# Hurricane Mk IIC vs. A6M2 Zero



## Soundbreaker Welch? (May 28, 2009)

Which of them do you think would win in a fight?


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## renrich (May 29, 2009)

I voted for depends on pilots. It would be a difficult fight for the Hurricane, however, with the Zeke having all the performance advantages. The Hurricane would have some advantage in survivability and firepower but if the IJN pilot was experienced, the Hurricane may never have a chance to get any hits in.


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## Colin1 (May 29, 2009)

The Hurricane IIC seems to have a speed advantage, it just doesn't look big enough to be a decisive one, with little choice but to try and make a fight of it, the A6M2 will be all over the Hurricane.

A6M2 *:Name:* Hurricane IIC
3,704lbs (1,680Kgs) *:Empty Weight:* 5,785lbs (2,624Kgs)
5,313lbs (2,410Kgs) *:Take-off Weight:* 8,710lbs (3,951Kgs)
316mph (509Km/h) *:Max Speed:* 328mph (528Km/h)

The Hurricane's giving away over 3,000lbs (1,361Kgs) to the A6M2 loaded for take-off, that's going to hurt in a furball.

Zeke


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## Vassili Zaitzev (May 29, 2009)

I have to say the zero. The hurricane may have the better firepower and survivability, but the zero has the greater maneuverability, and in a dogfight that matters more. Now, if the hurricane would use defensive team tactics, like the Thach weave(beam defense maneuver), then the hurricane would have to edge.


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## Doughboy (May 29, 2009)

Zero..Maneuverability means alot in a dogfight(as said above^)


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## claidemore (May 30, 2009)

Doughboy said:


> Zero..Maneuverability means alot in a dogfight(as said above^)



The Zero would have a maneuverability advantage at low speed, the Hurricane would be more manueverable at higher speeds. 

Hurricane IIC was 10 mph faster than A6M2, and 50 mph faster in a dive. It weighed 2000 lbs more than the Zero did empty (heavier construction = tougher?), overall climb rate was only 300 ft/min less, and ceiling was 3000 ft higher. 

Basically the same things that worked historically in the case of the Wildcat vs Zero could be used in this hypothetical matchup of Hurricane vs Zero. So it boils down to the pilots.


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## rank amateur (May 30, 2009)

An experienced Hurricane fighter would have know better than to get dragged into a dogfight with a Zeke. Unfortunately it took some time before this was realised, specially by former battle of Brittain pilots who opted to use the same tactics agains the Japanese as they had so succesfuly used against the Germans


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## Demetrious (Jun 1, 2009)

I almost voted "depends on the pilots-" simply because the Hurricane can, like anything else, out-roll a Zero easily and thus defeat it in the scissors handily. (Which gives it a badly-needed ace against a plane that can out-climb, out-turn, and out-accelerate it.) However, I ended up saying "Hurricane" when I remembered that old anecdote about a Zero being superior to a Wildcat in 1v1, but inferior in a team dogfight. War is won in numbers, and with a wingman watching your back and working with you, you can force the enemy to engage you more on your terms. The Thatch Weave is one example, but when your enemy is only just slightly faster or as fast as you, you can usually extend to about a mile away before they manage to reverse, and thus roar back in for another head-on pass. (A smart Zero driver would climb swiftly to a high perch and then wait for you to do something stupid, like trying that again.)

Then there's also the fact that air combat is about _winning,_ not about dueling. That's how Erich Hartmann scored so many kills- by ambushing enemies, then running like hell. Classic boom-and-zoom. And the higher operational ceiling, dive speed, and general sturdiness of the Hurricane enabled tactics like that. 

In this respect, I'd say that it has less to do with individual _pilots_ and more to do with their higher-up commanders setting the overall strategy and doctrine.


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## Hollywood (Jun 1, 2009)

If you'r comparing airplanes purely one to one the Zero wins. That's why I voted for it. In a dogfight it depends on pilot quality/experence and who saw who first.


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## JoeB (Jun 1, 2009)

rank amateur said:


> An experienced Hurricane fighter would have know better than to get dragged into a dogfight with a Zeke. Unfortunately it took some time before this was realised, specially by former battle of Brittain pilots who opted to use the same tactics agains the Japanese as they had so succesfuly used against the Germans


In the right circumstances Hurricanes might have been able to compete on even terms with Zeroes, but it was never demonstrated in action. Hurricanes and Zeroes met in combat 6 times for which both sides' losses are known (and only another 1 or 2 more where both sides' losses aren't known). The score in those combats was 6:38 in favor of the Zero, and the Zeroes won every combat. 5 in 1942 over Malaya, DEI and Ceylon, one other 5 December 1943 in the JAAF/JNAF combined raid on Calcutta, 0:3; Army Type 1 fighters downed or force the crash landings of another 6 Hurricanes in that raid also without loss to themselves (the Hurricanes downed 1 Army bomber). 

Even using the Type 1 as proxy for the Zero, probably an optimistic assumption from the Hurricane's POV, the Hurricane's record v the Type 1 was also disastrous in the opening campaigns of 1942 and even as of late 1943 the Type 1's in Burma were at least holding their own in actual outcomes v Hurricanes, outscoring them more often than not, though by then there were at least some cases of combats actually won by Hurricanes v Type 1's (needless to say, measuring by British claims the Hurricane was pretty successful v the Type 1 by then, measuring by Japanese claims the Type 1 was overwhelmingly successful).

'Depends on pilots', of course that's the correct answer for almost any match up unless completely one sided, but there's no actual operational evidence of the Hurricane performing well against the Zero in combat, or even v the Type 1 on a consistent basis. The much better record of the F4F v the Zero is not proof IMO that the Hurricane would have done as well even with the same pilots and situation, because it neglects the real possibility that less tangible performance factors put the Hurricane at more of a relative disadvantage than in appears to be on paper.

Joe


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## renrich (Jun 1, 2009)

JB, your posts, to me, raise a very interesting question. Most of the time, an attitude(among our members but also among most historians) seems to be prevelant that the air war in the ETO in the early going as well as later was where the "First Teams" were operating and what was going on in the Pacific was happening with, at least, inferior air craft, and probably overall with inferior pilots. Is it possible, in the 41-42 period that the aircraft in use in the PTO as well as the pilots were at least equal to those in the ETO and possibly superior?(pardon the compound sentences, sometimes I feel like Cormac McCarthy, without his talent)


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## Waynos (Jun 1, 2009)

ren, that view may, possibly, stem from the RAF's early stance, taken up after testing types like the Buffalo and P-40, and regarding certain homegrown types like the Wellesley, to get them 'out of harms way' during 1939-40. The quite decent P-40 going to the ME to fight the Italians and the Buffalo going to Singapore where there was (at that time) nobody to fight. Later on of course with Mk Viii Spits, Beaufighters and top class US types in theatre that had all changed, but as they say, mud sticks, so the out of date view could have persisted until long after it was no longer true?


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## JoeB (Jun 1, 2009)

Waynos said:


> ren, that view may, possibly, stem from the RAF's early stance, taken up after testing types like the Buffalo and P-40, and regarding certain homegrown types like the Wellesley, to get them 'out of harms way' during 1939-40. The quite decent P-40 going to the ME to fight the Italians and the Buffalo going to Singapore where there was (at that time) nobody to fight. Later on of course with Mk Viii Spits, Beaufighters and top class US types in theatre that had all changed, but as they say, mud sticks, so the out of date view could have persisted until long after it was no longer true?


Late war Allied types had generally good success in the Pacific but that was late war . Ca. 1942 the Hurricane wasn't the best British fighter, but the best British fighter of that time, the Spit V, had plenty of problems of its own against Japanese fighters in 1943; its combat exchange ratio v the Zero in 1943 was no better than that of the Hurricane in 1942-43. The Beaufighter actually also had quite a mixed air-air record in the Far East, it suffered a 1:2 kill ratio even against float Zeroes when flying from Australia v the Japanese float plane bases in the DEI in 1943. I wouldn't assume that just any Spitfire units replacing Hurricanes in 1942 in the Far East in 41-42 would have done much better. Using the proven best units or assembling some kind of 'all star team', maybe.

Re: what Renrich suggested, the fundamental difference between Japanese and British air arms in late 1941 was that one was basically a peacetime type force in having lots of high hour pilots, seasoned with some combat experience in China. But there hadn't been enough attrition and war time expansion to turn it into what British units typically were, full of relatively low hour mass produced war time pilots with a leavening of more (combat) experienced men. The Japanese combination of the best features of peace time (high hours) and combat experience was pretty close to optimal. Those units were hard to beat. It wasn't just a matter of simple shift of tactics against them and they'd turn into a pumpkin, that's IMO a long left over echo of Allied morale boosting propaganda during the war. What changed things was mainly attrition of the Japanese over time and their inferiority in building and expanding war time type air forces, related to which was more and more overwhelming Allied numerical superiority, and better Allied planes. It was helped along by tactics but the emphasis on tactics has its root I believe in the need to build the confidence of Allied pilots when things weren't going well, and is often over-emphasized today.

A case in point is the 64th Sentai JAAF, which flew in Burma for most of the war. They actually suffered an unfavorable kill ratio v the AVG quite early in the war. But they learned from it, and were generally more successful against RAF fighter units in 1943 than they'd been against the AVG* in first half of '42. But ultimately the Japanese fighter contingent in Burma was just too heavily outnumbered to accomplish anything, and once the Allies became really active (the air war there was pretty slow placed for a lot of 42 and 43 after the initial intense combat in 42) such units were attrited down. And again the Allied a/c improved, and Japanese ones less so: the 64th mainly used improved versions of the Type 1 through the end of the war.

*which did use tactics specifically intended against the Japanese, but which was also staffed by mainly quite senior ex-(or temporarily ex) US military pilots, even though almost none had previous combat experience. A cross section of AVG pilots didn't look much like a typical RAF 1942 unit, let alone a USAAF 1942 units which was typically war time mass produced pilots led by a few more experienced flyers who didn't even have combat experience. USN units didn't have any combat experience either, but their flying experience level was less diluted compared to peacetime than the RAF or USAAF in 1942. They somewhat more resembled the AVG, and it's probably a reason they also did relatively well against the Japanese. Their specialized anti-Zero tactics only became widespread in 1943, so that's less of an explanation for their success than the case of the AVG.

Joe


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## Wildcat (Jun 2, 2009)

JoeB said:


> The Beaufighter actually also had quite a mixed air-air record in the Far East, it suffered a 1:2 kill ratio even against float Zeroes when flying from Australia v the Japanese float plane bases in the DEI in 1943.
> Joe



Joe, is it possible for you to post a list of Japanese losses v's Beaufighters in this theatre? Would love to compare data, as off the top of my head I didn't think RAAF Beaufighters suffered too greatly against Japanese floatplanes.


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## JoeB (Jun 2, 2009)

Wildcat said:


> Joe, is it possible for you to post a list of Japanese losses v's Beaufighters in this theatre? Would love to compare data, as off the top of my head I didn't think RAAF Beaufighters suffered too greatly against Japanese floatplanes.


The conclusive engagements by Beaufighters against 934th AG Type 2 Float Fighters ('Rufe' or 'float Zero') in DEI were:
26 April '43: 1 Beau lost, no Type 2's
24 July: 1 Beau lost, no Type 2's
17 August: 1 Type 2 lost
21 August: 2 Beaus lost 1 Type 2 lost (collision between Beaufighters)
31 August: 1 Beau lost
21 Nov: 1 Beau lost, 1 Type 2 lost

Total 6 Beaufighters lost in combat v. Type 2's, 3 vice versa. Not heavy losses but lackluster performance v a not all that formidable opponent for single engine land plane fighters. Comparatives are P-40/P-39 v Type 2 in the Aleutians, 7:1 in favor of the landplanes, F4F/P-39 v Type 2 in the Solomons 1942, 14:0 (one F4F was downed by Type 0 obs seaplane, 'Pete' in one of those combats). Although P-38 v Type 2 in the Aleutians was also unfavorable to the twin, 2:5; it also included 2 P-38 losses to collision in air combat which I believe should generally be credited to the opposing fighters.

Joe


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## Wildcat (Jun 3, 2009)

Interesting Joe. I don't suppose you have the known losses for all Japanese floatplanes against RAAF Beaus, ie Jakes and Petes as well? I'm aware of the Beaufighter claims, however with some I can't distinguish whether they were destroyed in air combat or strafed on the ground.


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## dragonandhistail (Jun 5, 2009)

I've got to go with the A6M2 solely on performance stats. But I do agree that a veteran Hurrican pilot that knows the strengths of the aircraft would hold his own or win.


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## JoeB (Jun 6, 2009)

Wildcat said:


> Interesting Joe. I don't suppose you have the known losses for all Japanese floatplanes against RAAF Beaus, ie Jakes and Petes as well? I'm aware of the Beaufighter claims, however with some I can't distinguish whether they were destroyed in air combat or strafed on the ground.


A more complete chronology of 31 Sdn Beaufighters v 934th AG floatplanes including all combats where either side had an outright loss, in air or on water, all floatplane types. The combats mentioned before are marked *. Some other combats had claims but no total losses on either side, those are omitted. All incidents recorded by 31 sdn are also recorded by the 934th, there's no real known v unknown issue with one exception I noted.

The sources are Air Enthusiast No. 31 "Fighting Floatplanes of the Imperial Japanese Navy", "Soleil Levant sur L'Australie" by Bernard Baeza and the original 'tactical operations records'* of the 934th Air Group online at JACAR.go.jp 

*26 April '43: 1 Beau lost, no Type 2's
6 May 1943: Beau's destroy 4 Type 2's and 3 Type 0 Recon Seaplanes (Jakes) on the water at 934th’s base in Aroe islands DEI, one Beau downed by AA. 
11 May: Beau downs Type 0 Recon Seaplane (Jake) near the Wessel Islands off N. Australian coast 
12 June: 7 Beaus v 3 Type 2's and 2 Type 0 Observation Seaplanes (Pete): 1 Type 0 downed 2 KIA, 1 heavily damaged 2 WIA; 2 Type 2's medium damage; no Beau losses. Also 4 Type 2 and 1 Type 0 Recon destroyed on the water. 
*24 July: 1 Beau lost, no Type 2's
10 August: 2 Spits of 452 sdn down Jake, damage escorting Rufe, off N Australian coast, per AE31; not mentioned in Baeza, and a web source has Reginald L. Gordon of 31sdn claiming damage to one Pete that day. But 934th's report has that pair of a/c both returning safely and the Type 2 claiming a Spit, only air action of the day: so it seems it was the only Spitfire v Type 2 combat and inconclusive.
*17 August: 1 Type 2 lost [edit, one Beau total loss to fuel exhaustion; another crashlanded same cause eventually returned to service; might be counted as resulting from fighting off attacking Type 2 and Type 0 Obs, which claimed 5 plus a probable]
*21 August: 2 Beaus lost 1 Type 2 lost (collision between Beaufighters), also note 4 claims by the floatplanes, credited to a single Type 2 pilot in most sources, which may have caused the collision, Type 0 Obs (Pete) were also involved, one slightly damaged.
*30 August (I previously said 31 August, an error in AE31): 1 Beau lost. 3 Type 2 and 2 Type 0 2 seat, claimed 1 Beau plus 1 dam, 1 Type 0 obs. sank, 1 Type 0 slightly damaged
*21 Nov: 1 Beau lost, 1 Type 2 lost

*as JACAR translates the term, also sometimes referred to in English by the transliteration of the Japanese term, 'kodochosho'; the basic operations record of JNAF units: a form with a sheet or two for each day's ops giving the number and type of a/c engaged, the pilots' names, ammo expended, claims, damage and losses, times etc. and various scribbled notes that form a cryptic narrative of the operation in question.

Joe


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## Soren (Jun 7, 2009)

The A6M2, no doubt about it.


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## Wildcat (Jun 9, 2009)

G'Day Joe, many thanks for the list mate, makes for interesting reading! Regarding the action of August 10, I have P/O Coombes and F/O Young (both 452 sqn) claiming the shared destruction of a Pete and claiming a second Pete as a probable. You can read their combat reports here - http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/flight-test-data/spitfire-vs-different-models-zeros-9133.html Note they both identify the ea as two Petes. As for Gordon, 31sqn never flew a mission against the floatplanes on this day, however on August 11th they did. On this raid the squadron claimed one floatplane "extensively" damaged in aerial combat and one damged on the ground. I also have a reference to Gordon making a claim on this day, however this is obviously incorrect.
Also see the above link for the beaufighter combat reports for the August 17th action.
Incidently, Beauforts from 7 sqn RAAF also claimed a handful of Jakes around this period. W/Cmdr Parson's crew damaged one on 15 Sep, while F/O Legges crew claimed a Jake destroyed on the 20th. Two months later on 11th of Nov, F/L Cox's crew claimed the destruction of a second Jake. Any info on these actions?


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## JoeB (Jun 9, 2009)

Wildcat said:


> G'Day Joe, many thanks for the list mate, makes for interesting reading! Regarding the action of August 10, I have P/O Coombes and F/O Young (both 452 sqn) claiming the shared destruction of a Pete and claiming a second Pete as a probable. You can read their combat reports here - http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/flight-test-data/spitfire-vs-different-models-zeros-9133.html Note they both identify the ea as two Petes. As for Gordon, 31sqn never flew a mission against the floatplanes on this day, however on August 11th they did. On this raid the squadron claimed one floatplane "extensively" damaged in aerial combat and one damged on the ground. I also have a reference to Gordon making a claim on this day, however this is obviously incorrect.
> Also see the above link for the beaufighter combat reports for the August 17th action.
> Incidently, Beauforts from 7 sqn RAAF also claimed a handful of Jakes around this period. W/Cmdr Parson's crew damaged one on 15 Sep, while F/O Legges crew claimed a Jake destroyed on the 20th. Two months later on 11th of Nov, F/L Cox's crew claimed the destruction of a second Jake. Any info on these actions?


10 August:The RAAF reported time of 2359Z (ie. GMT) is not that far from the Japanese one of 0910 (I'm not sure exactly which zone that is, but it's local morning roughly speaking in both cases). There's not much question about the types which are indicated in JNAF shorthand, plus the 3 man crew of the Type 0 Recon and single pilot of the Type 2 are named, latter was Lt T Ikeda, the 934th's CO. Encountered 3 Spitfires claimed to have downed one. Again note the AE31 article (by Izawa and Shores) says the 'Jake' was downed, and on closer inspection there are other barely visible illegible entries in the report, and it actually doesn't give a return time for this flight, nor do I see the 'Jake' crew members featured in later flights (though Ikeda does appear later), so the report does not refutes a loss, but definitely a 'Jake' if so.
11 August: 934th's report shows 3 Type 2 (Rufe) and 2 Type 0 Observation (Pete) intercepting 6 Beaufighters (the correct number); 2 Japanese a/c damaged (it is not stated, or implied AFAICS, which type). Baeza draws the reasonable conclusion the Type 0's were damaged since that's what the other side claimed. The Air Enthusiast article but not Baeza says one Beaufighter was damaged. The Japanese claimed 1 Beaufighter downed plus 2 'probable''.
15 Sep: the first Type 0 Recon flight of the morning reported encountering a Beaufighter and was damaged.
20 Sep: there's an illegible entry for one Type 0 Recon flight and no return time given.
11 Nov: the second Type 0 Recon flight of the morning didn't return

None of the Beaufort incidents are covered in Baeza, and the AE article is mainly about Type 2's.

Joe


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## Soren (Jul 5, 2009)

Colin1,

The top speed of the A6M2 M.21 was 533 km/h, so it was just as fast as the Hurricane.


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## Vincenzo (Jul 5, 2009)

i think around 550 km/h (need check) the common figure ~530 km/h was not a max power

overboosted speed ~555 km/h, normal max ~508 km/h (maybe using british termonology at combat power and at climb power)


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## fibus (Jul 5, 2009)

I wonder how the hurricane compares to the F4f Wildcat?


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## Colin1 (Jul 5, 2009)

Soren said:


> The top speed of the A6M2 M.21 was 533 km/h, so it was just as fast as the Hurricane.





Vincenzo said:


> i think around 550 km/h (need check) the common figure ~530 km/h was not a max power



Well
which ever one it was, it wasn't good news for the Hurricane


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## BombTaxi (Jul 5, 2009)

This is a very interesting match-up. The historical record speaks for itself - but the Hurri should have had a chance. it could defeat the Zero in a scissor fight, and the 4 20mm cannon fitted to the Hurri would make an almighty mess of any Zero they hit. OTOH, the Hurri was a tough old bird. The Bf109s of the BoB era carried a very similar armament to the Zero (2x 20mm cannon, 2x rifle caliber MGs) and Hurris were able to take some punishment from this battery. It would be very interesting to know the circumstances of the historical encounters - my gut feel is that the Japanese victories were helped by attacking from a position of advantage and maybe even suceeding in bouncing the Hurris. If the boot had been on the other foot, the Hurris might well have been able to do some serious damage with superior firepower and the ability to extend away in a dive - assuming the Zeros didn't catch them on the way back up...


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## Marcel (Jul 6, 2009)

BombTaxi said:


> This is a very interesting match-up. The historical record speaks for itself - but the Hurri should have had a chance. it could defeat the Zero in a scissor fight, and the 4 20mm cannon fitted to the Hurri would make an almighty mess of any Zero they hit.



Were there canon-armed Hurricanes in the far east? I know of the MK.IIB's which had 12 MG's.


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## Wildcat (Jul 6, 2009)

Sure were Marcel, I have the following squadrons being equipped with MkIIc's in Burma:-
RAF
5, 11, 28, 34, 42, 60, 113, and 123 squadron
IAF
1 and 9.
I may have missed some, please feel free to add to the list.


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## Soren (Jul 6, 2009)

I'm very unsure of wether a Hurricane can win a scissors fight with a Zero. At low to medium speeds the roll rate turn rate of the Zero were excellent. At at low alt the Zero was also faster than the Hurricane, and possibly also at high alt. 

A comparison between the early A6M2 and the later A6M5:

A6M2: 
Top speed: 533 km/h
Climb rate: 3,150 ft/min

A6M5:
Top speed: 570 km/h
Climb rate: 4,500 ft/min

As one can see the only big improvement was in climb rate, where the Zero stayed competitive till the end of the war. In speed however it was quickly overtaken, ad by 1943 the USN's fighters were all faster.


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## dennis420b (Jun 27, 2010)

I have to go with the Zero. But only in the one on one, with equal pilots. Tactics and operational conditions can change everything.


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## ppopsie (Jun 27, 2010)

I wonder if the Merlin XX was fitted to the A6M2 airframe provided if a certain measure was taken to offset the CG problem. Engineer Jiro Horikoshi, chief designer of the Mitsubishi A6M fighter mentioned in the book "零戦" that he and the Navy badly wanted an engine with better high altitude capability for the Zero.


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## buffnut453 (Jun 27, 2010)

JoeB said:


> In the right circumstances Hurricanes might have been able to compete on even terms with Zeroes, but it was never demonstrated in action. Hurricanes and Zeroes met in combat 6 times for which both sides' losses are known (and only another 1 or 2 more where both sides' losses aren't known). The score in those combats was 6:38 in favor of the Zero, and the Zeroes won every combat. 5 in 1942 over Malaya, DEI and Ceylon, one other 5 December 1943 in the JAAF/JNAF combined raid on Calcutta, 0:3; Army Type 1 fighters downed or force the crash landings of another 6 Hurricanes in that raid also without loss to themselves (the Hurricanes downed 1 Army bomber).
> 
> Even using the Type 1 as proxy for the Zero, probably an optimistic assumption from the Hurricane's POV, the Hurricane's record v the Type 1 was also disastrous in the opening campaigns of 1942 and even as of late 1943 the Type 1's in Burma were at least holding their own in actual outcomes v Hurricanes, outscoring them more often than not, though by then there were at least some cases of combats actually won by Hurricanes v Type 1's (needless to say, measuring by British claims the Hurricane was pretty successful v the Type 1 by then, measuring by Japanese claims the Type 1 was overwhelmingly successful).
> 
> ...



Joe,

We've been around and around this subject before. The Hurricane did have a poor performance against the Type 1 in 1942-43 but in the overwhelming number of engagements, the Hurricanes were outnumbered and at an altitude disadvantage. As I keep banging on (and on, and on, and on) about, tactical conditions are pivotal and probably represent the "less tangible" factors to which you allude.

Cheers,
Mark


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## renrich (Jul 12, 2010)

Just finished reading "Bloody Shambles" volume two which some on this forum have quoted from before, especially Joe B. Quite an eye opener. It appears that the Hurricane was inferior not only to the A6M but to the Ki 43, which only mounted two 12.7 MM MGs and had a Vmax of 320 mph, and also had it's hands full with the Ki27, a fixed gear fighter with a Vmax of 286 mph and had the awesome firepower of two 7.7 mgs. The Japanese pilots knew that one bullet in the coolant system of the Hurricane was sufficient to put the Hurricane out of action and they aimed for that system.

In fact, in the section about the attack on Ceylon, it was noted that the only fighter the British had in that area that had close to an even chance against the A6M was the Martlet, which unfortunately did not get into action during that battle.

Kind of gives one a new perspective about the debates online in this forum about fighter armament.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 12, 2010)

Or a new perspective on pilot skill. 

that one sides pilots flying a slower aircraft with two .303 mgs could aim for and hit a portion of the enemy aircraft only a few feet square more often than their opponents, armed with 8/12 such MGs or with 4 cannon could hit the unarmored cockpit or non- self sealing fuel tanks or oil cooler of the Claude. 

How long before that one bullet in the radiator put the Hurricane out of action?
10 seconds?
20 seconds?
3 minutes?


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## Colin1 (Jul 12, 2010)

Shortround6 said:


> How long before that one bullet in the radiator put the Hurricane out of action?
> 10 seconds?
> 20 seconds?
> 3 minutes?


I'd give him 15 - 25 seconds, depending on how hard he was gunning it before he got hit


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## renrich (Jul 13, 2010)

At that stage of the war, (first six months) the IJN pilots were among the best trained in the world. More often than not, however, the Allied fighters in SE Asia were pitted against JAAF pilots and many of the British pilots were veterans of the war in Europe, North Africa and the Med. What is interesting to me is that the Japanese fighters, except for the A6M, fitted with what was considered sub-standard armament by European standards, were quite successful in shooting down, "rugged" fighters like the Hurricane and the P40 and bombers such as Blenheims, Hudsons and all the other types of aircraft the Allies used. As far as tactics were concerned the IJN pilots were trained to use the same tactics in their A6Ms as the AVG had been trained in by Chennault. That is to say, Boom and Zoom tactics, not dogfighting as popularly assumed although the A6M excelled in dogfighting.


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## buffnut453 (Jul 13, 2010)

Actually, the IJAAF units the Hurricanes were facing were amongst the most combat experienced - the 64th and 50th Sentais. During most combats, the Ki-43s significantly outnumbered the Hurricanes and for most of 1942 it was the IJAAF which took the offensive to the British and hence could concentrate their fighter force whereas the RAF had to defend everywhere at once. With numerical advantage, and frequently a tactical altitude advantage, it's not too surprising that the Ki-43 bested the Hurricanes during 1942-43.


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## proton45 (Jul 13, 2010)

I have "sometimes" wondered what effect it would have had on the war if Japan had been able to produce more A6M fighter's and trained pilots. Even with the "zero's" shortcomings, Im wondering if greater numbers of trained pilots and "fresh" A6M fighters might have influenced the tactical outcome of some "late war" engagements...


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## renrich (Jul 15, 2010)

It was stated over and over again by British pilots that the Hurricane was inferior to the Ki43 in air to air combat, not to mention the A6M. In 43-44-45, when the tide turned and the Allies took the offensive and had numbers advantages the Hurricane, (those not replaced by P47s) were continually outclassed by Ki43s. Additionally the Hurricane, in SE Asia, had servicability issues caused by glycol leaks.


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## Colin1 (Jul 24, 2010)

An interesting extract from Terence Kelly's book *Spitfire and Hurricane Pilots at War*:



_These men no doubt came to accept the fable, which has long since taken root elsewhere, that the Hurricane, on which no doubt initially they pinned great hopes, was outclassed by the Zero. (Incidentally, much of the fighting believed to have been between Hurricane and Zero was in fact between Hurricane and Hayabusa. In many cases which follow where the name Zero is used, the aircraft could well have been an Oscar).

I have read book after book in which this nonsense about the superiority of the Japanese fighters is written. It simply was not so. The Hurricane was not outclassed by the Zero, or as we knew it, the Navy O or Navy Nought, nor by the Hayabusa. The Hurricane was at least the match of either machine and had the battles between them been fought on equal terms would have coped quite comfortably. Such was my opinion at the time and so it remains to the present day and although the majority of pundits appear to disagree I do at least have the support of the Commander of the 14th Army in Burma, Field Marshall Sir William Slim who in his splendid book Defeat into Victory states that: 'Speaking generally, all the Japanese fighters were inferior in performance to the Hurricane with the exception of the Navy O which was approximately equal to them.'

It is true that the Allied fighter squadrons in Singapore and the Dutch East Indies were largely eliminated by their Japanese opposite numbers but to discover why one has to look far beyond a comparison of the qualities of the aircraft involved. The Japanese won the air battle because they had a huge superiority in numbers (normally of the order of 8:1), because almost invariably they had the advantage of height and because most of their pilots were battle-hardened men - although admittedly against only negligible resistance from the Chinese. Over Singapore, the bomber formations were escorted by 50, 60, 70 or more Japanese fighters and, because of the ludicrous decisions of those who gave the orders, against these were pitted mere handfuls of Hurricanes as they became available for service. There were never 100 Hurricanes available for flying in Singapore, there were never 50 or even 20. There might perhaps, at best, be 12 at any juncture and usually there were less.

The first time 258 Sqn engaged the enemy, out of 48 Hurricanes which had flown off the Indomitable, exactly 8 were ready for combat. These 8, of whose pilots perhaps not more than two or three had ever fired their guns in anger before, had to climb up to attack a bomber force which was protected by a swarm of Japanese fighters just waiting for them. 2 Hurricanes were shot down and three of the remainder so badly mauled as to be, for the time being at least, unserviceable. In the course of a single hour, 8 had become 3. This was to become the pattern: Hurricanes taking off in petty numbers, often in the teeth of strafing fighters to engage swarms of the enemy comfortably ready to receive and deal with them.

As to the qualities of the two aircraft, the Zero certainly had advantages. It was manoeuvrable, it was marginally faster up to heights of about 15,000ft and it had a far longer range. Its mixed armament of machine guns and cannons roughly matched the 12 (but later 8 when 4 were removed to improve manoeuvrability and speed) machine guns of the Hurricane and while there are arguments about relative rates of climb, I have it on good authority that pilots from my own squadron escaped from Zeros by climbing away from them. The Hurricane for its part had several very distinct advantages. It had a better ceiling, the aircraft could take punishment which would have made the lightly-built Zero disintegrate, it was faster at higher altitudes and the pilot had the protection of resealing fuel tanks and an armour plate shield behind his back.

Thus it will be seen that tactics were the vital thing, that pilots must avoid giving battle in conditions where the advantages lay with the enemy. The Hurricane pilot must not start mixing it in dogfights at lower altitudes, the Zero pilot must avoid finding himself outmanoeuvred in terms of height. Early on this was little if at all appreciated by the Allies and possibly not by the Japanese. When my own squadron's 8 Hurricanes took off to challenge that first Japanese air armada not only were they force majeure choosing a battle ground which was the Navy O's ideal, but they were doing so on the assumption that should a dogfight ensue, the Hurricane being (as they had not been disabused) the world's most manoeuvrable modern fighter, the advantage would be theirs - for no one had briefed us on the Zero or even heard of the Hayabusa. When we flew off the Indomitable, it was to clear the Japanese wooden biplanes from the skies. I beg the reader not to believe this to be exaggeration.

On Indomitable, we knew nothing of either aircraft and the first intimation the Zero even existed was gleaned amongst the gloomy, defeatist attitude which hung like a pall over Singapore on that evening when we landed at Seletar a mere 36 hours before we were to be in action.

So we were dribbled away piecemeal. Hurricanes would be ferried up in batches from Java only for some to be damaged landing across the deep ruts left by Flying Fortresses at the midway refuelling airfield known as P2 near Palembang or jumped by waiting Navy O's or Hayabusas whilst taking off or landing. Strength could never be built up sufficiently for properly planned defence. And tactics were hardly a matter for discussion when the one thought hammering at the mind of each of perhaps half a dozen scrambled pilots racing with thudding hearts to their Hurricanes was that with a horde of Japanese mere minutes away from Singapore he must somehow gain height before they came down en masse and clobbered him.

The alternative to this useless waste of valuable men and machines to no real purpose, was, to my knowledge at the time, put forward by only one senior RAF officer, Wing Cdr Harold Maguire, who, as previously mentioned had been my CO at 56 OTU at Sutton Bridge and was now in command of the proposed 266 Wing to be formed from 232, 242, 258 and 605 Sqns. His plan was that the entire force of Hurricanes should be withheld until all aircraft were operational, all pilots locally knowledgeable and a coherent tactical scheme had been formulated. Had his wise counsel been accepted, his plan adopted, quite different pages would have been written in the Operational Record Books._

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## Colin1 (Jul 24, 2010)

_For, given the right conditions, for example the conditions available to the Battle of Britain pilots (which is to say, reasonable parity of numbers and sufficient warning to enable the formations to climb to maximum, or near-maximum altitudes) it is quite clear that the Japanese pilots would have been faced with an insoluble problem. They would not have been able to attack the Hurricanes until the Hurricane pilots chose to descend to lower altitudes and after an attack on themselves, or on the bombers they were escorting, they would not have been able to follow the Hurricanes down because beyond a certain speed (which as will be seen the Hurricanes could accept with ease) the Zero's wings would simply have folded up. It is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which shall we say 27 Japanese bombers escorted by 50 Zeros are attacked by an equal number of Hurricanes working to the previously worked-out plan of a series of flights of say 10 aircraft which attack in turn, half-roll, pull out with maximum G, clear the area, climb and resume the process.

Sadly, no such opportunity occurred. The maximum number of Hurricanes I ever heard of in an operational flight was 14 and by the time (when we got back to Java where at least we usually had ample warning) and were able to use these tactics, like Scott for a time in Malta, we had 4 aircraft left.

It may be interesting to pause for a moment and speculate on how this fiction that the Zero outclassed the Hurricane came about. The only people who can advise on the relative merits of the two fighters in combat are the people who flew them in combat. When in the Battle of Britain, pilots returned, the first man they went to see was the Squadron Intelligence Officer who took it all down and out of the mass of information he, and all the other squadrons, collected, a picture could be built up from which the various strengths and weaknesses of the enemy aircraft could be deduced.

If we had Intelligence Officers with us in Singapore, they were conspicuous by their absence. Certainly on no occasion that I recall did anyone take down any notes of the various actions. Life wasn't of that order for it wasn't that kind of war. Life was to do with jumping from an aircraft after landing and running like mad to some slit trench and keeping fingers crossed for those trying to take off in the teeth of all this mayhem.

Thus, with no documentary evidence, judgement can only be made via the opinions of the pilots who fought the Japanese, survived and escaped from Singapore and the Dutch East Indies. These comprised 11 from 258 Sqn and about 16 others from 232 and 488 Sqns ie 27 out of the original 100 or so. Out of this 27, about 10 got to Australia by various means, about 12 to Ceylon and 2 or 3 to England. By no means all of these had been in action and of those who had, some had been shot down and injured on the first sortie or simply crashed through fuel exhaustion or instrument defect. I suppose that had a good Intelligence Officer been able to get all these pilots together to cross-question them in depth, some consensus of the relative merits of the two aircraft under consideration would have emerged, although even then it has to be remembered that of the 27, only the 8 who got to Australia had the luxury of reasonably early warning before meeting the Japanese in combat. 

I have re-met all but 3 post-war and none of them recalled any close questioning. I doubt if there was any. Everything was in too much of a mess, too disorganised. And anyway, it was already known that the Zero outclassed the Hurricane so why bother to ask the pilots who actually flew against them. It was, after all, a convenient fable - when terrible disasters such as the fall of Singapore occur, it is very convenient to be able to blame it on machines rather than on men._


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## buffnut453 (Jul 24, 2010)

Thanks for sharing this, Colin. I'm a huge fan of Terence Kelly - his writing still retains its immediacy, even though his books were written long after the events he describes. I fear your last 2 posts may well get dragged into the thread about the impact of additional RAF aircraft on the outcome of the Malayan Campaign and the British surrender of Singapore.

Cheers,
Mark


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## Colin1 (Jul 25, 2010)

buffnut453 said:


> I fear your last 2 posts may well get dragged into the thread about the impact of additional RAF aircraft on the outcome of the Malayan Campaign and the British surrender of Singapore


I was in two minds 
as to where to put it but not for long, I think the post is more relevant to this thread but I linked it into the more recent thread to emphasise the 'disorganised chaos' point over the 'more aircraft isn't the issue here' point.


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## buffnut453 (Jul 25, 2010)

I was also thinking about Kelly's comments about the number of fighters escorting the IJAAF bombers. There are certain individuals who believe that the 22nd Air Flotilla's A6Ms did the bulk of the work to gain air superiority for the Japanese. Kelly's comments demonstrate the odds the RAF was up against in the Malaya/Singapore Campaign.

By the time the Hurris arrived on the scene, there really was no hope. The leadership had no answers to the speed of the Japanese offensive and even ignored "best-practice" and available intelligence when laying out the Army defensive dispositions around Singapore.

Cheers,
Mark


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## Jerry W. Loper (Aug 6, 2010)

It was written in Brian Cull's _Hurricanes Over Singapore_ that the Hurricanes used in that theatre had a top speed of only 250 m.p.h. Is that true, or an exaggeration?


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## slaterat (Aug 7, 2010)

A tropicalized Hurricane II a/b has a max speed of about 265 mph at sea level, at higher altitudes around 20.000 ft a speed of 330-335 should be attained.

Statistics like raw kill/death ratios can be very misleading. There are other statistics that can be used to draw a more complete picture perhaps. 

I did a small analysis of Hurricanes vs Japanese fighters over Singapore. Using the numbers from Brian Culls "Bloody Shambles" and only counting encounters where the numbers of fighters employed from both sides are known, on a day to day average Hurricanes were outnumbered by a factor of 3.7 to 1. This figure does not include any bombers. 

Additionally , because of the lack of an effective EWS the Japanese fighters usually had an advantage in altitude.

At similar power settings the Hurricane/Zero/KI 43 have similar performance.

I believe that Terence Kelly's assessment is correct. Basically too much was expected from far too few Hurricanes. Out numbered nearly 4 to 1 by a fighter equal to their own what should one expect the outcome to be?

Slaterat


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## Ivan1GFP (Aug 9, 2010)

I'm in the discussion late, but my vote in a 1V1 fight is the A6M2. It is faster, more maneuverable and has a slightly better climb. The limiting speed in a dive was very low (400 mph IAS), but from what I have read, the initial acceleration was quite good.

Roll rate at high speed is noted to be poor, but at low speeds, it is very good. Those huge ailerons are good for something. FWIW, there are You-Tube films of the Hayabusa and a A6M5 Zero rolling. Observe those with a stop watch and you will find that those roll rates are quite good. What I see is a half roll in about ONE second with the Hayabusa and just a touch slower with the A6M5.

Regarding climb rates, the reported numbers are all over the place, but with the power to weight ratios remaining nearly constant throughout the life of the Zero, I don't think ANY of them were extraordinarily fast climbers.

As for altitude performance, the USN Test of Koga's A6M2 put the service ceiling at 38,000 feet and that is with the Sakae 11 single stage single speed supercharger.

- Ivan.


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## Just Schmidt (Aug 9, 2010)

I might be stating the obvious, but in the tactical situations prevailing it should be a big advantage for the japanese fighters that their pilots' vision to the rear was superiour to the hurricanes.


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## buffnut453 (Aug 9, 2010)

The tactical situation whereby the Japanese could concentrate their fighters and attack targets of their choosing while the RAF had to spread its defensive fighters across an entire front is probably more significant.


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## Colin1 (Aug 10, 2010)

Just Schmidt said:


> I might be stating the obvious, but in the tactical situations prevailing it should be a big advantage for the japanese fighters that their pilots' vision to the rear was superiour to the hurricanes.


A little ironic
to describe a situation whereby a Japanese pilot looks over his shoulder to find his rear plexiglass full of angry Hurricane as a 'big advantage'


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## Ivan1GFP (Aug 10, 2010)

It beats the heck out of NOT seeing the Hurricane back there.


- Ivan.


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## karprin (Apr 21, 2011)

What you wrote makes a lot of sense even from the perspective of my 1970's board games that I loved to play. (Avalon Hill's Air Force/Dauntless) If the Wildcat could hold its own against the Zeros and Oscars, I think that the Hurricanes and Spitfires should have also been able to. In game terms, and I'd like to think that the game's plane qualities roughly correlated to real performance, no plane could win a turning fight with the Zero or Oscar, not even the later planes that performed so well against them. The Hellcats, Corsairs, and other army planes did not generally fight them that way. They would use the diving tactics you described. They would also fight in the vertical, climbing, diving, rolling and scissoring to get on another plane's tail. This is how planes like the F-4 and F-104 could defeat highly maneuverable Mig 17's and 21's in later years. When using these kinds of tactics while playing the game I was almost always able to defeat the Japanese planes, even if it was a head on pass, because the Allied planes had better armor and fire power.


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## Al. S. Neworth (Jan 3, 2019)

Colin1 said:


> An interesting extract from Terence Kelly's book *Spitfire and Hurricane Pilots at War*:
> 
> 
> 
> ...


Well said! I too had read Terence Kelly’s book. A fine read it is, too.
Personally, I could never understand the claim Zero was more manoeuvrable than the Hurricane, but less so than the Mk. V Spit, when the IIC Hurri had retained the manoeuvrability edge over the Spit V in Europe.
It was therefore a pleasure to discover Kelly’s book.


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## Gpoll (Mar 1, 2019)

JoeB said:


> In the right circumstances Hurricanes might have been able to compete on even terms with Zeroes, but it was never demonstrated in action. Hurricanes and Zeroes met in combat 6 times for which both sides' losses are known (and only another 1 or 2 more where both sides' losses aren't known). The score in those combats was 6:38 in favor of the Zero, and the Zeroes won every combat. 5 in 1942 over Malaya, DEI and Ceylon, one other 5 December 1943 in the JAAF/JNAF combined raid on Calcutta, 0:3; Army Type 1 fighters downed or force the crash landings of another 6 Hurricanes in that raid also without loss to themselves (the Hurricanes downed 1 Army bomber).
> 
> Even using the Type 1 as proxy for the Zero, probably an optimistic assumption from the Hurricane's POV, the Hurricane's record v the Type 1 was also disastrous in the opening campaigns of 1942 and even as of late 1943 the Type 1's in Burma were at least holding their own in actual outcomes v Hurricanes, outscoring them more often than not, though by then there were at least some cases of combats actually won by Hurricanes v Type 1's (needless to say, measuring by British claims the Hurricane was pretty successful v the Type 1 by then, measuring by Japanese claims the Type 1 was overwhelmingly successful).
> 
> ...


The truth is that Hurricane pilots have said time and again that they had no problems engaging zeros and we're usually caught on the ground and the zeros had numerical advantage. Zero could not follow a hurricane in a dive because it's wings would fold over the cockpit. FACT. Listen to pilots not historians or myth makers.
Hurricane proved it could out turn a 109 in one turn with the 109 on its six and do the same to a spitfire within two turns. One v one tests were flown and documented.


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## Jock Tamson (Mar 1, 2019)

I have voted that it depends on the pilots. 

Having read many ww2 pilots accounts of aerial combat there often wasn't a dogfight in the conventional sense of the word. Many kills or aerial victories were scored as a result of the element of surprise, and or altitude advantage. The Hurricane did not perform well at high altitude according to Tom Neil's account in his book "Gun Button to Fire". 

If two equally experienced pilots went up against each other one on one i wouldn't be surprised if the Zero came out on top owing to its legendary maneuverability. However the Zero's very real disadvantage lay in its unprotected fuel tanks and lack of armor protection for the pilot.

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## Gpoll (Mar 1, 2019)

Jock Tamson said:


> I have voted that it depends on the pilots.
> 
> Having read many ww2 pilots accounts of aerial combat there often wasn't a dogfight in the conventional sense of the word. Many kills or aerial victories were scored as a result of the element of surprise, and or altitude advantage. The Hurricane did not perform well at high altitude according to Tom Neil's account in his book "Gun Button to Fire".
> 
> If two equally experienced pilots went up against each other one on one i wouldn't be surprised if the Zero came out on top owing to its legendary maneuverability. However the Zero's very real disadvantage lay in its unprotected fuel tanks and lack of armor protection for the pilot.


There are many 1v1 flight tests between planes these mock combats were flown and results well known. I really do not care for writers who distort the truth or sentimental attachment. Japanese pilots like there german counterparts did not like the idea of been shot down by Hurricanes and swore that it was spitfires even when spitfires were not in their sector.
They flew hurricanes (pilots views) is probably the best book. Combat tests carried out by Australia plus the UK and USA are the best information. If the combat
reports and test mock combats can be put up I will do so but there is also a site with the same documents.
What use would altitude advantage be to a plane that collapsed in a dive. What audience was Tom Neil writing for.
Interesting topic though. You really should read They flew Hurricanes.
No doubt Tom was a hero but cannot trace any information on him flying against the japanese.


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## Gpoll (Mar 1, 2019)

Terrence Kelly (his own words). 258 squadron the second unit in the far east.
" I have read book after book in which the nonsense about the superiority of the Japanese fighters is written. It simply was not so. The Hurricane was not outclassed by the Navy 0 or the Oscar. The Hurricane was at least the match of either machine and had the battles between them been fought on equal terms would have coped quite comfortably. Such was my opinion at the time and so it remains to the present day. He then goes onto say that the zero was more manoeuvrable, marginally faster up to heights of 15,000 feet and had longer range. The hurricane had very distinct advantages it had a better ceiling, could take punishment, faster at high altitude had resealing petrol tanks and armour plate behind pilots back. The Japanese pilots could not follow the Hurricane in a dive because its wings would have folded up.

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## CORSNING (Mar 3, 2019)

Well, I have read all the posts. I will agree that under certain circumstances
it would be possible to snap the wings back on the A6M2 (as any A/C under
certain conditions), it did not happen as often as the statements seems to be
suggesting. The A6M2 model 21 was a very well built aircraft for the purpose
it was designed for, carrier based air superiority fighter.

The A6M2 model 21 completely outclassed the Hurricane in the classic dogfight
at speeds up to 250 mph.

In my conversations on this site I have found it critical to know the performance
of the fighters involved before making any statements. This helps to prevents
foot-in-mouth disease.

The following information on the Hurricane IIC comes from two graphs titled
HURRICANE IIC AT 7,560 lbs. 15 January 1941 and 4 December 1941.
PS: with some help from William Greene.

WWII Aircraft Performance. Mike and Neil are the best. Henning's not to bad
either.

Altitude/Speed/Climb
Meters / mph / fpm / minutes to altitude
S.L..........288/2530/----
1,000..302/2495/-1.3
2,000..306/2460/-2.6
3,000..307/2457/-3.9
4,000..305/2050/-5.4
5,000..309/1975/-6.9
6,000..323/1730/-8.9
7,000..319/1385/11.0
8,000..308/1045/13.7
9,000..295/.-725/17.4
10,000..278/.-390/23.6

Full Throttle Height M.S. gear: 305 mph./3,800 ft. (1,158 m.)
Switch M.S. to F.S. gears: 303 mph./15,000 ft. (4,572 m.)
Full Throttle Height F.S. gear: 327 mph./20,200 ft. (6,157 m.)

Critical Altitude M.S. gear: 2425 fpm./10,000 ft. (3,049 m.)
Switch M.S. to F.S. gears: 2065 fpm./12,500 ft. (3,811 m.)
Critical Altitude F.S. gear: 1955 fpm./17,500 ft. (5,335 m.)

Combat Ceiling: 26,800 ft. (8,169 m.)
Operational Ceiling: 31,750 ft. (9,677 m.)
Service Ceiling: 35.650 ft. (10,866 m.)

Armament: 4x20mm/90 rpg.

Range (internal fuel): 460 ml. (740 km.)
Range (maximum external): 970 ml. (1,560 km.)

Engine: Merlin XX: 1,320 [email protected]+12 lbs. and* 1,490 [email protected]+16 lbs. boost.*
Combat Weight: 7,560 lbs. (3,428 kg.)
Wing Loading: 29.36 lbs./sq. ft. (Excellent for a WW2 fighter)
Power Loading: 5.727 lbs./[email protected]+12 lbs. and 5.074 lbs./[email protected]+16 lbs. boost.
Turn time at 1,000 m.: 19 seconds left / 20 seconds right (USSR tests)
Roll Rate: 40 deg./[email protected] mph., 57 deg./[email protected] mph., 65 deg./[email protected] mph.
53 deg./[email protected] mph.

These are the very limited facts that my many years of research have uncovered at this time.
Fact: I have just recently been looking deeper into the ability of this aircraft.

I must get ready for church now guys but hope to post information on the Ki 43-IIa and
A6M2 model 21 later today. Please look over the information I have posted and make
educated comments.

Thank you, Jeff

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## Glider (Mar 3, 2019)

I am sorry but the Hurricane was totally outclassed by the Oscar and the Zero which was a match for a Spit V.

This isn't a personal view but the official view of the RAF.


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## alsaad (Mar 3, 2019)

Putting it in historic perspective at the time when these two aircraft types were flying in combat IJN still had superior pilot training and I would dare to say better pilots in average which could take 1 on 1 fight. On the other hand just few .303 API rounds could set Zero on fire. Voted for Zero.


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## CORSNING (Mar 3, 2019)

The proper training and the skill of the pilot can overcome great performance
differences in aircraft vs. aircraft. There is no substitute for that knowledge. We
are talking about aircraft vs. aircraft capabilities here. The title of this thread
suggested nothing different.

That being said;
Untitled Document
FIGHTER COMPARISON STUDY NO. 1. The Curtiss P-40C Tomahawk VS. The 
Mitsubishi A6M2 Model 21 Zero-Sen. Also used for the following information
is TAIC information for the A6M2 model 21 and statements from Saburo Sakai.

Mitsubishi A6M2 model 21:

Altitude / Speed / Climb
Meters / MPH / FPM 
S.L.......298/3500
1,000..307/3439
2,000..317/3378
3,000...327/3317
4,000..336/3256
5,000..344/2904
6,000..340/2445
7,000..334/1685
8,000..327/1512
9,000..318/1067
10,000..--/608

Combat Weight; 5,313 lb.
Engine: 940 hp./T.O., 955 hp./14,500 ft.
Turn Time Observed: 14.1 seconds/4,000 m.
Turn Time Calculated: 13.2 seconds/1,000 ft./110 mph.
Roll Rate: 57 deg./sec./160 mph., 53 deg./sec./225 mph., 42 deg./sec./300 mph.
Combat ceiling: 30,000 ft.
Service ceiling: 36,450 ft.

I see nothing in these figures or any text I have read to date that suggests the 
Hawker Hurricane IIC had any ascendancy over the A6M2 model 21 other than 
pilot and fuel tank protection and possibly a greater maximum diving velocity.
I believe the Zero (once engaged in 1 on 1 combat) was quite capable of staying 
with the Hurricane in any maneuver it chose to use to dive away from combat, and 
its initial acceleration abilities would have allowed it to get in a lethal burst of fire.

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## Glider (Mar 3, 2019)

alsaad said:


> Putting it in historic perspective at the time when these two aircraft types were flying in combat IJN still had superior pilot training and I would dare to say better pilots in average which could take 1 on 1 fight. On the other hand just few .303 API rounds could set Zero on fire. Voted for Zero.


The Hurricane IIc served until the end of the war so the comparison of training depends on what period you pick. It was also was armed with 4 x 20mms but the point is well made, one burst would suffice.


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