# Battle of the Denmark Straights, what if..



## pinehilljoe (Jan 23, 2018)

Purely a what if, but how do you think the Battle would have evolved if ADM Holland had flagged the battle from Prince of Wales and not Hood? 

If Hood had been sunk, would have continued with PoW and continued to engage Bismark?


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## Marcel (Jan 24, 2018)

No, the POW had problems with her guns and could not continue the fight even if they wanted to.


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## Ivan1GFP (Jan 24, 2018)

Opinion:
The Prince of Wales would have ended up as a flaming wreck or sunk. Most likely sunk.
The Bismarck would have been severely damaged if she had not tried to run away.

On the assumption that all damage that was historically inflicted on Bismarck would still happen and additional damage would result from a longer battle, Bismarck may not have been able to run for as long as she did.

If Bismarck did not take the waterline hit in the bow from PoW and took no other hits on or below the waterline, she should have been able to escape.

More What If:
What if Admiral Leutjens had chosen to take on a full load of fuel before the beginning of the mission?
What if Prince of Wales did not have the historical armament issues?

My own opinion is that a single King George V class battleship is nearly an even match for Bismarck class.
Although their main gun calibers are different, the weight of their broadsides is very close and when ships are that evenly matched, my expectation is that in a fight to the finish, one is destroyed and the other is crippled.
Of course there is also Prinz Eugen and while she is not a match in a BB fight, she is not a small ship and probably carried torpedoes to make things interesting.

- Ivan.

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## parsifal (Jan 24, 2018)

There were problems galore from the british perspective. You have one BB (the PoW) not worked up properly, with many of the onboard systems not functioning or breaking down during the battle. Unlike KM capital ships, where about 6 months was spent to train the crews and get them to work as an integrated team, the RN had a nasty habit of sending ships into action with crews not fully integrated. The crews were a good mix of old salts and new chumps, but the crews were not worked up to work as a team.


As a consequence, the PoW could not be viewed as a ship ready for combat, much less a ship able to act as flagship in a Task Group. if the PoW had been the designated flagship it is unlikely the TG would even have been capable of getting into the fight, and if it did was not capable of excercising an effective C&C function on a sustained basis. The command system of the TG is not just the admiral, though he is important, it has to be the supporting executive staff as well, and the relative ‘newness” of the PoW staff meant this would have been a function they would have struggled with.


The hoods shortcoming stem from the age of the ship. She was revolutionary in 1916 when designed, but she had not been properly modernised since then. She was an experienced and well trained unit, well able to fill the roles of flagship in the TG, but ther levels of protection were so poor in 1941 that she was well out of her depth when ranged against a top shelf opponent like the Bismarck.

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## Ivan1GFP (Jan 24, 2018)

Regarding the "Mighty Hood", there should be a little more background.
The original plan for the British was to build several very large (for the time) battlecruisers of the Admiral class.
I don't remember how many but expect the total number would probably have been 4 as was British custom.
They liked the idea of an entire division of identical ships. Hood was the first.

The problem was that at Jutland, the vulnerability of the battlecruiser became rather obvious with the destruction of
Indefatigable, Queen Mary, Invincible and the very near loss of Lion.
While the Indefatigable and Invincible were fairly old ships, the Queen Mary was not and the Lion was flagship of the Battlecruiser Squadron.

That led to updates to the Hood which was under construction.
By the end of the war, the need was no longer there but it would have been bad for morale purposes to scrap a ship that was so far along so she was completed in 1920. She was the last battlecruiser built by the British which shows the degree of faith they had in the concept.
Her size and speed were her only real assets. Her gun power was easily matched by quite a few other ships and her armour was obviously not adequate. She was definitely pretty though....

- Ivan.


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## pbehn (Jan 24, 2018)

Ivan1GFP said:


> My own opinion is that a single King George V class battleship is nearly an even match for Bismarck class.
> Although their main gun calibers are different, the weight of their broadsides is very close and when ships are that evenly matched, my expectation is that in a fight to the finish, *one is destroyed and the other is crippled.*
> Of course there is also Prinz Eugen and while she is not a match in a BB fight, she is not a small ship and probably carried torpedoes to make things interesting.
> 
> - Ivan.


Could be or it could be that the first to land a hit that knocks out the ranging equipment can pulverise the other with little accurate return fire.


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## Ivan1GFP (Jan 24, 2018)

pbehn said:


> Could be or it could be that the first to land a hit that knocks out the ranging equipment can pulverise the other with little accurate return fire.



You are assuming that there is only a single range finder and director position. There are many of varying size and quality.
I do find it very interesting that Bismarck lost two main gun turrets to a single large caliber hit during her final battle.
Prince of Wales did not have to win a 1 v 1.5 fight. It just had to damage Bismarck's seaworthiness and the German would never make it home.
Think about how things actually turned out: A single hit at the waterline in Bismarck's bow contaminated a significant quantity of her fuel AND prevented her from making better speed to get away. That hit did not impact her fighting ability and had no chance of sinking her.

Bismarck as I see it was never the toughest kid on the block much as popular literature makes her out to be. People who don't know any better equate size with power and that is why Bismarck and Hood were the "most powerful". I believe the reality was a bit different.
She was basically a much enlarged and faster update of the Baden / Bayern class from the Great War.

Consider what else was afloat when she was commissioned.
With 4 x 2 x 15 inch guns, she was matched in gun power by Hood and any of the Queen Elizabeth class and quite a few of the older British battleships as well.
Nagato, Mutsu had 4 x 2 x 16 inch.
Nelson and Rodney had 3 x 3 x 16 inch.
As mentioned earlier, King George V class had ONLY 14 inch guns, but although the caliber was smaller, they threw shells that were much heavier than typical for a 14 inch gun.
USA was not in the war, but they had the Colorado class and in a year would have the North Carolinas.

Also, when comparing displacement of these ships, recognize that the treaty measurement was "standard displacement" and often that is the number that is quoted in books. Most countries tended to cheat on those numbers to some extent. The US in particular tended to understate the numbers by a fair amount. The original design may have been within treaty limits, but as built, they were heavier.

Look further and see what the deep load displacement is. The navies tended to play games with standard displacement. A ship might only specify 50 rounds per main gun in standard displacement but actually be capable of carrying 150 rounds per main gun (hypothetical numbers). When she sails, it is highly unlikely she will only be carrying 50 rounds per main gun.
When this system of understating capacities is carried across many ship's systems, the difference can be quite a lot of tonnage.

Gun power takes a certain amount of tonnage.
Protection also takes tonnage.
Interestingly, Speed takes a LOT of size and tonnage.
Before the Great War, the British had a practice of building a battleship and then building its battlecruiser counterpart. The battlecruiser would be significantly larger and generally displace a bit more but also carry less armament and much less armour.

- Ivan.


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## parsifal (Jan 24, 2018)

Ivan1GFP said:


> Regarding the "Mighty Hood", there should be a little more background.
> The original plan for the British was to build several very large (for the time) battlecruisers of the Admiral class.
> I don't remember how many but expect the total number would probably have been 4 as was British custom.
> They liked the idea of an entire division of identical ships. Hood was the first.
> ...



There are some elements of this account that deserve further clarification.

Design
The experiences at Jutland were largely coincidental to the preparation of the hood design.

Hood was designed specifically to overcome the protection issues that affected the older BCs that had fought at Jutland but which were known well before that time. But this wasn’t even the main concern at the time. Hoods design actually began well before Jutland

in the Autumn of 1915, the Admiralty instructed the Director of Naval Construction (DNC), Sir Eustace Tennyson-d'Eyncourt, to prepare design proposals for a new experimental fast battleship.

The goal of Sir Eustace's designers was to envision something decidedly superior to the current generation of ships. A number of key wartime deficiencies and problems common to many warships had been observed. The most prevalent of these were the combination of low freeboard and high draught – Due to increased war time loads (extra provisions, personnel, fuel and ammunition), many vessels were operating at heavier weights than originally planned. The extra weight caused potentially serious problems: ships now sat so low in the water, that in rough seas, secondary armament batteries (usually mounted in rows "cut" into the hull sides) were frequently awash. This often made the guns unusable and significantly detracted from a vessel's firepower potential. It also contributed to poor sea keeping, as notable quantities of sea water would penetrate the hulls around the gun battery openings, resulting in even more weight to deal with. The resulting high draught seriously degraded some vessels' abilities to operate in shallow waters. Accordingly, the designers were told to ensure that the new vessels incorporated the necessary features of high freeboard, high-mounted secondary armament and shallow draught. Additionally, the ships had to make in excess of 30 knots and use the new 15" main gun system.

Between the fall of 1915 and early 1916, multiple battleship designs (differences/variations in length, beam, draught, armour, machinery and performance) were prepared. About this time, the requirement was changed at the behest of Admiral Jellicoe, from that of a fast battleship to a large battle cruiser. This change was influenced in part by recently confirmed reports of German plans to construct a new class of "super battle cruisers."

The vessels of the Imperial fleets Mackenson class, if completed, would be impressive specimens: they would displace between 30,000 - 35,000 tons, be capable of speeds approaching 30 knots and would boast a powerful armament headed-up by 13.78" main guns. In typical German fashion, these vessels would also have very good armour protection. Simply put, the Mackenson would clearly out-match any of the British battle cruisers in service at that time. This was clearly unacceptable to the Royal Navy.

Construction
Intially only 3 ships were ordered. In April 1916, the Admiralty placed orders for three vessels of the so-called New Admiral class: Hood, to be built by John Brown & Company Ltd, at Clydebank, Howe, to be built by Cammell Laird & Company, Ltd and Rodney from Fairfield Shipbuilding & Engineering Company, Ltd.

Sometime later, a fourth ship, Anson, was contracted from W.G. Armstrong, Whitworth & Company, Ltd.

The effects of Jutland
The design was gradually altered to include what was felt to be the necessary improvements. In addition to increased armour/protective plating, there were also armament changes/upgrades (addition of above water torpedo tubes, changes to the main gun mounts, etc.). The increased weight spread along the slender hull would subject the vessel to great stress. As such, it became necessary to incorporate additional reinforcements for strengthening purposes. By August 1916, the "final" design had at long last been approved. Hoods box keel was finally laid on 01 September 1916

The effects of the post war naval treaties
The new ship came in at displacement substantially greater than the “final” design. This was to have far reaching implications in the post war treaty at Washington and London where limits to capital ships displacements made it necessary to scrap many of the new fast BBs then under construction in a number of countries. A few exceptions were allowed to allow wartime construction to be examined. Morale had little or nothing to do with the decision to retain the Hood. Because the Hood was at an advanced stage of construction, as a special case, the RN was allowed to keep her. I am fairly certain that in exchange both the Americans and the Japanese were permitted to retain certain overszed hulls for conversion into carriers (Lexingtons and the akagi/Kaga class0 whilst the French were similarly permitted to convert the slightly older Bearn. But the treaty forbade the laying down or completion of other new ships that exceeded treaty limits

Battlecruiser or Fast battleship?
Due to her extreme size, superb speed, large calibre armament and somewhat "larger than life" legend, she is often referred to (by modern day historians amd enthusiasts) as being not necessarily the last British battle cruiser, but the world's first true modern "fast battleship." This view is understandable when one compares _Hood's _protective armour and weaponry to contemporary battleships such as the _Queen Elizabeth_ class, _Hood_ was indeed a better armed and better protected ship. Of course, when one compares her armour/protective arrangement to those of the true fast/modern battleships that appeared in her latter days, it is clear that she was not quite up to par. At best, she was just a "super battle cruiser." Indeed, she always held an official designation of battle cruiser- the Admiralty knew full-well of her potential armour deficiencies.

So why, if she wasn't really a battleship, did the Admiralty employ her as one during the Second World War? Largely because of a lack of big gun resources. Her reputation was also a key factor...due to her somewhat inflated legend, she was widely feared the world over. Of course, that very same legend may have impaired the Admiralty's judgment as well– she had been the _"Mighty Hood"_ for so long that despite her known deficiencies, many may have actually thought her invincible.

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## Glider (Jan 24, 2018)

Together the Hood and the KGV were more than a match for the Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen. One was deficient in protection but had a good crew the other in the state of its crew and not being fully worked up but the odds were still on their side. 
With the Hood gone the KGV did all she could in the circumstances. Without the lucky hit the Hood would have lasted longer in the fight but the Bismarck would have taken more damage and been forced to run for home. The Hood was old but her fire control was pretty good and she did have Type 284 Radar control for her main guns so the probability is that she would have done some damage before being knocked out of the fight.
The Prinz Eugen was a first class Heavy Cruiser but couldn't have stayed in the fight for long, a couple of hits would have put her in dire danger of just loosing speed and the RN had two 8in cruisers in the area (a factor that is often overlooked), who would have loved that scenario. 

As soon as the Bismarck started trading shots with another capital ship of any type, the chances were that she would take damage and be forced to turn for home. What happened in the battle was probably the best case scenario for the German Navy.

Had the RN been able to slow the Bismarck then the end would have been the same, just sooner.


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## parsifal (Jan 24, 2018)

I don’t fully buy the “lucky hit” claims completely, because the germans in their exceptionally well prepared ships made every effort to make their shooting accuracy as faultless as possible. In this regard they were doing all they could to make their own luck 

There are some things about this battle that don’t add up. Why did Holland place Hood as the lead ship in his battle line? Why weren’t the shadowing cruisers called in for support (I concede probably to avoid breaking radio silence). The angle of approach is well known, as well as the reasons why Holland decided to do that but if he had accepted a shallower more lengthy rate of closure, would the additional broadside firepower have been worth that penalty. I cant help thinking that the british Admiral was just too keen to close the range, at the cost of compromising his broadside power


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## alejandro_ (Jan 24, 2018)

There are some things about this battle that don’t add up. Why did Holland place Hood as the lead ship in his battle line? Why weren’t the shadowing cruisers called in for support (I concede probably to avoid breaking radio silence). The angle of approach is well known, as well as the reasons why Holland decided to do that but if he had accepted a shallower more lengthy rate of closure, would the additional broadside firepower have been worth that penalty. I cant help thinking that the british Admiral was just too keen to close the range, at the cost of compromising his broadside power

Holland was trying to maintain radio silence and surprise the Germans, this is the likely reason for not using the cruisers. At the end of the day, the Royal Navy had the advantage anyway, 1 battlecruiser and 1 battleship versus 1 cruiser and 1 battleship.

I also think that Holland was not sure if the Germans were going to engage, a few months before Scharnhorst and Gneiseau had escaped without fighting. Also, a few hours before the battle radar contact was lost, forcing Holland to take the risk.


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## pbehn (Jan 24, 2018)

Ivan1GFP said:


> You are assuming that there is only a single range finder and director position. There are many of varying size and quality.
> I do find it very interesting that Bismarck lost two main gun turrets to a single large caliber hit during her final battle.
> Prince of Wales did not have to win a 1 v 1.5 fight. It just had to damage Bismarck's seaworthiness and the German would never make it home.
> Think about how things actually turned out: A single hit at the waterline in Bismarck's bow contaminated a significant quantity of her fuel AND prevented her from making better speed to get away. That hit did not impact her fighting ability and had no chance of sinking her.
> .


I knew that most capital ships had many different systems, RADAR being a comparatively new addition. However the radio ranging is probably the easiest to damage, if that is lost and your opponent still has it you are at a big disadvantage. To some extent all hits are lucky shots because both ships are moving and the ballistics of the shells are not perfect. A broadside or salvo just has a statistical probability of a hit not a guarantee. To be that was the problem of the surface raider strategy. Your enemy doesn't have to win a fight "duking" it out to the death, just a few hits were frequently enough to turn a top class battle ship into a much reduced threat in need of long repairs.


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## Ivan1GFP (Jan 24, 2018)

parsifal said:


> The effects of the post war naval treaties
> The new ship came in at displacement substantially greater than the “final” design. This was to have far reaching implications in the post war treaty at Washington and London where limits to capital ships displacements made it necessary to scrap many of the new fast BBs then under construction in a number of countries. A few exceptions were allowed to allow wartime construction to be examined. Morale had little or nothing to do with the decision to retain the Hood. Because the Hood was at an advanced stage of construction, as a special case, the RN was allowed to keep her. I am fairly certain that in exchange both the Americans and the Japanese were permitted to retain certain overszed hulls for conversion into carriers (Lexingtons and the akagi/Kaga class0 whilst the French were similarly permitted to convert the slightly older Bearn. But the treaty forbade the laying down or completion of other new ships that exceeded treaty limits
> 
> Battlecruiser or Fast battleship?
> ...



Hello Parsifal,

Thanks for adding and correcting the background information.
One minor clarification: The Japanese were actually trying to use the Akagi and Amagi for carrier conversions.
These were a pair originally intended to be completed as battlecruisers.
A major earthquake damaged Amagi beyond economical repair and the battleship Kaga was substituted.
That is why Akagi and Kaga were never really a matched pair even though they operated tactically as such.

If the Hood had superior protection to the next newest class of "battleship", the Queen Elizabeth, then why not continue with the three following ships? A result of the Washington Treaty perhaps?

Do you suppose that the German battlecruisers of the Great War were closer to the "fast battleship" concept?

- Ivan.


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## pinehilljoe (Jan 24, 2018)

if you look at Jutland, some of the German Battlecruisers took an incredible amount of punishment.


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## Ivan1GFP (Jan 25, 2018)

pinehilljoe said:


> if you look at Jutland, some of the German Battlecruisers took an incredible amount of punishment.



....and survived.


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## parsifal (Jan 25, 2018)

Ivan1GFP said:


> Hello Parsifal,
> 
> Thanks for adding and correcting the background information.
> One minor clarification: The Japanese were actually trying to use the Akagi and Amagi for carrier conversions.
> ...



The Derfflinger class was a class of three battlecruisers. The ships were ordered for the 1912–13 Naval Building Program of the German Imperial Navy as a reply to the RNs three new Lion Class BCs that had been launched a few years earlier. The preceding Moltke and the incrementally improved Seydlitz represented the end of the evolution of Germany's first generation of battlecruisers and were as a generalisation better protected but worse in firepower compared to their RN counterparts. The Derfflinger class had considerable improvements, including a larger primary armament, all of which was mounted on the centerline, eliminating the restricted arc of the amidships turret. The ships were also larger than the preceding classes at 26000 tons. They preceded the Hood class by 3 years, but were not as good as the Hood. If the hood is considered at best a borderline fast BB, then the Derfflingers are even less of a BB

Of greater interest was the Mackensen class which were laid down but never completed. The Mackensen class was the last class of German BCs from the WWI era though others were projected. The design initially called for seven ships, but three of them were redesigned as the replacement “Yorck Class. None were completed, after wartime shipbuilding priorities were redirected towards U-Boat construction

The design of the Mackensen class was a much improved version of the previous Derfflinger class. The most significant improvement was a new, more powerful 35 cm (14 in) gun, compared to the 30.5 cm (12.0 in) gun of the earlier ships. The Mackensen -class ships also featured more powerful engines that gave the ships a higher top speed and a significantly greater cruising range. The Mackensen design provided the basis for the subsequent Ersatz Yorck class, armed with 38 cm (15 in) main-battery guns.

The Mackensens represent a step in the direction of the fast BB concept, but in my opinion represent no greater advance to the Hood in that regard

1. Mackensen Class
Displacement :31000tons
Main armament: 8 x 13.8 in guns
Protection
Main belt: 100–300 mm (4-12 in)
Turrets 270 mm (11 in)
Deck 30 to 80 mm (1.2 to 3.1 in)
Many would argue that the german ship had superior armouring schemes and better distribution of armour. Im not convinced of that

2. Hood Class
The Hood class by comparison
Displacement :46000tons
Main armament: 8 x 15 in Mk I BL guns
Protection
Main belt: 152–305 mm (7-12 in)
Turrets 270-368 mm (11-15 in)
Deck 19 to 76 mm (075 to 3 in)

Mackenson was inferior to the Hood in all thicknesses except the deck armouring, and it was the deck armouring, or lack thereof that cause the loss of the Hood.

I don’t think the Mackensons have any greater association to the concept of a fast battleship over the Hood. What led to the failure of the hood was not her basic design, to me it was the failure of the RN to keep her modern in the interwar period. By 1941, the ship badly needed her main armament to be upgraded to be able to fire the new super propelled shells as had been done in the modernised warspites (and which enabled her to set the record for long range fire at 26000 yds)


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## Freebird (Jan 25, 2018)

Marcel said:


> No, the POW had problems with her guns and could not continue the fight even if they wanted to.



PoW had 7 of 10 guns functioning when she turned away and laid smoke.
Not ideal, but a concern for Bismarck



> . At the end of the day, the Royal Navy had the advantage anyway, 1 battlecruiser and 1 battleship versus 1 cruiser and 1 battleship.
> 
> I also think that Holland was not sure if the Germans were going to engage, a few months before Scharnhorst and Gneiseau had escaped without fighting. Also, a few hours before the battle radar contact was lost, forcing Holland to take the risk.



British also had heavy cruisers Norfolk and Suffolk


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## Shortround6 (Jan 25, 2018)

The British battlecruisers in WW I suffered from two problems, the often noted thin armor, and the cordite propellent that tended to explode in magazine fires. 
The German propellent tended to (but not always) burn a bit slower (helped by a large portion of it being in cartridge cases) which, while burning violently, didn't seem to blow the ships to pieces.

The middle series of British battlecruisers were handicapped by the use of large tube boilers which required more weight and larger boiler rooms (also more weight/larger hull) than small tube boilers of equivalent power. The extra weight had to made up somewhere and unfortunately it was in made up with less armor.


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## Ivan1GFP (Jan 25, 2018)

parsifal said:


> The Mackensens represent a step in the direction of the fast BB concept, but in my opinion represent no greater advance to the Hood in that regard
> 
> 1. Mackensen Class
> Displacement :31000tons
> ...



Hello Parsifal,
Thanks for taking the time to present some background history.

The Derfflinger class was exactly what I was thinking of regarding early fast battleship.
As for a comparison against the Hood, it is pretty ridiculous considering the difference in size, tonnage, and time of completion.
Hood was nearly twice her displacement and was not completed even by the end of the war.
Derfflinger fougnt in battles that affected the design of Hood. Naturally one would expect a ship completed 7-8 years later to be superior.
I believe Derfflinger's advance in armament was not so much the lack of amidships turrets as found on Konig class battleships but the elimination of wing turrets as found on Seydlitz and older ships. Amidships turrets are not such a horrible idea if there is space below decks not required by the larger machinery of a faster ship.

I figure Derfflinger should be compared with her contemporary German battleship and in this regard, she compares well.
German ships as you pointed out always tended to favour protection over main armament and she was no exception.

I have always discounted the Mackensen class because they were not completed by the end of the war.
In this regard, I suppose they were comparable to Hood though I don't remember how close Mackensen was.
Imagine though that Hood had NOT been completed and was broken up as Mackensen and sisters were.
Would she then also represent the great advance that you see her as now?
When comparing Hood against Mackensen, there is still the consideration that Hood is 50% bigger.

Regarding Hood's weakness in deck armour:
Admiral Holland certainly recognized that issue when he chose to close the distance as rapidly as possible to avoid the exposure.

There is always that element of chance and he didn't get the dice rolls.

- Ivan.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 25, 2018)

The vast majority of WW I battleships had main armament elevations of around 15 degrees (or less) it was only at the very end of the war and post war that the elevations were changed to around 30 degrees and then the new ships of the 30s went to around 40 degrees. Hood was caught in the change over, she got the 30 degrees of elevation but was too late to change the deck armor without a lot of reworking. 

Older British turrets were modified to give 30 degrees elevation.





Please note the "eyebrows" over the guns where the turret roof was cutaway and modified to allow the greater elevation. 
Newer turrets, like the Hood, had a higher turret roof to begin with. 

Obviously angle of fire affects range and angle of decent.

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## Peter Gunn (Jan 25, 2018)

Lot's of good stuff in here, most of which I agree with. I have never held that the Bismarck was such a supership, I think most of that was propaganda ( from both sides ) and agree that a worked up KGV was easily a match for it. I'd take a North Carolina _( she and Washington were in commission if just barely at the time of Operation Rheinübung )_ against her any day of the week.



> "Bismarck as I see it was never the toughest kid on the block much as popular literature makes her out to be. People who don't know any better equate size with power and that is why Bismarck and Hood were the "most powerful". I believe the reality was a bit different.
> She was basically a much enlarged and faster update of the Baden / Bayern class from the Great War."



Ivan - I totally agree.

Also, considering how many rounds it takes in a major sea battle to score a hit, I suppose any hit can be termed "lucky". I don't like the term myself, how is it considered "lucky" if I hit what I'm shooting at? I'm pretty sure the PoW was shooting at the Germans and vice versa so luck does not enter into it in my opinion.


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## Glider (Jan 25, 2018)

When I used the phrase 'Lucky Hit' I certainly didn't mean to detract from the skill shown by the Bismarck in hitting the Hood, but no one would have expected the Hood to explode and sink so fast, that was the luck.
I also agree that the RN tactics were hard to understand when you remember that the Battle of River Plate had so recently been fought. If the RN BB's had separated then the Bismarck would be in a difficult position as only one could have been kept under fire whilst the other had total freedom of tactical movement and almost practice like firing conditions. Damage would have been shared between the two BB's and the Bismarck under constant pressure switching targets and taking hits.

As the Battle started the Hood was under fire and turned to open fire with all her guns and that was when she was hit and lost. Had she survived that hit she would have been using all her guns and the POW could have continued to close the range and almost immediately the Bismarck would have had a tough decision. Continue firing at the Hood who by then would be trading broadsides, or switch to the POW who would be closing the range where she would be more accurate.

Its worth noting that the Bismarck under her rules of combat the _Rheinubung_ was forbidden to attack capital ships and the first that a German Officer in I think a rangefinder named Burkard von Mullenheim- Rechberg knew that he was facing BB's was when the Hood and POW opened fire first.

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## Shortround6 (Jan 25, 2018)

Naval gun fire is a bit like shooting at a Fitz luck target.






You need a bit of skill just to hit the scoring area, but once you are hitting in the scoring area the results are pure luck. Target is too far away to aim at the lines or intersections that give the highest score. Naval guns were fired with the idea of a certain percentage of rounds fired being "hits". Where the hits were on the ship was pure luck at long ranges. Granted a ship might _try _to fight at a range that optimized it's chances, long range if it's captain thought he had a better chance of going through deck armor than side armor, closer range if he thought the opposite. However the speed difference between the Hood, Bismark and Prince of Wales was so small that trying to control the range was going to be a very slow process. It might also have been determined by sea keeping ability and direction of wind/waves rather than trial run speed.

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## pbehn (Jan 25, 2018)

When I mentioned a "lucky hit" I wasn't referring to hitting the ship by luck but a hit that is out of proportion to what could be expected. Like the Hood being sunk in seconds by one shell or the Bismark being left without steering by one torpedo. Sods law dictates that you will get hit in a place or in a way you didn't think of causing damage and consequences that couldn't be imagined.


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## Ivan1GFP (Jan 25, 2018)

pbehn said:


> When I mentioned a "lucky hit" I wasn't referring to hitting the ship by luck but a hit that is out of proportion to what could be expected. Like the Hood being sunk in seconds by one shell or the Bismark being left without steering by one torpedo. Sods law dictates that you will get hit in a place or in a way you didn't think of causing damage and consequences that couldn't be imagined.



The military guys I worked with generally called this kind of thing the "Golden BB" as in Red Ryder BB gun.
Seems like there were a bunch of Golden BBs flying or swimming in that battle.
Hood gets killed while trying to close the range which was a pretty intelligent thing to try if only he had succeeded.
Bismarck gets winged by a non critical hit in her bow.
Of all the places for a Swordfish to land a torpedo, it has to hit the Bismarck's stern and put a rudder into a propeller.

This discussion is reminding me of a few discussions while working with a system for the Navy.
Even modern weapons apparently still fall in an elliptical pattern.

- Ivan.


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## pinehilljoe (Jan 25, 2018)

Hood was designed to counter the newer German Battlecruisers. The Mackensens were used as the basis for Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, just as Bismark used the Bayern Class.


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## pinehilljoe (Jan 25, 2018)

My favorite book on the Bismark chase is Ludovic Kennedy's Pursuit, its an exciting book.


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## Freebird (Jan 25, 2018)

Peter Gunn said:


> Lot's of good stuff in here, most of which I agree with. I have never held that the Bismarck was such a supership, I think most of that was propaganda ( from both sides ) and agree that a worked up KGV was easily a match for it. I'd take a North Carolina _( she and Washington were in commission if just barely at the time of Operation Rheinübung )_ against her any day of the week.



Peter, the North Carolinas were not fit for combat in 1941, due to a design flaw they couldn't make more than about 20 knots due to severe vibration.
It wasn't until early 1942 that the problem was reduced following experiments with multiple propeller designs and extensive trials, nevertheless strengthened bracing was required in some areas, and prolonged travel over 23 knots was discouraged





Peter Gunn said:


> Also, considering how many rounds it takes in a major sea battle to score a hit, I suppose any hit can be termed "lucky". I don't like the term myself, how is it considered "lucky" if I hit what I'm shooting at? I'm pretty sure the PoW was shooting at the Germans and vice versa so luck does not enter into it in my opinion.



The hit was lucky for plunging directly into a magazine or other sensitive area, and not into a less vital spot


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## Freebird (Jan 25, 2018)

Ivan1GFP said:


> Hello Parsifal,
> Thanks for taking the time to present some background history.
> 
> The Derfflinger class was exactly what I was thinking of regarding early fast battleship.
> ...



Hood was 5 knots faster and had 15" guns vs 12" on Derfflinger, so there is quite a difference




Ivan1GFP said:


> Regarding Hood's weakness in deck armour:
> Admiral Holland certainly recognized that issue when he chose to close the distance as rapidly as possible to avoid the exposure.
> 
> There is always that element of chance and he didn't get the dice rolls.
> ...



The supposed weakness of Hood's deck armour is perhaps largely hypothetical or irrelevant. Hood had 3" deck armour + 2-3" armour over magazine and machinery spaces. Bismarck had up to 4.7" deck armour, which is still nowhere near enough to stop a 15" she'll from plunging through. No battleship built ever had that much armour, even Iowa with 6" deck armour is going to be vulnerable to a 15" shell.


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## Peter Gunn (Jan 26, 2018)

I'm well aware of the North Carolina/Washington propeller issues, after all, the North Carolina didn't get the nickname "Showboat" for nothing, I simply stated my opinion that BB-55 and 56 were more than a match for Bismarck. In fact, if Tirpitz had ventured out of it's hidey hole in '42 I'll wager Washington would have put paid to her rather well.

I still don't believe in "Lucky" hits either, I realize all the permutations above regarding surface combat. Ship A is shooting at ship B and vice versa, they are not sending candy grams or flowers to each other and even if hit percentages are single digit ( I believe 3-4% at Jutland ) they're still _trying_ to hit each other. Dropping one into the enemy magazine is fortunate, but you're still trying to hit the guy, perhaps I'm in the minority on this so I'll just shut up.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 26, 2018)

The is a fair amount of skill needed to get a straddle at long range. The shells fired from the Washingtons guns took 46 seconds to reach 26,000yds. 
A 26kt ship will move just over 2000ft in that amount of time. So you are not aiming at the ship but where you estimate it to be in the future.
A lot of these battleships were doing good when all shells from a salvo landed in a area 300-400 yds across (it was somewhat elliptical) 
so the actual target area of a battleship (700-800ft long and side height plus deck width) was much smaller than the likely impact area. 
With a few shells going over and a few under even a very, very good "straddle" was only going to get 2-4 hits. Because of the changing conditions even if you got a good straddle it didn't mean the next salvo would also be a straddle. 

Please note that if you increase the range from Jutland type ranges the dispersion of the shells goes up with the square of the distance and that is just for target/impact area. throw in the time factor (a British 4 caliber radius shell took 24 seconds to reach 15,000yds and 48.7 seconds to reach 25,000yds) and the percentage of hits goes way down. Better fire control did help but there was always going to be some element of luck in getting early hits or early hits that changed things, the longest hits on record being the Warspite hitting the Giulio Cesare at 26,000yds after the Giulio Cesare had straddled the Warspite and the Warspite turned slightly to throw of the Italian gunnery. Other long range hit was Scharnhorst vs Glorious which may have been 400-500 yds further. 

As to luck, well the Italians put shells both over and under the Warspite in at least one salvo, bad luck one of the shells from that salvo didn't hit? 
Very good shooting on the Italians (withing 3-4 minutes of opening fire) part even though it didn't pay off. perhaps their patterns were larger ? They were on their cruisers (larger impact areas than some other navy's cruisers)


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## Shortround6 (Jan 26, 2018)

Found this.





Put an 800ft (266yd) ship 120ft wide in that pattern and see how many hits you might get or how many positions result in no hits.

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## pbehn (Jan 26, 2018)

SR was the Iowa stationary or under power?


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## Shortround6 (Jan 26, 2018)

I have no idea, Also the choice of a 16 shot pattern is a bit strange. 
The graphic is taken from an article about the use of the American battleships in the 1991 Iraq war.


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## pbehn (Jan 26, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> I have no idea, Also the choice of a 16 shot pattern is a bit strange.
> The graphic is taken from an article about the use of the American battleships in the 1991 Iraq war.


From memory it was static mainly because you cannot steam anywhere for very long without hitting land there, also they had to sweep for mines first I believe.


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## pinehilljoe (Jan 26, 2018)

Everytime I tour a battleship and I'm amazed they could hit moving targets at 5 to 10 miles range. Radar was the game changer. Washington stradled Kirishima on the first salvo at the Second Battle of Guadalcanal. Duke of York had the advantage at North Cape. At Suriago Straight the effect of radar was devasting


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## parsifal (Jan 26, 2018)

Ivan1GFP said:


> Hello Parsifal,
> Thanks for taking the time to present some background history.
> 
> The Derfflinger class was exactly what I was thinking of regarding early fast battleship.
> ...


hello ivan

The Derfflingers were ordered in the FY 1912-13 whilst the the Hood was ordered 1913-14. with only a year or two separating the two designs, it becomes immediately apparent just what a leap forward the hood represented. however to be fair the hood as a design underwent a number of design changes including some that arose out of the Jutland lessons. But in terms of timing there wasn't a lot of difference between the two classes. 


The Mackensons were full contemporaries of the hood, but they too would have been completely outclassed by the british ships.

Both the Mackensens and the hood classes were delayed for two reasons, firstly wartime priorities and secondly and especially in the case of the british, to take advantage in advances of naval technologies.

Holland wanted to close the range on the bismarck for two reasons. Firstly, and most importantly he wanted to get asclose aspossible,as quickly as possible, because he believed he had surprised the German TG,and did not want to let them get away. Secondly, at the longer ranges there was a much greater possibility of the hood suffering a deck penetration from plunging fire, and the hoods deck armouring and horizontal protection was known to be very weak. by comparison the hoods turret armour and her side plating was about the same as bismarcks If the range had been reduced and the hood not hit, the odds would have swung back in favour of Holland. he never got that chance. German gunnery was too good, her armament too powerful for there to ever be much chance for the hood.

Bismarck proved to be rather vulnerable in the finish. She took a lot to sink, but her guns were out of action after only about 30 mins of action some days later. If the tables had been turned and it had been Bismarck to receive the first hits, based on her performance in her last fight, I think the Bismarck would have been in a fair bit of trouble


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## Ivan1GFP (Jan 26, 2018)

Hello Parsifal,

I can't disagree with most of what you wrote. I just interpret things a little differently.
Even if the Hood and Dirt Flinger were both designed at the same time, they obviously were designed to different parameters.
One was an average sized ship of the type with typical armament for the period. The other was 50% larger than the biggest ship then afloat. One made it into service and the other for whatever reason, design modifications, lessons learned, etc. was on a rather long building program and never made it into the war. Hood was the biggest warship afloat when she was completed and remained so for quite some time.

I believe that even if the technologies were the same, the sheer size difference meant that the two ships were not comparable.
To me this is very much like a comparison between the Iowa class Battleship and the Alaska class Battlecruiser. Technology may be pretty similar, but size makes a serious difference in capabilities.

- Ivan.


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## Glider (Jan 27, 2018)

There has been one thing about this battle that this thread didn't mention. Much has been said quite correctly about the accuracy of the Bismarck's firing but we didn't mention that the first ship to hit the Hood was the Prinz Eugen, a quite remarkable achievement


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## Freebird (Jan 27, 2018)

Ivan1GFP said:


> Even if the Hood and *Dirt Flinger*
> 
> .


It's amazing what autocorrect can do.

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## parsifal (Jan 27, 2018)

Ivan1GFP said:


> Hello Parsifal,
> 
> I can't disagree with most of what you wrote. I just interpret things a little differently.
> Even if the Hood and Dirt Flinger were both designed at the same time, they obviously were designed to different parameters.
> ...


They were two different ships, built to different specifications, for sure, but they had the same basic role. They were scouting ships with capital ship armament, designed to run down enemy battleships and survive long enough to hold that enemy battle line in place. in 1913-1920 there were no treaty limits, Germany and Britain were building the best ships they could with the technology and resources available.

Whilst there were only a handful of yards that could handle a ship the size of the hood, I believe the germans had access to such ports. moreover the germans were aware British were designing and building the hood class, just as the british knew basically what the germans were building. This is what makes the Imperial fleets decisions about their new ships perplexing. They made similar mistakes 20 years later with their bismarck classes and even moreso in the way they went about designing and building carriers.

The alaskas were never considered ships for the gunline. they were the natural progression of US cruiser design, freed of all trety restrictions. Though they shared some similarity to the Battlecruiser concept they not that. Strangekly however their armouring was similar thickness to the hood, but the main battery much lighter. armour distribution was more modern than on the hood, with up to 4in over vitals in deck armour. Concistent with modern armouring, the Alaskas used the "all or nothing" system of armour distribution.

Just to show what a mistake the Alaskas were they were nearly as expensinsive as an iowa to build. The 12in guns were a new design and because only a few were made, they were very expensive to build....the most expensive guns in the US inventory....


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## Ivan1GFP (Jan 27, 2018)

freebird said:


> It's amazing what autocorrect can do.



Sorry, that was intentional. That is what the British called her.
Attached is a document with a lot more detail on Hood and Bismarck and some chronology.
I actually have not gone through he entire document. 
;-(

- Ivan.


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## Ivan1GFP (Jan 27, 2018)

parsifal said:


> They were two different ships, built to different specifications, for sure, but they had the same basic role. They were scouting ships with capital ship armament, designed to run down enemy battleships and survive long enough to hold that enemy battle line in place. in 1913-1920 there were no treaty limits, Germany and Britain were building the best ships they could with the technology and resources available.



This is an interesting argument because as you know and as supported by the article I just posted, the design of the Hood changed substantially from its initial concept especially after Jutland. Its initial design is not what actually commissioned, but more on that later.
As for knowing what the other side was up to, keep in mind that the Germans did not see the British as their natural enemy.

The Derfflinger was designed well before the war. It commissioned in 1914 a month after the war began.
As for knowing that the British were working on the Admiral class, that would be pretty hard considering that according to this article, the request for investigating the design that became the Hood did not even happen until 1915.

You also must know that the resources available to the Germans was not nearly equal to those available to the British.



parsifal said:


> Whilst there were only a handful of yards that could handle a ship the size of the hood, I believe the germans had access to such ports. moreover the germans were aware British were designing and building the hood class, just as the british knew basically what the germans were building. This is what makes the Imperial fleets decisions about their new ships perplexing. They made similar mistakes 20 years later with their bismarck classes and even moreso in the way they went about designing and building carriers.



First of all, the ports and facilities between the two nations was not equal. I believe that waterways (Kiel Canal?) needed to be dredged to allow a ship the size of Bismarck to pass. This was decades after the Great War, so Mackensen / Scharnhorst was probably as big as their infrastructure could support at the time.
Regarding size of Bismarck: With Washington Treaty limits at 35,000 tons, this was a pretty big stretch of the truth. When the limit escalated, obviously they were not going to be replacing her. King George V class had the same issue with being well under the "Treaty Limit" but even more so.
As history shows, the tiny little Nelson, KGV, and Queen Elizabeth classes and the even smaller and older ships were not so much a problem in the end. The big difference in the number of units in each navy was the worst problem for the Germans.

War was not supposed to come quite so early for the Germans. If it had been delayed another 5 years or more, perhaps Bismarck would have had more company. Perhaps Graf Zeppelin would have been finished and given the Germans some experience with aircraft carriers though I don't see how they could have built more very quickly. 
In the big scheme of things, a half dozen German battleships would not have made that much difference either



parsifal said:


> Just to show what a mistake the Alaskas were they were nearly as expensinsive as an iowa to build. The 12in guns were a new design and because only a few were made, they were very expensive to build....the most expensive guns in the US inventory....



Consider that only three ships were built along with a new design for a naval gun, that is not all that surprising.
Suppose that the post-war navy had settled on a ship between the size of Baltimore and Alaska armed with 12 inch guns as a standard platform? Maybe the 12 inch gun would not have been so expensive in quantity.

- Ivan.


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## Reluctant Poster (Oct 21, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> The British battlecruisers in WW I suffered from two problems, the often noted thin armor, and the cordite propellent that tended to explode in magazine fires.
> The German propellent tended to (but not always) burn a bit slower (helped by a large portion of it being in cartridge cases) which, while burning violently, didn't seem to blow the ships to pieces.
> 
> The middle series of British battlecruisers were handicapped by the use of large tube boilers which required more weight and larger boiler rooms (also more weight/larger hull) than small tube boilers of equivalent power. The extra weight had to made up somewhere and unfortunately it was in made up with less armor.


I would also add that the British shells were inferior, tending to break up before penetrating as well as being more susceptible to premature detonation. The British had made the decision to trade armor for a more powerful armament which unfortunately for them was negated by poor shell design . If the British started a crash program after Jutland that dramatically improved the performance of their shells. Jutland II would likely have been a disaster for the Germans.
It is interesting to note that while other navies lost of number of ships due to non combat related magazine explosions SMS Karlsruhe was the only German ship lost in that manner. The German educational system before WWI produced the worlds best chemists and metallurgists and it showed up in battle.

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## Reluctant Poster (Oct 21, 2018)

parsifal said:


> There were problems galore from the british perspective. You have one BB (the PoW) not worked up properly, with many of the onboard systems not functioning or breaking down during the battle. Unlike KM capital ships, where about 6 months was spent to train the crews and get them to work as an integrated team, the RN had a nasty habit of sending ships into action with crews not fully integrated. The crews were a good mix of old salts and new chumps, but the crews were not worked up to work as a team.
> 
> 
> As a consequence, the PoW could not be viewed as a ship ready for combat, much less a ship able to act as flagship in a Task Group. if the PoW had been the designated flagship it is unlikely the TG would even have been capable of getting into the fight, and if it did was not capable of excercising an effective C&C function on a sustained basis. The command system of the TG is not just the admiral, though he is important, it has to be the supporting executive staff as well, and the relative ‘newness” of the PoW staff meant this would have been a function they would have struggled with.
> ...


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## Reluctant Poster (Oct 21, 2018)

The Germans had the luxury of deciding when the Bismark would sail, therefore they could train to their hearts content. The Royal Navy and a lot more to deal with and was sending ships into action without fully trained crews because they had no other choice. Would you have sent the Hood out alone? Or would you just let Bismark run amuck.


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## fliger747 (Oct 21, 2018)

Note the photo above is Vanguard, interesting that GB's last Battleship re used some pretty ancient armament. POW actually made threee hits, the one mentioned for'd causing the fuel loss, one near the funnel aircraft catapult. Very minor damage from that one but it did disable the equipment used to launch the Arado seaplane. This was an issue when a decision was made toward the end to fly the Kriegs Tag Buch off when it was realized the ship was likely doomed. I imagine the pilot was somewhat disappointed... The third hit actually defeated the belt armor and caused flooding in I believe an evap compartment. 

Yes it was a lucky hit, much as the bomb that destroyed Arizona hit the black powder magazine for the charges used to launch the aircraft. Takes a lot of holes to sink a ship unless there are items aboard that can be touched off, on a warship the list is endless. It would be interesting to see what the RN fighting instructions were for Hood. Hood had a speed advantage over POW and would typically be in the lead. 

POW took a hit on the bridge wounding much of the bridge crew. The actor Esmond Knight was on the bridge and was wounded when this shell hit. He later played Capt Leach in "Sink the Bismarck". Leach probably did the right thing, shadow the Bismarck, backing up Suffolk and Norfolk till the fleet could be brought to bear. Bismarck was doomed if she couldn't shake her shadowers. She did trade a few more shots with Bismarks and made a turn around a fighting proposition that was not Bismarcks optimal choice.


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