# If the RAF had been defeated in the Battle of Britain



## DogFather (Aug 6, 2013)

I watched a documentary, that suggested even if the RAF had been completely defeated during the B of B, the Royal Navy would still be able
to stop a German invasion, or at least make it very risky. I'm sure the RN would still have attacked an invasion force, even in the face of air
supremacy. The Germans had no good way to move their Panzers and other heavy equipment to Britain. There were going to have to use
river barges, that had no engine and were very slow. The Germans also lacked a way to defeat the RN. Except with air power if the RN
attacked an invasion force. I wonder how well this would have worked? 

I guess the Germans hoped to bomb and starve Britain into surrender, with their U-Boats and surface raiders. I don't remember where I saw
the doc. But, it does sound correct to me. There was really no way Germany was going to defeat Britain, by invasion. At least not anytime soon after the war started in 1939. This is one reason for the so-called Phoney war. 

Because Britain was so concerned about preventing invasion, she didn't want to use resources to try and defeat Germany. A plan to mine
German rivers for example, by Churchill was rejected, because it would bring reprisals. The French wanted to stay in their forts. When they
could have attacked Germany's Ruhr industrial area. They too wanted to save their strength, for when they were attacked The moral of the
story, to me anyway, is don't declare war if you don't really mean it.

Anyway, is the RN being able to prevent invasion, even without the RAF accurate? Would the Luftwaffe, be able to sink or eliminate RN ships
trying to stop an invasion?


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## OldSkeptic (Aug 7, 2013)

Oh yes the RN would have done it, but the losses might have meant the Battle of the Atlantic might have been lost later.

The only way the RAF could have lost the BoB was if Leigh Mallory had been in charge of 11 group. In '41 when, due to political moves Downing and Park had been gotten rid of, LM did a BoB war game .. he lost all his planes straight away.

Park was the key, Dowding created the weapon, Park used it perfectly. The Bob has been war gamed by just about every air force in the World over and over ... and no one had exceeded Park's handling of it.

However quite a few prats have lost it.....

Read Stephen Bungey's 'Most Dangerous Enemy' for a strategic, tactical and logistical analysis.

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## Dogwalker (Aug 7, 2013)

The Operations Harpoon, Vigorous and Pedestal are good examples to what could happen if the RN had to operate in places where it didn't had the air superiority (and in those cases it didn't had only for a part of the run). The conditions in a English Channel were the RAF had lost the BoB are likely to be worse. I do not think RN could sustain that sort of attrition for long time.


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## JtD (Aug 7, 2013)

OldSkeptic said:


> Oh yes the RN would have done it, but the losses might have meant the Battle of the Atlantic might have been lost later.


I never thought of this that way, might very well be true. On the other hand, the Germans might have lost so many ground forces, that their presence on the Balkans or in North Africa, let alone later on the Eastern front could have been in question - yet, same might be said about the Commonwealth forces.

Eventually, winning and losing isn't a binary thing, by which margin will always matter. Both in the hypothetical win of the Luftwaffe in the BoB and the attempted invasion. There's even a chance for the invasion to fail without the participation of the RN at all, the Germans in 1940 didn't have the equipment, experience or logistics the Allies had in their late war operations. In fact, a small storm front, not unlikely to happen in autumn and hard to predict, could have meant a costly end of all invasion plans.


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## pattle (Aug 7, 2013)

When Churchill said we will fight them on the beaches, in the streets and in the fields and hills etc and that we shall never surrender he wasn't exaggerating. Churchill forecasted a new dark age should Britain fall and again he wasn't exaggerating because as we all know now that's what would have happened. These were not just brave words and talking big, Churchill was spelling out the reality of the situation and what needed to be done. If the Germans had of tried to invade Britain by sea then the German army would have been ruthlessly butchered by the Royal Navy and what little of it that made it ashore would have been slaughtered in frenzied killings by anyone and everyone that was within reach of it with whatever they had to hand. Britain has unlike the rest of Europe in having no tradition of being invaded and the British people in 1940 had the almost unique benefit of hindsight after having seen the fate of other countries. Hitler knew all this and that's why he didn't try. Invading Britain in 1940 would have cost Hitler his army even if he had of been successful and Hitler didn't want to lose his army invading a tiny island when he could of had Russia instead. Hitler's idea was to invade Russia and then come back and finish Britain off, Churchill knew this before even the Russians did and that's why he was so willing to support them in 1941 even though he hated Stalin and all he stood for and up until that point Stalin had been helping the Germans.


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## fastmongrel (Aug 7, 2013)

late September there is at most 12 hours of daylight in the Channel 4 weeks later there is less than 11 hours of daylight and the weather is getting nasty. During daylight the LW can prevent the RN operating freely in the Channel. At night and in bad weather the RN rules the Channel. If anyone can find a way of supplying an invading army by moving supplies just 12 hours a day then yes the Germans could possibly have succesfully invaded Great Britain. Its no use landing an army if you cant supply food, water, ammunition and reinforcements and the longer the battle goes on the worse it gets as you lose supply vessels to the RNs night time forays. 

Not forgetting of course the RN subs which according to most Axis fantasists do nothing which is crazy your playing in the RNs submarine training ground the skippers know the Channel like there own back hand, does anyone seriously think that the Submarine service will sit in port drinking tea when they had a Channel full of targets and subs loaded with the best torpedos outside of the Japanese navy. Yes losses to mines and ASW escorts will be heavy but when has that ever stopped determined submariners they are all barmy for going underwater in a glorified oil drum anyway.


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## stona (Aug 7, 2013)

The Royal Navy could and did operate in the face of enemy air superiority. A look at operations in the Mediterranean, Crete, Malta etc will show that it was possible but at a considerable cost.

The Luftwaffe could not have protected a slow (very slow) moving invasion fleet across the Channel and the Germans knew this.

They never had a serious intention of attempting the invasion and when the bluff was called they packed up and redeployed towards the real ideological objective which lay to the east.

High Commands draw up plans, which many will have seen, when they are asked to. This does not mean that there was ever a serious intention to implement them. To back up a bluff you have to make a threat look real. Move barges to channel ports and issue a few life vests, it all looks good. It was as the great bard so eloquently put it "sound and fury, signifying nothing."

Cheers

Steve


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## Dogwalker (Aug 7, 2013)

stona said:


> A look at operations in the Mediterranean, Crete, Malta etc will show that it was possible but at a considerable cost.


Operation Harpoon, six ships lost, seven damaged, two freighters arrived. Operation Vigorous, six ships and one MTB lost, five damaged, no freighter arrived. Operation Pedestal, 13 ships lost, three damaged, four freighters arrived. 
For how long could the RN sustain that cost?



fastmongrel said:


> At night and in bad weather the RN rules the Channel.


And, to rule the channel at night, were the RN think to spend the day? Remember that, in this scenario, the RAF had lost the BoB. The ports of south England are targets. To not be crippled, the RN, during the day, had to stay somewere out of the LW air cover.



fastmongrel said:


> Its no use landing an army if you cant supply food, water, ammunition and reinforcements


The Axis troops in Africa were supplied that way by the Regia Marina. 
In an heavily contended scenario (active Allied air bases at Malta and North Africa, active RN, submarines...), from 1940 to 1943 arrived: 
91.6% of the sended troops, 
80% of the fuel,
88% of the veicles
88% of weapons and ammunitions
86% of other load.

Having the control of air, and backed by the German industrial capability, Germans could probably do better (in 1940, with Malta silent and ULTRA not efficient, all the percentages are near to 100%)


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## Milosh (Aug 7, 2013)

The whole Home Fleet would not be required as the wake from a flotilla or two of destroyers at flank would swamp the barges.

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## fastmongrel (Aug 7, 2013)

Dogwalker said:


> And, to rule the channel at night, were the RN think to spend the day? Remember that, in this scenario, the RAF had lost the BoB. The ports of south England are targets. To not be crippled, the RN, during the day, had to stay somewere out of the LW air cover.



So the LW as well as fighting over the Channel against the RAF even if the RAF had withdrawn north it would still have aircraft, acting as the Heers Heavy Artillery because you cant land Heavy artillery across a beach, interdicting the rail and road system of Kent to prevent the British Army moving its much bigger resources to the battle, doing ASW patrols, mining harbours, doing recce flights, transport flights, weather flights, night bombing raids of major rail hubs in the North and Midlands, bombing raids on RAF bases and chasing the RN out to sea it also has the resources to fly as far as Plymouth say and flatten the dockyards. Well the LW certainly is going to be busy when do they land to refuel or does the LW invent inflight fuel, weapons and crew replenishment.

All that is after they have forced the RAF north which means much heavier losses of the original force.


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## stona (Aug 7, 2013)

Dogwalker said:


> Operation Harpoon, six ships lost, seven damaged, two freighters arrived. Operation Vigorous, six ships and one MTB lost, five damaged, no freighter arrived. Operation Pedestal, 13 ships lost, three damaged, four freighters arrived.
> For how long could the RN sustain that cost?



Easily long enough to destroy an invasion fleet. It would take less than twelve hours.

I'm well aware of the Mediterranean campaign, that lasted for years and the Royal Navy never went away.

Cheers

Steve


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## Dogwalker (Aug 7, 2013)

Milosh said:


> The whole Home Fleet would not be required as the wake from a flotilla or two of destroyers at flank would swamp the barges.


The Strait of Sicily, in its narrowest point is 145 km large. 
The English Channel, only 35.
In the last part of the Battle of Convoys, when the conditions were becoming difficult for the Regia Marina, the Strait of Sicily was colsed by two minefields (one east and one west of the narrowest point, leaving a obliged way from Sicily to Tunisia), that protected the Italian convoys from the RN.
In the Channel this would be way easier.


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## Dogwalker (Aug 7, 2013)

double


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## stona (Aug 7, 2013)

So what. What losses do you imagine the British would be prepared to sustain to protect their home island? I can assure you it would be much more than those sustained to evacuate Crete or supply Malta.

Aircraft were not terribly good at hitting small, fast ships. Imagine a flotilla or two of destroyers loose amongst the invasion barges.

Cheers
Steve


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## Dogwalker (Aug 7, 2013)

stona said:


> Easily long enough to destroy an invasion fleet.


An invasion fleet would move only after the route had been made safe, with ships, submarines and minefields (see the fate of Force K)



stona said:


> I'm well aware of the Mediterranean campaign, that lasted for years and the Royal Navy never went away.


The RN did'nt stationed long in places were it could have been targeted by aerial attacks, and, as a result, the Axis convoys generally passed.


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## Dogwalker (Aug 7, 2013)

stona said:


> So what. What losses do you imagine the British would be prepared to sustain to protect their home island?


I'm not boubting the will of substaining losses. I m'doubting the capacity of substaining the attrition required to contend the Channel under a LW air superiority for long.

Sunked ships can be glorious, but can't stop an invasion.



stona said:


> Aircraft were not terribly good at hitting small, fast ships.


Mines are. Especially if small and fast ships try to enter in minefields steaming at full speed by night.

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## stona (Aug 7, 2013)

We're losing sight of the objective here.

It will take an invasion fleet many hours to cross the Channel. It only has to be destroyed once.

As for mines, where are you planning to mine? I envisage a situation with British ships amongst or close to the invasion fleet. This happened to an Italian merchant convoy in the Mediterranean on one occasion with the loss of all the merchantmen.

The fleet would require several wide clear channels for its own passage, just as the rather more substantial allied fleet did in 1944.

Mines do sink small ships but there were counter measures. For sure, at the very least, approaching destroyers would have streamed their paravanes. Mine laying vessels, surface and U-boats, can be interdicted and channels can be swept. Mine laying from the air had, shall we say, mixed results.

As Cunningham both said and demonstrated., "The right range....to engage an enemy is point blank....at which range even a gunnery officer cannot miss." It is a comment, only half joking, which sums up the ethos of the Royal Navy at that time well, from Nelson's final signal at Trafalgar ("engage enemy more closely") onwards.

Cheers

Steve


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## fastmongrel (Aug 7, 2013)

For 73 years people with experience of the real thing have been in agreement that Germany could have invaded but couldn't have won the Battle due to logistical problems. How come internet amateurs think they know better. 

I always say before you start thinking it was was an easy job go and sail the Channel.


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## Dogwalker (Aug 7, 2013)

stona said:


> We're losing sight of the objective here.


Yeah. We are losing sight that, without the aerial cover, ships, in WWII, were practically only big and slow targets.



stona said:


> It will take an invasion fleet many hours to cross the Channel. It only has to be destroyed once.


An invasion fleet had to do only few tenths of km to pass the Channel and gain a bridgehead under LW aerial cover, while the RN, having heard the news that the invasion fleet is moving, had to steam for several hundreds of km by night, pass over minefields, the Kriegsmarine itself, and see if the invasion force had been so kind to wait for her. Then, having won the battle, have still to leave the scenario.



stona said:


> As for mines, where are you planning to mine?


This image show the position of the mines that effectively protected the RM convoys during the last part of the operations in NA.





As I said, the Strait of Sicily is large 145 km in it's narrowest point, and, as you can see, the secure route was not even in the narrowest point. 
The Kriegsmarine, operating by day (*the LW won the BoB in this scenario*), can effectively block the Channel eastward and westward of the possible invasion routes posing smaller (and easier more dense) minefields than those the RM historically layed (and it layed them with the Malta air base active).
The open water the Kriegsmarine would require for the invasion is a north-south channel (and a zone much close to the French coast to reach it). That's of no use for the RN, that had to enter in the Channel from east or west to intercept the invasion (steaming at full speed at night), so it has to pass over the minefields.
Needles to say, with the RN gently providing to light itself, catching fire over the mines, even the fact that it's operating by night is not of great protection from the bombers.



stona said:


> This happened to an Italian merchant convoy in the Mediterranean on one occasion


Yes, on one occasion.
At that time, the RM had three convoys contemporary sailing every day in the Sicily Strait. Plenty of targets. And, on one occasion, one of them encountered the RN.



stona said:


> Mine do sink small ships but there were counter measures.


Counter measures requires time. Not a swift action to wipe out the invasion force once. Do you checked the Force-K fate? Of 8 ships, two lost (one was a cruiser, mines are effective even to bigger ships) and one damaged (37.5% losses) to have entered in a minefield (not the vast ones of 1943), and they didn't tried to continue pursuing the RM convoy after realizing they were in a minefield. They only tried to leave it after the first explosion whit all the possible calm.



stona said:


> As Cunningham both said and demonstrated...


Cannons do not defeat mines.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 7, 2013)

Let me see if I have this right.

Germans have set up shop in Channel ports, they merrily proceed to place minefields across the English channel on both sides of the planned invasion route. They are doing this in view of English observers (at least in good weather), in spite of English minesweepers, in spite of English shore batteries ( or have the Luftwaffe knocked them out too?) and with little or no practical surface fleet after the Norway debacle. 

Germans have available in late summer/early fall of 1940.

Admiral Scheer 
Hipper
Emden
Koln
Nurnberg
11 destroyers (?)
8 older torpedo boats/small destroyers
8-12 of the of the 1935 type torpedo boats. 
10 F type escorts
40-60 mine sweepers ?
40-50 S boats? 

So basically 2 heavy Cruisers, 3 light cruisers, 2 flotillas of destroyers, a flotilla of torpedo boats, a flotilla of escorts/sloops and then the odds and sods and motor boats. 

The Luftwaffe will have to do the bulk of the work but since the British can afford to loose 3-4 ships of every German one (or more if it stops the invasion) that is a tall order, especially considering the the Luftwaffe not only can't operate at night against ships effectively but there will be days when the weather prohibits flying but ships can still operate. 

The Channel could become a scene of mine, counter mine, and sweep with numerous mine losses on both sides. 

Many British destroyers were fitted with high speed sweeps and many of them ( and some cruisers) were fitted for mine laying. 

The invasion is not a long campaign. It either works in a few weeks or it doesn't, if it doesn't it will be several years before the Germans can try again. They would have to build back up the fleet of barges and landing craft.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 7, 2013)

Dogwalker said:


> Yeah. We are losing sight that, without the aerial cover, ships, in WWII, were practically only big and slow targets.



True, to some extent, in day light in 1940. Few air attacks were successful in sinking 100% of the ships in a task force/convoy.




Dogwalker said:


> An invasion fleet had to do only few tenths of km to pass the Channel and gain a bridgehead under LW aerial cover, while the RN, having heard the news that the invasion fleet is moving, had to steam for several hundreds of km by night, pass over minefields, the Kriegsmarine itself, and see if the invasion force had been so kind to wait for her. Then, having won the battle, have still to leave the scenario.



I think you mean tens of Km and not tenths. Some body has posted the planned German invasion routes, the ports at the closest distance across the channel cannot accommodate the shipping required so the routes are some what longer. And the British coast closest to France is a lousy landing site, the Cliffs of Dover. 







Even assuming the invasion fleet can make 6kph the defenders can do an easy 36-42kph. 

The Kriegsmarine is little more than a speed bump, see previous post for ships. And most of those are in Germany and have to come through the North Sea and English Channel to support the Invasion. Through British mine fields and submarines. 



Dogwalker said:


> Cannons do not defeat mines.



Actually they do. Coastal Mine fields that are not covered by guns have only temporary effect as they can be located and swept. The Dutch built gun boats to extend the reach of their shore batteries to cover their mine fields. Shallow water would keep the big ships away for them. If your ships (guns) can silence the enemy guns (ships) then your minesweepers can work. It is harder but you can sweep at night and in weather that may keep aircraft grounded.


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## stona (Aug 7, 2013)

As above.

Also no one has yet explained how the Germans are going to get ashore. They had zero landing craft. The soldiers were supposed to row ashore in rubber rafts. Some barges, their bottoms filled with concrete, were to beach and land heavy equipment, but without the benefit of ramps, a kind of ramp was to be built using railway track amongst other things.

Presumably the British would sportingly hold their fire while all this was going on.

The plan called for 6 Divisions to land in Kent via Folkestone and Ramsgate (presumably captured intact) 4 Divisions via Brighton (**** beach!) and the Isle of Wight and then another 3 Divisions were to land in Dorset at Lyme Bay. 
Good luck with that.

It's all listed in this volume.






At least the German soldiers would have been given some nice post cards of things like Brighton Pier to keep as souvenirs.....if they hadn't drowned.

Neither did the Germans have anything like the many thousands of airborne forces, gliders etc to secure the inland side of a bridgehead. Their airborne forces in 1940 were very good, but very small. They were used as sort of bogeymen in Britain as the government ramped up invasion fever.

Compare this sort of operation with the one that the allies used four years later. The whole thing is ridiculous and would have ended in disaster, something the Germans themselves were well aware of.

Cheers

Steve

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## Dogwalker (Aug 7, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> Germans have available in late summer/early fall of 1940.


To lay minefields needs far less.

Minefields layed by Germans 1939-45





Some were pretty close to British shores, and Germans did not had the air superiority.




Shortround6 said:


> The Luftwaffe will have to do the bulk of the work but since the British can afford to loose 3-4 ships of every German one (or more if it stops the invasion) that is a tall order, especially considering the the Luftwaffe not only can't operate at night against ships effectively but there will be days when the weather prohibits flying but ships can still operate.


And why on earth the Invasion force had to move when the LW can't operate?

None to say we are reasoning as the British has perfect knowledge of German intentions. Obviously, in real world Germans can even do diversive operations to make the RN expose itself to mines and air attack to stop a feint.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 7, 2013)

Here is one map, there are others of greater detail;






You can't go by shortest distance, you need port capacity both to embark and to land ashore.

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## Dogwalker (Aug 7, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> True, to some extent, in day light in 1940. Few air attacks were successful in sinking 100% of the ships in a task force/convoy.


So you think the invasion could be stopped by 1 or 2% of the Home Fleet?



Shortround6 said:


> Even assuming the invasion fleet can make 6kph


So, starting at night (the RN had first to know that the invasion fleet started, then to start itself from outside the LW air cover), to ashore at dawn without a single enemy ship still on sight.



Shortround6 said:


> Coastal Mine fields that are not covered by guns have only temporary effect


And all the Germans needed was a temporay effect.


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## Dogwalker (Aug 7, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> You can't go by shortest distance


Several of the routes are very close to the shortest distance, that, remember, is of only 35 km.


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## Kryten (Aug 7, 2013)

Dogwalker said:


> To lay minefields needs far less.
> 
> Minefields layed by Germans 1939-45
> 
> ...



not wanting to point out the blindingly obvious, but the German invasion fleet will be just as vulnerable to mines as the RN, Coastal Command laid thousands of mines by night , do you really think the invasion fleet is going to be sailing in clear water?


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## Kryten (Aug 7, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> Here is one map, there are others of greater detail;
> 
> View attachment 239955
> 
> ...



The currents in the straights of dover would make towing barges a nightmare!


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## stona (Aug 7, 2013)

The towed barges would be lucky to make 3 knots. They also need something approaching "Dunkirk weather", a flat calm. They were designed to butt up the Rhine and Danube, as they do today, not make sea crossings.
The various fleets would also require substantial time to assemble before setting off across the channel. They don't simply weigh anchor and set off one by one.
Don't under estimate the time that the British would have to react.
Cheers
Steve


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## stona (Aug 7, 2013)

Kryten said:


> The currents in the straights of dover would make towing barges a nightmare!



Particularly flat bottomed river barges.

Cheers

Steve


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## Dogwalker (Aug 7, 2013)

stona said:


> Compare this sort of operation with the one that the allies used four years later.


And what was the opposition in the two cases? In June 1940 the British Army had 22 infantry divisions and one armoured division. The infantry divisions were, on average, at half strength, had only one-sixth of their normal artillery and were almost totally lacking in transport (Owen).


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## Dogwalker (Aug 7, 2013)

Kryten said:


> not wanting to point out the blindingly obvious, but the German invasion fleet will be just as vulnerable to mines as the RN, Coastal Command laid thousands of mines by night , do you really think the invasion fleet is going to be sailing in clear water?


Not wanting to point out the blindingly obvious, but British minelayers, apart for the smallest, had to go the same route the RN had to and with the same risks. The same for minesweepers. Being able to operate by day and with aerial cover, the minefields the Germans could lay are far bigger and more dense, and the distance the British had to cover in the minefields, longer.


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## stona (Aug 7, 2013)

Dogwalker said:


> And what was the opposition in the two cases? In June 1940 the British Army had 22 infantry divisions and one armoured division. The infantry divisions were, on average, at half strength, had only one-sixth of their normal artillery and were almost totally lacking in transport (Owen).



They still have to run the gamut of the Royal Navy and get ashore. One man and a machine gun caused carnage on Omaha beach.

Cheers

Steve


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## Kryten (Aug 7, 2013)

Dogwalker said:


> Not wanting to point out the blindingly obvious, but British minelayers, apart for the smallest, had to go the same route the RN had to and with the same risks. The same for minesweepers. Being able to operate by day and with aerial cover, the minefields the Germans could lay are far bigger and more dense, and the distance the British had to cover in the minefields, longer.



Coastal command was part of the RAF, they laid mines at night for years!


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## Milosh (Aug 7, 2013)

There was a continuing battle by both sides in the Straights of Dover, both laying and sweeping for mines.

Dogwalker, how many mines did the Germans have?


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## Shortround6 (Aug 7, 2013)

Dogwalker said:


> Minefields layed by Germans 1939-45
> 
> Some were pretty close to British shores, and Germans did not had the air superiority.



The map shows areas mines were dropped/laid in. It does not show density (mines per square km) or duration ( were mines swept/removed before war ended). 

British were sweeping port entrances on regular basis so the fields had to be replenished. Mine warfare is an ongoing thing. you cannot lay a mine field in enemy waters and then ignore it for weeks/months and expect it to still be effective. They will be working to remove it. 




Dogwalker said:


> And why on earth the Invasion force had to move when the LW can't operate?



Well, I guess it doesn't have to, if you can figure out how to get the parts of the invasion fleet from Le Harve to Brighton ( 150 KM?, 25 hours at 6kph, if slower ???) unload and back to Le Harve without the weather changing or night falling for 3-4 days. 

130km from Knokke-Heist to Ramsgate. What is the tidal current? 

And to keep the army supplied you have to keep running ships/barges across the channel until the British surrender. Each division needs 100-300 tons per day, stopping supply runs for 2-4 days because of bad weather and the Luftwaffe not flying isn't a real good option. 



Dogwalker said:


> None to say we are reasoning as the British has perfect knowledge of German intentions. Obviously, in real world Germans can even do diversive operations to make the RN expose itself to mines and air attack to stop a feint.


 If the Luftwaffe has to mine the western end of the Channel, because the German navy can't reach it, except for a few subs, what isn't the Luftwaffe doing? 

Laying a mine field across the channel is rather different than laying mines across several miles of port entrance.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 7, 2013)

Dogwalker said:


> Not wanting to point out the blindingly obvious, but British minelayers, apart for the smallest, had to go the same route the RN had to and with the same risks. The same for minesweepers. Being able to operate by day and with aerial cover, the minefields the Germans could lay are far bigger and more dense, and the distance the British had to cover in the minefields, longer.



Lay using what?

What German ships are in France/Belgium/Holland in late summer/fall of 1940? 

what captured ships are available?



Converted Destroyers could hold about 60 mines.


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## prem895 (Aug 7, 2013)

I would be sporting a Hitler mustache


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## pattle (Aug 7, 2013)

During the invasion of Crete the Germans had absolute control of the air but still didn't dare send a seaborne invasion fleet by day because of the threat from the Royal Navy and allied shore batteries, and when they tried sending a fleet by night the Royal Navy sank it.


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## wiking85 (Aug 7, 2013)

What sort of invasion fleet would have been available in 1941?
I know the Siebel ferries were available in number and the Marinefährprähme started to be delivered in April 1941.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marinefährprahm
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marinefährprahm
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siebel_ferry

Edit:
What if the Bismarck was used for the invasion instead of sorteeing in 1941?


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## Dogwalker (Aug 7, 2013)

Kryten said:


> Coastal command was part of the RAF, they laid mines at night for years!


Having won the BoB
So, in case, the British minelaying had to be limited limited to aircraft operating in obstile skyes at night.
I think the Germans, operating by day under aerial cover, can do a little better.


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## stona (Aug 7, 2013)

Dogwalker said:


> So, in case, the British minelaying had to be limited limited to aircraft operating in obstile skyes at night.



And Luftwaffe night fighters in 1940 amounted to what exactly?

Cheers

Steve


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## JtD (Aug 7, 2013)

We're still talking about a time frame of like late September the latest, are we not? Did the RAF cease to exist just because it lost the battle, or did it not?


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## Dogwalker (Aug 7, 2013)

Milosh said:


> There was a continuing battle by both sides in the Straights of Dover, both laying and sweeping for mines.


Obviously. Having the British won the BoB means that the two air forces had the upper hand on their respective shores, and the Channel was a no man land, but with the RN bein the strongest navy by far.
But having the LW won the BoB means that it has the upper hand on South England, and the Channel is it's backyard. A British minesweeper had to station out of LW reach at day, then steam a full force at sunset, reach it's area of operation (I can imagine accidents over freshy laid mines), sweep, and then withdraw at full force to reach a safe area first than dawn.
How many real hours of work every night? Or better, every night with not enough moonlight to be targeted anyway? How much possibilities, in a strait so narrow, than the explosion of a mine was not seen by an aerial patrol, a bengal launched, and the minesweeper become a sitting duck in the middle of a minefield?


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## Shortround6 (Aug 7, 2013)

Late summer/Fall of 1940 sees the Kriegsmarine at probably it's lowest strength of the war, or at least the first half of the war. The fleet has been reduced to a shadow due to losses and damages in the Norwegian campaign. Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Lutzow are out of action with torpedo damage. They become available in the winter/spring of 1941. The destroyer flotillas were smashed with 12 out of 22 of the big destroyers sunk, how many of the remainder were fit for action I don't know but more as each week/month goes by. The eight of the Z-23 class are commissioned between Sept 1940 and Nov 1941. Commissioned basically means accepted by the Navy. The ship still needs a shake down cruise or two and the crew needs training. 

The Germans also have a problem with air transport. This may be unknown to the British. Hundreds of Ju 52s were lost in the Norwegian Campaign and hundreds more in the attacks on Holland and Belgium. Many of these could be and were repaired but not in time for operations in the late summer/fall of 1940. 

Getting captured ships into operation within a few weeks or months is also a major problem. 
The Belgian navy was almost nonexistent with just a few left over German WW I steam torpedo boats,a single British WW I flower class sloop and a sail training ship. 
The Dutch left more behind but the bulk of their effective ships were either in the far east or escaped to England ( 2 light cruisers, 1 destroyer, 9 submarines, 2 gunboats, 1 sloop, 6 old torpedo boats and 2 mine layers).

Any French ships were of a minor nature for the most part, the French have moved most anything of value that could be moved. 

Even the invasion "fleet" that they did gather had to partially disbanded in order to restore carrying capacity to the coastal, river and canal traffic.


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## Njaco (Aug 7, 2013)

wiking85 said:


> What sort of invasion fleet would have been available in 1941?
> I know the Siebel ferries were available in number and the Marinefährprähme started to be delivered in April 1941.
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marinefährprahm
> https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marinefährprahm
> ...



This link has pics of the invasion barges ....

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww2-general/day-battle-britain-25360-27.html

and a pic of the proposed routes....

.


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## Dogwalker (Aug 7, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> The map shows areas mines were dropped/laid in. It does not show density (mines per square km) or duration


Have I said it shows? I said Germans were able to deploy mines close to British shores, so that's possible. Having the control of the air, they would probably do better.



Shortround6 said:


> Mine warfare is an ongoing thing. you cannot lay a mine field in enemy waters and then ignore it for weeks/months


Have I said someone had to?
*YOU* said Invasion is a *matter of weeks* that's the time the minefiels had to endure.
Really, *you* have to explain for what reason Germans could deploy the mines only once in this scenario.



Shortround6 said:


> Well, I guess it doesn't have to, if you can figure out how to get the parts of the invasion fleet from Le Harve to Brighton


I said someone had to go to Brighton?
I said several of the routes are very close to the shortest distance.




Shortround6 said:


> And to keep the army supplied you have to


Seize a port and an airfield using battle hardened troops counter newbies. If the Regia Marina could refurbish first Tripoli (587 km from Trapani to Tripoli, with Malta in the way), and then Tunis (271 km) with the RAF Active at Malta and in NA, with rates close to 90% (100% in 1940...)...



Shortround6 said:


> Laying a mine field across the channel is rather different than laying mines across several miles of port entrance.


The Channel is a narrow strait. Far bigger areas were mined in WWII without even having the complete control of the air.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 7, 2013)

Dogwalker said:


> Obviously. Having the British won the BoB means that the two air forces had the upper hand on their respective shores, and the Channel was a no man land, but with the RN bein the strongest navy by far.
> But having the LW won the BoB means that it has the upper hand on South England, and the Channel is it's backyard. A British minesweeper had to station out of LW reach at day, then steam a full force at sunset, reach it's area of operation (I can imagine accidents over freshy laid mines), sweep, and then withdraw at full force to reach a safe area first than dawn.
> How many real hours of work every night? Or better, every night with not enough moonlight to be targeted anyway? How much possibilities, in a strait so narrow, than the explosion of a mine was not seen by an aerial patrol, a bengal launched, and the minesweeper become a sitting duck in the middle of a minefield?



And how many German bombers shot down trying bomb mine sweepers in port defended by shore based AA guns? 

Or try to find the minesweepers in port. 

A minesweeper is a small ship, a bit narrower than a destroyer and about 1/2 the length and that is for a naval minesweeper, the British purchased and impressed commercial trawlers by the hundred during the war. 65 or so purchased before the war, 1300 requisitioned during the whole war ( including the Dominion navies), 6 whalers taken over building and 200 requisitioned and 24 Admiralty drifters and about 550 requisitioned.

The British may be able to play a shell game and move some of the mine sweepers from small port to small port forcing the Luftwaffe into lots of recon missions and small bombing raids. Or have the Luftwaffe try to bomb every ship/boat over 100ft long on the whole coast? 

Just because the Luftwaffe wins the BoB in this scenario does not mean it becomes omnipotent, able to find, bomb, and hit whatever it desires, whenever it desires. German losses during the BoB, even of bombers were not kept up with by production. The Germans do need to maintain an general air offensive against the British to keep the pressure on, they need to build up a reserve for supporting the ground forces once the invasion takes place, and they need to keep the Royal Navy at bay or tied up. 

Winning the BoB may mean winning it over Southeast England. It could very well mean NOT having control of the air over Western or Northern England. Which means the Luftwaffe has to be strong enough to counter any British counter attacks once the Invasion is under way. These may be forlorn hopes by Gladiators, Blenheim's and Lysander's ( and assorted bombers) but the Luftwaffe isn't doing itself any favors by trying to bomb every large fishing boat or coaster on the British east coast which is about the only way to make sure they get the majority of minesweepers.


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## Dogwalker (Aug 7, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> Late summer/Fall of 1940 sees the Kriegsmarine at probably it's lowest strength of the war, or at least the first half of the war.


What was the strenght of the Soviet fleet in the Black Sea? Soviets made someting like 114 landings, generally having to face battle-hardened opposition, using about every kind of available boat.
In this scenario about the only thing the Kriegsmarine battle units had to do is to take care of the RN smallest and fastest ships that, with heavy losses, could really try to pass through the minefields.
Had the big units of the Home Fleet tried to do the same... the Germans would have been happy to try the invasion, and fail, just to get rid of the Home Fleet so easily.


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## RCAFson (Aug 7, 2013)

pattle said:


> During the invasion of Crete the Germans had absolute control of the air but still didn't dare send a seaborne invasion fleet by day because of the threat from the Royal Navy and allied shore batteries, and when they tried sending a fleet by night the Royal Navy sank it.



*Actually, the Germans tried twice by day to send troops via sea to Crete and the RN destroyed both attempts, despite the fact that the RN was operating hundreds of miles from their bases and had absolutely no air cover.* Only after the RN was occupied in withdrawing Commonwealth troops did the Axis manage to land some forces by sea, otherwise the 3rd attempt would have met the same fate as the previous two. Crete really does show that the Germans had almost zero chance of landing troops across the channel.

There has been some mention that the RN convoys through to Malta some how proved that the RN could not operate in the face of Axis airpower, yet these convoys had to travel over a thousand miles from their bases to Malta and tied the RN escort to slow merchant ships, and even then the convoys never faced heavy losses until the final leg of the journey when the heavy escort had to leave the convoy.

RN, FAA and RAF forces that operated from Malta scored heavily against Axis convoys, despite the overwhelming disparity in numbers which favoured the Axis. Average Commonwealth air strength on Malta was maybe 1/10 of Axis air strength in the area with a similar disparity in Naval strength, despite this Malta based forces destroyed hundred of thousands of tons of Axis shipping yet we are to believe that with a huge advantage in numbers and some air cover, that the RN won't destroy an attempted invasion of the UK? General Halder summed up the German Army's chances when he said: 


> The German Navy wanted a front as short as possible as they regarded this as more defensible. Admiral Raeder wanted a front stretching from Dover to Eastbourne, stressing that shipping between Cherbourg/Le Havre and Dorset would be exposed to attacks from the Navy based in Portsmouth and Plymouth. General Halder rejected this, saying, *"From the army's point of view I regard it as complete suicide, I might just as well put the troops that have landed straight through the sausage machine."* ( Operation Sea Lion - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia )


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## Kryten (Aug 7, 2013)

and I suppose the Brits are just sitting on their hands whilst the Germans spend the next few weeks sowing mines across the channel?

lets get real, a minefield is not going to stop the RN getting at the invasion fleet, aircraft will be replaced and the RAF will be a factor because the BOB only covered a tenth of the UK, British aircraft industry outperformed the Germans comprehensively during this period, and bizarrely in this scenario the Luftwaffe is left at full strength yet in reality the losses it takes defeating the RAF will leave it in a weakened and parlous state to provide effective air cover for the invasion or to attack the RN, so you have to surmise the Luftwaffe would not have air supremacy over southern England, on top of that you have the thousands of troops brought back from Dunkirk to factor in and the fact the Germans have no tank landing craft so their invasion is going to be primarily infantry until a port is secured!
Then of course you have the weather!

No wonder the Kriegsmarine thought the whole idea was idiotic!


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## Milosh (Aug 7, 2013)

Be sure Kryten, the British will leave the ports in pristine condition.


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## Dogwalker (Aug 7, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> And how many German bombers shot down trying bomb mine sweepers in port defended by shore based AA guns?


So now ports under enemy air control are sure places? Interesting things happens...



Shortround6 said:


> Or have the Luftwaffe try to bomb...


"enemy air control" means that they bomb. Ships are privileged targets, better if they are steady in ports.



Shortround6 said:


> Just because the Luftwaffe wins the BoB in this scenario does not mean it becomes omnipotent,


Just because the RAF lost the BoB in this scenario does not means that every other british weapon becomes such to save the day. Ships capable to hide everywere, AA fire capable to hit everything, coastal artillery capable to survive bombings and hit everything, navy capable to pass everywere at the desired speed...



Shortround6 said:


> Winning the BoB may mean winning it over Southeast England.


So over the channel, the invasion shores and more than 100 km in the hinterland. Have I ever talked of other places?


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## Shortround6 (Aug 7, 2013)

Dogwalker said:


> Have I said it shows? I said Germans were able to deploy mines close to British shores, so that's possible. Having the control of the air, they would probably do better.



They can deploy them, the question is in what quantity, in 1940 the Germans were using He 115 float planes as mine layers among others. having control of the air does not increase the carrying capacity of your aircraft or their numbers. 

If you want to stop the Royal Navy from showing up near an invasion beach and conduction target practice on the assembled shipping you need a LOT of mines. Mining a shipping channel is one thing, just a few mines can block of a channel that is only a few hundred yards wide, or even laying a fan or arc where the channel opens up. The Germans dropped mines a number of nights but not all and the British swept channels most days, probably a lot more often than the Germans dropped mines. But the Germans need a lot of mines to close off the channel (or even half of it). it can't be done in a single night or even a few so you have an on going battle between the minelayers and the mine sweepers even before the first barge leaves port. Once the Invasion fleet is on the way what losses do the British accept in sweeping or forcing the mine fields? 



Dogwalker said:


> *YOU* said Invasion is a *matter of weeks* that's the time the minefiels had to endure.
> Really, *you* have to explain for what reason Germans could deploy the mines only once in this scenario.



They can deploy them as much as they want, in fact they *have* to reseed the fields to keep them effective. but planes/ships that are filling in the blanks (swept areas) are not doing other things. The Germans won the BoB, that didn't give them unlimited resources. 




Dogwalker said:


> I said someone had to go to Brighton?
> I said several of the routes are very close to the shortest distance.



The original German planes called for several divisions to got Brighton. Do you have your own plan? 

As stated before, the closest Continental ports have nowhere near the capacity to handle the number of divisions the Germans planned to use, unless you plan to take days if not weeks longer to put the same number of men and equipment ashore. 





Dogwalker said:


> Seize a port and an airfield using battle hardened troops counter newbies.



Germans were running out of Ju 52s. 150 had been lost in Norway and of the 430 used in the low countries 2/3s were lost or badly damaged. 100 were later repaired or used for parts. Depending on which port you seize it may not be enough for the number of divisions employed. 

The British army may not be the push overs you think. The troops in France actually performed one of the most difficult of all military operations. A controlled, systematic retreat in almost constant contact with an attacking enemy. A break down in discipline or a failure of tactics/procedures would have meant _NO_ troops reaching Dunkirk to be evacuated. 

And your short route to Dover is about the worst attack route. A limited port commanded by high ground with steep cliffs on _both sides_. The Luftwaffe is your _only_ support. 



Dogwalker said:


> The Channel is a narrow strait. Far bigger areas were mined in WWII without even having the complete control of the air.



Narrow where? at the Straits of Dover?

It is about 11km from Fecamp to Eastbourne and just a bit less from Cherbourg to Swanage. 

it is not just the area the mines are in but the density. Say the British send 16 destroyers and 4 hit mines and 12 get through. What will 12 destroyers do to the the invasion "fleet"? The only gun fire support ships are what ever guns are being carried as deck cargo on the barges. The German "fleet" is in Germany or trying to move down the channel itself. 

How many old "C" or "D" class cruisers are the British willing to loose?


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## Dogwalker (Aug 7, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> *Actually, the Germans tried twice by day to send troops via sea to Crete and the RN destroyed both attempts, despite the fact that the RN was operating hundreds of miles from their bases and had absolutely no air cover.*


"destroyed" is a big word.
The escort of the two attempted landings (made with small fishing boats) was of a single torpedo boat each. The first landing attempt was attacked by three light cruisers and four destroyers (Force D), that managed to sink about 1/3 of the boats. The second was attacked by three cruisers and four destroyers (Force C), and managed to escape almost untouched. The RN resisted for two entire days (21-22 may) at the cost of 1828 dead, three cruisers and three destroyers, to kill 800 Germans and sink some wooden boat. Then had to leave the camp, while the German airborne troops haven't already managed to seize even a single airport, leaving the Crete garrison, numerically widely prevalent over the Germans, to be crushed by air attacks.
The third attempt to stop the landings (5th Destroyer Flotilla, five destroyers) lost two ships without even came in contact with the landing boats and had to withdraw.
Other than those sunk, a carrier, two battleships, four cruisers and two destroyers were kept out of action for months for the damages sustained, and that's for only three days of battle not having aerial cover, counter a non existant surface enemy force, and without mines on the scenario.


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## Dogwalker (Aug 7, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> it can't be done in a single night


Have I ever said it has to be done in a single night?



Shortround6 said:


> or even a few so you have an on going battle between the minelayers and the mine sweepers


Yeah, the famous minesweepers invulnerable to air attacks and able to hide everywere.



Shortround6 said:


> The Germans won the BoB, that didn't give them unlimited resources.


Infact it seems that having lost it gave them to the British.




Shortround6 said:


> The original German planes called for several divisions to got Brighton.


The original German planes called for other routes too. It states somewere that taking Brighton wit the first wawe is necessary in some ways for the success of the whole invasion?



Shortround6 said:


> As stated before, the closest Continental ports have nowhere near the capacity to handle the number of divisions the Germans planned to use,


The fact that Tripoli was a small port was the reason why the RM had ever to keep three convoys at sea at the same time instead of only send one a month as originally planned.
The situation led to modify the plan.



Shortround6 said:


> Narrow where?


You prtefer I call it large? Facts don't change.



Shortround6 said:


> it is not just the area the mines are in but the density.


Larger areas had been mined effectively in WWII in worse conditions.



Shortround6 said:


> Say the British send 16 destroyers and 4 hit mines and 12 get through.


Force K had 37% losses only having come in contact with a small minefield. It hadn't even tried to get trough.


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## RCAFson (Aug 7, 2013)

Dogwalker said:


> "destroyed" is a big word.
> The escort of the two attempted landings (made with small fishing boats) was of a single torpedo boat each. The first landing attempt was attacked by three light cruisers and four destroyers (Force D), that managed to sink about 1/3 of the boats. The second was attacked by three cruisers and four destroyers (Force C), and managed to escape almost untouched. The RN resisted for two entire days (21-22 may) at the cost of 1828 dead, three cruisers and three destroyers, to kill 800 Germans and sink some wooden boat. Then had to leave the camp, while the German airborne troops haven't already managed to seize even a single airport, leaving the Crete garrison, numerically widely prevalent over the Germans, to be crushed by air attacks.
> The third attempt to stop the landings (5th Destroyer Flotilla, five destroyers) lost two ships without even came in contact with the landing boats and had to withdraw.
> Other than those sunk, a carrier, two battleships, four cruisers and two destroyers were kept out of action for months for the damages sustained, and that's for only three days of battle not having aerial cover, counter a non existant surface enemy force, and without mines on the scenario.



The RN at Crete was operating hundreds of miles from it's bases with absolutely no aircover, and the Axis still couldn't mount a seaborne invasion in the the face of RN opposition. In the channel the RN has more forces, is closer to it's bases and has some aircover. The 2nd axis invasion attempt at Crete did suffer light losses because they turned tail and ran away. There was no 3rd attempt to stop an axis invasion, as by that time the RN was tasked with withdrawing the troops from Crete and if they hadn't been so occupied the 3rd attempt would have been easily destroyed.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 7, 2013)

Dogwalker said:


> So now ports under enemy air control are sure places? Interesting things happens...



Just trying to point out that the Germans will not have everything their own way.

The Allies spent a lot of time, aircraft and aircrew bombing Brest and Le Harve. Sometimes they hit the ships there and sometimes ( a lot of times) they didn't. Just because you control the air does not mean you can automatically destroy every ship with in the zone you control, especially in 1940. Germans are already getting a bit short on bombers. Ports covered by AA guns are NOT sure safe places but neither are they death traps or target ranges for the Luftwaffe. German losses in Aug and Sept for bombers have operational losses running at about 1/6 to 1/3 of the enemy related losses. 






Dogwalker said:


> "enemy air control" means that they bomb. Ships are privileged targets, better if they are steady in ports.



Large ships may be privileged targets, easily replaceable small ships like mine sweepers may not be. How many days to fit mine sweeping gear and a couple of AA guns to a fishing trawler? 

Picking 3-4 trawler minesweepers tied up alongside a quay might be a little difficult if there are 12-20 other similar sized ships/craft tied up/anchored in the same harbor. 




Dogwalker said:


> Just because the RAF lost the BoB in this scenario does not means that every other british weapon becomes such to save the day. Ships capable to hide everywere, AA fire capable to hit everything, coastal artillery capable to survive bombings and hit everything, navy capable to pass everywere at the desired speed...



A little less hyperbole if you please. Large ships like cruisers have limited places to hide. Both due to sheer size (length) and depth of water required, there are only so many places they can go. A "ship" that is under 30 feet wide and 165ft long and needs 12-14 feet of water has a lot more harbors and estuaries it can "hide" in. 

AA fire doesn't need to hit "everything" just increase the operational losses somewhat and disturb the bomb aimers enough to miss, or at least to require more sorties per hit. 

Coastal artillery was hardly infallible but it was dangerous, it also proved rather hard to take out on anything approaching a permanent basis, wither it was British or German or American or Japanese. In many cases in survived up until overrun by infantry (or running out of ammo) despite air superiority (total in some cases) , battleship bombardment and the like. 

"navy capable to pass everywere at the desired speed" not sure what this means but it goes both ways. Some people have estimated that the Germans might take two full days to get from some ports to their planed landing sites, and as noted the Kreigsmarine, what there is of it, is nowhere near the English channel in the summer of 1940. Without doing a "channel dash" the Germans will have nothing larger than a WW I destroyer or gun boat to support the invasion fleet and darn few of them. Destroyers and light cruisers should have very little trouble maintaining 24 kts (44kph) for a number of hours on end. Roughly a 200km radius with an hours "working time". and that is if the Germans have recon planes or bombers right over the base entrance at sunset and sunrise. 




So over the channel, the invasion shores and more than 100 km in the hinterland. Have I ever talked of other places?[/QUOTE]


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## buffnut453 (Aug 7, 2013)

Interesting discussion but I think we need to define what is meant by defeat of the RAF in the BoB. If we're talking about total annihilation, or at least the destruction of Fighter Command such that it was no longer capable of defending British airspace, then th entire argument about the capabilities of the RN to interdict an invasion force is somewhat moot. There wasn't a single UK port that lay outside German bomber range. Long before the German invasion barges set off, the RN fleet would be, at best, severely attrited or, at worst, forced to retreat to Canada or some other part of the Empire. However, I think this an unlikely scenario.

It would be far more likely that Fighter Command would lose air superiority over southeast England. This would leave London entirely exposed, resulting in loss of confidence in the Churchill government. As late as May 1940 there were senior politicians advocating a political agreement with Germany. With London exposed and defenceless (apart from ineffectual AA guns and barrage balloons), there would be strong justification for a change of government which could have been led by Halifax or one of his cronies, potentially leading to a negotiated peace with Germany. 

With a negotiated peace, there's no need for an invasion force. Hitler could simply bide his time, installing pliant British politicians who would accede to his every whim. Want to station more German troops in the UK to protect against America? Certainly Herr Hitler. Like Vichy France, in the end the UK would become a Nazi satellite with zero autonomy. Undoubtedly, there would be resistance but where would they get their supplies? Resistance on the continent only survived because it had a good resupply base from the UK. Without that, there's nothing to sustain resistance other than courage. Certainly not sufficient to overcome the Nazi war machine.


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## Airframes (Aug 7, 2013)

At last, a sensible suggestion to the original question!
And I agree. Given the above scenario, I believe that is exactly what would have happened and, if it had, there's a good chance that all of Europe would now still be speaking German - or possibly Russian!


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## Greyman (Aug 7, 2013)

I agree, a _far _more likely scenario compared to the suicidal Op Sealion.


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## pattle (Aug 7, 2013)

RCAFson and Dogwalker, the first attempt to land troops on Crete was made by night and was discovered by radar about twenty or so miles off Hania, when within range the Royal Navy turned on it's search lights and basically opened up with every gun it had. This battle lasted for over two hours and only stopped when the Royal Navy had to break off contact in order to retreat from range of the stukas etc before first light. The sound of gunfire and flashes out to sea were close enough to be witnessed by the Allied troops. The second attempt was made by day when the Royal Navy sank a small number of ships before later finding the main convoy which retreated and got away. Both attacks by the Royal Navy succeeded in stopping the seaborne invasion although in the second attack the Royal Navy lost (from memory) two cruisers and at least one destroyer. The Germans eventually landed troops including a small number of panzer 2's and other heavy equipment at a small quay west of Maleme, this landing was not only possible because the Royal Navy was engaged in the evacuation of Crete but also because the tiny port in question had already been captured, it was not an opposed landing and the Germans were not able to land these reinforcements until the final Greek troops had been flushed out of this port. 
I would expect that the Germans would not only have to capture a intact port but also capture any points that command it as they needed to in Crete (and as the Allies needed to following their later capture of Antwerp). I don't know how many JU 52's the Germans had at their disposal during 1940 but I can't imagine it would have been anything close to enough to have supplied a bridge head during operation sealion. During the invasion of Crete the allies had no fighter cover and few anti-aircraft guns yet they destroyed many JU52's, of the three airfields the Germans attempted to seize they captured only one, and that only just and at great loss. In the case of the one airfield they did capture this was only held mostly because the Allies did not have radios to organise a counter attack or the transport to move their troops to the required area. Had the Germans won the Battle of Britain then unlike in the invasion of Crete the RAF would have still retained at least a small number of fighters, the British Army would of been able to communicate and move reinforcements to landing areas and would have had at least some heavy weapons while the Germans would had none until they had captured a port to unload them. Together with this and as in Crete the civilians would most likely have joined in the fight against the Germans, I know my own family were clear on this as they had nothing to lose because they understood they would have been amongst the first up against the wall had the Germans succeeded.

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## pattle (Aug 7, 2013)

Buffnut, defeatists and Nazi sympathisers were only a very small faction in British politics and were not supported by the King or the people, they wouldn't of had the authority to negotiate on behalf of the British government and probably would have been rounded up before they had chance to open their mouths.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 7, 2013)

Dogwalker said:


> Have I ever said it has to be done in a single night?



no, but then we are back to an ongoing battle or race. The mine fields will not spring into place instantly, the British will not know the exact location, the Germans will keep trying to add to (extend and thicken) them without knowing how much or exactly where the British have swept. 




Dogwalker said:


> Yeah, the famous minesweepers invulnerable to air attacks and able to hide everywere.



only to counter the German planes that can see through fog, smoke, cloud and never, ever miss. 
The minesweepers are hardly invulnerable, there are just a lot of them and they are hard to identify. Given that many pilots mis-identified ships ( calling even destroyers battleships on occasions or tankers aircraft carriers) trying to pick out small ships that can be in a variety of locations and look a lot like all kinds of other small ships is not anywhere near a 100% certainty. Even if the Germans sink a few dozen in one month it may not be enough. The British may have more hulls than crews. 




Dogwalker said:


> The fact that Tripoli was a small port was the reason why the RM had ever to keep three convoys at sea at the same time instead of only send one a month as originally planned.
> The situation led to modify the plan.



Tripoli could not support the Africa Corp on a steady basis, granted a fair amount of supplies got burned up on the way to the front but then the Africa Corp was not 8-10 divisions either. Both sides would have "stock up" for a while before going on the offensive as offensive operations sucked up supplies faster than they could be restocked. Landing on British beaches, advancing a few Km and waiting days to stock up for a further advance is not a good option. Dover is a lousy landing site because not only is there high ground on either side of the town but the ONLY way out (aside from going up or down the beach) is through a narrow valley and past a number of ridges that parallel the beach. If you can google map it, do so and hit terrain. 




Dogwalker said:


> You prtefer I call it large? Facts don't change.



Things are relative. the areas you need to block off with mines are a lot bigger than 21 miles, and really big mine fields tend not to work very well. The American put 70,000 mines into the North Sea Mine barrage in WW I and sank eight u-boats. 230 miles long and 15 to 35 miles wide. parallel columns of ships 500 yds apart dropping mines every 100 yards in 18 rows at three depths but against surface ships only one depth would be needed. Getting anywhere near even spacing from air drops would be impossible.


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## buffnut453 (Aug 7, 2013)

Pattle,

The British people had no choice when Churchill became their Prime Minister. There was no election. Chamberlain went to King George and simply recommended Churchill to be his successor. Why would a replacement for Churchill be any different? Vote of no confidence in Parliament, Halifax stakes his claim as the only viable candidate. Also, bear in mind that a defenceless London would likely be evacuated. With Parliament on the run, who would be in any position to oppose an appeasing faction from taking power.

If you haven't read "Five Days in May", I strongly recommend you do - a most enlightening insight into how many senior politicians and aristocracy were, at best, luke warm to the idea of opposing Hitler. Some were Nazi sympathisers (based, largely, on Hitler's economic miracle during the 1930s) and some were defeatists but a large proportion were simply imbued with a dread of large-scale modern warfare based on experience in WWI. Plenty of the rank-and-file across the country were willing to copy their lead. Even with Churchill's anti-Hitler rhetoric, he and the Royal Family were still booed by victims of the Blitz during his early period in office. 

I think there is plenty of justification for my statements once we get past some of the more mythical aspects of Britain's lonely stand from June 1940 until December 1941.


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## pinsog (Aug 7, 2013)

pattle said:


> When Churchill said we will fight them on the beaches, in the streets and in the fields and hills etc and that we shall never surrender he wasn't exaggerating. Churchill forecasted a new dark age should Britain fall and again he wasn't exaggerating because as we all know now that's what would have happened. These were not just brave words and talking big, Churchill was spelling out the reality of the situation and what needed to be done. If the Germans had of tried to invade Britain by sea then the German army would have been ruthlessly butchered by the Royal Navy and what little of it that made it ashore would have been slaughtered in frenzied killings by anyone and everyone that was within reach of it with whatever they had to hand. Britain has unlike the rest of Europe in having no tradition of being invaded and the British people in 1940 had the almost unique benefit of hindsight after having seen the fate of other countries. Hitler knew all this and that's why he didn't try. Invading Britain in 1940 would have cost Hitler his army even if he had of been successful and Hitler didn't want to lose his army invading a tiny island when he could of had Russia instead. Hitler's idea was to invade Russia and then come back and finish Britain off, Churchill knew this before even the Russians did and that's why he was so willing to support them in 1941 even though he hated Stalin and all he stood for and up until that point Stalin had been helping the Germans.



The German Army being cut to pieces by every person in Britain sounds all good and patriotic, but exactly how would the British people have done that? With what weapons? The British army had lost a great deal of equipment in France and in their great wisdom the British government had disarmed their own people. If you want to know how sharp sticks work against an invading army, ask the Chinese how their war went against Japan.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 7, 2013)

buffnut453 said:


> Interesting discussion but I think we need to define what is meant by defeat of the RAF in the BoB. If we're talking about total annihilation, or at least the destruction of Fighter Command such that it was no longer capable of defending British airspace, then th entire argument about the capabilities of the RN to interdict an invasion force is somewhat moot. There wasn't a single UK port that lay outside German bomber range. Long before the German invasion barges set off, the RN fleet would be, at best, severely attrited or, at worst, forced to retreat to Canada or some other part of the Empire. However, I think this an unlikely scenario.




There is a rather narrow window for this to occur. Just as the sea borne invasion has to take place before the weather gets too bad, A late fall, early winter invasion might not even need intervention by the Royal Navy. 

Destroying enough of the Royal Navy to safe guard the invasion can be done, just not quickly or easily. Again, see how many raids the RAF tried against the German ships at Brest. 

According to one source : Scharnhorst - The History - The Scharnhorst at Brest, France

" a series of operations that had already expended 3,413 tons of bombs (compared with the 20,202 that had been dropped on the whole of Germany) and which had cost Bomber Command 127 aircraft."

This was by the end of Dec 1941, more bombs would be dropped by the time of the Channel Dash. 

Granted a good deal of the attacks were at night but in some cases they were done by up to 100 4 engine bombers in one night.


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## buffnut453 (Aug 7, 2013)

And those raids against Brest were against defended airspace. Per my original comment, I was making the assumption that the RAF was no longer capable of defending Britain...a most unlikely scenario. However, I'll play along...how much damage would be done to port facilities? How many RN vessels would be capable of any form of effective operation, particularly en masse as would be needed for the valiant defence you're proposing. 

Irrespective, I still believe the most likely scenario would be the collapse of the Churchill Government to be replaced by one more willing to seek peace with Germany. Under those circumstances, the whole invasion problem disappears. Hitler doesn't need to invade because he now has a friend on his westernmost flank...he can throw all his resources against the USSR (although I still think he'd fail there, but that's another discussion).


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## silence (Aug 7, 2013)

Don't forget the U-boat force when you talk about ways to counter the RN. It could be a very significant factor depending on how its used.


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## nuuumannn (Aug 7, 2013)

> It could be a very significant factor depending on how its used.



I doubt that, simply because of the small number of them, the fact that they were largely coastal types and the really bad torpedoes the Germans had. The biggest crisis facing the Kriegsmarine at the start of the war and for the first year and a half was the fact that its torpedoes were malfunctioning or at worst did not work at all.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 8, 2013)

buffnut453 said:


> And those raids against Brest were against defended airspace. Per my original comment, I was making the assumption that the RAF was no longer capable of defending Britain...a most unlikely scenario. However, I'll play along...how much damage would be done to port facilities? How many RN vessels would be capable of any form of effective operation, particularly en masse as would be needed for the valiant defence you're proposing.



En masse.........valiant defence????

The _only_ defense the German invasion fleet has is the Luftwaffe, some mines and a some subs operating in shallow water. I have already listed the _available_ German surface ships at the time in question. Go ahead and add the Prinz Eugen for a 3rd heavy cruiser. Her dash down the Channel can be her shake down/1st training cruise for the crew. One of the 3 light cruisers available is the Emden, roughly equivalent to a "D" class Cruiser, she is being used as a training ship in the Baltic. 

How many German surface Combatants were south of Amsterdam in Sept 1940? 

BTW British subs had done a fair job on the German Navy in year leading up to the BoB. Torpedo hits had sidelined the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, the Lutzow, the Leipzeg ( turned into a training ship short one boiler room), the Nurnberg might have been repaired in time from her torpedo hit to take part in the invasion. The Karlsruhe was sunk as was the Sloop F9 by sub torpedoes and the 933 ton type 1924 torpedo boat Luchs was also a victim. 

Attempts by the Kriegsmarine to move en masse to a position to support the invasion may very well have seen them suffer a fair degree of attrition. 

If the Luftwaffe is trying to bomb the crap out of the RN it is NOT bombing London.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 8, 2013)

I cannot imagine any realistic scenario wherein the RAF would be so depleted at the close of the BoB that it had NO fighter capability remaining or production and training had ceased and all veteran pilots had disappeared. I would expect the RAF to be in considerably better shape than the USAAF Far East Air Force defending Bataan peninsula in early 1942. It is a poor analogy for many reasons but a handful of P-40's equipped with bombs completely disrupted Japanese attempts to perform amphibious assaults on the peninsula at a time when Luzon airspace was essentially completely controlled by the IJA. The point here is that it doesn't take much of an air force to wreak havoc on an amphibious assault force. At Normandy the Luftwaffe was conspicuous in its near total absence. Winning the BoB by any reasonable measure, would not translate to the complete destruction of the RAF capability to disrupt an amphibious attack. Defending southern Britain is not the same mission as staging a focused and escorted air attack on surface vessels crossing the channel. I should add that the very few landings that did occur on Bataan by trained veteran IJA infantry were dislodged after bitter fighting _by USAAF ground crew and navy cooks, untrained and lightly armed_. If the Germans had 'won' the BoB (in what would have been close to a Pyrrhic victory) and then attempted to invade Britain in 1940, I believe ww2 would have been over a lot sooner. JMHO

I also believe the RN would have barely broken a sweat as the bulk of the work would have been done by the _*beaten *_RAF in what would have been a slaughter in the channel. Payback is a bit*h.


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## RCAFson (Aug 8, 2013)

pinsog said:


> The German Army being cut to pieces by every person in Britain sounds all good and patriotic, but exactly how would the British people have done that? With what weapons? The British army had lost a great deal of equipment in France and in their great wisdom the British government had disarmed their own people. If you want to know how sharp sticks work against an invading army, ask the Chinese how their war went against Japan.



If the Germans could have invaded in July 1940 they would have had a much better chance of success, but by mid September the UK defenses were much stronger, with the Army being largely reequipped with new output from UK factories and bolstered by several Commonwealth divisions.


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## RCAFson (Aug 8, 2013)

pattle said:


> RCAFson and Dogwalker, the first attempt to land troops on Crete was made by night and was discovered by radar about twenty or so miles off Hania, when within range the Royal Navy turned on it's search lights and basically opened up with every gun it had. This battle lasted for over two hours and only stopped when the Royal Navy had to break off contact in order to retreat from range of the stukas etc before first light. The sound of gunfire and flashes out to sea were close enough to be witnessed by the Allied troops. The second attempt was made by day when the Royal Navy sank a small number of ships before later finding the main convoy which retreated and got away. Both attacks by the Royal Navy succeeded in stopping the seaborne invasion although in the second attack the Royal Navy lost (from memory) two cruisers and at least one destroyer. The Germans eventually landed troops including a small number of panzer 2's and other heavy equipment at a small quay west of Maleme, this landing was not only possible because the Royal Navy was engaged in the evacuation of Crete but also because the tiny port in question had already been captured, it was not an opposed landing and the Germans were not able to land these reinforcements until the final Greek troops had been flushed out of this port.
> I would expect that the Germans would not only have to capture a intact port but also capture any points that command it as they needed to in Crete (and as the Allies needed to following their later capture of Antwerp). I don't know how many JU 52's the Germans had at their disposal during 1940 but I can't imagine it would have been anything close to enough to have supplied a bridge head during operation sealion. During the invasion of Crete the allies had no fighter cover and few anti-aircraft guns yet they destroyed many JU52's, of the three airfields the Germans attempted to seize they captured only one, and that only just and at great loss. In the case of the one airfield they did capture this was only held mostly because the Allies did not have radios to organise a counter attack or the transport to move their troops to the required area. Had the Germans won the Battle of Britain then unlike in the invasion of Crete the RAF would have still retained at least a small number of fighters, the British Army would of been able to communicate and move reinforcements to landing areas and would have had at least some heavy weapons while the Germans would had none until they had captured a port to unload them. Together with this and as in Crete the civilians would most likely have joined in the fight against the Germans, I know my own family were clear on this as they had nothing to lose because they understood they would have been amongst the first up against the wall had the Germans succeeded.



I agree that the first invasion attempt was timed to land at night, but it was spotted in daylight by recon aircraft after it left port:


> 22. No seaborne landing had yet taken place
> but air reconnaissance reported groups of small
> craft, escorted by destroyers,. steering towards
> Crete from Milo. Forces B, • C and D
> ...


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## Jabberwocky (Aug 8, 2013)

For me, the crucial question of Sealion is not whether the Royal Navy could have defeated the Channel crossing (which I believe they comprehensively would have, purely on weight on numbers) but the logistics of the whole operation.

A German light infantry division consumed around 150-200 tonnes of supplies per day and around 400 tons while in heavy combat. A motorised/mechanised division consumed around 300 tons per day, a German armoured division consumed around 300 to 350 tons of supplies. An armoured division could consume up to 700 tons per day if it was in heavy combat.

For the Germans to supply the nine infantry and 2 airborne divisions put across in the first wave they have to land somewhere between 2200 tons per day (assuming 200 tons per day for light combat) and 4400 tons per day (assuming 400 tons per day for heavy combat). 

In their anti-invasion preparations, the British thought that the Germans would have to bring across around 3300 tons per day, a round figure of 300 tons per division. 

The port capacity in the Sealion invasion area was around 1400 tons per day, when at full capacity. The British plans were to wreck the port facilities in the event of a landing, which was expected to have the effect of cutting capacity to around 150 tons per week (one twentieth of estimated supply needed) in the first week, increasing to about 800 tons by the end of the second week.

Even if the German army achieves a coup de main and captures the port facilities intact (a highly unlikely scenario), it is still required to land somewhere close to 1900 tons (assuming the mean figure of 3300 tons per day) over open beaches without port facilities. Without the British Army, Royal Air Force or Royal Navy interfering. Or the weather.

To think Sealion has a reasonable chance of success, even with Fighter Command reduced to almost nothing, is wilfull denial of the evidence of the highest order.


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## stona (Aug 8, 2013)

buffnut453 said:


> Irrespective, I still believe the most likely scenario would be the collapse of the Churchill Government to be replaced by one more willing to seek peace with Germany. Under those circumstances, the whole invasion problem disappears. Hitler doesn't need to invade because he now has a friend on his westernmost flank...he can throw all his resources against the USSR (although I still think he'd fail there, but that's another discussion).



That's more or less what the Germans were hoping for.
Sealion was a bluff. Whether the coalition government would have collapsed or not is a moot point. Churchill may well have been replaced but even that doesn't necessarily mean that the same government, with a different Prime Minister, would start negotiations.
It was Germany's best chance of levering Britain out of the war. Luckily the Luftwaffe lost (yes, lost whatever some might write today) the Battle of Britain and we'll never know what might have happened. The one thing I'm sure of is that the Germans would not have launched an invasion across the Channel.
Cheers
Steve


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## Dogwalker (Aug 8, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> The RN at Crete


Was operating in an IDEAL situation of this scenario. Pratically no surfaces enemy forces. Landing forces composed of slow and unadapt boats (they didn't even had a single radio equipement onto them), no mines, but hadn't the air cover.
Result, RN held contact with the enemy for *two days*, facing heavy losses, and then Cunningam had to decide if the remaining units had to loose the contact in a orizontal direction or in a vertical one.
*Not only.* For these two days the performances of the RN appeared to be very sub standard. A force of three light cruisers and four destroyers wasn't able to deal with a single torpedo boat at 700m distance. A cruiser was damaged by a near miss of a torpedo, the RN ships even shoot themself, and two third of the flotilla was safe.
A second force of three cruisers and four destroyers gave up to act against the second flotilla, escorted by a single torpedo boat.
What happened? All the clueless of the RN had gathered in Crete? Or having to operate under very difficult conditions had degraded the performances of sailors who, in other circumstances, would have given the usual excellent proof of the RN?



RCAFson said:


> In the channel the RN has more forces,


Cause you think that in may 1941 all the German forces were were at Creete?



RCAFson said:


> The 2nd axis invasion attempt at Crete did suffer light losses because they turned tail and ran away.


"turned the tail and run away"? At what speed they "run away" exactly? Three cruisers and four destroyers wasn't able to pursue some wooden fishing boat? The second landing attempt suffered light losses cause the C Force gave up to pursue them under the bombings.



RCAFson said:


> There was no 3rd attempt to stop an axis invasion, as by that time the RN was tasked with withdrawing the troops from Crete and if they hadn't been so occupied the 3rd attempt would have been easily destroyed.


Two of the 5Th Destroyer Flotilla, sent to attack boats off the Cretan coast, were sunk without coming in contact with the targets on 23 may, then the flotilla withdrew. At that time the Germans had only partially seized an airfield. The evacuation order was issued only on 27 may.
On may 23 Cunningam informed it's superiors that daylight operations could no longer continue, but they refused (but at that point the bulk of his forces was already steaming to Alexandria). They would have taken different decisions in 1940? Or they would have sent the Home Fleet to certain destruction in full daylight?


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## Milosh (Aug 8, 2013)

> A force of three light cruisers and four destroyers wasn't able to deal with a single torpedo boat



The _Lupo_ wasn't your typical S-boat being more like destroyer-escorts.

ype: Torpedo boat
Displacement: 795 long tons (808 t) standard
1,020 long tons (1,040 t) full load
Length: 83.5 m (273 ft 11 in)
Beam: 8.1 m (26 ft 7 in)
Draught: 2.55 m (8 ft 4 in)
Propulsion: 2 steam turbines, 2 shafts
19,000 hp (14,200 kW)
Speed: 34 knots (39 mph; 63 km/h)
Complement: 116
Armament: 
• 3 × 100 mm (3.9 in) guns
• 10 × 20 mm (0.79 in) anti-aircraft guns
• 2 × 13.2 mm (0.52 in) anti-aircraft machine guns
• 4 × 450 mm (18 in) torpedo tubes
• Up to 20 mines


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## fastmongrel (Aug 8, 2013)

Jabberwocky said:


> For me, the crucial question of Sealion is not whether the Royal Navy could have defeated the Channel crossing (which I believe they comprehensively would have, purely on weight on numbers) but the logistics of the whole operation.
> 
> A German light infantry division consumed around 150-200 tonnes of supplies per day and around 400 tons while in heavy combat. A motorised/mechanised division consumed around 300 tons per day, a German armoured division consumed around 300 to 350 tons of supplies. An armoured division could consume up to 700 tons per day if it was in heavy combat.
> 
> ...



At last someone mentions logistics. The Heer could have been landed but within days would have been reduced to throwing rocks, eating whatever food they could find in the area and drinking from streams.


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## Dogwalker (Aug 8, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> trying to pick out small ships that can be in a variety of locations and look a lot like all kinds of other small ships is not anywhere near a 100% certainty.


Cause You think to sweep enough for the Home Fleet to pass with 5% of the sweepers? 
To deal with the smaller units don't need even bombing. Strafing is sufficient.



Shortround6 said:


> Tripoli...


 Was 500 km away from Sicilian basis, not 50.



Shortround6 said:


> Dover is a lousy landing site because not only is there high ground on either side of the town but the ONLY way out (aside from going up or down the beach) is through a narrow valley and past a number of ridges that parallel the beach. If you can google map it, do so and hit terrain.


The famous rough terrain of south England? Come on... and remember that the defenders had to operate under the bombings and strafings by day. So had their supplies to move. Do you really think that the Germans of 1940 had problems in seizing a pair of shallow hills versus the British of 1940 having the air superiority? At Crete the British had far mor experience, and fought well in a worse terrain, but...



Shortround6 said:


> the areas you need to block off with mines are a lot bigger than 21 miles,


have I ever said "21 miles"? 
Far bigger areas were effectively mined in WWII in worse conditions.


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## fastmongrel (Aug 8, 2013)

Dogwalker said:


> The famous rough terrain of south England? Come on... and remember that the defenders had to operate under the bombings and strafings by day. So had their supplies to move. Do you really think that the Germans of 1940 had problems in seizing a pair of shallow hill



Have you even bothered googling some images of Dover Harbour.


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## pattle (Aug 8, 2013)

Dogwalker, which ever way you look at it the Royal Navy stopped the German's landing troops on Crete by sea and it doesn't matter if they did this by sinking the invasion fleet or making it turn back because the end result was the same. When the Germans eventually did land troops on Crete the battle was lost and in any case even this landing was only possible once the tiny port of Kastelli Kissamos had been captured. Had the Italian Navy been prepared to provide a realistic escort for the German ships as requested then things may have been different.
I am using Crete as an example of how difficult it would have been for the Germans to launch an invasion in the face of the Royal Navy.


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## Dogwalker (Aug 8, 2013)

Jabberwocky said:


> The British plans were to wreck the port facilities in the event of a landing, which was expected to have the effect of cutting capacity to around 150 tons per week


That are 21.42 tons per day, the load of a single modern truck, or of a single 20 foot container, or of a small ship, or the load capacity of 430 men in a single time, or 43 men if they lift it 10 times in a day (hardly a hard day of work).
I think they were a little optimist.


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## Dogwalker (Aug 8, 2013)

pattle said:


> Dogwalker, which ever way you look at it the Royal Navy stopped the German's landing troops on Crete


Every way you look at it the RN had to withdraw after two days of fight, and Crete was conquered by the Germans, in face of larger British forces, thanks to the air cover.



pattle said:


> the end result was the same.


Infact the end result was that the Germans took Crete. It seems that someone tends to forget it.



pattle said:


> When the Germans eventually did land troops on Crete the battle was lost


It's interesting to wonder why, since the British troops were way more numerous, entrenched in a rough terrain, and better armed.


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## Milosh (Aug 8, 2013)

The 100,000 men of II Army Corps trapped at Demyansk had required no less than *300 tons* of supplies per day.

Logistics

Four years later the Allied D-Day landings showed just how much material had to be landed continuously to maintain an amphibious invasion. The problem for the Germans was worse, as the German Army was mostly horse-drawn. One of its prime headaches would have been transporting thousands of horses across the Channel.[74] British intelligence calculated that the first wave of 11 divisions (including the airborne divisions) would require a daily average of 3,300 tons of supplies.[75] In fact in Russia in 1941, when engaged in heavy fighting, a single German infantry division required up to 1,100 tons of supplies a day[76], though a more usual figure would be 212-425 tons per day.[77] British intelligence further calculated that Folkestone, the largest harbour falling within the planned German landing zones, could handle 150 tons per day in the first week of the invasion (assuming all dockside equipment was successfully demolished and regular RAF bombing raids reduced capacity by 50%). Within seven days, maximum capacity was expected to rise to 600 tons per day, once German shore parties had made repairs to the quays and cleared the harbour of any blockships and other obstacles. This meant that, at best, the nine German infantry and two airborne divisions landed initially would receive less than 20% of the 3,300 tons of supplies they required each day through a port, and would have to rely heavily on whatever could be brought in directly over the beaches or air-dropped.[78]

The capture of Dover and its harbour facilities was expected to add another 800 tons per day, raising to 40% the amount of supplies brought in through ports, but this rested on the assumption of little or no interference from the Royal Navy and RAF with the German supply convoys shuttling between the Continent and the invasion beaches.

Wiki


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## Dogwalker (Aug 8, 2013)

So we now are at 150 tons a day, in a single port, in the best conditions for the British (assuming to have succesfully demolished all dockside) and assuming regular RAF bombing raids (hardly in this scenario), for a week.

That's a little more convincing.

Then there was what the Germans could beach with boats seized on the French coast.


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## pattle (Aug 8, 2013)

Buffnut, I think what you are talking about is largely a conspiracy theory. Yes there was an element within the Tory party and the aristocracy that leant towards the Nazi's but in reality both the Tory party and the aristocracy were made up of old fashioned imperialists who knew they would not have no future under the Nazis. In addition to this Britain was not a single party state where the tory party could do just whatever it wanted, you have to remember that Churchill's view on continuing the war with Germany had the support of the majority of the house of commons and any leader that stepped forward with the intention of surrender would have received a vote of no confidence in the House of Commons and so would have been forced to resign as Chamberlain did. Had Chamberlain understood that the House of Commons wished for a defeatist Prime Minister then he would have recommended one to the King instead of the most defiant and war like person in British politics that he could find Winston Churchill. As the Tory Party was split between Churchill and Halifax at this time the balance of power in the Commons was held by The Labour Party, and the Labour Party being socialists understood what would happen to them should Britain surrender. The King under these circumstances would have had no other option than to refuse to accept a defeatist Prime Minister. 
Like other people have said invasion was really a bluff and Churchill's argument that Britain could be defended was proved right by history.


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## stona (Aug 8, 2013)

Dogwalker you need to take a look at the Battle of Crete.

It's not really relevant to an invasion of the British Isles and was only cited by some of us as an example of the Royal Navy's ability to operate in the face of enemy air superiority.

Cheers

Steve


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## pattle (Aug 8, 2013)

Dogwalker, the Germans seized Crete by air not by sea. There was no way the Germans could have invaded Britain by air in the same way as they invaded Crete by air as the Germans would have been facing a much larger well armed, supplied and mobile force with good communications on familiar ground with at least some air support. The Germans could never have maintained local superiority long enough for its airborne forces to be relieved by the main seaborne force.


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## stona (Aug 8, 2013)

pattle said:


> Buffnut, I think what you are talking about is largely a conspiracy theory. Yes there was an element within the Tory party and the aristocracy that leant towards the Nazi's but in reality both the Tory party and the aristocracy were made up of old fashioned imperialists who knew they would not have no future under the Nazis. In addition to this Britain was not a single party state where the tory party could do just whatever it wanted, you have to remember that Churchill's view on continuing the war with Germany had the support of the majority of the house of commons and any leader that stepped forward with the intention of surrender would have received a vote of no confidence in the House of Commons and so would have been forced to resign as Chamberlain did. Had Chamberlain understood that the House of Commons wished for a defeatist Prime Minister then he would have recommended one to the King instead of the most defiant and war like person in British politics that he could find Winston Churchill. As the Tory Party was split between Churchill and Halifax at this time the balance of power in the Commons was held by The Labour Party, and the Labour Party being socialists understood what would happen to them should Britain surrender. The King under these circumstances would have had no other option than to refuse to accept a defeatist Prime Minister.
> Like other people have said invasion was really a bluff and Churchill's argument that Britain could be defended was proved right by history.



And don't forget that the government in 1940 was a coalition. The Labour and Liberal parties were both part of that government, formed following Chamberlain's resignation on 10th May. You are right about the prospects of some of these men under Nazi rule. For example the minister of Labour and National Service was Ernest Bevin, a socialist and founder of the Transport and General Workers Union. He, and others like Herbert Morrison (who had a shelter named after him) and Clement Attlee (a fierce critic of appeasement) would never have made a deal with the Nazis.

Whether this government would have collapsed seems unlikely to me, given British constitutional politics. A coalition would have continued with or without Churchill. This is how a mature democracy works. The Germans with their one party system and a leadership who for the most part had never travelled outside Germany simply could not grasp this.

Cheers

Steve


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## pattle (Aug 8, 2013)

Pinsong, when I talk of the civilians fighting the Germans I do not mean this in the way you assume I mean it. Yes I think it is safe to expect that lone civilians or small groups of civilians would have opposed an invasion either directly or indirectly, this could have taken many forms such as sabotage, small scale killings and hit and run ambushes with petrol bombs and hunting rifles etc, I am not talking about massed ranks of men, women and children with broom handles. 
The majority of civilian resistance would have been carried out by the Home Guard. By the time of any German invasion in September or later the Home Guard was much stronger than when it was formed straight after Dunkirk by this it had weapons and prepared positions. Granted it had no heavy weapons and it's bunkers etc were much more modest than the Atlantic walls, but they were not designed to repel an invasion only to slow it down.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 8, 2013)

Dogwalker said:


> Cause You think to sweep enough for the Home Fleet to pass with 5% of the sweepers?
> To deal with the smaller units don't need even bombing. Strafing is sufficient.



Back to the omnipotent Luftwaffe?

You can sink 500 ton ships with 7.9mm machine guns? 

I guess the rest of the world really screwed up. 

And how _long_ does it take to sink or severely damage 95% or the British minesweepers? a day, a week, a month? 






Dogwalker said:


> The famous rough terrain of south England? Come on... and remember that the defenders had to operate under the bombings and strafings by day. So had their supplies to move. Do you really think that the Germans of 1940 had problems in seizing a pair of shallow hills versus the British of 1940 having the air superiority? At Crete the British had far mor experience, and fought well in a worse terrain, but...



How rough does it have to be? The bombings and strafings are only during good weather, artillery is 24/7. British had rail lines and paved roads, move supplies at night. 
I do like the shallow hills bit very funny. Looking north from Dover harbor.






Or North over the port area:









Dogwalker said:


> have I ever said "21 miles"?



Actually no but you keep making references to short distances like 



Dogwalker said:


> Was 500 km away from Sicilian basis, not 50.



50km is 31 miles. But the areas that need mining are more like 100 KM or more. 



Dogwalker said:


> Far bigger areas were effectively mined in WWII in worse conditions.



Define effective and the fact that a mine field sank one or two ships does NOT prove effectiveness of an entire "field" 

and please tell us what the worse conditions were? what resources were used and how long it took the lay the fields. 

The last is really important as the clock is ticking. _WHEN_ do the Germans win the BoB in this scenario? Sept 1st, Sept 15th, Sept 30th? Some time in Oct? What happens in this "WIN". British loose control over south east England or the entire RAF deserts to Ireland with their aircraft and sits out the war? Or the British maintain control over Plymouth and Hull? 

How long do the Germans have to set up their mine fields before the transports move? 2 days, two weeks, a month? 

and using what? Aircraft and small fishing ships? 

Part of the problem in Crete was supply, both in Crete and in Norway some British ships had fired ALL of their AA ammo and good portions of the their other ammo. But then they didn't have the German 7.9mm machine guns did they? 

Back to the ticking clock thing? how many Bren guns were coming out of the factory ever week, how many 2pdr AT guns and so on? How soon before the fall weather gets increasingly nasty? 

And where is the Kriegsmarine?


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## Dogwalker (Aug 8, 2013)

stona said:


> Dogwalker you need to take a look at the Battle of Crete.


Really? I think that you have to.



stona said:


> It's not really relevant to an invasion of the British Isles


Cause at Crete the British choose to fight worse than they could do?



stona said:


> and was only cited by some of us as an example of the Royal Navy's ability to operate in the face of enemy air superiority.


And this ability endured for two days. Or we have to think that the ship lost were only to make up a facade resistance having decided in advance that the isle couldn't be defended?


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## Dogwalker (Aug 8, 2013)

pattle said:


> Dogwalker, the Germans seized Crete by air not by sea.


Those were their plannings. The attempted landings were a side action. But someone said that the way the RN deal for two days, facing heavy losses, with a side action is the demostration of the impossibility of something.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 8, 2013)

Dogwalker said:


> Really? I think that you have to.
> 
> 
> And this ability endured for two days. Or we have to think that the ship lost were only to make up a facade resistance having decided in advance that the isle couldn't be defended?



Some ships shot off around 400 rounds per 4 in AA gun, magazines were empty, Sticking around when you can put up some sort of defense is one thing, sitting there and being bombed without being able to shoot back is another.


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## Dogwalker (Aug 8, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> Back to the omnipotent Luftwaffe?


No, let's remain with the omnipotent British sweepers.



Shortround6 said:


> You can sink 500 ton ships...


A fleet of which could be hidden under the bed obviously.



Shortround6 said:


> I guess the rest of the world really screwed up.


In not conquering the world with fleets of minesweepers?



Shortround6 said:


> How rough does it have to be?


Something more that is usually called "a plain"? Sorry, but that's the terrain back of Dover is.



Shortround6 said:


> move supplies at night.


And hide during the day, while Germans sleep I imagine.



Shortround6 said:


> I do like the shallow hills bit very funny. Looking north from Dover harbor.
> 
> Or North over the port area:


Interesting wiew of the cliffs, thank you. A shame that all the terrain around is what's usually called "a plain"







Shortround6 said:


> the fact that a mine field sank one or two ships does NOT prove effectiveness of an entire "field"


Given that large formations of vessels have preferred to stay away from minefields, for their effectiveness we have to see what happened to the smaller formations that we have found themselves into them. You may think that a ship is more resistant to explosions if it is in the company of others if you want.



Shortround6 said:


> Part of the problem in Crete was supply,


While in UK ships doesn't need to be supplied? Or you think to do this in operation zone?



Shortround6 said:


> And where is the Kriegsmarine?


Oh, I dont' know it. Who had taken the example of Crete probably think somewere in the Chinese sea.


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## s1chris (Aug 8, 2013)

Surely if any of this was feasible the Germans would have pressed on in the BoB to eliminate the RAF and Then launching Op Sea lion. Don't loose sight of Hitlers objectives of this war, you don't just cut a crippled country some slack in the hope they will surrender or join forces only to have to continue the fight against a country that has then had chance to rebuild its forces in the meantime. Just look at the mammoth task that we had keeping the country supplied logistically when we had it fully under British occupation. The sheer logistics of a landing on British shores would have made it impossible to pull off and mount full scale invasion. You can safely say if it could have been done it would have been.

I believe you can also rule out any question of a British Government willing to co-operate with the Nazi's coming into power. As has been said in previous post's, it would not have been allowed by the king and certainly not by a British Public that I suspect would fight to defend the country that has been successfully defended so many times before. 

Maybe I'm just being patriotic but I can't see that there was ever a chance of us talking German and driving on the wrong side of the road! By sea, by Air or by foot, we would have repelled it with whatever we had available at the time. Just ask the Spanish who tried it tried it the time before.

Cheers Chris


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## Hop (Aug 8, 2013)

The Home Guard had far more weapons than commonly believed.

Churchill proposed setting them up in 1939. He envisioned 500,000 men. In fact 1,500,000 had joined by the end of July 1940. By the same date 495,000 .303 service rifles had been issued to the Home Guard (Mostly P14s). 

Britain also purchased 500,000 .30 M1917 rifles from the US and began issuing these to the Home Guard in July, at first as well as, and later to replace, the .303 rifles.


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## s1chris (Aug 8, 2013)

The only way I can think of that the Germans could of pulled it off was to carry out airborne landings behind the key ports and beaches. Cut off the retreat of forces in ports and prevent total distruction. You would cause the government to withdraw from London as a precaution against failed defence, you would at least have access to the ports to bring in the supplies, you have removed the terrain factor ( who cares if google earth paints a nice scenic picture. I wouldn't fancy trying to scale the white cliffs under fire to reach the "plains" behind). You still have to deal with the RN but with ports already under control how will they resupply? You could the turn the vast numbers of British Minelayers against the British and try and halt the RN for a period long enough to setup a decent beachhead. (Still is there enough JU-52's available? no).
I just don't think in reality there is a scenario that would work but this is how I would propose it if we're to send my German Army to the slaughter on British soil. 

Cheers Chris


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## stona (Aug 8, 2013)

Dogwalker said:


> Something more that is usually called "a plain"? Sorry, but that's the terrain back of Dover is. A shame that all the terrain around is what's usually called "a plain"
> 
> 
> 
> .



You've got to go up the cliffs to get to the plain (or downs as we call it). The only other way out is as originally described, up the valley that road takes along the line of the buildings in the photo you've posted.

I once had the pleasure of standing off Dover for eight hours on a ferry which, despite the efforts of a couple of tugs, could not make it in due to the weather. I can't tell you how much fun that was. I believe I was probably one of a handful of people who were not sick and, worse, the bar ran out of beer.
The Germans were going to need a good window of good weather to commit military suicide in.

Cheers

Steve

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## Gixxerman (Aug 8, 2013)

It's my view that Germany was not equipped to invade the UK....and as it turned out not equipped to win the Bob either anyways.
The BoB has been gamed many times - like a hypothetical invasion - and, ttbomk, the German side always loses.
(someone can correct me if I'm wrong there, please, I'd genuinely be interested)

I think they were fully aware of this...and I am disposed to the idea that the BoB was a gambit (the gambler at work, again).
If it worked then great for Germany but if not, well, it certainly helped Stalin to persuade himself that for the time being at least (and right up to and a little beyond the attack on the USSR) Germany wasn't intent on an invasion of Russia any time soon.
I am also of the opinion that the German leadership, blinded by the quick victories up to (and beyond) 1940, lost sight of the heavy losses that would later come back to haunt them. 

But regardless assuming a German BoB 'win' (which really means 11 Group badly mauled remaining units withdrawn north....to join the still existing rest of the RAF) there are, as I see it, 2 glimmers of hope to the German plans in 1940.
Firstly Ultra was not what it would soon become and so German initiative would pertain with British forces planners largely reacting secondly political will.
One can never simply assume that the will to fight on endlessly regardless of cost (and even earlier than 1940 the Germans had shown themselves to have units with no regard whatsoever for the 'rules' of war or compassion for civilian casualties) would be universal.


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## pattle (Aug 8, 2013)

Dogwalker the English countryside is not flat like the Russian Steppes or even the North African Desert, and unlike Southern Europe the weather changes from one day to the next and often sooner, this year we had snow as late as May and a heat wave in July sandwiched between heavy rains. 
As far as Crete goes you have a very different understanding of events to Antony Beevor, Alan Clark, Christopher Buckley or any of the Authors and official histories I have read.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 8, 2013)

A few things to show what this "plain" was really like.












Taken out the back of Dover Castle. 

Not quite get on top of the cliffs and it's "Bobs your Uncle" a nice stroll to Canterbury. 

Landing at Folkestone actually offers easier terrain for advancement once ashore. 

Brighton overs a lot more maneuver room both at the beach and inland and once past the coastal hills is a lot more plain like the area around Canterbury. 

As for British supply at Crete, for the ships the supply point was Alexandria, Egypt.


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## stona (Aug 8, 2013)

The second photo shows the only way out of Dover without scaling the cliffs.
I've driven, or been driven, up that road many times without the heights either side being occupied by people intent on doing me mischief.
Cheers
Steve


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## Kryten (Aug 8, 2013)

The whole concept is a fantasy, the Germans are in no position to try an invasion in September 40, river barges are not going to make it across the Channel in October with the weather that prevails, not that the Germans could really be ready in just a few weeks anyway!

The Luftwaffe will be attrited by winning the BoB, the Kriegsmarine is, as noted, woefully understrength, there's no specialist equipment or vehicles to clear mines or obstacles, there's no specialist landing vessels for the infantry and their equipment, no specialist hospital ships to deal with casualties, no logistics ships, no tank landing vessels, the list is endless!

and where does this massive stock of mines Dogwalker seems to think exists needed to mine the channel come from, let alone the vessels/aircraft/TIME to lay them? 

The whole concept is absurd!


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 8, 2013)

Let's assume that characteristic German efficiency and organizational skills overcome the steep learning curve required to master the intricacies of amphibious landings and logistical support of amphibious operations. In other words, they master the operational art as unlikely as that is. Then whether Sea lion is conducted perfectly it still must be conducted with the equipment at hand. That's just one, but a significant problem:

from wikipedia: Operation Sea Lion - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

"_In 1940 the German Navy was ill-prepared for mounting an amphibious assault *the size of Operation Sea Lion (something like the cross channel transport of 8 wehrmacht divisions, no?) *. Lacking purpose-built landing craft and both *doctrinal and practical experience with amphibious warfare,* the Navy was largely starting from scratch. Some efforts had been made during the inter-war years to investigate landing military forces by sea, but inadequate funding severely limited any useful progress._[25]"

Comparatively the USMC was thought to be a specialized service, relatively well studied in this area and took about one year and an actual (A small, 1 division scale) operation to master the technique and even then had to overcome unforeseen problems in the future. (The USMC's first doctrinal manual on the topic was created in 1935). It is my understanding the Wehrmacht had NO doctrine established at the time.

"_A Pionierlandungsboot (de).
The Navy had taken some small steps in remedying the landing craft situation with construction of the Pionierlandungsboot 39 (Engineer Landing Boat 39), a self-propelled shallow-draft vessel which could carry 45 infantrymen, two light vehicles or 20 tons of cargo and land on an open beach, unloading via a pair of clamshell doors at the bow. But *by late September 1940 only two prototypes had been delivered*.[26]
Recognising the need for an even larger craft capable of landing both tanks and infantry onto a hostile shore, the Navy began development of the 220-ton Marinefährprahm (MFP) but these too *were unavailable in time for a landing on English soil in 1940,* the first of them not being commissioned until April 1941.
Given barely two months to assemble a large seagoing invasion fleet, the Kriegsmarine opted to convert inland river barges into makeshift landing craft. Approximately 2,400 barges were collected from throughout Europe (860 from Germany, 1,200 from the Netherlands and Belgium and 350 from France). *Of these, only about 800 were powered (some insufficiently); the rest had to be towed by tugs.*_[27]"

By contrast: The first USMC AmphTrac was deployed in their first amphibious operation at Guadalcanal in 1942. It's not the date that counts here, its the forethought put into the problem.

For Salerno, an operation that is barely called successful, it is my understanding that allies had a 4:1 advantage in combat aircraft of all types. It is also my understanding that at no time during the BoB did the Luftwaffe have anything near that scale an advantage. If that's incorrect, I am happy to be corrected. 

I admit the RAF's fighter, bomber and coastal command may not have been ideally equipped and armed to repel a sea invasion but considering the nature of the unarmored high value targets, it didn't have to be. Horizontal bombing can sink such craft by the displaced water and concussive effects of the blasts. Machine gun fire would be simply devastating. fighter and ground attack aircraft sporting 8 x .303 mgs against unarmored open craft? My God! 

With respect to losing the BoB, one should be very specific about what one is defining as _winning_. Even a so called RAF retreat to northern Britain does not necessarily mean complete abdication of staging air ops from bases further south. The start of WW2 is filled with examples of camouflaged bases that are made virtually undetectable even under attack by enemy air forces. 

I reiterate, I see no time during which Sea Lion could have succeeded even in the most perfectly imagined scenario.

MY favorite insanity is: Oh we'll just stage the invasion at night. all I can say is "_far easier said than done_" (_*with Towed barges????)*_.


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## stona (Aug 8, 2013)

Kryten said:


> The whole concept is absurd!



I think that's what several of us are saying 
Cheers
Steve


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## Civettone (Aug 8, 2013)

Most members seem to discard the German plans/preparations/vessels, based on an Allied invasion 4 years later against a much stronger opponent. I think initiative and surprise would be a major asset for the Germans. Other than that, we will never know what would have happened. To play it safe, is to say it would never have worked.

Personally, I think England could be invaded, but supplying the invasion force might be the real issue.


Kris


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## Milosh (Aug 8, 2013)

How was this 'surprise' to be obtained? The RAF flew recon over the French ports all the time and would see the barges were not there. The RAF also would see increased activity in the ports.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 8, 2013)

The Germans may be able to put troops ashore, that may technically be an invasion. Putting enough troops ashore, not loosing a large percentage of troops before they get ashore, keeping the ones that do get ashore supplied and advancing a 100km or more all are very different things.

The Luftwaffe may be able to do a number of jobs, some of them it may be able to do better than the British could do at the time. But Air superiority does NOT mean that ALL the jobs that need doing can be done at the same time or in a short span of time. 

If the bombers are laying hundreds of mines (assuming they are available) they are not bombing the defenses near/on the landing sites. If they are bombing the Beach defenses they are not bombing the naval bases. If they are bombing the navel bases they are not bombing the rail lines, roads, supply lines leading to the landing sites. If they are bombing _anything_ in the invasion zone they are not bombing anything in the rest of Great Britain (armaments factories?) and keeping up the pressure. 

And that is the big problem, _EVERYTHING_ has to be done in just a few weeks. Wither the weather cooperates or not. Because as the time goes by the weather gets less cooperative.


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## nuuumannn (Aug 8, 2013)

Here are some excerpts from a little book I picked up once called Hitler's Naval war and despite its rather modest appearance is a very good and accurate account of the German war effort at sea, based on German archival information and originally written in German. Here is a bit from the chapter on Sealion.

"In all these French Channel ports the Germans found virtually no seaworthy craft that they could use. The British had taken the lot to help in their evacuation, or if not had destroyed them. This fact alone makes nonsense of the idea, sometimes expressed, that the Germans should have pursued the beaten foe and landed straight away on his island sanctuary. There were just no vessels at hand for such a purpose. Now they had to be bought painstakingly from Germany. At Dunkirk, [Lt Cdr Heinrich] Bartels, up till 10th September, had struggled to accommodate some sixty tugs towing 180 flat bottomed barges and some 120 motor boats. Aboard these ungainly craft, when the hour struck, the 17th and 35th Infantry Divisions were supposed to be transported to the English coast , as if they were merely crossing a river. Bartels had been concerned with the business for weeks and knew all about its difficulties. Before coming to Dunkirk he had headed a research team at Emden , which had tried out every imagineable landing technique - though without landing craft, for the German navy did not then possess any.

"The Embarkation at the departure ports might go alright. According to its size, each barge would take from thirty to seventy men, plus a few vehicles and horses, repeat, horses: the first wave divisions were to actually rely partly on horse drawn transport! But how were the conquerors, if they ever got as far as the enemy coast, to disembark? How could the improvised ramps be used for landing vehicles and light tanks, even without any opposition from the enemy? It was up to Bartels, by trial and error to find out. Each morning he sent through the streets a loud speaker van blaring the song _Wir Fahren gegen England_ as a summons to the daily landing practise.

"At the other ports thing were much the same. At Ostend chief of the naval centre was Lt Cdr Erich Lehmann, who, on invasion day would have a convoy of about fifty ships and boats, plus twenty-five trains of barges to send off on their adventurous voyage. At Calais Kapt Gustav Kleikamp was responsible for 'Transport Force C', which in itself would be 16.5 kilometers long. But the largest force of these dubious craft - 'Transport Force D' - was concentrated at Boulogne. There the officer was Kapt Werner Lindenau, in charge of 165 trains of 330 barges, plus fifteen minesweepers and R boats and twenty five steam trawlers. With this armada, Lindenau was to set out in the afternoon of D-Day minus one and after crossing the Channel on a broad front - a voyage requiring four hours of broad daylight and the whole of the following night - land on the strip of east coast of Beachy Head, near the seaside resort of Eastbourne.

"Needless to say, Lindenau was more than dobtful as to whether his armada would ever get there. This contrasted with the eager optimism of General Officer commanding XXXVIII Corps, Erich von Manstein, who was to travel with him aboard the tender _Hela_. His was, however, the optimism of ignorance, and whatever Manstein's brilliance as a strategist on land, he might well be non plussed if the painfully slow and helpless trains of barges were set upon by a pack of British destroyers. The above named ports were not the only ones. Steamers, motor boats and more barge trains lay ready at Rotterdam, Antwerp and Le Havre. Though quite a number of vessels had blown themselves up on mines or been hit by British bombers, in mid September the invasion force totalled over 3,000 miscellaneous craft, and it seemed that 'D-day' could not be far off.

"Tell me your opinion", Raeder asked Bartels, after inspecting the preparations at Dunkirk, "do you think we shall make it across to England? Are you optimistic about it?"
Bartels was somewhat surprised by his Supreme Commander's question, but finally answered, "without optimism Herr Grossadmiral, the thing will be a flop from the start."

Considering they were written from a German perspective, these passages don't exactly inspire one with confidence.


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## Kryten (Aug 8, 2013)

the notion of towing low slung barges full of men in channel seas is bordering on unbelievable, the difficulties of landing troops who even survive the voyage is enormous, the excerpt mentions Eastbourne, I'm off there in two weeks for the air show, I can only imagine trying to struggle up those beaches of shale and pebble in combat order under fire!

That would have been nothing more than a living nightmare for those troops!


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## stona (Aug 8, 2013)

Regarding the weather, with which UK based members will be all too familiar. Dowding knew,and later wrote, that he only had to avoid defeat until November to "win" the upcoming Battle of Britain. We consider the battle to have started in mid July (10th officially) but most Germans don't consider it to have started until a month later. Boog for example states 8th August as the start date. This didn't leave the Luftwaffe much time. November might well be a bit pessimistic of Dowding too. The late autumn weather is often far from benevolent.

Incidentally Dowding never planned to withdraw Fighter Command north of the Thames prior to an invasion because this "would have exposed vital targets, military and civilian, to unimpeded attack." It would also cost Fighter Command the benefits of radar warning. There was a plan for withdrawal but only _after _an invasion force got ashore. That was never going to happen.

Cheers

Steve


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## RCAFson (Aug 8, 2013)

Dogwalker said:


> Was operating in an IDEAL situation of this scenario. Pratically no surfaces enemy forces. Landing forces composed of slow and unadapt boats (they didn't even had a single radio equipement onto them), no mines, but hadn't the air cover.
> Result, RN held contact with the enemy for *two days*, facing heavy losses, and then Cunningam had to decide if the remaining units had to loose the contact in a orizontal direction or in a vertical one.
> *Not only.* For these two days the performances of the RN appeared to be very sub standard. A force of three light cruisers and four destroyers wasn't able to deal with a single torpedo boat at 700m distance. A cruiser was damaged by a near miss of a torpedo, the RN ships even shoot themself, and two third of the flotilla was safe.
> A second force of three cruisers and four destroyers gave up to act against the second flotilla, escorted by a single torpedo boat.
> What happened? All the clueless of the RN had gathered in Crete? Or having to operate under very difficult conditions had degraded the performances of sailors who, in other circumstances, would have given the usual excellent proof of the RN?



Compared to Sealion the Crete invasion force was well equipped with self powered and seaworthy boats - Caiques - which were requisitioned fishing boats designed for open sea conditions, whereas Sealion relied on towed barges which were not sea worthy and were considered suicidal by the German navy. The German navy, which was small to start with, was largely destroyed in Norway and would not be able to provide an escort which was, on average better than that at Crete. As for engaging the enemy destroyer:


> KINGSTON, engaged an enemy destroyer at
> *7,000 yards*, claiming two hits. http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/LondonGazette/38296.pdf


 The RN should have pursued the convoy and destroyed it, but the RN was operating over 500 miles from their bases with absolutely no aircover which would not be the case in the Channel. How does a torpedo do damage from a near miss? It either hits or it doesn't! As for the RN shooting at their own ships, this seems to be another fantasy akin to your torpedo story.




> Cause you think that in may 1941 all the German forces were were at Creete?



The Italian navy in the Mediterranean was far stronger than the German navy in the Channel.




> "turned the tail and run away"? At what speed they "run away" exactly? Three cruisers and four destroyers wasn't able to pursue some wooden fishing boat? The second landing attempt suffered light losses cause the C Force gave up to pursue them under the bombings.


 None of those troops landed on Crete, did they?




> Two of the 5Th Destroyer Flotilla, sent to attack boats off the Cretan coast, were sunk without coming in contact with the targets on 23 may, then the flotilla withdrew. At that time the Germans had only partially seized an airfield. The evacuation order was issued only on 27 may.
> On may 23 Cunningam informed it's superiors that daylight operations could no longer continue, but they refused (but at that point the bulk of his forces was already steaming to Alexandria). They would have taken different decisions in 1940? Or they would have sent the Home Fleet to certain destruction in full daylight?



I don't know what history you are getting your information from, but it sounds more like a fictional novel than naval history:


> 41. Captain (D), Fifth Destroyer Flotilla, in
> KELLY, with KASHMIR, KIPLING,
> KELVIN and JACKAL
> :had left Malta at
> ...



The fact is, that until ordered to evacuate the Army from Crete, the RN maintained a nightly patrol around the island:


> 54. There had been indications that a landing
> might take place at Sitia during the night
> 24th/25th. In order to deal with this landing,
> a force consisting of AJAX (Senior Officer),
> ...


.


> 62. AJAX, with her force, had retired to the
> south-of Crete and was to carry out a repetition
> of her sweep, during the night 25th/26th May,
> •and if time allowed, bombard Maleme.
> ...




and no Axis forces were able to land until late on May 28th, which was well after the evacuation order.


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## pinsog (Aug 8, 2013)

If the German airforce couldn't stop the evacuation of several hundred thousand men at Dunkirk by a ragtag group of fishing boats, then how are they supposed to stop the entire Royal Navy from sailing in and destrying the invasion fleet?

Personally, if I were the British, I would wait until the Germans were about 2/3 of the way across the channel and then send every light cruiser and destroyer I had into the channel. There is really no need for large slow battleships and heavy cruisers. Light cruisers and destroyers would make difficult targets for the Luftwaffe to hit and would be easier to replace if they are sunk. Also, you don't need heavy guns to sink barges and tug boats. Quite honestly, light to medium AA guns(40mm type stuff) would be perfect for sinking unarmed barges and tugs. Could you imagine a RN destroyer closing to point blank range, sinking the tug boat and then at ranges so close, her main guns may not depress low enough to hit the target, they open fire on a crowded barge full of soldiers? If I got to choose to be on the invading force or the defending force, I would definately want to be on the defending side.


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## Dogwalker (Aug 8, 2013)

stona said:


> You've got to go up the cliffs to get to the plain


Shortround6 wrote that the terrain back of dover is Difficult. It Isn't. Simply as it. Every statement that describes that terrain as difficult is an invention. From Dover to Canterbury there aren't the Alps or every terrain charateristic that can described as "difficult". The cliffs, from the city, are only shallow hills. There are higher heights into the city of Rome.
If someone couldn't think of places to land other than under the cliffs north of the city, that's his problem.


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## Dogwalker (Aug 8, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> A few things to show what this "plain" was really like.


I see a similar, or rougher, terrain every day. Is called "the plain north of Rome". You can google from the city to Bracciano lake, or Civitavecchia.


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## Dogwalker (Aug 8, 2013)

pattle said:


> Dogwalker the English countryside is not flat like the Russian Steppes or even the North African Desert,


As incredible as could seems, the countryside of the most part of Europe, including that in which the Germans were operating normally, it is not.



pattle said:


> and unlike Southern Europe the weather...


Sorry if I can't think of the English climate as particularly harsh.


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## Airframes (Aug 8, 2013)

Have you been to this area of southern England?
Unlike an ideal invasion area, the flat, wide beaches of the east coast, with flat, relatively open country, the terrain is not as flat, or 'plain like' as it may appear in aerial photos, or as you may think. It's very good defensive terrain, and terrible offensive terrain, with rolling hills, some steep and deep valleys, thick hedgerows and woods and, at that time, the road system was very basic, with only one, relatively narrow (2 x 1930's car width) road leading to and from Dover, for example.
It was/is not unlike the 'Bocage' country the Allies encountered 5 year later in Normandy.
But of course, that didn't cause any problems, delays or heavy casualties, did it ......


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## Shortround6 (Aug 8, 2013)

Silly me, the cliffs south of the "city" are ever so much easier. 






View of the south cliffs _from_ Folkestone towards Dover






Another view, same direction.

Difficult doesn't always have to do with sheer height. How high was Normandy on average? 

Or were the Americans and British lazy incompetents trying to deal with hedge rows? 

Three short but steep grades in a row with drops between each one may be better for the defense than one long shallow but ultimately higher grade/peak. 

Broken ground can be difficult to deal with, there is no commanding height to get a view from( either for intelligence or artillery spotting). Lines of sight are short and there is lots of "dead" ground that flat trajectory weapons cannot reach. 

Just because you don't need alpine gear doesn't mean a certain type of terrain is easy to fight over/advance on. 

The point is that while Dover is the closest point to France it is one of the longest distances to London from Harwich to Portsmouth and while the terrain certainly isn't the equal of the Alps it is the the worst and most restrictive of the approaches to London.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 8, 2013)

Airframes said:


> But of course, that didn't cause any problems, delays or heavy casualties, did it ......



Of course not, it is all fabrication, Normandy simply didn't have a hill enough.


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## Dogwalker (Aug 8, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> Compared to Sealion the Crete invasion force was well equipped with self powered and seaworthy boats


Standing to information above, at mid september the Germans had "over 3,000 miscellaneous craft".



RCAFson said:


> The RN should


But didn't



RCAFson said:


> but the RN was operating over 500 miles from their bases


So 7000 yards were a long distance



RCAFson said:


> with absolutely no aircover


Bingo.



RCAFson said:


> As for the RN shooting at their own ships, this seems to be another fantasy akin to your torpedo story.


"Light cruiser ORION sustained some damage to her bridge from pom pom fire from cruiser DIDO. Two men were killed and nine were wounded."
Hunt for Bismarck and sinking, May 1941
It seems to be only your crass ignorance.




RCAFson said:


> The Italian navy in the Mediterranean was far stronger than the German navy in the Channel.


In general, maybe. But a torpedo boat is a torpedo boat.




RCAFson said:


> None of those troops landed on Crete, did they?


The RN stand for two days, dit it?




RCAFson said:


> I don't know what history you are getting your information from,


Surely not from the London Gazette.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 8, 2013)

Didn't somebody try something like this on Britain about 350 years earlier? Seems like the river barges would have been at least as vulnerable as the sea-going Galleons of the Armada. It's quite possible the invasion could have been defeated (and perhaps thousands drowned) by just one day of a high sea-state, without a bullet or shell being fired. the probability of such a day in the English channel would be difficult to predict (see below) especially absent the meteorology reports from many western weather stations in British control. _*Unknown*_ is not an acceptable probability for any invasion plans that call for embarking 8 divisions in low freeboard vessels. Churchill, Ike and company called it a _calculated risk._ and I would expect them to have considerably better data than the Germans possessed in the summer of 1940.

D-Day: the secret of swell and surf forecast

Quote from: How the Storm that Destroyed D-Day Harbor Inspired Innovation | WWII | Command Posts

"_The problem was that one could never predict wave heights and in the battle between Man-made structures and the ocean, the ocean invariably won.[/I"

I should add that I've read that wave heights of about 10 meters have been recorded in the channel. I assume they aren't common, but that's not the point. I expect it wouldn't take anything like a 10 meter wave to swamp a barge.

Waves during the late June 1944 storm were about 4 meters in height, while those on June 6 were about 1 meter, with occasional waves twice that height which are not unusual._


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## Dogwalker (Aug 8, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> Silly me, the cliffs south of the "city" are ever so much easier.


Uh, another wiew of the cliffs! Wow! How white they are!



Shortround6 said:


> Difficult doesn't always...


So were are the difficulties this time? Not in the terrain you show for sure.







Were are the difficulties in those shallow hills? Europe is full of this kind of terrain. Or are you saying that there could be some hidden difficulties that we can't predict?

Surely Allied had problems with hedge rows in Normandy. This was a a difficulty that was not anticipated. But you can't say that, since in Normandy there were problems with hedge rows, then the terrain of south east England must be impractical.


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## Dogwalker (Aug 8, 2013)

Airframes said:


> But of course, that didn't cause any problems


As incredible it may seems, any kind of terrain has it's "problems".


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## Kryten (Aug 8, 2013)

you really cant get your head around how utterly unsuitable barges and light craft are for the English Channel can you?

Luckily for the German infantry the Kreigsmarine certainly did!


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## Kryten (Aug 8, 2013)

Dogwalker said:


> Uh, another wiew of the cliffs! Wow! How white they are!
> 
> 
> So were are the difficulties this time? Not in the terrain you show for sure.
> ...



Surely this is just being obtuse?
You think advancing up that valley, in plain sight, with high ground commanding the only road , obviously mined and registered for artillery and mortars, is just a walk in the park?

you cannot move up that valley, its dominated by high ground, anyone on the road is a sitting duck with no cover and no escape, this "debate" is becoming ridiculous!

Do you have any military experience?


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## Shortround6 (Aug 8, 2013)

Dogwalker said:


> In general, maybe. But a torpedo boat is a torpedo boat.

































All torpedo boats.


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## RCAFson (Aug 8, 2013)

Dogwalker said:


> Standing to information above, at mid september the Germans had "over 3,000 miscellaneous craft".


 Most of which were barges that had to be towed at about 2knots, and had to way to land except by being pushed ashored.




> But didn't


And *the Axis and Italian navy didn't land any troops until the late afternoon of the 28th, and then only because the RN was otherwise occupied.*



> So 7000 yards were a long distance


 7000 yds is a lot longer than 700 meters.




> Bingo.



The RAF is not going to disappear even if it suffers a defeat, and even if the RAF pulled back from the coast it could still fly fighter patrols over the channel. In any event, the German invasion forces are so slow that the RN can still intercept at night with no fear of Luftwaffe attack.




> "Light cruiser ORION sustained some damage to her bridge from pom pom fire from cruiser DIDO. Two men were killed and nine were wounded."
> Hunt for Bismarck and sinking, May 1941
> It seems to be only your crass ignorance.


 That happened *at night* during thefirst convoy engagement, and was almost certainly an accidental over while engaging a close range target not a deliberate engagement of Orion by Dido - not that a few 40mm hits was a serious threat to a light cruiser. From the same source:


> Torpedo boat LUPO was hit by 18 six inch shells and survived despite heavy damage. I'm still waiting for a source for a claims of damage from a torpedo "near miss"...






> In general, maybe. But a torpedo boat is a torpedo boat.



Italian "torpedo boats" would be classed as destroyer escorts in the RN and USN, as they had a full load displacement of over 1000 tons. 





> The RN stand for two days, dit it?



The RN didn't have to go back during daylight because there was nothing to engage. 





> Surely not from the London Gazette


. 

The London Gazette (The London Gazette - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia ) is a official publication of the UK government and is used for posting official notices and despatches, including, in this case, Admiral Cunningham's official report of the Battle for Crete.


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## silence (Aug 8, 2013)

I could be reading things wrong, but it seems to me that Hitler's post-France peace feelers indicate that he wasn't really interested in either invading or occupying Britain, that he was perfectly happy to let them keep their overseas Empire while he built his own continental empire. He admired and respected the British and their accomplishments. I get the feeling that had there been a non-Churchillian gov't that didn't want to continue the fight after France - for whatever reason - that hostilities would have ended. As we especially now know it would not have been the "moral" option (for lack of a better word), but I think it could be viewed as the pragmatic political option. That is, assuming Mussolini is kept on a tighter leash than historically and Japan is left to fight for her empire herself, much as she did to Germany historically.

Wheels within wheels.


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## Dogwalker (Aug 8, 2013)

Kryten said:


> Surely this is just being obtuse?


From your part surely is.



Kryten said:


> You think advancing up that valley, in plain sight, with high ground commanding the only road , obviously mined and registered for artillery and mortars, is just a walk in the park?


Have I ever said it has to be?



Kryten said:


> you cannot move up that valley,


Then no one has ever moved up from a valley in history. That valley has nothing special. Is full of valleys in the world, and often battles were fought there. Every of them has hig ground around, and what you have shown is not particularly step.



Kryten said:


> this "debate" is becoming ridiculous!


Surely is.



Kryten said:


> Do you have any military experience?


And you? What experience you have to not have ever seen another valley?


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## Dogwalker (Aug 8, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> All torpedo boats.


And what of them is normally a match for a force of destroyers and cruisers?


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## s1chris (Aug 8, 2013)

Dogwalker said:


> Shortround6 wrote that the terrain back of dover is Difficult. It Isn't. Simply as it. Every statement that describes that terrain as difficult is an invention. From Dover to Canterbury there aren't the Alps or every terrain charateristic that can described as "difficult". The cliffs, from the city, are only shallow hills. There are higher heights into the city of Rome.
> If someone couldn't think of places to land other than under the cliffs north of the city, that's his problem.



Have you ever seen a horse try and climb a cliff using a rope or grappling hooks?

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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 8, 2013)

Do I detect the rattle of commonwealth chains being pulled here?

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## Dogwalker (Aug 8, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> *the Axis and Italian navy didn't land any troops...*


*
This change the fact that the Force C didn't pursued the second landing force?



RCAFson said:



7000 yds is a lot longer than 700 meters.

Click to expand...

700 meters were in the first engagement (Force D - Lupo), as I stated and you obviously didn't understand.



RCAFson said:



That happened at night during thefirst convoy engagement, and was almost certainly an accidental over while engaging a close range target not a deliberate engagement of Orion by Dido - not that a few 40mm hits was a serious threat to a light cruiser.

Click to expand...

And so? Have I ever said that it wasn't in the firts engagement? Have I ever said that it wasn't accidental? Have I ever said that were more than a few hits, or that they were a serious threat?
I said that "the RN ships even shoot themself".
You stated that it was "a fantasy".
So? It was my fantasy or your ignorance?



RCAFson said:



From the same source:

Click to expand...

Actually only three of the shells exploded, and the damages were light. Two sailors were killed (as those abroad the Orion for the friendly fire).



RCAFson said:



Italian "torpedo boats" would be classed as destroyer escorts in the RN and USN, as they had a full load displacement of over 1000 tons.

Click to expand...

And they are normally a match for a force of three cruisers and four destroyers (by night, having the force of cruisers and destroyers the radar, and the torpedo boat not)?



RCAFson said:



The RN didn't have to go back during daylight because there was nothing to engage.

Click to expand...

So, when Cunningam reported to his superiors that it was no more possible to operate in daylight, he was lying. Interesting...*


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## Milosh (Aug 8, 2013)

No one has mentioned yet the landing in the Romney Marsh area.

Some quotes from this link, Problems with German Plans for Operation Sealion

_The standard argument that if the Germans had gained air superiority they would have been able to sink the British vessels does not really stand up to much scrutiny. During the Dunkirk evacuation, despite having control of the air for long periods, and despite the ships spending a lot of time stationary in the harbour (loading), the Luftwaffe was able to sink only 4 of the 39 Royal Navy destroyers which took place in the operation._

_Lacking purpose-built invasion craft, the Germans planned to use barges from the Rhine and elsewhere to carry their landing force to England. However, these craft were flat-bottomed and unsuitable, liable to sink, in even slightly rough seas: in fact, many of the craft could have been sank by merely be the wake of passing fast destroyer!

Crewing the barges was also a major problem. The Kriegsmarine estimated at least 20,000 extra crew would be required to man these barges. After stripping men from its warships (which surely would have damaged their operational efficiency), as well as finding every other person with nautical experience in other military branches, or in civilian life, they were able to rustle up 16,000: 4,000 less than the minimum required._

_The Germans concluded that they would be unable to bring heavy equipment (such as artillery) with them, and would have to improvise. Nevertheless, since the army used horses for a variety of purposes, they planned to bring 4,000 horses with the first wave of the invasion fleet. To avoid the difficulty of loading horses on barges, they planned to place the horses on rafts towed by the barges (despite the fact that many of the rafts sank during tests). The barges themselves would be towed by tugs (two barges per tug), at would take up to 30 hours to cross the Channel.

Even this was not the end of the problems: the Germans planned for the barges to cross the Channel in columns, then for them to sail parallel to the coast until in a line formation, and then for the barges to turn again and advance towards the coast all at the same time. All of this was supposed to happen at night coordinated by loud hailers, without any rehearsals, and within insufficient numbers of crew with nautical experience._

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## buffnut453 (Aug 8, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> En masse.........valiant defence????



I was talking about the valiant defence of the British Isles that many are proposing the RN would achieve against Operation Sealion if there was no RAF around. Being ironic...


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## buffnut453 (Aug 8, 2013)

pattle said:


> Buffnut, I think what you are talking about is largely a conspiracy theory. Yes there was an element within the Tory party and the aristocracy that leant towards the Nazi's but in reality both the Tory party and the aristocracy were made up of old fashioned imperialists who knew they would not have no future under the Nazis.



So how does your comment square with Hitler's offer that Britain would retain it's Empire? Vichy France held onto its empire so why not Britain. As for painting this purely as a Tory issue...again, I disagree. There were plenty in the Labour party who didn't want war. They weren't necessarily on the side of Nazism but they were in favour of reaching an accommodation with Berlin because war ended up with "the people" killing each other...that would be a bad thing.


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## Jabberwocky (Aug 8, 2013)

No-one in this thread has so far demonstrated how the Germans are going to overcome the following:

The crossing and transport problems: How will they achieve surprise? How will they protect the transports - some of which will take more than 30 hours to reach their disembarkation points - from the Royal Navy? How will they land the troops? How will they provide protection for the flotilla and fire support?

The follow-on transport problem: How will Germany supply its land forces, both the seaborne and airborne infantry? How will it protect the supply convoys?

The land combat problem: How will Germany make its planned broad-front advance against an opposition that has superiority in availability of men and materiel and is fighting from prepared positions, in depth? How will it advance with less than 200 armoured vehicles in the first wave, as well as reduced organic artillery levels? How will will it maintain its beachheads for the nine days required before the second wave of divisions arrive?

The air combat problem: How will it defend the beacheads and ports from night bombing?


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 8, 2013)

Dogwalker said:


> Every of them has hig ground around, and what you have shown *is not particularly step*.



DW, this is a place called Cemetery Ridge, the rise is long and steady over a distance of some miles from a similar ridge seen in the distance over the stone wall. In 1863, 5,000 men are believed to have died advancing on this defended 'high' ground (no automatic weapons here). I doubt it is nearly as steep as what you were shown in the photo above of the terrain leading out of the landing beach. The second photo is a small low hill called Little Round Top. Less than 400 infantrymen in an understrength battalion-sized regiment essentially repulsed attacks and devastated five regiments in a matter of a few hours of fighting over this rather low _high ground _ which is what a defender would call _Good Ground_) (which seems considerably lower than the ground in the photos posted by Shortround6) Without actually walking it, it seems to me, Shortround6 showed you photos of what appears to be Very Good Ground. A more modern analog might be the bluffs above Omaha Beach during the Normandy Invasion also pictured here:


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## RCAFson (Aug 8, 2013)

Dogwalker said:


> This change the fact that the Force C didn't pursued the second landing force?


 It never landed any troops on Crete. Destroying the convoy would have only exposed the RN to more losses, although with hindsight it might have been safer amongst the convoy, the Saggitario not withstanding...



> 700 meters were in the first engagement (Force D - Lupo), as I stated and you obviously didn't understand.



and Lupo was hit 18 times.




> And so? Have I ever said that it wasn't in the firts engagement? Have I ever said that it wasn't accidental? Have I ever said that were more than a few hits, or that they were a serious threat?
> I said that "the RN ships even shoot themself".
> You stated that it was "a fantasy".
> So? It was my fantasy or your ignorance?



You implied that RN ships deliberately engaged each other.




> Actually only three of the shells exploded, and the damages were light. Two sailors were killed (as those abroad the Orion for the friendly fire).



Source please. 3 - 6in shells exploding is typically enough to do severe damage to a destroyer, not to mention 12 other 6in hits.




> And they are normally a match for a force of three cruisers and four destroyers (by night, having the force of cruisers and destroyers the radar, and the torpedo boat not)?



Lupo's convoy was destroyed. The RN opted not to destroy the other because of the Luftwaffe, not the naval escort. 




> So, when Cunningam reported to his superiors that it was no more possible to operate in daylight, he was lying. Interesting...


Apparently the Italians and Germans came to the same conclusion because they made no more attempts at seaborne landings for another 5 days or so. In any event Cunningham didn't have to operate in daylight to destroy Axis landing attempts, but it seems likely that the fleet would have done so if necessary.


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## pattle (Aug 8, 2013)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Do I detect the rattle of commonwealth chains being pulled here?



I wish they were, truth is everyone is in agreement apart from one contributor and I am bored with this thread now as for me it has been exhausted.


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## silence (Aug 8, 2013)

Jabberwocky said:


> No-one in this thread has so far demonstrated how the Germans are going to overcome the following:
> 
> The crossing and transport problems: How will they achieve surprise? How will they protect the transports - some of which will take more than 30 hours to reach their disembarkation points - from the Royal Navy? How will they land the troops? How will they provide protection for the flotilla and fire support?
> 
> ...



maybe the secret plan was to build the Chunnel...


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## wiking85 (Aug 8, 2013)

Milosh said:


> No one has mentioned yet the landing in the Romney Marsh area.
> 
> Some quotes from this link, Problems with German Plans for Operation Sealion
> 
> ...



Totally an unfair comparison. First of all the Germans were operating from bases quite a bit further away from Dunkirk than they would have been operating against Southern England during Sealion. Not only that, but this was after a huge expenditure of effort against the French and British ground forces at an extreme tempo of operations for over 2 weeks previous, meaning that operational rates had dropped tremendously, not to mention the losses incurred in defeating the Allied air forces on the continent. Also the LW was busy at the same time operating against the French and other allied ground forces in the pocket and outside of it too. The weather was pretty bad during the evacuation, meaning the LW could only operate 2 of the days of the evacuation, both of which were not at the peak of the 'packed' ship period. 

This is not comparable to the situation during Sealion, as the LW would have had time to rest, would have good weather (as they would be launching it during a period where shipping could operate), have much, much closer bases to the Channel, so would have a much higher turn around time between sortees and less fatigue traveling to the fighting area, and they would have air superiority over the Channel (as the prerequisite for Sea Lion is defeating the RAF in Southern England), which they did not have over Dunkirk, as the RAF was sending over fighters from England to cover the evacuation that was closer to Dunkirk than LW bases. Plus here the entirety of the LW would be available, rather than a fraction at Dunkirk.

The situation would be very different, meaning the Dunkirk experience is not useful for comparison at all. Even the fighting around Malta isn't instructive, as Malta was much further from Axis airbases than the English Channel was from German bases in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The LW is going to have much, much more in terms of aircraft to throw at the British as they advanced into the constricted area of the Channel mere tens of miles from LW bases in the Low Countries. As the Kanalkampf demonstrated the Ju87s were more than capable of shutting down British shipping during daylight hours even when covered by the RAF, which the British fleet would not be here, as again the premise is that the RAF has been defeated in Southern England as a prerequisite for the invasion to even be happening in the first place.


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## wiking85 (Aug 8, 2013)

Deleted, double post. I don't know why the forum keeps dping me, I only hit the post button once.


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## swampyankee (Aug 8, 2013)

buffnut453 said:


> So how does your comment square with Hitler's offer that Britain would retain it's Empire? Vichy France held onto its empire so why not Britain. As for painting this purely as a Tory issue...again, I disagree. There were plenty in the Labour party who didn't want war. They weren't necessarily on the side of Nazism but they were in favour of reaching an accommodation with Berlin because war ended up with "the people" killing each other...that would be a bad thing.



People killing each other is a bad thing; sitting around and letting other people kill you is worse.

The histories I've read is that there would not be any kind of negotiated peace had the invasion been resisted and succeeded; the occupation policy would have been to depopulate the British Isles. As for the Commonwealth? I suspect the reaction for many of its members would be less than conciliatory. I would be willing to be a large sum of money that Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa would simply declare themselves independent, and the peace treaty is not binding on them. Somehow I think that an occupied UK sending over a fleet to invade Canada to keep it in the nazi-controlled "Commonwealth" would not go over well with the slightly more populous, highly industrialized country south of its border.


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## pattle (Aug 8, 2013)

buffnut453 said:


> So how does your comment square with Hitler's offer that Britain would retain it's Empire? Vichy France held onto its empire so why not Britain. As for painting this purely as a Tory issue...again, I disagree. There were plenty in the Labour party who didn't want war. They weren't necessarily on the side of Nazism but they were in favour of reaching an accommodation with Berlin because war ended up with "the people" killing each other...that would be a bad thing.


We don't know what terms Hitler was prepared to offer, there was no formal offer made nor was there one drafted as far as I know so it is just speculation. I expect the very least Hitler would have wanted was to be sure that his western flank was secure in order for him to safely attack Russia and for this he would need to be certain that Britain was out of the war for good and not just using the time to gather strength. With this in mind he would have wanted to occupy at least part of the country with the option of occupying the whole of it as he did in Vichy France, he also would have robbed the place blind and bled it try through taxes. Vichy France was a rump state controlled by the Germans who were able to and did invade it on a whim. As far as the French Empire was concerned, the Germans were just using French troops as a convenience to stop it falling into British hands, the Germans said OK to the Japanese taking Indo-China from the French. Similarly Hitler would probably have used British troops to protect India from Russia in the short term but have handed it over to Japan in the long term.
I don't think Hitler put any serious thought or energy into invading Britain or even to what Britain might decide to do in the event it was left to fight alone. It sounds to me as though Hitler thought "well we will bomb them and threaten them with invasion and we will see if they are daft enough to trust us to honour a peace treaty", nothing ventured nothing gained. Churchill and the Admiralty must surely have understood about the practicalities of an invasion and understood that we could keep the Germans out. The Germans were trying what Nelson got away with at Copenhagen, invasion was a bluff but a bad one because unlike Nelson's Danes the British knew what they were up against.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 8, 2013)

Dogwalker said:


> And what of them is normally a match for a force of destroyers and cruisers?



That is not what you said, you said "a torpedo boat is a torpedo boat" and , as in many things some are more equal than others.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 8, 2013)

I am convinced, 12 Germans armed with pocket pistols in leaky rowboats with a spavined mule could have crossed the channel, stormed Dover castle and marched on to London and take over the seat of government all within 72 hours. Stopping for a number of pub meals on the way. 

The Royal Navy was bunch of incompetents who did nothing but drink rum and waste the taxpayers money. 


And yet the Germans lost????????

*IT WAS ALL HITLER"S FAULT!*

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## buffnut453 (Aug 8, 2013)

pattle said:


> As far as the French Empire was concerned, the Germans were just using French troops as a convenience to stop it falling into British hands, the Germans said OK to the Japanese taking Indo-China from the French.



Agree no terms were offered but the rhetoric of peace was included in several of Hitler's speeches. We all know how trustworthy he wasn't so Churchill and his Cabinet refused even to consider discussing terms. Would that be the same if London was exposed to unrestrained air attack? Not entire sure that it would...but we're arguing about what might have happened which nobody can know for sure.

One final point...I'm not entirely sure it was up to Berlin whether or not Japan took Indo-China from the French. The Japanese were highly offended by not having prior warning of Germany's attack against the USSR and saw themselves as operating within their sphere of influence without need to refer to Berlin. The Axis really didn't coordinate activities to the extent you are indicating.


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## nuuumannn (Aug 8, 2013)

> There were plenty in the Labour party who didn't want war.



I'm sorry Buffnut, but I think you are overestimating the extent of the anti-war sentiment and how big a part these people would or could play in Britain's future at that time. Churchill's decision making was made behind closed doors during private meetings with senior personnel, none of whom held anti-war sentiment. Britain was very autocratic at this time; it had to be. If there was an invasion you can guarantee that many of these individuals would quickly change their minds about any peace deals with the Nazis if their liberties were being threatened. You are right in stating that there was sympathy for the Nazis and an idea of peace being with among indivduals, but once the bombs started dropping and the dead began to be rolled out into the streets much of this dried up. No, people didn't want war, but they didn't want invasion and occupation either.


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## pinsog (Aug 8, 2013)

Many Americans were against the war before December 7, 1941. Attacks on ones own soil tend to piss off most of the population, even the most anti war people tend to get annoyed when their own homeland is being attacked.


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## prem895 (Aug 8, 2013)

Can I just wear my Hitler stash?


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## nuuumannn (Aug 8, 2013)

> I think initiative and surprise would be a major asset for the Germans.



A sixteen hour boat ride across the English Channel in flat bottomed barges is what constitutes initiative and surprise?! The men and horses would most likely have been seasick, with the animals shitting last night's dinner around the interior of the boats, causing even more ill feeling among the soldiers! Try invading with your army having to endure that! 



> Personally, I think England could be invaded, but supplying the invasion force might be the real issue.



Any country can be invaded with the right circumstances and equipment in place. By the Germans in 1940? Not a chance.


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## Jabberwocky (Aug 9, 2013)

My feeling is that if Fighter Command was comprehensively written down (say to around 200 fighter aircraft) and Bomber Command suitably diminished (cut by around 50%) and the Germans did decide to launch Sealion, the most likely result is the Germans losing anywhere from 10-25% of their initial force of 160,000 men in the crossing and landing, another 15-25% in the actual combat phase while on land and then another 10-20% as they beat an ignominious retreat.

SEA: There is simply no way to prevent the RN from sallying forth, at night or by day, to oppose the crossing. Submarines, mines, the surface fleet and the Luftwaffe were simply not enough to stop the RN braving its MTB/MTGs, sloops, destroyers and light capital elements (6" cruisers) in the channel. All through the BoB period, RN destroyers were running sweeps along the French and Belgian coasts and attacking targets of opportunity, both in daylight and at night.

If a crossing does get underway, as of 14 September 1940 there were the five battleships and aircraft carrier, 16 cruisers and 48 destroyers or corvettes, plus another 700 light armed patrol vessels in home waters. 12 destroyers, three battleships and two cruisers were ready to sail from Rosyth to directly oppose the flotilla.

To fight them, the Kriegsmarine has two old battleships, two modern battleships, five cruisers (including a gunnery training ship) and no more than ten destroyers. The submarine force is mostly going to be deployed in the North Sea or the Atlantic, not in the Channel, mostly due to its shallowness.

AIR: Even a written down RAF is still going to bomb the invasion beaches, ports and the follow on assembly areas in both Southern England and France/Belgium. Fighter Command will take a heavy toll on fighter bomber attacks by Ju-87s and Bf-110s, although F/B 109-E4s and E7s will probably have an easier time of it.

LAND: Sealion envisions a nine day build-up by infantry forces to grant the armoured forces of the second wave enough manoeuvring room for a push on London. This is lunacy of the highest order.

The British defence plan consisted of using fortifications, the Home Guard and static regular army units as a coastal crust to provide initial resistance. Behind this came the semi-mobile formations, again supported by fortifications (over 14,000 by September). Their main objective was to trade space for time and to channel German advances into corridors, allowing the reformed British divisions to chose the ground they fight on.

The nine German infantry divisions that land are going to be outnumbered, outgunned in terms of artillery and armoured support and lacking some of their organic transport support. The bulk of the British Army's armour and artillery was to have been brought in to phase lines inland of the invasion sites, mustered and then used to attack in strength.


What I see is a force that is subject to attack from both the land and the sea by day, by land, air and sea by night. It is outnumbered and under supplied, without significant armour support (the ~250 Tauchpanzers amount to roughly one division of armour) attempting to achieve a wide-front advance against an opponent that is going to meet it with a delaying tactics and resistance concentrated around strongpoints. A few days in, it is going to start to run shorts of bombs, bullets and bandages, while the opposition continues to strengthen. The BA is going to be raining shells on it from the land, the RN is going to be raining shells on it from the sea and Bomber Command is going to be appearing every night and hitting pretty much whatever they can find. 

General Franz Halder likened the whole exercise to sticking his hand into a meat grinder. I think he may have been understating the case.

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## Juha (Aug 9, 2013)

Hello Jabberwocky
both modern BBs were still in repairs, Sch. till late Nov 40 and Gnei. till mid Oct 40. Both were hit by a torpedo during Norway ops.

Juha


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## fastmongrel (Aug 9, 2013)

The highly trained Nazi Sea Lions would have easily got across the Channel and invaded at night. Can you imagine the chaos caused by squads of Sea Lions roaming the countryside balancing balls on there noses and attacking all the Fish shops. Luckily the Royal Seal Heavy Infantry aided by The Queens Own Otters would be ferried in and there would be bloody flipper to flipper combat in the Council Swimming pool at Walmington On Sea.

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## stona (Aug 9, 2013)

buffnut453 said:


> There were plenty in the Labour party who didn't want war.



Certainly not the leadership. Attlee was one of the most vociferous opponents of appeasement. This went for most Labour politicians if not some of the party's grass roots. The reason they joined the coalition was because it was perceived as being in the national interest. 

As soon as Barbarossa was launched this all became irrelevant. The Labour Party and the entire Trade Union Movement (and I agree some had been wavering, despite the Nazi treatment of its own Trade Unionists..."a bayonet is a tool with a worker at both ends" and all that) got solidly behind the war. Didn't prevent a spate of strikes which kept Beaverbrook on his toes!

Cheers

Steve


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## pattle (Aug 9, 2013)

I would just like to say how much I have enjoyed reading some of the comments on this thread, I enjoy a good bit of sarcastic wit and have had a really good laugh at some of things people have written.


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## Juha (Aug 9, 2013)

stona said:


> Certainly not the leadership. Attlee was one of the most vociferous opponents of appeasement. This went for most Labour politicians if not some of the party's grass roots. The reason they joined the coalition was because it was perceived as being in the national interest...



But Attlee and Labour Party opposed the rearmament till 1937. IMHO it was not very bright policy to pursuit active anti-nazi policy while in the same time made best efforts to make sure that one's own armed forces would be as weak as possible. Singing the International / Red Flag wasn't the most effective way to stop bombers or panzers.

Juha


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## fastmongrel (Aug 9, 2013)

Juha said:


> But Attlee and Labour Party opposed the rearmament till 1937. IMHO it was not very bright policy to pursuit active anti-nazi policy while in the same time made best efforts to make sure that one's own armed forces would be as weak as possible. Singing the International / Red Flag wasn't the most effective way to stop bombers or panzers.
> 
> Juha



To be fair it was only really Churchill that was pushing for rearmament before 1937 and he was in a political no mans land. The political class usually goes with the public mood and you wouldnt have found many outside the military that wanted to spend the money.


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## Juha (Aug 9, 2013)

Not so simple. E.g when in April 1936 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain, introduced a budget which increased the amount spent on the armed forces, Attlee was not only opposed it in the Parliament but also made a radio broadcast in opposition to it. And we know the reputation of NC.

Juha


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## stona (Aug 9, 2013)

Juha said:


> Not so simple. E.g when in April 1936 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain, introduced a budget which increased the amount spent on the armed forces, Attlee was not only opposed it in the Parliament but also made a radio broadcast in opposition to it. And we know the reputation of NC.
> Juha



He was still an opponent of appeasement, many in Britain jumped through hoops to avoid another war an Attlee was no exception. We are not talking about 1936 but 1940, Attlee and the Labour Party were solidly behind the war. The war was now de facto, not something that might be avoided. There is no way they would have become involved in negotiations with Germany. The Labour Party was founded by and funded by the Trade Union movement. Those organisations would have been well aware of the fate of their German "brethren" in the 1930s.

Singing the Internationale worked for the Red Army, along with tanks and all the rest.

Cheers

Steve


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## Juha (Aug 9, 2013)

stona said:


> He was still an opponent of appeasement, many in Britain jumped through hoops to avoid another war an Attlee was no exception. We are not talking about 1936 but 1940, Attlee and the Labour Party were solidly behind the war. The war was now de facto, not something that might be avoided. There is no way they would have become involved in negotiations with Germany. The Labour Party was founded by and funded by the Trade Union movement. Those organisations would have been well aware of the fate of their German "brethren" in the 1930s.



What I mean is that if in 34 - 36 Attlee and Labour Party had won the day it would have been rather irrelevant what they did in 40 because if GB's rearmament would have begun a couple years later the options would have been 1) ask terms or fight and after defeat ask terms.



stona said:


> Singing the Internationale worked for the Red Army, along with tanks and all the rest.



That was the reason for a part of the LabP to oppose rearmament, they were ready to risk the security of GB for the certainty that the armed forces of GB would not be used against SU. A part opposed rearmament because of pacifism.

Juha


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## buffnut453 (Aug 9, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> I'm sorry Buffnut, but I think you are overestimating the extent of the anti-war sentiment and how big a part these people would or could play in Britain's future at that time. Churchill's decision making was made behind closed doors during private meetings with senior personnel, none of whom held anti-war sentiment. Britain was very autocratic at this time; it had to be. If there was an invasion you can guarantee that many of these individuals would quickly change their minds about any peace deals with the Nazis if their liberties were being threatened. You are right in stating that there was sympathy for the Nazis and an idea of peace being with among indivduals, but once the bombs started dropping and the dead began to be rolled out into the streets much of this dried up. No, people didn't want war, but they didn't want invasion and occupation either.



You keep talking of an invasion when I'm saying that wouldn't happen because it wasn't needed. As you observe, Government in 1940 was autocratic and held behind closed doors. If the RAF lost the BoB there would have been a vote of no confidence in Churchill and his Government would have fallen and replaced, without an election, by something else. The question is what would replace it - a continuance of "fight them on the beaches" or a more concilliatory agenda? I think the latter, others think the former. We'll never know but I would go with the latter.


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## buffnut453 (Aug 9, 2013)

stona said:


> As soon as Barbarossa was launched this all became irrelevant.



But Barbarossa was April 1941 not September 1940. At the earlier stage of the war, who knows what would happen. There was no clear majority in Parliament. Would Attlee be allowed to lead in the place of Churchill? Unlikely as I think the Conservatives would want one of their own to take over.

Interesting discussion though!


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## swampyankee (Aug 9, 2013)

Juha said:


> What I mean is that if in 34 - 36 Attlee and Labour Party had won the day it would have been rather irrelevant what they did in 40 because if GB's rearmament would have begun a couple years later the options would have been 1) ask terms or fight and after defeat ask terms.
> 
> 
> 
> ...




I think it was a bit more than worries about the British armed forces being used against the bolsheviks again; it was that something like 1 out of 8 military-age men were killed in the war and the expectation was that the same thing would happen again. If I remember my history correctly, hitler was not considered a threat until _Anschluss_; even had Churchill been in charge, he may well have been more concerned with suppressing the independence movement in India than preparing for a war in Europe.


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## JtD (Aug 9, 2013)

While I don't think that Sealion would have successfully taken place, I find the certainty with which some predict its failure a bit over the top. I know the far east is not England in many ways, but looking at the Japanese invasion of Malaya, the odds were against them and they still succeeded. I'd never say never.

I still think the more interesting question is the impact of a lost BoB on the overall strategic situation.


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## Juha (Aug 9, 2013)

swampyankee said:


> I think it was a bit more than worries about the British armed forces being used against the bolsheviks again; it was that something like 1 out of 8 military-age men were killed in the war and the expectation was that the same thing would happen again.



That was the motivation behind the pacifist wing. Attlee had served during the WWI, wounded and after all end up being a Major. Fougt in Gallipoli, Iraq and France. I don't doubt sincery of his pacifism. But in the party there were also those who looked USSR through very pink glasses.



swampyankee said:


> If I remember my history correctly, hitler was not considered a threat until _Anschluss_; even had Churchill been in charge, he may well have been more concerned with suppressing the independence movement in India than preparing for a war in Europe.



Now Chamberlain worried on GB air defence from at least late 1935 and in his 36 budget wanted and got more money for defence, especially for air defence. IMHO it is difficult to see other reason than Germany behind those worries.

Juha


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## Juha (Aug 9, 2013)

buffnut453 said:


> Pattle,
> 
> The British people had no choice when Churchill became their Prime Minister. There was no election. Chamberlain went to King George and simply recommended Churchill to be his successor. Why would a replacement for Churchill be any different? Vote of no confidence in Parliament, Halifax stakes his claim as the only viable candidate. Also, bear in mind that a defenceless London would likely be evacuated. With Parliament on the run, who would be in any position to oppose an appeasing faction from taking power.



Why wouldn't the Parliament meet in some other place. During the Winter War Finnish Parliament moved from Helsinki to Kauhajoki, a small municipality in Western Finland and met there.

Juha


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 9, 2013)

fastmongrel said:


> The highly trained Nazi Sea Lions would have easily got across the Channel and invaded at night. Can you imagine the chaos caused by squads of Sea Lions roaming the countryside balancing balls on there noses and attacking all the Fish shops. Luckily the Royal Seal Heavy Infantry aided by The Queens Own Otters would be ferried in and there would be bloody flipper to flipper combat in the Council Swimming pool at Walmington On Sea.



Now you are just being silly... The more serious concern for any invasion of the southern coast of Britain is the necessity for the invaders to deal with Basil Faulty in Torquay. I cannot imagine any invading German force overcoming the combined opposition of Basil, Sybil, Polly but worst of all, Manuel.

On the other hand, if the Germans had formed an alliance with the intelligent blancmange-shaped aliens from the planet Skyron, they could have easily won Whimbledon Fortnight.

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## Juha (Aug 9, 2013)

buffnut453 said:


> ...With a negotiated peace, there's no need for an invasion force. Hitler could simply bide his time, installing pliant British politicians who would accede to his every whim. Want to station more German troops in the UK to protect against America? Certainly Herr Hitler. Like Vichy France, in the end the UK would become a Nazi satellite with zero autonomy. Undoubtedly, there would be resistance but where would they get their supplies? Resistance on the continent only survived because it had a good resupply base from the UK. Without that, there's nothing to sustain resistance other than courage. Certainly not sufficient to overcome the Nazi war machine.



Why would Halifax and co to allow German troops into England? One ask the terms and either accept them or if unacceptable continue fighting. Germany had to accept terms in Nov 18 but GB was in better position being an island state with a powerful navy and great industrial capacity, also in Midlands and in Scotland and so outside the effective range of Bf 109s.

Juha


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## redcoat (Aug 9, 2013)

buffnut453 said:


> So how does your comment square with Hitler's offer that Britain would retain it's Empire?


There was no offer.
After the battle of France was over Hitler waited for the British to come to him to seek peace. When that didn't happen Hitler made his 'Appeal For Reason' speech' on the 17th July 1940 in which he spent the majority of the speech ranting on how Britain and France were responsible for the war, he then ended it on these words.

"In this hour I feel it to be my duty before my own conscience to appeal once more to reason and common sense, in Great Britain as much as elsewhere. I consider myself in a position to make this appeal since I am not the vanquished begging favours, but the victor speaking in the name of reason. I can see no reason why this war must go on.

Possibly Mr Churchill will again brush aside this statement of mine by saying that it is merely of fear and doubt in our final victory. In that case, I shall have relieved my conscience in regards to the things to come.”

That was as close as Hitler ever got to a peace offer to the UK in the summer of 1940
.


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## redcoat (Aug 9, 2013)

During the Battle of Britain a British battleship and it's destroyer escorts sailed across the Channel and bombarded the German held Channel ports, and it wasn't even attacked by the Luftwaffe...because it was at night.

So I have a question.
How does the Luftwaffe protect the invasion fleet and zones at night ?

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## Civettone (Aug 9, 2013)

I don't think the Royal Navy tried again. So that must have had a reason? 

Anyway, with illumination Ju 88s and Ju 87s could be used against the RN. And E-boats, like during the D-day invasion exercises. 
 
It seems to me that the Royal Navy could be destroyed from the air - just see what losses they inflicted on British ships during Battle of Crete, BUT it would take several days and the Royal Navy would have to stay in the Channel, which seems unlikely.

Kris


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## stona (Aug 9, 2013)

Juha said:


> Why would Halifax and co to allow German troops into England? One ask the terms and either accept them or if unacceptable continue fighting. Germany had to accept terms in Nov 18 but GB was in better position being an island state with a powerful navy and great industrial capacity, also in Midlands and in Scotland and so outside the effective range of Bf 109s.
> Juha



Now we are arguing what terms would be acceptable to a British government. None that the Germans could offer. Try and invade then.

I take it people here have read the _full_ text of Hitler's July 19th "final appeal to reason" speech. It is nothing less than a typical Nazi rant, blaming everybody but Germany for the war. It was hardly likely to inspire a will to negotiate in the British government. Several members of that government, not just Churchill, were roundly abused in the speech.

Cheers
Steve


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## Shortround6 (Aug 9, 2013)

I believe the "theory" is that after the British loose the BoB _ALL_ British air activity over the entire British isles ceases, German bombers either sink the Royal Navy at their moorings or force them to withdraw well beyond their operational radius in one night's steaming. If the Royal navy is caught by day they will be wiped out down to the life boats in just a few hours time. 

That and the impenetrable 40-60KM long mine fields that spring up in just a few days on both sides of the invasion routes. 

As with a lot of things it is a question of degree, the Luftwaffe could and did sink ships both at moorings and in the channel and they could do it at a rate that could make _sustained_ operations difficult or impossible. But the invasion and counter invasion operations are NOT sustained operations in the sense that coastal convoys were. They are pretty much an all or nothing effort in a few days or few weeks at most. 

The Royal Navy had two basic jobs for over 350 years, defend Britain from invasion and protect the trade routes. If the Britain is invaded and conquered the trade routes don't matter. 

A variable in this scenario is _when_ the BoB is lost. By Sept 1st? Sept 15? Sept 22?

Historically Sea Lion was "postponed" on Sept 17, if the Germans had made good progress in the air would they have held on for another week or two? But there is a closing time when the worsening fall weather makes it too much of a gamble. 

The next variable is the extent of the loss, Are all the British Isles a "No Fly Zone" for the RAF or just south east England which reduces the distances the Anti invasion forces have to cover to manageable distances?


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## Shortround6 (Aug 9, 2013)

Civettone said:


> It seems to me that the Royal Navy could be destroyed from the air - just see what losses they inflicted on British ships during Battle of Crete, BUT it would take several days and the Royal Navy would have to stay in the Channel, which seems unlikely.



And what damage is the Royal Navy doing to the invasion "fleet" in those several days?


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## stona (Aug 9, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> A variable in this scenario is _when_ the BoB is lost. By Sept 1st? Sept 15? Sept 22?



And what do we mean by lost?
Defeat 11 Group and maintain something like local air superiority, at least temporarily, over the Channel and South Eastern England? That seems to have been the only objective that the Luftwaffe itself considered attainable in the time frame available, and it wasn't.
This is not the same as defeating the RAF. It does not make Southern Britain a "no fly zone" for the RAF and it does not prevent it interfering with the invasion. It just makes it more difficult and probaby more expensive.
This is partly why Dowding knew that he didn't have to win, he just had to avoid defeat. It's also why he had no intention of withdrawing Fighter Command north until an invasion was actually ashore. 
Cheers
Steve


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## Gixxerman (Aug 9, 2013)

fastmongrel said:


> To be fair it was only really Churchill that was pushing for rearmament before 1937 and he was in a political no mans land. The political class usually goes with the public mood and you wouldnt have found many outside the military that wanted to spend the money.



Even Churchill wasn't entirely negative about fascism, Hitler his gang (just) before the war.
I haven't got the exact quote here just a summary of it but it goers along these lines

"_He said that if he had been an Italian he would have been a Fascist, and as late as 1938 he stated that if England were ever in the same straits that Germany had been in 1933, he hoped that England would find "her Hitler."_ "

Those less than hard-line attitudes were undoubtedly held....but as event were to prove they were not as widely held as some might imagine - and when it came to it they were decidedly conditional on events.

I think that in many ways (from my reading on the subject) there was a strand of thinking in the Nazi leadership in Germany that had a very naïve view of the British and how the UK would respond to Germany and a German dominated European continent (including western Russia the Ukraine etc).
But then most of them had zero experience about these things and seemed happy to rely on whatever came out of their own heads as some sort of reality.
All that 'force of will' being always capable of determining reality nonsense.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 9, 2013)

That is one of the Big Questions.

If the British can keep air cover over Harwich, 120-130km (3 hours) by sea to Dover and the home of four destroyer flotillas. 

Even if the British are forced out of Portsmouth are they forced out of Plymouth?


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## stona (Aug 9, 2013)

Gixxerman said:


> Even Churchill wasn't entirely negative about fascism, Hitler his gang (just) before the war.



Churchill said and wrote many things that can be construed as pro fascist and or anti Bolshevik as well as anti semitic. I'm sure plenty of articles and quotes can be found online. He was a man of his generation.

They hardly reflect his attitude towards Nazism in the 1930/40s.

Cheers

Steve


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## pattle (Aug 9, 2013)

At what point would Britain have known that the RAF had failed to deter an invasion? I suppose this could only have been when the invasion commenced? The RAF was Churchill's first line of defence, in reality its job was to deter an invasion attempt by remaining intact. Churchill had a remit to stop the Germans from successfully invading Great Britain, not to stop them from trying. Should the RAF have failed to deter the Germans from attempting invasion then Churchill would still have a had a mandate to defeat the invasion. Churchill never promised anyone he would stop the Germans from trying to invade Britain he promised the people that "we will fight them on the beaches etc and that we shall never surrender". We are taking it for granted that if Britain had lost the Battle of Britain then the Germans would have tried to invade, I think it is wrong to assume they would have done as the Germans were aware of the difficulties involved. 
The German invasion barges would of had to of kept crossing the channel over and over again to resupply and reinforce, and each time this fleet set sail it would have just got smaller and smaller. 
How far would Churchill have gone should the Germans have landed? would he have ordered the use of gas and chemical weapons. I have not heard this possibility talked about much in some years but it was once a popularly held belief that he would have done.


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## redcoat (Aug 9, 2013)

Civettone said:


> Anyway, with illumination Ju 88s and Ju 87s could be used against the RN.


Even if they had the training to bomb ships at sea at night (which they hadn't) they still have to find them first


> And E-boats, like during the D-day invasion exercises.


 The E-boats tactic of choice was to sneak up to the enemy ships, fire their torpedoes, and then run away as quickly as possible....I don't think the invasion forces they are supposed to be defending would be too impressed with the 'running away' bit. 



> It seems to me that the Royal Navy could be destroyed from the air - just see what losses they inflicted on British ships during Battle of Crete, BUT it would take several days and the Royal Navy would have to stay in the Channel, which seems unlikely.
> 
> Kris


The RN would only need to dominate the Channel at night to defeat the invasion, they wouldn't even need to sink that many ships, just the disruption they would cause would be enough to tip the balance.

It should be noted that RN warships made regular patrols of the Channel at night throughout the Battle Of Britain

ps. Its often claimed that the Luftwaffe stopped the British running convoys through the Channel at the begining of the battle, but in fact after the heavy daytime convoys losses in the Channel earlier in the battle, the British merely re-timed the convoys to travel through the Dover Straits at night.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 9, 2013)

redcoat said:


> It should be noted that RN warships made regular patrols of the Channel at night throughout the Battle Of Britain
> 
> ps. Its often claimed that the Luftwaffe stopped the British running convoys through the Channel at the begining of the battle, but in fact after the heavy daytime convoys losses in the Channel earlier in the battle, the British merely re-timed the convoys to travel through the Dover Straits at night.



More room to maneuver in day light and harder to find. Even if the weather is good enough to fly, that does not guarantee 30 mile visibility from an airplane. The search aircraft have to find the British ships _in time_ for the strike aircraft to take-off and reach them. Unless search aircraft stay with them or are relieved the British ships can move 8-24 miles in an hour depending on type.,making it hard for the strike aircraft to find them if visiability isn't the best.

Web site for weather in the English channel: Marine weather forecast for English Channel Western | Marine | United Kingdom, Coastal Areas

Right now (3:51PM eastern daylight time) it seems to be showing 1.3 meter waves and 6 mile visibility. I could be off an hour or two. You can also adjust to eastern of mid channel. 

Middle of next week looks like under 1 meter waves for several days.


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## Milosh (Aug 9, 2013)

What are the tides like?

how fast and how high


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 9, 2013)

I believe the hypothesis of a successful Sea Lion may be rooted in the fantasy that all one has to do to stage a cross channel invasion is run Dunkirk in reverse. Calling Dunkirk a miracle is not an overstatement. It ranks, or should, with the parting of the Red Sea. As a miracle, it is multilayered. 

1st (and foremost), was the _sustained_ combination of good weather and calm sea state. The two don't always go hand in hand. 

2nd was the incredibly rapid mobilization of active support by the non-miltary component of Britain's sea-faring culture. While I'd bet the deep draft vessels carried the bulk of the evacuees, the small craft were most effective and essential as lighters to carry the troops from shore to ships. Yet the probable myth persists to the present that small boats carried an army back to English ports. I'd be shocked if the bulk of the evacuated army traveled by small craft, although from what I understand, thousands did. The importance of the deep-draft component of any amphibious operation was obviously already well understood by the RN which which had accumulated experience in the art. 

3rd, The observation that the Luftwaffe couldn't stop the effort on what was essentially their own shore may have lead to an incorrect conclusion that aerial opposition to an invasion could be easily overcome. Extrapolating from this that a _defeated _ RAF would be equally incapable of preventing a hostile landing. 

We know from Dunkirk and other WW2 examples in the PTO that even a few hostile aircraft can inflict serious damage on a properly equipped invading force even if it doesn't repulse the invasion. Sea Lion did not involve a properly equipped force.

4th, as is frequently the case, the overall success of the evacuation obscured the high (but not fatal) price paid by the RN and Merchant fleet units involved in the evacuation: from wikipedia:

_*Six British and three French destroyers were sunk (5 by air, 2 by E-boat, 1 each by mines and U-Boat), along with nine large boats.*_ In addition, *19 destroyers were damaged*.[18] Over _*200 of the Allied sea craft were sunk, with an equal number damaged.*_[32] 

These losses were accomplished largely by the leakage of Luftwaffe strike aircraft into the evacuation area despite a strong RAF mounted aerial blockade. Luftwaffe attacks were initially weather limited so the results were nothing like an all-out effort to prevent the evacuation as would likely be instituted by the RAF to hinder an invasion of the home island. This despite the fact that the Luftwaffe's anti-ship skill was reputed as not yet as formidable as it later became. 

It may be useful to compare with the German plans, specialized amphibious units, relative experience and available hardware among contemporary, future belligerent navies mounting such operations: The Japanese, British and Americans: 

The Kriegsmarine seems to have operated its very small marine force as reinforced platoons or companies in typically small operations more akin to special ops than amphibious invasions. 
By comparison the RN went into WW2 with what appears to be about a full division (~10,000 men) of Royal Marines which grew quickly into a fully capable amphibious ops specialty organization starting in August 1940. By the time of the BoB the royal navy had (and used in the Dunkirk evacuation) limited numbers of purpose built landing craft: Landing Craft Navigation or LCNs. 

The IJN/IJA also had a number of roughly battalion-sized special landing forces trained in amphibious ops including specialized landing craft to facilitate their ops. The major amphibious operations were mounted from deep draft vessels (Like the pioneering Shinshu Maru depot ship built in the mid-30's) acting as carriers for the (Shohatsu and Diahatsu) landing craft. The Japanese were performing and perfecting amphibious ops from about the mid-1930s. 

Even before WW2, the USA was deeply involved in developing amphibious ops doctrine, as well as specialized forces and equipment.

When the channel was finally crossed in June 1944, that invasion and virtually all others in the ETO and PTO were launched from deep draft vessels carrying the huge logistics required for supporting a large expeditionary force. That's what a military that is serious about such operations does. Using unseaworthy craft to mount and sustain an invasion is just putting the survival of an entire army at the mercy of natural elements. Basing invasion plans on unfounded expectations of an enemy's inability to interfere also exposes one's army to the risk of disaster (like at Midway). Sea Lion was never a serious threat. It seems to me that only after Sea Lion, did Germany begin to develop a real capability for such operations.

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## nuuumannn (Aug 9, 2013)

> Using unseaworthy craft to mount and sustain an invasion is just putting the survival of an entire army at the mercy of natural elements.



3,000 miscellaneous vessels and not one of them actually designed for the purpose. The British wouldn't be firing at them as the waterlogged, sea sick German soldiers hauled their bedraggled selves ashore, they'd be offering them seasickness pills, a clean towel and a stiff drink! "'Ere you go mate, 'ave this, you'll feel better in a coupla days. Shame about the weather eh?!"

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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 9, 2013)

I should have added natural and _*often quite unpredictable*_ elements


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## pinsog (Aug 9, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> 3,000 miscellaneous vessels and not one of them actually designed for the purpose. The British wouldn't be firing at them as the waterlogged, sea sick German soldiers hauled their bedraggled selves ashore, they'd be offering them seasickness pills, a clean towel and a stiff drink! "'Ere you go mate, 'ave this, you'll feel better in a coupla days. Shame about the weather eh?!"



Do you think the British would have actually fired on them or would they have just sailed around and through them with cruisers and destroyers and sunk them with their wakes?


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## nuuumannn (Aug 9, 2013)

> Do you think the British would have actually fired on them or would they have just sailed around and through them with cruisers and destroyers and sunk them with their wakes?



The admirals would have got their deck chairs out and watched the spectacle over a glass of Pimms. "Those Jerries are keen coming over at this time of year, eh wat?! Bottom's up, Old Boy!"


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## Shortround6 (Aug 9, 2013)

Oh, definitely wakes............

After they ran out of ammunition, depth charges, torpedoes.....and boarding cutlasses


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## nuuumannn (Aug 10, 2013)

> Oh, definitely wakes............



That sort of behaviour is far too ungentlemanly, besides, the admirals might spill their Pimms' on their tunics and we can have that, eh wat! Far more sporting to watch the Germans flail about miserably in the water and discuss how they would have done it if they were in the Germans' shoes...


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## stona (Aug 10, 2013)

Finally I would like to recommend a couple of books.

The Royal Navy and the Battle of Britain by Anthony J Cumming

Invasion of Engand 1940 - The planning of Operation Sealion, by Peter Schenk,

I won't spoil the surprise by revealing their conclusions 

Cheers

Steve


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## beitou (Aug 10, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> That sort of behaviour is far too ungentlemanly, besides, the admirals might spill their Pimms' on their tunics and we can have that, eh wat! Far more sporting to watch the Germans flail about miserably in the water and discuss how they would have done it if they were in the Germans' shoes...



Any surviving German soldiers would have been given a mercyless tutting and a sound raising of the the eyebrows before being told firmly to form a que for their towels and cocoa.


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## fastmongrel (Aug 10, 2013)

Interesting fact I have just come across. Axis POWs were given the same rations as the British Army as per the Geneva Convention. This meant POWs were getting more calories than the civilian population of Britain.


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## redcoat (Aug 10, 2013)

Milosh said:


> What are the tides like?
> 
> how fast and how high


The Channel is noted for its strong tides, especially in the area around the Dover Strait, where the German's intended to invade.


> The Dover Strait is renowned for having strong tidal flows with a large rise and fall in water from high to low tide. There are two types of tide, the ‘EBB’ tide and the ‘FLOOD’ tide.
> 
> Ebb Tide: This tide comes from the North East down the Channel towards Folkestone. It begins 4.5 hours after high water to 2 hours before high water (Dover).
> 
> ...


-Source Channel Tides
More info
Channelswimming.com - Navigation Q&A.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 10, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> Oh, definitely wakes............
> 
> After they ran out of ammunition, depth charges, torpedoes.....and boarding cutlasses



Ah Yes: Mister Christion! Pass out the belaying Pins!


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 10, 2013)

Jabberwocky said:


> For me, the crucial question of Sealion is not whether the Royal Navy could have defeated the Channel crossing (which I believe they comprehensively would have, purely on weight on numbers) but the logistics of the whole operation.
> 
> A German light infantry division consumed around 150-200 tonnes of supplies per day and around 400 tons while in heavy combat. A motorised/mechanised division consumed around 300 tons per day, a German armoured division consumed around 300 to 350 tons of supplies. An armoured division could consume up to 700 tons per day if it was in heavy combat.
> 
> ...



Somehow I missed JW's earlier post. It is excellent and I believe cuts to the heart of the problem facing the German military. I believe it may show either the absence of any intention of actually carrying out an invasion or the rank amateur nature of the planning.


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## redcoat (Aug 10, 2013)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> _*Six British and three French destroyers were sunk (5 by air, 2 by E-boat, 1 each by mines and U-Boat), along with nine large boats.*_ In addition, *19 destroyers were damaged*.[18] Over _*200 of the Allied sea craft were sunk, with an equal number damaged.*_[32]


The number of vessels sunk or lost during the evacuation was 94, of which 51 are credited in full or part to the Luftwaffe, of the remaining 130 or so losses these were nearly all small civilian vessels abandoned at Dunkirk at the end of the operation due to the risk involved in attempting to tow them back across the Channel.


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## fastmongrel (Aug 10, 2013)

If the German High Command had a massive brainfart and went ahead with the invasion against all sanity I can see the following happening. The big blue hammer from the North wipes out a big chunk of the German supply boats and the Channel is littered with sunken barges, the RN loses 5 or 6 WWI vintage light cruisers maybe a dozen or so WWI vintage destroyers and several dozen smaller vessels. The Kreigmarine rusts gently on the bottom of the North Sea. The south east coastal area up to 10 or 15 miles inland is a smoking ruin pockmarked with the wreckage of a large chunk of the LWs Ju52 and Ju87 fleet. Several thousand Germans mostly officers are rescued in a heroic effort by the LW and perhaps 100 to 120,000 men are marched off to POW camps to spend the rest of the war digging fields.

In even the worst possible case of the Germans holding Kent winter is coming the nights are getting longer and the RN owns the Channel and what remains of the LW transport fleet is being steadily whittled away by accidents even if the RAF doesnt get involved. On the inland waterways of Europe there is a massive shortage of barges a nasty winter is coming and a lot of Europe is going to get very cold as the coal the barges usually moved is stuck at the mines waiting for the overloaded railways to shift it. Iron ore is also not getting moved and the railways begin to lose the battle to keep everything moving. Hitler the worlds worst Charlie Chaplin impersonator and his fat friend wont retreat and the LW is ground away till it is a shadow of itself. The loss of even 250,000 troops and a few tanks and guns is neither here nor there but a much weaker LW means no Barbarossa in 41 and by 42 the Soviet Union might be ready for the invasion.


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## stona (Aug 10, 2013)

The Germans had a grand total of two pioneerlandungsboot type 39. This means at least two whole companies could have invaded in style .

The Allies, for Overlord on the other hand used 4,126 landing ships and landing craft, all purpose built for a seaborne invasion. The Germans seem to have viewed the Channel as a wide river, they couldn't construct a long enough pontoon so they'd requisition some river barges and set off.

Cheers

Steve


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## pinsog (Aug 10, 2013)

If you were in charge of the RN, would you allow a landing on the beach and then cut off the supply lines? Or would you simply sink all of the infantry barges in the channel? (this question is for everyone)


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 10, 2013)

pinsog said:


> If you were in charge of the RN, would you allow a landing on the beach and then cut off the supply lines? Or would you simply sink all of the infantry barges in the channel? (this question is for everyone)



It is possible to calculate, using the methods of Quantum Mechanics, the finite probability that an airliner will pass through a mountain undamaged with passengers unharmed. It's just not very likely that such an event (miracle) will ever happen. The point is, unlikely events (miracles) can and do happen (Dunkirk as an example).The number of enemy troops reaching the beach should be minimized by subjecting them to as continuous a process of attrition as long and with as much intensity as possible. The goal is to enable the defending troops to deal with the survivors with minimal effort and risk. Sink everything you can, kill or disable as many of the enemy and as much of their baggage as possible and then hope for the best. When the survivors reach the beach and hopefully surrender, treat them with every ounce of humanity that can be mustered.


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## pinsog (Aug 10, 2013)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> It is possible to calculate, using the methods of Quantum Mechanics, the finite probability that an airliner will pass through a mountain undamaged with passengers unharmed. It's just not very likely that such an event (miracle) will ever happen. The point is, unlikely events (miracles) can and do happen (Dunkirk as an example).The number of enemy troops reaching the beach should be minimized by subjecting them to as continuous a process of attrition as long and with as much intensity as possible. The goal is to enable the defending troops to deal with the survivors with minimal effort and risk. Sink everything you can, kill or disable as many of the enemy and as much of their baggage as possible and then hope for the best. When the survivors reach the beach and hopefully surrender, treat them with every ounce of humanity that can be mustered.



Well that would be my plan also, but I wondered if anyone else had a different plan. If the RN caught this ragtag invasion in the channel, I don't think there would be any hope of any of the Germans reaching shore in any shape to fight. I think any Germans reaching shore would do so while clinging to whatever debris that was leftover from the barge they were on before it was sunk. I can just imagine RN destroyers running wild among the invasion force, driving down the length of virtually unarmed barges at point blank range after having sunk the tug boat raking the decks with AA fire and then dropping depth charges alongside the barges.


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## fastmongrel (Aug 10, 2013)

There is a theory that the best thing would have been to let the Germans land as many troops as possible then shut off the supply routes. With say 150 to 200 thousand troops ashore they will be eating there boots in days.

A lot of Sealion fantasists also seem to think that Britain was defended by old men armed with kitchen knives lashed to broom handles and petrol bombs made from milk bottles. The reality was that there was very well equipped and trained Canadian div ready to roll plus going from memory in the south east corner there were 6 infantry divs, a mechanised div and an armoured div. With more than 400 tanks available and more coming the Valentine tank was starting to roll off the production lines and that was more than capable of dealing with anything the germans could have landed. Also Britain had bought for scrap value 1,000 ex US 75mm guns plus a million rounds of ammo, 1.5 million ex US rifles plus about 50 million rounds of 30.06, all the while building 25 pounders, 2 pounders, 3.7s, Bren guns and Lee Enfields as fast possible. 

Its going to take some seriously bad generaling to let the Germans break out of Kent and get to London. British generals didnt exactly cover themselves in glory attacking the Afrika Korp early on but the same men who had extracted the BEF almost intact from France when the French Army was split open by politics and pure bad leadership will have to be drinking moonshine 24/7 to let the Germans get 10 miles from the beaches.


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## swampyankee (Aug 10, 2013)

pinsog said:


> If you were in charge of the RN, would you allow a landing on the beach and then cut off the supply lines? Or would you simply sink all of the infantry barges in the channel? (this question is for everyone)



You obviously want to sink all the barges at sea. This has beneficial side effects: the Germans stop and rescue survivors, which would be disruptive, or let them drown, which would be demoralizing, and, unlike defeating them ashore, the British don't have to worry about caring for German prisoners.

Failing this, the goal would be to defeat the landed forces so badly that the Germans try to evacuate. Then you can attack the evacuation forces.


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## fastmongrel (Aug 10, 2013)

This alternate Sealion history is well worth reading A Better Show in 1940  over 20 posts and not too badly written.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 10, 2013)

pinsog said:


> Well that would be my plan also, but I wondered if anyone else had a different plan. If the RN caught this ragtag invasion in the channel, I don't think there would be any hope of any of the Germans reaching shore in any shape to fight. I think any Germans reaching shore would do so while clinging to whatever debris that was leftover from the barge they were on before it was sunk. I can just imagine RN destroyers running wild among the invasion force, driving down the length of virtually unarmed barges at point blank range after having sunk the tug boat raking the decks with AA fire and then dropping depth charges alongside the barges.



Ouch!  That's a bit harsh... I suggested merely killing the enemy, not dismembering them. This is only war after all, not an episode of Dexter!


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## Civettone (Aug 10, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> And what damage is the Royal Navy doing to the invasion "fleet" in those several days?


Annihilate it ...

Once, I suggested an 'expendable' landing. A couple of divisions would be transported over the Channel, just before dawn, supported by the KM. Then the KM would retreat, while the landing troops would dig in. Royal Navy would start to pound the troops, but would be under continuous attack by the Luftwaffe. The landing troops will probably have to surrender after two-three days, but by then, the Royal Navy would have suffered enormous losses. Then, a new invasion would start, this time witht the KM+LW fighting it out with the RN. This time, troops can get supplied, although suffering horrible losses, and Britain slowly gets conquered. 

All, rather blurry and wishful thinking. But unconventional thoughts have often been the most succesful 

Kris


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## pinsog (Aug 10, 2013)

Civettone said:


> Annihilate it ...
> 
> Once, I suggested an 'expendable' landing. A couple of divisions would be transported over the Channel, just before dawn, supported by the KM. Then the KM would retreat, while the landing troops would dig in. Royal Navy would start to pound the troops, but would be under continuous attack by the Luftwaffe. The landing troops will probably have to surrender after two-three days, but by then, the Royal Navy would have suffered enormous losses. Then, a new invasion would start, this time witht the KM+LW fighting it out with the RN. This time, troops can get supplied, although suffering horrible losses, and Britain slowly gets conquered.
> 
> ...



Unconventional: Ok, in the middle of the night, the British, while shelling the crap out of the Germans on shore form point blank distance, sail a dozen, or 20 or 30 old freighters around in front of the beach head and sink them end to end in 40 or so feet of water so the German barges can no longer reach the beach to unload supplies. Now the Germans are completely cut off from reinforcements and at night, British battleships sail to within 300 yards or so of the beach and shell the crap out of them before retreating.


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## redcoat (Aug 10, 2013)

Civettone said:


> Annihilate it ...
> 
> Once, I suggested an 'expendable' landing. A couple of divisions would be transported over the Channel, just before dawn, supported by the KM. Then the KM would retreat, while the landing troops would dig in. Royal Navy would start to pound the troops, but would be under continuous attack by the Luftwaffe. The landing troops will probably have to surrender after two-three days, but by then, the Royal Navy would have suffered enormous losses. Then, a new invasion would start, this time witht the KM+LW fighting it out with the RN. This time, troops can get supplied, although suffering horrible losses, and Britain slowly gets conquered.
> 
> ...


This ignores the fact that the German Navy only had the logistical capacity to transport 3 infantry divisions on the first day, a total of 1 division each on the 3 landing zones within the 50 mile wide beach head. The remaining 6 infantry divisions of the so-called 'first wave' would be landed over the next ten days.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 10, 2013)

It also rather ignores the fact that the KM in Sept of 1940 would be lucky to reach the channel. Things like the Channel dash aside ( and Feb weather is a lot different than Sept/Oct.) The KM major surface ships were either at Trondheim or in Germany after escorting the Gneisenau home after she got torpedoed. Or any other ships in German home waters are either repairing/refitting, working up after commissioning or engaged in general training like the Emden. 

So basically you have the invasion "fleet" scattered ( dispersed?) from Cherbourg to Anterwpen but anything larger than 600-800 ton minesweeper (or S-boat) is probably no closer than Emden at best or more likely Cuxhaven. 

The Likelyhood of the KM providing any "support" from ships of even destroyer size is pretty dim. 

This throws it back to the Luftwaffe. Can the Luftwaffe sink/damage _enough_ British warships _while_ providing support pre/during the landings _and_ while keeping up the pressure on the remains of the RAF to keep them from trying anything. 

Is the Luftwaffe strong enough to handle ALL THREE jobs at once?


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## fastmongrel (Aug 10, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> This throws it back to the Luftwaffe. Can the Luftwaffe sink/damage _enough_ British warships _while_ providing support pre/during the landings _and_ while keeping up the pressure on the remains of the RAF to keep them from trying anything.
> 
> Is the Luftwaffe strong enough to handle ALL THREE jobs at once?



Dont forget laying mines, recce flights, bombing harbours, bombing transport links, flying in men and supplies and casualties out and on and on. Each LW plane will be flying 25 hours a day 8 days a week.


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## stona (Aug 15, 2013)

Some quotes:

"I find it difficult to believe that the South Coast is in serious danger at the present time." Winston Churchill, 10th July 1940

"He told me he himself [Churchill] had never believed that invasion was possible! To which I replied to the effect that he had camouflaged it very well. He then had a go at me....however we made it up." Admiral Charles Forbes (C-in-C Home Fleet in 1940) to Godfrey Style, 6th February 1947.

"Naval Staff also appreciated clearly that air supremacy alone could not provide permanent security against vastly superior enemy naval forces in the crossing area." Admiral Kurt Assman

On flanking mine fields as protection for German convoys. 

Germany had "insufficient mines for viable barriers and every eight to fourteen days the mines would break away and need replacing." General Gunther Blumentritt who represented von Runstedt at Sealion conferences.

"The flanks were poorly guarded and could provide only partial protection because of the strong tides and rise and fall." The British could simply steam over the mine fields at high water. Vice-Admiral Friederich Ruge, C-in-C Minesweepers West.

War Diary of the Naval Staff, 10th September 1940.

"It would be more in the sense of the planned preparation for operation Sea Lion if the Luftwaffe would now concentrate less on London and more on Portsmouth and Dover, and on the naval forces in or near the operation.......bombardment of London might produce an attitude in the enemy which will make the Sea Lion operation completely unnecessary."

I could go on.....and on 

The idea that the Royal Navy was not already operating in the Channel is false too. Throughout September the French invasion ports were repeatedly attacked. Admiral Reginald Drax's flotillas, based at Nore, actually broke into Dunkirk, Buologne, Calais and Ostend sinking many invasion barges with short range gun fire. His colleagues from Portsmouth and Plymouth carried out similar operations. On 11th September every port from Holland to Cherbourg got entered and shelled. This continued into October. On the 11th October Calais received 45 salvoes from RN vessels.

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Aug 15, 2013)

Hi guys

Havent read all the pages. At the begining i notoce that great reliance was placed by some on the effects of minefields. This was certainly the plan, but it is unrealistic to expect minefields laid over a few weeks, at best, as being able to fully "close" the channel. The Germans might well start an intensive minelaying operation, but the likley response is simply that the British will move elements of their fleet, firstly to sweep the mines as they are laid, and secondly to interfere with the minelayers (if they are ships or subs). mines laid by aircraft will be harder, but more porous, as the minefields will be less dense.

Its important to note,, that the chief German offensive strategy against England in 1941, after the blitz, was an intensive minelaying operation by a full air wing, and at least 4 flotillas of minelaying craft 9operating mostly out of Rotterdam. To be sure, the Germans managed to sink a lot of ships from this effort, about 750000 tons of coastal shipping in total, but they never successed in closing thechannel, or indeed any of th other major ports of Great Britain. Germany simply lacked the wherewithall to successfully complete such a mission. Not all the LW could lay mines, and the surface capability was really quite limited.

Despite efforts stretching over severalk years, the Germans were unsuccessful at closing the channel to allied traffic. Why would they be successful all of a sudden with a couple of weeks of effort. And if the RN can penetrate these minefields, the invasion fleet was totally vulnerable.

Sea lion was a total crock


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## nuuumannn (Aug 15, 2013)

> Sea lion was a total crock



The Germans thought so as well. I bet there were more than a few Wehrmacht soldiers who breathed a heavy sigh of relief when the invasion was postponed, only to later find they'd be hading off to North Africa or Russia. At least they would have been in an environment they would have felt more comfortable on - land!


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## prem895 (Aug 16, 2013)

I guess fish and chips would have been changed to bratwurst and beer.


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## stona (Aug 16, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> The Germans thought so as well. I bet there were more than a few Wehrmacht soldiers who breathed a heavy sigh of relief when the invasion was postponed, only to later find they'd be hading off to North Africa or Russia. At least they would have been in an environment they would have felt more comfortable on - land!



Particularly the Navy (KM). Further entries in the diary along with the essays written immediately post war by many of the senior commanders make it quite clear that the Luftwaffe's failure in the Battle of Britain made a perfect excuse to abandon an invasion plan which they regarded as impossible and had no stomach for. They did, quite literally, blame the Luftwaffe. The Luftwaffe, or surviving officers bought in to the myth of the Battle of Britain for their own reasons. Galland used to talk about the Battle _for_ Britain, which never happened, though in later years he let it drop.

There has been much written in the thread about the ability of the Luftwaffe to sink RN vessels, but this is not supported by the facts.

Only three of twelve capital ships sunk between September 1939 and November 1941 had succumbed to air attack alone and these were Italian battleships sunk at anchorage. Smaller ships were more vulnerable. Twenty eight RN destroyers and five of its cruisers had been sunk this way.

The sort of bomb needed to sink larger vessels was investigated by the RAF after attempts to bomb German battleships in September 1939. The so called "Job 74 Trials" were carried out and a report made by the Ordnance Board. Essentially GP bombs exploded outside the vessel and were relatively ineffective. A delay fuse to allow them to "bounce around", maybe entering a hatch or falling over the side to create a near miss which was damaging was one solution which sounds ridiculous today. SAP bombs with a short delay were really required. Unfortunately the Luftwaffe did not have many such bombs in late 1940. The Sprengbombe Dickwandig (SD) ordnance only went up to 500Kg in late 1940. The Panzerdurchslags Cylindrisch (PC) ordnance was used against Illustrious in January 1941, but results for the 1,000Kg bomb were disappointing and the 1,400Kg version was developed later.

How were these large bombs to be delivered? By far the most accurate ship bomber was the Ju 87. It needed a cloud base at around 10,000ft for a typical attack profile, fine in the Mediterranean but not a daily occurrence in the English Channel in September. The Ju 87 B equipped the units operating from France. The B-2 could supposedly could carry a 1000kg bomb, though not according to the loading plan I have. This wasn't really big enough for sinking really large ships with any certainty, given the limited chance of scoring significant hits. Compare it with what the RAF dropped on Tirpitz!
We can forget the torpedo bombers, the He 111s of KG 26 were the only ones trained to do this, and their record even later, was woeful. It wasn't helped by the unreliability of the German torpedoes. The one thing that the RNs anti aircraft defences could hit was something coming in low (below 40 degree elevation) straight and slow.

As for hitting small ships the debate from the RN side centred on whether the smaller vessels should manoeuvre to dodge the bombs or maintain a study course. Rapid manoeuvre threw off the High Angle Control system for the ship's anti aircraft control system. The "Air Defence Instructions, 1939" did not permit fast evading action against dive bombers, despite admitting the limitations of the current anti aircraft defence systems. Luckily RN Captains are allowed considerable latitude and almost all small ships, and cruisers, did "dodge" the bombs. Rear Admiral L H K Hamilton wrote to Admiral Forbes from the cruiser Aurora in May 1940, having been subjected to continuous high level and dive bombing for thirty six hours.

"From my experience, I think that provided one has sea room and independence of manoeuvre in a ship of this size, one is most unlikely to be hit."

An enquiry established that HMS Ghurka was sunk by aircraft in the Norwegian campaign because she had "detached from screen to improve arc of fire", losing the protection of mutual covering fire from other ships. Also her Captain, a gunnery officer who believed in the efficacy of the AA system had deliberately chosen to "keep a steady gun platform without weaving."

There is an idea promulgated by some that even the best anti ship aircraft, the Ju 87, could simply swoop in and the ships were doomed. This is patent nonsense, not supported by the facts.

Alec Dennis was serving in the destroyer HMS Griffin of Crete. He remembers the Ju 87s attacking Force B.

The JU 87s came down in "groups of three, one after another........it was a classic attack, technically interesting, physically terrifying and, actually, ineffective."

All the bombs missed as Griffin weaved at top speed whilst the accompanying cruisers (Gloucester and Fiji) threw up a terrific barrage.

The light cruiser Naiad finally sunk after sustaining numerous hits over a two hour period, having dodged thirty six near misses in one ten minute period.

It took thirteen hours of attacks to do for Fiji. She had run out of AA ammunition and had resorted to firing practice ammunition (solid shot) at the incoming bombers. 

HMS Kipling survived eighty three attacks in a period of a few hours. HMS Kandahar survived twenty two attacks in a four and three quarter hour period.

Aircraft did not have the ordnance to sink the large battleships and whilst they could sink smaller vessels it took a tremendous effort over prolonged periods and even then success was by no means guaranteed.

The mine fields didn't work and the KM knew it. Neither the Luftwaffe, nor the KM could not keep the RN out of the Channel and the Luftwaffe and KM knew it. If any troops got ashore they could not be reinforced or resupplied in the face of concentrating resistance from the British Army and Royal Navy and the Luftwaffe, KM, Heer and OKW all knew it.

The only reputable historian I've read (and for whom I have the utmost respect) who seriously believes that the Germans would have attempted an invasion, successful or not, is Richard Overy. He is one of those who has always promoted the Anglo-American myth of the Battle of Britain, which more or less ignores any contribution from the Royal Navy, and in this case I beg to differ.

Cheers

Steve


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## stona (Aug 16, 2013)

prem895 said:


> I guess fish and chips would have been changed to bratwurst and beer.



I spend a lot of time in Germany and quite like a wurst and beer, but I wouldn't give up my fish 'n' chips for it 

Cheers

Steve


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## Tante Ju (Aug 16, 2013)

stona said:


> SAP bombs with a short delay were really required. *Unfortunately the Luftwaffe did not have many such bombs in late 1940. *The Sprengbombe Dickwandig (SD) ordnance only went up to 500Kg in late 1940. The Panzerdurchslags Cylindrisch (PC) ordnance was used against Illustrious in January 1941, but results for the 1,000Kg bomb were disappointing and the 1,400Kg version was developed later.



While I agree with your general assessment, it bothers me to see this mythical claim mentioned so often in these threads. I am curious for a source for this - from what I have seen the claim is unfounded. I am sure makers of the claim can support it figures of German bomb stocks by type.

You might also be interested in the PC - RS series of bombs.
PC 1000 Rs: Rocket-Propelled Bomb « Catalog of Enemy Ordnance

Your claim that the SD series only went up to 500 kg in _late _1940 is also curious in view that 1 April 1940 Luftwaffe instructions mentioned already the SD 1000, SD 1400, PC 1000, SC 1800 etc.
http://www.theairtacticalassaultgroup.com/wiki/doku.php?id=usebomb


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## silence (Aug 16, 2013)

Why not include December '41 for capital ships sunk and add Prince of Wales and Renown along with Pearl Harbor? Why not Midway? The Dauntlesses did a pretty good job against maneuvering Japanese carriers.

The Germans don't need to _sink _the RN ships, only mission kill them. HE bombs can tear up everything above the armor deck - including fire control and AA. If the RN has to dodge bombs their firing solutions for surface ships are not going to be very good.

The RN will also see a lot more Stukas than they faced at Crete: the LW had almost three times as many for the BoB as they did for Crete. They'll also face strafing fighters, which can do nasty things to exposed AA gunners in the octuple pom-poms.


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## stona (Aug 16, 2013)

I think the claim goes back to Galland's recollection of the bombs available to the Luftwaffe in 1940 which must itself have been second hand. The source for many authors' claims about the doubt when the Germans introduced their SD and PC bombs, particularly the heavier ones, is probably "Air Power and the Royal Navy, 1914-1945" by G Till, published in 1979. I don't have a copy and don't know his source.

It's a bit of a moot point since even if the B-2 could in fact carry a 1000Kg weapon (contrary to my loading plan, but according to many reputable sources) it certainly couldn't carry anything larger. I'd have to check, but I don't think that the Jumo 211 D engined B-2 equipped most Luftwaffe Ju 87 units in September 1940 in any case . I can't find any pictures, after a quick look, of a B series JU 87 carrying anything bigger than a 500Kg bomb either, but I'll happily be corrected.








The limited endurance of the Ju 87 (about 300Km) before the introduction of the R is also often overlooked by proponents of Sea Lion.

The first PC1400 bombs reported by the British were found in the Bristol area in 1942. The British surmised that the larger bombs were developed due to the inability of the 1000Kg version(s) to sink a large ship like HMS Illustrious despite several hits.

Given that the British usually found unexploded versions of new bombs or mines, and ordnance fitted with new fuses or timers within days or weeks (often days) of their deployment I doubt that they were in use much earlier. Certainly not in 1940

Cheers

Steve


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## redcoat (Aug 16, 2013)

stona said:


> We can forget the torpedo bombers, the He 111s of KG 26 were the only ones trained to do this, and their record even later, was woeful. It wasn't helped by the unreliability of the German torpedoes. The one thing that the RNs anti aircraft defences could hit was something coming in low (below 40 degree elevation) straight and slow.


The He 111 only became operational with torpedoes in 1941, in 1940 the only aircraft capable of torpedo attacks in the Luftwaffe were the He 59 and He 112 floatplanes, and it should be noted that at one point in September 1940 the Luftwaffe only had 32 torpedoes in stock.
By the end of 1940 the Luftwaffe had used over 160 torpedoes in combat, and for this they managed to sink 7 or 8 merchant ships.


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## redcoat (Aug 16, 2013)

silence said:


> The RN will also see a lot more Stukas than they faced at Crete: the LW had almost three times as many for the BoB as they did for Crete. .


On August 13 1940, the Luftwaffe had 311 Ju 87's in their OOB for the BOB, during the invasion of Crete they had approximately 230-250 available


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## Tante Ju (Aug 16, 2013)

stona said:


> I think the claim goes back to Galland's recollection of the bombs available to the Luftwaffe in 1940 which must itself have been second hand. The source for many authors' claims about the doubt when the Germans introduced their SD and PC bombs, particularly the heavier ones, is probably "Air Power and the Royal Navy, 1914-1945" by G Till, published in 1979. I don't have a copy and don't know his source.



However the above Luftwaffe document from April 1940 makes clear that the Luftwaffe possessed both large, armor piercing and rocket assisted armor piercing bombs as of April 1940 suitable against ships, particularly the older ones. So G Till seems to be in error.



> It's a bit of a moot point since even if the B-2 could in fact carry a 1000Kg weapon (contrary to my loading plan, but according to many reputable sources) it certainly couldn't carry anything larger. I'd have to check, but I don't think that the Jumo 211 D engined B-2 equipped most Luftwaffe Ju 87 units in September 1940 in any case . I can't find any pictures, after a quick look, of a B series JU 87 carrying anything bigger than a 500Kg bomb either, but I'll happily be corrected. The limited endurance of the Ju 87 (about 300Km) before the introduction of the R is also often overlooked by proponents of Sea Lion.



The Ju 87R was present in Norway IIRC or introduced at around the same time. The standard Ju 87B could carry an 1000 kger, I tend to believe it was more of a question of adding the suitable bombing rack, but the problem is moot since the rocket assisted PC 500 RS series were developed just to address the problem of anti shipping strikes from low altitude.

There was also the Ju 88 of course, which could carry large bombs and far away.



> The first PC1400 bombs reported by the British were found in the Bristol area in 1942. The British surmised that the larger bombs were developed due to the inability of the 1000Kg version(s) to sink a large ship like HMS Illustrious despite several hits.
> 
> Given that the British usually found unexploded versions of new bombs or mines, and ordnance fitted with new fuses or timers within days or weeks (often days) of their deployment I doubt that they were in use much earlier. Certainly not in 1940.



Certainly this logic is very flawed. what british intel speculation about german equipment (which was very often bordering phantasmagoria, see "fake smoke" devices speculated on aircraft) is quite irrelevant as to what the Germans actually had. The larger bombs, especially the AP ones were meant against specially hard targets, which did not turn up either at sea in 1940 (for a destroyer sized target, the standard high capacity 250 kgers were more optimal). I doubt the British fished out many unexploded German bombs from the Channel or from the Dunkerque beaches... they had the ability to inspect a number of unexploded ones dropped on the mainland, but those represented the ones believed to be optimal against prime mainland targets (airfields, light housing and brick buildings, shops, factories, docks, ie. overwhelmingly 50 and 250 kgers were to be used against building with less than three levels, ie. practically all british housing). IOW, why would the Luftwaffe, in 1940, drop one-and-a-half ton _armor piercing_ bombs on airfields, brick houses or docks...?

Obviously there was very little chance that the British would be aware of the larger bombs early.


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## redcoat (Aug 16, 2013)

Can anyone tell me how the Luftwaffe will deal with any RN battlegroups timing their attack so they are entering the Channel area at night ??????


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## silence (Aug 16, 2013)

redcoat said:


> Can anyone tell me how the Luftwaffe will deal with any RN battlegroups timing their attack so they are entering the Channel area at night ??????



Magic?
Big wide angle searchlights?

Actually, I would guess the KM will take up a blocking position. Depending on what formation the RN uses they may even last a few hours.


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## silence (Aug 16, 2013)

redcoat said:


> On August 13 1940, the Luftwaffe had 311 Ju 87's in their OOB for the BOB, during the invasion of Crete they had approximately 230-250 available



Hmm... the number I found in a quick search were (obviously) different - like 414 vs. 150.


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## stona (Aug 16, 2013)

Actually anti shipping bombs and mines were usually retrieved from the inter tidal zone after attempts to drop them on shipping or, in the case of mines, in shipping lanes. In the case of Bristol, it is the port with the biggest tides in England.

What is your source for the claim that a standard B could carry a 1000Kg bomb? None of my sources say that anything before the up engined B-2 could do this and the B-2 loading plan contradicts this. I still haven't found a picture of a "Bertha" with anything larger than a 500Kg bomb, as per the loading plan.

The first loading plan I have which allows a 1000Kg bomb is for the R-2 and it is this (being based on the B-2) which makes me wonder if this is why some sources say that the B-2 could also lift 1000Kg. They both used the Jumo 211 D.

Testing on the prototype R was carried out at Rechlin during April 1940 and the first order for 105 Ju 87 R-1s was placed in June 1940 so they certainly weren't available for the Norwegian campaign. I've seen claims that 1./St G 1 flew some in Norway but can't see how. The first order of R-1s which are just a B with added fuel tanks, were all delivered "by October" so some would have been available in the summer of 1940. Peter Smith's tables of Luftwaffe Ju 87 units deployed for the Battle of Britain show Bs and Rs. Two units with at least some Rs from a total strength of 36 serviceable aircraft. (Geschwader Stab St.G 1 and II./St.G.2)
The initial order was increased to 471 to be delivered by April 1941. 145 R-4s (with Jumo 211J) were ordered in March 1941. All irrelevant to Sea Lion.

Many units operating against Britain in August and September 1940 were still equipped with the B-1 powered by the Jumo 211 A 

Cheers
Steve


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## Shortround6 (Aug 16, 2013)

redcoat said:


> Can anyone tell me how the Luftwaffe will deal with any RN battlegroups timing their attack so they are entering the Channel area at night ??????



By eating lots of carrots? 



Having bombs in development or even tested, approved and cataloged does not necessarily mean available in large numbers. Granted all it takes is "one" (or two) but the bombs have to be brought from German to the French and low country airfields by train and truck and every "big" bomb is two or three smaller bombs not delivered. Handling the bigger bombs may be a bit more of a problem. It may not be, bomb trolleys and small cranes for unloading rail-cars trucks? Granted things like sheer legs can be rigged but again, how much man power and effort for one big bomb compared to handling smaller bombs? 

Something else to consider is the amount of AA fire the British _may_ be able to put up. Off Crete and Mediterranean convoys the ships were at sea and in combat zones for several days and hundreds of miles from supply points. 

Many of the Cruisers a "nominal" magazine capacity of 250 rounds per 4" gun(including practice ammo) which, with the gun firing at 12 rounds per minute ( and they could do better) was good for 21 minutes? This amount of ammo (firing time) had to be spread out over several days and a number of attacks. 2pdr ammo varied from 720-750 rpg on the older Battleships to 1800rpg on the reconstructed ones and many cruisers up to 3500 rpg on the Tribal destroyers. Allowing for a 'practical" rate of fire of 80 rpg that is 9 to 22.5 minutes firing time for most anything but a Tribal class destroyer. Depending on the "mission" the RN ships might be subject to air attack for several hours before sundown at the start of the mission and several hours after sunrise and the end of the mission before being in harbor and resupplying for the next nights raid/strike. 
The Luftwaffe may be able to mount more intense missions/strikes due to the short distances but they will be facing AA fire that was more intense than the "normal" AA fire seen in the Med. This does not mean the RN is invulnerable by any means but it does mean that the successes scored by the Luftwaffe in the Med ( with more training/experience in anti-ship work) might not translate to equal success in the Channel.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 16, 2013)

silence said:


> Magic?
> Big wide angle searchlights?
> 
> Actually, I would guess the KM will take up a blocking position. Depending on what formation the RN uses they may even last a few hours.




Tough to block from Kiel and Trondheim. It might be the RN who takes up blocking positions to keep the KM from getting near the Channel. I am not sure how willing the KM was to run large ships though waters that contained British submarines, they might have done if pressed and they all may have made it through.... or several ships heavily damaged/sunk before they even made to contact with the RN surface ships. And the KM didn't have ANY ships larger than a destroyer ( and darn few of them) they could afford to loose at this point.


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## stona (Aug 16, 2013)

silence said:


> Hmm... the number I found in a quick search were (obviously) different - like 414 vs. 150.



For numbers of Ju 87s available (not necessarily serviceable) I'd go with somewhere around 320-350 in August 1940 and around 150 for Crete. 

For Crete the Luftwaffe had a total of around 420-430 bombers of all types available. Is this where the confusion stems from?

Cheers

Steve


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## Tante Ju (Aug 16, 2013)

stona said:


> Actually anti shipping bombs and mines were usually retrieved from the inter tidal zone after attempts to drop them on shipping or, in the case of mines, in shipping lanes. In the case of Bristol, it is the port with the biggest tides in England.
> 
> What is your source for the claim that a standard B could carry a 1000Kg bomb? None of my sources say that anything before the up engined B-2 could do this and the B-2 loading plan contradicts this. I still haven't found a picture of a "Bertha" with anything larger than a 500Kg bomb, as per the loading plan.
> 
> The first loading plan I have which allows a 1000Kg bomb is for the R-2 and it is this (being based on the B-2) which makes me wonder if this is why some sources say that the B-2 could also lift 1000Kg. They both used the Jumo 211 D.



I will try to look at sources when available. Difference between the B-1 and B-2 was marginal.




stona said:


> Testing on the prototype R was carried out at Rechlin during April 1940 and the first order for 105 Ju 87 R-1s was placed in June 1940 so they certainly weren't available for the Norwegian campaign. I've seen claims that 1./St G 1 flew some in Norway but can't see how. The first order of R-1s which are just a B with added fuel tanks, were all delivered "by October" so some would have been available in the summer of 1940. Peter Smith's tables of Luftwaffe Ju 87 units deployed for the Battle of Britain show Bs and Rs. Two units with at least some Rs from a total strength of 36 serviceable aircraft. (Geschwader Stab St.G 1 and II./St.G.2)
> The initial order was increased to 471 to be delivered by April 1941. 145 R-4s (with Jumo 211J) were ordered in March 1941. All irrelevant to Sea Lion.



Well according to the unit table of StG 1 they had clearly reequipped with Ju 87R between March - July 1940.

Sturzkampfgeschwader 1

They wrecked havoc on Allied shipping between April - July 1940.

_On 9 April I./StG took part in raids against Oscarsborg Fortress after it sank heavy cruiser Blücher. Soon afterwards the gruppe was takes with naval interdiction. Its primary target was the Royal Navy's Home Fleet. The same day, the unit hit the 600 ton torpedo boat *Aeger *in the engine room. It was run aground and scuttled.[3] The units first loss occurred in 19 April. While attacking HMS Cairo, Leutnant Karl Pfeil and his gunner Gerhard Winkels were shot down and captured near Namsos. The same day, a British raid by Fleet Air Arm Blackburn Skua and Fairey Swordfish Aircraft destroyed six Ju 87s near Trondhiem/Vaernes from carriers HMS Ark Royal and HMS Glorious. Ju 87s did manage to sink anti-submarine trawlers *Siretoco*, *Jardine *and *Warwickshire*. *HMS Bittern* was badly damaged and sunk by HMS Juno. Later, on 1 May 1940, I. Gruppe failed to hit Ark Royal during an interdiction against British naval forces off the coast.[4] Staffelkapitan of 2 Staffel, Oberleutnant Heinz Bohne claimed to have hit the carrier (he did not) and failed to mention in his report that he lost one of his Ju 87s (Oberfeldwebel Erich Stahl and Unteroffizier Friedrich Gott) to two Sea Gladiators of No. 802 Squadron RAF. This was the only loss on 1 May.

The next few missions on the afternoon of 1 May and 3 May, the Ju 87s had more success. The French large destroyer *Bison *was sunk along with *HMS Afridi* by I./Sturzkampfgeschwader 1 on 3 May 1940 during the evacuation from Namsos. Bison's forward magazine had been hit killing 108 of the crew. Affridi, who had attempted to rescue Bison's survivors was sunk with the loss of 63 sailors. On 4 May Ju 87s of I. Gruppe sank Norwegian steamers *Blaafjeld*, *Sekstant*, *Pan *and *Aafjorld*.[5] On 8 May Gruppenkommandeur Hauptmann Paul-Werner Hozzel, Oblt. Elmar Schaefer and Lt. Martin Möbus and veteran observer Unteroffizier Gerhard Grenzel, became the first Stuka crews to receive the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. Grenzel was the first NCO in the Luftwaffe to receive the award.[6]

On 24 May 1940 I. Gruppe sank the Norwegian trawler *Ingrid *in Bodo harbour. The Gruppe suffered one loss; Feldwebel Kurt Zube, to a No. 263 squadron Gladiator. He was rescued by German forces. I. Gruppe also took part in the Battles of Narvik. Heinz Bohne and his gunner was killed on 2 June 1940 over Narvik. He was the victim of Sgt. H H Kitchener and Flt Lt A T Williams of No. 263 Squadron RAF. Two Ju 87s were shot down on the morning of the 2 June 1940. Lt Klaus Kuber and his gunner were killed, the victim of a No. 43 Squadron RAF Hawker Hurricane. Mk. I flown by Sgt B L Taylor whilst Feldwebel Hans Ott and his gunner Sonderfuhrer Brack fell victim to Flg Off. John F Drummond.[7]

On 14 July 1940 StG 1 engaged various convoys heading westward through the English Channel. II./StG 1 and IV.(St). Lehrgeschwader 1 sank *five ships* between them, including *HMS Boreas *and *HMS Brilliant*. Two II. Gruppe machines were lost. The same day III. Gruppe Ju 87s were forced to abandon a raid on Portland Harbour when engaged by RAF fighters. They suffered one shot down and two damaged.[9]
The last major convoy action took place on 8 August 1940 against Convoy CW 9 (Peewit), comprising 20 merchant ships and nine naval vessels. Two Stuka attacks were organised. The first involved StG 1 who lost two Ju 87s and two damaged. A second attack from 60 Ju 87s of I. StG 1, III./StG 2 and III./StG 3 resulted in the *destruction of four merchant ships and damaged seven*. In exchange three I./StG 3 Ju 87s were lost and another four damaged.[10] A third attack sank *Empire Crusader*.[11]

In mid-August StG 1 was ordered to cease missions owing to the Ju 87s unacceptable losses. It continued operating over the channel until February 1941.[12]_


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## silence (Aug 16, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> Tough to block from Kiel and Trondheim. It might be the RN who takes up blocking positions to keep the KM from getting near the Channel. I am not sure how willing the KM was to run large ships though waters that contained British submarines, they might have done if pressed and they all may have made it through.... or several ships heavily damaged/sunk before they even made to contact with the RN surface ships. And the KM didn't have ANY ships larger than a destroyer ( and darn few of them) they could afford to loose at this point.



Except for Sea Lion the German are proactive rather than reactive. They can tell the KM when to move, while the RN has to wait for it to happen. As far a big ships they can afford to lose, that's a command decision which will be weighed against the goal of the operation: is it worth losing some or all of you big ships in the interests of invasion?

And the RN will in all likelihood have to run a u-boat gauntlet, and ASW at this time was no where near what it was in '43, especially at night.

Regardless of the finer details, should invasion be attempted the Channel and maybe the North Sea are going to be redder than Stalin's pajamas.


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## stona (Aug 16, 2013)

Anyone want to see how to land a tank in 1940?











It took them twenty minutes, flat calm and nobody shooting at them.

Those folding ramps and steel "Krupp" ramps I've sometimes seen posted as evidence of German landing capabilities did not exist in 1940.

Cheers

Steve


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## stona (Aug 16, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> I will try to look at sources when available. Difference between the B-1 and B-2 was marginal.
> Well according to the unit table of StG 1 they had clearly reequipped with Ju 87R between March - July 1940.12][/I]



The B-1 and B-2 had different engines. 200 extra horses might or might not be a marginal difference, depending on your point of view. I'm still waiting for evidence that the Jumo 211 A powered B-1 could hoist a 1000Kg bomb. I believe that the B-2 might have, despite the loading plan and lack of photographic evidence.

If Stg 1 was reequipped with Rs at that time both Peter Smith, who lists _some_ with the units I listed above in the summer of 1940, and Eddie Creek from who the production information comes are wrong.

Cheers

Steve


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## stona (Aug 16, 2013)

Some more invasion vessels.

A kapok raft which was a failure.......because it sank!





















The English Channel is not an inland lake, though I doubt that some of these would hold together on a lake. On the open sea, with winds, currents and tides this whole fleet of rafts would have sunk without any intervention from the British at all. The Germans were well aware of this too.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Aug 16, 2013)

silence said:


> Except for Sea Lion the German are proactive rather than reactive. They can tell the KM when to move, while the RN has to wait for it to happen. As far a big ships they can afford to lose, that's a command decision which will be weighed against the goal of the operation: is it worth losing some or all of you big ships in the interests of invasion?



Big ships available to the Germans are ONE pocket battleship/heavy cruiser with 11 in guns, ONE heavy cruiser with 8in guns, TWO light cruisers with 6in guns in turrets, one light cruiser with 6in guns in single mounts ( employed as training ship in the Baltic) and two left over PRE-WW I Battleships. These had been used in Norway but only in the waters near Denmark. Top speed when new was 18-19knots and at 32 years of age? ability to run within 4-5 knots of top speed for long periods of time was always a problem for reciprocating engined ships. Any other Large German ships are either repairing torpedo/bomb damage or just "commissioned" and still doing shake-down/first training cruise. 



silence said:


> And the RN will in all likelihood have to run a u-boat gauntlet, and ASW at this time was no where near what it was in '43, especially at night.



To run a true U-boat gauntlet would require NOT deploying a number of U-boats to the Atlantic or Western Approaches at this time. Germans were having some trouble with torpedoes at this time? Granted ASW is now where near what is was in 1943 but then how good is the German ASW to stop the British subs? Germans have 10 or less modern/ large destroyers, eight steam torpedo boats ( equal to WW I destroyers?) a few fast escorts/sloops and some minesweeper trawlers. Anything else aside from motor S and R boats is under construction. 



silence said:


> Regardless of the finer details, should invasion be attempted the Channel and maybe the North Sea are going to be redder than Stalin's pajamas.



True, but the British Navy has the size to take some losses, the German Fleet and invasion force do not.


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## swampyankee (Aug 16, 2013)

To paraphrase: the KM is fighting for lunch; the RN for survival. Historically, we know what the British (among others; there wer also Dutch vessels involved) people did for the evacuation at Dunkirk: they took unarmed vessels across the Channel to evacuate British (and French; over 100,000 French soldiers were evacuate) soldiers. The Luftwaffe didn't just sit back and let this happen (nor did the Heer do so: French soldiers held the perimeter against them). 

Does anybody really think the people of the UK would do less when national survival is at stake?


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 16, 2013)

swampyankee said:


> Does anybody really think the people of the UK would do less when national survival is at stake?



Astonishingly, some people evidently do think just that. Those people need to be forced to sit in a room and listen to country western music for a week.  

The German military for all its well deserved reputation and acknowledged expertise didn't know squ*t about amphibious warfare in 1940 although the KM was smart enough to recognize the inadequacy. As a result of Sea Lion, the Germans began to think more seriously about the subject, although it is not clear to me their thinking was ever translated to a successful demonstration of the operational art. Perhaps the Nazis staged one successful, significant (larger than a division or corp in scale) amphibious operation (involving a shoreline invasion from open water to coastal beach. NOT a River crossing) in WW2. If so, I am not aware of it.


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## Juha (Aug 16, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> However the above Luftwaffe document from April 1940 makes clear that the Luftwaffe possessed both large, armor piercing and rocket assisted armor piercing bombs as of April 1940 suitable against ships, particularly the older ones. So G Till seems to be in error.
> 
> 
> 
> ...



Did they use this wonder weapons during the Norwegian campaign? If not, why? LW surely guessed that they would have opportunities to bomb heavy RN ships during the campaign, if they had those bombs, they should have used them then.

Juha


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## silence (Aug 16, 2013)

"Astonishingly, some people evidently do think just that. Those people need to be forced to sit in a room and listen to country western music for a week."

Isn't that against the Geneva Convention?


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## silence (Aug 16, 2013)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> The German military for all its well deserved reputation and acknowledged expertise didn't know squ*t about amphibious warfare in 1940 although the KM was smart enough to recognize the inadequacy. As a result of Sea Lion, the Germans began to think more seriously about the subject, although it is not clear to me their thinking was ever translated to a successful demonstration of the operational art. Perhaps the Nazis staged one successful, significant (larger than a division or corp in scale) amphibious operation (involving a shoreline invasion from open water to coastal beach. NOT a River crossing) in WW2. If so, I am not aware of it.



Offhand, I can't think of any time when they even had an opportunity or reason to do so.


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## stona (Aug 16, 2013)

swampyankee said:


> French soldiers held the perimeter against them



Dynamo would have been in serious trouble without the determined defence of several French units. They were not alone. The defenders of Lille so impressed the Germans that they were allowed to keep their weapons for the surrender parade.

Cheers

Steve


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 16, 2013)

silence said:


> "Astonishingly, some people evidently do think just that. Those people need to be forced to sit in a room and listen to country western music for a week."
> 
> Isn't that against the Geneva Convention?



It's not something that should be prohibited but encouraged! It girds the loins. 


If a citizen of the commonwealth they will come out of the room ready to fight, if a potential adversary they will realize that to challenge the sons of Albion is pure madness. If neutral, they will simply retreat permanently to their _happy place_.


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## stona (Aug 16, 2013)

silence said:


> Offhand, I can't think of any time when they even had an opportunity or reason to do so.



Well, they did develop what are recognisably landing craft later. They also developed so called landing bridges which are lightweight version of a floating dock. Both Krupp and Dortmunder Union built prototypes, in 1941.
Don't forget that Sea Lion was a long time dying. Hitler was still issuing orders regarding the operation in 1944. It wasn't viable in 1940 and certainly wasn't in 1944, despite the development of some amphibious forces and capabilities.
Cheers
Steve


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## swampyankee (Aug 16, 2013)

stona said:


> Well, they did develop what are recognisably landing craft later. They also developed so called landing bridges which are lightweight version of a floating dock. Both Krupp and Dortmunder Union built prototypes, in 1941.
> Don't forget that Sea Lion was a long time dying. Hitler was still issuing orders regarding the operation in 1944. It wasn't viable in 1940 and certainly wasn't in 1944, despite the development of some amphibious forces and capabilities.
> Cheers
> Steve




In _1944_? Germany's trying an amphibious invasion of the UK in 1944 would be war-winning move! For the Allies.


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## Civettone (Aug 16, 2013)

stona said:


> Don't forget that Sea Lion was a long time dying. Hitler was still issuing orders regarding the operation in 1944.


That seems unlikely ...


Kris


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## silence (Aug 16, 2013)

swampyankee said:


> In _1944_? Germany's trying an amphibious invasion of the UK in 1944 would be war-winning move! For the Allies.



Heh. Imagine the Wehrmacht stepping onto the beach and finding the Big Red One and the Desert Rats looking at them like a cat looks at a mouse!


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## Shortround6 (Aug 16, 2013)

Civettone said:


> That seems unlikely ...



Hitler may have been issuing orders........wither anyone was paying any attention (more than lip service) is another story.

Hitler " And manufacture 1000 more landing barges for the Invasion of England to be ready once the V-1 has brought them to their knees"

General taking notes " Certainly Mein Heer." Thinks to himself 'sure, right after we gold plate the porto-potties for use outside the Kremlin.'


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## Civettone (Aug 16, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> Something else to consider is the amount of AA fire the British _may_ be able to put up. Off Crete and Mediterranean convoys the ships were at sea and in combat zones for several days and hundreds of miles from supply points.


I remember reading that in 1940, the AA on RN vessels was unable to fire at a 90 degree angle. That was only rectified later, no doubt because of the Stuka dive bombers.

Around Crete, dive bombers sank three cruisers, six destroyers and damaged many more. LW losses were very low, I think a dozen or so were shot down by Naval AA fire. Given the distances involved, relatively few sorties were flown. One can expect the bombers to fly several sorties a day in the Channel.

My guess would be that the RN would survive 2-3 days if it decided to stay in the Channel. Its only hope after that would be to interrupt the landing at night. But of course, no German invasion would survive 2-3 days... 

Kris


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## swampyankee (Aug 16, 2013)

silence said:


> Heh. Imagine the Wehrmacht stepping onto the beach and finding the Big Red One and the Desert Rats looking at them like a cat looks at a mouse!




I was thinking more on the lines of largely undisturbed target practice by all just about everything the Allies could get into the neighborhood, like every dive bomber and torpedo bomber the FAA, RAF, and USN had in the Eastern Atlantic and North Sea. The few soldiers who got to the beach could have been rounded up by a few military police.


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## Juha (Aug 16, 2013)

Civettone said:


> I remember reading that in 1940, the AA on RN vessels was unable to fire at a 90 degree angle. That was only rectified later, no doubt because of the Stuka dive bombers.



No, but 4.5" and 4" HA mounts could at +80deg, which was enough even against Ju-87s. That was not the problem The problem was that RN DDs didn't have DP or HA guns other than their AAA guns at that time, their main armament max elevation was +40deg.



Civettone said:


> Around Crete, dive bombers sank three cruisers, six destroyers and damaged many more. LW losses were very low, I think a dozen or so were shot down by Naval AA fire. Given the distances involved, relatively few sorties were flown. One can expect the bombers to fly several sorties a day in the Channel...



Also LW had learned by Crete. At least some Stuka pilots were surprised off Dunkerque how difficult it was to hit manoeuvering warships and when Fliegerkorps X was sent to Sicily its Stuka pilots had got special anti-shipping training. Of course Between early June 40 and say mid-Sept 40 LW would have time to honey its anti-warship tactics.

Juha


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## stona (Aug 16, 2013)

Gentlemen there were orders issued regarding Sea Lion in 1944. It was postponed, not abandoned in 1940. Issuing fanciful orders about an operation and issuing orders for an operation are not the same thing.

As Juha says RN main armament had a maximum elevation of 40 degrees. Naval anti aircraft guns of medium calibre were classified as 3" to 5.25" firing explosive shells with timed fuses, typically timed to 1,500 yards. The Royal Navy's high angle control system didn't work very well but nobody's did with the possible exception of the USN. Some old cruisers had their 6" guns replaced with 4" guns for use as stop gap AA ships until the "Dido" class came along. The most vulnerable ships were the destroyers which mostly had WW1 vintage gun mounts unable to elevate above 40 degrees, probably due to Admiralty fears about the Low Angle Control for ship to ship engagements. A few Hunt class destroyers did have 4" guns capable of high elevation. Most ships had a suite of various armament from rifle calibre (.303) machine guns to 40 mm for close defence. In 1940 there was a shortage of the Oerlikon 20mm and Bofors 40mm guns. In the late 1930s the Admiralty backed a Vickers gun against the Bofors and it didn't really work. "Trials had proved most unsatisfactory" read the report. It was Chamberlain of all people who argued in that the effects of ordering a foreign weapon were not "necessarily over riding the essential need of obtaining a satisfactory weapon." 100 Bofors guns were in fact ordered. The saga of Vickers and the Admiralty is worthy of a book in itself!
Essentially, in 1940, Royal Navy anti aircraft guns and gunnery were far from satisfactory. Despite this the "Tactical Summary of Bombing Aircraft on HM Ships and Shipping from September 1939 to February 1941" makes it clear that, despite the opinion of some above, the Royal Navy itself was not unduly concerned about the potential of air attacks on its ships. The only method of attack it considered potentially dangerous was the dive bomber, and the Ju 87 comprised only a fraction of the Luftwaffe's bomber strength in Europe.
Cheers
Steve


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## parsifal (Aug 16, 2013)

It might alsobe worthwhile to note that aircrew not trained in anti-shipping strikes dont do that wel as a rule. In 1940, the LW had two wing sized anti-shipping units, this was being expanded, but we are talking September 1940 are we not?


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## fastmongrel (Aug 16, 2013)

stona said:


> GThe Royal Navy's high angle control system didn't work very well but nobody's did with the possible exception of the USN.



Not even the USN HA control system worked very well in 1940. The Mk33 directors were ok against level flying bombers that didnt manouver much (Just like HACS) because if the plane manouvered it could take up to 40 seconds to form a new firing solution. They were useless against dive bombers as the officer in charge had to put a pair of binocular sights on the target and keep the target centred for several seconds for the director to be able to start a solution, by the time the computer had made the solution it was too late so the USN relied on barrage firing just like the RN. Even in 1945 with radar directed Mk37 directors and VT fuses it was the close range Mk51 directors that did the best shooting against close in aircraft. Luckily some bright spark realised the Mk51 Bofors directors could provide the 5" guns with a solution against a diving manouvering attacker.

I was told by someone who knew what they were talking about that shooting at a plane is like trying to hit a man on a fast running Horse. Doing it at sea is like trying to hit a man on a running horse whilst being on a running horse yourself. 

The aim of naval AAA is not to hit the plane but to stop the plane hitting your ship.


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## parsifal (Aug 16, 2013)

> The aim of naval AAA is not to hit the plane but to stop the plane hitting your ship



Absolutely. And the role of the carrier based fighter is not primarily concerned with shooting enemy aircraft down, its disrupting enemy attacks so as to protect th vital assets of the Task Group. Its why just a few carrier aircraft can achieve great things defensively,, even when massively outgunned or outnumbered


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## redcoat (Aug 16, 2013)

Civettone said:


> My guess would be that the RN would survive 2-3 days if it decided to stay in the Channel.Kris


Are you aware that the RN never left the Channel during the Battle Of Britain. 

ps: It is often claimed that the RN would never risk a battleship in the Channel if the German's invaded, this somehow ignores the fact that the battleship HMS Revenge was based in the Channel from August 1940 for anti-invasion duties
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Revenge_(06)


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## RCAFson (Aug 16, 2013)

The the story behind HMS Gurka's loss:

HMS Gurkha (i), destroyer


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## Jenisch (Aug 16, 2013)

The Germans planned to put mines in the English Channel.


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## Jenisch (Aug 16, 2013)

Wasn't there a fleet in the Mediterranean that the RN didn't even moved, letting it there in order to counter the Italians?


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## fastmongrel (Aug 16, 2013)

Jenisch said:


> The Germans planned to put mines in the English Channel.



And the entire Royal Navy planned to stay in harbour and get steaming drunk for at least 3 weeks.


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## Jenisch (Aug 16, 2013)

I'm questioning how they would deal with the issue (...)


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## fastmongrel (Aug 16, 2013)

Jenisch said:


> I'm questioning how they would deal with the issue (...)



The RN would have done what it was doing anyway the question is where do the Germans suddenly find the 10s of thousands of mines and dozens of minelayers needed to lay the minefields planned in the time allowed. Read about the problems the RN had laying a big minefield Northern Barrage - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## Shortround6 (Aug 16, 2013)

Several hundred minesweepers? 

Home Fleet, June 1940

Go to page two for Nore Command

and page 3 for Plymouth command.

It is also entertaining to find out HOW the Germans were going to put mines in the Channel in the numbers needed in the short period of time they needed to do it in. 

And find out why the RN can't be mining the exits to the French, Belgian and Dutch harbors.


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## pattle (Aug 16, 2013)

I think we can learn a lot from the fact that Germany did not try to invade, end of chat.


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## silence (Aug 16, 2013)

stona said:


> Gentlemen there were orders issued regarding Sea Lion in 1944. It was postponed, not abandoned in 1940. Issuing fanciful orders about an operation and issuing orders for an operation are not the same thing.
> 
> As Juha says RN main armament had a maximum elevation of 40 degrees. Naval anti aircraft guns of medium calibre were classified as 3" to 5.25" firing explosive shells with timed fuses, typically timed to 1,500 yards. The Royal Navy's high angle control system didn't work very well but nobody's did with the possible exception of the USN. Some old cruisers had their 6" guns replaced with 4" guns for use as stop gap AA ships until the "Dido" class came along. The most vulnerable ships were the destroyers which mostly had WW1 vintage gun mounts unable to elevate above 40 degrees, probably due to Admiralty fears about the Low Angle Control for ship to ship engagements. A few Hunt class destroyers did have 4" guns capable of high elevation. Most ships had a suite of various armament from rifle calibre (.303) machine guns to 40 mm for close defence. In 1940 there was a shortage of the Oerlikon 20mm and Bofors 40mm guns. In the late 1930s the Admiralty backed a Vickers gun against the Bofors and it didn't really work. "Trials had proved most unsatisfactory" read the report. It was Chamberlain of all people who argued in that the effects of ordering a foreign weapon were not "necessarily over riding the essential need of obtaining a satisfactory weapon." 100 Bofors guns were in fact ordered. The saga of Vickers and the Admiralty is worthy of a book in itself!
> Essentially, in 1940, Royal Navy anti aircraft guns and gunnery were far from satisfactory. Despite this the "Tactical Summary of Bombing Aircraft on HM Ships and Shipping from September 1939 to February 1941" makes it clear that, despite the opinion of some above, the Royal Navy itself was not unduly concerned about the potential of air attacks on its ships. The only method of attack it considered potentially dangerous was the dive bomber, and the Ju 87 comprised only a fraction of the Luftwaffe's bomber strength in Europe.
> ...



Are you sure about the 40mm Bofors? 

"The Royal Navy also made extensive use of the Bofors. Their first examples were air-cooled versions quickly adapted to ships during the withdrawal from Norway. With the fall of the west in 1940 the Dutch mine-layer Willem van der Zaan brought them their first example of a water-cooled gun on their Hazemeyer tri-axially stabilized mounting. Locally produced examples started arriving in 1942, known as the QF 40 mm Mark IV for use in twin-mounts, or the QF 40 mm Mark V for single mounts. The Navy ran through a variety of versions of the basic Bofors gun over the war, including the Mark VII to Mark XI. The Royal Navy's home-grown light anti-aircraft weapon, the QF 2-pounder gun, also had a caliber of 40 mm, but was referred to as the QF 2 pdr."

I don't think any navy had "satisfactory" AA at this time - and probably didn't even realize it (Bismarck's AA performance being a prime example even a year later). That said, having half the RN firing in your general direction is gonna make you consider your life's sins.


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## parsifal (Aug 16, 2013)

Jenisch said:


> The Germans planned to put mines in the English Channel.



They did more than plan, they did mine the channel, alng with most of the main ports around England. And this program was ongoing, and managed during the war to sink about 750000 tons of shipping. The Germans, despite intensive, prolonged efforts stretching over several years, could never manage to close the channel to British shipping or naval activity.


And this is the problem, or rather, one of them. To lay these minefields, the germans would need to spend several weeks doing it, in full view of the British. The British have their own minelaying capacity, and they have grater minesweeping capacity than the germans have either minelaying and minesweeping. Both sides have signficant, and secure CA capability. , but the British guns are better placed to cover the channel. 

There is no way that the germans can lay a minefield dense enough and quick enough to securee their invasion routes. There is no way for the LW to prevent significant RN activity in the channel at night, and there is plenty of time for the RN to react to any embarkation and movement of the amphibious component of Sea Lion. The German transport relied on Rhine Barges and Tugs, which according to the wargaming done back in the 70s would take more than a week to load and get across the channel, and lord knows how long to disembark. say it takes 10 days to complete the operation, In that time the RN will have come in nightly and torn the inasion fleet to pieces, several times over. Whereever the landing point was, the british would have days to r3edeploy forces to that point and completely smother the landings. 

As I said, Sea Lion was a total crock for so many reasons Anyone, with any experience of amphibious ops can see that


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## stona (Aug 17, 2013)

Jenisch said:


> The Germans planned to put mines in the English Channel.



I covered that above. The KM were well aware that this did not secure the flanks of their operation. One of the men I quoted was the KM C-in-C Minesweepers West who should know what he was talking about.

Cheers

Steve


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## stona (Aug 17, 2013)

silence said:


> Are you sure about the 40mm Bofors?



Yes, absolutely in 1940. I'm not sure how many Bofors 40mm the RN had by 1942/3 but they had few, aside from the initial pre-war order of 100, and I don't know if they were delivered and fitted by 1940.
Cheers
Steve


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## stona (Aug 17, 2013)

Jenisch said:


> I'm questioning how they would deal with the issue (...)



They didn't have to as, by the Germans' own admission, it wasn't really an issue. It is possible that some ships may have struck mines, but the mines could never have closed the Channel to the RN and both sides knew it.

Cheers

Steve


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## stona (Aug 17, 2013)

redcoat said:


> ps: It is often claimed that the RN would never risk a battleship in the Channel if the German's invaded,



This is because Forbes told Churchill that he would not bring the Home Fleet south of the Wash "under any circumstances." Those present including Ismay all reported that Churchill kept his temper, spoke indulgently, and refused to believe Forbes. Nobody _at the time _seems to have seriously believed that Forbes would have kept the Home Fleet to the north and missed his opportunity for another Trafalgar with an invasion fleet lumbering across the English Channel. The fact that Forbes is virtually unknown outside naval or historical circles is because he never got this opportunity.

Raeder was concerned about British naval forces based at Portsmouth, Plymouth and the Nore which the Germans assessed as substantial. He was also concerned about the state of his own bases. Calais and Boulogne were operable from mid September, Zeebrugge not until November. According to Blumentritt the only harbours capable of loading a panzer division (given the proposed embarkation timetable) were in the Antwerp area which is a long way from Brighton.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Aug 17, 2013)

The "home Fleet" and "*a* battleship are not the same thing. In the summer of 1940 some of the "R" class battleships may have been looked upon as 'expendable' as they were due to be replaced by the KG V class.


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## stona (Aug 17, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> The "home Fleet" and "*a* battleship are not the same thing. In the summer of 1940 some of the "R" class battleships may have been looked upon as 'expendable' as they were due to be replaced by the KG V class.



Indeed, but Forbes' comment is often taken out of context and misinterpreted by those who believe that the Royal Navy would not have committed major assets to the defence of Britain. 

Raeder obviously didn't know of Forbes comment but he thought that the Royal Navy would treat the departure of an invasion fleet (which incidentally the Germans themselves reckoned would take fifteen hours to make the crossing in ideal weather) as a life or death situation and throw everything at it.

The estimated crossing time was given by Vice Admiral Ruge at one of the Sea Lion conferences in support of the KM's arguments that there would be no element of surprise and that the RN would have time to react. The fifteen hours does not include embarkation or assembly times.



Cheers

Steve


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## fastmongrel (Aug 17, 2013)

The R class were worn out and very much 3rd class by 1940. There were plans to convert 2 of them into bombardment ships by removing the B and X turrets, fitting massive torpedo water and air compartmentalised bulges proof against 2,000 pound mines and 1,200 pound torpedo warheads which would have increased beam to 140 feet, reduced draught by 9 feet and speed to 14 knots. All unnecassary upperworks would have been removed to leave a conning tower and gunnery directors. Flame cut slabs of 5 inch armour would have been fitted to the A and Y turrets and to make an armoured box around the engines, funnel, intakes, magazines and control positions. All the 6 inch guns would have been removed and replaced with a large number of HA guns and automatic AA guns.

This monstrosity was designed for one of Winston Churchills madcap plans to break into the Baltic and cut off Iron Ore supplies to Germany luckily for all involved the RN ignored and humoured Winston and nothing came of the plans. If an R had been converted it would have made an ideal anti-invasion vessel anchored off the beaches and diverting a big share LWs efforts from the invasion by acting as a bomb magnet.


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## silence (Aug 17, 2013)

stona said:


> Indeed, but Forbes' comment is often taken out of context and misinterpreted by those who believe that the Royal Navy would not have committed major assets to the defence of Britain.
> 
> Raeder obviously didn't know of Forbes comment but he thought that the Royal Navy would treat the departure of an invasion fleet (which incidentally the Germans themselves reckoned would take fifteen hours to make the crossing in ideal weather) as a life or death situation and throw everything at it.
> 
> The estimated crossing time was given by Vice Admiral Ruge at one of the Sea Lion conferences in support of the KM's arguments that there would be no element of surprise and that the RN would have time to react. The fifteen hours does not include embarkation or assembly times.



The RN prob doesn't even need BBs. This sounds to me like a perfect job for their oodles of light cruisers (and destroyers, of course). Maybe have the BBs shell the on-land assembly area....


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## stona (Aug 17, 2013)

silence said:


> The RN prob doesn't even need BBs. This sounds to me like a perfect job for their oodles of light cruisers (and destroyers, of course).



Yes, and that's precisely what Raeder was worried about.

Cheers

Steve


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 17, 2013)

Seems to me, not only is the success of Sea Lion a virtually absurd notion, but defeat of the RAF just about as unlikely:

It seems to me that production vs losses heavily favored a British Victory: 
Monthly aircraft production below: from: Statistics of the Battle of Britain

(I assume without evidence that most a/c production was dedicated to fighters).

Month------Great Britain-----Germany
June-----------446--------------164
July------------496--------------220
August---------476--------------173
September-----467--------------218
October---------469--------------200
Total----------2,354--------------975

I suspect trained pilots was a bigger problem. Clearly they needed more US recruits and french Armée de l' Air refugees


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## Jenisch (Aug 17, 2013)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Seems to me, not only is the success of Sea Lion a virtually absurd notion, but defeat of the RAF just about as unlikely



I didn't read Stephen Bungay's The Most Dangeours Enemy, but from reviews he seems to make a strong case of this.


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## stona (Aug 17, 2013)

There are some who see the classic story of the Battle of Britain and how not only Britain but the free world was saved by "the few" as a bit of a myth. Even Churchill, one of the myths architects, complained that "some people seem to forget we have a navy."
The argument is that the myth is something developed by the British and American press with their respective propagandists to develop a heroic image of the British acceptable to a U.S. public opinion. The myth was subsequently sold back to the British people and, importantly, with an American narration or accent. This includes both the Battle of Britain and the Blitz and is probably most eloquently expressed in Angus Calder's "The Myth of the Blitz".
It's a bit strong for me but, like most myths themselves, there is a grain of truth in it. That is probably a different topic though 
Cheers
Steve


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## silence (Aug 17, 2013)

stona said:


> There are some who see the classic story of the Battle of Britain and how not only Britain but the free world was saved by "the few" as a bit of a myth. Even Churchill, one of the myths architects, complained that "some people seem to forget we have a navy."
> The argument is that the myth is something developed by the British and American press with their respective propagandists to develop a heroic image of the British acceptable to a U.S. public opinion. The myth was subsequently sold back to the British people and, importantly, with an American narration or accent. This includes both the Battle of Britain and the Blitz and is probably most eloquently expressed in Angus Calder's "The Myth of the Blitz".
> It's a bit strong for me but, like most myths themselves, there is a grain of truth in it. That is probably a different topic though
> Cheers
> Steve




I think you hit the nail on the head. The legend of the "Few" has literally become so ingrained in Western culture that the automatic, kneejerk reaction is to focus on the air war as the only relevant aspect of the battle.


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## OldSkeptic (Aug 17, 2013)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Seems to me, not only is the success of Sea Lion a virtually absurd notion, but defeat of the RAF just about as unlikely:
> 
> It seems to me that production vs losses heavily favored a British Victory:
> Monthly aircraft production below: from: Statistics of the Battle of Britain
> ...



The Luftwaffe had even worse problems with new pilots, with less numbers and just as poorly trained as the RAF ones. Stillpepper gives some examples in his book (Spitfire on My Tail).

But the RAF could have lost. in '41 (after Dowding and Park were ignominiously kicked out) 11 group held an exercise duplicating the BoB ... and Leigh Mallory lost badly (nearly all planes caught on the ground).

So much of the credit depends on Park's superb tactical control, which has never been beaten (despite being war gamed by just about every air force in the World). A truly remarkable man. Didn't put a foot wrong over months.

Dowding had created a superb system (copied all over the World) and was in the key positions at all the right times to push the critical elements through. But it still took someone to wield it properly. 
An idiot with the best weapon in the World is still an idiot.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 17, 2013)

To me, the suggestion that the BoB myth is false and the RAF would inevitably have emerged the victors has all the benefit of hindsight. Not necessarily without merit but just obvious now but not then. It's easy to stand back now and say, well the BoB couldn't have been lost which may be a bit different I think than saying the Germans couldn't have won. 

I can imagine an alternate reality where the RAF is run by Rowan Atkinson's Bean and the Luftwaffe leadership makes perfect decisions at every turn, and the BoB goes the other way. Historically, it appears the opposite situation was closer to the mark although how Bean got into the Luftwaffe eludes me.


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## Jenisch (Aug 17, 2013)

What about if Mussolini sends torpedo bombers to augment the Corpo Aereo Italiano in the proposed scenario?


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## vinnye (Aug 17, 2013)

Maybe it was another Rowan Atkinson persona instead of Mr Bean it was Baldric with a cunning plan?


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## OldSkeptic (Aug 17, 2013)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> To me, the suggestion that the BoB myth is false and the RAF would inevitably have emerged the victors has all the benefit of hindsight. Not necessarily without merit but just obvious now but not then. It's easy to stand back now and say, well the BoB couldn't have been lost which may be a bit different I think than saying the Germans couldn't have won.
> 
> I can imagine an alternate reality where the RAF is run by Rowan Atkinson's Bean and the Luftwaffe leadership makes perfect decisions at every turn, and the BoB goes the other way. Historically, it appears the opposite situation was closer to the mark although how Bean got into the Luftwaffe eludes me.



Oh it was close, although the RAF had the advantage it was only if they did everything right, they had little margin for mistakes. Not so much the Germans could have won, in term of FC being totally destroyed, but they could have weakened FC in the SE enough to ensure they had local air superiority to cover any landing.

If you look at the entire history of air attack nearly everyone got caught on the ground and destroyed in the first part of the war, Poland, USSR, Philippines, etc (even when they should have known better). All it took would have been a bad day for Park, make a few mistakes and they could have lost a hundred or more fighters on the ground, a loss they might not have been able to recover from. That's exactly what LM did in their war game a year later. Yet another problem with the 'big wing' idea.

An example is Malta they lost more planes on the ground than to any other cause, by forming up into a big wing (this was later with plenty of Spits). Apart from the fact they didn't stop any bombing you had a large vulnerable number of planes on the ground at any one time (plus a big wing was more vulnerable to fighter attacks in the air as well). When Park took over there, he stopped that nonsense, actual bombs dropped on Malta dropped rapidly, very few planes lost on the ground and the Luftwaffe loss rates went up greatly. Kesselring taking a thumping from Park yet again, not to knock him though, the only successful leader of air and ground forces, he just (like Rommel coming up against Monty three times) got unlucky, against a more poorly led opponent he would could easily have prevailed.

So the BoB could have been lost in a few days basically (in the terms of losing local air superiority over the SE that is).

The Luftwaffe was at the peak of its power then, never again would it have such a qualitative edge (in machines and skills), it's really only weakness was not developing fighter bomber training and tactics enough. But then again it took the western Allies until early-mid '43 to do that properly (Park and Broadhurst being the architects in their own spheres of that).


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## pattle (Aug 17, 2013)

The RAF was only Britain's first layer of defence, if the RAF had of lost the Battle of Britain then this would not have left the door wide open for anyone to walk in. The idea that the Royal Navy would just stay in port and do nothing while Britain was invaded is extremely silly, without Britain there would be no Royal Navy, Britain was the Royal Navy's reason for existing.


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## nuuumannn (Aug 17, 2013)

> All it took would have been a bad day for Park, make a few mistakes and they could have lost a hundred or more fighters on the ground, a loss they might not have been able to recover from.



I think in the instance of the Battle of Britain, the mistakes were made by the Luftwaffe in this case, since although devastating, sustained attacks against 11 Group's airfields were not consistent, nor as thorough as they could have been. Obviously the RAF squadrons dispersed, but many of the airfields bombed were back to being in use again within days of the LW attack. The Germans also lacked in effective recon, so they were never able to assess accurately what damage was being done and where, nor were they able to establish an accurate picture of how they were doing - one of their biggest failings of the Battle.


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## parsifal (Aug 17, 2013)

I dont think that the RAF losing the air war in the BOB opens the way for invasion, but i do think it will mean Britain would come in for a terrible pounding, perhaps to the point of having to make terms with the Germans. If the Germans won air superioirty, they could then undertake the systematic destruction of british cities and imdustry, undertake comprehensive interdiction of the port facilities,and a sustainedf, unchecked minelaying operation around Britiain . her ships couold undertake a certain level of free moveent around Britain, not invasion but sea denial missions could be quite posible. The LW winning air superiority confers significant advantages to the germans, but it doesnt open the way for invasion.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 17, 2013)

OldSkeptic said:


> Oh it was close, although the RAF had the advantage it was only if they did everything right, they had little margin for mistakes. Not so much the Germans could have won, in term of FC being totally destroyed, but they could have weakened FC in the SE enough to ensure they had _*local air superiority to cover any landing.*_
> 
> If you look at the entire history of air attack nearly everyone got caught on the ground and destroyed in the first part of the war, Poland, USSR, *Philippines,* etc (even when they should have known better).



I think you are making a point here worth highlighting. Establishing the air superiority to cover a landing is not the same as saying a landing would be successful. It's just one condition, and in this case I'd describe it as a necessary but insufficient condition to achieve a successful landing. 

With respect to your list of examples. I have to challenge you regarding inclusion of the events in the Philippines on December 8, 1941. It's frequently asserted, incorrectly that MacArthur's air force was destroyed on the ground. It's true that virtually every aircraft that was on Clark airfield was destroyed, but that amounts to less than half the B-17s and about 20 P-40Bs from one squadron, the 20th PS. The fighters were caught because the group commander dithered in the case of that one squadron. the planes and pilots were ready and waiting for the order to launch as a sister squadron (17th PS) had done some minutes earlier. Of the four squadrons of P-40 fighters in the PI, one (the 20th PS) was mainly caught on the ground (5 P-40Bs either got airborne or were salvaged later) while the airborne 3rd PS was roughly handled by A6M Zeros. The other two squadrons were airborne but were misdirected by ground control and never engaged enemy a/c. Based on subsequent events, I'd rate the B-17s as not particularly effective in the numbers present even if they had all survived. The real damage was the loss of the 20 or so P-40Bs.


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## pinsog (Aug 17, 2013)

I just dont see how the Germans could have maintained any kind of air supremacy over England with a fighter as short legged as the 109. All the British had to do was withdraw all fighters and bases back beyond the effective range of 109's and savage any German bomber force that came beyond that point. They could continue to attack and harass German fighters within the range of the 109 as they chose. Basically, they would pick and choose where and when they tangled with German fighters.

That being said, exactly how far could the 109 effectively escort bombers?


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## Jenisch (Aug 17, 2013)

If the Germans attained air superiority over Britain and didn't invaded it, the British would be relived when the Germans invaded the USSR and subsequentely pay their sins there.


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## nuuumannn (Aug 17, 2013)

> All the British had to do was withdraw all fighters and bases back beyond the effective range of 109's and savage any German bomber force that came beyond that point.



This is a good point that is often overlooked; Fighter Command's full strength was not concentrated in 11 Group and the RAF always had squadrons on stand down in the north, not to mention the units primarily based in the north and Scotland through the battle. That Park in charge of 11 Group did not want to undertake this tactic of moving squadrons rearward, as a necessity I'm sure he would have done so if things got that far, but they didn't.


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## OldSkeptic (Aug 18, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> I think in the instance of the Battle of Britain, the mistakes were made by the Luftwaffe in this case, since although devastating, sustained attacks against 11 Group's airfields were not consistent, nor as thorough as they could have been. Obviously the RAF squadrons dispersed, but many of the airfields bombed were back to being in use again within days of the LW attack. The Germans also lacked in effective recon, so they were never able to assess accurately what damage was being done and where, nor were they able to establish an accurate picture of how they were doing - one of their biggest failings of the Battle.



They were not that devastating. The key thing was that the fighters were not caught on the ground and destroyed there. Taking out airfields of that time, with planes that were quite happy to land and takeoff on grass was really difficult if not impossible. Plus there were many alternative airfields all over the place.

For the Luftwaffe to win they had to achieve a kill/loss ratio of about 4:1 in fighters, at least, since they still had to have some 109s left for air cover for an invasion (5:1 was probably more realistic) as Britain had a lot of bombers.

There was only one sure fired way of doing that ... catch lots on the ground and destroy them. The Luftwaffe were very aware of this, they were very careful to camouflage and protect their own airfields in France, as British bombers found out to their cost.

Park made sure that never happened. What a delicate dance he played, intercept and inflict the maximum damage all the time, while always ensuring he never got caught out. Day after day, month after month. A lesser man would have failed (eg LM).

Dowding and Park knew they were in a war of attrition and played to that accordingly, the Luftwaffe didn't and lost as a result. After so many 'quick cheap wins' they were not prepared (or was the German economy) for that sort of battle.

Plus the RAF's command and control system (forever more called the Dowding System) was a thing of rare beauty, effective, fast, high levels of redundancy, et al. Plus it was designed for human mental strengths, it was visual with simple symbols to denote what was happening and enhanced, what the human brain is really good at, pattern recognition.

This enabled someone competent, such as Park, to respond very quickly as the Luftwaffe continually changed tactics and targets.

The Luftwaffe are never given enough credit for how flexibly they thought and tried out new things and tried continuously to 'con' the RAF into the wrong moves. This was no lumbering behemoth, they probed, they changed targets, they changed tactics, they always tried to get the RAF into fighter traps. Yes they were limited in information, but that didn't mean they weren't creative and smart. Against a lesser opponent they would have succeeded.

As for the 'Dowding System'. Even today, with all our computers and communication abilities there are very few (any?) systems as effective.

Very, very, very few people really understand good C&C systems properly, the list of rubbish and disasters is far (far?) longer than the list of successes. Here in Victoria Australia, we created a 'state of the art' C&C system for (mostly) bushfires. When "Black Saturday' hit us ... it progressively fell further and further behind until it was a couple of hours behind reality, whole towns were wiped out before the 'centre' even knew what was happening and the orders they were giving out were nonsense (and downright fatal in some cases) as a result ... so much for technology and stupidity (note that modern tech can allow people to stuff up even faster and more effectively than before, a real double edged sword).

In one sense it was sheer luck that the British won. If Leigh Mallory had been in charge of 11 Group ... or Sholoto Douglas had got his 10 (or was it 20 he wanted) squadrons of Defiants.
It was luck that Dowding was able to survive in a hostile (and very political) RAF and create the components and the system. 
Luck that Park was in charge of 11 group (thanks to Dowding again) .. a New Zealander for that job?
And luck that Chamberlain (never given a good press) was so supportive of fighters, which went against everything the RAF and Air Ministry stood for.

And lucky for the RAF, which has ever shone in the glow of the BoB, wiping out it's many, many, many stuff ups during the war (and seemingly ever since).


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## stona (Aug 18, 2013)

The attacks on the sector airfields were serious, even devastating. It is no accident that Park and Dowding wanted to move sector control rooms away from airfields in September 1940. Luckily the Germans had no clear idea how the British system worked, nor which were most important airfields.

The attrition of qualified pilots was also a much closer run thing than many realise. 

Dowding wrote. "The stabilisation of squadrons in the line and the creation of class "C" squadrons was a desperate expedient forced upon me by the heavy losses."

Nearly 1/3 of Fighter Commands pilots (440) were effectively non-operational at the end of September 1940. The raw numbers are irrelevant. 11 Group needed men who could fight and the men in the "C" class squadrons could barely fly a Hurricane or Spitfire.

Dowding was far from perfect, though the right man for the job in 1940. His biggest failing was in Fighter Command's woeful training system. It is no accident that Poles,Czechs and others out performed their British comrades. It wasn't because of some nazi hating recklessness, it was because they were better trained.

Park was a better tactician. He pulled it off again on Malta, something often forgotten. It is often said that the Luftwaffe bombed London in some sort of retaliation, but this is far too simplistic. Park ignored Luftwaffe fighter sweeps, designed to lure the RAF up to its destruction. It was assumed that the RAF would come up to defend London, and it did. It just didn't quite work out for the Germans.
It is also probable that it was dawning on the OKW that Sea Lion was a non starter and bombing London might concentrate the minds of the British government on some kind of negotiations. This had worked for them before.

Cheers

Steve


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## Milosh (Aug 18, 2013)

Fighter Command OoB for Sept 15 by Group

Document-49: Fighter Command Order of Battle Sept 15th 1940

from THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN HISTORICAL SOCIETY


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 18, 2013)

Did the RAF do much in the way of airfield camouflage or develop alternate camouflaged bases?


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## fastmongrel (Aug 18, 2013)

A lot of the satellite airfields were just that a field with a hut or tent for the pilots to keep out of the weather and a telephone line for the call from control. Hard to put a stretch of grass out of action unless the LW parachuted in a tractor and a plough.


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## stona (Aug 18, 2013)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Did the RAF do much in the way of airfield camouflage or develop alternate camouflaged bases?



They did. They camouflaged runways and laid false hedgerows, made from coloured sand. False field patterns and hedges were also painted onto runways. They also used decoy sites but more for night time deception.












This one shows the fake hedgerows running acroos the runways clearly.






Cheers

Steve


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 18, 2013)

pinsog said:


> I just dont see how the Germans could have maintained any kind of air supremacy over England _*with a fighter as short legged as the 109*_. All the British had to do was withdraw all fighters and bases back beyond the effective range of 109's and savage any German bomber force that came beyond that point. They could continue to attack and harass German fighters within the range of the 109 as they chose. Basically, they would pick and choose where and when they tangled with German fighters.
> 
> That being said, exactly _*how far could the 109 effectively escort bombers?*_



Here is what I could find. I think your observation is accurate. It seems to me that the 109 is not an aircraft well designed for offensive operations.

from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Hardest_Day


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## pattle (Aug 18, 2013)

My understanding is that the fall of France was in effect a dead end for Germany and that in 1940 Hitler could take the war no further in terms of further conquests. Germany was left with a Gordian Knot to undo in 1940 as Britain absolutely had to be invaded as a prerequisite to invading the USSR but that at the same time an invasion of Britain would have cost Germany such heavy losses that it would not of had the forces to later attack the USSR. Germany did not have the capability to invade Britain in 1940 but the longer Germany left an invasion of Britain the stronger Britain would have got and with it an invasion would have only become more and more difficult and costly. The USSR would of course have took advantage of the time it took Germany to defeat Britain to strengthen and build its forces.

Hitler already had his heart and mind set on Russia in 1940 and the Battle of Britain was all about getting Britain to surrender. Hitler was prepared to risk an invasion of Russia with Britain still in the war because invading Britain would have been at the cost of not invading the USSR. Britain in effect held the balance of power in 1940 and barred a successful German invasion of Russia. If the Germans had not have been fighting the British in North Africa, Greece and guarding occupied Europe against attacks from the British this could have made the difference against Russia.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 18, 2013)

stona said:


> They did. They camouflaged runways and laid false hedgerows, made from coloured sand. False field patterns and hedges were also painted onto runways. They also used decoy sites but more for night time deception.
> 
> 
> 
> ...



Not sure exactly where the airfield is located in these photos (note to me: that's the point dummy!  ) although the first one seems quite obvious.


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## fastmongrel (Aug 18, 2013)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Not sure exactly where the airfield is located in these photos (note to me: that's the point dummy!  ) although the first one seems quite obvious.



Zoom in and look for the NAAFI tea van






Navy, Army and Air Force Institutes - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## stona (Aug 18, 2013)

Nice disruptive camouflage on the buildings too. I missed what might be another runway in the top image as well 

Cheers

Steve


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 18, 2013)

Thanks Stona that comparison really helps, especially for these old eyes.


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## Hop (Aug 18, 2013)

> I dont think that the RAF losing the air war in the BOB opens the way for invasion, but i do think it will mean Britain would come in for a terrible pounding, perhaps to the point of having to make terms with the Germans.



Exactly. 

An invasion would fail because it would take the Luftwaffe many days to inflict crippling losses on the Royal Navy, whilst the Royal Navy can inflict crippling losses on the German invasion fleet in hours. The RN's task is simple: wait in bases outside effective Luftwaffe air cover. When the invasion occurs, go in, sink enough German ships, withdraw. The German forces that do get ashore won't have enough resupply to survive British counter attacks.

What's far more dangerous to Britain is large German bomber fleets hitting the towns and cities and industry of the South East in daylight. Being able to operate freely in daylight makes German bombing much more accurate and effective. With the very short ranges involved the Luftwaffe can lift significant tonnages.

I can't see how the government could survive if the Luftwaffe was able to operate freely by day over southern England. They would have to seek peace with Germany.



> I just dont see how the Germans could have maintained any kind of air supremacy over England with a fighter as short legged as the 109. All the British had to do was withdraw all fighters and bases back beyond the effective range of 109's and savage any German bomber force that came beyond that point.



It's easy to move the RAF and RN out of German fighter cover, which is why an invasion would never work. It's not easy to move Supermarine, or Hawker's factories in Langley and Kingston, or London itself. The British government could not abandon the south east to German bombing. 



> That being said, exactly how far could the 109 effectively escort bombers?



Galland complained that they only had 10 (or 15) minutes combat time over central London, so north and west London is about the limit. 



> The attrition of qualified pilots was also a much closer run thing than many realise.
> 
> Dowding wrote. "The stabilisation of squadrons in the line and the creation of class "C" squadrons was a desperate expedient forced upon me by the heavy losses."
> 
> Nearly 1/3 of Fighter Commands pilots (440) were effectively non-operational at the end of September 1940.



If 440 pilots were effectively non-operational, that still leaves 880 pilots able to fight. The Luftwaffe had 676 Jagdwaffe pilots fit for duty on 29 September. Dowding was desperate because the intelligence services greatly overestimated German strength.


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## redcoat (Aug 18, 2013)

Jenisch said:


> What about if Mussolini sends torpedo bombers to augment the Corpo Aereo Italiano in the proposed scenario?


and Italian torpedo bombers sank how many RN warships in the Med.


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## nuuumannn (Aug 18, 2013)

> They were not that devastating



About Biggin Hill from The Battle of Britain Then and Now - 

"Throughout the next two weeks, the aerodrome suffered almost daily air raids. On some occasions attacks came in twice a day, the buildings being knocked out one by one, consequently reducing the efficiency of the station."

"Friday August 30 1940 was the day Biggin was nearly knocked out of the battle altogether."

"The worst blow was a personnel shelter which received a direct hit, killing many of those inside. The terrible task of having to dig them out went on through that nightand the following day. All together there were 39 killed and 26 wounded."

"Practically no buildings remained in a habitable conditionand the main road running through the camp was blocked by two large craters. All services and communications were out of action and the Operations Room was temporarily moved to a shop a quarter of a mile away in the Pantiles."

I'd recommend this book for anyone with an interest in the subject of decoy airfields in Britain:

Fields of Deception: Britain's Bombing Decoys of WWII: Amazon.co.uk: Colin Dobinson: Books


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## stona (Aug 18, 2013)

Park wrote to Dowding on 22nd September 1940.

"Contrary to the general belief and official reports, the enemy's bombing attacks by day did extensive damage to five of our forward aerodromes and also to six of our seven Sector stations. The damage to forward stations was so severe that Manston and Lympne were on several occasions quite unfit for operating fighters."

Sector control rooms at Kenley and Biggin Hill were transferred to less well equipped emergency facilities. According to Park these "Emergency Operations Rooms were too small to house the essential personnel" and perhaps more worryingly lacked enough telephone landlines to "enable normal operations of three squadrons per Sector." 

Why the Sector control rooms associated infrastructure, communications, power and so on were housed in flimsy buildings, unprotected, above ground is a question for Dowding. Whilst we're at it we could also ask about the delays in filtering due to his insistence of centralising this at Fighter Command HQ.
He is one of my heroes but he made some serious errors of judgement.

It's a good job that the Luftwaffe's non existant intelligence gathering organisation had no idea just how well they were doing.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Aug 18, 2013)

redcoat said:


> and Italian torpedo bombers sank how many RN warships in the Med



Just caught this, they actual sank a few and /or more than the few, torpedo _damage_ could put a ship out of action for months if not over a year. the problem is the timing. 

From Wiki:

"The Sparviero began its torpedo bomber (Aerosilurante in Italian) career on 25 July 1940 when a new unit was established after several years of experiments."

"The first sortie under way on 15 August 1940 saw five SM.79s that had been modified and prepared for the task sent to El Adem airfield"

"After several months, and despite the losses and the first unfortunate mission, the core of the 278th was still operating the same four aircraft."

Which seems to be contradicted in other text. By August of 1941 they had put torpedoes into 5 British cruisers (sinking none) and a single destroyer (which sank) and several merchant ships. But by this time there were two a number of units acting as torpedo bombers. 
However it seems in the early fall of 1940 the Italian torpedo bomber strength was one unit with 4-5 aircraft. 

Axis anti-shipping ability in Sept. 1940 was NOT what it was in the summer/fall of 1941.


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## parsifal (Aug 18, 2013)

Jenisch said:


> What about if Mussolini sends torpedo bombers to augment the Corpo Aereo Italiano in the proposed scenario?



The following is from wiki, but corrected as best i can from other sources that I have. Wiki is basically accurate however. 

The development of the torpedo capbilities in the RA was still some distance off. They were not registering much sucess in 1940, and were deployed in miniscule numbers for most of that year. 

The RA Aerosilurante began with the SM 79 and were forming at the time of italy's entry. They moved to Nothrt Africa in August to the area around Tobruk initially The italians had spent years developing torpedo bombing, but had poured only a few actual resources into it, as high level bombing was seen as a better way to attack ships, with fewer risks.....in this regard they made the same mistakes as the british. Despite all the development work, the unit still went into action without proper aiming systems and a lacking tactical doctrine. 

An attack on shipping in Alexandria was quickly organized. There had been experiments for many years but still, no service, no gear (except hardpoints) and no tactics were developed for the new speciality. This was despite previous Italian experiments into the practice of aerial torpedoing in 1914, 26 years earlier.

The first sortie under way on 15 August 1940 saw five SM.79s that had been modified and prepared for the task (only a small fraction of SM 79s were so modified) sent to El Adem airfield. Among their pilots were Buscaglia, Dequal and other pilots destined to become "aces" (but they were still learning the trade in 1940). The journey was made at an altitude of 1,500 m (4,920 ft) and after two hours, at 21:30, they arrived over Alexandria and began attacking ships, but unsuccessfully. The departure airport had only 1,000 m (3,280 ft) of runway for takeoff, so two of the fuel tanks were left empty to reduce weight, giving an endurance of five hours for a 4.33 hour journey. Only Buscaglia and Dequal returned with torps dropped, both aircraft badly damaged by anti-aircraft fire (so much fot he claim that RN AA was not effective) . Buscaglia landed on only one wheel, with some other damage. The other three SM.79s, attacking after the first two, were hindered by a fierce anti-aircraft defence and returned to their base without releasing their torpedoes (again, so much for RN AA not being effective). However, all three ran out of fuel and were forced to jettison the torpedoes which exploded in the desert, and then force-landed three hours after the attack. Two crews were rescued later, but the third (Fusco's) was still in Egypt when they force-landed. The crew set light to their aircraft the next morning, which alerted the British who then captured them. These failures were experienced within a combat radius of only about 650 km (400 mi), in clear contrast with the glamorous performances of the racer Sparvieros just a few years before. This is something to bear ionm mind about the SM79, its radius in combat loading was far more restricted and hence of limited value in a British isles scenario. 


Many missions followed, on 22–23 August (Alexandria - no hits), 26 August (against ships never found), and 27 August (Buscaglia against a cruiser, no results). The special unit became known as the 278th Squadriglia, and from September 1940 carried out many shipping attacks, including on 4 September (when Buscaglia had his aircraft damaged by fighters) and 10 September, when Robone claimed a merchant ship sunk (one might have been damaged, but records are unclear, on balance a hit was unlikely). The Italians were learning, but were not yet effective, and were only available in miniscule numbers) . On 17 September, after another unsuccessful day attack, Buscaglia and Robone returned at night, attacking the British ships that shelled Bardia. One torpedo hit HMS Kent, damaging the heavy cruiser to the extent that the ship remained under repair until September 1941 ( this was their first real successafter more than 100 sorties). After almost a month of attacks, this was the first success officially acknowledged and proven. After almost a month of further attacks, a newcomer, Erasi, flew with Robone on 14 October 1940 against a British formation and hit HMS Liverpool, a modern cruiser that lost her bow and needed 13 months of repair. After several months, and despite the losses and the first unfortunate mission, the core of the 278th was now operating at near full strength of 9 a/c, but thats laughable to calim that might make a difference to the shipping wars around Britain. . The last success of this squadron for 1940 was at Suda Bay, Crete, when Buscaglia damaged another cruiser, HMS Glasgow, despite the anti-torpedo netting surrounding the ship, sending it out of commission for nine months while repairs were made. The fact that Buscaglia managed to aim his torpedo so as to pass between the nets is proff of their improving skill and potency, but that was in December.....


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## parsifal (Aug 18, 2013)

The premise of this what if is that the germans win the battle, not that they would win it with the forces historically fielded. For the germans to win, they would need to do a lot of thngs differntly and the british react in increadibly stupid ways for this ever to occur. The chances of that are very slim in my opinion.


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## silence (Aug 18, 2013)

parsifal said:


> The premise of this what if is that the germans win the battle, not that they would win it with the forces historically fielded. For the germans to win, they would need to do a lot of thngs differntly and the british react in increadibly stupid ways for this ever to occur. The chances of that are very slim in my opinion.



Sadly, many different armed forces do many stupid thing in an amazing variety of ways, and it becomes most tragic when they know better and keep on doing it (Vietnam).

And its the rank-and-file - and too often civilians - who really pay the the price. (how's that for an obvious statement?!)


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## parsifal (Aug 18, 2013)

Id agree, however in this case all the evidence of a botched campaign is in the german camp. More or less everythig they did and had was wrong for this campaign. target chooices, lack of proper targetting policies, escort resrtiction, limited endurance, weight of bombs, reserves and rediness rates, you name it, they got it wrong. 

I suppose, in a twisted kind of way, one could argue that the British could scarcely have done more than they did, whilst the germans could do a whole lot of things better that might well have given them a better result. But the Germans, whilst making mistake after mistake,, were far from a stupid people. They tended to make those "mistakes" for a reason. 

Luck and stupidity does play its part in wars. But Im a great fan of Asimovs "Foundation" series, in which in the future, humanity was able to refine its mathematical analyses such that it could predict to the last detail what was going to happen. Dowding was heading in that direction in 1940....his battle was planned and measured, and whilst the outcome was in doubt, the unknown variables in his war were less than the unknown variables in the germans war. and its the unkown variables that produce the unknown or unforeseen result. that and political interference with the soldiers' assessments (for Vietnam for example)


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## nuuumannn (Aug 18, 2013)

Well summarised Parsifal. The Germans lost the Battle of Britain as much as the British won it.


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## stona (Aug 19, 2013)

The Germans made a lot of errors in the initial campaign due to a lack of intelligence. The oft touted disastrous switch to attack London was a tactical mistake (originally _proposed by the Luftwaffe_ as a means of forcing the RAF to fight) later carried out with a political objective in mind.

The British made plenty of mistakes. Dowding's system was by his own admission "not perfect". I've already touched on the tactical delays caused by his insistence on centralised "filtering". There were long standing arguments about such things as basic as the armament of the RAF's fighters and then the synchronisation of what they had. Dowding was a bit of a "hobby manager". He never intervened decisively in the on going row between Park and Leigh Mallory, not least because his views on Leigh Mallory's proposed big wing tactics were much more sympathetic than the simplistic post war explanations would allow. This cost lives on occasions when 11 Group airfields were left undefended.

Training was pathetic, not just for air crew but the operators of Chain Home.

In October 1939 J.A.J. Tester, commanding the RDF school at Bawdsey reported to the Air Ministry that.

"Operators currently leave the school with little or no idea of the following points which are considered essential. (1) the R.F.type of receiver. (2)The anti jamming devices. (3) Multiple raids. (4) Plotting and filtering. (6) Counting.

The rest of the report makes for depressing reading. Despite his recommendation that the course should be longer it was shortened.

A report by E C Williams of the Stanmore Research Section, which was responsible for investigating the RDF chain's performance in 1940, days before the "Adlerangriff" was damning. Standards were "lower than they have ever been". This was due to the shortening of the Radio School Course, sending "completely untrained personnel to the chain" and employing "totally unsuited personnel." Personnel were being trained by half trained operators and he concluded that " a large part of the efficiency of the RDF chain is lost by poor operators, whose course of training has been curtailed."

As late as December 1940 Watson-Watt wrote to Sinclair at the Air Ministry saying.

"we have not yet proportioned our efforts in the installation of RDF coastal stations to the size and urgency of our programme."

Once again the myth and the reality are very different. The rate at which interceptions were actually made following detection of raids is contentious, but may be lower than 50%.

I think it was Calder who wrote that "the negative effects of the myth on British societies have almost worked themselves out."
Reading some posts here I would have to disagree!

Once again, it's a good job that the Germans didn't know any of this.

Cheers

Steve


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## OldSkeptic (Aug 19, 2013)

Well this is a bit incorrect, I recommend Stephen's Bungay's "Most Dangerous Enemy' to fill in some blanks.



stona said:


> The Germans made a lot of errors in the initial campaign due to a lack of intelligence. The oft touted disastrous switch to attack London was a tactical mistake (originally _proposed by the Luftwaffe_ as a means of forcing the RAF to fight) later carried out with a political objective in mind.
> 
> The British made plenty of mistakes. Dowding's system was by his own admission "not perfect". I've already touched on the tactical delays caused by his insistence on centralised "filtering". There were long standing arguments about such things as basic as the armament of the RAF's fighters and then the synchronisation of what they had. Dowding was a bit of a "hobby manager". He never intervened decisively in the on going row between Park and Leigh Mallory, not least because his views on Leigh Mallory's proposed big wing tactics were much more sympathetic than the simplistic post war explanations would allow. This cost lives on occasions when 11 Group airfields were left undefended.
> 
> ...


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## redcoat (Aug 19, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Luck and stupidity does play its part in wars. But Im a great fan of Asimovs "Foundation" series, in which in the future, humanity was able to refine its mathematical analyses such that it could predict to the last detail what was going to happen. Dowding was heading in that direction in 1940....his battle was planned and measured, and whilst the outcome was in doubt, the unknown variables in his war were less than the unknown variables in the germans war. and its the unkown variables that produce the unknown or unforeseen result. that and political interference with the soldiers' assessments (for Vietnam for example)


It should be noted that the RAF had been working since 1915 (the date of the first bombing attack on Britain) on the tactics and methods needed to fight this type of battle, while Germany was forced to work out the tactics and methods in the few weeks after the fall of France


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## nuuumannn (Aug 19, 2013)

> It should be noted that the RAF had been working since 1915



It was actually the Admiralty that was first tasked with the air defence of the UK from September 3 1914 for the first year or so of the war; one of the very first measures was a naval airman Eric Bentley Beauman and a Caudron G.3 at the London Aerodrome at Hendon and a search light, but the Caudron was unarmed! This was London's sole means of air defence for a time! In mid 1915 he went up to Edinburgh and was based 20 miles outside of the city, where a searchlight was located with a handful of Sopwith Tractor Biplanes (named 'Spinning Jennies' due to their tendency to enter into a nasty spin without warning) and Avro 504s at a makeshift camp in East Lothian. The Admiralty relinquished its defence responsibilities to the War Office in mid 1915.

The first German air attacks on the UK took place in December 1914 when seaplanes from the Zeebrugge seaplane station bombed Dover - the first attack was against Dover Pier.


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## stona (Aug 19, 2013)

Filtering did not work fine. Official reports concluded that centralised filtering built in a delay of up to four minutes. This might not seem much, but a raid travelling at a conservative 175 mph will travel about thirteen miles in that time. Given that most men who flew in the battle reckon that a good pilot could see enemy aircraft at a range of up to three miles this is disastrous to the chances of interception.
Even the MoD narrative, which largely supports the received version of events, concedes that in the quiet period leading up to December 1940 the filtering system was "still giving much trouble."

The Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshall Philip Joubert was appointed by Newall (Chief of Air Staff) to "investigate the RDF chain from the point of view of service control." His report was supposed to form the basis of a discussion on RDF policy but Dowding simply threw his toys out of the pram, faced with some of its content. He called it innacurate and accused Joubert of being "imperfectly acquainted with all aspects of the problem." In so doing conceding that there was in fact a problem. Dowding admitted there were delays often in order to avoid "nugatory flights" but refused to concede that there had been missed interceptions, despite evidence from his own squadrons. Newall wanted experiments carried out, devolving filtering from HQ to Group. Dowding would have none of it and without proper explanation opposed it on the grounds that this would be "thoroughly unsound and would lead to a grave loss of operational efficiency." His one modification was to have the "first arrow (plaque) told (relayed) to Groups and Sectors with an identity (friend or foe) added when established." My explanations in brackets. He seems to have believed that only he knew how his system worked and that the Air Ministry should concentrate on improving his equipment. This is not how the UK services work, they are run by committees, like boards of management, not individual officers.

There is a file in our national archives labelled "Present Filtering Organisation." It claims that there were missed interceptions in this relatively quiet period and that since the filter room had been located at Fighter Command HQ there had been a decrease in filtering efficiency and an overlap of function between NCO filterers and filter officers. The author (unknown) does stress that this is not meant to be an indictment of the system but is due to the rapid expansion of the RDF chain. Despite the improvement in instrument quality the operators now had "much less average ability than they previously possessed."

On 31st January 1940 Dowding wrote to the Air Ministry attempting to lay out reasons why he felt filtering should remain at Fighter Command HQ. This is something he had now had time to think about following his failure to do so at the meeting with Newall. He gives some valid reasons and also warns against the cost of locating new filter rooms underground as they would now be at Group and Sector stations.
Unfortunately he concluded in a way guaranteed to annoy members of the Air Staff, contributing to his own downfall ten months later.

"My contention is that members of the Air Council have the right to tell me what to do but should not insist on telling me how to do it so long as I retain their confidence."

With this back me or sack me attitude Dowding won a reprieve and the Air Council backed down. The question of filtering would not be raised again for several months. The dispute was so acrimonious that later in 1940 Dowding had involved Churchill who backed Dowding at the time but asked Sinclair to investigate.
In October 1940 it was Joubert who replied to the Prime Minister. The Air Ministry he said was,

"unconvinced of the rightness of the C-inC's views......but decided not to press him further at that time." In September "The question of decentralisation of filtering very naturally was reconsidered". The only real advantage of filtering at Fighter Command HQ was the presence of liaison officers from other commands, but only until IFF apparatus became generally available in operational aircraft. 

It was the Committee on Night Defence, chaired by Sir John Salmond, which finally recommended "the operation of filtering should be transferred from Fighter Command HQ to Group Headquarters _in order to reduce delay _" My italics.

Dowding objected yet again saying that the issue had been "disinterred" and he asked that he "may be spared the necessity of discussing the question afresh." He did list his objections and, because he knew he had lost the battle, had them placed on record. It was impractical until IFF was fitted to all operational aircraft. The filtering still could not be done on the operational table but in separate filter rooms which had to be excavated and built. This was, he considered, a waste of resources and money and represented a reduction in efficiency. 

I really don't have time to reproduce here all the arguments but even Dowding conceded that the decentralisation might achieve "a very small saving in time" launching fighters but due to the delay in sending information to Fighter Command (which was the reverse of his system) there would be a "delay in the issue of air raid warnings." That sounds like a man grasping at straws.

As for the efficiency of the RDF chain and it's operators, I can only point you at the official reports from which I quoted above.
An operation requirement report of June 1940 stated that

"interception over the sea usually failed because Chain Home was not accurate enough and Chain Home Low had no capability to measure height as it had originally been designed as a Coastal Defence Set."

Filterers would often receive wildly conflicting reports of a raid's altitude from two separate RDF stations. They would have to make an educated guess as to which was most likely to be correct.

Even Watson-Watt admitted in his memoirs that the very range of Chain Home sometimes caused errors.

"It was sometimes made more misleading by our very success, because the first height reports might be on formations which had not yet completed their climb to operational height." 

The personnel problems went on well into 1941, when Canadian radio officers and mechanics rescued the system from "serious difficulties." 

Bungay is either being disingenuous or has not thoroughly researched the personnel and operation of Chain Home in 1940/41. I have already posted some elements of a report by the man in charge of training these people. It gets worse. 

The school lacked a "complete dummy RDF system for training purposes." Mechanics training was described as "a lamentable state of affairs." 

Trainees graduated with a good theoretical but a poor practical knowledge of "(1) Any transmitter. (2) Any receiver with the exception of the mobile one. (3) Any work culminating in the equipment actually going on air. (4) Phasing. (5) Stand-by powere equipment. (6) GM." GM may mean general maintenance or possibly geometric mean in this context.

It makes you wonder what they actually could do. If the man in charge of training was writing this I find your contention that "the radar operators were actually very good" difficult to accept.

A well oiled machine it most certainly was not. 

Cheers

Steve


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## Kryten (Aug 19, 2013)

I think if anyone believes either side in the BoB was a well oiled, well trained, efficient and professional military machine your in for a disappointment!


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## redcoat (Aug 19, 2013)

stona said:


> A well oiled machine it most certainly was not.


But it was a machine that was far in advance of anybody else's, and it worked well enough for the RAF to win.


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## buffnut453 (Aug 19, 2013)

Perfection is the enemy of "good enough" and Fighter Command certainly WAS good enough in the summer of 1940.


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## stona (Aug 19, 2013)

buffnut453 said:


> Perfection is the enemy of "good enough" and Fighter Command certainly WAS good enough in the summer of 1940.



Good enough to hold out for two months.....just.

Dowding did some great work before the war and during but the myth that he was somehow infallible, a great commander, is just that. Park really was an officer on the top of his game. He didn't have the huge burden of responsibility that his C-in-C carried, but his handling of 11 Group was outstandingly good.

I don't want to diminish the effort of Fighter Command or its commanders, nor would I minimise the gallantry of the men who fought at the sharp end. I've already said that Dowding is one of my personal heroes, for all his faults. What I object to is the mythologizing of the battle and the hagiography around Dowding and Park in particular. It is not helpful and a more balanced appraisal is difficult, even now, in the face of the myth. That has been shown in some of the responses in this thread. The real story is different, much more exciting, and the evidence has been available for many years.
Cheers
Steve


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## Juha (Aug 19, 2013)

Hello Steve
thanks a lot for interesting info!
But as you know, if one had to expand an organization very fast, the quality of personel tended to drop. It was very common to complain in all armed forces that the hasty trained drafted/ for war-service only personel were not generally same quality than pre-war professionals. And every branch wanted, if I may use the Finnish Army terms, A1 men or at least A2s. But when a nation mobilized for total war, many B1s and B2s also got drafted and there were enough A men for all trades. So where one put all the B men, they were not suitable to pilots etc front line duties, not even to "bloody infantry". So they were trained to 2nd -line duties, not so dangerous and hard than 1st-line service but usually important tasks for the organization. But probably the branch chiefs would have liked more the A1 men.

Juha


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## l'Omnivore Sobriquet (Aug 19, 2013)

Sorry for this short and easy comment especially in front of the many valuable ones here, but I once read it in Le Fanatique de l'Aviation (a good magazine) in their conclusive paragraph on the matter :
The Germans lost the BofB (air) because they failed to aknowledge that they had won it ; the British won because they maintained they had not lost it (yet).

It's a bit easy a sentence but it fits. And what a difference with the Battle of France.
As for the aftermaths of an eventual RAF collapse, I'd stick to pattle's #302 comment : a stalemate. Strategical.


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## fastmongrel (Aug 19, 2013)

l'Omnivore Sobriquet said:


> The Germans lost the BofB (air) because they failed to aknowledge that they had won it ; the British won because they maintained they had not lost it (yet).
> .



The LW lost (or didnt win) because there aim was to destroy the RAF. The RAF won (or didnt lose) by not being destroyed.


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## Juha (Aug 19, 2013)

Hello l'OS
IMHO LW was not winning, especially because Jagdwaffe was running out combat ready fighter pilots faster than FC. On 29 June 1940 the total Jagdwaffe strength was 1,107 aircraft with 856 operational and 1,126 pilots of whom 906 were combat ready. As of 28 September there were 1,132 aircraft with 920 operational, but only 917 pilots of whom 676 were combat ready. Without enough combat ready fighter pilots it would not have been possible to win air superiority over Southern England.

Juha


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## l'Omnivore Sobriquet (Aug 19, 2013)

An extract from the nearby discussion about "Did the LW achieve air superiority over the 8th AF after the Schweinfurt missions? ", comment #26 page 2 :



> *The BoB was an interesting parrallel to 1944*, but with a vitally different epitaph. The Germans had air superiority at the start, but lost it as the full effects of Dowdings air denial campaign bit in deep. *Here we see the fundamentally different dynamic of the germans in 1940 versus the Americans in 1944*, and it brings it sharply home as to why *you cant rely on losses as to a measure of air superiority.* The Germans took such heavy losses in 1940 that *they had to abandon their primary objectives*....thats tantamount to losing air superiority. And they never really regained it. Losses led to the loss of air superiority, but it was not the loses per se that triggered or signalled *the loss of air superiority, it was the abandonment of the mission objectives that did that*
> 
> For the Americans in 1943, the losses led to the pause in operations, followed by a change in tactics, *but never really an abandonment of the mission objectives. They rapidly came back to resume their mission.* Is that a loss of air superiority? Does a tactical setback equate to or amount to a strategic defeat? It can be certainly argued that way, with some validity, but I tend to think not. *A tactical defeat does not, in my view amount to a loss of air superiority unless it can be shown that the overall mission objectives have been abandoned*, or so modified as to bear no resemblance or relevance to the prime objectives.



This explaines well what I put shortly in the Fana's (the magazine) quote up above. In BoB the LW may well have had, overall, a bloody strain on its effectives, but it was a RAF crushing machine nonetheless, as the FC had to keep on defending the vital South-East part of its country. At that stage, the middle of the battle, the LW was furthermore enjoying better pilots losses vs the RAf than the overall figure Juha (hello!) gives. But it is not really the point. 
The Lufwaffe changed its strategy, its aim (to central London blitz), and eventually changed it again (night blitz.) And according to the statement above it is this and not the losses, that lead to the loosing of air superiority
The abandon of primary objective did it. Signed it.
This is what should be read in the (coarse) sentence : "the German lost because they failed to acknowledge they [were winning] it."

Even though the very losses were, psychologically more than effectively (LW had lengthy reserves at this pace), part of the decision to indeed abandon primary target before its fullfilment.

I reckon the above quote should be put back into context to become really convincing. A long discussion about what air superiority is, compared to air denial, local air superiority etc., and the military consequences of these.


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## bobbysocks (Aug 19, 2013)

stona said:


> A well oiled machine it most certainly was not.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve



i think after all his success hitler didnt think the BoB would be that contested. i believe he felt if he put enough pressure he could have come to some sort of truce or cease fire...since britian was the last man standing from the alliance. and prior the fall of france i think the uk was optomistic about their stance and didnt gear up as much as they should of / could of. after the fall of france it was an "Oh $#!T" moment with a huge amount of crisis management dictating their defensive strategy. i dont think either side was ready or understood the complete situation as it stood.


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## OldSkeptic (Aug 19, 2013)

Sorry Stona I have to disagree pretty much entirely, both from what actually happened and from a theoretical point of view (cybernetics).

Joubert really didn't know what he was talking about, which given his background was understandable, he should have just shut up about it. This was the man after all that blocked the Leigh Light being used for 6 months (though he did admit later that he was wrong about it, unlike some he did learn from experience).

The issue of whether filtering is centralised or decentralised and why being centralised is better is simple to explain (apart from the obvious massive multiplication of resources required):

Information was coming in from all areas, such as a radars outside a particular Group's boundary. Plus the Observer Corp. Spotter planes, squadrons engaged, et al.
The Luftwaffe was not obliging enough to always take a route to a target in one Group while carefully avoiding another. They did cross 11 Group to get into 12 Group's area and vice versa on the return. They did the same with 10 Group too.

Taking a simple example, 10 and 11 Groups as a 'thought experiment'.

Each Group HQ would have to receive all the radar stations inputs (in their own area and outside it) simultaneously plus the Observer Corp input, plus other info from aircraft (their own Group's ones or not).
Without ALL the information their own filtering will be incorrect. If 10 group only gets data from the radar stations in its own area, then it will miss raids coming in that cross from 11 Group.
So immediately we have a communications issue with duplication of all the info. Given that most of the info was by phone (or basic teleprinter), the radar stations (etc) have to contact 2 places.
Then we have the issue of (say) how a spotter plane gets the into to everyone. It contacts its Sector station giving them info, this now has to pass it on to 11 Group HQ AND 10 Group. Or it only passes it on to 11 Group HQ which has to pass it onto 10 Group HQ (as well as FC too of course).

You start to see the problems coming up, everyone has to contact everyone else and quickly, because only with ALL of the information, whether it comes from within your Group or not can you interpret it properly. Otherwise you will have blank spots.

Then we have the interpretation of the data, say (somehow) we do manage to create a comms system that can achieve all this (basically invent an early internet?).
Each Group requires all the staff and systems that FC HQ has to filter it properly. And all really good and as experienced as each other.
What happens when they differ in their view? This is a recipe for chaos. One thinks that a raid is going towards X, the other thinks it is going towards Y.... One Group calls the other for assistance, which refuses it because it believes that the raid is going elsewhere. 

Then how do you coordinate handover between groups a raid passes through (say) 11 Group onto a target in 10 Group and then returns? As I said a recipe for chaos and total stuff ups.

And it will almost certainly be slower than a single filtering point in many cases. Think about it, data goes to FC HQ, filtered and passed down to Group HQs. Filtering takes time.
Now we have this decentralised system, each group doing all its own filtering, fair to presume that the time it takes will be a constant.

Taking the simple example again:
Data goes simultaneously into 10 11 Group HQs. The raid passes through 11 Group's area onto a target in 10 Group. The information from planes in the air goes to 11 Group, which then passes it onto (either directly or indirectly) 10 Group, which goes through it's own filtering system... You now have 2 filtering steps in the process.

I could go on, but you get the idea. Add in 12 Group to the mix and chaos would be kind word for the sort of mess that would ensue.

Centralised filtering was, overall quicker in most (but I will agree not all) circumstances. 
It used less valuable resources of skilled people. 
It meant communications was far simpler (and more robust too).
It meant there was a common view right across the organisation of what was happening .. in other words you had clarity and focus.
Tweaking and improving the filtering needed to be done at only one point. You need more people? Then it is only for a single place, rather than 3 or 4.
There was a single set of people getting steadily more and more experienced, poor performers could be easily replaced.
The 'stuff up' potential was decreased.

You can do this as a diagram or even if you were that keen a simulation model.


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## pattle (Aug 19, 2013)

Perhaps this is a very obvious point but it seems to have been overlooked by some. I don't believe it is possible judge the outcome of an air battle in the same way as it is possible to judge the outcome of a land battle, the difference being is that land battles decide who holds territory not air battles, territory can be held without an air force but not without an army as there always has to be boots on the ground. Britain was never going to be defeated from the air alone in 1940 anymore than Germany was 1945, perhaps Hitler never understood this in the summer of 1940 but he certainly understood this by the autumn of 1940.
Everything that Hitler did in the west prior to 1941 was only done to lay the ground for his attack on Russia and Hitler's mistake was in losing sight of this. Hitler moved straight to his pudding before finishing his meat and veg, and as we all know once you have moved to sweet you can not return to savoury.


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## stona (Aug 20, 2013)

Well Oldsceptic, we'll just have to assume that you and Dowding are correct and everyone else on the Air Staff was wrong and leave it at that.

Your thought experiment is essentially an illustration of Dowding's key argument. In paragraph six of his January 31st 1940 letter he explained that sometimes Groups delegated tactical control to Sectors, and a raid appearing on the table more than a hundred miles away may make several alterations in course, making it seem that several targets were to be attacked. Each sector might then scramble squadrons unnecessarily. There's a lot of ifs buts and maybes in what was his best argument and it obviously failed to convince the Air Council, just as it fails to convince me seventy odd years later.

You are underestimating the role that Group controllers already had in the centralised system, as well as their ability, in support of your argument

Even authors who have contributed to the hagiographies of Dowding (most recently Vincent Orange) have conceded this point.

"In short, Dowding was as unimpressed by the committees recommendations as its members were by his blunt rejection of most of them. Their exchanges ran on into October. It now seems that Dowding was wrong on some points and unwise, at least, to correspond directly with Churchill about them. It was sensible, despite Dowding's opposition, to decentralise filtering from Bentley Priory to Groups."

Orange continues that it is a great tribute to Dowding that the issue of filtering, and Dowding's refusal to decentralise it to Group level, is the only aspect of the air defence system he had designed which came under constant criticism. This is true and speaks for Dowding's greatest achievement, nobody would deny him this.
Of course Salmond eventually won the argument, but only after Dowding's authority had been eroded by his failure to counter night bombing, an impossible task, beyond him or anybody else with the technology available in 1940. 

As for a decentralised system being slower, everyone, including Dowding, allowed that it would be quicker. Official estimates vary from thirty seconds to four minutes quicker.

The RAF, Dowding and Park in particular won the Battle of Britain. This was in no small measure due to the work done by Dowding before the war. His air defence system worked well enough, as someone else pointed out. It was not perfect by his own admission. It suffered from problems of technology and training but we must remember how new this all was at the time. It just about did the job despite this. 

The Battle _for_ Britain was never fought because the Germans were well aware that any attempt at an invasion would have been defeated by the Royal Navy, however parlous a state the Royal Air Force might have been in.

A central tenet of the myth is that the RAF saved Britain from invasion and that I find to be untrue. 

Cheers

Steve


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## Kryten (Aug 20, 2013)

The Luftwaffe weren't winning, that was the problem, FC ended the BoB with more aircraft than it started with, pilot training was coming under control, tactics were evolving!

Turning on London was not the "Strategic disaster" in reality as they were failing to destroy FC air fields anyway, poor intelligence had them attacking CC bases and training fields in some cases, I believe only 2 sector stations were out of action for more than a day throughout the entire battle. 
The RAF had reserves in the West and North (much to the consternation of the Norwegian based KG) if the situation became really desperate, and had the ability to fall back and keep fighting if needed, at no time did the Luftwaffe really have the RAF on the ropes, In fact it was the Luftwaffe who was suffering unacceptable losses primarily in bomber crew, every aircraft lost over the UK was a pilot lost, many RAF pilots flew the same day they were shot down!

The reality is the Luftwaffe were not equipped to win that battle, if fighter command had entered the battle with the tactics the Luftwaffe learned over Spain it would have been an appalling defeat for the Luftwaffe, luckily for them the old men at the air ministry kept FC flying round in "rows of idiots" far too long, but as in every war, it's the painful lessons that are learnt the fastest!


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## OldSkeptic (Aug 20, 2013)

Steve, the official requirement was for a sector to get one plot per minute per raid. Note that was a sector.Not sure how much faster you could get.



> but only after Dowding's authority had been eroded by his failure to counter night bombing


That was an excuse for other internal political wrangling. Dowding had specified and started building all the things to deal with that. Airborne radar, Beaufighters, et al.

Nah, the little boys wanted to come put to play, they wanted their own playpen and there was this big adult in their way, telling them what a bunch of clowns they were.
Portal, Douglas, Leigh Mallory (later Harris) ... and the rest .. didn't exactly set the World on fire with their great decisions after Dowding (and Park) were gone.

RV Jones with his tale of the the BC SASO he finally got to (Harris would never see him) trying to save some BC crews lives by getting a Mosquito to do a German radar freq job, while this idiot only wanted to talk about model trains... The poor sods in a Wellington (a Wellington!!!!) got shot to bits actually doing it (months .. and many BC crews lives later).

As for the Air Ministry, well where do we start on them ... the list is endless of their desperate attempts to lose the war (not just the air war .. the war in total).

Freeman (who was actually anti-Dowding in 1940 and was probably a part of the plot to get rid of him .... and it was a political plot) said in '44, "after Dowding all we had were pygmies".

So we have a bunch of incompetent clowns vs Dowding, who had been right (including night defence) all the time. 

I think I'll pick Dowding, though I have other info in that Operations Research got created then, mostly with FC (though later applied elsewhere). And I have read the accounts of the scientists involved in creating the whole C&C system .. and the fights they had, though never with Dowding, who was their champion, just with ignorant people.

So who am I going to believe ... them? Believe Portal who lied (and probably went to his grave) fighting against a LR fighter right to bitter end, who sabotaged VLR Liberators being given to Coastal Command. I mean the man was worth 20 divisions of troops to the Germans and a 100, at least, U-Boats. Leigh Mallory an idiot, but a very good political player to the end, Douglas who loved his Defiants (he wanted more of them, much more) and didn't even have the slightest conception of what leadership was.

All of them quite happy to squander huge amounts of pilots and crews to their own ... bizarre political ends (model trains again).

After Dowding the torch of using the RAF for something sort of vaguely (instead of talking about model trains) useful passed to Tedder, Conningham and Broadhurst ... and of course Park again .. who were all far away from the RAF's higher command and the Air Ministry, though the latter tried their hardest to sabotage them. They fought their hardest to stop any Spitfires going to Malta and North Africa, only Churchill overruled them (finally) on that, and they still dragged their heels. 

All those poor sodding pilots in (eg) NA being slaughtered in their miserable P-40s and Hurricanes against 109Fs.... They were only lucky that they were facing Marsaiile (and his ilk) who only shot down a couple of bombers in his entire career, if, for all his faults, they had faced Galland then the entire DAF would have been destroyed in a matter of weeks in mid-late 42.


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## stona (Aug 20, 2013)

OldSkeptic said:


> Steve, the official requirement was for a sector to get one plot per minute per raid. Note that was a sector.Not sure how much faster you could get.



Not relevant. You can update the plot(s) as quick as you like. The lag, or delay, was already built in.

For the rest we'll agree to disagree.

Cheers

Steve


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## stona (Aug 20, 2013)

Kryten said:


> FC ended the BoB with more aircraft than it started with, pilot training was coming under control, tactics were evolving!



Good grief! Have you actually read this thread?

The myth is indeed still strong.

Cheers

Steve


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## Kryten (Aug 20, 2013)

stona said:


> Good grief! Have you actually read this thread?
> 
> The myth is indeed still strong.
> 
> ...



Quoted from Stephen Bungays The Most Dangerous Enemy.

"Fighter Commands victory was decisive, Not only had it survived, it ended the battle stronger than it had ever been. On 6th July it's operational strength stood at 1259 pilots. On 2 November, the figure was 1796, an increase of over 40%."

Pilots obviously are the most critical but aircraft production ramped up and outstripped losses, so not really seeing how this is a myth?

when the Luftwaffe's task was to write down FC, to have your enemy actually stronger at the end of the battle can only be a failure, no matter how you dress it up!


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## stona (Aug 20, 2013)

Kryten said:


> Quoted from Stephen Bungays The Most Dangerous Enemy.
> 
> "Fighter Commands victory was decisive, Not only had it survived, it ended the battle stronger than it had ever been. On 6th July it's operational strength stood at 1259 pilots. On 2 November, the figure was 1796, an increase of over 40%."
> 
> ...



Because Fighter Command was critically short of operational combat pilots. Dowding had also created "class C" squadrons which were effectively non-operational. Of the total number of pilots in Fighter Command about 440 were non-operational. The raw figures do not tell the whole story and were contradicted by no less a personage than Dowding himself. I posted what he said about this in a post way above and will repeat it here.

The Luftwaffe too had far, far more aircraft than men to fly them in 1945. Aircraft production figures mean nothing if you are not training pilots fast enough or well enough.

The problem pre-dates the battle of Britain. In an unsigned memorandum, usually presumed to be written by Newall of 3rd June 1940 it is stated that between 10th May and 24th June nearly two hundred pilots were lost, "a fifth of our most highly trained fighter pilots." The memorandum continues that "the number of pilots available per squadron is now little more than adequate to man the available aircraft. More serious is the loss of a considerable proportion of trained leaders." While many of the aircraft lost in France had been replaced "there remains a grave deficiency in pilots."

We can assume that Fighter Command had made up the short fall somewhat before the Battle of Britain really got going two months later as it was not until September that Dowding was forced as a "desperate expedient", his words, to introduce the much disliked "stabilisation system" to keep mostly 11 Group squadrons well above the average pilot strength of Fighter Command. 11 Groups average squadron pilot strength was 19, still well short of the official establishment of 26. By mid September other squadrons averaged only about 10 operational pilots.
The stabilisation system was not abandoned until the end of November 1940. It had been introduced as an operational expedient intended to last only until the OTUs could meet the wastage problem so it is reasonable to assume that this finally happened at the end of November 1940.
In August 1940 the OTUs only delivered 260 pilots to replace the 304 killed or wounded according to the Air Historical Branch Narrative of the MoD which obviously did not meet the criteria.

Bungay is simply quoting, almost word for word, the pamphlet "The Battle of Britain" published by HMSO whilst the war was still continuing. Dowding himself replied to the assertion that "the fighter squadrons of the RAF were indeed stronger at the end of the battle than at the beginning" replying, "whatever the paper return showed, the situation towards the end was extremely critical and most squadrons were fit only for operations against unescorted bombers."
I would expect better from Bungay whose writing I quite like. This is nothing new, the facts have been in the public domain for years. Some wilfully choose to ignore them.

Cheers

Steve


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 20, 2013)

Kryten said:


> The Luftwaffe weren't winning, that was the problem, FC ended the BoB with more aircraft than it started with, pilot training was coming under control, tactics were evolving!
> 
> Turning on London was not the "Strategic disaster" in reality as they were failing to destroy FC air fields anyway, poor intelligence had them attacking CC bases and training fields in some cases, I believe only 2 sector stations were out of action for more than a day throughout the entire battle.
> The RAF had reserves in the West and North (much to the consternation of the Norwegian based KG) if the situation became really desperate, and had the ability to fall back and keep fighting if needed, at no time did the Luftwaffe really have the RAF on the ropes, In fact it was the Luftwaffe who was suffering unacceptable losses primarily in bomber crew, every aircraft lost over the UK was a pilot lost, many RAF pilots flew the same day they were shot down!
> ...



from wiki:

"_In the late 1930s, Fighter Command expected to face only bombers over Britain, not single-engined fighters. With this in mind, a series of "Fighting Area Tactics" were formulated and rigidly adhered to, involving a series of manœuvres designed to concentrate a squadron's firepower to bring down bombers: with no apparent prospect of escorting fighters to worry about, RAF fighter pilots flew in tight, v-shaped sections ("vics") of three. These restricted squadrons to tight 12 aircraft formations composed of four sections in another tight "V". With this formation, only the squadron leader at the front was free to watch for the enemy; the other pilots had to concentrate on keeping station.[58] RAF fighter training also emphasised by-the-book attacks by sections breaking away in sequence. Fighter Command recognised the weaknesses of this rigid structure early in the battle, but it was felt too risky to change tactics during the battle, *because replacement pilots—often with only minimal flying time—could not be readily retrained,[59] and inexperienced RAF pilots needed firm leadership in the air only rigid formations could provide.*[60] German pilots dubbed the RAF formations Idiotenreihen ("rows of idiots") because they left squadrons vulnerable to attack.[61][62]_"

This describes my understanding of the motivation for the rows idiots for which the Luftwaffe had such contempt. In other worlds, the practice was a measure of the difficulty FC faced when losses of its trained pilots became serious in late summer. Wasn't one of the RAF's lesser lights responsible for this policy that was more effective than appreciated by the LW? Just asking...


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## Kryten (Aug 20, 2013)

stona said:


> Because Fighter Command was critically short of operational combat pilots. Dowding had also created "class C" squadrons which were effectively non-operational. Of the total number of pilots in Fighter Command about 440 were non-operational. The raw figures do not tell the whole story and were contradicted by no less a personage than Dowding himself. I posted what he said about this in a post way above and will repeat it here.
> 
> The Luftwaffe too had far, far more aircraft than men to fly them in 1945. Aircraft production figures mean nothing if you are not training pilots fast enough or well enough.
> 
> ...



That's interesting, how was the Luftwaffe faring in comparison, after all losses will have the same effect on both sides and Luftwaffe crew losses were substantial? 
and unless we can compare the effects on the Luftwaffe also we don't really see the overall picture?


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## Kryten (Aug 20, 2013)

Oldcrow,

Sailor Malan instigated a change to in line fours due to the obvious shortcomings of this formation, could you argue it's lack of initiative against rigid orders that prolonged the practice?

After all if Malan and Bader could make these changes surely other squadrons could have adapted if they had the will to do so?


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## stona (Aug 20, 2013)

The Luftwaffe was sustaining substantial losses too, on top of those sustained in the Battle of France. For some reason the French losses, on both sides seem to get ignored in most histories which tend to concentrate on the Battle of Britain within the British dates.

As for tactics, that is an entirely different topic. Formation flying was high on the agenda of RAF training programmes, precisely because the new pilots were expected to carry out the "Fighting Area Tactics". These tactics were developed for an entirely different scenario to those of the battles the RAF found itself fighting. Why they were retained for so long would be a subject for another thread, but there was hardly time to retrain pilots during the battle.

It's a shame gunnery wasn't as high up the training agenda as formation flying!

Cheers

Steve


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 20, 2013)

Kryten said:


> Oldcrow,
> 
> Sailor Malan instigated a change to in line fours due to the obvious shortcomings of this formation, c*ould you argue it's lack of initiative against rigid orders that prolonged the practice?*
> 
> After all if Malan and Bader could make these changes surely other squadrons could have adapted if they had the will to do so?



I am not sure I understand the question. It seems obvious to me that skilled pilots restricted to engaging an enemy in rigid formations is not a recipe for success or pilot survival in any sustained air battle but then my understanding is also that the numbers of skilled pilots were few and heavily attritted during the BoB and that formation flying was the heart of the RAF training curriculum so it offered an easy if problematic fix.

It's interesting to note that The USAAF for a period prior to December 7, 1941 adopted much of the RAF practices until changes were disseminated to its allies. FEAF training curriculum in the PI evidently emphasized formation flying and three plane elements until late 1941 when word spread that the RAF was promoting the use of two plane elements. Emphasis on formation flight training apparently persisted however.


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## Milosh (Aug 20, 2013)

Formation flying is precision flying (having to keep station with other a/c) so should help in positioning an a/c for shooting.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 20, 2013)

There may be a world of difference between trying to fly like three aircraft tied together with ribbons (two pilots focusing 99% of their attention on the lead plane) and keeping a loose formation while scanning the sky (all pilots trying to maintain situational awareness). 

A bit extreme but pretty peace time flying does not make for effective war time flying and having junior pilots spend too much time slavishly following the more experienced pilots around might not show a good return for hours invested.


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## stona (Aug 20, 2013)

Milosh said:


> Formation flying is precision flying (having to keep station with other a/c) so should help in positioning an a/c for shooting.



The idea was that the flight leader would get into position to attack the bomber (nobody had considered the possibility of enemy fighters being present) and then all three aircraft would open fire simultaneously with a weight of fire guaranteed to destroy the bomber. This was also the reason why the guns of RAF fighters were originally synchronised at such long range. It only sounds ridiculous with the benefit of hindsight.
It was reckoned that three hundred .303 strikes were needed to bring down an He 111. The chances of even an expert marksman achieving this in the time that was estimated to be available to fire were very slim indeed. Nearly every single round of a two second burst from eight .303 Brownings (which was what was considered possible) would have to hit the target.

Prior to the Battle of Britain gunnery training was in a poor state. The Inspector General's visit to Sutton Bridge OTU on 3rd May 1940 revealed that training was limited by the serviceability of the four Henley target tugs. A spares shortage limited these to one or two serviceable at any one time. The inspector (Air Chief Marshall Ludlow-Hewitt) also criticised Sutton Bridge's 25 yard firing ranges and noted that at the other Fighter Command OTU at Aston Down (there were only two) a 400 yard range was required to "enable fighter aircraft to fire their fixed guns at various ranges on the ground."

We know that some officers took it upon themselves to re-harmonise their guns. Malan harmonised his at 250 yards. This too was something Dowding resisted. In a memorandum he circulated to Group Commands in October 1939 he said "there is nothing much wrong with the harmonisation of the guns of an 8 gun fighter at the ranges for which this harmonisation has been designed." He also wished to discourage the practice of "close range firing" without specifying what he meant by the term. Another memorandum from the Air Ministry's Air Tactics Directorate supported Dowding's view on harmonisation but not on close range firing.

It is worth remembering that during the Battle of Britain (in British terms) the seventeen top scoring aces shot down 221 aircraft. That's about 1/5 of the total German aircraft destroyed. What were all the rest doing?
Only 900 of the 2000+ who flew in the battle made a _claim_ between July and November 1940. Only 15% were credited with a "whole" aircraft. In the same period the 160 or so men who became aces shot down almost all the Luftwaffe aircraft lost to fighters.

The training problems did not go away, even after the battle.

Dowding's successor ,Air Marshall Sholto Douglas, wrote in late 1941 that he was "very concerned about the standards of air gunnery in Squadrons and anxious that more gunnery training should be given to pilots prior to joining their Squadrons."
He noted that pilots at OTUs only fired their guns two or three times a week and raised the familiar problem of a lack of target towing aircraft. He finished saying that it was "imperative" that standards be improved.

Even Keith Park complained about the ineffectiveness of his pilots. Writing about events on 15th September 1940 he stated that he was "far from impressed with the performance of 11 Group." His argument was that with 1,600 potential targets and 300 fighters in the air his pilots should have shot down more than 56.

I'm sorry if none of this fits with the glorious myth of the Battle of Britain. Unfortunately we don't learn anything useful from myths, for that we need to take a cold, hard, look at the facts.

Cheers

Steve


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 20, 2013)

stona said:


> It is worth remembering that during the Battle of Britain (in British terms) the seventeen top scoring aces shot down 221 aircraft. That's about 1/5 of the total German aircraft destroyed. What were all the rest doing?
> Only 900 of the 2000+ who flew in the battle made a _claim_ between July and November 1940. Only 15% were credited with a "whole" aircraft. In the same period the 160 or so men who became aces shot down almost all the Luftwaffe aircraft lost to fighters.



Wow!




stona said:


> Even Keith Park complained about the ineffectiveness of his pilots. Writing about events on 15th September 1940 he stated that he was "far from impressed with the performance of 11 Group." His argument was that with 1,600 potential targets and 300 fighters in the air his pilots should have shot down more than 56.
> 
> I'm sorry if none of this fits with the glorious myth of the Battle of Britain. Unfortunately we don't learn anything useful from myths, for that we need to take a cold, hard, look at the facts.


How does that compare with the later 8th AF experience with in 1943? ~250-300 B-17s vs ~400 LW fighters? My numbers are probably way off but must be within a factor of ~10. Seems like the numbers of victories claimed aren't too different if you consider the possible victims of ~3-400 fighters in a target rich environment to be about 60 a/c as an average? Could the number of fighters be the real limiting factor *(Late entry: Probably not, see post below)*? Was Park being overly optimistic in his assessment?

I still think the BoB was a glorious victory if perhaps an inelegant one. As a wiser person than I once said, "_You don't want to know what goes into making the sausage, just enjoy the taste of the result._"

Reminds me a bit of the battle of Midway. Looks like a glorious victory until you put it under the microscope and the warts appear in abundance. yet the myths persist because, in fairness, those involved were feeling their way blindly and don't have the hindsight of 60 years perspective or the relatively accurate numbers we can exploit to the detriment of some of their reputations. The sight of a hurricane or a spitfire unfailingly evokes some deep emotions if only because of the uncertainty present in the men and women who fought the battle for us all.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 20, 2013)

Comparing the RAF number you quoted above to the USN's reputedly relatively well trained 'first team' in Lundstrum: Of 138 total pilots, 88 submitted no claims or a partial claim. 36% of the pilots (including 5 aces with ~5 victories each) accounted for all the claims accumulated by the USN thru the Battle of Midway, so I guess its safe to say, the numbers don't lie. (Although as a cautionary remark to myself when quoting numbers about anything, I say: "_Figures sometimes lie and liars sometimes figure._" )


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## stona (Aug 20, 2013)

I think the Battle of Britain was an important victory too. Glorious, well maybe.
I'm not challenging the result of the battle or its importance. I have a very great admiration for the men who fought the battle from the half trained rookie in the cockpit, or in front of his radar screen up to Park and Dowding. None of these men were perfect, nor did they always make the correct decisions. Luckily for all of us they were more often right than wrong, which is a lot more difficult than it sounds.

It's the mythologising which irritates me. Look at a well respected, if populist, historian like Bungay quoting virtually verbatim from a war time pamphlet without including Dowding's rebuttal. It's that kind of "sloppy" history which prolongs the life of the myth when the real story is far better, more exciting, and reveals the battle to have been a close run thing littered with errors and failings on both sides. 
Just like most campaigns then 

Veering off I found a list of the six approved methods of attack in the "fighting Area Tactics" system.

Fighter Attack No.1 (From Above Cloud) {3 aircraft Section vs single enemy}

Fighter Attack No.2 (From Directly Below) {3 aircraft Section vs single enemy}

Fighter Attack No.3 (From Dead Astern) Approach Pursuit or Approach Turning

Fighter Attack No.4 (From Directly Below) {A variation of No.2, attacking multiple aircraft}

Fighter Attack No.5 (From Dead Astern) {For attacking a large enemy formation}

Fighter Attack No.6 (From Dead Astern) {Attack conducted with entire squadron}

So I was incorrect to say that they all involved a simultaneous attack by an entire flight, though some do.

Cheers

Steve


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 20, 2013)

Speaking of national mythology, I have to admit to being shocked at the small numbers of americans actually involved in the BoB. Wikipedia says it was only 11. Of course American mythology holds that US participation in the Battle saved Britain (especially that of Ben Affleck who was apparently on leave from the USAAF and not afraid to lose his citizenship.)  What would Dowding say to that I wonder.

according to wiki:

"_The first Eagle Squadron, (No. 71 Squadron), was formed in *September 1940* as part of the RAF's buildup during the Battle of Britain,[1] and became operational for defensive duties on *5 February 1941.* Eventually, a total of three Eagle Squadrons formed and were numbered 71, 121, and 133, respectively.[1] Of the thousands that volunteered, 244 Americans served with the three Eagle Squadrons; 16 Britons also served as squadron and flight commanders._"

In other words except for 11 _unpatriotic_ americans willing to sacrifice their citizenship for the sake of Great Britain's survival, americans played essentially no role.

Bummer.


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## The Basket (Aug 20, 2013)

Hasnt it been proved that aces may not necessarily be the best trained best flyers but the most aggressive? 

Actually shooting down an aircraft is not the only way to 'win'.

I am not happy with your comment 'what were the rest doing?' How about being brave? Defending there country...dying maybe?


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## Readie (Aug 20, 2013)

Any volunteer was welcome Mal. 
If it was only 11 Americans then that is better than no Americans to fight for Britains survival.
The BoB is one of those cultural landmarks that I hope is never forgotten.
Cheers
John


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## Juha (Aug 20, 2013)

stona said:


> ...It is worth remembering that during the Battle of Britain (in British terms) the seventeen top scoring aces shot down 221 aircraft. That's about 1/5 of the total German aircraft destroyed. What were all the rest doing?
> Only 900 of the 2000+ who flew in the battle made a _claim_ between July and November 1940. Only 15% were credited with a "whole" aircraft. In the same period the 160 or so men who became aces shot down almost all the Luftwaffe aircraft lost to fighters....



Hello Steve
I cannot see anything remarkable in that. It was a common phenomenon. In FiAF, which had fairly good gunnery training, the 10 top aces shot down 489,5 out of some 1900 accepted kills, more or like RAF's confirmed and probables during the Winter and Continuation Wars. You can easily calculate how many kills were achieved by the top ten or 17 LW aces.

Juha

PS. In FiAF the top 17 shot down 666,5, that is 35% of the total.


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## stona (Aug 20, 2013)

The Basket said:


> I am not happy with your comment 'what were the rest doing?' How about being brave? Defending there country...dying maybe?



Please don't interpret the comment as being disrespectful to them. That was not my intention. They were doing all those things. 
The problem, from the point of view of the efficiency of Fighter Command is that they were not shooting down Luftwaffe aircraft. The vast majority were doing their best in a very difficult situation, it's just a fact that they were not very effective. This was not their fault and I've touched on some of the reasons for this above. It's one of the many reasons why the true story of the battle is even more remarkable than the myth. The few were in fact a lot fewer than most imagine.
Cheers
Steve


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## stona (Aug 20, 2013)

Juha said:


> Hello Steve
> I cannot see anything remarkable in that. It was a common phenomenon. In FiAF, which had fairly good gunnery training, the 10 top aces shot down 489,5 out of some 1900 accepted kills, more or like RAF's confirmed and probables during the Winter and Continuation Wars. You can easily calculate how many kills were achieved by the top ten or 17 LW aces.
> 
> Juha



It's not particularly remarkable. I suspect that similar figures applied to most air forces in WW2. It's a reflection of the training, particularly in air to air gunnery, that was given and the difficulty of hitting anything with the gun sights available for most of the war.

The poor quality of the RAF's fighter pilots' gunnery remained a concern throughout the war. I don't have information on how other air forces assessed theirs.

Cheers
Steve


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 20, 2013)

Readie said:


> Any volunteer was welcome Mal.
> If it was only 11 Americans then that is better than no Americans to fight for Britains survival.
> The BoB is one of those cultural landmarks that I hope is never forgotten.
> Cheers
> John



And I thought, like _Beetlejiuce_, you'd only appear if I said "Spitfire" three times.  Once was all it took!


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## Readie (Aug 20, 2013)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> And I thought, like _Beetlejiuce_, you'd only appear if I said "Spitfire" three times.  Once was all it took!




Even you thinking 'Spitfire' is enough Mal


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 20, 2013)

How's this! taken at my last visit to Virginia beach's Military aviation museum:


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## Readie (Aug 20, 2013)

Beautiful,magnificent and our national treasure.
Never has any interceptor fighter been so right from the beginning to the end.
Not that I'm biased of course...


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## Juha (Aug 20, 2013)

stona said:


> Because Fighter Command was critically short of operational combat pilots. Dowding had also created "class C" squadrons which were effectively non-operational. Of the total number of pilots in Fighter Command about 440 were non-operational. ...



While the "C" Class sqns were an emergency measure, it was IMHO a logical solution to the problem of too short OTUs. At the height of the BoB, OTU courses’ were of two weeks duration with final training at the “C” Class sqns, ie on fighter sqns resting in north and having some 2/5 of their pilots combat ready in case of surprising LW appearance and 3/5 of pilots non-operational and under training. The “C” Class sqn training was in operation 8.9.-1.12.40, when more OTUs were formed. That according to Norman Franks RAF Fighter Command 1936-1968 p.83.

One can read from J.E.J’s Wing Leader who the system worked. After his OTU ended on 28 August 1940 J.E.J. was posted to No 19 Sqn, but because the sqn didn’t have time to give him his final training (it had its hands full with the problems of the cannon Spi IBs) he was soon transferred to 616 Sqn . And only an ½ hour after he and 2 other green pilots had met the S/L, J.E.J was sitting in the cockpit of a Spit ready to took off for an hour flight with the S/L after which the S/L gave to J.E.J lot of advices on combat flying and tactics, then began the training in earnest which incl. air to air gunnery training.


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## pinsog (Aug 20, 2013)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Comparing the RAF number you quoted above to the USN's reputedly relatively well trained 'first team' in Lundstrum: Of 138 total pilots, 88 submitted no claims or a partial claim. 36% of the pilots (including 5 aces with ~5 victories each) accounted for all the claims accumulated by the USN thru the Battle of Midway, so I guess its safe to say, the numbers don't lie. (Although as a cautionary remark to myself when quoting numbers about anything, I say: "_Figures sometimes lie and liars sometimes figure._" )



I'm not sure Midway is a good example, unless you only count the Yorktown fighters. The Enterprise and Hornet were never under attack so their fighters were never in a "target rich environment" of enemy bombers. What percentage of Yorktown fighters claimed kills or were shot down while attempting kills?

There is no doubt what the Midway defenders were doing, they were decimated, they all made 1 pass and then spent the rest of the time trying not to die at the business end of a Zero piloted by some of the best pilots in the world at that time.


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## silence (Aug 20, 2013)

Readie said:


> Beautiful,magnificent and our national treasure.
> Never has any interceptor fighter been so right from the beginning to the end.
> Not that I'm biased of course...



I think you need to add the caveat that the bubble-top and griffon-engined (those cowling bumps for the engine are as ugly as a festering boil on the end of your nose) were a noticeable step backwards, beauty-wise.

But the "classic" looking ones are Kate Beckinsales made of metal.


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## stona (Aug 20, 2013)

Juha said:


> While the "C" Class sqns were an emergency measure, it was IMHO a logical solution to the problem of too short OTUs. At the height of the BoB, OTU courses’ were of two weeks duration with final training at the “C” Class sqns, ie on fighter sqns resting in north and having some 2/5 of their pilots combat ready in case of surprising LW appearance and 3/5 of pilots non-operational and under training. The “C” Class sqn training was in operation 8.9.-1.12.40, when more OTUs were formed. That according to Norman Franks RAF Fighter Command 1936-1968 p.83.
> 
> One can read from J.E.J’s Wing Leader who the system worked. After his OTU ended on 28 August 1940 J.E.J. was posted to No 19 Sqn, but because the sqn didn’t have time to give him his final training (it had its hands full with the problems of the cannon Spi IBs) he was soon transferred to 616 Sqn . And only an ½ hour after he and 2 other green pilots had met the S/L, J.E.J was sitting in the cockpit of a Spit ready to took off for an hour flight with the S/L after which the S/L gave to J.E.J lot of advices on combat flying and tactics, then began the training in earnest which incl. air to air gunnery training.



That's right. The reason that the "stabilisation" system was so unpopular with the squadrons wasn't so much the creation of the class C squadrons but the system for reinforcing the squadrons at the sharp end, principally 11 Group. It was impossible for entire squadrons to rotate in and out of 11 Group because the squadrons in quieter areas were either very under strength (in personnel) or were Class C and unfit for 11 Group operations. This meant that squadrons were stripped of their more experienced pilots who were sent to make up for wastage in front line squadrons.
This annoyed the squadrons who lost their senior pilots on the one hand and the squadrons at the front who did not get rotated out.
It is no accident that as soon as the rate of losses reduced in November and the OTUs were able to provide enough replacement pilots the system was abandoned' It always was, in Dowding's words a "desperate expedient."
Cheers
Steve


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## stona (Aug 20, 2013)

silence said:


> I think you need to add the caveat that the bubble-top and griffon-engined (those cowling bumps for the engine are as ugly as a festering boil on the end of your nose) were a noticeable step backwards, beauty-wise.
> 
> But the "classic" looking ones are Kate Beckinsales made of metal.



And what a noise! Don't forget the noise. I prefer a Merlin but a Griffon isn't half bad either.
Cheers
Steve


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## Juha (Aug 20, 2013)

l'Omnivore Sobriquet said:


> An extract from the nearby discussion about "Did the LW achieve air superiority over the 8th AF after the Schweinfurt missions? ", comment #26 page 2 :
> 
> 
> 
> ...


 
Hello again l’OS
IMHO the turning against London was a complicated question, Kesselring supported it, because he was thinking that it would help to achieve the main aim, the destruction of FC by forcing the elusive FC come up and fight and so would help his 109 pilots to get grip to British fighters which had to defend their capital (he would also get more units under his command). On the other hand Sperrle was against the shift, because he thought that it was too early, he would have continued the pounding of the RAF bases (the shift also would meant that he would lose some of his units to kesselring

Juha


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 20, 2013)

pinsog said:


> I'm not sure Midway is a good example, unless you only count the Yorktown fighters. The Enterprise and Hornet were never under attack so their fighters were never in a "target rich environment" of enemy bombers. What percentage of Yorktown fighters claimed kills or were shot down while attempting kills?
> 
> There is no doubt what the Midway defenders were doing, they were decimated, they all made 1 pass and then spent the rest of the time trying not to die at the business end of a Zero piloted by some of the best pilots in the world at that time.



Pinsog, you misread me... I quoted inclusive number for the "_USN thru the Battle of Midway_" Not USMC or just that battle itself: cumulative from 12/7/41 thru 6/07/42.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 20, 2013)

silence said:


> I think you need to add the caveat that the bubble-top and griffon-engined (those cowling bumps for the engine are as ugly as a festering boil on the end of your nose) were a noticeable step backwards, beauty-wise.
> 
> But the "classic" looking ones are Kate Beckinsales made of metal.



Heresy!!! He speaks heresy! Burn the heretic!!! Well wait, maybe commute the sentence for that Kate Beckinsale comment. That was pretty sweet.


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## silence (Aug 20, 2013)

stona said:


> And what a noise! Don't forget the noise. I prefer a Merlin but a Griffon isn't half bad either.
> Cheers
> Steve



Yes! Like a beautiful woman who can sing.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 20, 2013)

Apologies for distracting from the excellent and interesting discussion. But no discussion of the BoB should be had without at least one photo each of the Spitfire and Hurricane. I'll leave the 109 for someone else to post...


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## silence (Aug 20, 2013)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Heresy!!! He speaks heresy! Burn the heretic!!! Well wait, maybe commute the sentence for that Kate Beckinsale comment. That was pretty sweet.



I'm not a witch! I'm not!


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## Milosh (Aug 20, 2013)

stona said:


> The idea was that the flight leader would get into position to attack the bomber (nobody had considered the possibility of enemy fighters being present) and then all three aircraft would open fire simultaneously with a weight of fire guaranteed to destroy the bomber. This was also the reason why the guns of RAF fighters were originally synchronised at such long range. It only sounds ridiculous with the benefit of hindsight.
> It was reckoned that three hundred .303 strikes were needed to bring down an He 111. The chances of even an expert marksman achieving this in the time that was estimated to be available to fire were very slim indeed. Nearly every single round of a two second burst from eight .303 Brownings (which was what was considered possible) would have to hit the target.
> 
> Cheers
> ...



I meant later when the pilot would be in his own combat, not part of a V. The subtle changes in stick and throttle in keeping formation in the V would stand him in good sted in making the fine changes to acquire a firing solution.



> Even Keith Park complained about the ineffectiveness of his pilots. Writing about events on 15th September 1940 he stated that he was "far from impressed with the performance of 11 Group." His argument was that with 1,600 potential targets and 300 fighters in the air his pilots should have shot down more than 56.



Well 20mm cannons would have helped with the number of shoot downs.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 20, 2013)

silence said:


> I'm not a witch! I'm not!



Do you float? Can a bridge be built out of you?

(we really gotta get back on topic.... )


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## redcoat (Aug 20, 2013)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Speaking of national mythology, I have to admit to being shocked at the small numbers of americans actually involved in the BoB. Wikipedia says it was only 11. Of course American mythology holds that US participation in the Battle saved Britain (especially that of Ben Affleck who was apparently on leave from the USAAF and not afraid to lose his citizenship.)  What would Dowding say to that I wonder.


The US government actually banned the British from attempting to recruit ex-USAAF and USN pilots.


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## pinsog (Aug 20, 2013)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Pinsog, you misread me... I quoted inclusive number for the "_USN thru the Battle of Midway_" Not USMC or just that battle itself: cumulative from 12/7/41 thru 6/07/42.



Ooops. Missed that one.

I still wonder, as someone brought up earlier in the thread: You have 300 British fighter pilots and 1600 Germans all flying around in the same airspace and the British only get 56 kills. One wonders what was going on. Were 95% of both sides so incompetent that they just flew around in circles and got shot down? 

We aren't talking about long range fighter sweeps where you may not see the enemy at all, we are talking about FC saying "Hey guys, BIG groups of Germans will be at this place in 10 minutes, could everyone show up and shoot them down". They weren't particularly tough bombers, nor were they well defended. It looks to me like everyone would show up and most of one side would get shot down, but it just didn't happen that way.


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## redcoat (Aug 20, 2013)

Juha said:


> PS. In FiAF the top 17 shot down 666,5, that is 35% of the total.


3 Luftwaffe pilots are credited with shooting down almost 20% of the British aircraft claimed by the Luftwaffe in the North African campaign


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## pinsog (Aug 20, 2013)

redcoat said:


> 3 Luftwaffe pilots are credited with shooting down almost 20% of the British aircraft claimed by the Luftwaffe in the North African campaign



Reminds me of "Professional Wrestling" in the 1970's. There were like 3 stars and the other 50 guys were just there to get beat up every week.

Also reminds me of some of the group/gang fights I've seen on video where there are like 3 or 4 guys fighting while the rest of them are running their mouths or maybe pushing and shoving but never getting in and slugging it out.


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## Milosh (Aug 20, 2013)

pinsog said:


> Ooops. Missed that one.
> 
> I still wonder, as someone brought up earlier in the thread: You have 300 British fighter pilots and 1600 Germans all flying around in the same airspace and the British only get 56 kills. One wonders what was going on. Were 95% of both sides so incompetent that they just flew around in circles and got shot down?



There wasn't 1900 a/c in the same airspace at the same time.

Daily history by the hour, List of Website Contents


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## OldSkeptic (Aug 20, 2013)

The Basket said:


> Hasnt it been proved that aces may not necessarily be the best trained best flyers but the most aggressive?
> 
> Actually shooting down an aircraft is not the only way to 'win'.
> 
> I am not happy with your comment 'what were the rest doing?' How about being brave? Defending there country...dying maybe?



Bungey (and others) go into this quite a lot. Studies of all air warfare show that most kills are made by a small number of pilots (in Bungey's terms the 'hunter killers'). Then you have a large group of people that can survive in the battle field, but don't contribute much, then there is the cannon fodder (the victims). Naturally newbies make up most of the cannon fodder.

Good eyesight, good shooting skills and the ability to manoeuvre the aircraft as a gun platform were the main key skills, as well as situational awareness.
Deflection shooting skills were a real asset and it is no surprise when you look at all the aces you find nearly all of them had good shooting skills before they learned to fly.

Good aerobatic and formation flying skills were probably a liability for a fighter pilot, the British Vic formation was hopeless. 
You needed to keep the plane moving around all the time in a high risk area, to avoid being bounced and to be able to see more. Stanford Tuck said he used to deliberately fly very roughly and he was a superb pilot.
The German formation was excellent and is the standard everyone uses today.

Dowding's A/B/C squadron idea was also a response to whole squadrons of inexperienced pilots being slaughtered when they were moved into 11 Group. Ones that had no experience of combat at all.
In other words they were all cannon fodder.

Same thing happened to the only German one of 109s that got moved into the Battle that was inexperienced (unfortunately for the British virtually all the German ones were very experienced).


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 20, 2013)

OldSkeptic said:


> Good eyesight, good shooting skills and the ability to manoeuvre the aircraft as a gun platform were the main key skills, as well as situational awareness.
> Deflection shooting skills were a real asset and it is no surprise when you look at all the aces you find nearly all of them had good shooting skills before they learned to fly.
> 
> *Good aerobatic and formation flying skills were probably a liability for a fighter pilot, *the British Vic formation was hopeless.
> You needed to keep the plane moving around all the time in a high risk area, to avoid being bounced and to be able to see more. Stanford Tuck *said he used to deliberately fly very roughly and he was a superb pilot.*



OS, This is interesting. Reading about the USAAF experience in Java, even the combat vets and those considered ready to begin a combat tour appear to have been rigorously trained to the formation flying model. There seem to have been numerous occasions when an element or flight was tasked with covering their mates while landing or doing ground attack and they were bounced and put away by marauding Zeros. They were presumably engaged in scanning the environment for the enemy so as not to be surprised yet they were and ended up as simply meat on the table for the Zeros.

Thach's weave or beam defense maneuver may have provided more benefits than the mutual lookout and defensive options. Introducing continually changing curved flight paths may have been more confounding to an enemy's targeting and eliminated the inherent vulnerability brought about by a relatively predictable flight pattern. It seems like a tight formation of A/C following either a rectilinear path or a simple steady circle would provide a much simpler enemy firing solution.


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## stona (Aug 21, 2013)

pinsog said:


> I still wonder, as someone brought up earlier in the thread: You have 300 British fighter pilots and 1600 Germans all flying around in the same airspace and the British only get 56 kills. One wonders what was going on. Were 95% of both sides so incompetent that they just flew around in circles and got shot down?



Not exactly, but 27 RAF fighters were shot down on that day too.

We shouldn't under estimate the effect of relatively large numbers of RAF fighters on the morale of the Luftwaffe either. Many of the fighters might not have been effective in shooting down the Luftwaffe but they were present in a show of apparent strength.
Even Galland asserted that "anything from two hundred to three hundred [British fighters] might be found" when interviewed after the war. The senior narrator of the Air Historical Branch replied that even with the squadrons from 12 Group engaged there rarely more than three hundred fighter available in the whole southeast of England and, rather, sarcastically, that "it would be surprising if Galland ever saw them all in the air at the same time."

Cheers

Steve


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## Jabberwocky (Aug 22, 2013)

The RAF estimate is that there were approximately 290 to 300 combat actions on the 15th of September, from 705 fighter sorties.

While somewhere between 55 and 60 Luftwaffe aircraft were shot down, at least another 40 bombers and 15 fighters had damage of some kind.

To me, that lends a couple of possibilities:
The .303 was relatively ineffective at bringing down its targets;
Fighter pilots were shooting from too far away;
Pilots gunnery skills were inadequate.


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## OldSkeptic (Aug 22, 2013)

Jabberwocky said:


> The RAF estimate is that there were approximately 290 to 300 combat actions on the 15th of September, from 705 fighter sorties.
> 
> While somewhere between 55 and 60 Luftwaffe aircraft were shot down, at least another 40 bombers and 15 fighters had damage of some kind.
> 
> ...



Yes and no. 

The 'No' is that the 8x0.303 was a good killer for time against fighters and the smaller bombers used (though the Ju-88 was more resistant). The stats (source Bungay again) show that they were possibly more effective than the Me-109 E4 cannons of the time in fighter to fighter combat.

The 'yes' comes from RAF gunnery skills .. woeful comes to mind. Basically zero training. Lots of training on formation flying though .. made good targets for Luftwaffe pilots in their nice formations. 
The best squadrons (such as 'Sailor Molan's' abandoned them real fast).
Note the issue, short term, when Dowding introduced the A/B/C system. Because whole squadrons (usually from 12 Group) were switched into 11 Group got caught slaughtered as a whole, doing their lovely formation fllying and 'fighter attacks 1,2 or 3...'..

Made even better ones after Dowding and Park were kicked out and the Leigh Mallory's and Bader's could come out to play with their 'big wings' .. and get slaughtered over and over again for years, against 2 fighter groups (ref my post earlier on another thread that they could have just parachuted onto the, few, German airfields in France in 41/42 and clubbed them to death). 
Johnston was polite, but a scathing, critic of that time.
And when the Germans, under Galland no less, tried their own big wing stuff (and he should have known better) got slaughtered even faster.

Note though that Luftwaffe 'newbies' were just as hopeless, the far better trained Americans later on slaughtered the inexperienced Luftwaffe pilots just as fast as the Luftwaffe slaughtered the British ones in the BoB (and the British against the German ones).

Yes good guns help, but the first thing to do be able to do is bring the guns into the target. You could have rubbish guns with good pilots and they will kill bad pilots with better guns with ease.


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## stona (Aug 23, 2013)

Here's a translation of a document submitted by the OKM to the Fuhrer Conference of 26th July 1040. It outlines the problems associated with conjuring an invasion fleet out of thin air. The KM got 100% behind the plan, as you would expect from a professional military body, but these sorts of documents relating to everything from personnel, to fuel supplies (distillate for the boilers of the KM's destroyers was a major problem) the limited capacity of the ports and so on crop up frequently throughout the period.
Below is the first of many such documents outlining problems and what would be required to overcome them.

"1) Requisitioning the majority of inland barges and the tugs required to tow them to the conversion yards, and transporting them to the embarkation ports will bring inland shipping to a virtual halt. It is not possible to assess the exact effect upon the defence industry, food industry, retail trade and transport, but it is considered that the implications will be very serious. The Reichs Economics Ministry and the Reichs Transport Ministry support this view.

2) Material Required.
a) 30,000 tons iron and steel. This will require rolling mills to work on this project exclusively for ten days, thus postponing work for other contracts accordingly.
b) 40,000 cubic metres of lumber must be available which will have serious effects on the building sector and armaments industry.
c) Concrete. 75,000 cubic metres must be provided; negative impact on entire construction industry.

3) Shipyards
a) Inland yards: Full capacity of all inland shipyards on the Rhine and in the Netherlands/Belgium needed for at least four weeks; all repair work and new construction will have to be postponed for that time.
b) Coastal yards: a substantial portion of their capacity will be needed for the preparation of ocean going ships (coasters, transports, freighter etc); this would have priority over submarine construction. Moreover several hundred auxiliary ships and transports with degaussing systems are to be fitted out. This work will require the use of the workshops in all German dockyards for approximately four weeks, and will take priority over the submarine programme. This would mean, for example, that the work on Tirpitz would have to be postponed for four weeks.

4) The German cable industry will be heavily taxed with completeion of the approximate 1,000 sets of towing equipment, taking precedence over other production such as of mining cables, submarine nets, etc, for about three weeks. Furthermore, many workers from harbour construction projects are required, so that they must be postponed for four weeks. 

5) Transport of materials between the manufacturers and the processing plants (dockyards etc) will require a great deal of transportation, most of which is supervised by the Todt organisation. Its other work would necessarily suffer.

In order to perform this work, which will have serious implications for the armaments industry, trade, transport, and private industry in the Reich, the Netherlands and Belgium and which will lead to the postponement of top priority projects for the Navy and other armed forces, authority must be granted at the highest level for Operation Sea Lion to take precedence over other top priority programmes."

These are the facts, as expressed by the OKM, not opinion. Hitler and Jodl agreed to this demand at the conference. The KM started work immediately.

This is a strong argument that even the aborted operation must have had a significant impact on all sections of the Reich's war economy just as the armed forces were recovering from the cost of the victories in western Europe. It must also have effected preparations for the invasion of the Soviet Union, using up large resources that could have been better used elsewhere. 

Cheers

Steve


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## wiking85 (Aug 23, 2013)

OldSkeptic said:


> (ref my post earlier on another thread that they could have just parachuted onto the, few, German airfields in France in 41/42 and clubbed them to death).


There was actually a plan to do this, but it didn't quite work out in the planning stage, so it was abandoned. 5 French Commandos were parachuted into Northern France and were supposed to ambush German fighter pilots on their way to their airfields, but when it turned out they didn't arrive in one bus, making them a concentrated and very easy target, but rather individually on bikes and in cars as they got ready (and were coming from various billets), the plan wouldn't work other than to kill a handful of pilots, provoke retaliation against civilians, and result in better protection of the pilots in the future. So they abandoned the attack and dispersed, eventually making it back to England. Still, an interesting thought.


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## vinnye (Aug 23, 2013)

OldSkeptic said:


> Bungey (and others) go into this quite a lot. Studies of all air warfare show that most kills are made by a small number of pilots (in Bungey's terms the 'hunter killers'). Then you have a large group of people that can survive in the battle field, but don't contribute much, then there is the cannon fodder (the victims). Naturally newbies make up most of the cannon fodder.
> 
> Good eyesight, good shooting skills and the ability to manoeuvre the aircraft as a gun platform were the main key skills, as well as situational awareness.
> Deflection shooting skills were a real asset and it is no surprise when you look at all the aces you find nearly all of them had good shooting skills before they learned to fly.
> ...



I have to agree with a lot of what is being said here.
I have recently seen 2 documentaries which featured George Beurling. It would seem that he was a naturally gifted pilot who was top of his training class, was an exceptional marksman with incredible eyesight and instincts.
He also was not - particularly in the early days a team player or a good follower of orders etc.
He practiced scanning to make sure he would see any aircraft at maximum range, became outstanding at deflection shooting, and made alterations to the make up of his ammunition, and harmonization of his guns.
I know a lot of people say he was not a nice person, but he was sure effective in the air.


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## redcoat (Aug 23, 2013)

stona said:


> In order to perform this work, which will have serious implications for the armaments industry, trade, transport, and private industry in the Reich, the Netherlands and Belgium and which will lead to the postponement of top priority projects for the Navy and other armed forces, authority must be granted at the highest level for Operation Sea Lion to take precedence over other top priority programmes."
> 
> These are the facts, as expressed by the OKM, not opinion. Hitler and Jodl agreed to this demand at the conference. The KM started work immediately.
> 
> ...


Thanks for that. It helps disprove the theory that the invasion plans were a mere 'bluff'.


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## pinsog (Aug 23, 2013)

The Normandy invasion was tough enough with total air AND sea domination by the allies.

What would have happened if there had been no surface ship protection from the US and British fleets and a fleet the size of the Royal Navy had sailed in attacked the defenseless invasion fleet?

That is correct, the invasion would have failed, and the allies were 100 times more prepared for the invasion than the Germans would ever have been.


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## stona (Aug 24, 2013)

redcoat said:


> Thanks for that. It helps disprove the theory that the invasion plans were a mere 'bluff'.



Yes and no. There was initially an intent to mount the invasion. As I alluded to at the top of the post the problems simply kept piling up, particularly for the Navy (KM). Many senior officers simply did not believe it was possible, some thought it would be suicide. In the end it did end up being an expensive bluff. Just like poker, have your bluff called, and it was when the British failed to negotiate, and you have to pay up.

I highly recommend Peter Schenk's "Invasion of England 1940- the planning of operation sea lion" ISBN 0-85177-549-9, to anyone interested in the German side of the operation. It is the best book out there on the subject and benefits from meticulous research and also benefits from the earlier works of authors like Ansel, Klee and Wheatley on the subject.
My trusty copy has been well thumbed recently!

Cheers

Steve


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## Juha (Aug 24, 2013)

Hello Steve
yes, Schenk's book is good.

Juha


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## Barrett (Oct 26, 2017)

Excellent discussion(s) and so varied that I'll just jump around.

RAF saving Britain: I wrote an article for the BoB 75th anniversary with a long look at German abilities, since it's uncertain that Hitler intended to invade. (Obviously, his fondest goal lay in the other direction.) In the summer & early fall of 40 the Wehrmacht lacked an adequate phib capability--I cannot find evidence of any bow-ramp landing craft, let alone those capable of delivering heavy vehicles across a beach. (Recall the troop barges to be towed from France across the channel. Hooboy...) Therefore, an invasion would require securing one or preferably two large ports such as Dover, Portsmouth or Plymouth. (Southampton's too far inland.) Presumably cranes would've been needed to hoist tanks/trucks ashore, and obviously the Brits would not leave those ports intact if forced to abandon them. 

There's a widely held notion that many aces were good shooters before entering the service. It's not true. Even with the 1940s demographics of a heavily rural population, few were thoroughly familiar with firearms, let alone skilled wing shots. Joe Foss was one of the exceptions, growing up on a South Dakota farm, and Dick Bong in rural Wisconsin. But I knew a couple of hundred aces, and often asked about their firearms interests. The huge majority had little experience before enlisting. Those who did well in combat seemed to combine innate ability with ample training. McGuire comes to mind.


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## Juha2 (Oct 26, 2017)

Hello Barrett
in fact Germans had many solutions how to land heavy vehicles to beach from their barges and ferries up to Pz IIIs and IVs. In Peter Schenk's book there are several photoes and drawings on these.

Juha


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## swampyankee (Oct 26, 2017)

pinsog said:


> The Normandy invasion was tough enough with total air AND sea domination by the allies.
> 
> What would have happened if there had been no surface ship protection from the US and British fleets and a fleet the size of the Royal Navy had sailed in attacked the defenseless invasion fleet?
> 
> That is correct, the invasion would have failed, and the allies were 100 times more prepared for the invasion than the Germans would ever have been.



...total air and sea domination _and_ successful opposed landings in North Africa, Sicily, and a few spots in the Pacific (do you really think that Marine and Army planners for US forces in the Pacific didn't talk to their opposite numbers in Europe?


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## stona (Oct 27, 2017)

Juha[/QUOTE]


Juha2 said:


> Hello Barrett
> in fact Germans had many solutions how to land heavy vehicles to beach from their barges and ferries up to Pz IIIs and IVs. In Peter Schenk's book there are several photoes and drawings on these.
> 
> Juha



This is so, but not easily as we would see the Allies do a few years later.

In order to unload vehicles the barges, once tethered bow on to the beach, would have to wait for the water level to drop with the ebbing tide. The landings were supposed to be timed so that this wait would be between 15 and 45 minutes. During this time the barges and their cargoes would present a large and stationary target to any land, sea or air based defences.

The Germans did have both submersible and 'swimming' panzers. The submersibles may have got ashore, the swimmers needed almost a flat calm, not commonly found on the English Channel in September.

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Oct 27, 2017)

The Germans were fully serious in their intent to land, but their arrangements and planning were nothing short of laughable. DKM were completely sceptical of their ability to get across the channel (with or without the control of the air), and to my mind were the only one of the three services to apply serious feasibility analyses to the problem. Even without RN interference the rhine barges would have struggled to even get across the channel. With a best sea speed of 2.5 knots (some vessels could do more, but the fleet speed would have been under 3 knots). at that speed, some craft would struggle to deal with tidal currents, and with an average distance of 80--100 miles to cover, it would have taken the best part of week to make the crossing (taking into account zig zag defence and the like). Allowing 4 days of loading time from the damaged channel ports, you have your assault echelons on board for more than a week in completely unhygienic conditions, most of the soldiers would have been dead or very sick by the time the heer had been transported to the assault beaches. 

The army likened the exercise to an elaborate river crossing, while the LW were as usual intent on winning the whole battle on their own .

Perhaps one of the few men to appraise the chances realistically was hitler whose directives never specified the carrying out of the landings, rather just to prepare, suffixed by the odd term "and if necessary carry it (the invasion) out". That is not the stuff of a definite directive. That says to me that hitler doubted it was possible. compare the language used in the Sealion fuhrer directive, to the way he gave firm and un-arguable instructions for Fuhrer directive 21, the invasion of the USSR


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## swampyankee (Oct 27, 2017)

The Germans may have been fully serious about invading Britain, but the British would have been even more serious about stopping it. The RN would most certainly have repeatedly attacked the invasion force; the remnants of the RAF would have done the same.

About the only chance hitler would have for victory in WWII is an extreme right regime in the US, and such a government would still be likely to go to war with hitler’s ally, Japan


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## Juha2 (Oct 27, 2017)

This is an excellent threat on the reception side of possible German landing, and at the exact point shows a coprasion between Atlantic Wall and British preparations State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion • Axis History Forum

But the whole tread is very informative.


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## buffnut453 (Oct 27, 2017)

swampyankee said:


> About the only chance hitler would have for victory in WWII is an extreme right regime in the US, and such a government would still be likely to go to war with hitler’s ally, Japan



A more likely recipe for success would be the replacement of Churchill with a more compliant individual. Had the RAF lost air superiority over southeast England during the early phase of the Battle of Britain, it's possible that a vote of no confidence in Churchill's leadership at that early stage might have resulted in a more appeasement-focused government that was willing to make a deal with Hitler. That would give Hitler precisely what he wanted - a single-front war against the USSR. There would be no threat from the US because of the lack of operating bases near Europe and history would be very different...with no need for the German military to invade the UK (at least not in an opposed sense).


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## pbehn (Oct 27, 2017)

The build up of forces in the channel was as much political as military, hoping the threat of invasion was enough to promt a change of leader and a peace deal.

You cannot cross a channel with currents of upto 6 kts towing barges at two kts. You land when and where the sea allows you to land, and the chances of making it back to where you set off from and then coming back to land more troops and equipment are close to zero.

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## swampyankee (Oct 27, 2017)

buffnut453 said:


> A more likely recipe for success would be the replacement of Churchill with a more compliant individual. Had the RAF lost air superiority over southeast England during the early phase of the Battle of Britain, it's possible that a vote of no confidence in Churchill's leadership at that early stage might have resulted in a more appeasement-focused government that was willing to make a deal with Hitler. That would give Hitler precisely what he wanted - a single-front war against the USSR. There would be no threat from the US because of the lack of operating bases near Europe and history would be very different...with no need for the German military to invade the UK (at least not in an opposed sense).



I don't think that Hitler would have relied on a friendly British government; he would have demanded an occupation. I don't think any British government would tolerate that.

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## Shortround6 (Oct 27, 2017)

It was one thing for the Germans to rely on the French Vichy government





As Vichy France was pretty much surrounded by the Axis or friends of the Axis. Not to mention the Germans had occupied most of the industrial (but not all) areas of France. Trusting the British without an occupying force with the British sea lines of communication uncut would have been a really dumb idea.


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## swampyankee (Oct 27, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> It was one thing for the Germans to rely on the French Vichy government
> View attachment 470075
> 
> As Vichy France was pretty much surrounded by the Axis or friends of the Axis. Not to mention the Germans had occupied most of the industrial (but not all) areas of France. Trusting the British without an occupying force with the British sea lines of communication uncut would have been a really dumb idea.



Considering that the German plans after Britain had the temerity to fight back were genocidal, I don't think that anything other than a particularly vicious occupation was planned.


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## psl (Oct 27, 2017)

I'm sure the occupation would be no more than the brutal occupations through out Europe.


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## swampyankee (Oct 28, 2017)

psl said:


> I'm sure the occupation would be no more than the brutal occupations through out Europe.



Yep; murder everybody in town if they don't bow down every time a German walks by.

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## pbehn (Oct 28, 2017)

psl said:


> I'm sure the occupation would be no more than the brutal occupations through out Europe.


Well the Channel Islands were occupied during the war. It was a grim time for the Islanders which changed strangely from occupation to siege after D Day.


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## swampyankee (Oct 28, 2017)

pbehn said:


> Well the Channel Islands were occupied during the war. It was a grim time for the Islanders which changed strangely from occupation to siege after D Day.



Neglecting the rather confusing (to a USian) relationship between the government of the UK and the Channel Islands, I believe the residents of them were basically told to keep their heads down and not cause trouble (iirc, they weren't under control of Parliament, so the PM couldn't order them about). The German Army had a well-known and well-earned reputation for being more than ruthless against resistance.


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## rochie (Oct 28, 2017)

I'm sure there is the odd thread or two on here trying to prove Britain did indeed lose the Battle of Britain !


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## swampyankee (Oct 28, 2017)

rochie said:


> I'm sure there is the odd thread or two on here trying to prove Britain did indeed lose the Battle of Britain !



Probably with the ones saying the Holocaust didn't happen.

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## rochie (Oct 28, 2017)

swampyankee said:


> Probably with the ones saying the Holocaust didn't happen.


Yep thems the ones, they are next to the "Nazis were really the good guys" threads


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## stona (Oct 28, 2017)

rochie said:


> I'm sure there is the odd thread or two on here trying to prove Britain did indeed lose the Battle of Britain !



Well, you could argue that we didn't win it in a literal sense, but by not losing we won anyway...if you know what I mean 

Cheers

Steve

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## pbehn (Oct 28, 2017)

swampyankee said:


> Neglecting the rather confusing (to a USian) relationship between the government of the UK and the Channel Islands, I believe the residents of them were basically told to keep their heads down and not cause trouble (iirc, they weren't under control of Parliament, so the PM couldn't order them about). The German Army had a well-known and well-earned reputation for being more than ruthless against resistance.


I would say that less than 1% of the UK population understand the relationship between the UK and the Channel Islands, I just read about it a few months ago , two crown dependencies and a Bailiwick. While there was a threat of invasion the Germans were almost friendly for propaganda purposes. On such small islands resistance of any serious kind but also as the war went against Germany the threat of reprisals became less too.


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## rochie (Oct 28, 2017)

stona said:


> Well, you could argue that we didn't win it in a literal sense, but by not losing we won anyway...if you know what I mean
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve


I Understand and totally Agree a draw was all we needed to get through to the next round


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## parsifal (Oct 28, 2017)

I don't even buy the draw argument.

For the LW to win, it had to gain total air superiority and eliminate the RAF as a factor in the upcoming battle. they failed spectacularly to achieve that, Later they switched priorities to a sort of terror bombing campaign on a massive scale. There is debate about how close that came to success, but really I see no real evidence of a collapse in british morale. I suppose Halifax's treachery might qualify, but no more so than Hesses attempts to reach agreement with the british. The LWs initial aim of gaining control of the narrow seas around the UK was successful, but not to the extent of allowing invasion. they did succeed in closing the channel coastal traffic for a time. there were several devastating attacks on ports. Lastly the LW attacks on British industry were met with some success, but again not really lasting and not serious. Had those attacks been continued, German losses would have continued to mount to the point of unsustainability

As it was the losses to the LW in the blitz and the battle itself were sufficiently heavy to affect numbers and loss/readiness rates in the Barbarossa campaign. by July 1941, readiness rates had plummeted to under 1000 machines, in part because the supplies of spares had been allowed to dwindle, or otherwise forced to be used to recover from the frenetic pace of operations over Britain.

The so called battle of Britain did not win the war, but in every sense I can think of it was a victory for the RAF. It can gone into the battle determined to remain viable, it emerged more than viable. as a bonus it had inflicted serious and for perhaps perverse reasons, unrecoverable losses on the LW. To me they are the hallmarks of a complete victory

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## Kryten (Oct 29, 2017)

The draw argument is a nonsense.

The Luftwaffe was given the strategic tasks of writing down Fighter Command and securing air superiority for the invasion, they failed on both accounts!
BY the Battles end the RAF was actually stronger then at the start thanks to Beaverbrook's aircraft production and the improved pilot training whereas the Luftwaffe was getting weaker

The RAF's task was to remain a fighting force and defeat the German attempts to gain air superiority, they achieved both aims.

It was no draw it was an abject defeat for the Luftwaffe, a defeat Park then repeated in Malta 2 years later!

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## stona (Oct 29, 2017)

First, the objectives given to the Luftwaffe were more wide ranging and even less plausible than simply defeating the RAF and achieving air superiority for an invasion. It manifestly failed to achieve any of its objectives, and in that sense the campaign was a defeat.

If we play the numbers game, at a more tactical level, then the outcome is not so clear cut. That's the basis of the argument that the Luftwaffe was fought to a draw. You can even argue that on a fighter v fighter basis the Luftwaffe won!

Fighter Command's task was very clear. It included defending its own assets, extended to include the aircraft industry (with varying degrees of success) and the other industries and infrastructure (ports etc.) which were on the Luftwaffe's 'to do' list. Eventually the defence of London became the priority, the very thing that Fighter Command had been designed to do in the mid 1930s. In this sense the Luftwaffe's famous change of emphasis, in a last ditch attempt to force the British government to compromise, played into the hand s of the RAF. By continuing to do this it inevitably denied air superiority to the Luftwaffe.

I do agree that a vital objective was to remain a viable fighting force. It had to do that to even attempt any of the above. In the short term, as various commanders made clear, it had to survive at least until November, when any possibility of invasion was lost until the following year.


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## Kryten (Oct 29, 2017)

{stona} If we play the numbers game, at a more tactical level, then the outcome is not so clear cut. That's the basis of the argument that the Luftwaffe was fought to a draw. You can even argue that on a fighter v fighter basis the Luftwaffe won! {stona}

And this is why these arguments are worthless, the RAF was not fighting a 10 v 10 shout go battle against the Luftwaffe fighters like some video game, it was stopping the bombers, the bombers could force a political solution, the fighters could not.

When the RAF took off they were going into battle against the entire attacking force not just the 109's, the Jagdwaffe had only one target, the RAF fighters, so it's a meaningless comparison, it's a bit like claiming the Anti Aircraft guns won because they lost less, Goering was given wide ranging brief, that is true, and every task given to him failed.

Reality was the Luftwaffe was doomed to fail from the start, the RAF had the ability to draw back or disperse and still operate in the critical region but never had to, only one sector station was put out of action for more than 2 days, the RAF was building their force as the battle progressed whilst the Luftwaffe was taking casualties IT could not sustain, especially in bomber crew who were at the end of their tether by September!

You can scrabble around looking for fig leaves, but what matters is the strategic outcome, and the outcome is clear, the Luftwaffe were defeated!

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## pbehn (Oct 29, 2017)

The most surprising conclusion of the Battle of Britain that could be drawn, but wasn't at the time, was that Germany was in no way prepared for the war it had brought upon itself and everyone else. During the battle the UK overtook Germany in production of single engine fighters and would remain ahead until about 1944. Its losses in the Battle of France and the Battle of Britain in bombers and transports were never fully replaced. This is a losing situation when you are soon going to be in conflict with two other nations whos production capacity was even higher than that of the UK.

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## Stig1207 (Oct 29, 2017)

As to the numbers game, has some sort of consensus even been reached about what the aircraft losses of the two sides were?
A lot of different numbers have been put forward over time


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## parsifal (Oct 29, 2017)

short answer is no.


Many aircraft from both sides were so badly damaged they had to spend many weeks being repaired before returning to service. the LW ate into its logistic reserves so badly, in the battle and its unspoken follow on campaign over Britain (the blitz) that its readiness rates after just a few weeks in Russia plummeted. In 1942-3 they sataged a partial recovery, in 1942, readiness rates hovered around the 50% mark, whilst in 1943, there were a couple of months with readiness levels touching the 70% mark before plunging again to below 50%. These are clear weather rates, in winter, the readiness rates were generally below 25% 

Not all this crisis could be attributed to what happened in 1940-41, but what happened over Britain put the LW under strain from which it was never really given much chance to recover. It was always short of airworthy aircraft, Later it began to run short of pilots as well and later still began to run short of fuel


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## buffnut453 (Oct 29, 2017)

swampyankee said:


> I don't think that Hitler would have relied on a friendly British government; he would have demanded an occupation. I don't think any British government would tolerate that.



And Hitler may well have moved forward with occupation...but it wouldn't have required an opposed seaborne landing as per Operation Sea Lion. The requisite personnel could have been brought in piecemeal to achieve the objective over time. The most important component would not be military troops but Gestapo representatives to "encourage" the new British Government to comply with ALL Germany's demands, to include arresting dissenters and commence the rounding up of "untermensch", just as was done in Vichy France.


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## stona (Oct 29, 2017)

The figures always vary a little.

Pretty typical would be total aircraft losses, 1,023 RAF and 1,187 Luftwaffe. A score draw in the numbers game.

Fighters, well, almost all the RAF losses were fighters for obvious reasons, the Luftwaffe lost a combined total for Bf 109s and Bf 110s of 873, which is why you can argue that fighter for fighter they did better. 
Of course the Luftwaffe was targeting RAF fighters whereas the RAF was targeting any Luftwaffe aircraft, but the bombers were supposed to be the primary target.

The biggest deficit for the Luftwaffe is in airmen* killed*, 2,662 against 'just' 537. 

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Oct 29, 2017)

It was not the germans who rounded up the jews in Vichy, it was the Vichy, who then handed them over to the germans. It was within the power of the Vichy to resist this, at least for a while, but by then rmp regime was being run by members of the wacko right who supported many of the racial laws the germans had enacted. They did not need a lot of encouragement by the germans to get on board


in comparison the danes either passively, or overtly resisted, the German attempts to round up the 7500 Jews sheltering in Denmark. Unlike the French police, Danish police never collaborated to do the germans dirty work. Hardly any Danish Jews were killed. I would like to think an occupied britain would act more like Denmark than the corrupt and broken Vichy regime

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## parsifal (Oct 29, 2017)

the problem with steves figures is that they are more or less the immediate, losses. there are other losses arising from the aircraft damaged, and eventually scrapped that push the figures of both sides up considerably.

For the LW, some of the airframes that had suffered this sort of damage were not scrapped for months, thus artificially inflating the numbers of aircraft available. I expect the british played similar games but the british were given the opportunity to recover, whilst the bulk of the LW were not.


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## parsifal (Oct 29, 2017)

This is one summary I found on LW losses which shows their losses to be considerably higher than 1200. They suffered about 1200 from enemy action, but other immediate losses (operational and non operational, which are still immediate write offs) is over 2000. A further 953 were damaged. Any aircraft with over 50% damage will almost certainly be scrapped, whilst aircraft with below 30% damage aren't included in LW quartermaster reports from which these figures were drawn. I don't know for sure the exact numbers of damaged aircraft damaged that ended up being written off, but one can expect the figure to be at least 60% of the damaged aircraft.

German losses from all causes are in the order of 2600 a/c. British losses too greatly exceed the 1000 mark though I don't have a nice ready to post list for the british. I'm not trying to say british losses were significantly less than the germans. I'm saying both sides lost far more aircraft than the usual published lists

This list comes from

Luftwaffe Losses in the Battle of Britain (July-October 1940)

which in turn is derived from the "Narrow margin"


These loss numbers cover July to the end of October. November through to March are not included


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## pbehn (Oct 29, 2017)

stona said:


> The figures always vary a little.
> 
> Pretty typical would be total aircraft losses, 1,023 RAF and 1,187 Luftwaffe. A score draw in the numbers game.
> 
> ...


The numbers were actually closer because generally losses by Bomber Command are not included, although with raids such as ports with invasion barges are obviously part of the same battle.


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## buffnut453 (Oct 29, 2017)

parsifal said:


> It was not the germans who rounded up the jews in Vichy, it was the Vichy, who then handed them over to the germans. It was within the power of the Vichy to resist this, at least for a while, but by then rmp regime was being run by members of the wacko right who supported many of the racial laws the germans had enacted. They did not need a lot of encouragement by the germans to get on board
> 
> 
> in comparison the danes either passively, or overtly resisted, the German attempts to round up the 7500 Jews sheltering in Denmark. Unlike the French police, Danish police never collaborated to do the germans dirty work. Hardly any Danish Jews were killed. I would like to think an occupied britain would act more like Denmark than the corrupt and broken Vichy regime



I suspect you're right...but my main point is that there were other ways to achieve Hitler's objectives without trying to force an opposed landing across the Channel. The key problem lies with Hitler's inability to follow Clausewitzian theory about selecting and maintaining a single objective.

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## pbehn (Oct 29, 2017)

parsifal said:


> German losses from all causes are in the order of 2600 a/c. British losses too greatly exceed the 1000 mark though I don't have a nice ready to post list for the british. I'm not trying to say british losses were significantly less than the germans. I'm saying both sides lost far more aircraft than the usual published lists
> 
> ]


How much the figures matter depends on how many new aircraft are being made and damaged aircraft returned to service. By the time the height of the battle arrived the RAFs only concern was for pilots, They were producing fighters faster than they were losing them and certainly faster than the RAF could find / train experienced pilots.


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## parsifal (Oct 29, 2017)

The damaged aircraft, and aircraft requiring overhaul within the LW mattered to the LW, far moreso than the equivalent damaged airframes in the RAF. unlike the RAF, they (the LW) were never really given the chance to recover. I'm not saying they didn't repair damaged aircraft. they did, and the LW crossed into Russia with the best part of 2600 a/c on hand. However they lacked the spares to keep readiness rates up, and this can be traced to the over-use the LW had been subjected to the previous year. not just their experiences over Britain, but the fighting over britain dragged on for months and robbed the LW any real rest period before their next big fight in the east.

As far as pilots are concerned, in the immediate battle, pilot losses were critical, especially for the RAF, but the british in a long drawn out fight were going to win a battle of attrition over their own territory, although at great cost. The battle did not end in October, it was still being fought until the following May, with daylight raids continuing right until the end. but with the defeat of the "big pushes" of August and september, the LW was forced into a corner from which it could not win.


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## pbehn (Oct 29, 2017)

It is hardly surprising that the LW serviceability rates dropped quickly. They were in France and Belgium on mainly newly constructed airfields, their factories were in Germany. The ground crews may have had most tools but few hangars with cranes. Also they had many different planes to supply Me 109 and 110, Ju 87 and 88 Heikel 111 and Do17.

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## Stig1207 (Oct 29, 2017)

parsifal said:


> whilst aircraft with below 30% damage aren't included in LW quartermaster reports from which these figures were drawn.



It's damage below 10% that was not included. 

What is remarkable, to me, at any rate, is why a similar breakdown of RAF losses is not available.


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## stona (Oct 29, 2017)

As far as the British were concerned the BoB ended on 31st October 1940. All the British statistics for what they saw as a battle respect this date. It didn't begin until 10th July. The British see the overlapping but ongoing Blitz, and the preceding Channel battles as separate entities.

The Germans took a rather different view, not distinguishing between the early attempts to close the Channel, the Blitz and the RAF's lean into France in 1941. For them it was just one long campaign.

Since the BoB is an entirely British construct it lasted for the dates that they chose for it, 10th July to 31st October 1940.

Cheers

Steve

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## stona (Oct 30, 2017)

Stig1207 said:


> It's damage below 10% that was not included.
> 
> What is remarkable, to me, at any rate, is why a similar breakdown of RAF losses is not available.



The RAF did have a five tier classification of damage to aircraft, from A to E.

A Damage repairable on unit by squadron personnel.
B Damage repairable on unit by Station workshop personnel.
C Damage repairable on unit by RAF specialist team or Manufacturer's personnel, or at a Maintenance Unit.
D Damage repairable at manufacturer's works only
E Damaged beyond economical repair.

It would be a huge job to even attempt to go through the records of every damaged aircraft, but it could be done. If it has been I've never seen it published.

There is a good chance that category A and B damage would be repaired and the aircraft returned to service overnight. Given the strength of the civilian repair organisation the same_ might _apply to some category C damaged aircraft.

This was definitely one area of the BoB in which the British had and maintained a decisive advantage. 

Cheers

Steve


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## Stig1207 (Oct 30, 2017)

Thanks Steve, but what I meant was rather a breakdown of RAF losses similar to the LW, in operational losses with and without enemy action and in non-operational losses. Sorry, I should been clearer.


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## stona (Oct 30, 2017)

That could be done by going through something like 'The Battle of Britain Then and Now', day by day and collating all the information.

I'm not sure I'd fancy it!

Cheers

Steve

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## pbehn (Oct 30, 2017)

stona said:


> That could be done by going through something like 'The Battle of Britain Then and Now', day by day and collating all the information.
> 
> I'm not sure I'd fancy it!
> 
> ...


There was a similar discussion on here a while ago. The issue is one where each answer raises at least one more question. Battle damage on a Spitfire and Hurricane were different issues, generally the Hurricane was easier to repair in the field. Once planes are sent to a centre to repair then some get cannibalised with (for example) undamaged wings on one being fitted to an undamaged fuselage. The organisation of repair facilities changed and improved throughout the battle as did new production.


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## Stig1207 (Oct 30, 2017)

stona said:


> That could be done by going through something like 'The Battle of Britain Then and Now', day by day and collating all the information.
> 
> I'm not sure I'd fancy it!
> 
> ...



I would fancy someone else doing it


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## stona (Oct 30, 2017)

Battle of Britain day, 15th September. Fighter Command losses.

25 aircraft destroyed by enemy action, 2 aircraft written off (Cat E), 27 aircraft damaged but repairable (Cat A-D, not specified)

1 aircraft destroyed not on operations, 1 aircraft written off in non-operational accident (Cat E).

Figures may vary slightly in different sources. This could be done for every day for the entire Battle, but not by me!

Cheers

Steve


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## fastmongrel (Oct 30, 2017)

stona said:


> That could be done by going through something like 'The Battle of Britain Then and Now', day by day and collating all the information.
> 
> I'm not sure I'd fancy it!
> 
> ...



I started going through The Battle of France day by day recently trying to parse out the effort the French air force put into the battle. I was off sick in bed and bored with daytime telly, after 2 days I was up to May the 18th I had a pile of notes and the start of a spreadsheet but I had lost the will to live. Then the Cat knocked the notes off the bed and I realised Doctors was about to start on telly.

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## Stig1207 (Oct 30, 2017)

A daunting task for sure; not one I'd throw myself at either, even if I was fortunate enough to have BoBTN.


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## Civettone (Oct 30, 2017)

I find the comparison in sorties fascinating. Luftwaffe crew flew on average one sortie a day, sometimes more sometimes less. The RAF fighter pilots often took off for several sorties a day. 

Why was this?

I can only come up with one reason and that is that the logistics and the maintenance infrastructure of the Luftwaffe failed to get serviceability high enough to allow for more missions. 

Of course pushing the Luftwaffe air crew to more missions will lead to more fatigue and more losses. But the pressure on the RAF would have increased as well.

Kris


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## parsifal (Oct 30, 2017)

In Russia, the relatively high sortie rate definitely affected readiness rates. I know that is counterintuitive, and apparently contradictory, but it is what it is. Sortie rates did not remain constant. Sometimes, usually at the start of a campaign after a short period of rest and refit, the germans could mount high sortie rates, but as serviceability rates dropped as the push progressed, so too did the sortie rates (as a measure of the total airframes available).

Quoting sortie rates is also subject to the vagaries of the supporting logistics. If an aircraft is unfit to fly, and then removed from the active lists as it is sent back to rear area workshops for overhaul or repair, your sortie rate relative to the unit itself remains high, but the sortie rate relative to the total airframes available will drop. The LW in Russia tended to send back to the rear (sometimes even back to germany) aircraft in unflyable condition. These rebuilds are actually removed from the active lists as they were rebuilt, though the LW was not above including them in reports intended to be presented to hitler. 

The point is, knowing the true sortie rate of the Lw is more difficult than it seems. For operations over SE Britain in the summer and autumn of 1940, I don't have a lot of hard data, which doesn't help.


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## pbehn (Oct 30, 2017)

Civettone said:


> I find the comparison in sorties fascinating. Luftwaffe crew flew on average one sortie a day, sometimes more sometimes less. The RAF fighter pilots often took off for several sorties a day.
> 
> Why was this?
> 
> ...


When planning a mission you have to know how many aircraft you have available. If you send huge numbers of aircraft out in the morning you do not now how many will be available for operations in the afternoon. The LW were crossing the Channel and so their missions lasted longer. Park controlled operations over south east England, He frequently mobilised squadrons to cover many possibilities. When a bomber group was forming up behind Calais Dunkerque and into Belgium it is not obvious whether they will attack across the Channel or loop round and attack London up the Thames estuary. Pilots records and recollections do not dwell long on missions they were sent up and returned without seeing the enemy or firing their guns.


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## parsifal (Oct 30, 2017)

Up until 18 august, the german sortie rate sat somewhere below 1000 per day, give or take. After 18 august, the weather improved and with it the sortie rate for the LW. The average of 1,000 sorties per day was cracked 18 august and continued to be exceeded through to 6 September, with peaks of over 1,600 sorties on 30 and 31 August. This period saw the Luftwaffe continue the policy first seen on 18 August of attacking RAF bases further inland, and was the period in which the Germans came closest to victory. Correlating to this concentration on the sector fields was a decrease in RAF sortie rates, as might be expected. I haven’t found a precise number on RAF sortie rates in this period, but some sources vaguely suggest an average of about 600 per day If correct, the RAF was turning aircraft around more effieintly than the LW given the much smaller size of FC.

In the earlier phase of the battle Tangmere was the only one of the crucial Sector Stations to be in a vulnerable position close to the coast, but the new deep penetration tactics used after 18 August saw the network of stations around London come under attack. The success of this phase of the German attack was partly accidental, in that they didn't know of the existence of the vital sector control rooms. If the control rooms had not been built at major fighter stations then this stage of the battle would have been rather less dangerous for the RAF, although the fighter stations and squadrons would still have come under severe pressure.

Although the first attack on the inland stations came on 18 August, a return of the bad weather prevented the Germans from returning in force until 24 August. This marked a period in which the Germans flew an average of 1,000 sorties per day, peaking at over 1,600 sorties on 30 and 31 August and lasting until 6 September. The gap saw two significant events. The first was a conference at Goering's palatial home at Karinhall on 19 August in which he repeated that the RAF was the Luftwaffe's main target. Enemy fighters were the first target, either in the air or on the ground, followed by the aircraft industry and the ground organisation of the bomber forces.

The second came on 20 August, when Churchill paid his famous tribute to the men of Fighter Command, remembered many for the line 'never in the field of Human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few'. What does still surprise is how early in the battle this speech was made - on 20 August the hardest part of the battle still laid in the future. 

A key feature of this period of the battle was the repeated heavy attacks on the sector stations. North Weald was hit on 24 August, Biggin Hill twice on 30 August, Debden, Croydon, Biggin Hill and Hornchurch twice on 31 August. Biggin Hill was worst hit and the vital control room was knocked out of action. The staff moved to an emergency control room in an estate office in a nearby village, but this could only handle one of the three squadrons based at the airfield, so the remaining two were controlled from other sectors. 31 August also saw Fighter Command suffer its heaviest losses of the battle, with 38 aircraft shot down. The benefits of the RAF's 'home advantage' can be seen very clearly on this day. Of the 38 pilots shot nine were killed. Others will have been wounded and put out of action, but many were able to return almost immediately to the battle. In contrast very few of the crews of the 39 German aircraft lost on the same day will have escaped to fight again.

September started as August had ended. On 1 September Biggin Hill was hit for the sixth time in three days. Most of the buildings were now unsafe and most work had to take place outside, but the station somehow managed to keep working (largely due to the bravery of the WAAFs). Hornchurch was attacked on 2 September, North Weald on 3 September and Biggin Hill on 5 September. The aircraft industry also suffered. Vickers at Weybridge was hit on 4 September, Hawker on 6 September. The attacks also began to creep closer to London. On 5 September the oil farm at Thameshaven was hit and set on fire. The Germans returned on 6 September, and again during the raid on London on 7 September.

During 18 August 1940, Luftwaffe units flew a total of 970 sorties over Britain: some 495 by medium bombers, 460 by fighters and 15 by reconnaissance units. Of this total, about 170 of the bomber sorties were flown on the night of 17/18 August; the remainder were flown during the daylight hours on 18 August. Less than half of the available (or serviceable) aircraft on the _Luftflotte 2_ and _Luftflotte 3 _OBs were involved in the action that day, so it was clear that the Luftwaffe was not greatly extended in providing forces for the offensive. LF 5 did not take any part in the fighting, although its reconnaissance aircraft were active over Nthn England and Scotland

Altogether, the Luftwaffe lost between 69 and 71 aircraft destroyed or damaged beyond repair as a result of its operations over Britain on 18 August 1940. Of this total, 59 were lost to certain or probable action by fighters while two fell to ground fire, four to a combination of both and one collided with a British training aircraft. The remaining three crashed in German-held territory owing to technical failures. Altogether, the losses represented seven per cent of the force committed. Around 29 aircraft crashed in England. Personnel losses were 94 German crews killed, 40 captured and 25 returned with wounds. Some 27 to 31 German aircraft returned with damage.

The gross underestimation of Fighter Command's strength issued to Luftwaffe units meant the British reaction was much stronger than expected. During the 24-hour period, Fighter Command flew 927 sorties, slightly fewer than the Germans. Only 41 of these sorties were flown by night, 28 on 17/18 August and 13 on 18/19 August. The remaining 886 sorties were flown by day, a number almost exactly equal to the 861 serviceable Spitfire, Hurricane, Defiant and Gladiator day fighters available to squadrons.[6]

However, the average operational sortie rate of one per serviceable fighter was not spread evenly throughout the command, however. Nos 12 and 13 Groups in the Midlands and north of Britain, with a third of the serviceable fighters between them, put up 129 (or only 15 per cent) of the day sorties, and of these only three made contact with the enemy. No. 11 Group put up one-third of the serviceable fighters in 600 sorties, or more than two-thirds of the total; on average. Each of the serviceable Spitfires and Hurricanes flew 1.7 operational sorties. No. 43 squadron flew the most sorties: 63 operations including five each from the 13 serviceable at the beginning of the day.

Only 403 (45 percent) of the total number of sorties flown by Fighter Command were directed at the three major German raids. A further 56 (or just over 6 per cent) were standing patrols to protect shipping off the coast. Most of the remaining 427 sorties (nearly 50 per cent) were made to engage the reconnaissance aircraft. Usually several half-squadrons were committed. This was not excessive. But by sending more units to counter the flights, German aircraft were forced to fly higher and were denied the opportunity to drop to low altitude to take higher resolution photographs. This contributed to a lack of German intelligence which often failed to distinguish fighter, bomber and naval airfields from each other. Much of the time their strength was directed at non-fighter airfields on this date.

Of the 403 sorties put up by Fighter Command to meet the major German attacks, 320 of those made contact with the enemy, meaning 80 percent of the fighters sent to intercept the bombers did so. The percentage would have been higher, had the bombers on the afternoon raid not turned around short of their targets.

Between 27 and 34 RAF fighters were destroyed. One source of the battle indicated the figure to be 31 destroyed or beyond repair. Of these, 25 fell to German fighters, two to return fire from the bombers. One was shot down by British ground fire in error and the loss of the remainder cannot be established. Some 26 of the fighters lost were Hurricanes, and five were Spitfires. Personnel losses for the RAF amounted to 10 British fighter pilots killed on the day, and another who died of wounds. Around 19 pilots were wounded, 11 so seriously that they did not take part in the rest of the battle.[5]

Losses on the ground amounted to eight fighters (two Spitfires). Around 28 aircraft of other types were destroyed on the ground. The total destroyed or damaged beyond repair amounted to 68 aircraft, although 17 of these were trainers or non-operational types.

Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of this period of the battle was the slow but steady decrease in the quality of the British fighter pilots. As more experienced pilots were killed or wounded they had to be replaced with novices, many of whom would later become equally experienced, but that was in the future. The experienced squadrons were also becoming worn down, and under the Dowding system they were thus moved away from the battle and replaced with fresh squadrons. Unfortunately the intense nature of the battle in late August and early September meant that this policy failed. The inexperienced squadrons suffered much heavier losses than the tired units they were replacing, and in some cases had to be withdrawn themselves. But the system of squadron rotation meant at least that sortie rates would necessarily drop for the RAF as some of its units entered a rest period

On 8 September Dowding replaced the rotation system with a new 'Stabilization Scheme' (presumably because it was designed to stabilise the experienced squadrons). Fighter Command's squadrons were split into three categories. 'A' class categories were to be manned entirely with fully trained pilots and were to be used in No.11 Group and in the Middle Wallop and Duxford sectors of the neighbouring groups. Five 'B' class squadrons in No.10 and No.12 Groups were also to be kept up to strength and were to be used if an entire 'A' class squadron needed to be rested. The remaining squadrons, in every other group, became 'C' class squadrons. These had a core of five or six experienced pilots and were used to give new pilots enough experience to allow them to be moved to 'A' or 'B' class squadrons. At about the same time the number of pilots in each squadron was reduced from 26 to 16 - a move that in the short term allowed more squadrons to operate at full strength but at the price of eliminating each squadron's reserves, forcing just about every pilot to fly on every mission.

This period also saw an alarming trend in the number of fighters available to replace losses - the weeks ending 31 August and 7 September were the only two in the entire battle in which Spitfire and Hurricane losses greatly outnumbered the weekly output of new or repaired aircraft. Three more weeks at the same rate and Fighter Command might had run out of fighters, assuming it had enough pilots left.

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## pbehn (Nov 1, 2017)

parsifal said:


> This period also saw an alarming trend in the number of fighters available to replace losses - the weeks ending 31 August and 7 September were the only two in the entire battle in which Spitfire and Hurricane losses greatly outnumbered the weekly output of new or repaired aircraft. Three more weeks at the same rate and Fighter Command might had run out of fighters, assuming it had enough pilots left.


A long post and a great read Parsifal. I am sure the trend you noted was alarming, but up to that point production and repair had exceeded losses. On the other side of the Channel the situation was actually much worse. The RAF were struggling to replace the numbers of fighters but the LW were not replacing their bombers and twin engine fighters in any significant way. The switch to mass raids on London was caused by a mix of
1 Ideology :- revenge for bombs on Berlin. 
2.Strategy:- believing the RAF was weak and knockout blow was possible and maybe force a victory. 
3. Pragmatism:- The bomber and fighter units of the LW had lost so many aeroplanes and pilots/crews from each of their squadrons that they ceased to be effective and increasingly could not be used as they had been. When squadrons were down to 3 or 4 serviceable crews/aircraft they had to be consolidated to attack. The only practical way to do this was to issue an order with basic instructions on timing, form up location (behind Calais) and target (London).

The Battle of Britain was a battle of attrition as many are. While Churchill, Dowding and Park worried about the state of their forces as the battle reached its peak, Goering was quite certain that the RAF was down to its last 50 fighters and it was time to deliver the knockout blow.

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## Civettone (Nov 5, 2017)

Indeed. It was quite simple really. The Luftwaffe was logistically unable to fight a battle of attrition, while the RAF was. The only thing the RAF could not keep up was the supply of pilots. They were cutting short the training of recruits, something which they only managed to restore by the middle of the war. Interestingly enough, at the same time the RAF and USAAF were raising the standard of their new pilots, the Luftwaffe reduced theirs and paid the ultimate price in 1944. One could argue that they learned the wrong lesson from the RAF of 1940.

Kris


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## Hop (Nov 9, 2017)

Stig1207 said:


> Thanks Steve, but what I meant was rather a breakdown of RAF losses similar to the LW, in operational losses with and without enemy action and in non-operational losses. Sorry, I should been clearer.



There are RAF breakdowns of losses available. For example, The Narrow Margin has figures for August and September:

Spitfires and Hurricanes
Accident - 66
Enemy action on ground - 23
In action - 696

I'm not sure how comparable the figures are, though. The RAF's figure show less than 9% of losses to accidents, whereas the figures for the Luftwaffe, also August and September only:

Bf 109 and Bf 110
Due to enemy action - 559
Not due to enemy action - 75
On non operational flights - 44

That's double the percentage of the RAF losses to accidents. And Luftwaffe bombers seem to have been even more accident prone:

Level bombers
Due to enemy action - 348
Not due to enemy action - 110
On non operational flights - 50

That makes roughly a third of bomber losses accidents, during the height of the battle. I've looked at the figures before and the day bombers had a much, much higher accident rate than the night bombers, which doesn't really make sense.

The obvious problem is that air forces wouldn't know what caused many losses. They'd just know that aircraft failed to return. How they classified those losses would depend on the air force, and possibly even the individual units involved.

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## Hop (Nov 9, 2017)

On sortie rates, from Eagle in Flames by Hooton:

Luftwaffe sorties:

Aug 5-11 2,700
Aug 12-18 5,875
Aug 19-25 3,150
Aug 26-1 6,625
Sep 2-8 6,075
Sep 9-15 3,650
Sep 16-22 3,100
Sep 23-29 3,400

The three peak weeks for Luftwaffe fighter sorties were

Aug 12-18 3,825
Aug 26-1 4,700
Sep 2-8 4,050

Those were the only weeks where Luftwaffe fighter sorties exceeded 2,000.

RAF fighter sorties for those 3 weeks:

4,800
5,000
4,950.

RAF fighter sorties were over 3,000 a week from the second week of July until the last week of September.

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## psl (Nov 9, 2017)

how long did each RAF sortie remain in the air?


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## pbehn (Nov 9, 2017)

psl said:


> how long did each RAF sortie remain in the air?


Between take off and landing.

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## buffnut453 (Nov 9, 2017)

Ba-dum-dum! 

In reality, the distances involved probably had much to do with the differing sortie rates. It takes time to build an airborne formation and then transit from Europe to Britain. By comparison, the RAF was able to keep most assets on the ground and only scramble them when needed. By their very nature, the RAF sorties would be of far shorter duration than those carried out by the Luftwaffe.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 9, 2017)

Love seeing older members coming back.

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## Koopernic (Nov 10, 2017)

pbehn said:


> When planning a mission you have to know how many aircraft you have available. If you send huge numbers of aircraft out in the morning you do not now how many will be available for operations in the afternoon. The LW were crossing the Channel and so their missions lasted longer. Park controlled operations over south east England, He frequently mobilised squadrons to cover many possibilities. When a bomber group was forming up behind Calais Dunkerque and into Belgium it is not obvious whether they will attack across the Channel or loop round and attack London up the Thames estuary. Pilots records and recollections do not dwell long on missions they were sent up and returned without seeing the enemy or firing their guns.



In essence you are saying that Luftwaffe sorties over Britain were far more likely to see action whereas RAF sorties were often precautionary. That makes sense since the Luftwaffe fighter pilot is much more likely to be fatigued and his machine in need of arming and servicing.


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## pbehn (Nov 10, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> In essence you are saying that Luftwaffe sorties over Britain were far more likely to see action whereas RAF sorties were often precautionary. That makes sense since the Luftwaffe fighter pilot is much more likely to be fatigued and his machine in need of arming and servicing.


That is the historical fact Koopernic, there were very very few LW raids on the UK that were not met by the RAF in some way. To ensure all or most possibilities of a LW formation changing direction there were a lot of RAF sorties that were sent up "just in case" and didn't see action.


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## pbehn (Nov 10, 2017)

psl said:


> how long did each RAF sortie remain in the air?


Seriously, some RAF sorties were planes scrambled as the airfield was being bombed, others were standing patrols over the south coast while some by twin engine fighters involved chasing aircraft inland across the Midlands. The Chain Home RADAR only looked out so once a raid crossed the coast it was tracked by the observer corps, this was obviously not so good or as quick.


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## Stig1207 (Nov 10, 2017)

Thanks Hop, for the breakdown of RAF losses, and the more detailed the numbers crunching becomes, the more questions to ponder! 

As to the operational losses without accident being comparatively higher for than the Luftwaffe, I see your point; however, the RAF accident rate seems surprisingly _low _considering the scale and hectic activity of the operations.

It does certainly seem counter intuitive that the LW bomber operational losses without enemy action are so relatively high, but in October it's worse; where they _exceed _the losses due to enemy action, 78 and 64 respectively. This is of cause at the time the shift form day to mainly nighttime operations occurred. The twist here is that according to Foreman, FC claims for bombers also fell dramatically; a quick count gives 40 destroyed, so less than the LW's reported losses to enemy action.


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## Civettone (Nov 10, 2017)

It seems to me that the reason for the high German losses in non-combat are due to a lack of maintenance and spare parts ...


Kris


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## stona (Nov 11, 2017)

Civettone said:


> It seems to me that the reason for the high German losses in non-combat are due to a lack of maintenance and spare parts ...
> 
> 
> Kris



They were operating much further from their home bases and support infrastructure. Luftwaffe logistics were 'strained' to put it politely.

Many an aircraft would have been grounded for want of a part which should have been readily available with better management and planning.

Cheers

Steve


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## pbehn (Nov 11, 2017)

Could these accidental losses be a way of including cannibalised aircraft in the loss reports?


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## Civettone (Nov 12, 2017)

pbehn said:


> Could these accidental losses be a way of including cannibalised aircraft in the loss reports?


 Interesting idea. I doubt the Germans would do that. I guess they would cannibalise aircraft but would not write them off but put them up for repair.

Kris


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## pbehn (Nov 12, 2017)

Civettone said:


> Interesting idea. I doubt the Germans would do that. I guess they would cannibalise aircraft but would not write them off but put them up for repair.
> 
> Kris


I was just thinking of for example a plane with a damaged undercarriage but no spares to repair. engines used to replace others damaged, then instruments and cockpit panels. Pretty soon you have a hulk of an airframe that is very difficult to move and no one knows much about. Some models like the Do 17 and Ju** were being replaced by more up to date models which would hardly be worth the time restoring.


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## stona (Nov 12, 2017)

It would be reasonable to cannabalise an aircraft that was already U/S for parts, but that wouldn't show up as a loss, unless it was already damaged enough (maybe in a bad landing or collision on the ground) to qualify.
Cheers
Steve


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## parsifal (Nov 13, 2017)

The Germans were slow to write off airframes obviously never going to fly again. it usually could take weeks for the final decision to be made, some aircraft damaged in October were not finally removed from the available lists until March or april the following year

I'm less certain of the RAF processing times for damaged aircraft to be written off

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## Graeme (Nov 16, 2017)

Another new "booklet" publication available from newsagents and there's a few pages devoted to the thread title by Stephen Badsey.

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## Glider (Nov 16, 2017)

Graeme said:


> Another new "booklet" publication available from newsagents and there's a few pages devoted to the thread title by Stephen Badsey.
> 
> View attachment 472362
> 
> ...


Totally agree


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## Freebird (Nov 22, 2017)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Love seeing older members coming back.


Hey! Which "old" members are you referring to? 




DogFather said:


> Anyway, is the RN being able to prevent invasion, even without the RAF accurate? Would the Luftwaffe, be able to sink or eliminate RN ships
> trying to stop an invasion?



Hint - how successful was the LW at sinking British battleships, in the numerous instances where they were attacked?



OldSkeptic said:


> Oh yes the RN would have done it, but the losses might have meant the Battle of the Atlantic might have been lost later.



The ships needed to defeat the U-Boats were corvettes, sloops and frigates, which wouldn't be used in the channel



Dogwalker said:


> The Operations Harpoon, Vigorous and Pedestal are good examples to what could happen if the RN had to operate in places where it didn't had the air superiority (and in those cases it didn't had only for a part of the run). The conditions in a English Channel were the RAF had lost the BoB are likely to be worse. I do not think RN could sustain that sort of attrition for long time.



The ships mentioned as sunk in these operations were freighters, not warships

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## Shortround6 (Nov 22, 2017)

The Germans had a lot more practice, both training and combat in the Med in 1941-42 than they had in 1940.


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## pbehn (Nov 22, 2017)

When using towed barges, anything can sink them even a large tug. The LW would not only have to sink virtually every sea going vessel in the UK but also sink them with their first attempt. A light cruiser could devastate any landing area let alone a battleship.


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## fastmongrel (Nov 22, 2017)

An Inshore Trawler with a Pom Pom gun could make a mess of a Rhine barge

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## Airframes (Nov 22, 2017)

The swell and tides in the Channel could make a mess of a Rhine barge !


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## parsifal (Nov 23, 2017)

RN preparations to repel the German cross channel attack are generally not commented upon, I suspect because most of the armchair generals pedalling the idea of a successful cross channel invasion don’t want to bring out just what an impossible task DKM was facing.

The RN had between Plymouth & Harwich ( i.e., less than 8 hours sailing time from Dover) 1 Battleship, 1 Town Class Cruiser, 4 Light Cruisers, and 44 Destroyers. Not included in these figures are a further 13 French, Dutch, & Polish Destroyers and Torpedo Boats also in the same area, operating under RN direction. There were also about 450 armed auxiliary vessels (gunboats & armed trawlers etc) also available, armed with weapons of 4in caliber or greater. There were about 30 MTBs and roughly twice that many MGBs and Fairmile type MLs. In total, the RN would have access to about 1000 surface combatants within 8 hours steaming of the invasion beaches. You can basically double that number if the entire british isles is included 9with a maximum 2-3 days steaming time). Many of the vessels were attached to western approaches command, but many others of the escort type vessels were not suitable for open ocean work. They had been raised 1939 basically to drive the U-boats away from the vulnerable coastal regions of the UK and were being employed in this capacity at the time of seelowe.

The northern diversion by larger units of the German Navy was actually Operation Herbstreise, and was part of the 'real' German plan. The only three operational German light cruisers ( Koln, Nurnberg, and the old training cruiser Emden ) were intended to escort a number of liners, including Europa, Bremen, Gneisenau & Potsdam, together with 11 smaller vessels, towards the east coast between Newcastle & Aberdeen to suggest that landing were imminent there. At the same time Hipper, assuming that her faulty engines did not let her down, was to operate near Iceland. These dispositions were intended to distract the Home Fleet from opposing the real landings. However, as the Admiralty never intended to send the Home Fleet south anyway, the relevance to Sealion would have been nil. Having said that, if the diversion force was intercepted by the Home Fleet, and this was a distinct possibility as the ships needed to ensure that the British spotted them, then DKM could well have lost its few remaining operational larger ships, as well as some prestigious liners.

Some Pro-german sources have suggested that HOOD and ARGUS would be rushed south as part of the Sealion reaction. The idea that the 'thin skinned Hood' & Argus would have been sunk by the Luftwaffe is also very far fetched. The Admiralty had no reason to commit ARGUS, and HOD, whilst thin-skinned vis-a-vis other capital ships, was certainly well enough armoured to resist the kind of bombs available to the Luftwaffe in 1940. In fact, in the whole of the war, the largest RN warship sunk by the Luftwaffe was a CL

There was some planning in DKM to use super heavy artillery based on the French occupied territories to seal off the channel in some way. I find the idea that coastal batteries would have sunk or badly damaged one or two battleships or an unknown number of other ships as frankly absurd. The coastal batteries were quite amazingly ineffective. As examples, on 29 September 1940 the monitor EREBUS bombarded Calais. Whilst withdrawing at her maximum speed (8 knots!) she was fired at by the vaunted coastal guns, but unhurt. On 11/12 October, 1940, the BB REVENGE, together with the 5th Destroyer flotilla, shelled barge concentrations at Cherbourg, She was fired at for some time by the guns behind Cherbourg as she returned to port, but again was not hit. Hitler ordered that the coastal batteries 'must dominate & protect the entire coastal front area' but saying a thing doesn't make it so!

DKM warships amassed for the invasion ran to the following: 

In the summer of 1940 the only major surface units available to DKM were CA HIPPER, CLs KOLN and NURNBERG and EMDEN, and these were all assigned tasks with the diversionary forces.

For the invasion DKM had 7 full DDs and 12 largish TBs, 21 S bootes, 5 R Boote flotillas (roughly 30 boats) and 7 M Boote squadrons (about 28 boats). Most of the MSWs were of the large and capable M class type weighing in at about 650 tons . & sperrbrechen were assigned to the escort group for the invasion. DKM had available about 35 vorpostenbootes essentially armed trawlers 

In terms of sheer numbers, the RN has the advantage hands down. The 100 or so escorts available to DKM would be met by up to 1000 RN coastal vessels. Probably the sheer numbers of vessels involved might initially prevent the RN from getting to the 2400 invasion barges assigned, but with that many ships attacking the invasion fleet, it would only be a matter of time before the RN was tearing into the barge groups. The 1974 wargame of Seelowe carried out at Sandhurst by German and British veterans was never able to successfully get the invasion forces across the channel, so in the finish it was agreed simply to land the German forces 9disregarding the naval battle to see what might have happened anyway. 

Certainly the Germans assembled 2400 barges, but even the powered ones were incapable of making the crossing unaided. The barges were to be towed in pairs, which would have been fine had the Germans been able to provide sufficient tugs, but with only around 550 or so, they were already desperately short, before inevitable losses are even considered.

Finally, an invasion in Mid-October. As 11 days were required simply to get the first wave ashore, it would have been a brave, or foolhardy, German meterologist who would confidently assure his fuhrer that the weather in the Channel in October & November would remain calm enough for invasion purposes. In any case, the loss of so many barges from the inland waterways had seriously disrupted the German economy, and the need to release some, at least, had become acute.

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## swampyankee (Nov 23, 2017)

Some portion of the armchair generals probably think the nazi stormtroopers could just walk and drive their tanks across the Channel.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 23, 2017)

As usual a well written Post by Parsifal. 

A few notes if I may, 
Concerning the Argus, If the RAF is defeated the 15-18 aircraft the Argus could carry wouldn't amount to anything either way. 
Sounds like fan boys are just trying to run up the _possible _(or impossible ) score.

Parsifal left out the RN Submarines. They do tend to get forgotten in many armchair discussions of WW II naval operations and while operating submarines in the channel maybe rather difficult, as Parsifal wrote, ALL the German heavy units (and that includes destroyers at this point) are in Germany. The RN subs were rather successful in the Norwegian campaign and both the diversionary force and any reinforcements for the invasion fleet trying to reach the Channel would run the risk/possibility of encountering British subs.

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## Shortround6 (Nov 23, 2017)

swampyankee said:


> Some portion of the armchair generals probably think the nazi stormtroopers could just walk and drive their tanks across the Channel.



WHAT, you mean this wouldn't work?

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## Shortround6 (Nov 23, 2017)

For the German fan boys,

The Royal Navy would have been held at bay by the German Panzer ships.

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## Glider (Nov 23, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> As usual a well written Post by Parsifal.
> 
> A few notes if I may,
> Concerning the Argus, If the RAF is defeated the 15-18 aircraft the Argus could carry wouldn't amount to anything either way.
> ...


I the saying it but the channel is almost impossible for submarines to operate in. The tides are very high/low and its currents strong. Throw in the number of aircraft around plus the need to recharge and you have a serious problem


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## pbehn (Nov 23, 2017)

Glider said:


> I the saying it but the channel is almost impossible for submarines to operate in. The tides are very high/low and its currents strong. Throw in the number of aircraft around plus the need to recharge and you have a serious problem


I think the point being made was that the German fleet in Germany had to reach the channel, UK submarines could have formed part of a screen/ blockade.


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## swampyankee (Nov 23, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> WHAT, you mean this wouldn't work?
> View attachment 473111


Of course it’ll work. It’s WWII German, a group the fanboys think were infinitely superior. 

I wonder how the Germans would have done in Poland had the Soviets not invaded at at the same time

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## pbehn (Nov 23, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> For the German fan boys,
> 
> The Royal Navy would have been held at bay by the German Panzer ships.
> View attachment 473112


Now I know why they are all called tanks.


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## Glider (Nov 23, 2017)

At least the RN gave their equivalents a fighting chance being armed with 2 x 4.7


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## psl (Nov 24, 2017)

pbehn said:


> Seriously, some RAF sorties were planes scrambled as the airfield was being bombed, others were standing patrols over the south coast while some by twin engine fighters involved chasing aircraft inland across the Midlands. The Chain Home RADAR only looked out so once a raid crossed the coast it was tracked by the observer corps, this was obviously not so good or as quick.




I wonder if the number of sorties x time on each side would be about the same final total?


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## pbehn (Nov 24, 2017)

psl said:


> I wonder if the number of sorties x time on each side would be about the same final total?


I doubt it because almost all LW sorties were long range for the time


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## psl (Nov 24, 2017)

pbehn said:


> I doubt it because almost all LW sorties were long range for the time


That's what I mean't, that the total number of flying hours were the same for each side.


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## pbehn (Nov 24, 2017)

psl said:


> That's what I mean't, that the total number of flying hours were the same for each side.


In terms of the fighters the LW were almost always at long or maximum range, extra tanks were introduced for it. While some RAF sorties were quite long most were not. There were many ways in which the BoB was assymetric. Many pilots in the LW facing much fewer in the RAF 11 and 12 group.


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## psl (Nov 24, 2017)

pbehn said:


> When using towed barges, anything can sink them even a large tug. The LW would not only have to sink virtually every sea going vessel in the UK but also sink them with their first attempt. A light cruiser could devastate any landing area let alone a battleship.




Sinking ships is next to impossible in this era. Read on one forum that RN expended 5000 shells to sink one warship in the med.If you are interested read O'Hara volumes on the IJN VS USN + RN VS KM & RM


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## parsifal (Nov 24, 2017)

received a dislike from someone called "PSL" no explanation yet as to why.


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## pbehn (Nov 24, 2017)

psl said:


> Sinking ships is next to impossible in this era. Read on one forum that RN expended 5000 shells to sink one warship in the med.If you are interested read O'Hara volumes on the IJN VS USN + RN VS KM & RM


A loaded canal barge is very easy to sink in the English Channel, the plan was to tow two behind a tug or other vessel at about 2 knots, they could be sunk just by bumping into them, also highly probable that many would sink in bad weather and most would sink in a storm. I have been on a ferry swept by the waves into Dover Harbour wall and loading on a Ro Ro ferry moored in Calais was delayed for 30 minutes due to the swell in the harbour, that is on todays modern ferries of 26,000 tonnes (GT).


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## pbehn (Nov 24, 2017)

parsifal said:


> received a dislike from someone called "PST" no explanation yet as to why.


I suspect a fat finger scrolling on a kindle.


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## parsifal (Nov 24, 2017)

At Dunkirk the Allies committed 861 warships and were for about 8 days the focus of LW attention. There also attacks by air and subsurface laid mines and DKM light forces operating in the channel . 

In total the allies lost or had to withdraw due to damage 243 naval vessels of all sizes this gives clues on both the levels of damage the LW might be able to unleash onto the Allied surface forces, but also the determination the allies would prosecute an operation of this importance. there would be no question of "saving the forces for another day" These were overwhelmingly coastal forces, not forming part of the western approaches escort forces. they had been built and equipped for coastal protection, including anti invasion duties. There should be no question that these forces would continue to engage the invasion fleet until either DKM withdrew, or the anti invasion forces were destroyed.


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## parsifal (Nov 24, 2017)

psl said:


> Sinking ships is next to impossible in this era. Read on one forum that RN expended 5000 shells to sink one warship in the med.If you are interested read O'Hara volumes on the IJN VS USN + RN VS KM & RM




It would be true what you say if the forces engaged were moving at any speed, the engagement ranges were long, and had large quantities of ammunition to fire. but the average fleet speed of the DKM assault force was just 2.5 knots. Sitting ducks. Moreover the barges themselves didn't need to be fired upon. RN DDs would more than likely just slice through them. MGs at close range would be used to disable the tow ships, boarded and captured, 18th century style. this was a force that was defenceless at sea. there is no need to engage at range, and no difficulties in hitting things due to speed. near misses are likely to sink or capsize the barges because of their stability issues.


The only true defences for the invasion fleet are the 100 or so escorts of various sizes. a few of these were proper blue water warships, most were not. most, like the m-35 class MSWs had a maximum speed of just 15 knots, typically these light forces had about enough ammunition to last about an hour in action, and then would have to return to port to refuel and rearm. It might take 2hours to return to port, say an hour to restock, and another 2 hours to get back to the invasion fleet. That's 5 hours down time and 1 hours engagement time. that whole time the RN is a threat, probably constantly engaging (and shuttling back and forth like the DKM, but with vastly more reserves), But the diffefence and advantage here rests with the RN, they are the attackers in this, they can choose their timing and concentrations for attack, wheras DKM is far more limited in their ability to do this

Just on that arithmetic alone you could probably expect the RN to attack in waves of 200-300 small ships with about 10-15 DDs with each wave, attacking a defending force on their gunline of about 20 ships, probably with something like 2 DDs and 3 large TBs. The germans just aren't going to have enough Kahoonas to stop the repeatedallied attacks on them, and don't forget the assault is an 11 day operation 9according to DKM)

You are wrong incidentally about the ability to hit targets at this time. The key is the target sped and target range. Reduce these and the ability to hit and sink stuff goes up exponentially ,


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## psl (Nov 24, 2017)

parsifal said:


> At Dunkirk the Allies committed 861 warships and were for about 8 days the focus of LW attention. There also attacks by air and subsurface laid mines and DKM light forces operating in the channel .
> 
> In total the allies lost or had to withdraw due to damage 243 naval vessels of all sizes this gives clues on both the levels of damage the LW might be able to unleash onto the Allied surface forces, but also the determination the allies would prosecute an operation of this importance. there would be no question of "saving the forces for another day" These were overwhelmingly coastal forces, not forming part of the western approaches escort forces. they had been built and equipped for coastal protection, including anti invasion duties. There should be no question that these forces would continue to engage the invasion fleet until either DKM withdrew, or the anti invasion forces were destroyed.



what 861 warships? 

They had couple capital ships plus dozen cruisers and 76 DD/FF. Several times this number was available but strung out around the world. It would take week or two to return them to the UK.

Most counter invasion forces were 750 trawlers armed with either 12lb gun from WW-I plus AAMG or the ASW versions with ASDIC , DC racks & AAMG. At most 1/2 could be available to counter any invasion. There primary mission was coastal convoy escort work and in what ever clashes they were involved with they were a pain in the ass to sink . Admiralty wanted to use these trawler "warships"in Atlantic convoys , since the average convoy had only one escort...no wonder the Nazi had a field day with the convoys.

Historically most attacks on auxiliary vessels resulted in maybe one vessel sunk per attacking warship sortie.


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## parsifal (Nov 25, 2017)

psl said:


> what 861 warships?
> 
> They had couple capital ships plus dozen cruisers and 76 DD/FF. Several times this number was available but strung out around the world. It would take week or two to return them to the UK.
> 
> ...




The 861 vessels includes approximately 200 FFL ships, for which I don't have a lot of data. there were approximately 693 RN ships srawn mostly from dover,Harwich and nore commands, including the following

CLs -1

CLAs 2

DDs 59

Sloops and corvettes; 19

Large PCs; 9

Gunboats 12

MSWs; 56

Large TBs and ocean going ASW craft (eg the Hunts, Kingfishers) 33

Armed yachts 151

Small boarding vessels; 94

Ocean boarding vessels; 9

Minelayers; 7

Special service vessels: 16

Armed Tugs: 54

MTBs and MGBs: 46

Other armed Patrol craft; C 50

By the time the sealion operations loomed into view these forces had been substantially reinforced, to over 1000 warships, mostly coastal forces, spread from Harwich to brighton with about as many within another 8 hours sailing time.

Your right that these forces were strung out ant it would take time for a 'big wing" response to be mounted if the invasion fleet had gotten under way. The admiralty thought about a day at most, DKM estimated twice that. The defenders still had 9 days of attacks in which to decimate the invaders.

_Most counter invasion forces were 750 trawlers armed with either 12lb gun from WW-I plus AAMG or the ASW versions with ASDIC , DC racks & AAMG. At most 1/2 could be available to counter any invasion. There primary mission was coastal convoy escort work and in what ever clashes they were involved with they were a pain in the ass to sink . Admiralty wanted to use these trawler "warships"in Atlantic convoys , since the average convoy had only one escort...no wonder the Nazi had a field day with the convoys._

in the event of an invasion alert the admiralty orders to these ships were basically to drop everything and proceed immediately to their assembly points, and from there to proceed to positions to repel the invaders. there would have been no holding back on this. these coastal forces were there principally in 1940 for the sole purpose of defeating the invasion. from the end of july all east coast convoy traffic had been halted or diverted. there weren't any "convoy distractions" except for 1 or two here and there undertaken for propaganda purposes mostly. Most of the larger ships were armed with 4.7 and 4in, also quad 2pdrs, the middle sized ships were armed with 4in guns and 0.5in HMGs, the smaller conversions had a rather disheartening array of old weapons, the same as was the case in the DKM conversions that made up the majority of their forces.

You cant compare what would have happed here with anything during the war. It was a quite unique situation. I agree that initially the germans and the allies might find themselves in a standaoff....until the Germans run out of ammunition, then what???? They have no choice but to withdraw to replenish. once this nibbling process is over, those transports are fully exposed and vulnerable, with no real defences. on the few occasions that i can think of where anything like this happened, usually in remote corners of the eastern front, massacres did take place. We have nothing like that in the western hemishere, but it would extremely wrong to claim that it would never happen. It never happened, because nobody not even hitler were dumb enough to risk a fleet so totally vulnerable to attacks like that.

Some of the warships mentioned were capable of use in the western approaches, but were not attached to that command and had not since the beginning of the war. the majority of the coast forces were just that....coastal forced, not capable of ocean service. The Uboats were having a field day and continued to do so until the following March. but these coastal forces that you are so scornful of had in fact succeded in driving the uboats away from the UK coastal waters and out to the open sea. Had france not fallen, there would have been a reprive to a degree from the uboats, but the new uboat bases along the French Atlantic coast had given the uboats an extension of range that very nearly brought Britain to her knees. moreso than some half baked crackpot invasion. .

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## Shortround6 (Nov 25, 2017)

Just so we can see what we are talking about.





The barges appear to running light. This is a bit of controversy. you can find pictures of european river barges running with their gunnels almost awash bu they are carrying cargos of coal or scrap iron. Men are a lot less heavy. Ane the Germans would have to load them so they trimmed by the stern, light load in the bow so that it would draw less water and they could get the bow closer to the beach. 




Different waterways in Europe had different allowable dimensions of the barges/boats that could use them. Usually the size restrictions were due to locks than moved the barges/boats to different levels in the canal systems. 

Many of the barges were heavily built (if your going to carry coal for decades you don't do it in a light boat) but unlike warships there are no watertight compartments. One hole anywhere in the hull and the whole hull fills with water. With no engine the pumps are are going to hand pumps (or leg/back pumps) for getting out minor leakage/rainwater. 
Even running light you are not likely to pick up more than a couple of feet of freeboard. And running too light makes them harder to tow in a cross wind.

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## pbehn (Nov 25, 2017)

I find it a bit difficult to understand what the scenario means. It seems in some parts of the discussion that the RAF being defeated means that it never actually existed. That is the LW had its pre BoB strength while the RAF has no aircraft at all either fighters or bombers.


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## swampyankee (Nov 25, 2017)

psl said:


> what 861 warships?
> 
> They had couple capital ships plus dozen cruisers and 76 DD/FF. Several times this number was available but strung out around the world. It would take week or two to return them to the UK.
> 
> ...



The nazis had a field day before the convoys; the convoys worked because the U-boats couldn't find a convoy of a hundred ships any more easily than one ship, and that those hundred individual ships gave a hundred chances to be found. A convoy of one hundred ships gave one.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 25, 2017)

pbehn said:


> I find it a bit difficult to understand what the scenario means. It seems in some parts of the discussion that the RAF being defeated means that it never actually existed. That is the LW had its pre BoB strength while the RAF has no aircraft at all either fighters or bombers.



Or reconnaissance 
The German destroyers and large steam torpedo boats were in Germany over the summer. The British probably knew where they were 9at least every few days) and while they could have been moved closer before the invasion at night and staying close to the Dutch shore unless the RAF is totally wiped out they would probably be spotted within a few days of arriving and steps/plans made in British plans on how to deal with them. 
The British certainly had lots of pictures of the barge build up.

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## stona (Nov 25, 2017)

pbehn said:


> A loaded canal barge is very easy to sink in the English Channel, the plan was to tow two behind a tug or other vessel at about 2 knots, .



The final plan was for each tow, behind a tug or other vessel, to comprise two unpowered barges, one powered barge and two 'pusher boats' which would be used to beach the unpowered barges.
It was ridiculous and may well have ended in disaster, even without any British intervention 
Cheers
Steve

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## pbehn (Nov 25, 2017)

stona said:


> The final plan was for each tow, behind a tug or other vessel, to comprise two unpowered barges, one powered barge and two 'pusher boats' which would be used to beach the unpowered barges.
> It was ridiculous and may well have ended in disaster, even without any British intervention
> Cheers
> Steve


If the weather was anything like Seaton seafront last weekend it would have been a disaster. Even having a harbour wouldn't solve much, I have been on a ferry swept onto Dover harbour entrance.

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## rochie (Nov 25, 2017)

pbehn said:


> If the weather was anything like Seaton seafront last weekend it would have been a disaster. Even having a harbour wouldn't solve much, I have been on a ferry swept onto Dover harbour entrance.


you were in seaton, hope you were lost and passing through ?


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## pbehn (Nov 25, 2017)

rochie said:


> you were in seaton, hope you were lost and passing through ?


No worries, I am multi lingual and can speak fluent "sea coaler", I used to work there (Hartlepool steelworks) and frequently had a beer in the "Golden Flats" after work. Its a great beach to walk a dog.

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## Glider (Nov 25, 2017)

For those who doubt the ability of the RN to sink the invasion barges just think what a short burst from a quad 2pd would do


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## stona (Nov 25, 2017)

pbehn said:


> Even having a harbour wouldn't solve much, I have been on a ferry swept onto Dover harbour entrance.



I had the misfortune to be on a ferry which stood off Dover Harbour for several hours in a storm. There was a failed attempt to get us in with tugs. Given the sea state I'll let your imaginations run free with the state of the toilets and just about everywhere else. Worse, they closed the bars!
Cheers
Steve

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## rochie (Nov 25, 2017)

pbehn said:


> No worries, I am multi lingual and can speak fluent "sea coaler", I used to work there (Hartlepool steelworks) and frequently had a beer in the "Golden Flats" after work. Its a great beach to walk a dog.


That It is


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## Shortround6 (Nov 25, 2017)

Shoot the tugs. Most are going to have 1-2 scotch boilers, a vertical steam engine (either double or triple expansion) and only one steering station.


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## parsifal (Nov 25, 2017)

The pictures of those barges do look to be running light, and consequently do appear to be racing through the water, probably at 6-8 knots.
Be that as it may, DKM were estimating an 11 day operation from commencement of loading to disembarkation. The DKM orders were very specific, a maximum fleet speed of 2.5 knots. That's a fleet waiting to be sunk.

The barges were vulnerable to all manner of counter fire, including MG fire. DKM simply did not have the men to put proper DC teams on each barge, and their merchant marine was pretty well fully committed as well. These barges, by and large were being manned by heer personnel. The heer had some experienced small boat crews for river crossings and the like, but again not nearly enough to make any appreciable difference . if these barges are hit by anything, even rifle calibre MG fire (if enough hits are registered), is more than likely to sink, or at the very minimum to take on so much water as to be incapable of landing. If you add flame producing ammunition to the mix the vision of what is likely to happen gets even worse.

Just to put the German plan and the capabilities of its invasion fleet into perspective we can compare it to the last major invasion attempt on the british Isles. In 1588 the Spanish amassed a massive armada of ships and proceeded up the channel with the intention of landing troops. They intended to take on additional troops on Holland I believe, but were set upon by the coastal forces of the day that opposed them . The Spanish fleet was anchored at the time of its loss, but its fleet speed has been calculated to be in excess of 6knots at the time. , We are talking similar engagement ranges, similar ship numbers, a faster fleet, yet apparently, despite 500 years of development in military technique and technology, wouldn't be able to hit a near stationary, concentrated target unable to defend itself. Can some please explain the logic of how that works?????


The other major obstruction to amphibious operations is organization. things need to be planned very carefully, even to the tactical loading choices of the troops. We all tend to read about the successful amphibs, like Normandy, but what about the ones that don't work.....Gallipoli , Milne Bay, Kerch, Oslo, They (and many others) fell apart because of a lack of organisation. It doesn't take much disruption of naval forces to render the operation unworkable. Even if you want to countenance the idea that some of the barges might make it to the British coast, if substantial losses had been suffered does anyone seriously believe there be enough organization to get ashore. I think the heer units would be arriving in a total jumble, bits missing, the troops sick scared and ready to surrender as soon as set foot on dry land. hitler suspected this and it weighed on his decisions pretty heavily........

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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 25, 2017)

Even if the RAF had been defeated, (Which I think had the Germans not done things so stupidly was a possibility. A distant possibility, but a possibility.) there is no way that the Germans could have launched an invasion fleet, and sustained and supplied an occupation of the British Isles.


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## psl (Nov 25, 2017)

double post


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## psl (Nov 25, 2017)

Glider said:


> For those who doubt the ability of the RN to sink the invasion barges just think what a short burst from a quad 2pd would do



Probably nothing at the time. Barges are mostly empty space, and small shell make precious little damage.

11 Oct 1940 five GTB attacked four armed trawlers , all four were sunk but not before 1100 x 4" shells were expended plus several torpedoes.

1941 July- August 4 DD launched 11 sortie & sank 4 trawlers with 1300 shells.. 17th Dec 1941 four DD fired ~ 300 shells netting only 4 gun hits on one minesweeper, putting it in for repairs for 2 months.


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## Kryten (Nov 26, 2017)

The empty space on those barges was going to be filled with men and equipment!

Oct 1940, All four were sunk, well that should tell you something really, hitting a single target manoeuvring is more difficult than hitting a minesweeper towing several barges at 2.5knts!

Has anyone stopped to consider the ability to even keep the force on course at those speeds in currents as strong as the channel, the ability to actually land, have a look at the coastline in southern England, most beaches (what there are of them between the cliffs) are shale, look what happened at Dieppe, what about the state of the troops being transported in those barges, sea sick ,combat casualties, loss of communications equipment and command and control, this was a hodge podge invasion planned by a staff that had no clue what they were doing, the allies had years of planning, the lessons of Dieppe and massive force complete with overwhelming air superiority and still had problems!

The whole thing is a nonsense, the Luftwaffe could not defeat the RAF, the RAF was completely outstripping the LW in terms of pilots trained and aircraft produced by the end of August, had the battle continued the balance would have tipped entirely in the RAF's favour, Winter ends any notion of an invasion and by 1941 there was no chance of success at all!


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## Shortround6 (Nov 26, 2017)

psl said:


> Probably nothing at the time. Barges are mostly empty space, and small shell make precious little damage.



And the barges had precious little damage control, that is trained men, equipment and pumps. A few guys with hammers and corks to plug rifle bullet holes and bailing water out with helmets isn't going to work against the holes a 2 pdr would make in the side. 

I would also note that with thousands of barges a good portion of the tow ships will NOT be armed meaning the defence of the tow boat barge combination will be the rifles and machine guns of the troops.


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## stona (Nov 26, 2017)

Surely the definitive consequences expected of any invasion should be left to the men who might have been ordered to carry it out.
Two of the most senior (there are plenty more who expressed a similar view). First Raeder:

_‘I considered it extremely fortunate that the invasion project was not carried out, as the resulting setback would have been disastrous.’_

Gustav Kleikamp, head of the transport fleet based in Calais, writing in October 1940 (not with years of hindsight).

_‘In my opinion the belated beginning and insufficient preparations, as well as a complete lack of training in craft and prahme at steaming together, would have given the greatest trouble or might have rendered it impossible at the end of September or early October to take a transport fleet with the desired success and order to the enemy shore, especially at night.’_

The Germans responsible for carrying out the operation were more convinced of its impossibility than *some* of the British commanders, waiting on the other side of the Channel. Some British commanders, particularly in the RN, never believed that the Germans were capable of such a huge amphibious operation and would agreed with the opinions expressed by their fellow naval officers, across the Channel.

Even the army was not convinced that the operation could be carried out. Frederick-Karl Plehwe, head of the army's liaison staff at naval headquarters wrote, also in 1940.

_‘I would like to lay great emphasis on the fact that the decisive deterrent to the operation was the expected large-scale intervention by the British fleet.’_

Some idea of the lack of preparation may be gleaned from Blumentritt's comments, made later, in 1949.

_'I should state, for the record, that no member of my staff had an accurate picture of the English south coast. Our maps were inaccurate. Relief maps were sent to us from Munich! … It must not be forgotten that we Germans are a continental people. We knew far too little of England. We knew literally nothing of amphibious operations and had no experience. At the same time we were preparing the Sea Lion plans, accounts of the campaigns of Caesar, Britannicus and William the Conqueror were being read, and in Paris books about Napoleon’s ‘Camp of Boulogne’ (1804) were being sought in the bookshops.'
_
Compare that to Allied planning for Overlord.

In terms of the original question, had the RAF been defeated, had the KM not found some other excuses NOT to launch Sealion and had the operation been attempted, it might well have resulted in a complete defeat and total debacle for the Germans. This was certainly something that Raeder feared.

Cheers

Steve

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## Glider (Nov 26, 2017)

psl said:


> Probably nothing at the time. Barges are mostly empty space, and small shell make precious little damage.


Quite a lot I would have thought, 400 rpm with an explosive warhead at close range to a barge full of people, fuel and or ammunition would do a huge amount of damage.

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## fastmongrel (Nov 26, 2017)

I believe that Germany could have put a force onto a British beach. I also believe that a force of some tens of thousands of Infantry without heavy equipment or much hope of re supply would then fight bravely but after a few days will run out of ammunition and supplies. Its not landing the men its landing and distributing the supplies the Army needs every day. 

Logistics would defeat the Germans not the RN, RAF or Army.


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## stona (Nov 26, 2017)

fastmongrel said:


> I believe that Germany could have put a force onto a British beach. I also believe that a force of some tens of thousands of Infantry without heavy equipment or much hope of re supply would then fight bravely but after a few days will run out of ammunition and supplies.



You are more optimistic than many of the Germans who were supposed to carry out the operation!

Every time the scenario has been gamed an allowance has been made to allow the Germans to get ashore. Otherwise there is no game, just a body count.

Cheers

Steve

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## fastmongrel (Nov 26, 2017)

stona said:


> You are more optimistic than many of the Germans who were supposed to carry out the operation!
> 
> Every time the scenario has been gamed an allowance has been made to allow the Germans to get ashore. Otherwise there is no game, just a body count.
> 
> ...



I think the Germans could land, the numbers mean something will get across the Channel not all the landing vessels were the bloody awful Barges. Some of the vessels might even land in the correct county.


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## parsifal (Nov 26, 2017)

stona said:


> Surely the definitive consequences expected of any invasion should be left to the men who might have been ordered to carry it out.
> Two of the most senior (there are plenty more who expressed a similar view). First Raeder:
> 
> _‘I considered it extremely fortunate that the invasion project was not carried out, as the resulting setback would have been disastrous.’_
> ...




Hi Steve
Excellent points. You can add hitler to the list of doubters actually. the wording of his sealion directive is uncharacteristically vague and hesitant. his continual postponement of the operation all at least point to a man full of doubt as t o the chances for success


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## gumbyk (Nov 26, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> And the barges had precious little damage control, that is trained men, equipment and pumps. A few guys with hammers and corks to plug rifle bullet holes and bailing water out with helmets isn't going to work against the holes a 2 pdr would make in the side.
> 
> I would also note that with thousands of barges a good portion of the tow ships will NOT be armed meaning the defence of the tow boat barge combination will be the rifles and machine guns of the troops.



And you don't even need to sink the barges. without the tow ship, how is the barge going to get to shore?

What about the possibility of going in through N Ireland? I've heard that there were communications between Germany and N Ireland, mostly regarding intelligence, but could this have been an easier entry into the U.K.?


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## stona (Nov 26, 2017)

Hitler may have made his decision well before the accepted date. He was always equivocal about an invasion of Britain, and the British themselves.
Student, never the most reliable witness, claimed in a post war interview (beware hindsight) that at a meeting with Goering on 2nd September he [Student] expressed concerns about the planned use of airborne troops. According to Student, Goering told him not to worry, at least not for 1940, because 

_‘The Führer does not want to invade Britain.’_

Did this actually happen? Possibly. Is it plausible? Certainly. Only Goering, Student and Hitler could know.

Cheers

Steve

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## yulzari (Nov 26, 2017)

Everyone on both sides knew it could never work. It suited Britain to stir up the nation to continue the war. It suited the Germans as a blind for Barbarossa.

Even with no naval opposition the barges would have been scattered from the Isle of Wight to Essex just from amateur sailing of river barges across a complex and ever changing seaway even in good weather. Both Caesar and William the Bastard had to wait weeks until they got good enough weather long enough to put a trained fleet of just a few scores of vessels across in daylight. The Spanish Armada would have stood a better chance of shipping Spanish troops from the Netherlands to England and more likely to win once they arrived. At least they had seagoing vessels and trained sailors. The Dutch did best when they invaded in 1688.


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## parsifal (Nov 26, 2017)

Just wanted revisit this claim that in 1940 every battle took thousands of rounds before a hit was registered. I can think of enough exceptions to this rule to make a mockery of it.

Battle of Battle of Lofoten islands, between BCs RENOWN, GNEISENAU and SCHARHORST. At 04:30, _Gneisenau_ sighted _Renown_ on its radar and the German ships cleared for action. Due to poor weather conditions, neither side was able to engage the other until 05:05, as heavy seas and poor visibility prevented the two squadrons from closing within range. _Renown_ began the action by attacking _Gneisenau_ with her 15-inch guns. The German warships returned fire at 05:08 with _Gneisenau_ scoring two hits on _Renown_ with her 11 inch shells with their first salvo. Both shells failed to explode, with the first hitting the British battlecruiser′s foremast and the second passing through the ship near the steering gear room. About the same time, _Renown_ struck _Gneisenau_ with two shells. it was the british ships third salvo

Battle Of Denmark strait, engagement range > 20000 yds, speeds in excess of 20 knots. Fire commenced 0552, First hits registered (by PoW) approximately 0553, 1 minute after firing had commenced. Bismarck scored her first hit 0556 and destroyed her target (Hood) in one shot.

This level of accuracy was not limited to heavy ships, though their superior fire control gear and training was clearly a factor

At the Battle of Carnavon November 1941, DKM Kormoran did not have access to modern FC gear and her guns were old . She was firing on a target travelling in excess of 15 kts, but only 1500 yds distant. She scored hits on her 2nd, 3rd 4th and 5th salvos. Sydney is believed to hav scored hits on her 3, 5, and 6 th salvoes.

The claim that it was not possible to hit ships with naval technologies available at this time is just bunkum.

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## pbehn (Nov 26, 2017)

Could add the battle of the River Plate to that Parsival.


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## pbehn (Nov 26, 2017)

yulzari said:


> Everyone on both sides knew it could never work. It suited Britain to stir up the nation to continue the war. It suited the Germans as a blind for Barbarossa.
> 
> Even with no naval opposition the barges would have been scattered from the Isle of Wight to Essex just from amateur sailing of river barges across a complex and ever changing seaway even in good weather. Both Caesar and William the Bastard had to wait weeks until they got good enough weather long enough to put a trained fleet of just a few scores of vessels across in daylight. The Spanish Armada would have stood a better chance of shipping Spanish troops from the Netherlands to England and more likely to win once they arrived. At least they had seagoing vessels and trained sailors. The Dutch did best when they invaded in 1688.


Good post Yulzari, the eventual fate of the Spanish armada illustrates exactly what you are talking about. Many of the ships and crews were built and used in the Mediterranean sea. They made it to Gravellines OK in good weather but when attacked and sailed into the North sea they ran in to serious trouble, less than a third made it back to Spain and almost none of them were sea worthy despite few being sunk by enemy action.


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## stona (Nov 26, 2017)

The barges themselves proved remarkably sea worthy. I posted on this in some other thread. Even the Germans were surprised how well they coped in sea states rougher than expected.

The problems were the nature of the tows, rudimentary (being polite) communications and some very complicated manoeuvering both at assembly and particularly at the approaches to the landing grounds. Some German officers didn't believe that it was possible in a calm sea, in daylight and unopposed.

The plans for unloading the transports and landing the men and materiel from them were just as 'optimistic'.

The more you look into the detail of the plans, the more improbable they become. The senior naval officers expressing relief at the cancellation of Sealion knew exactly what would have happened to their makeshift invasion fleet.

Cheers

Steve

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## pbehn (Nov 26, 2017)

stona said:


> The barges themselves proved remarkably sea worthy. I posted on this in some other thread. Even the Germans were surprised how well they coped in sea states rougher than expected.
> 
> The problems were the nature of the tows, rudimentary (being polite) communications and some very complicated manoeuvering both at assembly and particularly at the approaches to the landing grounds. Some German officers didn't believe that it was possible in a calm sea, in daylight and unopposed.
> 
> ...


The invasion fleet would be like a convoy, if you have a designated landing area and some of the towed barges cannot get there because of the current what do you do, choose another beach or let some make their way to somewhere else?


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## parsifal (Nov 26, 2017)

According to Paul Watson (http://dionysus.biz/NavalGunnery.html) “_The Evolution of Naval Gunnery (1900 to 1945)_” .

“From 1890 through 1945 a continuous stream of technological improvements increased battleship big gun effectiveness in terms of:


Battle ranges
Hit percentages
Firing rates
Prior to 1906, high rates of fire for the medium gun (6 inch to 8 inch) enabled them to compete with big naval guns (11 inch to 12 inch in that period). From 1906 to 1914, the emergence of Central Fire Control and Fire Control Computers ushered in the period of the Big Gun, a period when destructive power and accuracy of the big gun totally dominated naval warfare.

Battle ranges increased as percentage hits grew throughout the period. In 1898, 2% hits was achieved by the Americans in the Spanish American War at ranges of approximately 2000 yards. By 1905, the Japanese achieved 20% hits at battle ranges of 6500 yards in the Russo-Japanese War. By World War I, 3% to 4% was achievable under the worst sea conditions at 14000 yards range. During the interwar years, 15% hits at 15000 yards was a realistic battle expectation using optical fire control”.

These estimates apply to Battleships, firing at ‘typical ranges” 9which began in the 1890s at just a few thousand yards and progressed through to the 1930’s to about 14-16000 yds, at targets travelling at normal speeds and manouvering in a normal way. Here we have a convoy, restricted in its ability to manouver by the need to maintain formation and the fact that the barges are under tow (by definition requiring the vessels to hoist appropriate signal flags to indicate a restricted ability to manouver and excercising their sea movement accordingly). These vessels are lagely undefended , but will be escorted by vessels with a typical armament of 20mm and 37mm cannon. A few of the escorts would be armed with 75mm guns.


The invasion convoy was expected to occupy a sea area of about 20km by 15km overall (if the German army plan was adopted you could basically double that). Assuming the convoy is roughly elliptical in shape, there will be 53 miles of convoy perimeter to patrol with roughly 100 warships, of which 19 could be considered “major warships’ (the DKM Zerstorers and torpedobootes). The vorpostenboote (armed trawlers) are not fully known as to armament, but a reasonable estimate might be that 20 of these vessels were armed with 75mm weapons. That gives us 3 DDs, 6 TBs, 10 vorpostenbootes) and about 29 other vessels with which to escort this great mass of vulnerable ships.

Assuming a 50% presence at any time (a DD on escort had an endurance of about 5-6 days, for an operation lasting 11 days, they will need to refuel at least twice, smaller warships have an endurance even shorter. Then there is the unknown variable of after action replenishment. A 50% availability is being massively optimistic for the germans).

The spacing of our estimated escort force is one “proper warship” every 6 miles, a somewhat less effective VP craft also at every 6 miles, and the rest spaced at about 1 warship every 2miles. Altogether, there might be a warship of some description spaced at 1 every 1 to 1.5 miles, with no reserves, no command and control vessels and no interior patrollers for the convoy.

As the attacker, with more than 60 DDs immediately available and maybe 40 MGB and MTBs, I wouldn’t be able to attack in one go and I would want to maximise surpise if possible. If not surprise, then attack with the defenders having the least possible opportunity of forewarning. Necessarily that means attacking at night. To ensure a continuous attack, I would attack in waves, separated by say 30 mins. The maximum distance to target is about 80 miles, the minimum is 10 miles. Looking at a compromise of 60mile, there is a 2 hour approach time (for ships already at sea), say a one hour engagement and then withdrawal. To ensure the convoy is under continuous pressure, I would need to break my attacks into at least 4 waves, each separated by about 30 mins. With four waves, I can expect attacks with about 16-18 DDs in each wave. There would be at least two of these waves attacking at any given time, prefereably from different sides of the convoy. I would use my MGBs as a pinning force, bolstered by one flotilla 96 ships) of DDs. Two full flotillas of Dds should be clear to pass through the gap so formed by these blockers, firing torpedoes, firing guns, firing light weapons, dropping depth charges as they go, to pass though the middle of the convoy and come out the other side. I would use my heavier ships to lay suppressive fire onto the convoy, forcing the DKM to take evasive action and quite unable to react by concentrating. I would try to increase the confusion by night air attack by any remaining bombers. Ahead of the convoy, I would use some of my slower escort ships and the minlayers, to lay a mine barrage in the path of the convoy. 

I would repeat this operation for as many nights as the convoy was at sea. If the convoy is at sea for say 7 days, with each of my attackers sinking just one ship each per sortie, and each ship able to undertake two sorties per night 9a not unreasonable estimate of activity), we can expect at the end of that seven days of continuous action do see at least 504 ships of the invasion fleet to be sunk, of which many would be the tow ships. Impossible to know what proportions of tow ships but probably at least 150, which effectely doubles the losses for those ships. At the end of the “initial” battles, I would expect to see at least 650 barges unable to land, probably sunk. I have no idea of the losses to mines and night air attack but one would expect some degree of loss. 

And we have yet to commit the bulk of the coastal forces to finish off this ill considered venture by the germans

RN losses would be unknown, but from the 3rd or 4th day we can expect to see the arrival of emergency reserves from the north and west. They would amount to at least another 40 DDs according to Admiralty sources. 

As I said, for the life of me, I cannot understand the logic of anyone claiming a billet in this invasion fleet was safe, nothing to worry about and likely to make it across the ditch without a scratch

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## buffnut453 (Nov 26, 2017)

Agree with all that invasion was a non-starter...but Hitler didn't need to invade to achieve his strategic objective which was removing Britain from the war. All he needed was a more pliant government in London than that led by Churchill. Loss of the BofB might well have brought about those circumstances.


gumbyk said:


> And you don't even need to sink the barges. without the tow ship, how is the barge going to get to shore?
> 
> What about the possibility of going in through N Ireland? I've heard that there were communications between Germany and N Ireland, mostly regarding intelligence, but could this have been an easier entry into the U.K.?



I think you mean Eire (ie the Republic of Ireland aka Southern Ireland). Northern Ireland is part of the UK.


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## gumbyk (Nov 26, 2017)

buffnut453 said:


> Agree with all that invasion was a non-starter...but Hitler didn't need to invade to achieve his strategic objective which was removing Britain from the war. All he needed was a more pliant government in London than that led by Churchill. Loss of the BofB might well have brought about those circumstances.
> 
> 
> I think you mean Eire (ie the Republic of Ireland aka Southern Ireland). Northern Ireland is part of the UK.


Eire was neutral, but apparently had contact with Nazi Germany.
There were also talks with the IRA from what I understand.


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## buffnut453 (Nov 26, 2017)

gumbyk said:


> Eire was neutral, but apparently had contact with Nazi Germany.
> There were also talks with the IRA from what I understand.



Correct..but in the post of yours that I quoted you stated N Ireland. Eire is not N Ireland.


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## pbehn (Nov 26, 2017)

gumbyk said:


> Eire was neutral, but apparently had contact with Nazi Germany.
> There were also talks with the IRA from what I understand.


A complex situation almost exactly repeated today, a neutral country is not forbidden to have relations with combative nations but they are prohibited from becoming involved.


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## parsifal (Nov 26, 2017)

Eire had some contact with the Nazis, and it is worth noting she was one of the few nations in 1945 to put their national flags at half mast after Hitlers death in 1945.

Eire’s relations were strained by the operations of the U-Boats in the North Atlantic and after the loss of several clearly marked neutral ships operating for the republic. Relations with the Germans were already strained by these actions.

Despite this the Irish assisted several U-Boats on several occasions that got themselves into difficulties, and readily accepted survivors that had been towed or transported to republic shores in that first year of the war.

Relations with Britain complicated, but far closer than the republics leadership cared to admit. Britain had maintained a naval presence in the republic until 1938, and from the beginning of the war there had been careful, and quiet negotiations on the level of 

assistance the “BEF” (as it was euphemistically called) would provide to the Germans. Ireland made plans to cover either an invasion by Britain or Germany

An invasion of the emerald isle for Germany would have been several orders of magnitude more difficult to achieve for Germany, in oceans generally rougher and more exposed, across open stretches of ocean. Re-supply would have been nearly impossible for Germany, infrastructure almost non existent.

I don’t see how this variant is at all helpful to the notion of a successful german cross channel attack

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## pbehn (Nov 26, 2017)

parsifal said:


> Despite this the Irish assisted several U-Boats on several occasions that got themselves into difficulties, and readily accepted survivors that had been towed or transported to republic shores in that first year of the war.


All situations are different but this is not automatically a violation of neutrality. Switzerland accepted allied bombers landing or crashing there and it was actually bombed by accident in the course of the conflict.


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## swampyankee (Nov 26, 2017)

gumbyk said:


> And you don't even need to sink the barges. without the tow ship, how is the barge going to get to shore?
> 
> What about the possibility of going in through N Ireland? I've heard that there were communications between Germany and N Ireland, mostly regarding intelligence, but could this have been an easier entry into the U.K.?




You may be confusing Northern Ireland, part of the UK, with the Republic of Ireland, which wasn't. While there probably wasn't much love lost between Dublin and London, especially between Éamon de Valera, Taoiseach of Ireland and either Chamberlain or Churchill, it's also quite evident that the Taoiseach was not a fan of Hitler: Irish neutrality was somewhat biased in favor of the Allies, not the Axis. About 28,000 Irish citizens joined the British armed forces, possibly some deserting the Irish Army to do so.

Ireland permitted overflights of RAF military aircraft, which was not a neutral act.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 26, 2017)

If you can't get troops across the channel then how do you get them 
A. *to* Ireland, regardless of where in Ireland. 
B. get them *from* Ireland to any point in the rest of the UK that is not Northern Ireland? (Britain, Wales or Scotland.)?

what would be the object of such a move?

March a couple hundred men landed from submarines to the Shorts factory in Belfast?

Same few hundred men seize the Dublin-Liverpool ferry and sail to Liverpool? Storm the Liverpool ferry terminal and signal a force of men hiding in a Neutral freighter?


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## buffnut453 (Nov 26, 2017)

There are a number of scenarios where Germany having troops in Ireland would be beneficial...but I just don't see it happening, nor do I see it being sustainable. Certainly it's not a good starting point for an invasion of the GB mainland.

On the plus side, one could imagine Hitler offering reunification as a carrot to encourage active aggression by Eire against Britain. That reunification could remove airfields in Northern Ireland that were used for long-range maritime reconnaissance, which would be a boon for the U-Boat fleet. It would also send a powerful message to counter the "Britain standing alone" propaganda...because a significant part of the UK would have fallen to the enemy. 

Despite these potential positives, I don't think any such operation would be sustainable, nor do I think the Irish Government would be duped by any such offer from Hitler. Eire had far too much to lose to countenance such an operation.


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## parsifal (Nov 26, 2017)

For every Irishman willing to side with hitler in the name of re-unifying with the north, rthere are going to be just as many opposed to it. . moreover, the leadership in Irelans was firmly opposed to entry into the war, on either side, under any circumstance.

There were reasons why they never sided with the germans, just as there were reasons for not joining the allies. Unlike turkey for example, who in the dying days did make a DoW on Germany

There was about as much chance of the irish being a willing partner against britain, as there was Sweden, Portugal ofr Switzerland. Almost none, to none.

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## psl (Nov 27, 2017)

parsifal said:


> According to Paul Watson (http://dionysus.biz/NavalGunnery.html) “_The Evolution of Naval Gunnery (1900 to 1945)_” .
> 
> “From 1890 through 1945 a continuous stream of technological improvements increased battleship big gun effectiveness in terms of:
> 
> ...





https://www.tapatalk.com/groups/warships1discussionboards/kriegsmarine-vs-center-force-t23530-s200.html



*Dec 1939* 2 RN DD clashed with 2 German Zerstörer 1934. Germans undetected at night launched 1/2 dozen torps at 5000 yards with one hitting HMS Juno putting in dry dock for 10 months repair. Germans escaped undetected.

*April 1940 Narvik 1st battle* : 5 RN DD ambushed 10 German Zerstörer refueling in port. In running gun battle 2 DD are sunk on each side while one RN and 5 German Zerstörer are damaged. Germans were unlucky since at least one torpedo passed under each RN DD but failed due to depth mechanism. None the less a brilliant British attack.

*April 1940 Narvik 2nd battle* : 9 RN DD + BB attack 8 remaining German Zerstörer in fiord, with only 4 of the German Zerstörer battle ready . Trapped in the fiord all the German Zerstörer are sunk ; while 3 RN DD are damaged/crippled in a running gun/torpedo battle.

*Oct 1940 Isle of White:* 5 RN DD chase 5 German "Raubvogel" Torpedo Boat who escape un harmed despite being slower and not as well armed.

*Oct 1940 off Lands End;* 5 German Zerstörer are chased by 5 RN DD plus 2 Cruisers in moderate seas. The British were able to close with the Germans since they were "chasing splash". In the long range exchange the British fired 1200 shells getting 2 minor hits on the German Zerstörer. German commander Bey had each German Zerstörer unload several Torps astern @ 15,000 yards and the RN evasive action allowed the Germans to open distance and escape.

*Nov 1940 off Plymouth;* 3 German Zerstörer again lead by Bey engage 5 RN DD launching a dozen torpedo ; crippling a RN DD at dawn. Germans suffered some splinter damage.

*March 1942 off Dieppe.* After beating off several RN MTB attacks, an escort of 5 Raubtier class Torpedo boats beat back a RN flotilla of 2 older DD plus 3 Hunt DEs. The Germans were escorting the HSK "Michel" which was showered with some splinters, while most of the RN warships were damaged with the worst two warships spending 1-2 months in repair each.

*Oct 1942 off Cherbourg*; 9 RN Hunts get revenge sinking the HSK Komet and damaging all 4 of the escorting German Torpedoboot 1935, without suffering any damage in return.

*March 1942; Defense of PQ13*; British flotilla of Cruiser plus 5 DD defend against 3 German Zerstörer in short range clash, in heavy seas and snow squalls. British Cruiser lead the fight crippling the lead German warship with multiple 6" shell hits. Finally a British Torps malfunctioned and slammed into their own Cruiser forcing it out of the fight and allowing the German Zerstörer an escape attempt. This attempt failed when intercepted and sunk by Mack's DD HMS Eclipse ; which in turn was then hammered by 3 German 5.9" shells at long range from the other two German Zerstörer . 

*May 1942 near Bear Island*; 3 German Zerstörer attack British convoy covered by 4 older DD plus 4 sub chasers. Germans attack in heavy seas and sleet/snow. In three attempts they sink Soviet freighter with long range torpedo hit and damage 3 RN DD in gun exchange, while the British return fire nets no results , all attempts to get through to the convoy fail. The next day these same German Zerstörer attack and sink a crippled RN Cruiser and batter 2 escorting DD, while loosing one Zerstörer sunk and another damaged in the exchange.

*July 1943 off Breton coast:* 2 German Elbing TB 1939 escort flotilla of minesweepers, while 3 RN Hunts mount a night attack. In the exchange a minesweeper is sunk while another damaged but the rest get through untouched. The DE on each side exchange rapid fire and the Germans hit each of the 3 RN DE putting them out of action for 1-2 weeks each. One of the German Elbing Torpedoboot suffers splinter damage from a near miss.

*Oct 1943 1st Tunnel battle;* RN launched a series of night attacks to cut of German coastal convoys along the French coast. Experienced German commander Franz Kohlauf ambushes a mixed RN flotilla of 5 Hunts and Emergency DD, with his 4th flotilla of 4 Elbing Torpedoboot. In the exchange 33 torpedoes were fired with no hits on either side. In the gunfight the two RN DD were each hit twice by German gun fire forcing them to retreat one flooding , the other on fire. The German Torpedoboot do not seem to have been hit in the exchange and the Hunts were left out since they were too slow to keep up.

*Oct 1943 2ndTunnel battle;* RN launched second night attack based on false reports of success earlier that month and include a light cruiser to increase the damage inflicted. This time Kohlauf aware of the British Tunnel tactics , establishes long range detection with his GHG passive sonar at 20-30km range. This allows him to move in for an ambush that sinks the British Cruiser and one DD with a flotilla spread of 24 torpedoes getting 3 hits. As usual no German ships were hit in the ambush.

*April 1944 3rdTunnel battle;* RN spent the winter reviewing the failures of 1943 and regrouped Tunnel based on homogenous escorts, no Hunt DE& DD mix.... all Tribal DD this time. While Kohlauf lead 3 Elbing Torpedoboot they were out gunned 4:1 by the 4 Canadian Tribals and RN light cruiser _Black Prince_ . This time the Commonwealth force was well lead and the gunnery advantage proved decisive, sinking Kohlauf's Torpedoboot and damaging the other two boats. At the conclusion of this close range ,moonless night action -two of the Canadian DD collided putting both out of operation for weeks.

*April 1944 another battle;* Two days later the 2 undamaged Tribal DD attacked the two remaining Elbing Torpedoboot of the 4th Flotilla in another night exchange. While the excellent Tribal firepower advantage sank one Torpedoboot and damaged another, the German massed torpedo salvo sank one of the Tribals in the exchange.


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## psl (Nov 27, 2017)

*June 1944* ]*Brittany:* 8 Allied Tribal DD attack a group of 4 German DD, out gunning them more than 2:1 in a short sharp night clash. In the span of 5 minutes the veteran RN DD got 13 hits crippling one ship and damaging 2 of the other 3 Zerstörer. Over the next 4 hours a series of confused clashes occurred with the allies getting the upper hand through superior training and leadership and use of radar and radio intercept. Allied force inflicted 30-40 hits on the German Zerstörer sinking one forcing another to run-aground or sink, while another Zerstörer was crippled. The poor German counter fire did net some 5.9” hits that did damage to one Tribal and lightly damaged 2 more.


]*5th* ]*GermanTorpedoboot* *Flotilla* : In the first week after D-day, [June 1944] the 5th German Torpedoboot flotilla -with prewar boats -launched 5 raids shooting 55 torpedoes and some gunfire getting 1 hit against a French DD. In all attacks they made long range attacks against allied DD and escaped unharmed. RAF bombers were then ordered in to put an end of the threat with 1200 tons of bombs that wiped out the flotilla, along with 15 S-Boot and 39 other vessels.[/font]

*Over the next couple of months the allied DD forces mounted 9 night sweeps against German coastal forces/convoys off France, but these were mostly German Minesweepers* *with the odd Torpedoboot. In only 4 sweeps did they catch the Germans but when they did they sunk 5 and battered 4 minesweepers; while lightly damaging another 6.

Interestingly enough in each encounter the Germans fought back well inflicting damage on at least one enemy warship. In each case the allies also enjoyed an overwhelming firepower advantage of over 5:1 in gun numbers; to say nothing of the fact that all the German guns were 4.1” single mounts, while all the allied guns were 4.7” twin guns or better. 

In the most surprising clash, a Minesweeper plus a couple of V-Boot [ 88mm gun each] engaged a Tribal DD , which destroyed the minesweeper- but was crippled when a 88mm gun destroyed the DD boiler and cut a steam line. The Tribal had to be towed back to port.

There were four other clashes off Norway and the Baltic through early 1945, where German coastal convoys escorted with minesweepers and V-Boot were attack by overwhelming forces of allied cruisers and destroyer. The Allied Firepower advantage was more than 4:1 and the results were predictable with 5 out of 19 warships sunk and 5 more crippled, but 9 retired. The German return fire damaged 4 allied warships and crippled two more.*


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## psl (Nov 27, 2017)

https://www.tapatalk.com/groups/warships1discussionboards/viewtopic.php?f=63&t=22080&p=360368#p360368





*1939 Battle of River Plate* 
*Weather: 3/8[/size][/size] Visibility: Excellent[/size] Sea State: calm[/size][/size]*
AGS fired 405 11" shells at distances between 19,000 and 13000 yard for 9 hits =2.22%
EXETER fired 200 8" shells at distances betwwen 18,000 and 13000 yard for 3 hits =1.50%
AJAX & ACHILLES fired 2065 6" shells at distances between 17,000 and 7000 yard for 17 hits =0.82%

*1940 Battle with JERVIS BAY
Weather*: 6/8 *Visibility*: decreasing from 24000 yar*d Sea State* calm to medium
AS fired 335 shells (including an unspecified number of 5.91") and attained no less than 8 documented hits at ranges from 16,000 yard to 9,000 yard >2.39%

*1941 Battle of the Denmark Strait* (ranges 26,000 yard down to 16,000 and up again to ~20,000 yard before general disengagement at good visibility and medium seastate):
NORFOLK fired 12 rounds and attained no hits =0% (note, the rounds fired is statistically not large enough a sample)
PRINZ EUGEN 157 rounds fired and attained six hits =3.8% (note, some say five hits, depending on how You rate PoW damage assesments)

*1942 Battle of Barent Sea*
Weather: mixed with intermittent snow storms[/size] Visibility: max 14000 yard, min 1500 yard[/size][/size] Sea State: large swells [/size] 
Hipper fired 120 8" shells at distances between 20,000 and 11,000 yard for 3 hits =2.50%

*1942 Battle of Java Sea*, February 27th, 1942
Weather: Fair to poor[/size] Visibility: good to small[/size] Sea State: moderate swells [/size] 
The japanese cruisers fired 1619 8" rounds at distances between 26,000 yard and 15,000 yard in the long range part of the action for 5 hits =0.31% hit rate
Allied cruisers fired an unspecified number of shells at distances between 20,000 yard and 13,000 yard for one hit = <0.1% hit rate

*1943 Battle of the Komandorski Islands*, March 26th, 1943
Weather: Clear, light breeze from SW, high overcast.[/size] Visibility: Excellent[/size] Sea State: Glassy[/size] 
USS SALT LAKE CITY fired 832 8" shells (all AP + 26 HE) at distances between 22,000 yard down to 13,500 yard for 3 hits attained = 0.36%
USS RICHMONT fired 271 of 6in at distances between 17,000 yard down to 9,000 yard for 4 hits =1.47%
IJN NACHI fired 707 8" at distances between 22,000 yard down to 9,500 yard for 3 hits = 0.42%
IJN MAJA fired 904 8" at distances between 22,000 yard down to 9,500 yard for 6 hits = 0.66%

*1944 Battle of the Suribao Strait*, Octobre 24 - 25th, 1944
Weather: partly clouded[/size], wind 7kts 40 deg[/size][/size].[/size] Visibility: 4000 yard[/size] Sea State: smooth[/size][/size] 
American Cruisers expended 553 x 6-8” shells at distances between 16,000 and 8000 yard, attaining 11 hits =1.989%


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## stona (Nov 27, 2017)

British efforts to get the Republic into the war peaked in 1940.The British government put a unified Ireland on the table but de Valera declined.
British efforts at the time were predicated on the fear that the Germans would invade Ireland, indeed, on 20th June 1940, Chamberlain observed _‘I fear he_ [de Valera] _won’t be moved until the Germans are in Dublin’._

For his part, de Valera saw Ireland’s neutrality as a statement of sovereignty. The British envoy to Ireland, Health Minister Malcolm MacDonald, would report to London on his discussions with the Taoiseach

_‘He could not enter into serious discussions on any basis except the immediate establishment of a united, neutral Ireland. Moreover, the Taoiseach made it clear to Mr MacDonald that Ireland belonged to the Irish people and Great Britain had no right of any kind to attempt to barter the unity of the Irish nation for the blood of her people. Ireland’s unity and complete independence would come some day. The Government would defend the country against invasion, but they would not purchase unity by an act which would bring civil war and disaster to the people.”_

The crucial word in the first sentence is ‘neutral’. The final sentence and reference to ‘civil war and disaster’ should be a reality check to republicans who don’t read their history.
Despite de Valera’s optimism about defending the Republic, it was almost defenceless. This was a bad thing for the British. Had the British managed to convince de Valera to forego Irish neutrality it would have fallen to the UK to provide troops and all the other resources required to garrison and defend the entire Island at a time when they were least able to do so. With hindsight de Valera not only stood up for his nation and people, even when offered what the British would have considered the most juicy of all carrots, he did the British a favour!

The offer of a unified Ireland was made by the then Minister of Health, Malcolm MacDonald (son of Ramsay MacDonald) and it was on behalf of the British government. MacDonald was well qualified, having had dealings with Dublin in his former role as Dominions Secretary. The proposal was for the abolition of the Northern Irish State and the unity of Ireland under Dublin rule. It would have entailed the complete withdrawal of the British and their forces from the entire Island of Ireland AFTER the war.

The British also briefed the US representative in Dublin, David Gray, who summed up the offer thus.

_‘…it guaranteed the whole lock, stock and barrel, providing for the immediate setting up of a commission to draft an all-Ireland Constitution but insisting on a declaration of war by Eire.’_

( I don’t know why Americans refer to the Republic as ‘Eire’!)

De Valera had many reasons for not accepting the offer, some of which I mentioned above. Though the document setting out the British proposal was drawn up by Chamberlain and taken by MacDonald to Dublin on 26th June, de Valera knew it would be Churchill with whom he would deal. To put it politely, de Valera didn’t trust Churchill further than he could throw him and given Churchill's record over the Irish issue he was probably correct not to.

The reaction of Craigavon and the Ulster Unionists was predictable. Craigavon, having seen a copy of the proposal wrote

_‘I am profoundly shocked and ed by your letter making suggestions so far reaching behind my back and without any pre-consultation. To such treachery to loyal Ulster, I will never be party.’_

With a war to win, just as he might have reneged on any deal with Dublin, I suspect that Churchill would have been prepared to throw ‘loyal Ulster’ under the bus. This may well have precipitated the civil war de Valera feared.

For their part, the Germans never considered an invasion of Ireland as an option.Günther Blumentritt, the operations officer of Army Group A, later explained that any thoughts about an early German landing in Ireland

_"were quite unreal and they bear no relation to German resources at sea and in the air at the time. It would have been necessary to get there, a much harder task than an attack across the Narrows_ [I think a reference to Norway/Oslo (Drobaksundet) rather than the Channel]_. The British fleet and air force would have crushed any attempt very quickly. Above all, it would have been impossible to transport supplies even if we had got there in the first place."_

On a different point,De Valera explained his visit of condolence to the German representative in Ireland in a letter to his close friend, Robert Brennan, Irish envoy to Washington.

_“I could have had a diplomatic illness but, as you know, I would scorn that sort of thing…So long as we retained our diplomatic relations with Germany, to have failed to call upon the German representative would have been an act of unpardonable discourtesy to the German nation and to Dr Hempel himself. During the whole of the war, Dr Hempel’s conduct was irreproachable. He was always friendly and invariably correct—in marked contrast with Gray _[US representative]._ I certainly was not going to add to his humiliation in the hour of defeat.”
_
You might like to investigate who flew what flags at half mast and on what buildings 

Cheers

Steve


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## Glider (Nov 27, 2017)

PSI
There is a huge difference between warships firing at approx. 20,000 yds travelling at 25 - 30 knots and a totally defenceless tug towing two loaded barges at 2-3 knots at a range thats likely to be down to 100 - 200 yards where the AA guns would simply decimate the targets.

You should also recall that part of the attack on the barges RN warships including battleships sailed up and down the channel without any problem

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## stona (Nov 27, 2017)

Glider said:


> You should also recall that part of the attack on the barges RN warships including battleships sailed up and down the channel without any problem



Exactly.

For the Germans, the fundamental problem was that the British still retained command of the sea in Western Europe and no amount of planning, barge loading or Siebel innovations could overcome that.

Cheers

Steve

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## pbehn (Nov 27, 2017)

stona said:


> ( I don’t know why Americans refer to the Republic as ‘Eire’!)


Because that was what it was called for a short time, during the war ships from the Irish Republic had Eire on the side to denote a neutral vessel. I remember seeing it on maps at school in the sixties and seventies.
Éire - Wikipedia

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## parsifal (Nov 27, 2017)

Glider said:


> PSI
> There is a huge difference between warships firing at approx. 20,000 yds travelling at 25 - 30 knots and a totally defenceless tug towing two loaded barges at 2-3 knots at a range thats likely to be down to 100 - 200 yards where the AA guns would simply decimate the targets.
> 
> You should also recall that part of the attack on the barges RN warships including battleships sailed up and down the channel without any problem





The guy is not listening I'm afraid. every one of the nngagements he has quoted, some incorrectly or misleadingly have zero relevance to what we are looking at here. 

The germans operated through most of the war at sea, for their surface forces, on the basis of avoiding combat on equal terms. inevitably these combats were carried out at high speed, at long range against targets that were free to manouver and with considerable defensive and offensive offensive capabilities. on those occasions when DKM was unable to run, they were lost. this occurred at Narvik, Oslo, and 2nd Denmark strait.

We have a similar situation in this hypothetical. Escorting an invasion convoy leaves DKM with no choice other than to fight it out. If you scatter the convoy, you will not be able to complete the Amphib operation. Your targets are severely restricted in speed and severely restricted in manouver. There are insufficient escorts to cover the perimeter. many of the defending escorts are too lightly armed to offer significant resistance except at ranges below 1-2000 yds. And then only for a very short period. 

This would be a battle like no other that DKM ever fought. DKM was a sea denial force, a force designed and structured to fight short, sharp engagement where there was no need to control the ocean after the engagement. This would force DKM into a role for which it could not win and was not trained to do. sea control. DKM would have to stand their ground win the fight and drive the RN away from the convoy. this was never going to happen.
,

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## swampyankee (Nov 27, 2017)

buffnut453 said:


> There are a number of scenarios where Germany having troops in Ireland would be beneficial...but I just don't see it happening, nor do I see it being sustainable. Certainly it's not a good starting point for an invasion of the GB mainland.



German troops beneficial? Beneficial to whom? Certainly not the Irish! Possibly a benefit to the nazis, but when -- and they would -- the Irish-Americans start hearing about German atrocities against the Irish -- and those would happen, too, as they had in _every_ country Germany occupied -- the US would probably get more actively involved, sooner.



buffnut453 said:


> On the plus side, one could imagine Hitler offering reunification as a carrot to encourage active aggression by Eire against Britain. That reunification could remove airfields in Northern Ireland that were used for long-range maritime reconnaissance, which would be a boon for the U-Boat fleet. It would also send a powerful message to counter the "Britain standing alone" propaganda...because a significant part of the UK would have fallen to the enemy.



Fighting on after a significant part fell to the enemy could form a good basis for propaganda. 



buffnut453 said:


> Despite these potential positives, I don't think any such operation would be sustainable, nor do I think the Irish Government would be duped by any such offer from Hitler. Eire had far too much to lose to countenance such an operation.



I'm sure the Irish would see that sort of unification, under nazi rule, to be worth even less than reunification would be under the British.

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## Milosh (Nov 27, 2017)

*Irish Republican Army – Abwehr collaboration in World War II*
Irish Republican Army – Abwehr collaboration in World War II - Wikipedia


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## buffnut453 (Nov 27, 2017)

swampyankee said:


> German troops beneficial? Beneficial to whom? Certainly not the Irish! Possibly a benefit to the nazis, but when -- and they would -- the Irish-Americans start hearing about German atrocities against the Irish -- and those would happen, too, as they had in _every_ country Germany occupied -- the US would probably get more actively involved, sooner.
> 
> 
> 
> ...



Yes...beneficial to the Germans. The question was asked about the purpose of Germany landing troops in Ireland...so, clearly, the advantages are all to Germany. 

The point I was trying to make is that, from a German perspective, occupation of Ireland would have some positive outcomes, particularly for the U-Boat campaign. However, the Irish Government would be decidedly against any such move. If Germany forced the issue, there might be some immediate tactical gains but it would not result in a sustainable positive change to strategic outcomes for Germany. As you point out, it likely would accelerate US involvement in the war.


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## nuuumannn (Nov 27, 2017)

parsifal said:


> The guy is not listening I'm afraid.



I've just read through (over a few days, that is) the entire thread, all 28 pages. It hasn't moved on by much since it first began. There's been one guy (at a time) who doggedly believes the Germans could have gone ahead with Sealion and succeeded, whereas every other poster uses logic and a better understanding of the situation to prove that it wouldn't. Yet that one guy _still_ refuses to accept it, after 28 pages of it! I don't know if PSL and Dogwalker are one and the same (or go to the same bierkellar/internet forums), but the latter was well antagonistic at times!

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## stona (Nov 27, 2017)

It is dangerous to conflate the IRA with the political leadership of the Republic in 1940. The British did to an extent. They saw Ireland as uncooperative, the recent loss of the treaty ports caused anger, compounded by the belief that Ireland was full of Nazi sympathisers, fifth columnists and the IRA, adhering to the traditional doctrine 'England's difficulty is Ireland's opportunity'. It was a view of Ireland formed with the benefit of several hundred years of shared history and it was largely nonsense.

Most Irish people were not sympathetic to the Nazi cause, even in 1940. Since the mid 1930s the de Valera government had pursued a ruthless campaign against Republican extremists who were regarded as a dangerous threat to the new state. The IRA was banned and its members faced internment, military tribunals and even in a few cases, execution. Just what the organisation was supposed to achieve on behalf of the Germans in such a political climate is difficult to say, but not much.

Aside from all this, and British perceptions of de Valera, the Germans considered him sympathetic to 'England', something he himself acknowledged.

Cheers

Steve

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## Shortround6 (Nov 27, 2017)

While the theoretical advantages are many the practical advantages are few and this is for the Germans. For the Irish the theoretical advantages are few and the practical advantages are close to zero. Aside from "sticking it to the British" there is really nothing in it for the Irish and an awful lot to loose. Aside from the Irish who joined the British military how many thousands (or tens of thousands) of Irish worked for the British in one way or another, even if just selling Irish grown food to the British? Irish economy really tanks even if the British don't counter attack the German/Irish bases. 

Without a science fiction transporter the Germans have no practical way of setting up or supplying a significant presence in Ireland.

Air supply is out of the question. Hundreds of Ju 52s trying to Overfly England or take-off from Brest and fly to Cork? (300 miles) the direct route puts you in sight of Lands End on a clear day so add a good dog leg and then remember that unless you bring it with you there won't be any av-gas in Ireland for the return trip. 
Submarines?
Highspeed dash by destroyers? There won't be any ammo for restocking the magazines in Ireland. And how many times could they pull this one off. 
Not to mention that the British just _might _(as in probably) violate Irish neutrality under the doctrine of hot pursuit to go after any German ship in an Irish port/harbour. 

Whatever the political considerations the practical one of getting more than a few platoons to Ireland and keeping them supplied seems out of the question.

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## stona (Nov 27, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> Highspeed dash by destroyers? .



What destroyers?



Shortround6 said:


> Not to mention that the British just _might _(as in probably) violate Irish neutrality under the doctrine of hot pursuit to go after any German ship in an Irish port/harbour.



Not might or probably, but would. 
There was already an agreement in place for Britain to respond to a German invasion of Ireland (at which point Ireland's neutrality was irrelevant). See Plan W. 
The Royal Navy would declare a 'sink on sight' zone in the western approaches and off the South and West coasts of Ireland. All other shipping was to clear Irish ports and head for various British ports, or be sunk.

The British were not f#cking about. The Germans had the same problem for the invasion of Ireland as they did for an invasion of Britain, just magnified. It was the British, not the Germans who controlled the seas around the British Isles.

Cheers

Steve

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## Shortround6 (Nov 27, 2017)

stona said:


> What destroyers?



The same 7-10 that were going to hold off the Royal Navy during Sea Lion 

Of course they had to get them from Germany to Brest for this to work, trying to run North west from Cuxhaven up around Scotland and then south to Ireland wasn't likely to work

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## Shortround6 (Nov 28, 2017)

Being somewhat more serious I would say that the Barges probably had more freeboard than they are given credit for. Being built to carry coal or ore (iron, others) means that even loaded with men, horses or even a truck they are running light.





I don't know if the hold sides are added to freeboard or not but the hold covers should keep out the majority of the spray/splash. Which is a good thing as I have mentioned before,any pumps on these craft are manual pumps. 
However even this additional freeboard may not be enough. 




Tug looks good (built 1915) but








And this is in a Dutch waterway several miles from the open sea.

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## fastmongrel (Nov 28, 2017)

Problem with a flat bottom Barge is in any sort of wind or current they need to be ballasted deep or they become completely uncontrollable. The Barges used for an invasion would have to have been well ballasted possibly with concrete.

I once took a 32 foot x 7 foot x 2 foot Canal Narrowboat onto the tidal River Douglas and cruised down to the River_Ribble  and then up to Preston docks. The whole experience of taking a flat bottomed not particulary powerful Canal boat into a tidal way was nerve wracking especially the point where we were heading towards the Irish Sea at about 2 knots whilst sideways with full throttle and the tiller hard left. Fortunately after a minute of panicking I remembered what I had to do run with the current, throttle back then use the speed to turn into the current if I had tried to turn with full throttle we would have been walking homehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/River_Ribble

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## parsifal (Nov 28, 2017)

nuuumannn said:


> I've just read through (over a few days, that is) the entire thread, all 28 pages. It hasn't moved on by much since it first began. There's been one guy (at a time) who doggedly believes the Germans could have gone ahead with Sealion and succeeded, whereas every other poster uses logic and a better understanding of the situation to prove that it wouldn't. Yet that one guy _still_ refuses to accept it, after 28 pages of it! I don't know if PSL and Dogwalker are one and the same (or go to the same bierkellar/internet forums), but the latter was well antagonistic at times!




You are absolutely right, and offer a steadying hand to the frustration that is slowly building in me with this guys obstinance and outright lies.

I'm going through my notes and checking on the battles he has quoted, and most of them are misrepresented

take 1st battle of narvik for example. His account is misleading in the extreme. The generally accepted account of what happened that day goes more like this...

FIRST BATTLE OF NARVIK
Early on the 10th, DKM DD DIETHER VON ROEDER was supposed to be on patrol across the mouth of Ofotfjord, but the approaches were unguarded. ROEDER was supposed to remain on patrol until relieved by HANS LUDEMANN, but in ROEDER's diary there was the entry "Am relieving SCHMIDT from 0300 as ASW patrol until dawn." ROEDER left her patrol area across Ofotofjord and turned towards Narvik with the RN DesFlot 2 less than a mile astern in heavy snow and mist. ROEDER anchored at Narvik at 0420. German refuelling was far behind schedule. While tkr JAN WELLEM (11,776grt) had arrived on schedule, the second tanker, KATTEGAT (6031grt) was sunk late on the 9th before reaching Narvik. LUDEMANN and HERMANN KUNNE were alongside the converted whaler JAN WELLEM when the British attack began at 0430.

DD HARDY went in first into the harbour and fired 7 torps. 1 exploded in the aft magazine of *DD WILHELM HEIDKAMP (DKM 2411 grt)* blowing off her stern; 81 crew including Cmdore Bonte were killed. Finally, on the 11th at 0600, as a result of culminating damage, *HEIDKAMP capsized and sank*.

Other torps from HARDY were aimed at the merchant ships in the harbour which the Germans had seized. These torps generally hit their intended targets striking these MVs in the harbour. As DD HARDY withdrew, DDs HUNTER and HAVOCK entered the harbour firing torps. Torps from HAVOCK struck *DD ANTON SCHMITT (DKM 2411 grt)*, seriously damaging her. DD KUNNE (she rolled over in fact), getting underway from alongside the tkr, was near SCHMITT when the torps hit and sustained damage to her engines from the concussion. SCHMITT, rolling over, settled onto KUNNE immobilising her for 40 minutes. 63 crew were killed on DD SCHMITT. DKM DD LUDEMAN had a gun knocked out from shellfire and a fire which necessitated flooding of her after magazine. 2 crew were killed.

*Steamers SAPHIR ( 4306 grt)* and *ELDRID ( 1712 grt)* were sunk in the harbour , but not paid off until later. , steamers *STRASSA (SD 5602 grt)* and *BODEN (SD 4265 grt)* ; Steamers *FRIELINGHAUS (Ger 4339 grt), HEIN HOYER (Ger 5836 grt), NEUENFELS (Ger 8096 grt), MARTHA HEINDRIK FISSER (Ger 4879 grt), AACHEN (Ger 6388 grt), ALTONA (5398grt) *were lost to hardy's torpedoes

DDs HOSTILE and HOTSPUR had been detailed to neutralize nonexistent coastal btys on the nth shore of Narvik. Upon finding no btys, the DDs entered the harbour fight. DD HOTSPUR fired torps at numerous merchant ships in the harbour and HOSTILE went into a gun action with *DKM DD ROEDER* damaging her so severely that the order to abandon ship was given by the German skipper. 

As the DDs withdrew, DDs HOSTILE and HOTSPUR laid a smoke screen and HOSTILE fired her torpedoes against merchant ships in the harbour. DesFlot 2 thus far had fought an excellent fight, in the finest RN Destroyer traditions, at this point the flotilla began its withdrawal out of the fjord. During this battle, 

DKM DDs WOLFGANG ZENKER , ERICH GIESE , and ERICH KOELLNER in Herjans fjord, waiting to refuel, got the alarm of the RN intrusion at 0515 and got underway at 0530. They chased the RN ships up the fjord as they were on the verge of escaping as the German destroyers did not have fuel to continue the chase further. However, DKM DDs GEORG THIELE and BERND VON ARNIM, getting underway from Ballengen fjord at 0540, contacted the RN DDs and attacked. In the ensuing fray, THIELE had two guns knocked out, a magazine flooded, was set afire and ARNIM was hit 5 times and had a boiler room flooded. DDs ZENKER, KOELLNER and GIESE expended more than half of their ammunition. 15 crew were killed and 23 wounded on DD THIELE. 2 crew was killed on DD ARNIM.

In the exchange, *DD HARDY (RN 1456 grt) *was badly damaged and then lost Cptn Warburton-Lee (flotilla leader) and 18 others were killed, and 12 wounded (1 died 3 months later). *DD HUNTER (RN 1370 grt) *was also badly damaged and then lost after a collision with DD HOTSPUR. DD HOTSPUR was badly damaged by German gunfire. 101 crew were lost on the HUNTER. 46 survivors were picked up by DKM DDs. Stuart-Menteth and 37 ratings were later able to escape to Sweden. 9 crew remained pows for the duration. The remaining survivors died from their wounds and exposure.

DDs HOSTILE and HAVOCK escaped without serious damage, but HOTSPUR suffered 14 fatalities, with 3 other ratings dying of wounds, 11 other crew were wounded. Retiring from the Fjord, DDs HOTSPUR, HAVOCK, HOSTILE encountered the *AK RAUENFELS (Ger 8460 grt)* carrying the Narvik force's ammunition supplies. DDs HAVOCK and HOSTILE hit RAUENFELS several times with gunfire and a fire was started that soon detonated the ammunition and destroyed RAUENFELS. DD HAVOCK picked up the Captain and 18 crew from one boat from the German steamer. The two other boats rowed ashore and were captured by Norwegian forces. DD HAVOCK sustained some hull damage from the concussion, but the German forces at Narvik now had no reserve ammunition which was sorely needed.


Doesn't read much like the account being fed to us by the other side does it. Doesn't support the notion that merchant shipping in near stationary condition could not be easily hit either.

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## pbehn (Nov 28, 2017)

parsifal said:


> DDs HOSTILE and HOTSPUR had been detailed to neutralize nonexistent coastal btys on the nth shore of Narvik. Upon finding no btys, the DDs entered the harbour fight. DD HOTSPUR fired torps at numerous merchant ships in the harbour and HOSTILE went into a gun action with *DKM DD ROEDER* damaging her so severely that the order to abandon ship was given by the German skipper.
> 
> As the DDs withdrew, DDs HOSTILE and HOTSPUR laid a smoke screen and HOSTILE fired her torpedoes against merchant ships in the harbour. DesFlot 2 thus far had fought an excellent fight, in the finest RN Destroyer traditions, at this point the flotilla began its withdrawal out of the fjord. During this battle,
> .


HMS Hotspur was my fathers ship for a while, though after Narvik. My mother still has a fading picture on her living room wall.

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## psl (Nov 28, 2017)

parsifal said:


> You are absolutely right, and offer a steadying hand to the frustration that is slowly building in me with this guys obstinance and outright lies.
> 
> I'm going through my notes and checking on the battles he has quoted, and most of them are misrepresented
> 
> ...




Course It doesn't , its meant to dissolve the clash down to basic elements, the DATA. Your attempt is embellishment the narrative that only clouds any judgment.

Such battles are ALWAYS misrepresented the more embellishment is heaped on one side- instead of the other. This is called bias and if left unchecked , removes any value from the comment.

The only way to give equal treatment in a battle , is to religiously avoid any bias and dissolve every thing down to as simple as possible -neutral statistics.

Pretty much most posters on this thread are unashamedly biased posters commenting on this theoretical clash , which NEVER HAPPENED!. No one here is remotely qualified to offer anything other than a passing opinion. Therefor you will never be able to establish with any certainty what may or may not happen.


Simplify and inform.


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## fastmongrel (Nov 28, 2017)

parsifal said:


> You are absolutely right.....snip.



The two naval battles at Narvik showed the real Nelson touch.

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## pbehn (Nov 28, 2017)

psl said:


> Pretty much most posters on this thread are unashamedly biased posters commenting on this theoretical clash , which NEVER HAPPENED!. No one here is remotely qualified to offer anything other than a passing opinion. Therefor you will never be able to establish with any certainty what may or may not happen.
> .



Quite the opposite in my experience, especially the main posters on this thread. As far as I am concerned the situation is this. If the RAF were completely defeated with no loss to the LW, AND the Royal Navy withdrew to Scapa Flow AND the tides and currents stopped in the Channel then the invasion may have stood a chance however some units of the Home Guard and Dover dockers may have had to give a helping hand.


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## Graeme (Nov 28, 2017)

An alternate timeline...


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## parsifal (Nov 28, 2017)

psl said:


> Course It doesn't , its meant to dissolve the clash down to basic elements, the DATA. Your attempt is embellishment the narrative that only clouds any judgment.
> 
> Such battles are ALWAYS misrepresented the more embellishment is heaped on one side- instead of the other. This is called bias and if left unchecked , removes any value from the comment.
> 
> ...




But your post was innaccurate, and designed to misinform so you are not informing. And simplify does not mean selective editing of the facts. You did not describe the full extent of losses, the targets being aimed for, those that were hit or the ability to hit targets that are stationary (or near stationary, at close range and and lightly or unarmed). Your contention was that it was not possible to inflict serious damage on an enemy with surface naval forces at this time. You failed to take into account the ranges, the speeds of the targets. you misreported the losses. You have not reported that as a sea denial force, DKM usually looked to withdraw from heavy combat, something it cannot do in a sea control operation like sealion (or narvik, though at narvik there were supply issues and political interference to consider as well).

You are doing anything BUT presenting an unbiased informed case on this issue. Its typical and predictable in these sorts of debates that a favourite tactic in the debate is to turn around and claim bias from anybody that opposes people like yourself's point of view. Try presenting a case that is balanced, does not attempt to hide data that might not accord to your misguided preconceptions for a change and you might actually learn something.

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## stona (Nov 28, 2017)

The problem, understood by both the Germans and the British, was that even if the Luftwaffe could achieve local air superiority in daylight hours, it would not achieve the supremacy at sea required for an amphibious operation. I don't believe the RN could have been 'kept at bay' in daylight hours and it certainly couldn't be at night. The German planning called for 24 hour operations over many days. The invasion was an impossible undertaking for the Germans,* and they knew it.*

This is the crux of the myth of the Battle of Britain. Fighter Command did not save us from invasion, but it made a good story, particularly to a US audience, at the time.

_"Pretty much most posters on this thread are unashamedly biased posters commenting on this theoretical clash , which NEVER HAPPENED!. No one here is remotely qualified to offer anything other than a passing opinion. Therefor you will never be able to establish with any certainty what may or may not happen."
_
Rubbish! I base my opinion and conjecture of what would have happened on those of the men on both sides who were involved in the planning of and opposition to the operation. It is quite clear that many senior officers in the KM and some in the Army felt that this was a disaster waiting to happen. Many senior British figures did not believe that an invasion was really possible, it's what allowed reinforcement of the Mediterranean at the height of invasion fever and Admirals arguing for the release of naval assets from anti-invasion duties for convoy protection duties..

You can find details of the German planning for Sealion and contrast that with later Allied amphibious operations and draw your own conclusions.

Furthermore, various scenarios (all of which make a special allowance for at least some German lodgements to be established on the English coast, otherwise there is not much to play out) have been gamed by officers from both sides, some of whom were originally involved, and the result is always the same. The operation fails. Are you better qualified to offer a better opinion than them?

Cheers

Steve

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## parsifal (Nov 28, 2017)

_Pretty much most posters on this thread are unashamedly biased posters commenting on this theoretical clash , which NEVER HAPPENED!. No one here is remotely qualified to offer anything other than a passing opinion. Therefor you will never be able to establish with any certainty what may or may not happen.
_
Wrong. actually there are people in this place well qualified, either from an historical perspective, and or an operational experience perspective to comment on an operation such as sealion. which is why we can call out a dud and a fake when we see one. The operation I mean.

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## pbehn (Nov 28, 2017)

parsifal said:


> _Pretty much most posters on this thread are unashamedly biased posters commenting on this theoretical clash , which NEVER HAPPENED!. No one here is remotely qualified to offer anything other than a passing opinion. Therefor you will never be able to establish with any certainty what may or may not happen.
> _
> Wrong. actually there are people in this place well qualified, either from an historical perspective, and or an operational experience perspective to comment on an operation such as sealion. which is why we can call out a dud and a fake when we see one. The operation I mean.


Others have just crossed the channel frequently in 27,000 ton ferries being thrown about or fog bound for hours fairly regularly.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 28, 2017)

I would note that trying to make comparisons of long range gun fire against fast moving ships vs close range gunfire vs slow/stopped ships is almost like comparing cheese and chalk.

In the interest of presenting _Data._

British 6in shell from modern cruisers took 47.16 seconds to reach 20,000yds. A 30kt ship could cover just under 2400ft in that amount of time. 
At 5,000yds the time of flight was 6.57 seconds and a 30 kt ship could only move 333ft. Angle of decent at 20,000yds in 39 degrees 52 minutes while the angle of decent at 5000yds is 3 degrees 0 minutes.
Figuring out exact course and exact speed of the target took some doing (even early radar didn't give good answers.) you had to plot the target ships movement and deduce course and speed from multiple sightings or taking the range/bearing. 
Bigger guns have shorter times of flight to long ranges, smaller guns have longer time of flight,if they can reach 20,000yds at all. 
Obviously using data from long range gun duals skews the number of rounds fired to get a hit. 

For close range gunnery ( under a few thousand yds) things revert pretty much to WW 1 or before considerations. 
You are no longer lobbing shells into the air at the _expected _future position of the target but firing directly at the target.(pretty much).

Assuming calm water and good visibility, (more on that later) you have very little movement of the target (a ship length for a destroyer at 5,000yds, 1/2 a ship length for a large cruiser or a ship doing only 15kts). What becomes important is danger space 





Not quite what I was looking for but it helps.
At 3000yds a 6in gun with MV of 2600fps was rated as having a danger space of 313 yds vs a 25ft high target. At 8000 yds that dange space had shrunk to 60 yds. Source, for numbers, chart for Bethlehem Steel guns in 1914 naval annual. 
Now two things show up here, short ranges give much greater danger spaces (and less target movement) *but *target size also matters. Much harder to hit craft that only sticks up out of the water 4-6ft vs one that is 20-30ft high. 

Very few real battles took place in calm water with good visibility. If one started under such conditions one side (usually the weaker) would see the disparity in the size of the forces and try to escape. 

Firing from a moving ship was much more difficult that firing from land (one reason Coastal Batteries used a lot fewer guns than ships, each gun was much more 'effective'.) as the gun was moving up and down in plane (pitch), was constantly changing elevation (roll) and was moving in the horizontal plane (yaw). Many really big ships had firing circuits that would fire the guns at the same point in the roll to help eliminate that error. 

Gunnery from trawlers, sloops, tugs and old destroyers was much more basic. No (or very simple) gun directors. Trained gunners shot at a certain point in the roll as best they could (there were simulators for this) IF they could not follow the roll with the elevation gear. 

Shooting in rain/snow squalls is going to affect accuracy, you can't hit what you can't see or see intermittently and/or indistinctly. 
Shooting at night depends on either moonlight or flares/searchlights. 

As opinion I would say that the barges are not easy targets, they are very small in height and not very wide. On the other hand they are near stationary (even 4 kts is just about 6 ft per second). However the towing vessels are somewhat taller, the steam powered tow vessels (the vast majority) have boilers that not only have their tops above the waterline, the boiler tops were often higher than the main deck making them very vulnerable to gun fire/shell fragments. Top of the cylinder heads of steam engines (very few turbine powered tugs) were also above the waterline and/or the main deck. A leak in the boiler or steam line could render the boiler/engine room uninhabitable. It might only take a few hours (maybe less?) to repair some leaks once the steam dissipates but until that time the tow vessels and barges are drifting at the full mercy of wind, waves and currents.

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## pbehn (Nov 28, 2017)

Barges are not easy targets but they don't even need a direct hit to sink them or seriously injure those in them.

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## Shortround6 (Nov 28, 2017)

Everything about the barges is a compromise or trade-off. The coal and ore haulers were mostly made of iron or steel plate (some wood ones?) and if riding low are small targets and are protected by the water from fragments from all but the closests misses. However if low riding they are more subject to water coming aboard from near misses, less margin for flooding before water enters from other points, and again, damage control was minimal. 
If riding high they are bigger targets but take longer to fill with water to the point of sinking. The men are more exposed because more of their bodies are above the water line and are depending on hull thickness/material.


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## pbehn (Nov 28, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> Everything about the barges is a compromise or trade-off. The coal and ore haulers were mostly made of iron or steel plate (some wood ones?) and if riding low are small targets and are protected by the water from fragments from all but the closests misses. However if low riding they are more subject to water coming aboard from near misses, less margin for flooding before water enters from other points, and again, damage control was minimal.
> If riding high they are bigger targets but take longer to fill with water to the point of sinking. The men are more exposed because more of their bodies are above the water line and are depending on hull thickness/material.


True for a barge on the open sea, a different issue on a beach, the only way they will be missed by naval artillery while trying to unload is if the sea is so rough the barges wouldn't make it anyway.


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## swampyankee (Nov 28, 2017)

Graeme said:


> An alternate timeline...
> 
> View attachment 473821



Oh. The time line were both my sisters' in-laws are all murdered. Thank you, but no.


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## parsifal (Nov 28, 2017)

I wonder how many of the members have been involved in exercises like “Tandem thrust” or the later “Talisman sabre”. When I was in the service they were known as exercise “Kangaroo I, II and III”. They are basically the US Pacific Fleets major bi-annual training exercises to test out many aspects of combined operations including a major focus on planning and implementation of amphibious operations. 

These exercises are also Australia's major biennial training exercise with United States forces, As a rule the exercise in the in the Shoalwater Bay area in Queensland involve more than 12,000 Australian and 15,000 American personnel in the month long exercises.

The Australians represent all three forces and come from all parts of the country.

The Kangaroo exercises involved generally more that 60 warships and some 300 aircraft. Obviously the techniques and technologies have changed since 1940, but certain basic truths and principals remain constant for operations of this kind. 


The exercises are designed to integrate Australian forces in working with the US marines and other allied forces in a war fighting environment, as well as develop the ADF's interoperability with US and other forces, and refine procedures for combined operations and test theory and practice in many different operations types, but including amphibious assault and the simple act of getting a large body of troops across the ocean to an insertion point.

In modern terms 'combined operations ' is used to indicate an operation conducted by forces of two or more nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission. 'Joint' activities, operations, organisations and the like refer to elements of more than one Service of the same nation participating together.

Highlights of the exercise have always been the amphibious landings in Shoalwater Bay and the sinking by warships and aircraft of decommissioned American and Australian naval vessel in deep waters off the Queensland coast (this happens less now with cost and environmental considerations) demonstrates in the clearest possible terms that hitting a stationary target at close range was not a difficult task. Sometimes these gunnery training exercises were done with ‘open sights”. That is, without the benefit of radar or other “modern” aids.

Under exercise tandem thrust in 2001, a scenario was devised where a friendly 'Blue Force', drawn from a combined Australian and American force, was to conduct an amphibious landing at Shoalwater Bay following an opposed sea passage. The US Commander Seventh Fleet, Vice Admiral James Metzger, USN commanded the 'Blue Force'. Little talked about but he suffered “catastrophic losses” in the approach from the orange force. It just served to underscore lessons already known, that in order to safely deliver an amphibious package on an opposed coast, you need decisive air superiority, and also decisive sea superiority. In sealion, the germans even under the most optimistic of assumptions cannot hope to achieve either state.

An enemy 'Orange Force' of Australian and American forces supported by an element of the Canadian Navy and commanded by the Commander of First Division, Major General Jim Molan opposed the attack

Commenting on the exercise MAJGEN Molan said that Tandem Thrust 2001 provided an excellent opportunity for the ADF and US forces to increase its own professional war fighting skills in a combined and joint environment, as well as further relations with Australia's major ally.

Recent history has taught us that Armed Forces may be called upon to embark on combined operations with very short warning,' he said. 'The Tandem Thrust series of exercises ensure that the ADF is ready to move at short notice and integrate quickly into larger operations if it is ever required to do so.'

'I am looking forward to a challenging exercise from which valuable lessons may be learned and implemented in any future contingency,' he said.

The exercises are generally conducted as “free play” exercises designed to give planners, tactical warfare offices and other senior commanders the opportunity to test procedures and plans under the most realistic battlefield conditions possible, without actually shooting at each other

I participated in three of these exercises. I have training in PWO (principal warfare officer). Ive served on gun armed ships that are the direct descendants of some of the DD types that were present or available for this hypothetical. No, I have never been in open combat, but yes ive provided training and instruction to others enrolled in similar trainng courses over the years. My university major whilst in the service was “strategic studies”. I was studying and learning the art of soldiering for over 10 years.

People with service experience are about as close as you can get to being qualified to comment IMO.

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## Peter Gunn (Nov 29, 2017)

psl said:


> Course It doesn't , its meant to dissolve the clash down to basic elements, the DATA. Your attempt is embellishment the narrative that only clouds any judgment.
> 
> Such battles are ALWAYS misrepresented the more embellishment is heaped on one side- instead of the other. This is called bias and if left unchecked , removes any value from the comment.
> 
> ...



You really haven't been paying attention, or have no clue as to who really visits this board do you?

I suggest you get to know who posts here by going through some older or even current threads. Check you ego at the door and learn a bit before making statements like the one I bold faced in your post. There is A LOT to learn from the gents that frequent this asylum, sometimes it's best to close the mouth and open the ears so to speak.

I say this hoping you'll avail yourself of the knowledge here and become a contributing member, good luck.

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## Milosh (Nov 29, 2017)

Wasn't _Sealion_ done by Sandhurst and came to the conclusion that it would have been a disaster for the Germans. Some might say there was bias since it was Sandhurst tho.

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## parsifal (Nov 29, 2017)

Milosh said:


> Wasn't _Sealion_ done by Sandhurst and came to the conclusion that it would have been a disaster for the Germans. Some might say there was bias since it was Sandhurst tho.


ah yes. here is the summary I found about how it progressed.

To make the landings work, it was found necessary to pull the bulk of the RN forces away from the east and south coasts of Britain.

http://mr-home.staff.shef.ac.uk/hobbies/seelowe.txt

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## pbehn (Nov 29, 2017)

parsifal said:


> ah yes. here is the summary I found about how it progressed.
> 
> To make the landings work, it was found necessary to pull the bulk of the RN forces away from the east and south coasts of Britain.
> 
> http://mr-home.staff.shef.ac.uk/hobbies/seelowe.txt


I didn't realise the plan was to tow barges at night! A recipe for chaos.


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## stona (Nov 29, 2017)

parsifal said:


> To make the landings work, it was found necessary to pull the bulk of the RN forces away from the east and south coasts of Britain.



This is what I was referring to when I said that some German lodgements had to be allowed, or there was nothing to game 

In the real world I very much doubt that any German troops would have landed in anything approaching good order.


Cheers

Steve

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## stona (Nov 29, 2017)

pbehn said:


> I didn't realise the plan was to tow barges at night! A recipe for chaos.



Not just tow across the Channel. Some of the manoeuvres which were to be coordinated (largely without any wireless communications) both for assembly and prior to the final approach to the beaches were also to be carried out in darkness. Only at first light would signal flags rather than lamps be used.

As I said before, the more you read the details of the German plan the less feasible it seems.

Cheers

Steve


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## pbehn (Nov 29, 2017)

stona said:


> Not just tow across the Channel. Some of the manoeuvres which were to be coordinated (largely without any wireless communications) both for assembly and prior to the final approach to the beaches were also to be carried out in darkness. Only at first light would signal flags rather than lamps be used.
> 
> As I said before, the more you read the details of the German plan the less feasible it seems.


Steve, what difference would wireless communications make unless you have lights on Where are you? I am here, where are you?

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## nuuumannn (Nov 29, 2017)

psl said:


> Pretty much most posters on this thread are unashamedly biased posters commenting on this theoretical clash , which NEVER HAPPENED!. No one here is remotely qualified to offer anything other than a passing opinion. Therefor you will never be able to establish with any certainty what may or may not happen.



Bias against what? The fact that the Germans themselves didn't carry it out because it was going to fail? You are in no position to make such a presumption regarding what members of this forum know and don't know. Regarding the establishment of certainty, are you kidding? All the evidence there points to a German defeat, but you cannot even acknowledge that even the Germans theselves thought it was a bad idea and that it wouldn't succeed. I call BS on your summation, simply because it was and still is extraordinarily obvious that Sealion would have failed.

You can't see it because you refuse to see it. You have not provided a shred of evidence to back up your claim, psl; you deliberately debate and dispute everything people write, that is backed up by sources, yet you provide none yourself, just mouthing off at others and their claims and sources. If you are so convinced of German victory, prove it. I bet you have never even been across the English Channel on a boat. I have, a bloody great ferry and people were still seasick - _and_ it was summer.



psl said:


> Simplify and inform.



What, imitating Donald Trump's twitter feed now? SAD.

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## Shortround6 (Nov 29, 2017)

And again we have the strange situation were the best weather conditions for the attackers are also the best weather conditions for the defenders. 




Pretty much a typical armed trawler of the time. In a less that flat calm she would be a lively gun platform and the gun crew working hard as the ship pitched and rolled. 
However in a less that flat calm the German towed barges are also in trouble just from the waves.
The Trawler has no radar and the gunner/s have to depend on seeing the target but the Germans are controlling their fleet/barge strings with signal lamps or signal flags so they need good visibility or the whole thing falls apart. Rain squalls, fog , sea mist would reduce the German "formations" to shambles so they need the same visibility and sea conditions that would favor the armed trawlers gunnery the most.


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## pbehn (Nov 29, 2017)

What were the actual weather conditions when the invasion was supposed to happen? That is a great photo SR but it doesn't look like the Channel in Autumn.


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## nuuumannn (Nov 29, 2017)

The thing is, the weather in the Channel (and over the North Sea) changes very quickly and suddenly. I remember on one particular trip on a walking tour of the heavy gun emplacements overlooking Dover, the day started with good clear weather, but in less than an hour it had greyed up and started raining. Visibility dropped rapidy. After a couple of hours the fog had rolled in. We left Dover and headed to Capel, and by the time we reached the BoB memorial it was sunny and clear (but very windy).


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## Airframes (Nov 29, 2017)

Here are a couple of pics of the Channel in August, with the English coast line at the right..
OK, at this altitude, the sea state is not visible, but those cloud formations tell at lot. The second pic, taken maybe two minutes after the first shot (if that), is approaching the coast of Holland - look how quickly the clouds have developed, meaning the weather situation below has also changed, and the sea will be starting to get rather agitated.

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## Shortround6 (Nov 29, 2017)

It isn't. 

Just pointing out that the gunnery of many of these small ships was nowhere near the gunnery of larger naval vessels. However the Germans, to have any chance of success, would have to pick weather conditions most favorable to their situation, clam seas and good visibility for visual signaling. Few, if any of the barges would have radios and even a good number of the tugs/ tow vessels would not have two-way radios.

With hundreds of trawlers in service their accomplishments are all over the place. From being sunk in their first engagement to having carriers that lasted the war and serving in the waters off 3 continents. 

Google HMT Arab and see Trawlers – World War 2

for some reading about some of these trawlers. 

If the trawlers are having a hard time with conditions the Invasion has already failed.

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## pbehn (Nov 29, 2017)

nuuumannn said:


> The thing is, the weather in the Channel (and over the North Sea) changes very quickly and suddenly. I remember on one particular trip on a walking tour of the heavy gun emplacements overlooking Dover, the day started with good clear weather, but in less than an hour it had greyed up and started raining. Visibility dropped rapidy. After a couple of hours the fog had rolled in. We left Dover and headed to Capel, and by the time we reached the BoB memorial it was sunny and clear (but very windy).


He He Nuuumannn, I am a veteran of many ferry crossings over more than 25 years, I was just asking if there was a record of the actual weather on the actual proposed dates.


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## nuuumannn (Nov 29, 2017)

Oh, okay, but the weather is remarkably changeable - I was astonished and regular journey makers to the area expressed no surprise at all to it. We did have fun standing on the cliffs yelling "I wave my private parts at your aunties!" and "Your mother was a hamster and your father smelled of elder berries!" in the general direction of France in the rain!


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## pbehn (Nov 29, 2017)

nuuumannn said:


> Oh, okay, but the weather is remarkably changeable - I was astonished and regular journey makers to the area expressed no surprise at all to it. We did have fun standing on the cliffs yelling "I wave my private parts at your aunties!" and "Your mother was a hamster and your father smelled of elder berries!" in the general direction of France in the rain!


nuuumannn your profile says Nelson which comes up as New Zealand south Island, you discovered why the English have a weather condition known as "changeable" which freaked out my Japanese colleagues, it says nothing and everything..."prepare for every possibility", something you cannot explain to anyone who hasn't been there. The idea of setting off in the dark to cross the channel in a towed barge could only be proposed by someone who hasn't left central Europe. A barge crossing a +/- 6 kts current at 2.5 kts is like a bomber doing 200 MPH flying in +/- 500MPH side winds with no outside reference other than a compass you have no idea where you are going or where you are until the sun rises. Some would land on a beach, some would be in open sea further from their destination than when they started.


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## nuuumannn (Nov 29, 2017)

pbehn said:


> something you cannot explain to anyone who hasn't been there.



Yep, agree wholeheartedly. It just reinforces just how unfeasible the entire venture would have been. In flat bottomed barges?!

Yes, I'm in sunny Nelson, a nice part of the world and a city in its own right, although a tiny one compared to European metropoli. It has a stretch of beach within the city and the airport is only five minutes drive from the centre; not a bad place at all. I lived in the UK for ten years and also lived in Germany and have travelled extensively in Eastern and Western Europe - as well as the rest of the world. There are parts of New Zealand where the weather changes as much as the Channel area; just spend some time on the west coast and you'll see it, arguably with wilder weather extremes. The surprising thing about the south coast of England is that the weather will be so pleasant and still, then gone so suddenly. It's never 'pleasant' on NZ's west coast.


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## Peter Gunn (Nov 30, 2017)

Channel weather sounds reminiscent of the upper Great Lakes in North America, Lake Sailors use the same saying you all probably do, "Don't like the weather, wait five minutes".

I can attest to that, as a teenager I crewed (as a deck ape) one of the Boblo Island Amusement Park boats (SS Columbia) and even plodding up and down the Detroit River things could get pretty ugly at the drop of a hat. After one particularly bad return trip (last one of the day so in darkness), we were shipping green water down the main deck. Fractured an elbow just before we docked. Strangely, I've never been on a boat since.

I can't imagine trying to run a fleet of flat bottomed barges across the Channel, in retrospect, the Germans were wise not to attempt it.


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## fastmongrel (Nov 30, 2017)

pbehn said:


> He He Nuuumannn, I am a veteran of many ferry crossings over more than 25 years, I was just asking if there was a record of the actual weather on the actual proposed dates.



15th to 27th Sept 1940 calm, sea state 2 to 3, visibilty good but with patches of Fog. 
27th to 11th Oct strong northerly winds sea state reaching 6, visibility poor. 
12th Oct to 20th light easterlies sea state 3 to 4, visibility excellent. 
20th to 27th light easterlies sea state 2 to 3 patches of heavy fog. 
27th Force 8 south westerly sea state 7 visiblity very poor.
November regular deep lows from the Atlantic coming changeable and blustery sea state generally 5 to 6.

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## fastmongrel (Nov 30, 2017)

*WMO Sea State Code* *Wave height* *Characteristics
Sea state, height, conditions.*
0 0 metres (0 ft) Calm (glassy)
1 0 to 0.1 metres (0.00 to 0.33 ft) Calm (rippled)
2 0.1 to 0.5 metres (3.9 in to 1 ft 7.7 in) Smooth (wavelets)
3 0.5 to 1.25 metres (1 ft 8 in to 4 ft 1 in) Slight
4 1.25 to 2.5 metres (4 ft 1 in to 8 ft 2 in) Moderate 
4 was the absolute maximum for loaded Barges in open water
5 2.5 to 4 metres (8 ft 2 in to 13 ft 1 in) Rough
6 4 to 6 metres (13 to 20 ft) Very rough
7  6 to 9 metres (20 to 30 ft) High
8 9 to 14 metres (30 to 46 ft) Very high
9 Over 14 metres (46 ft) Phenomenal

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## pbehn (Nov 30, 2017)

fastmongrel said:


> 15th to 27th Sept 1940 calm, sea state 2 to 3, visibilty good but with patches of Fog.
> 27th to 11th Oct strong northerly winds sea state reaching 6, visibility poor.
> 12th Oct to 20th light easterlies sea state 3 to 4, visibility excellent.
> 20th to 27th light easterlies sea state 2 to 3 patches of heavy fog.
> ...


Hey, there was one period of excellent visibility, what could go wrong. "Changeable and blustery" was exactly the sort of description that my Japanese colleagues asked me to explain, usually before a trip to UK, I never managed a decent description, but they all understood when they came back to France.


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## fastmongrel (Nov 30, 2017)

I have been trying to find some historical tide data but the tides along the coast from Dover to Southampton seems to be missing for the war years.

There is also daylight length the figures for Dover 2017 but they should be roughly the same for 1940
Sept 1st......13h 30m
Sept 15th.....12h 39 m
Sept 30th.....11h 41m
Oct 15th.......10h 43m
Oct 31st........9h 45m

During the night those chaps in Blue will be running round the Channel being beastly to the Germans.


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## pbehn (Nov 30, 2017)

fastmongrel said:


> *WMO Sea State Code* *Wave height* *Characteristics
> Sea state, height,  conditions.*
> 0 0 metres (0 ft) Calm (glassy)
> 1 0 to 0.1 metres (0.00 to 0.33 ft) Calm (rippled)
> ...



Some info on channel tides from the swimming association web site.

Several factors affect the tides in the English Channel. The Dover Strait is renowned for having strong tidal flows with a large rise and fall in water from high to low tide. There are two types of tide, the ‘EBB’ tide and the ‘FLOOD’ tide.

Ebb Tide: This tide comes from the North East down the Channel towards Folkestone. It begins 4.5 hours after high water to 2 hours before high water (Dover).

Flood Tide: Travels up the Channel from the South West towards the North Sea. It occurs 1.5 hours before high tide to 4.5 hours after high water (Dover).

An important factor in tidal control is the moon. When the sun, moon and earth are aligned the tides are at their maximum strength and are known as SPRING tides. When the moon is at 90° to the earth, we have weak tides called NEAP tides. The tides alternate in a two weekly cycle. High water during spring tides is at roughly midday and midnight (GMT) and high water during Neaps is in the region of 6am and 6pm (GMT). The mean height for a high water Spring tide is 6.8 metres and a Neap tide is 5.3 metres.

The preferred time for swims to take place is on the Neap tides as the period before the tide turns is much longer and the tidal flow, especially at the Cape, is much slower. Your pilot however, is very knowledgeable in the way the tides work and therefore advice from him is crucial. There are places where the tide will help your swim and other areas where you will be hindered.

You can probably now understand, why time is critical on your swim. If you spend a lot of time on your feeds; for example, 3 minutes for a feed every hour then on a 14-hour swim you will have lost 42 minutes. This can be crucial towards the end of your swim when the tide is about to change. You may think you are nearing the end of your swim, when in fact the tide has suddenly changed direction and is now moving against you. This can result in a further 2 hours or more to land rather than the 20 minute distance it may seem to the naked / goggled eye.

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## michaelmaltby (Nov 30, 2017)

great post .... thanks


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## pbehn (Nov 30, 2017)

michaelmaltby said:


> great post .... thanks


I found it very interesting. The straight line distance is 21 miles and the record is 7 hrs which is similar to the 2.5Kts of a towed barge however the longest time ever for a single crossing was in 2010 when Jackie Cobell took 28 hrs 44 mins and swam 65 miles in total to cross the 21 miles due to very strong currents.

From this it is clear you cannot set off when you want, in some conditions you shorten your crossing time by staying on the beach. and waiting hours for the tides to change. If the wind is blowing up or down the channel then every six hours it changes from being with the tidal flow to being against it.

With a lot of planning the first wave may have got away with a disorderly arrival but after that it would be complete chaos with no input from the RN or UK land forces needed.

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## michaelmaltby (Nov 30, 2017)

makes one, yet again, appreciate the thought and planning that went into Over Lord in 1944

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## pbehn (Nov 30, 2017)

michaelmaltby said:


> makes one, yet again, appreciate the thought and planning that went into Over Lord in 1944


Even then one of the Mulberry harbours was blown away on Omaha in a storm force six to 8 on June 19th.

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## Juha2 (Nov 30, 2017)

One good comprasion point is the German attemps to reinforce their air-landing troops on Crete By sea-borne troops on 21/22 May and 22/23 May 1941 and the RN actions against those two small convoys.

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## Glider (Nov 30, 2017)

This is interesting the sea is pretty average but you can see that a barge being towed would be difficult to manage.

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## swampyankee (Nov 30, 2017)

One other thing about weather: in the northern hemisphere, it tends to move west to east: Britain would know about the weather first. In those crappy squalls, the RN doesn’t have as much worry about air attacks. 

The RN would also put its destroyers to sea in weather that had German destroyers — which were much larger than the British — running for port.


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## Koopernic (Nov 30, 2017)

Juha2 said:


> One good comprasion point is the German attemps to reinforce their air-landing troops on Crete By sea-borne troops on 21/22 May and 22/23 May 1941 and the RN actions against those two small convoys.



German operations over Crete were severely compromised by detailed enigma decrypts. The British, Australian and New Zealand forces knew the exact drop zones of German paratroops and thus prepared ambushes right underneath the drop zones. The casualties of what were elite troops were massive and the Germans (Hitler personally) never allowed a large scale parachute assault again. Id say German Naval operations were similarly compromised even if the German Navy was more careful so probably no judgment can be made.

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## Juha2 (Nov 30, 2017)

The knowledge of drop zones didn’t have impact on naval battles on the tactical level. The info on convoys made the interception more certain but the radar equipped RN task forces had patrolled north of Crete already during the previous night. And the battle shows the effects of the warships versus a lightly protected convoy if the warships made contact with the convoy. IIRC correctly Kriegsmarine ciphers were still fairy secure at that time. The ships transported Heer’s troops (Mountain troops of the 5th Mountain Div). I cannot remember how much inroads into Heer ciphers British had made at that time. The weak point of German signal security were the LW ciphers and the LW many times babble out also KM’s and Heer’s secrets in its messages. The other possibility was Italian ciphers as the escort ship was an Italian Spica-class torpedo boat (Lupo) and IIRC Brits read the Italian naval codes at least periodically during the war. So yes, on 21 May, as the result of Sigint info, an a/c from Egypt (a Maryland of No. 39 Sqn) sighted convoys of caiques escorted by warships allowing the RN to attack the first convoy around midnight 21/22 May. The second convoy skirmish happened during the morning of 22 May while the RN ships were under heavy and effective air attacks.

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## parsifal (Dec 1, 2017)

The allied troops on Crete (3 British battalions, 2 New Zealanders Brigades, 8 Greek Battalions and 6 Australian Battalions) had been aware of the impending assault through *Enigma* intercepts, and by a process of deduction were able to accurately estimate the drop zones for the attacking german forces. However the allied commanders on the spot were not provided with any details as to the strengths or actual landing zones of the German airborne forces. The allied forces on the spot worked this out on their own initiative.

The Germans had been provided with inaccurate intelligence and dropped into stiff resistance of nearly three times the amount of men they were expecting. Pure and simple this was a mistake on their part. They stuffed up through faulty intel. The garrison had been re-enforced by allied troops who had retreated from the Greek mainland. In most of the drops they were sitting targets.

The allies had no knowledge at all of the amphibious or seaborne intervention forces. These forces were not using the cracked enigma codes. they were either using the as yet unbroken 5 rotor version of the code, or the never broken Italian naval ciphers. Moreover whilst some low grade information information was being hacked into and the LW blabbing like a squawking baby which gave a good deal of information on some element of the german plan, the naval forces patrolling around crete were not so blessed with fore knowledge of the invasion forces. Again it is worth noting that the commanders on the spot were denied any access to intel of this nature, the sensitivity of the intelligence was simply too great to allow this to be widely distributed

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## Koopernic (Dec 1, 2017)

*There was no such thing as the Battle of Britain*. What there was was a *Campaign *by the Luftwaffe against The RAF and RN and latter British Munitions manufacturing targets and associated infrastructure. There could be no decisive battle, such as the Battle of Hastings, that could lead to collapse of the British Government and takeover of territory.

The simple reality is that there was no significant German preparation for a war with Britain. Their solution was to defeat Britain's Allie France so that Britain lacked the bases to prosecute a war against Germany.

But what preparations could have been taken with the stretched resources they had? Id say insufficient.

For instance if the simple expedient of fitting drop tanks (a technology known and used by the Luftwaffe on its He 51 over Spain) to all Bf 109E and Bf 110C had of been taken then probably the Luftwaffe might have achieved levels of attrition that meant that the RAF would loose air superiority and thus allow the Luftwaffe to operate its bombers with acceptable losses over *only about 50% of Britain.* Even with drop tanks there was insufficient range to reach all of the UK and Britain could simply move its vital factories and RAF training bases out of range in the Western Half.

*After the Norwegian campaign there was no German Surface Navy left*. That's one reason the German aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin {edit correct from Spey} was suspended: there was nothing left to escort it properly and nothing in sight. *I think they were down to 4 destroyers.* 

The major reason was faulty u-boat Torpedoes which Admiral Doenitz had calculated would have lead to 37 sinkings of Royal Navy ships had they had worked. The faults were:
1 the depth keeping mechanism became faulty because the reference pressure chamber leaked air from ambient. Exercises had failed to consider the long periods submarines would actually spend under water in actual combat. As a result the torpedoes ran too deep.
2 The magnetic proximity fuse didn't work properly.
3 the contact pistol trigger also didn't work.
So the u-boats had torpedoes that ran far too deep and had both magnetic and contact pistol that didn't work.

The problem was quickly fixed, much faster than the US navy fixed a similar problem, but the opportunity to seriously deteriorate the Royal Navy while protecting the Kriegsmarine's own surface ships was lost. The Kriegsmarine must defeat the RN at Narvick.

In order for even a remote chance of a German invasion you need the following pre conditions. *These are only the realistic ones.*

*1* German Torpedoes worked in Norway Campaign thereby keeping German Navy intact.

*2* All Me Bf 109 and Bf 110 are all fitted with drop tanks prior to so called Battle of Britain.
*3* The first flight of the Focke Wulf Fw 187 is allowed with Daimler Benz DB 600/601 or Jumo 211 in 1938 instead of the impossibly undersized *Jumo 210* so that *perhaps a hundred of these long range escort fighters are operational by BoB start 1940*. The Fw 187 flew with inferior and undersized Jumo 210 because the Bf 110 and Ju 87 had priority. This allows the Luftwaffe to escort over the entirely of Britain with a fighter competitive with Spitfires and Hurricanes. This can easily be achieved by compromising Me 110 production in favor of Fw 187 production.

The above might check mate the RAF.

4 The German Navy needs many more u-boats, perhaps twice is many blockade Britain and occupy the RN. They only had 36 u-boats at the outset of War. Perhaps the Graf Spey or the H class battleships could be abandoned, maybe even Bismarck and Tirpitz to find the steel.
5 A proper long range maritime reconnaissance bomber to support the u-boats instead of the fragile and under armed Fw 200 airliner. Ju 89 could have done the job. It would need to be available in larger numbers.
6 Long range escorts and patrols to protect the u-boats. See Fw 187. A proper fighter version of the Ju 88 instead of the bomber versions that had their bomb sight replaced with a 20mm canon. The majority of Ju 88 patrolling the bay of Biscay were Ju 88A series and they were not aqueduct to the task.
7 The British armies at Dunkirk must be captured or destroyed. The German Army must attack and take losses instead of allowing the Luftwaffe to try and do the job.

So its August 1940 merely through better torpedoes, fitting drop tanks, Abandoning Fw 190 development and some Bf 110 production in favour of a long range escort:
1 German Bombers can range over most of Britain with painful but sustainable losses because Spitfire production and fighter pilot losses can't keep up.

2 The Luftwaffe and u-boats can keep the invasion zone clear of the RN and it’s Stukas can support the invasion.

But there are no amphibious landing craft. The Luftwaffe Transport units and it’s pilots are decimated due to Dutch FLAK so there is no way of getting there. Sure the Giant Me 321 and 321 might support the job but they aren’t ready either.

The German Navy has some superb landing aircraft in design or construction but they can’t be ready by the fall of 1940 and a landing in the weather of say Jan 1941 sounds difficult.

I also have no surety of the state of British Army radar which is responsible for coastal artillery. Chain Home is to primitive for fire control but Chain Home Low came out of UK Army work for coastal artillery.

Furthermore there is a looming Soviet danger.


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## parsifal (Dec 1, 2017)

The relevant anti invasion activity off Crete ive previously summarized in the "This Day in the War In Europe"

At 2330 on the 21st NE of Canea, the convoy being led by RM LUPO convoy was attacked by CLA DIDO, CL AJAX, and ORION and DDs KIMBERLEY, HASTY, HEREWARD, and JANUS of Force D. The bow of cruiser AJAX was bent through ramming a caique. ORION sustained some damage to her bridge from pom pom fire from DIDO. Two men were killed and nine were wounded. DIDO expended 70% of her ammunition, CL ORION 62%, and AJAX 58%.

*Ten schooners (FI 5000 grt (est))* were sunk by the British ships. *Steamer CARMEN SYLVA (Ru 1601 grt)* was also sunk.

RM TB LUPO was hit by 18 six inch shells but incredibly survived despite heavy damage. The action was broken off at 0400/22nd. RM TB LIRA rescued some of LUPO convoy survivors.

Force B CLs GLOUCESTER and FIJI with DDs GRIFFIN and GREYHOUND, returning from an uneventful sweep through Matapan Strait, was bombed for 1.5 hrs from 0630 as it was returning to join Force A-1. GLOUCESTER received some splinter damage from near misses. Cruiser FIJI received slight hull damage from near misses. GLOUCESTER only had 18% of her AA ammunition remaining. Cruiser FIJI only had 30% remaining. Force B joined Force A 1 at 0830.

British Force C, composed of CLAs NAIAD, CALCUTTA and CARLISLE, and RAN CL PERTH, as well as DDs KANDAHAR, KINGSTON, and NUBIAN attacked the RM convoy being escorted by TB SAGITTARIO. Torpedo boat SAGITTARIO was hit several times and at least one caique was set on fire. However the attack was broken off due to air attacks. The force withdrew to the SW, but was hampered in that CARLISLE's maximum speed was only twenty one knots, due to various defects.

CLA NAIAD sustained four near misses and her speed was limited to 16 knots. Two of her turrets were knocked out. The damage was structural. 7 men were killed and 31 wounded. NAIAD was able to proceed to Alexandria arriving on the 23rd.

CLA CARLISLE was hit on the bridge by a bomb and badly damaged. The skipper was killed. The cruiser was also struck by a second bomb. 15 crew were killed and 25 were wounded. The cruiser was repaired at Port Said from 26 May to 20 June.

DD KINGSTON closed to take off survivors from cruiser CARLISLE, but was ordered away. The cruiser was able to continue unassisted. KINGSTON was damaged by a near miss which caused damage to her machinery and hull. One rating was killed and two were wounded on the DD.

RAN CL PERTH was damaged by a near miss which damaged her six inch fire control. She sustained no personnel casualties. The cruiser arrived at Alexandria on the 23rd.

Force C joined Force A 1 at 1500. The German air attacks continued. BB WARSPITE was hit by a bomb at 1332 that put her starboard 4" and 6" batteries out of action. Her speed was reduced to 18 knots. Commissioned Boatswain A. E. Harding and seven ratings were killed, twenty four were missing, eleven died of wounds, and sixty nine were wounded. The BB arrived at Alexandria on the 24th. On 25 June, BB WARSPITE departed Alexandria for repairs at Bremerton, Washington. The BB departed Honolulu on 4 August and arrived at Esquimalt on 10 August escorted by two Canadian warships. She departed that day, under US.escort, for Bremerton, arriving on 11 August. Repairs were completed on 18 December 1941.

BB VALIANT was struck by two bombs aft that caused no serious damage or any personnel casualties.

At about noon, *GHI Class DD GREYHOUND (RN 1350 grt) * was detached to sink a caique, sighted by BB WARSPITE, between Pori and Antikithera. The DD sank the caique, but then was sunk herself by bombing while rejoining the Fleet. 76 officers and crew were lost with the ship. A further 8 crew were killed while in the water when strafed by attacking Me 109s. Some of the crew ended up on Crete, where 4 ratings were make POWs

What followed was a major blow for the RN. HMS GLOUCESTER formed part of a naval force acting against Axis military transports that themselves were trying desperately to get reinforcements to the hard pressed paratroopes fighting for Maleme airfield. The force began in operations nth of Crete with some success. On 22 May 1941, while in the Kythera, about 14 mi nth of Crete, she was attacked by LW Ju87s and sank, having sustained at least four heavy bomb hits and three near-misses. Of the 807 men aboard at the time of her sinking, only 85 survived. Her sinking is considered to be one of Britain's worst wartime naval disasters.

DDs KANDAHAR and KINGSTON picked up survivors. KINGSTON was damaged by near misses of air bombs. CLs FIJI and GLOUCESTER were ordered to support DDs KANDAHAR and KINGSTON.

On 30 May 1941, in a letter to the First sea Lord Dudley Pound, Admiral Cunningham wrote, "_The sending back of GLOUCESTER and FIJI to the GREYHOUND was another grave error and cost us those two ships. They were practically out of ammunition but even had they been full up I think they would have gone. The CO of FILI told me that the air over GLOUCESTER was black with planes_"

Cunningham was determined, though, that the "_navy must not let the army down_". At about this time of these heavy losses when army generals feared he would lose too many ships, Cunningham famously said, ”_It takes the Navy three years to build a destroyer. It takes 300 years to build a tradition. The evacuation will continue_”

Colony Class CL FIJI (RN 8530 grt) was sunk at 1830 by the LW. DDs KANDAHAR and KINGSTON dropped rafts and left the area, returning after dark to rescue survivors. KINGSTON picked up 339 survivors and KANDAHAR picked up 184. There were 523 survivors of the 780 man crew.

Colony Class CL FIJI in company with GLOUCESTER, returning to join Force C, came under heavy air attack at 1550. Town Class CL GLOUCESTER (RN 9400 grt) was hit by bombs and sunk. Cruiser FIJI dropped rafts for the survivors and continued with DDs KANDAHAR and KINGSTON.

DDs KANDAHAR and KINGSTON were able to refuel from the battleships in Force A 1.

RAN DDs STUART, VOYAGER, and VENDETTA coming from Alexandria were also ordered to pick up FIJI survivors, but they were unable to locate any. DDs KELLY, KASHMIR, KIPLING, KELVIN, and JACKAL from Malta joined Force A 1 later on the 22nd. At 1930, the DDs were detached to search of survivors of CLs GLOUCESTER and FIJI.

DDs DECOY and HERO were detached from Force A-1 to pick up the King of Greece, the Greek Prime Minister, and other important personages at Suda Bay.

Commando ship GLENROY with 900 troops departed Alexandria for Tymbaki escorted by CLA COVENTRY and sloops AUCKLAND and FLAMINGO. They were ordered at 2335 on the 23rd to return to Alexandria.

DDs JAGUAR and DEFENDER with ammunition for the troops on Crete departed Alexandria and joined Force A-1 off Crete. The DDs were detached to Suda Bay at 2359 on the 23rd.

CA YORK was abandoned after further damage by the LW.


22 May 1941
During the night of 22/23 May in Crete operations, DD DECOY picked up the King of Greece and his party from Crete. DD HERO in company picked up other important persons. Both DDs rejoined Force A-1 on the 23rd. The DDs were sent on ahead later on the 23rd.
DDs KELLY, KASHMIR, and KIPLING were on patrol in the Canea Bay area. DD KIPLING experienced a steering defects and withdrew to the west to correct it. DDs JACKAL and KELVIN patrolled in Kissamo Bay without event and returned to Force A-1 at dawn. DDs JERVIS, RAN NIZAM, ILEX, and HAVOCK patrolled Heraklion.
CLs ORION and AJAX were to join, but were unable to rendezvous in time and returned to Force D
DD ILEX was damaged by a near miss from the LW during the morning of 23 May. There was damage to her propeller, but sustained no personnel casualties. DD HAVOCK was near missed by the LW with damage to the boiler room. 15 men were killed and 10 were wounded. Force E arrived at Alexandria at 2000/23rd.

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## Koopernic (Dec 1, 2017)

Enigma Decrypts “Ultra” were never used without a cover story ie “plausible deniability”. Patrols or reconnaissance missions would have been set up in either a random or regular pattern so as to prevent German intelligence getting a correlation between compromised signals and allied actions.

Assets were however positioned whether they were patrols, battleships or fleets to take advantage of the foreknowledge Ultra provided. Field commanders were given orders not so general that they were unprepared. In Crete allied commander prepared for airborne assault. Patrols detected ships and assets just happened to be close enough to intervene.

The human tendency to be triumphant and to gloat or discredit a defeated enemy usually contradicts itself when viewed transcendentally. For instance one can not claim that the Germans were incompetent at protecting their ciphers by making it so easy yet be proud of how these “difficult” ciphers and their valuable information were cracked by allied ingenuity. One can not value Ultra yet at the same time be disparaging of German strategies or tactics because one wants them to seem fools associated with a bad ideology or because one does not want allied troops with the advantage of Ultra not to receive credit for their victory because they were playing with the advantage of a loaded dice. One can not have ones cake and eat it too.

As the Europe that the victorious allies inherited disappears in the way that it wanted and history for the most part becomes a lurid Hollywood version we must get the history true because few of the new peoples who inherit this posterity will care either way. The best we can hope for is they respect our truth.


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## stona (Dec 1, 2017)

German airborne operations against Holland were not compromised by any Enigma decrypts, and they too were very nearly a disaster. In terms of valuable transport aircraft and crews lost they were, and definitely limited German options against Britain.

It was the first large scale airborne landing in history and though lessons may have been learned the very idea that the Germans could have launched anything better a few months later across the English Channel is a ridiculous as much of the rest of Sealion planning. They planned to do the very thing in the capture of Lympne airfield that officers involved in the Dutch operation cautioned against! The pictures of burning Ju 52s littering various Dutch airfields should have concentrated the minds of the planners.

I recommend _'The_ _Battle For The Hague_ -_1940'_ by Lieutenant Colonel E. H. Brongers (ISBN: 9789059113077) for a good account of the airborne operations against Holland.

Cheers

Steve

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## swampyankee (Dec 1, 2017)

One of the weaknesses of the German Navy, worsened when u-boat wolf packs started, was that they were sometimes prone to being chatty. Radio can be detected and the transmitter located.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 1, 2017)

Ultra changed during the war, like most things. The number of messages that could be decoded in a day or week increased by a huge amount from beginning to end. Most histories (which could be wrong) put the effective start of British code breaking as June of 1941, I am sure some efforts were going on before then, but results may have been much lower. What commanders in the field knew is another thing.





Graph is for the average number of Ultra dispatches to field commanders per day. 
By the end of the war field commanders did have a significant advantage in knowing German plans. In 1940 and early 1941, not anywhere near as much.
And the actual content/detail is also important. A warning from Ultra that the Germans plan to send an invasion convoy to Crete is a big assist, giving the number of ships, the course the expected time of arrival would have been a much bigger assist. Of course most any commander worthy of the name knew where the most likely ports for such a convoy to come from were, what course (with a few zig zags ) they would have to come on, and roughly what hours they would come (night with arrival near dawn to minimize exposure) so allied commanders were not lead by the hand by Ultra.

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## stona (Dec 1, 2017)

Enigma was neither one type of machine, nor one code.

In 1940 the British could decipher a significant part of Luftwaffe traffic (mainly due to lax operational procedures) and some Army traffic, but none for the Kriegsmarine. All the services were using a version of the Enigma I, the KM's M3 machine was based on this, but Luftwaffe and Army machines were supplied with five cipher wheels, the Naval versions eight. Any more detail of how they were used you can look up yourselves 

The breakthrough in deciphering naval traffic came in mid 1941, when the British worked out the wiring of the additional wheels, and most popular accounts of enigma (Imitation Game etc.) give the impression that this was THE breaking of enigma, which is not the case.

On 2nd February 1942 the KM introduced a new enigma machine (the M4). This machine added an extra wheel which added an additional stage to the cryptographic algorithm. The extra wheel was not moved during encypherment and could not be exchanged with the other three wheels. The British were once again locked out of naval traffic, not regaining access until NINE MONTHS later.

Some versions of enigma, like the Enigma K used by the Abwehr, were never routinely broken, in fact it was never really broken at all.

Cheers

Steve

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## pbehn (Dec 1, 2017)

I am reliably informed by the BBC that Turing decoded all enigma traffic filled in the the Times crossword then did a round of golf before lunch.

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## Shortround6 (Dec 1, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> For instance if the simple expedient of fitting drop tanks (a technology known and used by the Luftwaffe on its He 51 over Spain) to all Bf 109E and Bf 110C had of been taken then probably the Luftwaffe might have achieved levels of attrition that meant that the RAF would loose air superiority and thus allow the Luftwaffe to operate its bombers with acceptable losses over *only about 50% of Britain.* Even with drop tanks there was insufficient range to reach all of the UK and Britain could simply move its vital factories and RAF training bases out of range in the Western Half.



The training bases could be moved, the factories not so much. At least not in a few weeks. 
Deeper penetrations would also lead to higher German losses. For incoming raids Radar told the British they were coming and told them the course over the channel (which could change over land) once 100-200 miles into Britain the British would know where they are and would know what route they would have to take to get out of Britain. 
Please note that a lot of the early raids were right along the coast and the Germans could be over water in minutes if not, in some cases , seconds. 



> *After the Norwegian campaign there was no German Surface Navy left*. That's one reason the German aircraft carrier Graf Spey was suspended: there was nothing left to escort it properly and nothing in sight. *I think they were down to 4 destroyers.*



I believe the carrier was the Graf Zeppelin, the Graf Spee was the Panzerschiff sunk off Montevideo. The Germans may very well have been down to 4 destroyers in June of 1940 but in the fall they were up to at least 7 with another 2-3 soon to be repaired? 




> The problem was quickly fixed, much faster than the US navy fixed a similar problem, but the opportunity to seriously deteriorate the Royal Navy while protecting the Kriegsmarine's own surface ships was lost. The Kriegsmarine must defeat the RN at Narvick.



The last was not going to happen. And I would note that British submarines caused a substantial amount of damage to German heavy vessels even if they did not sink them. 

In order for even a remote chance of a German invasion you need the following pre conditions. *These are only the realistic ones.*



> *1* German Torpedoes worked in Norway Campaign thereby keeping German Navy intact.
> 
> *2* All Me Bf 109 and Bf 110 are all fitted with drop tanks prior to so called Battle of Britain.
> *3* The first flight of the Focke Wulf Fw 187 is allowed with Daimler Benz DB 600/601 or Jumo 211 in 1938 instead of the impossibly undersized *Jumo 210* so that *perhaps a hundred of these long range escort fighters are operational by BoB start 1940*. The Fw 187 flew with inferior and undersized Jumo 210 because the Bf 110 and Ju 87 had priority. This allows the Luftwaffe to escort over the entirely of Britain with a fighter competitive with Spitfires and Hurricanes. This can easily be achieved by compromising Me 110 production in favor of Fw 187 production.



1. even with the best torpedoes in the world the U-boats could not have saved the Scharnhorst from getting hit by a torpedo from a destroyer unless you think the U-boats could have swept the Norwegian coast of all British surface ships. Commander of the Glorious should have shot for stupidity had he lived. _Gneisenau_ among other misadventures was hit by a torpedo from HMS Clyde on June 20th which put here out of action for 5 months. _Karlsruhe_ was sunk by the HMS Truant. Leipzig and Nurnberg had both missed the Norwegian campaign due to torpedo damage suffered in Dec 1939 From British subs. 
U-boats weren't going to save the Blucher either unless better torpedoes could take out shore batteries. 
2. covered above. 
3. There was nothing wrong with flying the _initial _FW 187s with Jumo 210s. either 1/4 or 1/3 of the Bf 110s used in Poland used Jumo 210s due to the shortage of DB 601 engines. Perhaps the mistake was in not shifting over later, but the whole evaporative cooling system scheme also delayed development of the FW 187 . I would also note that NO service Ju 87 used a DB 601 engine so they cannot be blamed for the FW 187 not getting them. 



> 4 The German Navy needs many more u-boats, perhaps twice is many blockade Britain and occupy the RN. They only had 36 u-boats at the outset of War. Perhaps the Graf Spey or the H class battleships could be abandoned, maybe even Bismarck and Tirpitz to find the steel.
> 5 A proper long range maritime reconnaissance bomber to support the u-boats instead of the fragile and under armed Fw 200 airliner. Ju 89 could have done the job. It would need to be available in larger numbers.
> 6 Long range escorts and patrols to protect the u-boats. See Fw 187. A proper fighter version of the Ju 88 instead of the bomber versions that had their bomb sight replaced with a 20mm canon. The majority of Ju 88 patrolling the bay of Biscay were Ju 88A series and they were not aqueduct to the task.
> 7 The British armies at Dunkirk must be captured or destroyed. The German Army must attack and take losses instead of allowing the Luftwaffe to try and do the job.



4. most sources say the Germans had 56-57 U-boats at the start of the war. How many were ready for sea may be different. Many are the small type IIs but that is the size you want if actually trying to operate in the channel or british coastal waters. I don't know how many more they got in service in teh year leading up to Sea lion. 

Stopping production of large surface ships means the British have time to change their building plans. I would also note that something under 2000 tons of steel had been assembled at the docks for the first two H class ships when construction was stopped so that doesn't get you much in the way of U-boats. Assuming of course that the steel is even suitable for U-boats and doesn't have to be sent back , melted down and reworked. Scrapping the Bismark and Tirpitz before completion means an awful lot of wasted money in already completed engines and armament (H class guns were used in shore batteries) and could very well signal to the British that they don't need five King George Vs?? 

more later.


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## pbehn (Dec 1, 2017)

Parachute and glider assault is a surprise tactic, it only works for as long as measures are not taken. During the BoB RAF pilots who had to make a forced landing had to be very carefull near the south coast because so many fields were filled with poles and other obstacles.

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## stona (Dec 1, 2017)

A lot of ditches, with a resulting bank several feet high, were dug across potential landing grounds as a fast, effective and cheap means of deterring gliders. The ditches could also subsequently be filled in causing little trouble to the landowner, always a consideration in a democracy!
Cheers
Steve


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## Glider (Dec 1, 2017)

I'm as confident as I can be that the Germans wouldn't have been able to launch a surprise invasion. The invasion force was too slow, the UK radar would have picked them up and the ports were under close PR surveillance. 
I'd certainly concede that the Enigma codes were broken less frequently in 1940 but the defences were ready. All RAF bases were reasonably well defended against parachute troops and some difficult decisions made. For example all AA guns had to be capable of firing against ground targets. It made them more vulnerable against air attack as the walls were a lot lower, but the benefit was a much stronger defence.


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## parsifal (Dec 1, 2017)

stona said:


> Enigma was neither one type of machine, nor one code.
> 
> In 1940 the British could decipher a significant part of Luftwaffe traffic (mainly due to lax operational procedures) and some Army traffic, but none for the Kriegsmarine. All the services were using a version of the Enigma I, the KM's M3 machine was based on this, but Luftwaffe and Army machines were supplied with five cipher wheels, the Naval versions eight. Any more detail of how they were used you can look up yourselves
> 
> ...




Very nicely summarised steve, and I stand corrected on the number of rotors. Naval enigma of course had more cypher wheels. I didn't realise it was eight wheels, having never actually seen the machine.

anyway, great post


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## Juha2 (Dec 1, 2017)

Enigma had produced unusually important material before the Battle of Crete because the German attack was improvised and the arguments about operational and tactical issues between the commanders took fairly long time, so detailled plans were sent by wireless from Germany to Greece probably because of tight timetable. Appr. April 18 - 22, Enigma info was sent to Crete via Cairo but on 22 April London ordered all material they had received on Crete to be burnt and Cairo-Crete connection was wounded up. But after Freyberg became the commander he was kept informed on the Ultra material but it was disguised as info supplied by an SIS agent in Athens. But even without the Enigma the local commanders had deducted the essences of the German plan. That was not very difficult after German ops in Denmark, Norway and Holland. And it was made even easier by the fact that British had got the German Air-landing manual in May 1940.

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## pbehn (Dec 1, 2017)

Glider said:


> I'm as confident as I can be that the Germans wouldn't have been able to launch a surprise invasion. The invasion force was too slow, the UK radar would have picked them up and the ports were under close PR surveillance.
> I'd certainly concede that the Enigma codes were broken less frequently in 1940 but the defences were ready. All RAF bases were reasonably well defended against parachute troops and some difficult decisions made. For example all AA guns had to be capable of firing against ground targets. It made them more vulnerable against air attack as the walls were a lot lower, but the benefit was a much stronger defence.


Well the thread OP assumes the RAF is completely defeated. This seems to imply some sort of honourable surrender where all aircraft are destroyed no more aircraft or pilots are trained. In reality if the RAF were losing the battle they would pull back and contest less and less space. The idea that the RAF would leave itself with no fighters or bombers when LW fighters could get past London is fantasy.


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## stona (Dec 1, 2017)

The M3 machines still had three coding wheels, like the Enigma I machines used by the Luftwaffe and Heer, they basically had more options as far as which were fitted. Wheels 1-V were wired the same as the Enigma I machines, but the wiring of the extra three wheels, VI-VIII, was the problem that Bletchley Park had to solve in order to read naval messages. 
The BASIC principle of all enigma machines was that the letters were scrambled by a set of rotatable wheels each with 26 contacts on either side. Each contact on one side is connected (wired) to a contact on the other side in some random fashion. If you can't figure out the wiring of the various wheels you can't even begin to break the code...then you have to start to work out the wheel settings etc., etc.

The M4 machine also had eight coding wheels available, and again I-V were identical to Enigma I. It was the addition of a fourth 'active' wheel that caused the problem. This fourth wheel, added to the left of the other three could be set (at position A) to allow the four wheel M4 to be backwards compatible with the earlier machines (in other words it didn't actually do anything).

The official name for the fourth wheel was 'Zuzatzwalze', but being thinner than the others it was also known as the 'thin wheel' or sometimes 'Griechenwalze' as it was identified by the Greek letter beta or gamma.

I have a reasonable grasp of how the machines worked, but it is almost impossible to explain. How they broke them is a miracle.

Cheers

Steve

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## Shortround6 (Dec 1, 2017)

5. The long range maritime patrol plane.Doesn't matter what this is for the invasion of Britain, a couple of dozen Ju 89s wouldn't have made any real difference. Later yes (maybe???), but in Aug-Nov of 1940?
Ju 89 in operational condition is a what if, The actual aircraft were never armed, Never fitted with fuel tanks that gave more range than the Fw 200 and used a huge, high drag wing so even with better engines performance increases would be marginal. Would need Jumo 211s or DB 601s in 1940 so would be fighting for resources with existing planes.proposed turrets were of dubious utility. One man controlled the traverse manually while a 2nd man controlled the elevation, also manually. 
6. Long range fighters to protect the U-boats? in 1940?
British anti-sub aircraft were a rather pathetic lot in 1940 and the standard long range overwater fighter was the Bristol Blenheim. the 10th Beaufighter was delivered Aug 3rd and 100th on Dec 7th, most (all?) going to the British night fighter force. 
What kind of JU-88 fighters (or Bf 110s) do you need to counter Blenheims?
I would also note that the Germans had a shortage of Jumo 211 F & J engines at this point and most JU-88s produced in 1940 had to use the lower powered Jumo 211 B-1s and G-1s. This impacts allowable armament and fuel loads and also restricts any theoretical 4 bombers.
7. Capture the British Army at Dunkirk. A lot more doable but still doesn't solve the cross the channel problem.


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## swampyankee (Dec 1, 2017)

Decrypting German radio traffic - and that of its allies -- was certainly a powerful tool in defeating them during WW2, but it was not the only one: just using the radio gave the British useful information. A classic example is the breaking of radio silence by the _Bismarck_, which was a -- perhaps the -- major factor in its location.

I'm also rather tired of people asking what Germany could have done to win, but what the British or French could do to keep Germany from winning at all.

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## Shortround6 (Dec 1, 2017)

For the British, adopt constant speed propellers when the rest of the world did. 
Learn to navigate at night (or develop navigation aids). 
Don't go sub hunting with carriers with only few destroyers for escorts and planes that have ineffective anti-sub weapons.
There are a lot more.


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## parsifal (Dec 1, 2017)

Opinions will vary of course, but for the RN the greatest single failure was the under estimation of the uboat threat. it was the campaign in which the Germans came the closest to actually defeating Britain. A few more escorts instead of building more BBs, the setting up of a proper ASW command prewar would have been a great help.

The reason thre is a far greater fascination with German what ifs is that the failures in the german camp are so much more obvious. in reality both sides fought a pretty competent war. Applying our wisdom after the fact is unrealistic in my opinion. Being there with incomplete information, or even wrong information under the pressure of combat makes it much harder than it looks

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## Koopernic (Dec 2, 2017)

In regards to the German Navy's "Torpedo Crisis". Had the Torpedoes kept proper depth, the magnetic proximity pistols not detonated prematurely and had the contact pistols triggered reliably dozens of Royal Navy Ships would have been sunk and dozens of German destroyers and u-boats in good working order and opperational

The u-boat hydrophone operators could hear the torpedoes detonate prematurely or hear the thud of the torpedo hit and the torpedo engines stop or hear the torpedo pass right underneath the sound of the targets propellers often launched from impossible to miss distances of 800m

It was so bad the entire u-boat fleet was relived of duty by Raeder and all the German u-boat aces that never came back without a tally came back with nothing for the only time.


The early years of the U-boat force were doomed by faulty torpedoes. In 1939-40 the torpedoes suffered from the following problems: 

Premature detonations due to faulty magnetic proximity detonator. This giving away the U-boat's presence and approximate position. 
Failure of contact detonator at certain angles of attack - torpedo doesn't explode. 
Running well under the required depth and running underneath the target without exploding. 
Exploding at the end of their runs when fuel expended - also giving away the presence of the U-boat. 

Here are details of the most important torpedo failures of the Germany U-boat Service. 

14 September 1939: 
U-39 sights HMS Ark Royal. Approaches undetected to 800 meters, and fires 2 torpedoes*. Both explode 80 metres short of Ark Royal's hull - giving away U-39's position*. The escorting destroyers pounce on U-39 so fast that she doesn't have time to dive deep and is and sunk - the first U-boat to be sunk in WWII. 

20 September 1939: 
U-27 sights 2 British destroyers. Approaches undetected to firing position and fires 3 torpedoes. *All three explode before reaching their targets*. U-27 is sunk. 

27 October 1939: 
U-46 attacks a British convoy, escorted by a cruiser. Attacks twice and fires 8 torpedoes against a wall of overlapping merchant ships. Only one hits. Reloaded. Cruiser stopped on surface rescuing survivors. U-46 fires 2 torpedoes at close range. *Both explode before reaching the target.* 

30 October 1939: 
U-56 encounters the flagship of the British Home Fleet - battleship HMS Nelson, in company with Rodney, Hood and 12 destroyers. Approaches undetected. Fires three torpedoes. T*wo are heard (two metallic clangs) to strike the hull of HMS Nelson - but both fail to explode*. Third torpedo runs too deep, passes underneath the battleship without exploding, and finally explodes at the end of its run. 

Sep 1939 - June 1940 - Many other failures against merchant shipping. 

April - June 1940 - Norwegian Campaign - an utter failure of the U-boat Service. 

10 April 1940, 2210 hours: 
U-48 encounters Cumberland class cruiser and fires 3 torpedoes. Two explode prematurely before reaching the target, last one misses and explodes at end of its run. 

10 April 1940, 2115 hours: 
U-48 encounters York class cruiser and fires 3 torpedoes. All three explode prematurely before reaching the target. 

10 April 1940, 2210 hours: 
U-51 encounters 2 destroyers and fires 2 torpedoes. One torpedo explodes prematurely after reaching arming distance, the other explodes 300 feet from destroyer's hull. 

14 April 1940: 
U-48 encounters HMS Warspite and 2 destroyers. Fires 4 torpedoes with contact detonators at battleship - *2 impact Warspite's hull, but fail to explode. *

15 April 1940: 
U-65 fires 2 torpedoes at a troop transport. No success. 

16 April 1940 
U-47 attacks 4 troop transports at anchor in Bygdenfjord. Range 750-1500 yds. Ships in a solid wall ahead of U-boat. Fired 4 torpedoesl - all torpedoes failed to explode. Enemy not alerted. Reloaded. All torpedoes thorughly checked. Surfaced after midnight and attacked again. Precise fire control data - torpedo running depth set at 12-15 feet. 4 more torpedoes fired. Result nil. 1 torpedo off course, exploded against the cliff. Enemy alerted - U-47 withdraws. Runs aground, refloated. Pursued with depth charges - engines damaged. Escaped. *Summary: 8 torpedoes fired at stationary targets at close range, no hits. *

19 April 1940 
U-47 encounters HMS Warspite (again) and 2 destroyers. A*ttacked battleship at 900 yards, firing 2 torpedoes. No success. *

So, had the torpedoes been working reliably in the period Sep 1939 - June 1940, the Germans would almost certainly have sunk: 

1 x Carrier Ark Royal 
2 x Battleships Nelson and Warspite 
3 x Cruisers 
7 x Destroyers 
5 x Troop Transports (1 loaded, 4 empty) 

The loss of these ships would have considerably affected the balance of sea power in the Mediterranean. For example, at the Battle of Calabria in early July 1940, HMS Warspite was the only fully modernised Queen Elizabeth class battleship present that could match the firing range of the Italian battleships Cavour and Cesare. An early hit by Warspite at very long range surprised the Italians, and as a result they withdrew from the battle almost before it had started. Without Warspite, the other old, unmodernised British battleships would have been considerably outranged by the 2 Italian battleships, and the battle would have been much more hard-fought as a result. 

The next fully modernised Queen Elizabeth class battleship was HMS Valiant, and she wasn't available to enter the Mediterranean until the end of August 1940. So for the first 3 months of the Mediterranean War, the Italians would have had the advantage in any battleship engagement. 

Also, if Ark Royal had been sunk in September 1939, the British may not have had a fast Illustrious-class carrier based at Gibraltar in May 1941, to launch the fatal torpedo attack that jammed Bismarck's rudder. If not, Bismarck would have escaped to France. 

(Note: The losses above would be in addition to the historical losses between Sept 1939 and June 1940 of 
1 x Carrier Courageous 
1 x Battleship Royal Oak 
3 x Cruisers 
3 x Armed Merchant Cruisers 
23 x Destroyers 
1 x Troop Transport (empty)


A book called "naval blanders" notes that Churchill but also a number of other high level naval personnel (i think the first lord of the admiralty as well, but i´m not sure about that). The death of Churchill alone would have large effects in the whole handling of the war by the UK. Also the effect on moral would be great.
The British carrier HMS Ark Royal capsized and sank 13 hours after being hit by a single torpedo from U-81. The HMS Courageous, on the other hand, sank only 17 minutes after being hit by two torpedoes from U-29.
HMS Barham capsized and exploded only 2 and a half minutes (!) after being hit by three torpedoes from U-331. HMS Nelson barely survived a magnetic mine explosion on 4 Dec 1939, and survived a hit by a single Italian air-launched torpedo in 1941.
I think it's reasonable to suggest that two torpedo hits would have been enough to sink either Ark Royal or Warspite. And three torpedo hits would almost certainly have been enough to sink Nelson - although she would have a chance of surviving two hits if one of them didn't flood an engine room.
Any battleship might be able to survive a single torpedo. HMS Barham survived a single torpedo hit from U-30 off the Clyde on 28 Dec 1939 but 2 is unlikely if the older type. These are the larger u-boat type.

Winston Churchill was indeed on HMS Nelson when she was attacked by U-56 on 30 Oct 1939! The loss of the flagship of the Home Fleet, and Winston Churchill, the CiC of the Home Fleet, and the Admiral of the Fleet would have been a devastating blow to the RN - far greater than the loss of Hood or even the POW and Repulse. The death of Churchill would have changed history

Articles: Faulty Torpedoes - The German Crisis

https://digitalcommons.georgiasouth...ng.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1599&context=etd

More reliable torpedoes for the Uboat in 1939/40

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## Koopernic (Dec 2, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> The training bases could be moved, the factories not so much. At least not in a few weeks.
> Deeper penetrations would also lead to higher German losses. For incoming raids Radar told the British they were coming and told them the course over the channel (which could change over land) once 100-200 miles into Britain the British would know where they are and would know what route they would have to take to get out of Britain.
> Please note that a lot of the early raids were right along the coast and the Germans could be over water in minutes if not, in some cases , seconds.
> 
> ...




I've separated out the torpedo issue.

In terms of then Focke Wulf Fw 187 "Falke" long range escort fighter. Its first flight was in May 1937. That's sufficient time to get the aircraft operational with several squadrons by the end of 1939.

Just looking at a Google map of Britain shows that an Me 109 and Me 110 with their 400 and 500 mph range respectively. will be unable to escort over the entirety of the UK even with drop tanks which might extend radius of action from 130 to 260 and 160 to 320 miles respectively.

The Fw 187 is no more going to be competitive with the Kestrel sized Jumo 210 than the Me 109 or Me 110 will be. Hurricanes, Spitfires and Defiants can't work with Kestrels nor could Me 109, Me 110 or Fw 187 be competitive with jumo 210. It's a waste of time developing and testing this aircraft with the Jumo 210. Richthofen did so because his hands were tied but wanted to throw Focke Wulf some money.

The Fw 187 excellent performance did not derive from its fashionable use of evaporation surface cooling in some models. It's excellent suitability came from having power to weight ratios, wing loading and drag to power ratios as good as or better than single engine fighters such as the Me 109.

It retained some of the advantages of 2 engine types greater internal fuel capacity and showed itself of carrying at least 1300L of fuel which is 650L/engine compared to the Me 109 400L/engine. That should give it a range of 700 miles ie radius of action of about 480 miles with drop tanks.

It could be made operational with the better performance the either the DB601 or the Jumo 211 irrespective of whether it had conventional radiators or evaporation types.

What was missing is the doctrine. When they saw its superior performance the powers kept trying to turn it into a sort of super zerstroyer with second crew members, rearward facing crew members and flexible armament all of which ruined its performance.

Such a long range escort also helps the Luftwaffe protect the u-boats over the Bay of Biscay etc.

Clearly something better than the Fw 200 needs to be ready. The Ju 89 with Jumo 211 can do it but it requires the scrafice of some He 111 to get the engines. This aircraft, likely with a 20mm tail gun will be able to deal with Hurricanes on CAM ships.

Ive tried to show that with luck (good torpedos) and the minor reallocation of resources (Drop tanks and Fw 187 instead of some Me 110) the Germans might have been in a position to guard their invasion fleet from the RN and RAF and have air superirity over the entire UK. However I don't think they'll have a suitable fleet of amphibious landing craft.


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## wuzak (Dec 2, 2017)

Did the Luftwaffe ever really come close to defeating the RAF? Or were they just close to defeating 11 Group?

And if the German invasion of Britain had been launched and failed, as spectacularly as predicted, how much damage would that do to Germany's war effort?

If the invasion failed, does that force the cancellation or delay of Barbarossa? Or does Barbarossa go ahead, but leaving France poorly defended, allowing the Allies to land a year or more earlier than they did?

Who would pay for the failure? Goering? Raeder? von Brauchitsch?


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## wuzak (Dec 2, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> In terms of then Focke Wulf Fw 187 "Falke" long range escort fighter. Its first flight was in May 1937. That's sufficient time to get the aircraft operational with several squadrons by the end of 1939.



With Jumo 210s.

The Fw 187 was cancelled before the idea of the Battle of Britain would have entered the planners' minds.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 2, 2017)

The 20mm tail gun in a JU 89 (or what ever 4 engine beast the Germans come up with ) would have been the MG FF or MGFF/M with a 15 round magazine, aimed by hand. 

The FW 187, with whatever engines, would have had the same 20mm guns (MG FFs or MG FF/Ms) with a single 60 round drum apiece. Radio operator/rear gunner in the BF 110 had two _extra magazines/drums per gun _help with multiple engagements. 

Germans had no idea (or very little) that they would have the Atlantic coast of France to base subs on when the FW 187 was canceled.


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## pbehn (Dec 2, 2017)

With the German codes it is a mystery to me how long the "plausible denial" ruse worked, Maybe it is an effect of a totalitarian regime, who would want to tell Adolf that the codes and system need to be changed because they have been broken for years?

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## swampyankee (Dec 2, 2017)

pbehn said:


> With the German codes it is a mystery to me how long the "plausible denial" ruse worked, Maybe it is an effect of a totalitarian regime, who would want to tell Adolf that the codes and system need to be changed because they have been broken for years?



I don't think it needs to be a totalitarian regime; there are many cases in democracies where government officials -- and military officers are exactly that -- will completely ignore evidence that contradicts their personal beliefs, _e.g._, US torpedoes during WW2. Of course, military hierarchies are not democracies, and those in the democracies, like the US, may have be equally rigid and even less accepting of criticism from subordinates or outsiders*
than those in non-democratic regimes. 

The German officials were probably told by the nazi experts on Enigma that it was unbreakable. They had probably purged the academics and civil servants who had the prestige to overcome the arguments from the second-raters that were left.



* "Outsiders" as in people from a different unit, such as submarine captains in the USN.


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## parsifal (Dec 2, 2017)

If the operators had followed procedures correctly it would have been much harder to break ENIGMA,

Because the Germans assumed that procedures were being followed, and because the odds of cracking the code under those assumed conditions were just about zero, the Germans were never able to work out what was happening. I know of at lest one occasion when KTB (UBoat command) suspected that their codes had been compromised , but their enquiry always thought it more likely that there was a traitor at work.

In a way they were right, The abwehr was a compromised organisation if ever there was one.

In 1972 the British Security Service revealed the extent to which the Abwehr’s agent network had come under its control after it had compromised the organization’s communications. Both the Abwehr’s hand and machine ciphers, codenamed ISOS and ISK, respectively, had been solved early in the war, which gave the Allies a formidable advantage in manipulating its activities. The Abwehr was also handicapped by high-level defections of staff in Lisbon, Istanbul, and Ankara, and by agents in the US and South Africa.

The Abwehr may also be said to have been disadvantaged by the political views of its personnel, fear of their _Sicherheitsdienst_ rivals, and the inherently insecure practice of allowing case officers to recruit and run agents for long periods without the discipline of rotating handlers who could exercise independent judgment, routinely conduct rigorous integrity tests, and be confident that their own careers would not end in a posting to the Russian Front in the event that one of their recruits had been “doubled” by the enemy.

Wilhelm Canaris was a German naval officer who escaped from internment in Chile during World War II; Canaris was appointed chief of the Abwehr in January 1935. He proved an assiduous spymaster, and under his supervision extensive networks were developed in Great Britain and the United States and representatives were posted under diplomatic cover to most of the capitals of Europe. His organization grew very large, adopted the Brandenburger Grenadier regiment as a military adjunct, and trained saboteurs to disrupt industry in the United States. Although personally an anti-Nazi, Canaris employed many zealous Nazis, but some of those closest to him were to be implicated in the 20 July 1944 plot to assassinate Adolf Hitler.

Prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Canaris disclosed details of the plan to his Polish mistress, Halina Szymanska, whom he knew to be in touch with Polish, and presumably therefore British, intelligence officers. Canaris was dismissed following the defection of Erich Vermehren and was arrested in the aftermath of the 20 July plot. He is believed to have been hanged at Flossenberg concentration camp in February 1945. After his death, rumors abounded about the extent of his contact with the Allies, but no credible evidence has emerged to support assertions that he held a wartime meeting with the British Secret Intelligence Service chief Stewart Menzies in Spain. In February 1940 GRU defector Walter Krivitsky claimed to MIS that Canaris has been on the Soviet payroll before the war, but again the allegation is unsubstantiated


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## swampyankee (Dec 2, 2017)

The British XX (Double Cross) scheme was quite effective at turning agents. Being offered the opportunity to help the British against the nazis or being hanged and buried in an unmarked grave tended to encourage most spies and traitors to chose the first option.


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## stona (Dec 2, 2017)

The poor operational procedures used by some Enigma operators, notoriously in the Luftwaffe, certainly hoped in early breakthroughs. I already said that in 1940 the British could read almost all Luftwaffe radio traffic.

Other 'myths' often repeated in true Hollywood style include that the breaking of Enigma was achieved by 'Colossus' the first electronic digital computer. It was in fact first broken with good old pen and paper and an electro-mechanical device called by the British a 'Bombe'. The Bombe was based on the earlier Polish Bomba, but operated on rather different principles. 

Here's a slightly technical bit. 

The Polish Bomba exploited the fact that the same message indicator was sent twice at the start of each message, a major flaw in the German cryptographic procedures. When the Germans realised this and abandoned the practice on 10th May 1940 the Polish Bomba became useless. The date will not be lost on any historian.

Turing designed the British Bombe in 1939. Compared to the Polish Bomba, it used a completely different approach. It was based on the assumption that a known (or guessed) plaintext, a so-called crib, is present at a certain position in the message. Famously weather reports and simple 'Heil Hitler' sign offs were among those used.The Bombe was further enhanced with the so-called diagonal board, an invention of fellow code breaker Gordon Welchman, that greatly reduced the number of steps needed for the code breaking effort (I've never worked out how this functioned, but it obviously did!). A second Bombe, with Welchman's diagonal board present, was installed at Bletchley Park on 8th August 1940. The first machine was soon similarly modified.

During the course of the war, over 200 Turing-Welchman Bombes were built.

Cheers

Steve


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## pbehn (Dec 2, 2017)

stona said:


> The poor operational procedures used by some Enigma operators, notoriously in the Luftwaffe, certainly hoped in early breakthroughs. I already said that in 1940 the British could read almost all Luftwaffe radio traffic.
> 
> Other 'myths' often repeated in true Hollywood style include that the breaking of Enigma was achieved by 'Colossus' the first electronic digital computer. It was in fact first broken with good old pen and paper and an electro-mechanical device called by the British a 'Bombe'. The Bombe was based on the earlier Polish Bomba, but operated on rather different principles.
> 
> ...


They also used the fact that some raids were reported in a known short code. Sea mining "gardening" operations used this, a bomber laying mines in a known area would trigger a known response transmitted by enigma.


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## Juha2 (Dec 2, 2017)

On the Koopernic's torpedo failure list, that is the German view, British agreed with some cases, some were according to British wake explositions, which could happen to any torpedoes, e.g. 14 Sept 39 Ark Royal
"_At 1512 ARK ROYAL was back on a south westerly course and making 26 knots to catch up with her screen who were now about two miles ahead. When Leading Signalman Joseph Ernest Hall, Official Number P/J 42557, who was on watch, observed the commencement of torpedo tracks and his very prompt and accurate report enabled the Officer of the Watch to put the helm over to port causing the torpedoes to miss astern and detonated about half a cable on the port quarter. It was noted that the tracks were very evident, much more so than those of our own torpedoes.

ARK ROYAL signaled FAULKNER informing her of the submarine attack. The FAULKNOR, FIREDRAKE and FOXHOUND then reversed course and proceeded to join the ARK ROYAL." _

And some didn't happen according to the RN, e.g. in the HMS Warspite case on 14 Apr. 40 the RN didn't notice the hits. And most navies had problems with their torpedoes early in the war, the USN problems are probably the most famous besides the KM's, but as the attack on Ark's Swordfishes on HMS Sheffield instead of KMS Bismarck shows, also the RN had problems with its magnetic proximity detonators.

On intelligence, the game was more even than is usually admitted. On German successes/Allied failures see: Christos military and intelligence corner: Index


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## stona (Dec 2, 2017)

pbehn said:


> They also used the fact that some raids were reported in a known short code. Sea mining "gardening" operations used this, a bomber laying mines in a known area would trigger a known response transmitted by enigma.



Also, from time to time so called 'code books', which were actually key sheets were captured. These gave the daily settings for Enigma machines within, say, the KM for several days. This would give any code breaker information such as which wheels were used, in what order, and the initial settings. Anyone with a compatible machine could read the coded messages with no need for difficult and time consuming decryption, at least for a few days or until the enemy realised the key sheets were missing/compromised.
Cheers
Steve


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## pbehn (Dec 2, 2017)

stona said:


> Also, from time to time so called 'code books', which were actually key sheets were captured. These gave the daily settings for Enigma machines within, say, the KM for several days. This would give any code breaker information such as which wheels were used, in what order, and the initial settings. Anyone with a compatible machine could read the coded messages with no need for difficult and time consuming decryption, at least for a few days or until the enemy realised the key sheets were missing/compromised.
> Cheers
> Steve


Certain ship,s known to have these were targeted, I think they were weather ships that had to be issued with them in advance. You would think such a ship suddenly stopping transmitting would have set off an alarm in some departments but it didn't.


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## Graeme (Dec 2, 2017)

parsifal said:


> it was the campaign in which the Germans came the closest to actually defeating Britain.



How close?


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## Milosh (Dec 2, 2017)

Came across this on the U-boats (not sure where the data came from).

1939:
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)
Sep39 48/178,621
Oct39 33/156,156
Nov39 27/72,721
Dec39 39/101,823
Tot39 147 (36.75/month)/509,321 (127,330.25/month)
British merchant ship construction capacity from 1939-1941 did not exceed 1.2 million GRT per year.
US merchant ship construction in 1939 was 0.242 million GRT.

Number of U-Boat patrols (combat patrols only, does not include tanker/resupply missions)/losses/aborts prior to contact in principle theaters (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Americas)
Aug39 19/2
Sep39 3/0
Oct39 13/3
Nov39 10/1/1
Dec39 5/1/1
Tot39 50/7/2 (an average of 10 patrols per month and 14% lost)

Thus for 1939, an average of 2.94 ships were sunk per patrol and one U-Boat was lost per 21 ships sunk (note that throughout these averages will be slightly inflated since they do not include the minor contribution of the Italian submarine fleet.)

1940:
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)
Jan40 53/163,029
Feb40 50/182,369
Mar40 26/69,826
Apr40 6/30,927
May40 14/61,635
Jun40 66/375,069
Jul40 41/301,975
Aug40 56/288,180
Sep40 60/288,180
Oct40 66/363,267
Nov40 36/181,695
Dec40 46/256,310
Tot40 520 (43.33/month)/2,462,867 (205,238.91/month)
US merchant ship construction for 1940 was about 0.5 million GRT.

Number of U-Boat patrols (combat patrols only, does not include tanker/resupply missions)/losses/aborts prior to contact in principle theaters (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Americas)
Jan40 8/2
Feb40 10/3
Mar40 10/2
Apr40 19/3
May40 8/0/2
Jun40 18/3/1
Jul40 4/0
Aug40 16/2/1
Sep40 12/0
Oct40 13/2
Nov40 14/1
Dec40 6/0
Tot40 138/18/3 (an average of 11.5 patrols per month and 13% lost)

Thus for 1940, an average of 3.77 ships were sunk per patrol and one U-Boat was lost per 28.89 ships sunk.

1941:
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)
Jan41 23/129,711
Feb41 47/254,118
Mar41 41/236,549
Apr41 41/239,719
May41 63/362,268
Jun41 66/325,817
Jul41 26/112,624
Aug41 27/85,603
Sep41 57/212,237
Oct41 28/170,786
Nov41 15/76,056
Dec41 23/93,226
Tot41 457 (38.08/month)/2,298,714 (191,559.5/month)
US merchant ship construction 1941 0.804 million GRT

Number of U-Boat patrols (combat patrols only, does not include tanker/resupply missions)/losses/aborts prior to contact in principle theaters (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Americas)
Jan41 10/0
Feb41 18/3/2
Mar41 15/3/3
Apr41 14/2/2
May41 21/0/2
Jun41 22/2/3
Jul41 24/1/9
Aug41 42/5/9
Sep41 38/0/2
Oct41 37/0/6
Nov 41 27/5/5
Dec41 49/4/6
Tot 41 287/25/49 (an average of 23.9 patrols sailing per month and 8.7% lost)

Thus for 1941, an average of 1.59 ships were sunk per patrol and one U-Boat was lost per 18.28 ships sunk.

1942:
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)
Jan42 56/310,224
Feb42 72/429,255
Mar42 93/507,514
Apr42 81/418,161
May42 129/616,835
Jun42 136/636,926
Jul42 96/467,051
Aug42 117/587,245
Sep42 96/461,794
Oct42 89/583,690
Nov42 126/802,160
Dec42 64/337,618
Tot42 1,155 (96.25/month)/6,158,473 (513,206.08/month)
British and Canadian merchant ship construction 1942 1.8 million GRT
US merchant ship construction 1942 5.433 million GRT

Number of U-Boat patrols (combat patrols only, does not include tanker/resupply missions)/losses/aborts prior to contact in principle theaters (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Americas)
Jan42 50/2/5
Feb42 29/3/2
Mar42 32/2
Apr42 37/2/2
May42 23/3
Jun42 39/9/5
Jul42 45/7/3
Aug42 58/10/4
Sep42 52/8/8
Oct42 62/6/10
Nov42 54/8/6
Dec42 59/8/7
Tot42 540/68/57 (an average of 45 patrols sailing per month and 12.6% lost)

Thus for 1942, an average of 2.14 ships were sunk per patrol and one U-Boat was lost per 16.99 ships sunk.

1943:
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)
Jan43 44/307,196
Feb43 67/362,081
Mar43 110/633,731
Apr43 50/287,137
May43 46/237,182
Jun43 17/76,090
Jul43 46/237,777
Aug43 20/92,443
Sep43 16/98,852
Oct43 20/91,295
Nov43 9/30,726
Dec43 8/55,794
Tot43 452 (37.67/month)/2,510,304 (209,192/month)
US merchant ship construction 1943 13.081 million GRT

Number of U-Boat patrols (combat patrols only, does not include tanker/resupply missions)/losses/aborts prior to contact in principle theaters (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Americas)
Jan43 61/13/11
Feb43 72/8/9
Mar43 59/16/10
Apr43 95/35/18
May43 55/23/9
Jun43 46/23/9
Jul43 39/27/7 (49 total patrols of all types)
Aug43 33/12/6
Sep43 32/11/10
Oct43 62/23/9
Nov43 36/9/4
Dec43 31/10/2
Tot43 621/210/104 (an average of 51.75 patrols sailing per month and 33.8% lost)

Thus for 1943, an average of 0.73 ships were sunk per patrol and one U-Boat was lost per 2.15 ships sunk.

So, overall, the most successful year for the U-Boats was 1940, before the expansion of the force allowed for an increase of more than about a dozen patrols sailing per month, and well prior to the entry of the US and its shipbuilding capacity into the war. Worse, the performance of the U-Boat force in 1941 and 1942 never exceeded its performance in the first months of the war. And, after 1943 the U-Boat campaign became ever less relevent to the outcome of the war.

Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)
Tot44 125/663,308
Tot45 63/284,476

US merchant ship construction for 1944 was 12.257 million GRT
US merchant ship construction for 1945 (through 1 May) was 3.548 million GRT

U-Boat Fleet to 1Sep42
On 19Aug39 there were 57 U-Boats in commission, 20 sea-going U-Boats and 18 ‘ducks’ were fully ready to put to sea
Total number U-Boats deployed to 1Sep42 275
Total number lost 94
Total number retired 10
Total number available 171

U-Boat Fleet 1Sep42 to 1May45
Total number deployed 1Sep42 to 1May45 531
Total number lost 1Sep42 to 1May45 568

British controlled merchant shipping over 1,600 GRT (number/in thousands of gross tons)
3Sep39 2,999/17,784
30Sep40 3,75721,373
30Sep41 3,608/20,552
31Dec41 3,616/20,693

Thus, despite the ‘success’ of the U-Boat force in 1940 (relative to its performance in 1941 and 1942) it had no appreciable effect in reducing the size of the British merchant fleet.

Numbers of ships arriving and losses in North Atlantic convoys inbound to Britain (ships arriving/losses)
1939 700/5 (7.1%)
1940 5,434/133 ((2.5%)
1941 5,923/153 (2.6%)
1942 4,798/80 (1.7%)
1943 5,667/87 (1.5%)
1944 7,410/8 (0.1%)

The operational U-Boat force from 1943-1945 never approached a "steady 400-500 boat." Rather, during 1942 the peak strength of boats assigned to combat flotillas (including those under repair for combat-damage and breakdowns, but excluding those assigned to school flotillas, experimental projects, or otherwise retired from combat) was 202, during November. The low in 1942 was 89 in January. The average monthly strength during 1942 was 143.83. The strength of the force peaked in May 1943 at 237. It had declined to a low of 159 by November. Average monthly strength during 1943 was 197.58. The peak strength during 1944 was 168 in February, the low was 146 in November. Average monthly strength in 1944 was 157.83. The peak strength in 1945 was April with 165, the low was May with 134, prior to the surrender. <http://www.onwar.com/ubb/smile.gif>

At that, these were much better than 1939 (average of 19.5 monthly), 1940 (average of 18.75 monthly) and 1941 (average of 47.5 monthly). OTOH, the 'bang for their buck' was probably highest in 1940, which was also arguably the U-Boats most 'successful' year in terms of ships sunk per patrol and U-Boats lost per ship sunk (see my previous reply).

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## Koopernic (Dec 3, 2017)

pbehn said:


> With the German codes it is a mystery to me how long the "plausible denial" ruse worked, Maybe it is an effect of a totalitarian regime, who would want to tell Adolf that the codes and system need to be changed because they have been broken for years?



The plausible deniability effort was quite extensive so anyone would have had difficulty.

Nevertheless the Germans never stopped improving and modifying their system. These efforts would have sent Bletcheley Park blind but for the strange failure to distribute the modifications fully.

Doenitz himself was suspicious and some within the cryptography branches knew enigma was vulnerable if the engineering effort was put in. One officer worked out that an enigma code could be cracked with 50,000 Hollerith punch cards. The Germans had mathematical and statistical punch card machine normally used in accounting and statistics that could search, sort and collate punch cards but also accumulate statistical data and patterns. They were computers. I've seen these envelop like slips running and to process 20 cards a second is nothing for these machines. So some people knew of the danger but each time they were talked down and the seniors assured that all had been checked and was OK. The Germans however did persistently take action, such as introduce a partially rewiredable keyboard (which stopped Polish efforts) and introduce a 4th rotor to naval enigma. It just wasn't enough.

I part it was the lack of being able to appreciate the resources the allies had and could put into it.

A lot of writers like to blame the "totalitarian government" but I think that is survivors or victors bias for the most part. The reality is that the allies had vastly more resources to put into such things and a relatively modest 2500 mile flight from Newfoundland to Bristol made cooperation easy. Engineers and scientists also like to crow about their part and Historians are ideological and will try to draw such conclusions to favor their pet politics. Both the Germans and Japanese did rather well competing commercially after WW2 and having worked with older Germans, Koreans and Japanese I can say their formal respect culture hierarchical systems have a way for the different ends to communicate, in some ways far more egalitarian than the anglo cultures.

The situation with German cryptography was this:
1 The treaty of Versailles had prohibited any German code breaking efforts or organisations.
If they broke this and were discovered they could get invaded as the French did in the Rhineland, trade or banking boycotted, overseas assets seized.
2 This meant any expertise in ciphers was reduced to a few mainly engineers who informally maintained an expertise in the area as second responsibility.
3 Engineers are usually pretty good at mathematics but their tool chest of techniques is perhaps 2% of what a Professionally developed mathematician has that is operating at Phd level. Their idea of mathematics is solving a fire control problem.
4 This also meant that cipher efforts had to be split up between army, navy and Luftwaffe. Combining them would be too formal and lead to discovery by the allied commission.

This created organisational and structural problems for the Germans, it meant that career experts and departments did not develop.

The Solution, and it shows good thinking, was to use commercially derived cipher machines which were used to protect contract prices from competitors.
The Germans were AFAIKT the first to do this on a massive scale in part due to the difficult of distributing code sheets in WW1 and in part due to exercises with the new Blitzkrieg tactics that showed the amount of communication needed.

These are some of their efforts. UKWD on its own could have succeeded.

*Rewirable Keyboard for 10 Characters. *This sent the Polish Methods Blind. The whole keyboard should have been made so.
*Naval Enigma M4 (4 rotor Engima).  *This famously sent Bletchely Park Blind for a long time. It was a 4th stationary rotor.





*UKWD or Umkehrwalze D known as "Uncle Dick" at Belchely Park**. *This was formidable and would have sent Bletchely Park Blind on its own. It was the equivalent of a new rotor and if every enigma machine had of been supplied it the new rotor could not be reconstructed by following a known message from a broken code group into an unbroken code group.
*UKW Dora *UKWD for Naval enigma.
*Lückenfüllerwalze *The rotor would step in an irregular pattern. Could be ued with or indpendatly from UKWD
*Enigma Uhr *or 'enigma clock' A clockwork mechanism altered the 10 way rewirable keyboard.
*
*
Because all of these systems were not distributed widely enough it was posslbe to crack them as they communicated into and out of cracked code groups.

The first orders for UKWD are 222–2542/40 of 19 July 1940 for 4000 units and 222–2543/40 of 12 October 1940 for 6048 units. This confirms that 1940 was the year it was decided to equip the Wehrmacht Enigma machines with a pluggable reflector. Additionally, existing Enigma machine orders received add-on orders for UKWD. These concerned the orders 222–2515/39 for 500 units, 222–2–2501/40 for a first delivery of 480 units and again in February 1941, for the same order, a second delivery of 1200 units. Hence, in 1940 alone a total of more than 11,000 UKWDs were ordered. In addition to these orders, UKWD orders were also placed for the new naval Enigma M4. On 13 September 1940 the OKM, Inspektion der Marine, Zeugamt, Wilhelmshaven placed order no. 18824 G for 1891 UKWD wheels. The order was later amended for an additional 2218 units. On 30 April 1941 OKH placed an order, SS 222-2-6401/41, for 1200 Heeres Enigmas equipped with UKWD...


A report of the Army Security Agency [2, p. 13], written shortly after the war, states: “How close the AngloAmericans came to losing out in their solution of the German Army Enigma is a matter to give cryptanalysts pause. British and American cryptanalysts recall with a shudder how drastic an increase in difficulty resulted from the introduction by the German Air Force of the pluggable reflector (‘Umkehrwalze D’, called ‘Uncle Dick’ by the British) in the spring of 1945 [this should read: 1944]. [...] Only a trickle of solutions would have resulted if the pluggable reflector had been adopted universally; and this trickle of solutions would not have contained enough intelligence to furnish the data for cribs needed in subsequent solutions. Thus even the trickle would have eventually vanished.

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## Koopernic (Dec 3, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> The 20mm tail gun in a JU 89 (or what ever 4 engine beast the Germans come up with ) would have been the MG FF or MGFF/M with a 15 round magazine, aimed by hand.
> 
> The FW 187, with whatever engines, would have had the same 20mm guns (MG FFs or MG FF/Ms) with a single 60 round drum apiece. Radio operator/rear gunner in the BF 110 had two _extra magazines/drums per gun _help with multiple engagements.
> 
> Germans had no idea (or very little) that they would have the Atlantic coast of France to base subs on when the FW 187 was canceled.



The Oerlikon guns could use 15 round clips, 60 round drums or 100 round drums and sizes in between. The 100 round drums are quite large and wouldn't fit into a wing but as the Fw 187 used fuselage mounted guns this wouldn't be a problem. I doubt it would have made the Fw 187 any less effective and they would have been replaced by belt fed MG 151/15 or MG151/20 soon enough.

I don't think you can be sure that a hypothetical Ju 89 would have been only armed with a single MG FFM in the tail. One reason the Luftwaffe didn't have large turrets is because their aircraft were too small to carry them. That wouldn't be the case with the Ju 89.

You can see some kind of tail turret concept here on this Ju 89.






Obviously by 1940 this aircraft has Jumo 211 engines or DB601 engines of around 1100hp and its speed and armament would be more evolved. It would be much better than the Fw 200 and would almost be able to out run Fairy Fulmars and limit Hurricanes to a tail chase.

Fw 200 can not adequately support the German Navy or the U-boats.

*General characteristics*


*Crew:* Five
*Length:* 26.49 m (86 ft 11 in)
*Wingspan:* 35.25 m (115 ft 8 in)
*Height:* 7.60 m (24 ft 11 in)
*Wing area:* 184 m² (1,979 ft²)
*Empty weight:* 17,000 kg (37,480 lb)
*Loaded weight:* 20,800 kg (50,266 lb)
*Max. takeoff weight:* 27,800 kg (61,160 lb)
*Powerplant:* 4 × Daimler-Benz DB 600A, 560 kW (750 hp) each
*Performance*


*Maximum speed:* 386 km/h (241 mph)
*Range:* 2,980 km (1,862 mi)
*Service ceiling:* 7,000 m (22,960 ft)
*Wing loading:* 112 kg/m² (25.4 lb/ft²)
*Power/mass:* 0.06 hp/lb ()
*Armament*
(proposed)


2 × 20 mm MG FF cannons
2 × 7.92 mm (.312 in) MG 15 machine guns
1,600 kg (3,520 lb) bombload
The gunner on the He 177 could fire sitting or prone. The range of travel is 70 degree cone. His position is well armored. This is quite an aerodynamic set up.


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## stona (Dec 3, 2017)

The UKW-D (field re-wirable reflector) was first introduced in January 1944 by the Luftwaffe of all organisations! It replaced the existing reflectors (UKW-B and UKW-C)

It was sometimes used in conjunction with the Enigma Uhr (which replaced the patch cables at the plug board (Steckerbrett) and was broken within days of introduction by Bletchley Park) as in the Luftwaffe 'Red Key'.

The new rewirable reflector was mounted in place of the existing UKW-B or C, and was rather cumbersome. It required part of the machine to be disassembled. The operators didn't like it and as a result, the wiring was changed only once every 10 days, as per an updated key sheet. 

Now the crucial part, at least for the British
*
Had UKW-D been used with all Enigma machines in the field, it would have posed a serious (and possibly fatal) threat to the British code breakers. Luckily, UKW-D wasn't distributed widely and was therefore only used for specific, important, messages. Like with the Uhr, the Germans had to be able to exchange messages with both UKW-D and non-UKW-D users, so they mixed messages with and without the devices, using the same basic key. This provided long cribs and made breaking both Uhr and UKW-D very easy once the basic key had been broken. 
*
Once again it was German operational procedure which allowed this Enigma to be broken.

A special version of UKW-D was developed for the KM, for use with the four rotor M4 machine, but was only issued to units which had to communicate with the Luftwaffe. Once again the backwards compatibility issue and poor procedure compromised the potential gain in security.

The Luckenfullerwalze (gap-filling wheel) sometimes called the Wahlluckenwalze (selectable gap wheel) really was any code breakers nightmare. This was an Army development of the Enigma machine and had it been produced and distributed in time may well have secured encryption for the foreseeable future, unless the Germans gave the game away themselves. 

Cheers

Steve
*
*

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## Graeme (Dec 3, 2017)

Milosh said:


> Came across this on the U-boats (not sure where the data came from).



Thanks. The reason I ask is I was always under the impression the Germans were determined to 'starve' Great Britain into submission.
From what I've read recently - they never at any stage of the war came close to achieving this?

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## parsifal (Dec 3, 2017)

The single greatest shortage in shipping type faced by the british was their tanker fleet. luckily for them German activities from the opening of the war played into the allied camp. From the first day of the war, the germans were forced to make good on shortages in their own merchant fleets by forced and illegal seizures of shipping from the neutrals, even those neutral transporting cargoes to German and german controlled ports. This short sighted policy led to some rather desperate expedient by the owners of the European merchant fleets. in the case of the Dutch large numbers of their merchant fleets were moved to the far east, or British controlled ports. in the case of the Norwegian tanker fleet , which the admiralty considered vital to the allied war effort, the planned actions in Norway by the britiah were postponed primarily because vital deals with the Norwegian controlling interests in their tankers, under the banner of a corporate entitiy known as "Nottraship" were not finalised until shortly before the Norwegian invasion.

The *Norwegian Shipping and Trade Mission* (Nortraship) was established in London in April 1940 to administer the norwegian merchant fleet outside German-controlled areas. Nortraship operated some 1,000 vessels and was the largest shipping company in the world amounting to some 3.5 million tons of shipping. By comparison, the Germans managed to forcibly seize under 1 million tons of mostly coastal rated shipping.

Notraship, and the tankers it controlled played a vital role in the fortunes of war, and was a major contribution to the Allied war effort.

The British politician Noel Baker, commented after the war that _"If we had not had the Norwegian fleet of tankers on our side, we should not have had the aviation spirit to put our fighters into the sky. Without the Norwegian merchant fleet, Britain and the allies would have lost the war."_

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## Shortround6 (Dec 3, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> The Oerlikon guns could use 15 round clips, 60 round drums or 100 round drums and sizes in between. The 100 round drums are quite large and wouldn't fit into a wing but as the Fw 187 used fuselage mounted guns this wouldn't be a problem. I doubt it would have made the Fw 187 any less effective and they would have been replaced by belt fed MG 151/15 or MG151/20 soon enough.
> 
> I don't think you can be sure that a hypothetical Ju 89 would have been only armed with a single MG FFM in the tail. One reason the Luftwaffe didn't have large turrets is because their aircraft were too small to carry them. That wouldn't be the case with the Ju 89.
> 
> ...



In 1940 the Germans had 3 aircraft guns in service with a 4th coming in at the end of the year it very small quantities.
1. the MG 17-7.9mm fixed gun which fired from a belt and used a closed bolt for synchronization.
2. the MG-15-7.9mm flexible gun which used the 75 round saddle drum and fired open bolt. May have used many of the same parts as the MG 17
3. the MG FF cannon and the nearly identical MG FF/M in 20mm. using a variety of magazines. The flexible guns used the smaller ones as they are lighter, and the lower weight and size made the gun more maneuverable.
4. the MG 151/15 showed up late in 1940 a a fixed gun in a few aircraft like He 115 floatplanes and Do 217s

The Germans seemed to have real problem with turrets. and lets not use the excuse of the planes being too small. The Grumman TBF used power turret




and the Blenheim used a powered mount/turret (not full 360 degree rotation.) we will leave the Defiant and Roc out of this.

I could be wrong but the first german turret _seems_ to be the FW 19 mounting a single MG 15 gun and hydraulically powered (?) mounted on some early FW 200s. Replaced by a non powered cupola type mount for a short period of time before being brought back. Production problems or service problems?
Early Do 217s get an electric turret mounting a single MG 131 in the late winter/early spring of 1941. I don't have details but it looks a little dodgy to me, some of these German turrets seem to have a few degrees of manual lateral traverse? in addition to the power traverse?

In any case you seem to want planes for 1941 and later instead of planes for 1940. The Germans built 26 FW 200s by the end of Dec 1940. If you want more long range recon planes in the summer or early fall of 1940 just build a few (6?) more FW 200s a little early. First Fulmars go into action in Aug 1940 in the Med. It takes quite a while for them to show up in the western approaches.

The Ju 89 was non-starter. whatever it's attributes were in 1937 it's day had come and gone by 1940




It used a wing of roughly 35-66% larger than the 5 most common Allied 4 engine bombers and 53% larger than the FW 200. Aerodynamically this was a 4 engine JU 86 and not a 4 engine Ju 88. Note the Junkers "double wing" as used on the Ju 52. Drag is going to be way higher than any of those six aircraft.
Look up pictures of tail gun positions for the JU 290, most or all of the planes _in service _used a single gun in a manual mount several years after 1940. There were powered mounts turrets but they all seem to be experimental.

You want to shoot down Blenheims and Hudsons (and Ansons)over the Bay of Biscay in 1940? hang a drop tank under each wing of a Bf 110 and have at it. No need for anything better as Coastal Command won't see a Beaufighter until about 1942.

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## pbehn (Dec 3, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> The plausible deniability effort was quite extensive so anyone would have had difficulty.
> 
> Nevertheless the Germans never stopped improving and modifying their system. These efforts would have sent Bletcheley Park blind but for the strange failure to distribute the modifications fully.
> 
> ...


The scientists on the Manhattan project had a similar system of punch cards for calculation. This was used to calculate the critical mass needed for a chain reaction to be sustaining. In a calculation that was a mix of pysics mathematics and statistics they repeatedly ran a calculation to see if the reaction was progressing in one way (hot) or another.(cold) all done with a card system. Don't ask me to explain it, it was damned clever though.

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## stona (Dec 3, 2017)

Punch cards were the way forward at the time!
Many machines were developed after the war which were clearly derivatives of Enigma. One, the Russian/Warsaw Pact 'Fialka' used punch cards in place of the plug board (Stekkerbrett) of Enigma. 
Other improvements included 10 wheels, rather than 3 or 4 on the Enigma, more frequent wheel turn-overs, adjacent wheels moving in opposite directions and wheel wiring which could be changed in the field. Another weakness of Enigma was also solved, a letter could be encoded onto itself, impossible with Enigma.
Cheers
Steve


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## pbehn (Dec 3, 2017)

stona said:


> Punch cards were the way forward at the time!
> Many machines were developed after the war which were clearly derivatives of Enigma. One, the Russian/Warsaw Pact 'Fialka' used punch cards in place of the plug board (Stekkerbrett) of Enigma.
> Other improvements included 10 wheels, rather than 3 or 4 on the Enigma, more frequent wheel turn-overs, adjacent wheels moving in opposite directions and wheel wiring which could be changed in the field. Another weakness of Enigma was also solved, a letter could be encoded onto itself, impossible with Enigma.
> Cheers
> Steve


That was why the goings on in Bletchley park were kept secret long after the war and the never told the Russians they were breaking Enigma. I remember 
being shown how card systems work as a start to a discussion about computing, it is amazing what can be done when that is all you have.


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## Koopernic (Dec 3, 2017)

Below I’ve attached a google map to which I’ve hand marked the plausible escort range of the Me 109E both with and without a 300 Litre drop tank and also the Fw 187. I’ve used 1/3rd of the maximum cruise speed range as the operational radius leaving 1/3rd for forming up, combat and reserve.

I think it proves the impossibility of the Luftwaffe “winning” it’s air campaign over Britain.

I doubt that important English cities such as Liverpool, Manchester, Sheffield ever saw an Me 109 if they did it was with a machine that had flown at a very slow speed.

Unless the RAF went insane it would simply withdraw its important bases and factories outside of Me 109 range and wait it out while practising ambushes against unescorted Luftwaffe bombers till it regained its strength. The Luftwaffe couldn’t prevent Britain’s sea trade on the western approaches.

The Luftwaffe clearly lacked a doctrine for a long-range fighter because it didn’t even equip its Me 109 with drop tanks it had invented in WW1. (Siemens-Schuckert SSW D.VI 3055 had a drop tank.)

The range of the Me 109E was about 700km/420 miles. It had just over 400L of fuel and the 300L drop tank added about 60% range. At economical cruising speeds, the ferry range might go up about 50% but this would get the Me 109 shot down. The Bf 110 had only about 20% more range, with drop tanks it’s about the same as the Fw 187 without. When carrying 2 x 900L (220 gallons) drop tanks the latter Me 110s had impressive range but this was really only good for loitering and combat patrol above a convoy since they had to be jettisoned upon engaging in combat. They extended loiter time but not combat radius.

Fw 187 had 1200km range on internal fuel with around 1300 Litres and 2100km with drop tanks.

The Fw 187 was a case of the Luftwaffe having the technology to carry out a vital function that it hadn’t recognised.

So although drop tanks dramatically would have improved the Luftwaffe war of attrition on Fighter Command the effect on Britain overall is minimal.

Red is Me 109 Radius of Action.
Pink is Me 109 radius of action with drop tank.
Green is Fw 187 Radius of Action. Also about range of Me 110 with drop tanks.
Blue is Fw 187 radius of action with drop tanks.






Below is some Data for the Fw 187 taken from the Dietmar Herman Book (transl Peter Petrick).

Data for the DB601 and DB605 engined versions of the Fw 187 is limited as it was lost but we do have some.

Speeds of the of the Fw 187V4 and Me 110B-0 both with Jumo 210G engines. By this time the Fw 187 had a second cockpit seat added. Both in equal combat trim.

Me 110 speed sea level 380kmh
Fw 187 speed sea level 466kmh *(Fw 187 86 kmh faster)*

Me 110 speed at critical altitude of 4000m 455kmh
Fw 187 speed at critical altitude of 4600m 545kmh *(Fw 187 90 kmh faster)*

So the Fw 187 has a significant aerodynamic advantage and twice the range. (1450KM versus 635KM)

Compared to the Me 109D also with the same Jumo 210 engine, the Fw 187 was 35kmh faster at sea level and 40kmh at altitude.

Fw 187 v5, in 1939 with a DB601 engine installed achieved 635km/h (394mph) at sea level. * This is the speed of a Tempest V or P-51D with 150PN fuel at sea level.*

This was with the Focke Wulf steam cooling system. A word on this. It used normal radiators but they could be smaller and hotter than normal radiators. It was not related to the Heinkel system that tried to cool the steam in the wing leading edges and return the water with 22 small scavenge pumps.

The system worked as follows:
1 Pressurized hot water came out of the engine at 6.5 bar
2 The water goes into an evaporator with a centrifuge to separate water from steam that has flashed when the pressure was released, the hot water isn't carrying much heat and is returned to the header tank whereas the steam is fed to the radiator.
3 It was tested on a 'spinning bench in all flight attitudes, then it was tested on an Me 110 and then it was tested on the Fw 187V5

Below is the Fw 187 V5 you cn see the split flaps for the steam radiator outlet. Obviously ordinary radiators could have been used but with a little more air flow. I think these systems were attractive because without glycol the water tended to form bubbles that interfered with cooling.




Below can be seen the characteristic inverted lines of the DB601 on the Fw 187 V5 CJ+NY^




Below an 'ordinary' Jumo 210 with the more normal lines of that engine




Dietmar Herman attributes the Luftwaffe failure to use the Fw 187 due to the refusal to admit that the zerstoerer concept had been a failure in the BoB. Putting in to production the Fw 187 would have been an admission of this. Instead the Me 210/Me 410 debacle developed.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 4, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> Fw 187 had 1200km range on internal fuel with around 1300 Litres and 2100km with drop tanks.
> 
> The Fw 187 was a case of the Luftwaffe having the technology to carry out a vital function that it hadn’t recognised.



It had recognized the vital function, it was using the Bf 110 to address it. A bit imperfectly to be sure and even more imperfectly when the 110s were ordered to stay close to the bombers.



Koopernic said:


> Below is some Data for the Fw 187 taken from the Dietmar Herman Book (transl Peter Petrick).
> 
> Data for the DB601 and DB605 engined versions of the Fw 187 is limited as it was lost but we do have some.
> 
> ...



Unfortunately the speeds/ranges quoted in the Dietmar Herman Book are a at odds with performance figures in William Green's old books, sometimes a little and sometimes a lot. Green did have a number of errors but Herman seems to be a bit selective and doesn't give speed or altitude for a lot of his range figures. There is also the "smell" test. He lists the 110 at 1270 liters of fuel with the fw 187 having 1110 liters, a 14% advantage in fuel for the 110 yet we are to believe the 110 using the *same engines* can fly only 44% as far? Green lists the range of a 110B-1 as 1070 miles. perhaps this is an error and should be 1070km? Cruise is given by Green as 198mph, an odd speed as it doesn't come out to an even KPH or even a multiple of 5 ( I doubt cruise speeds were given as 318kph)

I would also note that the planes were NOT in equal combat trim. In the chart (on page 68 of the book) the armament is listed as 12 x 20 MG/FF (an obvious typo) and 2 x 7.92 MG 17 (two less than the 110) . Chart is supposed to be for the Fw 187 V4, in other places in the book it is stated that that the 4 machine gun armament was added later and that the V4 and A series aircraft were originally built with two machineguns (in addition to the cannon).
Difference in armament (and drag of the gun ports)




Might explain Green's listed speed of 329mph (530kph?) for the A-0.

Specification sheet on page 63 is a bit suspect. Only in that it is calculated and not from tests. I am sure the it is the best information that Herman could get and I am not trying to imply anything about him. I would note that the FW engineers were claiming 13% additional engine "performance" due to exhaust thrust which is more than RR got from a Merlin XX using more boost and at higher altitudes (less back pressure at the exhaust outlets). 

[QUOTEFw 187 v5, in 1939 with a DB601 engine installed achieved 635km/h (394mph) at sea level. * This is the speed of a Tempest V or P-51D with 150PN fuel at sea level.*[/QUOTE]

nice. except these were not "standard" DB601 engines. They were rated at 1350PS for one minute at sea level. A level of power the DB601 would not see in service until the "E" model and the cooling system would be higher drag on any service aircraft for several years after 1939.

I would note that Green gives the following ranges for a Bf 110C
At max continuous cruise
483 miles at sea level at 262mph.
528 miles at 16,400ft at 304mph.
565 miles at 22,970ft at 301mph

and 680 miles at 217mph at 13,780ft at economical cruising speed. I would note that 680 miles is 1094 km which is not that far off from the 1070 number given for the Jumo powered 110, coincidence or bad translation?

The above numbers show why a range figure without speed and altitude is almost worthless.

I have no doubt the Fw 187 with it's smaller, lower drag airframe could out perform and fly further on the same amount of fuel than the Bf 110, but believing some of the figures in Herman's book takes faith to a new level. Again, he is presenting manufacturers estimates and not actual test data so I am making no accusations against him, plenty of Western Aircraft companies put out some rather bogus figures (390mph XP-39, 360mph single seat Defiant, 370mph Beaufighter and a lot more).

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## Peter Gunn (Dec 4, 2017)

Once again the unicorn that is the Fw 187 prances onto the stage as a world beater, even though relevant data suggests otherwise.

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## Shortround6 (Dec 4, 2017)

I would note that the 109 gained about 450kg in empty equipped weight going from the Jumo 210 powered versions to the E-1 with DB 601 which is a whole lot more weight the difference in the dry weight of the engines.
Again I don't doubt that the Fw 187 would be a better daylight fighter than the 110 if using the same engines, I just doubt that it is going to fall as high on the performance charts as some of it's boosters claim.



BTW if anybody can come with performance for the 110 from pilots manuals/charts it would be appreciated.


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## stona (Dec 4, 2017)

Before looking at fantasy aircraft or increased range for the Bf 109 one would do well to look at the objectives the Luftwaffe was attempting to achieve, helpfully, if vaguely, laid out for us in a Fuhrer order. One might then ask how exactly the fantasy aircraft and drop tank (or at least auxiliary tank) equipped Bf 109s would have enabled the rest of the Luftwaffe to achieve those objectives.
Cheers
Steve


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## Shortround6 (Dec 4, 2017)

German bomber armament in 1940 is best described as dismal bordering on pathetic. 
adding guns (and gunners) might not have reduced losses _that much_ but most German bombers made a Hampden look good. 
The He 111 had decent range for what they were trying to do. and a decent bomb load for the time but three RCMGs is little better than WW I.
adding 2-3 guns (one of them that fixed gun in the tail) wasn't much of a "fix". Unless you carried more crew either the dorsal gunner or ventral gunner had to man the waist gun/s which doesn't really increase the firepower that much and calls for a rather athletic crew  
Better reconnaissance and post raid photo assessment (a job for the 110) might have increased the effectiveness instead of assuming that one or two raids was enough for most targets.

The Germans were not a day late and dollar short on power turrets, they were weeks/months late and hundreds of dollars short. Somewhat fixed by 1941 (but the 111 doesn't get a power turret until 1942?) 

The Do 17 was sort of a super Blenheim  
Nice plane but a strategic bomber it was NOT. Max range as given by Green was 720 miles with an 1100lb bomb load (that is with a 197 imp gallon tank filling one bomb bay.) tactical radius with 2200lbs of bombs was 210 miles? 
Doesn't matter what kind of super escort you give them, you are going to have to come back to the same targets a number of times.


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## buffnut453 (Dec 4, 2017)

Hitler's strategic objective was to get Britain out of the war. How he achieved that really didn't matter much to him, he just wanted Britain out of the fight. 

We can all agree that Sealion was doomed to failure militarily...but the threat of invasion certainly diverted British resources from other activities and created several invasion scares which, at least at the local/regional level, generated confusion and some doubt/fear. The key piece that's missing from events as they played out is any escalation of those local/regional fears into a broader, national-level fear that the UK was destined to lose the war. 

To me, the key question is what, if anything, would have led the UK towards that more national-level fear that things were going awry? Defeating the entire RAF was obviously impossible because RAF aircraft could simply be pulled back out of range of single-engine Luftwaffe fighter coverage, thus making it much harder for the Luftwaffe. However, any such move would have been tacit acceptance that the air battle had been lost in 11 Group's area of operations, which clearly would leave London entirely exposed. For 11 Group to fold would have required a concerted effort on the RAF radar stations and the supporting Group and Sector C3 nodes...but these probably weren't difficult targets to locate or, frankly, to neutralize (the possible exception being 11 Gp's bunker at Uxbridge).

Would such a turn of events prompted a more general fear within the UK Government and the wider population? Perhaps. While propaganda may have papered over some of the cracks, it would pretty soon become apparent that forward airfields in 11 Group were being abandoned, leading to questions in the House of Commons about Churchill's leadership. Could a vote of no-confidence in Churchill's Government have resulted in a more compliant, appeasement-centric Government? I think it's certainly a possibility, and that would achieve Hitler's strategic objective without the need for Operation Sealion and without having to destroy the entirety of the RAF. 

Just my two penn'orth. I know I keep repeating it but, equally, we've banged on for several pages now about how implausible Sealion was from a military execution perspective. 

I would be interested if others had ideas of any additional potential tipping points that might have taken Britain out of the fight and hence secured Hitler's strategic objective for the campaign in the West.

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## michaelmaltby (Dec 4, 2017)

".... Could a vote of no-confidence in Churchill's Government have resulted in a more compliant, appeasement-centric Government? I think it's certainly a possibility, and that would achieve Hitler's strategic objective without the need for Operation Sealion and without having to destroy the entirety of the RAF."

That is the $$$ real question. The crowds greeted Mr, Churchill enthusiastically, but .... they also cheered Mr Maisky, the Societ Ambassador  ... funny thing about crowds.

I agree retreat from forward airfields would have been very political and publicly understood .... but a successful _multi_ U-boat penetration of Scapa Flow with loss of 8 or 10 capital ships would have shaken the British public to the roots, IMO. All participating U boats in the Scapa Flow attack naturally were lost ... but .... the mission was always suicidal.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 4, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> ...
> BTW if anybody can come with performance for the 110 from pilots manuals/charts it would be appreciated.



Somting like this: linky1, linky2?


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## Shortround6 (Dec 4, 2017)

Thank you, If I am reading it correctly (a very big IF) the 2nd table show that with 965kg of fuel (1270 liters)
the 110C-2 was supposed to fly 1040km at 518kph at 6000 meters altitude using 875PS per engine? 
Or 646 miles at 321-322mph at 19,685 ft? 
Granted that may very well be a 'yardstick' range and not count warming up, take off and climb to 6000 meters but it rather boggles the mind
that the Jumo powered version with the much lower powered engines would fly hundreds of km less on the same fuel. 
Unless I am missing something.


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## swampyankee (Dec 4, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> In 1940 the Germans had 3 aircraft guns in service with a 4th coming in at the end of the year it very small quantities.
> 1. the MG 17-7.9mm fixed gun which fired from a belt and used a closed bolt for synchronization.
> 2. the MG-15-7.9mm flexible gun which used the 75 round saddle drum and fired open bolt. May have used many of the same parts as the MG 17
> 3. the MG FF cannon and the nearly identical MG FF/M in 20mm. using a variety of magazines. The flexible guns used the smaller ones as they are lighter, and the lower weight and size made the gun more maneuverable.
> ...




Those Junkers flaps are also quite prone to icing up in weather. Bluntly, the more you read about German aircraft design the more you realize how overrated their designers are.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 4, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> Thank you, If I am reading it correctly (a very big IF) the 2nd table show that with 965kg of fuel (1270 liters)
> the 110C-2 was supposed to fly 1040km at 518kph at 6000 meters altitude using 875PS per engine?
> Or 646 miles at 321-322mph at 19,685 ft?



You read it correctly 



> Granted that may very well be a 'yardstick' range and not count warming up, take off and climb to 6000 meters but it rather boggles the mind
> that the Jumo powered version with the much lower powered engines would fly hundreds of km less on the same fuel.
> Unless I am missing something.



The Bf 110B have had almost the same internal fuel capacity - 927 kg in 4 tanks. I too don't believe that the 110B will be incapable to match the range of the 110C sans drop tanks. FWIW ('Uebungfall' - training 'mode'; 'Einsatzfall' - service 'mode'):

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## tomo pauk (Dec 4, 2017)

Petrick & Mankau give the 1200-1400 km range and 3-3.5 h endurance for the Jumo 210-powered Bf 110B.

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## pbehn (Dec 4, 2017)

The range of an individual aircraft is not truly representative of its range on operations. The map posted earlier showing the range of the Bf 109 is true for a plane flying in peacetime alone. In practice having to form up with the bombers, weave around keeping station with them and then going in to combat meant that on London raids the bombers had almost no escorts left at all.

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## InlineRanger (Dec 4, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> Thank you, If I am reading it correctly (a very big IF) the 2nd table show that with 965kg of fuel (1270 liters)
> the 110C-2 was supposed to fly 1040km at 518kph at 6000 meters altitude using 875PS per engine?
> Or 646 miles at 321-322mph at 19,685 ft?
> Granted that may very well be a 'yardstick' range and not count warming up, take off and climb to 6000 meters but it rather boggles the mind



Assuming the following specs, I get a Breguet Range of ~800 miles. It's plausible that the BF-110C has a real-world range of 646 miles without reserve. What are the performance specs of the earlier Jumo-powered BF-110?

*Given*
Gross Weight - 14,366lbs
Fuel Capacity - 354 gallons
Wing Area - 413 sq.ft
Aspect Ratio - 6.83
Cruise Altitude - 20,000ft
Cruise TAS - 322mph (235mph IAS)
Horsepower @ Altitude - 1726hp

*Estimated*
Zero Lift Drag Coefficient - 0.0258
Oswald Efficiency - 0.75
Engine BSFC - 0.53 lb/hp*hr
Propeller Efficiency - 85%
L/D @ Cruise Altitude - 8.33


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## buffnut453 (Dec 4, 2017)

michaelmaltby said:


> ".... Could a vote of no-confidence in Churchill's Government have resulted in a more compliant, appeasement-centric Government? I think it's certainly a possibility, and that would achieve Hitler's strategic objective without the need for Operation Sealion and without having to destroy the entirety of the RAF."
> 
> That is the $$$ real question. The crowds greeted Mr, Churchill enthusiastically, but .... they also cheered Mr Maisky, the Societ Ambassador  ... funny thing about crowds.
> 
> I agree retreat from forward airfields would have been very political and publicly understood .... but a successful _multi_ U-boat penetration of Scapa Flow with loss of 8 or 10 capital ships would have shaken the British public to the roots, IMO. All participating U boats in the Scapa Flow attack naturally were lost ... but .... the mission was always suicidal.



I like the sound of that operational concept. One can imagine a coordinated effort to hammer 11 Gp in the south and then, when some predetermined degree of attrition has been achieved, initiate the sub attack on Scapa Flow. Those would be 2 pretty sizeable body-blows to British prestige, not just internally but across the British Empire and also with then-neutral countries, most notably the US.

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## InlineRanger (Dec 4, 2017)

stona said:


> Before looking at fantasy aircraft or increased range for the Bf 109 one would do well to look at the objectives the Luftwaffe was attempting to achieve, helpfully, if vaguely, laid out for us in a Fuhrer order. One might then ask how exactly the fantasy aircraft and drop tank (or at least auxiliary tank) equipped Bf 109s would have enabled the rest of the Luftwaffe to achieve those objectives.
> Cheers
> Steve



According to battleofbritain1940.net, the planned invasion had three phases:

1) Luftwaffe conducts probing attacks on Southern English coast and interdicts English Channel shipping.
2) Destroy the RAF via BF109s clearing the airspace, bombers destroying airfields and Stukas taking out radar.
3) Conduct amphibious landings along breadth of southern English coast.



swampyankee said:


> Those Junkers flaps are also quite prone to icing up in weather. Bluntly, the more you read about German aircraft design the more you realize how overrated their designers are.



The Luftwaffe couldn't exceed phase 2 because their aircraft were not competitive. The BF-109E was outclassed by the Spitfire I. In hindsight, the choice to run an inverted engine, motor cannon and structurally optimized landing gear seriously hampered the design. The German tendency towards complex solutions for simple problems (e.g. wing slats, direct injection, electric propeller pitch control) just slowed them down further.

IMO, the Germans would have been much better off if they had licensed the Wright Cyclone like the Russians and dumped all their development efforts into that engine family. All the Luftwaffe's needs could have been met had they had entered the war with the 9 cylinder in service, the 14-cylinder undergoing trials and the 18-cylinder in development. Putting those engines on austere, efficient and easy to build air frames would have given them a highly competitive air force until the jet-age. Of course, there's the risk they'd just make them overweight and needlessly complex like the BMW-801...

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## tomo pauk (Dec 4, 2017)

InlineRanger said:


> ...
> The Luftwaffe couldn't exceed phase 2 because their aircraft were not competitive. The BF-109E was outclassed by the Spitfire I. In hindsight, the choice to run an inverted engine, motor cannon and structurally optimized landing gear seriously hampered the design. The German tendency towards complex solutions for simple problems (e.g. wing slats, direct injection, electric propeller pitch control) just slowed them down further.



The Bf 109E was not outclassed by Spitfire I.
Inverted engine and motor cannon (that 109E was never outfitted in-service) don't have anything to do with choice made for the landing gear. Take a look at He 112 and 100, or Ki 61. The Bf 109 prototype, as well as other competitors, was powered by an up-right V12 engine, without provision for engine cannon. The techincal items you mentioned served the purpose, Luftwaffe was more slowed down by lack of funds (Germany vs. UK and France combined, or even vs. UK only) and trained manpower than it was by unsuitability of it's hardware to be mass produced.



> IMO, the Germans would have been much better off if they had licensed the Wright Cyclone like the Russians and dumped all their development efforts into that engine family. All the Luftwaffe's needs could have been met had they had entered the war with the 9 cylinder in service, the 14-cylinder undergoing trials and the 18-cylinder in development. Putting those engines on austere, efficient and easy to build air frames would have given them a highly competitive air force until the jet-age. Of course, there's the risk they'd just make them overweight and needlessly complex like the BMW-801...



Talk about self-inflicted wound if they went with Wright Cycone. Gives them 320 mph Bf 109 instead 350, and 300 mph Bf 110 instead 320-330 mph. Plus more fuel used for same distance travelled. Better allow BMW to continue with the BMW 117 V12 engine of 36 liters, might have actualy powerful BMW engine in service before the BoB.

The M82 was a new development (crankcase, cylinders, crakshaft, supercharger, carb, reduction gear, crankpins...), not just the Cyclone somehow turned into 14 cylinder radial. It needed 95 oct fuel, unlike what most of German pre-1942 engines used.

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## stona (Dec 4, 2017)

InlineRanger said:


> According to battleofbritain1940.net, the planned invasion had three phases:
> 
> 1) Luftwaffe conducts probing attacks on Southern English coast and interdicts English Channel shipping.
> 2) Destroy the RAF via BF109s clearing the airspace, bombers destroying airfields and Stukas taking out radar.
> 3) Conduct amphibious landings along breadth of southern English coast.



That was the limited objectives of Directive 16.

_The English Air Force must be so reduced morally and physically that it is unable to deliver any significant attack against the German crossing._
_Mine-free channels must be cleared._
_The Straits of Dover must be closely sealed off with minefields on both flanks; also the Western entrance to the Channel approximately on the line Alderney-Poitland._
_Strong forces of coastal artillery must command and protect the forward coastal area._
_It is desirable that the English Navy be tied down shortly before the crossing, both in the North Sea and in the Mediterranean (by the Italians). For this purpose we must attempt even now to damage English home-based naval forces by air and torpedo attack as far as possible._
As a matter of historical fact the Germans never came close to achieving ANY of those five points.

This was superseded by the far more wide ranging Directive 17 which gave the Luftwaffe a list of tasks it could never have accomplished with the means at its disposal.
_
1. The German Air Force is to overpower the English Air Force with all the forces at its command, in the shortest possible time. The attacks are to be directed primarily against flying units, their ground installations, and their supply organisations, but also against the aircraft industry, including that manufacturing antiaircraft equipment.

2. After achieving temporary or local air superiority the air war is to be continued against ports, in particular against stores of food, and also against stores of provisions in the interior of the country.

Attacks on south coast ports will be made on the smallest possible scale, in view of our own forthcoming operations.

3. On the other hand, air attacks on enemy warships and merchant ships may be reduced except where some particularly favourable target happens to present itself, where such attacks would lend additional effectiveness to those mentioned in paragraph 2, or where such attacks are necessary for the training of air crews for further operations.

4. The intensified air warfare will be carried out in such a way that the Air Force can at any time be called upon to give adequate support to naval operations against suitable targets. It must also be ready to take part in full force in 'Operation Sea Lion'.

5. I reserve to myself the right to decide on terror attacks as measures of reprisal.

6. The intensification of the air war may begin on or after 5th August. The exact time is to be decided by the Air Force after the completion of preparations and in the light of the weather.
_
It was to defeat the entire RAF, it never defeated 11 Group, not just prevent attacks on the invasion operation.
Then there was a list of other objectives never even mentioned in the earlier directive.
It was to destroy the RAF's infrastructure, the British aircraft industry and other parts of the wider armaments industry. It was to enforce a blockade on British ports and destroy food and other supplies, both there and across the country.

Furthermore, in the detailed planning for Sealion, it was to support large scale airborne operations, support the amphibious landings and protect the invasion fleets!
The Allies did all this on D-Day with 12,000 aircraft at the end of a campaign lasting years which had reduced opposition from the Luftwaffe to as close to zero as to make no difference. The Luftwaffe was supposed to do it with a fraction that number of aircraft and in a few weeks.....it's ridiculous. It couldn't be done, and adding drop tanks or allowing a few fantasy aircraft makes no difference to the fundamental equation.

Cheers

Steve

_
_

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## buffnut453 (Dec 4, 2017)

stona said:


> That was the limited objectives of Directive 16.
> 
> _The English Air Force must be so reduced morally and physically that it is unable to deliver any significant attack against the German crossing._
> _Mine-free channels must be cleared._
> ...



I'd disagree slightly with your analysis in one respect. While the overall objective per #1 was to defeat the entirety of the RAF, item #2 provided some scope for achieving local air superiority which could be interpreted as over the 11 Gp AOR. 

Now...all that said, the above list of targets is so broad in scope and so poorly defined as to entirely prevent any reasonable assessment of progress or declaration of success. A more focused directive to eradicate the RAF's radar and C3 infrastructure as part of a phased operational-level campaign would have provided much-needed clarity in terms of expectations, ability to execute, and evaluation of success.

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## pbehn (Dec 4, 2017)

The LW attitude to the chain home RADAR has never been fully explained as far as I have read. It is obvious from their range and position that their field of view overlapped. That being the case the LW had to disable a minimum of two stations and best to make it four to guarantee making the system blind. The chain home system was far from secret, the failure to tackle it or understand its significance is ...well it is strange in hind sight.

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## Shortround6 (Dec 4, 2017)

Perhaps they didn't quite appreciate how the British air defense system worked at the time, It seems a few British commanders didn't even though they were operating within it. 

Early warning is just that, Early Warning. It doesn't fix tactics or poor gunnery or grand tactics (big wings) or a host of other aspects of air defense.


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## swampyankee (Dec 4, 2017)

pbehn said:


> The LW attitude to the chain home RADAR has never been fully explained as far as I have read. It is obvious from their range and position that their field of view overlapped. That being the case the LW had to disable a minimum of two stations and best to make it four to guarantee making the system blind. The chain home system was far from secret, the failure to tackle it or understand its significance is ...well it is strange in hind sight.



"Strange" only if one presumes that the Luftwaffe's analysts had made an accurate assessment of its value. While I don't think the Luftwaffe's analysts were stupid, I don't think that they were superhuman, either. The Luftwaffe had also been on a winning streak, including against the RAF in the Battle of France, and saw some spectacularly poor tactical decisions on the part of the RAF, _e.g.,_ some of the uses of the Fairey Battle


Shortround6 said:


> Perhaps they didn't quite appreciate how the British air defense system worked at the time, It seems a few British commanders didn't even though they were operating within it.
> 
> Early warning is just that, Early Warning. It doesn't fix tactics or poor gunnery or grand tactics (big wings) or a host of other aspects of air defense.


My suspicion is that the Luftwaffe had been winning, largely through superior tactics against significantly weaker opponents, they underestimated the technological capabilities of the British and the British ability to get a new technology into a significant operational role. Don't get me wrong: I think the German war planners were largely competent, but competent doesn't mean infallible.


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## parsifal (Dec 4, 2017)

I’m sure steve will give a more complete answer, but it is incorrect to assert that the Germans had no knowledge of radar detection or GCI techniques. They practiced it themselves. What I think came as a surprise was the level of integration and sophistication worked into the RAF early warning system. It was this non-technical aspect to the way information was organised and passed to the people that mattered that the germans failed to appreciate adequately.

Within a year the Germans were organising a bigger more sophisticated and more effective system for early warning of their own

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## Koopernic (Dec 5, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> It had recognized the vital function, it was using the Bf 110 to address it. A bit imperfectly to be sure and even more imperfectly when the 110s were ordered to stay close to the bombers.
> 
> 
> 
> ...



We know the fuel tank capacities of the Fw 187.
*There is no doubt as to Dietmar Herman's range figures for the Fw 187.*

1 The Fw 187 V5 (ie DB601 version) had an internal fuel capacity of *1250* liters and the Me 109E series *400* liters.
2 The Fw 187 V5 thus had *625* Litres of fuel to feed each DB601.
3 The Me 109 E7 thus had *400* Litres of fuel to feed its one DB601.
4 The Fw 187 thus had 400/625 = *1.55 *times more endurance and range at the same power setting.
6 Given the Fw 187 significantly greater speed at the same power ratings the range should be at least 1.55 times that of the Me 109E. Since the Range of the Me 109E or F is usually given as *410* miles (660km) we can see the 1200km range for the Fw 187 is realistic.

A DB601 producing 1100hp and consuming fuel at 0.210KG/hp is going to consume 308L an hour. Those are official DB figures I'm using fro combat power.

The Jumo 210 engined version of the Fw 187 had 1110 Litres of fuel disposed in 620L fuselage tank and 2 x 245 wing tanks.

The DB engine version of the Fw 187 had 1300 Litres of fuel disposed in 880L fuselage tank and 2 x 210

Worse case, if Focke Wulf has to get the Fw 187 in production without increasing its capacity gives us 1110 Litres of Fuel ie 38% more per engine than the Me 109E/F which substantially out ranges the Me 109 and the slower Me 110.

I agree regarding the 1350hp DB601H having a 1 minute rating of 1350hp being not operationally possible in 1939 but even with 1050hp, the same as the Me 109, is speed is not going to fall below that of the 109.

Below page 63 of Dietmar Herman's book you alluded. You can see the two aircraft have equivalent armament with differences trivia. Typo aside on the 12 instead of 2 MGFF 20mm guns.







The Bf 110C range variations isn't really relevant because it was an ineffective escort with rare exception when sent ahead of the bombers to disrupt enemy fighters and when it was effective it was too expensive. Nor is its 20% variation in range with regards to altitude important. The salient imprtant fact on the Fw 187 is that its range should be (worst case) 38% more range or 80% than the Me 109 with the improved tank-age.

Most German combat aircraft have their range given in terms of range at maxim sustainable power. This was about 880hp for the DB601A followed by 1/2 at combat power which is not WEP but another rating allowed only for 30 minutes (typically) 0.210 Kg of fuel per hp per hour is a good figure to use. No reserves for anything but warm up and climb.

Only the Fw 187 would have had the range and performance to take on the Hurricane and Spitfire over most of Britain.

The opportunity to develop it wasn't taken.

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## Koopernic (Dec 5, 2017)

Peter Gunn said:


> Once again the unicorn that is the Fw 187 prances onto the stage as a world beater, even though relevant data suggests otherwise.



What relevant data do you have. All the relevant data shows it carried the fuel needed at the speed needed.


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## Koopernic (Dec 5, 2017)

parsifal said:


> I’m sure steve will give a more complete answer, but it is incorrect to assert that the Germans had no knowledge of radar detection or GCI techniques. They practiced it themselves. What I think came as a surprise was the level of integration and sophistication worked into the RAF early warning system. It was this non-technical aspect to the way information was organised and passed to the people that mattered that the Germans failed to appreciate adequately.j
> 
> Within a year the Germans were organising a bigger more sophisticated and more effective system for early warning of their own



The Luftwaffe had at least 8 Freya radars in service in Germany at the outbreak of WW2 in September 1939. By the Battle of France they had introduced 20 more (some sources say they had 20 in total in Service.) This might explain the Luftwaffe willingness to move their fighters to forward bases and thereby leave the German interior undefended.

In addition they had used a portable Freya units in Czechoslovakia as early as 1938 and latter air transportable units in Norway.

In addition they had both ship and a few shore based Seetakt units at naval bases. The Willhelmshaffen raid was detect both by a Luftwaffe Freya and a Naval Seetakt. The operators contacted each other to confirm their bogies.

During the British retreat from France the German army captured several British radars. T*he British Force had 17 Transportable Radio Unit (TRU)*_* and several were captured.* These units operated at 6m and 50kW. They would have appeared primitive to the Germans but their portability would have convinced them of the impossibility of knocking out British radar. There were backups to Chain Home.

Furthermore Chain Home Low CHL was fully integrated by the so called Battle of Britain.

*Hence knocking out the British radar system would be impossible. Goering or whomever usually get blamed couldn't have done a thing, there were too many backups to Chain Home (CH), including Chain Home Low (CHL) and TRU.*_

By August 1940 they had introduced 20 Wurzburg A units into the Ruhr Valley. The units lacked conical scan, that came in with Wurzburg C in Feb 1941 and they also lacked synchros to transmit data to the FLAK computer (that came in with Wurzburg D and Wurzburg Riesse in June 1941) but could locate an aircraft with 2 degrees by wobbling the dish. These are service dates I'm quoting.

The Freya's were integrated into the existing Luftwaffe air reporting service so its wrong to say they weren't part of a system designed to intercept hostile aircraft. Radar was just another sensor along with observers, sound locators and radio direction finding.

The State of German IFF was more wanting. The system they used was initially was called FuG 25 Zwilling and was more intended to inform a FLAK radar that it might be tracking a friendly. Unfortunately it worked by returning an audio tone when triggered by the radar changing pulse repetition frequency so it could have been triggered any aircraft in the Beam. The superior FuG 25*a* Erstling only came latter, probably 1941, and gave a second distinct pulse adjacent to the reflection pulse when interrogation was turned on.

The infamous and deadly "Battle of Barking Creek" in Sept 6 1939 caused by inadequate IFF shows the RAF didn't have its systems fully developed yet.

The Germans were well aware of British radar and their own radar was better in some ways. Several unprofessional British historians tried to maintain the myth that they, the British, had developed radar probably as a matter of British pride and as an act of disrespect to former foes. This has lead to a lot of false and bad history. Obviously these attitudes were given up but their echoes persist. I think the Great Watson-Watt, who had so much to play in erecting Britain’s early Radar, annoyed the shit out of the Americans at GE developing SCR 268 and 270 with his unwelcome advice on a system that inevitably was going to be invented in several countries at the same time.

"Deflating British Radar Myths Of World War II" by Major Gregory C Clark Notes Air Field Marshall Joubert was conducting meetings as to whether the Germans had radar at all as late as Feb 1941.

Rather famously the Germans had developed blind navigation and bombing systems under the British radar so to speak.

It is true that the British had a well integrated system because it was older, it initially only had to operate over sea.

1 The Germans knew of British radar
2 They knew of its use because they had their own systems.
3 German IFF was less developed but they had a sense of the problems of IFF and had started experimenting with a system in November 1939 called "Zwilling"

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## stona (Dec 5, 2017)

The Germans understood what the Chain Home stations were, and had an idea of their capability. What the didn't understand was how they were integrated into a quite sophisticated air defence system.
They had no inkling of how this was organised. If they had there would have been no need even to attack the Chain Home stations, which were difficult targets anyway. They could simply have concentrated all their effort on the Sector Stations, and attacked them repeatedly and relentlessly, as often as weather permitted. It was Sector Control which controlled all the air defence systems, from barrage balloons, to anti-aircraft batteries, to interceptors. The Observer Corps also reported to them rather than Fighter Command's Filter and Operations Room at HQ. Destroy them and everything above them (Group Control and Fighter Command HQ) is irrelevant, and everything below them is blind. Of course, Sector Stations were sometimes attacked as part of overall operations, and, when significantly damaged, was the one thing that really worried Park.

The Luftwaffe was still arguing about the necessity for radios (or should that be wireless) in fighter aircraft when the British were using them to control their interceptions.

Cheers

Steve

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## Shortround6 (Dec 5, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> We know the fuel tank capacities of the Fw 187.
> *There is no doubt as to Dietmar Herman's range figures for the Fw 187.*



I wasn't doubting the range figures of the Fw 187 much, but the range figure given for the Bf 110 is total nonsense, or a major typo.



> Since the Range of the Me 109E or F is usually given as *410* miles (660km) we can see the 1200km range for the Fw 187 is realistic.


here were get into another bit of confusion. The 109F should have had better range than the 109E since it was faster on the same power?
Granted not enough to be escort fighter. However the 109F _might be _a better drag model (power to speed) for estimating performance of the FW 187 with normal DB 601 engines?

This is one area the book doesn't cover. It jumps from the Jumo 210 powered versions through the V5 with the experimental engines (not just cooling system) to the flights of fancy with DB605s and BMW 801s.



> I agree regarding the 1350hp DB601H having a 1 minute rating of 1350hp being not operationally possible in 1939 but even with 1050hp, the same as the Me 109, is speed is not going to fall below that of the 109.



Never said it would fall below the 109, just pointing out the lack of data, real or estimated for a _service _*Fw187 * using engines (and guns) that were actually in service at the time in question (1930-40)



> Below page 63 of Dietmar Herman's book you alluded. You can see the two aircraft have equivalent armament with differences trivia. Typo aside on the 12 instead of 2 MGFF 20mm guns.



The difference is not so trivial. I included the picture to show why. The weight of the two extra MG 17s and their ammo is trivial. The extra drag may not be. If you want to estimate the performance of a theoretical FW 187 using DB 601A engines lets start with the closest version to the service aircraft we can, not an under armed prototype, or the *estimated *speed of such a plane using estimated ram effect and estimated exhaust thrust. Why is there a 15kph difference between the speed in that chart and other figures for the FW187A-0?




> The Bf 110C range variations isn't really relevant because it was an ineffective escort with rare exception when sent ahead of the bombers to disrupt enemy fighters and when it was effective it was too expensive. Nor is its 20% variation in range with regards to altitude important. The salient imprtant fact on the Fw 187 is that its range should be (worst case) 38% more range or 80% than the Me 109 with the improved tank-age.



The range variations are important to show that the "snapshot" of the FW187s capabilities vs the BF 110 are in error. By how much is in dispute. But if the actual range difference between the two planes is actually close it helps explain the reluctance of the Luftwaffe to shut down a production program in progress and try to convert to a new type of aircraft right before a war.

I would note that FW did a much better job with exhaust thrust than Messerschmitt did even if the 13% figure is a bit high.




If you want exhaust thrust to work the gases have to exit the pipes flowing about 180 degrees to the airplanes direction of travel.
The exhaust on the left is just getting out of the cowl, not much else. The exhaust on the right is being deflected so the exhaust goes under the wing rather than flowing into the wing leading edge?
On DB powered 110s the outer exhaust pointed up and over the wing(kept the hot exhaust out of the radiator) while the inner exhausts pointed down and under the wing. Messerschmitt managing to get the exhausts of both engines pretty much inline with the wing.

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## Koopernic (Dec 5, 2017)

stona said:


> The Germans understood what the Chain Home stations were, and had an idea of their capability. What the didn't understand was how they were integrated into a quite sophisticated air defence system.
> They had no inkling of how this was organised. If they had there would have been no need even to attack the Chain Home stations, which were difficult targets anyway. They could simply have concentrated all their effort on the Sector Stations, and attacked them repeatedly and relentlessly, as often as weather permitted. It was Sector Control which controlled all the air defence systems, from barrage balloons, to anti-aircraft batteries, to interceptors. The Observer Corps also reported to them rather than Fighter Command's Filter and Operations Room at HQ. Destroy them and everything above them (Group Control and Fighter Command HQ) is irrelevant, and everything below them is blind. Of course, Sector Stations were sometimes attacked as part of overall operations, and, when significantly damaged, was the one thing that really worried Park.
> 
> The Luftwaffe was still arguing about the necessity for radios (or should that be wireless) in fighter aircraft when the British were using them to control their interceptions.
> ...




If you wanted to understand what the Germans understood of the British system you would have to understand how the German air reporting service worked and how well the Germans had integrated their own radar. Their ability to comprehend the RAF system would depend on their own.

Condor Legion was using radios in many of their aircraft and they saw value in it. If they were questioning the value of radios in the Me 109 perhaps it is because they thought that interception was a job for the Bf 110. After-all the Bf 110 was supposed to smash up enemy bombers and the observers other duties were to operate the radio and take navigation fixes.


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## stona (Dec 5, 2017)

It was the 'Spaniards' who were so opposed to the use of radios in fighters. Steinhilper has some severe criticism for the old hands, 'Spaniards', and in particular Galland over this issue in his account of the period. 
Cheers
Steve


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## Koopernic (Dec 5, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> I wasn't doubting the range figures of the Fw 187 much, but the range figure given for the Bf 110 is total nonsense, or a major typo.
> 
> 
> here were get into another bit of confusion. The 109F should have had better range than the 109E since it was faster on the same power?
> ...




Thanks, that's a nice illustration of the many minor mods that effect A/C performance.. Thanks for all of your informed information and insights especially on the technical issues.

I believe the main reason the Fw 187 is faster is because it is 1038kg lighter (3402kg empty versus 4440kg for the Me 110B) thats only 77% of the empty weight and 85% of the Gross weight( 4900kg vs 5701kg). It has only 78% of the wing area. (30.2 vs 38.55 m^2).

The length is also 10% less so I'm assuming that besides wing area that frontal area and whetted area is also about 80%-85% of the Me 110. That alone, applying a cube law, should make the Fw 187 5%-7% faster.

The Me 109F has 87 imp gallons of fuel (400 liters) and the Me 109E actually has 91 gallons (420L) so there is about a 5% fuel advantage to the E.

Its also quite possible that Me 109F (F1, F4) was calculated on a different power level. What appears in Messerschmitt or DB documents may not be authorized by the Luftwaffe. In addition there were different versions of the DB601A engines like the A, A1, AA and also of the N with different superchargers. I think early N's had an inferior supercharger. The differences are mostly minor but they effect critical altitude as well as power and WEP ratings. The AA I believe was an export version for the Swiss air-force that ended up in Luftwaffe aircraft.


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## rochie (Dec 5, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> After-all the Bf 110 was supposed to smash up enemy bombers and the observers other duties were to operate the radio and take navigation fixes.




I thought the 110's job was to range ahead of its own bombers and clearing the path of enemy fighters ?


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## Koopernic (Dec 5, 2017)

rochie said:


> I thought the 110's job was to range ahead of its own bombers and clearing the path of enemy fighters ?




It had several jobs. I think Rudiger Kosn lists them in his Book "The German Fighter"
1 Range ahead of own bombers to attack rising enemy fighters.
2 Strafe up enemy fighters and air defenses on the ground before they can takeoff.
3 Use its heavy fire power to bring down enemy bombers.
4 bad weather fighter ie operation in bad visibility (obviously night) with instruments and navigation aids.
5 the original zerstoerer spec called for bombs to be carried internally and a 3 man crew but Bf 110 could carry external bombs. The Bf 110 was actually a non conforming submission to the zerstoerer spec.

Because the RAF was using head on attacks on the bombers Goering had the Me 110 and Me 109 in close formation to thwart RAF head on attacks. Obviously the Me 110 would tend to win this type of duel but it made the Luftwaffe fighters very vulnerable particular the Bf 110 which had slow acceleration compared to a single and not quite as good a maneuverability.

If used in the 'range ahead of own bombers' I imagine it was reasonably successful as it can have the tactical freedom of moving at a faster speed and is said to have a superior exchange ratio versus the British fighters. Bf 110 are less likely to be 'bounced' due to the observers eyes and if there are enough Bf 110 around they can support each other due to good radio communication. Down side their large size means they are seen earlier. 

In a turning dog fight the British fighter would end up below the Bf 110 where the observer couldn't engage the attacking fighter. The heavy maneuvering preventing aiming or even reloading of magazines. The observer was helpless. The Me 210/410 was supposed to fix this with its hydraulically powered guns, ability to fire below.

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## Peter Gunn (Dec 5, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> What relevant data do you have. All the relevant data shows it carried the fuel needed at the speed needed.



And what relevant data do you have for a production, in service aircraft? Pre-production and prototypes ARE NOT in service aircraft, especially paper versions.

Fw-187 could have been German P-51?

Subject's been discussed before. Personally I think the Fw 187 is one of the most overrated unicorns ever discussed, you mileage may vary however.


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## Milosh (Dec 5, 2017)

This is what I have for the Bf109E for range and endurance.(numbers converted to Imperial)w/o dt

9842ft
max continuous: 2200rpm, 282.7mph, 1.00hr, 280mi
max economy: 1300rpm, 186.4mph, 2.05hr, 410mi

16,404ft
max continuous: 2400rpm, 282.7mph, 0.55hr, 286mi
max economy: 1400rpm, 186.4mph, 1.50hr, 413mi

19,865ft
max continuous: 2400rpm, 310.7mph, 1.10hr, 323mi
max economy: 1600rpm, 223.7mph, 1.40hr, 395mi

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## stona (Dec 5, 2017)

Peter Gunn said:


> Personally I think the Fw 187 is one of the most overrated unicorns ever discussed, you mileage may vary however.



It is, and a complete red herring. We have no idea what the performance of a true, mass produced service version might have been and extrapolating from the few (and various types) made leaves plenty of room for conjecture.

Conjecture is conjecture, no matter how well informed! Can anyone think of any WW2 aircraft that actually met the performance figures in service which were touted by the manufacturer to get the contracts? There must have been some, but I can't think of any.

Cheers

Steve

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## Shortround6 (Dec 5, 2017)

Mosquito

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## tomo pauk (Dec 5, 2017)

Spitfire did, so did P-51, also the P-40 after some tweaks.


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## stona (Dec 5, 2017)

Some of those mentioned didn't initially live up to expectation, even the prototype Spitfire was slower than hoped for.
Cheers
Steve


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## tomo pauk (Dec 5, 2017)

IIRC Supermarine expected 350 mph Spitfire. When the prototype was clocked at 349 mph, their comment was something along 'well, we can settle for that'. Once rear-facing exhausts were fitted, it went at 360 mph, still on same 1030 HP.
P-40 was also expected to make 350 mph. The 1st flight tests were dissapointing, but after a few alterations of radiators' locations it went to 350 mph. The P-40B was also good for 350 mph. Same as the small and light Bf 109E, kinda showing how the Emil was aerodynamically dirty.
P-51 lived up to the expectation of a 'better P-40'.

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## Shortround6 (Dec 5, 2017)

The trouble/s I have with the Fw 187 is that so much is ill informed conjecture or conjecture based on rose tinted glasses.

It wouldn't be hard to build a better twin engine _fighter _than the Bf 110. That isn't the problem. The problem comes with statements like the "FW 187 could be the Luftwaffe P-51". Ot that the Fw 187 was a lot cheaper than the Bf 110 while using the same engines, props, weapons, radios, etc. Yes the airframe/wing is smaller and should be cheaper but the overall cost of the airplane?

And that brings us back to the Luftwaffe P-51 claim. One reason the US jumped all over the Merlin P-51 was that it was much cheaper than the P-38 and P-47 and yet did the same job (remember that thousands were on order before a Merlin P-51 escorted it's first bomber), There is no way that a twin engine fighter grossing over 12,000lbs clean is going to be "Cheap" or be manufactured in the numbers that single engine fighters are.

As mentioned before the 109 gained around 450kg *empty * going from the Jumo models to the 109E despite the difference in engine weight being only about 170kg (?). Some of this may be due to strengthening of the airframe which I will assume the the Fw 187 doesn't need as it was designed for the DB 600/601 of some sort and had to revert to the Jumo 210 due to engine shortages. However that doesn't do away with the need for bigger props, bigger radiators, oil coolers, etc to suit the bigger engines. 

One of the "Paper" studies of the Fw 187 has a version with DB605A engines (with a longer fuselage and slightly modified wings) and that study has the plane weighing 5660kg empty or empty equipped (with a heavier armament). but the DB 605 is a lot heavier than the DB601. 
However we are left looking at a plane that is over 10% heavier empty equipped than the Jumo powered planes were loaded.

Where does the DB601A powered version lie on this spectrum? Where between the 4900kg loaded for the V4 and the 7200kg for the loaded (but clean ) DB605A powered version? 
Some promoters boast of the excellent maneuverability of the FW 187, which may be quite true for the versions flying at under 5000kg, but what happens at 6000kg and above? 

Going back to the P-51, the P-51 had 180 gallons for it's engine to start with or 680 liters, but it made it's reputation using a a further 321 liters in the rear tank (actually more like 140 or so liters in the rear tank when the drop tanks were dropped) and drop tanks.
The fictitious FW 187 can certainly use drop tanks but it's internal fuel of 1300 liters (or less) split between two engines is not going to give Mustang like operational radius. 

I would note that a fictitious FW 187 at 6000kg would be remarkable similar to an Early P-38 in size, weight, power (at least somewhat below 20,000ft ) and internal fuel capacity.(edge to the FW 187) 
Adjust as needed for the P-38 having 1150hp ?

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## Shortround6 (Dec 5, 2017)

Here are some numbers for exhaust thrust From Rolls Royce using a Hurricane II and Merlin XX engine.

altitude.............speed............MAP............propshaft power......charge flow......back pres......exhaust velocity........exhaust HP........% of shaftpower
15,000ft.........325mph..........48.24in................1048hp..............140.5lb/m............23.2in..........1395fps.....................86.5.................8.25%
20,000ft.........335mph..........48.24in................1073hp..............144lb/m...............22.3in..........1695fps.....................113.0..............10.53%
20,000ft.........340mph..........50.67in................1126hp..............151lb/m...............23.2in...........1788fps.....................126.8.............11.17%
25,000ft.........330mph..........42.12in................ 960hp..............129.1lb/m............19.6in...........1840fps.....................107.2.............11.16%
30,000ft.........317mph..........34.30in..................788hp..............107.2lb/m............16,3in...........1901fps......................89.0...............11.44%

Now please note that the higher the plane flies the less back pressure on the exhaust system (due to falling air pressure) and the higher the exhaust gas velocity. note that at 15,000ft and 30,000ft the thrust is almost the same, While the mass dropped to about 76.3% the gas velocity increase by about 36% Thrust is mass times velocity but thrust is not Horsepower. to get HP you have to figure in the velocity of the airplane vs the velocity of the escaping gas.

The table I got this from does list 35,000ft but doesn't go any lower than 15,000ft, but I think we can see the trend. The closer you get to sea level the higher the back pressure and the lower the exhaust gas Velocity. 

Trying to use a constant as high as 13% for exhaust thrust at all altitudes doesn't line up with this. I would also note that the British are using a richer mixture than the Germans at high speed and the charge weight will be higher per shaft HP. 
You don't get good fuel economy and high charge weight at the same time.

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## parsifal (Dec 5, 2017)

The Luftwaffe admitted the loss of 223~229 Bf110's during the Battle of Britain (to the end of October) .

Sources: 
1- “Statistics of the Battle of Britain”

2- “Osprey Aircraft of the Aces” 25 Bf110 Zerstorer Aces of ww2 page 51 (last paragraph)

On the other hand...

There were Bf110 victories as wel but losses clearly outweighed victories. The Me110 aces between them claimed 161 victories, break down is as follows:

ErprGr 210 (2 Aces with 15 Victories)
ZG 2 (1 Ace with 6 Victories)
ZG 26 (11 Aces with 81 Victories)
ZG 76 (6 Aces with 59 Victories)
Victories among Bf110 aces: 15 + 6 + 81 + 59 = 161 victories

These claims don’t include shoot downs by non-aces

Beginning in early September 1940, some German air units equipped with the twin-engined fighter plane Messerschmitt Bf 110 were withdrawn from the English Channel to be used as night fighters. Sometimes this has been regarded as a ‘degradation’ of the Bf 110. Clearly the Me110 was inferior in accelaration, climb and horizontal manouverability to the spitfire and a little less marginal against the hurricane. But the 110 was not without some strengths either. 

In fact, the withdrawals were more the result of heavy pressure from Hitler and the German population to put an end to the night raids against Berlin and other German cities. The LW chose the Me110 apparently because the type had some night compatible instrumentation, the crews had some basic training in night flying, and the weaknesses bedevilling the type in day fighter combat were not relevant to the night battlefield. The 110 in September was still considered a very potent fighter.

The myth that the 110 was a complete failure as a day fighter stems more from the expectations made of it rather than any concrete failures in air combat.

The twin-engined, long-range fighter Bf 110 was the result of the war games conducted under Göring’s supervision in the winter of 1933/34. These showed that the prevailing view by then that “the bombers will always get through” – the notion that regardless of intercepting fighters and air defence a sufficient number of bombers always would get through to their assigned targets, where they were expected to cause enormous damage – was incorrect.

In the summer of 1934, the leadership of the still secret Luftwaffe presented a study that suggested what at that time was quite revolutionary: a twin-engined fighter, heavily armed with automatic cannons as well as machine guns, to protect the bombers against enemy fighter interception, it being expected the Me110 would range far ahead of the bomber formations and demolish with firepower the more nimble SE fighters likely to range against it. This was the era of the Bristol Bulldog, with aircraft like the Gloster gladiator being developed at about the same time, remember. The idea was to dispatch these twin-engined fighter aircraft in advance, at a high altitude over the intended bombing target area, to clear the air of enemy fighters before the bombers arrived.

In fact, when used in that way, the Messerschmitt Bf 110 was quite successful. Actually, the Bf 110 appears to have had a better ratio of shot down enemy aircraft to own combat losses than any other fighter type during the Battle of Britain. Yet in most accounts of the Battle of Britain, the accomplishments of the Bf 110 have been nearly totally neglected (although admittedly this is largely a result of the inaccessibility of sources on this aircraft). Investigations of the available material have at least suggested enabled a different picture to be drawn of the Bf 110 during the Battle of Britain.

Bf 110 fighter units sustained some very heavy losses on various occasions. In most cases, however, this was when the Bf 110 fighters were ordered to fly slow, close-escort missions to German bombers. In those cases, there was no difference between what the Bf 110 suffered and what the Bf 109 suffered. There are numerous cases where Bf 109 units were absolutely thrashed by RAF fighters because they had to fly on foolishly slow close-escort missions. In this way, Bf 110-equipped I./ZG 26 lost six aircraft over the North Sea on 15 August 1940, just as Bf 109-equipped I./JG 77 lost five aircraft on 31 August 1940, to pick just two examples.

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## stona (Dec 6, 2017)

There were also occasions when Bf 110s were absolutely thrashed by RAF fighters when flying independent missions against Fighter Command airfields and other targets as anyone who has read a history of Erprobungsgruppe 210 would know.
The disastrous intervention of Luftflotte 5 in the Battle on August 15th, and the decimation of the Bf 110s involved had little to do with the escort role and much to do with the types inability to defend itself from, or, more critically, escape determined attacks from single engine fighters. They couldn't fly in a defensive circle over the North Sea, or anywhere else, indefinitely. 
It is simply not the case that a mythical order from Goering caused the lack of tactical freedom which led to the failure of the Bf 110. On the other hand the Bf 110 was not as bad as often portrayed today, though it was nowhere near as good as the Germans thought.
Cheers
Steve

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## swampyankee (Dec 6, 2017)

As an aside, the fact that the P-40, despite being heavier and bulkier than the Bf109, was so close in performance to the latter is a fairly telling counterpoint to the superiority of German designers.

Question in regards to rear gunners with single, rifle caliber machine guns: how effective were they? Did the really stop fighter attacks or were they more useful as extra eyes and the gun just a morale booster?

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## Shortround6 (Dec 6, 2017)

stona said:


> There were also occasions when Bf 110s were absolutely thrashed by RAF fighters when flying independent missions against Fighter Command airfields and other targets as anyone who has read a history of Erprobungsgruppe 210 would know.
> The disastrous intervention of Luftflotte 5 in the Battle on August 15th, and the decimation of the Bf 110s involved had little to do with the escort role and much to do with the types inability to defend itself from, or, more critically, escape determined attacks from single engine fighters. They couldn't fly in a defensive circle over the North Sea, or anywhere else, indefinitely.



Bf 110s from Norway were sort of a special case.






Add the drag of this tank (1050 liters/231imp gal) to even a Mosquito and see what happens. Even if empty the 110s from Norway were trying to fight with hundreds of liters more fuel in the normal fuel tanks than 110s that had flown from Belgium or France. 
A bit like a Spitfire trying to fight with the 170 gallon tank still attached, even if empty. 

The 110s days as a day fighter were numbered, Over England with an increasing number of Spitfires (and better ones) the 110 was outclassed sooner than in NA or on the Russian front. But there too better fighters showed up. However over England in the summer/fall of 1940 the 110 could still play an improtant part *IF* used correctly.

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## pbehn (Dec 6, 2017)

The concept of the Bf 110 was sound but to make it work it has to be developed as quickly as the opposition. Between 1939 and 1940 the Bf100s opponent in the RAF went from twin blade prop Hurricanes on 85 octane fuel to the Spitfire MkII guided by RADAR. Updating the engines and airframes is obviously a much bigger task.


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## stona (Dec 6, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> However over England in the summer/fall of 1940 the 110 could still play an important part *IF* used correctly.



So how do you use it?

Whenever it came up against single engine fighters it was in trouble. This could be attacking ports/shipping, as a fighter bomber (where it did enjoy some success by avoiding interception, but when it did come up against single engine fighters.... disaster) or as a bomber escort.

The Luftwaffe concept of clearing a way for the bombers was impractical as the RAF fighters had no need to engage a formation of Bf 110s ahead of the bombers, they would simply attack the bombers. The bombers were *always* the priority for *all* RAF fighters. If the Bf 110s escorted the bombers more closely they once again became vulnerable, relatively easy to avoid or out manoeuvre.

The Bf 110 losses in the last half of 1940 speak for themselves.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Dec 6, 2017)

stona said:


> So how do you use it?
> 
> Whenever it came up against single engine fighters it was in trouble. This could be attacking ports/shipping, as a fighter bomber (where it did enjoy some success by avoiding interception, but when it did come up against single engine fighters.... disaster) or as a bomber escort.
> 
> ...



It requires good timing between the 110s and the bombers. The 110s cannot arrive too early and they cannot arrive with and flying at the same speed as the bombers ( that wouldn't work for Mustangs in 1944). The 110 was never going to equal the Spitfire but had some chance against the Hurricane, which did after all, make up the majority of the British fighter strength. Granted the 110s could no more "pick" their opponents than the British could actually use Spitfires against 109s and Hurricanes against bombers. 

Perhaps the 110s could flown higher than the bombers and dive down on the attacking British fighters? 
And every British fighter trying to shoot down a BF 110 is a fighter that is not trying to shoot down a bomber.
However the Germans cannot play this game for very long unless they play it very well, trading twin engine fighters for single engine fighters is no way to win a war of attrition.


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## buffnut453 (Dec 6, 2017)

An alternate role for the Me110 might be low-level intruders, using their heavy firepower in low-level sneak attacks against RAF airfields? They could cause havoc as RAF fighters are coming into land short on fuel or are sitting on the ground being rearmed and refueled. Lots of potential damage to be done. But they'd have to come in at low level to avoid detection. The Luftwaffe did, eventually, employ such tactics but including them as part of a broader operational plan including traditional bombers escorted by single-engine fighters could have multiplied the challenges that Fighter Command had to address.


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## stona (Dec 6, 2017)

buffnut453 said:


> An alternate role for the Me110 might be low-level intruders, using their heavy firepower in low-level sneak attacks against RAF airfields? They could cause havoc as RAF fighters are coming into land short on fuel or are sitting on the ground being rearmed and refueled. Lots of potential damage to be done. But they'd have to come in at low level to avoid detection. The Luftwaffe did, eventually, employ such tactics but including them as part of a broader operational plan including traditional bombers escorted by single-engine fighters could have multiplied the challenges that Fighter Command had to address.



They did employ low level approaches in a fighter bomber role, rather than intruder role. They did manage to avoid detection and enjoy some success, but when they were caught the result was predictable, heavy losses for the Bf 110s.

The Bf 109s were most effective by arriving at a superior altitude to the bombers and the intercepting British fighters, putting them in a position to break up the RAF attacks and often force an engagement by using their advantageous position to attack the would be attackers. Given Fighter Command's basic tactical unit was a single squadron this did sometimes work, but often another squadron would arrive unopposed with the escort committed (another argument against the Big Wing, better to make frequent harassing attacks as the bombers approached, to break up the formations and prevent them bombing their targets, or at least preclude accurate bombing).
I simply can't see any reason to adopt a similar tactic for a big twin like the Bf 110, unless there really is no other use for it. It would also negate the only defensive tactic the type had, a defensive circle, given that it certainly couldn't outrun a Spitfire and might struggle against a Hurricane, depending on the situation.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Dec 6, 2017)

Speed of the 110 seems to be between that of the Hurricane and Spitfire. Climb, depending on altitude might only be a bit behind the Hurricane (at altitudes where only 6lbs boost can be employed.) Wing loading might be just under a 109E-3. and it had slats 

Roll response and indeed, response to other control inputs could very well have been below par. And most fights were going to devolve to lower altitudes where the British use of higher boost would show more advantage. 

Part of what started this discussion on the 110 is the often made claim that if the Fw 187 had been used instead of the 110 then the RAF would have been defeated, England would have been invaded and civilization as we know it would have ceased to exist.

Most proponents of the FW 187 want to use the higher powered engines and claim all the performance benefits and not accept the lower quantity of ammo, and the weight gain that would affect maneuverability/handling. 
The 110C-2 was carrying around 160kg more ammo than either the 110C-1 or the Fw187A-0. How much of this extra was ever used (or even carried?) I don't know, 1000 rounds for each 7.9 fixed machine gun? 2 _spare _drums for each 20mm cannon. 
Some answers can be found here http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/me110/Me-110_Tactical_Trials.pdf.
The Hurricane I and Spitfire Vb were the comparison planes. 

The captured and rebuilt 110 had trouble flying above 20,000ft due to fault/s in the engines. 
However one item of note is that the propellers were NOT really constant speed and required adjustment by the pilot in flight to get best performance from the engines or to keep from damaging them, pitch change was slow and the pilots fingers (plural) had to kept on the switches. I believe this was also the case with the early 109s? but in the case of the 110 there are two props to take-care of. 
Any actual FW 187 of the same era would have been fitted with same props and controls and suffered the same limitations.

I would note that a FW 187 flying at 5800kg (700kg less than a 110c-2) would have a wingloading of just under 40lbs sq/ft and any hope of outmaneuvering a Spitfire is long gone.

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## michaelmaltby (Dec 6, 2017)

Not to drift off topic but IMO the development, performance and fate of the Westland Whirlwind is a kind of a precursor of what the fate of the FW 187 _would_ have been. 

As a kid I built the Airfix Whirwind out of the 'baggy'  and loved the whole _idea_ of that plane ... but ... with mature understanding I don't see that plane as a significant game changer, period. It may have very well been well-loved by its pilots but it didn't distinguish itself on The Channel Dash ... as top cover element, IIRC, and served till decommissioned as a hit-and-run ground attack AC. IIRC. 

So, ask yourself, would you rather have a Typhoon or a Whirlwind as a Jabo? A Fw-187 of a Fw-190A?

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## tomo pauk (Dec 6, 2017)

michaelmaltby said:


> ...
> So, ask yourself, would you rather have a Typhoon or a Whirlwind as a Jabo? A Fw-187 of a Fw-190A?



There is no question for 1940 - those would've been Whirly and Falke, Typhoon and Fw 190 were not in production. Whirly also in 1941.
Two years mattered in ww2.


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## michaelmaltby (Dec 6, 2017)

my point was fighter AC with 2 smallish motors vs fighters with a single larger engine .... the P-38 evolved through the same trajectory in Europe 1942-45. Would you rather have a twin-engined P-38 or a P-47 jabo? AC evolve their usefulness regardless of the year.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 6, 2017)

I would also note that the 110 did a number of jobs, unintended when first designed (?) that the Fw 187 would have trouble doing.
Case in point being that 110 that the British recovered and rebuilt had been flying a photo recon mission and the cannon had been replaced by a camera.
German recon cameras were generally very large.





Trying to fit one of these in a Fw187 without extensive modifications would be difficult. 
German recon was bad enough as it was, using just Ju 88s and Do 17s in 1940 would have been worse.

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## Shortround6 (Dec 6, 2017)

michaelmaltby said:


> my point was fighter AC with 2 smallish motors vs fighters with a single larger engine .... the P-38 evolved through the same trajectory in Europe 1942-45. Would you rather have a twin-engined P-38 or a P-47 jabo? AC evolve their usefulness regardless of the year.


In the far east I would rather have the P-38 thank you very much.  
By the far the lowest losses of any fighter employed on similar duties in that theater. 
But then the Japanese didn't have AA guns every few miles all the way back to the coast.

and in some targets you might prefer the P-38 in Europe. The P-38 evolved like other aircraft and the capabilities changed considerably in the last year of the war. P-38s could carry larger bomb loads

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## tomo pauk (Dec 6, 2017)

michaelmaltby said:


> my point was fighter AC with 2 smallish motors vs fighters with a single larger engine .... the P-38 evolved through the same trajectory in Europe 1942-45. Would you rather have a twin-engined P-38 or a P-47 jabo? AC evolve their usefulness regardless of the year.



One big engine will always be a choice. However - beligerments could buy themselves a 2-engined fighter or jabo, however nobody has been able to buy time. Time is/was not a comodity.
In 1942 the P-47 was a flying death trap, talk the US Typhoon (airframe- and engine-related issues). P-38 will be carrying more payload, will use shorter strip for taking off, and it will out-climb and out-accelerate most of opposition under 15000 ft, unlike the P-47.

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## pbehn (Dec 6, 2017)

tomo pauk said:


> One big engine will always be a choice. However - beligerments could buy themselves a 2-engined fighter or jabo, however nobody has been able to buy time. Time is/was not a comodity.
> In 1942 the P-47 was a flying death trap, talk the US Typhoon (airframe- and engine-related issues). P-38 will be carrying more payload, will use shorter strip for taking off, and it will out-climb and out-accelerate most of opposition under 15000 ft, unlike the P-47.


If you count horsepower and not engines it comes to around 2000 BHP which is about what was needed to get all the "stuff" required in the air.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 6, 2017)

pbehn said:


> If you count horsepower and not engines it comes to around 2000 BHP which is about what was needed to get all the "stuff" required in the air.



No problems with the nice, round number of 2000 HP (though by the time P-47 and Typhoon became viable the P-38 was between 2650 and 2850 HP). What might get military planers in conductive mode for 2x1000 HP layout was the thing that such amount of horsies was a choice between two 1000 HP engines (doable by 1939 for all major countries) or wait until 1942 to maybe have one 2000 HP engine (some beligerents already folded, some others will have to wait until 1945 to have a 2000 HP engine in production).

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## pbehn (Dec 6, 2017)

tomo pauk said:


> No problems with the nice, round number of 2000 HP (though by the time P-47 and Typhoon became viable the P-38 was between 2650 and 2850 HP). What might get military planers in conductive mode for 2x1000 HP layout was the thing that such amount of horsies was a choice between two 1000 HP engines (doable by 1939 for all major countries) or wait until 1942 to maybe have one 2000 HP engine (some beligerents already folded, some others will have to wait until 1945 to have a 2000 HP engine in production).


It was just a convenient round number, in 1939 if you want four cannon and a decent range and performance then twin engine is the best option, by the time a single engine has 2000 BHP it can do most jobs pretty well.

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## tomo pauk (Dec 6, 2017)

pbehn said:


> It was just a convenient round number, in 1939 if you want four cannon and a decent range and performance then twin engine is the best option



To reiterate & reinforce my agreement with that - IMAM Ro.58, on a bit more than 2000 HP, five cannons + rear gunner, almost 380 mph, 980 miles of range (internal fuel only).
IMAM Ro.58 - Wikipedia

Kinda shows what to expect from a Daimlerized Fw 187, or perhaps the Whirlwing designed around Merlins from day one.


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## Koopernic (Dec 7, 2017)

The Focke Wulf Fw 187 did see production and did see combat.

Below I’ve tabulated comparisons between the Jumo 210 engined Fw 187 A0, Hurricane and Spitfire. I think they show that even with the Rolls Royce Kestrel sized Jumo 210G could have impacted the air balance over Britain in the Luftwaffe's favour.

The Me 110 like the Me 109 lacked the range to have much of any impact except in a tiny South East part of England. The Fw 187 did have the range.

They also show how critical 100 octane fuel was to the viability of the RAFs defence operations.

Three(3) Fw 187 A-0 were built as a pre-production series based on the Fw 187 V4 prototype as a master. These aircraft were used as factory protection of the Focke Wulf plant where they saw combat.

Because the Luftwaffe didn’t get the concept of a twin engine single seat long range air superiority fighter they were built with a second seat behind the pilot for a radio operator to conform with their ‘heavy fighter’ concept, a concept they were little interested in placing orders for. In actual combat these Fw 187AO were flown with the second seat position loaded with ballast. One can only imagine the fuel that could have been carried 400-500L litres? A massive camera?

In May 1943 the test pilot Wolfgang Stein is credited with a victory over a Spitfire while the Focke-Wulf company newspaper in an obituary for test pilot Kurt Mehlhorn said he had victories as well.

*The Fw 187 A0 with its 700hp Jumo 210G engines and two seat cockpit was faster than the Hurricane I with Merlin III with 12psig, 100 octane and with constant speed 3 blade rotol propellers*.

*Only 100/130 octane fuel made the Spitfire faster.*

Speed at Sea Level
Fw 187 A0 466kmh / 289.5mph with 2 x 700hp Junker Jumo 210G (87 octane)
Hurricane I 465kmh / 288.0mph with Merlin III 12psig 3000rpm (100 octane)
Hurricane I 420kmh / 260.0mph with Merlin III 6.25psig 3000rpm (87 octane)
Spitfire I 510kph / 316mph with Merlin III 12psig 3000rpm (100 octane)
Spitfire I 459 kmh / 285.0mph with Merlin III 6.25psig 3000rpm (87 octane)
Me 109E 500kmh/310.0mph 87 octane.

Speed at 4600m (15,090ft)
Fw 187 A0 545kmh / 338.5mph with 2 x 700hp Junker Jumo 210G
Hurricane I 525kmh / 326.0mph, Merlin III 12psig 3000rpm Rotol Constant Speed 3 blade prop.
Hurricane I 505kmh / 313.0mph, Merlin III 6.25psig 3000rpm Rotol Const Spd prop.
Spitfire I 571kmh / 355.0mph, Merlin III 12psig 3000rpm Rotol Const spd prop.
Spitfire I 547kmh / 340.0mph, Merlin III 6.25psig 3000rpm Rotol Const spd prop.
Me 109E 565kmh/351.0 mph 87 octane.

Max Speed
Fw 187 A0 545kmh / 338.5mph at 4600m/15091ft 87 octane
Hurricane I 527kmh / 322.0mph at 3300m/11000ft 100 octane
Hurricane I 515kmh / 320.0mph at 5200m/17000ft 87 octane
Spitfire I 576.5 kmh / 358.0mph at 3600m/12000ft 100 octane
Spitfire I 570 kmh / 355.0mph at 5200m/18000ft 87 octane
Me 109E 570kmh/355.0 mph 5000m/ 16500ft 87 octane

Loaded Weight, Wing Area and Wing Loading
Fw 187 Weight 4900 kg /10802lbs, wing area: 30.2sqm, loading 162.25kg/m2
Hurricane Weight 3061 kg / 6750 lbs, wing area: 23.9sqm, loading 128.0kg/m2
Spitfire Weight 2900 kg / 6395 lbs, wing area: 22.5 sqm, loading 129.0kg/m2
Me 109E Weight 2870 kg / 6327 lbs, wing area: 16.35 175.5 kg/m^2

Obviously, with a much higher high wing loading the Fw 187 was going to have a larger inferior turning radius but given equal engines it’s pilot would play to its significantly superior speed, climb rate, acceleration, energy and possibly turning rate (ie time taken to conduct a turn rather than radius).
The price of lower wing loading is lower speed. The spitfire did well not to pay too high a price for it's low wing loading.

Kurfürst - Baubeschreibung für das Flugzeugmuster Messerschmitt Me 109 mit DB 601.
Spitfire Mk I versus Me 109 E
Hurricane Mk I Performance








The Fw 187A0 carried 1110 Liters of internal fuel which gave a range of 1440km, about 880 miles. If the second cockpit had of been converted to a 400 Litre tank one would expect about 40% more range Stripped of guns & excess armour with engines tuned it probably would have made a difficult to intercept recon. There was plenty of room for a camera in that seat position.

The Fw 187 V1 flew in May 1937,about 13 months after the Spitfire. It only received a contract to convert it to DB601 engines in May 1938. In 1938 production of the Jumo 210 series ended leaving the Fw 187A impossible to mass produce. The next line of Junkers Jumo 210 development was the Jumo 210H and was to add a second exhaust valve and a high pressure glycol water cooling circuit effectively doing the same thing Rolls Royce did to the Kestrel to create the Peregrine of the Whirlwind I. I believe or recollect that it would have produced about 830hp or 19% more power and considerably more jet thrust with reduced drag due to the smaller radiators possible from the increased heat transfer of the hotter fluid. The development effort at Junkers was transferred into the Jumo 211 but the Jumo 210H served as a test bed.

The Me 110 received its first DB601 engine in late 1938. These engines weighed 580kg vs 440kg dry but knock on effects raised the weight of the sluggish Me 110B->Me 110C not by 140kg per engine but 200kg. Thus a 400kg increase or a 10% increase over the Fw 187 empty weight and 8% loaded and fuelled.

The Fw 187 could have been ready and competitive for the BoB if allocated engines either Jumo 210G. If supplied with Jumo 210H or DB601 it would have enjoyed decisive speed advantages its pilots could optimise his combat strategies on.

It could have completely supplanted the Me 110.

As a single seat long range air superiority fighter it could have turned up all over Britain with an intrinsically superior speed bestowed by its configuration even with inferior German engine power and fuels. It would have been able to carry out photo reconnaissance with an ease as great or greater than PRU Spitfires and Mosquitos. As a two seater it would have the speed to intercept Mosquitoes pathfinders at night. What it couldn’t do, carry 3 crew to operate a range of active and passive radar and navigation systems, could be performed by the Ju 88.

German single seat fighters were able to easily carry the Fu 217 Neptune radar but without a radar operator the pilots were left night blinded by staring at the oscilloscope plus with only a single engine the speed was affected.

The Luftwaffe tried to latter produce the Ta 154 “Moskito” making some of the same mistakes such as carrying a bomb bay and allocating by then readily available Jumo 211 engines dooming it to be inferior to the Mosquito till the Jumo 213 turned up.

Even an RAF Mosquito night fighter was too slow to intercept a Mosquito pathfinder or PRU.

If both the Luftwaffe and RAF had Mosquito night bombers the RAF would need FW 187 to intercept.

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## Milosh (Dec 7, 2017)

Afaik the Mosquito NF 30 was a 400mph+ airplane.


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## Koopernic (Dec 7, 2017)

Milosh said:


> Afaik the Mosquito NF 30 was a 400mph+ airplane.



I looked into this a couple of years ago just browsing on the internet and didn't log my hits. I came up with a 20 mph difference that must have been accounted for by the radar nose, 4 Hispano, flame dampers, armoured windscreen but at the moment I can only find 10-7 mph depending on whether in FS or MS gear. The figures from here are confounded by drop tanks being fitted. I can't find a speed for different Merlin 72 equipped Mosquito bombers, Night fighters, PR in clean configuration at the same boost.
Mosquito Performance Trials
The 15 psig merlun 61 variant is faster than the 18 psig merlin 72 variant because it only has 4 x 303 browning.

The difference at 25 psig would open up the speed differences.


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## Koopernic (Dec 7, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> I would also note that the 110 did a number of jobs, unintended when first designed (?) that the Fw 187 would have trouble doing.
> Case in point being that 110 that the British recovered and rebuilt had been flying a photo recon mission and the cannon had been replaced by a camera.
> German recon cameras were generally very large.
> View attachment 475027
> ...



Note the well muscled person of colour sitting on the port wing helping with something.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 7, 2017)

Milosh said:


> Afaik the Mosquito NF 30 was a 400mph+ airplane.



With two 50 gal drop tank it was measured at 397 mph. linky


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## stona (Dec 7, 2017)

The Fw 187 was FAR too small to be equipped as a night fighter, something even the RLM recognised.
It also had zero chance, even in its cleanest form, of intercepting a Mosquito, unless the Germans really could alter the laws of physics.

To say the type entered production is stretching things a lot. Many aircraft had more prototypes built than the total number of Fw 187s built, and there was never a standardised service version. Compare the Fw 187 to the number of Whirlwinds built, it certainly did enter production, but in numbers too few to make any difference to anything.

Cheers

Steve

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## tomo pauk (Dec 7, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> The Me 110 like the Me 109 lacked the range to have much of any impact except in a tiny South East part of England. The Fw 187 did have the range.



Me 110 have had enough of range for BoB.



> In May 1943 the test pilot Wolfgang Stein is credited with a victory over a Spitfire while the Focke-Wulf company newspaper in an obituary for test pilot Kurt Mehlhorn said he had victories as well.



Over a Spitfire, of all Allied aircraft in 1943. And described in no less than Fw company news letter, that of course have had nothing to do with the origin of Fw 187. Location of combat not stated?



> The Fw 187 A0 with its 700hp Jumo 210G engines and two seat cockpit was faster than the Hurricane I with Merlin III with 12psig, 100 octane and with constant speed 3 blade rotol propellers.
> 
> Only 100/130 octane fuel made the Spitfire faster.



100/130 octane fuel in 1940??
Does the book about the Fw 187 have any facsimile of test report? That should give use a far more realistic picture about the capabilities than the creative accounting for exhaust thrust once again due to some new set-up of exhaust stacks despite the excellent layout of exhaust thrust already present on the historic Fw 187A-0 as-is.
BTW - as noted earlier by Shortround6, expecting a 13% increase in propulsive power due to exhaust thrust at ~13000 ft is a bit over the top, DB company was offering around 10% there for the DB 601A.




> The Fw 187 could have been ready and competitive for the BoB if allocated engines either Jumo 210G. If supplied with Jumo 210H or DB601 it would have enjoyed decisive speed advantages its pilots could optimise his combat strategies on.



Install the HS 12Y from Czech license production lines and there is no need for any small Jumo, next to no weight penalty, performance increase due more HP.

Still - in order to kill RAF over Southern England, LW needs to deploy perhaps 50% more of the Bf 109s, all with drop tanks, plus perhaps 2 times the number of 2-engined fighters with at least 350 mph speed and useful range. Provided Germans have means to produce those, fuel them and pilot them. All while focusing bombers vs. RAF radars and bases, and allowing LR fighter sweeps to roam around before the inbound bomb raid.

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## stona (Dec 7, 2017)

Someone could include the Fw 187 in a sort of 'what if' book. They could call it 'The Foresight War'. Wait, someone has already done so, none other than Tony Williams.
Cheers
Steve

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## InlineRanger (Dec 7, 2017)

tomo pauk said:


> The Bf 109E was not outclassed by Spitfire I.



According to spitfireperformance.com, the Spitfire Mk.I running 100 octane developed more horsepower, was faster at all altitudes, had equivalent climb rates to the BF-109E all at a lower wing loading. It also had better dogfighting armament in its 8x .303 wing guns, which had a high rate of fire, uniform exterior ballistics and a superior incendiary bullet. The Spitfire Mk.1 also had better visibility, was easier to fly, had a torsionally stiffer wing, a constant speed propeller and much more development potential.

Even if the BF-109E had been the equal of the Mk.1, it wouldn't have been enough. The Spitfires had an inherent operational advantage by flying over home turf. The BF-109E needed to overmatch the Spitfire to win, which it did partially through tactics and pilot skill, but not in performance.



> Inverted engine and motor cannon (that 109E was never outfitted in-service) don't have anything to do with choice made for the landing gear.



I meant that each individual choice hampered the design, not that the engine and motor cannon resulted in poor landing gear geometry... even though that is partially true.



> The techincal items you mentioned served the purpose, Luftwaffe was more slowed down by lack of funds (Germany vs. UK and France combined, or even vs. UK only) and trained manpower than it was by unsuitability of it's hardware to be mass produced.



I think the unsuitability of their designs for mass production (_trainers on up_) made their lack of funds even worse.



> Talk about self-inflicted wound if they went with Wright Cycone. Gives them 320 mph Bf 109 instead 350, and 300 mph Bf 110 instead 320-330 mph. Plus more fuel used for same distance travelled. Better allow BMW to continue with the BMW 117 V12 engine of 36 liters, might have actualy powerful BMW engine in service before the BoB.



I'm not suggesting the Luftwaffe strap an R1820 onto a BF-109 airframe, but rather a clean-sheet design. Single row radial engines are easier to build and maintain than V12s. With careful layout and detail design, I estimate that an R1820 powered fighter could meet or exceed Spitfire MK.IX levels of performance on 87 octane gas with roughly BoB level of technology.



> The M82 was a new development (crankcase, cylinders, crakshaft, supercharger, carb, reduction gear, crankpins...), not just the Cyclone somehow turned into 14 cylinder radial. It needed 95 oct fuel, unlike what most of German pre-1942 engines used.



The Ash-82 was a development of the M-25, which was a licensed copy of an early Wright Cyclone. My argument is that the Germans would have been better off had they followed a similar development path.

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## InlineRanger (Dec 7, 2017)

michaelmaltby said:


> my point was fighter AC with 2 smallish motors vs fighters with a single larger engine .... the P-38 evolved through the same trajectory in Europe 1942-45. Would you rather have a twin-engined P-38 or a P-47 jabo? AC evolve their usefulness regardless of the year.



I agree with your sentiment. Twin engine fighter aircraft tend to be inferior to their single-engine counterparts. While they can have more installed HP, they lose in nearly every other metric. They're expensive to build and operate, have higher drag, and are less maneuverable due to a higher mass moment of inertia. I can't find a link to the video, by I remember watching a panel with Adolf Galland and other WW2 pilots where they share agreement that the BF110, P38 and other twin fighters were mostly failures. The P-38 was designed as the premier USAAF air superiority fighter, but I wouldn't describe it's performance during the European air war that way. Sure it had its utility, but I don't think it was the thoroughbred it's boosters had anticipated.

It's a debate that even led to the F-16 program. Since there are former fighter pilots on the forum, it'd be interesting to hear their opinion on WVR dogfighting between the F-15 and F-16 or their international equivalents.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 7, 2017)

InlineRanger said:


> According to spitfireperformance.com, the Spitfire Mk.I running 100 octane developed more horsepower, was faster at all altitudes, had equivalent climb rates to the BF-109E all at a lower wing loading. It also had better dogfighting armament in its 8x .303 wing guns, which had a high rate of fire, uniform exterior ballistics and a superior incendiary bullet. The Spitfire Mk.1 also had better visibility, was easier to fly, had a torsionally stiffer wing, a constant speed propeller and much more development potential.



I'm not sure that Spitfire have had torsionaly stiffer wing that Bf 109, at least not until late 1944/early 45 when Mk.18 emerged, or perhaps until Mk.21 emerged. 109E was rolling at much greater rate until 250 mph indicated speed, the Spitfire taking the slight lead past 320 mph indicated.
Bf 109E was much easier to enter a dive and keep the advantage. External ballistics of the MH FFM and MG 17 were close enough, the Spitfire was a bigger aircraft thus easier to spot and hit. Spitfire's (and Hurricane's) armament was far from perfect during the BoB, level of criticysm ranging from mild to harsh.
In order to be outclassed, the 'winner' need to trash the 'looser' by a wide margin. Talk Corsair vs. Zero, or Bf 109 vs. Hurricane. Not the case with Bf 109E vs. BoB Spitfires.



> Even if the BF-109E had been the equal of the Mk.1, it wouldn't have been enough. The Spitfires had an inherent operational advantage by flying over home turf. The BF-109E needed to overmatch the Spitfire to win, which it did partially through tactics and pilot skill, but not in performance.



No quarrels about this. Germany needed far more assets and much different approach to kill the RAF in 1940, vs. what they have had historically.



> I meant that each individual choice hampered the design, not that the engine and motor cannon resulted in poor landing gear geometry... even though that is partially true.
> I think the unsuitability of their designs for mass production (_trainers on up_) made their lack of funds even worse.



Once again - the choice of engine layout and wepon layout have had no bearing on landing gear geometry; the prototypes for fighter competition were powered by up-right V12 without provision for engine cannon. Might also check out the He 112 and 110.
Germany ramped up production of military hardware as ww2 went on, granted some designs & choices hampered them in that area. Talk Me 210, He 177 or Jumo 222 flops.



> I'm not suggesting the Luftwaffe strap an R1820 onto a BF-109 airframe, but rather a clean-sheet design. Single row radial engines are easier to build and maintain than V12s. With careful layout and detail design, I estimate that an R1820 powered fighter could meet or exceed Spitfire MK.IX levels of performance on 87 octane gas with roughly BoB level of technology.



Hopefully you will elaborate a bit on this.



> The Ash-82 was a development of the M-25, which was a licensed copy of an early Wright Cyclone. My argument is that the Germans would have been better off had they followed a similar development path.



I don't think they would've benefitted at all, their war effort will receive an own goal with that scenario.

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## pbehn (Dec 7, 2017)

As I understand it the Bf109 was easier to produce than the Spitfire in man hours, but the UK overtook Germany in production of S/E fighters in 1940 and retained that advantage until 1943. Germany actually wasn't on a 100% war footing in 1940 they underestimated UK production while the UK overestimated German production. There were 34,000 Bf 109s made in all marques as opposed to 20,000 Spitfires 

From what I have read the comparative performance of the Bf 109 and Spitfire were quite close and not uniform. The Bf 109 was faster and had better climb at some altitudes and was slightly better in rate of roll and dive, close enough in most cases for the situation and pilot to be decisive. The RAF pilots envied the Bf 109 cannon, and the RAF did introduce cannon during the BoB.

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## Shortround6 (Dec 7, 2017)

Ok we are starting to get into the flights of fancy here.

3 pre producton aircraft is not really production any more than many of the US ""Y" series aircraft were "production". There being no real investment in jigs/fixtures that enable true mass production.



> The Me 110 like the Me 109 lacked the range to have much of any impact except in a tiny South East part of England. The Fw 187 did have the range.


Actually the 110 did have a greater range than the 109, roughly 40-50% more, this would actually mean a slightly better than 40-50% increase in operational radius as the fuel needed to climb to altitude has to be taken out of the "nominal" range.



> They also show how critical 100 octane fuel was to the viability of the RAFs defence operations.



This is a non-issue. Doesn't matter what the British had for fuel, they had it. Question is whether the FW 187 would have made any real difference in the BoB, not it would have *IF*...................




> In actual combat these Fw 187AO were flown with the second seat position loaded with ballast. One can only imagine the fuel that could have been carried 400-500L litres? A massive camera?



Which is it? they needed ballast in the rear seat or you could use it as a fuel tank? Unless the _empty _tank weighs whatever the ballast did? (I am not saying the ballast had to weight same as a crewman.) Book says that the ballast was to allow 3 point landings. One also wonders what the radio installation was like. The book claims that initially the radio range was sometimes as short as 3km but with work they achieved the desired range of 60km. Great for a factory defence fighter, absolutely lousy for a fighter intended to roam over most of England, radio won't even reach across most of the English channel. Bf 110 used the same radio as the He 111. Took the extra man to operate it. 



*



Only 100/130 octane fuel made the Spitfire faster.

Click to expand...

*
there was NO 100/130 fuel during the BoB, None, nada, zip, zero.............
There was 100 octane and when tested later if proved to be around 100/115 to 100/120 the 100/130 came later. And once again, this NOTHING to do with whether the Fw 187 would have been a help to the Luftwaffe during the BoB.

Speed at Sea Level
Fw 187 A0 466kmh / 289.5mph with 2 x 700hp Junker Jumo 210G (87 octane)

Speed at 4600m (15,090ft)
Fw 187 A0 545kmh / 338.5mph with 2 x 700hp Junker Jumo 210G

Max Speed
Fw 187 A0 545kmh / 338.5mph at 4600m/15091ft 87 octane

Loaded Weight, Wing Area and Wing Loading
Fw 187 Weight 4900 kg /10802lbs, wing area: 30.2sqm, loading 162.25kg/m2

Still pushing the "estimated" speeds of the Fw187?
At least the British numbers are from _actually tests _even if service aircraft might not quite reach them.




> The Fw 187A0 carried 1110 Liters of internal fuel which gave a range of 1440km, about 880 miles. If the second cockpit had of been converted to a 400 Litre tank one would expect about 40% more range Stripped of guns & *excess armour* with engines tuned it probably would have made a difficult to intercept recon. There was plenty of room for a camera in that seat position.



Man, what can of worms we have here. In regards to the bolded part. Is there any evidence what so ever that any of these FW 187 were ever fitted with armor? or self sealing fuel tanks? *the last *Fw187A-0 with Jumo engines (work number 1974) made it's first flight in Sept of 1939, at this time few, if any Bf 109s or BF 110s were equipped with armor or self sealing tanks. Strange that aircraft not intended for front line service would be? Please note that teh Bf 110 the British test flew was noted as NOT having the full amount of armor that currant or later versions had and that aircraft was in service in Aug of 1940, not the summer of 1939.
If you put the camera in the back seat you can't use the space for fuel. This is part of what I hate about discussing the FW 187, it seems to be made of rubber and can be stretched, twisted and compresses in any manner to suit the objective at hand without any regard as to how that affects the rest of the plane.

BTW nobody was "tuning" aircraft engines in WW II. Not like car engines were tuned.
Mechanics had about 3 modifications they could make to an aircraft engine in the field. They could change the type of spark plug. They could change the timing of the ignition, This gets tricky as most aircraft engines used fixed timing, unlike cars. What ever timing you used for the spark plugs at idle was what you had at full rpm, there is no advance mechanism. A few had retard system for starting. 3rd, on many (but not all) allied aircraft you could change the jets in carbs or throttle body fuel injectors (and the mechanic had really better know what he was doing) or change a needle. For the Germans there is no easy adjustment for fuel flow. A new set of injector plungers? Change the injector rack setting so more fuel flows at all rpm and altitudes?
For motorcycles and cars the exhaust was often "tuned" in various ways (less restrictive muffler, larger diameter pipe, different length) to be less restrictive or to use resonated pulses. If you are already using short stacks only a few inches long you don't have options to change.





> The Me 110 received its first DB601 engine in late 1938. These engines weighed 580kg vs 440kg dry but knock on effects raised the weight of the sluggish Me 110B->Me 110C not by 140kg per engine but 200kg. Thus a 400kg increase or a 10% increase over the Fw 187 empty weight and 8% loaded and fuelled.



Hmm, only 60KG per engine for the "Knock on effects". Like the bigger props, the bigger radiators and coolant, the larger oil coolers and oil supply? Bigger engine mounts?
Something is beginning to smell.
See: Kurfürst - DB 601, 603, 605 datasheets - DB 601 A-1

I don't read German so perhaps I am in error but there seems to be two weights given for the DB601A-1 on that data sheet.
A dry weight (if google translate is correct) of 610KG and an equipped (with accessories?) of 715kg.

I would note that the numbers on Page 68 of the book for the Bf 110b-0 don't add up well. The difference between the empty weight and gross weight is only 1261kg but the fuel load (1270 liters) is 965kg and after you take out another 200kg for crew (100kg per man including parachute) you have 96kg left for engine oil and ammo. This assumes that the 4440kg "empty weight" is empty equipped (guns, radios and a few other bits included).

If you are comparing "empty" to "empty equipped" you are going to be off by several hundred kg.

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## pbehn (Dec 7, 2017)

Just imagine how good the Spitfire would have been if it hadn't been made?

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## rochie (Dec 7, 2017)

pbehn said:


> Just imagine how good the Spitfire would have been if it hadn't been made?


Or how much better it would've been with black crosses instead of roundels !


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## pbehn (Dec 7, 2017)

rochie said:


> Or how much better it would've been with black crosses instead of roundels !


I was thinking more about turning the engine upside down and taking an angle grinder to any curved surface.


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## Airframes (Dec 7, 2017)

But then Galland wouldn't have asked for a Staffel of Spitfires ........... "Nein, der motor ist now wrong, und you are making der vings too straight !"


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## rochie (Dec 7, 2017)

pbehn said:


> I was thinking more about turning the engine upside down and taking an angle grinder to any curved surface.


No Black crosses add 15% to all performance specs of WW2 weapon systems

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## pbehn (Dec 7, 2017)

rochie said:


> No Black crosses add 15% to all performance specs of WW2 weapon systems


In truth a plane probably suffers a 15% drop in performance when everything it needs is added, almost all of these discussions concern aircraft that were not mass produced.

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## tomo pauk (Dec 7, 2017)

I'm not sure that you've understand the joke. An aircraft XYZ will do, say, 350 mph if it has British roundels or Japanese rising suns, however you need to add 15% on that figure if it has black crosses on itself.

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## Shortround6 (Dec 7, 2017)

InlineRanger said:


> I'm not suggesting the Luftwaffe strap an R1820 onto a BF-109 airframe, but rather a clean-sheet design. Single row radial engines are easier to build and maintain than V12s. With careful layout and detail design, I estimate that an R1820 powered fighter could meet or exceed Spitfire MK.IX levels of performance on 87 octane gas with roughly BoB level of technology.



Unless you mistyped Spitfire MK.IX there is not a chance on the face of the earth of this happening without large quantities of fairy dust or magic reindeer towing the radial engine fighter. 

Please note that a P-36 with a two row radial had 22% more drag than than a P-40 long nose. 

An R-1820 using 87 octane fuel in 1940 was lucky to get to 1000hp. 
The G series ran at 2200rpm, the G100s could run at 2350rpm and the G-200s could run at 2500rpm. 

now just do the math, 1820 cu in times the rpm, divide by 2 (one power stroke every other revolution.) then divided by 1728 to get cubic ft of air per minute.
gives the R-1820 about 1320 cu ft of air per minute (disregarding boost at the moment) compared to the Merlins 1432 cu ft of air per minute. (zero boost) Now 6lbs of boost is about a 40% increase in airflow (very roughly) and 12lbs is 80%. a 1200hp R-1820 used 45in (7.75lbs) for take-off but could only hold that power to a bit over 4000ft. 

Now we get back to boost, The later models of the R-1820 were rated on 91 octane or 100 octane fuel, not 87. The British never used 91 octane or perhaps I should say they never bought it or issued specifications for it. 
Air cooled engine had trouble using the same boost as liquid cooled engines using the same fuel. 

Without a turbo the R-1820 is toast even before it gets to 10,000ft. even with a two speed supercharger and 100 octane fuel it was only good for 1000hp at 14,200ft. which is hundreds of horsepower and thousands of feet to low to compete with a MK IX SPit.

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## pbehn (Dec 7, 2017)

tomo pauk said:


> I'm not sure that you've understand the joke. An aircraft XYZ will do, say, 350 mph if it has British roundels or Japanese rising suns, however you need to add 15% on that figure if it has black crosses on itself.


I understand, but in a way it is understandable when you realise they are extrapolating from prototype or experimental results. The reason is obvious, the Spitfire and Mosquito were so damned pretty an ugly hairy assed version must have been quicker.


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## Milosh (Dec 7, 2017)

There was a radial engined Bf109.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 7, 2017)

There were two, One with a P & W R-1830 and one with a BMW801.


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## pbehn (Dec 7, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> now just do the math, 1820 cu in times the rpm, divide by 2 (one power stroke every other revolution.) then divided by 1728 to get cubic ft of air per minute.
> gives the R-1820 about 1320 cu ft of air per minute (disregarding boost at the moment) compared to the Merlins 1432 cu ft of air per minute. (zero boost) Now 6lbs of boost is about a 40% increase in airflow (very roughly) and 12lbs is 80%. a 1200hp R-1820 used 45in (7.75lbs) for take-off but could only hold that power to a bit over 4000ft.
> 
> QUOTE].


S/R I wish you wouldn't say things like "do the math" I am tempted to do it and end up knowing less than before


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## Shortround6 (Dec 7, 2017)

Don't worry, I stay away from things like "if a train left Chicago for New York at 40mph and a train left New York for Chicago at the same time doing 60mph.........." 

Maybe if I just say arithmetic


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## KiwiBiggles (Dec 7, 2017)

rochie said:


> No Black crosses add 15% to all performance specs of WW2 weapon systems


And turn the fuselage into Tardis.

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## pbehn (Dec 7, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> Don't worry, I stay away from things like "if a train left Chicago for New York at 40mph and a train left New York for Chicago at the same time doing 60mph.........."
> 
> Maybe if I just say arithmetic


With most things in physics concerning engines and aircraft I can build up a mental picture to understand it, with WW2 aircraft engines that never happens, beyond the basics there are just too many variables for my little head to cope with.


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## wuzak (Dec 7, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> Unless you mistyped Spitfire MK.IX there is not a chance on the face of the earth of this happening without large quantities of fairy dust or magic reindeer towing the radial engine fighter.
> 
> Please note that a P-36 with a two row radial had 22% more drag than than a P-40 long nose.
> 
> ...



Some numbers.
Martlet I, Cyclone G205A: 1,200hp @ 4,000ft, 1,000hp @ 14,000ft

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/martlet-I-ads.jpg


Spitfire I, Merlin III, +12psi: 1,300hp @ 9,000ft, (1,000hp @ 17,000ft)
+6.25psi: 1,030hp @ 16,000ft.

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/merlin3curve.jpg


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## InlineRanger (Dec 7, 2017)

tomo pauk said:


> I'm not sure that Spitfire have had torsionaly stiffer wing that Bf 109, at least not until late 1944/early 45 when Mk.18 emerged, or perhaps until Mk.21 emerged. 109E was rolling at much greater rate until 250 mph indicated speed, the Spitfire taking the slight lead past 320 mph indicated.



While the Spitfire had a thin wing, the leading edge formed an unbroken d-shaped torsion box. You're right that the Spitfire Mk.21 had additional structure added aft of the wing to bring the aileron reversal speed up from 580mph to 850mph. As far as I can tell, the BF-109 doesn't have a closed torsion box any where on its wing. The area forward of the spar is broken by the landing gear well and the area to the rear is broken by the radiator duct. I'm not 100% sure though, so I'd love to be proven wrong! 








> Bf 109E was much easier to enter a dive and keep the advantage. External ballistics of the MH FFM and MG 17 were close enough, the Spitfire was a bigger aircraft thus easier to spot and hit. Spitfire's (and Hurricane's) armament was far from perfect during the BoB, level of criticysm ranging from mild to harsh.
> In order to be outclassed, the 'winner' need to trash the 'looser' by a wide margin. Talk Corsair vs. Zero, or Bf 109 vs. Hurricane. Not the case with Bf 109E vs. BoB Spitfires.



Pireps on the 109E note its heavy elevator controls, making pulling out of a dive difficult.

AFAIK, the BF-109E used three different weapon configurations during the BoB, the most numerous being the E3 w/ 2x MG17 and 2x MG FF firing AP projectiles. The MG17 has a muzzle velocity ~50% higher than the MG FF. I haven't been able to find ballistic coefficients for the 8mm Mauser AP and 20x80mm AP, but I doubt they're too similar. The MG FF round is going to take longer to reach the target and drop more by the time it arrives. The 109E pilot must estimate lead differently and the poor sight line over the nose will make deflection shooting tougher. Don't get me wrong, the .303 was marginally effective, but I think volume and uniformity made the Spitfire pilot's life easier during the BoB.

Well, I guess "outclass" is subjective. 




> Once again - the choice of engine layout and wepon layout have had no bearing on landing gear geometry; the prototypes for fighter competition were powered by up-right V12 without provision for engine cannon. Might also check out the He 112 and 110.



My point was that the inverted engine, motor cannon and landing gear geometry _individually_ compromised the design. With that said, the engine and armament choice did have an effect on the landing gear. The motor cannon requires the propeller hub to sit further from the crankshaft so the barrel can clear the cylinders. On an inverted engine, this places the propeller shaft lower on the engine, meaning either the engine must be installed higher in the airframe or the landing gear legs made longer. The BF-109 appears to have chosen the latter.



> I don't think they would've benefitted at all, their war effort will receive an own goal with that scenario.



I don't understand what you mean.


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## wuzak (Dec 7, 2017)

InlineRanger said:


> My point was that the inverted engine, motor cannon and landing gear geometry _individually_ compromised the design. With that said, the engine and armament choice did have an effect on the landing gear. The motor cannon requires the *propeller hub to sit further from the crankshaft* so the barrel can clear the cylinders. On an inverted engine, this places the propeller shaft lower on the engine, meaning either the engine must be installed higher in the airframe or the landing gear legs made longer. The BF-109 appears to have chosen the latter.



I don't think it did.

The cannon barrel ran through the Vee in the engine. In the Merlin and V-1710 that space was occupied by the intake manifolds, and the rear blocked off by the supercharger.

If either the Merlin or V-1710 had been designed around a motor cannon, it is doubtful that the propeller shaft position would have needed to changed much.

In each case, the prop shaft is roughly centre of the frontal area of the engine.

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## pbehn (Dec 7, 2017)

InlineRanger said:


> While the Spitfire had a thin wing, the leading edge formed an unbroken d-shaped torsion box. .


I believe this was part of the original design for evaporative cooling, later used on some models as fuel tanks.


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## wuzak (Dec 7, 2017)

tomo pauk said:


> I'm not sure that Spitfire have had torsionaly stiffer wing that Bf 109, at least not until late 1944/early 45 when Mk.18 emerged, or perhaps until Mk.21 emerged. 109E was rolling at much greater rate until 250 mph indicated speed, the Spitfire taking the slight lead past 320 mph indicated.



Strength was added to the Spitfire wing for the VII/VIII and the XIV. So about 1942/43.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 7, 2017)

InlineRanger said:


> AFAIK, the BF-109E used three different weapon configurations during the BoB, the most numerous being the E3 w/ 2x MG17 and 2x MG FF firing AP projectiles. The MG17 has a muzzle velocity ~50% higher than the MG FF. I haven't been able to find ballistic coefficients for the 8mm Mauser AP and 20x80mm AP, but I doubt they're too similar. The MG FF round is going to take longer to reach the target and drop more by the time it arrives. The 109E pilot must estimate lead differently and the poor sight line over the nose will make deflection shooting tougher. Don't get me wrong, the .303 was marginally effective, but I think volume and uniformity made the Spitfire pilot's life easier during the BoB.
> 
> Well, I guess "outclass" is subjective.



Times of flight from a German test at sea level by way of Anthony Williams and Emmanuel Gustin's book "Flying Guns of WW II."

round...............MV............V/300m............time/300m.................V/600m..................time 600m
7.92 Ap............810.............538..................0.453.........................348...........................1.159
13mmHEI........750.............501..................0.49...........................337...........................1.22
20mm Mine.....695.............432..................0.551.........................281...........................1.428
20mm 117g.....720.............552..................0.477.........................422............................1.101

Velocities are in meters/sec, time is in seconds. 20mm mine shell is from an MG FF/M, the 117gram HET round is from an MG 151, when fired from an MGFF/M MV was 585M/S. At 300 meters and under there isn't that much to choose, especially at higher altitudes in thinner air. somewhere short of 600meters things get weird. 
Please note that all bullets _fall _at the same speed. They _fall _ 16 feet in the first second of flight (and are falling at 32ftper second at the end of the first second). they travel different distances in the second though 
It's the second second (really) that makes the big difference as the bullet will fall 48 feet in that second (staring at 32fs and ending at 64fps). 

the MG FF fired a 134 gram projectile at 600m/s and should hold it's velocity fairly well as it has a lot of weight per unit of frontal area, even if not well shaped. The German mine shell had poor shape and poor weight per unit of frontal area.

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## InlineRanger (Dec 7, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> Unless you mistyped Spitfire MK.IX there is not a chance on the face of the earth of this happening without large quantities of fairy dust or magic reindeer towing the radial engine fighter.



Well, I'll admit that my idea requires rewriting a bit of history. Reshuffling the deck chairs on the eve of the BoB wouldn't change much. Take this all for a grain of salt, because the further you diverge from the historical timeline, the more fantastical all this speculation becomes. That said...

The idea here is that Germany licenses the R1820 sometime in the mid 1930s and pours most of its development resources into this single engine family. There are three key technologies they need to figure out before the BoB. The most important is fully understanding the radial engine's torsional and linear vibration characteristics. AFAIK, the pendulum damper was internationally understood by the 1920s and patented by Wright in the early 1930s. Adding 2x and 4.5x pendulum dampers to the crankshaft gets them 80% of the way there. The other two key technologies are the two-speed supercharger drivetrain and roller follower/rocker valve train.

Yes, they would be ahead of the curve, but they need to be to win and it's plausible that they would given be the development resources allocated. The net result is a 1200hp engine running 40" MP at 2700rpm on 87 octane. I believe these numbers are conservative considering the G200 variant was producing 1200hp @ 2500rpm on 91 octane. I estimate the engine to have a high speed blower critical altitude of ~15,000ft producing 1050hp.



> Please note that a P-36 with a two row radial had 22% more drag than than a P-40 long nose.



The P-36 Hawk is deficient in power to weight ratio, wing loading and zero lift drag.

A single row radial engine does have more drag than an inline, but it is lighter (_fully installed_) and has less depth. I think if we play to the radial engine's strengths, we can compensate for its defects. The primary strategy is to maximize power to weight ratio and reduce wetted drag area.

Conceptually, this aircraft would most closely approximate the shape of the Polikarpov I-16. The firewall is located directly on the spar with the engine mount long enough just to clear the engine accessories. The intake and oil cooler are fed between the cylinders following Grumman FM-2 practice. The accessory section is inverted, allowing fuel gravity feed. Attached to the spar is a wing just large enough to have a loading of ~40psf at normal weight. Wing planform is trapezoidal, 0.75 taper ratio, uniform t/c ~13%, aspect ratio a bit over 5. Small wing means short tail. The landing gear is kept light by inverting the Spitfire arrangement, having it retract inwards behind the spar, like a simplified Sea Fury. Like everything else, main/tail gear retraction is manually operated by a ratcheting lever to pilots left. Split flaps operated similar.

Behind the firewall sit two self-sealing fuel tanks, one above the other. The top is shallow and extends further aft to the instrument panel, over the pilot's legs. The other has less depth and sits in front of the rudder pedals. Combined fuel ~90 gallons. Behind the fuel tanks and above the landing gear sits the pilot, whose cockpit slightly bulges upwards to afford ~6 degrees view over the nose. Simple blown canopy resembling the Me163 sits at wing trailing edge, turtle-deck extending aft to tail. Minimal seat back armor affording .30 protection only.

To each side of pilot are belt-fed synchronized HS.404 cannon (_assuming German license/development, if not use equivalent_) with barrels extending forward between engine cylinders. Manually charged via foot-operated lever on each side. ~200 rounds of ammunition for each stowed below pilot behind landing gear.

10ft, 3 blade hydraulic constant speed, lightweight wooden-blade propeller. Engine nacelle curves inwards on sides perpendicular to top wing surface at a rate slightly beyond attached flow, somewhat similar to SU-26 practice. Flat, straight fuselage sides from wing maximum thickness to trailing edge. Three exhaust stubs / variable outlet on each nacelle somewhat like a simplified Sea Fury. Oil cooler exhausts upstream inside nacelle.

Maximum weight <5000lbs. Wetted area ~50% of a Grumman FM-2. Still in conceptual design stage. Basic weight/performance analysis suggests plausibility. Germany needs lighter radios...


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## KiwiBiggles (Dec 7, 2017)

InlineRanger said:


> To each side of pilot are belt-fed synchronized HS.404 cannon



I believe the HS.404 wasn't capable of being synchronized.

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## InlineRanger (Dec 7, 2017)

wuzak said:


> I don't think it did.
> 
> The cannon barrel ran through the Vee in the engine. In the Merlin and V-1710 that space was occupied by the intake manifolds, and the rear blocked off by the supercharger.
> 
> ...



It's hard to tell, so you may be right. I tried dimensioning out a motor cannon on a V1710 once and and I remember the propeller sitting a bit high after putting in a 50mm blast tube. I may not have pushed the tube as close to the cylinder liner as the db601? I think the effect is more pronounced on the Hispano Suiza 12Y owing to its larger stroke/bore ratio... but that too may be an optical illusion.

Regardless, the propeller shaft doesn't sit perfectly in the center of any of the major V12 engines. It clearly sits low on the DB601. Notice the upper left-hand image how the propeller shaft doesn't bisect the vertical dimension line. Some other day, it might be interesting to compare thrust lines between the Spitfire and BF-109.









Shortround6 said:


> Times of flight from a German test at sea level by way of Anthony Williams and Emmanuel Gustin's book "Flying Guns of WW II."
> 
> round...............MV............V/300m............time/300m.................V/600m..................time 600m
> 7.92 Ap............810.............538..................0.453.........................348...........................1.159
> ...



I was using the velocities for the MG FF cannon (_585m/s_) as I'm under the impression the E3 was the most common variant during the BoB. Since I don't have any better technical data, I threw some best guess weights/BCs in a ballistic computer and calculated ~1ft difference in drop at 250yd. Not huge, but appreciable for an aircraft size target.



KiwiBiggles said:


> I believe the HS.404 wasn't capable of being synchronized.



It wasn't belt-fed in 1940 either. I'm hoping the German's are smart.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 7, 2017)

Nice theory, falls down a little in practice. 

Wright eventually got the R-1820 to 2800rpm, at some point in the late 40s. they did hit 2700rpm around late 1942 or early 1943.

trouble is it required an entirely new engine that just kept the bore and stroke of the R-1820 G200. 

Wright did this trick to a greater or lesser extent 3-4 times during the "development" of the R-1820. 

The older engines used a forged aluminium crankcase, the G100s used a forged steel crankcase, the G-200s used a brand new forged steel crankcase. 
The number and size of the cooling fins changed with every model. This can be a real hiccup to your plans. The H versions used forged cylinder heads and sheet metal fins rolled into groves machined into the steel cylinder barrels. They also used 20 studs on each cylinder compared to the 16 used on the Fs and Gs (really old cyclones use 12 studs per cylinder) 
Using roller followers on the cam rings was pretty standard practice. 




as was using a roller on the valve stem. 
Wright was one of the first engine makers to offer 2 speed superchargers. Trouble is that most Radial engine makers used the two speed feature to improve low altitude power. They actually didn't have much choice. Most people's superchargers in the 1930s weren't very good. The one on the RR Merlin was as good as there was in actual service and that is before Hooker took over. everybody else was in 2nd or 3rdplace. 

Radials have trouble with high RPM because you are running 7 or 9 cylinders on one crank throw and that is a lot of metal flying around. stress loads go up with the square of the speed. 200rpm doesn't sound like much but it is a 16% increase in stress loads gong form 2500rpm to 2700rpm. 
Please note that that on the FM-2 WIldcats the difference between the the 1300hp Cyclone on the first ones and the 1350hp Cyclones on the later ones was a new crankshaft. not a tweak on the carb or a twist on the boost control. 

They were using new manufacturing techniques on these engines (1940 Allison's used plain steel crankshafts, by 1942 they used the same steel alloy but they were shot peened and nitrided for a tremendous increase in both strength and fatigue life). 

An R-1820 running at 2700rpm has a piston speed of 3,093fpm. There was one engine running at that piston speed in 1939/40. The Bristol Pegasus and it wasn't running the pressure in the cylinders that you need. 


You better give up on the Hispanos, they were never synchronized by anybody ever. They are also heavy and the ammo is heavy. two guns with 200pg weigh around 540lbs. And there were no production belt feeds in 1940 for them, those came later.

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## Shortround6 (Dec 7, 2017)

Germans were working on the MG 151 at least as early as 1938, went into _service (not operational trials) _ in small numbers in the fall/winter of 1940, increasing in the spring/summer of 1941. 
Building aircraft guns that _worked _took almost as long as making aircraft engines.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 7, 2017)

InlineRanger said:


> I was using the velocities for the MG FF cannon (_585m/s_) as I'm under the impression the E3 was the most common variant during the BoB. Since I don't have any better technical data, I threw some best guess weights/BCs in a ballistic computer and calculated ~1ft difference in drop at 250yd. Not huge, but appreciable for an aircraft size target.



One foot is actually negligible. Please remember that the machine guns and cannon could be adjusted for elevation and a common impact point at the desired combat range would be used. Please note that a 300mph aircraft is moving at 440fps or moving 44ft in 1/10 of second. unless you are sitting exactly on the targets 6 you need to figure out where the target plane is going to be at some point in the future (deflection shooting) at which point high velocity/short time of flight becomes much more important than 1 foot of trajectory height.


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## parsifal (Dec 7, 2017)

Using two engines instead of one in a country that was always strapped for engine supplies is never good in the numbers game. Replacing established types with new technologies close to a campaign is going to affect your serviceability rates on two grounds, availability of spares and teething problems in bedding down the new technology. a FW187 introduced say in early 1940 is not going to be a reliable platform from which to fight a difficult campaign. 

Moreover up to 70% of losses suffered by aircraft are due to non-combat related causes. You lose your aircaft for reasons unrelated to enemy actions and unrelated to aircraft performance. Far more losses are due to technology failures, like engine problems, or human error.

I am unconvinced that the FW187 offered any kind of panacea to the problems faced by the LW in 1940.

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## wuzak (Dec 8, 2017)

InlineRanger said:


> It's hard to tell, so you may be right. I tried dimensioning out a motor cannon on a V1710 once and and I remember the propeller sitting a bit high after putting in a 50mm blast tube. I may not have pushed the tube as close to the cylinder liner as the db601? I think the effect is more pronounced on the Hispano Suiza 12Y owing to its larger stroke/bore ratio... but that too may be an optical illusion.
> 
> Regardless, the propeller shaft doesn't sit perfectly in the center of any of the major V12 engines. It clearly sits low on the DB601. Notice the upper left-hand image how the propeller shaft doesn't bisect the vertical dimension line. Some other day, it might be interesting to compare thrust lines between the Spitfire and BF-109.
> 
> View attachment 475223






wuzak said:


> In each case, the prop shaft is *roughly centre of the frontal area* of the engine.


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## rochie (Dec 8, 2017)

pbehn said:


> In truth a plane probably suffers a 15% drop in performance when everything it needs is added, almost all of these discussions concern aircraft that were not mass produced.


Bingo !

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## nuuumannn (Dec 8, 2017)

InlineRanger said:


> My point was that the inverted engine, motor cannon and landing gear geometry _individually_ compromised the design.



Just to be pedantic, the first Bf 109 to be fitted with the motor cannon to be put into production was the Bf 109F - there were no production Emils fitted with the motor cannon. The Emil was designed for it, but contrary to many publications having included such a detail, none were so fitted that went to war in the summer of 1940.



> I am unconvinced that the FW187 offered any kind of panacea to the problems faced by the LW in 1940.



Correct; it wasn't their aeroplanes that let the Germans down in the Battle of Britain and changing them won't make a lick of difference to the outcome, not if they don't change their strategy and tactics.

Here's the one thing I always ask the Fw 187 guys; if Fw are building 187s, what is the LW not receiving that it did traditionally? Fw 190s? Highly likely, so the Butcher Bird, being the terrific aeroplane it was would have been much later to the party, if at all, given the development of the 187 and let's face it, (sigh, here we go again) if the Fw 187 was as good as everyone says it was going to be, do its supporters _really_ believe that the British would have sat back and done nothing? The Spitfire IX was created out of a hasty need to redress the losses suffered in 1941 at the hands of Bf 109Fs and eventually Fw 190s, so if the Fw 187 was to sweep all before it away in 1940, would the British really sit on their hands? Not likely. We could have expected to have seen Merlin and Griffon development accelerate to have met any advanced threat.

Nad here's the big thing, as Steve pointed out, the LW didn't want it, so how could it have made such a difference? The Fw 190 was the right choice of fighter; it was a brilliant design, but it was too late for the BoB.

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## tomo pauk (Dec 8, 2017)

InlineRanger said:


> While the Spitfire had a thin wing, the leading edge formed an unbroken d-shaped torsion box. You're right that the Spitfire Mk.21 had additional structure added aft of the wing to bring the aileron reversal speed up from 580mph to 850mph. As far as I can tell, the BF-109 doesn't have a closed torsion box any where on its wing. The area forward of the spar is broken by the landing gear well and the area to the rear is broken by the radiator duct. I'm not 100% sure though, so I'd love to be proven wrong!
> 
> Pireps on the 109E note its heavy elevator controls, making pulling out of a dive difficult.
> 
> ...



The most common cannon during the BoB was the MG FFM, that fired the Mine shell at 700 m/s. The MG 17 fired the SmK projectie at 755 m/s.
Bf 109 have had far smaller wings, the torsion applied to the spar will be smaller than what is applied with a big wing.





> My point was that the inverted engine, motor cannon and landing gear geometry _individually_ compromised the design. With that said, the engine and armament choice did have an effect on the landing gear. The motor cannon requires the propeller hub to sit further from the crankshaft so the barrel can clear the cylinders. On an inverted engine, this places the propeller shaft lower on the engine, meaning either the engine must be installed higher in the airframe or the landing gear legs made longer. The BF-109 appears to have chosen the latter.



Landing gear for the Bf 109 was a carry-over from the Bf 108 Taifun. Plus it allowed for lighter wing. The legs of the U/C that are close to fuselage allow for shorter legs, not longer.



> I don't understand what you mean.



I mean that going with Wright Cyclone and it's derivatives would've decrease performance of German fighters from 1938-41, while increasing the fuel consumption per mile travelled. Own goal, or self-inflicted wound.



InlineRanger said:


> It wasn't belt-fed in 1940 either. I'm hoping the German's are smart.



Germans were smart, but some things are easier to engineer than others. 
They can buy a license for the .50 Browning in the 1930s and scale it up for 20mm - can be syncronised, it is belt fed. Or steal/copy the Soviet ShVAK.


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## swampyankee (Dec 8, 2017)

Typically


wuzak said:


> I don't think it did.
> 
> The cannon barrel ran through the Vee in the engine. In the Merlin and V-1710 that space was occupied by the intake manifolds, and the rear blocked off by the supercharger.
> 
> ...



One need only examine the French fighters of the era: upright V-12, cannon mounted between the cylinder banks. The Hispano 12Y and 12Z were largely designed around the gun installation


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## Shortround6 (Dec 8, 2017)

parsifal said:


> Using two engines instead of one in a country that was always strapped for engine supplies is never good in the numbers game.
> 
> I am unconvinced that the FW187 offered any kind of panacea to the problems faced by the LW in 1940.



to go with your post.

A large part of the Luftwaffe troubles is that they simply didn't have enough of any type of aircraft, or putting it another way, they didn't have enough aircraft in total, to get the job done. Substituting one type for another was not going to change the total numbers and as Parsifal says, substituting at twin for a single is going to make things worse. 

People often talk about P-40s in the BoB for the British. Flip it, give the Germans P-40s. Since they were just a P-36 with a new engine there is no secret technology. There is nothing the Germans couldn't build or substitute, and yet they could have fighter with six 7.9 machine guns (two in the cowl and two in each wing) and around 540 liters of internal fuel plus a drop tank and it would be faster than 109 with the same engine. Wouldn't climb well though and would have a lower ceiling than the 109. 
It can penetrate further in England but over all, would it have really changed things if 60% (to be conservative) were lost due to take-off and landing accidents, other engine failures or bad navigation?

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## stona (Dec 8, 2017)

wuzak said:


> Strength was added to the Spitfire wing for the VII/VIII and the XIV. So about 1942/43.



Wasn't this just some thicker skins?

Cheers

Steve


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## Koopernic (Dec 8, 2017)

Me 109 pilots who had flown the Spitfire thought the 109 had better visibility forward. They sat further forward (didn’t have a fuel tank in front), could see over the wing better. The inverted arrangement of the engine meant the pilot was looking over a relatively narrow crankcase rather than a wide V. They were both crap really.

Me 109 had 5 wing spars. The big one with the big bolts that held the wing to the fuselage that could be called the main spar detoured around the undercarriage. I imagine that it was formed in a single pressing operation, at least on the Me 109F onwards which was adapted to true mass production and automation rather than small family sub contractor supplied components.. Torsional rigidity of the wing was never an issue on the Me 109. Ailerons lost effectiveness due to compressibility increasing control forces on the ailerons, deflection was limited by the pilots strength.. Regarding the Spitfire: After replacing fabric covered ailerons to improve the issue on the Spitfire was twisting of the wing at high speeds. It was dealt with by a new stiffer wing in F.22 Spitfires which also received balance or servo tabs on the ailerons. MK XVIII Spitfires used stainless steel spars and stringers for added strength and stiffness but otherwise had the “old” wing.

The Me 109F and G received Friese ailerons to reduce aileron forces. This clearly wasn’t enough as speeds grew. On the Me 109 there were attempts to install spring tab servo ailerons, apparently successfully on WNF built Me 109G6s. The occupying allies, including American forces confiscated all private cameras from German households so no one had a camera to document anything including in the aircraft wrecks post war. The NACA developed something called geared servo spring tabs that limited the tendency for over deflection at high speed due to low force feed back.

The proper way to do this is hydraulic boost of the ailerons, something which made late war P38s among the fastest rolling aircraft of WW2. The only German aircraft that I’m aware of using these are Do 335. Rumors of Ju 290 and even He 162. In many cases these turn out to be servo tabs not hydraulics.

Back to the Me 109. It was a fast rolling aircraft at low to medium speeds. At high speeds it did roll, the speed depend on pilot strength. In the BoB period the Me 109 had the roll advantage.

The forearms of Me 109 pilots never look wussy.

Dietmars Book mentions the Fw 187 had spring tabs on the early prototypes.

These Me 109 tabs look like balance or geared tabs.

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## Shortround6 (Dec 8, 2017)

nuuumannn said:


> Just to be pedantic, the first Bf 109 to be fitted with the motor cannon to be put into production was the Bf 109F - there were no production Emils fitted with the motor cannon. The Emil was designed for it, but contrary to many publications having included such a detail, none were so fitted that went to war in the summer of 1940.



While what you say is true it is also true that the engines (jumo 210, perhaps the 211 and certainly the DB 600 series) were all _designed _to have a gun firing through the prop hub from the start. Gun development faltered. Badly. 
The Germans had tried a 20mm gun through the prop on an He 112 in Spain (let alone on the proving grounds) but being related to the Flak 30 AA gun, while powerful, it was large heavy and slow firing, not a good combination for air to air combat. They also tried using a 3rd MG 17 through the prop hub as a substitute on some early Jumo powered 109s but the gun didn't like the heat of the location and jammed more often than the cowl guns, this was to be a re-occuring theme until the 109Fs, experimental aircraft with guns firing through the prop hub suffered an unacceptable number of jams/malfunctions. This failure of the prop hub gun quickly lead to a gun bay being put in each wing for a MG 17 so the firepower could go to four 7.9mgs. 
The intention to use a prop hub gun was always there.

I don't like the term motor cannon even though the Germans used it. I don't really like the term prop hub gun either. The French and Russians actually bolted the gun to the engine and so are more correctly motor cannon. The Germans mounted the gun to the fuselage and just had the barrel sticking into the tube with no actual connection. You could remove the engine and leave the gun (of whatever type) behind. 





> Here's the one thing I always ask the Fw 187 guys; if Fw are building 187s, what is the LW not receiving that it did traditionally? Fw 190s? Highly likely, so the Butcher Bird, being the terrific aeroplane it was would have been much later to the party, if at all, given the development of the 187
> .



This is harder to predict as in the late 30s and 1940 the Germans had everybody building everybody else's designs. A bit of an exaggeration but Fiesler built about 90 109Bs and 80 109c/ds which is more than the Augsburg factory did. Focke-Wulfe built 123 109C/Ds and Arado built 144, there were other companies/factories involved in 109 production before the DB engines showed up. I believe there were a number of sources for the He 111?


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## Koopernic (Dec 8, 2017)

The different varieties Bf 109s used in the BoB campaign (E1,E3,E4 & E7) used 4 different engines.
The DB601A0 (often simply 601A), DB601A1, DB601Aa and in the latter part of the fight an early version of the DB601N that used higher octane C2/C3 fuel of about 94/115 octane was introduced.

The Aa was an export version, for Switzerland I believe, which had a higher supercharger setting I think 4500m instead of 4000m but saw Luftwaffe service. The DB601N closed some of the power gap that 100/130 fuel had created. The DB601N used in the Me 109F1 was a more refined version of this engine with a better supercharger.

I don’t tend to use 109 data from ww2performancetesting as it tends to compare aircraft maintained by the RAE/RAF with beat up captured aircraft. I’d rather go to German data or other data than wade through it. The site is an excellent collection of data but on the 109 issue there is a certain amount of patriotic fervor inherited from the previous Spitfire testing site.

Without 100/130 the Dornier Do 17 or Do 215 could outrun and outmaneuver a Hurricane.






This aircraft could achieve 316mph or 510 km/h. Note the rotating gun blisters, also used on the He 111 nose etc. Most Dorniers didn’t get the 1100 hp Daimler Benz engine but made do with 800hp. This seems to be a Dornier corporate video. Crew is in civies.

_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=91z4V_mZEfk

The above video seems to have been deleted. A version spliced into this clip a 5m30s is the same.

View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=k_N4TI1Li6Y

_

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## tomo pauk (Dec 8, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> While what you say is true it is also true that the engines (jumo 210, perhaps the 211 and certainly the DB 600 series) were all _designed _to have a gun firing through the prop hub from the start.
> ...



Jumo 211, at least the B and D versions, were outfitted with a tube where the gun's's barrel was supposed to pass through.


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## Airframes (Dec 8, 2017)

Regarding the 'motor cannon' in the early Bf109's, or more correctly, the intended use of such a weapon in the early Bf109's, most accounts attribute its omission being due to problems with vibration, rather than the weapon itself, which, not only being at a very unacceptable level, inevitably lead to stoppages. 
It would seem that the weapon worked OK, but the 'balance', for want of a better description was insufficient to counter the extreme vibration, a problem which was not fully solved even after the introduction of a 'motor cannon' on the Bf109F which, as we know, tried a 20mm weapon, then a 15mm weapon, before reverting to the improved 20mm weapon and associated mounting.
Even though no Bf109E mounted such a weapon during the BoB, there are still accounts from RAF pilots describing this weapon being fired in their direction - perhaps understandable if a) it was generally believed that such a weapon existed, and b) seeing only muzzle flashes in a small, rear-view mirror, in the heat of combat and possibly pure terror !
The 'myth' still persists today, with some relatively recent books stating that the Bf109E series, during the BoB, was so armed.


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## stona (Dec 8, 2017)

Airframes said:


> The 'myth' still persists today, with some relatively recent books stating that the Bf109E series, during the BoB, was so armed.



It was repeated by Douglas Bader, along with Bob Stanford Tuck who did not contradict him, in a famous '70s documentary. It just goes to show how fallible memory can be.

Such 'recollections', from such eminent participants in the fighting at the time, do much to reinforce such myths, though entirely unintentionally. Producers were also less likely to challenge such assertions in those days.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Dec 8, 2017)

oh boy, another super German plane.

Please see; Wayback Machine

The top speed of the Do 215 is in serious dispute, but there seems to be at least a 15kph difference between the bomber version and the nightfighter, advantage to the nightfighter despite aerial due to better shaped nose? 





The early do 17s used BMW V12s of the same type used in the He 51 biplane and a lot of other early German aircraft, it was about 750hp. Later Do 17s used both BMW and Bramo 9 cylinder radials of various powers. I would note in the engine chart in above website that the numbers next to the BMW VI engines (6.4 and 7.5) are not the displacement but the compression ratio. The engines actually being of about 47 liters displacement but without superchargers and low rpm. 

I Kind if like the Do 17 and think there are some interesting "what If's" that could be done with it but again, some of the claimed performance numbers for it look a little suspicious.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 8, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> oh boy, another super German plane.



Seems to me that you keep overlooking the law of 15% extra performance due to having black cross.

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## tomo pauk (Dec 8, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> The different varieties Bf 109s used in the BoB campaign (E1,E3,E4 & E7) used 4 different engines.
> The DB601A, DB601A1, DB601Aa and in the latter part of the fight an early version of the DB601N that used higher octane C2/C3 fuel of about 94/115 octane was introduced.
> 
> The Aa was an export version, for Switzerland I believe, which had a higher supercharger setting I think 4500m instead of 4000m but saw Luftwaffe service. The DB601N closed some of the power gap that 100/130 fuel had created. The DB601N used in the Me 109F1 was a more refined version of this engine with a better supercharger.



The DB 601Aa was with better low-alt performance than contemporary (1940 production) DB 601A, trading for that a bit of hi-alt performance. Small letter a denotes 'ausland' - 'for export', however plenty of those engines ended up in Jabos. The DB 601A of 1940 was with rated altitude of 4500m (1020 PS there), the Aa have had rated altitude at 3700m, but making 1100 PS there.
I'm all ears about the improved DB 601N used on the 109F. Yes, there is a footnote on the datasheet, but still all of the datasheets list 4.9 km as rated altitude, 1175 PS there. 601N used 96 oct fuel (sometimes called 100 oct fuel); nobody used 100/130 grade fuel in 1940; that engine improved situation vs. SPitfire II and Hurricane II that were also introduced during the BoB. One minute duration of max rating is woefuly short, though.



> I don’t tend to use 109 data from ww2performancetesting as it tends to compare aircraft maintained by the RAE/RAF with beat up captured aircraft. I’d rather go to German data or other data than wade through it. The site is an excellent collection of data but on the 109 issue there is a certain amount of patriotic fervor inherited from the previous Spitfire testing site.
> 
> Without 100/130 the Dornier Do 17 or Do 215 could outrun and outmaneuver a Hurricane.
> View attachment 475295
> ...



Whether the data from Willaims' site is okay, or it is not? 
At any rate, Do 17 was lucky if it beat 410 km/h mark at best altitude, the Do 215 is better but not as good as Hurricane.

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## buffnut453 (Dec 8, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> Without 100/130 the Dornier Do 17 or Do 215 could outrun and outmaneuver a Hurricane.



I think you're overstating things just a wee bit there. The account you cite indicates the aircraft frequently changing places because the Dornier fires at the Hurricane with both the front and rear guns...hardly possible unless the Hurricane is actually outmanoeuvering the Dornier. The Hurricane also "pulls the tit" and breaks off the engagement, which contradicts your contention of the Dornier outrunning the Hurricane. Yes, German bombers were fast when empty and going downhill, and hence were difficult for Hurricanes to tail-chase...but I think hyperbole is outrunning or outmaneuvering the reality here.




Koopernic said:


> Note the rotating gun blisters, also used on the He 111 nose etc.



Yeah...clumsy and awkward to use, as ably demonstrated by the "gunners" in this clip. What designer thought it would be a good thing to demand a gunner use one hand to spin the blister while trying to aim and shoot the gun with the other? Hardly the most stable gunnery platform!

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## pbehn (Dec 8, 2017)

I believe the performance of Hurricanes was improved a lot after France with fuel and prop. changes.


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## Airframes (Dec 8, 2017)

Certainly with prop changes - many Mk1 Hurricanes in France, at least in the early days of the war, still had the two-blade prop. This was replaced initially by the DH prop, and then the Rotol CS prop. Also, by the BoB, the majority of Hurricanes had the metal-skinned wing, although there were still some early, fabric-skinned examples around. Haven't got the figures to hand, but the metal wings also improved performance, if even just marginally.

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## Peter Gunn (Dec 8, 2017)

buffnut453 said:


> *SNIP*
> 
> Yeah...clumsy and awkward to use, as ably demonstrated by the "gunners" in this clip. What designer thought it would be a good thing to demand a gunner use one hand to spin the blister while trying to aim and shoot the gun with the other? Hardly the most stable gunnery platform!



Couldn't agree more, watching the video it seems whoever took the footage thought that Rube Goldberg affair was the Beez Kneez. That's just dreadful.


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## JAG88 (Dec 8, 2017)

It seems that with the cancellation of the Ural bomber program the design of manned turrets came to an abrupt halt and was replaced by the fancier remote barbettes intended for the Ju 288, Me 210 and He 177, a case of trying to run before learning to walk it seems...

I wonder if by persevering with the twin 20mm turret they would have managed to develop a belt feed for it earlier.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 8, 2017)

JAG88 said:


> I wonder if by persevering with the twin 20mm turret they would have managed to develop a belt feed for it earlier.



Germans have had a belt-fed 20 mm cannon in service from mid-1941 on - MG 151/20. 

Perhaps a good idea would've been to develop the belt feed mechanism for the MG FF(M), like the Japanese managed for the Oerlikon FF and L. Complemented by earlier introduction of the 90 rd drum should much improve duration of fire, allowing easy installation on the Bf 109, while not paying too much of weight penalty.


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## pbehn (Dec 8, 2017)

On a sort of related topic, Hurricane pilots started fitting armour to their planes in France which resulted in tests about its CoG. When did pilot armour become included in specifications? Was it in the original Mustang P51 spec?


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## Greyman (Dec 8, 2017)

All production Hurricanes delivered from 22 Feb 1940 had rear armour fitted.

I'm sure it was in the Mustang specification, knowing the British attitude toward aircraft armour since 1939.

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## Milosh (Dec 8, 2017)

What is this 100/130 fuel the British used I keep seeing in some posts?

Sure a change from the British hardly used 100 fuel during the BoB by a couple of ex members here.


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## pbehn (Dec 8, 2017)

Milosh said:


> What is this 100/130 fuel the British used I keep seeing in some posts?
> 
> Sure a change from the British hardly used 100 fuel during the BoB by a couple of ex members here.


I just gotta laugh Milosh, I googled "Battle of France 85 octane" and the third answer was a thread in this forum which sort of explained your comment.

The use of 100 Octane Fuel in the RAF pt 2


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## nuuumannn (Dec 8, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> While what you say is true it is also true that the engines (jumo 210, perhaps the 211 and certainly the DB 600 series) were all _designed _to have a gun firing through the prop hub from the start. Gun development faltered. Badly.



Yep, hence my statement saying the Emil was designed for it. The V 3 prototype was sent to Spain with the centre gun, but the gun refused to play ball. Talk of C or D model '109s fitted with the gun are also rubbish.



Shortround6 said:


> This is harder to predict as in the late 30s and 1940 the Germans had everybody building everybody else's designs.



Whilst you're right, SR, something has to give; the Germans are not going to magic a production line out of thin air, so something is not going to be built and I'm thinking the '190 since it took priority at Fw. If the '187 was put into production, then it can be assumed that it too, would take priority. Resources that were devoted to getting the Fw 190 into production - remember it suffered severe overheating, would have been devoted to the Fw 187, so again, something has to give and something is not going to be worked on as extensively as it traditionally was; likely the Fw 190.


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## JAG88 (Dec 8, 2017)

tomo pauk said:


> Germans have had a belt-fed 20 mm cannon in service from mid-1941 on - MG 151/20.
> 
> Perhaps a good idea would've been to develop the belt feed mechanism for the MG FF(M), like the Japanese managed for the Oerlikon FF and L. Complemented by earlier introduction of the 90 rd drum should much improve duration of fire, allowing easy installation on the Bf 109, while not paying too much of weight penalty.



Yeah, that is what I was talking about, they designed a turret with two MG FFs for the Do 19 in 1936 IIRC, couldnt make it work, and dropped it along with the bomber. They did develop a belt feed fro the MG FF eventually and used it on a few nightfighters, but by then the MG151/20 had covered the spot for such a gun.

So, it was more of a what if they did it earlier actually, when it could have had an impact.

A Bf 109 with 3xMG FFs doesnt seem too far fetched...


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## Milosh (Dec 8, 2017)

But but but the Bf109 eventual had 2 MG151/15s, or was it /20s, mounted in the cowling and a Mk103 center mounted. Yes one can read that some places.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 8, 2017)

nuuumannn said:


> Whilst you're right, SR, something has to give; the Germans are not going to magic a production line out of thin air, so something is not going to be built and I'm thinking the '190 since it took priority at Fw. If the '187 was put into production, then it can be assumed that it too, would take priority. Resources that were devoted to getting the Fw 190 into production - remember it suffered severe overheating, would have been devoted to the Fw 187, so again, something has to give and something is not going to be worked on as extensively as it traditionally was; likely the Fw 190.



Agreed. Companies being handed blueprints and a good look at an existing production line is one thing, sorting out a prototype (or series of prototypes) with on going problems is something else. This means working on actual aircraft and finding out that louver B, scoop C and slot D still haven't solved the problem is a lot different than some drawings on paper and a few pages of figures. 

Of course the FW 187 could have replaced the Fw 191 with a much better chance of getting something useful out of the tens of thousands of hours of work  While leaving the FW 190 alone.


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## JAG88 (Dec 8, 2017)

Milosh said:


> But but but the Bf109 eventual had 2 MG151/15s, or was it /20s, mounted in the cowling and a Mk103 center mounted. Yes one can read that some places.



Im sorry, I dont follow, is 3xMG FF unrealistic?


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## nuuumannn (Dec 8, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> Of course the FW 187 could have replaced the Fw 191 with a much better chance of getting something useful out of the tens of thousands of hours of work



I guess so, but only in hindsight, which they didn't have in 1939/1940 when Bomber B was issued. It's as likely as not, since if the Fw 187 was under development, Fw would most certainly have devoted resources to Bomber B; there's no reason to expect that to have changed, the Fw 191 was the preferred candidate along with the Ju 288. The issues that affected it could not have been known back in late 1939/early 1940, so again, what gives? The Fw 190; 'the second iron in the fire', because at that stage, the Bf 109 is still the Luftwaffe's primary fighter and there's no immediate need to supplement it.



> Without 100/130 the Dornier Do 17 or Do 215 could outrun and outmaneuver a Hurricane.



What?! One example of a German bomber pursuing a British fighter and all of a sudden the bigger and heavier bomber has better performance than a single-seat fighter!? (in saying that, at low altitude, a Hurricane had a hard time catching a Ju 88 without its warload making a sprint for home) So that's how the Luftwaffe got it wrong! The big fast twins were used as bombers instead of fighters! Perhaps if they switched roles and used the Do 17s against the Spits and Hurris then the Germans would have won, eh? Like the Brits; the bombers will go after the Hurricanes and the fighters after the Spitfires! 

Koopernic, your tendency to stretch the truth based on the flimsiest of evidence is striking.

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## Koopernic (Dec 9, 2017)

He


tomo pauk said:


> Seems to me that you keep overlooking the law of 15% extra performance due to having black cross.



Maybe folks are overlooking the flame dampers, Lichtenstein Radar aerials, gun packs on the night fighter.

There is plenty of +5% biases on equipment with or bullseye on it due to the in built superciliousness reality correction factor. I’ve found this to have a hyperbolic function that corrects lying reality back to legendary truth.

If a Do 17Z could manage 412km/h (256mp/h) at 1220m (4000ft) then it’s believable that a good pilot could get it over a Hurricane limited to 6.25 psig boost which managed 420km/h(260.0mph) at 0 meters and 444km/h(276mph) at 5000ft (less at 4000ft). The Hurricane on 87 octane or 6.25psig boost had only 10mph speed advantage. Dornier was flogging the Do 17 as a Zerstörer as well as a schnell bomber.

Data from here.
Hurricane Mk I Performance
Use the original report or data.

The Do 215 with much more powerful (33%) and streamlined DB601Aa engines had of been available in numbers it would have been hard to intercept for the Hurricane with Merlin III with any fuel. At DB601Aa full pressure altitude even with 100/130 the advantage in speed of the Hurricane was tiny.

Daimler Benz had a Dispute with the German Air Ministry over financing of the Geisingham aero engine plant in 1935/36 or so. This is probably one factor which left the DB601 in short supply dooming many aircraft to second rate engines such as the Fw 187 and Do 17/215.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 9, 2017)

JAG88 said:


> Im sorry, I dont follow, is 3xMG FF unrealistic?



Your proposal is excellent, granted people at DB and MTT need to refine the engine installation so it works reliably. That happened historically by some time of late 1940, with introduction of the pre-series BF 109F.
What Milosh said was a tongue-in-a-cheek joke - some early post-war publications stated that late 109s were outfitted with one MK103 and two MG 151 cannons as series. Proven wrong many times, but still sometimes surfacing. 



Koopernic said:


> Maybe folks are overlooking the flame dampers, Lichtenstein Radar aerials, gun packs on the night fighter.
> 
> There is plenty of +5% biases on equipment with or bullseye on it due to the in built superciliousness reality correction factor. I’ve found this to have a hyperbolic function that corrects lying reality back to legendary truth.
> 
> If a Do 17Z could manage 412km/h (256mp/h) at 1220m (4000ft) then it’s believable that a good pilot could get it over a Hurricane limited to 6.25 psig boost which managed 420km/h(260.0mph) at 0 meters and 444km/h(276mph) at 5000ft (less at 4000ft). The Hurricane on 87 octane or 6.25psig boost had only 10mph speed advantage. Dornier was flogging the Do 17 as a Zerstörer as well as a schnell bomber.



The Do 17 versions from the table I've posted are either bombers or recons (Aufklaerer), as listed there. Ergo no radars or cannon barrels sticking out to slow them down. Do 17 with radial engines of rated altitude at 4000 m were too slower than 420 km/h at their best altitude, that again can be read at the table. Dornier can flog the Do 17 as a Zerstoerer as much as they want, this is if Bristol pitches Blenheim as heavy day fighter.
As for how fast was the Do 215 (DB 601 on board), here it is, compared with SAAB bombers and the best Do 17. Bombers and/or recons:


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## JAG88 (Dec 9, 2017)

tomo pauk said:


> Your proposal is excellent, granted people at DB and MTT need to refine the engine installation so it works reliably. That happened historically by some time of late 1940, with introduction of the pre-series BF 109F.
> What Milosh said was a tongue-in-a-cheek joke - some early post-war publications stated that late 109s were outfitted with one MK103 and two MG 151 cannons as series. Proven wrong many times, but still sometimes surfacing.



Oh, I got that, but it seemed that he may have been drawing a parallel with my proposal and claiming that it was just as absurd, hence the question.

SOmeone should make a list of the craziest zombie claims, those that refuse to die and keep coming back...


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## Milosh (Dec 9, 2017)

Not at all JAG88, tomo was spot on.

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## swampyankee (Dec 9, 2017)

JAG88 said:


> SOmeone should make a list of the craziest zombie claims, those that refuse to die and keep coming back...




We can start with the canard about the _Bismarck_'s AA fire control being unable to engage the Swordfish because the aircraft were so slow. This fails the basic smell test, as the AAFCS development process would have started when the Swordfish's _predecessor_ was still in service and it would be incredibly stupid to design a system that couldn't cope with the threats that existed when the design started. While I don't think that the Germans were technically superior to everybody else, I don't think they were stupid, either.


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## JAG88 (Dec 9, 2017)

swampyankee said:


> We can start with the canard about the _Bismarck_'s AA fire control being unable to engage the Swordfish because the aircraft were so slow. This fails the basic smell test, as the AAFCS development process would have started when the Swordfish's _predecessor_ was still in service and it would be incredibly stupid to design a system that couldn't cope with the threats that existed when the design started. While I don't think that the Germans were technically superior to everybody else, I don't think they were stupid, either.



True, IIRC the issue was that the AA director somehow had a problem with controlling 105mm mounts that had different speeds, a consequence of the KM low production priority, rush to completion and sales to the Soviets.


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## pbehn (Dec 9, 2017)

swampyankee said:


> We can start with the canard about the _Bismarck_'s AA fire control being unable to engage the Swordfish because the aircraft were so slow. This fails the basic smell test, as the AAFCS development process would have started when the Swordfish's _predecessor_ was still in service and it would be incredibly stupid to design a system that couldn't cope with the threats that existed when the design started. While I don't think that the Germans were technically superior to everybody else, I don't think they were stupid, either.


The Story of the Torpedoing of the Bismarck

Reading the above link it is clear that the Bismark could bring down accurate fire on Swordfish because the last two who were to attack her dropped their torpedoes and left. I understand from the above that the Bismarks RADAR /fire control couldn't cope with 12 aircraft circling. At the time of the attacks visibility was poor and cloud down to 700 ft. The other conclusion I have is that it is much easier to make holes in a Swordfish than actually shoot them down.


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## buffnut453 (Dec 9, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> If a Do 17Z could manage 412km/h (256mp/h) at 1220m (4000ft) then it’s believable that a good pilot could get it over a Hurricane limited to 6.25 psig boost which managed 420km/h(260.0mph) at 0 meters and 444km/h(276mph) at 5000ft (less at 4000ft). The Hurricane on 87 octane or 6.25psig boost had only 10mph speed advantage. Dornier was flogging the Do 17 as a Zerstörer as well as a schnell bomber.
> 
> Data from here.
> Hurricane Mk I Performance
> ...




None of that justifies your statement that a Do-17 or Do-215 could out outrun AND OUTMANOEUVER a Hurricane. The Do-17 definitely wasn't a contender as your own figures demonstrate and the Do-215 production only amounted to 105 airframes by the end of 1941, by which time the RAF's fighter force was in a much stronger position than was the case in early/mid 1940, with corresponding performance increases even for the humble Hurricane MkI.


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## nuuumannn (Dec 9, 2017)

> If a Do 17Z could manage 412km/h (256mp/h) at 1220m (4000ft) then it’s believable that a good pilot could get it over a Hurricane limited to 6.25 psig boost which managed 420km/h(260.0mph) at 0 meters and 444km/h(276mph) at 5000ft (less at 4000ft). The Hurricane on 87 octane or 6.25psig boost had only 10mph speed advantage. Dornier was flogging the Do 17 as a Zerstörer as well as a schnell bomber.



On paper this looks all very plauseable, but remember that whilst on combat operations the German bombers were lumbered with fuel, ammunition etc, which meant that there is no way that they could match the acceleration (this is the key, _not_ overall speed) of the Hurricane. I can't be bothered searching for now, as my copy of Battle of Britain Then and Now is in another room, but there were plenty of examples of Hurricanes shooting down Do 17s. Heck, even Defiants, which had low speed and acceleration bagged Do 17s (and Ju 88s for that matter). Again, Koopernic, your evidence offers nothing but some dry statistics on paper that doesn't reflect reality. And where are the Do 17 and '215 curves and data as extensive as those of the Hurricane that have provided as evidence?


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## nuuumannn (Dec 9, 2017)

Okay, here's something I found among the information you provided, Koopernic. At the bottom of the Hurricane data page - very informative; thanks for the link - is a link to an official document called 'Report of Comparitive trials between Hurricane versus Messerschmitt 109', which states the following;

"At 15,000 ft the aircraft separated and approached one another head on for the dogfight. The Hurricane did a quick stall turn followed by a quick vertical turn and found himself on the 109's tail. The pilot of the 109 was unable to prevent this manoeuvre succeeding. From that point the Hurricane had no difficulty remaining on the tail of the Me 109. The pilot of the 109 trield all possible manoeuvres and finally the one most usually employed by German pilots, namely a half roll and vertical dive. The Hurricane followed this manoeuvre, but the ME drew away at the commencement of the dive..."

At the conclusion it states that; "The ME 109 is faster than the Hurricane by some 30 to 40 miles per hour on the straight and level. It can outclimb and initially out dive the Hurricane. On the other hand it has not the manoeuvrability of the Hurricane, which can turn inside without difficulty."

So, although the Hurri is no match in performance, pilots could out manoeuvre their German counterparts in their fighters, yet you are saying the Do 17 and Do 215 could outmanoeuvre a Hurricane and consequently Bf 109? Bulls**t.

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## pbehn (Dec 9, 2017)

nuuumannn said:


> "At 15,000 ft the aircraft separated and approached one another head on for the dogfight. The Hurricane did a quick stall turn followed by a quick vertical turn and found himself on the 109's tail. The pilot of the 109 was unable to prevent this manoeuvre succeeding. From that point the Hurricane had no difficulty remaining on the tail of the Me 109. The pilot of the 109 trield all possible manoeuvres and finally the one most usually employed by German pilots, namely a half roll and vertical dive. The Hurricane followed this manoeuvre, but the ME drew away at the commencement of the dive..."
> .


This explains to me why some Polish pilots preferred the Hurricane to the Spitfire simply because of its armament, describing the Spitfire as a pepper pot. In the hands of an expert in 1940 for what it had to do it was good enough.


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## JAG88 (Dec 9, 2017)

That Do 215 story sounds like a nice circumstancial story, maybe it happened just as is told due to some huge difference in pilot skill or damage to the Hurricane, weird crap can happen, but we cant take it as rule to compare both aircrafts...

It reminds of the time a Fulmar turned inside a CR 42... maybe it happened, but I doubt that such a heavy aircraft would be able to outmaneuver a friggin biplane consistently...


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## pbehn (Dec 9, 2017)

JAG88 said:


> That Do 215 story sounds like a nice circumstancial story, maybe it happened just as is told due to some huge difference in pilot skill or damage to the Hurricane, weird crap can happen, but we cant take it as rule to compare both aircrafts...
> 
> It reminds of the time a Fulmar turned inside a CR 42... maybe it happened, but I doubt that heavy aircraft would be able to outmaneuver a friggin biplane consistently...


Also, the pilot has to justify using the boost.


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## Koopernic (Dec 9, 2017)

stona said:


> It was repeated by Douglas Bader, along with Bob Stanford Tuck who did not contradict him, in a famous '70s documentary. It just goes to show how fallible memory can be.
> 
> Such 'recollections', from such eminent participants in the fighting at the time, do much to reinforce such myths, though entirely unintentionally. Producers were also less likely to challenge such assertions in those days.
> 
> ...



Memories are only partially stored but when required are reconstructed by the brain from fragments. With retelling memories may fuse with stories read or told elsewhere. I’ve personally seen people so infused with tales they themselves believe they were there. We usually let it go, I doubt if Galland if he were there himself would question a senior like Bäder. Nevertheless memories are more reliable than lying historians who generally have an agenda to push and reconstruct “events” as well. The ancients Greeks knew this and systemized and wrote down ways to think to avoid this.

Bäder may be right. Perhaps some Experten tested a motor canon intended for the Me 109F entering service at the close of the BoB campaign.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 10, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> ... a senior like B*ä*der.
> ....
> B*ä*der may be right.
> ....



Yikes

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## stona (Dec 10, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> Bäder may be right. Perhaps some Experten tested a motor canon intended for the Me 109F entering service at the close of the BoB campaign.



No, he was generalising about the armament. He and Tuck were holding 1/24 scale Airfix models of a Spitfire and Bf 109 E to illustrate their points.
I bet that old documentary is available somewhere online, MY memory of it is slightly vague .
Cheers
Steve


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## Airframes (Dec 10, 2017)

I remember that documentary, and I have a copy on an old VHS tape somewhere !


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## Kryten (Dec 10, 2017)

Or far more likely our novice pilot narrator has simply mistook a Do17 for Bf110!

Anyone who thinks you can chase a Hurricane round in a Do17 is having a laugh!


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## Kryten (Dec 10, 2017)

stona said:


> No, he was generalising about the armament. He and Tuck were holding 1/24 scale Airfix models of a Spitfire and Bf 109 E to illustrate their points.
> I bet that old documentary is available somewhere online, MY memory of it is slightly vague .
> Cheers
> Steve


I have read many anecdotes by BoB pilots who claimed the Bf109 had a 20mm in the spinner during the battle, obviously an error, but just because they flew in the war doesn't mean they are nerdy plane fanatics like us, aircraft recognition was not exactly proficient all the way through the war.

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## stona (Dec 10, 2017)

See about 2.20 in this clip for two 'experts' not getting the Bf 109 E armament quite right. The model is of an Emil and the cut away shows the spinner of an Emil, but they describe a mixture of armament not applicable to the E but a sort of hybrid of it and later types.


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8yaPiTrHAL8_

It's not quite how I remembered it, which is another demonstration of the fallibility of human memory, but close enough!

Cheers

Steve

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## rochie (Dec 10, 2017)

Think world would be a better place if we all spoke like that 
Bader is not everyone's cup of tea but a Hero of mine

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## Koopernic (Dec 10, 2017)

The Me 109F1 had a motor canon.

This is the quartermaster generals report on DB601N engines in service. It also notes the number of Me 109F1 in service.

Bader was shot down over France in August 1941, well after the BoB was over but also by then Me 109 F was in service.

And yes I’ve heard of Me 109F having the wing guns and the nose gun for a short time. There is a photo with Galland, Goering and an F2 all in it.

On the Generalluftzeugmeister meeting on the 22nd January 1941, the Generalstab pointed out the following figures on the number of 'active' DB 601N installed, referring to reports from the units on 1st of January, thus giving us a good picture on the number of Bf 109E-../N types in frontline service on the 1st of January : 2

in Bf 109s
Bf 109E-1 : 16 pcs, Bf 109E-3 : 1 pc, Bf 109E-4 : 54 pcs, Bf 109E-6 : 1 pc, Bf 109E-7 : 34 pcs, Bf 109E-8 : 2pcs. *Bf 109F-1 : 5 pcs.*

Total 112 Bf 109E with DB 601N present in service, plus 5 Bf 109F.

in Bf 110s
Bf 110C-1 : 4 pcs, Bf 110C-4 : 40 pcs, Bf 110C-5 : 12, Bf 110C-7 : 14 pcs, Bf 110D-0 : 18 pcs, Bf 110D-2 : 20 pcs, Bf 110D-3 : 8 pcs, BF 110E-1 : 176 pcs, Bf 110E-2 : 14 pcs.

Total : 306 engines, ie. 153 Bf 110s with DB 601N present in service.

in Misc. types
He 111P : 8 pcs, Do 215 : 68 pcs.
*
Note how many of these higher powered much higher altitude engines are being “wasted” on Me 110 in an attempt to make it competitive.*


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## Shortround6 (Dec 10, 2017)

Still pushing the Fw 187?

I notice that they "wasted" 76 engines on He 111s and Do 215s but of course the DO-215 with DB 601N engines could easily handle a Hurricane while a Bf 110 with the same engines could not? 

I guess the British wasted hundreds (if not thousands) of Merlin XX engines on the Hurricane II?

I do like the "much higher altitude engines" bit as I believe the FTH for the 601N was a whopping 400 meters higher than the 601A-1. This is without the emergency over revving of the engine/s above 5,500 meters. This over revving would increase the supercharger impeller speed by around 2000rpm and so increase the height at which a give level of power would be obtained. Was the extra 2000rpm ( I can't be bothered to find the exact gear ratio of the supercharger with the fluid coupling locked up) of the impeller responsible for the extra 400 meters in altitude? 

One does wonder how well a 109 with a 601A-1 engine running at 2600rpm at 6000 meters would compare to a 601N powered 109 also running at 2600rpm at 6000 meters?


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## tomo pauk (Dec 10, 2017)

The increase of the compression ratio when going from DB 601A to the 601N probably was self-inflicted wound, that cost plenty of HP. It needed 96, or 100 oct fuel (depending what one reads) needed to get just +4.5 psi worth of boost - much less than Merlin III was getting on just 87 oct fuel.



Koopernic said:


> ...
> Note how many of these higher powered much higher altitude engines are being “wasted” on Me 110 in an attempt to make it competitive.



Not only in Nazi Germany there were many cases of perspective and/or most numerous fighters receiveing the 2nd or even 3rd tier engines.


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## Juha2 (Dec 10, 2017)

Kryten said:


> Or far more likely our novice pilot narrator has simply mistook a Do17 for Bf110!
> 
> Anyone who thinks you can chase a Hurricane round in a Do17 is having a laugh!



In fact Roland Beamont told that kind of story in his memoirs or one of his articles in Aeroplane Monthly magazines, happened during the BoF and at low level. Do 17 was surprisingly manouvrable plane and B. was very surprised by the aggressiveness of the Do pilot. And as they were flying circles a while, B. probably had more time to look his adversary more closely than was usual during an aerial combat.

Ps. Found it, in Chaz Bowyer's Hurricane at War, pp. 30 & 32. It is very improbable that Beaumont would have mistaken Bf 110 for Do 17 because he had just been combat with 110s and another D0 17. It took less than 2 turns to reverve situation after which B. with engine boost over-ride pulled, banking into position for a broad deflection shot.but after three rounds B. run out of ammo. B. disengagd using all the Hurii's manoeuvrability and full over-boost to roll away to the right from the lefthand circle, and then pushed the nose down to 50 feet, Do came round after B. firing a few more burst from steadily increasing range and then pulled up, rocking his wings before turning away.

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## pbehn (Dec 10, 2017)

Poor Douglas must be turning in his grave trying to shake that umlaut out of his name.

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## stona (Dec 10, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> The Me 109F1 had a motor canon.
> 
> Bader was shot down over France in August 1941, well after the BoB was over but also by then Me 109 F was in service.
> 
> And yes I’ve heard of Me 109F having the wing guns and the nose gun for a short time. There is a photo with Galland, Goering and an F2 all in it.



They are talking about the BoB and referring to an E. The producers even cut away to a shot of an Emil spinner (uncapped) which certainly did not have a cannon or anything else firing through it.

They do muddle up the E anf F in the discussion. Bader would have seen the report on Pingel's interrogation, he subsequently set a number of further questions to be asked about the F series, all survive in TNA). He was also very keen to fly the Bf 109 F which Pingel had delivered.







No wing guns there!









The bit about 'pulling the wings off' applied to the F series and was mentioned by Pingel. The famous German pilot referred to was, according to Pingel, Wilhelm Balthasar.

From memory Galland had two modified F series aircraft with cannon in the wings (not machine guns as described by our illustrious 'experts'). The picture you are referring to was taken on 5th December 1941, more than a year after the end of the BoB.

Cheers

Steve

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## JAG88 (Dec 10, 2017)

stona said:


> From memory Galland had two modified F series aircraft with cannon in the wings (not machine guns as described by our illustrious 'experts'). The picture you are referring to was taken on 5th December 1941, more than a year after the end of the BoB.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve



One had MG FFs on the wings, the other replaced the cowl MGs with MG 131s that at least appears to be a much better installation than the one used on the later Gs, wonder why they didnt just kept it:

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## tomo pauk (Dec 10, 2017)

JAG88 said:


> One had MG FFs on the wings, the other replaced the cowl MGs with MG 131s that at least appears to be a much better installation than the one used on the later Gs, wonder why they didnt just kept it:
> ....



IIRC the ejected casings were hitting the fuselage and/or wings, thus the less tricky, but also less stremalined installation on the later Gs.
One reason more to persist with 3 MG FFM cannon set-up that never was

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## JAG88 (Dec 10, 2017)

tomo pauk said:


> IIRC the ejected casings were hitting the fuselage and/or wings, thus the less tricky, but also less stremalined installation on the later Gs.
> One reason more to persist with 3 MG FFM cannon set-up that never was



Thx! I was wondering if the shells may be hitting the tail under certain conditions, been looking for an explanation for years.


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## Koopernic (Dec 10, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> Still pushing the Fw 187?
> 
> I notice that they "wasted" 76 engines on He 111s and Do 215s but of course the DO-215 with DB 601N engines could easily handle a Hurricane while a Bf 110 with the same engines could not?
> 
> ...




I’ll get back to pushing the Fw 187 latter.

The Basic data is this, all of this is short term “emergency” type data.
DB601A0 1025hp at 0m, 1025 at 3900m, 1000hp @ 4100m all at 2400rpm
DB601A1 1100hp at 0m, 1020 at 4500m both at 2400rpm *
DB601Aa 1175hp at 0m @ 2500 rpm, 1100hp at 3700m, 1050 at 4100m both @2400
DB601N0 1175hp @ 0m, 1175 @ 4900m both at 2600rpm

All engines could from late 1940 be over reved by 200rpm above the above Full Throttle Heights for 5 minutes which must be about 8%-10% more shaft power and probably 16% more jet thrust as both mass flow and exhaust velocity would also increase and compound the gain.

Hence these engines must have been getting 1275 or so hp by the end of 1940.

Unlike over boosting this does not increase power only below the existing full throttle heights.

Data on the 2800rpm DB601 would be interesting.

The Germans had closed the power gap with British 100 octane fuel but only in the dying days of the BoB.

I’d say our Do 215 with DB601N over reved to 2800 would get us our 316mph Do 215. The Luftwaffe used these for reconnaissance.

The Do 215, DB601Aa were a premium products for demanding export customers; Sweden, Switzerland, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union got two. That’s how The 3rd Reich paid for its grain and oil, advanced technology. If Dornier and DB was trying to sell to a customer they’d offer their latest engine. The DB601Aa was better than the one the Luftwaffe specified.


*There is a note that 601Aa RPM can be increased 2400->2800rpm here
Kurfürst - DB 601, 603, 605 datasheets - DB 601 A-1

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## swampyankee (Dec 10, 2017)

Kryten said:


> I have read many anecdotes by BoB pilots who claimed the Bf109 had a 20mm in the spinner during the battle, obviously an error, but just because they flew in the war doesn't mean they are nerdy plane fanatics like us, aircraft recognition was not exactly proficient all the way through the war.



Memory is also quite malleable, and the stories of people around, as well as being generally unreliable. It's not unlikely that these Battle of Britain pilots generalized through-hub guns on Bf109s encountered later in the war to the Bf109 models in use during the Battles for France and Britain.

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## Koopernic (Dec 10, 2017)

pbehn said:


> Poor Douglas must be turning in his grave trying to shake that umlaut out of his name.


I have Cyrillic and German keyboard plugins on my iPad. Goes randomly bonkers because it doesn’t know what dictionary to use. If Bader came back and had a look around I suspect umlauts might be the lessor of his disappointments.

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## Juha2 (Dec 10, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> I’ll get back to pushing the Fw 187 latter.
> 
> The Basic data is this, all of this is short term “emergency” type data.
> DB601A0 1025hp at 0m, 1025 at 3900m, 1000hp @ 4100m all at 2400rpm
> ...



Hello Koopernic!
In fact only above 5 500m, well above the FTHs. So IMHO you are too optimistic in your power calculation.

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## Shortround6 (Dec 10, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> All engines could from late 1940 be over reved by 200rpm above the above Full Throttle Heights for 5 minutes which must be about 8%-10% more shaft power and probably 16% more jet thrust as both mass flow and exhaust velocity would also increase and compound the gain.
> 
> Hence these engines must have been getting 1275 or so hp by the end of 1940.



Increasing from 2400rpm to 2600rpm is a 8.3 increase *if *everything else stayed the same. Unfortunately the internal friction of the engine goes up by about 17.4% (internal friction may have been under 100hp to begin with) and the power to drive the supercharger also goes up with the square of the speed. Helped in this case by the thinner air. but at 5,500 meters the air is 4% less dense than at 4900 meters so you need more of it (volume) to make the same power (and to have the same mass for your exhaust thrust.) but, yes, your exhaust gas velocity will be higher due the thinner air, less back pressure. HIgher you go the less mass for the exhaust thrust. 




> The Germans had closed the power gap with British 100 octane fuel but only in the dying days of the BoB.


At which point the British opened it right back up by introducing the Merlin XII in the Spitfire II (actual first flight was in 1939, as almost always, improvements were planned for in advance of actual need or response to an enemy development) and the introduction of the Merlin XX in the Hurricane II. 




> The Do 215, DB601Aa were a premium products for demanding export customers; Sweden, Switzerland, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union got two. That’s how The 3rd Reich paid for its grain and oil, advanced technology. If Dornier and DB was trying to sell to a customer they’d offer their latest engine. The DB601Aa was better than the one the Luftwaffe specified.



More Hyperbole. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia got how many Do 215s???? how about ZERO. And was the promise of the Do 215 payment for raw materials or a bribe to get Yugoslavia to join the Axis. 
Yugoslavia was a lot more in the desperate catagory than demanding, from WIki: 
"The situation whereby the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had to acquire or manufacture aircraft from whatever source presented itself meant that by 1941, the VVKJ was rather uniquely equipped with 11 different types of operational aircraft, 14 different types of trainers and five types of auxiliary aircraft, with 22 different engine models, four different machine guns and two types of aircraft cannon"

Yugoslavia was already manufacturing DO17s in Jugoslavia so if they could get DB601 engines it would be a bonus. 

Sweden had ordered 18 Do 215s, they got........ wait for it...............ZERO. Sweden also was buying up whatever it could get from whoever would sell to them, and actual deliveries were another story or series of stories. They took delivery of 72 Fiat CR 42 biplane fighters for example because nobody else would sell/deliver aircraft to them. They had ordered 150 Seversky fighters (and 20 two seaters) but after the first 60 were delivered the US embargoed the rest. 40 of them wound up in the Philippines. So was Sweden demanding or desperate?

As far as Switzerland goes, any record of at all of Switzerland actually purchasing an Do 215, or planning to purchase? 
They did operate a single Do 17Z which was interned after landing at Basal airport in April of 1940. 

I am not at all sure the 601Aa was "better" than the 601A-1. lots of companies offered different models of engines with slightly different supercharger gear ratios or slightly different superchargers to suit the engine for specific applications. ANY engine with a lower than normal FTH usually had a higher take-off power or higher power at an intermediate altitude. Was the higher power of the 601Aa at low altitudes "bought" at the price of lower power at high altitude compared to the 601A-1 ?

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## tomo pauk (Dec 10, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> Was the higher power of the 601Aa at low altitudes "bought" at the price of lower power at high altitude compared to the 601A-1 ?



It was.


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## parsifal (Dec 10, 2017)

I like the claim the germans had to put premium technologies into its exports to pay for its grain imports. German difficulties with exports arose far more from its decision to artificially devalue its currency to massively and unsustainably favour its import costs, but this in turn made its exports of manufactured goods exceedingly expensive.

The Germany within the occupied territories and even the territories of their allies, often engaged in outright looting of resources. There were reasons why the germans within Romania were as hated as the Russians. This was one of the main reasons why. Finland absolutely refused to allow significant numbers of German troops into populated areas of the country, because they feared the germans would cut loose and steal everything (there were other issues as well, but this was one of them).

Germany began its thieving practices from other countries from day 1 of the war. With the outbreak of the war, many ships carrying cargoes to the Reich were seized, the cargoes confiscated and ships commandeered by the Germans. More than 40 vessels were rounded up in this way. It mattered not if those ships were neutral, friendly or otherwise acting lawfully. The Germans acted abominably towards nations otherwise keen to trade with them. Small wonder that nearly 80% of Europe’s merchant fleets within a year were working for the British or had been moved to areas outside Europe.

The British were no saints either. Ships from the beginning of the war were routinely rounded up and sent to the customs stations like the one at Kirkwall, where their cargo manifests and crew/passenger nationalities were checked. Cargoes and nationals for the allies were immediately released, cargoes for neutrals might be subject to a control order, particularly for strategic cargoes like fuel. Just enough to meet the needs of that neutral, not enough to allow contraband to find its way to Germany. Ships or nationals of enemy origin were immediately seized and detained.

The difference between the british practices and the german is an equity question. The British were acting within the accepted laws on the carriage of contraband, the rights of a belligerent to stop and search, and if necessary apprehend any vessel entering the declared war zones. The Germans did not. For them, any ship, friendly, neutral or enemy was fair game. Later on the high seas they adopted a policy of shoot on sight, no stop and search

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## JAG88 (Dec 10, 2017)

parsifal said:


> The difference between the british practices and the german is an equity question. The British were acting within the accepted laws on the carriage of contraband, the rights of a belligerent to stop and search, and if necessary apprehend any vessel entering the declared war zones. The Germans did not. For them, any ship, friendly, neutral or enemy was fair game. Later on the high seas they adopted a policy of shoot on sight, no stop and search



Heh, not to defend the nazis but, for the Germans the ship of legality had sailed in WW1, after the British broke international law and began to intercept and divert merchants and seize neutral cargoes there was really no point in unilaterally abiding by the rules. Why would they expect different in WW2?


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## pbehn (Dec 10, 2017)

JAG88 said:


> Heh, not to defend the nazis but, for the Germans the ship of legality had sailed in WW1, after the British broke international law and began to intercept and divert merchants and seize neutral cargoes there was really no point in unilaterally abiding by the rules. Why would they expect different in WW2?


For the Germans the ship of using neutrality sailed when they invaded Belgium in both wars. Germany wanted to enjoy a game of rugby while insisting all others must play cricket.

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## nuuumannn (Dec 10, 2017)

swampyankee said:


> Memory is also quite malleable, and the stories of people around, as well as being generally unreliable. It's not unlikely that these Battle of Britain pilots generalized through-hub guns on Bf109s encountered later in the war to the Bf109 models in use during the Battles for France and Britain.



Indeed, like the He 113, many pilots claimed to have seen it. It was a propaganda ploy by the Germans and it worked. Although to what end is something of a mystery.

Wiki page on the He 113: Heinkel He 113 - Wikipedia



> I'll get back to pushing the Fw 187 later



Oh, please don't.

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## buffnut453 (Dec 10, 2017)

nuuumannn said:


> Oh, please don't.



Amen!

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## pbehn (Dec 10, 2017)

Further to previous discussions about channel conditions, a P&O ferry was driven aground today by storms in Calais harbour.
Ferry runs aground in Calais harbour


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## parsifal (Dec 10, 2017)

JAG88 said:


> Heh, not to defend the nazis but, for the Germans the ship of legality had sailed in WW1, after the British broke international law and began to intercept and divert merchants and seize neutral cargoes there was really no point in unilaterally abiding by the rules. Why would they expect different in WW2?




In WWI neither side were seizing the ships or the cargoes of neutrals friendly to ones own side. In WWII, Finnish ships refused to transport thir ore to Germany in their own ships, for fear the germans would steal both the ship and the cargo, and most probably the crew too. The Germans were forced to transport such cargoes in their own ships , and did not receive any cargo unless they paid for the goods in advance. Nobody trusted them after the disgraceful displays they put on in August-December 1939, and from there, for the remainder of the war.


Your mixing up the issue of unrestricted warfare on enemy shipping to the kind of state sanctioned looting and thievery which the germans used routinely from the outbreak of the war. There is nothing comparable to that in WWI, and nothing in both world wars on the allied side that comes remotely close to that behavior.


It gets worse. In 1939, Sweden and Germany came quite close to open warfare over Germany’s maritime practices. Both sides were not averse to laying mines in the territorial waters of the neutrals (a major reason for the formation of the pan-American neutrality zone). However the generally accepted practice was to provide warnings in advance that a minefiled was being laid, so that neutral shipping could avoid such minefields. Plans of this nature were laid by the RN in the Baltic in 1939, but came to nothing. The RN was intending to at least inform the neutrals of their action. Not so the germans. They went ahead and planted minefields in Swedish, Norwegian and Danish territorial waters without informing them of these minefields. These were not at that time declared areas 9in the Baltic) and led to heavy losses of neutral shipping and the loss of many crew from countries that at that time were working mostly for the Germans rather than the allies.


There is no rhyme or reason for the germans to act in this way. And there was no precedent from WWI either. The germans were behaving with extreme arrogance and disregard to the neutrals, and then wonder why their exports to these and other countries fell right away after the outbreak of war, and why in areas where they excelled, such as their aircraft industries, they still had a hard time selling their stuff

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## JAG88 (Dec 10, 2017)

No contest, the nazis acted like, well, nazis... 

On the other hand...

"In WWI neither side were seizing the ships or the cargoes of neutrals friendly to ones own side."

The British did, they turned procedure around and detained ships expecting the owners to justify their cargo instead of them proving it was contraband, even though they didnt even had the right to stop shipping in the high seas to begin with... no to speak of confiscating cargo just because they believed it would be sold to the Germans, which, if they did, would have been completely legal and their business...

...and all this in order to starve people in breach of international law.

So, again, not defending the nazis, but after WW1 I wouldnt expect the Germans to play nice.

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## swampyankee (Dec 10, 2017)

JAG88 said:


> Heh, not to defend the nazis but, for the Germans the ship of legality had sailed in WW1, after the British broke international law and began to intercept and divert merchants and seize neutral cargoes there was really no point in unilaterally abiding by the rules. Why would they expect different in WW2?



Sorry, but intercepting and diverting merchant ships was within international law; this was customary international law as argued by the US 50 years earlier, and the British 50 years before that.


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## JAG88 (Dec 10, 2017)

swampyankee said:


> Sorry, but intercepting and diverting merchant ships was within international law; this was customary international law as argued by the US 50 years earlier, and the British 50 years before that.



Only as part of a legal and effective blockade on the enemy coast, which was not the case in WW1.

There was no such thing as a distant blockade, not in international law.

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## parsifal (Dec 10, 2017)

And again, you are badly mistaken.

What you are referring to was a system of customs control, which was something that had been going on since the times of the Napoleonic wars. It was refined and internationally accepted under the Hague conventions which had generally be in force since the beginning of the 20th century.

The British operated wholly within the rules, except and only after the german decided to break them. They were within their rights to stop and search any ship, on the high seas or within coastal waters, that came within the declared areas (ie the declared war zones) and detain or even sink said ships unable to produce an adequate cargo manifest. It was legitimate and lawful to enforce a blockade on neutral shipping and sink enemy shipping within that area. It was lawful for the british to pursue enemy shipping (which they rather generously interpreted as including neutral shipping in certain circumstances (notably Norwegian waters) under the guise of the “Hot Pursuit” rules which allowed the warships to enter into the waters of a neutral if it was known that an enemy ship or presence was being harboured in that neutral territory, Given that the Norwegians were caught allowing Uboats, warships and fully laden cargo ships bound for Germany via the Norwegian leads this was entirely legal and entirely reasonable for the British to hunt down said ships.

Blockade was recognized as a legitimate form of warfare in 1907. The claim that it was somehow illegal for the RN to enforce the blockade is farcical, and often trotted out by the German sympathisers trying to get some quick miles over the issue. It was always open to the germans to surrender, but they chose not to. The consequence of that obstinance is that in WWI they starved, whilst in WWII their economy suffered.

Plus we are comparing apples to oranges here. There is nothing illegal or immoral with prosecuting shipping, up to an including its sinking if said shipping is found (or even suspected) of working in the emply of the enemy. The Germans were not doing that in 1940. Shipping working in local waters, with manifests showing they were working for the germans were being seized, their cargoes stolen as well as the ships themselves even though the germans were fully aware of who these ships were and what they were doing. It didn’t matter to them. For a while at least any ship not flying a swastika was an enemy ship, even when it wasn’t. there was no precedent on the allied side in either war, and no justification can be found for it in the hague conventions

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## swampyankee (Dec 10, 2017)

JAG88 said:


> Only as part of a legal and effective blockade on the enemy coast, which was not the case in WW1.
> 
> There was no such thing as a distant blockade, not in international law.



Since the Confederacy was not a recognized state, international law wouldn't have applied to US actions taken against ships registered to the Confederacy, but the US stopped and seized shipping likely to be trying to break the blockade, including British ships. The only time that came close to causing serious trouble was the Trent Affair; the other cases were within customary practice at the time: ships, even neutral ships, which seemed to be potential carriers of contraband could be and were stopped on the high seas for decades before, _e.g._, by the British during the Napoleonic Wars (I've not heard anyone arguing that it was illegal when the target was the French).


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## Koopernic (Dec 10, 2017)

Juha2 said:


> Hello Koopernic!
> In fact only above 5 500m, well above the FTHs. So IMHO you are too optimistic in your power calculation.



Hi, most of the gains seem to come from the increase in FTH,

If the over Dornier Do 215 Managed 465km/h on the DB601Aa producing 1100hp at a FTH of 3700m/12200ft.

The effect of the DB601N producing 1175 at a FTH of 4900m/16200ft is as follows:

1 Increase in power 1175/1100 =1.068%
2 Decrease in drag due to thinner air is 12% equal to an increase in power of 12%.
3 The two factors compound 1.068 x 1.12 = 1.196.
4 Taking the cube root ³√1.196 = 1.061.
465kmh x 1.061 = 493.6kmh/306mph.

If we either assume the over reved DB601N managed 1275hp at the same altitude or 1175 at 5500m then the thinner air or power gets us another few percent. 316mph is in reach for the Do 215, whatever the source of the data (probably a Dornier Sales Brochure). I doubt they wasted time in an elaborate series of tests to satisfy armchair historians. They'd do some calculations, change the engines and do one test flight.

I'm capable of a prandle glauert compressibility correction, a rough propellor efficiency loss (which reduces the gain) and a jet thrust increase (very substantial) but this is well under Mach 0.5 over a 6% marginal increase.

I interpolated this for my density data:





I used the density reduction between 10000-15000 and interpolated 80% of that to represent the 4000ft decrease in air density drag from 12200-16200ft.

The primary concern of the over reving limitation to above 5500m was probably to keep manifold pressure below 1.3 atmospheres.

The impact on Me 109E4/N with DB601N over Me 109E4 with DB601A1 must have been dramatic.

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## parsifal (Dec 10, 2017)

JAG88 said:


> Only as part of a legal and effective blockade on the enemy coast, which was not the case in WW1.
> 
> There was no such thing as a distant blockade, not in international law.


The following is from:

The Law of Armed Conflict and the Use of Force: Max Planck

It summarises the development of the international laws of the sea from the time of napoleon to the present day. With regard to the hague convention and the London naval treaties it summarized the situation fairly neatly in the following terms:










Nowhere in Plancks summary does its suggest that stop and search (and the enforcement of blockade) is in any way illegal. It does restrain the searching party from the excessive use of force, but stop and search and apprehension is not in any sense excessive force. sink on sight is excessive, against the shipping of a party lawfully engaged in the transport of good for that neutral 9or any other neutral).

So, I am at a loss as to where you get this wild notion that "there was no such thing as a distant blockade". its written in plain English in the international conventions accepted by both Britain and Germany at the time. I'm at a loss to understand where you might be drawing your information from.

And remember, this is action against neutrals working for Germany, with said stop search and confiscation being done by the germans against the shipping working for them. That they would rob the people working for them is just unconscionable behaviour

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## tyrodtom (Dec 10, 2017)

Didn't anyone read that encounter report about the fight between the DO-17 and Hurricane ?

He makes plain the DO-17 was ABOVE and used that height advantage to gain speed and gain on him when he tried to get away just using normal power.

When they were flying round and round, he says the D)-17 was firing at him sometimes with his front gun, sometimes with his rear. What does that tell you ?
The front and rear guns on a DO-17 were aimed by gunners, the DO-17 could be flying a greatly larger circle but the gunners could still aim the guns at the Hurricane flying in a smaller circle. With him saying they sometimes shot with the front gun, and sometimes rear gun indicates to me he was turning inside them, which would put him above them in a banked turn. He wasn't being out manuvered .

And once he went through the wire to full emergency power ( or whatever it was called ) he wasn't being outran by the DO-17 either.


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## Koopernic (Dec 11, 2017)

tyrodtom said:


> Didn't anyone read that encounter report about the fight between the DO-17 and Hurricane ?
> 
> He makes plain the DO-17 was ABOVE and used that height advantage to gain speed and gain on him when he tried to get away just using normal power.
> 
> ...



I don't think of it as a big deal and my statements were tongue in cheek, yanking the chain. However a Dornier Do 17 with its constant speed prop might have a slight speed advantage over a Huricane with a 2 pitch or fixed pitch prop restricted to its old 87 octane boost restriction of 6.25 psig. The BMW radial on the Do 17 was a bit weak and had a lot of drag but the supercharger had been set up for low altitude. Maybe it was a Do 215B2 which had the more powerfull and streamlined DB601Ba

At 1220m/4000ft at Do 17Z2 managed 410kph/255mph
At the same altitude Hurrricane managed 440kph/273mph
(this is without 100 octane WEP or rotol prop).

A Do 215B2 with the DB601Ba engine seemed about 13.5% faster than Do 17Z-2 radial version. It had 1100hp at SL even a short term WEP of 1175 there.

It's food for thought if you imagine DB having its Geisingham engine plant pumping out DB601Aa and DB601N rapidly equiping Do 17 as Do 215 class aircraft, Ju 89 instead of Fw 200 and Fw 187 in production with a proper engine. About the same time 601N engines could reequip the Me 109, 110 annulling some of the advantage the RAF had gained with 100 octane.

A good pilot might use a speed advantage to gain altitude over an opponent. The altitude and speed could then be converted into a tight turn. This would not be a sustained turn advantage just a half turn or so.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 11, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> The BMW radial on the Do 17 was a bit weak and had a lot of drag but the supercharger had been set up for low altitude.



The BRAMO 232P was outfitted with a 2-speed supercharger, the top speed at listed altitude (1220m for the case of Do 17Z-2) is for the case the engine has low speed for S/C engaged.

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## Koopernic (Dec 11, 2017)

swampyankee said:


> We can start with the canard about the _Bismarck_'s AA fire control being unable to engage the Swordfish because the aircraft were so slow. This fails the basic smell test, as the AAFCS development process would have started when the Swordfish's _predecessor_ was still in service and it would be incredibly stupid to design a system that couldn't cope with the threats that existed when the design started. While I don't think that the Germans were technically superior to everybody else, I don't think they were stupid, either.



The Bimarck’s FLAK not being able to track ‘biplanes’ is a provable myth. It does obliquely link into the proctalgia fugax in this thread over the Dornier Do 215B2 that the Reich supplied the USSR in return for its cooperation and most particularly its Wheat and Oil.

The FLAK systems for the Bismarck’s 10.5cm and 15cm duel purpose guns was designed and capable of attacking fast small boats such as patrol boats either with a burst above the target or via direct fire. Obviously they’d be able to track a biplane. The guns could all depress several degrees below the horizon. This nonsense was fabricated by someone who was pretty ignorant, like we all are on certain topics, but propagated as if he knew for sure.

You can get all of these Original documents from KBismarck.org

There were supposed to be 4 triaxially stabilized directors: a pair to port and starboard of the bridge, they look like cyclops, and another pair in tandem aft of the superstructure.

Because of the Reichs agreements with the USSR the two tandem aft directors were removed from Bismarck (and another two from Prinz Eugen) and shipped to the USSR. There was no question of the Reich not meeting its agreements on time. Less capable biaxially units were installed and may have hurt Bismarck’s Defense.

They were very advanced: the target would track bearing, elevation and range ( taken in by a 3.5m range finder). Any other range finder could provide the data including any of the 3 FuMO 23 Seetakt radars or the 10m main optical range finders. These were converted to Cartesian coordinates and the 6 variables (x,y,z) for position and another 3 for velocity in the 3 directions calculated. The position of the target could thus be predicted at anytime ‘t’in the future. Another computer would converge on a firing solution, firing time and fuse setting time. The solution was transmitted via remote power control direct to the electro hydraulic elevation mechanism of the 10.5cm guns (hydraulic swashplate) but the traverse was by power operated but manual match the dial. Probably for safety reasons as this was an open mount and the men walked around the guns. All the other turrets were completely RPC.

The attack on the Bismarck was carried out in limited visibility and the Swordfish used clouds to hide from the Bismarck’s FLAK. The Swordfish had radar. The Japanese also used clouds to hide when they sank Prince of Wales and Repulse but that was on an otherwise clear day.

The Bismarck had 3 FuMO 23 Seetakt radar. The beam width was about 4 degrees and they could probably localize the Swordfish to within 1 degree and their range to better than 70m but they did not know their elevation.

No one in those days had a PPI Plan Position Indicator display in service. That means the radar operators would have been tracking targets and calling out their position for a plastic model to be placed on a plotting table of some kind. This plotting room was inadequate to the task as noted by the Kriegsmarinen Artillery Branch. 3 radars plotting 12 aircraft, overloading.

The 10.5cm and 15cm FLAK was very good for the day.

The 2.0cm and 3.7cm was week and this was what may have let the Swordfish through.

The 2.0cm C38 FLAK in a quad mount was a very effective weapon but there were only two of these. The rest were more basic single and twin gun mounts. The C38 2.0cm had 5300 yards range at 45 degree elevation, which was slightly more than the RN 40mm Pom Pom. When fired from a quad mount 2 guns could maintain continuous fire while the other two were reloaded and cooled. Dozens were fitted to Tirpitz but Bismarck had inadequate numbers.

The naval 3.7 cm guns had excellent ballistics. Fired at 45 degrees they had a 9000 yard range. By comparison the 40 Pom Pom was 5000 yards, 20 mm Oerlikon and 2.0cm C38 5300 yards, German Luftwaffe/Army FLAK 3.7cm 7100 yards. They were almost as good as the Boffors 40mm and its 11000 yard range.

They were fired from a gyrostabilized mount aimed by a reflector site.

Their main weakness was that they were manually loaded semi automatic weapons so rate of was 30-60 rounds per minute.

This is not totally silly since higher firing rates would have blinded the gunners with flash and smoke and lead to guns over heating.

What was needed was FLAK predictors to remotely aim the guns to get the gunners away from the blast and smoke.

One survivor from the Bismarck says he was unable to aim his gun because of the flash and smoke of the nearby heavy guns.

So there you have it: 12 swordfish, 700m visibility, Clouds to hide in, enough of a swell such that the German gunners reported seeing the Swordfish dip below the waves, congestion at the plotting table which was overwhelmed by 12 Swordfish attacking simultaneously, gun blast from nearby weapons disturbing the critical 3.7cm weapons.

No ship would have performed well at the time in these circumstances at this time. Tirptiz with here upgraded FLAK was able to evade all Torpedoes and shoot down two Albacore’s latter.

The Germans introduced a PPI radar on the ground in the form of dreh Freya and Jagdschloss in 1943 and in the form of the 50cm Hohetenweil radar in 1944 on ships as well as a microwave unit called Berlin.

The Royal Navy was perhaps a little more prepared in that it was trying to use remote predictor aiming (using match the dial initially) for its 40mm Pom Pom this moving the gun aimers away from the blast but it had such mediocre ballistics. They also had a basic range only radar type 285 on these sighting stations that could autonomously locate a target and thus reducing the overload. 3 of 4 were broken down on PoW for want of parts on the day of her sinking.

Tirpitz received an upgraded Seetakt that could get bearing to 0.25 degree and was blind fire capable. It’s somewhat of a mystery that GEMA produced 58 height finding radars for ships. I’m told that some of the latter Seetaks had height finding capability through the phase steering type system used on their other product the Wasserman Early Warning and height finding radars. (That’s a naval mystery).

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## ssnider (Dec 11, 2017)

THe WWI British blockade was not generally considered legal by the international comunity

The Blockade and Attempted Starvation of Germany

This was what Lord Devlin frankly calls "the starvation policy" directed against the civilians of the Central Powers (particularly Germany),2 the plan that aimed, as Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty in 1914 and one of the framers of the scheme, admitted, to "starve the whole population — men, women, and children, old and young, wounded and sound — into submission."3

The British policy was in contravention of international law on two major points.4 First, in regard to the character of the blockade, it violated the Declaration of Paris of 1856, which Britain itself had signed, and which, among other things, permitted "close" but not "distant" blockades. A belligerent was allowed to station ships near the three-mile limit to stop traffic with an enemy's ports; it was not allowed simply to declare areas of the high seas comprising the approaches to the enemy's coast to be off-limits.

This is what Britain did on November 3,1914, when it announced, allegedly in response to the discovery of a German ship unloading mines off the English coast, that henceforth the whole of the North Sea was a military area, which would be mined and into which neutral ships proceeded "at their own peril." Similar measures in regard to the English Channel insured that neutral ships would be forced to put into British ports for sailing instructions or to take on British pilots. During this time they could easily be searched, obviating the requirement of searching them on the high seas.

This introduces the second and even more complex question: that of contraband. Briefly, following the lead of the Hague Conference of 1907, the Declaration of London of 1909 considered food to be "conditional contraband," that is, subject to interception and capture only when intended for the use of the enemy's military forces. This was part of the painstaking effort, extending over generations, to strip war of its most savage aspects by establishing a sharp distinction between combatants and noncombatants. Among the corollaries of this was that food not intended for military use could legitimately be transported to a neutral port, even if it ultimately found its way to the enemy's territory. The House of Lords had refused its consent to the Declaration of London, which did not, consequently, come into full force. Still, as the US government pointed out to the British at the start of the war, the declaration's provisions were in keeping "with the generally recognized principles of international law." As an indication of this, the British admiralty had incorporated the Declaration into its manuals.

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## tyrodtom (Dec 11, 2017)

The Swordfish used to attack the Bismarck had no radar. If you read the encounter reports it clearly states several had to return to the nearest British ship to get the bearing to the vicinity of the Bismarck.
The first experimental use of radar equipped Swordfish was months after the Bismarck was sunk.

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## Koopernic (Dec 11, 2017)

The starvation policy continued after the Armistice and continued until 1919. The Germans were on the ropes run out of steal and food. 

About 600,000 with estimates 1,000,000 million are said to have perished. Malnutrition kills through disease and infant mortality.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 11, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> The Bimarck’s FLAK not being able to track ‘biplanes’ is a provable myth. It does obliquely link into the proctalgia fugax in this thread over the Dornier Do 215B2 that the Reich supplied the USSR in return for its cooperation and most particularly its Wheat and Oil.


I don't know what the Russians were looking for in Do 215B2 but the basic Do17 airframe dates to the end of 1934 (first flight) and the Russians certainly had opportunity to examine wrecked/shot down examples in Spain as 3 different versions were used there. Perhaps they wanted the latest model DB601 engine to go with the other examples they had purchased powering a few other planes (like He 100s)? in any case two light bombers weren't going to purchase a lot of oil or wheat.
Russians had problems with Naval fire control and during the 30s had purchased Naval fire control systems or parts from Italy. The sale of the heavy cruiser Lutzow would provide much more in the way of tonnage of goods that a pair of light bombers.



> The FLAK systems for the Bismarck’s 10.5cm and 15cm duel purpose guns was designed and capable of attacking fast small boats such as patrol boats either with a burst above the target or via direct fire. Obviously they’d be able to track a biplane.


Calling the 15cm guns dual purpose is certainly gilding the lily. I will grant that a number of navies used large caliber guns to shoot in the general direction of aircraft, Shooting battleship and cruiser main batteries into the water in front of torpedo bombers to cause large water spouts seems to have been a common tactic but nobody is really calling such guns or mounts dual purpose. 
Having two different heavy AA guns with different ballistics on the same ship is only going to make the fire control problems harder. The Bismark already had a pretty good heavy AA set up, at least as far as guns went. The British had gone too far to the surface target side in the KG Vs with the 5.25in gun. 



> The 10.5cm ------------------was very good for the day.





> The 2.0cm and 3.7cm was week and this was what may have let the Swordfish through.
> 
> The 3.7 cm guns had excellent ballistics. Fired at 45 degrees they had a 9000 yard range. By comparison the 40 Pom Pom was 5000 yards, 20 mm Oerlikon and 2.0cm C38 5300 yards, German FLAK 3.7cm 7100 yards. They were almost as good as the Boffors 40mm and its 11000 yard range.



Quoting max range for most of these Light AA guns (if not all) is nonsense. The *effective range *was often 1/4 to 1/3 of the max range. This is due to the times of flight and often primitive sights used. 
Another factor is that most of them used tracer ammunition and used the tracer as part of a self destruct "mechanism". When the tracer was just about all burnt out it hit a delay pellet (slower burning composition) that lead to the HE cavity. When the flame reached the HE it detonated the shell well short of it's max range. 
The max range is interesting in comparing the power of the gun and the shape of the shells (British 2pdr was poor on both counts) but in no way reflects on their actual use. 




> Their main weakness was that they were manually loaded semi automatic weapons so rate of was 30-60 rounds per minute.
> 
> This is not totally silly since higher firing rates would have blinded the gunners with flash and smoke and lead to guns over heating.








Trying to get even 30rpm out of this set up per barrel is pushing things. As the gun recoiled the breech blocks opened up and ejected the empty casing using cams/springs. Loaders shoved the new rounds into the chamber and the rim tripped a catch which released the spring loaded breechblock to close. Loaders have how long to reach back, grab another round and assume the position shown in the photo? 

This 37mm gun was obsolete almost from the first day it was placed on deck. 

Italians had a much better set up in 1932/33.

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## Koopernic (Dec 11, 2017)

The Russians are pretty good with technology but Soviets were not so good because of their system just wanted latest advances in mass produced technology and stressed skin production to fill the gaps in.

Zeiss multicoated optics, gyroscope practice, ballistics data transmission, the supremely accurate mechanical ballistics computers, fuel injection.

FFS, the max range for AAA is a relative indicator. 50% for surface fire and 35% for AAA is a guideline.

The German Navy wanted to produce an auto loader for the SK3.7 but the effort went into the Geräte 58 5.5cm hit to kill weapon system instead.

The guns could reasonably fire 30 rpm each. No point going beyond that till a director was in place and advances in flashless smokeless powder.. I would have added dials so that the 3.7cm guns could accept data from the main directors.

Most of the defensive work had to be done by the quad 2.0cm systems but note the SK3.7 could reach out way beyond the Pom Pom even if it was a low rate of fire.

The 3.7cm weapon of choice on land and sea became the 3.7cm FLAK 43 which fired 250 rpm from 8 round disintegrating clips fed continuously to a range of 7100 yards at 45 degrees. This is about twice the rate of the boffors albeit at less range.

No one had proper directors for their 3.7cm and 40mm Systems quite late. Most were angular rate gyro sights.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 11, 2017)

Now when we will have the 'mis-informative' post rating?



Koopernic said:


> The FLAK systems for the Bismarck’s 10.5cm and *15cm duel purpose* guns was designed ...



Deserved once.




> Because of the Reichs agreements with the USSR the two tandem aft directors were removed from Bismarck (and another two from Prinz Eugen) and shipped to the USSR. *There was no question of the Reich not meeting its agreements on time. *Less capable biaxially units were installed and may have hurt Bismarck’s Defense.



Twice.



> The attack on the Bismarck was carried out in limited visibility and the Swordfish used clouds to hide from the Bismarck’s FLAK. *The Swordfish had radar.*



Thrice. 



> The 2.0cm and 3.7cm was week and this was what may have let the Swordfish through.
> 
> The 2.0cm C38 FLAK in a quad mount was a very effective weapon but there were only two of these. The rest were more basic single and twin gun mounts. The C38 2.0cm had 5300 yards range at 45 degree elevation, which was slightly more than the RN 40mm Pom Pom. When fired from a quad mount 2 guns could maintain continuous fire while the other two were reloaded and cooled. Dozens were fitted to Tirpitz but Bismarck had inadequate numbers.
> 
> The naval 3.7 cm guns had excellent ballistics. Fired at 45 degrees they had a 9000 yard range. By comparison the 40 Pom Pom was 5000 yards, 20 mm Oerlikon and 2.0cm C38 5300 yards, German Luftwaffe/Army FLAK 3.7cm 7100 yards. They were almost as good as the Boffors 40mm and its 11000 yard range.



Several times earned the 'mis-information' post rating just in these paragraphs. In one sentence we have 'week' (weak) 2 and 3.7cm AA guns on Bismarck, yet in other sentences they sing, dance and cook. Amazing. 



> Their main weakness was that they were manually loaded semi automatic weapons so rate of was 30-60 rounds per minute.
> 
> This is not totally silly since higher firing rates would have blinded the gunners with flash and smoke and lead to guns over heating.



Main weakness and not totally silly for the same weapon? Gold dust.
Seems like the introduction of 40mm Bofors was a major step back for the British and USA, since the gunners were apparently blinded by flash and smoke. Same when Kriegsmarine introduced the fast-firing 3.7cm Flak.

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## swampyankee (Dec 11, 2017)

Ship-based AAA was far less effective than the planners thought, in general.


ssnider said:


> THe WWI British blockade was not generally considered legal by the international comunity
> 
> The Blockade and Attempted Starvation of Germany
> 
> ...


Do also remember that once the Haber process was industrialized, production of food could have been increased, as nitrate-based fertilizers could have been produced. The German government gave little priority to agricultural production, so the nitrates weren’t used for fertilizer, farm laborers were taken out of fields, as were draft animals. It was a classic guns-vs-butter conflict, and guns won , so the German people starved. I’m sure, though, that Ludendorff never missed a meal. 

The UK was a net importer of food, and the entire u-boat campaign was intended to starve Britain.


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## Greyman (Dec 11, 2017)

I've read several times about Swordfish radar being used against the Bismarck - is this false for sure?


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## Shortround6 (Dec 11, 2017)

I don't know but I can offer a compromise. 
How many of the attacking Swordfish had _functioning _radar? 

The RAF had trouble keeping radar functioning in the Fuselage of a Blenheim. Flying around in rain squalls/clouds with an open cockpit plane with the radar of the time means what percentage of sets (even assuming that ALL aircraft had radar) are working at the time of the attack? And what was the range?

The fact that some aircraft of the attack group needed help with the direction to fly in doesn't actually prove that there was radar on planes or that there was no radar.


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## pbehn (Dec 11, 2017)

According to the Bismark site some but not all Swordfish on Victorious and Ark Royal had ASV RADAR.


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## tyrodtom (Dec 11, 2017)

I should have read the encounter reports closer. 
3 Swordfish from the HMS Victorious ,had Mk I ASV radar, and a unknown number of the Ark Royal's Swordfish was also equipped.

Apparently each flight of 3 had one radar equipped aircraft. 
Some, or all, flights lost contact with each other in the clouds and confusion.

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## parsifal (Dec 11, 2017)

ssnider said:


> THe WWI British blockade was not generally considered legal by the international comunity
> 
> The Blockade and Attempted Starvation of Germany
> 
> ...




As I said, the british were not saints. moreover the 1856 paris agreements were not dead in 1914, but had been superceded, primarily because in the intervening years new technologies, notably submarines and long range surface raiders made the accord obsolete. in any event , the 1856 agreement had been superceded by a series of conventions which we collectively call or refer to as the Geneva conventions, or the hague conventions. Those conventions have been periodically updated over the years, the last being in 1987 I think. In any event, by 1914 the 1856 agreements had been superceded, by the hague agreements, and this allowed both close and distant blockades, the right to board search and detain neutral ships, the right for a naval power to declare certain areas a "declared area" (a war zone), and to control and restrict the imports of any nation within that area.

The British were confronted with rather a nasty surprise when the Germans decided to conduct worldwide mercantile warfare and then unrestricted attacks on merchant shipping, dispensing entirely with the niceties of stop and search.

The nation most opposed to the imposition of the blockade was the US. It was not "generally regarded as illegal, except by them and the free trade propnents. That believe largely evaporated after the germans started sinking their ships indiscriminately.

In WWII the issue of unrestricted mercantile warfare did bed down pretty quickly, but we are not talking about unrestricted warfare on an opponent, or even a neutral not working for ones own side. We are talking about why the Germans had a hard time with their exports. That hard time in part stems from their treatment of their own friends and trading partners not in the way they conducted operations against the allies. The german behaviour againt the European shipping market was so bad that despite the obvious threats from German U-boats those shipping companies thought it a safer, better deal to work for the allies rather the Germans. the germans proceeded to lose most of their own shipping during Norway, and after that were forced to play nicer towards the remaining neutrals and their ships

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## Juha2 (Dec 11, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> Hi, most of the gains seem to come from the increase in FTH,
> 
> If the over Dornier Do 215 Managed 465km/h on the DB601Aa producing 1100hp at a FTH of 3700m/12200ft.
> 
> ...



Hello Koopernic
thanks for the answer and calculations.

Juha

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## Koopernic (Dec 11, 2017)

I don’t think I can even begin to comprehend what you are trying to say Tomo. Just say it directly rather than try satire.

The Bofors system worked because by the time it was introduced widely it was aimed by remote control and had good Ballistics. The Pompom had mediocre ballistics. As noted by reports of the Sinking of PoW and Repulse nearly a year latter they had a very limited effect compared to a pair of Boffors on the foredeck.

Firing away with multiple AAA with gunners located at 37mm/40mm caused problems with blast and smoke. That’s one reason no one had a 50mm anti aircraft gun.

Whatever the limitations of the German Naval 3.7 cm mount and ROF it had good ballistics and was stabalised. I imagine it eventually received a gyro sight. They also never replaced them in Tirpitz or Prinz Eugen despite having the excellent 3,7cm FLAK 43 and earlier FLAK 37 I would assume they preferred to have the extra range and ability to fire continuously.

In terms of fire power relative to deck space the quad FLAK worked because it was not so large and didn’t produce so much blast it needed to be aimed remotely.

Some of the better FLAK directors were removed from Bismarck and Prinz Eugen to complete Lützow which had been sold to the USSR.

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## tomo pauk (Dec 11, 2017)

My opinion is that you are trying too much in painting German hardware in best colours, stating the performance figures and abilities that are either calculated or plainly wrong.

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## pbehn (Dec 11, 2017)

From reading the accounts the Bismark had no difficulty at all in laying accurate AA fire against an individual plane it just couldn't track a dozen targets at once. It was surprised by some attacks while it drove others off.

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## pbehn (Dec 11, 2017)

Doing a bit of browsing on the net, the mission report/account just says ASV RADAR but the two sites below show the ASV mk XI fitted to a Swordfish, the radome is between the wheels where the torpedo would go so it was a choice of either or.

quote
*ASV Mk.XI*
The ASV Mk.XI was a centrimetric radar intended for the TBR (torpedo bomber and reconnaissance) aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm, the component of the Royal Navy that operated carrier aircraft. It was also known known as ASVX and therefore it sometimes has been called, erroneously, ASV Mk.X.

ASV Mk.XI could be fitted between the main wheel legs of a Fairey Swordfish. In addition to the bulky radome, a Leigh light could be fitted. The radome made the the carrying of torpedoes or large depth charges impossible, so when the target was a ship the Swordfish was accompanied by other aircraft without radar. Against submarines, the radar-equipped Swordfish Mk.III was armed with eight rockets on underwing launches, and also carried flares to illuminate any U-boat it found. Fired at 600 yards, the rockets easily penetrated a submarine's hull.
This radar was also carried by the Fairey Barracuda Mk.III.

ASV Mk.XI had a maximum range of about 60km against ships, and in good conditions and at low altitude (2000 feet) it could detect a surfaced submarine at about 20km. But it could detect a schnorkel only in very calm seas and at distances below 8km. It gave bearings with an accuracy of about 2 degrees.
unquote.
Fairey Swordfish - Aircraft - Fighting the U-boats - uboat.net
British ASV Radars - Technical pages - Fighting the U-boats - uboat.net

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## Koopernic (Dec 11, 2017)

pbehn said:


> Doing a bit of browsing on the net, the mission report/account just says ASV RADAR but the two sites below show the ASV mk XI fitted to a Swordfish, the radome is between the wheels where the torpedo would go so it was a choice of either or.
> 
> quote
> *ASV Mk.XI*
> ...




The radar used by the Swordfish was the ASV Mk IIN operating at 1.5m. No microwaves in service yet. The RAF version was simply the ASV Mk II.

There would have been no radar dish, just dipole arrays.

Good luck with finding a photo of one on a Swordfish though plenty on Wellingtons etc. Usually one array scanned out along the wings to look sideways and another directly forward.

Probably helped aim the torpedoes as well.


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## parsifal (Dec 11, 2017)

ASV radar had begun to be fitted to Swordfish in early 1941, and some of 825 squadron (of HMS Victorious were embarked onto the new carrier during her shakedown preprations, arriving on the 15 May, fitted with ASV radar. In the first attack on the DKM Bismarck, the attack formation of 9 a/c was split into three groups of three aircraft, for some of these subflights, all three a/c delivered, or attempted to deliver a torpedo onto the target.

The early versions of ASV used did not allow a torpedo to be carried by those aircraft fitted with ASV radar, yet most accounts suggest all aircraft were carrying a torpedo in this first attack.


Some elements of the account therefore seem to be at odds with known facts, yet just as forcefully, most observers are of the opinion that without the assistance of ASV radar, this attack would never have developed. 

The following account is from the following site:

http://www.kbismarck.com/article2.html


“Realistically, the prospects for the attack were not good. The squadron was ill-prepared for its assignment, several of the pilots having only made their first carrier landing on the 19th, and they had not made even a single squadron attack in training. Under the prevailing weather conditions, eight-tenths cloud cover at 1,500 feet with intermittent rain squalls, a visual search was like looking for the proverbial ‘needle in a haystack’, but the squadron’s new ASV radar was expected to make the difference. At 2327 ASV contact was established on a contact some 16 miles ahead of the formation and Bismarck was sighted briefly through a gap in the clouds only to be lost again seconds later. Descending below the clouds with his squadron, Esmonde located the cruisers still shadowing, and HMS Norfolk directed the aircraft towards their target some fourteen miles ahead on the starboard bow.

At 2350 hours a further ASV contact was made and Esmonde again led his squadron below the cloud cover to begin his attack. Unexpectedly, the contact proved to be the United States Coast Guard cutter Modoc, peacefully pitching and rolling in the heavy Atlantic swell. Unfortunately Bismarck, then only six miles to the south, spotted the aircraft and the vital element of surprise was lost. When the Swordfish finally closed to deliver their torpedo attack, they were met by a ‘very vigorous and accurate’ barrage of heavy and light AA, which tagged Esmonde’s Swordfish (5A) at a range of four miles. Though Swordfish 5M lost contact in the dense cloud covering the area, the remaining eight aircraft pressed home their attack with _elan_.

At exactly midnight Esmonde led the first sub-flight into a simultaneous attack. His starboard lower aileron was hit almost immediately, and he abandoned his original intention to attack from starboard, deciding to drop there and then, whilst he was still in a good position on the target’s port beam and Bismarck was nicely silhouetted against the glow of the setting sun. Both he, and Sub-Lieutenant(A) Thompson, in 5C, released on Bismarck’s port bow from an altitude of 100’. The third member of the flight, Lieutenant MacLean, in 5B, got separated in the descent through the clouds and attacked separately, but also on the port side. Proving that his ship handling skills were superb, Captain Lindemann artfully dodged all three “fish”.

The three Swordfish of the second sub-flight were led in by Lieutenant Gick. Approaching from starboard, he was not satisfied with the approach angle, and elected to pull back into the clouds and work his way round to a better position. The remainder of his flight continued on however, Lieutenant (A) Garthwaite in 5G dropping on Bismarck’s starboard bow and Sub-Lieutenant(A) Jackson, in 5H/V4337 from her starboard quarter, but again Lindemann avoided the deadly missiles.

Moments later, the two Swordfish remaining in the third sub-flight appeared on the Bismarck’s port quarter, and amid a hail of AA fire, Lieutenant(A) Pollard, in 5K, and Sub-Lieutenant(A) Lawson, in 5L released from a good angle but, again, to no avail. Meanwhile, Percy Gick, in 5F, now appeared low down on the water on the enemy’s port bow. His sudden appearance caught the Germans by surprise, and there was no avoiding his torpedo, which plowed into Bismarck amidships, exploding on her armour belt”.

CV Ark Royal received a number of ASV equipped swordfish 18 and 19th May, with the arrival of aircraft transport HMS Furious with a load of hurricane, Fulmar IIs and Swordfish fresh from England. The hurricanes were destined for Malta but the carrier aircraft were for the Ark Royal.

Again it should not be in dispute that the Ark Royal was carrying ASV equipped Swordfish. From the same site…..

“Meanwhile, Ark Royal fitted two ASV-equipped Swordfish with long-range tanks and sent them off at 1200 to maintain contact until relieved. At 1154 Bismarck broke her long silence, reporting that she was being shadowed by an enemy 'Land plane'. Thereafter, and until 2320 that night, Ark Royal’s Swordfish, working in pairs, maintained a vigil over Bismarck, keeping her under continuous observation”. 

“Coode found he was four miles ahead and to leeward of the target. Realizing that a slow approach against the wind would be suicidal, he re-entered the cloud to close in and try another angle. This left the second sub-flight, to ‘open the ball’. Lieutenant D. F. Godfrey-Faussett (2B) having lost Coode in the clouds, led the second sub-flight up to 9,000 feet where they ran into some icing problems before descending on the ASV’s attack bearing. He and Sub-Lieutenant(A) K. S. Pattisson (2A) were both caught in an intense AA barrage that hit both aircraft as they made their run in from the Bismarck’s starboard beam, but both survived the storm of ‘shot and shell’. Meanwhile, Sub-Lieutenant(A) A. W. D. Beale (2P) having lost touch with the other two, returned to Sheffield to get a new range and bearing to the enemy. ”

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## pbehn (Dec 11, 2017)

I have no idea really about the various marques of the RADAR but I suspect the early marques while not having a radome did have a huge heavy set and power needs that meant carrying a ASV and a torpedo would be a bit of a problem.


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## Koopernic (Dec 11, 2017)

pbehn said:


> I have no idea really about the various marques of the RADAR but I suspect the early marques while not having a radome did have a huge heavy set and power needs that meant carrying a ASV and a torpedo would be a bit of a problem.




The builder of this Tamiya model says the ASV is on the interplane struts:










Both these Baracuda also appear to have an ASV Mk.IIN on the upper wing surfaces and a microwave pod on the rear aircraft only. I note how the Royal Navy didn’t seem to think it was worthwhile to arm the observer.





To me it looks like the two yagi arrays sent pulses alternately 45 degrees to each side. By comparing pulse return strengths a rough idea of direction could be formed.

The Admiralty probably lightened it’s version. This 1.5m RAF Radar did the yeomans work with versions used on sloops and corvets to warn of aircraft and provide radar ranging.

The Swordfish were able to use clouds to minimise the Bismarck’s ability to use its heavy FLAK and maybe used the radar to track Bismarck from within the clouds.

Bismarck’s light FLAK was weak, more in the sense of location, sweep angles that were noted already but had not been put into effect.

This thread has the core insights. It’s worth reading the AKVDS report. Bismarck hadn’t been worked up properly.
No Swordfish shot down by Bismarck - Naval History Forums

The capacity to deal with this kind of attack probably required full blind fire capability. Such a radar was the Euklid FuMO 231, some 6 delivered and possibly installed on destroyers in construction in 1945 or late 1944. A lot of great RN radars to do this job as well but only in 1944 as far as i can see.

This is a shore based multipurpose Seetakt called flakleit-g. Note the height finding aerial and also optical range finder.



0

Something like this was installed on Prinz Eugen in 1943 but then removed.




This is her 1944 setup. The height finding owls ears have disappeared. The FuMO 81 Berlin-S is a microwave set with 4 PPI scopes. Mostly issued to mine sweepers and torpedo boats. Note how small the microwave units are. The FuMO 26 is the standard blindfire capable Radar for ranging and engaging surface targets. The question is how did the Kriegsmarine restore its height finding ability. At least one expert says they used the phase shifting technology from Wassermann radars to find height. I’m not so sure.


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## pbehn (Dec 11, 2017)

Koopernic, it is all a mystery to me. The rocket firing Swordfish required metal underwings and came in in 1943. The centimetric RADAR radomed Swordfish also came in in 1943. I cant see any really conclusive proof that a Swordfish could carry both a torpedo and ASV

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## Greyman (Dec 11, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> I note how the Royal Navy didn’t seem to think it was worthwhile to arm the observer.



The Barracuda had a twin Vickers K mounted in the rear cockpit with 5 magazines per gun. The hoods are just closed in that photograph so they might be carried and not visible.

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## buffnut453 (Dec 11, 2017)

pbehn said:


> I cant see any really conclusive proof that a Swordfish could carry both a torpedo and ASV



From "Radar Days" by Taffy Bowen, inventor of air intercept and ASV radar (page 101):

_"A single Swordfish could not carry both a radar and a torpedo, so the tactic was for the search aircraft to be accompanied by one or more attack aircraft carrying torpedoes." _

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## parsifal (Dec 11, 2017)

The navalised version of ASV radar suitable for installation on carrier based aircraft was ASV MkIII. Earlier versions were only fitted to CC a/c but the Mk III version was miniaturised enough to allow being fitted to the swordfish. It entered service on the FAA a/c from the end of 1940, with crews taking abouyt 3 months to become proficient in its use. It was fairly decent as a radar, able to track a surfaced uboat at ranges for up to 7 miles and a periscope out to about 3miles.

The original fit was quite bulky. The photo shown by kooperic shows a swordfish of a later mark, sometime in 1944, by which time the equipment was completely miniaturised and did not interfere with payload.

in 1941 the ASV MkIII looked as follows:

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## Koopernic (Dec 12, 2017)

ASV Mk.III did not allow a torpedo to be carried. The much earlier metric ASV Mk.IIN was mounted on the inter wing struts so the torpedo could be carried. As ASV Mk.III was a magnetron based microwave unit it didn't enter service until after H2S long after the Battle of Denmark straights. March 1943, for the swordfish latter.


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## parsifal (Dec 12, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> ASV Mk.III did not allow a torpedo to be carried. The much earlier metric ASV Mk.IIN was mounted on the inter wing struts so the torpedo could be carried. As ASV Mk.III was a magnetron based microwave unit it didn't enter service until after H2S long after the Battle of Denmark straights. March 1943, for the swordfish latter.



I think you are right now that ive cross checked my information. I was relying on U-Boat Net which has the following: 

"The history of ASV Mk.III is rather complicated. Because of personal conflicts, the original group that had developed airborne radar was dispersed. A new team was formed, tasked with the development of centimetric AI radar for nightfighters. The big advantage of a centimetric radar is that the beam can be directed accurately by a relatively small paraboloid reflector. This offered better range and resolution and eliminated the strong ground returns, which were unavoidable with the broad beams of the 1.5 meter radar sets. Centimetric radar was made possible by the development, by J.T. Randall and H.A.H. Boot, of the cavity magnetron. The first was tested on 21 February 1940. By June 1940, GEC had produced the first sealed magnetrons, suitable for use in aircraft.

Development concentrated on AI for nightfighthers, but in the autumn of 1940 the 10cm radar attracted naval interest, represented by Captain B.R. Willett and C.E. Horton. It was demonstrated to them that the ground-based, experimental radar equipment could track ships. On 11 November tests were conducted with the submarine HMS Usk, which was tracked at 7 miles. Some time was spent refining the equipment and defining the antennas, until a cylindrical paroboloid section was chosen for shipboard installations. By March 1941, a fully engineered 10cm radar was on board of the corvette HMS Orchis, and on 16 November 1941 the sinking of U-433 near Gibraltar was attributed to the "Type 271" 10cm radar. By May 1942, 236 ships carried centimetric radar".

However I did recheck my facts, and admit that it was the mk II that equipped the Swordfish in May 1941, used against the Bismarck. you live and learn I guess


ASV MKII was developed at the Royal Aircraft Establishment, Farnborough in early 1940.It differed from the Mk I mainly in that it was properly engineered and much more reliable. ASV Mk II was generally called a 1.5 metre radar, but its actual frequency was 1.7 metres. It had a range of up to 36 miles, and the minimum range was about a mile. Several thousand sets were manufactured and equipped a variety of RAF Coastal Command aircraft such as Hudsons, Whitleys, Sunderlands: Fleet Air Arm aircraft such as Swordfish; and American Navy patrol aircraft such as the Catalina. The first success was recorded on 30 November, 1940, when a Whitley Mk VI equipped with ASV Mk II damaged U-71 in the Bay of Biscay ASV Mk II rendered sterling service in the War at Sea in both the Atlantic, Mediterranean and the Pacific. A Catalina equipped with this ASV detected the German battleship Bismarck after her destruction of the Hood. Swordfish strikes from Victorious and Ark Royal, which ultimately crippled the Bismarck ,detected the battleship using ASV Mk II radar. Swordfish and Wellington bombers, some fitted with ASV Mk II, operated from Malta and inflicted heavy damage in night attacks on Axis convoys supplying Rommel's forces. Long-range Catalinas, equipped with ASV Mk II, ranged the Pacific searching for Japanese warships. 'Black Cat' squadrons specialised in night attacks on Japanese shipping. By late 1942 German U-boats were carrying Metox receivers, which enabled them to detect ASV Mk II emissions. This set was increasingly replaced with ASV Mk III.


ASV mkIII was in production from March 1942, but its service delivery was somewhat delayed.

Thanks to kooperic for the correction


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## buffnut453 (Dec 12, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> ASV Mk.III did not allow a torpedo to be carried. The much earlier metric ASV Mk.IIN was mounted on the inter wing struts so the torpedo could be carried. As ASV Mk.III was a magnetron based microwave unit it didn't enter service until after H2S long after the Battle of Denmark straights. March 1943, for the swordfish latter.



It's mot just a question of where the antennas were carried. We must also consider the weight of the radar transmitter and receiver. Unless you have solid evidence of Swordfish carrying both the ASV MkII and a torpedo, I'd be inclined to put my money on Taffy Bowen's comments, given that he actually designed the thing and participated in the trials to determine its performance.

Now I will accept that Bowen's memory could be faulty and he could be transposing the 2 radars....but I'd still like to see photographic evidence of an ASV MkII-equipped Swordfish airborne while carrying a torpedo.


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## Koopernic (Dec 12, 2017)

buffnut453 said:


> It's mot just a question of where the antennas were carried. We must also consider the weight of the radar transmitter and receiver. Unless you have solid evidence of Swordfish carrying both the ASV MkII and a torpedo, I'd be inclined to put my money on Taffy Bowen's comments, given that he actually designed the thing and participated in the trials to determine its performance.
> 
> Now I will accept that Bowen's memory could be faulty and he could be transposing the 2 radars....but I'd still like to see photographic evidence of an ASV MkII-equipped Swordfish airborne while carrying a torpedo.



Bowen is ONLY talking about ASV Mk.III. This 9cm microwave set entered service in late 1943 on the Swordfish. It’s big and bulky and is carried where the torpedo was carried.

ASV MK Mk II is a completely different much lighter set of in service since 1940. The Swordfish version is the ASV IIN.

It doubt it weighed more than a hundred pounds. AI Mk IV weighed 300lb.
See my post 858 in this thread. It has pictures that enlarge.





You can see the radar yagi antenna array on the strut. No torpedo though.
This was secret.


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## buffnut453 (Dec 12, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> Bowen is ONLY talking about ASV Mk.III. This 9cm microwave set entered service in late 1943 on the Swordfish. It’s big and bulky and is carried where the torpedo was carried.
> 
> ASV MK Mk II is a completely different much lighter set of in service since 1940. The Swordfish version is the ASV IIN.
> 
> ...



Bowen was NOT talking about ASV MkIII. The page reference quoted in my previous post specifically relates to his descriptions of radar's role in the sinking of Bismarck, so please explain to me how he can possibly be referring to ASV MkIII?

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## parsifal (Dec 12, 2017)

I also don't know about the 9cm wavelength version of the Mk III (and have my doubts that it was referred to as the mk III by that time. the 10cm version of the airborne version was inproduction by March 1942 and was entering service a little later after that. Certainly not 1944.

I suspect the references to the 9cm wavelength sets are in reality either references to either the MkVII or the mkXI version.


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## fastmongrel (Dec 12, 2017)

The Swordfish could fly with a crew of 3 Pilot, Observer (navigator) and a *T*elegraphist *A*ir *G*unner. A Swordfish carrying ASVIIN only carried 2 men Pilot and Observer. Dont know what ASV IIN weighed but it wasnt a particulary large unit it didnt have a rotating PPI screen like more modern centimetric radars and the one I have seen was about the size of a old fashioned Cathose Ray Tube 20 inch TV.

I am going to guess ASVIIN weighed roughly the same as a TAG wearing all his kit plus Lewis Gun and seat

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## Koopernic (Dec 13, 2017)

The Story of the Torpedoing of the Bismarck
None of the crews listed in the Flighs that attacked Bismarck is listed as having less than 3 men, except one on the final mission.

The only way this could happen is if the ASV IIN was easily removed from the aircraft or if Radar equipped Swordfish crews did not receive credit for their participation or if ASV IIN Swordfish could carry a torpedo and full crew or if the TAG crew member is listed as present erroneously.

ASV IIN looks like a miniaturised version of the RAFs ASV II. The IIN has a combined transmit and receive antenna as well to reduce antenna size instead of separate systems. 

Radars like AI MK I through to IV and ASV I,II,IIN as well as Type 286,290,291 were all related developments.


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## stona (Mar 14, 2018)

RE: Enigma

I was asked by someone how long it would take to decrypt an Enigma message on their phone. This assumes a brute force attack, trying every possible key until you get the correct one.

I know the key space for a standard three rotor Enigma, it's a 76 bit key (rather better than the 56 bit Data Encryption Standard (DES) used on computers until 2002).

I don't know the computing power of his mobile phone, but I assumed that he could test 100,000 keys per second twenty four hours a day.

According to my back of a napkin calculation, if he set his phone to the task today he would have to wait not for hours, days or months to complete the task. He would have to wait for about twice the current age of the universe! 

That's why the Germans were so confident of their system, and also why it was never broken by a brute force attack.

Cheers

Steve

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## pbehn (Mar 14, 2018)

stona said:


> RE: Enigma
> 
> I was asked by someone how long it would take to decrypt an Enigma message on their phone. This assumes a brute force attack, trying every possible key until you get the correct one.
> 
> ...


From what I read about post war interviews of people working in Germany on Enigma they were not surprised that it was broken, they were very surprised that is was decoded "en mass" almost in real time.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Mar 14, 2018)

stona said:


> RE: Enigma
> 
> I was asked by someone how long it would take to decrypt an Enigma message on their phone. This assumes a brute force attack, trying every possible key until you get the correct one.
> 
> ...



You should have replied with something about Bon Jovi bringing the Enigma home.


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## stona (Mar 14, 2018)

pbehn said:


> From what I read about post war interviews of people working in Germany on Enigma they were not surprised that it was broken, they were very surprised that is was decoded "en mass" almost in real time.



When the full scope of the Allied code breaking effort against Enigma was disclosed in 1974 Doenitz was interviewed and was shocked that it had been broken at all. 

Edit: In a letter he wrote shortly after the 1974 revelations he also claimed that he'd been suspicious, but had no evidence to argue with the cryptographic experts who claimed a break was impossible.

What the Germans underestimated was not the strength of the encryption which was strong enough to render the encryption secure for any meaningful time span; it still is secure from a brute force attack, even using modern computers. What they underestimated was the ability of the code breakers to exploit certain weaknesses in the system and their use of what we would now call signals intelligence (and the resulting use of cribs, guessed plaintext).

Cheers

Steve

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## pbehn (Mar 14, 2018)

stona said:


> When the full scope of the Allied code breaking effort against Enigma was disclosed in 1974 Doenitz was interviewed and was shocked that it had been broken at all.
> 
> Edit: In a letter he wrote shortly after the 1974 revelations he also claimed that he'd been suspicious, but had no evidence to argue with the cryptographic experts who claimed a break was impossible.
> 
> ...


Basically what I meant Steve. I meant the people who devised and operated the system. They knew all codes could be broken and that Enigma had certain weaknesses. I doubt they were aware of how much their own procedures were broken or not followed properly allowing a "way in" to breaking the codes.


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## stona (Mar 14, 2018)

pbehn said:


> Basically what I meant Steve. I meant the people who devised and operated the system. They knew all codes could be broken and that Enigma had certain weaknesses. I doubt they were aware of how much their own procedures were broken or not followed properly allowing a "way in" to breaking the codes.



You are quite right. The problem was that they concentrated on the level of encryption, which would certainly resist any kind of brute force attack in their assessments.
They knew there were weaknesses. For example, throughout the 1930s the Germans continually made what we would now call hardware upgrades as well as changes in procedure which successively defeated the Polish methods of breaking Enigma.
On 15th September 1938, the Germans entirely changed the procedure for enciphering the message keys, and the catalogue method devised from 1936, became completely useless. It was this change that led to the development of the Zygalski Sheets and, most famously, the Polish 'Bomba'.
The Polish Bomba was based on the principle that the random 3-letter message key was sent twice at the beginning of each message and that every now and then, a particular plaintext letter, yields the same ciphertext letter three positions further on.
As an example, assume the indicator is AWB TWY. We see that the letter *W* occurs twice in the second position. The codebreakers at Bletchley Park would later call such occurences _females_. As both letter groups (AWB and TWY) originate from the same plaintext (e.g. ZXS), we know that the letter *X* is encrypted into *W* twice with an interval of 3 steps. This is a unique property that can only occur with a limited number of settings.
If enough _females_ were found, the Bomba could be used to recover the current Enigma settings in less than two hours. This is simply because not all possible settings have to be tested (which might take a very, very long time).

The Germans dropped this double encryption of the message key at the beginning of each message in May 1940 and rendered the Polish method useless once again.
The British 'Bombe' though based on the Polish system, used a completely different approach. It was based on the assumption that a known (or guessed) plaintext, a so-called _crib_, was present at a certain position in the message. This is where signals intelligence was involved.

Though the Germans did upgrade their machines throughout the war, the KM added a fourth rotor for example, there were always problems introducing a new piece of hardware across the entire network. The four rotor M4 machines had to be backwards compatible with earlier three rotor machines. The rewireable reflector ( UKW-D) could have posed a fatal threat to Bletchley Park, had it been more widely introduced, as could the programmable cipher wheel (Luckenfullerwalze) which featured 26 user configurable notches and allowed the number and position of the notches of each wheel to be changed frequently. It was planned to use this in conjunction with the UKW-D. the Enigma-Uhr was introduced by the Luftwaffe in 1944 and should have caused some serious problems for Allied code breakers. I can't explain how it works in a reasonably short post, but it was initially compromised by poor operational procedure on the part of operators who didn't understand how the system was supposed to be used.

The Germans were not overconfident about the encryption of Enigma, they were overconfident in the ability of the hundreds or thousands of operators to use it properly and securely.

I hope I've attached an interesting Bletchley Park file about the Enigma-uhr, which will save a lot of typing 

Cheers

Steve

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## Freebird (Nov 12, 2018)

parsifal said:


> received a dislike from someone called "PSL" no explanation yet as to why.



So did I. 
No explanation, no attempt to refute the points I made. 



freebird said:


> Hint - how successful was the LW at sinking British battleships, in the numerous instances where they were attacked?
> 
> The ships needed to defeat the U-Boats were corvettes, sloops and frigates, which wouldn't be used in the channel
> 
> The ships mentioned as sunk in these operations were freighters, not warships


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 12, 2018)

freebird said:


> So did I.
> No explanation, no attempt to refute the points I made.



It might have been a mistake. Back then the “like” and “dislikes” were right next to each other. There were lots of false dislikes given when people were fat fingering on their phones. They were attempting to hit the like button, but accidentally hit the dislike.

We have since moved them apart to prevent that...


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## RCAFson (Nov 12, 2018)

fastmongrel said:


> The Swordfish could fly with a crew of 3 Pilot, Observer (navigator) and a *T*elegraphist *A*ir *G*unner. A Swordfish carrying ASVIIN only carried 2 men Pilot and Observer. Dont know what ASV IIN weighed but it wasnt a particulary large unit it didnt have a rotating PPI screen like more modern centimetric radars and the one I have seen was about the size of a old fashioned Cathose Ray Tube 20 inch TV.
> 
> I am going to guess ASVIIN weighed roughly the same as a TAG wearing all his kit plus Lewis Gun and seat



*This is incorrect. A Swordfish could and did carry a crew of three and a torpedo when equipped with ASV II*:

The Story of the Torpedoing of the Bismarck

You'll note that three of the 9 Swordfish in the first strike against Bismarck had ASV II radar and all aircraft carried their full crew. The only time a Swordfish carried a crew of two was when the Observer was replaced by an internal 69IG fuel tank and this was the case for the Taranto strikes, IIRC.


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## RCAFson (Nov 12, 2018)

Koopernic said:


> I don’t think I can even begin to comprehend what you are trying to say Tomo. Just say it directly rather than try satire.
> 
> The Bofors system worked because by the time it was introduced widely it was aimed by remote control and had good Ballistics. The Pompom had mediocre ballistics. As noted by reports of the Sinking of PoW and Repulse nearly a year latter they had a very limited effect compared to a pair of Boffors on the foredeck.
> 
> ...



At least two and probably all 4 of the IJN torpedo bombers shot down by Force Z were downed by pom-pom fire. There is no record of the single Bofors on PoW scoring any hits, but it's fire was considered effective because it was equipped with tracer which appeared to disturb the aim of the incoming torpedo bombers.

Quad and Octuple pom-poms fitted on cruisers and larger ships were all fitted with an external gun director.


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## Freebird (Nov 12, 2018)

Koopernic said:


> ASV Mk.III did not allow a torpedo to be carried. The much earlier metric ASV Mk.IIN was mounted on the inter wing struts so the torpedo could be carried. As ASV Mk.III was a magnetron based microwave unit it didn't enter service until after H2S long after the Battle of Denmark straights. March 1943, for the swordfish latter.



Were the Swordfish equipped ASV MkIII still able to carry depth charges?


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## RCAFson (Nov 12, 2018)

freebird said:


> Were the Swordfish equipped ASV MkIII still able to carry depth charges?


Weapon load varied depending on the mission, launch platform and the target. Maximum underwing load was ~1500lb while typical load from an escort carrier in light wind might be 3 x 250lb DCs, or 2 x 500lb bombs or 8 x rockets.


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## Freebird (Nov 12, 2018)

RCAFson said:


> Weapon load varied depending on the mission, launch platform and the target. Maximum underwing load was ~1500lb while typical load from an escort carrier in light wind might be 3 x 250lb DCs, or 2 x 500lb bombs or 8 x rockets.



After the mk. III was introduced, I don't imagine there was much of a requirement to carry torpedoes by that point of the war, (Mid-late '42), both the German and Italian surface fleets have ceased to be much of a threat, and U-boats become the primary danger


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## RCAFson (Nov 12, 2018)

freebird said:


> After the mk. III was introduced, I don't imagine there was much of a requirement to carry torpedoes by that point of the war, (Mid-late '42), both the German and Italian surface fleets have ceased to be much of a threat, and U-boats become the primary danger


Partially true. The Swordfish III couldn't carry the Mk24 ASW homing torpedo although this was no problem for the Mk I, or II fitted with ASV II.


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## Kevin J (Jan 16, 2019)

Shortround6 said:


> Here is one map, there are others of greater detail;
> 
> View attachment 239955
> 
> ...



Looks like a suicide mission to me. There is insufficient air cover by Bf 109E's as only the E-7/N has drop tanks. Also there is only 1 paratroop division to seize critical junctions and bridges on the English side. My guess is that you need 6. Looks like a disaster in the making, Dieppe times six. Just think, each beachhead is supported by an average of 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers, 1 old MTB, 1 new MTB, etc. At Normandy there were 3 paratroop divisions supporting 5 landing beaches which were close to each other. All these landing beaches are widely spread. Finally transit times for the invasion fleets is anything from 10 to 40 hours depending on distance covered and the RAF has Mohawks, Battles, Lysanders and a few Whirlwinds available for ground attack duties against troops with little or no air cover. It would have been a massacre.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 16, 2019)

At Normandy there was never any real plan to resupply the Paratroops by air. The Plan was to link up with the forces coming in by sea and the vast majority (all?) of the supplies for the airborne troops would be brought over the beaches. 

as far a naval support goes;



Kevin J said:


> each beachhead is supported by an average of 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers, 1 old MTB, 1 new MTB


 the MTBs of which you speak may be a confusion. Actual MTBs are somewhat more numerous but are so lightly armed as to be worthless for shore fire.

The Germans (and other continental navies) had steam torpedo boats which were like junior destroyers. 





But three 10.5cm guns doesn't bring much to the party either. 

The next problem for the Germans is that none of the cruisers or destroyers or the majority of the steam torpedo boats are in the channel ports. They are all in Germany and it is over 300 miles from Emden (closest german port) to Dover giving the British opportunity to prevent them from showing up.

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## stona (Jan 16, 2019)

There were no cruisers intended for use in support of the Sealion landings. The 'Autumn Journey' diversion in the North Sea would use all the cruisers and light cruisers available (_Admiral Hipper, Emden, Nurnberg and Koln_). Even the gunnery training vessel _Bremse_, originally intended for Sealion was reallocated to the diversion.

Transport Fleet B would be protected by 9 light auxiliary gun boats and the 3rd Minesweeper Flotilla, the 2nd and 3rd Patrol Flotillas and the 11th R-Boat Flotilla. The 4th and 16th Minesweeper Flotillas would clear the way.

Transport Fleet C would be protected by the 4th R-Boat Flotilla, 1st, 15th and 32th Minesweeper Flotilla and 7th Patrol Flotilla.

Transport Fleet D would be protected by the 2nd and 18th Minesweeper Flotillas, 2nd R-Boat Flotilla and 15th, 16th and 18th Patrol Flotillas.

Transport Fleet E would be protected by 5 heavy auxiliary gunboats (the only accompanying naval vessels whose medium calibre guns were considered capable of a coastal bombardment) and 3 Patrol Flotillas.

These units were much less impressive than their names suggest. Most were very lightly armed and many 'minesweepers' were in fact motor boats, not what the RN would call a minesweeper or armed trawler. Armament consisted of machine guns and 2.0 and 3.7 cm cannon.

The Germans may have had a maximum of 7 destroyers available at the beginning of September, if they could get them all serviceable at the same time (_Hans Lody, Karl Glaster, Paul_ _Jacobi, Theodor Riedel, Erich Steinbrinck, Friederich Ihn_ and_ Friederich Eckholdt_). 1 more was due to re-enter service on 21st September ( _Richard Beitzen_) and another 2 in mid-October (_Bruno Heinemann and Hermann Schoemann_, too late).

They had 7 of the old Mowe class torpedo boats available, each with three 10.5 cm guns. They also had 10 Type 35 torpedo boats available, but with just one 10.5 cm gun and limited range they were not much use against the dozens of RN destroyers which were likely to appear among the transport fleets.

Three motor torpedo boat flotillas, about 30 boats, were to be deployed at the eastern end of the Channel. These flotillas were made up of the famous S-Boot (E-Boats to the British). As well as their four torpedoes they were armed with 2.0 and 3.7 cm cannon.

It was not just the destroyers of the RN that the fleets would have to contend. The British had literally hundreds of their own patrol boats, harbour protection vessels, armed trawlers etc. German naval forces in the Channel were outnumbered, out gunned and would have been outfought, all without any major units of the Home Fleet sailing south of the Wash. Unfortunately for the four convoys of the Autumn Journey diversion, some might have suffered an unfortunate fate at the hands of units of that fleet, out in the North Sea.

Cheers

Steve

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## Glider (Jan 16, 2019)

It's worth noting that the RN moved the Hood, Nelson, Rodney, two cruisers and eight destroyers to Rosyth, specifically to intercept any invasion forces.
You can imagine what they would do to any attempt to invade.

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## Shortround6 (Jan 16, 2019)

This a picture of an "R" boat.




Armament got heavier as the war went on but in 1940 they would have been lucky to have two 20mm automatic guns and one 37mm semi-automatic. 
That means the gun ejects the fired cartridge case and waits with open breech until a crewman shoves a new round into the chamber at which point the rim trips a catch and the spring loaded breech block slams shut. 
In any case, hardly what one would consider as decent fire support for an amphibious landing  
picture of a model


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## Kevin J (Jan 16, 2019)

wiking85 said:


> Totally an unfair comparison. First of all the Germans were operating from bases quite a bit further away from Dunkirk than they would have been operating against Southern England during Sealion. Not only that, but this was after a huge expenditure of effort against the French and British ground forces at an extreme tempo of operations for over 2 weeks previous, meaning that operational rates had dropped tremendously, not to mention the losses incurred in defeating the Allied air forces on the continent. Also the LW was busy at the same time operating against the French and other allied ground forces in the pocket and outside of it too. The weather was pretty bad during the evacuation, meaning the LW could only operate 2 of the days of the evacuation, both of which were not at the peak of the 'packed' ship period.
> 
> This is not comparable to the situation during Sealion, as the LW would have had time to rest, would have good weather (as they would be launching it during a period where shipping could operate), have much, much closer bases to the Channel, so would have a much higher turn around time between sortees and less fatigue traveling to the fighting area, and they would have air superiority over the Channel (as the prerequisite for Sea Lion is defeating the RAF in Southern England), which they did not have over Dunkirk, as the RAF was sending over fighters from England to cover the evacuation that was closer to Dunkirk than LW bases. Plus here the entirety of the LW would be available, rather than a fraction at Dunkirk.
> 
> The situation would be very different, meaning the Dunkirk experience is not useful for comparison at all. Even the fighting around Malta isn't instructive, as Malta was much further from Axis airbases than the English Channel was from German bases in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The LW is going to have much, much more in terms of aircraft to throw at the British as they advanced into the constricted area of the Channel mere tens of miles from LW bases in the Low Countries. As the Kanalkampf demonstrated the Ju87s were more than capable of shutting down British shipping during daylight hours even when covered by the RAF, which the British fleet would not be here, as again the premise is that the RAF has been defeated in Southern England as a prerequisite for the invasion to even be happening in the first place.



Okay, lets look at availability of paratroop divisions. In 1940, there is only one, so which of the landing zones are you going to send in the one and only paratroop division too. Only one third of the Bf 109E's are the E-7/N, so these will be needed to support the Lyme Bay and Isle of Wight invasions. The Lyme Bay invasion will be contested by the RN submarines based at Portland and the Isle of Wight invasion will be contested by whatever guns are available either on shore or on ships at Portsmouth. In the case of the former, its going to be a 30 hour run contested by at least MTB's, submarines and air attack, the latter by a 20 hour run in contested by whatever destroyers, MTB's and aircraft the RN has at Portsmouth. Then there are the night attacks which the RAF are sure to launch using either Swordfish, Lysanders, Battles or all three. I doubt that sufficient air cover during the day can be provided by the 200 Bf 109E-7/N's available. I'm sure the RAF will send in daytime attacks by Battles if necessary sacrificing their aircrews. These two attacks will simply be disasters.

The invasion at Ramsgate in the North will be opposed by just about every aircraft the RAF has available from north of the Thames. Even if they do successfully land, no doubt they will be contained on the Isle of Thannet, whose port Ramsgate is, so another disaster.

The invasion at Dover will be contested by marines and anti shipping guns. I predict disaster for that too regardless of what sort of barges or landing ships are employed.

That leaves the East and West Sussex landings, these are probably the only two that stand any chance of success, at a guess, you're looking at a 40 to 60 mile sea crossing. The Brits will have their only fully equipped armoured division waiting for them and since no heavy equipment can be brought across, I wouldn't give them much of a chance. Maybe they get ashore, but will they then be contained and cut off from re-supply. Everything will be thrown at them.


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## parsifal (Jan 16, 2019)

It wasn't the shortage of paratroop divisions. It was the shortage of transport to move the divisions. 

The paratroop division was the 7th airborne division. There were several other independent battalions that were eventually amalgamated in 1942 to form coherent formations like Ramcke. The main punch of the German airborne forces were 22 airlanding division. The genergsjager formations had been found in Norway well suited for rapid deployment by airborne transport, something that would again be used in Crete. 

What the airborne corps lacked was enough transport. it had suffered over 120 Ju52s lost over Holland and I think about 60 over Norway. Large numbers of gliders (needed to transport the 22AL div) had been destroyed. In the summer of 1940, the LW could deploy about 300 Ju52s and about 50 DFS 230 gliders.....enough to airlift about 2 regts. the germans knew that their transports always suffered heavy attrition when used in an offensive capacity. Each sortie, you might render unserviceable 50% of the force, of which 10% might be permanent write offs. That's each time you used them. 

So, in this scenario, the germans could reasonably lift 0.67 divs in the 1st wave, 0.33 divs in the second wave, and thereafter, say, 0.1 divs per sortie. They needed to transport about 3-6 divs to make a real difference. They could possibly fly 3-5 missions per day....maybe. At that rate, it would take the Germans more than a week to complete their lift. by then the lead elements would be starving and out of ammunition.

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## Shortround6 (Jan 16, 2019)

parsifal said:


> r 120 Ju52s lost over Holland and I think about 60 over Norway.



Those maybe the permanent losses. The damaged or "temporarily" unserviceable could double that amount easily. 

Anthony Kay's Putnam book " Junkers Aircraft & Engines" says 573 transports were use against Norway with the _majority_ being JU 52s. 150 Ju 52s were "lost" in Norway.
For the Attack on Holland there were 430 Ju 52s. 2/3rds were supposedly "either never returned or badly damaged". However the next sentence says " "About 100 wer later repaired or used for spare parts". 

Your sources may very well differ but there is little doubt that in the early fall of 1940 the German Air transport fleet was a shadow of it's former self. 

It took much hard work, new production and repairs of damaged aircraft, to get the JU 52 fleet up to 493 for the Assault in Crete in May of 1941. Many existing aircraft got new engines in the spring of 1941. The French Amoit factory was retooled to build JU 52s and built around 400 during the war (and over 100 after?)

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## nuuumannn (Jan 16, 2019)

Shortround6 said:


> About 100 wer later repaired or used for spare parts



The repair work was done by Fokker in Amsterdam. Aircraft were either recovered or stripped for recovery of parts. The Dutch shot down a total of 231 German aircraft of all types in Holland, according to the book Fokker; Aircraft Builders to the World by Thijs Postma.

Invading Western Europe took a high toll on the German armed forces, much higher than is often realised.

As a side note, from the same book;

"During the occupation the following items were delivered to the Luftwaffe: 26 T.VIIIWs and 26 G.I aircraft (completion only); 702 Bucker Bu 181B Bestmann training aircraft and 66 Arado Ar 196 seaplanes; 348 wings, 616 ailerons and 190 trim-tabs for DFS gliders; 377 sets of skis for Ju 88s (which were all rejected); 66 sets of floats and 200 sets of float undercarriagees for Ju 52s, as well as a number of control surfaces; 60 "utility engines" and 64 oil tanks for Ju 252s. In addition, 685 engine blocks and 60 unfinished engine mounts for the Ju 52 were welded, and 25 Do 24 flying boats went through their final production stage."

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## fliger747 (Jan 17, 2019)

On the far side of the world, to the 1940 world, a long ways off, the Japanese were still proceeding with their implementation of the "Co Prosperity Sphere" and the ultimate confrontation with the USA. 

Question? after Pearl Harbor would the Third Reich still declare war on the US without regard to goings on on the continent and Great Britain?


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## parsifal (Jan 17, 2019)

They did

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## fliger747 (Jan 17, 2019)

I know they did, however it was not at all a sure thing that the US would have declared war against Germany and Italy. A big mistake on Hitler's part.


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## Kevin J (Jan 18, 2019)

This Operation Sealion plan reminds me of the time, my MD wanted to lose some business back in the 90's. He asked me to do a design and quote for a goods distribution centre. So anyway, at the end of the week, we have a meeting and he said that he didn't want the business. Told me to double the quote. I was real pissed off for wasting a week, but hey he was paying. Sure enough the client got their own IT people to write the system. So if I look at Operation Sealion and think, well I have one paratroop division, no landing craft, just river barges, why don't I just make a proposal that is so outrageously unworkable that the boss will never go for it.


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## parsifal (Jan 18, 2019)

fliger747 said:


> I know they did, however it was not at all a sure thing that the US would have declared war against Germany and Italy. A big mistake on Hitler's part.


Not really. There was an undeclared war at sea being waged between units of the USN and DKM. The US had already seized most of the axis shipping sheltering in the Pan American ports. German assets were being frozen wherever possible, and following certain very unpleasant incidents between US neutral shipping and the kriegsmarin in 1940, as well as the RN control commission activities, had slowed trade between the Axis and the US to a tiny trickle of what it had been in 1940. The Roosevelt administration was already planning to enter the war in a more active role some time in 1942. The German 9and Italian DoWs on the US just simplified the diplomatic equation, it didn't much reduce the timing, not by much at any rate.


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## swampyankee (Jan 18, 2019)

fliger747 said:


> I know they did, however it was not at all a sure thing that the US would have declared war against Germany and Italy. A big mistake on Hitler's part.



Considering that Germany’s actions in WWI managed to get a far more isolationist president to successfully lobby Congress todeclare war, I think any assumption that a far more aggressive Third Reich would’ve seen the US sit out the war to be, at best, wishful thinking.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 18, 2019)

US ships had already engaged German subs in the Atlantic and a German sub had torpedoed a US destroyer (the USS Reuben James) on Oct 31st 1941. 
It was only a matter of time.

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## Shortround6 (Feb 17, 2019)

Carried over from the other thread.



Schweik said:


> First of all, I've got to say - the notion that the Germans _allowed_ the British to retreat from Dunkirque is absurd and really creepy and conspiratorial in it's implications. I don't buy that at all - I'll stop there.
> 
> Second, some of the discussion above presumes the English is making substantial air attacks - what I was asking is what would have happened if the Germans had defeated the RAF as it seemed they came close to doing on a couple of occasions.
> 
> ...



3rd paragraph. Bringing in the air attacks from 1 to 2 years in the future is skewing things a bit. The Germans in the summer of 1940 were just learning how to attack ships in actual fact, not just training missions. This learning process took a while and is what helped get the later results that you mention. Expecting similar results in the first few weeks of actual operations is a bit much. 
Actually the "Kanalkampf" operations may show the opposite of what you think. Sinking slow coastal freighters and fishing boats is one thing. Sinking warships moving at 20kts or better is another (as long as they stop steering in straight lines to improve their own gunnery). The other big point, often ignored by advocates of the German invasion is that hundreds of freighters did get through and some of those sunk were on repeat trips. If you sink a small freighter hauling coal on it's 3rd or 4th trip yes it is a loss, and the British Need every ship/cargo they can get _BUT _if you sink a British destroyer carrying a "cargo" of eight 21 torpedoes and 1000 rounds of 4.7in ammo on it's 3rd trip to shoot up your invasion fleet you are going to run out of invasion fleet pretty quick. 
It was always going to be a war of attrition. Neither side could guarantee safety of it's ships through air power. The British simply had many times the number of ships to loose. The Germans cannot afford to trade the British ship for ship or even two British ships for every German ship.

The German surface navy in the summer of 1940 was almost non existent. The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were both in dockyard hands repairing torpedo/mine damage. Only one of of the pocket battleships was operational at this time, one Cruiser of the Blucher class, Two modern light cruisers and the 1926 Emden (being used as a training ship in the Baltic)., number of destroyers varied as bit as repairs were made to ships damaged (or broken down) during the Norwegian campaign. By Sept there may have been eight. That is pretty much it for ships over 1000 tons except for a mine layer or two. Actual German plans for this group of ships was to escort some old passenger liners on a feint towards the North of England to draw off the Home fleet or ships stationed along the east coast. Vary as you see fit but this small group of cruisers/destroyers isn't going to be much more than a speed bump to the Royal Navy. 

Subs work both ways and the British subs had been pretty successful in Norway. Trying to use subs in the Channel is another game. 

The JU-88A-17 didn't show up until 1942. Slapping torpedoes under the existing JU-88s may not have worked very well, The differences between the A-1 and the A-4 were more powerful engines, a bigger/longer span wing and stronger landing gear. The last two were introduced on the A-5 model which preceded the A-4 as they waited for the more powerful engines to reach production status. 
In the Summer of 1940 the luftwaffe was pretty much limited to the HE 59 biplane and the HE-115 for torpedo bombers (both are float planes) and they don't have a lot of either or very many aerial torpedoes either. 

All of the french ships may not be gone, just many of the ones in close proximity to the area in question. 
We have two scenarios here, the quick and dirty follow the Dunkirk evacuation scheme (late June of 1940?) or the Sept/Oct invasion with 2-3 months to gather boats, barges and ships, not 2-3 weeks. 
Not all ships (in fact most) are not suitable for an over the beach invasion. If they draw more than 1 1/2 meters of water forward the men cannot wade ashore (and wading through chest deep sea water in Sept-Oct may not be easy or leave the men in good condition to fight.) 
Seizing a *suitable* harbor is easier said than done, Folkestone for example handled 35,000 troops and 9,000 refugees during the Dunkirk evacuation but Folkestone only had one pier capable of handling large ships.





The Pier was primarily for passengers from cross channel packets and not cargo. The enclosed Harbor behind it is often exposed mud flats at low tide. 
The next harbor actually worth anything to the south ( not a pier at an amusement beach) is Portsmouth. Lots of luck seizing that one in coup de main, even in the confusion after Dunkirk. 
So it is not just a question of ships, it is ships/craft suitable for the areas you plan to invade or land supplies at.

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## tomo pauk (Feb 17, 2019)

Shortround6 said:


> ...
> The JU-88A-17 didn't show up until 1942. Slapping torpedoes under the existing JU-88s may not have worked very well, The differences between the A-1 and the A-4 were more powerful engines, a bigger/longer span wing and stronger landing gear. The last two were introduced on the A-5 model which preceded the A-4 as they waited for the more powerful engines to reach production status.
> In the Summer of 1940 the luftwaffe was pretty much limited to the HE 59 biplane and the HE-115 for torpedo bombers (both are float planes) and they don't have a lot of either or very many aerial torpedoes either.
> ...



Good post. 
Just a nitpick - the A-1 have had two racks rated for 1000 kg each, the one at port side being also rated for a 1800 kg bomb (plus 2 racks for 500 kg, and 2 racks for 250 kg outboard of wings). Obviously, not all of them will be carrying max load in th same time.
Germany was probably lacking more in 'torpedo department' in 1940 (both quality and quantity?), than in aircraft capable carrying them.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 17, 2019)

The A-1s (maybe? ), A-2s and A-5s used under wing rockets to take-off in heavy loaded condition.
My sources may be old and outdated But the A-5s had the external racks out board of the engines?
A-1 carried a single 500kg bomb under each wing inboard of the engines but only if the internal bomb bays not full? or used 100kg bombs on these inner stations?


JU-88 is a can of worms 
gross weight normal for an A-1 was 10,360kg, A-4 was 12,105kg but 14,000kg max overload.
part of the trouble with the A-4 is the empty weight went up by over 2000kgs so the actual payload increase wasn't that great unless you go into the max overload condition.

Getting an early Ju-88 of the ground with a pair of torpedoes might be possible but you aren't going very far with them.


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## Glider (Feb 17, 2019)

It's also worth remembering that the RN had ships like the R class BB's, the loss of which would have had little impact on the war at sea, but were ideal as no German naval ship would have worried them, however for attacking an invasion fleet they would have been lethal. In a scenario where the attack would have been irrespective of losses they were perfect. 
Dive bombers would be the main threat, but the Ju87B only carried a 500lb bomb and these BB's were designed to take knocks so they would probably have done the job and at least reached the invasion force. Also remember that the Luftwaffe were irrelevant at night and an invasion is a 24 hour undertaking

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## Shortround6 (Feb 17, 2019)

I believe the Stukas could carry 1100lbs (it meant no bombs under the wing) and could, in certain circumstances, carry a 2200lb bomb. This assumes the 2200lb bombs are available at the airfields where the Stukas are or can be transported there in short order. 

This was much more likely in the Sept/Oct scenario, In the June scenario the Luftwaffe would be very lucky to have fuel at the forward airfields in the quantities needed let alone special munitions. 

There was one "R" in the Southern Channel, but the Germans didn't even have anything close to an old WW I D class cruiser closer than Germany.


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## parsifal (Feb 18, 2019)

The loss of air superiority would have greatly assisted the Germans in operation sea lion, but in no way would it guarantee success of the operation.

The Germans in the naval operation faced two massive problems. Unsolvable problems really in the context of the forces and capabilities they could draw upon in the late summer 1940.

The first problem was the shortage of escorts. The heavy units at their disposal were all laid up due to battle damage. Vessels like the Schleswig were simply not up to the task of providing effective escort to the invasion fleet. The modern units were either under repair (Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Lutzow, Hipper), fitting out for other operations Adm Scheer) or still not commissioned (Bismarck, Eugen)

There were four Light cruisers, but three of them were no longer considered combat worthy. Emden was a training cruiser that had been assigned frontline tasks during the Norwegian campaign but would have struggled in the North Sea. Koln was operational, but in the Sea Lion Plan was assigned to the so called northern force. Both Leipzig and Nuremberg had suffered very heavy damage after being attacked by HM subs, their speed and firepower was very limited and they both had vastly reduced complements aboard.

In the summer there were just two operational DDs in DKM and 8 large sized Torpedo Boats like the Mowe or Jaguar classes.

There were about 24 SBoats and about 40 rboats or Armed tralers and other light craft

Depending on the time frame, the rapid response forces available to the british consisted of the following

Humber (10 hrs)
3 CL: Manchester, Southampton, Birmingham
5 DD: Javelin, Jupiter, Jaguar, Kelvin, Watchman

Lowestoft (5 hrs):
1 TB: Draug (NO),
6MTBs/MGBs

Harwich (3 5 hrs)
6 DD: Malcolm (D16), Venomous, Verity, Wild Swan, Wivern, Worcester
1 SS: H 44
18xMTBs, London (4 5 hrs)
DD: Margaree (RCN) (damaged by bomb splinters 17 Sep)

Sheerness/Chatham (4 hrs)
2 CL: Galatea Aurora
9 DD: Brilliant, Icarus, Impulsive, Intrepid, Campbell (D21), Venetia, Vesper, Vivacious, Walpole
12 DE: Cattistock, Eglinton, Holderness (under repair from mine damage until 22 September), Garth, Hambledon, Quorn, Vanity, Vimiera, Wallace, Westminster, Winchester, Wolsey
3 MTBs

Dover (1 hr)
6 MTBs

There were approximately 350 Fairmile style cutters similar in capability to the German R bootes and Armed trawlers. At Scapa, some 23 hours sailing time there were a further 30-50 DDs

At the beginning of September the Admiralty had disposed sixty-seven (plus six cruisers) for immediate response to an invasion alarm. The first warning of the invasion’s sailing would come, it was hoped, from RAF reconnaissance over the assembly ports. But in case – as was likely – the Germans waited until after dark before commencing their 5 day toil across to England, the Royal Navy had a pool of 700 armed patrol craft (requisitioned motor yachts and trawlers) of whom around 200 were on picket duty “off the north coast of France” every night. So, owing to either the air reconnaissance or the trip-wire patrols, there was a high likelihood that the German invasion armadas would have found British destroyers between them and their intended landing-beaches, hiding by day, attacking by night. Even the light weapons aboard these DDs would have been lethal to the invasion barges.

The second component of RN interventions would have been the thirty-four corvettes and sloops, and approximately 40 MTBs, employed on East Coast and Channel convoy routes. Then, within twenty-four hours of the alert, the cruisers and capital units of the Home Fleet would have started to arrive from the far north and west. 165 “MSWs” of the flower class ilk were at hand to maintain swept channels. Finally, many of the thirty-five submarines based in home waters would have headed for the Channel to disrupt the shuttling back and forth of barges required by the German build-up for the next ten days.

The Luftwaffe in all probability could be expected to exact a heavy toll on the RN, but in no way is it reasonable to expect they could prevent the RN from interdicting the narrow seas of the channel. Almost certainly the LW, in gaining air superiority would have itself been heavily wounded. Even on the most successful days of Dunkirk, 6 british and 3 french DDs were lost over a 5 day operation. Other warship losses amounted to 17 armed trawlers, 5 fleet MSWs, 1 sloop, 1 ocean boarding vessel. No MTBs out of 27 committed were lost. 6 Fairmile type Boats out of over 30 committed were lost. Even under the most optimistic of assumptions it is implausible that the LW could do better than it did at Dunkirk, for the simple reason that it would be tired and in a weakened state, and still fighting the RAF in some form.

There was never the slightest chance of DKM successfully completing the cross channel operation.

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## stona (Feb 18, 2019)

"... it is implausible that the LW could do better than it did at Dunkirk, for the simple reason that it would be tired and in a weakened state, and still fighting the RAF in some form."

And that it would be engaging moving targets. Many of the vessels sunk and damaged at and around Dunkirk were stationary when hit.

And the Luftwaffe couldn't operate against the RN at night, whereas the RN could certainly operate against the invasion convoys at night. The transports and some barges and other vessels were expected to shuttle back and forth across the Channel continually to reinforce and resupply the initial landings. Quite apart from the vessels actually making the crossings, there would also be large numbers of invasion vessels loading and unloading (transferring to barges) off the invasion beaches, large, stationary and easily found targets for the RN (and RAF, which. theoretically at least, could bomb by night). There would also be concentrations of vessels loading in the continental invasion ports, which could also be attacked, and more heavily than they were historically, pre-invasion. *In late September day and night are about the same length; even allowing for nautical twilight the Luftwaffe can cover the invasion and on going cross-Channel operations for just 14 in every 24 hours. The RN has free rein for the other 10 hours.*

I could go on.....

Cheers

Steve

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## Kevin J (Feb 18, 2019)

Shortround6 said:


> Carried over from the other thread.
> 
> 
> 
> ...



If I was going to launch a cross channel invasion to seize a port, I would go for Weymouth which is 77 miles from Cherbourg. It has a gently sloping beach and a harbour.
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2f/Uk_dor_portharbour.JPG
The invasion date would have to be in 1941 as by then I would have my two heavy battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in Brest available to sortie out and provide heavy fire support. For fighter cover I would have the Bf 109E-7 and Bf 109F-2, both of which could carry drop tanks. I would have my submarines and U Boat pens in Lorient too. Of course losing the Bismarck in the Atlantic might well scupper my plans, and with the destruction of the dry dock at St Nazaire in March 1942, I couldn't even send Tirpitz down as a substitute.
Plus an airborne assault on the Isle of Wight so that I could 'bottle up' the RN in Portsmouth.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 18, 2019)

Shortround6 said:


> The A-1s (maybe? ), A-2s and A-5s used under wing rockets to take-off in heavy loaded condition.
> My sources may be old and outdated But the A-5s had the external racks out board of the engines?
> A-1 carried a single 500kg bomb under each wing inboard of the engines but only if the internal bomb bays not full? or used 100kg bombs on these inner stations?
> 
> ...



Max take off for Ju 88A-1, per manual dated March 1940, is 12300 kg.
Disposition of bomb racks on Ju 88A-1/A-5, translations in red rectangulars by yours truly:






Shortround6 said:


> I believe the Stukas could carry 1100lbs (it meant no bombs under the wing) and could, in certain circumstances, carry a 2200lb bomb. This assumes the 2200lb bombs are available at the airfields where the Stukas are or can be transported there in short order.
> 
> This was much more likely in the Sept/Oct scenario, In the June scenario the Luftwaffe would be very lucky to have fuel at the forward airfields in the quantities needed let alone special munitions.



Already the Ju 87R-1, a longer-ranged version of the B-1, with 1000 HP for take off, was rated for 1000 kg bomb, 2x300 L drop tanks and armor, all in the same time.


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## Glider (Feb 19, 2019)

Kevin J said:


> If I was going to launch a cross channel invasion to seize a port, I would go for Weymouth which is 77 miles from Cherbourg. It has a gently sloping beach and a harbour.
> https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2f/Uk_dor_portharbour.JPG
> The invasion date would have to be in 1941 as by then I would have my two heavy battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in Brest available to sortie out and provide heavy fire support. For fighter cover I would have the Bf 109E-7 and Bf 109F-2, both of which could carry drop tanks. I would have my submarines and U Boat pens in Lorient too. Of course losing the Bismarck in the Atlantic might well scupper my plans, and with the destruction of the dry dock at St Nazaire in March 1942, I couldn't even send Tirpitz down as a substitute.
> Plus an airborne assault on the Isle of Wight so that I could 'bottle up' the RN in Portsmouth.



By then the RAF will have recovered their numbers, the RN is starting to get better ships, the old R class are still more than good enough to deal with the German Battle cruisers, The night sky belongs to the RAF as the Beaufighter is starting to be produced in numbers, ad the army is getting better equipped all the time

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## Kevin J (Feb 19, 2019)

Glider said:


> By then the RAF will have recovered their numbers, the RN is starting to get better ships, the old R class are still more than good enough to deal with the German Battle cruisers, The night sky belongs to the RAF as the Beaufighter is starting to be produced in numbers, ad the army is getting better equipped all the time



My idea is still better than the previous year's suicide option called Operation Sea Lion. The Germans also need a heavy battleship like the Bismarck or Tirpitz to guard the Western Approaches to the English Channel and they don't have one in either 1941 because Bismarck was sunk, or 1942 after the Raid on St Nazaire destroyed the only dry dock on the French Atlantic coast big enough to take Tirpitz for repairs. Also, no Operation Barbarossa in 1941 as you need a re-run of the Battle of Britain, and no Channel Dash in 1942 as you lose your battle cruisers needed for heavy bombardment. I expect Stalin was expecting the Germans to be well bogged down in France for several years


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## stona (Feb 19, 2019)

Kevin J said:


> My idea is still better than the previous year's suicide option called Operation Sea Lion.



May be so! But I think an attempt in 1941 would have been just as suicidal as Sealion would have been.

The problem is that to launch a successful amphibious operation it is vital that the attacker has control of the sea, complete control, 24/7, for the duration of the operation, as the Allies had in 1944. I fail to see how even a win in the BoB could have achieved this for the Germans, the idea that local air superiority over the Channel and even SE England confers such control is a nonsense. The Germans were utterly incapable of controlling the Channel in 1940, 1941, or any other time.

With the benefit of hindsight I cannot see any situation in which the Germans could have launched a successful invasion of Britain. The problem was, and remained, the superiority of the Royal Navy.

Cheers

Steve

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## Shortround6 (Feb 19, 2019)

I think he is winding us up.
Some of our British members might want to think about what is right next door to Weymouth.
I had no clue until I Google mapped it.

Need we go into the problems of getting a sizable fleet of invasion ships to Cherbourg.


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## Kevin J (Feb 19, 2019)

Shortround6 said:


> I think he is winding us up.
> Some of our British members might want to think about what is right next door to Weymouth.
> I had no clue until I Google mapped it.
> 
> Need we go into the problems of getting a sizable fleet of invasion ships to Cherbourg.



Yes, I assume you are referring to Slapton Sands, but realistically, if you want to launch an invasion similar to Normandy, which incidentally worked, then Weymouth and Slapton Sands is probably your best bet. All you need is total air superiority and a bigger navy. While you're building it, you may as well launch Operation Barbarossa as its going to take a few years to get your navy fit for purpose.

Alternatives to Weymouth and Slapton Sands are:-
1. Southend on Sea. Distance from Antwerp, 161 miles. No port.
2. Clacton and Frinton on Sea. Distance from The Hague, 136 miles. No port.
3. Yarmouth and Lowestoft. Distance from The Hague, 115 miles. Small harbours.
4. Bournemouth and Poole. An interesting choice but a bit too close to our main navy base at Portsmouth. So not my choice. Same distance as Weymouth from Cherbourg. Has a port.
I don't think that any of these would have been feasible options as you can't provide any continuous air cover and don't have a reasonable sized port.

As for places like Dover. Folkestone, Ramsgate, Hastings, the beaches, like Dieppe are stones and pebbles, so your tanks' tracks won't grip.


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## Glider (Feb 19, 2019)

I lived at Southend for 35 years and the tide goes out about a mile, a worse place for a landing would be hard to come by.

On a different tack for those who believe that the Luftwaffe would have it all their own way and the German Navy block the channel with mines, the following may be of interest. I have found out that on September 8th 1940, the Light Cruiser HMS Aurora bombarded the landing barges at Boulogne, which really must have put the wind up anyone thinking of invading

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## Shortround6 (Feb 19, 2019)

Kevin J said:


> Yes, I assume you are referring to Slapton Sands, but realistically, if you want to launch an invasion similar to Normandy, which incidentally worked, then Weymouth and Slapton Sands is probably your best bet. All you need is total air superiority and a bigger navy. While you're building it, you may as well launch Operation Barbarossa as its going to take a few years to get your navy fit for purpose.
> 
> Alternatives to Weymouth and Slapton Sands are:-
> 1. Southend on Sea. Distance from Antwerp, 161 miles. No port.
> ...



I was referring to Portland Harbor/Naval base. 

Some sources claim the British had 17 divisions in Sept of 1940, 3 of them armoured divisions (or the equivalent tank regiments were available. How well trained or equipped these divisions were I don't know but the men who came back from Dunkirk had fought the Germans for several weeks doing one of the most difficult operations an army can engage in. A systematic withdrawal in the face of ongoing attacks. At no time did it turn into a rout. Many times the British were forced to retreat because of allied troops on one flank or the other retreating (often without telling the British) making their positions untenable. 

A few thousand Germans are not going be able to hang on for very long without constant supply/reinforcements. The Germans were never going to get enough shipping capacity to move with safety, the number of troops and the tonnage of supplies needed.

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## Glider (Feb 19, 2019)

I have also found that

On the 30th September the British Monitor Erebus with two destroyers bombarded Calais. 

On the 11th October HMS Revenge, escorted by seven destroyers fired 120 rounds of 15in and 801 rounds of 4.7in at Cherbourg.

The Channel was far from being an area controlled by the German forces


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## Kevin J (Feb 19, 2019)

Glider said:


> I lived at Southend for 35 years and the tide goes out about a mile, a worse place for a landing would be hard to come by.
> 
> On a different tack for those who believe that the Luftwaffe would have it all their own way and the German Navy block the channel with mines, the following may be of interest. I have found out that on September 8th 1940, the Light Cruiser HMS Aurora bombarded the landing barges at Boulogne, which really must have put the wind up anyone thinking of invading



When and where? I lived in Westcliff from 56 to 74.


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## Glider (Feb 19, 2019)

Kevin J said:


> When and where? I lived in Westcliff from 56 to 74.



I actually lived in Hadleigh from 75 to 77 then Rayleigh until three years ago when I came to Lincolnshire. Small world isn't it and you will know the tides at Southend

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## Kevin J (Feb 19, 2019)

Shortround6 said:


> I was referring to Portland Harbor/Naval base.
> 
> Some sources claim the British had 17 divisions in Sept of 1940, 3 of them armoured divisions (or the equivalent tank regiments were available. How well trained or equipped these divisions were I don't know but the men who came back from Dunkirk had fought the Germans for several weeks doing one of the most difficult operations an army can engage in. A systematic withdrawal in the face of ongoing attacks. At no time did it turn into a rout. Many times the British were forced to retreat because of allied troops on one flank or the other retreating (often without telling the British) making their positions untenable.
> 
> A few thousand Germans are not going be able to hang on for very long without constant supply/reinforcements. The Germans were never going to get enough shipping capacity to move with safety, the number of troops and the tonnage of supplies needed.



That's why I'm arguing for a limited number of landings, on gently sloping beaches away from the main air battle zone. Portland was a sub base so I'm assuming not quite as dangerous as either Portsmouth or Plymouth. You're right, the Germans need a much bigger navy and that never happened.


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## Kevin J (Feb 19, 2019)

Glider said:


> I actually lived in Hadleigh from 75 to 77 then Rayleigh until three years ago when I came to Lincolnshire. Small world isn't it and you will know the tides at Southend


 I certainly do.


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## parsifal (Feb 19, 2019)

There is no comparison between the experience and resources available to the allies for overlord in 1944 and the experience and resources available to the germans pertaining to amphibious operations at any time. The germans did undertake some amphibious operations in the Baltic in 1941 and 1944 that I know of. The 1941 operations were not even fully opposed by the retreating Soviet forces. The equipment used still centred around ersatz landing craft and barges, but at least the prime movers were the so-called Siebel ferries, which had greater capability compared to the River barges proposed in the 1940 proposed operation. In 1941, the numbers of Siebel ferries were still extremely limited….perhaps sufficient to lift 0.5 divisions. The siebels were still unsuitable for navigation across the open waters of the North Sea.

Amphibious lift capability does not come cheap, as the allies were to find out 1942-4. Building Amphibious capability is directly linked to shipbuilding capacity and steel outputs. It generally takes several years of work to perfect the designs needed to carry out opposed landings. Germany had a very limited shipbuilding capability, with priority given to U-Boat construction. A switch over to amphibious capability would have needed massive re-allocations of steel and dockyard capacity and work force away from the u-boats and over to amphibious transports and supporting surface fleet. That was not going to happen…..probably it would take until at least 1944 before some viable improvement in capability was going to occur. In 1941, German capability would be little different to its 1940 capability, or lack thereof.

In 1940, the Germans were very short of all these things. Their experiences with amphibious warfare was laughably absent, the last successful operations being WWI in the Baltic. It is very difficult to classify Norway as true amphibious operations, since most of the landings were completely unopposed. German ineptitude with opposed landings does come to the fore with their botched assaults of Oslo, and further losses they encountered off Bergen, Trondheim and Kristiansand. Their inability to pay sufficient attention to follow up re-supply is demonstrated in spades by the near disaster at Narvik. Their continued inability to carry out successful amphibious operations is clearly demonstrated in the failed attempts to take certain Finnish Baltic islands.

Amphibious operations are inherently complicated operations, made more difficult by unsuitable topography. Capturing a defended port by direct assault was beyond the capability of all the belligerents, including the Allies, and rarely attempted. One only has to look at Dieppe to realise that an assault against a defended port like Portland is a complete non starter. 

The defences of Portland were formidable, the island being a forward naval base for the RN. It was used during WWII as an advanced assembly point for overlord. The defences for the island dated back to the 1890s, and many were no longer used for that purpose by 1940, though there is no reason they could not be if the need arose.

The following image is an example of the disused defences on the island

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## Kevin J (Feb 20, 2019)

parsifal said:


> There is no comparison between the experience and resources available to the allies for overlord in 1944 and the experience and resources available to the germans pertaining to amphibious operations at any time. The germans did undertake some amphibious operations in the Baltic in 1941 and 1944 that I know of. The 1941 operations were not even fully opposed by the retreating Soviet forces. The equipment used still centred around ersatz landing craft and barges, but at least the prime movers were the so-called Siebel ferries, which had greater capability compared to the River barges proposed in the 1940 proposed operation. In 1941, the numbers of Siebel ferries were still extremely limited….perhaps sufficient to lift 0.5 divisions. The siebels were still unsuitable for navigation across the open waters of the North Sea.
> 
> Amphibious lift capability does not come cheap, as the allies were to find out 1942-4. Building Amphibious capability is directly linked to shipbuilding capacity and steel outputs. It generally takes several years of work to perfect the designs needed to carry out opposed landings. Germany had a very limited shipbuilding capability, with priority given to U-Boat construction. A switch over to amphibious capability would have needed massive re-allocations of steel and dockyard capacity and work force away from the u-boats and over to amphibious transports and supporting surface fleet. That was not going to happen…..probably it would take until at least 1944 before some viable improvement in capability was going to occur. In 1941, German capability would be little different to its 1940 capability, or lack thereof.
> 
> ...


Does anyone actually know what guns we had at Portland in WW2? I've done a search and all I can find is that their 6-in and 9.2 in BL guns were removed after WW1. Then something about the training base there moved in 1940/41 and something about artillery, but what sort, anti-aircraft? Naval? I read somewhere that the Germans used some of their converted barges in the Baltic, possibly 60 of them? The Germans 'ready, maybe, by 1944' seems quite reasonable to me, plenty of time to finish off the Russians, ho, ho! But back to the original topic, if the Germans had defeated Fighter Command in the BoB however long it lasted. Where exactly are they going to successfully land their invasion force because Operation Sea Lion is a suicide mission? If the Germans in 1941 can only transport half a division then that looks like a Dieppe style operation, so you need a decent beach to land on, Weymouth, and a port to take, Portland.
Wikipedia is inconsistent on whether or not there were BL 9.2 guns there in WW2. The photos I've seen show that the guns were exposed to the elements and not enclosed in turrets, so I guess if they would have to be taken out like at Pointe du Hoc. As for heavy cover, both Bismarck and Tirpitz plus the two unfinished German aircraft carriers. So no foray into the Atlantic for Bismarck in 1941, and completion of the carriers. Definitely 1944 earliest.


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## parsifal (Feb 20, 2019)

There were about 16 pieces of heavy artillery in the Dover region alone, capable of reaching all the way to the French coast. German heavy artillery facing these defences was heavier and more modern than the british guns. Nearly 20 pieces were added to six batteries running from Boulogne eastwards towards Calais and beyond. The guns ranged in size from comparatively “light” 8" guns capable of lobbing explosives up to 33 kilometers, to massive 16" radar guided pieces intended for the cancelled H Class BBs. These weapons could hurl one-ton projectiles more than 50 kilometers. Commanded by KM admirals, and crewed by Naval personnel the guns were eventually encased in massive bombproof concrete pillboxes on the coast, integrated into the Festung Europa defences in the Pas De Calais, to Boulogne and Ostend regions. These guns were formidable for defence, but their capability attacking British at sea naval forces was actually fairly disappointing. In four years the Germans managed to sink 4 British ships (including merchant vessels used to dispute the german claims that the channel was closed to British merchant shipping. The British coastal artillery batteries were not any more effective againt fast moving targets as the channel dash in the following year was to show.

So, coastal artillery was ineffective against fast moving naval warships. against barge traffic, it was a completely different story. With a fleet speed of just 2.5 knots, and very dense spacing it would have been virtually impossible for the British CA batteries to miss. Adding to that probem was the fact that many of the barges were towing other barges, which rulled out any zig zag patterns for the entire fleet.....if some barges cant manoeuvre, none of them will be able to do so safely.

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## Shortround6 (Feb 20, 2019)

Many of the coastal forts were mere shadows of what they were pre-WWI. But the cost of up-dating them competed with money for ships. Coastal forts may be cheaper than ships but depend on the enemy coming to fort. If he doesn't the money may be considered wasted ( what is unknown is if the enemy would have come if there was no fort/s). Ships can defend many areas but were often not in the right place at the right time.
another consideration was the increases in range from around 1900 (when many 'modern' forts/batteries were built) and the late 20s. the same guns went from 6,000yrds max range to 9,000 to 17,000yds depending on the elevation of the mountings and some even went to well beyond that. fewer guns (and crews) were needed to cover the same area of water off the coast. 

Portland appears to have had a pair of 9.2s mounted in Blacknor Fort on the west side of of the Isle of Portland (making them useless for defending Weymouth) overlooking Slapton sands. Slaptons sands itself may be a great beach to land on, it is a lousy beach to get off of, at least the eastern portion (4-6 miles?) 






the far end in the phop above




The Isle of Portland is just out of the top of the picture. 

The Fleet lagoon from the other end looking towards Portland. 





Yes there are a few miles of beach that have solid land behind them and not Lagoon.

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## Kevin J (Feb 20, 2019)

Slapton Sands is in South Devon quite a way from Portland, near to Dartmouth in Devon, its not the same as Chesil Beach.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 20, 2019)

You are be quite right, it is just that in the accounts of Exercise Tiger in which hundreds of men were lost mention the guns at Blacknor Fort were not given permission to fire on the German E-boats for fear of causing friendly casualties so I assumed (wrongly) that it was a closer beach. The Convoy of LSTs may have been a number of miles from the beach when the attack occurred

Slapton Beach is still not great beach to get off of.


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## Milosh (Feb 21, 2019)

Operation Tiger diagram, https://www.eucom.mil/media-library/photo/25656/exercise-tiger-diagram

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## Kevin J (Feb 21, 2019)

Shortround6 said:


> You are be quite right, it is just that in the accounts of Exercise Tiger in which hundreds of men were lost mention the guns at Blacknor Fort were not given permission to fire on the German E-boats for fear of causing friendly casualties so I assumed (wrongly) that it was a closer beach. The Convoy of LSTs may have been a number of miles from the beach when the attack occurred
> 
> Slapton Beach is still not great beach to get off of.



Agreed, lets scrub my idea for a secondary landing there, even I didn't realise it was so far away until I checked. I thought it was the Dorset side of Exmouth and not close to the navy college at Dartmouth. Not only that but our navy base at Plymouth is just round the corner, so definitely another of those suicide missions.


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## Freebird (Feb 21, 2019)

Shortround6 said:


> .
> 
> There was one "R" in the Southern Channel, but the Germans didn't even have anything close to an old WW I D class cruiser closer than Germany.
> View attachment 529538



A point often forgotten - The British actually had 4 battleships in the channel. 
In addition to HMS Revenge, there were two French battleships (seized and with RN crew), Paris & Courbet.
There was also HMS Centurion, with main guns removed but with a variety of smaller guns, still functional as a battleship.

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## Shortround6 (Feb 21, 2019)

The Centurion performed some varied and interesting missions for what was essentially a target/decoy ship but her actually utility in a real gun battle is highly dubious. 

She did manage to claim one Stuka while disguised as the HMS Anson but I am not sure she mounted anything bigger than 20mm AA guns? Or if so more than 1-2 as training weapons? 

but this was in 1942?

In 1940 she was still pretty much stripped and all that could be mounted in a hurry would be light AA guns.




This is how she looked in 1933.

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## Freebird (Feb 21, 2019)

Shortround6 said:


> The Centurion performed some varied and interesting missions for what was essentially a target/decoy ship but her actually utility in a real gun battle is highly dubious.
> 
> She did manage to claim one Stuka while disguised as the HMS Anson but I am not sure she mounted anything bigger than 20mm AA guns? Or if so more than 1-2 as training weapons?
> 
> ...



True, though as part of a squadron of 4 obsolete battleships the role would probably be as an additional target to draw air attack away from the other ships. Although not up to modern standards, he hull armour is likely not seriously threatened by 6" or 8" guns. Functional heavy guns wouldn't be needed, so dummy guns could be emplaced.

Certainly if we're talking about a small Kriegsmarine force of a couple CA and a few CL escorting 5 knot riverbarges, the threat of a battleship (even a disarmed one) ramming or swamping the barges would be a significant threat.
Could a Stuka starting a dive at 12,000 feet accurately identify which of the 4 battleships has dummy guns, on a smoke obscured deck? (From all the AA guns)

Here's a picture from 1942, all of the primary gun turrets are fake.

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## stona (Feb 21, 2019)

The RN had no intention of sending heavy units of the Home Fleet anywhere near the English Channel. If Sealion had been launched some of those units might have intercepted the 'Autumn Journey' diversion, which would have gone badly for the Germans.

You don't need heavy units lobbing huge shells at fleets of transports and barges when you have hundreds of destroyers (as many as seventy within 36 hours), mine sweepers, armed trawlers, harbour defence vessels and assorted other armed motorboats etc. which are more than capable of doing the job.

I am reminded of the famous gaming of Sealion at Sandhurst. The RN dispositions at the start of the game had to be altered from those that existed historically. Had the game been based on the actual disposition of the RN forces in September, 1940, then it would have been a damp squib, as it appeared that no organized German forces would have got ashore at all.
In order to bring about fighting on land, and thus give the celebrated players something to do, the RN dispositions were artificially changed to give the invasion force a chance to get ashore. With the 'new' dispositions, the Germans landed at dawn on the 22nd, after which a RN force of 17 cruisers and 57 destroyers arrived in the Channel on the morning of the 24th. 65% of the invasion barges were sunk, together with 3 destroyers and 7 S boats, for British losses of two destroyers sunk, four destroyers and two cruisers damaged. Remaining German forces surrendered on 28th.

Cheers

Steve

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## Freebird (Feb 21, 2019)

stona said:


> The RN had no intention of sending heavy units of the Home Fleet anywhere near the English Channel. If Sealion had been launched some of those units might have intercepted the 'Autumn Journey' diversion, which would have gone badly for the Germans.
> 
> You don't need heavy units lobbing huge shells at fleets of transports and barges when you have hundreds of destroyers (as many as seventy within 36 hours), mine sweepers, armed trawlers, harbour defence vessels and assorted other armed motorboats etc. which are more than capable of doing the job.
> 
> ...


Indeed, though the crippling of the KM in Norway may have much to do with that.
Scharnhorst, Gneisnau, Lutzow and Leipzig are all out of action with torpedo damage, Graf Spee, Blucher, Karlsruhe & Konigsburg sunk.
AFAIK, that only leaves Hipper and a couple CL's.
Scheer is refitting, and Prince Eugen has only commissioned in Aug '40, so is working up.

Had there been a couple of German Battlecriusers/Pocket Battleships in service, I could possibly see the RN sortie with a couple old BBs to counter the German ships.
Using old and obsolete ships makes sense, rather than risk KGV's or other valuable ships.


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## Glider (Feb 21, 2019)

That said, on the 11th October the RN *did *use HMS Revenge, escorted by seven destroyers fired 120 rounds of 15in and 801 rounds of 4.7in at Cherbourg. They couldn't have been much more than 15,000 yds from the harbour and well within the range of shore batteries.

I have no doubt that if push came to shove and the RN had to deploy the fleet, the Revenge at leas would have been involved


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## buffnut453 (Feb 21, 2019)

I have no doubt that, had the RN sortied against an invasion force, the results would have been highly one-sided. However, that presupposes that, having pushed 11 Group back into 10 and 12 Groups' areas, the Luftwaffe does nothing to attrit the RN before embarking on an invasion. 

Looking at this Wikipedia page (yes...I know, but it provides food for thought), aircraft were responsible for sinking more RN ships than any other single cause. Now, admittedly, that tally includes those sunk by Italian and Japanese forces in addition to Germany. However, it's worth noting that most of the losses were small, highly manoeverable and hard-to-hit destroyers, which are exactly the type of vessel needed to disrupt an invasion.

We should also consider that June 1940 marks the start of "The Happy Time" for German U-Boat commanders. 

What might it have required for Germany to force some hard decisions on the RN over whether to retain destroyers around the UK to deter an invasion versus sending them out to protect transatlantic convoys? Could a retreat by 11 Group followed by concerted Luftwaffe attacks against the RN have forced the UK into, effectively, a 2-front maritime war with the unpalatable choice between exposing convoys to even greater losses and risking losing vital warships that are stationed around the UK in case of invasion?

I'm not arguing any side here...I'm just trying to nudge the conversation along a little. We all agree that Sealion was largely doomed unless there could be some significant change in the balance of maritime power. I'm asking whether Germany could have brought about that change using air power?


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## Shortround6 (Feb 21, 2019)

buffnut453 said:


> I'm asking whether Germany could have brought about that change using air power?



Probably not with the airpower of 1940. The German torpedo bombers were pretty much the He 59 





and He 115





Use of the He 111 as a torpedo bomber has to wait until 1941. 

the Stukas were just learning their trade as far as anti-shipping goes. Same for other bomber types. 

I have pointed out before that Crete is not a good scenario to make comparisons from. The Stukas were sometimes operating from an Island only 50 miles from Crete making it rather easy for several missions to flown in one day, the same would be true of any battle in the channel, except the British ships at Crete were 370-380 miles from their resupply point and not 30-70 miles like they would be in the channel. British ships operating in the channel against invaders could fill up their AA magazines every night or every other night and not fight on until all ammo was gone like some ships at Crete. No need to husband fuel or worry too much about break downs either. Not saying the British ships would be invulnerable, just that there would be something of a shift in the dynamics of the situation.


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## Freebird (Feb 21, 2019)

buffnut453 said:


> I have no doubt that, had the RN sortied against an invasion force, the results would have been highly one-sided. However, that presupposes that, having pushed 11 Group back into 10 and 12 Groups' areas, the Luftwaffe does nothing to attrit the RN before embarking on an invasion.
> 
> Looking at this Wikipedia page (yes...I know, but it provides food for thought), aircraft were responsible for sinking more RN ships than any other single cause. Now, admittedly, that tally includes those sunk by Italian and Japanese forces in addition to Germany. However, it's worth noting that most of the losses were small, highly manoeverable and hard-to-hit destroyers, which are exactly the type of vessel needed to disrupt an invasion.
> 
> I'm not arguing any side here...I'm just trying to nudge the conversation along a little. We all agree that Sealion was largely doomed unless there could be some significant change in the balance of maritime power. I'm asking whether Germany could have brought about that change using air power?



One thing to note with these losses, almost all of those lost to Axis air power were immobile (at Dunkirk), ran out of AA ammo (Crete) or were small groups of ships. 
The record of large Axis wings attacking a large RN fleet during Pedestal was remarkably innefective, even given the British fleet's limited number of interceptors.

The concentrated AA fire was so intense that even waves of 80 - 120 escorted dive/torpedo bombers only produced a couple of hits.
Given that the targets were often slow unarmed freighters it's even less impressive



*Operation Pedestal (From Wiki)*

*Aug 12 morning
*
_The number of Axis aircraft in the attacks was unprecedented, with 117 Italian and 58 German sorties for only meagre results. Two bombers, a torpedo-bomber and a fighter had been lost for one hit on Victorious and the damage to Deucalion_
*
Aug 12 afternoon*

_The Axis air forces had flown 180–220 escorted bomber sorties during the day and the Germans claimed that they had damaged an aircraft carrier (Indomitable), a cruiser, a destroyer and a large merchant ship._

*Aug 13 *

_Force X was attacked by 35 Ju 88s and 13 Ju 87s, achieving only a near-miss on Kenya for a loss of one Ju 88 and one Stuka. The Regia Aeronautica attacked with 15 bombers and 20 torpedo-bombers for no loss_


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## Glider (Feb 21, 2019)

While its true that there would have been a reduction in capability due to the vulnerability of the ships to air attack, but ships in port can be difficult targets. Think of Malta and the effort put into attacking the two German battlecruisers for little result. 
It's safe to assume that the AA defences would have been built up to defend the fleet, they already had a high priority for AA guns and radar coverage. For this reason I doubt that it would have made a massive difference as Luftwaffe losses would have been high. The RAF would have been able to influence the air war as until the Luftwaffe had bases in the UK, their 109's still had a limited range and the remaining RAF fighters would be fighting unescorted German bombers

Regarding torpedo's it should be remembered that German Aerial torpedo's were at best average and for most of the war the Germans used Italian versions. In 1940 the Germans wouldn't have had access to many or even any.


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## parsifal (Feb 21, 2019)

Axis aircraft were not the prime reason for RN naval losses. That is flat out incorrect.

Here is a link to the naval history website that provides a ready reference to RN losses

If RFA merchant ships are included, hands down the primary cause of loss are uboats. 

British vessels lost at sea in World War 2 - major warships


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## parsifal (Feb 21, 2019)

stona said:


> The RN had no intention of sending heavy units of the Home Fleet anywhere near the English Channel. If Sealion had been launched some of those units might have intercepted the 'Autumn Journey' diversion, which would have gone badly for the Germans.



Substantially I agree, there was no plan to use the older “R” class BBs, as these were seen as too vulnerable to air attack. They were earmarked for commitment only in the most dire of emergencies . However the two most modern heavy ships, Nelson and Rodney and possibly one or two of the modernized Queen Elizabeth classes , with the most modern AA defences and best underwater protection and passive defences, were earmarked to sail from Scapa to “await developments". The RN didn’t want to commit them, but if everything went south the plan was to place these assets in harms way to block the advance of the invasion fleet. Admiralty planners rated the chances of this expediency being needed as being virtually nil, which I agree with, but plans were in place to commit certain heavy units, to the death if need be, should thhe situation require it. There was never the slightest intention that the RN would be withheld for some future battle, if such action would place the security of the UK at risk

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## stona (Feb 22, 2019)

"Admiralty planners rated the chances of this expediency being needed as being virtually nil..."

Exactly. It was the Germans that got it wrong (again).

'Herbstreise/Autumn Journey' was an operation deigned to draw the British Home Fleet away from the Channel by simulating a landing on the British East Coast somewhere between Newcastle-upon-Tyne & Aberdeen. It was the German naval high command which assumed that the British Home Fleet would immediately sail for the Channel in the event of an invasion, the Admiralty intended it to remain at Rosyth and Scapa Flow against the threat of a sortie by German heavy ships, reasoning that the resources allocated to the Channel area were more than adequate for the task.

Had ‘Herbstreise’ actually drawn the attention of the Home Fleet it could have resulted in the loss of the few remaining German cruisers, together with several prestigious liners and large merchantmen, without contributing anything to ‘Sealion’ at all. Fortunately, all four 'dummy' convoys were to turn around and head back to port well before they got anywhere near British waters, so they may have got away with it. It was just another example of the half-hearted planning by the KM, which I don't believe had any belief that 'Sealion' could be achieved.

I think the destroyer situation alone sums up the German problem. In September 1940 the Admiralty had control of 182 destroyers (including a few Australian, Canadian, Polish and Free French boats), distributed around the globe. There were 49 boats on overseas stations, 29 either on convoy escort duty or operating out of convoy escort ports ( including the RCN vessels ), 23 operating with the Home Fleet at Scapa Flow and Rosyth, and 17 repairing or refitting. This leaves 64 destroyer available for anti-invasion duties not counting convoy escorts or transfers from the Home Fleet. The number that appeared in the Channel in the Sandhurst game was 57 and is entirely realistic.

The most the Germans could have available was 7, and this assumes that a couple re-fitting in Germany could be made available in time.

Cheers

Steve

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## Glider (Feb 22, 2019)

Can someone explain the logic that says the R class battleships would not be used as they were too vulnerable to air attack, when the only BB used against the invasion fleet, was an R class?


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## stona (Feb 22, 2019)

Glider said:


> Can someone explain the logic that says the R class battleships would not be used as they were too vulnerable to air attack, when the only BB used against the invasion fleet, was an R class?



I don't think that's a reason not to use them. There were just far better and much more numerous options available.

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Feb 22, 2019)

Maybe they would have used them, but the plan ive seen did not favour their commitment. There were several different plans, but what is true is that after September 4th, Adm Forbes made the decision not to commit his BBs unless absolutely necessary. most of the heavy ships were given a screening brief to watch what the capital ships of DKM were intended to do. if they were used in a mass breakout, the Home fleet was instructed to deal with that, if the German used them in some way away from the main invasion beaches (which is what they was actually planned for them) the best and heaviest ships would be used to counter such a move. Forbes had resolved by early September that battleships were not needed to counter the main front. The admiralty was not 100% certain what the german plans were.....it was possible the germans might break up their invasion fleet into fast and slow components for example. It was estimated that if a fast division was formed, it could cross the channel in 2days, with embarkation and form up taking about 24 hours and disembarkation taking 3 days. If the Germans opted for the mass assault (which is what the army favoured) across the so called broad front, it would take a week to get into position, plus the form up and disembarkation component, the operation would take the best part of 10 days. The R class were kept close as a back up I believe.....if something went wrong with the light forces they were a reserve force, that could be called upon if needed, especially if the DKM northern feint had any success. I have seen accounts as well that in the latter stages of the Summer, the Admiralty became very concerned at the shipping losses in the western approaches. so many DDs had been pulled back out of the Atlantic that the losses due to u-Boats took a very alarrming trend upwards. Forbes began pushing for a reduction in DDs committed to the home defences by late September (I think it was then)

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## stona (Feb 22, 2019)

Forbes never believed a German invasion was possible. I believe this is something he had in common with some senior officers of the KM.

In June 1940 he was arguing that, _"History has proved beyond all shadow of doubt that invasion is to all intents and purposes impossible without local control of the sea."_

He also pointed out that even with such control and with minimal Norwegian resistance the Norwegian campaign had cost the Germans thousands of men, some of their most modern ships and many aircraft.

Forbes argued that if the Germans launched an invasion it would be _"a great opportunity."_ He envisaged exactly the situation which played out at Sandhurst, the Army holding up the invasion until the Navy cut its supply lines. He was so confident, remember that this is June 1940, that he further argued that _"no first line troops should be kept in England if required elsewhere."_ He was concerned about German mining in an effort to help interdict Britain's lines of communication, and suggested that_ "all small craft now allocated to inshore squadrons for invasion be diverted to sweeping."_

He certainly doesn't sound like a worried man. It is fair to say that his report caused some alarm at the Admiralty, where this view was certainly not shared by the majority.

Forbes was also arguing for destroyers to be released from anti-invasion duties at this time, the height of invasion fever, and continued to do so throughout the summer. He even had Churchill's backing in May/June/July following a rapid rise in shipping losses. Churchill argued to Pound that the losses were _"largely due to the shortage of destroyers through invasion precautions",_ which is exactly what Forbes would have told him. The Admiralty was unpersuaded. Forbes wouldn't get his boats back until the end of October.

Cheers

Steve

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## parsifal (Feb 22, 2019)

Thanks Steve, I did not realise that Forbes had wanted to start transfers back to the western approaches quite so early on.

I agree completely that Forbes was not overly anxious about Sea lion.


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## JAG88 (May 12, 2019)

I know, old thread, but I think I can add something:



Shortround6 said:


> The Germans seemed to have real problem with turrets. and lets not use the excuse of the planes being too small. The Grumman TBF used power turret
> View attachment 474528
> 
> and the Blenheim used a powered mount/turret (not full 360 degree rotation.) we will leave the Defiant and Roc out of this.
> ...



Fw 57 in 1936, lost to the Bf 110:







Ju 86:






This one was actually used as the Ju 89s tail turret as well, with the same MG 15:






But yeah, they did have an odd problem with them, I think they just decided to move straight onto remote turrets, the first one appearing in 1941 IIRC.



> The Ju 89 was non-starter. whatever it's attributes were in 1937 it's day had come and gone by 1940
> View attachment 474529
> 
> It used a wing of roughly 35-66% larger than the 5 most common Allied 4 engine bombers and 53% larger than the FW 200. Aerodynamically this was a 4 engine JU 86 and not a 4 engine Ju 88. Note the Junkers "double wing" as used on the Ju 52. Drag is going to be way higher than any of those six aircraft.
> Look up pictures of tail gun positions for the JU 290, most or all of the planes _in service _used a single gun in a manual mount several years after 1940. There were powered mounts turrets but they all seem to be experimental.



Couldnt the Ju 89 had been developed enough? It was larger than most WW2 bombers and in 1939 the 2nd prototype would take a 10.000Kg payload to 7.000m+, so it did have capacity to spare. I wouldnt expect it to be a world beater, but it would certainly be a better proposition than using Ju 88s for strategic work.

Funny thing is, large as it was, it evolved into the even larger Ju 290, an aircraft only barely smaller than the B29.


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