# Why was the Bf 110 obsolete as a night fighter



## spicmart (Dec 17, 2012)

Why was the Bf 110 considered obsolete as a night fighter? It was sleeker than the Ju 88 and had about the dimensions as the specialized night fighter Ta 154.
Was it not able to carry enough equipment?
It is often said that it was slower than those but would it have been competitive if given the same engines?
Maybe it had disadvantages construction wise?
And what about the Me 410? Why was it not converted into a night fighter?

Sorry for so many questions..


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## treyzx10r (Dec 17, 2012)

Size and performance,yes the 110 and 410 were 'sleeker' but they had smaller airframes. Consider you have to pack in Radar equipment and various armament packages then a lot of fuel. Consider also the Ju88 and Do217 were also fast bombers so they had capacity to offer that the others lacked. Still I would'nt say the 110 was obsolete as a Nachtjager the others just had more to offer.


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## davebender (Dec 17, 2012)

I think that is the answer.

Me-110 could have more powerful DB605D engines. Possibly even DB603 or Jumo 211. But there's no way around the relatively small interior space and the Ju-88G turned out to be a superb night fighter aircraft.


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## spicmart (Dec 17, 2012)

I'm also asking about a comparison with the specialized Ta 154 which does not have really much more space to offer as far as I can see and yet it was envisaged to be THE night fighter (along the He 219) to replace them all.
The Me 410 should have been easily converted into a night fighter considering it boasting DB 603s and having a spacious front fuselage. They were readily available.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 17, 2012)

LW NFs were to pounce on heavy bombers, RAF's NFs were just a nuisance for them. So punch, endurance and performance was the order of the day. With Bf-110 carrying external fuel, in order to increase loiter intercept time, with antler antennae, they were hardly any more streamlined than Ju-88 flying without drop tanks. Toss in the issues with Notleistung DB-601/605 have had mid-war, and BF-110 does not look as a performer. It also took (too much?) time for Mtt to install the Schraege Musik into the Bf-110.
LW dropped the ball when decided not to push the Me-410 into a night fighter role IMO. Together with Jumo-213 engined Ju-88/188, to hit hard RAF heavies.


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## davebender (Dec 17, 2012)

Milch spent 1942 and 1943 trying to kill the Me-410 program. That must change before anyone can consider a night fighter version of the Me-410.


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## stona (Dec 18, 2012)

davebender said:


> Milch spent 1942 and 1943 trying to kill the Me-410 program. That must change before anyone can consider a night fighter version of the Me-410.



That's not supported by a read of the minutes of meetings between Milch et alter at the RLM.
It was Goering who stopped and started the Me 210/410 program (first as early as March 1942,he even threatened to court martial three officers from the GL Division).
Milch was confronted with dealing with the practicalities arising from these decisions and the fact that the Me 210 wasn't fit for service. He revived and kept Bf 110 production going,but that's not the same as trying to kill the Me 210/410. Milch remained ambivalent towards the Me 410,hardly surprising considering the mess it had made of German production plans,not just the failiure to be produced itself but having to keep several other types in production long after they were to have been discontinued. He did consider it a good heavy day fighter but considered it a waste of time as a bomber.He regarded the bombing of England as "harrasment" and thought the use of the Me 410 in this role a lot of effort to put one 500Kg bomb on target. Galland liked it,Pelz didn't want it,he considered it not robust enough for the hurly burly of service life. His units had written off 80 by November 1943,30 in take offs or landings,30 during training and only 20 to enemy action. Ultimately the two men convinced Goering and Galland got what Pelz didn't want. The Me 410 would be a heavy fighter.

6 Oct 1942:
NJG 2 reports that the Do 217 is unsuited for night fighting. The Bf 110's gross weight is already pushing the limit and even the He 219 might be too heavy.

8 Jan 1943:
The He 219 cannot met the needs of the night fighter service. Milch says that it is fortunate that in addition to the Bf 110 G the Ta 154 will soon be available to supplement the inventory. 

_(Once again he didn't have the benefit of hindsight)_

On 16th July 1943 at a meeting about nightfighters it is clear that there are not enough Bf 110s to go around. The "General der Nachtjagd" is offered Ju 88 C-6s but declines,preferring Bf 110s for his force. He does demand the Ju 88 G and it is agreed that the "Technisches Amt."will ensure that this type enters production without any problem.

On 30th July Kannhuber describes the Ju 88 C-6 as a "sick bird",too small and with too short a range. He wants Bf 110s equipped with SN-2 radars. At the same meeting the Me 410 is mentioned but Galland is adamant that they should be equipped as Zerstorer for day light use.
It is this month that Oberfeldwebel Paul Mahle equips the first Bf 110 G-4 with two oblique upward firing MG FF/M. "Schrage Musik" was born.

3rd Aug 1943:
The Generalfeldmarschall (Milch) explains that an increase in Bf 110 production to 200 aircraft is not possible given the current resources._Converting another factory over to production of this older type of aircraft is not acceptable. Me 410 production will increase markedly during the second half of 1944........Milch would like to use the Me 410 in the day fighter role,leaving the Bf 110 for the night._

It seems that the RLM/Luftwaffe did not consider the Bf 110 obsolete as a nightfighter at all.
Milch was hardly killing off The me 410,he had to keep the Bf 110 in production as there was simply no viable alternative. The Me 210/410 did not work in 1942/43.
It is not until September 1943 that Me 410 production is agreed:

The Me 410 is to be built according to the following formula:the required number of reconnaissance aircraft (currently 10 per month),the remainder to be equally divided between zerstorers and bombers.

No mention of night fighters. The earliest mention I have found of the possibility of the Me 410 as a nightfighter comes in a meeting on 25th Feb 1944 when,at a "Developmental Meeting at The General Staff" Eschenauer raises the possibility,saying that Luftflotte 3 are endeavouring to fit the type with oblique firing armament (schrage musik).He thinks that the Me 410 should be built as a heavy fighter only and the bomber version abandoned. Milch agrees with the caveat that he will need "to bring it up with the Reichmarschall". Von Lossberg interjects that the Me 410 will be an unsuitable night fighter "because of its landing characteristics".

There were never enough Me 410s to go around and the RLM concentrated on fitting heavier and heavier armament to the zerstorer version. The Bf 110 soldiered on as a night fighter because it was available. There was never any serious consideration of the Me 410 as a nightfighter. It was used as a night _intruder_ but that is an entirely different thing.

Steve


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## Juha (Dec 18, 2012)

stona said:


> ... Von Lossberg interjects that the Me 410 will be an unsuitable night fighter "because of its landing characteristics"...



Eric Brown agrees with v. Lossberg on the landing characteristics of 410


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## spicmart (Dec 18, 2012)

Juha said:


> Eric Brown agrees with v. Lossberg on the landing characteristics of 410



Can you specify?


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## stona (Dec 18, 2012)

I'm not sure which specific comment of Brown's that "Juha" is referring to. 
Brown did say,

" it was one of those aircraft that gave, in my view, a knife-edge feeling to its pilot; it was certainly about the last aeroplane that I would have wished upon myself if returning to base in bad weather after loosing an engine."

Steve


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## Njaco (Dec 18, 2012)

stona said:


> I'm not sure which specific comment of Brown's that "Juha" is referring to.
> Brown did say,
> 
> " it was one of those aircraft that gave, in my view, a knife-edge feeling to its pilot; it was certainly about the last aeroplane that I would have wished upon myself if returning to base in bad weather after loosing an engine."
> ...



"Wings of the Weird and Wonderful" page 113.


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## stona (Dec 18, 2012)

Njaco said:


> "Wings of the Weird and Wonderful" page 113.



Indeed, according to my note which I quoted and have checked 

I thought that it might have been from "Wings of the Luftwaffe" but obviously not.

Edit: Actually it is repeated in "Wings of the Luftwaffe" p.256

Steve


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## spicmart (Dec 18, 2012)

Thank you.


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## davebender (Dec 18, 2012)

Forcing a light bomber to perform as a day fighter is just a bureaucratic way to kill the program. Just as he killed the Jumo 222 engine program through bureaucracy by continually changing specifications.


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## Jabberwocky (Dec 18, 2012)

The Me 210/410 wasn’t explicitly a light bomber. It was designed as a multi-role fighter, useful as a heavy fighter, night fighter, reconnaissance aircraft AND dive/light bomber. 

If you look at the competing design that Arado submitted (Ar 240) they had plans for individual versions of the aircraft for the heavy fighter, night fighter, bomber and reconnaissance roles. 

There was no “forcing” the heavy day fighter requirement onto the Me 210/410. Given the aircraft’s origin as a direct successor to the 110, it was designed to be a fighter from the outset.

Arguing that Milch tried to kill the programme by forcing a fighter requirement on the aircraft is like arguing that the Air Ministry tried to kill the Mosquito by recommending its use in the day fighter role.


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## parsifal (Dec 18, 2012)

I dont know about the reasons why the ME 410 was not chosen as a NF, but i do know the NJGs suffered diabolical losses in landing accidents....roughly 20% of the force structure each and every month from 43 onward. There were, apparently, extreme flying losses due to the fear of the Mosquito intruders apparently (according to Gunston). If Gunston is correct, then RAF Night Fighters were not an irrelevant factor for LW losses, they were forcing errors on the LW aircrew that was driving their attrition rates through the roof


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## stona (Dec 19, 2012)

Jabberwocky said:


> There was no “forcing” the heavy day fighter requirement onto the Me 210/410. Given the aircraft’s origin as a direct successor to the 110, it was designed to be a fighter from the outset.
> 
> Arguing that Milch tried to kill the programme by forcing a fighter requirement on the aircraft is like arguing that the Air Ministry tried to kill the Mosquito by recommending its use in the day fighter role.



I wasn't arguing that at all. Milch,whilst always remaining ambivalent about the entire Me 210/410 program,saw the best use of the type as a heavy fighter. It was promoted by Galland as a day light bomber destroyer with Milch's support. Both men were keen to get the KWK 5 cm guns fitted and see the 21 cm mortars as a stopgap..

The bomber version was retained largely for political reasons (echoes of the Me 262 here). Pelz didn't want it as a bomber and Galland wanted it as a fighter. 

In November 1943 an "Erprobungskommando 25 Action Report" it is made clear that the Do 335 will replace the Me 410 in all three roles (reccon,fast bomber,heavy fighter).It will also assume the role of a high speed night fighter "since the Me 262s range is inadequate".
Resources that might be freed up by the cancellation of the He 219 will be transferred to the Do 335.

Milch makes very clear his views on the Me 410.

_"The Me 410 was an induced labour birth. It was unusable when the Amt accepted it. It has been fixed,sometimes sometimes by doing things that ran contrary to the company itself. However,from a technical standpoint,it is a type already on the way out"._ 

The minutes continue with Galland saying that he wants the 5 cm equipped Me 410,the Furher has seen the new weapon and wants a wing established. Pelz does not want the type at all but says that since the Ju 88 S is not available in sufficient numbers the Me 410 is "being foisted" upon him.He is happy for Galland to have them all. Pelz also says that the aircraft has adequate performance but that it is difficult to utilise,the machine is "quite sensitive". Eric Brown would agree.
Milch then says that he "considers the Me 410 fantastic as a heavy day fighter". You have to get used to these men making blatant volte-face and changing their position,not just month by month but even within one meeting!
They then decide to alter the delivery quotas. For April '44 they are set at 10 recon,10 heavy fighters and 52 bombers.They want monthly production to settle at 20 recon,80 heavy fighters and 50 bombers. The idea was to produce more fighters for Galland's defence of the Reich.

Milch was a manager and he was managing a difficult situation. I think that if he could have killed of the Me 210/410 he would have done,but at a much earlier date. He was also pragmatic and realised that he needed the type until alternatives became available. In every meeting he backed Galland in supporting the Me 410 as a viable day fighter. He was pinning his hopes in late 1943 on the Do 335,not the Me 262. Post war we tend to view the Me 262 as some kind of wonder weapon but that is not how it was seen,by the Germans,at the time.

The original requirement for the Me 210 makes no mention of recconnaissance or night fighters. It dates from as early as November 1938. The acquisition plan called for 16 heavy fighter wings,equipped with the Me 210 and 8 dive bomber wings,initially equipped with the Ju 87 but to be replaced with Me 210s.

The RLM seems to have thought that they were getting a direct successor to the Bf 110. It was expecting something similar to the Bf 110,it's why it issued a contract for 2,000 aircraft before a prototype had been built. In 1938,as Messerschmitt's design bureau drew up various designs to fulfil the requirement Lusser concluded that an entirely new design was needed. The RLM must have been told this yet it remained a bone of contention between Messerschmitt and the RLM for years as the project foundered and accusations were hurled back and forth. It is often forgotten that the Me 210 was supposed to be in service by 1940.

Cheers
Steve


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## stona (Dec 19, 2012)

Just to return to the original question.

There was a meeting at the RLM on 15th June 1943. It was to discuss the He 219 night fighter which had just become operational (in a limited sense) and had already enjoyed some success. During this meeting Milch said that the Bf 110 would not be suitable for the night fighter role in the future. Night fighting units would still like to acquire as many Bf 110s as possible throughout 1943 and for the first half of 1944. Their interest in the Bf 110 ceases for the second half of 1944 _when a replacement becomes available_.

So,in mid 1943 Milch,the RLM and the Luftwaffe were planning to phase out the Bf 110 as a nightfighter by the second half of 1944. It soldiered on because the expected replacement did not materialise,at least not in sufficient numbers to replace the venerable Bf 110.

In September 1944 the Luftwaffe accepted 187 Bf 110 G-4s

In November 1944 the "Emergency Fighter Program" starts and development of the Bf 110 is halted. Production is reduced,but not stopped.

15th December 1944,Aircraft Construction Program 227-1 is issued. It is the last construction program from the RLM. The Bf 110 is not mentioned.

At the end of the war British troops find brand new Bf 110 G-4s at the Luther Works,Braunschweig Waggum. They have been sabotaged (blown up) by the manufacturer.

The Bf 110 never became obsolete. It was a fine aircraft and served from its inception in 1935 until the end of the war. It had a very good innings!

Cheers

Steve


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## davebender (Dec 19, 2012)

By fall 1940 most Me-110s belonged to night fighter units. There was never a Me-410 night fighter variant so how can anyone suggest it was to succeed the Me-110?


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## Jabberwocky (Dec 19, 2012)

Stona, I know you weren't arguing that. Davebender was, and I was pointing out his error.


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## stona (Dec 19, 2012)

Jabberwocky said:


> Stona, I know you weren't arguing that. Davebender was, and I was pointing out his error.



No worries,sorry I misunderstood 
Steve


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## stona (Dec 19, 2012)

davebender said:


> By fall 1940 most Me-110s belonged to night fighter units. There was never a Me-410 night fighter variant so how can anyone suggest it was to succeed the Me-110?



No.
14th September 1940.

Zerstorer Bf 110 C 151
Bf 110 D 103
I make that 254.

Nightfighters Bf 110 C + D 41

There were also 37 recconnaissance aircraft (Bf 110 C-5)

The Me 410 was never seriously considered as a nightfighter because Galland,with he support of Milch,wanted it as a day fighter. Von Lossberg said on several occassions that it was unsuitable for night time flying. On 30th July 1943 he said "operating the Me 410 at night would be didastrous".
The He 219 and Do 335 were to be the night fighters of choice.

Cheers

Steve


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## davebender (Dec 19, 2012)

That may be on hand strength but it certainly wasn't authorized strength. Hence all sorts of aircraft such as Me-109 day fighter and Do-217 heavy bomber were used in night fighter units for lack of enough Me-110s.

22 June 1940. NJG1 activated.
1 September 1940. NJG2 activated.
18 April 1941. NJG4 activated.
29 September 1941. NJG3 activated.
30 September 1942. NJG5 activated.
10 August 1943. NJG6 activated.
February 1944. NJG7 activated.

Authorized strength should be about 100 aircraft per geschwader. Plus additional Me-110s for night fighter training units and spares to replace combat losses. 

Me-110 or whatever replaces it must be produced in large numbers to keep night fighter geschwader at full strength.


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## stona (Dec 19, 2012)

davebender said:


> Authorized strength should be about 100 aircraft per geschwader. Plus additional Me-110s for night fighter training units and spares to replace combat losses.



It doesn't matter what authorised strength was or even what units were constituted. By your figures the Luftwaffe would have had an authorised strength of more than 200 night fighters in 1940. Infact it never had more than about 250 Bf 110s of all types at any time during the war.
NJG 2 (which was not a full Geschwader in 1940,nor incidentally was NJG 1) was not equipped with the Bf 110 but the Ju 88 and Do 17.
Cheers
Steve


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## parsifal (Dec 19, 2012)

plus night fighter groups early on were routinely of smaller size to their daylight counterparts. It is unlikely that the "authorized" strength for an NJG was anything like 100 a/c. training night capable crews is a tedious, slow process. Early on, it would not surprise me to find individual stafeln with "authorized" strengths of 4 or 5 a/c.


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## davebender (Dec 19, 2012)

Hence the reason Me-110 escort fighters were overwhelmed during the BoB and (later) unable to protect German cities from RAF Bomber Command. 

I suspect the much maligned Me-110 would work just fine if Germany produced enough of them and had an adequate supply of aviation gasoline. But the program must be established on a scale similiar to the Ju-88.


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## parsifal (Dec 19, 2012)

Dave, once again your ability to obtain the right facts, and then draw the wrong conclusions staggers me. Bf 110 production was not low priority. far from it. And that is reflected in its production history. Service delivery began in 1939, with 315 units being delivered by years end. In October Gotha and BMW were brought into the production program. In 1940, average production reached 102 units per month. 

after the drubbing the type suffered in the BoB, production was temporaily reduced in 1940, in anticpation of the new replacement type, the me 210 replacing it. when this failed to occur , production was ramped back up, such that by wars end, 6170 units had been produced. That is not insignificant. In the context of 1939-40, there were many more Me 110s than there were Ju88s throughout 1939 and for a good part of 1940.

As to why the germans would give priority to the Ju88, the Ju88 by any standard was outstanding, whereas the me 110 was an aircraft with clear limits


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## stona (Dec 20, 2012)

parsifal said:


> plus night fighter groups early on were routinely of smaller size to their daylight counterparts. It is unlikely that the "authorized" strength for an NJG was anything like 100 a/c. training night capable crews is a tedious, slow process. Early on, it would not surprise me to find individual stafeln with "authorized" strengths of 4 or 5 a/c.



Exactly,that was certainly the case with NJG 1 which was cobbled together from various units. The Bf 110s presumably came principally from ZG 76. The unit also operated some old Bf 109 Ds.

Training crews to fly at night,let alone fight at night,is indeed a time consuming process.

The time frame is relevant. In September 1941 the 41 night fighters on strength seems quite reasonable to counter the limited threat posed by the RAF. It would have been impossible to establish two complete Bf 110 equipped Geschwader in the autumn of 1940. There was a failiure of the supply organisation of the Luftwaffe to replace the losses incurred in the BoB. 
John Vasco gives the example of Wilhelm Schaefer,Geschwaderadjutant of ZG 2,who did not fly a single mission between ditching in the Channel on 11th August 1940 and the mission on which he was shot down over England on 4th September 1940 simply because of a lack of aircraft in his unit.

Cheers

Steve


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## stona (Dec 20, 2012)

davebender said:


> Hence the reason Me-110 escort fighters were overwhelmed during the BoB and (later) unable to protect German cities from RAF Bomber Command.
> 
> 
> > They were not overwhelmed due to a lack of numbers. They fought (with the exception of units making independent low level bombing attacks) at a tactical disadvantage. It is no secret that they struggled to compete with the RAF's single engined fighters.
> ...


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## Tante Ju (Dec 20, 2012)

davebender said:


> Hence the reason Me-110 escort fighters were overwhelmed during the BoB and (later) unable to protect German cities from RAF Bomber Command.



Neither statement is true. During the BoB the 110 was effective and gave good account and destroyed a large number of RAF fighters. The destoyer arm itself was badly mauled in the proccess, but that was largely because there were too few destroyers around and it generally fought in numerical disadvantage, and the losses taken effected the 110 units, few in number, than those of the numerous 109 units. 

As for failing to protect German cities from BC - we should recall that Bomber Command's strategy essentially failed and was defeated during the Battle of Berlin in 1944. The Nachtjagd was winning the night while the Tagjagd was loosing the day at the same time.

As a night fighter its most obvious limitation was that the airframe was not designed for such tasked. The pure 110 lacked the range required for the task, and could only fullfill it with external stores , i.e. droptanks, cannon pods etc. hanging from every possible direction. A night fighter required plenty of loiter time, and the 110 simply did not have it, the Ju 88 OTOH had, since it was designed from the start with long range in mind (being a bomber and all). The good point of the 110 was first and foremost that it was available when needed, where needed, and could be modified for the task quickly. AFAIK it also had very docile landing and handling charachteristics, important for a night fighter which has to take off and land in bad visibility conditions. But the Ju 88 was far better suited for the task.


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## stona (Dec 20, 2012)

Tante Ju said:


> the Ju 88 was far better suited for the task.



Yes it was and to return to the original question the Me 210/410 was not. The decision was made in March 1943 not to develop the Me 210/410 as a night fighter.

Milch:

_The Me 210 is not planned as a night fighter. It will only be used in the heavy fighter role and,on occasion,as a high speed bomber.The Me 410 is a heavy fighter with a fundamental secondary role of high speed bomber._

Reading both British and German accounts (from ZG 2 and ZG 76) I'm not sure I agree with the contention that the Bf 110s were fighting,typically,at a numerical disadvantage.They certainly,as I said earlier,usually fought at a tactical disadvantage. There were occasions on which an entire Geschwader of Bf 110s was confronted by a single Squadron of RAF fighters. It is also important to remember that the Bf 110s were not the primary target of RAF fighters,as Dowding had made quite clear.

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Dec 20, 2012)

Tante Ju said:


> Neither statement is true. During the BoB the 110 was effective and gave good account and destroyed a large number of RAF fighters. The destoyer arm itself was badly mauled in the proccess, but that was largely because there were too few destroyers around and it generally fought in numerical disadvantage, and the losses taken effected the 110 units, few in number, than those of the numerous 109 units.
> 
> As for failing to protect German cities from BC - we should recall that Bomber Command's strategy essentially failed and was defeated during the Battle of Berlin in 1944. The Nachtjagd was winning the night while the Tagjagd was loosing the day at the same time.
> 
> As a night fighter its most obvious limitation was that the airframe was not designed for such tasked. The pure 110 lacked the range required for the task, and could only fullfill it with external stores , i.e. droptanks, cannon pods etc. hanging from every possible direction. A night fighter required plenty of loiter time, and the 110 simply did not have it, the Ju 88 OTOH had, since it was designed from the start with long range in mind (being a bomber and all). The good point of the 110 was first and foremost that it was available when needed, where needed, and could be modified for the task quickly. AFAIK it also had very docile landing and handling charachteristics, important for a night fighter which has to take off and land in bad visibility conditions. But the Ju 88 was far better suited for the task.



Good post.
The Bf-110 (or any fighter, for that matter), when tasked with close escort is going to be mauled. Even more so when compared with lightweight contemporaries. The heavy 110, when flown at 20000 ft and at 'fighter' speeds is all another ball game vs. a 110 flying 15000 ft at 'bomber' speeds.
The Ju-88 have had it all to tackle BC's heavies - range, decent performance, space for fuel, electronics, both oblique and forward firing armament, being in production, while carrying many pairs of eyes. The benevolent handling was a must for the role, and it was present there, too.


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## mozart (Dec 20, 2012)

The Bf110G-4s may have had their limitations and disadvantages, but it's interesting that Schnaufer opted to retain his Bf110 when he was promoted to Kommodore of NJG 4, a Geschwader that was equipped with Ju88s. According to Rumpelhardt, Schnaufer initially considered it important to fly the same aircraft as the rest of his men, but after a few daytime familiarisation trips followed by some problems with night take-offs, Schnaufer wasn't happy and decided not to fly one again.
Max


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## stona (Dec 20, 2012)

That would depend on which version of the Ju 88. Schnaufer was promoted to that post late 1944 (November?) So I'm fairly sure he was preferring his Bf 110 to a Ju 88 G.
Many night fighter crews were happy with this version,unlike the earlier C-6s.
Cheers
Steve


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## Erich (Dec 20, 2012)

Schnaufer post war admitted he was afraid of the Ju 88 G-6 which was superior to the 110G-4 in all aspects. I wish I had time to post my interviews with ace Peter Spoden on this question, as t would brimg better insight to the specifics. as Stona said earlier the 110 was not totally phased out, NJG's 1, 5 and 6 had the latest 110's in their line ups by wars end.


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## mozart (Dec 20, 2012)

Erich....._I _wish you had time to post your interviews with Peter too! I've met him but not, unfortunately, had the time for a protracted discussion.

Max


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## davebender (Dec 20, 2012)

I wouldn't go that far. Nachtjagd shot down a lot of RAF bombers but not enough to put RAF Bomber Command out of business. 

RAF Bomber Command was an immense program which cost over 12% of total British military spending. Germany would shoot down 50 bombers (and aircrew) only to see them replaced by a larger number of more capable aircraft. You cannot defeat them by half measures. 

Nachtjagd were established during 1940. From that point the preferred night fighter aircraft (and aircrew) must be produced in numbers larger enough to keep NJGs at authorized strength. Anything less will result in RAF Bomber Command steamrolling German defenses, just as eventually happened during 1944 to 1945.


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## Erich (Dec 20, 2012)

Max

I just may come after the new year...........

Dave you are correct after the RAF disaster over Nuremburg the loss %'s did fall with only scant so-called success's during 1945, the NJG's were grounded, their A/F's torn to pieces both day and night, too may raw recruits, shall we say pinned in from both west/east. Even with single and twin seat 262's trying in vain to shoo Mossies........what a waste.............

interested folk purchase the dual volume set by Dr. Theo Boiten/Rod McKenzie > Nachtjagd War Diaries < updated completely in 2015.


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## mozart (Dec 20, 2012)

Erich said:


> Max
> 
> I just may come after the new year...........
> 
> interested folk purchase the dual volume set by Dr. Theo Boiten/Rod McKenzie > Nachtjagd War Diaries < updated completely in 2015.



Good news Erich.....I'll keep looking.

I bought my volumes of the Nachtjagd War Diaries on launch day, Telford November 2008 - they're signed by Theo, Rod, Peter Spoden and Rolf Ebhardt and are frequently used, invaluable!

Max


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## stona (Dec 20, 2012)

davebender said:


> Nachtjagd shot down a lot of RAF bombers but not enough to put RAF Bomber Command out of business.



That's true but it was a problem for the entire Luftwaffe. They never had enough aircraft or trained men to fly them. It's why they lost the air war and partly why Germany lost the war. It's been covered in other threads. The lack of planning and muddle of aircraft production,which only started to sorted out after the appointment of Milch,meant that Germany was literally years behind the Anglo-American alliance. Williamson Murray's "Strategy for Defeat" probably covers it as well as any readily available publication.

The night fighters certainly made the RAF pay for its ultimate success. Even the official Bomber Command history concedes that the Battle of Berlin was a defeat. I think it is fair to say that the German night defences,obviously including the night fighters,did have the upper hand for a long period. Ultimately,as you say,they were overwhelmed.

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Dec 20, 2012)

Battle for Berlin was an admitted failure, and further was the principal focus of BC efforts in the first months of 1944. I think it had more to do with Harris's obstinacy than anything. He refused to accept the advice from the "boffins" about how hard a target the place was....how porr the results from H2S were, how being beyond the range of OBOE was going reduce accuracy to a fraction of what it could be, how the flak over Berlin was the worst in Germany, about how predictable Berlin was as a target, and how much longer the streams approaching Berlin were to German airborne defences. Harris would have none of that. After the fantastic success of Hamburg, he wanted to mete out the same pounsihment on the most important city in Germany. Unfortunately, the Germans were ready for that. 

After Berlin, German strength began to wane, and some sense of sanity returned to BC. 

One final observation. The BC offensive was expensive, but is dwarfed by the amount of money the Germans were spending on air defence. A big part of that defence was ground based, and 80% of flak units formed before the US daylight offensive got under way. German responses to defending their air space was in response to British attacks. And it cost them a bucket to do it. That in itself is a victory.


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## davebender (Dec 20, 2012)

> BC offensive was expensive, but is dwarfed by the amount of money the Germans were spending on air defence


I doubt that but am willing to change my mind if you can present a financial analysis of the German air defense effort which proves your claim.


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## parsifal (Dec 20, 2012)

I recommend you have a look at professor Westermanns book on German Flak. German expenditures on the Luftwaffe generally, the night Fighter forces, and the flak arm, as well as investments into R&D in these fields are included in his analysis. Overy does a similar analysis IIRC. It comes as a bit of a shock that the germans were spending around 50% of their military budgets on air defence as early as 1941. Who else were the germans fighting in (early) 1941


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## stona (Dec 21, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Overy does a similar analysis IIRC.



I think Overy covers this in "The Air War, 1939-1945" but mine's gone AWOL 
Cheers
Steve


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## mhuxt (Dec 21, 2012)

stona said:


> I think Overy covers this in "The Air War, 1939-1945" but mine's gone AWOL
> Cheers
> Steve


 
What source are you using for the RLM meeting minutes, stona?


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## stona (Dec 21, 2012)

mhuxt said:


> What source are you using for the RLM meeting minutes, stona?



Mostly Mankau and Petrick's Bf 110/Me210/Me410.
There are a couple quoted from other books by Stocker,Petrick (Me 210/410) and Schmoll (Messerschmitt production at Regensburg).
I highly recommend that first book if you can find it at a reasonable price.It goes for about £50 here in the UK at the moment.
Cheers
Steve


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## stona (Dec 21, 2012)

parsifal said:


> It comes as a bit of a shock that the germans were spending around 50% of their military budgets on air defence as early as 1941. Who else were the germans fighting in (early) 1941



I just dug out Westermann. In the third quarter of 1941 24% of ALL spending on the armed forces went on Flak. The Flak also consumed 35% of ALL ammunition. 

The overall figure for expenditure on Flak as a percentage of total spending remained remarkably constant throughout the war. In 1944 it was between 25% and 27% per quarter.

Ammunition expenditure was staggering.In the third quarter of 1944 the 2,655 heavy flak batteries were firing 3.5 million rounds _per month_.For the 1,612 light flak it was a mind boggling 12.5 million rounds _per month_

Cheers

Steve


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## mhuxt (Dec 21, 2012)

stona said:


> Mostly Mankau and Petrick's Bf 110/Me210/Me410.
> There are a couple quoted from other books by Stocker,Petrick (Me 210/410) and Schmoll (Messerschmitt production at Regensburg).
> I highly recommend that first book if you can find it at a reasonable price.It goes for about £50 here in the UK at the moment.
> Cheers
> Steve



Thanks for that - should have picked the dang book up when I had the chance...


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## parsifal (Dec 21, 2012)

stona said:


> I just dug out Westermann. In the third quarter of 1941 24% of ALL spending on the armed forces went on Flak. The Flak also consumed 35% of ALL ammunition.
> 
> The overall figure for expenditure on Flak as a percentage of total spending remained remarkably constant throughout the war. In 1944 it was between 25% and 27% per quarter.
> 
> ...



Yep, exactly, and then from another source 9which i photocopied 20 years agao, and then forgot to record the book) which is simply entitled "Appendix - Further Statisitcs, the Germans were spending approximately 6500 RM of their 12000 RM R&D budget on radars and night fighter development in 1942. That kinda tells you just how big an investment the Germans were making on their air defence arrangements, and just how much was being diverted to combatting the night bomber offensive


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## davebender (Dec 21, 2012)

12,000 RM wasn't much money even during WWII. How can that be the entire Wehrmacht R&D budget?


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## parsifal (Dec 21, 2012)

sorry, the table is in millions, so 12000 is 12 billion reichmarks. The Table is from 1938-44


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## Tante Ju (Dec 22, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Yep, exactly, and then from another source 9which i photocopied 20 years agao, and then forgot to record the book) which is simply entitled "Appendix - Further Statisitcs, the Germans were spending approximately 6500 RM of their 12000 RM R&D budget on radars and night fighter development in 1942. That kinda tells you just how big an investment the Germans were making on their air defence arrangements, and just how much was being diverted to combatting the night bomber offensive



The number sound bullocks, sorry... 6 500 000 000,- RM on night fighters and radar?! A Me 110 cost about 150 000 RM, including of course everything, cost of development, manufacturing, industry expansion and profit etc. 

Thus 65 billion Reichmarks would alone buy you about _40.000 Bf 110s alone in 1942..._

The numbers need to come down to reality. In 1942 for example the Germans produced about 3052 of their classic 8,8 cm FlaK guns, each came at 33 600,- RM, or about 102 million RM for the whole lot. 

A considerable sum, but hardly breathtaking, for example the Bismarck class ships came at 196 million RM - for each of them! 

The costs of bombing and anti-bomber hardware can be also fathomed by the amount of money the Germans were spending on their own bombers - the unit cost of a Ju 88 for example was for example somwhere between 167 192 Reichmarks in 1942, and they have built some 3094 of them in that year, for a total sum of 517 million RM. The 1337 He 111s built, for about 265 000 RM for each cost about 354 million RM in total.

*Even neglecting that the price tag for the FlaK 8,8 is for an unknown date, and that it likely went down considerably through the war with mass production techniques use, the fact that we have compared the cost of relatively cheap medium bombers (and not the about twice or three times as expensive heavy bombers) its difficult to escape the fact that the Germans were spending about 8 times as much capital on their two main bomber types procurement than they have spent on FlaK guns (ca. 100 million RM for the main FlaK guns vs. 870 million on Ju88s and He 111). *This puts the whole idea of that anti-aircraft weapons being anywhere near as costly as bombers in la-la-la realm..

Of course ammunition expenditure can be added to that, but I'd wager that the cost of ammunition for bombers (bombs tends to hold a LOT of explosive compared to AA shells) far exceeded AA expenditure. Cast iron shell bodies were a non issue, and assuming that each 8.8 cm AA shell held about 1 kg of explosives while a commonplace SC 250 bomb held 160 kg of TNT and was, you start to appreciate that we are talking about entirely different scales for the cost of bombing and defense against bombing. Even the 3.5 million heavy rounds of flak expanditure/month in 1944 that stone mentioned works out as an equivalent of about 3500 tons of explosives - the equivalent of explosives needed for about 22000 common SC 250 bombs. So if all explosives production used for the monthly expenditure of 3.5 million FlaK shells would be diverted for producing SC 250 bombs, it would be only enough for only about 2750 fully loaded He 111 sorties with eight bombs, or half or third that number if we are talking about heavy bombers. 

To look at the issue at a cost vs cost basis for explosives, a Lancaster would carry, for example 14 000 lbs of bombs in the form of 14 x 1000 lbs MC bombs, each filled with 218 kg of explosives (each equivalent of _218 _8.8cm shells filling). The total explosive cost was thus 3053 kg per bomber. This means that about 1146 such fully loaded Lancaster sorties would require as much ammunition as those 3.5 million heavy flak rounds fired at them per month in 1944 - and they actully flew, on avarage, _about 9500 a month... and roughly double, triple that number with the USAAF and VVS considered, at whom those Flak guns were also shooting at_.

I got bored with digging down further, but at this point, for me, *the numbers pretty convincingly show that dropping bombs would be roughly nine times as costly than shooting at aircraft with AA guns.*


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## parsifal (Dec 22, 2012)

I was surprised to find that the cost of producing the very first ring pull can of coke, exclusive of the the actual materials and labour etc....ie just the development costs, was about US $600 million dollars. those are 1960s dollars incidentally. If the first AI radar fitted into an Me 110 was RM6500 million, and the airframe cost RM150000, then the cost of that very first airframe was not $150000, it was RM6500150000. Hardware that uses specifially designed and developed technology must include the development cost of that hardware in the unit cost, something frequently overlooked. Germany tended to use specially designed, or cutting edge technologies in its hardware ad this shows in its rather expensive unit costs. its why a tiger II costs about 20 times the price of a Sherman tank.

But in any case all this talk about the cost of scrap iron, and the cost of this aircraft and that piece of ordinance, is really just a smokescreen, designed to protect a sacred cow. From Dave, we are told that 12% of of the British military budget was spent on its bombing offensive. One has to assume that is an all up cost.....the cost of training the pilot, fuelling and arming the aircraft, producing the aircraft, and providing the all up cost of aircraft used. We dont have a dollar figure to hang off that 12%, we are just told that its 12%

Westermann gives a whole bunch of figures, which collectively add up to about 50% of the total German military expenditures. But for now, we know that the Germans were spending about 35% of their military budgets on on AA expenditures, and we also know that massive amounts were spent on R&D alone. We know from other places, that the Night fighter Groups were suffering huge losses mostly in non-combat realted accidents.

Accept or reject the percentage of military spending spent on air defence as you will, but it seems pretty clear to me that German expenditure on Air Defence was massive, and at the very least at least matches British expendituresd (as a percentage of their military spending). Either that, or a whole lot of people a whole lot smartyer than both of us, are telling a LOT of porkies.


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## stona (Dec 22, 2012)

What ever way you spin the figures you can't escape the fact that Germany spent roughly one quarter of ALL military expenditure,year on year,throughout the war,on anti-aircraft defences. That figure does not include fighters/nightfighters.
That is a huge amount of expenditure which could have been applied in other areas of production. 

It doesn't really matter whether the bombing cost more than the defences or not. The Anglo/American alliance could afford to produce the bombers and their bombs along with the fuel to fly them. I read an estimate that one typical Lancaster sortie cost about £100,000, about 50% of which is the cost of the bomber which would hopefully be spread across more than one mission in reality! Germany had much more limited resources and the fact that a quarter of those resources were spent on anti aircraft defences must have had a relatively higher impact on other areas of German wartime production than the bombing effort did on the UK/USA's economies.

Way back in the fiscal year 1935 the planned funding for air defence production (excluding aircraft again) was 152.6 million RM. The actual amount spent was just over 261 million RM. This was a substantial sum then and predates the 1937 development plan. It represents about 2% of _total government income_.
The procurement goals of the 1937 plan were largely exceeded.
For example on 1 May 1938 the Luftwaffe had 2,284 x 20mm guns (goal was 1950),668 x 37mm (550) and 1984 x 88mm (1400). They had also exceeded targets in fire directors,sound detectors and 150 cm searchlights.
Again this shows both how seriously air defence was taken and the effort and resources which Germany put into them.

Cheers

Steve


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## Tante Ju (Dec 22, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Germany tended to use specially designed, or cutting edge technologies in its hardware ad this shows in its rather expensive unit costs. its why a tiger II costs about 20 times the price of a Sherman tank.



Yes, specialised, high quality hardware was used since that made the best use of resources. You seem to mistaken on Tiger II costs though - 321 500 RM per unit, with armament radio - compared to 115 962 RM for a Pz IV with armament radio and 33 500 § for a Sherman built by Chrisler. The conversion rate between the USD and RM was about 3 to 4, meaning that a Sherman costs roughly 1/3 that of the Tiger II, and, unsurprisingly, about as much as the roughly comparable Panzer IV.

Which is all nice but heavy Tiger battalions tended to have a 15 to 20 : 1 kill ratio vs. enemy armor, which made them infinitely more cost effective than anything else out there. It was easier to build, maintain and supply a single Tiger than about 15 Shermans or T-34, which made them the best use of resources for specific tasks. Obviously though an all-Tiger force would make little sense, since you need numbers the fill the ranks too, which of course fell upon the cheap, readily available but still effective Panzervier and Panther.



stona said:


> What ever way you spin the figures you can't escape the fact that Germany spent roughly one quarter of ALL military expenditure,year on year,throughout the war,on anti-aircraft defences.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve



It's not a fact I am afraid. It's a random number that is being repeated without any serious source, spouted by Bomber Command's apoligists. Provide accurate and sourced figures, and then we shall something to discuss..


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## stona (Dec 22, 2012)

Tante Ju said:


> It's not a fact I am afraid. It's a random number that is being repeated without any serious source, spouted by Bomber Command's apoligists. Provide accurate and sourced figures, and then we shall something to discuss..



The figures for expenditure come from various sources,German archives,the USSBS and interviews with Germans post war. The figures for Flak ammunition expenditure come directly from German documents. I'm not trawling through all the foot notes of every chapter of every reference I've quoted from. If you choose not to believe the figures I'd be interested to see some alternatives.

Steve


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## Tante Ju (Dec 22, 2012)

Again what is the source of this "various sources"? You claimed you have a source for that 25 % of all German military expenditure was spent on anti aircraft defenses. I wish to learn the precise source for this statement. If there is any.

Westermann, for example, clearly notes that the Flak consumed about 25% of the total ammunition production, that was the greatest source of Flak's appetite for war material. However, Westermann also notes that the Army still very much preferred did not have ammunition shortage until 1945 because of that. Obviously Flak did not come free, but overall it's requirements were rather minuscule compared to the other branches of the German armed forces. Flak, quite simply, was something the Germans could afford easily.


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## parsifal (Dec 22, 2012)

> Westermann, for example, clearly notes that the Flak consumed about 25% of the total ammunition production, that was the greatest source of Flak's appetite for war material. However, Westermann also notes that the Army still very much preferred did not have ammunition shortage until 1945 because of that. Obviously Flak did not come free, but overall it's requirements were minuscule compared to the other branches of the German armed forces. Flak, quite simply, was something the Germans could afford easily.





I think you have made an error with westermann here. i dont recall seeing him say anything about the army not being short of ammunitions. Other good sources do talk about the shortages of ammunition. In Normandy for example, German guns were down to about 14% of artillery ammunition allocations very early in the campaign and this remained the case more or less for the remainder of the campaign. In front of Moscow during the final offensives there were acute shortages of artilerry, even at the distribution points (Nagorski) . At Stalingrad, well before the encirclement of 6th Army (Hayward) . The Heer QM General submitted regular reports on this very issue, and there were significant shortages at some very critical points in the war. More importantly however, is the potential artillery shell supply that would have been available except for the flak expenditures. Saying Germany was never short of materiel is just manifestly unsupportable.

As for the figure of RM321000, unfortaunately that is the sale price of the unit, not the actual price, moreover it is the price for a Tiger I not a Tiger II. The cost of each Tiger II, after factoring the development costs, is far closer to RM 750000. Now, I do have a source for that information, but it will take some digging.

The cost of a Sherman in 1945 was down to about $22000 per unit, It had cost about $37000 in 19043, but unit costs fell as the production run grew. a T-34 has been estimated to cost $10-15000 in 1945.

It is highly innaccurate and very poor analysis to make any comaprison here, but just the same, if the exhange rate is 4, then the Sherman in 1945 costs RM 88000. Not 20 times, I will grant you, but significantly more I think you would have to agree.


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## Tante Ju (Dec 22, 2012)

Are you saying Henschel lost no less than 400 000 RM on every Tiger B it sold to the Heer...? Exceptional claim, as are the rest...


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## stona (Dec 22, 2012)

Percentage of total expenditure spent on flak,the 1941 figures quoted come from the USSBS. As you know it's sources were varied. A lot of post war interviews and a lot of surviving documentation.
You'll need to look at Volume 3 "Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy". The relevant parts are near the end of the volume. My note has a page reference 280 for the second (1947) edition which I haven't checked.

The economists who analysed the figures clearly don't agree with you that "flak,quite simply, was something the Germans could easily afford".

Maybe the Americans,who were trying to make serious assessments of the effects of their bombing,bearing in mind the then ongoing war in the Pacific,were also "apologists" for Bomber Command?

Steve


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## stona (Dec 22, 2012)

Okay, it has been pointed out that the percentages are not for total military production but for "percentage distributions of production of weapons (and ammunition).

So throughout the period 1939-45 from14%-30% of all weapons distributed went to anti-aircraft. That's for Army,Air Force,Navy,AA. Was there any other major recipient of military production?

You are splitting hairs and playing with semantics. I originally posted from notes as I'm not in the habit of reading through an entire volume of the "Us Bus" (USSBS) before I post (and my page reference was wrong,it should be 284).

The fact remains that,as I originally said,around a quarter of all the weapons produced went to the anti aircraft arm throughout the war. If you still think that that is an insignificant effort then you are free to do so.
I believe that is an extremely significant amount of production capacity which might have been utilised for other purposes had the Anglo/American aerial onslaught not have been undertaken.

I haven't checked your link but just to keep everyone happy my "paper" version,for which I have fought my way past our Christmas tree, gives the source of the figures as the "Indexziffern der Deutschen Rustungsendfertigung". I'll allow you guys to work out what that is.

I'm still waiting for properly sourced alternative figures from someone else. .

Steve


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## parsifal (Dec 22, 2012)

I think we have to agree to disagree with tante on this matter. people can view the evidence presented and draw their own conclusions. I think its time we moved on. Agreed?


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## stona (Dec 23, 2012)

I know,I just never thought of the compilers of Germany's own statistics for armament production as being "apologists" for Bomber Command 
Steve


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## Tante Ju (Dec 23, 2012)

I do wonder however what did the the Flak arm do with those 2-300 U-boots. You know, with supposedly up to 25% of _all_ armament going to the Flak arm and stuff during the war.. 

Surely someone misunderstood something here.. I suppose the statistic was made on a basis of piece count, not cost count, which might explain why, in 1944 for example, 25% of the 'weapons' went to 'antiaircraft' but only 7 to 10 % went to the 'air force' - an obvious nonsense if the counting would be cost based, to me it seems its piece-based, and the 42 000 pieces of relatively cheap 2cm Flak plus ca. 9000 3.7 cm autocannons that went to the air force can screw those statistics badly (and btw practically none of those were/could be used against strategic bombing).

The Flak arm was also responsible for providing air defense for 'army' troops, as the AA defense was organised under the Luftwaffe and not the Heer. In short in that 25%, whatever it means, also contains many thousends of AA guns on the Eastern Front, for example, not just home defence.


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## stona (Dec 23, 2012)

Tante Ju said:


> You know, with supposedly up to 25% of _all_ armament going to the Flak arm and stuff during the war..
> 
> In short in that 25%, whatever it means, also contains many thousends of AA guns on the Eastern Front, for example, not just home defence.



It's not _supposedly_. The statistics are from the German government of the time. You can't run an economy,let alone a war time economy,without good statistics.

As for the second part, those weapons are included. It covers all anti aircraft weapons.It's a point made by Westermann in his analysis too.

Steve


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## parsifal (Dec 23, 2012)

the figures are what they are. They are based on dollar expenditures, not consumption of materials, or units produced. 

as far as providing air defence for the army, well certainly they did, but according to Mitcham (Hitlers Legions), 80% (more or less) of the flak guns remained within Germany and Western Europe, even in 1941 (after june). at that stage there were less than 30 divs in france), all of them seriously under strength. It is highly unlikely that these divs remaining in the west had any more need for air defence than their compatriots in the east, and the units in the east were existing with just 20% of available AA. In June 1941 there was just one enemy attacking Germany, and doing a really terrible job of it...supposedly. Good enough to require 805 of available flak to be ranged against it.....


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## Tante Ju (Dec 23, 2012)

stona said:


> It's not _supposedly_. The statistics are from the German government of the time. You can't run an economy,let alone a war time economy,without good statistics.



Yes statisics are important are useless to prove your point if one does not understand what they signify. Obviously these statistics do not signify directly the industrial cost. These costs can be measured in cost of these weapons, since they include material, labour, development profit etc. costs. And as shown above, the procurement cost of the two main (but not only) types of Luftwaffe bombers far exceeded by a magnitude the cost of procurement of all AA guns (including those for the use by the Army). From that point onwards, it is illogical to argue that the costs of anti aircraft defenses, and especially, the cost of those weapons systems employed in defense against the Anglo-Saxon bombing campaign in terms of the industrial (war) effort spent on them would exceed or even come close those of other armed branches. It clearly points out that these percentages have been made under some other criteria - for example, piece count. Even if the producing and upkeep costs of a single Ju 88 bomber for example were about 6-8 times that of a single 8.8 cm flak gun, this would not show up in a statistics that would just show something along 'eight flak guns for the flak arm, one bomber for the air force. It would be a simply piece count, and would not show at all that (in this example) the same effort was spent to produce these weapons. You seem to ignore this detail.



parsifal said:


> the figures are what they are. They are based on dollar expenditures, not consumption of materials, or units produced.



Another assumption. Please provide source where it says the tables show 'dollar expenditures'. I did not know the 3rd Reich used dollars for currency... while you are at it, please also provide source for the previous claim that a Tiger II cost 800k RM please, as opposed to the known selling price of ~ 320k RM.


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## stona (Dec 23, 2012)

These figures have been accepted and analysed by many post war historians. The Germans (Groehler,Mueller,Koch et alter) followed by various anglo/american authors (Hooton,Webster,Frankland,Westermann et alter). They invariably reach a different conclusion to yours. 

You keep demanding references and sources from people but I notice a distinct absence of any valid contribution or alternatives from you. It is easy to sit on the sidelines and keep saying no,but that is not a debate.

With that I will now bow out.

Cheers and merry Christmas!

Steve


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## Tante Ju (Dec 23, 2012)

And apart from vague and questionable references and the random listing of various authority names, and the blank statement that they all support you, I did not receive any valid arguement from your part. In my view, you found a piece of statistic that you do not understand and apparently do not wish to understand and happily wave it around. I agree that this discussion has run its course and there is no point in pursuing it any further. 

Instead, and I agree that we have better things to do now that the holidays have kicked in.

So I wish you a merry Christmas and a really happy new year!


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## Vincenzo (Dec 23, 2012)

The statistic data for me is clearly on pieces. if was in expenditure, obviously in RM, was surely indicated and indicated if the RM were current or the base year.


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## parsifal (Dec 24, 2012)

westermans analysis is not baseed on the number of guns, though he does have separate figures for that. its based on exepnditures, and is measured in RM. references to dollars are references to the general expenditure of funds.


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## parsifal (Dec 24, 2012)

> Yes statisics are important are useless to prove your point if one does not understand what they signify. Obviously these statistics do not signify directly the industrial cost. These costs can be measured in cost of these weapons, since they include material, labour, development profit etc. costs.



Westermans analysis is measured in RM and dollars and as a percentage of the total German military expenditures on weapons, munitions and delivery systems ("the hardware"). 



> And as shown above, the procurement cost of the two main (but not only) types of Luftwaffe bombers far exceeded by a magnitude the cost of procurement of all AA guns (including those for the use by the Army).




You havent "shown anything. Youve made some claims, unsupported and proceeded to misquote Westerman left right and centre. apart from that we have nothing of substance from you.....in particular verifiable sources to back up your various claims.



> From that point onwards, it is illogical to argue that the costs of anti aircraft defenses, and especially, the cost of those weapons systems employed in defense against the Anglo-Saxon bombing campaign in terms of the industrial (war) effort spent on them would exceed or even come close those of other armed branches.



Read Westerman. He says that for the first quarter of 1943, the Germans spent a total of RM 132 million on Hardware and munitions, RM 64m on the army, RM 20m on the navy, RM 9m on airborne air defences, and the rest on the flak arm and its munitions. Thats a whopping RM 39 million by my count. (Westerman Page 190) 



> It clearly points out that these percentages have been made under some other criteria - for example, piece count.



Westerman elswhere in his anaysis looks at piece counts, but he also spends a lot of time looking and the dollar costs. So no, your unsubstantiated claims are not correct. 



> Even if the producing and upkeep costs of a single Ju 88 bomber for example were about 6-8 times that of a single 8.8 cm flak gun, this would not show up in a statistics that would just show something along 'eight flak guns for the flak arm, one bomber for the air force.



Maintenance costs are a different issue, and not the focus of westermans account. However given that the Germans were maintining manpower levels of around 11million men to Britains 3 million, and that the Luftwaffe maintains manpower levels greater than the RAFs, one can at least expect the maintenance costs for the LW to be comparable to those of the RAF. 

Westermans analysis is simply about the dollar costs of the flak arm....the hardware and the munitions. He measures it RM, and converts it also into dollars (not sure how he does that), anbd measure that as a percentage of total German miltary expenditures on new equipment and munitions costs. 



> It would be a simply piece count, and would not show at all that (in this example) the same effort was spent to produce these weapons. You seem to ignore this detail.



Read Westerman. He does include piece counts elswhere in hias account, but the bits of his book we are referring to are abourt dollar expenditures. He is very clear about that. 



> Another assumption.




No, actually a fact. Figures are what they are. If you cant agree that figures are figures, then what do you describe them as? 



> Please provide source where it says the tables show 'dollar expenditures'.



Westermans book is ull of them. For just one quarter (he does the same for many of them) at page 190 he provides a detailed brakdown, measured in RM and then also converted to dollars. 



> I did not know the 3rd Reich used dollars for currency...



Which is why Westermans analysis is in both dollars and RM. Its legitamate for me to refer to the dollar value of the expenditure, because thats how he expresses it. Read Westerman. This is not about the Tu*rd Reich, or Germany, or you or me. Its about Westermans account, and if you can produce alternative material then that material as well. I am genuinely intered and listening to what alternative matrerial you have on the total cost of air defence for Germany, as a percentage of their total military procurement budgets. I hear you when you say that procurement and munitions are only a part of the total cost, and that is worth having a second look at, but I think it a stretch to argue that a force soaking up such a huge percentage of german procurement spending, and occupying nearly 1 million personnel, is somehow going to have lower maintenance costs . 



> while you are at it, please also provide source for the previous claim that a Tiger II cost 800k RM please, as opposed to the known selling price of ~ 320k RM.




Im not going to give you a source, though I have one, becaause it is off topic. RM 320K is the unit cost, biut it does not inlcude the development cost. If you include that, and rememeber there were only 498 produced, the real cost is closer to the figure I have given you.


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## stona (Dec 24, 2012)

parsifal said:


> westermans analysis is not baseed on the number of guns, though he does have separate figures for that. its based on exepnditures, and is measured in RM. references to dollars are references to the general expenditure of funds.



Correct.







Steve


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## Tante Ju (Dec 24, 2012)

stona said:


> Correct.
> 
> 
> 
> ...



I wonder why the 'crop'.

Note that the actual table has no such 'source' listed. It seems it has been doctored and cropped from another table in a misleading manner...

In the last quarter of of 1939, even without any meaningful RAF bomber activity over Germany, 12% of the munition 'distributon' went to the Flak anyway. In the first quarter of 1943, despite a major expansion programme of the Flak (heavy flak units increased overall by 80%, see the much quoted Westernmann - it is no wonder why parsifal picked this figure  ) the army received it's peak share from munitions through the whole war, more then ever before, 67%.






Volume 3 - The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy - Page 295 - War Archives Management System

Also note the next table in USSB. It was claimed that the monthly consumption of Flak shells were supposedly 3.5 million rounds / month. This table

http://www.wwiiarchives.net/servlet/action/document/page/149/295/0

Shows that this is completely unfounded (just like some previous stunts with statistics, see Tiger II etc.), the actual avarage consumption of the most common 8,8 cm shells was about 800 000 rounds per month during 1941, 1942 and 1943, raising to about 1.6 million in 1944. There was also a massive surplus of AAA shell production, which meant that the stocks almost tripled during the war, from about 5.7 million rounds in 1 January 1940 to 13 million rounds in 1944. Even in 1945, when things went rapidly downhill, there was a reserve stock of 8 million.


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## stona (Dec 24, 2012)

Good grief, it's how the "Indexziffern" were compiled. 

Value series at constant prices _from which were compiled the indices of finished munitions output _(Indexziffern der Deutschen Rustungsendfertigung).

The "indexziffern" were the source for the table above,and many others in the USSBS. 

I cropped it from a different part of the same volume but that's irrelevant (hence the crop). I didn't want to type the whole thing out but I have now.

J K Galbraith was an economist. They tend to work in relative units of currency.

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Dec 24, 2012)

My I kindly suggest the separate thread about the ongoing off-topic matter?


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## davebender (Dec 24, 2012)

Does AA weapon total include the 20,000 or so Heer flak weapons primarily employed against ground targets? How about 20mm and 37mm weapons on the 241 Schnellboot which were primarily used against naval targets? Flak weapons mounted in WestWall and other fortifications used primarily against ground targets?

All nations used AA weapons for ground defense in an emergency. Germany was different as their flak was duel purpose from 1914 onward. If you count only dedicated AA weapons around major cities and industrial areas the numbers will be a fraction of total German flak.


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## parsifal (Dec 24, 2012)

Firstly, thankyou for finally posting something we can look at and talk about. Unfortunately I couldnt see your tables im afraid except for the one you attached, but it seems to me that we might be comparing apples to oranges. The table you did post, does it measure output in units, or as a percentage of the military budget? If its the former, then it is not entirely compatible to Westermanns figures, since he unequivocally is measuring by cost, not output. 

In any event the figures you posted are very similar to some of the output data Westermann has presented elswhere in his work.However your interpretation of that data does appear a bit skewed, since flak guns as a percentage of output (if thats what the table is presenting), more than doubled from 1939 to 1942. 

As far as ammunition expenditure is concenrned, Steve has already commented that thre was a remarkable continuity to ammunition expenditure, as a proprtion of overall expenditures. Of course the fact that germany was having to deal with multiple threats might explain this. 

The timing I see as completely unimportant. Germany was building up its flak from before the war, thats still an expense, 80% of flak remained either in the west, or within the Reich.....the Germans didnt do that just because they thought it might be cute. They obviouslyhad a threat they wanted to deal with.

I should point out that Westermann is not hostile to the LW or the flak arm. He in fact points out that until 1944 it enjoyed considerable success. Its just that flak as a deterrent was expensive....very expensive.


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## parsifal (Dec 24, 2012)

davebender said:


> Does AA weapon total include the 20,000 or so Heer flak weapons primarily employed against ground targets? How about 20mm and 37mm weapons on the 241 Schnellboot which were primarily used against naval targets? Flak weapons mounted in WestWall and other fortifications used primarily against ground targets?
> 
> All nations used AA weapons for ground defense in an emergency. Germany was different as their flak was duel purpose from 1914 onward. If you count only dedicated AA weapons around major cities and industrial areas the numbers will be a fraction of total German flak.



20000 ???? where do you get that figure from. Except for the flak directly attached to field formations and on ships all flak was controlled by the LW. On September 1 1939, the total German flak available (including army and navy) was 2628 heavy guns, 6700 light guns. a year later it had increased to 3095, and the numbers of Lights to 9800. In 1940, the Army consumed 58% of flak ammunition, mostly light AA shells, the the LWs 30%

In 1941, the total ammunitions expenditures (by quantity) was 989000 Heavy shels and 1.9 million light shells. Thats a toatal 

1941 also saw the Army attempt to form independant flak forces, inpreparation for Barbarossa. They were strongly oppsed by the LW flak officers (whoi held great sway with Hitler). The Army did get some independant flak battlaions....about 6 in total, but these units were used mostly in the AT and Infantry support role


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## davebender (Dec 24, 2012)

Production Stats on German Tube-fired Weapons 1939-1945
Production Stats on German Tube-fired Weapons 1939-1945


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## davebender (Dec 24, 2012)

Lovett Artillery - 10,5 cm. leichte Feld Haubitze l.F.H. 1916
An excellent article on development of German 10.5cm Kanone. It's readily apparent the Heer developed doctrine for duel use of AA weapons 30 years before the start of WWII.


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## mozart (Dec 24, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> My I kindly suggest the separate thread about the ongoing off-topic matter?



I'm afraid I agree - this esoteric, and not terribly interesting (since it got into the realms of armament costs etc) thread should be continued elsewhere. Now if somebody could tell me the disposition of flak units (or dare I say, a source for) around Ladbergen/Dortmund-Ems canal, I'd be immensely grateful!!!

Max


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## hedge hopper (Dec 26, 2012)

The best WW2 Nightfighters as far as I'm concerned were both British! The Beaufighter and Mosquito !!


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 26, 2012)

hedge hopper said:


> The best WW2 Nightfighters as far as I'm concerned were both British! The Beaufighter and Mosquito !!



You must be just forgetting about the Ju 88. Oh wait can't be, it is not British...


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## stona (Dec 27, 2012)

hedge hopper said:


> The best WW2 Nightfighters as far as I'm concerned were both British! The Beaufighter and Mosquito !!



The He 219 could and did catch the odd Mosquito 

Steve


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## Erich (Dec 27, 2012)

you got that right Chris .............

Stona 12 to be exact for the He 219 but the Bf 110G-4 also did and believe it or not my cousin caught one over the isle of Sylt in his old funky Do 217N in 1943, also one cannot forget the single engine Bf 109G-6/AS of 1./NJGr 10 and 10.(N)/JG 300 and the 262's of Kommando Welter.


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## stona (Dec 27, 2012)

Yep and I believe (if my memory is correct ) that Bf 110s were still shooting Beaufighters down over the Bay of Biscay in 1945!
Steve


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## Erich (Dec 27, 2012)

not too sure about that Stona would that be covered in Chris Goss's book on the Biscay battles ?

interviewed at some length a NF ace of NJG 2 who shot down 2 Beufighters at night in his Ju 88G-6, he has covered the A/C and codes fairly well with descriptions of the engagements and the downings. am thinking this may be good for my future title......... at some point. T. Boiten has confirmed at least one of the shoot downs in his volumes.


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## Glider (Dec 27, 2012)

Going back to the original question it was my understanding that the Me110's main problem was its short range when carrying all the extra equipment.

Its performance ie speed etc was good enough but it was range that was the main problem. 

As for the Bay of Biscay as far as I know Me110's were not normally (if ever) used in this area, the long range fighter over the Bay of biscay was the ju88 and they treated the Beaufighter with considerable caution. 
IIRC, Standing orders for Ju88 crews was not to engage the Beaufighter in combat unless they had a clear advantage in numbers or tactical position.

Both the Beaufighter and the Me110 remained effective nightfighters for the entire war period, but both took second place to later Mosquito or Ju88 nightfighters


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## stona (Dec 27, 2012)

Glider said:


> e Bay of Biscay as far as I know Me110's were not normally (if ever) used in this area, the long range fighter over the Bay of biscay was the ju88 and they treated the Beaufighter with considerable caution.



Yes,bad memory,it was Bf 110s of 13.(Z)/JG 5 based in Norway in what passes for daylight up there in February.They were attempting to protect coastal shipping and installations 

Even my bad geography knows that's a long way from Biscay!

I agree that the Bf 110 remained an effective nightfighter up to the end. It was ultimately outdone by the Ju88,both were outclassed by the Mosquito. The Mosquito's superiority is the reason that Kammhuber kept the He 219 alive in the face of Milch's indecision.

Steve


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## Erich (Dec 27, 2012)

actually Steve the He 219 creation was for a long range powerful armed NF to combat the 4-eninges, it was rather by chance the He 219's like other German NF's engaged the Mossie deliberately in fact it was only the S/E's that I mentioned earlier that were designated anti-mossie units and later Kommando Welter.

the Ju 88G-6 was superior to the 110G-4 due to size, lower belly arms, visibility, more eyes to counter Mossie NF's, longer range, thus more fuel carried for the long haul, non cramped quarters for 3-4 crewmembers, could carry the latest LW radar gadgets....... this is of course just a brief from several LW crews that I have interviewed over many years.


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## stona (Dec 27, 2012)

Development of the He 219,typically for any German project,went through many variations as the goal posts kept moving. 

The He 219 was already being produced (the A-0 series) when the Ju 88 G was at an experimental stage,around December '43. 

The A-6 was specifically a Mosquito hunter and was lightened for the task. It's take off weight was nearly a tonne less than the A-2 and nearly two tonnes less than the proposed three man A-5. The Luftwaffe seems to have been somewhat obsessed with the Mosquito and the He 219s ability to catch them (on a good night) was used time and time again by Kammhuber,von Lossberg and others to keep the type in production.

One report (which wrongly imagined a Griffon powered Mosquito to have been developed) said:

"....The Do 335 nightfighter cannot be expected to enter service before the fall of the year [1945].As the fastest aircraft available the He 219 is the only suitable aircraft for intercepting the Mosquito."

Noone at the time took the Me 262 very seriously as a nightfighter. References to its limited range are very frequent.

Cheers

Steve


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## Erich (Dec 27, 2012)

Steve

remember the He 219A-6 never got off the ground it was an experimental model only, sure the Uhu was used to chase mossies like every other LW A/C at night if they could engage then do it from a height advantage.


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## spicmart (Dec 27, 2012)

I thought that the He 219 did not have the performance necessary to best the Mossie because it was underpowered and too heavy? According to Erich Brown it did not. So were its successes against british nightfighters just hyperbole or true?
If so what made the He 219 a better nightfighter than the Ju 88 and Me110 to intercept the Mosquito?


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## mhuxt (Dec 27, 2012)

Erich said:


> you got that right Chris .............
> 
> Stona 12 to be exact for the He 219 but the Bf 110G-4 also did and believe it or not my cousin caught one over the isle of Sylt in his old funky Do 217N in 1943, also one cannot forget the single engine Bf 109G-6/AS of 1./NJGr 10 and 10.(N)/JG 300 and the 262's of Kommando Welter.


 
Hiyas E,

My count for the 219 is 10 Mossies - Fincke's escaped and was able to rtb, and I believe the entry for Struening on 19 July which appears on some lists is in error. I believe it's a duplicate from the previous evening when both Struening and Wittman claimed a Mossie, in the same area and at the same time, with only a single Mossie lost. Struening's name doesn't appear on Tony Woods' list for the following night, nor is there a loss that night.

All the best for 2013.


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## Erich (Dec 27, 2012)

yes you are correct according to me . . . . . 

it was not a high performance crate for Mossie interception I./NJG 1 could only claim 12 Mossies but the question is how many Uhu's were shot down by the RAF/Aussies flying Mossie NF's ? one of the biggest failures in Uhu production was the lack of a rearward radar system standard on the Ju 88G-6 and no rear facing mg for self defense even if a small deterrent it was something.

Mark Merry Christmas to you yes we should all wait for Marcel H's continued intensive efforts on I./NJG 1 flying out of Venlo the man has the work on the Uhu and the figures and the interviews of former NJG 1 crews.


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## mhuxt (Dec 27, 2012)

spicmart said:


> I thought that the He 219 did not have the performance necessary to best the Mossie because it was underpowered and too heavy? According to Erich Brown it did not. So were its successes against british nightfighters just hyperbole or true?
> If so what made the He 219 a better nightfighter than the Ju 88 and Me110 to intercept the Mosquito?


 
The 219 didn't account for any nightfighters - all bombers. Armed Mosquitos on the other hand claimed 18 219s, I've strong matches for 14 of the claims, though I haven't made a systematic effort.

The successes of the 219 (as with all other aircraft, no doubt) depended on the circumstances, one Mossie was described as a straggler, the one which escaped from Fincke had been on one engine. Even though the 219 was slower than generally thought, it seems to have been quicker than its NJ contemporaries. 

If the 219 happened to be in the right place (in terms of location and height) at the right time, and the Mossie wasn't aware of it, the 219 could use its top speed against the Mossie's cruise. Had to be close though, Nabrich flogged one of his engines to death to catch up for his second.


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## davebender (Dec 27, 2012)

What difference does that make? 

German night fighter force was tasked with shooting down heavy bombers. Mosquitoes were shot down only if one happened to cross your path which wasn't very often.


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## Erich (Dec 27, 2012)

actually not true. herr Goebbels was so infatuated with the Mossie and so was the fat man over Berlin proper that written orders were up to form anti-Mossie squads to take on the invading LSNF. the myth that proports the Uhu as a famous Mossie killer has been around since the 1950's and makes some interesting conversation but as I stated earlier the Uhu was not originally created for these operations.


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## parsifal (Dec 27, 2012)

plus the mere threat from Mosquitos, flying in the incoming streams and masquerading as a bomber, caused the LW night crews a great deal of stress. That and the activities of the Night intruders (particularly the Canadians), that hovered around the known LW air bases, is believed to forced the accident rate for LW crews through the roof. You cannot aerobat a night fighter as much as a day crate. if you do, you need a lot of skill to recover the aircraft in the pitch dark. Many crews in the NJGs by 1944 were not that experienced. a few were exceptional, but many were new to the job. And they suffered as a consequence. 

The Germans spent a lot of time and effort working out countermeasures. Like ecerything there was a see-saw effect as firstly one side and then the other gained an advantage. 

But RAF Night Fighters were a factor in the LW NF attrition rates, Not all losses were a direct result of being shot down


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## davebender (Dec 27, 2012)

How many German fighter aircraft were assigned to these anti-Mossie squads?


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## Milosh (Dec 27, 2012)

davebender said:


> How many German fighter aircraft were assigned to these anti-Mossie squads?



JG25 and JG50 were 2 units.


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## davebender (Dec 27, 2012)

Jagdgeschwader 50 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


> On 31 July 1943 the unit was declared operational, with a total of 19 aircraft. On 17 August 1943 the unit was one of those who intercepted American bomber forces attacking the Messerschmitt factory in Regensburg and the ball bearing plants in Schweinfurt. Grislawski claimed two Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses downed on this raid. On 6 September the unit's pilots shot down four Flying Fortresses over Stuttgart, one to Grislawski, and two claimed by Graf with the WfGr.21, who was then shot down but survived a forced landing. Grislawski claimed one other kill with the unit, a B-17 on 14 October.
> 
> In around four months of operations Graf was the sole pilot of JG 50 to down a Mosquito, which he caught after loitering at 30,000 feet over Groningen.
> 
> By October, JG 50 had been disbanded and merged with I Gruppe, JG 301.



It appears to me these units were diverted to attacking B-17 formations. They didn't exist for long either.


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## wuzak (Dec 27, 2012)

davebender said:


> Jagdgeschwader 50 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> 
> 
> It appears to me these units were diverted to attacking B-17 formations. They didn't exist for long either.



Perhaps because they were spectacularly unsuccessful in shooting down Mosquitoes?


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## stona (Dec 28, 2012)

Erich said:


> actually not true. herr Goebbels was so infatuated with the Mossie and so was the fat man over Berlin proper that written orders were up to form anti-Mossie squads to take on the invading LSNF. the myth that proports the Uhu as a famous Mossie killer has been around since the 1950's and makes some interesting conversation but as I stated earlier the Uhu was not originally created for these operations.



Exactly,hence the proposed A-6. The biggest problem for the He 219 attempting to catch a Mosquito was the altitude at which the latter could fly. I wouldn't fancy flying around a night sky infested with enemy intruders in an unarmoured aircraft with no flame dampers but I suppose the Luftwaffe was getting desperate!

The reason for the obsession with producing something to deal with the Mosquito is rooted in Parsifal's post above.

BTW I make it 10 Mosquitos for the He 219 as well.

My notes have 19 He 219s shot down one way or another. 1 on a ferry flight,1 on a practice flight,1 by return fire from a Lancaster (crew survived to tell the tale) which leaves 16 available for the Mosquito claims,which makes 14-18 entirely plausible.

Cheers

Steve


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## davebender (Dec 28, 2012)

> Perhaps because they were spectacularly unsuccessful in shooting down Mosquitoes?


I suspect B-17 heavy bombers were considered a greater threat then Mosquitoe light bombers. That's why high altitude Me-109s got diverted to the new mission almost as soon as the unit was formed.


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## wuzak (Dec 28, 2012)

davebender said:


> I suspect B-17 heavy bombers were considered a greater threat then Mosquitoe light bombers. That's why high altitude Me-109s got diverted to the new mission almost as soon as the unit was formed.



I think you'll find that they were not the only night units used for intercepting the B-17s over Schweinfurt. And that they weren't removed from night duty because of it.

Also, Mosquitoes were the pathfinders for the RAF heavies. Shooting down Mosquitoes would cause problems for the navigation and accuracy of RAF raids. So, yeah, Mosquitoes were very important targets.


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## spicmart (Dec 28, 2012)

How did the nightfighters identify friend or foe?


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## parsifal (Dec 28, 2012)

RAF Night Fighter activities as part of the bomber offensive did not begin until after July 1943, with the introduction of IFF techs. There were various technologies used, of which Serrate (Marks I to V) were prominant. Serrate was hampered by Window and then the introductuction of SN-2 radar (for Serrate I to III). By later 1944, the RAF was slowly developing counters to SN-2.


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## Erich (Dec 29, 2012)

protection units both single engine and later 262's for Berlin. again the massive paranoia of the pin pricks on Berlin and surrounding areas by the LSNF gave rise to the 109 staffels to engage the Mossies if they could. 4./NJGr 10 which scored a terrible 0 was equipped with Fw 190A-8's tried to engage the Mossies at the coast line. 1./NJGr 10 out of Werneuchen equipped first with Fw 190A-5/6,7's and later A-8's then Bf 109G-6/AS scored a few kills. 10.(N)/JG 300 formulated out of III./JG 300 which first scored a scant 3-4 Mossies was truly an anti-Mossie unit based at Jüterbog. first 18 109G-6/AS later G-14/AS and then at November 44's end a paper transfer formulating II./NJG 11 primarily 5 and 6th staffels which went on with hardly a success.


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## Glider (Dec 29, 2012)

Erich said:


> protection units both single engine and later 262's for Berlin. again the massive paranoia of the pin pricks on Berlin and surrounding areas by the LSNF gave rise to the 109 staffels to engage the Mossies if they could. 4./NJGr 10 which scored a terrible 0 was equipped with Fw 190A-8's tried to engage the Mossies at the coast line. 1./NJGr 10 out of Werneuchen equipped first with Fw 190A-5/6,7's and later A-8's then Bf 109G-6/AS scored a few kills. 10.(N)/JG 300 formulated out of III./JG 300 which first scored a scant 3-4 Mossies was truly an anti-Mossie unit based at Jüterbog. first 18 109G-6/AS later G-14/AS and then at November 44's end a paper transfer formulating II./NJG 11 primarily 5 and 6th staffels which went on with hardly a success.



At a time when German resources were so desperately short, this must have been an effort which could not be spared.


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## hedge hopper (Dec 29, 2012)

The former home of this wonderful aircraft designer. This is Hazlemere, High Wycombe. Buckinghamshire.


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