# Nuclear War: Cold War



## Zipper730 (Apr 22, 2018)

From what I remember the idea of overwhelming response started in 1954, then the policy was changed in 1957 to a policy that included some form of limited conflict.

I'm curious as to the following

Did limited conflict still mean nuclear weapons?
When did the thought of brush-fire war come into existence?
I'm also curious what the general consensus the politicians had regarding the start of WWIII versus what the military had from the following periods.

1954-1957
1957-1960
1960-1962


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## fubar57 (Apr 22, 2018)

Probably the most important test and study to come out of the Cold War era...

U.S. Explodes Atomic Bombs Near Beers To See If They Are Safe To Drink

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## parsifal (Apr 22, 2018)

Mutually Assured Destruction, or MAD, does not exclude the use of “tactical” nukes outside of built up areas. Examples that it might pass as a tactical weapon might be at sea in conjunction with ASW defences, like ASROC , but there is no rule book as such as to when conflict passes from being a tactical or “limited” war, and when it becomes a “strategic” or ‘total’ war. Nobody knows when that line is crossed, and up to now nobody has been willing to test the theory. Having said that it is generally accepted that any use of nukes in any capacity could be seen as an act of total war.

Of greater significance to these demarkations are direct conflicts between the major powers. Since 1945, there has been only one direct confrontation between the superpowers, in Korea. Every other one of the flashpoint conflicts, like Vietnam, Cuba, the berlin wall even today in Syria, there has been a careful avoidance of direct confrontation between the big powers. Until now that is. Current posturing by both sides in places like the South China Sea, Korea, Syria and Eastern Europe show a lack of concern as to whether direct warfar is likely to arise, and from that, whether such conflict might escalate. 

Your assumptions about when the references to mutually assured destruction are in error. The concept has been existence for a lot longer than the 1950’s.

One of the earliest references to the concept comes from the English author Wilkie Collins, writing in 1870: "I begin to believe in only one civilizing influence—the discovery one of these days of a destructive agent so terrible that War shall mean annihilation and men's fears will force them to keep the peace."

After his 1867 invention of dynamite, Alfred Nobel stated that "The day when two army corps can annihilate each other in one second, all civilized nations, it is to be hoped, will recoil from war and discharge their troops."

Jan Gotlieb in his book “The Future of War” published in 1898, argued that the state could not fight a war "under modern conditions with any prospect of being able to carry that war to a conclusion by defeating its adversary by force of arms on the battlefield. No decisive war is possible that will not entail even upon the victorious power, the destruction of its resources and the breakup of society. War has therefore become impossible, except at the price of suicide."

In 1937, Tesla published _The Art of Projecting Concentrated Non-dispersive Energy through the Natural Media_, a treatise concerning charged particle beam weapons. Tesla described his device as a "superweapon that would put an end to all war."

In March 1940, the Frisch Peierls memorandum anticipated deterrence as the principal means of combating an enemy with nuclear weapons.

In August 1945, the United States accepted the surrender of Japan after the nuclear attacks on hiroshima and nagasaki.. Four years later, on August 29, 1949, the Soviet Union detonated its own nuclear device. At the time, both sides lacked the means to effectively use nuclear devices against each other. However, with the development of aircraft like the B-36 and the Tu-95, both sides were gaining a greater ability to deliver nuclear weapons into the interior of the opposing country. The official nuclear policy of the United States became one of “massive retaliation", as coined by President Eisenhower which called for massive attack against the Soviet Union if they were to invade Europe, regardless of whether it was a conventional or a nuclear attack.

By the time of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, both the United States and the Soviet Union had developed the capability of launching a nuclear-tipped missile from a submerged submarine, which completed the _third leg_ of the nuclear triad weapons strategy necessary to fully implement the MAD doctrine. Having a three-branched nuclear capability eliminated the possibility that an enemy could destroy all of a nation's nuclear forces in a first strike attack; this, in turn, ensured the credible threat of a devastating retaliatory strike against the aggressor, increasing a nation's nuclear deterrence.

Herman Kahn believed that although MAD was useful as a metaphor, when pushed to its logical conclusion it became absurd. In his 1960 book On thermonuclear war, he advocated a more reasoned approach to nuclear warfare and was understood by some of his critics to be a nuclear war hawk in his writings. (He did however hold a profound belief in the possibility of success in the event of a nuclear war.) He used the concept of the “Doomsday Machine” as an "idealized (almost caricaturized) device" to illustrate the danger of taking MAD to its extreme. He writes, "I used to be wary of discussing the concept for fear that some colonel would get out a General Operating Requirement or Development Planning Objective for the device". The term, "mutual assured destruction", was coined by Donald Brennan, a strategist working in Kahn's Hudson Institute in 1962.

The 1964 film Dr Strangelove parodies some of Kahn's work, and the titular character makes parodic references to Kahn's research, as in this quote from the film (after the United States mistakenly launched a nuclear attack on the USSR): "Under the authority granted me as director of weapons research and development, I commissioned last year a study of this project of a doomsday machine by the Bland Corporation. Based on the findings of the report, my conclusion was that this idea was not a practical deterrent, for reasons which, at this moment, must be all too obvious."

Sometime in the 1980s, a second, but real, doomsday device, called The Dead Hand, entered the picture in the Soviet Union. Unlike Kahn's device, it was not based on radioactive cobalt, but it was self-activated

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## Snowman (Apr 23, 2018)

fubar57 said:


> Probably the most important test and study to come out of the Cold War era...
> 
> U.S. Explodes Atomic Bombs Near Beers To See If They Are Safe To Drink



At least now I learned to stop worrying and love the Bomb!

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## Graeme (Apr 23, 2018)

Interesting book that gives a good chronological summary of SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Plan) from 1960 to 2003 based around the story of the Damascus accident...

Single Integrated Operational Plan - Wikipedia

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## Zipper730 (Apr 23, 2018)

parsifal said:


> Mutually Assured Destruction, or MAD, does not exclude the use of “tactical” nukes outside of built up areas. Examples that it might pass as a tactical weapon might be at sea in conjunction with ASW defences, like ASROC, but there is no rule book as such as to when conflict passes from being a tactical or “limited” war, and when it becomes a “strategic” or ‘total’ war.


Understood.


> Having said that it is generally accepted that any use of nukes in any capacity could be seen as an act of total war.


That was generally my assumption short of air-defenses...


> March 1940, the Frisch Peierls memorandum anticipated deterrence as the principal means of combating an enemy with nuclear weapons.


That's interesting...


> The official nuclear policy of the United States became one of “massive retaliation", as coined by President Eisenhower which called for massive attack against the Soviet Union if they were to invade Europe, regardless of whether it was a conventional or a nuclear attack.


Actually it was John Dulles, in 1954. However, as I said, this was changed in 1957 specifying certain circumstances which could include limited conflict (if what your saying is correct, it would not rule out the use of nuclear weapons).


> Herman Kahn believed that although MAD was useful as a metaphor, when pushed to its logical conclusion it became absurd.


Of course, you'd basically render humanity extinct except the politicians and powerful people able to afford bunkers (ironically the people who set the war off get to live).


> He used the concept of the “Doomsday Machine” as an "idealized (almost caricaturized) device" to illustrate the danger of taking MAD to its extreme.


What was this? A huge series of salted H-bombs bombs detonating in such a way as to drape the world in persistent radiation?


> Sometime in the 1980s, a second, but real, doomsday device, called The Dead Hand, entered the picture in the Soviet Union. Unlike Kahn's device, it was not based on radioactive cobalt, but it was self-activated


The system could be automated or semi-automated. The former scares me the most as it would be most likely to malfunction!


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## Zipper730 (Apr 23, 2018)

Graeme said:


> Single Integrated Operational Plan


I'm curious if SAC's almost hyper-centralized planning was based on the fact that it used supercomputers for target selection.

In the link above


> SAC obtained almost independent target selection by 1955. The Air Force often used target lists to justify greater weapons production, then greater spending on delivery systems for the additional weapons. Although other services opposed such "bootstrapping", they did not have the IBM 704 computer that SAC used to analyze target priorities so could not offer competing selection lists. Its Basic War Plan of March 1954 planned for up to 735 bombers to simultaneously and massively attack all targets, military and urban, in the USSR.


The target lists also seem to suggests that the plans largely relied upon using up all the weapons rather than considering the desired effects or strategic outcomes..


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## XBe02Drvr (Apr 26, 2018)

Zipper730 said:


> Actually it was John Dulles, in 1954


Actually, all that happened in 1954 was to put a name to the game. The concept of nuclear retaliation went back to the recognition of the iron curtain, Stalin's unveiling of his TU-4 strategic bombing force, and the first Soviet nuclear test. The total blackout of intelligence info from behind the curtain combined with these displays of Soviet capability led to a near panic and huge expenditures for interceptors, radars, long range jet bombers and even civil defense. In 1953 I was crawling under my first grade desk whenever the fire station put their siren into that chilling slow warble.
Cheers,
Wes


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## Zipper730 (Apr 26, 2018)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Actually, all that happened in 1954 was to put a name to the game.


Quite a game, where winning means losing and losing means being eradicated...


> The concept of nuclear retaliation went back to the recognition of the iron curtain, Stalin's unveiling of his TU-4 strategic bombing force, and the first Soviet nuclear test.


The Tu-4 was unveiled in 1947 or 1948? The first nuclear bomb was 1949, with an aerial delivery in 1950...


> The total blackout of intelligence info from behind the curtain combined with these displays of Soviet capability led to a near panic


I think it was kind of just a panic! 

The fact that the data we were getting back was guided by former Nazi's who were inclined to save their butts more than anything else, and provided all sorts of erroneous data to keep the Cold War cold so they wouldn't face the heat didn't help


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## XBe02Drvr (Apr 27, 2018)

Zipper730 said:


> The fact that the data we were getting back was guided by former Nazi's who were inclined to save their butts more than anything else, and provided all sorts of erroneous data to keep the Cold War cold so they wouldn't face the heat didn't help


Hogwash! The Iron Curtain was so impenetrable, and the KGB so much more effective than the CIA, that in the pre-U2 days we had almost no credible hard intelligence about true Soviet capabilities. We had electronic sniffers prowling the perimeters of the Eastbloc, but they didn't learn much of true strategic value, and a lot of them got shot down. We never learned until after the cold war that Stalin's TU4 fleet was no where near the threat we thought it was at the time. Not until the advent of the TU95 Bear did their bomber force reach the threat level we had been fearing. By then we had a formidable B52 fleet, and Bomarc and Nike and the DEW line, SAGE, and a hornet's nest of interceptors, not to mention bombs in the megaton range.
Cheers,
Wes

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## swampyankee (Apr 27, 2018)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Hogwash! The Iron Curtain was so impenetrable, and the KGB so much more effective than the CIA, that in the pre-U2 days we had almost no credible hard intelligence about true Soviet capabilities. We had electronic sniffers prowling the perimeters of the Eastbloc, but they didn't learn much of true strategic value, and a lot of them got shot down. We never learned until after the cold war that Stalin's TU4 fleet was no where near the threat we thought it was at the time. Not until the advent of the TU95 Bear did their bomber force reach the threat level we had been fearing. By then we had a formidable B52 fleet, and Bomarc and Nike and the DEW line, SAGE, and a hornet's nest of interceptors, not to mention bombs in the megaton range.
> Cheers,
> Wes



I think the real answer is more complex than either of the previous two posts, and complicated by a nearly hysterical overestimate of Soviet capabilities and by ideologues imagining reds under every bedk

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## XBe02Drvr (Apr 27, 2018)

swampyankee said:


> I think the real answer is more complex than either of the previous two posts, and complicated by a nearly hysterical overestimate of Soviet capabilities and by ideologues imagining reds under every bedk


Ah, but there WERE reds under(and in) every bed, cleverly disguised as liberals, beatniks, intellectuals, moviemakers, academics, journalists, members of co-ops and credit unions, Jews, blacks, homosexuals, and even the occaisonal Democrat! All intent on seducing unwary, but patriotic Americans! Just ask "Uncle Joe". No, not Stalin! The other "Uncle Joe".
Cheers,
Wes

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## soulezoo (Apr 27, 2018)

I cannot recall the name of the documents right now, but after the fall of the USSR, archived Soviet documents released pretty much confirmed all that Senator McCarthy feared. As it turns out, he was right all along--except that it was worse than he thought.

ETA: they are referred to as the Venona papers. The Venona project (US) collected Soviet transmissions but many were never decoded until after the fall of the Soviet Union and their records were released in the 90's.
A short article worth the read: Setting the Record on Joe McCarthy Straight


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## XBe02Drvr (Apr 27, 2018)

soulezoo said:


> archived Soviet documents released pretty much confirmed all that Senator McCarthy feared. As it turns out, he was right all along--except that it was worse than he thought.


Bullcrap!! He destroyed many more innocent victims than he deterred actual threats. But if we're going to get into a debate over "pinkos", "dupes", and "fellow travelers", and definitions of "Americanism", this thread is going to go right down the politic-hole.
Cheers,
Wes

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## soulezoo (Apr 28, 2018)

No, I am not trying to instigate anything or pass out foil hats or try to convince anyone of anything. Nor will I debate the point. 
But having read through the Soviet documents myself, I have my own opinion- and am entitled to it.


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## pbehn (Apr 28, 2018)

I worked with a few ex army guys and sons/daughters of ex army "brass" in Germany. As they explained it the Soviet army was so much bigger than the NATO forces in Europe that to stop them would take tactical nuclear weapons at least. From what they said, life expectancy was three days, whether there was a full blown nuclear war or a cease fire.


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## Glider (Apr 28, 2018)

Zipper730 said:


> I'm curious if SAC's almost hyper-centralized planning was based on the fact that it used supercomputers for target selection.
> 
> ..


Am I the only one who thinks of Supercomputers in those days as more than a little amusing.

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## michaelmaltby (Apr 28, 2018)

"... more than a little amusing."
But the _Nerds _persisted ... and there's nothing amusing about computing today


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## Glider (Apr 28, 2018)

soulezoo said:


> I cannot recall the name of the documents right now, but after the fall of the USSR, archived Soviet documents released pretty much confirmed all that Senator McCarthy feared. As it turns out, he was right all along--except that it was worse than he thought.


That archived documents said what the Soviet Leadership wanted them to say I can go along with. That what those documents said as being accurate and true I significantly doubt and that is also supported by facts. It was a braver person than me who would tell the powers that be, any bad news.
I would be willing to place a considerable bet that the Soviet Status reports in Jan 1988 said that everything was pretty much satisfactory, just before the Warsaw Pact imploded.

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## Zipper730 (Apr 28, 2018)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Hogwash!


You've never read about Reinhard Gehlen have you? You are right about the KGB (and GRU) being far more effective than the CIA (it seems they were ineffective because of the Nazi's they recruited who had little interest in telling the truth unless it was convenient, and the requirements were often overcomplicated -- see, we wanted to look like we were the good guys, the Russians didn't care if they looked like ogres)


> We never learned until after the cold war that Stalin's TU4 fleet was no where near the threat we thought it was at the time.


How many did we think they had?


> Ah, but there WERE reds under(and in) every bed, cleverly disguised as liberals, beatniks, intellectuals, moviemakers, academics, journalists, members of co-ops and credit unions, Jews, blacks, homosexuals, and even the occaisonal Democrat! All intent on seducing unwary, but patriotic Americans!


It is ironic how paranoid we looked in hindsight.



swampyankee said:


> I think the real answer is more complex than either of the previous two posts, and complicated by a nearly hysterical overestimate of Soviet capabilities and by ideologues imagining reds under every bedk


So basically, it was a matter of having no information; then just assuming the worst and letting our imaginations run wild.



soulezoo said:


> I cannot recall the name of the documents right now, but after the fall of the USSR, archived Soviet documents released pretty much confirmed all that Senator McCarthy feared. As it turns out, he was right all along--except that it was worse than he thought.





XBe02Drvr said:


> Bullcrap!! He destroyed many more innocent victims than he deterred actual threats.


Yeah, plus he actually got the idea from a priest to use communism as a way to boost his political campaign. Even if he had a kernel of truth in his assertions, it was basically through dumb luck, not sincerity.

He was a sociopath who was trying to gain political points and use fear-mongering, and paranoia to do it (highly effective with certain political views). I agree it's best to avoid going into this too much.



Glider said:


> That archived documents said what the Soviet Leadership wanted them to say I can go along with.


Who knows?


> It was a braver person than me who would tell the powers that be, any bad news.


Very true


> I would be willing to place a considerable bet that the Soviet Status reports in Jan 1988 said that everything was pretty much satisfactory, just before the Warsaw Pact imploded.


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## Zipper730 (Apr 28, 2018)

Glider said:


> Am I the only one who thinks of Supercomputers in those days as more than a little amusing.


In what way? That my computer probably has more processing power than a huge building?



michaelmaltby said:


> ... and there's nothing amusing about computing today


More like a combination of impressive, awe-inspiring, or frightening depending on how designed/used.


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## Glider (Apr 28, 2018)

Zipper730 said:


> In what way? That my computer probably has more processing power than a huge building?
> 
> More like a combination of impressive, awe-inspiring, or frightening depending on how designed/used.


Both really.
a) All of us have far more computer power in our phones that a super computer of the time, so what is your definition of Super Computer
b) Its not the machine its the ridiculous belief people have in the infallibility of computers. I used to be an IT Programme Manager and my speciality was projects that had either gone wrong, or were is severe danger of going wrong and the two most common statements I used to get when first reviewing a project were:-
i) It shouldn't do that
ii) The test system is the same as the live

With this bitter experience I always smile when someone says Supercomputer


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## XBe02Drvr (Apr 28, 2018)

Glider said:


> All of us have far more computer power in our phones that a super computer of the time, so what is your definition of Super Computer?


It's all about in what era you ask the question. The next time you fly into SYR Hancock International, note the derelict cube shaped building just NW of the main runway intersection. Looks like a 1 story cube nestled up against a 3 story cube.
That housed SAGE, a 1955 supercomputer that controlled the entire NE US air defense system, from BOMARC missiles in Bangor ME to interceptors in Dayton OH. It had hundreds of thousands of electron tubes, required an air conditioner 4 times its size to keep it cool, and had about the same computing power as an IBM 386 PC. Now that's a SUPERcomputer! One of my instructors was a retired career interceptor pilot who had done a tour at SAGE as a project officer deconflicting missiles and interceptors.
Cheers,
Wes


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## XBe02Drvr (Apr 28, 2018)

Zipper730 said:


> How many did we think they had?


I don't know the exact number, but bear in mind, our defense thinking was guided by veterans of 1000 plane raids in ETO. This had to have influenced their ideas. After the collapse we discovered the TU4 didn't have the range or payload we had attributed to it. With no air-to-air refueling capability, even a one way suicide mission couldn't reach the American Midland.
Cheers,
Wes


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## Graeme (Apr 28, 2018)

Zipper730 said:


> How many did we think they had?



From 1958....

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## Zipper730 (Apr 28, 2018)

XBe02Drvr said:


> I don't know the exact number, but bear in mind, our defense thinking was guided by veterans of 1000 plane raids in ETO.


This was before they had nuclear bombs?


> With no air-to-air refueling capability, even a one way suicide mission couldn't reach the American Midland.


I thought they could make Chicago...



Graeme said:


> From 1958....


I thought the plane was heavier than the B-29...


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## XBe02Drvr (Apr 28, 2018)

Zipper730 said:


> This was before they had nuclear bombs?


Wake up, man! The ETO was over months before the first A bomb. But the USAF leadership was well aware of the Soviet doctrine of "P for plenty".


Zipper730 said:


> I thought they could make Chicago...


On the last few fumes in the tanks, with a deadstick glide attack, maybe. But consider Chi Town is near the northern border of US. What about all those bases and factories in the American heartland south of there? Remember your great circle routes? The only way they could hope to reach us was "over the top".



Zipper730 said:


> I thought the plane was heavier than the B-29...


A little heavier, a little less horsepower, a little thirstier, it all adds up to "not quite" a B-29. (And certainly not a B-50) It was, however a formidable interceptor target with its 23MM cannon turrets.
Cheers,
Wes


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## Zipper730 (Jun 8, 2018)

XBe02Drvr said:


> On the last few fumes in the tanks, with a deadstick glide attack, maybe.


Didn't know that...


> It was, however a formidable interceptor target with its 23MM cannon turrets.


It can sting good...


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## Zipper730 (Aug 24, 2020)

Glider said:


> I used to be an IT Programme Manager and my speciality was projects that had either gone wrong, or were is severe danger of going wrong and the two most common statements I used to get when first reviewing a project were:-
> i) It shouldn't do that
> ii) The test system is the same as the live


What does "The test system is the same as the live" mean?


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## Glider (Aug 24, 2020)

Zipper730 said:


> What does "The test system is the same as the live" mean?



Programmes are developed and tested in a test environment which is nearly always described as being ' the same as the live'. However when you switch it to the live environment, guess what, you find it isn't. Often the servers may have slightly different specs. or often don't have all the patches installed. I should explain that operating systems get patches on an almost monthly or even weekly basis and they should be installed as soon as they arrive but invariably don't.

The most common symptom is that it runs a lot slower but if your really unlucky it fails. Where possible I used to insist on taking a live data backup, do a dry test run in the production environment, then clear the test data from production environment, reinstall the original live data and sign if off in live. 

A number of years ago I was involved in one very large and public system in the City of London involving a number of agencies, where the press and an entire Industry were watching. We followed the above protocol and to our horror we found that the differences in one agency were so fundamental, the new system simply wouldn't work on the production environment. So we tested to see if the test system would handle the loads involved in running live production volumes, found that by beefing up the servers and infrastructure they did overnight going 'live' on the test system. Definitely not best practice


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## nuuumannn (Aug 24, 2020)

XBe02Drvr said:


> After the collapse we discovered the TU4 didn't have the range or payload we had attributed to it. With no air-to-air refueling capability, even a one way suicide mission couldn't reach the American Midland.



Yeah, the Tu-4 had its inadequacies in reality, but the scare factor was part of the package as far as the Soviets were concerned. They were well aware it couldn't reach the US mainland and Tupolev in particular put vast amount of energies into using the tech and advancements the Tu-4 brought to the table to develop more capable aircraft. The real value of the Tu-4 to the Soviets was not merely the finished product, but the advancements the B-29 had that the Soviet aviation industry didn't. It was a lesson in catch-up the Soviets learned real quick and took to heart. Almost every post-war big bomber built by the Soviets gained B-29 DNA.

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## nuuumannn (Aug 24, 2020)

Zipper730 said:


> see, we wanted to look like we were the good guys, the Russians didn't care if they looked like ogres)



That's not true at all. The Soviets were no better nor worse than the USA intel community at the portrayal of the morally superior faction. Both sides were guilty of the propaganda flag waving exercise. The Soviets knew they couldn't match US technology advances, but quantity and a defensive military doctrine kept the US and the West at bay in their eyes. In reality the fear of being left behind and becoming less relevant drove the Soviet Union - it's a policy that drives modern Russia today. Russia wants to always be the Boorlaki or "strong man" and this was the same in the Soviet Union.

One thing though, the KGB as an intelligence organisation had nothing on the Stasi. The East German intel organism was the most ruthless and feared in the world. The KGB used to send agents to the DDR to train. Most Stasi staffers went straight from the Gestapo and SS into the post-war intel game, just changing uniforms and political doctrine. The Stasi originated from the post-war Soviet run K-5 intel organisation, the German branch of the NKVD, but its Soviet nominal head wanted it to become "the new Gestapo" [his actual words]. The last head of the Stasi, Erich Mielke, a long-time German commie learned his trade through the pre-ww2 German communists, then the NKVD and eventually through the Stasi to become its head, under which he gave the order to shoot on site any East German citizen attempting to breach the wall. He was once named "the most hated man in Germany" by a Munich based reporter and the tag stuck.

Erich Mielke - Wikipedia

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## Zipper730 (Aug 25, 2020)

nuuumannn said:


> That's not true at all.


They seemed more willing to brazenly kill people (assassinations), whereas we seemed to go to greater lengths to conceal the act. That said, the Russians could conceal it as good as anybody if they felt it could have catastrophic consequences.


> The Soviets knew they couldn't match US technology advances, but quantity and a defensive military doctrine kept the US and the West at bay in their eyes.


Just to be clear the USSR had a doctrine that was defensive and relied on superior numbers?


> One thing though, the KGB as an intelligence organisation had nothing on the Stasi.


They definitely had a very high ratio of spies/population and were shockingly ruthless. I didn't know they originated from the SS/SD and the K-5 intel organization of the NKVD.

That said, one has to consider the Romanian intelligence service -- they actually put recording equipment in every household. That's gotta take a degree of determination.


> The last head of the Stasi, Erich Mielke, a long-time German commie learned his trade through the pre-ww2 German communists, then the NKVD and eventually through the Stasi to become its head


I'm amazed he managed to survive Stalin, the East German government (ruthless regimes sometimes purge their intelligence chiefs every few years to limit their power), and the fall of the Berlin Wall (I could imagine a lot of East German citizens would have wanted to mete out the most painful of punishments to him).

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## Zipper730 (Aug 25, 2020)

Glider said:


> Programmes are developed and tested in a test environment which is nearly always described as being ' the same as the live'


That sounds like a good thing. The test environment and live environment are the same...


> So we tested to see if the test system would handle the loads involved in running live production volumes, found that by beefing up the servers and infrastructure they did overnight going 'live' on the test system.


Wait, so they had all the data going into the test system instead of the live one? I'm sorry if I'm wrong, but I'm not an expert on computers...


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## Glider (Aug 25, 2020)

Zipper730 said:


> That sounds like a good thing. The test environment and live environment are the same..



The point is this, they say they are the same and there supposed to be the same, but there not the same. Often there are differences and those differences can count.


> .
> Wait, so they had all the data going into the test system instead of the live one? I'm sorry if I'm wrong, but I'm not an expert on computers...


Look at it another way. There were three environments, a) Development, b) Test c) Production
In this case it was developed in the development environment and when tested in the Test environment it worked. When we tried to run it to the Production environment it failed, as the Production environment wasn't to the the same standard as the Test environment. When we reviewed the problem, the test system was up to date with all the 'patches' mentioned in my first message and it was the Production environment that was missing some making it less safe from a security and stability perspective.

The admittedly unorthodox solution was to boost the capacity of the test environment so it could take the additional load of the production volumes, and use that for 'production or 'live' running, until we sorted the problem out.

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## Zipper730 (Aug 26, 2020)

So basically you were saying that the two most common claims you heard were

- It shouldn't do that
- It's the same as the live (it isn't)?


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## Glider (Aug 26, 2020)

Zipper730 said:


> So basically you were saying that the two most common claims you heard were
> 
> - It shouldn't do that
> - It's the same as the live (it isn't)?


you got it

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## swampyankee (Aug 26, 2020)

Glider said:


> Both really.
> a) All of us have far more computer power in our phones that a super computer of the time, so what is your definition of Super Computer
> b) Its not the machine its the ridiculous belief people have in the infallibility of computers. I used to be an IT Programme Manager and my speciality was projects that had either gone wrong, or were is severe danger of going wrong and the two most common statements I used to get when first reviewing a project were:-
> i) It shouldn't do that
> ...



When I did PLM programming, we had problems with programs working well in development and beta test environments but showing unacceptably poor performance in production. This was due to there being about 200 times more users each processing much more complex drawings in production than either development or beta test environments.


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## Dimlee (Aug 26, 2020)

nuuumannn said:


> In reality the fear of being left behind and becoming less relevant drove the Soviet Union - it's a policy that drives modern Russia today.



The Soviet Union was driven by the Communist ideology agenda formulated in the so-called "Party programs". The core principle of any of the three programs was world domination. It was called by different names, "world revolution" earlier, "world socialist system" later, but the main principle was the same.
One typical mistake of _"Kremlinologists"_ and of many Western politicians (journalists, intellectuals, public figures) was to believe (or to pretend to believe) that the USSR strategy was based on anything else but the principle mentioned above. Churchill made this mistake when he coined his famous phrase _"a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma"_. His remark could be valid for the Russian Empire or the Russian Republic of 1917 or any Russian (short-lived) non-communist state of 1918-1922. But not for the USSR. Churchill has learned from his mistakes certainly and his vision was soberer in 1946 (Sinews of Peace).
As for *the fear of being left behind and becoming less relevant* - those were fears of many educated and less indoctrinated people in the USSR. Some of them belonged to "elite" and many - to the opposition, but those feelings did not determine the state policies, internal or foreign. And they had no impact on grand strategy. Some smart military and industry leaders, especially of later generations, were concerned with the technological gap, of course. But the bridging of the gap was never the first priority until the _"perestroika"._ One could always hope to steal or to buy more techs from the West or to use the quantity vs quality advantage. Or simply to relax and say: "Hey, we won that war, we can do it again". 

Sorry for the long post. Just a humble opinion of someone who lived in the USSR and excelled in the studies of "Marxism-Leninism" in those days.

As for the modern Russian Federation... This is also more complicated than many scholars of "geopolitics' say. So far, I find some lectures of Tymothy Snyder the most insightful. His concept of _the politics of eternity_ is one of the keys to the current "riddle", in my opinion.

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## michaelmaltby (Aug 26, 2020)

.. don't ever apologize for great, insightful posts, D.
Thanks

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## Glider (Aug 26, 2020)

swampyankee said:


> When I did PLM programming, we had problems with programs working well in development and beta test environments but showing unacceptably poor performance in production. This was due to there being about 200 times more users each processing much more complex drawings in production than either development or beta test environments.



That would point to a problem in the original business analysis and load test planning. To the PM coming in to try and sort it out, it falls into comment 1) 'It shouldn't do that'


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## swampyankee (Aug 26, 2020)

I think one of the things that many people forget is that bolshevik or not, the rulers of the USSR did not create their entire foreign policy out of whole cloth; significant parts of it were inherited or adopted from Russia. This could include subjugation of Poland (a goal Prussia had long held, and passed on to Germany), interventionism into foreign lands (a prime tenet of the so-called "Holy" Alliance, which led to Russian troops intervening in Western and Central Europe).

Personally, I think that the invasions of Poland, Ukraine, Georgia, the Baltic states, and Finland would have happened whether or not the bolsheviks had won the Russian Civil War. Those particular invasions were revanchism, perhaps cloaked in revolutionary rhetoric. While there may not have been a Cold War had the bolsheviks been defeated in the Russian Civil War, I think there would have been a WW2 in Europe which strongly resembled the WW2 that actually occurred. German revanchism would have been just as strong, the desire for revenge on revenge against the Entente just as strong, the antisemitism just as strong, and the desire for expansion eastward just as strong.

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## Dimlee (Aug 27, 2020)

_"Those particular invasions were revanchism, perhaps cloaked in revolutionary rhetoric "_

This is one of the main points of contention. Revanchism cloaked in revolutionary rhetoric - or revolutionary drive towards the world revolution which looked like a revanchism and used some imperial instruments.
As for Germany, we can wonder whether the Nazis can succeed if Moscow does not instruct Communists to fight against the Social Democrats and the Republic.


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## swampyankee (Aug 27, 2020)

Dimlee said:


> _"Those particular invasions were revanchism, perhaps cloaked in revolutionary rhetoric "_
> 
> This is one of the main points of contention. Revanchism cloaked in revolutionary rhetoric - or revolutionary drive towards the world revolution which looked like a revanchism and used some imperial instruments.



It really makes very little difference to the people who would be conquered in either case. 



> As for Germany, we can wonder whether the Nazis can succeed if Moscow does not instruct Communists to fight against the Social Democrats and the Republic.



Bolshevism -- and bolsheviks had pretty much taken over all the groups which had started as philosophically marxist -- was never some kind of pro-democracy organization. Having read some of Lenin's writings in my political science classes in college, the one thing that stuck in my mind about Lenin is his quest for power.

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## Zipper730 (Aug 27, 2020)

swampyankee said:


> It really makes very little difference to the people who would be conquered in either case.


What's revanchism? I've never heard the term before?


> the one thing that stuck in my mind about Lenin is his quest for power.


There's often a preoccupation for power in those who become dictators. You generally see some of the same traits that appear over and over again.

Narcissism: They're egocentric, and have a massive sense of entitlement. They often have an overinflated sense of their own abilities, and if they really are that able, any display of humility is a feint.
Machiavellian: They're largely amoral and treacherous. They're highly devious and have a cynical view of humanity, generally subscribing to a dog-eat-dog worldview. Unsurprisingly, they mistake the discipline and self-restraint from the largely unrestrained pursuit of absolute power as being some form of self-delusion. Their cynical view of humanity often includes a subtle paranoia, whereby they assume others will harm them in the same way they would if it was convenient, so they try to control others by entangling them in debt, scandal, or in compromising situations to establish leverage (it's all about power), and they're generally sadistic.
I really read about the best humanity's got to offer, eh?


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## Dimlee (Aug 29, 2020)

swampyankee said:


> It really makes very little difference to the people who would be conquered in either case.



For people who would be conquered if the USSR manages to expand beyond the borders of the "socialist camp" of 1970s-1980s, who knows...
But there was a huge difference between the ways the old Empire and USSR behaved in the conquered territories, before 1917 and after 1917, respectively.



swampyankee said:


> Having read some of Lenin's writings in my political science classes in college, the one thing that stuck in my mind about Lenin is his quest for power.



He was very straightforward in that quest, wasn't he. Ruthlessness unbelievable even for many of his comrades. From the letter to Trotsky (1919):
"If the advance begins, is it possible to mobilize about 20 thousand workers plus 10 thousand _bourgeois, _to place machine guns behind them, to shot down several hundred and to achieve the maximum pressure on Yudenich...."


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## nuuumannn (Aug 29, 2020)

Zipper730 said:


> Just to be clear the USSR had a doctrine that was defensive and relied on superior numbers?



Yes. The Soviet Military knew what its threats, its advantages and disadvantages were. At sea, the Western navies had assets that it could not match technologically nor qualitatively, for example aircraft carriers - the USSR's answer to these was the cruise missile, launched by submarines and aircraft as a stand-off weapon. From the Tu-4, the Tu-16, Tu-95, Tu-22M and the Big Tu-160, all cruise missile carriers designed to counter the US carrier threat. During Soviet times, the defensive strategy was layered, with its larger warships with their cruise missile capabilities - the Kievs and heavy cruisers equipped with these fearsome weapons, and cruise missile carrying submarines at the frontline and behind them the smaller less capable submarines behind, guarding harbour facilities etc. Obviously, the USSR's submarine force outnumbered the West's by a considerable margin.

The entire Cold War was a threat and counter threat game of developing weapon systems to defeat the opposition's advances. The USSR's numerically superior submarines were countered by not only by advanced anti-submarine ships and aircraft in abundance, but also by small stealthy diesel boats that were/are lethal. The USA's so-called 'bomber gap' with the USSR, leaving to the USSR developing ICBMs to counter the USA's numerically superior long range nuclear bomber fleet, and so on and so forth...



Dimlee said:


> The core principle of any of the three programs was world domination.



This is true, but not at any cost otherwise the USSR would have enacted this policy. The driver behind this was fear, however, not naked aggression...



Dimlee said:


> but those feelings did not determine the state policies, internal or foreign. And they had no impact on grand strategy.



I disagree with both these statements, simply because, as I mentioned, the USSR was driven by fear of failure, fear of what it considered hostile Western attitudes, fear of foreign intervention, fear of its leaders' lies being exposed etc. The desire to appear strong was (is in current Russia - Putin has stated on numerous occasions that Russia is surrounded by potentially hostile countries) driven by this exact same feeling. In Stalin's time, as you know, a desire to paint a positive picture of him and the USSR lent itself to heinous crimes against humanity, and the driver was that Stalin was paranoid beyond belief. Following this, the fear of falling behind technologically and ideologically drove aspects of every day life. Soviet citizens were being told theirs was a better life than in the West, but the reality was not the case. Why? The leaders didn't want their citizens to find out the truth behind the façade.

Analysing politically what dictated the USSR's actions has been written about by many authors and I have to admit that I haven't read many, but its ultimate driver was fear. When Perostroika was introduced, the reality behind it was the threat of economic collapse. Brezhnev's (and the two walking zombies between him and Gorby) approach was to draw the curtains and not look outside, but Gorbachev, being the astute economist that he was saw that the USSR could not compete militarily with the West, and that economically the survival of the USSR was at stake if the current status quo remained. He saw sense in a softening of the USSR's stance as being for the long term benefit of its survival, but obviously, fear of its collapse toward the end of the 80s drove him to act in typical Soviet fashion against dissident states in attempting to keep the Soviet Union together, but even he saw the end - riots and public dissent in East Germany told him the end was near for the DDR, which in turn brought about the symbolic fall of the wall, which brought about the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, with public uprising in different countries driving this shift. Fear is the key to understanding the motivation of this regime.


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## Dimlee (Aug 30, 2020)

nuuumannn said:


> I disagree with both these statements, simply because, as I mentioned, the USSR was driven by fear of failure, fear of what it considered hostile Western attitudes, fear of foreign intervention, fear of its leaders' lies being exposed etc. The desire to appear strong was (is in current Russia - Putin has stated on numerous occasions that Russia is surrounded by potentially hostile countries) driven by this exact same feeling



Agree to disagree. Your descriptions of the USSR are sometimes right on the spot and sometimes are missing crucial elements, as ideology.
Leaders of Soviet Russia were driven by fear often when the situation was not stable, the economy ruined and there were expectations of new military interventions. But the USSR since its early years was driven by the policies formed according to those ultimate goals set by the Party programs and fear was for the weak. USSR wanted to be strong and it considered itself strong since middle-late 1930s.

As a young _Komsomol _member and Navy lieutenant, I felt no fear. 
Neither my senior relatives, friends, teachers (in all forms), commanders, etc. 
The West was decadent and weak, the Capitalism was in yet another crisis, again and again, the was a Socialist Camp and the "national liberation movements" around us, so what to fear?
In none of my studies of the Soviet past, I can find the proof that the leadership was frightened, except in very few periods. For example, in 1941-1942, during the late Korean War (not Stalin himself but his close circle who probably helped the dictator to die), the Caribbean crisis to some extent (again, there was a division in the situation awareness between the leader and others).



nuuumannn said:


> This is true, but not at any cost otherwise the USSR would have enacted this policy.


Of course. Not any cost but only at that cost which was acceptable, as in the bloody but successful offensives of 1943-1945. Or in the proxy wars where the cost was economical mostly. But who said that USSR did NOT enact that policy? It was enacted step by step, year by year, everywhere where there was an opportunity. There were successes and failures and draw results, but the policy was enacted until the last years of the USSR.



nuuumannn said:


> Brezhnev's (and the two walking zombies between him and Gorby) approach was to draw the curtains and not look outside


Brezhev was a character of many anecdotes, true. And he was a talented _apparatchik_ and Party manager much more capable than his predecessor. He and his foreign minister Gromyko managed to divide the West and to enjoy the fruits of the so-called _detente._ "National LIberation"(read - organized terroristic) movement began to flourish during the Brezhnev's rule. He started to "draw" those curtains in his last 5-6 years, but it did not mean that the Party was headless. There were other smart and capable leaders. Andropov, despite the illness since 1980, was one of them and not a walking zombie even in his last weeks.

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## swampyankee (Aug 30, 2020)

Dimlee said:


> For people who would be conquered if the USSR manages to expand beyond the borders of the "socialist camp" of 1970s-1980s, who knows...
> But there was a huge difference between the ways the old Empire and USSR behaved in the conquered territories, before 1917 and after 1917, respectively.
> 
> 
> ...



I don’t think Lenin or a Lenin-like leader could come out of anyplace except a autocratic state.

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## XBe02Drvr (Aug 30, 2020)

swampyankee said:


> I don’t think Lenin or a Lenin-like leader could come out of anyplace except a autocratic state.


Spoken like a true 3rd generation social democrat!
You don't think a democracy can produce a dictator? Oh, ye of little faith! What about the Weimar Republic? And current regimes in Turkey, Brazil, Philippines, Venezuela, etc?
Citizens in a democracy under stress seem to be all too willing to embrace a charismatic, strongman leader. The more autocratic he his, the fewer hard decisions their poor, stressed out brains have to cope with. Witness the current Pied Piper of Foggy Bottom.

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## Zipper730 (Aug 30, 2020)

Dimlee said:


> Agree to disagree. Your descriptions of the USSR are sometimes right on the spot and sometimes are missing crucial elements, as ideology.


I know it sounds strange, but I generally assume most leaderships are devoid of ideology except to aggregate power and maintain it. I figure they simply use displays of ideology to get people to do what they want.


> not Stalin himself but his close circle who probably helped the dictator to die


Accidents happen...


> Brezhev was a character of many anecdotes, true. And he was a talented _apparatchik_ and Party manager much more capable than his predecessor. He and his foreign minister Gromyko managed to divide the West and to enjoy the fruits of the so-called _detente._


I assume the Vietnam war was used as a means to divide the United States up, and other conflicts affected other nations?


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## nuuumannn (Aug 30, 2020)

Dimlee said:


> Agree to disagree. Your descriptions of the USSR are sometimes right on the spot and sometimes are missing crucial elements, as ideology.



Dimlee, a pleasure to learn your perspective as always. Definitely agree to disagree though. Ideology is borne of the fear of the unknown and the nunknown itself (as is faith based constructs etc) and dissent against what exists in place. Regarding the USSR, yes, you are of course right throughout your argument, but I still believe that fear was a most successful driver. Yes, there is no doubt that those in power did not 'feel' fear, but the policy was driven by it. Perhaps insecurity is a better term of description. As a young Komsomolsk your point of view is obviously welcome and informative, but tempered by what you were expected to believe at the time. I would imagine there would have been little opportunity for you to question why you were told to believe and study what you did.

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## XBe02Drvr (Aug 31, 2020)

Zipper730 said:


> I generally assume most leaderships are devoid of ideology except to aggregate power and maintain it. I figure they simply use displays of ideology to get people to do what they want.


I think you're a bit harsh here. I think the process of acquiring power to achieve their honestly held ideological goals, and then hold on to power to protect those achievements from ideological heresy tends to change leaders from true believers to cynics. The perks that come with that power can also exert a seductive effect.


Zipper730 said:


> Accidents happen..


And can be encouraged to happen.



Zipper730 said:


> I assume the Vietnam war was used as a means to divide the United States up, and other conflicts affected other nations?


I think encouraging and supporting Uncle Ho started out as a cheap way to siphon off some of the USA's overwhelming military power, and was later recognized as a way to drive disruptive divisiveness into American society.

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## Dimlee (Aug 31, 2020)

nuuumannn said:


> Dimlee, a pleasure to learn your perspective as always.



The pleasure is all mine. This is a good discussion despite some disagreements.

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## Dimlee (Aug 31, 2020)

Zipper730 said:


> I assume the Vietnam war was used as a means to divide the United States up, and other conflicts affected other nations?



Yes, I think so. Vietnam war was probably the most impressive example, but not the only one. Yuri Bezmenov (aka Tomas Schumann) has written and spoken in many details about the underlying strategy and the methodology. I can't recommend his lectures highly enough.

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## Zipper730 (Sep 1, 2020)

XBe02Drvr said:


> I think you're a bit harsh here. I think the process of acquiring power to achieve their honestly held ideological goals, and then hold on to power to protect those achievements from ideological heresy tends to change leaders from true believers to cynics. The perks that come with that power can also exert a seductive effect.


I think for the kind of people you're thinking about, they start out with ideological goals and, in their desire to achieve them, they have to be what they're not (and they start to become the mask), and resort to devious means (which start to become routine).

That applies to people who people who become corrupted: Some people are naturally corrupt, however. That's the people that concern me most.


> I think encouraging and supporting Uncle Ho started out as a cheap way to siphon off some of the USA's overwhelming military power, and was later recognized as a way to drive disruptive divisiveness into American society.


Adds up. That said, the media played a role (whether unintentionally or not).



Dimlee said:


> Yes, I think so. Vietnam war was probably the most impressive example, but not the only one. Yuri Bezmenov (aka Tomas Schumann) has written and spoken in many details about the underlying strategy and the methodology. I can't recommend his lectures highly enough.


I should start reading


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## Zipper730 (Dec 8, 2020)

Graeme said:


> Interesting book that gives a good chronological summary of SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Plan) from 1960 to 2003 based around the story of the Damascus accident...
> 
> Single Integrated Operational Plan - Wikipedia
> 
> View attachment 490778


Hey, I just got that book! I was looking into nuclear close-calls (I'm honestly amazed we didn't blow ourselves to smithereens), and I stumbled upon to this book during the whole process.


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## Zipper730 (Dec 8, 2020)

When it comes to Strategic Air Command: Up to 1957, they had fighter aircraft (mostly for escort, though nuclear strike dominated matters). What effect did this have on the (in)flexibility of SAC?


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## soulezoo (Dec 8, 2020)

Zipper730 said:


> That said, the media played a role (whether unintentionally or not).



Intentional. The "most trusted man in America" Walter Cronkite, admitted as much in his autobiography.

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## nuuumannn (Dec 8, 2020)

Am currently reading about the development of the French nuclear deterrent and its airborne component, the Force de Frappe, or Force de Dissuasion. This is the first example of a French aircraft to air drop a nuclear weapon; on 19 July 1966 this Mirage IVA dropped an AN-21 60Kt parachute retarded bomb over the Fangataufa atoll in the French territory of Tahiti. The aircraft is on display in the Musee de l'Air, Le Bourget, Paris.





Musee de l&#x27;Air 39 

This is an AN-22 weapon. The AN-21 dropped by the Mirage was a development of the AN-11, which the AN-22 superseded as France's stockpiled air dropped nuclear weapon. The Mirage IVA was capable of delivering these weapons at supersonic speeds.




Musee de l&#x27;Air 40 

Detonating nuclear weapons in the Pacific has made France a pariah in the international community, as long after the USA, Russia and China abandoned atmospheric tests, the French continued to do so at Mururoa, which has resulted in the tagline 'Nuclear Free Pacific' gaining traction world wide and actively supported by Pacific nation governments.

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## Graeme (Dec 9, 2020)

nuuumannn said:


> Mirage IVA



To each their own - but in my opinion, one of the most beautiful looking jet aircraft ever built.

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## Zipper730 (Dec 9, 2020)

soulezoo said:


> Intentional. The "most trusted man in America" Walter Cronkite, admitted as much in his autobiography.


Really, do you have a quote. I had a hunch there was such intent.


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## soulezoo (Dec 9, 2020)

Zipper730 said:


> Really, do you have a quote. I had a hunch there was such intent.



No I don't. You'd have to read the book to understand and I read it decades ago. It's not just a quote but a story line in a chapter. Cronkite was trying to position himself to make a run at President and was using his on air opinions to leverage this aspiration. Again, he wrote this in his autobiography. So it's not just an opinion of another author doing a biography. These are Cronkite's own words.

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## tyrodtom (Dec 9, 2020)

soulezoo said:


> No I don't. You'd have to read the book to understand and I read it decades ago. It's not just a quote but a story line in a chapter. Cronkite was trying to position himself to make a run at President and was using his on air opinions to leverage this aspiration. Again, he wrote this in his autobiography. So it's not just an opinion of another author doing a biography. These are Cronkite's own words.


 If you mean the book, " A Reporters Life " it been quite a while since I read it too, but I certainly don't remember anything along that line of thought. 
That's the only book out there that might be considered a autobiography by Cronkite .

Guess I'll have to check it out of the library and check that out.

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## nuuumannn (Dec 9, 2020)

Graeme said:


> To each their own - but in my opinion, one of the most beautiful looking jet aircraft ever built.



Can't entirely disagree, Graeme. It's a beauty, makes up for all those flying outhouses the French built before World War Two! Here's some more Mirage IV goodness; the only one in existence that's not in France.





YAM 03




YAM 04 




YAM 05 




YAM 06

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## soulezoo (Dec 10, 2020)

tyrodtom said:


> If you mean the book, " A Reporters Life " it been quite a while since I read it too, but I certainly don't remember anything along that line of thought.
> That's the only book out there that might be considered a autobiography by Cronkite .
> 
> Guess I'll have to check it out of the library and check that out.



Yes, that's the one. It's been about 30 years since I read it, but that was my big takeaway. Of course, old guys and memories and all that.


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## Zipper730 (Dec 28, 2020)

I remember there was a creative strategy the USAF would do when it came to jacking up it's budgets: For starters, they would often try and assign as many targets as they could, so as to increase the number of nuclear weapons which they would require. Since nuclear weapons don't just deliver themselves, each nuclear weapon built would therefore, require a weapon system (aircraft, missile, etc.) to deliver it. Since their budgetary allotment was based on the amount they got the year before, they had no inclination to reduce budgets.

While trying to avoid the reduction of expenditures, to avoid future budget cuts, as well as using nearly every opportunity to jack up expenditures is not new, or unique to any branch of the military (or pretty much any government organization, who's budgets seem to be often set the same way), and neither is boot-strapping, the USAF seemed to take it to an entirely new level. While nuclear weapons cost a lot pound-per-pound to conventional weapons, I'm not sure if that drove up the costs as the amount of aircraft or weapons systems to deliver the weapon, as the enormous destructive capability would often offset the cost of the weapon.

As far as I know the USAF was generally the worst offender when it came to military expenditures, something that's quite impressive (depending on how you look at it), considering that.

The USAF's mission is basically aerial warfare and is kept large in even in peacetime for the purpose of deterrence
The USN's mission, also kept large in peacetime, included
Aerial warfare
Surface Warfare
Submarine Warfare
And with the USMC being under the Department of the Navy, you have
Infantry & artillery warfare
Cavalry operations
Another aerial-warfare arm
Amphibious warfare is generally viewed as a matter of the USMC, but the two almost certainly work together to make this one work.


It's certainly no small achievement -- and, while the strategy was kind of shrewd and crafty (and the old-guard of the USAAF days were very good at manipulating the bureaucracy -- sometimes better than actually fighting wars), but not so much so that it was beyond the understanding of the other services.

The USN, for example, specifically objected to this boot-strapping practice: The USAF countered with the argument that it had a supercomputer that allowed targeting to be done scientifically and with great precision. I'm not sure if, in those days, anybody in Congress realized that computers aren't magic, and only do what they are programmed to do (i.e. so if you program it to perform stupid functions, it does what it was told to), or knew anybody they could ask that was outside the USAF.

It also appeared that the USAF seemed resistant to allowing civilian policy makers to have any decision making in the target selection process (far as I know, I'm not sure if there was even a say in criteria), and appeared to have tried to keep it secret from the President when possible (they definitely tried to keep it secret from Kennedy, anyway).

From what was said over the years, even if one was to consider that striking several targets 2-4 times was acceptable (the rationale, from what I remember was to cover technical failures in the aircraft and warhead, and aircraft losses), it appears that one could have done the job with a fraction of the nuclear weapons required during the time period.

Since I'm not an expert on things (and yes, I've read the book "Command & Control"): I'm tagging a bunch of people who might have more information (to within the extent that it is not classified or confidential).



 fubar57
, 
G
 Glider
, 

 Graeme
, 
P
 pbehn
, 

 swampyankee
, 
T
 tyrodtom
, 
X
 XBe02Drvr
, and 

 Dimlee
since you were on the other side, and could lend historical perspective.

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## pbehn (Dec 28, 2020)

Zipper730 said:


> I remember there was a creative strategy the USAF would do when it came to jacking up it's budgets: For starters, they would often try and assign as many targets as they could, so as to increase the number of nuclear weapons which they would require. Since nuclear weapons don't just deliver themselves, each nuclear weapon built would therefore, require a weapon system (aircraft, missile, etc.) to deliver it. Since their budgetary allotment was based on the amount they got the year before, they had no inclination to reduce budgets.
> 
> While trying to avoid the reduction of expenditures, to avoid future budget cuts, as well as using nearly every opportunity to jack up expenditures is not new, or unique to any branch of the military (or pretty much any government organization, who's budgets seem to be often set the same way), and neither is boot-strapping, the USAF seemed to take it to an entirely new level. While nuclear weapons cost a lot pound-per-pound to conventional weapons, I'm not sure if that drove up the costs as the amount of aircraft or weapons systems to deliver the weapon, as the enormous destructive capability would often offset the cost of the weapon.
> 
> ...



You cant put all post war history in a single post. When discussing "costs" the nuclear deterrent is/was seen as a cheap alternative to a standing army in Europe of millions of men and hundreds of thousands of AFVs and transport vehicles.

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## Zipper730 (Dec 28, 2020)

pbehn said:


> You cant put all post war history in a single post.


I wasn't trying to, it had to do with the concept of overwhelming response versus limited conflicts from the start of the 'New Look' policy (in effect as of 1954) to around the time of the Cuban Missile crisis.

While threads have a tendency to meander, and there was some stuff about the nature of computer technology, the perspective of things from the USSR's side, and some discussions as to the actual degree to which they penetrated our government, but quite a bit did remain on nuclear weapons policy.


> When discussing "costs" the nuclear deterrent is/was seen as a cheap alternative to a standing army in Europe of millions of men and hundreds of thousands of AFVs and transport vehicles.


The cost of an infantry was probably the biggest issue, but even from an aviation standpoint, it also reduced the number of aircraft needed for the job at hand. The thing is, while the nuclear bombs were in a sense low-cost because (while they were actually quite expensive pound-per-pound, and had a massive infrastructure to make them) they could do so much damage per round that it worked out.

Of course, as I said in the above post: It went awry once people realized that by manipulating the targeting criteria, they could assign an ever increasing number of warheads; then boot-strap that to a weapon system needed for their delivery (and as they became more advanced, they became more expensive) and ran the budget into the stratosphere.


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## pbehn (Dec 28, 2020)

Zipper730 said:


> I wasn't trying to, it had to do with the concept of overwhelming response versus limited conflicts from the start of the 'New Look' policy (in effect as of 1954) to around the time of the Cuban Missile crisis.
> 
> While threads have a tendency to meander, and there was some stuff about the nature of computer technology, the perspective of things from the USSR's side, and some discussions as to the actual degree to which they penetrated our government, but quite a bit did remain on nuclear weapons policy.
> The cost of an infantry was probably the biggest issue, but even from an aviation standpoint, it also reduced the number of aircraft needed for the job at hand.


Even with the nuclear deterrent the cost was huge. I remember driving back from France when the build up to "Desert Storm" took place, the sky was full of USA and UK aircraft training before moving on to Saudi Arabia, friends reported the same in Germany. This was obviously what was pre planned for a European war then all people involved were packed off to the middle east when the bases had been readied for them. Maintaining a standing army was always avoided in the UK going back centuries, it is problematic. I caught the tail end of it in the late 1980s and early 1990s. My job was an inspection engineer but I wasn't allowed in some bars and clubs just because I was British (English). They had so many problems with the resident "squaddies" they just wouldnt allow anyone speaking English to go in. One guy in Hamm ( a quality manager) didn't believe I was English because I didn't have any tattoos, which is a weird way of discerning nationality, until you see the behaviour of a bunch of squaddies on a night out. It goes beyond a military issue, apart from the nights of violence in bars and random attacks on women associated with soldiers since the dawn of time 30% of men sent from UK to Germany married a local woman and didn't go back, many just left the army as soon as they could.


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## Zipper730 (Dec 28, 2020)

pbehn said:


> Even with the nuclear deterrent the cost was huge.


Yeah, I was kind of modifying my post and you responded too quick


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## Glider (Dec 28, 2020)

Zipper730 said:


> I remember there was a creative strategy the USAF would do when it came to jacking up it's budgets: For starters, they would often try and assign as many targets as they could, so as to increase the number of nuclear weapons which they would require. Since nuclear weapons don't just deliver themselves, each nuclear weapon built would therefore, require a weapon system (aircraft, missile, etc.) to deliver it. Since their budgetary allotment was based on the amount they got the year before, they had no inclination to reduce budgets.
> 
> While trying to avoid the reduction of expenditures, to avoid future budget cuts, as well as using nearly every opportunity to jack up expenditures is not new, or unique to any branch of the military (or pretty much any government organization, who's budgets seem to be often set the same way), and neither is boot-strapping, the USAF seemed to take it to an entirely new level. While nuclear weapons cost a lot pound-per-pound to conventional weapons, I'm not sure if that drove up the costs as the amount of aircraft or weapons systems to deliver the weapon, as the enormous destructive capability would often offset the cost of the weapon.
> 
> ...


First I must say I am touched to be included in your list of members and be aske to comment on this. My knowlege is far from comprehensive on this but the following is my understanding, which could easily be wrong.
From a British perspective we didn't have the capacity to have any 'overkill' for a specific target. The nearest we came was the first MIRV warheads we had on the ICBM's. The UK didn't initially have true MIRV's as we were not able to target say three different targets from the one missile. What we did was target three smaller warheads to hit three corners of the triangle with the one target in the middle. As result the target would be devastated by the three blasts. I would expect that this initial limitation has been overcome by now. 

As for the targeting itself, it's always been my belief that the Prime Minister has the final say as to what the targets are, no doubt advised by the Military authorities.

I do think that you are being unfair picking on the American forces as being '_As far as I know the USAF was generally the worst offender when it came to military expenditures_'. Russia and until recently China were in my view the worst offenders by some margin, keeping huge forces equipped with obsolescent equipment. I say recently China as they are spending vast sums of money on reequipping their forces with a lot of modern equipment of all types. Russia economically is very weak and whilst they do have some very good modern equipment the majority of their equipment is very old. Just look at their Airforce and Navy and the numbers of new ships and aircraft.

Russian Navy
No new destroyers since 1999
six frigates since 2010
There are a number of corvette's 

Russian Airforce
Might just be getting their first fifth generation aircraft. I say might as this has been announced a number of times and they have been false dawn's

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## Zipper730 (Dec 29, 2020)

Glider said:


> First I must say I am touched to be included in your list of members and be aske to comment on this.


No problem 


> From a British perspective we didn't have the capacity to have any 'overkill' for a specific target. The nearest we came was the first MIRV warheads we had on the ICBM's. The UK didn't initially have true MIRV's as we were not able to target say three different targets from the one missile. What we did was target three smaller warheads to hit three corners of the triangle with the one target in the middle. As result the target would be devastated by the three blasts. I would expect that this initial limitation has been overcome by now.


The first Polaris missiles to have multiple warheads had this too.


> As for the targeting itself, it's always been my belief that the Prime Minister has the final say as to what the targets are, no doubt advised by the Military authorities.


That is how it's supposed to be done.


> I do think that you are being unfair picking on the American forces as being '_As far as I know the USAF was generally the worst offender when it came to military expenditures_'.


I meant of the US branches. Compared to the USN, US Army, and so on...


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## Glider (Dec 29, 2020)

Zipper730 said:


> No problem
> 
> I meant of the US branches. Compared to the USN, US Army, and so on...


Apologies, I misunderstood

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## nuuumannn (Jan 15, 2021)

Glider said:


> The UK didn't initially have true MIRV's as we were not able to target say three different targets from the one missile. What we did was target three smaller warheads to hit three corners of the triangle with the one target in the middle. As result the target would be devastated by the three blasts. I would expect that this initial limitation has been overcome by now.



Indeed it has in the Trident. Initially though, the British developed, with US assistance the Chevaline programme as a retrofit to the Polaris A3 missile. Chevaline was a warhead carrying vehicle that in practise only carried two warheads, not the three that was intended - the Polaris' limited throw weight meant that because the British designed space vehicle was designed also to deploy decoys, the entire package was weight limited and so only two warheads could be carried. The concept was to launch the warheads and to deploy countermeasures designed to interact with Soviet radars, that would arrive over the target area simultaneous to the warheads, thus confusing the defences in determining which is real and which wasn't.

An extraordinarily complex programme, Chevaline was one the most sophisticated aerospace projects embarked in the UK in the late 60s/early 70s. Here is a picture of the Chevaline capsule as installed aboard a Polaris missile. The black cannister to the right of the warhead shape is a countermeasures launcher.




Chevaline

This is the vehicle body without the upper shroud, note the manoeuvring thrusters on the bottom of the capsule. This one is on display at the Farnborough Air Sciences Trust museum.




0307 FAST Chevaline

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