# You are in charge of the Luftwaffe: July 1940



## wiking85 (Jan 19, 2013)

As the title says, you are in charge of the Luftwaffe right after the Fall of France, but before the Battle of Britain.
You will have no interference from anyone with your conduct of the air war against Britain; how do you fight the British? Let's say that you don't have to conduct the Battle of Britain if you don't want, but you have to take the fight to the British in July in some way and step it up. You have until January before the weather affects you ability to conduct operations over Britain and March until units begin transferring to other theaters. All offensive operations end by June 1st 1941. 

Here are some OOBs if you need:
Luftwaffe Order of Battle August 1940 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Luftwaffe Campaign Orders of Battle

How would you conduct the air war against the British Isles?


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## meatloaf109 (Jan 19, 2013)

Simple. Bomb the radar sites and the airfields. Don't get sidetracked on vengence attacks against London. Keep the pressure on the RAF.


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## stona (Jan 19, 2013)

I agree,keep the pressure on the RAF and dominate the Channel. The luftwaffe was historically successful over the Channel in 1940.

Tactically,fit drop tanks to the Bf 109s. The technology and capability were there.

Don't be sidetracked by nonsense about invasion. The clear strategic objective should be to defeat the RAF and force Britain to the negotiating table.

Steve


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## davebender (Jan 19, 2013)

Transfer most of Luftflotte 2 and Luftflotte 3 to Sicily. During summer 1940 that's enough muscle to completely eradicate British airpower and ships from the central Med.

7th Flieger Division will reinforce the Italian invasion of Malta.

The central Med should now be an Italian lake. Transfer 12 motorized / mechanized divisions to North Africa. Afrika Korps x 4.

Panzerarmee Afrika will drive east, seizing the entire Med coast all the way to the Turkish border.

Next step depends on success of German diplomacy. If Britain signs a peace treaty then Panzerarmee Afrika won't need to invade Iraq.

Panzerarmee Afrika gives Germany enough diplomatic clout in the Med that Greece and Yugoslavia can probably be neutralized by diplomacy in return for German guarantee of borders. This means Germany won't need to commit significant military forces to the Balkans.

With Britain and France no longer a threat Germany can take a tougher diplomatic stance towards Stalin's Soviet Union. Perhaps the Red Army should withdraw to July 1939 border before Germany decides to reinstate Brest-Litovsk treaty borders.


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## wiking85 (Jan 19, 2013)

davebender said:


> Transfer most of Luftflotte 2 and Luftflotte 3 to Sicily. During summer 1940 that's enough muscle to completely eradicate British airpower and ships from the central Med.
> 
> 7th Flieger Division will reinforce the Italian invasion of Malta.
> 
> ...



You just have the Luftwaffe to command and you have to stick to the British Isles as part of this scenario.
Also the Afrika Korps was as large as it could be, because supply was far too tenuous in Libya to allow for even the forces that were there historically.


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## michaelmaltby (Jan 19, 2013)

Radar sites were notoriously difficult to take out of action for very long ... Ju-87's are out of the question where ever you don't own the air ... so - as the USAAF did with the P-51, you must force the RAF into the air again and again - feints and diversions striking tactical targets - but you must gain air superiority and that means mostly fighters against fighters - and the German pilots have to defeat "the few". If even a few Me-109's carry bombs and the rest have drop tanks the British will be forced into the air to defend home airspace. Failure to meet the German challenge will discredit further the British military (after Dunkirk) and have serious consequences. Once air superiority has been achieved - air fields in shambles, reserves diminished, then and only then does the real bombing campaign begin ... and a push for peace talks. If the world sees the RAF fighters defeated in battle and the Germans seeking some kind of an Armitice, public opinion will be more sympathetic to the German side 

The FW-190 'tip-and-run' raids in the later years were annoying and nasty -- if the FW-190 had been available in 1940 it would have been the ideal tool.

Bodenplatte in 1940 makes more sense in 1940 than it does in 1945.

MM


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## wiking85 (Jan 19, 2013)

I'm surprised no one has suggested starting the Blitz in August and focusing on the major Western Ports like Liverpool:
Liverpool Blitz - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


> The Liverpool Blitz was the heavy and sustained bombing of the British city of Liverpool and its surrounding area, at the time mostly within the counties of Lancashire and Cheshire but commonly known as Merseyside, during the Second World War by the German Luftwaffe.
> 
> Liverpool, Bootle, and the Wirral were the most heavily bombed areas of the country outside of London,[1] due to their importance to the British war effort. The government was desperate to hide from the Germans just how much damage had been inflicted upon the docks, so reports on the bombing were kept low-key. Around 4,000 people were killed in the Merseyside area during the Blitz.[1] This death toll was second only to London, which suffered 30,000 deaths by the end of the war.
> 
> Liverpool, Bootle, and the Wallasey Pool were strategically very important locations during the Second World War. The large port on the River Mersey, on the North West coast of England, had for many years been the United Kingdom's main link with North America, and this would prove to be a key part in the British participation in the Battle of the Atlantic. As well as providing anchorage for naval ships from many nations, the Mersey's ports and dockers would handle over 90 per cent of all the war material brought into Britain from abroad with some 75 million tons passing through its 11 miles (18 km) of quays. *Liverpool was the eastern end of a Transatlantic chain of supplies from North America, without which Britain could not have pursued the war.*


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## davebender (Jan 19, 2013)

Why?

1940 RAF was armed to the teeth in the British Isles. Bombing British Isles will just hand Britain an easy victory and cost the Luftwaffe a couple thousand aircraft.


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## davebender (Jan 19, 2013)

That would work only if the German Navy had procured an adequate stockpile of aerial mines and a modern aerial torpedo. Won't work with historical German Navy ammunition stockpile of 1940.


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## stona (Jan 19, 2013)

davebender said:


> Why?
> 
> 1940 RAF was armed to the teeth in the British Isles. Bombing British Isles will just hand Britain an easy victory and cost the Luftwaffe a couple thousand aircraft.



The Luftwaffe came close in late August 1940 to defeating the RAF.
The original question was what would you do as commander of the Luftwaffe with a free hand to _conduct the air war against Britain_?
As my old teachers used to say before examination days, "always read the question" 
Cheers
Steve


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## wiking85 (Jan 19, 2013)

davebender said:


> Why?
> 
> 1940 RAF was armed to the teeth in the British Isles. Bombing British Isles will just hand Britain an easy victory and cost the Luftwaffe a couple thousand aircraft.



As the Luftwaffe commander you still have to follow the overall strategy of OKW, which in 1940 is to take the fight to Britain. Historically this was the framework that the Luftwaffe had to labor under, so attacking Britain proper to bring them to heel is the approved strategy that you are required to follow.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Blitz#British_ports
Also the night Blitz cost the Luftwaffe under 400 aircraft from October 1940 through May 1941. 
Fighting the Battle of Britain as the LW did historically cost them nearly 2000 aircraft, but you've got the chance to reorient the strategy.



davebender said:


> That would work only if the German Navy had procured an adequate stockpile of aerial mines and a modern aerial torpedo. Won't work with historical German Navy ammunition stockpile of 1940.


By August 1940 the LW had over 1500 mines and by 1941 there were some 5000 on hand. The big problem was the Germans using them too early and the resulting capture of a magnetic mine in November 1939. If they had waited until May 1940 it would have been devastating. 
Of course if the Germans had requested the Regio Aeronautica had sent over their naval torpedo units instead of strategic bombers, that would have helped significantly...


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 19, 2013)

stona said:


> The Luftwaffe came close in late August 1940 to defeating the RAF.
> The original question was what would you do as commander of the Luftwaffe with a free hand to _conduct the air war against Britain_?
> As my old teachers used to say before examination days, "always read the question"
> Cheers
> Steve



Yeah but you can conduct the air war against Britain wherever the British are. They were in North Africa were they not? It even said, you don't have to conduct the BoB. 

Maybe the question should have been more specific...


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## wiking85 (Jan 19, 2013)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Yeah but you can conduct the air war against Britain where the British are. They were in North Africa were they not. It even said, you don't have to conduct the BoB.
> 
> Maybe the question should have been more specific...


Alright, I changed the POD to reflect that the campaign is only directed against the British Isles until June 1st 1941.


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## vinnye (Jan 19, 2013)

The LW had tried to draw the RAF into an unequal battle over ther Channel by attacking shipping with bombers that had heavy fighter cover. I believe that the RAF were informed about the concentration of fighters and ordered not to engage - I may be wrong here and am open to correction.
This lead to the LW having to change its emphasis and try to destroy the radar stations and then the airfields - which came close to succeeding!


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## The Basket (Jan 19, 2013)

Do nothing.


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## wiking85 (Jan 19, 2013)

The Basket said:


> Do nothing.


Unilateral truce? What then?



vinnye said:


> The LW had tried to draw the RAF into an unequal battle over ther Channel by attacking shipping with bombers that had heavy fighter cover. I believe that the RAF were informed about the concentration of fighters and ordered not to engage - I may be wrong here and am open to correction.
> This lead to the LW having to change its emphasis and try to destroy the radar stations and then the airfields - which came close to succeeding!


It would come at a serious cost to keep those stations down, because they could only be knocked out with a direct hit. Also the Germans, after they knocked them down, were fooled by the continued broadcasting by the British to mimic the station being active, so they felt they couldn't knock them out for long. What is to prevent the LW from falling for that again?

But even if you succeed, what is the cost going to be to knock out the RAF airfields in South England? What about them being able to continue if they have to withdraw from some of them? What do you do when you succeed? Sea Lion? There is more to winning some tactical or operational victory if the invasion strategy is a non-starter. 
What can the Luftwaffe do to ensure Britain's surrender in the absence of Sea Lion?


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## The Basket (Jan 19, 2013)

Why not? Better than risking your air force on a folly.


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## davebender (Jan 19, 2013)

If that were true Britain would not have shipped an armored brigade from England to Egypt during August 1940.


Since I am forced to do this the hard way....
Daylight air attacks will take place only over the English Channel. Main air battle will be at night with the intent to close Port of London and Liverpool to British shipping.

Purchase Order #1.
Procure 100 Fw-187 long range fighter aircraft per month. As soon as we have two operational and full strength Jagdgeschwader the Luftwaffe can consider daylight bomber raids over England. Otherwise there will be no daylight attacks over England.

Purchase Order #2.
Procure 40 long range Fw-200 maritime attack aircraft per month rather then the historical 4. When the Luftwaffe have two operational and full strength Kampfgeschwader they will make a serious dent in British shipping. One Fw-200 KG will operate from Norway. The other Fw200 KG will operate from Cherbourg Peninsula.

Purchase Order #3.
Procure 5,000 aerial mines per month for use against British seaports. 

Purchase Order #4.
Procure 1,000 F5B aerial torpedoes per month for use against British shipping.

Purchase Order #5.
Procure 2,000 300 liter drop tanks per month. They will extend combat radius and loiter time of our aircraft.


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## wiking85 (Jan 19, 2013)

The Basket said:


> Why not? Better than risking your air force on a folly.


You have to fight the war, because the British are going to attack you if you do nothing and are going to draw in the US. They refuse to negotiate and are blockading you, so time is not on your side.


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## The Basket (Jan 19, 2013)

Time is on Germanys side in 1940. Undisputed masters of Europe. Britain is the one fearing invasion. 

The bombing campaign in 1940 was very poor and with the Soviets help the blockade is worthless. 

Hitler was no more powerful than June 1940. He was at his zenith.


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## davebender (Jan 19, 2013)

During 1940 the British main effort was to secure military cooperation with Soviet Union and USA. That's why time was not on Germany's side. 

1940 Britain must be coerced into quitting the war. Handing the RAF an easy victory over England will only encourage Britain to keep fighting.


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## bob44 (Jan 19, 2013)

[QUOTE

The clear strategic objective should be to defeat the RAF

Steve ][/QUOTE]

I agree with this. To win the war, Germany needs to defeat the British at home. Britain will never negotiate a peace. Bombing Britain is not going to win the war, Germany will need to invade and occupy. And they cannot do this without air superiority.


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## The Basket (Jan 19, 2013)

The war was lost in the USSR not in England. Stalin was Hitlers ally in this time frame. The Germans couldnt invade Britain so it was a bluff.even with air supremacy they simply didnt have the shipping to do it. Plus bad weather and its just gets worse. Raeder was very sure of that


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## davebender (Jan 19, 2013)

Any rationally led nation will negotiate for peace if the cost of peace is less then the cost of continuing the fight.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 19, 2013)

davebender said:


> Since I am forced to do this the hard way....
> Daylight air attacks will take place only over the English Channel. Main air battle will be at night with the intent to close Port of London and Liverpool to British shipping.



Good plan, since the vast majority of over seas shipping is coming into Liverpool closing London does very little. 



davebender said:


> Purchase Order #1.
> Procure 100 Fw-187 long range fighter aircraft per month. As soon as we have two operational and full strength Jagdgeschwader the Luftwaffe can consider daylight bomber raids over England. Otherwise there will be no daylight attacks over England.


There will be NO daylight attacks over England then. There is no production line for the Fw 187. It Generally takes 6 months to a year to go from the _5TH_ production model to the 500th. and it takes a number of months to go from the initial order to the 5th production model. You would be lucky to have ONE Jagdgeschwader operational until winter/spring. 



davebender said:


> Purchase Order #2.
> Procure 40 long range Fw-200 maritime attack aircraft per month rather then the historical 4. When the Luftwaffe have two operational and full strength Kampfgeschwader they will make a serious dent in British shipping. One Fw-200 KG will operate from Norway. The other Fw200 KG will operate from Cherbourg Peninsula.



Another _plan_ that will take months to see any real effect. While you don't need ten times the factory space to produce ten times the aircraft you are going to need more space and more workers. Of course you could always cancel the aircraft FW was working on at the time to _make_ space and labor available and/or delay their dispersal plan. 



davebender said:


> Purchase Order #3.
> Procure 5,000 aerial mines per month for use against British seaports.



You can order anything you want, doesn't mean you are going to get it. The LMA aerial mine had a 300kg charge and a total weight of 550kg. 750 metric tons of HE per month.

The LMB aerial mine had a charge of 705kg from a total weight of 960KG. 

The standard SC-250 contained 125-130kg of explosive. The SD-250 contained 80KG. The SC 500 contained 25--260kg of explosive and the SD-500 (5 models) went from 75 to 180 KG. 



davebender said:


> Purchase Order #4.
> Procure 1,000 F5B aerial torpedoes per month for use against British shipping.



Once again, You can order anything you want, doesn't mean you are going to get it.

A. the F5B torpedo didn't enter service until late 1941.
B. as an indication that even Hitler couldn't get this purchase order fulfilled. In April of 1942 Hitler ordered that development of aerial torpedoes be stepped up by all possible means. Luftwaffe takes over from the Navy and sets a goal of 3000 torpedoes a month by the end of 1943 (18 months away).highest production attained was 700-900 month in the first half of 1944 (almost two years after initial order). 



davebender said:


> Purchase Order #5.
> Procure 2,000 300 liter drop tanks per month. They will extend combat radius and loiter time of our aircraft.



Only one that makes sense except it is too little. You have arranged for 67 drop tanks per day for a 30 day month, Granted the planes cannot fly every day due to weather but you have hundreds of fighters available.


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## wiking85 (Jan 19, 2013)

So Shortround, what's your suggestion then?


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## The Basket (Jan 20, 2013)

The Battle of Britain was never planned so you asking for a plan.

Have you thought that there is no actual way the Germans can win in 1940? none at all?

There...the Germans cannot defeat the British in 1940.


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## stona (Jan 20, 2013)

The Basket said:


> The war was lost in the USSR not in England.



Several German commanders disagreed with this view in their post war debriefings/memoirs. 
What they meant was that by failing to remove Britain from the war and thus being forced to fight both the Western Alliance and the Soviet Union they lost the ability to force a decision anywhere.
I do not believe that the Germans had to invade to remove Britain from the war. I don't believe they had the means to do so and neither did they. I agree with Davebender that any rational government can be forced to the negotiationg table. Don't imagine that Churchill and his clique were irremoveable. The coalition was fragile and a major defeat in the BoB would certainly have entailed a change of leadership.There were plenty within the British elite who had wanted a deal with Germany before the war started,they would have been forced to accept one now on less favourable terms. 
The perception was that if they could have removed Britain from the war,having already removed France,the US would never have become involved in Europe and Germany would have had a free hand in the East and that they would have prevailed. Ultimately Britain was seen as a potential ally in the war against bolshevism.

Cheers

Steve


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## The Basket (Jan 20, 2013)

Forced to fight? The Germans invaded the USSR!


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## stona (Jan 20, 2013)

The Basket said:


> Forced to fight? The Germans invaded the USSR!



The objective of the nazis and the reason they went to war was expansion of the Reich in the East. The timing of the attack,initially on Poland (East) was based on economic grounds. This is not the topic of this thread but it had been expressed time and again,both by Hitler and other nazi ideologues from the earliest days of the movement.
Germany was always going to attack the Soviet Union. She was "forced to fight" on two fronts because she had failed to remove Britain from the conflict.
Cheers
Steve


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## DonL (Jan 20, 2013)

stona said:


> The objective of the nazis and the reason they went to war was expansion of the Reich in the East. The timing of the attack,initially on Poland (East) was based on economic grounds. This is not the topic of this thread but it had been expressed time and again,both by Hitler and other nazi ideologues from the earliest days of the movement.
> Germany was always going to attack the Soviet Union. She was "forced to fight" on two fronts because she had failed to remove Britain from the conflict.
> Cheers
> Steve



I agree, but to be fair it was only Hitlers and parts of the Nazis goal to go East and fight the UDSSR.
From a rational viewpoint there was no single reason to invade the UDSSR.

Also I agree to all your statements in this thread, very good summary.


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## Hop (Jan 20, 2013)

> As the title says, you are in charge of the Luftwaffe right after the Fall of France, but before the Battle of Britain.
> You will have no interference from anyone with your conduct of the air war against Britain; how do you fight the British?



With the advantage of post war hindsight: Begin the Blitz immediately. Forget about daylight attacks. Increase orders for bombers, bombs, and divert more trainees in to bomber schools so that by the end of 1940 the bomber effeort will be growing, not declining. Hope that constant bombing of cities will force the British to accept peace terms.

Without hindsight: pretty much what Goering did. Begin attacks on Britain, see what works. When losses get too great (as they will) switch to night attacks. 

There are no easy answers for the Luftwaffe. They simply didn't have enough aircraft or pilots, and the ones they did have didn't have any major advantages over the RAF's. They were always going to lose, no matter what decisions Goering took. They fought over the Channel, German losses were too high. They attacked airfields, German losses were too high. They started bombing London in daylight, German losses were too high. No matter what targets they attacked the RAF were always there in enough strength to inflict unacceptable losses. Only by bombing at night could the Luftwaffe carry out operations with sustainable loss levels.


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## stona (Jan 20, 2013)

DonL said:


> I agree, but to be fair it was only Hitlers and parts of the Nazis goal to go East and fight the UDSSR.
> From a rational viewpoint there was no single reason to invade the UDSSR.
> 
> Also I agree to all your statements in this thread, very good summary.



Thanks Don. My views are not exactly radical,I think it is a fairly mainstream view now that we have the benefit of 70 years of hindsight 

As regards attacking the USSR I would suggest that Germany's difficult economic situation,particularly regarding her supply of oil, led to the decision to strike East. The second phase of the invasion,leading to the Crimean campign and ultimately to Stalingrad was driven by economic not military considerations.
For example the Luftwaffe alone had drawn 25% of its oil supply in 1941 from reserves which had fallen from 613,000 tons in 1940 to a mere 254,000 tons.The KM's famous Channel dash consumed 20,000 tons of fuel and on April 1st 1942 the Navy's reserve was only 150,000 tons. Ciano noted in his diary on 8th February 1942 that the Italian Navy was practically immobilised by a lack of fuel. In January 1942 the Italian Navy received only 13,500 tons of the 40,000 tons promised.
I believe that part of the developing conflict between the nazi leadership (particularly Hitler) and the commanders of the Eastern Forces was caused by economic criteria,primarily the need for oil and to a lesser extent Manganese and other vital materials,overiding military and strategic political objectives.Few OKW and OKH officers expressed much doubt about the Caucasian campaign (Fall Blau) nor challenged its feasibility at the time,but they certainly did after things went wrong.
Moscow apparently could wait. It is barely mentioned in "War Directive No.41".

"All available forces are to be assembled for the main operation in the Southern sector,with the objective of destroying the enemy forward of the Don,in order to secure the oil regions of the Caucasus and the passes through the Caucasian range itself." 

Now of course we all know that it would end with the disaster at Stalingrad.

Apologies for the diversion,this doesn't have much to do with getting Britain out of the war in 1940 

Cheers
Steve


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## DonL (Jan 20, 2013)

> As regards attacking the USSR I would suggest that Germany's difficult economic situation,particularly regarding her supply of oil, led to the decision to strike East. The second phase of the invasion,leading to the Crimean campign and ultimately to Stalingrad was driven by economic not military considerations.
> For example the Luftwaffe alone had drawn 25% of its oil supply in 1941 from reserves which had fallen from 613,000 tons in 1940 to a mere 254,000 tons.The KM's famous Channel dash consumed 20,000 tons of fuel and on April 1st 1942 the Navy's reserve was only 150,000 tons. Ciano noted in his diary on 8th February 1942 that the Italian Navy was practically immobilised by a lack of fuel. In January 1942 the Italian Navy received only 13,500 tons of the 40,000 tons promised.
> I believe that part of the developing conflict between the nazi leadership (particularly Hitler) and the commanders of the Eastern Forces was caused by economic criteria,primarily the need for oil and to a lesser extent Manganese and other vital materials,overiding military and strategic political objectives.Few OKW and OKH officers expressed much doubt about the Caucasian campaign (Fall Blau) nor challenged its feasibility at the time,but they certainly did after things went wrong.
> Moscow apparently could wait.
> Now of course we all know that it would end with the disaster at Stalingrad.



I agree to most of this statement.
But there are two major issues.

1. The war at the East consumed 80-90% of all oil/fuel out of Rumanias oil fields and other sources, witout this war the reserves and stockpiles would be much higher for the LW, KM and even the italian naval force.
2. To my opinion a clear strategic focal point to Britain, Mediterranean and NA without any war at the East has much more benefits and to my opinion it is more possible to get oil out of such a campaign then out of Barbarossa.

I'm working on a major new thread/post to present my arguments.

But now back to topic and your post Nr.3 had pretty much summed it up for this topic.


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## wiking85 (Jan 20, 2013)

stona said:


> Thanks Don. My views are not exactly radical,I think it is a fairly mainstream view now that we have the benefit of 70 years of hindsight
> 
> As regards attacking the USSR I would suggest that Germany's difficult economic situation,particularly regarding her supply of oil, led to the decision to strike East. The second phase of the invasion,leading to the Crimean campign and ultimately to Stalingrad was driven by economic not military considerations.
> For example the Luftwaffe alone had drawn 25% of its oil supply in 1941 from reserves which had fallen from 613,000 tons in 1940 to a mere 254,000 tons.The KM's famous Channel dash consumed 20,000 tons of fuel and on April 1st 1942 the Navy's reserve was only 150,000 tons. Ciano noted in his diary on 8th February 1942 that the Italian Navy was practically immobilised by a lack of fuel. In January 1942 the Italian Navy received only 13,500 tons of the 40,000 tons promised.
> ...



Germany also captured some 2 million tons of fuel with the Fall of France, so I'm not sure when in 1940 your numbers are taken, nor your 1941 numbers; if anything I think the 600k figure is prior to the Battle of France and the 200k figure after Barbarossa, i.e. in December 1941.


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## stona (Jan 20, 2013)

wiking85 said:


> Germany also captured some 2 million tons of fuel with the Fall of France, so I'm not sure when in 1940 your numbers are taken, nor your 1941 numbers; if anything I think the 600k figure is prior to the Battle of France and the 200k figure after Barbarossa, i.e. in December 1941.



The Luftwaffe figures are from 2 seperate and contemporary German sources. I'm not typing the rather long names full of abbreviations here,so you can choose not to believe me if you wish.
The KM figures are from the minutes of a Fuehrer conference on naval affairs. I doubt that they were giving Hitler the wrong figures.
The Italian figures are from the same source with the comment,as indicated,from Ciano's diary.

The quantity of _aviation fuel_ captured in France was 250,000 tons according to Tugendhat and Hamilton. That was a nice windfall,representing 5 months domestic (German) production.
I don't have a figure for oil as a whole but Germany undoubtedly,as you say,came out of the French campaign with more oil than she went in with

Perspective is required. In the last full year of peace Germany consumed 7,500,000 tons of oil. About a third was produced domestically. The other 5,000,000 tons was imported mostly from Venezuela,Iran and the United States. With the exception of the 461,000 tons from Romania this supply was cut off in September 1939.
Germany imported only 2,075,000 tons in 1940,most came from Romania,1,000,000 tons. A significant 619,600 tons came from the USSR,but that would obviously soon stop. The rest came from other continental European countries.

It must be remembered that after the fall of France,Norway,Denmark,The Low Countries etc Germany had to provide oil to all the occupied territories as well as its own domestic and military consumption. This put a strain on her reserves,not helped in June 1940 when Mussolini declared war on Britain. Italy had virtually no domestic production and the supply from Albania was blocked. She too,like all the occupied territories from Scandinavia to the Spanish border was totally dependent on Germany for oil. 

In March 1941 (three months before Barbarossa) General der Infanterie Georg Thomas,head of the War Economy and Armaments Office warned both Goring and Keitel that Germany's reserve stocks of oil would be exhausted by late October 1941. The rest as they say,is history.

Cheers

Steve


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## Timppa (Jan 20, 2013)

Playing the evil Nazi / "Butcher" Harris here:
-Mining all the harbors with the help of the Kriegsmarine to cause famine.
- Using mustard gas/tabun/soman (if available) against cities.
- Using biological weapons, like tularemia, anthrax, brucellosis, and botulism against the population.


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## wiking85 (Jan 20, 2013)

Timppa said:


> Playing the evil Nazi / "Butcher" Harris here:
> -Mining all the harbors with the help of the Kriegsmarine to cause famine.
> - Using mustard gas/tabun/soman (if available) against cities.
> - Using biological weapons, like tularemia, anthrax, brucellosis, and botulism against the population.



Germany didn't have a bioweapons program except later in the war and was behind all of her enemies in that research. The USSR and Britain had very advanced and nasty programs; look up operation vegetation to see how the British would have responded to a German first use of gas on them. 
I agree that the mining strategy coupled with bombing ports works the best in a conventional sense and avoids the British using anthrax on Germany.


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## wiking85 (Jan 20, 2013)

stona said:


> The Luftwaffe figures are from 2 seperate and contemporary German sources. I'm not typing the rather long names full of abbreviations here,so you can choose not to believe me if you wish.
> The KM figures are from the minutes of a Fuehrer conference on naval affairs. I doubt that they were giving Hitler the wrong figures.
> The Italian figures are from the same source with the comment,as indicated,from Ciano's diary.
> 
> ...



Ah, I thought you were talking about overall fuel, not just Avgas. Yes, your numbers are right on target for Avgas. My 2 million figure was for all types of fuels, most of which were not usable for aircraft.


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## stona (Jan 20, 2013)

wiking85 said:


> Ah, I thought you were talking about overall fuel, not just Avgas. Yes, your numbers are right on target for Avgas. My 2 million figure was for all types of fuels, most of which were not usable for aircraft.



Sorry for the confusion. 2 million tons,in the context of a total peacetime (1938 ) consumption is still a lot of oil,which is why I agree that at the end of the French campaign the Germans were,temporarily,better off. I have,but can't seem to locate,the figures for German consumption of oil throughout this early period of the war and it is surprisingly low. I suppose distances were relatively short and a lot of horse power,literally,was used!
Cheers
Steve


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## stona (Jan 20, 2013)

Timppa said:


> Playing the evil Nazi / "Butcher" Harris here:



He was sometimes known as "Butch" which is quite different from "Butcher". Butch was a name applied to a forthright,tenacious or determined individual. Butcher is an inappropriate post war revision which I whole heartedly discourage.

He was also known as "Bert" which,for reasons I cannot explain, seems to have been given to people with the surname Harris at that time and of course "Bomber".

Cheers
Steve


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## davebender (Jan 20, 2013)

Defeating Britain isn't the objective. Germany must make continuing the war more expensive then signing a peace treaty. Then Britain will quit the war.


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## stona (Jan 20, 2013)

davebender said:


> Defeating Britain isn't the objective. Germany must make continuing the war more expensive then signing a peace treaty. Then Britain will quit the war.



The objective must be to force Britain out of the war. If not defeat in the sense of invasion,a victory march up the Mall etc a defeat of Fighter Command would have been neccessary. The Germans had to be in a position to force Britain to negotiate for peace. I have indicated earlier that this is not a far fetched objective. All Germany wanted in 1940 was a freehand in continental Europe. What Germany might have demanded later is anyone's guess.
Cheers
Steve


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## davebender (Jan 20, 2013)

That works both ways. Luftwaffe operations over England will proceed at glacial speed until they have the right tools for the job.


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## stona (Jan 20, 2013)

davebender said:


> That works both ways. Luftwaffe operations over England will proceed at glacial speed until they have the right tools for the job.



With the exception of drop tanks for the Bf 109 I believe that they had the right tools,or at least tools that could do the job.
I'm not a fan of mining,it offers a very poor return on investment. Torpedoes were notoriously ineffective and unreliable. During the German operation to clear the Crimea the Luftwaffe attacked a Soviet convoy which included a heavy cruiser and several destroyers. 

Von Richthofen's comments on the attack are revealing.

"Fliegerfuhrer Sud attempted [to sink it] with II./KG 26,the old Group from Luneburg. Absolutely pathetic.They fired off 29 torpedoes without any success!"

Doenitz said that about 1 in 3 torpedos launched from his U-Boats in the first half of the war failed to explode.

Use the Bf 109s,with their increased range and tactical flexibility,as escorts for the Ju 87s,medium bombers and more importantly the Bf 110s. Don't pretend that the Bf 110 is a competent fighter in this theatre. Use it as a fast bomber as units like Erpr.Gr.210 did with considerable success. Keep attacking the RAF's airfields and infrastructure. There's no harm in having a go at the Chain Home radar stations. Just because they are difficult targets doesn't make them impossible to disable as the Luftwaffe demonstrated. II Gruppe and the stabsschwarm of KG 51 attacked Ventnor on 12 August,putting the station out of action for three days. It's important to follow up these raids.
Without early warning it might be possible to catch and destroy the RAF where it was most vulnerable,on the ground. This again is something the Luftwaffe had done to enemy Air Forces before and would do again.

Cheers

Steve


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## davebender (Jan 20, 2013)

Why do you think that?

*Type UC II minelaying submarines*
German Type UC II submarine - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


> If judged only by the numbers of enemy vessels destroyed, the UC II is the most successful submarine design in history: According to modern estimates, they sank more than 1800 enemy vessels


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## stona (Jan 20, 2013)

Because for the tens of thousands of mines laid,by whatever means, and sometimes at considerable risk,very few ships were sunk by them. I concede that the primary purpose of sea mines is not to sink ships but to deny certain sea areas to an enemy but they are not terribly good at this either.
During the entire war German mines sank 534 merchant vessels (slightly less than 1.5m GRT) about 10 destroyers and the unfortunate cruiser HMS Neptune.
From a British perspective defensive mine laying was seen as a waste of time. The Northern Barrage in particular was described by CinC Home Fleet as "the least profitable voluntary major undertaking of the war". Defensive minefields placed after 1940 can now be seen to have been an unnecessary drain on materials and manpower which involved considerable effort.
Offensive minelaying, particularly that carried out by Coastal Forces ML's and MTB's as well as by aircraft proved more rewarding and the British deemed it a worthwhile effort.Coastal Forces laid 6,642 mines and claimed 134 casualties (Ratio: 1:48 ) Aircraft laid 55,646 mines and claimed 1,666 casualties (Ratio: 1:33). Unfortunately I don't think the Germans had the wherewithall to lay the sort of numbers of mines required in 1940.

I never questioned the efficacy of German U-Boats. I simply repeated a comment by Grossadmiral Doenitz about German torpedoes in the first half of the war which must surely encompass 1940. I suspect Doenitz knew more about the reliability of German torpedoes than we do.

Cheers

Steve


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## davebender (Jan 20, 2013)

I agree. WWI era British minefields in general were poorly planned. It didn't help that WWI era British mines were also generally of poor quality.

That doesn't mean mine warfare per se is a waste of time. Germany achieved excellent results with sea mines in both world wars. So did USA vs Japan during 1945 and 1915 Ottomans at the Dardanelles.

Aerial mines laid at night are especially effective for closing enemy seaports. Exactly what Germany was trying to accomplish at London and Liverpool during the fall of 1940 and Spring of 1941. The only catch is you need enough mines for the job.


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## wiking85 (Jan 20, 2013)

The mining advantage in early WW2 was the magnetic and acoustic triggers that were virtually impossible to sweep until the British captured examples and discovered the mechanisms vulnerabilities. 
The Magnetic Mine
They were much more effective than the contact mines of WW1, but weren't used in large numbers because of the lack of units trained to deploy them; those that were trained were more often than not used for bombing British cities instead. 
Hell, even KG100 was used as a naval bombing unit from April 1940 until August 1940 despite being Germany's sole pathfinder/strategic bomber unit!


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## The Basket (Jan 20, 2013)

Part of military strategy is to do nothing. Italy would have been far better off doing 'nothing.'

Again. ...Germany was not forced to go to war....it wanted too.


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## davebender (Jan 20, 2013)

That's only partially correct. Germany was not forced to invade Poland.

Germany had no choice about fighting Britain and France after those nations declared war.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 20, 2013)

You need _enough mines_, you need _restricted areas_, you also need your opponent to be a little lacking in mine _sweeping ability_. 

Go ahead and drop 20-30 mines per night and then have 6-12 minesweepers come out every morning and take most of them out. 

This is why there was a cat and mouse game with the different exploders/triggers/fuses, including counters that would let a certain number of ships pass before turning "on". 

The "1915 Ottomans at the Dardanelles"is a bit dubious as the minefields were covered by shore batteries which could shoot up the mine sweepers. Unless the Germans can hinder/limit the British ability to sweep mines it becomes a race. Can the Germans lay them faster than the British can sweep them. A big reason for laying at night was to keep the mine drops from being spotted by the British.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 20, 2013)

davebender said:


> That's only partially correct. Germany was not forced to invade Poland.
> 
> Germany had no choice about fighting Britain and France after those nations declared war.



Germany *HAD A CHOICE*. Don't invade Poland. 

Both France and Britain _SAID_ they would go to war if Germany attacked Poland. Hitler didn't believe them and it is France and Britain's fault?


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## stona (Jan 20, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> Can the Germans lay them faster than the British can sweep them. A big reason for laying at night was to keep the mine drops from being spotted by the British.



Which also leads to them being dropped in the wrong place,like a mud flat,precisely how the British got their hands on the latest magnetic mine. Furthermore the aircraft dropping the mines were spotted.







Cheers
Steve


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 20, 2013)

davebender said:


> That's only partially correct. Germany was not forced to invade Poland.
> 
> Germany had no choice about fighting Britain and France after those nations declared war.



So it was the fault of the British and France? Sorry your logic is flawed and faulty.

If Germany had not started a war of aggression against Poland, France and Britain would not have been forced into war against Germany. You got it backwards.


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## stona (Jan 20, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> Germany *HAD A CHOICE*. Don't invade Poland.



Only if the nazis hadn't come to power in 1933. The inevitable result of nazi economic policy was a war by 1940/41 at the latest. In some respects 1939 was earlier than they wanted.
There was a grim inevitability about the outbreak of WW2 from the mid 1930s onwards. This is not hindsight,it was a widely held view at the time.
Cheers
Steve


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## Njaco (Jan 20, 2013)

"Theres a hole in my bucket, dear Lizza, dear Lizza....."


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## bobbysocks (Jan 20, 2013)

i believe hitler thought that britian and france were merely giving lips service but when it came down to it they would back off. he had heard a lot of sabre rattling with just about every act he committed but no one took action. he probably thought this was going to be the status quo. remember russia also invaded poland too...they didnt declare war on russia.

ok i am in charge of the LW. i am going to agree with some of the earlier posts... and follow through with the strategy and dont change tactics to bombing cities until you have air supremecy and can do so with little or no opposition. let strategy and tactics rule your decisions not emotion or payback.

1. you have to do something with the radar. its the UK's ace in the hole. you must nulify it. it allows the RAF to reduce patrols and concentrate their resources where air supremecy is needed. some ways to do this are...using one or all in conjuntion.
A. try different methods of bombing those sites. even if you have to use an early unguided version of Mistels.
B. send in stripped down versions of your fastest T/E to deploy chaff to send false signals. use any and all countermeasures before and 
during operations.
C. try to develope electonic or other ways to jam the radar signal or make them otherwise useless
D. develope tactics to fool the radar into thinking small ( decoy ) formations are large ( maybe by towing unmanned gliders or some sort
of kite ) and reduce the signature of large ( attack formations ) to appear small.


2. you MUST have range for your fighters. Drop tanks are a must. I would look into constructing refueling fields as close as i can get to the coast. they would only have fuel at the time the fighters arrive. fighters would "top off" fuel tanks before going across the channel to give them the optimum time over the uk. 

3. unfetter your fighters. let them do what they do best...hunt and kill fighters. dont make them stick exclusively with the bombersbut give free reign to let at least a portion of them persue the attackers. use the bombers as bait to draw up the RAF. Have a portion of your fighters ( now with extended range ) fan out ( zemke style ) ahead and wreak as much havoc as they can on the RAF airflields. like was mentioned...use 110s as fast bombers, chaff spreaders, or in a defensive anti bomber anti-shipping role. 

4. Bomb every RAF facility, factory ( arms and aircraft), supply routes...bridges..railway...river...

5. no rest for the RAF. I would continue the attacks night and day hopefully rotating my pilots for rest. I would reduce my actual attacks certain days but increase feint attacks ...have ac fly to where the RAF would have to scramble and then turn around with out engaging. trade fuel for sleep.


this would do for starters...


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## davebender (Jan 20, 2013)

> drop 20-30 mines per night and then have 6-12 minesweepers come out every morning and take most of them out.


It's to be expected the port will need to be reseeded with mines on a weekly basis. As long as the seaport remains closed Germany wins.


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## The Basket (Jan 20, 2013)

Britain is an island. It has many ports. 

If I had plans to go to war with Britian I would consider that as a navy war. And I would build U-boot not bombers.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 20, 2013)

davebender said:


> It's to be expected the port will need to be reseeded with mines on a weekly basis. As long as the seaport remains closed Germany wins.



try nightly, or at best 3 times a week. The British only have to clear a path 500-1000ft wide. The Germans have to "reseed" with in that width or additional mines are useless. Just to make it interesting the British can also lay out a dogleg approach to the port given enough depth of water so there isn't a 2-3 mile long straightaway to drop the mines into. 

Sweeping techniques varied but even the magnetic mine was forseen and provided for including aircraft. 

Vickers Wellington DWI

This is not a difficult conversion and the more the Germans rely on mines instead of normal bombs the more effort goes into mine sweeping instead of other weapons.


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## wiking85 (Jan 20, 2013)

The Basket said:


> Britain is an island. It has many ports.
> 
> If I had plans to go to war with Britian I would consider that as a navy war. And I would build U-boot not bombers.


In 1940-1 Britain only imported via the Western Ports, because they were the only ones that were not interdicted. The Southern and Eastern ports were too dangerous to use. London, Britain's most active port pre-war, was totally shut down except for local coastal convoys supplying the city with coal. Something like 1 million+ residents had to leave the city to lessen the need for supply via shipping.

But as far as ports went there were only three that could handle sufficient volume coming from overseas AND had a rail link sufficient to handling increased imports:
by descending order of importance they were Liverpool, Glasgow, and Avonmouth/Bristol. Liverpool handled 85% of imports during 1940-1, while Glasgow took in about 12%, with Avonmouth/Bristol the remainder. Closing Liverpool in 1940 via mining or bombing would have been catastrophic to the war effort, as it was the central hub of war shipping, both imports and exports; if it were shut down Glasgow and Avonmouth together could not handle even a fraction of Liverpool's volume. Also the exporting of war materials to the Mediterranean (including Gibraltar), Africa, and the Middle East came from Liverpool. 
So if all of the effort to bomb London were instead directed at Liverpool for the period from August 1940-May 1941 Britain very well might have had to leave the war, even excluding mining efforts. Just bombing alone would have seriously disrupted importing and exporting materials, especially food. Liverpool's docks also had a serious flaw in that there was no direct link to the port with a rail line; instead all transport from the warehouses to the rail yards had to be done via truck or horse cart. That means if the roads leading from the warehouses on the docks to the rail lines are blocked by rubble and unexploded ordnance, then the goods are just stacking up on the docks/warehouses. Then they become very good targets for bombers and incendiaries.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 20, 2013)

The Basket said:


> Britain is an island. It has many ports.
> 
> If I had plans to go to war with Britian I would consider that as a navy war. And I would build U-boot not bombers.



Subs don't do well in shallow waters. Putting subs just off the ports is a sure way to change the U-boat loss ratio in favor of the British sooner than it did. Increased submarine construction would also be spotted earlier and the British would have spent more money/effort on anti-sub equipment. There was good reason that the U-boats stayed clear of land based air craft when they could.


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## davebender (Jan 20, 2013)

I agree.

Port at War ~ Liverpool 1939-1945 ~ Mersey Docks and Harbour Board
Page 24 of booklet. 
26 April to 10 May 1941.
Weekly cargo throughput declined from 181,562 to 35,026 tons.
80% reduction.

Historically Liverpool was heavily bombed for only a single week. Results were dramatic but Germany cannot drive Britain from the war by closing Liverpool for a couple weeks. Liverpool must remain at 20% capacity for several months. That means a sustained night bombing campaign with plenty of sea mines to complete the carnage.


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## michaelmaltby (Jan 20, 2013)

Viking makes a convincing case for a prolonged attack on Liverpool .... but I believe air superiority is the paramount objective.

Taking radar out on the Chanel _is_ critical, The more I think on it the more I am temped to believe that German paratroops and glider troops should have dropped on the sites in the dark taking them and personnel out with demolitions - attempting escape by E-boats by dawn. Losses would be very high naturally - _but higher than Crete the following year_ ..? not necessarily, and, if successful in the campaign to bring England to the peace table via air superiority - there would be no need for Crete at all. Peace Adolphicus would have been achieved ...  and Mr. Churchill and the Royal Family would be in exil in Canada.

In the summer of 1940 German comandos and paras were on a roll .... from Holland, to Denmark, to Norway to France they had managed to strike with cunning, preparation and surprise - and succeed. The radar would have been a worthy objective for them, IMHO 

MM


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## wiking85 (Jan 20, 2013)

michaelmaltby said:


> Viking makes a convincing case for a prolonged attack on Liverpool .... but I believe air superiority is the paramount objective.


Why is air superiority the paramount objective if Britain could be knocked out with much less cost (in terms of losses) by night bombing of ports like Liverpool?

Liverpool Blitz - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


> The Liverpool Blitz was the heavy and sustained bombing of the British city of Liverpool and its surrounding area, at the time mostly within the counties of Lancashire and Cheshire but commonly known as Merseyside, during the Second World War by the German Luftwaffe.
> 
> *Liverpool, Bootle, and the Wirral were the most heavily bombed areas of the country outside of London,[1] due to their importance to the British war effort. The government was desperate to hide from the Germans just how much damage had been inflicted upon the docks, so reports on the bombing were kept low-key.* Around 4,000 people were killed in the Merseyside area during the Blitz.[1] This death toll was second only to London, which suffered 30,000 deaths by the end of the war.
> 
> Liverpool, Bootle, and the Wallasey Pool were strategically very important locations during the Second World War. The large port on the River Mersey, on the North West coast of England, had for many years been the United Kingdom's main link with North America, and this would prove to be a key part in the British participation in the Battle of the Atlantic. *As well as providing anchorage for naval ships from many nations, the Mersey's ports and dockers would handle over 90 per cent of all the war material brought into Britain from abroad with some 75 million tons passing through its 11 miles (18 km) of quays. Liverpool was the eastern end of a Transatlantic chain of supplies from North America, without which Britain could not have pursued the war.*





> The May blitz
> May 1941 saw a renewal of the air assault on the region; a seven night bombardment that devastated the city.[3] The first bomb landed upon Wallasey, Wirral, at 22:15 on 1 May.[4] *The peak of the bombing occurred from 1 – 7 May 1941. It involved 681 Luftwaffe bombers; 2,315 high explosive bombs and 119 other explosives such as incendiaries were dropped. The raids put 69 out of 144 cargo berths out of action and inflicted 2,895 casualties[nb 1] and left many more homeless.*
> 
> One incident on 3 May involved the SS Malakand, a ship carrying munitions which was berthed in the Huskisson Dock. Although its eventual explosion is often attributed to a burning barrage balloon, this fire was put out. However flames from dock sheds that had been bombed spread to the Malakand, and this fire could not be contained. Despite valiant efforts by the fire brigade to extinguish the flames, they spread to the ship's cargo of 1,000 tons of bombs, which exploded a few hours after raid had ended. The entire Huskisson No. 2 dock and the surrounding quays were destroyed and four people were killed. The explosion was so violent that some pieces of the ship's hull plating were blasted into a park over 1 mile (1.6 km) away. It took seventy-four hours for the fire to burn out.[5]
> ...



Perhaps a firestorm could be created:
Firestorm - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


> As Sir Arthur Harris, the officer commanding RAF Bomber Command from 1942 through to the end of the war in Europe, pointed out in his post-war analysis, although many attempts were made to create deliberate man made firestorms during World War II, few attempts succeeded:
> 
> "The Germans again and again missed their chance, ...of setting our cities ablaze by a concentrated attack. Coventry was adequately concentrated in point of space, but all the same there was little concentration in point of time, and nothing like the fire tornadoes of Hamburg or Dresden ever occurred in this country. But they did do us enough damage to teach us the principle of concentration, the principle of starting so many fires at the same time that no fire fighting services, however efficiently and quickly they were reinforced by the fire brigades of other towns could get them under control."
> —Arthur Harris, [8]



Perhaps if the efforts against London were shifted to Liverpool?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Great_Fire_of_London


> Probably the most devastating strike occurred on the evening of 29 December, when German aircraft attacked the City of London itself with incendiary and high explosive bombs, causing a firestorm that has been called the Second Great Fire of London.[112] The first group to use these incendiaries was Kampfgruppe 100 which despatched 10 "pathfinder" He 111s. At 18:17, it released the first of 10,000 fire bombs, eventually amounting to 300 dropped per minute.[113] Altogether, 130 German bombers destroyed the historical centre of London.[114] Civilian casualties on London throughout the Blitz amounted to 28,556 killed, and 25,578 wounded. The Luftwaffe had dropped 18,291 short tons (16,593 t) of bombs.[115]
> 
> The "Second Great Fire of London" is a name used at the time to refer to one of the most destructive air raids of the London Blitz, over the night of 29/30 December 1940. Between 6 pm and 6 am the next day, more than 24,000 high explosive bombs and 100,000 incendiary bombs were dropped.[1] The raid and the subsequent fire destroyed many Livery Halls and gutted the medieval Great Hall of the City's Guildhall.
> 
> The largest continuous area of Blitz destruction anywhere in Britain occurred on this night, stretching south from Islington to the very edge of St Paul's Churchyard. The area destroyed was greater than that of the Great Fire of London in 1666. The raid was timed to coincide with a particularly low tide on the River Thames, making water difficult to obtain for fire fighting. Over 1500 fires were started, with many joining up to form three major conflagrations which in turn caused a firestorm that spread the flames further, towards St Paul's Cathedral.



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Blitz#British_ports


> *The Luftwaffe could inflict huge damage. With the German occupation of Western Europe, the intensification of submarine and air attack on Britain's sea communications was feared by the British. Such an event would have serious consequences on the future course of the war, should the Germans succeed. Liverpool and its port became an important destination for convoys heading through the Western Approaches from North America, bringing supplies and materials. The considerable rail network distributed to the rest of the country.[130] Operations against Liverpool were successful. Around 75% of the ports capacity was reduced at one point, and it lost 39,126 long tons (39,754 t) of shipping to air attacks, with another 111,601 long tons (113,392 t) damaged. Minister of Home Security Herbert Morrison was also worried morale was breaking, noting the defeatism expressed by civilians.[129] Other sources point to half of the 144 berths rendered unusable, while cargo unloading capability was reduced by 75%. Roads and railways were blocked and ships could not leave harbour. On 8 May 1941, 57 ships were destroyed, sunk or damaged amounting to 80,000 long tons (81,000 t). Around 66,000 houses were destroyed, 77,000 people made homeless, and 1,900 people killed and 1,450 seriously hurt on one night.[131] Operations against London up until May 1941 could also have a severe impact on morale. The populace of the port of Hull became 'trekkers', people who underwent a mass exodus from cities before, during, and after attacks.[129] However, the attacks failed to knock out or damage railways, or port facilities for long, even in the Port of London, a target of many attacks.[39] Port of London in particular was an important target, bringing in one-third of overseas trade.*[132]


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## Shortround6 (Jan 20, 2013)

It's 179 miles from London to Liverpool. Roughly an hours flying time each way, all over enemy territory. It could be done, it was done. But the losses would be higher than attacking London. The fuel burn would be higher and the bomb loads may (or may not) be smaller. 

The Luftwaffe also has to keep up enough diversionary attacks to keep much in the way of reinforcements from going to Liverpool, which would divert some of the effort. 

If Liverpool was hit bad enough, the British might have brought ships into the east coast ports, at least on a temporary basis. 

Hull suffered as it was: Hull Blitz - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Portsmouth was also bombed heavily but as a navel base had some defenses in place.

The Luftwaffe was bombing a number of places besides London. Concentrating on one city leaves too much of the rest of the country alone. 

The best and easiest thing would be the wide spread use of drop tanks as soon as possible. 

The Luftwaffe has to inflict enough damage on a wide spread part of the country in order to convince the people that they will pay a terrible price if they don't surrender ( and with no TV that means they have to inflict local damage, blowing up stuff 300 miles away isn't going to count) and they have to convince the people in power that they cannot defend the people/cities. Which means they have to at least contest control of the air. Leaving the RAF alone and going over to night bombing early leaves the RAF with little to do except figure out how to make mischief for the Luftwaffe. They will not sit idly by. Increased night patrols? day light raids against Luftwaffe air fields?


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## wiking85 (Jan 21, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> It's 179 miles from London to Liverpool. Roughly an hours flying time each way, all over enemy territory. It could be done, it was done. But the losses would be higher than attacking London. The fuel burn would be higher and the bomb loads may (or may not) be smaller.
> 
> The Luftwaffe also has to keep up enough diversionary attacks to keep much in the way of reinforcements from going to Liverpool, which would divert some of the effort.
> 
> ...



The Blitz took place at night; there was very little loss to British defenses at night and the accuracy was surprisingly high. Terror bombing did not work, but starving the people out would, especially in winter, which was very cold in 1940-1. Britain did not produce enough coal to satisfy all of its needs and it had problems moving it around via rail, so needed to use coastal convoys, which were disrupted frequently by German mining, coastal uboats, and S-boats. 
You're right that the RAF left to its own devices would get aggressive. But they have the same problem the Luftwaffe did during the day historically: short range for their fighters, which crossing the Channel eats in to, and very vulnerable, slow bombers:

Bristol Blenheim - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


> The Blenheim units operated throughout the battle, often taking heavy casualties, although they were never accorded the publicity of the fighter squadrons.
> There were also some missions which produced an almost 100% casualty rate amongst the Blenheims; one such operation was mounted on 13 August 1940 against a Luftwaffe airfield near Aalborg in north-eastern Denmark by 12 aircraft of 82 Squadron. One Blenheim returned early (the pilot was later charged and due to appear before a court martial but was killed on another operation), the other 11, which reached Denmark, were shot down, five by flak and six by Bf 109s.[13]


Remember that the Germans had their own radar systems which were actually better than the British ones in 1940-1; in fact British attempts to bomb Germany during the day were so badly slaughtered because of early radar warning that the British discontinued daylight bombing over Europe in 1939 with some exceptions.

Also what did the British get up to during the Blitz? Not much. They didn't have much in the way of bombers after the losses in France in 1940 as they had only saved their fighters by holding them back. British fighters on their own were pretty much useless on the offensive. Sure they might try and wrest back control of the Channel from the Germans, but that's a fight on equal ground, which the Germans had an advantage on, because of their greater experience and doctrine. Eventually the British would catchup, but it would be at a high cost and do nothing to stem the tide of German bombers crushing their imports.

Speaking of which, the British were already dangerously low in terms of fuels stocks, being down to 3 million tons as of August 1940; they used over 300k per month. The LW was pretty good at hitting British oil refineries and their associated storage tanks, which held much of the British reserves, at night thanks to radio guidance navigation. Britain again had three oil stations that fuel was imported via, with Liverpool again being the most important, especially as it had the majority of storage facilities for reserves once London was unable to import after the Fall of France (too dangerous for tankers). 
HyperWar: Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War (UK Civil Series)
Oil: a study of war-time policy and administration - Derek Joseph Payton-Smith - Google Books
According to the British official history of the economics of WW2, the ports and oil stations were seriously vulnerable to interdiction by sustained bombing and Germany missed out on a serious opportunity to cripple Britain by hitting its oil import stations; crushing Liverpool would have been enough, as the other facilities were a fraction of the potential imports that Liverpool processed.

British night fighters were a joke, at no time generating more than 1% of losses of sortees per month: the RAF determined that 4% was the magic number to make bombing too costly for an air force. In fact until April 1941 British night fighters kills were less than aircraft lost to accidents for the Luftwaffe! Even their use of Hurricane fighters as night fighters proved a disaster, as they kept crashing or being shot down by their own AAA, killing more Brits than Germans until April 1941. The British innovated the 'Wilde Sau' tactics the Germans would later rediscover in 1943, with similar problems: they had to operate below cloud cover to attack aircraft backlit by search lights; the Luftwaffe operated above this to avoid AAA fire, meaning often the only aircraft that British AAA saw were the British fighters, which they then targeted! In fact the British AAA claimed more British night fighters until Spring 1941 than they did Luftwaffe aircraft!

Using the historical Blitz as a heuristic, we can see that avoiding daylight combat except over the Channel generates very little trouble for the Germans and very much trouble for the British, who had based their entire defensive strategy on fighting a daylight fighter battle over their own soil. Their production was not geared toward night fighters and they would require many months and the import of lots of US machine tools to build up their night fighter forces; bombing the ports prevents those tools and American aluminum (Britain did not have her own domestic source) from reaching the factories that produced night fighters for Britain. In any event the British did not put together an effective night fighter defense until 1942-3. So Germany has nothing to lose from a night Blitz from August on and everything to gain IF their bombing is properly directed at the critical pressure point, which was Liverpool and to a lesser degree Glasgow and Avonmouth.


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## bob44 (Jan 21, 2013)

[QUOTEWhy is air superiority the paramount objective if Britain could be knocked out with much less cost (in terms of losses) by night bombing of ports like Liverpool?

][/QUOTE]

Bombing the enemy does not win wars. The infantry ultimately does. And for a succsessful invasion of Britain, Germany needs air superiority. Same as the Allies needed in Normandy.
All the bombing, alone, against Germany and Japan did not defeat either one. With perhaps the exception of Hiroshima/Nagasaki.
I do not believe the there ever could be a peace between Britain and Hitler at this point of the war. 
I remember reading something that Churchill said, his biggest concern during the war was the ships being sunk by Germany's u boats. Perhaps indicating far more involvement by the US then we realize at this time of the war?


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## Jabberwocky (Jan 21, 2013)

wiking85 said:


> In 1940-1 Britain only imported via the Western Ports, because they were the only ones that were not interdicted. The Southern and Eastern ports were too dangerous to use. London, Britain's most active port pre-war, was totally shut down except for local coastal convoys supplying the city with coal. Something like 1 million+ residents had to leave the city to lessen the need for supply via shipping.


 
London never closed completely as a port during WW2, not even during the BoB or the Blitz. At worst, London's tonnage fell to about 1/4 of pre-war levels, which would imply it still handled 10-12 million tons annually. 

Keep in mind though, that UK imports had fallen almost 50% by 1942 and exports were down by about 45%.


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## N4521U (Jan 21, 2013)

I vant Schpitfires!


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## stona (Jan 21, 2013)

The bombing and mining of British ports would be a long term effort,somewhat like the Battle of the Atlantic. It is an effort to starve Britain out of the war. Even completely closing a port like Liverpool for periods won't accomplish this overnight. The British had many other options,don't under estimate their capacity for utilising other facilities to keep some supplies coming in. 
You'd imagine that axis forces based in Sicily,60 miles from Malta,an island with only one major port,would have been able to starve her out but they didn't. Noone thought that more than 1/3 of a million troops could be retrieved from the beaches of Dunkirk either. 

Many nations have shown themselves able survive blockades (which this is a version of) for extended periods.

Time is something the Germans didn't have. I have already posted their oil situation three months prior to the launch of Barbarossa.To remove Britain from the war in time to proceed unhampered in the East they had to force terms on her by early 1941 at the latest,more practically before the winter weather closed in late 1940. The objective Dowding set himself and Fighter Command before the BoB was to avoid defeat until November 1940. It was by achieving this that he very probably cost Germany the war.

I still believe Germany's best chance was to defeat the RAF with all the consequences that would have had for Britain's coalition government.Another defeat on this scale after the humiliation of Dunkirk would have been disastrous,particularly for Churchill.Churchill's first famous broadcast was on 19th May 1940, I have no difficulty imagining his last,resignation broadcast,being in October.

I also believe that with a few relatively minor tweaks to the Luftwaffe's historical campaign that they could have done it. History is full of "what ifs" and "if onlys".

Cheers

Steve


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## wiking85 (Jan 21, 2013)

bob44 said:


> Bombing the enemy does not win wars. The infantry ultimately does. And for a succsessful invasion of Britain, Germany needs air superiority. Same as the Allies needed in Normandy.
> All the bombing, alone, against Germany and Japan did not defeat either one. With perhaps the exception of Hiroshima/Nagasaki.
> I do not believe the there ever could be a peace between Britain and Hitler at this point of the war.
> I remember reading something that Churchill said, his biggest concern during the war was the ships being sunk by Germany's u boats.


 
You know what also wins wars? Politics. If the Churchill government can be toppled by the public after the war effort falls apart due to the collapse of imports, then the war is won. Britain doesn't need to be conquered, just brought to the table. Just as you say that Churchill was most concerned about shipping, which really means imports, it works to cut those imports at the end destination, just as well as in transit; its just more efficient to strike the port where you can hit both the ships, the goods, and demoralize the locals.



Jabberwocky said:


> London never closed completely as a port during WW2, not even during the BoB or the Blitz. At worst, London's tonnage fell to about 1/4 of pre-war levels, which would imply it still handled 10-12 million tons annually.


 
London was not used for international shipping in 1940-1. It was deemed to dangerous and it therefore only took local coastal convoys shipping in coal and food that were loaded at Liverpool. Its shipping was not direct imports, so hitting Liverpool would put a serious dent in London imports.
Liverpool however was much more vulnerable to being bombed, because unlike London, it did not have a direct connection to the rail station with its port and warehouses. Blocking the streets with unexploded ordnance and rubble would prevent the goods being moved to the rails for distribution to the rest of the country. Then with more goods pilling up on the docks/warehouses, they can be destroyed, which forces the British to spend more of their dwindling financial resources rebuying those goods and using their shipping to reimport, making them vulnerable again to Uboats. 

Yes Britain was able to eventually work out its rationing system and rationalize imports by 1942; that took time to work out effectively and it was much more costly financially to do so. There is a reason that it primarily happened after Lend-Lease started, because then the British could import finished goods instead of raw materials without worrying about the cost. As it was Britain was pretty much broke in January 1941 from all of the spending they had to do for the war; in March 1941 they had to have the Belgians pay for their imports because they couldn't pay for it anymore. 




stona said:


> The bombing and mining of British ports would be a long term effort,somewhat like the Battle of the Atlantic. It is an effort to starve Britain out of the war. Even completely closing a port like Liverpool for periods won't accomplish this overnight. The British had many other options,don't under estimate their capacity for utilising other facilities to keep some supplies coming in.
> You'd imagine that axis forces based in Sicily,60 miles from Malta,an island with only one major port,would have been able to starve her out but they didn't. Noone thought that more than 1/3 of a million troops could be retrieved from the beaches of Dunkirk either.


Yes to a degree; Britain was at a very low point in her stocks by July-August 1940, so was especially vulnerable to a coordinated, sustained effort at a trade war. Closing Liverpool at this point (I mean in the sense of badly disrupting shipping like during the May Blitz), a time when Britain had to totally reorient its trade and imports to account for the fact that now southern and eastern ports were shut down to international imports, especially London, would virtually collapse British abilities to import. They were already badly disrupted as it was and the waiting time to offload goods and oil in Liverpool was up to 10 days for things like oil tankers. It was very vulnerable to disruption, which would have shut down the disorganized mess that it was in mid-1940. There were only two other ports that had the ability to import goods and they were even more disorganized that Liverpool with far less capacity to import: Glasgow and Avonmouth/Bristol.
I'm not pulling this out of thin air, this was the conclusion of the British themselves in their official history of the civilian side of the war:
Merchant shipping and the demands of war. (Book, 1955) [WorldCat.org]
Britain did NOT have the ability to shift their shipping. It was one of three ports and Liverpool alone far outstripped the remaining capacity of the other two together to handle the volume necessary to keep Britain in the war.

Remember too that the point isn't to totally collapse British society, which would take more than a year likely, but rather convince the public and politicians to cut a deal, which could happen much more quickly and IMHO be accomplished before May 1941. 




stona said:


> Many nations have shown themselves able survive blockades (which this is a version of) for extended periods.


Right, but Britain was very disorganized for one and the Germans never really attempted seriously to blockade Britain in WW2 until 1942. By then it was already far too late and the effort put in was absurdly small. Its also not about 'surviving', but about politics; if there is little hope of changing the negative dynamics developing, its very likely for the Churchill government will fall and whomever replaces him will cut a deal. That is all Germany needs/wants: convince Britain to deal. Hitler did not want to crush the British at this point, he wanted to deal and have a free hand to fight the USSR.



stona said:


> Time is something the Germans didn't have. I have already posted their oil situation three months prior to the launch of Barbarossa.To remove Britain from the war in time to proceed unhampered in the East they had to force terms on her by early 1941 at the latest,more practically before the winter weather closed in late 1940. The objective Dowding set himself and Fighter Command before the BoB was to avoid defeat until November 1940. It was by achieving this that he very probably cost Germany the war.


Depending on the dynamics, it can very easily be the British who don't have time. Germany at least has the Romanians and Soviets supplying them to help get around the import problem; the Spanish were also helping the Germans transship goods; the British are far more vulnerable to having their imports disrupted, because they didn't have domestic sources of supply. Everything for the British had to be brought in via overseas shipping, so if that shipping/importing could be disrupted even for a long enough period, politically it because impossible for the British to stay in the war. Dowding set November as an objective, because then they knew there would be no Sealion if the Germans were held off until then; here the situation is much different, because if the Germans had been bombing Liverpool at night from August with over 1000 bombers rotating in (not at once) night after night, by November Britain would be extremely desperate because they would have some very serious shortages of war materials. 

BTW I screwed up earlier when I said the British consumed 300k of fuel a month, that was actually the weekly consumption. So in August 1940 they had 10 weeks of fuel. Bombing would disrupt import of fuel, as Liverpool was the main oil station left to import that. So if the RAF and RN are short of fuel, they won't be able to fight and stop the Germans...which means a political deal is on the horizon. The British had no idea of German fuel issues, just that the Soviets were supplying the Germans. Also the Germans have the benefit of knowing if Britain is knocked out of the war, then they can start importing fuel from overseas again, offsetting whatever the fuel spent knocking out Britain.



stona said:


> I still believe Germany's best chance was to defeat the RAF with all the consequences that would have had for Britain's coalition government.Another defeat on this scale after the humiliation of Dunkirk would have been disastrous,particularly for Churchill.Churchill's first famous broadcast was on 19th May 1940, I have no difficulty imagining his last,resignation broadcast,being in October.


I disagree for all of the above reasons. I don't think Britain was beatable even if they had to withdraw from some of their southern airfields. The Radar stations were too hard to knock out and keep out of service, especially thanks to the mobile radar stations that could be brought in to plug the holes in coverage.



stona said:


> I also believe that with a few relatively minor tweaks to the Luftwaffe's historical campaign that they could have done it. History is full of "what ifs" and "if onlys".
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve


We agree that changes were needed and Britain was certainly beatable. I just think that the RAF was too strong to beat during the day, so it would cost far too much to achieve a 'victory' during the day, which IMHO was not possible even if the RAF had to abandon their forward airfields. Also the lack of sufficient long range escorts like the Fw187 made it just that much more difficult. Having a night campaign against British imports could cost Germany a fraction of the casualties and cut off the flood of British weapons at the source.


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## DonL (Jan 21, 2013)

> You'd imagine that axis forces based in Sicily,60 miles from Malta,an island with only one major port,would have been able to starve her out but they didn't. Noone thought that more than 1/3 of a million troops could be retrieved from the beaches of Dunkirk either.



Stona I didn't disagree to your post.
I'm with you with the concentration and the defeat of the RAF.

But your above statements are little "confusing" without the circumstances.
Malta was starved out, the people were rebelling against the government since April 1940 through starving and Malta could only be again provided (June 1940) since the X Fliegerkorps was alone at the whole Mediterranean area and the other units were at the East to fight Barbarossa. Without Barbarossa it is near fact that Malta would be starved out.
I think this major circumstances should be known.

Also Dunkirk had his circumstances!
Guderian was on the short leash, through totaly stupid orders from Hitler and the OKW, without this orders and a Guderian without a leash, there would be no successful Dunkirk for the british troops.
And Goering totaly over estimated the potential of the LW against ships (at this timeline), because this was a whole new duty for major parts of the LW and at the time from Dunkirk the LW wasn't that sophisticated at anti ship performance. It needs a little time to train a new duty.


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## wiking85 (Jan 21, 2013)

DonL said:


> Stona I didn't disagree to your post.
> I'm with you with the concentration and the defeat of the RAF.
> 
> But your above statements are little "confusing" without the circumstances.
> ...



Of course if Germany had waited to use their magnetic trigger naval mines until the Battle of France, they could have used a couple hundred mines and prevented the Dunkirk evacuation.


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## DonL (Jan 21, 2013)

That is not necessary.

Guderian had his panzer troops at starting position to do the final knock against the troops of Dunkirk, long before any fleet was organized or on the way from Britain. But Hitler took him on the short leash and forbid the last knock.

There were some very loud and heavy words at the german OKW, OKH and the Heeregruppe Rundstedt and Guderian smashed his commando to the feets of General Kleist, only Rundstedt could do an intervention and could convince Guderian to take his commando back.
Dunkirk was the first real crises between parts of the leading Generals of the Wehrmacht and the OKW/Hitler.


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## stona (Jan 21, 2013)

DonL said:


> Malta was starved out, the people were rebelling against the government since April 1940 through starving and Malta could only be again provided (June 1940) since the X Fliegerkorps was alone at the whole Mediterranean area and the other units were at the East to fight Barbarossa. Without Barbarossa it is near fact that Malta would be starved out.
> I think this major circumstances should be known.
> 
> Also Dunkirk had his circumstances!
> ...



Yes Don, but Malta was not subdued. It remained a thorn in the side of the Axis in the mediterranean and had a profound influence of the outcome in North Africa. This was a trend in the German execution of the war. 
When they had a chance to invade Malta they didn't because as you correctly say other campaigns were given priority. The Italians also proved a liability....again.
When they had a chance to drive on Moscow it was deemed more important to clear the Crimea and push into the Caucasus.
There are many similar examples,leaving Britain in the war when I think most agree there was a real chance of forcing her out may have been the biggest blunder of all. We may disagree about exactly how Britain might have been forced into some kind of compromise peace,but it was possible. 
The nazi political leadership and the OKH/OKW simply dropped the ball more often than their opponents. 

As for Dunkirk,you are absolutely right. I have no idea what the Germans were thinking and I don't think they did either. There was a staggering lack of coordination and muddled objectives which really let the British (and to a lesser extent the French) off the hook. When you've got your man down,kick him to death.

Goering always over estimated the abilities of the Luftwaffe,he was at least consistent in that 

Cheers

Steve


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## Hop (Jan 21, 2013)

> The Blitz took place at night; there was very little loss to British defenses at night



Certainly in the early stages of the Blitz, but by 1941 British night fighters were starting to overcome the problems with their radar. In the first week of May they shot down 38 German bombers over Britain. The long flights to Liverpool provided the RAF with plenty of opportunity for interception.



> and the accuracy was surprisingly high.



Accuracy was rarely good. In the first large scale attack on a British city in late August 1940, the Luftwaffe claimed to have dropped several hundred tons on Liverpool. British records describe scattered attacks on the West Midlands, with no idea that the Luftwaffe had been attacking Liverpool.

Accuracy was best in coastal cities close to the continent. The longer the flight, the lower the accuracy.



> Britain did not produce enough coal to satisfy all of its needs



Britain produced far more coal than it needed. France was the main export destination, when France surrendered Britain was left with more coal than was needed, and miners were allowed to join the armed forces.



> Speaking of which, the British were already dangerously low in terms of fuels stocks, being down to 3 million tons as of August 1940; they used over 300k per month



Stocks of fuel and lubricants in the UK in August 1940 were 6,226,000 tons (source, war cabinet papers, oil report August 1940). Consumption was around 900,000 tons per month, imports around 1,000,000 tons.

To put the figures in perspective, the UK had stocks of 3,400,000 tons of petrol and diesel in August 1940. In May 1940 the Germans had stocks of less than 1 million tons. By June the addition of captured French stocks had increased the German total to about 1.5 million tons. That was the best position Germany achieved during the war. By the end of 1941 they were down to around 800,000 tons.

In other words, British stocks were more than adequate. By November the Air Ministry was sounding apologetic about the amount of aviation fuel they had in storage, pointing out that it would be worth a lot of money on the civil market when the war ended.



> The LW was pretty good at hitting British oil refineries and their associated storage tanks, which held much of the British reserves, at night thanks to radio guidance navigation.



From the report, covering August:



> During the month bombs fell on ten oil installations and depots, but at one only, the Admiralty depot at Pembroke, was there serious damage.



September:



> Enemy activity against oil installations and depots
> increased during the month and substantial damage was done
> at some of these particularly in the Thames Estuary.
> 
> ...



October:



> The damage during October was much less than during September.


(the total was about 5,500 tons)

November:



> In spite of the intensive raids on several provincial towns
> which occurred during the month, damage to Civil oil installations
> was slight. There was, however, a serious fire at the Admiralty
> oil fuel depot at TURNCHAPEL, PLYMOUTH, on 28th November, which
> ...



December:



> During the month a considerable number of incendiary bombs fell on oil installations and depots, but the damage done was slight.


(total from the summaries about 5 - 6,000 tons lost)

Bombing was a game of move and counter move. The Germans bombed the ports closest to France, the British moved shipping to the west coast. It created disruption at first, then the position improved. The Germans targeted oil installations, the British built blast and splinter proof tanks. The Luftwaffe did little damage to oil supplies after that.

What effect did the large Luftwaffe attack on Liverpool in early May 1941 have on the UK oil position? From the May oil report:



> A few incidents occurred during the month, but fortunately
> they were of a relatively minor character. During the raid on
> Manchester, on the night of 7th/8th May, damage was sustained to
> various installations at Barton where 9 tanks were badly damaged
> ...



Imports for May were 1,052,400 tons, up from 966,300 tons in April.



> Using the historical Blitz as a heuristic, we can see that avoiding daylight combat except over the Channel generates very little trouble for the Germans and very much trouble for the British, who had based their entire defensive strategy on fighting a daylight fighter battle over their own soil.



This is true, but for every problem there is a counter. The fundamental fact is the Luftwaffe was incapable of delivering the tonnage required to force Britain to surrender. Hindsight would allow them to improve their showing, but still wouldn't be enough to deliver victory.



> Their production was not geared toward night fighters and they would require many months and the import of lots of US machine tools to build up their night fighter forces



The problem wasn't so much a lack of night fighters, it was getting their on board radar to work effectively.


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## wiking85 (Jan 21, 2013)

Hop said:


> Certainly in the early stages of the Blitz, but by 1941 British night fighters were starting to overcome the problems with their radar. In the first week of May they shot down 38 German bombers over Britain. The long flights to Liverpool provided the RAF with plenty of opportunity for interception.


38 Bombers was 1% of sortees in May. It also took from September 1939, when night operations over Britain started, until May 1941 to achieve a night fighter kill ratio of 1%. That was far below expansion rate for the LW.



Hop said:


> Accuracy was rarely good. In the first large scale attack on a British city in late August 1940, the Luftwaffe claimed to have dropped several hundred tons on Liverpool. British records describe scattered attacks on the West Midlands, with no idea that the Luftwaffe had been attacking Liverpool.


Not all raids were highly successful, but on balance Liverpool was hit pretty badly during the Blitz, which itself was a fraction of the bombing London received. They certainly learned after their first deep raid how to improve accuracy, especially when KG100 showed up, which wasn't until August 24th. It had been misused as a naval bombing unit in Norway until then, when it could have been leading pathfinding missions; once they did accuracy went up markedly.



Hop said:


> Accuracy was best in coastal cities close to the continent. The longer the flight, the lower the accuracy.


Sure, but radio navigation certainly helped once KG100 showed up. Conventry, a non-coastal city pretty far north of London was very accurately bombed. Manchester too.



Hop said:


> Britain produced far more coal than it needed. France was the main export destination, when France surrendered Britain was left with more coal than was needed, and miners were allowed to join the armed forces.


Sourcing on that? The UK Civil Series states that production was 18 million tons and Britain consumed 20 million, so needed to import 2 million tons of coal from abroad. 



Hop said:


> German radar was not better, there was also a shortage of sets and a lack of an integrated defence network.


It was more accurate than Chain Home sets. Germany lacked a command and control system like the Dowding system, which hampered efficiency, but the readings the German sets of 1940-1 gave were more accurate than the British Chain Home system. 



Hop said:


> Stocks of fuel and lubricants in the UK in August 1940 were 6,226,000 tons (source, war cabinet papers, oil report August 1940). Consumption was around 900,000 tons per month, imports around 1,000,000 tons.


How much of that was lubricants? Later you claim there were 3,400,000 tons of fuel, which is pretty close to my number. Imports were lower than 1 million in August 1940. They did rapidly climb to that number once shipping had be reorganized, but it took considerable effort and wasn't seriously hampered by German bombs until the problems in organization were worked out. 



Hop said:


> To put the figures in perspective, the UK had stocks of 3,400,000 tons of petrol and diesel in August 1940. In May 1940 the Germans had stocks of less than 1 million tons. By June the addition of captured French stocks had increased the German total to about 1.5 million tons. That was the best position Germany achieved during the war. By the end of 1941 they were down to around 800,000 tons.


Germany also had supply from domestic production, Russia, and Romania. Britain had to ship theirs in, as they were totally dependent on outside oil. There were three oil stations handling that import: Liverpool (Ellesmere, which supplied Stanlow), Glasgow, and Avonmouth. They were targetable in August 1940 especially when there was a ten day wait to unload at Ellesmere, which was a ripe target if KG100 had led a raid in August on Liverpool.



Hop said:


> What effect did the large Luftwaffe attack on Liverpool in early May 1941 have on the UK oil position? From the May oil report:


Oil imports would have been higher had the attacks not been launched, but that was a fraction of the pressure that could have and should have been brought to bear in August 1940. By May 1941 most of the organizational problems at the port had been worked out, but in August 1940 there was mass congestion and long wait times to unload, which a well led mass raid by LW pathfinders and sustained bombing could have turned into a mess.



Hop said:


> The problem wasn't so much a lack of night fighters, it was getting their on board radar to work effectively.


No it was both. The Beaufighter wasn't really available in numbers until 1941 and the Blenheim couldn't even catch up to the German bombers. Night fighter training was very minimal for most units being used (including the hurricane fighters switched from day duty), and only a few had specialized training. Part of the problem was lack of aircraft, lack of training, lack of proper aircraft, lack of experience, and lack of an effective AI radar.


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## stona (Jan 21, 2013)

The ability of the Luftwaffe to actually hit and destroy the docks of Liverpool is being over estimated.

In August 1940 there were raids on 9,10,17,28,29,30 and 31. Bombs dropped across the entire Liverpool area. On only two occassions were the docks or their facilities hit. On the 17th Queen's Dock was damaged and on 31st warehouses in Stone Street and Vandries Street were hit.

In September there were raids on 3/4/5/6/10/11/12/14/15/16/17/18/19/21/24/26/27 and 29. The docks or warehouses were damaged on the 14th by a nuisance raid,only one aircraft was reported. On the 21st warehouses at Alexandra docks were set ablaze. 
Now the Luftwaffe's luck changes. On the 24th Liverpool city centre and the docklands are hit. Parker Street, Clayton Square, Church Street, Great Howard Street and Love Lane recieve hits. The Stanley Tobacco Warehouse, Silcocks Cattle Foodmill and a Cotton Warehouse on Glegg Street are damaged in the raid. On the 26th Wapping, Kings, Queens, Coburg and Brunswick Docks are hit hard with many warehouses alongside them ablaze. The Dock Board and Cunard Buildings are damaged. On the 29th a grain warehouse at Duke's dock was destroyed.

October the luftwaffe visits on 7/10/11/12/13/14/16/17/18/19/21/25/26/27/29. On the 11th the North Docks were damaged,particularly Alexandra and Langton docks. The Luftwaffe then bombed just about everything except the docks until the 29th when Queen's Dock was set afire again.

The Luftwaffe has missed its chance. Anyone familiar with the sort of weather prevalent in the winter months in the British Isles will understand why. In November the Luftwaffe does attempt some raids on 1/4/8/12/18/22/28/29. Only on the night of the 28th are the docks hit. A large fire is started in sheds at Queen's Dock. Tragically an Auxiliary Fire Service post in the dock is hit,killing three firemen.

In December nothing happens until what scousers call "the Christmas blitz". On three successive nights on 20/21/22 December there were heavy raids.
On 20th Bombs fall across the docklands area. In the worst incident A parachute mine lands at Waterloo Dock killing 9 people. 
On 21st,in what is considered the heaviest raid of all,Canada, Gladstone, Brocklebank, Princes, Wapping, King's and Carriers Docks all bombed.
On 22nd Canada, Huskisson and Alexandra Docks bombed. 

These three nights caused more damage to Liverpool's docks than all the previous raids. It was too little and too late. The Luftwaffe failed to come back to finish the job.
The question is what would have happened if these raids had taken place months earlier and then been repeated over a significant period? I don't think that the Luftwaffe had the ability to do it. Would it have been worth a try? Absolutely yes.

Cheers

Steve


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## wiking85 (Jan 21, 2013)

stona said:


> The ability of the Luftwaffe to actually hit and destroy the docks of Liverpool is being over estimated.
> 
> In August 1940 there were raids on 9,10,17,28,29,30 and 31. Bombs dropped across the entire Liverpool area. On only two occassions were the docks or their facilities hit. On the 17th Queen's Dock was damaged and on 31st warehouses in Stone Street and Vandries Street were hit.
> 
> ...



I would also like to add that hitting the docks themselves wasn't necessary, as the streets needed to be clear to move the goods from the warehouses to the rail yards. Blocking the streets with rubble and unexploded ordnance disrupts the distribution of the goods inland and the more that it builds up the greater the chances it will be hit eventually when bombers pummel the area night after night.

Had the Luftwaffe started in July-August against Liverpool and focused their efforts against the Liverpool area instead of London, the weight of ordnance would have been several times greater than what they had historically. If we skip the battle of Britain then there are some additional 1000 bombers available (though perhaps 600-700 were level bombers that could reach Liverpool, i.e. He 111s and Ju88s.
Still 600 extra bombers over the historic numbers would be a huge number more.


Edit:
http://sturmvogel.orbat.com/LWOB.html
So after part of the BoB there were nearly serviceable 1000 LW bombers; to August 17th there had been 279 bombers, both dive and level, lost. Assuming 40% were dive bombers (112), that leaves us 167 level bombers lost, so that puts our bomber total at 1127 as of July first. I think during most of July there was the Kannalkampf, which was mostly Ju87s lost, so that shouldn't reflect on the level bomber totals too much. 

Assuming August 1st is the start date of when bomber operations commence, let's say that we have 1100 serviceable level bombers. Of these probably 20% are Do17s, which cannot reach Liverpool, so 220. We then have 880 bombers that are serviceable that can reach and hit Liverpool.

That number will increase as other aircraft are made serviceable (IIRC by August 1st serviceability was 58%, so we have hundreds of bombers being worked on to bring them up to combat operational status) and replacements arrive. 
So assuming that we are focusing on Liverpool we have 880 bombers use, which gives us 440 per day if they alternate raids. The He111 could reach Liverpool with 2 tons of bombs and the Ju88A1 and A5 could reach it with 1.5-2 tons IIRC. 
That would be about 800-880 tons per day depending on accuracy and serviceability. Let's say that's around 600-700 per day that is on target. Within one month the total would around 18,000 tons assuming we multiply 600 tons by 30 days.
Let's say that weather means that we have to delete some days from that total, like 10 days. That still leaves us 12,000 tons in one month.
Even adjusting for losses, which were a fraction of 1% in night missions prior to 1941, let's subtract another 2000tons.
So we have 10,000 tons of bombs on Liverpool (really the Merseyside area).
That's enormous. What effect would that have on operation of the docks, the morale of the workers, the clearance of the material from the docks, the offloading of ships, which cannot now que up in the Mersey river and at night have to disperse elsewhere to avoid providing a target to German bombers?


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## stona (Jan 21, 2013)

wiking85 said:


> I would also like to add that hitting the docks themselves wasn't necessary, as the streets needed to be clear to move the goods from the warehouses to the rail yards. Blocking the streets with rubble and unexploded ordnance disrupts the distribution of the goods inland and the more that it builds up the greater the chances it will be hit eventually when bombers pummel the area night after night.



Railways proved to be easily and quickly repairable throughout the war. Streets were cleared in hours. The major problem is pummeling the area night after night. Take a look at where the bombs fell on London in the first two weeks of the London Blitz,a time when the docks were explicitly the target. 
The Luftwaffe,over the 50+ raids between August and December 1940 achieved a decent concentration of bombing in the area of the docks only on four or five occassions. Bombs fell on Birkehhead that were aimed at the Liverpool docks!
That's what I meant when I doubted the Luftwaffe's ability to pull it off. It might have been interesting had it tried.
Cheers
Steve


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## Hop (Jan 21, 2013)

> 38 Bombers was 1% of sortees in May.



38 bombers was the total shot down in the first week of May, not the whole month. When the bombers were hitting short range targets like London they were hard to intercept. Deep penetration missions resulted in higher losses. 



> It also took from September 1939, when night operations over Britain started, until May 1941 to achieve a night fighter kill ratio of 1%. That was far below expansion rate for the LW.



The Luftwaffe bomber force was not expanding. Throughout the first few months of 1941 losses kept place with replacement aircraft, pilot training didn't keep up at all. According to Murray Luftwaffe bomber losses rose from 5.8% of total strength in January to 10% in April and 12% in May.



> Not all raids were highly successful, but on balance Liverpool was hit pretty badly during the Blitz, which itself was a fraction of the bombing London received. They certainly learned after their first deep raid how to improve accuracy, especially when KG100 showed up, which wasn't until August 24th. It had been misused as a naval bombing unit in Norway until then, when it could have been leading pathfinding missions; once they did accuracy went up markedly.



And went down pretty fast again once the beam countermeasures were in operation. 



> Conventry, a non-coastal city pretty far north of London was very accurately bombed. Manchester too.



They were area bombed. There wasn't much "accuracy" required. 



> Sourcing on that? The UK Civil Series states that production was 18 million tons and Britain consumed 20 million, so needed to import 2 million tons of coal from abroad.



Which volume of the civil series? The British War Economy, part of the civil series:



> In the short term, part of the British stockbuilding programme was sacrificed to meet French needs. But this hard decision was only a month old when France collapsed, and with her, the coal production problem. A ten percent increase in British production was no longer wanted; instead, demand was now expected to be no more than 215 million tons a year, or ten percent less than current production. Even feverish stockbuilding at home in the summer of 1940 could not prevent unemployment in the coalfields of South Wales and the north-east.



I don't understand where the 18 and 20 million ton figures come from, they are around 10% of the true total. 

The statistical summary presented to the war cabinet in October 1944 lists UK coal exports:

1938 - 35,900,000 tons
1939 - 36,900,000 
1940 - 19,600,000
1941 - 5,100,000
1942 - 3,600,000
1943 - 3,400,000

I also know from previous research that the first UK coal imports didn't begin until 1974. 



> It was more accurate than Chain Home sets.



And shorter range. It was no more accurate than Chain Home Low, the low altitude stations that were integrated with the existing Chain Home stations in 1940.



> How much of that was lubricants? Later you claim there were 3,400,000 tons of fuel, which is pretty close to my number.



353,000 tons of lubricants, 327,000 tons of crude, 2,162,000 tons of admiralty fuel oil.



> Britain had to ship theirs in, as they were totally dependent on outside oil. There were three oil stations handling that import: Liverpool (Ellesmere, which supplied Stanlow), Glasgow, and Avonmouth.



There were more than those 3. Swansea, for a start. Llandarcy was the first oil refinery in Britain, most of the oil for it came through Swansea docks. I know that as much as 200,000 tons of oil a month was unloaded at Swansea.



> They were targetable in August 1940 especially when there was a ten day wait to unload at Ellesmere, which was a ripe target if KG100 had led a raid in August on Liverpool.



I suggest you read what the USSBS has to say about attacks on German oil facilities. Bombing an oil plant, even with the massive force the RAF and USAAF were able to muster later in the war, usually resulted in short term reductions in output. To keep production down they had to bomb again and again and again. 

The Luftwaffe didn't have those sorts of resources. The RAF and USAAF dropped 190,000 tons on the German oil industry alone. Germany managed about 40,000 tons in total during the Blitz, and much of that was against London, an extremely short range target. 

Germany just didn't have the force available. If the Luftwaffe didn't bomb at all by day they could drop a significantly larger tonnage during the Blitz. But if they are going to targets further than London most of the time, that will reduce the tonnage. So we are left with the luftwaffe dropping about 40,000 tons over 9 months. It's just not enough. Nowhere near enough. The combined RAF and USAAF effort in 1944/45 was probably enough to defeat the Germans even without the land fighting, but that amounted to about 100,000 tons a month, 20 times the German effort against Britain, and delivered in a more concentrated and more accurate fashion.


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## stona (Jan 21, 2013)

Much of the above reinforces my suspicion that the Luftwaffe simply didn't have the means to achieve this objective.

I do believe that the Luftwaffe,with very minor and achievable technical adaptations and a different strategy employing different tactics could have defeated the RAF in 1940.

As Luftwaffe commander I like the idea of attempting to bomb Britain's ports into oblivion,I just think that this was far less likely to be achievable than the other option.

Cheers

Steve


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## wiking85 (Jan 21, 2013)

Hop said:


> 38 bombers was the total shot down in the first week of May, not the whole month. When the bombers were hitting short range targets like London they were hard to intercept. Deep penetration missions resulted in higher losses.


Source on that? I've looked at E.R. Hooton's numbers of losses during the Blitz and there is no reference to that number being only for the first week in May.
Also May is at the tail end of things; we are talking about in August through December when losses to night fighters could be counted on one hand.



Hop said:


> The Luftwaffe bomber force was not expanding. Throughout the first few months of 1941 losses kept place with replacement aircraft, pilot training didn't keep up at all. According to Murray Luftwaffe bomber losses rose from 5.8% of total strength in January to 10% in April and 12% in May.


In 1940 they were during the Blitz. The losses you cite are for all fronts, not just over Britain. By 1941 they were being diverted to the Mediterranean to fight there, which increased overall losses. Of course there were also naval battles in the North Sea and Atlantic which took their toll on the overall bomber strength, but the losses you are citing include Me110s, Ju87s, and other bombers used exclusively for naval operations and weren't included in the level bomber strength of units over Britain.

German losses over Britain during the Blitz are listed here:
The Blitz - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



Hop said:


> And went down pretty fast again once the beam countermeasures were in operation.


According to postwar British memoirs talking up their achievements; the reality was quite a bit different. Kenneth Wakefield has done a bunch of research into the LW pathfinder operations and contradicts the efficacy of British jamming and beam bending efforts. In fact those memoirs, including R.V. Jones', have incorrect information about the G- and Y-Verfahren systems. Jones claims that Y-Verfahren was jammed on its first attempt and abandoned by the Germans, while German records show that the system was being used months before Jones claims it was, not to mention that it was successfully used months after successfully.
The First Pathfinders - The Operational History of Kampfgruppe 100, 1939 - 41: Kenneth Wakefield: 9780947554200: Amazon.com: Books

The Blitz - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


> From the German point of view, March 1941 saw an improvement. The Luftwaffe flew 4,000 sorties that month, including 12 major and three heavy attacks. The electronic war intensified but the Luftwaffe flew major inland missions only on moonlit nights. Ports were easier to find and made better targets. To confuse the British, radio silence was observed until the bombs fell. X- and Y-Gerät beams were placed over false targets and switched only at the last minute. Rapid frequency changes were introduced for X-Gerät, whose wider band of frequencies and greater tactical flexibility ensured it remained effective at a time when British selective jamming was degrading the effectiveness of Y-Gerät.[122]


German counter-counter measures worked out, though there were moments in 1941 where the British were successful in their jamming. Degrading the effectiveness didn't work out all that well all that often, because the LW learned the tricks the British used to trick them, so could pick out the differences. Often the British were reduced to jamming the full band of frequencies, which also degraded the performance of their interception of German bombers.

Liverpool Blitz - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
It certainly didn't help Liverpool in May 1941 long after the British supposedly 'mastered' the German beams.



Hop said:


> They were area bombed. There wasn't much "accuracy" required.


Exactly, perfect accuracy isn't necessary.



Hop said:


> Which volume of the civil series? The British War Economy, part of the civil series:
> 
> 
> 
> ...


Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War, Behrens, C. B. A. London: HMSO and Longmans, Green, 1955
Coal, Court, William H. B. London: HMSO, 1951
I based my post on these.



Hop said:


> And shorter range. It was no more accurate than Chain Home Low, the low altitude stations that were integrated with the existing Chain Home stations in 1940.


The difference was that the German radar could detect aircraft at a greater altitude than Chain Home Low, which was only for the altitudes of 500 to 800 feet. Its great that they were more accurate, but they didn't have the range of the German units. Of course by 1942 the British radar started to outstrip the Germans, which by 1943 it was far ahead.



Hop said:


> 353,000 tons of lubricants, 327,000 tons of crude, 2,162,000 tons of admiralty fuel oil.


Oil: A Study of War-Time Policy and Administration, Payton-Smith, D. J. London: HMSO, 1971
This contradicts that.



Hop said:


> There were more than those 3. Swansea, for a start. Llandarcy was the first oil refinery in Britain, most of the oil for it came through Swansea docks. I know that as much as 200,000 tons of oil a month was unloaded at Swansea.


When was that though? Swansea wasn't importing in 1940. 
Oil: A Study of War-Time Policy and Administration, Payton-Smith, D. J. London: HMSO, 1971




Hop said:


> I suggest you read what the USSBS has to say about attacks on German oil facilities. Bombing an oil plant, even with the massive force the RAF and USAAF were able to muster later in the war, usually resulted in short term reductions in output. To keep production down they had to bomb again and again and again.


That's comparing apples to potatoes. Germany produced her own oil at several massive facilities that dwarfed the British refineries, but Britain wasn't refining oil on site anymore once France fell; instead they were importing refined fuels, so the vulnerable spots aren't the large refineries, but rather the storage facilities and the oil stations in the ports. That's a much more concentrated target that is easier to damage and requires far less tonnage than the German cracking facilities.



Hop said:


> The Luftwaffe didn't have those sorts of resources. The RAF and USAAF dropped 190,000 tons on the German oil industry alone. Germany managed about 40,000 tons in total during the Blitz, and much of that was against London, an extremely short range target.


Part of the German problem during the Blitz was that they lost so many bombers during the BoB. Then they had more siphoned off in February for other fronts, and in January/February winter limited operations. Its not that the Germans couldn't have delivered more tonnage, they just mismanaged their bombers and used them for other duties, which reduced the number of bombers operating over Britain. 



Hop said:


> Germany just didn't have the force available. If the Luftwaffe didn't bomb at all by day they could drop a significantly larger tonnage during the Blitz. But if they are going to targets further than London most of the time, that will reduce the tonnage. So we are left with the luftwaffe dropping about 40,000 tons over 9 months. It's just not enough. Nowhere near enough. The combined RAF and USAAF effort in 1944/45 was probably enough to defeat the Germans even without the land fighting, but that amounted to about 100,000 tons a month, 20 times the German effort against Britain, and delivered in a more concentrated and more accurate fashion.


Germany was producing her own oil and had massive refineries to do so, which greatly increased the number of targets to hit, which were well defended.
Britain was importing refined fuels, not crude, so weren't using their refineries; instead its the storage facilities which needed to be hit and there were far fewer of them, thus requiring much less bombing to damage. Of course they didn't have to hit all or even most of stocks, but rather take out some of the stored stocks and damage the import facilities. The Allied efforts against German oil production did have a pretty damaging effect in late 1944-5.


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## fastmongrel (Jan 21, 2013)

wiking85 said:


> Y
> 
> Liverpool however was much more vulnerable to being bombed, because unlike London, it did not have a direct connection to the rail station with its port and warehouses. Blocking the streets with unexploded ordnance and rubble would prevent the goods being moved to the rails for distribution to the rest of the country. Then with more goods pilling up on the docks/warehouses, they can be destroyed, which forces the British to spend more of their dwindling financial resources rebuying those goods and using their shipping to reimport, making them vulnerable again to Uboats.



Never been to Liverpool docks have you. Because if you had you would realise how wrong that statement was about the docks. Only one dock was not directly rail connected Albert Dock which was only used by coasters. Mersey Docks and Harbours board had 107 miles of its own rail lines and there were 12 direct rail connections to the LMS, LNER, GWR and CLC rail networks via tunnels and level crossings. The Port even had its own railway stations. I worked for a short time at Gladstone Docks and everywhere you went there were rails set into the ground.

Wapping Tunnel - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Waterloo Tunnel - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Subterranea Britannica: Sites:
Liverpool Riverside railway station - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Alexandra Dock railway station - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Canada Dock Branch - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## stona (Jan 21, 2013)

The Luftwaffe bomber force was certainly not expanding. In fact, largely due to the efforts of the RAF and the incompetence of the German aviation industry it was diminishing.
In May 1940 the Luftwaffe had 1,758 bombers.
In December 1940 it had only 1,393.
In June 1941 the number was 1,511.The Luftwaffe embarked on the invasion of the Soviet Union,whilst still fighting Britain,with fewer bombers (in fact fewer aircraft full stop) than it had at the beginning of the Battle of Britain.
Figures exclude dive bombers and are total strength.Serviceability is even more depressing for a Luftwaffe commander,and are from "Luftwaffe Strength and Serviceability Tables,August 1938-April 1945", from the German, AHB translation VII/107.
Cheers
Steve


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## wiking85 (Jan 21, 2013)

fastmongrel said:


> Never been to Liverpool docks have you. Because if you had you would realise how wrong that statement was about the docks. Only one dock was not directly rail connected Albert Dock which was only used by coasters. Mersey Docks and Harbours board had 107 miles of its own rail lines and there were 12 direct rail connections to the LMS, LNER, GWR and CLC rail networks via tunnels and level crossings. The Port even had its own railway stations. I worked for a short time at Gladstone Docks and everywhere you went there were rails set into the ground.
> 
> Wapping Tunnel - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> Waterloo Tunnel - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> ...



Where you there in 1940? My information about this comes from this:
HyperWar: Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War (UK Civil Series)

Looks like the information about discharging the docks to rail might well be wrong, but I hesitate to say that information based on the current situation was the same in 1940.



stona said:


> The Luftwaffe bomber force was certainly not expanding. In fact, largely due to the efforts of the RAF and the incompetence of the German aviation industry it was diminishing.
> In May 1940 the Luftwaffe had 1,758 bombers.
> In December 1940 it had only 1,393.
> In June 1941 the number was 1,511.The Luftwaffe embarked on the invasion of the Soviet Union,whilst still fighting Britain,with fewer bombers (in fact fewer aircraft full stop) than it had at the beginning of the Battle of Britain.
> ...


Let me clarify: the loss rate during the Blitz was below the expansion rate for the LW; losses during the Battle of France and the Battle of Britain badly tore into Luftwaffe units, so by December they still had not recovered from the dual losses of May-June 1940 and July-September 1940. They were expanding compared to their numbers at the end of the Battle of France, but losses in the Mediterranean during early 1941 until Barbarossa blunted this recovery and set them back a bit. 

So if we are discussing a scenario like I am suggesting, that there is no Battle of Britain, and the historical loss rates hold, then by 1941 the Luftwaffe would be expanding to its relative numbers at the start of this version of the Blitz. It may still be below the pre-Battle of France numbers, but to say they were expanding would be true, just that that expansion is relative to their post-BoF and pre-Blitz numbers. 

Avoiding the Battle of Britain save some 1800 aircraft, less those that would still be lost during the Channel Struggle and during the daylight hours during this version of the Blitz.


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## Tante Ju (Jan 21, 2013)

Hop said:


> And shorter range. It was no more accurate than Chain Home Low, the low altitude stations that were integrated with the existing Chain Home stations in 1940.



Chain Home was an obsolate and dead end and very much exploitable radar technology. CHL was based on the same simplistic technology - it has trouble even picking off single aircraft, let alone having any 'accuracy'. Both were inferior in accuracy to Freya and Würzburg systems, which were gun laying radars also.

But it was useful and practical as an early warning system. Its range come from a single factor, that it was mounted on a 360 ft high tower, and therefore, could see further beyond the horizon at altitude. It only worked near the sea because its lack of resulution, and was completely blind and useless over inland. Put a Freya or any other radar on a large hill and it will see further, and it will cover a complete 360 degree arc if needed - one of the reasons why you needed so many CH towers, since it could only see a fixed 100 degrees forward...

With all its limitations and primitiveness, CH was extremely useful for the RAF (as in better than nothing) and also the LW later in the war who had simply exploited this primitivess of the system and used it for their own ends with the own parasite radar installations; the latter used the signals the CH emssion and could detect British bombers taking off from 400 km..


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## fastmongrel (Jan 21, 2013)

wiking85 said:


> Where you there in 1940? My information about this comes from this:
> HyperWar: Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War (UK Civil Series)
> 
> Looks like the information about discharging the docks to rail might well be wrong, but I hesitate to say that information based on the current situation was the same in 1940.



I am not basing anything on the current situation as only one rail line connects to Seaforth and the North docks these days though things are getting better with the re-opening of the Olive Chord. I am basing my information on the Docks and its railway connections from contemperaneous evidence easily found on Google and the information supplied by family members and friends family members who worked on the docks at the time. Liverpool and Birkenhead Docks was heavily served by rail connections which is not surprising as Liverpool was the main port of the American trade.

You can walk along the Dock roads in Liverpool, Bootle and Birkenhead and still see the rail lines coming out of long blocked warehouse doors and gates and disappearing under modern concrete and tarmac. I havent read anything of the link you posted above but if it says that horse drawn wagons were used to get goods off the docks then I am afraid the information is wrong and wrong on a similar scale to Goerings intelligence on the RAF. Horse wagons were used on the docks but not in anything the number that would have been required if the rails had not been there.


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## Tante Ju (Jan 21, 2013)

stona said:


> The Luftwaffe bomber force was certainly not expanding. In fact, largely due to the efforts of the RAF and the incompetence of the German aviation industry it was diminishing.
> Cheers
> 
> Steve



It has very little to do with either, they simply retired a lot of Do 17s and other older stuff in the Winter and started replacing them en masse with modern Ju 88s. The RAF itself never managed to shot down enough German bombers to even slow down the bombing.


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## fastmongrel (Jan 21, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> Chain Home was an obsolate and dead end and very much exploitable radar technology. CHL was based on the same simplistic technology. Both were inferior in accuracy to Freya and Würzburg systems, which were gun laying radars also.



It was todays technology and was good enough. Freya and Wurtzburg were tommorows technology if the UK had tried to build a system as good as the German then there wouldnt have been a chain of any radars. Better to have something that works than something which is still in development in 1938 when Chain Home got going.


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## wiking85 (Jan 21, 2013)

fastmongrel said:


> I am not basing anything on the current situation as only one rail line connects to Seaforth and the North docks these days though things are getting better with the re-opening of the Olive Chord. I am basing my information on the Docks and its railway connections from contemperaneous evidence easily found on Google and the information supplied by family members and friends family members who worked on the docks at the time. Liverpool and Birkenhead Docks was heavily served by rail connections which is not surprising as Liverpool was the main port of the American trade.
> 
> You can walk along the Dock roads in Liverpool, Bootle and Birkenhead and still see the rail lines coming out of long blocked warehouse doors and gates and disappearing under modern concrete and tarmac. I havent read anything of the link you posted above but if it says that horse drawn wagons were used to get goods off the docks then I am afraid the information is wrong and wrong on a similar scale to Goerings intelligence on the RAF. Horse wagons were used on the docks but not in anything the number that would have been required if the rails had not been there.



No, it was that trucks were used mostly to clear the docks and bring imports to the rail yards. I could have misunderstood what they were trying to say; unfortunately I don't own a copy, because its hundreds of dollars and I'm going on memory from the time that I ordered it via interlibrary loan. Thanks for the information, I want to be accurate about what I'm posting.


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## Tante Ju (Jan 21, 2013)

fastmongrel said:


> It was todays technology and was good enough. Freya and Wurtzburg were tommorows technology if the UK had tried to build a system as good as the German then there wouldnt have been a chain of any radars. Better to have something that works than something which is still in development in 1938 when Chain Home got going.



I agree realisation was logical in UK. Radar was important since it shares more or less accuracate information on enemy aircraft dislocation.

IMHO German operational mistake early in the Battle was to operate bombers very much like as in France, in smaller units attacking many different targets. Correct employment as Battles show in September was mass attack, which could overload the rigid British defense. But even then mass tactics were not employed to enough strenght and skillfull British fighter guidance could ensure local superiority in numbers for British, and thus, acceptable results.

LW leadership had short time frame so objectives should have been decided early on, and use maximum effort to achieve, unlike in Battle. Either select FC infrastructure or sea lane import, then simply amass 500 bombers every day with 1000 fighters and batter the way through for annihilating attack on that target (and any fighter trying to intercept - RAF control cannot provide local air superiority this way).


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## wiking85 (Jan 21, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> I agree realisation was logical in UK. Radar was important since it shares more or less accuracate information on enemy aircraft dislocation.
> 
> IMHO German operational mistake early in the Battle was to operate bombers very much like as in France, in smaller units attacking many different targets. Correct employment as Battles show in September was mass attack, which could overload the rigid British defense. But even then mass tactics were not employed to enough strenght and skillfull British fighter guidance could ensure local superiority in numbers for British, and thus, acceptable results.
> 
> LW leadership had short time frame so objectives should have been decided early on, and use maximum effort to achieve, unlike in Battle. Either select FC infrastructure or sea lane import, then simply amass 500 bombers every day with 1000 fighters and batter the way through for annihilating attack on that target (and any fighter trying to intercept - RAF control cannot provide local air superiority this way).



The only problem was that the LW lacked 1000 fighters in August 1940. They had some 800, which meant that mustering the full force every day would see them burned out very quickly, both the pilots and machines. They needed rest in between, time to train, service, and upgrade equipment.


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## bobbysocks (Jan 21, 2013)

the LW may have lacked planes but there were more to be had. how many italian fighters flew in the BoB?? and how many more could you have pulled in? how many french fighter ac were laying around and how would they stack up to RAF fighters?


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## davebender (Jan 21, 2013)

If you create a major fire while attacking a seaport it will be an accident such as Rotterdam where a small number of German bombers hit a margarine warehouse.


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## fastmongrel (Jan 21, 2013)

Were there enough pilots to fly 1000 fighters and 500 bombers. Also were there enough airfields to cope with 1000 fighters and 500 bombers taking off in one raid.


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## wiking85 (Jan 21, 2013)

fastmongrel said:


> Were there enough pilots to fly 1000 fighters and 500 bombers.


No to the fighters, yes to the bombers; the Germans put their best crews in bombers, so fighters were shortchanged when it came to replacements.
Overy states that the British fighters pilots outnumbered the German fighter pilots:
http://www.amazon.com/dp/0393322971/?tag=dcglabs-20



fastmongrel said:


> Also were there enough airfields to cope with 1000 fighters and 500 bombers taking off in one raid.


Probably, as there were some 3000 aircraft stationed in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, and Denmark that operated against Britain in 1940.


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## Balljoint (Jan 21, 2013)

Change the fighter’s mission from protecting the bombers to destroying the RAF fighters, i.e. gain air superiority. Rather than flying S-curves in close proximity to the bombers, position the 109s at altitude above the bombers. The interceptors have the disadvantage of needing to avoid the defending fighters to get at the bombers. Take advantage of this to gain a favorable attrition ratio.


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## davebender (Jan 21, 2013)

That won't make much difference if Germany has only short range Me-109Es. RAF Fighter Command will wait until Me-109s turn for home short on fuel and then attack in large numbers. It worked historically and it's the smart thing for RAF Fighter Command to do.


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## bobbysocks (Jan 21, 2013)

that is why you have to have drop tanks and refueling stops. also a large second wave coming in as they first is leaving and starting to be jumped by the RAF would be a good mouse trap play if the RAF elected not to disengage.


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## parsifal (Jan 21, 2013)

Havent read all the posts oin this thread, but with regard to the "mediterranean" option. There was no agreement in place with italy to accept any German assistance in the TO until after October 1940. Duce was dead set against German assistance until then, and would not allow any significant reinforcement until his own offensives came unstuck. A few things forced him to change his mind.....the defeats in Greece, the defeats suffered at sea, and the defeats being suffered in Libya and Abysinnia and the general loss of initiative to the British were all factors affecting the italians. but until those events occurred Italy had determined it wanted to conduct what it referred to as "parrallel war" which means it wanted to minimise German intervention. 

Since the scenario ends in January, there would not be much opportunity to achieve much of a victory in the MTO

If the operations were to be extended, there might be some scope for better results, but such ramp up in the central basin would necessarily need to be slow. There simply was not the infrastructure in place....the airfields, the port capacity, the logisitic netwoork in Sicily to allow for a rapid or wholsesale redeployment of the entire LW to that TO. The first moves to transfer the X FG to Sicily began in November, by January only a portion of the entire Korps was able to move to theatre. There may be some opportunity for greater LW committment, but not much. 

Any wholseale redeployment threfore will take time, and this would be bound to evoke some response from Britain. If Britain itself was not being heavily attacked, britain could transfer more of its units the MTO for some kind of different war. I have no doubt that given the right amount of resources, the germans could clear the central basin. But provided the british reinforced Egyp and the middle east, what are the germans going to do then?

The MTO option is a bit of a pipe dream in the same way as Churchils idea of Southern Europe being a "soft underbelly" a couple of years later. Its ability to be used as a TO in which Britian could be defeated is overstated so many times. 

Germany's destiny was decided in the west and the east. Thats where she needed to fight and win. In the south, about all she could realistically hope to achieve was an avoidance of defeat. 

I see from the discussiion, that Germany apparently simply chose not to win over SE England. an interesting perspective, and one Ive seen many times before.... essentially "we let you guys (the british) win because we are such nice fellows". Or "we werent defeated, we did everything we needed to, got tired of the fighting and moved on".

Amazing how history can be re-written so easily and effortlessly.....


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## davebender (Jan 21, 2013)

Drop tanks help but it won't be enough. There's no substitute for internal fuel capacity once the fighting starts.


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## davebender (Jan 21, 2013)

If the war plan requires long range day fighter aircraft then build some.


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## Hop (Jan 21, 2013)

> Source on that? I've looked at E.R. Hooton's numbers of losses during the Blitz and there is no reference to that number being only for the first week in May.



The Night Blitz, John Ray



> According to postwar British memoirs talking up their achievements; the reality was quite a bit different.



The reality is the accuracy the Luftwaffe achieved in their raids on Britain. They could reliably hit a port city, anything else was a bit hit and miss. You only have to look at the bomb map of London to see how bombs were scattered over a vast area. According to Hooton 18% of assigned crews failed to find Coventry, despite the massive fires lighting up the sky for miles around.



> Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War, Behrens, C. B. A. London: HMSO and Longmans, Green, 1955
> Coal, Court, William H. B. London: HMSO, 1951
> I based my post on these.



What exactly do they say? I can't believe any book would make the claim Britain was importing coal, and that consumption was about 20 million tons a year. Can we please have the quotes from the books that led you to that conclusion? 



> The difference was that the German radar could detect aircraft at a greater altitude than Chain Home Low, which was only for the altitudes of 500 to 800 feet. Its great that they were more accurate, but they didn't have the range of the German units.



The mistake is in thinking British radar = Chain Home. That was just part of it. Chain Home was an early, long range radar chain. It was supplemented with other radars.



> Oil: A Study of War-Time Policy and Administration, Payton-Smith, D. J. London: HMSO, 1971
> This contradicts that.



What exactly does it say? I have given you exact figures, broken down, from the War Cabinet.



> When was that though? Swansea wasn't importing in 1940.
> Oil: A Study of War-Time Policy and Administration, Payton-Smith, D. J. London: HMSO, 1971



Swansea was importing oil for Llandarcy from the 1920s until the Pembroke oil terminals took over in the 60s or 70s.

The use of Oil: A Study of War-Time Policy and Administration as a reference for saying Swansea wasn't being used for oil imports is odd. I don't have the book, but a Google search of it returns the following snippet:



> For example, in the months after the fall of France, the railway lines out of South Wales were blocked by the trucks loaded with coal that could no longer be exported to the Continent. Consequently the oil port of Swansea with its five ocean tanker beths, which had received 46,000 tons of oil a week in June when its storage had been nearly empty, could



Another snippet from the same book:



> Early in September there was heavy loss at Llandarcy in a fire which temporarily closed the oil port of Swansea to tankers



So Swansea was definitely being used for oil imports in 1940, on quite a large scale. Can you quote the parts of the book that made you believe it wasn't?



> That's comparing apples to potatoes. Germany produced her own oil at several massive facilities that dwarfed the British refineries, but Britain wasn't refining oil on site anymore once France fell; instead they were importing refined fuels,



Can you please provide a quote for this claim. Not simply a reference to a book, but what the book actually says. 

A war cabinet report from November 1940 gave the following production figures for 100 octane fuels from UK refineries:

Heysham - 150,000 tons
Billingham - 15,000 tons
Stanlow - 55,000 tons

It would have made no sense whatsoever to abandon refining. Refineries were the big bottleneck for fuel production during the war. 



> That's comparing apples to potatoes. Germany produced her own oil at several massive facilities that dwarfed the British refineries, but Britain wasn't refining oil on site anymore once France fell; instead they were importing refined fuels, so the vulnerable spots aren't the large refineries, but rather the storage facilities and the oil stations in the ports. That's a much more concentrated target that is easier to damage and requires far less tonnage than the German cracking facilities.



Hardly. Refineries have very specialised equipment that can be very difficult to replace. Imports are much, much easier to route to different ports etc, hence the provision of emergency off loading ports (like Port Talbot) as a contingency.



> Chain Home was an obsolate and dead end and very much exploitable radar technology. CHL was based on the same simplistic technology - it has trouble even picking off single aircraft, let alone having any 'accuracy'.



No, Chain Home Low had nothing to do with Chain Home. CHL was based on a gun laying radar produced by a different air ministry team. 



> But it was useful and practical as an early warning system. Its range come from a single factor, that it was mounted on a 360 ft high tower, and therefore, could see further beyond the horizon at altitude.



And power. Freya had a peak power output of 20 kw, CH 350 kw.


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## tyrodtom (Jan 21, 2013)

davebender said:


> Drop tanks help but it won't be enough. There's no substitute for internal fuel capacity once the fighting starts.


 The Bf109E's internal fuel load was 400L or 88 gals, when they eventually fitted a drop tank to the late E models it was 300L or 66 gals, that increased the range 75%. You use the fuel from the drop tanks to the British coast, or until combat if possibly. Then internal fuel for combat and RTB.

Not rocket science but SOP for drop tanks. And something that could be done with just a few months preplanning, instead of several years of preplanning that your magical FW187 would require.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 21, 2013)

Perhaps we need an English to English translation? 

I don't know what country Viking85 is from but in English railway terminology "trucks" are freight cars, usually with 2 fixed (non-pivoting) axles. 

Likewise the term "wagon" was often used to describe the same thing. 






or

The Battle of Cambrai | Imperial War Museums

in the caption "British Mark IV tanks are being loaded onto railway trucks"


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## wiking85 (Jan 21, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> Perhaps we need an English to English translation?
> 
> I don't know what country Viking85 is from but in English railway terminology "trucks" are freight cars, usually with 2 fixed (non-pivoting) axles.
> 
> ...



Someone already corrected me and thanks for being dickish about it.

Edit:
I misinterpreted your post, sorry.


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## nuuumannn (Jan 21, 2013)

> They could reliably hit a port city, anything else was a bit hit and miss. You only have to look at the bomb map of London to see how bombs were scattered over a vast area. According to Hooton 18% of assigned crews failed to find Coventry, despite the massive fires lighting up the sky for miles around.



Unaided, yes - but the Luftwaffe had the potentially the most accurate bombing force in the world at that time; the key was its radio navigation aids, Knickebein (which had been effectively countered by late 1940) and X-Gerat and Y-Gerat, both of which were, at the time of the Coventry raid carried by aircraft of KG 100 as 'pathfinders'. British scientists calculated that the 'beams' enabled the Germans accuracy down to 400 yards based on their research into the frequencies of the radio waves being transmitted from the German ground stations. These were located in France and Norway and comprised purpose built radar antennae called Wotan I and II for X and Y Gerat respectively. X-Gerat was first employed against Warsaw in September 1939. Clearly its potential was wasted attacking cities.

The fact that German bombers were not always accurate overall in their bombing is not because they did not have the capacity to do so, but because not every aircraft was fitted with the receiving equipment and perhaps other operational factors. The fact that these aids weren't used as effectively as they could have been boils down to policy and British countermeasures. The LW had the potential to carry out reasonably accurate attacks against smaller targets, but did not.

Another factor that foiled the Germans during the BoB was post-raid reconnaissance; it wasn't sufficient. The Germans had no idea how much damage they were doing after each raid. Their recon aircraft were often shot down and those that did get back gave an incomplete picture of the strategic situation. TRhis was one of their biggest failings during the battle; they never had a good idea of how well they were doing.

In order to successfully subdue Britain by attacking strategic targets - airfields, factories etc, the LW would have to step up its intel gathering efforts.

One thing that is often overlooked in 1939-41 period was how useless German torpedoes were. Attacks against British shipping occurred and torpedoes failed to explode, even when the torpedo struck the thip as had happened against HMS Nelson when attacked by U 56. Seven torpedoes were fired against Royal Oak in Scapa Flow, of which two exploded. During the Norwegian campaign German torpedoes fired at British destroyers exploded prematurely and this is thought to have been the cause of the destruction of U 27 - her torpedoes exploded prematurely, revealing her position to enemy destoryers.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 21, 2013)

wiking85 said:


> Someone already corrected me and thanks for being dickish about it.



I don't _know_ what country you are from, you don't have a country or flag listed. 

American and British terminology is not the same. In America the "truck" is the 4 wheel bogie that goes _under_ the car/wagon. If you are not a railroad buff it may be an honest mistake. If that is being "dickish" then so be it.


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## wiking85 (Jan 21, 2013)

Hop said:


> The Night Blitz, John Ray


I ordered it earlier today, so I'll check it out.



Hop said:


> The reality is the accuracy the Luftwaffe achieved in their raids on Britain. They could reliably hit a port city, anything else was a bit hit and miss. You only have to look at the bomb map of London to see how bombs were scattered over a vast area. According to Hooton 18% of assigned crews failed to find Coventry, despite the massive fires lighting up the sky for miles around.


Someone else already answered this.



Hop said:


> What exactly do they say? I can't believe any book would make the claim Britain was importing coal, and that consumption was about 20 million tons a year. Can we please have the quotes from the books that led you to that conclusion?


I don't own copies of these books, so I'll have to reorder them via interlibrary loan.



Hop said:


> The mistake is in thinking British radar = Chain Home. That was just part of it. Chain Home was an early, long range radar chain. It was supplemented with other radars.


Chain Home was the primary British radar system at the time, so in the sense of what is deployed in the largest amounts it was the most important system in 1940. Just like Freya wasn't the only German radar system either.



Hop said:


> What exactly does it say? I have given you exact figures, broken down, from the War Cabinet.


I'll have to interlibrary loan the books again to get an answer.



Hop said:


> Swansea was importing oil for Llandarcy from the 1920s until the Pembroke oil terminals took over in the 60s or 70s.
> 
> The use of Oil: A Study of War-Time Policy and Administration as a reference for saying Swansea wasn't being used for oil imports is odd. I don't have the book, but a Google search of it returns the following snippet:
> 
> So Swansea was definitely being used for oil imports in 1940, on quite a large scale. Can you quote the parts of the book that made you believe it wasn't?


Same as I said above.



Hop said:


> Can you please provide a quote for this claim. Not simply a reference to a book, but what the book actually says.


I have to reorder the books to get one.



Hop said:


> A war cabinet report from November 1940 gave the following production figures for 100 octane fuels from UK refineries:
> 
> Heysham - 150,000 tons
> Billingham - 15,000 tons
> ...


Looking at the numbers you have above and the earlier numbers you posted, refining crude was a fraction of overall British fuel supplies.



Hop said:


> Hardly. Refineries have very specialised equipment that can be very difficult to replace. Imports are much, much easier to route to different ports etc, hence the provision of emergency off loading ports (like Port Talbot) as a contingency.


But refining was a fraction of fuel supplies as your own numbers show. Disrupting the ports and oil stations makes it harder and harder to bring the fuel in. Knocking out the biggest and most important stations forces the British to use far smaller and less efficient stations to discharge fuel from tankers. Did Port Talbot have an oil station to unload tankers?




Hop said:


> No, Chain Home Low had nothing to do with Chain Home. CHL was based on a gun laying radar produced by a different air ministry team.


Just like Würzburg. It had limited utility and just plugged the gaps that the main radar deployed at the time had. What was its accuracy compared to Freya or Würzburg and how many units were available?


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## wiking85 (Jan 21, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> I don't _know_ what country you are from, you don't have a country or flag listed.
> 
> American and British terminology is not the same. In America the "truck" is the 4 wheel bogie that goes _under_ the car/wagon. If you are not a railroad buff it may be an honest mistake. If that is being "dickish" then so be it.



Sorry, I thought you were being condescending. Apologies.


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## stona (Jan 22, 2013)

Leaving Liverpool and its docks for a minute I think it is important to know _what the Luftwaffe thought it could do_.

A report of July 16th 1940 Luftwaffe intelligence estimated both the Spitfire and Hurricane well below there actual performance abilities. It made no mention of Britain's integrated radar controlled air defence system and reckoned,optimistically,that the Luftwaffe was in a position to have a decisive effect in the war against Britain in 1940.
The initial estimate for the duration of the campaign was _four days for the defeat of Fighter Command in Southern England _. After this a further four weeks would be required for the Luftwaffe's bombers and long range fighters (Bf 110) to mop up the remainder of the RAF and destroy the aircraft industry.

Three days later Fliegerkorps I stated the four Luftwaffe missions for the upcoming campaign in a document from its headquarters entitled "Gedanken uber die fuhrung des luftkrieges gegen England" . I translate that as "thoughts on leading/executing the air war against England/Britain"

1 Win air superiority by attacks on the RAF and its industrial support,particularly the engine industry

2 Support the Channel crossing by attacks against the enemy fleet and bombers and eventually through direct support for the Army

3 Attack British ports,supplies and imports.

4 Launch ruthless retaliatory terror attacks on British cities.

Two things stand out. First the idea of interdicting British supplies does feature,but only third on the list. In July 1940 the Germans were making express reference to terror bombing British cities,whatever the apologists and revisionists might like to believe.

Most importantly all this could be achieved in little more than a month. Germany foresaw another quick and easy victory,forcing terms on Britain by August/September 1940 and having several months to prepare for the turn to the East thereafter.
It is only with hindsight that this seems pie in the sky stuff.

Cheers

Steve


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## Tante Ju (Jan 22, 2013)

stona said:


> In July 1940 the Germans were making express reference to terror bombing British cities,whatever the apologists and revisionists might like to believe.



Yes they did - in the following context:



> _The Führer and Supreme Commander
> of the Armed Forces
> 
> Führer Headquarters,
> ...



Hermann Göring's general order on 30th June 1940:



> The war against England is to be restricted to destructive attacks against industry and air force targets which have weak defensive forces. ... The most thorough study of the target concerned, that is vital points of the target, is a pre-requisite for success. It is also stressed that every effort should be made to avoid unnecessary loss of life amongst the civilian population.



The 'express reference to terror bombing British cities' was in the context of specifically forbidding the Luftwaffe to_ initiate_ such attack a war (note - by this time the RAF was bombing various German cities for two months), and the right to decide for a _retaliation _for such British attacks were reserved for Hitler himself - whatever the apologists and revisionists might like us to believe.

Naturally when the RAF choose to bomb Berlin, the Luftwaffe responded in kind on 7 September 1940. In a public speech in Berlin on 4 September 1940, Hitler announced that:



> The other night the English had bombed Berlin. So be it. But this is a game at which two can play. When the British Air Force drops 2000 or 3000 or 4000 kg of bombs, then we will drop 150 000, 180 000, 230 000, 300 000, 400 000 kg on a single night. When they declare they will attack our cities in great measure, we will eradicate their cities. The hour will come when one of us will break – and it will not be National Socialist Germany!



Indeed Londoners and other unlucky inhabitants of other cities in the UK soon found out that this was a game at which two could play.


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## fastmongrel (Jan 22, 2013)

A lot of Alt history seems to depend on that nasty warmonger Winston Churchill being thrown out of office and terms being offered to Germany. I wonder which politician is supposed to take over from Churchill and then promptly destroy his career and be a pariah for the rest of his life and beyond by rolling over for Hitler to scratch his tummy. After seeing what Hitler had done to Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Norway, The Netherlands and France does anyone seriously believe the British public would allow its politicians to do something so rank and stupid. Britons were scared but I believe the general feeling was "Thus far and no further".


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## Tante Ju (Jan 22, 2013)

I believe Halifax was considered the main candidate for PM (and IMHO would have been a better choice than Churchill in any case).


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## fastmongrel (Jan 22, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> Naturally when the RAF choose to bomb Berlin, the Luftwaffe responded in kind on 7 September 1940. In a public speech in Berlin on 4 September 1940, Hitler announced that:
> 
> 
> 
> Indeed Londoners and other unlucky inhabitants of other cities in the UK soon found out that this was a game at which two could play.



The RAF and the LW had been happily bombing each other cities well before the famous speech about bombing London. Just ask any inhabitant of Portsmouth for example when the bombing started. The only difference the RAF was struggling to hit mainland Europe the LW was a bit better at it but still struggled to hit the right country on occasion.


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## stona (Jan 22, 2013)

I simply posted the content of a document propagated by Generalkommando I Fliegerkorps. I've given a reference,if you want to check the translation feel free. It is dated 24 July 1940 and makes a specific reference to "ruthless retaliatory terror raids on British cities". I think the translation is by the Air Historical Branch but I am not absolutely sure. 

The word "retaliatory" is included. I neither edit my references nor selectively quote to suit any particular point of view. If I remember correctly the invasion of Poland was itself a "retaliation" for some imagined Polish agression.
On August 31, 1939, SS men dressed in Polish army uniforms “attacked” a German radio station at Gleiwitz (Gliwice). The next day, Hitler announced to the German nation and the world his decision to send troops into Poland in response to Polish “incursions” into the Reich. The Nazi Party Reich Press Office instructed the press to avoid the use of the word war. They were to report that German troops had simply beaten back Polish attacks.
The nazi definition of "retaliation" might involve a somewhat loose interpretation of the word. 

The expression "terror raid" in direct reference to British cities was in use at a Luftwaffe headquarters in July 1940,sometime before the RAF targeted any German city.

Hitler's order to which you refer in your post is dated later than this. You might consider it a qualification or clarification of an earlier order. I do not believe that a scheme for bombing British cities was the unilateral invention of Fliegerkorps I. It is clear that this sort of bombing was being considered as part of the strategy for the attack on Britain from,at the very least,mid 1940.
As for Goering in June,he shows his normal lack of grasp of what the Luftwaffe,and in this case its bombers,were actually capable of.

Cheers

Steve


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## fastmongrel (Jan 22, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> I believe Halifax was considered the main candidate for PM (and IMHO would have been a better choice than Churchill in any case).



Lord Halifax is often held up as the sensible chap who would have sat down with Hitler over a brew and sorted things out like gentlemen. Two problems with that his being called on by the King to form a government is not going to happen without some big changes. The Labour and Liberal parties would have prefered him to Churchill (they would have preferred anyone but Churchill) but there were large parts of the Conservative and Unionist party who would rather have seen a Labour man like Attlee in 10 Downing St than Halifax, Halifax was not a popular man in the conservative back benches many prefering Eden. 

Number two problem is if you read Halifaxs diaries he was not about to give into Hitler in 1940 he wasnt as warlike as Churchill, Eden or Attlee but he was not about to be an appeaser any time soon. It was Halifax in March 39 who gave Poland the guarantee that Britain would go to war saying that there would be "No more Munichs". he personally rejected an offer of peace talks via a Papal nuncio without first discussing it with the Cabinet. He was also responsible for Britain buying up stocks of vital war materials like Tungsten to keep them out of German hands.

Oh and number three the fact that he was Lord Halifax the 3rd Viscount Halifax, the only way he could have been Prime Minister would have been giving up his hereditary title and that would have been for an old fashioned Tory Grandee like Halifax tantamount to committing suicide. He was first a Viscount and a long way second a politician.


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## Tante Ju (Jan 22, 2013)

stona said:


> I simply posted the content of a document propagated by Generalkommando I Fliegerkorps. I've given a reference,if you want to check the translation feel free. It is dated 24 July 1940 and makes a specific reference to "ruthless retaliatory terror raids on British cities". I think the translation is by the Air Historical Branch but I am not absolutely sure.



'A document propagated by Generalkommando I Fliegerkorps' - that would be your reference?



stona said:


> The word "retaliatory" is included. I neither edit my references nor selectively quote to suit any particular point of view. If I remember correctly the invasion of Poland was itself a "retaliation" for some imagined Polish agression.
> 
> *SNIP lenghty irrelevancy excuse for documents shown not supporting conclusion*



You seem to mix concept of retaliation with casus belli, though I did not get your point about the origins of the hundred years war. 



> The expression "terror raid" in direct reference to British cities was in use at a Luftwaffe headquarters in July 1940,sometime before the RAF targeted any German city.



No, the RAF bombed German cities since May 1940. Besides - riding on words is meaningless. The world retaliatory or reprisal air attack was in everybody's vocabulary. The bomber forces were very much like MAD in the nuclear era - everyone was watching the other, vouching not to strike first but retaliate in kind if need be. Its only natural that higher orders would deal with this issue. In case Luftwaffe, standing order was not to launch terror attack unless RAF do so first.

I am fairly sure something similar was written in RAF general orders, although War Cabinet meetings in 1939 show clear that bombing of German cities as strategy was considered since 1939. Fear of German reprisal attacks made them to consider twice, until May 1940, when situation on the ground become so critical that they wanted to bait the German air force into a bombing war of each others cities by provocative attacks on German towns - which, given bad situation was seen as better alternative then Luftwaffe bombers giving effectice support to Heer in Low Countries.

For practical purposes of this discussion, it is enough to fix that Luftwaffe standing orders ruled out terror attacks apart for retaliation. Attack on industry and supply was preferred method, much like USAAF doctrine.



> It is clear that this sort of bombing was being considered as part of the strategy for the attack on Britain from,at the very least,mid 1940.



No they were not, you misinterpret the document. The wording is very clear that 'this sort of bombing' was only being considered as a reaction, should the British initiate such attack first (which they did, at least in German perception, for months already). 

If Hitler would have wanted to employ such attacks as a strategy, he had more than ample excuse to do it, since the RAF bombers flew hundreds of bombing sorties against German cities since May. But Hitler was not particularly fond or convinced that such attacks would be useful at all (he had turned down such incitive in Septemer 1940 several times, in fact also in July when IIRC Keitel proposed it), therefore, they were very much kept at a minimum in favour of bombing industrial targets. In the Luftwaffe, before the bomber baron mindsets simply lost out and few would have preferred such douhetist doctrine. They simply did not believe in it (and as a matter of fact I find it hard to find anyone else, except of course good old Harris since his childhood).


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## stona (Jan 22, 2013)

The document is named in my earlier post.

As for the rest we'll agree to disagree.

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Jan 22, 2013)

None of the prominant british politicians of the time were prepared to make peace with hitler after Poland (and even before that). For three hundred years, Britain had always supported and aided the second most powerful power in Europe, whoever that may have been, so as to prevent any one nation from dominating and controlling the whole of Europe. a united Europe was a direct threat to British vital interests and security. The British were never going to allow that situation to remain, in much the same way that would never allow Napoleon to peacefully control Europe. 

Britain would fight for that principal, even if it meant sacrificing their own nation to do it. There was no room for negotiation on the issue. Allowing one nation to control and dominate western Europe was toally unnacceptable to the British, and they would fight to the death to prevent it.

There was an added twist for hitler. after Munich he was exposed for the liar and the bully that he was. The British could never forgive him for that. before Munich they had wanted nothing more strongly than peace. They were prepared to make sacrifices to achieve that, including the sacrifice of another nation. After Munich, the British realized that hilter could not be trusted, and that he had sucked the British into sullying their honour by even dealing with him. There was no further serious talk of negotiating with a man like Hitler. the British knew they were going to war. Once war broke out there was never the slightest chance that any British politician was going to parley with hitler.

Thats the nature of the British people that so infuriates the nordics. We are a bit illogical when it comes to exposing liars and bullies


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## Hop (Jan 22, 2013)

> Looking at the numbers you have above and the earlier numbers you posted, refining crude was a fraction of overall British fuel supplies.



Those numbers are just for 100 octane aviation fuel. They exclude all other grades of petrol, and diesel. 



> Disrupting the ports and oil stations makes it harder and harder to bring the fuel in. Knocking out the biggest and most important stations forces the British to use far smaller and less efficient stations to discharge fuel from tankers.



The same problem exists with refineries. They have storage tanks, pumps, pipelines, rail yards etc just like ports. In other words, the distribution network is the same, the big difference is that the refinery has to have a lot of complex equipment in addition to the distribution infrastructure. 



> Did Port Talbot have an oil station to unload tankers?



Yes. It was one of the ports equipped in case of emergency.



> Just like Würzburg. It had limited utility and just plugged the gaps that the main radar deployed at the time had. What was its accuracy compared to Freya or Würzburg and how many units were available?



CHL frequency was 1.5 metres compared to Freya's 2.4, so there's no reason accuracy should be a problem. Again power was much higher than Freya, giving superior range. As to numbers, it shouldn't be too hard to find the number of CHL stations, but the same radar was used in mobile versions, and I've never seen accurate numbers for those.


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## Tante Ju (Jan 22, 2013)

So in short you do not know either range or the accuracy of CHL system, but you claim it to be superior...


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## Timppa (Jan 22, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Thats the nature of the British people that so infuriates the nordics. We are a bit illogical when it comes to exposing liars and bullies



Indeed you are. Britain did declare war on Germany for attacking Poland. Yet Britain did not declare war on Soviet Union, when they also attacked Poland (September 17, 1939), or when they invaded and enslaved Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania...wait, the list gets too long.


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## Milosh (Jan 22, 2013)

Timppa said:


> Indeed you are. Britain did declare war on Germany for attacking Poland. Yet Britain did not declare war on Soviet Union, when they also attacked Poland (September 17, 1939), or when they invaded and enslaved Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania...wait, the list gets too long.



Did GB have the same agreement with those countries mentioned as it did with Poland?


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## Milosh (Jan 22, 2013)

The Radar Pages - Chain Home

The Chain Home radar system


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## stona (Jan 22, 2013)

This sort of thread has degenerated as usual.
For what its worth I do believe that Britain could have been forced into a negotiated peace with Germany.
It is true,as Parsifal says,that a Europe dominated by one power had been historically unacceptable to Britain. Her foreign policy in Europe had always had the prevention of such a situation as its primary aim. The British were quite happy to sacrifice the interests of small states on the altar of their own self interest. Historically Britain paid others to do most of the fighting and she could easily afford to do it. British money to fund the armies of other European states was known as "St George's cavalry". Nonetheless Britain might have been forced into an acceptance of this unsavoury situation by a succession of defeats and with any potential continental allies already defeated. That is something that had never happened before,even during the Napoleonic wars.Why do we imagine that Churchill looked so desperately to the United States for salvation?
Guarantees which the Germans seem to have been happy to make regarding Britain's wider imperial interests would certainly act as a spoonful of sugar to help the medecine go down.
In the long term and for reasons rooted in the perverse racial and political ideology of the nazi leadership,Britain and her Empire were perceived as a potential ally against Bolshevism and the Slavic hordes.
Cheers
Steve


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## parsifal (Jan 22, 2013)

Timppa said:


> Indeed you are. Britain did declare war on Germany for attacking Poland. Yet Britain did not declare war on Soviet Union, when they also attacked Poland (September 17, 1939), or when they invaded and enslaved Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania...wait, the list gets too long.



Refer to milosh's reply. i should not have used the term "nordic', but was trying to be somewhat 'politically correct". The Russians were also not a threat to vital british interests as Germany was. Russians were not capable of overrunning Europe, or at least Whitehall believed that. Plus one war at a time is more than enough. The British did not attack Russia in 1807 either, after their alliance with napoleon from the talks at Tilsit. Why? Well because both 1807 and 1939, Russia was not the major continental power, and on both occasions was viewed by Whitehall as the Russians simply acting from expediency . In 1807, Prussia and Austria had suffered a series of heavy defeat, as had Russia. The British in 1807 knew that russia was not keen on allying with Napoleon, and began work to prise them away. In 1939, the situation was not as clear cut, but Russia posed no real threat to the British. Thats not to say that the British were not foolish enough to consider involvement in a confrontation with Russia. During the Russo-Finnish war, the Allies were making plans to intervene, which would have had disastrous effects if they had.

Britain continued to sometimes get sidetracked on issues like Turkey and Yugoslavia, but in the main, her wartime strategy remained remarkably constant. no deviation from the primary objective. The primary objective was the defeat of germany. Seek to ring germany with hostile alliances, build the strength to defeat her. later the nature of what defeating germany meant was solidified by the unconditional surrender terms.


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## Njaco (Jan 22, 2013)

This is the only warning. I can see tempers starting to flare and like stona posted, another thread starts to go down in flames. If people can't be civil, then a week at the beach might help. No warning given - this is it.

To follow up what parsifal posted - I just completed reading the biography of Winston Churchill and it will amaze you what the British government was like during the 30s. Winston saw Hitler for what he was and was almost exiled from government as a 'warmonger'. Amazing.


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## michaelmaltby (Jan 22, 2013)

Originally Posted by Timppa 
"... Indeed you are. Britain did declare war on Germany for attacking Poland. Yet Britain did not declare war on Soviet Union, when they also attacked Poland (September 17, 1939), or when they invaded and enslaved Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania...wait, the list gets too long."

Did GB have the same agreement with those countries mentioned as it did with Poland? "

*No.* They did not.

MM


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## Juha (Jan 22, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> ... until May 1940, when situation on the ground become so critical that they wanted to bait the German air force into a bombing war of each others cities by provocative attacks on German towns - which, given bad situation was seen as better alternative then Luftwaffe bombers giving effectice support to Heer in Low Countries...



Any source to back up that claim? In fact the attacks were restricted against communication targets west of Rhein before 15 May 40 and changed only after the bombing of Rotterdam after which BC was allowed to attack German industrial targets. So from from 10/11 May (road and rail communications at Mönchengladbach) to 14/15 May (communications Mönchengladbach, Breda and Roosendaal) and then on 15/16 May Ruhr industry and railways then oil and railway targets in Western Germany to the end of May, didn't bother to look farther, only exceptions were attacks against battlefield targets in Belgium and NW France.



Tante Ju said:


> For practical purposes of this discussion, it is enough to fix that Luftwaffe standing orders ruled out terror attacks apart for retaliation. Attack on industry and supply was preferred method, much like USAAF doctrine.
> 
> No they were not, you misinterpret the document. The wording is very clear that 'this sort of bombing' was only being considered as a reaction, should the British initiate such attack first (which they did, at least in German perception, for months already).



What was the reason of bombing St. Helier, Jersey and St Peter Port, Guernsey on June 28 1940? Altogether 44 civilians died in that day.


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## Tante Ju (Jan 22, 2013)

Juha said:


> Any source to back up that claim? In fact the attacks were restricted against communication targets west of Rhein before 15 May 40 and changed only after the bombing of Rotterdam after which BC was allowed to attack German industrial targets. So from from 10/11 May (road and rail communications at Mönchengladbach) to 14/15 May (communications Mönchengladbach, Breda and Roosendaal) and then on 15/16 May Ruhr industry and railways then oil and railway targets in Western Germany to the end of May, didn't bother to look farther, only exceptions were attacks against battlefield targets in Belgium and NW France.



Except that the intention was laid out pretty clear in recently de-classified confidental annex to the War Cabinet meetings. Churchill was pressing for indiscriminate attacks on the Ruhr with Belgium used a pretext, or if things would go really sour. He hoped that indiscriminate bombings would break German civillian morale.

In short, he wanted to win the war with terror bombings, but as long as Chamberlain was prime minister, he had no chance to do so.

Note the date - 14th October, 1939 - since stona is amused by the world 'retaliation', for the historical record we should note how soon the British War cabinet was flirting with such idea. 

This was noted by Boog and other high profile historians in their exhaustive work on the Second World war. 



> TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.
> 
> MOST SECRET W.
> M-(S9) 47th CONCLUSIONS. MINUTE 4.
> ...






> What was the reason of bombing St. Helier, Jersey and St Peter Port, Guernsey on June 28 1940? Altogether 44 civilians died in that day.



Declaration of War by Britain on 3 September 1939, subsequent bombing of German towns (with many times the civillian casulties which you list above) when things turned sour in Belgium under the pretext of Rotterdam, refusal of German peace offer by the Churchill cabinet.


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## stona (Jan 22, 2013)

Boog can be strident in his opinions. On 1st September 1939 1,200 civilians died under the 46 tons of bombs dropped on Wielun in Poland. The germans had detected a Polish cavalry brigade and an infantry division in the area. Boog is adamant that these were the target and yet the centre of the town was destroyed. British aviation historian Peter Smith,a big fan of dive bombing,describes this as "collateral damage" and blames fog for the inaccurate bombing. 
It is no coincidence that some of the Luftwaffe officers involved had not only served with the Legion Condor but been directly involved in the bombing of Guernica (incidentally how would you characterise that raid?)

You might explain away the Luftwaffe raids on Warsaw on 1/8/and 13th of September,particularly those carried out by Ju 87s. The massive attack of 25th September was a terror raid by any measure.

This is a rather futile discussion about who did what first. Germany was the agressor in WW2. Basil Fawlty,an emminent historian and collector of Moose heads was correct when he said "you started it!"

Cheers

Steve


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## wiking85 (Jan 22, 2013)

stona said:


> Boog can be strident in his opinions. On 1st September 1939 1,200 civilians died under the 46 tons of bombs dropped on Wielun in Poland. The germans had detected a Polish cavalry brigade and an infantry division in the area. Boog is adamant that these were the target and yet the centre of the town was destroyed. British aviation historian Peter Smith,a big fan of dive bombing,describes this as "collateral damage" and blames fog for the inaccurate bombing.
> It is no coincidence that some of the Luftwaffe officers involved had not only served with the Legion Condor but been directly involved in the bombing of Guernica (incidentally how would you characterise that raid?)


I'm not endorsing these opinions, but I've seen it argued this way:
Guernica was an attempt to bomb Republican troops moving through the city/or was an attempt to knock out the bridge so they couldn't escape; therefore the mission was a failure. This is in Corum's "Creating the Operational Air War", where he shows different opinions, one from von Richthofen who lamented the poor aim of his pilots, and IIRC Sperrle's who trumpeted the destructive power of his bombers. 




stona said:


> You might explain away the Luftwaffe raids on Warsaw on 1/8/and 13th of September,particularly those carried out by Ju 87s. The massive attack of 25th September was a terror raid by any measure.


I've also see this one argued: Warsaw was a fortified military objective defended by military forces, so therefore was a military target. In the view of the Germans the Poles were using their civilians as shields because they were hiding in the city among them, rather than 'fighting in the field'. The 25th raid was to convince the Polish to surrender. 
I want to stress that I don't hold these views, but I've seen these counter arguments in writing and thought I'd share because you asked for the rationalizations that people had for these acts.




stona said:


> This is a rather futile discussion about who did what first. Germany was the agressor in WW2. Basil Fawlty,an emminent historian and collector of Moose heads was correct when he said "you started it!"
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve


Yes, the Germans did start the war. Legally speaking it is debatable whether they intentionally started violating the prohibition against targeting civilians first, though the actions in Poland are pretty damning. Even if not ordered from on high the Luftwaffe did strafe columns of civilians and bomb villages whether or not their were confirmed military targets there. Ultimately responsibility for these acts lie with the regime, which was tried and judged at Nuremberg for their crimes.


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## Njaco (Jan 22, 2013)

Basil Fawlty an emminent historian! I just spit my dinner all over the computer monitor!!!


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## Hop (Jan 22, 2013)

> Note the date - 14th October, 1939 - since stona is amused by the world 'retaliation', for the historical record we should note how soon the British War cabinet was flirting with such idea.



Flirting with the idea? The document you quoted expressly rules it out. Note that it first gives statements of facts _arrived at by an outside committee:_



> c) Germany's weakest spot was the Ruhr, the heart of which was about the size of Greater London, anr1 in which was concentrated approximately 60 per cent, of Germany's vital industry. It contained moreover, a population which might be expected to crack under extensive air attack. Such attacks would involve a heavy casualty roll among civilians, including women and children.



and 



> (d) We should not be the first to "take the gloves off". Prom this it followed that until and unless Germany, either by killing large numbers of civilians or by a violation of Belgium, gave the necessary justification,there could be no question of attacking the Ruhr, or anything other than strictly military objectives If the War Cabinet approved these conclusions, the Committee proposed that the governing principles should be applied to the situation with which we were now confronted, in the following way:



It then makes recommendations:



> i) If the enemy confined his attack either on the French or ouselves to strictly military objectives, we should reply by strictly limited attacks on corresponding German objectives, i.e., we should continue our present bombardment policy.





> (ii) If the enemy attacked convoys or even our Fast (joast ports indecisively, i,e,,if they were not doing vital damage — we should, still not do anything to invite retaliation which might do us vital damage.
> It would, however', probably be necessary, both on military and political grounds, to take some "token" action in reply. For example, an attack on Hamburg Oil Storage and. Refinery would, be a useful, spectacular and appropriate reply to a German attack on "East Coast ports or London Docks.





> (iii) If the Germans should deliver an attack on either France or ourselves which looked like being decisive and had involved either appreciable casualties to civilians outside the battle zone (i.e., anywhere in England or in the back areas in France) or a violation of Belgian neutrality, we should attack the Ruhr as our first and chief objective. In the event of an attack on France through Belgium, our air forces, in addition to attacking the Ruhr, should operate against any favourable military targets presented by the German advance.



The cabinet then debated the report, before agreeing the following:



> Tt was agreed that, while it was desirable to have preliminary discussion on this matter, there wa.s no need for the War Cabinet to reach a final decision that day as to the use of our Bomber Force in the circumstances envisaged.
> 
> The War Cabinet —
> (i) Approved the conclusions summarised in (a), (b), ( c) and (d) above:
> ...



How is this the government flirting with retaliation? Presented with a report by a separate committee they decided to adhere to existing policy, not to be the first to bomb.

The fact remains that the Germans bombed Poland with no provocation. They bombed Norway with no provocation. They bombed Belgium and the Netherlands with no provocation. At least France was at war with Germany before the bombers took off, but again the German air attacks preceded any French air attacks on Germany. 

Britain only began bombing Germany _after_ the Luftwaffe had killed tens of thousands in Poland, Norway, France, Belgium and the Netherlands. How then could the Luftwaffe "retaliate" against Britain?



> when situation on the ground become so critical that they wanted to bait the German air force into a bombing war of each others cities by provocative attacks on German towns



In fact, when the war cabinet authorised attacks on Germany east of the Rhine, they stressed the military nature of the objectives:



> To authorise the Chief of the Air
> Staff to order Bomber Command to
> carry out attacks on suitable
> military objectives, (including
> ...



"Military" was underlined in the original text.


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## parsifal (Jan 22, 2013)

Im waiting for someone to claim that the germans showed no aggressive behaviour toward their neighbours. After all Germany never declared war on anyone except the US AFAIK. 


With regard to losses, Germany was having dificulty inmaintaining force structure from before operations in the west even commenced. The exapnsion of the LW was much slower than the RAF up to mid 1941 suggesting they had some difficulties with aircraft supply. The aircrew training was another issue that constrained the LW as the war progressed. The losses sustained during the BoB cannot have been good for the LW given these constraints. 

However the significance of the battle was never about the losses, or the survival of the LW. It was a battle about firstly control of airspace, over south east england, and secondly about the survival of the RAF as aviable force. The LW was defeated because it failed in both of these missions. it did not gain control of the airspace over SE England, and it did not eliminate the RAF as a viable fighting force. By the following march, the RAF was begining to undertake significant counteroffensive operations over the Channel and Coastal areas of occupied Europe. initially the LW resisted, but by the end of 1941 all pretence at challenging the RAF over the channel, and over the port areas that surrounded it had disappeared. the LW continued to inflict heavy losses on the RAF, but losses were inevitable in gaing control of the skies over a particular area. Galland acknowledges that from a certain point in 1941, the LW was no longer the hunters on the attack. They were standing on the defensive in the west, and he acknowledges that was greatly debilitating to the LW.

The LW did not win anything during the BoB. The RAF gained considerably. Guess who won.


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## Tante Ju (Jan 22, 2013)

stona said:


> Boog can be strident in his opinions.



Hardly, he is a respected historian and head of the Bundesarchiv AFAIK. He also presents an extremely heavy dose of evidence. You, for your own reasons may disapprove his factual and objective presentation of the events, but you can be strident in your opinion sometimes. And unlike Boog, you do not present any significant sources.



> On 1st September 1939 1,200 civilians died under the 46 tons of bombs dropped on Wielun in Poland.



And 30 000 in Rotterdam, 6000 in Guernica, 350 000 in Dresden etc. All bogus war propaganda numbers I am afraid.



> The germans had detected a Polish cavalry brigade and an infantry division in the area. Boog is adamant that these were the target and yet the centre of the town was destroyed. British aviation historian Peter Smith,a big fan of dive bombing,describes this as "collateral damage" and blames fog for the inaccurate bombing.



So does even the official history of the Polish air force *caugh caugh*.. btw every single picture I have seen of the destroyed 'town centre' really shows about half a dozen damaged buildings around a tiny square of a small Polish town.



> It is no coincidence that some of the Luftwaffe officers involved had not only served with the Legion Condor but been directly involved in the bombing of Guernica



Certainly not. Both were performed by the Luftwaffe. And the Luftwaffe tended to have Luftwaffe offciers who in turn tended to be involved in previous bombing operations. That whats an air force do, bomb, right?



> (incidentally how would you characterise that raid?)



I would characterise it as as a successful interdiction of enemy forces and cutting of their roads of deployement and essential to Nationalist victory in the campaign over the anarcho-communist Republicans. The event has been heavily propagandized ever since and is a favoured myth to be repeated by certain groups.



> You might explain away the Luftwaffe raids on Warsaw on 1/8/and 13th of September,particularly those carried out by Ju 87s.



_"... by 8 September, as the Germans began to assualt Warsaw, a crisis developed in the rear. The city itself attracted much Luftwaffe attention on 8th of September, with Luftflotte 1 beggining daily attacks on bridge over the Vistula in the city centre. In the southern suburbs, the Luftwaffe sought to help Reichenau's advance in face of fierce resistence, flying 140 Stuka sorties (StG 77 and III/StG 51) on the first day alone. Meanwhile KG 77 struck railways east of Warsaw and during the night of 10/11 September LnAbt 100 conducted the last of four precision night missions using the X-Geraet navigation system. The first attack had taken place on 3/4 September and this last one destroyed a munition dump."_

There were no Stuka sorties at all on the 13th I know of. Two squadrons of KG 4 were initially tasked with bombing targets in the besieged northern Warsaw, dropping 50-50 load of incendinaries and HE, the jewish Ghetto due North of the Danzig railway station possibly being included in the target folder. 183 sorties were flown that day. The operation went very poorlz, none of the units attacked on schedule, there were several near misses and smoke prevented assessing the damage. KG 77s commader, Seywald ignored the selected targets in favour of purely miliitary ones. Seywald was relieved on the same night.



> The massive attack of 25th September was a terror raid by any measure.



Who's measure, yours? Terror raid of a besieged city, bombarded by 1000 pieces artilerry day and night, you are kidding, right? 
_
von Richthofen indeed requested for such a raid ('a last opportunity for large-scale experiment as devastation and terror raid') and given your fondness Harris's methods, by now you must be very fond of the guy, but OKL was a party pooper again and declined is request. Most of the modern bombers like He 111 were withdrawn a redeployed to Germany, leaving only Stukas and obsolate Ju 52s available. No larger than 50 kg bombs were permitted by OKL. A combined air and arty bombarbment began on 23rd, but low cloud prevented air operations, limited to destruction of the besieged city's utilities. A ground assault was prepeared on the 25th and was supported by 400 bombers, including five Stuka wings and a single bomber squadron flew 1150 sorties. 560 tons of HE and 72 tons of incendinaries were dropped. Methods were described as worse than primitive, given the lack of any 'real' bombers, Ju 52s for example showeled incendinaries out of the doorway. Accuracy was absymal, made worse by strong NW wings, and even German positions were bombed, causing friendly fire casulties. Three aircraft were lost, two being Ju 52s. The inaccuracy and thick smoke that blocked the gunner's view infuriated Blaskowitz, who's troops were about to make an attack. Blaskowitz requested the ceasing of the ineffective air support but Hitler ordered Richthofen to carry on. Weather was again unpermitting so he went on supporting the attack on Modlin. In the meanwhile things weren't going too well on the ground, the Germans suffering setbacks against stout Polish defence, prompting the Luftwaffe to prepeare another massive close support raid. However, the Polish commander (you gotta love that!) general Rómmel  made the best of the temporary success and surrendered in the afternoon, seeking best terms. Warsaw was out of everything anyway._

It hardly paints a pretty picture but hardly different than how the British battered their way through Caen in 1944, essentially razing the city to the ground with Lancesters aka terror raids by any measure.



> This is a rather futile discussion about who did what first.



Indeed. There is a mountain of evidence against opinion... 



> Germany was the agressor in WW2. Basil Fawlty,an emminent historian and collector of Moose heads was correct when he said "you started it!"


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## Tante Ju (Jan 22, 2013)

Hop said:


> Flirting with the idea? The document you quoted expressly rules it out.



Yes, they ruled out for the time being. Chamberlain was still PM and common sense mostly prevailed over Churchill's silly ideas. The UK did not have a bomber force to match the Germans, the French were even hopeless in that regard. Apparantly Chamberlain was not very fond if the idea either, the French were even less fond of the idea, validly pointing out that while the British chaps conduct a leisurely terror bombing campaign because Churchill considered it such a grand idea, it will be _their_ neck on which German bombers will breath down on when they come back to retaliate for all that. The Belgians were reluctant too, probably for the same reason.

In the end, Churchill pushed it through anyway when he became PM, but much like many of his other silly master plans, this one did not work out either. The Germans simply did not took the bait, and instead of mindlessly running to bomb the hell out of London in retaliation, they obliterated the French and British ground troops. Then used the PoWs to clear up the rubble.



> How is this the government flirting with retaliation?



It is not, it the First Sea Lord (Churchill) flirting with winning the war via terror bombing. Chamberlain evidently did not, not only for practical (= Germans would kick arses if we tried to pull that stunt off) but also for moral reasons. Post-war propaganda and apologists aside, nobody at the time considered the Luftwaffe's operation over Poland anything like terrorful, neither the British neither the French; Chamberlain was however quite aware what was Churchill asking for, no matter how he tried to pack it, it still stinked.

_The Prime Minister said that the adoption of this action might be necessary, and, if so, he would not shrink from it. *Nevertheless, he-would be reluctant that this country should lay itself open to the accusation of being the first country to adopt action of this kind. He did not think that what had happend in Poland was altogether comparable to the action which was proposed in the Ruhr, at any rate as regards the
effect which it would have on world opinion.* His conclusion was that the matter would have to be determined by judgment of the whole position when the time came._



> Presented with a report by a separate committee they decided to adhere to existing policy, not to be the first to bomb.



Unless, of course, things turn sour on the military front, in which case they shall be terror bombing. Things did turn sour in May 1940.

Or if the Germans invade Belgium, their close military ally, they would be terror bombing again. The Germans could still invade Luxemburg, or the Netherlands, that one did not count for some reason. Still, it is ironic that in the end they justified it with the bombing of a Dutch town, isn't it?



> The fact remains that the Germans bombed Poland with no provocation. They bombed Norway with no provocation. They bombed Belgium and the Netherlands with no provocation. At least France was at war with Germany before the bombers took off, but again the German air attacks preceded any French air attacks on Germany.



I think the Germans bombing Poland had something to do with being a war and such (plus the less then optimal history/relations of the two nations in the last 20 years)? 

The bombing of Norway (really? they bombed Norway?) must have to do with another of Churchill little plans to invade Norway, Operation Wilfred, formulated in September 1939 and executed in April 1940, which prompted to Germans who have found out to (and kick the French British the hell out of there) intervene. They were perfectly fine with a neutral Norway through which swedish ore could flow to Germany. The British weren't.



> Britain only began bombing Germany _after_ the Luftwaffe had killed tens of thousands in Poland, Norway, France, Belgium and the Netherlands.



True. But decided to to do it regardless well before the Luftwaffe supposedly killed 'tens of thousends' in Poland, Norway, France, Belgium and the Netherlands. 

How then could the Luftwaffe "retaliate" against Britain?



> In fact, when the war cabinet authorised attacks on Germany east of the Rhine, they stressed the military nature of the objectives:
> 
> 
> 
> ...



... knowing full well that the Ruhr _'contained moreover, a population which might be expected to crack under extensive air attack and that such attacks would involve a heavy casualty roll among civilians, including women and children.'_

But of course it was 'military targets'._ Justification_ for the unrestricted attacks was also discussed in detail. 

_THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF said that it should not be imagined that the Chiefs of Staff were at all anxious to let loose unrestricted air warfare, or, indeed, *at present *to start a train of circumstances which was likely to lead to heavy retaliation on our own and the French aircraft industry. They were only recommending the attack on the Ruhr in the particular circumstances of a German invasion of Belgium., Apart from the *justification* which such a violation of neutrality would give, they felt that the moment when the German Armies were starting their advance was psychologically and militarily the right one. As regards the legality of the operation, there were no agreed rules on the subject. The Hague draft Rules had received a certain measure of acceptance. In these draft Rules "factories engaged in manufacturing distinctly military supplies" were defined as military objectives. *As the whole of the German industry was organised for the production of war material, he thought that the targets selected would come within the definition.*_

It not really hard to see where this whole discussion was going about unrestricted attacks, cracking moral, justifications and lawyering the definition of what fits into a factory manufacturing distinctly military supplies (the whole of the German industry, down to shoemakers) and fear of heavy retaliation. It is not very hard to see what these fine gentlemen were cooking in the pot - in November 1939, that is. 

Now the real problem was not that, but the fact that this was a game at which two which could play, and the Germans at the time had a LOT more toys to play with.

You make it like you do not get the hypocrisy of Churchill about the Ruhr being a _'military deployment zone' which would give an excuse to attacks that 'would involve a heavy casualty roll among civilians, including women and children'_ a_ 'population which might be expected to crack under extensive air attack'_ but everybody else around the table clearly got it. Obviously nobody wanted to go straight on record about it, not even in documents classified for 70 years.

Certainly the THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS got the message in full:

_'It was necessary, however, to consider the effect on the morale of the German people. He had been able to consult a number of authorities who had lived in close touch with the German people up to the outbreak of war, and their views were conflicting. All were agreed, however, that *the breaking of the German morale would ultimately depend upon the success of our venture. If we attacked the Ruhr and failed, not only should we have let loose indiscriminate bombing,* but we should have strengthened the German will and made easier the task of the German Government.'_

OOPS, somebody failed to properly proof read (or simply did not care, since he was long dead by the time this would have been disclosed to public) left that politically incorrect word in the text which every one of these fine gentlemen were discussing with fine and elaborate words.


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## wiking85 (Jan 22, 2013)

parsifal said:


> With regard to losses, Germany was having dificulty inmaintaining force structure from before operations in the west even commenced. The exapnsion of the LW was much slower than the RAF up to mid 1941 suggesting they had some difficulties with aircraft supply. The aircrew training was another issue that constrained the LW as the war progressed. The losses sustained during the BoB cannot have been good for the LW given these constraints.


Axis History Forum • Luftwaffe losses France, 1940


> For example, E. R. Hooton, in Phoenix Triumphant p. 267-268 lists Luftwaffe losses as 1,428, 0f which 1,129 were lost due to enemy action. Hooton goes on to list 1,092 aircrew killed, 1,395 aircrew wounded, and 1,930 aircrew missing.



Battle of Britain - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


> 2,698 aircrew killed[12]
> 967 captured
> 638 missing bodies identified by British authorities[13]
> 1,887 aircraft destroyed[nb 9]



So the twin campaigns of the Battle of France and Britain seriously cost the Luftwaffe. IIRC they had 10,000 replacements in May 1940 before the invasion, so between the two campaigns the losses were 3790 killed, 2897 missing or captured, and at least 1395 wounded in France and another 270 wounded in July-August (not sure beyond that how many were wounded). That's enormous. Even with some of the wounded returning to duty, the losses in those two battle alone were most of the reserves that existed in May 1940. So Germany was able to make good its losses with replacements by October, but it had wiped out its crew reserves, so that meant any losses and replacements were going to be hand-to-mouth from here on out. 

So the Battle of Britain losses were the nail in the coffin of the Luftwaffe, as once Barbarossa started then losses could not be made good except for initially. There of course was an expansion of the Luftwaffe as time went on, but the replacement quality dropped ridiculously low immediately. Of course the losses from October 1940-May 1941 are not factored in, but with the Blitz and some daylight fight ongoing, plus the Mediterranean theater opening, there were probably hundreds more losses.

So this gets to my point of why it was not a good idea to launch the Battle of Britain with the losses from the French campaign so recent.




parsifal said:


> However the significance of the battle was never about the losses, or the survival of the LW. It was a battle about firstly control of airspace, over south east england, and secondly about the survival of the RAF as aviable force. The LW was defeated because it failed in both of these missions. it did not gain control of the airspace over SE England, and it did not eliminate the RAF as a viable fighting force. By the following march, the RAF was begining to undertake significant counteroffensive operations over the Channel and Coastal areas of occupied Europe. initially the LW resisted, but by the end of 1941 all pretence at challenging the RAF over the channel, and over the port areas that surrounded it had disappeared. the LW continued to inflict heavy losses on the RAF, but losses were inevitable in gaing control of the skies over a particular area. Galland acknowledges that from a certain point in 1941, the LW was no longer the hunters on the attack. They were standing on the defensive in the west, and he acknowledges that was greatly debilitating to the LW.
> 
> The LW did not win anything during the BoB. The RAF gained considerably. Guess who won.


The reason the LW didn't contest the Channel after mid-1941 was the draw down to fight in russia. Not only that, but the LW needed to conserve its strength, while inflicting as much damage as possible on the RAF, so that necessarily meant fighting over the continent, as the British demonstrated it was far more cost effective to fight over one's own territory, just as they had learned in WW1. The LW being on the defensive was not debilitating in 1941, 42, or 43 necessarily, as it kept Allied losses much higher than their own; it was only the arrival of the US and its massive replacement capabilities, plus its production and manpower and eventually technological advantages that finally debilitated the LW.


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## Njaco (Jan 22, 2013)

> Chamberlain was still PM and common sense mostly prevailed over Churchill's silly ideas.



You're kidding, right?

.






So let me get this straight - Germany was forced into 'terror' bombing and horrible acts of war because of Churchill's 'silly' ideas?? Germany just wanted a simple war - bang, bang, you're dead, I win.

Let me ask you Tante -

Was Churchill right? All through the 1930s and into the 1940s about Germany and Hitler's aggressive nature? Or was that just Churchill being 'silly'?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 22, 2013)

Njaco said:


> This is the only warning. I can see tempers starting to flare and like stona posted, another thread starts to go down in flames. If people can't be civil, then a week at the beach might help. No warning given - this is it.



And that goes for both offending parties. I don't give a **** if you are "Pro Allied" or "Pro Axis". I don't play that game. Both parties will equally be removed. Some of you are just picking fights and thinking you will get away with it. Not anymore. We mods have been discussing this, and we are tired of it.


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## Tante Ju (Jan 22, 2013)

Njaco said:


> Was Churchill right? All through the 1930s and into the 1940s about Germany and Hitler's aggressive nature? Or was that just Churchill being 'silly'?



No, IMHO Churchill was a war mongering, back stabbing fool who simply betrayed everyone, _in and outside_ Britain to further his own political career. But even the wrong clock shows the right time twice a day as they say it... silly? He certainly had plenty silly ideas. Was invading Norway a bright idea? Or the idea of attacking the USSR in Finland, or Bombing the Ruhr in 1940? The Dieppe Raid? Mers el Kebir that firmly pushed the French away and almost made the join the Germans? Interfering in Greece that finally gave the Germans an excuse to prevent the Italians from tripping over there? Sending Prince of Wales to the Far East without any air cover right after the IJN sank almost the entire US battleship force to the bottom with airplanes in a single strike? The 'soft underbelly of europe' fixation of his, on the WORST possible place to attack and finally relieving the Germans of the burden the Italians really meant for them?

But Churchill's silly ideas had nothing to do with 'forcing' the Germans into terror bombing. That seems to have been his plan in October 1939 - May 1940 but it did not work out, and because the Luftwaffe generally simply did not buy into douhet's ideas and did not took the bait. There was never such a bomber lobby in the LW as was in Britain and the Germans had entirely different idea how to employ their bombers, which worked very well for them for most of the war I might add (see Corum). There might have, but General Waver died, and the Germans simply did not believe in it. They flirted of course and made some attampts at it on a couple of occasions (which ironical, are least known ones) just like anyone else, but their idea of the bomber was somewhere between that of the Russians (tactical support) and the Americans (stategic bombing of industrial bottleneck) - they first and foremost believed in operational level bombing.

Chamberlain may not be liked for his appeasement policy, but perhaps he was right that from the British national interest, with Britain in a poor financial situation in the 1930s and very much struggling to make the Great War right, a peaceful solution could be better, and perhaps Hitler could be satisfied by giving in to his more or less reasonable demands (up to 1939), especially as there was nobody to fight him. Britain did not have an army worth speaking of and did not care that much of Eastern Europe (which sooner of later would Germany's turf anyway) and the French did not want another great blood letting either. War was not good for trade and Britain was a trading nation.

But Chamberlain was hardly the naiive fool that Churchillian propaganda cast upon him After When The Great Bulldog Descended From Heaven To Save The Empire either. When did all the rearmament programmes, that ensured that Britain could fight and survive at all the Battle of Britain and the Atlantic started? All in mid 1930s, the same time Chamberlain was damned for appease Hitler, he was also stocking up in weapons, securing fuel supplies for war, building large aircraft plants. Do you think Beaverbrook just popped out in mid 1940 out of nothing and fixed everything with a magic wand, tripled production and so on? These were all set in motion under and by Chamberlain's office. Look at the size of aerial programme of the RAF that were started under Chamberlain... he was pretty much a _realpolitik_ in my eyes, make peace when you must to buy time, and prepare for the worst.


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## Hop (Jan 22, 2013)

> Yes, they ruled out for the time being.



They ruled it out unless circumstances changed.



> Unless, of course, things turn sour on the military front, in which case they shall be terror bombing.



I don't see that phrase there. I see a reference to the Ruhr being Germany's weakest point, with 60% of German industry. 

And by this point the Luftwaffe had already inflicted mass casualties in Poland. At best the Luftwaffe didn't care about the civilian casualties they inflicted, at worst they did so deliberately.



> I think the Germans bombing Poland had something to do with being a war and such



It wasn't a war when the German bombers took off headed to targets in Poland. Likewise Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands.



> The bombing of Norway (really? they bombed Norway?)



Yes, they bombed Norway. Quite heavily in some places. In Kristiansund about 800 of the town's 1,300 buildings were destroyed.



> True. But decided to to do it regardless well before the Luftwaffe supposedly killed 'tens of thousends' in Poland, Norway, France, Belgium and the Netherlands.



No, they actually decided not to do it. And by that point Poland had already been heavily bombed.

The War Cabinet met on 14 May and decided not to bomb Germany. On the 15th they were unanimous in agreeing to the bombing. 



> knowing full well that the Ruhr 'contained moreover, a population which might be expected to crack under extensive air attack and that such attacks would involve a heavy casualty roll among civilians, including women and children.'



Which is why they kept in place very strict engagement rules. No bombing unless the precise target was identified. If not, the bombs had to be brought back or jettisoned at sea. That rule wasn't changed until mid September, with a few thousand Londoners dead from Luftwaffe attacks.

Again it's worth pointing out the casualty figures. The Germans didn't even see fit to compile a central registry until October 1940. In the last 3 months of the year the RAF killed just over 300 civilians. The Luftwaffe killed over 6,000 in September alone.

The fact remains the RAF did not bomb Germany at all until the Germans had begun a bombing campaign in the west. They did so on a smaller scale and with a more restrictive targeting policy than the Luftwaffe. They kept to that policy until the Luftwaffe began their campaign of firebombing British cities, causing mass civilian casualties. Only when approx 20,000 British civilians had been killed did the RAF begin area attacks on German cities.


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## nuuumannn (Jan 22, 2013)

> IMHO Churchill was a war mongering, back stabbing fool who simply betrayed everyone, in and outside Britain to further his own political career.



Change 'Churchill' with 'Hitler' and 'Britain' with 'Germany' and voila! World War Two!

Here's the best idea Churchill ever came up with; stop at nothing to defeat the Nazis. If one man could inspire a nation to carry this out during its darkest hour, it was Churchill.

Now, getting back on track; rightly or wrongly, indiscriminate bombing of civlians was on everyone's agenda, whether portrayed on paper or not. The fact of the matter was, in hindsight it didn't work as a means of knocking each country's opponents out of the war. At the time the Luftwaffe and RAF Bomber Command believed that it could be used as a war winning strategy, although with the amount of damage done to Germany by the Allied bombing campaign certainly slowed the German war machine down. Unfortunately, underlying fears and beliefs at the time meant that it was going to be pursued as policy.

As for Luftwaffe orders, as much as the intent that these held, part of the LW's failings was that it did not stick to the priorities as stipulated in these orders. Its lack of continuity was its downfall as much as the RAF's ability to counter it.If the Luftwaffe wanted to subdue Britain it needed to be consistent; keep bombing airfields and strategic factories, ports etc, collate information of the results of its work and keep attacking those same sites. Don't deviate from the plan.


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## michaelmaltby (Jan 22, 2013)

"... Do you think Beaverbrook just popped out in mid 1940 out of nothing and fixed everything with a magic wand, tripled production and so on? These were all set in motion under and by Chamberlain's office. Look at the size of aerial programme of the RAF that were _started_ under Chamberlain..."

Auntie ... you and I will have to part ways on Churchill. In Canada we like to say that the Nazi Germany in the late 30's and early '40s suffered from '_*Churchhill Envy'*_ .... they just didn't have a word for it.

"Started" ain't built. But yes - that is what Canadians do - effectively manage our magic wands ... 

"During the Second World War, *his friend Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister, appointed Beaverbrook as Minister of Aircraft Production and later Minister of Supply*. Under Beaverbrook, fighter and bomber production increased so much so that Churchill declared: "His personal force and genius made this Aitken's finest hour. ..... a Time Magazine cover story wrote, "Even if Britain goes down this fall [1940], it will not be Lord Beaverbrook's fault. If she holds out, it will be his triumph. This war is a war of machines. It will be won on the assembly line." **

** Wikipdia Aitken-Beaverbrook

MM
Proud Canadian

"... rightly or wrongly, indiscriminate bombing of civlians was on everyone's agenda"

Hardly surprising:

Zeppelin Raids WW1 [Kaiser Germany], Guernica, Spanish CW, April 26, 1937 [Nazi Germany]


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## parsifal (Jan 22, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> Change 'Churchill' with 'Hitler' and 'Britain' with 'Germany' and voila! World War Two!
> 
> Here's the best idea Churchill ever came up with; stop at nothing to defeat the Nazis. If one man could inspire a nation to carry this out during its darkest hour, it was Churchill.
> 
> ...



Great post and agree more or less 100%, with one exception. At a tactical level, sometimes terror bombing did at least have an effect. In 1940, the germans bombed Rotterdam. The intent of that raid was to terrorize the Dutch into surrendering. The fact that the actual bombing became superfluous, and a mistake seems immaterial to me.....the Dutch were inclined to abandon resistance primarily because of fears of reprisal bombing.

Bombing in the 1920s and 1930s had been seen in a siimilar vein to nuclear warfare postwar. Prdictions of dire casualties scared the bejeezuz out of the civilian populations. rightly or wrongly (I think rightly) the germans had acquired a reputation of meting out terror bombings whenever their opponents got in the way of their "peaceful occupations"....

Another instance where bombing of civilain targets had an effect was in the french campaign. There is evidence of the Germans targetting refugee columns to increase the panic and thereby clog the road systems. The French were so fearful of German bombing that they absolutely refused to allow the British to take any offensive action against Germany. There are recorded incidents of the french obstructing British airfields to prevent any raids from occurring even after hostilities in the west had broken out. The French would not allow the British to lay mines in the Rhine, for fear of german aerial bombardment in retailiation. 

On the Axis side, the incessant bombing of the island of pantellerria is said to have been the result of constant air bombardment, although I have seen reports that the garrisons surrender was due to a breakdown in the water supply

So while strategically it doesnt work, ther are tactical situations that suggest it might work


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 22, 2013)

Tante Ju, if Churchill was warmongering, what were the Nazis?


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## Njaco (Jan 22, 2013)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Tante Ju, if Churchill was warmongering, what were the Nazis?



I wish I could hit 'Like" a thousand times!!!!!!!


Tante, sorry to wake you up to this fact but...Hitler and the Nazis were a WARMONGERING, EVIL REGIME during WWII.....


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## nuuumannn (Jan 22, 2013)

Regardless of his faults, History quite rightly views Winston Churchill as the man who inspired millions to stand up to the evils of Nazi-ism. The civilised World will for ever be grateful to him for this.


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## parsifal (Jan 22, 2013)

He was indeed a great leader and an inspiration to the world really. More than any man, he was responsible for the formation of the grand alliance needed to defeat a great evil. That evils was evil even to the people of germany. Just ask any rational German old enough to remember

I hope we are done with this rubbish and can get back on topic


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## nuuumannn (Jan 23, 2013)

Yes, please.

Regarding the examples of terror bombing, Parsifal, you are probably right about its effect in the examples you give, but I think these might be the exception rather than the rule. Such examples served to convince war planners of the validity of their intentions.

One factor that anyone launching a campaign against Britain has to take into account is the Royal Navy - far from sitting on the sidelines, when the s*it hits the fan, there's no doubt the home fleet would go steaming into the Channel and cause as much disruption as possible - the Kriegsmarine has not the ships to successfully conduct an invasion and counter the RN simultaneously and that's where mining might prove useful. The obvious answer is dive bombers, but with heavy fighter escort and perhaps after Fighter Command has been countered.


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## Juha (Jan 23, 2013)

Hello Tante Ju
Thanks for the memo, but where there they wrote that the idea was "to to bait the German air force into a bombing war of each others cities by provocative attacks on German towns" as you claimed in your earlier message?



Tante Ju said:


> ...Declaration of War by Britain on 3 September 1939, subsequent bombing of German towns (with many times the civillian casulties which you list above) when things turned sour in Belgium under the pretext of Rotterdam, refusal of German peace offer by the Churchill cabinet.



Again, have you any numbers on German civilian casualties in May-June 40 caused by BC bombing? The BC attacks didn't kill many German civilians in May 40, e.g. 10/11 May bombing of road and rail communications at Mönchengladbach killed 4 civilians, one of them was an Englishwoman living there. 

Juha


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## stona (Jan 23, 2013)

Njaco said:


> Basil Fawlty an emminent historian! I just spit my dinner all over the computer monitor!!!



Well he was right and he did have a fine Moose head on his wall. 

You can make a quote support more or less any view. Horst Boog does a pretty good job with Webster and Frankland!

There is a tendency for people to take themselves far too seriously,not just here. A little levity is not a bad thing.

Cheers

Steve


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## stona (Jan 23, 2013)

wiking85 said:


> Warsaw was a fortified military objective defended by military forces, so therefore was a military target. In the view of the Germans the Poles were using their civilians as shields because they were hiding in the city among them, rather than 'fighting in the field'. The 25th raid was to convince the Polish to surrender.



That argument makes every village in Britain with a LDV (Home Guard) unit a legitimate target. 

The argument now seems to be that it is perfectly okay to kill civilians in 1939/40 if you can justify this by claiming that they were inextricably mixed with a military target. Of the roughly 1,200 killed at Wielun members of the Polish military are noteable by their absence.
That is a long way from claiming to target specifically military installations and formations,despite all the various orders,minimising civilian casualties etc, to the contrary posted in this thread..

Guernica it seems was bombed for exactly the same reason as Dresden. Thank heavens we have a precedent set by the Luftwaffe 

Cheers

Steve


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## Juha (Jan 23, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> ...Unless, of course, things turn sour on the military front, in which case they shall be terror bombing. Things did turn sour in May 1940.
> 
> Or if the Germans invade Belgium, their close military ally, they would be terror bombing again. The Germans could still invade Luxemburg, or the Netherlands, that one did not count for some reason. Still, it is ironic that in the end they justified it with the bombing of a Dutch town, isn't it?



In fact Belgium wasn't anyone's military ally, close or otherwise. In October 1936, King Leopold III announced that Belgium would remain neutral in the event of another war in Europe. To this end, the Belgian government tried to steer a path away from alliances: leaving the Locarno Treaty, repudiating a defence pact with France signed in 1920 and receiving a guarantee of neutrality from Nazi Germany in 1937. One more proof the trustfulness of 3rd Reich guarantees.



Tante Ju said:


> The bombing of Norway (really? they bombed Norway?) must have to do with another of Churchill little plans to invade Norway, Operation Wilfred, formulated in September 1939 and executed in April 1940, which prompted to Germans who have found out to (and kick the French British the hell out of there) intervene....



No, Germany didn't intervene, they invade Norway. British and French came only after German invasion





Tante Ju said:


> _THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF said that it should not be imagined that the Chiefs of Staff were at all anxious to let loose unrestricted air warfare, or, indeed, *at present *to start a train of circumstances which was likely to lead to heavy retaliation on our own and the French aircraft industry. They were only recommending the attack on the Ruhr in the particular circumstances of a German invasion of Belgium., Apart from the *justification* which such a violation of neutrality would give, they felt that the moment when the German Armies were starting their advance was psychologically and militarily the right one. As regards the legality of the operation, there were no agreed rules on the subject. The Hague draft Rules had received a certain measure of acceptance. In these draft Rules "factories engaged in manufacturing distinctly military supplies" were defined as military objectives. *As the whole of the German industry was organised for the production of war material, he thought that the targets selected would come within the definition.*_
> 
> It not really hard to see where this whole discussion was going about unrestricted attacks, cracking moral, justifications and lawyering the definition of what fits into a factory manufacturing distinctly military supplies (the whole of the German industry, down to shoemakers) and fear of heavy retaliation. It is not very hard to see what these fine gentlemen were cooking in the pot - in November 1939, that is.
> 
> ...



IMHO you really read too much from the docu, as I wrote the attacks were during May 40 restricted to oil and communication targets.


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## stona (Jan 23, 2013)

Some here are quoting Boog as if he is an impeccable source on WW2 bombing campaigns whereas in fact his views have always been controversial,even within Germany (both East and West). 
When Groehler wrote that there was " a group of historians" in the Federal Republic "who tried to deny the historical responsibility of Nazism for starting the terror bombing war" he undoubtedly had Boog in mind.
Now I would be the last man to see Groehler as an unbiased source. His early work in particular is very much influenced by the politics of East Germany but it is important that the interpretations of any historian are seen in the light of competing narratives and historical context. Other German historians like Maier,Bergander,Messerschmdt (Mannfred) also took exception to Boog's views.
Irving is a historian probably more familiar to an English speaking audience who also expresses some controversial views. Some of his research is nonetheless impressive and cannot be discounted out of hand. That doesn't mean you have to agree with his conclusions!
Cheers
Steve


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## fastmongrel (Jan 23, 2013)

I have this vision of the evil British Govt using giant cartoon ACME corporation horseshoe magnets to suck the bombs out of peaceful heavily loaded LW bombers that just happened to be flying over cities. All this so that the warmongering Winston Blofeld Churchill could get on with his plans of world domination.


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## Tante Ju (Jan 23, 2013)

Njaco said:


> Tante, sorry to wake you up to this fact but...Hitler and the Nazis were a WARMONGERING, EVIL REGIME during WWII.....



They were, no doubt.


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## Njaco (Jan 23, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> They were, no doubt.



Then lets leave it at that and get back on topic.

So the orders are "Sea lion", how would everyone use the Luftwaffe?


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## Juha (Jan 23, 2013)

German civilian losses by bombing 1 June - 28 June 40
The worst incident was on 5./6. June, when there was at 20:45 an explosion at Klausthal-plant for chemicals in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, IMHO probably too early to be caused by BC but I really don't know, which killed 35-40. also 2 kids died that night in gas-pipe fire in Offenbach.
2nd worst was 3./4. June, 17 dead by bombing
then 7./8. June 13 dead, 17./18. 8 dead, 19./20. 7 dead and then 27./28. June 5 dead plus there were a few night with 1 - 2 dead.

Juha


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## stona (Jan 23, 2013)

Njaco said:


> Then lets leave it at that and get back on topic.
> 
> So the orders are "Sea lion", how would everyone use the Luftwaffe?



Whilst rebuilding strength during the phoney war or sitzkrieg update all by Bf 109s with drop tanks. They are going to need the increased range for cross channel operations. The increased range will also give them much needed tactical flexibility. 

Attack British shipping in the Channel and force the Royal Navy's destroyer force in the Channel to withdraw. This was historically accomplished.

Attack and keep attacking the Chain Home radar stations,partcularly in the South East. They could be disabled,as was historically done but the Luftwaffe has to keep coming back. Luftwaffe pilots often refer to their surprise at the British ability to have their fighters,as if by magic,in the right place at the right time. This would not be possible without the coordinated radar based air defence system masterminded by Dowding. It was a very effective force multiplier for the RAF.


Attack the RAF airfields and infrastructure. With a lack of radar the RAF will be far more vulnerable and prone to being caught on the ground. Any Air Force is more vulnerable on the ground,ask the Poles,French Russians or Americans at Pearl Harbour.

Attacks on the British aircraft industry when possible but these should not detract from the above. Do not allow the Luftwaffe to become overstretched and lose concentration of effort on specific and achievable objectives.

Finally a don't.Do not start aimlessly and randomely bombing British cities. There are all sorts of historical and doctrinal reasons why this happened,but with the benefit of hindsight it was a waste of valuable resources. British cities can be hammered,if needs be,AFTER the defeat of the RAF. It might prove useful as an added tool to convince the British to negotiate,particularly if they call your bluff and challenge you to invade.

With a bit of luck Sealion will not be needed because the prospect of landing troops on British beaches with no landing craft,no direct naval support,from Rhine barges and rubber dinghys should fill any Army commander with a deep sense of foreboding.
Compare the means at the disposal of the wermacht to make a seaborne landing in 1940 with those of the Anglo/Americans in 1944. 

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Jan 23, 2013)

Gaining control of the air over SE England and the channel was a precursor to a cross channel invasion. however, in reality perhaps the very best the Germans could hope to achieve was a slight air dominance. I do not believe that the germans had the ability to achieve air superiority in the Summaer of 1940. But it might have been possible to achieve local advantages here and there for short periods of time.

There were other constraints working againsat the germans. The first was time. With every day after Dunkirk the shattered British Army was growing stronger as it re-equiiped and re-organized. It was really too late by the end of September because by then the British were well on the way to recovery. The other thing about time is the wosening weather as the winter approached. Winter weather is going to make a cross channel invasion impossible, it will make re-supply very difficult without a functioning port in German hands.

The other constraint is the lack of landing craft, and the lack of an effective surface navy. Without either of these a seaborne attack is well nigh impoossible. Using the river barges was found post war to be a toital failure. The craft could not make the channel crossing in anything like reasonable time. Their best speed was estimated to be 2 knots, however the currents in the channel work against a crossing from the continent. Troops were expect4ed to embark from ports 80-100 miles from their targets. Optimistically, that puts the troopps in these craft for over 150 hours, before going into action against a dug in enemy with pleanty of forewarning to move reserves to the threatened sectors. Anyone who has spent any time in an LC wil know how miserable they are. If even one British DD gets into the invasion convoy, the convoy will be toast.

So a seborne attack along the lines of the historical plan was never going to work.

The only thing I see as possible would require better planning and use of resources from the middle of 1940....ie at the time of Dunkirk, or even before. What I have in mind is some sort of coup de main using the airborne troops and airlanding forces. Instead of wasting the transports and airborne forces in Holland, simply leave Holland alone. After the British Army is either trapped or evacuated from France....immediately after, like hours after reachiing the channel, Student and the 22 AL Div, along with approximately 5-6 pared down air transportable Jaeger Divs, mountain troopers or similar and are moved closer to the front. in a night operation (arriving just before dawn, the Germans execute a concentrated air assault probably on a North Sea port in the midlands like Hull. The object is to secure airfields and set up a perimeter to defnd those airfields. Approximately 2/3 of the LW is detached from the continuing fighting in France, concentrating on sea suppression. General LW units arent going to hit much, but aircraft over the North sea will have some deterrent effect on the RN. Untrained general LW air units can also work to lay defensive minefileds as quickly as possible. The RN will retaliate very strongly, and frankly I dont like the germans chances, but its a better chance than the suicidal plan they did have The idea is to send Destroyers laden with supplies by Day and transports by night. As the bridgehead builds up, the idea is to cut England in two, destroy one pocket, and then the other, from a central position in the midlands. By attacking straight after Dunkirk, the Brits have maybe 3 divs in England combat ready. The plan would require a great deal of good luck, and I dont like its chances, but is better than the historical plan.


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## stona (Jan 23, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Gaining control of the air over SE England and the channel was a precursor to a cross channel invasion. however, in reality perhaps the very best the Germans could hope to achieve was a slight air dominance. I do not believe that the germans had the ability to achieve air superiority in the Summaer of 1940. But it might have been possible to achieve local advantages here and there for short periods of time.



That's not what Dowding thought.
Of a meeting on 7th September in which he described his command as "going downhill" and at which sought the means to go downhill as slowly as possible he said.

"It was absolutely essential that the enemy should not become aware that he had materially damaged us.It was imperative that an undiminished front exist in the South East,because the enemy was feeling the strain very much at the same time,and nothing should be affoded them in the nature of encouragement."

His success was largely due to what has been described as an 'air reserve doctrine'. The decision to make the squadron the 'largest tactical unit that it will be practically expedient to employ' backed this up. As September 1940 commenced the Luftwaffe were still confronted by what they called "the RAF's last 50 fighters" but the reality was that the RAF was close to breaking. Of particular concern was the acute shortage of _ combat ready fighter_ pilots.As Dowding was at pains to explain to Douglas in the four weeks up to September 4th,despite replacements from the three OTUs,he had suffered a net loss of 68 pilots. Park added that on the same date nine of his (11 Group) squadrons had started with less than fifteen pilots. Douglas suggested opening another OTU until Dowding explained that this in itself would be a further drain on Fighter Command's resources.
Dowding wanted more repair and maintenance crews. He was pleased with the works organisation,despite the attacks only two airfields (Lympne and Manston) had been out of action for any significant time. He also wanted to move vulnerable sector control rooms away from airfields but this was proving a big headache. There were problems with everything from re-routing of communications to security,accomodation,transport and even the provision of hot meals.
Fighter Command was on the verge of collapse. A more concerted and better organised effort by the Luftwaffe might have pushed it over the edge. It is no accident that Park always considered 7th September when the Luftwaffe switched its attention from his sector airfields to London as the turning point of the battle. The Luftwaffe's losses on 15th Septenber (later to become Battle of Britain day) might have precipitated the official cancellation of 'Sealion' two days later but the decisive mistakes had already been made.
Cheers
Steve


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## parsifal (Jan 23, 2013)

what about the strains being felt on the other side. How many billets were they short? Were the Germans attacking as strongly as they had earlier (well yes, but reserves were almost gone). What were their readiness rates. I can tell you they were suffering more than our friends of the LW would have you believe. And anyway, by September it was too late to undertake an invasion wehrmacht style. It could not have been done by that time. That was shown decisvely in post war wargaming of the scenario. August was the very latest weather wise that the cros channel attempt could have been made. 

And I dont think the RAF was as close to total collapse as you think. Strained yes, worried, yes, potential to lose yes, broken absolutely not. Likley to lose, no. possible to lose, partially, but not totally. Remember, the Germans had to achieve total air domination, or supremacy. Air superiority was not enough. look at Normandy. what were the air conditions that applied over Allied beachheads in 1944? What makes the Germans any less vulnerable to disruption that they can settle for a lesser air control state


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## Njaco (Jan 23, 2013)

I get the feeling we're looking at this all in hindsight and missing out on exactly what was known at the time.

Was radar important to the LW?
Did Downing know how the LW was straining?

etc, etc, etc.....


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## stona (Jan 23, 2013)

parsifal said:


> what about the strains being felt on the other side. How many billets were they short? Were the Germans attacking as strongly as they had earlier (well yes, but reserves were almost gone). What were their readiness rates. I can tell you they were suffering more than our friends of the LW would have you believe. And anyway, by September it was too late to undertake an invasion wehrmacht style. It could not have been done by that time. That was shown decisvely in post war wargaming of the scenario. August was the very latest weather wise that the cros channel attempt could have been made.
> 
> And I dont think the RAF was as close to total collapse as you think. Strained yes, worried, yes, potential to lose yes, broken absolutely not. Likley to lose, no. possible to lose, partially, but not totally. Remember, the Germans had to achieve total air domination, or supremacy. Air superiority was not enough. look at Normandy. what were the air conditions that applied over Allied beachheads in 1944? What makes the Germans any less vulnerable to disruption that they can settle for a lesser air control state



In my scenario as Luftwaffe commander I would not let the RAF off the hook. I would have disabled the air defence system at the outset,Dowding wouldn't have to worry about his vulnerable sector control stations ,they'd be useless. The first the RAF would know of my raids was when they were seen by the (Royal) Observer Corps. They'd be lucky to get off the ground from their more southerly fields. Dowding and Park did have a scheme to use aircraft to reconnoitre incoming raids but it was abandoned for lack of suitable aircraft or suitably trained crews. If they tried that I'd be sure to deal with them too.
I would keep unrelenting pressure on Fighter Command. My Bf 109s would not be limited tactically as they were historically. They would not only escort my bombers and fast bombers (the only role I would contemplate for the Bf 110 and something it was actually good at) but would also fly "freijagd" hunting and destroying the RAF in the air,on the ground,wherever it was to be found,to paraphrase a later US commander.
If the inept and badly managed effort that The Luftwaffe made historically pushed the RAF to the brink,or even within sight of it as you suggest,then my Luftwaffe,with the benefit of hindsight,will befinitely bundle it over the edge and break it.

As I've said before,Dowding set himself the target of _not loosing_ by November 1940. He saw salvation in the shorter days and winter weather. I reckon that he could have been defeated by mid September,at the worst early August.

After that I agree with you that the chances of a successful invasion are zero or mighty close to it,but I'd have done my bit.

Cheers

Steve


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## Hop (Jan 23, 2013)

> what about the strains being felt on the other side. How many billets were they short? Were the Germans attacking as strongly as they had earlier (well yes, but reserves were almost gone). What were their readiness rates. I can tell you they were suffering more than our friends of the LW would have you believe.



Exactly. Luftwaffe SE fighter pilots fit for duty:

29 June - 806
1 August - 869
1 September - 735
29 September 676

Serviceable aircraft:

Type - 13 Aug - 7 Sept
KG - 1008 - 798
JG - 853 - 658
ZG - 189 - 112

If you compare the RAF on 13 August with the 7 September, they had more pilots and more serviceable aircraft. For the Luftwaffe the reverse is true. Readiness rates had also dropped. The Luftwaffe fought what they thought would be a short campaign with their entire strength. The RAF planned for a long campaign and kept large forces in reserve.


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## stona (Jan 23, 2013)

Njaco said:


> I get the feeling we're looking at this all in hindsight and missing out on exactly what was known at the time.
> 
> Was radar important to the LW?
> Did Downing know how the LW was straining?
> ...



True,but the question was what would I do as Luftwaffe commander? 
I do have the benefit of hindsight. The Luftwaffe intelligence under estimated Fighter Command's abilities at all levels. It did not understand the importance of Britain's integrated air defence system or it's weakest link,clearly visible along the coast. It's post raid assessments were woeful. It failed to adopt extant auxiliary fuel tank technology as early as it could have done,a mistake repeated by the 8th Air Force a few years later. It never concentrated on what should have been its primary objective,the destruction of Fighter Command,which incidentally was always going to take longer than four days! The list could go on. 
These are not mistakes that I am going to repeat.
Cheers
Steve


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## wiking85 (Jan 23, 2013)

stona said:


> That's not what Dowding thought.
> Of a meeting on 7th September in which he described his command as "going downhill" and at which sought the means to go downhill as slowly as possible he said.
> 
> "It was absolutely essential that the enemy should not become aware that he had materially damaged us.It was imperative that an undiminished front exist in the South East,because the enemy was feeling the strain very much at the same time,and nothing should be affoded them in the nature of encouragement."
> ...


 
But what were German losses up to that point? The during the BoB Luftwaffe was outnumbered in terms of fighter pilots AND fighters!

http://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=103866
This thread explores a situation in which the Germans do what you suggest in putting pressure on the British and still lose in the end. I think you'd find it stimulating, even if you can find points to pick it apart.


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## stona (Jan 23, 2013)

Hop said:


> If you compare the RAF on 13 August with the 7 September, they had more pilots and more serviceable aircraft.



Aircraft were never a serious problem. There were few ocassions when Fighter Command suffered a net weakly loss.

On 17th August Evill sent Dowding a table showing Fighter Command's pilot situation. This would contradict the statement quoted above 

"Replacements available at the moment are barely 50% of the casualties suffered in the past fortnight". (AIR16/903)

The men at the Ministry,Dowding,Park and even Douglas were all aware in late August/early September that Fighter Command was facing a crisis in_ qualified combat pilot _numbers.

At the 7th September conference Douglas had assured Park that his command would be kept up to strength with new pilots. It was Evill who explained that this couldn't happen. In the four weeks up to September 4th Fighter Command had suffered 348 casulties. The OTUs had supplied 280 pilots in that same period,a shortfall of 68,equivalent to three squadrons. This does not take account of other losses caused by accident or illness. Furthermore the OTU course had been reduced from four to two weeks which meant that some pilots were going in to combat with as few as ten hours on frontline fighters and _having never fired their guns_

Park then told Douglas that casualties in 11 Group alone were running at about 100 a week.That very day nine squadrons had started the day with fewer than 15 pilots and the previous day squadrons had been put together as composite units,a practice detested by Park,Dowding,pilots and ground crews.

Dowding interrupted Park speaking directly to Douglas.

"You must realise that we are going downhill."

Now pilots were available but not combat ready fighter pilots. Dowding could have grounded all his Blenheims and Defiants and retrained these relatively experienced men (at least compared to those emerging from the OTUs) quickly.
He could have supported the creation of more OTUs but he saw them as a drain on his limited resources and anyway preferred pilots to finish their training at operational units. In 1940 there just wasn't time for them to do this.
Dowdings pilot shortage could have been alleviated but not solved by such measures. The real problem lay over his head at the Air Ministry which was determined to maintain a large bomber force.It had also failed to expand the training system to cope with the heavy casualties inevitable in wartime.

Cheers

Steve


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## Tante Ju (Jan 23, 2013)

stona said:


> I would keep unrelenting pressure on Fighter Command. My Bf 109s would not be limited tactically as they were historically. They would not only escort my bombers and fast bombers (the only role I would contemplate for the Bf 110 and something it was actually good at) but would also fly "freijagd" hunting and destroying the RAF in the air,on the ground,wherever it was to be found,to paraphrase a later US commander.



They did exactly that, but those fighter pilots who were assigned to close escort were complaining about it very loudly (meaning a certain cigarhead here *cough cough*). Others were performing Freie Jagd at the same time. The USAAF adopted similar tactics later.

Attacking London (or other high value target) was in fact the correct tactical move as Fighter Command losses increased, German losses decreased. The RAF HAD to come up and fight, and no longer could play hide and seek, ignoring raids, nor it did have the ability to produce local superiority against the relatively smallish sized individual raids that the LW was relying on earlier. As much a Göring et. co. was criticized for it, massed bombers with overwhelming fighter escort worked well to suck the RAF into a Verdun-like bloodletting.

It was again what the USAAF employed against the Luftwaffe in 1944. It did not yield results in a few weeks (the LW had little choice in that, since a very small time table was available to them until bad wather set in second half of September) but it did made an effect in a few months.

I dare say ca. 200 bomber raids (with a manageable and protectable size bomber formation) with heavy emphasiz on fast Ju 88s (which automatically minimises exposion to slow Hurricanes, i.e. 2/3s of the RAF force) with about 400 fighters - 3 or 4 entire Jagdgeschwadern - in escort in one blob during the daylight hitting high profile targets like London combined with twice as many bombers hitting the aircraft industry and ports, no more than the top 3 targets in sequence until they are utterly destroyed during the night with precision raids would yield results relatively quickly, in about two months. The other units may rest and refit in the meanwhile and hammer the RAF in turns. Do 17 units, which had limited use due to their limited load and range should be used as night harass aircraft of airfields with 50 kg bombs, making repairs impossible. Recon work must be delegated to Bf 110s units, which are extremely hard to be intercept in the time. The LW eventually figured that out during the course of the Battle, but they did not have the benefit of hindsight, but only trial and error.

It would also make radar stations and the observer corps irrelevant as it would not matter whether the RAF knew where the Luftwaffe was, it would be physically impossible to raise and concentrate enough fighters the same airspace from various airfields (given the infancy and limitations of RAF command and control as well) in the short time, nor could they, with their equally short endurance stay in the air long enough to assemble a Mega Wing in response. The end result would be that unlike in the Battle, the RAF would always face a largely superior local LW, with predictable results.

A crash programme for 109s with drop tanks would also be a must in July, even at the expense of operations. It is needed to control the space long enough, and to assembe large raids.


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## wiking85 (Jan 23, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> They did exactly that, but those fighter pilots who were assigned to close escort were complaining about it very loudly (meaning a certain cigarhead here *cough cough*). Others were performing Freie Jagd at the same time. The USAAF adopted similar tactics later.



Yes, but you realize that the close escorts were only ordered after prohibitive bomber losses when the campaign started with 'Freijagd' missions. Initially the fighters weren't tied to bombers in July and the beginning of August, but were linked to them after losses were high despite fighter efforts.


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## Tante Ju (Jan 23, 2013)

I realize that. Freie Jagd was effective for the fighters, but often did not protect the bombers very well. It is not easy to coordinate such a thing, and with too much freedom, sooner or later the bombers would find themselves exposed to enemy fighters. As much as the German fighter pilots hated close escort, the RAF hated it even more.


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## Juha (Jan 23, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> ...Attacking London (or other high value target) was in fact the correct tactical move as Fighter Command losses increased, German losses decreased. The RAF HAD to come up and fight, and no longer could play hide and seek, ignoring raids, nor it did have the ability to produce local superiority against the relatively smallish sized individual raids that the LW was relying on earlier. As much a Göring et. co. was criticized for it, massed bombers with overwhelming fighter escort worked well to suck the RAF into a Verdun-like bloodletting...



I agree that the decision to attack London wasn't all black and white but rather complex question with pros and cons. IIRC Göring and Kesselring were for it and Sperrle against, the fact that the decision also meant transfer of some units from Sperrle to Kesselring might have had some effect on the oppinions of those two gentlemen, there were infighting inside LW high command as there were in RAF.

Juha


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## stona (Jan 23, 2013)

Freijagd with the increased endurance and tactical flexibility this bestows would be an entirely different affair to the 10/15 minutes that the Bf 109 had historically when it reached an arc running through the Thames at london.

If you have blinded the RAF by destroying the Chain Home stations the risk of effective bomber interceptions are much reduced. I'm suggesting that the Luftwaffe's Bf 109s go on the offensive. If they can catch the Spitfires and Hurricanes as they take off,climb or ideally on the ground,they are much more easily dealt with. 

As Luftwaffe commander I propose a coordinated strategy,not the historical piece meal attacks with several concurrent objectives.

1. Destroy Britain's radar based air defence system.

2. Destroy Fighter Command.

3. Bomb the crap out of Britain and hope you can force her to negotiate rather than attempt a very risky invasion.

Cheers

Steve


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## wiking85 (Jan 23, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> They did exactly that, but those fighter pilots who were assigned to close escort were complaining about it very loudly (meaning a certain cigarhead here *cough cough*). Others were performing Freie Jagd at the same time. The USAAF adopted similar tactics later.
> 
> Attacking London (or other high value target) was in fact the correct tactical move as Fighter Command losses increased, German losses decreased. The RAF HAD to come up and fight, and no longer could play hide and seek, ignoring raids, nor it did have the ability to produce local superiority against the relatively smallish sized individual raids that the LW was relying on earlier. As much a Göring et. co. was criticized for it, massed bombers with overwhelming fighter escort worked well to suck the RAF into a Verdun-like bloodletting.
> 
> ...



What about using Bf110s with bomb racks and fighter-bombers, like Erprobungsgruppe 210 did? They were historically very interceptable, as when they were on escort duty they were shot down in droves, so as a recon aircraft they would not have faired well, though probably not as bad as the other options at the time.
Ideally a FW187 recon version would be been uninterceptable, but it was no more than a prototype at that point and out unless we change things much earlier.
Anyway, using the Bf110s at night as they did 1942 would have been a much better use of the aircraft for raids on airfields and radar stations. Even during the day flying low they could zoom in and out for raids on radar stations before fighters could scramble and intercept them. IIRC it took 6 minutes from radar sighting to sending to orders to stations to scramble; CHL had a 35 mile range, which could be covered in under 2 minutes by a bombladen Bf110. The challenge would then not be fighters, but rather AAA. That would hurt, but I think they would have greater survivability in that role bombing radar than Ju87s would. 

Since the consensus seems to be that bombing Liverpool would not be successful in the long run, night attacks on RAF airfields with things like Knickebein and on radar stations with D/F gear would be the best use of the LW, other than launching bigger raids that were heavily escorted against airfields or sector stations within fighter escort range (on freijagd of course). Only Ju88s would be used during the day, while He111s and Do17 would operate at night; Bf110 fighter-bombers would be used whenever. KG100 would be brought in in July to start leading night attacks on British airfields/stations or facilities.


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## riacrato (Jan 23, 2013)

stona said:


> Freijagd with the increased endurance and tactical flexibility this bestows would be an entirely different affair to the 10/15 minutes that the Bf 109 had historically when it reached an arc running through the Thames at london.
> 
> If you have blinded the RAF by destroying the Chain Home stations the risk of effective bomber interceptions are much reduced. I'm suggesting that the Luftwaffe's Bf 109s go on the offensive. If they can catch the Spitfires and Hurricanes as they take off,climb or ideally on the ground,they are much more easily dealt with.
> 
> ...


Even if there was no single fighter left in GB, that would never be a permanent state. Fighters can be rebuild, pilots trained. The KGs can't be everywhere, all the time.

Even if the Fighter Command disintegrates (big if, even the LW Jagdwaffe didn't disintegrate until long after the invasion), GB still had the option to defend against air attacks from the ground with AAA.

Even if LW bombers roam freely, as long as the RN is around, an invasion will fail.

Even if GB negotiates for temporary peace (which I think is highly unlikely no matter what big a 'what-if' you pull), who says they won't declare war again once the US enter the war?

All in all, this is a game with no winning strategy. Based on the (by now) disproven assumption that a determined populace can be forced to surrender (or sue for peace) by air assault only. With hindsight, doing nothing in the west (in terms of offensive actions on British soil), is the best strategy. Disrupt convoys, be a major nuisance in the atlantic. But other than that, hold back, conserve your numbers and cover your bases.


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## stona (Jan 23, 2013)

The Luftwaffe raids were successfully intercepted because the RAF _saw them coming_ and had an integrated system of command and control that allowed its fighters to be in a position and altitude to meet those raids. In my scenario the RAF would be no more capable of intercepting Luftwaffe raids than the Poles or the French.

Why did squadrons scramble,trying to be airborne in minutes? Because every second counted.

If raids were not detected until they approached the South or South East coasts of England,rather than as they assembled over the French coast or North Sea that advantage is lost. The RAF might have resorted to flying standing patrols in the hope of positioning its fighters to make an interception,something Dowding considered pointless.

I can't emphasise enough that stage one of my campaign is the destruction of the Chain Home sites. Raid them until they are put out of action and then keep coming back to keep them that way. It could be done,it was done. What the Luftwaffe didn't do was attack all the sites,neither did it come back to keep those it had disabled out of action.

Cheers
Steve


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## tyrodtom (Jan 23, 2013)

Your arithmatic is a little suspect, to cover 35 miles in less than 2 minutes would require a speed of over 1000mph.

Unless you are tieing this 2 minutes in with the 6 minutes of response time .


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## stona (Jan 23, 2013)

riacrato said:


> Even if there was no single fighter left in GB, that would never be a permanent state. Fighters can be rebuild, pilots trained. The KGs can't be everywhere, all the time.
> 
> Even if the Fighter Command disintegrates (big if, even the LW Jagdwaffe didn't disintegrate until long after the invasion), GB still had the option to defend against air attacks from the ground with AAA.
> 
> ...



You are still fighting the historical scenario,not the campaign that I would wage with the benefit of hindsight.

The Battle of Britain was winnable by the Luftwaffe with some major tweaks to their strategy and some minor ones to their equipment.

Britain's problem was pilots not aeroplanes. It's much easier to keep a man down than to get him down and any sign of the green shoots of recovery from the RAF would be dealt with.

Whether Britain could be forced to terms is an entirely different question. I think that she could have been in certain circumstances. An offer whereby she conceded Europe but held on to her maritime Empire would have been appealing to many in the British elite. It's not ideal but after the series of defeats she has now,in my scenario,suffered at the hands of Germany and with her cities defenceless from aerial attack (how many Luftwaffe bombers did British AAA shoot down in 1940?) it might be seen as the lesser evil.

Cheers

Steve


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## wiking85 (Jan 23, 2013)

stona said:


> The Luftwaffe raids were successfully intercepted because the RAF _saw them coming_ and had an integrated system of command and control that allowed its fighters to be in a position and altitude to meet those raids. In my scenario the RAF would be no more capable of intercepting Luftwaffe raids than the Poles or the French.
> 
> Why did squadrons scramble,trying to be airborne in minutes? Because every second counted.
> 
> ...



Until you can sustainably knock out radar stations, which was extraordinarily difficult to do so, then you can attack during the day. But it was also helpful to have bombers that can move quickly if needed because even if the radars are down, which would require bombing them every day and avoiding the AAA traps they would become, then there will still be risks of interception that fighters cannot beat off. Also the 'round the clock bombing of airfields and radar stations would sap RAF morale, as being hit during the day, having to scramble and fight, and being bombed at night would all reduce performance. 
The BIG question is whether the LW could keep up that level of effort. The British also had mobile radar stations for coastal and inland use, so if the CH systems are knocked out the mobile units can be brought in to plug the coverage gaps. Beyond that what's to say the British would deal if the RAF is forced to pull back to more northern fields out of the range of German fighters? They could still engage German aircraft over Britain and have radar coverage from mobile stations. Churchill isn't going to be toppled because some airfields need to be temporarily abandoned. Also once the RAF withdraws from southern airfields, what are the Germans going to target? London? Once they do that then those airfields can rebuild, because they are no longer being bombed. 

Chain Home - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


> During the battle, Chain Home stations — most notably the one at Ventnor, Isle of Wight — were attacked several times between 12 and 18 August 1940. On one occasion a section of the radar chain in Kent, including the Dover CH, was put out of action by a lucky hit on the power grid. However, though the wooden huts housing the radar equipment were damaged, the towers survived owing to their open steel girder construction. Because the towers were untoppled and the signals soon restored, the Luftwaffe concluded the stations were too difficult to damage by bombing and left them alone for the remainder of the war.



Radar in World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


> Transportable Radio Unit
> While at Bawdsey, the Army Cell developed a GL system code-named Transportable Radio Unit (TRU). Pollard was the project leader. Operating at 60 MHz (6-m) with 50-kW power, the TRU had two vans for the electronic equipment plus a power van; it used a 105-ft erectable tower to support a transmitting antenna and two receiving antennas. A prototype was successfully tested in October 1937, detecting aircraft at 60-miles range; production of 400 sets designated GL Mk I started the following June. The Air Ministry adopted some of these sets as gap-fillers and emergency substitutes in the CH network.
> 
> As the war started, GL Mk I sets were used overseas by the British Army in Malta and Egypt in 1939–40. Seventeen sets were sent to France with the British Expeditionary Force; most of these were destroyed at the Dunkirk evacuation in late May 1940, but a few were captured and gave the Germans their first full information on British RDF hardware. An improved version, GL Mk II, was used throughout the war; some 1,700 sets were put into service, including over 200 supplied to the Soviet Union. Operational research found that anti-aircraft batteries using the GL averaged 4,100 rounds fired per hit, compared with about 20,000 rounds for unassisted guns.


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## wiking85 (Jan 23, 2013)

tyrodtom said:


> Your arithmatic is a little suspect, to cover 35 miles in less than 2 minutes would require a speed of over 1000mph.



Damn, you right, I calculated that all wrong. About 7.5 minutes. I'm assuming that they would cruise at about 280mph. Still, it would take too long for fighters to show up, but they could run down the Bf110s on the way back if the wanted to pursue.


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## stona (Jan 23, 2013)

tyrodtom said:


> Your arithmatic is a little suspect, to cover 35 miles in less than 2 minutes would require a speed of over 1000mph.



I'm not sure what you are referring to. 

It would take a Luftwaffe formation cruising at an optimistic 220 mph about 10-12 minutes to cross the channel at its shortest point,by no means the route always taken. The formations were actually tracked from much greater ranges giving the RAF a chance to get into position to make the interception. 
If you rely on the Observer Corps seeing the formation as it comes in across the Channel/North Sea it may well be on the most Southerly or Easterly airfields before the squadrons have even been ordered to take off. It is also very difficult for the observer to establish an accurate bearing (on which the formation is flying) until the formation is really very close.
Cheers
Steve


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## Juha (Jan 23, 2013)

And then there was also CHL radars to be destroyed.

Juha


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## wiking85 (Jan 23, 2013)

Juha said:


> And then there was also CHL radars to be destroyed.
> 
> Juha


Those don't matter because they top out at 35 miles and 800 feet high. As naval gun laying radar they had a height limitation.


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## bobbysocks (Jan 23, 2013)

stona said:


> Freijagd with the increased endurance and tactical flexibility this bestows would be an entirely different affair to the 10/15 minutes that the Bf 109 had historically when it reached an arc running through the Thames at london.
> 
> If you have blinded the RAF by destroying the Chain Home stations the risk of effective bomber interceptions are much reduced. I'm suggesting that the Luftwaffe's Bf 109s go on the offensive. If they can catch the Spitfires and Hurricanes as they take off,climb or ideally on the ground,they are much more easily dealt with.
> 
> ...



that is it exactly! and that is what you have to develope your tactics around (including the use of driop tanks) . radar gave FC the ability to direct and concentrate its defense force where the attack was coming from. without it the raf is blind. would be forced to actively patrol in order to intercept incoming EA instead of scrambling and being directed to them. that meant more planes in the air but actually less at the actual intercept point ( if they made contact at all ). initially so the LW could have initial local air supermacy. after contact would be made radio call would direct available ac in the area to reinforce the defense but the battle could be over by then. with all the plane there a gap in the defense exists elsewhere. it boils down to less rest for the RAF pilots and less maintenence for the ac. i believe the RAF would have suffered more losses this way and exhausted their resources faster and the LW would have been able to get the upper hand and capitalize on it. i wouldnt have worried about the ports too much or the navy. once you gain air supremacy you can deal with them practically unopposed... but unless you nullify the radar you dont have chance of beating britian...unless you doulble or triple your air force.


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## stona (Jan 23, 2013)

wiking85 said:


> Those don't matter because they top out at 35 miles and 800 feet high. As naval gun laying radar they had a height limitation.



I'd say 25 miles and 500 feet but I do agree.

The sets were also at the Chain Home sites so you didn't have to attack different targets.

Where does the idea that these radars were very difficult to disable come from? When the Luftwaffe actually made an effort,as at Ventnor, they were very successful. 360 foot high towers with a "curtain" array between them are vulnerable and the receivers were on 240 foot high wooden towers. A typical station had four of each. This is the most vulnerable part of the system,the transmitter buildings were well protected.

Cheers

Steve


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## Juha (Jan 23, 2013)

wiking85 said:


> Those don't matter because they top out at 35 miles and 800 feet high. As naval gun laying radar they had a height limitation.



Not according to my info "When on 200' tower or on 200' cliffs, range on target at 500' is 110 miles." Maybe my sourse is over-optimistic because maps tended to show that CHL range was only just across the Strait of Dover


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## Juha (Jan 23, 2013)

stona said:


> I'd say 25 miles and 500 feet but I do agree.



That was at the beginning



stona said:


> The sets were also at the Chain Home sites so you didn't have to attack different targets.



Not true, take a look on a map showing where the radar stations were.


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## wiking85 (Jan 23, 2013)

Juha said:


> Not according to my info "When on 200' tower or on 200' cliffs, range on target at 500' is 110 miles." Maybe my sourse is over-optimistic because maps tended to show that CHL range was only just across the Strait of Dover


Sourcing on that? My source is the wiki-article on the CHL.

Chain Home - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


> This system had shortcomings in not being able to detect aircraft at lower altitudes and thus was used in conjunction with the Chain Home Low system, or AMES Type 2 which could detect aircraft flying at minimum altitude level of 500 ft. This was further refined by the addition of Chain Home Extra Low which gave cover down to 50 ft but at short ranges of only approximately 30 miles.



The CHL (Chain Home Low) Air Defence Radar System


> By July of 1939 the CD set could detect an aircraft flying at 500 feet up to 25 miles away with very good accuracy and in August 1939, on Watson-Watt's recommendation, the Air Ministry ordered 24 CD sets from Pye Radio with the intention of placing one at each CH site. These stations became known as Chain Home Low (CHL) stations and the equipment as Radar Type 2.





stona said:


> I'd say 25 miles and 500 feet but I do agree.
> 
> The sets were also at the Chain Home sites so you didn't have to attack different targets.
> 
> ...


 The mobile radar stations were plugging the holes in the system, so could keep open the eyes of the RAF while the stations were fixed. They had several dozen IIRC in 1940 and were building many more at the time (1,200 is all of WW2). Though with less range than the CH system, they were still much harder to target thanks to being mobile and could keep the system running as needed.
The CH stations required a direct hit to knock out, which was difficult and costly to make when it was ringed with AAA.

Chain Home - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


> However, though the wooden huts housing the radar equipment were damaged, the towers survived owing to their open steel girder construction.


Radar in World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


> even a concerted effort would not have had much effect on the transmitters as their structure made them very resistant to blast, which passed through the spaces in the metal lattice.



Its a question of having the right intelligence about the power systems, which the LW did not have in WW2. Its arguable that they could have gotten all the information about the British system if they had checked the French intelligence files on the British radar, which were not destroyed during the war and sat there with all the information the Germans needed to strike. But they never even looked.


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## parsifal (Jan 23, 2013)

great discussion guys. very interesting. with regards to Dowdings comments, he did not actually say the RAF was facing defeat. He was saying he had a shortage of pilots and that his command was under strain. He did not want the LW to know that the RAF was feeling the pressure.

What is the context of those comments? At the time there were subordinates, Mallory in particular, that wanted to take more aggressive action, so as to increase the loss rates in the LW. But in committing to that sort of increased levels of activity, the RAF itself would also have its loss rates go up. This is Dowdings brilliance at its best, and something so often misunderstood. Dowding knew that the battle did not hinge on destroying the LW. it was never about that. He knew that every strike, if humanly possible had to be parried, but more importantly, that the RAF had to remain a viable force, until the poor weather set in. Why? So that the Luftwaffe could not gain initially air superiority, and then air supremacy to facilitate the invasion. 

But Dowding was not saying directly that they were close to defeat. he was just telling his more impulsive subordinates (and political bosses) to cool it for a while. 

There were people in the RAF and the government that were deeply affronted by Dowdings responses to their demands for more asserive action. Dowding suffered as a consequence. 

Moreover, fighting the scenario with the benefit of hindsight is not a valid way to extrapolate the battle. If you give one side a free hand to respond to history, you have to give the other side some quid pro quo. Saying the germans have the benefits of hindsight and the British dont, in such a close battle as the BoB, can lead to just one outcome.

As far as target choices were concerned, the radar stations, the airfields, London, they were all valid targets. But the LW went for any and all of them, and as a consequence did no telling damage to any of them. as far as the radar stations were concerned, they were found to be an exceptionally hard target to knock out (at least permanently. And being a pin point target made them hard to hit and easy to defend. i think it relevant that the allies did not respond with a like strategy when they went on the offensive. Neither was it a focus in any other campaign where radar was important (which is just about all of them).


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## Milosh (Jan 23, 2013)

wiking85 said:


> Sourcing on that? My source is the wiki-article on the CHL.



I don't know why you are using Wiki when I posted a better source in Post#128.
Radar Pages Home page


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## wiking85 (Jan 23, 2013)

Milosh said:


> I don't know why you are using Wiki when I posted a better source in Post#128.
> Radar Pages Home page



I used that in my post too:
The CHL (Chain Home Low) Air Defence Radar System
From you source on CHL:


> n 1936 the War Office had established a small group at Bawdsey under Dr. E. T. Paris and Dr. A. B. Wood. This group had been working on gun-laying (GL) radar for antiaircraft guns and coastal defence (CD) radar for the direction of coastal artillery. The CD equipment worked on the higher frequency of 180-210 MHz and the aerial comprised of a broadside 32 dipole array that produced a narrow beam in both azimuth and elevation. By July of 1939 the CD set could detect an aircraft* flying at 500 feet up to 25 miles away* with very good accuracy and in August 1939, on Watson-Watt's recommendation, the Air Ministry ordered 24 CD sets from Pye Radio with the intention of placing one at each CH site. These stations became known as Chain Home Low (CHL) stations and the equipment as Radar Type 2.



CHL had very limited height and very limited range. It couldn't replace CH if it went down.


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## Balljoint (Jan 23, 2013)

The RAF heard them coming with its earliest warning system; LW radio checks prior to takeoff.


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## wiking85 (Jan 23, 2013)

Balljoint said:


> The RAF heard them coming with its earliest warning system; LW radio checks prior to takeoff.


Every single time? From what I can remember they only used that for night operations, rather than during the BoB.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Britain#Effect_of_signals_intelligence


> According to F. W. Winterbotham, who was the senior Air Staff representative in the Secret Intelligence Service,[129] Ultra helped establish the strength and composition of the Luftwaffe's formations, the aims of the commanders[130] and provided early warning of *some* raids.


So it seems it wasn't for every raid only some of them.


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## Juha (Jan 23, 2013)

Hello Viking
source is Radar Types

If you look a good map on British radar stations you will see that max for CHL seems to have been 50+ mls, which is in line with The Early Days of Radar in the UK
Notes for talks by Dr W.H. Penley, which can be found from the net.

I wonder how limited the CHL was in height, because at least 43 naval fire control radars could see heavy shells in flight whose trajectories rose rather high during longer range firing

Juha


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## wiking85 (Jan 23, 2013)

This gets back to my point that fighting the BoB is not a successful strategy for Germany. Bombing Liverpool/other ports and mining was the best option available in 1940-1.


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## Juha (Jan 23, 2013)

wiking85 said:


> ...So it seems it wasn't for every raid only some of them.



That was a different thing, my quess is that Balljoint means Y-Service, LW used the same system later on, simply noticing that many aircrews checked their radios indicated that a raid was soon coming.


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## riacrato (Jan 23, 2013)

stona said:


> You are still fighting the historical scenario,not the campaign that I would wage with the benefit of hindsight.
> 
> The Battle of Britain was winnable by the Luftwaffe with some major tweaks to their strategy and some minor ones to their equipment.
> 
> ...



And my point is: Even if you win a battle of britain, where do you go from there? Hoping they will come to terms wehn you can put no real pressure on them (i.e. boots on the ground) is a risky endeavour considering the loss in equipment and pilots you are willing to take.


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## nuuumannn (Jan 23, 2013)

> Even if you win a battle of britain, where do you go from there? Hoping they will come to terms wehn you can put no real pressure on them (i.e. boots on the ground) is a risky endeavour considering the loss in equipment and pilots you are willing to take.



That is a good question Riacriato and the answer is a tough one, but that's what strategists are for (which is what we are doing here); to aswer the tough questions. The only answer is subjugation through invasion. If the pressure of the attacks discussed abated, Britain would soon rebuild, not to mention enlist assistance from its Commonwealth. Essentially, any such attack without invasion would be ultimately fruitless and regardless of which course was taken, what would evolve is a war of attrition; who can maintain the hard losses the longest.

The only way that such a campaign would succeed is if all resources were poured into achieving the objective, which is the destruction of the RAF and Britain's war making industries (including ports, factories etc). The Luftwaffe would need a constant supply of bombers, fighters, recon aircraft, ammunition, pilots, support crews etc, otherwise, as you say, where do we go from here? This would obviously clash with resources required for the sustaining of an invasion, but if the objective is to be achieved, then this is necessary.

"_Kampf gegen England, meine Herren_..."


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## michaelmaltby (Jan 23, 2013)

"... a risky endeavour considering the loss in equipment and pilots you are willing to take."

Nothing - in terms of risk - compared to Barbarossa - the following June.

Let's be blunt here. If Hitler and the High Command can't bring England to "peace" after all the gains in Western Europe including Poland, then all future activities are doomed. Absolutely doomed.

We know that Hitler needed to secure economic "spoils" to keep the domestic economy from imploding [Adam Tooze]. Russia was a far larger prize than Britain - in terms of resources - but if you can't bend Britain to your will, where are you ...?

If you can't secure air supremacy over the RAF, where are you?

MM


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## TheMustangRider (Jan 23, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> The only way that such a campaign would succeed is if all resources were poured into achieving the objective, which is the destruction of the RAF and Britain's war making industries (including ports, factories etc). The Luftwaffe would need a constant supply of bombers, fighters, recon aircraft, ammunition, pilots, support crews etc, otherwise, as you say, where do we go from here? This would obviously clash with resources required for the sustaining of an invasion, but if the objective is to be achieved, then this is necessary.



In other words a prioritized and sustained bombing campaign against Britain and its capacity to wage war more or less in the lines of what the USSAAF and BC did for the latter part of the war against Germany without diverting to other fronts.
That is something on which I could agree.

I too would opt to starve GB out of the war with a pre-war enhanced U-boat fleet; a suggestion out of the realm of the subject in hand I'm afraid.


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## nuuumannn (Jan 23, 2013)

> a suggestion out of the realm of the subject in hand I'm afraid.



And out of the realm of reality as well. The U-boat force was too small in number to impose a naval blockade against British shipping, let alone the RN. Not only that but in mid 1940 the Germans were still struggling with ineffectual torpedoes.



> If you can't secure air supremacy over the RAF, where are you?



Precisely. The destruction of Fighter Command has to be the first priority in establishing air superiority. These things the Germans had intended to do in 1940, of course, but they just didn't or couldn't carry it through.


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## meatloaf109 (Jan 23, 2013)

After 14 pages of discussion, it still comes down to the basics, (with the benifit of hindsight,) eliminate the radar, don't get sidelined on retallitory strikes on London, and keep up the pressure on the R.A.F. Done deal.


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## Njaco (Jan 23, 2013)

Thats only if the objective and orders are to attack GB. England wasn't an ideological enemy of the Third Reich - so, if Sea Lion is cancelled, I can shepherd my forces for the true enemy of Nazi Germany - Russia (well, thats what the thinking was!) In the meantime, use a few Geschwaders as a holding force on the Western Front and complete the sweep of the Med and North Africa before continuing on to Russia.

I know - I'm very simplistic.


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## nuuumannn (Jan 23, 2013)

The thing about Barbarossa is that it shouldn't have been as big a surprise as it was to the world; Hitler mentions Lebensraum in the East in Mein Kampf. It was always his objective.


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## wiking85 (Jan 23, 2013)

meatloaf109 said:


> After 14 pages of discussion, it still comes down to the basics, (with the benifit of hindsight,) eliminate the radar, don't get sidelined on retallitory strikes on London, and keep up the pressure on the R.A.F. Done deal.



Not really; no one has demonstrated that defeating Fighter Command would force Britain from the war.


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## nuuumannn (Jan 23, 2013)

> I know - I'm very simplistic.



Often the best way to look at stuff, Chris; cuts through the BS.


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## nuuumannn (Jan 23, 2013)

> no one has demonstrated that defeating Fighter Command would force Britain from the war.



No one has stated that that alone would do so either. The key is a sustained bombing campaign against British industry. In order to do this without hindrance, Fighter Command has to be eliminated as first priority. This is how the LW intended on waging the war against Britain.


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## wiking85 (Jan 23, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> No one has stated that that alone would do so either. The key is a sustained bombing campaign against British industry. In order to do this without hindrance, Fighter Command has to be eliminated as first priority. This is how the LW intended on waging the war against Britain.


It wasn't necessary, as the Blitz showed; British industry was bombed at night with accuracy early on thanks to the guidance beams. They of course degraded, but area attacks did affect British industry, as it did when the RAF bombed the Ruhr in 1943. Not engaging in the Battle of Britain would preserve bomber strength for a sustained bomber campaign against British industry at night. Whether or not people accept that bombing the big ports would matter, the technology and skills existed for the Germans to hit targets at night. Part of the problem with targeting specific industries though is really poor intelligence on where factories were and what they produced. Shadow factories were not even known to the Germans, so they couldn't be targeted. So frankly I think this too is a non-starter.
Bombing the big port cities like Liverpool, Avonmouth, Glasgow, and Swansea had higher return potential than trying to target specific industries or beating the RAF, especially considering the Luftwaffe's weakness in the wake of the French campaign and the coming Russian campaign.


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## parsifal (Jan 23, 2013)

wiking85 said:


> Not really; no one has demonstrated that defeating Fighter Command would force Britain from the war.



No-one has conclusively shown that FC was likley to be defeated. There were a few quotes from Dowding, that dont add up FC facing defeat, there has been some rather sweeping statements about "taking out" the radar stations, when this was never really achieved. There has been some discussion about the value of alternative targets, like London (where tante makes some uncharacteristically inciteful comments about targetting London forces the RAF up), but nowhere do i see anyone "nailing it" that FC was likely to be defeated by this strategfy or that....people keep assuming that in a hypothetical like this only one side has the right to interpret history. Wrong. Properly gamed out, if an operational plan was being worked out, one simply has to consider all possible and plausible alternatives. sort of "If I do this, what is the likley response from the enemy", or "is it possible or likley that the enemy (in this case the british) will take action or make provision proactively, that is, do something before we even do anything" 

The case is far from proven that FC was likley to be defeated. Very far from it ........


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## nuuumannn (Jan 23, 2013)

> The case is far from proven that FC was likely to be defeated.



Couldn't agree more; the LW's plans began to unravel as soon as the realities of their weaknesses dawned on them. The LW lost the BoB in as much as FC 'won' it.

As for the bombing of British industry during the Blitz by the LW - the raids against British industry were devastating, but far from crippling. The biggest mileage the LW got out of the Blitz was propaganda after the bombing of Coventry, despite the strategic benefits of attacking the likes of Hillington, Glasgow (which was a Rolls Royce shadow factory - the Germans were aware of _some_ of them), because they did not continue and maintain strategic attacks on those facilities. Evidence of this is the fact that the bombing campaign on Britain did not resume in ernest after the Blitz until after D-Day with the V-1s. The Germans could not do it conventially, so had to bring in the Vergeltungswaffen.

As for the beams, yes they certainly did help, but the LW did not use them to their full potential before the British counteracted them - they did more than degrade them - they rendered them useless to the Germans. Knickebein was countered in mid 1940 but the LW heads did not want to take responsibility for notifying Goering for at least two months after the British had 'bent' the 'crooked leg' and continued using it even after the British had jammed its signals. By the time of Coventry the British had worked out that X-Gerat was transmitted on centimetric wavelengths, but got the frequency wrong. During the Coventry raid, there was a jamming signal broadcast, but it was too weak and did not interfere with the German signals from the main land, so the devastation happened. The idea that Churchill was witholding information for fear of exposing Ultra and knew that Coventry was going to be bombed is false. The British knew that either Birmingham, Coventry or Wolverhamption would be targets at that time. Since B'ham had recently been bombed it was fifty-fifty. The night of the raid, Churchill returned to London fearing a large attack against the capital, but the British were not 100% certain which of the two cities was next.


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## stona (Jan 24, 2013)

My premise for the defeat of Fighter Command,which I have repeated several times,is based on the destruction of the RAF's command and control system. This is now a pre-requisite of any modern aerial campaign.
It is essential to destroy the Chain Home sites and the Luftwaffe demonstrated historically that this was possible. It wasn't done because the Luftwaffe didn't understand and under estimated their importance to Britain's air defence system and _never made a coordinated effort to disable them_

The anti radar attack of 12th August which tore a 100 mile wide gap in British radar coverage was never repeated.

Goering:

“It is doubtful whether there is any point in continuing the attacks on radar sites, in view of the fact that not one of those attacked has so far been put out of action.”

Infact he was wrong,some had been put out of action (Rye,Pevensey,Dover for a short period,Ventnor for three days) and wrong again,he should have continued with the attacks.

On 7th August a Luftwaffe intelligence report had already demostrated that they just didn't get it. 

“As the British fighters are controlled from the ground by radio-telephone, their forces are tied to their respective ground stations and are thereby restricted in mobility, even taking into consideration the probability that the ground stations are partly mobile. Consequently the assembly of strong fighter forces at determined points and at short notice is not to be expected.”

Of course that is exactly what Chain Home did enable the RAF to do.

Without this system the familiar voice of sector controllers immortalised in various movies....."Blue leader I have some trade for you,60+ bandits,Angels one five,vector one six zero" ....becomes the self same controller picking up another telephone to be told...."Sir we have reports that they are bombing Hawkinge".


Fighter Command wouldn't know where the Luftwaffe attacks were heading or even the strength of the attacks _until it was too late to intercept them _with fighters already at altitude and in approximately the correct position.
People are quoting the historical Luftwaffe losses as evidence of its diminishing strength,which is historically correct,but in my scenario the RAF are not making the interceptions and my Luftwaffe losses are much reduced.

That is how Fighter Command could have been defeated. I am not repeating the historical campaign and it doesn't really matter whether we agree or disagree on just how close run that was. I won't be making the same mistakes.

Cheers

Steve


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## fastmongrel (Jan 24, 2013)

The problem with saying knock out Chain Home is its a Hydra a vast effort was expended in knocking a 100 mile gap in the coverage. Well the next day you have to try and knock out the others whilst you are doing that the initial damage is being repaired. That effort has to be carried out again and again because even the stupid incompetent Brits will notice what you are trying to do and will do something about it. 

Every time the LW manages to knock out a CH tower a couple of CHL units appear to help plug the gap. You are asking your dimishing Ju87 and Ju88 force to day after day dive into an ever growing storm of AAA. Every gun that could be spared would be set up near CH towers, even Dads Army with a WWI Lewis machine gun loaded with tracer is going to be there. The RAF controllers know where you are going to be even without complete cover and will not stand back and let your divebombers get there unopposed.

Thats the problem with what ifs they are always based on the opposition doing nothing about it or blindly carrying on doing as in real time. Knocking out CH is the right thing to do its just not going to be easy or quick and by the time you are finished the south coast is going to be littered with smoking aircraft. Just look at the experiences of the RAF and USAAF in 45 when they tried to catch Me262 taking off and landing if you want to see what happens when aircraft fly into concentrated AAA fire and they were flying low and fast in well armoured aircraft not slow moving dive bombers.


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## riacrato (Jan 24, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> The only answer is subjugation through invasion. If the pressure of the attacks discussed abated, Britain would soon rebuild, not to mention enlist assistance from its Commonwealth. Essentially, any such attack without invasion would be ultimately fruitless and regardless of which course was taken, what would evolve is a war of attrition; who can maintain the hard losses the longest.


Exactly.



> The only way that such a campaign would succeed is if all resources were poured into achieving the objective, which is the destruction of the RAF and Britain's war making industries (including ports, factories etc). The Luftwaffe would need a constant supply of bombers, fighters, recon aircraft, ammunition, pilots, support crews etc, otherwise, as you say, where do we go from here? This would obviously clash with resources required for the sustaining of an invasion, but if the objective is to be achieved, then this is necessary.
> 
> "_Kampf gegen England, meine Herren_..."


Yes, and seeing how long it took two giant bomber forces better equipped for strategic warfare to have any meaningful impact on the German war industry, we are now talking about years of attacks, development of new equipment and strategies and so forth. I don't see that happening without essentially abandoning any expansion plans to the east for years to come. So you either change your whole _Weltanschauung_ and declare the Soviets not so evil after all or you risk Stalin and his quickly expanding red army pulling their own Barbarossa on you, while you are occupied with an exhaustive strategic air war. Option 1 is not a bad idea, but not likely to happen with the Nazis in charge.

And in the meantime there's also one of the largest, best equipped and most experienced navys you have to destroy before any invasion can even be prepared.


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## stona (Jan 24, 2013)

The historical attack on Chain Home of 12th August was a moderate success,the specific attack one on Ventnor a complete success. That sort of pressure would need to be kept up over several days. The task in itself becomes much easier when the defenders can't see you coming as other nations without the benefit of a properly coordinated air defence system discovered.

The attack that disabled Dover,Rye and Pevensey (and failed to disable Dunkirk (the one near Canterbury) ) was carried out by a mere 16 Bf 110s. Not a massive effort by any stretch of the imagination. This is real world,not the famous 1967 film with its radio controlled Stukas 

The blind spot created led to successful attacks on Lympne (which faulty Luftwaffe intelligence was unaware was an emergency satellite field) and Hawkinge.
Portsmouth was also heavily bombed by a force which, even when detected by the Poling Chain Home station,the British could not ascertain where it was heading. Another undetected smaller force bombed Ventnor. Fifteen 500Kg bombs hit the station destroying the transmitter array and "demolishing almost every structure on the ground" according to Patrick Bishop. The station was only partially repaired by the 15th.
_It could be done_ .It should have been done. It was a campaign losing blunder not to do it.

I already posed a question about Britishh AAA capabilities in 1940. Here it is again,how many Luftwaffe bombers (including dive bombers) did British AAA shoot down in 1940? 

From my own family history I know that when AAA in the Oxford parks opened fire on some passing Luftwaffe aircraft the resultant damage to windows and roofs from concussion and falling splinters caused angry letters to the local press demanding that the guns desist unless the Germans were actually dropping bombs!

I don't believe the destruction of British industry was a prerequisite of negotiations. I think that is an overestimation of the British resolve to continue no matter what the cost. Britain is a democracy and a compromise "let's save what we can from this situation" mentality is not inconceivable,particularly with guarantees for the Empire.

I think this thread has run its course,though if anyone knows how many bombers British AAA shot down in 1940 I'd like to know as I can't find a figure. 

If I was Hermann Goering I would run my air war against "England" very differently and with a much greater chance of success.

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Jan 24, 2013)

x


stona said:


> My premise for the defeat of Fighter Command,which I have repeated several times,is based on the destruction of the RAF's command and control system. This is now a pre-requisite of any modern aerial campaign.
> It is essential to destroy the Chain Home sites and the Luftwaffe demonstrated historically that this was possible. It wasn't done because the Luftwaffe didn't understand and under estimated their importance to Britain's air defence system and _never made a coordinated effort to disable them_
> 
> The anti radar attack of 12th August which tore a 100 mile wide gap in British radar coverage was never repeated.
> ...



but this well illustrates one of the faulty premises in your plan, and it gets back to the quid pro quo i mentioned. if the LW did start to "get it" regarding the radar system, it would show up months or years of careful intell gathering to do so, which inevitably would show up in their various communications on the matter, including in their signal traffic, which the british had been reading since at least april. Time enough for the british to significantly harden and beef up the defences around these station, provide back up systems, and the like. and the british were fully aware of the impprtance of these stations to their air defence network.

moreover, despite this 'hundred mile gap' that you mention, the LW lacked the strength to exploit that gap as well as neutralize the whole system, and in any case there was no "gap created at all, since the RAFs C&C system did have adequate back ups within their system. It wasnt the radars that were the keystone to the RAF command, it was the sector system that it supported. take out one or two radars and you certainly downgrade it, but you dont destroy it. A weakened or downgraded C&C is not a destroyed C&C, and effort needed to subjugate those radars means less availability for exploitation. if the defences are stiffened/hardened, that means greater durability, more flexibility, more losses for the LW. Translates to even more resources needed to subjugate the or eliminate the sytem. which i think was an unatainable goal anyways.


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## parsifal (Jan 24, 2013)

stona said:


> I already posed a question about Britishh AAA capabilities in 1940. Here it is again,how many Luftwaffe bombers (including dive bombers) did British AAA shoot down in 1940?
> If I was Hermann Goering I would run my air war against "England" very differently and with a much greater chance of success.
> 
> Cheers
> ...



In response to the first issue, deighton says that conservatively during the whole of 1940, British AA shot down 400 german a/c. Dont how many of that number were bombers.

However, the primary role of flak is not shooting down enemies, its to disrupt enemy bombing accuracy. Even poor AA can do that .

in relation to your second claim, you might run it differently and succeed in alerting the british of your plans. you have most definately not shown that the destruction of the chain home system was possible, have not shown that british c7c was utterly dependant on that system, and have failed to consider the quid pro quos of your actions.

Case is not proven or shown likley at all in my opinion


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## stona (Jan 24, 2013)

Well I've had enough of this now but there was a gap created on 12 August which the Luftwaffe exploited in its attacks on Lympne,Hawkinge,Portsmouth and Ventnor which were not tracked and not intercepted before they bombed,something that both Dowding and Park always tried to achieve. On 17th September Leigh Mallory reported to Dowding on wing patrols,including Baders fanciful claims. On Park's copy of the report he has simply noted "Did these wings engage before targets were bombed?" (Mason,"Battle over Britain" and Higham,"Royal Air Force") The answer of course was no.

A case of "Sir,we have reports that they are bombing Portsmouth".

After the attacks on Chain Home and the airfields a force of more than 100 Ju 88s of KG 51,120 Bf 110s of ZG 2 and 25 Bf 109s of JG 53 formed up over the French coast _completely undetected _.
They were well on the way to their target by the time (11.45 am) they were finally detected by Poling. The Observer Corps was unsure where they were going,first reports suggested the Brighton area. In fact 70 Ju 88s bombed Portsmouth unintercepted. When the RAF arrived they did not chance Portsmouth's flak but attacked the withdrawing force shooting down one Ju 88 which crashed off Bognor Regis. The Ventnor attack was also unintercepted. 609 squadron finally arrived to find a large number (they said 200) German aircraft over the island.

If that's not a hole in the radar coverage I don't know what is.

The sector control system is almost useless without the radar. With out its "long range vision" the system did not have time to react to the incoming raids effectively.

I'd be amazed if British AAA shot down 1 in 5 Luftwaffe aircraft in the period. Even if it did,that's not going to compensate for the destruction of Fighter Command who presumably destroyed the other 4 out of 5.

Cheers

Steve


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## Njaco (Jan 24, 2013)

I have to go with Stona's working theory.

With hindsight - mind you - I would still go for the radar. I see alot of "If you do this, you will fail because...." Well, maybe I would and maybe I wouldn't. We do know what happened when a hap-hazard effort was made on the radar chain. What would happen if a concentrated 2 week effort was made? I think its possible that a serious break/gap in the system would allow the LW to concentrate for 2 or 3 weeks on the airfields - the proper ones not the satellite (hindsight is wonderful!)

With all the facts present, you still need some "Lets just do it" attitude - you might succeed.


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## wiking85 (Jan 24, 2013)

stona said:


> My premise for the defeat of Fighter Command,which I have repeated several times,is based on the destruction of the RAF's command and control system. This is now a pre-requisite of any modern aerial campaign.
> It is essential to destroy the Chain Home sites and the Luftwaffe demonstrated historically that this was possible. It wasn't done because the Luftwaffe didn't understand and under estimated their importance to Britain's air defence system and _never made a coordinated effort to disable them_
> 
> The anti radar attack of 12th August which tore a 100 mile wide gap in British radar coverage was never repeated.
> ...


 
Alright, let's assume your premise is true, that the LW is able to smash a hole in the radar screen and starts bashing up the airfields of FC badly enough to force them to withdraw from some of the southern fields; what then?
Can you take me from the point of how this causes Britain to accept peace terms?


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## nuuumannn (Jan 24, 2013)

Yep, I think you got it, Chris; such an attack on the UK was a bold premise not to be taken lightly and if you are going to commit, it has to be wholeheartedly. Naturally there would be continuous attacks on Britain's radar network; it makes sense to do so, whether you understand how the network works or not. As Steve mentioned, even taking out one or two aerials would allow raids to be missed until it was too late, which could be used to your advantage.

You could also do what the British did and 'listen' electronically for radio signals emanating from the radar and come up with an attempt to create jamming equipment, or even throw 'window' from your bombers to disrupt and confuse the radar, which would partially remove the threat of detection. Bombing isn't always the only means of disabling a C3 network. If you have scientists that could concoct something as clever as X-Gerat, you can come up with a means of countering Britain's radio signals, if you put your mind to it.

As for the Nazis, Riacriato, when you analyse what went wrong and why, you begin to wonder what could they possibly have hoped to achieve with all that they did. Their actions were bold and brazen, often clever, but it was all for nothing. The Nazis chose two countries to invade that have steadfastly resisted multiple attempts at invasion throughout history; Russia and the British Isles. They opened up a war on more than one front, which Hitler had been warned against doing by his own senior staff and the whole mess degenerated into a war of attrition, which Germany could not sustain. Her armed forces were not designed for it, although they did a pretty good job of adapting to new threats.


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## nuuumannn (Jan 24, 2013)

> what then?



Gotterdammerung. No less.


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## stona (Jan 24, 2013)

wiking85 said:


> Alright, let's assume your premise is true, that the LW is able to smash a hole in the radar screen and starts bashing up the airfields of FC badly enough to force them to withdraw from some of the southern fields; what then?
> Can you take me from the point of how this causes Britain to accept peace terms?



Not just the southern airfields.
My Bf 109s have drop tanks. I will go after the RAF wherever it goes. After my initial victories I want to be able to bomb the North and Midlands unmolested too. I don't want my Norwegian based units to receive the same nasty surprise that they did historically.

I don't think that defeating Fighter Command is the biggest leap in this scenario. I honestly believe that it could have been accomplished and with very minor changes to the equipment that the Luftwaffe already had. The campaign would be fought very differently,but isn't hindsight a wonderful thing?

Would this have forced Britain to negotiate? I don't know and there is no way of knowing,this is a bigger leap into the unknown. I think it is possible,not probable. I don't discount the possibility out of hand. There is plenty of evidence that not everyone in Britain felt the way Churchill did. Mind you,during the London Blitz you'd expect Londoners to complain most about the bombing. The Whitehall eavedroppers recorded that what people were moaning most about was ...... the weather!


It certainly represents Germany's best chance of getting Britain out of the war. A seaborne invasion I believe to have been impossible for the Wermacht in 1940.

Cheers

Steve


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## nuuumannn (Jan 24, 2013)

> The Whitehall eavedroppers recorded that what people were moaning most about was ...... the weather!



Not much has changed in the intervening years!


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## stona (Jan 24, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> Not much has changed in the intervening years!



Some things never change 
Steve


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## parsifal (Jan 24, 2013)

The attacks delivered 12 August did not see any major breakthroughs for the Luftwaffe. Certainly the specialist precision bombing experts of Erprobungsgruppe 210 managed to temporarily knock out four stations through which poured Ju88s and Ju87s. Ventnor was the most significantly damaged radar site, and Manston came in for some real punishment. But in the air the LW did not significantly do any better in th air than they had done on any preceding battle. The RAF lost 21 a/c, some on the ground, to the LW 27. Thats pretty consistent with the average for the whole campaign.

Kesselring in fact pointed out how poinltess it was to attack the radar stations. There was no loss of ability in the air, but some loss of ability to concentrate, or get airborne in time. Since the primary objective at that point was to destroy the RAF as a viable force, what was the point of destroying their ability to get airborne. The Luftwaffe needed to get the british into the air, and destroy the supply of pilots. Bombing airfields and sector stations doesnt do that. it destroys aircraft (not many though, and most werent even fighters) and does little or nothing in reducing the number of precious pilots. It does not reduce the effectiveness of individual pilots in the air, and does not completely affect the ability of the RAF to respond. And, the much vaunted "breakthrough" did what????? By next morning all but ventnor was in action, and the RAF airborne. The LW did sc*w up their attacks on the 13th, but putting that aside, ther is NO evidence that the RAF had suffered any significant downgrading in capability as a result of those attacks.


The importance of the radar was not that it assisted in the vectoring of aircraft so much, as it allowed the British to shift airborne reserves from one sector of the battle to another. In essence it gave their forces "mobility"to move around and engage. But by the 15th August that was largely an academic argument. Dowding and park were so short of reserves that they could not afford to concentrate significantly. most attacks in Mid Aigust were never greater than squadron strength. In those situations, tha advantages of radar were limited, if any. FC was still receiving reports from the observer Corps and undamaged radars and were still able to mount an effective defence.

Attacks on the Radar stations might have yielded better results, if the germans had the strehgth to both suppreess all the radars (or a significant number of them) and push through to absolutley obliterate all the airfilds so that the airborne RAF could not land on. There was little or no prospect of that ever happening. 

Sustained attacks on the radars as a means of defeating the RAF is a populist myth in my opinion. There was no way for the LW to defeat the RAF. Except by invasion


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## stona (Jan 24, 2013)

Good grief,I wonder why Dowding,and others,expended so much time and effort in convincing the treasury to stump up the cash for it if it wasn't really a vital part of his air defence system. They could have saved some money,actually quite a lot of money 

The invention of radar in 1935 revolutionised fighter tactics. Previously patrols and sweeps were the only reliable way of finding enemy aircraft. The experiments with sound detection,demonstrated to Dowding at Greatstone succeeded only in identifying a milkman's horse and cart. Radar promised much in the mid 1930s and by giving early warning the hope was that it would eliminate the need for standing patrols,wearing out engines,wasting fuel and tiring air crews.

Radar allowed what came to be called "forward interception". It was demonstrated in a series of 1936/1937 experiments at Biggin Hill. The conclusions are clear.

"Provided that the sector operations room could be supplied with the position of bombers at one minute intervals,correct to within two miles,it should be possible to direct fighter aircraft to within three miles of them. This is sufficient to ensure interception in average conditions of visibility."

It was absolutely vital for tracking the incoming bombers and for vectoring the fighters to intercept those bombers,you are incorrect to state otherwise. This is how it worked as a force multiplier.

The Observer Corps could only track and estimate a formations height when it was far too late to launch an interception.It took a SpitfireI what,about seven minutes to reach 15,000 feet after it took off? Nearly ten minutes to 20,000 feet. Radar gave them the time to get there. 

According to the official Signals historian if these experiments had not been initiated (by Tizard and Dowding) in July 1936 then, "it is doubtful whether Fighter Command could have been adequately prepared for the Battle of Britain."

You may poo poo the significance of radar in the integrated system,even call it a "populist myth" but I haven't seen an explanation of how Fighter Command was to manage its interceptions without it. The entire strategy of forward interception so successfully used by Park throughout the battle was based on radar detection.

Cheers

Steve


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## Ascent (Jan 24, 2013)

If you're going for the Radars, and it will be obvious that's what you're doing, then I shall straight away improve the AA defences. Historically they may not have been very effective but here we know what targets you're going for and if you're going to have any chance of hitting such a relativly small target you're going to have to do it at low level making you an easier target. It may not destroy you but it may well put your aim off.

Would barrage ballons affect the CH system? unfortunatley I don't know enough about the subject to say. If not then you can bet hundreds of those would be going up.

Next thing I'll do is start setting up dummy transmitters. Can you afford to ignore these new transmitters? Have the British developed a new system? now your effort is diluted.

Would all this make a difference? Well it is a what if. I'm not saying that your plan wouldn't work but I doubt it would be as plain sailing as you seem to be suggesting. As soon as you try something different your opponent will react, they're not just going to sit there and do nothing.


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## wiking85 (Jan 24, 2013)

Ascent said:


> If you're going for the Radars, and it will be obvious that's what you're doing, then I shall straight away improve the AA defences. Historically they may not have been very effective but here we know what targets you're going for and if you're going to have any chance of hitting such a relativly small target you're going to have to do it at low level making you an easier target. It may not destroy you but it may well put your aim off.
> 
> Would barrage ballons affect the CH system? unfortunatley I don't know enough about the subject to say. If not then you can bet hundreds of those would be going up.
> 
> ...



There was a reason the Ju87 was removed from the BoB; it was taking too many losses from the RAF AND AAA around radar sites. AAA was pretty dangerous to the necessary low level attacks that the Germans had to launch to actually hit and knock out the stations.

The dummy transmitters I think could be discerned easily because they won't be generating a signal and the Germans could hear the signals coming from the stations.


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## Ascent (Jan 24, 2013)

When I say dummy transmitters I do mean something kicking out a signal of some kind. It doesn't haave to be a usable signal just something that will get noticed.


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## wiking85 (Jan 24, 2013)

Ascent said:


> When I say dummy transmitters I do mean something kicking out a signal of some kind. It doesn't haave to be a usable signal just something that will get noticed.



Then all it would lack would be the receivers; for that level of effort it would just make more sense to build more stations and add the receivers, which IIRC were the easier part of the equation to add to the set up.


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## Juha (Jan 24, 2013)

stona said:


> Well I've had enough of this now but there was a gap created on 12 August which the Luftwaffe exploited in its attacks on Lympne,Hawkinge,Portsmouth and Ventnor which were not tracked and not intercepted before they bombed,something that both Dowding and Park always tried to achieve. On 17th September Leigh Mallory reported to Dowding on wing patrols,including Baders fanciful claims. On Park's copy of the report he has simply noted "Did these wings engage before targets were bombed?" (Mason,"Battle over Britain" and Higham,"Royal Air Force") The answer of course was no.
> 
> A case of "Sir,we have reports that they are bombing Portsmouth".
> 
> ...



According to Stephen Bungay
It was *a CHL station* which first to pick up something big heading towards Brighton at 1145. Portsmouth’s AA and FC shot down 11 Ju 88s of KG 51, both sides lost 10 fighters, too.
and in the evening Kesselring sent 3 small raids on coastal towns in Kent to test the damage done to the detection system. Radio traffic clearly indicated that the defenders had located all 3 raids precisely. Rye RDF station had come back on the air at noon, The other 2 in Kent were working within 6 hours. Ventnor was out of action for 3 days because the power supply had been cut and a mobile generator had to be brought in. In order to further misled the LW about its success at Ventnor, dummy radio signals were sent out as repairs were going on.


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## stona (Jan 24, 2013)

The Portsmouth raid was not detected, as it should have been,as it assembled over the French coast. 
The raid on Portsmouth was detected at 11.45 by Poling,agreed. 
The RAF did not engage until after the Luftwaffe bombing, a primary objective of 11 Group and the point of forward interception. They were unable to make the interception soon enough due to the lack of what we would today call early warning. 
Our loss figures are not exactly the same but that's not the point anyway.

Has anyone come up for a plan for forward interception,11 Group's primary tactic to try and prevent or disrupt the bombing,without radar yet? 

Cheers

Steve


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## Glider (Jan 24, 2013)

A couple of points. Just because one raid wasn't picked up doesn't mean that the whole system was a failure. The radars were difficult to knock out because of their girder construction. 
I don't know if the germans were able to monitor the signals at that stage of the war, after all there was a gap knocked in the radar but the Luftwaffe didn't pick it up. 
AA guns were in short supply but the AA guns that could be spared were around the Radar sites.

As an aside the RAF used tracking fighters to follow the German raids once they crossed the coast to support the Observer Corps as the radar was only outward looking


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## Juha (Jan 24, 2013)

stona said:


> The Portsmouth raid was not detected, as it should have been,as it assembled over the French coast.
> The raid on Portsmouth was detected at 11.45 by Poling,agreed.



And it was detected by a CHL station, after all they seemed to have been a bit more useful than you thought earlier, next to Poling CH station according to Bungay



stona said:


> The RAF did not engage until after the Luftwaffe bombing, a primary objective of 11 Group and the point of forward interception. They were unable to make the interception soon enough due to the lack of what we would today call early warning.



Maybe, but coastal targets were difficult to defend and as controllers were humans, the quality of fighter control varied, in Sept 40 KG 55 succeeded to bomb Bristol A/C Coy at Filton, N of Bristol, and they suffered the first fighter attack when already in the bombing run and the only loss before the He 111s dropped their bombs was shot down by HAA.



stona said:


> Our loss figures are not exactly the same but that's not the point anyway.



Bunguy's figure is in the line with The Blitz Then and Now Vol 1 and The BoB T&N, so IMHO the right one. Only one of the 15 Ju 88As that attacked Ventnor was llost, that of the CO of the Geschwader.



stona said:


> Has anyone come up for a plan for forward interception,11 Group's primary tactic to try and prevent or disrupt the bombing,without radar yet?



Without radar standing patrols might have been the only way to protect the coastal targets, Observer Corps might have been enough for the inland targets. On Standing patrols, FC had to use them in Autumn 40, because they were the only answer against high flying fighter bombers


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## parsifal (Jan 24, 2013)

Radar was important, but other nations had radar. It was the air defence system that was revolutionary, and there were multiple layers to that system. If the entire radar network could be knocked out it would have had a significant effect, but they never achieved that, nor was it an attainable goal given the resources available to the LW. There is no evidence that the successful attacks on the 12th had any significant effect on fighting capacity that I can see, either on the day itself, or as a long term loss of capability. Perhaps if a sustained campaign against the radars was undertaken, that might have had an effect, but that would only have occurred if the Germans had expended a lot of prior effort actually gathering intell on the matter, and would, in turn have been likely to come to the attention of the British. Attacking radar stations was in many ways counter to the LW primary objective to destroy the RAF which required pilots to be killed. Taking out radars might let airfields to be bombed, but you dont kill pilots by bombing a/c on the ground. And Britiain had no real shortage of machines, it was pilots that were their achilles heel. 

Sorry if the realities confronting you upsets your vision of the perfect plan. You do have a point if the radar network could be taken out on a wide scale and for a long period, and provided the germans then had the resources to fully exploit that situation. But they were never able to take out the full network, never able to do it for a long period, didnt even know what it was for really, or how it worked in the overall defence system. None of that ever happened, and was unlikely to ever happen given the situation and resources. Plus a successful campaign against the radar stations still does not remove the RAF, which means air supremacy has not been achieved. 

I am convinced attacking radar sites is a total dud as far as achieving the necessary situation for a cross channel attack.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 24, 2013)

Something to be considered in these Schemes is that the Luftwaffe of Aug 1940 was not the Luftwaffe of the spring of 1941. The Do 17 can't make it to Liverpool and back without an Aux tank filling 1/2 the bomb bay. A fair number of the He 111s in service were the "P" model with two DB 601 engines, 1100hp for take-off? Early "H" models had Jumo 211s with power varying from 1100-1200hp for take-off. Late model H-4s got better engines. Similarly the early JU-88s were a little lacking in range/speed/payload. The JU-88A-1 also can't get to Liverpool and back without an auxiliary tank in the forward bomb bay. It's ability to use the external racks is limited by the gross weight limit of the plane. Partially solved by the use of rocket assisted take-off. 

The introduction of the big wing JU-88 A-5 and A-4 with beefed up landing gear and other changes to handle a much increased gross weight increased the range/payload ability of the JU 88 units. The change over to later model He 111s also helped increase the average range/payload of the Luftwaffe bomber units as did replacing the Do 17 with JU 88s and He 111s. 

The "Beam" systems may not have been ready to go in August. Perhaps the first was but the second wasn't used until November? 

The 3rd was used when?


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## Tante Ju (Jan 24, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> The "Beam" systems may not have been ready to go in August. Perhaps the first was but the second wasn't used until November? The 3rd was used when?



They were used in Poland (Warsaw) September 1939 as per previous post. So planes had them. Maybe some time was needed to install transmitters in France - or were just not needed/held secret for strategic reasons?


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## Gixxerman (Jan 24, 2013)

Glider said:


> I don't know if the Germans were able to monitor the signals at that stage of the war



Isn't there a story about a German Zeppelin cruising the channel North sea just before the war looking for various radio emissions (including radar) but looking for at the wrong frequencies?
My memory may be misleading me but isn't this related to the cavity magnetron centimetre radar etc etc the Germans being convinced longer wave radar was the only kind achievable within credible costs R&D time at that time?

As regards the initial premise, as things were I don;'t think the LW had the means to defeat the RAF in the BoB, yes they could inflict heavy losses on 11 Group over a period but that is far from 'the RAF'.

Then there is the the whole issue of 'political will' to defeat the UK.
Yes it's the 'p' word.
But I don't believe the German high command (under Hitler's leadership at the time) expected anything other than a negotiated settlement after a severe prodding by the LW if they thought need be.

In short they did what they could given the true aim of their policies (the attempt to attack gain lands in the east).
They just didn't have the means to do all of it tried with what they could for as long as they could.

Whether they felt that this 'main event' (22nd June 1941) was a gamble forced upon them (given the raw materials manpower situation) or not it seems to me to be undeniable that the BoB (like the campaigns before it) created a situation where mounting losses were heavier than expected ever more difficult to cover.


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## nuuumannn (Jan 24, 2013)

Yep, got it there Glixxerman; it was pie-in-the-sky. Political will accounted for most of the dumb ideas the Germans had, and some of the smart ones too, I guess.

I think that you guys are missing the point behind attacking radar sites. There's no doubt that disrupting the system would be achieved momentarily by bombing them, but the point of doing so is that it is part of the bigger picture of destroying the enemy's ability to fight back. You're taking one isolated area and hinging your entire argument for carrying out the exercise on it. Yes, in reality the LW did not succeed in knocking out the radar sites, but that is no excuse in a war game scenario not to continue attacking them. In reality Germany did not have the means nor the inclination to invade the UK - wasn't gonna happen.

Yes, your bombers are going to be shot down; in reality the RAF lost more bombers attacking high threat sites like Peenemunde, but that wasn't going to stop them continuing to do so if need be. In this kind of scenario the entire place needs to be levelled to the ground (not possible in reality - that is why we pretend); "Bombed back into the Stone Age" is how the Americans put waging war against the Trail in Laos. It's the only way.



> Isn't there a story about a German Zeppelin cruising the channel North sea just before the war looking for various radio emissions (including radar) but looking for at the wrong frequencies?



The airship was Hindenburg's sister LZ 130 Graf Zeppelin II (not to be confused with LZ 127 Graf Zeppelin, which circumnavigated the Globe in 1927) and it was indeed sent out to clandestinely monitor British radio transmissions from radio towers erected along the British coast in late 1938 and throughout 1939 until just before war broke out. The excuse was route surveying flights, although LZ 130 never carried a single fare paying passenger. Off the coast of Scotland British aircraft were sent from RAF Dyce (now Aberdeen Airport) to keep an eye on it; the British never rose to the bait and radio transmissions were not recorded.

As for the 'beams'; Knickebein was successfully jammed in August 1940, but X-Gerat, which had been in operation since 1939 was not identified by the British as a seperate system until September 1940. By the time of the attack on Birmingham in October 1940 the British were aware of what the Germans were up to with this new device, although they had yet to establish its exact frequencies and wavelengths; they did this by using info from enigma decrypts, a KGr 100 He 111 that ran out of fuel over Britain and from examining the Graf Spee, which is pretty much all the British had on German radar until the BoB broke out - that line of thought (the Graf Spee's radar) yielded surpisingly useful information.

The Germans had gotten clever by November 1940 and X-Gerat was sufficiently arrayed that two raids could be launched in a single night; in the early days of November, Birmingham, Coventry and Liverpool were attacked, often on the same night. On the night of 14/15 November, the Germans enacted 'Moonlight Sonata'; this was the attack on Coventry that grabbed headlines around the world; the Brits knew about Moonlight Sonata, but didn't know the target; as I said earlier it was a fifty/fifty choice between Wolverhampton and Coventry. The other issue was that that day's enigma decrypts hadn't been decoded in time for the raid, so the vital piece of intel decifering which city was going to be bombed wasn't found out until afterwards.

Of course, the British sent out a jamming signal, but its strength was too weak (1500 MHz) and the bombers got through; the German signals worked on 2000 MHz. After Coventry the Brits got the measure of X-Gerat and used the ground stations broadcasting erroneous signals to do so, thus misleading the German pathfinders. The Germans continued using Knickebein and X and Y-Gerat into 1941 as their bombing efforts intensified, despite British efforts to jam them. More stations were set up throughout Europe to aid its campaign.

The Germans were aware that something was up, however, as reconnaissance aircraft had photographed increased AA around Wolverhampton - the next target, so, on the night that the British expected Wolves to be bombed, the Germans did not. At no time did they suspect that the British had broken their enigma codes, so they continued sending everything by this means.

By February 1941, the British had the measure of all three systems and used their countermeasures accordingly, which included decoy sites and false fires to deceive the raiders, thus the bombing raids over the next three months did not rely on accurate radio guidance as previously. The Germans placed high hopes on these systems; the LW described them in a contemporary publication as "enormously important and hardly replaceable" (I don't know the publication, this book doesn't list its name) - as the chappie who designed them, Dr Plendl was given a high commendation from Goering himself.


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## stona (Jan 26, 2013)

Glider said:


> As an aside the RAF used tracking fighters to follow the German raids once they crossed the coast to support the Observer Corps as the radar was only outward looking



I have a minute which I can't find at the moment in which this was discussed. It was not adopted because of a lack of aircraft and suitably trained pilots. Dowding and Park were both opposed to the idea of aircraft flying about in the hope that they might encounter the enemy.
Once the enemy formations crossed the coast they could be reasonably plotted by the Observer Corps (though on one occassion the planet Venus was plotted at 30,000 feet!). By this time it was too late to task squadrons to intercept the raid anyway. That was the whole point of forward interception,using radar to position RAF squadrons in the right place at the right time and,hopefully,the right altitude,_if they could achieve it_.
As Dilip Sarkar notes.

"Radar was essential,but it was not perfect,and the mathematics of time over distance,given the performance of the fighter aircraft in question offset against warning times,meant that scrambling RAF fighters were frequently caught on the climb,the worst possible tactical sitiuation to be in.."

And that's when the Luftwaffe formations were detected on the other side of the Channel! If they were detected close to the English coast the RAF could be caught on the ground at southerly fields. England is small and WW2 aircraft went at a decent lick. Brighton (South coast) to London is just over 40 miles. At 200 mph that's less than 10 minutes flying time.

Cheers

Steve


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## Juha (Jan 26, 2013)

Hello Stona
IMHO you are a bit too pessimistic, 40mls 200mph means 12 minutes. IMHO protection of London would not have been impossible but coastal areas would have been without standing patrols and the strain they produced.

Juha


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## stona (Jan 26, 2013)

Juha said:


> Hello Stona
> IMHO you are a bit too pessimistic, 40mls 200mph means 12 minutes.
> Juha



Correct.....I should have worked it out. I think 9.6 minutes is for 250mph which is a bit optimistic for the Luftwaffe's bombers 

It's still not long enough to react as Sarkar noted. The average scramble time,to get a squadron airborne, was 4-5 minutes. Then about 7 minutes to 15,000ft,10 to 20,000. Then they had to make an interception. The radar was supposed to position the interceptors within 2-3 miles of the enemy formation at which range they should be able to make visual contact. If you know the speed,bearing and altitude of the enemy and your own position and speed the arithmatic to calculate a bearing on which to fly to make the interception is easy. Without radar....?

Interception of withdrawing bombers was further complicated by the Luftwaffe formations breaking up into several groups,all of which then literally dived for "home",the French coast.

Cheers

Steve


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## Juha (Jan 26, 2013)

Hello Stona
the responsibility to give info on LW a/c over England was anyway in the hands of Observer Corps, CH radars "saw" only towards sea. And interceptions based on human eyes was possible but not sure, Finnish air defence during WWII was based on observers, even with more archaic signal system it worked moderately well, even in 43/44 when a 109G staffel protected Kotka harbour against attacks by Pe-2s protected by Yaks and La-5s.

Juha


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## stona (Jan 26, 2013)

Juha said:


> Hello Stona
> the responsibility to give info on LW a/c over England was anyway in the hands of Observer Corps, CH radars "saw" only towards sea. And interceptions based on human eyes was possible but not sure,
> Juha



Absolutely true. What the Chain Home radar did was give the RAF time. As the raids were tracked across the Channel their strength,altitude and bearing could be ascertained (not always perfectly of course). This allowed the Sector controllers to vector their squadrons into a position to make visual contact with the incoming raid and make the interception.
It was not a perfect system and the Germans were not daft enough to fly on a direct bearing to their target every time. Nonetheless it worked more often than it didn't.

To make an interception in the skies of Kent or Sussex the RAF fighters had to be in the air long before the Luftwaffe raid even reached the South coast of England.

Once the raid had crossed the coast the (Royal) Observer Corps,itself fore warned,became a vital link in the chain,updating the position of the raid. The observer posts reported to Sector Control via their own Observer Corps Centre unlike the radar stations which reported to HQ Fighter Command who "filtered" the reports which were passed on to Group Headquarters and only then on to the relevant Sector Control.

It truly was an integrated air defence system and Dowding's great achievment. Remove any link in the chain and it wouldn't have worked.

Cheers

Steve


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## Glider (Jan 26, 2013)

stona said:


> I have a minute which I can't find at the moment in which this was discussed. It was not adopted because of a lack of aircraft and suitably trained pilots. Dowding and Park were both opposed to the idea of aircraft flying about in the hope that they might encounter the enemy.


You certainly could be right but it looks as if it was used later in the BOB. I am going on a letter sent to Fighter Command dated 8th July where they are discussing the tactics used by the Germans to counter RAF sweeps and identify the raids with Bombers and those that don't. It refers to the enemy adopting the tactics used by FC towards the end of the BOB where high flying Recce fighters would spot the raids with bombers and instruct fighters to intercept.

A copy of the letter is attached


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## stona (Jan 27, 2013)

That is not detection of the raid but reconnaissance of it,I see that this was adopted at a later stage of the battle. I wonder which units carried it out?

In order to get in to a position high above an incoming raid in time to report on it's make up you'd need plenty of warning which could only come from the Chain Home system. This sort of reconnaissance was only possible because of the radar and itself formed an integral part of the whole system.

Is that PoW Pingel by any chance? It looks vaguely familiar 

Cheers

Steve


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## Glider (Jan 27, 2013)

I totally agree that it was the tracking/recce of the raid and the letter clearly states at the end of the BOB.

I am afraid that I have no idea as to who the POW was who spilled the beans or what unit carried out the task. 

Its only a guess but a PR Spit would be best for the job. They had the combination of range, altitude, performance and climb. A normally loaded 109 wouldn't get anywhere near it in altitude


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## Tante Ju (Jan 27, 2013)

E-7/Z, F-4/Z, G-1...


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## stona (Jan 27, 2013)

I can't emphasise enough that Britain's air defence system was made up of many interlinking parts. From the radar described by Park as "fickle as can be" and as behaving "just like a young lady" (he was born in 1892  ) to the Observer Corps whose reports were so unreliable that a raid not previously reported by radar was rejected at the filtering stage,to the Y service intercepts, it just about worked.

It was the radar and sector airfields,with their vital communications links,which were considered most vulnerable.

David Zimmerman has written,of the system, "If this system had suffered a complete failiure,either through its own inadequacies or enemy action,then surely the RAF would have been defeated."

AJP Taylor is unequivocal,"The Battle of Britain was won by Fighter Command and radar."

On 21st Decenber 1940 Watson-Watt told Sinclair that the battle had been won by "radar and the eight gun fighter" and that "our old statement that RDF would multiply by three,and perhaps five the value of our fighter force,has been justified."

Park wrote that "radar at its worst is most valuable to my fighter group,and at its best,it is quite invaluable and a great boon." 

Park also feared the disruption of communications which would be caused by concerted attacks on sector airfields. There were plenty of airfields in Southern England but they were not equipped to communicate directly with his headquarters. "Without signals" he wrote "I commanded only my desk at Uxbridge."

Dowding wrote in his official 1941 dispatch on the BOB,concerning radar specifically "it is not too much to say that the warning which it gave could have been obtained by no other means,and constituted a vital factor in the air defence of Great Britain." 

I still believe,like Zimmerman,that had this system been incapacitated by coordinated attacks the RAF would have been scuppered.

Incidentally,in response to a comment way back in the thread,there was no plan to withdraw the RAF North of the Thames unless the Germans mounted an invasion because this was considered to leave too many vital targets unprotected. Such a move,prior to an invasion,would be an admission of defeat.

Cheers

Steve


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## Njaco (Jan 27, 2013)

Was "?" a better Air Marshall than Dowding?


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## stona (Jan 27, 2013)

Njaco said:


> Was "?" a better Air Marshall than Dowding?



Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Pile who met and worked with Dowding when he was put in charge of the Army's anti aircraft and search light defences in support of Fighter Command wrote that Dowding 

"Was the outstanding airman I met in the war. A difficult man,a self opinionated man,a most determined man,and a man who knew more than anybody about all aspects of aerial warfare. He was a good friend to me on many occasions,and history will undoubtedly record his great contribution to Allied victory."

That seems fair enough to me.

Cheers

Steve


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## Glider (Jan 27, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> E-7/Z, F-4/Z, G-1...



Think BOB timescale


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## stona (Jan 27, 2013)

One more reference,from Sebastian Cox,who I suspect can be googled. Currently he is one of the three directors of the Royal Air Force Centre for Air Power Studies.He too believes that the Luftwaffe could have prevailed. From his "Comparative Analysis of RAF and Luftwaffe Intelligence in the Battle of Britain".

"It [Luftwaffe] should have been used,first,to destroy the Chain Home radar towers,a simple task because only nine,all flimsy and highly conspicuous,guarded the coast between Southampton and Dover. The blinded RAF airfields should then have been overwhelmed by around the clock bombing. And finally,if the British still showed resistance,their naked cities should have been deluged with high explosives and incendiaries."

Dowding himself,in a conversation with Portal and Churchill said that he could not understand why the Germans kept "coming in waves" rather than concentrating on one mass raid a day which "could not be effectively parried."

Cheers

Steve


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## Tante Ju (Jan 27, 2013)

E-4/N then..


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## Juha (Jan 27, 2013)

stona said:


> One more reference,from Sebastian Cox,who I suspect can be googled. Currently he is one of the three directors of the Royal Air Force Centre for Air Power Studies.He too believes that the Luftwaffe could have prevailed. From his "Comparative Analysis of RAF and Luftwaffe Intelligence in the Battle of Britain".
> 
> "It [Luftwaffe] should have been used,first,to destroy the Chain Home radar towers,a simple task because only nine,all flimsy and highly conspicuous,guarded the coast between Southampton and Dover. The blinded RAF airfields should then have been overwhelmed by around the clock bombing. And finally,if the British still showed resistance,their naked cities should have been deluged with high explosives and incendiaries."
> 
> ...



IMHO 12 Aug 40 proved that the CH masts were not flimsy, even very accurate bombing of Ventnor by 15 Ju 88s didn't knock down even a single mast. They were highly conspicuous and LW signal intelligence had pinpointed them during July 40. I wonder wheather LW had pinpointed the CHL stations, they used a different wavelenght but were situated very near the coast, those without tall mast looked very different than CH stations but were not unlike German Freya.


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## Juha (Jan 27, 2013)

stona said:


> ...Incidentally,in response to a comment way back in the thread,there was no plan to withdraw the RAF North of the Thames unless the Germans mounted an invasion because this was considered to leave too many vital targets unprotected. Such a move,prior to an invasion,would be an admission of defeat.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve



In war you adapt or die, if enemy knocked out your best system you try something else. If enemy are overwhelming you you will try to evade the worst strikes. With prevailing winds being from SSW and SW, squadrons taking off a bit N or NE of London were at least already climbing to right direction.

Juha


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## stona (Jan 27, 2013)

Following citations in a different thread,I've been revisiting Horst Boog,a man whose interpretation of history I rarely agree with. His research however is impeccable.

He makes some interesting points as to why the Luftwaffe failed. 

Firstly the Luftwaffe assault only began on 12/13 August giving the RAF seven weeks after the fall of France to develop and test its defences. Boog ignores the effect the substantial losses suffered by the Luftwaffe in the Battle of France (more than the first six weeks of the BoB). The Luftwaffe also needed time to set up the essential ground organisation,stocks of fuel and weapons had to be gathered. Workshops and billets had to be prepared and a skilled and unskilled workforce assembled. 

More saliently he highlights the complete lack of a coherent strategy on the German side. Should Britain be invaded? Should she be isolated by eliminating the Soviet Union,her only potential European ally? Should Germany sieze Gibralter and/or the Suez canal? Would she agree to peace on German terms?

He considers the German offensive against Britain to have been a hasty improvisation and here Cox agrees with him. Cox writes that in the Luftwaffe's campign everything was attempted but not in a logical order and,crucially,without persistence. A combination of over confidence and poor intelligence led to an ill directed campaign.

Cheers
Steve


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## Glider (Jan 27, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> E-4/N then..


Even this would be hard pushed to catch a PR Spit. Generally speaking the PR Spits roamed almost at will over occupied countries and Berlin throughout the whole war, why would this be any different in home airspace? 
A PR Spit would only have to do its job, spot the raids with bombers and those without, then clear off. Compared to the 109 it had fuel to spare and a higher ceiling. Turn inland and either climb or simply go flat out.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 27, 2013)

A problem with using quotes from leaders at the time was that they _KNEW_ what their own situation was but were _GUESSING_ at what their opponents situation was. Both sides were over-claiming to a considerable extent and neither knew what the opponents replacement schedule was. British leaders _KNEW_ what their losses and replacements were but were guessing as to what shape the Luftwaffe was in. Likewise the Luftwaffe _KNEW_ what shape they were in but kept getting surprised when the supposedly destroyed RAF kept showing up. A bit like two boxers going into the 10th round. Both could be near defeat, it is a question of which gets lucky or looses heart first. 

A problem for the Luftwaffe is the longer it drags on the worse it gets for them while the longer it drags on the better it gets for the British. Every week that it drags on the more equipment comes out of the factories to re-equip the men brought back from Dunkirk. In addition to aircraft, every week sees more AA guns. Every week sees the fall weather (Oct-Nov) get closer which reduces the threat of invasion. Every week brings more beach defenses and more preparation. The longer it drags on the less likely the British are to break and sue for peace unless the Germans can really inflect much more damage than they did historically. 
Up until the BoB the Germans had never been stopped let alone beaten. Just fighting to a draw was the best result anybody had gotten so far. few people knew how hard a cross channel invasion would really have been. As the fear of the cross channel invasion fades the air war becomes the focus instead of the prelude. 
The Germans to better than they did historically need to push the British harder than they did and make it seem much more like a sure thing than a close race. The Window of opportunity is small and gets smaller with each passing week.


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## stona (Jan 27, 2013)

I'm not sure that PR Spitfires could have been used in this Recon role. Not least of all because in July 1940 there were only 12 of them and because in June 1940 they had been transferred to Coastal Command.
Alfred Price has written,
"During the summer of 1940,as the Battle of Britain raged over southern England,the lone Spitfires of the PRU ranged far and wide over north-western Europe and returned with photographs of enemy movements and dispositions."
It seeems they were doing what they were supposed to do,and I can find no reference to them reconnoitering Luftwaffe raids.
Cheers
Steve


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## stona (Jan 27, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> A problem with using quotes from leaders at the time was that they _KNEW_ what their own situation was but were _GUESSING_ at what their opponents situation was.



But respected historians like Taylor,Cox and even Boog aren't guessing.

You'll notice that many of the leaders' quotes are from after the event and with the benefit of hindsight.

I'm seeing a lot of contrary opinions expressed but I'm not seeing them backed up with a lot of historical references. I feel I have supplied a considerable number of references from the protagonists and from later historians and I'm not seeing much similar material posted to contradict my view.


British anti aircraft defences in the summer of 1940 were in a parlous state,but that's another topic.

Cheers
Steve


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## Glider (Jan 27, 2013)

stona said:


> I'm not sure that PR Spitfires could have been used in this Recon role. Not least of all because in July 1940 there were only 12 of them and because in June 1940 they had been transferred to Coastal Command.
> Alfred Price has written,
> "During the summer of 1940,as the Battle of Britain raged over southern England,the lone Spitfires of the PRU ranged far and wide over north-western Europe and returned with photographs of enemy movements and dispositions."
> It seeems they were doing what they were supposed to do,and I can find no reference to them reconnoitering Luftwaffe raids.
> ...



It was only a guess, clearly they used something Presumably normal Spits with orders to get out once the job was done.


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## stona (Jan 27, 2013)

Glider said:


> It was only a guess, clearly they used something Presumably normal Spits with orders to get out once the job was done.



Yes,I'm not disputing that it was done but I'm b*ggered if I can find out by who 
Cheers
Steve


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## Juha (Jan 27, 2013)

stona said:


> I'm not sure that PR Spitfires could have been used in this Recon role. Not least of all because in July 1940 there were only 12 of them and because in June 1940 they had been transferred to Coastal Command.
> Alfred Price has written,
> "During the summer of 1940,as the Battle of Britain raged over southern England,the lone Spitfires of the PRU ranged far and wide over north-western Europe and returned with photographs of enemy movements and dispositions."
> It seeems they were doing what they were supposed to do,and I can find no reference to them reconnoitering Luftwaffe raids.
> ...



Now they were not PR Spits but Spit Mk IIAs, when LW high flying 109E fighter-bombers proved to be hard to intercept, FC formed No 421 Flight to fly "Jim Crow" missions on 8 Oct 40, one or two Spits would patrol the coast and over the Channel at high altitude in order to report on movements of enemy a/c, and the tactics they adopted in combat. 421 became later on No 91 Sqn.

Juha


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## stona (Jan 27, 2013)

Juha said:


> Now they were not PR Spits but Spit Mk IIAs, when LW high flying 109E fighter-bombers proved to be hard to intercept, FC formed No 421 Flight to fly "Jim Crow" missions on 8 Oct 40, one or two Spits would patrol the coast and over the Channel at high altitude in order to report on movements of enemy a/c, and the tactics they adopted in combat. 421 became later on No 91 Sqn.
> Juha



Thanks for that. 
8th October lies outside what the British at least consider the Battle of Britain.
Cheers
Steve


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## Juha (Jan 27, 2013)

stona said:


> Thanks for that.
> 8th October lies outside what the British at least consider the Battle of Britain.
> Cheers
> Steve



If there had been need the unit would have been formed earlier.


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## stona (Jan 27, 2013)

Juha said:


> If there had been need the unit would have been formed earlier.



I understand that it was a response to a change in Luftwaffe tactics and the need not to be suckered into rising to "Jabo" raids but still to respond to raids by escorted bombers. Radar could not distinguish the make up of a raid.
The change in tactics had effectively signalled,for the British,the end of the Battle of Britain. The pressure was off Fighter Command and it could now afford the fuel,wear and tear on aircraft and tiring of air crews which Dowding had been so desperate to avoid in early 1940. 
Park always thought that Battle of Britain day should have been the 7th not the 15th of September.
421 Flight was effectively just another and new link in Britain's integrated air defence system.It was certainly not a substitute for any part of it.
Cheers
Steve


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## parsifal (Jan 27, 2013)

I think it was Plautus who said (somethig along the lines of) "it is a poor commander who devises a plan that is so inflexible that it cannot be adapted to meet the changing fortunes of battle".

On that logic, Dowding was a fool, the Germans incredibly stupid people and the Battle Of Britiain a battle that should have been lost. 

Plautus was certainly correct. his maxim on military operations remains as valid today as it did in 209BC.

I do not believe any of the other three conclusions that must be reached if the FC defence system was so vulnerable, are in fact true. Dowding in fact was brilliant. The Germans were not stupid, and the battle Of Britain was not a battle easily lost. And thats because the FC defensive system was so flexible, so hard to knock over because it was so flexible. 


Why would I say that. If Dowding devised an air defence system (and he was its heart and soul) that could be easily taken out, and that system was so dependant on each part working efficiently, why the hell didnt the germans, who gave it a hell of a shuv albeit in many different directions, could not get the better of it. the reason is because the basic premise behind the claim.....that it was an inherently vulbnerable system, is so wrong as to be laughable.

Radar was critical alright. But knocking out the system, enmasse was anything but simple. Saying that the Germans didnt know what it was for is also a smoke screen....if they didnt know what it was for, why were they busy building a similar network (and better) themselves? 

The key to understanding FC system is three words, not one. Those three words are "integrated", "interlocking" and "resilient" . "Integrated" means that it was a massive force multiplier.....it was able to call on the resources of all the forces available to deal with all the threats appropriately, or to the maximum potential available to the defending force. "Interlocking" means that as an opponent seeking to neutralize it you needed to knock out the whole system or at least most of the system. "Resilient" means that the system had very good powers of recovery.

Admittedly we dont have a lot of history to base what might have happened if the Germans had somehow decided to concentrate on one thing, or one aspect of the system. But the attack of the 12 August do show that they tried to knock out a large portion of the radar netowk, using their prcision bombing unit, through which poured a sizable force of bombers. One would expect that given the alleged vulnberabilty of the system, that there might be some inkling of faltering RAF effort or worsening loss ratios. To be fair, the Germans did break through and pasted one airfield. They temporaily knocked out 4 stations, but 3 for less than 24 hours. Manston (the airfield knocked out of business) should have been closed, but not because of these raids, mearely because it was too exposed. Dowding evidently wasnt phased enough by losses to allow its closure....it remained open throughout the battle for propaganda reasons (suggesting the British had resources enough to waste onm propaganda).

But in reality the attacks on the 12th were no more successful than some of the other raids the Germans undertook, and decidely less than one or two at least. There was no significant change in the loss ratios (in fact they may have tipped slightly in favour of the RAF. If the German losses included losses to their specialised precison bombing unit, then it was an unqualified victory for the RAF that day). 

So despite all the posturing going on over this issue, what evidence have we that on the one occasion the Germans did make a serious effort at taking out the British defence system, that it had any significant effect at all. There is none.


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## stona (Jan 27, 2013)

Historians of air warfare like Cox and Boog,historians of the intelligence war like Thomas,and military historians like Taylor have studied this in considerably more depth than any of us and reached a diametrically opposite conclusion to you. They all believe that a better informed and better coordinated campaign by the Luftwaffe in 1940_ could_,not _would_ have defeated Fighter Command.
You don't have to accept my view or theirs,but I have ploughed through many of their(and others) publications and some of their sources and their arguments are persuasive for me.
Your opinion is yours and you are entitled to it just as I am to mine. I feel I have some illustrious backers for mine.
With that I bid you good day. I shall not be returning to this thread as I have no more to add.
Cheers
Steve


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## Tante Ju (Jan 27, 2013)

Glider said:


> Even this would be hard pushed to catch a PR Spit.



No. Even a common Emil could do that. The PR Spit wasn't anything special during 1940. Just a regular Spit, with some polish and marginally higher top speed. Some had huge bulges on the wing, that definitely did not help to make them faster.



> Generally speaking the PR Spits roamed almost at will over occupied countries and Berlin throughout the whole war, why would this be any different in home airspace?



Because when roaming over Europe the problem with PR (Spit or any other) aircraft was to locate them and vector the fighters on a good vector to make contact. It was the difficult part, since the interceptors would need a good time to climb to their altitude, and make a good vector. Once that happened, catching them wasn't all that hard. This was why Jabo 109s were so difficult to shoot down in 1940. 

If a PR Spit is used to spy on formations, the root of the problem is eliminated. Enemy fighters are already in contact, all they have to do is to point to nose towards the singe dot in the sky and firewall the throttle.



> A PR Spit would only have to do its job, spot the raids with bombers and those without, then clear off. Compared to the 109 it had fuel to spare and a higher ceiling. Turn inland and either climb or simply go flat out.



That should work if the PR Spit would had have performance or endurance advantage but it simply did not. What you have in mind is a magic uninterceptable plane, which the PR Spit was not. Good tactics can help, but a lone aircraft tailing a large formation is a extreme high risk job once fighters are near. What is likely to happen is that a 109 Rotte leaves the bombers chases down and shoots down the lone plane,_ just like they would do with any other Spitfire._ PR Spits weren't any different. And at this point, you are probably better off polishing regular fighter Squadron machines for the occasional odd job.


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## wiking85 (Jan 27, 2013)

stona said:


> Historians of air warfare like Cox and Boog,historians of the intelligence war like Thomas,and military historians like Taylor have studied this in considerably more depth than any of us and reached a diametrically opposite conclusion to you. They all believe that a better informed and better coordinated campaign by the Luftwaffe in 1940_ could_,not _would_ have defeated Fighter Command.
> You don't have to accept my view or theirs,but I have ploughed through many of their(and others) publications and some of their sources and their arguments are persuasive for me.
> Your opinion is yours and you are entitled to it just as I am to mine. I feel I have some illustrious backers for mine.
> With that I bid you good day. I shall not be returning to this thread as I have no more to add.
> ...



Could you list other sources so we can check out their publications for ourselves?


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## parsifal (Jan 27, 2013)

stona said:


> Historians of air warfare like Cox and Boog,historians of the intelligence war like Thomas,and military historians like Taylor have studied this in considerably more depth than any of us and reached a diametrically opposite conclusion to you. They all believe that a better informed and better coordinated campaign by the Luftwaffe in 1940_ could_,not _would_ have defeated Fighter Command.
> You don't have to accept my view or theirs,but I have ploughed through many of their(and others) publications and some of their sources and their arguments are persuasive for me.
> Your opinion is yours and you are entitled to it just as I am to mine. I feel I have some illustrious backers for mine.
> With that I bid you good day. I shall not be returning to this thread as I have no more to add.
> ...




Were it just my opinion it could be fairly easily dismissed. However its not. I had a university lecturer, who in 1974 was a witness and referee for what has become a famous wargame at Sandhurst of the invasion of Britain in 1940. There were several versions each time the rules were changed to favour the Germans more and more. In the beginning there was an air war component, but try as they might the "german" side could not gain the necessary air supremacy considered necessary for invasion. various strategies were tried, apparently including concentrating on the known radar stations. LW did not know all the locations apparently, and in the simulation, could not destroy the stations quick enough. Moreover the stations were always abale to give some inkling of strikes coming and their likely targets before being taken off line. Time and again, some radar stations were taken out, only to be repair in a matter of hours. 

These are not my opinions, they are the observations of professional soldiers using wargaming techniques based on the same model as used by the germans themselves. 

In the finish it was simply stated that the LW had gained air superiority (not quite enough), by means unkown. The invasion component started, and was a similar debacle. In the finish the referees simply forces the RN to remain in port for 26 hours to give the Germans a chance of getting ashore. 

Historically, the Germans were again able to knock out a number of radar stations again on the 16th. Two in fact, due to a power failure. It made timely interception of LW raids difficult, thus enabling three or four airfields to bombed, but the defenders did make interceptions and inflicted the worst attrition on the LW for the entire battle, 72 machines lost on that day alone. 

Historians I have a lot of respect for, and I do acknowledge that a lot of them share your belief,. but historians dont always get it right, and they usually dont have any operational experience or training. often they are just recycling what they have read elswhere


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## Glider (Jan 28, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> No. Even a common Emil could do that. The PR Spit wasn't anything special during 1940. Just a regular Spit, with some polish and marginally higher top speed. Some had huge bulges on the wing, that definitely did not help to make them faster.


Not quite. They were lighter without guns, ammo, armour and were adapted for extra speed, gaps filled extra polish and additional fuel tank behind the pilot. Also changes were made to the cockpit for better visibility. Compared to a normal Spit they were faster, climbed better and had a better ceiling.



> Because when roaming over Europe the problem with PR (Spit or any other) aircraft was to locate them and vector the fighters on a good vector to make contact.


Remembering that you are over the UK without radar vectoring I don't see how it can be easier to guide your fighters onto the recce aircraft.


> It was the difficult part, since the interceptors would need a good time to climb to their altitude, and make a good vector. Once that happened, catching them wasn't all that hard. This was why Jabo 109s were so difficult to shoot down in 1940.


Jabo's were difficult to intercept as they were low, picked up relatively late and went for home as soon as the job was done. A formation is spotted much earlier, the recce aircraft will have more time to get to altitude as they are on their own and don't have to wait for a squadron take off and forming up, plus the better climb perofrmance and can be guided to a safe spot to make the climb by ground control.



> If a PR Spit is used to spy on formations, the root of the problem is eliminated. Enemy fighters are already in contact, all they have to do is to point to nose towards the singe dot in the sky and firewall the throttle.


And the red light will be blinking so much earlier telling them to turn for home



> That should work if the PR Spit would had have performance or endurance advantage but it simply did not. What you have in mind is a magic uninterceptable plane, which the PR Spit was not. Good tactics can help, but a lone aircraft tailing a large formation is a extreme high risk job once fighters are near. What is likely to happen is that a 109 Rotte leaves the bombers chases down and shoots down the lone plane,_ just like they would do with any other Spitfire._ PR Spits weren't any different. And at this point, you are probably better off polishing regular fighter Squadron machines for the occasional odd job.


No one is saying it was without risk, but as mentioned the 109 Rotte would be soon out of fuel trying to chase down an aircraft which is faster, climbs better and has more fuel to spare. The main danger is of course the recce spit not seeing the 109s. 
Its obvious that the RAF used something for the role and wouldn't have continued if the losses were high. Presumably normal spits were used, I don't know but anything else would be very vulnerable but given the choice a PR version would in my mind be a better option.


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## Vincenzo (Jan 28, 2013)

I don't think that Spit PR was usefull in this mission, the plane need to back to home before to give info would bee too late for operational use of info.


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## stona (Jan 28, 2013)

There's some confusion here about what a PR Spitfire was in 1940.

As of 20th July 1940 the RAF had 12 PR Spitfires,All based on the Mk 1. 

Eight were the IB version. This carried a F.24 camera with an 8" focal length in each wing,taking the place of the two inboard machine guns and ammunition boxes. All other armament was removed. Gun ports were faired over and the entire airframe was filled and sanded before a coat of what was to be known as PR Blue. (The earlier IA was painted in camotint which became Sky). It was reckoned to be 10-15 mph faster than the standard fighter version.
Standard Spitfire Is carried 40lb of ballast to compensate for the weight of the three bladed,two pitch,propeller and Cotton got permission to remove this and add a 29 gallon fuel tank behind the pilot,giving a radius of action of 325 miles.

Three were the IC version.This had a 30 gallon fixed blister tank under the port wing counter balanced by a similar blister under the starboard wing housing two F.24 cameras,like the IB with an 8" focal length. This now carried an extra 59 gallons of extra fuel more than a standard Spitfire I. One of these aircraft photographed Kiel on 8th April 1940.

One was the ID version. This version is what most people think of as a PR Spitfire.The cameras were fitted in the fuselage behind the cockpit. A 57 gallon fuel cell was fitted in the leading edge of each wing,where the steam condenser would have gone had evaporative cooling been used. This was a major modification and could only be carried out at the factory by Supermarine.Though work began early in 1940 only one of these aircraft was completed by July.A special reconnaissance aircraft was far from being a priority in the lead up to the Battle of Britain,the fighter version was required more urgently.

The ID did not see action until October 1940. It had 114 gallons of extra fuel in the wings,29 gallons behind the pilot and 14 gallons of extra oil. Behind the rear fuselage tank it could carry two F.24 cameras with 8" or 20" focal length lenses or two F.8s with 20" lenses.

It was so heavily laden on take off that it was nicknamed "the bowser". You can imagine the effect on its rate of climb and handling,the latter was marginal to put it mildly.

Wing Commander Tuttle:

"You could not fly straight and level for the first half hour after take off. Until you had emptied the rear tank,the aircraft hunted the whole time. The centre of gravity was so far back you couldn't control it. It was the sort of thing that would never have got in during peace time,but war is another matter."

Cheers

Steve


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## Tante Ju (Jan 28, 2013)

Thanks for clearing that up for us, Steve!


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## Shortround6 (Jan 28, 2013)

A regular Spitfire would do nicely. depending on the clouds how close do you have to get? Even at two miles of range a plane 10mph faster than the other takes 12 minutes to catch it. Well exceeds the normal 5 minute limit and cuts deeply into the fuel on both planes.


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## stona (Jan 28, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> A regular Spitfire would do nicely. depending on the clouds how close do you have to get? Even at two miles of range a plane 10mph faster than the other takes 12 minutes to catch it. Well exceeds the normal 5 minute limit and cuts deeply into the fuel on both planes.



Plus the Spitfire could dive for home. The persuer(s) might not want to find themselves at low altitude over the British coast and a relatively long way from home themselves.Such a situation limits their tactical options.
The Luftwaffe did it in the other direction.
Cheers
Steve


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## nuuumannn (Jan 30, 2013)

> More saliently he highlights the complete lack of a coherent strategy on the German side... He considers the German offensive against Britain to have been a hasty improvisation and here Cox agrees with him. Cox writes that in the Luftwaffe's campign everything was attempted but not in a logical order and,crucially, without persistence. A combination of over confidence and poor intelligence led to an ill directed campaign.



Can't get much more succinct than that.

Seb Cox used to be the head of Air Historic Branch when it was still at Bentley Priory - a very knowledgeable man. I think he was former RAF Museum Department of Printed Books, or what is known as DoRIS now; a number of former DoRIS staff go on to brighter things at AHB.


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## SPEKTRE76 (Jan 30, 2013)

Bomb the RADAR sites, bomb shipping, request ground scouts to identify camouflaged hangers and airfields and do photo recon back up. Conduct night air-raids with Allied marked planes and destroy factories. Then I would blame it all on the Allied forces and offer my alliance to crush them.


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## parsifal (Jan 30, 2013)

oh boy


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## nuuumannn (Jan 30, 2013)

Regarding the radar sites, I'll just repeat myself, since it happens often - the system doesn't need to be completely destroyed to be disabled, in fact, you don't even need to bomb it for this to happen. Disabling Britain's radar network would be a high priority for obvious reasons - drop window, radio signals to deceive and jam it, but take it out to allow raids in.


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## nuuumannn (Jan 30, 2013)

> oh boy


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## fastmongrel (Jan 31, 2013)

Using 3 geschwader of TIE fighters I would launch a multi pronged attack using one geschwader as a spoof to draw up the RAF the other to drop chaff to confuse the operators and launch anti radar missiles. meanwhile the third group would sneak in and use 50 terra watt lasers and anti matter bombs to take out Bentley Priory. A squadron of 600 mph FW187s would then fly over at 65,000 feet and video the remains of southern England to be broadcast on Nazivision 9 o'clock news.

After all this with the RAF in ruins the Germans would still get stomped on by the Royal Navy if they tried to invade.


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## stona (Jan 31, 2013)

fastmongrel said:


> After all this with the RAF in ruins the Germans would still get stomped on by the Royal Navy if they tried to invade.



If the Luftwaffe could force the RN to withdraw its destroyer flotilla to safer waters in 1940,as it did using contemporary weapons,then surely your TIE fighters could use their lasers and anti matter bombs to prevent the British warships from interfering with the invasion. They would be unmolested by the RAF,now reduced to a smoking ruin of its former glory.
That was supposedly the whole point of achieving air superiority across the Channel and over south eastern England 

Nice model BTW

Cheers
Steve


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## tomo pauk (Jan 31, 2013)

Great one, fastmongrel


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## michaelmaltby (Feb 2, 2013)

_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEiFNTzqwiw_

MM


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## stona (Feb 2, 2013)

Good fun! 
I lost count of how many times the RC Stuka (the one whose wings fold as it explodes) was shot down last time I watched the whole film. Several would be a conservative answer 
Steve


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## vinnye (Feb 2, 2013)

Looks like low flying raids seem to have a good chance of not being detected in time to be detected and bounced, so if I were in charge of the LW or Bomber Command for that matter I would concentrate on low level stuff.


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## stona (Feb 2, 2013)

vinnye said:


> Looks like low flying raids seem to have a good chance of not being detected in time to be detected and bounced, so if I were in charge of the LW or Bomber Command for that matter I would concentrate on low level stuff.



Chain Home did have a seperate element (Chain Home Low) to detect low flying aircraft,but its detection range was much shorter.
Erpr. Gr. 210,operating its Bf 110 Ds as fighter bombers made the sort of low level,terrain hugging,attacks you describe with considerable success. They also employed relatively few aircraft (often single figures) making detection more difficult given the limitations of the technology of the day.
They were the only unit trained in this method of attack. German doctrine advocated dive-bombing and you can't do that from low level for obvious reasons.
Cheers
Steve


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## Juha (Feb 2, 2013)

9./KG 76 was also trained for low level attacks. It was equipped with Do 17Zs.

Juha


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## The Basket (Feb 3, 2013)

The Germans had a better chance of operational TiE fighters than Fw 187s in 1940.

Did the Germans have ANY plans for aerial bombardment of the UK in 1940? Extremely unlikely. I do declare that the Luftwaffe could have pushed the RAF out of 11 group in 1940. But it didn't even do this...nevermind defeat the RAF or even try an invasion. 

Any invasion possible would have been more Dieppe than Normandy. A total fiasco.


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## Njaco (Feb 3, 2013)

Juha said:


> 9./KG 76 was also trained for low level attacks. It was equipped with Do 17Zs.
> 
> Juha



see 18 August 1940....


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## stona (Feb 4, 2013)

Njaco said:


> see 18 August 1940....



Another raid that whilst brilliantly executed by the low level Dorniers didn't exactly go to plan. Oberleutnant Lamberty (who was shot down) and his men certainly didn't expect to be first over the target!

August 18th was also the Ju 87's swansong in the British campaign.

Alfred Price wrote "The Hardest Day" about August 18th.......no idea where my copy went 

Cheers
Steve


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## nuuumannn (Feb 4, 2013)

> Using 3 geschwader of TIE fighters I would launch a multi pronged attack using one geschwader as a spoof to draw up the RAF the other to drop chaff to confuse the operators and launch anti radar missiles. meanwhile the third group would sneak in and use 50 terra watt lasers and anti matter bombs to take out Bentley Priory. A squadron of 600 mph FW187s would then fly over at 65,000 feet and video the remains of southern England to be broadcast on Nazivision 9 o'clock news.
> 
> After all this with the RAF in ruins the Germans would still get stomped on by the Royal Navy if they tried to invade.



Now, you're just being silly.


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## Glider (Feb 4, 2013)

Your right, the German navy wouldn't be stomped, just sunk or scaterred to the four winds


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## parsifal (Feb 4, 2013)

The speed of the approaching invasion fleet is critical to understanding why a cross channel invasion was unrealistic with or without air superiority. Remember what the definition of air superiority is. Perhaps with air supremacy it might be possible, but still unlikely. Thats not to say that I agree with any of this. I think the idea that this target or that target will deliver victory is utter nonsense and Ive put my reasons why and the evidence that attacking radar in particular was a waste of time (because the whole system was beyond the capacity of the LW to destroy).

But anyway, assuming that by some miracle the LW could achieve air superiority, that still leaves the invasion fleet the task of getting across the channel. The invasion fleet was coming from some pretty far flung points of embarkation, Le Havre, Boulogne, Calais, ports in Holland even Germany. On average the distance to be covered was not 20 or even 40 miles, it was a whopping 80-100 miles. The speed of advance for the invaders was at best 2 knots, but this did not take into account tidal flows and currents. In reality the rate of advance might be 1.5 or even 1 knot. That means the troops are embarked for 120-150 hours (allowing for embarkation, or 6-8 days. Who in this forum has spent any time in a landing craft. Its miserable. After 8 days cooped up in a makeshift barge men would be dying from thirst and exposure. And in no condition to fight I can tell you.

On top of that the actual journey is around 4 days, thats 3 consecutive nights that British Destroyers would unrelentingly play havoc with the invasion fleet. 3 days that the Luftwaffe, or the Kriegsmarine could do virtually nothing to protect them. Sure, destroyers would be lost to mines, the odd pop gun set up on the forecaastle of some trawler trying to protect the troops, or some very lucky LW pilot. Remember also that experience shows very clearly that only specially trained crews adept at anti-shipping operations could undertake attacks on Destroyers with any reasonable prospect of success. One only has to look at he experiences of the italians in the Med, torpedo armed or high level bombing, it really doesnt make a difference.....if your crews arent trained to attack ships, they are going to miss more than they hit. and the LW had few resources to attack ships a this time. Its specially trained shipping unit was still recovering from the Norway operation. 

Anyone who thinks a cross channel attack was possible with the resopurces available to the germans in the fall of 1940, with or without air superiority is kidding themselves and trying to pull the wool over the eyes of the forum. An airborne operation was still a very long shot, but was at least plausible. But the airborne forces in 1940 were inadequate for the task and had suffered losses in the summer that they had not yet recovered. Previous wargame tests of this show it would need at least two airborne divs (which did not exist) in June or July able to capure forward airfileds and a port and hold it for 4-6 days whilst reinfor cements arrived. Virtually impossible in other words.


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## wuzak (Feb 4, 2013)

I think I would travel around France looking for things to add to my collections (art, wines, etc) and take them back home.

Then I would tell Hitler what he wants to hear...

I would also send some bombers at night so that I could tell Hitler that I have a 24 hour effort and that Britain won't last much longer.


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## Vincenzo (Feb 4, 2013)

afaik the sea lion planned the use of port in France and Belgium. on the speed the most of barges were towed so sure they go slow but 2 kts or less is very slow we have some experts on barges?


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## parsifal (Feb 4, 2013)

Vincenzo said:


> afaik the sea lion planned the use of port in France and Belgium. on the speed the most of barges were towed so sure they go slow but 2 kts or less is very slow we have some experts on barges?



The attached document assessing the capailities in April 1942 gives figures of 6 knots as you suggest. However the fact that some craft could do 30 knots, others 6 knots, and others still 2 knots (because they were towed) means that the fleet speed regardless of the speed of individual units is 2 knots. In 1940, a vaas number of the craft to be used were the so-called Rhine Barges......which had no motor and had to be towed. Because of stability of the barges they were estimated at the time to not be able to make better speed than 2 knots.

And, as you will see from the intelligence reports, the invasion barges were scattered from Germany to Le Havre.

Finally, thanks for the back handed insult about not knowing about barges.......


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## Glider (Feb 4, 2013)

Its often forgotten that in May 1940 the RN were often bombarding Calais with light cruisers and at time BB's so the german control of the channel was at best a pipe dream


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## stona (Feb 5, 2013)

And the RN had every intention of contesting the Channel.
This is from the weekly resume for 5-12 September 1940,the very point at which the Luftwaffe gave up trying to break Fighter Command and turned to London.







There never was the slightest chance of the Wermacht getting across the Channel,let alone mounting a successful invasion of southern England. "Sealion" was a bluff and it got called.

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Feb 5, 2013)

at last steve, something that we agree on in this debate


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## stona (Feb 5, 2013)

parsifal said:


> at last steve, something that we agree on in this debate



Indeed!

On 12th November 1939,even before the fall of France,a letter was written to General Sir Walter Kirke at the headquarters of Home Forces. It said that the Germans had

"..been extraordinarily successful in keeping us in a constant state of panic."

It continued.

"The invasion scare is,of course,the wildest of the lot.We kept back tens of thousands of men who were needed in France in the last war to deal with this bogey. Invasion was unlikely enough then,but now,with the development of air power,the probability of its even being attempted appears to me to be infinitessimal."

That letter was written by Dowding and he never believed,even after the catastrophe in France,that an invasion was possible.

Even as the eagle was about to fall off its perch,rather than swooping to the kill on "adlertag",as Telford Taylor famously put it, Hitler's thoughts were turning East. According to Goering Hitler considered "the defeat of Russia to be the prerequisite for a collapse of British resistance."

As I said "Sealion" was a bluff,even the Germans knew they couldn't have pulled it off.

Cheers

Steve


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## Vincenzo (Feb 5, 2013)

From the source of Parsifal 
speed: "unknown, but unlikely to exceed 6 kts with 2 barges" so is not 2
on the ports: (the barges) "but it is improbable that they would be used for a passage of any considerable lenghts" the english intelligence report time of passage also from ports from Germany but this is not the same that germans plans to use it. in the 1940 plan they used only french and belgian port maybe in '42 they planned also dutch ports.


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## parsifal (Feb 5, 2013)

Nope, that is incorrect. By 1942 the germans had made improvements to the brages that increased the speed of the invasion barges to 6 knots. that entailed plans to re-engine most of the tow vessels. in 1940, the German operational plan had estimated they needed about 1200 tugs, and this reduced the size of the tugs such that even vessels with only 250hp motors were expected to tow the large Rhine river barges. best sea speed of these craft was estimated (by the KM) to be no more than 2 knots.

The plan in its original form was a broad front affair, involving two complete army groups, one using Cherbourg, Le Havre and most of the Channel Ports as the ports of embarkation. The second Army Group was forced to rely on the Ports of Ostend, Antwerp, and everything as far east as Bremen as the embarkation points. This plan was resisted by the Navy, who advocated a much narrower frontage, undertaken by just a single army group. The Fuhrer accepted the navy' arguments and shipping began to be prepred for a crossing scheduled for August, but due to bad weather in August it was eventually put back to September 16. The poor weather played havoc with the fleet prepration. The rhine barges which still formed the bulk of the invasion transports had been concentrasted in German Ports, where changes and modifications were being undertaken. In total there were 2500 vessels involved including 168 MV transports totalling 414000 GRT of shipping. These were nearly all concentrated in Germany. In addition 1600 of the 2300 barges also remained in Germany awaiting their preprations for invasions. 

There were insufficient dockyard spaces in the Channel to undertake either the barge modifications or the embarkations in anything like a reasonable time frame. So the Germans cooked up another hair brained scheme. They would undertake the necessary modifications in German ports, and embark some of the troops from those same ports. Mostly willhelmhaven and Bremen. Some transports would be moved along the coast to Antwerp and Ostend where it was hoped that the 2nd and third waves of the invasion could be embarkewd. But in order to get into position in time the transports needed to start movement before anyone else......a dead giveaway that the invasion was underway if detected, and the reason why the Navy absolutely needed air supremacy in order to have any chance. They needed to keep Bdetecting the barge movements for as long as possibloe.

The whole plan was a massive excercise in self delusion. it never had a snowflakes chance in hell of being pulled off. 

To give you some idea of what the KM thought of its own plan, Ive attached a translated version of their own assessment. Its damning in its criticism.


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## stona (Feb 5, 2013)

The Wermacht did not posses a single specialised landing craft of any type. Even had this fleet crossed the Channel (unlikely verging on impossible)they had no realistic means of getting ashore. Infantry were to paddle themselves in inflateable dinghys and on rafts,as for the armour in its concrete bottomed barges........

As Parsifal says the whole thing was ridiculous.

Compare it with the Allied effort on D day. Even that nearly came unstuck ,only with an outstanding effort did Americans get themselves off Omaha beach.

Cheers
Steve


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## meatloaf109 (Feb 5, 2013)

wuzak said:


> I think I would travel around France looking for things to add to my collections (art, wines, etc) and take them back home.
> 
> Then I would tell Hitler what he wants to hear...
> 
> I would also send some bombers at night so that I could tell Hitler that I have a 24 hour effort and that Britain won't last much longer.


You forgot about having a few more uniforms made, and getting some more medals to display on them.


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## Vincenzo (Feb 5, 2013)

Sorry Parsifal what is the source for barges can not be towed to 6 knts in 1940?
on the port again in 1940 was planed to use french and belgian harbours the CONF102 agree with this, the early Army requirements for 2 army group never get a naval plan


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## parsifal (Feb 5, 2013)

suggest you have a close look at the KM plan again. The shipping was ordered to ports in germany, not the french coast. As were the majority of barges. The ports of departure for the initial waves were indeed the channel ports, but the embarkation and assembly of these elements were to be in those ports. There was no capacity to absorb the second and third waves, which by necessity had to come from German ports, where the shipping was being concentrated. i dont know how much you know about amphibious operations, but it takes several weeks or months to concentrate the shipping at the port of embarkation, then you move to the landing point. If the Germans wanted to undertake the operation in August or September, the shipping had to be at the point wherer the troops were going to be loaded. its not just a case of throwing a few troops on a transport over a few hours....its takes time to tactically load the trasnports so that everything comes out of the ship in the right order.

Since the ports in the channel were already filled with only a fraction of the barges, and none oe of the transports, and once they left the ports they would not hang around in the middle of the ocean, there was no other alternative other than to load and begin the movements of waves 2 and 3 from the more distant ports of embarkation. Quite simply the size of the plan dictated that some of the troops come from as far away as Germany. Moreover some 500 of the barges remained in Le havre and Cherbourg, so these too were being loaded in prepration from those ports.

its simply a physical impossibility to load and pass through all the necessary traffic from the Channel ports. The port of Antwerp was bigger, but ostend, calais and boulogne were basically fishing ports.

Dunkirk had been undertaken fom these ports. this was no invasion, it was an evacuation.....with no thought of tactical loading, or indeed any equipment at all. To get the troops out of that pocket, it still took from 26th May until 4 June using a greater tonnage of ships and involving a similar number of troops (338000 without equipment were evacuated, compared to about 300000 with equipment, with about 100000 in the 1st wave in the cut down german invasion plan). Contrary to popular belief, most of the troops in the evacuation were evacuated from the port, not off the beach. Why do you suppose it took eight days to complete this operation. the answer is simple, there was not the port handling capacity to deal with it any faster. You have more ports, but you have to undetake tactical loading and have the embarkation process finished in about 48 hours, give or take. The Germans would have faced a similar problem, but larger and more complex, hence the inescapable need to decentralise the embarkation points.

The reports Ive already given gives you the information on the engine sizes for the barges, and hence the speed. at home I have the report that will give the speeds for you if that is what you need. You can choose to not accept those figures if you want. 

But it never ceases to amaze me how people even today, still seem to view the cross channel attack as some kind of glorified river crossing. It was anything but that. amphibious crossings are amongst the most complex of all military operations, and port capacities, shipping concentrations, points of embarkation and discharge capabilities are a part of that problem. we havenet even looked as yet at the movement of the tides and winds, let alone mines, and enemy activities.


Even if you want to insist that the fleet speed is 6 knots, that still equates to a travel distance of over 30 hours. When you allow for assmbly times, the need to negotiate relatively clear channels through minefields, the tides and currents, that will equate to about 50 hours in the water. Long enough for the British destroyers to attack over two nights.

The 1974 RMC wargame did see the germans getting ashore, having suffered 25% casualties in getting there. Thats greatrer than the casualties suffered at Gallipoli incidentally. But they only got ashore because the situation was fudged....the RN was not allowed to react for 24 hours, and all the Germans were loaded in the Channel ports. Neither of these assumptions were ever true, they were given simply to make a game of the excercise. nobody likes being sunk even before you have the chance to fire a shot.....


Attached is a map of the modified Sealion Plan


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## SPEKTRE76 (Feb 5, 2013)

In addition to my previous post I would have fitted captured Spitfires and Hurricanes with some sort of plant killing spray in a drop tank and 'crop dust' all farms and fields that live stock or fowl were kept. This would be an attempt to starve the RAF and Her Majesty's Army.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 5, 2013)

Very shaky ground, It might open the door for the British to respond with "chemical warfare" of their own.


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## wiking85 (Feb 5, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> Very shaky ground, It might open the door for the British to respond with "chemical warfare" of their own.


Operation Vegetation.


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## parsifal (Feb 6, 2013)

"The main planning for the operation came out of two directives from Hitler and a supplemental one from the OKW, the first of which was issued on 16 July 1940. Up to this point, various meetings had occurred and planning documents had been issued by all three services and their High Commands from as far back as late 1939, including a memo from Jodl dated 12 July 1940 which alluded to the operation being called Löwe (Lion) and being a broad front operation, not much more complex than an extended river crossing. While the Heer found the idea appealing, rivers are not tidal, are not subject to severe weather and don't have the enemy's Home Fleet in a position to contest the crossing. Following this was a meeting between Hitler, von Brauchitsch, and General der Artillerie Franz Halder (the Army Chief of Staff) on 13 July 1940, where Halder presented more detailed planning proposals that outlined an operation incorporating 39 divisions and around 500,000 men (published 20 July). Hitler authorised continued preparations but was puzzled over the lack of peace feelers from Britain, as he once again outlined that he would prefer a negotiated settlement as he did not wish to hand Britain a military defeat which would disrupt the empire and only be of benefit to Japan and the USA. Hitler also reviewed his decision to reduce the size of the army by thirty-five divisions to release additional manpower for the economy and scaled it down to a reduction of fifteen divisions.


Fuhrer Directive No. 16 issued on 16 July 1940 stated that the Wehrmacht would 'begin preparations for, and if necessary carry out, an invasion of England. The aim of this operation is to eliminate Great Britain as a base of operations from which the war against Germany can be fought and, if necessary, the island will be completely occupied.' An invasion would be carried out on a broad front and preparations completed by mid-August. The Luftwaffe would eliminate the RAF as an effective fighting force and interdict the Royal Navy should it try to intervene and the Kriegsmarine would furnish an invasion fleet and protect it. Current army plans would form the basis of the operation, although the line would be shortened slightly to between Ramsgate and the Isle of Wight. Hitler also confirmed that the operation would be codenamed Seelöwe (Sealion). In some ways, it seemed that the Luftwaffe was expected to almost defeat Britain by itself. Goring and his commanders however, mostly ignored the directive and continued with their own plans - they thought an invasion was going to be unnecessary anyway, while Raeder and the Kriegsmarine thought that OKW was insane. From this point, the Heer continued to be the main supporter of the plan, with the Luftwaffe lukewarm to the idea and the Kriegsmarine trying to torpedo the Heer's plan.


Following Fuhrer Directive No. 16, in which many historians highlight the words 'and if necessary carry out, an invasion' as an indication of Hitler's lack of commitment, the second half of July was filled with various staff meetings and proposals where the Luftwaffe confirmed it would be able to start a major air campaign against the RAF in early August but the Kriegsmarine would not be able to complete its preparations until mid-September. On 28 July 1940, they proposed that if the invasion were to go ahead that a beachhead be established near Dover, the closest point to the continent, where a narrow corridor could be protected by minefields to each side as well as groups of U-Boats and E-Boats beyond these. *The Kriegsmarine estimated it would take ten days to put the first wave ashore and needless to say, the Heer was horrified*. It had wanted landings all along the south coast to occur on a 24 hour timetable. 

The plan at this point wanted wheeled and tracked vehicles and so all the car ferries were to be used along with all the cross-channel tourist facilities. The first wave was to be landed over three to four days and consist of 260,000 men, 30,000 vehicles and 60,000 horses. This was followed by a memo dated 31 July 1940, which advised that given the Kriegsmarine's preparations were complete . It could not however, guarantee to able to protect the invasion from the Royal Navy and would not be able to guarantee resupply if there was indeed bad weather. It was suggested that the invasion was put off until May 1941 when additional surface assets would be available and additional work be able to be carried out on converting or building vessels to allow for amphibious operations.

Eventually the plan was pared down to the point of proposing a first wave odf some 100-150000 men. It remained a totally unworkable and unrealistic plan.

With regard to vulnerability, one only need examine the british Destroyer dispositions to realize just how dangerously exposed this plan was


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## Vincenzo (Feb 6, 2013)

Parsifal so help me to find tell me the pages i can read for find this german port.
Again you've not source for tell that barges go only a 2 kts in 1940, and a 6 kts non need 30 hours for the passage, also in the far barges invasion bases were enough near to need less 20 hours probably less.


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## Glider (Feb 6, 2013)

To be honest 2 knots or 6 doesn't really matter to me. At six you are looking for your troops to spend hours at sea in a converted barge and I promise they will be in no condition to fight.

What interests me is how the germans expected to control thousands of horses in the first wave?


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## Juha (Feb 6, 2013)

Glider said:


> To be honest 2 knots or 6 doesn't really matter to me. At six you are looking for your troops to spend hours at sea in a converted barge and I promise they will be in no condition to fight.
> 
> What interests me is how the germans expected to control thousands of horses in the first wave?



Hello Glider
IMHO you are unduly pessimistic. E.g. Vikings could sail long distances on their longships and be ready to fight at the moment they disembarked, IIRC they also sometimes had some horses with them but at lest Normans could transport easily heavy cavalry horses on their ships as they did in 1066.

Juha


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## Gixxerman (Feb 6, 2013)

I've read about the war-gaming too.
Nobody could realistically engineer a German win without the most unlikely and unrealistic moves by the British.

If Germany had been in a position to mount an airborne assault on a large airfield (and hold it securely for at least the first couple of weeks) then there's the possibility that it might provide the start of an attempt to defeat the ill-equipped British army negate the Royal Navy's undoubed power to stop a sea-bourne invasion.
But the fact is they didn't.
They had neither the manpower, the necessary airbourne equipment nor the aircraft capable of achieving such a goal.
So they planned on the basis of what they had and what they might do, try barges.

I've yet to read any serious military historian say anything other than it would have been a disaster, for the Germans involved. 

Had Dunkirk not happened the British political will might have been so lacking - and the UK so desperate to negotiate the return of such a huge number of her captured troops - as to render attempts at peace more likely to succeed. 
But it did happen....and this coupled with Hitler's irrational views on British interests and likely actions together with his total blindness to British opinions about nazi Germany his likely future actions made peace absolutely unlikely in the extreme.


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## vinnye (Feb 6, 2013)

I agree that any invasion would require the LW being able to keep the RAF and RN at bay.
This never happened and never really looked like happening. The LW caused the RAF and particularly No. 11 Group heavy casualties. But they did not get the support / co-operation from 12 Group that they should have had. If necessary, the RAF could have used its resources differently and maintained a presence over the South East coast. This would have made the losses that any armada trying to invade across the Channel prohibitive, and that does not include RN intervention.
I don't think that the LW would have been able to carry out a parachute landing - air superiority would be essential for this to even be considered!


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## Vincenzo (Feb 6, 2013)

imho also if LW was able to keep RAF and RN at bay the invasion was not successfull, the naval capability were too low for invade the Great Britain
need some other changes from historical event


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## bobbysocks (Feb 6, 2013)

wuzak said:


> I think I would travel around France looking for things to add to my collections (art, wines, etc) and take them back home.
> 
> Then I would tell Hitler what he wants to hear...
> 
> I would also send some bombers at night so that I could tell Hitler that I have a 24 hour effort and that Britain won't last much longer.



and when things fail i would blame my subordinates...telling hitler both he and i have been betrayed ... and then send those poor soles ( who actually did nothing but cover my @$$ ) to the russian front....


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## Gixxerman (Feb 6, 2013)

That's about the size of it Bobbysocks.

....and don't forget the part about promoting your woefully ill-equipped pals who were supposed to be the show-biz end of things to important jobs they had no special skills for who will (have the honour to?) commit suicide over their own ineptitude allowing you to swan about as if it was any everyone else that had done the wrong thing(s).


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## stona (Feb 6, 2013)

Juha said:


> Hello Glider
> IMHO you are unduly pessimistic. E.g. Vikings could sail long distances on their longships and be ready to fight at the moment they disembarked, IIRC they also sometimes had some horses with them but at lest Normans could transport easily heavy cavalry horses on their ships as they did in 1066.
> Juha



The Vikings were sailing/rowing vessels designed to go to sea and were for the most part good sailors. You can't say the same about the average German soldier in WW2 being dragged across the channel in a flat bottomed river barge.

As for the Normans firstly the numbers are not comparable,William the Bastard probably landed about 8,000 men,the Germans would need to land tens or hundreds of thousands.

How many horses? Probably a lot. William was accompanied by 3,000 knights who would normally have at least one highly trained and expensive war horse each,maybe more.

More importantly they landed unopposed as Harold Godwinson and his army were not at the coast. The Normans had time to recover and some accounts claim that the Normans rather unsportingly attacked the Anglo-Saxons before they were ready. 
Also crucially the invaders actually outnumbered the defenders,certainly in terms what we might call professional soldiers. Much of Harold's army was made up of men of the "fyrd" armed with their agricultural tools. The men who supplied and led these men,the "thegns", might be properly armed but Harold had only about 2,500 "housecarls" who were paid professional soldiers.

I bet some of these Anglo-Saxon words look familiar to someone speaking a modern Scandinavian language. Harold's mum Gytha Thorkelsdottir was directly related to the King of Demmark. 

Not sure how this relates to the Luftwaffe!

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Feb 6, 2013)

Vincenzo said:


> Parsifal so help me to find tell me the pages i can read for find this german port.
> Again you've not source for tell that barges go only a 2 kts in 1940, and a 6 kts non need 30 hours for the passage, also in the far barges invasion bases were enough near to need less 20 hours probably less.



At the meeting of 21 July 1940,, the KM advised the heer that their plan would take 10 days to get the first wave ashore. That was with 260000 in the first wave. In the September permutation of the plan, the first wave had been reduced to about 100000 men. The heer expected that it would take 4 days to get the first wave from point of embarkation to to the landing sites. That was never confirmed or agreed to by the KM.

However assuming the Heer was about right, and further assuming the distance to travel was an average of say 80-100 miles, thats an average distance covered of 20 miles a day. Or less than 1 knot fleet speed. 

However if you allow say 1 day for embarkation and 1 day to disembark, you can increase your best fleet speed to 2 knots. 

If the flleet speed of the force was 6 knots and the distance to be covered is 80 miles, the time to traverse the distance will be about 13-15 hours. however there would need to be time to embark and assemble the fleet outside the ports of departure, and then time to disembark. If these elements of embarkation and disembarkation each take about 24 hours each, then a fleet speed reduces the duration of the operation to 3 days.

By comparison, the embarkation process for Overlord took 2 days and the disembarkation took about 6 hours, give or take. But Overloord was undertaken with speccially designed vessels, by people with vastly more amphoibious experience. One of the big problems for the Germans was how they would actually get their transports unloaded


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## Tante Ju (Feb 6, 2013)

IMHO German headache would not be in landing the troops, but supply them with stores and ammo once they have landed...

Also the idea that quarter a million men could subdue the UK must have been extremely unlikely even to the most ardent nazis in the Wehrmacht. I wonder if they ever got to the "what should we do after we have landed" part. The plan was obviously unrealistic and was barely more than a study, and quite clearly, a political bluff.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 6, 2013)

Perhaps the quarter a million men were supposed to seize a few _real ports_ so follow up troops could use normal shipping for transit? Unloading on beaches is one thing. Unloading onto docks/quays is another. 

Unloading 100-200 tons of supplies per division per day after the first wave gets ashore might have been a bit of a problem until real ports were seized. 

The list of problems goes on and on and on and........


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## Jenisch (Feb 6, 2013)

stona said:


> The Luftwaffe came close in late August 1940 to defeating the RAF.


 


> There is a consensus among historians that the Luftwaffe simply could not crush the RAF. Stephen Bungay described Dowding and Park's strategy of choosing when to engage the enemy whilst maintaining a coherent force as vindicated. The RAF proved to be a robust and capable organisation which was to use all the modern resources available to it to the maximum advantage.[215] Richard Evans wrote:
> Irrespective of whether Hitler was really set on this course, he simply lacked the resources to establish the air superiority that was the sine qua non-of a successful crossing of the English Channel. A third of the initial strength of the German air force, the Luftwaffe, had been lost in the western campaign in the spring. The Germans lacked the trained pilots, the effective fighter planes, and the heavy bombers that would have been needed.[216][nb 26]
> The Germans launched some spectacular attacks against important British industries, but they could not destroy the British industrial potential, and made little systematic effort to do so. Hindsight does not disguise the fact the threat to Fighter Command was very real, and for the participants it seemed as if there was a narrow margin between victory and defeat. Nevertheless, even if the German attacks on the 11 Group airfields which guarded southeast England and the approaches to London had continued, the RAF could have withdrawn to the Midlands out of German fighter range and continued the battle from there.[218] The victory was as much psychological as physical. Writes Alfred Price:
> The truth of the matter, borne out by the events of 18 August is more prosaic: neither by attacking the airfields, nor by attacking London, was the Luftwaffe likely to destroy Fighter Command. Given the size of the British fighter force and the general high quality of its equipment, training and morale, the Luftwaffe could have achieved no more than a Pyrrhic victory. During the action on 18 August it had cost the Luftwaffe five trained aircrewmen killed, wounded or taken prisoner, for each British fighter pilot killed or wounded; the ratio was similar on other days in the battle. And this ratio of 5:1 was very close to that between the number of German aircrew involved in the battle and those in Fighter Command. In other words the two sides were suffering almost the same losses in trained aircrew, in proportion to their overall strengths. In the Battle of Britain, for the first time during the Second World War, the German war machine had set itself a major task which it patently failed to achieve, and so demonstrated that it was not invincible. In stiffening the resolve of those determined to resist Hitler the battle was an important turning point in the conflict.



Battle of Britain - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## Juha (Feb 6, 2013)

Hello Steve
Many of Vikings, if not most, were farmers, and because of Germans probably planned to make the landing during calm weather, the flat bottoms would not have made much difference. Ihave some experience on flatbottomed boats/crafts from Buster outboard engine boat through army assault boat (like German Sturmboot) to navy’s fast landing crafts. Ride was hard at 30+ knots but more comfortable at lower speeds.

Of course medieval armies were much smaller than the mass armies of industrial major powers. The point is that if it was possible to transport several thousands horses then with more resources it was possible to transport tens of thousands horses.

And I’m aware of the structure of Anxlo-Saxon armies, the last exam I had to pass before I got my MA on General/World history was on the structure of Anglo-Saxon society.
And don’t underestimate too much armed peasants, 250 years later Swiss showed to Burgunds and Austrians that peasant armies could be very effective against professional feudal armies.

Juha


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## stona (Feb 6, 2013)

There is a consensus that the historical attempt by the Luftwaffe to defeat Fighter Command was doomed to failiure.It was an ill conceived and badly executed shambles. I would agree with that,though not always Price's jingoism. Incidentally I like Price and have many of his books,that doesn't make him correct all the time 
The shortage of trained fighter pilots in September 1940 was critical.
There is certainly not a consensus that a better organised and coordinated attack could not have succeeded. Had the eagle "swooped to the kill" rather than "falling of its perch" things may have gone differently.
If you read through this thread I refer to several emminent and well respected historians who share this view.
I'm not going to go over the whole thing again.
Cheers
Steve


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## Jenisch (Feb 6, 2013)

stona said:


> The shortage of trained fighter pilots in September 1940 was critical.



It could have been. But the LW was also not well.



> There is certainly not a consensus that a better organised and coordinated attack could not have succeeded.



Well, that applies to everything. A better defense of France could have well hold the Germans in 1940. There are many contemporany works that dispell the myth of the ultra superior WM and the "WWI" French Army, such as Ernest R. May's Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France. A similar situation could have existed for the RAF in 1940. History is dynamic. =D


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## Vincenzo (Feb 6, 2013)

parsifal said:


> At the meeting of 21 July 1940,, the KM advised the heer that their plan would take 10 days to get the first wave ashore. That was with 260000 in the first wave. In the September permutation of the plan, the first wave had been reduced to about 100000 men. The heer expected that it would take 4 days to get the first wave from point of embarkation to to the landing sites. That was never confirmed or agreed to by the KM.
> 
> However assuming the Heer was about right, and further assuming the distance to travel was an average of say 80-100 miles, thats an average distance covered of 20 miles a day. Or less than 1 knot fleet speed.
> 
> ...



Again you change the facts
The first directive for the operation was on 2nd july (was request to navy for landing 25/40 divisions). The 9th the Navy ask to Army and to LW their operational intentions wich would form a basis for Naval preparations. In the discussion of 15th July already were talking if embarking port in franco-belgian coast. 16th July the 2nd directive, (Sealion codename), The 20thJuly the Navy knewn that the Army want a 100,000 men first wave (embarked from the area cherbourg-dunkirq). the 25th July the first wave go down to 90,000 (from Ostend-Cherbourg), the 2nd wave would be 160,000 men this wave was not possible simultaneus so need 4/5 echelons at intervals of 2 days (this 260,000 were 13 divisions). The timetable of 2nd wave was inaceptable for the Army.


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## parsifal (Feb 6, 2013)

Vincenzo said:


> Again you change the facts
> The first directive for the operation was on 2nd july (was request to navy for landing 25/40 divisions). The 9th the Navy ask to Army and to LW their operational intentions wich would form a basis for Naval preparations. In the discussion of 15th July already were talking if embarking port in franco-belgian coast. 16th July the 2nd directive, (Sealion codename), The 20thJuly the Navy knewn that the Army want a 100,000 men first wave (embarked from the area cherbourg-dunkirq). the 25th July the first wave go down to 90,000 (from Ostend-Cherbourg), the 2nd wave would be 160,000 men this wave was not possible simultaneus so need 4/5 echelons at intervals of 2 days (this 260,000 were 13 divisions). The timetable of 2nd wave was inaceptable for the Army.



Do the math. If the second wave is coming from ports as far away as Rotterdam, Le havre and Cherbourg, and the fleet speed is 2-6 knots, and there is a need to assemble the TF outside the ports of embarkation , then those second waves have to start their part of the operation before the 1st waves. Thats a dead give away to the RN that something is coming.

Im not changing anything. im just over arguing with someone who has abslotely no idea what they are talking about.

Have you ever set foot on a ship in your entire life, or been involved in any amphibibious excercise. If so, you are hiding the experience really well. 

This is all shown in the plan I posted, which relates to the plan as adopted 1 September


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## michaelmaltby (Feb 6, 2013)

"... The plan was obviously unrealistic and was barely more than a study, and quite clearly, a political bluff."

Indeed. But the _bluff _failed, you see - instead of putting fear into the British it did just the opposite - it _rallied_ the British public after Dunkirk and the fiasco of France.

Rahm Immanuel - Obama's advisor early first term - is quoted for "never let a public crisis go to waste" or words to that effect. The public crisis was Sea Lion and Churchill knew Britain [with a history of being invaded] would rally and stand. The RAF delivered.

Hitler's bluff failed and Sea Lion was _never _anything than a combined arms military school exercise, IMHO.

MM


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## parsifal (Feb 6, 2013)

The embarkation aspect of the whole operation is also completely unrealistic. Just looking at one or two aspects of the plan immediately reveals it for the fraud that it was. 

Transport Fleet "E" was based at le Havre and was tasked with the movement of VII and X Korps which included 8, 26 and 6 mtn troops. Normally that would ba a force of at least 60000 men, however for the operations in Narvik, the germans pared down their assault forces from an average regimental size of about 3500 men, to about 2100 men. Lets assume they do something similar here. that means the assault force being carried by Transport Fleet "E" is about 36-40000 men. We know that each transport on average was going to carry about 400 men and their equipment. 

From the attached map of modern Le havre harbour, we can see that the barbour entrance is less than 200m. thats going to constrain the departures to a single file exit, in prepration for form up outside the harbour. We can assume a safe working radius for each ship of around 200m. Im being extremely generous. There were, I think 5 jetties in 1940 and to load 400 troops and their equipment (assuming some level of prior prepration) I would estimate at least an hour for each ship. Thats 5 transports per hour for the port. Or, 2000 men stated another way. Just to getr the transports loaded it will take about 18-20 hours, during which time the port would be alive with activity. The British would need to be blind deaf and dumb not to know something was up. Then we need to get those transports out of the harbour and into the form up position. If only one transport can leave the harbour entrance at a time, and there is a 200m separation between each transport, and those transports are able to move at a best speed of 5 knots, it will take those transports about 8 hourd just to clear the harbour. All up the form and loading times are about 28 hours just to get ready to kick off. Edit: I forgot the impact of tides.....normally from a given harbour you might get 6 hors in a 24 hour cycle in which to exit a harbour with a low power vessel such as these barges. So it is entirely plausible that theharbour exit and form up might take up to 52 hours to complete, if it cant be done in one tidal cycle. 

When the heer thought that it could get its first waves asdhore in four days after commencement of the operation, they were being wildly optimistic


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## Vincenzo (Feb 7, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Im not changing anything. im just over arguing with someone who has abslotely no idea what they are talking about.


 
ahah

you writed "At the meeting of 21 July 1940,, the KM advised the heer that their plan would take 10 days to get the first wave ashore." this is false was the 2nd wave would take until 10 days.
"That was with 260000 in the first wave." this is false this was the sum of first and 2nd waves
" In the September permutation of the plan, the first wave had been reduced to about 100000 men" this is false the 1st wave was 100,000 already the 20th july
"However assuming the Heer was about right, and further assuming the distance to travel was an average of say 80-100 miles, thats an average distance covered of 20 miles a day. Or less than 1 knot fleet speed. " this is full speculation the max distance were around 80-100 miles, was not covered a 20 miles of day, they thinked of use the ship of 1st wave after 48 hours after the 1st wave start so in 48 they start landing and back and are ready to restart.


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## parsifal (Feb 7, 2013)

Given that I am quoting someone elses accounts of those meetings, and you are just saying they are falsel with nothing to back up your claim that they are false , I cant see much point in arguing with you. you believe.....something, i dont know what, but it looks like you might be thinking the plan was in some way feasible . If you do, then give us your critique as to why you think it possible. obviously i dont, and a lot of other people agree with me. ive given you some reasons as to why i think it an unworkable plan, all you have said so far is that anything you dont like...."thats false" or "thats false" What the hell are you basing your rebuttals on? Which version of the plan do you think had any chance of success, and why. 

I actually used several sources for my quote, hence the absence of a reference, but most of the material came from this place. If you have a problem with what theyve said,, take it up with them.

http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/operation_sealion_primer.html

Other wise you are just demonstrating dumb stubborness and an acute lack of conviction and authority on the issue, and getting into a pissing contest with me.


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## Njaco (Feb 7, 2013)

Lets keep this civil.

I think that everyone might be missing the fact that AT THE TIME, many thought it WAS feasible and prepared for it. Hindsight is wonderful.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 7, 2013)

" AT THE TIME, many thought it WAS feasible and prepared for it."

IF the British made NO preparations, it may have been feasible as the landings would have been pretty much unopposed or defense in depth not planned. 

EVERY preparation the British made, no matter how small, increases the odds against the Germans, even if it is only by increasing morale or the will to fight. 

For small, see: 







tracks are 15" apart. 

Every week the RAF delayed the Germans was another week of arms/munition production and another week of construction of defense projects and another week of training for the ground troops. 

Which means the German troops that did make it to shore would have a harder job with each week that goes by.


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## Milosh (Feb 7, 2013)

The Romney Hythe and Dymchurch Railway is still in operation after 90 years.

The Romney Hythe and Dymchurch Railway


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## Vincenzo (Feb 7, 2013)

My source is conf102 "German Planes...." if you don't read that you post as your source it's not my fault, incidentally that was also my source. Only, relatively my last post, for the distance the source is in conf103 in the appendix.


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## stona (Feb 7, 2013)

Jenisch said:


> Well, that applies to everything. A better defense of France could have well hold the Germans in 1940. There are many contemporany works that dispell the myth of the ultra superior WM and the "WWI" French Army, such as Ernest R. May's Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France. A similar situation could have existed for the RAF in 1940. History is dynamic. =D



The original title of the thread supposed that I was in charge of the Luftwaffe in 1940.
It's not about the historical campaign specifically. My argument has been all along that with a few technical changes to the equipment that I would have in 1940,all of which were possible,and a campaign run rather differently, I could have defeated the RAF. I would have swooped to the kill and not fallen from my perch ! 
That is an opinion held by many emminent and respected historians and which I share.

If the original thread had put me in charge of the French army in 1939/40 then the Battle of France may or may not have had a different outcome,but that wasn't the question.

Cheers
Steve


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## parsifal (Feb 7, 2013)

Steve

Maybe its possible, but I would issue strong words of caution to would be armchair generals. Command of real people and real campaigns is a lot harder than it looks, or is portrayed even in professional excercises. I would be very careful about making claims that go "if they put me in charge I could tinker at the edges and win hands down" Sorry, but you cannot make that claim. You can point out the weaknesses of the historical battle, and how it might be improved. You cannot predict how the opponent will react, and you cannot be sure that the panacea that you so passionately believe in will work quite as well as you think. I happen to think, that the radar network you think so vulnerable, was not nearly as vulnerable overall as you think.. In fact I think it was beyond the capabilites of the LW to eliminate the system, keep it so, and then destroy the RAF as was needed. There are a few attacks historically on which to base that assessment, and nowhere does the historical record show that the LW could complete boith missions successfully or comprehensively. On the few occasions they did manage to knock out the radar network, the resulting exploitation attacks were amongst the most costly the LW undertook . Moreover the stations themselves were never out of action for more than a few hours or days at most, and there was never a comprehensive, region wide knocking out of the system. Quite a few of the commanders on the spot questioned the wisdom of the strategy in the first place, since the object was to draw the RAF into battle and destroy it, not break through and romp allover the countryside.

Maybe you are right. maybe a little tweak here or there might have changed history. Maybe you could succeed, where some of the most experienced and competent german commander s could not. But you cannot prove or even claim any probability to any of those conditions. So dont make them, because they (the claims) cheapens your obvious great knowledge on this topic.


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