# Saburo Sakai Zero vs Bf-109



## Chiron (Apr 19, 2005)

The famous Japanese ace, Saburo Sakai , once stated that if Germany had Zeros instead of Bf-109, the outcome of Battle of Britain would be very different. He believed Zero's superior range will enable Germans to strike deep into the interior of Britain.

Whats your opinions on that?


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## evangilder (Apr 19, 2005)

For range at the time, the Zero was the king. But I question that it would have been a huge difference. The Zero was more fragile than the 109 and could not have absorbed as much damage.


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## FLYBOYJ (Apr 19, 2005)

Chiron said:


> The famous Japanese ace, Saburo Sakai , once stated that if Germany had Zeros instead of Bf-109, the outcome of Battle of Britain would be very different. He believed Zero's superior range will enable Germans to strike deep into the interior of Britain.
> 
> Whats your opinions on that?



I think that would be correct and we also have to look at tactics. I think the Germans were better tacticly than the Japanese. We couild argue all day about Battle of Britian aircraft perfomances, but in reality much of Germany's earily successes were due to tactics...


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## evangilder (Apr 19, 2005)

Good point there, FBJ


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## Chiron (Apr 19, 2005)

"I think the Germans were better tacticly than the Japanese"

What do you mean? I dont think its fair to say that Germans were "superior" in terms of training and tactics. In terms of individual dogfight and discipline, Japanese were among the best.

Also, it is really important to consider in a strategic sense rather than a tactic. 

In 13th century, Mongols swept the Euro-Asian kingdoms. Their way of conduct warfare were admired gretaly even among WW2 Germans. Mongols relied on not heavy fire power, armour, but edurance, discipline, and stamina. Mongol calvary equiped with merely leather armours, and their primary weapon was composite bows. With merely less than a milion people, they conquered the world largest land empire ever. Even, China, the world most populated (over 100 millions people in 11th century) and technological state at that time, was unable to change their fate after unbelievable military resistance of 50 years against Mongols. 

What Germans needed during the Battle of Britain, as Saburo Sakai said, was a fighter with enough fuel to carry their missions. I recalled a Discovery channel on the Battle of Britian, many German fighters were forced to withdraw from fight in two hours after they reached their destination, because there were no fuel left to return.

The strategic goal for German air force was to eliminate and bombard British resistance.To carrying out a successful bomardment, a long range fighter, such as P-51, was needed to accompnay the bombers.

Why Japan lost was not because of its technological inferiority (a Japanese man was credited of designed one of first military radar in the world, and Japanese scientists contribution in atomic theory, and bomb), but because its failure of calculating its strategic outcome in China. With almost no natural resources, Japan was vulnerable in a long aggressive war. Zeros were clearly a product of Japanese military doctrine, which air force was intended to support the army. Zeros were able to strike deep into enemy territory with a duration of 12 hours. Time, time, has always been valued among great capitals, Napoleon, Alenander, and Sun Tzu. Technology deterrance was not prominent and privotal factor until the invention of Atomic Bomb by US.


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## FLYBOYJ (Apr 19, 2005)

"In terms of individual dogfight and discipline, Japanese were among the best."

This is where I disagree with you! When the US entered the war tactics were developed that eventually tore the Japanese to ribbons. Yes, they were dogfighters in the traditional sense, but took their lumps tactically. Proof of the pudding was when folks like Cmdr. Thach who developed tactics that enabled F4F pilots to achieve like an 8 to 1 kill ratio over the Zero. And lets not forget those Flying Tiger guys in China!


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## Chiron (Apr 19, 2005)

"This is where I disagree with you! "

So, are you trying to say Americans are better than Japanese in every way?
I said Japanese airmen were among the best, but it didnot say they were superior to Americans.


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## FLYBOYJ (Apr 19, 2005)

What I am saying is the USAAF and USN figured out how to exploit the Zero's weaknesses, as well as other Japanese aircraft like the "Oscar" for example. As a result by 1943 the Zero's days as a supreme fighter were well over. As pilots, the Japanese were initially "among the best" but because they didn't substantially improve equipment, logistics, tactics, and training they eventually lost air superiority over the pacific.


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## Chiron (Apr 19, 2005)

"For range at the time, the Zero was the king. But I question that it would "have been a huge difference. The Zero was more fragile than the 109 and could not have absorbed as much damage."

Well, Zeros were very effective against Australian/British Spitfire


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## FLYBOYJ (Apr 19, 2005)

An hour or two over Britain in a Zero as opposed to 20 minutes in the 109 - I think that would of made a big difference although that might of also been an extra hour or two worth of targets for the Brits - remember, they were fighting for their lives over their own country. Things work a little different when you're put in that situation. Look at the Finns!

Again, the Zero did well against Australian/ British Spitfires because the Aussies and Brits tried to "dance" around with the Zero and had their butts handed to them. They under estimated their enemy and made little or no changes to their tactics when they fought the Zero. 

Understand, and respect your enemy, exploit his weakness with patience, courage and determination and you have half the battle won!


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## evangilder (Apr 19, 2005)

I am not saying they weren't effective, what I am saying is that they were more vulnerable to fire than the German fighters. It poses an interesting what if. There is also the question of the tactics involved and a number of other variables.


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## Chiron (Apr 19, 2005)

I just asked a German who is also a fan of Luftwaffe, and he does agree on what Saburo Sakai said:

"..the outcome of the BoB would be yery different, if the Luftwaffe wouldn´t have this stupid idiot göring, who orderd that the german fighters had to escort the bombers as far as possible to their limit of range, so many many fighters were going down by runing out of fuel on their way home.

So i agree with u"


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## wmaxt (Apr 19, 2005)

FLYBOYJ said:


> An hour or two over Britain in a Zero as opposed to 20 minutes in the 109 - I think that would of made a big difference although that might of also been an extra hour or two worth of targets for the Brits - remember, they were fighting for their lives over their own country. Things work a little different when you're put in that situation. Look at the Finns!
> 
> Again, the Zero did well against Australian/ British Spitfires because the Aussies and Brits tried to "dance" around with the Zero and had their butts handed to them. They under estimated their enemy and made little or no changes to their tactics when they fought the Zero.
> 
> Understand, and respect your enemy, exploit his weakness with patience, courage and determination and you have half the battle won!



You'r right. Tactics are the main point I think. The F4F was outclassed by the Zero but with a change of tactics became very compettitive. the Japanese never did.
1) they fought like Samuri - singly
2) Poor group coordination - discriptions were gaggle and swarm, no orginization.
3) They didn't cover each other giving the Allies clear shots.

German tactics were much better but were handicapped by their choices of equipment the bf-109s were to fuel limitted and the bf-110 was not quite compettitive with it's competition.

The Zero with self sealing tanks and a little armor would have helped a lot.


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## delcyros (Apr 19, 2005)

Well, I digged in Karakorum (Dshingis Khans lately discovered palace in Mongolia) for a month last year and I can disprove that the Mongolians were around a single million, only. Beside this pure numerical strength and special horse tactics proved to be the succes for a very shortliving empire. We can discuss this if needed.
Zeros would be fine at BoB. But german pilots would need different tactics for fighting in a Zero (no dive out, no burn and zoom and so on). Range and time over Britain are one thing, survivability is another one. I think even a Hurricane would be a very good match at BoB... But still interesting.
Personally I think that simple drop tanks could enlenghten the duration of a Bf-109 E considerably at BoB. It would be the easiest solution, too.


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## Chiron (Apr 19, 2005)

"Again, the Zero did well against Australian/ British Spitfires because the Aussies and Brits tried to "dance" around with the Zero and had their butts handed to them. They under estimated their enemy and made little or no changes to their tactics when they fought the Zero."

Actually, Zero did prove superior to Spitfire not only in tactic but also in technical design. Several sources alread indicate this.

Here is one:

"It was in operations in defence of Darwin that Spitfire pilots first became aware of the exceptional maneuverability of the Japanese Mitsubishi A6M Zero. In their many European actions with the Luftwaffe's fighters Spitfire pilots had always enjoyed superior maneuverability - at least as regards their aircraft's rate-of-turn in level flight. It was a shock to the Allied 
air forces to discover that the Zero could easily out-turn their own fighters, and combat tactics had to be revised.
Indefensive operations based on Australia in 1942-43 the Spitfire generally suffered from a higher loss rate than the other Allied fighters involved. This was largely so because of its poor operational range - Spitfires often being drawn too far away from their base and consequently running out of fuel over the sea."

from--http://www.odyssey.dircon.co.uk/pacspitfire.htm


If you can prove Spitfire is much superior to Zero, please post your argument with your sources.


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## FLYBOYJ (Apr 19, 2005)

"If you can prove Spitfire is much superior to Zero, please post your argument with your sources"

I won't, but I'm willing to bet if the Brits and Austrailians fought the Zero like the Flying Tigers or the US Navy did, they would have faired much better. See the two post prior to mine, wmaxt and delcyros hit the nail on the head!


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## Chiron (Apr 19, 2005)

I just got reply from other forum, and some people replied that 

"Versus the Me109 - As posted already, the Japanese were familiar with the 109 and they didn't like it (different needs/philosophy)"

I am waiting his reply for further info. on that. However, it show that Japanese already knew Me 109, and did compare it with their indigenous Zero, but found out it wasnt suitable to them


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## FLYBOYJ (Apr 19, 2005)

Yea, the Zero was suitable to the Japanese Navy until 1943, where after that it suffered sadly


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## evangilder (Apr 19, 2005)

Of course the Japanese would not be interested in the short-range 109. They had vast expanses of water to fly over.


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## Chiron (Apr 19, 2005)

Zeros were still deadly in the hands of aces..but thats another issue......

Another point should mentioned is that the total output of Zeros were far smaller than that of Allies. Only merely 12,000 were produced, the production of Zeros were even far smaller than German Bf-109 (over 33,000 produced). 
Few tactical blunders, such as in the case of Battle of Midway, the lost of few air carriers and airmen proven devastated to Japanese, who never recovered from the losses.
Clearly, weak in industrial production in compariosn with numerious US fighters was probably the major factor that doom the Japanese Navy.


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## FLYBOYJ (Apr 19, 2005)

AGREED


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## evangilder (Apr 19, 2005)

Good points there Chiron. Plus, the zero was not the easiest plane to manufacture. I know from personal experience that it is a bear to work on as well.


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## DAVIDICUS (Apr 19, 2005)

You know from personal experience? Hmmm ... where were you on December 7th, 1941?


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## evangilder (Apr 19, 2005)

Geez, I'm not THAT old!  We have one of the last surviving flyable Zeros in the museum where I volunteer. We also have an unflyable one. I have helped to do some minor work on that bird in the past. It took three of us about an hour to get the damn engine cowling and prop spinner back on after it was removed. Not because we didn;t know how, but because the parts are all customer fit. It has to be in the exact position or the screw don't line up. There are about 40 screws just holding on the prop spinner! 

The cowling is a 2 piece unit with turnbuckle style screws that hold it on each side. There is barely any room to get a wrench in there to tighten them, so it is a slow and tedious process to get them tight and get it even. there are butterfly type covers that go after that that are all also custom fit, so you have to know where each on came from or keep trying until they all fit just right.

Bottom line, it was a HUGE pain in the arse and enough to convince me that I will stay on the museum side, giving presentations, tours and keeping my hands clean and my knuckles un-bloodied! The other guys can get dirty and bust their knuckles.

But I admire those guys and the work they do produces soem great results, as below.


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## Nonskimmer (Apr 19, 2005)

Imagine being a Japanese aero-engine mechanic working under fire on one of those things. No thanks!


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## R Leonard (Apr 19, 2005)

> the Japanese were familiar with the 109 and they didn't like it



Among other concerns, I'd suggest that the IJN wasn't interested in the Me-109 simply because it wasn't carrier capable. What would be the point of adopting an airframe in need of extensive modification (read: time, energy, and resources) when they were developing perfectly acceptable (for their concept of aerial warfare, at least) carrier monoplane fighters, beginning with the A5M, much less the A6M.

I'd also suggest that the Germans, had they had the opportunity to do so, would have taken one look at the A6M and ask some pretty sharp questions: Where's the pilot armor? Where's the self sealing fuel tanks? Where's the ignition dampening for the radio? What do you mean only 60 rounds of 20mm? They probably, and rightly, would have concluded that here was a plane that was designed to defeat late 1930's biplanes in individual combat, combining the low speed maneuverability of a biplane into a high speed monoplane airframe. 

The A6M, then, was faster and more maneuverable than most of the biplane fighters in service anywhere in the world. That it was also a fine monoplane fighter all by itself was just an added benefit. There were, though, planes under development at the time the A6M entered combat that were going to be faster and perform better than the A6M, the XF4U come to mind. Further, the A6M design was such that improved variants were only able to achieve marginal improvement and always at a cost to the one or more of the A6Ms other feature, for example, the A6M3 was a little faster than the A6M2, but only had, what, 75% of the A6M2's range and was less maneuverable. Later editions, better engines, more armament, more ammunition, more armor, same problems, reduced range, reduced maneuverability. I have a source who flew both the A6M2 and the A6M5 who says the A6M2 was much more responsive than the A6M5, though he thinks both were sweet to fly. The A6M, for the most part, only marginally outclassed it start of the war adversaries. Most of it's advantage came from a couple of factors; at the micro level, the advantage was allied fighter pilots getting sucked into low speed turning contests that they were sure to lose, and at the macro level there was the ability of the Kuido Butai to put a lot of fighters in the air and simply overwhelm the local opposition by weight of numbers. 

The effect of these factors becomes plain when you look at those instances where they did not occur. A classic example is the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942. Forces were somewhat evenly matched. Where the USN F4F fighter pilots played the A6M game they got chewed up. Where they played the USN game, the A6Ms. if not equally gnawed, were at least unable to inflict the drubbings they had been administering up to that point. In fact, against the F4F, in the first year of the war, A6Ms were never able to achieve and exchange ratio better than about 1.1:1. Hardly what one would expect from it's reputation. And it can't all be explained by the Thach Weave either. Squadrons did not start to seriously use that tactic until the late fall of 1942, towards the end of that first year. Kind of makes you wonder about all this great combat experience the IJN pilots supposedly brought to the table, but that's another subject and you don't want to get me started down that road.

I'd also suggest that one might wish to look into operational doctrine and practices. How a plane performs is certainly important, but how it is employed is more important. The A6M (which I'd also point out was not in combat service at the time of the BoB and kind of makes the whole question somewhat silly) was the result of design specifications drawn up by the IJN and was heavily influenced by the IJN fighter pilot ethos. This was the way of the warrior and leaned way over into the realm of one on one combat a' la WWI. IJN tactics and doctrine were, possibly, the penultimate evolution of WWI biplane fighter tactics and, in my estimation, to an extent ignored the realities of combat in the modern high speed monoplane fighter in favor of some idealized aerial dance of death. This can be evidenced in ways ranging from their general preference for the low speed individual turn and burn combat to their persistence in maintaining the biplane based three plane section, nine plane division formations into 1944. As soon as an adversary refuses to play the low speed tag game, the A6M loses much of it's popular, and IMO misplaced, superiority. As soon as the lone-wolf, one at a time mentality bangs up with a doctrine of disciplined team tactics, using modern formations and concepts that play to the monoplane's strengths, then the whole platter of sushi goes out with the trash.

The A6M was designed for a totally different kind of war than the average German fighter pilot was trained to fight. It's design was driven by the psychology of its users. I don't think the Germans, not being Japanese, nor reaching into the Samurai culture for their role models, would have been happy with it at all.

Just my opinion(s).

Rich


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## Chiron (Apr 19, 2005)

Detail analysis.

I do also found odd that despite the Japanese engineers's porposal for more powerful engines to cope with increasing armour and arments, Navy refused it. And it was not until 1945 did Navy finally allowed the Zero Design engineer Eitaro Sano to equip much powerful Mitsubishi MK8P Kinsei 62 fourteen cylinder air-cooled radial 1560 hp. The model was know as A6M8. But it was too late, despite an order as many as 6300 machines from Navy, none of them was delivered.


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## KraziKanuK (Apr 20, 2005)

Rich, did you forget about the Bf109T?


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## R Leonard (Apr 20, 2005)

> did you forget about the Bf109T



No, I didn't. 

A. The Japanese never examined the 109T.

B. The 109T design did nothing to improve on the basic 109E. Same problem one usually faces when converting a land-based plane for carrier work . . . not quite as good as a plane designed from the get-go to be carrier based. You just wind up adding a lot of extra hardware and reinforcing that needs to be carried around on the original frame. By the time the Germans got around to the 109T, the 109E was already old. I alluded to the problem above. Such a conversion was not worth the Japanese (or the Germans, for that matter) time and effort.

Rich


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## Chiron (Apr 20, 2005)

How did later Zero pilots learn to counter the threats from Hellcats or P-38?

I meant its unbelieveable that over 300 Zeros lost in The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot, how did that happen? I dont think its purely due to Hellcat's air superiority...........how about the Zero pilots? how did they deal with fast planes?


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## R Leonard (Apr 20, 2005)

Actually, what the USN carrier pilots reported destroying between 19 and 20 June 1944 was more like 283 A6M types (284 if you count 1 A6M2-N float fighter) and then also, 58 D4Y, 31 Ki-61, 30 B6N, 23 D3A, 19 B5N, 15 E13A, 4 G4M, 1 Ki-57, and 1 unidentified VB type. 

For June 19th, 
F6Fs were credited with 413-60-23:
A6M - 252-36-17
B5N - 14-1-1
B6N - 28-1-2
D3A - 20-8-1
D4Y - 57-6-0
E13A - 8-0-0
G4M - 1-0-0
Ki-44 - 0-1-0
Ki-57 - 1-0-0
Ki-61 - 31-7-2 
Unidentified VB type - 1-0-0 

FM-2s were credited with 4-0-0:
A6M - 3-0-0
B5N - 1-0-0

SB2Cs were credited with 5-0-1 (all by pilots):
B5N - 2-0-0
D4Y - 1-0-1
E13A - 1-0-0
G4M - 1-0-0

TBM credits were
A6M - 1-1-0 (pilots)
A6M - 0-1-0 (gunners)

Total for the day was 423-62-24 broken down as
A6M - 256-38-17
B5N - 17-1-1
B6N - 28-1-2
D3A - 20-8-1
D4Y - 58-6-1
E13A - 9-0-0
G4M - 2-0-0
Ki-44 - 0-1-0
Ki-57 - 1-0-0
Ki-61 - 31-7-2
Unidentified VB Type - 1-0-0 


For June 20th, 
F6Fs were credited with 36-8-7:
A6M - 23-8-6
B5N - 2-0-0
B6N - 1-0-0
D3A - 3-0-1
E13A - 5-0-0
G4M - 2-0-0

SB2Cs were credited with 4-2-17
A6M - 0-0-2 (pilots)
A6M - 2-2-14 (gunners)
A6M2-N - 1-0-0 (gunner)
D3A - 0-0-1 (gunner)
E13A - 1-0-0 (pilot)

TBMs were credited with 3-0-7
A6M - 1-0-0 (pilot)
A6M - 1-0-7 (gunners)
B6N - 1-0-0 (pilot)

Total for the day was 43-10-31 broken down as 
A6M - 27-10-29
A6M2-N - 1-0-0
B5N - 2-0-0
B6N - 2-0-0
D3A - 3-0-2 
E13A - 6-0-0
G4M - 2-0-0

You should bear in mind that these Japanese aviators were, for the most part, a second generation. The first generation took a hit at Midway, but, for the most part, was chewed up in the Solomons. The Japanese air groups in the Marianas were essentially green, not only in combat experience, but in overall flight time. The men who could have taught them to survive were already dead.

Rich


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## Chiron (Apr 20, 2005)

Man, thats record is amazing!

But, how did Japanese pilots LEARN to counter US air superiority? I meant Kamikazi was used to destroy ships, Japanese airmen must learned to how to maintain their control of air, right? Zeros maybe now outclassed by Hellcats, but proper tactics maybe still useful.


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## the lancaster kicks ass (Apr 21, 2005)

> F6Fs were credited with 413-60-23



ok i'm guessing the 413 is the number of planes they shot down, and one of them is the number of hellcats shot down, but which one?? and what's the other one??


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## Wildcat (Apr 21, 2005)

The 413 is the number of Japs shot down, the 23 is American loses but I'm not sure what the middle number is. Probables maybe?


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## evangilder (Apr 21, 2005)

I think it is kills, damaged and probables, in that order. So it would be 413 kills, 60 damaged and 23 probable kills. Rich could probably clarify that and hopefully define the terms. Would damaged mean a few hits were observed, but the plane got out of sight before it was seen to crash, or is it the plane had to show visible signs of damage (smoke, missing pieces)? What is the difference between damaged and probable?


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## R Leonard (Apr 21, 2005)

Formula is: Shot down - Probables - Damaged

in that order. Shot down is confirmed usually with a witness or with gun camera film. Probable is smoking and/or with obvious heavy and probably fatal damage, but no one sees it auger in. Damaged is fired on and reasonably assured of hits, but manages to evade or is otherwise lost from view and has an unknown fate.

Rich


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## R Leonard (Apr 21, 2005)

Of course, you have to remember that the numbers I’m reporting are taken from the actual reports of the action. They are, therefore, somewhat on the high side. I am not, however, in the business of second-guessing the combat observations of the folks on the scene from sixty-one years later. I like the “feel” of the original data and almost invariable defer to the reports from the scene. If I can put a date, timeframe, name, squadron, location and combat result for each aircraft reported as shot down, probably shot down, or damaged, then that is good enough for me.

That being said, here’s quick reference a compilation of action in the Marianas between 11 June 1944 and 30 June 1944. The results of action by USN carrier aircraft were as follows (Figures do not include action around Iwo Jima on 16 June or 24 June 1944):

Carriers in Action:
CV: 7
CVL: 8
CVE: 11
Action Sorties: 8,202
Tons of Bombs on Targets: 2,282
Enemy Aircraft Engaged: 1,393
Enemy Aircraft Destroyed, Air: 704
Enemy Aircraft Probably Destroyed, Air: 102
Enemy Aircraft Damaged, Air: 68
Enemy Aircraft Destroyed, Ground: 135
Aircraft Losses to Enemy AAA: 101
Aircraft Losses to Enemy Aircraft: 41
Aircraft Losses to Operational Causes: 120

Specifically for the 19 June – 20 June 1944 period, US carrier plane losses were in the range of 

19 June – 
Aircraft Losses to Enemy Action: 23
Aircraft Losses to Operational Causes: 6

20 June –
Aircraft Losses to Enemy Action: 17
Aircraft Losses to Operational Causes: 79





> But, how did Japanese pilots LEARN to counter US air superiority? I meant Kamikazi was used to destroy ships, Japanese airmen must learned to how to maintain their control of air, right? Zeros maybe now outclassed by Hellcats, but proper tactics maybe still useful.



Simple answer, they didn't. As far as the Japanese being able to adapt A6M tactics in order to deal with the threat posed by US technology and training, they, frankly did not have a lot to work with nor did they have time to do so. In the Marianas, their average pilot had about three months experience, outside their flight training program. In contrast, the average USN aviator had about two years flying experience and about 300 hours in type (oddly enough, less than what one finds for some USN VF squadrons at the beginning of the war). With the losses suffered in this battle, the result was that the next crop of flight school graduates became their front line pilots, with next to no experience, facing the increasingly experienced Americans. So, it wasn’t just a matter of the quality of the aircraft, but the quality of wresting the optimal performance out of the aircraft, something that only comes from training and experience. The Japanese had little time for training and almost no time to build on experience. The operational tempo was speeding up. The invasion of Saipan was scheduled originally for November 1944. It happened in June. By October, US forces would be in the Philippines. At the end of that month, the next crop of IJN carrier aviators would be launched from their carriers and instructed to land ashore; their training was incomplete and most could not land back aboard a carrier. This, of course, left the IJN carriers in their sacrificial mode for the action off Cape Enango, no planes to defend themselves, no planes with which to launch their own strikes. And so it went. The Japanese were faced with a continuing downward spiral. Pilot losses meant shortened training cycles to make up the losses. Lack of fuel meant less flight training time, both in primary training and once they got to their units. Increased pressures from US forces meant more losses to make up with still less training and still less fuel since the US submarines were snuffing out the Japanese tankers one by one. By the end of the war, in the summer of 1945, US carrier aircraft could, and did, roam almost at will over the Japanese home islands. The Japanese could see the writing on the wall, the Americans were coming and their intent was to finish it once and for all. The Japanese had some 9000 to 13000 planes (estimates vary) of all types left in their inventory. They had fuel for two or maybe three sorties each. Pilot experience, overall, was next to nothing. Other than for a very few extremely specialized fighter squadrons (like, maybe, two) there was no fuel to be wasted chasing around after US raiders. And even in those special squadrons, where what was left of the cream of the Japanese experience pool was concentrated, scrambling against the F6Fs and F4Us roaming the countryside meant a quick hit an run attack, in and out, before they turned on you and swarmed like a pack of mad blue dogs. And those experienced aviators, like every other resource essential to the Japanese, began a slow process of being winkled out one by one . . . there was just so many times one could tempt fate. There was no turn and burn dog fights of the early days, that took time and the longer one was exposed, the more USN fighters showed in for a piece of the action. Overall, this was another losing proposition. For the rest, it was disperse the planes and keep them de-fueled and hidden. USN photo planes were coming back with photos showing aircraft hidden as much as 5 miles from the nearest airfield. And the ACIO folks on the carriers were taking those photos and assigning the destruction of individual planes, one by one. In those last 45 days of the war, in 13 combat mission days, pilots from TF-38 destroyed some 1100 plus planes on the ground versus 124 in the air; and 53 of those air-to-air credits were shot down between 13 August and 15 August. Returning strike pilots noted in the same time period that they were seeing more of the planes attacked on the ground catching fire and burning. This meant that at some fields dispersed aircraft were being fueled and, presumably, readied for some action. Whatever that was, the surrender put a stop to it. For the most part, though, the Japanese air forces, army and navy, were biding their time and waiting for the anticipated arrival of the American invasion fleet. At which point, they still had thousands of airplanes could still fly, and enough pilots, with enough training to get off the ground and head in the general direction of the American ships, to man them. Landing was not a required skill. In the end, there was a pool of at least 10000 pilots who did not have the dubious opportunity to attempt to crash into an American ship. Would some have them have gotten through first the fighter screens and then the AAA fire? Most certainly, and if it was only 5%, then that’s 500 planes. And if only half of them actually hit a ship, that’s 250 hits. Moreover, the Japanese had learned their lesson; the target was to be transports, not warships. Not a very attractive outcome for all concerned, Japanese or American, and, fortunately, one way or the other, in the end, avoided.



Rich


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## evangilder (Apr 21, 2005)

Nice writeup, Rich. I had the opportunity to chat with Don McMillan, who was one of the Avenger pilots that put a fish into the Zuikaku during the Battle of the Leyte Gulf (one of the several in that "battle"). To hear him talk about the run is a real treat. 

He started his run facing the carrier broadside. As he was jinking in towards the Zuikaku, it turned into him. He ended up putting his torpedo into the bow of it and levelled out right beside the Zuikaku, running along the side. He said it was so close he could have almost reached out and touched it! He received the Navy Cross for his actions during the Leyte Gulf operations.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Apr 21, 2005)

The only advantage the zero had over the 109 was range. A 109E could turn just as well as a Zero. Yes the range would have been more effective in the Battle of Britain but a 109 would have held up easier against the Spits and Hurricanes then a flimsy Zero. She may have had range but she was not very well armed nor was she well armored and as she was shown in the Pacific she would have been cut to pieces by the RAF.

As was stated before about the 109T. The Japs had already evaluated the 109 by the time the T came out and even if they had not they would not have taken it for the simple fact that the undercarraige on the 109T would have made for very dangerous landings. I would not have wanted to land one on a carrier. 

An interesting thing though is that the Japanese accepted some Fw-190's to evaluate them and even though it was superior to the Zero, I wonder why they did not take it.


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## the lancaster kicks ass (Apr 21, 2005)

at a guess because they couldn't produce their own and germany couldn't supply them or something like that??


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Apr 21, 2005)

Why could they not produce there own. They could have liscence built it.


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## the lancaster kicks ass (Apr 21, 2005)

well this would have been late '43 early '44 yeah?? by this time the japaneese were starting to feel the strain, they had few carriers left and widespread introduction of a powerful type such as this would not only have been had to introduce to manufacture, but not easy for new pilots to master either..............


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## FLYBOYJ (Apr 21, 2005)

Actually the 190 is easier to fly than the 109 (I'm told), and I think it would be easier than the zero.


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## R Leonard (Apr 21, 2005)

Wouldn't matter. If you've no production capacity, then you aren't going to produce. Having a couple of examples of the aircraft and a complete set of plans and specs would do you no good. You'd need a location, all the necessary machinery to produce the airplane, the engines, the whole ball of wax and especially trained skilled people. So here you are in a country that has to import everything (remember you went to war to secure raw materials) and you suddenly feel the need to produce an aircraft with which you've no experience? And everyday your stream of supply of raw materials gets smaller and smaller. Also remember that Japanese aircraft production wasn't like walking into a Grumman plant and everything you need is there. Japanese production was a jobber's paradise. Very small facilities manufacturing a specific part and sending it to another facility to be connected to another part to be sent to another facility . . . and finally an airplane. Precisely the situation that led the strategic bombing folks to consider an entire city as a target, the piece works operations were all over, not just in manufacturing areas but in residential as well. And where are the people to build the plane, errr, put the parts together, going to come from when you've got all you skilled labor working day and night on the production you need right damn now. I'd also suggest there would be a certain amount of chauvinism raising its head "We don't need their stinkin' airplanes". No, wouldn't matter how good the 190 would be compared to the A6M. They couldn't, reinforced with a wouldn't, put it into production.

Rich

Rich


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## FLYBOYJ (Apr 21, 2005)

R Leonard said:


> Wouldn't matter. If you've no production capacity, then you aren't going to produce. Having a couple of examples of the aircraft and a complete set of plans and specs would do you no good. You'd need a location, all the necessary machinery to produce the airplane, the engines, the whole ball of wax and especially trained skilled people. So here you are in a country that has to import everything (remember you went to war to secure raw materials) and you suddenly feel the need to produce an aircraft with which you've no experience? And everyday your stream of supply of raw materials gets smaller and smaller. Also remember that Japanese aircraft production wasn't like walking into a Grumman plant and everything you need is there. Japanese production was a jobber's paradise. Very small facilities manufacturing a specific part and sending it to another facility to be connected to another part to be sent to another facility . . . and finally an airplane. Precisely the situation that led the strategic bombing folks to consider an entire city as a target, the piece works operations were all over, not just in manufacturing areas but in residential as well. And where are the people to build the plane, errr, put the parts together, going to come from when you've got all you skilled labor working day and night on the production you need right damn now. I'd also suggest there would be a certain amount of chauvinism raising its head "We don't need their stinkin' airplanes". No, wouldn't matter how good the 190 would be compared to the A6M. They couldn't, reinforced with a wouldn't, put it into production.
> 
> Rich
> 
> Rich



LOGISTICS, LOGISTICS, LOGISTICS - right on the money!


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## Chiron (Apr 21, 2005)

Fw-190?

Well, I think Japanese had technology to produce superior fighters to their rivals. 

Just look at the Nakajima Ki-84 Hayate, which was proven by US as superior to P-38 and even P-51.

By that, Nakajima Ki-84 Hayate can surely be the plane that can beat any plane from Axis or Allies, Fw-190, Spitfire.....


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## FLYBOYJ (Apr 21, 2005)

Advanced FW-190 feature:

"The engine was controlled by an ingenious, advanced Kommandogerat-a sort of electronic brain box that greatly relieved the pilot's responsibility to control airscrew pitch (rpm), fuel mixture and engine boost (throttle) in combat. In addition, the engine's two-speed supercharger shifted automatically at about 21,000 feet, and control of the important oil-cooler flaps was automatic, thus relieving the pilot of two more major cockpit duties. The pilot needed only to keep his hand on the throttle and his eye on his assailant. In the heat of combat, it was very easy for an Allied fighter pilot to forget to move one or both of the other two required controls if he needed immediate full power to beat his opponent."

In todays world this is called FADEC (Full Authority Digital Engine Control).


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## KraziKanuK (Apr 21, 2005)

Hold on Rich. There was thousands of backyard sheds being used in the USA to produce a/c bits and pieces, as well as other war related parts. Yes, even some stuff for the A-bomb.


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## delcyros (Apr 21, 2005)

The Ki-84 is a damn good plane, but I don´t think it could match a Fw-190 D or even a Bf-109 K under normal circumstances with the shortcomings in quality of airframe and engine, under which the good design suffered badly.
The US test plane also had some improved US tools and higher grade fuel, which made the plane an even better contender in these airplane evaluations.


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## Chiron (Apr 21, 2005)

"The Ki-84 is a damn good plane, but I don´t think it could match a Fw-190 D or even a Bf-109 K "

how so?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Apr 22, 2005)

Explain how the 190 which was the best axis fighter built would not outmatch a Ki-84?


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## delcyros (Apr 23, 2005)

As I told:Under the circumstances of it´s production. Of all the Ki-84 only the preseriel planes of subtype Ki-84-I have been of careful production quality. Most serial planes suffered badly from bad engine tools and wrong metals in vital airframe positions. Even the finish wasn´t that careful. 
While it is true that both, Bf-109 K-4 and Fw-190 D-9 suffered in quality also, both have been much more reliable in field operations (in case of Fw-190 D-9 in such a high desgree that a few planes have been overtaken from soviet airforces in the very last weeks of war for regular service).
The next point includes tactics: I generally agree that the Ki-84-I could outturn both planes at low speeds, but this wouldn´t take into effect at dogfight situations of late war stage. Bouncings, climbs and energy management, that´s what counts. In the vital terms of speed, acceleration and climb abilities the Bf-109 K-4 clearly beats the Ki-84. It also has an advantage in more powerful armement (esspecially if the MK-108 is replaced by a single high velocity MK-103). The Fw-190 has a generally roll advantage over and outturns the Ki-84 at high speeds (only beyond 275 mp/h). The Ki-84 has a better (lower) wingload and a better powerload than the Fw-190 D-9, but it lacked much in terms of max speed. It´s not all, the Fw-design is also much more rugged, providing excellent engine and pilot protection and it outdives the Ki-84. Plus, it´s comparable armement (slightly advantage thanks to better mine round fuzes). I don´t take the 30mm Ho-105 into comparement, because this gun has too much recoil energy for such a light airframe as would have the 4 20 mm wing mounted guns of the Ki-84-II, thus it would reduce the performance of the Ki-84 further against fighters. The Ki-84 tested by the US is (it has to be underlined) only an airframe test. That´s why it was that good. Just take japanese lower grade fuel and remove the US engine tools and the plane turns out to be not that impressive. Remember it´s max speed figure at favourable altitude (392 mp/h for Ki-84-I and 416 mp/h for the heavier Ki-84-II).


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## Chiron (Apr 23, 2005)

Japan suffered from shortage of resources in the late WWII, and all major factories were bombared by B-29. Ki-84 project therefore was surffered from lack of testing and lack of adaquate materials. I meant some K-84 even made up woods, and steels. Japan was in more desperate stage than in Germany. So, I dont see why Ki-84 is inferior plane to Fw-190, but it was merely a plane that came out too late, and appeared at wrong time. I meant even the famous Flying Tiger, who equiped P-51, had trouble to intercept Ki-84 in China. Americans would said: "Its Frank, forget it!" to describe how fast the newest Japanese fighter was that ijt was simply nonsense to go after it. Even under such desperate stage, with shortage of high quqlity engine fuels and metals, Ki-84 still demonstrated its unsurpassed air superiority, Ki-84 was undoubtedly the best Japanese plane in WWII.


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## KraziKanuK (Apr 23, 2005)

delcyros,

the MK103 would not fit in the 109.


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## R Leonard (Apr 23, 2005)

You can say all the nice things you want about the Ki-84 (IMO the sweetest looking of all the Japanese fighters). The Ki-84, though, since the thrust of the threat is the A6M, was an Army fighter, not a carrier based fighter (and for that matter, I should have raised the lack of carrier capability with the question of the 190 as well). So, anyway, they bring one back and tweek it up and run it through some tests against the like of the P-51 and it comes out looking pretty good. Okay, fine. But by the end of the war, the Japanese still didn’t have enough experienced pilots to go around and to fly the Ki-84 you really had to know what you were doing. Further, against USN VF types anyway, I’d also point out that the Ki-84 fared no better than any other Japanese fighter and perhaps worse; F6Fs were credited 114 Ki-84s to 12 losses and F4Us were credited with 28 victories for 4 losses. Hardly what one would call a world beater. You have to be careful to remember the reality of their situation. Would haves and could haves don’t count. After all, had the war lasted, the F8F *would have* come on line and *could have* handled the Ki-84 even more effectively than did the F6F and the F4U.




> Hold on Rich. There was thousands of backyard sheds being used in the USA to produce a/c bits and pieces, as well as other war related parts. Yes, even some stuff for the A-bomb.



Oh most certainly, didn't mean to imply it wasn't.


Regards,

Rich


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## Glider (Apr 23, 2005)

The Ki84 was an excellent aircraft and had it been supplied in sufficient numbers {and quality) been a problem for anyone. Can I ask why no one seems to rate the Shiden N1K2 which was better armed and had a clear advantage in combat over all USN fighters in particular the Hellcat.


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## Anonymous (Apr 23, 2005)

FLYBOYJ said:


> "In terms of individual dogfight and discipline, Japanese were among the best."
> 
> This is where I disagree with you! When the US entered the war tactics were developed that eventually tore the Japanese to ribbons. Yes, they were dogfighters in the traditional sense, but took their lumps tactically. Proof of the pudding was when folks like Cmdr. Thach who developed tactics that enabled F4F pilots to achieve like an 8 to 1 kill ratio over the Zero. And lets not forget those Flying Tiger guys in China!



US pilots who flew in both theaters consistantly reported that the Japanese were the more dangerous foe.

The Thatch weave worked because the weaknesses of the Zero were figured out by the USA. This same tactic probably would have worked had it been the Bf109E as an opponent in the same tactical conditions - it was not that much tougher and had almost identical weaponry to the A6M2 Zero.

=S=

Lunatic


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## Anonymous (Apr 23, 2005)

evangilder said:


> I am not saying they weren't effective, what I am saying is that they were more vulnerable to fire than the German fighters. It poses an interesting what if. There is also the question of the tactics involved and a number of other variables.



The Bf109E was not a tough fighter - the Spitfire was significantly tougher. The Zero was only a little less tough, but it also turned better at the BoB combat speeds.

=S=

Lunatic


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## Anonymous (Apr 23, 2005)

wmaxt said:


> You'r right. Tactics are the main point I think. The F4F was outclassed by the Zero but with a change of tactics became very compettitive. the Japanese never did.
> 
> 1) they fought like Samuri - singly
> 2) Poor group coordination - discriptions were gaggle and swarm, no orginization.
> 3) They didn't cover each other giving the Allies clear shots.



This is not true. The Japanese flew as pairs and did cover their wingmen. The problem was that when facing the Wildcat they had to score a tremendous number of hits to down it, but one quick burst from the Wildcats guns could down a Zero. The same would have been true of the Bf109E. The Wildcat was a very much tougher plane than the Bf109 or Spitfire.

[/quote]German tactics were much better but were handicapped by their choices of equipment the bf-109s were to fuel limitted and the bf-110 was not quite compettitive with it's competition.

The Zero with self sealing tanks and a little armor would have helped a lot.[/quote]

Well, German tactics were different, but they also failed on the offense so who can say that they were "better"?

A Zero with self sealing tanks and armor would not have been a Zero. The engine only made about 1000 HP and adding that weight would seriously detract from performance. Look at the A6M5, which had these features (well, fire resistant tanks anyway), and a more powerful engine, but the cost in terms of manuverability was singificant.

What the Japanese lacked in 1943 was a competitive engine that was reliable. Without that, they could not build competitive aircraft.

=S=

Lunatic


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## Anonymous (Apr 23, 2005)

R Leonard said:


> > the Japanese were familiar with the 109 and they didn't like it
> 
> 
> 
> Among other concerns, I'd suggest that the IJN wasn't interested in the Me-109 simply because it wasn't carrier capable. What would be the point of adopting an airframe in need of extensive modification (read: time, energy, and resources) when they were developing perfectly acceptable (for their concept of aerial warfare, at least) carrier monoplane fighters, beginning with the A5M, much less the A6M.



Umm.. the Bf109 could have been made suitable for Carrier ops, in fact I think there was a version intended for that German CV that never got finished. However, I think the liquid cooled engines were really not suitable for over water operations - they were too suceptable to cooling system damage or failures.

But...there was the IJA too. As for the Japanese not being interested... what do you think inspired the Ki61 Hien ("Tony")? They built the DB-601A engine for it under license, and they imported a Bf109E. It appears the Tony was inspired by the 109 and perhaps also one of those Italian fighters.



R Leonard said:


> I'd also suggest that the Germans, had they had the opportunity to do so, would have taken one look at the A6M and ask some pretty sharp questions: Where's the pilot armor? Where's the self sealing fuel tanks? Where's the ignition dampening for the radio? What do you mean only 60 rounds of 20mm? They probably, and rightly, would have concluded that here was a plane that was designed to defeat late 1930's biplanes in individual combat, combining the low speed maneuverability of a biplane into a high speed monoplane airframe.



Hmm.. lets compare the A6M2 to the Bf109E...



> *Specification of A6M2 Navy Type 0 Carrier Fighter Model 21:*
> 
> One Nakajima NK1C Sakae 12 fourteen cylinder air-cooled radial, rated at 940 hp for takeoff, 950 hp at 13,780 feet.
> 
> ...






> Powerplant: Daimler-Benz DB 601A, twelve cylinder inverted-Vee liquid cooled engine rated at 865 kW (1175 HP) at 2400 rpm for take-off, V.D.M. electrically-operated controllable-pitch fully-feathered three-bladed metal propellor.
> 
> Performance: Maximum speed 570 kph (354 mph) at 3800m (12480'). Cruising speed 400 kph (249 mph) at 62.5 percent rated power, stalling speed 121 kph (75 mph) in landing configuration with flaps down. Range 663 km (412 miles) at 62.5 percent rated power. Initial climb rate 945 meters/min (3100 ft/min). Service ceiling 10973 meters (36000').
> 
> ...



Notes: According to the Boscomb Down "Messershmidt 10 Fighter Brief Handling Trials" (AAEE Ref: S.4487 - http://www.lanpartyworld.com/ww2/axisair.htm) the 109E controls were good to 250 mph after which they became very stiff very abruptly. According to the S. Farnham report (ENEMY AIRCRAFT - Messerschmitt Me 109 - same url) manuverability was extremely poor above 300 mph (perhaps TAS) and turning circule at 1200 feet was 885 feet.

So, in respose to your Luftwaffe's "sharp questions":

1) Where's the pilot armor?

The Bf109E didn't have great pilot armor either. It could be argued the superior manuverability of the Zero provides more protection than a very thin sheet of armor immeadiately behind the pilot. And such minimal armor could have been added to the Zero w/o major penalty. 

2) Where's the self sealing fuel tanks?

Hmmm... did the 109E have self-sealing fuel tanks? Even from recieving fire from .303's I've seen footage of them leaking fuel. If it did, they wern't very effective - German SS tanks were not that good.

3) Where's the ignition dampening for the radio?

Easily rectified. Admittedly the Japanese didn't put enough value on radios - stupidity of the high command.

4) What do you mean only 60 rounds of 20mm?

LOL - the 109E had the same ammo load for its 20mm!


The A6M, then, was faster and more maneuverable than most of the biplane fighters in service anywhere in the world. That it was also a fine monoplane fighter all by itself was just an added benefit. There were, though, planes under development at the time the A6M entered combat that were going to be faster and perform better than the A6M, the XF4U come to mind. Further, the A6M design was such that improved variants were only able to achieve marginal improvement and always at a cost to the one or more of the A6Ms other feature, for example, the A6M3 was a little faster than the A6M2, but only had, what, 75% of the A6M2's range and was less maneuverable. Later editions, better engines, more armament, more ammunition, more armor, same problems, reduced range, reduced maneuverability. I have a source who flew both the A6M2 and the A6M5 who says the A6M2 was much more responsive than the A6M5, though he thinks both were sweet to fly. The A6M, for the most part, only marginally outclassed it start of the war adversaries. Most of it's advantage came from a couple of factors; at the micro level, the advantage was allied fighter pilots getting sucked into low speed turning contests that they were sure to lose, and at the macro level there was the ability of the Kuido Butai to put a lot of fighters in the air and simply overwhelm the local opposition by weight of numbers.[/quote]

Your ammunition arguments are void as pointed out above. As for speed, the 109E was only slightly faster than the A6M2. All your arguments against the Zero can also be made against the 109E, except the radio - which is really a non-issue since the Germans could easily have rectified this with no performance penalty.

The big difference is the range - the Zero had 3x the 109E's range w/o a drop tank, and 5x the range with one.



R Leonard said:


> The effect of these factors becomes plain when you look at those instances where they did not occur. A classic example is the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942. Forces were somewhat evenly matched. Where the USN F4F fighter pilots played the A6M game they got chewed up. Where they played the USN game, the A6Ms. if not equally gnawed, were at least unable to inflict the drubbings they had been administering up to that point. In fact, against the F4F, in the first year of the war, A6Ms were never able to achieve and exchange ratio better than about 1.1:1. Hardly what one would expect from it's reputation. And it can't all be explained by the Thach Weave either. Squadrons did not start to seriously use that tactic until the late fall of 1942, towards the end of that first year. Kind of makes you wonder about all this great combat experience the IJN pilots supposedly brought to the table, but that's another subject and you don't want to get me started down that road.
> 
> I'd also suggest that one might wish to look into operational doctrine and practices. How a plane performs is certainly important, but how it is employed is more important. The A6M (which I'd also point out was not in combat service at the time of the BoB and kind of makes the whole question somewhat silly) was the result of design specifications drawn up by the IJN and was heavily influenced by the IJN fighter pilot ethos. This was the way of the warrior and leaned way over into the realm of one on one combat a' la WWI. IJN tactics and doctrine were, possibly, the penultimate evolution of WWI biplane fighter tactics and, in my estimation, to an extent ignored the realities of combat in the modern high speed monoplane fighter in favor of some idealized aerial dance of death. This can be evidenced in ways ranging from their general preference for the low speed individual turn and burn combat to their persistence in maintaining the biplane based three plane section, nine plane division formations into 1944. As soon as an adversary refuses to play the low speed tag game, the A6M loses much of it's popular, and IMO misplaced, superiority. As soon as the lone-wolf, one at a time mentality bangs up with a doctrine of disciplined team tactics, using modern formations and concepts that play to the monoplane's strengths, then the whole platter of sushi goes out with the trash.
> 
> ...



Well, I'd agree with some of that. But also you have to consider that the F4F was simply a very very tough plane to shoot down. 109E's would have had a hard time with it too.

Whether or not the Germans would have been "happy" with it is not the issue - pilots fly the planes they are given. With the Zero, they would have been able to successfully complete their mission - to escort the bombers to their targets and defend them from the enemy. With the 109E, they simply could not.

=S=

Lunatic


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## Anonymous (Apr 23, 2005)

Chiron said:


> Man, thats record is amazing!
> 
> But, how did Japanese pilots LEARN to counter US air superiority? I meant Kamikazi was used to destroy ships, Japanese airmen must learned to how to maintain their control of air, right? Zeros maybe now outclassed by Hellcats, but proper tactics maybe still useful.



LOL - they didn't! It's as simple as that.


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## Anonymous (Apr 23, 2005)

R Leonard said:


> Of course, you have to remember that the numbers I’m reporting are taken from the actual reports of the action. They are, therefore, somewhat on the high side. I am not, however, in the business of second-guessing the combat observations of the folks on the scene from sixty-one years later. I like the “feel” of the original data and almost invariable defer to the reports from the scene. If I can put a date, timeframe, name, squadron, location and combat result for each aircraft reported as shot down, probably shot down, or damaged, then that is good enough for me.
> 
> That being said, here’s quick reference a compilation of action in the Marianas between 11 June 1944 and 30 June 1944. The results of action by USN carrier aircraft were as follows (Figures do not include action around Iwo Jima on 16 June or 24 June 1944):
> 
> ...



Rich, I enjoy reading what you write. But could you please use paragraphs some? The above needs them badly - it's just hard to read.

=S=

Lunatic


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## Anonymous (Apr 23, 2005)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> The only advantage the zero had over the 109 was range. A 109E could turn just as well as a Zero. Yes the range would have been more effective in the Battle of Britain but a 109 would have held up easier against the Spits and Hurricanes then a flimsy Zero. She may have had range but she was not very well armed nor was she well armored and as she was shown in the Pacific she would have been cut to pieces by the RAF.
> 
> As was stated before about the 109T. The Japs had already evaluated the 109 by the time the T came out and even if they had not they would not have taken it for the simple fact that the undercarraige on the 109T would have made for very dangerous landings. I would not have wanted to land one on a carrier.
> 
> An interesting thing though is that the Japanese accepted some Fw-190's to evaluate them and even though it was superior to the Zero, I wonder why they did not take it.



I disagree that the 109E turned just as well as the Zero. It turned about equally to the Spitfire, and we know the Zero substantially out turned the Spitfire.

The Japanese could not build the BMW radials, they didn't have the industrial tech for it, so that may explain why they didn't build their own. Without importing German casting technology it was kinda pointless.

=S=

Lunatic


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## R Leonard (Apr 23, 2005)

> paragraphs



Mea Culpa. Sometimes I get carried away.

R


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## Anonymous (Apr 23, 2005)

Chiron said:


> Fw-190?
> 
> Well, I think Japanese had technology to produce superior fighters to their rivals.



No they did not. They could not produce sufficiently powerful engines, and without that the rest is mute.



Chiron said:


> Just look at the Nakajima Ki-84 Hayate, which was proven by US as superior to P-38 and even P-51.



First that plane was not proven superior, only that it was competitive. Also, that plane had a US fuel system and other components in it and was running US hi-test fuel. The info you are refering to invariably comes down to the following quote:



> In 1946, a captured late-production Hayate was restored and tested at the Middletown Air Depot in Pennsylvania. At a weight of 7490 pounds, the aircraft achieved a maximum speed of 427 mph at 20,000 feet, using war emergency power. This speed exceeded that of the P-51D Mustand and the P-47D at that altitude by 2 mph and 22 mph respectively. These figures were achieved with a superbly maintained and restored aircraft and with highly-refined aviation gasoline, and were not typical of Japanese-operated aircraft during the later stages of the war.
> http://www.csd.uwo.ca/~pettypi/elevon/baugher_other/ki-84.html



It should be noted that the Middletown test data is virtually unavailable, only rumors of pilot comments about the plane exist. Also, the speed figures at 20,000 feet represent unrealisic performance for that plane since the Japanese did not posess the refinery technology to produce 150 grade fuel, and had problems with their own engine design (especially the fuel system). And finally, the speeds for the P-51 and P-47 reflect Normal (or Military) power performance. At 20,000 feet at full WEP both the P-51D and the P-47D could manage about 420 mph, a difference of only 7 mph off the claimed Middletown Frank data - and that is for a normal service plane, a tweaked plane (as the Frank was tweaked) could of course have gone faster.



Chiron said:


> By that, Nakajima Ki-84 Hayate can surely be the plane that can beat any plane from Axis or Allies, Fw-190, Spitfire.....



Well, it's entirely speculation. Actual performance of the plane in combat was not that good. P-47N's and Corsair's ate Franks for lunch!

=S=

Lunatic


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## Anonymous (Apr 23, 2005)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Advanced FW-190 feature:
> 
> "The engine was controlled by an ingenious, advanced Kommandogerat-a sort of electronic brain box that greatly relieved the pilot's responsibility to control airscrew pitch (rpm), fuel mixture and engine boost (throttle) in combat. In addition, the engine's two-speed supercharger shifted automatically at about 21,000 feet, and control of the important oil-cooler flaps was automatic, thus relieving the pilot of two more major cockpit duties. The pilot needed only to keep his hand on the throttle and his eye on his assailant. In the heat of combat, it was very easy for an Allied fighter pilot to forget to move one or both of the other two required controls if he needed immediate full power to beat his opponent."
> 
> In todays world this is called FADEC (Full Authority Digital Engine Control).



A system which failed badly at a certain altitude. Had the 190A's not have had the Kommandogerat on them they would have been effective up to at least 30,000 feet. The thing relied on the difference between internal and external pressure, and when external pressure dropped to low, it effectively got a "divide by zero" error and fell into "safe mode". I'm not sure if this was fixed by the Dora9's entry into the war, or if it maybe had a bypass feature, but this was a serious problem for the 190A's.

Also, a decent pilot can adjust manifold pressure and throttle easily, mixture needs little messing with for combat settings, the pitch control was automatic, and the cooling flaps on US planes were automatic (with manual override). Controlling these things became second nature for a well trained pilot and US evaluations of the FW's unified control system concluded that a well trained pilot could extract more performance from his plane than such an automatic system would provide.

It was (of course) an analog system, not a digital one as FADEC.

Attached is the NACA report on the Kommandogerat if you're interested.

=S=

Lunatic


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## Anonymous (Apr 23, 2005)

Chiron said:


> Japan suffered from shortage of resources in the late WWII, and all major factories were bombared by B-29. Ki-84 project therefore was surffered from lack of testing and lack of adaquate materials. I meant some K-84 even made up woods, and steels. Japan was in more desperate stage than in Germany. So, I dont see why Ki-84 is inferior plane to Fw-190, but it was merely a plane that came out too late, and appeared at wrong time. I meant even the famous Flying Tiger, who equiped P-51, had trouble to intercept Ki-84 in China. Americans would said: "Its Frank, forget it!" to describe how fast the newest Japanese fighter was that ijt was simply nonsense to go after it. Even under such desperate stage, with shortage of high quqlity engine fuels and metals, Ki-84 still demonstrated its unsurpassed air superiority, Ki-84 was undoubtedly the best Japanese plane in WWII.



That "It's a Frank, forget it!" comment has to do with scrambling fighters to intercept one going horizontally at altitude just in the reach of the radar, something that the Frank pilot's did frequently. It was impossible to launch fighters which would have to climb and travel 50-100 miles to make that intercept. When P-51's, P-47's, or F4U's were already in the air and in the area, they did intercept the Franks.

I agree the Frank was the best Japanese fighter of WWII, but lets not be over-rating it. It was a 410 mph (best case) fighter with fuel system problems. It was facing the 450 mph P-51, 440 mph P-47D, 465 mph P-47N, and 455 mph F4U-4.

P-47N's ate Franks piloted by the most experianced Sentia remaining to Japan for lunch over Korea!

=S=

Lunatic


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## Anonymous (Apr 23, 2005)

Glider said:


> The Ki84 was an excellent aircraft and had it been supplied in sufficient numbers {and quality) been a problem for anyone. Can I ask why no one seems to rate the Shiden N1K2 which was better armed and had a clear advantage in combat over all USN fighters in particular the Hellcat.



How did the George have any advantage over the F4U-4? It was a good match for the Hellcat, but it was outclassed by the Corsair, P-47, and P-51 in most repects - most notably speed.

And its guns were powerful, but also of relatively low RoF. The Ki-84-Ib's guns (4 x Ho-5 20 mm's) were probably superior for fighter vs. fighter combat.

=S=

Lunatic


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Apr 24, 2005)

RG_Lunatic said:


> Umm.. the Bf109 could have been made suitable for Carrier ops, in fact I think there was a version intended for that German CV that never got finished. However, I think the liquid cooled engines were really not suitable for over water operations - they were too suceptable to cooling system damage or failures.



As covered in one of my posts in this thread the 109 would not have been a very good carrier aircraft. The Bf-109T which you are referring to was the carrier version made for the Graf Zeppelin and it basically was a Bf-109E with lenghtend wingspan and wings that folded, and an arrestor hook. Nothing was changed to the landing gear which would have made landing on a moving carrier even more dangerous.



> The Messerschmitt Me 109T was the projected carrier version of the Me 109E model. About 70 planes of this version were build by Fieseler, several modifications had to be made to adapt these single seat fighters for the use on aircraft carriers:
> 
> T-0: 10 Me 109E-3 modified by Fieseler in 1939/40, Span enhanced to 11.06 meters, arrestor hook and catapult mountings. Those aircraft were planed to be used on the Graf Zeppelin and were later used by I/JG 77.
> T-1: like T-0, 60 build by Fieseler and delivered to JG 5. Since the carrier was not completed, all planes were modified to T-2
> ...



Dimensions 
Length: 8,76 m 
Span: 11,08 m 
Height: 2,60 m 
Empty weight: 2253 kg 
Max weight: 3078 kg 
Crew: 1 
Weapons 
MG 17 (7,92 mm): 2 (forward fuselage) 
either MG 17 (7,92 mm): 2 (wing mounted) 
or MG FF (20mm): 2 (wing mounted) 
Engines 
Engines: 1 
Type: Daimler Benz DB 601N inverted V-piston engine 
Engine performance: 1200 hp (895 kw) 
Performance 
Max. Speed: 575 kph 
Max. Range: 915 km (568 miles) 
Max. Altitude: 10500 m (34450 ft)


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## Soren (Apr 24, 2005)

Said in the reference you presented RG: 

_The Hayate was fully the equal of even the most advanced Allied fighters which opposed it, and was often their superior in many important respects_


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Apr 24, 2005)

Yeah that often happens, only quoting what one needs for there source, we all do it from time to time.


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## Soren (Apr 24, 2005)

RG_Lunatic said:


> Well, it's entirely speculation. Actual performance of the plane in combat was not that good. P-47N's and Corsair's ate Franks for lunch!



And there's a very obvious reason for that ! The pilots of the Franks were extreemly inferior in training !


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Apr 24, 2005)

Ki-84:



> The North American P-51D Mustang and the Republic P-47D Thunderbolt were both left behind, the first with 3 Mph (5 km/h), the second with 22 Mph (35 km/h).
> http://www.xs4all.nl/~fbonne/warbirds/ww2htmls/nakaki84.html



3 mph not that much of a difference! 

Ki-84
Strengths:


Good performance 
Good protection 
Good armament 
Good maneuverability 

Weaknesses:


Problems with fuel pressure and hydraulic systems 
Weak landing gear struts

*Problems with fuel pressure and hydraulic systems *

Big problem!


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## Anonymous (Apr 24, 2005)

Soren said:


> RG_Lunatic said:
> 
> 
> > Well, it's entirely speculation. Actual performance of the plane in combat was not that good. P-47N's and Corsair's ate Franks for lunch!
> ...



That is flat wrong. The Ki-84 pilots were the best the Japanese had. The IJAAF 22nd and 85th Sentais were vetran units. The 85th Sentai was formed in March 1941 and claimed a 4:1 kill ratio. The 22nd Sentai was formed in March 1944 out of vetran pilots and was the first to recieve the Frank, and they fought in the Philippines, China, and over Japan.

In general, only vetran pilots recieved Franks. The IJAAF was no where near so talent depleted as the IJN. The argument that the the Ki-84 was flown by rookie pilots simply does not wash!

=S=

Luantic


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## Anonymous (Apr 24, 2005)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Ki-84:
> 
> 
> 
> ...



Those speeds are at Normal or Military Power. At WEP the P-51D was capable of about 445 mph @ 26,500 pulling 67" of manifold pressure feet and the P-47D was capable of 441 mph @ 27,700 feet pulling 64" of manifold pressure. Both planes could pull more manifold pressure with 150 octane fuel, especially the P-47.

=S=

Lunatic


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## Chiron (Apr 24, 2005)

"US pilots who flew in both theaters consistantly reported that the Japanese were the more dangerous foe."

Holy!

 I guess Saburo Sakai was right about superiority of Japanese pilots as individual. But, I never thought that Japanese pilots were EVEN dangeous than their German counterparts!!!


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## pbfoot (Apr 24, 2005)

from what i've learned the japanese pilots didn't like the high wing loading on 109


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## Anonymous (Apr 25, 2005)

Keep in mind that most theater transfers were from the PTO to the ETO, so they would have faced the best of the Japanese pilots and not enjoyed a superiority of aircraft. Going to the ETO after a significant break they'd have entered that theater when the US was gaining parity or even advantage.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Apr 25, 2005)

RG_Lunatic said:


> DerAdlerIstGelandet said:
> 
> 
> > Ki-84:
> ...



If you read my full post, I said that it was not a relevent difference.


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## Anonymous (Apr 25, 2005)

Well, I think if you look at the real wartime performance of the Ki-84 the speed advantage lies with the US planes by at least 30 mph. And also the peak speed is not so important, the Ki-84 would not have been able to sustain those speeds nearly as long as the enemy planes.


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## Soren (Apr 25, 2005)

German pilots were much superior to Jap ones ! The cream of Jap pilots was lost in Midway.


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## the lancaster kicks ass (Apr 25, 2005)

actually at the start of the war the japs had some of the est pilots that came out of one of the best training rageim in the world, but you're right, most were lost at midway, but that's not to say they were worse than the germans...........


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## Soren (Apr 25, 2005)

the lancaster kicks ass said:


> actually at the start of the war the japs had some of the est pilots that came out of one of the best training rageim in the world, but you're right, most were lost at midway, but that's not to say they were worse than the germans...........



Just look at the loss records and you'll realize how big the difference really was.


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## the lancaster kicks ass (Apr 25, 2005)

you're basing your claims on loss records??


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## Soren (Apr 25, 2005)

the lancaster kicks ass said:


> you're basing your claims on loss records??



Lancaster, the Jap's had great pilots up until Midway, where most were lost. The Training the Jap's got was also inferior, as it relied almost purely on slow T&B Dogfighting, and not on team effort. The U.S. pilots beat the Jap's with team effort almost everytime they met, and hadn't it been for these team-tactics, then almost all the F4F's who fought the Zeke's in 41-42 would have been easely shot down. (But they werent)


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## Anonymous (Apr 25, 2005)

Soren said:


> the lancaster kicks ass said:
> 
> 
> > you're basing your claims on loss records??
> ...



Again, while that is true for the IJN, it is not true for the IJA. The IJA lost no pilots at Midway! It took longer for the US pilots to wear them down. There were still IJA units staffed with vetran pilots right up to the end of the war.


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## Soren (Apr 25, 2005)

RG_Lunatic said:


> Soren said:
> 
> 
> > the lancaster kicks ass said:
> ...



That still doesnt change the fact that the were overall poorly trained !

The Jap pilots were great in a one on one Dogfight (Preferably a T&B fight), but severely lacking in team-fights ! And as the U.S were superior in numbers they could always team up on any Jap fighter threat, giving the U.S. full advantage !


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## R Leonard (Apr 25, 2005)

> the Jap's had great pilots up until Midway, where most were lost



What’s "most"?

How many IJN pilots were at Midway and how many were lost? And what percentage was that? 

And how many pilots did the IJN have available, overall, at the start of the war and what percent of the overall were the Midway losses?

Your claim, you supply the numbers. 

And when you find them, explain how that’s the “most.”


Rich


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## evangilder (Apr 25, 2005)

The biggest loss for the Japanese at Midway was the secrets of the Zero that crashed near Dutch harbor in the Aleutians. The Japanese couldn't find the lightly damaged airplane. The Americans, with the help of Alaskan Scouts did find it. This led to the the Americans finding out all of the weaknesses of the Zero and enabled them to design the Hellcat to exploit those weaknesses.


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## Nonskimmer (Apr 25, 2005)

Ah, so _that_ was basically the beginning of the Hellcat, eh? Interesting.


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## Wildcat (Apr 25, 2005)

I tried to find exactly how many pilots the Japanese lost at Midway but couldn't (probably wasn't looking hard enough!) Instead I found an excellent article which believes the loss of the ground crews and mechanics was more devastating than the losses sustained by the pilots.
Article can be found at -
http://college.hmco.com/history/readerscomp/mil/html/ml_034100_midwaybattle.htm

The Japanese carriers were caught while refueling and rearming their planes, making them especially vulnerable. The Americans sank four fleet carriers—the entire strength of the task force—Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, and Hiryu, with 322 aircraft and over five thousand sailors. The Japanese also lost the heavy cruiser Mikuma. American losses included 147 aircraft and more than three hundred seamen.

Analysts often point to Japanese aircraft losses at Midway as eliminating the power of the Imperial Navy's air arm, but in fact about two-thirds of air crews survived. More devastating was the loss of trained mechanics and aircraft ground crews who went down with the ships.


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## R Leonard (Apr 25, 2005)

Ummm, not to contradict a perfectly good urban myth, but the Alaska Scouts had nothing to do with finding Koga's A6M. And neither reports from action to date, nor Koga's Zero, nor any other Japanese fighter, had anything whatsoever to do with the development of the F6F.

Rich


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## Nonskimmer (Apr 26, 2005)

That's it Rich, bust my bubble why don't you. 

It sounded so good.


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## evangilder (Apr 26, 2005)

That contradicts what I have read about the F6F development. It was obviously a follow-on design to the F4F using lessons learned from the wildcat. But I have heard from many sources that finding the Zero and determining it's weaknesses was part of the development of the hellcat. 

Regardless of how it was found, with or without Alaskan scouts, the fact remains that the Japanese could not find it before the Americans did. And because of that, the vulnerabilities were able to be discovered that would not have otherwise been known for awhile.


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## Anonymous (Apr 26, 2005)

Soren said:


> RG_Lunatic said:
> 
> 
> > Soren said:
> ...



Again you need to study a little more. IJA pilots used "team tactics". Units which upgraded to the Ki-44 "Tojo" had forsworn the "turn fighter" tactics in favor of energy tactics, since the Ki-44 was a poor turning plane. Part and parcel to this was the use of "team tactics". These are the units later recieved the Ki-84's.

And against the IJA the US rarely had significant numeric advantage. Early in the war the IJA had the numeric advantage, and later in the war only the longest rang USAAF fighters could reach the IJA fighters over Korea and Japan, which tended to result in combat at more even numbers.

=S=

Lunatic


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## Anonymous (Apr 26, 2005)

R Leonard said:


> Ummm, not to contradict a perfectly good urban myth, but the Alaska Scouts had nothing to do with finding Koga's A6M. And neither reports from action to date, nor Koga's Zero, nor any other Japanese fighter, had anything whatsoever to do with the development of the F6F.
> 
> Rich



This is contrary to what I've read. Specifically, I've read that the speed and especially turn evelopes of the F6F were bumped up about 25-30 mph in response to tests done on the two captured Zero's, the Koga plane and I think one captured by the Aussies(??).

Tests on the Koga plane were done in San Diego and they have (or used to have) a real nice presentation on how the plane was tested and data was forwarded to Grumman engineers. Upon discovery of the fact that the Zero's manuver performance litterally died above about 250 IAS it was determined that if the Hellcat could maintain at least 275 IAS through combat manuvers it would be nearly invulnerable to the Zero.

=S=

Lunatic


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## Anonymous (Apr 26, 2005)

R Leonard said:


> > the Jap's had great pilots up until Midway, where most were lost
> 
> 
> 
> ...





> The Japanese lost 332 of their finest aircraft and more than 200 of their most experienced pilots.
> http://www.cr.nps.gov/nr/twhp/wwwlps/lessons/90midway/90facts2.htm





> The Japanese lost 256 of their finest aircraft, and more than 200 of their most experienced pilots and several thousand sailors perished.
> http://midway.fws.gov/past/ww2.html





> Carrier pilot losses were much more costly for the Japanese than for the Americans. They had fewer carrier pilots, and it took longer to train replacements. Japan had begun the war with only about four hundred experienced, first-line carrier pilots.
> http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2000/summer/art3-Su0.htm





> ...
> the JNAF loses one tenth of its best pilots in the battle of Midway.
> http://www.flyandrive.com/sakai02.htm



So it appears that the IJN lost about half its vetran 400 carrier pilots at Midway, and that these made up about one tenth of all IJN vetrans, implying about 2000 vetran IJN pilots at the start of the war, some 1600 of which were ground based pilots (twin engine bombers and fighter support?).

Another 60-75 IJN pilots had been lost at the Battle of the Coral Sea.

=S=

Lunatic


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## R Leonard (Apr 26, 2005)

> This is contrary to what I've read. Specifically, I've read that the speed and especially turn evelopes of the F6F were bumped up about 25-30 mph in response to tests done on the two captured Zero's, the Koga plane and I think one captured by the Aussies(??).
> 
> Tests on the Koga plane were done in San Diego and they have (or used to have) a real nice presentation on how the plane was tested and data was forwarded to Grumman engineers. Upon discovery of the fact that the Zero's manuver performance litterally died above about 250 IAS it was determined that if the Hellcat could maintain at least 275 IAS through combat manuvers it would be nearly invulnerable to the Zero.



The Zero that crashed on Akutan Island was #4593, built in February 1942. Its crash site was discovered by the crew of a PBY, piloted by Lieut. William Theis, on July 10, 1942, while on routine patrol. 

The association of the development of the Grumman F6F-3 with the restoration of #4593 A6M2 is one of the great urban legends of WWII. Nothing of the kind happened. Other then the fact that the Navy knew the F4F was just holding its own against the A6M2 and needed replacement with something better, the A6M2 had absolutely nothing to do with the development of the F6F and, specifically the “Koga” or “Aleutian” Zero had nothing to do with its development. 

The only USN/USMC fighter combat experience at with the A6M at the time that Koga’s plane was being recovered, and at the time the XF6F was being first flown, occurred with the VF squadrons that fought at Coral Sea, VF-2 and VF-42, and the VF squadrons at Midway, VF-3 (and 59% of the combat flying pilots in VF-3 were from VF-42), VF-6 and VF-8. By the time the F6F-1 was ready to take to the air, the after action reports from these actions had yet to be distributed. Further, having read those reports, I can safely say that there is not much in them at all that could possibly be of interest to a Grumman designer, especially since the F6F-1 was already built. 

The “Aleutian Zero” was # 4593, recovered, loaded aboard the USS St Mihiel, then shipped to, and restored by US Navy personnel at North Island NAS, San Diego, California. Grumman had absolutely nothing to do with the restoration. In fact, the Grumman plant was located at Bethpage, New York. The airplane arrived in San Diego from Alaska on August 12, 1942. It first flew with a US pilot (Lt Cdr Eddie Sanders) on 20 September 1942. My father’s log book show that he flew this same airplane on 14 September 1944, 19 September, 14 October, 21 October, and 25 October 1944. It was destroyed in a taxiway accident in February 1945. My father salvaged the port wingtip and some instruments all of which he donated to the USN Museum at the Washington Navy Yard in the mid-1980’s. 

The US Navy asked Grumman to start the design of the F6F in June 1941 as a hedge against problems with the development of the Chance-Vought F4U which was scheduled to replace the Grumman F4F series. Grumman was already out of the starting blocks on this having begun studies on a concept for an improved F4F in early 1938; by 1940 the concept had received a company designation of G-50. The Navy’s order of 30 June 1941 was for two of the G-50 models, now designated as the XF6F-1 and the XF6F-2. As things turned out having Grumman design its own replacement for the F4F was a good idea as there were development and deployment problems with the F4U. 

The Grumman XF6F-1 first flew almost a year later, on 26 June 1942, (20 days after the Battle of Midway and 7 days after VF-3, VF-6, and VF-8 arrived back at Pearl Harbor), with a Wright R-2600 engine. Even at that time, it was already obvious that the 1600 hp R-2600, in either its R-2600-10 version in the XF6F-1 or its R-2600-16 version in theXF6F-2, was not going to provide the speed desired for the airplane. The solution, which Grumman had already identified, was a switch to the 2000 hp Pratt Whitney R-2800 engine. The XF6F-1 flight with the R-2600-10 was essentially a test to verify what Grumman and the Navy already suspected - the need for more power. The XF6F-3, the re-designated XF6F-1 now mounting the R-2800 engine, first flew on 30 July 1942. This was 20 days before the Koga Zero arrived in San Diego and almost two months before A6M2 #4593 got into the air over North Island. The F6F-3 was version of the Hellcat that first entered combat and of which some 4403 were produced. The Navy, with remarkable prescience, placed its first order for the F6F-3 on 23 May 1942, before any version ever got in the air (and a scant two weeks after USN fighter pilots had encountered the A6M2 for the first time at the Battle of the Coral Sea). 

The F6F was developed independent of the restoration of the A6M2 # 4593 and most, if not all of the basic design work accomplished long before the USN VF squadrons first ran into the A6M2 at the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942.


Rich


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## evangilder (Apr 26, 2005)

Rich, I appreciate your thorough response, although respectfully, I have seen it in several sources that while the F6F-1 was already designed before the war began, lessons learned from the Koga Zero did help in the decision to put the P&W engine in the -3. I do not remember which book I read that in, but I have seen this on the web:

_Although the F6F had been on the drawing boards at Grumman, even before Pearl Harbor, the advent of the war gave great impetus to the development of the replacement for the Wildcat. From the start it was a much bigger airplane. Leroy Grumman, and his two top engineers, Leon Swirbul and Bill Schwendler, laid out a plane with higher performance, more fuel ammunition, and huge wings. The wings extended over 334 square feet; the average was less than 250 sq. ft.. The wings folded back and pivoted ingeniously, so that they folded up next to and alongside the fuselage. 
The first prototype, the XF6F-1, was under development when the war started. Based on combat experience against the Zero and the intact A6M captured in the Aleutians, it was clear that speed and better climb would be needed from the Hellcat. Test pilot Robert L. Hall first flew the XF6F-1 in late June, 1942. Powered by a Wright Cyclone R-2600-16 engine (1,600 horsepower), the aircraft didn't have the needed performance. Grumman proposed the Pratt Whitney 2800 Double Wasp (2,000 horspower). Equipped with the P&W 2800, the original prototype airframe became the XF6F-3. A month later, Bob Hall flew the new configuration. Despite a crash of the XF6F-3 in August, the Navy placed an order. 
http://www.acepilots.com/planes/f6f_hellcat.html
_

There are others as well, possibly looking at the same source. Obviously, we have conflicting sources. Either way, for the Japanese to lose their premier fighter to the enemy was a big loss for them. Masatake Okumiya, author of the classic book ZERO, claimed that the loss of Koga's Zero was no less serious than the Japanese defeat at Midway.


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## R Leonard (Apr 26, 2005)

Responding to various comments on IJN aviator losses at Midway -

While some like to believe that the cream of the IJN carrier aviators were wiped out at Midway, that is not exactly true. The loss of the four carriers in this battle meant that, no matter what, all of their aircraft were lost. So, probably about 256 planes were lost. This does not equate to the loss of 256 pilots; rather, the Japanese only lost somewhat less than 100 pilots and aircrewmen in the battle (best estimate is between 94 and 100), most of whom met their ends aboard sinking carriers as opposed to air combat operations. Where the curve of the loss of experienced pilots started to drop off the chart was in the Solomons where both land based pilots and, thrown in as reinforcements, carrier pilot losses, went beyond the IJN’s training programs ability to replace them with a quality product. The short hiatus from the Solomons campaigns to the Mariana’s allowed the IJN some training and preparation respite, but it really was never enough to build air groups of the pre-war caliber. A substantial majority of these newly trained pilots, along with many of the residual experienced leaders, were lost in the Battle of the Philippines Sea. Essentially, this action eliminated the second generation of IJN carrier pilots and was a blow from which the IJN never recovered. 

On the subject of Japanese losses I suggest John Lundstrom's "The First Team - Naval Air Warfare from Pearl Harbor to Midway" or Robert Cressman, Steve Ewing, et. al. "A Glorious Page in Our History" both considered to be definitive works on Midway. Recommended reading at the Midway Roundtable (www.midway42.org). 

The Japanese Navy had, as near as I can figure, some 3500 “front line” pilots of whom about one half were carrier current, that is, assignable to carrier squadrons. These numbers pretty much correlate with those of the USN/USMC. Just looking at active 1941 USN squadrons yields a similar number of available aviators. As far as Japanese carrier qualified pilots are concerned, that is a more difficult number ascertain from the sources I have available. USN carrier squadrons, at the end of 1941 only mustered about 580 flying slots in 38 squadrons. Land-based USMC VMF and VMSB squadrons probably accounted for another 200-250 readily available carrier qualified pilots. Certainly this was not the total pool of available carrier qualified USN/USMC pilots as it does not take into account carrier qualified pilots assigned to such mundane activities as training and staff positions, as well as land based squadrons. The same would be true of the IJN, there were undoubtedly many carrier qualified pilots not actually assigned to a carrier squadron and so operating. 

Additionally, it was USN practice to move pilots from “community” to “community," e.g. from dive bombers to fighters. Famed fighter pilot Jimmy Thach, for example spent two or three tours in patrol planes, five to six years, if not more. My father got his wings in November 1941 and went to USS Ranger in a scout-bomber squadron, VS-41. In March 1941 the entire squadron was changed to a fighter squadron and it became VF-42. All USN pilots, prewar were carrier qualified at some point regardless of the community to which they were eventually assigned.

In preparing for the war, the IJN brought it’s operational aircraft up to a level of about 1800 aircraft, with about 1200 of them shore based and 600 ship based (aircraft carriers and battleship and cruiser scouts). If there were indeed only 1500 carrier qualified IJN pilots, then, obviously they had twice as many pilots as carrier pilot slots. And if they lost about 100 pilots and crewmen, figure, generously, *75* actual pilots, the rest being obsevers and rear gunners, that means 75 pilots out of about 1500 available . . . about 5%.

As near as I can put together, during the course of the war the IJN trained some 24,000 pilots of all stripes. Roughly 18,900 of them, and their pre-war compatriots, were killed, either in action, training, or operationally. Over 2500 of these were killed in suicide attacks. 

If you look at USN pilot training, in the years 1925 through 1941 (very few aviators from classes prior to 1925 were still in flying billets by 1941) 7,061 pilots had completed the program. Of these, 44 percent, 3,112 completed the program just in 1941. Those most likely to endure the most of the fighting were those who completed flight training between 1934 and 1941, some 5,687 pilots. How many of these were carrier qualified? All of them at some point as was USN training doctrine.

In 1942 USN pilot training programs started to ramp up; 10,869 aviators received their wings of gold, almost twice as many as had completed the program in the previous 8 years. In 1943 there were 20,842 graduates; 1944, 21,067; and, with then end of the war in sight, 1945 ended with 8,880 graduates. Thus in the period 1942 to 1945, the USN produced more than 2.5 times the number of pilots as the IJN. And each of those USN pilots went through a program of primary, intermediate, advanced, and, for the carrier pilots combat preparation in RAGs before heading west. New pilots were arriving for action in USN carrier squadrons with as many as 600 hours flying under their belts and as much as 200 hours of that in type. 

This was a level of training and preparation with which the IJN could never dream of competing. The IJN training programs suffered from an insufficient number of qualified instructors, lack of fuel for extensive flying time, poor maintenance of training aircraft, and shortages of ordnance. There two most critically lacking areas were a continued adherence to traditional adversarial nature of their programs (for every one graduate, there were nine others who did not) and, of course, time. There was never enough time to develop the students’ skills, to practice attack tactics or defensive actions. Most of them arrived in combat squadrons with less than 200 hours in all, by the very end of the war, less than 100 hours. Most had to learn combat skills on the job once assigned to a combat squadron. By then, it is too late and few survived. 

Rich


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## R Leonard (Apr 26, 2005)

Well, I've noted the mis-information at the aces web site before. 

Unfortunately, the timeline works against the entire theory. Production and flight dates come from USN and Grumman records. A6M restoration and flight dates from USN records as well as Jim Reardon's "Cracking the Zero Mystery" which also covers quite well the recovery and transport of the plane to San Diego. What you're finding is folks repeating the legend.

Suggest you also look at Barrett Tillman's "The F6F in World War II." 

Again, I've personally read the reports of fighter combat for the first six months of the war. Combat reports do not led themselves to aeronautical analysis. The USN fighters had only run into the A6M twice, Coral Sea and Midway. Again, the timeline for those reports works against their being of any consideration in the F6F development, and their contents certainly do not provide any insight that would be usable in aircraft design.

Regretfully the internet is a great place to repeat what someone else puts on a web site that they got from another web site, from another web site. Once a mistake receives enough coverage it becomes damn difficult to stamp it out with the facts.

Don't mean to be contentious, but really, the 4593/F6F connection is non-existent.

Rich


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## evangilder (Apr 26, 2005)

I understand what you are saying and I don't use the internet as my definitive source. I do remember seeing it in a book at some point as well, but am not sure which one.

You are correct that the timelines do make it suspicious. Either way, the Navy was looking to update the Wildcat, which with proper tactics was actually holding it's own against the Zero when properly used. By developing the Hellcat, they produced a very capable aircraft to counter the Zero and proved itself quite well against them.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Apr 26, 2005)

I dont see why it is so hard to understand that the Hellcat did not come out of this. It may have been designed before this incident but it could have been changed and upgraded because of it. This has happened to many aircraft from time to time from many nations.


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## Anonymous (Apr 26, 2005)

Rich,

What makes you think that there were no changes to the F6F from the XF6F based upon information gleaned from one or both captured Zero's or the post-combat reports? While it is true the XF6F-1 first flight was June 26, 1942, and the XF6F-3 (redesignated from the XF6F-2) on July 30th. The very first F6F-3's rolled out of the factory at the end of Sept. or the beggining of Oct. and the first one flew on Oct. 30th, 1942. However, only 10 production units were delivered by the end of the 1942, owing mostly to a series of design changes.

It was not until March 1943 that VF-9, the first fighter group equipped with Hellcats, was certified as "ready for combat". Many changes occured on the production line based upon tests and combat experiance right up to nearly the end of the -3 production run.

The Koga Zero was not available for testing until about the end of September 1942 but that still left pleanty of time to institute changes in the F6F based upon the information aquired, and apparently the F6F-3 was recieving a lot of fiddling during its first few months of production.

=S=

Lunatic


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## R Leonard (Apr 27, 2005)

> What makes you think that there were no changes to the F6F from the XF6F based upon information gleaned from one or both captured Zero's or the post-combat reports?



After some reflection, no, I don’t think so . . . And even if there were, a major design change based on some examination of the Koga Zero, something that would have caused a major change to performance, that would have required a contract change order (there isn’t one to my knowledge) and that would have required a nomenclature change, i.e., to F6F-4. There was only one F6F-4 (b/n 02981) modified from the original XF6F-1, but it was not a production model. 

Again, I have the combat reports for Coral Sea and Midway. Looked at them again last night. There is nothing in them that is of value to someone designing an airplane. I have BuAer interview transcripts of Jimmy Thach and Noel Gayler. The most you can get out of them is that the F4F is inferior in climb, turn, and speed performance compared to the to the Zero. Big deal.

No, confident with Grumman’s design, the Navy ordered production of the F6F on 20 June 1941 slightly more than a year before the first one ever took off. After the first flight (all done at the Bethpage NY facility) of the XF6F-3, the order was increased. Production, however, was somewhat delayed as Grumman did not have a building in which to set up the assembly line. Grumman had to stand in line for construction materials just like everyone else. Eventually, things started moving; in fact, work was started on production models with the roof and only three of the four walls of the F6F production facility, Plant Number 3, in place. The first production model F6F-3 (b/n 04775) flew on 3 October 1942, two weeks after Eddie Sanders took the air in the Koga Zero. VF-9 was the first squadron to get the F6F-3, taking their first delivery on 16 January 1943, a little over 18 months from the initial contract order. F6F-3 production increased rapidly. As you can see, there wasn’t a heck of a lot of time for design changes between the June test flight and the deliver of the first F6F-3 in October. 

Bureau number (b/n) production sequence was
F6F-3
04775 to 04958 delivered 10/42 to 4/43
08789 to 09047 delivered 4/43 to 6/43
25721 to 26195 delivered 6/43 to 8/43
65890 to 66244 delivered 8/43 to 9/43
39999 to 43137 delivered 9/43 to 4/44
F6F-5
58000-58999 delivered 4/44 to 6/44
69992 to 72991 delivered 6/44 to 12/44
77259 to 80258 delivered 12/44 to 6/45
93652 to 94521 delivered 6/45 to 11/45

And, indeed, yes, there were small tweaking changes made during the production runs, but they were superficial for the most part: The big change was the change in engine, R2800-10 to R2800-10W, between the F6F-3 and the F6F-5. Other changes were: 

- On b/n’s 04775 to 04958, 08789 to 09047, and 25721 to 26195 (these being the first 909 F6F-3s built had a radio mast that canted forward, subsequent production radio masts were straight up from the horizontal. 

- Additionally on all of those just mentioned and on b/n’s 65890 to 66244 and 39999 to 41294 (these being the first 2,560 F6F-3’s) the radio mast was slightly offset to the right of centerline. 

- Starting with b/n 41295, masts were offset slightly to the left of centerline. 

- The first 909 F6F-3s also had fairings over the two inboard guns on each wing. This was discarded in subsequent production. 

- Landing lights on the port wing were eliminated starting with b/n 08886 except for designated night fighters (F6F-3N and F6F-5N). 

- Lower cowl flaps were omitted starting with b/n 39999

- Bulge fairing over lateral exhausts omitted starting with b/n 40235

- Access panel for ADI system fluid tank installed on 40634 and all subsequent

- Starting with b/n 42185 all F6Fs were HVAR capable

- All F6F-5 production had provision for either 3 .50 cal machine guns in each wing or 1 20mm cannon and 2 .50 cal machine gun. Some late production F6F-5Ns utilized the mixed battery.

- The rear vision window to the rear of the cockpit, left and right, appeared on all F6F-3 and between 1500 and 2000 of the F6F-5. B/n of change is unknown.

- Dorsal recognition lights eliminated starting with b/n 70289.

- All F6F-3 had one controllable trim tab on the left aileron and a fix tab on the right. All F6F-5 had one servo tab and one fixed tab on each aileron; the left tab was controllable from the cockpit.

- On F6F-3 the bullet resistant pane was mounted the laminated plate glass windshield with space between to allow for heating/defrost. On the F6F-3N, F6F-5, and F6F-5N the laminated plate glass was eliminated and the bullet resistant pane was incorporated as an integral part of the canopy.

And then there’s the obvious question . . . exactly what features were incorporated into the F6F design that resulted from flights tests conducted in California while the first production models were being built on Long Island? The first F6F-3 rolled out less than a month after Koga’s Zero was airworthy. Just what did Sanders and company find that would make Leroy Grumman go running back to the drawing board while the approved design was already in production? 

Just what was so earth shattering about the A6M2 design? Answer, nothing . . . that’s the point no one gets. There was no rocket science here. The design was not some miracle. Examination of the aircraft and test flights explained its performance, but there was nothing earth shattering about the design once you figured out what the Japanese wanted to be able to do with the airplane. (Fair warning, this paragraph is a paraphrase from the words coming from an F4F ace - with 2 A6Ms to his credit - who also flew the Koga Zero and was a post war Navy test pilot.)

The design of the A6M2 was the result of the kind of war the IJN wanted to fight, the way they wanted to fight it. The F6F was designed to meet the USN’s requirements for the kind of war they wanted to fight, the way they wanted to fight it. There was nothing there. US builders were perfectly capable of building an airplane that could perform in the same manner as the A6M2 * *if they had a customer who asked for it**. These are two fundamentally different aircraft that represent diametrically opposing mentalities and doctrine and practices. Their only similarities were that they could fly, sat one pilot, and could land on an aircraft carrier. There was nothing in the A6M2 design that was needed in the F6F and the F6F was designed and approved before the Koga Zero fell into US hands. This whole issue is wrapped up in the postwar super plane A6M mentality fostered by Martin Caidin and the corresponding IJN super pilot nonsense. Get away from the wartime propaganda, the breath taking “gee whiz,” and look at the cold hard facts of designing airplanes to meet the customer’s specifications. 

This is analogous to fencing. My opponent prefers to use a foil, an elegant lightweight weapon that requires point contact on the trunk of the body, only, to score. I like to use a saber that allows edge of blade, top and bottom, and point contact anywhere from the waist up including arms and heads. Mu opponent is very good with a foil and even may score some points, but in the long run I’ll beat the crap out of him with my saber. So, he says, "I’ll use an improved foil!" and he switches to an epee. Heavier, with the entire body as a target area, but still only point contact. He’ll probably do a little better because I have more to think about on the defense, but, again, with a saber I have more directional attack options and, in the long run, he will lose. So he says “the hell with this” and he switches to a saber and now we’re operating under the same rules, I’ll still win because he has too many bad habits left over from using a foil in the first place. 

Get an understanding of training, doctrine, and practice of the adversaries. Look into the warrior culture of the adversaries. That’s the key to understanding the Pacific War in the air. 

Here, give me a hand and help me climb down from this here soap box, I'm likely to bust my butt.

oh, and here's a nice shot of the restored Koga Zero taken at North Island NAS in the late summer of 1944. This is an official USN photo, one of several taken at the same time, from my collection.







Regards,

Rich


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## the lancaster kicks ass (Apr 27, 2005)

that kinda looks like a small P-47 don't you think??


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## Nonskimmer (Apr 27, 2005)

lanc, are you smoking that wild grass again? I told you to lay off that stuff!


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## the lancaster kicks ass (Apr 27, 2005)

well it does!!


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## Nonskimmer (Apr 27, 2005)

Vaguely maybe, but it's most definitely a Zero.


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## the lancaster kicks ass (Apr 27, 2005)

really sherlock??


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## Nonskimmer (Apr 27, 2005)

Yes indeed. And the name's Nonskimmer. Two "m"'s. 
Most folks call me NS or Skim, but _you_ can call me Skimmy.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Apr 27, 2005)

R Leonard said:


> > What makes you think that there were no changes to the F6F from the XF6F based upon information gleaned from one or both captured Zero's or the post-combat reports?
> 
> 
> 
> ...



You present a very good argument but I still believe that changes could have been made because of it. I am not saying the overall design just as you said tweaking to it. It just makes sense since pretty much everybody did it when they had the opportunity.


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## Anonymous (Apr 27, 2005)

You make a very good argument Rich. And I am no fan of the Zero either.

However, part of your argument is flawed. The June 20th order was based upon flight tests of an R2600 powered XF6F-1, so it was clear the USN was going to order the plane regaurdless.

Also, the "04775 to 04958 delivered 10/42 to 4/43" production run is misleading. According to various sources I've read, of that lot of 183 planes, only 10 were built in 1942, all the rest in the first 4 months of 1943, which implies that most were built in late Feb, March and April as the production line would have been increasingly productive towards the end of that batch. While not false, this production information is... not very accurate as it implies a consistant 15 planes a month across those 6 months, when in fact the production was heavily loaded toward the end of that period.

I think that after the tests the speed goal of +30 mph in all fight conditions was established, and whatever tweaking may have been needed to ensure this was done. It is at least suspicious that at exactly this time the NACA and ALCOA suddenly put a major rush on a project to develop and fully test a satisfactory flush riviting machine/process for duraluminum starting in the late Summer of 1942. Also, NACA wind-tunnel canopy studies that look surprisingly like that of the Hellcat were conducted at this time. And further Wind Tunnel studies were suddenly conducted involving the effect on paint types/methods and aircraft speed - and then the Hellcat got a very different paint job than earlier USN fighters conforming exactly to the NACA results. The results of these projects could well have benefited the Hellcat without requiring a major redesign or change of contract by the manufacturer, and would also explain some of the early production delay. 

=S=

Lunatic


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## Schöpfel (Apr 28, 2005)

Nice post Rich, very informative.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Apr 28, 2005)

Yes this thread has been ver informative none the less.


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## wm3456 (Mar 22, 2008)

I stumbled on this thread while looking for performance information on the "de-navalized" Bf-109t and became absolutely fascinated by the spirit of discussion in this thread. I would however have to believe that Rich's information is probably the more accuarate. This is not only due to the fact that his sources on all things Grumman VS. IJN are impeccalbe, but more importantly, in a knife fight like this, Rich would show up with a pistol, but would probably keep it holsterd and use a sabre just for s***ts and grins.


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## Jerry W. Loper (Mar 24, 2008)

Chiron said:


> The famous Japanese ace, Saburo Sakai , once stated that if Germany had Zeros instead of Bf-109, the outcome of Battle of Britain would be very different. He believed Zero's superior range will enable Germans to strike deep into the interior of Britain.
> 
> Whats your opinions on that?



Somebody correct me if I'm wrong, but when the Battle of Britain took place (the RAF's official start and stop dates were July 10-Oct. 31, 1940), didn't Japan have only a handful of Zeros (which I think would've been a batch of A6M1's), and the majority of Japan's fighters would've been fixed landing gear A5M Claudes and Ki-27 Nates?


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## parsifal (Apr 6, 2008)

Sakai in my opinion was probably correct. Consider a few salient points. The british in 1940 were trained to dogfight, which was a major tactical advantage over the germans. Spitfires and Hurricanes could out-dive and out-turn an Me 109, whereas the Me 109 could outclimb, and had the firepower advantage. British pilots were trained to to try and dogfight the germans, because the 109 turned like a mule (comparatively speaking). 

These tactics were precisely the wrong tactics against the zero. There is no doubt that the zero could be beaten in a "shoot and scoot" engagement, which is basically how the Americans defeated the Japanese in the air battles after 1942. Japanese piloits and equipment were outstanding at the dogfight melee, as the spitfire pilots in the pacific found to their cost. the spitfire was an outstanding dogfighter...except when put up against a zero.

In addition, having the range of a zero would have given the germans enormous flexibility to attack the British anywhere in the british Isles. The British would have been forced to disperse their fighters, which meant the odds against them would be even longer than they were.

As for the vulnerability of the Zero, the zero was no more vulnerable than the Me-109 E-3 versions. the early marks of the 109 (including most of those used in the BoB, did not have armour, and structurally were a bit weak. A zero compared to this equipmentwas not that much worse. I am not sure whether the 109s had fire supressant equipment. the Zero certainly did not. by comparison the RAF fighters generally did have armour, but this was not resistant to 20mm AP shells. the germans used AP ammunition in their 20mm fitouts, the Japanese did not.

My opinion is that in the end the advantages of having zeroes instead of 109s in the BoB would outweigh the disadvantages.


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## parsifal (Apr 6, 2008)

Sakai in my opinion was probably correct. Consider a few salient points. The british in 1940 were trained to dogfight, which was a major tactical advantage over the germans. Spitfires and Hurricanes could out-dive and out-turn an Me 109, whereas the Me 109 could outclimb, and had the firepower advantage. British pilots were trained to to try and dogfight the germans, because the 109 turned like a mule (comparatively speaking). 

These tactics were precisely the wrong tactics against the zero. There is no doubt that the zero could be beaten in a "shoot and scoot" engagement, which is basically how the Americans defeated the Japanese in the air battles after 1942. Japanese piloits and equipment were outstanding at the dogfight melee, as the spitfire pilots in the pacific found to their cost. the spitfire was an outstanding dogfighter...except when put up against a zero.

In addition, having the range of a zero would have given the germans enormous flexibility to attack the British anywhere in the british Isles. The British would have been forced to disperse their fighters, which meant the odds against them would be even longer than they were.

As for the vulnerability of the Zero, the zero was no more vulnerable than the Me-109 E-3 versions. the early marks of the 109 (including most of those used in the BoB, did not have armour, and structurally were a bit weak. A zero compared to this equipmentwas not that much worse. I am not sure whether the 109s had fire supressant equipment. the Zero certainly did not. by comparison the RAF fighters generally did have armour, but this was not resistant to 20mm AP shells. the germans used AP ammunition in their 20mm fitouts, the Japanese did not.

My opinion is that in the end the advantages of having zeroes instead of 109s in the BoB would outweigh the disadvantages.


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## Glider (Apr 6, 2008)

There is no doubt that the additional range of the Zero would have made a huge difference. There is also no doubt that the Zero was a much better dogfighter than any aircraft in the BOB.
However a lot of 109's made it home after suffering damage that would have destroyed a Zero. This is something that the Japanese were aware of. Indeed there was a reccomendation from the Japanese air attaches in both the London and Berlin embassys that future Japanese aricraft be fitted with armour and sealing tanks, advice needless to say, that was not followed. 
The actual report stated 'The German planes are well protected, with good protection for the pilots, even the fuel tanks are protected. So German planes have durability even in disadvantageous combat positions. The Imperial Japanese navy should reflect this point and consider adapting better protection'.
Its worth noting that the Japanese air attache was a Naval officer Lt Commander Genda Minoru and his title was Assistant Naval Attache and Special Air Attache. 
It my belief that the advantages of the additional range would not have been sufficient. The Japanese losses would have been higher than the German losses of the 109 due to their poor protection. The ability of the Zero to dogfight would have been countered by the additional performance of the Spitfire and a change in tactics. It is often pointed out correctly that the Spit V did not score well against the Zero, it isn't often mentioned that the Seafire, which is a heavier Spit V with less performance did do well against the Zero. The difference being the tactics. A Spit I or II in the BOB still had the extra speed. 

Jerry Louper is correct in pointing out that the argument is in some way academic, as the only Zero's in service were pre production prototypes. In fact the IJN was still equiping with Zeros when the was started in December 1941. A better comparison time line wise is the Spit V, not the Mk I and II in the BOB.


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## HoHun (Apr 6, 2008)

Hi Parsifal,

>The british in 1940 were trained to dogfight, which was a major tactical advantage over the germans. 

>...

>There is no doubt that the zero could be beaten in a "shoot and scoot" engagement, which is basically how the Americans defeated the Japanese in the air battles after 1942. 

Hm, I sense a contradiction there. This is basically how the Luftwaffe defeated the RAF over France in 1941 and 1942 too, so how would an indoctrination for dogfighting an enemy who could refuse to play be a "major tactical advantage"?

>The British would have been forced to disperse their fighters, which meant the odds against them would be even longer than they were.

Actually, the British historically had already dispersed their fighters, enabling them to intercept the Luftwaffe's Norway-based attack on the North of the British Isle when it came.

>As for the vulnerability of the Zero, the zero was no more vulnerable than the Me-109 E-3 versions. 

Hm, are you aware that there were hardly any Me 109E-3 aircraft lost in the Battle of Britain? The losses are almost exclusively Me 109E-1 and E-4 aircraft.

>the early marks of the 109 (including most of those used in the BoB, did not have armour, and structurally were a bit weak. 

Now I'd like to see your source for that.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## The Basket (Apr 6, 2008)

Bristol flew a prototype fighter that was an almost copy of the Zero...it is spooky how close it is...1938 if I'm not mistaken.

The RAF totally rejected it as the Spitfire was way better. Range was never an issue in the early days of the 109 or Spitfire. 

The Zero is all mouth and no trousers IMHO. Compare time wise with the latest Soviet or Western fighters and it is sloooow.

Maybe the Zero would have done nicely in the BoB but it is out of time by about a year. It is no better saying if the Germans had Fw 190s...Now if the Germans had F-22 Raptors...jeez...I would be speaking German by now...Mien Gott!


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## smg (Apr 6, 2008)

i think then raf's aaguns woud had crush the zero like nothing


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## kool kitty89 (Apr 6, 2008)

The Basket said:


> Bristol flew a prototype fighter that was an almost copy of the Zero...it is spooky how close it is...1938 if I'm not mistaken.
> 
> The RAF totally rejected it as the Spitfire was way better. Range was never an issue in the early days of the 109 or Spitfire.




I think you mean the Gloster F.5/34, obviously for specification F.5/34 which stated:


> High-performance fighter with air-cooled engine for overseas (hot climate) use



The first flight was in December of '37. It prabably would have been ready on a similar timescale as the Hurricane, but work on the Gladiator postponed development. It was a bit underpowered with the Mercury, but could have done better with a Pegasus or Taurus engine. Top speed was a little better than the original Hurricane prototype as well, and I'd expect overall performance to be similar to the Hurrican with a 1000 hp class engine. (the Fraise ailerons also made it roll better than the Spit or Hurri, particularly at high speeds)
And it really doesn't look too much like a zero if you ook closely plus the canopy is obviously borrowed from the Gladiator. The landig gear is also a bit primitive, being only partially retractable (like the P-35) though it only protrudes a little more than the P-36/40's.


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## Graeme (Apr 6, 2008)

The Basket said:


> Bristol flew a prototype fighter that was an almost copy of the Zero...it is spooky how close it is...1938 if I'm not mistaken.



The Bristol 146.


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## The Basket (Apr 7, 2008)

Obviously...the Bristol fighter wasn't a Zero copy...but was very similair not only in looks but also performance.

It was too late as the Hurri and Spit were already in production and it was underpowered.

The fact is that it was rejected as the Spitfire was better. The later zeroes matched the Spit Mk I. hardly sign of a first rate fighter.


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## parsifal (Apr 7, 2008)

Hi Henning (HoHun) ,

>The British in 1940 were trained to dogfight, which was a major tactical advantage over the germans. 

>There is no doubt that the zero could be beaten in a "shoot and scoot" engagement, which is basically how the Americans defeated the Japanese in the air battles after 1942. 

Hm, I sense a contradiction there. This is basically how the Luftwaffe defeated the RAF over France in 1941 and 1942 too, so how would an indoctrination for dogfighting an enemy who could refuse to play be a "major tactical advantage"?

Response
The Luftwaffe defeated the RAF over France in 1941 and 42? How and when did that happen. Luftflotte III “defeated” the RAF essentially by running away, by the simple expedient of moving its forces out of the primary range of the RAF fighters. That is hardly defeating the RAF. Moreover, the Germans always favoured the diving pass, followed by the big run, relying on their speed, and strangely, their diving ability (strange, because the 109 was a terrible diver). Against the RAF, who could dive better than they could, could run almost as fast as they could although I concede the LW held a distinct speed advantage for both the 109 and the 190, until well into 1942), and when they caught them, could turn inside of the 109, given two pilots of equal ability. The germans held two principal advantages in 1941….their pilots were still better than the RAF, generally, and their firepower for their fighters was much greater. A 20mm Mauser cannon put out about twice as much kinetic energy as an equivalent Allied 20mm weapon.

The British would have been forced to disperse their fighters, which meant the odds against them would be even longer than they were.

Actually, the British historically had already dispersed their fighters, enabling them to intercept the Luftwaffe's Norway-based attack on the North of the British Isle when it came.

Response
True enough…against virtually unarmed Me110s with no rear gunner. About two thirds of the RAF strength was concentrated in the South, and South East of England. What would have happened if the ‘rest area”, the midlands, and the North, were added to the possible list of targets. Remember, the initiative lies with the attacker. So they get to choose the moment of attack, and the amount of strength devoted to the attack. The British undid a lot of this advantage with their radar, but this could not redepploy an entire wing or group halfway across the country

>As for the vulnerability of the Zero, the zero was no more vulnerable than the Me-109 E-3 versions. 

Hm, are you aware that there were hardly any Me 109E-3 aircraft lost in the Battle of Britain? The losses are almost exclusively Me 109E-1 and E-4 aircraft.

Response
No, but neither do I accept it. Would like to see your source on that one. I do know that by the end of the day battle, roughly the end of October, the German Jagdgruppen were a spent force, just 232 serviceable aircraft, with over 710 lost in the previous two months. If your assertion is correct, then the E-3 was an insignificant proportion of the total force structure. I know this is not true, so I have to question the veracity of your original assertion. 


>the early marks of the 109 (including most of those used in the BoB, did not have armour, and structurally were a bit weak. 

Now I'd like to see your source for that.

Response
My source for that is the publication “Messerschmitt BF 109 in Action-part I, by Beaman and Campbell
It states that armour began to be fitted to the E-3 midway through the battle, and was later fitted to E-1s as well. The initial armour fit was 53 lbs of 8mm back armour, and 28.6 lbs of armour above and behind the pilots head. In a curved plate attached to the actual canopy frame. There was no plexiglass or other frontal protection until after the battle. 

As far as the structural inadequacy of the Me109s, I know that I have read about it somewhere, but cant put my finger on the source at this minute. The main problem was in the wing loading. Compared to the Spit, which had a wing loading of about 21 lbs per square foot, the german fighter was working at something approaching 40 lbs. If the Germans were using the same engineering techniques as the brits, it follows with a wing loading twice as high as the brit fighter, that the 109 is going to give up the ghost a lot sooner than the Brit plane. 

Regards,

Parsifal


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## The Basket (Apr 7, 2008)

I remember an interview with Johnnie Johnson...his rule was get in and get out...don't hang around because then your dead.

The Zero thing...your missing one huge point...Yep outturn a Spitfire but what about two or three or four...I'm in a slow aircraft with no armour protection against faster fighters...I can turn and continue losing energy when what I really need to do is light the afterburner and bug out as fast as my little legs can take me. But...ooops...the Zero is much slower and the moment I stop turning, I'm going to be swiss cheese.

The 109 Emil had the performance to bug out and run for it when things turn sour. Now the pilot lives to fight another day. Simple.


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## krieghund (Apr 7, 2008)

Guy's you all missing the point...these aircraft have been built to a specification dictated by operational requirements and then you want to compare them together when they are built to different requirements...yes the Zero would have cleaned house in the BoB, the RAF could no longer count on only fighter contact in the south and they didn't have enough fighters to adequately cover all the sectors.

Imagine if they used Vals instead of Stukas....once unladden they could do fighter duty.

Show me the planes the zero copied from, let them sortie from a carrier, fly 500nm, do combat for 30 minutes and recover to that same carrier. That list evaporates. The Zero was perfect for its precise moment in history, no other carrier fighter could do that at this point in time. Japanese mistake was not to have the zero's upgraded (the A6M with a Kinsei54 in 1942) and its replacement coming down the pike.

Ever play War in the Pacific? If someone wasn't looking out for us we really would have had our heads handed to us.

Anyway every European combatant was rushing to get armor and protect fuel tanks in 1940 (BTW Trivia ? when did the Spitfire finally protect the bottom fuselage 37 gal tank?) 

Loose them dogs!!!


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## JoeB (Apr 7, 2008)

Glider said:


> It is often pointed out correctly that the Spit V did not score well against the Zero, it isn't often mentioned that the Seafire, which is a heavier Spit V with less performance did do well against the Zero. The difference being the tactics.


There was only one bona fide combat between Zeroes acting as fighters and Seafires. Seafires claimed other fighters attacking carrier groups as kamikazes in a few cases. The one real fighter combat was the last day of the war, August 15 1945. The Seafires claimed 8 Zeroes for 1 loss (and loss of one Avenger being escorted), but in the Spit V Darwin case (1: several ratio against the Spitfire) we are counting (or should be) losses recorded by both sides, not claims. But there aren't clearly complete Japanese accounts of that last day's combat, whereas the accounts of the Darwin combats seem to be, we know the 202nd Air Group was the only (Zero, one mission v Darwin was by JAAF Oscars) unit involved. 

In the August 15 combat the 252nd Air Group lost one Zero to Seafires, pilot survived, and the 302nd AG recorded one pilot WIA by Seafires though plane apparently not destroyed. USN F6F's made a number of claims in basically the same series of combats, similar area and time, and the Japanese attributed several other losses to F6F's. But, there's more potential for confusion and incompleteness in that accounting than the Darwin combats.

But the main point is it's one real fighter combat, can't draw a broad conclusion from that. You might say Seafires *would* have done a lot better, and you might assert tactics *would* have been the difference but there's no actual comparison that conclusively proves or disproves that exact reasoning. One other fairly obvious difference was the Spit V's at Darwin in 1943 faced the 202nd Air Group (redesignated from 3rd AG) which had gained extensive favorable experience defeating various Allied fighter units in 1942 but hadn't been attrited in the Solomons campaign nor apparently seen a large personnel turnover (though by same token had relatively old A6M2's even in 1943). The opponents August 15 '45 were run of mill 1945 JNAF units, a somewhat different proposition.

In general the most clearly wrong statement on this thread I saw was along lines that range wasn't a big deal for Bf109 and Spit in early war: quite the contrary. The lack of range, hence combat persistence even over southern Britain, of the Bf109 was arguably the key factor in the German failure in the BoB. Likewise the LW over France ca. 1941 did have a quite favorable actual fighter exchange ratio v the RAF, considerably better than it had had in BoB, and that was true even before it introduced better types like Fw190. The lack of combat persistence of the Spitfire over France, as opposed to over Britain, was an important reason for that shift.

Joe


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## claidemore (Apr 7, 2008)

Hi Parsifal,

Wingloading of a Spitfire Mk 1 was just under 25 lbs/sq ft, wingloading of the 109 Emils was about 32 lbs/sq ft. The 40 lb figure would apply to later G models of 109. 

Wingloading is a ratio of a planes weight to wing surface area, and has nothing to do with structural strength of the wing itself. The Spitfire wing might be a little stronger in that it flexes more and would tend to bend rather than break. 

The 109 was considered an excellent diving airplane, with very quick acceleration in the dive, quicker than a Spitfire. The Spitfire wing has a higher mach number, which means it can dive to a higher max speed.

Claidemore


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## kool kitty89 (Apr 7, 2008)

As Claidemore stated wing loading would be a factor for other issues (like stall, turning, etc.), certainly not structural issues. Plus (as for the wing loading issue its self) the 109 had a higher lift airfoil and LE slats that made up for this making lift loading about equal with the Spit. (as long as the slats worked properly)



> A 20mm Mauser cannon put out about twice as much kinetic energy as an equivalent Allied 20mm weapon.



What ever gave you that idea, the MG FF cannon of the Bf 109E had slow muzzel velocity and rate of fire compared to the allies Hispano cannons, similar to the Zero's cannon. (the MG FF was much smaller and lighter though, and the FF/M used the "Mine Shell") The MG 151/20 of the later 109's was roughly equal to the allied guns (a little lower velocity, but similar RoF, more max ammo, could use "Mine Shells," and a bit lighter)

See: The WWII Fighter Gun Debate: Gun Tables


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## kool kitty89 (Apr 7, 2008)

Graeme said:


> The Bristol 146.



I knew of the Bristol designs, but the Myth I've always read about was that the Zero was derived from the Gloster design. The Bristol design does look a bit more like the Ki 43 too. (more tapered fuselage, the wings, and the canopy)


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## HoHun (Apr 7, 2008)

Hi Parsifal,

>The Luftwaffe defeated the RAF over France in 1941 and 42? How and when did that happen. Luftflotte III “defeated” the RAF essentially by running away, by the simple expedient of moving its forces out of the primary range of the RAF fighters.

By attrition, 1941 and 1942. I'm surprised that anyone would deny that, though I'm not surprised someone would rely on attitude in denying it. 

E. R. Hooton, "Eagle in Flames", p. 111: RAF Fighter losses for Offensive Operations, Western Europe, July 1941 to December 1941: 416

E. R. Hooton, "Eagle in Flames", p. 113: Luftflotte 3 fighter losses July 1941 to December 1941: 85.

I'm not going to continue this discussion beyond this random data sample since I don't respond to baiting posts.

>>Hm, are you aware that there were hardly any Me 109E-3 aircraft lost in the Battle of Britain? The losses are almost exclusively Me 109E-1 and E-4 aircraft.

>No, but neither do I accept it. 

E. R. Hooton, "Eagle in Flames", p. 39.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## HoHun (Apr 7, 2008)

Hi Joe,

>One other fairly obvious difference was the Spit V's at Darwin ...

Talking about the Far East, have you seen my response to your post over in the Hurricane thread?

Direct link

Thread link in case the direct links doesn't work - post #195 for manual navigation:

Since we seemed to be finding some common ground in our latest posts, I'd regret it if we wouldn't try to make some further progress over there ...

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## The Basket (Apr 7, 2008)

To my knowledge both Zero and the Bristol fighter were different but came to the same conclusion. How to get as much performance out of a weak engine. Don't think the Bristol fighter was well known to be copied.

The only fighter I know which was influenced by the Zero was the Grumman Bearcat and that could chop up Zeroes all day long...but missed the war by a whisker.

When I said early days about the range of the 109 and Spitfire I meant the 1930s not actual combat experience...the 109 and Spitfire were what they were. A long ranged fighter of the same design era would have to have two engines to carry enough fuel. You either accepted a short ranged single engine fighter or went down the Bf 110 road. The Zero first flew a good 3 years later so could learn from the early monoplanes.

To my knowledge, there was only about 15 Zeroes in combat in July 1940...now...15 fighters against the RAF...Cleaned house? With what? 15 fighters?

The Val could do fighter duty? With a top speed of 242mph?


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## Glider (Apr 7, 2008)

JoeB said:


> There was only one bona fide combat between Zeroes acting as fighters and Seafires. Seafires claimed other fighters attacking carrier groups as kamikazes in a few cases. The one real fighter combat was the last day of the war, August 15 1945. The Seafires claimed 8 Zeroes for 1 loss (and loss of one Avenger being escorted), but in the Spit V Darwin case (1: several ratio against the Spitfire) we are counting (or should be) losses recorded by both sides, not claims. But there aren't clearly complete Japanese accounts of that last day's combat, whereas the accounts of the Darwin combats seem to be, we know the 202nd Air Group was the only (Zero, one mission v Darwin was by JAAF Oscars) unit involved.
> 
> In the August 15 combat the 252nd Air Group lost one Zero to Seafires, pilot survived, and the 302nd AG recorded one pilot WIA by Seafires though plane apparently not destroyed. USN F6F's made a number of claims in basically the same series of combats, similar area and time, and the Japanese attributed several other losses to F6F's. But, there's more potential for confusion and incompleteness in that accounting than the Darwin combats.



I will need to dig around in my papers but if I remember it correctly the SPits were awarded 7 kills the additional kill being awarded to the Avengers Gunners. Of the 7, I think about 4 or 5 could be called pretty certain the others more likely to be survivable, but I will get back on that.



> But the main point is it's one real fighter combat, can't draw a broad conclusion from that. You might say Seafires *would* have done a lot better, and you might assert tactics *would* have been the difference but there's no actual comparison that conclusively proves or disproves that exact reasoning. One other fairly obvious difference was the Spit V's at Darwin in 1943 faced the 202nd Air Group (redesignated from 3rd AG) which had gained extensive favorable experience defeating various Allied fighter units in 1942 but hadn't been attrited in the Solomons campaign nor apparently seen a large personnel turnover (though by same token had relatively old A6M2's even in 1943). The opponents August 15 '45 were run of mill 1945 JNAF units, a somewhat different proposition.


Quite likely. However re, the attacks on the Kamikazes some were awarded as Kamikaze kills and others as 'normal' kills as the Zero's in question were shot down as they moved to intercept the Spitfires. Again I will have to get back to you on that. 



> In general the most clearly wrong statement on this thread I saw was along lines that range wasn't a big deal for Bf109 and Spit in early war: quite the contrary. The lack of range, hence combat persistence even over southern Britain, of the Bf109 was arguably the key factor in the German failure in the BoB. Likewise the LW over France ca. 1941 did have a quite favorable actual fighter exchange ratio v the RAF, considerably better than it had had in BoB, and that was true even before it introduced better types like Fw190. The lack of combat persistence of the Spitfire over France, as opposed to over Britain, was an important reason for that shift.


Totally agree with you. The range (or lack of it) with the advantage of Radar direction gave the defenders, be they British or German fighters, a huge advantage.


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## JoeB (Apr 7, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Hi Joe,
> 
> >One other fairly obvious difference was the Spit V's at Darwin ...
> 
> Talking about the Far East, have you seen my response to your post over in the Hurricane thread?


I don't bug people why they don't respond to my posts, I might not like the answer  .

Anyway on this thread, I'm simply correcting a factual misunderstanding about historical ops: that the 'Seafire did well against the Zero'. In the period of the war where the two might have met often enough to say, the Seafire might have done very well, but in fact they barely met in true fighter combat, much less than the sample of Hurricane and Spit V v Zero combats.

And if they had met more, and the Seafire had done well, 'tactics' (except by distorting that word to mean 'all human factors') wouldn't necessarily have been the main difference v the Darwin debacle. Umpteenthly, those Spit units claimed to have adjusted their tactics and done better, it's just that Japanese accounts don't support that version of events very well (again, Allied accounts don't support the claims of the Zeroes well either, we're counting by recorded losses). 

The 1945 JNAF was very different than 1943 (and 202nd over Darwin was kind of a throwback to 1942). That big change was indirectly related to tactics (as one among other factors accelerating attrition over a prolonged period, plus the inability to re-produce the original quality of pilots) but it's basically confusing things to literally call such a difference 'tactics'. 

I suppose the idea behind the Seafire statement is that if Zeroes were encountered by the RAF over Europe in 1941 (agreed not many around in 1940) and the Zeroes gained an initial advantage, the RAF would quickly have countered it with different tactics. To an extent perhaps and over a long enough time perhaps a good deal, but such as to quickly reverse an exchange ratio like the Darwin one (perhaps 1:several against the Spitfires) to say 1:1 or several:1 the other way?, I'm not familiar with cases where changes anything like that dramatic were achieved simply by changing tactics in a short period (again same protagonists, same opponents, same situation othewise, the case of improvment in German exchange ratio v RAF from 1940 to 1941-2 doesn't really fit, in one case the shortlegged 109 was forced to fight at the edge of its range, other case the shortlegged Spit was forced to, and there were better German types later in that period). Of course one can simply assert the Spit would have done much better v the Zero in Europe from get go, hard to prove or disprove, like most 'what if' assertions.

Joe


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## JoeB (Apr 7, 2008)

Glider said:


> I will need to dig around in my papers but if I remember it correctly the SPits were awarded 7 kills the additional kill being awarded to the Avengers Gunners. Of the 7, I think about 4 or 5 could be called pretty certain the others more likely to be survivable, but I will get back on that.
> 
> 
> Quite likely. However re, the attacks on the Kamikazes some were awarded as Kamikaze kills and others as 'normal' kills as the Zero's in question were shot down as they moved to intercept the Spitfires. Again I will have to get back to you on that.


I'd appreciate any more FAA details on these ops, but, we're never going to establish actual outcomes of combats with one side's accounts, it's just a bad habit to try to do that for WWII combat IMO, leads to very distorted conclusions, over and over for 60 years that's obscured the truth in many situations. Even in 1945 over Japan, Allied claims were still sometimes quite overstated apparently, and highly variably, just can't go by them in any given combat. I was happy to come across what I related about the August 15 '45 combat from Japanese side in a couple of good Japanese language sources, just recently. Again while that might be incomplete, or the Japanese mistaken that Seafire victims were F6F victims etc. if the Seafires had 4-5 'pretty certain' and really knocked down 1 or 2, that wouldn't be unusual, as you may already know, in any given WWII air combat.

Again though I don't doubt much that Seafires would have generally had the advantage in that period against Zeroes if they'd met enough to say. I just think the difference in the quality of '45 and '43 JNAF would have been the monster factor.

Joe


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## kool kitty89 (Apr 8, 2008)

The Basket said:


> To my knowledge both Zero and the Bristol fighter were different but came to the same conclusion. How to get as much performance out of a weak engine. Don't think the Bristol fighter was well known to be copied.
> 
> The only fighter I know which was influenced by the Zero was the Grumman Bearcat and that could chop up Zeroes all day long...but missed the war by a whisker.
> 
> When I said early days about the range of the 109 and Spitfire I meant the 1930s not actual combat experience...the 109 and Spitfire were what they were. A long ranged fighter of the same design era would have to have two engines to carry enough fuel. You either accepted a short ranged single engine fighter or went down the Bf 110 road. The Zero first flew a good 3 years later so could learn from the early monoplanes.



The Gloster design prooved to be better though with the same engine, and flying a year earlier. (and that's with their preoccupation with the Gladiator) And the Gloster design is the one with the myth around it that it inspired the Zero design.

Well the Bf 110 road isn't really correct as it wasn't really designed to be a true "fighter" a/c; the Fw 187 on the other hand was designed as a high performance long range single seater, which fits necely with the contemporary P-38 and Whirlwind.


But in the case of the BoB, the kind of range capable with the Fw 187 was unnecessary in that drop tank equipped 109's would have been sufficient. (and trials of such had been caried out as far back as the Spanish Civil War)


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## Graeme (Apr 8, 2008)

kool kitty89 said:


> And the Gloster design is the one with the myth around it that it inspired the Zero design.



Likewise for Vought's V-143.

Vought V-143 - fighter





(From Angelucci and Bowers; 'The American Fighter')


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## HoHun (Apr 8, 2008)

Hi Joe,

>I don't bug people why they don't respond to my posts, I might not like the answer  .

Hm, actually *I* didn't ask why you did not respond, but merely if you had seen my post. 

Anyway, can I count on you to continue the discussion over there? 

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## The Basket (Apr 8, 2008)

It is possible to assert that the Spitfire can be better than the Zero. Just look at the numbers.

No Zero can match a Spitfire V...don't bother with the Mk XIV.

The Zero was golden against ya P40 or wildcats or buffalos but get something half decent and its cannon fodder.

One must remember that when the 109 and Spit was designed the most powerful engines were about 900bhp. Both fighters spurred on each other. It was sheer performance that mattered as both were designed as bomber destoryers or point interceptors. Neither were designed as escorts and the situation both fighters found themselves in were not imagined.

The fact that the Germans would invade and conquer France in six weeks and launch an air war against UK was not a design feature in 1935.


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## parsifal (Apr 8, 2008)

claidemore said:


> Hi Parsifal,
> 
> Wingloading of a Spitfire Mk 1 was just under 25 lbs/sq ft, wingloading of the 109 Emils was about 32 lbs/sq ft. The 40 lb figure would apply to later G models of 109.
> 
> ...



Thanks, and you are probably right. But I am still fairly sure that the Me 109 suffered some structural weaknesses, relating to the wing. It was more apparent in the f than the e, and im darned if I can find my source, but I am sure that there was a problem there somewhere.

Anyway, thankyou for the information

Michael


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## parsifal (Apr 8, 2008)

smg said:


> i think then raf's aaguns woud had crush the zero like nothing



British AA suffered from some severe problems in 1940. The zero did face exceptionally heavy AA from the US Navy on many occasions. Whilst their losses were never light, they were not "torn to pieces" by the Allied AA. It was the Allied fighters that did the lions share of damage

There will be people out there with better information than me, but I believe the top scorer at Phillipine Sea was either Iowa or Sth Dakota (cant remember which one), and they managed to shoot down something less than 10 Japanese aircraft during the battle. Would not mind if someone out there has better information

Anyway, Hi and nice to meet you

Michael


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## claidemore (Apr 8, 2008)

Parsifal,

I didn't want to go out on a limb and state that 109 wings were breaking off, but yesterday I was reading up on the 109F and did see mention of 'losing too many experten to wings folding up'. I believe you are correct that there was a problem there. I know the G series was beefed up in some areas, not sure if the wing was one of them. 

Claidemore


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## merlin (Apr 8, 2008)

parsifal said:


> The british in 1940 were trained to dogfight, which was a major tactical advantage over the germans.



Oh, I wish that were so. Unfortunately the RAF was not trained to 'fight' let along 'dogfight'. The RAF was prior to the War, one big Flying Club! 
It was thought that modern fast monoplanes would put too much physical stress on the pilot, that it would not be practical. And besides, no one considered that the RAF would be faced by an air force that would be able to escort its bombers with fighters! Hence, attacks were choregraphed so that a bomber would be subjected to a succession of two-second bursts of gunfire from different fighters - 'fighter area attacks'.
Even with the learn-on-the-job of the Battle of France, the RAF didn't share 'best practise' through out the 'Command', formation flying looked too good to be abandoned for an effective 'combat' formation.

The RAF's priorities in the BoB were always the bombers, the benefit of manoeurvreability enabled them to counter the 109's diving attack.

For the LW the priorities were the South-east where the potential invasion beaches were, where the RN ports were, where the aircraft factores were, and where most of Fighterr Commands airfields were i.e. IMO a small increase in range would help, a big increase not relevant.


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## merlin (Apr 8, 2008)

Graeme said:


> Likewise for Vought's V-143.
> 
> (From Angelucci and Bowers; 'The American Fighter')



Interesting to see the Vought aircraft. I remember reading a book about the Australian Aircraft Industry prior to WW2. Packet (I seem to remember) was the guy in charge; he was looking for different types of aircraft that could be produced at the Fishermans Bend Factory, and he was offered a 'Vought' fighter. 
What did he say when he saw a Zero - 'It's a Vought'!

But then with a similar specification, similar sized radial engine - different designers are going to come up with similar aircraft.


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## Glider (Apr 8, 2008)

15th August 1945 Seafires vs Zeros
This is a short version of the report that I have, I hope it helps
8 Seafires left Indefatigable escorting Avengers on a raid on Kisarazu airfield but due to the weather a secondary target in Odaki Bay was chosen.
2 Zeros were seen lower down but it was suspected that these were decoys and left alone. Shortly afterwards 12 Zero's dived on the formation from behind. The Lead Seafire was shot down in the first pass, it was suspected that he had radio problems as he made no move to evade or react to any warning. The pilot F Hockley bailed out and was beheaded after being captured.
Sub Lt Vic Lowden and Sub Lt Williams hit one which was seen to 'Flame Nicely going down and its undercarridge dropped' according to the report.
Sub Lt Lowden hit another and pieces were seen to come off as it went down, he then hit a another with his MG's and the Pilot was seen to bail out.
Sub Lt Williams was also credited with a second but I have no more information on that one.
Sub Lt Murphy was closer to the Avengers with his section when the Zero's reached the Avengers on the port side from the rear, while another section of Zero's attacked head on. Sub Lt Murphy reported that he hit one that was finished off by his no 3. He then attacked another Zero that was below him, again this was seen to smoke from its engine and its undercarridge dropped. As he overshot he climbed and found a third Zero that didn't see him, he fired from 100 yards observing strikes on the cockpit and engine, the Zero burst into flames rolled over and entered cloud.
Sub Lt Duncan from the close escort attacked three Zero's being credited with one probable before a cannon jammed after which he hit another with his MG's, his section leader Sub Lt Kay hit a zero and flames were seen on the wing root, he then hit a second with a high deflection shot as it crossed in front of him and blew the tail off.
Duncan was awarded 2 Probables
Kay, 1 Destroyed, 1 Probable 1 damaged
Murphy - 2 Destroyed
Lowden - 2 Destroyed, 1 Shared, 2 damaged
Garvin - 1 Damaged
Williams - 1 Destroyed, 1 Shared 

As mentioned the Avenger Gunners were awarded the eighth kill and one Avenger was shot down

The report mentions that the Zero's were well organised and carried out their attacks well but once the intial attack was completed they lost their organisation. Their shooting was also described as poor and they didn't allow enough deflection.
I think you will agree this ties in with a basically poorly trained unit with a couple of more experienced pilots who would have set up the attack.


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## kool kitty89 (Apr 8, 2008)

The Hurricane cou'd beat the Spit in a slow speed turning fight and the Zero (or Ki 43) could easily beat the Hurricane. The Spitfire V had the same advantages over the Japanese fighters as other early war allied fighters, level and dive speed; though it (and other merlin engined a/c) had better altitude performance as well. Though the Spit could match (or almost so) the Zero in a climb, which no allied fighter could do over there till the P-38 came. (and later F6F and F4U)

Another thing to note is that down low (up to 11,000 ft) the P-40 of the same period performed similarly to the Spit V (except in climb) and the AVG's Hawk-81's (H81-3A) may have actually out performed them at these levels. (basically the lighter P-40B's with 1,200-1,300 hp non standard engines, normaly 1,150 hp takeoff, with speed ~370 mph at 14,000 ft) The gear boxes of these engines were not designed for more than 1,100 hp for extended periods of time and were prone to stripping gears.

The Last Curtiss P-40C


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## slaterat (Apr 9, 2008)

Check out the Flight Test Data forum. There's a thread for spitfire vs zero.
Quite interesting actually. Keep in mind that the spit wasn't that great of a handler at high speed either, though still better than a zero.

Slaterat


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## Jerry W. Loper (Apr 9, 2008)

Another thing to note is that down low (up to 11,000 ft) the P-40 of the same period performed similarly to the Spit V (except in climb) and the AVG's Hawk-81's (H81-3A) may have actually out performed them at these levels. (basically the lighter P-40B's with 1,200-1,300 hp non standard engines, normaly 1,150 hp takeoff, with speed ~370 mph at 14,000 ft) The gear boxes of these engines were not designed for more than 1,100 hp for extended periods of time and were prone to stripping gears.

Kool Kitty: I've been a bit of a P-40 buff for years and am curious, what published sources give the small-mouthed P-40s a speed of 370 m.p.h.?


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## krieghund (Apr 9, 2008)

Where might the Flight Test Data forum be found?


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## claidemore (Apr 9, 2008)

krieghund said:


> Where might the Flight Test Data forum be found?



It's a sub-forum under the Technical section.


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## kool kitty89 (Apr 9, 2008)

slaterat said:


> Check out the Flight Test Data forum. There's a thread for spitfire vs zero.
> Quite interesting actually. Keep in mind that the spit wasn't that great of a handler at high speed either, though still better than a zero.
> 
> Slaterat



The spitfire also had a much higher critical dive speed (as did nearly all other allied fighters including the Hurricane Mk.II) than the Zero's of ~410 mph.




Jerry W. Loper said:


> Another thing to note is that down low (up to 11,000 ft) the P-40 of the same period performed similarly to the Spit V (except in climb) and the AVG's Hawk-81's (H81-3A) may have actually out performed them at these levels. (basically the lighter P-40B's with 1,200-1,300 hp non standard engines, normaly 1,150 hp takeoff, with speed ~370 mph at 14,000 ft) The gear boxes of these engines were not designed for more than 1,100 hp for extended periods of time and were prone to stripping gears.
> 
> Kool Kitty: I've been a bit of a P-40 buff for years and am curious, what published sources give the small-mouthed P-40s a speed of 370 m.p.h.?



Well as the P-40B had a top speed of 352 mph Curtiss P-40B (JoeB's site)


> The first P-40B flew on March 13, 1941. The airplanes were delivered in full camouflage. In contrast to the earlier P-40, the tail stripes and upper right and lower port wing stars were no longer present, but a star now appeared on each side of the fuselage. The P-40B retained the same dimensions of the P-40, but weight was increased to 5590 pounds empty, 7326 pounds gross, and 7600 pounds maximum loaded. Because of the additional weight, the P-40B had an inferior performance to the P-40, maximum speed being 352 mph, service ceiling being 32,400 feet, and initial climb rate being 2860 feet per minute. Normal range was 730 miles, but a maximum range of 1230 miles could be attained at the minimum cruise settings.


with only a 1150 hp (takeoff) engine which was down to 1040 hp at 15,000 ft, 370 mph isn't much of a stretch for the same plane (actually Tomahawk IIB/P-40C's stripped down to IIA/P-40B config.) with up to 220 more hp.


Here it's shown: The Last Curtiss P-40C


> Allison was running at 100% capacity. Simply stated, there weren't any extra engines to be had. Every block and cylinder head was already allocated to an existing contract. But, wait a minute, there were plenty of rejected blocks, cylinder heads and such. Allison realized that most of the rejected engine components were usable if the various parts were hand matched and fitted. They set up a production line and began assembling these engines. Individual parts were reworked and carefully matched. The results of this procedure were engines built to very tight tolerances. Essentially, these were 'blueprinted' engines. Dyno tests revealed that they produced as much as 220 hp more than the production line V-1710-33s going into the RAF Tomahawks and USAAF P-40C fighters. Allison had produced some very powerful and very expensive engines. Fortunately they were allowed to bury the extra cost into contracts for U.S. aircraft. These engines certainly account for the performance of the AVG's Tomahawks. In general terms, the AVG fighters could pull up to 370 mph in level flight, which is reasonable considering that these aircraft had 20% more power and less weight than the British Tomahawk IIB. Another fact not picked up on as significant by historians was the high rate of reduction gear failures in the AVG aircraft. This is easily explained when you realize that the older style reduction gear was rated for no more than 1,100 hp. With as much as 1,250 hp on tap, the reduction gearbox was over-stressed and frequently stripped gears. Later models, with 1,200 hp engines were fitted with a much stronger spur gear design that could handle up to 1,600 hp. This is the major reason that the nose is shorter from the P-40D onward.




Granted it says "up to 370 mph" though. However, since these were non standard a/c with non standard engines they are not fully comparable with normal production models.

IIRC the best performing P-40 was the P-40N with 378 mph at 10,500 ft with 1,480 hp V-1710-81 engine. The P-40M should have been similar, having the same engine but being ~400 lbs heavier empty. (I only have figures for the P-40M at 1,150 hp Mil power with crit alt at 17,400 ft, not WEP) The M could still manage a decent 362 mph at 20,000 ft (down to 950-1,000 hp) and could climb to 20,000 ft in a minimum of 7.5 min. (at normal gross, clean config with max power: 1,480 hp WEP to 10,500 ft down to 1,150 hp Mil at 17,400 ft and continues to drop, but the time limit for WEP as not exceeded due to this)


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## claidemore (Apr 9, 2008)

There is a performance trial between the Gloster F.5/34 (which looks so much like a Zero), and the Hawk 75 and Spitfire Mk1 over in the Technical section. 

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/at...iss-h.75-spitfire-gloster-f5-aileron-test.pdf

Interesting document. 

Claidemore


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## HoHun (Apr 9, 2008)

Hi Jerry,

>Another thing to note is that down low (up to 11,000 ft) the P-40 of the same period performed similarly to the Spit V (except in climb) and the AVG's Hawk-81's (H81-3A) may have actually out performed them at these levels. 

Quite credible ... please have a look at the attached analysis of the P-40E compared to the (non-tropicalized) Spitfire V, which I prepared quite a while back based on a variety of tests including that of P-40E A29-129. (Thanks to my Australian friend Peril for digging up all those tests from the archives! 

The P-43 and Ki-44 graphs are less accurate as I'm not aware of test data for the former, and for the latter I have relied on TAIC data modified to represent engine restriction as the early Ki-44 types the Flying Tigers might have met might have had.

The P-40C, having a similar top speed as the P-40E while being quite a bit lighter, would of course climb somewhat better than indicated in my graph.

>Kool Kitty: I've been a bit of a P-40 buff for years and am curious, what published sources give the small-mouthed P-40s a speed of 370 m.p.h.?

I actually think that a true air speed of 370 mph (595 km/h!) is rather unlikely. The extra power from overboosting the engine would only be available at low altitude, where the high air density makes it really difficult to achieve high speeds. (Not even the P-40N, running at 57" Hg, ever reached 370 mph in any tests I'm aware of. In a clean configuration, it might have exceeded 360 mph by a hair.)

It's possible that the overboosted AVG P-40 occasionally reached a speed that the pilots converted to 370 mph TAS, but it seems that the compressiblity error that makes the airspeed indicator read excessively high was only appreciated by engineers at that time, so the pilots probably were unaware of the error in their conversion.

The one major P-40 variant that in my opinion could exceed the 370 mph reference speed was the Merlin-engined P-40F - in supercharger high gear, it achieved high power at high altitude where the low air density allows high speeds to be reached more easily.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## kool kitty89 (Apr 10, 2008)

That is untrue on the P-40's engines most had rated WEP (or takeoff) op to ~10,500 ft. Plus most of the P-40's speed figures for the E and later models is at least 362 mph at 15,000 ft. (Merlin Models topped out at ~20,000 ft but at about the same speed, lowere altitude would be about the same at WEP)

The P-40E was ~10 mph faster than the P-40B, the B did 352 mph and 2,860 ft/min initial climb. The extra weight of the P-40C and the addition of the belly shackel decreased speed be ~5 mph and climb by ~220 ft/min. It should also be noted that the nose and canopy of the Tomahawk (P-40C and earlier) were much different from the D and later models due to the redesign of the gear box of the V-1710 engine resulting in a shorter engine with higher thrust line. The radiator was also moved foreware and enlarged. (making the plane a bit ugly and less shark like)

You seem underestimate the quality of the Allison engines of later models.

The P-40K's engine was rated for 1,320 hp while the Merlins were rated only for a Max of 1,300 hp (very similar to the Merlin XX). But the Merlins kept their power better with ~1,140 hp at 18,000 ft. These were "low altitude" single stage, 2-speed supercharged Merlins. I will admit that the speeds will be better with the Merlins at thier critical altitedes for WEP/Mil power than the similar Allison versions. (certainly above 15,000 ft) But with the P-40M/N this is NOT the case! (except above 20,000 ft) Plus the single-stage Allison was lighter by at least 200 lbs than these merlins. 

One problem with accurate speed and power figures is that sometimes only Mil power is used/listed instead of WEP.

This changed with the V-1710-81 engine of the P-40M/N. With normal rating overboost limited throttle to 1,200 hp for takeoff (this may have changed with high octane fuel) but at 3,000 ft full power of 1,480 hp was atained. This was acheivable up to the full throttle height of 10,500 ft. Critical altitude for Mil power (1,150 hp) was 17,400 ft. Above 18,000 ft the Merlin powered varients gained a slight advantage, ceiling was the only significant advantage. At 20,000 ft the P-40M could manage 362 mph at full throttle (down to ~1,000 hp). At 10,500 ft the P-40N was listed for 378 mph at 1,480 hp WEP. (this was with a reduced armament and lower weight, but the fully equipped later models were only 200 lbs heavier, and the P-40K/M were only 400 lbs heavier, enough to hurt climb but not significant speed) Best climb for the P-40M was 7.5 min to 20,000 ft.

Check out alot of figures here: Curtiss P-40 Warhawk, Tomahawk, Kittyhawk (granted a fair amount are at mil power)

This makes sense because the V-1710-81 powered P-51A with similar weight to the P-40 and higher wing loading (even higher lift loading due to lo lift airfoil, albeit the clean airframe and radiator helps a bit) had a top speed of 415 mph at 10,400 ft WEP and 408 mph at 17,500 ft (1,150 mil power). Time to 20,000 ft at 8,000 lbs was ~6.7 min and max climb was ~4,100 ft/min at ~7,500 ft.

See: Mustang (Allison Engine) Performance Trials

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/mustang/p-51a-1-6007.jpg


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## HoHun (Apr 10, 2008)

Hi Koolkitty,

>That is untrue on the P-40's engines most had rated WEP (or takeoff) op to ~10,500 ft. 

What exactly is untrue? And what which boost pressures for which version do you consider "WEP"?

>Plus most of the P-40's speed figures for the E and later models is at least 362 mph at 15,000 ft. 

Well, where are the test reports showing these figures? My analysis is built on actual flight test data, quite a bit of research (by several people) went into it, and I haven't seen a higher speed than 355 mph @ 15000 ft as achieved by a P-40N-1 at 57" Hg, 3000 rpm in RAAF tests for any Allison-powered model.

>You seem underestimate the quality of the Allison engines of later models.

...

>But with the P-40M/N this is NOT the case! (except above 20,000 ft) 

Well, having seen actual Allison power graphs, I don't think I underestimate anything, but if you have a graph you consider correct, I'm quite willing to check its impact on performance.

>Check out alot of figures here: Curtiss P-40 Warhawk, Tomahawk, Kittyhawk (granted a fair amount are at mil power)

That's a good site for getting a first impression, but the test reports from the Australian archives are really much more useful for an engineering analysis.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Wildcat (Apr 10, 2008)

Guys, this site has some great documents on the P40 that you might find interesting.
Perils P40 Archive Data


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## The Basket (Apr 10, 2008)

claidemore said:


> There is a performance trial between the Gloster F.5/34 (which looks so much like a Zero), and the Hawk 75 and Spitfire Mk1 over in the Technical section.
> 
> http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/at...iss-h.75-spitfire-gloster-f5-aileron-test.pdf
> 
> ...



it is...especailly in due to its testing against a Spitfire and well it comes out.

I thought the Gloster fighter was ignored after its cancellation....obviously not.


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## claidemore (Apr 10, 2008)

arggghhh


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## claidemore (Apr 10, 2008)

Duh, hit the submit buttom by accident before I was ready to post. 

First chart shows 362 and 378 for a P40N. (available in the Technical/Flight Test/P40 Performance Thread on these forums.)

2nd chart shows 366 for E and 370 for F. Note the speeds for D,E and F are calculated.


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## HoHun (Apr 10, 2008)

Hi Claidemore,

>Duh, hit the submit buttom by accident before I was ready to post. 

Has happened to me, too - I think it must be because the submit position is in the same position as the attach button on some other forums 

>First chart shows 362 and 378 for a P40N. (available in the Technical/Flight Test/P40 Performance Thread on these forums.)

>2nd chart shows 366 for E and 370 for F. Note the speeds for D,E and F are calculated.

Interesting to see that. However, it's not actual test data, and the P-40 tests I'm aware of (and those that Peril, who built the site containing these summaries, was aware of at that time) yielded somewhat lower speeds. I see that Peril has found more data than we had a couple of years back, so I wouldn't rule it out that he has some tests showing higher speeds now.

However, I still consider my analysis to be quite accurate, and I'm sure that if such a test indicating a higher speed actually turns up, there will be a good engineering reason to explain the difference between this and the various slower tests.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Juha (Apr 10, 2008)

HoHun
Thanks for the graphs. I have been interested in Ki-44 since late 60s so it's always interesting to see info on it.

Juha


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## claidemore (Apr 10, 2008)

Henning,

The higher speeds listed (calculated) are right from Curtiss, so i suspect, as Peril points out, that they are exageratted. When you look close at that second chart, it looks like the data is typed onto a printed form. There are too many other documents with P40 E speed listed as 340 mph to throw them all out for one that lists it higher. 

I'd say your analysis is correct too. 

An interesting sidebar; on Wiki, the last page of Spit variants, shows very slow 'max' speeds for Mk IX and Mk XIV. People do tend to pick and choose the figures they like the best. 

Claidmore


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## HoHun (Apr 10, 2008)

Hi Claidemore,

>An interesting sidebar; on Wiki, the last page of Spit variants, shows very slow 'max' speeds for Mk IX and Mk XIV. People do tend to pick and choose the figures they like the best. 

Absolutely true, and especially dangerous in Wikipedia were it's hard to find out who exactly put the numbers into the article! 

I really take my hat off to Peril in that regard - when I sent him the results from my analysis, I warned him "I'm afraid these figures don't look flattering for the P-40", but he simply said "That's allright, I just want to know how good or how bad it was, as accurately as possible!" 

Such an open-minded stance with regard to the performance of one's favourite aircraft is something I really admire, as I think it's very easy to sub-consciously tend toward the more optimistic values within the range of uncertainty that inevitably results from the often incoherent and contradicting data we're dealing with.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## kool kitty89 (Apr 10, 2008)

The 365 mph figure fot the P-40 (first series, no letter) Tomahawk I was actual test data as listed and that figure is a bit more than I would have thought even with the lighter armament and lack of armor. (which was not included standard for this model)

And on the other chart only Military power is listed (except for the P-40N) which is ~1,150 hp for most models. And the power figures of the M and N (which have the same engine) are listed at different ratings at different altitudes. And in standard procedure the full 1,480 hp WEP of the V-1710-81 was only available between 3,000-10,400 ft.


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## kool kitty89 (Apr 10, 2008)

That site is interesting, I hadn't realized those V-1710-39/73 engines had those kind of WEP ratings, albeit only at low altitude. (though I should have expected this seeing the performance of the P-38's engines) The Merlin, 1710-33/81 were as I expected. The 1710-81 really traded low alt performance for medium altitude performance, and even then at lower max power. The higher blower ratio had the low altitude disadvantages of overboost, high manifolt temp, and thus detonation problems, but the medium and high alt performance was much improved, this engine obviously not being meant to ever use turbocharging. (while the other designs reflect the intent of turbo use, at least for their sister designs)

From those figures I'd think the P-40K would have the best initial climb rate and performance below 10,000 ft, the P-40F the best performance above 20,000 ft, and the 1710-80 powered M/N to have the best climb from 5,000 to 15,000 ft ant the highest top speed. All of which are pretty much accurate.


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## HoHun (Apr 11, 2008)

Hi Koolkitty,

>The 365 mph figure fot the P-40 (first series, no letter) Tomahawk I was actual test data as listed 

It's Curtiss data which usually indicates higher speeds than the P-40 achieves in service tests.

>And in standard procedure the full 1,480 hp WEP of the V-1710-81 was only available between 3,000-10,400 ft.

Actually, the peak power would be only available exactly at the full throttle height. Below it would be slightly less due to the drop in charge mass caused by the higher air temperature, above it would be decaying because the supercharger wouldn't be able to achieve the full boost pressure. At the top end of the range, power would have dropped to the same value as the engine achieves at the same rpm without emergency boost.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Juha (Apr 11, 2008)

Hello
after testing Curtiss Hawk 75A Finns also thought that Curtiss' figures were clearly overoptimistic, OTOH Brewster Model 239 test results matched very closely to the specs.

Juha


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## kool kitty89 (Apr 11, 2008)

According to Mustang (Allison Engine) Performance Trials 1480 hp could be attained at "part" throttle at 5,000 ft and the same at 10,400 "wide open."

And also the 10,400 ft figure for the 1710-81's 1,480 hp was only during high level speed for "additional ram air" otherwise crit alt was ~7,500 ft. (the lower figure for climb, the higher figure for level flight)

The chart http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/mustang/p-51a-1-6007.jpg from the same website, supports your (Henning) statement, which makes perfect sense, and these figures are w/out the "ram" air due to the lower airspeed of climb. (1,400 hp SL, 1,480 ph 7,500 ft)


But this info on power at low alt an overboost (cleared 60" max) for the P-40E/K would be very interesting to bring over to the P-40 vs 109 thread. (which has been languishing)


Another thing to note is that (if direct copies of the British engine) the Merlins used on the P-40 would have the same -G problems which (although improved since the BoB) was still a problem for sistained -G or inverted flight. However if US injected carb's (on all Allisons) were fitted there would be n problem. (similar to "throttle body injection" this was later added to the British Merlin which fully solved the problem)


And Juha, the Finn's 75A-1 was much slower than (some of) the US's P-36 or the 75A-3/4 as those had 1,200 hp engines and the A-4's R-1820 had ~500 ft higher crit alt due to the 2-speed supercharger, allowing a higher top speed, though at lower altitudes it was slower than the 1,200 hp R-1830 of smaller diameter which gave less drag. The Finn's planes had only 950 hp and were low altitude models to boot. (there was also the A-2 with 1,050 hp, but I think the Finns had predominantly A-1's, though they received A-1/2/3 and 8 A-6's, either way the performances of these a/c would all be very different)
The A-1 had ~280-290 mph, A-2 ~300 mph, the A-3 311 mph @ 10,000 ft, the A-4 323 mph @ 15,100 ft. 

And the B-239 (Brewster), though it had the same HP as the F2A-1 (950 hp takeoff 1,000 hp WEP) it had a critical altitude for this powe of less than 10,000 ft compared to the F2A-1's 18,000 ft. Plus in both cases the Finnish a/c were fitted with armor and added equipment (albeit the Brewster's Navy equipment was omitted) which made the a/c heavier. The F2A-1 has a top speed of 311 mph at 18,000 ft, the B-239 had a top speed of ~298 mph at ~9,000 ft, though this speed stayed the same to ~15,000 ft due drag reducing about as much as thrust.

Now I wonder how the P-36 would do with a 2-stage supercharged R-1830 like the Wildcat had, It would probably have been quite a bit better performing than the Wildcat as the F4F-3 topped out at ~334 mph at 21,000 ft, (while the 75A-3 was already doing more than 320 mph at half that altitude) doubtless it would have been better than the 75A-4 at all altitudes. I'd bet that it would be better than a similar (with similar weapons config) P-40 above 18,000 ft. (and above 15,000 ft for all except the F,J,M,N)


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## HoHun (Apr 11, 2008)

Hi Koolkitty,

>1480 hp could be attained at "part" throttle at 5,000 ft and the same at 10,400 "wide open."

The "wide open throttle" bit is the origin of the British term "full throttle height" (called "critical altitude" by the Americans).

That 1480 HP are achieved both at sea level and at full throttle height is an indication that the early-war US rating system is used which assumes a power that is independend of altitude. You'd have to increase boost pressure at low altitude to actually achieve this.

With the typical boost regulators controlling to a constant boost pressure, the engine would actually lose some power below full throttle height.

(I'm not sure how realistic the US rating method was, since the use of a higher boost pressure increased the charge temperature, bringing the engine even closer to detonation than by increased boost pressure alone. The only engine I'm aware of that was not regulated for constant boost pressure but for constant charge mass was the Jumo 213, but it had a special "swirl" throttle in the supercharger intake which reduced the inevitable charge temperature increase.)

>And also the 10,400 ft figure for the 1710-81's 1,480 hp was only during high level speed for "additional ram air" otherwise crit alt was ~7,500 ft. (the lower figure for climb, the higher figure for level flight)

I hadn't thought about the exact altitudes you gave, but you're of course correct that ram effect is important when comparing the fast P-51 to the slower P-40.

>But this info on power at low alt an overboost (cleared 60" max) for the P-40E/K would be very interesting to bring over to the P-40 vs 109 thread. (which has been languishing)

Indeed! But where did you find the information on 60" Hg? I'm afraid I can't find that bit at the moment ...

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Juha (Apr 12, 2008)

Hello Koolkitty!
What I meant is that Brewster's spec for Model 239 for climb rate was the same that Finns got in their tests.

In speedtrials flown by BW-366, max speed was 480kmh when Brewster's figure was 484kmh. At sea level BW-366 428kmh and Brewster's figure 427kmh. I would say, that if all manufactures specs would have been that near to service tests, buyers would have been very happy.

In test with Curtiss CUW-551 max low level speed was 429kmh, that of Curtiss CUW-557 was 425kmh at 1500m. Max speed for CU-572 was a bit under 440kmh at 3000m, max speed for FAF’s few Cyclone Hawks was 480kmh at full throttle height, when Curtiss promised 520kmh, even if Curtiss figure was with S3C3-G engine, Finns thought it very optimistic..

Juha


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## kool kitty89 (Apr 12, 2008)

Okay, if it was Brewster's figures for the export B-239, not the the US F2A-1 that makes sense.

With those figures it may have been better to put those more powerful R-1820's into Brewsters which were better matched to the engine. (designed around)

It would still have been interesting to have trialed a 2-stage R-1830 Twin Wasp in a P-36, particularly if a tight cowling with cooling fan and conical spinner were fitted. (like at the tail end of the P-42 project; the long cowling was found to not help at all and cause much cooling problems, but a normal sized tight fitting cowling with fan and spinner would be advantageous as seen in the Fw 190, XP-47N, and XP-72. (and many japanese fighter designs, and a few less common others)


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## kool kitty89 (Apr 12, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Hi Koolkitty,
> 
> That 1480 HP are achieved both at sea level and at full throttle height is an indication that the early-war US rating system is used which assumes a power that is independend of altitude. You'd have to increase boost pressure at low altitude to actually achieve this.
> 
> With the typical boost regulators controlling to a constant boost pressure, the engine would actually lose some power below full throttle height.



I know, that's why I mentioned the climb rated HP from the P-51A chart, which did match up quite well with your statement.



> >And also the 10,400 ft figure for the 1710-81's 1,480 hp was only during high level speed for "additional ram air" otherwise crit alt was ~7,500 ft. (the lower figure for climb, the higher figure for level flight)
> 
> I hadn't thought about the exact altitudes you gave, but you're of course correct that ram effect is important when comparing the fast P-51 to the slower P-40.



Actually I just meant the ram air in high speed level flight compared to climb speed, granted the P-51 would have a small advantage given its ~35 mph speed advantage.



> >But this info on power at low alt an overboost (cleared 60" max) for the P-40E/K would be very interesting to bring over to the P-40 vs 109 thread. (which has been languishing)
> 
> Indeed! But where did you find the information on 60" Hg? I'm afraid I can't find that bit at the moment ...



I got it from Perils P40 Archive Data at the bottom of the page, there are a list of .pdf files specifically for the engines. They have the overboost clearance listed in the "V-1710-39 overboost". (also has the -73 listed in this file)

In that doccument they (Allison company) also mentions that the higher blower ratio of the -81/99 engines makes them much more dangerous to overboost. They also say that boost pressures as high as 66-70"+ are not safe to use and (even if it seems fine) that the engine may fail later on under normal operating conditions in later use. (requiring a complete tear-down and rebuild to be safe)


But one question: does anione actually know what the "blower ratio" figures stand for, the're obviously not compression ratios (at 8-9:1, at least not in common notation), so what do they mean?


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## HoHun (Apr 12, 2008)

Hi Koolkitty,

>But one question: does anione actually know what the "blower ratio" figures stand for, the're obviously not compression ratios (at 8-9:1, at least not in common notation), so what do they mean?

"Blower" is another term for "supercharger", and the "blower ratio" must be the supercharger gear ratio, with a higher ratio resulting in a higher supercharger speed so that it uses a bit more power while increasing full throttle height as well as available boost at low altitudes. It's the latter that makes overboosting dangerous, as it's easier to go beyond the maximum safe overboost accidentally when no boost pressure regulator is used. (Which is implied by the term "overboosting".)

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## parsifal (Apr 12, 2008)

Perhaps this extract might help....not my words, but i knew where to look. It relates to the fitting of a supercharger kit to a chevy big block motor.

I understand only some of this stuff. I have rebuilt a Cooper "S" motor, with a supercharger, more than twenty years ago. I remember that in order to fit the blower, we had to de-tune the engine, from a compression ratio of about 9:1 in the standard Cooper engine, down to 7.5:1. We did this by fitting a different cylinder head, and oversized head gaskets. Anyway, I thought this stuff might help....

Compression
The amount of boost you can run is directly related to an engine's static compresssion ratio. When the boost is combined with the compression ratio, the result is the effective compression ratio. Typically, a 5- to 8-psi boost range (usually produced with the supplied pulleys in blower kits) will work fine for compression ratios in the 8:1 to mid-9:1 range (operating on 91/92-octane fuel). However, this will ultimately depend on other modifications to the car, manual or automatic transmission, gearing, operating temperature, vehicle load, and altitude. If detonation is encountered it can often be controlled with boost retard devices or by experimenting with different-sized pulleys.

Special Carburetion
Choosing a carburetor or fuel injectors is a crucial step when building a blower-specific engine, because under boost the engine will often need 40-50 percent more fuel and air. Unlike a normally aspirated engine that may suffer only low power from poor fuel delivery, a supercharged engine without enough fuel under power may run extremely lean and destroy the engine. Running too small a carburetor also means that you can't flow enough air to produce maximum boost.

Because more fuel is required to feed a supercharged engine, the fuel-delivery system must be considerably improved. This means large fuel lines of AN-8 or bigger, properly selected and installed fuel pump(s), an adequately designed tank, full flowing filters, and a correctly wired electrical system to operate the fuel pumps.

Blow-Through Carburetion
On a blow-through supercharger system, the carburetor can either reside in a pressurized box or utilize a special carburetor hat. Under boost the false atmosphere (pressure being blown into the carb) requires revamping many of the original carburetor designs to properly supply fuel. A blow-through carburetor generally features sealed caps on the metering blocks, the main well, and the idle well. These carburetors typically feature only annular boosters so that as the signal gets stronger more fuel flows into the engine. As boost is increased by each psi, fuel pressure must too be increased at the same rate. To do this, a special regulator is referenced to boost pressure and raise or lower the regulated fuel pressure, depending on demand.

Turn Back
Reverse-rotation superchargers are generally used in applications where there are fitment issues or on engines designed to spin opposite of most other engines. Fitment issues arise when the area behind the belt driveline is impacted. Examples are 32-valve cylinder heads and exhaust manifolds. In this case the supercharger is mounted in front of the belt line. Consequently, the supercharger must now be rotated in a reverse motion, in which case manufacturers design the inner components of the blower as a mirror image of a standard unit.

Ignition Systems with a Supercharger
On any blown engine, high-performance ignitions are required primarily to provide adequate spark at higher-than-normal engine pressures and speeds. Additionally, it is often a good idea to run spark plugs that are one to two ranges colder than normal. Rule of thumb: the more boost, the colder the plug required.

One of the most important concerns with any supercharger installation is detonation control. This is because under acceleration, detonation can damage the piston ring lands (or other worse yet, damage rod bearings, destroy pistons, or blow head gaskets). A handy device to counteract most detonation problems is an ignition system with a boost-retard control.

Ignition timing is especially critical with a supercharger to not only keep detonation at bay, but also provide good power. For most applications, the distributor should have a centrifugal advance mechanism set up so that the entire advance is in by 2,500 rpm. Typically, 34 degrees should be a safe level of ignition lead to provide close to optimum performance[/I][/I]


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## kool kitty89 (Apr 13, 2008)

I knew the "blower" was the supercharger. (when I said compression ratio I meant pressure ratio acheived by the centrifugal compressor/supercharger)

But the gear ratio makes sense, thanks.


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