# Defiants and Battles deployed overseas, any merit in that?



## tomo pauk (Sep 1, 2012)

For the sake of discussion, perhaps members could make a plausible case for the 2 uderdogs deployed in the MTO -(1940-41) and Malaya/CBI (1941/42)? For the duration of this thread, those two remain in production until start of 1942.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 1, 2012)

Battles were deployed overseas but to training squadrons which is were their value was at that point in time. Sturdy and easy to fly they made a good stepping stone for pilots right out of flight school. Keeping them in production until 1942 would be a waste of resources. 

The 1940-41 Italian fighters are not so low performing as to give the Battle any real chance of success compared to the German fighters of the Spring of 1940. The Japanese Army Fighters with twin 7.7mm MGs or a single 12.7 and a 7.7 offer a bit more hope but depending on an enemy's lack of fire power is poor planning. 

The Battle simple offered too little bomb load and too little performance in 1941 to be very useful anywhere. Somebody may have sent them off to Singapore along with the Buffaloes but I am afraid they wouldn't have contributed much except to increase the Japanese scores.


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## ShVAK (Sep 1, 2012)

Defiant MK II's with radar would've made good night fighters, as they did in the ETO for a while.


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## yulzari (Sep 1, 2012)

Battles added to air power in Malaya would give a more effective attack on Japanese ships transporting troops Flown by crews properly trained in the concepts and equipment of the Defiant, the Defiants would have added to the defence capability there too. I would not have made them my first choices _nor volunteered to fly them_ but they would have given Malaya a better chance to defeat the Japanese attack, prevent Burma being overrun and thus allowed time for Indian forces to move to Malaya and Burma and meet a Japanese threat from the Dutch East Indies.

It would take a lot of Battles and Defiants, aircrews and groundcrews but the aeroplanes could have been made available.

Personnel is a different matter. I would suggest a branch of the Empire Training Scheme with the air and groundcrews trained in Malaya and India and retained there. Gladiators and Hart family types were also available from Middle East stores and could have been used in Malaya. Again poor choices but doable if the will were there.

One has to ask what would have not been made instead of Battles? they were only kept in production to give the works something to make until new types superceded them.


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## davebender (Sep 1, 2012)

Destroying German bridges over the Meuse River should have been the highest priority for Britain and France during May 1940. They get the job done or lose every aircraft in the attempt.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 1, 2012)

yulzari said:


> Battles added to air power in Malaya would give a more effective attack on Japanese ships transporting troops Flown by crews properly trained in the concepts and equipment of the Defiant, the Defiants would have added to the defence capability there too. I would not have made them my first choices _nor volunteered to fly them_ but they would have given Malaya a better chance to defeat the Japanese attack, prevent Burma being overrun and thus allowed time for Indian forces to move to Malaya and Burma and meet a Japanese threat from the Dutch East Indies.
> 
> It would take a lot of Battles and Defiants, aircrews and groundcrews but the aeroplanes could have been made available.
> 
> ...



Part of the problem is a shortage of trained and/or properly trained aircrews. I Believe there were some Blenheim squadrons in the far east? The Blenheim offered the same bomb load at higher performance--longer range-- and with a slightly better defense (power turret instead of free swinging gun). The Battle offers nothing over the Blenheim MK I. Without more and better trained aircrews the Battles bring nothing to the table.


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## stona (Sep 1, 2012)

davebender said:


> Destroying German bridges over the Meuse River should have been the highest priority for Britain and France during May 1940. They get the job done or lose every aircraft in the attempt.



They were deployed to France and very nearly lost every aircraft on the very missions you would have them perform.The problem was that despite the undoubted heroism of the crews they singularly failed to achieve their objectives.

I suspect that is why the original question wondered if there would have been any merit in deploying them elsewhere.

Steve


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## parsifal (Sep 1, 2012)

It was possible for the battle to be upgraded, but it would have needed a lot of effort to make them more survivable. They needed lots of things....better protection (armour, defensive weapons, particularly forward firing guns) , higher speed and performance (which means more engine power, since the design was relatively clean aerodynamically. It should have had some sort of dive bomb capability, and it was a bit short on range.

In the secondary TOs, it proabably could still have gotten through, but it was taking the places of more capable a/c. keeping second rate a/c is as hard as top shelf stuff, so why increase the sttrain on the supply chain unnecessarily, plus risk aircrews lives when youve got so many better choices....


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## davebender (Sep 1, 2012)

If they cannot succeed in France they probably won't do better anywhere else. Unless the failure of May 1940 was primarily caused by poor crew training.


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## fubar57 (Sep 1, 2012)

With a single .303 in the front and one in the rear, they were no match for the 109s. Two Victoria Crosses were awarded to two members of PH-K, s/n P2204 for their attack on a bridge in Belgium.

Geo


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## buffnut453 (Sep 1, 2012)

Tend to agree with Stona on this one. I can't see what the Battle would bring that was not already available in Malaya using the Blenheim. 

Having a squadron (or even a flight) of radar-equipped Defiant nightfighters might have achieved some successes but they wouldn't affect the outcome of the campaign.


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## RCAFson (Sep 1, 2012)

stona said:


> They were deployed to France and very nearly lost every aircraft on the very missions you would have them perform.The problem was that despite the undoubted heroism of the crews they singularly failed to achieve their objectives.
> 
> I suspect that is why the original question wondered if there would have been any merit in deploying them elsewhere.
> 
> Steve


 
The Battle did suffer very high losses, but not as high as you imply. According to Wikipedia 63 were lost during 4 raids amounting to 108 sorties. However, given the Luftwaffe's degree of air superiority and the density of German FLAK, it is unlikely that any other contemporary aircraft could have done better. Unescorted, the Bleinheim also suffered heavy losses. The Battles did achieve some measures of success during their missions, and with proper escort they could have done much more, and undoubtedly they could have had a considerable impact in the MTO and Malaya, if deployed in similar numbers.


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## davebender (Sep 1, 2012)

1940 Heer Flak looks dense only in comparison to French and British army AA defenses. It became much more capable from 1941 onward when the Heer began procuring the Flakvierling. 

Did the Defiant and Battle have armor to protect against ground fire?


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## Shortround6 (Sep 1, 2012)

The Defiant had no business flying low enough to get shot at by anything 37mm or smaller. It carried no bombs and trying to strafe with a mid-ship mounted turret is a sure sign of extreme desperation. 

The Battle could have been up graded but WHY?

Yes a new Merlin could have been installed, the rear gun could have been doubled to a twin ( it was done on the Hampden) a hole could have cut in the floor for a MG to fire out the bottom. One or more additional .303 guns could have been mounted in the wings, I am not sure what it needed to be a dive bomber, the air frame was pretty strong already.

Problems are:
1. the bomb storage is for four 250lb bombs in bomb cells in the wing. Can you put a 500lb INSIDE each wing or not? It will lift them if placed outside but the additional drag cuts into the already low performance and shortens the range. Without external carriage what is the max dive angle that can be used for the 250lb in the wings? How much redesign do you want to do and what other design gets delayed while you are fooling around with the Battle? 
2. The airframe will take a much more powerful engine, but where do they come from? From mid 1940 on the Merlin XX is available but it is wanted for both Bomber command (some Wellingtons and the Halifax for starters) and Hurricane IIS and some Bristol Beaufighters. Delaying these aircraft to make a marginally effective single engine bomber isn't going to go over well. 
3. even with several hundred more HP available adding guns is going only going to get you so far, and who mans the lower gun if fitted? the Bomb aimer or does the uper gunner do double duty? plenty of other aircraft tried this and usually with less than stellar success. A-20s often carried a 4th crewman for the lower gun. While twin free swinging guns are better than a single it is still not a turret. Any additional guns in the wing are for ground attack, While the Battle has the wing loading of an early Spitfire it's ability to manuver well enough to bring fixed forward firing guns to bear is suspect.

Without upgrading the engine even a quick and dirty "conversion" of existing airframes ( self sealing tanks, some armor, the dual rear guns.) is going to leave you with a rather under powered aircraft. 

And Please remember, the Battles belonged to bomber command. They were never intended to be used as army co-operation or support aircraft. Any continued production beyond Historical limits would be at the expense of a later Bomber Command aircraft.


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## Greyman (Sep 1, 2012)

The Battle had some protection with ground fire in mind but not the Defiant.

With regards to upgraded German anti-aircraft fire, you're right about 'dense' being a relative term. Keep in mind shooting down low flying, vic-formations of Fairey Battles at 220 mph is a bit of a different task than shooting down singular Hawker Typhoons dive bombing at 520 mph.


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## davebender (Sep 1, 2012)

Did they attack at that speed using a WWII era bomb/gun site? I suspect attack speed was quite a bit slower if they intended to hit anything.


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## Greyman (Sep 1, 2012)

The dive was at 90 degrees (or as close to it as they could judge; _'If you were not hanging in your straps, you were not straight down'_) so the high speeds were not much of a deflection issue.


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## nuuumannn (Sep 2, 2012)

Agree with Buffnut and Steve; I don't think the Battle would have been able to contribute anything else that what was already in either theatre could not provide (although the Blenheim's turret was manually operated; it wasn't powered). 

The last Defiants rolled off the production line in late 1942. The type served as a night fighter from mid-late 1940 until its retirement from front line use in mid 1942 (the later aircraft went straight to training units), fully or partially equipping some 13 night fighter squadrons. As very much a part of Britain's air defence in that time period, it would have been pretty hard to pry what Fighter Command had away from its duties, but for the sake of this thread the Defiant Mk.II night fighter would have been of some use in both theatres, but after the Battle of Britain, the likelyhood of it being employed during the day in its original role of bomber interceptor was slim.


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## cimmex (Sep 2, 2012)

Greyman said:


> Keep in mind shooting down low flying, vic-formations of Fairey Battles at 220 mph is a bit of a different task than shooting down singular Hawker Typhoons dive bombing at 520 mph.



I think the attacking speed of a Hawker Typhoon was far below 400mph.
Cimmex


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## merlin (Sep 2, 2012)

Greyman said:


> With regards to upgraded German anti-aircraft fire, you're right about 'dense' being a relative term. Keep in mind shooting down low flying, vic-formations of Fairey Battles at 220 mph is a bit of a different task than shooting down singular Hawker Typhoons dive bombing at 520 mph.



Typhons dive-bombing!!?? The RAF for some reason seemed to have an aversion to 'Dive-Bombing' its main succes with it was in the Far East with the Vengence, otherwise in the Med some Spitfire used some DB. but otherwise it wasn't done - as any Stuka pilot would recognise it that is. Of note with that Peter Smith's book Dive Bomber - doesn't mention the Typhon at all.
At don't know what others think - but IMHO I think it is physically easier for the AAA to track an aircraft at roughly the same altitude i.e. going right to left, than to follow one down from top to near bottom - with increasing speed.


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## stona (Sep 2, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> The Battle did suffer very high losses, but not as high as you imply. According to Wikipedia 63 were lost during 4 raids amounting to 108 sorties. However, given the Luftwaffe's degree of air superiority and the density of German FLAK, it is unlikely that any other contemporary aircraft could have done better. Unescorted, the Bleinheim also suffered heavy losses. The Battles did achieve some measures of success during their missions, and with proper escort they could have done much more, and undoubtedly they could have had a considerable impact in the MTO and Malaya, if deployed in similar numbers.



That's a loss rate of about 50% which is unsustainable.

The mechanism to escort them in 1940 simply didn't exist.

They were slow,unmanoeuverable,underarmed and didn't carry a worthwhile payload. In other words they were obsolete in the air battles of 1940. They were bought by the RAF for doctrinal and economic reasons both of which were demonstrably out of date very soon after hostilities commenced.

Cheers

Steve


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## stona (Sep 2, 2012)

Greyman said:


> The dive was at 90 degrees (or as close to it as they could judge; _'If you were not hanging in your straps, you were not straight down'_) so the high speeds were not much of a deflection issue.



This is simply not true.

The RAF did dive bomb but at nowhere near a vertical dive. Typhoons performed this type of attack.

The actual method of attack depended on how heavily defended the target was considered to be. I've lifted this from a post I made elsewhere as I'm not at home. I have the diagrams used to instruct the RAF's pilots in the first,steeper,attack but can't scan them at the moment.

The first method involved a fairly steep dive,about 60 degrees. A relatively steep dive angle was considered essential for safety and accuracy.Here are the explanatory notes that go with the diagrams.

"When in vicinity of target section changes to echelon starboard. The leader when over the target allows it to pass under the leading edge of his port wing as in second phase in diagram.When the target reappears at trailing edge the leader executes a semi stalled turn to port,followed by the other aircraft of his section. The result of this manoeuvre is a line astern attack at a steep angle on the reciprocal of the original course as shown in the third phase of the diagram. After releasing bombs,all aircraft make a violent evasive turn in a prearranged direction and reform in a section line abreast." 

At no point do any aircraft fly straight and level.

The RAF did make low level attacks. These were carried out in a dive at about 30 degrees with the bombs released at about 800' and the aircraft flying at high speed to escape small calibre and light flak as well as fragments and debris from their own bombs.Typhoons attacked in pairs using bombs fitted with short delay fuses so that the second pair attacked just after the first's bombs had exploded. Such attacks were considered extremely hazardous and an RAF report warned that four aircraft going down in two pairs was all that could reasonably expected to get away with this type of attack.

Again this is a diving attack,albeit from a shallow angle,and at no point are the attacking aircraft flying straight and level which the RAF considered suicidal.

Cheers

Steve


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## Milosh (Sep 2, 2012)

Greyman said:


> The Battle had some protection with ground fire in mind but not the Defiant.
> 
> With regards to upgraded German anti-aircraft fire, you're right about 'dense' being a relative term. Keep in mind shooting down low flying, vic-formations of Fairey Battles at 220 mph is a bit of a different task than shooting down singular Hawker Typhoons dive bombing at 520 mph.



The Pilot's Manual for the Typhoon says 450mph IAS max when diving with bombs. At 520mph it becomes a Kamikaze. Max diving speed limit, 525mph with no bombs.


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## stona (Sep 2, 2012)

merlin said:


> Typhons dive-bombing!!??



See my post above. It was the only method used to deliver bombs on a defended target,the shallower low level attack only being made on lightly or undefended targets.

The RAF did not have an aversion to dive bombing,it had an aversion to close air support in any form. 

I'm not surprised that Smith,a life long proponent of dive bombing and dive bombers,doesn't mention the Typhoon. The Typhoon was not a dive bomber,it was a fighter pressed into a ground attack role which is an entirely different animal.

Cheers

Steve


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## Edgar Brooks (Sep 2, 2012)

Greyman said:


> The dive was at 90 degrees (or as close to it as they could judge; _'If you were not hanging in your straps, you were not straight down'_) so the high speeds were not much of a deflection issue.


Sorry, but no; if you dive at the vertical, you plant your bomb into your own propeller disc, which is why the Ju-87 slung them out on a trapeze. Dives (for a Spitfire, but I doubt the Typhoon would have been very different) were at 45-60 degrees, with the bombs released as the target vanished under the nose during pull-out. Sight used was the standard Mk.I eyeball, plus "one thousand and one, one thousand and two" count, under one's breath. The recommended path was dive, level off, and leave at low level; do not climb back after delivery.


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## The Basket (Sep 2, 2012)

Over 2000 battles were made which was a huge mistake on someone's part.

Or was it? Could have been 2000 Hurricanes instead.

It was a good idea then suddenly became a bad idea but then you had hundreds of the things.

All aircraft of this class...Il-2, Val, Ju 87 and Devastator were cannon fodder. I don't blame the designers or the RAF but time was unkind.


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## tomo pauk (Sep 2, 2012)

When Typhoon, A-36, or Hurricane dives vertically, they have no problems to release bombs without the trapeze - their bombs are slung under the wing, approx. just under the wing guns.

BTW, was Battle able to conduct a bomber sortie from the N. Africa vs. Crete (say, attacking the German paratroopers during their asasult there), and, of course, return?


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## Edgar Brooks (Sep 2, 2012)

davebender said:


> If they cannot succeed in France they probably won't do better anywhere else. Unless the failure of May 1940 was primarily caused by poor crew training.


It would be nice if, just for once, you canned your snide, sarcastic, and ill-informed anti-British remarks. The Battle was a 1932 design, held in service for far too long, and a throw-back to the ludicrous "The bomber will always get through" doctrine of myopic, self-satisfied politicians and chair-polishing bureaucrats. By the outbreak of war, it was hopelessly slow, with a top speed of 275 mph at 15,000', and a ceiling of 25,000' so it was already obsolete, and the crews might as well have been dubbed Kamikazes from the start. Sending them anywhere (apart from the scrapyard) was the equivalent to a death sentence for any of the crews.


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## Edgar Brooks (Sep 2, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> When Typhoon, A-36, or Hurricane dives vertically, they have no problems to release bombs without the trapeze - their bombs are slung under the wing, approx. just under the wing guns.


Unless you have the slightest sideslip, want to keep your eyes on the target, and don't want to give AA gunners a no-deflection shot, which were enough reason for not using a vertical dive.


> BTW, was Battle able to conduct a bomber sortie from the N. Africa vs. Crete (say, attacking the German paratroopers during their asasult there), and, of course, return?


Get there, maybe; return? Not a chance.


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## stona (Sep 2, 2012)

Whether or not it is possible to bomb from a vertical dive in a Typhoon is irrelevant. It is not the way RAF pilots were taught to do it and it wasn't the way it was done. 30 degree dive for a low level attack and 60 degrees (maximum) for a higher level attack on a defended target.

I wouldn't want to drop a bomb within a foot of my propeller disc whilst in a vertical dive,a situation in which longditudinal stability became an issue for many aircraft.

Cheers
Steve


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## Shortround6 (Sep 2, 2012)

The Basket said:


> Over 2000 battles were made which was a huge mistake on someone's part.
> 
> Or was it? Could have been 2000 Hurricanes instead.
> 
> It was a good idea then suddenly became a bad idea but then you had hundreds of the things.



It went into squadron service a month before the Hurricane. It was a _ STRATEGIC _ bomber. Building 2000 may have been a mistake, building 500 was not. Where the cross over point was is the actual subject of debate. It helped train not only pilots, but bomb aimers, aerial gunners, radio operators, and thousands of ground personnel, aircraft fitters, engine mechanics ordnance personnel and so on. And this is in the operational squadrons of 1937-39. It helped with the rapid expansion of the RAF in the late thirties. New squadrons had to be equipped with something and there weren't enough old Harts to go around. The Battle was cheaper than a Blenheim, your other basic choice at the time. 

Please remember that the Merlin of the time, even if fitted with the better propeller of the Battle vs the fixed pitch prop of the Early Hurricane only made 880 hp at sea level for take-off. This would rather restrict any attempt to turn the Hurricane MK I into a fighter bomber even with a better propeller so the Hurricane cannot do any part of the Battles job, close range or long range.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 2, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> When Typhoon, A-36, or Hurricane dives vertically, they have no problems to release bombs without the trapeze - their bombs are slung under the wing, approx. just under the wing guns.
> 
> BTW, was Battle able to conduct a bomber sortie from the N. Africa vs. Crete (say, attacking the German paratroopers during their asasult there), and, of course, return?



The Battle had some sort of outside bomb racks, but the main load was INSIDE the wing with bomb doors. With out some sort of displacement mechanism a very steep dive is going to result in the bombs hitting the forward edge of the bomb cell much like a Blenheim or Mosquito could not release bombs over a certain angle of dive without the bombs hitting the forward wall of the bombbay. You could seal up the bomb cells, reinforce the area and carry the bombs outside but at lower speed and shorter range. 

Battle was supposed to carry 1000lbs for 1000 miles, It seems to be over 300 miles from Alexandria to the eastern tip of Crete and Crete is 160 miles long. That doesn't leave much for reserve for weather or navigation problems even if you don't go to a combat setting on the engine near the target.


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## stona (Sep 2, 2012)

tomo pauk said:


> BTW, was Battle able to conduct a bomber sortie from the N. Africa vs. Crete (say, attacking the German paratroopers during their asasult there), and, of course, return?



Only if the Luftwaffe let them 

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Sep 2, 2012)

The Luftwaffe fighters not being able to interfere during the assault?



Edgar Brooks said:


> Unless you have the slightest sideslip, want to keep your eyes on the target, and don't want to give AA gunners a no-deflection shot, which were enough reason for not using a vertical dive.


 


stona said:


> Whether or not it is possible to bomb from a vertical dive in a Typhoon is irrelevant. It is not the way RAF pilots were taught to do it and it wasn't the way it was done. 30 degree dive for a low level attack and 60 degrees (maximum) for a higher level attack on a defended target.
> 
> I wouldn't want to drop a bomb within a foot of my propeller disc whilst in a vertical dive,a situation in which longditudinal stability became an issue for many aircraft.
> 
> ...



Hi, Edgar, Steve,
Seem like the A-36 have had no problems at all to dive bomb in a near-vertical dive, and even had the capability to bomb with one bomb at time. That makes a fairly un-symetrical set up for the second bomb run, yet it was done. So no problems for Hurri and Tiffie (lack of the dive brakes maybe being the issue here, therefore restricting the dive angle)?



Shortround6 said:


> The Battle had some sort of outside bomb racks, but the main load was INSIDE the wing with bomb doors. With out some sort of displacement mechanism a very steep dive is going to result in the bombs hitting the forward edge of the bomb cell much like a Blenheim or Mosquito could not release bombs over a certain angle of dive without the bombs hitting the forward wall of the bombbay. You could seal up the bomb cells, reinforce the area and carry the bombs outside but at lower speed and shorter range.



Hi, SR6,
Did not tried to turn the Battle into a dive bomber (though it would be interesting to adopt Skua's gear for those?), but wondered about the fighters turned into bombers, with bombs under wing guns.



> Battle was supposed to carry 1000lbs for 1000 miles, It seems to be over 300 miles from Alexandria to the eastern tip of Crete and Crete is 160 miles long. That doesn't leave much for reserve for weather or navigation problems even if you don't go to a combat setting on the engine near the target.



Yep, seem like a stretch


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## Greyman (Sep 2, 2012)

merlin said:


> Typhons dive-bombing!!?? ... it wasn't done


 


stona said:


> This is simply not true. The RAF did dive bomb but at nowhere near a vertical dive



I encourage more reading of Typhoon pilots and their exploits. I'm not going to comb through all of my books but I remembered the location of a couple off the top of my head:

"_When they were in the open a vertical dive was best, but not all pilots could put their aircraft into such a position, since one always gains the impression within the aircraft that the dive is steeper than is really the case_." - Squadron Leader Raymond Lallement, 609 Squadron

_The method he recommended of checking that an aircraft was in a vertical dive was to do a roll: if the attitude was less than vertical, the pull of gravity would be felt when the aircraft was on its back. On a vertical dive one did not experience such an effect_. - (from same source) Typhoon: The Combat History

"_The dive itself was straight down. If you were not hanging in your straps, you were not straight down. If the target was heavily defended, we set our engine throttle for one-third open, dived from eleven thousand feet down to six thousand feet, released, and pulled hard. On the pullout the aircraft’s airspeed indicator read 525 mph, the red line for the aircraft. If less heavily defended and we were feeling confident, we dove from eight thousand, released at four thousand. Now Roy Burden, over at 438, he told me he used to release at three thousand, but you’d be yanking pretty hard—me, I liked four thousand. If there was anti-aircraft fire coming up at us, we fired our cannons in the dive to keep their heads down. The typical delay on the bomb fuse was 1/25th of a second_."

...

"_The Germans put a ring of guns around bridges, and they fired them to a cone right in the middle. They knew we had to go down through that cone. They wouldn't aim at us; they just created this cone of fire that we had to go through_." - Flight Lieutenant Harry Hardy, 440 Squadron

Flight Lieutenant Hardy also mentioned his time in No. 6 Tactical Exercise Unit in Scotland taking a dive-bombing course on Hurricanes prior to transfering to a Typhoon Squadron.

Wing Commander Hugh Godefroy in his book 'Lucky Thirteen' also made mention of his success deviating from the perscribed 60 degree dive—which his Wing "_discovered that this technique of dive bombing was extremely inaccurate_"—and diving straight down instead. But this was with Spitfires. Release also had to be during pullout with Spitfires due to the—as has been mentioned—trouble with centreline bomb rack.



Shortround6 said:


> The Battle had some sort of outside bomb racks, but the main load was INSIDE the wing with bomb doors. With out some sort of displacement mechanism a very steep dive is going to result in the bombs hitting the forward edge of the bomb cell much like a Blenheim or Mosquito could not release bombs over a certain angle of dive without the bombs hitting the forward wall of the bombbay.



Actually, the Battle did have such a mechanism. When the bomb doors opened the bomb racks were lowered so the bombs were clear of the aircraft prior to release.


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## The Basket (Sep 2, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> It went into squadron service a month before the Hurricane. It was a _ STRATEGIC _ bomber. Building 2000 may have been a mistake, building 500 was not. Where the cross over point was is the actual subject of debate. It helped train not only pilots, but bomb aimers, aerial gunners, radio operators, and thousands of ground personnel, aircraft fitters, engine mechanics ordnance personnel and so on. And this is in the operational squadrons of 1937-39. It helped with the rapid expansion of the RAF in the late thirties. New squadrons had to be equipped with something and there weren't enough old Harts to go around. The Battle was cheaper than a Blenheim, your other basic choice at the time.
> 
> Please remember that the Merlin of the time, even if fitted with the better propeller of the Battle vs the fixed pitch prop of the Early Hurricane only made 880 hp at sea level for take-off. This would rather restrict any attempt to turn the Hurricane MK I into a fighter bomber even with a better propeller so the Hurricane cannot do any part of the Battles job, close range or long range.


 
I agree that the Battle was part of RAF expansion and I agree that it replaced BiPlanes and I also agree that when it was being designed and flown in the early days it would have been certainly a winner and it could have shown mid 1930s biplane fighters like the He 51 a clean pair of heels. 

I mentioned the Hurricane as a fighter. I would hate to think that the RAF didnt have enough fighters because the Battle was allocated all production of Merlins!


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## davebender (Sep 2, 2012)

That sounds more believable.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 2, 2012)

Just about 2000 Hurricanes were made by the start of the BoB. Throw in Spitfire production and the Defiant and it doesn't look like the Battle was hogging all the Merlins. Production of the early Merlins were 172 Merlin Is at Derby 1935-37, 1,283 Merlin IIs at Derby 1937-39 and the Merlin II was built to the tune of 6,444 at Derby and 2,012 Crewe from 1938-41. Aside from a few prototypes you can throw in 73 Merlin IVs in 1938 for the Whitley, 184 Merlin MK VIIIs for the Fulmar 39-40, both at Derby and 312 Derby built and 4,589 Crewe built Merlin X engines 1938-42 for Whitley's Halifaxes and Wellingtons. The Merlin XII started in 1939 also lasting until 1941. 

Granted some of these engines were produced after the Battle had ceased production but the Defiant II got the Merlin XX engine so timing and allocations are in the same area. Or if Tomo's proposal is taken up the engines would have come out of these figures. 

In order to have a somewhat balanced air force you need both bombers and fighters, in 1937-39 if not the Battles then what? The Whitley was a much more capable bomber ( at least at night) but in addition to needing two Merlins it's empty weight is about 3 times that of a Battle so it is not even a 2 for one swap. 2 1/2 to 1 ? 

Between the Battle, Blenheim, Hampden, Whitley, Wellington, Sterling, Manchester and Halifax (first flight 24 September 1939) bomber command was getting more than it's share of the goodies. I would venture to guess that canceling the last of the Battles would not have increased fighter production but simple increased bomber production of another type.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 2, 2012)

davebender said:


> That sounds more believable.



450mph indicated is 522mph true at 8000ft. 

As I read the post describing this the planes dived at up to 450IAS and released the bombs, 525mph was seen during the pull out. Bombs are already gone but quating 525mph as a diving speed may be confusing.


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## RCAFson (Sep 2, 2012)

stona said:


> That's a loss rate of about 50% which is unsustainable.
> 
> The mechanism to escort them in 1940 simply didn't exist.
> 
> ...



They were slow compared to SE fighters, but the Battle was quite comparable in performance to the Stuka and most TE bombers. I would guess that if the RAF in France replaced it's battles with Stukas that their loss rate would very similar.

AFAIK, the SAAF used the Battle with some success in North Africa, and I suspect that the RAF could have used it there with similar success as well.


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## merlin (Sep 2, 2012)

Greyman said:


> I encourage more reading of Typhoon pilots and their exploits:-
> 
> snip
> Flight Lieutenant Hardy also mentioned his time in No. 6 Tactical Exercise Unit in Scotland taking a dive-bombing course on Hurricanes prior to transfering to a Typhoon Squadron.
> ...


 
Precisely - official policy even then was that it wasn't safe to go over 60 degrees, but individuals in practise went with steeper because it worked - more accurate.


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## merlin (Sep 2, 2012)

The Basket said:


> Over 2000 battles were made which was a huge mistake on someone's part.
> Or was it? Could have been 2000 Hurricanes instead.
> It was a good idea then suddenly became a bad idea but then you had hundreds of the things.
> All aircraft of this class...Il-2, Val, Ju 87 and Devastator were cannon fodder. I don't blame the designers or the RAF but time was unkind.



The failure was two fold - accepting a restriction on a bomber weight as per the Geneva Disarmament talks, - which the Battle was designed around, and then using that as an aircraft for the Shadow Factories. So yes the Hurricane should have been built in the Austin plant.
Curiously none of the other aircraft were a failure like the Basttle was!!


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## The Basket (Sep 2, 2012)

Was something like the early versions of the Blenheim and Wellington so much better?

If either met an Emil it was for the chop.

This is the illusion of all those ' what ifs'. Stop Battle production, chuck them all in the sea and start again. Can't do that.

It was well known that early bombers were well below Hurricane performance and the Spitfire was even more but you make these machines and send men to war.


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## davebender (Sep 2, 2012)

Ju-87B could deliver a 500 kg bomb with 30 meter accuracy. If the Battle was just as capable then it's difficult to explain why the RAF didn't destroy every German bridge over the Meuse River during May 1940.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 2, 2012)

The Basket said:


> Was something like the early versions of the Blenheim and Wellington so much better?
> 
> If either met an Emil it was for the chop.
> 
> ...



The Blenheim had a bit more speed and somewhat more range, the later versions had a two gun power turret. No power turret could give immunity to interception but could affect the loss ratio or the bombers lost to fighters lost ratio ( which would still be in favor of the fighters). The Blenheim used the same 3 man crew. 

Wellington had more range and a bigger bomb load. While it was still easy meat for fighters it's ability to carry 4500lb instead of 1000lbs of bombs meant the ones that got through did a lot more damage. The Ability of both the Blenheim and Wellington to use bigger bombs than 250lbs (granted only two 500lb for the Blenheim) also made them more dangerous. Neither could perform unescorted daylight missions . 

It is well known that you can't perform bombing missions of any kind with early Hurricanes and Spitfires and with the later ones the target better be darn close to the airfield. 

Closer comparisons to the Battle are the Japanese KI-30 and Ki-32. Neither of which could operate in Chinese airspace without escort. 

When comparing the Battle to the JU-87 remember that the Battle had a lower powered engine than the Ju-87B, had a two position air-screw ( fine or coarse although the JU-87 may have had the same) and the Battle carried around 960 liters of fuel in the standard wing tanks. Almost double the fuel in a JU-87.


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## buffnut453 (Sep 2, 2012)

Which goes back to what I was saying...the Battle offers no benefits over the Blenheim that was extensively used in the Middle East, North Africa and Malaya.


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## RCAFson (Sep 3, 2012)

davebender said:


> Ju-87B could deliver a 500 kg bomb with 30 meter accuracy. If the Battle was just as capable then it's difficult to explain why the RAF didn't destroy every German bridge over the Meuse River during May 1940.


 
I bet the FLAK and fighters had something to do with it, but even during the Vietnam war, bridges were hard to destroy with iron bombs.

Here's an interesting comparison chart of early war aircraft:
HyperWar: The Mediterranean Middle East, Vol.I (Appendix VIII)


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## Edgar Brooks (Sep 3, 2012)

davebender said:


> Ju-87B could deliver a 500 kg bomb with 30 meter accuracy. If the Battle was just as capable then it's difficult to explain why the RAF didn't destroy every German bridge over the Meuse River during May 1940.


 The Ju-87 was proved vulnerable against proper defences, and was shot down in droves by Spitfires and Hurricanes.
The Battle's top speed, and height capabilities were identical to those of the Gladiator; calculate the possibilities of aircraft that slow getting through the flak and Me109 defences, then start trying to talk sense.


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## parsifal (Sep 3, 2012)

Ju 87s were accurate but vulnerable. Battles were innaccurate but still vulnerable. Its a moot point as to which type (Stuka or Battle) was more vulnerable. And it is at least debatebale to say that Ju87s remained accurate when faced with decent stiffer opposition. Flak is the main factor that ones side uses to affect enemy bombing accuracy, and in 1940 allied flak in Frtance was very light. 

because of its great accuracy Stukas remained in production until 1944. Battles were phased out of service from 1940. Stukas however could not really operate in daylight (or where enemy fighters were effective) after 1943.

So Battles were a failure from the beginning but were phased out fairly quickly. Ju87s were higly successful at the start, but became a liability as time passed. But inexplicably they remained in service, suffering ever increasing losses as time passed. 

My opinion is is that it cannot be argued that Ju87s could be expected to succeed where the Battle failed is frought with uncertainty. In 1940, until opposed by FC over SE England, Ju87s were not subjected to the same density of resistance as the Battle was forced to endure. It therefore is an open debatable position to arguer that given the same situation the Stuka would have done better and be moer survivable


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## stona (Sep 3, 2012)

The difference in operation of the Ju 87 and the Battle is that the Ju 87 operated effectively in areas where the Luftwaffe had established local or temporary air superiority. When it didn't,as in the BoB for various reasons,the Ju 87 was cannon fodder.
The RAF in 1940 had no mechanism for,nor intention of,escorting its Battles,neither had it established local air superiority over,say,the Meuse bridges with inevitable results.

Cheers

Steve


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## stona (Sep 3, 2012)

I still don't believe that Typhoons bombed from a 90 degree dive. Pilots' memories can be notoriously unreliable and a steep dive easily becomes a vertical dive in the remembering. I don't doubt some pilots exceeded the recommended dive angles,there are plenty of reports of "Bombfires" suffering severe structural damage due to pilots diving too steeply,too fast and with too abrupt a pull out.
We'll agree to differ or we'll be flogging a dead horse 

It's also worth saying that when attacking a heavily defended target "where intense flak is anticipated" the steeper dive was used but by two sections of four aircraft simultaneously from two directions to dissipate the concentration of anti-aircraft fire.

All these tactics were published in the RAF's Air Fighting Development Unit report on fighter bombing,"Fighter Bomber Tactics"of 1944,the diagrams are in the appendices (AIR 23/7479), and "Tactics used by the Squadrons of the 2nd Tactical Air Force (AIR 37/871).

What were USAAF tactics for dive bombing in the A-36 or any other fighter bomber? I'm unfamiliar with them. Were they taught to bomb from the vertical? The RAF certainly were not.

Cheers

Steve


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## CobberKane (Sep 3, 2012)

Battles and Defients would have been extremely useful in any theatre. Half the enemy fighter pilots who met them would have died laughing, and the other half would have exhausted their ammunition gleefully shooting them out of the sky, thereby becoming easy meat for the real fighters in the second wave...


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## RCAFson (Sep 3, 2012)

CobberKane said:


> Battles and Defients would have been extremely useful in any theatre. Half the enemy fighter pilots who met them would have died laughing, and the other half would have exhausted their ammunition gleefully shooting them out of the sky, thereby becoming easy meat for the real fighters in the second wave...



The Defiant would have been a tough proposition for a CR-42, and the Battle would obviously fair better against IAF fighters than against the 109 and 110.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 3, 2012)

To see how well the Battle would have fared against the IAF, see how well the Blenheim did. It was faster, better defensive armament and had twin engines making it harder to bring down. 

Loosing 25% per mission instead of 50% is doing far better but it still unsustainable. 10% per mission is unsustainable.


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## CobberKane (Sep 3, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> The Defiant would have been a tough proposition for a CR-42, and the Battle would obviously fair better against IAF fighters than against the 109 and 110.



Everything was a tough proposition for the CR 42! Against the MC200 or G50 the Battle's losses might have improved from horrific to awful, until the MC202 arrived and it went back to horrific.


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## RCAFson (Sep 3, 2012)

CobberKane said:


> Everything was a tough proposition for the CR 42! Against the MC200 or G50 the Battle's losses might have improved from horrific to awful, until the MC202 arrived and it went back to horrific.



The fact still remains that if the RAF had deployed 200 Battles and the Defiant I to the Desert AF, they would have given the RAF a decisive edge over the IAF in 1940-41. Even off Malaya a strike force of a 100 Battles escorted by Defiants would have been able to cripple the IJN invasion forces in Dec 1941. 

The Machi 202 has an armament of 2 x 12.7mm Vickers MGs, and so much less deadly than the Cannon armed 109 and 110. 

The Battle could have been a campaign winner in the MTO and SEA theatres.


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## parsifal (Sep 3, 2012)

CobberKane said:


> Everything was a tough proposition for the CR 42! Against the MC200 or G50 the Battle's losses might have improved from horrific to awful, until the MC202 arrived and it went back to horrific.



Mc 202s began to be introduced from September 1941, but production really didnt get into stride until 1942. For most of its service life it was equipped with just 2 x 12.7 in MGs. There were supposed to be additional 2 x 7.7mm MGs, but these were rarely fitted. 

If we assume that the Battle was retained for some insane reason, until 1942, you cannot assume that it would be the same design as went into battle in May 1940. That really would be insane. But lets assume that the Battle was re-engined, uparmoured and up gunned, such that it carried 2 x 0.5in rear firing guns and 2 x forward firing 0.5in MGs. Say it was armoured to withstand 0.5in fire, that would make it a difficult opponent for the MC202. Particularly so if top speed was increased, to say around 280 mph. 


MC 202s were sent to the Eastern Front, where a few of them fought the Russians. i expect the C202s at some stage met up with the nearest equivalent I can think of to this "Battle-on-steroids", the IL-2. I dont know how the italian fighter fared in those encounters, but anecdotally, the Sturmoviks was considered a tough bird to bring down by the LW, who were generally cannon armed. How much more difficult for the Folgores with such light armament

One further comment...you do realize that the Italians actually did better with the CR42 at least early in the war, with the CR 42 than they did with the ostensibly more modern types like the MC 200.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 3, 2012)

A Battle is going to need about 1300hp, _AT 15-16,000ft_ in order to make 280mph. This is doable with a Merlin XX or Merlin 45. But that is with no additional drag. The Defiant picked up all of 8mph changing from the Merlin III to the Merlin XX. The Hurricane picked up between 10-15mph (at the same altitudes) making the switch. Picking up 20-23mph doesn't look good once extra cooling drag and other factors come into play. 

While a .50 cal gun in each wing sounds good and looks doable from a weight/space standpoint, how maneuverable was the Battle? Light wing loading needs good role response and pitch response. If the Battle cannot bring the guns to bear it doesn't matter what they are. 
Twin manual .50s in the top rear is no solution, sounds good but trying to heave a pair of .50s around in a narrow fuselage is going to be near impossible. Some US Navy gunners were split over using a SINGLE .50 or a pair of .30s. The .50 hit harder but the paired .30s were easier to aim. A .50 out the top and a .50 out the bottom might offer more scope. 

Add 300-400lbs of self sealing tanks, several hundred pounds of armor ( 3 crew stations), 230lbs worth of guns (over the originals) and around 200lbs more ammo weight ( at 200rpg of .50 cal ammo) and you have sucked up the entire normal bomb load of the original Battle. Granted a New Merlin can handle a bigger load but adding 10% or more to the gross weight of the plane is going to bring the performance back down. 

If you want a tactical bomber in late 1941 take the Fulmar, pin the wings in place, yank 4 of the .303s out with their ammo and cut the remaining guns to 350-400rounds each. about a 300l-350lb saving. Stick a Vickers "K" gun in the rear cockpit and do what you have to put a 500lb under each wing or a 1000lb bomb under the fuselage. Original would already take a 250-500lb under the fuselage and ditching some of the guns and ammo should help make the goal. The smaller airframe should offer more performance with the same engine compared to the Battle.


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## CobberKane (Sep 3, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Mc 202s began to be introduced from September 1941, but production really didnt get into stride until 1942. For most of its service life it was equipped with just 2 x 12.7 in MGs. There were supposed to be additional 2 x 7.7mm MGs, but these were rarely fitted.
> 
> If we assume that the Battle was retained for some insane reason, until 1942, you cannot assume that it would be the same design as went into battle in May 1940. That really would be insane. But lets assume that the Battle was re-engined, uparmoured and up gunned, such that it carried 2 x 0.5in rear firing guns and 2 x forward firing 0.5in MGs. Say it was armoured to withstand 0.5in fire, that would make it a difficult opponent for the MC202. Particularly so if top speed was increased, to say around 280 mph.
> 
> ...


 
I think the CR42 was about as good as biplane gets, but anyway you look at it, it was a generation removed from the Hurricanes and Tomahawks the RAF were fielding against it – and they were hardly cutting edge either. And I agree the Italian fighters were for the most part chronically under-gunned, though the net result of that might have been to simply prolong a Battle’s pain. 
Incidentally, in the timeline you are talking about wouldn’t our MTO ‘super-Battles’ have been facing the Lutwaffe as well? Bf109 E, F, and Gs as well as 110s were in the desert war weren’t they?


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## parsifal (Sep 3, 2012)

> I think the CR42 was about as good as biplane gets, but anyway you look at it, it was a generation removed from the Hurricanes and Tomahawks the RAF were fielding against it – and they were hardly cutting edge either.



Coomon sense and my natural instincts would lead me to agree. However Forum member Vincenzo provided some conclusive proof that over Malta in the very early days, the CR42 was actually somewhat effective against the Hurricane, and more effective against this type than the MC 200s that were also sent over Malta.

The problem with the CR42 and indeed all those early war italian types, is that they were in no way air superiority fighters. They were manouverable enough to stay out of trouble, and if an allied pilot was silly enough to get into a turning fight with them, could easily become a dangerous oponent. But they lacked the firepower, and the performance to force issues in the air....allied fighters could use energy and speed and usually altitude as well, to gain distinct advantage over the italians. To that extent, your comments about generational differences in performance I completely agree with 



> And I agree the Italian fighters were for the most part chronically under-gunned, though the net result of that might have been to simply prolong a Battle’s pain.




Er no, if we are talking "super Battle" not necessarily the case. At 280 mph, CR 42s cannot catch them, neither can a G-50 really. An MC200 is only 30 mph faster so will not really have time to approach from astern with any manouver in the mix. An aircraft forced to fly straight and level with in the face of 2 x HMGs is in for a tough fight. An MC 202 can catch the Battle, but the rate of closure is about 70mph. If there are any escorts about, it might be a difficult job even for them, particulalry considering that the fighters return fire is no greater than the defending Battles. And if the battles are flying in a tight defensive formation and the fighter is attacking individually, as they usually do, the defensive abilities of the "super battle" should be even more apparent. 



> Incidentally, in the timeline you are talking about wouldn’t our MTO ‘super-Battles’ have been facing the Lutwaffe as well? Bf109 E, F, and Gs as well as 110s were in the desert war weren’t they
> 
> In mid 1941, the majority of LW types remained Bf 109Es. From April the 109f began to supplant the 109E, but the E remained the dominant type in the MTO until about April 1942. The main fighter defending Rommel Jan-June 1942 were RA units at least numerically. LW started to really ramp up their presence in North Africa after June 1942, but not enough to make a difference.


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## CobberKane (Sep 4, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Coomon sense and my natural instincts would lead me to agree. However Forum member Vincenzo provided some conclusive proof that over Malta in the very early days, the CR42 was actually somewhat effective against the Hurricane, and more effective against this type than the MC 200s that were also sent over Malta.
> 
> The problem with the CR42 and indeed all those early war italian types, is that they were in no way air superiority fighters. They were manouverable enough to stay out of trouble, and if an allied pilot was silly enough to get into a turning fight with them, could easily become a dangerous oponent. But they lacked the firepower, and the performance to force issues in the air....allied fighters could use energy and speed and usually altitude as well, to gain distinct advantage over the italians. To that extent, your comments about generational differences in performance I completely agree with
> 
> ...


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## parsifal (Sep 4, 2012)

Me 110s had the priceless advantage over the MC 200 of firepower and speed. An Me 110 restricted to 270 mph maximum is not as badly off as you would expect. 270 mph would be its typical enagement speed anyway, it just would lack the level speed to get out of Dodge if it needed to. A good comparison would be to look at the french Potez 631...an aircraft similar in concept to the Me110, but with severely degraded performance (max speed 275 mph). Nevertheless, this type, which roughly fits the bill of your hypothetical Me 110, still managed to shoot down 29 enemy a/c, for the loss of 93 of their own (about 30 to friendly fire and around another 30 to flak). So whilst an unmanouverable type like the Me 110 with low performance, so so armour and very limited rear firing guns might be easy meat to more agile, more heavily armed, and quicker SE fighters, it does not follow that a "Super Battle", with heavy rear firing guns and flying in a tight mutually supporting formation is going to be "hacked out of the sky". Properly defended bomber formations seldom were "hacked out of the sky" in fact (except when the circumstances are exceptional). The effects of fighters on loss rates is one of the most overblown, overrated mallarkies of the post war wash up of the war in fact.


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## stona (Sep 4, 2012)

parsifal said:


> The effects of fighters on loss rates is one of the most overblown, overrated mallarkies of the post war wash up of the war in fact.



I've read dozens of documents both Allied and German that would contradict that view.

This isn't the place for that debate so,just to illustrate the effect of the mere presence of a fighter escort on attacking Luftwaffe fighter pilots here are three pages of "Excerpts from Typical German Radio Traffic Interceptions" lifted from 8th AF intelligence documents.

















I could post minutes of meetings in which many senior Luftwaffe figures bemoan their inability to deal with Allied fighters escorting the bombers and half a dozen other similar examples. If the Germans thought that they were unable to deal with the USAAF offensive due to the presence of escort fighters then that is an extremely important factor in the continuation of the daylight bombing campaign. Hardly an "overblown mallarkey".

On occassions when unescorted bomber formations were caught by a well coordinated attack I think it is fair to say they suffered very heavy losses. I wouldn't use the phrase "hacked out of the sky" but they were better than decimated.

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Sep 4, 2012)

I have read all those accounts as well, and they all sound very convincing, until the claims are compared to actual losses. This all relates back to the idea that fighters on the defensive somehow can confer a strategic advantage of decisive proportions. with one or two notable exceptions, they dont, and thats because losses to fighters are simply a statistically secondary cause of losses. far more losses are attributable to non-combat related causes, and flak is at least as significant to loss rates as were fighters.

Fighters were essential, not because of losses, but because of the threat of losses. in this way they could affect accuracy and cause other errors that decreased or eliminated the effects of the bombers. But the actual loss rates due to fighters seldom exceeded 15 of forces committed, whereas average loss rates to all causes per raid might climb, on average to 7 -10%. If your fighters are only accounting for 1/7 of total losses, they are not THE determinant of operations. 

For air forces on the attack such as the US 8AF fighters were essential. thats different. for the LW, acting on the defensive, fighters were a strategic blind alley that could only end in defeat. 

For most mid and small sized air forces, air defence by aircraft is all but abandoned in the post war environment. they maintain strong fighter elements for deterrent value, but if a shoooting war actually breaks out, these forces are seldom engaged. thats because of the economic realities of committing such forces and the relative unimportance of fighters in modern warfare.


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## stona (Sep 4, 2012)

Now I'm confused. Are you saying that fighters in an offensive role,i.e. to prevent their bombers being "hacked out of the air" are important whereas defending such an offensive campaign with fighters is a waste of resources?

The Luftwaffe only became ineffective in its defensive role when the sheer weight of Allied numerical superiority mitigated it attempts to disrupt the bombing offensive.

We can argue about when that point was reached.The following is again from a post war US document based wartime on German documents. The Germans are being positive about developments in early 1944,we know now that this was misplaced optimism.






Cheers

Steve


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## Vincenzo (Sep 4, 2012)

None MTO LW fighter unit had Emil in april '42 (same is true for march '42). imho the Emil was out to pure fighter unit in early fall '41, the Jabo staffeln probably used this some months more.


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## stona (Sep 4, 2012)

Vincenzo said:


> None MTO LW fighter unit had Emil in april '42 (same is true for march '42). imho the Emil was out to pure fighter unit in early fall '41, the Jabo staffeln probably used this some months more.



I agree. Most had cashed in their Emils by May/June 1941.

Steve


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## yulzari (Sep 4, 2012)

It is interesting to see how the discussion has developed. 

The Fairey idea of a super Battle was a twin engined one though where the extra engines would come from I have no idea. Twin Daggers?

Given the original question, my earlier response was from the point of view that war involves deciding to send people to risk death and terrible injuries. Sending Battles and Defiants, even as we know them, into action against the Japanese invasion transports would have cost the lives of many aircrew and losses would probably have exceeded 50 % per mission. However, the damage they could inflict would have saved the lives of innumerable soldiers and civilians who were the victims of Japanese Imperial aggression. For example, let us not forget that not only allied troops suffered and died on the Burma railway; more civilians did so too.

Would there be there merit in so deploying them? Yes. Were they the best choice? Probably not though I still retain a respect for the Defiant when aircrew were trained fully and properly to handle them and to understand the use of the turret guns by the pilot when they were trained forwards.

When we peer through the fog of war we can see that Malaya air power needed an effective anti shipping force and an early warning system, even on the Chinese spotter/telephone level. The Battle could sink transport ships and could maintain a sea reconnaissance screen. It would do so at a fearful rate of loss but the Battles and crew could be more rapidly replaced than the japanese could organise a new seaborne assault. War involves balancing loss against benefit and loss includes human lives.

The Russians understood that the bomber was air power. The fighter is a necessary adjunct but they rated a successful bombing mission as better than victories over enemy fighters.


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## davebender (Sep 4, 2012)

Every aircraft is vulnerable against proper defenses. Even a stealth aircraft can be shot down.


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## stona (Sep 4, 2012)

CobberKane said:


> parsifal said:
> 
> 
> > However Forum member Vincenzo provided some conclusive proof that over Malta in the very early days, the CR42 was actually somewhat effective against the Hurricane, and more effective against this type than the MC 200s that were also sent over Malta.
> ...


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## Shortround6 (Sep 4, 2012)

To improve the defense of Malay and southeast Asia requires trained crews. Those were in short supply, probably shorter than aircraft if you count all the second or third rate aircraft available. Sending ill trained aircrews, no matter how brave and self sacrificing, out in those second and third rate aircraft is not likely to affect the out come of the battle or the after effects ( the suffering of the captured military and civilians.)

From Wiki on the Vickers Vildebeest;
" The two Singapore-based squadrons, however, were still waiting for their Beauforts when Japan invaded Malaya in December 1941, and the now obsolete biplanes had to be deployed against the Japanese attackers, attempting unsuccessfully to torpedo a Japanese cruiser off Kota Bharu on 8 December"
" The Vildebeests continued to attack the Japanese as their forces advanced down Malaya, sustaining heavy losses from Japanese fighters, particularly when no fighter cover could be provided. On 26 January 1942, the Japanese landed at Endau, 250 miles from Singapore, and 12 Vildebeests of 100 and 36 Squadrons were sent to attack the landings. Despite an escort of Brewster Buffalo and Hawker Hurricane fighters, five Vildebeests were lost. The attack was repeated later that day by eight Vildebeests of 36 Squadron together with three Fairey Albacores, resulting in six more Vildebeests and two Albacores being shot down" 

Since even Kamikaze attacks cannot guarantee the destruction of one ship for one airplane expended the presence of one or two squadrons of Battles in addition to or in place of aircraft already there would make little difference to the outcome. The Vildebeest carried about the same war load as a Battle. About 1000lb worth of bombs, a fixed forward firing gun and a flexible, free swinging .303 out the back. The Battles guns were faster firing and the Battle itself was faster.

Stopping or severely crippling the Japanese invasion fleet would need scores if not hundreds of aircraft, not a few dozen. The Malaya Command had, in addition to the 24 Vildebeests, 47 Bristol Blenheim's and 24 Lockheed Hudson's and 3 PBY's. 
The Hudsons belonged to the RAAF and one squadron was effectively wiped out twice during the campaign. No 8 Squadron had suffered heavy losses and handed over it's remaining aircraft to No 1 Squadron and received new Hudsons, returned to the fight, continued to suffer heavy losses as was disbanded in Batavia in Feb 1942, personnel returned to Australia, reformed later. No 1 Squadron was not so lucky, about 160 personnel being captured at the end of the NEI campaign. 

If anybody really thinks that the Battle (or super Battle) was a better bomber than the Lockheed Hudson I have bridge over the East River in New York for sale. 
The Battle was a barely creditable "strategic" bomber in 1937-8. It was designed for and crews trained in level bombing. Turning it into a maritime


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## Vincenzo (Sep 4, 2012)

time ago i opened a thread asking what were the results of C.200 and G.50 vs Hurricane, comparing this with the around 3 loss for a 1 victory of C.R.42 in 1940/1 (this data came from JoeB/Nikademus report from best books on this fiels just now i don't remember the title). Limitating the example to Malta Nikademus report 8 42 losses for 3 Hurricane this from Shore's books on Malta


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## stona (Sep 4, 2012)

Vincenzo said:


> time ago i opened a thread asking what were the results of C.200 and G.50 vs Hurricane, comparing this with the around 3 loss for a 1 victory of C.R.42 in 1940/1 (this data came from JoeB/Nikademus report from best books on this fiels just now i don't remember the title). Limitating the example to Malta Nikademus report 8 42 losses for 3 Hurricane this from Shore's books on Malta



Thanks for the clarification Vincenzo.
I shall look for your thread.
Cheers
Steve


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## parsifal (Sep 4, 2012)

stona said:


> Now I'm confused. Are you saying that fighters in an offensive role,i.e. to prevent their bombers being "hacked out of the air" are important whereas defending such an offensive campaign with fighters is a waste of resources?
> 
> The Luftwaffe only became ineffective in its defensive role when the sheer weight of Allied numerical superiority mitigated it attempts to disrupt the bombing offensive.
> 
> ...



no, fighters whether on the defensive or the offensive (ie escorting bombers, or operatinng over enemy territory) were important, They did shoot down enemy a/c, and were critical in breaking up enemy formations and downgrading accuracy. Both sides neede fighters. The problem is analysing the losses they caused and whether they achieved strategicallysignificant results. Primarily they were an attritional weapon, not so much the cavalry that rode in to save the day at some strategic point, And its very hard to find overwhelming successes for fighters when on the defensive. Even the BOB is arguable as a victory for FC, though i personally and strongly believe that it was a victory for the RAF. but not because FC was able to inflict one sided losses on its opponents, rather because it could take heavy losses and the LW could not


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## stona (Sep 4, 2012)

I'm pretty much with you there....well,right up to the bit about the BoB I think that was a clear victory and not arguable at all. I really am not trying to start that debate here 

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Sep 4, 2012)

Vincenzo said:


> None MTO LW fighter unit had Emil in april '42 (same is true for march '42). imho the Emil was out to pure fighter unit in early fall '41, the Jabo staffeln probably used this some months more.



weve had this discussion before and constantly disagree, because our respective sources tell different stories. from memeory the source you mostly rely on is ased on unit returns and their authorised mounts. trouble is, my sources are based on LW quartermaster returns which tell a very different story. i dont know which source is correct, though I expect your about to give me another lecture.

For the record, my source (which packed away for the moment because we are moving house soon) says that the first fredericks began to arrive in april'41...15 of them from memeory. The last emils (e-7 trop) arrived either february or march (32 of them IIRC). Frederics overtook Emils in the MTO, in terms of deliveries either September 1941. by June 1942, the dominant type arriving according to the quartermaster was the gustav.

I think we should just agree to disagree and leave it at that


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## stona (Sep 4, 2012)

I wonder where they came from.
I have Regensburg production lists to hand and the last Emils (W.Nrn 3799-3824) were produced in September 1940. Regensburg didn't really get going on the F series until the end of the year which must mean that the Fs which arrived at JG 51 in October/November 1940 must have come from Wiener Neustadt,according to the C-Ampt program for fighter production of 1 Oct 1940.

The first loss report for a Bf 109 F-1 is on 11/11/40 (Georg Claus Staffelkapitan of 1,/JG 51).

I would have to check to see if Fiesler,Erla or even Arado carried on with a few Emils into 1941. . 

Steve


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## Vincenzo (Sep 4, 2012)

i think parsifal talking only of MTO.

Parsifal quartemaster general don't show emil in MTO after 27/09/41 report


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## RCAFson (Sep 4, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> Stopping or severely crippling the Japanese invasion fleet would need scores if not hundreds of aircraft, not a few dozen. The Malaya Command had, in addition to the 24 Vildebeests, 47 Bristol Blenheim's and 24 Lockheed Hudson's and 3 PBY's.
> The Hudsons belonged to the RAAF and one squadron was effectively wiped out twice during the campaign. No 8 Squadron had suffered heavy losses and handed over it's remaining aircraft to No 1 Squadron and received new Hudsons, returned to the fight, continued to suffer heavy losses as was disbanded in Batavia in Feb 1942, personnel returned to Australia, reformed later. No 1 Squadron was not so lucky, about 160 personnel being captured at the end of the NEI campaign.
> 
> If anybody really thinks that the Battle (or super Battle) was a better bomber than the Lockheed Hudson I have bridge over the East River in New York for sale.
> The Battle was a barely creditable "strategic" bomber in 1937-8. It was designed for and crews trained in level bombing. Turning it into a maritime



The Battle typically carried a heavier bomb load than the Hudson and it's general performance, except for range is quite comparable. 100 Battles would have been a formidable strike force, and would have greatly increase the RAF's striking power in Malaya. I would expect that a Battle would be more accurate in low level bombing than a Hudson or a Bleinheim, as it's bombs are released simultaneous rather than dropped from an internal bay.
You left off the results of the RAF/RAAF attacks; in fact they inflicted heavy damage on IJN shipping on the 7th with only a handful of sorties. A massed attack by Battles carried out with the same determination and numbers as their attacks on German held bridges would have wiped out the IJN shipping.


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## buffnut453 (Sep 4, 2012)

There are a couple of issues with your comments re the Blenheim's internal bomb bay and accuracy of simultaneous release -vs- serial release. Firstly, the Blenheim typically only carried a couple of bombs side-by-side in the bay so they could still be dropped simultaneously. Secondly, serial release can still result in more accurate results at low level because it helps overcome early/late pickling by the pilot.


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## parsifal (Sep 4, 2012)

stona said:


> I wonder where they came from.
> I have Regensburg production lists to hand and the last Emils (W.Nrn 3799-3824) were produced in September 1940. Regensburg didn't really get going on the F series until the end of the year which must mean that the Fs which arrived at JG 51 in October/November 1940 must have come from Wiener Neustadt,according to the C-Ampt program for fighter production of 1 Oct 1940.
> 
> The first loss report for a Bf 109 F-1 is on 11/11/40 (Georg Claus Staffelkapitan of 1,/JG 51).
> ...



I doubt they were new airframes. another way of looking at this issue, is to look at the numbers of aircraft in other TOs. How many Fs were produced from start of production to the end of June 1941? The entire production for Me 109s in the whole of 1941 was 2600, including prototypes and possibly a few Emils. If we assume a uniform production rate (a false premise, as production of the F ramped up as the year progressed), we arrive at about 2500 copies produced, give or take. There were no Fs suitable for issue produced in 1940. There were a few f-0s and F-1s, but none of these were used operationally, or at least not for some months. To June 1941 that means the Germans received about 1200 Me 109Fs.

For Barbarossa there were about 550 Fs committed. There were about 180 on strength in France, and a further 120 over Germany in Reich defences. I estimate about 120 had been lost over france Jan-June 1940 in combat (will check when I can) , and there were a number of training formations that were using the type. Average standard wastage for the Luftwaffe excluding combat losses was aboiut 7% per month....if assume a median number of 500 machines in that 6 month period the Luftwaffe would have lost or written off about 180-200 machines to non-combat related causes. I have not included any deployments to the MTO in that rough estimation. But we come to a figure of 1150 machines needed to account for Me 109F usage in other TOs, leaving about 50 or so that could have been deployed to the MTO between Jan-June. Given that roughly 450 fighters were deployed into the MTO (excluding the Marita/Merkur unit deployments) we can say that 50 out of 450 were Me 109Fs.

When I get access to my source material i will be a lot more accurate than this, but it should be obvious just from the above, that it is physically impossible for the major type deployed into the MTO Jan-June was the F. What the Germans were doing was the same as the RAF was doing...sending older airframes approaching obsolescence to a secondary front. Thats why they were sending Emils and not fredericks.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 4, 2012)

A problem with simultaneous release is that either all bombs hit or all bombs miss. With sequential release the bombs can be spread out in a line, say 100ft apart. If, as Buffnut has said, the drop is just a bit early or late the odds are that the end bomb of the string may hit. 

While Hudsons may have carried less of bombload at times than a Battle that is really picking your circumstances. Max bomb load for a Hudson went between 1400 and 1600lbs and four 250lbs bombs could be carried easily. Hudson had about 50% more range than Battle if not more while carrying a full bomb load. Hudsons could have four to six (seven?) .303 MGs, some planes being fitted with a ventral gun and one or two waist guns. 

For a bit of history on the Australian Hudsons see: Hudson in Service with Royal Australian Air Force

As I said before, the problem is in getting skilled crews, both air crew and ground crew. Unskilled crews with obsolete aircraft ( and the Battle was considered obsolete in 1939, there just wasn't much to replace it in early 1940) aren't going to accomplish much no matter how heroically they die. 

An additional 100 ( 8 or more squadrons) of any bomber would have made a difference in Malaya but that not only calls for aircrew but well over 1000 ground crew if not closer to 2000. Skilled ground crew.


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## RCAFson (Sep 4, 2012)

The Battle could carry two 500lb bombs on external racks and had a maximum 1500lb bomb load in an overload condition, including up to 6 x 250lb bombs. The fact is that having a bomb bay makes dive bombing problematic and limits the dive attitude. The Battle could release it's bombs while dive bombing at any angle, and the aircraft was stressed for dive bombing, even though it had no dive brakes.

One hundred SE Battles would probably require less air and ground crew than 100 TE bombers of any type.


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## buffnut453 (Sep 4, 2012)

I think that's what's called a bait and switch. Firstly, no mention was made of dive bombing as a necessary role and secondly what was the range of a Battle in overload condition? 

As for the point about fewer air and groundcrew, well the Battle had exactly the same aircrew complement as the Blenheim and the groundcrew number depends on what you measure. For example, in Singapore you may have required fewer groundcrew per squadron for Battles compared to Blenheims (although even that's arguable). One thing is certain in the Far East, that inclusion of the Battle in the AOB would have created significant additional logistics issues by introducing an engine that was not used on any other aircraft in the theatre - think overhaul crews at the MU, supplies at forward airfields, coolant (there were no liquid-cooled aircraft prior to the arrival of Hurricanes in Jan 42) etc.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 4, 2012)

To hit much of anything dive bombing the pilot needs to have trained in dive bombing, it also helps to have something more than a few grease pencil marks on the windscreen or side windows for aiming purposes. 

What is the Range of a Battle in "overload" condition or with two 500lb bombs under the wing? 

Hudsons were supposed to do 1500 miles with 1400lbs of bombs but certain models could trade bomb load for even more range. The big egg turret cost performance but offers better defense than a free swinging machine gun. 

According to the figures the Hudson might be able to out climb the Battle by a fair margin down low. This might be changed by the use of a "super" Battle with a more powerful Merlin but adding 1000lb or more to teh weight of the "super" Battle may put you almost to the start point. 

If you have 100 well trained pilots and crew, both air and ground, to send to Singapore in the fall of 1941, give them something better than the Battle. 

You want "what ifs" how about 4 squadrons of Hampdens at Singapore? 4 times the bombload per plane, the ability to carry a 2000lb bomb or torpedo or mines making it rather more dangerous against ships. 

The Battle in late 1941 is just too little return for the amount invested in aircrew, ground crew, and supply.


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## RCAFson (Sep 5, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> I think that's what's called a bait and switch. Firstly, no mention was made of dive bombing as a necessary role and secondly what was the range of a Battle in overload condition?
> 
> As for the point about fewer air and groundcrew, well the Battle had exactly the same aircrew complement as the Blenheim and the groundcrew number depends on what you measure. For example, in Singapore you may have required fewer groundcrew per squadron for Battles compared to Blenheims (although even that's arguable). One thing is certain in the Far East, that inclusion of the Battle in the AOB would have created significant additional logistics issues by introducing an engine that was not used on any other aircraft in the theatre - think overhaul crews at the MU, supplies at forward airfields, coolant (there were no liquid-cooled aircraft prior to the arrival of Hurricanes in Jan 42) etc.



We were discussing accuracy of bombing, and I'm pretty sure that dive bombing tends to be more accurate than level bombing, although the Battle could do both.

The Battle's single engine suggests to me, that it would require less maintenance and therefore a smaller ground crew. The Battle was used as training aircraft even prior to the BofB and almost all Commonwealth air and ground crew were familiar with it.


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## stona (Sep 5, 2012)

I think the idea of sending Battles to the Far East is built on a false premise.
After the experiences of the RAF with the type on 1940 it wasn't going to commit its highly trained and valuable aircrew to combat in the type under any circumstances. The Battle was obsolete in 1940,the RAF just didn't know it. In 1941 it did and quite rightly had withdrawn what it now regarded as a death trap from front line service.
Cheers
Steve


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## RCAFson (Sep 5, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> To hit much of anything dive bombing the pilot needs to have trained in dive bombing, it also helps to have something more than a few grease pencil marks on the windscreen or side windows for aiming purposes.
> 
> What is the Range of a Battle in "overload" condition or with two 500lb bombs under the wing?
> 
> ...



The range with 4 x 250lb bombs was 1000 miles at 200 mph @ 15000ft. I would guess that overloads would reduce this somewhat, but it would still have been sufficient to strike most targets in Malaya, for example. The other thing is that the Battle was, in fact, available while large numbers of alternate aircraft such as the Hudson were not, as they were still considered frontline aircraft in Europe. The Battle actually suffered quite small losses in combat (~200) compared to total production (~2400) so the remainder were eventally all used for training, although dedicated training Battles were under production prior to the BofB.

As for the "super" Battle it already existed as a simple mod from Feb 1940 allowed the Merlin III to use 100 octane fuel and generate 30% more power under 10,000ft. With 6.25lb boost, the Battle was good for 210mph at SL, and probably 230-240 mph with 12lb boost (5min rating) with a 1000lb bo,b load. 

IMHO, the Battle has suffered a smear job, to cover up the RAF's poor tactical employment of the type.


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## RCAFson (Sep 5, 2012)

stona said:


> I think the idea of sending Battles to the Far East is built on a false premise.
> After the experiences of the RAF with the type on 1940 it wasn't going to commit its highly trained and valuable aircrew to combat in the type under any circumstances. The Battle was obsolete in 1940,the RAF just didn't know it. In 1941 it did and quite rightly had withdrawn what it now regarded as a death trap from front line service.
> Cheers
> Steve



I'm sorry, but that's just not true. The Battle was no more obsolete than the Stuka; it was just not being tasked properly. It should have been employed where the RAF enjoyed air superiority and/or where the fighter opposition consisted of aircraft such as the Cr-42 or A5M, which had a much smaller margin of speed over the Battle than the 109/110. Additionally in secondary theatres, the enemy tended not to have dense concentrations of FLAK. The Battle would have been a game changer in the Med or Malaya.


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## buffnut453 (Sep 5, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> We were discussing accuracy of bombing, and I'm pretty sure that dive bombing tends to be more accurate than level bombing, although the Battle could do both.
> 
> The Battle's single engine suggests to me, that it would require less maintenance and therefore a smaller ground crew. The Battle was used as training aircraft even prior to the BofB and almost all Commonwealth air and ground crew were familiar with it.



I thought we were discussing the applicability of the Battle to overseas theatres.

The Battle was not a true dive bomber. Yes, it could undertake dive attacks but at far shallower angles than a true dive bomber, indeed I doubt its accuracy was much better than that of the Blenheim (which could also employ dive attacks, as can any small/medium bomber).

As for the maintenance question, you're focussing on the squadron level where the number of maintenance crew is a function of sortie rate. If you don't want rapid sortie rates, then you only need one engine fitter crew per airframe which is no different from a single engined aircraft (although I agree this was unlikely you're still probably not looking at double the number of engine fitters for a twin-engined aircraft). 

That said, you've ignored my point about the greater logistics train required to support Battles in Malaya. In 1941, the operational engines in use in northern Malaya comprised Wright Cyclones (Buffalos and Hudsons) and Bristol Mercurys. Adding Merlin-powered Battles means keeping those front-line squadrons supplied - that's a 30% increase in your logistics chain.


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## stona (Sep 5, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> I'm sorry, but that's just not true. The Battle was no more obsolete than the Stuka; it was just not being tasked properly. It should have been employed where the RAF enjoyed air superiority and/or where the fighter opposition consisted of aircraft such as the Cr-42 or A5M, which had a much smaller margin of speed over the Battle than the 109/110. Additionally in secondary theatres, the enemy tended not to have dense concentrations of FLAK. The Battle would have been a game changer in the Med or Malaya.



Someone else has already pointed out that all aircraft are vulnerable when incorrectly employed.

You now run into well established doctrinal problems. These take literally years to resolve. 

The Luftwaffe used the Ju 87 successfully as long range artillery and within an umbrella of at least locally established air superiority. When it strayed from this method the results for the Ju 87 were disastrous. 

This was a completely alien idea to the RAF in the first years of the war. 

The RAF was bitterly opposed to being forced into a role supporting the army. This has its roots in inter service rivalries which do not disappear just because there was a war on. The RAF was a recent and very much junior service and was desperate to reinforce its independence. Chester Wilmot in "The Struggle for Europe" describes the RAF perceptively as labouring under "a junior service complex."

Air Vice Marshall Slessor in a memorandum of May 1941 (AIR 20/2970) condemned what he saw as the tendency of the Army to ask the RAF to do what he thought it should be doing with its own guns. He and most senior RAF officers believed that the RAF's role was not on the battlefield at all but rather to prevent the enemy's forces from operating by denying them fuel,food and ammunition. This is a strategic not tactical role and this is what RAF bombers were intended for.

In the same file is another message dated a few days later, to the Air Ministry from a Group Captain Embry. This is presumably written with hindsight following the disastrous casualties amongst aircraft attempting to support the Army the previous year since Embry had led some of those missions. He argues that "the scale and intensity of German anti aircraft fire is such as to make close support prohibitive,with a potential casualty rate amongst aircraft out of all proportion to any result achieved".

Air Marshall Broadhurst,then commanding Desert Air Force was actually censured by Tedder for the air support provided to the Eighth Army at El Hamma in Tunisia during March 1943 nearly two years later! 

These men and their senior colleagues would never be convinced to send the Battle to the Far East or Mediterranean,even on the promise of lesser ground defences and/or fighter opposition. They had already decided that they were not suitable for that role and withdrawn them from front line service.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Sep 5, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> I'm sorry, but that's just not true. The Battle was no more obsolete than the Stuka; it was just not being tasked properly.



Well, tasking a strategic bomber with tactical duties is going to lead to some not so desirable results. 

Compared to the Stuka the Battle was a bigger airplane. About 6 ft longer and 6 feet more wingspan and about 22% more wing area. Yet the Battle has a lower empty weight?
Is that a partial reflection of the lack of armor and self sealing tanks? 
The Battle has a higher normal loaded weight, of course it carries and extra crewman and about double the fuel of a JU-87B.
Most Battles were built with two position props, of course they could be refitted with constant speed. 
Using 12lbs boost in a Merlin III called for notes in the aircraft log book, extra maintenance checks and shorter overhaul times. later Merlins could operate at higher pressures without these restrictions, or more accurately the level of "normal" boost went up as did the level of boost that required these extra measures. 

Without armor and self sealing tanks the Battle would not have been much of a game changer. It is only a game changer because you are using it as an ADDITION (and in large numbers) to the existing forces. If used _instead of_ an existing type it wouldn't have changed much. 
There were only 76 Brewster Buffaloes in Malaysia, would another 100 have seen the Brewster as a game changer and changed it's reputation?


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## buffnut453 (Sep 5, 2012)

I think it's a stretch to say the Battle was a strategic bomber. Had the treaties on heavy bombers been enacted then, yes, it probably would have been considered "strategic" but in reality it was a replacement for the Hawker Hind (and its family) and so really was a light bomber (gusting to medium depending on your definition).

I agree, though, that more forces were needed in Malaya but I remain unconvinced that the Battle offered significant advantages over the Blenheim - adding a hundred of either might have helped in the first attacks against Japanese shipping but without additional fighters, a functional early warning system and the will to take the fight to the enemy I suspect the end result would have been the same...just longer and with more losses on the Allied side.


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## stona (Sep 5, 2012)

I don't think the Battle was much of a strategic bomber either but RAF doctrine at the time,and considerably later,was to employ bombers in a broadly strategic role. 

Close air support was not considered a role at all and the means to apply it didn't exist in 1940 anyway.An Army officer requesting air support during the BoF would typically request it via a telephone call to London. He would be lucky to see any aircraft in less than three hours. 

Even what we would now call the interdiction missions of 1940 were deeply resented and considered entirely inappropriate use of air power by the RAF's senior officers.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Sep 5, 2012)

Well the Battle had that 1000 mile range compared to the Hinds 430 mile range. If the fuel load had been cut in half the plane might have carried 1500lbs over 500 miles. 

The Battle wasn't really much of a Strategic bomber as it turned out but then a lot of other peoples early single and twin engine bombers didn't turn out to be very good strategic bombers either.


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## stona (Sep 5, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> Well the Battle had that 1000 mile range compared to the Hinds 430 mile range.



Yes,and in the 1930s noone in the RAF was envisaging the sort of massive area bombing raids of the 1940s. Why would a bomber need a 10,000 lb load? They honestly imagined that their bomber force would be a precision instument,destroying the enemy's "means of production" and preventing him sustaining his armies in the field. 

There was plenty of talk of terror bombing,the destruction of cities and massive civilian casualties but this is not what the RAF nor,to be fair,the Luftwaffe initially intended to do. 

Everyone in the UK was required to carry a gas mask. 38,000,000 were issued along with pamphlets and public information films,all at considerable expense. This too was eventually proven to be completely pointless!

It was pie in the sky stuff but then we have the benefit of hindsight.

Cheers

Steve


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## Vincenzo (Sep 5, 2012)

parsifal said:


> I doubt they were new airframes. another way of looking at this issue, is to look at the numbers of aircraft in other TOs. How many Fs were produced from start of production to the end of June 1941? The entire production for Me 109s in the whole of 1941 was 2600, including prototypes and possibly a few Emils. If we assume a uniform production rate (a false premise, as production of the F ramped up as the year progressed), we arrive at about 2500 copies produced, give or take. There were no Fs suitable for issue produced in 1940. There were a few f-0s and F-1s, but none of these were used operationally, or at least not for some months. To June 1941 that means the Germans received about 1200 Me 109Fs.
> 
> For Barbarossa there were about 550 Fs committed. There were about 180 on strength in France, and a further 120 over Germany in Reich defences. I estimate about 120 had been lost over france Jan-June 1940 in combat (will check when I can) , and there were a number of training formations that were using the type. Average standard wastage for the Luftwaffe excluding combat losses was aboiut 7% per month....if assume a median number of 500 machines in that 6 month period the Luftwaffe would have lost or written off about 180-200 machines to non-combat related causes. I have not included any deployments to the MTO in that rough estimation. But we come to a figure of 1150 machines needed to account for Me 109F usage in other TOs, leaving about 50 or so that could have been deployed to the MTO between Jan-June. Given that roughly 450 fighters were deployed into the MTO (excluding the Marita/Merkur unit deployments) we can say that 50 out of 450 were Me 109Fs.
> .



i think the production until june '41 was around (a large around) 1500 Friederichs. the 28 june '41 LW had 1213 109s in SE fighter unit (include replacement unit) of this 704 were Friederichs. the early Friederichs go in combat in october '40. The production of F-1 started in august '40 (F-2 in november '40), and is true that some Emils were built in early '41( Emils production in '41, all with DB 601N january: 33, february: 28, march: 54, april: 20, may: 0, june: 6) but also some Friederichs in '40. The F-4 go in production in may '41 and ended in in may '42. In June '41 the 109 unit in MTO were 7/26 and I/27 both with Emils (the first is a staffel and the 2nd is a gruppe). The alone unit with Emils sent in MTO (with exclusion of Balkans campaign) were the 7/26 that stay with Emil until the withdrawn in september '41 and the I/27 until the reequip with Friederichs in september '41 (the Jabo units were build up in Africa this staffeln officially born in 42 with Friederichs but were informally in use in late '41 probably almost 10/27 with Emils).


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## Vincenzo (Sep 5, 2012)

stona said:


> Thanks for the clarification Vincenzo.
> I shall look for your thread.
> Cheers
> Steve



is not my thread where JoeB and Nikademus posted the data they were posted in an other and older threads


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## parsifal (Sep 5, 2012)

> the 28 june '41 LW had 1213 109s in SE fighter unit (include replacement unit) of this 704 were Friederichs.



Which confirms that only a fraction of the fighter units in the med were equipped with F subtypes. Think about it. over 550 of that 704 were deployed to the Eastern Front. (There were just under 300 Es allocated to the East Front incidentally, one source mentions 245). There were over 100 Fs allocated to the west, and then we have wastage and losses to account for. Whichever way you cut the allocation of resources there are less than 70 friedrichs on the Southern Frint in June and far more likley about 40-50. I know that over 50% of LW forces by June on the southern Front were fighters, some of which will be Me 110s but the lions share just has to be E subtypes. your unit based information sources may be saying that they were Fs, but in june this is simply a physical impossibility. They may be authorised to use Fs, but not yet received that equipme nt...a common failing for axis records. Try that excercise on some RA units, you will find the same problem


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## Shortround6 (Sep 5, 2012)

As has been noted the RAF did not like the idea of supporting the army directly, even though they claimed they could do it in order to get a larger share of the budget sometimes.
The Army found itself in France with niether proper air support _OR_ modern heavy artillery ( why spend money on heavy artillery when you have bombers?) .

When looking at the Battle a lot of little things begin to add up, perhaps they are all circumstantial, but judge for yourselves. 

1. I keep harping about the 1000 mile range. In 1934-37 why else would a plane have a 1000 mile range unless for strategic use?
A. The Boulton Paul's Sidestrand ( a re-engined modified Sidestrand) only went into squadron service in 1936, this bi-plane could carry 1500lbs of bombs and had a range of 545 miles (Wiki). 
B. The Avro Anson went into service in 1936, 360lb bomb load and a range of 790 miles, Sept 1939 saw 10 Coastal Command and 16 Bomber Command squadrons flying Ansons. 
C. At the end of 1936 the British had 9 squadrons of Handley Page Heyford night bomber biplanes. 3500lb max bomb load, 920 mile range, there are others.
D. as to the Battle, a range of 500 miles could be achieved on roughly 1/2 the fuel. The Battle carried just over 200 imp gallons. Taking out even 67 gallons let alone 100 could have increase the bomb load to 1500lbs over 500 miles (or more) . 
E. _OR_ Cut fuel tankage by 100 imp gallons, fuel alone (without tanks) is 750lbs. at a wing loading of 25.6lbs per square foot the Battle is using just under 30 sq/ft of wing for this fuel. As a very rough guess wing weight might be 3lbs a square foot so the wing could be made another 3 sq ft smaller. The Battle was paying a penealty for it's long range if it was intended to use it as a tactical or even interdiction bomber. 
F. Why the bomb aimer? with the Mk. VII Course Setting Bomb Sight? Unless bombing was to be done from medium to high (for the time) altitude. The RAF had been bombing troops/trenches in WW I and in the middle east for years without such a bomb sight. 
G. Why use a Merlin III engine? RR had built Kestrels without superchargers and with moderate and full supercharging. The Merlin X with two speed supercharger was shown at the Paris airshow in 1938 and the first production engine built in DEC 1938, if a low altitude bomber is what was wanted a Merlin with a lower supercharger ratio (even if not two speed) giving over 1100hp at 5,000ft on 87 octane fuel could have been had fairly early in the production run. Instead they kept the Merlin III with it's 16,500ft critical altitude. Cruising at 15,000ft will give longer range than cruising at 5-8,000ft. 

The Battle has too many things pointing to it being optimized for a long range role for me to believe it was ever intended for a non-strategic role _as understood in the early/mid 1930s. _


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## RCAFson (Sep 5, 2012)

Compare the Battle to the SBD. They have similar ranges on internal fuel, but no one has ever claimed that the SBD was a strategic bomber.


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## Vincenzo (Sep 5, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Which confirms that only a fraction of the fighter units in the med were equipped with F subtypes. Think about it. over 550 of that 704 were deployed to the Eastern Front. (There were just under 300 Es allocated to the East Front incidentally, one source mentions 245). There were over 100 Fs allocated to the west, and then we have wastage and losses to account for. Whichever way you cut the allocation of resources there are less than 70 friedrichs on the Southern Frint in June and far more likley about 40-50. I know that over 50% of LW forces by June on the southern Front were fighters, some of which will be Me 110s but the lions share just has to be E subtypes. your unit based information sources may be saying that they were Fs, but in june this is simply a physical impossibility. They may be authorised to use Fs, but not yet received that equipme nt...a common failing for axis records. Try that excercise on some RA units, you will find the same problem



as i already writed in my previous reply in june '41 there were no friederichs ih fighter unit in MTO, but there were not emils in october (with possible exception a jabo informal staffel)


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## stona (Sep 5, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> Compare the Battle to the SBD. They have similar ranges on internal fuel, but no one has ever claimed that the SBD was a strategic bomber.



I am not particularly familiar with the doctrines relating to air power in the United States during this period. 

I am reasonably familiar with the RAF doctrine and the men who instigated it and attempted to enact it. The bomber was perceived,in the 1930s,as a strategic,war winning tool. Some of the more optimistic proponents of the strategic bomber force imagined that it might not even be necessary to commit an army to the field in a future war.The method but not the doctrine changed throughout the war. 

Close air support was eventually provided by the RAF but rarely by Bomber Command. Even intedictory attacks on French infrastructure in the lead up to Overlord were seen as a distraction from the real task,that of flattening German cities and dehousing (killing) as many German workers as possible. Hardly a tactical objective!

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Sep 5, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> Compare the Battle to the SBD. They have similar ranges on internal fuel, but no one has ever claimed that the SBD was a strategic bomber.



Ok, I will bite, how many SBDs were flying in 1937? 
How many in 1938?
How many in 1939? 

And then you have the rather different purpose of a carrier _SCOUT/BOMBER_ compared to a single engine strategic bomber. 
The SBD was supposed to provide the long range _SCOUT_ or reconnaissance function for the carrier and have fuel allowances to get back the moving carrier (which may be moving away from the aircraft at 30kts in order to avoid a threat.)

Range alone does not determine the intended role but just what features did the Battle have (aside from being stressed for dive bombing, as it was understood in the early 30s) to suit it for the tactical role? 

Even the Lysander had two forward firing guns for flak suppression. The Lysander entered Squadron service about one year after the Battle and shows what the RAF _thought_ the Army needed for a tactical aircraft. And it really isn't that far off from the Hs 126 used by the Germans except the Lysander has about double the firepower and a much bigger bomb load.


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## stona (Sep 5, 2012)

The Lysander was an Army co-operation aircraft. In the context of the 1930s this meant an almost WWI role,reconnaissance and artillery spotting. It was not designed to support the Army in anything resembling CAS.

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Sep 5, 2012)

stona said:


> I am not particularly familiar with the doctrines relating to air power in the United States during this period.



We also have the confusion of doctrines of naval air power and land based air power intruding here not to mention the doctrine of a country who's potential enemies are only 200-400 miles away (in part) and a country who's potential enemies are many hundreds if not thousands of miles away. 

A rough check on Google maps shows that Norwich is a little over 300 miles from Bremen. Or Hull is 366 miles from Bremerhaven. 416 miles From London to Karlsruhe.

And in 1933-36 it was not a certainty that Germany would be the Future enemy. If the English were allied with the French and based in France so much the better, if it turned out that France was the enemy in 1940------413 miles from Portsmouth to Bordeaux. Or pretty much anything much north of a line from Bordeaux to Geneva. 

A rather ridiculous radius for a mid 1930s tactical bomber.


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## RCAFson (Sep 5, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> Ok, I will bite, how many SBDs were flying in 1937?
> How many in 1938?
> How many in 1939?
> 
> ...



Take a look at Gibraltar, Alexandria, Malta, Scapa flow, Singapore, Hatston on the Orkney Islands, etc, etc and then draw a 300-400 mile circle around those bases. Now imagine the consequences of the RAF having Battles deployed from these bases; having the range to strike at potential targets from these bases doesn't make the aircraft a strategic bomber, anymore than the Skuas were when they sank the Konigsberg and if the Skua could sink the Konigsberg from Hatson, then so could the Battle, with it's even better range and payload. The Battle was designed as a multipurpose attack bomber, that could deliver it's bomb load with a variety of attack profiles. It was tragically misused and it's potential wasted by throwing it against nearly unbeatable air and FLAK defenses, and then when it predictably failed, the failure was then blamed on the aircraft and not the impossible situation.

The Swordfish, Albacore and Barracuda all had a single .303mg as as their forward armament.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 5, 2012)

Well the provision of 3 , yes 3, light bomb racks might argue different. One on each stub wing outboard of the landing gear (which could also take a 250lb bomb each) and one under the fuselage for four 20lb bombs. The Stub wing bomb racks were also the attachment points for the "emergency" armament of two 20mm Hispano cannon for tank or barge busting in case Operation Sea Lion was ever started. Granted the 20mm were a late addition (thankfully never used) and not part of the original requirement. 

The Hs 126 could carry six 22 lb bombs inside I beleive and/or a single 110lb bomb under the port fuselage. 

It was quite common for early/mid 30s "Army co-operation aircraft" to be equipped as "light bombers". Much like the WW I two seaters. The provision of more machine guns and light automatic canon for AA use made this rather unattractive even by 1939-40 however. But in evaluating 1933-37 aircraft and their intended uses it has to e take into account.


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## RCAFson (Sep 5, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> As has been noted the RAF did not like the idea of supporting the army directly, even though they claimed they could do it in order to get a larger share of the budget sometimes.
> The Army found itself in France with niether proper air support _OR_ modern heavy artillery ( why spend money on heavy artillery when you have bombers?) .
> 
> When looking at the Battle a lot of little things begin to add up, perhaps they are all circumstantial, but judge for yourselves.
> ...



You've proven that the Battle could deliver 1500lb over a useful distance and that it had the range for a variety of missions.

Why did the TBD and TBF have a bomb aimer? Were they strategic bombers, or was it to suit them for a attacking a variety of tactical targets and/or to attack strategic targets when the opportunity arose? Giving aircraft multipurpose capabilities doesn't make it a strategic bomber.


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## stona (Sep 5, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> It was quite common for early/mid 30s "Army co-operation aircraft" to be equipped as "light bombers". Much like the WW I two seaters. The provision of more machine guns and light automatic canon for AA use made this rather unattractive even by 1939-40 however. But in evaluating 1933-37 aircraft and their intended uses it has to e take into account.



True enough,if little better than those chaps lobbing bombs from the observer's position in WWI.

I think that Lysanders may actually have dropped some bombs in France before being withdrawn. I know for sure that they made supply drops.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Sep 5, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> Take a look at Gibraltar, Alexandria, Malta, Scapa flow, Singapore, Hatston on the Orkney Islands, etc, etc and then draw a 300-400 mile circle around those bases. Now imagine the consequences of the RAF having Battles deployed from these bases; having the range to strike at potential targets from these bases doesn't make the aircraft a strategic bomber, anymore than the Skuas were when they sank the Konigsberg and if the Skua could sink the Konigsberg from Hatson, then so could the Battle, with it's even better range and payload. The Battle was designed as a multipurpose attack bomber, that could deliver it's bomb load with a variety of attack profiles. It was tragically misused and it's potential wasted by throwing it against nearly unbeatable air and FLAK defenses, and then when it predictably failed, the failure was then blamed on the aircraft and not the impossible situation.
> 
> The Swordfish, Albacore and Barracuda all had a single .303mg as as their forward armament.



Draw your circle and then imagine Handley Page Hampdens attacking with torpedoes or 500-1000 lb bombs.
The Battle was obsolete in 1939 and more so in 1940. Yes, it was tragically miss used, but given the numbers used and the lack of escorted no other attack profile offered any better chance of success. The chances of a hit level bombing from 8-12,000ft were pretty dismal, while giving the defense even more warning and the fighters shots at the belly. The dive bombing profile was also useless as it to gave to much warning and oppertunity to the fighters and flak

The Battle needed better protection, both armorial and Tankage, more firepower, more enginepower, lower drag (smaller size). In other words it needed to be replaced by a new airplane. There was a British specification for a "tactical" bomber after the Battle, it resulted in the Fairey P.4/34 and Hawker Henley, so for give me for thinking that the RAF didn't think of the Battle as a "tactical" bomber.
For sinking major war ships you need more than just bombload, you need bombs of a size/type that can do the job. The Battles wing bomb cells were to restrictive in bomb selection.


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## parsifal (Sep 5, 2012)

> as i already writed in my previous reply in june '41 there were no friederichs ih fighter unit in MTO,



Sorry, I thought you were saying the F was the dominant type from April 




> but there were not emils in october (with possible exception a jabo informal staffel)



This doesnt cut it either. Looking once again at the eastern Front, and the losses being sustained there, it is immedialtely apparent that Emils had to be substituted on the southern front as the 6 fighter groups transferred from the east to the Southern TOs were put into effect ((II,III/JG 27, I,II,III/JG 53, II/JG 3). 

On the Eastern Front attitional losses for the LW were very heavy. In the first three weeks of the campaign alone there were 189 unrecoverable losses to the fighter groups. Thats a whopping monthly attrition rate of 35% per month of the total force structure being lost each and every month. By October the Luftwaffe had lost 1005 SE fighters on the Eastern Front, and by the beginning of December this figure had risen to 1600. These are unrecoverable losses...losses that dont get repaired. This trend continued through to December, yet the LW managed to maintain a daily serviceability average of about 740 fighters at the beginning of the campaign, before slipping to 650 in September and finally plummetting to about 450 in November. With such a high wastage rate, yet maintaining a high serviceability rate, the Germans simply had to be pouring everything they could into the Eastern Front. Since AFAIK, there were no FW 190 deployments as yet to the East and Emils were out of production, the reinforcements being sent to the East had to be Fredericks. Since there were only 1000 Frederics produced in that period (or about 166 per month) and the Germans were sending more than 200 SE fighters per month to the East in that period, plus replacing losses in the west, there simply is no capacity to explwin the claim that Fredericks were sent south in that period. My source says that a few (about 30 in Septmeber, and then gradually increasing each month thereafter) were sent to the MTO, and that the units mentioned above arrived in theatre with Emils (in the East they had been equipped with Freferics, perhaps they were initially Frederics, but more likley they drew Emils from the reserve depots in Germany enroute, leaving the F mounts in the East, as reserves for other formations....that would be consistent with what the LW usually did at least) . 

So, I can only repeat, even though your unit based sources might tell you the newly arriving JGs were F equipped, and that ther were no E units in the TO, there is simply no other exaplanation other than these sources are wrong, given the emergency faced by the LW in the East at this time. Thats certainly what Berg in his book claims


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## RCAFson (Sep 5, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> Draw your circle and then imagine Handley Page Hampdens attacking with torpedoes or 500-1000 lb bombs.
> The Battle was obsolete in 1939 and more so in 1940. Yes, it was tragically miss used, but given the numbers used and the lack of escorted no other attack profile offered any better chance of success. The chances of a hit level bombing from 8-12,000ft were pretty dismal, while giving the defense even more warning and the fighters shots at the belly. The dive bombing profile was also useless as it to gave to much warning and oppertunity to the fighters and flak
> 
> The Battle needed better protection, both armorial and Tankage, more firepower, more enginepower, lower drag (smaller size). In other words it needed to be replaced by a new airplane. There was a British specification for a "tactical" bomber after the Battle, it resulted in the Fairey P.4/34 and Hawker Henley, so for give me for thinking that the RAF didn't think of the Battle as a "tactical" bomber.
> For sinking major war ships you need more than just bombload, you need bombs of a size/type that can do the job. The Battles wing bomb cells were to restrictive in bomb selection.



What bombing profile would you suggest?

...and it didn't have a HUD display, GPS navigation or terrain following radar...this is 1940/1 that we're talking about.  The Battle could carry 2 x 500lb bombs for attacking larger ships including CVs while the 250lb bomb was still effective against any unarmoured ship. Imagine 50 Battles accompanying the Bleinheim strike against the IJN carriers on April 09 1942; it would have been Midway two months earlier. 

The later designs such as the P.4/34 were improved, but they didn't exist and the Battle did, and in relatively large numbers (the UK probably had more Battles in 1940 than the IJAAF or USAAC had in total aircraft)


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## Vincenzo (Sep 5, 2012)

II/27 in MTO from late september with friederichs 
III/27 in MTO from early december with friderichs
II/3 in MTO from january '42 with friederichs
I/53 in MTO from december '41 with friederichs
II/53 in MTO from december '41 with friederichs
III/53 in MTO from very late november '41 with friederichs

this for Fighter units unit report

for quarterly report 27/9/41 Single engine fighters - 27.09.41
II/27 40 F-4
III/27 22 E
II/3 21 F-4
I/53 37 F-4
II/53 29 F-4
III/53 22 F-12

for quarterly report 27/12/41 Single engine fighters - 27.12.41
II/27 22 F-4
III/27 20 F-4
II/3 40 F-4
I/53 40 F-4
II/53 39 F-4
III/53 no fighters

Osprey publication LUFTWAFFE FIGHTER UNITS MEDITERRANEAN 1941-44 and Bf 109 aces in north africa and mediterranean are agree that after the first (7/26 and I/27) the others fighter unit came with friederichs


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## parsifal (Sep 5, 2012)

Vincenzo

I glanced at the source material you provided, and it simply confirms what I am saying. they are unit based reports, looking from the "ground up", but they cannot be reconciled with what was happening "from the top down". German losses on the est front and in the west were exceeding re-supply of new aircraft, 35% of the force structure lost in the first month of operations alone. Slowed down a litle in the following months, but still outstripping proiduction. Maximum effort was being applied in the east. It is possible that the units transfering to south tok their equipment with them, but not according to Berg. Neither wouold that be consistent with standard LW procedure. Units transferring out of the East would (usually) draw new equipment from the reserve depots then move to the new deployment. Not always but usually. 

So, once again, there are simply no airframes available to equip on a wholesale scale firstly those units already in the MTO, and then to re-equip 6 full gruppen that transferred in Septemeber. The unit histories may tell you that, but the stratgegic situation categorically says its not possible. 

Lets move on, we have had this discussion so many times and it does the thread, nor either of us any good to keep going around in circles


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## Shortround6 (Sep 5, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> What bombing profile would you suggest?



The one they used, fighter escort would help though.



RCAFson said:


> ...and it didn't have a HUD display, GPS navigation or terrain following radar...this is 1940/1 that we're talking about.



Yep and by late 1940 most fighters and combat planes in the western Nations _HAD_ armor, bullet resistant windscreens and protected tanks of some sort. While the "HUD display, GPS navigation or terrain following radar" might be lacking ANY plane _WOTHOUT_ armor, bullet resistant windscreens and protected tanks of some sort were considered little better than training aircraft. 




RCAFson said:


> The Battle could carry 2 x 500lb bombs for attacking larger ships including CVs while the 250lb bomb was still effective against any unarmoured ship.



Could the Battle carry two 500lb bombs? or could it carry a single 250lb under each wing? And if you can get a 500lb bomb under each wing what does it do to performance? 

A Hurricane IIB lost about 33mph carrying a pair of 500lb bombs. A Mosquito lost about 15-18mph, A P-51D cruising at 2700rpm and 46in MAP lost about 36mph with two 500lb bombs. Can the Battle afford to loose even 20mph? 




RCAFson said:


> Imagine 50 Battles accompanying the Bleinheim strike against the IJN carriers on April 09 1942; it would have been Midway two months earlier.



You do have an imagination. I take it you are also imagining another 24 or so Battles going in at low level to lure the CAP out of position and getting almost wiped out doing it? The US got very, very lucky at Midway. Taking nothing away form the skill or courage of the Flyers, it was in large part due to the _ unplanned_ sequence of events that Midway turned out so well for the Americans. Without the same measure of luck/fate many of the Battles in such a strike force would suffer the same fate as the Blenheims, around 40% losses over the Japanese fleet. Especially if they don't have the armor and self-sealing tanks of the Blenheims. 



RCAFson said:


> The later designs such as the P.4/34 were improved, but they didn't exist and the Battle did, and in relatively large numbers (the UK probably had more Battles in 1940 than the IJAAF or USAAC had in total aircraft)



While it is true they didn't exist in numbers I didn't bring then to say that they did, but to point out that the RAF had other ideas about what made up a tactical bomber than the Battle and they had those ideas before the Battle even flew. Please note the smaller Fairey bomber was a good 25mph faster than the Battle using the same engine. The Fact that the RAF choose to buy twin engine and 4 engine bombers instead of tactical bombers doesn't really mean they were happy with the Battle as a tactical bomber, It means they were concentrating on what they thought was their primary Missions. Defense of the British Isles with fighters and an independent offensive force, Bomber Command, not tied to the army.


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## stona (Sep 6, 2012)

The Battle was a dog's dinner from start to finish.

Specification P.27/32 was issued by the Air Ministry in April 1933 having seen some theoretical designs,one offered by Fairey for a single engined bomber to be powered by the Prince V-12 engine which hadn't left the drawing board. That specification was issued in paralell with specification B.9/32 for a replacement for the Boulton Paul Overstrand which eventually led to the Hampden and Wellington.

Fairey wanted to build an aircraft for P.27/32 which would have two engines but the AM refused. Fairey now offered three designs,the least favoured was a single engined two cockpit monoplane but this is the one the AM selected.

Marcel Lobelle made his initial design around the Prince engine but when no government support was forthcoming for that engine was forced to redesign around the Rolls Royce PV 12. He would not consider a radial engine for which he seems to have had considerable dislike. At this time he did away with the twin cockpits and adopted the long "glasshouse" canopy. This was fortunate as the AM now moved the goal posts,insisting on a third crew member,specifically a bomb aimer.
Incidentally,though the 1000lb bomb load was achieved it comprised four 250lb bombs which may have been of limited use against shipping as proposed by some above.

The prototype first flew on March 10th 1936 and was later tested by the A+AEE at Martlesham Heath during July and August. There were no major crticisms of the aircraft but the performance,even in 1936,was described as disappointing.

The type was named "Battle" on 2nd April 1936. The story goes that the name was given as a result of C.R.Fairey's constant "battles" with the Air Ministry to get them to accept the twin engined design which he favoured.

The RAF was totally disinterested in the type by this time. It was only under strong political pressure for new squadrons to be equipped that the Battle was identified as a candidate for the task under "Expansion Scheme C" of 1935 and "Expansion Scheme F" of 1936.

The first order for 155 aircraft was placed in mid 1935 and a new specification P.23/35 was drawn up to cover the new canopy,equipment,variable pitch propeller,external stub exhausts etc. Under specification P.14/36 the order was increased by 500 in May 1936 (under scheme F) and another 400 in August 1936.

By the end of production on 2nd September 1940,2,201 Battles had been built. 1 prototype Battle was built by Fairey at Hayes,1,155 at Stockport and 1,029 at the Austin satellite factory in Longbridge,Birmingham. A further 16 built by Austin for Belgium make up the grand total.

It is commonly asserted that the Battle was withdrawn from front line service in 1940 but as late as July 1941 98 Sqn. was flying reconnaissance and anti submarine patrols in its Battles,from Rekyavik,for Coastal Command.

Cheers

Steve


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## RCAFson (Sep 6, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> The one they used, fighter escort would help though.
> 
> Yep and by late 1940 most fighters and combat planes in the western Nations _HAD_ armor, bullet resistant windscreens and protected tanks of some sort. While the "HUD display, GPS navigation or terrain following radar" might be lacking ANY plane _WOTHOUT_ armor, bullet resistant windscreens and protected tanks of some sort were considered little better than training aircraft.



The Battle had armour added as stated earlier in this thread, and more was added prior to the BofF. I don't know whether bullet proof windscreens were added, but certainly it could have been and I don't know the state of protection to the fuel tanks. The USN/USAAC didn't begin to fit self sealing tanks and armour to their aircraft until late 1941.




> Could the Battle carry two 500lb bombs? or could it carry a single 250lb under each wing? And if you can get a 500lb bomb under each wing what does it do to performance?







(from Fairey Battle,by Huntley, p36. )

I don't know what carrying 2 x 500lb bombs externally would do to the performance, but it would have still been comparable to an SBD or even a TBF.



> A Hurricane IIB lost about 33mph carrying a pair of 500lb bombs. A Mosquito lost about 15-18mph, A P-51D cruising at 2700rpm and 46in MAP lost about 36mph with two 500lb bombs. Can the Battle afford to loose even 20mph?



The Ju-87B could barely stay in the air with a 500kg bomb, yet it did great execution when Allied fighters were absent.






> You do have an imagination. I take it you are also imagining another 24 or so Battles going in at low level to lure the CAP out of position and getting almost wiped out doing it? The US got very, very lucky at Midway. Taking nothing away form the skill or courage of the Flyers, it was in large part due to the _ unplanned_ sequence of events that Midway turned out so well for the Americans. Without the same measure of luck/fate many of the Battles in such a strike force would suffer the same fate as the Blenheims, around 40% losses over the Japanese fleet. Especially if they don't have the armor and self-sealing tanks of the Blenheims.



No, I was actually imagining the Battles coming in, unobserved, just as the Blenheims did, but attacking the IJN carriers with a low altitude pull-out diving attack, rather than at ~12000 ft. Yes, there would be losses, but the IJN CVs would have suffered hits as well, with possibly fatal results. In any event, the Battle has almost identical performance to the Blenheim and the entire IJN CAP only knocked down 4 or 5 of the 9 Blenheims, so it's hard to see how they would be able to increase their score.





> While it is true they didn't exist in numbers I didn't bring then to say that they did, but to point out that the RAF had other ideas about what made up a tactical bomber than the Battle and they had those ideas before the Battle even flew. Please note the smaller Fairey bomber was a good 25mph faster than the Battle using the same engine. The Fact that the RAF choose to buy twin engine and 4 engine bombers instead of tactical bombers doesn't really mean they were happy with the Battle as a tactical bomber, It means they were concentrating on what they thought was their primary Missions. Defense of the British Isles with fighters and an independent offensive force, Bomber Command, not tied to the army.


 As has been stated earlier, the Battle was a light bomber that was built to replace earlier biplane light bombers. I've been arguing that the Battle was misused and properly used it could have been a decisive factor in secondary theatres.


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## merlin (Sep 6, 2012)

Names for RAF bomer aircraft of the 30s 40s were usually after towns/cities - there is a town in the south east of England called Battle. The other factor with the Battle was the Geneva Disarmament conference - there was a large anti-bomber lobby that was campaigning to ban them - unrealistic n.b many of the Lw bombers were disguised as passenger aircraft. There was a proposal to restrict the weight of bombers - although it was relaxed with the Wellington design, it was broadly kept with the Battle e.g. single-engine.


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## stona (Sep 6, 2012)

merlin said:


> Names for RAF bomer aircraft of the 30s 40s were usually after towns/cities - there is a town in the south east of England called Battle.



True,but the story that circulated in Fairey Aviation,at the time,was that it related to C.R.'s battles with the Air Ministry.

To sink unarmoured ships you want something like the Luftwaffe's SC 500. They did a special version filled with Trialen 105 (15% RDX,70%TNT,15% Aluminium powder). Being thin walled the relative amount of explosive was high,over 50%, at 295 Kg. This gave a good "mining effect" that is it worked well when it exploded underwater. 
Unfortunately the Battle couldn't have carried a 500Kg bomb to attack the Japanese fleets.
I've got a picture somewhere of one such bomb with "Nur Gegen Handelschiffe" (only against merchant ships) stencilled on the side and a ship's silhouette rather than a yellow band on the tail cone. As a complete aside that bomb also formed the warhead of the first generation,anti ship, smart bombs,noteably the Hs 293 "glide bomb".

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Sep 6, 2012)

For another example of a single engine "strategic" bomber see the Vickers Wellesley.

Air staffs could be a bit on the optimistic side in the early thirties as the original specification called for "general purpose aircraft, capable of carrying out level bombing, army co-operation, dive bombing, reconnaissance, casualty evacuation and torpedo bombing." and all from a plane weighing 6000lbs empty? 

The Wellesley was a private Venture to replace Vickers own winning Biplane with ALL requirements except bombing dropped.


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## Vincenzo (Sep 6, 2012)

no the sources confirm that i am saying. all the 6 gruppen (that were not transferred all in september) were already equipped with friederichs when they go in MTO. At end 41 were built more of 2500 Friederichs so i don't see no trouble to equip this unit as you can see at 27/12/41 the only unit with emils were 
I/2 with 12 Emils and 19 Friederichs (in the west)
15/27 with 6 Emils, the spanish unit in the east
15/52 with 11 Emils, the croatian unit in the east
I/77 with 97 Emils in Norway
I/1 with 31 Emils and 14 Friederichs in the west
I/LG2 with 52 Emils in the east
66 emils were in the replacement units
so 275 emils vs 509 3 months before


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## Wildcat (Sep 6, 2012)

I'm no expert on the Battle, but what I find interesting is that the RAAF, which had received a number of battles since 1940, chose to deploy the (on paper) inferior Wirraway into combat whilst the battle was relegated to training units back in Australia. May-be the brass hats in Oz knew full well its short comings?


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## stona (Sep 6, 2012)

Wildcat said:


> I'm no expert on the Battle, but what I find interesting is that the RAAF, which had received a number of battles since 1940, chose to deploy the (on paper) inferior Wirraway into combat whilst the battle was relegated to training units back in Australia. May-be the brass hats in Oz knew full well its short comings?



I'm sure that senior RAAF officers would have been aware of the views of their British colleagues. Embry,Slessor,Tedder and many others.

Steve


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## stona (Sep 6, 2012)

merlin said:


> The other factor with the Battle was the Geneva Disarmament conference - there was a large anti-bomber lobby that was campaigning to ban them - unrealistic n.b many of the Lw bombers were disguised as passenger aircraft. There was a proposal to restrict the weight of bombers - although it was relaxed with the Wellington design, it was broadly kept with the Battle e.g. single-engine.



The luftwaffe was governed by other earlier treaties.

These debates were of their time and it is important to understand the atmosphere in which they were carried out.

It is noticeable that those seeking to limit air power were principally the senior officers of the other services! The War Office and Admiralty,in the 1934-9 period were ambivalent about the danger of aerial bombardment.They always underplayed it when discussing re-armament,partly to increase their own chances of obtaining a larger share of the limited funds available.They also did not believe the airmen's claim that they would decide the outcome of the next war.
Simultaneously the Admiralty was concerned about the prospect of aerial attacks on merchant shipping and the War Office was much excercised about the effect on the morale of the civilians of the working classes of attacks on them.

In January 1936 Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd,head of the Army (that really was his name!) argued,displaying Victorian attitudes to go with his Victorian name, that "air limitation,if not absolute prohibition was of infinitely greater importance to our security than the production of superior air forces." History has made Archibald look a little foolish.

Even later in November 1936 Sir Samuel Hoare,civilian head of the Admiralty,urged the government to seek an international agreement to restrict air war fare. As if the nazis would have honoured that.

A 1937 comittee,headed by Sir William Malkin of the Foreign Office was still seeking means to restrict the use of air power in warfare.

No less a figure than Harold MacMillan recalled in one of the volumes of his huge biography,published in the 1960s, that "we thought of air power in 1938 rather as people think of nuclear warfare today."

The emminent and sober men of the Committee of Imperial Defence suggested in 1936 that a well aimed air attack against "our people" might well succeed. The Air Ministry advised the committe to expect 20,000 casualties on the first day and 150,000 by the end of the first week.

This is what people then believed. Stanley Baldwin was not correct to say in 1932 that "the bomber will _always _get through" but he was probably still right in 1936/7.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Sep 6, 2012)

stona said:


> This is what people then believed. Stanley Baldwin was not correct to say in 1932 that "the bomber will _always _get through" but he was probably still right in 1936/7.



He may not have been right even in 1936/7 but most air staffs let alone civilians _ believed_ him to be right and made decisions on aircraft procurement based on that belief. 
The Spanish Civil war was supporting this wrong view as the 2nd or even 3rd rate air defenses let the vast majority of bombers through. The Germans experiences convinced them that 3 hand held (free swivel) rifle caliber MGs were sufficient defensive armament even though they knew the British were moving to eight gun fighters, and both themselves and the French were trying to move to cannon armed fighters. 
The Japanese were learning that un-escorted bombers could not make long distance raids without unacceptable losses even in the skies over China although they were not sharing that with the rest of the world.


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## RCAFson (Sep 6, 2012)

stona said:


> True,but the story that circulated in Fairey Aviation,at the time,was that it related to C.R.'s battles with the Air Ministry.
> 
> To sink unarmoured ships you want something like the Luftwaffe's SC 500. They did a special version filled with Trialen 105 (15% RDX,70%TNT,15% Aluminium powder). Being thin walled the relative amount of explosive was high,over 50%, at 295 Kg. This gave a good "mining effect" that is it worked well when it exploded underwater.
> Unfortunately the Battle couldn't have carried a 500Kg bomb to attack the Japanese fleets.
> ...



The JU87r was limited to a 550lb bomb and I doubt that the merchant Navy or RN would say it was ineffective. The SBD and TBF probably dropped more 500lb bombs than any other weight - and ask Konigsberg if 500lb bombs are ineffective.


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## stona (Sep 6, 2012)

500lb bombs were certainly effective against shipping,I never said that they weren't but bigger is self evidently better. Our beleaguered Battle wasn't designed to carry even a 500lb bomb. There is a diminishing return and 250 lb bombs become much less effective.

As for Konigsberg,the Royal Navy has a long and glorious tradition of attacking enemy ships at anchor or in port by whatever means. The Spanish Armada was attacked with fireships whilst anchored off Calais,then there is Copenhagen, The Nile,Taranto,Oran..... 
Ships make much easier targets when they are not moving 

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Sep 6, 2012)

when dealing with Cruisers, even light ones like the Konigsberg, you are dealing with armored decks. These generally need at least a SAP (semi-armor piercing) bomb to penetrate them. General purpose bombs carry a much higher percentage of explosive and can certainly wreck top side fixtures and structures and send a ship into the dockyards for months but need very lucky hits or even luckier "near misses" to sink armored ships. The armored deck was usually one or two decks below the main deck and penetration ( and detonation) of a bomb below this deck almost guaranteed damage to propulsion, power systems, magazines or flotation (leaks). 
Ge the fusing wrong on an AP bomb against a freighter and you might have a 12-16" hole through the bottom of the ship, not a good thing but perhaps "fixable" with local resources, at least temporarily. 
Of course AP (or SAP) bombs have to be dropped from the right height to have the proper impact speed. And just like an AP shot/shell the further from 90 degrees they hit the armor the less armor they penetrate. 

You have to suit the bomb, and it's delivery, to suit the target. The bigger the bomb, the more "over kill" you have and the less critical some things become. 1000lb bomb vs 250lb bomb?


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## stona (Sep 6, 2012)

Absolutely,I should have made it clear I was referring to merchant or at least unarmoured shipping. I'm assuming that our theoretical Battle,attacking a Japanese invasion fleet,would not be going after the naval escorts.

This is the kind of thing you want for them,if you can lift it.







Cheers

Steve


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## RCAFson (Sep 6, 2012)

stona said:


> 500lb bombs were certainly effective against shipping,I never said that they weren't but bigger is self evidently better. Our beleaguered Battle wasn't designed to carry even a 500lb bomb. There is a diminishing return and 250 lb bombs become much less effective.
> 
> As for Konigsberg,the Royal Navy has a long and glorious tradition of attacking enemy ships at anchor or in port by whatever means. The Spanish Armada was attacked with fireships whilst anchored off Calais,then there is Copenhagen, The Nile,Taranto,Oran.....
> Ships make much easier targets when they are not moving
> ...



The Battle was designed to carry 500lb bombs and I posted a chart previously showing that. Against unarmoured ships 250lb bombs are highly effective. The Battle could carry a variety of bombs types, including GP, SAP, and AS (high capacity) bombs. There's no reason why a Battle would be less effective in an anti-shipping strike than any other aircraft such as the Hudson or B-25.

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/at...oyed-overseas-any-merit-f_battle_armament.jpg


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 6, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> There's no reason why a Battle would be less effective in an anti-shipping strike than any other aircraft such as the Hudson or B-25.



Maybe an early Hudson, but not even close to a B-25, especially a B-25G.


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## RCAFson (Sep 6, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Maybe an early Hudson, but not even close to a B-25, especially a B-25G.



Of course a Battle wouldn't carry the same payload or have the same firepower as a B25-G, but it's bombing accuracy should be the same.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 6, 2012)

A Battle might very well be as effective as a Hudson, within the Battles combat radius, which is a lot less than the Hudson's, or even a Blenheim's. It also can't make it back to base with a bad engine ( normal failure or combat damage.) 

Vs a B-25? Well, The first 14 B-25Bs were accepted in August of 1941. "range 2000 miles with 3000 pounds of bombs"

Granted there were a lot more Battles around than B-25s but then that is rather beside the point. The point being that the Battle was a rather limited plane even in 1939/40.

Handley Page Hampden. 1,095 miles (1,792km) with max bombload. 4,000 lb (1,814 kg) bombs or 1 x 18 in torpedo or mines. 

Or see the Martin Maryland, granted not that many built (about 450) but again they show that the Battle had little place flying in contested airspace, and equipping large numbers of active duty squadrons that *have to be* deployed *ONLY* to areas without fighter opposition is a luxury Britain cannot afford in 1940/41. 
They may think the Japanese fighters aren't much good but sending aircraft to the far east with valuable crews to posts that takes weeks to get to and will takes weeks to get replacement aircraft or crews to actually doesn't make much sense no matter how cheap or available the aircraft appear at first glance.


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## stona (Sep 6, 2012)

The Battle was not _designed_ to carry 500lb bombs. It was adapted to carry them externally as a later expedient. It may be a matter of semantics but it's why I wrote _designed_. The Battle was built to a specification that required it to carry 1000lbs of bombs and it was designed to carry 4 x 250 lbs. Obviously smaller or lighter ordnance would not be a problem.
As far as I can tell the Battle never carried a 500lb bomb in anger though I stand to be corrected.
This seems a more typical scene.






Steve


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## Shortround6 (Sep 6, 2012)

Again this is one of the features that point to it being a strategic bomber rather than a tactical bomber. Streamlining the plane by internal bomb storage gives greater range in addition to higher top speed. It may slow rearming (multiple missions per day). Given the change in the ground situation from orders issued in France to arrival over target I fail to see the need to operate tactical aircraft at long ranges which just delay the arrival of the planes. 
This "feature" is part of what condemned the Battle from being improved much. Hanging bombs on the outside cut into the speed and range and trying to change the wing to accommodate larger bombs inside either required too much work or required some major lumps and bumps, or both. It also meant a thick, high drag (but high lift) wing. Not so bad in in 37-38 when it seemed the RAF was trying to build STOL aircraft that could use cow pastures as airfields ( an exaggeration) but a definite liability to getting a major improvement in performance. Once the British caught on to better flap designs that allowed for improved take offs with smaller wings the thick wing section lost a lot of appeal. 
that is part of the problem with trying to update older designs. How much work (engineering, drawing and tooling) and how much production disruption do you put up with for how much improvement and at what point do you just shift to a new design?


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 6, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> Of course a Battle wouldn't carry the same payload or have the same firepower as a B25-G, but it's bombing accuracy should be the same.



In what type of bombing? Maybe if it was bombing an undefended target! 

B-25s regularly skipped bombed and mast height bombed at high speeds and low altitudes, I don't see a Battle doing this in say in the Bismarck Sea and surviving. BTW the B-25s did this at over 260 mph, just faster than the Battle's top speed.


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## RCAFson (Sep 6, 2012)

I bought a copy of Pilot's Notes's for the Battle:

Vmax = 340mph IAS and there are no restrictions on diving except speed.






How many strategic bombers can release their bombs at 80 degrees?


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 6, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> I bought a copy of Pilot's Notes's for the Battle:
> 
> Vmax = 340mph IAS and there are no restrictions on diving except speed.
> 
> ...



V max at what altitude and what weight? IAS needs to be calculated to true air speed to give a real picture of how fast the aircraft is going


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## RCAFson (Sep 6, 2012)

stona said:


> The Battle was not _designed_ to carry 500lb bombs. It was adapted to carry them externally as a later expedient. It may be a matter of semantics but it's why I wrote _designed_. The Battle was built to a specification that required it to carry 1000lbs of bombs and it was designed to carry 4 x 250 lbs. Obviously smaller or lighter ordnance would not be a problem.
> As far as I can tell the Battle never carried a 500lb bomb in anger though I stand to be corrected.
> This seems a more typical scene.
> 
> ...



Hogwash. 

The Battle was carefully designed to accommodate a variety of internal and external ordnance including 500lb bombs. You know it's really unbelievable that the extraordinarily clean design of the Battle and it's ability to carry 1000lb of bombs internally (4 x 250lb) is now being held up as a draw back or a defect!


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## RCAFson (Sep 6, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> V max at what altitude and what weight? IAS needs to be calculated to true air speed to give a real picture of how fast the aircraft is going



There are no weight restrictions on diving except IAS:


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## RCAFson (Sep 6, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> In what type of bombing? Maybe if it was bombing an undefended target!
> 
> B-25s regularly skipped bombed and mast height bombed at high speeds and low altitudes, I don't see a Battle doing this in say in the Bismarck Sea and surviving. BTW the B-25s did this at over 260 mph, just faster than the Battle's top speed.



Battle SL Vmax with a full bomb load at max weight was 210mph at 6.25lb boost. 12lb boost would give another 20mph or so and a shallow dive would allow for the same speed as a B-25.


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 6, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> There are no weight restrictions on diving except IAS:


Bottom line, I think 10 B-25s are going to be a hell of a lot more effictive in bombing a defended target than 10 Battles.


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 6, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> Battle SL Vmax with a full bomb load at max weight was 210mph at 6.25lb boost. 12lb boost would give another 20mph or so and a shallow dive would allow for the same speed as a B-25.


 B-25s skipped bombed 200 - 250 mph and mast bombed over 260 mph


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## RCAFson (Sep 6, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Bottom line, I think 10 B-25s are going to be a hell of a lot more effictive in bombing a defended target than 10 Battles.



I don't doubt that, but the fact remains that the Battle could have employed the same tactics. In Malaya, the RAF was flying bombing missions with Vildebeests, and there's no doubt that the Battle was far superior as a bomber.

Here's what 17 Hudson sorties with 4 x 250lb bombs, each, accomplished:


> No. 1 Squadron RAAF based at RAF Kota Bharu launched ten Hudson bombers to attack the Japanese transports, each loaded with four 250 pound bombs. In the seventeen sorties flown they lost two Hudsons shot down and three badly damaged. One Hudson, flown by Flight Lieutenant John Leighton-Jones, crashed into a fully laden landing craft after being hit while strafing the beachhead, killing some 60 Japanese soldiers on board. All three Japanese troopships were significantly damaged, and while the Ayatosan Maru and Sakura Maru were still able to sail, the Awazisan Maru was left burning and abandoned.[18] The wreck later sunk or was torpedoed by the Dutch submarine K-XII on 12 December.[24]
> Japanese invasion of Malaya - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



Add 50 or 100 Battles and it's game over for the transports.


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 6, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> I don't doubt that, but the fact remains that the Battle could have employed the same tactics. In Malaya, the RAF was flying bombing missions with Vildebeests, and there's no doubt that the Battle was far superior as a bomber.
> 
> Here's what 17 Hudson sorties with 4 x 250lb bombs, each, accomplished:
> 
> ...


Same tactics, yes, same effectivness as a B-25? I doubt it, but they would have been a hell of a lot better than the Vildebeests.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 6, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> Hogwash.
> 
> The Battle was carefully designed to accommodate a variety of internal and external ordnance including 500lb bombs. You know it's really unbelievable that the extraordinarily clean design of the Battle and it's ability to carry 1000lb of bombs internally (4 x 250lb) is now being held up as a draw back or a defect!



It was an extraordinarily clean design for 1935-38. It's ability to carry those four 250lb internally ( same bomb load as the initial requirement/specification for the Mosquito) was an asset in achieving the performance of speed and range that it did have. 
The problem is that the state of the art in aircraft design and aerodynamics does not stand still. What is a good and innovative solution in 1934/35 (when the Battle was on the drawing board) is no longer the best solution ( or even 2nd best) in 1940/41. Compare the Battle to the Firefly. Different designers but the same company. Despite the Battle being a land plane and the Firefly a carrier plane the Firefly, while weighing just about 30% more had about 78% of the wing area. First flight of a FIrefly was made in Dec 1941 which means pencil was put to paper in late 1939 or early 1940. An awful lot had been learned about wing sections, airfoils, lift and flaps in those 5-6 years between the work on the Battle and the work on the Firefly. 

and look at the Barracuda (ok, squint through dark glasses  sandwiched about half way between the two. 

It may have taken an inordinate amount of time to get these later aircraft into service but that does not mean that the technical people were unaware of the limitations of some of these older designs, like the Whitley and the Hurricane and judged them as unworthy of further development even if they could perform some useful roles.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 6, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> Here's what 17 Hudson sorties with 4 x 250lb bombs, each, accomplished:
> Add 50 or 100 Battles and it's game over for the transports.



Add 50 to 100 more Hudsons or even Blenheim's and it would also be game over for the transports. And the Hudsons and Blenheims are more survivable and have a longer range for either strike or recon missions. 

100 more of ANY TYPE of plane is going to need 1000-2000 more men for aircrew and ground crew, TRAINED MEN. If you have the trained men, giving them 2nd or 3rd best aircraft is wasting them.


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## RCAFson (Sep 6, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> The problem is that the state of the art in aircraft design and aerodynamics does not stand still.



By contemporary western standards the IJN's Val and Kate were as, or more, obsolete than the Battle.


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## RCAFson (Sep 6, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> Add 50 to 100 more Hudsons or even Blenheim's and it would also be game over for the transports. And the Hudsons and Blenheims are more survivable and have a longer range for either strike or recon missions.
> 
> 100 more of ANY TYPE of plane is going to need 1000-2000 more men for aircrew and ground crew, TRAINED MEN. If you have the trained men, giving them 2nd or 3rd best aircraft is wasting them.



Yeah, but they didn't have hundreds of spare Hudsons and Blenheims, yet they had Battles coming out of their ears.


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## nuuumannn (Sep 6, 2012)

Haggling over whether the Battle could carry a 500 lb bomb or at what speed/altitude it could release its bombs and indeed what number there would have been available doesn't change the inescapable fact that, although its presense might have made a difference, it would not have been able to change the outcome, even if there were 100 available to the Allies. 

This is because inadequate aircraft types and numbers were only a part of the reason why the Japanese invasion proved so successful. Lack of supplies and an adequate supply train, lack of early warning, lack of sufficiently trained air and ground crew, poor facilities, lack of co-ordination between services all counted against the Allies and that's not bringing into account the abilities of the Japanese forces themselves.

The Battle was obsolete by 1941 and comparing its striking abilities to that of the B-25 is folly. The Battle had a rather lousy bomb sight and was not equipped for maritime attack at any rate; as touched on earlier it was a level bomber and attacking ships/any targets straight and level and even in a dive with the kind of resistance the Japanese would have thrown against them is asking for trouble, as it was over France in 1940. If the Battles had not been destroyed on the ground by Japanese bombers attacking thier airfields, as they did at the time, then it's highly likely they would have been mercillously attacked by large numbers of fighters en route to and over the target areas. Game over for the transports is a big stretch of the imagination.

There's no way that the British, even if they had them in numbers would have committed the Battle to action in Singapore based on the type's campaign over France, not to mention the RAF's doctrine, which hs been touched on before here. As for the Blenheim, it was still available in numbers in 1941 and the Blenheim IV and V (Bisley) was still in front line squadron service by that time.


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## RCAFson (Sep 7, 2012)

nuuumannn said:


> The Battle was obsolete by 1941 and comparing its striking abilities to that of the B-25 is folly. The Battle had a rather lousy bomb sight and was not equipped for maritime attack at any rate; as touched on earlier it was a level bomber and attacking ships/any targets straight and level and even in a dive with the kind of resistance the Japanese would have thrown against them is asking for trouble, as it was over France in 1940. If the Battles had not been destroyed on the ground by Japanese bombers attacking thier airfields, as they did at the time, then it's highly likely they would have been mercillously attacked by large numbers of fighters en route to and over the target areas. Game over for the transports is a big stretch of the imagination.
> 
> There's no way that the British, even if they had them in numbers would have committed the Battle to action in Singapore based on the type's campaign over France, not to mention the RAF's doctrine, which hs been touched on before here. As for the Blenheim, it was still available in numbers in 1941 and the Blenheim IV and V (Bisley) was still in front line squadron service by that time.



The Hudson proved to be a capable naval strike bomber despite having the same bomb load as a Battle. The Battle was not a "level" bomber and was fully stressed and designed for dive bombing, if need be.

Yes, the Battle was misused because of RAF doctrine, but no the Blenheim was not available in large numbers, and what aircraft were available were fully committed.


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## Jabberwocky (Sep 7, 2012)

An interesting debate.

A hypothetical Battle Mk XII or XX with a corresponding Merlin XII or XX isn’t really going to improve things for the aircraft vis-a-vee German fighters, although it may help against the slower Italian aircraft.

The RAF recognised the Battle’s obsolescence well before the outbreak of the war, possibly as early as 1937, but definitely by 1938, when it cut back the original Battle production order by about 40%. However, with war looming, the Air Ministry and the RAF decided that they had to play with the equipment they’d brought, so Battle production continued.

Turning to the Mediterranean, I think the Battle could have been useful, but I don’t believe the aircraft – even several hundred of them – would have made a tremendous impact on the war in the Western desert in 1940-1941, at least not as a strategic or strike bomber.

Firstly, I don’t believe that British bombing doctrine was sufficiently developed at the time to result in a well-coordinated enough strategic campaign that could have done major damage to the Italian efforts, or to the later efforts by combined Axis forces. It takes better than 12 months of combat in the region before the British really get a proper bombing doctrine, tactical or strategic, going in the region.

Secondly, the Battle’s bombload, and the bombs it carried – the early GP 250 lb and 500 lb GP bombs with their low charge to weight ratios – were just too light for the job at hand. I feel that the damage done to port areas, supply dumps and staging facilities would not have been crippling, merely inconvenient.

Thirdly, the Battle was next to useless as a maritime level bomber, largely thanks to its outdated bombsight. The CBSC Mk VII and IX bombsights fitted to the aircraft required a considerable time at straight and level flying before it stabilised (worse if the aircraft had any lateral or longitudinal instability). This pretty-much rules out everything bar high altitude bombing. I’m not sure if the Battle ever got the MK XIV. 

As a dive bomber, I've never heard anything complimentary OR disparaging, which leads me to believe that the aircraft wasn't often used in such a role.

Fourthly, and finally, I believe Battle poorly suited the rapid speed and free-wheeling nature of the Western desert campaign. 

If the Battle was to have a role in the MTO in 1940-1941, I’d suspect it would be as a light/nuisance bomber, reconnaissance bomber and as a general purpose patrol aircraft, rather than a front-line combat aircraft, even with an escort. Perhaps the best role would have been as a seamine-laying aircraft, but I don't think there were any mines small enough for the Battle to handle.


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## stona (Sep 7, 2012)

You need a lot of aircraft to stand any chance of sinking ships. One of the Luftwaffe's most successful attacks during the Kanalkamf was on convoy CW9 on 8/8/40. This was caried out with the Ju 87 which most would concede to be be one of the best and accurate dive bombers of the era,flown by well trained and experienced crews.
After piecemeal attacks in the morning it took two attacks by 57 and then 82 Stukas,heavily escorted by Bf 109s and Bf 110s to do the damage. In the end 7 of the eighteen freighters were sunk and only 4 were left undamaged. They limped into Weymouth,recent home of the Olympic sailing regatta.
That's 139 dive bombers ( I don't know how many actually pressed home an attack) and about 100 escort fighters (50 on each wave) to sink 7 freighters slowly butting there way up the English Channel,virtually within sight of the Luftwaffe bases.

Steve


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## nuuumannn (Sep 7, 2012)

> The Hudson proved to be a capable naval strike bomber despite having the same bomb load as a Battle.



That's because the Hudson was designed as a naval strike aircraft and was kitted out for maritime ops, the Battle wasn't. Similarities in bomb load has nothing to do with it. Why are you comparing the Hudson and Battle? They were totally different aircraft operated by different commands using different tactics. The Battle was not at any stage in its career used for maritime patrol nor anti-shipping strike. Its bomber career ended in 1940 and continued in service for second line duties only from then on, finally being officially declared obsolete in these roles in 1944.

As for Blenheims, they _were_ available _in numbers _in 1941 and were still operating in front line squadrons. In the Far East the following bomber squadrons operated Blenheim IVs; 11, 34, 39, 45, 60, 84, 113 and 211. Blenheim V units in the Far East were 34, 42 and 113. This list covers the duration of the war, bearing in mind that the Blenheim V did not enter service (firstly in North Africa) until November 1942. Yes, they were committed in large numbers (that's what I meant when I say 'available') at that time, remember the Blenheim was in service at home in Fighter, Bomber and Coastal Commands and in North Africa and the Middle and Far East as fighters, bombers and army co-operation aircraft. Blenheims served on every front in every theatre the RAF was engaged in throughout the war, despite having been superceded in key roles by more suitable aircraft.

The Battle _was_ a level bomber, as dive bombing wasn't RAF doctrine it was expected to fulfil the role of a level bomber with the capability for dive bombing. The spec to which it was built was P.27/32; this spec was produced as a replacement for the Hart and Hind bombers and also as insurance against the Geneva Convention banning heavy bombers. Even if it was capable of dive bombing or not, it doesn't change the situation in the Far East. The same as what happened over France to the Battle would have happened over Singapore too.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 7, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> Yeah, but they didn't have hundreds of spare Hudsons and Blenheims, yet they had Battles coming out of their ears.



Yes, but they didn't have the trained crew men did they? Or if they did Bomber command was hogging them.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 7, 2012)

The British, like the Germans and a few other air forces in the 1930s, tried to have their cake and eat it too. They often specified a number of jobs to be performed by a single aircraft. Obviously some jobs could be performed better than others and in many cases some of the original 'specified" jobs were never undertaken by a particular aircraft, after all it can take around 4 years from Specification to squadron service. Take the original specification that lead to the Wellesley Bomber, throw in high altitude interceptor and it would have done it all  from emergency transport to torpedo bomber. Common British practice of the time for "heavy bombers" (twins) was that they had to have a fuselage that could accommodate 24 troops in an emergency. Given that background it is no surprise that the Battle was stressed for dive bombing, it is not a real surprise that it's bomb racks were rigged to allow dive bombing. However they seem to have left off the dive brakes and a bomb sight for the pilot? Maybe he can use the gunsight? And then you have doctrine and training. In spite of lip service about Army co-operation and support to the treasury in order to get a bigger cut of the budget, the RAF concentrated on what would become the "strategic bombing" Mission even if it wasn't really called that at the time. Bomber command had first call on non-fixed pitch propellers and on two speed superchargers. Bomber Command wasn't really interested in dive bombing as a whole ( individual pilots or squadron commanders may have been), and they didn't want to be placed in a position subordinate to the Army. Throw in the vast over estimation of the effects of bombs or number of bombs needed to desrtoy a target( the last might be more properly the vast _under estimation_ of bombs needed) and the vast under estimation of navigational difficulties and planes that seemed to be perfectly good "bombers" in 1937-39 were found to be near useless in their intended role in 1940-41. This goes for the Blenheim as well as the Battle. It also goes for practically every other British bomber that they tried to use for daylight bombing even if the targets were Naval and not land targets. The Blenheim was still somewhat useful as it had longer range/endurance and marginally better performance. They may have thought the power turret gave it better defense too. It may have had a bit more flexibility in bomb load too. Not only in the ability to carry 500lb bombs inside but in the carriage of the small bomb containers and incendiaries. 

With the great expansion of the RAF (and the Commonwealth forces) after the war started large numbers of crew trainers were need. Using the large numbers of Battles ( the least capable RAF bomber) made sense as no other obsolete aircraft was available in such numbers and it would take too long to build a new, specialized trainer. Keeping several hundred in service in combat squadrons ties up available man power and slows down the training program. 

If Bomber Command hadn't been such a hog about bombing Germany with most available planes the Far east, mid east and especial Coastal command may have had more squadrons of more effective aircraft earlier and done more for the war effort than the bombing campaign of 1940-41.


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## tomo pauk (Sep 7, 2012)

Okay, we have had maybe the biggest discussion about what Battle was able to do, or could do if upgraded. What about the other plane here, the Defiant? Maybe not such a dog vs. fighters capable to do 500 km/h ( give or take 15%)?


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## Shortround6 (Sep 7, 2012)

Not such a dog if the fight takes place at night  

Even if it is nearly the same speed as a Hurricane it can't climb as well or turn as well. Functions of it's greater weight for same power and roughly same sized wing. It might do OK against unescorted bombers, it's original mission, but against other fighters????

The trouble was not only aircraft performance but coordinating the gunner and pilot.


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## Jabberwocky (Sep 7, 2012)

Against a first string opposition like the German types, the Defiant is little more than a target. Even second string opposition like the Italian monoplanes handily outclass it. Against biplane opposition it might have an easier time, but I think the British were thoroughly soured on it as a day-fighter by August 1940.

There are possibilities as a night-fighter, like there were in Europe.


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## stona (Sep 7, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> If Bomber Command hadn't been such a hog about bombing Germany with most available planes the Far east, mid east and especial Coastal command may have had more squadrons of more effective aircraft earlier and done more for the war effort than the bombing campaign of 1940-41.



I agree. On that final point we have to remember that Britain is a democracy and senior military commanders are also politicians and ultimately sub ordinate to other politicians. 
Germany was bombing Britain and for most Britons the Far East or even Mediterranean were a long way away,much further than they are in our much smaller world. 
It was easy for the men of Bomber Command to convince their political masters that they were hitting back. This kind of strategic application of air power had never been tried before,as Harris famously said. All they needed was more aircraft.....and more,and more. 
Knowledge of the almost total ineffectivness of RAF bombing in the early years was not widely circulated and certainly wasn't public knowledge. The films shown in cinemas at the time,from which many people gleaned there information about the war,give the impression that "our boys" in their bombers were doing exactly what they said they could do. We know now that they weren't and couldn't.


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## nuuumannn (Sep 7, 2012)

> Against a first string opposition like the German types, the Defiant is little more than a target. Even second string opposition like the Italian monoplanes handily outclass it



Not necessarily true. The Defiant proved itself more than capable of defending itself against fighters such as the Bf 109 _if the correct tactics were used_. During the three months it was in day fighter use during the Battle of Britain the majority of kills against Defiants were made by superior, often overwhelmingly so, numbers of enemy fighters. You are correct in saying that one-on-one, the Daffy would have a hard time against a Bf 109, but in the right hands it proved itself a worthy opponent against single-seat fighters as witnessed between 264 Sqn's sqn ldr Philip Hunter, who carried out a mock dog fight with Bob Stanford Tuck in a Spitfire. Tuck had a hard time staying on Hunter's tail.

You also have to remember the Defiant was designed as a bomber interceptor, not as a fighter-versus-fighter aircraft and it proved itself effectively in this role as Britain's premier night fighter from late 1940 to mid '42. As with the Battle after its showing over France, there would be no way that the RAF would deploy the type on day ops after the Battle of Britain; any deployment overseas would have been as a night fighter.


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## RCAFson (Sep 7, 2012)

nuuumannn said:


> That's because the Hudson was designed as a naval strike aircraft and was kitted out for maritime ops, the Battle wasn't. Similarities in bomb load has nothing to do with it. Why are you comparing the Hudson and Battle? They were totally different aircraft operated by different commands using different tactics. The Battle was not at any stage in its career used for maritime patrol nor anti-shipping strike. Its bomber career ended in 1940 and continued in service for second line duties only from then on, finally being officially declared obsolete in these roles in 1944.
> 
> As for Blenheims, they _were_ available _in numbers _in 1941 and were still operating in front line squadrons. In the Far East the following bomber squadrons operated Blenheim IVs; 11, 34, 39, 45, 60, 84, 113 and 211. Blenheim V units in the Far East were 34, 42 and 113. This list covers the duration of the war, bearing in mind that the Blenheim V did not enter service (firstly in North Africa) until November 1942. Yes, they were committed in large numbers (that's what I meant when I say 'available') at that time, remember the Blenheim was in service at home in Fighter, Bomber and Coastal Commands and in North Africa and the Middle and Far East as fighters, bombers and army co-operation aircraft. Blenheims served on every front in every theatre the RAF was engaged in throughout the war, despite having been superceded in key roles by more suitable aircraft.
> 
> The Battle _was_ a level bomber, as dive bombing wasn't RAF doctrine it was expected to fulfil the role of a level bomber with the capability for dive bombing. The spec to which it was built was P.27/32; this spec was produced as a replacement for the Hart and Hind bombers and also as insurance against the Geneva Convention banning heavy bombers. Even if it was capable of dive bombing or not, it doesn't change the situation in the Far East. The same as what happened over France to the Battle would have happened over Singapore too.



The Hudson was a hurriedly converted civil aircraft design:



> The Hudson's ancestry may be traced back to the Lockheed's Model 10 Electra, a ten-passenger civil airliner which first flew on 23 February, 1934. Designed by Hall Hibbard, Richard von Hake, Lloyd Stearman, and Clarence "Kelly" Johnson, this was Lockheed's first twin engine aircraft. It was Johnson's idea to adopt the twin tail configuration, which would be a Lockheed trademark for many years. Lockheed built 148 production Electras (plus the prototype), the most famous of which was flown almost around the world by Amelia Earhart. An interesting development of the Model 10 was the XC-35, which flew with a pressurized cabin in 1937.
> 
> The Model 10 was the immediate parent of the somewhat smaller Model 12 Electra Junior, a six-passenger executive transport. Lockheed built 114 examples of the Model 12 and 16 of a bomber version for the Netherlands East Indies. The latter aircraft later saw combat against the Japanese in late 1941 and early 1942. The Model 12 also served as military cargo aircraft and two, one purchased by France and one by Britain, served as clandestine photo-reconnaissance aircraft over Germany, Italy, and North Africa before the war.
> 
> ...



The Battle wasn't used where it should have been where air and ground defenses were less dense than in France, and was used when it was obviously faced with a task that no other contemporary strike aircraft could have done either; its failure was not a failure of the aircraft but of tactics and doctrine. The Battle was used for coastal patrol prior to being withdrawn entirely.


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## RCAFson (Sep 7, 2012)

stona said:


> You need a lot of aircraft to stand any chance of sinking ships. One of the Luftwaffe's most successful attacks during the Kanalkamf was on convoy CW9 on 8/8/40. This was caried out with the Ju 87 which most would concede to be be one of the best and accurate dive bombers of the era,flown by well trained and experienced crews.
> After piecemeal attacks in the morning it took two attacks by 57 and then 82 Stukas,heavily escorted by Bf 109s and Bf 110s to do the damage. In the end 7 of the eighteen freighters were sunk and only 4 were left undamaged. They limped into Weymouth,recent home of the Olympic sailing regatta.
> That's 139 dive bombers ( I don't know how many actually pressed home an attack) and about 100 escort fighters (50 on each wave) to sink 7 freighters slowly butting there way up the English Channel,virtually within sight of the Luftwaffe bases.
> 
> Steve



This actually points out the ineffectiveness of the Luftwaffe against targets defended by the RN and how much they feared RN AA. TheLuftwaffe seemed to require huge numbers of sorties to accomplish sinkings, when the ships were defended by an RN escort.
OTOH, the Battles proved that they would press their attacks home, even against suicidal concentrations of FLAK. I would submit that equal numbers of Battles flown by RAF aircrew would have wiped out the convoy.


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## stona (Sep 7, 2012)

The convoy was shepherded by RN vessels but was essentially protected by the RAF. The morning attacks were driven off by the RAF fighters. The first of the two afternoon attacks occurred off St Catherine's Point (Southern tip of the Isle of Wight) and was initiated by Bf 109s who quickly destroyed the protective barrage balloons. They were followed by the Ju 87s who had a relatively clear run at the ships.

Arthur Hague,aboard Borealis,recalled

"Under a hail of incendiary bullets the Borealis' balloon disintegrated in flames. Then,out of the sun,roared a flight of Ju 87 dive bombers."

The arriving RAF fighters (Hurricanes from three squadrons,Spitfires from one) were engaged by the escort as they tried to intervene. There were around 150 aircraft involved in the melee which lasted about twenty minutes.

I don't think it reflects particularly on the RN's defensive fire but rather the relative inaccuracy of even the best dive bomber. It is often said that the Ju 87 could put a bomb in a 30m circle,near enough 100',which given data from later allied efforts seems optimistic but we'll go with that. Presumably this was in in ideal conditions and with noone,on ships or in enemy aircraft,shooting at it.

The targets in that convoy would typically be less than 250' long and, more importantly, have a beam of under 50'. Not such an easy proposition,even in perfect conditions.

Steve


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## parsifal (Sep 7, 2012)

There was at least an equivalent of the battle in the MTO, and it didnt do wellat all. im thinking of the breda BA64 and 65. originally designed as a mixed fighter-bomber it was fairly easy meat for RAF fighters. Many in fact were grounded for lack of spares and captured during the British countetroffensive (or more correctly destroyed by the retreating italians).


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## Shortround6 (Sep 7, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> The Hudson was a hurriedly converted civil aircraft design:



True but it tuned out pretty well for 1938 design. It was upgraded to the Ventura. Of note is that it was the fist plane built in quantity to use the Fowler flap. 

That said it was probably a lousy design in 1943. 

See: Flap (aircraft) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Wing design was under going major changes in mid to late 30s. 





RCAFson said:


> The Battle wasn't used where it should have been where air and ground defenses were less dense than in France, and was used when it was obviously faced with a task that no other contemporary strike aircraft could have done either; its failure was not a failure of the aircraft but of tactics and doctrine. The Battle was used for coastal patrol prior to being withdrawn entirely.



The "density" of the air defense in France may be somewhat over blown. It was now where near what it would be one to two years later on most fronts the Germans fought in.

As for being used for coastal patrol??? Sure it was.

In 1939 Coastal command had 10 Squadrons of Ansons, 2 squadrons of Vildebeests, 2 of Hudsons, 3 of Sunderlands and 3 of Supermarine Biplane flying boats plus 3 squadrons equipped with mixtures of aircraft for training and AA co-operation. 19 service squadrons total and 4 for training.
By Nov 1940 there were 28 service squadrons and and 8 training squadrons. One squadron of Battles is stationed in Iceland. Ansons are on the way out.


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## RCAFson (Sep 7, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> The "density" of the air defense in France may be somewhat over blown. It was now where near what it would be one to two years later on most fronts the Germans fought in.
> 
> As for being used for coastal patrol??? Sure it was.
> 
> ...






German Flak:





The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West, p180. Also note the overwhelming Luftwaffe fighter superiority.
About a 1/4 of the Flak guns were 88mm, the rest were mainly 20mm and 37mm AAA.



> Three squadrons of Battles were used on coastal patrol duties, Nos. 88 and 226 Squadrons from Belfast and No. 98 Squadron from Iceland. These squadrons retained their Battles for most of 1941 – at this period Coastal Command often had to make do with whatever aircraft could be spared.
> Fairey Battle


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## stona (Sep 8, 2012)

Battles were not retained for "most of 1941". 98 squadrons were the last to go and were classed as non-operational on 9th June 1941 according to the squadrons records. This was the day after they received their first Hurricanes,so they seem keen to get rid of them! They did fly them a little longer but they were flown to Rekyavik and dismantled for shipping during July.
They were not based in Rekyavik either but infact at Kaldadarness with flights detached to the Northern airfields at Melgerdi and Akureyri.

88 squadron traded their Battles for Bostons in December 1940/January 1941. They were the first RAF squadron to adopt this type.

226 Squadron traded their Battles in for Blenheims in February 1941.

Cheers

Steve


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## Wingspanner (Dec 30, 2012)

If the Defiant was acknowledged to have been a capable bomber destroyer (in the absense of manoeverable fighter opposition), then I've always thought that a trick was missed not swapping them for the Hurricanes and Spits in the Northern sector during the BoB. THAT might have been a much more efficient usage of airframes - send the hurris and spits to where numbers were short - and send the Defiants north where they would have had no troubles against the bombers (northern targets esp. on the east coat being well out of range of the 109s)


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## Aozora (Dec 31, 2012)

Regarding the Battles: had they been available in Malaya or the NEI they probably wouldn't have made much of a difference; however they would probably have been better that the 
_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lOz_i_2USkY_ "A shallower dive is actually better than a vertical dive for practical purposes..." Best normal dive angle 65-70 degrees.
Waay back in the thread there was some comment about 
_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7HxDQdIZYoE_...some fancy flying for the cameras.


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## Wingspanner (Dec 31, 2012)

Well, IIRC, the Vildebeeste was primarily a torpedo bomber - but perhaps the best way of taking this speculative thought forward regarding whether the Battle would have been more survivable/effective is to simply compare its performance stats with that of the Vilderbeeste. Next question is to ask what the Battle's primary opposition's performance was and then to look to see if any improvement would have probably translated into lower losses/greater effectiveness. To start the ball rolling - 

Data from Vickers Aircraft since 1908[28]

General characteristics

Crew: three, pilot, navigator, and observer
Length: 36 ft 8 in (11.18 m)
Wingspan: 49 ft 0 in (14.94 m)
Height: 14 ft 8 in (4.47 m)
Wing area: 728 ft² (67.7 m²)
Empty weight: 4,773 lb (2,170 kg)
Loaded weight: 8,500 lb (3,864 kg)
Powerplant: 1 × Bristol Pegasus II-M3 air-cooled radial engine, 635 hp (474 kW)

Performance

Maximum speed: 143 mph (124 knots, 230 km/h)
Range: 1,250 mi (1,090 nmi, 2,010 km)
Service ceiling: 19,000 ft (5,800 m)
Rate of climb: 630 ft/min (3.2 m/s)
Wing loading: 11.7 lb/ft² (57.1 kg/m²)
Power/mass: 0.075 hp/lb (0.122 kW/kg)

Armament

Guns: 1 × fixed, forward-firing .303 in (7.7 mm) Vickers machine gun and 1 × flexible, rearward-firing .303 in (7.7 mm) Lewis Gun
Bombs: 1,100 lb (500 kg) of bombs or 1 × 18 in (457 mm) torpedo

Versus - 

Data from Fairey Aircraft since 1915[31]

General characteristics

Crew: 3
Length: 42 ft 4 in (12.91 m)
Wingspan: 54 ft 0 in (16.46 m)
Height: 15 ft 6 in (4.72 m)
Wing area: 422 ft² (39.2 m²)
Empty weight: 6,647 lb (3,015 kg)
Loaded weight: 10,792 lb (4,895 kg)
Powerplant: 1 × Rolls-Royce Merlin II liquid-cooled V12 engine, 1,030 hp (768 kW)

Performance

Maximum speed: 257 mph (223 kn, 413 km/h) at 15,000 ft (4,600 m)
Range: 1,000 mi (870 nmi, 1,610 km)
Service ceiling: 25,000 ft (7,620 m)
Climb to 5,000 ft (1,520 m): 4 min 6 sec

Armament

Guns:
1× .303 in (7.7 mm) Browning machine gun in starboard wing
1× .303 in (7.7 mm) Vickers K machine gun in rear cabin
Bombs:
4× 250 lb (110 kg) bombs internally
500 lb (230 kg) of bombs externally

... a speed improvement of 100mph would surely help in terms of presenting a more difficult intercept by Jap fighters, surely?


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## buffnut453 (Dec 31, 2012)

More speed is not necessarily a good thing. There are accounts where aircraft like the Swordfish flew too slowly to be effectively engaged. Now, this obviously wasn't the case at Endau with the Vildebeest but I rather doubt that the Battle would have fared any better.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 31, 2012)

Speed helps if the margin of speed between the fighter and the bomber is close. 

Say a 300mph fighter and a 200mph bomber and a 250mph bomber. The 250mph bomber is harder to intercept in that the fighter is gaining at less than one mile per minute. If it starts 20 miles behind the bomber it will take 24 minutes to catch the bomber and cover about 120 miles while doing so. a 270mph bomber is an even harder target. Depending on fuel state the fighter may run out of fuel before intercept or be limited in the attacks it can make. 
The 200mph bomber can be caught in 12 minutes and in 60 miles with a much larger amount of fuel remaining for the fighter. 
A 120mph bomber can be caught even quicker but once the fighter has a large margin of speed over the bomber the "safety" more speed brings (120mph vs 180-200mph) doesn't really buy much. 

Battles cruised at 180-200mph. Running at high speed could burn fuel at 2-3 times the cruise rate.


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## RCAFson (Dec 31, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> More speed is not necessarily a good thing. There are accounts where aircraft like the Swordfish flew too slowly to be effectively engaged. Now, this obviously wasn't the case at Endau with the Vildebeest but I rather doubt that the Battle would have fared any better.


 
Really? You don't think that an aircraft that's 100mph faster would be more survivable? Many of the IJN/IJAAF fighters were older models like the A5M that had only a modest speed advantage over a Battle, so that there would be fewer interceptions and interception speed versus target speed would be much lower allowing the rear gunner a much better target. Mathematically, the Battle should be much more survivable.


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## buffnut453 (Dec 31, 2012)

All depends what it's going up against and the tactical situation at the time. RCAFSon, you're assuming a rear attack by the Japanese fighters which, I'll accept, a Battle would probably be more survivable because the tail-chase would be harder for the Japanese fighters. That said, a daylight raid like the one on Endau where 2 formations were thrown into the assault and the Japanese were able to attack on the route into the target, I don't see the Battle as being any more survivable. Like I said, all depends on the situation at the time.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 31, 2012)

MAX speed for the Fairey Battle was 257mph at 15,000ft. 240mph at 10,000ft and 210mph at sea level. 

The Max Speed for the Vildebeest may have been at around 5000-6500ft. 

The Battle may not have been able to sustain those speeds ( for more than 5 minutes?) while the Vildebeest may have. Older engine/propeller combinations were rated at a constant power and not 5 minute or 30 minute ratings.


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## RCAFson (Dec 31, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> MAX speed for the Fairey Battle was 257mph at 15,000ft. 240mph at 10,000ft and 210mph at sea level.
> 
> The Max Speed for the Vildebeest may have been at around 5000-6500ft.
> 
> The Battle may not have been able to sustain those speeds ( for more than 5 minutes?) while the Vildebeest may have. Older engine/propeller combinations were rated at a constant power and not 5 minute or 30 minute ratings.



The speeds given are for a loaded Battle with 6.25lb boost. Using 100 octane fuel and 12lb boost, the Battle would be ~20mph faster under 10,000ft, and probably another 10mph more after bomb release.

However, the same logic holds true for the A5M, which for the A5M4 meant a combat speed rating of 273 mph at 10,000ft, so slower at higher and lower altitudes.

This site:
http://pwencycl.kgbudge.com/A/5/A5M_Claude.htm
gives the following A5M4 speeds: 

236 mph (380 km/h) at sea level
248 mph (400 km/h) at 3280 feet (1000 meters)
270 mph (435 km/h) at 9845 feet (3000 meters)
265 mph (426 km/h) at 10,140 feet (3090 meters)

Of course -4 made up only a proportion of all A5Ms, and the older variants were somewhat slower.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 31, 2012)

Would it be correct to say that Battle would be for Claude Nate what was the Mossie for LW day fighters? Defiant an even tougher catch?


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## Aozora (Dec 31, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> All depends what it's going up against and the tactical situation at the time. RCAFSon, you're assuming a rear attack by the Japanese fighters which, I'll accept, a Battle would probably be more survivable because the tail-chase would be harder for the Japanese fighters. That said, a daylight raid like the one on Endau where 2 formations were thrown into the assault and the Japanese were able to attack on the route into the target, I don't see the Battle as being any more survivable. Like I said, all depends on the situation at the time.


 
Reading "Bloody Shambles" the Battle would have been a much better, more survivable aircraft in this situation:

1) The Buffaloes were at a big disadvantage trying to escort the Vildebeest - they had to slow down and circle at low altitudes to try and keep the Vildebeest in sight, thus wasting fuel and being dragged down to speeds and altitudes where they were more vulnerable. The Battle had a cruising speed that was about 50 mph higher than the maximum speed of the biplane, and could cruise at higher altitudes. Less time on target approach, less time spent on withdrawal.

2) Against the Vildebeest and, to a lesser extent, the Albacore, the Japanese fighters had all the advantages of attacking slow moving targets - they could spend plenty of time lining up the targets and could attack from any direction, mainly from above, plus they had time to attack several times over. With a formation of Battles cruising at 200 mph + or withdrawing at, say, 240 mph they would have been drawn into a stern chase without a great deal of speed advantage, if any at all. 

3) The aircraft that inflicted the most damage on the Japanese ships off Endau were Hudsons, which also took part in the attacks.


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## parsifal (Jan 1, 2013)

Any additional speed in a bomber is an advantage. If the fighter has an endurance of say 4 hours, thats 2 hours on the out trip, and 2 hoursw return. I will assume the bomber can maximise the intercpt angle for the fighter. If the Fighter has a cruise speed of say 250 mph, and the bomber at say 200 mph, the fighter can only comence its interception at a maximimum of about 150 miles, allowing for manouvering to achieve a firing solution and increased fuel consumption whilst in combat. 

If the bomber has a cruise speed of say 240mph, the fighter really can only catch the bomber if using some of its boost. This will greatly reduce the combat times and interception ranges. 

People often look at the top speed of a mosquito....which could be as low as 360mp, and think "an me109 can go much faster than that!" True enough, but the Mossie can cruise at 320 mph fully loaded (roughly), which makes the 109 very short legged, and usually unable to catch the Mossie. Same principal; applies to all bombers. For the fighters attempting to intercept fuel management can be a deciding issue.

At sea during the Soviet invaasion of Afghanistan, we were often confronted with Soviet Tu95s with stand off weaponary. Our fighters were a good 250 mph faster than the bears, but catching them was hard because of the engine management issues. We had to have our fighters at the 300 KM line to counter stand off launches (none were ever made thankfully), but our pilots could not use full throttle if they wanted to get home in one piece. Same principal applies during the war.


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## buffnut453 (Jan 1, 2013)

Speed is an advantage if there isn't much to choose between the speed of the bomber and the speed of the fighter. However, the wider the difference between the 2, the less benefit you get from increasing the speed of the bomber. In the late 1960s, a series of trials were flown where Lightnings tried to intercept one of the last airworthy Spitfires. There were concerns that the Lightnings might have to take on, IIRC, the Indonesian Air Force which was still equipped with P-51s and so a Griffon-engined Spit was a pretty good substitute to see how the Lightning coped with such a slow target...and the answer was, they really struggled. The Spit was just too slow. Now, I'm not saying that the speed differential between a Vildebeest and, say, a Ki-27 was of that order of magnitude but I do wonder if the slower, more agile (from an instantaneous turn perspective) capabilities of the 'Beest might not offset some of the potential benefits that a faster bomber, like a Battle, might bring.


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## tomo pauk (Jan 2, 2013)

I'm not sure how healthy is for any bomber to engage in a dogfight. That means an automatic mission kill for the bomber, since it will discard it's bombs/rockets/torpedoes. Against a bomber that tries to dogfight, the fighter can enter into boom'n'zoom game. It also presents an opportunity for other fighters to gang up vs. bomber.
Yet another thing is training skill - not many of bomber pilots were that good to dogfight vs. a decent fighter jock. Despite the valiant deeds of Swede Vejtasa. Putting the pedal to the metal was far easier to do beneficial, providing the bomber can fly fast.


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## buffnut453 (Jan 2, 2013)

Tomo,

I'm not suggesting a bomber pilot engage in dogfighting, I'm simply suggesting that pilots would use the capabilities of the aircraft they're flying to best effect to carry out their mission and hopefully survive. If a slow, relatively agile biplane can turn or jink quickly, it makes a more difficult target for any attacking fighter.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 2, 2013)

The Cruise speed of the Battle was 180-200mph. We know it's top speeds. We may not know it's Max continuous speed, Speed it maintain for 30 minutes or so. This is not only governed by fuel consumption but by cooling. Singapore has an average high in the high 80s F. which is a bit more than the average July temp in southern England. Some Spitfires are noted for having marginal cooling for summer weather in England. Using higher than 6lbs boost on a Battle in the tropics _without_ modifications could be asking for trouble. 
Simply substituting Battles for Vildebeests on a one for one basis may have reduced the losses per mission a bit but would not have affected the campaign much at all. Reduced losses might have allowed one more mission to be flown.


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## Wingspanner (Jan 2, 2013)

> Some Spitfires are noted for having marginal cooling for summer weather in England.



On the ground running or when taxiing, _not_ when in the air as far as I've read.



> Using higher than 6lbs boost on a Battle in the tropics without modifications could be asking for trouble.



Most tropical modifications were to air-intakes and filters. Unless it was a blindingly hot day and the aircraft was operating on the deck, I doubt this was likely to have been a significant issue for this speculative scenario.



> If a slow, relatively agile biplane can turn or jink quickly, it makes a more difficult target for any attacking fighter.



True - but unless you have somewhere to hide (like the fjords as utilised by the Swordfish in Norway) - this will only temporarily delay the inevitable. Getting away is not the same as being able to turn inside someone a couple of times.

As for the other aircraft in this scenario, I'd rather fancy the chances of the humble Defiant against all but the zeke from this era. Any Jap aircraft tring to intercept is going to have a tiny to nil speed advantage - and given their light construction is going to be an easy and fragile target for the Defiant gunner: clawing slowly towards the target in s atright line is going to present him with a perfect opportunity. On the other hand, a Defiant attempting to intercept a Japanese fighter is going to have a much more difficult prospect however, as their far greater manoeverability would mean they can break off at will.


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## parsifal (Jan 2, 2013)

> As for the other aircraft in this scenario, I'd rather fancy the chances of the humble Defiant against all but the zeke from this era. Any Jap aircraft tring to intercept is going to have a tiny to nil speed advantage - and given their light construction is going to be an easy and fragile target for the Defiant gunner: clawing slowly towards the target in s atright line is going to present him with a perfect opportunity. On the other hand, a Defiant attempting to intercept a Japanese fighter is going to have a much more difficult prospect however, as their far greater manoeverability would mean they can break off at will


. 

Brave words in my opinion. Me 109s attacking Defiants were not armoured either, but were untroubled by Defiants (with some significant and heroic exceptions). Zeroes, Nicks, Oscars, and Tojos were all available (some in miniscule numbers) and were well capable of shooting Defiants down. Even Spits and hurricanes were hard pressed against the Japanese types....they were siply designed for a different enemy and environment. German fighters were energy fighters relying less on turning avility and more on speed, dive and climb. Spits were essentially a compromise, with some dive and some climb, and some turn ability. Japanese fighters excelled at the horizontal manouvre and the climb. They were ordinary in speed and generally poor in dive. How is the Definat going to do so well in those conditions. Possibly a dive, certainly not in a turning fight and not greatly so in a straight speed fight


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## Wingspanner (Jan 3, 2013)

Well, the discussion so far was based on what I understood was the main period opposition and the principal Jap fighter which hacked down the Vilderbeestes (though please correct if this earlier assumption is wrong).

The A5Ms capabilities were listed by RCAFson as:



> However, the same logic holds true for the A5M, which for the A5M4 meant a combat speed rating of 273 mph at 10,000ft, so slower at higher and lower altitudes.
> 
> This site:
> The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia: A5M "Claude", Japanese Carrier Fighter
> ...





> Me 109s attacking Defiants were not armoured either



109s WERE armoured by the time of BoB, were they not? Besides which, the A5m and contemporary Jap fighters were of far lighter construction than even 109s and lacked self sealing tanks to boot. 4 x 0303s in theory is going to be more than enough to swat them.

Looks again at the performance figures and then consider the engagement scenario. The failure of the Hurricanes against Japanese opposition came largely due to the fact that the Hurri didn't have a compelling tactical advantage - it had a little speed over the opposition - but that was basically it. It couldn't out-turn (though the pilots up to Singapore didn't realise that) - and due to its thick wing, couldn't dive away either, meaning pilots couldn't adopt zoom and boom tactics like the P40s. (see accounts in Hurricane the Last Witness by Brian Milton and Hurricanes in Sumatra by Terrence Kelly)

All a Defiant has to do is trundle at close to its best speed and tempt the Japanese on - which, given their tactical doctrine, is probably what they would have done. As you know from the 'heroic exceptions' - Defiants did great execution - even against 109s - when attacked from the rear quarter. Against a much slower, much more lightly constructed A5m, which has much lower fire-power to boot, I have no doubt they would have done even better... ESPECIALLY when the A5m has no speed advantage to force the belly or head-on attacks used later by the 109s. 109s had a 50mph+ speed advantage over Defiants. In our scenario here, Definats would appear to have an up to 50mph advantage over the A5m - and even if this performance was eroded by the fitting of Vokes filters etc, they would still have a significant speed advantage, even at the A5ms best rated alititude. Short of catching them with a height advantage, an intercepting A4m driver is going to have no option but to fly into the Defiant gunners cross hairs. 

So, the Defiant has the option of the dive which the Hurricane doesn't (as you can bet your bottom dollar that the weighty beast IS going to dive well) - and the opposition we're considering here has no speed advantage either. Given that it isn't going to even attempt a turning fight (why would a turret fighter even try to?!) it might actually seem to have some advantages. It would certainly have been a better option than Buffalos - and perhaps even in this environment, than Hurricanes. I'm not saying they would have ruled the skies by any exception - trundling along and downing attackers is NOT the same as winning air superiority, but they could have been a potentially difficult tactical proposition for period Japanese fighters.

Of course, if doctrine would allow them, the best option would have been for Japanese pilots to ignore them.


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## parsifal (Jan 3, 2013)

> Well, the discussion so far was based on what I understood was the main period opposition and the principal Jap fighter which hacked down the Vilderbeestes (though please correct if this earlier assumption is wrong.




Havent read the full thread, however over malaya there were no A5Ms (Claudes) deployed. The only Claudes I know of that were deployed were a few attached to Carrier Zuiho at the beginning of the war in the PI operations, and possibly a few at kwaj. AFAIK there were no Claudes in these areas. Against the poms in Malaya, the following types listed in numerical order of importance may have been present at some time or other

1) Ki27 Nate
2) Ki 43 Oscar
3) A6M Zero (and some doubt by some about that)
4) Ki44 Tojo (maybe, but even if so as prototypes only).




> 109s WERE armoured by the time of BoB, were they not?



It was being introduced from July. The main combats against the Defiants were over France some time earlier, and not all 109s were armoured by the time of the BoB. 




> Looks again at the performance figures and then consider the engagement scenario. The failure of the Hurricanes against Japanese opposition came largely due to the fact that the Hurri didn't have a compelling tactical advantage - it had a little speed over the opposition - but that was basically it.




They had a firepower advantage, and a dive advantage. The Japanese relied mostly on their Oscars to demolish the Hurricanes, which had very nearly the same speed as the Hurris. Incidentally the most common types of Hurris in late'41, early '432 were not the new Hurri II, they were still relying on clapped out Hurri Is. I dont know what the actual performance of these fighters were, but in '44, the long continuous offensive by the USN did not give their carrier wings any opprtunity to re-supply with new engines and the like. Consequently, the Americans were flying aircraft tyhat whilst theoretically were able to fly 370 mph, were actually just able to make 350mph. I would be surprised if the Hurris shipped out to the pacific were abale to fly faster than the oscars opposing them. 




> It couldn't out-turn (though the pilots up to Singapore didn't realise that) - and due to its thick wing, couldn't dive away either, meaning pilots couldn't adopt zoom and boom tactics like the P40s. (see accounts in Hurricane the Last Witness by Brian Milton and Hurricanes in Sumatra by Terrence Kelly)



Ive read those accounts, but I dont fully buy it. Over Burma, whilst the japanese still bested the later marks of hurricane (a somewhat unfair comparison, since by then, Hurricanes were being used as ground attack aircraft), Hurricanes did use diving as a means of outrunning Japanese aircraft. 



> All a Defiant has to do is trundle at close to its best speed and tempt the Japanese on - which, given their tactical doctrine, is probably what they would have done. As you know from the 'heroic exceptions' - Defiants did great execution - even against 109s - when attacked from the rear quarter.



One of the best ways of getting your a/c shot out from under you is to "trundle along" in a straight predictable speed. And thats basically what a definat had to do with the armament it was carrying. In the Pacific, with tropical conditions, it is not going to exceed 300mph IMO. And it will not be going flat knacker when jumped by Japanese fighters. And the Japanese pilots at that stage of the war displayed exceptional initiative and skill. Plus they studied the outcomes of battles in Europe with a great deal of interest. if the Definat was deployed into the TO in any numbers, you cannot count on the japanese not being aware of how to deal with it. Rule number 1 in combat. Assume your opponent knows all about your mount, and will fly to the best possible advantage 



> Against a much slower, much more lightly constructed A5m, which has much lower fire-power to boot, I have no doubt they would have done even better... ESPECIALLY when the A5m has no speed advantage to force the belly or head-on attacks used later by the 109s.




Im not sure why a comparison between the by then obsolescent claudes and the still in production Defiants is all that valid. Not sure the RAF would risk Defiants in daylight combat again anyway, when the Defiants niche was as a NF anyway. Against the Defiant it was far more likley that it would encounter Oscars which did by far the lions share of fighting over Malaya (at least in an offensive role), and possibly against Nates. Hurricaners even struggled against Nates. If the Nates are flying defensively, that will mean the Defiants are flying escort, and that means they will be tied to 150 mph bombers. If I were the Japanese, knowing I was flying against Defiants, and knowing its weknesses, I would direct my Nates to attempt to engage from below......get the height, then dive to a point below and finally engage the formation in a rapid climbing fight. 




> 109s had a 50mph+ speed advantage over Defiants. In our scenario here, Definats would appear to have an up to 50mph advantage over the A5m - and even if this performance was eroded by the fitting of Vokes filters etc, they would still have a significant speed advantage,



Nope, not necessarily. In a defensive fighter only situation, the Definats might have a 15-30mph disadavantage compared to the Oscar. In an offensive role, the Defiant would be tied to an escort role, meaning it might have a 100-150 mph disadvantage against a fast moving Nate. if the Nate had the altitude advantage, the speed advantage might be closer to 200mph




> So, the Defiant has the option of the dive which the Hurricane doesn't (as you can bet your bottom dollar that the weighty beast IS going to dive well) - and the opposition we're considering here has no speed advantage either. Given that it isn't going to even attempt a turning fight (why would a turret fighter even try to?!) it might actually seem to have some advantages.



Hardly, in comparison to th hurricane. Therere were good reasons why the Defiant was withdrawn from daylight operations, and the Hurri was not. Nothing would be substantially different in the Pacific. 



> It would certainly have been a better option than Buffalos - and perhaps even in this environment, than Hurricanes.



Buffnut would disagree with you on that.....Buffaloes I was surprised to learn actually did quite well considering the difficulties they were placed under. I dont see any different outcome arising from the deployment of a Defiant inplace of say Hurricanes and Buffaloes> The allies were not defeated because of their equipment. They were defeated because of other factors. 



> I'm not saying they would have ruled the skies by any exception - trundling along and downing attackers is NOT the same as winning air superiority, but they could have been a potentially difficult tactical proposition for period Japanese fighters.



If they were, they would have been the only Allied fighters apart from the F4F that was able to do that. a tall ask indeed. 



> Of course, if doctrine would allow them, the best option would have been for Japanese pilots to ignore them


.

Nope the best option for the Japanese would be to shoot them down, as they did with just about every allied aircraft type at that time


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## Glider (Jan 4, 2013)

I have been trying to think of somewhere where the Defiant and the Battle would have improved our chances and all I can come up with is in 1941 when the Iraq airbase at RAF Habbaniya was attacked. The Battle must be better than the Oxfords used as bombers and the Defiant at least as good as whatever they used (until some Hurricanes arrived)


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## buffnut453 (Jan 4, 2013)

They used Gladiators so perhaps the Defiant wasn't any better. Certainly armament was the same, the Gladiator being more manoeuverable.


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## Glider (Jan 5, 2013)

Gladiator or Defiant, close call. Possibly the Defiant just if only as it was a bit faster than the opposition and better protected.

Another option would be the very first days in the desert. The first RAAF fighter unit even had some Gauntlets.


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## VinceReeves (Feb 5, 2013)

I haven't read through the whole thread, but has anyone considered using the Battle as a torpedo bomber, which is the type it most resembles?

It offered quite a performance improvement over, for example, the TBD, so slinging a torpedo underneath it shouldn't be impossible.

A land-based torpedo bomber at Singapore or Ceylon would be quite useful. The Battle had good range and endurance. Also, it didn't look unlike a B5N, so if the red of the roundels was enlarged a bit, it might be able to sneak through Japanese CAPS.

With it's good range and endurance, I'm surprised the Battle wasn't used for maritime patrol more generally. The one place it was used, Iceland, had the most hostile environment.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 5, 2013)

In order to have good TO power, maybe it would need the Merlin X or XX. Some undercarriage strengthening would come in nice, too.


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## VinceReeves (Feb 5, 2013)

Maybe. I think the max. take-off load for the Battle was 1500lb. (4 x 250lb. int. + 2 x 250lb. ext.), so a 1600lb torpedo shouldn't be too much of an extra burden for the undercarriage. TO power would have been better than for a TBD, though with a proportionately higher TO weight. Also Merlins could get a bit wheezy in hot climes.

I'm not expert enough to give a solid opinion if an engine or u/c upgrade would be necessary, really.

In a general non-torpedo maritime role, think it wouldn't need an upgrade: 4 x 250lb Depth charges or 6 x 100lb. A/S bombs are no problem for it. Should be a good ditcher with those big wings. Can't think why they didn't use it for the jobs the Botha was intended for....


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## RCAFson (Feb 5, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Havent read the full thread, however over malaya there were no A5Ms (Claudes) deployed. The only Claudes I know of that were deployed were a few attached to Carrier Zuiho at the beginning of the war in the PI operations, and possibly a few at kwaj. AFAIK there were no Claudes in these areas. Against the poms in Malaya, the following types listed in numerical order of importance may have been present at some time or other
> 
> 1) Ki27 Nate
> 2) Ki 43 Oscar
> ...



There was a squadron of A5Ms based in Indochina but the Ki-27 has only marginally better performance than the A5M.


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## buffnut453 (Feb 5, 2013)

I don't think there's any evidence that the A5Ms were used operationally during the Malayan Campaign. Most likely they were used for local airfield defence over Saigon where they were based.


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## tomo pauk (May 30, 2013)

Guess I'm about to dust off another thread 

Looking at the take off power available for the Battle, the mere 880 HP are obviously a major shortcoming for a bomber airplane. Eg, the Ju-87B (with Jumo-211B) have had 1200 HP for take off (max bomb load being the 1000 kg bomb IIRC, with reduced fuel), 1340 was available for the Ju-87D with Jumo-211F (1800 kg bomb, also with reduced fuel?). Hence we might take a look at another early war possibilities, both for Merlin line of engines and another plausible power plants (those at another post; all at take-off ratings):
-Merlin VIII, used on Fulmar I, 1080 HP
-Merlin XII, for Spit II, 1175 HP (+12 psi)
-Merlin X, ??? HP
-Merlin XX, 1280 HP

A torpedo-armed Battle?


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## RCAFson (May 30, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> Guess I'm about to dust off another thread
> 
> Looking at the take off power available for the Battle, the mere 880 HP are obviously a major shortcoming for a bomber airplane. Eg, the Ju-87B (with Jumo-211B) have had 1200 HP for take off (max bomb load being the 1000 kg bomb IIRC, with reduced fuel), 1340 was available for the Ju-87D with Jumo-211F (1800 kg bomb, also with reduced fuel?). Hence we might take a look at another early war possibilities, both for Merlin line of engines and another plausible power plants (those at another post; all at take-off ratings):
> -Merlin VIII, used on Fulmar I, 1080 HP
> ...



The Merlin II/III could do somewhat better with 100 octane fuel and was rated for 12lb boost at TO for about 1200hp.
The Merlin VIII was rated at 1275hp with 100 octane. The Merlin XXX (1360hp) was also a good candidate.


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## tomo pauk (May 30, 2013)

Those are the values I was able to positively pin-point (found at Williams' site). Any source for you data?
Merlin 30 could be stated as mid-war engine, though.


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## Shortround6 (May 30, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> The Merlin II/III could do somewhat better with 100 octane fuel and was rated for 12lb boost at TO for about 1200hp.
> The Merlin VIII was rated at 1275hp with 100 octane. The Merlin XXX (1360hp) was also a good candidate.



You do NOT want to be using the 12lb boost rating for take-off on a regular basis with an early Merlin. EACH and EVERY use of the boost override switch had to noted in the log book for the engineering officer to determine any extra maintenance procedures (changing plugs and oil inspections) and shortened time between overhauls. 
If you had to use it on an existing airplane under bad conditions that is one thing, PLANNING to use it on a routine basis on a NEW variant of aircraft is poor planing. 

1200hp is also a bit optimistic for take-off. 

The R.M.S. 2 specification ( none produced ) called for 1000hp at 3000rpm at 8 1/4lbs boost with 100 octane using the same supercharger gear as the Merlin III. 

Please note that there was a bit of strengthening going on even with some of the Merlins that came right after the MK III, VIII and X. The Early Merlins were still restricted to 2600 rpm amd 4-6 lbs for climb while the slightly later ones were allowed to use 2850 rpm and 9 lbs boost for climb. 

The Merlin VIII was good for 1080hp at 5 3/4 lbs for take-off on 87 octane. 

The Merlin XII was rated at 1175hp for take off at 12 1/2 lbs boost. at some point in their production both the VIII and the XII got stiffened side panels to the crankcases, longer cylinder stud bosses, longer cylinder studs, the cylinder spigots were made slightly longer amongest a few other modifications.


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## pattle (May 30, 2013)

Blenheims were used by both the RAF and Hellenic Air Force against the Italians in the Greco Italian war and were found to be vulnerable against Italian CR42's. The Greeks at this time had in their small air force a squadron of Fairey Battles but only used them on targets where fighter opposition was not expected to be present. The Greeks realised that if the Blenheim was vulnerable to CR42's then the Battle had no chance, and so even as desperate as the Greeks were for aircraft they still didn't resort to using the Battle against defended targets. The Fairey Battle was used in the Italian East African Campaign along with a number of other obsolete types but again it was not risked against fighters. So if you ask me using the Battle against a Japanese fleet sounds like a recipe for disaster, look at what happened to the Devastator and remember the lack of success gained by the Italians when they attempted using small bombs against ships, even if the Battle was able to get through the fighters and massive AA barrage then it still wouldn't have caused much damage. 
As for the Defiant, well the Defiant was just a bad idea. Fighters attack other fighters from behind not by getting alongside of them and to add to this in a single seat fighter the pilot is the gunner and not his chauffeur and so uses the whole aircraft to aim his guns without relying on instruction. The success of the Defiant as a day fighter was only due to Me 109 pilots attacking them from behind after mistaking them for Spitfires and Hurricanes, as soon as the Luftwaffe realised this mistake they only had to attack them head on to shoot them all down. As a night fighter four rifle calibre machine guns was not really enough against large aircraft such as German bombers and again you didn't really want to have get along side them to shoot at them, especially close enough to use 33 cals.


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## RCAFson (May 30, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> You do NOT want to be using the 12lb boost rating for take-off on a regular basis with an early Merlin. EACH and EVERY use of the boost override switch had to noted in the log book for the engineering officer to determine any extra maintenance procedures (changing plugs and oil inspections) and shortened time between overhauls.
> If you had to use it on an existing airplane under bad conditions that is one thing, PLANNING to use it on a routine basis on a NEW variant of aircraft is poor planing.
> 
> 1200hp is also a bit optimistic for take-off.
> ...



The Fulmar pilot's notes states that with 100 octane fuel 9 lb boost could be used for TO using the Merlin VIII. In a separate paragraph it states that use of the boost cut-out may be used at low altitude for more power, but on those occasions it must be logged.

Harvey-Bailey gives 1275hp at SL with 9lb boost with 100 octane. He also states that the R.M.4.M was the 100 octane version of the Merlin VIII, but was otherwise identical, and that it had a 1300hp TO rating at 9.75lb boost and became redundent when the VIII was cleared for 100 octane.


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