the IJN are held off Java then there is no invasion of New Guinea, no subsequent attacks on Darwin, and thus Darwin remains an effective naval base. Better resupply to the Dutch East Indies is possible and, instead of sending P-40s to Australia, the USAAF sends P-40s to help the Dutch. P-40s with Hurricane II top-cover would have been a much better defence against the IJN's Zeros.
Even if they do little more than delay the Japanese on Java for a few months, come May we have the Battle of the Coral Sea possibly replaced by the Second Battle of the Java Sea, as the Japanese try to bring their carrier fleet to bear on the Java problem. The USN would still be able to break the code protecting the Japanese radio orders and could send their Task Force 11 carriers (which only had cruisers in support), now with Force Z's big-gun support plus _Indomitable_, to attack the IJN carriers and mop up the Japanese transports.
So, yes, it is possible to theorise a quite big part for Force Z if Phillips had accepted air-cover.

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## GrauGeist (Jul 8, 2019)

HMS Indomitable also had Martlets (Wildcats)

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## Glider (Jul 8, 2019)

The Basket said:


> Repulse v Yamato? Yikes.


Obviously I agree, but Repulse against a Kongo is close, with advantage to Repulse as it did have radar which depending on the weather, could be a good advantage. What is clear is that two x Kongo vs POW and Repulse is a mismatch.

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## buffnut453 (Jul 8, 2019)

Freebird said:


> I would have to disagree, the loss of Force Z does not allow the IJN to "operate with virtual impunity off Malaysia" as they could do that already. Conversly, the survival of Force Z (or even a successful interception of a Japanese convoy ) doesn't save Malaya, or even have much impact on Japanese naval operations.
> 
> The loss of Glorious has a far bigger strategic impact, with lasting effects for years.
> 
> ...




There are a number of potential roles for Force Z particularly if it included organic air power from a carrier. One big item would be interdicting Japanese resupply efforts. As it was, the IJA ran perilously low on ammunition and other key supplies. Even the loss of a few logistics vessels could have seriously hampered Yamashita's ability to continue fighting.

The big guns of Repulse and PoW could have had a really big impact on Japanese-held airfields in southern Thailand and northern Malaya. Several of the airfields were very close to the coast, and hence would have been vulnerable to long-range shelling. That said, it would probably have required a change of thinking by Far East Command and RN leadership in Singapore to even countenance such an idea.

Another squadron's worth (plus) of aircraft could have significantly helped with airpower resources. As things stood, the 4 Buffalo squadrons had to conduct multiple roles: convoy escort, air defence, bomber escort, tactical reconnaissance and close-air support. That's a lot of tasks for 4 squadrons. Having a moveable airfield could have greatly helped with burden-sharing of some of these tasks. RAF strafing attacks against IJA troops and convoys proved particularly effective. Tsuji's "Japan's Greatest Victory, Britain's Worst Defeat" specifically calls out Hurricane strafing attacks although this is almost certainly a mis-identification of the poor old Buffalo since it was the latter that conducted virtually all strafing missions (a case of Hurricane envy perhaps?). Additional resources to help with strafing missions, particularly further north up the Malay peninsula, would almost certainly have had a big impact on Japanese logistics. Switching their truck convoys to night-time (as the Japanese eventually did) might have hidden them from aircraft but then, again, the big guns of Force Z could have been ranged on the main roads (there was only one main road along the west coast from Thailand to Singapore) to disrupt night-time movements. 

Finally, there's a coastal interdiction role that was desperately needed. I'm not suggesting the Repulse or PoW would have engaged in this directly, but having a sizeable task force, particularly if Force Z became the command hub for an integrated ABDA naval force. Positioning Force Z to the west of the Malay peninsula, augmented with Dutch cruisers and destroyers, would have made a powerful force to interdict Japanese coastal movements down the peninsula. 

All the above would have drawn responses from Japanese forces but I think it's a mistake to believe that Force Z couldn't have had at least some impact on the outcome of the Campaign. I'm not suggesting it would change the result but it's not unreasonable to propose that the Japanese forces would have had a harder time of things.

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## buffnut453 (Jul 8, 2019)

Freebird said:


> The IJN long range bomber could perform search & strike unopposed, but trying to coordinate an escorted strike hundreds of miles from base is going to be tricky.
> 
> IJA air cooperation with the IJN was crap, so combined operations are unlikely.




Don't disagree on the challenges of such long-range escort. Also agree that coordination between the IJA and IJN was non-existent: they were virtually fighting separate wars. However, remember that the IJNAF's 22nd Air Flotilla had around 25 A6Ms at its disposal, based at Soc Trang in Indochina. I can easily imagine those aircraft being used as escorts for the IJNAF bombers. There were also a similar number of A5Ms but I think they would be less well suited to such a long-range escort mission.

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## The Basket (Jul 22, 2019)

Had the Royal Navy lost the Battle of the Atlantic then that's the big disaster. That's the money shot. 
That's was the only naval battle that really could defeat the UK. 
That's why Vanguard was constantly delayed and stop started. Gotta build them corvettes and destroyers.


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## Sid327 (Aug 30, 2019)

Was reading somewhere recently about this (PoW & Repulse)....

Two things I remember about it.
1] The RAF failed to provide air cover (?)
2] No tracer ammunition for the AA guns on one or both ships which would have helped with target correction (?)

[Unverified source, as I can't remember where I read about it].


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## buffnut453 (Aug 30, 2019)

Sid327 said:


> Was reading somewhere recently about this (PoW & Repulse)....
> 
> Two things I remember about it.
> 1] The RAF failed to provide air cover (?)
> ...



Your #1 isn't accurate. The RAF leadership in Singapore informed Admiral Phillips that sustained fighter protection over northern Malaya was impossible because the northern airfields had been, or were being, evacuated. However, a squadron of Buffalos was placed on dedicated alert to respond if called for by Force Z. Unfortunately, it seems that Admiral Phillips just heard "no RAF fighter cover" and so he didn't even call for fighter support when the first Japanese aircraft was sighted as Force Z retired back to Singapore. By the time the call was made, it was too late and the fate of Repulse and PoW was sealed despite the engagement taking place well within the range of the fighters sitting at Singapore. 

The RAF did not fail to provide air cover. The RN failed to ask for the cover that was available.

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## Sid327 (Aug 30, 2019)

buffnut453 said:


> Your #1 isn't accurate. The RAF leadership in Singapore informed Admiral Phillips that sustained fighter protection over northern Malaya was impossible because the northern airfields had been, or were being, evacuated. However, a squadron of Buffalos was placed on dedicated alert to respond if called for by Force Z. Unfortunately, it seems that Admiral Phillips just heard "no RAF fighter cover" and so he didn't even call for fighter support when the first Japanese aircraft was sighted as Force Z retired back to Singapore. By the time the call was made, it was too late and the fate of Repulse and PoW was sealed despite the engagement taking place well within the range of the fighters sitting at Singapore.
> 
> The RAF did not fail to provide air cover. The RN failed to ask for the cover that was available.




Thanks for that. 
Shows different writers seem to have their own interpretation with what actually happened.
I went from memory, but gladly accept your information.


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## The Basket (Sep 1, 2019)

I be thinking about this. Prince of Wales was RN top of the line and the 14 inch guns did Bismarck and Scharnhorst no good.

So I is thinking purely naval engagement that the Repulse and PoW are in a very strong position. And maybe against a Kongo or Nagato the PoW and Repulse would have been nicely placed. 

Maybe.


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## Freebird (Sep 5, 2019)

]



buffnut453 said:


> Your #1 isn't accurate. The RAF leadership in Singapore informed Admiral Phillips that sustained fighter protection over northern Malaya was impossible because the northern airfields had been, or were being, evacuated. However, a squadron of Buffalos was placed on dedicated alert to respond if called for by Force Z. Unfortunately, it seems that Admiral Phillips just heard "no RAF fighter cover" and so he didn't even call for fighter support when the first Japanese aircraft was sighted as Force Z retired back to Singapore. By the time the call was made, it was too late and the fate of Repulse and PoW was sealed despite the engagement taking place well within the range of the fighters sitting at Singapore.
> 
> The RAF did not fail to provide air cover. The RN failed to ask for the cover that was available.




Also some bad luck, one of the early hits on the PoW knocked out the radio.

However, Philips should have called for cover once the Japanese aircraft spotted Force Z and began to shadow


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## The Basket (Sep 6, 2019)

Loss of radio would be no thing as the destroyers and Repulse were there.

Force Z was peacetime deployment waving the flag. Wiki which is not the best states that Force Z would run for Ceylon at the first sign of trouble. That's what was envisaged when this plan was concocted.

Japanese armaments were an unknown quantity and the Western view on such things was usually adverse. The British may have envisioned any IJN air threat to be minimal and haphazard, using high altitude level bombing which has proved ineffective. Also any known surface vessels in the area were well within the PoW and Repulse wheelhouse. 

I am sure if they knew what was coming they would have ran for the hills. Even with air cover.


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## Freebird (Sep 6, 2019)

The Basket said:


> Loss of radio would be no thing as the destroyers and Repulse were there.



Only Philips could authorize breaking radio silence.

Tennant was unaware that PoW had lost its radio.



The Basket said:


> Force Z was peacetime deployment waving the flag. Wiki which is not the best states that Force Z would run for Ceylon at the first sign of trouble. That's what was envisaged when this plan was concocted.


Wiki is wrong.
Churchill was of the opinion that PoW could "catch and kill" any Japanese ship.

Force Z's orders were clear when it left Singapore - intercept and interdict any Japanese landing. 
This was not "waving the flag", it's mission (at least to Churchill) was military



The Basket said:


> Japanese armaments were an unknown quantity and the Western view on such things was usually adverse. The British may have envisioned any IJN air threat to be minimal and haphazard, using high altitude level bombing which has proved ineffective. Also any known surface vessels in the area were well within the PoW and Repulse wheelhouse.
> 
> I am sure if they knew what was coming they would have ran for the hills. Even with air cover.



Highly unlikely.
The defending troops were hard hit, they were duty bound to do their part, regardless of opposition.

The Royal Navy does not run away.


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## buffnut453 (Sep 6, 2019)

The Basket said:


> Japanese armaments were an unknown quantity and the Western view on such things was usually adverse.



Also untrue, I'm afraid. A file in the UKNA shows AHQFE asking RAF Mingaladon in Burma if they'd received the latest intelligence assessments about the "Type 0" in early Nov 1941. 

Also, the British Library has a booklet that was published in early 1942 in India which had rather good performance figures for Japanese aircraft. Given the date of production, the info can only have come from the Far East Combined Bureau in Singapore which had prime intelligence production responsibility for the Far East.

For years the intelligence community was castigated for not providing accurate details of Japanese aircraft performance. These documents indicate that the assessments were remarkably accurate...it's just that the operational community refused to believe them.


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## The Basket (Sep 6, 2019)

Obviously Churchill was not aware of the Yamato. 
Type 0 is the Zero not the Betty.
Japanese torpedoes were far more more effective than thought.
When Force Z was originally envisioned months before any ship set sail it was planned to use Ceylon if Singapore was overrun.


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## buffnut453 (Sep 7, 2019)

The Basket said:


> Type 0 is the Zero not the Betty



I know, but the booklet had pretty much all the operational fighter and bomber types.

Much of the blame for the loss of Force Z must rest with Phillips. Prior to taking up appointment, he had a long argument with an air Force officer, with Phillips maintaining that a well-handled ship at sea could evade any air attack. That sort of arrogance is, IMHO, of greater significance than whether British Intel knew specific details of Japanese torpedo capabilities.


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## Admiral Beez (Nov 20, 2019)

The Basket said:


> Force Z was a deterrent which never worked.


I think a deterrent force could have been effective, if sent much earlier and in realistically greater strength. What this deterrent force really needed to do, was the same as the Brits did in North Africa and Madagascar, occupy French territory before the Axis can. That's the deterrent force I want, with Britain seizing FIC before Japan does per history in Sept 1940. With British and RAN cruisers and destroyers at Saigon, hopefully with Free French ships, with heavies (albeit obsolete ones) back at Singapore. Doing this while still fighting in Europe shows the Japanese that the empire will not be trifled with.


The Basket said:


> Japanese were considered weak and so their threat was vastly underestimated.


But this is the problem, Britain underestimated the enemy.


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## GrauGeist (Nov 20, 2019)

The Basket said:


> ...Type 0 is the Zero not the Betty...


The L2D, F1M, E13A and E14Y were also Type 0 - the zero denotes the Imperial year the type entered service (Koki 2600).


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## The Basket (Nov 20, 2019)

Tientsin incident. 

Check this out if you want some context. 

The RN Battle Fleet was offered to go to the Far East but war with Germany was only days away. 

So not so much a green light but a red carpet with open invite. The Japanese knew the much vaunted Royal Navy was going to busy in Europe and it was open season.


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## Mad Dog (Dec 14, 2019)

Sid327 said:


> ….. 2] No tracer ammunition for the AA guns on one or both ships which would have helped with target correction (?)…..


The principle close-range defence for both ships was the Vickers 2pdr pom-pom. Desperate for an excuse to explain how they had lost the _PoW_, which was their most modern battleship, the Lordships heaped the blame on the pom-pom. Whilst the pom-pom ammunition in use did not include a tracer round, there is no real evidence that the Japanese pilots were scared of the tracer used by the few 40mm Bofors guns also present, but the Bofors advocates saw their chance and seized on the event as an excuse to push the Bofors 40mm over the Vickers pom-pom. However, the pom-pom had proven itself in the Med and was credited with helping save HMS _Indomitable_ in 1941. The RN even brought single-mount 2pdrs back into use to replace 20mm Oerlikons later in the War because the pom-pom was considered the better solution against Japanese kamikaze attacks, so I tend to consider the "no tracers for the pom-poms" as bluster. The real problem was the total lack of co-ordination with the RAF and the lack of a carrier. The fact that _PoW_'s air-defence radar was also broken probably also played more of a role than the lack of pom-pom tracer.


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## The Basket (Dec 14, 2019)

Trying to hit a battleship with an aerial torpedo is not a gimme. So I would say that it is not hyperbole to say that a modern battleship with flak manoeuvring at sea is not going to be sunk as a given.

Plus PoW had Repulse and 4 destroyers so it wasn't sailing alone like Bismarck. 

Plus PoW had torpedo defences. Also level bombing is not going to get results the same as torpedoes so in my view it was the scale of the assault as much as the individual attacks which was the issue.

Flak in the earlier part of the war was very light in comparison to later war so when a ship was refitted then it was always upgraded in flak capacity.

One issue with flak is that it was also designed as a dissuader so you don't bombs down the funnels. If you have to attack at maximum range so you don't get hit by flak then you probably miss. Kamikaze meant that you had to actually shoot down the aircraft which made flak more a numbers game. More bullets increase hit probability


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## Admiral Beez (Dec 21, 2019)

The Basket said:


> What was the worst moment for the Royal Navy during World War 2?
> 
> Loss of the Hood?
> Loss of Force Z?
> ...


For me, it’s the combined loss of the fast fleet carrier HMS Courageous, Glorious and Ark Royal. The first two would have been very useful for a greater attack on Taranto in Nov 1940, and then fast RAF ferries to Malaya, and Glorious and Courageous could have made for a much greater and earlier BPF.

Once the three Illustrious and Indomitable are active and supporting Ark Royal in 1941/2, I’d send all three Outrageous class to Singapore, or more likely Ceylon.


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## Admiral Beez (Dec 22, 2019)

I think we often forget how old the Royal Navy is. Founded in 1546, today‘s Royal Navy is 473 years old. To the RN, there was no disaster in WW2 comparable to those in its history. The RN is suppose to lose ships, big and small, that’s why you have more than one.

The Dutch sailed up the Medway and destroyed the RN’s battlefleet - can you imagine Bismarck, Tirpitz et al sailing into Scapa Flow or up the Thames, wrecking their targets and sailing home scot free? The RN’s greatest disaster, IMO was the lost at Chesapeake Bay, leading to the loss of the American colonies. Win that battle and George Washington and his rebels will hang.


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## The Basket (Jan 1, 2020)

A new idea to me at least that Force Z was a Tirpitz type fleet in being where Force Z would hang about and would need substantial IJN assets to keep in check. 

So that didn't work. 

Although I agree the loss of Glorious and Courageous was a blow considering. 

My view is that the first year in the Naval war against Japan was a dumpster fire in the Indian Ocean and then quickly replaced by the USN as top sea dog. So the true might of the Royal Navy was an empty threat followed by usurpation by a former rebellious colony. Boy that sucks.


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## pinehilljoe (Jan 2, 2020)

I would put Alexandria high the list. 

Its hard to evaluate Force Z. If ADM Philips had retired, Force Z may have been at the Sunda Straights or played a part in the Coral Sea.


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## The Basket (Jan 4, 2020)

Oh of course. 

The Greatest disaster was SMS Goeben. 

This is the greatest disaster of them all. 

If the Royal Navy had caught Goeben and Breslau then the Ottoman empire wouldn't have joined WW1. And that is IMHO the greatest disaster of a single incident.


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## Admiral Beez (Jan 12, 2020)

The Basket said:


> My view is that the first year in the Naval war against Japan was a dumpster fire


At sea, Britain gave as good as it got from Japan. But you're right, the first year wasn’t good for Britain, whilst the final year Britain brought it back to Japan.

Japanese sea power sank the old carrier HMS Hermes (no CAG aboard), four cruisers (HMS Cornwall, Dorsetshire, York and Exeter), four destroyers (HMS Tenedos, Thanet, Thracian and Stronghold), three submarines (HMS Stonehenge, Stratagem and Porpoise), four gunboats (HMS Tern, Cicala, Moth and Robin) and one minelayer (HMS Redstart).

In return, British sea power sank two cruisers (IJNS Ashigara and Haguro), twelve destroyers/frigates, eight submarines (I-160, I-27, I-30, I-34, I-124, I-166, RO-32, RO-33), eight minesweepers/layers and 29 transports. Most British kills were from 1944 onwards, suggesting an earlier deployment of RN assets, especially submarines might have increased Japan’s losses to the RN.

Of course Japanese land-based aircraft (IJNAS) get top marks for sinking HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse. But perhaps old Hermes aside, neither side scored any serious blows at sea.


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## WARSPITER (Jan 13, 2020)

The Basket said:


> Oh of course.
> 
> The Greatest disaster was SMS Goeben.
> 
> ...



That incident was certainly a disaster but more for the Ottomans than the RN as it effectively lead to the end of their empire.


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## The Basket (Jan 13, 2020)

A lot of people died in the Middle East campaign in ww1. And today in Syria and Iraq. So stopping Goeben would have prevented All that. So not just a disaster for the Royal Navy but for the world.


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## The Basket (Jan 13, 2020)

The loss of Force Z was a major blow because they could have been very dangerous opponents. 

Of course, the loss of a single ship has no top end consequences but the USN had no fast battleship to escort carriers in the first months of 1942 so at Midway and Coral Sea and this is where Repulse and PoW may have done a good job.


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## GrauGeist (Jan 13, 2020)

What good would a Battleship have been at Midway or Coral Sea?

Aside from being a fat target, their air defenses had not reached their potential at that point in time, so they would not be all that effective as an AA platform for fleet protection.


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## pinehilljoe (Jan 13, 2020)

Its speculation on the role PoW and Repulse may have had in 1942 had Force Z not been attacked. I can see them as a fleet in being in the first half of '42, tying up IJN forces in South East Asia. During the Guadalcanal Campaign, I don't think they would have been committed to Iron Bottom Sound in August and been part of Savo Island, but instead used as part of the carrier escort. Later they may have been committed with Lee's Task Force. 

What I find more plausible is Force Z being sent to the Mediterranean after the Dec '41 Alexandria Raid, offsetting the loss of QE and Valiant. All pure conjecture.


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## The Basket (Jan 13, 2020)

Just coz the Yamato didn't come over the Horizon in a gun battle doesn't mean you plan for the best. 

The Doolittle Raid could have done with an escort for sure. 

I would do more research about escort missions but my Internet is blocking me so will have to wait until I can turn off the kid filter.


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## GrauGeist (Jan 13, 2020)

The Doolittle raid itself encountered no enemy aircraft, only light AA.

As far as the Naval force goes, there were four cruisers and eight destroyers escorting the two carriers.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 13, 2020)

The Repulse, as she existed in Nov/dec of 1941 was a casualty looking for a place to happen in a war with the Japanese. 

Her AA battery was somewhat below a US cruiser and I am talking about the ones with eight 5in/25s. so she is more a liability than an asset as a Carrier escort.


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## The Basket (Jan 13, 2020)

There were no battleship escort with the Doolittle Raid as there was no USN battle ship at the time fast enough. 

One can say that it wasn't required. But had Yamato and a couple of Kongos shown up then it could have been nasty. 

I ain't sayin that Force Z was a war winner but it offered a proven capability which the USN lacked early doors in terms of fast battleships. 

Much of warfare hinges on what didn't happen as much as what did. 

At the time of the Doolittle Raid, the Kido Butai was coming back from the Indian Ocean raids so whether this was deliberate time chosen I'm not sure.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 13, 2020)

One Repulse against two or more Kongos (forget about the Yamato) would have more than likely been game over for the Repulse. 6 guns against 16 guns. The British 15in was a good gun but it wasn't that good. 
Repulse was good for 30.5knots in 1939 and not long out of dock. In the Spring/Summer of 1942 she would have been bog slow unless dry docked and bottom scraped. This had probably been done several times since her minor refit in 1939 (?) but marine growth is 2-3 times more rapid in tropical waters. British antifouling paint wasn't as good as the American anti fouling paint.


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## WARSPITER (Jan 14, 2020)

The Basket said:


> A lot of people died in the Middle East campaign in ww1. And today in Syria and Iraq. So stopping Goeben would have prevented All that. So not just a disaster for the Royal Navy but for the world.



Goeben escaping to the Ottomans and then attacking Russian coastal installations on the Black Sea under the Ottoman flag certainly caused war between Russia and
the Ottomans but I cannot see why that correlates to current events in Syria, Iraq, or even Iran.


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## GrauGeist (Jan 14, 2020)

The Basket said:


> There were no battleship escort with the Doolittle Raid as there was no USN battle ship at the time fast enough.


By the time of the Doolittle Raid (1942)

The USN had the North Carolina (BB-55) in service April 1941 - max. speed 27 knots, Washington (BB-56) in service May 1941 - max. speed 27 knots and in Spring 1942, the South Dakota (BB-57) entered service - max. speed 27.5 knots.

Not as fast as the cruisers or carriers, but certainly faster (or as fast as) than most BBs of the day


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## The Basket (Jan 14, 2020)

Not saying that PoW and Repulse were God tier weapons but they did offer capabilities that then current USN didn't have. 

Nagato was too slow so it's Kongos and Yamato. Not saying Repulse could have taken on Yamato but a Kongo is fair enough plus of course carrier escort means carrier dive bombers. So it's not all 1v1.

The fall of the Ottoman Empire was a result of ww1 and so the creation of the modern middle East. How long the Ottoman Empire would have survived is another matter without ww1 is a great dunno.


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## The Basket (Jan 14, 2020)

North Carolina was commissioned in April 1941 for sure. But when was she in the Pacific? The vibration problem for both her and Washington which limited her speed made her a non starter and that had to be fixed or bodged before she saw combat.


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## WARSPITER (Jan 14, 2020)

The Basket said:


> Not saying that PoW and Repulse were God tier weapons but they did offer capabilities that then current USN didn't have.
> 
> Nagato was too slow so it's Kongos and Yamato. Not saying Repulse could have taken on Yamato but a Kongo is fair enough plus of course carrier escort means carrier dive bombers. So it's not all 1v1.
> 
> The fall of the Ottoman Empire was a result of ww1 and so the creation of the modern middle East. How long the Ottoman Empire would have survived is another matter without ww1 is a great dunno.



Still not something the Royal Navy is responsible for. It is equally as easy to say that the Royal Navy's task in all that was to stop the German cruisers attacking French troop convoys
from North Africa - which they achieved by chasing the Germans away to the Eastern Mediterranean. It then follows that the current state of the Middle East becomes the result of
Germany's actions.


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## The Basket (Jan 14, 2020)

That depends on whether Goeben was the only reason for the Ottoman Empire joining the war. Or a minor factor. 

If Goeben was the reason Ottomans joined in ww1 then it's escape can be classed as a disaster as it meant all them deaths could have been avoided. The break up of the Ottoman Empire created modern states like Syria and Iraq so again cause and effect.

Same as saying had the RN had a over powered fleet in the Far East in 1939 then the Japanese would have stayed in there bed. Dunno if that's the case but alleged weakness on the UK part was a good reason to go south.

I am not blaming RN for Syria today but the domino was pushed in 1914 and here we are today.


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## Peter Gunn (Jan 14, 2020)

Freebird said:


> *SNIP*
> 
> The Royal Navy does not run away.



Paging Admiral Troubridge...






Although in all fairness, his was one hell of a tough decision.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 14, 2020)

Peter Gunn said:


> Paging Admiral Troubridge...
> Although in all fairness, his was one hell of a tough decision.



Very true, he had unclear and conflicting orders.
One was not to engage superior forces. 

It was as a result of his court martial that the British really adopted the don't run away unofficial policy.


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## The Basket (Jan 14, 2020)

Odd that Troubridge was given the elbow because he didn't engage a modern German battle cruiser so he can die honourably.

So lets see what Ships he got, Defence, Warrior, Duke of Edinburgh and Black Prince. All obsolete armoured cruisers.
So what happens when armoured cruisers went actually up against German Battlecruisers? They go bang.

Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Keith Arbuthnot, 4th Baronet, KCB MVO tested that theory out. Lost 3 ships and killed 1,831 men.

Duke of Edinburgh only survived because they couldn’t make the turn without colliding with other ships so missed the slaughter and Warrior only survived without massive casualties because Warspite got in the way.

I would take Troubridge over Arbuthnot every day of the week.


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## GreenKnight121 (Jan 16, 2020)

The Basket said:


> That depends on whether Goeben was the only reason for the Ottoman Empire joining the war. Or a minor factor.
> 
> If Goeben was the reason Ottomans joined in ww1 then it's escape can be classed as a disaster as it meant all them deaths could have been avoided. The break up of the Ottoman Empire created modern states like Syria and Iraq so again cause and effect.
> 
> I am not blaming RN for Syria today but the domino was pushed in 1914 and here we are today.



The Ottoman government was actually split on the issue... the older, higher-placed officials wanted to maintain neutrality as long as possible - and the younger officials wanted to see the British & French pushed out of the Middle East.

That latter faction had already signed pacts with Germany committing the Ottoman Empire to war against the UK if the UK and Germany went to war against each other, and after that event the Ottoman "Young Turks" agreed to a timetable for a declaration by the end of 1914. This might still have been forstalled by the older faction, until the 31 July 1914 seizure by Britain of the two battleships that were basically ready for handover to the Ottoman Navy... _Sultan Osman I_, commissioned into the RN as HMS _Agincourt_, and _Reşadiye_, commissioned into the RN as HMS _Erin_. Note that Ottoman crews for both of these ships were already in Britain preparing to accept the ships.

That insult, combined with the appearance of _Geoben_ & _Breslau_ and the German gifting of those ships basically silenced the neutrality faction, and finalised the war pact. In the event, Captain Souchon got the Ottoman part of the war started off a bit early with his attack on the Russians - but it is probable that even without the German ships being present that the war faction would have prevailed (although sometime in 1915, rather than late October 1914).

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## Admiral Beez (Jan 18, 2020)

GrauGeist said:


> What good would a Battleship have been at Midway or Coral Sea?


On the IJN side, any battleship with radar would be an asset to a carrier fleet that had none. Otherwise, yes, leave the battleships at home.


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## The Basket (Jan 19, 2020)

You thinking 21st century.

We know all the details 

In 1942 who knows. So you have to plan for the big details. And worse case scenario.

So you can argue that we have data that I knew exactly where Admiral Scheer was and that the RN should have picked her up.

And I would have sunk the whole High Seas Fleet at Jutland. And set a trap for the IJN at Pearl. I would have been good. The best.

It's amazing what you can do when you know 100% what happening.

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