# The Luftwaffe if Goering Died in WW1...



## lesofprimus (Nov 18, 2007)

So, what would the Luftwaffe have been like if Hermann Goering died during World War 1??? Would things have worked out differently???


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## syscom3 (Nov 18, 2007)

Probably not much would be different.

Hitler wanted lackeys in high places and micro manage where he wanted too.


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## pbfoot (Nov 18, 2007)

Udet had a better grip on things , he wanted change and believe he was trying to get a strategic component to the LW


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 18, 2007)

If Udet had been in charge I think the Luftwaffe would have been better. There might not have been the stupid requirements such as the He 177 having to be Dive Bomber Capable.

Udet also I believe might have gotten a Strategic Heavy Bomber program going sooner and maybe the Jets would have gone into service sooner.

Overall I dont think the conclusion would have changed. The Luftwaffe would not have been able to fight off all the allies and neither could the ground forces.

What would really interest me would be how the Battle of Britain would have played out. Any ideas?


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## FLYBOYJ (Nov 18, 2007)

How about Walther Wever fulfilling the role that Goering took had he not died in 1936?


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## pbfoot (Nov 18, 2007)

Forgot about Wever


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## FLYBOYJ (Nov 18, 2007)

Say Wever lived and fulfilled Goering's role the Luftwaffe might of had long range 4 engine bombers in quantity.


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## Micdrow (Nov 18, 2007)

Interesting question, Im not sure how to answer that one. Herman Goring had some good ideas and some bad ones. I think that at the wars end he was hooked on morophine which could have clouded his judgement due to an accident prior to the war if I remember right. 

Udet commited suicide during the war which shows that he was as unstable as the rest but he did have some good idea's also.

In the end I dont think either one would change the out come of the war but it would be interesting of you could some how play out both scenery's without the loss of life.


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## The Basket (Nov 18, 2007)

Goering was Hitlers successor and in charge of economics 

He had unlimited political and financial power to build up the Luftwaffe.

No other man could have done that and certainly no viable alternative could have had the driving force Goring had.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 18, 2007)

The Basket said:


> Goering was Hitlers successor and in charge of economics



No actually he was not. He sent a letter to Hitler proposing himself as the successor and Hitler found this to be disloyal.

On April 25, 1945 Hitler had Goering arrested by Bernhard Frank. Hitler had Goering expelled from the Nazi Party and removed him from all offices and titles that he held.

Hitler even gave orders to have Goering wife and daughter killed but Frank regected the order and they all retreated to a castle.

On April 26, 1945 Hitler even officially removed him as Head of the Luftwaffe.


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## Udet (Nov 18, 2007)

Nice to play with thoughts and ideas in this regard...

Had Göring died before WW2 chances are things could have fared somewhat better for the Luftwaffe. How come? Well, someone with a different personality and character could have held the position Göring did for WW2. I would not dare calling Göring "Hitler´s Lackey"...it gets boring when we are told it was only in Nazy Germany where the leader was surrounded by lackeys whose primary function was to protect and boost the ego of a lunatic erratic leader.

Göring was a very clever man, but his early succeses as head of the Luftwaffe lead him astray to a life of pleasure that made him lose contact with reality. Not that he would not issue opinions contradicting Hitler´s ideas, rather he became to lazy and unattached he did not seem to care all that much about anything.

What about General Wolfram von Richtofen? Repeat, what if General Wolfram von Richtofen had been at the leadership of the Luftwaffe from the outset?

In my view he is the epitome, the quintessential air force commander. Not only was von Richtofen a man with an intelligence out of the ordinary: he was utterly thorough when commanding his aerial force at the fronts. He always had a completely clear image of what was going in the front areas where he was operating. General Richtofen did not believe in "nasty surprises"; he was always one step ahead surprises; his forces would always perform thorough screenings of the enemy´s move, and not just that, he himself would fly his Fiesseler Torch plane in the area of operations. 

I do not think any other top ranking officer of either RAF or USAAF can come close to match the style of this man.

He was the very first high ranking official that pointed out supplying the cut off 6th Army at Stalingrad from the air belonged in the realm of fantasy.

Also, he was one of the very first officials in the armed forces to send Berlin prompt and timely reports on the assembly of Red Army forces northwest of Stalingrad during October/November 1942...the "black clouds" in the horizon that in the end would storm the sectors guarded by ill-equipped Romanians and other axis minors having the 6th Army trapped as a result.

It should be interesting to know that the very first German armed forces which engaged and attacked the Red Army forces assemblying for the winter offensive which would encircle the 6th Army were precisely the Stukas of von Richtofen. -In one of those incidents, the Stukas of Richtofen nearly killed political agitator and supreme war criminal Nikita Krushchev who was paying a visit to the tank forces assembly in the area-.

Had his reports and warnings been accepted by Hitler chances are Stalingrad would have had a very different end.

It would have been interesting to see Richtofen commanding the Luftwaffe during 1944 against the onslaught of the USAAF. From this scenario i´d expect at minimum a much wiser use of Luftwaffe resources. Too bad he was already retired due to health issues during 1944.

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## syscom3 (Nov 18, 2007)

Udet said:


> ....
> I do not think any other top ranking officer of either RAF or USAAF can come close to match the style of this man.
> ...1944.



Arnold was among the greatest generals of the air war. Chenault and Kenny were also two extremely capable generals that operated in the frame of reference that youre reffering too.


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## FLYBOYJ (Nov 18, 2007)

Udet, I agree 100% about Richthofen.


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## Freebird (Nov 18, 2007)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> If Udet had been in charge I think the Luftwaffe would have been better. There might not have been the stupid requirements such as the He 177 having to be Dive Bomber Capable.
> 
> Udet also I believe might have gotten a Strategic Heavy Bomber program going sooner and maybe the Jets would have gone into service sooner.
> 
> ...



The Battle of Britain was a whole new type of war that had never occured before. Goering was not the "goat" on this battle that many make him out to be. Remember that the key air fleet "Luftflotte 2" (HQ Brussels) was commanded by Kesselring, one of the most capable LW generals. The order to begin bombing London was given by Hitler himself, (Sept 7) the beginning of the "Blitz" which ended any chance of the Germans knocking out the SE British airfields (key to any successful attempt at Sealion)

However, the Germans had hoped that the devastation in London would force the British to negotiate peace. This was not as unreasonable as it sounds today, as the Germans had just defeated the French nation, who collapsed astoundingly quickly .


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## The Basket (Nov 19, 2007)

oops...Goering was Hitlers intended successor...with Hess third. I will find the Hitler decree when I finish work.

Slip of the keyboard.


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## Soundbreaker Welch? (Nov 19, 2007)

Goering got punished by Hitler in 1945 as badly as Herring did in "The Great Dictator."

And I thought that was comedy.

I had never heard of General Wolfram von Richtofen, but it sounds like he was very good.


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## Kurfürst (Nov 19, 2007)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> If Udet had been in charge I think the Luftwaffe would have been better. There might not have been the stupid requirements such as the He 177 having to be Dive Bomber Capable.



??? Udet was basically the Luftwaffe`s greatest 'fan' of dive bombers (which wasn`t a bad idea at all, it gave the LW it`s most iconic, and very successfull Ju 87 I might add), an idea he embraced after a visit to the US. So overall I believe with Udet at the steering wheel, such operational requirements would only receive encouregment from the high brass.



DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Overall I dont think the conclusion would have changed. The Luftwaffe would not have been able to fight off all the allies and neither could the ground forces.



I agree. Basically what the Germans would need is a good deal of foresight and predict what was coming to them in 1944 (easy to say..); perhaps if they`d gave high priority for fighter production and prepeare for stragetic air defense in early 1943, thing would have been _somewhat_ different _in the air_. But the war was lost _on the ground_, not in the air.



> What would really interest me would be how the Battle of Britain would have played out [if the LW had heavy bombers]. Any ideas?



I don`t think it would be that much different. The driving idea behind medium bomber programs in the 1930s was the realisation that a large medium bomber fleet can be built up more quickly and in sufficient numbers from scratch. If two medium bombers, which could carry half the bombload could be built for the time/materials (or even less) than required for for one heavy bomber, than it was a reasonable and logical choice, and it gave the Third Reich`s leaders a potent deterrent force in their political manouvers. In the end it resulted in the LW having the most potent bomber force in the world by the start of the war, so I think the decision was right. It would have not made things much different if the LW would send 300 heavy bombers over England with 6 tons of bombs on each than if it would send 900 medium bombers with 2 tons of bomb on each - except that mass attacks are always more difficult to repell than attacks of small formations. The advantage of the heavy bomber is not that it carries more bombs (given cost-effectiveness, the 2-3 mediums built for the same money will do the same), but that it could carry a reasonable bombload _to longer distances_. Distance was, however, not a factor in 1940 for the Germans, and, if I may add, _no airforce in the world had a meaningful force of heavy bombers in 1939/40_. The RAF`s BC for example was largely made up by a light Blenheims and medium Wellingtons and Hampdens. The Russians maybe had a couple of Pe-8s by that time?, and the B-17 was originally a_ long range _maritime _medium_ bomber. Heavy bombers were few and far between.

Their heavy bomber program developments started in due time, but the He 177 was a technically too ambitious and advanced project, that took a more time to be perfected than a more conventional design; the LW weren`t as hard pressed for a heavy bomber as the Western Allies, either, who were motivated by the need for a tool that could deliver sufficient tools _from British bases_ to Germany, ie. considerably longer distances than the LW`s operational targets in the East, Africa or the West, all of which lay in easily reachable distances for medium bombers. In the end, the reason that killed the German heavy bomber project just as it started to kick in by early 1944 when meaningful numbers of 177s appeared in service, were not directly rooted in the LW`s decisions, but the changing favours of fortune in the air war : massive Allied fleets attacking the _Reich_ called for fighters, not bombers. This fate of the He 177 was shared by all German bombers.

Göring didn`t pull too much strings after the war started; the actual work was done by his rather capble subordinates like Milch, Saur and the various Generals of the bombers/fighters etc. Initially, Göring`s politcal influence was certainly very useful for the LW getting as much resources as it did, of all the Army, Navy and Air Force, it was the latter that was in the best shape as the war started.


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## Njaco (Nov 19, 2007)

Kurfurst, you beat me to it. Udet was the reason that Germany was fixated on dive-bombing.

How about this? Goering dead. Udet pushing his Dive-bomber and Wever pushing for 4 engine (I'll say "Ural Bomber") aircraft. What direction would Germany have gone with those 2 opposing sides?

and for Soundbreaker...

Dr. Ing. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen

GenMaj 1.11.38, 
General der Flieger 19.7.40, 
GenOb 1.2.42, 
Generalfeldmarschall 16.2.43

1.4.38 - 31.10.38 Kommandeur KG257 
1.11.38 - 18.7.39 Befehlshaber des Führungsstabes der Legion-Condor 
19.7.39 - 2.10.39 Kommandeur Fliegerführer z.b.V. 
3.10.39 - 30.6.42 Kommandeur VIII. Fliegerkorps 
4.7.42 - 6.43 Oberbefehlshaber Luftflotte 4* 
26.6.43 - 27.10.44 Oberbefehlshaber Luftflotte 2** 
28.11.44 - 12.7.45 Führerreserve OKL and US P.O.W. 

* also Befehlshaber Südost
** was in the unusual position of being in command of two Luftflotten at the same time.

On sickleave 27.10.44 - 27.11.44

The Luftwaffe, 1933-45


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## The Basket (Nov 19, 2007)

Udet only joined the Luftwaffe at Goerings insistence so without Goering then maybe no Udet.

The Luftwaffe was very good in 1940. But this was because of Goering and his considerable power. 

Richtofen would be a good choice...especially with that name. But would he have the ear of Hitler and the power? Probably not.

Goering pushed the Luftwaffe in competition of funds against the army. He always had the final vote.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 19, 2007)

freebird said:


> The Battle of Britain was a whole new type of war that had never occured before. Goering was not the "goat" on this battle that many make him out to be. Remember that the key air fleet "Luftflotte 2" (HQ Brussels) was commanded by Kesselring, one of the most capable LW generals. The order to begin bombing London was given by Hitler himself, (Sept 7) the beginning of the "Blitz" which ended any chance of the Germans knocking out the SE British airfields (key to any successful attempt at Sealion)
> 
> However, the Germans had hoped that the devastation in London would force the British to negotiate peace. This was not as unreasonable as it sounds today, as the Germans had just defeated the French nation, who collapsed astoundingly quickly .



You are absolutely correct, however I firmly believe that someone who might not have been such a lackey to Hitler might have tried to convince Hitler to do things differently.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 19, 2007)

Kurfürst said:


> ??? Udet was basically the Luftwaffe`s greatest 'fan' of dive bombers (which wasn`t a bad idea at all, it gave the LW it`s most iconic, and very successfull Ju 87 I might add), an idea he embraced after a visit to the US. So overall I believe with Udet at the steering wheel, such operational requirements would only receive encouregment from the high brass.



I certainly agree with you but I am talking about aircraft such as the He 177.



Kurfurst said:


> I agree. Basically what the Germans would need is a good deal of foresight and predict what was coming to them in 1944 (easy to say..); perhaps if they`d gave high priority for fighter production and prepeare for stragetic air defense in early 1943, thing would have been _somewhat_ different _in the air_. But the war was lost _on the ground_, not in the air.



Agreed


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## The Basket (Nov 19, 2007)

The reason the He 177 failed is because it was designed to be a dive bomber.

Ernst Hienkel said himself that all the Greifs problems were the dive bombing requirement and blamed Udet for it. 

Hitler was not the type to be persuaded! Some Luftwaffe pilots wanted an attack on London because it would draw up the Raf.

How much did Goering do day to day in the Luftwaffe? not much I wager!


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## Lucky13 (Nov 19, 2007)

Here's another question about the Luftwaffe, I don't know if it would have done much of a difference, but anyhoo.....

What if Werner Mölders hadn't been killed in that accident caused by a thunderstorm on 22 November 1941, would it have affected the Luftwaffe as he was Inspector General of Fighters in a different way compared to Adolf Galland? Would they still have a mutiny in '45?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 19, 2007)

The Basket said:


> The reason the He 177 failed is because it was designed to be a dive bomber.
> 
> Ernst Hienkel said himself that all the Greifs problems were the dive bombing requirement and blamed Udet for it.
> 
> ...



I allways new that Udet was a big supporter of the Dive Bomber but I thought it was Goering who forbade Heinkel from designing a 4 engined version because he wanted it capable of dive bombing.


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## AL Schlageter (Nov 19, 2007)

The Basket said:


> The reason the He 177 failed is because it was designed to be a dive bomber.


The dive bombing was an extra requirement on top of its regular duty as a level bomber.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 19, 2007)

Yes but one of the reasons that they did not want Heinkel to develop it with 4 engines in 4 nacelleswas because they did not believe it could dive bomb with 4 engines in 4 nacelles.

Atleast that is one of things I have allways read about the He 177.


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## merlin (Nov 19, 2007)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Yes but one of the reasons that they did not want Heinkel to develop it with 4 engines in 4 nacelleswas because they did not believe it could dive bomb with 4 engines in 4 nacelles.
> 
> At least that is one of things I have allways read about the He 177.



I agree, if it had been designed and built at the start as a conventional four-engined bomber, it would have been a good aircraft, and got into service much earlier.

Very surprised at the favourable comments on Udet! The man was a clown!
As E. R. Hooton writes in 'Eagle in Flames the Fall of the Luftwaffe'
"The doyen of the Geat War aces, Udet wwas a brilliant barnstormer who flirted briefly with production, lost interest and watched his company absorbed by the Bayerische Flugzeugwerk. His new position reuired dedication, athorough knowledge of the aircraft industry and th ablilty to comprehend the potential of new technology - all features lacking from Udets character."

Goering was good at politics but IMO not a lot else, little appreciation of strategy or tactics. He did little in the BoB, which in the main was Kesselring against Park - where the latter proved the better, and to prove it wasn't a fluke did it again in Malta.

Though some differ, I think it had the potential to make a difference - if Wever was still around to develop the Do-19. If, for example the Lw had no Do-17's but yes had Do-19, yes fewer in number. But fewer no's mean fewer pilots to train, fewer airfields to service. In service a four-engined bomber under attack will fly longer than a twin-engined aircraft - especially against rifle calibre machine guns of the Spitfires Hurricanes.

With wever running the strategy and Milch sorting out the production, the Luftwaffe would have been a lot more effective.


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## Freebird (Nov 19, 2007)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> You are absolutely correct, however I firmly believe that someone who might not have been such a lackey to Hitler might have tried to convince Hitler to do things differently.



You know, upon more thought I think you may have been right, another commander could have won the BoB, *IF* they had a good plan on how to do it. I don't know enough about Udet, Kesselring or others, to know how they would have handled it.

The problem the Germans had in the BoB is that this was all new territory, I think it might be difficult for ANYONE to correctly determine the best strategy. They were also against some tight time constraints, as after "Alder Tag" (Eagle day - Aug 13) they would have only 40 - 50 days before the Autumn storms would make a channel crossing impossible. The Germans would try something for a few days, if it did not seem to be working, they could not keep trying for a few weeks, they would try something else.

At first they tried bombing the Radar towers, but after several days this did not seem to have an effect, the RAF were still scrambling to meet the LW. What the Goering did not know was that they HAD knocked out part of the radar net, but the British had developed a system of coast-watchers, who would call in the # and type of LW planes that crossed the channel, so they still had some advanced warning. 

Next he concentrated on knocking the S.E. airfields out of action, this did have some effect, although they could not know exactly how much, as the RAF would still intercept the bombers. The Germans were losing a large # of bombers, so Goering ordered the fighters to concentrate on escorting the bombers more closely. This turned out to be an error, the LW fighters were more effective when intercepting RAF fighters, not tied down with escort duties. But it would be hard not to make the order that he did, considering that the bomber pilots were crying out for more support.

The Sept 6 order to let up on the airfields and begin the "Blitz" was another big mistake, but at the time it was hoped that the terror would make the Brits "come to their senses" and negotiate a truce. That was what Hitler would really prefer.

The biggest error though was the 28 days that were allowed to pass from Hitlers War Directive # 16 on July 16 1940, (desruction of the RAF to prepare for Sealion) and "Alder Tag". During this time the LW only made some minor attacks on British shipping in the channel, and allowed the RAF Fighter Command to build up again after Dunkirk. If the Germans had attacked the RAF during this month, they could probably have won contol over SE Britain. 

The British fighter strength at the time of the final British evacuation from France (June 18 1940) was about 300, of which about 260 were Spitfires Hurricanes. (about 40 more were the obsolete Gladiators Defiants). There were also about 70 night fighters (Blenhiem Is). The British production was about 250 fighters per month, so by Aug 13 (Alder Tag) there were about 650 - 700 day-fighters, + about 80 or so Blenheims. I have checked 3 sources and none of them agree about the exact number of RAF fighters, if anyone else has more detailed #s please post them.

I think that an immediate attack on the RAF at the end of June would have had the best chance of success.


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## Udet (Nov 19, 2007)

As i did say, with a man like Wolfram von Richtofen in command of the Luftwaffe, say, for the year of 1944 when the big aerial onslaught in the west was on its way, i see a more efficient allocation and utilization of the resources of the overstretched Luftwaffe.

A significant difference i see occurring with Richtofen at the controls is that that the bulk of the Jagdwaffe would instead have been committed to support the Wehrmacht and not to intercept/attack the numerous USAAF heavy bomber streams.

Saving the lives of innocent German civilians that would get killed by the thousands by enemy bombers was a noble plausible task for sure, but in my view it was not there where the war priorities were...the civilian population of the time was extremely resilient and there is no evidence to suggest any sort of civilian uprising came close to occur due to extenuation during those dark days of 1944 and 1945 when the heavies of both Spaatz and "Civilian Bomber" Harris gutted some major German cities.

From this idea i´d expect a response in the direction that might suggest if the large number of B-17s and B-24s that were shot down by the Luftwaffe carry on with their bombing runs -because less enemy fighters are committed to intercept them- then the damage caused to the German military industry -and civilians- is of course far greater, something that would still cause the war to have a very similar duration.

I would not think so. 

With a greater number of Fw 190s and Bf 109s supporting the Wehrmacht during 1944, i see the allied advance on continental europe even slower than it was. Who knows, Paris is not taken until early 1945... but more importantly, now the truly heavy losses the USA would be suffering belong in the army, and not precisely in the ranks of the 8th Air Force, and high losses are -as i have suggested many times in the past- a significant issue in the military of the USA.

From the small number of Luftwaffe fighters committed to deal with heavy bombers, one can expect the skilled performance of Luftwaffe controllers to vector those few fighters to slam in the proper moment and still cause significant losses.

The flights of P-51s and P-47s are for sure committed to the sectors where the bulk of the German fighters are operating. So we would have the same bloody aerial battles taking place but this time right over the heads of the Panzer Lehr, 12 SS.Pz.Gr and other powerful German units in Normandy and not in the high skies over Europe.

The Wehrmacht units deployed to deal with the D-day offensive, and their supply lines, suffered critical delays due to the action of RAF and USAAF planes. With a significant part of the Jagdwaffe involved in this front, one can expect the delays to be less significant in their impact, enabling thus the Heer to arrive to the front sectors in a stronger position. It´s also possible to suggest that with the presence of friendly planes in numbers over their heads, the soldiers of an army are injected with a plus in terms of morale and performance.

Also, near the deck, the Fw-190s give the P-51s a more bitter time during the fight.

Slowing the western allied advance on continental Europe within this scenario could also bring posstive effects with regard to the eastern front.

I do not see the British, U.S. and allied armies reaching the German border before the end of 1944...so perhaps the futile Ardennes Offensive is not even seriously contemplated, so more German forces are available for launching against the soviets who were overbled and exhausted.


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## AL Schlageter (Nov 20, 2007)

You can't be serious Udet. You are robbing Peter to pay Paul.

The USAAF *alone* in the ETO had just under 9000 combat planes on hand and just under 4500 combat planes on hand in the MTO. You are looking at close to 20,000 combat planes when the RAF is included.

Even fully fueled P-51s which were sitting on the runway waiting to takeoff had good success against the LW fighters during Bodenplatte. These LW fighters didn't even carry bombs, yet you expect bomb laden fighters to slow the Allied advance. How are these bomb laden LW fighters to take off with an Allied aluminum air umbrella over their bases?

Basically you are allowing the _heavies_ to roam at will over occupied Europe. That means your German transportation system would be wrecked sooner (so much for the re-supply of your German troops at the front), airbases would be bombed into the stone age forcing those units based on those bases to pull back further from the front allowing more time for interception by RAF and USAAF fighters of the slow unwieldy LW fighter bombers and their escorts, and more precise bombing of your German war industries.

You expect significant _heavy_ losses with fewer LW fighters when larger numbers could not? Fewer LW fighters attacking the _heavies_ means less escorts required.

The RAF and USAAF dealt quite easily with attempts by the LW to slow the Allied advance. A few more LW planes would just decimate the LW sooner than it was historically and quicken the collapse of Nazi Germany.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 20, 2007)

freebird said:


> You know, upon more thought I think you may have been right, another commander could have won the BoB, *IF* they had a good plan on how to do it. I don't know enough about Udet, Kesselring or others, to know how they would have handled it.
> 
> The problem the Germans had in the BoB is that this was all new territory, I think it might be difficult for ANYONE to correctly determine the best strategy. They were also against some tight time constraints, as after "Alder Tag" (Eagle day - Aug 13) they would have only 40 - 50 days before the Autumn storms would make a channel crossing impossible. The Germans would try something for a few days, if it did not seem to be working, they could not keep trying for a few weeks, they would try something else.
> 
> ...



I am certainly not saying Udet would have done any better but they needed a Military Commander and not a Politician in the position.


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## Freebird (Nov 20, 2007)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> I am certainly not saying Udet would have done any better but they needed a Military Commander and not a Politician in the position.


I agree with that, there were bad political decisions made by both sides. I think Pearl Harbour could be considered as one. The Greek intervention by the British was another.

During July 1940 Hitler was really trying to sign an armistice with the British, he knew that the KM was not prepared for a cross-channel invasion. But this delay killed their chance to invade.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 20, 2007)

freebird said:


> I agree with that, there were bad political decisions made by both sides. I think Pearl Harbour could be considered as one. The Greek intervention by the British was another.
> 
> During July 1940 Hitler was really trying to sign an armistice with the British, he knew that the KM was not prepared for a cross-channel invasion. But this delay killed their chance to invade.



I saw an interesting documentary on German TV the other day about how the Nazi Party used the occult and astrologists to make some of there most political and strategic war time decisions.

That was pretty crazy.


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## The Basket (Nov 20, 2007)

Udet said:


> A significant difference i see occurring with Richtofen at the controls is that that the bulk of the Jagdwaffe would instead have been committed to support the Wehrmacht and not to intercept/attack the numerous USAAF heavy bomber streams.
> 
> Saving the lives of innocent German civilians that would get killed by the thousands by enemy bombers was a noble plausible task for sure, but in my view it was not there where the war priorities were...the civilian population of the time was extremely resilient and there is no evidence to suggest any sort of civilian uprising came close to occur due to extenuation during those dark days of 1944 and 1945 when the heavies of both Spaatz and "Civilian Bomber" Harris gutted some major German cities.
> 
> ...



The whole purpose of an air force is to defend the homeland. To allow the deaths of your own civilians is amazing.


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## comiso90 (Nov 20, 2007)

I recently found out that Goering's nephew was a B-17 pilot over Germany..

48 missions!

Werner G. Goering Crew

Werner Goering was born and raised in Salt Lake City, the young Goering spoke fluent German. After an extensive background check, he was assigned to the 303rd Bombardment Group -- Hell's Angels -- of the 8th Air Force, based at Molesworth, England.[1] This fact was kept secret by the Army Air Force during the time that young Goering flew missions against Nazi Germany. However, the AAF still assigned him a "uniquely qualified" co-pilot -- First Lt. Jack P. Rencher. Rencher was given orders to shoot him if he ever tried to land in Germany. According to Rencher, however, the only time young Goering wasn't eager to rain destruction on Nazi Germany was when he had to bomb Cologne, where his grandmother lived. "He was neat, clean, a sharp dresser and in every sense military minded," Rencher said. "While I served with him he and I got along well together and I believe made an excellent team. I know of no one I would rather serve as copilot with."


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## Udet (Nov 20, 2007)

AL Schlageter said:


> You can't be serious Udet. You are robbing Peter to pay Paul.
> 
> The USAAF *alone* in the ETO had just under 9000 combat planes on hand and just under 4500 combat planes on hand in the MTO. You are looking at close to 20,000 combat planes when the RAF is included.
> 
> ...



"your German transportation system..", "of your German troops at the front...", why is it that this style in tone seems so familiar to me...

I am as serious as one can be if referring to situations that did not occur.

Your assertion here is infatuated by the fact it is based on the deeply rooted notion nothing the Germans might have done would made any significant difference.

In the months previous to D-day, RAF and USAAF fighters committed to ground attack missions inflicted very low losses to German armored and infantry units moving toward the front. Allied fighters claimed a number of panzers and other AFV´s destroyed during this time that did not even exist in the German order of battle. Reading Niklas Zetterling´s works might be of help.

I will refrain myself from saying "your allied planes", but anyway, the fact is all that overwhelming aerial superiority of the allied air forces over Normandy proved inadequate and uncapable to severe the German flow of reinforcements to the battle front. Hope this helps a bit in the effort of clearing your mental issues.

Their main achievement was to cause critical delays in the German moves; many times German columns would advance only at night, and if advancing during daytime, the slightest warning of enemy planes approaching would cause a prompt manouver to move off the road and remain hiding for as long as enemy planes roamed the sector.

Bringing the bulk of the aerial fight close to the deck implies a higher risk not only for the German fighters as you seem to believe...allied fighters, no matter their numbers, are now exposed to Flak batteries assigned to armored columns, and, again, the greater manouvering of the Fw 190s near the deck.

Also i did never say all German fighters would be "jabos" in this scenario. Some are "jabos" while a number would fly free fighter missions in the sector.

I said that since the bulk of the Jagdwaffe is committed for supporting the Wehrmacht, the fighters of the USAAF are deployed accordingly...if you bother to read what i said, nowhere it is suggested USAAF fighters remain committed to escort bomber streams in the numbers records show they did since there are not that too many German fighters trying to hit the bombers.

Your prediction this hypothetical scenario would have had an even greater disaster for the Luftwaffe does not hold any water to say the least. Since it is not being suggested the Germans achieve anything like "complete victory" in such scenario, suggesting the allied air forces have an even "easier" job here seems rubbish.

Also, the bombers do not roam at will...they still have to make their way through the Flak lines of the Reich, including the fighter force that would still be committed for bomber interception duties.

This is one of those times when making clarifications seems an awkward experiece.

I am saying it is Wolfram von Richtofen in command; a man with a strong tough and ruthless personality with a clear vision of business. Forget about Adolf Galland.

By suggesting the idea it would be Richtofen a change in "style" comes along with the package. Revamping deployment of fighters to their bases, Flak defences become stronger...

Luftwaffe controllers proved their worth several times during 1944 vectoring a German fighter force that would gut a heavy bomber formation. 

The RAF and USAAF dealt "easily" with the Luftwaffe efforts to slow their advance for a very simple reason Mr. Schlageter: there was no serious attempt carried out during 1944.

Now this visions that during Bodenplatte we had Mustangs shooting down Bf 109s and Fw 190s while still on the ground seems like more of the allied mythology that has been served on our plates for too long now. If someday i come across accounts suggesting P-51 pilots "shot down" german fighters resorting only to poontang i can say i will not be surprised.


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## Bf109_g (Nov 20, 2007)

That is an interesting article you have there, Comiso. I wonder what would have happened if he _had_ landed in Germany?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 20, 2007)

comiso90 said:


> I recently found out that Goering's nephew was a B-17 pilot over Germany..
> 
> 48 missions!
> 
> ...



Yeah I found that out a few weeks ago and thought it was really neat. I posted something about in another thread.


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## comiso90 (Nov 20, 2007)

For me the kicker is 43 missions! That's a bunch..

I wonder if there any documented comments by Uncle Herman concerning the matter?

.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 20, 2007)

Im not sure. A cousin or nephew of his also was involved with helping Jews and everythind hide and escape.


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## comiso90 (Nov 20, 2007)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Im not sure. A cousin or nephew of his also was involved with helping Jews and everythind hide and escape.



Was that known during the war?


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## The Basket (Nov 20, 2007)

Albert Goering...he was Hermanns brother. He saved many jews using the family name.

Hermann must have known...I think.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 21, 2007)

Yeah thats him Basket. Goering apparantly new and even helped him in some cases. That Herman Goering helped him in some cases cant be verified I think. 

Here is a bit of info:







_"Albert Göring

Albert Göring (1900 - 1966) was a German businessman, notable for helping Jews and dissidents survive in Germany during World War II. His older brother Hermann Göring held the rank of Reich Marshal of Nazi Germany and was a convicted war criminal.

Early life
Göring was born near Mauterndorf to a former cavalry officer and German consul general in Haiti Heinrich Ernst Göring and his wife Franziska "Fanny" Tiefenbrunn (1859-July 15, 1923), who came from a Bavarian peasant family. Among his paternal ancestors were the Eberle/Eberlin, a Swiss-German family who were Jewish converts to Christianity in the 15th century. Goring was a relative of numerous descendants of the Eberle/Eberlin in Switzerland and Germany, among them German Counts Zeppelin, including aviation pioneer Ferdinand von Zeppelin; German nationalistic art historian Hermann Grimm (author of concept of the German hero as a mover of history that was embraced by the Nazis); the great Swiss historian of art and cultural, political, and social thinker Jacob Burckhardt; Swiss diplomat, historian, and President of International Red Cross Carl J. Burckhardt; the Merck family, the owners of the German pharmaceutical giant Merck; major German Catholic writer and poet Gertrud von LeFort. (See Wolfgang Paul, "Wer war Hermann Goring. Biographie," Esslingen: Bechtle Verlag, 1983, p. 33.)

The Göring family lived with their children’s aristocratic godfather of Jewish heritage, Ritter Hermann von Epenstein, in his Veldenstein and Mauterndorf castles. Von Epenstein was a prominent physician and acted as a surrogate father to the children as Heinrich Göring was often absent from the family home. Göring was one of five children, his brothers were Hermann Göring and Karl Ernst Göring; his sisters were Olga Therese Sophia and Paula Elisabeth Rosa Göring, the last of whom were children of his father's first marriage[1].

According to the author Leonard Mosley, who had interviewed Göring family members, von Epenstein began a long-term affair with Franziska Göring about a year before Albert's birth. Mosley also states that the strong physical resemblance between von Epenstein and Albert Göring led many people to believe that they were father and son. If this belief is correct, then Albert Göring had a Jewish paternal grandfather.

Anti-Nazi activity

Göring seemed to have acquired his godfather's character as a bon vivant and looked set to lead an unremarkable life as a filmmaker, until the Nazis came to power in 1933. Unlike his older brother Hermann, who was a leading party member, Albert Göring despised Nazism and the brutality that it involved. On one occasion he is reported to have gotten down on his hands and knees and joined a group of Jews who were being forced to scrub the street; the SS officer in charge, unwilling to see Hermann Göring's brother publicly humiliated, ordered the street scrubbing to stop.[citation needed]

Albert Göring also used his influence to get his Jewish former boss Oskar Pilzer freed after the Nazis had arrested him. Göring then helped Pilzer and his family escape from Germany. He is reported to have done the same for many other dissidents.[citation needed]

Göring intensified his anti-Nazi activity when he was made export director at the Skoda Works in Czechoslovakia. Here, he encouraged minor acts of sabotage and had contact with the Czech resistance. On many occasions, Göring forged his brother's signature on transit documents to enable dissidents to escape. When he was caught, he used his brother's influence to get himself released. Göring also sent trucks to Nazi concentration camps with requests for labour. These trucks would then stop in an isolated area, and their passengers would be allowed to escape.[citation needed]

After the war, Albert Göring was questioned during the Nuremberg Tribunal. However many of the people whom he had helped testified on his behalf, and he was released. Soon afterwards, Göring was arrested by the Czechs but was once again freed when the full extent of his activities became known.

Late life
Göring then returned to Germany but found himself shunned because of his family name. He found occasional work as a writer and translator, living in a modest flat far from the baronial splendour of his childhood. Prior to his death, Göring was living on a pension from the government. He knew that if he was married, the pension would transfer to his wife after his death. As a sign of gratitude, Göring married his housekeeper so she could receive his pension and not have to work anymore. One week later, he died in 1966, without having his wartime activities publicly acknowledged."_

Albert GÃ¶ring - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## AL Schlageter (Nov 21, 2007)

What other conclusion can a person reach Udet for when reading your posts one sees snide and uncomplimentary comments with regards to the Allies and the Germans are always the best. ie "Civilian Bomber" Harris, and the quote below. Then there is your personal comments. ie 'clearing your mental issues'.



> Now this visions that during Bodenplatte we had Mustangs shooting down Bf 109s and Fw 190s while still on the ground seems like more of the allied mythology that has been served on our plates for too long now. If someday i come across accounts suggesting P-51 pilots "shot down" german fighters resorting only to poontang i can say i will not be surprised.


Read the passage again Udet. 12 P-51s of the 352FG were waiting to take off to escort some P-47s of the 266FG. Read *Bodenplatte* Chap 7, Dogfight over Auch. Those bomb laden P-47s, at low level, had good success against the LW fighters and we all know what a dog the P-47 was at low level.

One only has to read the casualty list from Bodenplatte to see how the LW would have faired in your 'what if' scenario and this with the RAF and USAAF taken by surprise.



> Luftwaffe controllers proved their worth several times during 1944 vectoring a German fighter force that would gut a heavy bomber formation.


Only several times? That leaves very very many times they did not.



> Also, the bombers do not roam at will...they still have to make their way through the Flak lines of the Reich, including the fighter force that would still be committed for bomber interception duties.


The flak lines were breached anyways. Did you not say the interceptor force would be reduced in numbers. You forget that when it is said 600 escorts flew a bomber escort mission not all 600 were with the bombers at the same time. Only a 1/4 to 1/3 were and they did not have that much trouble with the larger number of LW fighters that tried to attack the bombers.

So yes, the bombers were basically free to roam all over Germany at will.



> I said that since the bulk of the Jagdwaffe is committed for supporting the Wehrmacht, the fighters of the USAAF are deployed accordingly...if you bother to read what i said, nowhere it is suggested USAAF fighters remain committed to escort bomber streams in the numbers records show they did since there are not that too many German fighters trying to hit the bombers.


Did you miss where I said less escorts would be required? That leaves those taken from escort duty to flying CAP over LW fighter airfields. Now that means a LW CAP over the bases and less LW fighters closer to the front.

You seem to think the Allies would not change their tactics in your 'what if' scenario. As I said, the bases these LW fighters were based at would be destroyed forcing the fighters further back just like was done to the 262 bases. That gives more time for interception and destruction.

You have yet to say where these fighters, jabos and especially, adequately trained pilots would come from.

As you said in your 'what if' von R does not show up til 1944.



> As i did say, with a man like Wolfram von Richtofen in command of the Luftwaffe, say, for the year of 1944 when the big aerial onslaught in the west was on its way, i see a more efficient allocation and utilization of the resources of the overstretched Luftwaffe.



You also forget that USAAF tactics changed in early 1944 from defending the bombers to actively going after LW fighters. Your 'what if' scenario would be an aid to the Allies.



> The RAF and USAAF dealt "easily" with the Luftwaffe efforts to slow their advance for a very simple reason Mr. Schlageter: there was no serious attempt carried out during 1944.


No serious attempt, then why the transfer of LW units to the west which were decimated?

Now lets look at what the LW had.

The Luftwaffe on the Eve of Overlord, 31 May 44
Serviceable Aircraft Strengths
Single-engined fighters	1063
Twin-engined fighters	151
Night fighters	572
Fighter-bombers	278
Ground-attack aircraft	352
Night harassment aircraft	305
Twin-engined bombers	840
Four-engined bombers	97
Long-range reconaissance aircraft	153
Short-range and army cooperation aircraft	210
Coastal aircraft	123
Transport aircraft	719
Kampfgeschwader 200 (misc. aircraft	65
Total	4928

For argument sake, lets say 1/4 of the fighters were on the EF and 1/8 were on Defense of the Reich. That leaves only ~625 fighter for your 'what if' against some 3000 USAAF fighter and whatever the RAF had (1000?).

To take this further, that ~625 would be reduced by those LW fighters flying CAP over their bases. Your 'what if' puts more Allied fighters in contact with the LW hastening it destruction.

Where does the replacement fighters and pilots come from? The EF? That allows the Soviets to advance quicker and results in an earlier defeat for Nazi Germany.



> the soviets who were overbled and exhausted


Not so in 1944. All one has to do is look at a map and see the vast territory the Soviets retook til Apr 1945.


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## plan_D (Nov 21, 2007)

I just wish the German units on the ground the best of luck when unintercepted heavy formations decided to off-load into their jumping off zones.


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## timshatz (Nov 21, 2007)

Think we might want to distinguish between a Leader/Manager and a Combat Leader when figuring what would've happened to the Lufwaffe if Herman had died in the First World War. A good example of the right people in the right places would've been the US Army in WW2. 

A farsighted Leader/Manager such as Marshall would've been a very effective head of the Lufwaffe. A person at that level has a to have extensive organizational skills to succeed. Hence the manager part. Milch was a good organizer, but I doubt he had the personality to make it as the head of the Luftwaffe. But he did revamp production after Udet's death, re-evaluated projects in the works and generally made things more efficient. But, as noted, I doubt he had the interactive ability to inspire personel by example or leadership skills.

As for Combat Leaders, the Luftwaffe had plenty of them, many already named. The Patton/Bradley types were well available. One that comes to mind right away is Josef Kammhuber. Developed and implemented an effective night fighter operation for the Riech. Generally considered one of the better Germman Air Generals to the point that he was IG for the reconstructed Luftwaffe after the war.


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## comiso90 (Nov 21, 2007)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Yeah thats him Basket. Goering apparantly new and even helped him in some cases. That Herman Goering helped him in some cases cant be verified I think.
> 
> Here is a bit of info:
> 
> ...



thanks


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## Udet (Nov 21, 2007)

So in conclusion...what you seem to suggest here is that the Germans chose the most adequate course of action to attempt dealing with the USAAF -outcome known- and that any other scheme which might differ from that would have done nothing but accelerating the German defeat. Very interesting.

I have read almost every book available that directly or indirectly deals with Bodenplatte, and all i am going to say about them is that i find them confusing to say the least. The Allies failing to put their stuff together, something that is not rare by the way.

With regard to your conclusions reached after reading my comments all i will say is i am not responsible about them, at all.


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## drgondog (Nov 21, 2007)

Udet said:


> A significant difference i see occurring with Richtofen at the controls is that that the bulk of the Jagdwaffe would instead have been committed to support the Wehrmacht and not to intercept/attack the numerous USAAF heavy bomber streams.
> 
> Saving the lives of innocent German civilians that would get killed by the thousands by enemy bombers was a noble plausible task for sure, but in my view it was not there where the war priorities were...the civilian population of the time was extremely resilient and there is no evidence to suggest any sort of civilian uprising came close to occur due to extenuation during those dark days of 1944 and 1945 when the heavies of both Spaatz and "Civilian Bomber" Harris gutted some major German cities.
> 
> ...



*I think the key to your strategy is balancing accelerated attrition of LW in June-August by throwing them into the area with highest Allied number advantage in favor of Allies, versus possible slowdown of Allied advance - specifically the Breakout and collapse around Averanche/Falais region. 

I really think this more likely to collapse LW far faster and Might have the effect of slowing down Allied advance.. but then reversing the effect by no longer having but a few exerienced pilots to provide any effective support from that point forward?.

But remember Patton was on German border in August. Who knows what the situation would have been if your strategy slows the advance to point of Operation Market Garden being no longer feasible, and all the primary assets punch from south and southwest? * 

It is an interesting notion

Regards,

Bill


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## drgondog (Nov 21, 2007)

lesofprimus said:


> So, what would the Luftwaffe have been like if Hermann Goering died during World War 1??? Would things have worked out differently???



Dan - I think he was responsible for at least three citically bad decisions wrt Air Battle Over Germany.

1. He ordered his commanders to 'avoid' escort fighters and go for the bombers. The consequence is that the 8th FC gradually got their nose bloodied by more experienced German fighter pilots in as good or better aircraft below 20,000 feet - and resulted in increased skills and confidence of the new American Fighter pilot with little relative attrition. These guys became the flight leaders and squadron CO and Group Commander cadre during the 8th FC build up.

These guys (the US fighter pilot) went completely aggressive and engaged German aircraft at will independent of odds.

2. Goering didn't order putting several flights of fighters over Channel to bounce US escorts at the Channel, forcing drops of belly and wing tanks - killing long range capability for those attacked.

3. Refrained from Night Intruder (or day) missions over US airfields, destroying fuel and bomb dumps, aircraft etc. I can't believe Me 410s could not have wreaked bloody havoc over English/US airfields at night.

There are so many other examples but the above examples resulted in defeating the Luftwaffe over Germany.


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## AL Schlageter (Nov 21, 2007)

Udet said:


> So in conclusion...what you seem to suggest here is that the Germans chose the most adequate course of action to attempt dealing with the USAAF -outcome known- and that any other scheme which might differ from that would have done nothing but accelerating the German defeat. Very interesting.
> 
> I have read almost every book available that directly or indirectly deals with Bodenplatte, and all i am going to say about them is that i find them confusing to say the least. The Allies failing to put their stuff together, something that is not rare by the way.
> 
> With regard to your conclusions reached after reading my comments all i will say is i am not responsible about them, at all.


Glad you finally see what your 'what if' will accomplish.

I had no trouble with the Manrho and Purz book on Bodenplatte. I don't know what your problem is with this book.

You have another posting using your name and password?


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## AL Schlageter (Nov 22, 2007)

posted by Erich on another forum here:

_frontal attacks on bombers ceased almost immediately after May of 44 *when nearly all the Geschwader were posted to the Normandie battles*, a change occurred and attacks from the rear were standard from mid July till wars end_

So Udet, it seems the Germans did exactly what you said von R should do.


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## drgondog (Nov 22, 2007)

AL Schlageter said:


> posted by Erich on another forum here:
> 
> _frontal attacks on bombers ceased almost immediately after May of 44 *when nearly all the Geschwader were posted to the Normandie battles*, a change occurred and attacks from the rear were standard from mid July till wars end_
> 
> So Udet, it seems the Germans did exactly what you said von R should do.



Al I have deep respect for Erich's knowledge but here is a website with the Luftwaffe Geschwader equipment, commander and bases. Erich is completely correct that the Luftwaffe shifted most of LuftFlotte Reich westward and a significant population in Western and SW Germany.

The Luftwaffe, 1933-45

Near as I can tell however, here are the Staffeln that did not move into France or were there only a short time

II./JG1, I.&III./JG2, I. IV./JG3, II./JG5, Stab II. III./JG4, Stab I. II./JG11, II./JG27, Stab and III./JG53, Stab and III./JG76, JG300, Stab JG301

Having said this, a lot of those bases were in Koln, Frakfurt, Wunsdorf and therfore flexible in reacting to daylight bombing or attacks on beach head.

Regards,

Bill


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## The Basket (Nov 22, 2007)

Goering had a pet lion cub called Ceaser...he created the GESTAPO and the first concentration camps...his huge house was call Karinhall after his first wife...He may/may not have burnt down the Riechstag...Prime minister of Prussia...First hunter of the Riech...stole art treasures from all over Europe...loved jewels...drug addict from taking morpine from the injury he sustained in the Beer hall Putsch...Hitlers 2nd command...leading officer of the German military...Had a big bowl of diamonds which he used to run his hands through to make him feel better....
And couldnt fly the Bf 109 because he was too fat!


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## HoHun (Nov 22, 2007)

>Goering had a pet lion cub called Ceaser...he created the GESTAPO and the first concentration camps...

One mean cub!


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## The Basket (Nov 22, 2007)

HoHun said:


> >Goering had a pet lion cub called Ceaser...he created the GESTAPO and the first concentration camps...
> 
> One mean cub!



You guys....


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## Udet (Nov 22, 2007)

Mr. Schlageter i let you enjoy your little victories here. Have fun.

Dragon: i can say i agree for the most part with what you said here. Keep in mind losses for 2nd TAF, 8th and 9th AFs over France in a period of ~5 weeks (June/July) 1944 reached nearly ~1000 planes...lost to Flak and Fw 190s and Bf 109s.

It is easy to undestand this sort of automatic response to consider any other type of German plan to deal with the USAAF as more doomed than what was really attempted. Not surprised by this at all.

With a smarter overall deployment and utilization of Jagd resources that could have occurred with von Richtofen in command, as hypothetically suggested here, we can not confirm in all boldness things would have resulted in greater loss for the Luftwaffe. 

Also you brought up interesting points i too have commented in the past...why not to bounce or intercept P-51 formations before they fly over continental Europe, forcing them to drop their tanks in order to deprive them of one of their essential features: long range.

Let´s bring von Richtofen back to the analysis.

I´d address one situation that occurred -under Richtofen- in the eastern front we could perhaps extrapolate to the West for 1944.

When commanding Luftflotte 4, during bloody Stalingrad, von Richtofen made emphasis on deploying the bulk of his dive bombers to attack the trains that were bringing soviet soldiers and war materiel forward for delivery to the opposite side of the Volga.

His recon planes flew thoroughly far beyond the city, and spotted the large numbers of trains the soviets were using for transporting troops that once delivered, would cross the Volga, enter the city, and engage the German troops positioned there. His recon planes would produce highly illustrative reports on the matter that were promptly submitted to Richtofen.

The decision was logical: let’s hit them before they reach their unloading points...the more we hit them while still en route to the city, the less enemy soldiers our troops will have to confront.

The views and proceedings of a smart skilled commander. In addition to timely detect the Red Army assembly northwest of the city which i did mention -the Kruschev incident-, his eyes were also placed far east the city, from where soviet reinforcements for the battle were coming.

Several times his Stukas proceeded accordingly, hitting trains heavily laden with troops and materiel, causing sickening carnages of soviet soldiers...still this did not happen as often as the General wished for his command was frequently disrupted by both Hitler and even von Paulus who insisted BADLY on giving direct dive bomber support to German troops fighting in the rubble of the city, a task von Richtofen started considering pointless as the battle within the city showed clear signs of indefinite protraction.

Stalingrad was to a good point, the engagement between two massive egos: Hitler’s and Stalin’s.

I know this thread goes on with Göring absent, but even with Göring who also had an ego, i can say that by 1944, and given the circumstances of the moment, he would have liked and approved the presentation of a scheme like the one we are talking about: attacking the long range escorts of the enemy to cause loss of long range capabilities.

If Dragon and myself are capable of seeing this today, i do not see why would von Richtofen not see it himself had he been in command of the Luftwaffe for 1944.

As i did say, the general was a man with a broad vision of things. That this was never really seriously considered by people like Galland seems surprising.

Like he saw it in the eastern front, let’s hit them during the initial stages of their flight, and that long range issue becomes seriously affected. With a good part or with a greater part of their long range escort lost due to our fighters actions either shot down or being uncapable to follow the bomber streams due to loss of drop tanks, our fighters stationed inside Germany will have much less trouble when confronting the bombers.

I do not have the intelligence von Richtofen had; who knows what other interesting things that are well beyond me he could have considered.


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## AL Schlageter (Nov 22, 2007)

drgondog said:


> Al I have deep respect for Erich's knowledge but here is a website with the Luftwaffe Geschwader equipment, commander and bases. Erich is completely correct that the Luftwaffe shifted most of LuftFlotte Reich westward and a significant population in Western and SW Germany.
> 
> The Luftwaffe, 1933-45
> 
> ...


Slight correction Bill, the units you listed are Gruppen, not staffel. A Gruppe usually consisted of 3 staffels.

At the time of D-day,
II./JG1 was already in France (Montdidier, LeMans, Essay, Lonrai) and had to retreat

I./JG2 was already in France (Aix, Cormeilles-en-Vexin, Creil) and forced to retreat

III./JG2 was already in France (Beaumont-le-Roger, Cormeilles-en-Vexin, Fontenay-le-Comte, Creil) and forced to retreat

Stab II. III./JG4 were not formed til after D-day

I. II./JG11 were forced to retreat from France after being posted their from western Germany bases

III./JG53 was pulled out of Italy and back to Germany

Stab and III./JG53 were not formed til after D-day


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## AL Schlageter (Nov 22, 2007)

Udet said:


> Dragon: i can say i agree for the most part with what you said here. Keep in mind losses for 2nd TAF, 8th and 9th AFs over France in a period of ~5 weeks (June/July) 1944 reached nearly ~1000 planes...lost to Flak and Fw 190s and Bf 109s.


What was the German losses? You tell only 1/2 the story Udet.

For example, 
I./JG26 
- started with 33 planes June 1 and lost 36 planes during the month
- started with 25 planes July 1 and lost 37 planes during the month
- started with 28 planes Aug 1 and lost 41 planes during the month

Most of these LW fighters would have been shot down by RAF and USAAF fighters while most of the Allied losses would due to flak.


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## AL Schlageter (Nov 22, 2007)

Udet, did the Soviets have the over whelming numbers of planes at Stalingrad like the RAF and USAAF did in 1944?


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## AL Schlageter (Nov 22, 2007)

Udet said:


> Also you brought up interesting points i too have commented in the past...why not to bounce or intercept P-51 formations before they fly over continental Europe, forcing them to drop their tanks in order to deprive them of one of their essential features: long range.


What you, and Bill, forget Udet is that it was Spitfires and P-47s which did the escorting for the first leg of the mission had already engaged the LW fighters over the Low Countries and western Germany. The P-51s, and P-38s, that were to do the relieving flew directly to the rendezvous point. Sure a few LW fighters might engage these P-51s, and P-38s, but most would be on the ground re-arming and re-fueling (basic flight time of the 109 and 190 was 1 hour - one does not cruise at most the economical settings in a combat zone). Don't forget that in early 1944 the 8th AF tactics changed with some escorts flying in front of the bombers to intercept and engage any LW fighters that appeared, and this would be well into Germany.

Germany did not have enough fighters to force all the long range escorts to drop their tanks especially if you have them over France in your 'what if'. From June 1944 there was airfields in France that the escorts could use if they ran short of fuel, and many did.


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## drgondog (Nov 23, 2007)

AL Schlageter said:


> Slight correction Bill, the units you listed are Gruppen, not staffel. A Gruppe usually consisted of 3 staffels.
> 
> At the time of D-day,
> II./JG1 was already in France (Montdidier, LeMans, Essay, Lonrai) and had to retreat
> ...


 I agree your points Al except the thesis of my point is where these guys were during Normandie - not necessarily on D-Day - I looked at what Udet was saying, and Erich, and you, and while I agreed with western movement I wanted to point out different Gruppen (each with 3 to four squadrons except Stab) weren't in France or Belgium for most of the Normandy campaign.

The reference I pointed you to could have errors but there was still one hell of a lot of LuftFlotte Reich in Germany during all or most of the Normandy campaign.

Yes JG4 and I think even 76 were formed after D-Day but were in ops in July which I consider part of the Normandy campaign.

So to re-iterate - my post is about the units that either were not in France, Belgium or Holland - or moved out (as you noted JG1 and JG2 for example, moved out, and were positioned to swing both ways but back to defend the Reich. 

My father for example, tangled with 109s of JG 300 on 20 June way the hell up at Rugen and with JG53 east of Phorzeim on August 3, JG300 near Hamburg on 6 August, and possibly with elements of III./JG3 on 28 July near Mulhausen, all days I consider part of the Normandy campaign

Regards,

Bill


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## drgondog (Nov 23, 2007)

AL Schlageter said:


> What you, and Bill, forget Udet is that it was Spitfires and P-47s which did the escorting for the first leg of the mission had already engaged the LW fighters over the Low Countries and western Germany. The P-51s, and P-38s, that were to do the relieving flew directly to the rendezvous point. Sure a few LW fighters might engage these P-51s, and P-38s, but most would be on the ground re-arming and re-fueling (basic flight time of the 109 and 190 was 1 hour - one does not cruise at most the economical settings in a combat zone). Don't forget that in early 1944 the 8th AF tactics changed with some escorts flying in front of the bombers to intercept and engage any LW fighters that appeared, and this would be well into Germany.
> 
> Germany did not have enough fighters to force all the long range escorts to drop their tanks especially if you have them over France in your 'what if'. From June 1944 there was airfields in France that the escorts could use if they ran short of fuel, and many did.



Actually I didn't forget. The sky is a very large place, German controllers were as good as ours. 

First, sending the first fighter reaction in flight size units to bounce from very high altitude over a Penertration escort of P-47s does a better job even that bouncing 51 for a couple of reasons. 1.) until March 1944, 80% of 8th FC were P-47s. 2.) Until Mid May 50% of 8th FC were P-47s.

Bounce them early in the April 1943 through Feb 1944 and you force a significant percent to turn back - if the Germans were lucky enough to engage all - then woe to the B-17s and B-24s when they were midway in Holland because then there were few 47s to engage.

Second, while the Target Escort of 38s and 51s did fly a straight line to the R/V point, they a.) took off from England, b.) crossed the Channel in full radar coverage anc c.) flew within striking range of JG26 and JG2 anywhere they crossed.

Bounce them early and you have a disaster over the target where there are no P-47s going that far.

Why would it be difficult to alter tactics to put up one high cover flight per squadron to intercept from 35,000? If the Group they bounced flew after them so much the better but it's not difficult to imagine a section to a squadron punching tanks at first SIGHT of enemy fighters, much less a bounce.

Yes to Fighter Sweeps,but they would be no more immune to the above threat over the Channel or during Penetration? As to knowing kinda 'when and where' the 51s and 38s were going...? 

German intelligence was very good - but how good did it have to be to a.) stand on a street corner in Royston and be in hearing distance of the 355th at Steeple Morden,the 4th at Debden and the 339th at Royston? 50 Merlins make a LOT of noise!

Then, b.) pass simple and short wireless to Deelen, or St. Omer or Abbeville or?? some other 'catcher', plot the bomber track - and voila you have your general heading from the Cambridge area to a point out in front of the bombers.. so T/O time is known, General intercept point is plotted, you hop in your 109G-6/AS, cruise to altitude, spot heavy hogs with internal fuel and wing tanks? 

How much fun could a III./JG26 pilot have in one day - even if they just bounced and ran home to refuel for the returning bombers?

No, Al, before D-Day the Luftwaffe could have screwed up escort effectiveness very easily.. can you imagine having to dedicate either a Spit sweep or sections of your own Fighter Group to take off early with minimum fuel, climb to 35,000 feet and be vectored by Type 16 control to possible 'bogies' detected forming up over Holland as the rest of the wing is climbing to cruise altitude? Just the THREAT of a possible bounce as a steady diet over the Channel would have posed a big problem.

I know that was talked about many times over brews between German and US Fighter Aces at reunions I attended.. one of the great mysteries in air tactics.


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## drgondog (Nov 23, 2007)

Udet said:


> Mr. Schlageter i let you enjoy your little victories here. Have fun.
> 
> Dragon: i can say i agree for the most part with what you said here. Keep in mind losses for 2nd TAF, 8th and 9th AFs over France in a period of ~5 weeks (June/July) 1944 reached nearly ~1000 planes...lost to Flak and Fw 190s and Bf 109s.
> 
> ...



Hitler didn't give his best commanders latitude, we were better in putting the decisions at the battlefield commander level but in retrospect could have been even better still.

I've often wondered about Soviet doctrine with Political Officer on near equal basis to battle commander?

Good to chat Udet!


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## AL Schlageter (Nov 23, 2007)

Bill, Udet's 'what if' has von R moving units west to combat the Allied invasion at Normandy and this is what I am basing my arguments on.

Remember Udet has most of the LW fighters occupied with the Allied invasion and has reduced the number of LW fighters for Reich defense.

Do you remember what was said to counter the forcing of the escorts to drop their tanks?

In Aug 1943, the P-47s had a range of ~375mi with drop tanks compared to the range without tanks of ~230mi in June 1943. That allows the P-47s to fly to a line Hamburg, Hanover, Frankfurt, Strasbourg.

Udet said:


> why not to bounce or intercept P-51 formations before they fly over continental Europe, forcing them to drop their tanks in order to deprive them of one of their essential features: long range.


This is 1944 not 1943.


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## drgondog (Nov 23, 2007)

AL Schlageter said:


> Bill, Udet's 'what if' has von R moving units west to combat the Allied invasion at Normandy and this is what I am basing my arguments on.
> 
> *OK with me. my only comment about that dialogue between you two was my uncertainty that pouring all of LuftFlotte Reich into Normandy campaign would have had much positive benefit and had a political downside.
> 
> ...



Al, if you go back a little bit you will see that my comments re: bouncing escort on the way in (didn't matter to me whether P-47s or P-51s or P-38s) it was in context of dumb decisions that Goering made (or prevented)? It had nothing to do with D-Day or Normandie - it everything to do with the Luftwaffe permitting a free hand to escort fighters with a single minded focus on bombers..

I didn't see much that we could do to prevent frequent and persistent attacks by a few fighters on our inbound escorts, and have no reason to believe that fighter sweeps or line flights to target R/V by Target Escort avoids detection and interception over the Channel.

Neither did the assembly of fighter pilots that flew those missions. I have actually never had that conversation come up without our fighter pilots in the discussion say" Gee I'm glad they (LW) didn't do that (Bounce us on the way in)..

So permit me to drop back to 'what if' Goering wasn't head of Luftwaffe, and some clever other leader directed Germans to bounce P-47s at will over the Channel - from the first day 4th FG and then the 56th and then the 78th and then the 353rd and then both the 355th and 352nd flew ops into September and then 356th, 361st and 359th through Dec, 1943, and did the same to P-38s from 20th and 55th in the through 1943? Before 8th had 51s and nobody was escorting beyond Hannover except the 38s and the 354th FG Mustangs from the 9thAF.

We did not have 'overwhelming air superiority in escort fighters at target until after the Normandy campaign was long over. ANY reduction of escort over Merseberg, Leipzig, Berlin, Brunswick, Munich, etc would have been very painful. 

It (early bounce) would have been less of an isssue for the P-47 groups on Withdrawal and Penetration in in 1944 (but huge in 1943) because a.) LW wasn't really resisting those much, preferring to concentrate over target, and b.) the number of 8th and 9th AF P-47 (short range D's) were still 2:1 over Mustang groups through April 1944 - so they would still have strong numerical advantage over Holland and France LW units anyway even if JG26 and JG2 could force an entire group (or more) to drop tanks..the Germans needed to ignore Penetration Support and go after the Target Support in 1944.

Al, I respect your opinion, but it doesn't change my own in this debate about 'early bounce'. Historically there were stated real concerns by Kepner, Blakeslee, Zemke, etc, etc. and those concerns were first manifested by orders from 8th FC to not drop tanks (cost/scarcity was also a factor)

You really don't think it (early bounces in 1943 even on on P-47s) would not have an effect on us getting to Munster, Koln - much less Hamburg, Dummer Lake, Stuttgart? 

Regards,

Bill

PS - While the 8th AF FC HQ forbade dropping of tanks, each Group CO raised a single digit salute and said "do what ya gottta do to survive in a bounce".


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## AL Schlageter (Nov 23, 2007)

This question of forcing the escorts to drop their tanks early has just been asked on the Ubi Il-2 forum.
Jagdwaffe vs Escorts - Topic Powered by eve community

A post by Kurfurst who posts here.

*Here’s the question:

Why did the Germans allow these forces to penetrate, and then attack them at the target? This was the method they used for the first half of 1944, the so-called point defence.*

_Because they couldn`t just 'spawn-in' large numbers fighters on single selected point. It took time to assemble a force to challange a large enemy force with success, and in this regard, the Allies were in an time-advantage (they already assembled the the large armada over Britiain).

During that time, the enemy bombers got closer, and also there`s additional problems how to navigate and concentrate the defending fighters in a single point. This could done if a fixed point is selected as reference, which all fighter group leaders can find and assamble at.

Pre-designated defensive areas also meant they could co-operate with the Flak that which would neccesarily soften/break up heavy bomber formations, making the fighter`s job easier to penetrate into their mutually supportive defensive fire system. It made maximum use of the available defensive resources.

*Why did the Germans not place some of the Jagdwaffe forward to engage the escorts at the French cost thus forcing them to drop their tanks? With the tanks jettisoned early in the flight, none of the fighters would have been able to provide target support. It would have put the bombers back to the position they were in from August to October 1943: unescorted and faced with unmolested night and heavy fighters.*

Because doing so would make absolutely no sense. Let`s recap the objectives of the two sides :

- Defending LW fighters ultimately had to protect the industries of the Hinterland, for that, they needed to shoot down bombers, preferably before they reached their target, or at the very least, do maximum damage to bombers.

- Escorting USAAF fighters had to protect the bombers, by not letting the attacking fighters to them.

To force the escorting USAAF fighters (all/most of them to be effective) into combat to jettison their droptanks and leave the bombers, you`d have to amass at least the number of LW fighters to bog down the escort fighters. Otherwise it just won` work, you`d be wasting senselessly your fighter pilots in unequal combat with no gain. It`s foolish to assume the whole escort fleet of Mustangs and 'Bolts would loose their minds upon to sighting of a single or two 109s/190s and chase them as far as Spain, leaving the bombers totally unprotected. You`d only have smaller detachments of escorts chasing you away, allowing then the rest of the LW fighters could get to the bombers more easily, but there would still be escort.

And here`s the problem No 1. The LW fighters simply did not have the numerical edge to do that.

Attacking in small formations to 'bait' the escorts over the sea/France would only waste a portion your main attacking force :

- they would be dealt with by short range outbound escorts like Spits and P-47s, most of which wouldn`t turn up over Germany anyway due to range issues. There`s no gain luring them away.

The LW 'bait' detachment otoh would certainly not attack the bombers that day though - they would be out of ammo, shot down, damaged, scattered, low on fuel, and mostly no idea where they are, and where the enemy formation is at. You can write them off for that day, all of them.

They would be at even greater disadvantage against escorts, being more isolated and heavily outnumbered, unless they could attack the escorts in even numbers - which they couldn`t. Chances are they`d suffer high losses for keeping a few escorts away and busy - something they can just as well over the target, and with less losses.

Even if you`d bait a part of the escorts to drop their tanks, it would ultimately mean the LW fighter detachment would fall out of that particular operation, and itself would be unable to attack the bombers. At this point, the escorts, even the ones dropping their tanks and turning back accomplished their mission without even being over Germany (they kept away a number of LW fighters from the bombers).

Overall, it made a lot more sense to focus fighters into a single point, and let some of them engage the escorts, and let the actual Strike get to the bombers for a single pass in the confusion. The relative numbers allowed for no more._


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## drgondog (Nov 23, 2007)

AL Schlageter said:


> This question of forcing the escorts to drop their tanks early has just been asked on the Ubi Il-2 forum.
> Jagdwaffe vs Escorts - Topic Powered by eve community
> 
> A post by Kurfurst who posts here.
> ...



Mustang Force
Dec 1943 - 354FG - 9th
Feb 1944 - 363rd FG (early) - 9th and 357 FG(middle) and 4th (late) - 8th 
March 1944 - 355th FG - 8th
April 1944 - 352FG - 8th
May 1944- 339 FG (april 30), 361st and 359th (late) - 8th AF

35-40 effective per group in Dec 1943 - March 1944, 45-50 (April-May) based on better reliability

Three Groups of P-38s (20 and 55 in late 1943) 364FG in March 1944.

This is whatcha got to cover three Bomb Divisions of 12-15 Bomb Groups each for Target Support between Dec 1943 and May 1944. 

Tell me why, under perfect conditions, that during Big Week for example, two Mustang and two Lightning groups can cover 40 Bomb groups in three separate tracks, constitute 'overwhelming numbers"' against LuftFlotte Reich that had 500+ effectives and could put 200-250 effectives in the same area as ONE Fighter group over a target?

I don't get it?


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## Hakenkreuz (Nov 25, 2007)

What if the Red barron had lived


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## drgondog (Nov 25, 2007)

Hakenkreuz said:


> What if the Red barron had lived



a good question.. I wonder 'what if' Galland had more authority, or what if Kesslering had been in command. I am unfamiliar with German aviation 'visionaries' in the context of a US Billy Mitchell, etc. 

Who, in your opinion would be the German leader that could step away from Wermacht doctrine and forge both a tactical and strategic capability?


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## Udet (Nov 26, 2007)

Dragon...fair points.

I am sure there were other choices for the Germans to choose.

If to this i add some other points i have stated regarding the types of planes the Germans were still producing during the closing months of 1943, and throughout 1944, that were not really required given the gravity of the circumstances and that when cleared for combat implied a greater consumption of fuel and crews, such as bombers (He 111s, Ju 188s) and twin-engined fighters (Bf 110s, Me 410s) for daylight operations as used by units such as ZG 1, ZG 26 and ZG 76, perhaps things fare somewhat better for Germany.

With the human and material resources Germany allocated for producing ~800 He 111s, ~600 He 177s, ~600 Ju 88s and ~350 Ju 188s during 1944, how many single engined fighters Bf 109s, Fw 190s, and even jets could instead have been produced? Things become worse when we add fuel, ground crews and aircraft crews equired to maintain, operate and man such planes.

From this number, an approximate ~2,350 planes that had two engines, and required a crew of 2 men -at minimum for twin-engined fighters-, and 4 men in the case of the German medium bombers, nearly half (~1,175) were produced during January-June of 1944...a time when it was clear to those in the High Command of the Luftwaffe the main enemy to German fighters would be the USAAF escorts.

Let´s not forget the critical impact fuel had on Luftwaffe´s operations during the last year of the war...and they were still using bombers and twin-engined fighters.

The fuel load dispatched to put a Me 410 in the air during 1944 could have been useful to put 2 Bf 109s or Fw 190s in the air -at minimum- if we consider the actual number of liters filling the large tanks of a Me 410. I would love to see some logs/reports made by ground crews from any of the ZGs operating during 1944, with regard to the number of fuel liters dispatched to one of those planes prior to combat missions.

I wonder if a man like von Richtofen could have played any influence that would be significant to either re-direct or stop this mis-management of Germany´s resources.

In my view this scenario could have commenced implementation during the closing months of 1943, when the losses in the ranks of the Jagdwaffe were still somewhat reasonable, and completely set up for the summer of 1944, when the main deployment of long range P-51s took place.

This will prompt a reaction from some fundamentalists here: "What of the pilots to man those extra single engined fighters available?" In the view of some of these pro-Allied priests, Germany had "ZERO" possibilities for producing new pilots with adequate training for the first half of 1944. 

With a disbadment of the majority of the Kampfgeschwadern and Zerstörergeschwadern, a large number of men become available for proper screening prior to being sent to fighter pilot schools. But the fundamentalists do not stop here...they immediately resort to another allied type of mantra: "Bomber pilots make poor fighter pilots". I wonder how come? I do not see any difference between said mantra and saying "Not any man would qualify to become a fighter pilot". If a guy lacks the skills for flying a fighter in combat, send him somewhere else: the Flak defences of the Reich, or the Wehrmacht...*anywhere but inside a He 111 or a daylight Bf 110 that can easily get shot down by enemy fighters in a time when resources are critical.*

Any men who died as rear gunner on a Bf 110 or crewmen other than pilot inside a He 111 during 1944 was a foolish loss.

A significant reduction in the number of bombers and twin-engined fighters in service, would represent fuel saved that can be re-distributed for fighter pilot training school and Jagdgeschwadern deployed for combat.

One thing is 100% true, Germany carried on with a completely unwise stytle for managing its dwindling resources.


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## drgondog (Nov 26, 2007)

Udet said:


> Dragon...fair points.
> 
> I am sure there were other choices for the Germans to choose.
> 
> ...



Excellent observations. 

I really had never thought about the potential for putting say 500-1000 skilled pilots into fighters in January 1944. They could NOT have done worse than the 50-100 hour wonders that were being sent to the squadrons in August. At least they would be excellent navigators, good instrument pilots and be totally familiar with radio and landing procedures - all confusing for new pilots, detracting from tactical and ACM training.


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## Njaco (Nov 27, 2007)

> Who, in your opinion would be the German leader that could step away from Wermacht doctrine and forge both a tactical and strategic capability?



General Wever?


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## kool kitty89 (Dec 13, 2007)

I was wondering what would have happened to Manfred von Richthofen too, would he have been in a position of power like Goering???

But what the LW really needed prior to the BOB, besidedes the stratigic points, was someone who respected the use of dive-bombers but was smart enough not to force such a requirement on a HEAVY bomber. Also someone willing to look elsewhere than Messersmitt for fighters and not force rediculous reqirements like a rear-gunner for a fighter and not reserve all the DB 600 series engines for Messersmitt fighters. Maby then they could have had the excelent Fw 187 and He 100 at the BOB. Can you immagine the effect these craft could have had? 

The 187 had performance equal or better (faster, better climb and dive, maneuverabillity: slightly worse roll-rate and turn-radius) then the 109 with the same engines and with 2x the range, the He 100 had a shorter range, but still longer than the 109 and should have been able to escort in the BOB as well. The 187 was like a German equivelent to the P-38.

Plus the Fw 187 would have been an awsome interceptor and fast enough to kill Mossies. It would have been the only fighter capable of carring a 30mm cannon (Mk 101) prior to the advent of the Mk 108. (and Mk 103) The He 100 would have made a good one too if provisions for larger weapons were made.

Perhaps give more support to the Heinkel Jet program too. Keep the HeS-30 (109-006) from being canceled and maby the HeS-8 too, as both could have been ready for full production before the 004 and (especially) 003. And the HeS-8 was a good engine for the He 280 and could have served until the Me 262 could enter service (likely with HeS-006 engines) and would be a good transition to the 262 and still be deadly t bombers. (albeit with a lighter armament) If this had been done the 280 might have seen service by early-mid 1943 and the 262 could enter limited service by late 1943 and see service in numbers by early-mid '44. With such engines fuel consumption would be much lower too (and ~half the weight of the 004B) giving added range (maby 1000+ miles for the 262) and endurance with less detriment to the fuel situation and better performance to boot. (lighter weight and smaller size of engine) This would have been very bad for allied bombers to say the least!


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## Eighthaf (Dec 14, 2007)

The Basket said:


> oering had a pet lion cub called Ceaser...he created the GESTAPO and the first concentration camps...his huge house was call Karinhall after his first wife...He may/may not have burnt down the Riechstag...Prime minister of Prussia...First hunter of the Riech...stole art treasures from all over Europe...loved jewels...drug addict from taking morpine from the injury he sustained in the Beer hall Putsch...Hitlers 2nd command...leading officer of the German military...Had a big bowl of diamonds which he used to run his hands through to make him feel better....



...And his own 'Parachute Panzer Division'. Kinda makes you wonder how someone so lacking in self-/impulse-control ever made it to flag rank in the first place. Oh wait, 'political appointee'.


Eighth


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## tpikdave (Dec 14, 2007)

Njaco said:


> General Wever?



*Irwin Rommel!!* Tactical genius and probably could have run the air war also!


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## kool kitty89 (Dec 14, 2007)

That and he wasn't as detached from reality. That didn't start to get really bad until after the BOB and the US joining the war. Probably really noticeably by late 1942-early 1943. As others have stated here. Goering, I mean.

Rommel was good, I'm not sure how he'd have handeled the LW, he'd have a lot on his plate...


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## Njaco (Dec 15, 2007)

But are the tactics of running an Air Force the same as an Army? I'm sure he could've handled Hitler....."Don't retreat!" "F You!"  But are they the same in terms of planning?


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## kool kitty89 (Dec 15, 2007)

There would be the other reason for being uncertain of how he'd do...


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