# Aerial Recon on the Western Front



## silence (Sep 4, 2013)

Disclaimer: about the only thing I know about this topic is that the allies used P-38s and Spitfires.

Basically, I'm quite curious about how each side did their recon and how the other countered (or tried to), typical mission profiles, and so on.

For example: were standing patrols used, or a sort-of "intercept-on-call" method, or something else?

And/Or: What planes were used for recon and for counter-recon?

Etc.

Just curious for any info and opinions the community might like to share.


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## Airframes (Sep 4, 2013)

The main contributor in NW Europe was the RAF's PRU - Photographic Reconnaisance Unit, employing mainly Spitfires and Mosquitos. The USAAF used Spitfires, Mosquitos, P-38 (F5) and P-51 (F 5/F6). Tactical recce was carried out using the above also, but chiefly the earlier, Allison engined Mustangs, and other types.
It wasn't really possible for the Luftwaffe to mount standing patrols as such, as there were so many sorties by the recce aircraft, all over Europe, and they flew singly, high, and fast. 
Of course, the details are much more involved than this brief overview, and there are a number of books covering various aspects of this often overlooked, but very vital, area of aerial operations.


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## stona (Sep 4, 2013)

The Luftwaffe used a lot of Ju 88s and Do 217s in this role around the coast of Britain. Dealing with them was one role found for the Whirlwind.
Cheers
Steve


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## davebender (Sep 4, 2013)

Something like 15% of Luftwaffe aircraft were devoted to recon. A higher percentage then anyone else at the beginning of WWII. Having an information advantage was part of the reason German army fought so well even when outnumbered.

Germany used a system of recon aircraft with over lapping capabilities.
.....Fi-156 (Storch) STOL at division and corps level.
.....Fw-189 at corps and army level.
.....Me-110, Ju-86, Ju-88, Fw-200 and several other large aircraft were employed for strategic recon.


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## Juha (Sep 4, 2013)

To add Dave's list
early war at panzer division and corps level Hs 126
late war when Fw 189 was shown to be too vulnerable the recon versions of Bf 109 became the main a/c in tactical/short range recon, there was even a LR recon version of Bf 109G, the G4/R3.
And one important plane used in strategic recon during the late war was Me 410A-3. Do 217 was later used specially as night recon plane, its very early versions were used earlier as LR day recon as was its predecessors Do 215Bs and Do 17s, some Ar 240s were also employed as recon planes against well protected targets.

Juha


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## davebender (Sep 6, 2013)

> late war when Fw 189 was shown to be too vulnerable the recon versions of Bf 109 became the main a/c in tactical/short range recon


Me-109 is an odd choice for aerial recon as visibility from cockpit was rather poor. 







IMO twin seat Fw-190 would make a better high speed recon aircraft. However rear cockpit (for observer) should be stepped up a bit to make visibility as good as possible.


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## Airframes (Sep 6, 2013)

Visibility from the cockpit is not as important, in recce work, as visibility from the camera ports. It's the ability to mount the required number and type of cameras which counts, along with the required altitude/performance and stability, to get the job done, no matter how many crew, or the visibility from the crew positions.


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## davebender (Sep 6, 2013)

> Visibility from the cockpit is not as important, in recce work, as visibility from the camera ports



That's fine for strategic recon. For tactical recon the forward observer requires good visibility of the target he's adjusting artillery fire onto.


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## Airframes (Sep 6, 2013)

In tactical recce, a pilot or observer would not be adjusting any fire, from any artillery - that's the job of AOP aircraft. 
Tactical recce aircraft, such as the Allison-engined P-51, were/are used to obtain the latest photos of an area or specific target, for use (normally) by ground forces.
Observation of, and guidance of artillery or strike aircraft, is a totally different role, employing totally different aircraft, and reliant on radio communication with a FAC on the ground. It is not classed as recce, tactical or otherwise.


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## davebender (Sep 6, 2013)

> Observation of, and guidance of artillery or strike aircraft, is a totally different role, employing totally different aircraft


I don't think so.
Fw-189 carried a camera but also called in artillery fire. So did the somewhat similar 1960s era OV-10.


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## silence (Sep 6, 2013)

What altitudes would these planes fly at, and were they typically alone?


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## wuzak (Sep 6, 2013)

silence said:


> What altitudes would these planes fly at, and were they typically alone?



Altitude depended on what was being photoed, and the weather. Typically RAF PR aircraft would fly high - 25,000ft +.

RAF PR aircraft usually flew alone, unescorted.


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## nuuumannn (Sep 6, 2013)

Silence, for a good history of British photographic reconnaissance, look up Frederick Sidney Cotton, a rather enterprising Australian who was responsible for setting up the British PR unit that became No.1 PRU. In typical British fashion, Cotton was outsted from his position as head of the PRU in favour of a serving RAF officer, even though it was his show; he had problems with authority (!). His concepts changed the face of photo recon during the war; it was Cotton's idea to use single engined single seat fighters for recon, requesting a Spitfire from Fighter Command, which initially refused.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sidney_Cotton

Like Terry said there are a number of good books on the subject, including _Eyes of the RAF; a history of photo reconnaissance_ by Roy Conyers Nesbit, who was a former PI (Photographic Interpreter) and also _Eyes for the Phoenix _by Geoffrey Thomas. A good personal account of the PR war is _Evidence in camera_ by Constance Babington-Smith, who was a PI and first identified German jet and rocket fighters and brought them to the attention of the British.

One thing that is often overlooked regarding photo recon is that it is a form of intelligence collecting and ties in with the work of the different branches of intelligence departments. In WW2 the British intelligence community had direct contact with the RAF's No.1 PRU to the extent that the head of Scientific Intelligence could turn up unannounced at RAF Heston, and then Benson and request that he wanted a particular object or place photographed and without question the available pilot would do the job, often at great peril to himself. As for altitudes ops were flown, it depends on what was being photographed. For an example of a pertinent use of photographic recon, take a look here:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Biting

The image of the Wurzburg radar on this page was taken by a certain Australian PR pilot Tony Hill, a relation of whom is a member of this forum.

Thanks to its photo recon assets, the British Intelligence community had a better picture of what the Germans were up to than many of us realise here on this forum, being able to identify and become fully aware of the build up of jet and rocket fighters and the V weapons long before these things entered service, whereas German photographic coverage of the United Kingdom during the war was almost non-existent (note the almost - it was certainly nowhere near as extensive as Britain's coverage of Germany and Axis held territories).

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## silence (Sep 7, 2013)

Heh, I just bought a semester's worth of books for my MA classes - I was hoping to avoid spending more for a while!!!!

But you all are giving me some nice general info, which is all I wanted. Thanks.

I am actually familiar with modern US recon: I live only a few miles from Beale AFB, which was the home base for the Blackbird and still is for the Dragon Lady. I even got on the simulator for the Blackbird years ago!


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## Juha (Sep 7, 2013)

Hello 
Edward Leaf's Above All Unseen is another good book on RAF's PR Units in 1939-45. In Kahn's book on Third Reich's intelligence there is a chapter on German aerial recon.
On heights flown, very high and very low were typical to British and USAAF, unarmed PR planes tended to fly very high and armed FR planes at low level. On LW same systems. In addition at least some TacRec Bf 109Gs carried Army radio, so they while flying low level tac rec used "running commentry" reporting what they saw directly to the ground forces unit HQ which had asked for the recon flight. 

And the book Fooling the Looking Glass tells the story of camoflage, tricks to try to fool other side's recon.

Juha

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## nuuumannn (Sep 7, 2013)

> I live only a few miles from Beale AFB, which was the home base for the Blackbird and still is for the Dragon Lady. I even got on the simulator for the Blackbird years ago!



Very cool Silence, I'd love to go to Beale. They've got an SR-71 and U-2 on display, havent they?



> And the book Fooling the Looking Glass tells the story of camoflage, tricks to try to fool other side's recon.



I've never read this, it would be an interesting book to read. English Heritage have released a good book on dummy airfield Q sites around the UK and dummy aircraft constructed out of wood and fabric.



> On LW same systems.



With the exception of the Ar 234 and Me 262 in the very late stages of the war, the Germans didn't use unarmed single-seaters in the same manner that the Brits did. Until the jets, the use of high speed recon platforms by the LW was restricted to tactical and battlefield recon only.


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## Juha (Sep 7, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> I've never read this, it would be an interesting book to read. English Heritage have released a good book on dummy airfield Q sites around the UK and dummy aircraft constructed out of wood and fabric.



The title was a little off, its Col. Roy M. Stanley II's To Fool Glass Eye. Camouflage versus Photoreconnaissance in World War II Airlife 1998



nuuumannn said:


> With the exception of the Ar 234 and Me 262 in the very late stages of the war, the Germans didn't use unarmed single-seaters in the same manner that the Brits did. The use of high speed recon platforms by the LW was restricted to tactical and battlefield recon only.



Messerschmitt built 80 LR Recon Bf 109G-4/R3s in 1943, they were able to carry 2 x 300ltr dts.

Juha


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## silence (Sep 7, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> Very cool Silence, I'd love to go to Beale. They've got an SR-71 and U-2 on display, havent they?



Yep - Blackbird #17963 is there and the U2 still flies from there. There are also WWII German POW cells with the graffiti still on the walls.

Sadly, the base is slowly switching over to a site for piloting drones.


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## pattle (Sep 7, 2013)

Just to go slightly off topic, a lot of public buildings on the south coast of Britain during 1940 were camouflaged from the Germans by not being camouflaged, what I mean by this is that if a German recon or any other plane had spotted a building that had been camouflaged the Germans would have assumed it was of importance and would have bombed it.


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## davebender (Sep 7, 2013)

Strategic recon typically flies high and fast. Tactical recon flies low and slow.

WWII era naval recon typically flew at a few thousand feet. Staying low allowed observers to spot a ship silhouette against the horizon. "Shattered Sword" discusses naval aerial recon methods.


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## Juha (Sep 7, 2013)

davebender said:


> Strategic recon typically flies high and fast. Tactical recon flies low and slow...



That was the original idea which produced e.g. Hs 126 and Westland Lysander. Modified bombers like Do 17 or simply fast bombers seconded as recon planes like Blenheim were given the strategic work. But it was soon found out that the low and slow approach was more likely to produce lost planes and crews than valuable info if the enemy was able to utilise its fighters over battlefields or had effective AAA. So came FR type planes, 109s, Spitfires and Mustangs flew low but not slow. Also strategic recon planes changed, if based on bombers like Ju 88 they were more extensively modified and were given engine boost systems like GM-1 or were based on TE-fighters like Me 410A-3 and USAAF F-4 and F-5 or were special planes like Ki-46 Dinah. And British used planes based on very fast bomber or heavily modified SE fighter.

Juha


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## buffnut453 (Sep 7, 2013)

There is a very blurred line between reconnaissance and army cooperation. Aircraft like the Lysander, Storch and Hs126 were used for observation purposes but they were equally useful for broader roles like message couriers, message dropping, commander's personal transport etc. There were dedicated PR aircraft - the Spits and Mossies flying alone and unarmed over enemy territory - and there were also fighter-recce aircraft that carried both guns and cameras, the latter often mounted obliquely because such aircraft typically operated at low levels. All contributed to intelligence gathering but they did different things and at different time periods as the fighting need evolved.


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## Juha (Sep 7, 2013)

buffnut453 said:


> There is a very blurred line between reconnaissance and army cooperation. Aircraft like the Lysander, Storch and Hs126 were used for observation purposes but they were equally useful for broader roles like message couriers, message dropping, commander's personal transport etc. There were dedicated PR aircraft - the Spits and Mossies flying alone and unarmed over enemy territory - and there were also fighter-recce aircraft that carried both guns and cameras, the latter often mounted obliquely because such aircraft typically operated at low levels. All contributed to intelligence gathering but they did different things and at different time periods as the fighting need evolved.



I'd say that BoF showed to RAF that Lizzy was a failure in its designed role and they wanted something else for their army co-op sqns and when US planes became available in sufficient numbers, most got Tomahawks and then Mustangs and when the supply began to dry out, some got Spitfires. In LW Hs 126, which was rather similar than Lizzy was slowly replaced by Fw 189 but when even that was found out to be too vulnerable units began to get tac rec 109s.

Fi 156 was a rather different bird, weighted some 50% less than Lizzy and 126, had 240hp engine vs 800+hp engines in those other two, In fact it was nearer to AOPs or US Army Pipers than Lizzy. So IMHO the realities of WWII killed the Lizzy/Hs 126 type army co-op planes and their duties were taken by AOPs, which usually stayed over the territory occupied by their own side, popping up over skyline when directing arty fire. And they were effective in that, maybe the Allied planes most hated by German ground troops in Normandy and dead cheap, so really good bargain. On other end of scale were the FR planes, operating over enemy territory looking info on enemy troops and attacking targets of opportunity. Lizzy type planes would have been vulnerable over enemy territory, easy targets to AAA, being big and slow and fighters, so they needed a fighter escort and being slow were rather difficult to escort effectively. So because one had to sent fighters anyway, it wasn't difficult to understand why the idea of FR spread. A pair of FR planes could do much of the same than a Lizzy and 4 fighters and more safely. Much cheaper AOP type planes could do the courier and transport jobs, message dropping was much less important than was thought because the development in radios etc.

Juha


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## davebender (Sep 7, 2013)

> replaced by Fw 189 but when even that was found out to be too vulnerable units began to get tac rec 109s.


The fighter aircraft was nowhere near as capable as Fw-189 for tactical recon but I suppose you have no choice without air superiority. Just as Ju-87Ds were replaced with less effective but more survivable Fw-190F late in the war.


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## Aozora (Sep 7, 2013)

Just finished reading Dr Alfred Price's_ The Hardest Day_ (Battle of Britain 18 August 1940): one statistic worth quoting is the number of RAF day fighter sorties put up on that day; *886* sorties...
Of these *403* were used to intercept the major raids...
and no less than* 427 *sorties were sent up to intercept the Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft! (Bf 110s and Do 17 or 215s plus at least one Ju 86P).

According to Dr Price the effort to catch the reconnaissance aircraft was well worth it because they were forced to fly high and couldn't take high resolution photos of RAF airfields, so a lot of attacks were against FAA or BC airfields, rather than key Fighter Command facilities. It also meant that the Germans over estimated the damage they were doing to Fighter Command.


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## nuuumannn (Sep 8, 2013)

To fool a glass eye, yes, I've heard of that, must read, Juha.



> Messerschmitt built 80 LR Recon Bf 109G-4/R3s in 1943, they were able to carry 2 x 300ltr dts.



Yes, this is true, but like I said, these were used for tactical and battlefield recon by fighter Staffeln within the Aufklarungsgruppen. These aircraft cannot be compared with the RAF's dedicated photo recon Spitfires as strategic recon platforms and it's in this role that the Germans had no equivalent to the RAF until the jets came along, specifically the Ar 234. The RAF PRU served as a seperate function to the tactical recon Army Co-op squadrons that you describe. The PRU was a close knit community of hand picked individuals who answered not only to the RAF hierarchy, but also to different British intelligence departments; a comparison might be the difference between the units that operated the RF-4 Photo Phantom and those that operate(d) the U-2 and SR-71. Two different kettles of photogenic fish.

Its not that the Germans didn't know about the use of high speed single seaters as camera platforms; there is a commonly held misconception that the RAF didn't have Spitfires in France prior to its fall in 1940; there were Spits of Sidney Cotton's Photographic Development Unit there and one of these was captured by the Germans. There's a series of propaganda images that appeared in Der Adler showing a Spitfire being chased by a Bf 109; it's an unarmed PR Spit painted in dubious British markings by the Germans. As for the use of the Lysander as a photo recon aircraft, these were typically liaison aircraft and photographic work was done with hand held cameras, not the specialised big long focus ones.



> It also meant that the Germans over estimated the damage they were doing to Fighter Command.



One of their biggest failings, a lack of real knowledge of the British state of affairs at any time during the Battle.


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## Juha (Sep 8, 2013)

Hello Nuuumannn
Bf 109G-4/R3s was an exeption among 109 recon plane, others were TacRec but G-4/R3 was a LR recon a/c, see the most famous case of their use: 109 recce - victim of Pierre Clostermann over Scapa Flow... - Luftwaffe and Allied Air Forces Discussion Forum or http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showthread.php?t=4227

It was a plane of a LR Recon unit, namely 1(F)/120.

Juha


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## Tante Ju (Sep 8, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> Yes, this is true, but like I said, these were used for tactical and battlefield recon by fighter Staffeln within the Aufklarungsgruppen.



No, the long range recce fighters (G-4/R3 and G-6/R3, Gewaehltaufklarer) were specifically for strategic missions - why bother with two droptanks otherwise? Unlike RAF PRs, these also retained their motor cannon. 

There were also tactical fighter-recce FR 109s (G-6/R2, G-6/R5, later called G-8, as well as G-10/R2), but that's a different story.



> These aircraft cannot be compared with the RAF's dedicated photo recon Spitfires as strategic recon platforms



And why is that, because they were not RAF or not Spitfires? G-4/R3 and G-6/R3 went as far as Scapa Flow.



> and it's in this role that the Germans had no equivalent to the RAF until the jets came along, specifically the Ar 234.



In fact Arado built (in licence) 29 Bf 109E-5/N already by the end of June 1940. These were with cameras, guns and faster than any RAF fighter in 1940. It was hardly an idea only the British came up with.

The Germans had recce versions of Bf 109E and 110C in production when the RAF had, IIRC a pair of prototype Spitfires (and as you said one of them soon in German hands), provisionally fitted with cameras. Now the "unarmed" part was pretty much a necessity by the RAF, since the Spitfire wing either carried guns, or fuel. And they had to cover plenty of distance.



> Its not that the Germans didn't know about the use of high speed single seaters as camera platforms; there is a commonly held misconception that the RAF didn't have Spitfires in France prior to its fall in 1940; there were Spits of Sidney Cotton's Photographic Development Unit there and one of these was captured by the Germans.



Its not that, indeed. They were producing high speed single seaters as camera platforms. Its a common misconception in Britain, that because all the post-war hype of those mid- and late war PR Spitfires, that the Germans couldn't possibly have something similar. In fact they did, and it seems they were already series producing the recce Bf 109E-5, E-6, E-8, E-9 while the RAF had basically two and a confusing myriad of proposed PR Marks at the time.


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## Juha (Sep 8, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> ... These aircraft cannot be compared with the RAF's dedicated photo recon Spitfires as strategic recon platforms and it's in this role that the Germans had no equivalent to the RAF until the jets came along, specifically the Ar 234. The RAF PRU served as a seperate function to the tactical recon Army Co-op squadrons that you describe. The PRU was a close knit community of hand picked individuals who answered not only to the RAF hierarchy, but also to different British intelligence departments; a comparison might be the difference between the units that operated the RF-4 Photo Phantom and those that operate(d) the U-2 and SR-71. Two different kettles of photogenic fish.



Yes I know, besides some books on PRU I have bought I photoed theVol II of the official post-war report on PRU during the WWII.





nuuumannn said:


> Its not that the Germans didn't know about the use of high speed single seaters as camera platforms; there is a commonly held misconception that the RAF didn't have Spitfires in France prior to its fall in 1940; there were Spits of Sidney Cotton's Photographic Development Unit there and one of these was captured by the Germans. There's a series of propaganda images that appeared in Der Adler showing a Spitfire being chased by a Bf 109; it's an unarmed PR Spit painted in dubious British markings by the Germans.



I always wondered that kind of security lapses, British should have burned the plane before they left the airfield.




nuuumannn said:


> As for the use of the Lysander as a photo recon aircraft, these were typically liaison aircraft and photographic work was done with hand held cameras, not the specialised big long focus ones.



Yes that was the norm at the time same in LW with Hs 126s or in FiAF with Fokker C.Xs.

Juha


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## Juha (Sep 8, 2013)

Hello Tante Ju
PRU had on 20 July 40 8 PR IBs, 3 ICs and one IE, of these IBs carried 29 impgal extra fuel and ICs 59 impgal extra fuel. The IF, with 89 impgal extra fuel began ops at the end of Jul 40.

Juha


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## GrauGeist (Sep 8, 2013)

The Luftwaffe employed over 18 types during the course of the war, for recon purposes, including the Ar234 (Ar234B-1 being dedicated for recon).

KG200 conducted long range recon and even employed captured Allied bombers for many of those missions.


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## nuuumannn (Sep 8, 2013)

> No, the long range recce fighters (G-4/R3 and G-6/R3, Gewaehltaufklarer) were specifically for strategic missions - why bother with two droptanks otherwise? Unlike RAF PRs, these also retained their motor cannon.



This is very interersting Tante Ju, I wasn't aware of these variants of the Bf 109. You've aroused my curiosity now; firstly, where were the cameras carried, what sort of cameras - in terms of focal length etc were they and what sorts of missions did they fly? Scapa is obvious, but did the German units operate within the branches of the Abwehr or SD?



> And why is that, because they were not RAF or not Spitfires?



No, simply because I wasn't aware of them.



> It was hardly an idea only the British came up with.



Well, actually Cotton was an Australian and he had a hard time attempting to get his point across to the Brits, who thought he was a bit mad.



> These were with cameras, guns and faster than any RAF fighter in 1940.



Which variants of Bf 109s and '110s were these then? Let's see some figures to back this up. The Bf 110 was a very good recon platform, but it was not faster than current RAF fighters in 1940.



> The Germans had recce versions of Bf 109E and 110C in production when the RAF had, IIRC a pair of prototype Spitfires (and as you said one of them soon in German hands), provisionally fitted with cameras. Now the "unarmed" part was pretty much a necessity by the RAF, since the Spitfire wing either carried guns, or fuel. And they had to cover plenty of distance.



Were these specialised strategic recon platforms or just tactical recon aircraft? Again, where were the cameras put on the Bf 109? Were they large high altitude cameras? The first two Spits were modified in October 1939 and had flown the first strategic recon op over Aachen by mid November. By the end of the Battle for France the PDU had considerably more that two Spitfires and had flown 557 sorties, photographing practically the whole of the Ruhr and and port facilities, including every German heavy warship. The Spitfire's cameras were initially only carried in the rear fuselage because of their enormous size; it was on later variants that oblique cameras were fitted in the wings.



> Its not that, indeed. They were producing high speed single seaters as camera platforms. Its a common misconception in Britain, that because all the post-war hype of those mid- and late war PR Spitfires, that the Germans couldn't possibly have something similar. In fact they did, and it seems they were already series producing the recce Bf 109E-5, E-6, E-8, E-9 while the RAF had basically two and a confusing myriad of proposed PR Marks at the time.



Perhaps its because these Bf 109s did not achieve as much as the PRU Spits did. I doubt the Germans used their strategic recon aircraft to anywhere near the same degree as the British did, since little is heard or written about them to the same extent as the Bf 109 fighter variants compared to the Spitfire. It is well known that German reconnaissance over Britain throughout the entire war was sorely lacking and was one of the big misfortunes of the Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain. It's one thing to have these aircraft, another to put them to effective use. German intelligence didn't have a patch on the British in terms of photographic coverage of Germany and its Allies during the war, so a fat lot of good they did for the Abwehr or SD, then. My understanding of German tactical recon is that it was extremely effective, but its strategic recon was poor by comparison to the Allies. Do you agree?


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## GrauGeist (Sep 8, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> where were the cameras put on the Bf 109? Were they large high altitude cameras?


There were several versions of Bf109 for recon.

The camera locations varied depending on the recon requirements and camera type (application). The first Bf109 recon was the Bf109E-5 and E-6, where all weapons were removed except the cowl MG and the camera was located behind the pilot, in the fuselage. The camera used was the Rb21/18.

For the Bf109F series, the F-6 was the version used for recon. Again, the wing armament was removed and because of it's limited range, drop tanks were fitted. The mounted cameras used were the Rb20/30, Rb50/30 or the Rb75/30.

In the G series of the Bf109, there were several dedicated PRU versions. The first of the series, the Bf109G-2/R2, remained fully armed and carried a Rb50/30 camera. Next was the Bf109G-4/R2 and R3. The difference between the R2 and R3, was the R3 carried drop tanks to increase it's range and they both carried the Rb50/30 camera. The G-4/U3 version was unarmed and carried two Rb12.5/7x9 cameras on board. The last G version PRU was the G-8 which carried a Rb50/30 along with either a Rb12.5/7x9 or a Rb32/7x9. In addition, some of these versions were also fitted with a small camera on the port wing.

I don't have photos handy at the moment, but the locations for the cameras were either fitted behind the pilot in the fuselage, on the bottom centerline of the fuselage just aft of the wing or along the bottom of the fuselage offset to either side of the centerline between the tailwheel and the mainwing. And of course, on the port wing.


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## pattle (Sep 8, 2013)

Don't forget the Dornier Do17P, these machines were used by the Luftwaffe until at least the end of 1941. You don't see many pictures or hear much mention of the P model with it's distinctive original slim nose, but the P model was a well used specialised recon plane early war.


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## Aozora (Sep 8, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> This is very interersting Tante Ju, I wasn't aware of these variants of the Bf 109. You've aroused my curiosity now; firstly, where were the cameras carried, what sort of cameras - in terms of focal length etc were they and what sorts of missions did they fly?



This is one installation:











The G-4/R3






All from Prien and Rodeike, Schiffer 1995 pages 50, 53, 94. According to this book the Bf 109F-6 didn't exist


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## OldSkeptic (Sep 8, 2013)

Pierre Clostermann tells of shooting down a very high altitude 109G going over Scapa Flow in his book. So they definitely used them.

And of course they used the Ju-86Ps for high altitude recon for a while, until fighter performance caught up. The story about how they modified a few Spit Mk Vs to shoot down one at 49,000ft is one of those great stories of the war (though seldom mentioned is the decompression sickness quite a few of the Spit pilots suffered as a result).


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## Aozora (Sep 8, 2013)

OldSkeptic said:


> Pierre Clostermann tells of shooting down a very high altitude 109G going over Scapa Flow in his book. So they definitely used them.
> 
> And of course they used the Ju-86Ps for high altitude recon for a while, until fighter performance caught up. The story about how they modified a few Spit Mk Vs to shoot down one at 49,000ft is one of those great stories of the war (though seldom mentioned is the decompression sickness quite a few of the Spit pilots suffered as a result).



Here's one of the modified VBs: (Andrew Thomas; Spitfire Aces of North Africa and Italy (Osprey Aces 98) page 10)






Because the modified Spitfire Vs were so effective it led to this interesting Spitfire P.R variant that was developed by the same Aboukir bods who modified the high altitude Spitfire Vs...






From:


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## nuuumannn (Sep 8, 2013)

> but the locations for the cameras were either fitted behind the pilot in the fuselage, on the bottom centerline of the fuselage just aft of the wing or along the bottom of the fuselage offset to either side of the centerline between the tailwheel and the mainwing. And of course, on the port wing.



This is good information, thanks guys. This is what I was trying to find out, where would you put the big cameras in the Bf 109? I assumed it'd have to be in the rear fuse; I've seen photos of the Bf 109G-4/R3 posted here before and I knew there were tac recon Bf 109s, but wasn't aware they were used for long range strategic recon. How effective were they? Any good info about operations using them? Did the Auflkarungsgruppen have a similar strategic recon unit to the British PRU?

The Germans mustn't have placed that much faith in them as the British did their assets; another wasted opportunity, perhaps?


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## OldSkeptic (Sep 8, 2013)

Thanks Aozora, great stuff. They were clever. They couldn't do anything about the supercharger in Egypt, so they raised the compression ratio, carefully grinding down the head (from memory), modifying pistons, etc.
The most advanced field modification ever?

Decompression sickness (the bends) was not so well understood then (though they had a fair knowledge) I wonder how many of the pilots suffered permanent damage (DC can damage the brain for example)?


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## nuuumannn (Sep 9, 2013)

Right then. Have been doing a bit of reading about German single-seat fighters modified as recon aircraft and German strategic recon in general from various sources, including the excellent series Auflkarer, Luftwaffe Reconnaissance and Aircraft. Indeed, the Germans used single-seat fighters (news to me) as strategic recon assets, even over the UK; there are recollections of Bf 109s being shot down or crashing through equipment failure, but these were few and far between and not carried out with any consistency. By 1943 enigma decrypts were revealing that the Germans hadn't taken any recent images over London "for years" and it wasn't until the Ar 234 that such a specially modified recon platform became available, and by then they were too few (only two to begin with) to be of real effectiveness, despite the fact they were largely unstoppable. Primary strategic recon aircraft used by the German armed forces were converted twin engined bombers and maritime aircraft, rather than specialised high speed high altitude assets - the Ju 86P nothwithstanding. German intelligence of Britain's military assets during the war was largely based on recon carried out clandestinely during peacetime and indeed the Germans carried out an extensive survey of the UK before the war, but once the shooting started, German recon of the British Isles declined rapidy. By contrast, the British had scant knowledge of German military facilities before the war and in the first few months of the war, but through the efforts of Cotton began to build a bigger picture, to the extent that the PRU became the foremost strategic recon asset of any armed forces in the war in terms of its utilisation.

Both Fw 190s and Bf 109s were modified by the installation of recon cameras in the rear fuselages and used for strategic recon coverage of Wehrmacht areas of action, in typical LW organisation, the units were self conatined, with their own PIs and developers. From what I've read the Fw 190 was primarily operational from France and to a lesser extent the Soviet Union, but Bf 109s were operational in France, North Africa, Italy and the Soviet Union. These aircraft carried out both tactical and strategic recon under the German _Operational Aufklarer _ stategic pre-and post battle recon and _Taktische Aufklarer_ for tactical battle recon.

The biggest problem facing the LW and indeed the Nazis and their disemmination of information gathered was the fractious nature of relations between the different war departments. The German Aufklarer did not enjoy the same autonomy as the RAF PRUs because of this and the information flow was not always outwith the military command structures of the Wehrmacht and LW itself. By contrast the PRUs and RAF Photographic Interpretation Unit had open communication within the British intelligence departments and not only shared the results of photographic sorties but were under instruction from the intel departments on which specific targets to cover. The lack of German intercommunicational flexibility within its armed forces is no secret. 

In conclusion German operations with its single-seaters were pretty much in line with what my understandng of German recon was, although I had no knowledge of the strategic use of the single seaters. Nevertheless, they were not same ops carried out by the RAF PRUs in terms of the endurance and coverage of the Reich for intelligence collecting and were more in common with how battlefield reconnaissance was represented within other countries' armed forces. Modifications to the Fw 190s and Bf 109s were the fitting of cameras and external fuel carriage in line with their role, this extended to the removal of radios and weaponry. The German use of strategic recon was primarily inline with the whims of its military operations in terms of its conquests, rather than building a bigger photographic picture of the Allies and their capabilities at home and abroad. By contrast, by the end of the war, both the United States and British recon assests had photographed almost the entire length and breadth of the Reich. So, my statement about the the differences between the British PRU stands to a degree, then. 

German use of its strategic recon assets appear to be determined and persistent at best, but inconsistent and lacking over time to be of real strategic value at worst; furthermore, the modified single-seat assets were not used to the same extent that the British PRU aircraft were, nor did they carry out as extensive operations deep into enemy territory as frequently with the same consistency as the British PRUs, as useful as the German assets were, however. This doesn't take away anything from the airmen who flew these ops for the Aufklarer; PR pilots had a hazardous existence and they were subject to the same pressures as their Allied counterparts.

Thanks for the heads-up guys, I learned something valuable today.


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## GrauGeist (Sep 9, 2013)

Aozora said:


> All from Prien and Rodeike, Schiffer 1995 pages 50, 53, 94. According to this book the Bf 109F-6 didn't exist


I know that the Bf109F-6/U was a "Galland" creation, but I have seen several sources list the F-6 as being attached to units such as 1.(F)122 stationed in Italy and North Africa during 1941-43.

Aufkl. Gr. 122 mainly operated Ju88D series (D-1 and D-5) for photo recon, but they did have Bf109s and even operated a couple of Fw190A-3 recon variants in 1942, part of 3.(F) 122.

Here's a photo (shown below, right hand) of a Bf109F-6 recon attached to 1.(F) 122, it's been said that it's F6+TH, but that was assigned to a Ju88A-4 (of the same gruppen) that was lost on 11 April 1943 due to interception by Spitfires of 87 Sqdn. near Algiers-Bone. Note the camera structure aft of the wing along the bottom of the fuselage

The photo is said to have been from 1941, though not sure if it was spring, fall, etc...


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## vinnye (Sep 9, 2013)

Found this on Wiki;
In August 1942, a modified Spitfire V shot one down over Egypt at some 14,500 m (49,000 ft); when two more were lost, Ju 86Ps were withdrawn from service in 1943.


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## Hop (Sep 9, 2013)

> German use of its strategic recon assets appear to be determined and persistent at best, but inconsistent and lacking over time to be of real strategic value at worst; furthermore, the modified single-seat assets were not used to the same extent that the British PRU aircraft were, nor did they carry out as extensive operations deep into enemy territory as frequently with the same consistency as the British PRUs



Hooton in Eagle in Flames says the Luftwaffe flew 187 recce sorties over Britain in the whole of 1943, losing 33 aircraft in the process. That's not only a very low total, it's a shockingly high loss rate of 18%.


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## nuuumannn (Sep 9, 2013)

Hi Dave, that great picture of the Bf 109s is present in Aufklarer; Luftwaffe Reconnaissance Aircraft and Units 1942 - 1945. Here's the caption on page 30;

"Two Messerschmitt Bf 109F-4/R3s of the 1.(F)/122 at Catania, Sicily, during the summer of 1942 where ground crews have placed sun umbrellas over their open cockpits to make them cooler and more comfortable for their pilots. Both aircraft carry the Staffel emblem of a stylised white stork flying across a red and white symbol representing the field of view of the camera."


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## Glider (Sep 9, 2013)

Just a couple of observations/questions. Thse drop tanks on the PR 109 look pretty big, does anyone have any idea what they did to the performance of the aircraft. The second is the camera installation. A Spitfire is pretty narrow and the 109 even thinner, were they able to get the twin installation needed for stero photography?


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## Milosh (Sep 9, 2013)

They are the usual Luftwaffe 300 l tanks.

On the Fw190G, 2 300 l drop tanks and a SC500 caused a speed loss of ~50mph (depends on the racks).


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## Juha (Sep 9, 2013)

Hello Glider
Carrying those double drop tanks caused real vibration problems for the a/c according to a report of 15.5.43. So that the a/c could only be safely flown between 250 and 420 km/h. Above that speed the wing would start vibrating, getting worse with increased speed. In the end, the best solution they found was to use a 2-part fairing to streamline the entire area between the wing and the fuel tanks. This removed the vibrations from the wing, and increased the a/c speed by 29 km/h. With the unfaired drop-tank mounting the a/c lost 55 km/h, compared to the clean a/c (in this case a G-4/R3); and with the fairings it lost 26 km/h. But the fairing was never produced in quantity.

This info is from one of the 2 TOCH treads links to which I posted earlier 

Juha


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## Aozora (Sep 9, 2013)

Glider said:


> Just a couple of observations/questions. Thse drop tanks on the PR 109 look pretty big, does anyone have any idea what they did to the performance of the aircraft. The second is the camera installation. A Spitfire is pretty narrow and the 109 even thinner, were they able to get the twin installation needed for stero photography?


 
AFAIK the 109 installation only ever used one vertical camera and there was no provision for lateral installations. 

Luftwaffe Cameras

View attachment Reihenbildkamera.pdf


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## HBPencil (Sep 9, 2013)

silence said:


> And/Or: What planes were used for recon and for counter-recon?



Late in the war the Lufftwaffe apparently used the Me262 and 163 to intercept high flying recon aircraft. This resulted in the 7th PG getting P-51Ds to use as escorts for their F-5 Lightnings and PR XI Spitfires but I haven't heard of the RAF's PRU having escorts assigned.


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## OldSkeptic (Sep 10, 2013)

HBPencil said:


> Late in the war the Lufftwaffe apparently used the Me262 and 163 to intercept high flying recon aircraft. This resulted in the 7th PG getting P-51Ds to use as escorts for their F-5 Lightnings and PR XI Spitfires but I haven't heard of the RAF's PRU having escorts assigned.



Yes they did sometimes, escorting Mosquitos, not (as far as I know) the later (particularly Griffon) PRU Spits though, probably because they ran at such a high altitude that the Mustangs basically couldn't operate at. And the 262s (and all the 1st and quite a few of the 2nd generation jets) had to zoom climb to get at. Hence why they kept using the late model PR Spits for so long.

Hard work for the Mustangs though, Mossies set a cracking cruise speed.


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## HBPencil (Sep 10, 2013)

Cheers OldSkeptic, for the heads-up on Mossies sometimes being escorted.


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## Glider (Sep 10, 2013)

Juha and Aozora
Thank you both for your comments. It explains why the 109 wasn't as effective as I thought in the PR role. The secret of the SPits success was that it was both difficult to intercept and had a decent selection of camera outfits. Clearly the 109 wasn't in the same league


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## nuuumannn (Sep 10, 2013)

> It explains why the 109 wasn't as effective as I thought in the PR role.



Part of this was organisational and had little to do with the aircraft's capabilities. Ultimately, the effectiveness of a weapon is determined by its use and the Bf 109 recon variants were effective platforms in terms of the pre-and post battlefield reconnaissance they carried out and the information gleaned from their flights. As strategic recon platofrms outwith the Wehrmacht and LW's battlefields, again, their effectiveness was limited by their usage - too few flights made to be effective enough, maintenance issues, the method by which the data they gathered was analysed and also by the internal organization of the LW all hampered the effective use of the Bf 109 for intelligence gathering. One thing that is often pointed out is that lack of stereoscopes in use by the German PIs; this is largely false and they did have them, but the Germans often worked directly from negatives placed on light boxes rather than for prints; this was owing to the speed of German advances; the information was required immediately and in the field the Aufklarungs gruppen didn't have the luxury of a building full of PIs and necessary equipment, such as was available in the Abwehr HQ and RAF Medmenham.

One problem that it not often highlighted is that the Germans viewed photographic interpretation as a necessary process and allocated the PI role to NCOs with little real knowledge of intelligence work, this was in contrast to the RAF, whose PIs were trained in intel and were specifically requested to look for anomalies. This is where the German system fell down a bit; again, it boils down to organisational expectations. The Brits had far more leeway in intel interpretation than the Germans.


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## mhuxt (Sep 10, 2013)

Agree with every word of ^ that, however it still boggles my mind that the Brits, of all people, out-organised the Germans.

To quote the fellow in Fawlty Towers, "How effer did zey vin?"


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## buffnut453 (Sep 10, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> ...but the Germans often worked directly from negatives placed on light boxes rather than for prints



Actually, working from negatives is usually better than working from prints - the quality of negatives is better because prints are inevitably one generation removed from the originally-captured image. Also "light boxes" (or the more capable light tables) provide a much better illuminant for analysing imagery than shining a spot lamp onto a print. As late as 1994 the RAF was still using wet-film photo recce and we were still analysing negatives on light tables using stereoscopes - not the best in the world but it worked and delivered results sufficient for the operation at that time.


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## Aozora (Sep 11, 2013)

mhuxt said:


> Agree with every word of ^ that, however it still boggles my mind that the Brits, of all people, out-organised the Germans.
> 
> To quote the fellow in Fawlty Towers, "How effer did zey vin?"


 
Read Ian Kershaw's _Hitler 1889-1936 'Hubris' _and_ Hitler 1936-1945 'Nemesis'_ and Bungay's _'The Most Dangerous Enemy'_ and you'll find out how administratively chaotic, bureaucratic and disorganised the Germans had become under the Nazis - they did lots of things well but organising their economy and administration for the long war was not one of them. It is also a myth that the Brits were bumblers in comparison with the supposedly super-efficient Germans because, believe it or not, their administration of most aspects of the war was efficient, although there were inevitably some problems.

 Wartime Economies Compared (pages 10, 11, 12 most relevant)


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## yulzari (Sep 11, 2013)

OldSkeptic said:


> the 262s (and all the 1st and quite a few of the 2nd generation jets) had to zoom climb to get at. Hence why they kept using the late model PR Spits for so long.



That is right. They were still using them over China in the 1950's for that very reason.


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## Glider (Sep 11, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> Part of this was organisational and had little to do with the aircraft's capabilities. Ultimately, the effectiveness of a weapon is determined by its use and the Bf 109 recon variants were effective platforms in terms of the pre-and post battlefield reconnaissance they carried out and the information gleaned from their flights. As strategic recon platofrms outwith the Wehrmacht and LW's battlefields, again, their effectiveness was limited by their usage - too few flights made to be effective enough, maintenance issues, the method by which the data they gathered was analysed and also by the internal organization of the LW all hampered the effective use of the Bf 109 for intelligence.



There is a lot of truth is what you say but at the end of the day the 109 couldn't carry the same range of cameras as the PR spits, they didn't have the range and didn't have the performance to avoid interception. Most importantly the Luftwaffe didn't have any alternatives.

If the ground organisation had been the slickest in the world, the priority the highest and number of flights increased, they still wouldn't have been nearly as effective.


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## nuuumannn (Sep 11, 2013)

> Actually, working from negatives is usually better than working from prints - the quality of negatives is better because prints are inevitably one generation removed from the originally-captured image. Also "light boxes" (or the more capable light tables) provide a much better illuminant for analysing imagery than shining a spot lamp onto a print.



That's right; the Germans just didn't have as flexible an approach to analysing what they were looking at as the Brits. That was the principal difference between British and German Photo Recon.




> Most importantly the Luftwaffe didn't have any alternatives.



Actually they did. The Fw 190 could carry a wider range of cameras that the Bf 109 and it had performance to boot, the problem was, the number the LW had weren't utilised as extensively as the Bf 109, which seems peculiar since the Fw 190 was a better fighter with more growth potential than the Bf 109. There was a F 190D that was converted with oblique cameras mounted to photograph out the fuselage side, similar to PR Spits, but little was done with it. The Germans experimented with a wide variety of different aircraft types for the specialised out-of-theatre recon role, including the Henschel Hs 130, Arado Ar 240, Do 335 etc. 



> If the ground organisation had been the slickest in the world, the priority the highest and number of flights increased, they still wouldn't have been nearly as effective.



Having read your comment prior to doing the reading I've done, Glider, I would agree, but I'm not so sure about that now. Prior to the outbreak of WW2 the German intelligence system and aerial recon was quite sophisticated - far more so than anyone else in Europe, including the UK. In fact, Britain lagged behind Germany in terms of the number of aircraft and the systems in place to use the information gleaned from the recon flights. Prior to the outbreak of WW2, one fifth of the Luftwaffe's total number of aircraft were dedicated recon types, stategic, tactical, weather etc. As early as the late 1920s the Germans were carrying out clandestine recon flights over potential enemy countries' borders and had a better idea of the disposition of its enemies' forces than others had of its. Long before anyone else had thought of the idea, the Germans had the Wekusta, which were specialised weather recon units that carried out long ranging flights into enemy territory. The Wekusta continued its largely unrecognised role throughout the entire war. 

The big enthusiast for the subject of PR in Germany was a chap by the name of Theodor Rowehl, who has been called the 'Sidney Cotton' of German PR, but in fact his work pre-dates Cotton's and it should be the other way round. Rowehl used Lufthansa aircraft fitted with hidden cameras in sliding hatches years before Cotton converted his Lockheed 12, including a Junkers W 34, which had broken an altitude record, a couple of the early pre-production He 111 prototypes and an He 111C airliner. His primary type of choice was the Do 17, however, owing to its high speed and altitude for the time - it was virtually unstoppable. 

As his efforts became better recognised he was recruited by the Abwehr who established a special out-of-theatre strategic recon unit, which eventually was named Kommando Rowehl in his honour. The Ju 86P bomber recon aircraft were utilised on raids on the UK at his insistence. With a motley collection of types pre-war, his unit was largely responsible for photographing large swathes of Czechoslovakia, Poland, France and Britain, all of which was very useful to the German military. He was the driving force behind modifying many German aircraft prototypes as reconnaissance aircraft - he became well known for his enthusiasm for the task and was not discouraged - unlike Cotton to begin with. It was from Rowehl's unit that the roots of KG 200 grew from - KG 200 also had Wekusta aircraft in support of its activities.

Like I stated earlier, the Nazi organisation (petty jealousies, empire building, currying favour with the Fuhrer etc) let its formidable recon assets down. Goering himself had little interest in what Rowehl was up to despite the enormous potential of the organisation he had helped to create, with the assistance of the Abwehr and Canaris personally. Like many things during WW2, the Germans initially had the upper hand in terms of aerial recon over and above anyone else in the world, but lost that lead rather quickly (except in terms of battlefield in-theatre recon, which they performed expertly) once the shooting started.


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## Balljoint (Sep 11, 2013)

Another recon technique was the use of bombers hauling somewhat heavy but powerful flash illumination equipment at night.


http://web.mit.edu/6.933/www/Fall2000/edgerton/EdgertonWW2.pdf

Scroll down a bit on the link.


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## Tante Ju (Sep 11, 2013)

Glider said:


> There is a lot of truth is what you say but at the end of the day the 109 couldn't carry the same range of cameras as the PR spits, they didn't have the range and didn't have the performance to avoid interception. Most importantly the Luftwaffe didn't have any alternatives.



We will have to see the particulars. What would be the typical range of cameras PR Spits would carry, their type and details, what was their speed capabilities, especially sustainable cruise speeds and mission profiles, how did it happen they were still intercepted (IIRC the fitst victim of the 109G was a PR Spit) and what was their range under that mission profile? How many produced and how many missions flown?

In the already mentioned excellent _Aufklaerers _volume it is mentioned that due to lack of proper cameras and difficulties of importing them from the US the British were forced to scavenge the Zeiss objectives from a downed Ju 88 recon plane in order to boost up their unsuitable lenses (possibly lacking detail?). This tends to raise some doubts if the British ever possessed proper quality cameras during the war.


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## Balljoint (Sep 11, 2013)

buffnut453 said:


> As late as 1994 the RAF was still using wet-film photo recce and we were still analysing negatives on light tables using stereoscopes - not the best in the world but it worked and delivered results sufficient for the operation at that time.



As you say the Brits used stereo viewing that required two separate viewpoints for each image. The 3-D images were instrumental in finding and interpreting the initially overlooked V-1 and V-2 weapons and sites. Recently there was a PBS program that did a good job of reviewing this and the resulting, as I recall, Operation Crossbow


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## Juha (Sep 11, 2013)

Hello Tante Ju
Straight from Wiki, the most numerous PR Spit
The Mk XI was the first PR variant to have the option of using two vertically mounted F52 cameras with 36-inch-focal-length lens in the fuselage behind the cockpit.[48] Several other configurations could be fitted, depending on mission requirements; the "X Type" installation, for example had two vertically mounted F24s with 14-inch lens and an oblique F24 with an 8-inch lens mounted above and facing to port.[49] PR Mk XIs used for tactical reconnaissance had an additional, vertically oriented camera in a fairing under each wing.[48]

Physically the Mk XIs had a deeper nose fairing to accommodate a larger 14.5 gal oil tank and used the unarmoured, wrap-around PRU windscreen. "Booster" pumps for the wing tanks were fitted and covered by "teardrop" shaped fairings under the wings. Retractable tailwheels were fitted as standard and the majority of the Mk XIs built had the later large-area "pointed" rudder. 260 Mk XIs were powered by Merlin 61, 63 or 63A engines, while the remaining 211 used the high-altitude Merlin 70. All of the Merlin 70 and 198 of the Merlin 60 series aircraft were fitted with the Vokes Aero-Vee dust filter in the extended, streamlined carburettor air intake under the nose.[48] All Merlin 60 powered aircraft featured the fuel cooler in the port leading edge wing root. The radio installation was either the VHF TR.1133 or TR.1143 fitted with the "Rebecca" beam approach equipment.[48]

Additional "slipper" drop tanks could be fitted under the centre-section; in common with the Mk IX these could be 30, 45 or 90 gal capacity and, for the Mk XI, a tank of 170 gal capacity was also available.[38]

Spitfire PR Mk XIs were capable of a top speed of 417 mph (671 km/h) at 24,000 ft (7,300 m) and could cruise at 395 mph (636 km/h) at 32,000 ft (9,800 m). Normally Spitfire XIs cruised between these altitudes although, in an emergency, the aircraft could climb to 44,000 ft (13,000 m) However, pilots could not withstand such altitudes for long in a non-pressurised cockpit without suffering from serious physiological effects.[46]

At first, production of the PR Mk XI was delayed because development of the Mk VII and VIII series was delayed. As a result it was decided to base the Merlin 60 powered PR aircraft on the MK IX airframe.[45] Production was further threatened because of a dispute over RAF PR doctrine: in early 1943, because the new PR Spitfire was delayed, the Air Ministry proposed that all PR units be converted to de Havilland Mosquitoes. After further analysis the Air Staff agreed that Mosquitoes could perform 90% of PR missions so the Spitfire production for only 10% of PR units was mooted. Air Vice Marshal John Slessor, head of Coastal Command pointed out that the Spitfire was smaller than the Mosquito, used half the number of Merlin engines and was faster, more manoeuvrable and quieter and, therefore production should be increased, not reduced. As a result the Air Staff decided that PR Mk XI production should be accelerated at the cost of the fighters.[48]

The first Mk XIs were built in November 1942: from April 1944 production ran concurrently with the PR Mk XIX before ending in December 1944, when they were phased out in favour of the Mk XIX. In total 471 Mk XI were built by Supermarine.[50]

_In the already mentioned excellent Aufklaerers volume it is mentioned that due to lack of proper cameras and difficulties of importing them from the US the British were forced to scavenge the Zeiss objectives from a downed Ju 88 recon plane in order to boost up their unsuitable lenses (possibly lacking detail?). This tends to raise some doubts if the British ever possessed proper quality cameras during the war._

Just look from internet for wartime British recon photos and see yourself the quality. For ex Tirpitz photos and then try to found out German high altitude photos on KGV BBs and compare.


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## buffnut453 (Sep 11, 2013)

Balljoint said:


> Another recon technique was the use of bombers hauling somewhat heavy but powerful flash illumination equipment at night.



Those were for post-strike analysis to determine whether the bombs were actually hitting the designated target area.


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## nuuumannn (Sep 11, 2013)

> This tends to raise some doubts if the British ever possessed proper quality cameras during the war.



Actually, British cameras were very efficient. The F24, which was the standard RAF recon camera was in service until the 1960s as was its high altitude derivative the F52.

As for disposition of PR aircraft, by September 1941 No.1 PRU had 37 Spitfires, 2 Mosquitoes and 2 Martin Marylands. In October 1942 No.1 PRU was disbanded and the different flights became squadrons; Mossie PR.IVs went into 540 Sqn and the Spit PR.IV Flights became 542 and 543 Sqns, with 140 Sqn with Spit PR.IVs doing army co-operation sorties. Indeed the PR.IV was no match for a Bf 109F or G, being based on Spit Mk.Is and Vs. A total of 229 Spit PR.IVs were built. The introduction of the PR.XI, which was based on the Spit IX went some way to redress inequality between German fighters and the recon aircraft however; the Mk.XI was fitted with the two-speed two-stage 60 Series Merlin; 471 of these were built. With the Griffon engined Spit XIV came the PR.XIX, to which in terms of PR aircraft performance, the Germans had no equal (except for jets of course); 20 pre-production aircraft were followed by 205 production PR.XIXs. These were all specialised unarmed strategic recon aircraft; not just standard Spitfires fitted with cameras.

These numbers represent the principal production PR Spitfires and do not include specialised variants, such as the Spit PR.X, which was a Spit IX with a pressurised cabin; 16 of these were built. Nor do they include tac recon Spitfire FR variants; fighter recon variants of standard models, such as the FR.XIV, of which 430 were built.

The de Havilland Mosquito was another aircraft that specialised recon variants were built from the outset and was used extensively by the PRUs for strategic recon; the first Mosquitoes to enter service were PR variants in mid 1941. The first was the PR.I, which went into service in small numbers, followed by the PR.IV, which was the PR variants of the B.IV, ther first Mossie bomber; 32 were converted from B.IVs. The PR.IX followed from this, 90 of these were built, followed by the PR.XVI, the first pressurised variant of which 432 were built. There was also the post war PR.34.

Within the first few months of ops with the Mossie, the Admiralty ws the principal client of the Mossie squadrons; all the main German ports were photographed in Germany, Norway, France and Poland. These aircraft went as far as North Africa and the Middle East. The Spitfires carried out sorties closer to home for the Admiralty, Scientific Intelligence and also the USAAF once they arrived on the scene. Like I said in an earlier post, the V weapons and German jets were discovered years befor they entered service by the PR aircraft; their efforts were crucial in planning heavy bomber raids, such as that against Peenemunde as well as against the _Tirpitz_ and the _Bismarck_.

In light of the German efforts, I still maintain that the British strategic recon PRUs carried out a far greater number of sorties than Rowehl's unit (this doesn't include in-theatre battlefield recon) and the Brits were not slow learners; despite being behind in terms of organisational structure and aircraft at the beginning of the war, they did not suffer the organisational turmoil the Germans did and operated with far greater flexibility than their German counterparts. When comparing the resultant effort in terms of analysing intel collected, the frequency and kinds of sorties flown etc the British PRUs come out ahead. Like I said earlier, the Germans had very little up-to-date images of within the UK at all during the war; those that they did get were for too few in number to be of real benefit. Despite German superiority to begin with, the tables turned very quickly.


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## nuuumannn (Sep 11, 2013)

> Another recon technique was the use of bombers hauling somewhat heavy but powerful flash illumination equipment at night.



British bombers were fitted with their own cameras to carry this out whilst on the raid. Shots of H2S screens were also used for this kind of intel as well. Special cameras with mountings to fix them to the H2S unit in the aircraft were used.


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## Aozora (Sep 11, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> We will have to see the particulars. What would be the typical range of cameras PR Spits would carry, their type and details, what was their speed capabilities, especially sustainable cruise speeds and mission profiles, how did it happen they were still intercepted (IIRC the fitst victim of the 109G was a PR Spit) and what was their range under that mission profile? How many produced and how many missions flown?




































Tante Ju said:


> In the already mentioned excellent _Aufklaerers _volume it is mentioned that due to lack of proper cameras and difficulties of importing them from the US the British were forced to scavenge the Zeiss objectives from a downed Ju 88 recon plane in order to boost up their unsuitable lenses (possibly lacking detail?). This tends to raise some doubts if the British ever possessed proper quality cameras during the war.



Low altitude oblique photo of Wurzburg at Bruneval taken by Tony Hill December 1941





Low altitude oblique photo of Tirpitz
All sizes | Tirpitz ' caught on film ' - a remarkable low-level oblique photographic-reconnaissance photograph taken over the German battleship TIRPITZ moored in Aasfjord, Norway, by a Supermarine Spitfire of No. 1 Photographic Reconnaissance Unit. |

Oblique photo of Tirpitz from further away






Photo of Mohne Dam taken by Spitfire PR Mk IX:





plus a larger image:

http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/4C30599C_1143_EC82_2EB81706BE1EF2B1.jpg

PR Photo of Berlin Olympic Stadium






And Templehof Airport






All done with "proper quality British cameras".

As it is I would like to see the evidence for the Aufklaerers claim about the lack of proper cameras, including the source of the information quoted in the book. There were a couple of instances where the British salvaged and used Luftwaffe camera equipment but it was a far from general practice. The supposed lack of suitable British cameras didn't seem to prevent them from regularly photographing targets deep inside German territory at all times, whereas by 1944 the Germans couldn't penetrate British airspace with any degree of comfort until the advent of the Arado 234.


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## mhuxt (Sep 11, 2013)

View attachment Journal%2010%20-%20Seminar%20-%20Photo-Recce%20in%20WWII.pdf






View attachment PR spits.zip


This link

Royal Air Force Recce Units

says one of the Spit recce squads alone flew 2458 sorties, after being formed from PRU flights in mid-October '42.


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## buffnut453 (Sep 11, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> We will have to see the particulars. What would be the typical range of cameras PR Spits would carry, their type and details, what was their speed capabilities, especially sustainable cruise speeds and mission profiles, how did it happen they were still intercepted (IIRC the fitst victim of the 109G was a PR Spit) and what was their range under that mission profile? How many produced and how many missions flown?



I don't have production numbers or mission specifics but here are some performance figures for the earliest PR Spit variants:


Spitfire PR MkIC - 2 x F24 cameras with 8in lenses mounted obliquely (Wing-Mount)
Speed: 391mph
Range: 900 miles
Alt: Low-level


Spitfire PR MkID - 2 x F24/2 x F8 cameras with 14in or 20in lenses in Split-Vertical mount
Speed: 372mph
Range: 1,460 miles
Alt: 38,000ft

Spitfire PR MkIG - 3 x F24 cameras with 14in or 5in lenses Vertical-mount lenses, plus a 14in Oblique-mount lens (also carried 4x machine guns for self-protection)
Speed: 369mph
Range: 710 miles
Alt: Low-level


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## Juha (Sep 12, 2013)

Hello
info on the number of PR sorties flown, unfortunately not divided between Spits and Mossies. Source the same RAF Narrative the title page of which I posted earlier.


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## stona (Sep 12, 2013)

About 120 Typhoons were converted for reconnaissance. Cameras were fitted in the space in the port wing previously occupied by a fuel tank and the inboard camera. I comprised a pair of 5", split oblique, high speed cameras angle downwards and a long focus, high speed camera laid laterally, facing the beam and angled down at twenty degrees.











These aircraft started operating with No. 268 Squadron over the Normandy battlefields. They were not part of the 2nd TAF but reported to Group Headquarters. Their operations were carried ot between zero and five thousand feet.
The Typhoon was preferred to the Mustangs also operated by the squadron because it was faster and could more easily out run any Luftwaffe fighter opposition. It was also much stronger and could sustain significant flak damage, a serious consideration when operating at low altitude.
This 2nd TAF Typhoon (not a PR version) survived some serious damage.






Cheers

Steve


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## Glider (Sep 12, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> We will have to see the particulars. What would be the typical range of cameras PR Spits would carry, their type and details, what was their speed capabilities, especially sustainable cruise speeds and mission profiles, how did it happen they were still intercepted (IIRC the fitst victim of the 109G was a PR Spit) and what was their range under that mission profile? How many produced and how many missions flown?.



I cannot add much to the earlier replies on the above but the PR IV entered service in Oct 1940, had a range of 2,000 miles and its first missons were over Stettin in the Baltic.
The cameras carried were :-
W: Two F.8 with 20in focal length
X: One F.24 with 14in focal length
Y: One F.52 with 36in focal length
S: Two F.24 with 14in focal length

The PR XI was the next major version the performance has been outlined but cameras common carried included two F.52 cameras with a 36in focal length, two F.8s (20in), one F.52 (20in) and two F.24 (14in) combined with one F.24 (14in or 8in) in an oblique position. Some also carried a 5 inch F.24 just behind the wheel well for low to medium level tactical reconnaissance.

Its worth noting that the RAF PR missons were daylight missions often many hundreds of miles behind the front lines. 

As for performance they seem to be considerably better than the 109 PR versions which would have been at grave risk over the UK. I am not able to check my papers at the moment, but from memory Luftwaffe PR mission more or less ceased from 1942 apart from short range dashes over the Channel and occaisional very high altitude missions.


> In the already mentioned excellent _Aufklaerers _volume it is mentioned that due to lack of proper cameras and difficulties of importing them from the US the British were forced to scavenge the Zeiss objectives from a downed Ju 88 recon plane in order to boost up their unsuitable lenses (possibly lacking detail?). This tends to raise some doubts if the British ever possessed proper quality cameras during the war.



I think to phrase 'ever had' is over cooking it a bit. Clearly the RAF lacked something at the time but equally there is no doubt that the resultant cameras were used for many years after the war so quality was not in doubt.

Its also worth remembering that the USAAF when they arrived quickly asked for PR SPits as the F5 was taking heavy losses. They used to the end of the war.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 12, 2013)

The war lasted 5 1/2 years, to claim that the use of a few salavaged lenes at one point during that time is an indicator of the quality of the British lenes for the entire war seems to be stretching things quite a bit. 

I am not sure about the difficulties in importing US cameras/optical goods? surely if they can import aircraft engines, complete aircraft, and 30 ton tanks, getting cameras and optical goods is not a physical problem? 

Optical goods can be bare (un-mounted) lenses. The British and American optical industry may not have been the equal of the German one in terms of production numbers AND quality ( at least in the first few years) for thousands (or tens of thousands) of camera lens and telescopes but teh production of recon cameras in the hundreds may have been quite doable. Such manufacture being much closer to hand made. 

For an interesting story on US optics (even if not recon cameras) see:

http://www.europa.com/~telscope/rfprmgng-pa.txt


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## stona (Sep 12, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> The war lasted 5 1/2 years, to claim that the use of a few salavaged lenes at one point during that time is an indicator of the quality of the British lenes for the entire war seems to be stretching things quite a bit.



Particularly since the Williamson cameras that were used throughout WW2 and for a considerable time afterwards were already nearly twenty years old in 1939!
Cheers
Steve


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## Tante Ju (Sep 12, 2013)

The following excerpt from the already referenced Aufklaerer Vol I. book gives some interesting information of the comparitve quality of British PR camera sets. Apparantly, British cameras, perhaps limited by their small print format of only 5" did not give satisfactory resolution. Captured German sets were highly seeked and were gave about 1/3 better resolution (1:13000 vs 1:18000).






It should be interesting that the in the link mentioned by Azora it is stated that the LW in contrast was using large format films with better resolution (in addtion to arguably finer quality Zeiss lenses). This would explain why German sets had little trouble with resolution - working with a much larger format will always yield better resolution, which is important when the shots are taken from far away, from high altitude.

It also explain why Germans sets were regarded so highly sought after, certainly until 1941.

_By far the most widely used reconnaissance camera operated by the Luftwaffe was the Rb 30 series. This camera was first introduced in 1938 It was a large format camera designed mainly for task of carrying out photo-mapping work. At the beginning of the World War 2, the Rb 20/30 was in general use throughout the Luftwaffe, however, as Allied aircraft slowly forced the Luftwaffe to fly at greater higher heights, the focal length of the lenses had to increased and to this end, the Rb 75/30 became more widely used. These camera were generally mounted mostly in the vertical position, as a single camera or set up as a split pair. It was also known that they were occasions used in the oblique position.

The camera was fitted with an iris shutter within the lens and when fitted with a full magazine of film (210ft) and all attachments, its approximately weight was 160lb. *Using a large film format, 32cm wide perforated film, this would give a frame size of nearly one foot square.* During the exposing of the imagery, the film itself was held flat within the camera by means of "dynamic" air pressure that was supplied by the camera motor drive.
_

Obviously you cannot expect the if you have to work with compact cameras using 5"x5" or at best 7"x7" format films.


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## Juha (Sep 12, 2013)

Now it happened to be that F8 and F52 used 8.25"x7" picture size, F24 5"x5", source Edward Leaf: Above All Unseen. The Royal Air Force's Photographic Reconnaissance Units 1939-1945 (1997). The best camera FiAF had was a pre-war Fairchild, it was better than war-time Fairchild obtainend or German Rb 30 series cameras obtained from Germany. And thanks for the scan.

Juha


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## Tante Ju (Sep 12, 2013)

Juha said:


> Now it happened to be that F8 and F52 used 8.25"x7" picture size, F24 5"x5", source Edward Leaf: Above All Unseen. The Royal Air Force's Photographic Reconnaissance Units 1939-1945 (1997).



So it is confirmed RAF used smaller format film. Thank you for information, this explains differences found in resolution of shots.


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## Juha (Sep 12, 2013)

Hello Tante Ju
if you have seen British verticals of Mistels at Prague/Ruzyne e.g. in Price's The Last Year of the Luftwaffe, of a V1 at Peenemünde or Tirpitz in Norway, Graf Zeppelin in Stettin or compared a RAF photo of Schanforst and Gneisenau in Brest on 28 May 41 to a LW photo of Alexandria on 24 April 1941 you'd see that British cameras produced sharp enough high altitude vertical photos.

Juha


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## Aozora (Sep 12, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> So it is confirmed RAF used smaller format film. Thank you for information, this explains differences found in resolution of shots.



Thanks for the scan of the page; however to use one incident in early 1940 to make out that the British were constantly scrambling for photographic equipment is a biiig stretch. Have also yet to see any convincing evidence that the British camera equipment was somehow inadequate for the use that was made of it. While the German equipment was undoubtably larger format and the Zeiss lens were justifiably regarded as some of the best in the world, the German RB series cameras were far heavier and bulkier, weighing 160 lbs, such that they had trouble fitting them into smaller aircraft. In fact it would seem that Germany needed to develop a, smaller, lighter series of cameras based on what they had found in Allied aircraft, mostly using a 7 in by 7 in format. 

Luftwaffe Cameras


> As the war continued the Luftwaffe looked at developing smaller and lighter reconnaissance cameras, mostly on the lines of the USAAF and the RAF, these cameras evolved from the hand-held versions of the pre-war systems. Captured RAF cameras may have also helped in some way towards the development. The Luftwaffe looked at a number of smaller size film formats for these camera, 25cm (10 inches), 7.5cm (3 inches) and the most generally used 18cm (7 inches). These cameras were primarily used in aircraft that could not carry the bulky Rb 30 series. With the 7x9cm format two focal length lenses were used, the 32cm and the 12.5cm, both these cameras used a focal plane shutter suggesting that they may have been a copy of the RAF F.24 or the USAAF K-24.







RB 50/30, British F24 w/14" lens, RB 20/30, British F.24 w/3.25" lens

So there were trade-offs for that larger format. Does the _Aufklaerers_ book mention this?

And, as has already been mentioned, the German intelligence services didn't make the best use of what they had. For example, while the Allies could photograph Berlin almost continuously, by late 1943 German reconnaissance aircraft had great difficulty penetrating as far as London and, for example, could not help the Germans work out the mean strike area of the V-1s.


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## Tante Ju (Sep 12, 2013)

Aozora said:


> Thanks for the scan of the page; however to use one incident in early 1940 to make out that the British were constantly scrambling for photographic equipment is a biiig stretch. Have also yet to see any convincing evidence that the British camera equipment was somehow inadequate for the use that was made of it.



Well there was not one known incident but four PR Spitfire are listed which are known (there may be others). How many _intact _German camera sets were captured by the British - four perhaps? It seems there has been quite a rush.



> While the German equipment was undoubtably larger format and the Zeiss lens were justifiably regarded as some of the best in the world, the German RB series cameras were far heavier and bulkier, weighing 160 lbs, such that they had trouble fitting them into smaller aircraft. In fact it would seem that Germany needed to develop a, smaller, lighter series of cameras based on what they had found in Allied aircraft, mostly using a 7 in by 7 in format.



Which smaller aircraft did you have in mind having trouble fitting them? 

The "far heavier and bulkier" (well its sounds like a bit of a marketing slogan here - better cameras are almost always heavier and bulkier) RB x/30 series cameras were the standard fit of the Bf 109 (the big one on the left of your picture) and indeed other LW recce planes. 

I think the slogan was that the Bf 109 was sooooo small it was incapable mounting them... 

They did indeed develop some smaller format cameras, mostly for low altitude work I believe. They were called Rb 32 / 7 x 9 and Rb 12,5 / 7 x 9. Different task may require different equipment. The smaller they were used in pairs in tactical fighter recons (Fw 190 and Bf 109, ie. G-8, G-10/R2), where, usually operating at low altitude, resolution was probably not a problem. 



> And, as has already been mentioned, the German intelligence services didn't make the best use of what they had.



I think you are mixing up cause and effect. German recon flights over England dwindled after 1941 and there was two very simple answer for that. First, they already photographed England before the war in clandestine actions and during the intense bombing operations of 1940. I am pretty sure London, Birmingham or Liverpool did not swap places by 1943. Secondly, the large scale German bomber operations after were concentrating in the MTO and in Russia - and where the bomber bombs, it needs target photo and photos showing the effect the bombing. Where it does not bomb it does not need that, ie. over England, where post-1941 the bombing actions were largely limited to brief outbursts of retaliatory raids for BC attacks on Germany. Now, Bomber Command did bomb Germany almost continously, so no big surprise there that it needed constant flight for target aquisition and damage assessment.

German intelligence services did make the best use of what they had, where they needed: the _Eastern _Front. Juha just posted an old paper showing about 12 000 RAF PRU recon sorties during the entire war. And I just found a picture of a single Ju 88D celebrating its 500th (!!) recon sortie, and another picture of a Fw 189 squadron celebrating its 1000th sortie. This should help put things in context on the scale of recon flights. As nuumann noted, the Germans had an extensive array of recon planes and made great use of them.



> For example, while the Allies could photograph Berlin almost continuously, by late 1943 German reconnaissance aircraft had great difficulty penetrating as far as London and, for example, could not help the Germans work out the mean strike area of the V-1s.


 
Yes I would say above is example of not seeing the forest from a tree.. I am pretty sure London was at the same place in 1940 through 1944, of which the LW had plenty of photograph. Even a tourist map would do. What they did have trouble was penetrating the airspace by the summer of 1944 - and this had some rather unrelated reasons to recce aircraft availability or performance as you may well know.

Speaking of performance, there is one more interesting question. What was supposed to intercept these single engined LW PR fighter-recces over British Isles? Mark VI Spitfires?  I skimmed over one of these G-4/R3 "super recce" 109s losses, and they lost like - three of them in the whole of 1943?


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## Shortround6 (Sep 12, 2013)

Let's try rereading that page again, I am getting TWO _lens ASSEMBLIES_ were fitted to British camera bodies (no change in film size) and the second was lost in 1941? 

What ever did the British do for the rest of the war? 

You also need to compare the focal length of the camera to the film size. As a standard that most of us ar familar with a 35mm camera has a diagonal of 43.3mm and so a 42-50mm focal length lens gives a perspective about "noraml to the human eye and and 85mm lens givesa bout a 2X magnification and a 180mm-200mm lens about 4X magnification. 
If you are using a 5in X 5 in frame size the diagonal is about 7in and you need a 7in focal length lens to get the same perspective as the 35mm camera has with its 43.3mm 1.7in lens. the Rb 20/30 has a field of view and perspective of around a 28mm lens on a a 35mm camera. What the big cameras have is a lot more silver crystals recording the image. Think more pixels. 
However, if you use a 6in X 6in camera and use a lens with a focal length of about 17in the area of ground on the negative is 1/4 the size of the bigger camera so the silver crystals (pixels) per 100yrds of "ground" come out about the same. You do have to aim the camera better and take more frames (pictures).
trying to figure out "resolution" without figuring in image size on the negative (say the object in question is 12mm long on the negative) , quality of the film (not all film had the same grain size) film flatness, where in the the frame the desired part of the image is ( center or edge), and lens quality 70 years after the pictures were taken is asking a bit much.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 12, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> Well there was not one known incident but four PR Spitfire are listed which are known (there may be others). How many _intact _German camera sets were captured by the British - four perhaps? It seems there has been quite a rush.



Try rereading it. ONE camera was fitted to 3 different Spitfires in succession. Never more than 2 Spitifires equipped with the hybrid cameras at one time. The Hybrid cameras may well have a different magnification than a "standard" camera. You can swap camera lens on some types of cameras with different film sizes but when you do the "focal" length and magnification change. 




> Which smaller aircraft did you have in mind having trouble fitting them? The "far heavier and bulkier" (well its sounds like a bit of a marketing slogan here - better cameras are almost always heavier and bulkier) RB x/30 series cameras were the standard fit of the Bf 109 and indeed other LW recce planes. I think the slogan was that the Bf 109 was sooooo small it was incapable mounting them.



Some Spits carried 3 of the smaller cameras. Want to try to fit 3 Rb **/30s in a 109? 




> I think you are mixing up cause and effect. German recon flights over England dwindled after 1941 and there was two very simple answer for that. First, they already photographed England before the war in clandestine actions and during the intense bombing operations of 1940. I am pretty sure London, Birmingham or Liverpool did not swap places by 1943. Secondly, the large scale German bomber operations after were concentrating in the MTO and in Russia - and where the bomber bombs, it needs target photo and photos showing the effect the bombing. Where it does not bomb it does not need that, ie. over England, where post-1941 the bombing actions were largely limited to brief outbursts of retaliatory raids for BC attacks on Germany. Now, Bomber Command did bomb Germany almost continously, so no big surprise there that it needed constant flight for target aquisition and damage assessment.



No, cities did NOT change places in 1943 or 1944 but more airfields were built, more training grounds were built and the ports built up shipping for the various invasions. A better idea of what was actually going on in Britain may have helped the Germans figure out Allied intentions and capability. Things a 1939 Michelin road map has no hope of telling you.


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## Juha (Sep 12, 2013)

Hello Tante Ju
a) I'm little puzzled what the Fw 189 is doing in photorecon fighter discussion, its nearest RAF equavalent was Lizzy, it was better than Lizzy in army co-op work but still hopelessly slow with fairly low ceiling for the proper PR or even FR work. 
b) one key rule in good PR work was constant surveilance, then it was much easier to catch a new factory/ammo dump etc. That was only way to keep in touch of the changes in enemy's capabilities and dispositions. Even if one had good info on the situation in 39-40 that would have been fairly out of date in 43-44. Have you ever wondered why it was so easy to fool Germans in June 44?
c) IMHO Spit IX and definitely Spit VII was quite capable for catching G-4/R3 that maybe the reason why KM complained the lack of constant surveilance of Scapa, or even reliable surveilance of it before KM's heavy units ops out of their lairs in Norway. KM got some nasty surpraises when heavy RN units appeared suddenly out of surveilance void.


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## michaelmaltby (Sep 12, 2013)

"...one key rule in good PR work was constant surveillance"

Exactly.


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## Milosh (Sep 12, 2013)

Aozora said:


> And, as has already been mentioned, the German intelligence services didn't make the best use of what they had. For example, while the Allies could photograph Berlin almost continuously, by late 1943 German reconnaissance aircraft had great difficulty penetrating as far as London and, for example, could not help the Germans work out the mean strike area of the V-1s.



I vaguely remember some counter intelligence where the Germans were fed false V-1 strike positions (iirc over shoots) and the Germans compensated so the V-1s fell short. The Germans never caught on as they could do photo recon.


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## Aozora (Sep 12, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> Which smaller aircraft did you have in mind having trouble fitting them?
> The "far heavier and bulkier" (well its sounds like a bit of a marketing slogan here - better cameras are almost always heavier and bulkier) RB x/30 series cameras were the standard fit of the Bf 109 (the big one on the left of your picture) and indeed other LW recce planes.
> I think the slogan was that the Bf 109 was sooooo small it was incapable mounting them...
> 
> They did indeed develop some smaller format cameras, mostly for low altitude work I believe. They were called Rb 32 / 7 x 9 and Rb 12,5 / 7 x 9. Different task may require different equipment. The smaller they were used in pairs in tactical fighter recons (Fw 190 and Bf 109, ie. G-8, G-10/R2), where, usually operating at low altitude, resolution was probably not a problem.



So show us evidence that the "inferior" British cameras somehow hampered their PR performance.

German Cameras






Your book does mention that the bulkier, heavier cameras did create problems:












Tante Ju said:


> I think you are mixing up cause and effect. German recon flights over England dwindled after 1941 and there was two very simple answer for that. First, they already photographed England before the war in clandestine actions and during the intense bombing operations of 1940. I am pretty sure London, Birmingham or Liverpool did not swap places by 1943. Secondly, the large scale German bomber operations after were concentrating in the MTO and in Russia - and where the bomber bombs, it needs target photo and photos showing the effect the bombing. Where it does not bomb it does not need that, ie. over England, where post-1941 the bombing actions were largely limited to brief outbursts of retaliatory raids for BC attacks on Germany. Now, Bomber Command did bomb Germany almost continously, so no big surprise there that it needed constant flight for target aquisition and damage assessment.



In other words after 1941 the Germans failed to keep up operational sorties over Britain thus failing to keep up with important developments such as invasion preparations, locations of important factories or research places etc etc. This constitutes an intelligence failure, regardless of how much of a priority the Russian front got. Thus, the Allies got more bang for their buck in intelligence gathering, including gathering information about the development of the V-1, German radar equipment, where important German ships were and all sorts of other info. PR wasn't just about following the bombs.



Tante Ju said:


> German intelligence services did make the best use of what they had, where they needed: the _Eastern _Front. Juha just posted an old paper showing about 12 000 RAF PRU recon sorties during the entire war. And I just found a picture of a single Ju 88D celebrating its 500th (!!) recon sortie, and another picture of a Fw 189 squadron celebrating its 1000th sortie. This should help put things in context on the scale of recon flights. As nuumann noted, the Germans had an extensive array of recon planes and made great use of them.



You've misread the paper; look again, it says 24,743 British PR sorties. It also shows that the overall British PR campaign was very effective in its mission to gather intelligence.



Tante Ju said:


> Yes I would say above is example of not seeing the forest from a tree.. I am pretty sure London was at the same place in 1940 through 1944, of which the LW had plenty of photograph. Even a tourist map would do.



This is completely failing to address the issue - the Germans could not determine the impact of their V-1 campaign, nor did they know where their V-1s were going because there was no PR coverage. Because of this they were deceived into lengthening the range of the V-1s so that far more of them landed in open country than than would have happened had the Germans been able to keep a regular PR watch. 

The inability to photograph London was just one example; as has been pointed out the Germans completely failed in their attempts to keep constant observation of the areas from which the D-Day invasions took place. Just because they were able to map the south of England pre-war is no excuse for failing to continue that coverage throughout the war. 



Tante Ju said:


> What they did have trouble was penetrating the airspace by the summer of 1944 - and this had some rather unrelated reasons to recce aircraft availability or performance as you may well know.



Would you care to explain why German PR aircraft had so much trouble penetrating British air space?



Tante Ju said:


> Speaking of performance, there is one more interesting question. What was supposed to intercept these single engined LW PR fighter-recces over British Isles? Mark VI Spitfires?  I skimmed over one of these G-4/R3 "super recce" 109s losses, and they lost like - three of them in the whole of 1943?



How many 109 G-4/R3 sorties were flown over Britain? How many in 1944 and how many were shot down? What proportion of them were intercepted, damaged and turned back? Sortie to loss ratio? How effective were they at providing good coverage of their allocated targets?


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## silence (Sep 12, 2013)

Aozora said:


> In other words after 1941 the Germans failed to keep up operational sorties over Britain thus failing to keep up with important developments such as invasion preparations, locations of important factories or research places etc etc. Thus, the Allies got more bang for their buck in intelligence gathering, including gathering information about the development of the V-1, German radar equipment, where important German ships were and all sorts of other info. PR wasn't just about following the bombs.



Perhaps. Or it may simply have been a case where the previous scale of operations was reduced by, say, 90%. They still did recon over Britain, but now on a small scale just to keep tabs.


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## nuuumannn (Sep 12, 2013)

> I think you are mixing up cause and effect. German recon flights over England dwindled after 1941 and there was two very simple answer for that.



Actually the very simple answer is that German reconnaissance aircraft were shot down over Britain in numbers. One of the big setbacks the Germans suffered during the Battle of Britain was a lack of pre-and post-raid recon. This is well documented and was part of the reason that led the Germans to believe they had virtually wiped out the RAF when they hadn't, much to their surprise.



> First, they already photographed England before the war in clandestine actions and during the intense bombing operations of 1940. I am pretty sure London, Birmingham or Liverpool did not swap places by 1943.



This is a bit naive Tante and I think you can do better; During wartime, the military landscape changes over time and updated recon gives an accurate picture of what the enemy is up to. Just relying on pre-war imagery is futile. You also have nothing with which to back up that statement to prove that that is why the Germans did not photograph the UK in numbers after the Battle of Britain. I'm pretty certain the Aufklarungsgruppen didn't see it this way and did continue PR sorties over Britain throughout the war, just not in any large numbers to be effective.



> German intelligence services did make the best use of what they had, where they needed: the Eastern Front. Juha just posted an old paper showing about 12 000 RAF PRU recon sorties during the entire war. And I just found a picture of a single Ju 88D celebrating its 500th (!!) recon sortie, and another picture of a Fw 189 squadron celebrating its 1000th sortie.



You're comparing apples with oranges; the PRU was a strategic recon outfit and the Fw 189s were used for in theatre tactical and pre and post battlefield strategic recon. Again, the difference is like an RF-4 and a U-2. The use of the Ju 86P is directly comparable to the PRUs and yes, it was effective, but over Britain it eventually proved vulnerable to attack by high altitude fighters - this is not to say British aircraft weren't over Germany, but the use of the Ju 86 was not continuous, particularly after Rowehl's unit's move to the Meditteranean, where they proved their worth again.


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## Aozora (Sep 13, 2013)

silence said:


> Perhaps. Or it may simply have been a case where the previous scale of operations was reduced by, say, 90%. They still did recon over Britain, but now on a small scale just to keep tabs.


 
"Just to keep tabs" is not good enough for a dynamic conflict such as WW2; as nuuumannn has explained by failing to keep up a solid strategic recce campaign over Britain post 1941 the Germans lost track of what their enemy was doing then discovered far too late that they had handed the initiative back to Britain and the Americans.


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## Tante Ju (Sep 13, 2013)

Aozora said:


> "Just to keep tabs" is not good enough for a dynamic conflict such as WW2;


 
Blah blah blah.... 



> as nuuumannn has explained by failing to keep up a solid strategic recce campaign over Britain post 1941 the Germans lost track of what their enemy was doing then discovered far too late that they had handed the initiative back to Britain and the Americans.


 
They did not "fail" in it as much as you like to use the word. After 1941, Britain could not pose any serious threat to Germany, it could not hope to challange the situation and the Germans knew that. It could serve as a starting leap for the Americans, that the biggest threat about it, Britain being bankcrupt, fed, fueled paid and armed by the US and its forces in full retreat on all fronts.

On the German threat scale of ten, Britain was threat level 3 perhaps, and the USSR was threat level 9. A thorn in the side, yes, but threat? 

Resources - including bombers and recon aircraft - were allocated accordingly - an occasional Ju 86, He 177, Ju 88 Me 109 recce sortie just to check if the Brits were up to something new (they weren't, the Army was having regular cups of tea, Bomber Command was struggling to hit Germany, Fighter Command was trying to figure out the meaning of life over France) would just suffice. You do not have to check daily on Birmingham wheter a new factory construction site appeared. And what "important" production facilities and "research centers" were in Britain unknown to the Germans after 1940? All of these were in the US my friend, not in Britain, and none of them could be photographed or bombed.

You can argue until the cow comes home that the Germans should have absolutely cover Britain daily, but the Germans were just not convinced of that. You mix up indiffirence with failure.


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## stona (Sep 13, 2013)

But in fact on a scale of 1-10 Britain (with her allies) ended up being threat level 11, something the Germans failed to grasp in 1944 precisely because they had failed to maintain a strategic reconnaissance effort over the UK, particularly Southern England. It's one of the reasons, almost incredibly, that the D-day landings took the Germans by surprise.

Keeping tabs is not "blah,blah,blah" it is, as the original poster stated, not good enough. An on going and determined campaign of aerial reconnaissance was the only way that the Germans could have kept abreast of a dynamic and developing situation and they manifestly failed to do so. In reality the Luftwaffe's reconnaissance efforts failed even to "keep tabs".

The Luftwaffe's pre and early war reconnaissance was so good that it now forms an important part of British history, particularly research into the way agriculture has developed since that time. They did take some lovely photographs, just not of the right things at the right time!

Cheers

Steve


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## Tante Ju (Sep 13, 2013)

Very interesting opinion stona. In particular the "Britain and her Allies" part. Its nice to know that the US proved such a useful auxilarry force of British legions. 8)

I would like to learn more about importants events on the Western Front that German recon failed to uncover, between 1940-1943. Would you list some of those, that would show how keeping the tabs was just, well, "not enough"? In which they failed, in your opinion - a couple of examples of those failures with evidence, perhaps?

Let me give you an example. The Germans introduced a mobile radar set, the Wurzburg in 1939, which by 1941 they had in the hundreds. The first PRU photo of said set was not until the end of the year - almost exactly TWO YEARS after in introduction, during which the British had no idea it even existed and guided night fighters and AA guns with deadly accuracy.

They finally identified a factory suspected to produce Wurzburgs in mid 1943. They bombed it and I believe, missed. The Zeppelin factory may have not even been involved with radars but V-2 parts.

Yes, failure to keep tabs and photographing vegatation comes to mind. But my point is - providing daily photography of British soldiers sipping their afternoon tea in the King's barracks was not too high on the Wehrmacht priority list, and perhaps rightly so.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 13, 2013)

> You do not have to check daily on Birmingham wheter a new factory construction site appeared.



Weekly might be nice........or even every two weeks. 

"And what "important" production facilities and "research centers" were in Britain unknown to the Germans after 1940? All of these were in the US my friend, not in Britain, and none of them could be photographed or bombed."

No new factories in Britain after 1940? How about keeping track of ship launchings? Ship repairs? New airfields? When did the British go from "struggling to hit Germany" to 1000 bomber raids? May of 1942? 

There is a fine line between indifference and stupidity.


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## Tante Ju (Sep 13, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> Weekly might be nice........or even every two weeks.



Which they did - keeping the tabs you know.



Shortround6 said:


> No new factories in Britain after 1940?



Care to list a few of them that the LW missed?


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## stona (Sep 13, 2013)

I'm not going to start a petty did they see this or didn't they for every year of the war.

Oberst Walter Gaul. "The last satisfactory photographic report dates from 24 May and covers the harbours of Bournemouth, Poole, Portland, Weymouth, several river mouths and the coastal waters in this region. Folkestone and Dover were also photographed. Portland, Weymouth and Poole were particularly crowded with landing craft (L.S.I, loaded with L.C.P.)"

24th of May! They set off, twelve days later, on June 5th unnoticed. That I would suggest was a catastrophic failure to "keep tabs" on the invasion fleet, even though the Germans knew it was coming. 

Don't be disparaging about British and Commonwealth legions, a sad tendency particularly in more "popular" history. More of them landed on D-Day than did their American comrades. There were more Lee Enfields than Garrands, at least initially. I'm surprised to see "Private Ryan" syndrome on a forum where I would expect a firmer grasp of historical facts than that found in Hollywood.

Britain, geographically, was threat level 11 because that is where the invasion was launched from, even if the Luftwaffe missed it.

Cheers

Steve


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## silence (Sep 13, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> Weekly might be nice........or even every two weeks.
> 
> "And what "important" production facilities and "research centers" were in Britain unknown to the Germans after 1940? All of these were in the US my friend, not in Britain, and none of them could be photographed or bombed."
> 
> No new factories in Britain after 1940? How about keeping track of ship launchings? Ship repairs? New airfields? When did the British go from "struggling to hit Germany" to 1000 bomber raids? May of 1942?



The Germans did! V-2-launched satellites and the super telescopes on their moon base replaced mere aerial strategic photorecon! (Just like, according to the powers-that-be, they did for the SR-71; I'm still bitter about that!)


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## mhuxt (Sep 13, 2013)

Heheh, and all that nooper-dooper Moonbase Alpha tech utterly missed the largest single event on the Western Front since Dieppe.


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## Aozora (Sep 13, 2013)

As far as 109s shot down - just one squadron, 486(NZ) Sqn, flying humble Typhoons (and part of the British legions) shot down lemme see...










Seven of the mighty recce 109s, including two of the fantastic G-4/R3s, not to mention an Fw 190...

and here's a 109G-4/R3 shot down by Spitfire VIIs in 1943:








Tante Ju said:


> You can argue until the cow comes home that the Germans should have absolutely cover Britain daily, but the Germans were just not convinced of that. You mix up indiffirence with failure.



Indifference = hubris = stupidity = failure in wartime


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## Tante Ju (Sep 13, 2013)

Aozora said:


> Indifference = hubris = stupidity = failure in wartime



I must assume thats a direct qoute from "A Brief introduction to British and Commonwealth armed forces doctrine in World War II". 

BTW the journal posted by IIRC was a very good read, it confirms the tecnical inferiority of British camera equipment and the bad survivability of Spitfire PR aircraft in mid war. Early oxygene equipment was unsatisfactory - again, local hacks with captured German equipment are mentioned, a noteworty tendency of British PRU history.

It appears that the Spitfire PR IV was just not up to the task when the opposition became 190A/109G, even the 109F was a bit too much. Losses of PR Spits were severe, especially towards the end of 1942. When the PR XI arrived it helped a great deal and could be expected to survive, but, and that the question - the serials listings seems to indicate the XI did not really arrive in numbers until 1944.

Indeed Mark V Spitfires had it bad enough with 190/109s, being essentially an unarmed Mark V burdened with cameras doesnt make it sound any better. Essentially the only thing they could do was to turn turn turn.

There is also mention of one downside of the Spitfire which made it a curious choice for PR work - that is, the large wings blocked essentially all downward vision. This might explain British fixation with cameras pointing in every direction.


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## buffnut453 (Sep 13, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> On the German threat scale of ten, Britain was threat level 3 perhaps, and the USSR was threat level 9. A thorn in the side, yes, but threat?



Interesting choice of words - presenting USSR as a threat. In my history books, Hitler was allied with Stalin until the former initiated Barbarossa and invaded the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly the USSR was Germany's main axis of effort...but use of the term "threat" makes it sound like Germany was the victim. Maybe (I hope) just a translation issue given that English isn't your first language (and I'm not being patronising, just articulating realities - I failed German at school...twice!  ).



Tante Ju said:


> Britain being bankcrupt, fed, fueled paid and armed by the US and its forces in full retreat on all fronts.



You seem to indicate that Britain was entirely reliant on US supplies and funding. In reality, no more than 25% of British war supplies came from the US...indeed, Britain was providing war supplies to the USSR. Finally, please remember that more British Commonwealth soldiers went ashore on D-Day than did US soldiers. Britain was undoubtedly struggling in 1941 but from that point on we just kept on getting stronger...and that vast majority of that expansion had nothing to do with US supplies. 



Tante Ju said:


> They did not "fail" in it as much as you like to use the word. After 1941, Britain could not pose any serious threat to Germany, it could not hope to challange the situation and the Germans knew that.



Again, I think you're overstating the case. I'd agree with your statement specifically during 1941 but after that point, there was a massive increase in UK and US capability to attack Germany. Did German PR increase accordingly? My gut tells me it didn't but I'd be keen to learn specifics.



Tante Ju said:


> Resources - including bombers and recon aircraft - were allocated accordingly - an occasional Ju 86, He 177, Ju 88 Me 109 recce sortie just to check if the Brits were up to something new (they weren't, the Army was having regular cups of tea, Bomber Command was struggling to hit Germany, Fighter Command was trying to figure out the meaning of life over France) would just suffice. You do not have to check daily on Birmingham wheter a new factory construction site appeared.



Again, I'd largely agree with your comments if we were talking about 1941 but 1942 onwards was a whole different ball-game. Bomber Command was not struggling to hit Germany during those years and the 8th AF was getting stronger and stronger. You may not need to image the cities but you do need to keep tabs on the disposition and build-up of forces, the huge expansion in the number of airfields and then the build-up for D-Day.



Tante Ju said:


> You mix up indifference with failure.



Maybe but I hardly think the German people were indifferent to the impact of the 8th AF and Bomber Command - and 1,000-bomber raids is not "struggling to hit Germany", indeed it's something the Luftwaffe never accomplished over Britain. Similarly the commanders of the Channel defences certainly needed better intelligence than they were served with in the run-up to D-Day. Your disparagement of the British military is, IMHO, overstated.


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## Tante Ju (Sep 13, 2013)

stona said:


> Don't be disparaging about British and Commonwealth legions, a sad tendency particularly in more "popular" history. More of them landed on D-Day than did their American comrades. There were more Lee Enfields than Garrands, at least initially. I'm surprised to see "Private Ryan" syndrome on a forum where I would expect a firmer grasp of historical facts than that found in Hollywood.



The tendency of disparaging about British and Commonwealth legions is not that there were too Lee Enfields and erhm, Shermans on the beach, but the fact that in the next two months they seemingly did little else than camping in front of Caen, and sipping tea.



> Britain, geographically, was threat level 11 because that is where the invasion was launched from, even if the Luftwaffe missed it.



Yes in 1944. No in 1940-43, a period which you peculiarly avoid. 

But lets talk photo recce in the West, 1944, Chapter Arnhem, Ardennes. Nobody's recond worked like 100%.


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## mfg495 (Sep 13, 2013)

For some recce information have a look at my site - Airrecce The story of photographic reconnaissance

If you have any questions, please ask away.

Mick


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## buffnut453 (Sep 13, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> There is also mention of one downside of the Spitfire which made it a curious choice for PR work - that is, the large wings blocked essentially all downward vision. This might explain British fixation with cameras pointing in every direction.



Huh? Aside from the PZL P7 and P11, show me a WWII single-engine fighter where visibility downwards isn't impacted by the wings! 

You don't need to look down to do high-level PR. Pointing cameras at targets beneath you is accomplished by flying your track and keeping a consistent attitude in the rolling plane. PR pilots would put chinagraph lines on the cockpit canopy at the correct position so that, when the horizon coincided with the line, the camera was pointing straight down. It's a very simple and yet very effective means of pointing a camera - the RAF Harrier pilots rediscovered the technique over northern Iraq during Op Northern Watch.

Finally, the "cameras pointing everywhere" were for different PR roles. Vertical and split vertical installations were for high-altitude PR whereas oblique were for low-level PR. That' simply an effective way of implementing a PR airframe that can do multiple tasks.


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## pattle (Sep 13, 2013)

I have never taken the trouble to look into this properly but as far as I know the Germans never discovered the Mulberry harbours under construction at Lepe Beach near Calshot, considering the size of the things I would have thought that these massive structures being built in broad daylight so close to Southampton would have been easily discovered by the Germans who would have been able to deduce something from their presence.


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## buffnut453 (Sep 13, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> But lets talk photo recce in the West, 1944, Chapter Arnhem, Ardennes. Nobody's recond worked like 100%.



The PR was there and it captured the intelligence on German armoured dispositions. The fact that commanders ignored the intelligence is not the fault of the PR system. The PR worked, period!


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## Aozora (Sep 13, 2013)

mfg495 said:


> For some recce information have a look at my site - Airrecce The story of photographic reconnaissance
> 
> If you have any questions, please ask away.
> 
> Mick



Thanks Mick, some interesting information. The images of Peenemunde are interesting:

World War II Imagery

Site now bookmarked. 8)


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## stona (Sep 13, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> in the next two months they seemingly did little else than camping in front of Caen, and sipping tea.



Do you by chance know a Colonel Vassilievsky? He was a Soviet liaison officer who turned up at 7th Armoured Division Head Quarters. He expressed the view that the British advance was rather slow and was invited to show, on a map, the sector of the eastern front where he was fighting. It transpired that there were nine German divisions on that sector which was 600 miles long. The British officers pointed out that they were facing 10 German divisions, including 6 panzer divisions on a front only sixty two miles long.

You remind me of Soviet propagandists claiming that the best German divisions were still "on the Soviet-German front". Ilya Ehrenburg wrote in Pravda that " our allies are now seeing the Germans we have nicknamed "Totalnick", a prefabricated product that is destined for annihilation." 
This despite the presence of 6 Panzer divisions as well as Panzer Lehr and the supposedly recuperating 2nd Panzer Division in France.

Again, maybe we should stick to the historical facts rather than prejudice.

I'm not particularly interested in 1940-43 aerial reconnaissance as the Luftwaffe posed no meaningful threat to the RAF's survival or the UK's means of production post BoB.
It might have taken nice photographs of our factories but it didn't flatten them. Even the raids on ports like Liverpool were little more than a nuisance, though not for the 4,000 people who lost their lives.
I'm interested in the pre-invasion period because this is when a catastrophic failure of intelligence, including aerial reconnaissance occurred.

Cheers

Steve


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## Aozora (Sep 13, 2013)

buffnut453 said:


> The PR was there and it captured the intelligence on German armoured dispositions. The fact that commanders ignored the intelligence is not the fault of the PR system. The PR worked, period!



For Arnhem that was accomplished by low level TAC-R sorties flown by Spitfire FR Mk IXs and Mustang Is without a single loss.

Another interesting site:

Craters surround a site at Peenemunde in Mecklenburg-Vorpommem, Germany on - The Independent


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## Glider (Sep 13, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> Care to list a few of them that the LW missed?



More or less all of them. In Dec 1944 a Luftwaffe PR officer admitted that no air reconnaissance of British Industry had taken place for three years.

Source Hitlers Spies David Kahn page 135

This tends to knock a hole in the view that the Luftwaffe overflew every couple of weeks.


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## Tante Ju (Sep 13, 2013)

Aozora said:


> For Arnhem that was accomplished by low level TAC-R sorties flown by Spitfire FR Mk IXs and Mustang Is without a single loss.



Yes. In this thread British interpretation superiority was also claimed.

Battle of Arnhem - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

_Due to poor intelligence, the British were told to expect only limited resistance from German reserve forces. A serious challenge to their operation was not expected and many men believed that their work would lead to the ending of the war.[18] Some—anticipating a period of occupation in Germany—packed leisure equipment in their kit or in the sea tail.[19] The optimistic mood prior to the operation would have tragic consequences however. Browning's intelligence officer—Major Brian Urquhart—obtained information from the 21st Army Group in Belgium and Dutch resistance that German armour was present around Arnhem. This was backed up with aerial reconnaissance that he ordered to be flown.[20] Browning however was dismissive and ordered his chief medical officer to have Urquhart sent on sick leave.[21] In fact, SHAEF was aware that there were almost certainly two Panzer divisions at Arnhem but with the operation looming chose to ignore them.[20] Such information would have been gleaned from Ultra intercepts that the Allied Airborne Army was not privy to and therefore could not act upon themselves.[20]_

Establishing the size and dislocation of the German armored forces nearby was one primary reason for the failure of the operation.



> Another interesting site:
> 
> Craters surround a site at Peenemunde in Mecklenburg-Vorpommem, Germany on - The Independent


 
_"At a cost of 215 British aircrew members, 40 bombers, and 732 (Polish) civilian deaths in a nearby concentration camp; the air raid killed 2 V-2 rocket scientists and delayed V-2 rocket test launches for seven weeks."_

Operation Hydra (1943) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

1944-07-18 Mission 481	377 Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses bombed the Peenemünde experimental establishment, the scientific HQ at Zinnowitz, and the marshalling yards at Stralsund. *Three B-17s were lost and 64 were damaged*. Escort was provided by 297 P-38 Lightnings and P-51 Mustangs; they claim 21-0-12 Luftwaffe aircraft; three P-51s are lost and one is damaged beyond repair.[3] A Peenemünde test launch planned that day was scrapped when Test Stand VII was heavily damaged. The P-11 production calibration firing stand near Werke Süd was a complete loss, and *50 people died*, including anti-aircraft soldiers.[4]

1944-08-04 Mission 512	221 B-17s against Peenemünde, 110 against Anklam Airfield, and 70 against Anklam aircraft factories; they claim 1-0-0 Luftwaffe aircraft; *three B-17s are lost, one is damaged beyond repair and 94 damaged; 2 airmen are KIA, 2 WIA and 40 MIA.* Escort is provided by 223 P-51s; they claim 4-0-4 Luftwaffe aircraft on the ground; 9 P-51s are lost and 1 is damaged beyond repair; 1 pilot is KIA.[3]* Ten Peenemünde people were killed, including anti-aircraft soldiers.* The big hangar had been damaged, including the office and laboratory wings.[4]

_1944-08-25 Mission 570	376 B-17s against the Peenemünde Experimental Station (146), Neubrandenburg Airfield (108) and Anklam Airfield (73); 21 others hit Parow Airfield and 5 hit targets of opportunity; 5 B-17s are lost and 75 damaged; *1 airman is KIA, 9 WIA and 45 MIA*. Escort is provided by 171 P-47s and P-51s; they claim 36-0-28 aircraft on the ground; 2 P-51s are lost.[3] Repairs to Peenemünde Test Stand VII allowed launchings to resume just six weeks after the daylight raid.[4]_

It is estimated that an estimated 2,754 civilians were killed in London by V-2 attacks with another 6,523 injured.

It seems more people were killed/lost while trying to stop the V-2 programme than the rocket actually killed.


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## mhuxt (Sep 13, 2013)

No need to overfly old boy, they'd seen it all before.


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## stona (Sep 13, 2013)

Wikipedia will only give an overview of any historical event, and not always an accurate one.

One of the rocket scientists killed was Dr Thiel. With his demise the "Wasserfall" anti aircraft rocket system effectively died (along with the A-9) for which many US bomber crews might be grateful. Neither was operational before the end of the war. I concede that the A-9 probably wouldn't have been in any realistic scenario.

The raid precipitated considerable disruption to the V-2 program. In a meeting only four days later at the highest level (Hitler, Himmler and Speer were all present) much of Peenemunde's activity was ordered to be moved to more secure locations. Test firing to Poland, R+D to Austria, though some did stay at Peenemunde, and manufacture to expensively constructed facilities in the Harz mountains.

The delay caused is estimated quite consistently by both the British and Germans. The last pre-raid German estimate for the time at which V-2 operations would commence was "summer 1944." They actually started on 8th September 1944. This fits well with Goering's statement that the delay was "six to eight weeks" and the British official history's estimate of "two months."

The real reason for the Peenemunde raid was to delay development and deployment of the V-2 rocket and this it did, everybody agrees on a figure of around two months. The bomber crews thought they were attacking a facility producing RDF equipment and countermeasures to the RAF bombing campaign.

About 2,500 V-2s were launched in the seven months of the campaign. 517 hit London and more fell in surrounding areas. It is often forgotten that more than half, 1265, fell on Antwerp, something you and Wikipedia seem to have ignored. In London 2,700 people were killed by V-2s (officially). Extend the campaign by two months and many more would have been killed both in London and Antwerp.

Edit: 3,700 civilians were killed in the Province of Antwerp, took me a while to find the figure. Antwerp was described as "The City of Sudden Death" in March 1945 in TIME magazine. 
6,400 people died in London and Antwerp. Add another two months worth onto that........

It is impossible to say whether raids like that on Peenemunde was worth it. It did what it was supposed to do. The cost was high for many reasons, not least because it was one of the few occasions when the Nachjagd got lucky.

Cheers

Steve


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## Aozora (Sep 13, 2013)

Not that anyone actually needs to comment on the effects of the Peenemunde bombing raids because Tante Ju has ignored the central fact; the Allies were able to detect and accurately photograph and map the Peenemunde research areas in great detail with minimal PR casualties. Compare this with the German record of being unable to detect the build up and totally successful launch of the biggest invasion fleet in history. For the Arnhem raid he claims that the poor execution of the raid was somehow the fault of the PR coverage while once again ignoring the central fact that the build up of German armour in the area was detected and photographed by low flying Tac-R aircraft; what Frost and co did with the information had nothing to do with the PR work. How many low flying German Tac-R aircraft (apart from the odd Me 262) were able to similarly penetrate Allied lines and photograph their positions?


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## Juha (Sep 13, 2013)

Aozora said:


> Not that anyone actually needs to comment on the effects of the Peenemunde bombing raids because Tante Ju has ignored the central fact; the Allies were able to detect and accurately photograph and map the Peenemunde research areas in great detail with minimal PR casualties. Compare this with the German record of being unable to detect the build up and totally successful launch of the biggest invasion fleet in history. For the Arnhem raid he claims that the poor execution of the raid was somehow the fault of the PR coverage while once again ignoring the central fact that the build up of German armour in the area was detected and photographed by low flying Tac-R aircraft; what Frost and co did with the information had nothing to do with the PR work. How many low flying German Tac-R aircraft (apart from the odd Me 262) were able to similarly penetrate Allied lines and photograph their positions?



Yes, he also totally ignored the fact that because LW was unable to keep adequately watch on Scapa, KM was surprised several times by Home Fleet, first time in May 41 In Denmark Strait, 2nd time in March 42 off Lofoten and 3rd time in Dec 43 off North Cape, Even if at the first time the surprise at first produced no joy to RN and Tirpitz escaped on the second time because somewhat botched up torpedo attack, on the third time Scharnhorst was lost.

Juha


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## buffnut453 (Sep 13, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> It seems more people were killed/lost while trying to stop the V-2 programme than the rocket actually killed.



And precisely what does that have to do with the effectiveness of Allied photo recce?


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## Glider (Sep 13, 2013)

On of the key aspects of the PR in relation to the raid on Peenemunde was the importance of the 3D photos. It because of the 3D that they had some idea as to the size and importance of the V2 effort. They were able to build very accurate models of the entire site and persuade the senior ranks and the political leasers as to the importnace of the raid.
This was vital as Churchills chief scientific advisor didn't believe what was being built was possible.


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## Njaco (Sep 13, 2013)

ONLY WARNING:

Things will be kept civil or vacations will be given. I can see the usual suspects starting to poke each other. This is the only warning.


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## wuzak (Sep 13, 2013)

stona said:


> One of the rocket scientists killed was Dr Thiel. With his demise the "Wasserfall" anti aircraft rocket system effectively died (along with the A-9) for which many US bomber crews might be grateful. Neither was operational before the end of the war. I concede that the A-9 probably wouldn't have been in any realistic scenario.



British Intelligence were also receiving information from an insider at Peenemünde before the raid. This is what led to the overflights by PR aircraft.

They didn't get anything from the informant after the raid, so it would be reasonable to conclude that he was killed in the raid. British Intelligence never knew the identity of the informant.


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## OldSkeptic (Sep 13, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> The tendency of disparaging about British and Commonwealth legions is not that there were too Lee Enfields and erhm, Shermans on the beach, but the fact that in the next two months they seemingly did little else than camping in front of Caen, and sipping tea.



Pardon??? Was that a joke, certainly hope so. If not it flies in the face of every historical fact about Normandy.

In case some haven't actually read the history, the Allied effort was to a clear strategic plan, conceived by Monty (delivered in April '44) agreed by Eisenhower and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Monty was the Land Forces Commander, in charge of all the (UK, Canadian, Polish, US, etc) forces.

The plan, right from the beginning was for the UK/Canadian/etc forces to hold the North, creating a 'hinge', from which the US forces would pivot around. In other words, the US was always planned to do the breakout, with the British/etc held the Germans. That was what was planned and that was what happened. The breakout took longer than expected, mainly because of bad weather impacting the force and logistic build up (particularly the US), at one point it got so bad the US forces were rationed to only (from memory) 25 artillery shells per day.

But after the build up and then the break out, the German forces had been so written down (mostly against the British/.etc) that the advance went far faster than expected. 

In fact, the original plan phase line at 90 days (basically the clearing of France) was exceeded and was done in only 75 days!! Or in other words Monty's plan worked brilliantly.
Bradley in his own book described it as (paraphrase) "the British/etc would take on the self sacrificing task of holding the Germans ......".

Remember this was planned and executed as a coordinated Allied plan. So I find it amazing that 60 plus years later people are still going on about 'slow British', etc, nonsense (you could just as justifiably accuse the US forces of being slow if you want to make that sort of argument), everyone did there jobs and did them well. 
Not everything worked perfectly, uncontrollable things (eg the weather) changed timings, the Germans were their usual brilliant fighting selves, tactics were changed and adapted to circumstance,etc. But the overall strategy was flexible enough (another sign of a good plan) to handle all that and succeed.

A truly great Allied victory, sadly spoiled afterwords by some people getting all nationalistic about it and re-writing history.


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## Milosh (Sep 13, 2013)

TJ does have a bit of a point as Caen was to be captured on the first day (Operation Perch).


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## nuuumannn (Sep 13, 2013)

> British Intelligence were also receiving information from an insider at Peenemünde before the raid. This is what led to the overflights by PR aircraft.



The discovery that Peenemunde was the centre of German rocketry and missile experiments was made by accident as much by intention. The British knew the Germans had been developing rockets; Polish intelligence had reported 'flying torpedoes', and at Peenemunde itself strange earthworks were photographed in 1942, although their purpose was unknown. Peenemunde was initially thought to be connected to explosives and fuel production, but it was on a PR flight to photograph the railway yards at Stettin that had been on the receiving end of bombing in late April 1943 that the PR Mossie crew left their cameras running as they skirted the north coast of Germany, unknowingly capturing a cylindrical object emerging from a building whilst overflying Peenemunde. In the next frame it was gone. In mid May 1943 a PR sortie over Peenemunde revealed more of these cylindrical objects, which the interpreters at Medmenham correctly deduced were rockets.



> It seems more people were killed/lost while trying to stop the V-2 programme than the rocket actually killed.



And if Peenemunde had not been attacked then there would have been even more rockets and larger losses of life on the receiving end of them.


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## silence (Sep 13, 2013)

OldSkeptic said:


> Pardon??? Was that a joke, certainly hope so. If not it flies in the face of every historical fact about Normandy.
> 
> In case some haven't actually read the history, the Allied effort was to a clear strategic plan, conceived by Monty (delivered in April '44) agreed by Eisenhower and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
> Monty was the Land Forces Commander, in charge of all the (UK, Canadian, Polish, US, etc) forces.
> ...




Hmmm....

According to Carlo d'Este in "Decision in Normandy":

1. "Contrary to most later interpretations of Montgomery's master plan, his remarks then and later did not reflect a defensive posture around Caen or a ploy to use the city as a hinge. Rather, he wanted strong and aggressive _offensive_ action to ensure _protection_ of the critical and vulnerable British flank. As the plan unfolded was later formally presented, the Montgomery strategy called for the Second British Army to hold and pivot at some point while US forces drove south and eventually turned eastwards when the Loire, the southern flank of the American advance, was reached. Bradley's recollection was that Montgomery 's concept was not defensive and that his early orders and discussions did not contain reference to Caen as a hinge upon which the British would hold and pivot. As will be seen, no one else connected with the planning or execution of OVERLORD recalls any such indication either." [pp 74-75]

2. It was during THUNDERCLAP that Montgomery first developed his estimate that the Normandy campaign could be over in three months. At no time did Montgomery emphasize or refer to a holding action around Caen or to a deliberate policy of drawing in Rommel's reserves." [pg 77]

3. "Montgomery's close friend,Sir James Grigg, the Secretary of State for War, was not misled: 'Of course Montgomery's original idea was to break out of the bocage country around Caen in the first few days after landing - it would be idle to deny that...'" [pg 206]

4."Chester Wilmont, one of Montgomery's most eloquent advocates ... [a]lthough accepting the premise that Montgomery never wavered in the pursuit of this main strategic purpose [_to harry the Germans, keeping them unbalanced and eventually sapping their defenses_] wrote that: '...he did modify and change the means by which he sought to achieve it. After the war, however, over-anxious to defend himself against American criticism, he asserted that 'the operations developed in June, July and August exactly as planned.' In making this claim, Montgomery does himself less than justice, for his real genius as a commander was shown inthe way he varied his day-to-day policy to meet the unpredictable situation caused by bad weather ... and tactical failure or slowness on the part of both British and American troops.'" [pp 207-208]

5. "[Group Captain T.P.] Greave disputes Montgomery's intention that this strategy was included in the original pre-D-Day planning: 'It is true he helped the attack to the west and he deserves credit for that, but when he says that was his plan, he is stating _his second reconsideration_. As a result of his failure to take Caen his area became very congested ... Original plan was to run out great armored fingers around Caen. When the German came in they would be enfiladed. [We] were to get the humps beyond Caen so as to control the terrain." [pg 209]

6. "[Captain J. Hughes-Hallett, Royal Navy] bluntly contradicts Montgomery: ' Montgomery's talk of of his original intentiion to hinge on Caen is absolute balls. Monty is a great operational commander. When he was checked in his original intent of taking Caen he had the idea of doing the other operation. I believe the second thing shows greater insight and don't see why he doesn't tell the truth.'" [pp206-207]

7. "What Ellis [in the official history] is that ... [d]efensive strategy after invasion was precisely what Montgomery had hoped at all costs _to avoid_." [pg 210]

8. Finally, "Montgomery had not intended to create a myth when he vigorously defended his actions in Normandy, and there is no reason to doubt that he firmly believed his plan provided the firm framework of the Allied victory. Despite his public image of disdain and aloofness from these quarrels, Montgomery was deeply distressed by the criticism of Ingersoll, Correlli Barnett, R.W.Thompson, Tedder, Bradley and others. Without question it led to a hardening of his attitude that his reputation would suffer considerably unless he resolutely defended himself. Nevertheless, his refusal ever to admit that the campaign had not gone 'exactly according to plan' was paid for at the cost of his credibility." [pg 501]


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## Tante Ju (Sep 14, 2013)

Aozora said:


> As far as 109s shot down - just one squadron, 486(NZ) Sqn, flying humble Typhoons (and part of the British legions) shot down lemme see...
> 
> *snip*
> 
> Seven of the mighty recce 109s, including two of the fantastic G-4/R3s, not to mention an Fw 190.



There was nothing mighty about them, they were just like other recon 109s, but had two droptanks and could go pretty much anywhere. Of course they could be shot down just like anything else, just like PR Spitfires that operated at high losses, contrary to popular beliefs. 

Now, much have been said about how supposedly PR Spitfires roamed free over Europe. This was especially not true for the early PR Marks, but not even the much hyped Mark XI was operating in peace. 

Its story is much like that of the two staged Spitfire fighters - production was very slow initially and the type appeared only in small numbers, most of them being produced in 1944. The early ones (1943 series) all had the Merlin 61 or 63 and were not that hot. The Merlin 70 engined variant begun to appear in the spring of 1944 only and even though it had improved high altitude performance - and unfortunately so did the new high altitude Luftwaffe fighters that appeared at the same time.

The production numbers are telling.

*1942*: 10 were produced in the last two months of the year, of which 4 were shot down on mission and one was lost to engine failure.
*1943 *production amounted to a whopping 61 aircraft up to August 1943, all with M61/M63 engines. 12 of them, or exactly 20% of the production was shot down, three further planes were lost to engine failures and a number of others to misc reasons (accidents, tests etc)
*1944 *production amounted to 201 aircraft, almost all of them with the new Merlin 70, which seem to have given considerable trouble. 23 were lost on missions or to enemy action (11%), with a couple being shot up during Bodenplatte. The Merlin 70 proved that it was almost as good at destroying planes as the Luftwaffe, with further 22 lost to engine cuts and engine fires. A number of others were lost to accidents etc.
*1945 *production amounted to 18 aircraft, all with Merlin 70, with one being lost to enemy action and one to engine fires.

The below is the list of PR Mark XIs lost to enemy action - 40 of the PR Mark XI has been destroyed via enemy action:

BS498	PRXI	3682	HEA FF 25-11-42 1PRU Benson 7-12-42 541S 26-3-43 Missing (Dortmund-Ems Canal) 13-6-43
BS501	PRXI	3716	BEN FF 1-12-42 1PRU Benson 7-12-42 542S 14-12-42 VASM 27-9-43 universal camera install 541S 16-10-43 Missing (Essen) [5-3-43]
BS502	PRXI	3717	HEA FF 6-12-42 1PRU Benson 7-12-42 542S 14-12-42 VASM 27-9-43 universal camera install Missing (V-sites) 25-2-44
EN151	PRXI	3769	CHA	M61	FF 20-12-42 33MU 22-12-42 1PRU Benson 11-1-43 542S 1-2-43 Missing (Nurnberg) 26-2-43
EN330	PRXI	3830	CHA	M61	FF 9-1-43 33MU 11-1-43 1PRU Benson 5-2-43 NWAfrica 21-5-43 542S 9-7-43 Missing on PR mission over V-sites 10-4-44
EN338	PRXI	3889	CHA	M61	FF 20-1-43 33MU 27-1-43 Benson 9-3-43 1OADU 26-3-43 Malta 26-3-43 218Grp NAfrica 30-11-43 682S Missing on PR to Munich 24-8-44
EN347	PRXI	3927	CHA	M61	FF 29-1-43 39MU 2-2-43 Benson 15-2-43 ? 1OADU 10-3-43 NAfrica 10-3-43 Missing on PR mission over Sardinia 30-3-43
EN385	PRXI	3708	HEA	M61	FF 2-12-42 1PRU Benson 7-12-42 541S 9-12-42 Missing from PR sorties to Cologne 13-2-43
EN411	PRXI	3979	CHA	M61	FF 12-2-43 45MU 14-2-43 Benson 12-3-43 541S Missing (Lubeck) 28-5-43
EN421	PRXI	4104	CHA	M63	FF 10-3-43 Benson 23-3-43 1OADU 16-5-43 NAfrica 19-5-43 Missing (Naples) 13-6-43
EN424	PRXI	4100	CHA	M63A	FF 13-3-43 6MU 15-3-43 1PRU Benson 25-3-43 543S 12-4-43 542S Missing from PR over V-sites Pas de Calais 14-4-44
EN427	PRXI	4129	CHA	M63A	FF 20-3-43 Benson 23-3-43 1OADU 20-4-43 FF eng trouble returned Benson 25-4-43 Miles Aircraft 1-7-43 Missing (Genoa) 29-8-43
EN503	PRXI	4288	EA	M63	FF 8-5-43 6MU 15-5-43 Benson 23-5-43 541S 1-6-43 VASM 1-9-43 univ camera install Missing from PR over Pas de Calais 21-1-44
EN652	PRXI	4370	CHA	M63	FF 26-5-43 6MU 25-6-43 ros 22-7-43 Benson 23-7-43 542S 20-8-43 8OTU 30-8-43 Missing on training flight 12-3-45
EN669	PRXI	4520	CHA	M63	FF 6-7-43 6MU 11-7-43 Benson 23-7-43 541S 26-8-43 1OADU 4-10-43 Missing(Hamburg) 18-12-43
EN685	PRXI	4638	CHA	M63	FF 13-8-43 6MU 15-8-43 Benson 2-9-43 543S 16-9-43 Missing (Hannover) 13-5-44
PL782	PRXI ALD	M70	Benson 2-4-44 8/7USAAF 20-4-44 lost over Germany 5-9-44
PL790	PRXI ALD	M70	Benson 6-4-44 8/7USAAF 20-4-44 lost over England 15-6-44
PL796	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 25-4-44 Benson 20-5-44 4S 15-6-44 High level PR pm east of Utrecht Shot down by Me109 of JG1 nr Nieukuik 24-12-44 F/O T A Priddle killed
PL834	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 14-5-44 Benson 20-5-44 16S 8-6-44 missing on PR mission to Arnhem 20-9-44
PL841	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 29-5-44 Benson 9-9-44 1OADU 20-9-44 NWAfrica 25-9-44 ACSEA 12-10-44 681S missing from PR mission to Moulmein 7-6-45
PL845	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 1-6-44 Benson 15-9-44 16S 5-10-44 missing on PR mission to Venlo 18-11-44 P/O W C Heath killed
PL848	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 11-6-44 Benson 15-9-44 16S 28-9-44 Damaged by Bfl09s CAC ops 25-12-44 HAL 23-2-45 recat E SOC 14-9-45
PL853	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 12-6-44 Benson 15-9-44 16S 5-10-44 Sortie to Dusseldorf shot down by Me163 from JG400 14-1-45
PL856	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 12-6-44 Benson 16-8-44 541S 5-9-44 missing (Luneburg) 20-3-45
PL883	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 3-7-44 400S CAC ops 26-7-44 Benson 14-10-44 Destroyed in air raid Eindhoven CE 1-1-45
PL899	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 22-7-44 1PP Benson 14-10-44 541S 1-11-44 missing (Hamburg) 1-1-45
PL904	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 28-7-44 Benson 16-8-44 541S missing (Bremen) 28-9-44
PL906	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 29-7-44 Benson 16-8-44 542S missing (Munich) 27-11-44
PL911	PRXI M70	6MU 21-8-44 Benson 15-9-44 400S 28-9-44 Destroyed in air raid Eindhoven 1-1-45
PL916	PRXI M70	6MU 27-8-44 Benson 9-9-44 1OADU 16-9-44 NWAfrica 18-9-44 683S missing (Stuttgart) 8-10-44
PL919	PRXI M70	6MU 29-8-44 Benson 28-9-44 541S 28-11-44 missing (Frankfurt) 24-12-44
PL950	PRXI M70	9MU 18-9-44 CRD RAE 28-9-44 Benson 27-10-44 400S 9-11-44 DBR in air raid Eindhoven CB 1-1-45 HAL recat E SOC 13-9-45
PL962	PRXI M70	9MU 24-9-44 8/7USAAF 3-10-44 lost over France 15-1-45
PL976	PRXI M70	Benson 12-10-44 16S 23-11-44 Destroyed in air raid Melsbroek CE 1-1-45
PL991	PRXI M70	Benson 15-11-44 1OADU 7-12-44 NWAfrica 14-12-44 683S missing from PR mission over Trieste presumed ditched in Adriatic 29-1-45
PM123	PRXI ALD	M70	1PP Benson 18-11-44 16S 11-1-45 enemy action 19-3-45 AFDS CFE 15-11-45 SOC 8-4-48
PM128	PRXI ALD	M70	Benson 27-11-44 400S Attack on Eindhoven airfield CB 1-1-45 409RSU 18-1-45 HAL 17-4-45 recat E SOC 3-9-45
PM142	PRXI ALD	M70	Benson 17-12-44 400S 18-1-45 Tac/R sortie Hit by fire from a ship as he flew low over the Baltic 9-5-45 F/Lt L L McMillan DFC AM killed
PM148	PRXI M70	1PP Benson 17-1-45 541S 23-1-45 missing (Bohlen) 8-3-45

Edit: seems to have missed "Mk XIT" series, but no time now to add these...


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## Tante Ju (Sep 14, 2013)

continued. 

The following 27 PR Mk XI were lost to engine related troubles - its noteworthy how much trouble the Merlin 70 series gave:

EN154	PRXI	3774	CHA	M61	FF 21-12-42 33MU 22-12-42 1PRU Benson 15-1-43 541S 21-2-43 FAAC 19-2-44 HAL 8OTU 1-7-44 engine failed on takeoff force-landed Woodbine Farm Haverford West CE 11-5-45 SOC 25-5-45
EN414	PRXI	4046	CHA	M61	FF 28-2-43 46MU 4-3-43 Benson 14-3-43 1OADU 5-4-43 NWAfrica 8-4-43 Engine cut forcelanded at Forli CE 26-5-45 SOC 31-5-45
EN425	PRXI	4114	CHA	M63	FF 17-3-43 6MU 20-3-43 1PRU Benson 27-3-43 1OADU 29-4-43 Gibraltar 1-6-43 Middle East 30-9-43 Engine cut ditched off Rhodes 24-5-45
EN682	PRXI	4629	CHA	M63	FF 11-8-43 6MU 17-8-43 Benson 2-9-43 ros 7-9-43 542S engine failed wheels up landing nr Billingshurst Station Sussex CE 2-8-44
PL758	PRXI CHA	M63	AAEE 28-2-44 cool trials with reduced area rad exit duct Fitt FXII rud Benson 20-8-44 4S 31-8-44 HAL 6-2-45 recat E SOC 3-9-45 bboc SFU Honiley 7-3-46 engine failed wheels up landing nr Warwick 19-7-46 FA SOC 25-7-46
PL763	PRXI ALD	M70	Benson 12-3-44 1OADU 28-3-44 ? MedAAF 11-4-44 682S Caught fire taxying at San Severo 12-10-44
PL774	PRXI ALD	M70	Benson 27-3-44 1OADU 6-5-44 ACSEA 18-5-44 9FU Engine cut on ferry flight bellylanded 15m E of Bone 22-7-45 SOC 6-9-45
PL776	PRXI ALD	M70	Benson 23-2-44 1OADU 4-4-44 ACSEA 17-4-44 681S Engine cut bellylanded nr Whaiknyaung 28-3-45 SOC 26-4-45
PL787	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 22-4-44 Benson 14-5-44 4S 25-5-44 Engine caught fire on high level PR mission and abandoned over Channel 17-7-44 F/O N S Cooper killed
PL797	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 22-4-44 Benson 14-5-44 400S 23-5-44 Engine cut on PR mission abandoned St.Mervieu (sic) nr Bayeux 17-7-44
PL827	PRXI CHA	M70	RAE 6-5-44 replacement trials aircraft for EN409 Rate of roll and continuation of compressibility trials initiated with EN409 Engine broke up in dive hit HT wires recovering and crashed Whitmoor Common CB 15-9-44 HAL recat E 24-9-44
PL828	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 30-4-44 Benson 13-6-44 400S 6-8-44 Attack on Eindhoven airfield CAC 1-1-45 Engine lost power on PR mission bellylanded at Blankenberg FAAC 21-3-45 HAL recat E SOC 14-9-45
PL829	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 2-5-44 Benson 14-5-44 400S 25-5-44 eng fire in circuit Odiham hit tree crashed dbf CE 28-7-44 pilot killed
PL831	PRXI ALD	M50	6MU 7-5-44 Benson 14-5-44 4S 30-5-44 High level PR sortie Caught fire and crashed nr Petersfield Hants CE 9-8-44 F/O R A Drapper killed
PL858	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 19-6-44 Benson 3-7-44 1OADU 17-7-44 MedAAF 20-7-44 ACSEA 8-8-44 681S Engine caught fire abandoned nr Kalewa 2-1-45 SOC 6-9-45
PL860	PRXI ALD	M70	Benson 30-6-44 1OADU 24-7-44 NWAfrica 27-8-44 ACSEA 6-9-44 Caught fire in air and crashed Mount Lavinia Colombo Ceylon 30-12-44
PL864	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 7-7-44 Benson 9-9-44 NWAfrica 21-9-44 682S Engine cut on approach stalled and hit ground Ochey CE 6-1-45
PL882	PRXI ALD	M70	Benson 1-7-44 541S 22-7-44 Engine cut over North Sea ditched 5-12-44
PL901	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 28-7-44 Benson 16-8-44 542S 28-8-44 Engine cut on PR mission crashlanded nr East Grinstead Surrey FACE 6-1-45 SOC 12-1-45
PL913	PRXI M70	6MU 23-8-44 Benson 5-9-44 16S 14-9-44 FACB 17-11-44 HAL 1401Flt 16-1-45 engine cut force-landed Salzwedel 29-1-46
PL953	PRXI M70	6MU 2-9-44 Benson 21-9-44 4S 19-10-44 Engine cut crashlanded nr Tilburg 29-10-44
PL960	PRXI M70	6MU 9-9-44 Benson 21-9-44 1OADU 30-9-44 NWAfrica 2-10-44 Middle East 8-10-44 ACSEA 8-10-44 681S Caught fire and abandoned off Ceylon 30-12-44 [SOC 27-2-47]
PL964	PRXI ALD	M70	9MU 2-10-44 1PP Benson 17-1-45 16S 8-2-45 Engine cut on take-off crash-landed Teuge FAAC 5-8-45
PL996	PRXI ALD	M70	1PP Benson 18-11-44 MedAAF 309FTU Engine caught fire on ferry flight abandoned nr Troyes 10-12-44
PL997	PRXI M70	Benson 25-11-44 1OADU 7-12-44 Middle East 17-12-44 ACSEA 10-1-45 681S 6RIAF 7RIAF Engine cut on take-off crashlanded Kohat CE 14-2-47 SOC 27-3-47
PM135	PRXI ALD	M70	Benson 11-12-44 eng fire ground running Benson CE 31-12-44
PM152	PRXI M70	1PP Benson 22-1-45 4S 22-2-45 Engine caught fire on take-off Mill CE 22-3-45


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## mhuxt (Sep 14, 2013)

Yes, that's all been known for years. Can you tell us how that translates to loss rates?


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## stona (Sep 14, 2013)

The Spitfire was not the only PR aircraft deployed by the British over Europe.
Steve


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## Tante Ju (Sep 14, 2013)

Now, if you though the PR XI was bad, here is the PR Mark III and IV - the major PR type of 1941-1943.

Lets see the PR Mark III briefly. 17 produced. Nine were shot down. Ouch.

PR Mark IV 

1941 saw 97 PR Mark IV produced, all with the less than stellar Merlin 45. Of that, 44 were lost to enemy action (45% ...!) and further 7 to engine failures. Again, a number of others were lost to accidents and other causes, used in tests etc.
1942 saw 136 PR Mark IV produced, most of them with the somewhat better Merlin 46. 32 were lost to enemy action (23,5%), mostly in the same year and in the MTO - a telling statistic. Further 11 aircrafts engines went kaputt and a number again was lost in accidents.
1943 saw the last 11 produced, with one being lost over Foggia, and another mysteriously going missing in a transit flight between Gibraltar and North Africa in mid 1943.


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## Tante Ju (Sep 14, 2013)

stona said:


> The Spitfire was not the only PR aircraft deployed by the British over Europe.
> Steve



The point is to sober up those who may believe they operated with inpunity.


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## mhuxt (Sep 14, 2013)

You're still firmly in the "so what" zone.

"Someone I don't know posted a file, and I picked all the negative stuff out of it.

Look at meeeeeee."

Can you tell us how that all translates to loss rates? Actual engine failures vs operating hours? Anything at all?


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## Tante Ju (Sep 14, 2013)

Why so excited mhuxt? Its just loss data... 

The sudden increase in engine failures, many on take off with the introduction of the Merlin 70 was certainly an interesting thing for me. Perhaps you have more information on this (Merlin 70 troubles).


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## mhuxt (Sep 14, 2013)

I know it's friggen loss data, I posted it as the thread's about PR.

I'm still waiting for you to tell us something we didn't already know.

And people wonder why Luftwhiners get sh*tcanned.

I'm outta this thread.


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## stona (Sep 14, 2013)

Montgomery's plan once Caen had not fallen as planned was, in his words, "to assault to the West of the river Orne and to develop operations to the South and South-East, in order to secure airfield sites and to protect the eastern flank of First US Army while the latter is capturing Cherbourg."
It was the German Panzer Divisions that thwarted the plan, not any lack of effort on the part of the Anglo-Canadian forces. British hopes of enlarging the beachhead were dashed and the open country South East of Caen was denied them. _The Panzer Divisions themselves were broken into Kamfgruppen to hold the line against the British thus ruining German plans to concentrate armoured forces to throw the allies back into the sea_. A not inconsiderable achievement. Not all campaigns are won by breakthroughs and hundred mile dashes.

On 10th June Montgomery and Dempsey met Bradley. Montgomery now revised his plan to launch a pincer attack on Caen. The most daring aspect was to drop the 1st Airborne Division (held in reserve in England) around Evrecy. It was our old friend Leigh Mallory who blocked this causing Montgomery to describe him to Freddie de Guignand (his Chief of Staff at 21st Army) as " a gutless bugger."

It was on 11th June, importantly the day after he had met Bradley, that he wrote that his general objective was "to pull the Germans on to the Second Army so that the [US] First Army can extend and expand."

It was the Germans and specifically their Panzer Divisions who dictated this state of affairs, not Montgomery. Both Runstedt and Rommel regarded the 2nd Army as the principal threat because a South Easterly breakthrough towards Falaise opened the possibility of an allied dash for Paris. They also both admitted to under estimating the Americans.
There were consequences for the Germans too. Geyr was very unhappy that using these divisions to block the route to Paris led to "the unfortunate decision to employ on the inner flank the most powerful mobile forces."

Quickly an ugly battle of attrition developed. Constant pressure was maintained on the Germans by ground air and artillery attack (hardly drinking tea) and this, while seldom adventurous, prevented Rommel from using his armoured divisions effectively. He was forced to adopt "fire fighting" tactics, dividing up these divisions to reinforce infantry formations on the point od collapse.

Montgomery's statement that Caen was the key to Cherbourg was not only wrong but didn't impress his American colleagues. General Collins, tasked with taking Cherbourg, observed to Bradley "Why doesn't he just send us the key?"
Montgomery was a complicated character. One of his flaws was an inability to admit when he was wrong.

Things are never as simple as they seem, or Wikipedia would have you believe. 

Best estimates for BRITISH losses alone between 6th June and 19th July 1944 are about 6,000 killed and 29,000 wounded. That is not "drinking tea" and it is disrespectful to their memory to use phrases like that.

Cheers

Steve


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## Tante Ju (Sep 14, 2013)

Glider said:


> More or less all of them. In Dec 1944 a Luftwaffe PR officer admitted that no air reconnaissance of British Industry had taken place for three years.
> 
> Source Hitlers Spies David Kahn page 135
> 
> This tends to knock a hole in the view that the Luftwaffe overflew every couple of weeks.



They flew 187 recon sorties in 1943 over Britain, an all time low but enough to check whats happening now and then IMHO.

Well lets see the hard data instead on Luftwaffe recon activity in the West/MTO, via Hooton: Eagle in Flames.

Fliegerkorps X: Campaign against Malta, Jan - May 1941, recon sorties: 132 recon sorties flown.
Fliegerkorps X: excluding Malta, Jan - May 1941, recon sorties, armed: 364 recon sorties flown.
Fliegerkorps X: excluding Malta, Jan - May 1941, recon sorties, E Med: 525 recon sorties flown.
Maritime recon sorties in MTO, 1942, Fliegerkorps II and X: 1730 recon sorties flown.
Luftflotte 3 recon sorties in the West, July - December 1941: 1330 recon sorties flown.

For a comparison of British 1942 recon sortie totals for 1941: 1888 PR, 652 other. See post. no 70 of this thread

Luftflotte 3 recon sorties in the West, Jan- December 1942: 5868 recon sorties flown.
Fliegerkorps II, recon sorties against Malta January - November 1942: 536 recon sorties flown.
Fliegerfuhrer Afrika / Fliegerkorps X recon sorties over land, January December 1942: 2770 recon sorties flown.

For a comparison of British 1942 recon sortie totals for 1942: 2079 PR, 1878 other. See post. no 70 of this thread.

Luftwaffe recon activity in the MTO, January - May 1943: 3710 recon sorties flown.
Luftwaffe recon activity in the MTO, 13 December 1943 - 16 January 1944: 497 recon sorties flown.
German operations over Britain, 1943: 187 recon sorties flown

For a comparison of British 1943 recon sortie totals for 1942: 2286 PR, 2339 other. See post. no 70 of this thread.

Now this data for LW recon may be well incomplete, as Hooton only gives some figures now and then. I also ommitted Eastern Front recon sorties, but to give some idea where German recon priorities/assets were, in the first _ten days_ of Unternehmen Zitadelle, 1943, Luftlotte 6 flew 1371 recon sorties, while Luftflotte 4 flew 693.


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## fastmongrel (Sep 14, 2013)

A distant relative was one of those tea drinkers in Normandy. Hes still there and will never grow old so obviously drinking tea is a bloody dangerous occupation. I am out of this thread as well, its always the same an interesting thread gets derailed by sh1tkickers who have to re-write what happened 70 years ago for some strange nasty little reason.


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## Hop (Sep 14, 2013)

> They flew 187 recon sorties in 1943 over Britain, an all time low but enough to check whats happening now and then IMHO.



But how many were successful? The loss rate was 18%.


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## Tante Ju (Sep 14, 2013)

stona said:


> Best estimates for BRITISH losses alone between 6th June and 19th July 1944 are about 6,000 killed and 29,000 wounded. That is not "drinking tea" and it is disrespectful to their memory to use phrases like that.



You seem to have missed "_seemingly_" from that sentence, that referenced to the lack of progress and keeping to the original plans and was not meant to be disrespectful to the sacrifices the troops made. I am aware that the resistance was stiff - still, for some reason the British could not keep with the schedule and it irritated a lot of people, especially as Monty came up with his usual garbage excuses and how he planned that all along. Now, as for drinking tea, that was a very real phenomenon, Reynolds for example strongly criticizes that aspect of the British offensives and and tactical "thinking", namely the absolutely passivity of local commanders and that of the British infantry. British infantry would usually advance slowly towards to set objectives with tanks, after a barrage. If they managed to reach it, they would STOP, no matter if there would be no Germans to offer resistance, they would not even try to exploit the opportunity. Instead, they would do what they were always doing, dig some holes and prepare some tea. That lack of aggressive and opportunity spirit was what set them apart from the US and German army. Americans usually grabbed opportunities, and the Germans were aggressive even in defense, emphasizing the importance of immediate counter attacks. In short, the British army tactical doctrine was essentially stuck in World War I. Hold the trenches, barrage them with artillery, advance slowly with tanks, fix bayonet because the Hun fears the naked iron and above all else, do not do anything unless an officer tells you to. Like in WW1, it could work if the odds were heavily in your favor, but it was anything but up to date, or brilliant.


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## pattle (Sep 14, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> You seem to have missed "_seemingly_" from that sentence, that referenced to the lack of progress and keeping to the original plans and was not meant to be disrespectful to the sacrifices the troops made. I am aware that the resistance was stiff - still, for some reason the British could not keep with the schedule and it irritated a lot of people, especially as Monty came up with his usual garbage excuses and how he planned that all along. Now, as for drinking tea, that was a very real phenomenon, Reynolds for example strongly criticizes that aspect of the British offensives and and tactical "thinking", namely the absolutely passivity of local commanders and that of the British infantry. British infantry would usually advance slowly towards to set objectives with tanks, after a barrage. If they managed to reach it, they would STOP, no matter if there would be no Germans to offer resistance, they would not even try to exploit the opportunity. Instead, they would do what they were always doing, dig some holes and prepare some tea. That lack of aggressive and opportunity spirit was what set them apart from the US and German army. Americans usually grabbed opportunities, and the Germans were aggressive even in defense, emphasizing the importance of immediate counter attacks. In short, the British army tactical doctrine was essentially stuck in World War I. Hold the trenches, barrage them with artillery, advance slowly with tanks, fix bayonet because the Hun fears the naked iron and above all else, do not do anything unless an officer tells you to. Like in WW1, it could work if the odds were heavily in your favor, but it was anything but up to date, or brilliant.



Yes that is what the British did at Anzio when the British General Lucas ordered the American troops from moving inland to take the high ground to prevent the defenders from surrounding the beaches and turning them into a killing ground. Even though the road to Rome was open the British General Lucas stopped the Americans from leaving the beach because it was tea time.

For anyone that wants to learn the actual truth behind World War Two watch Churchill the Hollywood years , you tube Churchill the Hollywood years.


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## vinnye (Sep 14, 2013)

It is all very well and good making a plan, but then reality wakes up and bites you in the backside!
It may be that Caen was supposed to be taken on Day 1, but I don't think anyone had the courtesy of informing the Germans of the plan!
Gallipoli was supposed to be taken on Day 1, El Alamein did not go exactly to plan ; nor did Anzio, or many other battles.
That does not mean that the plan was not a good one, its always going to be down to what happens on the day, weather, luck etc can easily play their hand.
As posted earlier a good plan usually is a flexible plan that can respond to the reality of the situation at hand. 

If as written by OldSceptic, Bradley acknowledges that the British / Canadian /Polish were to hold the line and pull in the German reserves whilst the US swung around them - it is pretty pointless in arguing with that!


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## stona (Sep 14, 2013)

I think TJ needs to sit down and read some decent history books.

Since we are talking about stultified thinking, advancing behind a barrage etc how would you fit an operation like "Market Garden" into that template. The fact that it was ultimately unsuccessful is not relevant. The thinking and planning was both bold and adventurous. 
I doubt that it would have been attempted had Montgomery's pincer plan with advanced airborne units been tried at Caen, but that's another story.
Cheers
Steve


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## Aozora (Sep 14, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> Its story is much like that of the two staged Spitfire fighters - production was very slow initially and the type appeared only in small numbers, most of them being produced in 1944. The early ones (1943 series) all had the Merlin 61 or 63 and were not that hot. The Merlin 70 engined variant begun to appear in the spring of 1944 only and even though it had improved high altitude performance - and unfortunately so did the new high altitude Luftwaffe fighters that appeared at the same time.
> 
> The production numbers are telling.
> 
> ...



TJ says* "40 destroyed via enemy action"* but then again that's not what the entries say - note the number of "missing" which could mean such things as being caught in a thunder storm - there is _no confirmation_ they were all destroyed by enemy action.

At least three of this list were lost post war or over Britain during training, so those can be written out. (37 lost on operations)

Then there were those caught on the ground at Eindhoven - there's no reason include these when we are supposedly talking about Mk XIs lost while engaged on operational sorties, although it does make the list look more impressive... thus there were 32 lost on PR operations.

Exactly three were confirmed as lost to enemy aircraft...

Also note the production numbers, which TJ has also gotten wrong;

there were, in fact* 471 PR Mk XIs built, 211 with Merlin 70s*. *

Thus, the Operational Loss Rate of PR Mk IXs = 8.5%* - that's using the original estimate of 40 given in post #123.

So lets have a proper look at the list:

BS498	PRXI	3682	HEA FF 25-11-42 1PRU Benson 7-12-42 541S 26-3-43 Missing (Dortmund-Ems Canal) 13-6-43 [Time in Service 6 months]
BS501	PRXI	3716	BEN FF 1-12-42 1PRU Benson 7-12-42 542S 14-12-42 VASM 27-9-43 universal camera install 541S 16-10-43 Missing (Essen) [5-3-43] [Time in Service 3 months]
BS502	PRXI	3717	HEA FF 6-12-42 1PRU Benson 7-12-42 542S 14-12-42 VASM 27-9-43 universal camera install Missing (V-sites) 25-2-44 [TiS 15 Months]

EN151	PRXI	3769	CHA	M61	FF 20-12-42 33MU 22-12-42 1PRU Benson 11-1-43 542S 1-2-43 Missing (Nurnberg) 26-2-43 [TiS 3 Months]
EN330	PRXI	3830	CHA	M61	FF 9-1-43 33MU 11-1-43 1PRU Benson 5-2-43 NWAfrica 21-5-43 542S 9-7-43 Missing on PR mission over V-sites 10-4-44 [TiS 15 Months]
EN338	PRXI	3889	CHA	M61	FF 20-1-43 33MU 27-1-43 Benson 9-3-43 1OADU 26-3-43 Malta 26-3-43 218Grp NAfrica 30-11-43 682S Missing on PR to Munich 24-8-44 [TiS 19 Months]
EN347	PRXI	3927	CHA	M61	FF 29-1-43 39MU 2-2-43 Benson 15-2-43 ? 1OADU 10-3-43 NAfrica 10-3-43 Missing on PR mission over Sardinia 30-3-43 [TiS 2 Months]
EN385	PRXI	3708	HEA	M61	FF 2-12-42 1PRU Benson 7-12-42 541S 9-12-42 Missing from PR sorties to Cologne 13-2-43 [TiS 2 Months]
EN411	PRXI	3979	CHA	M61	FF 12-2-43 45MU 14-2-43 Benson 12-3-43 541S Missing (Lubeck) 28-5-43 [TiS 3 Months]
EN421	PRXI	4104	CHA	M63	FF 10-3-43 Benson 23-3-43 1OADU 16-5-43 NAfrica 19-5-43 Missing (Naples) 13-6-43 [TiS 3 Months]
EN424	PRXI	4100	CHA	M63A	FF 13-3-43 6MU 15-3-43 1PRU Benson 25-3-43 543S 12-4-43 542S Missing from PR over V-sites Pas de Calais 14-4-44 [TiS 13 Months]
EN427	PRXI	4129	CHA	M63A	FF 20-3-43 Benson 23-3-43 1OADU 20-4-43 FF eng trouble returned Benson 25-4-43 Miles Aircraft 1-7-43 Missing (Genoa) 29-8-43 [TiS 5 Months]
EN503	PRXI	4288	EA	M63	FF 8-5-43 6MU 15-5-43 Benson 23-5-43 541S 1-6-43 VASM 1-9-43 univ camera install Missing from PR over Pas de Calais 21-1-44 [TiS 8 Months]
EN669	PRXI	4520	CHA	M63	FF 6-7-43 6MU 11-7-43 Benson 23-7-43 541S 26-8-43 1OADU 4-10-43 Missing(Hamburg) 18-12-43 [TiS 4 Months]
EN685	PRXI	4638	CHA	M63	FF 13-8-43 6MU 15-8-43 Benson 2-9-43 543S 16-9-43 Missing (Hannover) 13-5-44 [TiS 8 months]

PL782	PRXI ALD	M70	Benson 2-4-44 8/7USAAF 20-4-44 lost over Germany 5-9-44 [TiS 5 Months]
PL796	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 25-4-44 Benson 20-5-44 4S 15-6-44 High level PR pm east of Utrecht Shot down by Me109 of JG1 nr Nieukuik 24-12-44 F/O T A Priddle killed [TiS 6 Months]*
PL834	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 14-5-44 Benson 20-5-44 16S 8-6-44 missing on PR mission to Arnhem 20-9-44 [TiS 3 Months]
PL845	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 1-6-44 Benson 15-9-44 16S 5-10-44 missing on PR mission to Venlo 18-11-44 P/O W C Heath killed [TiS 1 Month]
PL848	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 11-6-44 Benson 15-9-44 16S 28-9-44 Damaged by Bfl09s CAC ops 25-12-44 HAL 23-2-45 recat E SOC 14-9-45 [TiS 3 Months]
PL853	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 12-6-44 Benson 15-9-44 16S 5-10-44 Sortie to Dusseldorf shot down by Me163 from JG400 14-1-45 [/COLOR][TiS 3 Months]
PL856	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 12-6-44 Benson 16-8-44 541S 5-9-44 missing (Luneburg) 20-3-45 [TiS 6 Months]

PL899	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 22-7-44 1PP Benson 14-10-44 541S 1-11-44 missing (Hamburg) 1-1-45 [TiS 2 Months]
PL904	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 28-7-44 Benson 16-8-44 541S missing (Bremen) 28-9-44 [TiS 1 Month]
PL906	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 29-7-44 Benson 16-8-44 542S missing (Munich) 27-11-44 [TiS 3 Months]
PL916	PRXI M70	6MU 27-8-44 Benson 9-9-44 1OADU 16-9-44 NWAfrica 18-9-44 683S missing (Stuttgart) 8-10-44 [TiS 1 Month]
PL919	PRXI M70	6MU 29-8-44 Benson 28-9-44 541S 28-11-44 missing (Frankfurt) 24-12-44 [TiS 1 Month]
PL962	PRXI M70	9MU 24-9-44 8/7USAAF 3-10-44 lost over France 15-1-45 [TiS 3 Months]
PL991	PRXI M70	Benson 15-11-44 1OADU 7-12-44 NWAfrica 14-12-44 683S missing from PR mission over Trieste presumed ditched in Adriatic 29-1-45 [TiS 1 Month]

PM123	PRXI ALD	M70	1PP Benson 18-11-44 16S 11-1-45 enemy action 19-3-45 AFDS CFE 15-11-45 SOC 8-4-48[TiS 2 months]
PM142	PRXI ALD	M70	Benson 17-12-44 400S 18-1-45 Tac/R sortie Hit by fire from a ship as he flew low over the Baltic 9-5-45 F/Lt L L McMillan DFC AM killed [TiS 4 Months]
PM148	PRXI M70	1PP Benson 17-1-45 541S 23-1-45 missing (Bohlen) 8-3-45 [TiS 2 Months]


32 lost during wartime operations, not neccessarily all due to enemy action.

And those that can be removed from the list...

EN652	PRXI	4370	CHA	M63	FF 26-5-43 6MU 25-6-43 ros 22-7-43 Benson 23-7-43 542S 20-8-43 8OTU 30-8-43 Missing on training flight 12-3-45 [TiS 20 months - NON OPERATIONAL LOSS]
PL790	PRXI ALD	M70	Benson 6-4-44 8/7USAAF 20-4-44 lost over England 15-6-44 [TiS 2 months NON OPERATIONAL]
PL841	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 29-5-44 Benson 9-9-44 1OADU 20-9-44 NWAfrica 25-9-44 ACSEA 12-10-44 681S missing from PR mission to Moulmein 7-6-45 [TiS 8 Months POST WAR]
PL883	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 3-7-44 400S CAC ops 26-7-44 Benson 14-10-44 Destroyed in air raid Eindhoven CE 1-1-45 [TiS 3 Months]
PL911	PRXI M70	6MU 21-8-44 Benson 15-9-44 400S 28-9-44 Destroyed in air raid Eindhoven 1-1-45
PL950	PRXI M70	9MU 18-9-44 CRD RAE 28-9-44 Benson 27-10-44 400S 9-11-44 DBR in air raid Eindhoven CB 1-1-45 HAL recat E SOC 13-9-45
PL976	PRXI M70	Benson 12-10-44 16S 23-11-44 Destroyed in air raid Melsbroek CE 1-1-45
PM128	PRXI ALD	M70	Benson 27-11-44 400S Attack on Eindhoven airfield CB 1-1-45 409RSU 18-1-45 HAL 17-4-45 recat E SOC 3-9-45


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## Juha (Sep 14, 2013)

Neither Bf 109G-4/R3 was invulnerable, I checked 3 Staffeln that were using it:

1.(F)/Aufklärungsgruppe 120, got 3 Bf 109G-4/R3s in May 43, one was lost in Oct 43 without enemy action (ohne Feindeinw.) and the last 2 in next month, one because of enemy action (durch Feindeinw.) and one without. Got 3 repaired ones in Jan 44, lost one because of enemy action in Feb 44, one was moved to another unit in March 44 and the last one in April 44. The unit operated from Stavanger-Sola at that time, so responsible the PR of Scapa.

1.(F)/Aufklärungsgruppe 122 got 2 new Bf 109G-4/R3s in Feb 43, 4 new in March 43 and 2 new more in Apr but lost also 2 in Apr by enemy action and one was moved to another unit. In May 43 it lost 2 by enemy action, one was sent to maintenance/overhaul/repairs (Überholung) and one to another unit, the last one was sent to another unit in June 43. The Unit operated from Greece at that time.


2.(F)/Aufklärungsgruppe 123 got 4 new Bf 109G-4/R3s in March 43, one new more in Apr but also lost 1 in Apr by enemy action. In June 43 lost 2 Apr by enemy action. And in Sep 43 lost the last 2 without enemy ation. Up to and incl May was based in Northern France and from Aug 43 in Northern Italy.

Juha


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## Aozora (Sep 14, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> continued.
> 
> The following 27 PR Mk XI were lost to engine related troubles - its noteworthy how much trouble the Merlin 70 series gave:



What TJ doesn't tell us is how many of these were relatively elderly aircraft, some over two years old. 

Nor are we told that *out of 211 Merlin 70 PR XIs built 21 were lost to engine trouble, or 10%*;

6 of the 21 were relatively old airframes so *a total of 15 relatively new Merlin 70 powered Mk XIs were lost due to engine trouble, or 7.2%* hardly noteworthy. 

What the list also doesn't tell us is what was the reason for the engine failure. Was it related directly to the engine or to an engine component? How many were caused by, for example, vapour lock in the fuel lines, often the cause of engines cutting out? 

PL787	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 22-4-44 Benson 14-5-44 4S 25-5-44 Engine caught fire on high level PR mission and abandoned over Channel 17-7-44 F/O N S Cooper killed [TiS 2 Months]
PL797	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 22-4-44 Benson 14-5-44 400S 23-5-44 Engine cut on PR mission abandoned St.Mervieu (sic) nr Bayeux 17-7-44 [TiS 2 Months]
PL827	PRXI CHA	M70	RAE 6-5-44 replacement trials aircraft for EN409 Rate of roll and continuation of compressibility trials initiated with EN409 Engine broke up in dive hit HT wires recovering and crashed Whitmoor Common CB 15-9-44 HAL recat E 24-9-44 [TiS 4 Months]
PL829	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 2-5-44 Benson 14-5-44 400S 25-5-44 eng fire in circuit Odiham hit tree crashed dbf CE 28-7-44 pilot killed [TiS 2 Months]
PL831	PRXI ALD	M50	6MU 7-5-44 Benson 14-5-44 4S 30-5-44 High level PR sortie Caught fire and crashed nr Petersfield Hants CE 9-8-44 F/O R A Drapper killed[TiS 3 months]
PL864	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 7-7-44 Benson 9-9-44 NWAfrica 21-9-44 682S Engine cut on approach stalled and hit ground Ochey CE 6-1-45 [TiS 4 months]
PL882	PRXI ALD	M70	Benson 1-7-44 541S 22-7-44 Engine cut over North Sea ditched 5-12-44 [TiS 5 months]
PL901	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 28-7-44 Benson 16-8-44 542S 28-8-44 Engine cut on PR mission crashlanded nr East Grinstead Surrey FACE 6-1-45 SOC 12-1-45 [TiS 5 Months]
PL913	PRXI M70	6MU 23-8-44 Benson 5-9-44 16S 14-9-44 FACB 17-11-44 HAL 1401Flt 16-1-45 engine cut force-landed Salzwedel 29-1-46
PL953	PRXI M70	6MU 2-9-44 Benson 21-9-44 4S 19-10-44 Engine cut crashlanded nr Tilburg 29-10-44 [TiS 1 month]
PL964	PRXI ALD	M70	9MU 2-10-44 1PP Benson 17-1-45 16S 8-2-45 Engine cut on take-off crash-landed Teuge FAAC 5-8-45 [TiS 7 Months]
PL996	PRXI ALD	M70	1PP Benson 18-11-44 MedAAF 309FTU Engine caught fire on ferry flight abandoned nr Troyes 10-12-44 [TiS 1 month]
PM135	PRXI ALD	M70	Benson 11-12-44 eng fire ground running Benson CE 31-12-44 [TiS 1 Month]
PM152	PRXI M70	1PP Benson 22-1-45 4S 22-2-45 Engine caught fire on take-off Mill CE 22-3-45 [TiS 1 month]

*Spitfire PR Mk IXs in service 11 months and over: 7
*
EN154	PRXI	3774	CHA	M61	FF 21-12-42 33MU 22-12-42 1PRU Benson 15-1-43 541S 21-2-43 FAAC 19-2-44 HAL 8OTU 1-7-44 engine failed on takeoff force-landed Woodbine Farm Haverford West CE 11-5-45 SOC 25-5-45 [TiS 28 Months]
EN414	PRXI	4046	CHA	M61	FF 28-2-43 46MU 4-3-43 Benson 14-3-43 1OADU 5-4-43 NWAfrica 8-4-43 Engine cut forcelanded at Forli CE 26-5-45 SOC 31-5-45 [TiS 26 Months]
EN425	PRXI	4114	CHA	M63	FF 17-3-43 6MU 20-3-43 1PRU Benson 27-3-43 1OADU 29-4-43 Gibraltar 1-6-43 Middle East 30-9-43 Engine cut ditched off Rhodes 24-5-45 [TiS 26 Months]
EN682	PRXI	4629	CHA	M63	FF 11-8-43 6MU 17-8-43 Benson 2-9-43 ros 7-9-43 542S engine failed wheels up landing nr Billingshurst Station Sussex CE 2-8-44 [TiS 12 Months]
PL774	PRXI ALD	M70	Benson 27-3-44 1OADU 6-5-44 ACSEA 18-5-44 9FU Engine cut on ferry flight bellylanded 15m E of Bone 22-7-45 SOC 6-9-45 [TiS 14 Months]
PL758	PRXI CHA	M63	AAEE 28-2-44 cool trials with reduced area rad exit duct Fitt FXII rud Benson 20-8-44 4S 31-8-44 HAL 6-2-45 recat E SOC 3-9-45 bboc SFU Honiley 7-3-46 engine failed wheels up landing nr Warwick 19-7-46 FA SOC 25-7-46 [TiS 29 Months]
PL828	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 30-4-44 Benson 13-6-44 400S 6-8-44 Attack on Eindhoven airfield CAC 1-1-45 Engine lost power on PR mission bellylanded at Blankenberg FAAC 21-3-45 HAL recat E SOC 14-9-45 [TiS 11 Months]

PL763	PRXI ALD	M70	Benson 12-3-44 1OADU 28-3-44 ? MedAAF 11-4-44 682S Caught fire taxying at San Severo 12-10-44 [TiS 6 Months - no evidence this was engine related]

Now, this thread is about PR operations over Europe, so why include aircraft based outside of that theatre?

PL860	PRXI ALD	M70	Benson 30-6-44 1OADU 24-7-44 NWAfrica 27-8-44 ACSEA 6-9-44 Caught fire in air and crashed Mount Lavinia Colombo Ceylon 30-12-44[TiS 6 Months]
PL776	PRXI ALD	M70	Benson 23-2-44 1OADU 4-4-44 ACSEA 17-4-44 681S Engine cut bellylanded nr Whaiknyaung 28-3-45 SOC 26-4-45 [TiS 12 Months]
PL858	PRXI ALD	M70	6MU 19-6-44 Benson 3-7-44 1OADU 17-7-44 MedAAF 20-7-44 ACSEA 8-8-44 681S Engine caught fire abandoned nr Kalewa 2-1-45 SOC 6-9-45 [TiS 14 months]
PL997	PRXI M70	Benson 25-11-44 1OADU 7-12-44 Middle East 17-12-44 ACSEA 10-1-45 681S 6RIAF 7RIAF Engine cut on take-off crashlanded Kohat CE 14-2-47 SOC 27-3-47 [TiS 27 months]
PL960	PRXI M70	6MU 9-9-44 Benson 21-9-44 1OADU 30-9-44 NWAfrica 2-10-44 Middle East 8-10-44 ACSEA 8-10-44 681S Caught fire and abandoned off Ceylon 30-12-44 [SOC 27-2-47] [TiS 3 months]


*A more relevant question is what the heck has any of this to do with the effectiveness of PR over Europe during WW2?*


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## Airframes (Sep 14, 2013)

With reference to post #61, and the ludicrous statements by Tante Ju, and the progressive statements, I believe this member should one day wake up from the dream he is in, open the door of the Fantasy World he lives in, and go out and do some _real _research.
The complete 'package' of photo recce used by the allies, and in particular, the RAF during WW2, was excellent, and the progressive development of lenses, and the silver halide grain of the Kodak Aerographic film, allowed superb results. The fine-grained silver halides used at the time were approaching the supreme quality of the Kodak 'T-Grain' silver halide emulsion, not released publicly until the early 1980s, with virtually the same type of film emulsions, in 9 x 9 inch format, and the same camera types, still in use until the late 1990s !
Of course, our member will probably 'pooh pooh' this, and spout more b*ll*cks, seemingly derived from associates in whatever revisionist group he belongs to.
Please, either accept _facts_, or b*gg*r off and play with your other deluded friends.


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## vinnye (Sep 14, 2013)

Pattle, I am not sure if your remark related to the British General Lucas was a sarcastic response to the previous generalizations about the British Infantry or not.
Lucas was in fact American, from Wiki ;
In the Spring of 1943, Lucas was sent overseas as a deputy to Eisenhower, and briefly took command of II Corps (9–19 September 1943). On 20 September 1943, Lucas was given command of VI Corps, taking over from Major General Ernest J. Dawley. On January 22, 1944, from the deck of the cruiser USS Biscayne, Lucas was relieved of command after Operation Shingle, the amphibious landing at Anzio. Lucas was highly critical of the plans for the Anzio battle, believing his force was not strong enough to accomplish its mission. His confidence was not reinforced when the mission was scaled back by last-minute orders and advice from his commander, Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, who told him not to "stick his neck out". After nine days of preparation to reenforce his position and four weeks of extremely tough fighting, Lucas was relieved by Clark and replaced with Major General Lucian K. Truscott as the commander of VI Corps at Anzio. Lucas spent three weeks as Clark's deputy at Fifth Army headquarters before returning to the United States.

So it would seem the accusation that Anzio was a bloodbath due to the inertia caused by the British is completely false.
Many of the screw ups in Italy were of US origin - particularly Mark Clark who caused the timidity in the first place, then when the breakout happened, he went for glory in Rome rather than trapping the Germans before the could retreat and dig in again!


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## pattle (Sep 14, 2013)

vinnye said:


> Pattle, I am not sure if your remark related to the British General Lucas was a sarcastic response to the previous generalizations about the British Infantry or not.
> Lucas was in fact American, from Wiki ;
> In the Spring of 1943, Lucas was sent overseas as a deputy to Eisenhower, and briefly took command of II Corps (9–19 September 1943). On 20 September 1943, Lucas was given command of VI Corps, taking over from Major General Ernest J. Dawley. On January 22, 1944, from the deck of the cruiser USS Biscayne, Lucas was relieved of command after Operation Shingle, the amphibious landing at Anzio. Lucas was highly critical of the plans for the Anzio battle, believing his force was not strong enough to accomplish its mission. His confidence was not reinforced when the mission was scaled back by last-minute orders and advice from his commander, Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, who told him not to "stick his neck out". After nine days of preparation to reenforce his position and four weeks of extremely tough fighting, Lucas was relieved by Clark and replaced with Major General Lucian K. Truscott as the commander of VI Corps at Anzio. Lucas spent three weeks as Clark's deputy at Fifth Army headquarters before returning to the United States.
> 
> ...



Oh yes sorry, thanks for putting me right on this one, somebody must have slipped something in my tea.


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## silence (Sep 14, 2013)

pattle said:


> Oh yes sorry, thanks for putting me right on this one, somebody must have slipped something in my tea.



Maybe that's why James Bond once blamed tea for the downfall of the British Empire (can't remember in which book, though...)


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## OldSkeptic (Sep 14, 2013)

stona said:


> Montgomery's plan once Caen had not fallen as planned was, in his words, "to assault to the West of the river Orne and to develop operations to the South and South-East, in order to secure airfield sites and to protect the eastern flank of First US Army while the latter is capturing Cherbourg........"



At the final presentation at St Pauls on the 15th May (where in attendance were the King, Churchill Eisenhower, BCoS, all the relevant other generals, admirals, air commanders, etc.) Monty presented the final plan (agreed with all the relevant people beforehand of course). This included the famous 'phase lines' map.

There was, obviously much to it, breakdowns of all the German forces, what Rommel would do, what Hitler would allow, etc, etc.

_"Turning to the wall maps he gave his strategic intentions for 'the development of Operations up to D +90, outlining again the manner in which th British and Canadians wouyld 'contain' the maximum enemy forces facing the eastern flank of th bridgehead' while the Americans 'once though the difficult bocage country' were to 'thrust rapidly towards Rennes', seal off the Brittany peninsula and wheel round towards Paris and the Seine, *pivoting on the right flank of the British 2nd Army.*.."
_
Master of the Battlefield, Hamilton, page 588. Sources available in many places, including the PRO and so on.

So I really don't know how there can even be the single bit of doubt that this was the strategic plan from the very beginning agreed by all parties, JCoS, Marshall, Eisenhower, Bradly, et al.

Not sure how it can be clearer that he planned it this way. Oh sure many of the sub tasks took longer than expected, for example Caen fell in D+33 instead of D Day, but then again St Lo (a US responsibility) fell on D +45 instead of D +9 (_but no one ever talks about US soldiers stopping for coffee all the time_). But the overall plan and its final results were actually achieved faster than planned ( D+75 rather than D +90).

Interesting those earlier phase lines were drawn up by a junior officer who had asked Monty where to put them and he just said basically anywhere. When he wrote his plan (which he did personally) he only used D +90 as a goal, he knew that some sub-goals would take longer than expected and some less. After all he had fought the Germans far too often to ever underestimate them.

Another interesting thing was that Caen (forever used to beat up Monty) was only a class B objective for D-Day itself. A 'nice to have' but not absolutely necessary (as was proven by actual results). The first priorities were to get a good bridgehead and for all the armies to link up (obviously).

The US supply build up (which was probably the single biggest cause of the delays in the 'break out') started running into problems even before they lost their Mulberry on the 19th June. On the 8th June they were already '2 tide behind now' (Bradley).

Note that the British and Canadians were 'containing' the German, not just defending. They made continual attacks to force them to keep their Panzer divisions there, otherwise the Germans (as they tried to do) would replace them with infantry and then move them against the American. hence all those attacks. All the while the Canadians were (and why oh why do they never get any credit???) doing the same, consolidating territory and steadily pushing (and up against the SS, hence some of the bitterest fighting in the war).

So I repeat, this was an Allied operation, with am Allied strategic plan that covered them all, led by Monty who was the Allied commander. They all had their roles and, despite various setbacks (the US supply issues added at least 4 weeks to everything), succeeded brilliantly.
So why all this desperate desire to re-write history to 'prove' than the British were just a bunch of incompetent bumblers forever stopping for tea (and the Canadians were never even there), while the 'bold thrusting' Americans got fed up and 'on their own initiative' came up with their own plan, broke out and won the war.

This is so ridiculous that it is not funny. A simple look at the map would show that it was impossible. The German forces were concentrated in the North east, breaking through all those was impossible, but they could be contained. 

For the sake of a (ridiculous) argument: say the plan was for the British/Canadians to break though .. and they did it (about one chance in a Million I'd say). What were the Americans supposed to do? Take a holiday, go swimming on the beaches, go straight east and link up with the forces from the South of France and have a big party? It would have basically excluded them from the war. When both the British and Canadians were running out of men? Nonsense and no general would have agreed to that plan even if someone had been daft enough to propose it (in fact I can imagine Monty declaring such a person as 'useless' and firing them immediately).



> Montgomery was a complicated character. One of his flaws was an inability to admit when he was wrong.



Definitely complicated, but isn't it funny that he was one of the few who actually admitted he was wrong though. For example, he admitted in his own book that he made a mistake over Antwerp. Can't recall any others at his level who admitted such things in their own books....


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## GrauGeist (Sep 14, 2013)

Yeah, that's right...the Americans came and saved all of Europe while the timid commonwealth troops gratefully hid behind the advancing American soldier. YaY we saved the world...

I'm trying to see where that was posted in this thread and I'm also trying to see how it pertains to Aerial Recon over Europe...


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## OldSkeptic (Sep 14, 2013)

GrauGeist said:


> Yeah, that's right...the Americans came and saved all of Europe while the timid commonwealth troops gratefully hid behind the advancing American soldier. YaY we saved the world...
> 
> I'm trying to see where that was posted in this thread and I'm also trying to see how it pertains to Aerial Recon over Europe...



It was a response to TJ's comment


> The tendency of disparaging about British and Commonwealth legions is not that there were too Lee Enfields and erhm, Shermans on the beach, but the fact that in the next two months they seemingly did little else than camping in front of Caen, and sipping tea.



Not going to allow that sort of historical nonsense, especially since no one else pulled him up on it.

The recon stuff being well handled by the others here, some great stuff which I have enjoyed reading. In summary I think the key difference was that air recon was a high priority first for the British (thank you Cotton) then the Americans when they came in. Hence they put serious effort into it. 

They had some technical advantages over the Germans which helped a lot (eg a Mossie could survive over Germany, a Ju-88 couldn't over Britain).
But they key was the importance they put into it . This gave them a key strategic (and later tactical) advantages.

Their more integrated intelligence (and of course the redoubtable RV Jones) meant they got more out of the info as well. His book gives some good examples where information from resistance organisations was used to help target things for photo recon ... and vice versa of course.


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## Aozora (Sep 14, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> Now, if you though the PR XI was bad, here is the PR Mark III and IV - the major PR type of 1941-1943.



The only one claiming the PR Mk XI's record was bad is Tante...



Tante Ju said:


> the PR Mark III . 17 produced. Nine shot down.
> 
> PR Mark IV
> 
> ...



Given the less than steller "research" into the Mk XI...these are all of the PR Mk IVs FTR on PR missions (assumption that all were "shot down" or "lost to enemy action" but not stated in records):

R7035	PRIV	1838	HEA	M45	Benson 9-7-41 Cv PRIV Type D 23-12-41 1PRU Leuchars 19-2-42 FTR PR mission Stavanger 18-3-42 1 Month
R7036	PRIV	1856	HEA	M45	HAL 7-7-41 Cv PRIV Type C 1PRU Benson 8-7-41 FTR PR mission Bremerhaven 12-4-42 9 Months
R7037	PRIV	1901 M45	HAL 7-7-41 Cv PRIV FF 16-7-41 Cv PRV 1PRU Benson 16-12-41 Missing PR mission Cherbourg - Le Havre 3-6-42 10 months
R7038	PRIV	1922	HEA	M45	HAL 7-7-41 Cv PRIV FF 19-7-41 1PRU Benson 9-8-41 Missing PR mission Wilhelmshaven 16-9-42 13 months
R7039	PRIV	1943	HEA	M45	HAL 7-7-41 Cv PRIV FF 1-8-41 1PRU Benson 18-8-41 Missing PR mission French/Spanish frontier 10-9-41 1 Month
R7040	PRIV	1944	HEA	M45	HAL 7-7-41 Cv PRIV FF 2-8-41 1PRU Benson 12-8-41 Missing PR mission Brest 2-12-41 4 Months
R7041	PRIV	1945	HEA	M45	HAL Cv PRIV FF 6-8-41 1PRU Benson 17-8-41 541S 1-10-42 Missing PR mission Kristiansand 12-1-43 15 months
R7043	PRIV	1971	HEA	M45	HAL 7-7-41 Cv PRIV FF 9-8-41 1PRU Benson 21-8-41 Missing PR mission Kiel 30-9-41 1 month
R7044	PRIV	1972	HEA	M45	HAL 7-7-41 Cv PRIV FF 13-8-41 1PRU Benson 22-8-41 541S 12-11-42 Missing PR mission Stadlandet 13-1-43 17 Months
R7056	PRIV	1997	HEA	M45	HAL 7-7-41 Cv PRIV FF 14-8-41 Henley 1PRU Benson 28-8-41 Missing PR mission Trondheim CE 12-4-42 7 months

R series = 10

X4500	PRIV	1617	HPA	M45	1PRU 10-7-41 Missing from PR mission Stavanger and Kirstiansand 1-9-41 2 months
X4502	PRIV	1632	HEA	M45 1PRU 29-6-41 CB 1PRU 13-9-41 1PRU 18-11-41 140S Army Coop 22-4-42 Missing from PR mission to Cherbourg 2-6-42 12 months
X4503	PRIV	1644	HEA	M45 1PRU 3-10-41 Missing on met flight 16-3-42 5 Months

X series = 3

AA781	PRIV	1998	HEA	M45 1PRU 28-8-41 Missing PR mission Vegesack 1-8-42 12 Months
AA783	PRIV	2000	HEA	M45	1PRU 30-8-41 HAL 8-11-41 Benson 6-2-42 Missing PR mission Wilhelmshaven 14-3-42 4 Months
AA787	PRIV	2044	HEA	M45 1PRU 6-9-41 Missing PR mission Katwijk 23-2-42 5 months
AA792	PRIV	2077	HEA	M45 1PRU 13-9-41 Missing PR mission Brest 7-12-41 3 Months
AA795	PRIV	2113	HEA	M45	1PRU 25-9-41 Missing PR mission Amiens 24-4-42 4 months
AA796	PRIV	2115	HEA	M45 1PRU 25-9-41 HAL 12-12-41 mods 1PRU 12-12-41 Missing PR mission Brest 30-12-41 18 days
AA797	PRIV	2148	HEA	M45	1PRU 1-10-41 HAL 30-11-41 mods 1PRU 10-12-41 Missing PR mission Trondheim SOC 3-4-42 4 Months
AA798	PRIV	2143	HEA	M45 1PRU 1-10-41 GAL 2-2-42 PRU St.Eval 6-2-42 Crashed on PR mission en route Rotterdam Wickham Berks FACE 12-4-42 2 Months
AA800	PRIV	2145	HEA	M45	1PRU 1-10-41 HAL mods 1PRU 8-12-41 Missing from PR mission to Bergen 30-7-42 8 months
AA802	PRIV	2147	HEA	M45 Henley 1PRU 5-10-41 Missing from PR mission to Bremen 7-9-42 SOC 8-9-42 11 months
AA804	PRIV	2166	HEA	M45 1PRU 7-10-41 HAL 30-11-41 mods 1PRU 7-12-41 Missing PR mission Dusseldorf 28-12-41 2 Months
AA806	PRIV	2195	HEA	M45 1PRU 19-10-41 543S 30-9-42 Missing PR mission Cherbourg 28-10-42 12 Months
AA809	PRIV	2207	HEA	M45 1PRU 19-10-41 543S 30-9-42 Missing PR mission Lorient CE 13-2-43 16 Months
AA810	PRIV	2203	HEA	M45 1PRU 19-10-41 Missing from PR mission to Trondheim 5-3-42 4 Months
AA814	PRIV	2221	HEA	M45	1PRU 26-10-41 Missing from PR mission to Kiel 17-8-42 10 Months

15

AB119	PRIV	2259	HEA	M45 1PRU 6-11-41 Missing PR mission St.Malo 18-4-42 5 months
AB120	PRIV	2270	HEA	M45	1PRU 6-11-41 Missing PR mission Kiel 11-8-42 9 Months
AB121	PRIV	2271	HEA	M45	5MU 11-11-41 1PRU 27-6-42 542S 30-9-42 Missing ops CE 3 Months
AB125	PRIV	2304	HEA	M45 5MU 26-11-41 543S 22-1-43 Missing PR mission Rotterdam 10-2-43 15 Months
AB127	PRIV	2299	HEA	M45	8MU 18-11-41 1PRU 20-4-42 Missing PR mission Trondheim 10-5-42 1 Month
AB128	PRIV	2300	HEA	M45	8MU 18-11-41 1PRU 8-3-42 543S 30-9-42 Missing PR mission Bordeaux 28-2-43 11 Months
AB129	PRIV	2318	HEA	M45	8MU 23-12-41 1PRU 8-3-42 Missing PR mission Bordeaux 20-5-42 2 Months
AB301	PRIV	2357	HEA	M45	5MU 5-12-41 1PRU 5-4-42 Missing PR mission Lilbeck 30-7-42 3 months
AB307	PRIV	2394	HEA	M45 6MU 15-12-41 1PRU 17-1-42 Missing PR mission St.Malo 10-4-42 3 months
AB309	PRIV	2401	HEA	M45 6MU 17-12-41 1PRU 9-3-42 541S 30-9-42 Missing PR Cherbourg - Le Havre believed shot down by flak nr Caen 6-11-42 8 Months
AB312	PRIV	2426	HEA	M45 1PRU 2PRU Egypt 17-3-42 Missing 19-10-42 7 Months
AB314	PRIV	2427	HEA	M45	FF 23-12-41 9MU 29-12-41 1PRU 3-5-42 Missing PR mission to Trondheim forcelanded Funasdalen Sweden and interned 4-8-42 

12 

Total built 1941 FTR = 40 plus one lost in India

AA793	PRIV	2091	HEA	M45 1PRU 1OADU 5-5-43 India 31-5-43 FTR ops Bombay 30-9-43

so not too much of an overestimate

1942 pdn:

BP881	PRIVT	2540 M45	FF 28-1-42 9MU 30-1-42 Benson 28-8-42 1PRU 1-9-42 541S 30-9-42 Missing (Rotterdam) 8-2-43 FH74.70
BP883	PRIVT	2553 M46	FF 31-1-42 1PRU 6-2-42 2PRU Middle East 14-3-42 Malta 6-9-42 Missing (Crete) 22-9-42 SOC 19-10-42
BP887	PRIVT	2581	HEA	M46	FF 11-2-42 (W camera) 8MU 13-2-42 CRD RAE 24-2-42 1PRU 18-4-42 Missing (Hamburg) 17-8-42
BP914	PRIVT	2673	HEA	M46	FF 14-3-42 1PRU 25-3-42 Malta 3-5-42 CA ops 4-5-42 1PRU Middle East 69S [Missing (Mersa Matruh) 6-8-42]
BP916	PRIVT	2707	HEA	M46	FF 20-3-42 1PRU 25-3-42 2PRU Middle East 5-6-42 Missing (Sidi Barrani) 16-6-42
BP924	PRIVT	2762	HEA	M46	FF 1-4-42 (X camera) 5MU 3-4-42 1PRU 16-4-42 Missing (Cuxhaven) 28-8-42
BP933	PRIVT	2819	HEA	M46	FF 15-4-42 1PRU 18-4-42 Middle East 5-6-42 601S FACB 28-6-42 FTR ops 26-10-42
BP934	PRIVT	2831	HEA	M46	FF 16-4-42 1PRU 18-4-42 47MU 25-5-42 Corabella 16-6-42 Takoradi 30-7-42 Middle East 11-8-42 FTR 13-10-42

8

BR411	PRIVT	2843	HEA	M46	FF 18-4-42 1PRU 19-4-42 Benson 19-4-42 Middle East 5-6-42 Missing (Crete) 22-9-42
BR423	PRIVT	2936	HEA	M46	FF 15-5-42 (W camera) 9MU 16-5-42 Benson 2-9-42 Gibraltar 6-11-42 EAfrica Missing (Kairouan) 31-12-42
BR426	PRIVT	2971	HEA	M46	FF 19-5-42 (W camera) 9MU 22-5-42 1PRU 6-9-42 47MU 12-10-42 Benson 31-10-42 Porthreath 6-11-42 ff Malta 7-11-42 Middle East 11-11-42 69S Shot down in sea by Bf109s Sgt Howard dead in dinghy ops 18-12-42 FH111.10
BR430	PRIVT	2996	HEA	M46	FF 30-5-42 Benson 31-5-42 47MU 18-6-42 Wallsend 21-7-42 Takoradi 15-8-42 Middle East 2-9-42 2PRU FAC2 21-9-42 682S Missing over Crete or Greece 14-2-44
BR433	PRIVT	3020	HEA	M46	FF 6-6-42 1PRU 8-6-42 9MU 27-6-42 FACB 29-7-42 HAL Benson 6-8-42 Middle East 1-3-43 Missing (Piraeus) 20-3-43
BR435	PRIVT	3034	HEA	M46	FF 11-6-42 1PRU 14-6-42 47MU 6-7-42 Wallsend 21-7-42 Takoradi 15-8-42 major repair 2-9-42 Missing (Crete) 23-9-42 SOC 14-10-42
BR644	PRIVT	3068	HEA	M46	FF 20-6-42 1PRU 26-6-42 47MU 25-7-42 Nigerstown 24-8-42 Takoradi 3-10-42 Middle East 1-12-42 Forcelanded in Turkey on PR mission over Aegean 26-9-43
BR645	PRIVT	3070	HEA	M46	FF 22-6-42 1PRU 24-6-42 47MU 15-7-42 Nigerstown 24-8-42 Takoradi Middle East 12-11-42 Crashed nr Berka returning from PR sortie 26-9-43
BR649	PRIVT	3101	HEA	M46	FF 27-6-42 (W camera) 45MU 29-6-42 Benson 2-9-42 Porthreath 31-10-42 Gibraltar 6-11-42 Missing (Tunis) 20-11-42 [BUT belly-land 17SP 12-10-43]
BR663	PRIVT	3195	HEA	M46	FF 24-7-42 1PRU 25-7-42 FF Middle East 13-8-42 Malta 6-9-42 FTR ops 4-4-43
BR669	PRIVT	3245	HEA	M46	FF 12-8-42 39MU 13-8-42 Benson 20-9-42 544S 3-10-42 Damaged by flak and abandoned 3m off Cap Ferrat 13-11-42

11

BS359	PRIVT	3302	HEA	M46	FF 28-8-42 (X camera) 6MU 29-8-42 Benson 8-9-42 47MU 11-10-42 Malta 6-11-42 69S FTR ops 15-11-42 P/O Jennett missing
BS367	PRIVT	3492	HEA	M46	FF 13-10-42 1PRU 16-10-42 Malta 6-11-42 69S Missing (Taranto) 10-11-42 SOC Flt/Lt Coldbeck Pow SOC FH19.30
BS495	PRIVT	3594	HEA	M46	FF 6-11-42 1PRU 13-11-42 Porthreath 6-12-42 ff Malta 12-12-42 ? 4PRU Missing (Bizerte) 17-12-42 SOC 31-12-42
BS500	PRIVT	3683	HEA	M46	FF 25-11-42 Benson 30-11-42 Porthreath 9-12-42 Malta Missing on PR from Malta 12-1-43

4

21 overestimated by 11.

Total FTR = 61 

NOT the 76 guesstimated by Tante.


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## mhuxt (Sep 15, 2013)

mfg495 said:


> For some recce information have a look at my site - Airrecce The story of photographic reconnaissance
> 
> If you have any questions, please ask away.
> 
> Mick


 
Do you have sortie totals by unit, or by aircraft type? Would be a great help...


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## nuuumannn (Sep 15, 2013)

> They had some technical advantages over the Germans which helped a lot (eg a Mossie could survive over Germany, a Ju-88 couldn't over Britain). But they key was the importance they put into it . This gave them a key strategic (and later tactical) advantages.



I agree and disagree with this statement; from what I've learned, German recon was very efficient, more so in terms of in-theatre, tactical and pre-and post-battle recon than out-of-theatre strategic recon, but this was no less efficient than Allied efforts, just not as consistent. Like I said earlier, the Aufklarungsgruppen were far more sophistcated in their approach than the Allied units, with dedicated weather recon aircraft, high speed aircraft and general spotter recon machines. The Germans also had these assets before the British. In order to launch the offensives they carried out, photo recon was paramount and questioning the importance of it is foolish as it was of very high importance to the Germans and in light of the successes of the PRUs (a different kettle of fish to the average Aufklarungsgruppen - granted) we do tend to forget how good German recon was. They had more dedicated camera equipped photo recon aircraft than the Allies to begin with, but this number declined for obvious reasons. 

I wouldn't be too hasty to single out the Ju 88 as being inefficient compared with the Mossie as a recon aircraft; the effectiveness of German recon aircraft shouldn't really be in question as British recon losses over enemy territory was also high - although the Mossie was a better performer than the Ju 88, nevertheless, the issue was that British air defences improved to an extent that German aircraft could not operate satisfactorily over Britain. The key reasons for the downfall of German out of theatre strategic recon - and yes, they had their specialised unit like the PRU, before Sidney Cotton came along and it was formed as a branch of the Abwehr and it produced extraordinarily complete images of future enemy countries' defences during peacetime and also during wartime over North Africa, Italy and crucially over Russia produced very good coverage of these countries - was numerous.

Firstly, Allied air superiority made high altitude overflights over Allied held territory unsustainable. Secondly, the chaotic organisation of the Reich meant intel wasn't keenly shared between departments. Thirdly, the dissemination of intel was not done with the same flexibility owing to the rigid structure of German organisation. Fourthly, as the war wore on, military effort by the Germans became more and more difficult, so, naturally, the efficiency of almost every military organisation within the Reich declined.

One aspect that causes us to disregard German PR is the scant attention it gets in the press. Very few dedicated books have been produced on the Aufklarungsgruppen by comparison to British recon in particular, especially the PRUs and Mr Cotton, but , like I said, the German photo recon was of no less importance to them, was well equipped and technically very efficient and equally as capable as that of the Allies during the war.


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## OldSkeptic (Sep 15, 2013)

By and large I agree with you nuuumann. The Luftwaffe did have advantages at first, no doubting that by any means. 

What I meant was that the Allies focus and their greater *total* priority applied meant over time they matched and then exceeded the Luftwaffe (jnc weather recon and all the others).
It was that usual German fragmentation thing again, throwing away their initial advantages.

Not being able (or willing) to do photo recon over Britain in the lead up to D-Day was a criminal failure of them. But caused by poor decisions made in 41 42. While the Allies kept getting better they stayed static.

I have absolutely no doubt that if they placed similar priority on it they would have been able to maintain a good capability right to the end, albeit their lack of a fast twin would have caused issues with VLR recon in contested airspace. Both Spit and Mossie high altitude recon (particularly later models with 2 stage Merlins and Griffons) really were pretty immune to to whatever the Germans could do, despite (by mid 43) their formidable air defences.

Take the Mossie ones, flew before night and day raids, then afterwards with very acceptable loss rates (far far lower than the bombers). 
The low level people had a much tougher job of course (as did anyone doing low level stuff.

But, bit like the aircraft production race, the Allies won the air recon race too, despite staring from behind.

But Cotton should be given a heck of a lot of credit. Getting and converting some Spits (against air 'establishment' opposition) was a stroke of genius. Stripping guns (etc) out for fuel tanks and careful attention to details like polishing (etc) to gave them the speed to survive. he was a clever man, sadly treated (like Dowding, Park, etc) badly.

Fortunately the British air establishment quickly recovered from their earlier opposition, really thanks to the quick pickup by the intelligence organisations and the demand from the RN (who always had Churchill's ear), to the point where the first Mossies were PR ones.

From that point on (41) they British (later followed by the US) started to pull ahead. Even the better tactical recon the Germans had eroded in North Africa, Malta etc (the whole Med war), plus the superb (and never recognised) pioneer work by Army Coordination Command (using Mustangs mostly). By early '43 the Allies were well ahead in both areas, strategic and tactical. 

Thanks greatly to the early work by the 'first' North African Generals and then Monty (who was a bit of an obsessive about it as you would expect) on the 'demand' side. And the great work by people like Tedder and Cunningham on the 'supply' side. So much so by the time of Alemein, the Commonwealth knew Rommel's entire order of battle and where they were, which made their artillery and air attacks so devastating.
Which also meant that they managed total tactical surprise, not just in timing but where they attacked.

So 39, 40 Germans were way ahead. 41 the British were catching up and pulling ahead in the strategic side, 42 they caught up and had pulled ahead in the tactical side. By 43 (and the US had came to the party in a big way and became excellent as well very quickly) the Germans weren't even in the game, in the west at least.

I quoted Monty's May address before (for another reason) but in it he listed all forces (each divisions, etc) facing the western Allies and where they were (not perfectly but to a high degree of accuracy). Largely due to the Allies dominance of photo recon (enigma was not so useful then for that because the Germans could, and did, use landlines so much).


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## Juha (Sep 15, 2013)

One can find few PR losses incl. what happened from here: Allied Wrecksites

Juha


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## Tante Ju (Sep 15, 2013)

OldSkeptic said:


> I have absolutely no doubt that if they placed similar priority on it they would have been able to maintain a good capability right to the end, albeit their lack of a fast twin would have caused issues with VLR recon in contested airspace.



Hmm.


























> Both Spit and Mossie high altitude recon (particularly later models with 2 stage Merlins and Griffons) really were pretty immune to to whatever the Germans could do, despite (by mid 43) their formidable air defences.



Well at least in case of the Spitfire PR IV and PR IX it was already shown that they were simply not immune to that mysterious force that caused them to fail to return from operations (credits to Aozora's meticulous research work pointing out that that it is not "proven" that it had _anything _to do with German air defences).



> So 39, 40 Germans were way ahead. 41 the British were catching up and pulling ahead in the strategic side, 42 they caught up and had pulled ahead in the tactical side. By 43 (and the US had came to the party in a big way and became excellent as well very quickly) the Germans weren't even in the game, in the west at least.



However, the relative number of PR sorties posted cast some serious doubts on that assessment, though I of course agree about 1943 (if we limit our understanding of "West" to England and not include to MTO).


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## pattle (Sep 15, 2013)

Just a quick question and nothing important but if anyone can give an answer to it then it will cure my curiosity. In Ben Mcintyre's Agent Zig Zag, the true story of Eddie Chapman, Chapman was said to have parachuted into Britain from a fast flying German recon plane said to have been a Focke Wulf. I am think this was actually probably a Ju 88, I would be grateful for any information anyone may have.
Or to ask a more general question what sort of aircraft did the Germans use to deliver agents into Britain? I am aware that some German agents came by sea via Spain or Portugal.


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## OldSkeptic (Sep 15, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> Hmm.
> 
> 
> 
> ...



I didn't say they were totally immune , just that the loss rate was acceptable.

Galland, I have quoted this here before in this forum, was that he admitted that until they got the 262 they could do nothing about them .. and he was talking about Mossies, which meant both the daylight bombers and recon ones. 

I posted what he said, which (not going to do it again, check my posts or get the book) was that he was overruled (again by Goering who put 2 JGs onto it, specially for daylight Mossies ... and never shot a single one down). Now by the time he was talking about they were all nearly recon one, though Goering was obsessing about the fact of the bombing (brilliant propaganda exercise) of the attacks in 43 ... in daylight, forced all the NAZI leadership into shelters, the Germans used to say "Fatty can't even stop a few Mosquitos". Goebbels was obsessed about them in his diaries.


Spits at 40,000ft+ level (higher than the Mossies) what could take them down? Nothing basically, which is why the British used them into the early 1950s as the early Gen 1 2 jets could not get up there.


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## Tante Ju (Sep 15, 2013)

OldSkeptic said:


> I didn't say they were totally immune , just that the loss rate was acceptable.
> 
> Galland, I have quoted this here before in this forum, was that he admitted that until they got the 262 they could do nothing about them .. and he was talking about Mossies, which meant both the daylight bombers and recon ones.



OS, I am sure Mosquito crews would have been delighted if Gallands post war exaggrevation would have been true, but it just weren't - PR Mossies were shot down like anything else, they were after all slower than PR Spits, and even the latter were shot down in numbers.



> Spits at 40,000ft+ level (higher than the Mossies) what could take them down? Nothing basically, which is why the British used them into the early 1950s as the early Gen 1 2 jets could not get up there.



Well for example 109G-1s at 46,000 feet... These (along some other similar types) were pressurized high altitude fighters with NO2 boosting and it was what they were meant for after all.


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## Aozora (Sep 15, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> Well at least in case of the Spitfire PR IV and PR IX it was already shown that they were simply not immune to that mysterious force that caused them to fail to return from operations (credits to Aozora's meticulous research work pointing out that that it is not "proven" that it had _anything _to do with German air defences).



Just pointing out that the assumption held by some that ALL PR aircraft were shot down by the defences isn't what the records actually say. Nor did anyone else ever try to make out that the PR Spitfires operated with total impunity until Tante made that claim  here (#123).



Tante Ju said:


> Well for example 109G-1s at 46,000 feet... These (along some other similar types) were pressurized high altitude fighters with NO2 boosting and it was what they were meant for after all.



So lets see some reputable, properly researched figures for high flying Mosquitos and Spitfires proven to have been shot down by 109G-1s.


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## Juha (Sep 15, 2013)

So Tante Ju
what is your explanation, why were Germans so out of touch of reality on Allied OoB in June 44 that they were fooled for a couple months to believe that Normandy landing was a possible diversion or why time to time LW was unable before and during KM BB sorties, not an usual occurrence, PR Scapa to find out was Home Fleet BBs there or not?
And as I wrote in the message #47, 109G-4/R3 suffered from the fact that it could carry much less internal fuel than PR Spits from PR ID/PR IV onwards.

Juha


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## Juha (Sep 15, 2013)

Hello Aozora
there are info on some PR IV losses in Norway in the site I mentioned, Allied Wrecksites, e.g. Spitfire Forbordfjellet Stjørdal and Spitfire Mk IV Beverdalen Surnadal. PR Spits are easy to find from the table because all Spits mentioned are PR planes.

Juha


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## Tante Ju (Sep 15, 2013)

Juha, when you start putting facts on the table and not just opinion, we can have discussion.


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## Aozora (Sep 15, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> I wouldn't be too hasty to single out the Ju 88 as being inefficient compared with the Mossie as a recon aircraft; the effectiveness of German recon aircraft shouldn't really be in question as British recon losses over enemy territory was also high - although the Mossie was a better performer than the Ju 88, nevertheless, the issue was that British air defences improved to an extent that German aircraft could not operate satisfactorily over Britain. The key reasons for the downfall of German out of theatre strategic recon - and yes, they had their specialised unit like the PRU, before Sidney Cotton came along and it was formed as a branch of the Abwehr and it produced extraordinarily complete images of future enemy countries' defences during peacetime and also during wartime over North Africa, Italy and crucially over Russia produced very good coverage of these countries - was numerous.
> 
> One aspect that causes us to disregard German PR is the scant attention it gets in the press. Very few dedicated books have been produced on the Aufklarungsgruppen by comparison to British recon in particular, especially the PRUs and Mr Cotton, but , like I said, the German photo recon was of no less importance to them, was well equipped and technically very efficient and equally as capable as that of the Allies during the war.



One book which gives coverage to Rowehl's _Verschuchsverbund_ and successor units is  On Special Missions by J Richard Smith, Eddie J Creek and Peter Petrick: I've only just got a copy so haven't had a chance to read it properly. 

Two aircraft types the book describes are the Arado Ar 240 and Ju 88B:

at least two unarmed Ar 240s were used by the _VfH_ and _Afkl.Gr.Ob.d.l_ to photograph some coastal towns in Britain during 1942 and 1944 - the Ar 240 could reach 384 mph at 19,700 ft. (pages 14 19)

While evading Spitfires during a PR mission over Britain, a Ju 88B with GM 1 reached about 385 mph in a shallow dive at about 15,000 ft although the aircraft (T9-FH of 1./Verschuchsverbund Ob.d.l ) was shot down soon afterwards, although by what isn't mentioned (5 June 1943 pages 27 30).


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## Juha (Sep 15, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> Juha, when you start putting facts on the table and not just opinion, we can have discussion.



Now I truly doubt that we can have discussion on German failures, IMHO you are one of those Germans who still had difficulties to accept that those "degenerated Englishmen" played their part in kicking "blond knights of Reich with their wunderwaffen" out of WWII.

That Germans were fooled in Summer 44 is a fact
On the Scapa issue I gave the facts in my message #114
And on G-4/R3 in my message #47, George Hopp is well known researcher, look e.g. Kurfürst site, there are some docus delivered by GH if you are unware his Bf 110 book.

Juha


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## Tante Ju (Sep 15, 2013)

In that case we can agree to disagree. I find it too often so that your post are devoid of any rational or factual substance and invariable turn into pure _ad hominem_ postings, which ain't worth reading, or responding to.

In contrast, I found some interesting things to learn from others in this thread, and if you do not mind, I shall concentrate on those more constructive discussions instead.


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## Milosh (Sep 15, 2013)

One could cross reference the Spitfire losses with Tony Woods Luftwaffe claim list.

AB125 PRIV 2304 HEA M45 5MU 26-11-41 543S 22-1-43 Missing PR mission Rotterdam 10-2-43

10. February 1943
R.A.F. 11 Group Ramrod: CAEN
10.02.43 Uffz. Walter Leber 3./JG 2 Spitfire £ 10 km. N. Caen: 2.000 m. 
10.02.43 Hptm. Helmut -Felix Bolz Stab I./JG 2 Spitfire £ 7 km. N.E. Orne-Mündung: 2.000 m. 
10.02.43 Ltn. Joachim Bialucha 2./JG 2 Spitfire £ 50 km. N.W. Havre: 10 m. 
10.02.43 Ofw. Friedrich Klöpper 3./JG 2 Spitfire £ Orne -Mündung: 200-250 m.

So it looks like AB125 was lost to other than air enemy action.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 15, 2013)

And here we go again. Same old **** again.

Same fricken people that have to start degenerating a thread.

Can you please save me the time and effort, and just go someplace else. If you have no desire to act like an adult, get lost!!! Or I will do it for you. 

This is not a Kindergarten! Verstehst du mich????


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## Airframes (Sep 15, 2013)

pattle said:


> Just a quick question and nothing important but if anyone can give an answer to it then it will cure my curiosity. In Ben Mcintyre's Agent Zig Zag, the true story of Eddie Chapman, Chapman was said to have parachuted into Britain from a fast flying German recon plane said to have been a Focke Wulf. I am think this was actually probably a Ju 88, I would be grateful for any information anyone may have.
> Or to ask a more general question what sort of aircraft did the Germans use to deliver agents into Britain? I am aware that some German agents came by sea via Spain or Portugal.


I wondered that when I read the book. I would think it was a FW 58 'Weihe', designed as a light bomber trainer, but also used as an air ambulance and known to be used for dropping agents. Its relatively quiet engines would be advantageous in this role, rather than use the He 111, Ju 88 and 188, also employed for para dropping. In the movie 'Triple Cross', loosely based on Chapman's story, which was still covered by the Official Secrets Act at the time, a Siebel was used.
And I totally agree with Adler !


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## nuuumannn (Sep 15, 2013)

Yep, Oldskeptic, I do agree with you on the majority of your post, but my point is to not take for granted how efficient German PR was and that it wasn't because of the inefficiencies of the equipment the Germans used that cost them.



> I have absolutely no doubt that if they placed similar priority on it they would have been able to maintain a good capability right to the end, albeit their lack of a fast twin would have caused issues with VLR recon in contested airspace.



Unfortunately I have to disagree with you here, simply because they could not maintain a continued war effort of the same magnitude as they had begun with. Again, it's not the lack of a long range recon aircraft that prevented them from carrying out continued recon, but a lack of enough of them and resources in general, largely owing to Allied air superiority over Allied air space and growing Allied air superiority over mainland Europe as the war wore on.

As for Sidney Cotton, yes, I'm well aware of what he achieved, very much so; very important for British recon, which was literally in the Dark Ages and far behind Germany until he appeared. Like I've stated before, what he had achieved was not new; the Germans also had been carrying out clandestine flights using hidden cameras in civlian aircraft before Cotton introduced the idea to the British - this is not to say that I'm diminishing the magnitude of his efforts, but to also state that he was not alone in his desire to change the face of photo recon, although his efforts to convince the hierarchy to converting Spitfires as long range photo recon platforms took some beating; I still believe that although the Germans also used single-engined fighters for PR work, they were not modified as extensively as Spitfires, except perhaps the very few numbers of (only one?) Fw 190Ds, but by then it was too late for the Germans.


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## nuuumannn (Sep 15, 2013)

One thing I should add regarding the conversion of Spitfires for PR work that might be of interest; an RAF chap by the name of Maurice 'Shorty' Longbottom wrote a paper stating that fast high speed aircraft could be used for photo recon in early 1939, although converting them was known as 'Cottonising' after the work Cotton did on the examples given to his experimental unit at Heston. The aircraft had gaps and excresences faired over with plaster of Paris and were highly polished, once painted in 'Camotint', giving them a highly smooth finish, also, windscreen armour plating was removed, as was guns and other unnecessary weight. The canopies were fitted with teardrops either side for better visibility dowwards and incresed oil and fuel tankage. It was truly remarkable that a small short range fighter could be modified to carry enough fuel and cameras to fly at extremely high altitude, still maintain respectable speed over enemy territory and have the range to reach almost across Germany. I remember reading of a PR.XI carrying out recon over Berlin.


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## stona (Sep 15, 2013)

Berlin was no problem at all. This has been posted before, so for the Berlin bit skip to about 7.40. If you haven't seen this then it is well worth a watch to hear first hand how they flew these missions directly from one of the typically modest men who was there and did it.


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ie3SrjLlcUY_

Cheers

Steve


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## Njaco (Sep 15, 2013)

I've had enough - I've had enough - I've had ENOUGH!!

Tante, you are gone! You make the most asinine statements I have ever seen by someone over 10 years of age. You claim that 523% of PR flights were shot down by LW then when shown your data is screwed you give thanks for showing that it was the fault of the British design or whatever then you go right back to the statement that the LW shot down all the PR flights!!!!!!

But I can take all that EXCEPT the tea comment before Caen remark. That was disparaging the servicemen of a country and their memory. That was too much. Thats like saying Germany lost the war because they ate too much weinerschnizzel. You are gone! Take your twisted facts and play in another sand box.

And the ice has cracked. Be careful. He is not the only one who stirs the pot. The Mods are getting tired of the [email protected]


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## pattle (Sep 15, 2013)

Airframes said:


> I wondered that when I read the book. I would think it was a FW 58 'Weihe', designed as a light bomber trainer, but also used as an air ambulance and known to be used for dropping agents. Its relatively quiet engines would be advantageous in this role, rather than use the He 111, Ju 88 and 188, also employed for para dropping. In the movie 'Triple Cross', loosely based on Chapman's story, which was still covered by the Official Secrets Act at the time, a Siebel was used.
> And I totally agree with Adler !



I think you are right if it was a Focke Wulf at all it was probably a Fw58. I didn't know that this plane had so many uses or that so many were built. I always thought of it as a minor type but I have just read that about 1350 were built and it was used in recon, training, transport and other duties, a unsung hero of an aircraft. I assume it was only used in recon as a stand in for the FW189 or for coastal work and searching areas occupied by friendly troops etc.


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## OldSkeptic (Sep 15, 2013)

stona said:


> Berlin was no problem at all. This has been posted before, so for the Berlin bit skip to about 7.40. If you haven't seen this then it is well worth a watch to hear first hand how they flew these missions directly from one of the typically modest men who was there and did it.
> 
> 
> _View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ie3SrjLlcUY_
> ...




Thanks for that, brilliant. 51 missions, amazing.

Love his quote: "that was the sweetest aeroplane, any pilot should fly it at least once".

Note Berlin and back ... without drop tanks. Ties in with my calcs on a LR fighter Spit.


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## Aozora (Sep 15, 2013)

OldSkeptic said:


> Thanks for that, brilliant. 51 missions, amazing.
> 
> Love his quote: "that was the sweetest aeroplane, any pilot should fly it at least once".
> 
> Note Berlin and back ... without drop tanks. Ties in with my calcs on a LR fighter Spit.



Ditto, thanks for that. The look on his face when he saw the footage of him coming in for the crash landing on 12 September 1944...must have been the first time he'd seen it in 70 years. Priceless.

These are the guys we're talking about when we rabbit on about statistics etc

Might pay to remember that.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 15, 2013)

Njaco said:


> He is not the only one who stirs the pot. The Mods are getting tired of the [email protected]



There are several of you that you will not receive any more warnings. You know who you are. 

This is not a Kindergarten.

If you don't like it, if you don't want to behave, then just do us all a favor and go and play someplace else. You will not be missed.


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## OldSkeptic (Sep 15, 2013)

Well said, very brave men. We always tend to go on about the fighter pilots and bomber crews, but the PR people were incredible (both the low and high level ones). 
Their contribution to victory is probably incalculable.

Mission after mission over enemy territory, on their own for long hours, no guns, just skill and speed to keep them out of harm's way. No jinking and manoeuvring to avoid flak when on their photo runs

In RV Jones book there are some pictures taken by the low level boys, including Tony Hill's (who was sadly killed later) famous radar shot at about zero feet.


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## GrauGeist (Sep 15, 2013)

PR certainly had it's hazards...it even claimed Antoine de Saint-Exupéry and his F-5 in 1944


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## nuuumannn (Sep 15, 2013)

Well, I wouldn't say Berlin was 'no problem', Steve, but I do get what you are saying. It was a remarkable achievement at that time. That's a neat film; I've seen it before and really enjoyed the footage. Good to see it again though; thanks for posting.

The Fw 58 was a maid of all work; the German equivalent to the Anson. They were everywhere the LW went.



> Tony Hill's (who was sadly killed later) famous radar shot at about zero feet.



An Aussie forum member is a direct relation to Hill. Operation Biting was a classic example of the strategic use of intelligence and British resourcefulness. A great story. There's a good book about it called The Bruneval Raid; Stealing Hitler's radar by George Millar; well worth reading.


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## Aozora (Sep 15, 2013)

OldSkeptic said:


> Well said, very brave men. We always tend to go on about the fighter pilots and bomber crews, but the PR people were incredible (both the low and high level ones).
> Their contribution to victory is probably incalculable.
> 
> Mission after mission over enemy territory, on their own for long hours, no guns, just skill and speed to keep them out of harm's way. No jinking and manoeuvring to avoid flak when on their photo runs
> ...



Flt Lt Tony Hill went to photograph that Wurzburg at Dr Jones' request and was unable to get any photos because the camera failed, although he could describe what the radar looked like. He volunteered to go back the next day to have another go at it, although he didn't have to because PRU policy was not to repeat a run on successive days, particularly on tricky targets. 

This is what his Spitfire might have looked like, using an overall white or PRU pale pink camoutint used on some low-level "dicing" Spitfires (although this is the one-off Spitfire PR IE, without the lateral camera)







or it could have looked like this (Spitfire PR Mk IV(T) BP888 ) 






Another PR pilot I've just been reading about is a Canadian, Flt Lt Edmund "Pappy" Dunn:

A Bitter struggle - The Pappy Dunn Story > les Ailes d


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## Airframes (Sep 16, 2013)

I believe it looked more like the second photo. I'm currently preparing to do a painting of the flight, for Darryl, who has supplied me with a wealth of detailed info, including copies of the recce photos, and some ground level shots of the villa and Wurzburg pit, plus present day photos.
As an aside, I 'jumped in' to the same DZ, on the 30th anniversary of the Bruneval raid.
And Chris, I love your new 'siggy' !!!


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## parsifal (Sep 16, 2013)

oh my......

Basic principles of Photo recon are set out in the US Field Manuals. (Major David Dengler US Army 2009) 

Field Manual 1-20, Tactics and Technique of Air Reconnaissance and Observation, 1942; Field Manual 1-35, Aerial Photography, 1941; Field Manuals 30-10, Observation, 1940, and Field Manual 30-21, Military Intelligence - Role of Aerial Photography, 1940, provided the basics of observation and photographic reconnaissance that units and soldiers needed to employ this capability. These four manuals served as the best of nine primary manuals available, but each covered topics in varying degrees of detail and lacked a common organizational thread. Therefore, soldiers would have had a difficult time finding information on similar subjects. Field Manual 1-20 described the four basic missions that occurred throughout the war: visual and photographic reconnaissance, artillery adjustment, and liaison. Its authors acknowledged that missions would entail not only deep penetration for strategic targets, but also coverage of large areas close to the battlefront to secure information of the enemy rear and flanks. The manual fundamentally misunderstood the aircraft types best suited to perform these missions in the contemporary threat environment. It assumed that high performance fighters would satisfy the deep penetration missions while light, low performance aircraft would handle missions along the battlefront.19 Events in North Africa forced a reassessment of that concept due to heavy losses among light aircraft.
This manual also described support to different ground echelons of the field army, the corps and division. The two biggest differences between these levels concerned the scope of area covered and the degree of detail. While support to a field army and corps required the broadest coverage and description of enemy activity in general terms, divisions needed a continuous supply of as much information as aerial reconnaissance could provide, to include individual firing positions and points of resistance. Ideally, according to Field Manual 1-20, Tactics and Technique of Air Reconnaissance and Observation, reconnaissance units should remain physically close to the supported unit headquarters, be included within the communications networks, and have the capability to relocate quickly in support of rapid advances by mobile forces.20 Ground commanders believed that too much separation between ground and air command headquarters would create communication and coordination problems. This represented a differing philosophy that existed throughout the war on the degree of centralization needed to allow airmen the flexibility to meet the demands of many units across a wide area versus the decentralization required to effectively support individual ground commanders. In addition to the various echelons, Field Manual 1-20 described variations in support required by artillery, infantry, cavalry, and armor units. Artillery needed accurate target identification, registration and adjustment of artillery fire, with a focus on long-range artillery fire against defiladed positions. Once again, the Army focused on multi-seat light aircraft, ―The use of single-seater observation airplanes for artillery missions is limited. Pilots are not ordinarily trained in the principles of adjustment of artillery fire. Moreover, the pilot‘s concern with the handling of the airplane will interfere with an alternate role as observer.‖21 The distinctions between infantry, cavalry, and armor reflected thinking similar to the armies and divisions; mobile units needed area coverage like armies to identify routes and major hostile units, but also sufficient detail to identify weak points to attack. Only in support of armor forces did a realization exist that light aircraft might not suffice, ―The rapidity of armored force operations may frequently require that combat aircraft perform the dual role of reconnaissance and attack during a single flight in order to insure timely support in fast moving situations.


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## nuuumannn (Sep 16, 2013)

Terry, do show us the result of your painting and any reference photos you use.


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## GrauGeist (Sep 16, 2013)

Good to hear you're doing another painting, Terry!


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## Airframes (Sep 16, 2013)

Will do Grant, and thanks Chris. I just hope my hands and wrists can cope; the arthritis is getting worse, and my right shoulder, and both wrists are still aching from using the cameras at the Duxford air show a week ago!


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## fastmongrel (Sep 16, 2013)

Airframes said:


> Will do Grant, and thanks Chris. I just hope my hands and wrists can cope; the arthritis is getting worse, and my right shoulder, and both wrists are still aching from using the cameras at the Duxford air show a week ago!



Have you tried a monopod for the cameras. A friend who has problems with a frozen shoulder and a bad knee cant use anything more than a mobile phone without support but his monopod which also doubles as a walking stick has made a massive difference to him. I think its this one

Hama Alpenpod Walking Stick with Monopod for DSLR: Amazon.co.uk: Camera Photo


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## Airframes (Sep 16, 2013)

Thanks. I've considered a monopod, and tried my tripod, folded as a monopod. But I find both too restrictive, especially when panning, and certainly for high-angle shots.
I use a shoulder stock, with a pistol grip and remote on the Nikon, but 'modern' DSLR's, being so clumsily designed, and off balance (compared to film SLR's ), really pull on the wrists. Unfortunately, I contracted Rheumatoid Arthritis some years ago, which is getting progressively worse and, as it effects the nervous system and immune system, dexterity and articulation really suffer!


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## fastmongrel (Sep 16, 2013)

Sorry to hear that getting old is a bugger isnt it. Your right about DSLRs being badly balanced I still have my 32 year old Olympus OM10 and its a hefty beast but everything falls to hand and it seems so much easier to point and aquire for a shot than the DSLRs I have tried. Only problem is its film and its geting to be too much bother to get it processed these days. Now got a Leica D compact and loving it again no lightweight but it just feels right.


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## Airframes (Sep 16, 2013)

Yep, I recently sold my Olympus OM1's and lenses, after 30 years of use. Beautifully engineered and easy and quick to use. Even used them for oblique aerial shots, which is almost related to this thread!


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## Njaco (Sep 16, 2013)

Thanks Terry. There was a reason for the change.


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## Glider (Sep 16, 2013)

Airframes said:


> Yep, I recently sold my Olympus OM1's and lenses, after 30 years of use. Beautifully engineered and easy and quick to use. Even used them for oblique aerial shots, which is almost related to this thread!



I am very confident that my DSLR will not be in use after 30 years. That progess for you


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## nuuumannn (Sep 17, 2013)

That's some pretty specialised camera equipment you sold there, Terry. One thing I don't understand is why film is still so expensive when only specialists use it; surely it should be cheaper for the public now than ever before with the rise of digital photography and almost everything with a camera on it.



> There was a reason for the change.



Is that an Fw 187C in your siggy, Chris?


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## Njaco (Sep 17, 2013)

You should know me better! Me 410 - recon!


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## Aozora (Sep 17, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> That's some pretty specialised camera equipment you sold there, Terry. One thing I don't understand is why film is still so expensive when only specialists use it; surely it should be cheaper for the public now than ever before with the rise of digital photography and almost everything with a camera on it.



The problem is that film itself is a more specialised product and is being manufactured in far smaller quantities - note the comment "Please contact your stockhouse dealer regarding availability" KODAK PROFESSIONAL Films Most film being is now concentrated on the large format, professional end of the market while 35mm has a far smaller share.


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## GrauGeist (Sep 18, 2013)

Njaco said:


> You should know me better! Me 410 - recon!


I always thought that the Ar240 was interesting and was capable of becoming the successor to the Bf110.

It never really got past the prototype stage, but interestingly enough, several of the aircraft were used for high speed/high altitude recon over England.


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## nuuumannn (Sep 18, 2013)

> You should know me better! Me 410 - recon!



Sorry Chris, I was being facetious!  I know its a '410; with that 'nose', it could only be!

Thanks Aozora, I do still have 35 mm film cameras, but the cost of film and developing is too high for me to continue using these.


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## Airframes (Sep 18, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> That's some pretty specialised camera equipment you sold there, Terry. One thing I don't understand is why film is still so expensive when only specialists use it; surely it should be cheaper for the public now than ever before with the rise of digital photography and almost everything with a camera on it.
> 
> Grant, that's the very reason that film, particularly 35mm format, _is_ expensive nowadays, due to lack of use by the general public. When I worked for the 'Big Yellow Box', amateur film was fairly reasonably priced, with Professional film, such as Vericolor VPS, in 35mm, 120/620 and sheet formats, about 25% more expensive.
> That was 20 years ago, and I used to get my film either at a very low price, or free, as part of my demo budget (!). But, only about five years ago, it was possible to buy the same film in a UK supermarket, in a multi-pack which cost less than one film at staff rates!
> ...


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## fastmongrel (Sep 18, 2013)

Its not just price and availability of 35mm film its also getting it developed. I finally dropped film when the last place in my area that did developing in house stopped doing it. Apparently the machinery was costing more to maintain than the work justified. You can send film away to be developed but its eye wateringly expensive with the price of insured delivery.


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## Airframes (Sep 18, 2013)

Yep, all the '1 Hour', relatively cheap processing places have gone, although I think some branches of 'Bootes' still offer D&P, probably at a higher cost than it used to be. The alternative is a Professional processing lab, if there's one locally. But that will be even more expensive.


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## nuuumannn (Sep 18, 2013)

Sad, really. Part of the fun of going to a foreign country and visiting some obscure spot in the middle of nowhere and photographing the planes there was waiting with anticipation for the photos to come back of what it was you went to see, when you got back. Something has been lost in the digital age; the name Kodak for a start. When I was young, anyone wielding a camera and happily snapping away at everything was known as a "Kodak Warrior".


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## nuuumannn (Sep 18, 2013)

> It never really got past the prototype stage, but interestingly enough, several of the aircraft were used for high speed/high altitude recon over England.



That's right, this again was Theodor Rowehl's doing. The third prototype Ar 240 V3 was flown by Obst Knemeyer (I think that spelling is right) over Britain in 1941, who succeeded Rowehl in charge of Aufkl.Gr Ob.d.L, the long range Aufklarer unit that Rowehl established with Abwehr assistance. I think the V5 and '6 were designed for armed recon.


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## Airframes (Sep 18, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> Sad, really. Part of the fun of going to a foreign country and visiting some obscure spot in the middle of nowhere and photographing the planes there was waiting with anticipation for the photos to come back of what it was you went to see, when you got back. Something has been lost in the digital age; the name Kodak for a start. When I was young, anyone wielding a camera and happily snapping away at everything was known as a "Kodak Warrior".


Very sad indeed Grant. Kodak Ltd., in the UK, barely exists today, when it was once a real giant, with plants and facilities at five major locations, and the head office, Kodak House, dominating the sky line above the 'Magic Roundabout at Hemel Hempstead.
I was one of the early 'casualties', which was lucky really, a I got a good severance package, and to be honest I was ready for a break, but the division I worked in, Graphics Imaging, streets ahead in innovation and technology, ceased to exist just a few years later. In retrospect, it was inevitable, as I sensed a complaceny of sorts at high level which, perhaps not bad management, certainly wasn't dynamic management, and that spread down from the parent company in Rochester, NY. As a result, I was one of about twenty from the division which, over night, lost it's most experienced technical staff, in favour of 'salesmen'.
A great shame, as the company was more than just a photographic manufacturer, having very diverse product and research basis, from pharmaceuticals, to plastics (PET, for example), digital and electronics, fibres, etc etc.
How is the mighty fallen.........


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## nuuumannn (Sep 19, 2013)

You worked for Kodak, Terry? Well, that's a real unfortunate story and all it illustrates is an inability for a company to be flexible and remain current. You look at firms like Brother, who built typewriters, they didn't go out of business when they good ole typewriter died a lonely death; they now build digital printers. You'd think a major corporation the size of Kodak would be able to foresee that the future lay with digital processing etc.


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## GrauGeist (Sep 19, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> That's right, this again was Theodor Rowehl's doing. The third prototype Ar 240 V3 was flown by Obst Knemeyer (I think that spelling is right) over Britain in 1941, who succeeded Rowehl in charge of Aufkl.Gr Ob.d.L, the long range Aufklarer unit that Rowehl established with Abwehr assistance. I think the V5 and '6 were designed for armed recon.


Nope, those were stripped of thier defensive armament and would get up to thier service ceiling and go like hell.


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## nuuumannn (Sep 19, 2013)

> Nope, those were stripped of thier defensive armament and would get up to thier service ceiling and go like hell.



This is true of the Ar 240 V3, Dave, but the V5 and '6, or Ar 240A-01 and A-02 were armed with machine guns in the wing roots and with the FA-13 barbettes.


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## fastmongrel (Sep 19, 2013)

Airframes said:


> Very sad indeed Grant. Kodak Ltd., in the UK, barely exists today, when it was once a real giant, with plants and facilities at five major locations, and the head office, Kodak House, dominating the sky line above the 'Magic Roundabout at Hemel Hempstead.
> I was one of the early 'casualties', which was lucky really, a I got a good severance package, and to be honest I was ready for a break, but the division I worked in, Graphics Imaging, streets ahead in innovation and technology, ceased to exist just a few years later. In retrospect, it was inevitable, as I sensed a complaceny of sorts at high level which, perhaps not bad management, certainly wasn't dynamic management, and that spread down from the parent company in Rochester, NY. As a result, I was one of about twenty from the division which, over night, lost it's most experienced technical staff, in favour of 'salesmen'.
> A great shame, as the company was more than just a photographic manufacturer, having very diverse product and research basis, from pharmaceuticals, to plastics (PET, for example), digital and electronics, fibres, etc etc.
> How is the mighty fallen.........



I used to live in Hemel Hempstead and when I got made redundant I went to work for a courier firm that had a contract with Kodak, I was in and out of Kodak head office and their sites particulary the Kirkby site. I hate to say it but the people who worked there were a lazy bunch I used to pick up parcels at Heathrow or Luton airports marked URGENT and run them to whichever site it was going to and then they were thrown on a shelf, I would regulary go back 5 days later and recognise a parcel I had dropped off. How is the mighty fallen...usually because of laziness.


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## Airframes (Sep 19, 2013)

You're right there ! Unfortunately, as happened with many companies, there was, or seemed to be, an influx of 'head steppers', as I call them, younger, 'five year plan' types, more intent on stepping on other people's heads to rise in the ranks, and show how 'good' they were, rather than actually doing the job and keeping the business going properly. As for laziness, it was probably more complacency - it was a company where whole families worked, in a job for life, with excellent pay, benefits, perks and conditions. In some areas, this resulted in a 'not my job' attitude, although to be fair, it was not the general attitude.
What really puzzles me, is how, and more importantly, why Kodak in Europe, and particularly Kodak Ltd in the UK, allowed themselves to be directed in such a way in the major markets (outside of the amateur, 'happy snaps' market) by the parent company, when there was such a big difference in the cultures of these markets (in Europe), compared to the USA. The technology, products and diversity was truly staggering, and embraced over here more than 'across the Pond', and, although it may sound 'nationalistic' , I did experience, even if only slightly, that sense of 'if it ain't made/invented in the USA, it can't be any good' feeling.
And the rapid decline started very soon after a new Company President took over in Rochester, a person who was not from within the company.
But enough of the sorry tale of the giant who lost his way, and back to the thread !


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## michaelmaltby (Sep 19, 2013)

"....As for laziness, it was probably more complacency - it was a company where whole families worked, in a job for life, with excellent pay, benefits, perks and conditions..."

Spot on. A real case of "careful what you wish for" ....


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## nuuumannn (Sep 19, 2013)

> this resulted in a 'not my job' attitude, although to be fair, it was not the general attitude.



Ahhh, the classic British "Jobsworth". I'd forgotten about them. The Railways seemed to be full of them, or is that just a general perception held by the travelling public who are tired of excuses like "leaves on the line"?


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## stona (Sep 19, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> Ahhh, the classic British "Jobsworth". I'd forgotten about them.



They are alive and thriving still. Many have discovered a new and profitable niche in health and safety.
Cheers
Steve


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## Airframes (Sep 19, 2013)

And Local Councils and Parliament ..........


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## nuuumannn (Sep 19, 2013)

> Many have discovered a new and profitable niche in *Health and Safety*.



Aaah, the very term warms the cockles of any Jobsworth.


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## GrauGeist (Sep 19, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> This is true of the Ar 240 V3, Dave, but the V5 and '6, or Ar 240A-01 and A-02 were armed with machine guns in the wing roots and with the FA-13 barbettes.


You're absolutely correct, V3, V5 and V6 were armed versions, the latter two had the upgraded FA13 weapon system instead of the F9 like V3, but they removed the defensive armament to increase thier speed for over-flights of the UK.

Initially, they were assigned to Versuchsstelle fur Hohenflug (Vfh) for tactical research, but found to be useful in hi-speed/hi-alt recon (this is when the armement was removed).

The three Ar240s used were:
V3 - KK+CD (WkNmr. 2400003)
V5 - T5+MH (WkNmr. 2400005)
V6 - T5+KH (WkNmr. 2400006)


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## Juha (Sep 19, 2013)

Hello
info on the losses suffered by 3./NAG in 1944. It was equipped with Bf 109Gs, mostly tacrecon 109G-8s, which were far from invulnerable even with MW50 boost.
NAG 13 (page 1)


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## nuuumannn (Sep 20, 2013)

> The three Ar240s used were:
> V3 - KK+CD (WkNmr. 2400003)
> V5 - T5+MH (WkNmr. 2400005)
> V6 - T5+KH (WkNmr. 2400006)



That's it. An impressive aeroplane, the Ar 240. Unusual looking bird. I recently read something else I didn't know was how the Do 335 V3 had the camera mounted in the bomb bay; the camera was mounted on its side because of its size and it was with a series of mirrors that vertical pictures could be taken. No UK overflights were made because of overheating issues with its rear engine, from what I read, although there were flights planned over Scapa and the south of England.


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## Aozora (Sep 20, 2013)

GrauGeist said:


> You're absolutely correct, V3, V5 and V6 were armed versions, the latter two had the upgraded FA13 weapon system instead of the F9 like V3, but they removed the defensive armament to increase thier speed for over-flights of the UK.
> 
> Initially, they were assigned to Versuchsstelle fur Hohenflug (Vfh) for tactical research, but found to be useful in hi-speed/hi-alt recon (this is when the armement was removed).
> 
> ...



There was a fourth Ar 240 - this was the A-01 W.Nr 0011 GL-QA reallocated to Aufkl.Gr. Ob.d.l in October 1942 and used for operations over Southern England. It was also used by VfH in early 1944, then became T9-GL of 1./F.100


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## GrauGeist (Sep 20, 2013)

V3 (KK+CD) had the DB601E and V5 (T5+MH) and V6 (T5+KH) had the DB603E and reportedly had excellent speeds (even with the DB601 equipped V3), I wonder how well these airframes would have performed in service if they had replaced the Bf110 as intended.

As it stands, the Ar240A-01 (fully armed) with the DB601E gave it top speeds of 384mph (618kph) and a top altitude of 34,449ft. (10,500m). This is only 4 mph slower than the Me410A-1 (with DB603A) in comparison.


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## wuzak (Sep 20, 2013)

Was there some sort of stability issue with the Ar 240?

I seem to recall somewhere that there was some kind of problem with the airframe.


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## Aozora (Sep 20, 2013)

According to Mankau and Petrick_ Messerschmitt Bf 110.Me 210/Me/410: An Illustrated History_ (the Ar 240 is also described) the first two Ar 240 prototypes suffered from poor handling partly because of a poorly designed wing profile and because the short rear fuselage placed the vertical stabilisers in the engine slipstreams. The V-3, which first flew on 5 September 1941, had a longer rear fuselage and other changes which solved the instability problems.

M P also say that the 4th Ar 240 W.Nr 0011 GL-QA, used by VfH, was the Ar 240A-04/U2 which was converted to DB 603s while still under construction. In December 1942 it was based at Rechlin and was flown in competition against a Ju 88S, an He 219 and an Me 410, which showed it was "markedly superior" to the Ju 88 and Me 410 - by then, however, the Ar 240 was no longer considered worth pursuing.

(Listening to Manly v Cronulla in the NRL - Cronulla have just scored a try and might be on a comeback...)


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## nuuumannn (Sep 20, 2013)

> (Listening to Manly v Cronulla in the NRL - Cronulla have just scored a try and might be on a comeback...)



American and European readers are wondering WTF...

"Up the Tigers"


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## Gixxerman (Sep 20, 2013)

stona said:


> They are alive and thriving still. Many have discovered a new and profitable niche in health and safety.
> Cheers
> Steve



Hate to disagree Steve (and no, I do not never have worked in H&S) but I think the real problem here is not H&S but insurance and the way people have become much more willing to sue, coupled with 'no win, no fee' legal support.
Schools almost every business going is terrified of being sued.
Silly - often mythical or half-truth - tabloid tales aside, H&S has grown along side this of course (as a set of 'rules' to try to safe-guard from financial ruin) but I think it has largely become a handy public scapegoat diversion from the activities of the legal insurance professions who are the real culprits.


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## Juha (Sep 20, 2013)

Eric Brown flew one found in France, groundcrew claimed that it was used on recon flights over GB. It had DB 605A engines. While he things it had impressive max speed of 390mph at 20,000ft it had terrible harmony of controls, dangerous stalling characteristics incl. high-speed stallling, poor engine-out characteristics. Ending to note that that Ar 240 had outstanding performance for its class and era, but it could not capitalise on this because of inferior and indeed dangerous handling characteristics.

Ar 440 was in my understanding clearly better behaving a/c but it arrived too late, Me 210/410 was already chosen to be replacement of 110.

Juha


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## nuuumannn (Sep 20, 2013)

> the activities of the legal insurance professions who are the real culprits.



Litigation, litigation, litigation.

(That's the Balmain Tigers to you, Sonny...)


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## stona (Sep 20, 2013)

Gixxerman said:


> Hate to disagree Steve (and no, I do not never have worked in H&S) but I think the real problem here is not H&S but insurance and the way people have become much more willing to sue, coupled with 'no win, no fee' legal support.



Health and Safety at work has never been the problem. Keeping people safe and in some cases saving them from their own stupidity, can only be a good thing. It is the arbitrary and inconsistent application and interpretation of the rules by some H+S officers which is the problem. Many, even most, are very good. Some are blithering jobsworths who appear to have forgotten their training, if they ever had any, and certainly haven't any experience at the sharp end.
And yes, I have been dealing with them for years 
Cheers
Steve


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## swampyankee (Sep 20, 2013)

iirc, there was a Lockheed Electra modified shortly before WW2 which wandered over Europe clandestinely performing aerial reconnaissance. I think the aircraft was owned by an anglophile American and flown out of Britain.


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## fastmongrel (Sep 20, 2013)

2 Electra 12s were officially bought by British Airways Ltd but were actually bought by the British Govt intelligence MI6 and were modified by Sidney Cotton with cameras and flown all over Europe.


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## swampyankee (Sep 20, 2013)

Airframes said:


> In tactical recce, a pilot or observer would not be adjusting any fire, from any artillery - that's the job of AOP aircraft.
> Tactical recce aircraft, such as the Allison-engined P-51, were/are used to obtain the latest photos of an area or specific target, for use (normally) by ground forces.
> Observation of, and guidance of artillery or strike aircraft, is a totally different role, employing totally different aircraft, and reliant on radio communication with a FAC on the ground. It is not classed as recce, tactical or otherwise.



The USN, for observing its shoots, especially after Sicily used Spitfires, Wildcats, and Hellcats (Google "VOF-1" and "VCS-7"). The aircraft would typically operate in pairs, with one pilot observing the shoot and the second pilot escorting the first.


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## mhuxt (Sep 20, 2013)

FWIW, happened across this while looking for sortie numbers:

Wing Commander Gordon Hughes - Telegraph


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## Glider (Sep 21, 2013)

These pilots of all nations who flew long PR missions deep into enemy airspace had a special kind of courage.


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## Airframes (Sep 21, 2013)

swampyankee said:


> The USN, for observing its shoots, especially after Sicily used Spitfires, Wildcats, and Hellcats (Google "VOF-1" and "VCS-7"). The aircraft would typically operate in pairs, with one pilot observing the shoot and the second pilot escorting the first.


Correct, and they were used over the D day beaches too, in this case, RAF aircraft impressed into USN service. But again, this is AOP work, not recce.


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## Juha (Sep 21, 2013)

While looking for 20 Nov 43 losses, came across losses of Aufklärungsgruppe 123, so here is more LR Recon Bf 109G-4/R3 losses in West in 1943 as an addenda to my earlier message. It would be nice to know the number of sorties flown by these 2 Staffeln and their targets. Number of losses alone doesn't tell too much.

4.(F)/Aufklärungsgruppe 123 got 6 new Bf 109G-4/R3 2.43, 3.43 7 new more, lost one without enemy action, 4.43 got 2 new more, lost 4, of which 3 by enemy action and 1 without, in 5.43 1 new more but lost 2 by enemy action, in 6.43 3 new more, lost one without enemy action, in 8.43 I new more, lost 1 by enemy action, 2 without and one to Überholung, in 9.43 1 new more, lost 1 by enemy action, in 10.43 lost 1 without enemy action, in 11.43 lost 1 without enemy action. Operating from Normandy. So 7 lost to enemy and 7 otherwise in 1943.

5.(F)/Aufklärungsgruppe 123 got 3 new Bf 109G-4/R3 in 2.43, in 3.43 got 6 new Bf 109G-4/R3, lost 1 by enemy action, in 4.43 got 5 new Bf 109G-4/R3, lost 1 without enemy action, in 6.43 1 new more, lost 2 by enemy action and one without. In 8.43 1 new more, lost 1 without enemy action, in 9.43 lost 1 by enemy action and 1 without, in 10.43 lost 1 by enemy action and 1 without, in 12.43 1 transferred to another unit. Was based in Northern France. So 5 lost to enemy and 5 otherwise in 1943.


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## Juha (Sep 21, 2013)

Noticed just Tante Ju's message #133, he gladly compares apples to oranges, C.I.U = Central Interpretation Unit, so it interpretated aerial photos and of course the numbers incl only those sorties that sent to them photos to be interpretated. There were lot more recon flights flown by RAF, e.g. in mid July 40 CC flew c. 45 anti-invasion patrols daily, that alone makes some 1350 recon flights per month.

Juha


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## nuuumannn (Sep 21, 2013)

> I think the aircraft was owned by an anglophile American and flown out of Britain.



Like Mongrel said, the chap was Frederick Sidney Cotton, who was Australian. He is credited for the idea of using Spitfires for photo reconnaissance, but the idea was put forward by a serving RAF officer called Maurice "Shorty" Longbottom, in a paper he wrote before the outbreak of war about future photo recon, where he suggests the use of single-seat high speed aircraft, including Spitfires. Cotton's two Lockheeds, G-AFTL and 'AGTL still survive, the former in Canada and the latter in France.


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## swampyankee (Sep 21, 2013)

Airframes said:


> Correct, and they were used over the D day beaches too, in this case, RAF aircraft impressed into USN service. But again, this is AOP work, not recce.



Oh, I agree it's the same sort of work as done by AOPs, but observing battleship and cruiser gunfire was a role of units like VCS-7 from their establishment.


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## mhuxt (Sep 21, 2013)

Best I can do right now for Mossie PR loss rates is the following, reflecting Mossie sorties undertaken for the PRU, before the unit was split into numerous other squadrons, including 540 Sqn for the Mosquitos, later to be joined by 544 Squadron as part of the PR wing, separate from other PR ops such as those for 2nd TAF or MEAF.







This reflects all sorties, whether photos were taken or not, (mainly when the targets were cloud-covered). Represents only around 300 sorties total, which is why the month-on-month loss rates jump around.

Many of the sorties reflect the PRU's roots in Coastal Command, and were to keep an eye on German naval units, but nota bene, these include flights to Kiel in November '41, and Gdynia, Danzig and Koenigsberg, the first two being visited as early as 15 January '42, the latter on 3 March '42. Other targets were Stettin and Swinemuende in March, Augsburg and Stuttgart in April, Dresden, Pilsen and Regensburg in May.

Just noted Juha's avatar is none other than Porco Rosso - great flick.


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## nuuumannn (Sep 21, 2013)

> Many of the sorties reflect the PRU's roots in Coastal Command, and were to keep an eye on German naval units



This again dates back to Cotton approaching the Air ministry with his ideas and initially being turned away, but not after he had done the same thing to the Admiralty, who took him up on his offer. He carried out a few over flights of German naval facilities in his Lockheeds, capturing superior photos than the oines the RAF had taken; he even stole the show at a meeting that he had turned up to on the invite of the Admiralty (I think) where the RAF were asked to get images of the German ships and they couldn't, this is after the shooting had started and Cotton walks in and produces these beautifully clear images of exactly what the Admiralty wanted. The navy made better use of the Photographic Development Unit in the very early days than the RAF. The Coastal Command stationing was as much a ruse - as was the name Photographic Development Unit - as it was because Fighter Command was less than interested in unarmed Spitfires in its ranks.


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## nuuumannn (Sep 23, 2013)

> There was a fourth Ar 240 - this was the A-01 W.Nr 0011 GL-QA reallocated to Aufkl.Gr. Ob.d.l in October 1942 and used for operations over Southern England. It was also used by VfH in early 1944, then became T9-GL of 1./F.100.



From reading about this aircraft, this machine in the image was built as Ar 240A-04, which was a hybrid fitted with DB603s, four bladed propellers and extended wing sections outboard of the engines to take a longer span wing. This aircraft and other similarly modified Ar 240, the Ar 240A-03 and 'V-9 and V-10 (according to the information I read), were variously referred to as Ar 440s as a revised variant of an existing troublesome airframe, much like Me 210 to Me 410. The profile Aozora provides captions the aircraft T9-GL as an Ar 240, but was a hybrid and is referred to as an Ar 440 with the modifications previously mentioned according to Arado drawings - I got this from reading another chap's research. Other differences include different cowls and tail fins.


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## mfg495 (Feb 18, 2014)

My site at Airrecce The story of photographic reconnaissance looks at the history of photographic reconnaissance. Still a number of pages to add, but the WWII sections are more or less complete.

Reactions: Like Like:
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## fastmongrel (Feb 18, 2014)

mfg495 said:


> My site at Airrecce The story of photographic reconnaissance looks at the history of photographic reconnaissance. Still a number of pages to add, but the WWII sections are more or less complete.



Nice site 

I have found a dead link though the post WWII USAF camera link doesnt seem to be working.


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## Aozora (Feb 18, 2014)

mfg495 said:


> My site at Airrecce The story of photographic reconnaissance looks at the history of photographic reconnaissance. Still a number of pages to add, but the WWII sections are more or less complete.



Ditto BSA - thanks and congratulations on doing such a good job. Now bookmarked.


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## swampyankee (Feb 18, 2014)

davebender said:


> That's fine for strategic recon. For tactical recon the forward observer requires good visibility of the target he's adjusting artillery fire onto.



USN VOF squadrons, which directed NGFS shoots, used single-seat aircraft, usually operating in pairs. Among other things, they flew Spitfires, Hellcats, and Wildcats. Perhaps the USN was odd in this regard, but in its observation squadrons, the pilot was also the observer and the guy in back was a radio operator.


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## Denniss (Feb 19, 2014)

mfg495 said:


> My site at Airrecce The story of photographic reconnaissance looks at the history of photographic reconnaissance. Still a number of pages to add, but the WWII sections are more or less complete.


Nice site but several errors for german aircraft.

To name just a few:
No Ar 234 B-1 production, all recons were prototypes or B-2 with recon cams
Lots of problems in the Ju 88 section - first recons were A-1 and A-5 bombers with 2-3 cams in the rear bomb bay, the dedicated recon series Ju 88D had then in a more aft position so a fuel tank could be placed in the rear bomb bay. First production was the A-5 based D-2, then A-4 based D-1 as major production version, D-5 a variant of the D-1
Ju 188 recce were built alongside the bombers, starting in 1943 (not 44)
Bf 109E: no handheld cam, fitted to rear fuselage as in E-5
Bf 109F: No handheld cams in those, mounted in rear fuselage of dedicated recons F-4/R2 and /R3 and probably some converted fighter, no F-5 or F-6 existing, no reason to remove the engine cannon
Bf 109G: no armament removal unless it was a /R3 variant with an oil tank in place of MG ammo boxes
Bf 110G: fitting of two MK 108 to recons is questionable, either they retained their 4x MG or unit hack to 2x 2cm
Me 262: A-1a/U3 and A-5a were the same (name change as it was to become a production version), upper nose guns retained
Me 210: no drop tanks on 210/410 unless unit hacks, no Me 410 A-2 produced, Me 410 could install the same amount of cams as the 210 but not 2 on 210 and just one on 410 (either 1 or 2 is wrong), Me 410B had not uprated engines


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## swampyankee (Feb 22, 2014)

buffnut453 said:


> Actually, working from negatives is usually better than working from prints - the quality of negatives is better because prints are inevitably one generation removed from the originally-captured image. Also "light boxes" (or the more capable light tables) provide a much better illuminant for analysing imagery than shining a spot lamp onto a print. As late as 1994 the RAF was still using wet-film photo recce and we were still analysing negatives on light tables using stereoscopes - not the best in the world but it worked and delivered results sufficient for the operation at that time.



It undoubtedly takes a bit practice to interpret a negative, vs positive, image, but any reproduction, such as producing a positive print, is going to introduce noise. For similar reasons, astronomers, before they went entirely digital, always worked from negatives.


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