# The Battle Of Kursk - the air battle



## parsifal (Jul 19, 2011)

Quite a few people have approached me to start a new thread about the battle of Kursk. A little reluctantly I have agreed. 

So what were the main features in the air battle, how did it progress, what were its outcomes. What were the precursors that led to the battle. I would suggest that we limit our discussion from the last days of Stalingrad, through to the battles in November, but the focus should be the battle in July.

However, I would also be interested to hear peoples views about the air battle if Mansteins ideas had been adopted and the battle had occurred in late May. Would the outcome of the air battle have been any different? 

And finally, what might have happened, if the germans had not undertaken the battle at all, simply fortifyiong and waiting for the Russians to attack? Would it have been possible foir them to wear down the Russians to the peace table if they had not been so rash as to attack them again in 1943.......

Anyway, hold on, here we go...enjoy guys


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## davebender (Jul 19, 2011)

According to David Glantz the German 6th Air Fleet began the battle with only two thirds of the required aviation fuel reserve. I think actual combat results prove his point. The Luftwaffe provided good support at first. As the battle progressed the Luftwaffe sortie rate fell off for lack of fuel.


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## parsifal (Jul 19, 2011)

We will no doubt get to those and other issues, but if I may, I would like to pick up the story at the close of Stalingrad.

When Fall Blau had begun, in June 1942, the eastern air fleets controlled 2644 aircraft, of which 1610 were assigned to the southern sector. Under the exceptional command of Von Richthofen, the operational rate of LF4 was to reach the highest level of any major formation on the eastern front....71%

By 31 January 1943, the state of LF4 had deteriorated markedly. Its Operational readiness rate was down to less than 37%, with just 624 machines available to LF4. Things were desperate. The formations supporting 1 Pz Army...FliegerKorps VIII under Fiebig was in just as poor shape. On the day of Paulus' surrender, there were just 244 airworthy airplanes in the whole of LF4. Things were desperate. 

However not forming part of LF4 was the vast transport fleet of some 477 machines. The majority of the transports were Ju52s, drawn mostly from the advanced bomber training schools (with their instructors), but there were also three groups of He 111s (mostly of obsolete types again drawn from the training formations) and one Gp of Ju88s, There were also odds and sods of other types including He 177s, and FW 200s, both of which had suffered heavy attrition. 

The immediate priority for LF4 was to provide as much support as possible to Mansteins efforts to keep the escape routes open for those formations retreating from the Caucasus, principally 1Pz Army and 17 Army. Richthofen had in fact been making arrangements to that end since 20 January. He ordered one of his Group Commanders, Oberst Kuhl to transfer most of the He 111s away from the makeshift forward airfield at novocherkassk back 180 kms to Stalino. He also ordered Oberstleutnant Von Beust to transfer another group of He111s at Voroshilovsk to withdraw his Groups (I think part of Fiebigs command) back to Konstantinovska. These transfers were made to pull bomber assets out of harms way for respite and propration for further operations. Fighter Groups attached to LF4 were overstretched at this time and the Soviets were putting a lot of pressure on novocherkassk. Re-supply at Stalino and the other rear airfields was much easier....these airfields had good road and rail links making maintenence a lot easier. Richthofen knew he needed to get bomber assets back to a better state of readiness, if he was to provide effective support to manstein. On 23 January Richthofen received the first of many releases from Hitler, allowing some KGs to return to normal combat operations. On that day 30 He111s were released from transport duties (the ones that had already been pulled back for rest), on the stipulation they be ready for a return to trnsport duties within 48hours notice. they never did. 

These first 30 machines were used in direct support operations in those opening days in support of the retreating 17th Army in the far south, which was retreating toward the Taman Peninsula. These attacks were completely unescorted, by aircraft unsuited to ground support by crews untrained for the purpose. It is a testament to the crew proficiency that they were reasonably successful; in these operations, and suffrered only relatively light casualties. 

Meanwhile nearly 200 transports after the surrender had been atached (but not absorbed) to FKVIII for re-supply of 1Pz Army and 17A.

While these operations and preprations were being implemented, Richthofen began to rest and redeploy some of his other subordinate formations.....


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## Altea (Jul 19, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Quite a few people have approached me to start a new thread about the battle of Kursk. A little reluctantly I have agreed.
> 
> So what were the main features in the air battle, how did it progress, what were its outcomes. What were the precursors that led to the battle. I would suggest that we limit our discussion from the last days of Stalingrad, through to the battles in November, but the focus should be the battle in July.
> 
> ...



Herewe go!

*Context*: After Stalingrad disaster, Werchmacht managed to stop soviet offensive and stabilize the front. During an operational pause created by the spring thaw and mud, german side looked for an opportunity to regain the strategic initiative.

That's short, i will let someone else to devellop more...

*ODB*:

*German:* about 1 100 from the 8th Fliegerkorps (south of the salient)
730 from 1st fliegerdivision (north)

German industry produced 2000 planes/month so Luftwaffe strengh rised from 6 224 planes in march to 7 089 at the end of june, despite losses (1)...

But on eastern front the number does not increased and was representing less than a half (~ 3 400, i guess) from the whole number.

Now, by Alfred Price (2), total serviceable Luft strenght did not exceeded 5 000 planes at the same period.

*
Soviet*

16th VA (air army) 1037/117 (Central Front)
2nd VA 881/149 (Voronezh Front)
17th VA 638/73 (Steppe (rear) front).

Total 2 453 serviceable/ 339 unseviceable planes


So, no polemic about soviet strengh.

What about German, does someone else can provide other numbers?






(1) D Khazanov p 6.

(2) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luftwaffe_serviceable_aircraft_strengths_(1940â€“1945)


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## Erich (Jul 19, 2011)

will you chaps be making reference to this work at all ?

Amazon.com: Kursk: The Air Battle, July 1943 (9781903223888): Christer Bergstrom: Books

good luck this could be a very fine thread if handled appropriately.


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## davebender (Jul 19, 2011)

IMO aircraft production numbers are meaningless if they didn't have enough fuel. What counts is how many sorties could be sustained with the existing fuel supply.


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## Altea (Jul 19, 2011)

davebender said:


> According to David Glantz the German 6th Air Fleet began the battle with only two thirds of the required aviation fuel reserve. I think actual combat results prove his point. The Luftwaffe provided good support at first. As the battle progressed the Luftwaffe sortie rate fell off for lack of fuel.



Khazanov is more precise than Glantz on that point: 

5 722 of 8 634 tons of B4 fuel
441 of 1 079 T requested C-3 fuel, recieved.

*But*, if the number of Luft missions fail from 2 008 + 2 387 to 1 023 + 1 686 from the 5th to 6th july, it increased to 1 687 + 1 829 for the 7th.

So i don't think about any brutal and curious fuel starvage of the Luft on the 6th, also being the "official" doubtfull explanation. Germans had several months to prepare the operation. 
I rather think they suffered from VVS and AA fire unexpected opposition, compared to the summer 42's one.

BTW, i don't believe either soviet "official" claims about gaining the air superiority from the 7th or 8th july, despite Rokossovski promises to Stalin, and memors.

Regards


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## Altea (Jul 19, 2011)

Fur sure, *Davebender* how many missions were made by Luft in 1943, in eastern front, and during Kusk battle?

How many flying hours had a Luftwaffe rookie in 1943 before being comited in combat?

For your information in may of 1943 the soviat aiforce suffered also from fuel starvage, some pilots were going to front units with 20-30 flying hours!
I (also) think actual combat results prove his point! Anyway, losses that occured to the Luft, reduced flyable planes number much lower to available fuel stocks...In fact threre were soon more fuel than enough for operational needs!


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## Altea (Jul 19, 2011)

Erich said:


> Amazon.com: Kursk: The Air Battle, July 1943 (9781903223888): Christer Bergstrom: Books



Welcome to the debate! Provide your data.


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## Erich (Jul 19, 2011)

Parsifal and all hopeful you will be able to use these two pages of interesting and intelligent information. Some food for thought, we must remember the Hs 129 unit flew in low barely over the earth and with this type of flying it was impossible to accurately confirm "kills". Of course we have discussed Rüdels bogus claims over and over again.

Tank Busting Aircraft at Kursk - The Dupuy Institute Forum

as Parsifal started this thread up it really should be up to him on how the thread is formed before we all start spiderwebing, throwing our 2 cents around where the thread will not make much sense and will have to be continually edited.


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## Erich (Jul 19, 2011)

use when necessary Parsifal if it is current

The Luftwaffe at Kursk


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## Nikademus (Jul 19, 2011)

Erich said:


> will you chaps be making reference to this work at all ?
> 
> Amazon.com: Kursk: The Air Battle, July 1943 (9781903223888): Christer Bergstrom: Books
> 
> good luck this could be a very fine thread if handled appropriately.



Eventually. 

I've about given up hope for Mr Bergstrom to produce Vol IV of his Black Cross/Red Star Series. Been eyeing the Kursk and Batragon to Berlin books for some time now but some consider them "lite" versions of his earlier series.


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## davebender (Jul 19, 2011)

I'm surprised at the number of He-111s still being used for tactical air support this late in the war.


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## parsifal (Jul 19, 2011)

Erich et al

Thankyou for the great sources material. Am out of the loop for a couple of days, will have a closer look and make further narative when I return

Cheers folks and enjoy


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## Rivet (Jul 19, 2011)

Does anyone have any detailled information regarding Russian air strength and missions regarding this conflict on or immediately after July 11, 1943? Russia managed to stage counter offensive operations from a line at Orel. These were countered by German forces. What might have become a complete collapse and route was nullified by Ju-87 operations. I wonder of the presence of the Soviet 2nd and 17th air armies in the area at the time?


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## claidemore (Jul 20, 2011)

online source for Soviet and German OBs during Kursk.Russian Air OB Page German Air OB Page


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## Altea (Jul 20, 2011)

Erich said:


> Parsifal and all hopeful you will be able to use these two pages of interesting and intelligent information. Some food for thought, we must remember the Hs 129 unit flew in low barely over the earth and with this type of flying it was impossible to accurately confirm "kills". Of course we have discussed Rüdels bogus claims over and over again.
> 
> Tank Busting Aircraft at Kursk - The Dupuy Institute Forum
> 
> .



Too soon!

Well, this is the best way to make a discussion stall, or spin....We'll debate about that later!

For the moment we are looking for german ODB.

I Repeat: 



> What about German, does someone else can provide other numbers?



In an old encyclopedia of aviation, i'v got different numbers:

2 100 of the 2 500 planes present on the eastern front participated to the operation.

This detail has its *importance*. It means that german commited more than 84% Luft forces, 70% tanks and artillery over the Koursk salient, and were anyway dominated by soviets, in 1.4 for soldiers, 1.9 in artillery, 1.3 in tanks and 1.6 in planes numbers.
At the same time soviets used only 28% of their soldiers, 24% canons and mortars, 33% and 40% of the _active _* combat planes and tanks in central, Voronnezh and Steppe (rear) front. 

* active = front line or operationnal units.
The total planes and tank numbers was about 26 000 / 13 000 and 23 000/ 9 000 total with the rear military districts / active units.

The conclusion is easy, soviets were able to concentrate forces elsewhere to launch simultaneously another offensive, even *without * activating their powerfull reserves, that couldn't be said for germans, that concentrated their whole forces and hopes over the Koursk salient.

Regards


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## Altea (Jul 20, 2011)

Rivet said:


> Does anyone have any detailled information regarding Russian air strength and missions regarding this conflict on or immediately after July 11, 1943? Russia managed to stage counter offensive operations from a line at Orel. These were countered by German forces. What might have become a complete collapse and route was nullified by Ju-87 operations. I wonder of the presence of the Soviet 2nd and 17th air armies in the area at the time?



Prokhorovka you mean? 
2nd and 17th air armies performed 759 + 134 day and 109 + 164 night missions for 654 and 61 respectivly for the _Luftflotte 4 _. 
All in bad weather conditions, surprislingly soviet 1st Bomber Air Corps (BAK) provided high efficiency due to its Pe-2 equipped by radio-goniometers at morning, since Luft confined to ground. 
But in general soviet air action was irrelevant, since it was not concentrated over the 5th Guards Tank Army attack, that had few fighter cover and virtually no Shturmovik support, those often attacking soviet forces by lack of organisation.
Anyway the foolish cavalery attack "asswind in the plain" of the 5 GTA had never a single chance to succeed over german well prepared ambush with numerous 75/88 antitank canons, and hidden Tigers and other panzers of the _2nd SS PanzerKorps_. 
If i'm not wrong, only Whittman himself is claiming more than 15 T-34 in this action...

I'm no sure that Luftwaffe is the main factor for the soviet failure/losses of the day.

Regards


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## Juha (Jul 20, 2011)

Hello
On the fuel situation of the LFl 6, the info seems to come from its CoS Friedfich Kless’ post war study to US Army via Plocher’ book. The problem is that Kless begins in his introduction “In writing this description of the activities of Luftflotte 6, no original reference material dating back to the period involved was available to me. This applies to all but a few instances. I was thus forced to write this study from memory …” As the editor of the book (Steven H. Newton, the book, which I highly recommended to everyone who is interested in Kursk battle, of course to be used with other more up-to date books which also use Soviet material plus better set of maps, but Newton’s introductions are very good to put the articles to modern context, is Kursk. The German View) this put the accuracy of the figures under some doubt.

And more generally, because LW fuel situation was better in summer 43 than in summer 42, why the acute problem. Kless also mentioned VVS attacks on the railconnections of LFl 6 areas, which according to him, didn’t produce much problem to logistics, the increased partisan activity against those lines on the other hand were more effective in disturbing rail transportation. 

Fuel wasn’t the only problem, Kless:”A/c allotments were generally sufficient to make up for losses, with exception of Fw 190s, Ju 88s and Bf 110G-2s, but engine replacements were inadequate, and no a/c reserve could be amassed prior to the beginning of the offensive. Thus our formations – especially those of Fw 190s [Juha: Which formed the vast majority of the fighter resources of LFl 6] – were bound to lose streght rapidly due major losses and mechanical attrition whenever involved in periods of intensive combat.” There was also insufficient amount of 88mm and 20mm Flak ammo. 
Kless also writes “Besides, even if the supply problem could be resolved and OKL found significant reinforcements for Luftflotte 6, it would have been impossible to increase the number of a/fs available with sufficient speed to assemble these formations if and when they arrived.” This is odd because in the area there were numerous Heer units waiting for the attack, also numerous Pioneer units, which could have used to a/f construction, even if the number of a/fs had increased from 3 to 15 in Orel bulge IMHO more could be done if needed with proper use of resources available.

Juha


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## Rivet (Jul 20, 2011)

Thanks for the input, Altea. What conditions regarding the Soviet air operations in the area are in regard to what the Russians called Operation Kutuzov, the counterattack against the German Prokhorovka operation? It is my understanding that the Russians had some prior knowledge of this operation, Zhukov having a series of defensive areas prepared in order to absorb the impact of the expected assault of the Germans. The prior knowledge explains the rapid response on the part of the Russians. Interesting to see mention of Panzer leader Michael Wittem, on of the better armor operatives of the time.

OK. What I am seeking is detailled information regarding Russian aviation fuel reserves, lower level area VVS commanders and airfield conditions during the period July 11, 1943 to August 8, 1943. Could someone cite some period Soviet documentation in English as well as the sources and locations of same? Regards


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## Altea (Jul 20, 2011)

Rivet said:


> Thanks for the input, Altea. What conditions regarding the Soviet air operations in the area are in regard to what the Russians called Operation Kutuzov, the counterattack against the German Prokhorovka operation?



What's the relationnship? Kutuzov was a planned operation since previous spring. It took place in the north of the salient on july the12th, Prokhorovka occured in the south on the same day. Maybe it was a part (rather uninspired due to conditions) of the general strategic plan.

Kutuzov map:

On july the 12th, Western and Briansk fronts launched the big offensive, followed by central front on 15th

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## Erich (Jul 20, 2011)

like I said earlier as you guys try and do a spin on this thread remember who started or should say was asked to start a thread on the KURSK air operations. my intent was to give Parsifal needed background information where he could try and decipher and see how this can/could play into the thread overall along with his own data acquired.

verstehen ?


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## Nikademus (Jul 20, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Quite a few people have approached me to start a new thread about the battle of Kursk. A little reluctantly I have agreed.
> 
> So what were the main features in the air battle, how did it progress, what were its outcomes. What were the precursors that led to the battle. I would suggest that we limit our discussion from the last days of Stalingrad, through to the battles in November, but the focus should be the battle in July.
> 
> ...


 

Would need to dig out Glantz's excellent book on the battle of Kursk for specifics, but from what i remember....the Germans had to resort to establishing "local" air superiority over specific battlefields at specific times as they simply did not have the strength to dominate the entire battlefield and put the VVS on it's heels as in the old days such as what occured after Case Blau started (though one key difference in the case of Blau was that initially the VVS held it's own, even scoring near 1:1 exchanges in the critical sectors...until attrition took out their carefully hoarded cadre of trained airmen and then the domino effect began)

I recall from Glantz that during these times, VVS casualties were appalling but they just kept coming and once the Luftwaffe had to either withdraw to rearm/reorg or simply move to try to address the latest emergency, the VVS would move in to fill the gap. Glantz painted the VVS effort as one of brutal determination....zero finesse and with the typical Soviet disdain for casualties. 

I'm sure that there were specific incidents of skills.....even though Glantz's book is focused entirely on the battle, the air component would naturally revolve around major movements so specific air battles where one regiment or squadron performed with skill would be overlooked. So i don't consider the author to be dissing the VVS, just looking at it from the Big picture.


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## davebender (Jul 20, 2011)

The U.S. 8th Air Force began large scale operations over Europe during 1943 and RAF Bomber Command continued to expand. I suspect that countering these bombing campaigns took quite a bite out of German aviation gasoline reserves by July 1943.


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## Erich (Jul 20, 2011)

as you pointed out Dave, the Reich defense command was formed and the order was for most eastern front Jagdgeschwaders to re-arm and refit back into Germany to defend the homeland in July of 1943 this was the case for twin engine ZG 26, 76 and 1 to reform as Zerstörern formations against the US AF heavies.

the reality was that there was not that good of ground to air correspondence during Kursk or really any time afterward on the Ost front.


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## Juha (Jul 20, 2011)

Hello Dave
not really, according to USSBS the aviation fuel situation of LW was better in summer 43 than it had been in 42. And one should not forget Med, it was very important and to LW very costly theathre from Oct 42 to Oct 43 and in Apr, Jul and Sept 43 LW losses in Med were clearly higher than in the East and in Apr and Jul also clearly greater than in the West and over Reich, in Sept 43 losses in the West + over Reich wwere slightly higher than in the Med (522 vs 503, in the East 338 ).

Juha


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## Milosh (Jul 20, 2011)




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## davebender (Jul 21, 2011)

I agree. The Med was the Anglo-American Schwerpunkt during 1943. All the battles absorbed significant amounts of German airpower including the usually ignored (by popular histories) fighting in Greece and the Agean.

Spring 1943. Tunisia.
July 1943. Sicily.
September 1943. British and U.S. landings on Italian mainland.
September 1943. Fighting between German and Italian forces in Greece.
September to November 1943. Failed British attempts to seize control of the Agean islands.


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## Ratsel (Jul 21, 2011)

*lack of Strategic bombers*

The Luftwaffe achieved huge operational successes, destroying thousands of Soviet aircraft. But it failed to destroy the Red Air Force. Due to a lack of Strategic bombers, the Luftwaffe could not strike at Soviet production centers regularly or with the needed force. As the war dragged on, the Luftwaffe was eroded in strength. The defeats at the Battle of Stalingrad and Battle of Kursk ensured the gradual decline of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front. All fronts actually. Tic Toc.


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## Erich (Jul 21, 2011)

please take into consideration that Stalingrad and Kursk did not weaken the LW in any way in manpower or resources in fact they came into their own in 1944 even when fighting US heavy bomber formations and fighters via their production activities


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## Ratsel (Jul 21, 2011)

yes you are correct. Stalingrad Kursk did in no way weaken the luftwaffe. The Soviet airforce is like
angry wasps. one comes out to try to bite you, you kill one, then they come in hundreds to bite you,
you kill hundreds, eventually, if you don't kill the nest, the wasps will kill you. Thats what happens
without Stategic Bombing of manufacturing plants fuel/oil depots. The Soviets, or anybody else for
that matter, will win. Even is the loser is techincally superior. Kursk was the begining of the end of the 
Luftwaffe in the east in my opinion.


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## Erich (Jul 21, 2011)

an earlier posting of mine says it all Riech defense was formed in July of 1943 nearly all S/E and T/E fighter GEschwaders were ordered to return to the Reich and re-arm and re-equip plus training. what was left in the East ? not a whole lot JG 51 portions, JG 52 and 54 to take on the whole of the WS. the LW in the Ost never had one chance, one can easily see how the bulk of kills was so high for these three Geschwaders


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## davebender (Jul 21, 2011)

Heavy bombers did little to impair the German military-industrial complex. What makes you think they would work any better against the Soviet industrial base?


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## Ratsel (Jul 21, 2011)

I think, and this is only my opinion, that the Soviets were not capable of repairing/rebuilding military complexes as fast as the Germans could. I also believe that in conjunction with destroying Soviets railroads, it would have been impossible in any reasonable time. Thus allowing the Germans more 'freedom' in Soviet airspace, resupply of Soviet troops would be much harder, etc. again, this is only my opinion.

I know that in 1944, the Germans while under constant and heavy bombarbment did produce more fighters then in any other year, their only
problem was a lack of fuel, which led to a lack of adequite fighter pilot training and the trickle down effect thereof. Constant Strategic bombing is very effective, as the Americans proved. 

I hope this makes sense, I'm open to criticism.


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## Milosh (Jul 21, 2011)

davebender said:


> Heavy bombers did little to impair the German military-industrial complex. What makes you think they would work any better against the Soviet industrial base?



I believe it was Speer who said the Allied Strategic bombing cost Germany 30% of its manufactured war material. That would mean another ~10,000 Me109s, for example. The SBC also diverted personnel and materials defending and repairing damage that could have been better used elsewhere.


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## davebender (Jul 21, 2011)

> Soviets were not capable of repairing/rebuilding military complexes as fast as the Germans could


The Soviets weren't working alone. Industrial centers such as Tankograd were built very quickly during 1942 to 1943 with American machine tools and American engineering assistance. They will repair bomb damage just as quickly.


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## Ratsel (Jul 21, 2011)

I wasn't talking about single targets once a week, I'm refering to multiple targets daily like the Americans did. 
Imagine if they did that during Operation Barbarossa. There was a guy who's name escapes me now, (he died 
in 1936 I believe?) who was pushing Germany for Long range heavy bombers. After he died, why they concentrated
on short range fighters only is beyond me. I mean, I know the whys but why not both.. kinda like a primary/secondary
plan.


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## Rivet (Jul 21, 2011)

The fellow you refer to is General Wever. There is a thread on this forum regarding him and the question of the German Strategic Bomber.

The target for those planes would have been Russian hydo-electric generating capability. That might have not been as easy to restore rapidly as manufacturing capability. I'd go into the whys and why nots here, but it is not the primary line of enquiry for us here. Back to Kursk, if you please, Sirs. Regards


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## DonL (Jul 22, 2011)

> There was a guy who's name escapes me now, (he died in 1936 I believe?)



General Walter Wever

Commander of the Reichsluftfahrtministerium, and later became Chief of Staff.
His death, the dismissal of Wimmer and a suddenly again more involved Göring (after the death of Wever), were key elements to the arrangements of the Luftwaffe after 1936.


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## davebender (Jul 22, 2011)

I assume you are referring to the final year of the war when both 8th Air Force and RAF Bomber Command each had over 1,000 heavy bombers. That's out of the question. Germany cannot afford to spend about 20% of their entire military budget on a heavy bomber force.


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## TheMustangRider (Jul 22, 2011)

davebender said:


> Heavy bombers did little to impair the German military-industrial complex. What makes you think they would work any better against the Soviet industrial base?



The destruction/heavy damage inflicted upon synthetic oil refineries and the German rail transportation system by the combined strategic bombing campaign which caused the fuel starvation of the German war machine and disrupted its logistic supply lines of equipment delivered to the front lines during the final stages of the war in Europe point to another direction.


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## Altea (Jul 22, 2011)

Hello,

Before milosh's post...



davebender said:


> IMO aircraft production numbers are meaningless if they didn't have enough fuel. What counts is how many sorties could be sustained with the existing fuel supply.



100% sure. But what is the relationship between that sentence and german fuel supply in june of 1943th?

twice:


> Fur sure, Davebender, how many missions were made by Luft in 1943, in eastern front, and during Kusk battle?


You did not aswered to my question...




davebender said:


> I'm surprised at the number of He-111s still being used for tactical air support this late in the war.


Oh yes. But weren't they able to carry 2, even 3 tons of bombs at short range? Can you propose better german bombers?



> LW fuel situation was better in summer 43
> The U.S. 8th Air Force began large scale operations over Europe during 1943 and RAF Bomber Command continued to expand. I suspect that countering these bombing campaigns took quite a bite out of German aviation gasoline reserves by July 1943.


Yes and so what? You _insinuate _for the secund time about _some_ fuel lack withou providing any support. 

You didn't red/understood Juha's post, maybe?

Back to my sources*, in june 43, only on the rear of the Central front ( german Front North, Model's 9th army) 268 locomotives and 1 222 wagons were destroyed as well as 44 strategic bridges, all by soviet partisans, _spetsnaz_ and aviation, particulary light Po-2 night bombers.
A terrible loss, because russian standard railroad gap and ballast, is not produced in germany.

Anyway, even if Plocher was worried, but only 70 years later and only in his memors, there's apparently no document issued from the Luftwaffe about any fuel problems, neither before, nor during Kursk battle. Even more, _generaloberst_ Jeschonnek mobilised prior to battle some important Luftwaffe transport means. This resolved and overcompensate ground logistic problems. Moreover, in june russian roads are becaming dry, and hard again: transportation can be made by simple trucks.

After milosh

Thank you Milosh, , obviously in 1943, Luft had no fuel starvage problems.

The question is closed?

Regards

* Encyclopédie illustrée de l'aviation, Editions Altas, 1984.


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## Altea (Jul 22, 2011)

TheMustangRider said:


> The destruction/heavy damage inflicted upon synthetic oil refineries and the German rail transportation system by the combined strategic bombing campaign which caused the fuel starvation of the German war machine and disrupted its logistic supply lines of equipment delivered to the front lines during the final stages of the war in Europe point to another direction.



When, in 1943 prior to Sicily and Kursk battles?

Or in summer (august) of 1944, when Ploesti was captured by soviets. Are you sure that strategic bombing campaign caused the fuel starvation, and not because german's had simply nothing else nothing to refine?

Regards


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## Altea (Jul 22, 2011)

Erich said:


> as you pointed out Dave, the Reich defense command was formed and the order was for most eastern front Jagdgeschwaders to re-arm and refit back into Germany to defend the homeland in July of 1943 this was the case for t*win engine ZG 26, 76 and 1 *to reform as Zerstörern formations against the US AF heavies.
> 
> the reality was that there was not that good of ground to air correspondence during Kursk or really any time afterward on the Ost front.



ZG 26 in july of 1943th? This Geschwader was disbanded in April 1942.
ZG 76 was not based in USSR in 1943.
Even the III/ZG 1 never went to SSSR. 
II/ZG 1 went back to germany loosing virtualy all material in 3/43
I/ZG 1 +stab in full strenght and supply, faught during Kursk battle inside 1st Fiegerdivision

So what did eastern ZG units lost to US heavies in spring of 43. *Nuts.*

Maybe some of them (II/ZG1) reminded in germany, the unit was not send to SSR, and was transformed to _nachtjagd._? But this is speculation, not proof.
For their best of course, Me-110 was not much feared by Yaks in 41, even less in 43 than by Spitfires in 1940!

On other hand night eastern luft fighter squadrons were reinforced by five other squadrons that came from germany, 2 of them participating previously to Berlin defence. Later, IV/JG 5 joined the defence system.
In all 66 planes.

Regards


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## Erich (Jul 22, 2011)

ZG 26 was not disbanded in 43 sorry your sources for this ? II./ZG 1 did not lose materials in 43 it had Ju 88C's as well as the better armed Bf 110G-2's, re-read some of the older postings on Reich defense on this very forum. I've been studying this **** way too long Altea like about 50 years worth and many many personal interviews of German/US airmen with research going to many authors of the Euro air war. am not even going to debate you, the Destroyer Geschwaders were REFORMED back in Germany for July 1943 Reich defense I have copies of the original documentation. It would be lof your best interest to deleet your above posting or re-edit it.

lastly if you will note in my adresse that I did not say ANY Zerstörer gruppen were on the Ost front only Jagdgeschwader in your quotation of me.


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## Ratsel (Jul 22, 2011)

Yes Erich your are 100% correct. The Geschwader was reformed in 1943 from I Gruppe and the III. Gruppe of Zerstörergeschwader.
I believe they disbanded in July, 1944? Perhaps joining another Geschwader.

Some people who decide to post false information can be entertaining sometimes lol.


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## Erich (Jul 22, 2011)

apologies for being in a pissing match but I was planning on writing several books on the Nachtjagd and the Destroyer gruppen back in the 1970=80's until new materials starting to come into light, held off and forwarded my archiv-data base to better known authors, still working on several books of my own and in time hopefully if I don't croak they will be published, one of them was to be about the night air war over the Ost with NJG 100 as it's base using the night ship Togo but this is all another topic base.


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## Milosh (Jul 22, 2011)

Stab ZG26

25.9.41 - 29.9.41 Stade Bf 110
???
13.10.43 - 22.3.44 Wunstorf Bf 110
22.3.44 - 31.7.44 Königsberg-Devau Bf 110, Me 410

Formed 1.5.39 in Dortmund from Stab/ZG142. On 29.9.41 redesignated Stab/NJG3.

Reformed 13.10.43 in Wunstorf. In 7.44 redesignated Stab/JG6.

I./ZG26

18.10.41 - 3.42 Kitzingen Bf 110
???
13.10.43 - 12.43 Bad Lippspringe Bf 110
12.43 - 1.4.44 Völkenrode Bf 110

Disbanded 4.42, and was absorbed by ZG1 and ZG2.

Reformed 13.10.43 in Bad Lippspringe from I./ZG1 with:

Stab I./ZG26 from Stab I./ZG1
1./ZG26 from 1./ZG1
2./ZG26 from 2./ZG1
3./ZG26 from 3./ZG1


II./ZG26

18.10.41 - 3.42 Dugino Bf 110
???
10.43 - 2.44 Hildesheim Me 410
2.44 - 24.3.44 Pfaffenhofen* Me 410

Disbanded 4.42, and was absorbed by ZG1 and ZG2.

Reformed 11.10.43 in Hildesheim from III./ZG1 with:

Stab II./ZG26 from Stab III./ZG1
4./ZG26 from 7./ZG1
5./ZG26 from 8./ZG1
6./ZG26 from 9./ZG1


III./ZG26

5.8.42 - 11.42 Kastelli** Bf 110
11.42 - 6.43 Trapani Bf 110
6.43 - 31.7.43 Ciampino/Rome Bf 110
31.7.43 - 10.43 Plantlünne Bf 110
10.43 - 22.3.44 Wunstorf Bf 110

Zerstörergeschwader 26


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## Erich (Jul 22, 2011)

so what is the point now anyway ? I have all this and more plus all the losses for ZG 26, 76 and II./ZG 1. I am seriously debating on closing this thread and allowing Parsifal to bring up a brand new one


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## Milosh (Jul 22, 2011)

Erich said:


> so what is the point now anyway ? I have all this and more plus all the losses for ZG 26, 76 and II./ZG 1. I am seriously debating on closing this thread and allowing Parsifal to bring up a brand new one





Erich said:


> ZG 26 was not disbanded in 43 sorry your sources for this ?



I was hoping you would give an explanation as some of ZG26 was disbanded.


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## Ratsel (Jul 22, 2011)

well as Altea wrote, " ZG 26 in july of 1943th? This Geschwader was disbanded in April 1942.", as a whole, this is not the case, as only some of ZG 26 was disbanded on 4.42.

I did not mean to speak for Erich, wasn't my place. Sorry.


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## Rivet (Jul 22, 2011)

Well, that's it for me. I've found research venues in both Russia and the U.S. regarding the Battle of Kursk. You kids fight it out anyway you want to, I'll communicate with the useful who can stick to aone topic.


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## parsifal (Jul 22, 2011)

Hi Guys am back

Picking up from my Post No3

While these operations and preprations were being implemented, Richthofen began to rest and redeploy some of his other subordinate formations..... 

Richthofen continued his refit,reorganization, re-equpiment and redeploymentof his LF4 formations. He withdrew Plugbeils FKIV by a process pf staged withdrawals and refits. FKIV at that time was providing essential support to 4PzA and the mobile remnants of 4A (Ru), (some people may be surprised to learn that the Rumanian Armoured Div distinguished itself at this time, earning it commander Radu Korne the Iron Cross). These formations were pulling back, with difficulty, across the Manych River, and needed as much air support as could be spared, The destination of these formations was initially the lower Don. FKIV performed relatively well, and even those formations that were not rested and refitted improved their operational rate simply by redeplyment to better supplied and equipped airfields. Richthofens instructions on 25 January 1943 to FKIVs air staff was to "work in the region southeast of Rostov with maximum forces whilst undertagoing refit of its formatiuons by stages" 51st Nomber Wing was returned to the Corps from transport duties. The refit and reequipment program involved only a few squadrons per week, but this steadily improved FKIVs operational readiness rates, and the formations shattered morale, such that by the time of the partial thaw in mid February, it was back to over 50% readiness states. 

27 January LW Kaukasus was renamed LW Kuban to more accurately reflect its new role. Its primary purpose was the defence of the taman Peninsula. It took some time to organize this new role, and the formation was not really ready until the second week of february. Once 17A was in position and fortified, it was Richtohofens intentions to pull out the Corps to the southern Ukraine, where the situation remained very serious. The plan was for the formation to be subordinated to FKVIII. Air defence for the Kuban was planned be passed to a newly created formation, the 9th Flak Div. This Div was being built by General Pickert from fresh Bns and surviving remnants of the previous 9th flak XX, which had been destroyed at Stalingrad. At first this formation lacked heavy guns and searchlights, but the influential Richthofen made request for such equipment in February, and it appears to have arrived in March or April. The division received over 200 heavy guns and searchlights by April and was deplyed well forward in dug in positions along the 17A front line in many instances. It and LW Kuban (and FKVIII) were to be subjected to a sustained soviet air attack in the coming weeks. I will come back to this in further posts. 

Flieger Division (FD) Donetz was the only other command subordinated to to LF4. Formed on a makeshift basis 2 jan 1943, under major General Mahnke, this formation had provided the major support elements to Army Detachment Hollidt. Strangely, Richthofen considered this formation to be his least well performing LW organization, due mainly to a lack of HQ staff experience. They tended to make up for this lack of experience with great enthusiasm, something acknowledged even by Richthofen. Similar to his other commands he instituted a program of redeployment and refit. At the beginning of Feb, he transferred the division from its unsatisfactory (and heavily attacked) airfields at Shakti, to the more secure and better supplied fields at Gorlovka (Soviet sources claim this airfield to have ben put under a lot of pressure as well, however the recovery of the formation after its re-deployment to Gorlovka suggest this was not the case at this time). The formation was subjected to the same gradual, staged process of refitas the other formations, and was placed under the direction of Plugbeils FKIV. 

By the time resistance had ended at Stalingrad on the 2 February, Richthofen had already begun the process of re-positioning and refit of LF4. Even before the closure of the air bridge he had started a process of re-equipment and refit of his bomber formations (and later, his fighters and ground support assets as well). A big benefit was derived by pulling the assets back to better equipped and supplied airfields in the lower Don region. By April overal numbers were back up to about the 900-1000 mark for LF4, plus there was a sizable Rumanian and Hungraian element in support, and most significantly operational rates were back over 50%. German efforts at recovery were aided by the improvement in the weather in February, which also assisted in Mansteins counteroffensive of February-March. Mention also needs to be made of Milch's efforts which at this time was making a great effect on the re-supply of the forward units. For the LW this meant many units were at last receiving new equipment in reasonable numbers. Richthofen had staged a remarkable recovery, and LF 4 was ready to go back into action.


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## Ratsel (Jul 22, 2011)

sooo is this just word for word from some book? cause if it is, I think the Kuban Peninsula would be a great conversation. Especially there overinflated claims of ' _Germans falling out of the sky every 10 minutes_. '


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## parsifal (Jul 22, 2011)

no not word for word, but based on eight separate sources. Words are my own, but the sources are:

1) Joel S Hayward: Stopped At Stalingrad - The Luftwaffe and Hitlers Defeat In the East *University Press Of Kansas 1998

2) Alfred Price: Luftwaffe ( Intro By Adolf Galland)McDonald Press 1970

3) Geoffrey Jukes, Barrie Pitt Kursk - Clash Of Armour Pan Ballaantyne Books 1970 

4) Von Hardesty Red Phoenix - The rise of Soviet Air Power 1941 - 45 Smithsonian Institute 1992

5) Chris Bellamy Rise Of Soviet Airpower Pan Military Books 2009

6) Brian Moynahan Talons Of the Bear - The story of Soviet Airpower Arrow Books 1988

7) Edited By Peter Tsoura [U Fighting in Hell - The German Ordeal On the Eastern Front[/U] Preidio Press 1995 (series of essays by captured German officers in the USA 1952)

8) VV Lavrentyev PD Kazakav: The Great Patriotic War 1941-5, Moscow Military Press 1982 (I think). In Russian, so I needed some help in reading it. 

I have Bergstoms book on order, and hope to have my copy in about a week or so. 

When this thread was started I expressed reservations about it on the basis that claims and counter claims are very difficult to verify. German loss records are incomplete, and their estimates of Soviet losses have been shown to be wildly innaccurate. Similar claims can be levelled at Soviet sources, because they suffer from political inference from the Soviet era. Then there is what I call the martin Caidin effect, which has inbuilt innaccuracies that almost defy logic. There will never be a definitive, completely accurate account of the losses for the eastern front.

I am about to make a submission about the fighting in the Kuban. I am aware of the firce debate that rages to this day about that campaign. I would say this however....by Stalingrad, the VVS had learned how to survive, but its battle cordination remained poor. Its ability to impeded LW operations remained limited. By Kursk this situation had changed....the VVS had learned a number of important lessons on what it needed to do, and how it should conduct its operations. Like it or not, the VVS at the conclusiuon of Kursk was dominating the airspace whereas the LW could only selkectively and over a limited area make that claim. For the remainder of the war, VVS continued to dominate the areas immediately over the battlefield. LW to amuch lesser extent. We need to try and understand how that came about, even if we cannot agree on numbers.....


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## Ratsel (Jul 22, 2011)

Kuban, awesome! as far as VVS claimes/losses, I would trust russian sources/documents as far as I could throw a Jak-9.
ie: untrustworthy.

German loss documents, well some are incomplete.. but unit diaries make up for that.


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## parsifal (Jul 22, 2011)

German own losses are accurate enough, but their claims of kills are not very accurate. At the end of the day they are based on guesswork, like all claims. 

Russian sources are dodgy from the Soviet era, but I am fairly confident that good work was done from the latter part of the 80s plus there are some reasonable western sources now.

Like I said, accurate figures on losses are hard to find, always disputed, and seldom accurate. that goes for both sides.

Best we can hope for is understand what happened, and perhaps why, forget the details of how many were lost on this day or that. We will never be abale to get a set of numbers that everyone can agree on


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## Ratsel (Jul 22, 2011)

' _Best we can hope for is understand what happened, and perhaps why, forget the details of how many were lost on this day or that_ '

this is one of the most senseable statements I read in a long while. now, lets figure out what happened at Kuban.


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## parsifal (Jul 23, 2011)

The VVS had emerged from Stalingrad somewhat invigorated by its succes, but with nevertheless some obvious shortcomings. It was superior to the bedraggled forces that had doggedly resisted the LW in 1941-2....it had at least learned how not to get itself destroyed. 

For the Soviets, Stalingrad provided the means and opportunity to implement some of the Novikov reforms, however a lot was still needed to be done. The VVS claimed to have shot down 1200 LW aircraft november-Feb, in fact the Luftwaffe had lost only 488 a/c to all causes. If allowances are made for flak/artillery and non-combat losses, VVS fighters may have shot down about 150 aircraft (if they were lucky). Still, it was a start....

In the mobile operations that followed the encirclement, VVS again broke down and failed in its mission. The offensive that resulted in the recapture of Kursk and Kharkov had quickly outrun VVs support, and the Russians seemed incapable of conducting a proper mobile operation, particulalry for their air assets. Their supply arrangements remaioned completely unsatisfactory which allowed Mantein to inflict his riposte in March. 

Still the benefits and victories of Stalingrad should not be underestimated. For the VVS, the victory had brought honour and recognition. A total of nine air divisions earned guards status. 17 pilots were awarded Hero Of the Soviet Uniond, there were over 1000 lesser awards for VVS flying peronnel. VVS had flown 35000 sorties over the winter to 18500 by the LW. Most importantly, experienced higher echelon air commanders were beginning to emerge, names familir to Soviet airpower: Generals SA Krasovski (17Air Army), S I Rudenko (16 Air Army), GG Khryushkin (8 Air Army) and A Golovanov (ADD).

An important development that grew out of the Stalingrad experience was the establishment of a firm bridgehead in the Kuban Peninsula, which the Soviets rightly saw as a potential threat to their control of the Caucasus. Here was the making of the final precursor to Kursk, the air and land battles in the Kuban

The mixed results gained from their experiences at Stalingrad made the Soviet rethink and reassess what they should be aiming for with their airpower. It was to be further refined in the Kuban operations.


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## Altea (Jul 23, 2011)

Hello,



Erich said:


> ZG 26 was not disbanded in 43 sorry your sources for this ?


Who said in 43 ? 



> II./ZG 1 did not lose materials in 43 it had Ju 88C's as well as the better armed Bf 110G-2's, re-read some of the older postings on Reich defense on this very forum.


Where was located II/ZG 1 from april to june 43?




> I've been studying this **** way too long Altea like about 50 years worth and many many personal interviews of German/US airmen with research going to many authors of the Euro air war. am not even going to debate you, the Destroyer Geschwaders were REFORMED back in Germany for July 1943 Reich defense I have copies of the original documentation. It would be lof your best interest to deleet your above posting or re-edit it.


Look Old Sage, you might be the most autorithative author about the subjet, but there are some others i have red, and they could perfectly be erronated. I don't have the pretention to debate with you, j'm just looking for reliable data.
However, so please what JG and ZG units (stabs, gruppen etc...) were taken from the eastern front to be rearmed and refitted in germany from *april to july *of 1943 included?



> lastly if you will note in my adresse that I did not say ANY Zerstörer gruppen were on the Ost front only Jagdgeschwader in your quotation of me.


Cf please read my previous question

Regards


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## Altea (Jul 23, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> I think, and this is only my opinion, that the Soviets were not capable of repairing/rebuilding military complexes as fast as the Germans could. I also believe that in conjunction with destroying Soviets railroads, it would have been impossible in any reasonable time.


You think that, but why?




> Constant Strategic bombing is very effective, as the Americans proved.


Nothing is proved, it's still a disputable question. I'm far from being sure that a strategic bombing is more effective than a blitskreag, leaded with the same *means *in Europe.


Anyway bombing Russia, in 41-42 no? 
With what kind of navigation devices and maps would you use, e-net with satellite images and GPS something like that?

You want to attack the big factory n° 153 in Novosibirsk?

So if you please, 
distance from Berlin to London: 926 km.
Berlin to Novosibirsk: 4387 km

About 4 800 km to hit Lavotchkin factory in Ulan Ude
About 7 500 km to strike on strategic wooden stocks at Komsomolsk on Amur

Goog luck


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## Altea (Jul 23, 2011)

> parsifal said:
> 
> 
> > *German own losses are accurate enough*, but their claims of kills are not very accurate. At the end of the day they are based on guesswork, like all claims.
> ...


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## Ratsel (Jul 23, 2011)

I don't have a problem.


The German Fourth Luftflotte, was responsible for this area, while its Soviet counterparts were primarily the 
Fourth and Fifth Air Armies, along with three air corps from STAVKA reserves. Both air forces were roughly 
equal in size at about 1000 combat aircraft each. The Luftwaffe fighter units were mainly equipped with 
Bf 109G-2/-4's and Fw 190 A's, while the VVS possessed a mixture of the latest Yakovlev and Lavochkin fighters, 
along with large numbers of IL-2 Sturmoviks and Pe-2 bombers. In addition, there was a steady flow of lend-lease 
aircraft: P-39's, A-20's, P-40's and Spitfire V's.


Some info about losses Bf 109 during April 17 –June 7 1943 over Kuban bridghead. 
Total losses: 
Destroyed in air fight – 28 Bf 109 
Destroyed by antiaircraft fire – 5 Bf 109 
Non combat losses – 5 Bf 109 
Destroyed from another reasons – 5 Bf 109 
Damaged: 
Damaged in air fight – 20 Bf 109 
Damaged by antiaircraft fire – 9 Bf 109 
Non combat damaged – 9 Bf 109 
Damaged from another reasons – 18 Bf 109. 

The mostly losses were in II./JG. 52: 
10 Bf 109 (WNr.13 688, 14 309, 19 251, 19 454, 19 489, 19 525, 19 527, 19 550, 19 709, 19 745) were destroyed in air fight. 
2 Bf 109 (WNr.19 748, 19 758] were destroyed by antiaircraft fire (guns) 
2 Bf 109 (WNr.14 470, 19 512) were non combat losses 
2 Bf 109 (WNr.13 469, 14 729) were destroyed from another reasons 
10 Bf 109 (WNr.19 335, 14 822, 14 956, 19 440, 19 700, 14 847, 19 444, 19 735, 19 598, 19 769) damaged in airfights. 
1 Bf 109 (WNr.13 720) damaged by antiaircraft fire 
3 Bf 109 (WNr.19 235, 19 920, 19 744) non combat damaged 
2 Bf 109 (WNr.19 344, 14 966) damaged from another reasons


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## davebender (Jul 23, 2011)

During July 1943 Germany had a bunch of aircraft models superior to the He-111 for the CAS role. 
Ju-87D
Fw-190F
Hs-129
Ju-88A
Me-110E
Me-410A
Me-210C (Hungarian Air Force)


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## Ratsel (Jul 23, 2011)

Are you asking me? then better bombers for what? or, what's 'CAS'? answer that then I can answer you.


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## imalko (Jul 23, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> I think, and this is only my opinion, that the Soviets were not capable of repairing/rebuilding military complexes as fast as the Germans could.



You are aware that Soviets moved much of their industrial complexes from threatened parts of Ukraine and west Russia to the Ural in matter of months, right? If they were capable for such an unprecedented feat, why would you think they would be incapable to fast repair any damage from bombing?


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## Ratsel (Jul 23, 2011)

relocated to existing factories? big difference I would think. so to avoid an arguement. I retract my statement " _I think, *and this is only my opinion*, that the Soviets were not capable of repairing/rebuilding military complexes as fast as the Germans could._"


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## davebender (Jul 23, 2011)

Attacking enemy units located within a few miles of friendly troops in order to assist the attack or defense. In the modern world this is largely accomplished with attack helicopters and specialized aircraft such as the A-10.
- Artillery positions.
- Anti tank positions.
- Machinegun positions.
- Forward observer positions.
- Enemy vehicles of all types.
- Command posts and communications centers.
- Supply points.
- Refueling points.
- Other targets as specified by a radio equipped forward observer attached to the ground forces.


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## Ratsel (Jul 23, 2011)

oh. "close air support" or variation of. I see. well I would not choose a bomber, but rather the Bf 109.


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## davebender (Jul 23, 2011)

The Me-109 was sometimes employed in that role. However lightweight aircraft such as the Me-109 and Spitfire aren't ideal for that mission. Payload is too small, stall speed is too high and the aircraft cannot carry much armor. Purpose built CAS aircraft such as the Ju-87 and Hs-129 typically have a low stall speed to facilitate accuracy, high payload and significant armor for protection against ground fire. The Ju-87G and Hs-129 also had cannon and ammunition specifically designed for killing armored vehicles.

Think in terms of the U.S. AD-1 Skyraider which entered service a couple years too late for WWII. IMO it may be the best fixed wing CAS aircraft ever built.


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## Ratsel (Jul 23, 2011)

JG 51/JG 53, and others were masters at using the Bayerische Flugzeugwerke 109 in bomber rolls.


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## imalko (Jul 23, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> relocated to existing factories? big difference I would think. so to avoid an arguement. I retract my statement " _I think, *and this is only my opinion*, that the Soviets were not capable of repairing/rebuilding military complexes as fast as the Germans could._"



Bold part noted. However, there weren't many factories at the Urals at that time. They had to physically relocate almost entire industry to the east, build new infrastructure, open new mines, etc.


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## TheMustangRider (Jul 23, 2011)

Altea said:


> When, in 1943 prior to Sicily and Kursk battles?
> 
> Or in summer (august) of 1944, when Ploesti was captured by soviets. Are you sure that strategic bombing campaign caused the fuel starvation, and not because german's had simply nothing else nothing to refine?
> 
> Regards



Nazi Germany did not have vast quantities of crude oil but it possessed vast quantities of coal that could be used to produce synthetic oil, a raw material heavily dependent of the German rail network as well.
The Soviets occupied Romania and its oilfields, do you think they were operating at 100% after the relentless offensive by the US 15th AF? I would not be so sure.


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## Ratsel (Jul 23, 2011)

since 44 the Germans were operating on reserves mostly. I'm still waiting on hearing from Altea on how allied strategic bombing campaign 
*did not *cause Germany's fuel/oil shortages. It should be a good one.


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## davebender (Jul 23, 2011)

Perhaps a bit of information on the German oil industry is in order.

Crude oil from Ploesti and elsewhere was refined into motor fuel, lubricating oil etc. When Ploesti was bombed and eventually over run it caused a shortage of motor fuel. This had no effect on the supply of aviation gasoline.

German aviation gasoline was almost entirely produced from coal at large hydrogenation plants. These facilities also produced some motor fuel. RAF Bomber Command more or less put the hydrogenation plants out of business from the summer of 1944 onward. Destruction of the aviation gasoline supply led to an emergency program to speed up the introduction of jet aircraft as they used a different type of fuel. Among other things this resulted in the He-162 being rushed into production in record time (and well before the engineering glitches were fixed).

Germany made a lot of other things from coal also. It was the basis for their chemical industry from the late 1800s onward. Synthetic dystuff, synthetic rubber, nitrogen for the production of explosives and fertilizer, certain drugs and quite a few other things were made from coal.


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## Ratsel (Jul 23, 2011)

yes, I know those things. and yes, I know about Ploesti. my question remains, how was SBC _not responsible _for
Germany's fuel/oil shortage ( notice I did not say aviation fuel only)? unless Altea only meant Ploesti. then its
a moot point on my part. otherwise its a valid question.


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## Ratsel (Jul 23, 2011)

*Strategic Bombing Campaign Impact on German oil production*

The oil campaign was hugely successful. In June 1944, just 56,000t of oil had been produced against the planned total of 198,000 tons. Consumption was well above stocks produced since mid-May 1944 so that by the end of June 1944, it had been reduced to a reserve of just 410,000t, a 70% reduction from 30 April 1944. ULTRA intercepts confirmed cutbacks in non-operational flying as a direct consequence. According to Speer, by 21 July 1944 98% of all Axis fuel plants were out of operation. The monthly production fell from 180,000t in March 1944 to 20,000t in November; inventory dropped from 575,000t to 159,000t. The campaign caused huge shortfalls in fuel production and contributed to the impotence of the Luftwaffe in the last 12 months of the war, and the inability of the German Army to conduct counter offensives.


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## Erich (Jul 23, 2011)

this thread has gone over the top into the OT zone. last warning get back on topic or it will be closed and Parsifal will have to start all over again.............


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## parsifal (Jul 23, 2011)

I agree with Erich 100%. This thread has developed all the nasty aspects I thought that it would. If you guys want to continue this thread, and attract better debate and information, the rules of the Forum about respect need to be observed to amuch greater extent.

I am a bit disappointed by how this thread has developed, but Im not surprised. 

If you get the impression I sound Pissed off, you'd be correct


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## Juha (Jul 24, 2011)

Hello
Kursk air battles had its impact on LW, in July-Aug 43 LW lost 1030a/c in the East (351 fighters, 273 bombers and 202 dive-bombers) according to Williamson Murray, or 1463 according to Khazanov’s Air War Over Kursk. LW lost also 9 Ritterkreuzträger, of which 4 were fighter aces in Kursk battles according to Khazanov.

On strategic bombing and Soviet ability to repair damage, in spite of the best efforts of the LFl 5 to knock out Murmansk it didn’t succeed. Also efforts to cut Murmansk railway was futile, Soviet repair teams very effectively repaired the cuts.

The connection between strategic bombing and the Kursk battle. The CoS of LFl 6, Kless, writes that when LW bomber force in the East was used, according to him very effective, raids against the Soviet armament industry in Jun 43 that means that the German bomber fleet could not be employed to smash the Soviet ground built up in the Kursk bulge during its most critical stage.

And to davebender’s message #75 I agree but one point, IMHO the offensive to put the hydrogenation plants out was joint BC and USAAF effort.

Juha


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## TheMustangRider (Jul 24, 2011)

My apologies Erich and Parsifal.
I believed for a moment that the potential impact of strategic bombing against the Soviet Union was a valid point to be considered in this thread; now I realize it has nothing to do with it.


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## Ratsel (Jul 24, 2011)

parsifal said:


> If you get the impression I sound Pissed off, you'd be correct



my appologies parsifal, I should not have responded to obvious off-subject remarks that some have made.

Juha,
to continue onto your post a little if I may:

The VVS played a significant role in hampering German preparations. On 17 April 1943, a raid on the German airfield at Orsha-South destroyed five Ju 88 reconnaissance aircraft from 1./Aufklärungsgruppe 100 and 4./121, and three Do 17s/Do 217s of 2. Nachtaufklärungsstaffel. Three days later, another ten high-level reconnaissance aircraft were destroyed on the ground. As a result, the only operational strategic reconnaissance Staffel was 4./14.

The Luftwaffe was also busy before the main operation. The tank factory at Gorkovsky Avtomobilny Zavod (GAZ) was subjected to a series of heavy attacks throughout June 1943. On the night of 4/5 June, He 111s of Kampfgeschwader 1, KG 3, KG 4, KG 55 and KG 100 dropped 179 tons of bombs, causing massive destruction to buildings and production lines. All of GAZ No. 1 plant's 50 buildings, 9,000 metres of conveyors, 5,900 pieces of equipment and 8,000 tank engines were destroyed.However, the Germans made an error in target selection. The GAZ plant No. 1 produced only the T-70 light tank. Factory No. 112, the second-biggest producer of the more formidable T-34, continued production undisturbed. Soviet production facilities were repaired or rebuilt within six weeks. The Luftwaffe also failed to hit the Gorkiy Artillery Factory (No. 92) and the aircraft plant where the Lavochkin La-5 and La-5FN were made.

According to Christer Bergström, VVS losses amounted to 1546 a/c.


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## Juha (Jul 24, 2011)

Hello Ratsel
thanks for the info from Bergström's book, and yes, Gorky tank factories were the main targets, but not only ones of that German strategic bombing campaign.

Juha


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## claidemore (Jul 24, 2011)

On topic, off topic, sheesh. This is a conversation guys, and conversations are fluid. An article, or an essay, will stay on topic, a conversation will not. 

As interesting or contested points are made they will be discussed, and this will lead to other points that may diverge from the original topic. 

That being said, if you wish to bring the conversation back to the original topic you merely make a point that pertains to that topic and it will be picked up and discussed. If it is not picked up, it's because nobody is interested in it. People will discuss what interests them, and people will read the threads that interest them. 

Again, all that is required to refocus the direction of this thread (or any thread) is a post with relavant points that posters will respond to. 

my 2 cents

Claidemore


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## Erich (Jul 24, 2011)

May I recommend right now that no more postings be made here and that Parsifal open a brand new thread with a slightly different title. this thread will be closed soon ..........


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## Altea (Jul 24, 2011)

parsifal said:


> I agree with Erich 100%. This thread has developed all the nasty aspects I thought that it would. If you guys want to continue this thread, and attract better debate and information, the rules of the Forum about respect need to be observed to amuch greater extent.



100% agree, can we go a little forwards, please?

In spring soviet armies recieved some new material. For aviation it was the La-5F appeciated for improved armor, and 360° visibility, the Yak-9 with new steel wing spars, the Il-2 with increased reliability AM 38F, and Pe-2 with modified aerodynamics. All these planes were replacing desuete and tired Polikarpovs, worned MiG-3 ans some other secund choice planes as LaGG-3, Hurricane, Tomahawk, Kittihawk that proved disappointing for the eastern-front. 

Soviet industry produced 3 394 fighters, 2 838 stormoviks, 1101 bombers in april, may and june 1943. 
And this despite the whole production loss of the 292 th factory in Saratov (Yak-1) after the night of the 23 to 24th june. Lufwaffe raid provided insignificant damages on the factory, but some period after the raid, a negligated fire occured on the wooden floor that quickly expanded to the whole factory. I hope it will be, once that said, the last mention to strategic bombers, fuel etc of the thread.

Such stressed production rate, took of course it's toll: numerous problems occured with engines reliability and planes of mixted construction, as Yak-7b, and Il-2 that were loosing some wooden skinning. Urgently some workers were taken from factories to repare and reglue on ribs the wooden skin on faulty immobilised planes directly on the front airfields. Due to such efforts the availability reached at about 90% rate. *

*Khazanov p 17


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## michaelmaltby (Jul 24, 2011)

".... This is a conversation guys, and conversations are fluid."

Agreed 

MM


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## Juha (Jul 24, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> ...According to Christer Bergström, VVS losses amounted to 1546 a/c.



Hello Ratsel
during what timeframe?

According to Khazanov, VVS losses during the Battle of Kursk as Russians definite it (5 July - 23 Aug 1943) were 2800 a/c, that incl. ADD and PVO losses which occured during the sorties connected to the battle.

Juha


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## parsifal (Jul 24, 2011)

If the thread survives, I will post a more complete opinion piece on the significance of the Kuban battles later tonite. However in essence the points i wanted to make were

1) VVS emerged from Stalingrad with some additional skills and better survivability. For the first time they had conducted operations that had a strategic effect

2) However, though they now possessed many of the ingredients needed for an effective offensive posture, they still lacked sufficient experience and an effective doctrine to be effective in offensive operations. 

3) LW continued to demostrate marked superiority in its fighter operations over the Kuban. However the campaign as a whole has to be seen as a Soviet maturing of strategy and application of airpower. No longer was the priority for theVVS to shoot down German Fighters and gain air superiority in the traditional sense. VVS fighters were there to keep losses amongst friendly bombers tolerable, and to harass German bomber operations to the point of writing them down to insignificance. losses continued to heavily favour the LW, but the LW was being reduced to no more than nuisance value....VVS completed its mission, which was now firmly wedded to the ground support mission. Germans despite inflicting very heavy losses on the VVS were unable to have any appreciable effect on the ground operations (particularly near Myshakko) and their bomber formations no longer could operate with impunity over the battlefield

4) Many LW bomber operations had to be conducted at night because of the effects of VVS fighters. Also, VVS losses were inflated by the significant effects of the newly re-constituted 9 flak division, operating at the front and with many hundreeds of heavy and light guns attached. Just the same rounds per kill for the flak arm were rising. Over Stalingrad, LW flak had expended around 5000 rounds per kill, now it was over 9000 rpk. 

5) Thiings were getting harder for the LW. VVS now had a workable offensive strategy, an expanding experience base, lessons that it could absorb, and equipment that rivalled LW quality. It could always count on a numerical superiority because of the simplicity of its equipment

6) In the coming three months to Kursk, Soviet frontal Aviation in the TO was to grow by over 75% in frontline strengths which was not done at the expense of other sections of the front. Overall quality was improving in a numbe of areas....Higher echelon leadership, servicieability rates, mechanization, ground organizations, arguably even, aircrew experience. LW expansion between the end of April and the start of the battle in July was extremely modest....question then begs, with such a rapid rise in size, experience and effectiveness by the VVS in that 3 month period, was it a mistake for the germans to wait until July....should they not have continued their offensive-defensive operations as had been demonstrated by Manstein. To successfully implment this stratgy, Germans needed to at least maintain mobility for thei Infantry, but by the latter part of '43 this had gone, and with it, the last hope of salvaging anything in the east.


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