# Arc Light One



## Zipper730 (Nov 23, 2018)

I read a book called Arc Light One, by Don Harten, who flew B-52's, F-105's later on, and the F-111's. 

The title of the mission was the operation he was involved with: Initially, it called for a low altitude raid on Phuc Yen by 30 x B-52F's operating out of Andersen AFB. The aircraft would fly along the coast at low-altitude; then pass over Hanoi, and bomb Phuc-Yen into a moonscape; then cruise back to Anderson.

The mission was shelved and instead, the B-52's would be used to attack troop-strongholds in the jungle's of North Vietnam. This mission would be flown at altitude (30,000 feet), but the mission included an atypical refueling, radio-silence, precise time requirements to refuel with the tanker, and a massive typhoon (Dinah) that was basically pulling them along at a higher than normal ground-speed. There also was a problem with one aircraft having a bomb/nav malfunction, requiring aircraft 1 & 2 in the formation to switch places.

The higher ground-speed would place them on the tanker too early, so they did a 360, and it was a bit wider than needed, and they crashed into an aircraft in the cell behind them. The collision sheared off part of the B-52's wing causing it to go out of control, and several crew-members (including Harten) ejected. Ultimately 8 people died, and to make it worse, the rescue aircraft also sprung a leak, attempted to take off, and crashed (they were ultimately rescued by a ship nearby).

While many of SAC's actions in Vietnam were fairly badly executed, this one actually seemed to decently well thought out, as initially planned. Phuc Yen was one of North Vietnam's best airfield's and would have thrown a monkey-wrench into much of the plans the North Vietnamese had in mind.

My guess was there was some kind of concern about killing Russian military advisors or drawing China into the conflict: I'm not sure that was really a case because

The Chinese did not have a mutual-defense pact with North Vietnam
We could always claim we didn't know there were Russian advisors at the base: It sounds silly, but they weren't supposed to be there anyway...

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## tyrodtom (Nov 23, 2018)

Did China have a mutual defense treaty with North Korea when they crossed the Yalu ? Do you really think it would make a difference ?

There were more nations than just Russia and China with personnel in North Vietnam, and why shouldn't they be there ? We never declared war on North Vietnam.

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## GrauGeist (Nov 24, 2018)

Quite a number of nations were involved with North Vietnam, aside from China and the Soviet Union, there were local Asian outfits like Cambodia, North Korea and neighboring communists groups along with several Warsaw pact nations and Cuba.

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## tyrodtom (Nov 24, 2018)

Not just communist aligned nations had personnel in North Vietnam, but French and Japanese nationals were present, I've heard of a few from Ireland too.. 
Doctors, sanitation engineers, agriculture experts, etc.
Doctors Without Borders wasn't formed till the early 70s, but there were plenty of people, or small organizations, performing a similar service before that.

A lot of the rest of the world didn't have the same viewpoint of the war as the US government. 
We saw it as protecting South Vietnam from North Vietnam's aggression.
A lot of the rest of the world saw it as the US trying to impose it's will on one side of a civil war.

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## Zipper730 (Nov 25, 2018)

tyrodtom said:


> Did China have a mutual defense treaty with North Korea when they crossed the Yalu?


I don't know


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## GrauGeist (Nov 25, 2018)

Many people also fail to realize that the war in Vietnam wasn't started by the U.S. but


tyrodtom said:


> Not just communist aligned nations had personnel in North Vietnam, but French and Japanese nationals were present, I've heard of a few from Ireland too..
> Doctors, sanitation engineers, agriculture experts, etc.
> Doctors Without Borders wasn't formed till the early 70s, but there were plenty of people, or small organizations, performing a similar service before that.
> 
> ...


And the vast majority of modern history ignores the fact that the Vietnam war was a result of the Viet Mihn defending French Indo-China from France trying to take back their former colony after WWII.
Ho Chi Mihn and his cohorts were trained guerilla fighters to cause damage to Imperial Japanese occupation. They used their tactics well in trying to retain their homeland later against the French.
Korea, French Indo-China, Burma and other asian countries all became a hotbed of communist insurgencies in the vacuum left by the withdrawel of Imperial Japanese forces...

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## mikewint (Nov 25, 2018)

POST WORLD WAR II VIETNAM
The causes of the Vietnam War trace their roots back to the end of World War II. A French colony, Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, & Cambodia) had been occupied by the Japanese during the war. In 1941, a Vietnamese nationalist movement, the Viet Minh, was formed by Ho Chi Minh to resist the occupiers. A communist, Ho Chi Minh waged a guerilla war against the Japanese with the support of the United States.
Near the end of the war, the Japanese began to promote Vietnamese nationalism and ultimately granted the country nominal independence. On August 14, 1945, Ho Chi Minh launched the August Revolution which effectively saw the Viet Minh take control of the country.

Following the Japanese defeat, the Allied Powers decided that the region should remain under French control. As France lacked the troops to retake the area, Nationalist Chinese forces occupied the north while the British landed in the south. Disarming the Japanese, the British used the surrendered weapons to rearm French forces that had been interned during the war. Under pressure from the Soviet Union, Ho Chi Minh sough to negotiate with the French who desired to retake possession of their colony. Their entrance into Vietnam was only permitted by the Viet Minh after assurances had been given that the country would gain independence as part of the French Union.
Discussions soon broke down between the two parties and in December 1946, the French shelled the city of Haiphong and forcibly reentered the capital, Hanoi.
These actions began a conflict between the French and the Viet Minh known as the First Indochina War. Fought mainly in North Vietnam, this conflict began as a low level, rural guerilla war as Viet Minh forces conducted hit and run attacks on the French.

In 1949, fighting escalated as Chinese communist forces reached the northern border of Vietnam and opened a pipeline of military supplies to the Viet Minh. Increasingly well-equipped, the Viet Minh began more direct engagement against the enemy and the conflict ended when the French were decisively defeated at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. The war was ultimately settled by the Geneva Accords of 1954, which temporarily partitioned the country at the 17th parallel, with the Viet Minh in control of the north and a non-communist state to be formed in the south under Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem. This division was to last until 1956, when national elections would be held to decide the future of the nation.

THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT
Initially, the United States had little interest in Vietnam and Southeast Asia, however as it became clear that the post-World War II world would be dominated by the US and its allies and the Soviet Union and theirs, isolating communist movements took an increased importance. These concerns were ultimately formed into the doctrine of containment and domino theory. First spelled out 1947, containment identified that the goal of Communism was to spread to capitalist states and that the only way to stop it was to “contain” it within its present borders.
Springing from containment was the concept of domino theory which stated that if one state in a region were to fall to Communism, then the surrounding states would inevitably fall as well. These concepts were to dominate and guide US foreign policy for much of the Cold War.

In 1950, to combat the spread of Communism, the United States began supplying the French military in Vietnam with advisors and funding its efforts against the “red” Viet Minh. This aid nearly extended to direct intervention in 1954 when the use of American forces to relieve Dien Bien Phu was discussed at length. Indirect efforts continued in 1956, when advisors were provided to train the army of the new Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) with the goal of creating a force capable of resisting Communist aggression. Despite their best efforts, the quality of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was to remain consistently poor throughout its existence.

THE DIEM REGIME
A year after the Geneva Accords, Prime Minister Diem commenced a “Denounce the Communists” campaign in the south. Throughout the summer of 1955, communists and other opposition members were jailed and executed. In addition to attacking the communists, the Roman Catholic Diem assaulted Buddhist sects and organized crime, which further alienated the largely Buddhist Vietnamese people and eroded his support. In the course of his purges, it is estimated that Diem has up to 12,000 opponents executed and as many as 40,000 jailed. To further cement his power, Diem rigged a referendum on the future of the country in October 1955 and declared the formation of the Republic of Vietnam, with its capital at Saigon.

Despite this, the US actively supported the Diem regime as a buttress against Ho Chi Minh’s communist forces in the north. In 1957, a low-level guerrilla movement began to emerge in the south, conducted by Viet Minh units that had not returned north after the accords. Two years later, these groups successfully pressured Ho’s government into issuing a secret resolution calling for an armed struggle in the south. Military supplies began to flow into the south along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the following year the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (Viet Cong) was formed to carry out the fight.

FAILURE AND DEPOSING DIEM
The situation in South Vietnam continued to deteriorate with corruption rife throughout the Diem government and the ARVN unable to effectively combat the Viet Cong. In 1961, the newly elected Kennedy Administration promised more aid and additional money, weapons, and supplies were sent with little effect. Discussions then began in Washington regarding the need to force a regime change in Saigon. This was accomplished on November 2, 1963, when the CIA aided a group of ARVN officers to overthrow and kill Diem. His death led to period of political instability that saw the rise and fall of a succession of military governments. To help deal with the post-coup chaos, Kennedy increased the number of US advisors in South Vietnam to 16,000.
With Kennedy's death later that same month, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson ascended to the presidency and reiterated the US' commitment to fighting communism in the region.

The Vietnam war escalation began with the Gulf of Tonkin incident. On August 2, 1964, USS Maddox, an American destroyer, was attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin by three North Vietnamese torpedo boats while conducting an intelligence mission. A second attack seemed have occurred two days later, though the reports were sketchy (It now appears that there was no second attack). This second “attack” led to US air strikes against North Vietnam and the passage of the Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin) Resolution by Congress.
This resolution permitted the president to conduct military operations in the region without a formal declaration of war and became the legal justification for escalating the conflict.

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## mikewint (Nov 25, 2018)

A word about Dien Bien Phu. Its purpose was to cut off Viet Minh supply lines into the neighboring Kingdom of Laos, a French ally, and tactically draw the Viet Minh into a major confrontation that would cripple them. It was an “airhead”, that is a fortified position supplied by air. As such its position at the bottom of a valley surrounded by high hills was not considered a problem by the French commanders. The establishment of such “airheads” was based upon the French experience at Na San in Nov – Dec 1952. The Na San airhead had been repeatedly attacked by the Viet Minh forces who had suffered very heavy losses inflicted by superior French artillery, armor, and air support.

The French had made three serious errors: One, at Na San the French artillery had full control of the high ground with overwhelming force. None of the French commanders believed that the Viet Minh had heavy artillery let alone a 4:1 advantage nor that it was possible to move and emplace such artillery through the heavy jungle. Two, the Viet Minh had not been prepared to attack a fortified base like Na San and simply used “human wave” tactics. At Dien Bien Phu they (Viet Minh) spent months preparing. They stockpiled ammo and food, emplaced heavy artillery and anti-aircraft guns on the hilltops around Dien, Viet Minh spies had entered the French camp and located all of its gun emplacements. The French on the other hand knew nothing about the Viet Minh emplacements or even how many. Third, at Na San, the Viet Minh had few anti-aircraft guns and air re-supply had not been interdicted. At Dien, massed anti-aircraft fire quickly shut down the airfield and made re-supply almost impossible.

In short, the French superiority complex had led them into the always fatal mistake of underestimating your enemy

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## tyrodtom (Nov 25, 2018)

Zipper730 said:


> I don't know


 One would think that you would have researched that before putting forth your theory that the lack of a mutual defense treaty between North Vietnam and China meant China would not enter the Vietnam war in a more active posture.


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## mikewint (Nov 25, 2018)

There is new evidence from China that suggests that Mao was seriously prepared to intervene. There was a secret agreement between Hanoi and Beijing that if the Americans launched a ground invasion of North Vietnam (at that time, the United States had restricted itself to a bombing campaign), China would send ground troops into North Vietnam and would not allow the United States to defeat Hanoi. If the Americans bombed North Vietnam, China would match the American military action by taking measures to protect North Vietnamese cities and to rebuild roads and bridges. They would also send anti-aircraft artillery units and army engineers to support North Vietnamese troops and help them deal with the air bombing pressure.

In China, Mao was making preparations in anticipation of war with the United States. He relocated industries, universities, and research institutions in the coastal areas of eastern China to the mountainous areas of southwest China. He ordered his people to build anti-air shelters throughout China.

Mao took the American escalation seriously; he interpreted it as a security threat. But he also believed that the success of North Vietnam had ideological significance. At that time Mao was criticizing the Soviet Union for not giving enough support to national liberation movements, for pursuing détente with the United States. Thus he hoped to use the Vietnam War as a way to embarrass Khrushchev.

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## fubar57 (Nov 25, 2018)

Not new, this from 1995. Skip down to pg 5. where, in 1965, China told North Vietnam they would come to its aid and how they would co-ordinate operations

http://www3.nccu.edu.tw/~lorenzo/Jian China Involvement Vietnam.pdf

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## Zipper730 (Nov 25, 2018)

tyrodtom said:


> One would think that you would have researched that before putting forth your theory that the lack of a mutual defense treaty between North Vietnam and China meant China would not enter the Vietnam war in a more active posture.


I didn't really give it much thought, I figured the Chinese did have such an agreement in place since the hordes plowed across the border by the hundreds of thousands.




mikewint said:


> There is new evidence from China that suggests that Mao was seriously prepared to intervene.


Another Korean War scenario, except the Chinese had nuclear weapons this time. I'm not sure how big these weapons were in scale (our early weapons were around 8900 - 10,300 pounds) and what aircraft were intended to deliver them at first (Tu-95 seems like an obvious candidate).


> There was a secret agreement between Hanoi and Beijing that if the Americans launched a ground invasion of North Vietnam (at that time, the United States had restricted itself to a bombing campaign), China would send ground troops into North Vietnam and would not allow the United States to defeat Hanoi.


When you say "not allow", I assume that means they'd do anything they could if the bombs started to hit Hanoi...


> In China, Mao was making preparations in anticipation of war with the United States. He relocated industries, universities, and research institutions in the coastal areas of eastern China to the mountainous areas of southwest China. He ordered his people to build anti-air shelters throughout China.


This kind of came out of the recesses of my memory from years ago -- he seemed pretty gung-ho about nuclear war.


> At that time Mao was criticizing the Soviet Union for not giving enough support to national liberation movements, for pursuing détente with the United States. Thus he hoped to use the Vietnam War as a way to embarrass Khrushchev.


Is this why things reached such an extreme level of hostility?

I'm curious what the intelligence services and military knew about China-Soviet relations, and what they told the President?



fubar57 said:


> Not new, this from 1995. Skip down to pg 5. where, in 1965, China told North Vietnam they would come to its aid and how they would co-ordinate operations


Yikes...


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## Zipper730 (Nov 25, 2018)

mikewint said:


> the CIA aided a group of ARVN officers to overthrow and kill Diem


I thought Diem's death was caused from within? If the CIA did play a role, then it seems they went outside Kennedy's orders. It's not a surprise admittedly...

As for the Gulf of Tonkin -- the second attack never occurred and Johnson knew it on the day it happened. Even the Captain told Johnson that no battle occurred and the combination of weather and the ship's acoustical signature produced the predicament


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## tyrodtom (Nov 25, 2018)

The Chinese tested their first nuke in late 64.
How long it took for them to make them into a form that could be used as a weapon, I don't know. 
They were more on their own as the 60's developed, them and the Russians were having border skirmishes in the late 60s.
Sorta doubtful the Soviets would have helped China develop weapons that could be used against themselves.


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## GrauGeist (Nov 26, 2018)

Yeah, in the 60's, China and the Soviet Union were actually in a shooting war along the Amur river - the two regimes were not on speaking terms in any sense of the word.

And those border skirmishes damn-near escalated into a full-blown war.


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## Zipper730 (Nov 26, 2018)

tyrodtom said:


> The Chinese tested their first nuke in late 64.


The weapon was a tower-test, but the first nuke was based on the tower-test article in May 1965. The aircraft that dropped it was a Hong-6 (H-6?) which was a Tu-16 clone.


> How long it took for them to make them into a form that could be used as a weapon, I don't know.


What's more a question is how quickly could they crank them out...


> They were more on their own as the 60's developed, them and the Russians were having border skirmishes in the late 60s.


When did the US realize the USSR & China were negatively relating with each other? Did the President of the US know this? Would the USSR have come to PRC's aid if we did attack them?


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## GrauGeist (Nov 26, 2018)

Zipper730 said:


> When did the US realize the USSR & China were negatively relating with each other? Did the President of the US know this? Would the USSR have come to PRC's aid if we did attack them?


I'm sure the President and JCoS had good intel regarding the heightened tensions between the Soviet Union and China and to be honest, at that point in time, if the U.S. and China got into a shooting war, the Soviet Union may have just sat back and let China take a beating. Doing this would have allowed the SU to solve their border issue while at the same time, reinforce the SU's position as a dominant power in the region after the dust settled.


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## Dimlee (Nov 26, 2018)

Back to original topic. 
Many thanks to Zipper730 for mentioning this book.
I just noticed that there is Kindle version on Amazon. Will look into free sample and will buy if it's interesting.

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## mikewint (Nov 26, 2018)

In 1984 the New York Times published recently declassified documents outlining the Eisenhower's Administrations plans to use atomic bombs in North Korea and in Communist China in 1953, if necessary, to end the Korean War.
Once the armistice was achieved, on July 27, 1953, the Eisenhower Administration continued to define plans to use nuclear weapons if the Communists renewed the war.

The fact that the Eisenhower Administration was ready to use nuclear weapons is not new. President Eisenhower, in his memoirs, said he came into office prepared to use them, if necessary, to break the deadlock. What is new in the 2,000 pages of documents now made public is the high level of planning and the detail of discussion on possible use of these weapons, and Mr. Eisenhower's interest in overcoming reluctance to use them. He indicated a readiness to use the weapons rather than face another debilitating war in Korea, according to a report of a National Security Council meeting on Dec. 3, 1953.

The discussion about the possible use of nuclear weapons in Korea was followed by a policy of threatening to use such weapons in case of a large-scale attack by the Soviet Union. There was also discussion in 1954 of possible American nuclear support to aid French forces besieged at Dien Bien Phu in the war that ended French rule in North Vietnam.
On Korea, President Eisenhower asked Adm. Arthur W. Radford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the December 1953 meeting whether he agreed that there would be a war with China if South Korea were attacked anew.
Admiral Radford said he did and added, ''We would have to strike against the Communist Chinese in the air, from Shanghai all the way north.''

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who agreed that the United States should not shrink from using atomic weapons, nevertheless was alarmed at the recommendation. Dulles Favored Limited Use
According to the record of the meeting, Mr. Dulles felt that ''Admiral Radford's course of action contemplated general war with China and probably also with the Soviet Union because of the Sino-Soviet alliance.''
Mr. Dulles said the State Department preferred to limit a nuclear attack to North Korea and to nearby troop concentrations. He also said he could accept a naval blockade of China and seizure of offshore islands.
His concern, he said, was not just that the Russians might enter the war, but that American allies would not support the United States.
Eventually, on Jan. 7, 1954, the State Department and the Joint Chiefs compromised by saying that in case of a resumption of hostilities, the United States should undertake ''offensive air operations employing atomic weapons against military targets in Korea, and against those military targets in Manchuria and China which are being used by the Communists in direct support of their operations in Korea.

The nuclear issue arose twice in the Eisenhower Administration, the documents show. The first time was when Mr. Eisenhower, elected in 1952 on a pledge of ending the Korean War, expressed frustration at the drawn-out negotiations over a prisoner exchange, which, in turn, had delayed agreement on an armistice.

At a National Security Council meeting on Feb. 11, 1953, the record shows, Mr. Eisenhower, then in office less than a month, agreed with Mr. Dulles that ''we could not go on the way we were indefinitely.''
On March 27, 1953, at a subsequent meeting, they agreed ''that somehow or other the taboo which surrounds the use of atomic weapons would have to be destroyed''.
''While Secretary Dulles admitted that in the present state of world opinion, we could not use an A-bomb, we should make every effort now to dissipate this feeling,'' it says.

By May 13, 1953, the National Security Council was discussing a memorandum, designated NSC 147, which outlined six choices for ending military restraints, several of which involved ending the ban on bombing raids against China and increasing air attacks on North Korea.
Several military men said they saw no particular tactical value in using atomic weapons in North Korea.
Gen. J. Lawton Collins, the Army Chief of Staff, said:
''Personally, I am very skeptical about the value of using atomic weapons tactically in Korea. The Communists are dug into positions in depth over a front of 150 miles.''
He added that nuclear tests ''proved that men can be very close to the explosion and not be hurt if they are well dug in.''
President Eisenhower said he ''thought it might be cheaper, dollar-wise, to use atomic weapons in Korea than to continue to use conventional weapons against the dugouts which honeycombed the hills along which the enemy forces were presently deployed.''
By the summer of 1953, the terms for the armistice and return of prisoners were worked out, over the objections of President Syngman Rhee of South Korea, who opposed a truce. Mr. Rhee so antagonized American leaders that a plan called ''Ever Ready'' was drawn up to arrest him if he started trouble.

After the armistice went into effect, in July, American planners began to study a response to a possible resumption of hostilities.
There was concern, extending into the 1960's, that if a war was going to break out, it was likely to occur in the Far East involving China. The United States was drawn into Vietnam in part to contain China.

Although planning has changed through the years, the United States still maintains 40,000 troops in South Korea, and they have nuclear arms. American officials have said that in case of an all-out attack from North Korea, the United States retains the right to use nuclear weapons in defense.


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## GrauGeist (Nov 26, 2018)

On 29 Jauary 1955, congress passed a resoultion that authorized the use of force against China if they persisted in their attacks against Taiwan. It was after this, that Dulles announced in a public address that the use of nuclear weapons were being considered.
Eisenhower was having plans drawn up that following March designed to eliminate China's ability to wage war, but soon after (April), China backed down and wanted to negotiate.

So the prospect of nuclear war with the U.S. seemed to have changed Mao's mind.


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## mikewint (Nov 26, 2018)

Zipper730 said:


> While many of SAC's actions in Vietnam were fairly badly executed, this one actually seemed to decently well thought out, as initially planned.


As with all thing Vietnam warish: Sorta - Kinda:
On 15 June, VC forces were discovered near Ben Cat at a regional headquarters 10 miles north of Saigon, and a raid was scheduled for 18 June. Johnson, fearing negative world reaction from the use of the B-52s, demanded assurance that no civilian areas would be hit during the raid. Ambassador Maxwell Taylor instructed Brig Gen George Simler, chief of Operations, 2d Air Division (AD), to accompany the mission in a C-123 Provider to guarantee tight command and control so no bombs would accidentally fall on nearby villages. Plans called for 30 B-52Fs of the 7th BW and 320th BW to launch from Guam at 0100 hours, rendezvous for aerial refueling over Luzon, Philippines, and meet over the target at 0730 hours. There were 10 three-aircraft cells; 24 planes carried fifty one 750 lb bombs, while six carried 1,000 armor-piercing bombs. Things began as planned, but tailwinds from a typhoon in the eastern Pacific pushed the bombers ahead of schedule. When the first cell banked 360 degrees to slow for the arrival of the refuellers, they ran into the path of the second cell in the dark skies over the South China Sea. Two planes collided and crashed into the sea. Eight crew members perished, while the four survivors and one body were recovered. Only 27 of the bombers refueled. The 28th bomber, with a broken hydraulic pump and radar, landed in Okinawa. The remaining bombers crossed the Vietnamese coast at 0630 hours and dropped their first bombs 15 minutes later from about 20,000 feet. Guiding off a beacon placed in the area the night before, they bombed a one-by-two-mile target box with 1,300 bombs. Half the bombs hit inside the box. They then flew south to avoid the Cambodian border, and near Saigon they turned east toward Guam. One bomber was forced to land at Clark AB, Philippines, because of electrical problems. The last bomber landed exactly 13 hours after the first one had departed. *Shortly after the raid, three US-led 36-man Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) reconnaissance teams inspected the area and found no enemy bodies and little damage to the camp area*. Later, MACV discovered that the VC had fled on a tip from a spy in the local ARVN unit.

By spring 1966 President Johnson had become less concerned with the negative impact of the B-52s on public opinion, believing they were effectively curtailing enemy infiltration and hurting enemy morale in South Vietnam. Adm U. S. G. Sharp—commander in chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC)— was given approval for target designation. Instead of facilitating use of the powerful B-52 weapon, the new policy only compounded tensions between airmen and their Army and Navy counterparts. Airmen had been upset that Army ground commanders were ordering a strategic bomber ever into a ground support role, but now to have a naval officer pick targets was simply unbearable. Target restrictions and lack of target flexibility was nothing new for airmen; to them it had always been an annoying feature of Rolling Thunder. In the case of Rolling Thunder, the restrictions and target approvals came directly from the White House, thus reducing target value and increasing response time. While General Westmoreland was pleased with the new Arc Light policies, Westmoreland’s direct control over these strategic air assets caused Gen William W. “Spike” Momyer, Seventh Air Force commander, to worry openly that the entire process not only violated the basic concept of a separate strategic and tactical air force run by airmen trained in such combat but that “Westmoreland’s employment of the B-52s as long range artillery to suppress ‘what may or may not be suspected concentrations or supply areas’ was questionable and relatively ineffective.” Momyer wanted to use the B-52s against specific targets, reserving just two squadrons to fly approximately 150 sorties each month, while using tactical aircraft to strike enemy concentrations. This disagreement came about partly because *no one had any hard evidence regarding how effective US air forces were; since there were no “quantifiable assessments, each general adopted a position that fit his preconception of the role of airpower.” *Normal Air Force intelligence and data collection were all but completely absent during the Vietnam War. In previous wars the Air Force had kept a data catalogue for airmen to use in planning operations. They did not do so in SEA until 1968 during the Tet Offensive and siege at Khe Sanh. Their lack of ability to select ground targets or use their assets in close air support (CAS) roles also meant that it was all but impossible to commit reconnaissance assets to establish the effectiveness of Arc Light or any other raids in Vietnam. In the words of World War II Lt Gen Elwood R. Quesada—USAF, retired—after returning from a special fact-finding tour of Vietnam in early 1966. In his evaluation of the use of airpower (especially B-52s) in Vietnam he declared, “Our effort in Vietnam . . . to me as far as air power was concerned was a little bit of what I used to refer to as operational masturbation. *I have always felt that the B-52s were to a large extent bombing forests* . . . It was just clear to me that tactical airpower as being exercised in that theater was the product of the Army and Army thinking.”
One of the main reasons B-52s had to do the job normally reserved for tactical air assets was that most tactical assets were being used in Operation Rolling Thunder. Another reason was the lack of fighters of the kind needed (ones that flew lower and slower) to carry out CAS or other important tactical roles, especially in the South. Tactical weapons development and fighter pilot training had reduced the US fighter advantage in all areas, especially air-to-air combat. Dr. Futrell observed that, “It was tragic irony that the air war in SEA would necessitate an agonizing relearning process and a hurried adaptation of weapon systems back into an arena thought to have been eliminated [conventional tactical fighter operations].” The numbers show just how far the US fell between Korea and Vietnam. During World War II, the best figures available indicate that in Europe 7,422 enemy fighters were shot down while the US lost 1,691, a ratio of 4.4:1. In Korea, the numbers were 874 to 122, or a ratio of 7.2:1. In Vietnam, the North lost 195 fighters—139 to Air Force fighters and 56 to Navy fighters—while the US lost 61 Air Force fighters and 16 Navy fighters, totaling 77. The ratio was 2.53:1. The numbers changed once better aircraft, antiradar jammers, and targeting systems like Teaball were employed. After 1972, the ratio reached 5:1, with better training also making a big difference.

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## Zipper730 (Nov 27, 2018)

GrauGeist said:


> I'm sure the President and JCoS had good intel regarding the heightened tensions between the Soviet Union and China


One would think, but when it came to that period -- you had people keeping secrets from each other and withholding stuff now and then.


> If the U.S. and China got into a shooting war, the Soviet Union may have just sat back and let China take a beating


It would be logical to assume that our side would have realized that after China got battered into the stone-age, the USSR might be emboldened to assert it's dominance and face nuclear war over it?



Dimlee said:


> Many thanks to Zipper730 for mentioning this book


I would suggest you get a version called "Collision over Vietnam" same author. It's more recent and has more pages in it.

The author has made a few errors about the origin of SAC (LeMay didn't create SAC, for example), but much of the rest was definitely accurate over the mission planning and execution...


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## Zipper730 (Nov 27, 2018)

tyrodtom said:


> Not just communist aligned nations had personnel in North Vietnam, but French and Japanese nationals were present, I've heard of a few from Ireland too..
> Doctors, sanitation engineers, agriculture experts, etc.


Fascinating...


> A lot of the rest of the world didn't have the same viewpoint of the war as the US government.
> We saw it as protecting South Vietnam from North Vietnam's aggression.
> A lot of the rest of the world saw it as the US trying to impose it's will on one side of a civil war.


It was, in a way, both...



mikewint"President Eisenhower said:


> On 29 Jauary 1955, congress passed a resoultion that authorized the use of force against China if they persisted in their attacks against Taiwan. It was after this, that Dulles announced in a public address that the use of nuclear weapons were being considered. . . So the prospect of nuclear war with the U.S. seemed to have changed Mao's mind.


He seemed to become more aggressive by 1964...


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## GrauGeist (Nov 27, 2018)

Zipper730 said:


> One would think, but when it came to that period -- you had people keeping secrets from each other and withholding stuff now and then.


The U.S. had a good picture of what was going on.



Zipper730 said:


> It would be logical to assume that our side would have realized that after China got battered into the stone-age, the USSR might be emboldened to assert it's dominance and face nuclear war over it?


The Soviet Union would have been a contender, but aside from a few hardware designs that proved on a par with Western equipment, they were roughly 20 years behind the west - that in itself would be the basis for a long and interesting thread.


Zipper730 said:


> He seemed to become more aggressive by 1964...


Chairman Mao knew that China was playing hard catch up in the late 50's. His military had been bled in Korea, his series of purges and mass civilian relocations had caused a great deal of disarray internally and his industrial base took a while to get things moving foreward.
After Eisenhower was no longer President, several cold-war leaders thought they had an edge with this young "nobody" Kennedy, so they tested the waters and found out he was not one to fool with - but they tried.

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## Zipper730 (Nov 28, 2018)

GrauGeist said:


> The U.S. had a good picture of what was going on.


That's good to know


> The Soviet Union would have been a contender, but aside from a few hardware designs that proved on a par with Western equipment, they were roughly 20 years behind the west - that in itself would be the basis for a long and interesting thread.


It actually is...


> Chairman Mao knew that China was playing hard catch up in the late 50's. His military had been bled in Korea, his series of purges and mass civilian relocations had caused a great deal of disarray internally and his industrial base took a while to get things moving foreward.
> After Eisenhower was no longer President, several cold-war leaders thought they had an edge with this young "nobody" Kennedy, so they tested the waters and found out he was not one to fool with - but they tried.


Supposedly the Communists understood the Republicans very easy, but not democrats.


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## Zipper730 (May 6, 2021)

I actually forgot about this thread.


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## Zipper730 (May 7, 2021)

This is a video from a B-52 the Don Harten (Lt. Col., USAF, Ret.) was involved in the mid-air collision during the Arc Light 1 mission: I'm not sure if all his conclusions are right based on what was said throughout the discussions here (particularly the part about Russia cheering us on during the February to June 1965 period), but it's an interesting speech.



It's been awhile since I've visited this thread, but looking at Vietnam, there were a bunch of overarching themes that had taken hold, and these are probably over-summarized, (and I'm willing to stand corrected if I'm wrong), but listed for brevity...

1. Distrust of The JCS: President Johnson seemed concerned about the JCS (probably LeMay in particular) being overeager to escalate the war, expanding into China, with a seeming lack of concern about the possibility that this could lead to nuclear war. While he might not have been as cosmopolitan as Kennedy, he did know about the Mukden Incident, which served as a pretext for invading Manchuria in 1931, and might have felt that the JCS would be looking for any excuse to expand the conflict's scale.​​While I'm not sure what the prospects for Soviet intervention actually were, it's possible that Johnson might have seen their attitude as cavalier. If the attitudes of the intelligence agencies didn't line up with each other and/or the JCS, I could imagine that would only create more distrust over the matter.​​2. Concern of the war expanding: It seemed that there were basically several concerns about the expansion of the war​​a. Chinese Intervention: The Chinese could send hordes of people across the border and cause mayhem. I'm not sure if there was any discussion as to the possibility that they could stir up trouble in Korea (after all, the war never didn't "end" with a peace treaty, but an armistice), or something else.​​b. Soviet Responses: Would they come to the Chinese aid if we attacked China?​
3. Concern of public outrage over the War: Johnson had apparently criticized a General who pointed out his idea went against air-power doctrines that generally called for massive force applied with surprise, and consistency, rather than piecemeal application that would waste time, money, and lives. He basically told the General that he wanted to hammer North Vietnam while simultaneously convincing the American public that he wouldn't be expanding the war.​​4. Quantity and Proficiency in Conventional Warfare: I'm not sure how large our conventional stockpile was by 1964-65 compared to the Korean War, but there were numerous cases where there were arms shortages. Additionally, it seemed there was just a lot of personnel who didn't seem to understand the nuances of conventional warfare in the nuclear age.​​5. Lack of Creativity in Counter-Insurgency Operations: While that doesn't require much, there was some kind of idea that involved a General (Blackburn?) who wanted to train hatchet-forces. 

 mikewint
, mentioned this before, and it largely fell by the wayside because the Ambassador in Laos. Whether Mike explained this before or not, I'm not sure if this occurred during LBJ or JFK's time in office, and why Johnson didn't simply replace the Ambassador if he didn't comply with his demands.​​

 GrauGeist
& 
X
 XBe02Drvr
: Your thoughts?


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## Thumpalumpacus (May 7, 2021)

Zipper730 said:


> One would think, but when it came to that period -- you had people keeping secrets from each other and withholding stuff now and then.



By 1960-61, the split was public, with each nation verbally attacking the other at a conference in Bucharest in Nov 1960. By 1962, China had broken off diplomatic relations with the USSR.

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## Zipper730 (May 7, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> By 1960-61, the split was public, with each nation verbally attacking the other at a conference in Bucharest in Nov 1960. By 1962, China had broken off diplomatic relations with the USSR.


Okay, so there was a negative relationship with the USSR & China even prior to 1965?


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## Thumpalumpacus (May 7, 2021)

Zipper730 said:


> Okay, so there was a negative relationship with the USSR & China even prior to 1965?



Yes. I had to use Wiki to confirm the dates I remembered from classes, but it started unfolding in the late 50s and by 1962 was very big news. The Wiki article I used to confirm my remembered dates is a fairly concise and accurate article in my opinion. Even a broken clock, etc etc, heh.

Pertinent particularly to this thread is the following paragraph:



> Geopolitically, despite their querulous "Maoism vs. Marxism–Leninism" disputes about interpretations and practical applications of Marxism-Leninism, the USSR and the PRC advised, aided, and supplied North Vietnam during the Vietnam War, which Mao had defined as a peasant revolution against foreign imperialism. In socialist solidarity, the PRC allowed safe passage for the Soviet Union's _matériel_ to North Vietnam to prosecute the war against the US-sponsored Republic of South Vietnam.



So while they were having an open, public spat, both nations not only supported North Vietnam, China co-operated materially by allowing transit for Soviet arms.

As was noted above, it's complicated.

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## Zipper730 (May 7, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> So while they were having an open, public spat, both nations not only supported North Vietnam, China co-operated materially by allowing transit for Soviet arms.


So, there would have been a concern by some that the USSR would have joined in if the war was taken into China? Was it valid or not?


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## tyrodtom (May 7, 2021)

Zipper730 said:


> So, there would have been a concern by some that the USSR would have joined in if the war was taken into China? Was it valid or not?



There's no way to know what concerns are valid for a situation that never happened, is there ?

My take at the time was a lot of people in the military, and civilians, thought the rift between the USSR and China was all a charade put on to encourage the USA and NATO, etc, to lower their state of readiness. Just my opinion.

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## Thumpalumpacus (May 7, 2021)

Zipper730 said:


> So, there would have been a concern by some that the USSR would have joined in if the war was taken into China? Was it valid or not?



That's not my reading at all. I don't think either USSR or China wanted to be involved with boots, inside VN, or in an invasion of China. Nor do I think any American strategist thought going into southern China was a good idea. Probably because it ain't.

I think China was willing to support Vietnam for 1) Comintern optics of helping a peasant country out and 2) (and more importantly!) they once again did not want an American army up on their borders. North Vietnam meant something to them as a buffer state, just as DPRK did in 1950.

The USSR supported NVN because 1) they could show they were just as friendly as the Chinese, and 2) Vietnamese ports could prove useful, if the Soviets could extend their navy down there for power-politics purposes, not military purposes.

As happens many times in history, the interests of two nations overlap but do not coincide. So they set aside differences for each their own reasons, none of which had to do with actually deploying forces against Americans troops.

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## SaparotRob (May 7, 2021)

I've read (can't remember where) that North Vietnam wanted closer ties to the U.S.S.R than China. It was precisely because of the shared border with China. "Better to smell Russian stuff than to eat Chinese stuff". I was paraphrasing.


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## Thumpalumpacus (May 7, 2021)

SaparotRob said:


> I've read (can't remember where) that North Vietnam wanted closer ties to the U.S.S.R than China. It was precisely because of the shared border with China. "Better to smell Russian stuff than to eat Chinese stuff". I was paraphrasing.



I can imagine they'd feel that way, much like the Caribbean island-nations felt about us Americans after the Banana Wars, or Poland vis-a-vis Russia or Germany. It's pretty hard to trust the giant on your doorstep.

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## tyrodtom (May 7, 2021)

tyrodtom said:


> There's no way to know what concerns are valid for a situation that never happened, is there ?





Thumpalumpacus said:


> I can imagine they'd feel that way, much like the Caribbean island-nations felt about us Americans after the Banana Wars, or Poland vis-a-vis Russia or Germany. It's pretty hard to trust the giant on your doorstep.



We may forget Vietnam's history , but they don't .
They fought for independence from China several different times in their history.
They were more than just a little wary of China.
They'd never been invaded by Russia.

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## ThomasP (May 7, 2021)

China (like the USSR) wanted a buffer zone along its border, in order to help prevent being invaded again. China figured it was safe from invasion by anti-communist regimes via the overland routes through Russia, Manchuria, and through the Himalayas.

The Korean War was an attempt to remove one base (ie South Korea) from the equation, a route of invasion used by the Japanese before WWII.

After the Japanese occupied/invaded Indochina at the start of WWII, Japan used it for a base of operations that greatly increased their ability to prosecute the war against the forces of Mao, Chang, and Ho - to the point that it was feared that the Japanese would be able to cut off the resistance and destroy any major organized threat.

After WWII and the rearrangement of the bordering states, China realized that it was in the same position as before the war, but with a much bigger and more capable potential invader (ie the US and others).

The prevention of a US friendly state (ie a US puppet state) in Vietnam that could be used for operations and invasion of southern China (as Japan had used it in WWII) was of significant importance. At some point in the 1960s China made it quite clear to Johnson that a border state that was subservient to an openly declared enemy of communist China (the US) was not acceptable.

At some point during Operation Linebacker 2, it was communicated to Nixon (by our CIA and DIA) that North Vietnam would be out of AA missiles within a week, and only a little longer than 2 weeks to run out of AAA projectiles larger than 57mm. If this happened it was believed (with high confidence) that North Vietnam would have to surrender/sue for peace/? shortly there after.

The mining of the harbors (including the most recent mining of Haiphong) had stopped ~all resupply of heavy war materials. And by that point in time China was no longer allowing Russia to send material through China.

However, the unwillingness of China to accept a hostile border state was re-communicated to Nixon during the early seventies "most strongly", and it was believed by our intelligence agencies that China would most likely become a main actor in the war by invading North Vietnam.

This is most likely a basis for the ending of the war in the form that it took (ie the US sitting back and not supporting South Vietnam - in breach of promise - during North Vietnam's invasion of South Vietnam in 1975).

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## Thumpalumpacus (May 7, 2021)

tyrodtom said:


> We may forget Vietnam's history , but they don't .
> They fought for independence from China several different times in their history.
> They were more than just a little wary of China.
> They'd never been invaded by Russia.



It's very easy for us Americans to overlook that. We don't really understand what it means to live next to a giant, because we _are_ the giant, in our neck of the woods. We haven't suffered that sort of insecurity.

Vietnam and China were shooting at each other in late 78 -- early 79, and currently there are big problems looming with China's building artificial bases and claiming sovereign sea rights over fishing grounds. This history of distrust you lay out above is ongoing.

During the war, of course, they took help where they could get it.

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## SaparotRob (May 8, 2021)

I was following the conflict between China and Vietnam. I think Vietnam had to field reserve units against the PLA because the NVA ( was it still called that?) were in Cambodia.

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## Zipper730 (May 8, 2021)

tyrodtom said:


> There's no way to know what concerns are valid for a situation that never happened, is there?


I was curious what the JCS, intelligence guys, and the politicians thought at the time, and what was actually valid (we have the luxury of knowing things they didn't know back then).


> My take at the time was a lot of people in the military, and civilians, thought the rift between the USSR and China was all a charade put on to encourage the USA and NATO, etc, to lower their state of readiness. Just my opinion.


So a lot of people didn't believe the rift was all that serious, and if anything happened to China, the USSR would respond aggressively?



Thumpalumpacus said:


> That's not my reading at all. I don't think either USSR or China wanted to be involved with boots, inside VN, or in an invasion of China. Nor do I think any American strategist thought going into southern China was a good idea. Probably because it ain't.


General LeMay did want to take his B-52's into China to hammer Lop Nor.


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## Thumpalumpacus (May 8, 2021)

Zipper730 said:


> General LeMay did want to take his B-52's into China to hammer Lop Nor.



Yabut I specified "strategist", lol. LeMay was always a great example of Maslow's Hammer.

In seriousness, LeMay was pretty much alone in this wish of his you're reporting.

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## tyrodtom (May 8, 2021)

Zipper730 said:


> I was curious what the JCS, intelligence guys, and the politicians thought at the time, and what was actually valid (we have the luxury of knowing things they didn't know back then).
> So a lot of people didn't believe the rift was all that serious, and if anything happened to China, the USSR would respond aggressively?
> 
> General LeMay did want to take his B-52's into China to hammer Lop Nor.


 
The Chinese set off their first atomic bomb in 1964, their first hydrogen bomb in 67, LeMay retired in 1965.
I'm having a little trouble with your timeline.
What Lemay said once he was a civilian didn't have much importance.

I have no idea what the generals and such were talking about among themselves, that's private, and probably always will be. And memoirs written later tend to be a little revised and self serving.
I only know what was talked about by the troops around me, mostly enlisted, and lower ranking officers.


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## Zipper730 (May 8, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> Yabut I specified "strategist", lol. LeMay was always a great example of Maslow's Hammer.


I actually didn't know what the term meant, but it fits LeMay pretty well.

Considering Harten's comments about follow-up Arc Light sorties to include the possibility of Lop Nur, indicate that it might have been more prevalent in the USAF (SAC especially) than just LeMay.



tyrodtom said:


> The Chinese set off their first atomic bomb in 1964, their first hydrogen bomb in 67, LeMay retired in 1965.
> I'm having a little trouble with your timeline.


I'm just basing it on the supposed proposals for Arc Light, which involved attacks on Phuc Yen, followed by attacks on infrastructural targets, and Lop Nur was one idea as a target.

Didn't China have their first aerially-deliverable bomb by 1965?


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## Thumpalumpacus (May 8, 2021)

Zipper730 said:


> I actually didn't know what the term meant, but it fits LeMay pretty well.
> 
> Considering Harten's comments about follow-up Arc Light sorties to include the possibility of Lop Nur, indicate that it might have been more prevalent in the USAF (SAC especially) than just LeMay.
> 
> ...



I'm sure there were more than LeMay amongst the generals who were fire-breathing, so my statement about him being alone is probably not accurate. However, I don't think they really had access to policy at that time in order to bring such an operation within the realm of possibility.


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## Dimlee (May 8, 2021)

Zipper730 said:


> While I'm not sure what the prospects for Soviet intervention actually were,


Intervention was impossible. China was not friendly to the USSR anymore, Soviet Navy was not yet a "blue-water navy", there were no bases in the region. Moscow did have plans for Indonesia but after 1965 purges there was no chance for the military cooperation.

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## Zipper730 (May 8, 2021)

Dimlee said:


> Intervention was impossible. China was not friendly to the USSR anymore, Soviet Navy was not yet a "blue-water navy", there were no bases in the region. Moscow did have plans for Indonesia but after 1965 purges there was no chance for the military cooperation.


All of these facts were known to the United States? In particular, the Joint Chiefs, the Intelligence Agencies, the Department of Defense, and the President of the United States.


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## Thumpalumpacus (May 8, 2021)

Zipper730 said:


> All of these facts were known to the United States? In particular, the Joint Chiefs, the Intelligence Agencies, the Department of Defense, and the President of the United States.



As noted above, the Sino-Soviet split was public by 1962. And I don't think anyone was worried about Soviet blue-water capabilities.

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## Zipper730 (May 9, 2021)

Why was Johnson worried about public opinion about his actions in Vietnam? After the Gulf of Tonkin, he had large scale public support, right?


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## Thumpalumpacus (May 9, 2021)

Zipper730 said:


> Why was Johnson worried about public opinion about his actions in Vietnam? After the Gulf of Tonkin, he had large scale public support, right?



You have to remember that public opinion in America featured a sharp division. Many Americans were pro-involvement; many Americans were anti-involvement, and that sentiment grew as time went on.

That shift in public opinion eventually harmed his chances enough that he decided not to run for a second full term. 

By 1967, LBJ had had almost half-a-million troops deployed in-country, right as the shift in public opinion supporting the war fell below 50% (see table below). Once NVN launched Tet and Cronkite aired his special report, even many who supported our war effort were questioning it, and LBJ had likely lost any chance of re-election, hence his withdrawal from the race.






Digital History

Put graphically:





Gallup Polls #3 – US attitudes to the Vietnam War

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## SaparotRob (May 9, 2021)

I heard an interesting factoid about LBJ. As most of his male relatives died in their early 60's LBJ may have considered his own mortality as well and didn't want to die in office. I had to get this from some PBS (public broadcasting/ educational) channel.

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## Zipper730 (May 9, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> You have to remember that public opinion in America featured a sharp division. Many Americans were pro-involvement; many Americans were anti-involvement, and that sentiment grew as time went on.


It seemed the majority were pro-involvement all the way into early/mid-1966. I'm guessing the anti-war sentiment grew from the lack of progress/success and the media.

I'm not sure what Johnson was like as a person: Some described him as boorish, unscrupulous, and willing to do nearly anything to get what he wanted, yet he oversaw considerable positive changes (I don't want to touch that anymore since it might run afoul of the forum rules).

I'm curious if he was unusual in his concern for public opinion, and/or had irrational or _unusually_ irrational concerns about Vietnam spiraling out of control because, from what I've heard

There seemed to be little issue about the USSR joining in China's aid, even if they did send the hordes across the border like in the Korean War
Experiences in Korea seemed to indicate that, as long as we acted as if we didn't know that we killed Russian advisors at bases (much like how we didn't acknowledge the MiGs they flew were piloted by Russians), we'd probably avoid a major conflict.
Also, what was McNamara's attitude? I figure, if he didn't trust the JCS (fire-breathers), I figure he might have defaulted to him as the voice of reason.


> That shift in public opinion eventually harmed his chances enough that he decided not to run for a second full term.


Even if he ran and won a second term, I have a strong suspicion he wouldn't have made it through, as he had heart problems.

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## SaparotRob (May 9, 2021)

Full disclosure; I was always a fan of LBJ. I think of him as a tragic figure trying to push a positive agenda through while saddled with a war (police action?) he couldn't win.

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## Zipper730 (May 9, 2021)

SaparotRob said:


> I think of him as a tragic figure trying to push a positive agenda through while saddled with a war (police action?) he couldn't win.


Is that the problem? That he saw it as a "police action" rather than a war?

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## Thumpalumpacus (May 9, 2021)

Zipper730 said:


> I'm curious if he was unusual in his concern for public opinion, and/or had irrational or _unusually_ irrational concerns about Vietnam spiraling out of control because, from what I've heard
> 
> There seemed to be little issue about the USSR joining in China's aid, even if they did send the hordes across the border like in the Korean War
> Experiences in Korea seemed to indicate that, as long as we acted as if we didn't know that we killed Russian advisors at bases (much like how we didn't acknowledge the MiGs they flew were piloted by Russians), we'd probably avoid a major conflict.



He was no more nor less concerned about public opinion than any other American President, I reckon. What he was really concerned about was not getting bogged in a war with China, so that he could focus on his domestic agenda. The tragedy is that this caused him to pursue the war in a half-assed manner, which got us bogged down and prevented him focusing on his domestic agenda. The fact that the quagmire was in NVN and not PRC is almost irrelevant.

I doubt the USSR would have intervened conventionally in Vietnam. Once the Sino-Soviet breach happened, the USSR had no reasonable way of getting large numbers of troops and supplies to the theater without passing through waters controlled by America or China.




Zipper730 said:


> Also, what was McNamara's attitude? I figure, if he didn't trust the JCS (fire-breathers), I figure he might have defaulted to him as the voice of reason.



I know very little about McNamara, frankly. If he was the voice of reason, he was using inapt reasoning. While warfare is amenable to reason, it has its own logic and its own rationality that civilians may or may not understand. It seems to me he was one of those civilians who didn't understand .



Zipper730 said:


> Even if he ran and won a second term, I have a strong suspicion he wouldn't have made it through, as he had heart problems.



Quite possibly. He died in 1973, suffering two heart attacks before a third killed him. No doubt the stresses of the office would have added to his cardio issues.

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## SaparotRob (May 9, 2021)

No. I don't how the Vietnam war was classified. No declaration of war but it sure looked like one. LBJ was passionate about addressing social ills. This is from interviews of Doris Goodwin Kearns (Doris Kearns Goodwin?), an historian and biographer of LBJ who actually knew the President very well. He inherited a war from....well there are lots of fathers of this conflict, and did not want to go down in history as the first president in American history to lose a war.

I'm replying to post #53.

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## GrauGeist (May 9, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> I know very little about McNamara, frankly. If he was the voice of reason, he was using inapt reasoning. While warfare is amenable to reason, it has its own logic and its own rationality that civilians may or may not understand. It seems to me he was one of those civilians who didn't understand .


McNamara was a former Lt. Colonel with the USAAF, serving from 1940 through 1946 where he conducted analysis of bombing efficiency under LeMay, among other things.

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## Thumpalumpacus (May 9, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> McNamara was a former Lt. Colonel with the USAAF, serving from 1940 through 1946 where he conducted analysis of bombing efficiency under LeMay, among other things.



Thanks, bud. I will do some more reading on him to fill this hole in my knowledge.

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## ThomasP (May 9, 2021)

In the US it takes an act of Congress to officially declare war, and (by international law) war can only be declared on an actual sovereign nation. Although the US recognized the State of Vietnam as a sovereign nation in 1950, it was separated into North and South Vietnam in 1954. Since the US did not recognize North Vietnam as a sovereign nation we could not (legally) declare war on them. Note that a similar thing took place at the start of the Korean War.

The President on the other hand, may initiate war-like actions if it is felt that we are under attack or have been attacked, or attack is imminent.

The 1st attack in the Gulf of Tonkin incident took place well within what most nations considered its territorial waters, ie 12 nm. The 1st attack took place at about 8-9 nautical miles from the coast of North Vietnam. (North Vietnam claimed the same 12 nm limit as Vietnam had before the split. but since the US did not consider North Vietnam a sovereign nation it could not have any territorial waters rights.) The USS Maddox fired first when the NVN torpedo boats closed to with 10,000 yds. Subsequently, in the press releases and the information presented to Congress, it was stated that North Vietnam had previously claimed only a 5 nm limit, and that the NVN torpedo boats fired first. The movement of the USS Maddox was a part of numerous incursions/raids by the South into North Vietnam waters, and was intended to be a show of force and a chance to gather intel.

The President initiated military action after the 2nd part of the Gulf of Tonkin incident, which did not occur. Note that it is quite possible that the President did not know that the 2nd attack was not real, as there is no evidence that he was ever told. However, McNamara, our intel community, and the Military knew that the 2nd attack did not occur. In his memoirs, McNamara acknowledged that he was aware of the falsity of the 2nd attack, but did not mention that he had informed the President of this.

For a Police Action to become an actual War Congress would have to pass a Declaration of War, but for whatever reason they were unwilling to do so.

All of the above information (including official documents) pertaining to the Golf of Tonkin incident was declassified in the early 2000s, and made public by the NSA at the Congressional hearings (2005?) on this matter and other matters pertaining to the US conduct in starting previous wars.

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## tyrodtom (May 9, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> McNamara was a former Lt. Colonel with the USAAF, serving from 1940 through 1946 where he conducted analysis of bombing efficiency under LeMay, among other things.


 The information I've seen says McNamara joined as a Capt. in 1943, and discharged as a Lt. Col. in 46.
Another poster claimed McNamara was a 2nd lt. on Eisenhower's staff, I've found no evidence of that.


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## GrauGeist (May 9, 2021)

He had all sorts of degrees and was a ROTC cadet at Berkeley in the late 30's not sure why the dates bounce between 1940 and 1943.
Captain to Lt. Colonel in 3 years is a hell of a feat.

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## tyrodtom (May 9, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> He had all sorts of degrees and was a ROTC cadet at Berkeley in the late 30's not sure why the dates bounce between 1940 and 1943.
> Captain to Lt. Colonel in 3 years is a hell of a feat.



A Legion Of Merit also.
Evidently he didn't mess up everything then.


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## Thumpalumpacus (May 9, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> He had all sorts of degrees and was a ROTC cadet at Berkeley in the late 30's not sure why the dates bounce between 1940 and 1943.
> Captain to Lt. Colonel in 3 years is a hell of a feat.



Stranger things have happened in wartime. Ike was a light colonel in 1939, four stars and five years later in charge of everything in ETO.


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## Zipper730 (May 10, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> He was no more nor less concerned about public opinion than any other American President, I reckon. What he was really concerned about was not getting bogged in a war with China, so that he could focus on his domestic agenda. The tragedy is that this caused him to pursue the war in a half-assed manner, which got us bogged down and prevented him focusing on his domestic agenda. The fact that the quagmire was in NVN and not PRC is almost irrelevant.


And if he was excessively concerned of Chinese intervention, that would have thrown a serious monkey-wrench into things.

You'd think that he would be better able to focus on his domestic agenda if he wasn't micromanaging things so much: After all that'll tie up valuable energy (that's why you delegate, because it's damned near impossible to do everything yourself). I'm surprised he didn't understand that.


> If he was the voice of reason, he was using inapt reasoning.


Correct.



SaparotRob said:


> LBJ was passionate about addressing social ills. . . . He inherited a war from....well there are lots of fathers of this conflict, and did not want to go down in history as the first president in American history to lose a war.


I'm just surprised he didn't understand the concept of delegation, unless he was terrified that the people he'd delegate with the job would throw things so sideways that he'd have to baby-sit them (which honestly seems like the case).

I'm not sure when the various policies for war were conceived and worked out, but you'd figure that, after LeMay left the service, things would have calmed down quite a lot.



GrauGeist said:


> McNamara was a former Lt. Colonel with the USAAF, serving from 1940 through 1946 where he conducted analysis of bombing efficiency under LeMay, among other things.


That's why I found it so surprising that we needed RAND (that came up in a thread I created): McNamara's actions were operational analysis.



ThomasP said:


> The 1st attack in the Gulf of Tonkin incident took place well within what most nations considered its territorial waters, ie 12 nm. The 1st attack took place at about 8-9 nautical miles from the coast of North Vietnam. (North Vietnam claimed the same 12 nm limit as Vietnam had before the split. but since the US did not consider North Vietnam a sovereign nation it could not have any territorial waters rights.) The USS Maddox fired first when the NVN torpedo boats closed to with 10,000 yds. Subsequently, in the press releases and the information presented to Congress, it was stated that North Vietnam had previously claimed only a 5 nm limit, and that the NVN torpedo boats fired first. The movement of the USS Maddox was a part of numerous incursions/raids by the South into North Vietnam waters, and was intended to be a show of force and a chance to gather intel.
> 
> The President initiated military action after the 2nd part of the Gulf of Tonkin incident, which did not occur. Note that it is quite possible that the President did not know that the 2nd attack was not real, as there is no evidence that he was ever told. However, McNamara, our intel community, and the Military knew that the 2nd attack did not occur. In his memoirs, McNamara acknowledged that he was aware of the falsity of the 2nd attack, but did not mention that he had informed the President of this.


From what I remember, the President was completely aware of the fact that the battle probably didn't occur...



Thumpalumpacus said:


> Stranger things have happened in wartime. Ike was a light colonel in 1939, four stars and five years later in charge of everything in ETO.


And he was good at it.

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## Thumpalumpacus (May 10, 2021)

Zipper730 said:


> And if he was excessively concerned of Chinese intervention, that would have thrown a serious monkey-wrench into things.
> 
> You'd think that he would be better able to focus on his domestic agenda if he wasn't micromanaging things so much: After all that'll tie up valuable energy (that's why you delegate, because it's damned near impossible to do everything yourself). I'm surprised he didn't understand that.



What training I've had in leadership -- mind you, low-level stuff, NCO Academy in the USAF (six weeks in a classroom) and retail management -- focused on several things. Pertinent to this point of yours, we learned that wise delegation is an art of leadership: identifying those who 1) share your operational vision, 2) who have the initiative to make things happen, and 3) who spend more time on solutions than fretting over problems.

Granted that my experience gives me very little standing to pass judgement on the topic at hand, I'll give a little anyway. I suspect that LBJ understood these principles at some level, but that McN did not. This is due to their prior experiences, LBJ as a politician who had to lead voters to polling stations, and McN with his background in metrics rather than people.

Don't get me wrong, a good command of details is important, but from my scanty reading, it seems like McN fetishized numbers rather than mission; and as a senior advisor to LBJ likely promulgated his own approach to the detriment of the latter's skill at getting people to do what he wanted them to do. LBJ's failure, if I'm right, is in giving McN too much ear.

This is all opinion, and I'm certainly amenable to correction on any points I'm making.

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## Zipper730 (May 11, 2021)

I was reading a book called "Clashes: Air Combat over Vietnam 1965-1972" by Marshall L. Michel III. I was largely looking for a passage which described the use of F-4's in 1967 performing CAP's over the airfields to either catch MiG's taking off (they couldn't bomb the fields, but they could shoot the planes once airborne) -- and that was on page 88.

Regardless, I found another passage that's of interest here on page 90

_....In March the northeast monsoon kept the weather bad and limited the _​_number of strikes, but the strikes escalated when, on March 10, the Thai _​_Nyugen steel works were bombed for the first time. In Washington _​_another battle continued: Rolling Thunder was becoming ever more con-_​_troversial and had resulted in *a sharp division between the military and *_​_*the secretary of defense, with the President in the middle.* The military _​_continued to press for an increase in the bombings and the relaxation of _​_other restrictions, including the mining of Haiphong harbor; *Secretary of* _​_*Defense McNamara* believed the bombing was achieving its objectives _​_and *still feared a confrontation with China or the Soviet Union*._​
The emboldened stuff is emphasized by me.

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## Graeme (May 12, 2021)

Zipper730 said:


> had irrational or _unusually_ irrational concerns about Vietnam spiraling out of control









(From LBJ - Randall B. Woods. Free Press - 2006)

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## Dimlee (May 12, 2021)

Graeme said:


> View attachment 622845
> 
> 
> (From LBJ - Randall B. Woods. Free Press - 2006)



Thanks. Added this book to my " Vietham - must read" list on Amazon.


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## Dimlee (May 12, 2021)

Zipper730 said:


> I was reading a book called "Clashes: Air Combat over Vietnam 1965-1972" by Marshall L. Michel III. I was largely looking for a passage which described the use of F-4's in 1967 performing CAP's over the airfields to either catch MiG's taking off (they couldn't bomb the fields, but they could shoot the planes once airborne) -- and that was on page 88.
> 
> Regardless, I found another passage that's of interest here on page 90
> 
> ...



The mining of Haiphong and adjacent area was not done until 1972, as I remember? Probably, one of the critical mistakes. Most of the USSR/Warsaw Pact supplies were delivered by sea.

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## Zipper730 (May 12, 2021)

Graeme said:


> View attachment 622845
> 
> 
> (From LBJ - Randall B. Woods. Free Press - 2006)


So Johnson was unusually concerned, and the SecDef was even MORE extreme in his worries. There's also the possibility that his abnormal worries were affected by McNamara.

McNamara seemed to only done a few good things that I can readily think of

Prevented Operation Northwoods: After the Bay of Pigs invasion, a plan was created to justify occupying Cuba (this predated the Cuban Missile Crisis) through some sort of false-flag operation. It was approved by all members of the JCS. McNamara rejected the plan, which JFK agreed. The Chairman of the JCS was removed shortly after.
Created a joint-designation system for aircraft and missiles: Truthfully, just the missile system alone would have been a pretty solid idea, to be honest, but it definitely made the designation system less unwieldy.
Suggested the SST program be enlarged in size: While the SST program was a failure (and McNamara had slowed the development of the designs with needless studies), he suggested that, with high-bypass turbofans (as used on the CX-HLS) likely to make large airliners possible (and that would make them greatly more efficient), the SST designs should be scaled-up to make them economical (while this required the engines to be scaled up, it proved not to be an insurmountable problem). This ultimately resulted in the designs being enlarged to an extent that they could be economically feasible even if operated over oceanic airspace (something that was a major issue).
Frankly, I'm amazed that Johnson didn't relieve McNamara (I'm not even sure how much McNamara _*wanted*_ to be the SecDef -- he was reluctant to take the job, and felt he wasn't qualified).

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## Zipper730 (May 19, 2021)

Regarding counter-insurgency operations, from what I remember seeing in another thread: The MACV SOG was given permission to infiltrate the Ho Chi Minh Trail using reconnaissance teams with a new commanding officer, Colonel Donald Blackburn who back in WWII managed to escape the Japanese death marches, and began training Filipino resistance fighters, and had 20,000 of them by the time General MacArthur returned.

He conceived a plan that involved using teams of Green Berets, and Nung tribesmen that would explore southern Laos in order to find NVA bases and troop concentrations and then use that to direct air-strikes on them: At that point, company sized raiding units that were called "hatchet forces' would be recruited and trained, and would attack targets that were identified by reconnaissance teams by dropping in by helicopter, and swiftly taking out their targets, then get back in the helo and be out of there before anybody figured out what happened. Lastly, thousands of Laotian tribesmen would be recruited to attack the NVA wherever possible with the goal of getting them all bunched together, so that they could be better identified, targeted, and killed.

For some reason, Ambassador Sullivan imposed heavy restrictions on the plan, and since the Kennedy Administration, the operations in Laos were under an ambassador's control: I'm not sure why such heavy restrictions were imposed, as it seemed truly effective, and Johnson was under no obligation to follow Kennedy's orders as Kennedy was dead, and he was now the President.

I'm tagging Mike Wint because he knows more here.


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## GrauGeist (May 19, 2021)

Unfortunately, Mike may not respond at this point.
He has had health issues and hasn't been on the forums for a year.
Hoping he recovers and returns soon, but not sure when that'll be.

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## Zipper730 (May 21, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> Unfortunately, Mike may not respond at this point. He has had health issues and hasn't been on the forums for a year.


Didn't know, but I'm sorry to hear that.

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## Zipper730 (Oct 3, 2021)

Dimlee
, 

 GrauGeist
, 

 Thumpalumpacus
, 
T
 tyrodtom


I'm curious about two things

1. Why did Sullivan impose such restrictions on the training of the hatchet teams, and their use?
2. Why did Sullivan have so much say in the war?


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## Thumpalumpacus (Oct 3, 2021)

Zipper730 said:


> Dimlee
> ,
> 
> GrauGeist
> ...



I don't know enough to give an informed reply.

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## GrauGeist (Oct 3, 2021)

Sullivan was the lead in a covert war, which even the North Vietnamese kept secret.
So the chain of command was literally LBJ, Sullivan and ministers in the Loatian government.

As far as the Spec Ops question, I wasn't aware that Sullivan was involved, so I can't offer any insight.

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## ThomasP (Oct 4, 2021)

Hey Zipper730,

If you have not already run across it, check out the Wiki article on Laotian Coups here:

"1960 Laotian coups - Wikipedia"

It does a pretty good job of explaining the complicated politics involved, which in turn helps explain the tight control on operations.

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## SaparotRob (Oct 4, 2021)

Great post ThomasP, thanks.


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## Zipper730 (Oct 4, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> Sullivan was the lead in a covert war, which even the North Vietnamese kept secret.
> So the chain of command was literally LBJ, Sullivan and ministers in the Loatian government.


Would a proposed covert operation of this nature reached the President? If so, would it have gone through Sullivan, or through the CIA/DoD/Military?



ThomasP said:


> If you have not already run across it, check out the Wiki article on Laotian Coups here:
> 
> "1960 Laotian coups - Wikipedia"


It seems like one coup after another.

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## GrauGeist (Oct 4, 2021)

Zipper730 said:


> Would a proposed covert operation of this nature reached the President? If so, would it have gone through Sullivan, or through the CIA/DoD/Military?


In this case, the operations went straight from Sullivan to LBJ, with as few as possible in the loop due to the secrecy.
Very few knew about the operations in Laos and it was many years before either the U.S. or Vietnam would admit or discuss the actions.
My Uncle Bill (Capt. USN) was lost either over Laos or Cambodia during an intelligence flight. Due to the sensitivity of the covert ops, he flew the mission himself and was reported missing after he failed to show for the primary or secondary refueling windows.
They eventually found his aircraft, but not him. This was in early 1969.

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## Zipper730 (Oct 5, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> In this case, the operations went straight from Sullivan to LBJ, with as few as possible in the loop due to the secrecy.


So LBJ only heard what Sullivan told him? I've often described power structures like this as a neck because the single source is much like the neck to the leader's head -- he can turn the head anyway he wants, becoming more powerful than the leader through the practice of removing/altering crucial details to suit his own purpose (ranging from self-preservation, implementing policies that wouldn't be acceptable without some terminological inexactitude, even causing harm to the leader).

Was there ever any known disagreement between LBJ and Sullivan, and was there anybody he could replace him with?


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