# 1918 - the year of offensives



## parsifal (Sep 6, 2011)

we were discussing this issue in another thread, and were correctly advised to get back on topic. Because this issue was intersting, i thought people might like a dedicated thread to discuss the issues.

The discussion can take whatever form and progress it likes, but of interest to me was a claim that the allies had to accept versailles, as a negotiated settlement, because they lacked the ability to defeat the german army. Not my opinion, but a claim put very seriously in this other threead. I believe that the german Army was defeated in 1918, and it was easily within the grasp of the allies to seek unconditional surrender of the Germans in 1918. Various political machinations, mostly from the Wilson camp, prevented that from ever happening, and from there we get the unsatisfactory treaty of Versailles....unsatisfactory from all perspectives.....

Perha-ps we should start by discussing or establishing the historical context of the various offensives, force availability tactics, resources, outcomes that kind of thing


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## michaelmaltby (Sep 6, 2011)

Aunt Ju needs to appreciate the role *non-Europeans* played in WW1.

I'll start with Canada because Parsifal you have already laid out some of the Australian achievements.


Canada's 100 Days 

Canada's Hundred Days - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Wikipedia or not, it sounds like a route to me.

MM


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## parsifal (Sep 6, 2011)

Thanks MM, despite being a wiki source, that lines up pretty exactly with AWM accounts.

We must all be living in the dark ages, I guess, because we just dont understand our european history........

And huzzah to the Canadians. Fine soldiers, fine country


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## davebender (Sep 6, 2011)

How about the Eastern Front? By 1918 the German garrison consisted almost entirely of Landwehr and cavalry. During the summer of 1918 Germany liberated all of Ukraine and the Caucasus from Bolshevik control using these third troops. The German Army also assisted in the liberation of Finland. One can argue the opposition was weak but it was essentially similiar to the opposition that defeated British organized White Russian forces during 1919.






Unfortunately the German efforts were mostly undone by the Versallies Treaty. Poland and the Baltic nations managed to defend newly won independence. Ukraine and the Caucasus were conquered by the Bolsheviks as soon as the German Army withdrew. They would have to wait another 70 years for freedom from communist rule. 

The above map shows what might have happened to Russia without the Versallies Treaty. Ukraine, The Don Cossacks, Kuban Cossacks, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan were all independent nations for a few months. Siberia east of the Urals had essentially no government other then that provided by military units such as the Czech army corps and Japanese Army.


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## parsifal (Sep 6, 2011)

It sounds like an intersting topic, but the issue being discussed is the western front. Perhaps we need another thread for this additional topic


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## Readie (Sep 7, 2011)

I'm going to re read my WW1 sources.
In the meantime my understanding of the situation on the Western Front in 1917-18 is this:

1) Australian Army.This wiki article sums up nicely History of the Australian Army - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
2) The Canadians were there at the start and finish Canadian Expeditionary Force - CEF - Battalions in WW1 
3) The Americans arrived too late to have any real impact. HOWEVER, the Germans must have realised the enormous resources that the USA could hurl into the fray.
4) The French Army was near the end of its tether.
5) The British Army was plugging away and had finally learned the lessons on 1915. The Tank would prove a formidable weapon.
BBC - History: World War One
Taking the USA resources, the allied naval blockage superior battle tactics into account, the allied victory was assured.

Cheers
John


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## davebender (Sep 7, 2011)

Excuse me but I don't see "Western Front" mentioned in the topic.


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## Readie (Sep 7, 2011)

davebender said:


> Excuse me but I don't see "Western Front" mentioned in the topic.



Dave, have a shuftie at the original thread that this one has spun off from and you'll see that we were talking, well some of us were talking... about the Western front.
Cheers
John


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## parsifal (Sep 7, 2011)

davebender said:


> Excuse me but I don't see "Western Front" mentioned in the topic.




Ah true, but I do see 1918 in the title (as opposed to post war), and as John points out its the western front.

But to respond to your comments attempting to compare operations on the eastern front to those on the western front, the germans suffered just as many supply failures on the western front as the allies did. more in fact. And, further, their rates of advance were nowhere near what they were on the Eastern Front. For the Germans it was a good day if they advnaced 5 km, just like the allies.

As toatmpting to say the British could not achieve what the germans did. Maybe, but in the TO where comparisons like that are possible, that is on the Western Front, you have declined to make any comment. The best place to make the comparison that you want to make, that is german army versus British army, is on the western front. Why not make that comparison. The data and the knowledge is there, so isnt that the best place to look at the effectiveness issue?


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## parsifal (Sep 8, 2011)

Making the record as complete as possible.....

The comment that led to the creation of this htread came from the thread "Which side would you fly for" and basically said this

_"So did the German advance so much in spring 1918 offensive. There was little indication that Entente could stop it. Then German reached end of supply line, and offensive gradual halted. It simple nature of non-motorized warfare. There was simply nothing suggest that German army was about to collapse in 1918. All it was done to push it back a bit. 40-60 miles advance may seem a lot to generals of trench warfare, but in practical side? German were retreating toward supply, Entente from it, and frontline shortened. You also seem to forget they were still in Belgium - France border. Territory could be traded any time - it had no importance for German. Problem was that march forward 50 miles was not going to change anything in big picture of things. What parsifal suggest, that march into Germany and force unconditional surrender was simple pipe dream for Entente or anybody else"_.

My initial reply to that was to recount the victory at hamel....the point where the allies stopped banging their heads against the wall, and started to de-construct the german defences:

"According to the Deuxieme Bureau the germans were calculated on the 27 March to posses 85 divisions for their offensive. of which 62 were considered combat ready. A contemporay German high command corroborates this assessment, and further reports that of the remaining divisions, approximatrely half could not be considered combat ready because of malnourishment. They were starving and considered unable to stand up to the rigours of an offensive battle. So much for Germany being self sufficient in food in 1918. 

By 27 June, the numbers of combat ready divisions on the western front had fallen to just 39 divisions, and the French intelligence service noted that many of these formations had lost their most experienced troops, including the stosstruppen. Replacements were insufficient to fill all gaps in the ranks and consisted mostly of underaged, inadequately trained replacements.

According to martin Marix Evans (1918, Year of Victories), "_the germans were becoming increasingly anxious at the level of allied resistance and the casualties they (the Germans) were suffering. The army high command determined that they could not recommence offensive action until the 20 july but in the end this proved an impossible target, and the offensive was not restarted. 

Moreover sickness rates per division in the German army were very high, about twice as high as in the british army, due mostly to systemic malnourishment in the German Army at this time_."

Part II of this excellent book is entitled "The Allied counteroffensive - the German army destroyed. The ANZAC Corps was involved in these counterattacks at this time, and represented one of the elite formations used to spearhead and destroy the rearguards of the retreating Germans. Just as an example, lets look at one small counterattack In the counterattack at Hamel. The Australian commander, John Monash demonstrtrated how well and how complete the Australians now understood the principals of warfare. Monash put his plan to his army commander Rawlinson in June. He requested and received a tank Brigade for support, the 5th tank Brigade to support the single division committed. The assault Infantry battalions rehearsed and trained for several weeks with the Tank Corps men, so that the tanks and the infantry worked as a close knit team and had a good understanding of each other. The 5th Tank Brigade, was equipped with the new MkV tanks far more reliable than those used at bullecourt, and now adequately supported by proper maintenance. Monash arranged to to use his artillery in counterbattery fire assisted by observation balloons and FOOs. The command structure for thje attack was simple and efficient. The artillery was to be used also as a smokescreen and as a creeping barrage to support the attack. The Infantry were detailed to support the armour, not the other way round. Each Infantry Company was to advance independantly, behind the cover of an tank. The Infantry were carrying machine guns and grenades and a heavy amount of ammunition.

The battle went ahead on the 4 July, with some 8 companies of American troops also participating (with reluctant agreement from Pershing). The battle was a complete success. Despite some stiff resistance from the german defenders (2 VCs were won that day), the ANZACs killed or captured 4310 Germans in less than 93 minutes. Australian casualties were 731. It was a marked demonstration of just how far the Australians had developed their fighting techniques. The British published the battle plan in a brochure and used it for the remaineder of the war as a model for a set piece battle. Gains of territory unheard of previously had been achieved....close to 6 miles in places. The best appraisal possibly can be found in the records of the enemy. The German second army HQ commented on the allied success that day, and how the germans had proven unable to counter the offensive effectively. It was the beginning of the end for the German army." 

A further comment by Aunty Ju was as follows

_What German high command (Luddendorf) knew was that war could not be won, but there was no doubt on the other hand that peace could be made. The suffering of morale is true, but at same time it is noted that Entente morale for offensive was already crippeld two years ago. We know French soliders simply refuse to attack. Mass executions were ordered by Petain to restore order. In short, the German were at the end of their will to make offensive, but so were the Entente. I completely agree with you about importance of German allies falling out. This was imho most important part that German throw in towel, too. _

My response (slightlymodified)

"Really???? Err no, by the second half of 1918, the french had staged a recovery, and were counterattacking effectively. For example, Foch used the french XX Corps of the 10 army to counterattack after 2nd Marne to recapture Soissons, and trhen clear the Germans entrencehed along the river. The frenchmen performed very well in this operation, before being relieved and rested by the American forces. The Germans were essentially kicked from pillar to Post by this series of attacks, delivered in rapid succession to each other"".

I will come back a bit later and analyse in more detail just how "crippled" the French were, looking at some of the battles they were involved in such as SDoissons and 2nd Marne along with their collaborative efforts at belleau Wood and elswhere with the americans and the british. There can be no denying that the french had been wounded by their experiences in 1917, but "at the end of their will to make offensive"...hardly as the accounts will show


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## parsifal (Sep 8, 2011)

The Battle Of Amiens
This is a further cut and paste from the thread "which side would you fly for, again to make the records as complete as possible)

"Looking a little further at events in late 1918, and whether the German Army was effectively resisting allied offensives...

This is an extract, a summary from the Official Australian War Memorial archives in Canberra 


"On 14 July 1918, the German Army launched its last great attack on the French in the area of the Marne River, east of Paris and on either side of the major city of Rheims. The French had anticipated this move and had held their front line lightly. Then, as the Germans went forward, they encountered strong French reserves and were repulsed. On 18 July the French, accompanied by fresh American divisions, counter-attacked. This Franco-American advance drove the enemy back towards his main supply railhead. Taken by surprise, the Germans began to pull back and a major offensive against the British in Flanders was called off as reinforcements were sent south. It was a turning point on the Western Front. The great German offensive had faltered and was not resumed. The initiative now passed back to the Allies and it was decided that a major British attack would be made east of Villers-Bretonneux. It was thought that because of constant Australian harassment there, the Germans’ morale was low and their fortifications weak.

The Battle of Amiens, fought between 8 and 11 August 1918, marked the beginning of the British advance that culminated in the Armistice of 11 November 1918. The preparations for the battle included unprecedented security in order to achieve maximum surprise. The Canadian Corps was secretly moved to the Somme area and took over the southern half of the Australian front line. The Australia Corps was concentrated between the Canadians and the Somme River while the British held the line north of the river. The infantry moved into their assembly positions in the small hours of 8 August. A dense fog gathered and unseen aeroplanes droning above drowned out the noise of the tanks that would support the infantry. The fog was still dense at 4.20 am when the artillery barrage opened fire and the advance began.

These early attacks were carried out in dense fog with infantry and tanks moving in what they hoped was the right direction. The first objective was seized by 7.30 and some German positions were bypassed and then attacked in the rear. Most of the German field artillery was overrun and quickly captured. By 8.20 the fog had began to thin and fresh troops resumed the advance". 


Charles Bean, the Australian official historian wrote:

"A_ little later the mist suddenly cleared, and for a moment all eyes on the battlefield took in the astonishing scene: infantry in lines of hundreds of little section-columns all moving forward – with tanks, guns, battery after battery, the teams tossing their manes"_. 

Charles Bean, Anzac to Amiens, Canberra, 1948, p.471


When the fog lifted German guns opened up at the tanks and put many out of action, but the Australian infantry kept going and soon overran most of the guns. The greater part of the final objective for the day, the old outer line of the Amiens defence system, was captured. The Canadian and French attacks had gone as well as those of the Australians and penetrations of up to 25 kilometres of the German front south of the Somme had been achieved within a few days of the offensive as the german defences were swept away in dramatic fashion. 

This was a victory that far surpassed any previous success of the British Army on the Western Front. The Allies had inflicted over 75000 unrecoverable casualties on the totally demoralized german forces. 4th Australian Division alone had captured more than 13,000 Germans were made prisoners and more than 200 guns captured. The French had taken 3500 prisoners. 

General Eric von Ludendorff, the German commander, later wrote of 8 August 1918:

[It] _was the black day of the German Army in this war. ... The 8th of August put the decline of that [German] fighting power beyond all doubt. ... The war must be ended._ 

Ludendorff, quoted by Charles Bean, Anzac to Amiens, Canberra, 1948, p.473

The advance continued on the following days with the Australians taking Etinehem, Lihons and Proyart. Australian casualties for the offensive, mainly from 9–12 August, were 6,000 killed and wounded with total Allied casualties (some of whom later returned to battle) of just 22000.

I fail to see how it can be said the german army by this stage was effectively resisting the allied counteroffensive. Sure they may have staged a partial recovery in the latter stages of 1918 as the winter weather set in, and some manpower previously wounded was returned to units, but as ludendorf states, from the 8th August on there was no recovery for the germans.

The allies should never have accepted the weak treaty of versailles. Pershing was absolutely right. Unconditional surrender should have been the allied terms. nothing less. That and the full occupation of germany itself in 1919 (the modern equivalent the romans ploughing salt into the soil of carthage) would have left no doubt as to who had won, and prevented the myths that led to Hitlers rise from ever gaining traction.

What a lost opportunity...... "


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## parsifal (Sep 8, 2011)

The Battle Of Cambrai-St Quentin

The battle of Cambrai-St. Quentin, 27 September-9 October 1918, was the main British contribution to Marshal Foch’s all out attack on the Hindenburg line (the Hundred Days). It saw three British and one French army force the Germans out of their strong defensive line and back to the River Selle. In this period the german army was repeatedly and comprehensively defeated, following on from the initial successes at Hamel and Amiens.

Foch’s plan involved a Franco-American attack between Reims and Verdun (Meuse-Argonne Offensive), a combined French, British and Belgian attack in Flanders, and a mainly British offensive between Cambrai and St. Quentin. Here four allied armies (three British and one French), under the overall attack of Douglas Haig, would attack the strongest part of the German line. 

Haig’s four armies, from north to south, were the British First (Horne), Third (Byng) and Fourth (Rawlinson) and the French First (General Marie Eugene Debeney). On 25 September the British had 22 divisions in the front line, with twenty more in reserve (all conbat ready). In addition there were two divisions of the American II Corps, the equivalent of four normal divisions. Debeney had a further eight divisions in the line. The Germans had fifty seven divisions opposing the British. Rawlinson’s fourth army, which was to make the central attack, was faced by von der Marwitz’s Second Army. 

The German defensive position had been carefully chosen towards the end of 1916. Long sections of it were based on the Canal du Nord and the St. Quentin Canal, which ran through steep sided 60ft deep cuttings. The British plan was to launch their main attack between Vendhuille and Bellicourt, where the canal ran through a tunnel. The elite Australian corps and the fresh US II Corps would carry out the attack. Elsewhere attacks would be made on the line of the canal, but less was expected of them.

The battle began on 27 September with an attack by the First and Third Armies on the Canal du Nord. They advanced four miles along a thirteen mile front, captured 10,000 prisoners and cleared the canal. They suffered less than 2000 casualties completing this task.

The southern attack began on 29 September. It did not go according to plan. A preliminary attack on 28 September had failed, leaving American troops in isolated advanced position close to German strong points. The artillery bombardment couldn’t fire on these strong points for fear of hitting the Americans, and nor could the first part of the advance be protected by a creeping barrage. The American attack was soon bogged down (although elements from the 30th Division were able to seize control of the southern end of the St. Quentin Canal), forcing the Australians to join in much sooner than expected. The attack on the St. Quentin Canal was in serious trouble.

Further south the canal itself was also under attack. IX Corps had prepared carefully for the water crossing, providing their men with collapsible boats, life jackets and even floating piers, in the expectation that the Germans would destroy every bridge over the canal. Instead, as the 46th (North Midland) Division advanced towards the canal they realised that the bridge at Riquaval was still intact. The 137th (Staffordshire) Brigade captured the western bank of the canal, and the 1/6th North Staffords rushed the bridge. By the end of the day two divisions were across the canal, and IX Corps had captured four miles of the main Hindenburg Line. The attack at Riquaval produced one of the most famous pictures of the war, taken on 2 October 1918 and showing the men of the 137th Brigade lining the steep banks of the cutting listening to a speech by Brigadier-General J V Campbell. 

The following day the 3rd Army were in the western suburbs of Cambrai and by 2 October the line of the St. Quentin Canal had been captured. General Max von Boehm, commanding the local German army group, was forced to retreat to a new line running south from Cambrai. 

This line only held for a few days. On 8 October the British Third and Fourth and French First Armies, launched a set-piece attack along a 17 mile front, forcing the Germans out of the new line. Cambrai was liberated on 9 October, and the Germans forced back to a new line on the River Selle, near Le Cateau. The BEF was returning to the battlefields of 1914. 

The battle of Cambrai-St. Quentin is also know as the battle for the Hindenburg Line. Officially it was the battles for the Hindenburg Line, further broken down into the battle of the Canal du Nord, 27 September-1 October 1918 (the British First and Second Armies) and the battle of the St. Quentin Canal, 29 September-2 October 1918 (the Fourth and French First Armies), followed by the battle of Beaurevoir, 3-6 October 1918 and then the battle of Cambrai of 1918, 8-9 October 1918. 

After 9 October the fighting died down for a few days while the British prepared to attack the line of the Selle. Having pushed the Germans out of their main defensive lines, Haig was determined not to give them the time to create strong new positions. The battles of the Selle, 17-25 October, Valenciennes, 1-2 November 1918 and the Sambre, 4 November 1918, followed by the Pursuit to Mons, 4-11 November 1918, saw the Germans pushed out of a series of defensive positions, until on the morning of 11 November the Canadians entered Mons, just in advance of the armistice.


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## parsifal (Sep 8, 2011)

*The Hundred Days *The above accounts are part of what Foch referred to as the "Hundred Days" (references to Napoleons Hundred days perhaps???)

(18 July-11 November 1918) was the final Allied offensive of the First World War on the Western Front. The stalemate on the Western Front had been broken by the great German offensives of the spring and summer of 1918, which had pushed the Allies back up to forty miles and created a series of huge salients in the Allied line. They had failed to achieve their main objective, which had been to separate the British from the French and capture the channel ports, and had drained much of the strength out of the German army. 

One result of the crisis caused by the first of the German offensive (second battle of the Somme), had been the appointment of Marshal Foch as commander-in-chief of all Allied armies on the Western Front. As the German offensives began to run out of power, Foch began to plan the Allied counterattack. This was to begin with a series of attacks designed to eliminate the salients in preparation for a final campaign in 1919. If the initial attacks went well, then Foch hoped to launch a major offensive that he hoped would push the Germans back off French soil. Even if that succeeded, there was every chance that the Germans might choose to defend their own borders, leaving the final campaign still to be fought. 

Phase One – Clearing the Salients 

The Hundred Days began with a French counter-attack. The final German offensive, the Champagne-Marne Offensive, 15-18 July, made very little progress, and on 18 July the German salient (Château-Thierry or Marne salient) was attacked from the west (Aisne-Marne Offensive, 18 July-5 August). By the time the French offensive ended, the Germans had been pushed back to the line of the Aisne and Velse rivers. 

The next step was the elimination of the Amiens salient. This had been created during the second battle of the Somme, and extended over the old Somme battlefield of 1916, past the Somme River and almost to Amiens. The battle of Amiens began on 8 August with a surprise tank attack by the British Fourth Army (Rawlinson). This broke through the German lines, destroyed six divisions and forced the Germans back nine miles in one day. Ludendorff described 8 August as the “Black Day of the German Army”. The second phase of the battle (battle of Bapaume) saw the Germans forced back to the line of the Somme, and then to the Hindenburg Line, their starting point back in March. The most important feature of this battle was that it saw entire German units collapse for the first time during the war. 

The final salient to be cleared was at St. Mihiel (12-13 September), south of Verdun. This was the first major battle fought by the American army since their arrival in France. The Germans were caught in the process of evacuating the salient and after some fierce fighting the Americans captured 13,000 German prisoners and cut off the salient. 

Phase Two – Assaulting the Hindenburg Line 

The great success of the battles to clear the salients encouraged Marshal Foch to launch his great triple offensive. The Germans had been forced back to the strong defensive line they had held at the start of 1918, known in English as the Hindenburg Line. To the Germans this was the Siegfried Stellung (the Siegfried Position), a series of defensive zones constructed over the winter of 1916-17 twenty five miles behind the then front line on the Somme. Operation Alberich saw the Germans withdraw to the new shorter stronger front line in four days (March 1917). Ludendorff’s five great battles of the spring and early summer had seen the Germans advance well beyond the line, but now they were back in place. This would be the big test of Allied strength. 

Foch decided to launch a three pronged attack on the German lines. In the north King Albert of Belgium, with a force of British, French and Belgian troops, would attack through Flanders. In the centre of the line Haig would command three British and one French army in an attack on the heart of the Hindenburg line between Cambrai and St. Quentin. Finally, to the south the French and Americans would attack on the front between Reims and Verdun. 

The great offensive was timed to begin at the end of September. A number of preliminary operations were required to bring the Allied line into place for the assault; amongst them the battle of Epehy (18-19 September) but the Allies were soon in place ready for what was hoped would be the final “big push”. 

The southern part of the great attack was the Meuse River-Argonne Forest offensive of 26 September-11 November. This saw the America First Army attack on the front west from the Meuse into the Argonne Forest and the French Fourth Army from the Argonne Forest east towards Reims. The first phase of this battle began on 26 September. The Americans advanced two miles through the difficult Argonne Forest and five miles along the Meuse. Further west the French pushed forward nine miles. The Americans were then forced to take a short break to rotate fresh troops into the front line, before beginning the second phase of the battle on 4 October. Between 14-17 October they forced their way through the main German defences, and by the end of October had cleared the Argonne forest. On their left the French advanced twenty miles, reaching the Aisne River. By the end of the war the French and Americans had reached Sedan and had cut the Sedan-Metz railway line, one of the main supply lines to the German front.

The northern attack began on 28 September and was a dramatic success. The British and Belgian armies advanced across the old Ypres battlefield and recaptured all of the ground lost during the Lys Offensive. In three days the Menin Road Ridge, Passchendaele Ridge and all of the familiar landmarks of four years of fighting were back in Allied hands, and at the end of three days the Allies had advanced ten miles, reaching the Menin-Roulers road. This phase of the fighting was officially designated the battle of Ypres, 1918, but is also sometimes known as the fourth battle of Ypres. 

Rain, mud and inadequate planning then delayed the offensive for a fortnight. The second phase of the northern offensive began on 14 October (battle of Courtrai) and continued until the end of the war. On 17 October Lille, Ostend and Douai were liberated. The Belgian army reached Zeebrugge and Bruges on 19 October. By the end of the month the Allies were at the Schelde and by the time of the Armistice the Allies had advance fifty miles. 

Haig had been given the hardest job. His was the only front where the Germans still outnumbered the Allies, although not by a great deal, and the quality of their troops was in some doubt after the fighting of the spring and early summer. Forty British divisions supported by the American II corps faced fifty seven German divisions protected by the powerful fortifications built before the German withdrawal of 1917. The German defences took advantage of a series of wide canals which ran though deep cuttings. The cuttings on the Canal du Nord and the St. Quentin Canal were up to sixty feet deep. 

The central attack began on 27 September with an attack on the Canal du Nord by the 1st and 3rd Armies (battle of Cambrai-St. Quentin). Two days later the 4th Army began the main attack on the St. Quentin Canal. The main set-piece attack, aimed at a gap in the line where the canal went through a tunnel, got bogged down, but an attack by the 46th (North Midland) Division further south captured a bridge over the canal at Riqueval, and captured a key beachhead across the canal, along with a stretch of the main Hindenburg line. A second set piece attack on 3 October met with more success, pushing the Germans out of their reserve line. The Hindenburg line had been broken. 

If the British had expected a rapid advance beyond the Hindenburg line they were to be disappointed. German resistance was stubborn, if unsuccessful, and every advance was contested. The Germans held a new line running south from Cambrai, forcing another set-piece attack. On 8 October the British Third and Fourth Armies and the French First Army attacked along a seventeen mile front extending south from Cambrai. The town was captured on 9 October and the Allies advanced four miles before the Germans took up another position on the Selle. 

After a brief pause another set-piece attack was launched on 17 October (battle of the Selle). The British were now back on familiar ground from 1914, fighting around Le Cateau (17-18 October). The Germans retreated to yet another river line, this time on the Sambre. Once again a set-piece attack was launched. A preliminary attack on 1-2 November saw the Canadians capture Valenciennes, and then on 4 November Haig’s armies launched an attack on a thirty mile front along the Sambre. This was the final British set-piece of the war. The fighting from 4-11 November was officially designated the Pursuit to Mons. One of the last actions of the war saw Canadian troops liberate Mons on the morning of 11 November. 

This final phase of the fighting on the Western Front was amongst the most costly of the war. The British suffered 350,000 casualties between August and the end of the war, 200,000 of them between the start of September and 9 October, of which 140,000 were suffered at Cambria-St. Quentin. Only the first battle of the Somme was more costly. The difference this time was that the Allies finally achieved all of their objectives, for the fighting since August had finally broken the German will to continue the war.


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## parsifal (Sep 8, 2011)

U]Phase Three – The German Collapse[/U]

The three pronged Allied offensive triggered a process of collapse inside the German establishment. On 28 September Ludendorff had his own black day, spending most of the day in an incoherent rage. That evening he told Hindenburg that Germany needed to seek an armistice, as it was no longer possible to win the war on the battlefield. The spring and summer offensives had been designed to win the war before the Americans could arrive in numbers. Now an increasingly large number of American troops were taking part in the fighting and the British and French were demonstrating an ability to force their way through the strongest of defensive lines.

The crisis soon spread. On 29 September the Kaiser visited headquarters as Spa to be told that victory was no longer possible. On the same day the Bulgarians began armistice negotiations – the first of Germany’s allies was about to be knocked out of the war. 

On 3 October the Kaiser appointed Prince Max of Baden, a political moderate, as Chancellor of Germany. It had been decided that the only way to gain a good peace was to transform Germany into a democracy. There was also an increasing amount of unrest on the home front, where the Allied blockade was being felt. Sacrifices that were acceptable while the German armies were advancing were not tolerable now they were in retreat. 

German hopes were based on President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points. These peace terms had been announced on 8 January 1918 in a speech to Congress, and were seen as the basis for an honourable peace. That speech had been made before the massive battles of 1918, and the eventual armistice terms would be rather less generous. 

Prince Max had the sense to get Hindenburg to admit in writing that there was no further chance of forcing a peace on the enemy. This was fortunate, as towards the end of October Ludendorff had recovered his nerve. The German army was still in retreat, but it was now a fighting retreat. On 24 October Ludendorff issued and then withdrew a proclamation denouncing Prince Max. One copy was leaked, and on 27 October Ludendorff was ordered to resign.

At the British prepared for their attack on the Sambre, the Kaiser left Berlin and moved to the military headquarters at Spa (29 October). There he soon lost all contact with reality, and began to plan to use the army to restore order in Germany. 

30 October was a key day. On that day Turkey surrendered. Germany’s only remaining ally, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was in the process of dissolving. With defeat clearly imminent the German High Seas Fleet was ordered to sea, to seek a final suicidal battle with the British Grand Fleet. Not surprisingly the fleet mutinied, and refused to take to sea. On 4 November the Kaiser’s brother, Prince Henry of Prussia, the commander at Kiel, was forced to flee. On the previous day the Austro-Hungarian cease fire had come into effect. 

Negotiations with the Allies were now under way. The only stumbling block was the Kaiser, who was unacceptable to the Allies. On 9 November, under increasing pressure from revolutionary forces in Berlin, Prince Max handed power to Friedrich Ebert. He was a moderate socialist, who despite being a monarchist saw that any attempt to retain the Kaiser might lead to revolution. On 10 November Willhelm II went into exile in Holland, from where on 28 November he signed his abdication papers. At 11 am on 11 November the fighting stopped on the Western Front.


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## parsifal (Sep 8, 2011)

So, there it is, a basic framework of what happened in that final 5 months of 1918. Happy to field questions or additional questions, but the burning question for me is, that the allies had it within their power to demand unconditional surrender, why did they accept the unsatisfactory peace of Versailles???? I blame Wilson


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## michaelmaltby (Sep 8, 2011)

"... I blame Wilson". 

I basically agree - although the Revolution taking place in Russia and the diplomatic leaks that followed Lenin's withdrawal (for ex. 
Sykes-Picot) from the war cannot have made for easy going for either Britain or France. Certainly Britain knew the Bolsheviks were going to be sewing discord among Russia's former allies wherever they could. Long term - a new Communist state committed to world Revolution was more dangerous than a more traditional foe - Germany - which itself was being threatened by the 
Internationaliste conflagration.

But Wilson - the academic - had certain pretensions for himself and for America. He was wrong of course, as born out by Congress' rejection of membership in the League. But - like our current crop of academics, Wilson was a dabbler IMHO. Dangerous because he wasn't geo-politically realistic and he didn't carry the weight of America behind him - the way Harry Truman and George Marshall did in 1945-46, for example.

MM


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## parsifal (Sep 8, 2011)

I agree. But I should also acknowledg that the glaring difference in WWI interallied co-operation was the lack of international co-operation outside the strictly military. In the 2nd war, the allies were able to meet and agree on general terms of surrender. that makes it harder for a nation to cut and make a separate deal with the enemy. The allies were also able to provide assistance to each other such as lend lease and the coordination of major offensives and the like. None of this occurred until the appointment of Foch as the supreme leader of the allied armies, and then only for that TO, and only in relation to miltary matters. Diplomatic arrangements continued to be a bit of a hodge podge IMO


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## davebender (Sep 10, 2011)

Fourteen Points - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


> The Fourteen Points speech was the only explicit statement of war aims by any of the nations fighting in World War I.


The German Government agreed to stated U.S. war aims. Try as he might, President Wilson could not refuse to accept an armistice based on the Fourteen Points. Otherwise he would probably get impreached by Congress.


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## parsifal (Sep 10, 2011)

well, it does seem that there is general consensus that militarily the Allies were capable presing for unconditional surrender. The main problem preventing this from ever happening was 

a) British and French war weariness and exhaustion
b) a lack of unity at the diplomatic level by the Allies. There was no clearly stated joint declaration by the allies calling for unconditional surrender.
c) The US was committed to a negotiated settlement 

First question then, are there any other factors that might have contributed to the Allies negotiating a peace deal rather than demanding it. One possibility i can think of is the Rhine barrier. I have never found any references to this anywhere, its sheer speculation, but I could envisage the allies seeing the crossing of the rhine as a major incentive to making peace. Was the situation along the rhine different in a major way to 1945. Would the germans have surrendered unconditionally once their territory west of the rhine had been lost? 

Secondly what sort of unconditional surrender were the Germans likley to have imposed on them? The WWII sirrender had been pretty carefully worked out, with zones of occupation, de-nazification and de militarization programs agreed on. Eventually how to deal with war crimes was also worked out....no summary justice, rather a process of war crimes trials, as fair as they could be.....no application of collective responsibility, though Soviet behaviour kinda tested that principal. The allies agreed that Germany as a nation would be retained, and rebuilt, though once again the Soviets kinda reneged on that idea, hence the two state solution until 1989. 

All of these principals were unheard of in 1918, and the peace treaty had more in common with the treaty that followewd Waterloo rather than the treaty that followed German surrender in '45. Unconditinal surrender had usually led to annexation, permanent occupation and exploitation and the like and had pretty much disappeared after the 1700s. Negotiated settlements, a kind of extension of limited war, was the order of the day, but in my view, the concepts of "civilized" limited war settlements could not be applied to a conflict that to all intents and purposes had been a toal war, the first since the 30 years war (Napoleons wars were not total in the same sense, though they were big. The ACW was perhaps the nearest modern equivalent) 

But despite the new concepts in diplomacy that would have been needed, it was not beyond possibility for this to have occurred. I think the main stumbling block was that countries were concerned that occupation would be permanent, and would in fact lead to annexation....the destruction of the german state, and this would have been just as unsatisfactory as conditional surender to most of the major powers (Britain and the US mostly)

So, even though I am a very strong believer in unconditional surrender in 1918, because i think it would avoid the need for a 2nd global conflict, I simply dont think it was feasible for a number of reasons. 

Still, I have to pose a final question.....if a unconditional surrender had been achieved, with Germany as a state surviving, would this have been enough to have prevented the 2nd war from erupting (perhaps later than 1939), would germany have ended up a communist state, or would the remainder of Europe have achieved a permanent peace for itself???

seems


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## michaelmaltby (Sep 10, 2011)

".... the peace treaty had more in common with the treaty that followed Waterloo rather than the treaty that followed German surrender in '45."


This is very profound and very true . The EXPERIENCE of WW1 -- four years of mass, mindless slaughter - was a great influencer of tween-war consciousness:the death of Christianity for many in Europe and the West. The climate leading to WW2 was totally shaped by the horrors of '14-'18.

"....if a unconditional surrender had been achieved, with Germany as a state surviving, would this have been enough to have prevented the 2nd war from erupting (perhaps later than 1939), would germany have ended up a communist state, or would the remainder of Europe have achieved a permanent peace for itself???


The short answer is: WW2 was act II of a three act play. If the First Punic War had turned out differently, would there have been a Second or Third Punic War?

Yes. There wasn't room for Carthage and Rome. And there wasn't room for another European "Empire" in 1914. [And as a consequence of the war, all European empires were destroyed.

MM


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## davebender (Sep 10, 2011)

The Soviet Union will still be just as aggressive and they may control a communist German rump state.

Plus all the regional conflicts that have the potential to become a general European war. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia are civil wars waiting to happen. Hungary has border disputes with Czechslovakia and Romania. Italy has border disputes with Yugoslavia. Poland has border disputes with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and the rump German state. Bulgaria has border disputes with Greece, Serbia/Yugoslavia and Romania. The rump German state has border disputes with everyone except Switzerland and the Netherlands. Turkey has multiple border disputes also. Spain will still fall apart and the Soviet Union will still take the opportunity to install a client communist government. If France continues to occupy the Saar and Rhineland into the late 1930s you can expect an insurrection. If the rump German state becomes communist then France is likely to become communist also, as they almost did historically during 1936.

Europe looks like a house of cards to me. The first gust of wind will blow something over.


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## michaelmaltby (Sep 11, 2011)

"..... Europe looks like a house of cards to me. The first gust of wind will blow something over."

Absolutely, DB.  And after 1917 (after 1905, actually) the additional inflammatory in the European tinder box in the form of international communism - an 'almost' revolution in 1905 and then a sovereign state dedicated to revolution and hegemony after 
1917. 

MM


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## davebender (Sep 11, 2011)

Red Petrograd: revolution in the ... - Google Books
Okhrana data is now available on the internet. There was another "almost Russian revolution" during the summer of 1914. Mobilization for war may have delayed Russian revolution for 2 1/2 years.


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## michaelmaltby (Sep 11, 2011)

That's interesting - doesn't surprise seeing how the Russo-Japan war was so closely linked to the 1905.

Thanks,

MM


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## davebender (Sep 11, 2011)

> In the summer of 1914 Russia was believed to be on the edge of revolution.


U.S. Ambassador James Gerard. Excerpt from his book "My Four Years In Germany"






> There was considerable internal unrest. The 1912 wave of strikes continued into 1913. Revolutionary propaganda made gains. Dissatisfaction was evident in all social classes. The Duma was divided by conflicts between the reactionary, constitutional and left parties and was unable to produce a majority. The sole source of unanimity was the willingness to sacrifice in the interest of national defense.


Extract from 1913 German Army intelligence summary for Russia.

The Official German Army intelligence summary disproves those who claim time was on the side of Russian Army modernization. Mobilization was the only thing which could halt Russian revoluntionary activity. Therefore the best July 1914 German strategy was to take whatever steps necessary to delay the onset of a major European war. By the end of the year Russian would probably be fighting a civil war. Then the Habsburgs would have a free hand to deal with the Serbian terrorist organization headed by Dragutin Dimitrijević.


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## michaelmaltby (Sep 11, 2011)

So the Czarist gov't used "mobilization" as a diversion from pending unrest ... and we know that European "mobilization" was one of the contributing factors to the 
cascading events that brought inevitable war in August, 1914 .....? I didn't realize that under till now, DB, but what a sad train of events.

MM


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## davebender (Sep 11, 2011)

I have read an Irish claim that British mobilization during August 1914 averted an Anglo-Irish war during the fall of 1914. I don't know enough Irish history to weigh in one way or the other but it sounds plausible as they did fight during 1916.


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## parsifal (Sep 11, 2011)

No doubt Europe in 1914 was a powder keg waiting to explode. No doubt that Communist Russia after the war was an exporter of unrest and revolution. That was its stated purpose in the world. no doubt also that in a post war environment where Germany had been forced to unconditional surrender, but somehow retained independance as a nation, there would be a likelihood of internecine disputes between the newly emerging minor nations of Europe, like Poland, Hungary Latvia and the like. 

However none of these nations, the USSR included, in that interwar period, had the capacity to undertake map changing aggression in the same way that an "undefeated" germany thought that it could. Above all else, IMO, the germans harboured a deep resentment at the "unfair" treatment that was meted out on them under Versailles. Somehow, Germans were convinced that they were not facing defeat in 1918, or that if they were, they had been duped or coerced into accepting a peace that was biased against them. To a degree, Versaille was an unfair treaty, but only if you accept the lie that Germany was not defeated in 1918. If you do accept that Germany was facing total defeat, and further accept that it was Germany and her Central Power allies that had initiated wars of aggression in the highly volatile European scene of 1914, then Versailles was a treaty light in its burden.

The myth of being "stabbed in the back" was a powerful force in shaping German attitudes for the 2nd world war. And not just because it gave the nazis means and opportunity to pervert the political systems in Germany. Many ordinary, decent germans were hoodwinked and influenced by this lie. They had seen the country nearly torn apart by internecine political disputes, a central government weak and inneffective, an economy wrecked by mismanagement, Germany humilated by partial occupation, Germany labelled a pariah and aggressive state. Where was the evidence....above all, where was the evidence of total defeat? Germans were depserate to find blame, to seek reason for the state of affairs they witnessed.

My opinion is that unconditional German surrender would not solve the stability or long term problems facing central and eastern Europe at that time, but would avoid the prospect of another Total War. The brush fire disputes between minor nations headed by otherwise rational people were well within the capabilities of the League to deal with. The authority of the league was largely destroyed by the rise of political extremism, like the Fascists, and the Communists, but without germany to really rip the organizatrion apart it may have stood some chance of actually doing some good. If nothing else the democracies would not have been so exposed as the weak states that they appeared to be. Would this have been enough to maintain some stability and avoid general war??? Not sure on that one......


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## michaelmaltby (Sep 12, 2011)

"... British mobilization during August 1914 averted an Anglo-Irish war during the fall of 1914."

I have never heard that before, DB, and I too know very little about Irish affairs, but - were what you say true - an Irish uprising is peanuts, nada, squat when compared to what the Czar was trying to abort in July, 1914.  IMHO.

Parsifal - your post is very thoughtful and true. As we well know from these threads, there are still Germanaphiles amongst us who are swayed by events and 
believe that their team has been hard done-by - . I don't. But I am very fond of Germans and German achievements and - as I have stated elsewhere - I believe the true test of any organism - be it individual or nation - is to learn from past mistakes and *change behavior*. Japan got it on one try. It took Germany two tries. And as we know - France _*still*_ looks incredulous and exclaims "moi !!!! .

Reading Wm Manchester on the Krupp enterprise(s) a few weeks ago I was interested to learn that German resentment of France traces its origins to the 30 Years War - where France was intervening in the affairs of various German principalities - servicing her interests politically as well as trying to stem the influence of the 
Protestant Revolution (reformation).

Murder-Mystery writers like to talk about "Motive and Opportunity". Well. Germany had _both _in spades .

MM

PS - The current issue of Vanity Fair has a very insightful article about the economic role of Germany in the current Euro-sovereign debt crisis. It is very insightful about Germany and Germans and speaks to the best and the worst .

"It's the Economy, Dummkopf" http://www.vanityfair.com/business/features/2011/09/europe-201109

Worth reading.


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## davebender (Sep 12, 2011)

I disagree. 

michaelmaltby is right. A 1914 Irish rebellion/civil war would be peanuts compared to British participation in WWI. Without WWI the entire BEF would be available. The initial fighting would be quickly over. After that it's up to Anglo-Irish politicians to create a permanent solution. 

Russian civil war was inevitable by 1914. But without WWI the entire German Army would be available to manage the resulting mess. A rump Bolshevik-communist state would probably control St. Petersburg. A rump SR-communist state would probably control Moscow. Neither communist state would be powerful enough to project military power outside the immediate area. The remainer of Imperial Russia would consisted of the historical post-Russian independent nations with borders guaranteed by the German Army. What's wrong with that?

Dragutin Dimitrijevi


> Captain Dimitrijević and a group of junior officers planned the assassination of the autocratic and unpopular king of Serbia. On 11 June 1903, the group stormed the royal palace and killed both King Alexander and his wife Queen Draga.
> 
> Dimitrijević, who used the codename Apis, became leader of the secret Black Hand group. In 1911 Dimitrijević organised an attempt to assassinate Emperor Franz Josef. When this failed, Dimitrijević turned his attention to the heir to the throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand.


1914 Serbia had a lot in common with 2001 Afghanistan. An entire nation controlled by a professional terrorist. If other European nations (especially Austria-Hungary) had been on the ball the murderers would have been dealt with during 1903. By 1914 Serbia was armed to the teeth making the job much more difficult. None the less it had to be done. Without WWI the Habsburgs and Bulgaria will get the job done in a couple months.

Portugal was heading towards civil war. Not a big deal unless you live in Portugal.

The 1914 French economy was sluggish and it will get worse after Russia defaults on all those French loans. Just another day in France. 

The remainder of Europe was mostly stable and most national economies were booming. A situation beneficial to all.


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## michaelmaltby (Sep 12, 2011)

"..... No doubt Europe in 1914 was a powder keg waiting to explode."

Parsifal, davebender has a point. You might want to just remove "1914" from your lead sentence , as throughout the post you are (we are) discussing events 
post 1917-18. 

MM


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## davebender (Sep 12, 2011)

During 1900 the U.S. Republican Party almost adopted the position that Canada should be annexed. 

I have no idea what brought this on. Were Canadians at that time lobbying to become our next state? Did the Canadian Prime Minister forget to send a Christmas card to the American President?


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## pbfoot (Sep 12, 2011)

davebender said:


> During 1900 the U.S. Republican Party almost adopted the position that Canada should be annexed.
> 
> I have no idea what brought this on. Were Canadians at that time lobbying to become our next state? Did the Canadian Prime Minister forget to send a Christmas card to the American President?


Just the opposite there was concern that we were part of manifest destiny, its was the driving force in getting the cross country railway built it wouldn't have taken a whole lot to annex the 3 prairie provinces as there was very few folks there til the railway brought in the people with the offer of free land


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## michaelmaltby (Sep 12, 2011)

".... Were Canadians at that time lobbying to become our next state? "

You mean the next *twelve states *don't you DB? 

MM


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## davebender (Sep 12, 2011)

Inititally it would probably be called something like "Canada Territory". Individual regions would become American states when they met population requirements for statehood.


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## michaelmaltby (Sep 12, 2011)

So the strategy was all worked out, eh Dave ....? Operation Canadian Bacon I .

I don't think the Elephants of the GOP were serious .... I think they were phishing for votes or special interests.

But, there _is_ this, from Wikipedia:

"Starting in 1855, while Canada was under British control, free trade was implemented between the colonies of British North America and the United States under the Reciprocity Treaty. In 1866, a year before Canadian Confederation, the United States Congress voted to cancel the treaty.

Free trade with the U.S. has long been a controversial issue in Canada. Historically, Canadians who advocated a closer relationship with the U.S., especially closer economic ties, were portrayed by critics as encouraging political annexation by the Americans. Under Canada's first Prime Minister, John A. Macdonald, the protectionist National Policy became a cornerstone of the new Canadian nation.

The Liberal Party of Canada had traditionally supported free trade. In the 1911 Canadian federal election, free trade in natural products became the central issue. The Conservative Party campaigned using fiery anti-American rhetoric, and the Liberals lost the election. Further political disputes over free trade were shelved for many decades.

From 1935-1980, a number of bilateral trade agreements greatly reduced tariffs in both nations. The most significant of these agreements was the 1960s Automotive Products Trade Agreement (also known as the Auto Pact)."

MM


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## parsifal (Sep 12, 2011)

Back in the 60s, the then Australian prime Minister, Harold Holt, coined the phrase..."all the way with LBJ" suggesting Australia should become the 53rd (???) state in Union. That put the whole country of 14 million (at that time) on a par with nebraska or Hawaii.


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## davebender (Sep 12, 2011)

President LBJ couldn't get re-elected in the USA. Perhaps he should have ran for PM of Australia during 1969. Better yet, he should have run for PM of Australia during 1965. Then the USA might elect someone smart enough to keep out of Vietnam.


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## parsifal (Sep 12, 2011)

They (Australians) went nuts over him, which is beyond me....I didnt think he was all that great. I agree, his responses to vietnam were pretty poor.

Anyway, with regard to MM comments about the french, I agree totally that the French as a national identity are about the most obnoxious, cranky countries that are in the western group of nations. Clemenceaus bastardization of the 14 points in the final treaty is enough proof of that. A treaty that punishes the germans but does not teach them....a treaty and penalises them but fails to deliver security to Europe.

But just the same, france cannot be categorised, IMO as an aggressor nation or a threat to European security. Difficult yes, obnoxious yes, unthinking yes, self absorbed yes, but a security risk, no....


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## davebender (Sep 13, 2011)

Have you read Article 2 and Article 3 of the Franco-Russian Military Alliance Convention? France and Russia were committed to invading Germany simultaneously with over 2 million soldiers as soon as Austria-Hungary mobilized vs Serbia. And that's exactly what happened historically. Seems pretty aggressive to me and I suspect 1914 Deutsches Reich viewed it the same way. 

First World War.com - Primary Documents - Franco-Russian Military Convention, 18 August 1892


> Article 2
> In case the forces of the Triple Alliance, or of any one of the Powers belonging to it, should be mobilized, France and Russia, at the first news of this event and without previous agreement being necessary, shall mobilize immediately and simultaneously the whole of their forces, and shall transport them as far as possible to their frontiers.
> 
> Article 3
> ...


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## BombTaxi (Sep 13, 2011)

While the Entente stance seems overly aggressive, lets not forget that aggressive German foreign policy and naval expansion had been one of the things that had driven the UK, France and Russia to form the Entente in the first place. Indeed, the fact that France and the UK entered a co-operative agreement at all, after 50 years of sizing each other up and engaging in an on-off naval arms race, indicates how serious a threat Germany had become. Germany out-produced even the UK in terms of strategic materials, had a massive, well-trained, well-equipped army, was building a navy that could challenge the UK for control of the North Sea and Atlantic approaches, and had show a willingness to use the threat of force to intervene in Africa, where both Britain and France had massive colonial interests. Taking these guys out was top of the Franco-British Agenda, and it's hardly surprising that they wanted to do it quickly and cleanly. Not trying to take sides, but Wilhelm II certainly did nothing to make friends amongst the European nations prior to 1914.


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## tyrodtom (Sep 13, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Back in the 60s, the then Australian prime Minister, Harold Holt, coined the phrase..."all the way with LBJ" suggesting Australia should become the 53rd (???) state in Union. That put the whole country of 14 million (at that time) on a par with nebraska or Hawaii.


Harold Holt didn't coin that phrase, that's from the 1964 LBJ election campaign.


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## davebender (Sep 13, 2011)

> Germany out-produced even the UK in terms of strategic materials


The German economy was booming during the decade prior to 1914. So was the British economy. What's the problem?



> had a massive, well-trained, well-equipped army


The German Army was far smaller then armies belonging to the Franco-Russian Alliance. As for being well trained, so is the modern day American Army. What's wrong with providing your soldiers with high quality training?



> had show a willingness to use the threat of force to intervene in Africa


I think you mean Britain and France, both of whom invaded multiple African nations between 1890 and 1911. Meanwhile Deutsches Reich invaded no one between 1871 and 1914. 



> building a navy that could challenge the UK for control of the North Sea and Atlantic approaches


The German goal was a dreadnought fleet 60% the size of the RN. I agree it was larger then necessary and a huge waste of German tax money. But it was never a serious threat to RN control of the North Sea, a point driven home at Jutland.


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## BombTaxi (Sep 13, 2011)

In your rush to defend Germany at all costs, you miss a few things. Firstly, the strength of the German economy was a great concern to the Entente powers as it meant Germany had the means to produce weapons in larger quantity than anyone else, particularly heavy equipment like artillery and warships. Nothing 'wrong' with that, but in the context of the early 20th century, enough to make the Entente jittery.

Secondly, when you take into account potential mobilisation of reserves, Germany did have a huge army, and even if Russia's was bigger, it was badly led and some of the men didn't even have weapons. Nothing 'wrong' with training your troops well, but again, it hardly serves to calm the nerves of people who think you're trying to take over Europe.

Thirdly, anyone with a brain in their skull knows Britain and France were colonial powers and acted in the fashion this implies. But the Agadir crisis showed that Wilhelm wanted to use Germany's growing strength to interfere in other nation's business. I'm sure if he had sent gunboats to Cuba, the US would have been perfectly pleased to talk... or invoke the Monroe Doctrine and blow them off the face of the map.

Finally, the German dreadnought building program was aimed at the Royal Navy. There was no other major naval power with whom Germany might fight in that period. Britain felt threatened in the same way the US felt threatened by the Russians stockpiling thousands of nukes after WW2. It doesn't matter that Wilhelm 'wanted' a small fleet to show how important it was, it looked like a threat to the most powerful navy in the world.

I'm not taking sides here, just pointing out that the Entente had it's reasons to feel threatened by Germany. This isn't about defending the poor innocent Germans, it's about seeing that Wilhelms bumbling and foolhardy approach to foriegn policy and armament s building, coupled with the strenght of his nation, made others around him very edgy.


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## davebender (Sep 13, 2011)

*Franco-Russian Miliary Alliance Battleships.*
3 x Bretagne class. 1912 program.
4 x Courbet class. 1910 program.
6 x Danton class. 1907 program.
.....13 x French dreadnoughts. Total.

4 x Borodino class. 1912 program.
4 x Gangut class. 1909 program.
.....8 x Russian dreadnoughts assigned to the Baltic Fleet.

I think 21 modern dreadnought battleships belonging to a hostile military alliance, all of which were less then 7 years old, constitutes a major naval power during 1914.


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## BombTaxi (Sep 13, 2011)

The French and Russian navies posed nowhere near the threat that the Royal Navy did - if any member of the hostile military alliance was going to be a naval threat to Germany, it was the UK. They were the only power who could implement a rapid and total blockade of German shores and maintain it. Which was exactly what they did...


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## parsifal (Sep 13, 2011)

It also assumes that the French and Russian navies were efficient and able to collaborate. The British had shown 110 years previously, what happens to a navy that is not well trained or well motivated or well organised (ne: the Spanish Navy at Trafalgar). The Japanese Navy had shown just how poorly trained the Russian Fleet was at Tshushima in 1905, and the IJN at that time was probably more British than the British Navy.

The Imperial Fleet was built for one purpose, to challenge the RN control of the oceans. This, in itself constituted an overtly aggressive and de-stabilising act, as it challenged what the british saw as a vital interest for them.

As far as serbia being a terrorist state, hardly. It was radicalised, because it represented a nemesis for the Austro Hungarian empire. Serbia was an ultranationalist state, and nationalism was the poison that threatened the very existence of Austria Hungary. Austria Hungary was not amodern state, with any hope of nationalist progressive change. It was aconglomeration of nationalities and ethnic groups governedby a small section of the country, and not on democratic or even popular grounds. Everything that Austria represented, was anathema to Serbia, and the serbians were rightly seeking self determination for many of the oppressed minorities within Austrias borders. The Austrians reacted to that in a highly aggressive devious and destabilising way....in other words, by acts of overt aggression. There can be no doubt who was at fault here....the paranoid austrians. And they were supported by the germans, who knew they also had to act aggressively and pre-emptively to defeat their enemies. But by reaching that conclusion they crossed an ethereal, subtle line, that makes all the difference in determining war guilt. Who attacked who first. Germany invaded belgium and attacked france, not the other way around. Austria attacked Serbia, a Russian ally. They initiated a war of aggression in a highly charged and dangerous situation.

So, who lit the match that blew the powder keg sky high??????


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## davebender (Sep 14, 2011)

That's rather obvious from looking at ship numbers and naval base structure. 

However there was a serious naval war in the Baltic which most of the popular history books ignore. Including divsion size amphibious assaults against heavily fortified islands in the Gulf of Riga and the first successful use of aerial mine laying.


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## BombTaxi (Sep 15, 2011)

Correct, but the Baltic grew in importance for the Germans only _after_ the RN locked them out of the North Sea at Jutland. The war would not be won or lost in the Baltic, and German planners new this. The German fleet was designed to fight the Royal Navy, and everyone around the North Sea knew it . If Wilhelm seriously wanted Germany to be a world power, he knew that battle would have to be fought at some point.


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## davebender (Sep 15, 2011)

The RN locked German surface ships out of the North Sea by August 5th, 1914. Almost two years before the Battle of Jutland.


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## BombTaxi (Sep 15, 2011)

Not at all. The near-engagement off Scarborough in 1914, the Whitby Raid, the Lowestoft Raid, and the Battle of Dogger Bank are all proof that the Germans had freedom of action in the North Sea prior to Jutland.

But coming back to my earler point, do you really believe the Germans were blameless in starting the war in the first place?


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## davebender (Sep 15, 2011)

"Blame" has no meaning in international diplomacy. The winner gets to write the popular history books so they are always right and the loser is always wrong.


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## parsifal (Sep 15, 2011)

Incorrect. 

War guilt has a very specific meaning internationally agreed upon by the majority of nations. (Generally the ones that dont are the ones guilty of waging such wars or the ones intending to do so....pariah states in other words). One of the preconditions of war guilt is who embarked on agressive "shooting" wars first. And the records clearly show that it was the central powers that took that option. Ther may well have been extenuating circumstances, they may well have been delivered almighty sucker punches, but it is still they that are guilty of initiating aggressive wars. It is generally accepted that they did not initiate war crimes (although their conduct in belgium kind of challenges that) 

In the aftermath of the second world war, it was an important first step to determine war guilt, on a more refined basis to the way it was applied after the first war, and then from there to apply the concept of war crimes on specific individuals.

I totally reject the concept that history was substantially rewritten so that germany got all the blame. Germany doesnt get all the blame for the two major wars of the 20th century, just that bit that they were responsible for (which happens to be most of it). its just that Germany (and/or her proxies) happened to be responsible for firing the first shots in these events. In law, that has significant culpability.


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## BombTaxi (Sep 15, 2011)

The loser gets to write history as well, they just have to wait a while. This is usually called 'revisionism', and is similar to what you are practicing in this thread. Both blocs involved in WW1 spent long enough preparing, that they fully understood what would happen when the Austro-Serbian situation went hot. Wilhelm knew he was handing the Austrians a blank cheque by promising to support them against Russia. And he knew that this meant he would have to fight France. The only thing he got wrong was Britain, who were not expected to mobilise in defence of Belgian neutrality. To pretend that Germany suddenly found herself thrust into a war entirely of other's making is ridiculous. All of the major alliance partner take an equal share of the blame for creating a situation where the Balkan Wars spilled over into a general European conflagration, and for being foolhardy enough to honour their alliances and unleash that war upon Europe.


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## parsifal (Sep 15, 2011)

The Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties was instituted at the plenary session of the Paris Peace Conference of 25 January 1919. Its purpose was to formally assign war guilt, a judgement that inevitably saw blame fully attributed to the Central Powers. Clearly, this committee was commissioned for a biased purpose, however it also contains a section that outlines the basic statements of facts about how war broke out. Whilst the language is clearly biased, the facts are known to be an accurate record of what happened in the late summer of 1914, and these facts clearly speak for themselves. 

The commission was comprised of two representatives from each of the five main Allied powers - the U.S., Britain, France, Italy and Japan - and one from Belgium, Greece, Poland, Romania and Serbia. Robert Lansing was selected as its chairman.

The commission's two conclusions briefly summarised the findings of the report, in particular the first, i.e.: "The war was premeditated by the Central Powers together with their Allies, Turkey and Bulgaria, and was the result of acts deliberately committed in order to make it unavoidable".

The key parts of the first chapter of the commission's report, which was accepted at the Paris Peace Conference on 6 May 1919, is reproduced below:

"_On the 27th Sir Maurice de Bunsen telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey: "This country has gone wild with Joy at the prospect of war with Serbia." At midday on the 28th Austria declared war on Serbia. On the 29th the Austrian army commenced the bombardment of Belgrade, and made its dispositions to cross the frontier.

The reiterated suggestions of the Entente Powers with a view to finding a peaceful solution of the dispute only produced evasive replies on the part of Berlin or promises of intervention with the Government of Vienna without any effectual steps being taken.

On the 24th of July Russia and England asked that the Powers should be granted a reasonable delay in which to work in concert for the maintenance of peace. Germany did not join in this request.

On the 25th of July Sir Edward Grey proposed mediation by four Powers (England, France, Italy and Germany). France and Italy immediately gave their concurrence. Germany refused, alleging that it was not a question of mediation but of arbitration, as the conference of the four Powers was called to make proposals, not to decide.

On the 26th of July Russia proposed to negotiate directly with Austria. Austria refused.

On the 27th of July England proposed a European conference. Germany refused.

On the 29th of July Sir Edward Grey asked the Wilhelmstrasse to be good enough to "suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to prevent a war between Austria and Russia." She was asked herself to say what she desired. Her reply was evasive.

On the same day, the 29th of July, the Czar dispatched to the Emperor William II a telegram suggesting that the Austro-Serbian problem should be submitted to the Hague Tribunal. This suggestion received no reply. This important telegram does not appear in the German White Book. It was made public by the Petrograd Official Gazette "January, 1915).

The Bavarian Legation, in a report dated the 31st of July, declared its conviction that the efforts of Sir Edward Grey to preserve peace would not hinder the march of events.

As early as the 21st of July German mobilization had commenced by the recall of a certain number of classes of the reserve, then of German officers in Switzerland, and finally of the Metz garrison on the 25th of July. On the 26th of July the German fleet was called back from Norway.

The Entente did not relax its conciliatory efforts, but the German Government systematically brought all its attempts to nought. When Austria consented for the first time on the 31st of July to discuss the contents of the Serbian note with the Russian Government and the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador received orders to "converse" with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Germany made any negotiation impossible by sending her ultimatum to Russia.

Prince Lichnowsky wrote that "a hint from Berlin would have been enough to decide Count Berchtold to content himself with a diplomatic success and to declare that he was satisfied with the Serbian reply, but this hint was not given. On the contrary they went forward towards war."

On the 1st of August the German Emperor addressed a telegram to the King of England containing the following sentence: "The troops on my frontier are, at this moment, being kept back by telegraphic and telephonic orders from crossing the French frontier." Now, war was not declared till two days after that date, and as the German mobilization orders were issued on that same day, the 1st of August, it follows that, as a matter of fact, the German Army had been mobilized and concentrated in pursuance of previous orders.

The attitude of the Entente nevertheless remained still to the very end so conciliatory that, at the very time at which the German fleet was bombarding Libau, Nicholas II gave his word of honour to William II that Russia would not undertake any aggressive action during the pourparlers, and that when the German troops commenced their march across the French frontier Mr. Viviani telegraphed to all the French Ambassadors "we must not stop working for accommodation."

On the 3rd of August Mr. von Schoen went to the Qual d'Orsay with the declaration of war against France. Lacking a real cause of complaint, Germany alleged, in her declaration of war, that bombs had been dropped by French airplanes in various districts in Germany. This statement was entirely false. Moreover, it was either later admitted to be so or no particulars were ever furnished by the German Government.

Moreover, In order to be manifestly above reproach, France was careful to withdraw her troops ten kilometres from the German frontier. Notwithstanding this precaution, numerous officially established violations of French territory preceded the declaration of war.

The provocation was so flagrant that Italy, herself a member of the Triple Alliance, did not hesitate to declare that in view of the aggressive character of the war the casus foederis ceased to apply.

Conclusions
1. The war was premeditated by the Central Powers together with their Allies, Turkey and Bulgaria, and was the result of acts deliberately committed in order to make it unavoidable.

2. Germany, in agreement with Austria-Hungary, deliberately worked to defeat all the many conciliatory proposals made by the Entente Powers and their repeated efforts to avoid war."_


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## davebender (Sep 15, 2011)

The Austro-Serbian conflict is about responding to a terrorist attack. It has little to do with the Franco-Russian decision to invade Germany except to serve as a convenient casus beli.


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## parsifal (Sep 15, 2011)

davebender said:


> The Austro-Serbian conflict is about responding to a terrorist attack. It has little to do with the Franco-Russian decision to invade Germany except to serve as a convenient casus beli.



Dave 

I dont know what version of history you are following, but it is nothing like any history I have read, and nothing like the basic statements of fact that i have seen (and some of which I have posted) . Lets analyse briefly the statments you are making above....

"_The Austro-Serbian conflict is about responding to a terrorist attack_"

The records clearly show that Serbia as a nation was not responsible for the assassination. Offers by serbia to hunt down and deal with the small group of extremists (including those in the government, but acting outside of it) to justice. Serbia agreed to comply with the Austrian ultimatum, but Austria invaded anyway, and the records show they acted deliberately to cause war, by keeping secrets and telling fibs. 

Serbia was guilty of ultranationalism, which the austrians were terrified of. The Serbs resented Austrian aggression and persecution of Serbian and slavic nationalities within the borders of the austrian empire, the latest example of which was the brutal invasion of Bosnia in 1908 (they also wanted access to the sea, lets be clear about that). Trying to argue that Austria was responding to a terrorist threat is a shocking disconnect of the facts.....serbia was not responsible for the assassination, though nationals from that country were. The Serbs were quite prepred to deal with these crimials themselves, and meet all the other austrian demands (except one minor one), but this was rejected by the Austrians...why....because they wanted war, not resolution. 

"_It has little to do with the Franco-Russian decision to invade Germany except to serve as a convenient casus beli_"

Again a gross distortion of the facts. Russia was responding to Austrian aggression to its ally, initiated by the austrians and supported by the germans. Whilst taking sound military preparations, the russians continued to act in good faith and seek a peaceful solution to the crisis. The central powers had already made a decision to go to war and subverted every attempt to avoid the conflict. This is clearly shown in the basic statements of fact previously posted

In the case of France, a decision to invade Germany was only made after it had become apparent that the Germans were preparing to do exactly the same to them. France was reacting, not initiating, and it is also worth noting that French military theory of the time was all about the attack (though if the french had invaded first it would be them that was guilty of the aggressive war). Again the basic facts speak for themselves. Germany had decided to attack its enemies from at least 19 July and did not deviate from that path. they were the first to inititiate mobilisation plans, despite revisionist claims to the contrary, and the first to decide on going to war (well, only after Austrians I guess). They had commenced operations in france without a formal declaration from at least the 28th July. No amount of posturing or rewriting of history can get past that. 

If you wanted to argue the extenuating circumstances faced by Germany and Austria, i would be happy to concede certain points there......but to argue that the Austrians were responding to a terrorist threat is a disconnect from the fact, whilst also arguing that France and Russia were initiating the escalation is also not supported by the basic facts.


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## BombTaxi (Sep 15, 2011)

davebender said:


> The Austro-Serbian conflict is about responding to a terrorist attack. It has little to do with the Franco-Russian decision to invade Germany except to serve as a convenient casus beli.



My point is, Germany didn't get attacked. So what were they doing invading anybody in the first place? The alliance system was at fault, and Germany must shoulder some of the blame, being party to one of these alliances


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## parsifal (Sep 16, 2011)

The causes behind the outbreak of war in 1914 are complex, and less clearcut than establishing immediate war guilt. 

However from wiki, about the causes behind the war in 1914, comes the following

_The new French President Raymond Poincaré, who took office in 1913, was favourable to improving relations with Germany. In January 1914 Poincaré became the first French President to dine at the German Embassy in Paris. Poincaré was more interested in the idea of French expansion in the Middle East than a war of revenge to regain Alsace-Lorraine. Had the Reich been interested in improved relations with France before August 1914, the opportunity was available, but the leadership of the Reich lacked such interests, and preferred a policy of war to destroy France. Because of France’s smaller economy and population, by 1913 French leaders had largely accepted that France by itself could never defeat Germany.

In May 1914, Serbian politics were polarized between two factions, one headed by the Prime Minister Nikola Pašić, and the other by the radical nationalist chief of Military Intelligence, Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević, known by his codename Apis. In that month, due to Colonel Dimitrigjevic’s intrigues, King Peter dismissed Pašić’s government. The Russian Minister in Belgrade intervened to have Pašić’s government restored. Pašić, though he often talked tough in public, knew that Serbia was near-bankrupt and, having suffered heavy casualties in the Balkan Wars and in the suppression of a December 1913 Albanian revolt in Kosovo, needed peace. Since Russia also favoured peace in the Balkans, from the Russian viewpoint it was desirable to keep Pašić in power. It was in the midst of this political crisis that politically powerful members of the Serbian military armed and trained three Bosnian students as assassins and sent them into Austria-Hungary._


The article elsewhere states:

"With the recently announced Russian military reconstruction and certain British communications, the possibility of war was a prime topic at the German Imperial War Council of 8 December 1912 in Berlin, an informal meeting of some of Germany's top military leadership called on short notice by the Kaiser. Attending the conference were Wilhelm II, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz - the Naval State Secretary, Admiral Georg Alexander von Müller, the Chief of the German Imperial Naval Cabinet (Marinekabinett), General von Moltke - the Army’s Chief of Staff, Admiral August von Heeringen - the Chief of the Naval General Staff and (probably) General Moriz von Lyncker, the Chief of the German Imperial Military Cabinet. The presence of the leaders of both the German Army and Navy at this War Council attests to its importance. However, Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg and General Josias von Heeringen, the Prussian Minister of War, were not invited.

Wilhelm II called British balance of power principles “idiocy,” (Britain had warned Germany not to write a blank cheque for the Austrians - which germany ignored), but agreed that Haldane’s statement was a “desirable clarification” of British policy. His opinion was that Austria should attack Serbia that December, and if “Russia supports the Serbs, which she evidently does…then war would be unavoidable for us, too,” and that would be better than going to war after Russia completed the massive modernization and expansion of their army that they had just begun (in 1912). Moltke agreed. In his professional military opinion “a war is unavoidable and the sooner the better”. Moltke “wanted to launch an immediate attac_k_”.

_Both Wilhelm II and the Army leadership agreed that if a war were necessary it were best launched soon. Admiral Tirpitz, however, asked for a “postponement of the great fight for one and a half years” because the Navy was not ready for a general war that included Britain as an opponent. He insisted that the completion of the construction of the U-boat base at Heligoland and the widening of the Kiel Canal were the Navy’s prerequisites for war. As the British historian John Röhl has commented, the date for completion of the widening of the Kiel Canal was the summer of 1914. Though Moltke objected to the postponement of the war as unacceptable, Wilhelm sided with Tirpitz. Moltke “agreed to a postponement only reluctantly_.”

Some historians such as British historian John Röhl, interpret the words of Admiral Müller (an advocate of launching a war soon, but whose diary entries are often misconstrued by German revisionists) as saying that "nothing" was decided for 1912-13, but that war was decided on for the summer of 1914....meaning that the Germans should have gone to war in 1912. Röhl argues that even if this War Council did not reach a binding decision - which it clearly did not - it did nonetheless offer a clear view of German intentions, which were that they favoured an early march to war, at any cost, including the initiation of an aggressive war of conquest. if there was going to be a war, the German Army wanted it before the new Russian armaments program began to bear fruit. Röhl and other historicans see this conference as setting a clear deadline when a war was to begin, namely the summer of 1914.

_With the November 1912 announcement of the Russian Great Military Programme, the leadership of the German Army began clamoring even more strongly for a “preventive war”_ (code for an aggressive war) _against Russia. Moltke declared that Germany could not win the arms race with France, Britain and Russia, which she herself had begun in 1911, because the financial structure of the German state, which gave the Reich government little power to tax, meant Germany would bankrupt herself in an arms race. As such, Moltke from late 1912 onwards was the leading advocate for a general war, and the sooner the better._

Throughout May and June 1914, Moltke engaged in an “almost ultimative” demand for a German “preventive war” against Russia in 1914. The German Foreign Secretary, Gottlieb von Jagow, reported on a discussion with Moltke at the end of May 1914:

“_Moltke described to me his opinion of our military situation. The prospects of the future oppressed him heavily. In two or three years Russia would have completed her armaments. The military superiority of our enemies would then be so great that he did not know how he could overcome them. Today we would still be a match for them. In his opinion there was no alternative to making preventive war in order to defeat the enemy while we still had a chance of victory. The Chief of the General Staff therefore proposed that I should conduct a policy with the aim of provoking a war in the near future_.” 

It cannot get much clearerr as to what german aims were in the lead up to war in 1914. They were looking for trouble, and eventually they got what they were looking for


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## davebender (Sep 16, 2011)

24 July 1914. Serbia is promised the support of Russia and France in the event of war.
25 July 1914. Serbia orders a general mobilization. 
25 July 1914. Austria orders a partial mobilization (vs Serbia only).
26 July 1914. Russia mobilizes forces in the western military districts (i.e. vs Austria and Germany).
27 July 1914. France orders preparations for mobilization.
29 July 1914. Russia orders a full mobilization.
29 July 1914. Belgium orders a partial mobilization.
29 July 1914. Britain orders preparations for mobilization.
30 July 1914. France mobilizes 5 army corps (i.e. an entire field army) on the German border.
31 July 1914. Austria orders a full mobilization in response to the Russian threat.
31 July 1914. Ottomans order a full mobilization in response to the Russian threat.
31 July 1914. Germany orders preparations for mobilization in response to the French and Russian threats.
31 July 1914. Belgium orders a full mobilization.
1 Aug 1914. German 16th AK mobilizes at Metz. Infantry support for the fortress complex in case of French attack.
2 Aug 1914. France and Germany begin full mobilization.

2 August 1914. Russian cavalry raids against German rail lines.
- Attempted to blow up rail bridge over the Warthe River. 
- Attacked the town of Prostken in an attempt to cut the Konigsberg-Bialystok rail line.
- Cut the rail line between Johannisburg and Lyck.

It appears to me the Russians were taking advantage of their one week mobilization head start. Just as OHL pre-war intelligence estimate had predicted. If not for the initiative of local German Army reserve units the Russian cavalry raids might have caused serious damage before Germany had even begun national mobilization.


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## parsifal (Sep 16, 2011)

Austria had plans in place to destroy Serbia since 1912. Negotiations with Germany led to German endorsement of any action against Serbia from 1 July. Preprarations for war, short of actual mobilization began 14 July. Originally it had been intended to attack Serbia from the 22nd July, but certain delays in preparations delayed that initial target date. meanwhile there were alsmot daily violent disputes at the border between Serbian frontier guards and the Austrian Army. 

An ultimatum was delivered finally on the 23rd July that was known as the "impossible ultimatum" It was naed that because it was designed to be impossible for Serbia to comply. By this stage both Austria and Germany had long been making preprations for war, short of full mobilization. Because of these preparations and the known superiority of the Central Powers call up mechanisms, the Entente powers were forced in some ways to order general mobilzations earlier than their enemies. However, it is a travesty to try and argue that austria was not prepring for war far earlier than everyone else. They had been prepring for war with Serbia for more than two years in fact.

For Germany the decision for war had also been made in 1912, with active preparations beginning mid may 1914. The Germans had the most efficient mobilization program in Europe, and the fact that they were known to be making preprations and plans short of mobilization only added to the apprehension in the allied camps. 

Though the germans did not declare war until August, they were undertaking incursions into French and Belgian frontier positions from the 28th July

Arguing that the mobilization orders were responsible for the general outbreak of hostilities ignores the facts that both Austria and Germany had begun their preprations for war from 1908 (for Austria) and 1912 (for germany), and that direct prepration began well before anyone else anbnd well before mobilization. Allied mobilzation only occurred as a defensive measure (well, defensiver in the sense that they planned to attack the germans and Austrians but only if they were attacked) . It further ignores the facts that allied mobilzation took considerably longer to complete, and that generally at the time they were ordered (except Russia) incidents were already occurring that required military action to be prepred for by them.

There is no doubt that by the beginning of July both Germany and Austria were no longer acting in good faith towardsd maintaining peace. They were actively plotting for war. As I said, there are extenuating circumstances to justify this dis-ingenuous approach, but it cannot be argued that the Central powers were not responsible for the outbreak of hostilities


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## davebender (Sep 17, 2011)

Dragutin Dimitrijevi


> In 1911 Dimitrijević organised an attempt to assassinate Emperor Franz Josef.


Austria should have put those plans in motion. They would have been fully justified to destroy Serbia after that nation attempted to assassinate KuK Franz Josef.


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## parsifal (Sep 17, 2011)

Austria was in fact destroying and occupying territories that Serbia considered essential to its national interst, and Serbia was in pretty bad shape after the Balkans war. 

Austria was seeking the destruction of Serbia for years before they went to war with her in 1914. Dragutin was one of those "extenuating circumstances" that caused the Central Powers to Initiate aggressive acts that led to total war, and even though he was part of the Serbian Government, his activities in the black hand movement were not known or sanctioned by the government per se. Balkan politics was a hotbed of ultranationalism, tribal feuds and extreme violence, and Dragutin fitted in perfectly with that scene, as did the behaviour of the Austrian Army after its subjugation of Bosnia in 1908. Black Hand was able to flourish because of Austrian brutality in slavic territories, and franz Ferdinand was targetted because he was a moderate that the Black Hand did not want around. This was a game that both sides were playing very roughly, but it was the Austrians that decided to risk total war. 

And remember, that the Black Hand was not an organization that was part of the Serbian Government, nor was it oficially supported by Serbia. it was a secret organization with friends in high places. The link you posted is revealing, because it shows what happened to Dragutin....

"_Nikola Pašić decided to get rid of the most prominent members of the Black Hand movement, by then officially disbanded. Dimitrijević and several of his military colleagues were arrested and tried on false charges blaming them with attempted assassination of regent Aleksandar I Karadjordjevic. On May 23, 1917, following the so-called Salonika Trial, Dimitrijević was found guilty of treason and sentenced to death. A month later, on June 11, 24 or 27, he was executed by firing squad_".

Austria had reason to to not like Dragution or the Black Hand, but its a stretch to try blame the whole of Serbia for the activities of this group. And it seems ironic to me that the Black Hand organization evolved primarily asa result of Austrian attrocities in the balkans, specifically targetting slavs for persecution.


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## davebender (Sep 17, 2011)

On reflection 1912 won't work as Serbia, Greece, Montenegro and Bulgaria were busy beating up the Ottoman Empire. 1913 might not work either as the Balkan situation remained very confused.

All of this could have been avoided if Austria had acted after Captain Dimitrijević seized control of the Serbian Government during 1903. Russia was occupied fighting Japan and internal Bolshevik revolution. Britain and Russia were barely on speaking terms after the Russian Baltic fleet shot up some English fishing boats. Maybe Britain could even be convinced to take charge of Serbia after the terrorist regime has been driven from power.


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## BombTaxi (Sep 17, 2011)

The Russo-Japanese War was 1904-1905, and the shooting-up of the North Sea fishing fleets and the first Russian Revolution also occurred in 1905. I also doubt the UK would have 'taken control' of Serbia in the event of an Austrian intervention, as the country was none of their business and offered no benefits to the British. Britain would only intervene in Europe or European overseas posessions to preserve the balance of power or respond to a direct threat to herself. British policy was in some ways much smarter in 1905 than it was in 2005...


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## davebender (Sep 17, 2011)

If Britain took that attitude they wouldn't have most of the empire.

Things didn't work that way during the early 1900s. Britain was cementing control over Egypt at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, trying to expand the border of Malaysia at the expense of sovereign Siam and French controlled IndoChina, invading two sovereign Boer Republics in Southern Africa, sparring with Russia over who gets to control Persia etc. Offer them a chance to control Serbia and they will jump on it like starving wolves on fresh meat.


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## BombTaxi (Sep 17, 2011)

You rather miss the point that Britain's imperial possessions all offered some benefit to Britain - Egypt gave control of the Suez Canal, the Northwestern frontier contolled overland access to India, the Far East colonies exported valuable commodities back to the UK, etc. Serbia offered no such benefit to the UK and as such, I doubt the British would 'jump' on it at all, with, as you would have it, half a planet to massacre and subjugate


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## davebender (Sep 18, 2011)

I'd hazzard a guess 1903 Serbia had a higher GDP then places such as Uganda and Kenya. It sits astride the main rail line to Constantinople (hence the reason 1915 Germany invaded). Control of Serbia would greatly increase British leverage over the Ottoman Empire and probably over Greece too.


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## parsifal (Sep 18, 2011)

The balkans were of interest to all the great european powers, as it was essentially a power vaccuum. If one nation attempted to gain control of the region other nations were attracted to it, simply to deny that control to the other nation.

In the case of Aust4ria, there was an added complication. Its human rights records towards ethnic slavs was so bad that it generated radical opposition groups like the Black Hand every time it made incursions into the region. The problem however, was greatly compounded by the fact that significant slices of the subjugated peoples of the Austro-Hungarian empire were of slavic descent, and were bei8ng affected by the ultra-nationalist influences of serbia.

Britain had no interest in gaining territory in Europe. Since the peace settlement following Waterloo, Britain had been ceded control of the seas, and with it, control of overseasd trade. Britain had done very well economically from this arrangement. She had had a very extensive empire in 1815, but the imperial expansion era was not really done so9lely for economic reasons. The amount of red on the map of the world served prestige and nationalist sentiments.

The only real foreign policy objectives for the Brits were

1) Undisputed control of the oceans, as had been given them after Waterloo
2) Control of trade omnto and out of Europe....by extension this meant dominance of the colonial possessions outside of Europe.
3) Maotenance of the balance of power in Europe, preventing any single power on the continent. A united Europe under the control of one power had the potential to subvert the british position. In its crudest form,this meant Britain would always support the second most powerful continental power in Europe. 


Onto this was grafted the French alliance system, after rapprochement with that country was achieved after 1870. This meant inevitably that britain France and Russia ended up in alliance with each other. Though they had differences, they remained allies bound by common purpose....to deny dominance of the continent to their enemies

Their enemies had diametrically opposed objectives....they wanted to upset the fine balance of power that existed....Germany wanted to break free of British control of the seas, subvert and occupy France and the low countries, and push Russia out to the peroiphery of Europe. Germany wanted dominance of Europe, here enemies meant to deny her of that prize. 

Therein lies the causes of the war.


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## davebender (Sep 18, 2011)

Then why did Britain expend so many resources attempting to control the Agean during both world wars? 

Getting Serbia for free during 1903 is a lot cheaper then invading Salonika and Gallipoli during 1915.


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## parsifal (Sep 18, 2011)

davebender said:


> Then why did Britain expend so many resources attempting to control the Agean during both world wars?
> 
> Getting Serbia for free during 1903 is a lot cheaper then invading Salonika and Gallipoli during 1915.



because by getting control of the Aegean, they could place pressure on the turks, open up one of the seas closed to british power (the Black sea) and excercise control far beyond the rather limited expenditure of resources that they would need to excerise that control. Garrisoning an island or a city is a far cry from garrisoning and administering a whole country or region.

Best analogy would be to analyze British reactions in Italy during the napoleonic wars. by enlisting support of a local nation, Britain got control of the med at a small cost in gold. They hoped to achieve something similar in 1913. 

Projection of this power into Serbia achieved nothing in terms of this agenda, and would have cost a bomb, given the ungoverbnnable nature of the Serbs. 

The most realistic option for avoiding war in 1900-14 would be to allow the break up of the hapsburg empire into ethinically based nations, much as historically transpired in the post WWWI peace treaty.

As for the statement that getting Serbia for free, well this is rather a silly statement to make. Serbia would not be obtained for free....it would come at the price of the alliance with Russia. This was a very high price to pay for a country that strategically was of no interst to the british, (escept as mentioned before to keep the balance of power. if the british lost russia as an ally that would be a price that far outweighed any benefits that might be derived (though I doubt any such benefits would arise)


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## davebender (Sep 19, 2011)

The recently conquered Boer Republics were ungovernable too but somehow Britain made it work. IMO the creation of friendly South Africa from hostile conquered territory in only a decade may rank as Britain's finest achievement in colonial administration.

Work that same colonial magic in Serbia. Europe and the world would be a better place if Britain can pull it off.


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## parsifal (Sep 20, 2011)

Its a matter of opinion, but IMO there was a world of difference between the Boers and the Serbs. Boers were few in number, and could be reasoned with. Serbs....there were plenty of them, and could not be reasoned with. Stubborn, cranky, great fighters. who would want to be governing them. Leave Serbia to the Serbs.....which was why it was so much of an issue for Austria, because Serbs means slavs, and a big part of Austria was Slavic. 

In any event, Britain was never going to take over the serbs in that fashion. It represented the same behaviour that got the british upset with Germany. Germany completely ignored the sovereign interests of other countries, from 1866 on, and ending with the flouting of Belgian neutrality. The very thing that got the british back up, is never going to become British policy. It just would never happen. Britain was not going to turn on its own allies, and wasnt going to engage in behaviour within Europe that got Germany into trouble. 

Regarding Brish attempts in the Aegean, I see you raise the campaigns in Gallipoli. Gallipoli was a brilliantly conceived plan that was attociously executed. With better planning and prepration it might actually have worked. But Gallipoli was not just about getting seaborne access to the black Sea. It was also about protecting Suez, by taking the fight directly to the turks own doorstep. It was about trying to knock Turkey out of the war early, and threby protecting the oil installtions in the Middle East, which even then were of some importance. It was about relieving pressure on the army of Egypt which was too weak to resist the Turks at that time. 

The British had wanted to divert troops for a proper invasion of Salonika, but Joffre would have none of it. Joffre was right IMO. So the allies tried a naval assault firstly, and when that didnt work, opted for a smalller scale assault on the Dardanelles.


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## michaelmaltby (Sep 20, 2011)

".... In any event, Britain was never going to take over the serbs in that fashion. It represented the same behavior that got the british upset with Germany. Germany completely ignored the sovereign interests of other countries, from 1866 on, and ending with the flouting of Belgian neutrality."

British foreign policy and "Imperial" policy had taken a couple of hundred years to evolve and was nuanced. Germany ... on the other hand ... thought that it could just invent itself and everyone would step aside and bow to the superior German logic and geist. 
For example: the Peninsular Wars that Wellesley fought against Napoleon .... there's no equivalent in the German repertoire. Why 
would Britain take a physical interest in Serbia ..... DaveBender? It is so out of character that I wonder you even suggest it. 

MM


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## davebender (Sep 21, 2011)

For the same reasons they were interested in Serbia during both world wars. Britain desired to have some influence in that region.
- Counter French influence in the Balkans.
- Counter Russian influence in the Balkans.
- Gain leverage over the Ottoman Empire and Greece.
- The value of the rail line through Serbia cannot be overstated. Among other things, that rail line was crucial to development of the Mosul oil fields (i.e. Berlin to Baghdad Railway).


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## parsifal (Sep 21, 2011)

Most of the gains you mention run counter to basic British foreign policy objectives, and would in fact destroy the alliance system that by the beginning of the 20th century was an essential aspect to British relations in Europe.

Britain did not object to French influence being extended by 1903. Not sure about their attitude to Russia, but they certainly did not see the Rusians as a threat to essential British interests (as an aside, the Australians did....there were nagging fears of a Russian invasion in the Far east since the 1880s...however these were not fears shared by Britain to any significant degree).

Why would Britain not object to French or Russian increases in power within Europe? Because Britain did not view either of these countries as major threats to any of their essential interests. Germany, and her allies, however were viewed with a great deal of concern. Any increase in the power prestige and influence of nations opposed to germany was viewed with approval by Whitehall. Any increase to German strength or power was not. Its pretty much that simple.

Having said all that, the situation regarding turkey and the allies was complex, and difficult. France and Britain had fought the crimean war against Russia, largely to protect an ailing Turkey. The loss of territory in the balkans wars had seen the western nations acquiesce to the Balkan states victories. Italy's war with the turks in 1911 over Libya had further driven the turks away from the allied camp. The entry of Russia to the triple entente in 1907 had completed the turn around in relations between the west and Turkey and Russia. No longer was Russia an enemy of the west, they were an important ally. A more valuable ally than Turkey. But Turkey and Russia had long standing disputes, and the alliance between Russia France and Britain, kinda left them in the cold.

Nevertheless, Turkey was still split. Turkey had viewed Britain as her natural ally, and even as late as 1913, there were many in turkey that still considered that to be the prefereable position to adopt. however the increasing influence of Germany in the region, exemplified by the completion of the berlin to bagdhad railway, gained favour within certain elements of the Turkish government. The likely outcome of the prewar drift of turkey might have been continued neutrality, except for the rise of radical elements within Turkey. Led by Enver Pasha these radical elements were incensed by British refusal to hand over warships already purchased by Turkey. Pashas secret allowance of the Goeben and Breslau into turkish waters, and then the bombardment by these ships of Russian Black Sea Ports was instrumental in securing turkish belligerency on Germany's side. 

The occupation of Serbia would not have assisted in unravelling this complex diplomatic impasse, in fact it would have made things worse in my view. And would have been achieved at the expense of losing russia as an ally, and destroying British credibility as a bulwark against german aggression. It would even have strained the Franco British alliance, since it would have been a clear shot across french aspirations.

In a word, the occupation of Serbia served none of the british essential interests, and would have come at a massive, disastrous cost to the British position. It would have served austrian and German intersts however. in other words, Britain would have sacrificed itself, so as to promote the intersts of its enemies. As if that was ever going to happen.....


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## michaelmaltby (Sep 21, 2011)

Agreed. 

Why would Britain do _anything_ by land that it could do be sea ..? And external commerce for Britain was by sea.

MM


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## Readie (Sep 21, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Most of the gains you mention run counter to basic British foreign policy objectives, and would in fact destroy the alliance system that by the beginning of the 20th century was an essential aspect to British relations in Europe.
> 
> Britain did not object to French influence being extended by 1903. Not sure about their attitude to Russia, but they certainly did not see the Rusians as a threat to essential British interests (as an aside, the Australians did....there were nagging fears of a Russian invasion in the Far east since the 1880s...however these were not fears shared by Britain to any significant degree).
> 
> ...



Interesting points Michael,
I would add that we (and other European countries) held our breath when we realised that the spectre of a reunited Germany after the collapse of the Soviet bloc was a reality.
John


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 21, 2011)

Readie said:


> Interesting points Michael,
> I would add that we (and other European countries) held our breath when we realised that the spectre of a reunited Germany after the collapse of the Soviet bloc was a reality.
> John



Why? I really never got that feeling from any other European countries, and don't see why they would.


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## parsifal (Sep 22, 2011)

We havent yet analysed the German offensives of 1918. perhaps we should....

Anyone feel up to leading off on these amazing military achievements. If not, i will, later tonite, though rather hoped a student of german history better than me might take up this mantle


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## parsifal (Sep 22, 2011)

*Operation Michael - The First of the Spring Offensives*

Whilst out of chronological order it is perhaps appropriate to assess the success and failure of the German Spring offensives in 1918.

As a precursor, German war aims by 1918 were not outright victory....the best that Ludendorf rlaistically hoped for was to achieve a commanding position from which a respectable negotiated settlement could be reached. Germany was fast approaching exhaustion in the field, and starvation at home. There was enormous unrest and war weariness setting in on the home front. The matter needed to be resolved quickly, or Germany faced certain defeat. 

Following the collapse of Russia, General Ludendorff was able to transfer west a large number German formations from the Eastern Front. Germany had developed new tactics involving the new rapid bombardment and infiltration tactics that had led to success at riga and other locations, particlularly those attacks carried out by one General von Hutier. These tactics were really the birth of modern warfare tactics, and deserve some detailed examination, but for now we will recount the historical progress of the offensive. 

Aware that growing numbers of American troops would soon negate the numerical advantage Germany had gained, Ludendorff began planning a series of offensives to bring the war on the Western Front to a swift conclusion. Dubbed the Kaiserschlacht (Kaiser's Battle), the 1918 Spring Offensives were to consist of four major assaults code-named Michael, Georgette, Gneisenau, and Blücher-Yorck.

The first and largest of these offensives, Operation Michael, was intended to strike the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) along the Somme with the goal of cutting it off from the French to the south. The assault plan called for the 17th, 2nd, 18th, and 7th Armies to break through the BEF's lines then wheel northwest to drive toward the English Channel. Leading the attack would be Hutiers stormtrooper units whose orders called for them to drive deep into British positions, bypassing strong points, with the goal disrupting communications and reinforcements.

Facing the German onslaught were General Julian Byng’s 3rd Army in the north and General Hubert Gough’s 5th Army in the south. In both cases, the British suffered from possessing incomplete trench lines as a result of an advance after the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line the previous year. In the days prior to the assault, numerous German prisoners alerted the British about an impending attack. While some preparations were made, the BEF was unready for an offensive of the size and scope unleashed by Ludendorff. At 4:35 AM on March 21, German guns opened fire along a 40-mile front.

Pummeling the British lines, the barrage caused 7,500 casualties. Advancing, the German assault centered on St. Quentin and the stormtroopers began penetrating the broken British trenches between 6:00 AM and 9:40 AM. Attacking from just north of Arras south to the Oise River, German troops achieved success across the front with the largest advances coming at St. Quentin and in the south. At the northern edge of the battle, Byng's men fought tenaciously to defend the Flesquieres salient which had been won in the bloody Battle of Cambrai.

Conducting a fighting retreat, Gough's men were driven from their defensive zones along the front during the opening days of the battle. As the 5th Army fell back, the commander of the BEF, Field Marshal Douglas Haig, became concerned that a gap could open between Byng and Gough's armies. To prevent this, Haig ordered Byng to keep his men in contact with 5th Army even if it meant falling back farther than ordinarily necessary. On March 23rd, believing that a major breakthrough was in the offing, Ludendorff directed 17th Army to turn northwest and attack towards Arras with the goal of rolling up the British line.

The 2nd Army was instructed to push west towards Amiens, while the 18th Army on its right was to push southwest. Though they had been falling back, Gough's men inflicted heavy casualties and both sides began to tire after three days of fighting. The German assault had come just to the north of the junction between the British and French lines. As his lines were pushed west, Haig became concerned that a gap could open between the Allies. Requesting French reinforcements to prevent this, Haig was denied by General Philippe Pétain who was concerned about protecting Paris.

Telegraphing the War Office after Pétain's refusal, Haig was able to force an Allied conference on March 26 at Doullens. Attended by high-level leaders on both sides, the conference led to General Ferdinand Foch being appointed overall Allied commander and the dispatch of French troops to aid in holding the line south of Amiens. At last, after three long years of heavy fighting, the Allies had a logical, unified command structure. 

As the Allies were meeting, Ludendorff issued highly ambitious new objectives to his commanders including the capture of Amiens and Compiègne. On the night of March 26/27, the town of Albert was lost to the Germans though 5th Army continued to contest each yard of ground.

Realizing that his offensive had departed from its original goals in favor of exploiting local successes, Ludendorff attempted to put it back on track on March 28 and ordered 29 of his freshest divisions to assault against Byng's 3rd Army. This attack, dubbed Operation Mars, met with little success and was beaten back. That same day, Gough was sacked in favor of General Sir Henry Rawlinson, despite his able handling of 5th Army's retreat.

On March 30, Ludendorff ordered the last major assaults of the offensive with General Oskar von Hutier's 18th Army attacking the French along the south edge of the newly created salient and General Georg von der Marwitz's 2nd Army pushing toward Amiens. By April 4, the fighting was centered in Villers-Bretonneux on the outskirts of Amiens. Lost to the Germans during the day, it was retaken by Rawlinson's men in a daring night attack. Ludendorff attempted to renew the attack the following day, but failed as Allied troops had effectively sealed the breaches caused by the offensive.

In defending against Operation Michael, Allied forces suffered 177,739 casualties, while the attacking Germans endured around 239,000. While the loss of manpower and equipment for the Allies was replaceable as American military and industrial power was brought to bear, the Germans were unable to replace the number lost. Though Michael succeeded in pushing the British back forty miles in some places, it failed in its strategic objectives. This was largely due to the German troops being unable to significantly dislodge Byng's 3rd Army in the north where the British enjoyed stronger defenses and the advantage of terrain. As a result, the German penetration, while deep, was directed away from their ultimate objectives. 

Not to be deterred, Ludendorff renewed his Spring Offensive on April 9 with the launching of Operation Georgette in Flanders.........


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## Readie (Sep 22, 2011)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Why? I really never got that feeling from any other European countries, and don't see why they would.



Didn't you?
Perhaps German newspapers were suitably selective in their editorials.
While were pleased to see the end of the Soviet threat the prospect of a reunited Germany getting inflated ideas about where you fit into the scheme of things is not one that made us happy.
John


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## Mustang nut (Sep 22, 2011)

Readie said:


> Didn't you?
> Perhaps German newspapers were suitably selective in their editorials.
> While were pleased to see the end of the Soviet threat the prospect of a reunited Germany getting inflated ideas about where you fit into the scheme of things is not one that made us happy.
> John


 
I was in France at the time but working for a German company. The French as I remember were very positive not about German unification but at the demise of Soviet control in the East of Europe. The Germans (all from the west) seemed resigned to paying for unification which is still a drain on the economy. As I remember, British politicians were more concerned with a Soviet backlash if things moved too far too fast, but then I could just read the Telegraph and listen to the BBC.


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## Readie (Sep 22, 2011)

Mustang nut said:


> I was in France at the time but working for a German company. The French as I remember were very positive not about German unification but at the demise of Soviet control in the East of Europe. The Germans (all from the west) seemed resigned to paying for unification which is still a drain on the economy. As I remember, British politicians were more concerned with a Soviet backlash if things moved too far too fast, but then I could just read the Telegraph and listen to the BBC.



Cold War Museum

MN,
We were all pleased to see the Soviet threat end. Who wouldn't be? Certainly the Poles etc have made the most of their new opportunities and good for them. I admire their energy.
I know your views but, please read this short article. German drive for reunification and the resulting economic recession.
This time they didn't have anyone to blame but, history teaches us that these circumstances usually lead to trouble...eventually.
I hope I am wrong to be suspicious. Time will tell if the Leopards spots are different eh
John


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 22, 2011)

Readie said:


> Didn't you?
> Perhaps German newspapers were suitably selective in their editorials.
> While were pleased to see the end of the Soviet threat the prospect of a reunited Germany getting inflated ideas about where you fit into the scheme of things is not one that made us happy.
> John



No I did not, and I don't limit myself to just reading German papers. You forget that I am an American...

I do however think that it is only *your* way of thinking. 

In your view, how do the Germans fit into things? Based off of the history of your posts, I honestly believe that you see the modern Germans as no different than the Nazis. Pretty sad if you ask me. I will leave it at that though, because it is way off topic of this thread.


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## parsifal (Sep 22, 2011)

guys

this is a thread about the offensives of 1918. I started it because in another thread we drifted off topic, and some claims were made to the effect that Germany was not defeated at the end of the war and had really been poorly treated by the treaty of Versailles.

I dont subscribe to that theory, but i determined that we should have an open forum to discuss this important issue. I am happy to wander a little or a lot off topic to discuss the causes of the war, because that, in a way determines whether what happened at wars end was justified or not. I was happy to discuss possible alternatives like the Serbian thingy that Dave raised. Yeah, Im one-eyed about a lot of these issues, and I will let you know exactly what I think, and if you have an opposing view expect to be interrogated by me. Nevertheless, I invite you to air your views, make your points. Thats why we are here for.

But talkinmg about modern Germany doesnt have a lot to do with 1918, so to avoid jeopardising the future of this thread, i would just ask we stay just a little on topic. Im not whinging, just asking. 

I notice the original poster of that other thread has decided not to particiapte in this debate. probably a good thing since he doesnt like me much......


Go ahead and enjoy guys.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 22, 2011)

parsifal said:


> But talkinmg about modern Germany doesnt have a lot to do with 1918, so to avoid jeopardising the future of this thread, i would just ask we stay just a little on topic. Im not whinging, just asking.



And you are correct. Even as a moderator I must apologize here, I just can not let some things go unanswered. You should hear my wife's take on some of things she has read on this forum. No she is not a member of this forum, but I have asked her about her opinion on some things said. (She happens to be German who was born after the war, whose parents happen to have been born after the war, and is sick and tired of being force fed that she should feel shame or be blamed for what happened, when she was not alive nor where her parents. Or that Germany is no different than it was then, or "where they fit into the scheme of things".) 

But as I said in the post above yours, and what you said in your post, it is not related to this topic. Lets try and keep this thread on topic, as it is an interesting subject. 

So as I said, I do apologize...

(On a side note, parsifal, you know I think you are a very wise person and I have nothing but respect for you. I really would love to sit down and have a few drinks and talk history with you.)


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## Readie (Sep 22, 2011)

Michael,
I got side tracked too. Sorry for the drift off topic.
As a final remark, there is still the same denial defensiveness shown ...the same as a certain Mr H capitalised on.
which leads me nicely back to 1918....
John


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## parsifal (Sep 22, 2011)

Theres no harm done, I love history and I love beer, so maybe some day when I travel to Europe Adler (and Readie), we can have a beer and talk this stuff to our hearets content

I would really love to hear peoples various viewpoints on this issue. not so much the macro political stuff, as the military bump and grind. For example, the air war in 1918. What was happening, who was winning.

I know for example that the first tank battle occurred on April 24 1918, just south of Villers Bretonneux. 4 German A7W tanks were engaged by 3 British Mk IV tanks, later joined by 7 Whippet tanks. One A7W tanks was destroyed, and the germans forced to withdraw back into the town. Few people know that was the first tank engagement in history. 

Its a pity we dont have too many french memebers, I would like to hear their version of what happened at this time.

To me 1918 was one of those pivotal moments in history. it was the moment in time when finally the trench deadlocks were gradually solved, in different ways by either side. It was a moment of lost opportunities. The allies could have either adopted a moderate approach in their peace treaty with Germany, following Wilsons fourteen point plan, or they could have opted for an unconditional surrender approach. Either way would have been far better than the half nasty, half weak treaty that was finally adopted. I believe the har fought victory achieved by the allies in 1918 was wasted, and was a major factor in the next war


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## Readie (Sep 22, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Theres no harm done, I love history and I love beer, so maybe some day when I travel to Europe Adler (and Readie), we can have a beer and talk this stuff to our hearets content
> 
> 
> To me 1918 was one of those pivotal moments in history. it was the moment in time when finally the trench deadlocks were gradually solved, in different ways by either side. It was a moment of lost opportunities. The allies could have either adopted a moderate approach in their peace treaty with Germany, following Wilsons fourteen point plan, or they could have opted for an unconditional surrender approach. Either way would have been far better than the half nasty, half weak treaty that was finally adopted. I believe the har fought victory achieved by the allies in 1918 was wasted, and was a major factor in the next war



Michael,
A beer with you and Chris Alder would be great. I'm in Au in October 2013 so, maybe then too.
I agree with you wholeheartly about the waste of the 1918 victory.
Boy, did we pay the price though...
Cheers
John


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## davebender (Sep 22, 2011)

Are you sure?

Germany produced only 21 A7V prototype tanks. Compared to hundreds of British and French tanks that were captured from 1916 onward and refurbished for German Army use. I find it difficult to believe one of the captured tanks employed by Germany didn't encounter their British or French counterparts prior to April 1918.


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## Readie (Sep 22, 2011)

davebender said:


> Are you sure?
> 
> I find it difficult to believe one of the captured tanks employed by Germany didn't encounter the British prior to April 1918.



That's because the Germans drive on the right....


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## davebender (Sep 22, 2011)

So do the French. I assume British citizens driving on French roads also drive on the right. 8)


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## Readie (Sep 22, 2011)

davebender said:


> So do the French. I assume British citizens driving on French roads also drive on the right. 8)



Only special occasions like Bastille Day. The rest of the time its every man for himself


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## parsifal (Sep 22, 2011)

davebender said:


> Are you sure?
> 
> Germany produced only 21 A7V prototype tanks. Compared to hundreds of British and French tanks that were captured from 1916 onward and refurbished for German Army use. I find it difficult to believe one of the captured tanks employed by Germany didn't encounter their British or French counterparts prior to April 1918.





short answer, yes.

this utube file gives their account of the battle, though is at odds with my published accounts which say that the German tank was abandonrd and lost.

You can find more substantial sources, such as Martin Evans book on the battles in 1918. Most accounts say that Operation Michael was supported by more than 200 tanks initially though I think most of these were captured versions.

I also think you will find that the first use of tanks by the germans was in this operation. They had essentially hoarded those that they captured up to that time. Not as sure about that however 



_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bn4uRvgIEJY_


this further file on the A7W includes an image of one of them blown over on its side, which tends to support Evans account of the battle


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Hr8Jl_4eGw_


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## davebender (Sep 22, 2011)

Most popular histories of WWI contain so many errors that I don't trust them as "substantial sources". I want to see historical German Army documents (preferably translated into English) or first person accounts such as those Zuber quotes for his books on WWI.


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## parsifal (Sep 22, 2011)

davebender said:


> Most popular histories of WWI contain so many errors that I don't trust them as "substantial sources". I want to see historical German Army documents (preferably translated into English) or first person accounts such as those Zuber quotes for his books on WWI.



Evans book contains an entry from Lt Mitchell, the commander of the British Tank involved and he states that it was the first time ("at last") that the RTC was able to engage enemy tanks.

His book incidentally, is not a "popular history". Its an authorised account sponsored by the AWM which happen to be considered the foremost institution on wwi issues that i am aware of. 

The following link gives some details on the battle. 

Australian Battlefields of World War 1 - France - 1918

Whilst the article posted is extremely limited in scope, it comes from an organization considered to be one of the worlds leading authorities on wwI (as stated above). You can take a step down and rely on your german sources if you like. AWMs reputation and database is particularly true of battles in which Australians particiapted, and Villers Bretonneux certainly qualifies for that 

Lt Blitz, the German commander of the Tank involved ("Nixe") also gave interviews about the engagement after the war, though i dont have access to them.


Wiki has this to say :

_The first tank against tank combat in history took place on the 24 April 1918 when three A7Vs (including chassis number 561, known as "Nixe") taking part in an attack with infantry incidentally met three Mark IVs (two female machine gun-armed tanks and one male with two 6-pounder guns) near Villers-Bretonneux. During the battle tanks on both sides were damaged. According to the lead tank commander, Second Lieutenant Frank Mitchell, the female Mk IVs fell back after being damaged by armour piercing bullets. They were unable to damage the A7Vs with their own machine guns. Mitchell then attacked the lead German tank, commanded by Second Lieutenant Wilhelm Biltz,[3] with the 6 pounders of his own tank and knocked it out. He hit it three times, and killed five of the crew when they bailed out. He then went on to rout some infantry with case shot. The two remaining A7Vs in turn withdrew. As Lieutenant Mitchell's tank withdrew from action, seven Whippet tanks also engaged the infantry. Four of these were knocked out in the battle, and it is unclear if any of them engaged the retreating German tanks. Lieutenant Mitchell's tank lost a track towards the end of the battle from a mortar shell and was abandoned. The damaged A7V was later recovered by German forces.


All 18 available A7Vs had been put into action that day with limited results; two toppled over into holes, some encountered engine or armament troubles. After a counterattack, three ended up in Allied hands. One was unusable and scrapped, one used for shell testing by the French, and the third captured by the Australians.

The A7V was not considered a success and other designs were planned by Germany, however the end of the war meant none of the other tanks in development, or planned ones, would be finished (such as the Oberschlesien, K-Wagen, LK I or LK II). The final use in World War I of A7Vs was in October 1918; a number were scrapped before the war ended in November._


This russian site also gives some account of the battle

WWI Tanks


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## davebender (Sep 23, 2011)

> Lt Mitchell, the commander of the British Tank involved and he states that it was the first time ("at last") that the RTC was able to engage enemy tanks.


French 5th Army employed 8 tank companies during their April 1917 offensive. If one of those Schneider tanks encountered a German tank during the battle would a British Lieutenant located 100 miles away know about it? I tend to doubt it.


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## Readie (Sep 23, 2011)

davebender said:


> French 5th Army employed 8 tank companies during their April 1917 offensive. If one of those Schneider tanks encountered a German tank during the battle would a British Lieutenant located 100 miles away know about it? I tend to doubt it.
> View attachment 179118



http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/lions_donkeys_01.shtml

Interesting article. Primitive radio being used for communications. I'm not sure what the range of these sets would be though.
Cheers
John


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## parsifal (Sep 23, 2011)

There were no German tanks in the front line in April 1917. The first German Tank regiment was not formed until September 1917, but his formation had no operational tanks until December. The earliest known deployment of German tanks, whether they be captured or of domestic production was either late 1917, or more likley February 1918, and there are no known battle deployments until March 1918. Up to that time they were simply hoarding those tanks that they captured.

The Germans used their tanks to support the Schwerpunkt of their main assault in March 1918. However German tanks were not very successful at all, until April 1918, and the first successful employment of tanks by the germans army that is known and recorded, is on the 24th April....the very day of the battle at Villers Bretonneux. 

The March offensives were initially aimed at the british forces, as Ludendorf was aiming to push a gap between the French and British Armies. French forces on the southern flank of the Amiens bulge were engaed, but only relatively lightly, and were not pushed back. Given that the Germans were targetting the british at that time, and February March was the first time they used tanks other than to haul them to the rear areas, it makes sense that the British members of the RTC would know if German tanks had been previously engaged or not. 

We are not talking the middle ages here. There was a good exchange of knowledge in the british army, indeed between the allies generall , and the RTC was a relatively small element of tightly knit professionals that talked among themselves. Hard as you may find to believe it, the British army was a professional body of soldiers that would keenly distribute this sort of information, as it would have significant implications on the developing tactics and usage of their tanks.


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## Readie (Sep 23, 2011)

Indeed, the British army in 1918 was quite sophisticated compared to 1915.
The only issue was the lack of able bodied Brits to sign up....
Cheers
John


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## davebender (Sep 23, 2011)

The British Army suffered a huge defeat at Cambrai during late 1917 despite employment of 476 tanks. This and earlier defeats of Entente tank forces gave the German Army a low opinion of tanks in general. That opinion didn't change until they began encountering Renault FT-17 tanks from 31 May, 1918 onward. Then the German tank program progressed with amazing speed.

June 23, 1918. 
German Army orders production of 670 LK II tanks.

July 17, 1918.
Additional LK II tank orders. 
.....A total of 2,000 by June 30th, 1919.
.....2,000 additional LK II tanks to be produced July to December 1919.

Oct 2nd, 1918. First LK II tank rolls off the assembly line. 3 1/2 months after the program was initiated!

Late Oct / early Nov 1918. Planning begins for improved LK III tank.

It's worth noting that Germany had no oil shortage after capturing Romania during 1916 and the Caucasus during 1918. If the war had lasted another year there would have been full scale tank battles during 1919!

*LK II tank.*
Walkaround of a surviving LK II Strv m/21 WW1 Tank
8.5 tons.
3 man crew.
14kph max speed.
Armor. 12 to 14mm on front, sides and rear. 8mm on top. 3mm on floor.
3.7cm cannon in rotating turret. 1/3rd of vehicles would be armed with a machinegun ILO the cannon.


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## Readie (Sep 23, 2011)

davebender said:


> The British Army suffered a huge defeat at Cambrai during late 1917 despite employment of 476 tanks. This and earlier defeats of Entente tank forces gave the German Army a low opinion of tanks in general. That opinion didn't change until they began encountering Renault FT-17 tanks from 31 May, 1918 onward. Then the German tank program progressed with amazing speed.
> 
> June 23, 1918.
> German Army orders production of 670 LK II tanks.
> ...




'A huge defeat'? Au contraire.
First World War.com - Battles - The Battle of Cambrai, 1917
Cambrai showed what the British tanks could achieve. Look at the infantry losses. 50k German 45k British. *95 thousand men*...the mind boggles even after all these years.
Cheers
John


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 23, 2011)

My understanding is that the tanks did not do so well after the first day of battle. 180 were knocked out on the first day alone. The battle from my understanding was a stalemate in the end with both sides having gained no ground in the end (British advances were great in the beginning but in the end they lost those gains). 

I will admit thought that my knowledge of the WW1 is pretty limited (which is one reason why I find any WW1 topic very very interesting and try to learn as much as possible). In fact the info I have above is from Wikipedia, which I normally do not use because it is not the most accurate source. I did use it here however so as to read up a bit on the battle. It can be a decent "first" source, but further reading from more reliable sources is required. So basically if that info is false, please don't crucify me...


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## Readie (Sep 23, 2011)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> My understanding is that the tanks did not do so well after the first day of battle. 180 were knocked out on the first day alone. The battle from my understanding was a stalemate in the end with both sides having gained no ground in the end (British advances were great in the beginning but in the end they lost those gains).
> 
> I will admit thought that my knowledge of the WW1 is pretty limited (which is one reason why I find any WW1 topic very very interesting and try to learn as much as possible). In fact the info I have above is from Wikipedia, which I normally do not use because it is not the most accurate source. I did use it here however so as to read up a bit on the battle. It can be a decent "first" source, but further reading from more reliable sources is required. So basically if that info is false, please don't crucify me...



Chris, you are basically right. The British tanks were unreliable and in their infancy. The Cambrai battle showed what the tank could do, Nothing more.
I visited that area in 2002 and saw the WW1 tank that a Frenchman had tracked down and dug up. It was complete on one side and had the front half on the other side missing from a direct hit.
Fascinating piece of history.
The sheer scale of loss of human life, as I said earlier, 95,000 men, is...what can I say? Very hard to really get your head around.
Cheers
John


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 23, 2011)

Oh I know. I visited Verdun back in July, and was speechless when thinking about the battle and the loss of life there. WW1 was a human meat grinder.


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## davebender (Sep 23, 2011)

Unfortunately I don't have official German casualty data for just November and December 1917. So I need to compare for Aug to Dec 1917. 

*Germany. Aug to Dec 1917. Opposite the British Front.*
37,630 dead.
51,848 missing and prisoner.
147,658 wounded.
----------------------
237,136 total.

*Britain. Aug to Dec 1917. Western Front.*
(unfortunately they are not broken down by "Dead", "Missing" and "Wounded")
81,080 Aug 1917.
81,249. Sep 1917.
119,808. Oct 1917.
73,888. Nov 1917.
38,620. Dec 1917.
---------------------
394,645 total.


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## Readie (Sep 23, 2011)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Oh I know. I visited Verdun back in July, and was speechless when thinking about the battle and the loss of life there. WW1 was a human meat grinder.



My tour included the Somme valley. There is a sadness about the place which is unsurprising. I have read a lot about WW1 and listened to my Grandparents stories, watched TV programmes and I still don't really understand why that generation of men were destroyed and why society/ Governments/ Kings Queens (in all countries) allowed the slaughter to continue for 4 years.


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## Readie (Sep 23, 2011)

davebender said:


> Unfortunately I don't have official German casualty data for just November and December 1917. So I need to compare for Aug to Dec 1917.
> 
> *Germany. Aug to Dec 1917. Opposite the British Front.*
> 37,630 dead.
> ...



A shocking indictment to 'civilised' man eh dave


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## parsifal (Sep 23, 2011)

davebender said:


> The British Army suffered a huge defeat at Cambrai during late 1917 despite employment of 476 tanks. This and earlier defeats of Entente tank forces gave the German Army a low opinion of tanks in general. That opinion didn't change until they began encountering Renault FT-17 tanks from 31 May, 1918 onward. Then the German tank program progressed with amazing speed.
> 
> June 23, 1918.
> German Army orders production of 670 LK II tanks.
> ...




Cambrai was hardly a defeat. It was at worst a stalemate, with 44000 British casualties compared to around 50000 German.

Britains Tank formations had performed brilliantly on the first day, but had suffered heavy breakdown rates after that. These were not losses in the sense that the Germans destroyed them, they were simply mechanically unreliable. 

The attack phase had gone brilliantly achieving territorial advances that for the time were miraculous for the allies. It was the defensive stage that broke down and could be considered a defeat. 

What damned the british defence was firstly and most importantly a lack of manpower. Cambrai followed hard on the heels of The Somme and Passchendaele, which had very nearly destroyed the British Army. Linked to this was a severe breakdown in command and control....the british had not expected such a massive breakthrough. the Germans had superior reserves behind their front lines and and used them to great effect. 

The main failing foir the British Tanks had been reliability, and this was mostly due to inadequate maintenance and poor construction and design of the early Marks. Mark IVs were a big improvement, and mkVs even better still. At Villers Bretonneux, the following year, British tanks had performed quite reliably, and at Hamel and Amiens (the following July and August) British tanks acted quite reliably. British tank field formations by wars end were the most reliable of any of the major armies using tanks. 

Both German and French tank formations suffered very poor reliability issues (considerably worse than the british), and this was both before and after the introduction of the FT-17. The first mass employment of French armour was on the aisne, where 128 were committed. Just 8 of that numbere remained operational long enough to actually get into battle.

The first major usage of tanks by the Germans was April 1918. About 100 tanks were committed to the offensive, however only about 50 actually got into battle. By April 24, the day of their first big committment, there were just 13 tanks left operational.

The Germans eventually formed 5 regiments of tanks, but by October, there was not a single operational tank left in the German army.


The LkII was a marked improvement over earlier German attempts at producing a tank, but there is nothing to suggest that they were even close to the british by wars end in terms of integrating their tank formations into the army. The British experience showed that it was absolutely necessary to provide proper maintenance facilities within the tank formations, whilst the experiences at Hamel and Amiens had demonstrated what could be done with properly integrated Infantry/armour/artillery teams. Which was precisely what Monash did, and it paid off very well. There were absolutely no indications that the germans were anywhere near that level of development in their tank formations

Further, Fuller had taken this concept of integrated all arms, properly supported tank formations even further. The British were prepring for 1919 by planning to form proper armoured divisions. 

if fighting had continued into 1919, it would have seen properly organized, and better equipped British formations, with a wealth of experience to back them up, versus a fledgling, inexpereienced German tank Corps not properly supported and outnumbered. The German tank formations would have lasted a few days at best. 

However, all this misses the main point. Tanks were an integral part of the Allied response to the static warfare deadlock. They had taken the german assault tactics and built on them. Allied methods were more careful and meticulous than the Gemans Stosstruppen tactics, with tanks integrated into the attack (and defence), so the territorial gains were more measured. however casualty rates were also far more favourable to the allies from Hamel onward. At Amiens, for example, the Germans had lost something like 70000 men, to the Allied losses of about 25000. During operation Michael, by comparison, german losses had run to a staggering 244000 compared to 177000 allied losses. Michael was a success, in terms of territorial gains, but it tore the heart out of the german army in terms of casualties. The Germans worked out how to break the deadlock, but they had not really solved the frightful cost needed in order to achieve that deadlock. by comparison, the British, during their 100 days counteroffensive, achieved a more modest territorial breakthrough, but tipped the losses heavily in their favour. 


There would not have been full scale tank battles in 1919, just a lot of captured German tanks, and even greater defeats for the german army, as had been started in August, and continued right until the end of the war.


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## davebender (Sep 23, 2011)

Fall 1917 wasn't even the bloodiest time period.

*WWI Official Casualty Data*
Axis History Forum • View topic - An aside on Casualties

Add in economic consequences and I see nothing good at all that resulted from WWI. 1919 Europe was worse off in every way from what they had been at the beginning of 1914.


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## Readie (Sep 24, 2011)

davebender said:


> Fall 1917 wasn't even the bloodiest time period.
> 
> *WWI Official Casualty Data*
> Axis History Forum • View topic - An aside on Casualties
> ...




That is what I meant Dave...


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## davebender (Sep 24, 2011)

1946 Europe was worse off in every way from what they had been at the beginning of 1939.


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## parsifal (Sep 24, 2011)

davebender said:


> 1946 Europe was worse off in every way from what they had been at the beginning of 1939.



Hardly. They had rid themselves of a crimnal regime, that was deadly efficient, and just deadly. Half of Germany was free, , mostly from the militarism that had plagued the nation since 1870.

Eastern Europe had fallen under a dark shadow, but the remainder of Europe was free, and would develop accordingly. The period of militarim was over, though it took some time to sink in.

And most importantly the rule of law had been restored. No longer were millions being judged and executed on the basis of race or religion. The right to practice freedom of religion, freedom from prejudice, freedom from persecution discrimination had been restored. Mostly, Europe was free from the spectre of german overt aggression, which had taken 70 yearsa to achieve. 

Saying that Europe in 1945 was worse off than in 1939, is a massive traversty, and denies the criminality of the nazis, even to the German people themselves.

Are you aware of what you are claiming here??????? Are you aware of what that makes you, without admitting it in as many words????? Think about what you are saying Dave.....


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## Readie (Sep 24, 2011)

davebender said:


> 1946 Europe was worse off in every way from what they had been at the beginning of 1939.



Dave, Are you saying that Europe was better off after the holocaust? I hope not...


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## davebender (Sep 24, 2011)

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn would disagree. His "Gulag Archipelago" is well worth reading if you think mass executions ended during May 1945.


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## davebender (Sep 24, 2011)

?
1939 was before the Jewish holocaust.


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## Readie (Sep 24, 2011)

davebender said:


> Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn would disagree. His "Gulag Archipelago" is well worth reading if you think mass executions ended during May 1945.



I don't. They have never ended.
Quite what this has to do with WW1 is beyond me though...


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## Readie (Sep 24, 2011)

davebender said:


> ?
> 1939 was before the Jewish holocaust.



I reiterate dave...

'Are you saying that Europe was in good shape during the worst economic depression in modern history while Nazi Germany was already murdering Jews and other persecuted individuals and groups, and all of Europe was unable to comprehend the need to stop Hitler before cause the World to go to war?'

(with thanks to my mate)

John


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## davebender (Sep 24, 2011)

?
*Historical GDP Data.*
ggdc.net/maddison/index.htm

Most of Europe was out of the depression by 1939.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 25, 2011)

This shall be interesting.

Europe was certainly economically in ruin in 1945, but it is really hard to argue that Europe was not better off with out Hitlers and cronies running Germany and trying to destroy Europe. I don't see how you are going to win this one Dave...


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## parsifal (Sep 25, 2011)

The war was not about getting rid of Soviet aggression, it was about getting rid of German militarism. The world was successful in achieving that, and Europe in particualr was better off for it. To achieve that, compromises had to be made, and this resulted in the rise of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. However, that was nothing different to what was happening in 1939. Soviets were already occupying the Baltic States, annexing large areas of Finland, occupying large areas of Poland, and Rumania, and infiltrating many of the governments of eastern Europe. many of the Governments of these eastern countries were already radicalised and undemocratic. For example the the green cross movement in Hungary, the Iron Guard in Rumania, and similar near fascist movements in yugoslavia. There was a military dictatorship in Greece, and Bulgaria was under marshal law. 

The outlook for all these countries was anything but rosy in 1939, and with two great totalitarian states vying for their control, the future was bleak.

By 1945 the threat from Germany had been removed. Western Europe stood like a beacon of hope for these countries. Sure, the inevitable had happened, and the Soviets had filled the void left by the destruction of the Nazis. But now the people of eastern Europe had only one tormentor, plus they possessed something more precious than all the gold and guns in the world....hope. They could look at western europe and hope for what was possible. In 1939 they could only see blackness and subjugation. In 1945, they could look over their back fences and see a world, gutted by war, but free from tyranny, and with huge amounts of potential. Dont try to tell me that this was not a better situation for Eastern Europeans. It took another 50 years to get free of Soviet oppression, but without the defeat of Hitler, this would not have been possible.

Finally, people often compare the Soviets to the Nazis. nothing could be further from the truth. The Soviets were analogous to a child given a gun, and not told it was wrong to shoot someone. They were like primitive natives really in comparison to the peoples of the west. Doesnt excuse what they did, but they were crimes borne of ignorance for the common Soviets at least. Soviets had never known anything but brutalization and barbarity.

In comparison, the German approach was akin to a psychopathic killer.....they knew exactly what they were doing. They knew right from wrong. but they chose evil over virtue. Therein lies the difference between the Germans of 1939 and the Soviets of 1939. The Soviets had no real choice, the Germans did.


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## michaelmaltby (Sep 25, 2011)

".... But now the people of eastern Europe had only one tormentor, plus they possessed something more precious than all the gold and guns in the world....hope."

Also - something more useful than "hope" - EXPERIENCE. First-hand daily life experience in peace-time - experiencing how god-awful, ass-backwards economically 
speaking the SSR's really were. Nothing to buy. Black-market 'valuta' trading. Corruption. Phony 'quotas'.

The SSR's were collapsing from within when Mr. Reagan started pulling out the bricks. 

In contrast, the Nazi State was a brief affair - a twisted phoenix that arose out of the ashes of WW1. The Soviet System has been through revolution, hot war, cold war, 
space war and much more. Citizens of the SSR's learned to control their outward expressions and trust their internal instincts. Only party apparatchniks were shocked when the Soviet system tumbled.

"... The Soviets were analogous to a child given a gun, and not told it was wrong to shoot someone. They were like primitive natives really in comparison to the peoples of the west."

With all respect, Parsifal, the "peoples" had been Christian (Eastern Orthodox) for CENTURIES. Or Moslem, for centuries. I can't speak for Islam but 
Christianity calls for individual responsibility - FREE WILL. Soviets don't get off the hook (morally speaking) in my books. People get the government (and rule of 
law) that they are willing to fight (and die) for.

Beyond that, I agree with your sentiments. 

MM


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## Readie (Sep 25, 2011)

davebender said:


> ?
> *Historical GDP Data.*
> ggdc.net/maddison/index.htm
> 
> Most of Europe was out of the depression by 1939.



dave,

Most economist date the end of The 'Great Depression' to the beginning of WW2. The accepted date for the beginning of WW2 is 9-1-39, so for 3/4s of 1939 The Great Depression was not over. Europe had not recovered to the level it was before the beginning of the Depression.

Europe was in better shape in 1945 if for no other reason that conditions now existed that did not exist before for what we have today in Europe. One of them being the demise of Nazi Germany.

History of the Holocaust - An Introduction

You don't understand the start date for the Holocaust. I am not surprised as I don't think many people realize how many Jews and other persecuted peoples were killed before they invaded Poland and before the "Final Solution" was implemented.

( with thanks to my mate)

John


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## davebender (Sep 26, 2011)

Europe contains a lot more nations then just Germany. Let's look at the list of nations besides Germany that got destroyed and then added to the communist Empire during 1945. I won't count the Czech Republic and Austria since they were part of Germany by the summer of 1939.

Poland
Latvia
Lithuania
Estonia
Romania
Hungary
Slovakia
Croatia
Slovenia
Serbia
Part of Finland
Bulgaria
Albania
Bosnia


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## davebender (Sep 26, 2011)

10s of millions and 95% of the victims were from the Soviet Union. Most of the remainder were killed during the Spanish Civil War with plenty of blood spilled by both sides.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 26, 2011)

davebender said:


> Europe contains a lot more nations then just Germany. Let's look at the list of nations besides Germany that got destroyed and then added to the communist Empire during 1945. I won't count the Czech Republic and Austria since they were part of Germany by the summer of 1939.
> 
> Poland
> Latvia
> ...



I hear what you are saying, but again I ask you, can you really say that Europe was not better off without Hitler and the Nazis? Seriously...

Sure the Soviets were knocking right on the door, but at the time the most dangerous was Nazi Germany. Do you really think that Europe was worse off in the Cold War than during WW2?



davebender said:


> 10s of millions and 95% of the victims were from the Soviet Union. Most of the remainder were killed during the Spanish Civil War with plenty of blood spilled by both sides.



Again, once the smoke had cleared and the ruins could start being built, Europe was still 100% better off than it was in 1939. The Holocaust had ended and Hitler was not trying to take over the world. Sure there were countries that were wrongfully taken under the influence or "control" of the Soviet Union, but that is all another matter.


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## Readie (Sep 26, 2011)

davebender said:


> 10s of millions and 95% of the victims were from the Soviet Union. Most of the remainder were killed during the Spanish Civil War with plenty of blood spilled by both sides.




Your contention that Europe was better off in 1939 than 1945 is, er how can I put this politely...deeply flawed.

The first regime to be defeated was Nazi Germany, the second regime that you refer to defeated itself. But, that is an entirely different subject.

You surely are not suggesting that Hitler was a foil to Communism and therefore Europe was better off....


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## davebender (Sep 26, 2011)

Hitler ran for political office on an anti-communist platform. 

As for whether Europe was better off under Soviet domination, there are millions of people in Poland, Ukraine, Hungary etc. old enough to remember what Soviet occupation is all about. Ask them.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 26, 2011)

davebender said:


> As for whether Europe was better off under Soviet domination, there are millions of people in Poland, Ukraine, Hungary etc. old enough to remember what Soviet occupation is all about. Ask them.



No one said they were better off, but they certainly were not any better under the Nazi thumb. Do you actually believe that?

Look at it this way. You have to pick and choose your battles. The right battle at the time was Germany, they were the most dangerous. After Germany had been defeated, then you could worry about the Soviets.

So please explain to me how Europe was not better off in 1946 than it was in 1939. The Nazis had been defeated and the worst war known to man was finished. Yes Europe was in ruins, but it was the beginning of reconciliation and rebuilding. For the most part Europe as a continent has seen more than 60 years of peace. Yes there have been isolated conflicts such as we have seen in the Balkans but for the most part Europe has seen peace and economic prosperity.

So again please explain to me how Europe in 1939 on the brink of a major world war that would see the deaths of 70 million people world wide was better off.


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## Readie (Sep 26, 2011)

davebender said:


> Hitler ran for political office on an anti-communist platform.
> 
> /QUOTE]
> 
> ...


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## Lighthunmust (Sep 26, 2011)

davebender said:


> Hitler ran for political office on an anti-communist platform.
> 
> As for whether Europe was better off under Soviet domination, there are millions of people in Poland, Ukraine, Hungary etc. old enough to remember what Soviet occupation is all about. Ask them.



Dave,

I think Hitler would have run for political office on an anti-cabbage platform if he thought it would bring him to power. He just wanted power and would use anyone or anything to get it.

No matter how bad Soviet domination and occupation was it never approached what the Nazis planned for Europe. Yes Soviet Russia's leadership caused the death of tens of millions of people but it never had the agenda of the Nazis.

Sixty-five years without a major European war is a good indication that conditions in 1945 were the breeding ground for this peace. A breeding ground soon seeded with new state of the art manufacturing facilities and new ideas for organizing society. It is a tragedy that this breeding ground for peace was first tilled with the most terrible of wars before it was prepared for the growth of the new, successful, and peaceful Europe. A growth that continues, in some places faster than others, but still grows in every corner of Europe.


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## parsifal (Sep 26, 2011)

The points on this side issue are made, and everybody has had their opportunities to put their various points forward. The arguments will become circular and counterproductive if we continue on this related, but still side issue.

I suggest we move back to topic and pick up where we left off. Readers of the thread can decide for themselves what to make of this discussion.

We had left off with a summary of Operation "Michael", with a bit of side discussion on the role and importance of the various nationalities viz tank production. German plans for 1919 had the war continued into that year had been put forward. It had been pointed out that the germans planned to build about 600 or so tanks in 1919, a new model the LII.

The LII was roughly the same weight as the Whippet "A". In fact the LII was in reality a copy of the Whippet, mounted on an Armoured Car (AC) chassis, with tracks substituted for the wheels. All this dictated the basic layout of the vehicle, with a front mounted engine.

The vehicle had been designed with a turetted armement in mind, and in the postwar versiuon developed in Sweden, a turretted version was built (in 1926) but the limited resources available to the germans in 1918-19 meant that there were no plans to build a turret for the gun armed version in Germany during the war. Instead the 57mm gun ( acaptured British gun) were to be mounted in a fixed box, with limited traverse sponson . It was planned to build a turret for the MG armed version, and for production to be split roughly 50/50 between the MG and gun armed tanks. 

Armour protection was from 0.24in to 0.43 in. The tanks was designed to climb a 6ft trench, with the ability to climb inclines of up to 45 degrees for short distances. The tank had a radius of 40 miles . It was powered by an AC petrol engine, a 55hp daimler water cooled engine. In common with most WWI tanks the vehicle was unsprung. 

We should look at Allied plans and capabilities. 

The French had actually overtaken the British in terms of tank production in 1918, with over 4000 tanks produced. By 1918 they were concentrating on the little Rebault, which had the following basic charateristics. For a WWI tank, the FT17 was an exceptionally well designed vehicle. Its design had begun way back in 1915, when Col Estienne had first approached Renault to build a tracked vehicle. Some sources say that the design was worked out by Estienne, others by the rtenault engineers, others still say it was a jopint effort.....but the basic layout was worked out in 1916. The first prtotypes were built in March 1917. There was considerable debate about appropriate armement, which finally settled on two main types, an MG armed version, and a cannon armed version. Orders fopr nearly 3500 of these tanks (to be deliveed in 1918) were placed in December 1917 (these were delivered, and when it is considered that total french tank production was a little over 4000 tanks for 1918, the importance of this vehicle to their equipment program becomes apparent). Not all the production was undertaken by Renault, constructors included SOMUA, Berliet, Delaunay, and Belleville (all heavy engineering firms). Component manufacture was also undertaken in England. most of the steel for the armour plate was produced and rolled in England. The US was also brought into the program, with plans to build over 8000 of the slightly different 6ton M1917.

The first combat usage of the FT17 was in May 1918. It initially suffered heavy casualties, not because of any design failings, more because of crew inexperience and reliability. Gradually its reliability improved, and by wars end was a reliable and potent vehicle. The french planned to maintain production at the same level through 1919.

This was not the only vehicleon the books for 1919. After the relative failure of the St Chamond, the French designed and built a few of the new Char 2c were built, and were designed as heavy assault tanks. 10 were built. Weighing 70 tons, they were the largest AFVs ever built until post 1945. They were armed with a turretted 75mm gun, and four MGs. If the war had not ended, it was planned to build 300 of these tanks, and use them to spearhead the destruction of the german defensive lines. They were a reliable, potent vehicle. It was the Tiger Tank of 1919, its armour completely impervious to abything the germans possessed, a massive vehicle and rather similar to the tiger in concept and effect (a waste of resources perhaps???). 

The British had produced the first of their rhomboidal tanks in 1916, with the mk I. They had produced 150 of these vehicles, before progressing to the Whippet "A" and MkIV tanks in 1917. 1277 tanks had been produced in 1917, followed by 1378 in 1918. There had been a steady improvement in the rliability of British tanks, culminating in the MkV and Whippet "C" breakthrough tanks. Planned production for 1919 was about 2000 units.

However, there was an intersting development towards the end of 1918, with the development of the MkVII tank. At 45 tons, it was intended to be the first interallied engineering project, using the Britiah designed Mk VIII tank, US jigs and dies, located in a factory in France, This interallied agreement was worked out in November 1917, with a planned production of 600 vehicles, to be delivered from late 1918. In the finish, the outbreak of peace curtailed the plan, thoughh a number were built and used in the US postwar.

The mk VIII was an altogether better designed vehicle that the mk V. It had a separate engine compartment, pressurized crew compartment improved steering system. At 45 tons it was armoured to 0.63in, it had a range of some 50 miles, trench climbing of 14 feet, and could climb a gradient in excess of 40 degrees. 

These are the principal vehicles that would have been in the 1919 campaign. It would have seen approximately 15000 allied tanks engaging about 600 German tanks. Allied tanks were significantly better than the single design put forward by the germans. To me, there was no doubt as to the outcome of the tank battles of 1919. 


I would suggest that we move the focus to the next major offensive of the german Spring campaign.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 26, 2011)

I agree, we have ventured way too far off topic...


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## parsifal (Sep 26, 2011)

There was one tank, or rather AFV, that I forgot to mention, and which I thought quite interesting

The Infantry Tank Mk X was the worlds first APC. Developed in 1918, a few had been built by wars end. I have some pictures at home for those intersted. It was a large vehicle, similar in general outline to the mk V, though larger. It was unarmed. It could carry up to 30 fully equipped troops, and was amphibious, which IMO was a very advanced concept for 1918. 

This suggests to me that the allies were making prepration for a rhine crossing in 1918. Getting across the Rhine would have been a major undetaking, but having amphibious armoured support would have assisted a crossing gratly. From the accounts I have, the british intended to build about 2000 of these vehicles.

We also need to look at JFC Fullers concepts for armoured warfare in 1919, his so-called 1919 armoured division or armoured corps....I have an article somewhere and will dig it out if I can....


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## parsifal (Sep 27, 2011)

The changes in warfare in 1918

Both sides expected that the war would continue and planned accordingly. But the fighting could hardly have gone on as it had thus far. A new form of warfare was clearly emerging in 1918, one that threatened to render the fighting methods 1914-1917 obsolete in many respects. 

The German offensives of Spring and Summer 1918 were notable in that they showed the way to break the deadlock of trench, HMG, and QF artillery on the one hand, against the extreme vulnerability tightly packed infantry trying to advance out of cover on the other hand. The basic problem was the differential in firepower….the weapons of 1914 heavily favoured the defence. This was compounded by the poor understanding of tactics…the generals continued to think in terms of Napoleonic wars really. The best defence against cavalry had been tightly packed formed infantry advancing slowly in close order. And it needs to be remembered, that both sides maintained large bodies of cavalry behind the front lines, waiting to exploit a breakthrough in the lines that never came. 

Fundamentally what had been under estimated was the defensive power of the machine gun. Moreover the perceived solution to the problem, planned, long running preparatory artillery barrages caused more harm than good. They were designed to destroy the defences at certain point, but they could never succeed in defeating all of the MGs, and because they lasted days or weeks, gave plenty of warning of an impending attack, allowing reserves to be moved into position to contain any breakthroughs.

The Germans were the first to develop tactical methods to break this deadlock. The main elements to their solution included

1) Surprise. This dictated very short preparatory barrages. It also meant that concentration of troops should, if possible be completed as secretly as possible. This in part meant that air superiority over ones own lines was needed in order to limit or deny the enemy the ability to carry out effective aerial recon. 

2) Use of terrain, weather and cover. Instead of advancing along a broad front in clear conditions at a slow pace, with little or no return fire, Hutiers tactics envisaged rapid advances by small groups of Infantry from cover position to cover position, using mutually supporting formations and firepower centred around the Infantry Squad. To this end Infantry was trained to maximise return of fire even whilst advancing .

3) To this end, the Germans made changes to their basic Infantry arrangements and equipment. They maximised the short range firepower of the Infantry squad by introducing a new weapon, the MP 18 Bergmann SMG. Squads were issued a high degree of mortars, and light mountain artillery pieces, so that artillery fire could follow the infantry breakthroughs. AT weaponary, generally in the form of 7.92mm Patrone AT rounds were issued. German Madsen and LMG 08—were more widely issued than before and were treated as mobile, offensive weapons rather than as static, defensive assets
4) There were two significant tactical elements to the new methods of attack. The first was that assaults were targeted at the weaker elements of a defence, rather than the stronger parts, with the idea that a breakthrough would lead to the dislocation of the defence, rather than having to completely overwhelm the defence. The second element, kind of linked to the first, was that strongpoints revealed in a defence were isolated and bypassed, rather than the halting the advance to deal with the strongpoint. This tactic emphasised forward movement and momentum in an offensive 


During the German offensive of 1918, small, highly motivated, lightly equipped units of Sturmtruppen had penetrated Allied lines with relative ease. But the Allied armies had not disintegrated. Observers in both camps noted that, wherever clerks, cooks, and stragglers rallied around a field kitchen or an isolated strip of ruined trench, the infiltrators suffered grievously, slowed, and, as often as not, fell victim to organized counterattacks. The multiplication of small defended points caused delays, and delay was the isolated, lightly loaded storm trooper's deadliest enemy. This lesson led both sides to develop formidable defenses in depth. The old, shallow trench lines were replaced by deep, discontinuous belts of strongpoints, arranged for all-around fire and mutual support. On the German side, where this trend was most pronounced, concrete pillboxes and shell-proof infantry shelters shared interlocking fields of fire. Mine fields, wire, and antitank ditches 20 to 30 feet across channeled attackers into fire lanes where pre-laid artillery and machine-gun fire could annihilate them. It was thus clear that the new weapons and tactics could easily replace the 1914-17 stalemate with another, deadlier impasse. To achieve a decisive, war-winning breakthrough, the new weapons and tactics would have to be combined under a new strategy, a strategy calculated to exploit their potential before they could be countered.


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## Readie (Sep 27, 2011)

parsifal said:


> The changes in warfare in 1918
> 
> Both sides expected that the war would continue and planned accordingly. But the fighting could hardly have gone on as it had thus far. A new form of warfare was clearly emerging in 1918, one that threatened to render the fighting methods 1914-1917 obsolete in many respects.
> 
> ...




You make an interesting point here Michael. But, one should not forget that by 1918 European countries were all running out of men to fight. (The exception being the as yet untapped resources of America)
Quite how the Germans seriously intended to fight on is hard to see.
Cheers
John


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## davebender (Sep 28, 2011)

I don't think so. APCs were part of the German tank program right from the beginning.

First Panzers 1917-1918


> On November 13th of 1916, the German Army decided to build tanks and overall project was under direction of Joseph Vollmer.
> 
> *New tank was to be a universal platform to be used as a base for both a tank and cargo carrier
> 
> ...



The German Army cancelled the A7V tank after only 20 prototypes. However they apparently liked the cargo carrier variant enough to keep it in limited production. I suspect some of the hundreds of captured British and French tanks became cargo / personnel carriers also.






This particular tracked cargo carrier was based on the cancelled Orion Wagen tank.







WWI Flak Panzer based on the A7V chassis.


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## parsifal (Sep 28, 2011)

Well i'll grant you that when I made my statement I was unaware of the vehicle you mentioned. however, I would not classify either the photo that you posted or the A7 as APCs by any stretch. The Photo is more a tracked ammunition carrier, does not provide sufficient protection for Infantry to be carried into a hot environment, and is in fact classified as a cargo carrier. Infantry is cargo, but they are a special forma of cargo. if you wanted to classify that vehicle as an APC, then why not the numerous ammunition carriers employed by the allies from before the war??????

The A7 cannot be classified as an APC either, though it did carry some Infantry. The Infantry could not be tactically loaded or disembarked easily, and in any event that was not the intention for the A7

I am also very dubious about the link that you posted. It claims that there were tank battles in the vicinity of St Quentin 21 March 1918, against the british. German tanks are known to have been committed to battle on that day , and were quite successful, but there were no British tanks that I know of committed to any sector held by Byngs 5th Army on that day. AFAIK all tanks of the RTC were under refit well behind the lines. Its possible that tanks were there, but highly doubtful. The source then says that there was a further engagement 21 April near Villers Bretonneux....well almost right, except that they got the date wrong....it happened on the 24th April, and is an event we previously talked about. That is the first time that British tanks engaged German tanks , and as I stated and referenced several times, is believed to be the first tank vs tank engagement in history (something you have disputed, but provided no supporting evidence or references until now) 

The mk X is, in my opinion, the first true APC. It was tracked, armoured, allowed for tactical embarkation and disembarkation and could enter the field of battle with some hope of survival for its occupants. It was amphibious to boot. A photo is attached

Trying to argue that the germans held any sort of technical advatage in AFVs in WWI is certainly a new and novel argument. i know of no author that would support that position. The Germans were by 1918 the masters of tactical concepts and in some areas of weaponary, particulalry small arms, but its a new angle for me to see anyone trying to argue the germans held a technical superiority in tank design


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## parsifal (Sep 28, 2011)

Readie said:


> You make an interesting point here Michael. But, one should not forget that by 1918 European countries were all running out of men to fight. (The exception being the as yet untapped resources of America)
> Quite how the Germans seriously intended to fight on is hard to see.
> Cheers
> John



Ah true enough, though the germans were in worse shape than the Brits. Both nations had lost 1.8 million dead by the beginning of 1918, but whereas the Brits had suffered about 2 million wounded, the germans had sufferfed a whopping 3.25 million. After Operation Michael, which had cost the allies 177000 casualties to halt, the British were able to transfer a further 170000 fully trained fillers from the training schools to the front line, more or less immediatley. The French also replaced their losses. The Germans had lost 244000 men, but could only replace about 40% of men lost, and most of these were untrained levies. They had lost a large proportion of their Stosstruppen, which they could not easily replace. These guys were very like modern soldiers, taking months to train properly.

By 1918, the Germans were down to their old men and boys, like they were 27 years later


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## davebender (Sep 28, 2011)

WWI era "sufficient protection" is not the same as WWII era "sufficient protection". Dozens of WWI era British and French tanks were knocked out using standard German Army hand grenades, light infantry mortars and 7.92mm machineguns with armor piercing ammunition. Dozens more were destroyed using standard 7.7cm field guns firing standard HE ammunition.


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## parsifal (Sep 28, 2011)

davebender said:


> WWI era "sufficient protection" is not the same as WWII era "sufficient protection". Dozens of WWI era British and French tanks were knocked out using standard German Army hand grenades, light infantry mortars and 7.92mm machineguns with armor piercing ammunition. Dozens more were destroyed using standard 7.7cm field guns firing standard HE ammunition.



I agree that the gun armour race in WWI was at the entry level, however the means to kill or disable tanks was as limited as the armouring used to protect their targets. The main German AT weapon in 1918, was the AT rifle, in 7.92mm calibre. This was already having difficulty in penetrating the frontal armour of Allied tanks and toward the end of 1918, the germans were already taking steps to phase this weapon out, or at least supplement it by an ATR in the 13mm calibre,

Grenades could not generally penetrate the armour of Allied tanks, though it did happen on occasion. Rather, a grenade lobbed onto the roof of a Mk IV or MkV could damage the tracks of the tank and force its abandonment. 

77mm field guns were used, along with a number of guns, but i am unsure just how successful they actually were. A field gun cannot slew its aim very effectively, especially when it has to be dug into a trench system, and is firing HE rather than any AP round AFAIK. But its the limited traversing ability that limits their effectiveness the most. Certainly the number one limiting factor in tank effectiveness IMO was not anything the germans were doing, it was the poor reliability of the vehicles themselves, but by the latter half of 1918, this had been dramatically reduced, and the vehicles planned and entering production for 1919 would suffer from mechanical unreliability far less. In the later 1918 offensives, i am not aware of the germans being able to knock out large numbers of tanks outright, to the extent they could halt an operation. I dont even think anything like that happened in 1917 either. Inferred in your statements is that German AT defences in 1917-18 were able to defeat determined concentrated allied tank assaults, and to be honest, I dont think that actually ever happened. Breakdowns were the major cause of failure in tank offensives. 

In any event arguing that the armouring on Allied tanks was not a fullproof defence against AT defences doesnt do anything to promote your claim that the open topped tracked ammunition tractor or the A7 tank were effective APCs. If anything it only serves to underscore their unsuitability in the Infantry vehicle role.


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## davebender (Sep 28, 2011)

No such thing during WWI. Automotive technology had not advanced to the point where combat vehicles could carry sufficient armor and still maintain an adequate power to weight ratio. So a WWI era tracked combat vehicle must settle for minimal protection plus a power to weight ratio good enough to get the vehicle across no mans land without breaking down. Even that requirement was tough to meet. 

For instance, only 9 of the 49 BEF tanks employed on the Somme during September 1916 made it across no mans land. The 121 French tanks employed May 16th, 1917 did a bit better. 81 were put out of action the first day but only 29 were due to mechanical malfunction. The other 52 were disabled by German fire. These actions were before the German Army began issuing purpose built anti tank guns.

*3.7cm Rheinmetall TAK* 600 issued during 1918.
Review of MGM's 1/72 German WW1 3.7cm Rheinmetall TAK AT gun


> It was a gun on a fixed wheel carriage, with the 809mm long tube fixed to the carriage, without any recoil system. The gun had mechanisms for elevation (-6 degrees to +9 degrees) and traverse (21 degrees). The fixed iron sights allowed for firing up to 2,600m. The muzzle velocity was 506 m/sec. Emplaced, the gun itself weighed 175kg. The gun fired solid armour-piercing 0.46kg shells (with or without a tracer). These shells could penetrate 15mm of armour plating at a distance of 500 meters. The gun could be pulled by one horse, and on the battle*field by four men dragging it in harnesses.


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## parsifal (Sep 28, 2011)

I agree that there was no such thing as fullproof defence, neither did I make any claim to that effect. However, the question is not whether tanks were fullproof but whether the AT defences were good enough, and dense enough to break up allied armour. In summary they were not. the loss rates you mention are not loss rates due to enemy action, about 90% of those losses are due to break downs, and this decreased as the war progressed.

Now, looking at individual performance, if we take the german 37mm gun as the likely primary AT defence for 1919 (which it wasnt....the plan was to introduce the 13mm ATR as the main defence against tanks), with an armour penetration of 15mm @ 500m, this might sometimes, maybe 30% of the time that hits were scored, penetrate the 16mm frontal armour of an FT17, or 14mm frontal armour of a MkV. It would have little hope of penetrating the 45mm of an FCM or the 30 mm of a Medium Type D. It would have slim hope of penetrating the 18mm of case hardened (the first in the world) frontal armour of an International Type. 

In 1918, 1919, the balance favoured the tanks defences over the AT defences, and this is reflected in the relatively low numbers of tanks lost to enemy action. As previously indicated, your implied claim that the majority of tanks were knocked out by German action is just false, or at best misleading (I believe deliberately so) since the majority of losses 1916-June 1918 were due to breakdowns

Further the actions that you have selected are highly selective and misleading. As has been stated several times, Allied tanks did not really start to have their full effect until the last half of 1918. At Hamel, for example, 45 tanks were committed to the battle, and only 3 were knocked out due to German activity. Others did break down, but about half the tank force was still operational at the end of the action.

Trying to argue that German defences were effective against Allied tanks, or that tanks were not a decisive element in the fighting at the end of the war is a nonsense. Tanks were very effective, once the allies worked out how to use them, and the reliability issues had been solved. Once that was done, the Germans were no longer in the hunt.


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## parsifal (Sep 29, 2011)

I found Tim Travers' book (Command Technology in the British Army 1917-18, Routledge 1992) to be very good. it includes a number of primary sources that are appended to the main dialogue. I would recommend it as a reference for peope wanting to study this period and the effect of technology on the british Army at this time.

He spends quite a bit of time on the contribution of tanks to both Hamel and Amiens fought in July and August of 1918, and attributes the low loss rates at Hamel to the way they were employed and the visibility conditions, along with the close levels of co-operation that had been developed in the prepratory training leading up to th attack. At Hamel, the Infantry led the Tanks, not the other way aroundwith the tanks providing close fire support as the Infantry advanced. This was the theory, though in practice the relatively speedy MkVs overtook the advanacing Infantry in a number of places.

At Amiens, the performance of the tanks was quite good, though victory was less one sided than it had been at Hamel. At Amiens, in support of 4th Australian Division, the 8th Tank Bn of the RTC with 39 operational tanks were committed. In the after action reports it was generally considered that 10-14 of the tanks committed had done critical work in the attack. 10 of the tanks had remained operational but had not fulfilled a critical role in the battle. 15 tanks had either broken down due to mechanical breakdown or had been disabled by german fire. Frustratingly there is not a breakdown on the reasons for these breakdowns, so we dont how how many broke down of their own accord, and how many had been disabled by German artillery and ATG/ATR fire. Neither do I have information on the numbers of tankmen killed or injured. However, every one of the tanks knocked out, or broken down were repaired and eventually returned to service. So, in this major attack on a critical German position, german AT efforts failed to break up the assault, and inflicted zero permananet losses on the supporting British tank Bn. I fail to see the "scores of British tanks knocked out" here, and this battle was viewed by both sides as a critical final turning point in the war...... 

To be fair, Travers does not view the role of tanks at either Hamel or Amiens as critical to the outcome of the battle. In both cases, indeed, right to the wars end, tanks in the british Army played a supporting role to the infantry/ artillery combination. Still they were critical to reducing casualties, and generating a collapse of morale in the frontline German units


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## parsifal (Sep 29, 2011)

To be as fair as possible, Travers does mention several occasions following Amiens (mostly in the pursuit in September) where the retreating Germans delivered some nasty stinging blows on the RTC. Haig to my mind was attempting to exploit the near collapse of the german Army in flanders following the bollocking it received in August, and in essence sent s number of tank Bns into battle without adequate support. The results were predictable, and quite nasty, so to that extent the German defenders demonstrated in spades that they still had plently of fight and could be effective when they were given the opportunity to do so. But in properly planned battles, with proper all arms integration, the Germans by August and beyond were just outnumbered, and outgunned. And they knew it, which was affecting their morale...


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## davebender (Sep 29, 2011)

No such thing. The German Army employed multiple anti tank weapons by 1918. You can expect improved AT weapons and tactics during 1919.

Welcome to Landships! - A site for WW1 Military Hardware WW1 Military Modelling
- K rounds. 7.92mm AP rounds that could be fired from normal infantry rifles and machineguns.
- 13.1mm AT rifle. By the end of the war every infantry company had two.
- TUF 13.1mm AT machinegun. Essentially a scaled up Maxim MG. Prototype stage when war ended.
- HMGs dedicated to AT role. LMGs replaced the pre-war Maxim 08 in the infantry support role.
- A new model 7.58mm light mortar was introduced that allowed direct fire vs tanks and bunkers.
- 3.7cm TAK AT gun. Intended to replace light mortars in the AT role. Hence more mortars available for infantry support.
- 7.7mm field guns plus special AP ammo. Sep 1918 instruction designated tanks as the primary target for all field guns.
- Flammenwerfer. An effective close range AT weapon. German Pioneer had them by 1916.
- Grenade bundles. A method still employed at the beginning of WWII.
- Mines. German soldiers improvised mines during 1914. By 1918 they had factory built mines.
- AT ditches. Crude but effective right up to modern times.
- Dedicated AT squad. Most German infantry battalions had one by 1918. Satchel charges and grenade bundles were the preferrred weapons.
- 3.7cm AT guns and 7.7cm field guns with the new AP ammo were often located in designated AT forts.
- Experiments for developing the 2cm Becker autocannon into an anti tank weapon.


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## parsifal (Sep 29, 2011)

Thankyou for posting that, quite a good source. however, does not alter my basic position that the 13mm AT rifle was planned to be the German army's primary AT weapon system. According to the article you posted, they were planning to issue 30000 of them at a scale of 2 per company. thats a total of 54 or so per division, making it the most numerous AT weapon, and hence the primary weapon system for combatting tanks. Just a quick note for you to remember in future, "primary" does not mean "sole" 

The unfortunate thing about this AT rifle was that it lacked sufficient peformance to be fully effective against the heavier tanks being introduced by the allies in the latter half of 1918. The smaller 7.92mm rifle, would be even less effective, though more accurate. Both weapons would have been useful, but inadequate overall

With regard to the AT MG, I note that the article finds it doubtful that any had been issued, but also notes the Germans intended to use all their available HMGs for AT work, firing the standard K round. This means the standard issue maxim might have similar performance to the 13mm AT rifle, which by 1918 was insufficient except at close range to deal with allied tanks. and the whole concept is deeply flawed when you think about it. If the german MGs were busy engaging the allied tanks and not the allied Infantry, and they were busy doing that until close range, that would mean the Allied Infantry would be able to cross no-mans land virtually untroubled.....the tanks would achieve their purpose, and survive, simply by staying 100 to 300metres from the trenches but issued on a much lower scale. 

A German Infantry Bn in 1918 had a total of 6 MGs, thats 54 per Div, so if all MGs were converted to the AT role then yes, these become the primary AT weapon. Problem is, I just cannot see all 54 being diverted to that purpose. Maybe 1 company per Bn (2 guns) equalling 18 per div. In any event, converting your primary anti-infantry weapon to an AT function, is a bad idea, because it takes a weapon system very good at one thing (killing Infantry) and diverts it to a role that it would be less good at (killing tanks) and demands that it do that at a time in the battle when maximum anti-infantry capability would be needed. Dumb.......

The direect fire mortar would have been used as part of the standard mortar detachments which were already being used to engage allied tanks. The problem here is twofold, limited scales of issue, and limited range of the weapon system. But it has to be conceded that they were at least effective at range below 500m. 

The article you posted relevantly states..."_In September 1918 an instruction was issued to the effect that half of every battalion’s light trench mortars should be dedicated to anti tank work. The 192nd division of the German Army had already pioneered this approach in August. They proved very effective but limited by a shortage of horses for the transport of ammunition. During this trial British tank crews had described the use of light trench mortars in this role and from September onwards German light trench mortar crews reported that tank gunners were paying them particular and unwanted attention. With their relatively short range if operating in the mobile anti tank role (in the open) they were highly vulnerable to machine gun fire from tanks_"

This fails to appreciate that from Hamel onward, the British were using their tanks as part of all arms assualt groups, and as often as not were pushing their Infantry forward of the supporting tanks and using their tanks as fire support vehicles. If the mortars were being detailed to engage the tanks at the very time they were needed to also engage the advancing infantry, the tanks were achieving their stated purpose. two things were developed in the allied inventory to counter the AT mortars. The tanks from the mkV onward were more mobile, and they used their MG armament to keep the mortars suppressed.

In terms of equipment scales, it is worth noting that each Bn had 6 mortars attached, 3 light and 3 medium. It was only intended that the Light mortars be assigned to this task, so each Division in theory had 13 or 14 of these weapons for AT duties. thats not enough to make much difference. Average frontage of a German Inf Div on the western front was 6 miles from memory....But if you read the tactical employment methods devised by the germans it becomes apparent just how limited they were...."_light trench mortars assigned to anti tank duties were not to be used singly but always positioned in groups of at least two. They were also to be positioned were two or more groups could provide each other with supporting fire. They were to be echeloned in depth behind the front line being concentrated where tank breakthroughs were most likely_". In other words, one might expect that at minimum a given piece of the divisional frontage with an effective enagem,ent range of no more than 500m out of a divisional fontage of 12000m might be repeated 3 times. that means that the mortar teams could cover, at most, a little over 10% of the divisional frontage when used in this way. hardly any sort of show stopper i am afraid.

If the 3.7cm gun had been introduced, it at least would have allowed the mortars to return to duties that they were better suited to.

Not included in your article is the expected rate of issue for the dedicated ATG assets. I can tell you it was intended to provide each Bn with just 2 guns. some Divs may also have had a further centralized detachment of 6 guns attached, though in reality this would have been rare IMO. so at maximum the 37mm gun would have been issued at a rate of 24 per Div, but more likely 18, to cover an average frontage of 12000m. The dedicated AT Bns might have helped a bit, but the germans would have been lucky to have any of them in time, and in the right place at the right time.

The ATg was a vast improvement on the lash up adaptations mentioned so far, but still insufficient to be truly effective against the heavy breakthrough tanks the allies were preparing for 1919. 


All of the other measures and equipment have issues one way or another. The central problem was that the germans had not appreciated the threat from tanks in time, and by detaching their other weapons to the AT role, were in fact diminishing the eoverall effectiveness of their field formations. This includes things such as AT ditches and the like

My opinion...by the latter part of 1918, the allies had worked out tactical methods, some of them taken from the germans themselves, and grafted tanks and aircraft into the mix. The Germans had underestimated the effect of tanks in widening the all arms concepts, and by August 1918, increasingly one sided defeats were being inflicted on the Germans. There is no reason that in 1919 this would not have continued, at an accelarated rate in fact. Basic problem for the germans was that they were running out of men, faster than their opponents, and were suffering a crisis in morale to boot


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## davebender (Sep 29, 2011)

AMMS Brisbane
7.7cm Feldkanone 96 n.A modified for the anti tank role. The Heer had 50 batteries of these heavy AT guns by the end of WWI. I find it difficult to believe anyone could mass produce a WWI era tank with enough armor to survive an AP shot of that size.


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## parsifal (Sep 29, 2011)

They were effective, in terms of the weight of shell, but replaced rather than added to the 24 guns normally attached to a German Infantry Div. also the weight of these guns made them clumsy and difficult to bear on a moving target. Given that the new MkVs and above were all noted for their improved mobility the firing solution for a field gun adapted to ATG work becomes that much harder. 

With 50 batteries available, that equates to just 2 to 4 guns per div, so these weapons are going to have virtually no effect on a tank/infantry battle. just not enough of them, they are too clumsy and hard to train to be effective. This was certainly the experience of the Australian formations that came up against them during the 100 days offensive. many were captured, many more abandoned...

Moreover, to be used in the AT role, they would have needed to be in the trench lines, in relatively open revetments, and in the artillery dominated battlefields of WWI that was a damning weakness. an open revetment would be needed to permit proper movement of the gun, but the minute you do that, you expose both gun and crew to counter battery from the Allied artillery as well as MG fire from advancing Infantry and armour (and in 1919 they would also have been bombed by the armourd Sopwith TR ground attack aircraft) . if the guns are held back, they are still going to be under threat, since by the second half of 1918, allied Infantry/Armour teams were being accompanied by mobile batteries of artillery, much as the germans themselves had done at the beginning of 1918.

Dont be mistaken, these guns were useful, but had some sever limitations, and given the small numbers that could be deployed, would have little or no effect on the battle.

The germans needed a lightweight, purpose built AT gun, strong enough to defeat the second gen Allied tanks coming into service. the gun needed to be lightweight, and easily trained. The 3.7cm gun they did develop was a step in the right direction, but still lacked power to kill the allied new tanks


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## davebender (Sep 29, 2011)

*British Casualties on the Western Front.*
122,272 August 1918.
114,831 September 1918
121,046 October 1918

Except for the Somme bloodbath Britain sustained more casualties during the final 3 months then any other period of WWI. Propaganda aside I'd say the Australians had a rough time during the so called "100 days".


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## parsifal (Sep 30, 2011)

davebender said:


> *British Casualties on the Western Front.*
> 122,272 August 1918.
> 114,831 September 1918
> 121,046 October 1918
> ...



Its useful to compare the actual losses, for both sides to determine if the hundred days offensives were having a real or propaganda effect. From 8 July 1918 to 11 November the principal combattants suffered the following casualties

Killed, wounded and prisoners:
Allies
531,000 French
411,636 British Empire
127,000 American
Total: 1,070,000 Killed wounded and prisoners:

Germans
785,733
Total prisoners:
386,342

Total: 1,172,075 killed wounded and prisoners

The casualty rates were heavy for all sides in that last 3 months of the war, but the difference was that by the end of it, German morale was clearly collapsing and the German army was in full retreat. German formations were taking heavier casualties than any of the opposing nationalities, and could only remain competitive in the field if they continued their retreat. Further, the opposing nationalities could spread their casulaties over three main national groupings. The strongest evidence that the germans were clearly losing, and badly so, comes from the reaction of the german leadership itself. 

Australian casulaties were the heaviest of any of the protagonists on either side, as a percentage of the force deployed. 68% of all soldiers deployed ended up a casualty. There were 67000 dead Australians alone by the end of it. 12000 of these were killed at gallipoli. I dont dispute that casualties for the allies continued to be heavy, but what i do dispute is this attempt to re-write history....that somehow the germans were not losing, that somehow they were not suffering even more catastrophic losses than their opponent. Clearly the statement by their own leadership disproves that, as well as the figures themselves, along with a glance on the map as to what was happening.

The success of the 100 days isnt that casualties were avoided, they werent. But during set piece battles, such aas at Hamel or Amiens the division of losses was clearly and substantially in favour of the allies. Allied losses took sharp rises whenever they tried to cut corners and exploit apparent german weaknesses. Here the allied strengths of careful preparation and true all arms co-operation gave way to a mad scramble and improvisation, and inevitably this led to heavy losses for the allies, because in those situations the allies made mistakes. However, the germans could only now survive if they retreated. Every time they attempted to stabilize and create a static defence, the allies would give them a rather severe beating. Allied military technique had mastered the technique of the static line battle, but was less able to deal with a mobile engagement. The germans could only survive if they kept retreating. Thats why their military leaders knew they had to find a way out of the quagmire


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## Readie (Oct 1, 2011)

Good post. Another interesting thing to consider is the Aussie volunteering rate. Bearing in mind that all Aus trops were volunteers and not conscripted.

In the early years of WW1 most of the Au volunteers were of British stock (like my Great Uncles and Grand father), as the war progressed and the casualty rates got worse and with the realisation of the consquences of battles at Gallipoli and on the Western Front the Aussies became, er.. less willing to volunteer.
Man for man the Aussie troops took a pounding wherever they were deployed.
First World War 1914

Cheers
John


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## parsifal (Oct 1, 2011)

Thanks John 

My grandfather was in the 7th Light Horse Regiment, AIF, from 1914 to 1919. The following is a brief history. I also have the original regimental history as well as my grandfathers military6 decorations....


_7th Light Horse Regiment A.I.F., 1914-19

After the outbreak of World War One, 7th Light Horse Regiment was formed at Liverpool and Holsworthy, near Sydney in October and November 1915, as part of 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade.
The first commanding officer was Lt Col J. M. Arnott of 11th Light Horse (C.M.F.) and Major G. M. Macarthur-Onslow of 9th Light Horse (C.M.F.) was appointed 2nd-in-command.
The Regiment arrived in Egypt on 1st February, 1915 and in May, the Brigade was ordered to Gallipoli as a dismounted force, the 7th disembarking on the 19th. From then on it was in the fighting until the evacuation of the Peninsula in mid-December. For a period, the squadrons were distributed to the battalions of 3rd Infantry Brigade; later the Regiment operated as a complete unit. It was at such historical places as Bolton's Ridge, Tasmania Post, Chatham's Post, Balkan Pits and Lone Pine.
During August, Lt Col Arnott was evacuated sick and was succeeded in command by Major (later Lt Col) Macarthur-Onslow.
After Gallipoli, the Light Horse were re-horsed in Egypt and 2nd Light Horse Brigade was allotted to Anzac Mounted Division, with which the 7th Regiment remained until the end of hostilities. In Egypt, Sinai and Palestine, it gained battle honours and the following remarks by Lt Gen Sir Harry Chauvel, who commanded the Desert Mounted Corps, are appropriate:
"At the Battle of Romani it was largely due to its stubborn defence and spirited counter-attack, under the leadership of Lt Col G. Macarthur-Onslow that the victory was so complete.
At the first Battle of Gaza, it was this Regiment that led the Anzac Mounted Division through the night to its position in rear of the city and which captured the new Commander of the Gaza Defence, who was on his way up to take his command. During the Battle of Beersheba and the pursuit which followed, the Regiment sustained the fine traditions it had already established for dash and gallantry. In the raids across Jordan and throughout the long summer of 1918 in the Jordan Valley, it bore its share of the fighting and the hardships, from the bitter cold of Gilead in mid-winter to the scorching heat of Jericho in July.
Under Lt Col J. D. Richardson, it played a brilliant part in the final victory which destroyed three Turkish Armies and brought Germany's Allied out of the War."
Decorations and awards gained by the Regiment were as follows: CMG - 2; DSO - 5; MC - 8; Order of the Nile - 4; DCM - 8; MM - 20; Serbian Medal - 5; Mentioned in Despatches - 41; Complimentary Mention (Anzac) - 1; Mentioned in Divisional Orders (Anzac) - 1._ 

My Grandfather was a scout in the campaign in Palestine. When war broke out, he was working in Queensland as a Stockman. He and his best friend , a man named Doyle brought over 400 head of horses down from Mt Isa to Sydney....that over 2000 miles by the long paddock. He was the best horseman I ever knew, and tough as nails. 


The 7th fought at Gallipoli, Beersheeba, Romani, helped to capture Jerusalem and Damascus just to name a few. My grndfather was mentioned when he and Doyle rode down and captured a German advising officer North Of Jerusalem. Said he roped and hog tied him like a calf. His own horse was a big grey mare, 17 hands high, which he called "Charlotte", after my Grandmother I think 

At the end of the war, Field Marshal Allenvy wrote to Harry Chauvel, the commander of the Australian Light Horse, 2nd Brigade, with a specific unit commendation. Unless you believe this was all just proaganda, it was a pretty impressive rap....


_"I knew the New South Wales Lancers and the Australian Horse well in the Boer War, and I was glad to meet some of my old friends of those days when the Light Horse came under my command just two years ago ... 

The Australian Light Horseman combines with a splendid physique a restless activity of mind... on every variety of ground - mountain, plain, desert, swamp or jungle - the Australian Light Horseman has proved himself equal to the best. 

He has earned the gratitude of the Empire and the admiration of the world"._

Finally here are some photgraphs of the Light Horse....


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## Readie (Oct 1, 2011)

Thanks Michael,
The respectful Au archives have a mine of information that never fails to impress me.
http://naa12.naa.gov.au/scripts/Imagine.asp?B=8070340
If this link doesn't work and you are interested in a bit of Read history
Search Retrieve - Session timed out
Or type Charles Archibald Read into 1915 - 1917 into the national archives of Au website and you can see his history.
Cheers
John


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## Lighthunmust (Oct 1, 2011)

parsifal said:


> My grandfather was in the 7th Light Horse Regiment, AIF, from 1914 to 1919. The following is a brief history. I also have the original regimental history as well as my grandfathers military6 decorations....



I am extremely impressed! You have much to be proud of Michael! I saw the Mel Gibson movie 30 years ago and "The Light Horseman" when it came out. Both moved me to do a little reading about Gallipoli and Beersheeba. Your grandfather's generation was magnificent in the performance of duty! Have you ever read about the Australian submarine that penetrated the Sea of Marmara? Really impressive.

Steve


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## TheMustangRider (Oct 2, 2011)

I second Lighthunmust's post.
Your grandfather seemed to be a very admirable person Parsifal and I'm sure you must feel very proud of him.
I hope you had the opportunity to have long talks with him about The Great War.


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## parsifal (Oct 2, 2011)

Thanks guys, I am proud of his achievements. But he hated the war. Talking about casualties, he was the only surviving 1914 man to make it through the whole war unscathed....well almost unscathed. he suffered psychological trauma for the rest of his life. Not a happy experience for him. He never really complained about it, but he suffered I can tell you.

We could look at the 1918 offensives on the fronts other than the western front, though we have not really finished with the western front. 

I was hoping that some of you other guys would post information on the other nationalities It would be great to make this thread a more or less complete record of the war in 1918.


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## davebender (Oct 2, 2011)

Where are you getting your data? 

You have omitted Russian casualties so I assume only western front casualties count for this comparison. Per the Reichsarchiv these are the German western front casualties for July to November 1918.
78,196 Dead.
347,867 Missing and POW.
359,670 Wounded.
-----------------------------
785,733 Total German Western Front Casualties July to November 1918.


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## parsifal (Oct 2, 2011)

My sources in all of this are the Australian War Memorial (AWM) archives mostly, which are recognized as providing the most complete and accurate records of this nature for WWI. The figures I posted are for the western front only. 

(Edit: One thing worth scommenting on...the figures you paraded as "British losses on the wetern front" appear for all the world to be the allied equivalent of what you are rqaising for the Germans. They appear to be British empire" losses for all fronts, though the majority were on the western front, admittedly)


Ive just realized what Ive done. Have added the wounded figures to the total. There are two figures one that adds up to 785733, which includes the wounded total. ive then added that number again to the total, which skews the number right out of whack. 

Doesnt change the outcome, or the significance of the 100 days.


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## parsifal (Oct 3, 2011)

Some images of the new equipment for the projected 1919 campaign 

French Char 2c or FCM

The French were to produce International tanks for their units. But, typically, they also developed breakthrough (or assault) tanks of their own. These were rather more ambitious than the Mk. VIII, and far more heavily armoured (frontal to 45mm). The furthest advanced was the Char 2C. It had a 75-mm field gun in the rotating, forward turret and a 7.5-mm machine gun in separate, rear-mounted turret. The latter was intended to enfilade trenches as the tank crossed. Additional machine guns fired from ball mounts on the flanks of the vehicle. Ten were eventually built between 1920 and 1925. All were destroyed on their railroad flatcars while being rushed to the front in 1940. The illustration shows how the vehicle might have appeared in action in 1919.

Medium Type D 

The Medium D, was considerably different in design to its three predecessors. It weighed only 20 tons and, because of its powerful 240 hp engine and flexible tracks allowing a smooth ride, was capable of reaching 20 mph (32 kmh), lightening fast compared to any other tanks before it. Its great strength was its speed and reliability. The new track types would have greatly enhanced battlegield mobility and reliability 


Medium Type C 

The first British medium, the Whippet, had proved barely adequate. It was fragile, hard to drive, short-legged, and lacked the trench-crossing ability that the infiltration phase of the plan required. Mediums would have to cross the formidable anti-tank ditches of the Hindenburg Line before they could turn the German flanks and raid the headquarters areas at the rear. Accordingly, the new Medium B, Medium C, and Medium D tanks adopted the rhomboidal form of the British heavies. While they retained the all-machine gun armament and fixed turret of the Whippets, they were much larger, easier to handle, and better protected vehicles. They were all designed to withstand the standard German 13mm "K" AT round 

Infantry Tank Mk VIII "International"

The the main breakthrough tank would be the Anglo-American Mark VIII "Liberty" or "International." This was an enlarged and improved version of the rhomboid-type heavy tank, with better track, greater trench-crossing ability, and a powerful Ricardo or Liberty V-12 engine in a sealed engine compartment. The armor was designed to withstand the German K-patrone and the bullet splash (molten lead) that forced its way through the joints and vision slits of the earlier vehicles. The Mark VIII went into production in the US, but did not see combat. They formed a major part of the US Army's nominal tank strength up until 1940, when they were quietly sent to Canada for use in training. Examples can still be seen at the Aberdeen and Bovington tank museums. They were considered reliable tanks for their time


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## parsifal (Oct 3, 2011)

Some developments in aircraft for the projected 1919 campaign

The high-performance AEG G.IV medium bomber was converted into an armored, antitank gunship, the G.IVk (kanone). Armor enclosed both engines and the entire forward half of the fuselage. Two of the new SEMAG/Becker automatic cannon were mounted, one in a fully enclosed turret under the nose and on an open, large-diameter gun ring on the rear cockpit. The Becker was the first 20-mm light-weight cannon. A number were produced prior to the end of the war, but their is no evidence that they were ever used.

The anticipated proliferation of armored Allied airplanes naturally provoked counter-measures. Germany developed its own armored trench fighters in 1918, and tasked them with attacking Allied trench fighters and contract patrol aircraft. The first attempt at an aircraft in this class was the AEG PE (Panzer Einsitzer) triplane, which was not accepted. But its successor, the AEG DJ.1, was ordered into production. The DJ.1 was a structurally advanced two-bay biplane powered by the new 195-hp Benz Bz III or Maybach Mb IVa V-8 engine. The airframe was fabricated from dural light alloy with fabric covered flying surfaces and a dural-sheet fuselage. To reduce vulnerability to ground fire, there were no bracing wires. The wings were braced to each other and to the fuselage by substantial, I-section struts. Armor protected the pilot, fuel tanks, and engine. Initially, the fighter was to carry two standard 7.92-mm machine guns and light bombs. But it was also designed to incorporate the formidable TuF (Tank und Flieger Gewehr), a heavy antitank machine gun chambered for the 13-mm Mauser cartridge described below. Three prototypes were under test when the war ended in the West. The Benz-engined aircraft attained a maximum speed of 112 mph. They weighed 2606 lbs empy and 3,031 lbs fully loaded. Span was 32 ft 9 in and length was 21 ft 11 in. 

The Sopwith TF.2 Salamander was a British World War I ground attack aircraft which first flew in April 1918. The war ended before the type could enter squadron service, although two were in France in October 1918.

By 1917, the use of close support aircraft had become an essential part of an infantry attack. On the German side, specialist aircraft were designed specifically for the task, such as the Halberstadt CL.II and the armored Junkers J.I – the British however relied for this work on ordinary fighters such as the DH 5, and the Camel, and general purpose two seaters such as the F.K.8. Ground fire took a heavy toll of aircrew involved, and an equivalent to the armored German machines was sought. The first British aircraft to be built specifically for "ground strafing", as close support was known, was an armored version of the Camel, known by the company as the "TF.1" (for "trench fighter"). This did not go into production, but information gained in testing it was used for the Salamander design.

Design of the Salamander, conceived as an armored version of the Sopwith Snipe, began in January 1918. The forward portion of the fuselage was a 650 lb (295 kg) box of armor plate. The rear portion was a generally similar structure to the Snipe's, but flat sided, to match the forepart. The wings and tail unit were identical with the Snipe, and the same Bentley BR2 rotary engine was fitted. This was protected by a standard (unarmored) cowling – the foremost armor plate forming the firewall.

The prototype underwent its initial trials in April 1918, and was sent to France for evaluation on 9 May, but subsequently crashed on 19 May during test program while with No. 65 Squadron when the pilot had to avoid a tender crossing the aerodrome responding to another crash. . By this time four prototypes were flying, undergoing many of the same modifications to the tail and ailerons as the Snipe in order to correct the initially rather heavy and unresponsive controls.

Production was intended to be on a very large scale – The Air Navigation Co., Glendower Aircraft, and Palladium Motors all signed contracts to supply Salamanders, as well as the Sopwith company itself. By the end of the war, however, only 37 Salamanders were on RAF charge, and only two of these were in France. None had as yet been issued to an operational squadron.

With the Armistice, the immediate need for a specialist close support aircraft evaporated, and no squadron was ever fully equipped with the type, which had disappeared from RAF service altogether by the mid 1920s. The type was not developed, but was used in trials of various patterns of disruptive camouflage in the early post war years. One example went to America, and was apparently still in existence at McCook Field in 1926.

Fullers Plan 1919 built on experience gained from the first major tank actions—Cambrai, Amiens, Villers- Bretonneux. In each of these seminal battles, tanks had achieved major breakthroughs and thoroughly disorganized the German defenses. But, just when victory seemed in reach, the offensives had, in each case, faltered. Tanks broke down, got lost, or fell victim to well-sited field guns. The artillery that would normally have neutralized the enemy guns and the flow of orders, supplies, and spare parts that would sustain and guide a conventional advance had been rapidly left behind in the mud of the shattered German defence lines. Poor communications and the inability of artillery to keep up were, by 1918, the main limiting factor on the success of tank offensives. 

Fuller addressed these problems by a twofold solution, he firstly used a german idea of making some of the artillery mobile (in fact this was already used from Hamel; on) he secondly suggested a greater reliance on aircraft than had hitherto been the norm. Bombers would isolate the battlefield by disorganizing enemy communications, attacking headquarters, and bombing road junctions. Fighters would serve in lieu of field artillery during the advance. They would use their machine guns and 20-lb Cooper bombs to pin down antitank artillery, thus securing the fast and, hopefully, reliable medium tanks against their most dangerous enemy. Fighters would also strafe rolling stock, road transport, and assembling reinforcements in the rear. Most importantly of all, "contact patrol" aircraft would take over for the supply train and the field telephone network that the fast moving assault forces had left behind. These airplanes would locate friendly forces and front lines, pick up messages, and drop orders and supplies to temporarily isolated units. 


The contact patrol type was, in many ways, the most characteristic aircraft to emerge from the First World War, even though it appeared in only limited numbers and at the very end of the fighting. Radio telephony was still in its experimental stages in 1918, so troops communicated with aircraft using Very lights and pre-arranged patterns of cloth staked out on the ground. To locate small, camouflaged units of friendly troops on a rapidly changing, discontinuous front, contact patrol aircraft thus had to fly slowly, close to the ground, where enemy fire was heaviest. When ordinary two-seaters were used in this role, casualties were heavy and useful information scarce. The obvious answer was a well-armored two-seater— the contact patrol machine. 

Germany's AEG, Albatros, and all-metal Junkers J-1 airplanes were the only contact patrol types to see active service. But the first Allied equivalent, the Sopwith Buffalo (illustrated) was just entering large-scale production when the Armistice was signed. The prototype, H.5892, was, in fact, sent to France for testing but did not fly operationally. The Buffalo closely resembled Sopwith's Snipe and Salamander fighters. It shared the same engine—the 230-hp Bentley BR.2—and had roughly similar two-bay wings and balanced tail surfaces. The Buffalo was, however, a two-seater. The pilot sat high up under a large cut-out in the upper wing, back-to-back with the observer/gunner. A single, fixed, .303-cal Vickers machine gun was mounted in the upper engine decking for the pilot, and the observer had a single Lewis gun on a Sopwith pillar mount (on the first prototype) or Scarf ring (all others). The entire forward fuselage, from the rear of the observer's cockpit to the engine was fabricated from flat sheets of armor plate. Weight was, of course, a problem. The Buffalo weighed 2,178 lbs empty (vs. 1329 lbs for the similarly powered Snipe). With a 360-lb crew, 375 lbs of fuel and lubricant, and a military load of 158 lbs, the airplane tipped the scales at 3071 lbs. While it had a respectable speed for a two-seater, 114 mph at 1000 ft, climb rate was poor and control response sluggish. It was seriously under-powered. Still, in the absence of higher-powered engines, the aircraft was felt to be adequate for service use, given the urgency of the need. 

The Sopwith T.1 Cuckoo was a British biplane torpedo bomber used by the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS), and its successor organization, the Royal Air Force (RAF). The T.1 was the first landplane specifically designed for carrier operations, but it was completed too late for service in the First World War. After the Armistice, the T.1 was named the Cuckoo.

Commodore Sueter proposed plans for an aerial torpedo attack on the German High Seas Fleet at its base in Germany. The carriers HMS Argus, HMS Furious, and HMS Campania, and the converted cruisers HMS Courageous and HMS Glorious, would have launched 100 Cuckoos from the North Sea. In September 1917, Admiral Sir David Beatty, commander of the Grand Fleet, proposed a similar plan involving 120 Cuckoos launched from eight converted merchant vessels. Training took place in the Firth of Forth, where Cuckoos launched practice torpedoes at targets towed by destroyers. Cuckoos of No. 185 Squadron embarked on HMS Argus in November 1918, but hostilities ended before the aircraft could conduct any combat operations.


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## davebender (Oct 3, 2011)

That's the best source for Australian casualties. It's not authoritative for the casualties of other nations.

*Authoritative source for French and German casualties.*
Axis History Forum • View topic - An aside on Casualties

As for British and Commonwealth casualties, I have no idea whether Australian archives are more accurate then data provided by Winston Churhill. However he was appointed Secretary of State for War during January 1919 so Churchill certainly had access to official British casualty data.


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## parsifal (Oct 3, 2011)

As a matter of fact , they are one of the best sources for all casualties, because it includes a research library on the subject, that is used and contributed to by some of the best researchers in the field. It has sharing arrangements with other libraries and research institutes across the world. It is considered by many to be the best of its kind in the world. The databases are by no means limited to just Australian forces. It is used by military colleges and strategic studies institutions as well as general historical researchers across the world. The library is enormous, and includes electronic and print databases containing materials across a wide range of nationalities. You can spend years in the place and still not have scratched the surface of its information sources.

I think your preconceptions and prejudices are restraining you from undertaking some really fine research, to be honest. 

Of course the casualties lists you posted are good, but you need to be mindful of their limits. For example, what is meant by "Franco-Belgian" front. After July, the Belgians had ben moved to the far north and took part in the capture of Belgian Ports, as part of a Belgian-British offensive. Some care needs to be taken in using these figures. For the germans, toal reported casualties apears to lag somewhat as casualties are still being reported after the end of hostiities. Not sure whats happening there


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## davebender (Oct 3, 2011)

> casualties are still being reported after the end of hostiities. Not sure whats happening there


That's no mystery at all. The USA, Canada and Australia may have packed up and gone home after November 1918. For much of Europe plus Asia Minor WWI continued into the early 1920s.


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## parsifal (Oct 3, 2011)

was Germany involved in that fighting?


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## pbfoot (Oct 3, 2011)

davebender said:


> That's no mystery at all. The USA, Canada and Australia may have packed up and gone home after November 1918. For much of Europe plus Asia Minor WWI continued into the early 1920s.


you forget about Russia with both US and Canada as players


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## parsifal (Oct 3, 2011)

davebender said:


> That's no mystery at all. The USA, Canada and Australia may have packed up and gone home after November 1918. For much of Europe plus Asia Minor WWI continued into the early 1920s.



In fact on closer examination of the page you posted, all the answers are there, just a little hidden.

One of the posters gives an accurate explanation as follows:

"_German losses all fronts 1914-18,Land Forces. 

These figures are from the more reliable Central Inquiry Office(Zentral Nachweiseamt) that continued postwar to also allocate the missing as dead as their findings continued.They worked separately from the Reichsarchiv by checking all hospital returns at both home and the front.The Reichsarchiv collected the casualty returns every ten days from units in the field,and did not investigate the fate of the missing. 

German death toll of 1,834,524 as at 1923 excludes 170,000 in Footnote 4 still missing but presumed dead.These were later reclassified dead by 1930.Add these plus 50,000 deaths in the Naval Forces and a total of around 2.05 million dead seem correct_".

Further, in the notes section on German losses, there are 170000 unacounted deaths as at December 1918. I am willing to bet that the lions share of these unnaccounted losses in fact occurred at the end of the war. What is not clarified in the notes are the numbers of unnaccounted wounded and and POW/missing. So, potentially German losses for July to November could be substantially higher than those previously listed.

The notes appended to WSCs tables should be taken into account. For the germans, it notes that the October losses are incomplete, and that the losses for november are not included in the listed figures at all. This might explain why losses for the western front are different in some sources. German repports for losses are made at best an estimate by a further note in the tables....the losses for the first part of the war in 1914-15, are based on estimates only....

Like i said, you would do well to explore the AWM archives which go into some detail on these anomalies, rather than rely on Reichsarhiv reports which are known to be incomplete and quite innaccurate in some respects


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## davebender (Oct 4, 2011)

Of course. Germany had no choice in the matter as nations such as Poland and the Soviet Union sought to expand territory by force of arms. Germany also had naval personnel killed at Scapa Flow during 1919. German POWs died in captivity after 1918 causing their status to be changed from missing to killed.


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## parsifal (Oct 4, 2011)

davebender said:


> Of course. Germany had no choice in the matter as nations such as Poland and the Soviet Union sought to expand territory by force of arms. Germany also had naval personnel killed at Scapa Flow during 1919. German POWs died in captivity after 1918 causing their status to be changed from missing to killed.




I think you should read the material you posted, because the casualties listed there are the result of persons missing in action prior to 1918, but not included in the casualty lists at the time. Whole months worth of casualties are not included in those lists (and additional to the 170000 that are included as unaccounted losses that were gradually added up until 1930). There is an unnaccounted 170000+ men are not the result of post November fighting, they are the result of sloppy German reporting on casualties.

If the germans were involved in any fighting after 1918, the casualties they suffered are not reflected by those delayed casualty numbers. 

You are also so quick to dismiss the Australian, the Canadians the Americans as being able to go home early, ie in november 1918....quite apart from being designed specifically to be insulting in the extreme, it also happens to reveal that you have not even the slightest clue, nor interest in knowing what actually happened after November 1918 to the allies. 

For your information, not that you will believe it because it does not fit in with your jaundiced view of the world, most of the Australian mounted Division, the Australian formation in the middle East, did not stand down until the end of 1919. in that time from the end of the war until departure at the end of 1919, it was busy undertaking policing duties in the newly acquired territories of the Middle east....jordan and israel principally,alongside numerous British units


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## parsifal (Oct 4, 2011)

The campaign in Palestine 1915-16 - Summary

1915 Jan. 14 - Turkish army of 25,000 led by Djemal Pasha, with the help of German adviser Kress von Kressenstein, left Beersheba in Palestine to attack the Suez Canal, crossed 150 miles of Sinai desert without the loss of a single man. The attack on Feb. 3 was repelled by Indian troops and a small British Regular force, with guns from British ships in the Canal. The Turks lost 2000, but Turkey occupied the Sinai in Feb. and caused the British to build up a major force in Egypt to defend the canal. 

Feb. 13 - In the Sinai, a Gurkha force of 500 surprised the Turks at Tor east of Suez, due to Arab spy network of Lt. Col. Parker. 

1915 Oct. - After the Ottoman Turks entered the war, Gen. John Maxwell assumed military control of Egypt, at first told Egyptians that England "accepted the sole burden of the war" and would not ask Egyptians, or fellahin, for any participation or aid. But this changed in 1915. Egyptians were hired to dig trenches for defense of canal, build railways, water pipes, load supplies, join British as camel drivers. Thus were organized the Egyptian Labour Corps (ELC) and the Camel Transport Corps (CTC). One company in the CTC had 2020 camels and 1168 Egyptians including native overseers with buffalo-hide whips that supervised drivers. There was high turnover of drivers, 170,000 serving during the war. In Nov. 1915, Maxwell requested reinforcements to his dwindling army of 60,000. by Dec., he had 300,000 Territorials and Dominion troops. The new force was sent to Egypt by General Staff Chief Gen. William "Wully" Robertson, who had risen from a private, who also sent Gen. Archibald Murray to command the defense of the Suez Canal, while Maxwell commanded western Egypt. Murray proposed in 1915 to advance on El Arish, using camels. The EEF (Egyptian Expeditionary Force) purchased tens of thousands of camels from the Delta to assemble the largest camel force in history. Each camel could carry 2 water tanks of 12 gals each. The Imperial Camel Corps was officially organized at Kantara on Jan. 24, 1916. The British forces included the Army Cyclist Corps, and armored cars, and a growing air force. 

1915 Nov. 20 - the Senussi revolt of puritanical Muslim Arabs in western Egypt began, encouraged by German and Turkish agents. The British evacuated the westernmost outpost at Sollum. 

1916 Feb. 26 - Battle of Agagiya in the western desert of Egypt, the Western Frontier Force of Territorials and Yeomanry with armored cars defeated the Senussi, included a cavalry charge against the Arabs by the Dorset Yeomanry that was called "the outstanding event of the campaign." 

1916 Mar. - British advance into Sinai began at ancient caravan station of Kantara on the Suez Canal and the railroad from Cairo. The British would extend the Kantara Military Railroad along this caravan route to El Arish and Gaza and Jaffa. By 1917 Kantara became one of the largest British camps in the war 

1916 Apr. - Turks under von Kressenstein led 3500 against British outpost at Qatiya and defeated the Yeomen of the 5th Mounted Brigade, who were replaced by the Anzac Mounted Division, and the railroad construction reached Romani. 25 miles from Kantara. 

1916 July 19 - Brit airplane reported advance from Beersheba of 16,000 Turks, incl the crack Anatolian division, and incl heavy artillery for which special tracks were laid in the sand of timber and brush. 

1916 Aug. 4 - Battle of Romani - Kress attacked sand dunes of Mount Meredith near Romani where Murray had intentially weakened his right flank to pull in the Turks, then surround them with cavary (like the battle of Cannae). Murray brought up 50,000 troops to the battle front, and defeated the Turks who lost 6000, the British lost 1130, but Kress was able to withdraw his army intact to El Arish 

British built railroad 15 mi per month, but delays in getting 15-inch water pipe, finally arrived trom United States in Oct. Also laid chicken wire road parallel to railroad 

1916 Dec. 7 - Murray organized his Eastern Force to advance with the railroad, and appointed Gen. Philip Chetwode to lead a mobil vanguard force called the "Desert Column" and attack El Arish. The unit had 18 camel companies, Anzac Mounted Division, and the 42nd and 52nd Territorial divisions. 

1916 Dec. 22 - Battle of Magdhaba - The Desert Column occupied El Arish and on Dec. 23, then advanced on Magdhaba, 25 mi southeast of El Arish, won victory, took 1282 pows 

1916 Dec. - The new British government of David Lloyd George that came to power in Dec. and gave new importance to defeating the Turks and occupying Jerusalem, rather than the earlier passive policy of just defending Egypt. 

1917 Mar. - Murray's Eastern Force advanced toward Gaza with 40,000. Reporter Charles A. Court Repington of the London Times reported the upcoming battles. 

Mar. 26 - First Battle of Gaza, Murray was defeated by Turks, lost 4000 and Turks lost 2500. British had only 170 artillery, only 25 airplanes, and were 25 miles from the railhead at Rafah, badly in need of water.


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## parsifal (Oct 4, 2011)

War In Palestine 1917 - Summary

1917 Jan. 9 - Battle of Magruntein (or Battle of Rafah) - Desert Column from El Arish took 1635 pows at El Magruntein southwest of Rafah 

1917 Mar. - Murray's Eastern Force advanced toward Gaza with 40,000. Reporter Charles A. Court Repington of the London Times reported the upcoming battles. 

Mar. 26 - First Battle of Gaza, Murray was defeated by Turks, lost 4000 and Turks lost 2500. British had only 170 artillery, only 25 airplanes, and were 25 miles from the railhead at Rafah, badly in need of water. 

Apr. 1 - Murray received 8 tanks, the only theater outside France to get tanks 

Apr. 19 - Second Battle of Gaza was a classic infantry attack on a broad front against entrenched machine guns, tanks failed in fine sand and heat, poison gas from 3000 gas shells evaporated in hot winds, lack of artillery. British were defeated, lost 6444. Dobell was blamed and was replaced by Chetwode as commander of the Eastern Force. 

Apr. 23 - The new Imperial War Cabinet of the George government decided to remove Murray from command. British policy was at a crisis point. Unrestricted submarine warfare since Feb. raised ships sunk from 3 per day to 13 per day; Nivelle's offensive in France had failed and the French army mutinied; in Russia, Nicholas II had been ousted in March, and Russia no longer posed a threat to Turkey 

June 27 - Gen Allenby arrived in Egypt to replace Murray. Unlike most generals, Allenby became well-known to his troops, moved his HQ from Cairo to Palestine. His mission was, in the words of Lloyd George, "Jerusalem before Christmas" and then take Aleppo before new German force of 6500, the "Asia Corps" under Falkenhayn, arrived to defeat the British in Mesopotamia. But Gaza had to be taken first, where the Turks were building trenches to create a defense line from Gaza to Beersheba 30 miles long. 

Oct. 1 - Allenby reorganized his army of 92,000 into 3 groups: the Desert Column, the 20th Corps, and the 21st Corps. He increased his artillery to 400, received Bristol airplanes that gave him control of the air. He planned to surprise the Turks with a feint attack at Gaza, where the Turks expected the attack, and make his main thrust on his right toward Beersheba. 

Oct. 27 - The six-day bombardment began with navy guns as well, the largest artillery barrage outside France. 

Oct. 31 - The 4th Australian Light Horse led by Gen. W. Grant charged and took Beersheba and its valuable water wells, a charge that became as famous as the Charge of the Light Brigade in 1854. The Light Horse force of 800 lost only 31 killed and 36 wounded, most casualties from hand-to-hand combat in the trenches, not from the cavalry charge. 

Nov. 1 - night attack on Gaza by 21st Corps took outer defenses, but stopped. 

Nov. 3 - British planes spotted Turkish reinforcements toward the heights of Khuweilfe, and the 53rd and 55th divisions reached the position before the Turks, and some units were hit by their own British artillery. 

Nov. 6 - Chetwode attacked Sheria and won the battle in one day, used Stokes mortars against trenches, and over the next days widened the gap in the Turkish defense lines. 

Nov. 7 - Third Battle of Gaza won by British. 

Nov. 14 - British took Junction Station, cut the railroad line, opened the way for an advance into the Judean Hills to Jerusalem. 

Nov. 20 - The 75th Division, the last one formed during the war, of Gurkas and British from India, captured the Jerusalem-Jaffa road, then on Nov. 21 captured the vital hill of Nebi Samwil, the key to the city. The division adopted a key as its unit symbol. 

Nov. 27 - Falkenhayn had taken command of Turks in Nov. and launched counterattack Nov. 27-Dec. 3, against Nebi Samwil, but the British held. 

Dec. 8 - Allenby sent the 20th Corps for final assault on Jerusalem, and at 7 am Dec. 9 the Turkish army retreated out of the city, and 4 centuries of Turkish rule came to an end. Lloyd George spoke to Commons Dec. 10 to announce the victory, and Dec. 11 Allenby made a dramatic and well-photographed entry into the city, walking rather than riding thru Jaffa Gate. 

Dec. 27 - Turks attacked on the road from Nablus in the north, the British counterattacked the turkish flank, fighting went on for 3 days, but the British held the city. By Dec. 30, the British controlled the entire road from Jerusalem to Jaffa, but Allenby had lost 30,000 of his 97,000 and suffered supply problems. Allenby faced a communication and supply crisis in Jerusalem, the heavy rains having washed out the bridges and railroad construction, only the camels could cross the desert, ans some trucks were able to bring supplies from the railhead to the camels. The stormy seas hindered ships trying to unload supplies.


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## parsifal (Oct 4, 2011)

War In Palestine 1918 - Summary

Mar. 6 - War Cabinet told Allenby to advance "to the maximum extent possible"; Allenby created another corps, the 23rd Corps commanded by Gen. Barrow and with Wavell as chief of staff. Also, Allenby sent Gen. Shea to lead a force into Jordan that would capture Amman, but "Shea's Force' was defeated and retreated to Jerusalem Apr. 2 

1918 Mar. 21 - German offensive began in France, and due to the disaster in France, the offensive in the Midwest was stopped and Allenby had to send some of his divisions to France, eventually losing 60,000 troops 

1918 Apr. 29 - Gen Chauvel led another raid into Jordan, but it failed. 

1918 Sept. 19 - Battle of Meggido, Allenby defeated last Turkish army. Allenby would fake a flank attack into Jordan, but send his main body and cavalry across the coastal Plain of Sharon to take Meggido. He could control the skies with the seven squadrons in the Palestine Brigade of the RAF. He had 385 artillery but there would be no preliminary bombardment, only a surprise attack, The airplanes destroyed key communication posts and the German air base at Jenin, then attacked Turkish troops on the roads. On Sept. 21, the airplanes destroyed a convoy attempting to flee into Jordan, dropping 9 tons of bombs and 56,000 machine gun rounds. By Sept. 22, Allenby had destroyed the Turkish 7th and 8th armies, taken 25,000 pows and 260 guns. 

1918 Sept. 25 - Feisal's Northern Arab Army entered the battle in Jordan, and destroyed the Turkish 4th Army as it fled northward from Deraa. Gen Ryrie of the 2nd Australian Light Horse allowed the fleeing Turks to keep their weapons to fight off the Arabs who would not let the Truks surrender, and arrived in Amman fully armed but ready to surrender to the British. Gen. Barrow of the 4th Cavalry Division told T. E. Lawrence to stop the Arabs from killing Turks, but Lawrence refused. 

1918 Oct. 1 - Australians and Arabs took Damascus, and Oct. 5 took Rayak. Australians were the first to enter the city, and left it several hours later 

1918 Oct. 8 - British took Beirut. 

1918 Oct. 26 - Brit took Aleppo, the last city to fall in Allenby's campaign.


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## parsifal (Oct 9, 2011)

Prelude to Operation Geogette (2nd German Offensive) - The Portugeuse

An article i found regarding the Portugeuse who were an integral part of the BEF, and whose casualties were generally lumped in with those recorded as British. 

The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance 

"Portugal is England's oldest ally with The Treaty of Windsor dating back to 1386 (In the middle of the Hundred Years War).

Like England Portugal was a seafaring nation and began to acquire her own colonies around the world. This led of course into diplomatic conflict when in 1890 Britain ordered the Portuguese government to remove its troops from what would become Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).

King Carlos I gave in to the British demands and with that the authority of the Portuguese monarchy began to slip away. In 1908 the King was assassinated and on 5th October 1910 the country became a Republic with bitter views about the territorial desires of its old ally. Perhaps not without reason for in 1913 Britain and Germany signed a secret accord dividing up the Portuguese African colonies of Angola and Mozambique.

Defending her colonies

When war broke out the following year between Britain and Germany Portugal was persuaded to remain neutral. Opinions in Portugal were mixed in that there was an opinion that they should let the British and French get on with it whilst at the same time there was a nagging worry about the war being waged in Africa. How secure were the Portuguese colonies ?

Another important question for the young republic was how to put itself onto the international stage. Whilst the thoughts of going to war over something that did not really concern them was not popular with the government, they were astute enough to realise that some form of involvement would provide greater guaranties in the future.

On 24th February 1916 the Portuguese government seized all the German and Austro-Hungarian ships that had been laid up in the port of Lisbon since the outbreak of the war. It was explained to the concerned governments that they were needed to transport food for a the civil population and that they would eventually be returned, but the two powers didn't buy the explanation and on 9th March 1916 German declared war on Portugal.

The formation of an Expeditionary Force

The Portuguese set about creating an expeditionary force for the Western Front.

In effect this force consisted of two bodies:

1.An Independent Heavy Artillery Corps (CAPI)
Corpo de Artilharia Pesada Independente
2.A Portuguese Expeditionary Corps (CEP)

Corpo Expedicionário Português

The Expeditionary Corps started to arrive in Brest on 2nd February 1917 and over the next eight months nearly 60 000 men would arrive in France. They were transported by train to the front in Artois near the town of Air sur la Lys and placed under the control of the British First Army.

They located their Corps Headquarters in St Venant at the mansion of La Peylouse and would remain there until forced out by Operation Georgette in April 1918.

The CEP consisted of two Divisions and were given British equipment and training in trench warfare techniques. On 11th May 1917 they were sent up to the front line and the problems began almost immediately.

The Portuguese government was not whole heartedly behind the war and no account was made for the daily attrition of manpower. The idea that outside of the great battles the front was peaceful is a false one. Artillery bombardments were carried out routinely as well as trench raids by both sides. One of Field Marshal Haig's gripes in 1918 was the fact that the British government wasn't prepared to replace his daily losses let alone plan to defend against a major German offensive.

The winter of 1917 was harsh and the soldiers far from acclimatised to such hardships. The constant gnawing away at their numbers created gaps that needed to be filled by working the men for even longer hours at the front (Sometimes for months at a time - unthinkable within the British Divisions around them).

Sitting in a filthy mud filled trench for a cause which seemed to have little to do with their homeland resulted in a lot of disaffection amongst the often illiterate Portuguese soldiers who felt abandoned by their government and officers.

Leave was almost non-existent for the simple reason that it was hard enough to get the officers to return to duty. Surprisingly it would appear that the soldiers had better military bearing than their superiors for of the 519 that were given leave, all returned - which could not be said for nearly half of the officers (1090 out of 1912).

The British were swift to acknowledge that the morale of the CEP was being seriously weakened as established strengths fell by almost a quarter. On 4th April 1918 their Commander: General Fernando Tamagnini de Abreu e Silva alerted the British of mutinies within the ranks and the decision was swiftly taken to have the CEP removed from the front.

Orders were promulgated to relieve the Portuguese 1st Division on the 6th April and the 2nd on the 9th April. Unfortunately the Germans were on the point of interfering with the plans.

With about 20 000 Portuguese soldiers holding their sector and already in the mindset that they were going to the rear, the Crown Prince of Bavaria was amassing 100 000 trained troops supported by 1 700 pieces of artillery.

9 April 1918 - Operation Georgette

At 0415 hours Colonel Bruchmüller's artillery orchestration began its work as it had done a few weeks before against the British on the Somme. Pounding all centres of communication and identified HQ's emplacements as well as the front line and artillery positions. Whole sectors were drenched with gas and the Portuguese Artillery noted their infantrymen starting to retire through them long before the actual attack had begun.

In the north of their line the 4th (Minho) Brigade did their best to stem the tide in front of Laventie but by 1100 hours it had been taken along with almost all of the Portuguese 4th Brigade.

Elsewhere the line collapsed despite being bolstered by the British as fast as they could with the 1st King Edward's Horse and the 11th Cyclist Battalion."

A stand was made at Lacoutre by the Portuguese 13th and 15th Battalions aided by the arriving British but even here the position became untenable by 1145 hours.

The hole created in the line was plugged as best as possible by the British 50th (Northumbrian) and 51st (Highland) Divisions. For the CEP the battle was finished.

Their losses amounted to nearly 400 killed and 6 500 captured.

Their participation in the battle, though, earned Portugal the right to participate in the victory parade and a place at the peace conference in Paris.

The Million Man

The low morale of the Portuguese soldiers no doubt contributed to the day's events but faced by a similar bombardment and overpowering enemy the British Fifth Army had fared little better in March.

Not every Portuguese grabbed a bike and ran. Private Anibal Milhais of the 15th Bn was in charge of one of their Lewis gun's on the 9th April. Firing his gun Louisa for all he was worth, he managed to cover the retreat of Portuguese and Scots alike despite coming under heavy attack himself.

Only 1.55 metres tall the big wee man stayed at his post until he had run out of ammunition. His bravery under severe circumstances managed to convince the Germans that they were up against a fortified unit rather than just: one Portuguese peasant with a machine gun.

He managed to extract himself and wandered back towards the rear lines where he was received to great acclaim.

His commanding officer Major Ferreira do Amaral described his action as having been worth a million men and the nickname stuck.

Milhais, a simple farmer by profession survived the war and lived until 1970 having spent some time in Brazil. His home town in Murça District erected a statue in his honour and he became a symbol for the new Portugal.


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## parsifal (Oct 10, 2011)

The battle Of Lys

"On 7 April 1918 the German 6th Army launched the second part of Ludendorff's strategic plan. Originally named George it had been watered down enough for it to have been re-named Georgette.

The objective was Ieper.

In a swinging blow the 6th Army would break the Allied Line under Armentières whilst the 4th Army would attack Ieper in an encircling move from the north.

Sometimes known as the 4th Battle of Ypres, it is more correctly termed the Battle of the Lys.

The first blow fell at Neuve Chapelle on 9 April 1918 against the 2nd Portuguese Division.

The Portuguese Expeditionary Corps Alongside and in support, the British Divisions in the sector had all been involved in Operation Michael on the Somme and had been sent north to rest and take on new recruits. Thus many Battalions were tired, under strength and with a high percentage of untried raw recruits.

At 04:15 hours the German bombardment began. The fire plan was orchestrated by the same Colonel Bruchmüller who had helped make such terrifying punctures in the British lines on the Somme.

At 08:00 hours he added trench mortars to his ensemble and 45 minutes later, four German Divisions made up of well trained and rested assault troops threw themselves at the Portuguese lines."

The Portuguese had already started to fracture in the face of the bombardment and apart from a few isolated positions gave the Germans no opposition at all. Within the hour the front line was taken along with 6 000 prisoners.

Struggling to keep pace with the hole that had formed in their line the British were also by this stage on the retreat.

The following day with the advance of the German 6th Army continuing, the British were forced to give up Armentières and Bailleul would fall on the 15th despite a strong defence.

Realising that resistance was weakening Ludendorff decided that the time was ripe to increase the scope of Operation Georgette and to commit his reserves. The British looked as though they could be broken.

Backs to the wall

With the situation turning desperate, General Haig issued his Order of the Day to the British Army.

"_There is no other course open to us but to fight it out ! Every position must be held to the last man: there must be no retirement. With our backs to the wall and believing in the justice of our cause, each one of us must fight on to the end_."

Haig's requests to Foch for full scale assistance fell on deaf ears. The new Commander in Chief was by no means convinced that the attack in Flanders was the German's last effort and he was determined to be prepared with sufficient reserves for the next blow.

He did however make two Divisions available to General Plumer's 2nd Army and moved General Maistre's Army up into the Authie Valley around Doullens to rebuff any breakthrough should the British give way.

In fact although the British were forced to alter their line they were making the German advance pay dearly for every metre of territory gained. Haig remained concerned that all his reserves were being committed and again asked Foch to have the French take on part of his line. Foch remained firm to his convictions that this battle on the Lys was nothing more than a huge diversion in preparation for something more solid elsewhere.

The Australians at Merris

"The Australians of their 1st Division had begun to move south on 8 April in order to support the situation on the Somme, but with the opening of the Battle of the Lys found themselves in the thick of the fighting near Merris and Méteren.

The town of Hazebrouck behind them was an extremely important supply route in this region. If it fell the British lines of communication would be seriously disrupted.

On the morning of 14 April 1918 the Germans launched an attack against the Mont de Merris which was held and commanded by Lieutenant Christopher Champion of the 3rd Bn AIF.

The Germans advanced in waves so dense that the Australians said that they could hardly miss their targets.

A farm just in front of the Australians called Gutzer Farm was taken by the Germans and this allowed them to fire from the flanks against Champion's men.

At 10:30 hours having beaten off the German attack Champion decided to try and push them out of Gutzer Farm, ordering Lt Prescott forward with his platoon. Prescott managed to drive the Germans out of the farm but realised that he couldn't hold the position due to the machine gun fire from all sides.

Having lost a number of men including Corporal Ernie Corby by sniper fire he retired.

Throughout the afternoon the Germans tried to press Champion and his men but each time they let the enemy get close and then riddled their waves with bullets, driving them off each time. A lull developed until 19:00 hours when a final effort by the Germans was also beaten off.

Sadly after his determined stand throughout the day, Champion was hit in the head by a bullet and fell.

Neither Lt Champion or Cpl Corby were found on the battlefield for burial, until 85 years later in 2003 when a farmer found the remains of four Australian soldiers. Two were identified, and at last Christopher Champion and Ernie Corby were given proper burials in Outtersteene Cemetery not far from where they had fallen.

On 16 April Méteren and Wijtschate fell and the Germans came to the foot of Mont Kemmel."......


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## renrich (Oct 11, 2011)

Read a book a year or so ago about the Meuse-Argonne offensive in 1918. The AEF took heavy casualties there but I disremember the numbers. For the whole war:
KIA-53402
WIA-204002
Other-63000
I believe most of those took place during the Meuse-Argonne


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## parsifal (Oct 11, 2011)

Meuse Argonne was one of the three offensives undertaken by order of the supreme commander , Marshal Foch, designed to clear the germans from french territory, and more importantly to break the heavily fortified Hindenburg line.

I intend to have a closer look at the other allied offensives in due cours, though i would prefer an American or french member of the forum to do the detailed postings for these events. If i have to do it, it will be based on learnt evidence rather than an intimate knowledge of the subject. 

It needs to be remembered that Meuse Argonne was not just a purely American operation, it also involved significant numbers of french troops, with a corresponding significant french casualty list. Often american-centric histories claim all the casualties as US casualties.

The sources I have suggest 117000 US casualties (killed, wounded MIA) , 70000 french, and about 100000 German losses. Of the American casualties, 48909 were listed as dead. The 117000 total casualties represented 40% of the total casualties suffered by the AEF, however it needs to be noted that in addition to the battle casualties, the AEF suffered a further 53000 fatalities from Spanish Influenza during the latter stages of the war. These losses are not usually included as battle casualties by the Americans.


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## parsifal (Oct 11, 2011)

I am not all that familar with this particular battle, so have relied on third party sources to recount the events. anyone with better information please feel free to post, but please, do not try to argue that the germans actually won the battle as this is clearly an erroneous position to take. 

The First Battle of Kemmel

"On 16 April 1918 Méteren and Wijtschate fell and the Germans came to the foot of Mont Kemmel.

At dawn on 17 April 1918 the Germans launched a thunderous assault from Houthulst Forest against the Belgian Front Line at Merkem and Kippe. Just in front of the village they succeeded in breaking through and for a tantalising moment for the German High Command it looked as though they were going to achieve what all sides had been attempting since those heady days of glory in 1914 - the ability to out flank and roll up the enemy's line.

The Belgians, however, were fighting for the last few kilometres of their country and were not going to be so easily dealt with. They tenaciously held the remainder of their front line and counter attacked with such vigour that they drove the Germans back and re-established their front line.

The Belgians took nearly 800 prisoners and 60 machine guns. Most of the Belgian casualties were from their 3rd Division who have a monument just outside Kippe. They however inflicted three times as many casualties on the assaulting Bavarians.

The northern pincer movement of von Ludendorff's Operation Tannenberg had failed. Within two weeks it would become apparent that this heroic stand by the Belgian Army had thwarted Ludendorff's aspirations in Flanders. By holding the line on their own they had released British Divisions which would prove vital in the next few weeks.

South of Ieper Mont Kemmel was held in a thin defensive line by the British 19th Division.

At 08:30 hours following two and a half hours of bombardment, the German infantry attacked the British lines but were bloodily beaten off and failed to break through.

That evening the French 28th Division took over responsibility for the Front Line at Kemmel and the hill itself. They also held the rear at the Scherpenberg, a smaller hill to the north west of Kemmel and where the British had undergone training in June 1917 for the great victory at Messines - now back in German hands after the briefest of struggles.

The situation was becoming increasingly difficult for the Allies and considerations about a strategic withdrawal were put forward. Such thoughts were rebuffed by General Foch who dispatched a further 3 French Divisions to bolster the British Line.

A quiet interlude

From the 19th to the 24th April the Germans appeared to have called a halt to their attack, and new worries began in the Allied camp that a new strike was being planned elsewhere - perhaps once again on the Somme ?

In fact the Germans were merely preparing their assault on Mont Kemmel.

By the morning of 25 April the French had taken over the entire line between Bailleul (Now in German hands) and Spanbroekmolen, where the Irish and Ulster Divisions had, side by side, stormed through the German lines less than a year before.


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## parsifal (Oct 11, 2011)

Viller Bretonneux

We have already discussed this battle in some detail, wherein it was denied that this might be the first time that a tank versus tank engagement was fought (of course without supporting evidence to back up the claim), so i will not go into too much detail again. However in the context of the narrative it was the next battle to be fought in the great german Spring Offensives on the Western Front.

The Germans attacked the French village of Villers-Bretonneux (Bret-on-er) , after first using poisonous gas and artillery. When night fell, the ANZACs stormed from their trenches and counter-attacked. The only order given was to “fight it out like Australians” (propoganda of course). A British General, who himself had won a Victoria Cross for bravery, called the ANZACs’ attack that night as “perhaps the greatest individual feat of the war” (not propaganda, by that stage the abilities of the australians all along the front on both sides of the lines had become the stuff of legend) .

The ANZACs then had to enter the village and fight from house to house. Finally, Australian and French flags were raised over Villers-Bretonneux. The ANZACs stopped to bury their dead – 1200 Australians had been killed saving the village. It was not until they were putting the date on some makeshift crosses that they realised the date – it was ANZAC Day 1918, three years to the day since they had stormed ashore at Gallipoli.

The Australian flag is still flown at Villers-Bretonneux. It flies atop the Australian National Memorial, on which is listed the names of the 10,982 Australians killed in France who have no known grave. The French have called the main road through Villers-Bretonneux, Rue de Melbourne. The town has a restaurant called Restaurant le Kangarou, and the school, called Victoria College, was built from the donations of Victorian school children in the 1920s. Above every blackboard are the words.... 

“N’oublions jamais l’Australie” – never forget Australia.

It was one of the defining moments of the 1918 offensives


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## Njaco (Oct 11, 2011)

davebender said:


> That's no mystery at all. The USA, Canada and Australia may have packed up and gone home after November 1918. For much of Europe plus Asia Minor WWI continued into the early 1920s.



Many didn't pack up and go home - some troops were sent to the Russian Civil War...

Russian Civil War - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

might be where the extra casualties are coming from.


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## renrich (Oct 12, 2011)

The casualty numbers I listed were for the whole war. The Category- Other of 63000 would be the deaths from sickness. The book definitely gave the full account of the offensive with all the French involvement. As I remember, the AEF did the majority of the blood spilling because they were fresh and the American generals were anxious to prove their mettle.


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## parsifal (Oct 12, 2011)

Correct, nevertheless, the french still managed to suffer 70000 or so casualties. Even on the defensive units would take heavy casualties were the norm.


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## parsifal (Oct 12, 2011)

Foch finally sends reinforcements - The second battle of Kemmel 25 April 1918

Whilst the Australians were enjoying their success on the Somme at Villers-Bretonneux, the French on Mont Kemmel were about to go through hell in Flanders.

Finally realizing the danger posed by the German assaults on the british, Foch finally released elments of the french army to assist the hard pressed British. They were alsmost immedialtey engaged in another critical battle for the heights of Mont Kemmel. Termed the 2nd battle of Kemmel I have yet agin had to rely on third party sources for a description of this battle. 

"At 02:30 hours on 25 April 1918 over 250 batteries of German guns opened up on Allied artillery positions with a mixture of gas and high explosive. For the next two hours they concentrated solely on destroying gun emplacements.

After a short pause, at 05:00 hours the German barrage was switched to the French front line.

French soldiers who had survived the horrors of Verdun described it as the worst they had ever encountered.

Opposite a single French Division were amassed three and a half German Divisions. An hour of such a furious bombardment was considered sufficient by the Germans and at 06:00 hours they launched their infantry to the attack.

By 07:10 hours Kemmel Hill was theirs and by 10:30 hours it was all over.

Even the German airforce had joined in with 96 aircraft dropping 700 bombs and machine gunning the French positions as the Leib Regiment of the élite Alpine Corps (In fact a Division) stormed forward.

The fact that the French Ossuary on the hill contains the remains of more than 5000 unidentifiable soldiers, mostly, from fighting in this area in April says more about the fury of the bombardment than mere words.

The advancing Germans pushed on over the hill and down towards the Scherpenberg and Loker (Locre). Here they halted waiting on their artillery to be brought forward.

Having taken Mont Kemmel the Germans had a superb view into the Allies' hinterland

Two battalions of the French 99th RI together with the remnants of those who had escaped from Mont Kemmel held the line assisted by units from their dismounted 3rd Cavalry Division.

On the southern flank of the 28th Division the 154th had been forced to give way towards Loker but their line was basically holding, as was that of the British on the northern flank.

A gap however developed between the struggling 99th RI and the 9th Bn KOYLI and 6th Bn KOSB who were immediately alongside them. To this end the 147th British Brigade was brought up from Poperinge to plug the gap.

Pressure from the Germans continued and by midday Vierstraat had fallen, but by now the attackers were also tired.

That evening the British 25th Division arrived at Reningelst and were placed under French command to attempt with the French 39th Division to seize back Kemmel."

Georgette fails to break through

Both Foch and Haig wanted an immediate counter attack against Mont Kemmel.

The plan put together was for the French to take Mont Kemmel and the British Kemmel village. Throughout the night it poured with rain and by dawn this had turned into a thick mist.

The available artillery was so meagre that the Germans failed to recognise the preliminary bombardment for what it was. At the junction of the two Divisions the British 74th Brigade managed to make some headway, but by the finish of the day the only gain that had been made was to strengthen the French line and fill in the gaps. The exhaustion of the Germans, however, was beginning to show through and further attacks against the remaining hills in the locality were all withstood and repulsed. By the evening of the 28th though, it was apparent from the number of deserters and resulting information that another assault was about to be launched in the area of Kemmel.

Counter bombardments were commenced but nevertheless the German attack manifested itself just before 06:00 hours after a gas and shell bombardment. Despite being met by devastating fire from the French the German Alpine Corps pushed through the French lines towards Scherpenberg. Initial worries that yet another breakthrough was about to occur were found to be alarmist as the French 39th and 154th Divisions supported the weakening line and started to push the Alpine Corps backwards. Loker fell for a short time but a vigorous counter attack by French Dragoons pushed the enemy back out of the village. To the north the British in the area of Voormezele were forced to relinquish the area mainly because of the weight of the artillery bombardment.

German losses were too great to be able to continue with such abandon and when the Alpine Corps was ordered to advance again at 17:00 hours it found that it was so reduced in numbers that it was unable to comply. The second great German offensive had come to a halt and Ludendorff was forced to call off Operation Georgette. His attention would now turn towards the south and this time against the French.

Mont Kemmel would in fact remain in German hands until the end of August when the American 27th Division and British 34th Divisions would finally drive them back from the area.


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## Readie (Oct 13, 2011)

Thanks Michael, its hard for me to really grasp the sheer ferocity losses involved.
I think WW1 will always have that shock factor that is unlikely to lessen with the passing of years.

The 11th hour of the 11th day of the 11th month is a special day here.
Least we forget eh

John


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## parsifal (Oct 13, 2011)

Yes, well said. The war had a number of discernible phases despite the unremitting carnage. by 1918, both sides had developed methods to break the deadlock on the western front that really form the basis of modern warfare. German infiltration tactics and use of artillery remain the valid basis of nearly all modern tactics for Infantry on the attack. The tank and armoured fighting vehicles generally are an integral part of warfare to this day. The (largely) french triangular TOE remains the most efficient TOE for land formations. Aircraft, sumarines, aircraft carriers, magnetic mines, destroyers, submachine guns, semi automatic rifles, and a whole bevy of new technologies that profoundly and utterly changed the face of warfare came into widespread usage. I happen to think that 1918 was a period where the greatest rate of change in warfare and technology occurred, either before or since (with the possible exception of 1945, and the introduction of atomic weapons).

Its an irony not lost on me that humanity's periods of greatest innovation seem to follow its periods of greatest suffering and loss


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## pbfoot (Oct 13, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Yes, well said. The war had a number of discernible phases despite the unremitting carnage. by 1918, both sides had developed methods to break the deadlock on the western front that really form the basis of modern warfare. German infiltration tactics and use of artillery remain the valid basis of nearly all modern tactics for Infantry on the attack.


I might be mistaken or maybe reading nationalistic books but most of those small unit tactics were pioneered at Vimy.


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## parsifal (Oct 13, 2011)

I dont know, will look into this point a little further. books i have read say it was the germans, using tactics developed by Von Hutier and first used near riga in 1917, and then on the italian front that led to the change in tactics. These tactics revolved around advances by Infantry in smal groups, under as much cover as could be provided, incorporating return of fire techniques such as automatic weapons like subnmachine guns as much as possible. Flamethrowers and mortars were another feature of these tactics. The advancing Infantry was instructed to take gound by probing for weak points in the line rather than frontally assaulting the strongest positions on the line.

Defensively instead of building a continuous line, it was found best to crete a number of strongpoints connected by a series of interlocking, but relatively lightly held trenchlines 

Artillery bombardments up to 1917 were long running affairs, but von hutier developed the idea of short, high intensity barrages, designed to achieve the maximum of dislocation, but in a short space of time, to deny an enemy opportunity to react and bolster defences. 

Ive always been led to believe that it was the germans that pioneered this new technique, however i also believe that the allies took the basic german concept and improved on it by adding tanks and massed mobile artillery to the mix (germans had used mobile artillery to exploit breakthroughs, but not in a massed fashion).

As I said your claim is wrth having a look at....


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## parsifal (Oct 14, 2011)

well, PB has provided me some information that certainly backs up his position, and makes me rethink some of the "basic truths" that I have always assumed were correct. Perhaps the development of modern tactis was not solely or exclusively a German innovation after all, as this article seems to support. (Article found by PB)

The Development of Infantry Doctrine in the Canadian Expeditionary Force: 1914-1918

Those wishing to consider the german contribution, might think about articles like the following:

http://www.enotes.com/topic/Oskar_von_Hutier


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## pbfoot (Oct 15, 2011)

This topic has forced me to the library ,I think the reason for the sucess if the CEF (Canadian Expiditionary Force) was the unique make up of the division which was larger then the British 21000 as opposed to 15000 for the Brits , allowing a pointy end of 12000 as opposed to 8000, as for engineers the Brits had 637 Field engineers and a pioneer battalion of 900 whereas the Canadians fielded 3000 engineers and a separate pontoon bridging unit and another 65 specialties . The most eye opening thing was in automatic weapons with the CEF had . one auto weapon for every 13 men and the Brits had one for every 61 men. The Anzacs and the CEF were without doubt the best the Allies could field
The last line is not a nationalistic rant but fact proven by numbers


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## parsifal (Oct 16, 2011)

I agree, though there has always been some friendly rivalry between the Anzacs and the Canucks as to who was actually the best. For me, it matters not....both were incredibly brave groups of men

One note for the non-anzac readers. Anzac is not totally Australian....it includes new Zealanders, who fought with extraordinary distinction as well


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## pbfoot (Oct 16, 2011)

parsifal said:


> I agree, though there has always been some friendly rivalry between the Anzacs and the Canucks as to who was actually the best. For me, it matters not....both were incredibly brave groups of men
> 
> One note for the non-anzac readers. Anzac is not totally Australian....it includes new Zealanders, who fought with extraordinary distinction as well


just discovered the Kiwis were not part of the Aussies in last hundred days but am trying to figure out stength of Aussies, the best I can see is 4 divisions and if so were they set up on British lines as in strength


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## parsifal (Oct 16, 2011)

I think they were organized as standard Divisions, however, as a corps, they more or less had either 2 or 4 armoured regiments more or less permanently attached as well as significant non-divisional assets. The Australian contingent of the Corps was about 5900 or so, but monashes command in terms of combat strength was about 50% bigger than that. 

At Hamel for example, the division committed to the battle was supported by a full british armoured regiment, 45 vehicles, and for the first time had significant maintenence units attached. The tanks and the Infantry trained together for weeks before the battle....something unheard of until that time. There were special mobile (I think motorised) Light Artillery units, attached to the Infantry Brigades follwing thgem for rapid unlimbering so as to hel hold the ground once taken....not sure about the pioneers in the Anzac Corps, but the fighting at Villers Bretonneux would suggest that considerable assault assets were attached to the Australian formations. At Hamel, 4th Australian had about 250 guns supporting it, whereas the normal amount per Div was about a quater of that (including Corps assets and the like. Getting off the discussion point, the French and Americans put a lot of effort into railway guns, which I dont think the Brits did


The biggest problem for the Australians by 1918 was manpower. The country only had a population of 5 million or so, By wars end 367000 men were in the army and of that number 67% had been injured and were unfit for combat. War weariness was setting in and the numbers of volunteers joining were hard pressed to fill the gaps. Australia never introduced any draft for its armed forces in WWI. It was the major political issue of the time, as a referendum on the issue was lost (Australian Government was prohibited by law until after Korea from sending chokos....consripts...."chocolate soldiers" because they melt in any sort of heat) outside the bordersd of Australia, though there was some fancy footwork in the Pacific in WWII.

With regard to the New Zealanders in the Anzac Corps, that substantially true, but not quite. Moreover, not all Australian formations were attached to the newly formed Anzac Corps in 1917.

When the Austrlians transferred their infantry to the Western Front in 1916, thay had actually formed a second corps. Australians and New Zealanders thus formed I II Anzac Corps. There were at first four Australian and 1 NZ Infantry Divs attached, but a fifth Australian Div was formed in 1916. In addition XIII Light Horse regiment gave three squadrons whilst 4th Light Horse hgave two squadrons of Cavalry. The New Zealnders gave their Otago mounted rifles to this special attachment. These assets were used to form the II Cav regiment which was a permanent attachment to the II Anzac. There was another regimentformed by similar stripping out of mounted assets in Egypt. The two Anzac Corps went to France with the equivalent of two Cavalry Regiments attached.

It had been intended that these assets would remain Corps assets, however in practice they were more or less continuously directly attached to the divisional structure.

In 1917 there was a reorganization, as you say. II Anzac Corps was renamed XII British Corps and the New Zealanders, who up to that point been attached to I Anzac Corps, were sent to the XII. The 4th Aus Div, which had been attached to II Anzac Corps were transferred to I Anzac to replace the New Zealanders. The two Cav regiments which had always been a mix of Brit, NZ and Australian formations remained attached to their respective Corps, so there is every possibility New Zealanders were still fighting in the reorganized ANZAC Corps of 1917-18 ANZAC Corps fought for most of its existence with 5 Divcs attached, plus numerous non-divisional attachments that were more or less permanent


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## pbfoot (Oct 26, 2011)

SomE interesting things I'm learning are the differences in the tactics employed by the Aussies and Canadians , the Canadians were "masters" of using artillery and the Aussies were the "masters" of working with armour. Armour played its biggest role in the Battle of Amiens .
The Aussies would take German OP's and not give them back as was the custom at the time this was very frustrating for the Germans.The Canadians would use set piece attacks they would take a trench and hold it using artillery that had been pre positioned forward along with fact they were very heavy on automatic weapons . The Germans would counterattck and would be attacking a very heaviliy defended trench backed by artillery aided by what was comsidered the best counter battery fire. The Canadian artillery was very adept at changing directions to the point where a segement of trench would be taken and the artillery would shift directions 90 degrees and and bombard the trench not yet taken taking into account the contours of the trench .
An interesting fact being that 2 countries with a combined population of 13 million encountered and defeated between them 86 German divisions or 40% of the German Army


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## michaelmaltby (Oct 26, 2011)

".... 2 countries with a combined population of 13 million encountered and defeated between them 86 German divisions or 40% of the German Army"

Thanks for those insights, BP. 

The "100 Days" was a Commonwealth effort - not to diminish the role of others, but the Commonwealth troops who had been at war since 1914 and had seen much that was stupid, brutal and pointless finally had the chance to open it up in 1918, and boy did they ever role up the carpet. 

MM


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## pbfoot (Nov 3, 2011)

I found this stat which impressed me 
Canadian
Troops engaged 105000
Duration of operations 100 days
Distance Advanced 86 miles
Divisions engaged 68
german divisions defeated 47
Casualties per division Defeated 975
Rounds fired per day by artillery piece 42
Total casualties 45830
Prisoners 31,537
guns captured Heavy and Field 623
machine guns 2482
trench mortars 338


The numbers for the Aussies are not as complete
Australians captured 29144 prisoners 338guns and defeated 39 divisions



The AEF
Troops engaged 650000
duration of operations 47 days
Distance advanced 34 miles
German Divisions defeated 46
Avg number of casualties per division defeated 2170
Total casualties 100000
Rounds fired per day by artillery piece 23


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## parsifal (Nov 10, 2011)

Today is Rememberance Day....the 11 hour of the 11 day of 11 month that marked the end of hostilities for a war, that had proven to be more costly than all the wars of the past three hundred years combined.

Sobering thoughts. We should take a moment to remember those who have paid the ultimate sacrifice.

Lest we forget


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## michaelmaltby (Nov 10, 2011)

Thank you, Parsifal. 

Proud Canadian

MM


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## nuuumannn (Nov 11, 2011)

Indeed. Thanks.

One of the more astonishing facts about the Great War is that the influenza pandemic killed more people between 1917 and 1919 than all those who died during WW1 by a long shot. The estimated figure is more than 40 million world wide; some say higher.


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## Readie (Nov 11, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Today is Rememberance Day....the 11 hour of the 11 day of 11 month that marked the end of hostilities for a war, that had proven to be more costly than all the wars of the past three hundred years combined.
> 
> Sobering thoughts. We should take a moment to remember those who have paid the ultimate sacrifice.
> 
> Lest we forget




WW1 the war that changed society forever.
Naivety and trust were destroyed in mud of Flanders. 

John


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## michaelmaltby (Nov 12, 2011)

".... Naivety and trust were destroyed in mud of Flanders."

"... the influenza pandemic killed more people between 1917 and 1919 than all those who died during WW1 by a long shot."

Interesting contrast. Nature operates on a scale and with an efficiency still unreached by man. WW1 really was the end of a long history of war between _Christian_ nations .... since then it has been war between democracy and various '_isms_'.

MM


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 13, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Today is Rememberance Day....the 11 hour of the 11 day of 11 month that marked the end of hostilities for a war, that had proven to be more costly than all the wars of the past three hundred years combined.
> 
> Sobering thoughts. We should take a moment to remember those who have paid the ultimate sacrifice.
> 
> Lest we forget



Agreed! 



If I had not been in the Alps this weekend, I think I would have loved to have driven up to Verdun. I am sure they always have a nice remembrance.


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## parsifal (Nov 13, 2011)

Just a quick note guys. I havent finished the information for this thread as yet, will get back to finishing it eventually. Wanted to include some of the operations (including planned ops) by the RN, and also some of the aerial stuff as well. But am engaed in some othjer stuff in the "three fighters" thread at the moment.

Patience is a virtue guys.....


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## Readie (Nov 14, 2011)

michaelmaltby said:


> ".... Naivety and trust were destroyed in mud of Flanders."
> 
> "... the influenza pandemic killed more people between 1917 and 1919 than all those who died during WW1 by a long shot."
> 
> ...





Edwardian British society had demarcations that were thoroughly broken down by the needs of WW1. Women working in munitions factories, the equalisation of the trench and so on. 
Any lingering naivety about 'war' and the ordinary man's trust in those above him were destroyed once and for all.
Not to mention the after effects of demobilisation and the hardships of the 1920's.
This aspect of WW1 is often over looked but, in some ways, has left a more lasting legacy than the horrors of the battles themselves.
BBC - History - The Home Front in World War One

John


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## parsifal (Nov 14, 2011)

Ah Verdun....the shop of horrors if ever there was one........


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## michaelmaltby (Nov 14, 2011)

Interesting link, Readie. The "Home Front" was something that neither France nor Germany "developed" in quite the same way as Britain (and the Commonwealth countries). My very anglo Canadian-born Mom -- born in 1899 -- was working in munitions by 1916. Her Dad and two older brothers were overseas by then.

The BBC article does a good job of explaining the effect of that war on UK society: "... The Home Front meant that by 1918, World War One had become truly a people’s war, and we should not be surprised, therefore, that the nation’s first Labour government was elected shortly afterwards, in 1924.

And Mr. Churchill experienced the same effect in 1945 .... 


MM


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## Readie (Nov 14, 2011)

michaelmaltby said:


> Interesting link, Readie. The "Home Front" was something that neither France nor Germany "developed" in quite the same way as Britain (and the Commonwealth countries). My very anglo Canadian-born Mom -- born in 1899 -- was working in munitions by 1916. Her Dad and two older brothers were overseas by then.
> 
> The BBC article does a good job of explaining the effect of that war on UK society: "... The Home Front meant that by 1918, World War One had become truly a people’s war, and we should not be surprised, therefore, that the nation’s first Labour government was elected shortly afterwards, in 1924.
> 
> ...



That's right Michael,

The whole concept of the 'post WW2 dream' was built on Beveridge's vision and the eradication of the ills of the previous decades (want, ignorance, idleness, squallor disease).
My father, having been demobbed in '47 and my grandparents ( WW1 vets) fervently hoped that the British people would never suffer the appalling conditions of the earlier part of the 20th century.
Bevan had the people's mandate to deliver.

As a side note, we are outraged at the recent Chinese report blaming our cherished welfare state for our malais. 
No post war British government, whatever political party, dare to seriously meddle with our health service, benefit system state education.

I think that the greatest gifts we have been given by our forefathers sacrifices are our liberty and our welfare state.

John


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## michaelmaltby (Nov 14, 2011)

Like earthquakes ... societies that have been severely stressed rebound and readjust after massive trauma, through aftershocks. England held it together in the face of Empire-loss and financial ruin, but you can only expect the vessel to go to the well so often .. the aftershocks are still rippling. 

Time to discover yourselves again. God save our next young King and Queen.

MM


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## Readie (Nov 15, 2011)

michaelmaltby said:


> Like earthquakes ... societies that have been severely stressed rebound and readjust after massive trauma, through aftershocks. England held it together in the face of Empire-loss and financial ruin, but you can only expect the vessel to go to the well so often .. the aftershocks are still rippling.
> 
> Time to discover yourselves again. God save our next young King and Queen.
> 
> MM



Very true Michael, and thank you.
The legacy of Blair and his concept of 'Cool Britannia' have done more harm to our self esteem than virtually anything else and while it was very trendy at the time people are realising the truth now...and smarting.
Having said that, I believe that this Remembrance Sunday was the best supported I can recall. The entire city centre of Plymouth stopped for 2 minutes, people, buses, taxi's...everyone. The country came together to celebrate, reflect and be grateful without feeling embarrassed.

John


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## nuuumannn (Nov 15, 2011)

Readie said:


> That's right Michael,
> 
> The whole concept of the 'post WW2 dream' was built on Beveridge's vision and the eradication of the ills of the previous decades (want, ignorance, idleness, squallor disease).
> My father, having been demobbed in '47 and my grandparents ( WW1 vets) fervently hoped that the British people would never suffer the appalling conditions of the earlier part of the 20th century.
> Bevan had the people's mandate to deliver. I think that the greatest gifts we have been given by our forefathers sacrifices are our liberty and our welfare state.



Well put, John. The NHS is one of the best things created post-war for residents of the UK.

While we don't commemorate Remembrance Day on 11/11 here in New Zealand there are many who think we should do more to remember the day, at least. Our remembrance day is ANZAC Day on 25 April, so we don't need two remembrance days.

Like all nations that took part in WW1, New Zealand suffered accordingly; we lost the largest number of people to the war per head of population than any other country. In some communities, every male between a certain age was wiped out. Sensibly and not before time, the Education board has introduced WW1 to the curriculum for young school children, so they can learn what 'Passchendaele' really meant.


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## Readie (Nov 15, 2011)

nuuumannn said:


> Sensibly and not before time, the Education board has introduced WW1 to the curriculum for young school children, so they can learn what 'Passchendaele' really meant.



About time as you rightly say. Here WW1 WW2 and a sensible curriculum have enabled a new generation of Brits to understand the sheer scale of the conflicts.
I have my father's North Africa Italy war diary, my mother's RAF fighter command diary and my grandfather's WW1 whistle and binoculars to show my 3 children. They add a personal touch that helps them in their project work. There are also a raft of awkward questions about the Nazi's, Germans and other Axis countries that need an honest answer.
The Holocaust is not shied away from, as much as you can it is just presented as facts without any spin.
There has been a certain amount of historical re writing in Europe but, not here I'm glad to say.
The British and our valued friends around the English speaking world should never forget and even as the world changes I would hope our bond survives.
John


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## pbfoot (Nov 15, 2011)

nuuumannn said:


> Well put, John. The NHS is one of the best things created post-war for residents of the UK.
> 
> While we don't commemorate Remembrance Day on 11/11 here in New Zealand there are many who think we should do more to remember the day, at least. Our remembrance day is ANZAC Day on 25 April, so we don't need two remembrance days.
> 
> Like all nations that took part in WW1, New Zealand suffered accordingly; we lost the largest number of people to the war per head of population than any other country. In some communities, every male between a certain age was wiped out. Sensibly and not before time, the Education board has introduced WW1 to the curriculum for young school children, so they can learn what 'Passchendaele' really meant.


Why did the Kiwis separate from the Aussies , whose decision was it the Kiwis or the Brits


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## Readie (Nov 15, 2011)

pbfoot said:


> Why did the Kiwis separate from the Aussies , whose decision was it the Kiwis or the Brits


 
New Zealand goes to war - First World War overview | NZHistory.net.nz, New Zealand history online
First World War 1914

Neil, part of the answer is that a lot of Au NZ at the time were of British stock. Upset one you upset us all.
John


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## parsifal (Nov 15, 2011)

The formation of Australia as a nation was the result of a plebiscite taken at the end of the 19th century. There had to be a majority in favour of federation in every colony that participated. The successful Yes vote was the result of hard campaigning by people like sir Henry Parkes. Participation in the vote was a decision to be made by each colony individually, and explains some of the strange arrangements for the protection of States Rights. The most strange of all are the arrangements for our upper house of parliament, which disproportionalty favours representation by the smaller states. This was done so the larger dtates like NSW could not dominate the house at the expense of the other smaller states.

New Zealand had considered participation in federation, but its people rejected union at some point and have remained quite fiercely independant ever since.

The British never imposed Federation on any part of Australia, though the Colonial Secretary had to approve it. Initially the british had opposed union, which had started as early as 1867, but did eventually give their stamp of approval for it. The first legislative moves toward union occurred in 1883. A big influence that drove Fedration was the fear of Russian aggression and defence generaly. The second was fiscal and economic issues.

A good discussion as to why NZ did not join the Federation can be found here.....

Ged Martin - Australia, New Zealand and Federation, 1883-1901 - Section C


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## pbfoot (Nov 15, 2011)

I think my question was misinterpeted , why did the Kiwis leave the ANZACs was it a choice of the Kiwis or Brits. As you probably are aware the Brits were more inclined to use the colonies as replacements for their units , and I'm assuming the Aussies were much like the Canadians in the fact they wished to keep there units as a single force rather then being used piecemeal


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## parsifal (Nov 15, 2011)

Are you referring to the reorganization that basically disolved II Corps deployment, transferring some assets (Mostly Australian) to I Corps, and the remainder (including the NZ Div) to 12 Corps ( a British Army formation)? If so, the decision was a mixture of British and Australian input. Monash and others worked exceedingly hard for the retention of Australian as a single formation and were successful in achieving that national objective. Manpower shortages made it impossible to retain two ANZAC Corps, so the decision was made to reduce the Australian committment to a single, but larger Corps. The New Zealnders never committed or formed a Corps level command, so they probably didnt get much say where their divisionwas sent, though I am sure they were consulted, just as the Aussies didnt get much say which army their Corps was attached to (though once again they were extensively consulted on this very issue) . The New Zealanders did, however retain the right to keep their divisional assets concentrated (more or less....they did provide some non-divisional assets for I Corps, whilst we provided an even greater non-divisional attachment for II Corps...this was done quite willingly bwetween the ANZAC partners as far as I am aware.....our co-operation remained very tight despite the separation of the two armies after the reorganization....)


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## pbfoot (Nov 15, 2011)

thanks for the answer


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## nuuumannn (Nov 16, 2011)

Regarding Parsifal's answer about the two nations; before NZ became a Dominion, it was governed by New South Wales. NZ, however was never a penal colony! The troops tasked with guarding the prisoners were sent to NZ on holiday to Russell in the far north (once the capital), where local whores gave them all manner of stds and the soldiers gave the natives alcohol, influenza and rifles.

Winston Churchill on Australia; "You can't make a decent nation out of convicts and Irishmen"!


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## parsifal (Nov 16, 2011)

Its true....churchill never thought much of australia, or its troops. In 42 he was quite willing to try and override our governments wishes and divert the only trained troops in the eastern hemisphere to Burma, against our wishes.

Churchill unwittingly probably had more to do with the formation of the ANZUS alliance than any other british leader


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## nuuumannn (Nov 16, 2011)

Yep, from my understanding, Churchill and John Curtin never really hit it off. Curtin was too brash for Churchill; he preferred Peter Fraser's understated charm. Interestingly, Fraser and FDR became friends, to the extent that Elenor made a visit during the war and stayed at Fraser's house. Fraser was quite a visionary, and while you might suspect, not wrongly that Churchill's prejudice was influential in the formation of ANZUS, Fraser made alliances with the USA during WW2 against the wishes of Great Britain purely based on the fact that America was closer, and this was before Pearl Harbour. Fraser was quite the strategist and a brilliant mind. He was widely admired around the world. I guess the thing about Fraser was he came after Savage, who was also very well liked at the time; his death came as quite a shock to the nation.


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## Readie (Nov 16, 2011)

Churchill was a devious old bugger. 
I wouldn't underestimate his cunning in making remarks about Australia..
Remember he was a man of war, not peace.

John


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## nuuumannn (Nov 17, 2011)

Readie said:


> Churchill was a devious old bugger.
> I wouldn't underestimate his cunning in making remarks about Australia..
> Remember he was a man of war, not peace.



I recently read a biography by an American on him; very interesting, a man of paradoxes. He certainly was a man of war; he seemed to thrive on it and derived his best and worst moments while knee deep in it. Once he got an idea in his head, it was impossible for him to shake it. On the other hand, his general staff were constantly having to put up with his constantly changing mind on certain aspects of the war.

John Curtin raised his ire with a speech he made to the Australian people declaring the nation's loyalty to the USA with Australia's declaration of war on Japan, which was a sensible thing to do - the NZ Prime Minister had cemented relations with the USA before Pearl Harbour. Churchill was angered by Curtin's declarations, even FDR stated he was panicking. Nevertheless the speech pretty much let everyone know that the country was going into a wartime footing. He was a man who didn't mince his words at a time when Australia needed men who didn't mince their words.


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## Readie (Nov 17, 2011)

nuuumannn said:


> John Curtin raised his ire with a speech he made to the Australian people declaring the nation's loyalty to the USA with Australia's declaration of war on Japan, which was a sensible thing to do - the NZ Prime Minister had cemented relations with the USA before Pearl Harbour. Churchill was angered by Curtin's declarations, even FDR stated he was panicking. Nevertheless the speech pretty much let everyone know that the country was going into a wartime footing. He was a man who didn't mince his words at a time when Australia needed men who didn't mince their words.



We all need leaders who don't mince their words...now, even more than ever. I cannot abide mealy mouthed policymakers.
Logic would dictate that Australia NZ's first concern would be the Japanese in WW2 and Britain was never going to effectively deal with those madmen.
We had a series of bloody noses and our hands full in Europe / North Africa.
The Burma Star vets are among the bitterest of all WW2 combatants.
Fighting the Japanese was something else.

Churchill is loved as a war leader here, but when peace came he was sidelined for a few years. He had an interesting way with dealing with people to say the least. 

John


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