# Panther and Tiger, designed by the Allies....



## Lucky13 (Sep 6, 2014)

How would the Allies have designed the Panther and Tiger?
I'm sure that when they got their hands on them and studied them, they thought 'we would have done this differently'....or?


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## Shortround6 (Sep 6, 2014)

For the British:












sanity prevailed and 






For the US, we started with this _BEFORE_ the Tiger was known. 






It was dropped and after bouncing a few times and the Tiger and Panther became known it was replaced by this too late to see action;






Take an M-26 and widen it a bit and stretch it by two road wheel stations. 

"we will see your 88mm and raise you to a 105mm, nah-nah!"

and if a 105 wasn't enough, there were versions with 120mm and 155 guns. 






Please note that this was a *gun* and NOT a *howitzer.*

Of course the fact that all/most of these guns needed two loaders (at least) and the shell and cartridge were loaded separately tended to slow the rate of fire waaaaaaay down.


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## parsifal (Sep 6, 2014)

The two nations that led in tank development , USSR and germany had priceless advantages mostly in engine development....power, reliability, safety, weight were all to their advantage. 

However whilst the panther was a basically sound concept, along the lines of a heavy-ish MBT the tiger concept was a strategic blind alley. Other nations more or less experimented with the concept and dropped it post war , recognizing the bogus "advantages" that foisted on those nations that had decided to try and make it work. pretty rapidly it was realized that the cost and the lack of mobility for these behemoths was a waste of time and money. That was the main reason why the Tortoise was dropped. It did not fit the satandards required for an attacking army such as the allies were in 1944-5.

had the british began their tank development earlier and in a more rational way, it would not have been Black prince or tortoise that led them into battle in 1944. It would have been upsized Comets, and Centurions, and both of these were fully the equal of the panther.


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## davebender (Sep 7, 2014)

Soviet Union did not think so. KV and IS series heavy tanks were designed for battlefield roles similar to German Tiger tank.


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## wiking85 (Sep 7, 2014)

davebender said:


> Soviet Union did not think so. KV and IS series heavy tanks were designed for battlefield roles similar to German Tiger tank.


The IS and KV were as heavy as the Panther, the Tiger was heavier than anything fielded by anyone else.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 7, 2014)

The IS and KV were limited by the drive train. 

The Russians had tried the T-35 series and combat trialed the SMK/T-100 multi turret tanks. Even with a 500hp diesel you can only make a tank so heavy with a 4 speed gear box. They later went to 5 speed but mobility (speed) of the KV series was poor. 
So poor that in late 1942 they reversed the up armoring program and built over 1300 thinner armored but faster KV-1S tanks. 

With more gears you can build a heavier vehicle using the same power, especially if you can actually shift gears while the vehicle is moving  

A lot of the heavy tanks were never _intended_ to be used as general purpose battlefield tanks or _heavy cruisers_ or _pick a term_. They were intended for set piece break though battles of heavily defended positions, once the breach had been made by the heavies the regular medium and light tanks were to conduct the "breakout" and penetration of rear areas and large encirclement. A lot of the later American thoughts (after the initial M-6 but including reworked M-6 tanks) were coming up with ways to attack the Siegfried line with a minimum of casualties. Projects for the invasion of Japan also included heavy tanks rather than mediums to deal with heavy bunkers. 

The evolution of the "heavy" tank changed a bit from the 30s to the 50s as advances in both drive lines and armament were made. Now that we have 1000-1500hp engines and good transmissions 60+ ton tanks are "standard"


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## parsifal (Sep 7, 2014)

of course as technology advances, and the cost of producing these tanks becomes more manageable, what was once in the category of a "Heavy tank" would now qualify as an MBT. A T-62 weighs in at 42 tons, which in WWII put it in the size category of a heavy tank, but it was anything but a heavy tank. Its power to weight mobility, overall light armouring scheme puts it in the category of breakthrough tank, but its armament puts it into the category of a battle tank. It was an allrounder tank, with adequate capability in all areas. 

A heavy tank generally sacrifices one or more essential characteristics to gain advantages elsewhere. In general they have two of the three main characteristics....armour and armament but lose out in mobility. They are usually costly to build as an added disincentive. The heavy demands they place on the procurement machine limits their numbers, and they are limited in the responses they can deliver. You cant fight a war with one arm tied behind your back, even if the one remaining good arm is as buff as you can make it. That's why MBTs....all round solutions to a difficult problem, remain very much alive, whilst heavy tanks are dead and buried as a concept.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 7, 2014)

We are getting a bit off topic as post war heavy tanks began to have a different function/role than war time heavy tanks. The Post war Heavy tanks (of which there were basically 3) became long range anti-tank support machines. Sit behind the front line of medium/MBTs and pick off enemy tanks at a longer range using a larger gun than the medium/MBTs mounted and engage the enemy heavy support tanks. In the west at least the Heavy tanks were NOT made in the numbers that would allow them to _lead_ an attack despite their heavier armor. 
With the coming of better ammo for the medium tank guns and better fire control systems, allowing the mediums to engage at longer ranges the need for the heavy support tanks faded out. Some other countries being a bit slow to adapt APDS ammo (or getting to work to their satisfaction) Of course more powerful medium tank guns called for the "medium" tanks to be *up* armored to stand a decent chance of survival although a few countries tried reverting to mobility (speed) as protection. 
The T-62 had a couple of problems if it _tried_ to perform like a WW II heavy tank. Like 15mm thick lower hull armor (between/behind the road wheels) and a 46mm vertical rear hull. Relatively light weapons could knock it out from the flank or rear. It was also a victim of better ammunition. By the time it was going into wide spread service (or offered for export) better ammo for the T-55's 100mm gun had reduced the need for the 115mm gun. Much like the adoption of the British 105mm gun had reduced teh need for the 120mm guns in the American M-103 and British Conqueror heavy tanks. The 120's _may_ have had a place supporting 20pdr and 90mm armed tanks but 105mm gun left them with little real advantage and some disadvantages. 

The Tiger I _may_ have an bit of a tarnished reputation because it _may_ have been misused. _IF_ it was intended to be a break though tank ( different from a breakout tank) and was used for deep penetrations or as a "fire brigade" to rush from one trouble spot to another due to a lack of regular tanks it's short range and mechanical problems are going to show up more than if it had been held to it's intended role. 
The Tiger II gets no such pass as by the time it shows up the Germans were well aware of the change in circumstances they were fighting under. 

Youtube video of a Churchill tank and Challenger II running together.

http://video.search.yahoo.com/video...&turl=http://ts4.mm.bing.net/th?id=VN.6080103

Modern power packs have allowed the combination of firepower, protection and mobility to be combined in one tank, at the cost of over 60 tons.


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## parsifal (Sep 10, 2014)

modern armour is different in terms of assigned role for heavy tanks. I agree completely. however, the instances of heavy tanks being used in the way intended are few and far between.

Insofar as tigers were concerned, it was always expected that they would run around the battlefield and it was in this area they fell down badly. East front particularly there were always massed breakthroughs by Russian tanks that simply kept moving until they could move no more . this took a pretty frightful toll on soviet tank formations, but it also completely dislocated German defences. Typically Soviet penetrations were in the 250-300 km range, Tigers had an operational range of 120km, max. More than often they would get left behind and forced to be abandoned for lack of fuel. 

If the allies had had tigers in their TOE, they could not easily take part in the amphibious assaults that were part of more or less routine operations. Crossing wrecked bridges, ARV operation would all have been a nightmare for the allies. Short range would preclude deep penetration breakthroughs. The allies would have ben forced into a stand up slugfest with the unmotorised heer formations, something that played to their best strengths by late war. successful operations for the allies was all about mobility and light to medium weight, to allow maximum dislocation of enemy fixede positions and static lines


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## yulzari (Sep 10, 2014)

We have to be careful of what we mean when we say mobility. In post war trials in Germany the Tortoise proved to be as able to travel over terrain as a Centurion, could stand up to almost anything fired at it and destroy any other vehicle and was reliable to boot, if slow. So its mobility allowed it to travel across the ground as well as any other tank. However, the lack of capable bridges made any tactical move of more than 20km a nightmare as all moves had to be planned around the few German bridges that could take the weight, never mind that any, or all, of these could have been destroyed by the enemy. Hence, in effective military terms it had no mobility. In mechanical terms it had adequate mobility.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 12, 2014)

From Wiki so usual disclaimers 

"While initially the Soviets made a lot of poor defense decisions, worsened by recent "cleansings" of Soviet military command, the KV-1 was unlike anything the German army had expected to encounter, and some of the battles against numerically superior Axis forces became legendary. Even though the operations of the KV family of tanks were severely hampered by restrictions due to its weight, it was a fearsome and formidable weapon through most of the Second World War."

"The IS-2 tank first saw combat in early 1944. IS-2s were assigned to separate heavy tank regiments, normally of 21 tanks each.[14] These regiments were used to reinforce the most important attack sectors during major offensive operations. Tactically, they were employed as breakthrough tanks. Their role was to support infantry in the assault, using their large guns to destroy bunkers, buildings, dug-in crew-served weapons, and other 'soft' targets. They were also capable of taking on any German AFVs if required. Once a breakthrough was achieved, lighter, more mobile T-34s would take over the exploitation."

This may not be correct but there was a difference between a "breakthrough" tank and a "_breakout or exploitation_" Tank. While the British didn't build any production tanks over 40 tons or so in WW II they most definitely had "breakthrough" (infantry) tanks and "breakout or exploitation" (cruiser) tanks. 
The size of the British "heavy" tanks wasn't restricted so much by tactical brilliance of the British military but by Britain having one of the most antiquated and restrictive Railroad lading gauges (allowable size of objects on railcars) of any European nation. 

This "idea" of "Breakthrough" tanks was popular in many countries in the late 30s when any future war was often in-visioned as a replay of WW I. 

The US got lucky in that it's late 1930s "Breakthrough" tank 
View attachment 271753

View attachment 271754

was able to be modified (or drive and suspension _borrowed_) for the M3 and M4 mediums saving much time and trouble. Please note the angled plates on the rear fenders that allowed the reward facing machine guns in the sponsons to ricochet fire _down into trenches._ 

from the Wiki entry on the French Char B1

"The similarity resulted partly from the fact that the Char B1 was a specialised offensive weapon, a break-through tank optimised for punching a hole into strong defensive entrenchments, so it was designed with good trench-crossing capabilities. The French Army thought that dislodging the enemy from a key front sector would decide a campaign, and it prided itself on being the only army in the world having a sufficient number of adequately protected heavy tanks. The exploitation phase of a battle was seen as secondary and best carried out by controlled and methodical movement to ensure superiority in numbers, so for the heavy tanks also mobility was of secondary concern. Although the Char B1 had for the time of its conception a good speed, no serious efforts were made to improve it when much faster tanks appeared."

And 

"More important than the tank's limitations in tactical mobility, though, were its limitations in strategic mobility. The low practical range implied the need to refuel very often, limiting its operational capabilities. This again implied that the armoured divisions of the Infantry, the Divisions Cuirassées de Réserve, were—despite their name that merely reflected the fact that they had originally been planned to be raised in a secondary mobilisation—not very effective as a mobile reserve and thus lacked strategic flexibility."

Germans were impressed with the Char B1 when it was used in combat though. 
French did have the same problem the Germans did with tank production though. " Although the French expenditure on tanks was relatively larger than the German, France simply lacked the production capacity to build a sufficient number of heavier tanks. The Char B1 was expensive enough as it was, eating up half of the infantry tank budget."

Cavalry tanks were in a different budget and again show that the major powers had the idea that one tank could NOT _do it all_. 

The Tiger was coming at the end of a series of progressively heavier prototypes, the last round of which were ordered _before_ operation Barbarossa started. Once teh Germans encountered the KV series and T-34 in numbers the Tiger was the only real game in town. Throw it out and start over with many months delay (if not a year or more).
Tiger started production 4-5 months before the Panther and the early Panther production was slow and of dubious quality due the rush put on it. 

The Tiger was far from ideal in a number of respects but criticizing it because it was NOT what we would now call an MBT doesn't seem quite fair. German's tactical/strategic situation had changed from the initial design period to the time of it's main combat service.


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## parsifal (Sep 12, 2014)

Agreed that they were stuck with the tank by midwar, however, the tiger was never the success that its supporters would have people believe. its first empoyment, near Novgorod was an outright disaster, its performance at Kursk was impressive, until one scratches just a little, to find that by late July it had suffered 100% casualties. Compared to lighter tanks like the mkIV, it had a marginally better Kill/loss ratio, but this in no way justified the vast quantities of resources lavished upon it.

It was a tank that should never have even been considered, let alone even built.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 12, 2014)

The Problem is that the MK IV could *not* do what the Tiger was _designed_ to do, or what the Churchill, KV and Char B tanks could do. And that was overrun defended positions and achieve the "breakthrough".

The 30mm side and rear armor was just too vulnerable to small anti-tank weapons (37mm or even smaller) to allow the tanks to get into positions that would allow flank shots. 

The MK IV could NOT be up-armored enough to under take that role even at a cost in speed/mobility. 

Novgorod was an example of using tanks on unsuitable ground. Perhaps a different tank would have done better but that better tank would NOT have been an up-armored MK IV unless fitted with much wider tracks. And how many were used?

NO tank was so mighty that 3-12 tanks could swing an entire battle. This is despite what some Tiger enthusiasts might wish. 

While WW II tanks were much better mechanically that WW I tanks there were darn few British MK IV tanks still operational after several days at the Battle of Cambrai . This does not mean the tanks didn't make a valuable contribution (although perhaps not as great as the tank supporters claim  or that the the use of tanks to attack defended positions was a such a bad idea that it should have been given up. 
The role of tanks in a Breakthough operation is NOT to post impressive numbers on a scoreboard but to achieve the objective of breaking the enemy line so that more mobile forces can Breakout and exploit the gap in the line. The Tanks help by keeping causalities of the accompanying infantry to a minimum and bring their firepower (main guns and machine guns) to positions/locations that the supporting artillery cannot reach or effectively deal with. 
If at the end of the day (battle) you have not one runner left of the assault tanks but you have a division or several regiments of mobile troops loose in the enemy's rear areas the Assault tanks may have done their job. How many _more_ of the cruiser/cavalry tanks (and their trained crews) would have been lost trying to do the same thing even if the objective was even accomplished? 

Should the the British have stopped Churchill production in favor of more Crusader tanks (even if the Crusader was fitted with a 75mm gun) because the Crusader was faster and cheaper? 

The US built about 200 of these 





which weighed about 42 tons because they didn't think the standard Sherman could perform the assault role.


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## parsifal (Sep 12, 2014)

The germans undertook a number of breakthrough operations with tank infantry formations without the help of socalled heavy or breakthrough tanks, against opposition that did contain heavy tanks. Sometimes these heavy tanks caused consternation in german formations, such as at cressy, again at abbeville and several times that i can think of in the MTO, but they did not suffer markedly different or greater losses because of that gap in their inventory. neither did they suffer outright defeats, or slowed rates of advance, though to be fair there were pauses generated sometimes at critical moments in a given operation because of these enemy heavy tanks being present. inevitably, and always, it was manouvre, skill, communication, teamwork and numbers that won out, not sometimes, but every time. Germans achieved their greatest success, not when they threw their tanks into gunfights with other tanks. they considered that a waste, and they were right. Generally it was their Infantry that led assaults when on the offensive, backed up by towed AT guns that provided the firepower to knock out or at least keep these enemy tank formations busy whilst the germans own tank formations worked the flanks and got into the rear areas. when they achieved success with those tactics, they achieved major breakthroughs....and not a heavy tank, or a breakthrough tank in sight. "Breakthrough or 'assault" tanks was an outmoded concept that dates back to WWI, and even back then was a poor use of armoured resources. the tiger was simply an extension of that outmoded, misuse of armoured assets.

Today it is different. Tanks can be used as a battering ram to knock over enemy armour, provided it has a clear technological advantage. But in 1940-45 that dynamic, as far as i can recall, never arose, at least in a strategic sense. More specifically, Im referring to offensive situations. in defensive situations, a heavy tank was an asset. Tigers, or any heavy tank for that matter, were a liability in an attacking situation, but in a defensive situation they did have their uses. they are still so expensive as to make them a nett waste of time, but nevertheless it was good propaganda to see a single Tiger brew up a whole column of Cromwells or Shermans in the Bocage. The fact that those incidents as an overall element of the campaign are irrelevant seems to be lost so often, but still, you have to give credit when it is due.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 13, 2014)

The concept of the "break through" tank _may_ have been proven to be faulty but it was a concept that most major armies _of the time subscribed to_. 
Part of it's success, or failure, in a given battle/campaign also depends on the _exact_ balance of the armor vs anti-tank capabilities of the forces involved. This _balance_ could swing wildly in just a few months time. 
The Matilda could be considered a "break through tank" and it's heavy armor (The Matilda weighed around 50% more than a contemporary cruiser if not approaching 100% over the early cruisers) came in quite useful in a number of battles when enemy anti-tank guns were of the 37-47mm variety. It's low mobility and poor firepower limited it's overall usefulness but it was rather successful in over running a number of defensive positions in the early NA battles. When _common_ AT guns went to the 75-76mm class it's usefulness was pretty much over. 
BTW dragging your divisional or corp AA guns up to the front lines to use as AT guns is a sure sign of desperation in the AT gun field. It also only works real well if you have air superiority as you have just reduced the air defenses of your rear areas (logistic support). 
If the Germans had stayed with the MK IV or a slightly improved version the British might never had had to field the 17pdr as the 6pdr could certainly take out a MK IV from the side or rear from as far away as it could hit it. 
Russians would have had little or no need to mount 85mm guns on T-34s, KV/IS tanks or develop towed 85mm divisional gun. 
Reverse is true for the Germans, No Matildas, Churchhills and KVs and there is no need to put 88s in the front line and a lot less need for even the Pak75, or as early a need. 

The assault tank was not really intended to attack dug in enemy tanks in mass formations in frontal duels , but rather to attack field fortifications. AND to use it's mobility to attack them from the side or rear when possible rather than stand and slug it out from the front of the bunker. You don't need a lot of mobility to out maneuver a bunker but thick armor on the sides/rear does help survival (but does not guarantee it) when a second hidden bunker opens fire on the tanks flank as it maneuvers to the side of the first bunker. This is one reason that open topped SP guns make lousy assault vehicles no matter how big the gun they mounted. 
The assault tank was limited use/specialized vehicle. It was often misused or more widely issued than intended due to failures or mismatches in gun vs armor capabilities of different armies. British used Valentines (a small breakthrough tank?) in cruiser formations why? Lack of cruisers or existing cruisers had such crappy armor that they needed more armor to get into effective range of the guns the British tanks carried? 
Early Churchills were effective why? Same reason? thicker armor, even with low speed allowed them to get with in effective range of existing armament. 

The Tiger had a number of things wrong with it but trying to carry the 88mm gun, heavy armor and have even _fair_ mobility ( it was faster and more mobile than the Churchill or KV tanks) required a larger heavier tank.


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## parsifal (Sep 13, 2014)

SR

what is that US tank you posted a picture of? Of course its r4ecognizably a Sherman, but the detail is quite different....


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## GrauGeist (Sep 14, 2014)

parsifal said:


> SR
> 
> what is that US tank you posted a picture of? Of course its r4ecognizably a Sherman, but the detail is quite different....


That looks like the M4A3E2 (nicknamed "Jumbo"), armed with either a 75mm or 76mm gun and uparmored.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 14, 2014)

Graugeist is correct. It is the Sherman "Jumbo". The final drives were modified for lower speed to help handle the weight but both power train and suspension were overloaded leading to higher than normal breakdowns. They were built with the 75mm gun because of it's higher HE content than the 76mm shell but a number were re-gunned after arrival in Europe in the hope that the extra armor would allow them to slug it out with the Tiger and Panther.

Americans also built over 4000 Shermans with 105mm howitzers in the turret for infantry support but with "standard" armor. 






I believe the 105 armed Shermans lost the power traverse and rate of fire was rather lower than the 75/76mm armed tanks. Only AT round was a hollow charge 

Perhaps the Tigers greatest value was much like the the Navy's "fleet in being". How much time, money and effort was spent trying to counter or come up with an answer to the Tiger tank? 
For 1350 or so tanks it may have had a disproportionate effect on the design and procurement of tanks and anti-tank weapons in three armies


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## Shortround6 (Sep 14, 2014)

The US and British had designed two tanks earlier to do the same mission as the "Jumbo". 40 ton "Assault" tanks.

The US T-14 was designed with British input 






and 8500 were ordered off the drawing board in 1941/42 but only two were completed for testing. 

The British had also designed their own A33 with different suspensions. 










By the time they were ready the Churchill was performing well enough to do the job. 

Perhaps in hindsight these projects were a waste or diversion of effort but they do show that the major powers were ALL interested in heavier tanks. Existing Technology and logistic support (bridging, recovery vehicles, more fuel trucks, etc) often combined to kill them as practical equipment but the interest was certainly there.


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## parsifal (Sep 14, 2014)

For the US at least, the General Boards priority was standardisation. Introducing new types that deviated from the main types were not accepted, except if there were exceptional reasons for doing so. The British somewhat more reluctantly, followed suit, as did the Canadians, and as a result most effort was given to Sherman production. Ive read that something like 80% of Allied tanks were shermans of one kind or another in the front line, and of these, well over 50% were the 75mm armed variety, because these tanks were the better tank in mass production as far as Infantry support was concerned.

It can be argued that the Sherman was the main tank because that's the tank that the US produced. I don't accept that. The US could have frittered away its production capability in the same way as the germans did and produce a little of everything, with all the attendance maintenance, logistic and breakdown issues that went with that. Instead the US settled on a design, with just enough stretchability to allow them to make it work for the remainder of the duration. And then they turned them out like hotcakes....

The results speak for themselves. Whilst the allies showed interest in other tanks as an R&D exercise mostly as insurance, just in case the Germans, with their love of technology got too far away or too much technological advantage, but the tanks that went into battle in 1944-5 were overwhelmingly built on the principals of numbers, modest performance, reliability, mobility. And these formulae counted far more in the battles that ensured than any theoretical advantages in gun power or protection. inevitably, by emphasising these attributes in the latter stages of the war, and by not insisting on a standardised tank park, the Germans suffered in numbers and reliability, and this, from the second most powerful economy in the world, was fatal to their tank arm 


Having a common tank with only relatively few variations was a war winner. Frittering effort away on tanks like the tiger cost the Germans very dearly, and was not worth the effort wasted on it. If there was one lesson to be learnt from WWI experiences, it has to be that. The fact that the allies also toyed with heavy tank concept arose essentially as an insurance policy. The people that mattered, never allowed that technical interest deviate from what was required to win the war.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 14, 2014)

The US might have frittered away fewer tank crewmen if they had realized that, however good a tank may have been in 1942, it was going to be obsolete in 1945/45. 

The US actually had the production capacity to use on at least one _non-standard_ tank. Or at least was the country in the best position to build more than one type of tank. Granted M4A3E8 was a lot better than a 1942 Sherman M4 but then a 1945 T-34/85 was a lot better than a 1941 T-34 and the Soviets were working on the T-44. 

The Americans built about 73% of the number of MK IVs produced in M3 Grants and Lees alone. 
They also built (but perhaps wisely did not commit to combat in large numbers) about 25,000 M3/M5 Stuarts. add another 4700 M-24s made before August 1945.
Throw in a number of the US "oddballs" that never made it offshore like 250 M23 tanks






with electric transmissions that stayed in the US. Total production of M20 series tanks (including prototypes) up to the end of _May_ 1944 was 301 ?

The Sherman was built in 9 different factories (although not all factories made large numbers) and with 4 major engine types, cast and welded hulls (and a Hybrid hull), different turrets on later models and two different suspension systems so as a "standard" tank it might leave a bit to be desired


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## GrauGeist (Sep 14, 2014)

Don't forget the early M4A1 with riveted lower hull. When one of those took a hit, the rivets flew around the interior like schrapnel.

The one thing that many people overlook about the Sherman, is that U.S. docterine was to support infantry with the M4 and leave the enemy tank engagement to the tank destroyers.

However, it didn't end up like that. But in the end, the Shermans versus German heavy panzers was much like fireants overwhelming a rhinocerous beetle...

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## parsifal (Sep 14, 2014)

Despite the shortcomings of the Sherman, it was still absolutely the right decision not to allow wholesale changes to be made to the basic design. The Allies suffered an overall exchange rate of 4.3 tank losses to each german loss. But the Allies were never seriously troubled by these losses whereas the Germans were gutted by the losses they suffered. It should not have been that way. Germany had a head start on AFV production, had superior designs and the productive capacity to absorb losses up to an exchange rate of about 2:1 but they couldn't even survive when the exchange rate blew out to 4:1. They were on the defensive, which gave them enormous inherent advantages, but they still lost, and badly. the reason for their gut wrenching losses lies in their inability, late war, to appreciate that basic numbers will win you battles (and in terms of favourable loss rates), but quality, if that comes at the price of numbers (which their incessant tampering with production lines certainly did, as did, equally, their mania for ever bigger tanks of greater and greater complexity) will not gain you anything substantial at all. The germans achieved the favourable exchange rates mostly because of the remaining experience in their crews and the vastly superior leadership and teamwork they could call upon. Dupuy has done some pretty exhaustive studies in this. they are experts at determining reasons for performance, and whilst raw ratio comparisons are notoriously rough, they still provide some illumination for discussions like this. At the time of Normandy, the heer enjoyed a qualitative (as in army superiority) advantage over the allies of 2.63, that is, in normal attacking situations, the allies needed 2.63 soldiers, or 2.63 tanks for every 1 heer soldier, or 2.63 tanks for every heer tank. they estimate that Tigers accounted for less than 5% of that advantage. If they did not have tigers, the German advantage would have dropped to 2.50. Dupuy doesn't look at what numbers might do, but Im willing to bet the farm that if these tigers were replaced by roughly 3x Mk IVs, the German advantage would have increased significantly.

Another factor affecting exchange rates (in men) was the effect of airpower. no direct losses really, but airpower has a multiplying effect on your fpf values that can really turn exchange rates around. EG, trapping an entire army on the Seine as it tries to escape....not directly the result of airpower, but airpower made it all possible.


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## parsifal (Sep 14, 2014)

Duplicate, sorry guys.


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## GrauGeist (Sep 14, 2014)

In regards to the PzKfw IV, I partially agree, but pound for pound, the StuG III was perhaps one of the best panzers of the war. Inexpensive, easy maintenance, reliable and proven effective many times over on the battlefield with an impressive success rate.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 15, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Despite the shortcomings of the Sherman, it was still absolutely the right decision not to allow wholesale changes to be made to the basic design.



Actually this is not quite accurate. By the time 1945 rolled around the Shermans had different engines, different turret, different suspension and a different front hull shape. This disregards different armament. Basic hull shape, layout and transmission stayed the same. 

It was pretty much an obsession with numbers that kept the Sherman in production with the above changes, and a refusal to change doctrine/tactics that kept it under armed for so long. They built almost as many Sherman TANKS ( not including SP guns-tank destroyers etc) from 1941-45 as the Germans did tracked chassis from 1936-45 (_including_SP guns-tank destroyers etc) from the MK I to the Tiger II. 
The Sherman had been _intended_ as an exploitation vehicle, Break through was not supposed to be it's job and tank to tank fighting (or AFV to AFV)was _supposed_ to be handled by the tank destroyers and AT guns. The Germans didn't co-operate with US doctrine 
The US built about 10,600 full tracked tank destroyers during the war. 




> The Allies suffered an overall exchange rate of 4.3 tank losses to each german loss. But the Allies were never seriously troubled by these losses whereas the Germans were gutted by the losses they suffered. It should not have been that way. Germany had a head start on AFV production, had superior designs and the productive capacity to absorb losses up to an exchange rate of about 2:1 but they couldn't even survive when the exchange rate blew out to 4:1.



If the Americans were not seriously troubled they would not have been operating tanks in NW Europe with 3-4 man crews instead of full 5 man crews and in some cases the even these reduced numbers were made up of drafted infantrymen and not trained tankers which lowered the effectiveness in combat. Please look at production numbers, the Germans could NOT afford even a 4-5 loss ratio as they did NOT have the production capacity to keep up. Throw in British (roughly 7,000 later Churchills and Cromwells) and Russian production with the American numbers. 




> They were on the defensive, which gave them enormous inherent advantages, but they still lost, and badly. the reason for their gut wrenching losses lies in their inability, late war, to appreciate that basic numbers will win you battles (and in terms of favourable loss rates), but quality, if that comes at the price of numbers (which their incessant tampering with production lines certainly did, as did, equally, their mania for ever bigger tanks of greater and greater complexity) will not gain you anything substantial at all.



I am not sure how much "tampering" went on. There was only one production line for the Tiger and most modifications were minor (until the Tiger II and that is a totally different story). Early Panthers _needed_ tampering with and the 6500 or so Panthers sure did a lot more than the Tigers did in combat just due to numbers let alone any advantages. Early 'responses' ( need for new/modified tanks and AT guns) to the Panther lumped it in with the Tiger as a heavy tank and it wasn't until 1944 that the allies appreciated that it was a new "medium" tank. Panthers were produced in different factories than the MK IV tanks.

The Tiger II and the later monsters fly in the face of experience gained with the Tiger I and Panther. Not so much in actual combat ( but semi-mobile pill box/bunker is a very limited role) but in getting into combat and getting out (mobility both on road and off) and with the experience of being unable to recover broken down tanks due to inadequate numbers of recovery vehicles building even heavier tanks (and with the Tiger II using the same overloaded engine and transmission) certainly did not make sense. 



> they estimate that Tigers accounted for less than 5% of that advantage. If they did not have tigers, the German advantage would have dropped to 2.50. Dupuy doesn't look at what numbers might do, but Im willing to bet the farm that if these tigers were replaced by roughly 3x Mk IVs, the German advantage would have increased significantly.



This rather leaves out the Panthers? It also means you need 3X the crewmen and if not 3X the logistic support perhaps 2X? If many Tigers were abandoned due to lack of fuel will the MK IVs have enough more range (on roads) to reach the fuel dumps? 
Tigers and Panthers sometimes allowed crews to survive when they might not in a MK IV and gain experience. 



> Another factor affecting exchange rates (in men) was the effect of airpower. no direct losses really, but airpower has a multiplying effect on your fpf values that can really turn exchange rates around. EG, trapping an entire army on the Seine as it tries to escape....not directly the result of airpower, but airpower made it all possible.



Quite true but then it matters little if the accompanying tanks are Tigers or MK IVs if air power is blocking/restricting the roads/bridges needed to escape.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 15, 2014)

Trouble is it won't do some of the jobs a MK IV will do. 

It may be 30% (or some such number) cheaper but it carries much less ammo. Lack of rotating turret limits it in _some_ tactical situations. It's ability to support infantry with MG fire is extremely limited meaning it has to use the main gun with it's limited ammo supply more often. A Stug that is being resupplied (re armed) is NOT in combat. 

A Stug is NOT a 1 for 1 replacement for MK IV so if you need 25-30% more Stugs to equal the MK IV in actual combat and not just fill out TOA/TOE what have you gained?


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## GrauGeist (Sep 15, 2014)

However, the Stug filled the gap remarkably well, produced some of the highest kills of any panzer type and remained an extremely dangerous threat to Allied units right up to the final minutes of the war.


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## tomo pauk (Sep 15, 2014)

IMHO, one of the German problems, from mid-war or, is that they don't have a real medium tank. The Pz-IV can be killed by many of Allied guns, on decent combat distances. It reached it's upgrade potential some time in 1942. The Panther, let alone Tiger, cannot be produced in quantities suitable for a country that is in a war with 3 major powers and their allies; Germany must also supply it's allies with tanks.

StuG-III was a fine vehicle IMO, maybe not capable to replace the Pz-IV on 1:1 basis, but way more useful than a heavy ATG with a dedicated prime mover. It is also a far better thing to have than any Pz-III for most of combat situations?


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## Shortround6 (Sep 15, 2014)

The MK IV was still quite useful but is a little slow, a bit short ranged, a bit thin in protection on sides and rear (once you get more than 45 degrees to the side 37 and 2pdr APCBC ammo will penetrate out to around 2000 meters or more). It's gun was quite useful up until the end of the war although it left something to be desired against the bigger Russian tanks. The co-ax MG with with 3000+ rounds of ammo is a big plus over the Stug, so is the 87 rounds of main gun ammo vs the 44-54 rounds in the Stug. 
However the later versions were getting a bit less spritely in performance and the suspension may have been approaching it's limit. 
It's Usefulness in 1944/45 was extended or helped by the _failure_ of the British and Americans to develop better tanks and introduce them in 1944/45 in any real numbers. Perhaps the Russians wouldn't have bothered with the T-34/85 without the the Tiger and Panther being built but the T-34/85 sure shows the MK IV was falling behind. 
Maybe the Germans didn't really _need_ a 45 ton Panther but they needed _something_ that was better than the MK IV. 
The Tiger is a bit of a red herring, at 25 tanks a month at the start of production would 75 more MK IVs a month in the Fall and Winter of 1942 really have changed the German position? 
Germany should have ramped up production of a lot of weapons in 1941-43 while they still had the opportunity. 
I am not sure I quite but the 3 MK IV vs 1 Tiger cost equation either. I know that there are contract costs that show that or claims. 
However can you really build 75 twelve liter 12 cylinder engines for the price of 25 twenty-three liter 12 cylinder engines? 
Can you really build 75 7.5cm Kwk 40 guns for the price of 25 8.8cm Kwk 36 guns?
Maybe the Transmission do equal out? 
you need 3 times the number of machine guns, 3 times the number of radios, 3 times the number of gun sights and vision devices. 
You are not using quite 3 times the steel. 
The Tiger may have been much more labor intensive to build but something seems a bit out of whack. Small scale production is never as cheap as large scale production.


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## redcoat (Sep 15, 2014)

parsifal said:


> The Allies suffered an overall exchange rate of 4.3 tank losses to each german loss.


Do you have a source for that figure.
Thank you.


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## parsifal (Sep 15, 2014)

> Actually this is not quite accurate. By the time 1945 rolled around the Shermans had different engines, different turret, different suspension and a different front hull shape. This disregards different armament. Basic hull shape, layout and transmission stayed the same.



They did the same with hardware like the Spitfire, the B-17, even ships of various classes. It is still far cheaper and more efficient to modify an existing design than finalise a whole new design, set up your mouldings, stamping machines, forges and the like from scratch. the m4, despite its numerous changes, was still using many parts common to the original design at the end of its production run. 



> It was pretty much an obsession with numbers that kept the Sherman in production with the above changes, and a refusal to change doctrine/tactics that kept it under armed for so long. They built almost as many Sherman TANKS ( not including SP guns-tank destroyers etc) from 1941-45 as the Germans did tracked chassis from 1936-45 (_including_SP guns-tank destroyers etc) from the MK I to the Tiger II.



And that says volumes about the german failure. Germany is estimates to have possessed about 37% the productive capacity of the USin 1938, yet in all categories, produced a fraction of that percentage, in all categories 



> The Sherman had been _intended_ as an exploitation vehicle, Break through was not supposed to be it's job and tank to tank fighting (or AFV to AFV)was _supposed_ to be handled by the tank destroyers and AT guns. The Germans didn't co-operate with US doctrine.The US built about 10,600 full tracked tank destroyers during the war.



The whole concept of using Tanks as "breakthrough tanks, or "assault tanks" smacks of a disturbing misunderstanding of the proper usage of tanks in 1944-5. Tanks were not being used successfully in either of those capacities on the western front. Even on the eastern front, there was much more reliance on combined arms, tank infantry teams, in which the lead assault elements were the Infantry, not the tanks. the tanks were providing support, and in this role the 75mm was more than adequate. 

Russians were still using crash through assault tactics, but at great cost in the east, and in these battles, the Tiger excelled when used defensively 




> Please look at production numbers, the Germans could NOT afford even a 4-5 loss ratio as they did NOT have the production capacity to keep up. Throw in British (roughly 7,000 later Churchills and Cromwells) and Russian production with the American numbers.



The US commanded about 40% of the world industrial potential in 1938, the Germans about 18%, the British about 10%, and the Russians about the same. occupied Europe and Italy accounted for about 12% of world Industrial potential, and japan about 6%.... the rest of the world made up the remainder. 1/3 of US industrial potential was diverted to the pacific, and there was virtually no tanks diverted to this TO except obsolete types, or the very end of the war. The US had a clear lead in automotive construction, however the Germans had a five year head start in setting up dedicated war industries.. by my calculation the allies enjoyed a potential advantage over Germany of 48:28....or less than 2:1. and yet, in the field of tank production, they enjoyed advantages of around 5 or 6:1. Some of that disparity arose because of the Germans resistance to standardisation and their fixation on building so called heavy tanks. 

Not finished, but ill have to come back to this later.....


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## parsifal (Sep 15, 2014)

Continuing on....




> The Tiger II and the later monsters fly in the face of experience gained with the Tiger I and Panther. Not so much in actual combat ( but semi-mobile pill box/bunker is a very limited role) but in getting into combat and getting out (mobility both on road and off) and with the experience of being unable to recover broken down tanks due to inadequate numbers of recovery vehicles building even heavier tanks (and with the Tiger II using the same overloaded engine and transmission) certainly did not make sense


.

Tiger II in the attack were never very successful. I think it was during the Ardennes that 45 in an independent Abt crossed the front lines and within a week all 45 had been lost, mostly due to fuel issues and break downs. 45 lost is 105 of the production run, equivalent to 4000 T-34s! 




> This rather leaves out the Panthers? It also means you need 3X the crewmen and if not 3X the logistic support perhaps 2X? If many Tigers were abandoned due to lack of fuel will the MK IVs have enough more range (on roads) to reach the fuel dumps?




With a tiger component you may have 100 tanks in a divisional establishment. There were typically 2500 other vehicles attached to the division. If you had more lighter tanks in the division, you may have 250 or so tanks attached. The extra 150 tanks is insignificant to the overall logistic demands of the division.

But it is far more significant that the tanks made logistic support at the front lines easier, not harder. By far the biggest problem for logistics was that last 5-8km from the front lines. Getting supply or other support from the forward depots to the teeth in the front line was an enormous issue. If you have enemy tanks roaming around in that area, it becomes virtually impossible to do. And having a divisional establishment with only 100 tanks attached, basically means you have 1/3 the chance of containing such enemy penetrations. The issue builds on itself. if you have insufficient tanks to secure your forward areas, your logisitc support decreases, and up goes your breakdown rates. Losses start to climb, this was precisely what the germans found incidentally as they placed all their faith in a limited number of high quality and frightfully expensive AFVs.

The allies did not follow that maxim. they went for the numbers. In open combat they paid a price for that. But because they had numbers in their formations, there never was that situation of the germans running amok in their rear areas.....it happened once or twice in 1942, but not in 1944. If the heavy tank concept had any credibility one would expect these heavy tanks being ablke to effect breakthroughs (that was their role after all) and then the allied logistic network being rolled up as german tanks destroyed the soft skinned support. Never happened, but it happened repeatedly to the germans as the so called "inferior" shermans cut their front lines to pieces 



> Tigers and Panthers sometimes allowed crews to survive when they might not in a MK IV and gain experience.



So too did the mk IIs, IIIs and IVs. During Barbarossa, in the dark days in front of Moscow, confronted with large numbers of T-34s at last, the tank formations suffered casualty rates up to 90% of the force structure. But 90% of the crews escaped, whats more, despite the attrocious weather, the Germans got most of the U/S tanks out and back to the workshops for repair. Soviets lacked the skills to put into effect full breakthroughs so the Germans got away with this on that occasion. later, during operations like Kursk, where the Soviets had learnt the skills needed for deep penetrations, the heavy tanks that had broken down and were far more difficult to recover were generally lost outright. Not sure about the crews, but a crew without a tank is as useful as a tank without a crew.....



> Quite true but then it matters little if the accompanying tanks are Tigers or MK IVs if air power is blocking/restricting the roads/bridges needed to escape./QUOTE]
> 
> Falaise arose for a number of reasons. If there had been more tanks in the german formations, they may have been abale to circumvent the encirclement of the pocket, or effect a breakout. Maybe, maybe not, but virtually anything would have been better than having a few broken down heavy tanks no linger able to contain or parry Allied encirclement operations


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## parsifal (Sep 15, 2014)

redcoat said:


> Do you have a source for that figure.
> Thank you.



no. there are German records for tigers, and then you have some Soviet figures for exchange rates. Somewhere, a long time ago I saw loss rates for Normandy. ive also seen some figures along those lines at the Dupuy website, but I wasn't trying to be super accurate....


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## Shortround6 (Sep 15, 2014)

I believe the majority of the Tigers were in independent battalions under army command and assigned as needed. Only 4 divisions had Tiger companies permanently attached. 

I think this is where we are disagreeing. The Tiger was not _intended_ as a general issue tank. It was conceived and initially built (and 25 per month is a laughably low number) for a special role. This role may have been a bit misguided but it was certainly not out of line with the thinking in American, British, French and Soviet armies at the beginning of the war. All of whom built prototypes of such tanks and in fact ONLY the Americans (due to trans Atlantic shipping problems) failed to field them. 

NONE of these armies were depending on the "assault" tanks to crash through heavy defenses _by themselves_ but they were part of a tank/infantry/artillery team which would open a hole for the modern version of the cavalry (light and medium/cruiser tanks and motor infantry (trucks) to rush through and attack the soft areas. 
In Practice it didn't work much better than the WW I idea of knocking a hole in the line with infantry/artillery to allow the horse cavalry to get into the enemies rear/soft areas.

There may have been a bit of fuzzy thinking going on in a number of armies.

The US tank destroyer doctrine was that the very fast tank destroyers (held at corp or army level) would be able to rush to threatened point/s in the line and get there in time to stop breakthroughs. For some reason they didn't seem to think the enemy would use much the same tactic/method only with somewhat slower standard tanks. 

The British decided to use a _lot_ of little "assault" tanks and call them "infantry" tanks instead of a few big ones. British couldn't move big tanks by rail and the British went for cheap all too often when it came to tanks. AN infantry tank was a shell proof mobile mg nest that could accompany the infantry as it assaulted. Sticking an AT gun in it was a bonus. Cruisers were the modern cavalry to exploit the the Breakthrough. 

French went both ways ( or three ways?) with little/slow two man tanks to accompany the infantry in the assault but armored against 37mm AT guns and small HE shells AND larger Assault tanks with thick armor and a larger HE firing gun. The Cavalry got the third type of tanks (again both small and large) with more speed to exploit the breakthrough and do the actual breakout. 

Russians were in transition but the KV was intended for attacking prepared positions. Not for romping around the enemy rear areas. 

The American M2 medium/heavy was the ultimate mobile MG nest (at least 6 MG operated from inside the tank) but sanity prevailed ( and the ability to learn at least a bit from others war experience) it became the basis for the Grant and SHerman while being replaced by the M6. 




US built 40 of these things and I would note that had the Germans built even half that number they would have seen combat somewhere. The Americans had the advantage/disadvantage of a 3000-6000mile supply line in keeping 'salesmen's samples' out of the front lines. 
The US did try to revive the thing with a new turret and gun




for attacking the Siegfried line but that idea came to nothing. Or should I say that the idea persisted but with other vehicles taking the place of the modified M6s.

Perhaps the concept of the assault tank was faulty but it took until _after_ the war for that view to become widespread. 

The independent Tiger Battalions were used most often as fire brigades to stop Breakthroughs or to perform counter attacks to restore the situation and since there were never enough of them ( or indeed enough regular tanks) they suffered from high mileage/utilization and the associated losses in a fluid situation or retreat. This was nothing new and had been noted by both sides in North Africa. Who ever got contol of the battlefield got to recover the bulk of the knocked out tanks and return them to service. 
_*IF*_ the Germans had succeeded in pushing the Allies out of Normandy we would be reading about the highly reliable Tigers and MK IVs and large numbers of Shermans, Cromwells and Churchills that ran out of gas or broke down in a matter of days. 
Seriously, most WW II tanks had pretty lousy reliability, even some post war tanks had some problems, early M-48s suffered a major or minor breakdown every 68 miles if I recall right. Somebody once claimed that one reason the Russians built so many T-54/55/62s was that with their lousy transmission/clutch/steering system they would suffer 50-60% losses just driving across Europe in 4-5 days _without_ any interference from NATO from blown clutches ( main engine and steering). The steering clutches in the Maltida had a book life of about 600 miles before needing to be relined. Some British tankers were astounded when _a few_ Valentines managed 1500 miles on a single set of tracks in North Africa.

The question was how fast they could be repaired and catch up with their units. If due to the tactical situation the tanks have to be abandoned before repair many countries could suffer major losses. 

Yes the Tiger was probably well below the average but the Germans certainly abandoned quite a few other types.


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## parsifal (Sep 15, 2014)

Even though the tigers were mostly independent battalions, as were the US TDs, they were almost always attached to a division for a particular operation(s). They would rely on that divisions other services, particularly supply and recovery for support during the operation.

US TDs were used in the same way. not always, but often, such attachments could last for months at a time. effectively they were a part of that Division. Ive got the numbers of TD battalions at home, in Stantons book on the US army. They raised rather too many, as a considerable number of formations were broken up and the manpower yielded sent mostly to fight as infantry, but a few were sent to replace losses in the Tank formations, which as the 1944-5 campaign wore on were seen as more important. The US was never able to provide enough fillers to even replace light losses. it was their achilles heel really. And the arm in most need of replacements were the frontline infantry formations. Average casualty rates (killed/wounded/captured, but not returned) was about 1-4000 for the 70 or so divs that saw action in NW ETO. by far the majority of these losses were in the Infantry. Something is nagging the back of my mind that the US was receiving about 20000 fillers per month at that time. If the average loss rate was 3000 per div, for 10 months of fighting, that's roughly 21000 losses per month, or a net loss of about 1000 for the active army each month. its a lot worse than that, most losses were coming out of the 20 or so front line divs doing most of the fighting The arm that lost the most manpower were the numerous AA and CA units that had been raised.

If the germans had been able to increase this leakage of manpower even a little, the US Army would have been in a world of hurt before VE day was reached. what the germans needed to do was be able to stabilise their front and reduce the fighting to a static form of warfare. Tank engagements were irrelevant to that issue. What prevented them from achieving that is complex, but at least part of the issue was that the US was able to stick a lot of pointy nasty things in the direction of the retreating germans and never give their unmotorised formations the opportunity to stabilise until it was way too late. In that context, having bucket loads of adequate, but not outstanding tanks was the right thing to do. the germans should have sat up and taken notice of that, and the people in the position to know certainly advocated such an approach....guderian for one was never a fan of the panther or the tiger, neither was speer, and most thinking german generals were disdainful of their value, given the sacrifices made to secure them. In 1942 when they first appeared, the average cost per unit was simply staggering...about 750000 RM per copy, a Mk IV cost just under 100000 at the same time. by wars end, this unit cost had dropped to just under 330000 but still....what a waste.


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## redcoat (Sep 16, 2014)

parsifal said:


> no. there are German records for tigers, and then you have some Soviet figures for exchange rates. Somewhere, a long time ago I saw loss rates for Normandy. ive also seen some figures along those lines at the Dupuy website, but I wasn't trying to be super accurate....


During the Tunisian Campaign Tiger tanks were credited with more Allied tanks kills than the total number lost from all causes by the Allies during the period in question.
German army intelligence, when trying to get a realistic figure of enemy tanks destroyed, always cut the figure of claimed tank kills by 50 percent.

As for Normandy the only tank loss figures we can rely on to some extent is the number of tanks totally lost by both sides, around 3,000 for the Allies and just over 1,500 for the German's.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 16, 2014)

Just like aircraft, changes in tank production can take one to two years to totally change over or bring a new tank into large scale production. 

Germans main problem was a massive failure to mobilize industry in 1941-42-43. The Germans built about 20-21% more AFV chassis in 1945 (in 4-5 months) than they did in all of 1941 and about 80% in 1945 of their 1942 production. This despite the disruption of the bombing. 

1943 production was 11,600 chassis with Tiger Is making up 649 chassis. swapping the Tigers for 3 times the number of MK IVs means another 1300 MK IV tanks in 1943. And another 1300 or so in 1944. 1944 chassis production was just under 19,000. 

See: German armored fighting vehicle production during World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Would these 2600 additional tanks have really changed the war much? 
And
Germans built 2958 MK IIIs in 1942, 3379 in 43 and 4752 in 44.
Germans built 994 MK IVs in 1942, 3822 in 43 and 6625 in 44.
These are chassis of all types but Germany could have picked up 2600 MK IVs easy by getting large scale production going sooner. 

First contract for the Tiger tank called for 285 tanks to be built from July/Aug of 1942 till May 12th 1943 for the Summer of 1943 offensive? 

Again, hardly a general issue tank.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 16, 2014)

redcoat said:


> During the Tunisian Campaign Tiger tanks were credited with more Allied tanks kills than the total number lost from all causes by the Allies during the period in question.
> German army intelligence, when trying to get a realistic figure of enemy tanks destroyed, always cut the figure of claimed tank kills by 50 percent.
> 
> As for Normandy the only tank loss figures we can rely on to some extent is the number of tanks totally lost by both sides, around 3,000 for the Allies and just over 1,500 for the German's.



and here we get into the same can of worms as with aircraft. Claims vs actual kills and losses from ALL causes vs combat losses. 

what is even worse for tanks is just what was considered a "loss". The US in NW Europe didn't consider a tank a "loss" unless it suffered catastrophic damage or burned. A large fire ruined the heat treatment of the armor making it rather questionable. Many a "knocked out" tank had the crew's bodies removed, the inside cleaned, equipment repaired and shot holes plugged and welded and returned to service. Some tanks were back in service in just a few days. 
Now if the allies suffered 3,000 "total" losses and yet held the battlefield/s and were able to recover/repair a fair number of tanks and the Germans "lost" 1500 tanks but a fair number of lightly damaged/broken down tanks are included in this it rather skews the actual day to day combat results.

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## parsifal (Sep 16, 2014)

Yes, I agree, you need to get to write offs, or lost/captured to get meaningful understanding of numbers. when i say 4.3:1, thats still just an estimate. We know that the germans in battle could usually get a better exchange rate, but overall, their losses were evened out by the attrition they were suffering. it really is hard to know the precise loss rates to be honest, but most objective assessments follow the line that the germans had the advantage in battle, but the allies won in the wider dimensions of the battle....


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## redcoat (Sep 16, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> and here we get into the same can of worms as with aircraft. Claims vs actual kills and losses from ALL causes vs combat losses.


It's a far bigger can with a lot more worms.



> what is even worse for tanks is just what was considered a "loss". The US in NW Europe didn't consider a tank a "loss" unless it suffered catastrophic damage or burned. A large fire ruined the heat treatment of the armor making it rather questionable. Many a "knocked out" tank had the crew's bodies removed, the inside cleaned, equipment repaired and shot holes plugged and welded and returned to service. Some tanks were back in service in just a few days.


The German's used almost exactly the same classification, they only counted tank losses where the tank was totally destroyed/lost or had to be sent back to Germany for a complete re-build.
The Western nation we have the greatest difficulty with for tank losses is Britain, there is no easy way to work out the number of tanks totally destroyed as the figures most easily available are for tanks out of service at the end of the day, which until recently has been the most common basis for working out British tank losses. This has lead to situations like during Operation Goodwood where British tank losses are often reported as being around 500, but if we use the German method of counting losses the figure falls to just over 150, against admitted German tank losses in the battle of 75-100 (The 100 includes tank destroyers). 


> Now if the allies suffered 3,000 "total" losses and yet held the battlefield/s and were able to recover/repair a fair number of tanks and the Germans "lost" 1500 tanks but a fair number of lightly damaged/broken down tanks are included in this it rather skews the actual day to day combat results.


The 3000 and 1500 are the figures for tanks totally lost (unrepairable/captured).


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