# You are in charge of the Italian Fleet 1941.



## vinnye (Mar 3, 2013)

OK, you have the whole Italian Fleet at your disposal in 1941.
What would be your plan to bring the Mediterranean under your control?


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## Wavelength (Mar 3, 2013)

Occupy Malta, denying it to the enemy, and establishing it as an unsinkable Axis aircraft carrier.


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## vinnye (Mar 3, 2013)

They tried to bomb and starve Malta into defeat but it did not happen.
So what would you do differently in order to try to achieve this?


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## Wavelength (Mar 3, 2013)

Don't bomb it and starve it but invade it and take over instead. This changes everything just like taking Guadalcanal and its air field put the Japanese into a very disadantagous position.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 3, 2013)

Pulling off an amphibious invasion may not have been practical. 

While the defenses of Malta in 1941 may not have been what they were in 1942 the forces planned for "Operation Herkules" (German/Italian invasion in 1942) give a good idea of the difficulties faced in 1941, especially if an Italian _ONLY_ operation. 

Operation Herkules - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

A lack of numbers of aircraft for the airborne troops. 

Lack of numbers of landing craft capable of landing on beaches.


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## herman1rg (Mar 3, 2013)

Surrender the fleet to the allies and allow them to use it.


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## davebender (Mar 3, 2013)

That should have happened during June 1940. 

If the Italian Navy have been sitting in port for the past year watching the world go by they probably aren't going to invade Malta during 1941 either.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 3, 2013)

The big coast defense guns on Malta were NOT installed after 1940. 

The Royal Navy wasn't sitting in port watching the world go by in 1940. 

From WIki, for what it is worth "At the time that Italy declared war, the Regia Marina consisted of six capital ships. The four most modern of these ships were being re-equipped. Only the two oldest capital ships were in a state of operational readiness."

IF the British decide to abandon Malta all well and good, If they decide to fight for it and are willing to accept a few lost ships from air power the Italians are in big trouble.


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## davebender (Mar 3, 2013)

British ship losses in the vicinity of Malta would continue until the RN withdraw to Gibraltar. "Few" will become "many" if the RN hang arould more then a week.


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## Vincenzo (Mar 3, 2013)

The malta invansion would be early possible, in the summer '40


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## vinnye (Mar 3, 2013)

After Taranto - it seems the Italian fleet was vary wary of the RN and particularly the Fleet Air Arm.
They were also at a disadvantage due to their signals not being secure so the RN knew their intentions as soon as they sent them to their ships.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 3, 2013)

davebender said:


> British ship losses in the vicinity of Malta would continue until the RN withdraw to Gibraltar. "Few" will become "many" if the RN hang arould more then a week.




Why and how?

Italians have no dive bombers. Level bombing doesn't work well against ships in the open sea. That leaves torpedo bombers. 

From Wiki:

"The Sparviero began its torpedo bomber (Aerosilurante in Italian) career on 25 July 1940 when a new unit was established after several years of experiments. The "Special Aerotorpedoes Unit" was led by Colonel Moioli. After having ordered the first 50 torpedoes from Whitehead Torpedo Works, on 10 August 1940 the first aircraft landed at T5 airfield, near Tobruk. Despite the lack of an aiming system and a specific doctrine for tactics, an attack on shipping in Alexandria was quickly organized. There had been experiments for many years but still, no service, no gear (except hardpoints) and no tactics were developed for the new speciality."

"The first sortie under way on 15 August 1940 saw five SM.79s that had been modified and prepared for the task sent to El Adem airfield. Among their pilots were Buscaglia, Dequal and other pilots destined to become "aces."

"On 17 September, after an unsuccessful day attack, Buscaglia and Robone returned at night, attacking the British ships that shelled Bardia. One torpedo hit HMS Kent, damaging the heavy cruiser to the extent that the ship remained under repair until September 1941. After almost a month of attacks, this was the first success officially acknowledged and proven."

"After almost a month of further attacks, a newcomer, Erasi, flew with Robone on 14 October 1940 against a British formation and hit HMS Liverpool, a modern cruiser that lost her bow and needed 13 months of repair. After several months, and despite the losses and the first unfortunate mission, the core of the 278th was still operating the same four aircraft."

While the Italian airmen went on to perform many great feats both with torpedoes and bombs their actual effectiveness in the _summer_ of 1940 would have been very low. 

An Italian invasion fleet could not survive for several days with a British group ( or two, Alexandria based ?) shooting it up. 

Italians don't have enough replacement shipping. 


It all hinges on how much the British want to save Malta and how fast the Italians can get an operation under way. Time is not on the side of the Italians.


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## vinnye (Mar 3, 2013)

I think the British would want to save Malta quite badly!
After surviving the Battle of Britain, the significance of Malta could be raised up the priority scale. It was a severe thorn in the side of the Afrika Korps - they lost a lot of material because of raids from aircraft from Malta. If the British army were to have success in North Africa, they needed to keep the disruption of Rommel's supplies as high as possible and maintain their own supplies to build their strength to go on the offensive.
Hitler was very wary of paratroop operations after the losses at Crete, he also was unsure of the ability of the Italian Navy to keep the RN at bay if there were to be a seaborne invasion. 
By the middle of 1941 he had turned his attentions to Russia - so would be reluctant to divert aircraft and troops from there to support an assault on Malta.


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## Wavelength (Mar 3, 2013)

vinnye said:


> By the middle of 1941 he had turned his attentions to Russia - so would be reluctant to divert aircraft and troops from there to support an assault on Malta.



Actually Hitler had it on his mind even in the summer of 1940. This is the point though. Invading Malta is a lot easier than invading Russia or invading Greece and requires a lot less commitment or risk. It is a lot smarter too. 



> After surviving the Battle of Britain, the significance of Malta could be raised up the priority scale. It was a severe thorn in the side of the Afrika Korps - they lost a lot of material because of raids from aircraft from Malta. If the British army were to have success in North Africa, they needed to keep the disruption of Rommel's supplies as high as possible and maintain their own supplies to build their strength to go on the offensive.



It would essentially secure the southern flank 

What was lacking on the Italian part was a lack of vision from the beginning. What was lacking from Hitler was the will and determination to see it through.


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## vinnye (Mar 3, 2013)

From Wiki ; operation Herkules ;
The concept was approved at a meeting between Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini on 29–30 April 1942.

So I think by this time, Malta was being reinforced with Spitfires eg Pedestal. Which showed that Britain was serious about keeping Malta out of Axis hands. Even with German air superiority, any invasion fleet could be attacked by RN forces at night where they had the upper hand over the Italian ships due to radar and the LW were not able to intervene.


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## Wavelength (Mar 3, 2013)

1942 was too late. It should have been first order of bussiness for the Italian fleet in 1940 and by Jan 1941 at the latest. The Italians should of stayed out of Greece. Even by then the Germans should have assisted the Italians by whatever means necessary. Malta was that important.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 3, 2013)

How about this: Germans take Crete, Italians go to Malta simultaneously?


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## davebender (Mar 3, 2013)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Savoia-Marchetti_SM.79\


> successfully completing torpedo launches from a target distance of 5 km (3.1 mi) in August 1936.
> 
> Almost 600 SM.79-I and –II aircraft were in service when Italy entered World War II



There were at least 200 SM.79 bombers stationed in Italy/Sicily and Italy had almost four years to prepare. If they aren't ready to attack Malta during June 1940 they will never be ready. 

Might as well remain neutral and make money selling stuff to both Britain and Germany.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 3, 2013)

A lot depends on Italian capability. 

The Regia Aeronautica got a lot better at attacking ships at time went on. It wasn't very good in the summer of 1940. 

Ships on both sides got completed/fitted out and got damaged/sunk so fleet strengths varied from the summer of 1940 to the summer of 1942. 

Having a fleet does _NOT_ mean you can put troops ashore. You need some sort of landing/assault craft. Something the Italians seem to be lacking from day one if they were asking the Germans for 200 _Sturmboote_ for the 1942 invasion for ferrying troops ashore. Using small motor boats that only hold 5-6 men per trip smacks a little of desperation as does using inflatable rafts powered by paddles/oars. Hopefully these were for the 2nd or 3rd wave? 

The Malta defenses and the number of troops on Malta improved quite dramatically in these two years so the forces needed in the summer of 1940 would be much less than needed later but then the forces available to the Italians are also quite smaller. Italians had troops/equipment tied up in the French Alps until the French surrender. Getting several divisions back to Sicily and prepping them for an amphibious invasion in a few weeks seems doubtful.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 3, 2013)

davebender said:


> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Savoia-Marchetti_SM.79\
> 
> 
> There were at least 200 SM.79 bombers stationed in Italy/Sicily and Italy had almost four years to prepare..



Just you because you have plane that has carried and dropped torpedoes in tests does not mean you have a stock of torpedoes ready to go or torpedo mounts, sights in your level bomber fleet or crews trained to use them.


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## N4521U (Mar 3, 2013)

Pizza and Rum................. what a thought!


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## davebender (Mar 3, 2013)

Italy made a bunch of amphibious landings from 1911 onward. How did they put troops ashore at Tripoli, Tobruk, Derna, Khoms, Benghazi, Dodecanese Islands, Balearic Islands etc.?


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## Shortround6 (Mar 3, 2013)

Ships boats?

Coming along side a dock?

Putting 1500 sailors into Tripoli against minor resistance ( what shore batteries of pill box/MG emplacements were there?) is a far cry from assaulting defended beaches or harbors on Malta. 

Malta may have been "lightly" defended in 1940 compared to what it was later but it's defenses were well above what the Turks had in place in North Africa in 1911.


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## Vincenzo (Mar 4, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> Ships boats?
> 
> Coming along side a dock?
> 
> ...



also italian capability would be best of theat in 1911, and if italian ask to surrender to viceroy/governor?
what is the strenght of malta defence in summer '40?


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## vinnye (Mar 4, 2013)

I don't believe that Italy could manage an invasion on its own in 1940. Germany was busy finishing off France and trying to do so with Britain or launch its own invasion, therefore was unlikely to offer much help.


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## davebender (Mar 4, 2013)

*September 1939 Malta Garrison.*
I doubt it was much bigger during June 1940.
Malta, 03.09.1939
Malta Brigade. 4 infantry battalions attached.
.....2 Devon
.....1 Dorset
.....2 Rwk
.....2 RIF

Four British infantry battalions won't stop a serious enemy invasion. Speed of the invasion will be determined by how fast Italian Navy and Air Force can reduce enough coastal batteries to clear a landing beach.


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## vinnye (Mar 4, 2013)

I am not that familiar with the geography of Malta, but I have seen some film that shows quite a lot of coastline has cliffs.
So how much coastline would be able to have a seaborne landing?
From what I have seen on documentaries, Malta was probably at its weakest during Spring / Summer 1942 - lack of convoys supplying food, ammo etc.


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## davebender (Mar 4, 2013)

Malta - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
121 square miles. 30 square miles per British infantry battalion.

With a British troop density that low you can land almost anywhere in small units. You can also land or parachute troops into clearings. 4 infantry battalions cannot be everywhere at once so Britain must rely on counterattacks to eject an invading force.


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## DonL (Mar 4, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> Ships boats?
> 
> Coming along side a dock?
> 
> ...



This is a myth which is cultivated in victory literature, also in this forum, but it has nothing to do with the hard facts.
The Italian Navy had a full *fleet* of landingships. The Sesia Class

Axis History Forum • Sesia class landing ships

With the four modern and the one older (five ships/Forza Navale Speciale) you can bring very easily 2500-3000 men with howitzer, ATG, smal vehicles and supply at the first wave directly to the beach to fight for a proper landingzone. Also they can come back in 12-15hours (Sicily-Malta) with the next wave plus supply.

This myth that Malta was impregnable 1940 and 1941 is realy ridiculous and a very well proganda from victory literature.

The X Fliegercorps at Sicily (from January 1941 till June 1941) was able to totaly isolate Malta. The people were starving and no single supply convoy reached Malta. From the hard military facts of ships, troops and planes, it would be much easier to invade Malta then Crete! Both can be reached at 1940/41 also to my opinion simultaneously if the Italians were willing to deploy troops and insert their whole fleet to cover such a szenario.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 4, 2013)

Mr Bender was apparently referencing "landings" carried out by the Italians in the Italian-Turkish war of 1911-12 as "experience" of their amphibious warfare capability. Obviously the ships you refer to did not exist in 1911-12. 


Malta was far from impregnable 1940 and 1941 but landing 2500-4000 men in a the first wave is a very chancy proposition. You are basically pitting 5 battalions of attackers against 5 battalions of defenders in 1940 plus what ever airborne troops the Italians had. You are also gambling that the 5 landing ships can also get back off the beach (something a number of American landing ships failed to do) and NOT get hit by shore batteries or RN ships. 
Much depends on how much the RN is willing to risk and what the Italian Navy is willing to risk. With the arrival of the Luftwaffe in Jan 1941 things look much darker for the RN.


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## parsifal (Mar 4, 2013)

We can get some idea of the historical italian capability by their operations during the operations imediately before and after italy's entry. 

Albania

The original Italian plans for the invasion called for up to 50,000 men supported by 137 naval units and 400 airplanes. Ultimately the invasion force grew to 100,000 men supported by 600 airplanes. Not all the forces committed were involved in the landings....about 10-15000 men were in the initial assault forces. There was no prepratory bombardment (the Italians didnt think of that......) and no evidence of advanaced landing craft....it was all done from ships boats and lighters that came from Taranto. On April 7 1939 the italian troops, led by General Alfredo Guzzoni, invaded Albania, attacking all Albanian ports simultaneously. The largest garrison defeing these ports was a scratch force of 360 militia men, under the command of a man named Lupo and defending the port town of Durres. This pathetic force held up the invasion forces for over 24 hours. There were 65 units in Saranda, 40 at Vlorë, 38 in Durrës, 28 at Shëngjin and 8 more at Bishti 

Greece

During the invasion of greece in late 1940, the italians planned an amphibious assault of Corfu using landing craft, and some of their tiny marine forces. The assault was intended to be in roughly reinforced battalion strength, but was cancelled at the last minute and never went ahead. Not sure why.

During the Greco Italian war, Italian forces invaded Greece and made limited gains. At the outbreak of hostilities, the Royal Hellenic Navy was composed of the old cruiser Georgios Averof, 10 destroyers (four old Theria class, four relatively modern Dardo class and two new Greyhound class), several torpedo boats and six old submarines. Faced with the formidable Regia Marina, its role was primarily limited to patrol and convoy escort duties in the Aegean Sea. This was essential both for the completion of the Army's mobilization, but also for the overall resupply of the country, the convoy routes being threatened by Italian aircraft and submarines operating from the Dodecanese Islands.

Nevertheless, the Greek ships also carried out limited offensive operations against Italian shipping in the Strait of Otranto. The destroyers carried out three bold but fruitless night-time raids (14–15 November 1940, 15–16 December 1940 and 4–5 January 1941). The main successes came from the submarines, which managed to sink approximately 10 Italian transports. On the Italian side, although the Regia Marina suffered severe losses in capital ships from the British Royal Navy during the Taranto raid, Italian cruisers and destroyers continued to operate covering the convoys between Italy and Albania. Also, on 28 November, an Italian squadron did undertake a bombardment of Corfu, while on 18 December and 4 March, Italian task forces shelled Greek coastal positions in Albania in support of their by now retreating army. 

Yugoslavia

During operations against Yugoslavia, the italians again considered and planned an invasion of Kotor, but was cancelled again, allegedly due to inadeqiate resources, particulalry landing craft. 

British perspective and preprations

In his book "Malta and British Strategic Defence Policy 1925-43, douglas Austin writes that British defence policy for the island estimated (rather optimistically as it turns out) that the italians had the ability to land across opposed coastline about 12000 Infantry, with no heavy weapons or tanks available until a port was captured. 

From 1925 to 1935, the landward defences of the island were in a very run down state, ut plans at least were drwn up to raise up to 2 militia brigades from thje local population in the event of war. Priority was very low, because at that time Italy posed no real threat to british interests. however this situation changed from 1935 to 1939, following the italian transgressions in Abysynnia. 

Defences were so weak in 1936 that the JPC considered that a rapid coup de main by the italians would probably succeed. At that stage there was less than a battlaion of ground troops about 24 AA guns, no fld artillery and about 30 coast defence guns. 

The Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) undertook a study in 1936 that confirmed the vulnerability to seizure by the Italians in the event of surprise attack. In 1937-8 these bleak predictions persisted, even though the strength of the lanward defences were by that time starting to increase. By 1937, the possibility that a war with Germany and Italy was being considered, and further possible conflicts with Japan at the same time were being factored into the assessments. These triple headed threats made re-supply a very difficult proposition in the mind of the RN. 

Changes in this assessment began to appear with the RNs Strategic Assessments Committee (SAC) in April 1937. Talks were due with the French where it was being considered that pre-emptive action against Italy in the time of war might be possible. Prophetic words really…The general idea was that in the event of a two headed war, Italy would be picked off as the weaker partner in the Axis alliance. 

From here there was a steady hardening of resolve in the British camp. By wars outbreak, the Malta landward defences were about two understrength brigades. Given the difficulties the Italians had with much smaller and probably lower quality opposition in Greece and Yugoslavia, I think it very difficult that a rapid coup de main at the beginning of hostilities was entirely feasible. Particularly so, since the british response tended to over-estimate Italian abilities, and the british counter –preparations were made specifically to thwart such a move by the Italians. 

I think a far more realistic option was for the Italians to ready their fleet more effectively than they did. Half the battle fleet was in reserve at the outbreak of the war, and it took many months for this situation to be addressed.


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## vinnye (Mar 6, 2013)

I agree with you Parsifal, the Italians should have prepared their fleet better.
The balance of power shifted a number of times due to actions / losses.
Royal Navy in the Mediterranean 1940-1941
The above site has the RN with 4 BBs in the Eastern Med in June 1940 at Alexandria. the Italians had 6 BBs - two being completed.
To offset the Italian land based aircraft the RN had 1 aircraft carrier at Alexandria. 
That balance changed in favour of the RN after Taranto on 11 Nov 1940 - 3 BBs sunk at their moorings.
By the end of 1941, Barham had been sunk and Queen Elizabeth and Valiant had been severely damaged (sunk) in Alexandria harbour. 
Only by excellent management of this event by the RN and Cunningham in particular prevented the Italians from realizing that they had a significant advantage in BBs.


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## davebender (Mar 7, 2013)

It's a bad idea to assume Italy would stupidly attack strongest Malta defenses head on. 

Italy would have naval and air superiority. They can land anywhere they want on any of the three islands. Tiny British garrison will be split among the islands or else Italy gets ungarrisoned islands without opposition. 

After Italy has one island it's all over but the crying as other two islands are within artillery range. Italy will set up heavy artillery just as Japan did opposite Corregidor Island during spring of 1942. 

Army artillery has the accuracy which naval and air bombardment lack. They will systemically pulverize British defenses on next island before landing just as Japan did to Corregidore.


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## parsifal (Mar 7, 2013)

> It's a bad idea to assume Italy would stupidly attack strongest Malta defenses head on.



Im assuming your proposing a coup de main from the very beginning oof the war. 

They have to....the key to control is the port. without it they cannot get heavy equipment and decent levels of supply. They had some LCs but not enough for more than a single Battalion,. as evidence by their planning of contemporary operations. Everything else is by ships boats. 



> Italy would have naval and air superiority. They can land anywhere they want on any of the three islands. Tiny British garrison will be split among the islands or else Italy gets ungarrisoned islands without opposition.



"Tiny British garrison" is 2 brigades at the beginning, significantly reinforced in the early months of the war through to 1942. And they are not strung out allover the island(s), they were concentrated in a central location protecting the vital infrasstructure on the islands.....the ports, the gun emplacements and the airfields . There are minefields iin place from before the very first day that the italians will have great difficulty inpenetrating except along a narrow predictable path and with a great deal of time needed to clear them . the sweeping operations will take days or weeks to complete, and will be a dead giveaway of their MLA. Necessarily they will need to assault on a predictable narrow front. In that time the british fleet, which easily outnumbered the italians by a significant margin (there were only two Italian BBs in commission at the outbreak of the war, with the remainder commissioned from reserve or refit over a roughly 3 month period) will be met by at least 6 British BBs and 3 carriers. 




> After Italy has one island it's all over but the crying as other two islands are within artillery range. Italy will set up heavy artillery just as Japan did opposite Corregidor Island during spring of 1942.
> 
> Army artillery has the accuracy which naval and air bombardment lack. They will systemically pulverize British defenses on next island before landing just as Japan did to Corregidore.



You need a port to do that. Italy has no significant cross beach re-supply or heavy equipment capability or very limited. Setiing up on one of the outer islands is a very bad idea. The RN will use them for target practice, as they sit there starving and out of ammunition. . The artillery on the island (in place from 1938) will outrange and outgun anything the Italians are likley to bring to bear. 

The Italans had nothing like the Japanese in terms of sealift and across the beach capability. the japanese had acecess to a port from day 1 in the Philipines,as they did in malaya. The situations are just not comparable. A comparable scenario would be a direct asault of Singapore.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 8, 2013)

davebender said:


> It's a bad idea to assume Italy would stupidly attack strongest Malta defenses head on.
> 
> They can land anywhere they want on any of the three islands. Tiny British garrison will be split among the islands or else Italy gets ungarrisoned islands without opposition.



Perhaps a few tourist photos will show what the Italians were up against. 






a Malta "beach"






The North west Shore of the small Island of Comino with the the Island of Gozo in the background. Please note that the two inlets are with Vicker's machine gun range of the larger Island. 






Mellieha Bay beach on the main Island. 






View going the other way.






The Island in the Back ground may be Comino.

The Italians _CANNOT_ land anywhere they _want_ let alone get heavy weapons and supplies ashore. Practical landing sites are restricted and well known. 




davebender said:


> After Italy has one island it's all over but the crying as other two islands are within artillery range. Italy will set up heavy artillery just as Japan did opposite Corregidor Island during spring of 1942.
> .



The Japanese did not have to _LAND_ their artillery from ships/boats within artillery range of Corregidor.

It took _only_ 27 days from the fall of Bataan to take Corregidor and most of the men on Corregidor were in very bad physical condition. 

It would NOT take the RN 27 days to mount some sort of relief expedition. 

For the Italians to take Malta in the Summer of 1940 was NOT impossible but it was certainly not going to the walk in the park that some are making it out to be. 

Against the British lack of preparedness you have to balance the Italian lack of preparedness. If they were really ready to go to war in May/June of 1940 they would have had 1 or two more battleships ready for action and their army would have been much more prepared than it was for the actions in the French Alps.


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## parsifal (Mar 8, 2013)

There are some parrallels in history relating to Malta. The siege of Malta in 1565 saw 6100 defenders, including just 500 elite Knights Hospitaller and rest basically chaff defeat a force of over 48000 invading ottomans which included a force of the elite Jannisaries. The Ottomans were unable wrest control of the ports, and had to fight hard to capture the fortress strongpoints over the island. Ottoman records suggest they used over 130000 cannon bals during the year long battle. Eventually the turks gave up, and were defeated, losing 16-20000 men in the process. Even though its 500 years old it gives a pretty good illustration of just how difficult a place this ilsand would be to take...

However it needs to be conceded that Napoleon in 1798 succeeded in capturing the island, after a short and dispirited fight by the islanders. 

This campaign saw the 300 knights and around the same number of village milita initially ranged by a fleet with 30000 french soldiers embarked (part of the Egyptian invasion forces, which in turn was a stepping stone in the planned ivasion of India). I do not believe all these frenchmen were used in the assault, I have read that about 2-3000 were used in the assault. The militaia promptly deserted and surrendered, and about 100 of the Knights of french nationality also changed sides. There simply were not enough defenders, being so heavily outnumbered.

Maltas french garrison surrendeed to the British after a two year blockade, and a revolt from the local population


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## Freebird (Mar 8, 2013)

vinnye said:


> OK, you have the whole Italian Fleet at your disposal in 1941.
> What would be your plan to bring the Mediterranean under your control?



Nothing - it is virtually impossible for the Italians to control the Mediterranean, given the circumstances at the time.
They cannot control the Med while the British have a superior fleet at Alexandria.

1.)It is all but impossible for the Axis to capture Egypt, given the extreme difficulties in supplying the Afrika Corps Italian Army eastward.
2.) The Italian Navy will fail, not because they lack brains or courage, but because they lack fuel.

RegiaMarina.net has a good analysis of the problem:
Oil Fuel Shortage



> 1940
> Italy entered the war not only with the most complete lack of readiness of her armed forces, but also without much fuel. It was thought that the war would not have last long and that the little fuel reserve would be sufficient.
> 
> 1941
> To worsen this situation came the attempted coup d’ètat in Rumania, which tried to replace the pro German government. Despite Rome’s denial, it was common opinion that the Italian government had supported this action and therefore all shipments of fuel were immediately ceased. For the Regia Marina this situation meant that in addition to losing any hope of replainge the oil fuel burned, 250,000 tons had to be transferred to the Ministry of Corporations which declared it "intangible" while an additional 34,000 tons had to be transferred to the national industry. During 1941, Italy was only able to import 600,000 tons of fuel and of this 163,000 tons were "donated" to the Navy. At this point the situation became really dramatic and the monthly consumption had to be reduced to 60,000 tons. The total amount of oil fuel available at the end of the year was about 200,000 tons and during this period of crisis it was decided to remove from service the older battleships. To worsen this already negative situation, after the November British attack in Egypt, the high command and Mussolini requested that the fleet defend the Libya-bound convoys. This strain, which eventually paid off, was only possible thanks to the special shipment of 80,000 tons of German oil fuel, which was delivered at the end of the year.



What it boils down to is that by Feb 1941 the Italian RM fuel situation is in crisis mode, and can thereafter conduct only limited operations.




vinnye said:


> I think the British would want to save Malta quite badly!
> After surviving the Battle of Britain, the significance of Malta could be raised up the priority scale. It was a severe thorn in the side of the Afrika Korps - they lost a lot of material because of raids from aircraft from Malta.



Malta's role has been built up to legend, but in fact from early 1941 the Britiah were forced to withdraw the bulk of Malta's strike/bombing aircraft, and thereafter the main function of aircraft was self defence.

The critical British disruption of Rommel's supplies was by naval action night bombing, neither of which could be done based at Malta.



vinnye said:


> If the British army were to have success in North Africa, they needed to keep the disruption of Rommel's supplies as high as possible and maintain their own supplies to build their strength to go on the offensive.



Even with the capture of Malta, the Africa Korps just can't keep an army supplied for a sustained attack into Egypt


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## davebender (Mar 8, 2013)

Difficult to imagine Britain allowing her navy and merchant marine to be whittled down during BoB. That's exactly what would happen if Italy were prepared for war during June 1940.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 8, 2013)

That is a might big 'IF". 

And it cuts both ways. 

British have 14 battleships/battlecruisers Minus damages from the Norway campaign?) in the summer of 1940, No KGVs are ready yet but 5 ships are building.

Germans have how many battleships/battlecruisers after the Norway campaign? ZERO? 

Italians have 2 battleships historically and how many in this theoretical scenario? 3? 4? 5? 

British _may_ have an opportunity to to knock the Italian fleet out of the war in the summer of 1940 with this Invasion plan. They sure don't need 12 capitol ships to stop a German invasion fleet.


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## parsifal (Mar 8, 2013)

davebender said:


> Difficult to imagine Britain allowing her navy and merchant marine to be whittled down during BoB. That's exactly what would happen if Italy were prepared for war during June 1940.



Difficult for you to imagine, but the historical record shows that your imagnation is misplaced.

The facts are that throughout the battle Of Britain ther was a steady reinforcment of the Med forces in voth the eastern and western basins, and that whilst the italians could claim dominance in the central basin, this was never any real impediement to the British projecting force into this area. The Italians at no stage ever enjoyed sea control to the extent that they could undertake any significant amphibious operation more than a few miles from their own bases. Malta was outside that very limited radius. 

Up to June 24th the western basin was covered by the French fleet. Even as the french were in the death throws of defeat, their fleet was being aggressively used to contain the italian fleet. There is not likelihood of italian action wahilst the French fleet reamins part of the Allied force structure. 

Some time between June 20-24, Force H forces were concentrated at Gibraltar. Initially the Force was built around HM Ark Royal Renown and 3 DDs arrived to be augmented by the 8 DDs already on station at the port. By June 28, the force had ben further reinforced by a further 2 BBs a CL and a further 4 DDs, which by my calculation brings the total force structure to 1 A/C 2 BBs, 1 BC, 1 CL and 15 DDs. By July3 , the Force consisted of at least 1 A/C 2 BBs, 1 BC, 2 CLs and at least 11 DDs. The Med fleet had been similalrly reinforced, with 4 battleships and 1 a/c in July.

The RN at this time was in fact able to completely dominate the central Basin from the point of view of sea control, because they outnumbered the Italian Fleet 2 carriers to 0, and the italian battle fleet 7:3. The Italians held the paper advantage in light forces, but as events were to show, this advantage never amounted to much in reality. 

The decision was taken to reinforce Malta and in Operation 'Hurry'. Force H now reinforced by a further 8 DDs, the carrier Argus and 2 CAs, carried out an operation to get the first meaningful air power elements to the island. Carrier "Argus" flew off 12 Hurricanes from a position southwest of Sardinia. This was the first of many reinforcement and supply operations, often bitterly fought to keep Malta alive and in the fight against Axis supply routes to their armies in North Africa. Now, as in the future, cover from the west was provided by Force H. The opportunity was taken for "Ark Royal's" aircraft to hit Sardinian targets. In the middle of the month (July), Mediterranean Fleet battleships "Warspite", "Malaya" and "Ramillies" bombarded Italian positions around Bardia in Libya, just over the border from Egypt. 

There was a second reinforcment operation to Malta from the west two weks later, Operation "Hats" saw 4 Merchant ships deliver supplies, a/c and ground units to the island. The operation was protected by Force H, at that time with a strength of 2 carriers, 2 BBs, 1 BC, 4 cruisers and 16 DDs. there was no interference by the italians to thjis operation. RN activity around the island was so intense and effective that in the first month of operations the itlians had lost no less than 11 submarines....10% of their submarine fleet mostly around Malta. 

The first serious clash between the italians and the British occurred on the 9th July at the battle Of Punit Stilo (also referred to as the Battle Of Calabria). Forces involved were as follows:

Force A was made up of the 7th Cruiser squadron and HMAS Stuart under Admiral Tovey; Force B commanded by Vice Admiral Andrew Cunningham who was the Commander in Chief of the entire Mediterranean Fleet; and Force C commanded by Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Pridham-Wippell.

3 battleships: Warspite, Malaya, and Royal Sovereign.
5 light cruisers: Orion, Neptune (damaged), HMAS Sydney, Gloucester (damaged), and Liverpool.
1 aircraft carrier: Eagle.
16 destroyers: Nubian, Mohawk, Hero, Hereward (damaged), Decoy (damaged), HMAS Stuart,[32] Hyperion, Hostile, Hasty, Ilex, Dainty, Defender, Juno, Janus, HMAS Vampire, and HMAS Voyager.

The destroyer HMS Escort was sunk in the Western Mediterranean where Force H was providing a feint and demonstration against Sardinia to distract the Italian fleet from the sailing of the Allied convoys. She was torpedoed on 11 July by the Italian submarine Marconi during Force H's return passage.

Regia Marina force commanded by Vice Admiral Inigo Campioni.

2 battleships: Conte di Cavour and Giulio Cesare (damaged).
6 heavy cruisers: Zara, Fiume, Gorizia, Pola, Bolzano (damaged), and Trento.
8 light cruisers: Eugenio di Savoia, Duca d'Aosta, Muzio Attendolo, Raimondo Montecuccoli, Alberico da Barbiano, Alberto di Giussano, Duca degli Abruzzi, and Giuseppe Garibaldi.
About 16 destroyers, among which Vittorio Alfieri, Artigliere, Lanciere, Leone Pancaldo, Dardo, Sestri Ponente, Freccia, Saetta and Strale.

This battle was not decisive, but it was still an allied victory. it completely exposes what the Italian swar strategy was with regard to their fleet. they had absolutely no desire to risk significant losses to their fleet fighting the British. the expectation at the time was that the British were about to be defeated by the germans, and no losses to the RM should be risked asa result. Standing toe to toe with the RN at that time was seen by the RM leadership as totally unecessary and specifically to be avoided. Despite materially giving as good as they received, the italians ended the battle having retreated from the battle and forfeiting control of the sea. From that standpoint it was an unequivocal demonstration of who was in control of the seas around Malta at that time. 

Mediterranean Fleet pursued to within 50 miles of the south west Italian coast off Calabria before withdrawing. 

How anyone can argue that it was even possible for the italaians to be able to excercise any semblance of sea control at this time, let alone exercise enough to undertake an extremely difficult amphib operation whilst denying sea access to the RN is beyond me. arguing that the BOB and threat of invasion at home somehow curtailed reinfocement of the med, or operations in the med is also patently untrue. The British never showed any signs of evacuating the med or denuding the commands of forces. Quite the opposite actually.


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## Freebird (Mar 9, 2013)

vinnye said:


> I agree with you Parsifal, the Italians should have prepared their fleet better.
> The balance of power shifted a number of times due to actions / losses.



Despite numbers, Italian battleships were never considered a match for the RN battleships, with heavier firepower and radar assisted gunnery. This is why the Italian BB's never closed for a decisive battle with the RN BB's, even when they had an equal number of ships, instead the RM would withdraw.


vinnye said:


> The above site has the RN with 4 BBs in the Eastern Med in June 1940 at Alexandria. the Italians had 6 BBs - two being completed.
> To offset the Italian land based aircraft the RN had 1 aircraft carrier at Alexandria.



Vinne, there are also 3 British battleships, a battlecruiser and a carrier based at Gibraltar, they could have been dispatched in event of a major assault against Malta.



vinnye said:


> That balance changed in favour of the RN after Taranto on 11 Nov 1940 - 3 BBs sunk at their moorings.
> By the end of 1941, Barham had been sunk and Queen Elizabeth and Valiant had been severely damaged (sunk) in Alexandria harbour.
> Only by excellent management of this event by the RN and Cunningham in particular prevented the Italians from realizing that they had a significant advantage in BBs.



The British also had 3 battleships in the Indian Ocean in Jan 1942.
They were well aware that Italy lacked the fuel to mount aggressive operations in the Med in 1942, and had the Italians been able to, the RN would have brought a couple of battleships through the Suez canal.


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## vinnye (Mar 9, 2013)

I was unaware of the fuel supply situation for the Italians - that goes some way to explain their lack of aggression.
I had thought that with their newer designed BBs that they might have fancied their chances against the RNs WW1 designed ships?
Having air superiority in some ares also may have encouraged the Italians to try to draw the RN into chasing them into a trap?

The RN did have technical advantages - radar, which it used to good effect at night to surprise some Italian cruisers and the breaking of Italians signals codes etc, quite a useful advantage to have!


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## parsifal (Mar 9, 2013)

I respectfully disagree with FB that Italian ships were inferior to British ships. I totally agree with regards to fuel, but also add that the italians were simply not interested in stand up fights with the RN. Until it was way too late, they wanted to preserve their fleet as a "fleet in being" until after the British had surrendered.That didnt happen, and by the time the Italians realized that they were in for a tough fight, things had changed completely for them. They went into the war as an alleged great power, were comprehensively defeated on all fronts, and by 1941 had been reduced to the position of abject lackie for the germans. Mussolini was asked by Franco in late 1940 whether he regretted getting into the fight. He didnt answer directly, just rolled his eyes in agreement. Cianos diary also reveals how the italians felt. Not even consulted over important events like Barbarossa, their command system frequently bypassed and often left behind to their fate by theiur German "allies", the Italian armed forces became firstly despondent and then openly resentful toward their leader and the Germans.

Had the Germans showed greater respect toward the Italians, giuven them greater support, above all a greater supply of oil and resources to keep the italian factories operating, shipyards building and training to continue, the italians might have again been in position to mount serious challenges to British naval supremacy by late 1941. by then Britain was on the rack herself in the Med, with a whole new TO to worry about. The Italians did mount some naval challenges, at this time, but were never willing to commit everything, boots and all in a stand up fight with the British. By the middle of 1942, it was all too late.....British naval strength had been redployed back to the med, and the Italians went into the final act of their tragic war.


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## Freebird (Mar 9, 2013)

vinnye said:


> I was unaware of the fuel supply situation for the Italians - that goes some way to explain their lack of aggression.
> I had thought that with their newer designed BBs that they might have fancied their chances against the RNs WW1 designed ships?
> Having air superiority in some ares also may have encouraged the Italians to try to draw the RN into chasing them into a trap?



The newer Italian BB's were certainly a step up from the older ones, and had the same 15" guns as the British did.
In the autumn of 1940 the Regia Marina was on orders not to engage the RN unless they had clear superiority, concerned that they could suffer a major defeat and endanger their plans. 
They were anticipating that the British would soon be defeated in the BoB, and surrender or sue for peace.
In any event, their massive ground advantage in Libya and East Africa would soon crush the British, so Malta would be of little significance anyways.

Air power was not thought to be threatening to ships, it was only really after Taranto that navies considered aircraft mch of a threat to capital ships.

The Italians did in fact mount a massive air operation against the Royal Navy at Calabria- 72 aircraft attacking on 8 July and 126 aircraft attacking on 9 July, yet the only damage was a bomb hit on the bridge of a RN light cruiser, though the ship was not put out of action.


Suppose that the Italian aircraft were attacking a British fleet in defence of Malta in the summer of 1940, why would the results be any better than they were at Calabria?


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## Freebird (Mar 9, 2013)

parsifal said:


> I respectfully disagree with FB that Italian ships were inferior to British ships.



Note that I said "considered" better, not that that was the reality.

The Littorio class were certainly better than the QE's, being a generation newer and with better protection etc.
They were however brand new, and were working up in the summer of 1940. Had they been thrown into action in June, with an inexperienced crew and a new ship, there is a possibility that they would have had some breakdowns or a "Prince of Wales" failure.

I think the WWI Italian ships were inferior to the QE battleships in practice, partly due to radar advantage, veteran crews, intelligence advantages etc. The aggressive nature of the Royal Navy seemed to throw the Italians off as well. In some cases a very aggressive resistance will give the attacker pause to wonder just how strong the defender actually is.


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## vinnye (Mar 10, 2013)

The newer Italians BBs had a speed advantage over their British counterparts and so in theory be able to dictact how any engagements were carried out?
This is why I said I believe that they could have tried to lure the RN into range of their land based torpedo bombers?
I know that the RN were not stupid and would most likely know what the game was - but the RN was usually aggressive and may have thought the risk worthwhile?
Given the restrictions in fuel and lack of willingness to risk a serious engaement, the RN did not have to change what they were doing - they were in control.
It was the Italians who needed to change tactics if they wanted to wrest control from the RN.


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## parsifal (Mar 10, 2013)

RM was not necesarily wrong to be cautious. They would have needed to risk a lot and very likely suffered heavy losses to their fleet that would not serve italian intersts directly. once again, it would be Italaian blood being spent for German gain. thats how the italians would have viewed it.

Moreover, for the italaians to have been more aggressive in their attacks, all the traditions and expoerience that their fleet had been built on would have had to change. There was also a fundamental problem, which they never really solved. Time and again in 1941-2, the Italian fleet made ready to intercept, only to be let down by poor recce by both the LW and RA. Even basic levels of co-operation between the RM and the supporting airforces was next to non-existent. You cannot really sortie if you dont have good information on the strength and placement of the enemy fleet.

This was a fixable problem, but it needed the formation of a very sizable separate land based fleet air arm years before the Italians ever went to war. Given Mussolinios bombast on this issue, historically that was a very remote possibility.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 10, 2013)

The British could also afford to "trade" the Italians ship for ship _IF_ it suited their long term goals. If the British loose 3 old Battleships in 1940/41 and the Italians loose 3 battleships the British can control the Med with what they have left (11 capitol ships until the first KVGs show up.) The Italians would never again be able to put to sea in equal numbers or close to it. They _needed_ to preserve their fleet in case an opportunity presented itself later. 

In Nov of 1940 things really swung in the British favor with the raid on Taranto, but by Jan 1942 things were looking much better for the Italians. Ships damaged at Taranto had been repaired and British losses had mounted. Three BBs added to the Fleet (Duke of York just barely) but 4 sunk and two more heavily damaged in Alexandria by The daring Italian raid. Needing to Guard against the Japanese further strained RN deployments. 

This was the Italian window of opportunity. If they had thrown away several battleships trying to challenge the British in 1940 they would be in no position to challenge them at a later date. 

A weaker Fleet ( or force) cannot go into action for no better reason than _not to sit on their hands_. Mussolini tried to jump on the French an the last minute and failed to make any real progress against rather limited opposition.


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## DonL (Mar 14, 2013)

Here are a lot of mixing up facts for a wrong timeline!

1. Not one single english battleship or cruiser had a radar set at 1940, beginning 1941.
2. The Regia Marina has no oil problem until late 1941!
3. The Regia Marina had a very clear advantage after the surrender of France till Tarent.
4. As I written bevor, if the italians would attack with all their strenghts and all will Malta, at middle August till beginning September 1940, it is a matter of fact, that this will be an Italian victory!

They had 3 airborne battalion action ready at August 1940. They had superioty at battleships and cruisers from August 1940.
The Alpinis, San Marcos and Bersaglieri are equal to every other unit from the english army and the Italian Air Force had totaly air supermarcy at August 1940.
The strenghts of the Italian Air Force 10. June 1940 (excluding North Africa).

CR.32: 69
CR.42: 120
C.200: 64
G.50: 81
Fighter in summary: 334
***
BR.20: 107
Z.1007: 24
S.79: 287
Z.506: 24
Bomber in summary: 442
Plus a lot of reconnaissance aircraft , and 107 S.79, 87 fighter and 66 light bomber at North Africa.
Plus 15 Stukas at middle August at sicily

Malta didn't get any reinforcement at this time and from a simple military viewpoint and maths the Italians had;

1. the troops
2. the landingships
3. the battleships for support
4 totaly air supermarcy

to attack Malta with success at August/September 1940.

And it is only logic, if I want to attack at North Africa that I crack the lock at my direct supply line!


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## parsifal (Mar 14, 2013)

Here are a lot of mixing up facts for a wrong timeline!



> 1. Not one single english battleship or cruiser had a radar set at 1940, beginning 1941.




I think this is basically right, though I believe Rodney was fitted with Type 79Y in 1938. Point is, radar was not extensively fitted to the battle line until 1941. However, this gave the italians no real advantage. There is a well demonstrated inferiority operating at night and during the day, the italaians could not match the accuracy of the RN gunnery, with or without radar. At Punto Stilo (ne Calabria) Warspite achieve a record by hitting Cesare at 26500 yards. Italians had problems with dispersion, fire control and a marked reluctance for their destroyers to enter any smokescreen. 

Under those conditions, whilst it was difficult for the RN to achieve dominance in Mare nostrum, because of the numbers, it was also very difficult to deny sea access to the RN as well...The situation until Taranto was essentially a "stalemate", except that the Italians simply refused to take risks, whilst the RN was completely the opposite. With their carriers they achieved air superiority at sea in that six months despite the numerical advantages to the RA. wouild. 




> 2. The Regia Marina has no oil problem until late 1941!



Bragadin says that they were suffering oil shortages that were curtailing training and full usage of the battlefleet frommuch earlier than that. Ciano also says similar things in his diary. The crisis was not acute, but it was affecting themn from a very early stage. 



> 3. The Regia Marina had a very clear advantage after the surrender of France till Tarent.



Theoretically for about a week they did. In practice they didnt. They entered the war with just 2 BBs operational, which ramped up over the next 2 months to 4, and then finally 5 just before Taranto. They had clear numbers advantages in light forces, but were very spooked by the RN carriers .

Rapidly, the RN took steps to address this, such that by the second week of hostilities they outnumbered Italian Battlefleet, 5/2, and by the end of July 7/3. At no stage is there any evidence that the italians could get the better of the RN in open battle. They enjoyed a cl;ear superiority of numbers at Punto Stilo, but were driven from the battle, something they simply could not have done during an amphib operation. This reluctance to risk open battle was not an isolated icident, it happened again and again, and the only think that really saved the italians was the superior speed of their ships, that allowed them to escape when caught by any reasonable counter force by the RN. When robbed of speed advantages, such as at Cape Spada, they usually came off very badly. 



> 4. As I written bevor, if the italians would attack with all their strenghts and all will Malta, at middle August till beginning September 1940, it is a matter of fact, that this will be an Italian victory!




Its not a matter of fact, its a matter of your opinion. The facts are, in fact, that the italians never attempted that, and on the few occasions they attempted to gain undisputed control of the central basin were strategically defeated (notably Punto Stilo and south of Sardinia). And historically the Italians in August/ September would have been attacking with 4 BBs available to 7 or 8 in the RN. They would have had to endure combat at Night, which the italians were very poor at doing, clearing minefields, and using (mostly) unsupported Infantry to attack a fairly well equipped and dug in defending force. that is not an easy ask, even for a big Navy like the USN 



> They had 3 airborne battalion action ready at August 1940. They had superioty at battleships and cruisers from August 1940.



They had superiority of Cruisers, but not battleships. They also enjoyed a big advantgae in numbers of Destroyers. The historical battles shows these advantages were not enough to win them much at all in open battle, even when they massively outnumbered the british.

With regard to airborne resources, I refer you to this site

http://www.stormomagazine.com/Articles/itaparadivs.htm 


Relevantly it says

The first paratroop units were organized in Libya in 1938 under the direction of Italo Balbo and consisted of two battalions totaling approximately 300 Libyan Ascaris and 50 Italian officers. 

1st Rgt. "Fanti dell'Aria" (Air Infantry)

1st Libyian Paratroop Bn. (colonial troops)

2nd Libyian Paratroop Bn. (colonial troops)

A third Libyan battalion was raised in 1940 composed mainly of Italian colonials and was assimilated with the other two existing units into the Tonini Modile Group. The Tonini Mobile Group fought at Derna in January 1941 under 10th Army command and delayed the Australian advance however was eventually destroyed at Beda Fomm in subsequent fighting. 


1st National Paratroop Bn. Of Libyia (Italians)




> The Alpinis, San Marcos and Bersaglieri are equal to every other unit from the english army and the Italian Air Force had totaly air supermarcy at August 1940.



There were Bersaglieri present at the beginning of occonnors offensive. they were good troops, but poorly led, like all the italian formations. They showed reasonable skills in set piece battles, such as Keren but were easily outclassed in small unit fights or in mobile operations. alpini were used in the Italian offensive of 28 october against the greeks, showed better combat capability than the line Infantry units, but fell apart like the rest in the end



The strenghts of the Italian Air Force 10. June 1940 (excluding North Africa).



> CR.32: 69
> CR.42: 120
> C.200: 64
> G.50: 81
> Fighter in summary: 334



And the majority oif those were strung out in Norther italy supporting the abortive offensive into France, and many were also needed in Albania. About 40 were immediately detached to reinforce Rhodes and a similar number to Sardinia. Italian air supremacy was stretched from the very beginning and suffered attrociauous servicieability issues


***


> BR.20: 107
> Z.1007: 24
> S.79: 287
> Z.506: 24
> ...




Same as a above, plus important to note that only a fraction of these could deply to Sicily, because of the very primitive airfield situation. Wasnt addressed until FKX airfield engineers deplyed in October. 




> Malta didn't get any reinforcement at this time and from a simple military viewpoint and maths the Italians had;



Incorrect. 12 Hurricanes were ferred in in mid July, and another convoy with a similar number arrived two weeks later. Malta received additional AA troops by the end of Auigust, and overall, was well supplied at that time. 




> 1. the troops


Yes




> 2. the landingships



Nope, not according to their historical performance. Several modest sized operations were cancelled in leter 1940 (Corfu) and 1941 (Kotoir) due to a lack of sufficient landing craft. They had them....in miniscule numbers, enough for about a battalion....the rest were by ships boats as demonstrated in their invasion of Albania in '39. 




> 3. the battleships for support



Outnumbered and unwilling to go toe to toe with the allies, and vulnerable to the Malta minefeilds, laid from pre-war. 



> 4 totaly air supermarcy



Nope. they had the numbers, but could not achieve air superiority in any sense. Their aim in 1940 had been to isolate Malta. They could not achieve that, even after 6 months of effort. if anything, particulalry at sea, it was the british and their carriers, with the priceless advantages of mobility, who could claim air superiority over the central basin 




> to attack Malta with success at August/September 1940.
> 
> And it is only logic, if I want to attack at North Africa that I crack the lock at my direct supply line!



So many ifs here, also trying to teach a leopard to change its spots. Just too much wishful thinking for this to ever be considered a reasonable capability assessment.


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## parsifal (Mar 14, 2013)

The fate of Gruppo Tonini in January 1941

These were the paratroopers mentioned, fighting alongside regs, armour, and Bersglieri in a dug in position at Derna. About 11000 defenders, pitched against approximately 5000 attacking Australians from the 19 Brigade. It wass a tough fight, but ultimately the italians were defeated (this was an article i helped to write some years ago) 

Italian OB
Fteiah airfield area:
60th Bersaglieri Motorcycle Company (less 2 platoons)
an M11 medium tank platoon with 4 tanks
14th anti-aircraft battery (6 x 20mm guns)
(this, barring the tanks, was the small garrison the Australians faced in their initial attack in the airfield area)
Martuba-Derna crossroads, west of Fteiah (northern Derna line portion):
Libyan Paratroop Battalion
a 75/27 field arty battery from 10th Arty Rgt
eleven 47/32 AT guns
six 20mm guns
(this force fought tenaciously against the advancing Australians) – at the airfield 
Wadi Derna (southern portion of the Derna line):
2nd Battalion, 86th Inf. Rgt., Sabratha Division
Depot infantry battalion from 115th Inf. Rgt, Marmarica Division
17th Machinegun Battalion from Brescia Division
Town of Derna:
Elements, 55th Machinegun Bn from Savona Division
18th Libyan Inf. Bn.
an artillery battery
Fort Piemonte, Fteiah plain:
2 x 75/27 guns
1 x 47/32 gun
Line of Communications December 2007
30
a machinegun platoon
Fort Rudero, Fteiah plain:
2 x 75/27 guns
1 x 47/32 gun
a machinegun platoon
Reserve:
2 platoons of 201st Bersaglieri Motorcycle Coy.
4 x 20mm guns
2 armored cars (decrepit Lancia WWI model)
a Motorcycle Carabinieri team
Derna Sector Artillery:
1st Group (=Battalion), 75/27 field guns (20 guns used in anti-tank role)
7th Group, 75/46 AA guns (7 guns)
5th 20mm AA battery
256th 65/17 light gun battery
5 x 47/32 guns
one 76/40 gun battery
two 102/45 gun batteries
one 152/45 gun battery
one 120/45 gun battery
seven Scotti light guns
Of all the Italian troops remaining in Cyrenaica many of the best of them were to be found in the Derna Area in January 1941. Two of the 4 independent (divisional) Bersaglieri motorcycle battalions, the veteran Libyan para battalion, and 2 battalions of the newly arrived 10th Bersaglieri regiment, all strengthened with large amounts of artillery and a few tanks. The Australian official history correctly identified the 10th Bersaglieri regiment, but not the other units.
Australian OB
19 X/6th XX. 2/4, 2/5, 2/6, 2/7, 2/8 bns (part of 17 X too)
January 14th to 22nd, fighting in the Derna sector was limited to patrol skirmishes.
The Australians attacked hard on Jan. 23rd-26th in the northern area. The Italian and Australian versions may differ in several details, but basically the battle went as follows: the Australians seized, not without some difficulty, the airfield facilities, but could not push farther west due to a powerful artillery barrage pinning them down and the stiff resistance put up by the Libyan paratroops and other small units. The four Italian medium tanks were soon put out of combat (Australian version) or they proved quite effective to thwart an Australian flanking move (Italian version).

On January 26th Australian elements crossed Wadi Derna, in the southern sector, and began to drive the defenders back. A counterattack launched by a weak company-sized Italian infantry force went nowhere. Alarmed by the gaping hole on Wadi Derna and the Australian push, the Italian commanders ordered a larger scale counterattack to be executed on the following day, Jan, 27th, by the 10th Bersaglieri Regiment (less one battalion).
Jan. 27th the counterattack was launched and succeeded to throw the Australians back to the eastern side of the Wadi (Australian version: running short of ammo, they had to withdraw to avoid being cut off). However, in the north the two forts Piemonte and Rudero and their tiny garrisons were battered by enemy artillery and overwhelmed by enemy infantry.
On Jan. 28th, Graziani, alarmed by the overall situation steadily getting worse, decided to break contact and withdraw. On Jan. 30th/31st, the garrison of Derna slipped off unmolested, except a few tiny rearguard elements left in place to delay the Australian advance which were obviously overrun.

On 23 January, Lt. Fiammingo, commander of 2nd Company, Libyan Paratroops Battalion, sent a group of paratroopers with a truck-mounted 20mm gun and 2 machineguns, led by Lt. Sainas to support the Fteiah airfield defenders? On the following day, during the fighting an artillery shell destroyed the 20mm gun truck (the blast is recorded even by the Australian history!) and Sainas had to withdraw to a nearby post where he found a 47/32 mm gun. After reorganizing his men, at night he returned to the battle scene, drove temporarily off the Australians and carried the bodies of the dead 20mm gun crew back to Italian lines. (Both Sainas and Fiammingo were heavily wounded in action a few days later).

And what about the Libyan paratrooper Bubakr Ramalon, awarded the Silver Medal for Valour as he was wounded twice while hurling hand grenades at the enemy, and fought on in spite of the wounds? And Libyan Sergeant Mohammed Iden, who, wounded in action, rescued under enemy fire his wounded officer as the latter was about to be captured

Some more details on Derna. It seems the toughest fighting the Derna paratroopers force was involved in took place on 25 January. It is difficult to identify the various phases of the fighting and where precisely they took place, anyway after a morning of sharp combat, in the evening after 5:00pm a heavy attack pushed back the forward posts of the Italian defensive line and some Australian companies almost managed to outflank and encircle a portion of the line. According to the Italian account, this attack was repelled thanks to local counterattacks and hand-to-hand fighting on some occasions.

A source (actually not very reliable, though: Nino Arena, History of the Italian Paratroopers) gives an Italian casualties figure for 25 January, 40 dead and 54 wounded. That the losses near Derna were at any rate severe, decidedly higher than Australian losses, is agreed by both sides. 

The OH figure for the whole period from the beginning of the battle for Derna to 26 January, when the Fteiah airport was seized by the Australians and the Derna garrison folded back behind the steep cliff east of the town: 87 dead and 131 wounded. Contrary to their habit Australian and Commonwealth sources don’t mention “hordes” of Italian prisoners, an omission usually signalling hard fighting and few prisoners taken.

(Gruppo Tonini was captured some days later at Beda Fomm) 


Bibliography
The basis for this article was a well researched document compiled by Alessandro Gazzi , who very kindly agreed for me to use it as a primary source here.
Vicini, Diego (General), The history of the 8th Bersaglieri regiment, 1982 [not only a history of the 8th regiment but also a masterly survey of the whole campaign and all the other Bersaglieri units in Africa until 1943]
3 of the Italian Official Histories on North Africa.
Pignato Cappellano, Combat vehicles of the Italian Army, volume 2 (1940-1945). USSME, 2002 (official history).
Cappellano, F. Artillery of the Italian Army in the Second World War, Storia Militrare, 1998.
Lucio Ceva Andrea Curami. The Mechanization of the Italian Army until 1943. USSME, 1994. (official history)
[the 3 titles above translated from their Italian titles]


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## DonL (Mar 14, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Here are a lot of mixing up facts for a wrong timeline!
> 
> 
> 
> ...




1. Ciano is a rat that can't be trust
2. 5 Italian Battleships (partly modern) against 4 old RN battleships
3. 2 libysche and 1 Carabinieri-Bataillon
4. they had the four Sesia class plus the one older ship, capacity to 4500 troops plus equipment, with 2500-3000 troops much more equipment.
5. 12 Hurricans against 334 fighter?
6. The capacity of Sicily you will kidding me? At March 1941 there are 500 hundreds german aircrafts plus italian aircrafts!
7. RN Battleships were outnumbered at middle August to September 6/5 to 4 RN old Battleships.
8. I have written about strenghts and hearts! The Italian midddle leadership had the hearts and the strenghts, the problem was the high leadership!

Edit:

http://www.bing.com/maps/default.as...RM=Z7FD1#JmNpZD1FRTlDREFFQjA3RDE4MzEzITE0NQ==

So 2 X 6 pounder and 2 x 9,2 inch at Marsaxlokk and not any gun at Wied at Zurieq!
Very impressive, sorry for the sarcasum not a single chance against Battleship Guns

Edit:
AGAIN:
If my goal is North Africa I will attack with all my strenghts at the lock. If I'm a smart ass I declare war at x Day at August 1940 when all my surface shipps are mainly at port and my battleships and landingships are minutes away to open fire at Malta and the landing ships are minutes away from the beach!
The spoils of war doesn't inrested! (France)


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## parsifal (Mar 14, 2013)

> Ciano is a rat that can't be trust


Why


> 2. 5 Italian Battleships (partly modern) against 4 old RN battleships



Most of the BBs were not ready in June. Between June and September, the Italian fleet added or managed to commission a further 2 of the refurbished battleships, and then in October the first of the Littorios were finally worked up. other ships were commissioned but had not yet completed work up until November



> 3. 2 libysche and 1 Carabinieri-Bataillon



Yes, and these were grafted onto the Derna Garrison, where they put up a good fight defensively, but were overwhelmed by Australians half their number




> 4. they had the four Sesia class plus the one older ship, capacity to 4500 troops plus equipment, with 2500-3000 troops much more equipment.



Thats goos information, and confirms that the Italains lacked sufficient capability to get enough troops ashore to defeat the Malta Garrison, which stood at two Brigade groups. 



> 5. 12 Hurricans against 334 fighter?



Embarrassing isnt it. Except that the Italians could never concentrate that number over Malta for a number of reasons. 
They could outnumber the British, but could never really do much with it. Same thing happened to them over Greece. 




> 6. The capacity of Sicily you will kidding me? At March 1941 there are 500 hundreds german aircrafts plus italian aircrafts!


Significant upgrades of the Sicilain airfields was needed from October. FKX began movement in October...the very first thing they did ws upgrade the airfield facilties. Until then, spot capability was very limited

In any event the important battle was around the seas, and the RA was simply untrained and badly equipped to fight that sort of fight. The RN had proven many times that italaians airstrikees were veryu innefective against moving ships, and the experiences of the illustrious in the following january showed that even the germans had difficulty hitting ships sheltering in Grand Harbour. 




> 7. RN Battleships were outnumbered at middle August to September 6/5 to 4 RN old Battleships.



No, this is wrong and i strongly disageree. The italians did not enter the war with four operational BBs. they had just 2, the others needed to be broughht out of refit and worked up. By early July there were 3 Bbs in Force H and 4 in Alexandria, and this remained more or less the situation for the restof the year, as the italaians gradually increased the numbers of operational BBs.

The RN showed in spades at Punto Stilo their untter disdain of Italian capability. They saw a fleet off with the following strengths. 

Italian Navy

2 battleships
6 heavy cruisers
8 light cruisers
16 destroyers 

Royal Navy 

aircraft carrier
3 battleships
5 light cruisers
16 destroyers

The results of the battle itsellf were even, but the italians followed their operational doctrine and withdrew from the battle. In an amphib they just cannot do that. 

Strikes by the RA involving more than 70 strike aircraft hit the RN repeatedly, with no appreciable effect. The utter disdain of the RN to this threat is evidenced by the fact that Cunningham pursued the fleeing Italians to within 50 miles of the Calabrian Coast. for 



> I have written about strenghts and hearts! The Italian midddle leadership had the hearts and the strenghts, the problem was the high leadership!



Unfortunately this a bit of wishful thinking. Middle leadership, where it existed was good, but the basic problem was the shortage of good middle leadership and the generally poor relationship between the commanding generals and their men. The rations and conditions for the enlisted man in the italian army were pretty poor, whilst the conditions for officers were often palatial. This bred resentment and poor esprit de Corps in the italaian Army. There were exceptions, such as Ariete and the Bersiaglieri, but even here comparing them to men like the AIF isreally a bad joke.


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## parsifal (Mar 14, 2013)

Edit:



> Bing Maps - Driving Directions, Traffic and Road Conditions
> 
> So 2 X 6 pounder and 2 x 9,2 inch at Marsaxlokk and not any gun at Wied at Zurieq!
> Very impressive, sorry for the sarcasum not a single chance against Battleship Guns



These relate to the Voctorian era defences at the island. Read the book i posted earlier and you will see that these defences had been substantially augmented after that. Actually the defences at malta were comparable to those at Dover and Singapore, and they were "good enough" in the finish




> If my goal is North Africa I will attack with all my strenghts at the lock. If I'm a smart ass I declare war at x Day at August 1940 when all my surface shipps are mainly at port and my battleships and landingships are minutes away to open fire at Malta and the landing ships are minutes away from the beach!
> The spoils of war doesn't inrested!




But italy did not go to war with a premeditated plan. they went to war opportuistically. Its that simple. If they had tried to make preprations pre-war, you have assume a quid pro quo and assume simiular prepration by the British, or assume the british asre idiots and will let you go ahead and get away with it.

The real world does not work the way you think it should I am afraid


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## Vincenzo (Mar 14, 2013)

the italians got 5 BBs in operation since the operation Hats (from 31st august), they never got 6, the Doria go in operation only in january '41. in the late summer 40 probably there were 4 para btls (1 libians,1 italian in libya, 1 carabinieri and 1 regular in Italy) but the regular and the carabinieri btls were just formed in july (afair the 2 lybians were merged in 1). In late summer '40 the war with France is over and the war with greece is not started, probably it's possible add around 50% of air force in Sicily, airport situation there were 10 military fields under Sicily comand and some were in building in june '40 i think there is not large logistic trouble.


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## DonL (Mar 14, 2013)

I will come back tomorow with exact datas, but the italian had 2 Littorios action ready at august 1940.
Also how can airborne troops fight at Derna at August?

You are forwarding the boring victoty literature, you should look at the exact datas!

Laut Ordersofbattle.com:
1.Dorste: regulär
2.Devon: regulär
2.West Kent: regulär
2.RIF: regulär
8.Manchaster: 1st Line TA
1.KOMR: regulär
2.KOMR: War Formed (15.01.1940)
3.KOMR: War Formed (01.07.1940 !)

hardly impressive!


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## DonL (Mar 14, 2013)

Vincenzo said:


> the italians got 5 BBs in operation since the operation Hats (from 31st august), they never got 6, the Doria go in operation only in january '41. in the late summer 40 probably there were 4 para btls (1 libians,1 italian in libya, 1 carabinieri and 1 regular in Italy) but the regular and the carabinieri btls were just formed in july (afair the 2 lybians were merged in 1). In late summer '40 the war with France is over and the war with greece is not started, probably it's possible add around 50% of air force in Sicily, airport situation there were 10 military fields under Sicily comand and some were in building in june '40 i think there is not large logistic trouble.



Thanks that is proving my source, the attack must be at middle of august to beginning september, because no italian troops are involved at other frontlines.

Edit:


> Thats goos information, and confirms that the Italains lacked sufficient capability to get enough troops ashore to defeat the Malta Garrison, which stood at two Brigade groups.



We are talking about 5 ships! If I'm looking at the capacity of the italian fleet, there are more then enough ships to support an invasion with landing troops, especialy if the landingzone is save!
The italians had an armada of small landing ships and Malta was only 40-50 miles away from Sicily at summer at the Meditrain.
This isn't the englisch channel nor the north atlantic!


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## parsifal (Mar 15, 2013)

Guys

There were 6 Battleships commissioned by September, but only some of these were ready for operations.


This is the actual Order of Battle available to the italian Navy June 10th . Only 2 Battleships were ready for action with an additional 2 Littorio Commissioned, but not ready for action 

Italian Naval Order of Battle June 10th, 1940

"Steel Ships" says that Caio Duillo "Recommissioned on July 15, 1940 Caio Duilio ready for action last week of August, sortied on 31 August against HMS Valiant but returned to port the next day. On September 7 she returned to sea, acting under information that the British Force H was on the move. Force H was indeed on the move but instead of eastward into the Mediterranean, it went south to the west coast of Africa on the fiasco that was the Dakkar attack. Caio Duilio was at Taranto when the Italian battle fleet was attacked by the FAA on November 11, 1940".

Battleship Andrea Doria was even later. Steel Navy again "After repairs and modernizations had been completed, the Andrea Doria was recomissioned into the Regia Marina on October 20, 1940. She was assigned to convoy duty between Italy and Libya to supply Axis troops fighting in the North African Front and took part in the First Battle of Sirte. After the Armistice in September 1943 the ship was sailed to Malta with her sistership and was interned by the Allies".

Again, I repat. For the period between June and the end of October, the Italians had not more than 4 BBs at any given time operational. In June through to the end of July they had only 2. From the begining of August they had 4, increasing to 5 from the end of Septemeber and then finally to 6 (but by then one of them was damaged).



> The italians had an armada of small landing ships and Malta was only 40-50 miles away from Sicily at summer at the Meditrain.
> This isn't the englisch channel nor the north atlantic



Not according to the felgrau OB I posted. Im more than a litle curious now about the amphibious capability of the italian Navy. Can you name the ships you think available and we can easily check if they are available and what their capabilities are from general reference material like Janes or Conways. If they arent commissioned and operational as at June, they are not availble for an Amphib in August.


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## DonL (Mar 15, 2013)

To my sources the italians had 5 battleships ready for operation at august 1940!

Italian landing crafts available for C3
10 x PF (Piroscafo) [Aventino, Viminale, Quirinale, Italia, Milano,Tunisi,
Calino, Rosandra, Crispi, Donizzetti]
Small passenger ships. Capacity from 800 to 1,400 men.
6 x PFC (Piroscafo da carico) [ ? ]
As above, but loaded with cargo. Capacity 3,000 tons.
2 x NT (Nave traghetto) [Messina, Aspromonte]
Ex-Messina Strait railway ferries. 1,000 tons. Capacity 4-8 tanks each.
* 4 x MC (Motocisterna) - [Sesia, Tirso, Scrivia, Garigliano]*
Thats the four landing ships I refer in my previous posts
Pre-war purpose-built LST. Utilized for artillery transport. Could carry two
75 Btys with vehicles.
5 x PM (Posamine) [Buccari, Durazzo, Pelagosa, Crotone, Vieste]
Ex-light minelayer. Makeshift bow ramp (motorcycle-able). Capacity 500 men.
2 x MN (Motonave) [Aquileia and ?]
Ex-Venice ferries. Similar to PM. Capacity 400 men.
4 x PFP (Piroscafo Piccolo) [Tabarca, Sauro, Mafalda, Argentina]
Ex-Capri ferries. As MN.
* 70 x MZ (Motozattera) [50 Italians, 20 Germans]*
German MPF model. 250 tons, 10 knots. Armament 1x76/40, 1x20/65. Bow loading
ramp. Capacity 220 men, or vehicles for 50 tons.
30 x MV (Motoveliero)
Ex-trawlers. Makeshift bow ramp (men only). HMG-armed. Capacity 300 men, or
100 tons of supplies.
24 x MF (Motoscafo)
Ex-Venice motorboats. 20 tons. LMG-armed. Capacity 75 men.
50 x ML (Motolancia)
Littler still motorboats. 15 tons. Capacity 30 men

At least the 70 MZ = MFP are not available at 1940.

Edit:

The british fleet had 30 hours from Alexandria to Malta at 20kn (20kn are very optimistic for the old BB and DD for cruising speed), more then enough time to do the critical moves, even landing a second wave with the Sesia Class.


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## parsifal (Mar 15, 2013)

> I will come back tomorow with exact datas, but the italian had 2 Littorios action ready at august 1940.



By August the Royal Navy was routinely deploying 7 battleships into the Med, to the RMs 4. 




> Also how can airborne troops fight at Derna at August?



They were part of gruppo Tonini which was mostly colonial troops> The main parachute school for the Italians was near tripoli in Libya 



> You are forwarding the boring victoty literature, you should look at the exact datas!



"Boring victory literature" - hardly . anyway, matter of opinion I guess




> Laut Ordersofbattle.com:
> 1.Dorste: regulär
> 2.Devon: regulär
> 2.West Kent: regulär
> ...


[/QUOTE]

These are, I assume intell report from the Germans. if not please clarify. They appear to be battalions based on Malta. If so, what is it you are trying to say? That 2 and 2/3 of a brigade on the Island which would actually be a fairly formidable defending force. rember, in 1565, the ottomans with a force of 48000 men were defeated by a force of just 7000, of which aonly about 1500 were professional soldiers. And the Ottomans supposedly held many of the 16th century equivalents to air and naval supremacy


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## DonL (Mar 15, 2013)

We are talking about Alpinis, San Marcos and Bersaglieri not any second rate troops.
Please stay realistic and to the topic not all Italian troops were inferior!

8.Manchaster: 1st Line TA
2.KOMR: War Formed (15.01.1940)
3.KOMR: War Formed (01.07.1940 !)

Hardly first line troops.

The rest is also debatable through the lack of training. 
We are doing hairsplitting!
The troops which will defending Malta weren't *any* better then the airborne, Alpinis, San Marco or Bersaglieri!

This troops could land with the support of BB guns and had the possibilioty to land smal tanks, the defenders of Malta weren't anything special only average troops!


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## parsifal (Mar 15, 2013)

DonL said:


> We are talking about Alpinis, San Marcos and Bersaglieri not any second rate troops.
> Please stay realistic and to the topic not all Italian troops were inferior!
> 
> 8.Manchaster: 1st Line TA
> ...




No-one is claiming that the malta forces were anythng special, but then, the forces that defested the Italians in Cyrenaica werent special either. And the forces that defended Crete and almost defeated the german airborne and mountain units were the same troops, less their heavy equipment. So this is not about tropp quality, though in the end it is. The Italaians were quite effective fighters, but their organization let them down,as well as other factors, and no amount of elite training could overcome that. 


So if the Australians (nothing special) could defeat an Italian fortified defender whilst outnumbered 2:1 on the attack, why couldnt the maltese defenders, whilst operating from dug in positions on the defensive not defeat 3 or 4 times their number of italian attackers. Therir forebears in 1565 certainly did exactly that, and anyone who knows the maltese (as i do) knows just how tough and good soldiers these guys are and were

There were 5000 regulars defending as at the beginning of june. On June 3 the Malta Milita (KOMR) was formed, and by the end of June had over 3000 men enlisted. These were poorly equipped at the start, but trained pretty hard, and gradyually received weappons ober the coming months. There were over 150 pillboxees and additional strongpoints laid around the shoreline, and additional troops being inducted from the local population all the time (one source says about 9000 at peak strength).

In any event malta by August was defended by about 8000 men, 5000 regulars and 3000 volunteers. Very similar numbers to the defenders of 1565.

Im not claimimng that the defenders of Malta were anything special, but then neither was the 6th Aus. It had gattereed its manpower in 1939, but the division only formed in March 1940. It went into action in December, initially defeating over 40000 defenders at Bardia. It again led the assault into Tobruk, where it was again outnumbered by at least 2:1 in troops. There were Bersglieri present at both those battles, and Italian elite units were also present at the debacles of Sidi barrani and Beda Fomm. At Derna, the Australians faced the best Infantry in North Africa at the time, including significant elements of 10th Bersaglieri Regt. There is no question that at Derna, and at Keren, the italians fought tenaciously and at times effectively (read the article and you will see it says that). But they were always poorly led, sometimes because of poor leaders, sometimes because there were not enough leaders in "middle management". Their tactics were poor, and sometimes their equipment and kit was poor. Its a credit to the Italian soldiers that they fought as well as they did.

Italian alpine units were present for the offensive into Greece. Initially this saw 8 divs attacking 1 2/3 greek divs. 

The OB for that initial offensive consisted of an Army Corps to each theatre, formed from the existing forces occupying Albania. The stronger XXV Ciamuria Corps in Epirus consisted of the 23rd Ferrara, the 51st Siena Infantry Divisions, the 131st Centauro Armoured Division. In total, this was 30,000 men and 163 tanks. They intended to drive towards Ioannina, flanked on the right by a small brigade-sized "Littoral Group" (Raggruppamento Litorale) of 5,000 men along the coast, and to its left by the elite Julia Alpine Division, which would advance through the Pindus Mountains.

The XXVI Corizza Corps in the Macedonian sector consisted of the 29th Piemonte, the 49th Parma Infantry Divisions, and the 19th Venezia Division, for a total of 31,000 men. It was initially intended to maintain a defensive stance. In total, the force facing the Greeks comprised about 85,000 men under the command of Lt. General Sebastiano Visconti Prasca. 


The Greek forces in the immediate area at the outbreak of the war were the 8th Infantry Division, fully mobilized and prepared for forward defence by its commander, some corps troops including the "Pindus Detachment" of regimental size under Colonel Konstantinos Davakis, the 9th Infantry Division (partially mobilized), and the 4th Infantry Brigade in Western Macedonia. The Greek forces amounted to about 35,000 men. so were badly outnumbered from the outset. 

Julia Alpine Division showed great promise in this offesnive, but was eventually brought to ground by the greeks, with some difficulty. Once Julias resistance started to collapse, the entire front seemed to also falter. So I dont dispute that the Alpini were better quality trrops, but this is no different to the situation faced by the Knights Hospitaller in 1565. the Ottoman Janissaries numbered about 10000 in the Sultans army, yet were defeated by the unseseasoned levies of malta. in this case the defenders of malta were somewhat better trained and equipped (except for MT) than the 6Aus, which as previously shown had been able to defeat Italaian forces up to twice its own size, including Bersaglieri elite troops. They were to do it again in the following year at tobruk, defending against the germans. 


Anyway, really would like these ships you are referring to so i can check their characterisitcs and numbers available.


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## Vincenzo (Mar 15, 2013)

Again the italian get 5 BBs in operation Hats from 31st August. and i'm talking in operation not commissioned. (so we had the 2 Cavour, 2 VV, and 1 Duilio). The italian never get 4 BB in operation in '40 the got from 2 to 5, is true that probably the VV maybe ready before of the others but was not used before.
What are the british BB in medit?
There were not 2 Brigatde in Malta at that time there were a HQ/Brigade and 4 infantry and 1 mg btl of BA and 2/3 btls of maltese


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## DonL (Mar 15, 2013)

> What are the british BB in medit?



To my sources they had 4 BB's at August 1940 till enf of the year.


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## Vincenzo (Mar 15, 2013)

just checked on naval-history.net
british BB (medit in '40, including Gibraltar)
Barham: from 15th october (just arrived was drydocked for repair, this stay in Gibraltar also from 2 to 6 september waiting for Dakar operation)
Malaya: from 19th april 
Queen Elizabeth: never
Valiant: from 30th june to 4th august, from 29th august
Warspite: from 5th may 
Ramillies: from 23rd may (just go in floating dock for refit but was sospended with italy declaration of war) to 7th december
Resolution: from 10th june to 6th september, from 16th december but in reparation
Revenge: never
Royal Sovereign: from 23rd april to 11th august, from 18th november to 1st december but at repair
Nelson: never
Rodney: never
Renown: from 20th august 
Hood: frm 23rd june to 4th august.


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## Vincenzo (Mar 15, 2013)

i want add on albanian orbat that Piemonte was the theater reserve and Venetia was original deployed on the Yugoslavian border. and that most of greek army were redeployed in the front, and the greek division had 3 infantry reg and the italian 2


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## parsifal (Mar 15, 2013)

The specific deplyments of Britih Battleships to the Med, by month were as follows. Ive included a Battleship as available if it was on operations for more than 12 days in that calendar month in the TO. The only exception to this is June where, because the italians were not at war until the June 10, Ive reduced the necesary operations time to 7 days or more. 

June: Hood, Malaya, Warspite Ramillies Resolution, Royal Sovereign (6)
Italians had four Battleships but only 2 had worked up and were ready

July: Hood Malaya, Valiant, Warspite, Ramillies Resolution Royal Sovereign (7)
Italians had 3 BBs operational and 2 others in commission but still not operational. 

August: Ramillies, Resolution, Renown, Malaya, Valiant, Warspite (6)
Italians had 3 Bbs, possibly 4 operational, with 1 still working up and 1 still completing its modernization

September: Renown (also on Atlantic Patrols for a few days), Valiant, Warspite Ramillies, Royal Sovereign (5)
Italians had 4 BBs operational, with 1 working up and 1 still not yet commissioned. 

October: Renown Malaya Valiant Warspite Ramillies, (5)
Italians had 6 BBs, but one had only just been recomissioned after a revuild and was not yet operational

November: Renown, Malaya, Valiant, Warspite Ramillies, Barham,(6)
Italians 6 BBs (all theoretically avaialable)

December: Renown, Malaya Valiant Warspite Barham (5)

Italians: 3 (possibly 2, not sure) 


For the hats convoy, there were actually two operations , the british committed the following significant units

Force H

Renown Resolution
Cruiser Sheffield (radar equipped)

Cunningham

Warspite Malaya Valiant (now radar equipped....she was transferred from west to east because of that reason), Carrier Illustrious (radar equipped) Cruisers Coventry, Caledon and Caradoc (all radar equipped) 

According to Corelli Barnett the italians completely missed force H, but did put to sea on the second day with 2 BBs 7 cruisers and many destroyers. However they did not seiously interfere with any part of the operation. They should have. Valiant about 5 DDs and the 3 CLAAs spent the night in Valetta offloading more than 1200 Army and air force personnel (with their wepons....this was an additional Infantry Battalion) . This brought the number of regular Infantry Battalions on the island up to 5. In additiona to that, there were now 4 locally raised militia units (KOMR) battalions. A convoy of 3 supply ships put out from Alexandria. One merchantmen was hit, but she remained afloat and made it that evening to Malta. This convoys carried precious cargo, 5500 rifles, with ammunition, 8 x 3.7in HAA guns, 10 x 40mm Bofors, 10000 rounds of HAA (including the 40mm shells) and a similar number of artillery shells, 100 Bren guns. Some sources also say that a few 2 pounder AT guns and AT riflres were delovered, but I am doubtful about the 2 pounders. My best guess if that 24 ATRs were delivered. A few sources also say that mortars were delivered ....but Im not convinced.

You guys are absolutely wrong to assert there were only 4 Infantry Battalions defending the island. Up to June 3 that is a correct statement. From June 3 to June 30 an additional 4 Battalions of local militia were added to the defenders, amounting to 3000 men. I believe that this had increased to about 4000 by the beginning of August. They were only pooorly armed until the arrival of the Hats convoys in August. From August there were 5 regular and 4 militia Bns deployed, with the milita Bns now properly armed. There were over 150 strongpoints and concrete pilboxes now in place in addition to the prewar fortifications, and dense minefeilds now protected the approaches to the island except by classified channels not known to the Axis. Malta was now a veritable fortress, and the only way the italians had any hope of assaulting the island was by effective blockade, which "Hats" and other relive operations demonstrated in spades they could not do.


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## parsifal (Mar 15, 2013)

DonL said:


> To my sources the italians had 5 battleships ready for operation at august 1940!
> 
> Italian landing crafts available for C3
> 10 x PF (Piroscafo) [Aventino, Viminale, Quirinale, Italia, Milano,Tunisi,
> ...





With regard to the alleged sealift capability, why did the italians cancel two important operation (Corfu and Kotor) citing inadequate sealift capability as one of the reasons for these cancellations (poor weather was also stated for the Corfu operation though Greek sources do not corroborate that claim, and Greek DDs unertook nuisance bombardments in the same general areas at that time).

With regard to your alleged timetable, not a chance. Your fleet has to emark, form up travel from the ports of assembly and then undertake one of the most difficult assaults i can think of. I dont know the embarkation rates for the nearest major port (which would have to be either tripoli ofr Syracuse), but 24 hours has to be at least a plausible number. Lets assume a fleet speed of 8 knots and a straight line travel distance of 130 miles. Because zig zag will need to be oput into effect, and convoy rules established, you are lookintg at a crossing time of about 30-60 hours. Then you you have the battle to fight. It will be necessary to clear pathways through the minefields for the assault forces, which given the italian capability will be at least 48 hours (Im trying to be charitable....more like a week really, if at all) then undertake prepratory bombardments.... similar minesweeper reports that I have seen. For the capture of tarawa, considered a failure because the bombardment was too short, it took 3 hours of bombardment and 3 days of extremely hard fighting for the island, less than one twentieth the area of Malta, to be taken. Therer were over 30000 attackers (including 18000 Infantry and only 2500 defenders, mostly in fairly rudimentary earthern bombshelters. The Japanese, despite being heavily bombed to eliminate the air resources of the area, knew of the approaching Americans at least two days in advance (and sank one of the carriers as a result). The Americans employed at least 300 assault craft, 170 of them bigger than a DD, and i count about 70 in your force. 

There is no way that the italians can sneak in in less than 30 hours and have any hope of taking the island 20 times the size of betio, and defended by 4 times the numbers of defenders. There is no way they can clear the minefields in time, if at all and then there is no way they can hope to get a big enough landing force across the beaches to anything other than sit on the beaches and get themselves killed. let alone subdue the defenders with the tiny sealift capacity you are relying onb. It would be a bad joke, except you are actually serious.


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## vinnye (Mar 16, 2013)

Ignoring the relative strengths of the troops on both sides, I think that the Italians would have had great difficulty in gathering an invasion force without the British getting wind of it.
Aerial recon and interceptions of radio traffic would give the RN in Alexandria and Gibralta sufficient time to intervene if they wanted to.
I believe that they would have decided that this was an opportunity that they could not miss out on. If they were concerned about aerial attack - whichthey were not if it were the high altitude Italian bombing, then they could hold off the islands until dark and engage the invasion fleet when th RN had a distinct advantage.


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## Vincenzo (Mar 16, 2013)

Parsifal are you ignoring me? so just for known
i've posted already that since 31st august the italian fleet sail with 5 BBs, so yiu can not wirte that in september they had 4, for the british in my post 65th i give exact date for deployement in medit. 
your method for 12 days in a month can give duplication, you can had 2 BB that get this target but that were not present in same time.
British started with 5 (Malaya, Warspite, Ramillies, Resoluton and Royal Sovereign)
23 june add Hood (so 6)
30th june add Valiant (so 7)
4th august left Valiant and Hood (so 5)
11th august left Royal Sovereign (so 4)
20th august add Renown (so 5)
29th august add Valiant (so 6)
from 2nd to 6th september add Barham (so 7)
6th september left Resolution/Barham (so 5)
15th october add Barham (so 6)
obviously after Taranto night the landing on malta are impensable


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## Freebird (Mar 16, 2013)

DonL said:


> To my sources they had 4 BB's at August 1940 till enf of the year.



No, in fact there are 7 British battleships, + 1 battlecruiser



Vincenzo said:


> Parsifal are you ignoring me? so just for known
> i've posted already that since 31st august the italian fleet sail with 5 BBs, so yiu can not wirte that in september they had 4, for the british in my post 65th i give exact date for deployement in medit.
> your method for 12 days in a month can give duplication, you can had 2 BB that get this target but that were not present in same time.
> British started with 5 (Malaya, Warspite, Ramillies, Resoluton and Royal Sovereign)
> ...


 
Vincenzo you seem to be assuming that the British will completely ignore the events around Malta in regard to their deployments.
British intelligence was intercepting Axis transmissions, and would also certainly be aware if there was a major build up of Axis naval assets (in preparation for an amphibious invasion)
Royal Sovereign left the Med for the Indian Ocean on Aug 11, and began a minor refit in Durban in September. They would almost certainly not have withdrawn this ship if there had been a major Axis operation underway.

Barham was based at Gibraltar from July - September 1940, with short periods escorting convoys to/from Freetown or Bermuda, so the ship is not "unavailable" during this time. Had there been a major Italian operation all 7 battleships could have been deployed, being pulled off of convoy escort if needed. (as was done during the Bismarck sortie)

Guys, there is an excellent resource on the "Cruiser Operations" website, they have a fleet locater which will show you the location of all British battleships, Carriers cruisers + German capital ships including Panzerschiff, for any month of the war. (Just input month year at the bottom)

Fleet Dispositions


Shortround6 said:


> That is a might big 'IF".
> 
> And it cuts both ways.
> 
> ...



Shortround, there are 12 British battleships in service July - Sept 1940, as QE is being refitted and Nelson is still repairing damage. There are 11 available from Oct - Dec, assuming that British refits proceed as planned.

You are correct, there are no German capital ships available, other than cruisers the only German ship not under repair is the Adm. Scheer.


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## Vincenzo (Mar 16, 2013)

freebird check your data, Barham was a Scapa Flow until 28 august, sail to Gibraltar and arrive the 2nd september, Sovereign was sent for refit the 16th august at arrive to Aden had 1 boiler operational, actually she stay to work in various bases, only the 1st december was sent to join to Halifax Escort Force


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## DonL (Mar 16, 2013)

There is not a single prove or anything elese to claim, that England had the capacity in radio transmission intelligent at *summer 1940*.


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## vinnye (Mar 16, 2013)

You do not have to have broken someones codes to be able to interpret the quantity of radio traffic to be alerted to the possibility of your opponent is preparing for something big.
Organizing all of the component parts of a large scale amphibious invasion with coordinated air operations usually makes a lot of radio noise! Once you have picked up the increase in radio chatter, the sensible thing to do is send aerial recon missions to see what the noise is all about.


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## parsifal (Mar 16, 2013)

> Parsifal are you ignoring me? so just for known
> i've posted already that since 31st august the italian fleet sail with 5 BBs, so yiu can not wirte that in september they had 4,




Nope, not ignoring you, just not acknowledging that it is anything other than what it is....unsupported opinion. My Post 58 provides a referenced response and states as follows

_"Steel Ships" says that Caio Duillo "R*ecommissioned on July 15, 1940 Caio Duilio ready for action last week of August*, sortied on 31 August against HMS Valiant but returned to port the next day. On September 7 she returned to sea, acting under information that the British Force H was on the move. Force H was indeed on the move but instead of eastward into the Mediterranean, it went south to the west coast of Africa on the fiasco that was the Dakkar attack. Caio Duilio was at Taranto when the Italian battle fleet was attacked by the FAA on November 11, 1940".

Battleship Andrea Doria was even later. Steel Navy again "After repairs and modernizations had been completed, the Andrea Doria was *recomissioned into the Regia Marina on October 20, 1940*. She was assigned to convoy duty between Italy and Libya to supply Axis troops fighting in the North African Front and took part in the First Battle of Sirte. After the Armistice in September 1943 the ship was sailed to Malta with her sistership and was interned by the Allies"._

So, instead of "telling me" with unsuppported statements (which appear wrong anyway), how about supporting your assertions with soime referenced statements, like Ive fone. 




> for the british in my post 65th i give exact date for deployement in medit.
> your method for 12 days in a month can give duplication, you can had 2 BB that get this target but that were not present in same time.
> British started with 5 (Malaya, Warspite, Ramillies, Resoluton and Royal Sovereign)
> 23 june add Hood (so 6)
> ...




There are some errors in here, you seem to have missed a couple of dates, moreover you seem to think that ships in Force H operating in the Atlantic for a day or a week are not available. not so, they remained under the command of Force H and were available 

Nothing wrong with my method. A unit that spends 12 days in the TO will generallt spend a few days either side of that refitting and or refuelling at Gib before entering the command. Quite possibley as a ship enters the TO whilst another is leaving, ther will be two BBs on station at Gib, one leaving and one arriving (to releive the one about to leave. if a crisis developed in the central basis, there would be two BBs available instead of the one.

Also, it is reasonable to base it on 12 days in the month, because on average, thats the number of days any ship will spend on station, or ready for operations. At other times the ships of both navies will be in refit, refuelling restocking or whatever. ships tend to spend more than 50% of their commissioned time not available, so 12 days is a reasonable estimate. .


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## parsifal (Mar 16, 2013)

With regard to reading Italian Naval Codes, I am not completely sure one or the other about the extent that Italian naval Enigma was being read. The British had cracked the Italian Naval ciphers in 1937, during the Spanish Civil War, and in 1940 Dilly Knox (the man responsible) wanted to establish whether the Italian Navy were still using the same system that he had cracked during the Spanish Civil War; he instructed his assistants to use rodding to see whether the crib PERX (per being Italian for "for" and X being used to indicate a space between words) worked for the first part of a current message. After three months there was no success, but Mavis Lever, a 19-year-old student, found that rodding produced PERS for the first four letters of one message. She then (against orders) tried beyond this and obtained PERSONALE (Italian for "personal"). This confirmed that the Italians were indeed using the same machines and procedures.

The subsequent breaking of Italian naval Enigma ciphers led to substantial Allied successes. The cipher-breaking was disguised by sending a reconnaissance aircraft to the known location of a warship before attacking it, so that the Italians assumed that this was how they had been discovered. The Royal Navy's victory at the Battle of Cape Matapan in March 1941 was considerably helped by Ultra intelligence obtained from Italian naval Enigma signals.

On the basis of the above, youd probably have to concede that in Augist, there would not be much direct r eading of italian traffic. however the British were reading significant amounts of German traffic (with the exception of the U-Boat ciphers). Given that this scenario trlies on some German help, there is a better than 50% chance that the British would at least get some idea of what was coming and where from via third part proxies. 



Other source material paint a slightly different picure::

http://www.bletchleypark.org.uk/content/archive/index/june.rhtm,

"With the entry of the Italians into the war on 10th June the work of the BP Italian naval sub-section under Wilfred Bodsworth becomes important. Since 1937 they had been reading the most secret book code of the Italian navy, but the Italians now changed these, and BP failed to read them after July 1940, except for rare, capture assisted, occasions. BP read the valuable but rarely used Italian naval Enigma from September 1940 until it was withdrawn in the summer of 1941. For in December 1940 the Italian navy introduced a medium grade Swedish cypher machine, the C-38m. This was broken by BP in June 1941 and read almost continuously thereafter with great impact on the war in N. Africa".

This suggests that the British could read italian signal traffic up until July 1940, and from July until June 1941 just bits and pieces, and then from June 1941 more or less all Italian traffic (the C-38M machine used the same levels of security as the Lufwaffe and heer machines). If the British could read traffic until July, they would have knowledge of a planned italian assault on Malta, and would act accordingly


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## Vincenzo (Mar 16, 2013)

Parsifal my statement are right in both 31st august and 7th september italian fleet run with 5 BBs this easy to checked, i never tell that Doria was operational in 1940, actually i writed was operational in january. 
What errors please? i have not take out ship operating in Atlantic for 1 day or a week. You method was wrong i've already write because. my list count ship in refueling a Gib as in fleet.


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## Vincenzo (Mar 16, 2013)

on italian code the code break from Mavi Slever was not the common used from the navy was for the variant used of enigma that was in limited use (commonly were used book codes). (for some source the first decriptation of italian message was in march '41 and were not usefull decriptation before of this)


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## parsifal (Mar 16, 2013)

> Parsifal my statement are right in both 31st august and 7th september italian fleet run with 5 BBs this easy to checked, i never tell that Doria was operational in 1940, actually i writed was operational in january.



You never said 31 August, you said August. Littorio and Vento were decalred operational 2 August, but continued work up excercises throughout most of August. First operational usage of these two ships that i know of was against "Hats", where they put to sea briefly before retiring having not fired a shot.

However for some time in August, Battleship Cesare was undertgoingt repairs from damage received from the 15" hit(s) she had suffered at Puno Stilo. So the correct, or most correct answer to "how many Battleships in August" is 4, not 5. 




> What errors please? i have not take out ship operating in Atlantic for 1 day or a week. You method was wrong i've already write because. my list count ship in refueling a Gib as in fleet


.

I jotted them down as I went through the individual ship histories of the Nav History website. I will have to go back and find them now. I will get back to you on the omissions you have made.


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## Vincenzo (Mar 17, 2013)

parsifal said:


> You never said 31 August, you said August. Littorio and Vento were decalred operational 2 August, but continued work up excercises throughout most of August. First operational usage of these two ships that i know of was against "Hats", where they put to sea briefly before retiring having not fired a shot.
> 
> However for some time in August, Battleship Cesare was undertgoingt repairs from damage received from the 15" hit(s) she had suffered at Puno Stilo. So the correct, or most correct answer to "how many Battleships in August" is 4, not 5.
> 
> ...



Parsifal i've not said 31 august? you are a false be ashamed, my post 55 of 14/3 never modified, my post 64 15/3 never modified. not fired a shot so you want count not present its? so we can count not present all the british BB no fired a shot? The Cesare go in Sea in both the operation and i never writed that in august the italian had 5 BBs again you are false i writed that were 5 in september.
i'm waiting for my omissions


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## Freebird (Mar 17, 2013)

Vincenzo said:


> freebird check your data, Barham was a Scapa Flow until 28 august, sail to Gibraltar and arrive the 2nd september, Sovereign was sent for refit the 16th august at arrive to Aden had 1 boiler operational, actually she stay to work in various bases, only the 1st december was sent to join to Halifax Escort Force


 
From what I have seen is Valiant at Alexandria and Barham at Gibraltar in August of 1940.
Royal Sovereign was at Puna Stilo, so did all her boilers but one fail in the next month?



DonL said:


> There is not a single prove or anything elese to claim, that England had the capacity in radio transmission intelligent at *summer 1940*.



Yes, they were reading Italian naval ciphers



Vincenzo said:


> *20th august add Renown (so 5)*
> *29th august add Valiant (so 6)*
> from 2nd to 6th september add Barham (so 7)
> 6th september left Resolution/Barham (so 5)
> ...


 



parsifal said:


> You never said 31 August, you said August. Littorio and Vento were decalred operational 2 August, but continued work up excercises throughout most of August. First operational usage of these two ships that i know of was against "Hats", where they put to sea briefly before retiring having not fired a shot.
> 
> However for some time in August, Battleship Cesare was undertgoingt repairs from damage received from the 15" hit(s) she had suffered at Puno Stilo. So the correct, or most correct answer to "how many Battleships in August" is 4, not 5.



Guys, I'm not sure that there is a disagreement about the RM here.
There might have been a misunderstanding so let's not get hung up on it OK? 

The Italians have 3 battleship at the beginning of Aug while Cesare is under repair, 4 battleships by August 9 or so, then 5 in September with Duilo re-commisioned (by the end of Aug), and 6 with Doria ready around October 20.

So the Italians will have at best the same number of battleships, and possibly one less


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## Vincenzo (Mar 17, 2013)

freebird:
Barham: HMS Barham, British battleship, WW2
Valiant: HMS Valiant, British battleship, WW2
R. Sovereign: HMS Royal Sovereign, British battleship, WW2

for the italian ciphres they only reading enigma machines ciphres, that were in very limited use, (commonly ere used book codes) only with german deployement this becoming more common and ultra can get usefull information from march 41: March 1941


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## parsifal (Mar 17, 2013)

Vincenzo said:


> Parsifal i've not said 31 august? you are a false be ashamed, my post 55 of 14/3 never modified, my post 64 15/3 never modified. not fired a shot so you want count not present its? so we can count not present all the british BB no fired a shot? The Cesare go in Sea in both the operation and i never writed that in august the italian had 5 BBs again you are false i writed that were 5 in september.
> i'm waiting for my omissions



Not ashamed, my friend, im not the one trying to rewrite history. Im not trying to cast the italian fleet as anything other than what it was. In any event, even if you were referring to the whole of August, the two modern BBs, despite being declared operational, does not mean they were finished actual work up. It means, "for the most part we are ready". It doesnt mean "we are at the peak of our game and ready to take on a superior number of British Battelships in a most difficult operation". They were ready for that by 31 August 



> The Cesare go in Sea in both the operation and i never writed that in august the italian had 5 BBs again you are false i writed that were 5 in septembe



Ah yes, you are right about your claim, but according to my sources, Cesare did not put to sea until 27 September after Punto Stilo. That meant for the whoile of August she was not ready (you claimed she did) and most of September she was either still reparing or getting back to operational efficiency 

Bottom line is this, the Italians never enjoyed enough of an advantage (and in fact never had ANY advantage) to risk most of their fleet on a sea copntrol operation that would leave them exposed to massive retaliatiuon by the Brits. Even on those many occasions when they gave battle with an advantage in numbers, they relinquished control of the ocean, relying on their superior speed to get them out of trouble (most of the time that worked, on a few occasions it went horribly wrong). If they were engaged in an amphib operation that takes many days to complete, they dont have the luxury of withdrawing, without losing their amphibious fleet. As I recall, you were one of the people claiming it would be an "easy" operation, and that ther were no significant landward defences to worry about. Sorry, but wrong and wrong. They (the Italians) did have enough lift capacity to put a lot of people offshore, but its the transition from ship to shore that is the problem. They had very limited (offensive) minesweeping capability (which in any case in this hypothetical are being used as makeshift transports, so for this scenario their capability is close to zero), and the ability to put about a regiment across the beaches, except in ships boats. They had some additional capability akin to the british effort at Suvla in 1915 ( where makeshift LCIs were used and were cut to pieces by the few companies of Turks defending). It would have been a sheer massacre, and anyone still insisting it was possible should be the ones being ashamed of themselves


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## N4521U (Mar 17, 2013)

With Me in charge, the fleet will surely be lost, soon!


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## parsifal (Mar 17, 2013)

Something I just missed. I went back to the original thread defintiion. why are we arguing about what is possible in 1940, when the the thread is specifically 1941?

How did that happen guys?


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## Wavelength (Mar 17, 2013)

I's probably my fault. I suggested the most important move they could have made was to take Malta. Then it was pointed out that it was more viable in 1940. Even in 1941 they should have taken Malta even if it required heavy German assistance IMO. 

Beyond strategic moves, on the tactical level simply fighting things through to a decision may have payed dividends in some cases. When Halsey took command during the Guadalcanal campaign he stated that the navy had been too adverse to taking risks and loosing ships. Halsey took risks and the fleet payed a heavy price in blood and treasure but things eventually turned for the better.


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## DonL (Mar 17, 2013)

No I was the man who wrote most of the things parsifal critize or what get him annoyed.

What I don't understand is, that his arrogance is back in post 83 at a normal discussion.
After official papers and sources 2 BB's were declared action ready beginning august, how on earth anybody can deny this only it doesn't suit his opinion?

Again my sources and researches came from profesional military men of the general stuff of the Bundeswehr, who have done the researches at archivs.
After this sources *five* italian BB's were action ready at end of August beginning September.
Also the numbers of Post 68 are complete wrong. The range between Siracusa and Malta is 150km or 81 naut. miles.
After official papers to operation Hercules, the planed time for the journey was 12 hours at 8kn. from Siracusa to the landing point with the Ships I have posted.
The same ships were action ready august 1940 after official research at archives excluding the 70 Motozatteras.

Also I'm highly aware of the pileboxes, but the pileboxes can be taken through BB and Cruiser guns, also through howitzers which were part of the equipment of the landing troops and through attacks of italian planes, which they had more then enoughs, even german/italian stukas since end of august 1940.

I can't understand the personal and offended attack at post 83 only through a normal discussion and researched facts.
I will end here, because to me the discussion will get back personal and I don't want this, but I have learned it get only not heated if the facts are suiting, if other facts were posted the rough calling is back.


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## Vincenzo (Mar 17, 2013)

parsifal are you again wrong Cesare go in operation the 31 august : British, read all (i've also on paper and in italian source), i'm curious what are your source?


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## parsifal (Mar 18, 2013)

Given that this whole issue is Off Topic, I am not going to respond to any further comments. Restrict your conversations to On -topic issues, specifically, what the Italian Navy could do better in 1941. Im happy to respond in an approproriate thread that deals with options in 1940, or if the thread author is happy to conintue discussions, he needs to say so.

Sorry guys, but i am not going to be party to yet another hijacked thread


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## Vincenzo (Mar 18, 2013)

Smart people before give false info and after run away with off topic excuse.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 18, 2013)

This forum saw many threads drifting away off topic (or 'off topic'), nothing wrong with that if the posts bring out good data and spirited discussion, but not a flame war and name calling. So be it for 1940, 1941 or 1942, having a discussion about RM in this particular thread does not seem like something earth shaking.


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## vinnye (Mar 18, 2013)

After Taranto, the balance of naval power shifted quite significantly in favour of the Royal Navy. They could not operate with impunity due to the lack of air superiority in a lot of the Mediterranean - especially whilst the LW were operating from Sicily. But if the Italians were to attempt a landing on Malta, I would have expected any such operation to be challenged - probably at night by the RN as this would reduce the risk to their ships from the air.
Later in 1941, the loss of Barham and the damage to Queen Elizabeth and Valiant at Alexandria would have given the Italian fleet a greatwe chance for success in ant landings.


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## parsifal (Mar 18, 2013)

Its a whole different ballgame in 1941, particularly after the entry of japan. That and the successful chariot attacks into Alexndria and Gibraltar were, after several failed attempts, highly successful. The RN managed to to hide the extent of the damage done to here remaining battleships, so in the context of this thread, what the italians needed was better intell in alexandria and Gibraltar.

For a brief period, the RN did not have sufficient strength to counter the italians, and if an all out effort had been mounted in late 1941, or early 1942 (already off topic) I think there was a good chance of success. The RM of 1942 was not the bunch of amateurs they were in 1940, they were a battlehardened force that ought not be underestimated. Leadership had been vastly improved, they tended to be careful, but thorough. If Rommel had been rained in and not go toes to toe with the allies in Crusader, becaome a team player sharing resources to achive a common strategic outcome, it may well have been possible to pull off an upset and take the island by combined airborne and amphibious assault. 

That I can agree with. Pie in the sky ideas about non-existent italian capability in 1940 is just so much hot air.


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## DonL (Mar 18, 2013)

> Pie in the sky ideas about non-existent italian capability in 1940 is just so much hot air.



Hard facts from archive sources are not hot air, your claims about 1940 are not very substained.

By the way Malta is vulnerable from March 1941 till the operation Crete.
Even a simultaneous landing with Crete could be managed, also the Italian had back two more battleships at Mai 1941, and the german 21. airborne division is available.
The landing fleet existed since August 1940.

This victory literature about the impregnableness of Malta and the lack of Axis possibilitys through the "mighty" RN, which could not even stop the Invasion of Crete is nothing then hot air to me.


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## Freebird (Mar 18, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Given that this whole issue is Off Topic, I am not going to respond to any further comments. Restrict your conversations to On -topic issues, specifically, what the Italian Navy could do better in 1941. Im happy to respond in an approproriate thread that deals with options in 1940, or if the thread author is happy to conintue discussions, he needs to say so.
> 
> Sorry guys, but i am not going to be party to yet another hijacked thread


Do you have an answer to the question of what Italy could have done in 1941 OTHER than an attack on Malta? 



vinnye said:


> After Taranto, the balance of naval power shifted quite significantly in favour of the Royal Navy. They could not operate with impunity due to the lack of air superiority in a lot of the Mediterranean - especially whilst the LW were operating from Sicily. But if the Italians were to attempt a landing on Malta, I would have expected any such operation to be challenged - probably at night by the RN as this would reduce the risk to their ships from the air.
> Later in 1941, the loss of Barham and the damage to Queen Elizabeth and Valiant at Alexandria would have given the Italian fleet a greatwe chance for success in ant landings.



Vinnye, could you answer Parsifal's question? 

Would you like to continue the thread as "What Italy could do in Aug 1940?" (as in an attack on Malta) or would you prefer that we do it on a separate thread?


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## parsifal (Mar 18, 2013)

> Do you have an answer to the question of what Italy could have done in 1941 OTHER than an attack on Malta?




The italians excelled at attacks by unconventional forces, particulalry Maile. I think a more considered development of these capabilities, backed up by a better intelligence effort at the ports being attacked, would have achieved good results for small cost.

I know you disagree, and I do respect your POV concerning the importance of Malta. It has certainly been overstated in the post war wash up. however, I still believe that Malta WAS the key to the TO. Its mere existence enabled continual implied threats to the Axis suply lines and forced them to take defensive steps, such as convoy and occupied so much of their air force, that it made other more ambitious plans un achievable until it was captured. The Axis failure to capture it was not just, or even predominantly a failure by the RM. they knew from an early stage they needed to take it, but they never did get proper support from the Germans to pour the necessary resources needed to achieve its capture. The Italians do share some of the blame however. In 1941-2 they needed to take risks and accept losses, something they were never really happy to accept, in order to clamp shut the blockade of the island. There was always a trickle of just enough to keep the island supplied, and this needed to be quaterised in order to win the crucial battle of the Theatre.

Thats why these guys aree attempting to re-write history. if they can win that argument they know they can then claim that the British should never have won the battle....we didnt win....they just chose to let us win. Its a blatant power play, and Im having none of it. The Axis lost for good reasons, and not all of it has anything to do with superior Allied resources. thats a part of the issue, but not all of it. There are some elements of their war that the italians, and the germans, completely botched, and this was one of them.


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## vinnye (Mar 19, 2013)

I am happy to go along with whatever you guys wish - either restrict this thread to 1941 and use the other thread to debate 1940?


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## vinnye (Mar 19, 2013)

I doubt that Hitler would have given the go ahead for an airbourne invasion after Crete - the losses were too high.
The Italians use of midget submarines was remarkable - extremely brave men using a horrible weapon that they themselves called "the pig".
I agree that one of the reasons for the Italians not being able to be more pro-active with their fleet was the lack of intelligence about how effective their actions were.


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## Freebird (Mar 20, 2013)

vinnye said:


> I am happy to go along with whatever you guys wish - either restrict this thread to 1941 and use the other thread to debate 1940?



What other thread?

Ah, OK there ia another thread started here:
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww2-general/malta-1940-a-36422.html


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## VBF-13 (Mar 20, 2013)

vinnye said:


> I am happy to go along with whatever you guys wish - either restrict this thread to 1941 and use the other thread to debate 1940?


I know The Maltese Falcon was 1941.


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