# P-51 tank busters?



## grampi (Jul 30, 2015)

Has anyone seen the movie "Saving Private Ryan? I just watched it again last night and I noticed near the end of the movie when the Mustangs are flying over shooting up the Germans, Capt. Miller asked what they were. One of his troops says "they're P-51 tank busters, sir." Was this some kind of mistake by the writers, or was there actually such a thing as a "tank buster" version of the P-51? I've never heard of one...


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## pbehn (Jul 30, 2015)

P51s and RAF Mustangs could carry 500Ib bombs or rockets and had 0.5in MGs or 20mm cannon not really "tank busting" equipment. Post war evaluation showed very few tanks were busted in Normandy. I remember the scene you are talking about in real life I think Tom Hanks would be dead and the tank would rumble on. Good film though.


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## drgondog (Jul 30, 2015)

pbehn said:


> P51s and RAF Mustangs could carry 500Ib bombs or rockets and had 0.5in MGs or 20mm cannon not really "tank busting" equipment. Post war evaluation showed very few tanks were busted in Normandy. I remember the scene you are talking about in real life I think Tom Hanks would be dead and the tank would rumble on. Good film though.



Agreed - at the time of D-Day. Having said that the bomb racks were redesigned for increased bomb load of 1000 pounds each - or 110 gallon/160 gallon fuel tanks before D-Day. Napalm was carried during several July/August 1944 CAS missions by 8th AF FG's in 75 gallon tanks. The D-25 had five rocket launcher stubs on each wing capable of carrying 5" zero launch rockets and was available in numbers in February 1945.

The silly part of Saving Private Ryan is that the P-51Ds shown were VERY rare on D-Day and as shown were 78th FG which didn't convert from P-47s until the last week of December, 1944

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## pbehn (Jul 30, 2015)

Post D Day there were many more uses for P 51s like escorting bombers diver patrols or destroying V1 launch sites.


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## GregP (Jul 30, 2015)

You forgot about hanging beeg kegs on the bomb shackles and flying up to 30,000+ feet to get then cold. I have heard numerous stories about this from former WWII pilots.

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## pbehn (Jul 30, 2015)

drgondog said:


> Agreed - at the time of D-Day. Having said that the bomb racks were redesigned for increased bomb load of 1000 pounds each



I think a 1000Ib bomb would have done for Hanks, however it was a special armour piercing bomb that exploded inside the tank, I dont remember seeing the other one explode though.


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## Airframes (Jul 31, 2015)

Although not strictly accurate, the movie scene in question used the best available aircraft (Duxford based and, as Bill mentioned, in the colours of the 78th FG. ) for the visual effect required by the _story line._
A bit of a partial slip, historically, but much better than using Harvards (AT-6), as was the 'norm' in most war movies of the past !
In reality, the aircraft used would more likely have been P-47's or Typhoons. But then, it was a movie trying to tell a partly-realistic story, whilst portraying a fairly authentic view of the action and battles of the time, employing the best available props and equipment the producers could obtain or manufacture.
To be really pedantic, Tom Hanks and his group would not have come up against Tiger tanks either, as the story was set just a few days after D-Day itself, with the first Tigers arriving on the front in very late June / early July, having traveled from the south of France, and been involved in some brutality on the way, such as Oradour sur Glane.
Although a good movie overall, with the production team making great efforts at authenticity of equipment, action scenes etc, it _was_ a movie, for entertainment and mass box-office returns, not a truly accurate documentary presentation.

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## mexchiwa (Aug 1, 2015)

Would the Mustamg have been any more of a tank killer in Korea? Israel in 48?


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## pbehn (Aug 1, 2015)

mexchiwa said:


> Would the Mustamg have been any more of a tank killer in Korea? Israel in 48?



Destroying a tank from an aircraft isnt easy. Single engined AC cant carry heavy weapons. The A 36 dive bomberversion of the mustang was a good dive bomber but suffered from having a water cooled engine.


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## tomo pauk (Aug 1, 2015)

The A-36 didn't suffered from having a water cooled engine IMO. The single engine aircraft, even fighters, were capable to haul up to some 4000 lbs of under-slung weaponry, plus internal MGs or cannons; some fighters were obviously better than the others. 
Granted, it took plenty of an effort from aircraft to actually destroy a tank.

As for Mustang (or other fighters) in Korea, there was an option to use napalm to kill tanks and other unlucky 'receivers'.


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## pbehn (Aug 1, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> The A-36 didn't suffered from having a water cooled engine IMO. The single engine aircraft, even fighters, were capable to haul up to some 4000 lbs of under-slung weaponry, plus internal MGs or cannons; some fighters were obviously better than the others.
> Granted, it took plenty of an effort from aircraft to actually destroy a tank.
> 
> As for Mustang (or other fighters) in Korea, there was an option to use napalm to kill tanks and other unlucky 'receivers'.



from wiki

Besides dive bombing, the A-36A racked up aerial victories, totaling 84 enemy aircraft downed and creating an "ace", Lieutenant Michael T. Russo from the 27th Fighter Bomber Group (ultimately, the only ace using the Allison-engined Mustang).[14] As fighting intensified in all theaters where the A-36A operated, the dive bomber began to suffer an alarming loss rate with 177 falling to enemy action.[14] The main reason for the attrition was the hazardous missions that placed the A-36A "on the deck" facing murderous ground fire. German defenses in southern Italy included placing cables across hill tops to snare the attacking A-36As.[23] Despite establishing a "reputation for reliability and performance, "the one "Achilles' heel" of the A-36A (and the entire Mustang series) remained its vulnerable cooling system leading to many of the losses.[24] By June 1944, A-36As in Europe were replaced by Curtiss P-40s and Republic P-47 Thunderbolts.[6]
unquote


Rockets are hard to aim precisely, MGs and small calibre cannon cant destroy a tank. A bomb will destroy a tank if you hit it directly or very close to it but dive bombing a tank means flying straight at it and tanks usually had a lot of men with MGs around them. P51 loss rates started to climb when they went down to straf airfields, ground fire was a bigger danger than LW fighters.


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## tomo pauk (Aug 1, 2015)

Gruenhagen might be wrong that P-40s replaced A-36s from June 1944 - how many USAF units used P-40s by that time in Europe? The A-36 was out of production for more than a year by that time anyway.
The number of losses need to be weighted vs. missions flown, bombs dropped/hits, enemy AAA and fighters deployed, and indeed vs. enemy aircraft killed (not just claimed), then we compare that with losses of aircraft aircrew lost. I'd bet dollars to doughnuts that A-24 (Dauntless foe USAF) would've suffered far greater losses than A-36, per same weight of bombs delivered on same targets. Also from Wiki: "Nevertheless, the A-36 was used with great success as a dive-bomber, acquiring a reputation for precision, sturdiness and silence.[21]" 



> Rockets are hard to aim precisely, MGs and small calibre cannon cant destroy a tank.



Agreed all the way. British were testing the Mustang with 2pdr cannons from Hurricane IID, too bad the A-36 didn't get those.



> P51 loss rates started to climb when they went down to straf airfields, ground fire was a bigger danger than LW fighters.



Agreed again. 
Quirk was that P-51 had legs to fly 450-650 miles away from own base, strafe the airfields say, anywhere between Rhine and Berlin, and return, without need for escort. The F4U can'd do that, F6F can't, the Fw-190 can't (had the Allies had them), the P-38 is a bigger target and has problems of it's own, the P-47 that can do that is 6 months too late for that (late P-47D that is deployed in ETO from mid 1944 on).


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## pbehn (Aug 1, 2015)

The P 40 was produced until 1944 the A 36 was a political plane serving mainly to keep the "P51" in production 500 were produced. If you have air superiority I dont think it matters how fast your ground attack planes are especially if you are dive bombing.
The Mosquito Tsetse with a 57 mm gun would probably have been great but with its rate of fire you need your enemy to sit the tank exactly where you can hit it, plane mounted anti tank guns seem to me to be suited to the steppes or north african desert in Europe The land isnt flat enough and has trees on it.

Personally I think the allies in Normandy would be better off not trying to bust tanks and making sure they busted everything around them trucks bowsers and men, if the tank is the only thing that can move then it wont move far and cant go much faster than walking pace.


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## Greyman (Aug 1, 2015)

pbehn said:


> ... busted everything around them trucks bowsers and men ...



... horses. Somewhat vulnerable ...


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## tomo pauk (Aug 1, 2015)

A P-40 produced in 1944 does not automatically mean it will be in USAF service in 1944. Especially not in Europe; Asia/Pacific might be different for the same user. 



> the A 36 was a political plane serving mainly to keep the "P51" in production 500 were produced.



It's role in keeping the NAA production lines running in Inglewood surely was of great importance With that said, the A-36 flew combat missions with distinction, calling it a political airplane is selling it short. 



> If you have air superiority I dont think it matters how fast your ground attack planes are especially if you are dive bombing.



The A-36 did not enjoyed air superiority in 1943 when attacking targets 200-300 miles away from the bases. It actually served as an escort for B-25s and B-26s in 1943.


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## Elmas (Aug 1, 2015)

But sometimes, rather than destroy tanks, it was easier and more effective to destroy the bowser convoys travelling to refuel tanks....


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## Shortround6 (Aug 1, 2015)

pbehn said:


> The P 40 was produced until 1944 .



The US formed no _new_ units with P-40s after 1943. A-36 units in Italy may have gotten P-40s due to shortages of replacement A-36s for a short period of time in 1944. P-40s using Allison engines may have been seen as requiring minimum training for ground crew. Units were converting to P-47s within weeks or a couple of months. The P-40s may have already been in theater and/or been planes turned in by P-40 units converting to P-47s. 

By 1944 the "new" P-40s were going mostly to allies as lend lease. The last few hundred built went directly to scrap yards.


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## Denniss (Aug 1, 2015)

The P-40 in A-36 units were indeed interim, I assume to replace losses or worn-out A-36. They transitioned to P-47 shortly afterwards.


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## redcoat (Aug 1, 2015)

Airframes said:


> To be really pedantic, Tom Hanks and his group would not have come up against Tiger tanks either, as the story was set just a few days after D-Day itself, with the first Tigers arriving on the front in very late June / early July, having traveled from the south of France, and been involved in some brutality on the way, such as Oradour sur Glane.


The US Army did not encounter Tiger tanks until after Operation Cobra, before then they had all operated against the British and Canadian sectors.

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## Airframes (Aug 1, 2015)

Yep.


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## pbehn (Aug 1, 2015)

Shortround6 said:


> The US formed no _new_ units with P-40s after 1943. A-36 units in Italy may have gotten P-40s due to shortages of replacement A-36s for a short period of time in 1944. P-40s using Allison engines may have been seen as requiring minimum training for ground crew. Units were converting to P-47s within weeks or a couple of months. The P-40s may have already been in theater and/or been planes turned in by P-40 units converting to P-47s.
> 
> By 1944 the "new" P-40s were going mostly to allies as lend lease. The last few hundred built went directly to scrap yards.



I think by the summer of 1944 Italy had become a sort of back water. Italy had changed sides US forces took Rome on 4 July, and the German military was getting out ASAP. This all stems from a quote from wiki, but I could see sense in using P40s to replace lost A36s in Italy engines are the same and I believe many pilots had flown P40s prior to the A36.


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## pbehn (Aug 1, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> The A-36 did not enjoyed air superiority in 1943 when attacking targets 200-300 miles away from the bases. It actually served as an escort for B-25s and B-26s in 1943.



The subject under discussion was the time when the A36 was (allegedly by wiki) replaced by the P40 summer of 1944, I would say that in Italy in the Summer of 1944 the allies had almost complete air superiority, they had superiority over Northern France which the Germans were actually contesting.



tomo pauk said:


> A P-40 produced in 1944 does not automatically mean it will be in USAF service in 1944. Especially not in Europe; Asia/Pacific might be different for the same user.



Did I say that it did?



tomo pauk said:


> It's role in keeping the NAA production lines running in Inglewood surely was of great importance With that said, the A-36 flew combat missions with distinction, calling it a political airplane is selling it short.



I have said nothing detrimental about the A 36 apart from being water cooled it was vulnerable, if the US military had a budget for more fighters then the A 36 would never have flown and from that the US could have had 500 P51B/C s much sooner.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 1, 2015)

pbehn said:


> I have said nothing detrimental about the A 36 apart from being water cooled it was vulnerable, if the US military had a budget for more fighters then the A 36 would never have flown and from that the US could have had 500 P51B/C s much sooner.



Not really, the Merlin engines to power 500 P-51B/Cs didn't exist any earlier. In July of 1943 534 P-51B airframes had been completed but only 173 Merlin engines had been received by North American. Packard had only completed 81 two stage Merlin engines by the end of June, 1943. They built 184 in July. It is 1980 Miles from Detroit to Los Angles by air, by train it is ???

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## Milosh (Aug 1, 2015)

pbehn said:


> Italy had changed sides US forces took Rome on 4 July,



The capture of Rome, *June* 4 1944, was overshadowed by the Normandy invasion.


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## stona (Aug 2, 2015)

No RAF or USAAF aircraft were good tank busters, even those modified for that role. The P-51 was intrinsically a very good aeroplane which meant that in a ground attack/tank busting role it was inferior to some but better than most.
Cheers
Steve

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## Greyman (Aug 2, 2015)

stona said:


> No RAF or USAAF aircraft were good tank busters, even those modified for that role. The P-51 was intrinsically a very good aeroplane which meant that in a ground attack/tank busting role it was inferior to some but better than most.
> Cheers
> Steve



What compares favourably enough to a Hurricane IId that you would say that it wasn't a good tank buster?


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## Kryten (Aug 2, 2015)

Hurricane iiD's were mostly used in the desert against the PzII, PzIII and early PzIV, somewhat softer targets than the later uparmoured PzIV V and VI, Stug etc that operated in Italy and Normandy, also consider the visibility and low level approach advantage a gun armed tank buster had in the desert, it would be very difficult to run in low and accurately in Normandy amongst the hedges and trees!


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## Greyman (Aug 2, 2015)

Right, I got hung up on the question by itself and forgot about the time/place in history (movie) this all pertains to.

EDIT: Really when all is said and done - I'd put money on the best tank buster aircraft in Normandy turning out to be the Lancaster (at least the one with the highest overall 'score').


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## stona (Aug 2, 2015)

Greyman said:


> What compares favourably enough to a Hurricane IId that you would say that it wasn't a good tank buster?



Even in the desert, with targets out in the open, the Hurricane pilots achieved a 10-15% hit rate with AP ammunition (depending who you believe). That's somewhat less than the Typhoons with their 20mm cannon. It's not bad, but hardly game changing.

Cheers

Steve


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## Greyman (Aug 2, 2015)

stona said:


> Even in the desert, with targets out in the open, the Hurricane pilots achieved a 10-15% hit rate with AP ammunition (depending who you believe). That's somewhat less than the Typhoons with their 20mm cannon. It's not bad, but hardly game changing.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve



10-15% with 40-mm?


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## bobbysocks (Aug 2, 2015)

pbehn said:


> from wiki
> 
> Despite establishing a "reputation for reliability and performance, "the one "Achilles' heel" of the A-36A (and the entire Mustang series) remained its vulnerable cooling system leading to many of the losses.[24] By June 1944, A-36As in Europe were replaced by Curtiss P-40s and Republic P-47 Thunderbolts.[6]



so the A36 suffered because of it was water cooled and the P40 didn't?


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## pbehn (Aug 2, 2015)

bobbysocks said:


> so the A36 suffered because of it was water cooled and the P40 didn't?



I think they both did but they were running out of A36s, neither were originally designed for ground attack.


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## pbehn (Aug 2, 2015)

Greyman said:


> 10-15% with 40-mm?



In Normandy the standard 75mm sherman tank armament struggled to knock out German tanks, the firefly fitted with the high velocity 17 pounder was better, good luck mounting them on any single engine aircraft. I think the Hurricane with 40mm cannon only carried 15 rounds.


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## Greyman (Aug 2, 2015)

Kryten said:


> Hurricane iiD's were mostly used in the desert against the PzII, PzIII and early PzIV, somewhat softer targets than the later uparmoured PzIV V and VI, Stug etc that operated in Italy and Normandy, also consider the visibility and low level approach advantage a gun armed tank buster had in the desert, it would be very difficult to run in low and accurately in Normandy amongst the hedges and trees!



Excerpt from a report from Air Vice Marshal Broadhurst (Air OC, RAF, Western Desert) on this very subject:



> _The future policy for tank busting aircraft must be considered with relation to the general strategic situation and it is submitted that too much weight should not be attached to the experiences gained in the AFRICAN campaign. If land operations in the future are likely to take the form of opposed landings and subsequent fighting in close country, such as is found in most of EUROPE, then tank busting aircraft, as at present designed, are not likely to achieve the successes they have in the open desert country. Indeed, it is already becoming increasingly difficult to find suitable targets for them in the mountainous and wooded country of Northern TUNISIA.
> 
> .. it would probably be uneconomical to embark on large scale production of a specialist aircraft of this nature and certainly unwise to rely on it as a major battle-winning factor in future campaigns._ - 12 May 1943


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## wuzak (Aug 2, 2015)

pbehn said:


> In Normandy the standard 75mm sherman tank armament struggled to knock out German tanks, the firefly fitted with the high velocity 17 pounder was better, good luck mounting them on any single engine aircraft. I think the Hurricane with 40mm cannon only carried 15 rounds.



The Firefly was a single engined aircraft. 

Can you elaborate about the "high velocity 17 pounder"?


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## Greyman (Aug 2, 2015)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sherman_Firefly


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## wuzak (Aug 2, 2015)

pbehn said:


> The Mosquito Tsetse with a 57 mm gun would probably have been great but with its rate of fire you need your enemy to sit the tank exactly where you can hit it, plane mounted anti tank guns seem to me to be suited to the steppes or north african desert in Europe The land isnt flat enough and has trees on it.



The 57mm auto-cannon in the FBXVIII had a rate of fire of 55 rounds per minute, so a 2 round burst would take a little over a second, a 3 round burst just over 2s. How much distance could a tank travel in that time? 60km/h is 16.7m/s, but surely that is flat out for a tank, and not its normal battlefield speed?

With only 21 rounds in the rack you wouldn't want to expend too much ammo in a burst. I think they used the 0.303"s to line up, but I'm not sure how much help that would be in aiming the 57mm cannon.


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## stona (Aug 3, 2015)

Greyman said:


> 10-15% with 40-mm?



Yes. HE ammunition was more accurate, probably something to do with its trajectory being closer to that of the sighting machine guns. It does mean that even firing all 30 rounds at a target (unlikely) they'd struggle statistically for a hit. Nonetheless the North African squadrons were credited with some tank kills. I don't remember the total, nor can I find it, but a figure of about 40 seems to be lurking in my memory. That might not seem many in the context of total German losses, but is pretty good going for a relatively few aircraft (never more than four squadrons, with low operational rates).

The IID had the advantage of carrying armament specifically to destroy the vehicles it would encounter in 1942. It has also been shown in numerous trials and experiments that cannon and machine guns were by far the most accurate weapons that fighter bombers carried when compared to dropped ordnance (bombs, napalm etc) or rockets. To that extent the IID was a good tank killer, but I wouldn't fancy my chances flying one in the ETO in 1944/5, and of course nobody did.

Cheers

Steve


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## Milosh (Aug 3, 2015)

Didn't 184 Squadron operate IIDs in NE Europe for awhile ('42-'43)?


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## stona (Aug 3, 2015)

Milosh said:


> Didn't 184 Squadron operate IIDs in NE Europe for awhile ('42-'43)?



Possibly before they got Typhoons, but I'd have to look them up. I know it was part of 2nd TAF from mid '43.

Cheers

Steve


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## Greyman (Aug 3, 2015)

stona said:


> Yes. HE ammunition was more accurate, probably something to do with its trajectory being closer to that of the sighting machine guns. It does mean that even firing all 30 rounds at a target (unlikely) they'd struggle statistically for a hit. Nonetheless the North African squadrons were credited with some tank kills. I don't remember the total, nor can I find it, but a figure of about 40 seems to be lurking in my memory. That might not seem many in the context of total German losses, but is pretty good going for a relatively few aircraft (never more than four squadrons, with low operational rates).
> 
> The IID had the advantage of carrying armament specifically to destroy the vehicles it would encounter in 1942. It has also been shown in numerous trials and experiments that cannon and machine guns were by far the most accurate weapons that fighter bombers carried when compared to dropped ordnance (bombs, napalm etc) or rockets. To that extent the IID was a good tank killer, but I wouldn't fancy my chances flying one in the ETO in 1944/5, and of course nobody did.
> 
> ...




Been looking up a bunch of this stuff. The score for the IIDs must have been much higher.

I have a report on 6 Squadron claims March 10 to April 8th 1943:



> *Flamers**Destryd**Hit**Total*Tanks Mk.III4301145Tanks Mk.IV48517Armoured Cars67517Lorries7101633Mobile Guns-123Semi-tracked vehicles42142088 m.m. Guns-224
> 
> TOTAL SORTIES................117
> 
> ...




Also here is one of (perhaps their best) day in action (February 10th):



> DESTROYED
> 6 Mk.III Tanks (2 flamers)
> 13 Armoured Cars (5 flamers)
> 10 Lorries (4 flamers)
> ...



It is thought that this was the first time that an armoured force was turned back solely by air action - I don't know if that's true but Coningham, Montgomery and Leclerc (who's position was about to be attacked) all sent their praise to 6 Squadron for this action.

On the subject of accuracy, I'll truncate it but - 6 Squadron training stated that a 50% hit standard was expected from new pilots before going on operations and that fully trained, experienced pilots achieved 75% hits in deliberate practice shoots. It was noted that this high standard of accuracy was rapidly lost when not on tank-busting operations (eg; switching to defensive Hurricane IIc duties) or even when on operations too long and in need of refresher training.

Also I would note that the Hurricane IId _was_ used in the ETO - but only at night against trains and lighter surface vessels off the coast.


*EDIT:* 
On this issue of claims - I just found a simple summary in a 6 Squadron pilot biography:

Egypt: 45 tanks destroyed
Libya Tunisia: 46 tanks destroyed


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## stona (Aug 3, 2015)

I think my figure of around 40 came from ORS on the ground assessments rather than squadron claims, but since I can't find the source I can't be certain. Let's not forget that later, in Normandy, Typhoon pilots claimed 100 armoured vehicles destroyed for every 1 they actually destroyed according to their own (2nd TAF) ORS 

Their claims for accuracy are also a lot more optimistic than the RAF's own trials.

The IID was a decent tank destroyer, given a relatively soft target and limited AA fire. In the Far East it proved its worth even late in the war. At Imphal in June 1944 No 20 Squadron engaged 12 Japanese tanks and destroyed them all for the loss of 1 Hurricane. As late as 13th February 1945 the same squadron found and engaged 13 Japanese tanks around the village of Paunggadaw, again destroying them all, as confirmed by British troops on the ground.
The RAF ORS (Air Command South East Asia) produced a report on the effectiveness of the IID against Japanese tanks (AIR 37/1236) which is very complimentary about the ability of the type to destroy Japanese armour. 

Cheers

Steve


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## Greyman (Aug 3, 2015)

stona said:


> Their claims for accuracy are also a lot more optimistic than the RAF's own trials.



I'd be willing to bet that the time and effort 6 Squadron put into getting a 50% to 75% hit standard was a lot greater than whatever unit briefly trialed the Hurrie IId.


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## gumbyk (Aug 3, 2015)

GregP said:


> You forgot about hanging beeg kegs on the bomb shackles and flying up to 30,000+ feet to get then cold. I have heard numerous stories about this from former WWII pilots.



And making ice-cream with a similar setup...


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## pbehn (Aug 3, 2015)

wuzak said:


> The 57mm auto-cannon in the FBXVIII had a rate of fire of 55 rounds per minute, so a 2 round burst would take a little over a second, a 3 round burst just over 2s. How much distance could a tank travel in that time? 60km/h is 16.7m/s, but surely that is flat out for a tank, and not its normal battlefield speed?
> 
> With only 21 rounds in the rack you wouldn't want to expend too much ammo in a burst. I think they used the 0.303"s to line up, but I'm not sure how much help that would be in aiming the 57mm cannon.



I have just read that the heavy cannon armed mosquitos would start at 5,000 ft and descend in a 30 degree dive opening up at 1,800 yards which left the plane very vulnerable and I suppose any cross wind or turbulence would screw everything up. one shot per second means it would be hard walk the shots on target The RAF quickly stopped using them against shipping and U Boats in favour of rockets. Tanks in Northern France were frequently "dug in" in forests or villages, not easy to spot from 5,000 ft


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## wuzak (Aug 3, 2015)

pbehn said:


> I have just read that the heavy cannon armed mosquitos would start at 5,000 ft and descend in a 30 degree dive opening up at 1,800 yards which left the plane very vulnerable and I suppose any cross wind or turbulence would screw everything up. one shot per second means it would be hard walk the shots on target The RAF quickly stopped using them against shipping and U Boats in favour of rockets. Tanks in Northern France were frequently "dug in" in forests or villages, not easy to spot from 5,000 ft



RPs were far less accurate than the the 57mm cannon. And there were fewer of them - only 8 on a Mosquito or Typhoon, and they were often (always?) all fired in one go. Which would also make it difficult to correct aim.


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## parsifal (Aug 4, 2015)

mexchiwa said:


> Would the Mustamg have been any more of a tank killer in Korea? Israel in 48?



Not sure. But 77 sqn (RAAF), 91 wing based in Japan used P-51s almost exclusively for air support after the introduction of Chinese MiG-15s. When the units converted to Meteor F8s in '51, for a short while the new type was employed in the air superiority role until it was quickly realized the Meteor just wasnt competitive in this role. At that point the new type also reverted to CAS the same as the P-51 it replaced. 

In all, 91 wing and the FAA Sea Fury FB11s are credited with destroying something like 2-3000 bunkers and about 60 AFVs. JoeB, another member of this forum, claims that not one heavy tank was knocked out by allied tacair in that time. Certainly destroying tanks from the air is an incredibly difficult task, but Joes claims dont stack up with post war RAAF survey teams that found evidence of at least 7 of the 60 tanks claimed as destroyed actually being destroyed.


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## drgondog (Aug 4, 2015)

Legitimate tank killers after WWII (Ju 87 and IL2 being the only two that achieved consistent results) may boil down to A-10 although precision munitions do expand the domain to attack helicopters, RPV's and conventional fighters. Then if the targets are lit up, even JDAMs have the requisite capability - so maybe the B-52 and B-1 and B-2 can be considered as such.


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## pbehn (Aug 4, 2015)

wuzak said:


> RPs were far less accurate than the the 57mm cannon. And there were fewer of them - only 8 on a Mosquito or Typhoon, and they were often (always?) all fired in one go. Which would also make it difficult to correct aim.



The RAF stopped using the cannon in favour of rockets for anti shipping. Granted the accuracy was less but so were the losses. I think it was a weapon whose draw backs were only realised when it went into service. The tsetse had to have other mosquitos to suppress flak. I think the 57mm would only work against an enemy who did what you wanted and didnt fire back.


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## stona (Aug 4, 2015)

wuzak said:


> RPs were far less accurate than the the 57mm cannon.



You can say that again. 
Typhoon pilots, in trials, firing all eight rockets in a salvo had about a 4% chance of hitting a target the size of a German tank. The average distance of the mean point of impact (MPI) from the aiming point was 62.5 yards. This figure could only become worse when pilots flew on operations against camouflaged and difficult to find targets protected by anti aircraft fire.
Accuracy improved slightly, the average MPI being only 43 yards from the aiming point, with the introduction in late 1944 of a modified Mk.IID gyroscopic gun sight which allowed for wind, target movement and importantly the initial gravity drop of the rockets.
Cheers
Steve


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## pbehn (Aug 4, 2015)

stona said:


> You can say that again.
> Typhoon pilots, in trials, firing all eight rockets in a salvo had about a 4% chance of hitting a target the size of a German tank. The average distance of the mean point of impact (MPI) from the aiming point was 62.5 yards. This figure could only become worse when pilots flew on operations against camouflaged and difficult to find targets protected by anti aircraft fire.
> Accuracy improved slightly, the average MPI being only 43 yards from the aiming point, with the introduction in late 1944 of a modified Mk.IID gyroscopic gun sight which allowed for wind, target movement and importantly the initial gravity drop of the rockets.
> Cheers
> Steve



The effect was more on the crews than the tanks from what I have read.


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## stona (Aug 4, 2015)

pbehn said:


> The effect was more on the crews than the tanks from what I have read.



Attacks by rocket firing aircraft definitely had a disproportionate psychological effect on the victims. As tank busters rocket firing aircraft were not particularly effective, but many inexperienced crews abandoned their vehicles.

The US 9th AF hardly used rockets at all and then on P-47s. This means that a P-51 tank buster in WW2 would be a fighter bomber and though I don't have figures to hand for bombs dropped by the P-51, figures for comparable aircraft, like the Spitfire, would not lead one to believe that it would have been effective at all. 
The average radial error for bombs dropped in the period October 1944-April 1945 by fighter bombers of the RAF 2nd TAF was 158 yards. Only 50% of the bombs fell within 130 yards of the target.

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Aug 4, 2015)

I doubt it was even 4%, as you suggest. At 4% probability, that would mean that every 25 sorties flown against an AFV would be roughly one tank destroyed. I doubt it. Soft targets wouldnt even achieve that success rate. I dont have the figures, but as Lehr was moving into position during one of Monty's pushes, what was the sortie rate to kill ratio for all vehicles.

Dupuy estimates that sir support is lucky to account for even 5% of overall casualties for an army enagaged in battle. It has risen post war to maybe 10% in the modern age. 

You could get a rough idea of direct attacks on formations by comparing that to the heavy raids conducted by the USA just before the Cobra breakouts. Again, not properly researched but how many US bombers were used in that famous raid. Losses were roughly 2000 men froim Lehr and all 17 remaining tanks Ive read. 

But I would challenge the notion of the accuracy/effectiveness of dedicated tank buster a/c like the Ju87G. One attack Ive read about claimed 53 of 117 Soviet tanks destroyed during an engagement during Kursk. More than 50 a/c committed to the attack, attacking in shuttles all day, losses about 12 a/c. Soviet records show nothing like that was achieved. The bde in question lost 3 tanks in those attacks, but was pinned for a while. 

Am I saying direct attacks were not worth it. Not at all. I believe the german accounts that say the air attacks on theitr formations debilitated and demoralised them. If nothing else, it robbed them of freedom of manouvre. Air support if effective has been quantified by people like the Dupuy institute of decreasing the effectiveness of the the fpf factors (basically a measure of their effectiveness in combat) of formations subjected to sustained air attack by the order of 50%. Thats well worth the effeort in my book.


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## Greyman (Aug 4, 2015)

Greyman said:


> I'd be willing to bet that the time and effort 6 Squadron put into getting a 50% to 75% hit standard was a lot greater than whatever unit briefly trialed the Hurrie IId.



More on accuracy:




> AEROPLANE AND ARMAMENT EXPERIMENTAL ESTABLISHMENT
> BOSCOMBE DOWN.
> 9th April, 1942.
> 
> ...


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## parsifal (Aug 4, 2015)

Lehr's experiences at St Lo offer some insight as to the effectiveness of airpower if used at saturation levels...

On July 2, Panzer Lehr was ordered to pull out of Tilly-sur-Seules and head west to provide support to the divisions resisting the American advance near Saint-Lo. The area around Saint-Lo consists of small fields with high ancient hedgerows and sunken lanes, known as bocage. The bocage made it extremely difficult for armor to maneuver and provided superb defensive positions to the infantry on either side of the battle, but is also gave opportunities to hide armour from air attack. On reaching this location, the division found itself up against the U.S. 83rd Infantry Division. After several holding battles, Panzer Lehr attacked towards Pont-Hebert, which it captured and held against several American counter-attacks.

On July 11, Panzer Lehr attacked towards the village of Le Desert, deep in the bocage. M10 Tank destroyers and Allied air attacks destroyed 20 tanks; the division's remaining tanks withdrew over the Vire Canal to relative safety.

Lehr had already suffered pretty heavily but from this point, in particular, the division began to fall apart as rear echelons of the division had to be thrown into the fray. Air powe became a deciding factor as it hit the formation with increasing ferocity and efficiency, Allied air power began to have a direct impact on Lehr. Air power was at its most effective when it was used in conjunction with friendly ground operations. It worked best as a pinning force, allowing ground based forces to encircle then destroy in detail the german forces being subjected to such attacks. 

Over the next two weeks, the division fought a defensive battle of attrition against the numerically superior Allied forces. On July 19, Saint-Lo fell to the Americans. Six days later, the Americans launched Operation Cobra, their breakout from the Normandy lodgment. The operation was preceded by a massive aerial bombardment by over 1,500 allied bombers. Panzer Lehr was directly in the path of attack, and the division suffered about 1,000 casualties during this bombardment, estimated to be a 50% casualty rate. After the bombing run, the Panzer Lehr came under massed artillery fire of approx. 1000 pieces of artillery of different calibres. After these bombardments, the U.S. 1st Infantry Division attacked the Lehr Panzers, along with 238 Shermans from the 2nd and 3rd U.S. Armoured Divisions. Lehr by this point was a spent formation, unable to effectively resist. 

The seriously depleted Panzer Lehr could not hope to halt the allied assaults against it, and so, on August 5 after a fighting withdrawal, it was ordered back to Alençon for rest and refitting. Two battle groups, dubbed Kampfgruppe von Hauser and Kampfgruppe Ritgen were formed from the remaining battle-ready men and tanks (about 500 men and no more than 17 tanks) and these units remained in combat and operated side by side with German Fallschirmjägers. Later, when Kampfgruppe Hauser pulled back towards Fontainebleau to rest and refit, division commander Bayerlein ordered the rest of the division to follow. The division was subsequently called back to Germany for rest and refitting.

Within seven months of its formation, the division was reduced to a combat-ineffective unit with no remaining tanks. At one point in September, it consisted only of a panzer grenadier battalion of company strength, an engineer company, six 105-mm. howitzers, five tanks, a recon platoon, and an Alarmbataillon (emergency alert battalion) of about 200 men recruited from stragglers and soldiers on furlough in Trier. After spending a month refitting in the Saar, the division was moved to Paderborn. There it received 72 tanks, 21 assault guns and replacements, something to compensate the losses suffered in Normandy. But the losses to its support echelons had been so severe that the division never recovered its former combat efficiency. this was the application of air superiority at its most deadly.


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## kool kitty89 (Aug 4, 2015)

Was the Vickers S gun perhaps underutilized? The potency of a single hit would obviously be much lower than rockets (let alone a 57 mm shell), but would the overall performance trade-offs have net advantages? (accuracy, ammunition capacity, rate of fire, weight and/or drag compared to the heavy 57 mm gun or rockets+rails) That goes for putting a pair of 40 mm cannon in the Mosquito or under the Typboon or Tempest. (and at least in the Mossie's case, the belt feed mechanism might have been practical)

With the railless mountings on late-war American fighters, there's a greater advantage to rockets (I'm not sure of the earlier American tube mounted arrangement was much better than the British rails either), but that wasn't the case for the british. (and the American 37 mm M4 was less powerful than the Vicker's S, if somewhat lighter and the M10 variant a bit faster firing and using a more conventional disintegrating link belt) There was also the high velocity M9 autocannon but that didn't see airborne service for one reason or another. (too large and heave for the P-63 but it seems like the A-20, A-26, or P-38 could have handled it) The Vickers S might have adopted the high velocity littlejohn AP projectile had it stayed in service longer, so potentially some additional anti-armor capability there too.


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## Greyman (Aug 5, 2015)

I don't think it was underutilized. 

RP were much superior when you factor in how inflexible the 'S' gun was in terms of 

1) the types of targets it could engage
2) the specialized aircraft on which it was mounted

This is kind of rolled into point 1, but the vulnerability of a standard 'S' gun attack is far higher than a standard RP attack. RPs were much safer, much more flexible, much more destructive, and -discovered by accident- much more potent psychologically against the enemy.


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## stona (Aug 5, 2015)

4% chance of hitting a tank comes from Price, but I don't have his source.

The niftily entitled 'ORS 2nd TAF/No.2 ORS 21st Army Group joint report No. 3 (1945)' paints a more realistic picture of what happened operationally rather than in trials. It calculated that to have a 50% chance of hitting a German tank (it quotes a Panther) 140 rockets, equivalent to 18 sorties, were required.

Rockets may not have been effective in destroying armour or other pin point targets, but they could be devastating against larger targets, columns of soft skinned vehicles and troop concentrations. The same ORS report concluded that only 24 rockets (3 sorties) were required for a 50% chance of destroying an 'army hut' for example. 

There are many reports of the morale effect of air attacks on defending German units, not just by rocket, strafing could have a similar effect. One report from the US 9th Infantry Division in Normandy sums this up. _"Every time we have an air mission the rate of surrender goes up"_

Cheers

Steve


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## pbehn (Aug 5, 2015)

stona said:


> There are many reports of the morale effect of air attacks on defending German units, not just by rocket, strafing could have a similar effect. One report from the US 9th Infantry Division in Normandy sums this up. _"Every time we have an air mission the rate of surrender goes up"_


Didnt this become a point of argument about cause and effect between Airforce and Army commanders. The Airforce commanders becoming increasingly convinced that without air support the army didnt press on, a sort of chicken and egg situation.


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## stona (Aug 5, 2015)

It did between the RAF and British Army. It had been a bone of contention since before the war. The RAF in particular resented being asked to do what it considered the Army's job for it. 

I think it was less of an issue, at least operationally, for the Americans as they weren't dealing with two separate and independent services. Nonetheless, at a higher level, Spaatz did not want his strategic air forces subordinated to AEAF control, and therefore to Army operations, as this would compromise the fight for an independent US air force that was well underway by 1944. Zuckerman noted a conversation to this end in his journal.

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Aug 5, 2015)

> The niftily entitled 'ORS 2nd TAF/No.2 ORS 21st Army Group joint report No. 3 (1945)' paints a more realistic picture of what happened operationally rather than in trials. It calculated that to have a 50% chance of hitting a German tank (it quotes a Panther) 140 rockets, equivalent to 18 sorties, were required.



Thats roughly the same odds actually. 4% success per sortie is equivalent to 200 rockets per kill on avcerage, whereas 140 rockets means an estimated success rate of 5.8% per sortie, assuming 8 rockets per sortie. Im not disagreeing with the point you are making, Im agreeing with it, but just noting the maths is wrong.


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## stona (Aug 5, 2015)

The arithmetic is a bit tricky. 140 rockets were required for a 50% chance of hitting the tank. How many were needed for a 100% chance? Is it double? I think it might be more, but it's been far too long since I did any statistics 
I think that we are all agreed that it required an awful lot of rockets to have a reasonable chance of actually hitting a tank or any other small target !
Cheers
Steve


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## soulezoo (Aug 5, 2015)

Also, within statistical analysis, I will note here that if one were to send those 18 sorties, it does not mean that a tank would be hit. Maybe 3 or 4 tanks are hit; maybe none at all. 

With each sortie, before the toggle is moved, there remains that 4% chance. It does not mean that while sorties 1-8 (for instance) were unsuccessful that the next ten have higher odds for success. Each following sortie has just that 4%.

Like with roulette... and you are betting odd/even or red/black. Either choice has a 50% chance of hitting (actually less due to ought and double ought). But that 50% is with each spin. If you hit "odd" 10 times in a row, that does not mean the next spin has a greater chance to hit "even". It is still 50%.

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## parsifal (Aug 5, 2015)

ah statistics....my favourite subject at school


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## pbehn (Aug 5, 2015)

soulezoo said:


> Also, within statistical analysis, I will note here that if one were to send those 18 sorties, it does not mean that a tank would be hit. Maybe 3 or 4 tanks are hit; maybe none at all.
> 
> With each sortie, before the toggle is moved, there remains that 4% chance. It does not mean that while sorties 1-8 (for instance) were unsuccessful that the next ten have higher odds for success. Each following sortie has just that 4%.
> 
> Like with roulette... and you are betting odd/even or red/black. Either choice has a 50% chance of hitting (actually less due to ought and double ought). But that 50% is with each spin. If you hit "odd" 10 times in a row, that does not mean the next spin has a greater chance to hit "even". It is still 50%.


That is completely true but not the task in question. The tank is the banker and the gambler is the fighter. Someone betting only on red is playing double or quit you must have in the bank enough to cover his statistical luck. In the case of tanks in Normandy the odds wernt 50/50 but 96/4 (or similar) in the tank commanders favour. The problem is each AC carries 8 rockets so it is very easy to be convinced your luck is about to run out.

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## kool kitty89 (Aug 5, 2015)

stona said:


> 4% chance of hitting a tank comes from Price, but I don't have his source.
> 
> The niftily entitled 'ORS 2nd TAF/No.2 ORS 21st Army Group joint report No. 3 (1945)' paints a more realistic picture of what happened operationally rather than in trials. It calculated that to have a 50% chance of hitting a German tank (it quotes a Panther) 140 rockets, equivalent to 18 sorties, were required.
> 
> ...


Wouldn't those 'soft but large/heavy' targets also be among the most effective for the 40 mm HE shells the Vickers S sported? (or the P-39's M4 cannon for that matter, I'm not sure about the MK 108, particularly with mine shells vs harder cased steel HE shells)

And how much more effective were those 40 mm shells than a higher volume of 20 mm hispano shells? (4 Mk.II hispanos have 10x the rate of fire of 2 Vickers S guns) How would they compare in the anti-rail and anti-shipping roles? (including against the heavier, slow firing 57 mm cannon the Mosquito carried) 

For that matter, might it have been useful to install the 37 mm M4 for use against heavy ground targets in the B-25 and A-20? (not the anti-tank role, but rail and heavy transport vehicles or light armored vehicles) The manually re-loaded magazine arrangement attempted on the YFM-1 might have been more useful in a nose/belly mounting on bomber/attack aircraft. (prior to the continuous belt feed mechanism of the M10)

In American service, the M4 also had one other advantage: it was reliable while the Hispano continually proved not to be. (so you've got a wider gap between .50 and 37 mm performance than the British 20 mm vs 40 mm) The 23 mm Madsen gun the USAAF was considering for a time might have been a better option for many uses, but it seems no production license was ever acquired.


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## stona (Aug 6, 2015)

On an average pass 32 of the 120 20mm cannon shells fired by a British four cannon fighter bomber would hit a vehicle sized object. I can't think of any WW2 soft skinned or even semi-armoured vehicle or train that could survive that. I can't see any reason at all to use instead a heavier weapon (like the Vickers with a maximum of 15 rounds per gun) even with the highest probability of hits claimed by the squadrons who used them.
Also, we are talking about fighter bombers here. The four 20mm cannon mounted by the RAF's fighters also proved formidable armament in an air to air role. Every weapon system has to be a compromise and a Typhoon armed with 4 x 20mm cannon was a very good compromise indeed. Any aircraft mounting some of the heavier armament suggested would have itself needed an escort of fighters, denying the force multiplication that the fighter bomber brings.

Whether the Americans might have adopted cannon armament earlier, during WW2, is a moot point. They were happy with the considerably lesser hitting power of their 6 or 8 .50 calibre machine guns, the primary role of their fighters in the ETO being to destroy the Luftwaffe's fighters, for which machine guns were more than adequate. In the ground attack role they did try various options (rockets, bazookas, napalm) but to a large extent their fighter bombers were just that...fighters that dropped a bomb or bombs and strafed.

Cheers

Steve


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