# Polish AF: preparing for 1939



## tomo pauk (Aug 12, 2013)

Helo, gents,
What tecnological paths hould`ve been undertaken by the Polish air force in the 1930s, in order to be better prepared for the September war in 1939? Not that it would`ve changed the outcome, but just to give Polish air crews better chances once airborne.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 12, 2013)

I think you have run into a problem here Tomo.

Anything the Poles needs to be in production in numbers by the spring of 1939 in order to be in service in any numbers by Sept. This rather limits the available engines.

I know it is wiki but......: PZL.50 Jastrz

The best they could really hope for was the improved Mercury or Gnome-Rhone N engine or buying Hispano V-12s, it was probably too late to set up a Polish Hispano factory. 

More use of variable pitch or constant speed props? 

Plans for better aircraft in 1940 don't do any good.


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## pattle (Aug 12, 2013)

The Polish had some good aircraft designers and what may have been promising modern fighters on the drawing board including the PZL 50 series, this was a low wing radial engine monoplane fighter unlike earlier PZL parasol designs. Maybe if the Poles had been able to develop this aircraft sooner it could have made life more difficult for the Luftwaffe, unfortunately though the development of this aircraft was out of hands of the Polish as they were dependent on foreign engines and other components. Poland just didn't have the money to afford a modern air force large enough to threaten the Luftwaffe, and Poland was never going to be able to defend itself against attack from Germany and the USSR at the same time.
The Greeks used the PZL 24 against the Italians with success, it was a little faster than the PZL 11, but I don't think the Polish having the PZL 24 rather than the PZL 11 would have made much difference except that it may have made catching bombers a little easier.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 12, 2013)

Were the Poles in a position to buy foreign products? Hawker Hurricane, and/or Curtiss Hawk 75 come to mind as possible imports?


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## Greyman (Aug 12, 2013)

All the Hurricanes time would allow.


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## Greyman (Aug 12, 2013)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Were the Poles in a position to buy foreign products? Hawker Hurricane, and/or Curtiss Hawk 75 come to mind as possible imports?



The Poles had struck a deal with Britain and France in March '39, and had received one Hurricane for evaluation purposes before the invasion. Nine more were en route, but it was over before they could be delivered.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 12, 2013)

So they were late in perceiving the threat?


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## Shortround6 (Aug 12, 2013)

Perhaps just late in perceiving how fast the threat would turn into action. 

They might have been able to have PZL 50s in squadron service ( at least a few squadrons) using Mercury engines but 250-260mph monoplanes aren't really going to do much more than the PZL 11s. They thought they had time for Bristol Taurus or Hercules engines but the engines weren't available in time. Same with the G-R 14N engines, which model of the 14N was available for _production_ when in 1939? 

If they thought the war wouldn't start until 1940 then waiting for the better planes might be a good idea.


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## Civettone (Aug 12, 2013)

There is not much they could have received before September 1939... 

Maybe they should have tried with light weight fighters. For instance, the Gnome Rhone 14K 700 hp air cooled radial and the Walter Sagitta 600 hp air cooled inline engine. Also, licence producing the Morane Saulnier MS 406 could have been done in 1938/1939.

Kris


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## Shortround6 (Aug 12, 2013)

Light fighters were a waste of time/money/pilots. The Gnome Rhone 14K 700 hp air cooled radial is a poor start. If you mean the 14M that is a bit different but still leaves you with a 2nd rate fighter. 

As far as the licencing the Morane Saulnier MS 406, it is possible but the deal _has_ to be done in early 1938. Any later and the factories ( airframe and engine) will NOT be tooled up in time to produce more than a handful of aircraft by Sept 1939.


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## Civettone (Aug 12, 2013)

Yeah, I meant the 14M. 

Of course you are right about the MS.406. However, that is a matter of capital and resources. If the Poles wanted it badly, they could have sped up the licence production of both airframe and engine. 

I disagree that light fighters were a waste. What else is the Yak-3? Also the Italian SAI.403 would have made a name for itself if the war had continued.
The GR 14M powered the excellent Roussel 30. Also arrived too late. 

All these aircraft could be substantially lighter and use less resources, thereby allowing more aircraft to be build. 
It is the only option I see for the Poles.

Kris


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## bobbysocks (Aug 12, 2013)

what was the size of the polish AF at the time of attack vs the size of the LW? i think no matter what ac they get they will still be overwhelmed by the LW. the germans did take some losses and might have taken more but i dont think acquiring any other ac would have changed the outcome. in 39 the 109 was high tech and an ac to be reckoned with....the stuka was in its hayday....the german tactics no one had ever seen before. with all the spits, hurris, etc the western allies couldnt stop germany in france and belgium....those planes arent going to be a factor. and remember they were fighting the russians at the same time.... basically you face a difficult decision. if you prolong the conflict which you cant win you will subject your civilian population to more casualities...tough call


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## Greyman (Aug 12, 2013)

Perhaps it would be more efficient for Poland to focus maximum effort into building a vicious level of anti-aircraft guns.


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## tyrodtom (Aug 12, 2013)

The SAI.403 one and only prototype first flew in early 1943, that's about 5 years too late to help Poland.
And it's earlier derivative the SAI.207 that first flew in late 1940, never entered service.

There's lightweight fighters, early model Bf109, A6M2 Zero, Oscar and a few other early WW2 fighters might fit that definition with around 4000 lbs empty weights.
But the Yak 3 with a 5600 lbs empty weight can hardly be considered a lightweight, maybe light for a late WW2 fighter though.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 12, 2013)

Civettone said:


> I disagree that light fighters were a waste. What else is the Yak-3?



The Yak 3 is a small fighter designed around the most powerful V-12 engine the Russians had in production at the time. It was NOT an even smaller fighter designed around a 2nd rate engine. While later in timing and light for it's time period it weighed within a few hundred pounds of a Spitfire I. 

Pilots cannot be scaled down, cockpits cannot be scaled down, radios cannot be scaled down. Armor cannot be scaled down. And if you scale the armament down you need more planes to get the same amount of guns/ammo into the air. 




Civettone said:


> Also the Italian SAI.403 would have made a name for itself if the war had continued.
> The GR 14M powered the excellent Roussel 30. Also arrived too late.
> 
> All these aircraft could be substantially lighter and use less resources, thereby allowing more aircraft to be build.
> It is the only option I see for the Poles.



Poles need a general purpose engine that can be used in several aircraft, not a 2nd rate engine usable in 2nd rate fighters. 

We have no idea how any of the these fighters would have fared in combat but the FIVE light French fighters were either totally outclassed or have little reliable flight test information and what does exist points to rather poor rates of climb even if the speed is in the ball park. A lot of the details don't seem to add up well.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 12, 2013)

tyrodtom said:


> There's lightweight fighters, early model Bf109, A6M2 Zero, Oscar and a few other early WW2 fighters might fit that definition with around 4000 lbs empty weights.
> But the Yak 3 with a 5600 lbs empty weight can hardly be considered a lightweight, maybe light for a late WW2 fighter though.



The Yak may have been 5600lb loaded.

The French light fighters ALL weighed around 4,000lb loaded except the Caudron-Renault 770 with the 16 cylinder Renault engine. 

I am left wondering HOW some of these fighters achieved the claimed performance on the available power, straight line speed is one thing but climb and ceiling with low powered engines?


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## tyrodtom (Aug 12, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> The Yak may have been 5600lb loaded.
> 
> The French light fighters ALL weighed around 4,000lb loaded except the Caudron-Renault 770 with the 16 cylinder Renault engine.
> 
> I am left wondering HOW some of these fighters achieved the claimed performance on the available power, straight line speed is one thing but climb and ceiling with low powered engines?


 There's quite a bit of disagreement between Wiki and a book I have on fighters, on the Yak 3, but Wiki appears to be right, the Yak was much lighter than what I posted. But the SAI S403 weighted around 4300 empty, not loaded, according to both.


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## davebender (Aug 12, 2013)

Nothing will help. The historical scenario was national suicide for both Poland and Germany. To make things better Poland and Germany must fight on the same side against the common Russian enemy just as the 1938 Soviet war plan anticipated.


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## bobbysocks (Aug 12, 2013)

i dont think allying up with poland would put a nail in the coffin for the ussr even at this early date.


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## davebender (Aug 12, 2013)

That should not be the objective. At least not during 1930s. Poland and Germany must strengthen border defenses and grow their economies for a few years. At same time they should attempt to add other nations such as Hungary, Romania and Finland to the anti-communist military alliance. A 1939 version of NATO. 

Unfortunately Britain, France and USA will be absent as those nations were flirting with communism during late 1930s / early 1940s.


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## bobbysocks (Aug 12, 2013)

*and grow their economies for a few years*

iirc wasnt that the whole purpose of annexing and invading all these lands....the german enconomy wasnt the greatest.


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## buffnut453 (Aug 12, 2013)

A propos of absolutely nothing, the Poles were in discussion with Brewster to buy a variant of the Model 339 (aka Buffalo). It would probably be something akin to the B339B that was sold to the Belgians.


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## davebender (Aug 12, 2013)

Not sure where you get your economic data. By 1935 the German economy was booming.

Spreadsheet with GDP data used to be available from the below site:
Maddison Project


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## bobbysocks (Aug 12, 2013)

according to that the german economy was in absolute great shape until 1945. the highest GDP was reported in 44.

Hjalmar Schacht was replaced in 1937 by Hermann Goering when he resigned. Goering introduced the four-year plan whose main aim was to make Germany self-sufficient to fight a war within four years. Under Goering imports were slashed. Wages and prices were controlled—under penalty of being sent to a concentration camp. Dividends were restricted to six percent on book capital. And strategic goals to be reached at all costs were declared: the construction of synthetic rubber plants, more steel plants, automatic textile factories.

While the strict state intervention into the economy, and the massive rearmament policy, almost led to full employment during the 1930s, real wages in Germany dropped by roughly 25% between 1933 and 1938. Trade unions were abolished, as well as collective bargaining and the right to strike. In place of ordinary profit incentive to guide investment, investment was guided through regulation to accord with needs of the State. Government financing eventually came to dominate the investment process, which the proportion of private securities issued falling from over half of the total in 1933 and 1934 to approximately 10 percent in 1935–1938. Heavy taxes on profits limited self-financing of firms. The largest firms were mostly exempt from taxes on profits, however government control of these were extensive.

Another part of the new German economy was massive rearmament, with the goal being to expand the 100,000-strong German army into a force of millions under the Four-Year Plan. The war came and although the Four-Year Plan technically expired in 1940, Hermann Göring had built up a power base that effectively controlled all German economic and production matters by this point in time. In 1942 the growing burdens of the war and the death of Todt saw the economy move to a full war economy under Albert Speer.

This collection is based on these three economic publications: 
•Monatliche Nachweise-ber den Auswartigen Handel Deutschlands (January 1933-June 1939)
•Der Aussenhandel Deutschlands Monatliche Nachweise (July 1939)
•Sondernachweis der Aussenhandel Deutschlands (August 1939-1944). 


The Nazis and the German Economy

From 1933 to 1939, the Nazi government always spent more than it earned so that by 1939, government debt stood at over 40 billion Resichsmarks.

and real earnings in 1938 were all but the same as the 1928 figure. Real earnings are wages adjusted to allow for inflation


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## davebender (Aug 12, 2013)

Which was a huge improvement from German real earnings during 1933.

I suspect USA real earnings in 1938 were still below 1928 level as our economy performed poorly during FDR administration. American unemployment was still high during 1939 despite the massive naval construction program and a bunch of large public works programs.


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## parsifal (Aug 12, 2013)

The problem with the allying with germany scenario is that Germany wasnt intersted in being polands ally.

As it was, the PAF did surpisingly well in the campaign. It was airborne for about 2 weeks, before evacuating, and in that time the Germasns lost nearly 4-500 a/c (many to ground fire, but perhaps 200 to air combat ) . thats a big attrition rate. What the Poles could not do was interfere, or prevent the Germans from pasting their ground formations and installations from being worked over at will. in that sense the Germans held air superiority from the very beginning.

What the Poles needed to challenge that was a high performance fighter, more fighters (and pilots to fly them) and better AA defences. High performance fighters were a real problem. There was the P-50, but unlikley to be ready. there was the export version of the P-11, the P-24, but that did not offer a big increase in performance (but did increase firepower). there were foreign imports from the west, but availability was problematic, and Poland lacked the cash to buy enough aircraft. Obtaining supplies from Germany was a non-starter, Italian aircraft also lacked performance, that leaves the Russians, which politically were unacceptable. 

If I were in charge of the Polish forces, with a magic wand, I would scrap or cancel all of the bomber forces in the PAF, which would amount to about 200 a/c. I would buy or buuild roughly another 100 fighter aircraft, and build roughly an additional 500 or so HAA and 1000 LAA (based on a rough estimate of equivalent costs), which I would fully motorise and distribute to the army. The Polish land forces were roughly the equivalent of 30 divs, so that should give each div an additional 50 AA pieces per 8000 men (ie per div). Thats 16-20 heavy guns and 30 light guns per div. I think ground based defences would give each Polish Div some ability to keep the monkey off its back as well as some valuable direct firepower capability that their ground formations urgently needed. I thin they would have derived greater benefit out of having a fighter element of 250, instead of 150 as they did. I dont think they achieved very much with their bomber groups. Just using rough correlations of force structure, increasing the fighter component to 250, should increase LW loss rates from air to about 350, and losses to ground fire by maybe 4-500 (Polish ground formations had virtually no dedicated AA). I dont think it beyond the realm of possibility to estimate German losses at 8-900 aircraft. if the allies had mounted a sustained and heavy air campaign from French bases, not worrying about losses of their own, I can see Gerany in a world of hurt at the end of all this. If the Russians had been pursuaded to join a collective security arrangement, and the Poles allowed them into their country 9not going to happen I know), I can see germany being defeated outright on the Polish plains


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## tyrodtom (Aug 12, 2013)

davebender said:


> Which was a huge improvement from German real earnings during 1933.
> 
> I suspect USA real earnings in 1938 were still below 1928 level as our economy performed poorly during FDR administration. American unemployment was still high during 1939 despite the massive naval construction program and a bunch of large public works programs.



If America earnings in 1938 were even near 1928 levels, that would be very good, Americas depression didn't start till 1929, it was booming in 1928.
You can't say the same for Germany in 1928.


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## pattle (Aug 12, 2013)

The Polish had a number of fighter types on the drawing board in 1939, these included light weight designs similar to those developed by Italy and France, heavy fighters similar to the Beaufighter or Me110 and also single seat high performance fighters, there were also advanced bomber types under development. I was once shown a book with drawings, pictures and illustrations of these aircraft by a Polish friend and was rather surprised by the how advanced the Poles were. Of course just because the Poles had made drawings etc it doesn't mean these planes would have been any good.


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## parsifal (Aug 12, 2013)

The Poles had a decent aero indutry, but limited funds. Designs are likley to be good, but unless you can finace them, arent worth worrying about. plus they need time, a longer time than the germans, to develop ebd build their air force and the types they would use to equip them.

Possible foreign order might be the Fokker D-21 or Fokker GI, though the latter was not ready. Possibly the Po631 instead


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## Jabberwocky (Aug 12, 2013)

Polish Air Force has multiple options for fighter and bomber modernisation. I’ll deal with indigenous fighters first.

The main issue for fighter production was the decision in 1933/1934 that the PAF would concentrate on the PZL.38 and PZL.39 for their future fighter force. At the time, this seemed at the time to offer them an affordable ‘high-low’ mix of technology and capabilities, but effectively left them without a modern fighter force.

The PZL.38 was the ‘high’ element: a twin engine heavy fighter/light bomber, with some construction elements borrowed from the PZL.37 bomber. Despite work commencing in 1934, the aircraft was a failure and only two prototypes were produced. Apart from the fact that it was a two seater, the choice of powerplant doomed it to failure: an air cooled V8 with around 400 hp per engine. Just two prototypes were built, mostly due to issues with the engines.

The PZL.39 was the ‘low element’ – a light fighter with the same engine. It too ended up being abandoned in 1938 after only a few prototypes were made. The prototypes barely made 250 mph, and the project was canned.

So, for an alternative time-line, I’d propose that at the end of 1933, the Polish decided to stick with a single monoplane fighter for their air force, instead of going with the dual PZL.38/39 route.


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## Jabberwocky (Aug 12, 2013)

Alternate time line options for indigenous fighters:

Over and above the base PZL.11c, I see the following options: 

Option one, least ambitious: PZL.11g 

Poland attempted to modernised the PZL.11c in 1938, but unfortunately it was a case of way too little, way to late. The .11g put an 840 hp Mercury in a strengthened airframe. 100 were ordered, but only a few prototypes were completed prior to the invasion. 

If the decision to upgrade the PZL.11g is made in 1936 (Mercury VIII is available from 1935 onwards), then the fighter could have easily become the mainstay of the Polish fighter force in 1939.

Outcome: If the .11g is developed an ordered ahead of time, the PAF gets a fighter that is really only marginally better than the .11c. The 11g was around 20 mph faster, had a 6000 ft higher ceiling and a slightly better armament that the base mode 11c, thanks to better LMGs streamlined into the wing. 

Porducing the .11g is probably going to be of only marginal benefit against both LW fighters and bombers, so not much of an impact really. I don't envision an all PZL.11g equipped air force being more of an impact that an all PZL.11c force.

Option two, moderately ambitious: PZL.24

There was another Polish fighter in production at the time, the PZL.24. This was a partially reworked P.11 with new tail surfaces, cut-down engine cowling and better streamlining for the rear fuselage. The aircraft was flying by 1936, so there’s plenty of time to get it into production. 

There were multiple PZL.24 designs, most featuring a 900 hp Ghnome-Rhone 14K radial. Several designs had 4 LMGs in the wings, but there were also designs with 2 x 20 mm Oerlikons either under the wings in early designs or in the wings in later designs, so there is a big potential step up in armament.

Again, like the PZL.11g, if its PZL.24 is ordered in time, several hundred could have been produced in the 1936-1939 period, allowing it to become the 

Outcome: Compared to the 11c, it offers a speed advantage of up to 30 mph, better range and better rate of climb. Compared to the PZL.11g, its about 10 mph faster.

The PZL.24 doesn’t really bridge the gap to the 109E-1, E-3 or E-4, so I don’t see it performing much better in fighter to fighter combat. 

However, with either 4 LMGs or 2 20 mm cannon and the ability to catch bombers like the Do-17 and He-111 as they run away, it might make a bigger dent in the Luftwaffe’s bomber fleet during the campaign. It might down more Luftwaffe bombers and transports, potentially having an impact in the French/British campaigns in 1940.

Option three, most ambitious: PZL.50

The PZL.50 is one of those aircraft that look right, but somehow don’t quite match up to the expectations. Performance and manoeuvrability were lower than expectations, but still a step up on the existing fighters in Polish service.

Design work starts at the end of 1936, approval in 1937 and the first prototype isn’t ready to fly until February 1939, mostly due to engine and landing gear supply issues.

The major problem was that work got started too late to get all the kinks out. The test flights had engine problems, cutting the best speed to 275 mph, about 16-18 mph lower than initial projections. The aircraft was reportedly nice to fly, but was sluggish in the controls and had some control and aerodynamics issues, resolved with a redesigned tail. 

The ideal for Poland would be to start the project in 1934 instead of the PZL.38/39, test flights by either late 1936 or early 1937 and production deliveries commencing later in 1937. The Polish had ordered 300 Mercury VIIIs, so they intended to produce the PZL.50 in quantity. That way they can work out the kinks and have a decent indigenous fighter in service, in quantity, by November 1939.

Outcome: A modern, low-wing, stressed-skin monoplane, the PZL.50 offers a step up over the two other options. Even without hitting its 470 kph/292 mph projected top speed, it still offered an advantage of 40 mph over the P.11c, 30 mph over the P.11g and about 20 mph over the P.24.

Unfortunately, its still up to 55-65 mph slower than the Bf 109E-1/3/4 and 110C, so its probably not going to redress the imbalance in fighter-on-fighter combat. 

However, with 2 x 20 mm and 2 x LMG projected armament I think it would take a much heavy toll on bombers than in the historical time line. 

I'll get around the looking at the foreign import alternatives in the next day or so. Likely candidates would be the MS 406, Hawker Hurricane, Curtis Hawk 75 and the Fokker D.XXI


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## davebender (Aug 13, 2013)

Not sure where you are getting your information. 

Historically Germany tried hard to settle the Danzig border dispute by plebiscite. Multiple diplomatic proposals were made. Poland refused to seriously consider a diplomatic solution.

Poland has no chance to fight both Germany and Soviet Union to a standstill but that was their historical strategy. Unless they have a change in government and national strategy Polish military preparations will never be enough.


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## Civettone (Aug 13, 2013)

davebender said:


> Not sure where you are getting your information.
> 
> Historically Germany tried hard to settle the Danzig border dispute by plebiscite. Multiple diplomatic proposals were made. Poland refused to seriously consider a diplomatic solution.
> 
> Poland has no chance to fight both Germany and Soviet Union to a standstill but that was their historical strategy. Unless they have a change in government and national strategy Polish military preparations will never be enough.


In fact, Hitler often toyed with the idea of allying with Poland to fight the Soviets. It was only after Poland allied itself with the French, that Hitler gave up on the idea. Of course, the Poles were not to keen on the idea anyway, maybe because they saw it to their advantage that Germany and the SU would keep each other in balance.



davebender said:


> Not sure where you get your economic data. By 1935 the German economy was booming.
> 
> Spreadsheet with GDP data used to be available from the below site:


GDP gives a distorted view. It merely shows that Germany was spending a lot of money. In fact, Germany was running out of foreign exchange and gold. Schacht said he would no longer support these policies and he was replaced. At the same time, Hitler responded with the autarchic driven 4-Year plan. That was far from a success. In the end, it was Stalin who saved Germany from imminent bankruptcy. 
I suggest you read Tooze and Overy.



Shortround6 said:


> The Yak 3 is a small fighter designed around the most powerful V-12 engine the Russians had in production at the time. It was NOT an even smaller fighter designed around a 2nd rate engine. While later in timing and light for it's time period it weighed within a few hundred pounds of a Spitfire I.


Be careful to mix time frames. A light fighter in 1944 would not be the same as one in 1940. The Northrop F-5 is a lightweight fighter plane but weighs more than the P-47. 



> We have no idea how any of the these fighters would have fared in combat but the FIVE light French fighters were either totally outclassed or have little reliable flight test information and what does exist points to rather poor rates of climb even if the speed is in the ball park. A lot of the details don't seem to add up well.


None of the French fighters were light weight. They were in the same league as the Bf 109 or Spitfire. They may have been lighter, but were not light weight aircraft: they were powered by the most powerful engines available. 

I guess a light fighter concept would mean that the engine is chosen for weight/power ratio, not the most powerful engine. In that sense, the Yak-3 is not a light fighter. It is merely a lightened version of their main Yak-1 fighter. The Roussel 30 is a better example: it was a smaller version of the Bloch MB.150 and powered by a lighter engine. It had an empty weight of 1,000 kg, half of the MB.152, and had a higher top speed. Of course, no one can be sure how it would have performed. Nor, the SAI.403 or Nakajima Ki-116. But, it is insufficient reason to discard the notion of light weight fighters. Post-war, they were succesful, e.g. the Folland Gnat.

Kris


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## Shortround6 (Aug 13, 2013)

Civettone said:


> None of the French fighters were light weight. They were in the same league as the Bf 109 or Spitfire. They may have been lighter, but were not light weight aircraft: they were powered by the most powerful engines available.



French had two classes of fighter, The MS 406 and D 520 class ( and derivatives) and their "light class"

Bloch 700, 690 hp G-R 14M

Caudron 714, 450 hp Renault

Caudron 760, 750hp Isotta-Fraschini 

Caudron 770, 800hp Renault V-16

Potez 230, 690hp Hispanp X series engine, not Y series

Roussel 30, 690 hp G-R 14M

all were smaller and lighter than the MS 406 and D 520. 



Civettone said:


> I guess a light fighter concept would mean that the engine is chosen for weight/power ratio, not the most powerful engine. In that sense, the Yak-3 is not a light fighter. It is merely a lightened version of their main Yak-1 fighter. The Roussel 30 is a better example: it was a smaller version of the Bloch MB.150 and powered by a lighter engine. It had an empty weight of 1,000 kg, half of the MB.152, and had a higher top speed. Of course, no one can be sure how it would have performed. Nor, the SAI.403 or Nakajima Ki-116. But, it is insufficient reason to discard the notion of light weight fighters. Post-war, they were succesful, e.g. the Folland Gnat



Some of the Post war "light fighters" were successful because of the very rapid advancement in Jet engine technology. Engine in the Gnat gave about 80% of the thrust of the one in an F-86 but weighed about 1/3 to 1/2 as much. The J85s used in teh F-5 Fredom fighter weigh about 1/2 as much as the engine in the Gnat. The piston engine sin WW II showed no such difference in power to weight and in fact the smaller (450-800hp) engines usually had slightly worse power to weight ratios than the bigger (1000-1200Hp) engines at the beginning of the war.


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## davebender (Aug 14, 2013)

Assumption.
Polish government aligns with anti-communist nations as they should have done.


1926. Gebauer mini gun approved for use by Hungary air force.
…..7.92mm Mauser. 500 round belt feed.
…..1,500 rpm
…..Powered by aircraft engine. This also ensured synchronization through prop.

March 1934.
Development work begins on Me-109 fighter aircraft.

29 May 1935.
Me-109 prototype first flight.

October 1935. DB600 engine approved for German mass production.
…..Genshagen plant designed to produce 220 V12 engines per month.
…..Daimler-Benz management wanted to produce fuel injected DB601. RLM forced production of carbureted DB600 instead.
…..RLM cut funding from RM 50 million to RM 20 million. Not terribly large even by mid 1930s standards.

Fall 1935.
Poland can afford RM 20 million for a Genshagen size engine plant. 
…..Will produce fuel injected DB601 from beginning just as Daimler-Benz preferred.
…..Surplus engines will be sold to Hungary for use in He-112B manufactured by Manfred Weiss. Foreign currency earnings are a good thing.

1936. Luftwaffe fighter competition.
…..Ar-80.
…..Fw-159.
…..He-112.
…..Me-109.
Me-109 won the competition and it’s dirt cheap to mass produce. Poland does not need to look further. DB601 powered Me-109 will be produced in Poland.

Poland will also market Me-109 to friendly nations such as Norway, Sweden, Finland and Spain. Foreign currency earnings are a good thing.

Polish Me-109 will have a pair of cowl mounted Gebauer mini guns chambered for 7.92mm Mauser cartridge.

Historically Gebauer made a larger version of their mini gun chambered for 12.7mm Fiat-Safat cartridge. Poland will contract for a version chambered for Mauser 20mm x 82mm cartridge (i.e. same as MG151/20). If Gebauer cannot produce an acceptable hub cannon then Poland will choose a different weapon such as Madsen 20mm aircraft cannon.


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## parsifal (Aug 14, 2013)

Saying that Hitler only decided to invade Poland after Poland sided with france, is the same warped logic as Hitler used. Poland had a non-aggression pact with Germany dating back to 1934, and before that there was the treaty of Locarno. the Poles had already demonstrated their good intentions towards Germany. Germany betrayed them, simple as that. As late as 1938, the Germans were professing their friendship towards the Poles, but at the same time making preprations for war, though the final decision to move came later, which is your entire casus belli.

All good and noble, but the world was already witnessing how the germans treated their "friends". That hitler could not be trusted was being demonstrated by event after event, culminating in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, and then finally the Czech rump. As those events unfolded, the Poles knew they could not trust the germans, and the germans were not genuine in their offers of friendship. Nearly every freedom loving nation in the world was realizing that at that time. 

These statements of mine are not just my own, they were established at nuremberg after the war and were a precursor to being able to try the German leadership as war criminals. So I am conscious of your motivations here. Re-write history as to who is the aggressor nation, and you can establish that Hitler and the rest of his cronies were not war criminals, and disprove Germany's war guilt. sorry guys, not buying it, and it exposes you people for what you really are.


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## bobbysocks (Aug 14, 2013)

how many times did hitler say something to the effect..."if you just let me have this ( land ) i will be happy and assure you i have no further aspirations towards any other land? the sarrland, the rhineland, austria, sudatenland, east prussia....


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 14, 2013)

To Be or Not to Be - *Mel Brooks as an actor imitating Hitler* - 

I Want Peace

"_I don't want war.
All I want is peace. Peace. 
Peace!
A little piece of Poland
A little piece of France 
A little piece of Portugal
And Austria perchance
A little slice of Turkey
And all that that entails 
Und then a piece of England Scotland
lreland and Wales
A little nip of Norway
A little spot of Greece
A little hunk of Hungary
Oh what a lovely feast
A little bite of Belgium
And now for some dessert
Armenia Albania
And Russia wouldn't hurt_"


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## davebender (Aug 14, 2013)

6 May 1935. P-36 prototype first flight.
1937. P-36 wins USAAC fighter aircraft competition.

P-36 was dirt cheap ($23,000 each) and it just won the 1937 U.S. fighter competition. There's no reason Poland couldn't purchase some aircraft followed by license production. Just replace the American machineguns with a pair of Madsen 20mm aircraft cannon.


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## Tante Ju (Aug 14, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Saying that Hitler only decided to invade Poland after Poland sided with france, is the same warped logic as Hitler used. Poland had a non-aggression pact with Germany dating back to 1934, and before that there was the treaty of Locarno. the Poles had already demonstrated their good intentions towards Germany. Germany betrayed them, simple as that. As late as 1938, the Germans were professing their friendship towards the Poles, but at the same time making preprations for war, though the final decision to move came later, which is your entire casus belli.



JSTOR: An Error Occurred Setting Your User Cookie


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## davebender (Aug 14, 2013)

Don't know how good it would have been but an aircraft which looks this good deserves to produced. Why not in Poland?


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## Jabberwocky (Aug 14, 2013)

davebender said:


> 6 May 1935. P-36 prototype first flight.
> 1937. P-36 wins USAAC fighter aircraft competition.
> 
> P-36 was dirt cheap ($23,000 each) and it just won the 1937 U.S. fighter competition.


 
P-36 wasn't "dirt cheap" in the late 1930s, at least not for nations buying it as the Hawk 75. In 1938, the French were appalled when Curtis quoted them a unit price for the Hawk 75 A-1 of nearly twice that of the MS 406. The price difference even led to the French Purchasing Commission delaying their Hawk 75 purchase until the first MB 150 took to the air, to see if it was a viable option. Even with two year's work, the MB 150's unit price was about half that of the Hawk 75. 

The P-36 may have cost $23,000 for the USAAF - I've newer seen an official contract price - but Curtis was charging a lot more to export customers. 

The 24 Hawk 75s sold to Thailand went for about $27,700, plus the cost of purchasing a manufacturing licence. However, these were simplified variants with fixed landing gear and other changes, so aren't really representative. 

In 1939, the Finns were offered 15 Curtiss Hawk 75s at a unit price of $47,500 for 15 or $45,500 for 30. At the same time the P-40 was about $60,000 for and the P-39 was about $75,000 for the USAAF. 

The Norwegian Hawk 75 A-8s were about $81,000 apiece.



> There's no reason Poland couldn't purchase some aircraft followed by license production. Just replace the American machineguns with a pair of Madsen 20mm aircraft cannon.



Trying to get a par of Madsen or Oerlikons - which is what the Polish used - into the Hawk 75 without doing a major rework of either the wing or the cowling is probably a futile effort. There isnt enough room between the wing spars for anything with a longer breech than the .30s, unless you want to cut even bigger holes in the spars. To fit them in the cowling, you'd need to relocate the oil tank and punch holes in the engine firewall, and possibly have to lengthen the entire nose/engine mounting.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 14, 2013)

A lot of times the price quotes for USAAF contracts were for the airframe ONLY. Engine, propeller, guns, radio, oxogne equipment etc were government furnished equipment. Sometimes the export planes had an all inclusive price or at least included the price of a flyable plane even if it didn't include guns or radio. But P-36s were NOT 'dirt cheap'. You probably couldn't get a Cyclone 9 engine for under $10,000 in the 30s new.


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## parsifal (Aug 15, 2013)

P-35 might have been a more realisitic acquisition for the Poles. the last thing you want your air force to be doing is trying to bed down a new type 2-4 months before they enter the fight for their lives. 

Even for the P-35 to be delivered, the Poles would have been lucky. The P-35A, the domestic version, was delivered 1937/8 with 77 deivered. The 60 Swedish J-5s incorporated changes that delayed delivery until early 1940....to late to help

The P-35A had the following characterisitcs

Performance
Maximum speed: 290 mph (252 knots, 467 km/h) at 12,000 ft (3,660 m)
Cruise speed: 260 mph (226 knots, 418 km/h)
Range: 950 mi (826 nmi, 1,530 km)
Service ceiling: 31,400 ft (9,570 m)
Rate of climb: 1,920 ft/min (9.8 m/s)
Wing loading: 27.8 lb/ft² (135.8 kg/m²)
Power/mass: 0.172 hp/lb (0.282 kW/kg)

Armament

Guns: 2x 0.30 in machine guns; 2x 0.50 in machine guns
Bombs: up to 350 lb (160 kg) of bomb


The P-36 would have been too late for the Poles. The first Hawk 75A-1 arrived in France in December 1938 and began entering service in March 1939, but not complete until the end of the year. After the first few examples, aircraft were delivered in pieces and assembled in France, and this took time

The first production P-36As were delivered to the 20th Pursuit Group at Barksdale Field in Louisiana in April 1938. The aircraft's service history was marred by numerous teething problems with the engine exhaust, skin buckling over landing gear, and weak points in the airframe, severely restricting the performance envelope. By the time these issues were resolved, the P-36 was considered obsolete and was relegated to training units and overseas detachments. the US did not receive a decent version of the P-36 until 1941....


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## parsifal (Aug 15, 2013)

Facts are there are no real foreign supplies of aircraft that can be reliably assumed as available


(Edit)

Options that might have worked or helped was a collaborative effort with other nations. the most obvious might have been a collaborative effort to licence build and improve the One option that might have been the Avia B 534 biplane, which had the following characterisitcs

Performance
Maximum speed: 405 km/h (252 mph; 219 kn) at 4,400 m (14,436 ft)
Cruising speed: 345 km/h (214 mph; 186 kn)
Range: 580 km (360 mi; 313 nmi)
Service ceiling: 10,600 m (34,777 ft)
Rate of climb: 15.1 m/s (2,970 ft/min)
Time to altitude: 5,000 m (16,404 ft) in 4 minutes 28 seconds
Wing loading: 90.2 kg/m² (18.5 lb/sq ft)
Power/mass: 0.292 kW/kg (0.178 hp/lb)

Armament

Guns: 4× 7.92 mm (0.312 in) Mk 30 (Česká zbrojovka Strakonice) machine guns with 250-300 rpg
Bombs: 6× 10 kg (22 lb) or 4x 20 kg (44 lb) bombs


The Czech had developed a were working on a cannon armed version of this aircraft. It was introduced in 1933, and was a type that could have been licence built in Poland fairly easily. Poland might have been able to refine the design and het maybe another 10-20 mph out of the design if they worked at it.

This compares to the P-11Cs performance of 

Performance
Maximum speed: 390 km/h (242 mph; 211 kn) at 5,000 m (16,404 ft), 300 km/h (186 mph) at sea level
Stall speed: 98 km/h (61 mph; 53 kn)
Range: 700 km (435 mi; 378 nmi)
Service ceiling: 8,000 m (26,247 ft) absolute ceiling 11,000 m (36,089 ft)
Time to altitude:
5,000 m (16,404 ft) in 6 minutes
7,000 m (22,966 ft) in 13 minutes

Wing loading: 91.1 kg/m² (18.7 lb/sq ft)
Power/mass: 0.279 kW/kg (0.166 hp/lb)

Armament

Guns:
P.11a,b,c - 2 x 7.92 mm (0.312 in) KM Wz 33 or KM Wz 37 machine guns with 500rpg.[8]
P.11c - optionally an extra 2 × 7.92 mm (0.312 in) KM Wz 33 machine guns with 300rpg.
P.11f - 4 x 7.92 mm (0.312 in) FN Browning machine guns.
P.11g - 4 x 7.92 mm (0.312 in) KM Wz 36 machine guns.

so they woud have been slightly beter off building the B534 over their own P-11s. The B-534 led to the B-35, which was still at protoype by September 1939. 

Another possibility was the yugoslav IK-2, which was seamlessly developed into the IK-3. The IK-2 was intersting, and offered some improvemenent over the standards P-11 mount. its charact4risitics included

General characteristics
Crew: 1
Length: 7.88 m (25 ft 10 in)
Wingspan: 11.4 m (37 ft 5 in)
Height: 3.42 m (11 ft 3 in)
Wing area: 18 m2 (190 sq ft)
Empty weight: 1,502 kg (3,311 lb)
Gross weight: 1,857 kg (4,094 lb)
Powerplant: 1 × Hispano-Suiza 12Ycrs V-12 liquid-cooled piston engine, 642 kW (861 hp)
Propellers: 3-bladed adjustable pitch

Performance
Maximum speed: 435 km/h (270 mph; 235 kn) at 5,000 m (16,404 ft)
Cruising speed: 250 km/h (155 mph; 135 kn)
Range: 700 km (435 mi; 378 nmi)
Service ceiling: 12,000 m (39,370 ft)
Wing loading: 107 kg/m² (22 lb/sq ft)

Armament

1 × 20 mm Hispano-Suiza HS.404 cannon with 60 rounds
2 × 7.92 mm Darne machine guns


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## Greyman (Aug 15, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Facts are there are no real foreign supplies of aircraft that can be reliably assumed as available



What's the problem with (more) Hurricanes? Aside from being a rather 11th Hour option, I can't see a realistic option that would offer better results.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 15, 2013)

The main problem is Poland needs several hundred fighters, not a couple of dozen. And it needs them delivered and flying (not in crates) By July at the latest and more likely by May/June to get the full effect.


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## Greyman (Aug 15, 2013)

Canada began receiving Hurricanes September 1938, South Africa by November 1938, Yugoslavia by December 1938 ... so it was possible.


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## pattle (Aug 15, 2013)

I think within the time frame that the Polish had the best option would have been the PZL P24 as there was nothing better available. The PZL P24 wasn't badly armed and like the Gladiator and CR42 while slower than the Bf109 was quite difficult to shoot down due to their manoeuravabilty.


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## parsifal (Aug 15, 2013)

Greyman said:


> What's the problem with (more) Hurricanes? Aside from being a rather 11th Hour option, I can't see a realistic option that would offer better results.



because the poles are short of cash and will not be able to afford enough hurricanes to make a difference.

As the french found when they started buying American equipment to supplement their own indigenous stuff, it cost roughly twice as much for each foreign aircraft as the indigenous stuff.

moreover, youare only robbing peter to pay paul if you draw on the hurricane reserves. and for poland to survive,or make any difference at all, you need action from the two westen powers.

and there are viable alternatives in the east anyway. aircraft that, with a little improvement will give the germans a run for their money.

aircraft like the Avia, the yugoslav IK-3 and a few others. in sufficient numbers, given the obvious superiority of the polish pilots, the germans might be delayed. if they are delayed long enough (about 2 months), the weather moves in, and buys a couple of months for the poles, time enough for the allies to do something to stop hitlers rise


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 15, 2013)

Pars, if the Avia B534, why not the Gloster Gladiator? The performance is similar if not quite as sharp as the Avia but with hindsight the Gloster was combat proven and experienced some notable success vs the Germans and Russians.. 

Performance
Maximum speed: 407 km/h (253 mph; 220 kn) at 4,400 m (14,500 ft)
Cruising speed: 338km/h (210 mph; 183 kn)
Range: 580 km (~400 mi; 348 nmi)
Service ceiling: 10,000 m (32,800 ft)
Rate of climb: 11.7 m/s (2,300 ft/min)
Time to altitude: 3,050 m (10,000 ft) in 4.75 minutes

I guess the question is, would it be easier (cheaper available in greater numbers than the Avia)


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## Greyman (Aug 15, 2013)

parsifal said:


> because the poles are short of cash and will not be able to afford enough hurricanes to make a difference



I don't see why this would be the case.


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## parsifal (Aug 15, 2013)

p-24 is an option,but it is not good enough to make a difference. And the first thing to do is to think of a way of amassing the capital to expand their fighters, not buy a couple of dozen foreign crates at the last minute that will not make a difference.

what i would suggest, is the stuff of magic, of perfect hindsight. It would never happen, but it just demonstrates that the potential was there for an upset. 

The primary issue has nothing to do with technology or skill, or the will to fight. poles were the best airmen in europe, bar none,and they had a fighting spirit that puts many other nations to shame. they deserved better than what they got. And they could have if they had started 5-8 years before the conflagaration hit them and had the benefit of perfect foresight. Polish industry had the capacity to produce aircraft, but the poles lacked the money to develop a new fighter, and then produce it. 

So the first thing to do is to find a means of raising money. i think that source comes from two areas, the polish bomber program, and the polish naval expansion programs, both of which were a waste of money in the context of the 1939 battle

The Polish six year rearmament program lavaished money on the Polish navy from 1934 onwards, for no real gain.all they received from it was 3 DDs, 4 subs 17 small ships and some build up of the naval shipyard. i dont know how much this amounted to, but its a fair bit. i also dont know how how much they spent on thir bombers, but i know of at least two types; one of which was developed and deployed, and the other almost ready. scrap these programs, or divert R&D lavished on them into a fighte development program and you should be able to start augmenting the p-11s with something decent by 1937-8. Im guessing that the savings pointed out might be the equivalent of about 200 fighter. 200 new fighters, like the ik-3, or the avia type, plus the 150 older fighters already available, will be something to think about. not enough to win, but enough to give the germans a bit of a bloody nose. after all, if 600 british fighters could do unspeakable things to 2000 german aircraft a year later, why cant 350 Polish fighters, with better pilots and some modern equipment do evil things to 1200 german aircraft in 1939?

And, if the germans are stopped or checked, there is a good chance the russians might not attack either. After all, they only attacked after september 17, when it was obvious th poles were on their knees. Avoid that situation, and it is at least arguable that the russians wont have the stomach to stab the poles in the back


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## Shortround6 (Aug 15, 2013)

As of Sept 1939 497 Hurricanes had been delivered ( to the RAF or including exports?) Of the exports 12 were to Yugoslavia, 20 to Canada, Belgium 20, Romania 12, Turkey 15 and South Africa just 3. Were this delivered in full batches or part shipments. 

First metal wing Hurricane flies on 28th April of 1939. The provision of two position or constant speed props may also be a problem. The Constant speed almost certainly. 

Of course the Germans have a _lot_ fewer cannon armed 109s in Poland too.


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## parsifal (Aug 15, 2013)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Pars, if the Avia B534, why not the Gloster Gladiator? The performance is similar if not quite as sharp as the Avia but with hindsight the Gloster was combat proven and experienced some notable success vs the Germans and Russians..
> 
> Performance
> Maximum speed: 407 km/h (253 mph; 220 kn) at 4,400 m (14,500 ft)
> ...



you ave to look at two things. firstly, and most importantly, the produceability in Poland. im not suggesting a program of foreign mports....thats a dead end IMO. It has to be something within the grasp of polish industry to build.

gladiator fits that bill, but its the second factor that i think rules out the gladiator. what was the development potential of the the gladiator v the avia. Adopting the earlier Avia design should give the Poles the option of co-develping the B-35 with the czechs,and bringing its completion forwad by a year or so. I dont see similar possibilities developingor arising with the gloster design

Avia B.35 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## Greyman (Aug 15, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> Of course the Germans have a _lot_ fewer cannon armed 109s in Poland too.



And a _lot _more Jumo-engined 109s as well. Which the Hurricane was far superior to, even with the Watts propeller.


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## Tante Ju (Aug 15, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> Of course the Germans have a _lot_ fewer cannon armed 109s in Poland too.



From memory they deployed just 200 109s against Poland, and half of those were older Jumo powered ones (ie. all-MG equipped) Of course the Germans could divert a lot more from Home Defense but it shows that you do not need so many fighters to make life for the Luftwaffe _much _more difficult.

The major problem is that you do not need to counter German fighters, you need to counter German bombers. And compared to the historic Polish fighters, those were far too fast and far too tough to shoot down. Since those were easily doing 400-430 km/h at the time, anything below a minium 470-500 km/h enabling reliable interception is a waste of money IMHO.


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## parsifal (Aug 15, 2013)

Another avenue of possibility might be the Fokker designs. A big constraint for the Poles was engine availability. The Poles were licence producing the Bristol Mercury with two principal subtypes evident in theor P-11a to c subtypes

1 × Bristol Mercury V.S2 9-cyl. air-cooled radial piston engine, 420 kW (560 shp) or 1x 481 kW (645 hp) Polish Skoda Works Mercury VI.S2 

For their stop gap P-11g, which was first considered 1937, but did not fly until August 1939, they were building the much improved Mercury VIII with much improved power output of 840HP. The Mercury VIII had first appeared in 1935-6 in England, but Im not entirely sure of its availability in Poland. Assuming circa 1936, that presents some possibilities for the Poles. Makes me think two possible licence production types, the DXXI and the GI, both Fokker types, and both utilising the later Mercury engine. The Twin engined Fokker had 26 examples ready for export to Spain in 1938, but blocked export to that country at the last minute. The GI had first appeared at the paris air show in 1936 as a private venture, so its availability is not in question. The real question is whether Fokker would allow its licence production in Poland. I think quite possibly. Slightly larger and more powerful versions of the fokker twin fought with some distinction in 1940 over Holland, so it should do quite well against the unescorted bomber formations that were the norm over Poland. it also had some limited fighter Bomber capabilities, which might give the Poles some flexibility in providing Ground Support. 


The other Fokker possibility is the DXXI, also powered by the Mercury. It was available for service entry by the beginning of 1938, and was licence built allover the place. It could have been available even earlier, possibly from mid-37, except the Dutch air force initially cancelled its order. 

It had a respectable performance, and in its career did quite well, but at 267 mph, would have struggled in a stand up fight against the Me 109e. However it uses existing or available engine technology, and the scope for the Poles to fit retractbale undercarriage is obvious. With retracts and the 840 HP engine, it would probably achieve around 300 mph which isnt outstanding, but a lot better than the P-11. The Fokker was also designed to be as cheap as possible, which probably puts the cost per copy at around $15K per copy in 1940 USD

With the P-11s retained, the navy program curtailed, and the bomber proam cancelled, the Poles should have little difficulty building up a respectable force of G1s (with bombs) and DXXI (with retracts) by the beginning of 1939. Time enough to work up the force and have it well and trully ready for combat on time.


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## pattle (Aug 15, 2013)

Lets remember that Czechoslavakia and Poland had actually fought each other over disputed border territories and were traditionally not on the best of terms between the wars. The PZL P24 was a faster aircraft with heavier armament than the Avia B534 biplane, the PZL P24 while not being a fast aircraft was fast enough to catch all German bombers with the exception of the JU88 and when it caught them unlike the Avia B534 it had the all important cannon rather than machine guns to fire at them. I don't understand why or how Poland would approach the Czechs under these circumstances.


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## parsifal (Aug 15, 2013)

Polands engine supplies were from Skoda works in warsaw (I think it was Warsaw). dont doubt that relations migt be strained at times, particualalry after Poland participated in its final dismemberment, but relations before that were not too bad, or at least, not bad enough to stop collboration, as the manufacture of engines in Poland clearly shows.


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## nuuumannn (Aug 15, 2013)

> Canada began receiving Hurricanes September 1938, South Africa by November 1938, Yugoslavia by December 1938 ... so it was possible.



It was certainly possible, but for every Hurricane that went to Britain's allies, it was one less for the RAF. The Hurricane was a finite resource.

I don't actually know if a more advanced fighter in the Polish air force would have made much of a difference - Shortround's right in that whatever it was would have to be in large numbers by September 1st. The Bf 109 was the best fighter in continental Europe and the LW bombers the most modern, but we also have to consider that it wasn't just superior airpower that defeated the Poles. A combined effort from the German armed forces - _Blitzkrieg_ - the speed of Germany's advance caught everyone by surprise - in France and Russia subsequently. Although fighting continued into October, it is recognised that by September 17, the invasion was successful - that's seventeen days to take Poland out! 

The Polish air force dispersed its fighters to satellite fields before the invasion so when the LW attacked its airfields, vital types were not wiped out. The Germans were quite surprised by the determination of the Polish pilots, largely because they weren't expecting such determined counter attacks, but it wasn't any more courage or more modern aeroplanes that could have saved Poland.


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## parsifal (Aug 16, 2013)

I agree that numbers were what was required, but the P-11 was just so close to obsolescence that it also created problems for the PAF over and above the numbers issue. two things really dogged the P-11s, slow speed and light armament. They lacked the speed to catch the German bombers, and even on those occasions that they did catch them, struggled because of the weak armament.

Just the same the P-11 had its uses, and given the limited supply of aircraft, in any alternate scenario, it should be retained to flesh out the Polish air strength.

So, any new fighter should not be viewed as a replacement, rather a reinforcement. And reinforcements can only come from additional money. In a cash starved country like Poland, they would need to make difficult choices as to what they sacrificed so that they could have more fighters. My opinion is that they sacrifice the naval expansion and bomber programs, and i now think they build Fokker DXXIs (with retractable U/C and possibly 2 x 12.7MG) and GIs.

Poland did not succumb to blitzkrieg as is popularly portrayed, though it has to be conceded that it had similar tactics and certainly similar outcomes. They did not go down the same way as France and the Low Countries. And it took longer than 17 days to overcome polish resistance. Certainly the back of Polish defence had been broken by September 17, but serious battles continued to rage right through September, including the Battle of Tomaszów Lubelski and the battle of Warsaw. A big factor in the Polish leaderships decision to look for its forces to escape rather than reform was the Soviet invasion. 

The last resisitance did not end until 6 October. It is arguable, though conceded as unlikely that without intensive air support, the German encirclement movements, Kesselschlachts, might well have faltered and failed. If they had been forced to fight a ground slogging land battle, one or more of the encirclemeing mobvements may well have failed. if that happened, it would have been the German encircling forces that would have surrendered, rather than the Poles. And success in one sector would mean they (the Poles) could shift forces to relieve other encircled elements. this was certainly along the lines of the Polish battle plan, and it may well have worked except for the combined effects of tanks and air support. Take away the air support, and the Germa penetrations may well have been contained and defeated.


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## nuuumannn (Aug 16, 2013)

> Certainly the back of Polish defence had been broken by September 17



Well, that's still 17 days, Parsifal, which is still extraordinarily quick. You are right about the PZL P.11, and if they had a handful of Hurris or another type as reinforcements maybe things might have gone on for a bit longer, but the end result would have been the same, regardless of how long the resistance held out for. The German armed forces were too strong. In order to carry out the scenario you envisage, the Poles would have needed a pretty large number of fighters and bombers, so where do you stop in this scenario in terms of what you think they need as opposed to what they can get hold of beforehand?


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## parsifal (Aug 16, 2013)

From Wiki, but a good summary of the common misconceptions of the Polish campaign


The Polish Army fought German tanks with horse-mounted cavalry wielding lances and swords.

In 1939, only 10% of the Polish army was made up of cavalry units. Polish cavalry never charged German tanks or entrenched infantry or artillery, but usually acted as mobile infantry (like dragoons) and reconnaissance units and executed cavalry charges only in rare situations against foot soldiers. Other armies (including German and Soviet) also fielded and extensively used elite horse cavalry units at that time. Polish cavalry consisted of eleven brigades, as emphasized by its military doctrine, equipped with anti tank rifles "UR" and light artillery such as the highly effective Bofors 37 mm anti-tank gun. The myth originated from war correspondents reports of the Battle of Krojanty, where a Polish cavalry brigade was fired upon in ambush by hidden armored vehicles, after it had mounted a sabre-charge against German infantry.

The Polish Air Force was destroyed on the ground in the first days of the war.

The Polish Air Force, though numerically inferior, had been moved from air bases to small camouflaged airfields shortly before the war. Only some trainers and auxiliary aircraft were destroyed on the ground. The Polish Air Force, significantly outnumbered and with its fighters outmatched by more advanced German fighters, remained active up to the second week of the campaign, inflicting significant damage on the Luftwaffe. The Luftwaffe lost, to all operational causes, 285 aircraft, with 279 more damaged, while the Poles lost 333 aircraft. 


Poland offered little resistance and surrendered quickly.

In the first few days, Germany sustained very heavy losses: Poland cost the Germans an entire armored division, thousands of soldiers, and 25% of its air strength. As for duration, the September Campaign lasted only about one week less than the Battle of France in 1940, even though the Anglo-French forces were much closer to parity with the Germans in numerical strength and equipment. Furthermore, the Polish Army was preparing the Romanian Bridgehead, which would have prolonged Polish defence, but this plan was cancelled due to the Soviet invasion of Poland on 17 September 1939. Poland also never officially surrendered to the Germans. Under German occupation, the Polish army continued to fight underground, as Armia Krajowa and forest partisans—Leśni. The Polish resistance movement in World War II in German-occupied Poland was one of the largest resistance movements in all of occupied Europe. 

Poland succumbed to Blitzkrieg


It is often assumed that blitzkrieg is the strategy that Germany first used in Poland. Many early post-war histories, such as Barrie Pitt's in The Second World War (BPC Publishing 1966), attribute German victory to "enormous development in military technique which occurred between 1918 and 1940", citing that "Germany, who translated (British inter-war) theories into action… called the result Blitzkrieg." This idea has been repudiated by some authors. Matthew Cooper writes: "_Throughout the Polish Campaign, the employment of the mechanized units revealed the idea that they were intended solely to ease the advance and to support the activities of the infantry…. Thus, any strategic exploitation of the armoured idea was still-born. The paralysis of command and the breakdown of morale were not made the ultimate aim of the … German ground and air forces, and were only incidental by-products of the traditional manoeuvers of rapid encirclement and of the supporting activities of the flying artillery of the Luftwaffe, both of which had as their purpose the physical destruction of the enemy troops. Such was the Vernichtungsgedanke of the Polish campaign._"

Vernichtungsgedanke was a strategy dating back to Frederick the Great, and was applied in the Polish Campaign little changed from the French campaigns in 1870 or 1914. The use of tanks "left much to be desired...Fear of enemy action against the flanks of the advance, fear which was to prove so disastrous to German prospects in the west in 1940 and in the Soviet Union in 1941, was present from the beginning of the war." John Ellis, writing in Brute Force asserted that "…_there is considerable justice in Matthew Cooper's assertion that the panzer divisions were not given the kind of strategic (emphasis in original) mission that was to characterize authentic armoured blitzkrieg, and were almost always closely subordinated to the various mass infantry armies_." Zaloga and Madej, in The Polish Campaign 1939, also address the subject of mythical interpretations of Blitzkrieg and the importance of other arms in the campaign. "_Whilst Western accounts of the September campaign have stressed the shock value of the panzers and Stuka attacks, they have tended to underestimate the punishing effect of German artillery (emphasis added) on Polish units. Mobile and available in significant quantity, artillery shattered as many units as any other branch of the Wehrmacht"_......


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## parsifal (Aug 16, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> Well, that's still 17 days, Parsifal, which is still extraordinarily quick. You are right about the PZL P.11, and if they had a handful of Hurris or another type as reinforcements maybe things might have gone on for a bit longer, but the end result would have been the same, regardless of how long the resistance held out for. The German armed forces were too strong. In order to carry out the scenario you envisage, the Poles would have needed a pretty large number of fighters and bombers, so where do you stop in this scenario in terms of what you think they need as opposed to what they can get hold of beforehand?



Polish resistance cracked on the day the Soviets intervened. its arguable as to why it cracked. Up until that point the Poles were making preprations for the Rumanian redoubt....a retreat to the south of the country into the rough terrain near the Rumanian borders. Thats still a strategy responding to defeat, but its not surrender either. 

I dont think the answer lies in a few dozen foreign imports. The Poles needed several hundred additional fighters, and that really rules out bringing expensive imports. They had to build their new fighters, and they needed about 200 new fighters to have any real effect. That plus the 150 they already had would have given them 350 fighters, and 350 , along with a concerted effort by the western allies might well have unhinged the LW. 

The problem with my ideas arent that they wouldnt be effective, its that the Poles would have needed crystal clear hindsight, much better support from their allies, and a German response no different to the historical. none of those assumptions are attainable, but within the limits of those faulty assumptions, if the Poles had done something along the lines of what im suggesting, I think it is very posible for them to pull off an upset. With 350 fighters, plus 1200 or so allied fighters in the west hammering away at the LW. , and a faltering encirclement battle on the ground, if the Poles could last until the winter, Germany might well find herself face with a true two front war from the very beginning. Who knows what might happen from there.


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## nuuumannn (Aug 16, 2013)

That's very interesting Parsifal and yep, looks like _Blitzkrieg_ was perhaps not what we might call what they did, but nevertheless, the result was pretty swift (define Blitzkrieg - Lightning War). I'm under no illusion and never was that it was a cake walk for the Germans, but ultimately, the time it took for Poland to capitulate, despite the German casualties was remarkable. Advanced fighters might have slowed things down, but not been enough, which brings us back to this thread. Perhaps we should be asking what it would have taken to defeat the Germans in Poland, with the obvious limitations on technology and availability of equipment to the Polish armed forces? Would more advanced air power have been enough to do so?


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## nuuumannn (Aug 16, 2013)

My answer was to your informative post - and I definitely agree with you on your last one.


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## parsifal (Aug 16, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> That's very interesting Parsifal and yep, looks like _Blitzkrieg_ was perhaps not what we might call what they did, but nevertheless, the result was pretty swift (define Blitzkrieg - Lightning War). I'm under no illusion and never was that it was a cake walk for the Germans, but ultimately, the time it took for Poland to capitulate, despite the German casualties was remarkable. Advanced fighters might have slowed things down, but not been enough, which brings us back to this thread. Perhaps we should be asking what it would have taken to defeat the Germans in Poland, with the obvious limitations on technology and availability of equipment to the Polish armed forces? Would more advanced air power have been enough to do so?



Nah, not a chance. The big killer in the Polish campaign was the german artillery, mobility and numbers. there simply was no answer to that, given the forward defence policies insisted upon by the Poles. A fortified defence behins the Vistula, with better fortifications might have helped , but most of Polish industry was located in Polish Silesia......the Poles were in an almost imppossible situation....


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## Greyman (Aug 16, 2013)

I don't think anyone is under the impression better aircraft would have turned the tide in favour of Poland. As per tomo pauk's initial post, the idea is to think of Poland's best course of action.


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## pattle (Aug 16, 2013)

I think if the British and French had of stepped in that could of taken some pressure off the Polish, but then again I don't think the British and French were really capable of giving enough help to change the Polish situation. From memory I don't think the British Expeditionary Force even started arriving in France until after Poland had fallen. Britain's strength was mainly in it's Navy and I don't think that even with the best of will that there was much any Navy could have done to aid the Polish. As for the French Army it was not ready to attack Germany, one of the French Armies biggest weaknesses was it's poor communications and this prevented it from organising a proper defence let alone an attack into Germany. The only thing I think the Western Allies could have done was possibly a bit of bombing, although I am not sure what they would have bombed or with what.
Basically the Germans had the Poles by the short and curlies in 1939 and there was nothing either they or their allies could do about it.
Maybe if the Polish had of invested more of their money in fortifications and fighters this may have slowed the Germans. As far as Polish fortifications are concerned a lot remain intact until this day as the Germans just went around them. More fighters esp something like the PZL P24 with canons for dealing with bombers would have been useful but they would really have needed efficient ground control to direct them towards the bombers, ideally radar. Perhaps though if the Poles had of been able to inflict more heavy losses on the Germans this could have effected later events in the west, but then a lot of the early equipment used by the Germans had been replaced by 1940 anyway.


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## Civettone (Aug 16, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Saying that Hitler only decided to invade Poland after Poland sided with france, is the same warped logic as Hitler used. Poland had a non-aggression pact with Germany dating back to 1934, and before that there was the treaty of Locarno. the Poles had already demonstrated their good intentions towards Germany. Germany betrayed them, simple as that. As late as 1938, the Germans were professing their friendship towards the Poles, but at the same time making preprations for war, though the final decision to move came later, which is your entire casus belli.
> 
> All good and noble, but the world was already witnessing how the germans treated their "friends". That hitler could not be trusted was being demonstrated by event after event, culminating in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, and then finally the Czech rump. As those events unfolded, the Poles knew they could not trust the germans, and the germans were not genuine in their offers of friendship. Nearly every freedom loving nation in the world was realizing that at that time.
> 
> These statements of mine are not just my own, they were established at nuremberg after the war and were a precursor to being able to try the German leadership as war criminals. *So I am conscious of your motivations here. Re-write history as to who is the aggressor nation, and you can establish that Hitler and the rest of his cronies were not war criminals, and disprove Germany's war guilt. sorry guys, not buying it, and it exposes you people for what you really are.*


Parsifal, I believe calling me a revisionist is uncalled for. I am a serious historian, who has spent more time reading about Nazi Germany than I would like to admit. 
I am merely passing on information, which is available through a large number of primary and secondary sources. Hitler did often take up the idea of creating an alliance with Poland to fight Russia. In the end, he did not and instead massacred a large part of the Polish population. 

But I will not take this kind of insult... 

Kris


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## parsifal (Aug 16, 2013)

I apologise if you are offended, and was a little harsh on you, I can see. But harsh as my treatment of you was, that doesnt make me wrong to say what i said, and I dont retract it in any way. Thats because, perhaps without realizing, what you are saying is in sync with hitlers ideas. i am not accusing you of nazism, fwiw. Its just that Hitler was the agressor against poland. there was no choice for Poland. except perhaps to allow her people to die without a fight, which was never going to happen willingly. And saying you are offended pales to insignificance when you compare the monstrous nature of your opinion to the huge suffering inflicted on the Poles by the criminal aggression displayed by the Germans towards them. 

Germany acted disingenuously toward Poland, and all nations that surrounded Germany in the end lived to regret it (even Switzerland). Any nation that tried to ally with Germany was always betrrayed in the end. Germany in the interwar period was a totally ammoral nation, no respect for the rule of law, and no peaceful intent whilst under Hitler. In just the same way as they presented a smiling friendly face to the Soviet Union, they always intended to dismmember Poland. Hitler in Mein kampf restated conservatrive racist german dogma already pursued from at least 1915, when he saw Poland, Lithuana and estonia as colonial frontiers of Greater Germany. He never made any secret of what he intended to do in these states. For a time, as he consolidated his power, he gave the impression of cultivating good relations with the Poles, and f rom time to time he toyed with the idea of using the Poles to attack the Soviets. But his base course was the same as that first suggested by Ludenforf in 1915, and stated very clearly in Mein Kampf.

Hitlers stated intent was virtually the same as that of Imperial germany, namely it was planned to annex territory in both Lithuania and Poland for direct colonization by German colonists after the forcible removal of the Polish and Lithuanian population. As early as April 1915, the Polish Border Strip plan against Poland, which was first suggested by General Erich Ludendorff in 1914, was approved as a German war aim by the Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg. The German historian Andreas Hillgruber argued that the foreign policy of General Ludendorff, with its demand for lebensraum to be seized for Germany in Eastern Europe during World War I, was the prototype for German policy in World War II. Lebensraum almost became a reality in 1918 during World War I. The new Communist regime of Russia concluded the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany, ending Russian participation in the war in exchange for the surrender of huge swathes of land, including the Baltic territories, Belarus, Ukraine, and the Caucasus. However, unrest at home and defeat on the Western Front forced Germany to abandon these favorable terms in favor of the Treaty of Versailles, by which the newly acquired eastern territories were agreed to sacrifice the land to Lithuania, Poland, and new nations such as Estonia or Latvia, and a series of short-lived independent states in Ukraine.

if you want to get upset because I dont compromise on German war guilt, thats your perogative. I dont want to fight with you. i dont mind discussing it. But neither will i compromiose on this issue, Ever. I dont make deals with the devil. I should not have made the accusation i did, but neither am i about to make any concessions about german war guilt. they are guilty as hell....


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## Civettone (Aug 16, 2013)

I dont see what war guilt has to do with it. I merely said that, at some point, Hitler was thinking of allying with the Poles to attack the Soviets. 

You are right about everything you said and yes, Hitler would have backstabbed the Poles, but then again, allies is not the same as friends. You use them to your benefit as long as they are useful. I am sure the Poles had no illusions about this and decided not to team up with Hitler. As I said, they probably saw a division of power between Germany and Russia as a good thing. That turned out badly 

Anyway, your rant was uncalled for and in no relation to my post. If you think you can just insult people and then justify it by saying you feel strong about these things, well, that just won't do. As a word of advice, try to keep your anger under control. I had the most respect for you up til today and I hope I was not wrong.

Kris


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## Shortround6 (Aug 16, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> Helo, gents,
> What tecnological paths hould`ve been undertaken by the Polish air force in the 1930s, in order to be better prepared for the September war in 1939? Not that it would`ve changed the outcome, but just to give Polish air crews better chances once airborne.



Getting back to the original question, the most _practical_ engine solution would be a late model Mercury engine. The Poles already had a licence for an early version, they had a factory tooled up for the early version. It would have been the quickest and cheapest way to a 840-900hp engine. Unfortunately that is about the limit for Mercury without 100 octane fuel. Going to the 14 cylinder G-R engines _might_ be the next step, depending on licence. The "K" series might be easily licensed (everybody and their brother was making it) and it _might_ be able to be made on the Mercury machinery without too much trouble (same bore and stroke) but the "K" doesn't really offer much over a late model Mercury. The "N" series might be harder to license as it was the latest _production_ version. From a manufacturing stand point it isn't really much different ( more and deeper fins, not sure what else) and some countries that Licensed the "K" developed versions close to the "N". 
The Hispano engine offers more performance (with out trying to get into low drag radial cowlings in 1939) but may require the most money in manufacturing set up. 

Using better propellers may help and it may be possible. The British had actually fallen behind the world standard and were playing catch-up so I would not use their time line as to when variable pitch ( two-pitch) and constant speed propellers were available.

For guns you are pretty much down to the standard MG used by the Poles or possibly the two 20mm cannon. Either pretty much the same thing as the German MG/FF (as used in some export fighters) or the 20 Hispano (or early version) IF they use the Hispano engine. Trying to be the first air force to mount Hispano guns in the wing is not likely to end well. 

Retractable landing gear? The Poles can certainly design it and build it in prototype form, Large scale production? Please remember that many British and French aircraft companies bought the landing gear for their planes from specialist companies. Maybe they can and maybe the can't I don't know.


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## parsifal (Aug 16, 2013)

Some points about the Mercury


In early 1938 Roy Fedden (its chief designer) pressed the UK Air Ministry to import supplies of 100 octane aviation spirit (gasoline) from the USA. This new fuel would allow aero engines to run at higher compression ratios and supercharger boost pressure than the existing 87-octane fuel, thus increasing the power. The Mercury XV was a derivative of the Mercury VIII (with the same power output rating...I have read, however that the Mercury XV was capable achieving outputs of over 900HP with the 100 Octane and a boost of 9lbs) was first developed in 1938 and was one of the first British aero engines to be type-tested and cleared to use the 100-octane fuel. There is no reason to believe the Skoda (poland) production lines could not produce the Mercury XV. By early 1939 they were already building the Mercury VIII, with an 830HP rating. The Mercury VIII was first designed in 1935, so on the assumption that more fund are available, ther is no reason not to allow or consider reasonable the earlier introduction of this engine as well.

As indicated, the Poles were already producing the Mercury VIII in 1939 for the abortive P-11g. It arrived too late for the battles in September, but given that the engine was available from 1935, ther is no reason not to assume that given more money the engine could not have entered service in Poland from early 1938, and the mercury XV from early 1939. The great appeal of the Mercury for the Poles is that adoption of the improve models is seamless to production. They could seamlessly move from one model to the next without affecting production.

Retracts is a problem. However two Fokkers were modified to take retracts in the Finnish AF. It took about 3 months to fit the prototype, and they did give some problems to the Finns, in that the gear collased on one of the prototypes. Ive only seen one account of this test, and with retractable gear fitted, 200 lbs of weight was added to the aircraft, but an additional 15mph added to the top speed. that was with the lower rated Mercury VIs engines (645hp) fitted. with an 830hp engine fitted, you might get 2025 mph extra out og the Fokker with retracts. Again, given ideal conditions, I see it as very possible for the Poles, if they adopted the DXXI in 1937, to have a functional retract system in service by 1938. The Polish aero industry was working for the 6th biggest air force in Europe, and was quite efficient, certainly moreso than the FAL state factory at Timmpa.

I think the ideal weapon for the Polish DXXI and GI would not be in 7.7mm caliber. Neither do i see use of the 20mm cannon as all that optimal. Fitting and strengthening the wings for the DXXI might be a bit of a problem. The Danes had tried to fit 20mm madsen cannon to their DXXIs and it had not really worked, because it caused too much warping in the wings. But LMGs were too light as well IMO. I think the optimal would 2 x 12.7mg in place of the 4 x 0.303 Brownings. The Browning 0.303 weighed about 31 lbs, so total all up weight for the four guns would be about 125lbs. The Poles had a 12.7mm aircraft MG, but I dont know its weights. Assuming it was similar to the US 0.5 AN guns was about 61 lbs, so no weight penalty for the change of armamant. not sure about ammunition.


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## Matt308 (Aug 16, 2013)

Civettone said:


> I dont see what war guilt has to do with it. I merely said that, at some point, Hitler was thinking of allying with the Poles to attack the Soviets.
> 
> You are right about everything you said and yes, Hitler would have backstabbed the Poles, but then again, allies is not the same as friends. You use them to your benefit as long as they are useful. I am sure the Poles had no illusions about this and decided not to team up with Hitler. As I said, they probably saw a division of power between Germany and Russia as a good thing. That turned out badly
> 
> ...



...and I would suggest that you both leave it at that. He apologized and you didn't accept his apology. Now move on.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 16, 2013)

Problems for the Poles are getting 100 octane fuel. 

Again, the problem with retractable gear is not necessarily the design and fabrication of a few prototype sets but the manufacture of several hundred sets *IF* you don't have an industry set up for it. I don't know what the Poles had in place at the time. 

Poles might be better off with six rifle caliber machine guns than using two .50s. I am not sure what the Belgians were getting for a cycle rate in 1938-39 but the US was only getting 500-600rpm even in an un-synchronized gun. .50 cal ammo is about 5 time heavier per round than rifle caliber ammo. ie, 250 rpg for four guns (1000 rounds total) of 7.9/.303/.30cal ammo weighs what 100 rpg (200 rounds total) does for TWO .50 cal guns. .50 cal ammo weighs about 30-31lbs per hundred. 
Weight given for the US .50 cal varies but 61lb sounds like a bare gun while a 31lb browning .303 sounds like "as installed'. An installed .50 cal may well go over 71lbs.

Or the Poles could try the 20mm cannon (MG/FF clone) they were sticking in the wings of the export Pz 24s.


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## Jenisch (Aug 16, 2013)

What the Polish AF was thinking and did already tried to improve the situation?


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## parsifal (Aug 16, 2013)

> Problems for the Poles are getting 100 octane fuel.



Quite possibly, I dont know enough about the supply side of the 100 Octane Fuel. But it had been sought after by Roy Feddon since 1938. Assuming that the Poles followed suit, what sort of time delays were there in securing quantities of the fuel from the US. Say orders were placed at the beginning of 1938, how long before they would receive any quantities of the new fuel? 




> Again, the problem with retractable gear is not necessarily the design and fabrication of a few prototype sets but the manufacture of several hundred sets *IF* you don't have an industry set up for it. I don't know what the Poles had in place at the time.




The Poles were already designing and producing significant quantities of Retract gear for several models. The PZL-37 bomber had begun to enter service in 1938, used a home designed retract, more complex than those for most fighters. The PZL-46, of which 160 had been ordered and were in the pipeline, included a subtype with retractable undercarriage. The P-50 Jastrab had another design of retract. The Poles already had existing designs of retract gear, in service and under production. i dont see any major problems with building and adapting these designs to suit the light weight DXX1. The GI would most likley have needed to use an adaptation of the P-46, or it might even have used a lightreened single wheel version (as oposed to the double bogey version used) in the Pzl37) 



> Poles might be better off with six rifle caliber machine guns than using two .50s. I am not sure what the Belgians were getting for a cycle rate in 1938-39 but the US was only getting 500-600rpm even in an un-synchronized gun. .50 cal ammo is about 5 time heavier per round than rifle caliber ammo. ie, 250 rpg for four guns (1000 rounds total) of 7.9/.303/.30cal ammo weighs what 100 rpg (200 rounds total) does for TWO .50 cal guns. .50 cal ammo weighs about 30-31lbs per hundred.
> Weight given for the US .50 cal varies but 61lb sounds like a bare gun while a 31lb browning .303 sounds like "as installed'. An installed .50 cal may well go over 71lbs.
> 
> Or the Poles could try the 20mm cannon (MG/FF clone) they were sticking in the wings of the export Pz 24s


.

If the Poles go for 6 x 7.7mm, or a 20mm cannon version, they would need to strengthen the wings of the DXXI. i dont know if they would have time to do that. Assuming it can be done quickly, they would need to swing to the Pegasus, which was also available from local sources. They were already producing a 940 hp version for the Pzl 37, and had further developed it for the Pzl 46, which was in production but not yet in service as a replacement for the P-23. Some reports rate the redesigned version of the Pegasus at over 1000 HP. I was looking for quick easy conversions, because at the end of the day, the Poles needed a large number of fighters, of higher performance than the ones they had, and not a series of near prototypes. As I said, the Polish aeronautical industry was quite advanced, but time was limited.


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## tomo pauk (Aug 17, 2013)

Many thanks to the people contributing here, unfortunately I don't have time to do that by myself right now


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## Shortround6 (Aug 17, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Quite possibly, I dont know enough about the supply side of the 100 Octane Fuel. But it had been sought after by Roy Feddon since 1938. Assuming that the Poles followed suit, what sort of time delays were there in securing quantities of the fuel from the US. Say orders were placed at the beginning of 1938, how long before they would receive any quantities of the new fuel?



Howard Hughes had used 100 octane in 1935 to set the speed record, but in 1935 100 octane fuel cost over 10 times per gallon what 87 octane did. Everybody KNEW 100 octane was coming, they just didn't know _when_ at an affordable price. They also didn't know exactly what kind of 100 octane fuel. The Americans were the first to use 100 octane in military planes but their "aromatics shall not exceed 2%" fuel is not going to allow the same boost/power as the British ""aromatics shall not be less than 20%" 100 octane fuel. 



parsifal said:


> The Poles were already designing and producing significant quantities of Retract gear for several models. The PZL-37 bomber had begun to enter service in 1938, used a home designed retract, more complex than those for most fighters. The PZL-46, of which 160 had been ordered and were in the pipeline, included a subtype with retractable undercarriage. The P-50 Jastrab had another design of retract. The Poles already had existing designs of retract gear, in service and under production. i dont see any major problems with building and adapting these designs to suit the light weight DXX1. The GI would most likley have needed to use an adaptation of the P-46, or it might even have used a lightreened single wheel version (as oposed to the double bogey version used) in the Pzl37)



Well, it seems the retracting gear would be no problem then. thank you. 



parsifal said:


> If the Poles go for 6 x 7.7mm, or a 20mm cannon version, they would need to strengthen the wings of the DXXI. i dont know if they would have time to do that. Assuming it can be done quickly, they would need to swing to the Pegasus, which was also available from local sources. They were already producing a 940 hp version for the Pzl 37, and had further developed it for the Pzl 46, which was in production but not yet in service as a replacement for the P-23. Some reports rate the redesigned version of the Pegasus at over 1000 HP. I was looking for quick easy conversions, because at the end of the day, the Poles needed a large number of fighters, of higher performance than the ones they had, and not a series of near prototypes.  As I said, the Polish aeronautical industry was quite advanced, but time was limited.



If they could mount a 20mm Madsen cannon AND a mg in each wing (or cannon under?) then six mgs shouldn't be a real problem. And even if stuck with four that may not be quite as bad as it might seem. Nobody had armor or self sealing tanks. Germans had few (if any?) fighters with 20mm cannon. Most 109s used in Poland had 4 mgs.


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## parsifal (Aug 19, 2013)

we should really analyse the numbers of German fighters commited to the battle to determine the numbers of PAF fighters that should be fielded. tante mentioned only 200 Bf 109s, that would seem a bit low

This is a link to Dr Niehorsters Armed Forces OOB. The two principal formations committed to the battles were LF 1 and 4. On the assumption they were fully committed I count 370 Bf 109E and 94 Bf 109D. Therer were also about 100 Me 110s. that gives the Germans almost 570 fighters overall

Order of Battle 1.9.39


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## klugi (Jan 9, 2014)

Very interesting discussion. The unavailability of 100 Octane fuel is a bit of a moot point as there were already issues with lower grade fuels. The Poles had tremendous logistical problems during the September campaign. Fuel was in high demand and short supply, the poor infrastructure and rapid relocation from one auxiliary field to the next made the job of supplying the squadrons next to impossible. By the time the soviets invaded most of the available reserves had been depleted, what was left could not get to the units.


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## bobbysocks (Jan 14, 2014)

probably the best thing the PAF could have done is pick several large farms and build barn looking buildings ( hangars) on them. when they felt that attack was getting close...take off at dusk and move all their ac to these hidden strips. they had to know they would not be able to defend their airdromes against the might of the LW so why not hide them. they could have had a couple strips for each group and rotate them in a "shell game" ( yes a logistical nightmare to some degree ) from field to field. it would not have changed the outcome but might have given their AF several more days to inflict damage on the advancing germans and surprise the LW. later in the war when us bombers and fighters were targeting their airdromes germany went to hiding ac on camoflauged bases.


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## parsifal (Jan 14, 2014)

remarkably, thats pretty much what they did do. When the german attack struck, they comprehensively pasted the known airfields of the PAF. Trouble is, the PAF had largely relocated to auxiliary fields. The PAF fought well above its weight, German losses for the campaign exceeded the frontline strength of the PAF and Polish pilots emerged as the best in Europe, bar none. 

What the Poles could not do, was gain air superiorityor prevent the Germans from completing their mission . The LW was an integral part of the modern method, and it undertook that role efficiently and effectively. the Poles were better pilots, but they were too badlky outnumbered and as part of the overall polish war machine were not nearly so well integrated.

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## ElkSlayer (Jul 17, 2015)

Bringing an old thread back to life...the Polish Air Force preparing for 1939. First off, one must put yourself in the Polish mindset during the time. I might be off a little, but I do believe the British offered immediate bombing of Germany if they attacked Poland. France, promised to attack Germany within something like two weeks. At this time in France I do believe they had something like 110 divisions vs. Germany's 36. So, you can see how Poland's defense plan was...a delaying defense. They only had to hold out for a short time until the French would be in artillery range of Berlin. Now, if I was to realistically prepare Poland's forces for 1939, I would buy RADIOS!!! Putting in the planes, tanks, everywhere. I would also have fuel dumps and spare parts in southern Poland. The planes originally were not supposed to retreat to the south, so when they did, they were ill-prepared. Radios were rare in the Polish military and I would say communication all-around was one of their military's biggest problems. Other thing I would do, is blow off France and Britain when they told me not to mobilize all the troops days before the invasion; having less than half your troops mobilized when you are invaded is not a good thing. Doing these things I mentioned; as well as, France and Britain sticking to their word, Germany would've been crushed.


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## SpicyJuan11 (Jul 17, 2015)

ElkSlayer said:


> Bringing an old thread back to life...the Polish Air Force preparing for 1939. First off, one must put yourself in the Polish mindset during the time. I might be off a little, but I do believe the British offered immediate bombing of Germany if they attacked Poland. France, promised to attack Germany within something like two weeks. At this time in France I do believe they had something like 110 divisions vs. Germany's 36. So, you can see how Poland's defense plan was...a delaying defense. They only had to hold out for a short time until the French would be in artillery range of Berlin. Now, if I was to realistically prepare Poland's forces for 1939, I would buy RADIOS!!! Putting in the planes, tanks, everywhere. I would also have fuel dumps and spare parts in southern Poland. The planes originally were not supposed to retreat to the south, so when they did, they were ill-prepared. Radios were rare in the Polish military and I would say communication all-around was one of their military's biggest problems. Other thing I would do, is blow off France and Britain when they told me not to mobilize all the troops days before the invasion; having less than half your troops mobilized when you are invaded is not a good thing. Doing these things I mentioned; as well as, France and Britain sticking to their word, Germany would've been crushed.



The lack of radio's wasn't the only problem the Polish army faced. The best strategy Poland could have, was to fortify behind the Vistula and hope that Stalin doesn't declare. Also, look at the Saar 'Offensive', it was a disaster. You're not going to change the outcome in Poland unless the German's make large blunders and/or France gets it together which would take an earlier POD.


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## Balljoint (Jul 17, 2015)

Poland was overconfident and badly blindsided. The history below is selective and incomplete but despite the agenda is reasonably well documented. 

bionic mosquito: Timeline To War (Through 1938)

bionic mosquito: Timeline to War (Beginning 1939)


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## Wurger (Jul 17, 2015)

Well documented....????

What Polish troops in Gdańsk were under mobilization ? I think the Polish Post Office and Railway members can be taken as the troops.

s. 24 March i. Poland makes a partial mobilization of troops in Danzig, contrary to the German-Polish Treaty. (1:494)

What Polish newspapers in West Prussia-Pomerania??

March i. Polish newspapers in West Prussia-Pomeralia call for a boycott of Germans: shops, market stalls, restaurants, hiring, etc. (1:555)

First of all the author should edit all spelling mistakes . "Zachód" ( West in English ) is written with "ó" in Polish but not with "u". Also the "Pomeralia" should be the Pomerania.


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## Balljoint (Jul 17, 2015)

Wurger said:


> Well documented....????
> 
> What Polish troops in Gdańsk were under mobilization ? I think the Polish Post Office and Railway members can be taken as the troops.
> 
> ...






“Documented” refers to footnotes, not accuracy. I’m sure there are inaccuracies, omissions as well as questionable inferences. But Poland had been successful in the most recent military clashes and may well have been overconfident as to their military might. And, both at the beginning and at the end of the war, their expectations of help from the west were misplaced.


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## Wurger (Jul 17, 2015)

I see. However the Polish overconfidence was a kind of a propaganda mostly. In fact, the Polish Army H.Q knew well the level of the Nazi German military might and also was aware of the weakness of the own Army, etc... Therefore the attempts to the accelerated purchases of the military stuff for the Polish Armed Forces . But the most important thing was to find allies and signation of military treaties with them together. Why? Because it made an impact on the Polish military strategy for the inevitable war. The idea of including of the Soviets in a guarantee arrangement sounds let's say sounds a little bit funny. Poland would never agree for that because of "the national experience" and political differences between the two systems. One thing is true though... believing in the military treaties with the western countries led Poland to the defeat.


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## Balljoint (Jul 17, 2015)

Wurger said:


> I see. However the Polish overconfidence was a kind of a propaganda mostly. In fact, the Polish Army H.Q knew well the level of the Nazi German military might and also was aware of the weakness of the own Army, etc... Therefore the attempts to the accelerated purchases of the military stuff for the Polish Armed Forces . But the most important thing was to find allies and signation of military treaties with them together. Why? Because it made an impact on the Polish military strategy for the inevitable war. The idea of including of the Soviets in a guarantee arrangement sounds let's say sounds a little bit funny. Poland would never agree for that because of "the national experience" and political differences between the two systems. One thing is true though... believing in the military treaties with the western countries led Poland to the defeat.




That’s sort of the point. Poland exported its best fighter but couldn’t afford it for its own forces. Why would Poland need much of an air force when France and Great Britain would be bring theirs to bear and draw off the LW?


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 17, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> As of Sept 1939 497 Hurricanes had been delivered ( to the RAF or including exports?) Of the exports 12 were to Yugoslavia, 20 to Canada, Belgium 20, Romania 12, Turkey 15 and South Africa just 3. Were this delivered in full batches or part shipments.
> 
> First metal wing Hurricane flies on 28th April of 1939. The provision of two position or constant speed props may also be a problem. The Constant speed almost certainly.


Gloster's F.5/34 flies in 1937 all metal and while the RAF ended up not ordering it into production, shifts in foreign interest (for export or possible license) might make it more interesting, especially compared to suggestions of licensing the Gladiator or Avia B-534. If the Poles had gotten the Mercury VIII into production sooner it would be a good match for a license built Gloster monoplane. Other than that, a license built Gladiator with F.5/34 or Blenheim style cowling and variable-pitch prop might bump performance up too and possibly exchanging the underwing LMGs for Oerlikons. (the PZL P.24 seems to have already switched to variable pitch 3-blade props of a similar arrangement, as does the PZL.37)

Otherwise it seems the P.24 and Fokker D.XXI seem like the best options to pursue. (aside from new indigenous designs other than the routes they tried historically -like re-using the P.24 fusealage and mating it with a smaller area -probably somewhat thicker- low wing with retractable gear) And a D.XXI with retractable landing gear might perform similarly well to the Gloster fighter anyway if using a similar engine and propeller. (and probably be significantly cheaper)

The PZL.38 failure was mentioned early in this thread as well, and while it wasn't workable in its current form, a small twin engine heavy fighter/interceptor might have worked better if targeting more powerful engines, especially if some of the added weight was traded for optimizing around a single-seat configuration or at least a more streamlined two-seat one. (dedicated advanced radio operator like the Fw 187?) Designing around the existing mercury engines in production with possible plans to upgrade to the VIII might be useful. The Mercury VI was rated for 645 vs the variety of 420-490 air cooled V-8 and V-12 engines tested on the PZL.38. Granted those are larger, draggier engines, but the Fokker G.1 dealt with the same frontal area along with a much larger wing and more pod+boom area, so may have been significantly better performing when mated with the same 840 hp engines while more of a mystery with those 645 hp engines. If focused as a bomber destroyer, using a battery of Oerlikon FF cannons concentrated in the nose would make sense as well. (or possibly 23 mm Madsen cannons, slower firing but the belt feed and much heavier damage per round should be an advantage -lots of trade-offs depending which is easier to fit into the nose, including oerlikons with larger capacity drums)

Given the historical timing of the PZL.38's development, focusing on using the Mercury VIII from the start might make more sense. (focus on getting both the airframe and new engine into production by late 1938 )




Shortround6 said:


> Getting back to the original question, the most _practical_ engine solution would be a late model Mercury engine. The Poles already had a licence for an early version, they had a factory tooled up for the early version. It would have been the quickest and cheapest way to a 840-900hp engine. Unfortunately that is about the limit for Mercury without 100 octane fuel. Going to the 14 cylinder G-R engines _might_ be the next step, depending on licence. The "K" series might be easily licensed (everybody and their brother was making it) and it _might_ be able to be made on the Mercury machinery without too much trouble (same bore and stroke) but the "K" doesn't really offer much over a late model Mercury. The "N" series might be harder to license as it was the latest _production_ version. From a manufacturing stand point it isn't really much different ( more and deeper fins, not sure what else) and some countries that Licensed the "K" developed versions close to the "N".
> The Hispano engine offers more performance (with out trying to get into low drag radial cowlings in 1939) but may require the most money in manufacturing set up.


Going with the Mercury VIII sooner seems the safe bet and fastest route while also significantly lighter than the 14N. The 14K might be useful if licensed early enough to develop further like the Italians and Romanians did. (which also seemed to be lighter than the 14N though not as powerful by 1939)

The Romanian P.24E used the 930 HP Gnome-Rhône 14Kfs or IAR K14-II C32, so those might be compelling alternate engines to consider over the Mercury VIII while similar enough in size and weight to probably be usable in most other designs targeting the 840 hp mercury. (would be relevant to both the D.XXI and alternate PZL.38 suggestions)

Any P.11 and (preferably) P.24 derivatives would be better as interim designs but likely necessary for to supplement overall numbers and worth investing in over some of the alternate military spending Parsifal noted. (including the Polish Naval build-up)

You also have the 940 hp license-built Pegasus XII engines used on the PZL.37. The 970 hp Pegasus XX is also referenced, but I'm not sure if those were license built or imported. The added drag of the Pegasus might exclude it from being interesting compared to the Mercury or 14K dervatives. In any case, it might be best to concentrate on a single engine design rather than being spread between the Mercury, Pegasus, and 14K, even if the three have a fair degree of similarity.

Finally, you've got the potential to import the Hispano 12Y but tooling up for licensed production of that would indeed seem more costly and more likely for delays than any of those radials. (it would seem the best bet drag-wise for the PZL.38 though, and perhaps offer a speed boost to the PZL.37 as well, at least without bombs -might be a 'quick' option for boosting P.24 speed too) The 12Y would have made more sense if they'd switched production over in the 1935 timeframe rather than focusing on Bristol engines.





> For guns you are pretty much down to the standard MG used by the Poles or possibly the two 20mm cannon. Either pretty much the same thing as the German MG/FF (as used in some export fighters) or the 20 Hispano (or early version) IF they use the Hispano engine. Trying to be the first air force to mount Hispano guns in the wing is not likely to end well.


Why not go with 2 Oerlikons in the wings and one in the engine while possibly omitting the LMGs? 



Shortround6 said:


> If they could mount a 20mm Madsen cannon AND a mg in each wing (or cannon under?) then six mgs shouldn't be a real problem. And even if stuck with four that may not be quite as bad as it might seem. Nobody had armor or self sealing tanks. Germans had few (if any?) fighters with 20mm cannon. Most 109s used in Poland had 4 mgs.


Taking the existing 4x LMGs in the wings and adding 2 synchronized ones in the nose of the D.XXI seems pretty reasonable without requiring any wing modifications. (unless modifications to the wings to allow retractable gear coincided with ones making more/heavier wing guns practical -it could be the opposite though, retractable gear making it more troublesome to add/change guns)





SpicyJuan11 said:


> The lack of radio's wasn't the only problem the Polish army faced. The best strategy Poland could have, was to fortify behind the Vistula and hope that Stalin doesn't declare. Also, look at the Saar 'Offensive', it was a disaster. You're not going to change the outcome in Poland unless the German's make large blunders and/or France gets it together which would take an earlier POD.


Radios and radar would both be very useful if they had the resources to purchase such. More extensive adoption of radios seems more likely and in leu of radar, use of patrol/observation aircraft with better radios and coordinated network on the ground might be one of the more feasible options. (or possibly coupled with a limited number of radar stations ... I don't know what sort of access to RADAR technology the Poles would have had, if any though)

The PZL.37 might be good to adapt to the recon role.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 17, 2015)

Civettone said:


> Hitler would have backstabbed the Poles, but then again, allies is not the same as friends. You use them to your benefit as long as they are useful. I am sure the Poles had no illusions about this and decided not to team up with Hitler. As I said, they probably saw a division of power between Germany and Russia as a good thing. That turned out badly.


Not to drag up the more personal argument (or miscommunication) between you and Parsifal, but this paragraph seems to be the more relevant (and interesting) factual/historical part of that side discussion.

Humoring Germany's aspirations for an alliance against the Looming Communist Threat might have been interesting, but certainly not something to take likely let alone actually _trust_ the Nazi government to be honor consistently ... or respectfully. (or sanely/rationally) It would involve a good deal of complicated political games to play to the Polish benefit and having any real interest in getting that close to Germany would likely require a stronger perception of real threats of invasion from Germany or the USSR.

Broadly opposing Communism would make alliances with France more complicated (possibly the UK as well) though opposing the Soviet Union and espansion more exclusively than a vague all encompassing 'Communist' threat might be more feasible. (Hitler probably wouldn't like it, but satisfying him would be impossible ... and generally insane or stupid anyway: the goal would be staying on reasonably favorable terms for as long as possible while not becoming too vulnerable)

Situations like allowing German troops and military equipment to march through Poland and line up on the Soviet boarder would be complicated at best and suicidal at worst. Being very selective about what routes were taken to minimize potential takeovers from within and maximizing potential seizure of German resources if/when any betrayal resulted seems like the ideal situation, but managing that without rousing too much German suspicion would be unlikely.

The more realistic, safe route seems like relying mostly on supplemental German resources more like the Finns did in Opposing Russia. A Poland-Finnish-Baltic alliance might be more useful and universal and one with potential to stand up against Soviet and Nazi betrayal. (while possibly retaining more Neutral support from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, The Netherlands, possibly France and Brittain, and other countries) And alliance along the Baltic coast could potentially starve out Russian shipping trade as well. I'm not sure if Romania or the Slavic States would be more likely to actively support an alliance in Soviet opposition or more neutral economic/material support. (given Romania Allied with Germany, the former seems likely there at least) Romania's shared boarder with Poland would also be significant, as would the immediate Soviet threat posed by the Russian boarder. (cooperation with Romania would also make the 14K derived engines the more attractive designs to focus on along with license producing the IAR.80/81)

So you delay/prevent the 1939 Invasion of Poland and have more concentrated support to Finland during the Winter War, possibly with conflicts in the Baltic states to push back the Soviets there as well.



On a more idealistic alternate history point: you also keep Poland as a more free haven for Jewish refugees from German-held territories, and a more accepting one than many other European countries were in 1939. (plus more potential time for migration before Hitler's Final Solution starts to come into full swing, particularly with the war on and boarders closed -which also might not happen if the Polish Invasion is avoided/delayed)


And one thought on Finland: the Fokker D.XXI also seems like one of the more attractive options to produce under license with that country's limited resources along with potential to develop it further. (a modified license built D.XXI might have also developed into something a good deal more useful than the VL Myrsky ended up being a good deal later)


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## Wurger (Jul 18, 2015)

Balljoint said:


> That’s sort of the point. Poland exported its best fighter but couldn’t afford it for its own forces. Why would Poland need much of an air force when France and Great Britain would be bring theirs to bear and draw off the LW?



According to the military treaties with France and Great Britain , Poland was obliged to make the Nazi German Army busy at the East in order to give allies some of time for getting start of their own actions against Hitler's Third Reich. Would Poland need much of an air force? I don't think Poland would need that. Just the Polish AF needed to replace the worn out stuff with a new one. The economical abilities didn't allow Polish AF to have more than 600 or maybe 700 planes of all types. However the small number could be compensated by better training of pilots and the better quality of flying stuff. Unfortunately getting of both these things requires quite a lot of time and money, the Poland already didn't have. However the training of Polish pilots was excellent what the September Campaign showed.

As far as the export of the best Polish fighter is concerned.... the PZL P-24 was much better than the P-11 , that's true. However the plane was designed just for the export only. The reason for that was the income for the PZL factory. The Polish Airforce was going to replace the P-11c type with PZL.50 Jastrząb that was going to become the basic fighter plane in 40'. To be honest , the design works for a P-11 successor were in progress from 1936. Initailly it was going to be a two-engine plane PZL.38 Wilk. But the project was ginven up because of technical problems with engines and the high production costs. Unfortunately the works on the PZL.50 Jastrząb got delaying because of a couple of different reasons including too weak motor, too heavy fuselage structure and an incorrect airfoil of the wing. Additionally the design engineer of the Jastrząb, W. Jakimiuk , got involved in PZL.44 Wicher design and build. So the farther works on Jastrząb had to be postponed or slowed down for a year.


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## parsifal (Jul 18, 2015)

Poland made mistakes concerning its appraisals of german capabilities but its a big stretch to argue they were over-confident. The biggest mistake was under-estimating the effects of Blitzkrieg, and also under-estimating just how effective the LW ground strikes would be. Their own defences were mostly ouflanked and then the final straw was the attack by the Russians into areas they had intended to retreat to. 

Poland was forced to adopt a forward defence strategy west of the Vistula, because most of its industries were located close to the German / Polish frontier. They also needed to try and keep the corridor to Danzig open in the forlorn hope that resupply could be made from the west through the port of Danzig. The Poles hoped to hold a line for three month, using their frontier fortifications to hold the assaulting German army and hook into their flanks with their excellent cavalry. They were caught off guard however, because they had not completed their mobilization by the time of the German attack. It was expected they could hold out for at least three months, and in that time the westerm allies would put enough pressure on the Germans to force them to the negotiating table. In the air the Poles thought they could exact enough attrition on the LW to make it unprofitable for the germans to attack them. They passed over the Pzl-24, an export version of slightly better performance to their own Pzl-11s because they miscalculated how quickly the Germans would move on them, and were hanging out for the service delivery of the Pzl-50 and some foreign imports. They needed to remain open to business with other countries to bolster their meagre cash reserves.
A cool short video on the protypes the Poles were working on in 1939


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BaqhlXhFuuw_


and also some visual of the Polish AFVs being considered, or adopted post war. 


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QUxktG0q7wI_


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## Wurger (Jul 18, 2015)

Well said Michael. But just a small correction regarding the corridor to Gdańsk and the resupply that could be made from the west through the port. In fact Gdańsk wasn't Polish at that time. Practically it was a German city from 1938 and even earlier. The port that could be used for delivering western supplies was Gdynia that was a Polish port.


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## SpicyJuan11 (Jul 18, 2015)

Wurger said:


> Well said Michael. But just a small correction regarding the corridor to Gdańsk and the resupply that could be made from the west through the port. In fact Gdańsk wasn't Polish at that time. Practically it was a German city from 1938 and even earlier. The port that could be used for delivering western supplies was Gdynia that was a Polish port.



No Würger, Danzig was a "free city" but was a de facto Polish puppet.


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## Wurger (Jul 18, 2015)

Man, I have never heard a such nonsense. Initially it was so-called "free-city" where both the German and Polish residents lived together quite peacefully. Since Hitler and his NSDAP got power in the Germany , the fascism of the city started. In 1934 there were 408 000 city dwellers. Most of them were Gremans, Poles were a part of about , different sources say 3-15%. In 1938 Nazis took the full control over the city. The official joining to the Third Reich took place on the 1st September 1939 on the day of the Nazi attack on Poland.


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## SpicyJuan11 (Jul 18, 2015)

Wurger said:


> Man, I have never heard a such nonsense. Initially it was so-called "free-city" where both the German and Polish residents lived together quite peacefully. Since Hitler and his NSDAP got power in the Germany , the fascism of the city started. In 1934 there were 408 000 city dwellers. Most of them were Gremans, Poles were a part of about , different sources say 3-15%. In 1938 Nazis took the full control over the city. The official joining to the Third Reich took place on the 1st September 1939 on the day of the Nazi attack on Poland.



Yes, the city was ethnically German, but was still controlled by Poland. There's a reason why the Nazi's demanded Danzig to be annexed by Germany and didn't just take it.


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## stona (Jul 18, 2015)

You might ask why the Poles built and developed the sea port at Gdynia if they had such control of Gdansk 

Cheers

Steve

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## Wurger (Jul 18, 2015)

SpicyJuan11 said:


> Yes, the city was ethnically German, but was still controlled by Poland. There's a reason why the Nazi's demanded Danzig to be annexed by Germany and didn't just take it.



OK. .. How did the Poland control the city then?



stona said:


> You might ask why the Poles built and developed the sea port at Gdynia if they had such control of Gdansk
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve



A good question here Steve.


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## SpicyJuan11 (Jul 18, 2015)

stona said:


> You might ask why the Poles built and developed the sea port at Gdynia if they had such control of Gdansk
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve



Because they did not have complete control of the seaport and needed a naval base.


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## SpicyJuan11 (Jul 18, 2015)

Wurger said:


> OK. .. How did the Poland control the city then?



They had a binding customs union with the "Free City" essentially owning it.


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## Wurger (Jul 18, 2015)

SpicyJuan11 said:


> Because they did not have complete control of the seaport and needed a naval base.



Interesting... The first naval base in Poland was set in Puck at the beginning of 1920. In the same year a decisson was made to start building of a new port in Gdynia. Untill 1926 the Polish Navy HQ was just in Puck. 



SpicyJuan11 said:


> They had a binding customs union with the "Free City" essentially owning it.



It was on paper only. In fact the Polish rights were sabotaged by the the Free City's government from the beginning of the existing of the "Free City". The German population deeply resented being separated from Germany, and subjected the Polish minority to discrimination and ethnically based harassment. This was specially true after the Nazi Party got political control in 1935-36 and later.

By the way do you know to whom the city had belonged before it became the German one?


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## stona (Jul 18, 2015)

A customs union is not ownership. It was exactly what it said, a customs union between Poland and Danzig. It is only in the modern era that this might be seen as a first step on a road to closer economic *(not political)* union. 

Many of the conditions laid down or implemented (as part of the Versailles treaty conditions in the case of Danzig) under the auspices of the League of Nations were being ignored or worse by the 1930s, and not just by Germany.

Cheers

Steve

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## SpicyJuan11 (Jul 18, 2015)

Wurger said:


> By the way do you know to whom the city had belonged before it became the German one?



It was Polish, but how is that relevant?


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## SpicyJuan11 (Jul 18, 2015)

stona said:


> A customs union is not ownership. It was exactly what it said, a customs union between Poland and Danzig. It is only in the modern era that this might be seen as a first step on a road to closer economic *(not political)* union.
> 
> Many of the conditions laid down or implemented (as part of the Versailles treaty conditions in the case of Danzig) under the auspices of the League of Nations were being ignored or worse by the 1930s, and not just by Germany.
> 
> ...



But the Poles must have had some power over Danzig "behind the scenes", as I don't understand why if there wasn't any, then why didn't Danzig join Germany sooner, and why did the Nazi government ask/demand Poland, Danzig?


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## Wurger (Jul 18, 2015)

SpicyJuan11 said:


> It was Polish, but how is that relevant?



Just I was curious.


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## SpicyJuan11 (Jul 18, 2015)

Wurger said:


> Just I was curious.



Just to be clear I'm not advocating that the Nazi's should've been given Danzig or anything like that. I always thought and heard that Poland de facto owned Danzig and this is the first time that I've heard that Nazi Germany was in-fact the de facto ruler of Danzig, and I'm just curious as to the "how".


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 18, 2015)

Wurger said:


> As far as the export of the best Polish fighter is concerned.... the PZL P-24 was much better than the P-11 , that's true. However the plane was designed just for the export only. The reason for that was the income for the PZL factory. The Polish Airforce was going to replace the P-11c type with PZL.50 Jastrząb that was going to become the basic fighter plane in 40'. To be honest , the design works for a P-11 successor were in progress from 1936. Initailly it was going to be a two-engine plane PZL.38 Wilk. But the project was ginven up because of technical problems with engines and the high production costs. Unfortunately the works on the PZL.50 Jastrząb got delaying because of a couple of different reasons including too weak motor, too heavy fuselage structure and an incorrect airfoil of the wing. Additionally the design engineer of the Jastrząb, W. Jakimiuk , got involved in PZL.44 Wicher design and build. So the farther works on Jastrząb had to be postponed or slowed down for a year.


A non-export variant of the P.11 with similar armament and engine power to the P.24 would be a similarly useful stopgap. The proposed P.11G lacked the heavier 20 mm cannon armament of the P.24 though. A Pegasus powered P.11/24 variant might also have been useful as an interim solution. (though I still think standardizing production of 14K derivatives with Romania might be the most useful -further, those exported and license built Romanian P.24Es would have been more mutually useful had Poland managed to establish an alliance with Romania)

Production cost seems to be the most valid criticism over the PZL.38 and up-engining it (or a similar design) would likely worsen that drawback, but it might still be a more interesting option if some of the military spending was redirected to the air force.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 19, 2015)

Huh, something I missed before was how similar the PZL.50 ended up being to Gloster's F.5/34 in size and appearance, yet it ended up roughly 50 MPH slower using a similar engine. (also flew a couple years after the gloster monoplane. 

Aside from that I'd forgotten to suggest one other option (though obviously most of these suggestions require additional military funding and interest). Go for middleground between the P.24 (and P.11g) and PZL.50 project with something that maintains more commonality with the existing P.11/24 wings and fuselage while adopting a low-wing configruation with retractable landing gear. (possibly retaining the existing outer wings and gun mounts and mating them to a new -likely fairly thick- low wing center section carrying the landing gear) With similar engines, they should be at least somewhat faster or as fast with some weight gain from heavier armament and/or armor (if such modifications were actually undertaken). With the existing fuselage and wing you could have 6 LMGs (with fuselage guns) and possibilities for 2 or possibly 4 20 mm Oerlikon FF cannons in the wings. (4 LMGs and 2 20 mm cannons seems more likely due to weight and due to the 4 cannon armament being limited to the P.24H -also an interesting possibility but hinging on use of the more powerful 14N engine)

In terms of fighter vs fighter combat, the 6 LMG configuration seems like the most attractive option.


Alternately, a low-wing configuration with streamlined fixed landing gear using the P.11/24 fuselage (and portions of the wing) might be a better option than licensing or importing the D.XXI. If not any better performing, it might at least be faster to set up for production with PZL (if they started development soon enough) and would avoid license overhead. The low-wing arrangement should also improve forward-side visibility significantly over the P.11 and P.24.


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## parsifal (Jul 19, 2015)

The constraint holding the Poles back was engines and money, but after 1937 it was also time working against them. Basically the Poles had to have their engine manufacture bedded down by the end of 1936. If they didnt have an airframe ready to go by the beginning of 1937, they might get about 1 year more, if they just went for someone elses design off the shelf. Problem is, that by 1937, their major allies, the French and the brits are going gangbusters themselves trying to rearm, and the Americans are over priced and not fully matured as aircraft manufacturers. Indigenous production has basically the P-24 and the P-50. P-50 design began at the end of 1936, progressed through to the middle of 1938. But the engine delivery for the prototype and the retracs were badly delayed until the end of the year and this basically meant the type was by then too late for squadron entry by September 1939.

For the P-24, it first flew in June 1933, then with the Gnome Rhone 14KD engine (930hp) towards the end of 1934. It was an evolutionary progression of the p-11, which made its development a lot easier. Its the engine that attracts my eye. The KD Gnome Rhone was under licence production in Poland from 1935 (I think) and there is not a lot technologically with the 1050hp rated 14N. 14N was available from the beginning of 1937, at which time it was immediately pressed into the design of several aircraft foregn to the French. The 14N powered a number of aircraft, including some Dutch designs like the FK58, which was commissioned by the FAF, progressed very slowly and basically went nowhere. But as a design it was ready by the middle of 1938. If the Poles had opted to build the 14N engine and licence build the FK58 from the middle of 1938, they may have just been able have that aircraft in squadron service by May 1939....maybe. It was an aircraft better than the MS406, roughly on par with the MB 152, so a good step up from p-11, and a better solution than the p-24, and ahead in the timeline to the P-50. but there are a lot of ifs and maybes between concept and delivery.......


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## fastmongrel (Jul 19, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> Huh, something I missed before was how similar the PZL.50 ended up being to Gloster's F.5/34 in size and appearance, yet it ended up roughly 50 MPH slower using a similar engine. (also flew a couple years after the gloster monoplane.



The prototypes engine came direct from Bristol so should have been up to the standards of the F5/34s engine but I have read in several places that the carburetor inlet was very badly designed robbing power.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 19, 2015)

The outside of the carb inlet looks close to the one on the F.5/34 but it is the twists and turns that lead to the carb inlet that matter. I believe the Mercury used a updraft carb so the passage to the carb shouldn't have been too bad. 

The Gloster number just seems too good to be true compared to many other planes of it's era and power.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 19, 2015)

parsifal said:


> For the P-24, it first flew in June 1933, then with the Gnome Rhone 14KD engine (930hp) towards the end of 1934. It was an evolutionary progression of the p-11, which made its development a lot easier. Its the engine that attracts my eye. The KD Gnome Rhone was under licence production in Poland from 1935 (I think) and there is not a lot technologically with the 1050hp rated 14N. 14N was available from the beginning of 1937, at which time it was immediately pressed into the design of several aircraft foregn to the French. The 14N powered a number of aircraft, including some Dutch designs like the FK58, which was commissioned by the FAF, progressed very slowly and basically went nowhere. But as a design it was ready by the middle of 1938. If the Poles had opted to build the 14N engine and licence build the FK58 from the middle of 1938, they may have just been able have that aircraft in squadron service by May 1939....maybe. It was an aircraft better than the MS406, roughly on par with the MB 152, so a good step up from p-11, and a better solution than the p-24, and ahead in the timeline to the P-50. but there are a lot of ifs and maybes between concept and delivery.......


Again, you also have the Pegasus under license powering the PZL.37, but the smaller diameter 14K and 14N seems a better direction to go in. Given the performance the 14K derivatives were giving, those would seem more attractive than getting the Mercury VIII into production. Transitioning to 14N production or further 14K derivatives would certainly be a possibility. (even without more power, working on the supercharger might have been more useful for improving altitude performance -one of the advantages of the Mercury) 

Still, the Pegasus was in production well before the Mercury VIII, so it would be a real option to consider for a P.11 derivative or for the P.50 prototype. (doing initial testing with fixed landing gear might expedite development of the latter too) The Gnome Rhone engines retained the advantage of flexibility for export and smaller diameter. (and high-power 14K derivatives were being built in Romania)

It might be possible to upgrade the existing P.11C fleet to something closer to P.24 standards with new engines and modified armament. (adopting a 6 LMG arrangement might be simpler than adding cannon mounts)

The PZL.38 still seems interesting. The PZL.37 was the most advanced warplane the Poles had in service and one of the more impressive medium bombers around leading up to the war. The PZL.38's route of scaling down the PZL.37 seems rather sound there (though internal structural redesign is obviously needed for the strains a fighter goes though) and adapting the 2-seat configuration to a single-seat one also seems fairly straightforward while also more advantageous than some contemporary heavy fighters. (the PZL.38 was a pretty small/compact twin more in the range of the Hurricane or P-36's size, somewhat akin to the later Whirlwind) Given the engine logistics involved, I still say using the older 645 hp Mercury VI.S2 should be a serious consideration, including engines potentially pulled from P.11Cs. 

Obviously, larger plans for adapting the more powerful 14K or Mercury VIII (again 14K seems preferable) but working with limited resources and aiming at having as many capable combat aircraft as possible, reserving more of the higher powered engines to single-engined fighters seems feasible, especially if that combined 1290 hp at 15,500 ft the Mercury offered managed to push the little 'heavy' fighter into the 300 mph range. (the Pegasus would seem like a worse idea to try on the P.38, it might be useful on a single engine fighter but the added weight and drag of twin 55 inch radials seems less worthwhile, especially on such a small twin) The 14M would actually be really interesting to use, but that breaks into the issue of limited engine production and the ideal situation of streamlined/unified engine production with as few distinct models as possible. (and new bore/stroke and tooling)

Those 645 HP mercuries are going to be pretty much useless otherwise anyway, at least as far as combat aircraft are concerned (possibly better for training) but might be effective used in pairs.







Shortround6 said:


> The outside of the carb inlet looks close to the one on the F.5/34 but it is the twists and turns that lead to the carb inlet that matter. I believe the Mercury used a updraft carb so the passage to the carb shouldn't have been too bad.
> 
> The Gloster number just seems too good to be true compared to many other planes of it's era and power.


The Gloster figures match up fairly well with the IAR 80 prototype with roughly similar size and power IAR K14-III C32. (somewhat lower critical altitude as well) Like the F.5/34 prototype, this would have been without full military load.

There might also have just been a variety of aerodynamic problems with the PZL.50 holding it back. Plenty of aircraft had dramatic performance increases after a number of (often visually superficial) modifications were made. The XP-40 and XF2A-1 come to mind. They'd have needed a good deal earlier start on the PZL.50 to give enough time to make such modifications, though.

The IAR 80 itself is obviously a compelling choice for Poland, but it comes too late to be relevant for something able to be fielded (or at least in production) by late 1938. (granted, the PZL.50 didn't fly much sooner, so an earlier project would be needed in any case)


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## net_sailor (Jul 20, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> Huh, something I missed before was how similar the PZL.50 ended up being to Gloster's F.5/34 in size and appearance, yet it ended up roughly 50 MPH slower using a similar engine. (also flew a couple years after the gloster monoplane.
> 
> Aside from that I'd forgotten to suggest one other option (though obviously most of these suggestions require additional military funding and interest). Go for middleground between the P.24 (and P.11g) and PZL.50 project with something that maintains more commonality with the existing P.11/24 wings and fuselage while adopting a low-wing configruation with retractable landing gear. (possibly retaining the existing outer wings and gun mounts and mating them to a new -likely fairly thick- low wing center section carrying the landing gear) With similar engines, they should be at least somewhat faster or as fast with some weight gain from heavier armament and/or armor (if such modifications were actually undertaken). With the existing fuselage and wing you could have 6 LMGs (with fuselage guns) and possibilities for 2 or possibly 4 20 mm Oerlikon FF cannons in the wings. (4 LMGs and 2 20 mm cannons seems more likely due to weight and due to the 4 cannon armament being limited to the P.24H -also an interesting possibility but hinging on use of the more powerful 14N engine)
> 
> ...



There is one big hole in your idea. The outer parts of wing in section containing the gun bays were designed with struts. There were no possible jut to fit it with a new center section, without serious changes. Generally the Polish constructors of P.50 followed the best and easy way. They took P.11 semi-monocoque fuselage and merged with new truss structure section containing cockpit and engine compartment. To this tubular section a new wing center section with retractable landing gear was fitted. General idea was to use the most existing parts as they could. However the tubular section was made of steel, and was too heavy for kite with Mercury VIII cause airframe has enough strength to adopt much heavier engines. The more powerful GR 14N was considered for export purposes only, and the second prototype with this powerplant was under construction. Why they didn't took GR as the standard equipment for the PAF? It is a long and interesting story. In short words the French were considered as totally unreliable parters. An GR engines bought for the test failed on the testbed, large quantities of engines (for export partners) were delivered ALWAYS behind schedule sometimes damaged or with some essential parts missing (starters, propeller hubs etc.). If the export partner wanted to risk his time and money Poles din't care about that. The second factor was the Bristol licence agreement did'n allow to sell Polish licence copy of engines abroad. That's why P.11b and P.24 were sold with GR engines, as well P.37 Łoś was offered with GR's. 

About P.50 with Pegasus engine. This was not suitable choice for the fighter. Pegasus was typical bomber engine with more power on the ground level, and poor high altitude performances. The full-throttle hight was 3,5 km only, and the power decreased rapidly above that level.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 21, 2015)

net_sailor said:


> There is one big hole in your idea. The outer parts of wing in section containing the gun bays were designed with struts. There were no possible jut to fit it with a new center section, without serious changes.


Thanks, so the gun bays are all in line with or inboard of the support struts and the free-standing outboard portion of the wing wouldn't carry any of them. One idea that might have worked is a low wing with struts attaching to the top of the wing. That might not be very useful though between the lack of gains in drag and engineering effort needed. Probably just better to focus on the all-new wing design.

I think my point about starting with fixed landing gear on the P.50 to speed up initial testing would still be useful. Getting something on par or superior to the D.XXI would have been a very useful step forward. (seems like that would have been a good compromise to work towards in place of the earlier P.39 light fighter efforts)

Do you have any idea why the fuselage machine guns were dropped from the P.24? Offering 6 gun versions seems like an attractive option and they did consider 4 canons, so unless there was some problem with the synchronized guns, it seems odd to remove them. (6 7.92 mm Brownings would be lighter than the 2 LMG + 2 20 mm armament and arguably more useful against other fighters -given the slightly more powerful ammunition and I believe slightly higher rate of fire than the .303 browning, it might not be too far from the Hurricane's armament)




> They took P.11 semi-monocoque fuselage and merged with new truss structure section containing cockpit and engine compartment. To this tubular section a new wing center section with retractable landing gear was fitted. General idea was to use the most existing parts as they could. However the tubular section was made of steel, and was too heavy for kite with Mercury VIII cause airframe has enough strength to adopt much heavier engines.


The added steel tube structure was too weak to cope with the stress from the more powerful engine, but the fuselage itself was strong enough? (and the older P.11 and P.24 airframes that didn't have that steel tube truss section had already been strong enough to handle more power?)




> Why they didn't took GR as the standard equipment for the PAF? It is a long and interesting story. In short words the French were considered as totally unreliable parters. An GR engines bought for the test failed on the testbed, large quantities of engines (for export partners) were delivered ALWAYS behind schedule sometimes damaged or with some essential parts missing (starters, propeller hubs etc.). If the export partner wanted to risk his time and money Poles din't care about that. The second factor was the Bristol licence agreement did'n allow to sell Polish licence copy of engines abroad. That's why P.11b and P.24 were sold with GR engines, as well P.37 Łoś was offered with GR's.


I was suggesting licensed production of the Gnome Rhone 14K (or N, but mostly directing it towards the earlier K) like the Romanians did and focusing on models of that engine rather than adopting the newer mercury, or building the Pegasus for that matter. If it was cheaper to expand their licenses with Bristol than get one for GR engines, that would certainly be a good counter argument. (in which case, more effort to get the Mercury VIII into production sooner would have been the most practical option)



> About P.50 with Pegasus engine. This was not suitable choice for the fighter. Pegasus was typical bomber engine with more power on the ground level, and poor high altitude performances. The full-throttle hight was 3,5 km only, and the power decreased rapidly above that level.


I was actually thinking more of using the Pegasus for an upgrade for the P.11 more like the P.24 already did and the P.11G was intended to do with the Mercury VIII. Unless I'm mistaken, the Pegasus was in production in Poland under license already (unlike the Mercury VIII) and at least gave significantly more power than the older Mercury VI used in the P.11c.

It seems the 2 most powerful aircraft engines Poland had in production by 1938 were the Pegasus XX (powering the PZL.37) and the older Mercury VI.S2, with the Mercury VIII planned but not yet in volume production. (unless I'm mistaken and all those Pegasus engines were imported) So the only options for a more powerful fighter using existing engine production would be using the Pegasus or adopting a twin-engine configuration with those older Mercury engines.


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## net_sailor (Jul 21, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> I think my point about starting with fixed landing gear on the P.50 to speed up initial testing would still be useful. Getting something on par or superior to the D.XXI would have been a very useful step forward. (seems like that would have been a good compromise to work towards in place of the earlier P.39 light fighter efforts)


The landing gear originally was developed by Dowty, but contractor failed and finally PZL had to built own gear. The delay takes few months and the provisional fixed gear would be highly recommended.



kool kitty89 said:


> Do you have any idea why the fuselage machine guns were dropped from the P.24? Offering 6 gun versions seems like an attractive option and they did consider 4 canons, so unless there was some problem with the synchronized guns, it seems odd to remove them. (6 7.92 mm Brownings would be lighter than the 2 LMG + 2 20 mm armament and arguably more useful against other fighters -given the slightly more powerful ammunition and I believe slightly higher rate of fire than the .303 browning, it might not be too far from the Hurricane's armament)


If you reefer to P.24 prototype I have to check the problem.



kool kitty89 said:


> The added steel tube structure was too weak to cope with the stress from the more powerful engine, but the fuselage itself was strong enough? (and the older P.11 and P.24 airframes that didn't have that steel tube truss section had already been strong enough to handle more power?)



All PZL gullwings had front sections with tubular structure but in different range:
on P.7 - from the wing joint section to the engine strut 
on P.11c - from the cokcpit, along the wing joint to the engine strut 
on P.24 - again from the wing joint to the engine strut 

Rear fuselage section was semi-monocoque and strong enough to take more powerful engines. That's why it could be used for further development. In Romania they took P.24 fuselage with integral cockpit section, so the wing joint on IAR.80 was in front of the cockpit. On Polish P.50 the wing joint was located under cockpit section, cause rear fuselage belonged to P.11c and all cockpit tubular structure was redesigned to take new wing center section. This tubular part on P.50 was very heavy for two reasons: use of steel against aluminium tubes to gain more strength for further GR 14N engines and wrong stress distribution (tube truss was too low in side view - that made all parts oversized). 



kool kitty89 said:


> I was suggesting licensed production of the Gnome Rhone 14K (or N, but mostly directing it towards the earlier K) like the Romanians did and focusing on models of that engine rather than adopting the newer mercury, or building the Pegasus for that matter. If it was cheaper to expand their licenses with Bristol than get one for GR engines, that would certainly be a good counter argument. (in which case, more effort to get the Mercury VIII into production sooner would have been the most practical option)


When licence production of GR 14K was possible in Polish high command there were no interest in high power engine for the fighters. Till 1938 the PZL.38 Wilk was under development with pair of Foka engines - both should produce no less power as one powerful engine (2 x 420HP). Moreover, the Foka engines could be used solely for other types: P.39 lightweight fighter and LWS-3 Mewa reconnaissance aircraft. After the Foka fiasco a new engine was necessary. For the classic pursuit fighter (P.50) the Mercury VIII was chosen, as well GR 14M for other types (PZL.45 Sokół lightweight fighter, LWS-3 Mewa, PZL.48 Lampart two engine destroyer). 



kool kitty89 said:


> I was actually thinking more of using the Pegasus for an upgrade for the P.11 more like the P.24 already did and the P.11G was intended to do with the Mercury VIII. Unless I'm mistaken, the Pegasus was in production in Poland under license already (unlike the Mercury VIII) and at least gave significantly more power than the older Mercury VI used in the P.11c.
> 
> It seems the 2 most powerful aircraft engines Poland had in production by 1938 were the Pegasus XX (powering the PZL.37) and the older Mercury VI.S2, with the Mercury VIII planned but not yet in volume production. (unless I'm mistaken and all those Pegasus engines were imported) So the only options for a more powerful fighter using existing engine production would be using the Pegasus or adopting a twin-engine configuration with those older Mercury engines.



OK, but again Pegasus engines was not suitable for a fighters. Mercury VI was not considered any more for the future aircraft due an obsolete construction. On summer 1939 a licence production of Mercury VIII has begun and few dozen engines were produced before the war broke (captured engines Germans sold to Finland). After the summer tests of the P.50 prototype, this aircraft was found underpowered and PZL started looking for another powerplant. All Mercury VIII production was directed to P.11g "emergency fighter program".


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## Balljoint (Jul 21, 2015)

SpicyJuan11 said:


> But the Poles must have had some power over Danzig "behind the scenes", as I don't understand why if there wasn't any, then why didn't Danzig join Germany sooner, and why did the Nazi government ask/demand Poland, Danzig?



Treaty Of Versailles - Poland, East Prussia and Danzig

Also, it didn’t help that Poland took more territory from Germany during –I think- 1919. And then they were attacked by Russia about the same period and unexpectedly kicked Russia’s butt.
Poor Poland. Twenty years later the memories were still fresh with Stalin and Hitler.

Of course Poland was the invasion route between Germany and USSR.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 21, 2015)

net_sailor said:


> When licence production of GR 14K was possible in Polish high command there were no interest in high power engine for the fighters. Till 1938 the PZL.38 Wilk was under development with pair of Foka engines - both should produce no less power as one powerful engine (2 x 420HP). Moreover, the Foka engines could be used solely for other types: P.39 lightweight fighter and LWS-3 Mewa reconnaissance aircraft. After the Foka fiasco a new engine was necessary. For the classic pursuit fighter (P.50) the Mercury VIII was chosen, as well GR 14M for other types (PZL.45 Sokół lightweight fighter, LWS-3 Mewa, PZL.48 Lampart two engine destroyer).


Aside from throwing out the light + heavy fighter concepts entirely, it seems like having both the light-weight PZL.39 and 'heavy' PZL.38 had used the existing Mercury VI.S2 engines as alternatives. (some of the engines actually considered for those planes -like the Gypsy twelve- were already about as heavy or heavier than the older Mercury while lower performing and the only advantage being smaller frontal area)

The PZL.39 itself did lead to the later PZL.45 project, and something close to that but using the older 645 hp Mercury engine from the start might have shown up soon enough to make a difference. Either developing a new, light fighter around the Mercury VI.S2 engine or using the PZL.11C (or possibly P.24) fuselage but using a smaller, low wing with fixed landing gear instead as an interim 'light' fighter. (faster but less maneuverable than the P.11) Climb rate would still be a problem with that older engine, though and tended to be a problem for most 'light' fighters in general. Though I guess a small, but thick wing would make for useful lift at low speeds and better take-off, turning ability, and better space for guns.

Continuing to use the old Mercury VI.S2 with the light fighter concept would mean similar forward fuselage structure could be used from the P.11 as well, keeping weight down and simplifying production. (it would limit further development, but that's where the P.50 would come in anyway) If the P.24 fuselage was used, and the new wing was designed with at least a little more power in mind, it shouldn't have been difficult to adapt the Mercury VIII when it was ready. (or for the Romanians to install 14k engines)




> OK, but again Pegasus engines was not suitable for a fighters. Mercury VI was not considered any more for the future aircraft due an obsolete construction. On summer 1939 a licence production of Mercury VIII has begun and few dozen engines were produced before the war broke (captured engines Germans sold to Finland). After the summer tests of the P.50 prototype, this aircraft was found underpowered and PZL started looking for another powerplant. All Mercury VIII production was directed to P.11g "emergency fighter program".


Yes yes, but I'm thinking of developments starting back around 1934/35, including interim fighter projects or light fighters and the PZL.38 and 39 projects specifically. Going with the old Mercury VI for the interim wouldn't be that big a step from the planned air cooled V-8 and V-12 engines. Development plans potentially following the pace of the PZL.37 bomber project.

I guess a better idea might have been to design the PZL.37 around Mercury VIII engines instead (more like the Blenheim) with more of a fast-bomber approach with somewhat reduced maximum load and then have a new, powerful engine with good altitude performance useful for a new generation of fighters and bombers.


One final thought on the Gnome Rhone engine topic: did Romania's license for the 14k not allow for them to export engines? With France being unreliable, it seems like importing Romanian manufactured 14ks would be much more attractive.


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## Timppa (Jul 22, 2015)

Wurger said:


> One thing is true though... believing in the military treaties with the western countries led Poland to the defeat.



True words. Western countries declared war to only one country of the two who invaded Poland.

During the Winter War Churchill spoke:
"We cannot tell what the fate of Finland may be, but no more mournful spectacle could be presented to what is left to civilized mankind than that this splendid Northern race should be at last worn down and reduced to servitude worse than death by the dull brutish force of overwhelming numbers. If the light of freedom which still burns so brightly in the frozen North should be finally quenched, it might well herald a return to the Dark Ages, when every vestige of human progress during two thousand years would be engulfed."

Less than two years from that speech Britain declared war on on Finland and did everything to quench that light. To appease the most tyrannical regime of the twentieth century.

Welcome to the world of "Realpolitik".


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## Greyman (Jul 22, 2015)

Timppa said:


> ... and did everything to quench that light.



Bit of hyperbole, there.


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## parsifal (Jul 22, 2015)

The prime enemy was always Nazi Germany, and by unfortunate circumstance Finland was forced into alliance with that country after the Soviets attacked them again in 1941. Britain showed remarkable consistency in that regard. Any European nation that sided with Germany regardless of the reason was dealt with as an enemy. Not always a declaration of war, but they were made to suffer if they decided to provide significant help to the Germans. This usually took the form of confiscating ships and restricting their seaborne trade, as was the case for the Russians until they too were forced into the Allied camp. Any ship under the Soviet flag was detained and taken in prize. 

The declaration of war on Finland was the price that had to be paid and arose primarily because the Finns decided to let German forces into their country as allies. This was totally unacceptable to the British.

Having said that, at the end of the war, it was largely intervention by the British and to a lesser extent the US that saved Finland from Soviet takeover in 1945.

Poland was never so lucky, and it is to our shame that we allowed to happen what happened


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## Timppa (Jul 22, 2015)

parsifal said:


> it was largely intervention by the British and to a lesser extent the US that saved Finland from Soviet takeover in 1945.



What a baloney. 
What made Finland different from Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria,Hungary and Czechoslovakia?
Good will from British ?


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## Balljoint (Jul 22, 2015)

Timppa said:


> What a baloney.
> What made Finland different from Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria,Hungary and Czechoslovakia?
> Good will from British ?


Just as Great Britain held its nose and allied with Stalin, Finland allied with Germany as the Soviets were by far the greater threat. But Finland was never fascist. Just the opposite, it maintained true democracy and treated its Jews as it did all its citizens.

After the war Finland was adjudged an Axis entity and paid substantial retribution to the Soviets. But I’m not aware of accusation/charges of war crimes.


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## Koopernic (Jul 22, 2015)

Timppa said:


> What a baloney.
> What made Finland different from Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria,Hungary and Czechoslovakia?
> Good will from British ?




Indeed, I have to agree. Finland received as much Goodwill from Germany as Britain, the latter which had some kind of strategy of using Finland as a springboard excuse for cutting of German Iron Ore supplies from Sweden by a Goodwill occupation of Norwegian ports. The Germans also needed Nikel and at least part of Hitlers no retreat order was to preserve that supply as long as possible.

The Molotov Ribbentrop pact specifically guaranteed Estonian independence for instance however it did break up the Baltic into spheres of economic and treaty influence. When the Soviets started regarding 'sphere of influence' as the right to invade and annex alarm bells went of in Berlin (likewise over threats to Romanian oil supplies). The first Soviet attack on Finland was one of these alarm bells.

The long planned "Goodwill" invasion of Norway by Britain known as operation Wilfred (belatedly implemented the day before the German invasion with a preliminary mining operation) lead to a ferocious German response since this would have cut of 80% of Germany's Iron Ore supplies from Sweden (the cause of their loss of WW1). Britain's (Churchill's) invasion of Norway (accurately anticipated by German intelligence) meant that Denmark had to be invaded to protect the supply routes to Norway from the Royal Navy and while you are going to hell in a hand basket you might as well invade Holland which might enjoy goodwill invasion in the future as well. This is the 'cornered animal' response.

Finland of course secured an armistice with the Soviet Union to secure their post war independence, part of that was asking the German troops to leave and then declaring war on their erstwhile allies Germany. Plus there was the grudging respect the Finns earned from the soviets from their powerful resistance.

The problem with diplomatic Goodwill is that it often hides ulterior motives. The Goodwill invasion of Iran by Britain to get at Communist Russia lead to the dethroning of the legitimate and progressive Shah and the current problems in that country.

Finland at the time was ethnically homogenous at that time, although now it is visibly gaining diversity with say quite a lot of Somalis. As far as "Jews' go: they did not figure in Finnish politics as there were, I believe, perhaps 300 living in that country at the time. They were however quite visible in Vienna and Berlin being perhaps 40% 50% of Lawyers, Doctors etc. in those cities.


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## Koopernic (Jul 22, 2015)

The Best Polish engine for 1939 was probably a Daimler Benz DB600 or Jumo 211. 

The problems between Poland and Germany were not so insuperable. 

Hitler was an Austrian though a pan-German nationalist. As a southerner he had no particular truck with the Poles. He had in fact offered a Polish-German friendship treaty that was in a thinly disguised anti Soviet military treaty. His concern was the economic viability of marooned North Prussia and the German Hanseatic Port of Danzig which was of enormous cultural significant. To secure this he wanted a rail and freeway link 'right of way' to Danzig in return for the anti soviet pact. The treaty foundered on Polish instance on customs inspections (which would have destroyed the viability of the free trade zone). Other tensions included the disenfancshiment of ethnic German land owners in Poland and a continuous level of ongoing low level anti German hate crime (about 2000 to 4000 victims before the war) which Hitler seemed prepared to stomach.

There is evidence that Chamberlains Guarantee of Polish independence was meant as not complete integrity and backing of the Polish position and that chamberlain still wanted negotiation over German Grievances.

Had the Polish Dictator, Beck, played his cards differently Poland might have had a powerful allie against the Soviet Union that could have supplied a lot of world class licence technology with no threat of a German invasion.

Poland was not deindustrialised. When part of the Prussian and then German empire it had industrialised and had manufacturing capacity. In 1919 the Poles had stopped Trotsky's massive Bolshevik Army which would invade Poland and a disarmed Germany.

licence building French designs would not give them a lead. 

The HS12 series was slow in developing and no better than the Italian water cooled inlines of around 860hp and MS460 and DW520 used by German training squadrons were universally hated for their viscous unannounced stalls and spins. The French simply had not had the time to debug these things. The Swiss made them work though, after a few years.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 22, 2015)

Timppa said:


> Welcome to the world of "Realpolitik".


More like false, shortsighted ignorance passed off as some sort of detached pragmatism.

The likes of which I'd hope most of the great turn of the century statesmen would have been ashamed to witness. Bismark in particular, Teddy Roosevelt comes to mind too (both very nationalistic but also very centered on stability and very active international influence) Even Taft with his more legal/economic-centered dollar diplomacy was far more involved and aware of world politics and potential big-picture consequences. (all of them had plenty of selfish, or nationalistic goals that ended up ALSO favoring stability and general world progress due to sensibility -Taft's methods might have been more efficient in the end, but Roosevelt's more active, visible, aggressive approach probably appealed much better to the masses and fit better into typical national politics and culture -appear too 'weak' and you loose influence no matter how right you are)

Honestly, I'd think Churchill was shamed of many of those actions (or lack thereof as well). He was far from perfect, but he at least seems to have seen Stalin for what he was and how real a threat the USSR was bot before and especially at the end of the War. (of course he also saw Hitler for what he was prior to the war) He certainly was very nationalistic as well, but I really can't see him standing by had he been Prime Minister in 1939 ... or 1938 for that matter.

It's a matter of pragmatism or 'realpolitik' philosophy in the proactive interventionist vs falsely practical isolationism (only sensible when you literally have NO resources to be influential) as well as vengeful or reactionary retaliation. Stalin's actions might have been more genuinely of the realpolitik sort, but his end goals were pretty awful, willfully selfish, and in general, harmful to his own people and the world. (I'm trying to stay objective here, but I have a very serious bias against Stalin and Stalinism in deep philosophical, rational, and emotional ways, so I've tried to avoid using emotive speech as much as possible here)







parsifal said:


> The prime enemy was always Nazi Germany


By 1940, certainly, prior to, or immediately after the invasion of Poland, it would be less obvious. After the Fall of France, Germany gained enough resources to be seriously dangerous and the obvious threat. There likely was too much sympathy for the Soviets pre-war with the spread of communism and the unfortunate tendency to associate the USSR with communist/socialist ideals in general. (rather than seeing it for what it was, and what Stalin stood for)

That's not just a matter of military support, but potentially more aggressive diplomatic negotiations and economic pressures to prevent the invasions in the first place. (and using both the carrot and the stick ... appealing to common ground while never fully trusting German or Soviet leadership)

Of course, that was hardly limited to Britain, and while France was a political mess, there was a good deal more potential common ground and mutual benefit from the likes of (at least some of) the Scandinavian countries, Poland, Romania, Finland, some of the Slavic countries, Denmark, The Netherlands, possibly Belgium, and possibly the disputed Baltic states to form various alliances or particularly favorable trade agreements. (Finland, Romania, and Poland had the most immediate united cause against Russia -same for the Baltic states- and all of those save Finland had looming threats and pressure from Germany as well)

The good thing about Britain was that they were at least economically and politically stable enough to provide good trade resources pre-war and good shipping trade in particular (useful to Poland and other coastal countries). Same was true for the US, though Poland didn't seem to much rely on American trade for military goods. (Finland certainly did to some extent)



> The declaration of war on Finland was the price that had to be paid and arose primarily because the Finns decided to let German forces into their country as allies. This was totally unacceptable to the British.
> 
> Having said that, at the end of the war, it was largely intervention by the British and to a lesser extent the US that saved Finland from Soviet takeover in 1945.
> 
> Poland was never so lucky, and it is to our shame that we allowed to happen what happened


Not just a shame to Poland, but a shame to everyone that the war wasn't quashed early on by diplomatic, economic, and material aid. I suppose I said enough on that above though, and it's really a matter of isolationism vs more proactive interventionism. (NOT just pre-emptive military action, but proactive diplomatic and international dealings in general ... the sort that held together the fragile peace before WWI -in no small part because of Bismark's efforts- and to some extent American interventionism under Theodore Roosevelt and Taft prior to the shift towards Isolationism during Wilson's Administration that deepened in the 1920s and 30s)

So not just isolationism, or even selfishness, but general shortsightedness. (and unwillingness to compromise) Granted, Hitler's ideals themselves fed into this same fault, on top of other ... horrible beliefs and heavy, impulsive reactionism. I don't think Stalin behaved as such, he may have been paranoid, but he seems to have been far more calculating in most of his actions and more aware of all the greater consequences of those actions. (and less driven by superstition or hatred fueled faulty beliefs of certain races/ethnic groups being inherently evil -and faulty understanding of history or the nature of WWI)


Hmm, unless I misread your post and you were describing Finland's actions as Realpolitik as their alliance with Germany was indeed quite obvious the most practical and pragmatic move they could have made, as was their later armistice with Russia and declaration of war on Germany. Finland seemed to be the only country willing to be consistently practical and efficient in both politics and warfare strategy and tactics both prior to and throughout the war. Had More of the smaller countries done so prior to the war ... well, that's exactly what I've been suggesting as far as alliances among the 'smaller' countries. (admittedly, Poland was hardly small, but militaristically its force was much smaller than the likes of Russia, France, or Britain -or Germany after rearmament)

That includes potential alliances with Germany not out of any sort of trust or sympathy, but practical compromise. (the exact context of any sort of 'intentionally dishonest' alliance made by Poland with Germany) I suppose that's also basically cold war style actions and posturing ... having all those alliances and treaties internationally publicized would be important too. (none of the secret treaties that complicated pre-WWI Europe)





Balljoint said:


> Just as Great Britain held its nose and allied with Stalin, Finland allied with Germany as the Soviets were by far the greater threat. But Finland was never fascist. Just the opposite, it maintained true democracy and treated its Jews as it did all its citizens.
> 
> After the war Finland was adjudged an Axis entity and paid substantial retribution to the Soviets. But I’m not aware of accusation/charges of war crimes.


To be completely fair to the British, Churchill had been far more wary about continued support to the Soviets and more willing to (potentially) break ... or bend their alliance late in the war when the possibility of conditional surrender (with particularly unfavorable results for the Soviets) was very possible. Or more likely, be ... selective of the sort of aid given to the Soviets in preparation for the immediate post-war threat. Of course, it was Roosevelt who forced the unconditional surrender and also had control of the biggest foreign resources supporting the Soviet warmachine. (tactfully limiting Lend-lease support to the USSR would have very well limited their potential post-war influence and limit portions of the wartime Soviet advance without compromising the overall war effort -the trick would be managing to do that with legitimate enough excuses and explanations to avoid undue suspicion ... Stalin managed to be plenty tricky and manipulative enough, so responding in kind would be the natural, smart diplomatic route to take)

Plenty of those late-war P-39Qs and P-63s could have been useful in the PTO instead with American or Commonwealth pilots. And use in that theater might have merited more effort to expanding the fuel capacity or switching to a hispano in the hub. (and hell, as it was, both the P-39Q and P-63A had much better better combat radii than the Spitire and the P-63 might have made a more competitive fighter-bomber with its triple wing racks)

Of course, the horrible decisions made by the post-war Labor government in the UK made things a lot worse.




I'll get back to Koopernic's more relevant post regarding engines in a little while. (hopefully)


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## parsifal (Jul 22, 2015)

when war broke out in September, the major players responded in various ways. Almost immediately, even before the outbreak of war between Finland and the Soviets, the Soviets began to place a great deal of pressure on the Finns. All of the nations across Europe and Nth America expressed a great deal of sympathy for Finlands predicament, and each of them offered amounts of support for the Finns in their unequal struggle with Stalin. All except one nation.....Germany, who worked tirelesly to support the Soviets in their aggression at every opportunity. The German foreign ministry were instructed to "play down the Finnish position, play up the Soviet case". Hitler was only major leader who expressed a desire to recognixe the Kuusinen(??) puppet regime. The German intelligenece services began feeding information to the Soviets to assist them in their attempts to enforce a blockade of Finlands Baltic sea trade. The Germans began a policy to apprehend, all Finnish shipping that they could, take it in prize and confiscate the cargoes. They absolutely refused all material aid from passing through territory they controlled , including the shipment of the italian fighters and Hungarian military formations that wanted to go to Finland's aid. The British response was limited, but of greater help to the Finns. They gave the Finns a better than even break with regard to the Allied Control Commission activities, allowing the importation of military cargoes into Finland when all other non- aligned nations were being denied such access. They cleared for export engine and spare parts for the Finnish Military equipment, Blenheims and Gladiators mostly, at a time when even allies like Australia were disallowed such access. Its more than a bit rich to argue that the Germans were sympathetic to Finland's position, when in fact they were doing everything they could to hurt Finland.

From March 1940 until Finland's joining with the Axis, the British protected and allowed free movement of Finnish shipping which provided the Finns with considerable external revenue. Not all of this shipping was used for allied purposes, much of it was used for the transport of non-military neutral cargoes. It was still the target of unrestricted warfare by the Germans and still afforded whatever protection could be undertaken by the RN. Hardly the actions of a nation bent on Finland's destruction. And for Germany, hardly the actions of a nation acting in good faith with the welfare of Finland paramount in German interactions with the Finns. 

Churchills DoW on Finland was about the most apologetic declaration that could be made. Britain was desperate, and had a new found ally in Soviet Russia. Allowing German troops into Finland forced the British to do what they did. The following is a memo from Churchill to the Finns explaining what they were doing and why. After apologising for the declaration of war to the finns, Churchill made it clear that it was the newly forming alliance with the Soviets that was forcing his hand, and stated that no real action likely to prejudice Finland would be taken provided the Finns pulled up at the 1939 borders. This was not a formal agreement, but it was an understanding that both sides observed.








By the time the Tehran conference in 1943, the emergency for Britain was receding and Britain was able to lead the way in protecting the interests of Finland. Stalin had forcefully wanted to occupy the whole of the nation, the US was ambivalent about the issue (brought about by ignorance really of Soviet methods), but Churchill ferociously advocated that no Soviet occupation was to occur. Stalin was reluctantly made to accept that position, and when the peace treaty was negotiated a year later, it was largely on the principals that Churchill had been able to secure at Tehran.

Prior to the capitulation in September '44, Germany held the Finns to ransom, in exchange for vital military equipment, the Fins were being asked to fight to the death against the Russians. The Finns were also held to ransom by the germans to enter into a formal alliance with them. Skillfully the Finns saw the writing on the wall and refused. It probably saved their country from destruction and occupation, but it also clearly demonstrate the German duplicity and machiavellian behaviour. 

In the meantime Soviet demands were that Finland drive out their erstwhile allies, In the beginning there was a "gentlemens agreement" that allowed the peaceful evacuation of northern Finland by the Germans. Like most things, the germans again demonstrated they could not be trusted as they unsusccessfully attempted to occupy certain Finnish islands in the Baltic and implemented a scorched earth policy in Lappland. Hardly the stuff of a trusted ally. 

Finland has itself to thank for its survval as a nation, but it also has a debt to the British for giving them some manouvre room as well. Without that assistance, Finland would not have survived Stalins aggression.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 23, 2015)

Jumo 210 on the PZL.38

Bramo 323 on the PZL.37




Koopernic said:


> The Best Polish engine for 1939 was probably a Daimler Benz DB600 or Jumo 211.
> 
> The problems between Poland and Germany were not so insuperable.


Those would be more relevant if war ... or continued uneasy cold conflict (including more grudging treaty agreements or even alliances of sorts) might not foster very favorable trade or at very least make licenses more difficult. Diamler Benz engines also tended to be more complex and problematic to build, so the Jumo 211 would seem more realistic.

In terms of 1937/38 production designs (with development starting in the 1934-35 period), the Jumo 210 might be a consideration, but power would be in the same class as the Kestrel and indeed the Mercury VI.2S the Poles already had in production (the latter with more drag but also lower weight and better altitude performance). Either engine, or both, might be more attractive to import rather than attempt any sort of license. The Hispano 12Y would be attractive for license if they pursued it early, but for imports it might have suffered the same supply problems as the Gnome Rhone engines.

The BMW 132 and Bramo 323 might be useful as potential substitutes for the Mercury and Pegasus. The 132 was larger in diameter than the Mercury, but in the same power class (both for the older Mercury VI and the new VIII) while the Bramo engine would be more useful as a Pegasus substitute. (the 2-speed versions would be later, so they'd have the 900 ps take-off A/B and 1000 ps take-off C/D with poorer altitude performance but better specific fuel consumption -the latter seems the better bomber/transport engine if inferior to the Pegasus)

The BMW 132 might have been an interesting consideration as a fighter engine, though. With the existing Mercury tooling, not as attractive to license than the Mercury VIII or GR engines for that matter, but useful as an imported engine and potentially a more reliable source than GR. I'm not sure if there were any 132 models with altitude performance competitive with the Mercury VIII, though.

If a more favorable alliance with Germany had been struck, and stronger anti-Soviet provisions been made in general (again Allying with Romania and Finland at the very least seems significant) then licensing the Jumo 211 would seem the logical choice in 1939. However, the tool-up time would still seem complicated compared to the various radial engines using the Mercury bore and stroke, so the Mercury VIII would seem the good short-term option with the Jumo as a followon front-line design. (possibly imported too -and the Germany manufacturing situation would be different if war hadn't broken out in 1939 ... or if it had been the Winter War that sparked things off with no German invasion of Poland)



> Hitler was an Austrian though a pan-German nationalist. As a southerner he had no particular truck with the Poles. He had in fact offered a Polish-German friendship treaty that was in a thinly disguised anti Soviet military treaty. His concern was the economic viability of marooned North Prussia and the German Hanseatic Port of Danzig which was of enormous cultural significant. To secure this he wanted a rail and freeway link 'right of way' to Danzig in return for the anti soviet pact. The treaty foundered on Polish instance on customs inspections (which would have destroyed the viability of the free trade zone). Other tensions included the disenfancshiment of ethnic German land owners in Poland and a continuous level of ongoing low level anti German hate crime (about 2000 to 4000 victims before the war) which Hitler seemed prepared to stomach.


Would anti-German sentiment have played into the politics surrounding Hitler's proposed Alliance? I don't mean anti-Nazi sentiment or distrust of Hitler and his regime, but general prejudice against ethnic Germans detracting from any sort of 'friendship' even if more strictly a military alliance.

Hatred (or less passionate disdain) and poor, irrational decisions tend to go together (and tends to breed conflict, including war), so it wouldn't be that surprising if there was at least some relation there.


Of course, this would have all been much simpler if Stalin had made the first move and made anti-Soviet alliances much more obviously necessary. (along with associated compromise) Germany would make an objectively safer ally than the USSR as well ... even considering some hypotentical Polish-Soviet alliance the biggest resource the Soviets had was manpower, so pressure to allow Soviet troops to enter Poland as support could be very high. (and much more dangerous than having only material resources being provided as assistance) 



> The HS12 series was slow in developing and no better than the Italian water cooled inlines of around 860hp and MS460 and DW520 used by German training squadrons were universally hated for their viscous unannounced stalls and spins. The French simply had not had the time to debug these things. The Swiss made them work though, after a few years.


Back in the early 1930s, compared to licensing the Mercury, the 12Y might have been attractive, but then so might the Fiat A.30 and both were available earlier than the Jumo 210 and were more powerful. (eventually more powerful than the Kestrel as well)

The decision would have to be made to go with water cooled V-12 engines rather than 9 cylinder air cooled radials with the original PZL P.11 design to make that feasible, but neither of those V-12s were available when the Mercury IV was licensed for the P.11, so you have the Mercury licensed and tooled up in the early 1930s and then the added overhead of a totally new (but not that much better) engine tooling up in the mid 1930s. Switching to the Mercury VI in 1934 made more sense for that reason, as did the Mercury VIII but they were just too slow and late to shift to the latter.

The Fiat A.22 and A.24 are in the right size range and were around in the late 1920s, but neither was built in large numbers and I don't think either was ever supercharged. Given the fact Fiat switched to the radial A.74 in a fairly similar size and performance class to the 14K and late model Mercury, it seems to point to the Poles making a good choice with the Mercury back in 1931, it might have been better if they'd just stuck with it with a bit more focus. They could try to get more out of the 645 hp Mercury VI as well as pushing for Mercury VIII production sooner, possibly at the expense of Pegasus production. The Mercury VIII could and did make a decent bomber engine too and the PZL.37 was already close to being a good fast bomber and recon aircraft that could have been optimized more around the more limited take-off power of the Mercury VIII to take advantage of the lower weight, drag, and much higher critical altitude. (very well might have beaten the Blenheim)


If it was the VVS alone and not the Luftwaffe they were opposing in 1939, the P.11g might have been good enough ... or really just a P.24 re-engined with a Mercury VIII (just need to get that into production sooner). 2 LMGs plus 2 oerlikon FFFs with far better handling and better pilots than Soviet I-16, better performance than the I-15, though the I-153s might have been more trouble. If they'd managed to purchase any Bf 109s (even Jumo powered ones) that obviously would have been very significant, but the cannon-armed P.11s would be more effective against heavier targets.
A 6 LMG armament (2 in the fuselage) might have also been possible for the P.11g or 4 LMGs and 2 cannons. (the latter might not be worth the weight/performance trade-offs, but the 6 LMGs would be a good fighter vs fighter armament and good for strafing)


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## net_sailor (Jul 23, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> They could try to get more out of the 645 hp Mercury VI as well as pushing for Mercury VIII production sooner, possibly at the expense of Pegasus production.





kool kitty89 said:


> If it was the VVS alone and not the Luftwaffe they were opposing in 1939, the P.11g might have been good enough ... or really just a P.24 re-engined with a Mercury VIII (just need to get that into production sooner).


This effords were taken on late 1935 and abandoned on erly 1936, cause Bristol refuse delivery of Mercury VIII construction drawings for licence production. At this time only few prototype units of Mercury VIII existed, and there were no drawings adequate for mass productions at all. Bristol couldn't make these drawings in reasonable time (the drafting room was a bottleneck of all factories). Poles didn't press too hard - situation on PAF was quite satisfactory. The large number of P.7 were on strength a new P.11a just entered into the service, and P.11c was in sight.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 23, 2015)

net_sailor said:


> This effords were taken on late 1935 and abandoned on erly 1936, cause Bristol refuse delivery of Mercury VIII construction drawings for licence production. At this time only few prototype units of Mercury VIII existed, and there were no drawings adequate for mass productions at all. Bristol couldn't make these drawings in reasonable time (the drafting room was a bottleneck of all factories). Poles didn't press too hard - situation on PAF was quite satisfactory. The large number of P.7 were on strength a new P.11a just entered into the service, and P.11c was in sight.


And the Pegasus XII was available sooner than the Mercury VIII so was the obvious alternative, at least as a bomber engine. I still think a Pegasus powered P.11 would be useful, though performance would probably fall to P.11c levels around 4.5 to 5 km altitude range (at or above the Mercury VI's critical altitude). The Pegasus I think still has a little more power at altitude, but not enough to overcome the added weight and drag of the larger engine.

I'm not sure about the Pegasus XX used for most of the production PZL.37s, was that available any sooner than the Mercury VIII? (if they'd kept pressing for both the newer Mercury and Pegasus designs and the Mercury VIII became available as soon as the Pegasus XX, they could have focused production on that instead) Even with the same power loading limits applied to the PZL.37, its bombload would still be competitive with the Ju 88, better than the Do 17 and much better than the Blenheim, so it doesn't seem like a bad move. (and should make the PZL.37 a better fast recon aircraft) Rough field load limits might bring things closer to the Blenheim's load, but reduced fuel load could partially compensate. 


But even with the Mercury VIII delayed and the Pegasus not so good as a fighter engine, attempting to get a license for one of the Gnome Rhone 14K engines would seem a better option. (at least if any had altitude performance close enough to the Mercury VIII to be useful) If none of the 1935/36 14k models in production had performance as good or better than the Pegasus XVIII, then using that engine seems like the better option. (the 14K with similar performance to the Pegasus would still be a better engine given it's nearly 5 inches or 127 mm smaller in diameter)

Lack of a 2-speed supercharger would mean less take-off and low altitude power in all cases, or of course having decent take-off power but poorer altitude performance than the Pegasus. (one bonus for the Pegasus's low-altitude power would be improved initial rate of climb on a fighter)


Also remember that 3500 m isn't far from the critical altitudes French fighters had to deal with in general and all without the benefit of 2-speed superchargers.


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## net_sailor (Jul 24, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> I'm not sure about the Pegasus XX used for most of the production PZL.37s, was that available any sooner than the Mercury VIII? (if they'd kept pressing for both the newer Mercury and Pegasus designs and the Mercury VIII became available as soon as the Pegasus XX, they could have focused production on that instead) Even with the same power loading limits applied to the PZL.37, its bombload would still be competitive with the Ju 88, better than the Do 17 and much better than the Blenheim, so it doesn't seem like a bad move. (and should make the PZL.37 a better fast recon aircraft) Rough field load limits might bring things closer to the Blenheim's load, but reduced fuel load could partially compensate.


Contact for delivery of 3 Pegasus XX engines (two for PZL.37 prototype + spare engine) was signed on March 1937, but licence production started on 1939. Between April and June only 29 of planned 45 pieces were completed, mainly due of lack of some parts delivered by Bristol (not all parts could be fabricated in Poland cause technological limits). 



kool kitty89 said:


> But even with the Mercury VIII delayed and the Pegasus not so good as a fighter engine, attempting to get a license for one of the Gnome Rhone 14K engines would seem a better option. (at least if any had altitude performance close enough to the Mercury VIII to be useful) If none of the 1935/36 14k models in production had performance as good or better than the Pegasus XVIII, then using that engine seems like the better option. (the 14K with similar performance to the Pegasus would still be a better engine given it's nearly 5 inches or 127 mm smaller in diameter)


Generally it would be a good idea, but there was a one small factor I didn't mentioned earlier: the money. Licence agreement with Bristol allow us to fabricate all next generation engines without any additional licence fees! That's why Poles praised for Hercules for the future generation bomber PZL.49 and Taurus for powering the P.50 Jastrząb II project. The only matter was availability of construction drawings. An implementation of new engine on production lines takes about one year. It is acceptable time, when you planning a long term air force development with very limited resources: money and material stocks (ie. more money, cause all aluminium was imported). 
Anyway it would be quite wise to develop an "shadow fighter" parallel with controversial PZL.38. The Wilk was technologically advanced, high risk program built around non existing, high performance engines. Fokker D.XXI class fighter constructed around Mercury VIII and without use of strategic material would be a good support.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 24, 2015)

net_sailor said:


> Generally it would be a good idea, but there was a one small factor I didn't mentioned earlier: the money. Licence agreement with Bristol allow us to fabricate all next generation engines without any additional licence fees! That's why Poles praised for Hercules for the future generation bomber PZL.49 and Taurus for powering the P.50 Jastrząb II project. The only matter was availability of construction drawings. An implementation of new engine on production lines takes about one year. It is acceptable time, when you planning a long term air force development with very limited resources: money and material stocks (ie. more money, cause all aluminium was imported).


The license agreement didn't include any royalties, but only a single large sum paid up front? That does indeed seem like an expensive route and if those existing older Mercury VI engines could continue to be built free of additional license royalties, that should certainly be an attractive reason to seriously consider using those engines for newer projects. 



> Anyway it would be quite wise to develop an "shadow fighter" parallel with controversial PZL.38. The Wilk was technologically advanced, high risk program built around non existing, high performance engines. Fokker D.XXI class fighter constructed around Mercury VIII and without use of strategic material would be a good support.


Given the aerodynamic similarities and what I assume would be similar construction techniques, putting more investment into the PZL.38 earlier might have made more sense than funding the PZL.37 as much as they had IF that fighter had used engines already readily available. A mercury VI powered PZL.38 could potentially be built and tested with Mercury VI.S2 engines even before the PZL.37's Pegasus engines could be imported from Bristol. Building and testing that smaller scale aircraft (which really does seem to be a scaled down PZL.37 in many respects) should be significantly cheaper than the full-sized bomber version while also having less (or no) delay related to engine availability. With engine availability limiting PZL.37 production anyway, it seems like diverting those resources towards building PZL.38s fitted with engines already in production would make plenty of sense.

So even if they thought having advanced bombers was more important than fighters (or fighter-bombers or attack aircraft), there seem like plenty of practical economic reasons the PZL.38 would be more attractive. That said, my 'ideal' suggestion of turning the PZL.38 into a single-seat fighter might be more difficult to promote at the time. (plenty of aircraft developers seemed to like the idea, but most governments seemed to balk at a single seat twin-engine fighter)

Using the Mercury for initial testing of the P.39 would also make sense even if they still planned to use an alternate powerplant for production. I'd honestly expect they'd eventually have just preferred to produce the fighter using the Mercury engine if it was felt a light fighter was actually practical. Something lighter than the D.XXI or P.11c but similarly powered should be more useful than the underpowered Italian and French light fighters, perhaps closer to the VG-33 in concept but maybe not as reliant on wooden construction unless PZL had access to engineers and craftsmen experienced enough to manage that reliably without making it too heavy. (still, compromising to use steel, wood, and fabric where practical and aluminum where most needed should work well as long as they planned on striking a balance from the start -Fokker seemed to manage with the D.XXI) 


I also found some interesting translated resources for the P.24 and 14K engines:
Data Sheet PZL P.24A - WiP data sheets - War Thunder - Official Forum (a couple posts later down have lists of speed and rate of climb at various altitudes along with weight and load information )

The posts there cited this archive for the information MusÃ©e Safran

The climb rate of the P.24 seems to be a great deal better than what Wiki lists and actually over 1000 m/min in its best altitude range. (which appears to be between 2000 m and 4000 m with best climb at 3000 m at 1091 m/min)

Top speed is 430 km/h at 4250 m and still managing 415 km/h at 6000 m.


I also found this http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc63391/m1/10/med_res/
The 14Kfs is listed at having maximum power of 900 hp at 3620 m which drops to 760 hp at 5000 m.

Pursuing a Gnome-Rhone 14Kfs license might have been more useful than the Mercury VIII or Pegasus as both a fighter and bomber engine. (again, common production with IAR would be an advantage there too) And aside from the above suggestion of a light fighter targeting the older Mercury VI, work on the P.50 could have started sooner with a 900 hp engine available that much sooner. (aiming at a wooden wing like the D.XXI would make sense to minimize imported material while re-using as much of the P.24 design as possible and initially using fixed landing gear like the D.XXI -aiming at a 'better' D.XXI alternative that also used existing components and didn't need acquiring a license or importing foreign aircraft seems like a pretty sensible overall objective)


I really think the Gnome Rhone 14N is a bad idea, it's heavier, not all that much more powerful at altitude, available later, and still heavy and powerful enough on take-off to complicate structural stability (and add yet more weight) in the P.50 design.


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## Timppa (Jul 25, 2015)

parsifal said:


> Finland has itself to thank for its survval as a nation, but it also has a debt to the British for giving them some manouvre room as well. Without that assistance, Finland would not have survived Stalins aggression.



No, British "assistance" was worth a diddly-squat. Where was the assistance to Poland ?
There may been an other factor in the play. I let you figure it out.


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## parsifal (Jul 25, 2015)

Please enlighten me. 

At tehran the focus of the western allies were the future military operations, in particular the second front and securing Soviet entry into the pacific war. The western alliance was still fighting for survival in many ways, or at least trying to do all possible to maximise the chances of its success in the up coming cross channel attack. Nevertheless, both the US and Britain did what they could to try and curb Soviet aggression. Undertakings were extracted from Stalin to allow self determination elections in Poland and the Baltic States. Stalin was made to agree to a pull out of Iran at wars end, and to support the Turks if they entered the war. Because of the concerns about the cross channel attack, Stalin was able to extract a secret agreement from the allies about Polish borders. basically they were to remain at the partition line of 1939, or as Churchill called it the curzon line ( a reference to the agreement made in 1920, but not really sticking to those borders), in exchange for a co-ordinated offensive by the Russians to throw the Germans off guard.....the offensive that led to the destruction of AGC. In exchange for entry into the pacific, the Russians were promised the Kuriles and control of Manchukuo, something they later pulled back away from. 

These were all critical issues for the west and they were prepared to make compromises of principal to secure the best co-operation they could from Stalin. The west was prepared to make concessions where needed to secure Soviet co-operation. Poland, the Baltic States or indeed Finland were not of critical importance to western interests of 1944. Normandy, minimising allied casualties, securing Russian co-operation were....I have no problem in understanding the logic behind that, and i certainly would give no credence to a national of a country that had co-operated fully with its axis partners and then expects to be able to occupy some form of the moral high ground because the west did not break or threaten a military alliance that was critical to them. You, and your country are in no position to lecture me, or countries i identify with, in any way. You should just hang your head low and be thankful that we did win.

As it turned out, in Eastern Europe, the Soviets failed to honour their committments in Poland or Baltic States, but they did honour respect for the turks, they did pull out of Iran and they never made a serious effort to undertake a full military occupation of Finland. They were content with Finnish capitulation of their foreign policy freedom of action (though to finlands credit, it never participated in joint military excercises as had been expected by the Soviets under the 1948 peace agreement). The pattern emerging is that on the flanks of the main front, the Soviets were prepared to make concessions. In the case of Finland, in Soviet eyes, there was only Sweden and Norway beyond, but in the case of of Poland there was Germany, who twice in 30 years had attacked Russia. The Russians were never going to concede Poland as anything except direct domination by the Soviet political and military establishments. There really was nothing the British could do about that, though they did not realize just how bad things would be. In the case of Finland, the suggestions made by churchill as forcefully as he could make from a position of weakness, and with the knowledge also that there were far more important issues also at stake, were considered and accepted by Stalin. He could have chosen to ignore those agreements if he chose, just as he did in Poland, but there wasnt the gain in it for the USSR that there was in Poland. I think, however that by stating the case for Finland at tehran, Churchill made the wests position clear, and Stalin accepted that because there wasnt much to gain by breaking the agreement. He got economic dominance through the reparations, he got political non- alignment through the peace treaty, and he never really had any military threats to worry about. In central Europe the situation was fundamentally different, so all the scheming by Churchill could not deviate the Soviets from that path of direct occupation and intimidation. 

With regard to Poland, it was beyond Britains power to avert the subversion of Poland both in 1939 and in 1945. But britain did more to at least try and protect Poland than Finland has ever done. All Finland did was side with Germany. Too precious to get their own hands dirty but happy enough to side with a regime bent on the extermination of millions. That, sadly, made her an enemy. And Finland did what to help anyone but the germans and themselves?


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## Glider (Jul 25, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> Helo, gents,
> What tecnological paths hould`ve been undertaken by the Polish air force in the 1930s, in order to be better prepared for the September war in 1939? Not that it would`ve changed the outcome, but just to give Polish air crews better chances once airborne.



To give the aircrew the best chance the only option that I can see is simply to buy as many Hurricanes as they can get. The main Luftwaffe fighters would be the Me110 and the Me109D. The 1939 Hurricane has a clear advantage over the 109D and it has a good chance against the Me110.


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## fastmongrel (Jul 25, 2015)

Glider said:


> To give the aircrew the best chance the only option that I can see is simply to buy as many Hurricanes as they can get. The main Luftwaffe fighters would be the Me110 and the Me109D. The 1939 Hurricane has a clear advantage over the 109D and it has a good chance against the Me110.



What date is the earliest Hawkers could deliver Hurricanes to the Poles and would the Air Ministry allow any delays to RAF deliveries to equip the Polish AF. Also just the Hurricanes arriving in Poland doesnt mean they could go straight into service did the Poles have the time to get Pilots and ground crew trained for a useful number of Hurricanes into service.


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## Greyman (Jul 25, 2015)

fastmongrel said:


> What date is the earliest Hawkers could deliver Hurricanes to the Poles and would the Air Ministry allow any delays to RAF deliveries to equip the Polish AF. Also just the Hurricanes arriving in Poland doesnt mean they could go straight into service did the Poles have the time to get Pilots and ground crew trained for a useful number of Hurricanes into service.



From posts I made in this thread a few years ago:



Greyman said:


> The Poles had struck a deal with Britain and France in March '39, and had received one Hurricane for evaluation purposes before the invasion. Nine more were en route, but it was over before they could be delivered.





Greyman said:


> Canada began receiving Hurricanes September 1938, South Africa by November 1938, Yugoslavia by December 1938 ...


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## Glider (Jul 26, 2015)

fastmongrel said:


> What date is the earliest Hawkers could deliver Hurricanes to the Poles and would the Air Ministry allow any delays to RAF deliveries to equip the Polish AF. Also just the Hurricanes arriving in Poland doesnt mean they could go straight into service did the Poles have the time to get Pilots and ground crew trained for a useful number of Hurricanes into service.



Belgium received some in 1939 and even Latvia paid for some in 1939 but they couldn't get delivered. It seems clear that they were in production and cleared for delivery in the right timescale. 


Your comments about training pilots and ground crew on the Hurricane are absolutely valid, but would apply to any type, even a home grown one. To ease this there were other benefits iro the Hurricane, it was famously easy to fly and being largely based on older technology, easy to maintain as well as being robust for operations from all types of airfield. I would suggest that a better choice for Poland in 1939 would be almost impossible to find.

If a 'Plan B' is allowed then buy the P36, the French Hawks did well in the Battle of France but they were slower, with less firepower than the Hurricane


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 27, 2015)

Given the delays in getting new Bristol engines to Poland in a timely manner, I rather doubt Hurricanes with their Merlins would be any more expedient.

Though that made me realize something else: French, German, and even Italian liquid cooled V-12 engines have been addressed, but British ones have not. I'd forgotten that Rolls Royce had both the Kestrel and Buzzard running in the mid/late 1920s and at least the former in production. The Buzzard was never put into large scale production, but I believe that was mainly due to lack of interest than any technical problems.

The Kestrel was in a similar weight and power class to the Mercury engines the Poles used in the early 1930s (though heavier with the radiator included) and around early enough to consider importing or acquiring a manufacturing license instead of the Mercury license.

I'm not sure if the Buzzard would have been compelling. Larger and heavier than the Kestrel (but lighter than the later Merlin by a good amount) but if the altitude performance was close, the added power of the Buzzard might be interesting to consider. I'm not sure if the lack of interest British aircraft developers showed in the engine would have made Rolls Royce any more likely to offer a manufacturing license, but that might have been a useful factor as well.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 27, 2015)

There may have been a different design philosophy in the the early 30s (not universal) that saw fighters as light and agile and large/heavy engines, even though powerful, being more suited to bombers/flying boats) than to fighters. 
The Buzzard was several hundred pounds heavier, about 25% wider and about 20-22% taller than a Kestrel, weight not including coolant. To get the landing speed the same with the bigger engine ( or have the same turning ability) you need a bigger wing, and perhaps heavier landing gear to support the larger airplane (and more fuel). Remember that there were darn few wind tunnels at the time and what was 'common knowledge' about streamlining was mostly intuition (guess work) and not actual facts. 
Planes may have been built to a price also and using a Buzzard engine to tote around a pair of 7.7mm mgs might have looked like a very expensive solution. Everything changed in just a few years


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## Balljoint (Jul 27, 2015)

parsifal said:


> Please enlighten me.
> 
> 
> With regard to Poland, it was beyond Britains power to avert the subversion of Poland both in 1939 and in 1945. But britain did more to at least try and protect Poland than Finland has ever done. All Finland did was side with Germany. Too precious to get their own hands dirty but happy enough to side with a regime bent on the extermination of millions. That, sadly, made her an enemy. And Finland did what to help anyone but the germans and themselves?


There’s a bit of mismatch between Great Britain and Finland. After Napoleon’s defeat, Europe was divided into major countries and sphere of influence counties; Austria, Germany collectively, Russia, Britain and France constituting the former, and the remaining countries being secondary dependencies. WW1 generally resulted from the rise of nationalism in the “sphere” countries and particularly Germany’s response to the challenge to imperial rule.

Poland and Finland are sphere countries without the military or political clout to determine an independent course of action. They could only react and compromise –though Poland attempted to ally and maintain an independent course. With hindsight, they might have been better advised to ally with the Soviets or Germans since these countries were the centers of their sphere –Germany incipiently so.
Similarly Britain recognized the better course to be cooperation with the Soviets, a sphere center, though save for a personality clash they seemingly could have allied with Germany in return for Germany perhaps yielding in Western Europe –just speculation. The point being the sphere of influence principle originally more or less kept the peace during the initial decades – but certainly presently has proven to be a cure as bad as the decease. 

Britain vis-a-vis Finland are two entirely different entities in terms of available responses to Soviet/German aggression. Britain made arbitrary but reasonable major power decisions. It’s inappropriate to moralize relative to Britain –though it may be useful to critically review decisions and results for future reference.

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## bobbysocks (Jul 27, 2015)

I don't see Poland having the funds to get an airforce that would give Germany any reason to hesitate. maybe if france and the uk basically worked out a lend lease deal with them it could have been bolstered somewhat. if the us did lend lease the planes they could give them were what...buffalos, severskys, peashooters, p40s?? at that stage of the game they would have been better off with French and uk ac.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 27, 2015)

fastmongrel said:


> What date is the earliest Hawkers could deliver Hurricanes to the Poles and would the Air Ministry allow any delays to RAF deliveries to equip the Polish AF. Also just the Hurricanes arriving in Poland doesnt mean they could go straight into service did the Poles have the time to get Pilots and ground crew trained for a useful number of Hurricanes into service.


Another thought on the Hurricane is that: while the Hurricane Mk.I was faster, its rate of climb (with the fixed pitch prop) was significantly worse than the P.24 while the armament was worse than the P.24's as well (at least against bombers). Same should be true for the P.11g or a Pegasus powered P.24 derivative. (possibly the P.11c as well)

Polish interest in Gloster's F.5/37 monoplane might for export might have been more useful given it wouldn't compete with RAF orders aside from Gladiators (which were already on the export market using similar Mercury VIII engines). I was under the impression the F.5/34 was publicized and not developed under any great degree of secrecy, so such a scenario should be plausible. (whether they reached Poland in time is another matter, and I suppose this same argument could apply to Finnish Gladiator orders as well with the exception that they didn't already have aircraft with equal/superior performance to the Gladiator -the P.11c's performance and armament were equivalent or slightly better)




Shortround6 said:


> There may have been a different design philosophy in the the early 30s (not universal) that saw fighters as light and agile and large/heavy engines, even though powerful, being more suited to bombers/flying boats) than to fighters.


Yes, so in the 1930 time range when the P.7 was under development, the Kestrel would have been the main British engine to consider next to the Mercury and Jupiter, and focusing on the Bristol engines certainly had advantages.

Did Rolls Royce ever even offer a license for the Kestrel? Sure there was the fairly similar V-1570 around the same time with similar power and Curtiss was in a tighter situation actually trying to find buyers, but I think it relied on glycol cooling and might not have transitioned to water cooling easily, or it might have benefited from it given the 100% glycol related coolant leaking and hot-spot formation issues. (which the Kestrel avoided by using pressurized water cooling until the Peregrine, I believe)



> The Buzzard was several hundred pounds heavier, about 25% wider and about 20-22% taller than a Kestrel, weight not including coolant. To get the landing speed the same with the bigger engine ( or have the same turning ability) you need a bigger wing, and perhaps heavier landing gear to support the larger airplane (and more fuel). Remember that there were darn few wind tunnels at the time and what was 'common knowledge' about streamlining was mostly intuition (guess work) and not actual facts.
> Planes may have been built to a price also and using a Buzzard engine to tote around a pair of 7.7mm mgs might have looked like a very expensive solution. Everything changed in just a few years


Mid 1930s fighter designs like the YP-24/P-30, Supermarine 224, and Hawker Hurricane with their rather large size and wing area would have been better cases for an engine of the Buzzard's class, but that already was discussed to some extent in the Supermarine 224 thread a while back.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 29, 2015)

bobbysocks said:


> I don't see Poland having the funds to get an airforce that would give Germany any reason to hesitate. maybe if france and the uk basically worked out a lend lease deal with them it could have been bolstered somewhat. if the us did lend lease the planes they could give them were what...buffalos, severskys, peashooters, p40s?? at that stage of the game they would have been better off with French and uk ac.


P-40s would come way too late and as it was Finnish B-239s came too late to be used in the Winter War. P-36s were already mentioned as a bit late as well and expense while P-35s might have been more realistic but also likely relatively expensive. An export version of Gloster's F.5/37 seems potentially more attractive but might be just as costly (still seems like a more timely option given the shorter distance to Britain and greater commonality with the Mercury VIII the Poles were already targeting). The D.XXI was also mentioned but I think the Poles could have done as well or better with more extensive modifications to the P.11/P.24 (but simpler and earlier than the P.50's more dramatic redesign)

They had good pilots and potentially more of the needs was more seriously realized. (and an expanded training program was established) But the first big step would be replacing the several hundred old P.11s with something at least close to competitive with German (and Soviet) opposition. Threats came from both sides (before the invasion began), so focusing solely on the capabilities of one over the other wouldn't make as much sense.

I still say that the Poles should have acquired similar licenses for the Gnome Rhone 14K as the Romanians had. Engines with competitive performance to the Mercury VIII were available sooner (as the Romanians applied to their P.24s). Mating those engines with a more dramatic improvement over the P.24 airframe should have been able to create something at least directly competitive with the Mercury VIII engined D.XXI or possibly better. (the P.24 already had the engine and fuselage, the engineering for the new wing and landing gear is what was needed, best to stick with fixed landing gear to expedite production and service entry)









parsifal said:


> Its more than a bit rich to argue that the Germans were sympathetic to Finland's position, when in fact they were doing everything they could to hurt Finland.
> 
> From March 1940 until Finland's joining with the Axis, the British protected and allowed free movement of Finnish shipping which provided the Finns with considerable external revenue. Not all of this shipping was used for allied purposes, much of it was used for the transport of non-military neutral cargoes. It was still the target of unrestricted warfare by the Germans and still afforded whatever protection could be undertaken by the RN. Hardly the actions of a nation bent on Finland's destruction. And for Germany, hardly the actions of a nation acting in good faith with the welfare of Finland paramount in German interactions with the Finns.


Might it be more fair to say that Germany didn't have so much a strong interest in sympathy to Finland as much as an interest in building allies? And actions taken against Finland's favor were at least in part intended to pressure them into such an alliance?

From Finland's point of view it seems mostly a matter of choosing which allies are most necessary and useful. (this includes practical material resources and considerations regarding how trustworthy or dependable ... or at least predictable said allies might be)

On the whole, they seem to have played things very smart, perhaps the smartest of the smaller countries involved in the European war. That was one of my bigger points regarding Poland's situation in 1939. (Poland had a more complicated situation sandwiched between Germany and Russia such that allying themselves with neither left them open for invasion by both) The potential for various alliances or treaties (as fleeting as they might have ended up) and general diplomatic and military negotiation in 1938 and early 1939 were in far more flux with more possibilities than once war broke out and the players began to get more set in their roles.

In 1939, Poland (and Romania for that matter) would have had more to gain from an alliance with Germany than Finland would by far, while maintained trade and support from Britain was entirely practical and sensible for the Fins. (same for any support or trade from Sweden, Norway, Denmark, or Holland)

Either way, Germany and the USSR would remain the biggest threats even as 'allies' and remaining vigilant towards actions from either would be absolutely necessary. (had an alliance been made with Germany, it's still entirely possible that Hitler would have become dissatisfied with the arrangements and invaded one way or another) The question is more whether Poland could have delayed conflict further and potentially gained some advantages in the short term from an alliance either of those looming threats. (German materials and technology support/trade? Or soviet? -Germany seems the more practically useful option by far and easier to manipulate and exploit to their advantage than the Soviets -the Soviets were also an older, more established long-term threat building up gradually ... Germany's was a flash in the pan that was far less stable and more fickle in nature -much more confusingly and ambiguously so without the benefit of hindsight, obviously)

Would the British have put sanctions on Poland if they allied themselves with Germany? (or Russia?) Unless that was a real threat, then there doesn't seem to be a whole lot arguing against playing more heavily with German politics and economic exchange prior to the war.






parsifal said:


> At tehran the focus of the western allies were the future military operations, in particular the second front and securing Soviet entry into the pacific war. The western alliance was still fighting for survival in many ways, or at least trying to do all possible to maximise the chances of its success in the up coming cross channel attack. Nevertheless, both the US and Britain did what they could to try and curb Soviet aggression.


Would it not have at least been plausible (by 1944) to be paranoid/distrustful or at least seriously concerned about Stalin to consider Soviet involvement in the Pacific war a viable sacrifice for limiting their status in Europe as soon as a reasonable armistice with Germany (on the Western Front) could be established? Not just Europe either, but curb risk of potential Soviet expansion in East Asia as well. (what's the point of defeating Japan if the former Japanese Empire ends up occupied by a -potentially, at the time- similarly dangerous Imperial influence?)

You'd loose Soviet resources, but you'd gain all those late-war lend-lease resources (including thousands of P-39Qs, P-40Ns, and likely all P-63s) going to the USSR to redistribute to the Western Allies (including those newly freed from German Occupation and their associated colonies) along with independent South East Asian allies from China to the South Pacific (again, including colonies and Commonwealth states). 

Obviously, there's more logic to this in hindsight, but even at the time there was plenty of evidence to support Stalin's character and aspirations. Churchill seems to have seen this much at least and it seems more that Roosevelt's relations with (and perception of) Stalin compromised the situation a great deal. Had the US treated the USSR as a necessary evil (at least behind closed doors) rather than a friend and ally, the above scenario seems far more plausible.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 29, 2015)

Balljoint said:


> Poland and Finland are sphere countries without the military or political clout to determine an independent course of action. They could only react and compromise –though Poland attempted to ally and maintain an independent course. With hindsight, they might have been better advised to ally with the Soviets or Germans since these countries were the centers of their sphere –Germany incipiently so.
> Similarly Britain recognized the better course to be cooperation with the Soviets, a sphere center, though save for a personality clash they seemingly could have allied with Germany in return for Germany perhaps yielding in Western Europe –just speculation. The point being the sphere of influence principle originally more or less kept the peace during the initial decades – but certainly presently has proven to be a cure as bad as the decease.


The British might not have sided with the Soviets at all if the war had started differently with different alliances involved. Different actions taken in 1938 and 1939 could drastically change the actual state of conflict and aggressors active by 1940, let alone 1941. Circumstances might have led the Soviets to be greater aggressors at that point and the Germans may have failed to gain a good position to invade Western Europe (unless they were insane enough to invade under unfavorable conditions -delay and manipulation making Germany hesitate and they loose their advantage of speed and surprise, but any direct aggression on Western countries would screw up a lot of potential alliances, trade and/or neutrality)

If Poland handled things more like Finland, they'd have switched allies depending on the situation. Germany made a lot of sense (logistically and politically) to find some sort of partnership with in 1938/39, but further relations from 1939 onward would heavily depend on Germany and Russia's actions and if/when and where active hostilities broke out. The UK might have made more sense as a FRIENDLY ally than Germany, but in terms of raw practical political, economic, and military needs and stability (or preparations for lack thereof) in 1938/39 and the strategic situation involved, Germany seems much more attractive. (The USSR as well, location wise, but Germany seems to have had more to offer on the whole AND was boxed in by other Western countries vs the USSR's more solid single boarder and expansive territory making counter-attacks much more difficult, especially on the ground the Russia's massive numerical superiority)

There's also the other question: would it have been possible to sway Hitler (and the Nazi regime in general) to put focus in Eastern Europe as much higher priority than any aspirations of expanding westward? Or at least any direct acts of aggression towards the West? Would numerous alliances with Germany with de-facto goals of anti-Soviet action (in a cold or hot conflict) prevent Germany from being in an effective situation to attack western Europe? Could Germany have been coerced into passing up their chance to strike at Western Europe, delaying action long enough to allow various Western European countries to properly prepare for possible action and circumventing many of the flawed interim measures that allowed Germany to be so effective in 1939?


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## parsifal (Jul 30, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> ....Might it be more fair to say that Germany didn't have so much a strong interest in sympathy to Finland as much as an interest in building allies? And actions taken against Finland's favor were at least in part intended to pressure them into such an alliance?



I dont think either is accurate. Germany was not about building alliances. Wartime Germany never ran "alliance warfare" with any of its partners. Germany adhered to the view that minor nations were client kingdoms there to do the bidding of their masters. Their treatment of all their partners was always the role of the imperious master and the dependant client kingdoms doing her bidding or be thrown on the fire, as all of them were eventually as germany began losing. 

At the time of the Soviet invasion of Finland, Germany was not interested in any alliance with Finland. Consideration was being given to an invasion of Sweden, and plans were actively underway for the subjugation of Norway and Denmark. Norway and Denmark offer pretty good insight as to what was likely to happen if Finland tried to side with germany. That was never going to happen in any case. The secret protocols worked out between the USSR and Nazi Germany as part of the non-aggression pact were a division of the territories that separated them. All but one of the Baltic states were allocated to Russia, half of Poland also ceded to Russia as well as Finland. One of the Baltic States (Lithuania?) was to go to Germany, the western half of Poland and later, Rumania were to be german spheres of influence. Bulgaria was considered Russian, whilst Hungary initially thought best left to italy. Russia was to meet the raw materials needs of Germany, and Germany was to provide technical and military assistance to the Russians. No side adhered completely with the obligations of the treaty. The Soviets occupied all three of the baltic states and made aggressive inroads into Rumania, Bulgaria entered the German orbit after the attack on Greece (though they did remain loyal to Russia as well). The Hungarians gravitated to the Germans after Case Yellow. Germany gave only a small fraction of the technical support to the russians. But during the winter war, Germany actively supported Stalins by denying foreign entry in support of finland where she could, assisting in the Soviet naval blockade by passing vital information to them, and adopting a seizure policy of their own toward Finnish shipping. In 1939-40, even Hitler acknowledged the vital nature of the arrangements with Stalin. They would never have considered alliance with Finland at that time, until after Soviet duplicity was exposed as this would have jeopardised the far more important pact with Russia. 



> From Finland's point of view it seems mostly a matter of choosing which allies are most necessary and useful. (this includes practical material resources and considerations regarding how trustworthy or dependable ... or at least predictable said allies might be)



There is an element of truth to that, though the degree to which it has been played up in the interests of cold war tensions is open to debate. What is clear is that for Finland, BARBAOSSA offered them the opportunity to win back lost territory. Finland from that perspective ran a parallel war, not an alliance war. They never allowed German troops into their country except in the far north, never agreed or allowed expansions much beyond the 39 borders, never allowed German entry into Karelia, and never undertook anything other than occasional bombarment of the great city of Leningrad. Frankly they werent interested in German victory in the german grand scale. In fact they conducted their war in the hope the Germans would lose, and their conduct, being entirely consistent with Churchills secret memo to Mannerheim appears to be hoping for an eventual allied victory in which they could retain their prewar boundaries, with a weakened USSR powerless to protest. They were, in effect, hoping for the germans and Russians to bleed themselves white and allow Finland to survive. 



> That was one of my bigger points regarding Poland's situation in 1939. (Poland had a more complicated situation sandwiched between Germany and Russia such that allying themselves with neither left them open for invasion by both) The potential for various alliances or treaties (as fleeting as they might have ended up) and general diplomatic and military negotiation in 1938 and early 1939 were in far more flux with more possibilities than once war broke out and the players began to get more set in their roles.



There already existed a non-aggression pact between Germany and poland, derived mainly from fear of Polish aggression on the one hand by Germany, and secondly by a fear of Soviet aggression by Poland on the other. But as Germany re-armed and gained strength, this marriage of convenience with Poland fell away in importance. Hitler had no interst in developing any sought of rapport with Poland after 1938. Hitlers main worry seems to have been that the Poles actually would accede to his demands and avoid war for the moment. He was tensing up because he was worried war would yet again be avoided. All this stuff came out in painful detail at Nuremberg as germany was indicted for actively seeking to wage aggressive war. Hitler loathed the whole concept of an independant Poland, loather its people, coveted its resources and hated them becuse of the innate threat they posed to German security during the Weimar republic days. Talk of an alliance with Poland is a daydream after 1938. 



> In 1939, Poland (and Romania for that matter) would have had more to gain from an alliance with Germany than Finland would by far, while maintained trade and support from Britain was entirely practical and sensible for the Fins. (same for any support or trade from Sweden, Norway, Denmark, or Holland)



If Germany had been prepred to enter an alliance with Poland, that would have destroyed any chance of a detente with Russia. Without Russian raw materials Germany was going to be in trouble economically very quickly....within months. A Germany floundering because of a lack of resources would have begun the exterminations in Poland earlier, not later as the Nazis began to look for ways to appease a resless and angry home front.

This is just one of the difficulties I see with a possible german/Polish Alliance. 



> Would the British have put sanctions on Poland if they allied themselves with Germany? (or Russia?) Unless that was a real threat, then there doesn't seem to be a whole lot arguing against playing more heavily with German politics and economic exchange prior to the war.



Absolutely. the British would impose sanction on the Poles if they sided with Germany. Anyone found to be treating with the enemy was subject to allied control commission attentions. Sanctions were applied to Russia until June 1941, also against Denmark, Vichy, Spain and italy in the lead up to war. Poland would have been forced into economic ruin if she followed that route.


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## parsifal (Jul 30, 2015)

> Would it not have at least been plausible (by 1944) to be paranoid/distrustful or at least seriously concerned about Stalin to consider Soviet involvement in the Pacific war a viable sacrifice for limiting their status in Europe as soon as a reasonable armistice with Germany (on the Western Front) could be established? Not just Europe either, but curb risk of potential Soviet expansion in East Asia as well. (what's the point of defeating Japan if the former Japanese Empire ends up occupied by a -potentially, at the time- similarly dangerous Imperial influence?)
> 
> You'd loose Soviet resources, but you'd gain all those late-war lend-lease resources (including thousands of P-39Qs, P-40Ns, and likely all P-63s) going to the USSR to redistribute to the Western Allies (including those newly freed from German Occupation and their associated colonies) along with independent South East Asian allies from China to the South Pacific (again, including colonies and Commonwealth states).
> 
> Obviously, there's more logic to this in hindsight, but even at the time there was plenty of evidence to support Stalin's character and aspirations. Churchill seems to have seen this much at least and it seems more that Roosevelt's relations with (and perception of) Stalin compromised the situation a great deal. Had the US treated the USSR as a necessary evil (at least behind closed doors) rather than a friend and ally, the above scenario seems far more plausible.



Equipment was never the problem for the allies after 1943. it was manpower. A defeat in Normandy was estimated to lengthen the war by moiree than 2 years by the JCS and probably cost more than a million men. Britain alone would have been forced effectively out of the war. The US would have been forced to raise another 100+ divisions and destroy, or seriously damage their own economy. So no, you dont get all those extra goodies. You have had to raid your domestic workforces to make up the army to a stronger outfit than it was. In the pacific, in the pre-atomic bomb planning, the expectations were also for a million allied casualties. Thats 2 million American casualties in two years. Frankly I dont think the US could absorb that level of punishment and keep fighting. So getting the Russians on side was definately something worth selling several kidneys over.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 30, 2015)

parsifal said:


> Equipment was never the problem for the allies after 1943. it was manpower. A defeat in Normandy was estimated to lengthen the war by moiree than 2 years by the JCS and probably cost more than a million men. Britain alone would have been forced effectively out of the war. The US would have been forced to raise another 100+ divisions and destroy, or seriously damage their own economy. So no, you dont get all those extra goodies. You have had to raid your domestic workforces to make up the army to a stronger outfit than it was. In the pacific, in the pre-atomic bomb planning, the expectations were also for a million allied casualties. Thats 2 million American casualties in two years. Frankly I dont think the US could absorb that level of punishment and keep fighting. So getting the Russians on side was definitely something worth selling several kidneys over.


Yes, planning tied to pursuing the full ground invasion of Japan would make that somewhat attractive, though there was an alternate route there too: A-Bomb or no A-Bomb you had mass carpet bombing (particularly incendiary bombing) to continue for a good while, particularly with most of Japan's population centers much more vulnerable to that than Germany's. Horrific loss of life on the Japanese end ... but much lower risk for the allies as far as manpower goes.

Reaching out and establishing enough force (from the entirety of international allied resources) on the ground to push the IJA back from its remaining occupied territories would be more important than any plans to invade the Japanese islands.


Honestly, the biggest losers in a scenario like that would seem to be Russia and Japan.


The remaining IJN surface fleet remnants might be a problem too, but on the Navy end of things, I'd think a working Japanese atomic bomb would be the worst hypothetical possibility. (even then somewhat unlikely to be successfully deployed and only really useful against densely masses fleet formations -like an invasion force- and if an allied invasion force didn't eventuate, then that wouldn't matter either)





parsifal said:


> I dont think either is accurate. Germany was not about building alliances. Wartime Germany never ran "alliance warfare" with any of its partners. Germany adhered to the view that minor nations were client kingdoms there to do the bidding of their masters. Their treatment of all their partners was always the role of the imperious master and the dependant client kingdoms doing her bidding or be thrown on the fire, as all of them were eventually as germany began losing.


I wasn't suggesting Poland create any real alliance with Wartime Germany, I was suggesting they form a facade of an alliance with pre-war Germany and play their cards very carefully to milk as much out of the arrangement as possible for as long as possible without outright effectively capitulating to Germany (or putting themselves in a position where defiance/betrayal of their alliance was strategically impossible). Trusting Hitler or Stalin for much of anything was folly, but playing the sneaky, manipulative diplomat and military power/'common enemy' appeal to different degrees outside and behind closed doors seems what was necessary.

It might have even avoided the war going hot in the sense that it did historically, but how that might have worked out in the long run is another matter. (personally, the Nazi regime of 1939 seemed much more likely to fall apart in a timely manner than Stalin's) But even that doesn't matter so much when we're trying to see things from Poland's perspective ... they wouldn't be so concerned about what happened INSIDE Germany as they were to what Germany might do beyond their current boarders.

There's a lot more middleground between outright appeasement and direct violent resistance. (I'm sure Hitler's own subordinates and peers alike had to deal with plenty of manipulative placation to his whims ... so why not apply that on an international diplomacy level? -and Hitler's delusions seem far more readily played on than Stalin's ... aspirations) Unless you think Poland lacked the skilled diplomats and statesmen to pull that off.


(possibly more later, but that seems the short of it)


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 30, 2015)

parsifal said:


> There is an element of truth to that, though the degree to which it has been played up in the interests of cold war tensions is open to debate. What is clear is that for Finland, BARBAOSSA offered them the opportunity to win back lost territory. Finland from that perspective ran a parallel war, not an alliance war.
> ...
> In fact they conducted their war in the hope the Germans would lose, and their conduct, being entirely consistent with Churchills secret memo to Mannerheim appears to be hoping for an eventual allied victory in which they could retain their prewar boundaries, with a weakened USSR powerless to protest. They were, in effect, hoping for the germans and Russians to bleed themselves white and allow Finland to survive.


I expressed similar context to a Polish 'alliance' with Germany among my first few posts in this thread. (particularly regarding it only being useful to the Poles if they could gain German support/resources -for a time at least- without significant numbers of German troops entering the country) That is also one more area the Germans were more attractive than the Soviets: more potential technology to make use of in relatively small quantities but relatively potent in quality. Any resources requiring numerical foreign troop 'support' would just make Poland an easier target to take apart from within: a de facto preemptive invasion.

Actual expeditionary type volunteer support would have made more sense from some other potential allies or supporters, but not Germany or Russia. (A stronger alliance with Romania seems to be one of the most immediately useful scenarios from both the Polish and Romanian perspectives in 1938/39, and Romania as it was played more into tricky political/diplomatic cooperation with Germany during war-time -albeit a potentially different context had Germany not invaded Poland or if Poland and their allies had stood united against any eventual invasion) Even if cultural and ideological grounds complicated matters, the Poles, Romanians, Slavic states, and potentially even further down into the Balkin region had common ground to share from a strategic standpoint against both Germany and Russia. The Western European countries had just Germany to worry about directly on their boarders and those separated by the sea had yet greater degrees of separation (plus France, in 1939 technically should have been highly resistant to invasion, logistically and strategically speaking, and fears over breakdown in coordination/communication weren't really present to drive serious concern of a looming invasion threat on the level of the countries stuck between Germany and the USSR). And Finland at least had mostly the USSR to worry about and a more secure route to supply/resources/aid to the west. 




> There already existed a non-aggression pact between Germany and poland, derived mainly from fear of Polish aggression on the one hand by Germany, and secondly by a fear of Soviet aggression by Poland on the other. But as Germany re-armed and gained strength, this marriage of convenience with Poland fell away in importance. Hitler had no interst in developing any sought of rapport with Poland after 1938. Hitlers main worry seems to have been that the Poles actually would accede to his demands and avoid war for the moment. He was tensing up because he was worried war would yet again be avoided. All this stuff came out in painful detail at Nuremberg as germany was indicted for actively seeking to wage aggressive war. Hitler loathed the whole concept of an independant Poland, loather its people, coveted its resources and hated them becuse of the innate threat they posed to German security during the Weimar republic days. Talk of an alliance with Poland is a daydream after 1938.


It seems what I was suggesting is exactly that: diplomatic dealings playing right into Hitler's concerns and delaying war further. Germany needed war to make war, and they couldn't sustain rearmament even at the pre-war pace they were moving at if they were forced to wait much longer. (while the rest of Europe would have more time to update their own defenses, let alone ability to retaliate) They might not have guessed all of Hitler's aspirations and motives, but there seems enough indicators to make reasonable guesses. (the only other factor to bet on was that delays would allow non German countries to expand their military potency more quickly than Germany could continue its own advancement, and a good enough understanding of Germany's economic situation to have some confidence in that -sort of a case where underestimating Germany's capabilities would be better than overestimating as predicting they would NOT outpace the surrounding nations would be a strong reason to force delays and non-aggression for as long as possible)

I have probably been confusing matters by even using the word 'alliance' in this context. I should have been more explicit in the context of broader diplomatic negotiations that avoided forcing immediate conflict. (still different than pure appeasement if the intentions were more strategic in mind and less passive isolationist) 




> If Germany had been prepred to enter an alliance with Poland, that would have destroyed any chance of a detente with Russia. Without Russian raw materials Germany was going to be in trouble economically very quickly....within months. A Germany floundering because of a lack of resources would have begun the exterminations in Poland earlier, not later as the Nazis began to look for ways to appease a resless and angry home front.


Not a direct counter to this, but in the alternate 1938/1939 context of a Polish-Soviet alliance (or economic partnership of SOME sort), it does indeed seem like access to Soviet raw materials would be the most practical advantage. Allowing Soviet troops to enter Poland would be strategically unwise, and Soviet aircraft of 1939 weren't more attractive than the variety of options from Western Europe. In either case, it would still be an unreliable and dangerous situation for Poland regardless of any posed cooperation with Russia or Germany. (neither could be trusted and neither were remotely practical options for genuine alliances, finicky diplomatic and trade negotiations were the most practical pre-war-extenuating options I can see)



> Absolutely. the British would impose sanction on the Poles if they sided with Germany. Anyone found to be treating with the enemy was subject to allied control commission attentions. Sanctions were applied to Russia until June 1941, also against Denmark, Vichy, Spain and italy in the lead up to war. Poland would have been forced into economic ruin if she followed that route.


I mean in 1939, before any military action was taken. Would an alliance (or more specifically, a particularly favorable diplomatic/economic agreement) with Germany put pressure on the UK to restrict trade to Poland and thus further weaken/delay Poland's own military build up and potential effective capability to resist or strike back against Soviet or German aggression.

The basic idea here is anticipating that Hitler and/or Stalin (or more likely, both) would eventually betray any real cooperation and support for peace or Polish independence and thus prepare for such betrayal as best as possible while also delaying it as long as possible with the aim to maximize strategic advantages.


Though in all of that, if they couldn't establish an alliance with at least Romania, their odds at resisting German and Russian conflict would be bad (unless there was some sort of coup, Hitler's hand would be forced sooner or later, and further delays may have even compelled him to make more intimate deals with Stalin for support of one sort or another, which would obviously be horrible).

In fact, I'd go back to my suggestion of Romania and Poland aiming at standardizing more of their manufacturing, including Poland focusing on a Gnome Rhone 14N license to compliment Romania's (and allow the P.24 to be produced with entirely domestic components -even if aluminum would still need to be imported). Either collaboration or competition on the PZL.50 and IAR 80 projects might have accelerated development of both (and some of the PZL.50's structural issues could have been avoided if the P.24's engine specifications had been focused on rather than making provisions for the heavier and more powerful 14N). Likewise, having both countries focus on a combination of Oerlikon FF and 7.92 mm Browning guns, possibly with additional introduction of 23 mm madsen cannons would also be exceptionally useful. (the PZL.37 seems to have had plenty of potential development as a potent medium bomber and recon aircraft too) I'm not sure if the Romanians would have had enough interest in the PZL.38 to be supportive of it or a similar, heavier design powered by Mercury or 14N engines.



I don't know much about the intricacies of Polish-Romanian politics, so maybe there was something big holding back cooperation there as well. (it at very least seems far more likely than a Polish-German or Polish-Soviet alliance) Honestly, outright avoiding strong relations with Germany in 1938 and focusing on gaining Romanian and Slavic support (and continued favorable trade with Western Europe) should have left Poland in a decently favorable position to ally with Finland as well. (allying with Russia in any way would have ruined much of those chances)


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 31, 2015)

On this off topic 1944/45 Soviet alliance line, I should acknowledge I've failed to address a wide number of compromises or middle ground regarding potential conditional surrender terms from Germany earlier, general Alliance management with Stalin, and different routes to take that would still have maintained Soviet support in the Pacific. (I believe it was Roosevelt alone that insisted on unconditional surrender, Stalin may have benefited from this in the end -at the expense of many of his own troops- but from what I understand he, along with Churchill were more willing to compromise on conditions of surrender with Germany and possibly end the war sooner without requiring a full out invasion force or the continued bombings in early 1945)


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## Balljoint (Jul 31, 2015)

kool kitty89 said:


> On this off topic 1944/45 Soviet alliance line, I should acknowledge I've failed to address a wide number of compromises or middle ground regarding potential conditional surrender terms from Germany earlier, general Alliance management with Stalin, and different routes to take that would still have maintained Soviet support in the Pacific. (I believe it was Roosevelt alone that insisted on unconditional surrender, Stalin may have benefited from this in the end -at the expense of many of his own troops- but from what I understand he, along with Churchill were more willing to compromise on conditions of surrender with Germany and possibly end the war sooner without requiring a full out invasion force or the continued bombings in early 1945)



This would have been viable if one of the several assassination attempts on Hitler’s life been successful. In fact it was a primary motivator for such plots. With Hitler in charge neither side would seem disposed towards a conditioned surrender.


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## parsifal (Jul 31, 2015)

Its true that if Hitler were removed, ther would been possibilities to avoid war. But after Hitlers betrayal at Munich, his true self was exposed and none except his own lackeys trusted him. Even the most die hard appeasement lobbyists were shocked into silence by his duplicity. Everybody opposed to him knew that they could never trust him. Even Stalin and Mussolini were wary in their dealings with him. None of the non-aligned, much less the regimes opposed to him were ever going to deal with Hitler on a statesman level again after Munich. Some have argued that britain in particular manipulated the situation to force Germany into acting out the aggressor nation. All nations engaged in that sort machiavellian scheming, its just that Nazi Germany had so much wrong with it that they were bound to get themselves into trouble sooner or later.

Without Hitler there would be no Nazi Party in power, and without the Nazis there would be no right wing revival. The most likely outcome of a "no Hitler scenario is a communist takeover in Germany. This would likley6 lead to civil war in Germany, but assuming the communists were able to hold on to a weakened germany, more disorganised, less well developed technologically, and with an army basically headless bewcause it officers were all dead, you get some interesting musings. This kinda leads to the same conclusion as the Nazi path.....sort of. A rise of communism would generate opposition in France and Britain, encirclement of Poland and an alliance between Germany and Russia to crush Poland. Then it gets interesting. What would Russia do with a fair um communist ally that was then at war with the west. I think she would come to her ally's aid, and from there a whole different war.


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## Timppa (Dec 23, 2015)

parsifal said:


> You, and your country are in no position to lecture me, or countries i identify with, in any way. You should just hang your head low and be thankful that we did win.



Yeah, Finns do not need to bow anybody, but perhaps Estonians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Polish, Rumanians, Bulgarians, Hungarians and the people of "East Germany" were the lucky ones of your "victory". Just ask them (from those left living).


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## klugi (Dec 23, 2015)

The original Puławski fighter, the PZL P.1, was constructed with a Hispano-Suiza liquid cooled V engine. The continuation of this line the P.8 was built with a Lorraine V12, the added weight of the coolant negated the reduction in drag and performance was on par with the P.7. The Rolls-Royce Kestrel was apparently considered for the PZL P.10 but the licencing fees were considerably high, this coupled with Puławski's death and the ministry's preference of radial engines spelled an end to this development line.


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## GrauGeist (Dec 23, 2015)

Timppa said:


> Yeah, Finns do not need to bow anybody, but perhaps Estonians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Polish, Rumanians, Bulgarians, Hungarians and the people of "East Germany" were the lucky ones of your "victory". Just ask them (from those left living).


I can tell you for a fact that Tsar Boris III, in an agreement with Hitler, never declared war on the Soviet Union and made sure that Bulgarian assets were not involved in any actions against the Soviet Union and was the only Axis nation to do this.

When the war was drawing to a close, Tsar Boris met with Stalin to draw a neutrality and ensured Stalin that the Bulgarians would expel the Germans out of Bulgaria proper.

Within a few hours after returning from the meeting, Boris died mysteriously and the Soviets tore through Bulgaria.

So "victory" or not, Stalin was just as determined as Hitler was, to occupy as much territory as he could get away with.


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## fastmongrel (Dec 23, 2015)

GrauGeist said:


> I can tell you for a fact that Tsar Boris III, in an agreement with Hitler, never declared war on the Soviet Union and made sure that Bulgarian assets were not involved in any actions against the Soviet Union and was the only Axis nation to do this.
> 
> When the war was drawing to a close, Tsar Boris met with Stalin to draw a neutrality and ensured Stalin that the Bulgarians would expel the Germans out of Bulgaria proper.
> 
> ...



Tsar Boris died after returning from a meeting with Hitler in August 43 and I dont think he ever met Stalin during the war. The Soviets invaded Bulgaria in September 1944.


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