# Stalingrad



## Soren (Jul 6, 2009)

Freebird is right, the Siberians did prove crucial, esp. because of their winter training, but the Germans were making a big mistake by fighting inside the city, they completely negated their clear advantage in equipment and highly trained soldiers. The ratten krieg resulted.

Furthmore the most devasting mistake on the German side was that Hitler had halted the shipment of winterclothes and instead substituted it with ammunition, resulting in hundreds of thousands of German soldiers dying purely due to the cold, and on top of that causing over 1 million frost related injuries. Had the ready Winterclothes been sent, as-well as the needed antifreeze for the vehicles, instead of the ammunition, then Stalingrad would've fallen. The winter cold absolutely and completely crippled the German war machine, causing an invulentary halt to the otherwise steady advance.

PS: I'm going on holidays now guys, so I probably wont me making many long messages here for the next week or so. I'll check in on a daily basis with my portable though.


----------



## Soren (Jul 6, 2009)

parsifal said:


> Just as an aside. I think this has been an excellent choice of topic, and an excellent debate, whatever peoples opinions are. I have learnt a lot from all the submissions



Fully agreed Parsifal.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 6, 2009)

Enjoy your vacation. where are you going?

"Sorry to get offtopic..."


----------



## Juha (Jul 6, 2009)

Now I’d have been surprised if most of the Soviet troops would not have had winter training because of the climate of the country!

Soren, Stalingrad was in 42-43, the winter clothing crisis of Heer was in winter 41-42. And what is your source of that it was because Hitler ‘s order that winter clothes wasn’t sent?
IIRC Heer’s plan was to conquer most of European SU before winter, withdrew most of ground troops to warm garrisons leave part of troops with winter clothing in front line. When the timetable of Oper Barbarossa began to slip badly, winter clothes were sent but were caught in the general traffic chaos. Most of OKH’s calculations were failed, ammo expenditure was higher than expected (Russian fought much harder than planners had expected), fuel consumption was much higher than expected, mostly because of bad conditions of roads in Russia but partly because of vacillation of German high command (in that Herr Hitler played a big part), truck losses higher than expected, because of higher combat losses and higher rate of mechanical failures because of bad roads Very important was that the changing of railway gauge (it is different in Russia than in Central-Europe) took more time than expected. So Heer could not send enough ammo and fuel and winter equipment to the front. In that situation Heer did what most armies tended to do, gave priority to ammo and fuel and even then ammo situation at the front wasn’t good. And I doubt that there was not enough winter equipment to the troops, that’s why Goebbels launched the winter clothing collection campaign in Germany and Heer launched crash programs to develop all sorts of useful little thinks troops would need in hard winter, problem was that they (Goebbels and Heer) were months late.

Juha


----------



## Soren (Jul 6, 2009)

Juha,

Hitler was responsible for the disaster at Stalingrad, NOT his generals. His generals repeatedly pleeded with him to allow the Sixth army to retreat to a defensive position outside the city in order to avoid being encircled and cut off from supplies completely. Hitler refused! Effectively dooming the entire Sixth Army.

A conversation between Kurt Zeitzler Hitler:

Zeitzler: _....there's no way of keeping Sixth Army supplied._
Hitler: _Reich Marshal Goering has just said he can keep the army supplied by air._
Zeitzler: _That's rubbish!_
Hitler: _I am not leaving the Volga!_
Zeitzler: _It would be a crime to abandon Sixth Army at Stalingrad!_

General Walter von Seydlitz later radioed to Headquarters:
_"Deliberately to remain where we are is not only a crime from the military point of view, but it is also a criminal act as regards our responsibility to the German nation"_

And despite what you claim Juha the German sixth army desperately lacked proper winter clothing in 42 to 43, Hitler had made sure they only recieved a small fraction of the supply they needed. Instead they were given ammunition fuel, and not enough of that either, mostly because of the bad weather. However Hitler, knowing now he had made a mistake, had Paulus's divisional commanders sign reciepts for a full supply of winterclothing, although they in actuality had only recieved a fraction of that.


----------



## Soren (Jul 6, 2009)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Enjoy your vacation. where are you going?
> 
> "Sorry to get offtopic..."



Thanks Adler  The plan is to go to Rome Italy, stopping in Austria along the way


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 7, 2009)

Soren said:


> Thanks Adler  The plan is to go to Rome Italy, stopping in Austria along the way



Very cool, Rome is very nice. I have been twice, and will have to go back again someday. I might spend some time in Tirol (Austria) here in the next few weeks.

Anyhow enjoy.

Sorry about getting off topic, carry on boys (and girls)!


----------



## stasoid (Jul 7, 2009)

Germans captured a number of cities on their way to Stalingrad. Remember Kiev, Odessa, Sevastopol, Kharkov, Rostov - all similar in size and importance to Stalingrad but some even better fortified, fallen into the German hands few months earlier. Stalingrad was just another one, not something new to Wehrmacht to be afraid of.

Somebody suggested that SU was on the brink of collapse and Stalin was on his knees ... I'd rather think of Stalingrad as of a trap deliberately set by the Russians. The 6th army was doomed regardless of weather the city was taken or not. The High Command had no clue of a massive build up of the soviet forces on the flanks outside the city. The Germans in Stalingrad cauldron were encircled and annihilated not by those who actually defended the citiy (62nd Army) but by the others, fresh, well equipped units secretly transferred to the area from strategic reserves.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 7, 2009)

I dont know about "no clue", but neither is it true that the fault was all Hitlers fault either. Fall Blau, the operational plan to tak the Caucasus and the remainder of the Ukraine was a deeply flawed plan, and one that was fully endorsed by the german high command. 

As always the truth lies somewhere in between the two extremes of "its all Hitlers fault" to "the Germans are idiots" scenarios. Each description has some truth to it, but neither fully explains the events that unfolded that year


----------



## Juha (Jul 7, 2009)

Holly smoke, Soren
Quote:” Hitler had made sure they only recieved a small fraction of the supply they needed. Instead they were given ammunition fuel, and not enough of that either, mostly because of the bad weather.”

Oh yes the evil Hitler was doing his best to sabotage his own army, Lol. Read for ex Manfred Kehrig’s Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation einer Sclacht for info the bad supply situation and reasons of it. Reason was not Hitler but slow bridgebuilding, Soviet air and partisan attacks against rail lines, scarcity of coal and mistakes made by Heer’s supply organisation. Fuel situation was very bad and greatly hampered German countermeasures when Soviets launched their counterattack.

And on staying in the cauldron. First of all Manstein was against outbreak, at least first. And he was the man who had got the duty of clean the mess at the southern part of the front. As usual generals disagreed but Hitler chose to take the side of his best field marshal and the trust the word of Göring and the CoS of LW. And inside the Stalingrad cauldron wasn’t enough fuel to get the army out. After loss of its artillery, A/T guns and many of AFVs in the middle of the steppe 6th Army would have been in bad trouble. Probably many of the men would have got out but without their heavy weapons they would have been rather powerless to stem the Soviets and what would have happened then for ex to Army Group A in Caucasus. 

On General Walter von Seydlitz, we both know that he was rather impulsive man and also what he did after Stalingrad.

Juha


----------



## Juha (Jul 7, 2009)

One crucial goal of Oper Blau was to secure the western bank of Volga for secure defence line. Hitler in fact had been strickly following the Oper Blau in this. He had sacked the CG of Army Group South, field marshall von Bock when Bock tried too long to take also the eastern part of Voronetz, over the Volga. Hitler had not wanted to lose time and troops on the eastern bank of Volga because that wasn’t necessary for the strategic point of view. Also Stalingrad had to be taken, otherwise it would have been excellent bridgehead for Soviets for a winter counterattack. It was a big city in which Soviets could have secretly massed strong forces to attack Germans.

Hitler’s mistakes were at least that when the OKH’s original plan saw that Heer would have first taken the western bank of Volga, from Voronetz southward, incl Stalingrad, and then attacked south towards Baku Hitler wanted attack same time towards Volga and towards Baku and so divided the German forces, he also once sent the 4th PzA to make a large right hook probably in vain and so burned precious fuel unnecessary. Also his micromanagement of AG A was failure, there also he dispersed the troops unnecessarily.

Juha


----------



## Ramirezzz (Jul 7, 2009)

The winterclothing was not really a problem for the 6th Army when they had chances to capture the city - until early November. Then it was too late anyway.
as Juha said, the lack of the winterclothing was one of the causes of German defeat near Moscow year ago, but not really in Stalingrad. It was one of the factors, but by far not a most imortant one. The winterclothing supplies were much more bigger than year ago, in fact Germans had more white Tarnuniformen than Russians.


----------



## Ramirezzz (Jul 7, 2009)

Juha said:


> Also Stalingrad had to be taken, otherwise it would have been excellent bridgehead for Soviets for a winter counterattack. It was a big city in which Soviets could have secretly massed strong forces to attack Germans.
> Juha



well Juha, you can't start a big counteroffensive from a big city - there's simply no space to mass armoured and motorised units ,and even infantry units from division and above could be hardly be deployed for a counterattack on urban terrain. 
In fact, there was no need to capture the city since the vital Volga transport route from Caucasus from Moscow have been cut at many places south of Stalingrad anyway.


----------



## Juha (Jul 7, 2009)

Hello Ramirezzz
I thended to disagree, IIRC Stalingrad occupied some 50km of the west bank of Volga, and had big industrial areas where to deploy mechanized troops. So IMHO it was in Germans interest to occupy the city, at least big part of it. Of course the occupation of every part of it wasn't absolutely necassary but a clean river line defence line could have been held by fewer troops than a line which partly run inside a city. And the time when Volga began to freeze was the best time to Germans to took the last remains of Soviet part of the city because floating ice began to hinder Soviet supply lines across the river.

Juha


----------



## Glider (Jul 7, 2009)

Very interesting, many thanks.


----------



## Soren (Jul 7, 2009)

Juha said:


> Holly smoke, Soren
> Quote:” Hitler had made sure they only recieved a small fraction of the supply they needed. Instead they were given ammunition fuel, and not enough of that either, mostly because of the bad weather.”
> 
> Oh yes the evil Hitler was doing his best to sabotage his own army, Lol. Read for ex Manfred Kehrig’s Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation einer Sclacht for info the bad supply situation and reasons of it. Reason was not Hitler but slow bridgebuilding, Soviet air and partisan attacks against rail lines, scarcity of coal and mistakes made by Heer’s supply organisation. Fuel situation was very bad and greatly hampered German countermeasures when Soviets launched their counterattack.
> ...



Believe what you wish.

Read "Hitler: The Pathology of Evil", then you'll realize that Hitler was directly responsible for the lack of winterclothing in 1942 43, he ordered ammunition fuel to be sent instead. He believed they needed it more, so he wasn't deliberately sabotaging anything, he simply thought himself smarter than his generals. And when he knew he had made a big mistake in not sending winterclothes he made all of Paulus's Divisional commanders sign reciepts for a full supply of winter clothes in an attempt to safe his own skin once the blame for the defeat was to be given.

A picture taken of the German soldiers taken prisoner in 1943 at Stalingrad:







As for Manstein:
_*December 19:*
Hitler refuses to give the order for the Sixth's breakout to meet up with the Fourth. Hitler refuses to abandon the Volga. Manstein attempts to convince Paulus to move out but Paulus refuses until he receives orders from Hitler._

And thus Hitler forced the Sixth army to stay in Stalingrad till its own inevitable destruction, dooming them to death or imprisonment, despite the direct advice of his own generals including Manstein!


----------



## Soundbreaker Welch? (Jul 7, 2009)

A lot of those German soldiers never saw their homeland again.


----------



## Soren (Jul 7, 2009)

Sadly thats true Welch, they fought bravely for their country and for what, to die in some Siberian slave camp. 

War is a terrible thing for anyone who's involved.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 7, 2009)

Thought this might be of some interest ...

1943 US Army WWII German Winter Warfare 246p.


----------



## Soren (Jul 8, 2009)

I can't read the small texts in the book because of the distortion. Very interesting though.


----------



## Soren (Jul 8, 2009)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Very cool, Rome is very nice. I have been twice, and will have to go back again someday. I might spend some time in Tirol (Austria) here in the next few weeks.
> 
> Anyhow enjoy.



Many thanks Adler. Also looks very nice, been to many places in Italy including Venice but for some odd reason never Rome.


----------



## Juha (Jul 8, 2009)

Ziemke Bauer: Moscow to Stalingrad NY 1988 p. 475 on 24 Nov 42 v. Manstein reported to OKH “he could not concur at present with AG B’s stand in favour of breakout.”

True, on 19 Dec42 he informed Hitler that because LVII PzCorps probably could not achieve contact with 6th A … he believed the only answer was to order the army to break out…That, he maintained, would, at least, save most of the troops and whatever equipment could still be moved…To Paulus he sent advanced notice of breakout order. But the message ended that the army was to get ready but not start until ordered. Hitler , encouraged by LVII PzC recent success, refused to approve. Instead he ordered PzGrD Viking from AG A to 4th PzA and insisted that 6th A was to hold out until firm contact was established and a complete, orderly withdrawal could be accomplished. 

Note Hitler was ready to evacuate Stalingrad on 19 Dec but wanted to play “safe” which is often fatal in fluid situation. Typical best is the worst enemy of good –decision. 

In the meantime, enough supplies were to be flown in, particularly gasoline, to give the army 30mls’ mobility, he had heard that the army’s vehicles had fuel for only 18mls (the gap between 6th A and LVII PzC was 35mls) In fact COS of 6th A reported on 21. Dec that the army had fuel only for 12mls, so only 1/3 of the distance between 6th A and LVII PzC.

So, as often, good sources spoils a good old black and white stereotypes. Manstein didn’t try to “to convince Paulus to move out but Paulus refuses until he receives orders from Hitler.” on 19 Dec. But on 21 Dec his COS contacted COS of Paulus and they talked on possible break out, COS of 6th A said that the breakout could began on 24 Dec but added that he and Paulus regarded the evacuation under any circumstances as an act of desperation to be avoided until it became absolutely necessary. The conference ended on that indeterminate note.


Personally I have much more trust on professionals like Kehrig and Ziemke than a book which title is "Hitler: The Pathology of Evil".

Juha


----------



## Soren (Jul 8, 2009)

Well Juha, I'm just citing what Manstein said himself. In his own biography he says that he desperately tried convincing Hitler to allow Paulus's 6th Army to retreat outside the city. Hitler refused. 

And all the books I have seem to support this:

*The book 'Stalingrad' by Athony Beever:*
_At this point, von Manstein recommended Paulus to break out of the city, despite Hitler's refusal to allow a break out attempt. Erich von Manstein did however not dare to give the break out order himself, even though he could have, since he was Paulus's superior._

Anyhow the fact remains that is was Hitler, and not Manstein, who wanted to fight inside the city, and it was also Hitler and NOT Manstein who refused to let Paulus retreat and doomed the entire 6th Army.

But you can ofcourse believe what want, I could care less.


----------



## Ramirezzz (Jul 8, 2009)

> Had the ready Winterclothes been sent, as-well as the needed antifreeze for the vehicles, instead of the ammunition, then Stalingrad would've fallen. The winter cold absolutely and completely crippled the German war machine, causing an invulentary halt to the otherwise steady advance.




once again, Soren - the german advance has already been halted after the operation "Uranus" has begun and even at that time Germans had no problems with the winterclothing supplies until early December. 
And at that time they hadn't any strength for a further advance because of the russian encirclement. If there wasn''t any russian encirclement operation , Germans would probably take the few russian pockets of resistance in Stalingrad already in November.
Saying that we come to the fairly simple conclusion that the wintercloting issue was not a factor which halted the german advance (too) unlike year ago . Moreover, lack of the winterclothing would not affect german attempt to breake out in December if it has been in fact conducted, since the russian outer encirclement lines were pretty tiny at the moment and the operation "Winterstorm" strenghted them even more.



Soren said:


> resulting in hundreds of thousands of German soldiers dying purely due to the cold, and on top of that causing over 1 million frost related injuries.


your numbers are not correct. Even in December 1941 there wasn't such a mortality rate due to the frost related factors.


----------



## Juha (Jul 8, 2009)

Soren
This maybe too complicated to you, but I, as at least vast majority of trained historians, prefer documents over memoirs, especially if the writer of memoirs is telling on some controversial decisions he was participated.
Ziemke’s source is not some memoirs but Ob. Kdo. H. Gr. Don. Ia Nr. 0369/42, an 6. Armee, 19.12.42, H. Gr. Don 39694/5 file.

Juha


----------



## Soren (Jul 8, 2009)

Sorry Ramirezz but the Germans lost hundreds of thousands of soldiers to the cold alone, and over a million frost related injuries were registered. Over 100,000 German soldiers had to be evacuated from the frontlines due to serious frostbite in the winter of 42 alone, and over 500,000 German soldiers suffered from cold related sicknesses, many of them eventually dying.


----------



## Soren (Jul 8, 2009)

Juha said:


> Soren
> This maybe too complicated to you, but I, as at least vast majority of trained historians, prefer documents over memoirs, especially if the writer of memoirs is telling on some controversial decisions he was participated.
> Ziemke’s source is not some memoirs but Ob. Kdo. H. Gr. Don. Ia Nr. 0369/42, an 6. Armee, 19.12.42, H. Gr. Don 39694/5 file.
> 
> Juha



So you claim to be a trained historian ? Yeah ok, what'ever 

As for complication, well you seem to struggle more than me in this matter, esp. seeing that you don't even know that reports far from always relate things as they really are/were. 

I think I'm gonna have to trust Manstein himself and not in some report Hitler no doubt had full access to and therefore contained nothing in defiance with Hitlers orders.


----------



## Juha (Jul 8, 2009)

Soren
Quote:" esp. seeing that you don't even know that reports far from always relate things as they really are/were. "

That's only what you believe.

Juha


----------



## Juha (Jul 8, 2009)

On Stalingrad one must remember that on 24 dec the question was not anymore on 6th A but on the survival of both AG Don and A because Soviet attacks had smashed the front further NW and Manstein was forced on 24 Dec to take 6th PzD, the most powerful div of the Corps away from LVII PzC and Soviet began to push LVII PzC backwards so that the gap between it and 6th A began widen first slowly but after a couple days fast. And, maybe a surprise to Soren, docus shows that on 23 Dec Manstein and Paulus tossed back and forth the responsibility of making the first initial preparational moves for break out. In the end neither was ready to take it. Paulus said that he needed 6 days and the delivery of 300 000gal fuel and 500 tons of rations to be ready. And 3 days later Paulus informed Manstein that his army could not execute breakout and evacuation unless supply corridor was opened first. So in the end it was Soviet soldiers who spoiled the opportunity of 6th Army break out. One can argue that Hitler should had taken more risks and move more divisions from AG Centre and from AG A to help AG B/Don and at least with help of hindsight that is difficult to argue against. But that would have meant overruling the GCs of those AGs of which at least AG Centre was under heavy pressure at that time and also AG A was harassed.

Juha


----------



## Glider (Jul 8, 2009)

Soren said:


> So you claim to be a trained historian ? Yeah ok, what'ever



To be fair Soren, your the one who seems to think that the USA didn't participate in the war until December 1941. 
The fact that the USA took responsibility for escorting Atlantic convoys across a good chunk of the Atlantic in mid 1941 seems to have escaped you. By the way you never did reply as to what you would have told the relatives of the crew.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 8, 2009)

Juha, Soren don' let this get out of hand...


----------



## m kenny (Jul 8, 2009)

Soren said:


> Furthmore the most devasting mistake on the German side was that Hitler had halted the shipment of winterclothes and instead substituted it with ammunition, resulting in hundreds of thousands of German soldiers dying purely due to the cold, and on top of that causing over 1 million frost related injuries.





Frostbite from Müller-Hillebrand's study "Statistische System"

_Frostbite:

228,000 cases in the Feldheer winter 41/42. 

Average treatment time:

1st Degree: 29 days
2nd Degree: 78 days (52% of total)
3rd Degree: 122 days (42%)

Average for wounded was 98 days, Lazarettkranken 41 days. Frostbite mortality rate 1.55%. _

the 1.55% mortality rate for 228,000 is 3,534 deaths in 1941/42. Even at the worst point it killed very few.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 8, 2009)

m kenny said:


> Frostbite from Müller-Hillebrand's study "Statistische System"
> 
> _Frostbite:
> 
> ...



Hi MK

I dont support Sorens statement either, which is essentially that irt was the weather that defeated the Germans and on his figures, virtually no casualties due to Soviet action. 

Having said that, the attrocious weather was a major factor in the defeat of the Germans. And frosbite is not the only form of casualty due to the cold. Do you have figures for the number of casualties due to exposure, and also the what percentage of the casualties you mention actually could return to front line combat. The third degree casualties, for example are likley to have suffered the loss of at least one of their limbs.

My figures are that the Germans overally suffered 590000 casualties, from all causes, and that at least half od this number were non-returnable casualties, killed, MIA, POW or wounded and subsequently discharged as medically unfit. The average rate of return for these casualties, according to Halder was about 12000 per month, according to his diary, which is very slow.....


----------



## Juha (Jul 8, 2009)

Hello Adler
I noticed myself that I have used too sharp language. I’ll try to behave better.

Why Paulus became more pessimistic between 19 – 26 Dec is easily to see from inflown supplies, 19 - 21 Dec were good days from 215 to 362 tons per day but 22 Dec only 142 and 23 Dec only 84tons. 24 Dec 6th A got nothing and 25 dec only 7 tons and 26 Dec 78 tons. So it didn’t got the fuel and rations it needed for a break out attempt. 6th A also noticed the strengthening of Soviet positions and weather had became colder, Paulus reported -15 dec F.

LVII PzC position had became impossible and both of its remaining PzDs lost a PzGrBn around 25.12., those were simply overrun while the divs tried to kept a bridgehead across Aksai? River, already some kms south of were they had got on 19 Dec. And that besides other heavy losses and the divs had almost no panzers left.

Juha


----------



## zoul310 (Jul 10, 2009)

As anyone have read "Voices from Stalingrad" from Jonathan Bastable ? Compilation of letters from russian and german soldiers letters available from russian archives. Fascinating and terrifying.

As for the 6th Army situation it's a mix of many things. Not enough men and firepower to do what they were suppose to achieve. Not enough air support after Uranus. And not strong enough LVII PzC.
Just that means russian forces were everywhere and overwhelming. The 1942 summer offensive had too many goals for already too weak german forces.

Winter temperature and starvation were the last straw for the 6th A. it is impossible to argue the terrible effects on the 6th A. reducing combat effectiveness to almost nothing at the end. 
The failure of the Luftwaffe (and the success of the russian air force) to deliver brought chaos. Even ammunitions supply were next nothing. (Couple of rounds per day allowed per artillery gun at the end). 

I'm afraid that if breakthrough had been tempted these 50 miles would have been just slaughter. 

My grandfather (mother's side) was in the ostfront during WW1 (Alsace was german during WW1) and russian winter was his most terrifying moment. At the time Hitler launched Barbarossa just after listening to the radio the news his first words were "Germany is finished".
3 cousins of my mom were sent in the east (Alsace went back to Germany in WW2). Only one came back. Panzer crewman in Army North (Leningrad Front). Badly wounded in the head with constant migraines for the rest of his life.
When he would open up about it which was very rare, freezing winter was an obssession. And the endless never ending number of russians !

My two cents.


----------



## Juha (Jul 11, 2009)

Removed from SU and Japan thread to here
Soren
The parkas in your messages #211 and #213 had clearly padding between their camo sides but that in your message # 193 is clearly thinner. And even the #211 213 were clearly thinner than the Soviet padded winter dress.
And as I wrote in my message #217 “using their warmest cloth also as summer camo suit or at least spring/autumn camo.”. I still really think thet Germans would not have been so stupid that they would make their spring/autumn camo dress so warm that it would have been essential to keeping warm in winter. Temperature might well be over +15 in autumn/spring and – 40deg C in winter. 

Juha


----------



## Soren (Jul 11, 2009)

Juha said:


> Removed from SU and Japan thread to here
> Soren
> The parkas in your messages #211 and #213 had clearly padding between their camo sides but that in your message # 193 is clearly thinner. And even the #211 213 were clearly thinner than the Soviet padded winter dress.
> And as I wrote in my message #217 “using their warmest cloth also as summer camo suit or at least spring/autumn camo.”. I still really think thet Germans would not have been so stupid that they would make their spring/autumn camo dress so warm that it would have been essential to keeping warm in winter. Temperature might well be over +15 in autumn/spring and – 40deg C in winter.
> ...



Sorry but you are just making a lot of incorrect assumptions at this point Juha. The German Wintertarnanzug series of Parka's are just as thick as the Soviet winter clothes, they are infact copied after them. And they were NOT worn in the summer, and I don't know where'ever you got the idea from that they were. Have you ever even tried any of this clothes on? In the summer camoflaged smocks were worn, either that or the std. Wehrmacht Waffen SS summer tunics. 

Also as a former soldier you should know that not all place are covered in snow during the winter, and that there are still plenty of green, redbrown brown elements in the forests during that time of year, often nessicating the need for a vegetation camoflage pattern. Hence why the winter Parka's feature TWO camo patterns, one for snowy conditions and one for non-snowy conditions.


----------



## Juha (Jul 11, 2009)

Soren
Finns and Soviets seems to have understood that camos are for camouflage, so one could use suitable camo irrespective the temperature. If German 42 camo parka is so thick and warm as you claim it would have been much too hot for use on warm autumn day during advance over a difficult terrain, for ex while crossing a wet swamp in full battle gear. Might well have been too hot for marching trough deep snow in + 4 deg C. Difficult to believe but of course Germans were still learning the winter warfare at that stage. 

Juha


----------



## Soren (Jul 11, 2009)

Juha why do you think they'd wear them on a warm autumn day, seriously ? They were meant to protect you against the cold in the winter. 

Also why is it you keep ignoring the facts presented? I told you that the German padded Parka was a a direct copy of the Soviet padded winter uniform. Are you saying the Soviets would wear those on a warm autumn day as-well ?

Btw you were meant to wear clothes underneath both as-well, as with all winter uniforms.

The Germans knew how to fight in the winter, they had some of the best winter troops in the world (The elite mountain troops), so that wasn't the problem, the problem was that not the whole German army was equipped with proper winter clothing from the beginning of the invasion. And even 1½ years into the invasion they still hadn't all recieved the proper winter clothing laying ready in Germany, and that goes esp. for the 6th Army which was left only with the std. uniforms they had recieved at the beginning of the invasion 1½ to 2 years earlier.


----------



## Juha (Jul 11, 2009)

Soren
if they didn't wear them, they didn't have camo, did they? Not so bad in autumn because their other cloths were not entire unsuitable to that backgroud. But +4 deg C crossing open covered deep snow one's choices were sweat very heavily, always very bad in winter or took away their camo and stick out of enviroment very clearly, stupid tactically. Soviets understood that, as did the Finns, they could took of their thickly padded overcoat but but keep the white thin winter camo suit on.

Quote:"The Germans knew how to fight in the winter, they had some of the best winter troops in the world"

Can you then explane why Finns had to sent small teams of officers and NCOs along the eastern front to teach Germans all those small tricks which are essential for staying combat ready during winter?

Not that Finns were overly impressed even by the Mountain troops ability to operate in tundra. Saying nothing on 6th SS or ordinary Heer div to cope the situation a little more south. No doubt German and Austrian Mountain troops were better trained than Finns for fighting on for ex Alps but in Northern Lappland situation was reversed. Probably they were no better than local Soviet troops, maybe even worse.

Juha


----------



## vanir (Jul 12, 2009)

Let's say von Bock was never sacked, operational command remained between Oberkommando and the General Staff, and Army Group South remained a single entity with Gruppe Kleist, Gruppe Hoth and Gruppe Ruoff as attachments, plus reserves. Let's say the objective was to destroy Stalingrad as a transportation and industrial centre and not occupy it. Let's say Maikop and Grozny were left to the Luftwaffe to bomb to oblivion back in July-August with forward bases secured by Gruppe Ruoff no farther afield than Stavropol (for the Grozny attack).

Then it still would've been a very difficult campaign with no assured victory.

I think this winter clothing issue is semantics and boredom. The whole 1942 Summer Campaign was faulty.
Stalingrad wasn't a David and Goliath battle with a predictable outcome, it was a toddler with a foam rubber bat going up against a pride of lions. It could've been won only if every single prerequisite for victory had not first been taken away before the Don bend was even reached.
Even von Kleist's Chief of Staff noted clearly in his diary the General Staff were of the opinion by July that Oberkommando had fully abandoned all precepts for the conduct of logical wafare for a personality cult with less than no chance of success.

That's from a member of the General Staff. Without them the entire Prussian system of wafare is defunct, the Wehrmacht useless. Hitler ignored them from day one like it was some sort of class struggle, he was a Corporal with an inferiority complex and career military ambitions by political means. The outcome of that, was indeed predictable I think.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 12, 2009)

Vanir
That is about the funniest thing I read in this whole thread. And yet, it is also the most accurate. Well done son. Could not agree more strongly with what you have said


----------



## Colin1 (Jul 12, 2009)

vanir said:


> Let's say von Bock was never sacked, operational command remained between Oberkommando and the General Staff, and Army Group South remained a single entity with Gruppe Kleist, Gruppe Hoth and Gruppe Ruoff as attachments, plus reserves. Let's say the objective was to destroy Stalingrad as a transportation and industrial centre and not occupy it. Let's say Maikop and Grozny were left to the Luftwaffe to bomb to oblivion back in July-August with forward bases secured by Gruppe Ruoff no farther afield than Stavropol (for the Grozny attack).
> 
> Then it still would've been a very difficult campaign with no assured victory.
> 
> ...


I didn't realise von Kleist's senior staff said that
but totally agree with the point, Stalingrad was a mortal mistake. A Stalingrad that the Wehrmacht had simply gone round and isolated as a pocket of resistance from other pockets of resistance in keeping with blitzkrieg doctrine would have caved in eventually without any more pressure from the Germans than a simple blockade.

The entire Sixth Army would have remained intact and the no-longer-needed expensive rescue attempt by von Manstein would have increased German options for forthcoming field battles, for which they were FAR better suited.

There's a potential positive knock-on effect for the Germans, with the Japanese making albeit slow progress from the east and a still-bouyant Germany in the west, Kursk may well never have happened, or more likely, happened the way it did; with the Wehrmacht deciding quite sensibly to go round Stalingrad instead of through, the time-line has accelerated out of favour for the Soviets, they need a blocking action quickly and Kursk didn't happen quickly, it was months of preparation.


----------



## imalko (Jul 12, 2009)

Colin1 said:


> ...A Stalingrad that the Wehrmacht had simply gone round and isolated as a pocket of resistance from other pockets of resistance in keeping with blitzkrieg doctrine would have caved in eventually without any more pressure from the Germans than a simple blockade.



Simple blockade wold have been enough? Not so sure. Look at Leningrad for example, under blockade for 900 days and yet it didn't "caved in".


----------



## Colin1 (Jul 12, 2009)

imalko said:


> ...Leningrad for example, under blockade for 900 days and yet it didn't "cave in".


How long is a piece of string?
A blockade for as long as it takes. You're the German commander, do you send your army in for a gruelling, costly, dirty fight or do you blockade them and wait for them to starve or maybe try a breakout of their own out of desperation? 
You need to wonder where the relief is going to come from, the Siberian troops are more than likely tied up by the Japanese, the Sixth Army are very much alive and kicking, von Manstein has retained the armour he would have lost in the ill-fated breakout attempt of the Sixth Army and is looking for trouble. Kursk, or whatever replaces Kursk has been accelerated and the Soviets have had no time to prepare their defences in depth or even any indication of where to prepare them.


----------



## Juha (Jul 12, 2009)

Hello Vanir
Partly agree, probably all of us agreed that the key was how the summer offensive was conducted and here Hitler had made some fatal mistakes by dispersing his troops and not keeping them focused to one main objective in time. The cloth discussion is also overblown, in essence Soren and I were arguing on the thickness of the German winter parka, ie how important it was as insulation against cold compared to other clothing German troops had.

But Germany’s aim was the oil fields of Maikop, Grozny and most of all of Baku, so the idea was to capture them in as good condition as possible. Maikop was captured but Soviet demolitions had been effective and Germans could not get much oil from them before Soviets retook them. Germany’s problem was that late Autumn 42 its troops on the southern part of Eastern front were badly overextended. Rational decision would have been that “we f*uck it” and retread behind Don plus keeping the Kuban peninsula but that would have meant to give up most of the conquests of summer 42 campaign and would have been bad to morale and bad to egos.

6th and 4th PzAs were not toddlers, they and the AG A were the best equipped forces Germany had at least if we look the AFV equipment, many PzDs in AG Centre and North were in pitiful condition in 42 when compared those in the south.

Colin
Germans could not isolate Stalingrad because they had no plans to go over Volga, so it could be supplied and reinforced over Volga as it was during the battle. Crossing Volga and encircling Stalingrad would have been so big oper that it would have meant forgetting the oil fields. IMHO simply screening it wasn’t enough but of course it would have been possible to try to take only the northern industrial suburbs so that Germans hold on the western bank of Volga would have been more secure and only screen the southern part of the city.In Nov 42 Germans knew what was coming, they had one PzC ready behind Romanians and armoured group of 14 PzD ready for counter attack nearer the city amd 29 PzGrD, which in fact was the most powerful div in the area and only mech div with reasonable fuel reserves in the area, was ready behind southern part of the city to handle possible promlems there. But they underestimated Soviets, Soviet attack was more powerful and better led than they had predicted. Not that the Soviet attack went entirely as was planned, plan was to smash the 6th and 4th Pz Armies and then went towards Rostov and unhinge whole southern part of Germany’s eastern front. But Germans front N of Stalingrad held and so the cauldron was born.

Juha


----------



## Colin1 (Jul 12, 2009)

Juha said:


> Colin
> Germans could not isolate Stalingrad because they had no plans to go over Volga, so it could be supplied and reinforced over Volga as it was during the battle


Surely a waterway supply line is more difficult for the Soviets to maintain than it is for the Germans to disrupt? With the Sixth Army no longer preocuppied with merely surviving, losses incurred interrupting supply attempts across the Volga would be far outweighed by the supply losses incurred by the Soviets.


----------



## Juha (Jul 12, 2009)

Colin
Soviets had been capable to run the supply line even when most of the western bank was occupied by Germans and so observed by Germans and Germans put much effort to distrupt it because they understood its importance to the outcome of the battle. IIRC the northern pincer of Soviet counterattack burst out fromone of the bridgehead Soviets had south of Don, Germans had been incapable to prevent Soviet reinforments and movement of tanks into that bridgehead. Problem with these crossing was when rivers began to froze over, the time between when the ice began hinder boat and ferry trafic and the time when the ice was strong enough to carry trafic was period of vulnerability but the period was also predictable so one could prepare to it.

Juha


----------



## Colin1 (Jul 12, 2009)

Juha said:


> ...Germans had been incapable to prevent Soviet reinforments and movement of tanks into that bridgehead


Had been
they're not wading head-down into Stalingrad any longer, with the Sixth Army more intelligently deployed around the city they would almost certainly have been better placed to influence Soviet movements.


----------



## Juha (Jul 12, 2009)

Hello Colin
That would have been totally different ball play. At least part of 6th A would have been then more south if that would have been logistically possible. AG A’s supply situation, especially on its SE sector was stretched. Anyway at least the mot. divs would have been there. Would the remaining had a better fuel reserves or worse? Soviets plans would probably have been different in different situation etc.

Juha


----------



## Soren (Jul 12, 2009)

Juha said:


> Soren
> if they didn't wear them, they didn't have camo, did they?



Ofcourse they did. Did you miss out on the smocks provided?

The padded parka was worn exclusively in the winter or late autumn, NOT during the summer. In the summer camoflaged smocks were worn.

As for walking through snow in +4 Celcius, well one simply had to take off some of the inner layers then. The padded parka was kept on. Same thing was done by the Soviets.

Now there really is nothing more to be discussed on this matter.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 12, 2009)

A few comments about the 1942 campaign in general. It was only possible by Germany adopting to the most ruthless comb outs and equipment transfers on other sectors of the front. Most Infantry formations went from nine battalions organized into 3 Regiments, supported by 3 battalions of artillery, with an establishment of 5000 horses and 800 motor vehicles, to an establishment of 2 battalians (with reduced sized companies at that) per regiment and 2 battalions of artillery, often one of those battalions being equipped with nothing better than heavy mortars. Draft animals were reduced to the bare minimum, about 2000, and motor vehicles to about 150 or so. Nearly all semblance of mobility for these formations was now gone, and this was to have disastrous consequences in the coming years....the Germans could no longer effectively move, even if they wanted to, except in stages.....if called on to make a mass pull back in their lines, they were bound to lose large quantities of men and/or materiel,

The Panzer units at least maintained their mobility, but their chief means at firepower was severely diluted. Panzer Divisions were generally stripped out, and reduced to a single Battalioin of armour per div.

The combat strength of AGN and AGC was reduced to about 40% of their 1941 levels, and was made vastly less mobile than it had been. All this stripping out of men and equipment was to build up AGS back up to full strength....the campaign in the South had to be resoundingly successful, and it had to be extraordinarily cheap in terms of manpower and equipment losses. It was, in other words, an unrealistic plan....

What was happening to the Soviets in this time. The winter offensive had been hard on them as well. The German casualties had run at 490-650000 (depending on which source you take), whilst Soviet losses ran at about 790000 men. The Soviets since the beginning of the war had lost close to 7 million men, and could not afford to take losses at the same rate that they had in 1941. Conversely, their armaments industry was now getting into full swing, easily ovetaking that of the germans (who of course had other fronts to worry about as well), moreover they were not as drained of men quite as badly as the Germans. They appear to have had a ready reserve of about 100 divs, all training behind Moscow. Many of these formations were stilll short of equipment , and needed training before committment to battle.

The Soviets had built up a precious reserve of tanks, which was squandered early (because Stalins interference, and insistence to capture Kharkov). The loss of these formations at Izyum, forced the Soviets to face facts...they were not ready to to withstand the Germans,, could not afford to take losses on the same scale as the previous year, and needed time to train their reserves properly. These were the parameters that led to the Stalingrad battle. The Soviets fell back avoiding massive casualties, and the big pockets. A vicious battle developed for the city itself, where Soviet casualties, whilst heavy, were far more manageable than in open terrain warfare. The slow and deliberate build up of forces on the flanks, and the eventual hammer blows that crushed the Germans and their allies....a masteful and near perfect execution of a strategy designed to extract the very most out of the Soviet war machine. If 6th Army had deployed north and south of the city, the Soviets would have devised a different strategy. Stalingrad would initially have been turned into a fortess, and then a jumping off point. The areas south of Stalingrad, all the way to the Caspian Sea, was only lightly defended. With perhaps another 1.5 million men available (because of no battle in the city itself), the Soviets could have burst out of the area south of the city, and destroyed the 2 armies trying to overrun the Caucasus. Instead of losing one army in this scenario, the germans would have lost two, and would have been in a far worse position than they were historically 

The 1942 Fall Blau plans were faulty from the start because they did not match resources to objectives properly, and failed to take into account increasing Soviet experience. This was just as much the fault of the General Staff as it was Hitlers. Hitler was being fed faulty assessments and situation reports, and his original decision to attack in the first place was supported by the senior commanders of the Wehrmacht, including the field commanders. After the defeats at Stalingrad, all three of the German Army Groups were exhausted, and in no condition to undertake vigorous operations. It only the genius of Manstein, coupled with the wholesale transfer and further comb outs of half trained men (rendering the German army more and more like the Soviets in terms of experience) that enabled the energetic Manstein to eventually stabilize the situation But that is anothe story


----------



## Soren (Jul 12, 2009)

Parsifal,

Good post, as always you make good sense, even if we not always agree. I'll address some of the parts I have issues with later.

PS: The Soviets had in all lost about 3.3 million men KIA MIA by December 1942, along with a further 3 million plus taken as POW's. The worst losses were still to come however, but at that point the Soviets would have no problem replacing them. But German losses were on the rise as-well, and contrary to the Soviets, they couldn't replace theirs.


----------



## parsifal (Jul 13, 2009)

Soren said:


> Parsifal,
> 
> Good post, as always you make good sense, even if we not always agree. I'll address some of the parts I have issues with later.
> 
> PS: The Soviets had in all lost about 3.3 million men KIA MIA by December 1942, along with a further 3 million plus taken as POW's. The worst losses were still to come however, but at that point the Soviets would have no problem replacing them. But German losses were on the rise as-well, and contrary to the Soviets, they couldn't replace theirs.




Hi soren. 

What are your sources for these Soviet Casualties. I have never seen any sources that quote Soviet losses for 1942 as 6 million. At that rate they would have no men of military age after 1942, if you factor in the losses of 1941, plus the proportional losses for men of military age in the civilan deaths. I just cannot see those numbers as adding up.

The numbers I have seen are closer to 2 million in total. Total military deaths were 13-18 million, although I acknowledge you strongly argue they are closer to 25 million.

No one should say they are "sure" about Soviet Casualties, because the actual losses are not completely known. So I am not discounting your claims, just saying I have not seen them that high before.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 13, 2009)

I want to point something out. Most soldiers did not wear camo. Most wore the standard Wehrmacht uniforms. If you look at most pictures from the East Front, you are not going to see Camo smocks or Camo Parkas. The SS wore that stuff more often than the regular Wehrmacht.

I know for sure that my Grandfather was not issued an Camo while he was on the East Front including his service in Stalingrad. I also know from pictures that my wifes Grandfather was not issued Camo during his time on the East Front as well as during his service in Stalingrad.


----------



## Soren (Jul 13, 2009)

parsifal said:


> Hi soren.
> 
> What are your sources for these Soviet Casualties. I have never seen any sources that quote Soviet losses for 1942 as 6 million. At that rate they would have no men of military age after 1942, if you factor in the losses of 1941, plus the proportional losses for men of military age in the civilan deaths. I just cannot see those numbers as adding up.
> 
> The numbers I have seen are closer to 2 million in total. Total military deaths were 13-18 million, although I acknowledge you strongly argue they are closer to 25 million.



25 million ?? I've seriously never claimed that. 

Soviet military deaths were around 16.8 million according to my sources.

I admit I was going off of memory before as I remember around 3 million Soviet POW's taken in 41 to 42 and around 3 million Soviets KIA MIA. With another 12½ million KIA MIA from 42 to 45. That's purely out of memory Parsifal, and I am ready to be corrected on this.



> No one should say they are "sure" about Soviet Casualties, because the actual losses are not completely known. So I am not discounting your claims, just saying I have not seen them that high before.



Oh I agree.


----------



## wheelsup_cavu (Jul 13, 2009)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> I want to point something out. Most soldiers did not wear camo. Most wore the standard Wehrmacht uniforms. If you look at most pictures from the East Front, you are not going to see Camo smocks or Camo Parkas. The SS wore that stuff more often than the regular Wehrmacht.
> 
> I know for sure that my Grandfather was not issued an Camo while he was on the East Front including his service in Stalingrad. I also know from pictures that my wifes Grandfather was not issued Camo during his time on the East Front as well as during his service in Stalingrad.


  Knowing how bad the survival rate was for the men captured at Stalingrad, Did both of them come back after their captivity ?
If they were captured at Stalingrad and this is not too personal of a question for me to be asking you.
Accept my apologies in advance if it is.


Wheels


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 13, 2009)

wheelsup_cavu said:


> Knowing how bad the survival rate was for the men captured at Stalingrad, Did both of them come back after their captivity ?
> If they were captured at Stalingrad and this is not too personal of a question for me to be asking you.
> Accept my apologies in advance if it is.
> 
> ...



My grandfather was captured at Stalingrad and he came home in 1947. One reason why we believe he survived was the fact that he was a doctor and not a fighting soldier.

My wife's grandfather as far as I know was not captured at Stalingrad, but was captured later in the war on the eastern front. He too came home a few years after the war. I am not sure what year though, I will have to ask her. I did see some interesting photos of him on the eastern front in fighting positions. The one that I found the most interesting was was the one of him climbing over a knocked out T-34 tank. Most of the photos I have of my grandfather are from the western front (in fact all of them are from the western front). The most interesting would be of him standing in front of the Eifell Tower in his Wehrmacht uniform.


----------



## wheelsup_cavu (Jul 14, 2009)

Thanks Adler.
One of the reason I asked was my dad worked with a guy in the late 60's who had been captured by the Russian's during the war.
He was 15 when he was captured and didn't get released until 1955.
He said the prisoners were used to help rebuild Stalingrad and other cities.

All second hand stories for me but when my Dad told me about the things Werner experienced during his captivity...
All I can say is Holy [email protected]

The picture of your grandfather in front of the Eifell Tower does sound interesting.
It's not something you would normally see over here.
Also being able to talk to someone who knew the person in the picture helps make it more "real" for me.
It not just another picture in a book or photo album.

I am sure I had relatives fighting on both sides during the war so any stories from the Wehrmachts side of the war interests me too.
My Dad's side of the family fought on the German side in WW I and WW II. 
My Mom's side of the family on the Allied/US side. 
We can't trace her side of the family to the Mayflower yet but we can get as far back as the mid 1600"s in the "New Country." 

Sorry for the OT guys. 
We now return you to your normally scheduled thread. 


Wheels


----------



## vanir (Jul 17, 2009)

Hi Juha. Oberkommando des Heere's advice was isolating Stalingrad (read: destroying from a distance). The General Staff only cared about keeping the reserves in place (no split of Heeresgruppe Süd). OKW wanted the Donets properly secured and were prepared to have an advance to the Don, no further. OKL wanted to bomb the Causcasus oil fields to oblivion and call it a day (disallowing Soviet use of them, a strategic victory where capturing them was impossible).
Hitler wanted a Don Front. Then he wanted Stalingrad taken care of. Then he wanted the oil fields for Germany. Then he wanted Stalingrad occupied. His big mistake was splitting off all the reserves to form Heeresgruppe A, to which he also assigned Gruppe Ruoff which really needed to operate independently (as an attachment to Heeresgruppe Süd).
This is what OKW, OKH and the General Staff had severe problems with, they started resigning, and wrote things like "Hitler is the Devil."

When Heeresgruppe B moved on the Don bend and launched towards Stalingrad, it had no reserves. They were now Heeresgruppe A.
Now all things considered that doomed it.

I know why this happened, Hitler was an arrogant moron and when he received reports of little or no contact from Gruppe Ruoff in the Kuban he decided personally that the Red Army had itself finally run out of reserves. He couldn't have been more wrong, and he was told this by the General Staff, by OKW and by OKH. He refused to listen.
And when he made his final Directive changes, for the upteenth time and filled with his increasingly typical holy zeal of self infatuation both OKW and OKL had enough, even his field commanders started resigning. You've heard what von Kleist said to him on the telephone haven't you?
The honeymoon was definitely over with OKH and the General Staff, no question.


The 1942 was in my opinion an undercurrent of civil war between Hitler's Nazis and the Prussian leadership which traditionally ran the German military. Previously Hitler used scheming and manipulation to get them to play ball, but from December 41 all pretence dropped, and the brilliance of Prussian military doctrine was no more. The General Staff, who's job it was to look after the men in the field became useless. The leadership, who's job it was to maintain absolute tactical control towards strategic ends, were completely tied. Hitler ran them by decree, the same way he kept the Nazis in such disarray that he was both absolute dictator and a force of pure chaos.

Hoth suffered so much attrition running back and forth he had barely two dozen tanks, and the 14th and 24th Panzerkorps were relying on Pz38(t) for the bulk of fighting ability by September. All Panzergruppen were utterly dependent upon day to day replenishment by very stretched and continually attacked supply lines, it was a matter of lose a PzIII, two Pz38s and a StuG, get a PzIV and a Marder next week and requisition two or three older StuGs and a couple of armoured cars in the meantime. That's how Stalingrad was fought, with a division of Luftwaffe infantry taking up flanks from an armoured Korps. Meanwhile those idiot sonderkommando SS are murdering ten year old children and school teachers over near Krasny, Cherkassy or something, on the Don bend there. That gives an idea of the Nazi priorities here, von Weichs himself ordered the Einsatzgruppen out of the area for morale.
Heeresgruppe B never stood a chance, no way. Hitler sacked what's his face, General Lube I think for protecting his rear. I mean c'mon, how much interference can you get? Not toddlers? They were being treated like they were.


----------



## Juha (Jul 17, 2009)

Soren
do you mean that Germans carried they summer smock in their rucksack after they had got their winter parka? Not handed them over when they got their winter parka? Entire possible of course, it weighted little and didn't took much space even if soldiers didn't like to carry around things they thought unneccessary.

Adler
IMHO Heer's uniforms early in the war were a bit too neat being a bit too tight and so looking nice in parades but not so practical than looser uniforms of British (or Finns). IIRC they moved towards looser uniforms a la British during the war, because they restricted less movements and as a extra gave possibility to stuff more material inside them during the cold period. On the other hand uniforms of SS, maybe because they were less tied to traditions, were very innovative and very good.

Vanir
sorry a couple projects took all my time, so I cannot give a passable answer, only a couple points.
Heer's fuel situation was bad and because their hope against Russians depended on mobility IMHO Hitler might well be right that the Caucasus oil fields were crucial for Germany. It is different thing that to say that they were reachable to Germany. IIRC during the summer 42 OKH's bureau of future operations stopped its planning because all predictions showed that Germany will lose the war.

Hitler had Jodl in his side. When List? was sack because of AG A's inability to reach its goals, List defended himself skillfully and showed that he had followed Hitler's orders. As a result Hitler suffered a sort of nervous breakdown and Jodl draw conclusion that he must protect Führer from things that might hurt his self-esteem. Ie began to separate Hitler from unkind reality.

OK, back to work.

Juha


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 17, 2009)

Juha said:


> Adler
> IMHO Heer's uniforms early in the war were a bit too neat being a bit too tight and so looking nice in parades but not so practical than looser uniforms of British (or Finns). IIRC they moved towards looser uniforms a la British during the war, because they restricted less movements and as a extra gave possibility to stuff more material inside them during the cold period. On the other hand uniforms of SS, maybe because they were less tied to traditions, were very innovative and very good.



I agree completely. I believe the Germans new this as well. If you look at the later pattern uniforms they are more "field" practical and better suited for field operations. Everything from the colors to the material the uniforms were made out of is better for combat.

I have some very good examples of original Wehrmacht uniforms of different patterns, where you can see the evolution of the uniforms.


----------

