# Nice CGI from IJN perspective



## Admiral Beez (Sep 2, 2020)



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## SaparotRob (Sep 2, 2020)

Admiral Beez said:


>



That was very entertaining. I now have an urge to check out Drachinifel’s stuff again.

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## Admiral Beez (Sep 3, 2020)

SaparotRob said:


> That was very entertaining. I now have an urge to check out Drachinifel’s stuff again.


When those Zero pilots surrender their altitude advantage to dive upon the Devastators I’m saying to the iPad, idiots, leave some CAP at altitude to deal with the inevitable dive bomber strike. You know the USN has both TB and DB, same as the IJN.

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## SaparotRob (Sep 3, 2020)

Admiral Beez said:


> When those Zero pilots surrender their altitude advantage to dive upon the Devastators I’m saying to the iPad, idiots, leave some CAP at altitude to deal with the inevitable dive bomber strike. You know the USN has both TB and DB, same as the IJN.


..and I kept thinking “don’t look up. Look down for submarines!”


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## Admiral Beez (Sep 3, 2020)

SaparotRob said:


> ..and I kept thinking “don’t look up. Look down for submarines!”


It goes to show the impact the lack of radios in the Zeros, lack of radar on the carriers, lack of centrally coordinated fleet air defence, and the Zero pilots training and doctrine to fight as one and focus on dogfighting, not as a team focused on the bigger picture led to much of their defeat at Midway. If you kill five Wildcats but a Dauntless gets through, you've lost.

Have the Kido Butai of late 1941 fitted with both German-sourced radar for the carriers and radios for the fighters (the IJN radios suffered badly from interference that they were removed as dead weight), and have centralized fleet air defence on the carriers to track and priortize threats and allocate fighters to respond, and Midway is an entirely different day for the Kido Butai. It's as if they set out to make the best carriers strike force in the world, with the biggest and best fighters, strike aircraft and carriers.... but totally ignored the technological advancements in fighter direction seen since 1939 in Europe.

But technology aside, the IJN didn't plan to fight as they fight, with massed strikes of LA TBs attacking simultaneously with HA DBs. To strip your HA CAP to deal with the LA TBs was just dumb. There was already a LA CAP to tear apart the Devastators, the HA CAP should have remained where it was to deal with the inevitable Dauntless strike from HA.

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## Gnomey (Sep 3, 2020)

Good one!


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## SaparotRob (Sep 3, 2020)

The problem with IJN plans was the damn yankees never carried out their appointed roles in their own destruction.

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## Admiral Beez (Sep 4, 2020)

SaparotRob said:


> The problem with IJN plans was the damn yankees never carried out their appointed roles in their own destruction.


Actually they did. The USN was baited out to protect Midway, just as the IJN has planned. And the IJN had more carriers and more planes than the USN, exactly how the IJN’s force concentration doctine dictated. The IJN controlled both the place and the superior numbers of the engagement. The IJN just screwed up in execution. Had the IJN sent more scouts, and maintained mulitiple level CAPs they would have done a lot better.

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## SaparotRob (Sep 4, 2020)

Admiral Beez said:


> Actually they did. The USN was baited out to protect Midway, just as the IJN has planned. And the IJN had more carriers and more planes than the USN, exactly how the IJN’s force concentration doctine dictated. The IJN controlled both the place and the superior numbers of the engagement. The IJN just screwed up in execution. Had the IJN sent more scouts, and maintained mulitiple level CAPs they would have done a lot better.


I never thought I’d disagree with the Admiral.
Admiral Yamamoto was trying to get the demoralized Yankees to fight. The plan was to take Midway. Force the American carriers out of Pearl to take it back. Baffled by majestic fleets sailing about the Pacific, the Americans would have no clue. They don’t even have water at Midway! Okay, that whole Coral Sea thing? The Yankees weren’t in the proper position. No need to change recon protocol. The Yankees will follow the script next time. The IJN did war games and they won, except when they didn’t. The officers playing the Americans that won just did something wrong, that’s all. Midway was bait indeed, just not the way the IJN planned.

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## Peter Gunn (Sep 4, 2020)

Admiral Beez said:


> Actually they did. The USN was baited out to protect Midway, just as the IJN has planned. And the IJN had more carriers and more planes than the USN, exactly how the IJN’s force concentration doctine dictated. The IJN controlled both the place and the superior numbers of the engagement. The IJN just screwed up in execution. Had the IJN sent more scouts, and maintained mulitiple level CAPs they would have done a lot better.


Mmmm... Not sure about that, the USN wasn't "baited" out to protect Midway, Nimitz et. al. were spoiling for a fight, he believed that his carriers and air crews were as good as the IJN. That could be debated but to some extent but I think he was correct. USN VF's were every inch as good as their IJN counterparts and the VB's were certainly as good as the Japanese. Plane numbers were almost equal, remember, Midway had a sizable air group, what they did or did not accomplish is immaterial on June 4, the numbers were there.

If anyone was baited it was the IJN, they were completely flanked by TF 16 and 17. And Rob is correct, the American's were expected to blunder into their own destruction according to IJN planning, too bad the IJN had such a low opinion of their enemy because it bit them in the ass HARD.

As far as the IJN wargames, they were a total joke, anytime the officers playing the Americans did ANYTHING outside of "the plan" the umpire's nixed it in favor of what the American's were "supposed to do".

Also remember, Nimitz didn't sent Enterprise, Hornet and Yorktown out on a "do or die, protect Midway at all costs" mission. In fact, had the IJN got the upper hand early they were to withdraw and let Midway fend for itself, which BTW, it could have done quite handily. If lost, Nimitz knew he could retake it at his leisure.

And with regards to IJN CAP, well, incompetent comes to mind. Read Shattered Sword for a detailed analysis of how it worked and you'll be shaking your head with disbelief.

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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 4, 2020)

Peter Gunn said:


> And with regards to IJN CAP, well, incompetent comes to mind. Read Shattered Sword for a detailed analysis of how it worked and you'll be shaking your head with disbelief.


It seems the IJN really didn't take defense of their carriers very seriously, which sort of makes sense in a culture dedicated to "attack! attack!", and which had never had its carriers seriously threatened until a month ago. The lesson hadn't sunk into the culture or the procedures yet.
Absent centralized control, it's hard to imagine aggressive young fighter pilots with an altitude advantage forgoing easy kills below them which are threatening their ship. Combat successes tend to outweigh "minor" breaches of discipline. And the Devastators just kept coming, one flight after another. And those of the land of the "Long Lance" had reason to have a special fear of torpedoes, even the yankee variety. They tended to think of the torpedo as the ultimate anti-ship weapon, which theirs were.

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## SaparotRob (Sep 4, 2020)

The Japanese might have had good reason to fear American torpedoes. At the battle of the Coral Sea, Shoho was hit by five WORKING torpedoes. Might have been the only five we had that did work. 
The Kido Butai really had about the same combat experience as the USN at Midway, carrier vs carrier. The Indian Ocean raid wasn’t up against Task Force 17. The IJN at the Coral Sea had different leadership. The Shokaku and Zuikaku and their combat experienced crews (against the USN) weren’t there. Both sides were still learning. Hence the loss of focus of IJN cap at Midway. Battle with American fleets wasn’t like strafing gunboats on the Yangtze River.

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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 5, 2020)

SaparotRob said:


> The Kido Butai really had about the same combat experience as the USN at Midway, carrier vs carrier.


Actually USN had a slight edge; Yorktown's air group were veterans of Coral Sea and none of Kido Butai was.
And in the end Shoho actually absorbed *seven* fully functional US torpedoes. Certainly a record up to that point in the war.

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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 5, 2020)

Admiral Beez said:


> When those Zero pilots surrender their altitude advantage to dive upon the Devastators I’m saying to the iPad, idiots, leave some CAP at altitude to deal with the inevitable dive bomber strike.


Oh, for radar and a CIC! Tinker to Evers to Chance, and who's on first?
Wars are won by those who can learn their lessons, adapt to the new realities, and not let old habits, tradition, or cultural bias get in the way. Hard to do in a 5,000 year old society.

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## SaparotRob (Sep 5, 2020)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Oh, for radar and a CIC! Tinker to Evers to Chance, and who's on first?
> Wars are won by those who can learn their lessons, adapt to the new realities, and not let old habits, tradition, or cultural bias get in the way. Hard to do in a 5,000 year old society.


Who’s on second. What’s on first.

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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 5, 2020)

Admiral Beez said:


> To strip your HA CAP to deal with the LA TBs was just dumb. There was already a LA CAP to tear apart the Devastators, the HA CAP should have remained where it was to deal with the inevitable Dauntless strike from HA.


If you've read the timeline in "Shattered Sword", you know that by the time the Dauntlesses arrived Kido Butai had been under pretty much continuous air attack for the longest two hours of its life from both land and carrier based aircraft, almost all of it low level. (B17s excepted..."what are they doing here?") This was unprecedented in their experience, and not according to the IJN game plan. (Can you spell "hornet's nest"?) Up to this point, their string of triumphs had come from sticking faithfully to the plan. An entrenched mindset, and Nagumo was no Yamamoto.
They were having trouble keeping the CAP fueled, armed, and airborne in the midst of the wild evasive maneuvering, and with no centralized fighter control, and most of the CAP pilots without officer training, there was a shortage of "big picture" thinking aloft and a lot of "finger in the dike" reaction.
The question remains, if IJN had availed itself of German radar and communications technology as the admiral suggests, could they have used it effectively, so early on the learning curve? It takes awhile to sort this gee-whiz stuff out. Japanese society was not rife with mechanical and electronic experience as America and Europe were. Japanese kids didn't grow up tinkering with Model Ts and crystal radios.

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## SaparotRob (Sep 5, 2020)

Which brings up a “hidden” catastrophe for Japan. Many books mention the loss of experienced aircrews as well as their aircraft. Most of the IJN aircrews had been rescued. 
It was the loss of the aircraft maintenance crews which really hurt. As XBe02Drvr pointed out, Japanese society was short of backyard mechanics. How long to train mechanics? How long until they’re good at it?

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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 5, 2020)

SaparotRob said:


> It was the loss of the aircraft maintenance crews which really hurt.





SaparotRob said:


> Japanese society was short of backyard mechanics. How long to train mechanics? How long until they’re good at it?


Bullseye! Issue that man an "Expert" badge!

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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 5, 2020)

Admiral Beez said:


> they set out to make the best carriers strike force in the world, with the biggest and best fighters, strike aircraft and carriers.... but totally ignored the technological advancements in fighter direction seen since 1939 in Europe.


December 7, 1941 was day one of the Fast Carrier Task Force Era. The first day of a new game nobody had ever played before. It's hard to imagine now, but they were learning the ropes on the field of battle. Before you can set out to acquire that newfangled German technology, you've got to perceive the need for it. Obvious to us today, not so then. In their world of permanent air superiority, CAP and scouting had always done the job. The hornet's nest they encountered at Midway was outside their experience and heretofore inconceivable. A culture that worships the glories of its past often fails to envision its needs for the future.

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## SaparotRob (Sep 5, 2020)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Actually USN had a slight edge; Yorktown's air group were veterans of Coral Sea and none of Kido Butai was.
> And in the end Shoho actually absorbed *seven* fully functional US torpedoes. Certainly a record up to that point in the war.


I was always so amazed that US torpedoes worked at the Coral Sea battle that I never remembered how many.


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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 5, 2020)

SaparotRob said:


> Japanese society was short of backyard mechanics. How long to train mechanics? How long until they’re good at it?


A long time, if your trainees are reporting to school without an experience-based conceptual framework of tools, processes, and mechanical principles. I showed up at A&P school with a pilot's license and a background of casual tinkering on lawn mowers, gokarts, and my SAAB ice race/autocross/hillclimb car, and found myself awash in a sea of lifelong motorheads with 10W30 in their veins, axle grease under their fingernails, and their heads full of tolerances and displacements. I could hold my own on the academic side of things, but in the shop, they all blew my doors off.
I taught a couple Iranian naval cadets to fly, (Pre-Khomeni) whose driving experience before they came to the US was limited to ox carts. They both learned eventually, but it was a long slow process, and one of them never really got good at it. He got shipped back home after the revolution and died in the Iran-Iraq war, while the other jumped ship, stayed here, got naturalized, and eventually got his commercial license. Where there's a will there's a way.

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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 5, 2020)

SaparotRob said:


> I was always so amazed that US torpedoes worked at the Coral Sea battle that I never remembered how many.


Five in the first attack, two in the second.

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## Admiral Beez (Sep 5, 2020)

XBe02Drvr said:


> December 7, 1941 was day one of the Fast Carrier Task Force Era. The first day of a new game nobody had ever played before. It's hard to imagine now, but they were learning the ropes on the field of battle. Before you can set out to acquire that newfangled German technology, you've got to perceive the need for it. Obvious to us today, not so then. In their world of permanent air superiority, CAP and scouting had always done the job. The hornet's nest they encountered at Midway was outside their experience and heretofore inconceivable. A culture that worships the glories of its past often fails to envision its needs for the future.


I agree that these were all new experiences from Japan’s perspective. But radar directed fleet air defence and fighter direction has been going in the Mediterranean since late 1940. Throughout 1941, operating from multiple carrier groups, Fulmars were directed by shipborne radar and centralized fighter direction offices to intercept incoming Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica strikes, allowing the Fulmar, inspite of its slow speed and climb rate to rank as the FAA’s all time top scoring fighter. Not bad considering that it was being withdrawn throughout 1942.

Throughout the peace with Britain the IJN and embassy staff should have been reviewing the Royal Navy’s carrier fleet. By autumn 1940‘s close of the Battle of Britain the benefit of radar should be obvious. The RN’s fleet carriers and battleships had radar by then. The allies are often criticized for ignoring the advances of the Axis, but in carrier ops the IJN definitely had its blinders on.

If USA interwar anti-British feeling and isolationism can be overcome there‘s a huge opportunity for the RN and USN to run war game against their respective carrier fleets. 1935, Lexington, Saratoga, Glorious, Courageous and Furious meet at Bermuda.

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## SaparotRob (Sep 5, 2020)

Admiral Beez said:


> I agree that these were all new experiences from Japan’s perspective. But radar directed fleet air defence and fighter direction has been going in the Mediterranean since late 1940. Throughout 1941, operating from multiple carrier groups, Fulmars were directed by shipborne radar and centralized fighter direction offices to intercept incoming Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica strikes, allowing the Fulmar, inspite of its slow speed and climb rate to rank as the FAA’s all time top scoring fighter. Not bad considering that it was being withdrawn throughout 1942.
> 
> Throughout the peace with Britain the IJN and embassy staff should have been reviewing the Royal Navy’s carrier fleet. By autumn 1940‘s close of the Battle of Britain the benefit of radar should be obvious. The RN’s fleet carriers and battleships had radar by then. The allies are often criticized for ignoring the advances of the Axis, but in carrier ops the IJN definitely had its blinders on.
> 
> If USA interwar anti-British feeling and isolationism can be overcome there‘s a huge opportunity for the RN and USN to run war game against their respective carrier fleets. 1935, Lexington, Saratoga, Glorious, Courageous and Furious meet at Bermuda.


Now that’s a fleet photo I’d love to see!
No argument that the RN had real world experience with radar direction as opposed to the Pacific opponents. The USN would have been better served without the ridiculous family squabbles between “cousins”.

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## SaparotRob (Sep 5, 2020)

.. and the other services as well. Kind of had blinders on there for a minute.


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## SaparotRob (Sep 5, 2020)

XBe02Drvr said:


> December 7, 1941 was day one of the Fast Carrier Task Force Era. The first day of a new game nobody had ever played before. It's hard to imagine now, but they were learning the ropes on the field of battle. Before you can set out to acquire that newfangled German technology, you've got to perceive the need for it. Obvious to us today, not so then. In their world of permanent air superiority, CAP and scouting had always done the job. The hornet's nest they encountered at Midway was outside their experience and heretofore inconceivable. A culture that worships the glories of its past often fails to envision its needs for the future.


We need an icon for “Insightful”.


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## nuuumannn (Sep 6, 2020)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Obvious to us today, not so then.



The key to this forum. Get that into your head and everything becomes clearer, or... more blurred... or clearer...

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## nuuumannn (Sep 6, 2020)

SaparotRob said:


> We need an icon for “Insightful”.



Which emoji to use for "avoiding a marriage proposal..."

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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 6, 2020)

nuuumannn said:


> The key to this forum. Get that into your head and everything becomes clearer, or... more blurred... or clearer...


Let's not get too clear! If truth becomes so clear it's incontrovertible, absolute, and uncontestable this forum has no raison d'etre. Now what fun is that?

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## nuuumannn (Sep 6, 2020)

XBe02Drvr said:


> If truth becomes so clear it's incontrovertible, absolute, and uncontestable this forum has no raison d'etre. Now what fun is that?



You Americans, you always talk in absolutes...

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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 6, 2020)

Admiral Beez said:


> 1935, Lexington, Saratoga, Glorious, Courageous and Furious meet at Bermuda.


In 1935, carriers were just scouting tagalongs to the battleships, and didn't have the offensive power to be thought of as capital ships by the decision makers. They were still flying F4B4s and VE7s. The idea (and the weaponry) of a "carrier fleet" as opposed to a "fleet carrier" were still 2/3 of a decade away. The quantum leap in striking power that turned the carrier into a true offensive weapon didn't occur until 1940-42. The Swordfish led the pack, but was handicapped in forming a formidable triad by shortcomings in the fighter and dive bomber arenas, hence making it an effective weapon only under certain conditions. We all know how the TBD turned out. Not until the Hellcat/Avenger/Dauntless did we have a sure fire counter to Zeke/Kate/Val.

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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 6, 2020)

nuuumannn said:


> You Americans, you always talk in absolutes...


We abhor uncertainties, haven't the patience for halfway measures, and are addicted to extremes, it seems. AND PROUD OF IT!
No wonder the "Ugly American" is a worldwide icon. It's in our DNA.

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## SaparotRob (Sep 6, 2020)

nuuumannn said:


> Which emoji to use for "avoiding a marriage proposal..."


Where was that emoji 6 years ago?

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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 6, 2020)

SaparotRob said:


> Where was that emoji 6 years ago?


Or 32 years ago?

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## SaparotRob (Sep 6, 2020)

XBe02Drvr said:


> We abhor uncertainties, haven't the patience for halfway measures, and are addicted to extremes, it seems. AND PROUD OF IT!
> No wonder the "Ugly American" is a worldwide icon. It's in our DNA.


We DEMAND rigidly defined boundaries of uncertainty.

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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 6, 2020)

Admiral Beez said:


> I agree that these were all new experiences from Japan’s perspective. But radar directed fleet air defence and fighter direction has been going in the Mediterranean since late 1940.


From the bridge of IJNS Akagi, spring 1942: "Neat stuff, but what we're doing is working just fine, and we're too busy right now to take the yard time to install it!"



Admiral Beez said:


> Throughout the peace with Britain the IJN and embassy staff should have been reviewing the Royal Navy’s carrier fleet.


By the late '30s Britain was viewed as an adversary, and despite the traditional homage of the IJN, the brotherly closeness of the Admiral Togo days was long gone.
And there was no "British carrier fleet" to review, at least in the Kido Butai sense. Carrier ops were either attached to larger fleet actions or as single carrier task groups. Multi deck fast carrier task forces with combined air group operations, a la Kido Butai, were few to non- existent, and certainly not a staple.

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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 6, 2020)

SaparotRob said:


> We DEMAND rigidly defined boundaries of uncertainty.


As a people, I fear we are suffering from the neurological equivalent of "hardening of the arteries", hardening of the neurons.
Intellectual and philosophical agility TRUMPed by tribal rigidity.

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## taly01 (Sep 6, 2020)

Remember although Midway was a disaster those 4 were the only Fleet carriers the IJN lost until June 1944!

I haven't read what the IJN changed after Midway apart from having more scouting planes.


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## Admiral Beez (Sep 6, 2020)

taly01 said:


> Remember although Midway was a disaster those 4 were the only Fleet carriers the IJN lost until June 1944!
> 
> I haven't read what the IJN changed after Midway apart from having more scouting planes.


It is a good point, what were the Japanese doing for those next two years? We know what the Americans were doing up to June 1944, rushing to complete ten Essex class carriers and introduce and perfect the Hellcat, Corsair, Helldiver and Avenger.

Over those two years Japan seemed to have learned and implemented nothing. They only completed three additional carriers up to June 1944 (2 x Hiyō-class, and Taiho). When war commenced in Dec. 1941 Japan had only one carrier under construction, Taiho. Japan’s carriers of June 1944 had essentially the same planes, still lacked radar, radios and centralized fighter control. Did they learn nothing at Midway?

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## taly01 (Sep 6, 2020)

> It is a good point, what were the Japanese doing for those next two years?



I meant to say the IJN carrier force did not perform badly after Midway. They improved their scouting and also changed their doctrine to dedicate some carriers to CAP servicing.

The IJN did come out slightly ahead after the battles of Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz. They did miss out the chance on a killer blow in Eastern Solomons as the flight leader of a large strike missed the radio call with the updated location of US fleet (according to my read of the First Team: Guadalcanal). Santa Cruz they won, and had a well coordinated strike, but had very high plane losses, due to the improved US defences radar/AAA.

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## Admiral Beez (Sep 6, 2020)

taly01 said:


> I meant to say the IJN carrier force did not perform badly after Midway. They improved their scouting and also changed their doctrine to dedicate some carriers to CAP servicing.


At Midway the CAP could have been serviced from one carrier while preparing a strike on the other three. Per this video below, it was the inability to prepare a strike due to the need for all four carriers to service the CAP that prevented the IJN from hitting back, start at 24:06.



Instead, dedicate one carrier to refuel and especially rearm the Zeros (why does your fleet air defence fighter have only a short burst of ammunition?!), then you can get your strike aloft.

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## SaparotRob (Sep 6, 2020)

At the time of Midway, carrier tactics were still evolving. At least for the USN. As XBe02Drvr pointed out, the IJN lived in a world of permanent air superiority. The Zero was the undisputed master of sky. Any minor setback could be fixed by “a touch of the armored gauntlet”. ( I love that line. Got it from the book Shattered Sword.). I can’t see the IJN having the wherewithal to have a dedicated cap carrier. It would have been far better (IMO) to have kept the smaller carriers with the Kido Butai as cap carriers. But they were off taking Attu and Kiska or covering the main body. 
The loss at Midway offered almost no education at all for the IJN. The whole battle was hushed up. The survivors (ships and crews) were isolated from rest of their forces, especially the IJA! They were denigrated as losers. What could be learned from failure? Yeah I know. 
The dedicated cap carrier did appear by 1944. As the war progressed, the USN steadily increased the fighter component of their air groups eventually leading to Admiral McCain’s “ big blue blanket “. I’m not up on much past the Battle of Midway until the the actions off Leyte. Heck, I never even heard of the “big blue blanket” until it was posted here. But it has the ring of truth. Japan’s dwindling naval forces limited just what the IJN could do. Lesson not learned.

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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 6, 2020)

Admiral Beez said:


> At Midway the CAP could have been serviced from one carrier while preparing a strike on the other three.





Admiral Beez said:


> Instead, dedicate one carrier to refuel and especially rearm the Zeros (why does your fleet air defence fighter have only a short burst of ammunition?!), then you can get your strike aloft.


The tradition bound Japanese generally suffered from a deficit of "forward think" and an affinity for the status quo, except for occasional stellar performers like Horikoshi and Yamamoto. They also lacked infinite resources and detailed information on what was going on technically in the wide world beyond.
Case in point, the Zero. Designed for, and based on the war in China, it was a world-beater at the time, but was born pretty well maxed out, with limited growth potential. The limitations of its cannon ammo supply hadn't been an issue until it met large numbers of heavier built planes that wouldn't quickly succumb to a burst of 7.7. No one (able to do anything about it) saw this coming. Their offensive-centered mindset wouldn't perceive the value of building such an aircraft. Likewise, the scenario of extended defensive air combat, unprecedented before Midway, wasn't in their thought processes. Attacks against the fleet, rare as they were, were generally over and done with in short order. The hornet's nest of Midway was beyond their ken.

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## Admiral Beez (Sep 6, 2020)

Makes me wonder if Nagumo had IJNS Shōkaku and Zuikaku for a half dozen fleet carriers would it have made a difference.

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## SaparotRob (Sep 6, 2020)

And that’s what’s most curious about the IJN to me. If an American carrier was out of action, the aircrews would be assigned to another, IIRC. I believe U.S.S. Saratoga’s airgroups were assigned to other carriers while in dry dock.
The Shokaku was damaged and inoperable as a carrier but its air groups largely intact. The Zuikaku was undamaged but it’s planes and aircrews decimated. It’s unbelievable to me how they would leave their most modern carrier (close enough) and Shokaku’s planes and veteran crews behind because the they never trained together. Say What? Imagine that happening in the RN or USN? They’d be flying off essentially the same ship. The island superstructures were on the same side. Some of Shokaku’s pilots got home after LANDING on the Zuikaku (I think). So experience enough. It may have been “victory disease” or a monumental case of chutzpah in thinking THEY DIDN’T EVEN NEED Carrier Division 5.

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## Admiral Beez (Sep 6, 2020)

SaparotRob said:


> It was the loss of the aircraft maintenance crews which really hurt. As XBe02Drvr pointed out, Japanese society was short of backyard mechanics.


I’ve also read that unlike the resourceful and often desperate Allies, IJ ground personnel neglected to scavenge parts from broken aircraft to keep others in the air. Three grounded Japanese aircraft wouldn’t be stripped to make one flyable.







Clearly the props were pulled from these grounded Japanese aircraft, but there’s no indication that engines or undercarriages were pulled. Was shipbourne aircraft maintenance any different?

Here‘s how the RAF linies (ground personnel) left their Buffalos. Stripped of everything to keep others in the air.

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## Admiral Beez (Sep 6, 2020)

SaparotRob said:


> And that’s what’s most curious about the IJN to me. If an American carrier was out of action, the aircrews would be assigned to another, IIRC.


Same with the British. HMS Eagle was disabled before the Nov 1940, Taranto raid. Eagle’s Swordfish simply flew over to HMS Illustrious and carried on their part in the strike.

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## SaparotRob (Sep 6, 2020)

Admiral Beez said:


> Same with the British. HMS Eagle was disabled before the Nov 1940, Taranto raid. Eagle’s Swordfish simply flew over to HMS Illustrious and carried on their part in the strike.


Bingo. That’s what I find bewildering about the IJN at that time.


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## SaparotRob (Sep 6, 2020)

Also if one has the Samauri spirit and following the code of the Bushido (I never actually read it) why even stress it? Take the whole dang navy in one big fleet and sail up to Midway and level the place. They wanted a decisive battle, right? It’s not like we could stop them. Even if they thought they would be attacked by land based aircraft, so what? Their naval aviation would sweep the Yankees away. I can’t remember the name of the Admiral commanding the Center Force at the Battle of Samar but wasn’t he supposed to attack the landing force at all costs? Conserving his resources wasn’t part of the plan. He had battleships close enough to shoot at US fleet carriers (he thought they were fleet carriers). That’s a decisive battle right there. Ain’t saying the IJN would succeed but a touch of the armored gauntlet would take care of that.
Most confusing.


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## SaparotRob (Sep 6, 2020)

Re: post #46
It’s depressing to see those Buffalos like that.


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## Admiral Beez (Sep 6, 2020)

SaparotRob said:


> Conserving his resources wasn’t part of the plan.


But maximizing resources should have been. Japan chose the date for Midway, they should have waited the necessary month or so until the two carriers from Coral Sea were returned to frontline duties.

Come on Japan, put away your anti-Sino views and read your Sun Tzu.

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## michaelmaltby (Sep 6, 2020)

culture sometimes trumps logic

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## SaparotRob (Sep 6, 2020)

Shokaku was out of action for about 6 months. The Zuikaku was available. Still, 5 fleet carriers, a bunch of light carriers, battleships, including the biggest one on Earth, against the two carriers we had available (they thought) and no BB’s. 
Admiral Yamamoto’s “6 month to 1 year” clock is running and time is running out. How many Essex class ships on the slipways?

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## Admiral Beez (Sep 6, 2020)

SaparotRob said:


> Shokaku was out of action for about 6 months.


Could she have been patched up and sent back out, like USS Yorktown? Here’s Shōkaku‘s damage... Two significant hits, one through the flight deck, one in the bows.













SaparotRob said:


> Bingo. That’s what I find bewildering about the IJN at that time.


I believe there’s the wreck of a Hawker Hurricane in the rear left.

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## SaparotRob (Sep 6, 2020)

Admiral Beez said:


> Could she have been patched up and sent back out, like USS Yorktown? Here’s Shōkaku‘s damage... Two significant hits, one through the flight deck, one in the bows.
> 
> View attachment 594033
> 
> ...


They could have patched it up if Captain Eliot Buckmaster was her skipper and Admiral Chester Nimitz was in charge of the IJN. (IMHO)


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## SaparotRob (Sep 6, 2020)

Sorry about that. Couldn’t resist. I was also going to say “and if Admiral Ernest J King was CINCJAP” but I don’t want another “time out” from The Eagle.


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## Admiral Beez (Sep 6, 2020)

SaparotRob said:


> They could have patched it up if Captain Eliot Buckmaster was her skipper and Admiral Chester Nimitz was in charge of the IJN. (IMHO)


True. Looking at the damage, I’d say strip off the wood, lay down new wood, seal up the aft lift (there‘s two more), close the upper aft hangar if necessary, and plank over the bows.


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## SaparotRob (Sep 6, 2020)

I agree with you and I can’t understand why it wasn’t done. Perhaps victory disease clouded judgement at the Imperial shipyards as well.


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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 6, 2020)

Admiral Beez said:


> Makes me wonder if Nagumo had IJNS Shōkaku and Zuikaku for a half dozen fleet carriers would it have made a difference.


Good question! I think it might have. Insert two more carriers into the historical sequence of the actual battle, and the likely retaliatory strike against TF17 would likely have been devastating. There wasn't much CAP available over the American carriers, and they would likely have been overwhelmed.

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## jetcal1 (Sep 6, 2020)

Admiral Beez said:


> True. Looking at the damage, I’d say strip off the wood, lay down new wood, seal up the aft lift (there‘s two more), close the upper aft hangar if necessary, and plank over the bows.



With a ship it's the damage that you don't see that could literally be seven or 8 frames away. Warped water tight doors, broken fire mains, water damaged wiring, and so forth. It depned on what kind of equipment you have, how well your crew has trained to both contain the initial conflagration and then contain, control, and repair the damage. Here are few nice picutres of the USS Houston from later in the war.
As someone who ran patching and shoring teams onboard a CV, I am in awe of the improvised repairs that were made to get her into Ulithi harbor.
(I'm not sure the '42 Yorktown crew had as much shoring material onboard or welding equipment capable of handling steel that was that thick.)

Here's a link to the Damage Report. 
USS Houston CL81 War Damage Report No. 53

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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 6, 2020)

SaparotRob said:


> It’s unbelievable to me how they would leave their most modern carrier (close enough) and Shokaku’s planes and veteran crews behind because the they never trained together.


In some ways similar to our own navy before NATOPS. Every squadron and every air group had their own tactics, procedures, and communications protocols, which had to be learned and relearned with every transfer. But at least in USN, these transfers were frequent enough to engender a certain amount of mental flexibility. Not so in the Japanese system, where crewmembers tended to stay with the same ship/air wing/squadron indefinitely. Given the lack of electronic communication, and the use of signals, being on the same page would be crucial to tactical success.

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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 6, 2020)

SaparotRob said:


> It may have been “victory disease” or a monumental case of chutzpah in thinking THEY DIDN’T EVEN NEED Carrier Division 5.


Well, they were only up against two American carriers, weren't they? And not very competent ones either, right? Four vs two, that oughta do!

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## SaparotRob (Sep 7, 2020)

Thank you jetcal1. I have always been of the opinion USN damage control has been the major “trick up its sleeve” against all comers. It’s why U.S.S. Yorktown CV-5, won the Battle of Midway. Yes, I said it! 
It’s one of the many reasons why I hold U.S.S. Yorktown with the same regard as H.M.S. Warspite does for our “cousins”. Captain Buckmaster, as the story goes, listened to one of his ratings about damage control equipment. The fog nozzle was developed (I don’t know how true that is). I have read the Captain was instrumental in damage control procedures, such as emptying fuel lines and filling them with co2. 
Yorktown took part in various early raids and her crews were definitely the first team. She struck the enemy and was struck. Her crew got her going and absorbed the second attack sparing U.S.S. Enterprise and U.S.S. Hornet. And then she struck again. Her planes with the the Enterprise groups. This was the catastrophe of leaving Zuikaku at home for the IJN. 
Hmmm. This just occurred to me. Could The Battle of Midway have been the battle of the damage control parties?

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## SaparotRob (Sep 7, 2020)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Well, they were only up against two American carriers, weren't they? And not very competent ones either, right? Four vs two, that oughta do!


I know, right? 
Isn’t it basic War 101 to be there the firstest with the mostest? You know, shock and awe?

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## SaparotRob (Sep 7, 2020)

Oh yeah, I almost forgot. Never underestimate your enemy.

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## taly01 (Sep 7, 2020)

Possibly the "weakness" of Shokaku and Zuikaku saved them as their sides blew out when hit (a "flaw" that also apparently saved US carriers from fatal damage), Akagi and Kaga (based off British Battlecruisers) died very easily. But i'm way beyond my knowledge here 

P.S. fun fact, the picture of late war Japanese graveyard planes above, probably post surrender pile ups, contains many 13.2mm nose gun Zero's (larger vertical ejection port vs more horizontal small ejection port for 7.7mm). (fun fact #2, Zero changed from 0.30" to 0.50" almost same time as Spifire did mid'44!)

Purely from a war nerd viewpoint its disappointing the original 6 fleet IJN carriers didn't get to fight together again.

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## SaparotRob (Sep 7, 2020)

taly01 said:


> Possibly the "weakness" of Shokaku and Zuikaku saved them as their sides blew out when hit (a "flaw" that also apparently saved US carriers from fatal damage), Akagi and Kaga (based off British Battlecruisers) died very easily. But i'm way beyond my knowledge here
> 
> P.S. fun fact, the picture of late war Japanese graveyard planes above, probably post surrender pile ups, contains many 13.2mm nose gun Zero's (larger vertical ejection port vs more horizontal small ejection port for 7.7mm). (fun fact #2, Zero changed from 0.30" to 0.50" almost same time as Spifire did mid'44!)
> 
> Purely from a war nerd viewpoint its disappointing the original 6 fleet IJN carriers didn't get to fight together again.


The sides blowing out of HIJMS Shokaku and Zuikaku were probably design flaws as the IJN built armored hangars. The unarmored American hangars with a wooden flight deck on top could be easily opened up and ventilate or ditch munitions quickly when there are fumes or smoke. 
The YouTube site Drachinifel has great videos of this stuff. Check out the one on Armoured vs Unarmoured aircraft carriers.

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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 7, 2020)

SaparotRob said:


> Hmmm. This just occurred to me. Could The Battle of Midway have been the battle of the damage control parties?


Every naval battle since time immemorial has been a battle of the damage control parties. Not as glamorous as battering rams, 32 pounder cannons, and dive bombers, but frequently the decisive element.

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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 7, 2020)

SaparotRob said:


> I know, right?
> Isn’t it basic War 101 to be there the firstest with the mostest? You know, shock and awe?


Sun Tzu say: "Half-assed leader bring half-assed force to battle, get full-ass kicking!"

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## SaparotRob (Sep 7, 2020)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Every naval battle since time immemorial has been a battle of the damage control parties. Not as glamorous as battering rams, 32 pounder cannons, and dive bombers, but frequently the decisive element.


Ya got that right.


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## Admiral Beez (Sep 7, 2020)

taly01 said:


> Purely from a war nerd viewpoint its disappointing the original 6 fleet IJN carriers didn't get to fight together again.


Agreed. The IJN should have waited to begin their Midway plan until all six were ready. Shōkaku was repaired and returned to service July 14, 1942. Zuikaku was undamaged and just needed to replenish its CAG. For god sake’s Yamamoto, just wait six weeks. 

And maximize your fleet of fast carriers... keep the 28 knot CVL Zuihō and her 30 aircraft with Nagumo. You can still send the slow carrier Hōshō (and the absent?!) CVL Jun'yō with the landing force. Imagine Nagumo with six or seven fast carriers!

Best two websites on this topic, Kido Butai! Operational Histories of Japanese Carriers | Nihon Kaigun and World Aircraft Carriers List: Japanese Aircraft Carriers

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## jetcal1 (Sep 7, 2020)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Well, they were only up against two American carriers, weren't they? And not very competent ones either, right? Four vs two, that oughta do!



According to Shattered Sword they kept losing so the umpires got involved to make Admiral Yamato happy.

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## jetcal1 (Sep 7, 2020)

SaparotRob said:


> Thank you jetcal1. I have always been of the opinion USN damage control has been the major “trick up its sleeve” against all comers. It’s why U.S.S. Yorktown CV-5, won the Battle of Midway. Yes, I said it!
> It’s one of the many reasons why I hold U.S.S. Yorktown with the same regard as H.M.S. Warspite does for our “cousins”. Captain Buckmaster, as the story goes, listened to one of his ratings about damage control equipment. The fog nozzle was developed (I don’t know how true that is). I have read the Captain was instrumental in damage control procedures, such as emptying fuel lines and filling them with co2.
> Yorktown took part in various early raids and her crews were definitely the first team. She struck the enemy and was struck. Her crew got her going and absorbed the second attack sparing U.S.S. Enterprise and U.S.S. Hornet. And then she struck again. Her planes with the the Enterprise groups. This was the catastrophe of leaving Zuikaku at home for the IJN.
> Hmmm. This just occurred to me. Could The Battle of Midway have been the battle of the damage control parties?



Your welcome. Keep in mind Damage Control (DC) is really a pretty odd combination of learn as you go, Darwinian in nature with a roll of the dice thrown in. We probably weren't significantly different from any other Navy until after the battle for the Solomons. We learned a lot off of Guadalcanal.

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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 7, 2020)

jetcal1 said:


> According to Shattered Sword they kept losing so the umpires got involved to make Admiral Yamato happy.


Yup. Read that too. Exercise in collective self delusion.

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## Admiral Beez (Sep 7, 2020)

jetcal1 said:


> According to Shattered Sword they kept losing so the umpires got involved to make Admiral Yamato happy.


Can you elaborate on what the “American” side was doing that was rejected? Was it close to what the USN actually did?


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## SaparotRob (Sep 7, 2020)

Admiral Beez said:


> Can you elaborate on what the “American” side was doing that was rejected? Was it close to what the USN actually did?


In one gaming session, it was just about the exact same tactics that the Americans actually used, less one American flattop.

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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 7, 2020)

Admiral Beez said:


> Can you elaborate on what the “American” side was doing that was rejected? Was it close to what the USN actually did?





SaparotRob said:


> In one gaming session, it was just about the exact same tactics that the Americans actually used, less one American flattop.


And in more than one case the "American" forces sortied from Pearl Harbor sooner than decreed by Yamamoto's timeline.

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## nuuumannn (Sep 7, 2020)

XBe02Drvr said:


> We abhor uncertainties, haven't the patience for halfway measures, and are addicted to extremes, it seems. AND PROUD OF IT!



Now, see, this is the problem. Americans don't get the rest of the world, because in the rest of the world uncertainty is the only certainty and most of us have learned to live with it. The rest of the world _tolerates_ the USA because it has no choice, just like it does other superpowers, but it is ironic that the superpowers (not just the USA) display disproportionate degrees of inflexibility when dealing with outher countries because of their absolute attitudes. Sigh.


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## nuuumannn (Sep 7, 2020)

Admiral Beez said:


> Here‘s how the RAF linies (ground personnel) left their Buffalos. Stripped of everything to keep others in the air.



Nah, that photo was taken when the Buffaloes _arrived_ in Malaya...

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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 7, 2020)

jetcal1 said:


> We probably weren't significantly different from any other Navy until after the battle for the Solomons. We learned a lot off of Guadalcanal.


Well, at Coral Sea and Midway our DC performed better than the Japanese.

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## nuuumannn (Sep 7, 2020)

michaelmaltby said:


> culture sometimes trumps logic



Or put another way, logic sometimes cultures trump...

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## SaparotRob (Sep 7, 2020)

nuuumannn said:


> Nah, that photo was taken when the Buffaloes _arrived_ in Malaya...


I just knew you guys got the good ones.

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## Admiral Beez (Sep 7, 2020)

nuuumannn said:


> Nah, that photo was taken when the Buffaloes _arrived_ in Malaya...


It’s another nod to the RAF linies that they could take an aircraft out of a box like an IKEA shelf and quickly knock it together.












IMO, the only thing wrong with the Buffalo was there weren’t enough of them. Five squadrons of sixty active aircaft to patrol and defend a territory larger than the entire UK is untenable. Give Malaya Command sixty Spitfires or Meteor F3s and they’re still doomed. But give them 400 Buffalos...

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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 7, 2020)

nuuumannn said:


> Now, see, this is the problem. Americans don't get the rest of the world, because in the rest of the world uncertainty is the only certainty and most of us have learned to live with it.


Because of our dominant position on the world stage we feel so ENTITLED to a sense of security and certainty that we don't even recognize that it is an ENTITLEMENT enforced by our political, economical, and military power, rather than a global norm. Hence "the Ugly American". We have our own "perestroika" coming.

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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 7, 2020)

nuuumannn said:


> Or put another way, logic sometimes cultures trump...


Nah, it would take more than logic to do that...if it's even doable.


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## SaparotRob (Sep 7, 2020)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Because of our dominant position on the world stage we feel so ENTITLED to a sense of security and certainty that we don't even recognize that it is an ENTITLEMENT enforced by our political, economical, and military power, rather than a global norm. Hence "the Ugly American". We have our own "perestroika" coming.


Sadly again, I agree.


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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 7, 2020)

Admiral Beez said:


> Give Malaya Command sixty Spitfires or Meteor F3s and they’re still doomed. But give them 400 Buffalos...


...and five Chenaults. Then maybe they'd have a chance.

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## jetcal1 (Sep 7, 2020)

Admiral Beez said:


> Can you elaborate on what the “American” side was doing that was rejected? Was it close to what the USN actually did?


Edited: Oops, so many other replies. Much better than mine.


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## jetcal1 (Sep 7, 2020)

nuuumannn said:


> Now, see, this is the problem. Americans don't get the rest of the world, because in the rest of the world uncertainty is the only certainty and most of us have learned to live with it. The rest of the world _tolerates_ the USA because it has no choice, just like it does other superpowers, but it is ironic that the superpowers (not just the USA) display disproportionate degrees of inflexibility when dealing with outher countries because of their absolute attitudes. Sigh.


I know, right? You'd think we were like pre-1914 England or something.

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## jetcal1 (Sep 7, 2020)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Well, at Coral Sea and Midway our DC performed better than the Japanese.


IMO? Yes and no. We were a little further along the "get rid of the flammables" curve and we had literally just started inerting POL systems. (Consider that someone listened to a Chief. I don't think that would have happened in the IJN.) The Japanese just basically got hit in better places than we did at Midway. 6-9 months later? After Guadalcanal? They weren't even in the same league, let alone ballpark. 
Aside from the Bureau of Ordnance and our torpedoes the rest of the Navy reacted quickly and efficiently to keep ship's companies outfitted with increasing varieties and quantities of DC gear.

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## SaparotRob (Sep 7, 2020)

jetcal1 said:


> Edited: Oops, so other replies. Much better than mine.





jetcal1 said:


> Edited: Oops, so other replies. Much better than mine.


Talk about read the writing on the wall! 
This is what is so ironic. Senior IJN officers, in the same room, pointed out how flawed “The Plan” was.


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## SaparotRob (Sep 7, 2020)

Hey, what just happened to the post I’m answering? 
“The Americans kept surprising them. “ is perfect. It’s what happened.


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## SaparotRob (Sep 8, 2020)

taly01 said:


> Remember although Midway was a disaster those 4 were the only Fleet carriers the IJN lost until June 1944!
> 
> I haven't read what the IJN changed after Midway apart from having more scouting planes.


I’ve been thinking about this. 
From Midway on, which side was on the offensive? The USN did suffer greatly at the hands of the IJN at Guadalcanal. I can explain it away all day but a few times, they whupped us good. The loss of two carriers, cruisers and destroyers. The loss of sea control that cost the lives of so many Marines from night time bombardment and re-supply of Japanese troops. Both sides were losing men and equipment. Both sides were slugging it out. The veteran air groups of the IJN at sea and on Rabaul were thinning out. Both sides were running out of the equipment they had from December 7 forward (Germany first). But not for long. 
I don’t think the IJN was doing so well. The IJN does however, hold Attu.

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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 8, 2020)

SaparotRob said:


> From Midway on, which side was on the offensive? The USN did suffer greatly at the hands of the IJN at Guadalcanal. I can explain it away all day but a few times, they whupped us good.


Both sides...or neither side. Take your pick. The Solomons were a meat grinder, grinding down both sides. We had more meat to cram into the grinder. We could absorb more losses than the Japanese could and still maintain fighting effectiveness. Logistics pays.
Fortunately Guadalcanal was at the extreme effective range of Japanese ships and planes, thus allowing the Cactus Airforce to maintain local air superiority most of the time. Any Japanese surface units that showed their face in daylight within range of Henderson did so at their peril.

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## Admiral Beez (Sep 8, 2020)

taly01 said:


> Remember although Midway was a disaster those 4 were the only Fleet carriers the IJN lost until June 1944!


To be fair, beyond the two Shōkaku-class and the two converted, small and slow Hiyō-class, the IJN didn’t have other fleet carriers to lose. And the two Hiyō class were used mostly as aircraft ferries. Their next true fleet carrier, Taihō doesn’t enter service until spring 1944, which matches Britain’s first new CV (since 1941!) HMS Indefatigable‘s entry into service in May 1944, but by which time the USN has completed ten Essex class CVs and nine Independence class CVLs.

Meanwhile, between Midway and June 1944, in addition to the two Hiyō class being torpedoed and forced home for repairs, the IJN lost the smaller carriers Chūyō and Ryūjō. My point is that the period between Midway in June 1942 to June 1944 was not a period of respite for the IJN’s carrier forces.

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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 8, 2020)

SaparotRob said:


> The IJN does however, hold Attu.


To what advantage? They couldn't do anything useful with it. It would never sustain an offensive along the Aleutian chain. If the Japanese had done their homework ahead of time they would have realized it would be a waste of effort, and require skills and equipment they didn't have. Like long range bombers equipped to fly IFR in continuous severe icing conditions and navigate and bomb "blind" by radar only. Like Ground Controlled Approach radars to get said bombers back on the ground in the ever present arctic fogs. The slender Japanese task force managed to sneak up on Dutch Harbor and poke them in the eye once, but that couldn't have been reliably repeated on the scale of a campaign, due to weather.

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## SaparotRob (Sep 8, 2020)

XBe02Drvr said:


> To what advantage? They couldn't do anything useful with it. It would never sustain an offensive along the Aleutian chain. If the Japanese had done their homework ahead of time they would have realized it would be a waste of effort, and require skills and equipment they didn't have. Like long range bombers equipped to fly IFR in continuous severe icing conditions and navigate and bomb "blind" by radar only. Like Ground Controlled Approach radars to get said bombers back on the ground in the ever present arctic fogs. The slender Japanese task force managed to sneak up on Dutch Harbor and poke them in the eye once, but that couldn't have been reliably repeated on the scale of a campaign, due to weather.


Attempting to be sarcastic.


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## jetcal1 (Sep 8, 2020)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Both sides...or neither side. Take your pick. The Solomons were a meat grinder, grinding down both sides. We had more meat to cram into the grinder. We could absorb more losses than the Japanese could and still maintain fighting effectiveness. Logistics pays.
> Fortunately Guadalcanal was at the extreme effective range of Japanese ships and planes, thus allowing the Cactus Airforce to maintain local air superiority most of the time. Any Japanese surface units that showed their face in daylight within range of Henderson did so at their peril.



(Rant on)
From the Navy side? The first few months there was no material advantage. The Japanese excelled at night fighting and had a torpedo that was so advanced the USN though they were taking mine hits. We had our asses handed to us on a routine basis. 
The USN was forced to learn how to use radar, Talk Between Ships (TBS) and the Combat Information Center (CIC). IMO, The genesis of modern naval Command, Control and Communication (C3) started with the US Navy at Guadalcanal. 

By the time we had the material advantage? We'd pulled our experienced folks out to teach the newbie's and the raisins. By the end of the campaign we were sending a mix of veterans and new ship's company against tired the worn out ships and sailors of the IJN. From a USN perspective? I would say after the Gilberts it was pretty much a done deal.

And? As you mentioned the US Navy by the time the battle was over in early '43? The USN was starting to become the master of Damage Control and was at the beginning of becoming awash in an embarrassment of DC equipment. 
(Rant off)

As an side, We had an AFCM who was forced into retirement in '84. He was on the USS San Diego as part of their VOC Det and afloat at the Solomon's. He had some stories! 42 years of active duty.

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## SaparotRob (Sep 8, 2020)

jetcal1 said:


> (Rant on)
> From the Navy side? The first few months there was no material advantage. The Japanese excelled at night fighting and had a torpedo that was so advanced the USN though they were taking mine hits. We had our asses handed to us on a routine basis.
> The USN was forced to learn how to use radar, Talk Between Ships (TBS) and the Combat Information Center (CIC). IMO, The genesis of modern naval Command, Control and Communication (C3) started with the US Navy at Guadalcanal.
> 
> ...


Please excuse my ignorance. 
AFCM?
VOC DET?


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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 8, 2020)

jetcal1 said:


> We had an AFCM who was forced into retirement in '84. He was on the USS San Diego as part of their VOC Det and afloat at the Solomon's. He had some stories! 42 years of active duty.


I met an APCM in 1974 who had been in for 40 years, and was flying left seat in a C9 with his son in law and CO, a newly frocked Rear Admiral as FO. He enlisted in 1934 and became an ordie, then a tail gunner, then sent to flight school under the cadet program, where he was denied commissioning due to what he described as a "couth deficit". Flew Helldivers (the biplane version), F4Fs and F6Fs in the RAG squadrons, then the early jets. He said he spent WWII stuck as an instructor in various RAG squadrons despite frantic efforts to get assigned to a deploying squadron. His SIL, the Admiral, said: "He shot himself in the foot by getting too good at what he did. They wouldn't let him go. Trained five Hellcat aces!"
This was their last trip together, as the new Admiral was being relieved as CO of the composite squadron and "kicked upstairs" to a Pentagon staff billet.

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## nuuumannn (Sep 8, 2020)

jetcal1 said:


> I know, right? You'd think we were like pre-1914 England or something.



Oh, not quite, not yet anyway. Great Britain mastered subjugation on a global scale quite unlike any other master race, self declared or otherwise. The USA has a long way to go before it ever matches the scope and size of the British Empire. To begin with, it has to sort out its obvious internal differences.

Also, I hope you guys realise that I made these comments with my tongue firmly planted in cheek! (being American, you might need that pointed out to you...)

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## jetcal1 (Sep 8, 2020)

nuuumannn said:


> Oh, not quite, not yet anyway. Great Britain mastered subjugation on a global scale quite unlike any other master race, self declared or otherwise. The USA has a long way to go before it ever matches the scope and size of the British Empire. To begin with, it has to sort out its obvious internal differences.
> 
> Also, I hope you guys realise that I made these comments with my tongue firmly planted in cheek! (being American, you might need that pointed out to you...)


Dude, didn't I have the smiley face to tell you I was giving you a ration of shitt?

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## nuuumannn (Sep 8, 2020)

jetcal1 said:


> Dude, didn't I have the smiley face to tell you I was giving you a ration of shitt?



Obviously, but it does need to be pointed out that Great Britain still holds the Number one spot for being the biggest dirtbags to indigenous races in world history, regardless of how hard modern superpowers try...

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## SaparotRob (Sep 8, 2020)

nuuumannn said:


> Obviously, but it does need to be pointed out that Great Britain still holds the Number one spot for being the biggest dirtbags to indigenous races in world history, regardless of how hard modern superpowers try...


Was that a challenge?

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## jetcal1 (Sep 8, 2020)

XBe02Drvr said:


> I met an APCM in 1974 who had been in for 40 years, and was flying left seat in a C9 with his son in law and CO, a newly frocked Rear Admiral as FO. He enlisted in 1934 and became an ordie, then a tail gunner, then sent to flight school under the cadet program, where he was denied commissioning due to what he described as a "couth deficit". Flew Helldivers (the biplane version), F4Fs and F6Fs in the RAG squadrons, then the early jets. He said he spent WWII stuck as an instructor in various RAG squadrons despite frantic efforts to get assigned to a deploying squadron. His SIL, the Admiral, said: "He shot himself in the foot by getting too good at what he did. They wouldn't let him go. Trained five Hellcat aces!"
> This was their last trip together, as the new Admiral was being relieved as CO of the composite squadron and "kicked upstairs" to a Pentagon staff billet.



Master Chief Cleveland also had a "couth deficit".
He came down to our shop (IM-2 400) after an incident where the DivO went after a TAD Sailor and proceeded to rip our DivO a new assshole in front of about 30 white hats and two Chiefs. His CO got called. He came down, heard the Chiefs explanation and in front of the humiliated O-3 and the rest of us? Said; "Okay Master Chief, carry-on". (The DIvO was a prick who had no business being commissioned.)

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## jetcal1 (Sep 8, 2020)

nuuumannn said:


> Obviously, but it does need to be pointed out that Great Britain still holds the Number one spot for being the biggest dirtbags to indigenous races in world history, regardless of how hard modern superpowers try...



My advice is keep it in the context of the philosophies of the time and carry on. (You know the only difference between an American and a Aussie? The Aussie got caught. (Unless you're from Georgia.)

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## nuuumannn (Sep 9, 2020)

SaparotRob said:


> Was that a challenge?



Ha haaa! You mean you haven't started?



jetcal1 said:


> (You know the only difference between an American and a Aussie? The Aussie got caught.



Now you're really betraying your origins...  So, to avoid further thread drift, I'll take a break and have a drink.


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## jetcal1 (Sep 9, 2020)

SaparotRob said:


> Please excuse my ignorance.
> AFCM?
> VOC DET?



Sorry. 
AFCM is a E-9 Master Chief that combined a few "rates" such as airframes, engines, hydraulics. By the time you make E-9? You're expected to know the systems. To continue on that "theme" a Navy E-9 in the aviation electrical, fire control, or electronics fields would be an AVCM and expected to have mastered anything that had a wire attached to it. 

VOC is an old, old squadron designation for Composite Spotting Squadron V = Fixed Wing, O = Observation C= Composite that flew the float planes off ships like cruisers and battleships during WWII.

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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 9, 2020)

nuuumannn said:


> So, to avoid further thread drift, I'll take a break and have a drink.


Great idea! I think I'll do likewise.

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## SaparotRob (Sep 9, 2020)

Great minds think alike.

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## jetcal1 (Sep 9, 2020)

nuuumannn said:


> Ha haaa! You mean you haven't started?
> 
> 
> 
> Now you're really betraying your origins...  So, to avoid further thread drift, I'll take a break and have a drink.


I had fun with that comment in Perth many decades ago. Although at 21, I didn't realize how much it would upset the people who were in their 60's. (Or maybe 70's)

On a serious note, a Jamaican friend last year explained to me....She said "Of course they were offended. You might have been talking about their grandparents."

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## nuuumannn (Sep 9, 2020)

jetcal1 said:


> I had fun with that comment in Perth many decades ago.



The funny thing is when I lived in Australia, the majority of them had the driest senses of humour. Not much offends them. I like that about them.


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## XBe02Drvr (Sep 9, 2020)

jetcal1 said:


> AFCM is a E-9 Master Chief that combined a few "rates" such as airframes, engines, hydraulics.


And an APCM is an obsolete rate, Aviation Pilot Chief (Master), which was actually abolished years ago, before E8 (Senior) and E9 (Master) Chief rates were established, by Macnamara, I think. The Navy seemed to humor the few old guys who were still active by letting them wear the insignia. (Probably to avoid suffering anal enlargement.)

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## nuuumannn (Sep 9, 2020)

SaparotRob said:


> Great minds think alike.



When this covid stuff is over, you're all invited for a barbeque. Bring your bevvie of choice!

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## jetcal1 (Sep 9, 2020)

nuuumannn said:


> The funny thing is when I lived in Australia, the majority of them had the driest senses of humour. Not much offends them. I like that about them.



I hosted a group onboard my ship (1982) and there were numerous people in their 70's. Several of my inadvertent (And innocent) comments were offensive 'but not offending" to some of them. They understood I was young and not trying to be rude. (Just like I didn't get offended when they innocently teased me.)

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## jetcal1 (Sep 9, 2020)

XBe02Drvr said:


> And an APCM is an obsolete rate, Aviation Pilot Chief (Master), which was actually abolished years ago, before E8 (Senior) and E9 (Master) Chief rates were established, by Macnamara, I think. The Navy seemed to humor the few old guys who were still active by letting them wear the insignia. (Probably to avoid suffering anal enlargement.)


I seem to recall the last one retiring in the early 80's out of a VP outfit.


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## Peter Gunn (Sep 9, 2020)

Man I take a couple of days off and you guys go hog wild in here. 

WRT post Midway and the IJN, Shattered Sword has a good amount of detail about changes for IJN doctrine, they actually DID learn quite a bit but were slow at instituting it. There were changes that were supposed to be in place at the time of I think Eastern Solomons, but were delivered too late to the fleet to act on. They were literally trying to fly out to the carriers with new changes, read Shattered Sword for details.

Also during the Solomon's Campaign, the IJN was still in the game and gave as good as it got, perhaps better if you counter them losing one light carrier and zero fleet carriers vis a vis USN loss of Hornet and Wasp with Saratoga damaged and sent stateside (again). They just didn't have the ability to STAY in the game. Their building program hadn't foreseen the protracted type of war they found themselves not only mired in, but by virtue of the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, virtually guaranteed they would be in. Mentioned in SS is the fact that the Japanese never understood the war they instigated, but also did not understand their opponent, and even their own goals for going to war with the United States in the first place could be said to be rather nebulous and short sighted.

Much like expecting the American's at Midway to "go lowing to their slaughter" (Shattered Sword) they totally misread the effect on the American psyche regarding the way they started the war. Seen as weak willed for starters I think that America's resolve to prosecute the war to the fullest extent was quite a shock to them, and indeed, I think many still didn't accept that they had their collective asses kicked from hell to breakfast, even in 1945.

They also apparently failed to take into account America's economy, which had been running in low gear due the Great Depression, _but was still in 1940, FIVE TIMES that of Japan's_, which was already straining due to their mucking about in China and Southeast Asia etc. So as their economy started reaching its breaking point in 1940-41, America's went from that low gear into overdrive.

But back to Midway, I can't take any credit for what I've written, just paraphrasing from Shattered Sword, which I believe is one of the most comprehensive books written on ANY battle in the history of warfare. There are others AS good, but none better I believe.

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## SaparotRob (Sep 9, 2020)

I don’t know why I keep forgetting about U.S.S. Saratoga.


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## Peter Gunn (Sep 9, 2020)

SaparotRob said:


> I don’t know why I keep forgetting about U.S.S. Saratoga.


Probably because she was in and out of the repair yards so many times in 1942 from torpedo hits. A pity really as she is my second favorite after Enterprise.

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## SaparotRob (Sep 9, 2020)

Peter Gunn said:


> Probably because she was in and out of the repair yards so many times in 1942 from torpedo hits. A pity really as she is my second favorite after Enterprise.


The Lexington class were pretty cool looking.

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## SaparotRob (Sep 9, 2020)

Well, with the help of you guys, I realize I made at least 2 glaring errors in my posts. I’m giving myself a time out.

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## jetcal1 (Sep 9, 2020)

SaparotRob said:


> Well, with the help of you guys, I realize I made at least 2 glaring errors in my posts. I’m giving myself a time out.



Why? That's the fun of the place and why we're all here is to learn.

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## Peter Gunn (Sep 9, 2020)

Admiral Beez said:


> It’s another nod to the RAF linies that they could take an aircraft out of a box like an IKEA shelf and quickly knock it together.
> 
> View attachment 594193
> 
> ...




True on both parts, but Buffs' were hardly the only ones to come in a box, over at Zeno's there's a DVD for the Thunderbolt:
_"Uncrating and Assembly of the P-47 Thunderbolt (40:00)This truly remarkable step-by-step training film shows how a ground support crew of fifty men could assemble a P-47 in a field using nothing more than muscle, unpowered hand tools, and pieces of the shipping crate it came in. We're talking nothing more than hammers, wrenches and bicycle pumps! You'll also get a unique look at the inner workings of the big Jug as it is literally bolted together by field personnel. A must see for P-47 fans and shade tree mechanics alike!* "_

I've seen the video, it's really amazing how they take P-47 out of some BIG crates and assemble a fully functional fighter is impressive.

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## Peter Gunn (Sep 9, 2020)

SaparotRob said:


> Well, with the help of you guys, I realize I made at least 2 glaring errors in my posts. I’m giving myself a time out.


Uh... What?

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## Admiral Beez (Sep 9, 2020)

Peter Gunn said:


> True on both parts, but Buffs' were hardly the only ones to come in a box, over at Zeno's there's a DVD for the Thunderbolt:
> _"Uncrating and Assembly of the P-47 Thunderbolt (40:00)This truly remarkable step-by-step training film shows how a ground support crew of fifty men could assemble a P-47 in a field using nothing more than muscle, unpowered hand tools, and pieces of the shipping crate it came in. We're talking nothing more than hammers, wrenches and bicycle pumps! You'll also get a unique look at the inner workings of the big Jug as it is literally bolted together by field personnel. A must see for P-47 fans and shade tree mechanics alike!* "_
> 
> I've seen the video, it's really amazing how they take P-47 out of some BIG crates and assemble a fully functional fighter is impressive.


It's smart to make your aircraft capable of being knocked down and reassembled in the field. Japan's main fighters, the A6M, Ki-43 and Ki-44 had mono-spar or monolithic wings, meaning the wing cannot be removed in parts for later reassembly in the field, as shown on the A6M Zero being restored below. The wing is one big piece from tip to tip. The only three ways to get your Zeros and Oscars to forward bases is to fly them there, find a freighter with wide open decks, or use an aircraft carrier as a ferry, as was done with the Hiyo class of light fleets after Midway.






Legend Flyers Zero – Restoration Update

Here's a Hawker Hurricane coming out of its crate. One can imagine only a couple of hours needed to bolt on the wings, rudder and prop, top up the fluids and ammunition.






If only the below was the scene at Singapore in late summer 1941. 






I imagine the wood used on those crates was repurposed and is probably framed in some Ghanaian houses today.

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## SaparotRob (Sep 9, 2020)

Okay, I’m back. What I miss?

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## nuuumannn (Sep 10, 2020)

Admiral Beez said:


> meaning the wing cannot be removed in parts for later reassembly in the field, as shown on the A6M Zero being restored below.



The Zero could be split at the rear fuselage just aft of the canopy and with the wing tips being folded and engine removed could easily be transported within a compact space. It was designed precisely for ease of transport.

The split can be seen running from the after end of the canopy to forward of the lower retractable step.




Detail fuselage centre section

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## nuuumannn (Sep 10, 2020)

SaparotRob said:


> Okay, I’m back. What I miss?



COVID is still a thing...

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## Peter Gunn (Sep 10, 2020)

SaparotRob said:


> Okay, I’m back. What I miss?


Two glaring errors?

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## SaparotRob (Sep 10, 2020)

Peter Gunn said:


> Two glaring errors?


At least two. Totally spaced out on U.S.S. Saratoga. I got caught up in the discussion and mentioned build flaws in HIJMS Shokaku. When did I become a naval architect? Got caught up in the discussion. Worst of all, I didn’t write “IIRC” after stating HIJMS Shoho was hit by 5 torpedoes. A most grievous mistake for this forum. Finally, dumb joke about Attu.

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## Admiral Beez (Sep 10, 2020)

nuuumannn said:


> The Zero could be split at the rear fuselage just aft of the canopy and with the wing tips being folded and engine removed could easily be transported within a compact space. It was designed precisely for ease of transport.Dailfuselage centre section


I see that now.





Mitsubishi A6M fuselage | World War Photos

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## Peter Gunn (Sep 10, 2020)

SaparotRob said:


> At least two. Totally spaced out on U.S.S. Saratoga. I got caught up in the discussion and mentioned build flaws in HIJMS Shokaku. When did I become a naval architect? Got caught up in the discussion. Worst of all, I didn’t write “IIRC” after stating HIJMS Shoho was hit by 5 torpedoes. A most grievous mistake for this forum. Finally, dumb joke about Attu.


I doubt the term "glaring" is appropriate here, "minor" is more in line with what you're describing, possibly even "unnoticeable".

You want glaring? I went to renew my drivers license this morning, and the way the questions were worded I almost admitted to being:

*A). A convicted felon
B). Have been judged mentally incapable (OK, they might have a case for that one, just ask around here)
C). Addicted to hard narcotics such as cocaine or heroin*

Fortunately I was able to use my wit and charm to convince the nice lady that I was none of the above, although she seemed unconvinced where *B* was concerned.

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## SaparotRob (Sep 10, 2020)

Peter Gunn said:


> I doubt the term "glaring" is appropriate here, "minor" is more in line with what you're describing, possibly even "unnoticeable".
> 
> You want glaring? I went to renew my drivers license this morning, and the way the questions were worded I almost admitted to being:
> 
> ...


Okay, you won this round Gunn but I’ll be back!

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## Peter Gunn (Sep 11, 2020)

SaparotRob said:


> Okay, you won this round Gunn but I’ll be back!


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## SaparotRob (Sep 20, 2020)

Time to eat crow. I’m reading “Neptune’s Inferno”. The HIJMS Shokaku was built much tougher than I thought. Now, if it had better damage control at the Battle of Santa Cruz.....

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## Glider (Sep 20, 2020)

Admiral Beez said:


> It's smart to make your aircraft capable of being knocked down and reassembled in the field. Japan's main fighters, the A6M, Ki-43 and Ki-44 had mono-spar or monolithic wings, meaning the wing cannot be removed in parts for later reassembly in the field, as shown on the A6M Zero being restored below. The wing is one big piece from tip to tip. The only three ways to get your Zeros and Oscars to forward bases is to fly them there, find a freighter with wide open decks, or use an aircraft carrier as a ferry, as was done with the Hiyo class of light fleets after Midway.
> 
> View attachment 594399
> 
> ...


I have seen a number of examples where the crates were reused by Ground Crew to make better class accommodation than provided by their air force. The most impressive being 8th Air Force crew who did a lot better than the standard issue Nissen Huts.

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## SaparotRob (Jul 24, 2021)

I just saw a YouTube video entitled "Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands (CG Documentary)". It was by -Juno- TakaLeon. It looks really good to me. It doesn't seem to have a bias. The site has a few interesting videos, mostly combat sims. I did watch a clip of a Ki-84 that was filmed at a 1973 airshow. Neat stuff. 
I gotta' figger' out how to link these things.

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## Thumpalumpacus (Jul 24, 2021)

Peter Gunn said:


> Mmmm... Not sure about that, the USN wasn't "baited" out to protect Midway, Nimitz et. al. were spoiling for a fight, he believed that his carriers and air crews were as good as the IJN.



Parshall and Tully make this point in _Shattered Sword_. They also assert that given the choice between losing Midway and losing a couple of carriers, Nimitz preferred losing Midway and saving the carriers. I think this is the rationale behind his "calculated risk" orders.

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## Thumpalumpacus (Jul 24, 2021)

XBe02Drvr said:


> The question remains, if IJN had availed itself of German radar and communications technology as the admiral suggests, could they have used it effectively, so early on the learning curve?



Even had German radars been present, and the IJN had had time to incorporate that technology into their doctrine, the crummy radios on the Zeros may well have rendered its impact meaningless. If those fighters can't hear the fighter-directors, they can't be where they needed to be. 

Japanese C³I was crummy throughout that battle, from the inadequate search to the absence of radar and radios that worked for their fighters, to the basic assumption of Japanese leadership that the Americans would cooperate with Japanese plans.

And directly to your question quoted above, look at the CAP issues Americans had in the Battles of Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz, and that was with functioning radars and radios. We still hadn't integrated them into a functional doctrine; we were still learning 2-4 months later, ourselves.

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## Thumpalumpacus (Jul 24, 2021)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Good question! I think it might have. Insert two more carriers into the historical sequence of the actual battle, and the likely retaliatory strike against TF17 would likely have been devastating. There wasn't much CAP available over the American carriers, and they would likely have been overwhelmed.



Not to mention the clusterflock that was the main American strike. It's likely at least one of the two hypothetical add-ons would have, like _Hiryu_, escaped damage -- or perhaps even notice, in the confusion of the battle. You not only have more decks for cycling CAP, you have more bombers available for the counterstrike.

We could be looking at _Yorktown_ lost in the first strike, and the other two American flattops damaged or sunk in the second. That's a major shift in the outcome of the battle.

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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 24, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> Even had German radars been present, and the IJN had had time to incorporate that technology into their doctrine, the crummy radios on the Zeros may well have rendered its impact meaningless.


Part of the German communications technology would have necessarily been better airborne R/T radios and ignition shielding.

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## Thumpalumpacus (Jul 24, 2021)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Well, at Coral Sea and Midway our DC performed better than the Japanese.



We learnt a lot from losing _Lexington_. Her fate wasn't very different from _Taiho_ two years later, fuel fumes turning the ship into essentially an FAE. Hence, the innovation Capt Buckmaster approved (mentioned above by 

 SaparotRob
) of draining the fuel lines and filling them with CO² under Condition Zed, which came about as a direct result of the Lady's loss.

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## Thumpalumpacus (Jul 24, 2021)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Part of the German communications technology would have necessarily been better airborne R/T radios and ignition shielding.



One should hope! But the fact that the Japanese removed the radios rather than improved them bespeaks an attitude towards aerial warfare that is, to my mind, a touch outdated for the time.

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## Thumpalumpacus (Jul 24, 2021)

Peter Gunn said:


> I doubt the term "glaring" is appropriate here, "minor" is more in line with what you're describing, possibly even "unnoticeable".
> 
> You want glaring? I went to renew my drivers license this morning, and the way the questions were worded I almost admitted to being:
> 
> ...



Your "wit and charm"? Now _there's_ a glaring error!

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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 24, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> One should hope! But the fact that the Japanese removed the radios rather than improved them bespeaks an attitude towards aerial warfare that is, to my mind, a touch outdated for the time.


Removing the radios was in most cases a field activity rather than a fleet wide policy choice. An understandable reaction to being sent into battle with crappy equipment. It's a typically Japanese cultural phenomenon that a shortcoming in a superb weapon like the Zero would have trouble percolating up the chain of command.

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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 24, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> One should hope! But the fact that the Japanese removed the radios rather than improved them bespeaks an attitude towards aerial warfare that is, to my mind, a touch outdated for the time.


It wasn't outdated, in their experience, until suddenly, it was. And that was when they came up against competent opponents who had radios that worked and the numerical strength to press them severely. Midway was their first experience of that.

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## Thumpalumpacus (Jul 24, 2021)

XBe02Drvr said:


> It wasn't outdated, in their experience, until suddenly, it was. And that was when they came up against competent opponents who had radios that worked and the numerical strength to press them severely. Midway was their first experience of that.



Of course I have the benefit of hindsight in writing what I wrote. But it's weird how they paid attention to, say, tactics at Taranto, but not tactics from the BoB. It seems to me the latter would be more useful on a much wider scale, given those German radars and radios.


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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 24, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> Of course I have the benefit of hindsight in writing what I wrote. But it's weird how they paid attention to, say, tactics at Taranto, but not tactics from the BoB. It seems to me the latter would be more useful on a much wider scale, given those German radars and radios.


Japan is an island nation and had a heavy focus on the naval aspect of things. The BoB was a land based campaign and Japan, lacking an analog to the Straits of Dover, likely failed to see its significance.

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## Thumpalumpacus (Jul 24, 2021)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Japan is an island nation and had a heavy focus on the naval aspect of things. The BoB was a land based campaign and Japan, lacking an analog to the Straits of Dover, likely failed to see its significance.



That baffles me, insofar as the principles (early warning radar, early launch, and GCI) would translate neatly to both home and carrier defense. Am I missing something here, outside of their naval culture which emphasized offense rather than defense?

It seems to me to be a natural for borrowing. Why didn't some clever IJN captain or rear-admiral say "we should have this"? Or did someone suggest it only to be rebuffed?

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## GrauGeist (Jul 24, 2021)

Midway would have been the ultimate challenge for any contemporary radar equipped fleet, as typical engagements would show enemy elements approaching from a predicted direction.
The Japanese, however, were being hit from all directions and altitudes in successive waves.
I honestly don't think that any radar equipped Navy at that time could have kept up with trying to get CAP up or down or over here or over there fast enough.
And all this was without the Hornet's elements, which would have added to the confusion.

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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 24, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> That baffles me, insofar as the principles (early warning radar, early launch, and GCI) would translate neatly to both home and carrier defense. Am I missing something here, outside of their naval culture which emphasized offense rather than defense?


Many things about the East baffle us westerners, one of them being the fixation on offense to the almost total exclusion of defensive measures, or even thinking. Defensive thinking was culturally akin to a "loser mentality", and afflicted the entire culture, not just the IJN


Thumpalumpacus said:


> Or did someone suggest it only to be rebuffed?


Even the likes of Yamamoto could get away with only so much.

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## Thumpalumpacus (Jul 24, 2021)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Many things about the East baffle us westerners, one of them being the fixation on offense to the almost total exclusion of defensive measures, or even thinking. Defensive thinking was culturally akin to a "loser mentality", and afflicted the entire culture, not just the IJN



I think that's my hang-up. But it's odd that they didn't seem to see how efficiency on defense aids the resumption of the offensive.

I get how culture colors thinking. I've seen that both in my own military experience (which is as culture-bound an institution as anything around), and also having lived in the Middle East for five years. I get that decisive battle doctrine also permeated the IJN in the decades between Tsushima and their final defeat in WWII.

I don't get why they'd spurn a tool for their toolbox that held so much promise as a force-multiplier, especially after the Brits had shown the effectiveness of good C³I earlier. Even the USN paid attention to that, and they were as hide-bound as anyone in 1940-41.



XBe02Drvr said:


> Even the likes of Yamamoto could get away with only so much.



Right. He had to threaten resignation over PH, and Midway as well IIRC, and have personal guard against assassins (of the Japanese variety).


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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 24, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> I don't get why they'd spurn a tool for their toolbox that held so much promise as a force-multiplier, especially after the Brits show the effectiveness of good C³


"If an American bomber ever reaches Tokyo, you can call me Meyer!"

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## Thumpalumpacus (Jul 24, 2021)

XBe02Drvr said:


> "If an American bomber ever reaches Tokyo, you can call me Meyer!"



Yeah, all cultures have their blind-spots, if I'm understanding you correctly. Maybe I'm just displaying my own, here.

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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 24, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> Yeah, all cultures have their blind-spots, if I'm understanding you correctly. Maybe I'm just displaying my own, here.


One's own culture is nigh impossible to shake off when viewing others, especially for those with not much practice at it. You sound like you've had some practice. Ditto here, but immersion is a whole nother level.
Maybe someday...

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## Thumpalumpacus (Jul 24, 2021)

XBe02Drvr said:


> One's own culture is nigh impossible to shake off when viewing others, especially for those with not much practice at it. You sound like you've had some practice. Ditto here, but immersion is a whole nother level.
> Maybe someday...



I've had some practice, but escaping my own preconceived notions is, as always, difficult. I find I do better when I practice the concept of perspectives.

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## nuuumannn (Jul 24, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> Yeah, all cultures have their blind-spots, if I'm understanding you correctly. Maybe I'm just displaying my own, here.



I don't know if it's culture or whether it's what you know in hindsight that affects your thinking. We know so much more about the war than the combatants could have known about one another back in the day because of what we read and absorb from what's been produced in the war's wake. It _could_ be presumptuous to suggest that the Japanese could have learned from the Battle of Britain, it might not be, also; they possibly did have access to intel, but it also depends on what the Germans as allies are offering the Japanese intel-wise, too. I suspect they read about it from newspapers, but without reporters in Britain, how much coverage is the battle getting, and is that information factual? Besides, information took a bit longer to get places and be disseminated back then. Being on the other side of the world was a greater hindrance to the passage of intelligence.


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## GrauGeist (Jul 24, 2021)

The Japanese did have a consulate in Berlin as well as a military attache, so they would have had some idea of what was going on.

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## Thumpalumpacus (Jul 25, 2021)

nuuumannn said:


> I don't know if it's culture or whether it's what you know in hindsight that affects your thinking. We know so much more about the war than the combatants could have known about one another back in the day because of what we read and absorb from what's been produced in the war's wake.



This too is a fair point which indicates I should give this some more thought.


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## nuuumannn (Jul 25, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> The Japanese did have a consulate in Berlin as well as a military attache, so they would have had some idea of what was going on.



This is true, but to what degree was the information the Japanese were receiving affected by bias? The Germans didn't like admitting they were losing.

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## Barrett (Jul 26, 2021)

When we filmed the Dogfights series in 06-07 the head CGI guy predicted near photo reality in about 10 years. Certainly the art has progressed well beyond that era!

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