# Ju-87 Stuka vulnerability to fighter attack



## Nikademus (Jan 1, 2008)

I think that this question is good enough to warrent it's own thread. I have to admit I've often wondered myself if the Stuka perhaps gets it's "bad rap" more from the circumstances of it's employment vs. any inherrant design flaw.

from a post by "Kurfurst" on the SBD/D3A/Ju-87 comparison thread :



> There`s absolutely nothing supporting the Stuka being especially vulnerable as a dive bomber. It shared the defiences of all dive bombers - namely, a relatively small plane with limited defensive armament, and more importantly, the difficulty of maintaining a mutual defensive fomation with each other the escorting fighters immidiately after the dive attack was made. In short, the formation broke up after the dive bombing, and in this period the dive bombers were vulnerable to fighter attacks. But such weakness is equally true for any other dive bomber. For a dive bomber, the Stuka was solid - as fast as the best, rugged, well armored and armed. It continued to operate successfully until the Allied air superiority was such that even fighters found it difficult to operate in the daylight.
> 
> Other than that, there`s nothing to support it had some 'special vulnerability'. The claim is largely based on British propaganda stemming from the BoB, but even that is just that - propaganda.



So....what do other people think about the Stuka and it's history of being the life of the "Stuka Party?"


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## B-17engineer (Jan 1, 2008)

I think the Stuka was Okay just the fact it had to be withdrawn during BoB it was vulnerable and even with fighter support still it's not that good


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## Erich (Jan 1, 2008)

if you would do a bit of research on the most highly decorated LW recipients you would easily find many pilots that flew the Ju 87 variants and still lived to tell about it. It was not uncommon to fly some 800 to over 1000 missions especially added up from Ost front activities. why oh why the Soviets were not on top of these things in droves it would of been a pick nic to shoot them down, but it was not the case even when 9/10ths of the time the StG Stuka units on the Ost front and western front were unescorted


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## B-17engineer (Jan 1, 2008)

Hans-Ulrich Rudel was the most notable Stuka ace, and the most highly decorated German soldier of World War II.


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## Erich (Jan 1, 2008)

and the biggest propaganda tool of the Wehrmacht, many of his tank kills are subject to speculation as well as they being actual other pilots kills


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## Njaco (Jan 1, 2008)

I believe the Stuka was effective but again, only with air superiority.

On August 18, 1940, 109 Ju87s from StG 3 and StG 77 attacked airfields and radar stations on the east coast of England, supported by Bf 109s. 30 Stukas, nearly 21% of the total force committed, were shot down. Since 13 August to 18 August, a total of 41 Ju 87s were lost over England. Some say this loss rate forced the Luftwaffe to remove it from the BoB. 

It was the last day they were sent over England in force.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 1, 2008)

Exactly Njaco. 

No Dive Bomber will be 100% effective without air superiority. 

I just really dont understand how it is that hard to undestand.


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## Erich (Jan 1, 2008)

Gents remember the nocturnal misions. NSGr 1 and 2 and others flying the Ju 87D's flew in a formation of 3's at medium to very low formation, and also NO fighter support


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## Njaco (Jan 1, 2008)

Correct, Erich, there is hardly any mention of those operations. A few days of hard losses makes a myth. I believe that the Stuka was withdrawn because of a starting change in tactics for the Luftwaffe. Whatever importance was being placed on radar (and there wasn't much by the Luftwaffe at that time) was thrown away when results couldn't be achieved. Going after the RAF airfields, the Luftwaffe probably wanted a larger bomb load with carpet effect instead of pin-point and those losses that week just convinced them to pull the Ju 87 from those type of operations. This is my own opinion reading between the lines of what I have read. I couid be wrong.


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## drgondog (Jan 1, 2008)

Njaco said:


> Correct, Erich, there is hardly any mention of those operations. A few days of hard losses makes a myth. I believe that the Stuka was withdrawn because of a starting change in tactics for the Luftwaffe. Whatever importance was being placed on radar (and there wasn't much by the Luftwaffe at that time) was thrown away when results couldn't be achieved. Going after the RAF airfields, the Luftwaffe probably wanted a larger bomb load with carpet effect instead of pin-point and those losses that week just convinced them to pull the Ju 87 from those type of operations. This is my own opinion reading between the lines of what I have read. I couid be wrong.



AFAIK the Stuka only flew one daylight mission from June 6 forward in the west?

The 354FS and 357FS caught SG 103 on way to beachhead and annhilated them. Did they fly again somewhere else in West


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 1, 2008)

Njaco said:


> Correct, Erich, there is hardly any mention of those operations. A few days of hard losses makes a myth. I believe that the Stuka was withdrawn because of a starting change in tactics for the Luftwaffe. Whatever importance was being placed on radar (and there wasn't much by the Luftwaffe at that time) was thrown away when results couldn't be achieved. Going after the RAF airfields, the Luftwaffe probably wanted a larger bomb load with carpet effect instead of pin-point and those losses that week just convinced them to pull the Ju 87 from those type of operations. This is my own opinion reading between the lines of what I have read. I couid be wrong.



I think that is a pretty good and I agree with it. Ofcourse we will never actually know though.


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## Njaco (Jan 1, 2008)

You may be correct, Drgn. I'm not aware of many operations at that time in the west using the Stuka. There were some in the Med and some night-time attacks. I could be wrong. I'll check the meager resources i do have. I was speaking about mostly 1940 to 42. The Stuka was still used for operations in the dive-bombing role during that time.

Forgot about what I posted in another thread. For January 1943 II./StG 3 and III./StG 3 flew successful operations against the Allied positions throughout January with no more than 2 Ju 87s being registered as lost to enemy fighters (another 4 Ju 87s were registered lost due to 'Feindbeschuss' or unknown reasons). Now if I can find out how many were servicable for the month, I think thats a pretty good return.

Checked one source from Albert Price and a Nachtshlachtgeschwader was using the Ju 87 in the west in May 1944. But thats it so far.


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## B-17engineer (Jan 2, 2008)

i've sat in the rear seat of a Stuka its gun and sight and the cramped back was hard to aim but also it was a dive bombers what do you expect.......


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## Erich (Jan 2, 2008)

NSGr 8 used them in Norway in the fall of 44 into 1945

NSGr 10 used the Ju 87D's out of Wels, Austria in 1945


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## Nikademus (Jan 3, 2008)

Erich said:


> if you would do a bit of research on the most highly decorated LW recipients you would easily find many pilots that flew the Ju 87 variants and still lived to tell about it. It was not uncommon to fly some 800 to over 1000 missions especially added up from Ost front activities. why oh why the Soviets were not on top of these things in droves it would of been a pick nic to shoot them down, but it was not the case even when 9/10ths of the time the StG Stuka units on the Ost front and western front were unescorted



Other than the fact that the Germans had major air superiority for the first half of the conflict...not sure. The air war in the East is an intersting one to be sure. In the west, it was a different matter however from what i've read.

I recall reading Rudel's book a couple decades ago. It was..."interesting" to say the least. . Lots of monologues about endless streams of Soviets coming at him.


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## Nikademus (Jan 3, 2008)

Njaco said:


> Correct, Erich, there is hardly any mention of those operations. A few days of hard losses makes a myth.



Problem though is that there's more than a few days involved. It would appear that the Western Desert saw it's share of "Stuka Parties" as well. Was able to pick out some of the bloodier highlights:

2/15/41 - 8 of 12 Ju-87's downed by Hurricanes from 3 RAAF and 73 squadron. 67% loss ratio.

4/3/41 - 8 x Ju87 with an escort of 8 x 110's. 3 Ju-87 downed along with 4 110's. 

4/5/41 Patrols from 3 RAAF and 73 squadron again have party. 5 of 9 Ju-87 downed, then 9 of 12 Ju-87's intercepted. 1 Hurr shot down in return by Stuka. total loss 14 Ju-87.

4/14/41 5 Ju-87 downed by patrol from 73 Squadron. Part of large raid escorted by 110's, and CR-42's and G-50's

7/15/41 5 of 15 Ju-87 downed then 1 of 8 Ju-87 downed. escorted by 109's and 110's.

8/2/41 4 x Ju-87 downed despite large escort of 109's and MC-200's

There are more of course.

By themselves, these would not fully indicate a greater degree of vulnerability though I have to wonder if SBD's would be as vulnerable to rifle caliber bullets. D3A's....yes.

More interesting are the commentaries from the men who fought there as well as conclusions drawn by authors like Christopher Shores and Hans Ring. I found this passage interesting:

_The Axis fighters were thus unable to prevent the WDAF from bombing their troops and supplies, but they were also unable to extend similar protection to their own bombers. To a large extent, this can be attributed to the use of the Ju-87's, the low preformance and diving tactics of this aircraft making it difficult to escort. The much faster Ju-88's which could bomb in level flight or shallow dive, like the British bombers, and which were nearly as fast as the fighters, were never cut to pieces in the way the formations of Ju-87's were during the "Stuka Parties" beloved of Allied fighter pilots. The difference in speed made it difficult for the swift 109's to stay with their charges during the flight to and from the target, but the bomber crews demanded that the fighters stay with them in their dives, when the Ju-87 was at it's most vulnerable. Since the bombers were fitted with dive brakes and the fighters were not, this was virtually impossible. To make matters worse, the bombers frequently split up into small formations when attacked, instead of staying together for mutual support. _ 
- Christopher Shores, _Fighters over the Desert_

_During these months of regeneration for the WDAF,_[1942] _ the German fighters were worn out escorting the obsolete Stukas at a time when the Ju-87 should have been withdrawn from service. The Ju-87 was too slow and therefore very difficult to cover, and these missions were very costly to JG-27._
-Eduard Neumann, Kommodore, JG-27 (exerpt from Fighters over the Desert)


Reading from this and other books, the constant theme underscored is "slow" and in some cases "unweildy" or "low preformance" when describing the Stuka. The other theme is, "hard to escort." The apparant ruggedness and armor protection of the plane doesn't appear to have been much help against even the early rifle caliber armed fighters faced and the plane was a "favorite" of the Allies throughout the campaign. The comment about the Stuka being most vulnerable during a dive supports comments i've read about it being almost "too good" a diving platform, that stability making it more open to attack from fighters.

It is noteworthy regarding the difficulties of the 109 in escorting the Stukas. It could be argued however that this difficulty was as much an issue of the "speedy" 109 as it was the slow Ju-87. In the end they don't appear to have been a good match in regards to the defensive factor. Speed was life for a 109. Going low and/or slow....bad. Even with large #'s of fighter escorts, the Stuka's remained very vulnerable. Again the question...would SBD's prove so vulnerable if heavy escorts are available?

lol....still not sure. There are lots of indicators of vulnerability but alot of them can be explained away as circumstances of the battlefield. It may just be that a "dive bomber" wasn't a very survivable plane to have in a land campaign. The British and Americans preferred level bombers, light and heavy over a DB, the latter type mostly reserved for naval operations. Russians had the Il-2 of course. The SBD did operate against land bases in the Pacific but per Eric Bergerud, being a 1E, it was also the most vulnerable of platforms when faced with an unhealthy environment. Yet on the other side of the coin there were times when SBD's met good numbers of enemy fighters and they did not consistantly suffer the large losses claimed against Stukas. (The above examples would be bigger adding the unconfirmed claims to them)


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## The Basket (Jan 3, 2008)

The Stuka had poor performance for a front line bomber and was not very agile. The rear gunner was also of marginal quality.

AFAIK the Stuka was withdrawn from the BoB to cover Operation Sealion. Losses of Stukas is one thing but losses of irreplacable crews is another bag of spanners.

I don't think the Stuka was a bad aircraft but vulnerable to fighter attack. That the Stuka was able to operaate on the eastern front has more to do with the qualities of Soviet air defence than strenghts of the Stuka.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 3, 2008)

B-17engineer said:


> i've sat in the rear seat of a Stuka its gun and sight and the cramped back was hard to aim but also it was a dive bombers what do you expect.......



Where did you sit in the rear seat of a Stuka? There are only 2 complete Stuka left in the world.


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## B-17engineer (Jan 3, 2008)

It was like 2,000 dollars it was expensive but i am a war buff I swear they let u sit in it! I am not lying............Raf museum in Hendon i was there on one time they let ppl in


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## lesofprimus (Jan 3, 2008)

Hmmmmm....


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 3, 2008)

Yeah I am calling Bullshit! You can not bullshit a bullshitter kid!

You know if you had just said that when you were visiting the Museum they were letting people take a seat in the Ju 87 I might have believed it, but to say they were charging you $2000 to sit in it. Nope sorry, they dont even use Dollars in England kid.

How old are you?


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## Soren (Jan 3, 2008)

Why, why why why why would you ever claim that B17engineer ??? 

Good advice for you kid, never lie, it ruins your credibility.


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## mkloby (Jan 3, 2008)




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## Nikademus (Jan 3, 2008)

My claim to infamy involves no money....just balls and stupidity. Climbing up into the formast of the USS Texas and snapping some photos from inside the tripod mast.  Cost: free. Memory: Priceless. Getting nearly thrown off the ship after being caught sneaking into the #3 gun turret magazine was less fun. ah youth......

More on topic.....did have an opp to fly in a B-17 that visited Seattle along with a B-24. However $400 and flying in a plane older than me by a considerable margin did not make for clean underware on my part. I'll gladly restrict my examinations from Planet Earth. The Boeing museum has a wonderfully preserved Ki-43II on display. and no...i did not attempt to touch it, climb in it or take it for a test taxi around the showroom. Well i may have reached over and touched the wingtip. History made solid. always a rush....always makes a GF unit roll her eyes too.


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## Soren (Jan 3, 2008)

mkloby said:


>



My face exactly


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 3, 2008)

Soren said:


> Why, why why why why would you ever claim that B17engineer ???
> 
> Good advice for you kid, never lie, it ruins your credibility.



B17engineer - listen carefully. There are some on this site who have an extensive background in aviation and for the most part we don't appreciate bullsh!tters of any age. SO if you have that much money to throw away just to alledgely plant your butt in a museum piece, well I invite you to come to my part of the world and I'll get you an L-39 ride for the same price.


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## B-17engineer (Jan 3, 2008)

Okay sorry i apologize, I dont know why i said it and it will never heppen again..........:'(


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 3, 2008)

Good - carry on!


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## B-17engineer (Jan 3, 2008)

THanks look at my new post I wrote an apology letter I hope u can forgive me....


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## FLYBOYJ (Jan 3, 2008)

B-17engineer said:


> THanks look at my new post I wrote an apology letter I hope u can forgive me....



Responded - its all good at least with me!


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## Soren (Jan 3, 2008)

Hear yay hear yay FLYBOYJ !


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## Erich (Jan 3, 2008)

ok back on topic then ......

Njaco well there is going to be a book on at least 3 NSGr units in the future, have added a bit from the files to the German author whose relative was in one unit on the Ost front but sadly was KIA. The BA/MA files in Freiburg are really full of information and it is one source which should be researched into further where most western authors dread it appears to go in and retrieve the necessary documentation to bring out the truth instead of the supposed details.

Point is the night units did lose to many Ju's and crews to Allied AA and Mossie nf's. A few and mean only a few fell to P-61's........


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 3, 2008)

B-17engineer said:


> Okay sorry i apologize, I dont know why i said it and it will never heppen again..........:'(



How old are you?


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## Soren (Jan 3, 2008)

Anyone want to start a bet ??


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## lesofprimus (Jan 3, 2008)

By my account, he's a teat-sucking numbnut who needs more attention from his Father.... I just got home and have to read this bullsh!t, along with his apology post....

I'd rather have bamboo shoots rammed under my toenails....

Kid, take the advice from the others and zip ur freakin mouth and use ur eyes to educate urself here... Speak up when u have a question or something u think might encourage a good discussion....

USE THE SEARCH BUTTON UP ABOVE!!!!

Liars get nowhere in life.... Trust me and all the others here, its a fact.... Liars are scumbags; dont be one....


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## Crumpp (Jan 3, 2008)

> How old are you?



Ahh the Yewwts...Wadda ya dew?


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## Njaco (Jan 3, 2008)

You callin me funny?!!

Erich and Nik, I must submit to your far superior resources than mine. My only take on the Stuka is that if the plane was so bad, the design poor, the power awful, why was it kept on operations throughout the war? It had to have some redeeming value about it. Yes there were "Stuka parties" and it was at times, meat for the butcher but there just was something that kept it flying (besides engines  ).

I think it did well, considering.


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## wilbur1 (Jan 4, 2008)

Well i dont know enough about the plane but i will tell you that when a person spouts crap then it must be crap, now im willin to give the guy the benifit of the doubt,but at the same time it still churns to be sh** but i say to hell with it! i read his post on apology, so hes makin amends give him that chance fellas,.........but if he screws up again.......feed him to lesbride she will take care of it


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## Konigstiger205 (Jan 4, 2008)

Well Stuka was made to operate under total air domination from the Luftwaffe and when the situation changed...well we all know the results...


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## renrich (Jan 4, 2008)

Well, I have the movie, BOB, on DVD and tape and those JU 87s sure looked vulnerable. Kidding aside I have read in many places where the Stukas did not do well when enemy fighters were present. The Dauntless was used by the USN as a CAP against enemy torpedo planes on a couple of occasions when their carriers were short of VFs.


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## V-1710 (Jan 5, 2008)

As some of the earlier posts pointed out, I don't think it was a case of the Stuka being vunerable to enemy fire. On the contrary, I think it was a particularly rugged aircraft. However, I have read on many occasions that it was not a pleasent aircraft to fly. Terms like slow, ungainly, difficult to handle, and poor in turns are common in Stuka reports. Those are characteristics that make a plane a good target. Though well armoured, it was still an aircraft, not a tank. 8 .303 Brownings, 20mm cannon fire, or 6 .50's will tear a Stuka up. So, I think it is accurate to say that a Stuka was one of the easier planes to take down. I think the Dauntless was not a good target, as it was small and handled well.


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## Nikademus (Jan 5, 2008)

Njaco said:


> You callin me funny?!!
> 
> Erich and Nik, I must submit to your far superior resources than mine. My only take on the Stuka is that if the plane was so bad, the design poor, the power awful, why was it kept on operations throughout the war? It had to have some redeeming value about it. Yes there were "Stuka parties" and it was at times, meat for the butcher but there just was something that kept it flying (besides engines  ).
> 
> I think it did well, considering.



I agree. It did have value....and it was vulnerable too. After tossing the idea around here or there and browsing a few sources for more tidbits.... The below passage helped me put it into more perspective as well as provide a last piece that also helps answer your question of why they were kept around;

"Goring's unwavering belief in the Stuka troubled his commanders, too. Unrivaled in precision-bombing and close infantry support when the Luftwaffe held the sky, they now made up *one third* of the Luftwaffe's bomber force.-_for maximum success at minimum cost of material,_ [my italics] the Reichsmarschall saw them as unbeatable. Yet to most, heavy losses of August 8 presaged the shape of things to come."
-Collier, _Eagle Day, The Battle of Britian_

So in conclusion, I personally feel that both viewpoints are essentially correct. Yes, the Stuka was probably more vulnerable than an SBD....or put another way, as vulnerable as often described. However, in terms of the "big picture", its also to a degree irrelevent as _any_ land power that employs a 1E precision weapon as 1/3 of their striking power is going to suffer heavier losses vs. a power that relies fully on 2E light and medium bombers (as well as 4E "heavies") in the absence of complete air control.

The above passage helps to also spread more light on why Germany embraced the DB as a primary component of their airforce while other nations did not. It was seen as a means of delivering maximum success at minimal cost in economic terms. It could also be built up rather quickly as well. Other nations, less bent on an offensive posture, but also not surrounded by landbased enemies, embraced the bomber concept from a more strategic angle, thus invested in 2E and 4E designs. While not as accurate, and in some cases, not all that much protection without good fighter protection, ultimately the type could be developed and woven into a doctrine of operational and tactical support of the land battlefield without sacrificing survivability on the modern battlefield. Plane for plane it might not be as accurate as a Stuka, but numbers and repeated attacks can make up for it and more trained men get home at the end of the day. The portents were there, but like with the Bf-110, it would take actual combat to make all realize this truth. Even after that however, with 1/3 of your airforce made up of these dive bombers....you can't simply stop using them. You work with what you have. Thus, the Stuka went to war in the Balkans, Russia and the Western Desert. When the Luftwaffe could dominate the air, the Stuka could regain some of it's early success, but faced with any decent fighter defense such as with the WDAF at times....the result was "Stuka-Parties"

SBD's would probably have fared better, but losses would still have been higher vs. the employment of 2E's.


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## HoHun (Jan 5, 2008)

Hi Nikademus,

>Yes, the Stuka was probably more vulnerable than an SBD....

Hm, I don't see how you concluded that. In your last post, you seemed to leave that question entirely open ...

With regard to the SBD's success, note that the Spitfire VB used in the desert had two times the firepower of the A6M2, and the cannon-armed Hurricane had four times the firepower. Additionally, the western fighters were armoured, had protected tanks and featured a bullet-resistant wind screen, factors reducing the effect of the Stukas' return fire.

The firepower factor alone can easily account for any perceived differences in Stuka and SBD vulnerability.

However, if we don't know the number of opportunities for large-scale dive bomber slaughter both in the desert and in the Pacific theatre, there is actually nothing we can learn from the number of Stukas shot down on such occasions anyway.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Soundbreaker Welch? (Jan 5, 2008)

> The firepower factor alone can easily account for any perceived differences in Stuka and SBD vulnerability.



Interesting point.......


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## JoeB (Jan 5, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Hm, I don't see how you concluded that. In your last post, you seemed to leave that question entirely open ...
> 
> With regard to the SBD's success, note that the Spitfire VB used in the desert had two times the firepower of the A6M2, and the cannon-armed Hurricane had four times the firepower. Additionally, the western fighters were armoured, had protected tanks and featured a bullet-resistant wind screen, factors reducing the effect of the Stukas' return fire.


I mainly agree, this situation somewhat resembles 'Spit outclassed Zero' in that there might be a general tendency to conclude something based on general reputation of each plane in different theaters. But in Spit v Zero case there were real meetings showing a surprisingly different result than the standard reputations would imply; whereas here we just can't say for sure.

The SBD had somewhat of a reputation for being able to take care of itself against fighters at least in USN, while Ju-87 had the opposite reputation, as least in West. But not only did they face different fighter opponents, but SBD's just didn't come under heavy fighter attack all that many times. In most of the 1942 carrier battles the Japanese carriers' CAP system failed to bring heavy attacks to bear on divebombers; one exception was the Marine SBD's at Midway which suffered pretty heavily, and another was Santa Cruz were VB-8/VS-8 came under heavy attack unescorted, and suffered several losses though did actually down a couple of Zeroes (the only Zeroes downed by SBD's in 1942 per Japanese accounts AFAIK; some other claims by SBD's to have downed Zeroes, as at Coral Sea are still celebrated even on TV shows etc. though it's long been known they aren't confirmed as losses in Japanese accounts). In the Guadalcanal campaign SBD's rarely came under landplane Zero attack, one notable exception being the day of the landing when an SBD gunner wounded Saburo Sakai. And after 1942 the losses of all USN attack types to enemy fighters were pretty limited, and almost non-existent from 1944, because of USN fighters.

The SBD didn't have a good reputation v fighters in the USAAF though. In New Guinea Zero's (also including Sakai it so happened) almost wiped out a small formation of A-24's (SBD's) July 26 1942, after which the USAAF made a point of keeping A-24's away from enemy fighters: that one incident cemented a pretty different reputation about its survivability.

I agree we might not find much to choose among planes like Ju-87, SBD, Type 99 Carrier Bomber (Val) in the same circumstances, though couldn't rule out that the greater manueverability of SBD and Type 99 might bail them out sometimes.

Joe


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## Njaco (Jan 5, 2008)

Nik, you may have part of the puzzle. I totally forgot how obsessed Hitler, Goering and such were with dive bombing. So that would be one major reason for its continued operation and the failure of High Command to recognize its obsolecence.



> The above passage helps to also spread more light on why Germany embraced the DB as a primary component of their airforce while other nations did not.



That point you may be mistaken on is the failure of other nations to develop DBs: as the previous posts state there was the SBD, the Vengence, etc. Other nations did not ignore the dive bombing concept but instead recognized its limitations. Germany and the Stuka were a litmus test for the DB for all nations and the Allies caught on real quick. You don't bring a knife to a gunfight. This is only my opinion.


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## Udet (Jan 6, 2008)

I said it before and i´ll say it again...

Had Germany won the war then we would be reading on the "perfect" nearly "unbeatable" ground attack plane in history.

That´s precisely the sort of tale sold by the Soviet Department of Mythology Affairs regarding their ultra-overrated IL-2 "Shturmovik".

Also you have the other allied fairy tale, the one that affirms the Stuka became obsolete "early in the war"....go tell Pinocchio stories to kindergarten kids when tucking them into bed...the fact a plane not designed for air-to-air combat might endure high losses when caught by enemy fighters will not make it obsolete, at all.

With proper fighter cover or in conditions of nearly complete air superiority in the sector, the Stuka is something like the ultimate tool of destruction *any year of the war*. (Ask the Royal Navy commanders and sailors operating off the coast of Crete in 1941)

Following such allied logic then the B-17 and B-24 were "obsolete" considering the period of time prior to mid-1944 when they flew deep into Germany without fighter escorts and were slaughtered by the Bf 109s and Fw 190s.

Also Erich hit the nail, how come that "superb" soviet air force that allegedly re-emerged from 1943 through the end of the war proved uncapable of wiping out the presence of "obsolete" Stuka units operating in the eastern front....


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## HoHun (Jan 6, 2008)

Hi Joeb,

>this situation somewhat resembles 'Spit outclassed Zero' in that there might be a general tendency to conclude something based on general reputation of each plane in different theaters. 

You fallacy in the Spitfire vs. Zero and the Hurricane vs. Zero threads (where you should keep it!) is that you look at the results achieved by men in their machines, and then use that to fuzzily doubt the quality of the machines.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## HoHun (Jan 6, 2008)

Hi Njaco,

>Other nations did not ignore the dive bombing concept but instead recognized its limitations. 

Based on their early-war experience, Germany actually specified, developed and deployed a Stuka successor far superior in performance and self-protection to the earlier model. It was a twin-engined aircraft with internal bomb bay, wing-mounted dive brakes, a defensive armament arrangement that allowed the rear gunner to cover the lower rear sector as well, and a top speed close to the Mosquito's.

I'm sure you know the type - it's the Messerschmitt Me 210.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Njaco (Jan 6, 2008)

I may have mispoke about the obsolete part and I was saying it was only one part of the equation, this being Hitler's insistance. And I agree with Erich on the all mighty Red AF.

HoHun, I wasn't saying it was given up on. I was trying to point out that while Germany slowly came to realize that the DB concept would only work within certain limitations, The Allies recognized that early and conducted opeations with the type within those limits.

Dive-bombing without aerial supremecy is just being a bullet magnet.


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## AL Schlageter (Jan 6, 2008)

Udet said:


> That´s precisely the sort of tale sold by the Soviet Department of Mythology Affairs regarding their ultra-overrated IL-2 "Shturmovik".
> 
> Also you have the other allied fairy tale, the one that affirms the Stuka became obsolete "early in the war"....go tell Pinocchio stories to kindergarten kids when tucking them into bed


Do we need this type of posting?



> Also Erich hit the nail, how come that "superb" soviet air force that allegedly re-emerged from 1943 through the end of the war proved uncapable of wiping out the presence of "obsolete" Stuka units operating in the eastern front....


Could it be that there was enough LW fighters around to escort the Ju?: shock: 



> Following such allied logic then the B-17 and B-24 were "obsolete" considering the period of time prior to mid-1944 when they flew deep into Germany without fighter escorts and were slaughtered by the Bf 109s and Fw 190s.


What is with this use of the word 'allied'?
Yes the B-17 and B-24 could be considered obsolete as they couldn't operate without escorts.


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## JoeB (Jan 6, 2008)

HoHun said:


> You fallacy in the Spitfire vs. Zero and the Hurricane vs. Zero threads (where you should keep it!) is that you look at the results achieved by men in their machines, and then use that to fuzzily doubt the quality of the machines.


I respectfully disagree and think it's actually a theme that runs across most if not nearly all debates about plane characteristics v operational results. In this case there are in fact some 'plane' differences between Ju87's and say SBD-3's (speed, agility, fwd and rear firing armament, etc) that suggest the SBD might be more survivable. The problem is judging how significant those differences would really be to outcomes against a given fighter opposition. So it's not about 'fuzzy doubt of machines' but rather reasonable doubt about the actual effect of particular plane differences on combat outcomes. 

In this case we don't have comparable outcomes to say the SBD's apparently better qualities against fighters would really make much difference in a given situation (either that SBD's would survive better than Ju87's in ETO/MTO situations as they were, or that Ju87's wouldn't have survived as well as SBD's in PTO situation as they were). Whereas in the Spit/Hurricane/Zero case we have a real outcome that at least casts doubt, to the open minded IMO, whether the plane differences held up as making the Spit 'outclass' the Zero, or 'Hurricane a better fighter than F4F' etc. were really that important in determining outcomes, though I agree that doesn't tell us which factors were most important in their exact rankings (more subtle plane differences, pilot factors etc).

I tend to think in this case the difference in survivability among Ju87, SBD and Type 99 in exactly the same cirumstances wouldn't have been dramatically different, but it's possible they may have been different. I believe the main point is not to make statements as if of clear fact when speculating about such things, which in at least this case you seem to agree.

Joe


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## Erich (Jan 6, 2008)

I still go back to the Panzerjäger staffeln of SG 2, 3 77 as examples who had a staffel of Ju 87G's and did terrible work on Soviet armor, and yet the crews time after time sortie after sortie did their work, where was the Soviet A/F ? even in the final weeks of the war. Soviet AA was responsible for 9/1-ths of the losses known.

back to the origins even in 45 the Stuka was of use


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## drgondog (Jan 6, 2008)

JoeB said:


> I respectfully disagree and think it's actually a theme that runs across most if not nearly all debates about plane characteristics v operational results. In this case there are in fact some 'plane' differences between Ju87's and say SBD-3's (speed, agility, fwd and rear firing armament, etc) that suggest the SBD might be more survivable. The problem is judging how significant those differences would really be to outcomes against a given fighter opposition. So it's not about 'fuzzy doubt of machines' but rather reasonable doubt about the actual effect of particular plane differences on combat outcomes.
> 
> In this case we don't have comparable outcomes to say the SBD's apparently better qualities against fighters would really make much difference in a given situation (either that SBD's would survive better than Ju87's in ETO/MTO situations as they were, or that Ju87's wouldn't have survived as well as SBD's in PTO situation as they were). Whereas in the Spit/Hurricane/Zero case we have a real outcome that at least casts doubt, to the open minded IMO, whether the plane differences held up as making the Spit 'outclass' the Zero, or 'Hurricane a better fighter than F4F' etc. were really that important in determining outcomes, though I agree that doesn't tell us which factors were most important in their exact rankings (more subtle plane differences, pilot factors etc).
> 
> ...



Great Post Joe. 

Doctrine, applied tactics, lethality of environment all are major influences to results - without taking into account Performance and Training and Experience. 

We have a tendency to extrapolate way too much based on flight tests and published results.

Regards,

Bill


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## HoHun (Jan 6, 2008)

Hi Joeb,

>In this case there are in fact some 'plane' differences between Ju87's and say SBD-3's (speed, agility, fwd and rear firing armament, etc) that suggest the SBD might be more survivable. The problem is judging how significant those differences would really be to outcomes against a given fighter opposition. So it's not about 'fuzzy doubt of machines' but rather reasonable doubt about the actual effect of particular plane differences on combat outcomes. *So it's not about 'fuzzy doubt of machines' but rather reasonable doubt about the actual effect of particular plane differences on combat outcomes.* (My emphasis - HoHun)

Basic text comprehension, again - my comment was referring to your "Spitfire" example, applied clearly stated to the Spitfire, and I didn't mention the Stuka with a single word.

You are not actually discussing things with HoHun, but with a mental mirage of your own making that results from you not really reading my posts.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## HoHun (Jan 6, 2008)

Hi Erich,

>I still go back to the Panzerjäger staffeln of SG 2, 3 77 as examples who had a staffel of Ju 87G's and did terrible work on Soviet armor, and yet the crews time after time sortie after sortie did their work, where was the Soviet A/F ? even in the final weeks of the war. Soviet AA was responsible for 9/1-ths of the losses known.

Good point - that the Stuka was replaced by Fw 190 Jabos in the Schlachtflieger role was really a result of the continuous increase of the Soviet anti-aircraft artillery (along with aggressive use of infantry weapons for air defense).

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Nikademus (Jan 6, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Hi Nikademus,
> 
> Hm, I don't see how you concluded that. In your last post, you seemed to leave that question entirely open ..



Hi HH,

I left the question a little open because I don't feel that there's a simple Black or White answer here. Both sides of the argument have merit and after looking back and forth between them and re-going over the detailed accounts I currently have combined with more operatoinal/strategic focused books, I felt this is one of those situations, like many others were there are elements of truth in both, dependant on what aspects one wants to focus on or interpret.



> With regard to the SBD's success, note that the Spitfire VB used in the desert had two times the firepower of the A6M2, and the cannon-armed Hurricane had four times the firepower. Additionally, the western fighters were armoured, had protected tanks and featured a bullet-resistant wind screen, factors reducing the effect of the Stukas' return fire.



Yes.....later in the war. However the worst of the Stuka Parties I documented occured during times when there were no cannon armed UK planes conducting the slaughter. The terrible vulnerability of the Stuka to even rifle caliber only armed opponents, many of which only had rudimentary training in gunnery is one of those factoids that had me scratching the chin. Yes, the A6M had less rifle caliber guns to spray the target yet there were more than one case documented where the SBD was riddled with them by skillful Japanese pilots and yet the plane continued to fly. (F4F had a similar effect....one pilot once commenting that the best place to have an A6M on you if it had to be was on your six. the centermounted rifle guns could spray you good but would just ping off the armor plate)




> The firepower factor alone can easily account for any perceived differences in Stuka and SBD vulnerability.



I have to disagree. At least on a plane for plane basis. However, I agree that if there are massive numbers of fighters present, then yes, all that firepower is going to take a toll. Balanced against this though, is the fact that even with tremendous numbers of escorts.....the Stuka's remained vulnerable. SBD's could be vulnerable, but tended to suffer more marginal losses when adequate escorts were present.



> However, if we don't know the number of opportunities for large-scale dive bomber slaughter both in the desert and in the Pacific theatre, there is actually nothing we can learn from the number of Stukas shot down on such occasions anyway.



I think there's enough commentary and battle accounts to at least make an educated guess. Going back to the "open question" The specific accounts of SBD vs Stuka combats, and author's comments do show a difference, however when looking at the "big picture" again, such as the situation in the Desert where the Luft faced a large if often inexperienced airforce, the chance for fighter attack was far greater. If an SBD is a tougher kill than a Stuka, its equally arguable that a Wellington or Ju-88 is a tougher kill than an SBD. Thus, I think in the "big picture" the better estimated toughness of the SBD is largely moot. Either plane, put in such a situation is going to suffer heavy losses. If the SBD suffers less than the Stuka but is still classified as being heavily attritted, its largely moot. A different solution is needed.

On a related note.....I've just finished a day by day account of Operation Torch. The Cassablanca landings saw SBD's employed, sometimes without fighter escort against land and port targets in a situation where complete air superiority was not fully established. The Vichy French fighter force put up a spirited defense using Hawk 75A's and D.520's. There were no "SBD Parties" Worst incident i've documented so far was a couple interceptions of unescorted SBD strikes. Both were undeterred from striking their targets. One with a TBF was reputedly flown like a "fighter" and was not downed. None of the SBD's were shot down from the first element despite being attacked by 8 French fighters. The 2nd flight suffered several losses but still bombed their targets. French fighters got 2 SBD's here. So far this is the worst single incident loss i can find.


Regards,

Henning (HoHun)[/QUOTE]


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## Nikademus (Jan 6, 2008)

Njaco said:


> Nik, you may have part of the puzzle. I totally forgot how obsessed Hitler, Goering and such were with dive bombing. So that would be one major reason for its continued operation and the failure of High Command to recognize its obsolecence.
> 
> That point you may be mistaken on is the failure of other nations to develop DBs: as the previous posts state there was the SBD, the Vengence, etc. Other nations did not ignore the dive bombing concept but instead recognized its limitations. Germany and the Stuka were a litmus test for the DB for all nations and the Allies caught on real quick. You don't bring a knife to a gunfight. This is only my opinion.



Hi Njaco,

I probably should have worded that better. What i meant by the previous was that none of the other nations embraced the DB as a principle instrument of ground support for the army. The US was weded mainly to the idea of strategic level bombing and also developed a string of 2E type bombers for army support. They did toy with the DB in the form of the A-24 but it died a quick death. It didn't help that the A-24's were an early version of the SBD and I don't think they were armored or had self sealing tanks. Combined with a harsh envirnment with few recognizable targets they didn't do so well and were replaced by 2E's and saturation bombing. (The Austrailians however did develop a better more precise ground support system using Wirraways though)

The RAF was very resistant to the idea of the DB and this impeeded the development and eventual deployment of the Vengence.....it being used in more distant theaters like Burma where it operated well under conditions where enemy fighter defenses were intermittant. Like the USN, the DB mainly saw development and service in naval orgs like the FAA. The DB was a good weapons platform vs. naval ships. Land ops though....the Western Allies mainly used the LB and fielded some very tough designs in quantity.


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## Nikademus (Jan 6, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Hi Erich,
> 
> >I still go back to the Panzerjäger staffeln of SG 2, 3 77 as examples who had a staffel of Ju 87G's and did terrible work on Soviet armor, and yet the crews time after time sortie after sortie did their work, where was the Soviet A/F ? even in the final weeks of the war. Soviet AA was responsible for 9/1-ths of the losses known.
> 
> Henning (HoHun)



I may have a partial answer for that. IIRC, Glantz (Kursk) mentioned that a large majority of Soviet airpower was subordinate to the ground commanders for the purpose of that huge clash with the Germans. As such the bulk of the Red Airforce ops tended to be devoted to the task of supporting the Red Army ops, not fighting the Luftwaffe directly. They didn't appear to devote a large amount of their efforts to fighter sweeps (Freie Jagd type ops) and a defensive patrols though admitedly they had the numbers to do it all at times. According to that book, it was only by mid-late 43 that the Red Airforce finally began to become competetive in direct conflict with the Luft which had owned the sky prior to that. Even at Kursk though, Soviet air achievements appeared more a matter of numbers and a willingness to edure horrendous losses vs. any general indication of skill. The Germans were also quoted in the book as having one key advantage in their radar nets which could provide enough warning of incoming strikes to vector the fighters (when available) to intercept them.


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## HoHun (Jan 6, 2008)

Hi Nikademus,

>Yes, the A6M had less rifle caliber guns to spray the target yet there were more than one case documented where the SBD was riddled with them by skillful Japanese pilots and yet the plane continued to fly.

The A6M2 had two machine guns compared to the Spitfire's and Hurricane's eight - again, the Stuka was facing four times the firepower. 

>the centermounted rifle guns could spray you good but would just ping off the armor plate

Armour is a good keyword here - the Betriebsanleitung for the Ju 87B-2 dating from June 1940 gives a weight table for a B-2 without armour, noting that the weight table for an armoured B-2 "is currently being pepared". Maximum take-off weight was indicated to increase from 4870 kg to 5000 kg for the load condition fully fueled and armed, two-man crew, 1000 kg bomb due to the addition of armour.

Until the armour condition of the Stukas "slaughtered" in 1940 is determined, it's not possible to conclude anything from it since obviously, an unarmoured aircraft would indeed be terribly vulnerable regardless of the qualities of the specific aircraft type.

If comparing the Stuka to a SBD-3 that fought in the first line from the Battle of the Coral Sea in mid-1942 to the conclusion of the Guadalcanal campaign in 1943, it would be better to use an armoured example of the Ju 87B-2 or even a Ju 87D. The latter seems to have featured "Grundpanzerung" as a standard ('basic armour' - probably to differentiate it from more elaborate ground attack armour). The Ju 87D entered service in March 1942.

>I have to disagree. At least on a plane for plane basis. 

Oh well - firepower is directly related to the killing ability of any aircraft, even on a plane-for-plane basis. I never heard of fighter pilots discounting firepower either - and they sure were focused on their personal aircraft.

>The specific accounts of SBD vs Stuka combats ...

I don't think SBDs ever fought Ju 87s - you surely meant to write something different 

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Erich (Jan 6, 2008)

it's a fact that the Fw 190 Schlachtflieger could skim over the humps/bumps of eastern Germany ~ Prussia and the eastern regions and fire off 2cm and the panzerblitz rockets before the Soviet MT with triple AAA would know what hit them, the Stuka units in small waves and in singles could not perform this function let alone be implemented with rocket/racks it would tear the wings right off


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## Nikademus (Jan 6, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Hi Nikademus,
> 
> The A6M2 had two machine guns compared to the Spitfire's and Hurricane's eight - again, the Stuka was facing four times the firepower.



Hi HH,

In theory yes. However the Hurricane/Spit's guns were wing mounted and to get the full effect of that firepower required the target to be in the optimum convergence point and all guns had to be functioning (no jams). The A6M has less total theoretical firepower but with the guns centermounted, a highly skilled pilot such as those faced in 42 in the Pacific had a good chance to get a thorough spraying of the target using 2 guns. Not *always* of course, but it shows that static comparison of total firepower isn't always black or white. Dependant on situation, he might end up putting more or equal bullets on target. They had more challenges bringing their cannons on target. The Germans, their skilled pilots at least were also notorious for being able to make the most of their center mounted cannon(s)



> Until the armour condition of the Stukas "slaughtered" in 1940 is determined, it's not possible to conclude anything from it since obviously, an unarmoured aircraft would indeed be terribly vulnerable regardless of the qualities of the specific aircraft type.



Are you saying the Stukas used in 40 and 41 were unarmored or were less armored? If the latter yes, thats a factor though it still doesn't seem to have made much difference at least against fighter planes. One online source speaking of the B-2 stated it's armor was increased to combat damage from ground attack. Perhaps rear facing protection was not signifigantly enhanced. And what about the fuel tanks? better self sealers? 



> If comparing the Stuka to a SBD-3 that fought in the first line from the Battle of the Coral Sea in mid-1942 to the conclusion of the Guadalcanal campaign in 1943, it would be better to use an armoured example of the Ju 87B-2 or even a Ju 87D. The latter seems to have featured "Grundpanzerung" as a standard ('basic armour' - probably to differentiate it from more elaborate ground attack armour). The Ju 87D entered service in March 1942.



The Ju-87B-2 beganreplacing the B1 by the end of 39. I believe it fought in the desert and over Britian. The D fought in the Med....it's vulnerability to fighters seemed largely unchanged. Tactics (night attack for example) did more to limit losses in some cases. 



> Oh well - firepower is directly related to the killing ability of any aircraft, even on a plane-for-plane basis. I never heard of fighter pilots discounting firepower either - and they sure were focused on their personal aircraft.



I don't think anyone is discounting firepower here.



> I don't think SBDs ever fought Ju 87s - you surely meant to write something different



Well its little known in the West, but Russia secretly built their own copy of an SBD to use as an anti Stuka vehicle.  

naw. I meant comparing battles that involved SBD's vs fighters and Stuka's vs. fighters. As you mention its impossible to put a completely level playing field comparison due to environment but one can still glean impressions from them and comments by pilots and air leaders. There seems to be a difference though as i mentioned prior....i think overall the difference would be moot if the SBD were employed en-mass as an army support weapon. A 2E is simply a better more survivable vehicle. For example only, if one were to conclude an SBD was 20% tougher to kill than a Stuka, and you lose 55 Stukas in a single battle, then just using that equation you lose 44 SBD's. Both suffered heavy losses. The difference becomes largely moot.


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## HoHun (Jan 6, 2008)

Hi Nikademus,

>However the Hurricane/Spit's guns were wing mounted and to get the full effect of that firepower required the target to be in the optimum convergence point 

Roger that - you could even have beat me over the head with my own post in the "Centreline Armament Thread". The Spitfire armament was even worse than the Hurricane armament since the outer guns were really very far from the centreline.

Since the question if the Stukas we are looking at were actually armoured (and to which degree) is of overriding importance, a detailed discussion of the 8-wing-gun fighter versus the 2-nose-gun fighter is not going to help us much, though.

>Are you saying the Stukas used in 40 and 41 were unarmored or were less armored? If the latter yes, thats a factor though it still doesn't seem to have made much difference at least against fighter planes. 

The Betriebsanleitung lists the standard Ju 87B-2, and the Ju 87B-2 "with armour". That might be simplified language, but the "with armour" version had its weight increased by 130 kg. I don't think that in June 1940, Stukas were considered for the Schlachtflieger role already, but I might be wrong.

The type overview Ju 87D lists "basic armour" in the column "Variant and differences" emphasized in bold type. "Basic armour" doesn't sound like ground attack armour, and that it's listed in the "differences" column appears to indicate that the B was not equipped with basic armour off the factory lines. The Betriebsanleitung for the B-2 leaves open the possibility that it was retro-fitted, though.

>The D fought in the Med....it's vulnerability to fighters seemed largely unchanged. 

It might have had increased armour, but the RAF fighters had greatly increased firepower for certain.

That doesn't mean it couldn't have done better against the A6M2 the SBD-3 faced. The rear guns of the Ju 87D had a 50% higher rate of fire than those of the SBD-3, and the A6M2 had only 50% of the firepower of a Spitfire, and 25% of that of the four-cannon Hurricane.

>I don't think anyone is discounting firepower here.

Well, then my observation that the Ju 87D's opponents fielded heavier firepower than the SBD-3's should have some relevance to the assessment of the two dive bombers' relative vulnerability  

>The difference becomes largely moot.

I think it's rather difficult to determine any difference at all since there is no comparable situation which shows the success of both types in similar circumstances. 

As I see it, the one thing that we can say for certain is that the SBD-3 tended to face unarmoured, unprotected, low-firepower fighters while the contemporary Ju 87D met well-armoured and protected fighters of generally superior firepower and speed.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## drgondog (Jan 6, 2008)

HoHun said:


> As I see it, the one thing that we can say for certain is that the SBD-3 tended to face unarmoured, unprotected, low-firepower fighters while the contemporary Ju 87D met well-armoured and protected fighters of generally superior firepower and speed.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Henning (HoHun)



Henning ?????

Are you saying that an SBD was by definition in a far less hostile environment because it ONLY met the lightly armored and under gunned Zero? Is that your 'certainty'?


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## helmitsmit (Jan 7, 2008)

Also the stuka was surprisingly manuvourable

I have heard reports of german stuka polits giving the Spits a run around. 

I think it was the most accurate dive bomber of the war because it could do vertical dives. And the most practical. But you neeed to have air supiriority before the stuka can be truely effective, yet the Luftwaffe never had that in the BOB. Remember how good it was at the blitzkreg of western europe.


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## Wildcat (Jan 7, 2008)

helmitsmit said:


> I think it was the most accurate dive bomber of the war because it could do vertical dives. .


Thats debatable. The Vengeance also used a vertical dive to attack targets (probably others too). Any a/c dropping a bomb from the vertical, or very little angle, is going to be highly accurate. I don't see how two different a/c capable of the same feat is going to be more accurate then the other.


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## lesofprimus (Jan 7, 2008)

Stability in a dive, speed of said dive, aiming devices, bomb performance, AAA fire.......


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## Kurfürst (Jan 7, 2008)

Nikademus said:


> Are you saying the Stukas used in 40 and 41 were unarmored or were less armored? If the latter yes, thats a factor though it still doesn't seem to have made much difference at least against fighter planes.
> 
> ...
> 
> The D fought in the Med....it's vulnerability to fighters seemed largely unchanged.



'Seems'? Excuse moi, but to me it *seems* these statements of yours are appearantly based on _nothing_. Where are the bloody facts....?

It`s just kept being repeated that the Stuka had some sort of mythical vulnerability, while the SBD had some sort of mythical survivability. The Stuka was 'slow'. It had 'poor armament'. It was 'not so rugged'. 'Not so survivable'. _Not invented here._

Claims were not supported by any facts, references or serious sources so far, basically most claims in this thread *seem* to have no relation to the technical facts - actual speed, actual defensive armament, actual level of armoring the plane had - just personal bias and preconceptions is present. 

It`s a pointless excercise, nothing can be learned from it by anyone.


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## Soren (Jan 7, 2008)

The Ju-87 was a better dive bomber than te SBD, and as far as protection goes I'm sure there wasn't much difference between the two.


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## HoHun (Jan 7, 2008)

Hi Nikademus,

>It didn't help that the A-24's were an early version of the SBD and I don't think they were armored or had self sealing tanks. 

David Donald's "Bomber" gives the A-24 versions as follows:

A-24 = SBD-3 (minus arrestor gear), 78 examples factory build
A-24 = SBD-3A, 90 examples from a Navy batch converted to A-24 standards
A-24A = SBD-4, 100/170? examples
A-24B = SBD-5, 615 examples, Tulsa-built

I figure all of the Army A-24 variants had the arrestor gear removed, but Donald mentions it only specifically for the first batch.

Accordingly to Donald, armour and self-sealing tanks were introduced with the SBD-2 variant.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## AL Schlageter (Jan 7, 2008)

What is the data for each model of Ju 87 for actual speed, actual defensive armament and field of fire, actual level of armoring the plane had?


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## HoHun (Jan 7, 2008)

Hi Al,

>What is the data for each model of Ju 87 for actual speed, actual defensive armament and field of fire, actual level of armoring the plane had?

I'd love to see accurate data, too - hard to find, though.

Here is some armour data for the Ju 87D-3 from David Donald's "Bomber":

Pilot armour: Armour glass windscreen, armoured seat with 8 mm back armour, 4 mm side armour, 8 mm shoulder and head armour (above the armour seat). The side armour is a triangle designed to protect hips and thighs from oblique rear shots. The head armour is labelled "head rest" in the drawing, but I suppose it was the customary cushioned armour plate.

Cockpit armour: 4 mm armour floor, 8 mm rear armour bulkhead. 

Some bits and pieces of rear gunner "side and head armour" that I can't make out clearly in the drawing.

8 mm armour floor below the main oil tank aft of the engine.

"Additional side armour (external)" for the cockpit sides - I think this may be our Schlachtflieger bolt-on armour. Unfortunately, no thickness is given.

For the SBD-5 and -6, the BuAer standard characteristics provide a drawing showing armour and fuel tank arrangement. 

Untitled Document

(This also has SBD-5 performance data. "Speedy Bee" indeed! 

On the SBD-5 and 6, there is some armour decking on the nose, probably designed to close the gap between the protection the engine yields against frontal shots and the pilot position. The pilot has an armour glass windscreen and back armour, set about 1 ft behind his back. The rear gunner has the shield on the Brownings and some armour plates on the rear bulkhead for breast and shoulders.

Pilot rear armour weight is listed as 45 kg, forward armour as 17 kg, rear gunner armour as 14 kg. The total is 76 kg. No armour thickness figures are given.

For comparison, the difference between standard Ju 87B-2 and Ju 87B-2 "with armour" was given as 130 kg in the Betriebsanleitung, but what exactly is included in that amount is not clear. (It might be different from the Ju 87D-3 layout described above.)

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## helmitsmit (Jan 7, 2008)

It is very easy for pilots to think they are vertical when they are not. The stuka had an angle meaure at the side of the canopy to aim the pilot and it had a automatic recovery system incase of blackout.


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## AL Schlageter (Jan 7, 2008)

Henning, a cubic foot of rolled steel weighs 489.6lbs.


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## Kurfürst (Jan 7, 2008)

HoHun said:


> For the SBD-5 and -6, the BuAer standard characteristics provide a drawing showing armour and fuel tank arrangement.
> 
> Untitled Document
> 
> ...



In comparison, the Ju 87D`s armor protection weight some _400_ kg.

Maximum speed also appears to be the same, ie. 410 km/h.

Armament, forward firing, two fifites on the SBD, compared to two 7.92mm MGs or two 20mm cannons on the Ju 87D.

Rear armament, two 30 cals on the the SBD, two 7.92mm on the Ju 87D, altough the latter were MG 81s and were much faster firing than the Brownings, and the rear gunner`s position was more heavily armored.


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## Graeme (Jan 7, 2008)

Wildcat said:


> The Vengeance also used a vertical dive to attack targets (probably others too).



Boscombe Down tested a Vengeance I (AN889) in August 1942.





Proved to be a _"very accurate" _dive-bomber._ "A radial error of 30 yards was achieved in near vertical dives by 'tipping-in' after the the target disappeared under the wing."_

The dive brakes also proved to be very effective-_"a 45 deg. dive was held to 280mph with the brakes extended compared to 390 mph retracted." 
_
How fast was the Stuka traveling in its optimum dive at 90 deg.?


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## HoHun (Jan 7, 2008)

Hi Graeme,

>Boscombe Down tested a Vengeance I (AN889) in August 1942.

Thanks for the summary! I'd almost say the Vengeance must have been a better plane than generally recognized - Dunstan Hadley, author of "Barracuda Pilot", also had something nice to say about the type, which he flew for a while instead of his usual mount, the Barracuda (which was dive-bombing capable as well, though I understand the expected attack mode was to dive, level out and then make a torpedo run).

>How fast was the Stuka traveling in its optimum dive at 90 deg.?

Eric Brown has written an article on the type in "Wings of the Luftwaffe" ...

First a bit on armour since we were discussing that before:

"The cowling embodied quite an amount of armour plate to protect engine and cooler, and I was to discover liberal quantities of additional armour distributed beneath and around the two cockpits ..."

On diving:

"Now a dive angle of 90 deg is a pretty palpitating experience for it always feels as if the aircraft is over the vertical and is bunting, and all this while terra firma is rushing closer with apparently suicidal rapidity. In fact, I have rarely seen a specialist dive bomber put over 70 deg in a dive, but the Ju 87 was a genuine 90 deg screamer! For some indefinable reason the Ju 87D felt right standing on its nose, and the acceleration to 540 km/h was reached in about 1370 m, speed thereafter creeping slowly up to the absolute permitted limit of 600 km/h so that the feeling of being on a runaway roller-coaster experienced with most other dive bombers was missing."

"As speed built up, the nose of the Ju 87 was used as the aiming mark. The elevators were moderately light in the initial stages of the dive but they heavied up considerably as speed built up Any alterations in azimuth to keep the aiming mark on the target could be made accurately by use of the ailerons. [...]"

"When I finally turned for Schleswig, to where I was supposed to deliver the Ju 87D-3, I must confess that I had had a more enjoyable hour's dive bombing practice than I had ever experienced with any other aircraft of this specialist type. Somehow the Ju 87D did not appear to find its natural element until it was diving steeply. It seemed quite normal to stand this aircraft on its nose in a vertical dive because its accleration had none of that uncontrollable runaway feeling associated with a fixed 90 deg inclination in an aircraft like the Skua. [...]"

(Eric Brown notes that he had flown the Skua, the Vengeance and the Dauntless dive bombers before he tried the Stuka.)

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## HoHun (Jan 7, 2008)

Hi Kurfürst,

>In comparison, the Ju 87D`s armor protection weight some _400_ kg.

Highly interesting! Is that including the external side armour mentioned in Donald's book (and also in Eric Brown's account)?

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Harleyfxdl (Jan 7, 2008)

I recently read the book by Hans Rudel "Stuka Pilot", who everyone knows is the pinnicle of Stuka pilots. In the book he clearly states his superior piloting skills allowed him to avoid being shot down. He states pulling high G manuvers that the soviet pilots could not maintain. Not to mention his rear gunner was a crack shot and kept the enemy at bay. For excellent reading I highly suggest this book. I have read somewhere about SBD's dogfighting with Kates Vals. The SBD's had 2x.50 cal's where as the Japanese counterparts as well as the Stukas had 2x.30 cal. Quite a difference between the two weapons.


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## Crumpp (Jan 7, 2008)

> Thanks for the summary! I'd almost say the Vengeance must have been a better plane than generally recognized - Dunstan Hadley, author of "Barracuda Pilot", also had something nice to say about the type, which he flew for a while instead of his usual mount, the Barracuda (which was dive-bombing capable as well, though I understand the expected attack mode was to dive, level out and then make a torpedo run).



Hi Henning,

It very nicely illustrates the fact the aircraft is designed to do a job and unless the design team is incompetent, it will perform that design task.

So much is just flat out O-P-I-N-I-O-N.

Reminds me of "high wing" vs. "low-wing" fans going at it as to whose aircraft is the best!

It amazes me what people will take and push as fact.

All the best,

Crumpp


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## HoHun (Jan 7, 2008)

Hi Crumpp,

>It very nicely illustrates the fact the aircraft is designed to do a job and unless the design team is incompetent, it will perform that design task.

Interesting that you mention that - Mike Crosley, Fleet Air Arm Seafire pilot and military test pilot, heavily criticized the Barracuda too ... but not for being a poorly designed aircraft, but for being an aircraft designed for poorly conceived specifications. Seems to be right on your line of thinking! 

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Crumpp (Jan 7, 2008)

> being an aircraft designed for poorly conceived specifications



That is a major cause of designs being shelved.

All the Best,

Crumpp


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## Graeme (Jan 7, 2008)

Hi Henning,

Thanks for the Gen on the Stuka’s diving profile.



HoHun said:


> "Now a dive angle of 90 deg is a pretty palpitating experience



Regards the experience of flying a dive-bomber mission, it must have been an exhilarating and hypnotic? experience. David Donald’s Airplane part work No.152...

_“US Navy legend has it that pilots (of SBDs) were prone to ‘target fascination’ which could lull them into failing to pull out of the dive in time.”_



HoHun said:


> Barracuda (which was dive-bombing capable as well, though I understand the expected attack mode was to dive, level out and then make a torpedo run).



Until today I thought the same, but I revisited some of the ‘standard’ British references and it appears to be the opposite…

British Naval Aircraft since 1912-Owen Thetford pp 158;

_“It was, in fact, as a dive-bomber that the Barracuda figured most prominently: it used the torpedo rarely.”
_
The British Bomber since 1912-Peter Lewis pp 320;

_“Relatively little use was made of the Barracuda as a torpedo-carrier during the war, but the type was spectacularly successful in the role of dive bomber…”_

The British Bomber since 1914-Francis Mason pp 342;

_“As previously stated, the Barracuda’s service did not include torpedo operations, principally owing to the diminishing opportunities in European waters during the last two years of the War. For such operations in the Far East, the Fleet Air Arm increasingly depended on the excellent Grumman Avenger.”_

Barracudas of 831 and 829 Squadrons practised dive-bombing on a full size dummy of the Tirpitz prior to the famous attack. After three weeks of dive-bombing practice the strike force had attained a remarkable degree of proficiency-on their penultimate practice run, 24 Barracudas dropped 96 practice bombs on to a target 600 ft by 40 ft in less than 30 seconds; of the 96 bombs dropped 90 were direct hits.





An early production Barracuda Mk I demonstrating the Fairey-Youngman flaps being deployed in dive-bombing. The slipstream created when the flaps were at a negative angle necessitated a high-set tailplane. Also visible is the navigator's starboard window.


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## Njaco (Jan 8, 2008)

Graeme...

from "Hitler's Stuka Squadrons" by John Ward pg 39-41

Pilots converting to the Ju 87 from the Hs 123, with which most of the Stuka units had previously been equipped, found operating the new aircraft straightforward enough. ....Acceleration was good, the Stuka becoming airbourne after a run of about 475m at a speed of 116kmh. Initial climb was at 215kmh, the supercharger being moved from low gear to the automatic position at an altitue of 3500m. The climb was laborous, the aircraft taking some 20 minutes to reach 5000m.

Before entering a dive, the Stuka pilot went through the following checklist: landing flaps at cruise position, elevator trim at cruise position; rudder trim at cruise position; propellor pitch set at cruise; contact altimeter ON; contact altimeter set to release altitude; supercharger set at automatic; throttle fully closed; cooler flaps closed; dive brakes open.

The action of opening the dive brakes made the Stuka nose over under the influence of the pull-out mechanism, which was itself activated by opening the dive-brakes. To enable the pilot to judge the correct dive angle - not an easy thing to do without some form of artificial aid - a series of graduations was etched on the front starboard side of the cockpit canopy. Speed in the dive built up rapidly to 540 kmh after descending 1370m, increasing relatively slowly to a maximum permissable speed of 600kmh.

As the Stuka dived, the pilot kept an eye on a warning light on the contact altimeter; when this illuminated, he pressed a knob on the control column, activating the automatic pullout. The aircraft required 450m to recover to level flight, being subjected to 6 g in the process. The pilot could override the automatic pullout and complete the operation manually, although this required considerable strength and careful use of the elevator trimmer. As the nose came up through the horizon, the dive brakes were retracted, the propellor pitch set to take off/climb, and the throttle and radiator flaps opened.


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## Graeme (Jan 8, 2008)

Thanks Njaco. Appreciate your effort.


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## HoHun (Jan 8, 2008)

Hi Graeme,

>“US Navy legend has it that pilots (of SBDs) were prone to ‘target fascination’ which could lull them into failing to pull out of the dive in time.”

Hm, I believe "target fixation" is a real technical term and is still applied to all kinds of attack during which you fly a collision course (with the ground).

>“It was, in fact, as a dive-bomber that the Barracuda figured most prominently: it used the torpedo rarely.”

Quite possible - if I remember his book correctly, Hadley's squadron was mainly trained for torpedo attacks (and he actually flew torpedo trials with a "dud" against a ship underway, protected by torpedo netting), but his actual combat missions turned out to be bombing attacks on the oil refineries on Sumatra and similar targets.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## drgondog (Jan 8, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Since the question if the Stukas we are looking at were actually armoured (and to which degree) is of overriding importance, a detailed discussion of the 8-wing-gun fighter versus the 2-nose-gun fighter is not going to help us much, though.
> 
> That doesn't mean it couldn't have done better against the A6M2 the SBD-3 faced. The rear guns of the Ju 87D had a 50% higher rate of fire than those of the SBD-3, and the A6M2 had only 50% of the firepower of a Spitfire, and 25% of that of the four-cannon Hurricane.
> 
> ...



*Not very 'certain' in comparing either survivability or results. 

Pilots like Rudel and Vejtasa are not 'average' dive bomber pilots.. the others were hammered by Zeros, Hurricanes, Mustangs, Spitfires, etc - neither aircraft was seemingly more survivable than the other in an environment in which enemy fighter were present and escorts weren't.*


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## JoeB (Jan 8, 2008)

HoHun said:


> *So it's not about 'fuzzy doubt of machines' but rather reasonable doubt about the actual effect of particular plane differences on combat outcomes.* (My emphasis - HoHun)
> 
> Basic text comprehension, again - my comment was referring to your "Spitfire" example, applied clearly stated to the Spitfire, and I didn't mention the Stuka with a single word.


My point is that the examples are parallel, and there are many similar examples. On the *Stuka* case, now the discussion has gone on to much detail about armor weights, and rear gun rates of fire etc. This is all interesting and getting the particular facts right is important, but any attempt to quantify how much those facts would or wouldn't affect actual Ju-87 and SBD vulnerability to fighters, is still almost completely speculative IMO. *Like* establishing from the best sources what the relative theoretical speeds of Spitfire V and A6M2 were can be an interesting and somewhat factual exercise (the 'somewhat' comes in the fact that measures like speed were not always the same in operational conditions as official stats, whereas say armor weight would be). But saying how, if really much at all, such a speed difference influenced combat outcomes is much more speculative. So it's an *analogy* between two cases, and I think a valid one applicable to many other such comparisons. 

And actually there is some direct relationship between those two cases. Because Zero and Spit V have been given as examples of fighters attacking SBD's and Ju-87's. But you do seem to be making fairly strong judgements based on analysis of one factor that happens to lend itself to quantitative analysis, firepower (and which was less for the Zero, though more than 1/2 that of the Spit V). But considering all factors, ie in actual practice, Zero units had lots of 'parties' v. Allied non-fighters in 1942 with few losses of their own to flexible gunner fire (eg. even v B-17's; very few Zeroes were actually downed by them in contrast to the claims of the B-17's at the time, and the Zeroes inflicted unacceptable % losses on unescorted B-17's in many cases 1941-42, though absolute numbers small by ETO standards). 

I would say again that the SBD's reputation for relative low vulnerability to fighters might be mainly because it didn't come under really heavy and prolonged fighter attack very many times. (Re: Nik, I share your interest in the USN v French combats at Casablanca, but again that wasn't really intense numerous, or necessarily totally determined fighter opposition, ie. mixed emotions of the French fighting Americans though trying to do their duty as they saw it). So I'm on you general side of the Stuka SBD debate, but I doubt it's a closely quantifiable product of the analysis of fighter and rearward firepower plus armor, which does harken back to my analogy I think.

Back to specifics of SBD's and Ju-87's the rear firing gun of the Ju-87's in notable high loss cases was mainly a single gun with cyclic rof ~1500, later on (frm ca. '42) double barrel gun with rof ~3000. The SBD-3 had a pair M2 .30 calibers, cyclic rof~1200 per gun (faster rof than M1919 ground Browning .30's or M2 .50 a/c guns); and as noted the SBD had a much heavier fwd firing armament which in some noted cases was relevant (eg. SBD scout sections escaping outnumbering Zero attacks at the Battle of Santa Cruz, claiming Zeroes in the process: they did escape by acting like 'fighters with guns at both ends', even though those claims don't check out). 

But how much immediate effect did 1500, 2400 or 3000rpm of rifle caliber mg bullets have on determined WWII fighter attackers? My impression from first hand accounts is not a lot, or perhaps binary, some pilots deterred by the show of tracers at any of those rof's, but the more determined ones not, and determined pilots inflicted the lion's share of all fighter successes. And the chance of actually hitting the fighter pilot, armored windshield or not, was pretty low (though not zero, eg. Sakai case). And it seems from first hand accounts such return fire did sometimes end up downing the attacker, particularly a liquid cooled one, but usually after he'd completed his attacks.

Also consider how rearward armament interacts with numbers. Single passes by a few fighters against a tight formation using their rear guns in unison were one thing (again see Sakai v SBD case Aug 7 1942, that was two Zeros v. a bunch of gunners firing together). A bunch of fighters continuously attacking a small formation of divebombers was another matter. 

Ju-87 and SBD vulnerability to same opposition, interesting discsussion, but no direct evidence of actually comparable outcomes, the main bottomline IMO.

Joe


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## HoHun (Jan 8, 2008)

Hi Joeb,

>But you do seem to be making fairly strong judgements based on analysis of one factor that happens to lend itself to quantitative analysis, firepower 

Joe, would you please show me the sentence which I typed in this thread which you think contains my fairly strong judgement? Thanks in advance!

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## AL Schlageter (Jan 8, 2008)

> Also, the versions up to (but not including) the Type 52, that were in operations from Pearl Harbor through Midway, had two 7.7mm nose guns plus two 20mm cannon. The later version Type 52 had three 13mm (one nose/two wing) plus two 20mm in the wing.


That would be only for the Type 52c of which ~90 were built. 

The 52b change one of the cowl 7.7mm mgs to a 13mm mg and the cannons were belt fed instead of using drums. ~470 built

The 52a had 2 7.7mm mgs and 2 20mm cannons. ~390 built


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## Nikademus (Jan 8, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Hi Nikademus,
> 
> 
> Roger that - you could even have beat me over the head with my own post in the "Centreline Armament Thread". The Spitfire armament was even worse than the Hurricane armament since the outer guns were really very far from the centreline.



Hi Henning. Sorry for the delay....real life and the need to earn money for the Internet connection must be served. LoL....Don't you love threads where you almost seem to find yourself arguing against a point you made in an earlier thread?  




> Since the question if the Stukas we are looking at were actually armoured (and to which degree) is of overriding importance, a detailed discussion of the 8-wing-gun fighter versus the 2-nose-gun fighter is not going to help us much, though.



Perhaps not. It is puzzling though. The armor discussion below though may have made it less so.




> The Betriebsanleitung lists the standard Ju 87B-2, and the Ju 87B-2 "with armour". That might be simplified language, but the "with armour" version had its weight increased by 130 kg. I don't think that in June 1940, Stukas were considered for the Schlachtflieger role already, but I might be wrong.
> 
> The type overview Ju 87D lists "basic armour" in the column "Variant and differences" emphasized in bold type. "Basic armour" doesn't sound like ground attack armour, and that it's listed in the "differences" column appears to indicate that the B was not equipped with basic armour off the factory lines. The Betriebsanleitung for the B-2 leaves open the possibility that it was retro-fitted, though.



Interesting. I can't really dock the Stuka though...as the Wildcat and Dauntless also saw earlier varients retrofitted with armor. F4F's with makeshift boiler plate for armor actually fought in early 42 vs. A5M4's. Worked nicely against 7.7 ammo despite it's humble origins.



> It might have had increased armour, but the RAF fighters had greatly increased firepower for certain.



Point. The only counterbalance that comes to mind quickly is that unlike the Germans, the WDAF had a great deal of inexperienced pilots flying reducing their ability to put the cannons on target to a degree. Yet they continued to ove facing the Stuka. The recorded incidents of Stuka Parties did go down though "claims" remained high. 



> That doesn't mean it couldn't have done better against the A6M2 the SBD-3 faced. The rear guns of the Ju 87D had a 50% higher rate of fire than those of the SBD-3, and the A6M2 had only 50% of the firepower of a Spitfire, and 25% of that of the four-cannon Hurricane.



Optimally yes. As mentioned though, the good Zero (and Oscar) drivers were adapt at riddling the target with their rifles. The Cannons were trickier. In some ways I think that gave the Oscar an edge....i'd almost rather have the two 12.7's centerline vs. the outboard 20's with limited ammo. Then again I'm one of the worst flight simm pilots on the planet and still have bad memories of trying to hit anything with them. (I also may be in the running for King LawnDart trying to fly a Bf-109 without falling into a spin)



> Well, then my observation that the Ju 87D's opponents fielded heavier firepower than the SBD-3's should have some relevance to the assessment of the two dive bombers' relative vulnerability



Depending on the form of attack, yes. The A6M's success against SBD's shrank with each carrier battle, mainly due to tactics employed. The SBD crews quickly learned to close in and mass their defensive firepower making low deflection shot runs from behind very perilous. Recall too the comment from Shores regarding the tendancy of Stuka formations to loosen up into small groups when attacked or closing on a ground target. This may help explain in part why the "Parties" occured.



> I think it's rather difficult to determine any difference at all since there is no comparable situation which shows the success of both types in similar circumstances.



True. I was/am only offering a speculation. Facinating subject though. Much better than Matrix based threads where the Stuka was simply lampooned as a kill waiting to occur.



> As I see it, the one thing that we can say for certain is that the SBD-3 tended to face unarmoured, unprotected, low-firepower fighters while the contemporary Ju 87D met well-armoured and protected fighters of generally superior firepower and speed.



I agree the SBD faced a less lethal environment though I look at it more from the # of sorties/# of fighters PoV. One reason is that while acknowledging the less than optimal ballistic qualities of the 20's in the A6M, the crack pilots none-the-less knew how to make good use of them and for the time period (1940-1) the overall Zero firepower was fairly good. By this same period the (1941) over Malta the Hurricane I drivers with their 8 rifles were having difficulties against armored targets lowering their kill value. (I can quote the source if you want Kurfurst....don't have a cow man  )

However in the end I don't question that the Stuka, as a principal land attack platform equipping 1/3 of an airforce's bomber OOB, would end up facing much more combat situations. mentioned even if one (in theory) concluded the SBD was somewhat more survivable based on all facets, it would still suffer heavily just like the Stuka without good fighter protection. A D3A is in trouble despite it's nimbleness.


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## Nikademus (Jan 8, 2008)

Kurfürst said:


> 'Seems'? Excuse moi, but to me it *seems* these statements of yours are appearantly based on _nothing_. Where are the bloody facts....?



On the prior pages I think. If you mean "technical stats" I could link for you a couple websites I've browsed while looking through my own sources detailing the combats. I didn't post the technical info because anyone can google after all. Sorry for offending your sensibilities.



> It`s just kept being repeated that the Stuka had some sort of mythical vulnerability, while the SBD had some sort of mythical survivability. The Stuka was 'slow'. It had 'poor armament'. It was 'not so rugged'. 'Not so survivable'. _Not invented here._



Well....I happen to believe, and believe strongly that the factual opinions of those men who actually fought in, against, or beside the device in question have merit. I also believe in some of the accredited author's who've done a hell of a lot more total research on the subject that involves the device in question. I'll at least assume they've studied the matter before printing their opinion.



> Claims were not supported by any facts, references or serious sources so far, basically most claims in this thread *seem* to have no relation to the technical facts - actual speed, actual defensive armament, actual level of armoring the plane had - just personal bias and preconceptions is present.



Well....I know i've cited at least two "serious" sources so far. I can cite some more if you wish. They won't be technical manuals though so by the sound of it you'll probably just dismiss them as ancedotal nonsense. 



> It`s a pointless excercise, nothing can be learned from it by anyone.


[/quote]

I don't agree that it's pointless. I'm actually having fun tackling the question. What else is a site like this for?


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## Nikademus (Jan 8, 2008)

JoeB said:


> Back to specifics of SBD's and Ju-87's the rear firing gun of the Ju-87's in notable high loss cases was mainly a single gun with cyclic rof ~1500, later on (frm ca. '42) double barrel gun with rof ~3000. The SBD-3 had a pair M2 .30 calibers, cyclic rof~1200 per gun (faster rof than M1919 ground Browning .30's or M2 .50 a/c guns); and as noted the SBD had a much heavier fwd firing armament which in some noted cases was relevant (eg. SBD scout sections escaping outnumbering Zero attacks at the Battle of Santa Cruz, claiming Zeroes in the process: they did escape by acting like 'fighters with guns at both ends', even though those claims don't check out).



Hi Joe,

I don't recall any instance offhand where an SBD claimed a Zero with it's foward guns, but against enemy bombers they did when acting in the role of anti-torpedo fire. They bagged 5 at Coral Sea (and got one D3A) But also suffered heavily to Zeros as a result of being caught singlarily. SBD rear gunners got from 1-2 A6M's at Midway, and 3 at Santa Cruz. 



> (Re: Nik, I share your interest in the USN v French combats at Casablanca, but again that wasn't really intense numerous, or necessarily totally determined fighter opposition, ie. mixed emotions of the French fighting Americans though trying to do their duty as they saw it). So I'm on you general side of the Stuka SBD debate, but I doubt it's a closely quantifiable product of the analysis of fighter and rearward firepower plus armor, which does harken back to my analogy I think.



No, it doesn't especially as the campaign was quickly concluded. Thought it might be interesting to post. The USN pilots agreed with you in stating that the French pilots were not very aggressive, 'but' doing a good job. They summed up their tactics as "Very World War I"

Rough summary so far shows 7 F4F's traded in the air for 11 French fighters. Not too shabby an exchange given the challenges faced by the French pilots, some having to take off while under ground attack by straffing fighters. An interesting skirmish showing a rare land situation with SBD's facing ground defenses and enemy fighters while unescorted for the large part.


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## Nikademus (Jan 8, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Hi Al,
> 
> Pilot armour: Armour glass windscreen, armoured seat with 8 mm back armour, 4 mm side armour, 8 mm shoulder and head armour (above the armour seat). The side armour is a triangle designed to protect hips and thighs from oblique rear shots. The head armour is labelled "head rest" in the drawing, but I suppose it was the customary cushioned armour plate.
> 
> ...



Great stuff!

Hmm...An opinion i've often seen toted is that 8mm of armor won't impress a HMG round like a .50cal. depending on deflection angle. Against rifle caliber though it should be adequate. Of course if your sitting in a full stream of bullets for very long...... 

Is there any info on the quality of the fuel tank protection?




> (SBD)
> Pilot rear armour weight is listed as 45 kg, forward armour as 17 kg, rear gunner armour as 14 kg. The total is 76 kg. No armour thickness figures are given.



The thicknesses appeared enough to provide the same "ping" effect described by Wildcat pilots who recounted their experiences being riddled by gunfire. 



> For comparison, the difference between standard Ju 87B-2 and Ju 87B-2 "with armour" was given as 130 kg in the Betriebsanleitung, but what exactly is included in that amount is not clear. (It might be different from the Ju 87D-3 layout described above.)



130kg-400kg. Interesting. interesting. interesting.




Regards,

Henning (HoHun)[/QUOTE]


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## HoHun (Jan 8, 2008)

Hi Nikademus,

>Interesting. I can't really dock the Stuka though...as the Wildcat and Dauntless also saw earlier varients retrofitted with armor. 

It's an open question, no doubt. Did you catch the recent cannon article Micdrow posted? It made a comment like "Machine guns have served us well since the Germans have not provided their aircraft with armour yet, but as that is bound to happen soon, we should give 'shell-guns' serious consideration" - with "shell guns" being Flight's term for rapid-fire cannon. The article remarked that "cannon" sounded too much like Trafalgar for their liking 

>The only counterbalance that comes to mind quickly is that unlike the Germans, the WDAF had a great deal of inexperienced pilots flying reducing their ability to put the cannons on target to a degree. Yet they continued to ove facing the Stuka.

They wouldn't have hit other types any more accurately either  And more seriously, since there were no comparable types around, we can't really use this for a comparison.

>True. I was/am only offering a speculation. Facinating subject though. Much better than Matrix based threads where the Stuka was simply lampooned as a kill waiting to occur.

Definitely!  It's always a learning experience to go and critically examine the familiar stereotypes that have been printed again and again for decades! You'd think by now, they should be water-tight - but far from it 

>As mentioned though, the good Zero (and Oscar) drivers were adapt at riddling the target with their rifles. The Cannons were trickier. In some ways I think that gave the Oscar an edge....i'd almost rather have the two 12.7's centerline vs. the outboard 20's with limited ammo. 

I think it was Richard Dunn who recently wrote an article on Oscar armament ... apparently, there were few (if any) Ki-43 fighters with 2 x 12.7 mm, the norm being 1 x 7.7 mm and 1 x 12.7 mm. Surprisingly, the pilots did not like the 12.7 mm gun since it synchronized rather badly, suffering from a major loss in rate of fire as a result. That did of course detract from the advantages of the centreline gun, on which I agree with you!

>Then again I'm one of the worst flight simm pilots on the planet and still have bad memories of trying to hit anything with them.

The low muzzle velocity and the wing position really makes the A6M2 cannon short-range weapons, and their destructiveness doesn't compare to Western 20 mm cannon. I don't think you were such a bad pilot, but merely that you struggled with their objective disadvantages 

>The A6M's success against SBD's shrank with each carrier battle, mainly due to tactics employed. The SBD crews quickly learned to close in and mass their defensive firepower making low deflection shot runs from behind very perilous. 

For an un-armoured A6M2 that had to close in to bring its cannon to bear effectively, I'd add. The same tactics might not have worked so well against Spitfires with armour glass windscreen, re-inforced cowl, self-sealing fuel tanks and a pair of cannon that enabled it to open fire effectively at a longer range. That might have influenced the development of different Stuka tactics ...

>Recall too the comment from Shores regarding the tendancy of Stuka formations to loosen up into small groups when attacked or closing on a ground target. 

Hm, if tight formations of B-17s couldn't slug it out with Luftwaffe fighters and win, asking the Stuka to go and try to defeat the RAF that way seems optimistic. The way I read Shores' comment was that splitting up made it harder for the escort fighters to cover the various groups, but I suppose the Stukas only split into their Vic formations when they had to evade fire ...

>I agree the SBD faced a less lethal environment though I look at it more from the # of sorties/# of fighters PoV. 

Hm, I fear I have not fully understood that line of thinking. What are these numbers for both?

>One reason is that while acknowledging the less than optimal ballistic qualities of the 20's in the A6M, the crack pilots none-the-less knew how to make good use of them and for the time period (1940-1) the overall Zero firepower was fairly good. By this same period the (1941) over Malta the Hurricane I drivers with their 8 rifles were having difficulties against armored targets lowering their kill value.

Having cannon is quite a bonus over a pure machine-gun armament, no doubt. With regard to the period, the SBD-3 entered combat in the first half of 1942, by which time the British 8-gun-fighter was no longer a first-line aircraft (as far as I can tell), so it's really the pitting cannon-armed RAF fighter vs. Ju 87D that is the contemporary parallel.

>even if one (in theory) concluded the SBD was somewhat more survivable based on all facets, it would still suffer heavily just like the Stuka without good fighter protection. A D3A is in trouble despite it's nimbleness.

Absolutely - the lack of armour really disqualified some otherwise promising Western types ... they were just not considered fit for combat duty. It were only the Japanese who carried on regardless (and even the Japanese Army undertook steps to armour their aircraft). However, the old saying that "there are just two types of aircraft - fighters and targets" really means that whatever type you fly, if it's not a fighter you'll be in trouble.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## HoHun (Jan 8, 2008)

Hi Nikademus,

>Is there any info on the quality of the fuel tank protection?

Such information is hard to find regardless of the type. You might have seen the Me 110 analysis Micdrow posted - one example was analyzed in detail by US aircraft companies, and they concluded that while the self-sealing fuel tanks was not quite up to the then-current US standards, it was two years old by the time of the analysis and superior to the contemporary US designs when it was new. They also mentioned that the design of the fuel tank compartent was excellent as techniques and materials had been chosen to minimize the danger for the rubber cell in the compartment when the compartment metal skin was pierced by bullets. (That just applies to the Bf 110 of course, but I thought you might find it interesting anyhow.)

>An opinion i've often seen toted is that 8mm of armor won't impress a HMG round like a .50cal. depending on deflection angle.

It seems the Mustang was armoured with a 1/4" plate (at least in some models), which would be equivalent to 6.35 mm. I have checked the Mustang manual, but it lacks the usual legend "protected against .30 in fire ... protected against .50 in fire" the armour and protection angle diagrams usually have. It shows different sectors in the overhead diagram, but they are not explained. It looks to me as if the legend was just forgotten, so the sectors would indicate that 6.35 mm was considered worthwhile protection against 12.7 mm rounds, but with the missing links in the logical chain, it would be better to find another example where thickness and protection level are stated more clearly.

One thing to keep in mind is that - as pointed out by Tony Williams ("Rapid Fire", "The Flying Gun") - rounds that penetrate light aluminium skin tend to tumble and lose a good part of their armour penetration ability. The British estimated from an analysis of the first Fw 190 they captured (they couldn't actually make firing trials as they needed the aircraft for further flight evaluation  that from a dead astern position from 200 yards, even 20 mm semi-armour piercing rounds would be unlikely to wound the pilot unless they hit the armoured head protection through the canopy (avoiding tumbling that way). The Fw 190 had a 8 mm armour seat and a 5 mm back plate behind it.

In firing trials against a Me 109F, a 22 mm laminated duralumin bulkhead in combination with an 8 mm back armour was penetrated by 30% of the 12.7 mm armour-piercing shots fired from 200 yards and 5° off. This shows the statistical nature of the process - a good proportion of the hits were stopped, but there was no safety, and taking a prolonged burst would be certainly lethal.

>The thicknesses appeared enough to provide the same "ping" effect described by Wildcat pilots who recounted their experiences being riddled by gunfire. 

Hm, do you know the actual thickness for the SBD? I didn't find anything on that, I'm afraid.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## plan_D (Jan 9, 2008)

Nikademus, if you're interested in the air combat between the USN and Vichy France over Casablanca I would advise reading this old thread - our resident USN expert gives a great account of kills and losses (and I add a minute amount  )

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/av...e-mk-iib-vs-grumman-f4f-4-wildcat-1550-2.html


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## drgondog (Jan 9, 2008)

1/4" steel plate was the common denominator for all US fighters. 

The P-51B/C/D all had a 10 1/2"x19 1/2" by 1/4" plate on the rear of the seat and nothing forward except thick windscreen glass and the Packard Merlin. I vaguely remember some steel plate aft of radiator core but NOT sure of that.

Would not stop a 50 cal round under normal circumstances at 200 yards... and the existence of a 85 gallon fuel tank between the shooter and the armor plate, while self sealing, is not necessarily a 'comfort'.

Allegedly it was effective against the 7.92mm as Bob Johnson (same rear armor in P-47) and others experienced but I know a lot of fighter pilots that were ambivalent about the value and ultimately kept it because of flak fragment protection (none of them would admit to possibility of a German fighter getting on their tale - but I was talking with survivors)


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## JoeB (Jan 9, 2008)

Nikademus said:


> 1. I don't recall any instance offhand where an SBD claimed a Zero with it's foward guns, but against enemy bombers they did when acting in the role of anti-torpedo fire. They bagged 5 at Coral Sea (and got one D3A) But also suffered heavily to Zeros as a result of being caught singlarily. SBD rear gunners got from 1-2 A6M's at Midway, and 3 at Santa Cruz.
> 
> 2. Rough summary so far shows 7 F4F's traded in the air for 11 French fighters.


1. Several 2 plane scouting sections VB and VS-10 at Santa Cruz that separately made contact with the Japanese CAP claimed 7 Zeroes without loss, at least one to fwd guns in a 7 v 2 encounter by the VS-10 CO, though none of those claims check out apparently. The team of Strong and Irvine did however score at least one 500# hit on Zuiho, following by a several on 2 where their rear gunners claimed a Zero each, and both returned safely. Even aside from the aerial claims, it's hard to imagine pairs of Ju-87's of any model pulling off those missions, though I don't offer it as positive proof.

I read Lundstrom as verifying fewer victories for SBD's than you mention and the only clear Zeroes IMO were two of the CAP over Shokaku and Zuikaku v formation of VS and VB 8 at Santa Cruz.

2. I'd comment on R Leonard's tally of F4F-4 air combat losses at Casablanca(on the thread linked by Plan D above) as follows based on the detailed blow by blow in Cressman "Ranger":
"In aerial combat:
...
F4F (VF-41) Ens CE Mikronis to H75A, WIA, POW (said his engine was ko'd by AA in the strafing/air combat encounter over Cazes 11/8 )
F4F (VF-41) Lieut.(jg) CA Shields to H75A, POW (yes)
F4F (VF-41) Lieut GH Carter, ditched due to damage from H75A (yes)
F4F (VF-41) Lieut. MT Wordell to H75A, POW (downed by warship AA later the morning of 11/8 )

to AA fire
...
F4F (VF-41) Lieut.(jg) CV August, POW (like Mikronis could have been AA or fighter bullets over Cazes, but August didn't claim to know which)
..."

and I'd add 
probable air combat loss:
F4F (VF-9) Ens CW Gerhardt of VF-9 ditched after an oil leak that appeared following the 11/9 combat with GC I/5 H75's. 
possible air combat loss:
F4F (VF-41) Ens AD Conner, was in the 11/8 VF-41/GC II/5 combat, claiming an H75, ditched after the mission but cause not given in any source I know.
non air combat loss:
F4F (VF-9) Ens LA Menard: implied combat loss in the 11/9 combat in Lambert, but seems purely operational in Cressman.

The French plane losses in the two well known combats aren't certain AFAIK, from French sources in Lambert GC II/5's losses 11/8 were 5 pilot KIA, 1 WIA parachuted, 1 WIA 'landed roughly', 1 WIA plane fate not given, several other planes inoperative. The losses of GC 1/5 11/9 are given in Cressman as 2 pilot KIA, 1 pilot 'seriously burned', 2 'force landed'. French sources say the Armee de l'Air didn't use its Dw.520's though VF-41 claimed some in the first combat.

Another victory is found in comparing "La Bataille de Casablanca" by Mordal with Lambert. VGF-26 F4F's off Sangammon in the Northern Task Force claimed 1 + 2 probable French fighters w/o loss morning of 11/8 at Port Lyautey, but were not officially credited. However an Aeronavale Dw.520 failed to return at the same time and while the French assumed it was downed by AA of US warships, there's no matching warship claim. 

So F4F-4 v French fighters could be 12~14+:3~6, but I'm not aiming to quibble over a small difference, especially in view of the uncertainty.

The one known SBD aerial victory in Morocco was a DB-7 credited to fwd guns of a VGS-29 SBD-3 off Santee in the Southern TF, actually a Potez 63.

Joe


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## Captn javy Wilson (Jan 9, 2008)

_*ALL* bombers_ have flaws and without _fighter_ support its will greatily _decrease_ the chances of sucess. The stuka was an *excellent* dive bomber at the _start_ of the war. BUT as the war goes on the _number_ of planes in the air i_ncreases_ and makes the Stuka _more difficult _to handle. The Stuka has fixed landing gear. Which means that it has a lot of _drag_. _Vulnerable_ from the _bottom_ and the _front_ with little protection from the back. The Stuka could only do so much. AND as the war goes on it only gets more _obsolete_ and the number of _more_ and _better enemy fighters _increases. _The Stuka could only do so much_


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## AL Schlageter (Jan 9, 2008)

Nikademus said:


> Hi Joe,
> 
> I don't recall any instance offhand where an SBD claimed a Zero with it's foward guns, but against enemy bombers they did when acting in the role of anti-torpedo fire. They bagged 5 at Coral Sea (and got one D3A) But also suffered heavily to Zeros as a result of being caught singlarily. SBD rear gunners got from 1-2 A6M's at Midway, and 3 at Santa Cruz.


Wasn't there a Dogfight show where a SBD took on some A6Ms and won?


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## JoeB (Jan 9, 2008)

AL Schlageter said:


> Wasn't there a Dogfight show where a SBD took on some A6Ms and won?



VS-5 SBD's acting as anti-torpedo plane screen attacked by Zuikaku's Zero sdn, at Coral Sea. The SBD's claimed 4 Zeroes for 4 losses, but the Zui Zeroes didn't actually suffer any losses. And that's not new info at all (see pg 250 of Lundstrom "The First Team" published 1984). But that's TV for you.  

Joe


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## AL Schlageter (Jan 9, 2008)

Found it on AOL Video.
Dogfights: Long Odds - "Swede" Vejtasa - Part 1 of 2 - AOL Video

Stanley W. "Swede" Vejtasa was the pilot of the SBD.

*Dogfights* really blew that show!


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## Jank (Jan 9, 2008)

The P-47 had 9.5mm or 3/8" hardened armor plate behind and in front of the pilot.

Design Analysis of the P-47 Thunderbolt

The same is indicated in Technical Order and other spec docs.


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## Kurfürst (Jan 10, 2008)

HoHun said:


> In firing trials against a Me 109F, a 22 mm laminated duralumin bulkhead in combination with an 8 mm back armour was penetrated by 30% of the 12.7 mm armour-piercing shots fired from 200 yards and 5° off. This shows the statistical nature of the process - a good proportion of the hits were stopped, but there was no safety, and taking a prolonged burst would be certainly lethal.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Henning (HoHun)



Actually, the 30 % penetrating figure is a sort of an indication how information gets distorted when referenced from another source; the thing you noted about the firing trials of 109F appears in the Wright Field evaluation report of the 109F, but that one is just a compilation of British reports; there seem to be a case of 'lost in translation - the original reports state that the rounds (30%) which were fired and passed through the fuel tank above the fuel line would penetrate the pilot`s back armor, but those that go below it would not.


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## HoHun (Jan 10, 2008)

Hi Kurfürst,

>the thing you noted about the firing trials of 109F appears in the Wright Field evaluation report of the 109F, but that one is just a compilation of British reports; there seem to be a case of 'lost in translation - the original reports state that the rounds (30%) which were fired and passed through the fuel tank above the fuel line would penetrate the pilot`s back armor, but those that go below it would not.

You're right, I used the Wright Field report - thanks for straightening that out! 

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## HoHun (Jan 10, 2008)

Hi Joeb,

Noting that you came, saw, and evaded the question, I'm going to ask again:



JoeB said:


> But you do seem to be making fairly strong judgements based on analysis of one factor that happens to lend itself to quantitative analysis, firepower



Joe, would you please show me the sentence which I typed in this thread which you think contains my fairly strong judgement?

I'm not amused by the careless way in which you distort my statements, and this is your chance to correct a misunderstanding. (If it is one.)

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## JoeB (Jan 10, 2008)

HoHun said:


> 1. Noting that you came, saw, and evaded the question, I'm going to ask again:
> 
> 2. Joe, would you please show me the sentence which I typed in this thread which you think contains my fairly strong judgement?
> 
> 3. I'm not amused by the careless way in which you distort my statements, and this is your chance to correct a misunderstanding. (If it is one.)


1. I don't know what question you claim I'm evading, unless something I missed among long posts by several people.
2. It wasn't one single sentence but ongoing theme that the SBD faced a weaker attacker in the Zero, than Ju-87 in Western fighters say early/mid Spit's for example. Was that not your contention? But your main repeated piece of evidence was their higher firepower. True higher (though not really twice and four times for Spit V's and cannon Hurricanes as you maintained) but that's just one factor. In many other cases Zero units devastated Allied non-fighters; it's not clear at all to me that 1941-42 Zero units overall qualitatively represented a significantly more permissive opponent to divebombers than the British fighter units of the same period. They had plenty of 'parties' and other successes against Allied non-fighters in 1941-42, including a/c better armed than any divebomber. Again, I think the SBD's reputation is partly due to the fact that *quantitatively* it didn't face intense Japanese fighter opposition all that often; although there are cases like the Santa Cruz one just discussed where it's reasonable to doubt Ju-87's (any model) could have survived in pairs against 1942 several plane CAP sections of Japanese carriers as SBD's did.
3. There's no such intention, but I haven't said anything in this debate that would offend any reasonable person. I suggest just sticking to defending your positions on the topic, not accusing people of 'distorting'.

Joe


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## B-17engineer (Jan 10, 2008)

[edit] Poland
On 1 September 1939 the Wehrmacht invaded Poland triggering World War Two. At exactly 04.26 hours a Kette of Ju 87s of 3./StG 1 lead by Staffelkapitän Oberleutnant Bruno Dilly carried out the first bombing attack of the war. The aim was to destroy the charges wired to the bridges over the Vistula. The mission failed and the Poles destroyed the bridge before the Germans could reach it.

It was a Ju 87 that achieved the first air victory during World War II on 1 September 1939, when Kettenführer Leutnant Frank Neubert of I./StG 2 'Immelmann' shot down a Polish PZL P.11c fighter aircraft piloted by Captain Mieczysław Medwecki, who was killed in the engagement[2].

On one occasion six Polish divisions trapped by encircling German forces were forced to surrender after a relentless four day assault by StG 51, StG 76 and StG 77. Employed in this assault were the 50 kg fragmentation bombs which caused appalling damage to enemy ground troops. Demoralized, the Poles surrendered. The Stukas also participated in the Battle of Bzura which resulted in the breaking of Polish ability to resist effectively. The Stukageschwaders alone dropped 388 tonnes of bombs during this battle[3].

Once again enemy air opposition was light, the Stukawaffe lost just 31 machines during the campaign[4].


[edit] Norway
Operation Weserübung began on 9 April 1940 with the invasions of Norway and Denmark, Denmark capitulated within the day whilst Norway continued to resist with British and French help.

The campaign was not the classic Blitzkrieg of fast moving armoured divisions supported by air-power as the mountainous terrain ruled out close Panzer/Stuka cooperation. Instead the Germans relied on Fallschirmjäger (paratroops), airborne troops transported by Junkers Ju 52s and specialised mountain (ski troops). The strategic nature of the operation made the Stuka essential. The Ju 87s were given the role of ground attack and anti-shipping missions. The Stuka was to prove the most effective weapon in the Luftwaffe's armoury carrying out the latter.

The Stukageschwaders were now equipped with the new Ju 87R Richard, which differed from the Berta as the 50 kg bomb racks had been replaced by external fuel tanks increasing range.

The first Stukas took off at 10.59 hours from occupied airfields to destroy Oscarsborg Fortress. The Stukas of I.StG 1, failed to silence its batteries contributing to the loss of the heavy cruiser Blücher and causing the disruption of the amphibious landings in Oslo through Oslofjord.

The Stukas however had numerous successes against Allied Naval vessels. HMS Bittern was sunk on 30 April. The French super-destroyer Bison was sunk along with HMS Afridi by Stukageschwader 1 on 3 May 1940.


[edit] France and the Low Countries
The Stukawaffe had learned some lessons from the Polish and Norwegian campaigns. The failures of Oberleutnant Bruno Dilly in Poland and the Stukas of I.StG 1 to silence the Oscarborg fort ensured even more attention was paid to pin-point bombing during the Phoney War period. This was to pay off in the Western campaign.

When Fall Gelb began on 10 May 1940 the Stuka helped swiftly neutralise the fortress of Eben Emael. The HQ of the Commander responsible for ordering the destruction of the bridges along the Albert Canal was stationed in the village of Lanaeken (14km to the north). However the Stuka demonstrated its accuracy when the small building was destroyed after receiving four direct hits. As a result only one of the three bridges was destroyed allowing the German Army to rapidly advance.

The Stukageschwader were also instrumental in achieving the breakthrough at Sedan. The Stukawaffe flew 300 sorties against French positions, with Stukageschwader 77 alone flying 201 individual missions[5].

The Luftwaffe also benefited from excellent ground-to-air communications throughout the campaign. Radio equipped forward liaison officers could call upon the Stukas and direct them to attack enemy positions along the Axis of advance. In some cases the Stukas responded to requests in 10-20 minutes. Oberstleutnant Hans Seidemann (Richthofen's Chief of Staff) said that "never again was such a smoothly functioning system for discussing and planning joint operations achieved"[6].

During the Battle of Dunkirk 89 merchantmen (of 126,518 grt) were lost, and the Royal Navy lost 29 of its 40 destroyers sunk or seriously damaged, mostly at the hands of the Ju 87s[7]. Enemy airpower was ineffective and disorganised, as a result the Stukas losses were mainly due to ground fire. Some 120 machines, one-third of the Stuka force was destroyed or damaged to all causes[8].


[*edit] Battle of Britain
The Battle of Britain proved for the first time that the Junkers Ju 87 was vulnerable in hostile skies against well organised and determined fighter opposition.

Steady losses had occurred throughout their participation in the battle. On 18 August, a day known as the 'hardest day' as both sides suffered heavy losses, the Stuka was withdrawn after losing 16 of its number and numerous others damaged[9]. The myth of the Stuka was shattered.*[edit] North Africa and the Mediterranean
In response to the Italian defeats in Greece and North Africa the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht ordered the deployment of some German forces to these theatres. Amongst the Luftwaffe contingent deployed was the Gescwadersatb StG3 which touched down in Sicily in December 1940. In the next few days two Gruppen - some 80 Stukas were deployed under X.Fliegerkorps. The first task of the Korps was to attack British shipping passing between Sicily and Africa. The Ju 87s first made their presence by subjecting the British aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious to heavy attack. The crews were confident that they could sink it given the flight deck spanned approximately 7,000 square metres.

On 10 January 1941 the Stuka crews were told four direct hits with 500 kg bombs would be enough to sink the carrier. The Ju 87s delivered six and three damaging near-misses[10]. But the ships engines remained untouched and it made for the dubious sanctury of Malta.

Many ex- Luftwaffe Ju 87s were handed over to their Italian ally, the Regia Aeronautica and re-named the Picchiatelli. Some of the Picchiatelli saw action in the opening phase of the Italian invasion of Greece in October 1940. The number was ineffective and the Italian forces were quickly pushed back. By early 1941 the Greeks had pushed into Italian occupied Albania. Once again Hitler decided to send military aid to his Allies.

In March the pro-German Yugoslav government was toppled. A furious Hitler ordered the attack to be expanded to include Yugoslavia. Operation Marita commenced on 7 April. The Stuka once again spearheaded the air assault with a frontline strength of 300 machines. Yugoslav resistance in the air was minimal. As a result the Stukas fearsome reputation returned. Operating unmolested the Stukawaffe took a heavy toll of ground forces. The light losses incurred were a result of ground fire. The effectiveness of the dive-bombers helped bring about Yugoslav capitulation in just ten days.

The Stukas also took a peripheral part in Operation Punishment - Hitler's retribution bombing of Belgrade. The dive-bombers were to attack airfields and known anti-aircraft gun positions whilst the level bombers struck civilian targets. Belgrade was badly damaged, and a reported 15,000 people were killed or injured.

In Greece, despite British aid, little air opposition was encountered. The Stukas were able to roam the skies and attack targets unmolested. As the Allies withdrew and resistance collapsed the Allies began evacuating to Crete. The Stukas proved effective in inflicting severe casualties to Allied shipping. On 22 April the 1,389 ton destroyers Psara and Ydra were sunk. In the next two days the Greek Naval base at Piraeus suffered the loss of 23 vessels to Stuka attack[11].

As the Battle of Crete drew to a close the Allies began yet another withdrawal. The Stuka and their crews once again proved exceptional against enemy warships. On 21 May HMS Juno was sunk, on the 22 May the battleship HMS Warspite, and the cruiser HMS Gloucester were damaged . The Ju 87s also crippled HMS Fiji that morning, (she was later finished off by Bf 109 fighter bombers) whilst destroying HMS Greyhound with a single hit. On 23 May the Royal Navy also lost HMS Kashmir, HMS Kelly sunk followed by HMS Hereward on the 26 May. HMS Orion and HMS Dido were also severely damaged[12].

However despite initial successes, the Stuka remained vulnerable. Perhaps the prime example of the type's vulnerability to fighters, even at this stage in the war, was the shooting down of five Stukas in the space of a few minutes, by the Australian ace Clive Caldwell in a P-40 Tomahawk, on December 5, 1941, over Libya.

The Stukageschwaders faithfully supported Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommels Deutsches Afrika Korps in its two year campaign in North Africa, helping it achieve considerable success. However as the tide turned and Allied airpower grew in the Autumn of 1942, the Ju 87 became little more than cannon fodder. The old frailties emerged and losses were heavy. The entry of the Americans into North Africa during Operation Torch made the situation far worse. The Stuka became obsolete in what was now a fighter-bomber's war. The Bf 109 and Fw 190 could at least choose to fight on equal terms after dropping their ordnance whereas the Stuka enjoyed no such option. An example of the Junkers vulnerability was demonstrated on 11 November 1942 when 15 Ju 87Ds (Doras) were all shot down by USAF P-40Fs in minutes[13].

By 1943, the Allies enjoyed total air superiority in North Africa. The Ju 87s ventured out in Kette strength only, often jettisoning their bombs at the first sight of enemy aircraft and making "a run for home".


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 10, 2008)

B-17 Engineer you need to post the sources where you got that from, such as Wikipedia where I believe you copied that from.


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## B-17engineer (Jan 10, 2008)

sorry


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## drgondog (Jan 10, 2008)

Jank said:


> The P-47 had 9.5mm or 3/8" hardened armor plate behind and in front of the pilot.
> 
> Design Analysis of the P-47 Thunderbolt
> 
> The same is indicated in Technical Order and other spec docs.



Jank - You are absolutely correct but I believe the change was made in the P-47D-1 forward, along with the increased armored glass?

I haven't yet found any intial production fighter that started with anything greater than 1/4 inch plate?


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## drgondog (Jan 10, 2008)

JoeB said:


> 1. I don't know what question you claim I'm evading, unless something I missed among long posts by several people.
> 2. It wasn't one single sentence but ongoing theme that the SBD faced a weaker attacker in the Zero, than Ju-87 in Western fighters say early/mid Spit's for example. Was that not your contention? But your main repeated piece of evidence was their higher firepower. True higher (though not really twice and four times for Spit V's and cannon Hurricanes as you maintained) but that's just one factor. In many other cases Zero units devastated Allied non-fighters; it's not clear at all to me that 1941-42 Zero units overall qualitatively represented a significantly more permissive opponent to divebombers than the British fighter units of the same period. They had plenty of 'parties' and other successes against Allied non-fighters in 1941-42, including a/c better armed than any divebomber. Again, I think the SBD's reputation is partly due to the fact that *quantitatively* it didn't face intense Japanese fighter opposition all that often; although there are cases like the Santa Cruz one just discussed where it's reasonable to doubt Ju-87's (any model) could have survived in pairs against 1942 several plane CAP sections of Japanese carriers as SBD's did.
> 3. There's no such intention, but I haven't said anything in this debate that would offend any reasonable person. I suggest just sticking to defending your positions on the topic, not accusing people of 'distorting'.
> 
> Joe



Joe - this would be one of several 'unequivocal' positions that is hard to prove that caught my eye... particularly since the RAF fighters pronounced as 'better armored and heavier firepowered' were trounced by the same fighter dismissed below?

*As I see it, the one thing that we can say for certain is that the SBD-3 tended to face unarmoured, unprotected, low-firepower fighters while the contemporary Ju 87D met well-armoured and protected fighters of generally superior firepower and speed.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)*


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## HoHun (Jan 10, 2008)

Hi Joeb,

>I suggest just sticking to defending your positions on the topic, not accusing people of 'distorting'.

Yes, I'm accusing you of distorting my words. It might be entirely unintentional on your part, but it has to stop anyway.

You claim I passed "fairly strong judgements" on the SBD vs. Stuka case in this thread, and I want to see where you got that from, with direct, verifiable quotes from my own posts.

If on re-reading my posts, you'd like to correct your claim, that would be perfectly acceptable of course.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## drgondog (Jan 10, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Hi Joeb,
> 
> You claim I passed "fairly strong judgements" on the SBD vs. Stuka case in this thread, and I want to see where you got that from, with direct, verifiable quotes from my own posts.
> 
> ...



How bout this one?

*As I see it, the one thing that we can say for certain is that the SBD-3 tended to face unarmoured, unprotected, low-firepower fighters while the contemporary Ju 87D met well-armoured and protected fighters of generally superior firepower and speed.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)
*


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## Kurfürst (Jan 11, 2008)

B-17engineer said:


> [*edit] Battle of Britain
> The Battle of Britain proved for the first time that the Junkers Ju 87 was vulnerable in hostile skies against well organised and determined fighter opposition.
> 
> Steady losses had occurred throughout their participation in the battle. On 18 August, a day known as the 'hardest day' as both sides suffered heavy losses, the Stuka was withdrawn after losing 16 of its number and numerous others damaged[9]. The myth of the Stuka was shattered.*[edit]



Myth. And it was shattered far too many times. 

The Stukas were neither withdrawn, neither there were 'steady losses'. The loss rate was quite acceptable, and they had major successes during the Battle.


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## JoeB (Jan 11, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Hi Joeb,
> 
> >I suggest just sticking to defending your positions on the topic, not accusing people of 'distorting'.
> 
> ...


Drgondog's post is one good example. It seemed to me a fairly strong statement, which you then elaborated on with analysis of things like firepower, etc , but without enough IMO consideration to the high overall actual combat effectiveness of JNAF fighter units in 1941-42, against Allied fighters and non-fighters alike, which seriously undercuts the general implication of your statement. If you disagree that that was a 'strong statement' or in any other way, that's your opinion.

So please, I have no intention to annoy you (or anybody else), but it's not going to get you anywhere to tell me 'what must stop' and so forth. All my posts have been well within any reasonable ROE on any forum. If you're upset about them that's unfortunate, but your problem. 

Joe


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## HoHun (Jan 11, 2008)

Hi Joeb,

>Drgondog's post is one good example. 

Quoting myself:

"As I see it, the one thing that we can say for certain is that the SBD-3 tended to face unarmoured, unprotected, low-firepower fighters while the contemporary Ju 87D met well-armoured and protected fighters of generally superior firepower and speed."

I asked for a "fairly strong judgement" (your own words!) on the SBD vs. Stuka case, and that quote is not a judgement - it's a simple, verifiable statement of fact. "Judgement" is a verdict, "statement" is evidence. 

>It seemed to me a fairly strong statement ... 

That is a very good example for why I am positively unhappy with your posts. You orginally wrote "judgements", I asked for "judgements" - three times over! -, and here you go talking about "statements" as if I had asked for just that. (I had not.)

I guess you'll agree that "judgement" is a significantly different concept from "statement"?

Now notice that while posting, you were obviously genuinely convinced that you had portrayed my position correctly. However, in fact you were assuming that I was talking about a significantly different concept. 

If you accept that you have seriously misrepresented my position in this case without even noticing, I figure you might see my suggestion that this has happened before with other eyes now.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Udet (Jan 11, 2008)

Not exactly on topic, but see Stukas slamming British armor in North Africa; experts only. Quite an adrenaline rush with the utterly furious siren...(by the way, sounds like F1 racing).


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jA09htDvr9s_

Also i find those stories of allied soldiers saying that after a while that infernal noise "had no effect on them" very very hard to believe.


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## Nikademus (Jan 12, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Hi Nikademus,
> 
> It's an open question, no doubt. Did you catch the recent cannon article Micdrow posted? It made a comment like "Machine guns have served us well since the Germans have not provided their aircraft with armour yet, but as that is bound to happen soon, we should give 'shell-guns' serious consideration" - with "shell guns" being Flight's term for rapid-fire cannon. The article remarked that "cannon" sounded too much like Trafalgar for their liking



Hello!

Havn't had a chance to read it yet, but it sounds interesting.



> They wouldn't have hit other types any more accurately either  And more seriously, since there were no comparable types around, we can't really use this for a comparison.



True, but that was my point  In the beginning it was stated that the Stuka faced greater adversity in the form of cannon armed, armored planes but as I saw it, it wasn't as black and white as that. Also, the "Parties" began even in the days of rifle only armed fighters.




> I think it was Richard Dunn who recently wrote an article on Oscar armament ... apparently, there were few (if any) Ki-43 fighters with 2 x 12.7 mm, the norm being 1 x 7.7 mm and 1 x 12.7 mm. Surprisingly, the pilots did not like the 12.7 mm gun since it synchronized rather badly, suffering from a major loss in rate of fire as a result. That did of course detract from the advantages of the centreline gun, on which I agree with you!



I've read the Dunn article. It is very interesting and makes a good case though in retrospect, I don't consider it to be an open and shut refuting of prior sources. It also only deals with the Ki-43-I. When mentioning the Oscars in the examples i've cited here and in prior threads I am referring to the Ki-43-II.



> The low muzzle velocity and the wing position really makes the A6M2 cannon short-range weapons, and their destructiveness doesn't compare to Western 20 mm cannon. I don't think you were such a bad pilot, but merely that you struggled with their objective disadvantages



Trust me....i'm a _bad_ pilot. I did do better with .50cal armed fighters. Even managed one classic boom and zoom attack on a G3M once. ONCE.  

Yes, the Japanese 20's don't compare ballistically to the Western versions but in RL they could still get the job done and at times did. My point was that they cannot simply be dismissed and the early (orig) crop of Japanese fighter pilots were able to put them on target very well, including hard deflection shots. I think it bears merit to also mention that if the Japanese had cannon ammo that didn't top the list, they also faced extremely rugged opposition as well. Planes like the P-40 and F4F won't win alot of awards here from what i've read in terms of preformance but the latter plane in particular could take loads of punishment including cannon hits.



> For an un-armoured A6M2 that had to close in to bring its cannon to bear effectively, I'd add. The same tactics might not have worked so well against Spitfires with armour glass windscreen, re-inforced cowl, self-sealing fuel tanks and a pair of cannon that enabled it to open fire effectively at a longer range. That might have influenced the development of different Stuka tactics ...



It depends. In the case of armor glass its a bit of hit or miss from the descriptions i've read. Sometimes it would stop/deflect a 7.7mm slug...other times no. I would also factor in that a Spit or Hurr has an increased vulnerability to the engine/radiator being liquid cooled vs. a radial. 01 flyers in Burma made specific mention of aiming for a Hurr's radiator in order to make up for their lack of firepower. Given the results there, it worked very well.



> Hm, if tight formations of B-17s couldn't slug it out with Luftwaffe fighters and win, asking the Stuka to go and try to defeat the RAF that way seems optimistic. The way I read Shores' comment was that splitting up made it harder for the escort fighters to cover the various groups, but I suppose the Stukas only split into their Vic formations when they had to evade fire ...



Well I'd say thats almost an Apples and Oranges comparison. Over Germany, the Luft would mass a large wedge of airpower and then attack at a moment of their choosing en-mass (and usually after the escorts had left the scene) Under such circumstances the only viable tactic is to use the box formations. Not enough by itself but still the best tactic. The engagements Shores was commenting on tended to be smaller with less time for defensive patrols and scrambles to react. A better comparison is with USN dive bombers facing enemy attack. Once the SBD's reacted by closing ranks and concentrating their rear guns, the A6M's had a harder time of it. Shores was suggesting that the Stuka's might have done better as well had they done the same but it appears they did the opposite, often breaking up into smaller groups increasing Stuka vulnerability and making the job of the escorts that much harder. This would be a factor in support of posters like Kurfurst who feel the Stuka simply suffers from bad PR in terms of it's vuln.



> >I agree the SBD faced a less lethal environment though I look at it more from the # of sorties/# of fighters PoV.
> 
> Hm, I fear I have not fully understood that line of thinking. What are these numbers for both?



For the SBD, it's primary opposition was naval, and there were only four carrier clashes where enemy fighter opposition was occured in all of 1942. Lunga saw SBD's basing there but they operated primarily at night vs naval targets, no or little fighter opposition. By day the Zeros were busy trying to keep the Wildcats off the G4M's backs. Due to distance involved they're arrival could be accurately predicted in most cases. In constrast the Stuka, being used as a primary land based support plane flew less intermitedly, and faced larger total numbers of enemy air squadrons (though that didn't always auto translate into actual attacks by enemy fighters being very large in nature)



> Absolutely - the lack of armour really disqualified some otherwise promising Western types ... they were just not considered fit for combat duty. It were only the Japanese who carried on regardless (and even the Japanese Army undertook steps to armour their aircraft). However, the old saying that "there are just two types of aircraft - fighters and targets" really means that whatever type you fly, if it's not a fighter you'll be in trouble.



No argument from me. 8)


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## Nikademus (Jan 12, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Hi Nikademus,
> 
> >The thicknesses appeared enough to provide the same "ping" effect described by Wildcat pilots who recounted their experiences being riddled by gunfire.
> 
> ...



Hello.

No, Lundstrom did not mention specific thicknesses. Some of the battle accounts describing Zero attacks on SBD's matched descriptions on attacks of the F4F's. From these it would appear the SBD displayed similar ruggedness in the face of being sprayed by 7.7's and the occasional. The 7.7's had a hard time even when many hits were scored. Cannon hits did better but didn't always lead to the plane's demise. (not immediately at least) During Coral Sea, a VS-5 element endured a Zero attack which was pressed home. Despite numerous hits none were lost. Specific mention was made that the self sealing tanks in particular had handled 7.7mm hits very well. (hence my curiosity about how well Stuka tanks fare under similar hits)


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## B-17engineer (Jan 12, 2008)

How'd we get from Stuka to SBD's and Zero's fighting in a completly different thearte


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## Nikademus (Jan 12, 2008)

JoeB said:


> 1. Several 2 plane scouting sections VB and VS-10 at Santa Cruz that separately made contact with the Japanese CAP claimed 7 Zeroes without loss, at least one to fwd guns in a 7 v 2 encounter by the VS-10 CO, though none of those claims check out apparently. The team of Strong and Irvine did however score at least one 500# hit on Zuiho, following by a several on 2 where their rear gunners claimed a Zero each, and both returned safely.



Lundstrom confirms the latter. Nakagami Koichi's 17th Shotai Zero being downed by an SBD. The 2nd A6M appears to have indeed used it's forward guns. This due however to an unusual diving head on attack made by 13th Shotai leader Omori. The defender was Ltcr William Widhelm who simply fired his forward guns and set Omori's engine on fire.



> I read Lundstrom as verifying fewer victories for SBD's than you mention and the only clear Zeroes IMO were two of the CAP over Shokaku and Zuikaku v formation of VS and VB 8 at Santa Cruz.



I'm rechecking Lundstrom. The 3rd Zero may be an error or a ditching due to damage from an SBD. (PO3c Tochi.....if the latter i count it as a kill)




> 2. I'd comment on R Leonard's tally of F4F-4 air combat losses at Casablanca(on the thread linked by Plan D above) as follows based on the detailed blow by blow in Cressman "Ranger":
> "In aerial combat:
> ...
> F4F (VF-41) Ens CE Mikronis to H75A, WIA, POW (said his engine was ko'd by AA in the strafing/air combat encounter over Cazes 11/8 )
> ...



This would match what Shores wrote. a total of 7 F4F's. One of the seven includes Gerhardt and a pilot of VGF-29 who reported that his oil line had been cut and then was never heard from again. Shores suspects he fell afoul of a French fighter.

I was able to confirm 5 F4F's to AA. Total losses listed for F4F's stated as 25. 



> The French plane losses in the two well known combats aren't certain AFAIK, from French sources in Lambert GC II/5's losses 11/8 were 5 pilot KIA, 1 WIA parachuted, 1 WIA 'landed roughly', 1 WIA plane fate not given, several other planes inoperative. The losses of GC 1/5 11/9 are given in Cressman as 2 pilot KIA, 1 pilot 'seriously burned', 2 'force landed'. French sources say the Armee de l'Air didn't use its Dw.520's though VF-41 claimed some in the first combat.



According to Shores, Flotilla IF's CO Vaisseau Folliot was shot down in his D.520 by Wildcats. The other 10 were Hawks though.


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## HoHun (Jan 12, 2008)

Hi Nikademus,

>Also, the "Parties" began even in the days of rifle only armed fighters.

But we don't know the armour status for the early Stukas, so we can't draw any conclusions on this for lack of data.

>It also only deals with the Ki-43-I. When mentioning the Oscars in the examples i've cited here and in prior threads I am referring to the Ki-43-II.

That might indicate that the Ki-43-II could have two 12.7 mm machine guns indeed, but unless they changed their synchronization technology too, it would still be a 12.7 mm not much more effective than the 7.7 mm of the Ki-43-I. (But that's really going off topic here 

>My point was that they cannot simply be dismissed and the early (orig) crop of Japanese fighter pilots were able to put them on target very well, including hard deflection shots. 

Hm, how could we know? Those targets who were hit really well would not return so you'd not know what brought them down, and those who did return were by definition not hit well. Not to say that cannon were not effective, just that I don't think there's much reason to assume that their effectiveness is not accurately portrayed by the technical firepower figures (based on total muzzle energy):


```
Hurricane/Spitfire I   0.70 MW
F4F-3                  1.14 MW
A6M2                   1.22 MW (ca.)
F4F-4, P-40E           1.70 MW
Spitfire VC            2.40 MW
Hurricane II           4.25 MW
```

>I would also factor in that a Spit or Hurr has an increased vulnerability to the engine/radiator being liquid cooled vs. a radial. 

You couldn't stop an attack by a cannon-armed fighter by piercing its radiator, though. It might be minutes before the fighter pilot even notices. Besides, I have never seen data that actually proves the assumed greater vulnerability of liquid-cooled engines. It might be a case like the supposed greater survivability of the B-17 over the B-24 that many people take for granted, while 8th Air Force statistics show that the B-24 actually did better.

>This would be a factor in support of posters like Kurfurst who feel the Stuka simply suffers from bad PR in terms of it's vuln.

As I don't Shores can prove his point, I tend to agree with his statement being bad PR, though I'm sure he merely reflected the contemporary RAF thinking. One would really have to look at each "Stuka Party" independendly and in detail to see if any conclusions regarding the success of different tactics are possible.

>For the SBD, it's primary opposition was naval, and there were only four carrier clashes where enemy fighter opposition was occured in all of 1942. Lunga saw SBD's basing there but they operated primarily at night vs naval targets, no or little fighter opposition. 

How many engagement between SBD formations and Japanese fighters were there in all? If we're talking about SBDs in pennypacket numbers as for the A-24 variants, I'm not sure that this enough of a data basis for serious statistics ...

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## HoHun (Jan 12, 2008)

Hi Nikademus,

>Specific mention was made that the self sealing tanks in particular had handled 7.7mm hits very well. (hence my curiosity about how well Stuka tanks fare under similar hits)

The Me 110 analysis indicates that the tank in that aircraft, supposed to be of 1939 construction, sealed 4 out of 5 shots from 7.62 mm ammunition fired in single shot mode. A burst of five shots fired into another tank resulted in three hits, only one of which sealed though the leaks were slow. 

I'd expect the Stuka tanks to be similar in construction to these Me 110 tanks at least for the Battle-of-Britain era Stukas.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Glider (Jan 12, 2008)

I don't think that there is any doubt that having an in line engine does make you more vulnerable to damage and loss. If only because there are two ways of stopping the engine, hit the engine or hit the cooling system and if you don't have a cooling system you are clearly less vulnerable.

This argument will of course apply to any in line engine (with the exception of the 190 due to its radiator being in front of the engine) not just Hurricanes and Spitfires.

Taking this a step forward, this must apply to any comparison between the Dauntless and the Ju87 as one is a radial and the other an inline.

Personally I do not believe that the Ju87 was more vulnerable than any other dive bomber, they all tended to be slow and lack defensive fire power. To compare these two, the additional armour on the Ju87 probably balanced out the vulnerability of the radiator. Any difference would be marginal and probably depend on the tactical situation.

Any light bomber is vulnerable to heavily armed fighters of any nation. 
The Japanese Ki43 would have had a problem due to its design and being particually vulnerable to any return fire due to its light structure. 2 x LMG wouldn't worry most fighters once armour and sealing tanks were the norm, but the Japanese were vulnerable.


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## Kurfürst (Jan 12, 2008)

I would like to know more about these so called 'Stuka parties'. Did they only exist in the RAF folklore perhaps, ie. cases when fighters were claiming ridiculus amounts of Ju 87s shot down compared to the actual losses? I`d certainly like to see examples.

This might of interest, since this is the official British PoV about the Stuka, issued for RAF pilots as a tactical recommendation :

HINTS IN ATTACKING VARIOUS TYPES OF GERMAN AIRCRAFT, FROM EXPERIENCE GAINED OVER ENGLAND AND NORTHERN FRANCE

_JU.87.

5. It has not proved possible for monoplane fighters to attack the Ju.87 when it is dive bombing, as owing to the steep angle of dive and the slow speed attainable with the diving brakes, our fighters over-shoot. It is therefore recommended that fighters should try to attack the Ju.87 before it commences to dive, or, failing this, when it has pulled out of its dive. 
The Ju.87 has been found to be well armored behind and below the rear gunner so that attacks from directly astern and below are less effective. Formations of Ju.87's are usually preceded, or accompanied, by large fighter escorts which endeavour to distract the attention of our fighters.

- Deputy Directorate of Air Tactics (Air Ministry), March, 1941._

This would be an early Stuka, Bertha model.


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## Crumpp (Jan 12, 2008)

> (with the exception of the 190 due to its radiator being in front of the engine)



Liquid exchange oil coolers are a "feature" on all aircraft. Just to keep some perspective.


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## HoHun (Jan 12, 2008)

Hi Glider,

>I don't think that there is any doubt that having an in line engine does make you more vulnerable to damage and loss. 

I do not know of any combat statistics that would quanitfy the point, so even if it migth be true qualitatively, there is no way to tell if the effect was significant quantitatively. I don't think that there is any doubt that aircraft like the Typhoon or the P-40 were very rugged despite their inline engine, so maybe the advantage of having a radial engine was not that great. Who could tell without data?

>To compare these two, the additional armour on the Ju87 probably balanced out the vulnerability of the radiator. Any difference would be marginal and probably depend on the tactical situation.

Oh, well. Personally, I'd not dare to make statements about two factors balancing each other unless I could quantify the individual factors.

According to "Wings of the Luftwaffe" by Eric Brown, the radiator of the Ju 87D-3 was armoured, by the way.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Hop (Jan 12, 2008)

> Myth. And it was shattered far too many times.
> 
> The Stukas were neither withdrawn, neither there were 'steady losses'. The loss rate was quite acceptable, and they had major successes during the Battle.



Where has this "myth" been "shattered"?

The truth of the matter is that the Luftwaffe suffered very high stuka losses during the BoB, and withdrew the type from combat over Britain, later on using them for attacks on shipping under favourable conditions only.

From ER Hooton, Eagle in Flames:



> The same day ended Stuka daylight operations over England when four fighter squadrons slaughtered Major Clemens, Graf von Schonborn's StG 77 during an attack upon Poling radar station, with 16 Stukas last and two damaged beyond repair (21% of the force) in what Seidemann justly described as "a black day"


Wood and Dempster, Narrow Margin:


> August 18th was the virtual death knell of the Ju 87s over Britain. Losses had been mounting at an alarming rate and, apart from a few isolated sorties, they were pulled out of the battle


Stephen Bungay, Most Dangerous Enemy:


> Most unusually, Luftflotte 3's post-action report the next day (always called an Erfolgsmeldung - literally a "Success Report") commented on the losses of the Stukas. It attributed them to "British fighters gaining a local superiority due to particularly favourable weather conditions" and carrying out a pursuit up to 30km over the the Channel. StG 77's air corps commander, von Richthofen, confided to his diary that a "Stuka Gruppe has had it's feathers well and truly plucked".
> 
> What really struck von Richthofen were not the overall losses of the Stukas, which at 15% were high but bearable in the short term if they were achieving results, but the near destruction of one Gruppe, whose losses ran at 50%. This was on top of the losses of nearly 30% to another single unit, I/StG2, in the Tangmere raid on the 16th, and the loss of 70% of one Staffel of II/StG2 on the 13th. Earlier losses, such as those over convoy Peewit, had been heavy but acceptable. It was becoming clear, however, that any unlucky Stuka unit caught without its escort would be almost wiped out. It was also becoming clear there was at least one such unlucky unit on every major sortie. Some rethinking was called for.



Rich from the Dupy Institute quotes Ju 87 numbers from the Luftwaffe records:
10 May 360 on hand, 326 operational
13 August 347 on hand, 276 operational
7 September 161 on hand, 123 operational 

Wood and Dempster give "dive bomber" losses as:
Month - On Operations - Not on Operations
July - 16 - 5
Aug - 51 - 7
Sept - 2 - 7
Oct - 0 - 6

We can see two things from that. Firstly, moderate losses in July, very high losses in August. Secondly, either the Stuka became almost invulnerable, or the Luftwaffe did not use them much after August.

In fact, the latter is true. From Bungay again, quoting Goering:



> "Until the enemy fighter force has been broken, Stuka units are only to be used when circumstances are particularly favourable." With this withdrawal of the Stukas from general operations, the only precision bombing instrument the Luftwaffe had left was Erpro 210



Now, there are plenty of authors who say Stuka losses were very high, leading to their withdrawal from combat. I've only ever seen that view rejected by a few forum posters. What is the evidence, or even _opinion_, to the contrary?


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## Njaco (Jan 12, 2008)

Kurfurst, I believe one of those "Stuka parties" was on Aug 18, 1940 where numerous Ju 87s were shot down and in following the RAF protocol that you posted. Most caught just coming out of their dives. As I posted "On August 18, 1940, 109 Ju87s from StG 3 and StG 77 attacked airfields and radar stations on the east coast of England, supported by Bf 109s. 30 Stukas, nearly 21% of the total force committed, were shot down." 

I am in no way claiming the Stuka was withdrawn because of this but I would say that was one party.

But looking at this thread would the Ju 87 have a slight advantage based on this ;



> Graeme - “US Navy legend has it that pilots (of SBDs) were prone to ‘target fascination’ which could lull them into failing to pull out of the dive in time.”



The Ju 87 had an automatic pull-out whereas I am assuming the US SBDs did not? Would that be an advantage?


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## Negative Creep (Jan 12, 2008)

Were the Stukas really getting results against mainland targets? If I remember correctly only one radar station was taken out of action and even then it was only for a short period. Luftwaffe strategy of attacking RAF airfields and factories would seem to be better suited to medium bombers than the Ju 87


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## Glider (Jan 12, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Hi Glider,
> 
> >I don't think that there is any doubt that having an in line engine does make you more vulnerable to damage and loss.
> 
> I do not know of any combat statistics that would quanitfy the point, so even if it migth be true qualitatively, there is no way to tell if the effect was significant quantitatively. I don't think that there is any doubt that aircraft like the Typhoon or the P-40 were very rugged despite their inline engine, so maybe the advantage of having a radial engine was not that great. Who could tell without data?


The RAF considered the Radiator to be a weak spot, on the Mossie the Radiator was a weak spot, on the Typhoon the Radiator was seen as a weak spot, Rugged yes but hit the Radiator and you were going down. This applied to all aircraft with a Radiator.



> >To compare these two, the additional armour on the Ju87 probably balanced out the vulnerability of the radiator. Any difference would be marginal and probably depend on the tactical situation.
> 
> Oh, well. Personally, I'd not dare to make statements about two factors balancing each other unless I could quantify the individual factors.



Its impossible to quantify such differing factors, but the fact remains that the Radiator is a weak spot that the Dauntlass didn't have, but the Ju87 had armour the Dauntlass didn't have in such quantity. 
It can only be an opinion that one would tend to balance the other out and its one that I hold. You can disagree certainly, but it is a valid point.



> According to "Wings of the Luftwaffe" by Eric Brown, the radiator of the Ju 87D-3 was armoured, by the way.


I know, but it wouldn't stop a 20mm or almost certainly a 12.7 fired at the sort of ranges common in air combat. It would give you a fair degree of protection against LMG bullets. 

The Radiator increases the size of the target area that will bring down the plane. My comment about the 190 was that by putting the radiator in front of the engine, the increase in the size of the target area is minimised.


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## HoHun (Jan 12, 2008)

Hi Glider,

>Rugged yes but hit the Radiator and you were going down. This applied to all aircraft with a Radiator.

Rugged just means having small or few weak spots. Having a weak spot of one particular type does not automatically make an aircraft "non-rugged". And radial engines have a radiator as well, though it's usually called "oil cooler" there.

>Its impossible to quantify such differing factors

It's impossible to quantify without sufficient data ... any attempt to do so is pure speculation.

>I know, but it wouldn't stop a 20mm or almost certainly a 12.7 fired at the sort of ranges common in air combat. 

How do you know? The thickness is not even given in Brown's book. 

And considering that rear attacks are typical for air combat against slower aircraft, and the Stukas would usually try to manoeuvre to bring its rear guns to bear on the attacker, oblique impact engines on the armour seem more likely than perpendicular hits. A relatively small armour thickness is sufficient to protect against glancing hits, and the exact amount of protection would depend on the exact armour thickness.

>the fact remains that the Radiator is a weak spot that the Dauntlass didn't have

As Crumpp pointed out, the Dauntless certainly did have an oil cooler. The radiator of the Stuka was armoured, the oil cooler of the Dauntless was not.

>The Radiator increases the size of the target area that will bring down the plane. 

Having a radial engine increases the size of the target area that will bring down the plane, too. (Of course it depends on aspect, but as you're talking about areas, that's implied already.)

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Glider (Jan 12, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Hi Glider,
> 
> >Rugged yes but hit the Radiator and you were going down. This applied to all aircraft with a Radiator.
> 
> ...



I am aware that there are such things as oil coolers, I am also aware that on the vast majority of aircraft these are a heck of a lot smaller than a radiator. Also they don't often stick out into the airflow to anything like the degree of the Typhoon, P51, Spitfire, 109 or most other in line types

However I do have to admit to allowing myself a smile at your comments about armoured radiators. 
To have the level of protection your hinting at, the Armour on a Ju87 Radiator would dwarf that on an Il2, loads of which were shot down my 20mm. Not likely.


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## Crumpp (Jan 12, 2008)

> I am also aware that on the vast majority of aircraft these are a heck of a lot smaller than a radiator.



That is not really fact. In an air-cooled engine, the oil becomes the primary coolant. The oil cooler and the oil tank tend to be much larger as a result.

Here you can see the differences in some air-cooled radials. It really is just a matter of picking your poison.

The FW190 system incorporated the oil tank and cooler under and armored ring. At extreme angles projectiles can get behind ring. I certainly wouldn't think it was more vulnerable than other unarmored systems.


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## HoHun (Jan 12, 2008)

Hi Glider,

>I am aware that there are such things as oil coolers, I am also aware that on the vast majority of aircraft these are a heck of a lot smaller than a radiator. 

That's quantitative thinking - just what I'be been trying to emphasize. I'm glad that you seem to consider it necessary for a meaningful assessment of vulnerabilities, too.

>To have the level of protection your hinting at, the Armour on a Ju87 Radiator would dwarf that on an Il2, loads of which were shot down my 20mm. Not likely.

I've got a Pilot Press cutaway of the Il-2 here that indicates a thickness of 6 mm for the Il-2 cowl armour, which encloses the Stormovik's radiator. The Ju 87D-3 cutaway in Eric Brown's "Wings of the Luftwaffe" shows 8 mm ventral armour beneath the oil reservoir, and an unspecified thickness of armour for the radiator.

If you found out that thickness figure, please share it with us. If you didn't, well - difficult to make reliable statements on something you don't know.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Nikademus (Jan 12, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Hi Nikademus,
> 
> >Also, the "Parties" began even in the days of rifle only armed fighters.
> 
> But we don't know the armour status for the early Stukas, so we can't draw any conclusions on this for lack of data.



Hello!

We know they were armored, and that the Ju-87B-2/U3 featured "increased" armor for the close support role. One can at least assume this armor protection would resist rifle caliber bullets. The question does remain, how well the coverage of this armor extends as well as the quality of the self sealers. I suspect that the plane's stability might have more to do with it's vulnerability. As one author/ex pilot once said....you put any plane into a bullet stream long enough....its going to go down. 



> That might indicate that the Ki-43-II could have two 12.7 mm machine guns indeed, but unless they changed their synchronization technology too, it would still be a 12.7 mm not much more effective than the 7.7 mm of the Ki-43-I. (But that's really going off topic here



Effective enough to preform well in Burma.  (but yes...off topic) 



> Hm, how could we know? Those targets who were hit really well would not return so you'd not know what brought them down, and those who did return were by definition not hit well.



We know from the accounts of the pilots. Lundstrom for example contains such testimony to the general ineffectiveness of 7.7 fire against their F4F's. When hit by a cannon shell...they usually were aware of it. Despite this, some F4F's did live to return after being hit. The F4F was amazingly tough. While one can't discount a lucky hit from a 7.7, odds are that F4F's brought down were done so by a combination of cannon and 7.7. Saburo Sakai stated in his book that the 7's were used to line up the target, and then the cannons employed to finish off said target.



> You couldn't stop an attack by a cannon-armed fighter by piercing its radiator, though. It might be minutes before the fighter pilot even notices.



The 64th Sentai pilots used this tactic and it proved rather effective at stopping Hurricanes quickly. Similar accounts are in Shores' Fighters over the Desert. A coolant hit can very quickly disable a plane/pilot combo.



> Besides, I have never seen data that actually proves the assumed greater vulnerability of liquid-cooled engines. It might be a case like the supposed greater survivability of the B-17 over the B-24 that many people take for granted, while 8th Air Force statistics show that the B-24 actually did better.




Statistics can be the greatest liars at times. I've heard about that said statistic yet i've never seen a source yet that claims the B-24 to have greater ruggedness over the B-17. When the issue of ground attack came up, the P-47 came up the preferred choice over the liquid cooled P-51.


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## Nikademus (Jan 12, 2008)

Kurfürst said:


> I would like to know more about these so called 'Stuka parties'. Did they only exist in the RAF folklore perhaps, ie. cases when fighters were claiming ridiculus amounts of Ju 87s shot down compared to the actual losses? I`d certainly like to see examples.



I listed a few on page 2. The losses listed exclude all those "claimed" by RAF pilots in total but not fully verified. I can add those if you want.



> This might of interest, since this is the official British PoV about the Stuka, issued for RAF pilots as a tactical recommendation :



That would track with accounts in fighting vs. D3A's and SBD's. I was suprised by the comment in FotD regarding the Junkers being "most vulnerable" while in the dive. From accounts in Eagle Day, Fighter boys and Duel of Eagles the point of worst vulnerability was after the dives had been completed. Interesting there were multiple descriptions of diving brake failures that further slowed the planes after pulling out. Next worst/equal Point of vuln would appear to be before the dive.


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## Njaco (Jan 12, 2008)

> Next worst/equal Point of vuln would appear to be before the dive.



Nik, that point would be correct as in the Aug 18 battle Hurricanes from RAF No. 43 and 601 Sqdrns either latched onto them as they dived and followed them through the attack or went around and waited for the pull-out.



> Were the Stukas really getting results against mainland targets? If I remember correctly only one radar station was taken out of action and even then it was only for a short period. Luftwaffe strategy of attacking RAF airfields and factories would seem to be better suited to medium bombers than the Ju 87



Negative, that was the point I was trying to make that the Stukas weren't really withdrawn only because of losses. It was a combination of factors including the Luftwaffe's failure to place any real importance on radar stations. On Aug 15 Goering ordered that "From now on we shall waste no more time on the British radar installations." With that kind of target withdrawn what exactly were the targets for the Stukas? Airfields aren't very vulnerable to pin-point attacks as shown the very next day, Aug 16 1940, 54 Ju 87s of StG 2 attacked Tangmere and caused some damage to 2 hangars and several other buildings including 7 Hurricanes, 6 Blenheims and a trainer. 10 minutes after the Stuka attack the airfield was attacked by Ju 88s and they were far more accurate and caused major damage, more so than the Stuka attack. Every building was hit and 14 aircraft on the ground were destroyed.

As the Stukas were returning they were bounced by RAF No 43 and 601 sqdrns and the Germans lost 8 Ju 87s with 6 more damaged. Not a good return for the damage caused.

Med bombers caused more damage than dive-bombers, radar stations were declassified as targets and then the coup-de-grace - heavy losses on the 18th. They were withdrawn from MAJOR operations in the BoB but not strictly because they were vulnerable. It was a change of tactics combined with no air superiority and the losses cemented it.


----------



## JoeB (Jan 12, 2008)

Nikademus said:


> 1. This would match what Shores wrote. a total of 7 F4F's. One of the seven includes Gerhardt and a pilot of VGF-29 who reported that his oil line had been cut and then was never heard from again. Shores suspects he fell afoul of a French fighter.
> 
> 2. According to Shores, Flotilla IF's CO Vaisseau Folliot was shot down in his D.520 by Wildcats. The other 10 were Hawks though.


1. The VGF-29 pilot was Lt.jg George Trumpter; the loss seems operational from the description in Lambert "Wildcats Over Casablanca", left his formation after takeoff with oil leak, failed to return (to USS Santee). Since there were no known encounters with French fighters in the Southern Task Force's area, (and none mentioned in Mordal's account from the French side), it seems speculative of Shores to add that one. Especially considering again that among the other 6 there's doubt about the cause of three already: Mikronis (AA according to him, though during an air combat), August and Connor.

2. Foillot's loss was the one which matches the uncredited claim of VGF-26 at Port Lyautey I mentioned in the next paragraph. For Hawks I have a Squadron Signal book by Shores summarizing 6 lost (+5 'damaged') in first combat 4 in second. Do you get the details from "L'Aviation Vichy au Combat' or yet something else he wrote? But it seems low to me given the French-sourced named pilot casualties in Lambert for the 11/8 combat (5 KIA, 4 WIA, 'several other a/c inoperative') and Cressman for 11/9 (2 KIA, WIA, 2 forced landings). Another source is Ketley "French Aces of WWII" which quotes 5 KIA, 4 WIA and 2 killed in takeoff accidents in the 11/8 combat with 13 total GC II/5 a/c destroyed (including ground); and 4 downed in the second plus Plubeau's a/c belly landed.

I'm on the minutiae level well off topic I know  , but seems to me a straight down the middle analysis would count a likely maximum of 6 F4F's, and having taken the maximum there, wouldn't then split hairs by not counting French planes whose pilots crashed in accidents during combat, bellied, etc, so would come out a few higher than 11. Shores is one of the greats, but I question that particular accounting.

Of course, besides the political/psychological factors, the first combat had most of the French at a disadvantage (taking off, though others already on CAP bounced the strafing Wildcats from above). But in the second combat neither side had initial tactical advantage, and GC I/5 outnumbered VF-9.

Joe


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## HoHun (Jan 13, 2008)

Hi Nikademus,

>We know they were armored, and that the Ju-87B-2/U3 featured "increased" armor for the close support role. 

I haven't seen any proof that the Battle of Britain Stukas were armoured, so where did you find this bit of information?

>We know from the accounts of the pilots. 

Remember I replied to your comment on Japanese pilots knowing how to hit effectively with cannon. You'd not get the account of the pilot who had been hit effectively because he would not come back to tell about it.

>Statistics can be the greatest liars at times. I've heard about that said statistic yet i've never seen a source yet that claims the B-24 to have greater ruggedness over the B-17. 

Oh well, my general impression from many internet discussions is actually that this is a conception usually born from poor understanding of the laws of statistics, and for some people perhaps from a refusal to part with their toy theories when they discover they are not supported by facts. Better to shoot the messenger 

Here is the data on the B-17 vs. B-24:

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/hardest-plane-take-down-ww2-3114-5.html#post293977

Note that the statistics do in fact point towards a greater survivability of the B-24, but not necessarily towards a greater "ruggedness" as the B-24 has different performance charactistics from the B-17. All we can say is that in the end, fewer B-24s were lost per sortie than B-17s. (If we mean to discuss this in depth, I suggest we continue it over in the original thread to keep things organized 

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## HoHun (Jan 13, 2008)

Hi Nikademus,

>The 64th Sentai pilots used this tactic and it proved rather effective at stopping Hurricanes quickly. Similar accounts are in Shores' Fighters over the Desert. A coolant hit can very quickly disable a plane/pilot combo.

I was commenting on the effectiveness of the rearward armament of a dive bomber, and as far as I can tell the 64th Sentai was a fighter unit using its forward armament.

The difficulties of aiming a manually operated gun from a moving platform certainly make aimed fire at the radiator of an attacker impractical, and while the perception of any hits at all, effective or not, often (but not always) would make the attacker break off his attacks, I have read plenty of accounts showing that a hit in the radiator was only noticed by a pilot when the temperature gauge showed the engine was boiling.

That might lead to a "quick" end, but the dive bomber might have gone down as result of the continued attack all the same.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Glider (Jan 13, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Hi Glider,
> 
> >To have the level of protection your hinting at, the Armour on a Ju87 Radiator would dwarf that on an Il2, loads of which were shot down my 20mm. Not likely.
> 
> ...



True as ever to a degree, but seeing as the 20mm would penetrate 19mm or armour at 400 yards at a deflection of 20 degrees, the bsis of my assumption is not unreasonable. Obviously if the range was closer or the angle less it would penetrate a lot more.
Your implication that the radiator still may survive this sort of fire made me smile. 
I have this vision of a formation of Radiators flying along, imune to shell and shot with barely a scratch on the paintwork. The rest of the aircraft is of course shot to hell but never mind, the radiators carry on regardless.


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## HoHun (Jan 13, 2008)

Hi Glider,

>the 20mm would penetrate 19mm or armour at 400 yards at a deflection of 20 degrees

Hm, which 20 mm, and which 20 degrees?

>Your implication that the radiator still may survive this sort of fire made me smile.

I implied and am ready to say explicitely that not every hit is going to penetrate. High-explosive incendiary and steel "ball" rounds, which made up a fair share of the belting for the British Hispano cannon, don't have the penetration of armour-piercing rounds. 

And if you look at a typical armour protection diagram, for example that of the Wildcat that is praised in this thread as particularly rugged, you'll find that the cones of protection are remarkably small. The Wildcat is protected against rifle-calibre rounds in a 12 degree angle above, 40 degree below if you accept that the pilot's legs and thighs can be hit, but only 12 degree below if you mean to protect them, and 15 degree to either side. The vertical angles are even smaller for protection against 12.7 mm rounds.

Still, that bit of armour protection made a big difference in combat.

>I have this vision of a formation of Radiators flying along, imune to shell and shot with barely a scratch on the paintwork. The rest of the aircraft is of course shot to hell but never mind, the radiators carry on regardless. 

Excellent picture - now imagine the same shot-to-hell aircraft with a happily purring radial engine in front. That's the radial's "big" survivability advantage ...

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Nikademus (Jan 13, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Hi Nikademus,
> 
> I haven't seen any proof that the Battle of Britain Stukas were armoured, so where did you find this bit of information?



Hi HH,

I havn't seen any proof that they wern't. . Recall I asked you when you suggested they might not be. I did a little digging and found this site indicating that they were. The discussion then moved on to the question of how much "better" protected the D varient might be over the B varient.

The Junkers Ju-87 Stuka. 




> Remember I replied to your comment on Japanese pilots knowing how to hit effectively with cannon. You'd not get the account of the pilot who had been hit effectively because he would not come back to tell about it.



I don't see how you can claim such a thing. It is fully possible to "effectively" target (i.e. "hit") a plane and not have it become an automatic kill.



> Oh well, my general impression from many internet discussions is actually that this is a conception usually born from poor understanding of the laws of statistics, and for some people perhaps from a refusal to part with their toy theories when they discover they are not supported by facts. Better to shoot the messenger



lol. Maybe. My general impression, also from many many years of Internet discussions is that Statistics are a most popular course of action because they can be manipulated and interpreted in many ways to support whatever argument is currently being forwarded. Being 'statistics' (i.e. "data") they carry an automatic air of authority. Another way of putting it was a statement recently made from one of my professors when the subject of statistics came up; "Statistics don't lie....people lie using statistics"  Point being here, that in the end as with any other form of "fact", interpretation and point of context are key. I don't discount statistics. But I take them with a grain of salt. Especially when they are bandied around during a political debate.  




> Here is the data on the B-17 vs. B-24:
> 
> http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/hardest-plane-take-down-ww2-3114-5.html#post293977



Ah yes....seen it. Big thread. Can you point me directly to where it shows the B-24 to be more survivable than the B-17? I really don't feel like rereading the whole thing.  



> Note that the statistics do in fact point towards a greater survivability of the B-24, but not necessarily towards a greater "ruggedness" as the B-24 has different performance charactistics from the B-17. All we can say is that in the end, fewer B-24s were lost per sortie than B-17s. (If we mean to discuss this in depth, I suggest we continue it over in the original thread to keep things organized



Indeed. Believe I already made some counter-arguments on that theory on that thread. I'll leave them there.

Back to the Football game


----------



## Nikademus (Jan 13, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Hi Nikademus,
> 
> I was commenting on the effectiveness of the rearward armament of a dive bomber, and as far as I can tell the 64th Sentai was a fighter unit using its forward armament.
> The difficulties of aiming a manually operated gun from a moving platform certainly make aimed fire at the radiator of an attacker impractical, and while the perception of any hits at all, effective or not, often (but not always) would make the attacker break off his attacks, I have read plenty of accounts showing that a hit in the radiator was only noticed by a pilot when the temperature gauge showed the engine was boiling.



Hello,

I have read numerous accounts as well, where the pilot, whether hit from behind/angle from a fighter or from a rear gunner, immediately knew when he took a hit in the engine/coolant system. Hence my comment that yes, there are times when the effect is immediately felt and the attack stopped in it's tracks.



> That might lead to a "quick" end, but the dive bomber might have gone down as result of the continued attack all the same.



In some cases, but not _all_ cases.


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## Nikademus (Jan 13, 2008)

JoeB said:


> 1. The VGF-29 pilot was Lt.jg George Trumpter; the loss seems operational from the description in Lambert "Wildcats Over Casablanca", left his formation after takeoff with oil leak, failed to return (to USS Santee). Since there were no known encounters with French fighters in the Southern Task Force's area, (and none mentioned in Mordal's account from the French side), it seems speculative of Shores to add that one. Especially considering again that among the other 6 there's doubt about the cause of three already: Mikronis (AA according to him, though during an air combat), August and Connor.



Hi Joe,

Yes, it is speculation in part. Shores writes it as such (i.e. "possible") Per this source the transmission from the pilot (It might have been Trumpter or not) the statement was that his line was "cut", not that he had a leak. It seems strange to me that if he had a leak from the beginning that he wouldn't have immediately aborted his mission. Another wrinkle is that Shores states another pilot of the flight went down in a operational loss at sea. This might have been a reference to Trumpter.

Either way.....I certainly don't have a problem with the estimated loss being 6 as opposed to 7 F4F's. I included it though because the author felt it was possible. The French pilots made a number of claims (as do all pilots) anytime no connection can be made i discount them but if the author feels a poss exists, i'll at least notate it as possible.




> 2. Foillot's loss was the one which matches the uncredited claim of VGF-26 at Port Lyautey I mentioned in the next paragraph. For Hawks I have a Squadron Signal book by Shores summarizing 6 lost (+5 'damaged') in first combat 4 in second. Do you get the details from "L'Aviation Vichy au Combat' or yet something else he wrote?



Something else; _Fighters over Tunisia_ by Shores, Ring and Hess. (1975)



> I'm on the minutiae level well off topic I know  , but seems to me a straight down the middle analysis would count a likely maximum of 6 F4F's, and having taken the maximum there, wouldn't then split hairs by not counting French planes whose pilots crashed in accidents during combat, bellied, etc, so would come out a few higher than 11. Shores is one of the greats, but I question that particular accounting.



that kill (and possible another i'll add) could be called into question. Its rare when 2 different sources agree completely. One must also use their own judgement as well. As mentioned, i included it because the author specifically wrote that he felt it was "possible" a kill took place. But if someone wants to say its 6 vs. 7. I don't have an issue with it. It doesn't disturb the conclusions i've made thus far on WWII air combat on a day to day basis.


----------



## HoHun (Jan 13, 2008)

Hi Nikademus,

>I havn't seen any proof that they wern't. . Recall I asked you when you suggested they might not be. I did a little digging and found this site indicating that they were. The discussion then moved on to the question of how much "better" protected the D varient might be over the B varient.

The Junkers Ju-87 Stuka. 

Hm, I found this post by you:

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/av...bility-fighter-attack-11124-2.html#post308745

Notice you mentioned "one online source" without a URL, and an armour increase for ground-attack aircraft. As we were talking about dive bombers, I didn't think it was necessary to consider that, especially as I had pointed out the existence of an armoured version in the post I made directly before.

With regard to the armour status, I visited a friend today who has a well-stacked aviation library and asked him for information on the Stuka armour status. No final answer, but he had "Das geheime Typenbuch der deutschen Luftwaffe" by Manfred Griehl, which contains reproductions of the Flugzeug-Baureihen-Buch of the RLM, and it had very brief descriptions of the Ju 87 variants:

Ju 87A-1: "Ohne Panzerung"
Ju 87B-1: "Ohne Panzerung"
Ju 87B-2: "Ausführung ohne Panzerung läuft aus"
Ju 87D-3: "mit zusätzlicher Grundpanzerung"
Ju 87D-8: "wie Ju 87D-5 (Ausführung ohne Rüstsatzpanzerung)"
Ju 87R-1: "Mit und ohne Panzerung"

More variants are listed, but with no reference to armour.

("Ohne Panzerung" means "without armour". "Ausführung ohne Panzerung läuft aus" means "variant without armour is being phased out from the production line". "Mit zusätzlicher Grundpanzerung" means "with additional basic armour". "Wie Ju 87D-5 (Ausführung ohne Rüstsatzpanzerung)" means "like Ju 87D-5 (variant without equipment kit armour)". "Mit und ohne Panzerung" means "with and without armour".

>I don't see how you can claim such a thing. It is fully possible to "effectively" target (i.e. "hit") a plane and not have it become an automatic kill.

Well, depends on the definition of "effective". My point is that you only see part of the total hits because someone inevitably will fail to return, so it's difficult to judge the effectiveness of the attacking fighter pilots from looking at the planes that returned, even if they were holed.

>My general impression, also from many many years of Internet discussions is that Statistics are a most popular course of action because they can be manipulated and interpreted in many ways to support whatever argument is currently being forwarded. 

Guess you are a burned child because of that Sherman-vs.-Tiger thread  Interpretation of statistics may be difficult, but without any data at all, everything is open to imagination.

>Can you point me directly to where it shows the B-24 to be more survivable than the B-17?

It's a direct link to the relevant post - maybe it takes a while to load completely before jumping to the right position. I have switched off signature blocks, so maybe my load times are faster ...

>Believe I already made some counter-arguments on that theory on that thread.

Hm, I found comments you made on Koolkitty's posts, but not on mine. Perhaps you could post a direct link?

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


----------



## Glider (Jan 13, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Hi Glider,
> 
> >the 20mm would penetrate 19mm or armour at 400 yards at a deflection of 20 degrees
> 
> Hm, which 20 mm, and which 20 degrees?


British Hispano II and its 20 degrees from angle of impact




> >Your implication that the radiator still may survive this sort of fire made me smile.
> 
> I implied and am ready to say explicitely that not every hit is going to penetrate. High-explosive incendiary and steel "ball" rounds, which made up a fair share of the belting for the British Hispano cannon, don't have the penetration of armour-piercing rounds.


And I wouldn't disagree with you. Ball penetrated 9mm of armour at 400 yards at 20 degrees from angle of impact, HE obviously wouldn't 



> >I have this vision of a formation of Radiators flying along, imune to shell and shot with barely a scratch on the paintwork. The rest of the aircraft is of course shot to hell but never mind, the radiators carry on regardless.
> 
> Excellent picture - now imagine the same shot-to-hell aircraft with a happily purring radial engine in front. That's the radial's "big" survivability advantage ...


Again I totally agree. There is less of a target area on a Radial as the cooling system is mostly behind the engine. On an in line, the radiator is out in the open ready to be hit.


----------



## HoHun (Jan 13, 2008)

Hi Glider,

>British Hispano II and its 20 degrees from angle of impact

What exact type of ammunition? What is the reference for measurement of that angle? What kind of armour plate?

>Again I totally agree. 

Guess the irony was lost on you ... what your pretty image described was merely that you can (and with a fair likelihood will) shoot an aircraft "to hell" without even touching the engine. The radiator and oil cooler are just part of the total vulnerable area, and you'll have to run a serious analysis of projected target area to find out which aircraft is actually more vulnerable to fire, with the engine type being just one of several factors.

>There is less of a target area on a Radial as the cooling system is mostly behind the engine. On an in line, the radiator is out in the open ready to be hit.

If you look at the diagrams Crumpp posted, you'll see that reality is more complex than that. And if you look at the SBD protection diagram I linked above, you'll see that for bullets coming from behind as during fighter attacks, oil reservoir and oil cooler of the SBD are actually in front of the engine, as the bullet sees it.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## JoeB (Jan 13, 2008)

Nikademus said:


> Something else; _Fighters over Tunisia_ by Shores, Ring and Hess. (1975)
> 
> 
> 
> that kill (and possible another i'll add) could be called into question. Its rare when 2 different sources agree completely. One must also use their own judgement as well. As mentioned, i included it because the author specifically wrote that he felt it was "possible" a kill took place. But if someone wants to say its 6 vs. 7.


Yes I guess the other thing I'm suggesting is using more sources, I've mentioned 4 others, including newer ones directly quoting original US and French sources in detail (I've heard a rewrite/update of 'Fighters over Tunisia' is eventually forthcoming. ?). 

On VGF-29 that's definitely Trumpter because he was the only guy missing in that unit. To perhaps better explain what I said before, there were three US task force in three fairly separate areas of the Moroccan coast. VGF-29 flew from USS Santee, in the area around Safi where no French source mentions any claims. It's simply not plausible to 'suspect' it corresponded to French claims in the Casablanca and Port Lyautey areas of the Central and Northern TF's, even for Chris Shores.  .

And as mentioned it isn't just 6 v 7 but that the 6 could easily be 3, since Mikronis thought he was downed by AA and there's no evidence August wasn't too, nor any specific account saying Gannon's ditching was due to hostile action at all. And 11 could only be calculated by paring the French losses in a way that *would* result in more like 3 than 6 F4F losses if the same treatment was applied on both sides, that's my point. Though, it could be more limited info available to Shores back in '75, not saying it's a bias necessarily. But altogether it was more like 3~6 F4F v ~12-14 Hawk/Dw, so not actually a tiny difference in the episode, though not a major revision to the air history of WWII, indeed  

Joe


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## Glider (Jan 13, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Hi Glider,
> 
> >British Hispano II and its 20 degrees from angle of impact
> 
> What exact type of ammunition? What is the reference for measurement of that angle? What kind of armour plate?


AP MkII
Ball Mk 1
Armour I.T.70
I dont understand what you mean by reference for the measurement of angle. I also don't know what the spec is of I.T.70 before you ask.

I also don't get where you are coming from as I have supplied everything I can and the only point that I am trying to make is that this type of ammunition is almost certain to penetrate any armour on an aircraft at normal combat ranges. That is clear.



> >Again I totally agree.
> 
> Guess the irony was lost on you ... what your pretty image described was merely that you can (and with a fair likelihood will) shoot an aircraft "to hell" without even touching the engine. The radiator and oil cooler are just part of the total vulnerable area, and you'll have to run a serious analysis of projected target area to find out which aircraft is actually more vulnerable to fire, with the engine type being just one of several factors.


The irony was lost on you my friend.



> >There is less of a target area on a Radial as the cooling system is mostly behind the engine. On an in line, the radiator is out in the open ready to be hit.
> 
> If you look at the diagrams Crumpp posted, you'll see that reality is more complex than that. And if you look at the SBD protection diagram I linked above, you'll see that for bullets coming from behind as during fighter attacks, oil reservoir and oil cooler of the SBD are actually in front of the engine, as the bullet sees it.


Again I agree, but on an inline all the radiator and all of the engine are visible and vulnerable. Generally speaking, on a radial one tends to be behind the other and the vulnerable area is less.


----------



## Crumpp (Jan 13, 2008)

> Again I agree, but on an inline all the radiator and all of the engine are visible and vulnerable. Generally speaking, on a radial one tends to be behind the other and the vulnerable area is less.



The vulnerable area is about the same. Once again, air cooled engines have a larger oil tank capacity and larger oil cooler. Oil is the motors liquid coolant.

As for one behind the other, see the Corsair diagram.

All the best,

Crumpp


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## HoHun (Jan 13, 2008)

Hi Glider,

>I dont understand what you mean by reference for the measurement of angle. 

Is it measured between a line perpendicular to the plane of the (flat) armour plate and the projectile trajectory, or is it measured between a line in the plane of the armour plate and the projectile trajectory?

>I also don't get where you are coming from as I have supplied everything I can

I'd additionally like to ask for your source, please.

>Again I agree, but on an inline all the radiator and all of the engine are visible and vulnerable. 

If you'd look at a three-view, you'd notice that the radial engine has a larger frontal area than the inline engine. When we are analyzing rear attacks, the same applies to the rear area of both engines. 

It would be hard to make any meaningful statement on relative vulnerability without actually measuring these areas, but - well, surprise me by not even trying.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## plan_D (Jan 13, 2008)

As far as I'm aware the Ju 87B-2 had armour albeit I don't know where or how much. The Ju 87B-2/U3 had "additional armour" over the standard B-2 but once again I don't know where. Given the information I have at hand though I don't believe the radiator was armoured until the Ju 87D (in 1941), but I could be wrong.

I don't believe the Stuka to be anymore vulnerable than any of the other slow dive bombers/ground attack aircraft of the day. I also don't believe it to be any better, and those sirens were only effective in the early days - and mostly against civilians. Their whole purpose being to disrupt columns of refugees to make military movements harder for the enemy. It's like soldiers getting used to being mortared in Iraq and Afghanistan today, sure they still get their heads down but it doesn't demoralise or strike fear anymore.


----------



## Glider (Jan 14, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Hi Glider,
> 
> 
> >I also don't get where you are coming from as I have supplied everything I can
> ...


Dig it out for yourself, its easy to find and to give you a clue, part of this site. You haven't tried to look into it, just asked the same question different ways as a way of avoiding the obvious fact that a 20mm hit on a radiator at normal combat ranges will destroy the radiator and the plane will go down.

If you have looked for it and cannot find it, I will post the source but do some work for a change.




> >Again I agree, but on an inline all the radiator and all of the engine are visible and vulnerable.
> 
> If you'd look at a three-view, you'd notice that the radial engine has a larger frontal area than the inline engine. When we are analyzing rear attacks, the same applies to the rear area of both engines.
> 
> It would be hard to make any meaningful statement on relative vulnerability without actually measuring these areas, but - well, surprise me by not even trying.



This may come as a suprise but not all attacks are from the back, there tends to be a vertical factor involved an the danger area on an in line is greater than on a radial. 

At the end of the day the airforces (all of them) recognised that an in line was more vulnerable to damage than a Radial due to the vulnerability of the Radiator.
If you disagree with this statement and know better then prove it wrong and I will accept your view. 

Glider


----------



## Graeme (Jan 14, 2008)

Glider said:


> At the end of the day the airforces (all of them) recognised that an in line was more vulnerable to damage than a Radial due to the vulnerability of the Radiator.



Makes you wonder why the British Air Ministry 'gently' encouraged aircraft manufacturers to respond to specification F.7/30 (1930) with the evaporatively-cooled Goshawk engine. Despite the aerodynamic advantages they must have known how vulnerable the system would have been in a bullet fight? In the end they gave up on F.7/30 and selected the radial engined Gladiator.

Evaporative cooling - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## Crumpp (Jan 14, 2008)

> Makes you wonder why the British Air Ministry 'gently' encouraged aircraft manufacturers to respond to specification F.7/30 (1930) with the evaporatively-cooled Goshawk engine. Despite the aerodynamic advantages they must have known how vulnerable the system would have been in a bullet fight? In the end they selected the radial engined Gauntlet.



Do you know what evaporative cooling is and the differences?


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## Graeme (Jan 14, 2008)

Crumpp said:


> Do you know what evaporative cooling is and the differences?



The physics of it, very little Crummp, only a basic understanding that the concept was to distribute the drag inducing 'radiator' over a large surface area, but this in turn provided a larger vulnerable area for damage.


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## Crumpp (Jan 14, 2008)

> only that the concept



The skin of the aircraft is used to condense the coolant. 

The concept is to keep the liquid coolant under great pressure so that it remains in liquid form as long as possible when sprayed directly on the cylinders/heads. The liquid turns to vapor and cools through evaporation just like the sweat on your skin. The heated vapor is then collected and cooled to liquid form through a network of tubes in the skin of the aircraft.

I probably don't need to point how this would be problematic for an Military aircraft. 

All the best,

Crumpp


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## Graeme (Jan 14, 2008)

Thanks Crumpp


----------



## Crumpp (Jan 14, 2008)

You are very welcome!


----------



## Nikademus (Jan 14, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Hi Nikademus,
> 
> Hm, I found this post by you:
> 
> ...



Did you click on the link i posted and you just quoted in your last reply? Here it is again. If you'll reread post#138 you'll see I wrote "the Ju-87B-2/U3 featured "increased" armor for the close support *role*"

Not close support aircraft.

The Junkers Ju-87 Stuka



> With regard to the armour status, I visited a friend today who has a well-stacked aviation library and asked him for information on the Stuka armour status. No final answer, but he had "Das geheime Typenbuch der deutschen Luftwaffe" by Manfred Griehl, which contains reproductions of the Flugzeug-Baureihen-Buch of the RLM, and it had very brief descriptions of the Ju 87 variants:



Interesting. It would be puzzling why they'd build an unarmored version of the Stuka when even the Hs-123 that preceeded it supposedly had 'some' armor.



> Well, depends on the definition of "effective". My point is that you only see part of the total hits because someone inevitably will fail to return, so it's difficult to judge the effectiveness of the attacking fighter pilots from looking at the planes that returned, even if they were holed.



It doesn't seem all that difficult to me after reading the pilot's accounts, examining the damage and reading up on the weapons used. As for the definition of "effective". hokay. I think i can hear the hairs splitting here.  



> Guess you are a burned child because of that Sherman-vs.-Tiger thread  Interpretation of statistics may be difficult, but without any data at all, everything is open to imagination.



Oh believe me......i've seen many more threads like that, and threads choke full of statistics, alleged or otherwise. I also own Clay Blair's Uboat war series...one of the most statistically stuffed books i've ever read. Yet many of his conclusions and interpretations are considered controversial. As mentioned....statistics or not, it all still comes down to interpretation and context.  




> It's a direct link to the relevant post - maybe it takes a while to load completely before jumping to the right position. I have switched off signature blocks, so maybe my load times are faster ...



starting to wonder if there's a problem with linking here. You didn't seem to see my link to the Ju-87 online page. And when i click, i do go to another part of this site but i'm not seeing the particular post that's being referenced.
odd.



> Hm, I found comments you made on Koolkitty's posts, but not on mine. Perhaps you could post a direct link?



I'm afraid too now.  My linkings seem to not be working. You might end up on the Isle of Myst.


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## Nikademus (Jan 15, 2008)

JoeB said:


> Yes I guess the other thing I'm suggesting is using more sources, I've mentioned 4 others, including newer ones directly quoting original US and French sources in detail (I've heard a rewrite/update of 'Fighters over Tunisia' is eventually forthcoming. ?).



God i hope not. I just spent a fortune getting this copy.  Yes, multiple sources are always helpful though in the end one still ends up choosing which one is more accurate. Parshalls/Tully and Lundstrom don't completely match up either where losses are concerned. I'm happy with Shores in the meantime. His cred is very good. Which doesn't mean i won't chk other sources.....but there's the time and money thing. Just recently picked up Ford's revised Flying Tiger's book. So far matching up Shore's figures in Bloody Shambles I....but i'm sure there will be some varience at some point given some of the arguments tossed in the past on that particular subject.




> On VGF-29 that's definitely Trumpter because he was the only guy missing in that unit.



right, but I never said that any other pilots went missing. The other pilot who went down was picked up and returned. 



> And as mentioned it isn't just 6 v 7 but that the 6 could easily be 3, since Mikronis thought he was downed by AA and there's no evidence August wasn't too, nor any specific account saying Gannon's ditching was due to hostile action at all. And 11 could only be calculated by paring the French losses in a way that *would* result in more like 3 than 6 F4F losses if the same treatment was applied on both sides.



Yes, i've read many accounts where the pilots thought they were hit by this or that. I've also read numerous accounts where pilots swore they saw a plane slam into the ground and explode, yet records postwar later state all the planes on the opposite side returned!

As for the 11 french planes.....I committed no sleight of hand pairings and treated both sides the same. Since we seem to be getting into the nitty gritty despite both stating we can dispense with it  , one can go even deeper and par down the French losses due to their tactical situation of the time. (For example, GC II/5 being caught while just taking off by the F4F's.....a factor that greatly impacted the exchange ratio of that skirmish)



> , that's my point. Though, it could be more limited info available to Shores back in '75, not saying it's a bias necessarily. But altogether it was more like 3~6 F4F v ~12-14 Hawk/Dw, so not actually a tiny difference in the episode, though not a major revision to the air history of WWII, indeed
> 
> Joe



Ok. I guess my point would be, just because it's older doesn't mean it's less accurate. I'll give the benefit of a doubt though. I don't have these other sources you cite so i'm not going to say your wrong but on the same token you don't have my source and to be honest i don't feel like printing whole pages out so we can nitpick each instance of kill. The way I see it at the moment its looking like 5-7 F4F for 11-13 French H/Dw. A ratio range not uncommon with other engagements I've seen.


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## HoHun (Jan 15, 2008)

Hi Glider,

>Dig it out for yourself, its easy to find and to give you a clue, part of this site. 

Either you name your source, or our discussion ends here.

"Name your sources" is principle #1 for educated discussions, and I have zero tolerance for refusing to do so.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## HoHun (Jan 15, 2008)

Hi Nikademus?

>starting to wonder if there's a problem with linking here. You didn't seem to see my link to the Ju-87 online page. And when i click, i do go to another part of this site but i'm not seeing the particular post that's being referenced.
odd.

Hm, seems you are right as Flyboyj had the same problem in another thread - my precise link was not taking him to the correct post. I usually spend quite some effort on finding the posts I'd like to reference so that the reader can access it easily, so it's a bit frustrating that it doesn't seem to work for others  Strangely, it always works when I test it!

I create these links by simply pasting the URL into the post and not using any of the user interface buttons, leaving it to the forum software to create the proper HTML. I'll have a look at the HTML ...

Did you already post the link to the Stuka site in the post #138 in this thread? I only saw it in the post #148 (and our following posts) of this thread. 

(As basically the information regarding armour is not more exact to that of the Betriebshandbuch mentioned earlier except for naming the number of the Umbausatz, I thought it didn't provide much new information, which is why I didn't give it deeper consideration. It was not a question of the URL working or not 

>Did you click on the link i posted and you just quoted in your last reply? Here it is again. If you'll reread post#138 you'll see I wrote "the Ju-87B-2/U3 featured "increased" armor for the close support *role*"

Roger, I saw that. Problem is, we still don't know the status of the Battle-of-Britain Stukas (which were not used for close support, but of course they could have carried the extra armour anyway since they clearly was the need for it). 

The problem with the site itself is that it lists Green's work as one of the sources, and while Green has done great work in general, it seems generally to be accepted that details from his book should better be cross-checked with independend modern sources.

>Interesting. It would be puzzling why they'd build an unarmored version of the Stuka when even the Hs-123 that preceeded it supposedly had 'some' armor.

I'm surprised, too. It had been my impression that the Luftwaffe was one of the few airforces to have recognized the need for armour early on, based on their experience in the Spanish Civil War.

>As mentioned....statistics or not, it all still comes down to interpretation and context.  

Still, disagreeing over statistics is a lot more scientific than disagreeing over reputations 

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## HoHun (Jan 15, 2008)

Hi Joeb,

Just in case you missed this post, too:

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/av...bility-fighter-attack-11124-3.html#post311116

(Post #118 in this thread, in case the direct link doesn't work.)

I'd really appreciate an answer. Thanks in advance!

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## JoeB (Jan 15, 2008)

HoHun said:


> (Post #118 in this thread, in case the direct link doesn't work.)


I did miss that, so my supposed 'distortion' all comes down to parsing the words 'statement' v. 'judgement'?  

The clear implication of your 'statement' about inferior firepower and speed (not sure what difference a few 10's mph of speed of mid 300's mph fighters really makes combating low-mid 200's mph divebombers, but anyway...) is the conclusion or 'judgement' of a more permissive environment faced by SBD's, or else you would naturally have explained 'the firepower of Zeroes was lower but that's just one aspect....etc.'. I think your implication, of more qualititatively permissive environment of divebombers facing Zeroes, is questionable, given the high effectiveness of Zero units of 1941-42 inflicting losses on many Allied non fighter types. Though I'll repeat again, I personally think the SBD reputation of being able to take care of itself against fighters is *partly* because there weren't than many cases where they met intense opposition from well positioned Zeroes; although in cases like the survival of 2 plane SBD scout sections vs several Zeroes at a time, it's hard to envision Ju-87's of any model also surviving those missions.

And that's all I'm going to explain about my already, I really think, reasonable straightforward and fairly simple opinion I've already explained a couple of times. If you continue to have a have a problem with it, I regret that you feel that way.

Joe


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## HoHun (Jan 15, 2008)

Hi Joeb,

>I did miss that, so my supposed 'distortion' all comes down to parsing the words 'statement' v. 'judgement'?  

No. That's just one specific example to highlight your consistent problems in understanding what are perfectly unambiguous English statements. 

Allow me to ask straightforwardly: Do you concede that "statement" and "judgement" are significantly different concepts?

No need even to mention dive bombers in your reply, that's really a meta-discussion about communication here ...

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## drgondog (Jan 16, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Hi Joeb,
> 
> >I did miss that, so my supposed 'distortion' all comes down to parsing the words 'statement' v. 'judgement'?
> 
> ...



Since the discussion seems to veer toward parsing the difference between Statement and Judgement"

What is your interpretation of this?

*As I see it, the one thing that we can say for certain is that the SBD-3 tended to face unarmoured, unprotected, low-firepower fighters while the contemporary Ju 87D met well-armoured and protected fighters of generally superior firepower and speed.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)*

And given that the faster more heavily armed fighters (Zeros,Yak3, Mustang, Spitfire and Hurricane) are busy turning human beings into hamburger with various combinations of 20mm, 50. cal, 303, cal, 7.7 mm in large quantities from close range - blowing away wing spars, hitting fuel tanks, etc., including attacks from below where rear facing armamment is mostly worthless.. does it matter which had better armor for oil coolers? They were BOTH Pitiful against fighter opposition!

They were BOTH exceptionally vulnerable and got hammered by opposing fighters. 

Where are you going to remotely prove one way or another that one or the other was 'more survivable' when they didn't fly the same missions, didn't fly against the same opposition, the SBD was retired while the Ju 87 was still getting hammered by modern fighters?

But you want to debate "judgement and Statement" with JoeB??

Sheesh!


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## plan_D (Jan 16, 2008)

I couldn't agree more, drgondrg. The argument over English is getting quite pathetic, it seems that people are just clutching at the change to be 'right'. The discussion itself is pretty pointless to say the least, as it's obvious that the Ju 87 was vulnerable to the modern fighters of the day just as much as any other dive-bomber. 

In other words; shut the f*ck up, you boring ba*tard, Ho Hun. Just let it go whether you're right or not. If you want to continue your pis*ing up the wall contest do it in PM - it's like a freakin' schoolyard. You tell Glider about educated discussions in one thread and have a pointless argument with JoeB in another ! My advice to you JoeB is to just ignore him, he's clutching at his ego. It's a shame as well because you seemed quite intelligent and willing to learn HoHun, but now you just seem like a small shrivelled penis.


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## Crumpp (Jan 16, 2008)

> In other words; shut the f*ck up, you boring ba*tard, Ho Hun.



The insults are completely uncalled for and unnecessary. Flaming each other for some perceived brownie points does not make for intelligent discussion. Only the ignorant pursue this type of internet argument just like face to face conversations.

As for the argument over "English" word meanings, I have to wonder how "pathetic" it would be if the argument was over the meaning of a word in "German", Henning's native language. 

Could you *even participate* on any intelligent level in such a conversation?

Keep some perspective, please.



> They were BOTH exceptionally vulnerable and got hammered by opposing fighters.



Absolutely. It's like trying to prove which fish in a sharks jaws will take longer to swallow. The fish is eaten in the end.

All the best,

Crumpp


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 16, 2008)

Everbody knock it out with the childish bull **** allright!

One more like that and this thread will be closed.


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## plan_D (Jan 16, 2008)

Wait a second... 


...no, I didn't see moderator under your name. So, you can shut up as well if you want to involve yourself. HoHun's contribution to the discussion was fine until his argument about language; it makes no difference what his first language is. 

I don't need brownie points and I bet HoHun doesn't need you in a pink suit pretending to be his knight in shining armour. If wants to argue over the English language then he can start a thread on it; I wouldn't argue over German because I can barely speak the language and I don't need to. If you want to lick HoHun's bumhole because he can speak another language, feel free but I'd rather not see it. 

The fact remains that he is arguing over something pathetic. And I'm sure you're feeling really satisified that you told someone off, well go realease the pressure in your semi and involve yourself somewhere else.


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## Crumpp (Jan 16, 2008)

> I don't need brownie points and I bet HoHun doesn't need you in a pink suit pretending to be his knight in shining armour.



It has nothing to do with Henning and everything to do with common decency to one another. Attempting to rationalize that does lend weight to your point of view.


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## HoHun (Jan 16, 2008)

Hi Pland,

>In other words; shut the f*ck up, you boring ba*tard, Ho Hun. Just let it go whether you're right or not. 

Glad to see that you jumped into the gap to liven up things around here 

Someone of your eloquence will probably agree that our only means of communication here are words.

If it is irrelevant if I used a certain word, or a different one with a different meaning, I honestly don't see a way of communicating successfully. That means that if Joeb and I can't agree on the meaning of one single word that should be in no way ambiguous, we might as well abandon our attempt at communicating at all. 

However, it's not up to you to make this decision.

With regard to the rest of your post, I'll just take you as a textbook example for a "rough diamond" 

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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