# WWII air war myths



## Oreo (Jul 25, 2012)

Let's talk about the myths. Let's just list them. Let's just put them all right out there and toss them on the bonfire. 

1. The AVG (Flying Tigers) were in combat before Pearl Harbor was attacked. "Ha!"  Thanks for nothing, John Wayne.

2. A P-38 shot down an Fw 200C near Iceland within hours (or minutes) of the U.S. declaration of war. Not.

3. An A6M2 Zero was markedly faster than a P-40.  

4. Colin Kelly died in a suicide attack on a Japanese ship. Nope.

Somebody else take over.


----------



## stona (Jul 25, 2012)

1 During the Battle of Britain Hurricanes attacked bombers whilst Spitfires engaged the escorting fighters.

2 The "Big Wing" worked

3 Kenneth Moore (along with Trevor Howard,Michael Caine et alter) saved our bacon (from Hardy Kruger et alter) on land sea and in the air.

4 Douglas Bader was forced to abandon his aircraft after a mid air collision. Von Werra tried that one as well. 

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Edgar Brooks (Jul 25, 2012)

1/. The Spitfire I could easily turn inside the 109E; there wasn't, in fact, much to choose, but RAF pilots felt safer, due to the Spitfire's benign stall warning.
2/. The first "casualty" of German raids was a Scottish rabbit (origin of the Flanagan Allen song "Run, rabbit, run.") Propaganda ruled, even then.
3/. "Who do you think, you are kidding, Mr. Hitler?" was a wartime song; it was written specially for the series "Dad's Army."
4/. Fighter Command was only saved by the Luftwaffe turning on London; Germany never came close to winning, in fact they only forced the closure of one airfield, for 24 hours.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 25, 2012)

1. The sacrifice of the TBDs at Midway cleared the air of the A6M CAP permitting the SBD's to sink 4 carriers (or at least 3 of the 4 if some aspect of the historical record is preserved in its telling).
2. AVG P-40Bs typically fought IJN A6Ms.
3. B-17s were good for antishipping. (debunked long ago but perhaps persistent)
4. P-39 was only useful in a ground attack role.
5. The Spitfire won the battle of Britain.


----------



## CobberKane (Jul 25, 2012)

1) For a time Malta was defended solely by three Gloster Gladiators; Hope, Faith and Charity
2) The Grumman Hellcat was specifically designed to be a 'Zero Killer'
3) The USAAF bombing campaign destroyed German industry
4) The P-38 Lightning was a decent fighter (just kidding, everyone...)


----------



## CobberKane (Jul 25, 2012)

...One other thing - for an ignorant Kiwi/Aussie could we have some explanation?
1) Oldcrow63, how come the B17 was no good in the anti shipping role when the Condor was the scourge of the Atlantic? And didn't the TBD's draw the Zeros down low and Give the SBDs a free shot at Midway, or did you mean the myth was that their 'sacrifice' was a deliberate ploy rather than happenstance? 
2) Stona, why was the BoB less strategically important than is commonly stated?
3) Oreo, what really happened with the P-38 and the Condor - although I have no problem believing a P-38 failed to shoot down even such a large, slow moving target. All right, I'll stop now...


----------



## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 25, 2012)

CobberKane said:


> ...One other thing - for an ignorant Kiwi/Aussie could we have some explanation?
> 1) Oldcrow63, how come the B17 was no good in the anti shipping role when the Condor was the scourge of the Atlantic? And didn't the TBD's draw the Zeros down low and Give the SBDs a free shot at Midway, or did you mean the myth was that their 'sacrifice' was a deliberate ploy rather than happenstance?



Ahhhh! glad you asked! 

B-17? Good question. I supose an unwarranted reliance on the Norden in a role for which it wasn't designed may have contributed. Don't know otherwise. 

TBD's at Midway:

1. Mainly one VT squadron should get the lions share of any credit due and that one is VT-3. Of the other two, one arrived almost 45 minutes ahead of the SBDs and the other about 20 minutes or so ahead, and so neither could have prevented the A6M's from regaining altitude to contest the approach of the SBDs. VT-3 did have escorts and the epic furr ball that developed around Thach and company was probably far more effective in diverting the CAP.
2. the very legitimate sacrifice, for which the TBDs rarely receive credit, was keeping the IJN carriers manuevering to avoid them. Without being able to consistently point into the wind, the carriers launch and recovery ops were limited. 
3. Whether they got a free pass or not, the SBDs virtually always got through to hit their targets. A6M's were just not very effective on high altitude CAP without RADAR direction which as I understand it, never really evolved to a great extent during the war.

4. Consider the PM assault on the Hiryu as the test case. Hiryu was well defended by two dozen A6M's at altitude and the unescorted 24 SBDs got through to plant 4 hits on the flight deck and some damaging near misses I believe although Shatteered Sword and First team gives the best accounts. Wally Short's tactics (arcing around (BVR) unseen to attack from up-sun) evidently overcame the defender's efforts


----------



## Njaco (Jul 25, 2012)

> 1 During the Battle of Britain Hurricanes attacked bombers whilst Spitfires engaged the escorting fighters.



That WAS the general order given by Dowding although it wasn't always adhered to.



> 4/. Fighter Command was only saved by the Luftwaffe turning on London; Germany never came close to winning, in fact they only forced the closure of one airfield, for 24 hours.



This needs a much deeper response than can be given here but...
1) The week before the switch to London on 7 Sept was known as "The Bad Weekend" where Goering concentrated his forces on the airfields. While it may be true that airfields were never really out of commission for more than 24, they were extremely hard pressed to continue operation. Biggin Hill was so badly bombed that weekend, that if it wasn't for the switch to London and the LW attacking non-essential sector airfields, they would have been kaput. Several other airfields were also in the same predicament. The switch to London did give the RAF a breather to recover and continue the fight.


----------



## timmy (Jul 25, 2012)

The P40 was a terrible fighter


----------



## Thorlifter (Jul 25, 2012)

1. The P-38 was called "The Fork Tailed Devil" by the Germans
2. The F4U was called "Whistling Death" by the Japanese
3. The P-51 was better at anything than the F4U. Ok, this one is just my opinion! hahahaha


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 25, 2012)

30% of what Martin Cadin wrote......


----------



## ToughOmbre (Jul 25, 2012)

We've had other threads on this myth, and it's one of the biggest.....

The Tuskegee Airmen, 332nd Fighter Group never lost a bomber on any mission that they flew as escorts. 

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## renrich (Jul 25, 2012)

The biggest myth of all!
The "winning" of the BOB by the RAF prevented Germany fron executing Sea Lion and invading England.
Another myth-The RN "taught" the USN how to operate Corsairs from carriers.
The IJN flight decks were full of strike planes when the SBDs struck at Midway.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## A4K (Jul 25, 2012)

Old ones that persist in various books and opinions:

1. Britain was doomed until the US entered the war.
2. Pearl Harbour was a complete surprise attack.
3. The Mustang was nothing till fitted with a Merlin engine.
4. The A-bomb won the war
5. 'German' means 'Nazi'

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Timppa (Jul 25, 2012)

From Wikipedia (Yak-3):
Luftwaffe issued an order to "avoid combat with Yak fighters without an oil cooler under the nose and with an inclined aerial mast below 5000 m".


----------



## stona (Jul 25, 2012)

CobberKane said:


> 2) Stona, why was the BoB less strategically important than is commonly stated?



I never meant to imply that. I was being facetious about the same actors in post war movies winning the war,over and over again,against the same stock adversaries 

Cheers

Steve


----------



## stona (Jul 25, 2012)

Njaco said:


> That WAS the general order given by Dowding although it wasn't always adhered to.



Yes,but it's a myth since Fighter Command simply did not operate that way. 
Squadrons were tasked to intercept raids depending on their state of readiness and geographical position. Whether they flew Spitfires or Hurricanes was not a consideration,nor was the make up of the raid.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## stona (Jul 25, 2012)

Edgar Brooks said:


> 1/. The Spitfire I could easily turn inside the 109E; there wasn't, in fact, much to choose, but RAF pilots felt safer, due to the Spitfire's benign stall warning.



Edgar I'm surprised at you 

The "Me. 109 [sic] Handling and Manoeuvrability Tests" carried out by the RAE in September 1940 first calculated.

"The minimum radius of turn without height loss at 12,000 ft., full throttle, is calculated as 885 ft. on the Me. 109 compared with 696 ft. on the Spitfire."

Later in the report the results of mock dogfights are reported with this conclusion.

"When the Me.109 was following the Hurricane or Spitfire, it was found that our aircraft turned inside the Me.109 without difficulty when flown by determined pilots who were not afraid to pull their aircraft round hard in a tight turn. In a surprisingly large number of cases, however, the Me. 109 succeeded in keeping on the tail of the Spitfire or Hurricane during these turning tests, _merely because our Pilots would not tighten up the turn suficiently from fear of stalling and spinning._"

Italics in original.

The Spitfire Mk I could easily out turn the Bf 109 E as long as the pilot was confident and capable of pushing the Spitfire close to its limits.
I suspect a few cannon shells whizzing by would encourage even the meekest pilot to tighten his turn.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Njaco (Jul 25, 2012)

stona said:


> Yes,but it's a myth since Fighter Command simply did not operate that way.
> Squadrons were tasked to intercept raids depending on their state of readiness and geographical position. Whether they flew Spitfires or Hurricanes was not a consideration,nor was the make up of the raid.
> 
> Cheers
> ...



I can agree somewhat but when both types had prepared and were ready, for the most part Dowding did want the Hurris after the bombers and the Spits after the escorts. But you are correct that state of readiness and deployment did not always afford them that luxury.


----------



## VBF-13 (Jul 25, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> 2. the very legitimate sacrifice, for which the TBDs rarely receive credit, was keeping the IJN carriers manuevering to avoid them. Without being able to consistently point into the wind, the carriers launch and recovery ops were limited.


Good point. One doesn't think of it until one gets one's head out of the clouds and right down there on the water on those carriers.


----------



## Rogi (Jul 25, 2012)

1. Chuck Norris flew a Spitfire.

It is well known fact that Chuck flew a Hurricane.....

Ok kidding aside, 

1. The Tuskegee airman never lost a bomber while they escorted them. 

its a well known "myth" of WW2, they did lose bombers while on escorting duties. 

2. (this is most likely the most disputed) Admiral Yamamoto called off the final wave of the Pearl Harbor attack because he felt "sorry" for the US's losses in the attack. (again down to a movie quote  Tora! Tora! Tora!)

He did call it off, but it was mostly due to the fact that he was cautious, they hadn't hit their intended targets (the US carriers) and I beleive that he wanted to catch them out at sea with a ready wave to attack if the opportunity presented itself.


----------



## stona (Jul 25, 2012)

Njaco said:


> I can agree somewhat but when both types had prepared and were ready, for the most part Dowding did want the Hurris after the bombers and the Spits after the escorts. But you are correct that state of readiness and deployment did not always afford them that luxury.



Dowding may well have done but it was Park and his staff who bore the brunt of the battle and they did what they had to do.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## ToughOmbre (Jul 25, 2012)

Rogi said:


> 2. (this is most likely the most disputed) Admiral Yamamoto called off the final wave of the Pearl Harbor attack because he felt "sorry" for the US's losses in the attack. (again down to a movie quote  Tora! Tora! Tora!)
> 
> He did call it off, but it was mostly due to the fact that he was cautious, they hadn't hit their intended targets (the US carriers) and I beleive that he wanted to catch them out at sea with a ready wave to attack if the opportunity presented itself.



It was Nagumo, not Yamamoto, that decided not to employ a third wave against Pearl. Since he did not know where the American Carriers were, he thought it prudent to err to the side of caution and bring his carriers home intact.

Steve


----------



## ToughOmbre (Jul 25, 2012)

A4K said:


> Old ones that persist in various books and opinions:
> 
> 1. Britain was doomed until the US entered the war.
> 2. Pearl Harbour was a complete surprise attack.
> ...



The attack on Pearl WAS a complete surprise. The myth relating to Pearl Harbor is that FDR found out before hand (God knows how he could have done that) and "let" the Japanese attack us. The conspiracy theorists like to say that we broke their code and listened in on the Japanese plans for the attack. 

Did the US know we were on a collision course with Japan and would probably go to war eventually? Yes. Did we break their diplomatic code? Yes. Did we miss-interpret the radar sightings and the Ward's report of sinking a sub in the restricted zone? Yes again.

Complete surprise? IMHO, yes.

Steve


----------



## boeing299 (Jul 25, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> 30% of what Martin Cadin wrote......


 
I'm curious about how to interpret that. I've always been a Martin Caiden fan, but would like to hear someone elses opinion.


----------



## Thorlifter (Jul 25, 2012)

Another one.....that the B-17 and P-51 "single handed" won the ETO. A major role, yes. Single handed, uh, no.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 25, 2012)

boeing299 said:


> I'm curious about how to interpret that. I've always been a Martin Caiden fan, but would like to hear someone elses opinion.


"The Forked Tailed Devil," his B-40 story and "F-38s" in Korea at the start of the Korean War, all false - for example


----------



## A4K (Jul 25, 2012)

ToughOmbre said:


> . The conspiracy theorists like to say that we broke their code and listened in on the Japanese plans for the attack.
> Complete surprise? IMHO, yes. Steve



I disagree but it dosen't matter. The British had given a version of 'the bomb' (the machine that could crack the Enigma codes) to the US, as the Japanese were using a version of Enigma aswell.

Evan


----------



## Rogi (Jul 25, 2012)

ToughOmbre said:


> The attack on Pearl WAS a complete surprise. The myth relating to Pearl Harbor is that FDR found out before hand (God knows how he could have done that) and "let" the Japanese attack us. The conspiracy theorists like to say that we broke their code and listened in on the Japanese plans for the attack.
> 
> Did the US know we were on a collision course with Japan and would probably go to war eventually? Yes. Did we break their diplomatic code? Yes. Did we miss-interpret the radar sightings and the Ward's report of sinking a sub in the restricted zone? Yes again.
> 
> ...




There are just too many "Complete" Suprises for it to be a coincidence. Plus the whole fact that the nation didn't want to go to war in the first place, it needed something to push it into conflict. It was known as "Europes" war, so why should they of butted into it? 

They had many warnings leading up to the conflict, if they had acted for example and declared War on Japan before the event, no one would of been as receptive to a full blown war, the US barely entered WW1, entering in 1917 (they declared war in 1914, but thats like Montenegro declaring war on Japan, it doesn't mean anything unless you commit your troops and the US didn't commit any till 17)? When the conflict was nearly over. Its like coming into the World cup in the last minute and scoring in the final, after your beating your opponent by 6-1, ya you did your part but it wasn't all that much of a impact to the final outcome. 

We could theorize to why they wouldn't want to be involved in the conflict, but entering the conflict would of meant more financial gain for the country than staying neutral and letting it ride out the war.


----------



## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 25, 2012)

timmy said:


> The P40 was a terrible fighter



Terrible seems a really harsh judgement suggesting it had no redeeming value. It apparently proved very early on to be an awe-fully good fighter bomber and ground support aircraft. With decent tactics it was able to come back a bit from a horrible first inning as an air to air fighter. For all its shortcomings, it soldiered on. Could be an overstatement but my impression is that by the time the PI campaign ended in spring 42 the P-40 had accounted for about as many IJN ships sunk or damaged as the USN SBD. Is my soft-spot for the venerable P-40 showing or that just the one on the top of my head?


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 25, 2012)

A4K said:


> I disagree but it dosen't matter. The British had given a version of 'the bomb' (the machine that could crack the Enigma codes) to the US, as the Japanese were using a version of Enigma aswell.
> 
> Evan





Rogi said:


> There are just too many "Complete" Suprises for it to be a coincidence. Plus the whole fact that the nation didn't want to go to war in the first place, it needed something to push it into conflict. It was known as "Europes" war, so why should they of butted into it?
> 
> They had many warnings leading up to the conflict, if they had acted for example and declared War on Japan before the event, no one would of been as receptive to a full blown war, the US barely entered WW1, entering in 1917? When the conflict was nearly over. Its like coming into the World cup in the last minute and scoring in the final, after your beating your opponent by 6-1, ya you did your part but it wasn't all that much of a impact to the final outcome.
> 
> We could theorize to why they wouldn't want to be involved in the conflict, but entering the conflict would of meant more financial gain for the country than staying neutral and letting it ride out the war.


The only codes the US broke prior to Pearl Harbor were Japanese Diplomatic codes. My ex's grandfather was a cryptographer stationed in the PI at the start of the war and wrote about this in great detail


----------



## tyrodtom (Jul 25, 2012)

Rogi said:


> 1. Chuck Norris flew a Spitfire.
> 
> It is well known fact that Chuck flew a Hurricane.....
> 
> ...



Though Yamamoto planned the Pearl Harbor attack, he was the Combined Fleet CiC, not the on scene commander, that was Vice Admiral Nagumo, and a 3 strike was never in the origional plan to call off. Some of the commanders in the first strikes pushed for a 3 rd strike, after the successes of the first 2 waves. But Nagumo knew by the time a 3rd strike was launced and returned, it would be well after dark. With other missions to perform while sailing back to Japan, he didn't want to lose more of his aircraft to night time carrier landings.


----------



## A4K (Jul 25, 2012)

Cheers Joe, I stand corrected then. 

Who was using the bomb then, and why didn't they let Pearl know? The goal was to interpret IJN messages AFAIK. (Maybe an example of Churchill's Coventry sacrifice, to not alert the Germans that their codes were being read?)


----------



## Rogi (Jul 25, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> The only codes the US broke prior to Pearl Harbor were Japanese Diplomatic codes. My ex's grandfather was a cryptographer stationed in the PI at the start of the war and wrote about this in great detail



They did sink that sub....*shrugs I wasn't saying anything about the codes  just the suprises !  

I remember when they had that whole "Russian" military aircraft scare a couple years ago, 2 pilots flew below the alt. restrictions and had their aircraft painted in Russian markings and everyone thought it was a Russian Invasion (They were taping for some movie). If I find the article I'll post it, found it funny and sad at the same time. Especially since the two were trainers. The Pilot was a real idiot :S I beleive he got some jail time for the crime

Edit: There found it, he was buzzing the Santa Monica Pier. 
If I find the one where they go "there are Russian jets invading" in the phone call, I'll post it, but its been a while since I found the vid  

Video Captures Military Jet Buzzing Santa Monica Pier - ktla.com


----------



## fastmongrel (Jul 25, 2012)

(1) The Hurricane was made of wood = It had some wood formers in the fuselage but they werent structral

(2) Churchill sacrificed Coventry to keep the secret of Ultra = The British knew a large raid was coming but didnt know where or when it would hit they expected it to be Liverpool. Even if they knew Coventry was the target what were they supposed to do at short notice put Coventry on wheels and move it. The LW didnt send target information via enigma they used the telex system so the secret of Ultra couldnt have been compromised.

(3) If Hitler hadnt insisted the 262 become a bomber Germany would have won the air war = Maybe if the LW had got the 262 in 1940 or 41 I could believe it but late 43 or 44 is waaaaay too late


----------



## muscogeemike (Jul 25, 2012)

What about:
1. The Flying Fortress was named due to its defensive firepower
2. The Brewster Buffalo and the Bell P-39 series were failures
3. The US entered the war flying obsolete aircraft, and the US Army Air Corps or the US Air Force fought the war rather then the US ARMY Air Force
4. The Japanese always greatly outnumbered the USMC in the Pacific
5. The China Air Task Force and the 14th AF were “Flying Tigers” 
6. The AVG was opposed by “Zeros” and other aircraft superior to the P-40
7. The US won the Pacific War alone
8. Russia (the USSR) only survived due to US lend lease and that their war fighting equipment was “crude” and inferior to the West.
9. The Italians, as a whole, were not fighters
10. The French should be more appreciative of the US for freeing them from the Nazi’s, forgetting that without the French there probably would not be a US.
11. Maybe not a myth but that the war against Japan had huge racial overtones.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 25, 2012)

A4K said:


> Cheers Joe, I stand corrected then.
> 
> Who was using the bomb then, and why didn't they let Pearl know? The goal was to interpret IJN messages AFAIK. (Maybe an example of Churchill's Coventry sacrifice, to not alert the Germans that their codes were being read?)


 All that was known was "somethng" was going to happen but no one knew when or where. The ex's grandfather thought the whole attack would be against the PI.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 25, 2012)

Rogi said:


> They did sink that sub....*shrugs I wasn't saying anything about the codes  just the suprises !
> 
> I remember when they had that whole "Russian" military aircraft scare a couple years ago, 2 pilots flew below the alt. restrictions and had their aircraft painted in Russian markings and everyone thought it was a Russian Invasion (They were taping for some movie). If I find the article I'll post it, found it funny and sad at the same time. Especially since the two were trainers. The Pilot was a real idiot :S I beleive he got some jail time for the crime
> 
> ...



I know this incident well and know both pilots involved. Can't comment much at this time but I don't remember much being said about a "Russian Invasion." All that was reposted was "military planes" were buzzing Santa Monica pier

http://www.aviationcriminal.com/riggs/


----------



## stona (Jul 25, 2012)

What's this nonsense about a US "Bombe".
The wiring diagrams and plans of the British Bombes were handed to the Americans at Bletchley Park in July 1942.
The first US built Bombe was tested in May 1943.
A bit late for Pearl Harbour I think you'll agree.

It is true that the British were circumspect about handing over data from their code breaking exercises,nervous of alerting the Germans to the failiure of their codes. This did not prevent cooperation with the Americans. A US officer who visited Bletchley Park in February 1941 later wrote.

"There was complete cooperation. We went everywhere, including Hut 6. We watched the entire operation and had all the techniques explained in great detail. We were thoroughly briefed on the latest techniques in the solution of Enigma and the operations of the bombes. We had ample opportunity to take as many notes as we wanted and to watch first hand all operations involved."

That doesn't fit in with the Churchillian conspiracy theories at all.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## A4K (Jul 25, 2012)

Cheers Joe, would have been interesting yarning with him me thinks...

Steve, I'll take your word on the dates, but am sure I'd read earlier. (Trouble is I'm a visual person, only important dates and numbers remain in the grey matter )

Personally I think an excuse was sought to enter the war anyway, but that's just my feeling on it.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 25, 2012)

A4K said:


> Cheers Joe, would have been interesting yarning with him me thinks...
> 
> Personally I think an excuse was sought to enter the war anyway, but that's just my feeling on it.



Oh it was - and Hitler gave up the "real" excuse the next day!


----------



## tyrodtom (Jul 25, 2012)

muscogeemike said:


> What about:
> 1. The Flying Fortress was named due to its defensive firepower
> 2. The Brewster Buffalo and the Bell P-39 series were failures
> 3. The US entered the war flying obsolete aircraft, and the US Army Air Corps or the US Air Force fought the war rather then the US ARMY Air Force
> ...



That #10 has always puzzled me, we sacrificed America lives for France to be free, but when it comes to them supporting our decisions or policies we don't seem to want to extend to them the freedom to make up their own minds.


----------



## stona (Jul 25, 2012)

muscogeemike said:


> 11. Maybe not a myth but that the war against Japan had huge racial overtones.



A quick look at US propaganda would suggest that that is no myth. The dehumanising of your enemy is quite normal in wartime and when that enemy is of a different race it is easy to use that in your propaganda. The Japanese did the same.

It was Laurens van der Post who wrote that in denying another man's humanity you diminish your own.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 25, 2012)

Folks, let's try to keep this "non-politial"


----------



## A4K (Jul 25, 2012)

Great author (and personality I supect) Laurens van der Post...


----------



## krieghund (Jul 25, 2012)

Edgar Brooks said:


> 1/. The Spitfire I could easily turn inside the 109E; there wasn't, in fact, much to choose, but RAF pilots felt safer, due to the Spitfire's benign stall warning.



I think the Bf109 has the better accelerated stall characteristics as quoted in " FIGHTER COMBAT COMPARISON No.2: Bf109E-3 vs Spitfire MkI " but if the Spitfire is pulling its max instantaneous 'g' at a given airspeed the Bf-109 has to pull more 'g' to turn inside of it..not going happen.

More importantly is the question of which aircraft could pull more 'g' at a given airspeed and which one pisses more airspeed away in doing so. The one that has the greater "Specific Excess Power (SEP)" has the advantage.


----------



## stona (Jul 25, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Folks, let's try to keep this "non-politial"



What's political about that?

Cheers
Steve


----------



## stona (Jul 25, 2012)

krieghund said:


> More importantly is the question of which aircraft could pull more 'g' at a given airspeed and which one pisses more airspeed away in doing so. The one that has the greater "Specific Excess Power (SEP)" has the advantage.



Most important is which aircraft could out turn (or otherwise out manoeuvre) an opponent when caught at a disadvantage in a real combat situation. In the RAE tests,

"The Spitfires and Hurricanes could follow the Me.109 round during the stalled turns without themselves showing any signs of stalling."

A British test pilot,flying the Bf 109 reported.

"From all this dog-fighting I am certain that if the pilot of a Hurricane or Spitfire finds himself attacked by a Me.109 he can easily out-turn it, and can lose it straight away by doing any violent manoeuvre; the Me.109 just cannot be made to do a really quick manoeuvre because at high speeds the controls are much too heavy, and at low speeds the slats come out, causing the ailerons to snatch, followed by the aircraft stalling if the manoeuvre is done more rapidly. "

Now obviously this is not empirical data but one fighter pilots opinion. He does however have the advantage of having flown both aircraft.

Steve


----------



## ToughOmbre (Jul 25, 2012)

Rogi said:


> There are just too many "Complete" Suprises for it to be a coincidence. Plus the whole fact that the nation didn't want to go to war in the first place, it needed something to push it into conflict. It was known as "Europes" war, so why should they of butted into it?



We would have that push eventually in the ETO. We were already in a shooting war with German U-boats two months prior to December 7th. The USS Kearny (DD-432) was torpedoed (not sunk) with the loss of 11 sailors on October 17th. The USS Reuben James (DD-245) was sunk on October 31st with the loss of 115 sailors. We had Hitler on our mind, not Japan.



Rogi said:


> They had many warnings leading up to the conflict, if they had acted for example and declared War on Japan before the event, no one would of been as receptive to a full blown war, the US barely entered WW1, entering in 1917 (they declared war in 1914, but thats like Montenegro declaring war on Japan, it doesn't mean anything unless you commit your troops and the US didn't commit any till 17)?



We actually declared war on April 6, 1917. First American troops in combat was spring 1918.

From Wiki.....

*Impact of US forces on the war*

On the battlefields of France in spring 1918, the fresh American troops were enthusiastically welcomed by the war-weary Allied armies in the summer of 1918. They arrived at the rate of 10,000 a day, at a time that the Germans were unable to replace their losses. After the Allies turned back the powerful final German offensive (Spring Offensive), the Americans played a central role in the Allied final offensive (Hundred Days Offensive).

In a little over 6 months of combat Americans lost 117,000 killed, 206,000 wounded. I wouldn't call that "barely" entering the war.

Steve


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jul 25, 2012)

stona said:


> What's political about that?
> 
> Cheers
> Steve



Nothing YET but I have seen discussions like this turn into pissing contests so please don't second guess my comments, it will piss me off!!!!!!!!!!


----------



## stona (Jul 25, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Nothing YET but I have seen discussions like this turn into pissing contests so please don't second guess my comments, it will piss me off!!!!!!!!!!



Fair enough,I was only stating a widely accepted historical fact.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## evangilder (Jul 25, 2012)

Rogi said:


> They did sink that sub....*shrugs I wasn't saying anything about the codes  just the suprises !
> 
> I remember when they had that whole "Russian" military aircraft scare a couple years ago, 2 pilots flew below the alt. restrictions and had their aircraft painted in Russian markings and everyone thought it was a Russian Invasion (They were taping for some movie). If I find the article I'll post it, found it funny and sad at the same time. Especially since the two were trainers. The Pilot was a real idiot :S I beleive he got some jail time for the crime
> 
> ...



Don't get me started on the Santa Monica incident. That jackass is responsible for the deaths of four people. A convicted felon, con artist and a reckless individual who will take everything he can away from his victims. There is a whole lot going on with that.


----------



## JoeB (Jul 25, 2012)

The above is a mixture IMO of:

1. genuine myths
2. wrong statements against 'myths' that are actually true or mainly true.
3. opinionated statements in opposition to other opinions where there's no actual myth factually speaking
4. statements which set up straw men of 'myths' which aren't common beliefs among minimally well informed people.

An exampe of 2 is 'myth' PH attack was a surprise. There's no evidence it wasn't a surprise in the immediate tactical sense of morning of Dec 7. An imminent war with Japan v. the Anglo-Americans in SEA was no surprise by a few days before, but an attack on US territory proper, was, at the time. In hindsight that might seem irresponsible, but hindsight needs to be factored out.

Pre war code breaking v Japan had nothing to do with Enigma. The US had read both Japanese diplomatic and naval codes, but off and on, as was generally the case with codebreaking, v the Germans as well. All types of communications read at various times were not read all the time, as stuff like code settings within a given encryption system were reset, or plain language codewords for various things within the encrypted messages were changed. It took some time to get back to fully reading and understanding, and late 1941 was such a 'dark period' wrt Japanese naval codes. Anyway there's no evidence the Japanese made radio transmissions which would have given direct warning of the specifics of the PH attack. The Mobile Force itself followed strict radio silence. It was ominous that the force's transmissions (known by the by idosyncrasies of particular transmitters or operators aboard the various ships even when the message couldn't be read) disappeared in November, but that wasn't conclusive evidence that the force would attack PH, rather than support operations elsewhere.

In case 3 USAAF bombing v German industrial targets was eventually devastating, so 'B-17/[B-24] destroyed German industry' is a matter of opinion and degree (assuming leaving out the B-24 isn't supposed to be the 'myth'). Wholly destroyed German industry in a timely way, eliminating the need for major land campaigns? obviously not; did so by themselves?, also not; but the wholly contrary statement 'USAAF HB's didn't destroy a lot of German industry, particularly in 1944' would be factually false.

An example of 4, 'Britain doomed in WWII till US entered'. Who actually says that? Britain might eventually have been doomed if Hitler never attacked the USSR, *and* the US never got involved in the war, but it's a very low threshold of historical knowledge to know that the Germans had a potentially big problem on the Eastern Front by December 1941, not having knocked the Soviets out by then, that they didn't have prior to June 1941 when facing basically only the British Empire. It's very debateable anything the British did or could do by themselves, without the Soviets *or* the US (especially extending that to no semi belligerent help like Lend Lease), would ever have defeated Germany. So, it could eventually have ended up in a German victory, in a longer war (perhaps on and off over a long period, like the French Revolutionary/Napoleonic Wars).

Joe


----------



## Njaco (Jul 25, 2012)

> Originally Posted by Rogi
> They had many warnings leading up to the conflict, if they had acted for example and declared War on Japan before the event, no one would of been as receptive to a full blown war, the US barely entered WW1, entering in 1917 (they declared war in 1914, but thats like Montenegro declaring war on Japan, it doesn't mean anything unless you commit your troops and the US didn't commit any till 17)?
> *
> We actually declared war on April 6, 1917. First American troops in combat was spring 1918.*



Thanks Steve because that was the first time I had ever heard of that. 1914????


----------



## Edgar Brooks (Jul 25, 2012)

A4K said:


> I disagree but it dosen't matter. The British had given a version of 'the bomb' (the machine that could crack the Enigma codes) to the US, as the Japanese were using a version of Enigma aswell.


No, we hadn't; the U.S. had devised their own machine, called "Purple," which concentrated on Japanese codes. They brought one here, but the gift wasn't reciprocated, largely because we only had six, and they were working flat out, so one couldn't be spared. American Intelligence was not happy (to put it mildly) to be refused, and the situation didn't change until 1942, when the first true machines, called "Adam" "Eve," were built in Dayton, to Alan Turing's design.


----------



## Edgar Brooks (Jul 25, 2012)

A4K said:


> Who was using the bomb then, and why didn't they let Pearl know? The goal was to interpret IJN messages AFAIK. (Maybe an example of Churchill's Coventry sacrifice, to not alert the Germans that their codes were being read?)


Another load of twaddle (where the Hell are you getting this tosh?) We knew that a town, in the Midlands, was to be a target, but the Germans always used codenames, so it was not known which one it was, or exactly when, and it was assumed (wrongly) that it would be West Bromwich, where the Spitfire factory was centred. When the raids started, Churchill was on his way to the country residence of Chequers, but immediately turned round, and returned to London, to try to coordinate the emergency services, hardly the action of a hard-nosed politician, delighted to allow his countrymen and women to die. You do yourself no favours by repeating this ing lie.


----------



## ToughOmbre (Jul 25, 2012)

One more piece of evidence that disproves the notion, IMO, that FDR/Joint Chiefs/George Marshall etc. knew that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl and did NOT warn Kimmel and Short......

War Warnings were sent to all Pacific commanders in the days leading up to the attack. Telling them to take any action necessary to prepare for hostilities with Japan. 

Last two were sent on November 27 and December 3.

Steve


----------



## stona (Jul 25, 2012)

The quote from an American officer I posted above was from one of the four man team that delivered "Purple" to Bletchley Park. He doesn't sound that unhappy.

In July 1942 we handed over all the plans and diagrams for Turing's Bombes to the Americans,hence their first tests in early 1943.

In early 1943 we had about forty 3 rotor bombs on line. This leapt to 90 by the end of the year as the US versions came on line.

By war's end there were well over 300 3 rotor and 4 rotor bombes spread on both sides of the Atlantic,I'd need to check the exact number.In any case I'd call that cooperation.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## fastmongrel (Jul 25, 2012)

Edgar Brooks said:


> Another load of twaddle (where the Hell are you getting this tosh?) We knew that a town, in the Midlands, was to be a target, but the Germans always used codenames, so it was not known which one it was, or exactly when, and it was assumed (wrongly) that it would be West Bromwich, where the Spitfire factory was centred. When the raids started, Churchill was on his way to the country residence of Chequers, but immediately turned round, and returned to London, to try to coordinate the emergency services, hardly the action of a hard-nosed politician, delighted to allow his countrymen and women to die. You do yourself no favours by repeating this ing lie.



I am sure I read somewhere that Liverpool was the expected target. Perhaps the intelligence was so vague that all that could be assumed was that a major target that wasnt London or the south coast was to be hit.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 25, 2012)

Rogi said:


> They had many warnings leading up to the conflict, if they had acted for example and declared War on Japan before the event, no one would of been as receptive to a full blown war, the US barely entered WW1, entering in 1917 (they declared war in 1914, but thats like Montenegro declaring war on Japan, it doesn't mean anything unless you commit your troops and the US didn't commit any till 17)? When the conflict was nearly over. Its like coming into the World cup in the last minute and scoring in the final, after your beating your opponent by 6-1, ya you did your part but it wasn't all that much of a impact to the .



Where did you learn your history? Whatever teacher told younthat should be fired. 

Want to know why we did not enter the war until 1917? 

Wait for it, wait for it....

*We did not declare war until 06 April 1917*

In that one year of war we still comitted over 4,000,000 fresh troops , and lost over 117,000 soldiers and over 200,000 wounded. So please don't take the US contribution lightly. Before 1917 it was just not our war yet. 

Now this has nothing to do with WW2, if you wish to discuss the US contribution to WWI, then please do so in the WWI section.


----------



## davebender (Jul 25, 2012)

*RAF Fighter Command was outnumbered during the BoB.*
In fact the reverse was true.

*Britain was worried about invasion during 1940.*
So worried they shipped an armored brigade from England to Egypt during August 1940.


----------



## JoeB (Jul 25, 2012)

stona said:


> The quote from an American officer I posted above was from one of the four man team that delivered "Purple" to Bletchley Park. He doesn't sound that unhappy.


Other elements in US intel were not happy, drawing and notes about Enigma machines v actual Purple machine(s and Red machines and various code books produced for various other Japanese codes) given to the British. But it was all worked out eventually. This is discussed in Blair's "Silent Victory" among other sources.

But, let's just be sure we're all on the right page about one thing: Enigma had nothing, zero, to do with reading Japanese codes before Pearl Harbor. 

The Japanese didn't use any Enigma method at the time. The Purple machine was a device to decode a different type of code. Later, from ca. 1943 the Japanese and Germans began using the Enigma T machine to communicate with each other, and it was eventually used on a limited basis late in the war for intra-Japanese diplomatic and other traffic. But it was also different from the German service Enigma machine and code, and wasn't intercepted enough for the Allies to have enough material to work with to keep up with the machine settings and procedures and actually read it, even though actual German Enigma T machines were captured in France in 1944.

Joe


----------



## Njaco (Jul 25, 2012)

> RAF Fighter Command was outnumbered during the BoB.
> In fact the reverse was true.



Do you have a source for this? Are you talking fighter vs fighter or fighter vs the LW?

WWII Data Book by John Ellis pg 232

_(Luftflotte 2 and 3 only for LW. Numbers for LW are actual strength - only about 50% were servicable)_

6 July 1940
RAF S/E fighters...................................... 644
RAF S/E in storage- immediately available.....373
RAF S/E in storage - delayed available.........181
LW S/E fighters.......................................760
LW T/E fighters.......................................220
LW Dive bombers.....................................280
LW bombers...........................................1200
RAF = 1198 LW = 1230

10 August 1940
RAF S/E fighters...................................... 708
RAF S/E in storage- immediately available.....336
RAF S/E in storage - delayed available.........267
LW S/E fighters.......................................805
LW T/E fighters.......................................224
LW Dive bombers.....................................261
LW bombers...........................................998
RAF = 1311 LW = 1143

7 September 1940
RAF S/E fighters...................................... 746
RAF S/E in storage- immediately available.....194
RAF S/E in storage - delayed available.........196
LW S/E fighters.......................................623
LW T/E fighters.......................................129
LW Dive bombers.....................................180
LW bombers...........................................772
RAF = 1136 LW = 853

I split the LW totals by half for serviceability as stated in the book but other charts within the book show closer to 75% serviceability. But are we adding the a/c in storage not immediately available? Lots of variables but I would say that at least for the first 2 months the LW did have an advantage in machines over the RAF.


----------



## Oreo (Jul 26, 2012)

I've never read "Doornob 5-2" but I've heard there were some doozies in there. Maybe someone knows. 

Early on, somebody asked me about the P-38 incident at Iceland. I have mentioned this in a couple of other threads, including one exclusively dealing with it. The myth aspect is the timing-- the often repeated myth is that it occurred 12-8-1941, when in fact it was in August of 1942. A vast and significant difference when you consider the timing of the U.S. entry into war. Several books claim the Fw 200 was shot down within hours or minutes of the declaration of war. Simply isn't so.


----------



## A4K (Jul 26, 2012)

Edgar: I read books, you read books. Who's are right? 

Can tell you the first time I read of 'The bomb' - as I recall it being written Steve - was in 'Bodyguard of Lies' by Anthony Cave Brown. If any misquotes on my part, it's due to remembering back 18 years to the last time I saw most of my books. Pardon, such is the travelling life.

Evan


----------



## stona (Jul 26, 2012)

The raw numbers are pretty irrelevant during the BoB.
The Luftwaffe committed three "airfleets",a significant proportion of its total strength to the attack on Britain. This was opposed,with a few noteable exceptions,almost exclusively by one of Fighter Commands Groups,11 Group. This,combined with the British tactics of meeting raids with limited resources,keeping a reserve(again with at least one famous exception) meant that over Southern England and the Channel the RAF fighters were almost invariably out numbered.

Njaco's 50% serviceability for all Luftwaffe aircraft is a little pessimistic for the BoB period,the average was a little higher. 
It is also worth remembering that whilst single engined fighter pilots remained at an operational ready rate above 80% from July to August 1940 until plummeting to a mere 60% in September the operational ready rate for bomber crews was down to 75% by July and had fallen to 59% by September.

These dramatic falls followed "Adlertag",13 August 1940. In the week following Adlertag the Luftwaffe wrote off 284 aircraft. That is 7% of its total force structure or 10% of aircraft deployed against Britain.
In the whole month of August it wrote off 774 aircraft or 18.5% of all aircraft available at the beginning of the month. Losses of aircrew this month were disproportianately high as most combat was over enemy territory.
216 killed
13 captured
80 injured
264 missing
It doesn't matter how many aircraft you have if there is noone to fly them. The RAF had the same problem.

Whoever had the most aircraft in a particular place at a particular time this,August 1940,was when the Luftwaffe was comprehensively defeated for the first time.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Milosh (Jul 26, 2012)

*13 Aug 40*

Strength Summary
Number	Type	Strength	Svcble
42 1/3	Kampfgruppen	1482	1008 > 68%
9	Stukagruppen	365	286 > 78%
1	Schlachtgruppe	39	31 > 79%
26 Jagdgruppen	976	853 > 87%
9	Zerstrergruppen	244	189 > 77%
3	Nachtjagdgruppen	91	59 > 65%
14	Seefliegerstaffeln	240	125 > 52%

Overall > 72%

*7 Sept 1940*

Strength Summary
Number	Type	Strength	Svcble
43	Kampfgruppen	1291	798 > 62%
4	Stukagruppen	174	133 > 76%
2	Schlachtgruppe	59	44 > 75%
27	Jagdgruppen	831	658 > 79%
8	Zerstörergruppen	206	112 > 54%
18	Fernaufklärungsstaffeln	191	123 > 64%
6	Seefliegerstaffeln	52	33 > 63%

Overall > 68%

Luftwaffe Campaign Orders of Battle

RAF 10 Group - 5 squadrons of Hurricanes, 3 squadrons of Spitfires
RAF 11 Group - 14 squadrons of Hurricanes, 7 squadrons of Spitfires
RAF 12 Group - 7 squadrons of Hurricanes, 6 squadrons of Spitfires
RAF 13 Group - 7 squadrons of Hurricanes, 2 squadrons of Spitfires

So basically there was 21 squadrons of fighters (11 Group) opposing the Lw with some additional squadrons from 10 and 12 groups helping out.


----------



## davparlr (Jul 26, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Ahhhh! glad you asked!
> 2. the very legitimate sacrifice, for which the TBDs rarely receive credit, was keeping the IJN carriers manuevering to avoid them. Without being able to consistently point into the wind, the carriers launch and recovery ops were limited.



This is very true but I do think it should be expanded on to show the importance of the events that led up to the final destruction of the Japanese carriers. I think a time line, from “Shattered Sword” is revealing. Time line is a bit approximate.

0710 - 0725 Attack from Midway. Six Navy/Marine TBF Avengers and four Army B-26s attack the Akagi and Hiryu. Five TBFs and two B-26s were shot down but several torpedoes were dropped. One B-26 flew over the Akagi straffing and one B-26 apparently tried to ram the Akagi before it crashed, missing Nagumo by an estimated 10 ft. One Avenger and one B-26 shot down a Zero each. The Japanese were impressed by the attackers courage but not their expertise, dropping their torpedoes too far out. No damage was done.

0753-0835 Midway SBD and B-17s attack the Akagi, Soryu, and Hiryu. Poor training of Marines prevent any damage being done by the SBDs and again B-17 were not effective, this time bombing from an even higher altitude. Losses to the SBDs was high.

0918 VT-8 commences attack and the rest is history.

It is important to note that, while the earlier attacks were pretty well shot up and not physically damaging, their effects on the Japanese operational timeline was critical. When the carriers were twisting and turning to avoid torpedoes, dive bombers and B-17s, they could not refuel aircraft, rearm aircraft, move aircraft from the hanger deck to the flight deck and vice versa, nor launch and retrieve aircraft. From 0710 to 0918, and taking into account delays in coming back up to speed after an attack, the Japanese had perhaps 50-55 minutes of unmolested operational time. In addition, the Japanese practice of rearming and refueling aircraft on the hanger deck instead of the flight deck as the Americans did meant time preparing aircraft and positioning them for launch was excessive. For two hours before VT-8 attacked, a large amount of Japanese flight operations was paralized. Throw into that the almost three hours of constant combat by the Japanese fighters and you have a pretty good picture of the situation before the SBDs began their bomb runs.

While these early attacks are often overlooked and dismissed, and certainly overshadowed by the historic attack by the SBDs, these incredibly brave and sacrificing airmen deserve more than just a footnote to one of the most important naval battles in history.


----------



## stona (Jul 26, 2012)

Milosh said:


> So basically there was 21 squadrons of fighters (11 Group) opposing the Lw with some additional squadrons from 10 and 12 groups helping out.



Exactly so. Rarely were they all committed at any one time. 
10 Group covered the South West and both squadrons and personell were rotated to 11 Group. 12 Group was more directly involved most famously on the rare occassions that Mallory/Bader's "Big Wing" actually managed to assemble and get in position to do something useful.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## Marshall_Stack (Jul 26, 2012)

Myth: The Sherman tank caught fire easily because it used gasoline rather than diesel.

Most of the fires in Sherman tanks were caused by hits that ignited shell propellant. The practice was to store ammunition in the turrets and that is what caused most fires. When they kept shells out of the turret and used storage that had armour protection with water / glycol surrounding it,the fires went down something like 85%. The fact that the German practice was to keep hitting the Sherman with shells until it caught fire so the Allies couldn't repair the vehicle didn't help. Most German tanks used gasoline and the T-34 used diesel and they would also catch fire. I haven't read any accounts of the diesel powered Shermans that the US marines used in the Pacific faring any better than the gasoline counterparts...


----------



## Marshall_Stack (Jul 26, 2012)

I'm sorry. My reply had nothing that related to AIR myths. My apologies.


----------



## Vincenzo (Jul 26, 2012)

stona said:


> Exactly so. Rarely were they all committed at any one time.
> Steve



The same is true for the LW unit.
So or we measured strenght in each air battle and after this we can tell what air force was outnumbered. or we take all the unit involved in the Campaign (BoB) and tell what air force was outnumbered in the deployemet strenght.

If RAF squadrons rotate and gruppen not maybe this came from different air force structure, the LW gruppen are a larger unit of RAF squadron so maybe that the rotation was within the gruppen and not between the gruppen.


----------



## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 26, 2012)

Dav, Great summary and a very good point. The USMC SBDs apparently came very close to scoring a Glide-bombing hit on one of the IJN CVs, a matter of a few meters as I recall. How different might the outcome have been if the F2As were sent as escorts as originally planned. Might the reputation of the F2A-3's been somewhat redeemed by THEIR worthy sacrifice? They surely would have had their hands full with the strong defending IJN CAP, but perhaps might have provided that often narrow difference between a hit and a miss.


----------



## stona (Jul 26, 2012)

Vincenzo said:


> The same is true for the LW unit.



The Luftwaffe committed three "Luftflotten" to the campaign against Britain,though Luftflotte 2 was tasked with London and the South East. All the aircraft of all three fleets were certainly not committed at the same time. Luftflotte 5 made its one major attack on August 15th and got its arse kicked. Dowding had not transferred his fighters South and 13 Group was ready for them. Generaloberst Stumpff,in command of Luftflotte 5,would soon have to transfer his fighters to Luftflotte 2.
Nonetheless there were occassions when more than 1,000 German aircraft crossed the Channel,hugely out numbering the RAF's defenders,principally from 11 Group.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## JoeB (Jul 26, 2012)

stona said:


> Nonetheless there were occassions when more than 1,000 German aircraft crossed the Channel,hugely out numbering the RAF's defenders,principally from 11 Group.


This gets back to what was asked previously in response to somebody saying the *LW* was outnumbered. Just a matter of counting things, it's factually true to say, for if example 1300 bombers escorted by 800 fighters and intercepted by 800 opposing fighters, that the interceptors are outnumbered 2100/800. But that's certainly not equivalent to a fighter sweep by 210 fighters intercepted by 80 fighters.

As a general rule the force on offense *has* to have superior numbers of fighters *plus* bombers to the opposing interceptor force or its operations will be put to an end very quickly, save tremendous qualitative superiority of its fighters.

In very rough terms, per numbers in posts above from standard sources, the Germans committed comparable to inferior numbers of single engine fighters in the BoB, depending on the vagaries of stored reserve v. unsericeable a/c, plus a number of other a/c that doubled or more the total. Of course interceptors must worry always about shooting down bombers not just fighter combat. OTOH in this particular situation the escorts had poor fuel persistance over the targets, a very key factor. That seems clear from the lower kill ratio 109's scored against RAF fighters in BOB than in fighter sweeps back over France later on, or for that matter in most other other campaign of the first 3 years or so of the war. Even in the supposedly 'advantageous' position as escorts in BoB 109's had perhaps less than 2:1 kill ratio v RAF fighters, but equal or greater to 2 in most other campaigns through 1942, often substantially more than 2. 

As you allude to, another factor is how the two forces are deployed, but it's not really 'numerical inferiority' in any kind of warfare, land sea or air, if one side the other or both doesn't optimally deploy their forces. That's part of leadership quality.

In summary I don't see a simple 'myth' either way about RAF v LW numbers in BoB. To make real sense of numbers you have take into account a lot of other factors, and there legitimate differences of opinion emerge.

Joe


----------



## davebender (Jul 26, 2012)

I am referring to fighter aircraft sorties over England during the summer and fall of 1940.

Not sure how bomber sorties match up. However if we include all of 1940 then RAF Bomber Command almost certainly put more bomber sorties over Europe then the Luftwaffe put over England.


----------



## Njaco (Jul 26, 2012)

I believe you were talking about the BoB which wasn't a strictly fighter vs fighter campaign. You must include bombers and T/E fighters (that is what they were used for at that point in the war). That being said, JoeB's point about numbers and variables is so true. There are far too many factors involved to just say "Air Force A was outnumbered by Air Force B".

My personal opinion is that the RAF was outnumbered at least through the early months and then a possible parity or even superiority occurred for the RAF towards the later months.


----------



## Oreo (Jul 27, 2012)

davebender said:


> Not sure how bomber sorties match up. However if we include all of 1940 then RAF Bomber Command almost certainly put more bomber sorties over Europe then the Luftwaffe put over England.



Possibly, but that is not apples to apples, since Germany's forces were focused against France and other countries during the first half of 1940. You would have to compile all of the Allied powers vs. all of the Axis powers on the western and north-western fronts for the year, and even then its hard to draw a comparison because it is just not apples to apples. However, a more telling statistic would be bomber sorties for Germany and England during the BoB months.

I was under the impression, from various sources, that Bomber Command sorties were far fewer than the KG sorties for all of 1940, however.


----------



## stona (Jul 27, 2012)

The BoB is generally understood as an offensive campaign fought by the Luftwaffe using bombers and escorting fighters and a defensive battle fought by the RAF's Fighter Command. What Bomber Command was up to in 1940 is not really relevant_ to the battle._

I would dispute the contention that the total numbers of aircraft available is relevant to the battle either. The battle was principally fought over the Channel and South Eastern England. On the rare occassions when the Luftwaffe attacked the Midlands and the North Dowdings decision to retain his other Groups,at something approaching full strength,to cover those regions (the industrial heartlands of Britain) was fully justified.

I'm sure that the Allies had more infantry and artillery available to them at the time of Waterloo,but if they weren't there they count for nothing.

There are many accounts from the RAF pilots who actually fought the battle containing the "six of us against all that lot" type of comments and few when they thought that they had a numerical advantage,or even something approaching parity.

I have read dozens of combat reports in which RAF pilots comment that they feel they would have been more effective had there been more of them. Men at the front are rarely able to see the bigger picture.

Their experience was clearly that they were almost invariably out numbered. If you want to argue with that there are still a few of the "few" around who might be happy to dispute your conclusions!

Cheers
Steve


----------



## Francis marliere (Jul 27, 2012)

davparlr said:


> 0753-0835 Midway SBD and B-17s attack the Akagi, Soryu, and Hiryu. Poor training of Marines prevent any damage being done by the SBDs and again B-17 were not effective, this time bombing from an even higher altitude. Losses to the SBDs was high.



Totally agree, except that, as far as I know, most of USMC dive-bombers were not SBD but SB2U.

Best regards,

Francis Marliere


----------



## Hop (Jul 27, 2012)

According to Hooton, Eagle in Flames, the Luftwaffe flew 15,330 bomber sorties against Britain from 1 July - 29 September. There were 8,200 bomber sorties in October, 7,050 in November, 4,100 in December, total 34,680

Bomber Command flew 2338 sorties in July, 2605 in August, 3239 in September, 2414 in October, 2007 in November, 1441 in December, total 14,044

Total BC sorties for the whole of 1940 were 22,743, still far below what the Luftwaffe flew against Britain alone in the second half of the year.

As to fighter numbers, the Luftwaffe had a large superiority in front line fighters at the start of the BoB. Britain had more aircraft in storage than the Germans, but total numbers were still in Germany's favour. The Luftwaffe had nearly all their fighter force deployed along the channel facing 11 Group, which had only about 40% of the RAF's deployed fighters.


----------



## stona (Jul 27, 2012)

Thanks for those numbers on bomber sorties. I thought as much but was going to look them up before posting,not something I can do at work 

Your last sentence is exactly the point I've been trying to make.

Cheers
Steve


----------



## davebender (Jul 27, 2012)

How many RAF Coastal Command sorties were flown in that area?


----------



## VBF-13 (Jul 27, 2012)

davparlr said:


> The Japanese were impressed by the attackers courage but not their expertise, dropping their torpedoes too far out. No damage was done.


Just a footnote on these torpedo-bombers. My dad's buddy piloted these TBF/TBMs. These planes had to come in very low to the water--I'm talking under 50', or so--just to deploy their "fish" effectively. What's more, they had to come in "broadside," or, i.e., in this case, right into the mouth of those carriers' guns. 

That's all to say, I don't know that I'm too eager to buy into the inference that these torpedo-bomber pilots were somehow inadequate. It does make sense to me that they aborted their torpedoes too soon, however, given what they were up against.


----------



## Shortround6 (Jul 27, 2012)

davebender said:


> How many RAF Coastal Command sorties were flown in that area?



And Missions flown by Avro Ansons or Lockheed Hudsons count as _WHAT_ in the BoB, target opportunities for the Luftwaffe?

Should we count HE 59 or Arado 196 missions flown in the area?


----------



## stona (Jul 27, 2012)

Maybe we should tot up the Luftwaffe's Air-Sea rescue missions too 

Steve


----------



## parsifal (Jul 27, 2012)

BC and CC flew the following operational sorties in 1940 9takeen from varley, reading a graph...so figures are accurate, ut approximate

Jan: 150
Feb: 175
Mar: 310
Apr; 740
May: 2300
Jun: 3100
Jul: 2200
Aug: 2450
Sep: 3100
Oct: 2400
Nov: 1900
Dec: 1250

I dont have a full set of figures for FC or the LW. however the LW flew over 4000 sorties in the last week of may alone. They flew a similar number in the days around Adlertag, and one source claims the LW flew 88000 sorties during the BoB.


The figures that I do have for FC show that in May they flew 4500 sorties, and on adlertag, they flew about 900 sorties

Al the evidence point to the lW heavily outnumbering the RAF in terms of available frontline strength, and by extension in the sortie rates thay were able to maintain until the last week of September, when they really began to fall away badly


----------



## Milosh (Jul 27, 2012)

Sorties per day

Jan: 150 > 5 per day 
Feb: 175 > 6 per day
Mar: 310 > 10 per day
Apr: 740 > 25 per day
May: 2300 > 74 per day
Jun: 3100 > 103 per day
Jul: 2200 > 71 per day
Aug: 2450 > 79 per day
Sep: 3100 > 103 per day
Oct: 2400 > 77 per day
Nov: 1900 > 63 per day
Dec: 1250 > 40 per day


----------



## JoeB (Jul 27, 2012)

muscogeemike said:


> What about:
> 4. The Japanese always greatly outnumbered the USMC in the Pacific
> 5. The China Air Task Force and the 14th AF were “Flying Tigers”


Just to nitpick at a couple.

4. But who really says that? Moreover it implies this is a misconception specific to the Marines which I don't buy either. Japanese ground forces were outnumbered almost all the time 1937-1945, win, lose or draw, in terms of OOB strength in overall campaigns or battles. And I think this is broadly recognized in case of all the later Allied offensive campaigns, and fairly well recognized that it was true even in most of the early Japanese offensives. There might be a few cases where there is such a myth, or arguably so (eg Wake, where the Marine force has often been described as outnumbered, though the Japanese landing component in the final attack was comparable in number to the Marine defending force, clearly outnumbered by the total of Americans on the island; OTOH the Japanese had the support of significant naval/air contingent but the Marines no outside help, and lots of men in those ship crews). But even to the extent there is a misconception about Japanese land force numbers, I don't think it would be specific to battles v the Marines.

5. This is a matter of opinion. Veterans of the AVG and their famlies and partisans vehemently insisted/insist that the "Flying Tigers" moniker belongs only to them. The veterans of the CATF/14th AF disagreed, as did and do Chinese veterans of the Chinese-American Composite Wing(s) of the 14th AF. And in fact even today the US 14th AF, now the designation of the USAF component of US Space Command, still uses the nickname.

Here's an air myth: 'the key loss for the Japanese at Midway was all the air crews who went down with the carriers rather than the carriers themselves'.
In fact the Japanese lost per one detailed account exactly as many airmen at Midway as the US carrier force did (110 each IIRC), so the US actually lost more aviators counting the Marine and Army flyers from Midway Island v. just a handful of additonal non-carrier airmen (floatplane crews) lost by the IJN. And OTOH the Japanese hadn't really fully replaced those 4 carriers by the time of the Battle of Mariana in 1944, were weakened by mainly lower quality ersatz carriers. There was a more costly loss of a/c maintenance crews at Midway, and the IJN could less afford to lose even 110 carrier fliers than the USN could, but AFAIK there was a genuine longstanding myth that a large % of the aviators on those carriers had gone down with them, which was not true.

Joe


----------



## parsifal (Jul 27, 2012)

Joe


were the aircrews that were on the carriers that sank rescued? I believe your revelation, but it does come as a surprise


----------



## R Pope (Jul 27, 2012)

OK, how about the myth of the inherent superiority of German engineering over anything the Allies could come up with? And how the Allies just overwhelmed better equipment with masses of inferior planes? I have heard that bull since I was a little kid. And not just aircraft either, ships, guns, cook stoves, ad infinitum!


----------



## Njaco (Jul 27, 2012)

So the Allies DIDN'T overwhelm with numbers?


----------



## JoeB (Jul 27, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Joe
> 
> 
> were the aircrews that were on the carriers that sank rescued? I believe your revelation, but it does come as a surprise


Not only rescued after or as the ships went down but non-essential personnel were removed in most cases even earlier as remaining crews tried to save the ships.

The breakdown of airmen given in Peattie "Sunburst" attribued to the research of Jim Sawruk in turn from the Japanese book 'Midowei Kaisen' and various other accounts and records where he apparently tracked it down to names of all air men present and those killed. I also give the total crew losses per other sources: 
Akagi: 7 airmen (3 in the air, 4 went down with the ship), 263 total crew lost
Kaga: 21 (8 and 13), 814
Soryu: 10 (6 and 4), 713
Hiryu: 72 (64 and 8 ), 383
So it's not a myth that many men, 2000+, were lost when the ships went down, but only 29 were airmen. Of course only Hiryu was able to launch a strike v the US carriers which took heavy losses; the earlier strike on Midway by a/c from all 4 carriers, and the CAP actions, resulted in only moderate a/c and aircrew losses.

Joe


----------



## fastmongrel (Jul 28, 2012)

R Pope said:


> OK, how about the myth of the inherent superiority of German engineering over anything the Allies could come up with? And how the Allies just overwhelmed better equipment with masses of inferior planes? I have heard that bull since I was a little kid. And not just aircraft either, ships, guns, cook stoves, ad infinitum!



Sometimes the Allied equipment was better technically sometimes the Axis equipment was better. However the Allies with some exceptions could always afford to replace lost men and equipment something the Axis couldnt do with there much smaller resources. If the Germans had concentrated on churning out large numbers of standardised competent equipment as the Allies did I dont think the war would have gone any different. 

It does come down to numbers in the end the Axis had to win quick or lose slow. The combined economic output of the US, the British Empire and Commonwealth and the Soviet Union was about 10 times greater than the Axis. Plus the Allies had free access to the Neutral worlds resources.


----------



## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 28, 2012)

JoeB said:


> JHere's an air myth: 'the key loss for the Japanese at Midway was all the air crews who went down with the carriers rather than the carriers themselves'.
> In fact the Japanese lost per one detailed account exactly as many airmen at Midway as the US carrier force did (110 each IIRC), so the US actually lost more aviators counting the Marine and Army flyers from Midway Island v. just a handful of additonal non-carrier airmen (floatplane crews) lost by the IJN. And OTOH the Japanese hadn't really fully replaced those 4 carriers by the time of the Battle of Mariana in 1944, were weakened by mainly lower quality ersatz carriers. There was a more costly loss of a/c maintenance crews at Midway, and the IJN could less afford to lose even 110 carrier fliers than the USN could, but AFAIK there was a genuine longstanding myth that a large % of the aviators on those carriers had gone down with them, which was not true.
> 
> Joe



Joe, that"s my understanding as well from a number of reliable sources IIRC First Team and Shattered Sword.
I think the general consensus is that Guadacanal is the campaign that really broke the back of the flower of IJN aviation. IIRC, The IJN CV wings were stripped from their flight decks and used to reinforce the Rabaul contingent and suffered heavy losses. But I don't recall exactly when in the campaign that happened.


----------



## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 28, 2012)

fastmongrel said:


> Sometimes the Allied equipment was better technically sometimes the Axis equipment was better. However the Allies with some exceptions could always afford to replace lost men and equipment something the Axis couldnt do with there much smaller resources. If the Germans had concentrated on churning out large numbers of standardised competent equipment as the Allies did I dont think the war would have gone any different.
> 
> It does come down to numbers in the end the Axis had to win quick or lose slow. The combined economic output of the US, the British Empire and Commonwealth and the Soviet Union was about 10 times greater than the Axis. Plus the Allies had free access to the Neutral worlds resources.



FM, I recently saw or read somewhere that the Oft maligned Sherman iwas very underrated and far more effective than typically given credit for, particularly against German armor. Just what I recall hearing. Not about aircraft but Germain to the general point.


----------



## fastmongrel (Jul 28, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> FM, I recently saw or read somewhere that the Oft maligned Sherman iwas very underrated and far more effective than typically given credit for, particularly against German armor. Just what I recall hearing. Not about aircraft but Germain to the general point.



Your right oldcrow new research is showing that the Sherman was easily the equal of the T 34 and the panzer MkIV and when fitted with the bigger 76mm guns particulary the British 17 pounder was able to handle the Panther and Tiger series. Even the Tommy Cooker legend turns out not to be entirely true yes Shermans burnt but so did every other tank in roughly similar proportions and actually when the water jacketed ammo storage came into use the Sherman had the best crew survivablity ratio of any tank except the British Churchill. As an ex tanker one of the most important things in a tank is the ability to take damage and to be able to bail out when things go wrong. Getting out of a Sherman was childs play compared to some especially when a loaders top hatch was fitted. 

Of course the Tiger and Panther are sexier but for all that the Sherman was the better all round tank. The Allies understood after some false starts that a reliable tank in large numbers to support infantry is how you win battles. Sexy big expensive unreliable tanks that can kill another tank at 2 miles are no use if your infantry is without protection. My opinion is its hard sometimes to nail down a war winner but the solid reliable dull old Sherman M4 series was definitely a war winner.


----------



## stona (Jul 28, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Al the evidence point to the lW heavily outnumbering the RAF in terms of available frontline strength, and by extension in the sortie rates thay were able to maintain until the last week of September, when they really began to fall away badly



Again yes. The rates fell in September because they had lost the battle,something else that has,for some reason,become contentious in the last ten tears or so.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## JoeB (Jul 28, 2012)

fastmongrel said:


> Your right oldcrow new research is showing that the Sherman was easily the equal of the T 34 .


Yes and this was demostrated directly in M4A3E8 v T-34/85 actions in Korea, not just new research. And I agree the offensive power of the M4 could be further increased from 76mm, to 17pdr or even 90mm. However to be fair the M4 was still not as well protected as the T-34 (not to mention Panther) which could be important in other circumstances though not in direct M4 76mm (well supplied with HVAP ammo) v T-34/85 combats in Korea, which were usually at pretty short range besides: in that case either could penetrate the other reliably, outcome usually depended who got off the first accurate shot.

And as mentioned the use of gasoline as fuel had a marginal impact on tank survivability. Ammo propellant was the key combustible, and even the rubber of tracks or on road wheels (latter would be set on fire mainly by napalm in case of T-34's hit with that weapon by a/c in Korea, for example). Diesel fuel and even engine lube oil would eventually go up in a propellant fire, or even a rubber fire. Again in Korea a comprehensive US Army study of tank v tank actions estimated that the survival rate of tank crews of knocked diesel fueled KPA T-34's was much lower than of ko'd gasoline fueled M4's and M26/46's, though it involved many other factors beside fuel type.

The key advantage of gasoline tank engines was uniformity of fuel supply with much more numerous soft skinned vehicles, as long as they were gasoline fueled, as well as abillity to use existing airplane and car engine production to boost tank production in US in WWII (eg. small a/c radial engines used in M4 and M4A1, and the five car engine arrangement of M4A4). The biggest drawback was shorter range of a gasoline v diesel tank.

Joe


----------



## JoeB (Jul 28, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> I think the general consensus is that Guadacanal is the campaign that really broke the back of the flower of IJN aviation. IIRC, The IJN CV wings were stripped from their flight decks and used to reinforce the Rabaul contingent and suffered heavy losses. But I don't recall exactly when in the campaign that happened.


I counted JNAF fighter pilot, only, losses by name from the listing in Hata/Izawa's book. In studying the 1942 New Guinea campaign report by report in JNAF records, I found the H/I listing for that campaign almost though not quite complete; I assume it's similarly mostly complete overall:
Pearl Harbor: 9
Philippines: 14
Malaya: 2
DEI/Bismarks/raids Australia through Feb: 19
New Guinea/raids Australia March-up to Coral Sea: 16
Ceylon: 6
Coral Sea: 7
Midway/Aleutians raids: 24
NG/Aus after Coral Sea>end '42:39
G'canal (including carrier battles) to end '42: 122

I know no reliable number for total IJN fighter pilots in this period. The JNAF as a whole reported having about 3,400 pilots of all kinds in 1940 including those rated as pilots but still in training units; ie there were perhaps on order of 1,000 JNAF fighter pilots in Dec 1941. So 258 front line pilots was quite significant, and of course including a much higher % who had significant combat experience (for example Tainan AG, most experienced and successful group Dec 41-Aug 42, though taking a fair number of losses already, but worn down heavily after that at G'canal and essentially disbanded late in the year). 

But, really 'breaking' the IJN fighter force by end of 1942 might be an overstatement, though not exactly a 'myth'. A lot of good JNAF fighter units remained by the end of '42, just as the stats indicate most prewar pilots had not been lost. That's shown in cases like the 'Valentine's Day Massacre' in Feb '43 (F4U's and P-38's badly defeated by 204th AG) or the 202nd (formely 3rd) AG's heavy fighter combat advantage v Spitfires over Darwin in 1943. But even in holding their own in kill ratio, actually, v Allied fighters in second half 42 and into '43 in some cases, the JNAF was losing badly as the Allies could replace and increase strength so much faster. By November '43 the Japanese were forced to send their pretty well trained second generation of carrier fighter sdns to Rabaul, where they were pretty much wiped out in the following months. Then a relatively poorly trained third generation was left to fight from the carriers in 1944; meanwhile the Allied quantitative advantage had wided greatly as well. The 122 figure includes a significant number of losses from Sho, Zui, Ryujo, Junyo and Zuiho groups in the carrier battles of the G'canal campaign, but besides Hiyo's group (after ship's mechanical casualty) the land based Zeroes met in the G'canal campaign in 1942 were from dedicated landbased groups.

Joe


----------



## Vincenzo (Jul 28, 2012)

JoeB said:


> Yes and this was demostrated directly in M4A3E8 v T-34/85 actions in Korea, not just new research. And I agree the offensive power of the M4 could be further increased from 76mm, to 17pdr or even 90mm. However to be fair the M4 was still not as well protected as the T-34 (not to mention Panther) which could be important in other circumstances though not in direct M4 76mm (well supplied with HVAP ammo) v T-34/85 combats in Korea, which were usually at pretty short range besides: in that case either could penetrate the other reliably, outcome usually depended who got off the first accurate shot.
> Joe



M4 76mm is a good tank but it's available only after D Day and HVAP ammos also later, september, and in very few number. The M4 75mm was common in Europe also in '45.


----------



## fastmongrel (Jul 28, 2012)

JoeB said:


> However to be fair the M4 was still not as well protected as the T-34 (not to mention Panther)
> Joe



There is some good research that shows that equivalent marks of M4 were much better for crew survivability than the T34. Certainly the waterjacket models were distinctly better than a T34/76 and could survive hull hits better than a T34/85. Crew survivability was vastly better for an M4 particulary when the floor escape hatches were welded up and later removed. Most M4s were not killed by tanks but were killed by in order A/T guns S/P guns Infantry weapons (like Panzerschrek) Mines and in 5th place Tanks. One on one a Panther would win more times against an E8 but it is not as clear cut as most books would have you believe. Thats not surprising the Panther was a heavy tank the M4 a medium but up against its most common adversary the Pz 4 the M4 won more often.


----------



## cimmex (Jul 28, 2012)

...but this is still no “WWII air war myths” but didn’t the Russian have flying tanks...
Cimmex


----------



## JoeB (Jul 28, 2012)

Vincenzo said:


> M4 76mm is a good tank but it's available only after D Day and HVAP ammos also later, september, and in very few number. The M4 75mm was common in Europe also in '45.


and re:fastmongrel:

Those are both reasonable one hand/other hand responses to what I said. Most M4's in the NWE campaign of 1944-45 were 75mm, relatively few rounds of HVAP were available. But the basic capability of M4 76mm directly against T-34 proved pretty good when it happened*. Overall though, I see no reason to contest the idea that US medium tank development in WWII era was slightly behind Soviet. There were plus/minuses to match ups like M4 75mm v T-34/76 and 76mm v /85 but the Soviet vehicles in question were a bit earlier in each case. There was not however a big difference.

And yes of course a minority of tanks were ko'd by other tanks even in relatively 'tank heavy' theaters like the East Front, and a much smaller % in NWE where Allied tank units were mainly up against enemy infantry formations, and often in an infantry support role (especially the M4's of 'independent' tank bns de facto tied one each to US infantry divisions). But that wasn't the M4's forte either, because of its relatively light armor. The M4 was designed for and best at an armored division role in explotation: relatively fast, mobile, and reliable; rather than either an anti-tank or infantry support role. There's again no reasonable question IMO the M4's protection was found lacking by the consensus in US Army in 1944-45, aside from the (more famous) controversy about its gun power, though that was only relevant in relatively unusual tank v tank actions.

*actually per the report I quoted, the % of penetrations by 76mm HVAP and APC v T-34's in Korea was the same, though this was based just on collating combat reports, not scientific study, and no information is given in the report about what angles the various shots were at; I figure it's common sense that it was handier to have HVAP around, but it's not clear that 76mm APC was inadequate v T-34's, either.

Joe


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 28, 2012)

Lets try and get back to "air war myths"...


----------



## renrich (Jul 28, 2012)

Just finished reading a biography of Robin Olds and even he was sucked in by the myth that the AVG fought the Japanese before Pearl Harbor. Very wide spread myth.


----------



## drgondog (Jul 28, 2012)

Great book, great man, awesome funeral - when General Titus (Eartquake McGoon) finished his eulogy at Air Force Academy on an overcast day - the clouds parted and a ray of sunshine flooded the area - NO kidding. He was the man I loved and admired most, second to my father. Christina and Ed Rasimus did one helluva job on the book.

When to get to the point where Robin shot down two FW 190s on August 15 and noted someone from the 355th FG called Zemke to confirm the scores - that was my father. Robin was one of a kind.


----------



## Oreo (Jul 28, 2012)

drgondog said:


> Great book, great man, awesome funeral - when General Titus (Eartquake McGoon) finished his eulogy at Air Force Academy on an overcast day - *the clods parted *and a ray of sunshine flooded the area - NO kidding. He was the man I loved and admired most, second to my father. Christina and Ed Rasimus did one helluva job on the book.
> 
> When to get to the point where Robin shot down two FW 190s on August 15 and noted someone from the 355th FG called Zemke to confirm the scores - that was my father. Robin was one of a kind.



Clods or clouds? Very ironic typo considering the subject matter. . . . 8)


----------



## ToughOmbre (Jul 28, 2012)

renrich said:


> Just finished reading a biography of Robin Olds and even he was sucked in by the myth that the AVG fought the Japanese before Pearl Harbor. Very wide spread myth.



The AVG vs the Japanese prior to Pearl Harbor would get my vote as the biggest WWII air war myth of all time!

Steve


----------



## davparlr (Jul 29, 2012)

VBF-13 said:


> That's all to say, I don't know that I'm too eager to buy into the inference that these torpedo-bomber pilots were somehow inadequate. It does make sense to me that they aborted their torpedoes too soon, however, given what they were up against.


 [/QUOTE]
That was just a comment from the Japanese according to the book. The Japanese were certainly experts in torpedo drops and their comments, if correct, should be taken seriously. I have no idea what kind of training the AAF pilots had on torpedo drops but I would guess not as good as the Navy, which would have been a shame given they were flying the most effective torpedo bombers at Midway. You are right in stating the environment in which they were operating, and the low speed and altitude requirements of those lousy torpedoes, made the situation horrendous.


----------



## drgondog (Jul 29, 2012)

Oreo said:


> Clods or clouds? Very ironic typo considering the subject matter. . . . 8)



There no clods at the funeral.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 29, 2012)

I just wonder how many of these "myths" are being "exposed" by other myths????

There is a saying....you can fool some of the people all the time and all the people some of the time, but not all the people all the time. These so called "myths" have been accepted by some pretty well respected people, and are being ripped up by the flimsiest of evidence. Rather like the witches of salem, I fear the "crimes" against history we are "exposing" are causing the perpetration of greater crimes against history


----------



## meatloaf109 (Jul 29, 2012)

I haven't read all of this one, so apologies if posted before.
Colin P. Kelly sinking the Japanese battleship "Haruna". The real heroic effort of Kelly's was holding the plane level so his crew could escape, according to Saburu Sakai.


----------



## renrich (Jul 29, 2012)

I enjoyed the book about Olds from start to finish. I did feel a little sad about his story book marriage, the children and then the marital problems. It seems as if Olds was destined to be a warrior. The contrast between the way WW2 was conducted and the war in VN was stark.


----------



## ToughOmbre (Jul 29, 2012)

meatloaf109 said:


> I haven't read all of this one, so apologies if posted before.
> Colin P. Kelly sinking the Japanese battleship "Haruna". The real heroic effort of Kelly's was holding the plane level so his crew could escape, according to Saburu Sakai.



Also it was believed at the time (and still by some) that Colin Kelly was was awarded the Medal of Honor. He was recommended for the MOH but received the Distinguished Service Cross.

Steve


----------



## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 29, 2012)

Francis marliere said:


> Totally agree, except that, as far as I know, most of USMC dive-bombers were not SBD but SB2U.
> 
> Best regards,
> 
> Francis Marliere


They were a mixed bag. one unite of 16 SBD-1 or -2s and another of 11 SB2U-3s . IIRC, the SBDs suffered 50 pc casualties attaxking a CV and the SB2Us about 35 pc attacking a BB in the inner defense ring.



VBF-13 said:


> Just a footnote on these torpedo-bombers. My dad's buddy piloted these TBF/TBMs. These planes had to come in very low to the water--I'm talking under 50', or so--just to deploy their "fish" effectively. What's more, they had to come in "broadside," or, i.e., in this case, right into the mouth of those carriers' guns.
> 
> That's all to say, I don't know that I'm too eager to buy into the inference that these torpedo-bomber pilots were somehow inadequate. It does make sense to me that they aborted their torpedoes too soon, however, given what they were up against.



I would expect the VT-8 detachment to have been pretty proficient in their profession.espeocially flying an aircraft whose performance far outclassed their previous mount, however, as has been pointed out before by others, the real problem limiting their odds of survival was the dam*ed POS mk 13 which demanded an approach pretty much the same as a TBD. WIthout escort their odds were sorely lowered with or without the mk 13. Tomonaga's 10 escorted B5Ns suffered 50 pc casualties attacking the Yorktown. Of course his crews scored 2 hits IIRC. TBF armor surely played a role.


----------



## VBF-13 (Jul 29, 2012)

davparlr said:


> That was just a comment from the Japanese according to the book. The Japanese were certainly experts in torpedo drops and their comments, if correct, should be taken seriously. I have no idea what kind of training the AAF pilots had on torpedo drops but I would guess not as good as the Navy, which would have been a shame given they were flying the most effective torpedo bombers at Midway. You are right in stating the environment in which they were operating, and the low speed and altitude requirements of those lousy torpedoes, made the situation horrendous.


Here's a typical approach. Do you now see the problem I'm seeing? It wasn't any bad torpedoes. And, while I'm sure it's beyond me to question the eyesight of those Japanese pilots, it probably wasn't our pilots, either. It was getting there, putting those unescorted torpedo-bombers into that position, while in that shooting gallery. I don't need a book to supply me with conjecture on why those pilots couldn't get a hit off on that task force. Given what they were up against, the explanation is right here. Good enough for me, anyway...


----------



## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 29, 2012)

VBF-13 said:


> Here's a typical approach. Do you now see the problem I'm seeing? It wasn't any bad torpedoes. And, while I'm sure it's beyond me to question the eyesight of those Japanese pilots, it probably wasn't our pilots, either. It was getting there, putting those unescorted torpedo-bombers into that position, while in that shooting gallery. I don't need a book to supply me with conjecture on why those pilots couldn't get a hit off on that task force. Given what they were up against, the explanation is right here. Good enough for me, anyway...



The observations of the IJN witnesses were probably biased by their experience with their own shorter range aerial torpedo. The photo you post is revealing in that it shows the restricted altitude of a torpedo attack into the teeth of AAA defense but that low altitude is somewhat effective for countering aerial attacks prior to that final approach. It remains the prime tactic of relatively defensively limited aircraft to get low when attacked by a fighter type to the present day.
The mk 13 ran barely a few knots faster than the IJN CVs and about 10-12 knots slower than the IJN counterpart. That's got to be a problem for getting reliable hits.


----------



## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 29, 2012)

parsifal said:


> I just wonder how many of these "myths" are being "exposed" by other myths????
> 
> There is a saying....you can fool some of the people all the time and all the people some of the time, but not all the people all the time. These so called "myths" have been accepted by some pretty well respected people, and are being ripped up by the flimsiest of evidence. Rather like the witches of salem, I fear the "crimes" against history we are "exposing" are causing the perpetration of greater crimes against history


That's a very good point but on the other hand, histories written shortly after events are heavily influenced by accounts of the participants. That's appropriate of course but should take into account the participant may be a bit distracted by the intensity of the events and a slightly less than reliable witness. Participants also see events through the soda straw of their immediate locale and may not have the best global view of the events unfolding around them. I'm not saying anything you of all people don't already know but just restating the value of the post morton along with the necessity to be a diligent reporter in balancing the two perspectives.
What I like about the forum is its continuing effort to bring both perspectives into view whether intentionally or not, by the ongoing dialectic process.

A classic case of myth meets reality is the debate that raged among naval aviators for decades about which squadron and it's pilots sunk the Kaga. First person accounts were Both misleading and very helpful but some only available well after WW2 ended. Uh oh. Sounds like the basis for a new thread or a digressive path for this one,


----------



## VBF-13 (Jul 29, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> It remains the prime tactic of relatively defensively limited aircraft to get low when attacked by a fighter type to the present day.


That's a valid point. It's certainly safer there. Those torpedo-bombers had to get there, first, though. And, even then, even if ideally they're coming into their targets broadside, at that altitude, they're flying right into those carrier's hangar deck guns. Not a pretty picture.

In a nutshell, I think our boys did everything they possibly could. Without any fighter cover, they were simply overmatched.


----------



## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 29, 2012)

VBF-13 said:


> In a nutshell, I think our boys did everything they possibly could. Without any fighter cover, they were simply overmatched.


Yep and probably with more skill and gallantry than the results might suggest their efforts warranted.


----------



## JoeB (Jul 30, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> That's a very good point but on the other hand, histories written shortly after events are heavily influenced by accounts of the participants. That's appropriate of course but should take into account the participant may be a bit distracted by the intensity of the events and a slightly less than reliable witness. Participants also see events through the soda straw of their immediate locale and may not have the best global view of the events unfolding around them.


And then there's the obvious corollary to that, which is that consideration of first hand accounts from both sides will tend to cancel out some of the distortions. A lot of myths grow from the natural availability of first hand accounts on only one side, during or just after a war. But emphasizing one side's first hand accounts so heavily over the other's becomes a less and less excusable technique to learn history as time goes on.

Also myths are not often random errors. They often serve to promote some story or angle which their proponents want to be told, and that's sometimes for good reason during a war. But again as time goes on it becomes less valid.

This is true for example with myths like Colin Kelley/Haruna, the need for *some* kind of real heroics, as understood in those times, in a very dark period. In today's American (and I think Western) culture a military man can be a maximal hero just for doing what Kelley actually did: risking and in the event losing his life to give his crewmen a better chance to survive. But in those days there was still some idea that a hero had to actually strike a hard blow at the enemy. Just being a heroic victim was a lesser achievement than it is now.

And for example the outright myth of heavy JNAF pilot losses at Midway, or the semi-myth of a JNAF fighter arm crippled by the end of 1942, when coined during WWII, were not just totally objective attempts to find and tell the facts. They were also optimistic assessments designed to boost morale. The same is true of the semi-myth that Zeroes could be defeated easily just by changing tactics. This overstatement was in part to give Allied pilots more confidence. That's not to say any of those ideas were attempts to manipulate pilots' psyche by some 'higher ups'; the ideas in many cases came from pilots, from leaders among pilots. Part of winning is convicing yourself you're as good as your opponents. Leading a fighter squadron is not the same task as trying to understand history as objectively as possible decades later. But the latter is what, IMHO, we should be doing now.

The problem again is not that these wrong or semi-correct ideas were current during the war. It's only a problem if people *now* refuse to reconsider and modify, not necessarily reject, them in light of facts from the other side.

Joe


----------



## parsifal (Jul 30, 2012)

One of the biggest myths however, is that fighters are the main cause of losses for either side. They are not, well, usually are not. far more significant are what might be termed "attritional losses". Fighter attacks in the air might account for up to 40% of total losses, but more typically account for about 30%. Depending on the situation and ther nationality, flak might account for 25-40% of losses, whilst non combat losses....losses due to things like navigation errors, running out of fuel, or engine failure, landing/take off accidents, inclement weather, just failing to return, often accounted for as much as 50% of total losses. Its important to remember that aircraft of all combabtants were routinely overloaded and pressd to points beyond their design limits.... 

For the Western alliances, an airframe typically had a shelf life of just over 10 months in 1944. For an Me 262, Ive read (but cannot confirm) that engine rebuilds were needed every 10 hours of flight time. Thats rough;ly once every 3rd or fourht flight

And then we have write offs due to excessive damage to the airframe. During Barbarossa , for the first three months of the campaign, combat losses for the Luftwaffe were about 300 a/c. Yet by the conclusion of Smolensk, according to the sources I have, the LW was down to less than 1000 airworthy machines and total losses operational and noncombat combined were over 1000 a/c. Similar problems beset the Japanese....well in fact it was affecting everyone really, but only the allies had the logistic base to cope with that attrition. The Luftwaffe for example, in the phoney war suffered about a monthly attrition rate of about 7% of the toal force structure, without significant combat. Thats everything, including retirements but it is still a very large number, and virtually none due to direct allied activity.


----------



## Marshall_Stack (Jul 30, 2012)

Myth: The P-39 was a tank buster.


----------



## stona (Jul 30, 2012)

Marshall_Stack said:


> Myth: The P-39 was a tank buster.



Or the Typhoon (discussed at considerable length already in another thread).

Steve


----------



## Jenisch (Jul 30, 2012)

The Corsair being called "whistling death" by the Japanese is a myth or not?


----------



## JoeB (Jul 30, 2012)

Marshall_Stack said:


> Myth: The P-39 was a tank buster.


Yes re: Typhoon, the distinguishing myth wrt P-39's and tanks was that it was *supposed* to be a tankbuster, or mainly ground attack a/c, in Soviet service, when actually they used it as a general purpose fighter w/ no particular emphasis on the ground attack role generally or tanks specifically. 

Typhoon units in NWE were heavily (though not entirely) devoted to ground attack and a particular specialty was attacking tanks; it's just the results that are controversial. But other such threads have gotten into whether even (relatively) big gun-armed German/Soviet tank busting a/c on the East Front actually destroyed a lot of tanks either. Some well informed (about a/c guns) fans of those devices had written on their sites and various fora stuff pointing up the low kill rates of rocket armed fighter bombers v tanks, but seem to just assume the theoretical capabilities of (say 30-37mm) gun armed a/c made them a lot more effective. Soviet info about the effectiveness of German air strikes on their tanks seems to call this into question. The 30-37mm gun type of concept might still have been more effective than rocket concept, but it seems its real kill rate has been subject to less scrutiny. 

Joe


----------



## JoeB (Jul 30, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> The Corsair being called "whistling death" by the Japanese is a myth or not?


Almost certainly made up on the Allied side, as was 'whispering death' nickname the Japanese supposedly gave the Beaufighter.

And these cases are sort of the mirror images of the semi-myths of quickly tamed JNAF fighter threat, 'Zeroes blow up from one bullet hit' etc. To buy those nicknames as really having been Japanese, you have to envision Japanese airmen as coining names sort of 'celebrating' their fear of the enemy, and emphasizing his strength. Yet Allied airman told stories (over)emphasizing the weaknesses of their opponents. The second seems a lot more to me like human nature in a military organization which hasn't lost its morale, and by all accounts individual Japanese military men believed their assumed superiority in moral and spiritual factors could still win the day even later in the war. Those nicknames just don't seem plausible as having been coined by the Japanese. But anyway AFAIK neither of them has ever been found in a Japanese language source from the period.

Joe


----------



## parsifal (Jul 30, 2012)

I doubt that the name "whispering death" comes from a japanese source, however the makeup of Japanese airmen was fundamentally different to western persona. They were heavily influenced by their bushido warrior codes, which stressed prowess in battle, and the warrior code. Honouring your enemy was integral to all of that.

In western culture there was an element of that, but it was far less romantic and prvalent than was the case in the Japanese services. Far more emphasis was being given to the technocratic aspects of flying....survival, working as a team, using the technology to advantage. Like all generali zations, its danger is that we assume that one nationality had all one trait, and another nationality all of another. truth is, the Japanese had elements of "technocracy" while the allies possessed elements of the "airborne knights of the sky" personas. But what i am referring to is the emphasis, what elements of a national persona tended to dominate thinking for that force....


----------



## JoeB (Jul 30, 2012)

parsifal said:


> I doubt that the name "whispering death" comes from a japanese source, however the makeup of Japanese airmen was fundamentally different to western persona. They were heavily influenced by their bushido warrior codes, which stressed prowess in battle, and the warrior code. Honouring your enemy was integral to all of that.
> 
> In western culture there was an element of that, but it was far less romantic and prvalent than was the case in the Japanese services. Far more emphasis was being given to the technocratic aspects of flying....survival, working as a team, using the technology to advantage. Like all generali zations, its danger is that we assume that one nationality had all one trait, and another nationality all of another. truth is, the Japanese had elements of "technocracy" while the allies possessed elements of the "airborne knights of the sky" personas. But what i am referring to is the emphasis, what elements of a national persona tended to dominate thinking for that force....


The Japanese were different, but I don't see the differences as actually making it at all likely that Japanese air units would attach fearsome names to Allied a/c.

We might have included 'bushido' as another semi-myth. The basic code of conduct of Japanese miltiary men through the Pacific War was, at least in theory, the Imperial Rescript for Soldiers and Sailors, of 1882. In that period a new Japanese society was being built, with no more Samurai; and OTOH the Samurai code hadn't applied to commoners. The Rescript is an example of a re-manufactured kind of national belief system, but it was taken quite seriously in the Meiji Period. And the Rescript told military men to honor enemies in a way that would be easily recognizeable to any culture: by treating them humanely, not just in some abstract sense or conditional on their non-surrender. And this was the case in RJ War, by and large. But after Meiji period the in fact newly manufactured Japanese society changed, to where the kind of brutal and xenophobic military attitudes seen in Sino-J and Pac War's became more prevalent. There was in fact much less emphasis on 'honoring' enemies in either abstract or concrete ways. And then it's also tricky that Japanese society took another turn post 1945, and many expressions of respect for Pac War enemies we read now were written long after the war.

It was not in character actually for WWII Japanese military forces to view their enemies with much if any more respect than Western military men had for the Japanese: grudging where unavoidable. The two sides were different in many ways, but I believe you're mistaken to think the typical Japanese attitude of the time was a lot different in that particular aspect.

As far as technical or technology mindedness, I don't see how it would directly affect something like nicknames for Allied planes. But, you cannot make any generalization about technical mindedness including both IJN and IJA. The IJN was perhaps the *most* technologically minded navy in the world in the interwar period. It had always somewhat so since the modern service's birth in the Meiji Period but that characteristic intensified in the wake of the naval treaties post WWI. The IJN was practically obsessed with technology (night optics, oxygen torpedoes, big DD's, midget subs, long range bombers [Type 96 Rikko far longer range than any other in 1937], underwater trajectory shells, the Zero itself) as a way to offset USN numerical superiority. And pre-war JNAF training emphasized technical understanding by a pilot of his a/c and its engine more than Western training, not less, though it's unclear if this had practical benefit. The Anglo-Americans achieved technological superiority in almost all relevant areas v IJN *during* WWII, but did so largely by bring to bear resources *outside* their own navies, like academia and 'tech companies', where Japan was far weaker than the combined Anglo-Americans at that time.

The IJA OTOH was probably below average in emphasis on technology among major armies. 

Joe


----------



## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 31, 2012)

So, was Joe Bauer's charge to his troops on October 18, 1942: " When you see Zeroes Dogfight 'em" simply bluster, an attempt to motivate or boost the morale of his pilots, or based on an astute observation of the changing realities of the campaign? Or was it a combination of these?

Bauer, Harold "Joe": Bio: Decision at Gaudalcanal 

suggests the latter as does Lundstrum in First Team Guadacanl.


----------



## meatloaf109 (Jul 31, 2012)

I read a book about U.S. Naval aviators captured and held on the island of Chichi-jima. The author claims that they were killed and eaten by the Japanese. He also claimed that the Japanese were the only army in ww2 that had to be ordered not to eat their own soldiers. If true, this would be bizzare to the extreme. If not, it would be equally bizzare that someone would even come up with that.
Has anyone else ever heard of this?


----------



## vikingBerserker (Jul 31, 2012)

It's mentioned in _Flyboys_ by Bradley. I also just read quite a bit about it in a book whose name escapes me. A lot of it appears to stem from the Japanese being left on their own and expected to live off of the land. It talked mainly about other races being eaton, but dead Japanese were also consumed, though it did mention that it was suspected some of the "dead" Japanese were helped getting into that condition.


----------



## bobbysocks (Jul 31, 2012)

if you were lowest in rank you slept with one eye open and a hand on your pistol i would bet.... lol


----------



## parsifal (Jul 31, 2012)

.



> We might have included 'bushido' as another semi-myth.




It may be a myth, but it was believed by at least portion of the japanese military. Pictures of Japanese officers carrying swords into aircraft is a direct reference to the medieval code of the bushido 




> The basic code of conduct of Japanese miltiary men through the Pacific War was, at least in theory, the Imperial Rescript for Soldiers and Sailors, of 1882. In that period a new Japanese society was being built, with no more Samurai; and OTOH the Samurai code hadn't applied to commoners. The Rescript is an example of a re-manufactured kind of national belief system, but it was taken quite seriously in the Meiji Period. And the Rescript told military men to honor enemies in a way that would be easily recognizeable to any culture: by treating them humanely, not just in some abstract sense or conditional on their non-surrender. And this was the case in RJ War, by and large. But after Meiji period the in fact newly manufactured Japanese society changed, to where the kind of brutal and xenophobic military attitudes seen in Sino-J and Pac War's became more prevalent.




I disagree. The changes that you mention occuring during the meiji restoration were the aboration, not that which followed. Japanese history from 1550 through to 1850 was xenophobic, inward looking brutal and anti-western....exactly what it was during the war. 



> There was in fact much less emphasis on 'honoring' enemies in either abstract or concrete ways. And then it's also tricky that Japanese society took another turn post 1945, and many expressions of respect for Pac War enemies we read now were written long after the war.




Respect for your enemies was in fact a fairly small component of the bushido code. It was more to do with generation of the warrior spirit, and a big part of that was about insilling fear in your enemy. That was achieved by brutal behaviour and strict discilpline....allegiance to the Daimyo etc. 



> It was not in character actually for WWII Japanese military forces to view their enemies with much if any more respect than Western military men had for the Japanese: grudging where unavoidable. The two sides were different in many ways, but I believe you're mistaken to think the typical Japanese attitude of the time was a lot different in that particular aspect.




It was fundamentally different, which is best displayed in their treatment of the chinese and the Allied POWs. That mentality was just as prvalent amongst their flyers as it was in their more general military. Honour to the warrior class was paramount, and Japans flyers were their paramount warriors. 

The allies had no such illusions. They honoured their flyers, and their military generally , but the fundamental difference that existed between Japanese society and western culture is that the military in western culture was never given to placing their military at the very centre of their society. Moreover, and linked to this, the jpanaese demanded complete obedience within the military structure, whereas for the western military men, initiative, was never completely suppressed to the same extent as it was for the japanese. The Japanese were less imaginative, but more obedient, that is no myth 




> As far as technical or technology mindedness, I don't see how it would directly affect something like nicknames for Allied planes.



I agree 



> But, you cannot make any generalization about technical mindedness including both IJN and IJA. The IJN was perhaps the *most* technologically minded navy in the world in the interwar period.



I dont see how you can say that. There were many areas that the Japanese did excel, and put great effort into technological advance. But there were many areas where they lagged badly, but worse, even when faced with stark defeat, seemed slow to adapt their conceptions of warfare and what they needed to do to survive and win. Nowhere was this more evident than in their attitudes and efforts in ASW. The Japanese failed singulalry to come to terms with this threat, and more than any other single battle, cost them dearly. They were so wedded to the concept and need for the "decisive battle" that they just coulf not adapt their thinking to deal with the problem. they had witnessed and studied Jutland down to the most minute detail. They had also witness the Convoy battles of 1917, and yet failed to take any action in the development of their post war navy. And this is just one area that they failed....As a consequence it is very difficult to argue that the japanese Navy (apart from its R&D areas) was a technologically minded force at all really 




> It had always somewhat so since the modern service's birth in the Meiji Period but that characteristic intensified in the wake of the naval treaties post WWI. The IJN was practically obsessed with technology (night optics, oxygen torpedoes, big DD's, midget subs, long range bombers [Type 96 Rikko far longer range than any other in 1937], underwater trajectory shells, the Zero itself) as a way to offset USN numerical superiority.



Which are all very narrowly focussed on winning the one big decisive battle, and which all made various sacrifices in their technological development that eventually led to their undoing. The shortcomings of the Zero are well known, the shortcomings of their torpedoes less well known, but evident just the same. Japanese torpedoes were the most effective in the war, but that efficiency came at a cost....they were too large for warships smaller than a DD to carry. The airborne torpedoes were still superior, but that edge is a lot less than one might expect. Japan was also wasteful in its expenditure of resources. The development of the yamatos and the Mogamis as well as the tomodozuru classes is typical of that wasting of resources. The japanese paid virtually no attention to ease of production, consequaently many items were shown to be exepensive to produce 



> And pre-war JNAF training emphasized technical understanding by a pilot of his a/c and its engine more than Western training, not less, though it's unclear if this had practical benefit.



Image and belief has nothing to do with the levels of training. The Japanese flyers were the best trained in the world at the beginning of the war, but that does not mean they didnt believe in the ceremonial hocus pokus that characterized Japanese society, ofr the warrior class mentality that also permeated their organizations at that time. 




> The Anglo-Americans achieved technological superiority in almost all relevant areas v IJN *during* WWII, but did so largely by bring to bear resources *outside* their own navies, like academia and 'tech companies', where Japan was far weaker than the combined Anglo-Americans at that time.



If the military establishment in th west had been resistant to change such external applications of outside thinking would not have been as enthusiastically and quickly bsorbed as they were. The western militaries were far quicker in accepting and absorbing military change and doctrinal changes than the Japanese ever were. In fact i would go so far as to say that the Japanese were almost incapable of changig their doctrine 



> The IJA OTOH was probably below average in emphasis on technology among major armies.



I agree, but I would simply say the IJN was almost as bad in accepting change when such change was needed. ]


----------



## parsifal (Jul 31, 2012)

meatloaf109 said:


> I read a book about U.S. Naval aviators captured and held on the island of Chichi-jima. The author claims that they were killed and eaten by the Japanese. He also claimed that the Japanese were the only army in ww2 that had to be ordered not to eat their own soldiers. If true, this would be bizzare to the extreme. If not, it would be equally bizzare that someone would even come up with that.
> Has anyone else ever heard of this?



During the advance across the Owen Stanleys, the advancing Australians came across repeated and systematic cases of bodies that had been "butchered" for food. It was assumed that the victims were already dead when so interfereed with, though witness statements from the natives suggest that wounded unable to be carried were sometimes murdered and then consumed.

Cannibalism amongst the IJA was no myth.


----------



## vikingBerserker (Jul 31, 2012)

vikingBerserker said:


> I also just read quite a bit about it in a book whose name escapes me.



The book was _Hidden Horrors - Japanese War Crimes in World War II _by Yuki Tanaka


----------



## mhuxt (Jul 31, 2012)

As above, not a myth. There's even a post-war Japanese film which depicts it happening. Can't think of the damn name now. Very spooky scene where the two soldiers supporting a walking-wounded comrade are looking at him ...

Edit - Found it.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fires_on_the_Plain_(film)


----------



## Capt. Vick (Jul 31, 2012)

Isn't it a myth that the crickets that were given to the airborne troops and used on D-day mimiced the bolt of the german rifle and led to us deaths?


----------



## JoeB (Jul 31, 2012)

parsifal said:


> .
> 1. It may be a myth, but it was believed by at least portion of the japanese military. Pictures of Japanese officers carrying swords into aircraft is a direct reference to the medieval code of the bushido
> 
> 2. I disagree. The changes that you mention occuring during the meiji restoration were the aboration, not that which followed. Japanese history from 1550 through to 1850 was xenophobic, inward looking brutal and anti-western....exactly what it was during the war.
> ...


Well this seems to have drifted far from your original (seeming) point of explaining the plausibility of the Japanese giving fearsome to names to Allied a/c due to their culture. Some of your statements now seem to pretty directly contradict that as in 3, which IMO means you've moved further torward the truth, because it was in fact particularly unlikely that the Japanese would do something like call an Allied plane by a name implying it was to be feared, even compared to other air arms, who probably wouldn't do it either.

Anyway on a few other points,
1. and 2. Every modern nation has a national myth of its past, not 'myth' is sense of the 'air myths' we're speaking of here, but some semi-true story that expresses what that nation thinks it is or wants to be. It never exactly coincides with the real past. Just the fact that typical Japanese officers, commoners, would ape the habits of Samurai gives you a hint about that. That belief 'they were like the Samurai' came from the national myth created in the Meiji period, which was no aberration whatsoever, but the basis of a new society created not all that long before those 1940's men were born. Their actual ancestors weren't Samurai, they were peasants who counted for nothing, by and large. Their idea of what the Samurai was and how he should act was a mixture of history and national myth of the Meiji period, as modified (or mutated perhaps) by particular social developments between then and WWII. It's somewhat like Americans speaking of 'our traditions of the Old West', which had no actual place in the direct family lineage of the vast majority of Americans. But that's part of our national myth: the *story* of the Old West does have an impact.

Japan was inward looking from around the 1620's to 1850's, which isn't just to nitpick but to recognize that attitudes ca. 1550 were quite different again; Japan a major trading country at that time. And an expanisionist culture and a hermit culture are not the same thing at all; that was a real change. As far as brutality the English in the 16th century still half hung, castrated and mutilated to death live victims, and put down rebellions with mass killings. Once you go back a few centuries that was pretty much universal behavior when rulers thought it necessary.

I think this discussion also gets back to leftover Allied WWII propaganda (which doesn't mean 'false', but just simplified story to get across and have adopted by the audiecne the 'necessary' POV). 'The Japanese were just like that via their culture', when in fact the 16th century culture of Japan had no more really direct impact on 20th century behavior than in the West. There were real events in Japanese history which caused the social/political changes which manifested in Japanese policy and behavior in the 30's-40's. Of course some also had roots much further back, but it's way oversimplified to characterize as just a resumption of 'normal' after an 'aberration', which also logically implies that current Japanese society is another 'aberration', IMO a very hard to support thesis in the face of any facts or direct experience in modern Japan.

4. Actually Japanese airmen were mostly enlisted men, as opposed to mostly (and eventually almost exclusively) officers in Western air arms and had less prestige if anything.

5. I can say it because it's historically true. The IJN had a particular strategy, decisive fleet battle in a short war. But in pursuit of that strategy in the interwar period it was definitely more focused on finding technological silver bullets than the relatively more complacent RN and USN were. *During* WWII as I said, the RN and USN could use resources in civilian society, academia and industry, to make technical advances the Japanese couldn't nearly match (Japanese progress being further hindered by destructive competitiveness between IJA and IJN). Japan didn't have the same capability to make rapid technical advances in war, but the IJN was not less institutionally focused on technology as an answer to it key goal than other navies; it was more focused on it.

Also, it is true that ASW and commerce defense generally were a blind spot in Japanese naval thinking for a long time before WWII. But besides being a completely different issue than whether the outlook was 'romantic' or 'technical', the IJN's theory of beating the USN in a decisive naval action in a short war, while ultimately unsuccessful and perhaps unrealistic, was more realistic than the idea of winning a war of attrition v the US by successfully defending Japanese commerce for a long time.

Joe


----------



## tyrodtom (Jul 31, 2012)

Capt. Vick said:


> Isn't it a myth that the crickets that were given to the airborne troops and used on D-day mimiced the bolt of the german rifle and led to us deaths?


 Those little cricket clickers were still popular when I was a kid, they don't sound remotely like anyone working the bolt of a Mauser, or any other rifle bolt being worked.

Even if the sound was similiar, how many troops would be that familiar with how a Mauser bolt sounds, and really anyone waiting in ambush is going to put a round in the chamber well before there's any hostiles around, and engage the safety, maybe.
Whoever made up that little myth has seen too many movies, where the enemy has to work his bolt when surprised. In real life, any troop would already have a round chambered.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 31, 2012)

> Well this seems to have drifted far from your original (seeming) point of explaining the plausibility of the Japanese giving fearsome to names to Allied a/c due to their culture. Some of your statements now seem to pretty directly contradict that as in 3, which IMO means you've moved further torward the truth, because it was in fact particularly unlikely that the Japanese would do something like call an Allied plane by a name implying it was to be feared, even compared to other air arms, who probably wouldn't do it either


.

Read my post concerning the term "whispering death". i never said there waas any evidence to support it. My exact words were that it was *unlikely* that the term came from a japanese source. Dont try and attribute things I never said or implied to justify your obvious and overt pro-japanese bias

Anyway on a few other points,


> 1. and 2. Every modern nation has a national myth of its past, not 'myth' is sense of the 'air myths' we're speaking of here, but some semi-true story that expresses what that nation thinks it is or wants to be. It never exactly coincides with the real past. Just the fact that typical Japanese officers, commoners, would ape the habits of Samurai gives you a hint about that. That belief 'they were like the Samurai' came from the national myth created in the Meiji period, which was no aberration whatsoever, but the basis of a new society created not all that long before those 1940's men were born. Their actual ancestors weren't Samurai, they were peasants who counted for nothing, by and large. Their idea of what the Samurai was and how he should act was a mixture of history and national myth of the Meiji period, as modified (or mutated perhaps) by particular social developments between then and WWII. It's somewhat like Americans speaking of 'our traditions of the Old West', which had no actual place in the direct family lineage of the vast majority of Americans. But that's part of our national myth: the *story* of the Old West does have an impact


.



Th myth about the japanese military being the descendants came from a number of sources, the influence of the meiji was about the least important influence. The rise of japanese militarism was not a random incidental event....it permeated every aspect of military traning, and the militarists exploited japans medieval military traditions down to and including training regimes for its personnel. if you are imbued with a miltary doctrine, which we call the code of the bushido, it is a certainty that the organization as a whol, including its aviators, and its military strategists are going to have their thinking, their problem solving approaches, coloured by that thinking.

its intersting that you raise the myth of the old west. I agree that its a part of the American national psyche, but it seems to escape you that this psyche is essentially rooted in the very thing i am talking about. the myths of the old west for their time are essentially technocratic in comparison to the older, more medieval thinking of the japanese self image 




> Japan was inward looking from around the 1620's to 1850's, which isn't just to nitpick but to recognize that attitudes ca. 1550 were quite different again; Japan a major trading country at that time. And an expanisionist culture and a hermit culture are not the same thing at all; that was a real change. As far as brutality the English in the 16th century still half hung, castrated and mutilated to death live victims, and put down rebellions with mass killings. Once you go back a few centuries that was pretty much universal behavior when rulers thought it necessary


.


You are right about the period 1550 to 1620, however you fail to acknowledge that during that period the japanese fought a series of wars that progressively decreased the outward looking, progressive attitudes, and reinforced the inward looking shogunates. The ultimate outcome of that period (1550-1620) was the adoption of the isolationist policies thast we are talking about. It is therefore entirely valid for me to include 150 



> I think this discussion also gets back to leftover Allied WWII propaganda (which doesn't mean 'false', but just simplified story to get across and have adopted by the audiecne the 'necessary' POV). 'The Japanese were just like that via their culture', when in fact the 16th century culture of Japan had no more really direct impact on 20th century behavior than in the West.




sorry but this has nothing to do with post war propaganda. The japanese as a society were far more conservative and militaristic than anything seen in the west, arguably even moreso than the germans. It was (and is) an inherently conservative society, and its behaviour in the 20th century is entirely consistent with that.

because of that ultra societal conservatism, ther was and is amuch greater affinity to their medieval past than anythig we have experienced. There is nothing proagandist about that. There is, however an agenda behind trying to dress up japanese socitey as 'progressive" and "just like us"....in fact they were neither. 

There were real events in Japanese history which caused the social/political changes which manifested in Japanese policy and behavior in the 30's-40



> Of course some also had roots much further back, but it's way oversimplified to characterize as just a resumption of 'normal' after an 'aberration', which also logically implies that current Japanese society is another 'aberration', IMO a very hard to support thesis in the face of any facts or direct experience in modern Japan


.

There are plenty of sociological theses to support that very notion...suggest you do some basic research and come back to earth before making statements like that 



> 4. Actually Japanese airmen were mostly enlisted men, as opposed to mostly (and eventually almost exclusively) officers in Western air arms and had less prestige if anything


.

true that they were mostly enlisted. I would also reinforce that by saying that the military leaders that used them viewed them as 'cheap and expendable". Apart from that, almost everything else in your statement is sheer fabrication, designed i believe to achive a specific purpose and outcome. The prewar aircrews were imbued with a psyche of invincibility and indoctrinated to amuch greater extent of the military virues of their 'system" to a far greater extent than anything in the west. 



> also, it is true that ASW and commerce defense generally were a blind spot in Japanese naval thinking for a long time before WWII. But besides being a completely different issue than whether the outlook was 'romantic' or 'technical', the IJN's theory of beating the USN in a decisive naval action in a short war, while ultimately unsuccessful and perhaps unrealistic, was more realistic than the idea of winning a war of attrition v the US by successfully defending Japanese commerce for a long time.



It was also a strategic blind spot for both the RN and USN. However, whereas both the western navies recognized that defincy and reacted appropriately (some initiatives like convoying not costing a penny inrresources), the japanese displayed a marked resistance to such thinking. Almost certainly this sterms from the more authoritarian system within the IJN, japanese officers were simply not trained to think outside the square 9or circle0, wester officers were (well, generally)


----------



## A4K (Aug 1, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Cannibalism amongst the IJA was no myth.



Read once of a british officer being consumed as a 'special feast' for a visiting japanese General. Can't remember where unfortunately.


----------



## stona (Aug 1, 2012)

A4K said:


> Read once of a british officer being consumed as a 'special feast' for a visiting japanese General. Can't remember where unfortunately.



You may be thinking of the US airman Marve Mershon who,having been beheaded,was partially consummed by Japanese Officers (Chichi Jima,Feb '45).

This is an example of ritualistic cannibalism, a form of so called "customary" cannibalism,something that has been practised in many cultures around the world. The victim is not eaten because there is no other sustenance available but rather for ritualistic or magical reasons. A common belief is that the eater,by ingesting the flesh,will somehow acquire some desirable attributes perceived in the victim. 

Cannibalism in WW2 was more often driven by desperation. This is called survival cannibalism,almost anyone is capable of this. There are examples of men surviving in life boats by eating their deceased (allegedly) comrades,or even drawing lots to see who would be eaten,and who would be the killer. These weren't Japanese.
In Western cultures this type of cannibalism sometimes called "lifeboat cannibalism" is tolerated. The perpetrators did not often find themselves executed after rescue. 

The most famous modern case must surely be the survivors of the 1972 Andean plane crash. These survivors were not subject to any form of retribution and received a Papal Indulgence to remit the punishment due for the "sin" in the after life (they were all Roman Catholics).

In the US the story of the 1846 "Donner Party" is,or should be,well known.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## A4K (Aug 1, 2012)

I don't remember the time or place Steve, but I do remember a british pilot was the subject of the meal. Setting was in the jungle somewhere and food was scarce, but they wanted to prepare a special feast in the General's honour so the poor pilot (as the highest, or one of the highest ranking officers among the prisoners) got the chop. The article gave all the names and details but I've long forgotten them.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 1, 2012)

Lets keep our heads here and cut the sarcasm. I don't want this thread to implode.


----------



## stona (Aug 1, 2012)

A4K said:


> I don't remember the time or place Steve, but I do remember a british pilot was the subject of the meal. Setting was in the jungle somewhere and food was scarce, but they wanted to prepare a special feast in the General's honour so the poor pilot (as the highest, or one of the highest ranking officers among the prisoners) got the chop. The article gave all the names and details but I've long forgotten them.



I'll see if I can find the details. It's oddly weird when a name is put to the victims. I don't doubt for a second that it happened.

Not sure what sarcasm is referred to.There is no sarcasm intended in anything I wrote.
Cheers

Steve


----------



## Njaco (Aug 1, 2012)

Not you stona. The last 2 pages of posts have started to get away from the subject and fall into sarcastic attacks. Too many threads go this way and its tiresome.


----------



## meatloaf109 (Aug 1, 2012)

Cannibalism, ritual or otherwise still creeps me out.
Except for that Monty Python sketch, now that was funny!


----------



## stona (Aug 1, 2012)

Njaco said:


> Not you stona. The last 2 pages of posts have started to get away from the subject and fall into sarcastic attacks. Too many threads go this way and its tiresome.



Okay and sorry,I misunderstood 

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Capt. Vick (Aug 1, 2012)

Thanks Tyro, that's what i figured.


----------



## A4K (Aug 1, 2012)

Cheers Steve, be interested if you can find something out re the British officer. The name of the Japanese officer was definitely given, and am pretty certain the pilot's name was too. 
Wish I could remember where I read it (-possibly in an early '80s Australian 'Parade' magazine - always full of WW II articles)

Evan

(Chris, sorry if one of my posts fell into that category)


----------



## at ease (Feb 21, 2014)

Thorlifter said:


> 1. The P-38 was called "The Fork Tailed Devil" by the Germans



Today, I found some evidence that it may have been.

See:

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/p-38-german-name-39919-4.html#post1102698


----------



## parsifal (Feb 22, 2014)

1. coral sea was the battle that saved australia
2. Hellcats achieved a kill loss ration over a6Ms of 19:1
3. the war in china was ad "incident"
4. hitlers germany was a respectable regime, more or less the same as most other nations of the time
5. hitlers treatment of the jews was about the same as as the british treatment of nonwhite colonials.
6.The allies and soviets won by numbers alone
7. fighters are always the most important aircraft in the inventory


----------



## DonL (Feb 22, 2014)

> *4. hitlers germany was a respectable regime, more or less the same as most other nations of the time
> 5. hitlers treatment of the jews was about the same as as the british treatment of nonwhite colonials.*



This are no myths, this is clear revisionist history.
To my opinion, proved false statements of facts and enough to bring someone to court to get an adequate penalty.

Edit.

You can also directly formulate Point 4 just as well for the UDSSR of Stalin

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## swampyankee (Feb 22, 2014)

Oreo said:


> 4. Colin Kelly died in a suicide attack on a Japanese ship. Nope.
> 
> Somebody else take over.



To expand a bit on 4: that he was awarded the Medal of Honor. I happen to think he was a hero, but he was awarded the DSC, not the MoH.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Feb 22, 2014)

DonL said:


> This are no myths, this is clear revisionist history.
> To my opinion, proved false statements of facts and enough to bring someone to court to get an adequate penalty.
> 
> Edit.
> ...



Also, no one seriously tries to make out the Nazis to be that way. So how can they be myths. Myths are widly believed? Who besides possibly the minority known as Neo Nazis believes this?


----------



## DonL (Feb 22, 2014)

*Nobody!*


----------



## GregP (Feb 22, 2014)

Hi Parsifal,

Never hear the F6F being touted as having a kill-to-loss ratio over A6M's of 19:1 before. It did over all aerial opposition taken as a whole, but not specifically over A6M's. Maybe that's a prevalent belief in Australia?

Another that gets me is people claiming the highest kill ratio for FM-2's. It's a Wildcat and belongs in with the Wildcats. I don't see anyone tying to make a separate category for the F4U-4 from the F4U-1 ... they were Corsairs. Or one for a separate F6F-3 from the F6F-5. There was more horsepower difference between an F4U-4 and an F4U-1 than there was between an F4F and an FM-2, and more for the F6F-5.

Heck, the Bf 109 started with less than 1,000 HP and wound up with about 1,500, but they don't try to differentiate the victories among the variants. The ONLY reason we see this we HAVE the data for the two variants in the case of the FM-2 and the rest of the Wildcats due to the Navy combat reports, but not for ANY other fighter variants in WWII. Sorry, a Wildcat is a Wildcat.

At least in my book, they're all Wildcats together.

To tell you the truth, the notion of counting all the victories divided by only the losses to enemy aircraft alone is suspect itself.

I understand not counting losses to Flak, as no pilot sees incoming shells fired from the ground ... but operational losses should be counted against all kills, too. If you lost 4 Hellcats due to mechanical failure, they're still stricken from the books and are lost ... if on action missions. Reliability is a part of every weapon system and causes real-life losses that are aviodable if the reliability was better.

Just my opinion. Like the mileage you get in your car, opinons vary.


----------



## Balljoint (Feb 24, 2014)

parsifal said:


> 4. hitlers germany was a respectable regime, more or less the same as most other nations of the time



Basically true relative to other nations of the time of the Thirty Years War.


----------



## Rick65 (Feb 24, 2014)

I had to look up the 30 year war to understand Balljoint's post.
Glad I did as my knowledge of pre industrial european history isn't great and I was stunned to see another example of the horror that countries and people put themselves through.


----------



## GrauGeist (Feb 24, 2014)

Rick65 said:


> I had to look up the 30 year war to understand Balljoint's post.
> Glad I did as my knowledge of pre industrial european history isn't great and I was stunned to see another example of the horror that countries and people put themselves through.


That was one of countless protracted wars that plagued Europe over the centuries.

If one looks at the list of all European wars, it's a wonder that Europe has any people left in it.
List of conflicts in Europe - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


----------



## parsifal (Feb 24, 2014)

few match the size and savagery of hitlers war, particularly in the East. Its the sheer scale of the thing that sets the German wars apart from all the others, including bonapartes war.

The 30 years war was possibly a more savage conflict, but both WWII and the 30 years war were fought on ideological grounds, so whatever differences existed, is more logistical than a matter of intent


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Feb 24, 2014)

parsifal said:


> few match the size and savagery of hitlers war, particularly in the East. Its the sheer scale of the thing that sets the German wars apart from all the others, including bonapartes war.
> 
> The 30 years war was possibly a more savage conflict, but both WWII and the 30 years war were fought on ideological grounds, so whatever differences existed, is more logistical than a matter of intent



I still don't see how it is a myth. The small group of people that may believe it are a serious minority. In order for something to be a myth, there has to be a large group of people that follow or believe it.


----------



## parsifal (Feb 24, 2014)

you are probably right, if the definition of a myth is as you say something that enters widespread or general acceptance. To a degree I dont agree with even the notion that it is not a widespread or generally held belief. particularly on the internet, people can say anything, and there will always be someone that believes it. In more normal academic realms, a person may make a serious claim by publishing a paper, backing it up with hard facts, and then subjecting his theary or claim to review and scrutiny by his peers. That seldom happens in the hothouse of a forum. People will often make claims, often with some fact nicely embeded with a lie, and others will inevitably believe the lie. You know the saying....you can fool some of the people some of the time.......

But the definition of myth doesnt really have anything to do with how many people believe or accept the myth. a myth can have just one believer, or even none....

The online dictionary defines myth as follows:


myth
[mith] Show IPA 

noun 
1. 
a traditional or legendary story, usually concerning some being or hero or event, with or without a determinable basis of fact or a natural explanation, especially one that is concerned with deities or demigods and explains some practice, rite, or phenomenon of nature. 

2. 
stories or matter of this kind: realm of myth. 

3. 
any invented story, idea, or concept: His account of the event is pure myth. 

4. 
an imaginary or fictitious thing or person. 

5. 
an unproved or false collective belief that is used to justify a social institution. 

none of the above require mass acceptance of the myth


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Feb 24, 2014)

It may need mass acceptance, but I still don't see how it is accepted by people (other than maybe an extreme minority), nore has it ever been presented as a myth. 

Where in all seriousness are these things believed?


----------



## GregP (Feb 25, 2014)

Noplace I've ever heard of, that's for sure.

On the other hand, many Nazis seemingly escaped captivity by the allies somewhere in South America. Maybe it's a myth there.

I'm not sure I'd want to go down and find out.


----------



## wheelsup_cavu (Feb 25, 2014)

My foggy memory seems to think it was Bolivia that they were purported to have fled to after the war to escape prosecution.


Wheels


----------



## GrauGeist (Feb 25, 2014)

And Uruguay


----------



## Milosh (Feb 25, 2014)

wheelsup_cavu said:


> My foggy memory seems to think it was Bolivia that they were purported to have fled to after the war to escape prosecution.
> 
> Wheels



As well as Argentina, Peru, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay each had German residents so easy to blend in.

*Many* were helped to get there by the Roman Catholic Church.


----------



## GregP (Feb 25, 2014)

Many were also helped there by South American countries themselves and the German people within them.


----------



## parsifal (Feb 25, 2014)

Part I 
David irving is one historian that seriously denies the holocaust and , as i understand it claims that Hitler was justified in his reprisals and behaviour

David Irving - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

There are people in this place that believe in this stuff. Several over the years have claimed that the holocaust was overblown (Kurfurst). one current member, has stated that hitlers regime was justified to go to war. i will not name him. 

Justifying Hitler is the flip side of antisemitism, and antisemitism is statistically on the rise again in Europe. The following is from wiki, but it explains very well, why myths such as ive stated are very much thriving and surviving. the two issues, anti semitism and Nazi revisionism, are pretty well inextricably linked, though i admit that they are not the same. The association is what might be called a surogatre measurement......but it is still valid means of estimation

This is from wiki

_With the end of World War II in 1945, the surviving Jews began to return to their homes although many chose to emigrate to the United States, Great Britain, and British-controlled Palestine. In many ways, the antisemitism of the Nazi regime was continued in different guises. Claims of blood libel and persecution of Jews continued, in part due to fear that the returning Jews would attempt to reclaim property stolen during the Holocaust or expose the true nature of the assistance given by the local population in the previously Nazi-occupied territories. One culminating example was the Kielce pogrom, which occurred in 1946 in Poland when citizens violently attacked Jews based on a false accusation of the kidnapping of a Christian child.

The postwar period also witnessed a rise in antisemitic feeling in the USSR. In 1948, Stalin launched the campaign against the "rootless cosmopolitan" in which numerous Yiddish-language poets, writers, painters and sculptors were killed or arrested. Also, in the Doctors' Plot issued between 1952-1953, a number of Jewish doctors were arrested and accused of attempting to murder leading party leaders. There were also assumptions, made by modern historians such as Edvard Radzinsky, that Stalin planned to deport the Jewish population of the USSR to exile in Kazakhstan or Siberia.

After the foundation of Israel and the escalation of the Israeli-Arab conflict, a new kind of antisemitism began to emerge in Europe as a part of the anti-imperialist struggle of the extreme left. The criticism against Israel as a conquering imperial power and the solidarity between the extreme left and the Palestinian struggle led to a perceived connection between European Jews and Zionism. In some cases, this connection resulted in attacks on the Jewish communities in Western Europe. One example is the German leftist terrorist group "Revolutionary Cells" whose members participated in hijacking the Air France Flight 139 in 1976 (Operation Entebbe) as well as the planned assassination of the head of the German Jewish community, Heinz Galinski and famous Nazi hunter Simon Wiesenthal.[7] During those years, the antisemitic attacks from various neo-Nazi groups and the flourishing of antisemitic conspiracy theories continued throughout western Europe.

In the 21st century[edit]

Antisemitism has increased significantly in Europe since 2000, with significant increases in verbal attacks against Jews and vandalism such as graffiti, fire bombings of Jewish schools, desecration of synagogues and cemeteries (my emphasis). Those incidents took place not only in France and Germany, where antisemitic incidents are the highest in Europe but also in counties like Belgium, Austria, and the United Kingdom. In those countries, physical assaults against Jews including beatings, stabbings and other violence, increased markedly, in a number of cases resulting in serious injury and even death.[8][9] Moreover, the Netherlands and Sweden have also had consistently high rates of antisemitic attacks since 2000.[10]

This rise in antisemitic attacks is associated one the one hand with the Muslim Anti-Semitism and on the other hand with the rise of far right parties as a result of the economic crisis of 2008. The failure of assimilation of Muslim immigrants communities in Europe together with economic and social problems and the spread of fundamentalist ideas among the Muslim youth in Europe has led to radicalization inside the Muslim communities and especially among the youth. This, together with the escalation of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict and the failure of the Oslo peace process, the Jews in Europe were more and more perceived as promoters and favors of pro-Israeli ideas. Thus, the thin line that existed before between antisemitism and anti-Zionism has become even thinner. A number of studies conducted among the Muslim youth in various western European countries have showed that Muslim children have far more anti-Semitic ideas than Christian children- in 2011 Mark Elchardus, a Belgian sociologist, published a report on Dutch-language elementary schools in Brussels. He found that about 50 percent of Muslim students in second and third grade could be considered anti-Semites, versus 10% of others. In the same year Unther Jikeli published his findings from the 117 interviews he conducted with Muslim male youngsters (average age 19) in Berlin, Paris and London.. The majority of the interviewees voiced some, or strong anti-Semitic feelings. They expressed them openly and often aggressively.[11]

A large number of violent antisemitic attacks in Europe were done by Muslims- the murder of 4 Jews in Toulouse in 2012 by Mohammed Merah,[12] the 1982 attack on the Jewish Goldenberg restaurant in Paris that was carried out by Arab terrorists, the kidnapping and murder of the French citizen Ilan Halimi in 2006 by a Muslim gang and the antisemitic riots in Norway in 2009 are a few examples to this phenomenon.[11]

The second cause of the rise in the scope of antisemitism in Europe is the economic crisis that started in 2008 and resulted in the rise of far right parties, anti-immigration and antisemitic ideas.[13] The number of anti-Semitic political parties in European parliaments rose from 1 to 3 during 2012 and a survey in 10 European countries revealed high levels of anti-Semitic attitudes. In June, Greece's neo-Nazi party, Golden Dawn, won 21 seats in parliament. In November, the radical Svoboda (Freedom) party of Ukraine captured more than 10% of the popular vote, giving electoral support to a party well known for its anti-Semitic rhetoric. They joined the ranks of Jobbik, an openly anti-Semitic party, in the Hungarian parliament.[14] This rise in the support for far right ideas in western and eastern Europe has resulted in the increase of antisemitic acts, mostly attacks on Jewish memorials, synagogues and cemeteries but also a number of physical attacks against Jews.[15]_


----------



## parsifal (Feb 25, 2014)

part Ii (contd)

According to a poll conducted by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) in 2012, anti-Semitic attitudes in ten European countries remain at "disturbingly high levels", peaking in Eastern Europe and Spain, with large swaths of the population subscribing to classical anti-Semitic notions such as Jews having too much power in business, being more loyal to Israel than their own country, or "talking too much" about what happened during the Holocaust. In comparison with a similar ADL poll conducted in 2009, several of the countries showed high levels in the overall level of anti-Semitism, while other countries experienced more modest increases:[16]
Austria: Experienced a slight decrease to 28 percent from 30 percent in 2009.
France: The overall level of antisemitism increased to 24 percent of the population, up from to 20 percent in 2009.
Germany: antisemitism increased by one percentage point, to 21 percent of the population.
Hungary: The level rose to 63 percent of the population, compared with 47 percent in 2009.
Poland: The number remained unchanged, with 48 percent of the population showing deep-seated antisemitic attitudes.
Spain: Fifty-three percent (53%) percent of the population, compared to 48 percent in 2009.
United Kingdom: antisemitic attitudes jumped to 17 percent of the population, compared to 10 percent in 2009.

In Eastern Europe anti-Semitism in the 21st century continued in a similar scale of the 1990s. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the instability of the new states has brought the rise of nationalist movements and the accusation against Jews for the economic crisis, taking over the local economy and bribing the government alongside with traditional and religious motives for amtisemitism (blood libels for example).

Most of the antisemitic incidents are against Jewish cemeteries and building (community centers and synagogues). Nevertheless there were several violent attacks against Jews in Moscow in 2006 when a neo-Nazi stabbed 9 people at the Bolshaya Bronnaya Synagogue,[17] the failed bomb attack on the same synagogue in 1999,[18] the threats against Jewish pilgrims in Uman, Ukraine[19] and the attack against a menorah by extremist Christian organization in Moldova in 2009.[20]

Since the outbreak of the economic crisis of 2008 there has been a rise in the scope of antisemitic incidents with the rise in power of nationalist parties such as "Svoboda" in Ukraine although the number of physical attacks against Jews remains low. Eastern Europe was less affected by the rise of Islamic antisemitism because of much smaller numbers of Muslims living in the area . Nevertheless, in areas and countries populated by Muslims, such as the Caucuses there had been an increase in antisemitism as a result of the Israeli-Arab conflict such as the attempt to assassinate a Jewish teacher in Baku in 2012.[21][22]

A statistical analysis shows that 150 million people in across Europe have "serious anti-Semitic" or "demonic view of Israel".[2]

Academic research[edit]

The summary of a 2004 poll by the "Pew Global Attitudes Project" noted, "Despite concerns about rising antisemitism in Europe, there are no indications that anti-Jewish sentiment has increased over the past decade. Favorable ratings of Jews are actually higher now in France, Germany and Russia than they were in 1991. Nonetheless, Jews are better liked in the U.S. than in Germany and Russia."[23] However, according to 2005 survey results by the Anti-Defamation League,[24] antisemitic attitudes remain common in Europe. Over 30% of those surveyed indicated that Jews have too much power in business, with responses ranging from lows of 11% in Denmark and 14% in England to highs of 66% in Hungary, and over 40% in Poland and Spain. The results of religious antisemitism also linger and over 20% of European respondents agreed that Jews were responsible for the death of Jesus, with France having the lowest percentage at 13% and Poland having the highest number of those agreeing, at 39%.[25]

A 2006 study in the Journal of Conflict Resolution found that although almost no respondents in countries of the European Union regarded themselves as antisemitic, antisemitic attitudes correlated with anti-Israel opinions.[26] Looking at populations in 10 European countries, Small and Kaplan surveyed 5,000 respondents, asking them about Israeli actions and classical anti-Semitic stereotypes. "There were questions about whether the IDF purposely targets children, whether Israel poisons the Palestinians' water supply - these sorts of extreme mythologies," Small says. "The people who believed the anti-Israel mythologies also tended to believe that Jews are not honest in business, have dual loyalties, control government and the economy, and the like," Small says. According to this study, anti-Israel respondents were 56% more likely to be anti-Semitic than the average European. "This is extraordinary. It's off the charts." says Small. The study also found that popular levels of both antisemitism and anti-Israel opinion were lower than expected, and did not equate antisemitism with anti-Zionism.[27[/I]

Antisemitism in Europe - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


----------



## GregP (Feb 25, 2014)

Tell me what you're really trying to say in one sentence.


----------



## pattern14 (Feb 25, 2014)

GregP said:


> Tell me what you're really trying to say in one sentence.


 I guess it says that anti semitism is still as strong as ever, although anti Israeli might be mixed up in it as well. I remember reading many years ago ( I seem to think it was from the author Len Deighton, of "Bomber " fame ) that "few historians" would disagree that If Hitler had not been anti semitic, the Nazi's would have developed the atomic bomb first, mounted it in a V2, and won the war. The theory obviously being that Jewish scientists, engineers and physicists would have stayed in Germany and worked for the regime. Something of a nightmarish scenario in my opinion.


----------



## GregP (Feb 25, 2014)

I know that is what he was saying; just wanted to hear it from the source.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Feb 25, 2014)

My point parsifal is that serious and intelligent people don't believe it. It is not myth. Turning it into a myth is exagerating how much it is believed.


----------



## parsifal (Feb 25, 2014)

we probably will have to accept each others pov I guess. I think it was hitler that said something like "the people will believe the big lie more than they will believe a little lie", or something similar . if that is true, then the creed that hitler has been massively maligned and misunderstood by the verdicts of history might be accepted more easily than you would expect. Economic collapse generated the right conditions in the depression years to allow the Germans to make themselves believe that hitler was a good thing for them. We have a smaller, weaker economic collapse on our hands now, and we see already a rise in anti-semitism. People like to blame someone when things dont go right. We fell for Hitlers song 80 years ago, because in our deepest darkest parts of our minds it was easy listening. We were unhappy and hitler offered an easy way to blame someone else for that. Why would it be any less easy to achieve today. And it starts by convincing some of the people out there that hitlers was not such a bad guy......

thats why its important never to let the little lies take hold


----------



## parsifal (Feb 25, 2014)

GregP said:


> I know that is what he was saying; just wanted to hear it from the source.



Yeah, might talk a bit much sometimes. My apologies for that, but then, ill beat my own drum and claim its great read.......


----------



## buffnut453 (Feb 25, 2014)

I always said your humility was one of your greatest traits, Parsifal.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## GrauGeist (Feb 25, 2014)

parsifal said:


> thats why its important never to let the little lies take hold


Strongly agree...

Sometimes the truth makes a person uncomfortable and there is a tendency these days to take the sharp edges off of the truth so that everyone can remain in their comfort zone.

The problem is, that the sharp edges of the truth is what prevents society from falling into the same trap over and over again.

It seems to be a human trait to look for a target to place blame on when there's difficult circumstances: Christians in Rome, Chinese in California Goldfields, Jews repeatedly through history and the list sadly goes on.

The moment history is altered, it opens Pandora's box.

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## bobbysocks (Feb 25, 2014)

Milosh said:


> As well as Argentina, Peru, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay each had German residents so easy to blend in.
> 
> *Many* were helped to get there by the Roman Catholic Church.



that was the odessa project....as many as 9000 ( or more ) escaped to SA...brazil was also big. supposedly juan peron of argentine sold 10,000 blank passports to odessa and ~800 passports were given to them by the vatican. but then again how many were given clean slates if they came to the us and uk to share their expertise in various fields...??


----------



## GregP (Feb 25, 2014)

In your post 178 however, you say that WE feel for Hitler's stuff at the time ... who is “we?”

Some in Germany and elsewhere did, but a hell of a lot of people didn't. There were Nazi sympathizers in many places before the Holocaust took place. A lot may have been due to sympathy for the poverty caused by the war reparations clause in the Treaty of Versailles. When the Nazi atrocities came to light after the war, there were very few Nazi sympathizers remaining. Did they still exist? Yes, else the Nazis could not have fled to anywhere for safety. But you didn't find too many.

It is a sad note that society puts up with them. Your notes above indicate anti-Semitism is on the rise in Europe. They don't indicate a rise in Nazi thinking; they indicate a rise in anti-Semitism. I wonder if anyone has done a study to find the root cause of European anti-Semitism. I know a lot of Jewish people here in the USA and, to date, none have done anything to harm ME in any way. Are European Jews so different from that? What exactly are they doing to garner all this ill feeling?

If the real answer is, "nothing," then the anti-Semitic Europeans need some serious soul searching to contemplate what is wrong within themselves. Most of the Europeans I have met have been very nice. Out of the 120 - 150 I have met and interacted with at the Planes of Fame Air Museum over the last 8 years or so there have been maybe 2 - 3 that I could have done without meeting. That is not an unusual ratio and, in fact, says a lot positive about Europeans. Now we didn't discuss Jews ... we were mostly talking about aircraft. But I spent enough time and went to lunch with enough to have had many one hour plus long conversations. Almost all were pleasant.

Statistics is a mathematical science that depends upon rigorous collection of random data. One of the potentially really bad things about polls is the way the samples are collected. If you don't work very hard to get a truly random sample, you get skewed results. For instance, if you conduct your polls at large shopping centers, you get a classically skewed view of the population because most people don't shop at large shopping centers ... the large shopping centers attract a certain tripe of clientele that is not representative of the population ... it is representative of mall shoppers.

So if the polls you quote above were conducted by people with an agenda in anti-Semitism, you have to ask yourself how representative of true European anti-Semitic attitudes the polls are. I would not claim the polls were wrong unless I investigated them personally and concluded so myself.

The Anti-Defamation League was founded in 1913 "to stop the defamation of the Jewish people and to secure justice and fair treatment to all." Now the nation's premier civil rights/human relations agency, ADL fights anti-Semitism and all forms of bigotry, defends democratic ideals and protects civil rights for all.

An organization created to fight anti-Semitism would hardly be the logical choice to come forward with a glowing report, would it? Perhaps the rise in European anti-Semitism coincides with a large influx of Muslim immigrants into Europe? I don’t really know for sure. I advocate tolerating any religion as long as that religion recognizes the right of all people to practice other than that religion.

What should happen if a particular religion doesn’t recognize that right might best be left to somewhere other than a WWII aviation forum. Should a society put up with it legally or ethically? Therein lies a considerable discussion with little or nothing to do with the WWII aircraft we all love.

We may have very similar feelings. I could have a pretty good discussion with you about it elsewhere but I think not in here.


----------



## parsifal (Feb 25, 2014)

> Some in Germany and elsewhere did, but a hell of a lot of people didn't. There were Nazi sympathizers in many places before the Holocaust took place. A lot may have been due to sympathy for the poverty caused by the war reparations clause in the Treaty of Versailles. When the Nazi atrocities came to light after the war, there were very few Nazi sympathizers remaining. Did they still exist? Yes, else the Nazis could not have fled to anywhere for safety. But you didn't find too many.




belief that hitler was an honourable man that people could trust and do business with was a LOT wider than you are suggesting. even Winston Churchill, in the beginning, thought hitler was someone that could achieve a lot of good things. Rapidly thinking rational people began to have the ir suspicions, but sadly, as a generalization, this is not true of Germany. Hitler had this knack of keeping most people in the dark of his true intentions, or the wider picture, the result was that many groups supported hitler, believing they were part of his "special interest" groups. It is believed, for example that durung the 1932 elections, a majority of Jews voted for Hitler, because apparently Hitler was saying quietly on the side to Jewish leaders ("dont worry about all that other stuff....im just saying that to pander to the crowd...i really need you guys so dont worry about it!' they didnt. 

I disagree that the majority of germans either did not believe in Hitler, or acquiesced to his lies and deceit until very nearly the end. it persisted somewhat after the war, but was gradually worn away by the denazification program, and by German society itself. This is not meant to be an indictement of germany today. its a vastly different place to 1938. 



> It is a sad note that society puts up with them. Your notes above indicate anti-Semitism is on the rise in Europe. They don't indicate a rise in Nazi thinking; they indicate a rise in anti-Semitism. I wonder if anyone has done a study to find the root cause of European anti-Semitism. I know a lot of Jewish people here in the USA and, to date, none have done anything to harm ME in any way. Are European Jews so different from that? What exactly are they doing to garner all this ill feeling?



Antisemitism and neonazism are different, and yet they go hand in hand. if you are an anti semite, chances are, you will also relate to some or all neo-nazi beliefs. its not just the thugs running these political parties, it includes those who see something and say "I can agree with some of that". And the facts are far right, neo fascist movements in Europe are on the rise as far as attracting votes. Just have a look at how many seats Golden Dawn secured in the greek parliament. Similar things are happening across Europe. How many of these guys believe hitler was a good guy? ive no idea, but I bet its a lot.

Last statement is worrying greg. Except for their religion, Jews are no "different" to any other persecuted minority. Except that Jews have more or less been the subject of persecution since the resurrection. Its not their fault they are persecuted. its the attitudes towards them that do that, and the fact they are different is not reason to allow or tolerate prejudice 



> Statistics is a mathematical science that depends upon rigorous collection of random data. One of the potentially really bad things about polls is the way the samples are collected. If you don't work very hard to get a truly random sample, you get skewed results. For instance, if you conduct your polls at large shopping centers, you get a classically skewed view of the population because most people don't shop at large shopping centers ... the large shopping centers attract a certain tripe of clientele that is not representative of the population ... it is representative of mall shoppers.



Random population sampling is part of my current job, so I do get that, and you are right. I have no idea if the sampling done for that wiki article was rigorous or not, however i do know that more than one survery, from completely different sources and data collection are all coming up with the same general trends. It would require a lot more research I agree, but im satisfied the data sets are accurate enough to draw some generalised conclusions. 



> So if the polls you quote above were conducted by people with an agenda in anti-Semitism, you have to ask yourself how representative of true European anti-Semitic attitudes the polls are. I would not claim the polls were wrong unless I investigated them personally and concluded so myself.



There will always be bias in the sampling techniques, it unavoidable, and the person or organization undertakling the research is most definately relevant. however , separate independant studies are being conducted into this sort of thing all the time, across the world, by secular and non-secular organizations. Most credible are the various university studies that are being done into this phenomena. Are we all dedicated left wingers with the express intent of painting an innaccurate picture of national moods and trends. if that is the case, then lord help us. it means our long term urban planning and resource allocations are all skewed by dodgy social networks planning. i would suggest greg,, that you need to be a little more trusting and get out a bit more.


----------



## GregP (Feb 25, 2014)

The statement that you find worrying might be so if taken on its own, out of context. It was preceeded with. "Are European Jews so different?" meaning are THEY doing something to harm people? I seriously doubt it, but am not exactly up on internal European intrigue ... largely due to its non-coverage in our press rather than from any disinterest on my part. I wish our press covered the rest of the world better than it does.

I was seeking to point out that persecution should not be tolerated. Political activism should be against a behavior, not a race or religion ... unless that religion is intolerant and causing civil discord in a free society. In other words, if something is harming the body politic, then maybe it should be expelled. If there is no action against the people by a group, then persecution against that group should not be tolerated.

I find that reasonable, but it's only my opinion.


----------



## parsifal (Feb 25, 2014)

I think we are pretty okay on this. The point that led to this was never meant to be the proliferation of anti-semitism, or even the rise of neo fascist beliefs. The starting point was whether ther is a credible basis for my claim that the myth that hitler was good was alive, or just my imagination at work. Adler doesnt think that it is a credible myth, and i do respect that pov. it has some validity. I believe differently. ther is no easy way to say which opinion is right, because were are trying to gauge peoples opinions here. So in the context of this forum, people will need to form their own opinions I guess.

Maybe i should have a think about the hellcat issue. havent forgotten, just havent had time to respond.


----------



## Garyt (Feb 25, 2014)

My Grandparents were living in Germany in the 30's-40's (My mother was a child and lived with them as well of course).

My Grandfather thought Hitler was a good thing at first, but by the late 30's he as well as a fair amount of other Germans were not as enthralled with Hitler anymore. He was speaking out against Hitler to someone where he worked at, was picked up by the SS and kept a few days. My Grandmother thought he was dead, but he was let go after some interrogation, intimidation and a little physical beating.

This is a tad bit of a tangent, but he who wins also writes history. What the loser does are considered war crimes, the winner is considered a hero for these same things. Look at Donitz for instance - Nimitz even testified in his defense saying the US subs operated in the same manner, and Donitz received a life sentence. It was probably the thought by many Allied Commanders that he was unjustly imprisoned that led to his early release. 

Torpedoing Ships and not rescuing survivors was a war crime - how about bombing innocent civilians, particularily if the intent of such bombing was to induce a fireball that would consume much of the civilian population? Or even worse, the terror weapon of the 20th century, the atomic bomb? Somehow I think killing over 200,000 civilian men women and children with 2 bombs is more of a war crime than the Bataan death March, a forced march without provisions. At least those on the Bataan death march only had about a 7% chance of dying - those in Hiroshima and Nagasaki I would not think were as fortunate.

Oh well, I digress

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## GregP (Feb 25, 2014)

Actually I think Hitler may habe neen perceived as a pretty good thing while he was building up the German economy from dire poverty brought on by the Treaty of Versilles to a position of respectability again. I knew a woman (married to a good friend of mine, they were both friends) who was a 16 year old Luftwaffe airplame spotter when the war ended. She said that when people were starving, Hitler at least brought food back to the tables in enough supply to make him preferrable to starving. So people supported him even while disagreeing with some things he said.

The first thing he did when he came to power was to disarm the civilians and by the time the average German KNEW what he was, the German military had the only firearms in the country, they were in a war that none of the civilians wanted or much understood, and if you disagreed very loudly, your food supply was cut off and you might be imprisoned or killed. She said that by mid 1942, virtually every German civilian knew they had made a mistake supporting Hitler but were pretty much powerless to do anything about it. You can't fight Mauser K-98's and trained soldiers with pitchforks very successfully. Some near the concentration camps knew what was going on from the smell, but others who were farther away and had little communication with those near the camps, generally didn't. It's not like the internet was around and news was fast ... it was released by Nazi propaganda Czars and only the official news was heard on the radio or seen in print. Word of mouth was around but quite slow compared with today when people get around a lot. In WWII Germany, people could be born, grow up, live and die all in the same town. By the time it became more generally known, she said that many were certain the entire country would be killed by the advancing Allies when the war was lost despite the fact that the German civilians had nothing to say about what decisions were made in the Reich. 

Their opinions were not solicited nor were they given any thought or consideration. Hitler was in absolute power and simply did whatever he wanted by issuing orders, not by asking opinions of others.

I asked her about becomming a Nazi and she said that when her family joined the party, the alternatives were to join, survive and have food to eat or not join and starve slowly while being ostracized by the people in power, imprisoned or worse. Her duties were to man a tower and report by phone line the planes she saw with the approximate number, type, speed, heading, and altitude. She did that for about 6 months until the war ended, and at least got fed daily while she was in the tower and was not acosted by the troops since she was in German uniform.

So I think there was some amount of support for Hitler early on when his entire agenda was not generally known to the world at large. After it was, pretty much after the war had been won in Europe, much of that support waned. It took the end of the war and the liberation of some of the camps to make anyone much realize what had been going on and to what extent within the Reich. I think "Mein Kampf" was translated into English in 1933, but not very many copies were sold or distributed. I don't think Hitler settled on extermination of Jews until sometimes in the mid-1930's. Up until the war he was a political animal and had not yet become the worst criminal of the 20th century.

In fact, it was probably only after about 1939 that Hitler departed from being at least somewhat seen as "reasonable" in many circles. By that time, WWII had started and there was little to be done except see what happened to the world as the war spread. During the war, Allied news was also censored, but not quite to the extent it was in Germany.

Today, 80 years later and well after any classification should have expired, does anyone really think they know everything that happend, why, and who knew or planned it? The Allies committed what might be called atrocities, too, but the winning side rarely prosecutes itslef much as the people who make up a layoff list at work very rarely add their own name to it.

Reactions: Like Like:
3 | Like List reactions


----------



## tyrodtom (Feb 25, 2014)

Germany's population in 1940 was 80.6 million people, at it's peak, the Nazi party had 8.5 million members.

Roughly 1/2 half of that 80 million people would have been of adult age where they could have been party members. 

It's sort of revealing that when faced with the same choices as your acquaintances Greg, 4 out of 5 Germans chose NOT to join the Nazi party.

And I think you should do some research on the German gun laws of the 30's, especially the gun laws passed in 1938, everything put out by the NRA isn't necessarily true.


----------



## GrauGeist (Feb 25, 2014)

A quick look at German firearm regulations

*1919* - "Regulations on Weapons Ownership" legislation enacted, which stated that anyone in possession of a firearm of any kind and/or ammunition of any kind, for any circumstances, would be imprisoned up to 5 years AND fined 100,000 marks.
*1928* - "Law on Firearms and Ammunition" legislation relaxed the law of 1919 to a certain degree, by repealing the law of 1919 but put into place firearm licensing that was closely regulated. In this law, a citizen could own a firearm by permit. They could buy/sell firearms by permit. They could carry a firearm by permit. They could manufacture firearms by permit. Any firearm manufacturer or dealer was required to keep a record of customers, complete with weapon serial numbers and provide these records to police annually.
*1938* - "German Weapons Act" was a new law that superseded the 1928 Law on Firearms and Ammunition act with several revisions and additions. In order to obtain any permit, the citizen had to prove their need for a firearm and had to prove their good civic character. It removed restrictions on long-guns and ammunition while hand-gun ownership remained closely regulated. It changed the legal age of possession from 20 years old to 18 and extended permit validation from 1 year to 3. The 1928 provision for tight record keeping was carried over, emphasizing on recorded accuracy of customer information and firearm serial numbers to be provided to police.

The legislation of 1938 also made provisions for firearm ownership permit exemptions if: you were a hunting permit holder, a member of the government or a member of the NSDAP.
It also made a provision that Jews were forbidden to possess any dangerous weapon, including firearms or ammunition. It also forbade Jews from manufacturing or selling firearms or ammunition.


----------



## parsifal (Feb 25, 2014)

my step father comes from Berlin, and his parents house is still owned by his relations. As an aside, its back boundary was the demarcation line in 1945 between east and west berlin....

he says just about everyone knew what was going on from before the war, and where it was leading to. From Krystalnacht on there was no doubt as to the outcome, but the re-housing and redistribution of wealth derived from the property confiscations. he said nobody really objected, and in fact there was a fair degree of support for what was happening.

The treaty was not the cause of germany's economic predicament. That has been fairly conclusively proven in a number of books. moreover, the claim that Hitler suspended payments is untrue, as that was in effect from 1931 initiated by bruning. This idea that versailles was to blame for Germany's problems is again linked back to the idea that Hitlers was a good guy an in fact is a lie propagated by the man himself, and believed by many . 

In a speech to the Reichstag on 17 May 1933, Adolf Hitler denounced the Treaty of Versailles because, in part, he claimed it had imposed such large reparations payments as to leave Germany in economic shambles. 


"All the problems which are causing such unrest today lie in the deficiencies of the Treaty of Peace which did not succeed in solving in a clear and reasonable way the questions of the most decisive importance for the future. Neither national nor economic—to say nothing of legal—problems and demands of the nations were settled by this treaty in such a way as to stand the criticism of reason in the future. It is therefore natural that the idea of revision is not only one of the constant accompaniments of the effects of this treaty, but that it was actually foreseen as necessary by the authors of the Treaty and therefore given a legal foundation in the Treaty itself…. 

"It is not wise to deprive a people of the economic resources necessary for its existence without taking into consideration the fact that the population dependent on them are bound to the soil and will have to be fed. The idea that the economic extermination of a nation of sixty-five millions would be of service to other nations is absurd. Any people inclined to follow such a line of thought would, under the law of cause and effect, soon experience that the doom which they were preparing for another nation would swiftly overtake them. The very idea of reparations and the way in which they were enforced will become a classic example in the history of the nations of how seriously international welfare can be damaged by hasty and unconsidered action. 

"As a matter of fact, the policy of reparations could only be financed by German exports. To the same extent as Germany, for the sake of reparations, was regarded in the light of an international exporting concern, the export of the creditor nations was bound to suffer. The economic benefit accruing from the reparation payments could therefore never make good the damage which the system of reparations inflicted upon the individual economic systems. 

"The attempt to prevent such a development by compensating for a limitation of German exports by the grant of credits, in order to render payments possible, was no less short-sighted and mistaken in the end. For the conversion of political debts into private obligations led to an interest service which was bound to have the same results. The worst feature, however, was that the development of internal economic life was artificially hindered and ruined. The struggle to gain the world markets by constant underselling led to excessive rationalization measures in the economic field. 

"The millions of German unemployed are the final result of this development. If it was desired, however, to restrict reparation obligations to deliveries in kind, this must naturally cause equally serious damage to the internal production of the nations receiving them. For deliveries in kind to the amount involved are unthinkable without most seriously endangering the production of the individual nations. 

"The Treaty of Versailles is to blame for having inaugurated a period in which financial calculations appear to destroy economic reason. 

"Germany has faithfully fulfilled the obligations imposed upon her, in spite of their intrinsic lack of reason and the obviously suicidal consequences of this fulfillment. 

"The international economic crisis is the indisputable proof of the correctness of this statement." 

— From Norman H. Baynes, ed. The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922–August 1939. Vol. 2. New York, 1969 "

All this is a lie, or substantially so, and yet more evidence of the belief that hitler was really a good guy misunderstood. Germany's economic crisis of 1918-33 was derived far more because of the way the Germans had finanaced their war effort. according to MacMillan, Margaret (2003). Peacemakers: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War. John Murray. ISBN 978-0-719-56237-2.

In summary they say that During the First World War Germany could not import or export industrial goods, which severely limited trade. Food and other resources were diverted to the war effort.

To pay for the war, rather than raise taxes, the Kaiser borrowed massive amounts of money by selling ‘war bonds’ to the public. By the end of the war the country was heavily in debt, far more so than any other nation. As a result, by 1919 Germany was no longer the second most economically advanced nation in the world and unable to meet its foreign debt obligations. it was already insolvent as a national government. 

The immediate economic consequences of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles were a significant concern and added to Germany’s humiliation. Under the terms of the treaty Germany had to pay huge sums in reparations. In 1921, this amount was set at £6.6 billion, but they were already in debt to amuch greater degree than that (some sources say $60 billion others have other figures, but they are all substantially greater than the amount impposed by Versailles, which was successsivly extended as it became apparent Germany simply could not pay the reparations imposed on her). No denying that versailles was bad for germany, but it is just untrue that Versailles caused the german economic crisis. that was already inevitable by the time of the german surrender.


----------



## parsifal (Feb 25, 2014)

Part II

The treaty in detail 

The London Schedule of Payments, of 5 May 1921, established "the full liability of all the Central Powers combined, not just Germany alone," at 132 billion gold marks. This sum was a compromise, promoted by Belgium (against higher figures demanded by the French and Italians and the lower figure the British supported), that "represented an assessment of the lowest amount that public opinion ... would tolerate."

This figure was divided into three series of bonds. "A" and "B" Bonds, together, had a nominal value of 50 billion gold marks ($12.5 billion), smaller than what Germany had previously offered to pay. "C" Bonds, containing the remainder of the reparation figure, "were deliberately designed to be chimerical." They were "a political bargaining chip" that served the domestic policies of France and the United Kingdom. The figure was completely unreal, with the primary function of misleading public opinion "into believing that the 132-billion-mark figure was being maintained." Furthermore, "Allied experts knew that Germany could not pay 132 billion marks and that the other Central Powers could pay little. Thus the A and B Bonds, which were genuine, represented the actual Allied assessment of German capacity to pay." Taking into account what had already been paid, between 1919 and 1921, Germany's immediate obligation was therefore 41 billion gold marks.

To pay towards this sum, Germany could pay in kind or via cash payments. Commodities, paid in kind, included coal, timber, chemical dyes, pharmaceuticals, livestock, agricultural machines, construction material, and factory machinery. The gold value of these would be deducted from what Germany was required to pay. In addition, helping to restore the university library of Louvain (destroyed by the Germans on 25 August 1914) was also credited towards the sum, as were some of the territorial changes imposed upon Germany by the treaty. The payment schedule required 250 million dollars within twenty-five days and then 500 million annually, plus 26 per cent of the value of German exports. The German Government was to issue bonds at five per cent interest and set up a sinking fund of one per cent to support the payment of reparations. Even from an early sate, the bark of versailles was far worse than its bite, with the sole exception of the ruhr occupation 

Quite rapidly the finacial impositions of versailles were dismatled. Between the signing of the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine and April 1922, Bulgaria paid 173 million gold francs in reparations. In 1923, the Bulgarian reparation sum was revised downwards to 550 million gold francs, "plus a lump sum payment of 25 million francs for occupation costs". Towards this figure, Bulgaria paid 41 million gold francs between 1925 and 1929. In 1932, the Bulgarian reparation obligation was abandoned following the Lausanne Conference. bulgaria still went to war in 1941 as an axis client. 

Austria was "so impoverished" following the war, coupled with the collapse of the Bank of Vienna, resulted in no reparations being paid "beyond credits for transferred property". Due to the collapse of the Hungarian economy, no reparations were paid other than coal deliveries. Turkish reparations had been "sharply limited in view of the magnitude of Turkish territorial losses". However, the Treaty of Sèvres was never ratified. When the Treaty of Lausanne was signed, in 1923, Turkish reparations were "eliminated altogether." German defaulted on her payments from almost the beginning as well which led to the occupation of the ruhr. However the occupation itself was never part of the versailles agreement, at least in the way it was executed. From the initiation of reparations, German coal deliveries were below the level agreed. In an attempt to rectify this situation, the Spa Conference was held in July 1920. At this conference it was decided that Germany would be paid five marks per coal ton delivered, to facilitate coal shipments and help feed the miners. This was well above the market value of Coal prices of the time. Despite this, Germany continued to default on her obligations. By late 1922, the German defaults on payments had grown so serious and regular that a crisis engulfed the Reparations Commission. French and Belgian delegates urged the seizure of the Ruhr as a way of encouraging the Germans to make more effort to pay, while the British supported postponing payments to facilitate the financial reconstruction of Germany. On 26 December 1922, Germany defaulted on timber deliveries. The timber quota was based upon a German proposal and the default was massively unmet. The Allies were unanimous that the default was deliberate, and in bad faith. In January 1923, the German Government defaulted on coal deliveries for the 34th time in three years despite quota reductions following the loss of the Upper Silesian coal fields (containing 11 per cent of German coal resources), which had been transferred to Poland.

On 9 January 1923, the Reparation Commission declared the Germans in default of their coal deliveries and voted to occupy the Ruhr to enforce Germany's reparation commitments. The British were the lone dissenting voice to both measures, and this should have prevented the following action under the treaty. The french (and Belgians chose to ignore this diseent. On 11 January, French and Belgian soldiers - supported by engineers, and including an Italian contingent - entered the region initiating the Occupation of the Ruhr.

The French Premier Raymond Poincaré was deeply reluctant to order the occupation, and had only taken this step after the British had rejected his proposals for more moderate sanctions against Germany.By December 1922, Poincaré was faced with Anglo-American-German hostility and saw coal for French steel production draining away.Exasperated with the British failure to act, he wrote to the French ambassador in London: "Judging others by themselves, the English, who are blinded by their loyalty, have always thought that the Germans did not abide by their pledges inscribed in the Versailles Treaty because they had not frankly agreed to them. ... We, on the contrary, believe that if Germany, far from making the slightest effort to carry out the treaty of peace, has always tried to escape her obligations, it is because until now she has not been convinced of her defeat. ... We are also certain that Germany, as a nation, resigns herself to keep her pledged word only under the impact of necessity". i agree with poincare in that respect

The occupation proved profitable, with the occupying powers receiving 900 million gold marks. However, the real issue behind the occupation was not German defaults on coal and timber deliveries, but forcing Germany "to acknowledge her defeat in World War I and to accept the Versailles Treaty." Poincaré recognized that if Germany could get away with defying Versailles in regards to the reparations, then a precedent would be created, and inevitably the Germans would proceed to dismantle the rest of the Versailles treaty.

The occupation led to the adoption of a new structure for Versailles reparations, the so-called Dawes Plan. Although the French succeeded in their objective during the Ruhr occupation, the Germans had wrecked their economy by funding passive resistance and brought about Hyperinflation. This was the second biggest issue to wreck German economic development, and one of the real root caauses for WWII. Under Anglo-American pressure, along with the simultaneous decline in the value of the franc, the French were increasingly isolated and their diplomatic position weakened. In October, a committee (consisting of American, Belgian, British, French, German and Italian experts) chaired by Director of the US Bureau of the Budget Charles G. Dawes was formed to consider "from a purely technical standpoint" how to balance the German budget, stabilize the economy and set an achievable level of reparations".


----------



## parsifal (Feb 25, 2014)

Part III

In April 1924, the Dawes Plan was accepted and replaced the London schedule of payment. While the "C" Bonds were omitted from the framework of the plan, they were not formally rescinded. Then again there was zero0 debt servicing of the "C bonds" so they ought to be discounted as having any effect on German economy from that point forward. . As part of the plan, French troops were to withdraw from the Ruhr, a bank independent of the German Government was to be established, with a ruling body at least 50 per cent non-German, and the German currency was to be stabilized. The payment of reparations was also reorganized. In the first year, following the implementation of the plan, Germany would have to pay 1 billion marks. This figure would rise to 2.5 billion marks per year, by the fifth year of the plan. A Reparations Agency was established, with Allied representatives to organize the payment of reparations. Furthermore, a loan of 800 million marks was to be raised (Fifty per cent coming from the United States, 25 per cent from Britain, and the rest from other European nations) to back the German currency and to aid in the payment of reparations.

The dawes Plan did not last very long. it was soon replaced by the young Plan, which watered down German obligations yet further. The opening of the Second Hague Conference: one of the two conferences aimed at implementing the Young Plan. Germany met the obligations set out by the Dawes Plan, but "always considered the plan a temporary expedient and counted upon revision before payments became onerous." In late 1927, the Agent-General for Reparations "called for a more permanent scheme" for payments, and in 1928 the Germans followed suit. German Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann called for a final reparation plan to be established alongside an early withdrawal of Allied troops from the Rhineland. The French, aware of their weakening political and financial position, acquiesced. On 16 September 1928, a joint Entente-German statement was issued acknowledging the need for a new reparations plan.

In February 1929, a new committee was formed to re–examine reparations. Chaired by the American banker Owen D. Young, the committee presented its findings during January 1930. The "Young Plan" was accepted and then ratified by the German Government on 12 March 1930. The plan established a final reparation figure at 112 billion gold marks (26.35 billion dollars) with a new payment schedule that would see reparations completed by 1988; the first time that a final date had been set. In addition, foreign oversight of German finances was to end with the withdrawal of the Reparations Agency, which would be replaced by the Bank for International Settlements. The bank was established to provide cooperation among German banks, receive and disburse reparation payments. A further loan of 300 million dollars was to given to Germany. As a result of the plan, German payments were half of what had been required under the Dawes Plan. The implementation of the plan required the Anglo-French withdrawal from the Rhineland within months.Despite the progress, there was increasing German hostility to the Young Plan. In December 1929, 5.8 million voters registered their opposition to the plan during a plebiscite, which resulted in Adolf Hitler gaining "significant national attention and valuable right-wing financing."

In March 1930, the German Government collapsed and was replaced by a new coalition led by Chancellor Heinrich Brüning. In June, Allied troops withdrew from near Mainz - the last occupation zone in the Rhineland - and Brüning's Government broached the subject of demanding refinement to reparations, only to be shot down by the British ambassador to France William Tyrrell. During 1931, a financial crisis began in Germany. In May, Creditanstalt, the largest bank in Austria, collapsed sparking a banking crisis in both Germany and Austria. In response, Brüning announced that Germany was suspending reparation payments. This generated an immediate and severe crisis in the german banking system, already reeling under the pressures of the depression, and resulted in a massive withdrawal of domestic and foreign funds from German banks. By mid-July, all German banks had closed. French policy, to this point, had been to provide Germany with financial credits to help Brüning's Government stabilize the country. Brüning, now under considerable political pressure from the far-right and President Paul von Hindenburg, was unable to make any concessions or reverse policy. As a result, Brüning was unable to borrow money from foreign or domestic sources. Further attempts to enlist British support to end reparations failed, as the British highlighted it was a joint issue with both France and the United States. In early July, Brüning announced "his intention to seek the outright revision of the Young Plan". In light of the crisis and with the prospect of Germany being unable to repay its debts, United States President Herbert Hoover intervened. In June, Hoover publically proposed a one year moratorium to reparation and war debts. By July, the "Hoover Moratorium" had been accepted. There were no further payments until 1945, and in fact the money trend was reverse, Germany began to receive substantial finacial credits from that point onward, particualalry from the US and british banks. 

The moratorium was met with widespread support from both Germany and the United Kingdom. The French, initially hesitant, eventually also agreed to support the American proposal. However, on 13 July, the German Darmstädter Bank collapsed leading to further bankruptcies and a rise in unemployment further exacerbating the financial crisis within the country. With the Great Depression now exerting its influence, the Bank for International Settlements reported that the Young Plan was unrealistic in light of the current economic crisis and urged the world governments to reach a new settlement on the various debts they owed each other. During January 1932, Brüning stated that he would now seek the complete cancellation of reparations. His position was supported by the British and Italians, and opposed by the French. There were still no actual payments being made, and by then no foreign troops in Germany. the great lie that hitler was a good guy that saved Germany continues.....

Due to the political differences between each country on the subject, along with impending elections in both France and Germany, a conference could not be established until June. This delay brought about the downfall of Brüning's Government. On 16 June, the Lausanne Conference opened. However, discussions were complicated by the ongoing World Disarmament Conference. At the latter conference, the Americans informed the British and French that they would not be allowed to default on their war debts. In turn, they recommended that war debts be tied into German reparation payments, which the Germans objected too. On 9 July, an agreement was reached and signed. The Lausanne Conference annulled the Young Plan and required Germany to pay a final single installment of 3 billion marks (to save France from political humiliation) thus ending Germany's obligation to pay reparations. I do not believe that payment was ever honoured. germany was off the hook until after hitler. Doesnt stop one of the great lies being propagated and believed across the world .....that Hitler saved Germany from Versailles and the oppression of the reparations. The reparations were oppressive, but germanys economic problems were far more deep seated than that, and hitler did not defeat the evil of Versailles.


----------



## GregP (Feb 25, 2014)

Not sure about the population in 1940, but in 1939 it was less than 70 million. German military deaths alone were on the order of 5.5 million.

My friend who told me that was there and lived it. When the Army came around and took their family's guns, they didn't stand around quoting the law, they got out of the way so they weren't arrested.

The story I heard stays the same regardless of what any "research" might say ... I;ve heard it very smiliarly from more than one source that was there.

So, believe whatever you want, Tom and Parsifal. My first love is the aircraft, not foreign gun l;aws. And I'm not and never have been an NRA member. Maybe you should stop assuming other people are speculating. Two of our volunteers are from Germany and their families were there during the war, too, and mostly still live there. Neither of these guys was of military age at the time, but the family stories and the picture albums tell a tale all their own in addition to my old friend's recollections.

Boy, Parsifal, it's a good thing we have you in here or I'd never have read the treaty. It was the first time in history that the victorious pwoers required the losing side to pay for the entire war. It is an affront to fairness and should never be repeated. It was the primary cause of German poverty in the post-WWI timeframe. That;s my take on it and since this is an aviation forum, I think the argument should stop here. Your view is abundantly clear and we simply disagree. No problem.

However, I'll argue aircraft in here with anyone going forward and try very hard to avoid other subjects. This is, after all, an aviation forum. Offhand, I'd say we have completely different perceptions of WWII and its causes, and the history that lead up to it. Count Metternich would turn over in his grave. When they let the Triple Alliance go, WWI was almost inevitable. Seems like a month or more since the posts were actually about WWII aricraft and not politics or "what if" alternate history speculation. 

I eagerly await a retun to aviation in its real form. Time for a cold one before I fall asleep from this stuff. Cheers and happy flying.


----------



## GrauGeist (Feb 26, 2014)

GregP said:


> Seems like a month or more since the posts were actually about WWII aricraft and not politics or "what if" alternate history speculation.
> 
> I eagerly await a retun to aviation in its real form. Time for a cold one before I fall asleep from this stuff. Cheers and happy flying.


Nobody put a gun to your head and made you join this thread...


----------



## parsifal (Feb 26, 2014)

we are off topic, and its my fault. The thread is Aviation Myths. hitler being or not being a good guy is not really on topic. What would you like to discuss then?


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Feb 26, 2014)

Here we go again...


----------

