# RAF after BoB: mid-term strategy, tactics technology?



## tomo pauk (Sep 29, 2014)

A discussion about what the RAF should have pursued after th BoB. Eg. what at is the best way to hit Axis, how to prepare best for very possible LW atacks in next year, what about N. Africa and Malta, what to do once Japan takes the French Indochina? Once Germany turns East, how to capitalize on that? How to best help SU from 1941 on?
Tecnology hardware - maybe a bit more emphasis on a 'gunless' bomber? When is a good time for a long range fighter? What to ask/buy/demand from Commonwealth and the USA? About what to insist on airframe and engine makers? What about 'problematic' stuff, like Whirlwind/Peregrine, Typhoon/Sabre, Manchester/Vulture? What would be the best upgrades for the Spitfire and Mosquito, not just performance-wise, but also production-wise?

The tread should cover the time until 1944 stars.

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## wuzak (Sep 29, 2014)

I would think more advanced high speed bombers should have been persued.

Aircraft such as the Hawker P.1005/B.11/41. 

Data sheet for the B.11/41 says bomb load of 4000lb comprised of 4 x 100lb, 2 x 2000lb (not that the RAF used 2000lb bombs) or 1 x 4000lb. Max speed 400mph @ 25,000ft (down from Hawker's estimate of 430mph).

I think the RAF were pushing for higher performance fighters - the Spitfire received upgrades and improvements, the Typhoon was being developed.

I don't think long range escort fighters was a high priority.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 29, 2014)

Hmmmm, get popcorn or participate 

With perfect use of the trusty 'retrospectroscope' :

Toss the Sabre engine in the junk bin and replace the Typhoon with a _proper_ Whirlwind. Peregrines staying in modified form 
Taurus engine follows two minutes later. Buy all the R-1830s you can get your hands on. 
Unfortunately you are _stuck_ with just about all the existing airframes as two years is the about the _minimum_ to go from idea to flying prototypes and another year to get to around 500 service aircraft. No waving the magic wand about and having 4 engine 380mph 'gunless' bombers in 1942. British usually took even longer to go from paper to service use. 

More emphasis on navigation, especially at night, would bring much better bombing results sooner. 

A shift in the whole "fighter-sweep circus/rodeo thing". You have to put enough bombers in the mix to make the threat creditable (4-6 Blenheims escorted by 40-60 Spitfires is NOT going to lure the Luftwaffe up to play) and you have to pick targets the Germans actually care about. Most French targets being considered somewhat expendable by the Germans.

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## Shortround6 (Sep 29, 2014)

A lot of the early British twin engine aircraft were not really "twin" engine aircraft but more like 'engine and half' aircraft, much like early P-38s. Generators and hydraulic pumps were only on one engine so loosing the engine with the accessories far from home often meant the loss of the aircraft even if the 'bare' engine kept running. A lot of early British twins also did NOT have fully feathering props or even constant speed props which means in an engine out situation even with the prop set to coarse there was an awful lot of drag form the dead engine windmilling. Considering than most early war British twins didn't have a whole lot of power to begin with this was a real problem. 
Was the Lockheed Hudson called 'old Boomerang' because it was really so tough or because it had a better power to weight ratio and fully feathering props that allowed for a much better number of one engine returns? 

Perhaps something could be done about that god awful turret used on the Manchester, Hudson and others?










we can debate if the idea of an armed bomber was a good one or not but an _armed_ bomber does NOT need turrets that can double as forest fire look out towers.


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## tomo pauk (Sep 29, 2014)

The turret from Defiant was a far better job, it is only a question whether it can be produced in quantities needed. Of course, a gun-less bomber can do without it 
Good call about navigation training and better baits for the LW.



> Toss the Sabre engine in the junk bin and replace the Typhoon with a proper Whirlwind. Peregrines staying in modified form



Isn't the solution for the Sabre's issues to use sleeves as the ones from Taurus - maybe RAF/AM can be more persuasive with Bristol, so we can have the Sabre working in good order a bit earlier (6 months?)? Did the Whilry/(updated)Peregrine combo have had the potential to go 400+ mph? Maybe the Welkin, with the wings in a more conventional form would be well able to hit hard german 400+ mph opposition?

What about the Spitfire III?


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## Shortround6 (Sep 29, 2014)

The Taurus sleeve 'blanks' showed Napair the way to make an engine last more than 20 hours. Napair still needed to make their own (and needed grinders from America to do it) and that was far from the end of the Sabre's troubles. I believe but am open to correction that the Sabre wasn't really a satisfactory power plant until some time in 1943? 

Even if the "new" Peregrine never goes past Merlin XX development and 12lb of boost that gives you 1014hp per engine for take-off (instead of 775) and increases the FTH by about 3500-4000ft incuding RAM for around 885hp per engine, 965hp or so at 11,500ft (No ram) isn't to shabby either. 
Please remember that the first 1200 Typhoons had Sabre II engines limited to 3700rpm and 7lb boost, after that came the Sabre IIa with 9lbs boost starting April of 1943 and the Sabre IIb with 3850rpm and 11lbs boost doesn't show up until late 1944 although many earlier planes got them as replacement engines. 4 bladed props don't show up until after 1800-2000 planes have been built? It also took about 9-10 months to deliver the first 250 Typhoons. The Whirlwind might _never_ fully equal a Typhoon (especially a late one) but might be available 6-12 months sooner?

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## Shortround6 (Sep 29, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> The turret from Defiant was a far better job, it is only a question whether it can be produced in quantities needed. Of course, a gun-less bomber can do without it
> Good call about navigation training and better baits for the LW.
> What about the Spitfire III?



The thing is you can't make ALL your bombers gun less. Blenheims, Hudsons, Stirlings, Hastings could all benefit from a lower drag dorsal turret and the ONLY way they are going to outrun German fighters even if you take the guns out is to use rocket engines  
Waiting for a "new" gun less bomber to help the Mosquito means no bombing offensive until late 1943 or 1944. You can't take an exiting airframe and rip out the turrets and fair over the openings. You NEED the smaller fuselage and smaller wing that come with lighting the plane up by thousands of pounds to make the idea work. And no, just clipping the last 10ft or so off the wing span isn't going to work well either (if it did the Sterling wouldn't have been such a dud).

A bigger gunless bomber than the Mosquito might have worked fairly well, you just have had to start it in the summer/fall of 1938 and not in the fall of 1940.


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## stona (Sep 29, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> The thing is you can't make ALL your bombers gun less. ....Waiting for a "new" gun less bomber to help the Mosquito means no bombing offensive until late 1943 or 1944.



Yes and I think late 1943 is optimistic. Look at the state of Bomber Command as Harris took over. The figures available to him, as recorded in the Air Ministry war room on 1st March (1942) were 221 Wellingtons, 112 Hampdens, 54 Whitleys, 29 Stirlings, 29 Halifaxes, 20 Manchesters and just 4 Lancasters. In addition there were day bombers available comprising 56 Blenheims and 22 Bostons.

The constant drain of squadrons to Coastal Command, a trend which some would like to have been even greater, and the losses of 1941 had prevented any kind of build up. The fact that within four months Bomber Command was launching the 'thousand raids' speaks volumes for Harris, given the deafening and somewhat justified din from his later detractors. Mind you the thousand raids operated a pathetic mixture of aircraft, even some dragged in from other commands.

For example Bomber Command sent to Bremen 472 Wellingtons, 124 Halifaxes, 96 Lancasters, 69 Stirlings, 51 Blenheims, 50 Hampdens, 50 Whitleys, 24 Bostons, 20 Manchesters and 4 Mosquitos. Another 102 Hudsons and Wellingtons went from Coastal Command and even a handful of Blenheims from Army Cooperation Command were despatched.

Talk about 'sound and fury signifying nothing'. The man in charge of Bremen's air raid precautions estimated that the city was attacked by 80 aircraft!

There were far more fundamental problems than stripping turrets out of bombers to be addressed.

Cheers

Steve

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## Shortround6 (Sep 29, 2014)

Thank you, I have brought this up many times before;

Lancastrian





Handly Page Halton





The Lancastrian was about as streamline as it got for stripped/faired 4 engine bomber and it picked maybe 20mph over a normal Lancaster at the _same_ weight. 

You can forget trying to streamline/fair over the Beaufort, Hampden and Wellington and getting enough performance to do anything. The Handley Page "fast bomber" exists as concept drawing/s and preliminary engineering study, it didn't make to mock up stage so you would be starting from almost Zero. As a cautionary tale one can look at the Bristol Beaumont/Buckingham, Form wiki:

"Air Ministry specification B.7/40 called for a medium bomber to replace the Blenheim. The specification stipulated a speed of at least 300 mph with a normal load of 1,000 lb of bombs and a turret armed with at least two machine guns of 0.50 inch calibre. Only one manufacturer tendered a full design, but it did not meet with approval.[2] Bristol then brought their Type 162 to the Air Staff, which was fortunately well matched to B.7/40 and which led to a request for a completed mock-up and then a contract for three prototypes in late 1940"

"Construction began in late 1940, with a new Air Ministry Specification B.2/41 to be written around it. However changes in the requirements - removing dive bombing and "direct army support" which incoming US bombers were expected to be capable of - and increasing the performance requirement to allow for the future meant the Beaumont would no longer suffice. The changes in performance (requiring a bomb load of 4,000 lb, a speed of 360 mph and a range of 1,600 miles) meant a redesign by Bristol to use the Bristol Centaurus engine"

"The first flight took place on 4 February 1943"

"By the time the design entered production, the requirements had already changed, with attacks against German industry being covered by the US by day and by RAF Bomber Command's de Havilland Mosquitos by night. The Buckingham was not considered suitable for unescorted daytime use over Europe, and in January 1944, it was decided that all Buckinghams would be sent overseas to replace Vickers Wellingtons" 

and then they discovered handling problems that caused the program to be canceled in Aug 1944: 119 were built to keep the Bristol work force together. 

Now perhaps you can speed things up a bit but most anything you *start* in late 1940 WILL NOT be available in enough numbers to make a difference in 1943.


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## tomo pauk (Sep 29, 2014)

Thanks for the feedback 

It would be then prudent to ramp up Mossie production, both in the UK, but also in Canada and Australia? Would the engine production be capable enough to suffice for the greater/earlier quantity of Mosquitoes? Any other engines for it, at least for low-level and day fighter-bomber versions?

Again:



> What about the Spitfire III?


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## Glider (Sep 29, 2014)

I don't think that much could be done on the equipment side. The Spit was being developed as fast as it could, the four engine bombers were also being developed as fast as possible. The Typhoon was going through its growing pains and from 1944 proved its worth. A long rang fighter is the only obvious defect but the RAF didn't need a long range fighter as its heavies were night bombers.

Persona;;s the only real difference I would make is the deployment getting the Spit units overseas in the middle and Far east during 1942 instead of trying to attack the continent. Tactics should also have been more widely developed with best practice being forced on those areas that refused to use them.

Development was wasted on a number of aircraft Bisley, Botha, Sterling and this should have been diverted into a long range AS aircraft capable of covering the mid atlantic. Shorts had the experience and given free reign by the RAF could have achieved this. 

On long term research Whittle should have been given the research facilities he wanted and the development on an aircraft to make the best use of his jet engines instigated. Everyone talks about the Me262 in late 1943, the UK could easily have got the Meteor in late 1943 and the impact would have been huge.


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## tomo pauk (Sep 30, 2014)

Re. Typhoon/Sabre: Hawker, Gloster and Napier are needed for the war effort. Napier has only Sabre to offer, out of the engines that can really be useful. Or maybe they can produce Merlins under license? The days of the Hurricane are numbered, once BoB is over it can receive Merlin XII/45/30 'stead of Merlin XX (that would go to Spitfire instead)? So Hawker and Gloster either produce Typhoon, or Spitfire under license?

Good call on greater efforts for the anti-sub work. The long range aircraft don't need the cutting edge technology, when it comes down to the engines aerodynamics, but themselves are crucial for the UK/Allied war effort.

The Spitfire could use some subtle improvements, like 2x6 exhausts (gives 6 mph, according to tests, instead of 2 x 3), a bit more fuel (a tank under pilot, like the early PR versions, increase of main tanks to up to 96 imp gals; later, with more engine power and heavier engines, the rear tank of maybe 30 gals) - the extra fuel tankage would be necessary for overseas Spitfires (Africa, Malta, Australia), but it would also make them more useful for over the Chanel operations. The earlier introduction of pressure injection carbs might also help a bit (8-10 mph extra). How about a longer intake tube, for better use of ram effect? Hopefully the performance advantage the Fw-190 and Bf-109F-4 held would be cut in half with such improvements for the 'Spitfire V'?
For 1942 and further, the 2-stage Merlin is a given, we might also consider the fully-covered undercarriage to cut the drag a bit.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 30, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Thanks for the feedback
> 
> It would be then prudent to ramp up Mossie production, both in the UK, but also in Canada and Australia? Would the engine production be capable enough to suffice for the greater/earlier quantity of Mosquitoes? Any other engines for it, at least for low-level and day fighter-bomber versions?



You are out of British engines, A Pegasus powered Mosquito? Late 40/early 41 sees the Hercules just starting to trickle off the production lines, the reason for Merlin powered Beaufighters and Wellingtons.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 30, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Re. Typhoon/Sabre: Hawker, Gloster and Napier are needed for the war effort. Napier has only Sabre to offer, out of the engines that can really be useful. Or maybe they can produce Merlins under license? The days of the Hurricane are numbered, once BoB is over it can receive Merlin XII/45/30 'stead of Merlin XX (that would go to Spitfire instead)? So Hawker and Gloster either produce Typhoon, or Spitfire under license?



Well, if you can't stop/ditch the most expensive/troublesome engine and build something else it doesn't leave much wiggle room in the "what if" 



> Good call on greater efforts for the anti-sub work. The long range aircraft don't need the cutting edge technology, when it comes down to the engines aerodynamics, but themselves are crucial for the UK/Allied war effort.



Depends on the year, 1940 being a bit tough to bridge the entire Atlantic gap. However even planes that could _patrol_ 200 miles further from base can give about an extra 24 hours steaming for an 8 knot convoy _on each end of the trip_. Waiting for the *best* makes for a much rougher first few years. 



tomo pauk said:


> The Spitfire could use some subtle improvements, like 2x6 exhausts (gives 6 mph, according to tests, instead of 2 x 3), a bit more fuel (a tank under pilot, like the early PR versions, increase of main tanks to up to 96 imp gals; later, with more engine power and heavier engines, the rear tank of maybe 30 gals) - the extra fuel tankage would be necessary for overseas Spitfires (Africa, Malta, Australia), but it would also make them more useful for over the Chanel operations. The earlier introduction of pressure injection carbs might also help a bit (8-10 mph extra). How about a longer intake tube, for better use of ram effect? Hopefully the performance advantage the Fw-190 and Bf-109F-4 held would be cut in half with such improvements for the 'Spitfire V'?
> For 1942 and further, the 2-stage Merlin is a given, we might also consider the fully-covered undercarriage to cut the drag a bit.



The leading edge tanks seemed to work pretty well although made fuel management a bit complicated, why does everybody want to forget about them and jump to the rear fuselage tanks? The leading edge tanks don't have any funny handling problems, They also found room for a few extra gallons in the main tank/s.


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## tomo pauk (Sep 30, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> You are out of British engines, A Pegasus powered Mosquito? Late 40/early 41 sees the Hercules just starting to trickle off the production lines, the reason for Merlin powered Beaufighters and Wellingtons.



A Twin Wasp powered Mosquito? V-1710 powered version? Both for the overseas production, of course. The Hercules aboard Mosquito should make a better/more useful A/C than a Beaufighter. Of course, the Merlin looks like tailor made for the needs of the Mossie.



Shortround6 said:


> Well, if you can't stop/ditch the most expensive/troublesome engine and build something else it doesn't leave much wiggle room in the "what if"



It was also most powerful the British had - a more reliable Sabre should make the life for the Fw-190 problematic, at least under 15000 ft. Historically, the Fw-190 threat was the raison d'etre for the Typhoon/Sabre for quite a time.



> Depends on the year, 1940 being a bit tough to bridge the entire Atlantic gap. However even planes that could _patrol_ 200 miles further from base can give about an extra 24 hours steaming for an 8 knot convoy _on each end of the trip_. Waiting for the *best* makes for a much rougher first few years.



+1 on that.



> The leading edge tanks seemed to work pretty well although made fuel management a bit complicated, why does everybody want to forget about them and jump to the rear fuselage tanks? The leading edge tanks don't have any funny handling problems, They also found room for a few extra gallons in the main tank/s.



I certainly don't wan't to forget about the LE tanks. However, both the under-seat and rear fuselage tanks were in use before the LE tanks. They would require a minor change in airframe, compared with LE tanks. 
Once there is enough of breathing space in production lines, the LE tanks (maybe made install an L-shaped tank to fit under behind the pilot, to?) should be installed, by all means. All together 150-160 imp gals for the 'new Spitfire VIII'?
The (front) fuselage tank(s) were increased to 96 imp gals for the Spit VII, in late 1944 also the Spitfire IXs received the modification.


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## OldSkeptic (Sep 30, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> A discussion about what the RAF should have pursued after th BoB. Eg. what at is the best way to hit Axis, how to prepare best for very possible LW atacks in next year, what about N. Africa and Malta, what to do once Japan takes the French Indochina? Once Germany turns East, how to capitalize on that? How to best help SU from 1941 on?
> Tecnology hardware - maybe a bit more emphasis on a 'gunless' bomber? When is a good time for a long range fighter? What to ask/buy/demand from Commonwealth and the USA? About what to insist on airframe and engine makers? What about 'problematic' stuff, like Whirlwind/Peregrine, Typhoon/Sabre, Manchester/Vulture? What would be the best upgrades for the Spitfire and Mosquito, not just performance-wise, but also production-wise?
> 
> The tread should cover the time until 1944 stars.



Oh the RAF after the BoB was a litany of strategic and tactical disasters. In fact it is hard to work out something they did right until they were finally forced to.

Ok lets look at the British overall strategy, what did they *have* to do:
(1) Win the Battle of the Atlantic, this is the #1 priority.
(2) Win in North Africa, which also means holding Malta and having it as a viable 'aircraft carrier' for German/Italian convoys attacks at all costs.

Everything else should have been secondary to that.

For #1 this meant:
(1)Coastal Command (CC)must get the LR bombers first, BC should not have got a single Stirling, Halifax , Lanc or B-24 until CC is fully supplied.. CC must get the latest and best ASX, radar first (not a single BC plane should have got H2S until every CC plane had it first).

The U-Boat pens in south eastern France should never have been allowed to be built. That should have been BC’s #1 target and not allowed to hit anything else until the Germans gave up trying to build them.

For #2:
Spitfires should have been sent in large numbers in early ’41 to NA and Malta. That was the key battlefield, not useless ‘leaning towards then enemy’ nonsense in France that cost so may RAF pilots their lives and achieved precisely nothing. The lack of competitive fighters in NA/Malta also killed a lot of RAF fighter pilots. So it was a ‘double stupidity’.

Technology: There was nothing wrong and, with one exception, little to improve in the RAF’s stuff. It was the use that was wrong.

The exception was a MR/LR Spitfire. That should have been a #1 priority. Technically there were few challenges, rather doctrine was the issue (Portal fought against a LR fighter from the moment he became C&C and only shut up when the Mustang came into service).

That would have enabled BC to attack in daylight the previously mentioned U-Boat pens, enabling round the clock bombing which would have prevented the Germans building them. Once they had been built they were invulnerable until the Tallboy came along.

After and only after, that was achieved then BC could have started key daylight raids (with nuisance night raids) that would have started to hurt Germany, but more importantly started hammering and degrading the Luftwaffe far earlier than actually happened.

Misc improvements: More Mossies of course, with production being diverted from other areas. The Sunderland should have had total priority over the Stirling.. Etc, etc, etc.

The RAF top brass (as did the USAAF) lived in a fantasy land of their own making, in that they thought ‘they could win the war’ by themselves, with no reference to any overall strategy or needs….or reality (not sure where BC thought its fuel was going to come from if the U-Boats won).

For examples of the ga-ga land they lived in: It took President Roosevelt’s personal intervention to get more VLR B-24s to be allocated to Iceland. It took Churchill’s personal intervention to get Spits to North Africa (when the UK had 75 squadrons of them, 25 more than for the BoB)….

The RAF high command were the equivalent of the WW1 ‘Colonel Blimps’… R.V. Jones tells in his book how he tried to get a single Mossie allocated to the job of determining the German nightfighter radar frequencies. And of the meeting where the senior BBC officer just wanted to talk about model trains.....In the end, because the need was so pressing and no Mossie was allocated, they used a Wellington, which did it but got totally shot up doing so.

Woeful.

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## yulzari (Sep 30, 2014)

For 1941 to 44 you have to run with what you have. 

You need no more engines than the Merlin except for the FAAs Griffons and Bristol who are already gearing up. Abandon the rest and leave development to the Merlin and jets.

You have the Spitfire that works and will keep on working. Swap all other single seater production to Spitfires over time. Get residual Hurricanes to the Far East and Spitfires to the Middle East.

Back the Mosquito but you are committed to heavy bombers but you don't know which will be the best out of the Halifax and Manchester/Lancaster. Pick the easiest to make and run with that one phasing out the others. 

Coastal command can take the residual production of the other types until production of the chosen type can be diverted to them.

Your principal weapon is your heavy bombers supplemented by fast daylight Mosquitos. You have to invest in navigator training, navigation aids, pathfinder marking and master bomber control far earlier than IOTL and hugely increase the forces effectiveness. Now if we take the Lancastrian as a model streamlined unarmed heavy bomber with an 8 percent increase in cruising speed then, crudely, for the same bombload it can spend 8 percent less time in danger, fly higher without turret crew weights Also being that bit more difficult to intercept with the speed increase in itself. Combined it will reduce the losses allowing the force to grow faster as less production goes to replace losses. The increased numbers are opposed by the same numbers of night fighters as IOTL so a smaller proportion are intercepted. Combine this with a decision to risk UK security by diverting more RAF night fighters to intercept duties over Germany. What must be fought is Bomber Commands instinct to react to any performance increase by raising the bomb load. The end result of all of this is a larger bomber force, able to hit it's targets almost at will and with a proportionately smaller opposing Luftwaffe night fighter force subject to increased losses from RAF nightfighters. A virtuous circle.

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## Shortround6 (Sep 30, 2014)

Once again it was use and not so much technology ( although pulling turrets and adding sheet metal isn't very sophisticated technology). The big bombers were *NOT* even flying at max lean cruise to and from their targets. Now it might not have been possible to reach ALL targets flying at max lean cruise but it sure would have helped survival rates for a lot of western German targets. Although at perhaps a trade off between bomb load and fuel load.


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## OldSkeptic (Sep 30, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> Once again it was use and not so much technology ( although pulling turrets and adding sheet metal isn't very sophisticated technology). The big bombers were *NOT* even flying at max lean cruise to and from their targets. Now it might not have been possible to reach ALL targets flying at max lean cruise but it sure would have helped survival rates for a lot of western German targets. Although at perhaps a trade off between bomb load and fuel load.



Stripping down the Lanc and getting another 50mph out of it would have given the German nightfighters a much harder job. Their pursuit curve would have been much harder and they would have had to have ran at full(er) throttle for far longer periods, thus reducing their loiter time and forcing them back to the ground. This is particularly so for the Me-110s which were the backbone of the German NFs.

To achieve maximum effectiveness the German NFs ran at economical cruising as much as they could to enable them to hit multiple targets. Even a short time at max power to catch a faster bomber would have crippled that. Instead of being able to attack 3 or 4 or 5 bombers in a night they would have been forced down to 1 or 2. It would have slashed the BC loss rates.

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## parsifal (Sep 30, 2014)

After the BoB the RAF was faced with two very difficult problems....how to keep the skies and seas around Britain safe, and how to prosecute an offensive war against Germany. after the withdrawal of most of the LW from western Europe the duality of the problem remained, but solutions could be sought almost entirely by offensive action. hence the combined day and night offensives. The fighter sweeps and small scale day operations were hampered by a lack of range, and the exceptional quality of the opposition facing the RAF. The LW could, and did pick and choose the fights they wanted to fight, and consequently the loss rates were heavily one sided. I still believe that despite the carnage, it was a necessary price the RAF had to pay. A better outcome would have been achieved with more bombers and longer ranged fighters. There was not a lot wrong with the equipment per se once the shooting started, but the dribbling numbers of bombers never worried the LW, and the short range of the fighters over complicated the battle problems facing the RAF and meant they could never achieve any real decisive outcome in their daylight operations

The bombing offensive over Germany was necessarily a night offensive, but the numbers available and the losses suffered, and even more importantly the inability to hit much accuracy wise made it frustrating exercise. What do you do. The need to maintain the pressure on the germans whilst your last remaining ally on the continent is taking a massive beating is palpable, and cannot be overstated, but the means at your disposal makes it a rather pointless exercise. You are not going to achieve much, but you need to keep doing something. I think the best option was to try and minimise losses whilst still continuing to act offensively, until technology and industry offered better chances for some result. I would have made mosquito production a priority, which was possible, and continued to send small numbers over Germany on point attacks, day and night, until the heavies were more meaningful. Not expecting much to happen, but keeping the pressure on the Germans, whilst decreasing own losses has to be a worthwhile objective.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 30, 2014)

You are NOT going to get other 50mph out of it without strapping jets or rockets to it. That is where the whole thing falls apart.

The Lancastrian only about 2,400lb less than a Lancaster empty. max loaded weight war 65,000lbs or about 3,000lb less that the "normal" loaded weight of the Lancaster with the same engines. trouble is that the Performance figures are for a mean weight of 53,000lbs and max speed was 310mph at 12,000ft. Max weak cruise 285 at 17,500ft. rates of climb and ceiling are given at 65,000ft (ceiling was 23,000ft),

Range was rather spectacular but that is because of the fuel carried, not the streamlining. It carried not only 2154 imp gallons in the wings but 1020imp gallons under the 'cabin floor' (old bomb bay?). Three ranges are given carrying a 3597lb payload at 15,000ft: At max weak mixture cruise (265mph) 3,570miles, at speed between max weak cruise and most economical( 232mph) 3,950 miles, at most economical (200mph) 4501 miles. Please note that these are theoretical ranges and do not include take-off and climb. 

Also please note that the Avro York had a max speed using the same engines and wing of 290mph.


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## Greyman (Sep 30, 2014)

For what it's worth I have an A&AEE test of a Lancaster I at light load (38,800 lb), no mid-upper turret (I think) and it made, at only +9 boost/3000 rpm:

310 mph at 21,100 ft
302 mph at 15,000 ft

That's about +40 mph and +3,500 feet.

EDIT: Now that I think about it - this test is probably without exhaust shrouds either.

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## wuzak (Sep 30, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> A Twin Wasp powered Mosquito?



Are you making bombers or targets?




tomo pauk said:


> V-1710 powered version?



A V-1710 powered version would be excellent for a low altitude bomber version. Low altitude attacks are where the Mosquito excelled.

That said, I don't think Merlin supply was what was lacking in Mosquito production.

Also, if you are using more Mosquito bombers I would expect that the numbers of Lancasters being used would be trimmed, freeing up more Merlins.

At the end of the day, Mosquito production would have the same problem as historically - what mix of versions is made?


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## wuzak (Sep 30, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> It was also most powerful the British had - a more reliable Sabre should make the life for the Fw-190 problematic, at least under 15000 ft. Historically, the Fw-190 threat was the raison d'etre for the Typhoon/Sabre for quite a time.



Maybe expedite the Spitfire XII instead. That would be more than a match for the Fw 190.




tomo pauk said:


> I certainly don't wan't to forget about the LE tanks. However, both the under-seat and rear fuselage tanks were in use before the LE tanks. They would require a minor change in airframe, compared with LE tanks.
> Once there is enough of breathing space in production lines, the LE tanks (maybe made install an L-shaped tank to fit under behind the pilot, to?) should be installed, by all means. All together 150-160 imp gals for the 'new Spitfire VIII'?
> The (front) fuselage tank(s) were increased to 96 imp gals for the Spit VII, in late 1944 also the Spitfire IXs received the modification.



If you make the Spitfires carry 2 x 20mm or 1 x 20mm + 1 x 0.50" in each wing earlier, you could use the outer wings to store fuel in leading edge tanks. Maybe even use the old mg bays and ammo bays to store a little more?


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## nuuumannn (Sep 30, 2014)

> we can debate if the idea of an armed bomber was a good one or not but an armed bomber does NOT need turrets that can double as forest fire look out towers.



Those godawful FN.7 turrets were a real problem; cramped inside, they caused severe tail buffeting in the Manchester when rotated. That led to the third fin on the centre fuse. The Hudson turret was a Boulton Paul unit and although bulky, was actually well liked as it was roomy and easy to manipulate, as it was exactly the same as the Defiant turret in mechanical workings, but with two guns. Both BP and FN built twin turrets fitted with .50 cal guns early war, but these weren't put into production until later.

I'm very much in agreement with SR regarding removing turrets from four engined bombers - not a good idea. That wouldn't improve performance by much at all and it would leave them hopelessly unable to defend themselves. Fast unarmed bombers make sense if they are Ju 88 or Mossie size, but you have to wait until the jet age before a good fast unarmed heavy bomber. If you want fast bombers, concentrate on building lots of smaller aircraft rather than larger ones.

Regarding the what if ideas, obviously, much of what we are proposing here is based very much on what we know now and could not have been necessarily known in late 1940 early 1941. What the RAF faced immediately after the BoB was a increasing bombing campaign by the Germans, who used sophisticated navigation and bombing aids. Certainly the most useful advances at that time would have been to bolster night fighter defences and other means of deterence not necessarily directly connected with aircraft. Regarding the aircraft in service and about to enter service in that period; the die is already cast, as many have said here already. You are stuck with the likes of the Manchester, Wellington, Whitley, Hampden, Sunderland, lots of Blenheims and Battles, Hurricanes and Spitfire I and IIs. Also small but increasing numbers of Beaufighters, Beauforts, Defiants etc. As I've said before; you go to war with what you have, not necessarily what you want.

One thing that would have been of great benefit would be the decision to fit high altitude Merlins to fighters before bombers sooner than it was made. The two-speed, two-stage Merlin was originally intended as a bomber engine - scrap that and fit it directly to the prototype Spit III as is what eventually happened anyway and you have a Spit IX a year or so earlier, maybe if haste is applied - the Fw 190 provided enormous impetus to British fighter development. The Mosquito requires little modification to its timeline or spec, but certainly if it could be done, speed up production and increase the number being built. Get Hawker to work on a thin wing Typhoon; the Tempest earlier and bring Hurricane production to a slow to incorporate that aircraft. Do the same with the Blenheim with the Beaufighter. Heavy bombers? Can't really do much. The Lanc is really the only thing that is going to be effective and that's a year or so away from service. The Halifax was beset with problems, which took another two years before a really suitable aircraft could be built, the Mk.III. You could possibly insist that the Hali be powered by Hercs from the start, but that doesn't help the drag or instability issues. So that leaves the Stirling. Not much you can do, really.

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## nuuumannn (Sep 30, 2014)

Another thing I forgot about turrets, they weren't just somewhere to put gunners. Putting men in cupolas at the extremities of aeroplanes increased the flight crews' situational awareness. Take that away and you are effectively flying half blind. Gunners provided extra sets of eyes, the only proximity sensors afforded the bombers of the day (1940 - 42). Equally important since Bomber Command was also flying a large number of daylight raids. Having turrets at least gave you the ability to interrupt any attacking fighter's concentration, thereby buying time. Get rid of that and you have little option for defence. You could put glazed sections around the turretless bombers for crew to sit in, but when not occupied, instead of stooging about and clogging up the Elsan, you might as well put a gun in front of them.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 1, 2014)

On the British 4 engine bombers you have to remember that they were ALL designed to a requirement that they should be able to transport *24 fully armed soldiers* in case of need. This means they had rather large fuselages right from the start. Some designers may have placed more importance on that requirement than others. 
A 4 engine bomber, designed from the _START_ to have no guns and NO secondary transport role might very well be considerably faster. But pulling the guns from an existing _fat_ fuselage bomber is NOT going to turn it into a large Mosquito. 
First Prototype flights for the Sterling, Halifax and Manchester all took place in 1939 and production was _starting_ on all three by late 1940. Scrapping one or more of them and starting over in late 1940 means the super-bomber isn't going to show up until late 1943 or 1944.

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## yulzari (Oct 1, 2014)

x


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## merlin (Oct 1, 2014)

To got at from a different - don't have Leigh-Mallory in Charge, or for that matter Douglas - the 'Big Wings' failed in the BoB, failed in France in '41, and still failed over Dieppe in '42!

There would be a number of imperatives:

- guard South-East England just in case the Luftwaffe tries BoB mark II,

- after the Blitz London, and other Cities had endured - now was pay back time,

- after the German Invasion of the Soviet Union, came the need create a situation whereby Luftwaffe Fighters in the East would be called back (not achieved in OTL),

If Dowding had been promoted to CAS and Park made AoC Fighter Command - maybe unlikely but not impossible. My thinking is that Dowding would have made BC navigation and bombing accuracy a higher priority - to make raids more effective. His maxim of protect the 'base' - would just as easily apply to Malta North-Africa - so they get the Spit's earlier. And Park, I think would apply better tactics over France.


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## stona (Oct 1, 2014)

The Battle of the Atlantic was won and without denuding Bomber Command any further. Britain didn't lose the battle or the war which effectively proves the decision makers of the time correct. Remember that they didn't have the benefit of hindsight. War involves politics and any solution to OldSkeptics point #1 which involves preventing Bomber Command from striking back at Germany, however ineffectively was not acceptable. 
I've already posted the parlous state of the command shortly after Harris took over. Anything to prevent the build up through 1942/3 would have had to pass not only the old heads at the Air Ministry, bomber men almost to a man, but just as importantly, the Prime Minister. That's why it didn't happen.

The Battle of the Atlantic is often mooted as a closer run thing than it was, largely down to Churchill's recollections. Can anyone cite me a month in the war when RAF operations from the UK were curtailed for a lack of fuel for example? Nobody in Britain starved or came close to it. Food and clothing rationing might not have been popular or bountiful, but it WAS enough.

I absolutely agree that Spitfires should and, crucially, could have been sent to North Africa/The Mediterranean earlier. 

Cheers

Steve


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## Juha (Oct 1, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> ...Isn't the solution for the Sabre's issues to use sleeves as the ones from Taurus - maybe RAF/AM can be more persuasive with Bristol, so we can have the Sabre working in good order a bit earlier (6 months?)? ...



IIRC the culprit was Napier not Bristol, the latter gave all the help asked but Napier was more interested in to design new versions than to modify current ones reliable. In the end AM lost its patience and gave the operational control of napier to someone else and fairly soon most of Sabre's problems were solved.

juha


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## parsifal (Oct 1, 2014)

stona said:


> The Battle of the Atlantic was won and without denuding Bomber Command any further. Britain didn't lose the battle or the war which effectively proves the decision makers of the time correct. Remember that they didn't have the benefit of hindsight. War involves politics and any solution to OldSkeptics point #1 which involves preventing Bomber Command from striking back at Germany, however ineffectively was not acceptable.
> I've already posted the parlous state of the command shortly after Harris took over. Anything to prevent the build up through 1942/3 would have had to pass not only the old heads at the Air Ministry, bomber men almost to a man, but just as importantly, the Prime Minister. That's why it didn't happen.
> 
> The Battle of the Atlantic is often mooted as a closer run thing than it was, largely down to Churchill's recollections. Can anyone cite me a month in the war when RAF operations from the UK were curtailed for a lack of fuel for example? Nobody in Britain starved or came close to it. Food and clothing rationing might not have been popular or bountiful, but it WAS enough.
> ...



Steve, with regard to the air offensive i agree very strongly. With regard to your second point about the battle of the Atlantic and fuel shortages, at one point things did get perilously close to collapse actually. britain entered the war with fuel reserves for the navy at normal operation consumption rates for just over 18 months. by the latter part of 1942, fuel reserves for the navy were at a very dangerous level of about 3 months. capital ship movements and training were cut back, for a while. The so called "line of death" for britain in 1942 was just over 12 million tons per annum of imports overall, and by the latter part of 1942 were hovering just above that. the drop off in sinkings caused by the winter gales, combined with increased outputs of shipping by the US and Canada were what saved the british really. They did manage to divert nearly a million tons of shipping temporarily in preparation for Alamein, but other attacks, in particular the TORCH landings were to suffer severe cutbacks to the point of making the margin for error dangerously close (that wasnt the sole reason but it was A reason). There were reasons why the invasion of guadacanal was unnofficially named "operation shoestring" 

For most of the period 1941-3, the ME Command had at its disposal more than 20 divs from various nations, but they mostly just lolled around the delta, because the formations were incapable of being used actively because of a lack of supply. 8th army for most of its existence could support no more than about 5 or 6 divs beyond the Matruh line. In the pacific, the US suffered similar problems. they had available nearly 20 divs combat ready in the pacific or in the continental US awaiting shipment to the TO. most of them had to be kept at home whilst the allies were being pushed hard with inadequate forces....not because they were short of manpower for fighting, but because they simply lacked the shipping to use these formations effectively.

make no mistake, the shortages in shipping worldwide acted as a massive sheet anchor on the ability of the allies to enage in effective force projection for a very long time, and the majority of those shipping losses came from the allied merchant marines in the Atlantic, and one reason for that happening was the pitifully small resources poured into the VLR patrol requirements 

Though not directly linked, the shortage of shipping WAS felt worldwide. Nimitz famously had a sign above his desk "DO WE HAVE THE SHIPPING...IF YOU DONT KNOW, DONT ASK?" In 1942, for a number of critical operations the answer was a resounding "NO!!!!" Operations like the 1942 and then the 1943 cross channel incursions were all, (thankfully I might add) cancelled , primarily for a lack of shipping. Even the normandy operation to a degree was curtailed or limited at least by shipping restrictions. Thats because offensive operations soak up roughly three times the supply consumption compared to what might be thought as "normal" or "defensivfge" operations. Even by 1944, though the battle of the Atlantic was won the deep losses that had been suffered were having a residual effect.

Churchill might have exaggerated a little, but the threat was more than just a possibility. It was the one thing that came closest to wrecking the allies. And what is all the more galling is that the aircraft that were really needed....the VLR b-24s, were at one point in such pitifully short supply as to be laughable.

Churchill, except for a few moments of panic in 1942, actually kept his nerve and supported those who supported a continued priority for BC. his carry on was largely a post war construct, but at various conferences held on the issue and usage of BC resources at various times in 1942, the Navy argued very strongly, and convincingly at the time t for the need of a much greater slice of the long range air assets.

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## stona (Oct 1, 2014)

None of which I dispute at all. But none of it actually amounts to anything like a narrow escape for Britain, certainly not complete defeat, and that's my point. Of course it would have been nice for Coastal Command to have been equipped with all the latest long range types in unlimited numbers but in war as elsewhere resources are limited and hard choices have to be made.
The argument that Coastal Command should have had some kind of priority over Bomber Command is one which has been frequently made post war with the benefit of hindsight, particularly a more realistic assessment of what the bombing campaign(s) achieved in 1942/3.
Cheers
Steve


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## Shortround6 (Oct 1, 2014)

That maybe but there is little denying that Coast Command struggled for a long time without adequate resources. Avro Ansons might have been faster than some of the planes that went sub hunting in WW I but they had very little change in armament (and sometimes less)or 'sensors' (eyeball, Mark I) early in the war. 

"Nice to have" is a far cry from what was actually used for too long. The _very_ long range planes of coastal command equipped how many squadrons in 1940/41??? one or two?? You have given us the numbers of aircraft available at a single point in time, how many were pis**d away before that day in ineffective attacks on Germany? 

It didn't have to be all or nothing. Just two squadrons of Wellingtons or Whitleys would have made a difference, not closed the "gap" but narrowed it by 1-2 days steaming time.

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## tomo pauk (Oct 1, 2014)

wuzak said:


> [about Mossie + Twin Wasp] Are you making bombers or targets?



Bombers. That powerplant would yield a better performer than an early Douglas DB-7 (tough target for Bf-109Es) or B-26 (hard catch for Zeroes), let alone the Beaufort, Maryland or Baltimore. Should do just fine at CBI PTO.
Goes without saying that other engines should be better choices, though.



> A V-1710 powered version would be excellent for a low altitude bomber version. Low altitude attacks are where the Mosquito excelled.
> That said, I don't think Merlin supply was what was lacking in Mosquito production.
> Also, if you are using more Mosquito bombers I would expect that the numbers of Lancasters being used would be trimmed, freeing up more Merlins.
> At the end of the day, Mosquito production would have the same problem as historically - what mix of versions is made?



A bit of the PR versions (Merlin), decent number of NFs and intruders (V-12s, Hercules) and fighter bombers (Hercules, V-1710), majority of bombers (Merlin). We can have Halifax with Hercules exclusively, so extra Merlins are available for the Mossie?



wuzak said:


> Maybe expedite the Spitfire XII instead. That would be more than a match for the Fw 190.



It probably would. We need to have working Griffons prior the summer of 1942, though? Again, what the Napier and Hawker/Gloster to build if we forget Sabre Typhoon? An expedited 2-stage Merlin pretty much negates the need for the 1-stage Griffon.



> If you make the Spitfires carry 2 x 20mm or 1 x 20mm + 1 x 0.50" in each wing earlier, you could use the outer wings to store fuel in leading edge tanks. Maybe even use the old mg bays and ammo bays to store a little more?



I've suggested something similar in the 'faster, longer ranged Spitfire' thread some time ago


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## Shortround6 (Oct 1, 2014)

In reverse order, the trickier you make the fuel system the more planes/pilots you loose due to mistakes/malfunctions of the fuel system. How many planes were (and still are) lost due to pilot selecting the wrong tank or failing to switch over in time and not being able to restart the engine? The more tanks, lines and valves the more chances for a leak and that goes both ways, fuel leaking out (fire hazard) or air leaking in ( air bubble in fuel line can mean engine stoppage or failure to draw from tank). It was does but KISS!! 
Mustang pilots only had to manage 5 tanks and that included two drop tanks. P-47 pilots had two inside and 1-3 outside. Coming up with 5 or more inside tanks is staring to look like and accident waiting to happen. 

single stage Griffons are a nice belt and suspenders approach. They don't NEED super fuel or high boost numbers to make decent power. Perhaps not enough use was made of them during the war. 

With enough lead time you can have Hawker/Gloster and even Napair build whatever you want. With first production Typhoon not delivered _until_ Sept 1941, you have some wiggle room if you trash the project in Nov/Dec of 1940. If you wait until July/Aug 1941 you are pretty much committed. (although they did have second thoughts later) as you already have all the contracts placed and parts under construction at sub-contractors (landing gear legs, brakes, hydraulic cylinders, radiators, etc.) leaving you with a large amount of expensive scrap.


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## OldSkeptic (Oct 1, 2014)

wuzak said:


> Maybe expedite the Spitfire XII instead. That would be more than a match for the Fw 190.
> If you make the Spitfires carry 2 x 20mm or 1 x 20mm + 1 x 0.50" in each wing earlier, you could use the outer wings to store fuel in leading edge tanks. Maybe even use the old mg bays and ammo bays to store a little more?



Very underestimated plane the Spit XII, pretty competitive at low level even in July '44 as per their V1 victories (and by that stage they were getting pretty old). Run rings around a Typhoon.

A rear tank (even an L shaped on) is the best for the Spit because of simplicity. You have the option of fully filling it for LR missions, half fill for MR and empty for SR ones. Elevator bob weights (and perhaps further modified elevator horns?) reduce the CoG issues for full fill ones. But, using the rear tank for take off, climb and initial cruise takes care of that issue pretty quickly, so the plane returns to stability long before it enters a combat zone. The Mk VIII data card gives 26 gals used for takeoff and climb to 20,000ft, that's a fair chunk of a 66 (UK) gal rear tank. After even just another 100 miles cruise you are down to 25 gals, where things are getting much better.

A Mustang was unstable (particularly the P-51B) with a full rear tank (51Ds added an elevator bob weight). It settled down to about normal and fairly combat worthy as you got down to about 30 gals in the rear. At that level a Spit was probably still a bit twitchy but was definitely fine at 10 gals (all UK gals by the way). A Griffon Spit is better of course because of the greater weight of the engine (just as a Merlin 60 series Spit was better than a Mk V).

An L shaped tank (as per the 109) might have helped the Spit more of course, maybe been ok at 20 gals?

The key thing is that there were a lot of technical options, only dogma got in the way of the RAF in this.


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## OldSkeptic (Oct 1, 2014)

stona said:


> None of which I dispute at all. But none of it actually amounts to anything like a narrow escape for Britain, certainly not complete defeat, and that's my point. Of course it would have been nice for Coastal Command to have been equipped with all the latest long range types in unlimited numbers but in war as elsewhere resources are limited and hard choices have to be made.
> The argument that Coastal Command should have had some kind of priority over Bomber Command is one which has been frequently made post war with the benefit of hindsight, particularly a more realistic assessment of what the bombing campaign(s) achieved in 1942/3.
> Cheers
> Steve



Good little book is CINDERELLA SERVICE: RAF Coastal Command 1939 - 1945. Part of the problem was that BC over promised (lied?) in that it claimed it would take out the U-Boat production (it didn't) so there was no need to go "swanning all over the ocean" (Harris quote).
Every decent plane that CC got was over the howls of protest of BC (and Portal being ex BC was on their side). So Churchill was conned a bit.

Back to that critical '41 period. Now BC couldn't hit anything in the dark anywhere (lucky to hit the right country at times). At that point the Germans were just starting their U-Boat pens construction on the Biscay ports. Giving them that chance was a strategic mistake of the first order. It enabled the Germans to put large numbers of U-Boats into the Atlantic with little (until much, much later) opposition. Their other northern ports all could be constricted much more easily (by mines, patrols,etc) as they had to run a gauntlet through the Channel or the North Sea to get to the Atlantic.

So the British handed them a great gift, for which the paid for dearly later.

Those ports should have been hit by the RAF endlessly by day as they were being built, until the Germans gave up, this was within their technical capabilties. With even a moderately modified Spit getting the range necessary to escort the bombers. Add night time nuisance raids (you could not expect any accuracy at night back then) just to keep them on their toes.

This would have been expensive, but at least productive. BC and FC threw away huge numbers of planes on far less important stuff at that time. It would have given FC the big air battles against the Luftwaffe that they wanted, something they could afford but the Germans couldn't. The Luftwaffe did so well against FC in '41 because they could pick and choose their fights to when it suited them (hence got something like 4:1 victories). But if those pens are being hammered they have to fight everytime, therefore the odds become much more even.

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## Aozora (Oct 1, 2014)

OldSkeptic said:


> Good little book is CINDERELLA SERVICE: RAF Coastal Command 1939 - 1945. Part of the problem was that BC over promised (lied?) in that it claimed it would take out the U-Boat production (it didn't) so there was no need to go "swanning all over the ocean" (Harris quote).
> Every decent plane that CC got was over the howls of protest of BC (and Portal being ex BC was on their side). So Churchill was conned a bit.



It was probably inevitable that the first 20 B-17s handed to the RAF in 1941 were used by 90 Sqn BC to carry out ineffectual high-altitude daylight attacks. The USAAF criticised the RAF for flying the B-17s over Europe in small formations and attempting to bomb from too high an altitude. Even one squadron of long-range B-17s flying escort missions over North Atlantic convoys during 1941 might have helped make a difference.

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## parsifal (Oct 1, 2014)

Its a bit misleading to claim that the pens provided an immediate decisive advantage for the germans. The first pens were built in 1941 from memory, and 1941 was described by Donitz himself as an overall defeat for the Uboat arm, as it began to suffer significant losses from about March. by the end of the year, the average survival time for a Uboat man had dropped from just over 200 days at the beginning of the year to just over 100 days by the end of the year. many of the aces, including Shepke, Prien and Kretschmer were dead or captured.

But more importantly, the mere presence of CC aircraft with some range and ASV capabilities (a relatively rare thing in 1941) would often force uboats to submerge, thereby denying one of their greatest advantages....their mobility. this was a major factor in the drop in tonnage losses, in fact the losses were almost manageable by the end of 1941.

The Germans responded to this, firstly by switching attacks to the US East Coast, but also shifting the main focus of attacks to the remaining air gap mid ocean. The pens helped in this regard, to the extent that I would say "a lot' but moreso, the germans were reducing habitability standards in the Uboats so that they could carry extra fuel and thereby increase their times on station. always the limiting factor for most Uboat cruises was the torpedo supply rather than range or endurance. 

Without the pens, the Germans would have been forced to keep their uboats on the harbour floors whilst in port, to avoid destruction from the air, but losses would not have been catastrophic. What would have been the issue was the turnaround times for the uboats. In essence, the pens were "nice to have", but weren't the whole of why the Uboats could do what they did.


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## nuuumannn (Oct 1, 2014)

> On the British 4 engine bombers you have to remember that they were ALL designed to a requirement that they should be able to transport 24 fully armed soldiers in case of need. This means they had rather large fuselages right from the start. Some designers may have placed more importance on that requirement than others.



This might have been true of B.12/36, from which the Stirling came, but not of P.13/36, from which the Manchester/Lancaster and the Halifax by way of the HP.56, which were designed to be smaller overall than the aircraft of B.12/36, twin instead of four engines. On both specs gun turrets were mandatory for defence. The Hali certainly had a large enough fuse to carry troops and was used in that role, but it was somewhat larger than the HP.56 design. Which ever way you look at it, you're not going to get 24 troops in the fuselage of the Manchester/Lancaster!  Lancastrian maybe, but not the Lanc or Manchester, it'd be standing room only and they'd risk getting bopped in the head by the mid upper turret. That is unless they lay down between the fwd and rear wing spars... nah. There's not much room in there.



> There would be a number of imperatives: - guard South-East England just in case the Luftwaffe tries BoB mark II,



Merlin has a point. This would or should be number one priority. A more defensive stance in late 1940 should be applied to all the services across the entire country; shoring up the barricades for the night bombing offensive, at the expense of other commands if need be. As with the rest of you, no _leaning into_ France; a waste of resources. The first priority is night fighter defences. Let's look at the options post BoB:

Blenheim; obsolescent but a necessity since there is a desperate shortage of suitable aircraft, but once these come on line the Blenheims should go to OTUs. Their radar is an advance, but proved faulty in service, plus the Blenheims were so slow, they often couldn't catch the enemy bombers. Bring Blenheim production to a standstill and concentrate on bringing Beaufighters in their place on the production lines.

Beaufighter; not available in large numbers initially, plus, very difficult for pilots used to the benign handling of the Blenheim and Defiant to get used to. There were a large number of crashes at OTU level as a result. This was largely from the Beaufighter Mk.II with its Merlins, whose handling was described as 'evil', but these are also necessary; an evil handling Beaufighter is better than no evil handling Beaufighter in the numbers game. Advanced specific training at OTU level to assist tyro pilots to get round its handling issues. Beaufighters were hampered in service by the radar sets also and the type really didn't get into service in suitable numbers to replace interim types until early '42 as a result of technical difficulties - much effort should be expended to sort electronic issues out to facilitate smoother radar ops for British night fighters.

Defiant: As a result of the Beaufighter's unexpected troublesome introduction into service, the Defiant rose in importance. Although not ideal, it had little or no vices in its entry into night fighter service, plus it was available in numbers. BP had been building Defiants for more than a year or so, so the two squadrons that served in the BoB can be bolstered by fresh production examples used strictly for new night fighter units. Little can be done with the Defiant; it's not going to get any faster and the Daffy Mk.II is also having trouble with its radar, but it's better than nothing. Once Beaufighters come on line, the Defiants can be sent to OTUs (the largest Defiant operator was 60 night fighter OTU).

Hurricane: In my scenario, the Hurricane takes on greater prominence as a night fighter. Since day fighter units are not going to be so busy on offensive ops, I propose that day Hurri squadrons (not all, though) convert to strictly night ops, along with new build Hurricanes, with crews going through OTUs for specialist training. Once the 'thin wing' Tornado/Typhoon is sorted out, it would replace the Hurricane in production altogether, since it was approaching obsolescence by 1942 - 43, and go into service as the RAF's single-seat night fighter.

Mosquito: By the end of BoB the DH.98 prototype had not yet flown, but a spec for a night fighter variant had been issued, so little can be done to the Mossie's timeline that wasn't done in reality. The idea of building the Mossie with a tail turret can be canned for certain!!! Perhaps anticipating a need and establishing production facilities (for engines as well - Canadian Mossies had Packard Merlins) in Canada and Australia from the outset when the type was ordered?

OTUs: More specialist night fighter OTUs are required, with radar operations taking prominence. Experienced aircrews on front line squadrons would naturally be given a tour of the OTUs to facilitate training, and to give them a bit of a rest.

New designs: In July 1940 Spec F.18/40 for a new night fighter was issued, in December it was altered to incorporate a turret - scrap that and continue it without said appendage. The Gloster Reaper was one aircraft conceived to this, but it wasn't progressed with because Gloster didn't have the resources to work on jets simultaneously to setting up production for the Reaper. Jets are obviously important for the future, so that cannot be interrupted. Two options are available here. Another firm, Boulton Paul or Miles perhaps could put the Reaper into production as a twin engine fighter bomber/night fighter, photo recon platform, estimating an in-service date to suppliment Mossies and Beaufighters in 1942, or option two undertake Mosquito production (easier for Miles than Boulton Paul) and can the F.18/40 spec altogether.

Another option is looking to the USA. Traditionally, Douglas Havocs arrived for RAF service since the US didn't have a specialised night fighter in late 1940, but the Havoc was slow, like the Defiant and Blenheim, but it bolstered numbers. Perhaps a Lockheed Lightning night fighter derivative? We are straying into other threads here.

That's the aircraft side of things, obviously greater defensive measures around the country would be put in place to combat the German bombers and deter their use of sophisticated radio nav aids.

Once the bombing offensive - in late 1940 no one could judge when this might happen - the next step in the plan would be to look at offensive elements and improving the RAF's strike capabilities. Traditionally, the German invasion of Russia gave the British some breathing space, so once the bombing offensive against Britain eases, step two can be acted on. This involves improving Bomber Command and crucially, Army Co-operation Command, which takes on increased importance in my scenario.

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## wuzak (Oct 1, 2014)

nuuumannn said:


> Another option is looking to the USA. Traditionally, Douglas Havocs arrived for RAF service since the US didn't have a specialised night fighter in late 1940, but the Havoc was slow, like the Defiant and Blenheim, but it bolstered numbers. Perhaps a Lockheed Lightning night fighter derivative? We are straying into other threads here.



By the time you start getting these Lightning NF.IIs you should also be getting some Mosquito NF.IIs. The Mosquito is definitely better for the radar operator.


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## nuuumannn (Oct 1, 2014)

Yep, probably right, but when your back's against the wall and all you have is a handful of Blenheims and Defiants and Beaufighters that don't work properly, you take what you can. The RAF put the Havoc into service despite its inadequacies, so the idea of a night fighter Lightning doesn't sound so bad when attempting to bolster numbers.


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## wuzak (Oct 1, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Bombers. That powerplant would yield a better performer than an early Douglas DB-7 (tough target for Bf-109Es) or B-26 (hard catch for Zeroes), let alone the Beaufort, Maryland or Baltimore. Should do just fine at CBI PTO.
> Goes without saying that other engines should be better choices, though.



Sorry, but an R-1830 in a Mosquito airframe is a waste of an airframe.

Mosquito production was, in my mind, restricted by airframe production, not engine supply.




tomo pauk said:


> It probably would. We need to have working Griffons prior the summer of 1942, though? Again, what the Napier and Hawker/Gloster to build if we forget Sabre Typhoon? An expedited 2-stage Merlin pretty much negates the need for the 1-stage Griffon.



The XII was faster down low than the F.IX or LF.IX, though maybe not when LF.IX gets +25psi boost.

I suggested earlier, Napiers can have a little longer to perfect the Sabre so they can put it in the Hawker P.1005 unarmed high speed bomber.

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## tomo pauk (Oct 2, 2014)

wuzak said:


> Sorry, but an R-1830 in a Mosquito airframe is a waste of an airframe.



I've just read a bit about the Argentinian Calquin, really a non-performer. Guess I can shelve the Mossie on Twin Wasps.



> Mosquito production was, in my mind, restricted by airframe production, not engine supply.



Probably. If we attempt the increase in Mossie's production, alternative engines could come in handy.



> The XII was faster down low than the F.IX or LF.IX, though maybe not when LF.IX gets +25psi boost.



Agreed. In case RR can come out with the 1-stage Griffon some 15 months after the BoB (winter of 1941/42), that would likely give us the 2-stage version for service use in say, Spring/Summer of 1943?



> I suggested earlier, Napiers can have a little longer to perfect the Sabre so they can put it in the Hawker P.1005 unarmed high speed bomber.



The Sabre-powered bomber should really be capable to lug an 8000 lb cookie to offer an advantage over the Mossie? The P.1005 have had wings in mid-wing position - would that restrict the bomb bay?


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## Shortround6 (Oct 2, 2014)

Part of the problem with increasing Mosquito production by a LOT, is trying to get the wood for it. With Ecuadorean Balsa wood being used as the core of the sandwich you are rather limited. Balsa trees don't grow in stands or forests of balsa trees but a a bit scattered. Balsa does grow in other countries but Balsa can also vary in weight per cubic inch (CC) quite a bit. Then you have then you have the Spruce outer layers and spars, only certain grades of Spruce will do. long, straight grain and knot free. Also selected by weight to volume ratio. 
You can't use Pine or Oak or Elm or............
Canada (and US ?) had the Spruce but doubling wood output was not quite like doubling the output of a mine or smelting. The Trees had to a minimum age to get the growth/grain structure wanted and also couldn't be over a certain age without causing problems. 
Now maybe the wood production was not maxed out but just saying you are going to double or triple Mosquito production if you can get the engines might be a lot harder than it looks at first glance.

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## tomo pauk (Oct 2, 2014)

Guess that a 30% increase of the production would gave a boost to the Allied cause. That, and more emphasis on bomber versions.

Back to the engines a bit - wonder whether it would be of use to develop the 2-stage version of the Hercules? Bristol was experimenting with 2-stage supercharging pre-war (setting the world record in process), though the systems were quite bulky then.


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## wuzak (Oct 2, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> The Sabre-powered bomber should really be capable to lug an 8000 lb cookie to offer an advantage over the Mossie? The P.1005 have had wings in mid-wing position - would that restrict the bomb bay?


 

The P.1005 was designed from the beginning to carry 4000lb, rather than the Mosquito's 1000lb (changed to 2000lb early on).

The data sheet shows 1 x 4000lb, 2 x 2000lb and 4 x 1000lb bombs. The Mosquito with bulged bomb bay could carru only 2 x 1000lb bombs, and early experiments with the normal bomb bay had 1 x 1000lb and 2 x 500lb.

I doubt that the P.1005 could have taken the longer and larger in diameter 8000lb HC bomb.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 2, 2014)

Good source for info on British bombs. Bombs

8000lb HC was 38in diameter and either 131.5 or 159in long depending on tail, The 4000lb HC was 30in diameter and 110in long. Lancasters had to use bulged bomb-bay doors to handle the 8000lb HC bomb.


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## nuuumannn (Oct 2, 2014)

> Now maybe the wood production was not maxed out but just saying you are going to double or triple Mosquito production if you can get the engines might be a lot harder than it looks at first glance.



Yet they built over 7,000 Mosquitoes and not to mention other wooden aircraft, such as the Oxford, Magister etc. I honestly don't think it would have been too much of an issue, to be honest. A lot more of the world was forested back then than what it is now. The issue with the Mossie was that there weren't enough of it to go round.


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## tomo pauk (Oct 5, 2014)

Thought that it would be better to discuss a bit about Hercules vs. Merlin here:



wuzak said:


> Merlin 45 1,190hp @ 23,000ft. Weight 1,385lb
> Merlin XX 1,430hp @ 11,000ft. 1,460hp @ 6,500ft. Weight 1,450lb
> Hercules VI 1,545hp @ 15,500ft. 1,750hp @ 6,500ft.. Weight 1,845lb.
> 
> The Hercules has more power than the equivalent period Merlin, but also more weight and drag. Plus there would need to be significant revisions to the fuselage since the Hercules is nearly twice as wide. Also, the prop centreline will be lower so the prop diameter will be restricted and the extra hp may not result in extra thrust.



The Merlin 45 was good for 1515 HP at 11000 ft, corrected for altitude it gives ~1300 HP at 15500 ft, and ~1130 HP at 20000 ft. IOW, some 250 HP less than Herc VI at 15500 ft, and some 200 HP less at 20000 ft. The weight of cooling system need to be added for the Merlin - 350 lbs? We might recall that BMW-801C was some 200 lbs heavier than the Hercules, making 1360 HP at 15100 ft (the restricted BMW 801D was in the ballpark). The heavy Fw-190s (even before the restrictions on the 801D were lifted) were still faster and with greater RoC than the lightweight and more sleek Spit V. 
As for changes required to the Hercules Spitfire to work - Lavochkin and Kawasaki were capable enough to pull that out, the people at Supermarine are at least as good. As for the prop - the 4-bladed can be used, like the one installed at the Spitfire VI. Part of the drag can be cancelled out by deletion the underslung radiator. 

The Spitfire with such power should be able to at least hold it's own at all altitudes against the Fw-190 (prior late 1942, by then we should have had 2-stage Merlins around) and Bf-109F-4, a thing that the Spitfire V has been unable to do. At lower altitudes, it would be a far tougher machine, especially vs. the Bf-109.


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## wuzak (Oct 5, 2014)

Don't forget that you have much more blockage behind the prop with the Hercules than the Merlin.

Also, Beaufighter with Merlin XX was faster than with Hercules.


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## wuzak (Oct 5, 2014)

Also, consider that the Fw 190 had a much better installation of the radial than was the case in the UK at the time. It wasn't until the Tempest II in 1944/45 that the British caught up.


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## tomo pauk (Oct 5, 2014)

wuzak said:


> Don't forget that you have much more blockage behind the prop with the Hercules than the Merlin.



Fair enough. Seems like the La-5 and Ki-100 managed to deal with that problem.



> Also, Beaufighter with Merlin XX was faster than with Hercules.



If it was - how much was the difference? What about the RoC? BTW, there was a reason for calling the handling of the Merlin Beau as 'vicious' - the lack of power was really felt?



wuzak said:


> Also, consider that the Fw 190 had a much better installation of the radial than was the case in the UK at the time. It wasn't until the Tempest II in 1944/45 that the British caught up.



150 extra HP should cater a good deal for imperfections of engine installation. We can recall that an usual BMW-801 installation was not perfect either - the internal air intakes cost a good deal of aircraft performance; Hercules used external intake.
The Hercules Spitfire should still be a good deal lighter than Fw-190, that wold yield benefits in RoC and (though less) in speed.


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## wuzak (Oct 5, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Fair enough. Seems like the La-5 and Ki-100 managed to deal with that problem.



I would imagine that they were less compromised by the landing gear than the Spitfire was.




tomo pauk said:


> If it was - how much was the difference? What about the RoC? BTW, there was a reason for calling the handling of the Merlin Beau as 'vicious' - the lack of power was really felt?



I don't think it was a lack of power. Probably more to do with the shift in CoG and slightly different aerodynamics.

Not sure on the RoC.



tomo pauk said:


> 150 extra HP should cater a good deal for imperfections of engine installation. We can recall that an usual BMW-801 installation was not perfect either - the internal air intakes cost a good deal of aircraft performance; Hercules used external intake.
> The Hercules Spitfire should still be a good deal lighter than Fw-190, that wold yield benefits in RoC and (though less) in speed.



The 150 extra horsepower would struggle to overcome the extra drag, IMO. This also affects RoC.


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## Greyman (Oct 5, 2014)

wuzak said:


> Also, Beaufighter with Merlin XX was faster than with Hercules.



Over 20,000 feet. Under those heights the Hercules Beaufighters were generally 20-30 mph faster.



tomo pauk said:


> What about the RoC?



Data Sheets say:

*Time to 15,000 feet*
Mk.I - Herc III: 9.5 minutes
Mk.I - Herc XI: 8.7 minutes
Mk.II - Merl XX: 8.8 minutes
Mk.VI - Herc VI: 7.8 minutes

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## nuuumannn (Oct 5, 2014)

> It wasn't until the Tempest II in 1944/45 that the British caught up.



The Fw 190 is often credited with being partially responsible for the design on the Centaurus installation in the Tempest and Fury, but Hawker were working on that installation on the Tornado in 1940 and I've never seen anything official to state the Fw 190 connection.

The Merlin Beaufighter's issues were concernign the shift in CG forward and also its asymetric handling. On the ground, if pilots were not careful, advancing the throttles, even gingerly caused the aircraft to ground loop. Part of its reputation came from the fact that OTU pilots experienced on Blenheims and Defiants got used to rather benign handling and the Beau Mk.II was a little much. This caused many accidents.


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## nuuumannn (Oct 5, 2014)

> It wasn't until the Tempest II in 1944/45 that the British caught up.



The Fw 190 is often credited with being partially responsible for the design on the Centaurus installation in the Tempest and Fury, but Hawker were working on that installation on the Tornado in 1940 and I've never seen anything official to state the Fw 190 connection.

The Merlin Beaufighter's issues were concernign the shift in CG forward and also its asymetric handling. On the ground, if pilots were not careful, advancing the throttles, even gingerly caused the aircraft to ground loop. Part of its reputation came from the fact that OTU pilots experienced on Blenheims and Defiants got used to rather benign handling and the Beau Mk.II was a little much. This caused many accidents.


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## wuzak (Oct 5, 2014)

nuuumannn said:


> The Fw 190 is often credited with being partially responsible for the design on the Centaurus installation in the Tempest and Fury, but Hawker were working on that installation on the Tornado in 1940 and I've never seen anything official to state the Fw 190 connection.



The Tornado's installation in 1940 was different to the Tempest's in 1944.


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## KiwiBiggles (Oct 6, 2014)

If you were converting the Spitfire to a radial engine, a fully-worked installation like that on the Fw 190, La 5 or Tempest II would be nice, but by no means essential. As far as I can tell the Ha-112 installation in the Kawasaki Ki-100 was a very hasty lash-up, with extra fairing being tacked onto the fuselage behind the air and exhaust exits. Despite this, the new fighter was 300 kg lighter than its inline progenitor, and had correspondingly better performance and handling. So a quick-and-dirty conversion of the standard Hercules power-egg installation to fit the Spitfire firewall, with some tin stuck on behind to make it look nice, would be a pretty good start.

Although the dry weight of a Hercules is about 500 lb greater than a single-stage Merlin (or about 300 lb more than a two-stage), once the weight of the cooling system is also considered, there really can't be much in it weight-wise. And the Hercules is of course shorter than a Merlin, so installed on the same firewall in a Spitfire V would give pretty much the same balance.


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## wuzak (Oct 6, 2014)

It's just not right.....

A drawing from a guy named Mossie 







Supermarine Spitfire and Seafire

It doesn't seem as if the Hercules was considered for any single engine fighter. Having said that, someone will prove me wrong.

Also, when was teh Hercules available in quantity? The Beaufighter II was built because of the possible shortage of Hercules.

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## Shortround6 (Oct 6, 2014)

KiwiBiggles said:


> So a quick-and-dirty conversion of the standard Hercules power-egg installation to fit the Spitfire firewall, with some tin stuck on behind to make it look nice, would be a pretty good start.
> 
> Although the dry weight of a Hercules is about 500 lb greater than a single-stage Merlin (or about 300 lb more than a two-stage), once the weight of the cooling system is also considered, there really can't be much in it weight-wise. And the Hercules is of course shorter than a Merlin, so installed on the same firewall in a Spitfire V would give pretty much the same balance.



The cooling system of a two stage Merlin was several hundred pounds heavier than a single stage Merlin. The radiators and intercooler were _behind_ the CG so taking them out and adding weight ot he nose does get a bit tricky, (more ballast in the tail?), they had to add ballast just to fit the variable pitch/constant speed props.

And I really want to a see a Spitfire fitted with a Hercules with that honking big airscoop right in front of the canopy


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## tomo pauk (Oct 6, 2014)

The war time Merlins dictated a single airscoop under engine, yet there was a fair number of Merlinized A/C with 'bifurcated' intakes. Should work for Hercules, too. Or, locate the scoop at 10 or 2 o'clock, rather than at 12 o'clock position.



wuzak said:


> ...
> It doesn't seem as if the Hercules was considered for any single engine fighter. Having said that, someone will prove me wrong.



Bristol was proposing the Type 153; a bit about it: link.



> Also, when was teh Hercules available in quantity? The Beaufighter II was built because of the possible shortage of Hercules.



Both 4-engines Halifax and Stirling were to be powered by Hercules engines, so I guess that a single engined fighter might get some of the Hercules without those bombers taking much of a hit.


A less controversial topic - water injection for the Merlin. Per Morgan Shacklady: the Merlin II Special was tested with water injection, during 1938 (!). Combined with 110 oct fuel, boost achieved was +18.5 psi, 1450 HP power. With special fuel (noted as 'SR24'), it was +25 psi, 2150 HP. Engine life was cut back severely on there powers. 
The water injection could be an useful addition for the Merlin 45, we could probably go to +18 psi there, without much damage to the engine? The inter-cooling effect would mean that also altitude capabilities are improved over the usual Merlin 45.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 6, 2014)

Hercules carb intake was pretty high up, almost level with exhaust ports.
Spitfire didn't have the best forward and down vision as it was. The radial is not going to help and sticking big air intakes anywhere in the 3 to 9 o'clock positions makes it even worse.
The straighter and least amount of turns in the inlet duct is going to give the best ram effect. On the twins it did one 90 degree bend. Go much below the 1 to 11 o'clock positions and you are dealing with multiple bends, 3 or 4.


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## nuuumannn (Oct 6, 2014)

> The Tornado's installation in 1940 was different to the Tempest's in 1944.



I'm well aware of that and if you re-read my post, it says, "but Hawker were working on that installation on the Tornado in 1940", meaning a Centaurus installation. The point I'm trying to make is that Hawker had been pondering it for some time and that I'd like to see confirmation that the BMW 801 installation in the Fw 190 had an impact on the Tempest and Fury, if it exists. I'm sure it would be interesting reading.

Yep, SR, the downdraught carb is going to be the thing, unless clever cowling is thought up where the intake is in the top lip of the cowl, like the cowl on the Zero.






Not sure what a Hercules Spit is going to do apart from ruin the aerodynamics. Why not go for a Griffon engined Spitfire that early in the piece? Fairey approached Rolls-Royce in 1938 and RR used the old 'R' derived Griffon - in its first incarnation bench tested in 1933 - and one was running a year later. By late 1939, Rolls had advised Supermarine of the potential of the Griffon, but in mid November Supermarine advised RR that it wanted to concentrate on the Spit III and the Merlin XX, but three weeks later changed its mind and began examining a Griffon engined Spitfire. Hows about anticipating this and approaching RR sooner with the Griffon idea?

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## wuzak (Oct 6, 2014)

nuuumannn said:


> I'm well aware of that and if you re-read my post, it says, "but Hawker were working on that installation on the Tornado in 1940", meaning a Centaurus installation. The point I'm trying to make is that Hawker had been pondering it for some time and that I'd like to see confirmation that the BMW 801 installation in the Fw 190 had an impact on the Tempest and Fury, if it exists. I'm sure it would be interesting data.



I didn't say that the Tempest's installation was inspired by or copied from the Fw 190. 

What I said was that the Tornado's installation, nor any other British radial installation, was as advanced at the time (~1940-1942).


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## nuuumannn (Oct 6, 2014)

> What I said was that the Tornado's installation, nor any other British radial installation, was as advanced at the time (~1940-1942).



I'll give you that. The Bristol installations stuck with the exhaust collector ring for too long; it added weight and drag. I'll also agree with your comment about the Herc powered Spitfire; "it just isn't right!"


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## wuzak (Oct 6, 2014)

nuuumannn said:


> I'll give you that. The Bristol installations stuck with the exhaust collector ring for too long; it added weight and drag. I'll also agree with your comment about the Herc powered Spitfire; "it just isn't right!"



I also don't think a Hercules powered Spitfire would be any great shakes either.

Also, by 1940 Supermarines were working on the Griffon Spitfire. A Hercules version would distract from that work, as well as the 2 stage Merlin versions.


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## nuuumannn (Oct 6, 2014)

> by 1940 Supermarines were working on the Griffon Spitfire. A Hercules version would distract from that work, as well as the 2 stage Merlin versions.



That's right. Read my post above about that. Perhaps in this what if scenario, Supermarine instead of Fairey could go to RR regarding a new engine and kick start the Griffon?


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## wuzak (Oct 6, 2014)

nuuumannn said:


> That's right. Read my post above about that. Perhaps in this what if scenario, Supermarine instead of Fairey could go to RR regarding a new engine and kick start the Griffon?



Not sure that Fairey had anything to do with getting the Griffon started.

The question was asked, not long after the Griffon was started, if it could be fitted to the Spitfire. This was before the war.

Fairey was asked to help with or develop the Seafire, also before the war, but they wanted to do their own thing.


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## tomo pauk (Oct 7, 2014)

wuzak said:


> I also don't think a Hercules powered Spitfire would be any great shakes either.



In case the Hercules Spitfire can climb with Fw-190 and Bf-109F-4/G-2 (and Zero?), it is offering something valuable. At under 7000 lbs loaded (2x 20mm, 4x .303s)and 150 HP extra with Hercules VI, it would be in advantage vs. the 8300+ lbs heavy Fw-190A-1 (2x MG FF, 4 LMGs). 



> Also, by 1940 Supermarines were working on the Griffon Spitfire. A Hercules version would distract from that work, as well as the 2 stage Merlin versions.



Unlike the Griffon, the Hercules is in production - once testing is done, there are engines around to install them. Vickers can allocate their engineers and technicians to bulk up the Supermarine's design staff. Plus, the Supermarine cancelled out the work on their heavy bomber once the prototype is destroyed during bombing - meaning there is more design staff to work on the Spit, that has the major aerodynamics structural long solved. The 2-engined heavy fighter is also cancelled.
Trial installation tests can be done during the Autumn and Winter, and small scale production to be undertaken from summer of 1941. Large scale production from Winter of 1941/42. 
Hawker was working on 3 different-enough engines for their Typhoon/Tornado in about the same time.


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## wuzak (Oct 7, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> In case the Hercules Spitfire can climb with Fw-190 and Bf-109F-4/G-2 (and Zero?), it is offering something valuable. At under 7000 lbs loaded (2x 20mm, 4x .303s)and 150 HP extra with Hercules VI, it would be in advantage vs. the 8300+ lbs heavy Fw-190A-1 (2x MG FF, 4 LMGs).



Maybe. I'm not convinced.




tomo pauk said:


> Unlike the Griffon, the Hercules is in production - once testing is done, there are engines around to install them. Vickers can allocate their engineers and technicians to bulk up the Supermarine's design staff. Plus, the Supermarine cancelled out the work on their heavy bomber once the prototype is destroyed during bombing - meaning there is more design staff to work on the Spit, that has the major aerodynamics structural long solved. The 2-engined heavy fighter is also cancelled.



Supermarines stopped working on the 324/327 in 1938, having never received an order to proceed. So that wasn't an issue.

It is telling that the Air Ministry chose the "interim" Mk V over the more advanced Mk III. The Mk III was refined aerodynamically and would have (probably) been a match for the Fw 190A and Bf 109F.

A Hercules version, like the Griffon version, would have required significant strengthening of the fuselage. That adds weight. As does the need, identified earlier, to install counterweights in the tail to correct the CoG.




tomo pauk said:


> Hawker was working on 3 different-enough engines for their Typhoon/Tornado in about the same time.



The Centaurus was somewhat closer in size (frontal area) to the Vulture and Sabre than the Hercules was to the Merlin.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 7, 2014)

This seems like another one of those ideas/projects that requires working on a version of plane that will NOT be very good in service for 1 to 2 years so you can be ready with a tooled up production line _when_ the version of the engine you really want to use shows up. 
It also requires a fair amount of jiggery-pokery to get it to work. 

AS for availability of Hercules engines, details seem to be a bit sketchy but it took until Dec of 1941 to get the first 200 Short Stirlings. 
The first Wellington Prototype with Hercules engines flew May 19th 1939 but the first production version didn't fly until the Jan of 1941 with the Hercules XI engine. 

Photo of Halifax engine installation






Photo of the Zero

http://www.enginehistory.org/G&jJBrossett/RAFCosford/Nakajima Sakae 21 display.JPG

can't get it to transfer over.

It is not question of unbolting the Merlin and it's radiators and bolting on a Hercules "power egg" and bashing some sheet metal to fill the gaps. The Hercules has a higher carburetor than the Sakae and some other radial engines. It often used a remote drive to the accessories. Good for servicing the accessorizes, not so good for a short engine installation. The exhaust system is going to offer a lot less exhaust thrust than the Merlin. The cowl is not exactly low drag. 
Everything can be 'fixed' with enough time and effort but the longer it takes the less need for it. 
The Early Hercules doesn't offer anything the Melrin doesn't at the time and even a Hercules VI giving 1545hp at 15,500ft (Lumsden) is fighting higher weight and much higher drag than the Merlin.

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## Aozora (Oct 7, 2014)

wuzak said:


> It's just not right.....
> 
> A drawing from a guy named Mossie
> 
> ...








So, Mr Blackadder - aka Mossie - you decided that a Spitfire powered by a Hercules would be an interesting idea?

Errr...errr...yup!

And having thought up this idea, you proceeded to photoshop it, and put it out on the net - for EVERBODY to see!?

Errrr...weeell...yup!

I put it to you, Mr Blackadder, you have just admitted responsibility for what is, in fact, *AN ABOMINATION OF BEELZEBUB!!!*



wuzak said:


> Not sure that Fairey had anything to do with getting the Griffon started.
> 
> The question was asked, not long after the Griffon was started, if it could be fitted to the Spitfire. This was before the war.
> 
> Fairey was asked to help with or develop the Seafire, also before the war, but they wanted to do their own thing.




The Griffon was designed in response to RN requirements. According to Morgan and Shacklady, Supermarine issued a specification (No. 466) for a Griffon powered Spitfire on 4 December 1939, and subsequently issued a revised specification No. 468, on 27 Feb 1940:










Flight articles from 1944 and '45

View attachment Rolls-Royce Griffon II VI.pdf

View attachment Spitfire XII 1944.pdf

View attachment Rolls-Royce Griffon 65 1945.pdf

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## wuzak (Oct 7, 2014)

Let's look at the prop diameters again.

Mk V and Mk IX had prop diameter of 10'9".

Mk XII and MK XIV had a prop diameter of 10'5". The difference to the Merlin types is due to the lower thrust line.

The Hercules is ~10" taller than the Griffon. So we can expect a reduction of thrust centreline of ~5". That would mean a prop of ~9'7". That is a reduction of area of 21% over the V/IX and 15% over the XII/XIV.

The shorter engine may give some extra clearance, so if we assume a diameter of 10' that is still a loss of 13% and 8% respectively.

As regards to adding blades, the XIV got 5 blades in 1943. A 5 blade prop didn't exist in 1941 - it would have to be built.

Also, due to the smaller diameter the XIV spun its prop faster. The Hercules VI would need new reduction gearing to do that.

Also, ~1/5-1/4 of the prop will be blocked by the engine behind. The frontal area of the Bristol being roughly twice that of the Griffon.


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## nuuumannn (Oct 7, 2014)

> Not sure that Fairey had anything to do with getting the Griffon started.



I think I should have written FAA rather than Fairey, but Fairey did have _something_ to do with kickstarting the Griffon. The Navy approached RR regarding a more powerful 'Merlin Type' engine, as stated in the text above in Morgan and Shacklady's book provided by Aozora, and subsequently released N.8/39 and N.9/39. To the former spec, Fairey offered the Griffon as a powerplant option (one of four engine types it specified) and it was selected for N.8/39. The spec was was re-written as N.5/40 and the Fairey design was selected for production off the drawing board, which became the Firefly I (first flying 22 December 1941) and indeed, the Firefly introduced the Griffon into service.


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## tomo pauk (Oct 8, 2014)

By the end of 1940, there was plenty of orders from the American manufacturers. What orders should be kept, what ones altered, what can we be without? 
Merlin (even the single stage) Mustang is a given


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## gjs238 (Oct 8, 2014)

And putting aside national pride, which British designs would be better shelved and foreign designs utilized?


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## gjs238 (Oct 8, 2014)

Order P-38 Lightnings (Model 322B) with counter-rotating engines and turbochargers.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 8, 2014)

P-38s with turbos won't show up in useful numbers until Nov/Dec of 1941 at which point the US grab the majority of the ones on order (this sort of happened historically, many of the P-38s originally ordered by the British weren't actually canceled, the orders were taken over by the US and the planes completed as several different models. However the British orders allowed Lockheed to hire workers, order machinery, material and parts. Like landing gear, Brakes, instruments, etc.). 

BTW, By July of 1941, the RAF recognized that there probably would be a need for high altitude capabilities, and the original contract was amended to provide for the delivery of 143 Lightning Is with the originally-specified V-1710-15 un-turbosupercharged engines, with the remaining 524 aircraft to be delivered as Lightning IIs. First Lighting I does arrive in England until March of 1942.


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## gjs238 (Oct 8, 2014)

But it's a bit more complicated, right?
Didn't the British run into the "tail flutter" issue and cancel the order?
Lockheed tried to hold the British to the order, negotiations dragged on, then Pearl Harbor changed everything.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 8, 2014)

Leaving out the P-38 and P-39 you have;

The P-40 contracts.
The P-51 contract. 
The Martin Maryland.
Martin Baltimore.
Lockheed Hudson.
Lockheed Ventura. 
Some B-24s (or Liberator IIs) were ordered in 1941, no turbos and with British turrets total 14 .303 guns.

Some others?


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## Shortround6 (Oct 8, 2014)

gjs238 said:


> But it's a bit more complicated, right?
> Didn't the British run into the "tail flutter" issue and cancel the order?
> Lockheed tried to hold the British to the order, negotiations dragged on, then Pearl Harbor changed everything.



Not sure, if the British don't get a plane to test in England until 4 months _after_ Pearl Harbor it gets a little hard to figure out what was going on. Since the planes were sent by ship through the Panama Canal perhaps the British did a bit of test flying at the factory? In any case the last of the British order wound up be competed as 28 P-38F-13-LO for the USAAF, 121 as P-38F-15-LO, 174 as P-38G-13-LO, and 200 as P-38G-15-LO.

Which is an indication (but not proof) of where the British order slotted into the production schedule.


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## merlin (Oct 8, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Bristol was proposing the Type 153; a bit about it: link.



No the other single-engine Hercules design was favoured over the Bristol designs - the Boulton-Paul P.88A - interestingly enough if you follow the 'link' you'll see I commented on it there!


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## stona (Oct 9, 2014)

OldSkeptic said:


> :
> (1)Coastal Command (CC)must get the LR bombers first, BC should not have got a single Stirling, Halifax , Lanc or B-24 until CC is fully supplied.. CC must get the latest and best ASX, radar first



Just to reiterate how divorced from the political realities of the British war effort in 1940 this is, it is worth quoting Churchill as of 3rd September 1940.

"The Navy can lose us the war, but only the Air Force can win it. Therefore our supreme effort must be to gain overwhelming mastery of the Air. The Fighters are our salvation, but _the bombers alone provide the means of victory._ We must therefore develop the power to carry on an ever increasing volume of explosives to Germany so as to pulverize the entire industry and scientific structure on which the war effort and economic life of the enemy depends, while holding him at arms length in our Island. In no other way at present visible can we hope to overcome the immense military power of Germany, and to nullify the further German victories which may be apprehended as the weight of their forces is brought to bear upon African or Oriental theatres. The Air Force and its action on the largest scale must, therefore, subject to what is said later, claim the first place over the Navy or the Army."

The italics are mine.

The Battle of the Atlantic was perceived as a naval battle (which only the Navy could lose, or, as it did, win). It was as a direct result of this memorandum that Portal's initial list of twenty German cities to be attacked was drawn up.

Cheers

Steve

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## yulzari (Oct 9, 2014)

In September 1940 this matched political reality. This was the only way for Commonwealth forces to strike at Germany in the absence of allies. The underlying political aim was to involve USA and USSR as a prelude to a land assault on Germany one day but an air assault was the only realistic option to keep on carrying the war to Germany as things stood then. Otherwise the war would have settled into a stalemate whereby Germany had contained Britain.

Certainly Churchillian hyperbole was in full flight and is a statement of the will to prosecute the war offensively and not sit back defensively. He defines the risk of a failure in the Atlantic but determines to take the risk to seek an eventual victory. He was a horrible man but as a leader he set the right tone.

What else could we seriously advise at that date? Now, with hindsight, we can see how weak the effort would be and the years it would take to grow an effective night bomber force. In the context of this thread the issue is to see how the resources could have been better used. For me navigation is the key. All else will follow. Nothing can be a better force multiplier than accuracy. Then Intelligence so that the accuracy can be directed to best effect. The airframes, engines and the all too vulnerable crews can then follow in the plan. Even improved bombs will multiply our putative night bomber force. So, if we can get them over the right target with the best bombs for the bomb load that can be carried wen will do better with a force of Whitleys than five times as many Stirlings operating as IOTL.


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## stona (Oct 9, 2014)

The bombing campaign(s) would also be used as a sop to the Soviet Union by both the British and Americans to help soften the blow of their inability to launch a 1943 invasion of occupied Europe.

The politics of war will always override purely tactical military considerations and exert a not always benign, sometimes even malign, influence on strategy.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Oct 9, 2014)

It also didn't need to be all or nothing either way. 

The Sterling wouldn't have been a very good ASW aircraft or VLM. While it could carry a large bomb load over a short distance this didn't trade off into long range very well and for long range missions it just burned up a lot more fuel to carry very little more bomb load than the twin engine planes like the Wellington or Whitley. 

From the RAF website:
Whitley V......1,650 miles (2,661km) with 4,000lb (1,816kg) bombload
Stirling III.......2,010 miles (3,242km) with 3,500lb (1,589kg) bombload


The Early Liberators weren't much use over Europe, they didn't have power turrets or turbos and _were_ used as maritime patrol planes. First 20 equipped one Squadron of coastal command staring in June of 1941. Of the next 140, they equipped 3 coastal command squadrons and two bomber command squadrons. *But* the first of Liberator IIs doesn't go into service until Jan 1942. Some of the Liberator IIs were used as unarmed transports. 

A _LOT_ of Bomber Command's operations achieved little more than propaganda or morale results for quite some time. But those results were also important. 
Better results could have been achieved and perhaps should have been.
Too much importance _was_ placed on numbers or "head lines" in the propaganda war.


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## gjs238 (Oct 9, 2014)

stona said:


> The bombing campaign(s) would also be used as a sop to the Soviet Union by both the British and Americans to help soften the blow of their inability to launch a 1943 invasion of occupied Europe.



The Italian Campaign didn't count?


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## stona (Oct 9, 2014)

gjs238 said:


> The Italian Campaign didn't count?



The landings were late in 1943 (September IIRC) and were not what or where the Soviets wanted and allied invasion to be. 

The impact on German operations against the Russians on that Front is debatable, but this probably isn't the place for that debate. Suffice to say that around the time that the Western Allies became bogged down in Italy the Soviets had pushed the Germans back 200-250 km on the central and southern sectors of the Eastern Front without any help from the Western Allies. 

Think of Soviet advances at Orel, the Belgograd/Kharkov salient, crossing the Donets (both sides of Izium). The Soviets crossed the Mius near Kuibyshev. The Donets basin (Donbas much in the news today) was entirely lost by the Germans. In the south Army Group South's 4th Panzer Army had been forced back to the Dnieper and Army Group Centre's 2nd Army had been forced back behind the Dnieper and Sosh rivers. Army Group Centre in its entirety fell back to positions east of Vitbesk along the Pronia river. I could go on.

Against this Allied operations in Italy are less significant. In the various military conferences held throughout this period Italy is only ever worthy of a few lines. In one situation report at the 'Wolfsschanze' in late October Jodl, assured the Fuhrer that he need not worry about any further allied landings in Italy. Hitler's response is illuminating.

_"...he won't land anymore. He's much to cowardly for that. This landing in Salerno he did in agreement with the Italians." _

There was remarkably little concern for Italy. In early October the Red Army was starting an advance that would end in Berlin, and it knew it. So did some German Generals. 

We've already veered a bit off topic.

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Oct 9, 2014)

Steve, Italy capitulated in Sept 1943. The landings (Salerno) started in the time of battle of Kursk, ie. on 10th July. Here is the excerpt from Wkipedia, credited to Clark, 1966:



> On 16 July, German forces withdrew to their start line. The following day, OKH ordered the II SS Panzer Corps to be withdrawn and transferred to Italy.



Not a good thing for already outnumbered Germans.


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## pbehn (Oct 9, 2014)

nuuumannn said:


> I think I should have written FAA rather than Fairey, but Fairey did have _something_ to do with kickstarting the Griffon. The Navy approached RR regarding a more powerful 'Merlin Type' engine, as stated in the text above in Morgan and Shacklady's book provided by Aozora, and subsequently released N.8/39 and N.9/39. To the former spec, Fairey offered the Griffon as a powerplant option (one of four engine types it specified) and it was selected for N.8/39. The spec was was re-written as N.5/40 and the Fairey design was selected for production off the drawing board, which became the Firefly I (first flying 22 December 1941) and indeed, the Firefly introduced the Griffon into service.


Wasn't the rotation of the Griffon stipulated by the admiralty? It had to rotate opposite to a merlin so that the torque would take a plane away from the tower not in to it I believe I read years ago.


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## stona (Oct 9, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Steve, Italy capitulated in Sept 1943. The landings (Salerno) started in the time of battle of Kursk, ie. on 10th July. Here is the excerpt from Wkipedia, credited to Clark, 1966:
> Not a good thing for already outnumbered Germans.



Sicily (Husky) was July. That was hardly an invasion of mainland Europe. Even the most republican of Italians will concede that Sicily is an island in the Mediterranean Sea. I'm sure the Russians would have agreed. The invasion of mainland Italy was indeed in September, initially the 3rd and then the operation at Salerno on the 9th.

The major Soviet offensive followed on October 6th. This was launched on a front from Nevel to the Taman peninsula and built on the earlier successes. A large breach caused a broad gap in the front between Army Groups North and Centre. The 4th Panzer Army hung on to Kiev but the Germans were thrown back south east of Kremenchug (the defensive line on the Dnieper) and also on both sides of Dnepropetrovsk. The Russians also broke through near Melitopol on the Sea of Azov. They would go on to cut the land connection to the Crimea.

In the situation report of 26th October at which the catastrophic news from the Eastern Front was discussed the fighting in Italy warrants scant attention. It is noted that the 'English' and Americans are attacking positions on the Volturno and Biferno rivers but that they are being held. Positions are being prepared to the rear on the Carigliano and Sangro rivers to which a planned withdrawal would be made when necessary.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Oct 9, 2014)

Two squadrons of CC had been equipped with Whitleys in Oct 1940, perhaps a few more squadrons could have equipped over the winter or a better supply of replacement aircraft kept up? 

Coastal Command didn't need dozens of squadrons equipped with 4 engine aircraft, at least in 1940/41. However a 1/2 dozen squadrons of long range aircraft might have paid good dividends. 

From wiki: "By 1 December 1941 the situation was improving. Some 18 Consolidated Catalinas, nine Sunderlands, 20 Armstrong Whitworth Whitley and 170 American Hudsons. The Command's strike aircraft consisted of 60 Bristol Beaufort and 40 Bristol Beaufighters and 60 Blenheim fighter versions for a total of 397 aircraft in 18 squadrons."

Whitleys and Wellingtons could patrol at 600-700 miles from base but only at the cost of high crew fatigue. Please remember that to 'effectively' patrol a plane has to spend a number of hours at the distance form base, not just fly to and from the base. Later even the Liberators patrol distance was governed by a 14 hour flying limit rather than the fuel capacity. 

Since the Germans did not have the number of U-boats in service in 1940/41 that they had later, sightings and sinkings would be rarer than later in the war but perhaps with the knowledge that the British were patrolling more effectively sooner the Germans _might_ not have pushed the U-boat war quite as hard?


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## tomo pauk (Oct 9, 2014)

stona said:


> Sicily (Husky) was July. ...



Indeed, my bad 

Still, Hitler ordered a redeployment of some of his armed forces from SU to Italy.


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## parsifal (Oct 9, 2014)

The events in Italy and the Balkans had a direct and catastrophic effect on german operations in the east. it was not the actual invasion of Italy that caused the initial rupture. II SS Panzer Corps, which had spearheaded the attacks by 4th Panzer Army was withdrawn on the news that Mussolini had been deposed, which occurred 10 July. This action alone was directly responsible for the cancellation of the operations near Kursk, but more seriously left the germans without the capability of containing or countering soviet counteroffensives, which began in earnest at the beginning of August. By the end of september , the Italian situation, which included raising troop s to garrison or replace the 30 or so italian divs in the Balkans and Greece, had soaked up the equivalent of nearly 30 german divs. II SS was not able to return to east front operations until the end of November, by which time the heart had been torn out of AGS. 

I SS Panzer XXX was formed 26 July, with the intention of sending it east as soon as possible. unlike IISS it never made it to the east. With the Italian crisis, it, like most of the other units being raised at this time was sent to Italy, to be ready for the disarming of the Italian forces when the expected surrender occurred.

Its fair to say that Italy was not a decisive front. but it is also untrue to say it had no effect. For a brief moment it caused a major rupture in the German ability to hold the initiative, which it lost as a result of both Kursk and the Italian surrender. After that, the germans never again regained the initiative, though they tried several times.

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## OldSkeptic (Oct 9, 2014)

The 1940/41 period was disasterous for the British. They were all over the place in terms of strategy and went from disaster to disaster.

A large part of that was due to Churchill himself, never one for consistency.

What really mattered to them at that time were: clearing the Med and winning the Battle of the Atlantic. This guaranteed their logistics, without which they would have lost.
Juts clearing the Med was (according to Brooke) worth 2 million tons of shipping. They had to hold Malta, they had to win in North Africa, they had to destroy the Italian fleet and its merchant shipping.

Anything else was a luxury. What is amazing was how starved of air assets the NA/Malta campaign was and how the RAF fought against supplying them properly.

The BoA was an air/sea thing, but the Med was an air/sea/land war. They nearly won in North Africa, until they threw away that victory by going in the disaster of Greece.

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## parsifal (Oct 9, 2014)

Greece was a no win situation whatever the brits decided. if they chose to do nothing, the minor allies, and even the major ones, would have seen it as a gross betrayal by the british. Politically, they were more or less forced down that burrow, given they were looking to stir things up in the Balkans and were worried about Turkish reactions to inaction. 

As it turned out the benefits strategically outweighed the tactical losses that were suffered. Tying down German forces in the Balkans, brought about by yugoslavias emboldened repudiation of its forced alliance with Germany (mostly because of British efforts in Greece) combined with the length of time needed to overpower the greeks, put a serious dent in the Barbarossa timetable, forcing the jump off date from mid may to late June. It didn't cause the eventual collapse of the german assault on Moscow, but the reduced time for the summer offensive made it more difficult. 

In addition the Germans found they needed to commit their airborne forces to the capture of Crete, and this proved to be an unrecoverable blood bath for them. In terms of the air situation, a large number of the transport pilots were instructors from the flight schools, that lost their lives in this operation. They recovered, just in time to lose large numbers allover again in a place called Stalingrad in the following year.

British strategy was anything but a mish mash. it was very clear, and deliberate and considered, and it worked a treat actually. After June 1940, Britain found herself without friends, and on the very edge of defeat. Winning where she could, whilst working ceaselessly to find friends that could help her became the number 1 priority, and in this Churchill was resoundingly successful. Britain went from being basically friendless, to having virtually the entire world on her side. that didn't just happen by accident. Churchill worked unflinchingly to use whatever means he could to achieve that grand alliance. sure, he was helped along the way by the stupidity of his opponents, but that alone would not ensure the movement of the world against the axis in the way that it did. Credit needs to be given where credit is due, and Churchill, and Britain, was responsible for the formation of the allied alliance. that was the strategy of 1940-41, and it was highly successful actually.

The notion that Britain could take Tripoli in 1940 to early 1941 is another one of those Axis smoke screens put out post war by people looking for any reason they can to criticise british strategy. There was never the slighte4st chance of that happening even with all the resources available in 1940 concentrated to that end. Britain simply lacked the MT to keep its army supplied at that distance.....the ports of Tobruch and benghasis were both wrecked and would required months to repair. The WDF was relying on supply lines that stretched all the way back to the delta, trying to cope with a road network heavily damaged. one of the major engineering achievements, seldom talked about in 1942 was the rapid repair of the Via balbia, and the rapid extension of the railway all the way to Tobruk, but in 1940 this capability did not exist. The only option available to the brits in 1940, if they wanted to continue to put pressure on the Italians was to attack in Greece. There was no "Tripoli option".

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## yulzari (Oct 10, 2014)

OldSkeptic said:


> The 1940/41 period was disasterous for the British. They were all over the place in terms of strategy and went from disaster to disaster.



In 1940/41 Commonwealth forces had engaged Germany in Norway, Belgium and France. Withdrawn its expeditionary forces intact (if ill equipped) from the continent (together with a substantial French force). Engaged the Italian forces with a supply line that extended around the Cape, taken Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somaliland, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon whilst defending Britain against a seaborne invasion threat and an actual air assault as well as showing its determination to prosecute the war by the sad destruction of the French fleet and diverting forces to defend Greece and the Far East to the extent of sending an armoured division to Egypt whilst the invasion threat was at its highest. All against the background of a continuous naval battle from the Channel to the Indian Ocean and sending war resources to Russia in 1941. Not to mention starting a priority air assault against Germany.

The detail had to meet the exigencies of the moment and hindsight shows us where the execution was flawed but the strategy was clear. To risk defeat at home in order to clear the enemy from Africa and remove Italy from the war whilst acting to engage the USA and USSR in the war to allow a return to a continental assault on Germany from the west in concert with the night bombing campaign over Germany. A year later this is what happened.

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## stona (Oct 10, 2014)

I think that OldSkeptic was referring to the various debacles from France to Norway and thence to Greece and Crete and North Africa. A war is not won by evacuations and withdrawals.

I do agree that there was a clear if somewhat desperate strategy.

Cheers

Steve


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## Juha (Oct 10, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Indeed, my bad
> 
> Still, Hitler ordered a redeployment of some of his armed forces from SU to Italy.



In the end only LAH went to Northern Italy and after leaving its tanks to the other 2 SSPzGrDivs of the Corps (it picked up new ones on the way to Italy), 2nd and 3rd SSPzGrDivs had to be diverted to Mius River where Soviet forces were close to achieving a breakthrough and in fact suffered there heavier losses than during the Oper. Zitadel (the German offensive at Kursk).

Juha


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## OldSkeptic (Oct 10, 2014)

yulzari said:


> In 1940/41 Commonwealth forces had engaged Germany in Norway, Belgium and France. Withdrawn its expeditionary forces intact (if ill equipped) from the continent (together with a substantial French force). Engaged the Italian forces with a supply line that extended around the Cape, taken Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somaliland, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon whilst defending Britain against a seaborne invasion threat and an actual air assault as well as showing its determination to prosecute the war by the sad destruction of the French fleet and diverting forces to defend Greece and the Far East to the extent of sending an armoured division to Egypt whilst the invasion threat was at its highest. All against the background of a continuous naval battle from the Channel to the Indian Ocean and sending war resources to Russia in 1941. Not to mention starting a priority air assault against Germany.
> 
> The detail had to meet the exigencies of the moment and hindsight shows us where the execution was flawed but the strategy was clear. To risk defeat at home in order to clear the enemy from Africa and remove Italy from the war whilst acting to engage the USA and USSR in the war to allow a return to a continental assault on Germany from the west in concert with the night bombing campaign over Germany. A year later this is what happened.



A lot of that was post war rationalisation. At the time they were totally confused as to what they were doing or wanted (at one point they nearly went to war with the USSR...). Plus they had aspirations far beyond their capabilities.

Greece was the classic. Even the Greeks didn't really want the British in, because (correctly) they argued that if they did then the Germans could come in and they were handling the Italians quite well by themselves. Which the Germans did and very quickly cleared them out. At that time the British Army was in no shape to take on the Germans (or the Japanese). 

Instead of focus and winning one thing at a time and rebuilding and retraining their army until they could take on the Germans on something like an equal basis, they threw away large numbers of irreplacable troops in largely pointless exercises. Even by '42 Britain was hitting manpower limits.

To claim afterwards that it was some sort of a win because Germany redirected a couple of divisions towards them, while they themselves lost far more, is a bit of stretch. At that time the British themselves certainly didn't think so, questions in Parliament, no confidence votes and all that and Churchill and Allan Brooke were in despair.


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## tomo pauk (Oct 11, 2014)

Sorry for a late reply 



wuzak said:


> ...
> Supermarines stopped working on the 324/327 in 1938, having never received an order to proceed. So that wasn't an issue.



Okay, thanks.



> It is telling that the Air Ministry chose the "interim" Mk V over the more advanced Mk III. The Mk III was refined aerodynamically and would have (probably) been a match for the Fw 190A and Bf 109F.



Not going with the Mk. III seem like a bad idea indeed. 



> A Hercules version, like the Griffon version, would have required significant strengthening of the fuselage. That adds weight. As does the need, identified earlier, to install counterweights in the tail to correct the CoG.



The Spitfire XIIs were conversions of the Spit V at 1st - seems like not much strengthening was not needed after all? The weight of the Hercules Spitfire should be somewhere in between the Spit Vb and XII, ie. at about 7000 lbs.



> The Centaurus was somewhat closer in size (frontal area) to the Vulture and Sabre than the Hercules was to the Merlin.



Wikipedia gives 55 in dia for both Centaurus and Hercules, and, indeed, the R-2600 - wonder whether there are factory specs anywhere to get the real measures?



wuzak said:


> Let's look at the prop diameters again.
> Mk V and Mk IX had prop diameter of 10'9".
> Mk XII and MK XIV had a prop diameter of 10'5". The difference to the Merlin types is due to the lower thrust line.
> The Hercules is ~10" taller than the Griffon. So we can expect a reduction of thrust centreline of ~5". That would mean a prop of ~9'7". That is a reduction of area of 21% over the V/IX and 15% over the XII/XIV.
> The shorter engine may give some extra clearance, so if we assume a diameter of 10' that is still a loss of 13% and 8% respectively.



Thanks again. We can recall that Germans installed, on a captured Spit V, the DB-605A with a 3m (9.84 ft) prop, on a distinctively lower thrust line than what would be for Hercules. The Italian V-12 fighters also received a low-thrust DB engine coupled with 3m prop, the combination worked fine. The Soviets managed to convert both Lagg-3 and Yak-3 to radial powerplants.
Vs. the Merlin 45 and it's 3-bladed prop, the 4-bladed prop should cater a good deal for the lost prop area. 



> As regards to adding blades, the XIV got 5 blades in 1943. A 5 blade prop didn't exist in 1941 - it would have to be built.
> Also, due to the smaller diameter the XIV spun its prop faster. The Hercules VI would need new reduction gearing to do that.
> Also, ~1/5-1/4 of the prop will be blocked by the engine behind. The frontal area of the Bristol being roughly twice that of the Griffon.



I'm not trying to have a 5-bladed prop in 1942 
The 'blocked' part of the airframe seem not to hamper very much the radial-engined fighters.


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## tomo pauk (Oct 11, 2014)

> Shortround6 said:
> 
> 
> > This seems like another one of those ideas/projects that requires working on a version of plane that will NOT be very good in service for 1 to 2 years so you can be ready with a tooled up production line _when_ the version of the engine you really want to use shows up.
> ...


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## wuzak (Oct 11, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> The Spitfire XIIs were conversions of the Spit V at 1st - seems like not much strengthening was not needed after all? The weight of the Hercules Spitfire should be somewhere in between the Spit Vb and XII, ie. at about 7000 lbs.



The XIIs needed stronger longeropns in the fuslage to take the engine loads.




tomo pauk said:


> Wikipedia gives 55 in dia for both Centaurus and Hercules, and, indeed, the R-2600 - wonder whether there are factory specs anywhere to get the real measures?



RRHT may be able to help with the Bristols.

What I was saying is that the Sabre was 46" high x 40"wide and the Vulture something similar. So the size and shape of these are closser to the round engines than the Merlin or Griffon (which were tall and narrow).




tomo pauk said:


> Sorry for a late reply
> 
> 
> 
> ...



The DB engines are similar in shape (although upside down) to the Merlin. The frontal area is little changed.




tomo pauk said:


> The Soviets managed to convert both Lagg-3 and Yak-3 to radial powerplants.



In those cases the power gain was more substantial than we are suggesting for the Merlin -> Hercules.




tomo pauk said:


> Vs. the Merlin 45 and it's 3-bladed prop, the 4-bladed prop should cater a good deal for the lost prop area.
> I'm not trying to have a 5-bladed prop in 1942



More blades may also cause instability. It happened with the IX, requiring more rudder area, and the P-51B.




tomo pauk said:


> The 'blocked' part of the airframe seem not to hamper very much the radial-engined fighters.



Usually because they swung a bigger prop.

The Fw 190 had a 3.3m (10'11.75") diameter prop.


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## Aozora (Oct 11, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Interestingly enough, Lumsden gives for the Herc IX: 1590 HP at 13500 ft on 87 oct, and 1510 HP at 11250 ft on 100 oct fuel? Typo somewhere?
> Even with lower power listed, in 1941 there is more power under 17-18000 ft from the Herc IX than from any Merlin available, including the Mk. XX - the over-boosting of those was allowed from early 1942 on.
> 
> *at least when going by the chart for the DB-601A, where 12% extra power via the exhaust thrust is available at 4500 m; for individual exhausts



Weight of Hercules XI (dry) = 1,870 lbs for 1,460 hp max; Hercules VI XVI = 1,930 lbs for 1,675 hp 

Weight of Merlin XX = 1,450 lbs for 1,480 hp max; Merlin 66 = 1,650 lbs for 1,750 hp @ +18 lbs boost or 2,000hp @ +25 lbs boost using 100/150 grade fuel

Question: what was the fuel consumption of the Hercules vs the Merlin?

While it might be interesting to compare a radial engined Spitfire with the Fw 190, the Fw 190 was designed from the outset to be powered by a radial engine, with all that entailed in regards to weight distribution, fuselage design, how the control surfaces were jigged, etc. To expect a similar performance from an airframe that was designed for a lighter, far more streamlined engine, without a major redesign? Highly unlikely. To redesign the Spitfire to cater for the Hercules would have been a major exercise, plus there would be major disruption of the production lines at, arguably, one of the most important times of the war 

Why would anyone bother redesigning the Spitfire to use the Hercules when there were already perfectly good Merlins available, in quantity, with the more powerful Griffon engines pending? 

Interesting article on Sleeve-Valve engines vs Poppet valve: http://www.enginehistory.org/members/articles/Sleeve.pdf

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## stona (Oct 12, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Not going with the Mk. III seem like a bad idea indeed.



It was a matter of expediency. From StH.

'It was obvious from trial reports that the converted Spitfire Mk 1 with the modified engine was an unqualified success and the Air Ministry wanted to have a production machine in service in large numbers as quickly as possible. _Supermarine could not produce the projected Mk III Spitfire in the time specified by the Air Ministry and a compromise had to be reached._ It was decided that the Merlin 45 would be married to a strengthened Mk I airframe, a larger radiator installed and the resulting Spitfire be called the F Mk V. The contract for 1,500 Mk III Spitfires was cancelled and the serials allocated to the new Mk V."

My italics.

If only the RLM could have made decisions like that 

Cheers

Steve


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## Juha (Oct 12, 2014)

Yes
the stop-gap solutions were the rule in Spit development, all the main production machines were stop-gaps (Mks V, IX and XIV) During a war it is better to choose good-enough that can be delivered soon enough than to wait the optimal solution and took heavy losses while waiting its perfection. Of those versions designed to give a significant boost of performance only Mk VIII was produced in significant numbers (was that 1,600+) but still significantly less than its stop-gap half-sister Mk IX (was that appr. 6,500)


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## stona (Oct 12, 2014)

Juha said:


> Yes
> the stop-gap solutions were the rule in Spit development, all the main production machines were stop-gaps (Mks V, IX and XIV) During a war it is better to choose good-enough that can be delivered soon enough than to wait the optimal solution and took heavy losses while waiting its perfection. Of those versions designed to give a significant boost of performance only Mk VIII was produced in significant numbers (was that 1,600+) but still significantly less than its stop-gap half-sister Mk IX (was that appr. 6,500)



It was the result of a superb airframe. As Rolls Royce developed better engines it was an obvious expedient to bolt them on to airframes already in production and requiring minimal (if any) alterations. The Spitfire and Bf 109 stand head and shoulders above the rest in this particular respect.

The Fw 190 D was also a stop gap that proved its worth in the limited time it had before the end of the war. It even underwent its own development whilst waiting for the Ta 152 to arrive.

Cheers

Steve

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## tomo pauk (Oct 14, 2014)

Aozora said:


> Weight of Hercules XI (dry) = 1,870 lbs for 1,460 hp max; Hercules VI XVI = 1,930 lbs for 1,675 hp
> 
> Weight of Merlin XX = 1,450 lbs for 1,480 hp max; Merlin 66 = 1,650 lbs for 1,750 hp @ +18 lbs boost or 2,000hp @ +25 lbs boost using 100/150 grade fuel



Both timeline and weights for the Merlins are off. 
In 1941 Merlin XX was making, in all-out level flight, some 1400 HP on rated boost (+12 lbs/sq in) at 8000 ft. 1st notes of +14 psi of allowed boost were issued in late Nov 1942. The Merlin 66 was introduced in (mid?) 1943, the 150 grade fuel was introduced during the Spring of 1944. 

For the single stage Merlin, we need to add some 300+ lbs for cooling system, so it's now within 100 lbs of difference vs. Hercules XI. Two stage Merlin needs 500+ lbs of cooling inter-cooling (in P-51B it was 663 lbs, but the radiators were bigger there?) - that makes 2150-2200 lbs, together with engine itself. Two stage Merlin will also increase aircraft's drag, due to the need to stick out another radiator in the slipstream. 



> Question: what was the fuel consumption of the Hercules vs the Merlin?



I'd also appreciate the data.



> While it might be interesting to compare a radial engined Spitfire with the Fw 190, the Fw 190 was designed from the outset to be powered by a radial engine, with all that entailed in regards to weight distribution, fuselage design, how the control surfaces were jigged, etc. To expect a similar performance from an airframe that was designed for a lighter, far more streamlined engine, without a major redesign? Highly unlikely.



For 1942 (Herc VI vs. available BMW 801s in respective airframes) I expect at least better climb rate, due to a far better power to weight ratio. A major redesign was not required for the La-5, nor for the Ki-100, both worked fine.



> To redesign the Spitfire to cater for the Hercules would have been a major exercise, plus there would be major disruption of the production lines at, arguably, one of the most important times of the war



Disagreed about the need for a 'major exercise'. No major disruption of the production lines, either - it would require a minor modification of one of production lines. Once Germans turn East, there is much less pressure on British.
If someone is bothered about the production lines after the BoB, maybe it would be handy to phase out the Hurricane from production. 'Production' of pilots was a much more important thing anyway.



> Why would anyone bother redesigning the Spitfire to use the Hercules when there were already perfectly good Merlins available, in quantity, with the more powerful Griffon engines pending?



How ever the Merlins were good, the Spitfire did not received the Merlin XX (bar the token numbers for the Spit IIC), but the second best, Merlin 45, that was also later in production than the Mk. XX. The two stage Merlin was considered for the Spitfire only once LW extracted a major toll on the Spit V. 
The Griffon might be pending, but it was not available for 1941-42 time frame.




> Interesting article on Sleeve-Valve engines vs Poppet valve: http://www.enginehistory.org/members/articles/Sleeve.pdf



Thanks.


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## wuzak (Oct 14, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Both timeline and weights for the Merlins are off.
> In 1941 Merlin XX was making, in all-out level flight, some 1400 HP on rated boost (+12 lbs/sq in) at 8000 ft. 1st notes of +14 psi of allowed boost were issued in late Nov 1942. The Merlin 66 was introduced in (mid?) 1943, the 150 grade fuel was introduced during the Spring of 1944.



All true.

The Merlin 61 Mk IX was introduced in July 1942. 

I doubt a Hercules-Spitfire would perform as well as the IX, certainly not at higher altitudes. And probably wouldn't be available any sooner.




tomo pauk said:


> For the single stage Merlin, we need to add some 300+ lbs for cooling system, so it's now within 100 lbs of difference vs. Hercules XI. Two stage Merlin needs 500+ lbs of cooling inter-cooling (in P-51B it was 663 lbs, but the radiators were bigger there?) - that makes 2150-2200 lbs, together with engine itself. Two stage Merlin will also increase aircraft's drag, due to the need to stick out another radiator in the slipstream.



The two stage Merlin will still have less drag than the typical Hercules installation of the time.

The Hercules XI is also a lower altitude engine than the two stage Merlin.




tomo pauk said:


> For 1942 (Herc VI vs. available BMW 801s in respective airframes) I expect at least better climb rate, due to a far better power to weight ratio. A major redesign was not required for the La-5, nor for the Ki-100, both worked fine.



I would suggest an improvement in climb rate could be achieved by fitting the Merlin XX. And it would require a lot less work to do. You could dump the Hurricane, or convert them to the Hercules (which would suit their soon to be role of ground pounding better).

The Ki-100 gained about the same hp over the Ki-61 as the Hercules would over the Merlin 45. It also lost a little bit of weight. Performance was about the same.

The La-5's power gain was about twice that of the Hercules over Merlin. Probably greater than that over the altitude range. The in-line used in the LaGG-3 wasn't that brilliant. The weight gain was ~900lb.

A Hercules-Spitfire would work. The question is whether it would be worth the effort.




tomo pauk said:


> Disagreed about the need for a 'major exercise'. No major disruption of the production lines, either - it would require a minor modification of one of production lines. Once Germans turn East, there is much less pressure on British.
> If someone is bothered about the production lines after the BoB, maybe it would be handy to phase out the Hurricane from production. 'Production' of pilots was a much more important thing anyway.



The problem was that there was the development of the VII and VIII, which needed modifications to production lines, production of the IX, which needed fewer changes, development of the Griffon Spitfire and general performance improvements to the V. Something has to be sacrificed to perform the modifications for the Hercules-Spitfire.




tomo pauk said:


> How ever the Merlins were good, the Spitfire did not received the Merlin XX (bar the token numbers for the Spit IIC), but the second best, Merlin 45, that was also later in production than the Mk. XX. The two stage Merlin was considered for the Spitfire only once LW extracted a major toll on the Spit V.



The two stage Merlin was being tested in the Spitfire III before it became clear that the IX was necessary.


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## wuzak (Oct 14, 2014)

fuel cons | gipsy major | ib | 1946 | 1809 | Flight Archive

This gives the consumption of the (post war) Hercules 630 as:
0.8/0.86 pt/bhp/hr at maximum power, 1,795hp @ 7,250ft.
0.68/0.73 pt/bhp/hr at maximum cruise power, 1,550hp @ 4,750ft.

The Merlin 620 (also post war) is given as
0.669 pt/bhp/hr at maximum power, 1,795hp @ 4,500ft.
0.517 pt/hp/hr at max continuous, 1,175hp @ 10,250ft.

miles | bell aircraft | 1946 | 2181 | Flight Archive provides the corrections for the Merlin's figures.

It also gives values for maximum weak mixture cruise for the Hercules, which is:
0.465pt/hp/hr, 1,330hp @ 9,250ft.

Thanks to former member J.A.W.


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## Aozora (Oct 14, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> For the single stage Merlin, we need to add some 300+ lbs for cooling system, so it's now within 100 lbs of difference vs. Hercules XI.


 
You are ignoring the weight distribution;_all_ of the extra weight - and drag - of the Hercules would be well forward of the Spitfire's cg, with no cooling system to help counter-balance it. The only way that such a weight transfer could be compensated for would be to use heavy ballasting, meaning extra weight. Chances are the tail surface would need to be redesigned because of the Hercules' different thrust line



tomo pauk said:


> Two stage Merlin needs 500+ lbs of cooling inter-cooling (in P-51B it was 663 lbs, but the radiators were bigger there?) - that makes 2150-2200 lbs, together with engine itself. Two stage Merlin will also increase aircraft's drag, due to the need to stick out another radiator in the slipstream.



Can't quite work out the maths here - the cooling system of the two-stage Merlin did not weigh an extra an extra 2,150 - 2,200lbs over the weight of the engine. The extra drag of the new radiator installation, which did, at least, contribute some thrust because of the Meredith effect (albeit not as efficiently as the P-51's installation), would have been nothing like the extra drag developed by the Hercules engine installation, as it was manufactured in 1941. The exhaust-collector system alone added to the drag and contributed none of the jet-thrust of the two-stage Merlin's exhausts. 



tomo pauk said:


> For 1942 (Herc VI vs. available BMW 801s in respective airframes) I expect at least better climb rate, due to a far better power to weight ratio.



Not with the extra weight and drag of the Hercules.



tomo pauk said:


> A major redesign was not required for the La-5, nor for the Ki-100, both worked fine.



I disagree that a major redesign wasn't needed for both the LaGG 3 to La-5 and Ki-61 to Ki-100: the LaGG's wooden airframe was more easily adapted to such a redesign, while the Ki-100 benefited from Japanese studies of the Fw 190. Both engine installations were far more efficient than anything the British had in 1941. It would have taken a major effort to redesign both the Spitfire airframe and the Hercules installation (including a complete rethink by Bristol on how to design exhaust systems) before the combination would have been worthwhile to be used in frontline operational service. It goes back to the question, why do it at all when installing the Merlin 60 series would have been so much easier? 




tomo pauk said:


> Disagreed about the need for a 'major exercise'. No major disruption of the production lines, either - it would require a minor modification of one of production lines. Once Germans turn East, there is much less pressure on British.



In 1941 the British would have had no idea that the bulk of the Luftwaffe would be stuck on the Eastern front for over two years - it would have been foolish in the extreme not to have planned for the possibility that the Germans would be able to start a new "Battle of Britain" in 1942. The Spitfire III was dropped in favour of the "interim" Spitfire V to avoid too much disruption to the assembly lines. Why would a redesign to accommodate the Hercules be a more acceptable alternative? 



tomo pauk said:


> How ever the Merlins were good, the Spitfire did not received the Merlin XX (bar the token numbers for the Spit IIC), but the second best, Merlin 45, that was also later in production than the Mk. XX. The two stage Merlin was considered for the Spitfire only once LW extracted a major toll on the Spit V.



There would be absolutely no guarantee that the Hercules would have been any better than the Merlin 45; chances are it would have been a retrograde step. 



tomo pauk said:


> The two stage Merlin was considered for the Spitfire only once LW extracted a major toll on the Spit V.
> Thanks.



Wrong - the two-stage Merlin installation was underway well before the Fw 190 appeared, such that the first Spitfire/Merlin 60 combination (N3297 - the ex-Spitfire III) was flown on 27 September 1941, just a week after the Fw 190 made its debut.


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## wuzak (Oct 14, 2014)

Aozora said:


> Can't quite work out the maths here - the cooling system of the two-stage Merlin did not weigh an extra an extra 2,150 - 2,200lbs over the weight of the engine.



He is saying that 2,150-2,200lb is the installed weight of a 2 stage Merlin including coolant and intercooler radiators.


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## wuzak (Oct 14, 2014)

I would guess that the Hercules would require a larger oil cooler. It would also require a larger fuel tanks and oil tank to have the same endurance - even if the engine has better specific fuel consumption, it is making more power and therefore using more fuel.

As Aozora says, having the heavier radial up front will require ballasting in the tail. The Hercules is similar in weight to the Griffon 65, so would probably have similar ballasting requirements. Griffon Spits were quite a deal heavier than Merlin 45 Spits.


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## KiwiBiggles (Oct 14, 2014)

I'm not sure the Hercules would require ballasting beyond what is required by the removal of the cooling system. The firewall in a Spitfire is pretty much at the CoG, and although the Hercules is heavier than the Merlin, it is also shorter (1350 mm vs 1753 mm) and so the total moment about the CoG would be very similar.


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## wuzak (Oct 14, 2014)

KiwiBiggles said:


> I'm not sure the Hercules would require ballasting beyond what is required by the removal of the cooling system. The firewall in a Spitfire is pretty much at the CoG, and although the Hercules is heavier than the Merlin, it is also shorter (1350 mm vs 1753 mm) and so the total moment about the CoG would be very similar.




And can the Hercules be pushed up against the bulkhead?

The bulkhead is behind the leading edge of the wing.

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## wuzak (Oct 14, 2014)

Also, most of the Hercules' weight is at the front. The Merlin's weight is more evenly distributed along its length. That is, the CoG of the Hercules may still be as far forward as the Merlin's.


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## Aozora (Oct 15, 2014)

wuzak said:


> He is saying that 2,150-2,200lb is the installed weight of a 2 stage Merlin including coolant and intercooler radiators.



Yep, I see that now.



KiwiBiggles said:


> I'm not sure the Hercules would require ballasting beyond what is required by the removal of the cooling system. The firewall in a Spitfire is pretty much at the CoG, and although the Hercules is heavier than the Merlin, it is also shorter (1350 mm vs 1753 mm) and so the total moment about the CoG would be very similar.








Fair enough, there would not be a great deal of problem with the ballast - assuming that the Hercules could be fitted anywhere near the firewall!

What is being discussed is a heavy, draggy installation stuck in front of an aircraft that was designed around the Merlin. To make the Hercules/Spitfire combination work, without compromising the Spitfire's performance too much, would require some careful work on a new engine cowling design (hopefully ditching the collector ring in favour of a well designed free-flow exhaust system), plus careful fairing of the Spitfire's forward fuselage. All of this would have to cater for the cooling requirements of the Herc, which would probably mean that a cooling fan a-la the BMW 801 would be very useful. Goodness only knows how many manhours at the drawing board would have been needed to produce a decent Hercfire, considering that in 1941 the British hadn't yet cottoned on to designing a radial engined installation as good as that in the Fw 190. 

I'll rephrase the question I've already asked tomo - why on earth would Vickers-Supermarine bother with the complication involved in executing such a conversion, when they had already passed over the Spitfire III in favour of the V and, by mid-1941, were working on a two-stage Merlin installation, which offered a quantum leap in performance over any forseeable Spitfire/Hercules redesign, for far less trouble (noting that the conversion was based on the passed over Spitfire III)?


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## Edgar Brooks (Oct 15, 2014)

The Spitfire fuselage is 36" wide; the Hercules is 55" diameter, so it won't fit. If you butcher the airframe, to get it in, and keep the same thrust-line, the top of the engine would be so high, the pilot couldn't see over it, or use a gunsight. Lower the thrust-line, so he can see, and you can't have a propeller bigger than 8' diameter.
The Spitfire III was cancelled because the Merlin XX was needed for the four-cannon ground-attack Hurricane, which was needed to replace the obsolescent Whirlwind; the Spitfire III also needed a completely new set of cowlings (like the Hurricane II it was 4" longer,) while the Merlin 45, with only minor adjustments to the carburettor intake, could fit into the same space as the Merlin II/III.
The broader-chord rudder was first fitted to the XII, not the IX, but extended onto other Marks later.

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## Shortround6 (Oct 15, 2014)

While several aircraft did change from V-12s to radials the Merlin to Hercules swap is going to be a bit harder.







As Mr. Brooks says, there is a lot more Merlin below the prop shaft than above. Not so with the Hercules. 






Ki-61 had a rather low prop





Ki-100






Now _maybe_ you could get it to work. Longer landing gear and move the guns out-board in the wing, requiring a new wing guns bay area. Hump back the fuselage so pilot can see over the engine, this may or may not interfere with the airflow over the vertical stabilizer and rudder requiring bigger Stab/rudder? Needs new reduction gear on the engine to run smaller/faster turning propeller. And so on and so on...........

And after all that work what have you got? 

A plane that is heavier than the one you started with and has more drag (even 8-12%)? 

And since you sucked up thousands (if not tens of thousands) of man hours engineering this conversion what *don't* you get? two stage Merlin Spitfires? Griffion Spitfires?

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## wuzak (Oct 15, 2014)

Edgar Brooks said:


> The Spitfire fuselage is 36" wide; the Hercules is 55" diameter, so it won't fit. If you butcher the airframe, to get it in, and keep the same thrust-line, the top of the engine would be so high, the pilot couldn't see over it, or use a gunsight. Lower the thrust-line, so he can see, and you can't have a propeller bigger than 8' diameter.
> The Spitfire III was cancelled because the Merlin XX was needed for the four-cannon ground-attack Hurricane, which was needed to replace the obsolescent Whirlwind; the Spitfire III also needed a completely new set of cowlings (like the Hurricane II it was 4" longer,) while the Merlin 45, with only minor adjustments to the carburettor intake, could fit into the same space as the Merlin II/III.
> The broader-chord rudder was first fitted to the XII, not the IX, but extended onto other Marks later.



Where is it at its widest? Over the cam covers?


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## Edgar Brooks (Oct 16, 2014)

wuzak said:


> Where is it at its widest? Over the cam covers?


Frame 5 (engine bulkhead/firewall.)


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## gjs238 (Oct 16, 2014)

If putting a radial in a Spitfire was not practical, what about putting a radial in a P-40?


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## Shortround6 (Oct 16, 2014)

Uh, I think they called that a P-36 

Or Hawk 75. 

And we have several threads on that one 

Something to note, of the planes that did swap between radials and in-line engines ALL had cowl guns firing over the top of of the engine which means they might have had more fuselage depth (top to bottom) than the Spitfire. Or at least more distance from the pilots eyes to the prop shaft.

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## tomo pauk (Oct 16, 2014)

Hello,



Edgar Brooks said:


> The Spitfire fuselage is 36" wide; the Hercules is 55" diameter, so it won't fit.



The engine is always 'connected' to the airframe via an engine bearer. Bearer is always tailored to fit to the firewall/bulkhead on the one side, and obviously the engine on the another. Wide engines were made to fit slender airframes historically, as we can see, for example, on the Ki-61 and Ki-100 drawings Shortround6 kindly posted.



> If you butcher the airframe, to get it in, and keep the same thrust-line, the top of the engine would be so high, the pilot couldn't see over it, or use a gunsight. Lower the thrust-line, so he can see, and you can't have a propeller bigger than 8' diameter.



There will be no butchering 
The Germans installed a distinctively low-thrust DB-605 on a captured Spit V, the prop was of 3 m diameter (9.84 ft); all worked fine.



> The Spitfire III was cancelled because the Merlin XX was needed for the four-cannon ground-attack Hurricane, which was needed to replace the obsolescent Whirlwind; the Spitfire III also needed a completely new set of cowlings (like the Hurricane II it was 4" longer,) while the Merlin 45, with only minor adjustments to the carburettor intake, could fit into the same space as the Merlin II/III.



The space where the smaller Merlin 45 fitted, later accommodated the longer, two-speed two-stage Merlins.
The Merlin XX was installed in the Hurricane (12 gun version) to cut a bit the performance advantage that Bf-109E have had during the BoB? 



> The broader-chord rudder was first fitted to the XII, not the IX, but extended onto other Marks later.



Thanks.

edit: Flight magazine states that diameter of the Hercules was 52 inch.


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## wuzak (Oct 16, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> There will be no butchering



Hercules in a Spitfire is the very definition of butchery! 





tomo pauk said:


> The Germans installed a distinctively low-thrust DB-605 on a captured Spit V, the prop was of 3 m diameter (9.84 ft); all worked fine.



The DB 605 (or was it a DB 601) Was about the same dimensions as a Merlin. Teh thrust line was lower, but at a guess I woud say no lower than the Griffon.

A Hercules will have a lower thrust line and require a smaller prop.





tomo pauk said:


> The space where the smaller Merlin 45 fitted, later accommodated the longer, two-speed two-stage Merlins.
> The Merlin XX was installed in the Hurricane (12 gun version) to cut a bit the performance advantage that Bf-109E have had during the BoB?



The Merlin XX was the same width and height as the 45 - just longer.

The 2 stage Merlins were wider by about 0.7" but lower by 3". But Much longer.

The Griffon was about 0.5" wider than the Merlin 45 and about 3" taller. And also longer.

The Griffon in the XII weighed slightly less than the Hercules, while the Griffon 65 weight slightly more (not including cooling systems). The Griffon II/VI weighed about 100lbs more than the Merlin 66, yet the XII was 500lbs heavier than the LF.IX. The Griffon 65 weighed 250-300lb more than the Merlin 66, but the Spitfire XIV was 1500lb heavier than the LF.IX. Some of that would be to do with the extra cooling, but also with the required strengthening of the airframe.

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## Aozora (Oct 16, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Hello,The engine is always 'connected' to the airframe via an engine bearer. Bearer is always tailored to fit to the firewall/bulkhead on the one side, and obviously the engine on the another. Wide engines were made to fit slender airframes historically, as we can see, for example, on the Ki-61 and Ki-100 drawings Shortround6 kindly posted.



The Ki-100 conversion was made possible because Kawasaki could study the Fw 190 installation, a luxury the British did not have in 1941. As it was, the conversion was forced on Kawasaki because of the almost total failure of the DB derived Ha-140, meaning there were lots of engineless Ki-61 airframes sitting around at a time when Japan desperately needed all the fighters it could get. AFAIK, the British didn't have a desperate need to alter the Spitfire to take a radial engine.



tomo pauk said:


> There will be no butchering
> The Germans installed a distinctively low-thrust DB-605 on a captured Spit V, the prop was of 3 m diameter (9.84 ft); all worked fine.








Of course there will be butchering and a lot of alterations. First of all the aerodynamics around the forward fuselage would be completely butchered, unless the designers came up with a radically different cowling for the Hercules, and a proper set of fairings for the forward fuselage. Redesigning the cowling and developing proper fairings alone would require hundreds of man-hours, and a complete change of British design philosophy. Sure, Sydney Camm, for example, came up with some excellent designs for the Centaurus in the Tempest II and Fury series, but that was three years later, after examining the likes of the Fw 190.

The main engine bulkhead would have to be redesigned to cater for the completely different engine mounts of the Hercules.

Any thoughts on what's going to happen to the airflow over the inner wing and horizontal tail when the cowl flaps are opened, noting also the lower thrust line of the Hercules? 

Any thoughts as to how the inefficient collector exhaust system - almost universal on British radials in 1941 - would penalise the Spitules' performance? Would the exhaust fumes be properly dispersed away from the cockpit area?



tomo pauk said:


> The space where the smaller Merlin 45 fitted, later accommodated the longer, two-speed two-stage Merlins.The Merlin XX was installed in the Hurricane (12 gun version) to cut a bit the performance advantage that Bf-109E have had during the BoB?



As noted by Wuzak, the Merlin 60/70 series was only marginally wider than the 45 - the fit was a whole lot more comfortable than trying to fit a radial engine, plus its cowling.

The question again: why fit the Hercules? There would have been absolutely no advantage, and a whole lot of trouble for...what?


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## Shortround6 (Oct 16, 2014)

Anything that keeps the Hercules from being fitted on the front of the Spitfire can be fixed with *enough* _time and effort._

With the same amount of time and effort you can mount several other engine options. You only have so many engineers and draftsmen. 

Why have them work on what is going to be the 3rd or 4th best option? 

Options.

1. Fit 2 speed Merlin XX, Mr. Brooks says it needed 4 more inchs, some accounts claim about 50 Spitfires were modified later in the war to take Merlin XX series engines and used for air/sea rescue duties. These were well used Spitfires that had their original single speed engines taken out. 
Given that you can pry Merlin XX engines away from Bomber Command or from the Hurricane II this is your easiest conversion. Least amount of new parts and flight testing needed. 
2. Fit the two Stage Merlin as was done. 
3. Fit the Griffon. As was done. If you have _spare_ engineers/draftsmen have them work on this. The Mark IV DP845 first flew on 27 November 1941. However it needed some development to sort out. 
"Jeffrey Quill, Supermarine's chief test pilot, was the first to fly the Mk IV/Mk XII prototype DP845; "...there was somewhat less ground clearance, resulting in a slight reduction in propeller diameter; the power available for take-off was much greater; and the engine RPM were lower than in the Merlin. All this meant that the throttle needed to be handled judiciously on take-off but, once in the air, the aeroplane had a great feeling of power about it; it seemed to be the airborne equivalent of a very powerful sports car and was great fun to fly. Changes of trim with changes of power were much more in evidence, both directionally and longitudinally, and the aeroplane sheared about a bit during tight manoeuvres and simulated dog-fights. I realised at once that we should have to correct its directional characteristics and probably its longitudinal stability also, both of which in due time we achieved. Indeed, DP485 eventually went through many phases of development throughout and I, and others, flew in it a great deal; it became one of our favourite aeroplanes."

4. The Hercules is *NOT* going to be a snap fit.
You have about the same RPM as the Griffon except the normal props are for bombers and are way too big. Yes you can fit smaller props and perhaps change the gear ratio= more work. 
You need to sort out the intake to the carb, can't use existing ones= More work.
You need to sort out the center of gravity. _without_ having the radiators as counter weights =more work. 
Your view over the nose is going to be truly horrible. Even more work won't solve this one unless you move the entire cockpit up and humpback the fuselage like the Italian fighters. Spitfire was known to have a worse veiw over the nose than the Hurricane. 
To have any _hope_ of a low drag cowling you have to toss aside everything Bristol has done and start over. Without a low drag cowling the idea doesn't work. How much work and experimentation is needed? And while a good NACA cowling may be better than Bristol's cowling in 1941 even a 1941 NACA cowling is a far cry from what good cowling would be several years later. 
Maybe you can get Bristol to flip the supercharger intake and fit an up-draft carburetor. It is certainly not impassable but it is one more thing that needs _work._ 
Bristol did eventually design a rearward flow exhaust system with exhaust thrust. SO it could be done, the question is when and at what cost (in terms of other work Bristol was doing) 

The list just goes on. 

What do you get in the end?


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## gjs238 (Oct 16, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> What do you get in the end?



A great thread.


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## Edgar Brooks (Oct 17, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> The engine is always 'connected' to the airframe via an engine bearer. Bearer is always tailored to fit to the firewall/bulkhead on the one side, and obviously the engine on the another. Wide engines were made to fit slender airframes historically, as we can see, for example, on the Ki-61 and Ki-100 drawings Shortround6 kindly posted..


Frame 5 (the bulkhead/firewall) was behind the wings' leading edges, and more-or-less level with the mainspars (to which it was bolted.) You either have to cut away several inches of wing (where it's most efficient,) or extend the engine bearers enough to keep the engine clear of the wing. This plays havoc with balance/CoG (the IX needed counter-balancing lead weights in the rear fuselage, and the XIV had them in the fin.


> The space where the smaller Merlin 45 fitted, later accommodated the longer, two-speed two-stage Merlins.


In width and height only; the IX fuselage was 9" longer than that of the I/II/V. In fact the 45 was not smaller than the III or XX, it was actually slightly longer, but a tweak to the carburettor position made it the same overall length, so it could still fit.


> The Merlin XX was installed in the Hurricane (12 gun version) to cut a bit the performance advantage that Bf-109E have had during the BoB?


The Hurricane was in danger of being totally outclassed (in 1942 Malta refused to accept any more, even the Mk.II,) yes, so it got priority for the Merlin XX.


> edit: Flight magazine states that diameter of the Hercules was 52 inch


With, or without, cowling? (And it still won't fit a 36" fuselage.)


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## Shortround6 (Oct 17, 2014)

You need a couple of feet behind the main diameter of the cylinder heads for the supercharger, carb, and accessories (generators, pumps,etc).
This 'stuff' fills the space between the Bulkhead and leading edge.
However I agree that the needed work far exceeds the work needed to fit a different V-12. And for a questionable result.
Higher drag means more fuel burn for SAME speed. Shorter ranges for SAME fuel.


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## tomo pauk (Oct 17, 2014)

wuzak said:


> ...The DB 605 (or was it a DB 601) Was about the same dimensions as a Merlin. Teh thrust line was lower, but at a guess I woud say no lower than the Griffon.
> 
> A Hercules will have a lower thrust line and require a smaller prop.
> ...



The thrust line for the DB Spitfire was lower than the main fuselage longeron (pic taken from airwar.ru; can be translated; scroll down for photos 3-view of greater resolution) :








Edgar Brooks said:


> ...
> 
> [about Hercules being at 52 in diameter:]With, or without, cowling? (And it still won't fit a 36" fuselage.)



Not specified, more likely it is without cowling.


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## wuzak (Oct 17, 2014)

The Propeller used on that aircraft is the same diameter as used on the Bf 109. Maybe they could have used a slightly larger one.

The point remains, though, that the thrust line would be lower with the Hercules, requiring a similar or smaller prop.

Note that the Fw 190A's prop was 3.3m (10 ft. 11¾ in) in diameter - a full foot larger in diameter than in the DbSpit. Also note that the the BMW 801 was more tightly cowled and slightly smaller in diameter.

Luftwaffe Resource Center - Fighters/Destroyers - A Warbirds Resource Group Site

The Beaufighter TF.X with Hercules XVII (developed from the VI) had propellers of 12ft 9in diameter - nearly 2 feet bigger than on the Fw 190.

Bristol Beaufighter

A smaller prop would require more blades and a faster rotation speed. A note on increasing the prop rpm (by increasing engine rpm limits) on the Beaufighter:



> In level flight in M.S. supercharger gear, there is a small increase in speed (2 1/2 m.p.h.) due to the increased r.p.m. and boost limitations. In F.S. gear, however, there is a decrease in speed of about 1 1/2 m.p.h., above full throttle height at the new limitations. It wouild appear that the increase of power due to increasing engine r.p.m. is small and that the decrease in propeller efficiency at the higher r.p.m. produces a nett decrease in thrust horse power in this case. It seems doubtful in view of these results, whether the increased R.P.M. limitations are worth while, in view of the probable decrease in engine life.



Beaufighter (F) Mk.VI Testing

I still think that if you are going to stick a radial in any fighter it has to be the Hurricane. That frees up Merlin XXs for the Spitfire - either as the III or an interim MkV/MXX version.

As the Hurricane was being pushed into 2nd line roles already by 1941, the radial may help with its survivability.

It would also help Camm with the development of the radial cowling for the Tempest II in later years.

And the Hurricane already had a larger prop than the Spitfire, so it may be less compromised in that area.


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## wuzak (Oct 17, 2014)

Double post


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## Edgar Brooks (Oct 18, 2014)

I cannot understand this obsession with radial engines; the Hurricane is the same as the Spitfire, with a fuselage too narrow, and the firewall behind the wings' leading edges and level with the wingspars, so you're just not going to get the Hercules in.
There is an added complication, since the Hurricane was more touchy, with regard to CoG balance (they couldn't fit pilot's armour to the early Mk.I with two-blade prop, and had to have the three-blade fitted first.)
The Hurricane was not relegated to secondary duties (unless you feel that the defence of Malta, the desert, and Atlantic convoys was secondary,) in fact the whole idea of fitting the Merlin XX + 20mm cannon was because of the expectation of the Battle of Britain restarting with the better weather; we know, now, that it didn't happen, but that wasn't known in December 1940. There's also the consideration that it was expected that any fighting would be between 20,000'-30,000' (the 109s were flying above 20,000' before the BoB ended,) and the Hercules ran out of "puff" long before that.
Fitting the Hercules (or any other radial) into the Hurricane would not have freed the Merlin XX for the Spitfire, since the decision to fit the Merlin 45 (virtually a "drop-in" fit, which the XX was not) had been taken as early as 15-12-1940.


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## stona (Oct 18, 2014)

They managed to bolt radial engines onto a couple of Bf 109s, and what a waste of time that was.

Both the Spitfire and Hurricane were designed for what became known as the Merlin engine (the PV-12 first ran in 1933) and I just don't understand why anyone would want to bolt a radial onto them. Evidently the British didn't see the point at the time either 

Cheers

Steve


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## gjs238 (Oct 18, 2014)

It's good to think outside the box, or the cowling, so to speak.
May not always achieve a usable idea, but then again, once in a while, something marvelous may result.


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## stona (Oct 18, 2014)

Well, more than 57,000 Hercules were produced by the end of the war and thankfully not a single one was bolted onto a Spitfire! Something marvellous I don't think it would have been 

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Oct 18, 2014)

I dont get it either. The RAF had problems 41-2, as it tried to take the fight to Germany, but that wasnt due to the Merlin. They were still playing catch up in the experience of their pilots, they had poor tactical options over france, and technology wise, their fighters lacked range, but I dont see how a hercules is going to change that


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## stona (Oct 18, 2014)

And the Luftwaffe introduced the much improved Bf 109 F and the Fw 190 A, the latter designed from the get-go for a radial engine. The British took the only sensible option available to upgrade the Spitfire, and mucking about with radial engines certainly wasn't it!

In terms of "mid-term strategy, tactics and _technology_" a Hercules engine Spitfire is a complete non-starter.

Cheers

Steve


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## gjs238 (Oct 18, 2014)

So should we move on then to the R-2800 powered P-51?

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## tomo pauk (Oct 18, 2014)

This will be, hopefully, a less controversial idea:

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## wuzak (Oct 18, 2014)

Edgar Brooks said:


> I cannot understand this obsession with radial engines; the Hurricane is the same as the Spitfire, with a fuselage too narrow, and the firewall behind the wings' leading edges and level with the wingspars, so you're just not going to get the Hercules in.



Fair enough.

I never considered the Hurricane might have the same issue as the Spitfire - ie narrowness.




Edgar Brooks said:


> There is an added complication, since the Hurricane was more touchy, with regard to CoG balance (they couldn't fit pilot's armour to the early Mk.I with two-blade prop, and had to have the three-blade fitted first.)



I never knew that the Hurricane was very sensative to CoG.




Edgar Brooks said:


> The Hurricane was not relegated to secondary duties (unless you feel that the defence of Malta, the desert, and Atlantic convoys was secondary,) in fact the whole idea of fitting the Merlin XX + 20mm cannon was because of the expectation of the Battle of Britain restarting with the better weather; we know, now, that it didn't happen, but that wasn't known in December 1940.



I was thinking slightly longer term for the Hurricane doing secondary duties. A Hercules Hurricane - if it could be done - wasn't going to turn up any sooner than a Hercules Spitfire. ie not until 1942.




Edgar Brooks said:


> There's also the consideration that it was expected that any fighting would be between 20,000'-30,000' (the 109s were flying above 20,000' before the BoB ended,) and the Hercules ran out of "puff" long before that.



Hence the suggestion that a Hercules Hurricane would work for low level ground attack, anti-tank and the like.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 19, 2014)

Hercules as installed in a Beaufighter 






Bare engine






The area/part of the engine _behind_ the cylinder heads gets a lot smaller than 52 in real quick. Of course all that "stuff" (supercharger/carb, pumps, etc) behind the cylinders means you can't shorten the distance from the cylinder heads to the firewall by much so you still have the cg problem.


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## Edgar Brooks (Oct 19, 2014)

wuzak said:


> I never knew that the Hurricane was very sensative to CoG..


You're not the only one; as regular as clockwork comes the enquiry, "Why not fit the Griffon in the Hurricane?" 
Camm had already thought of that, and submitted drawings, but it involved wholesale redrawing of the centre-section, with the stub-spars having to be raked forward, to bring the wings forward enough to retain a CoG balance. Camm was told to forget it, and concentrate on the Tornado/Typhoon.


> I was thinking slightly longer term for the Hurricane doing secondary duties. A Hercules Hurricane - if it could be done - wasn't going to turn up any sooner than a Hercules Spitfire. ie not until 1942.


The Air Ministry had to put the expected fighting, in 1941, first, and the Typhoon had flown in March 1940, with the second prototype in May 1941.


> Hence the suggestion that a Hercules Hurricane would work for low level ground attack, anti-tank and the like


Which Dowding had foreseen as being the province of the XX-powered IIC, in the event of a 1941 German invasion, which Mussolini effectively scuppered by mucking-up in the Mediterranean and needing German help, plus Hitler's plans for Russia.

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## Shortround6 (Oct 19, 2014)

Edgar Brooks said:


> You're not the only one; as regular as clockwork comes the enquiry, "Why not fit the Griffon in the Hurricane?"
> Camm had already thought of that, *and submitted drawings, but it involved wholesale redrawing of the centre-section, with the stub-spars having to be raked forward, to bring the wings forward enough to retain a CoG balance. Camm was told to forget it, and concentrate on the Tornado/Typhoon.*
> 
> The Air Ministry had to put the expected fighting, in 1941, first, and the Typhoon had flown in March 1940, with the second prototype in May 1941.
> ...


The section in *bold* is pretty much the answer to a lot of these schemes. There was only so much _engineering capacity_ (and that includes draftsmen to make the drawings of the new parts) and any scheme that needed more than the most minor of alterations was going to cut into another project. Hercules Hurricane *instead* of Typhoon? or delays Typhoon by months? 

The British were caught out by several things in 1941. Not only the appearance of the FW 190 but the change from the 109E to the 109F. A Hurricane II might have been a match (or close to it) for a 109E powered by an improved DB601 but the reduction in drag the 109F achieved moved the 109 out of the Hurricane's league. Trouble is and was that it is hard to change the direction of large production programs.
It can take months to change a factory over to a new type and you have a considerable supply chain. Few, if any, British aircraft companies made their own landing gear, brakes, hydraulic equipment or electrical. These were made by specialty firms as were forgings, extrusions and other bits of metal used in the airframe. Sudden cancellation of a certain aircraft type could leave you with hundreds of tons of very expensive "stuff" that you have no use for. "stuff" on the aircraft factory floor/supply bins, "stuff" in transit, "stuff" at the supplying companies factory in various stages of completion and in some cases even further back. Landing gear maker does the machining on forgings/extrusions it buys from other companies. It could take many weeks for raw materials to go through the chain and wind up in a finished aircraft. 

In the Fall of 1940 it looked like the Hurricane II would be a viable fighter aircraft. It isn't until the 109F shows up in numbers in the _summer_ of 1941 that the decision really looks like a mistake.

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## stona (Oct 19, 2014)

Also worth mentioning that in 1940 the cannon armed Whirlwind was seen by many, including Dowding, as the only viable anti-tank weapon the RAF had. In June 1940, when the prospect of German tanks on English beaches seemed a distinct possibility to some, Dowding wrote to Beaverbrook who had sought his opinion of the Whirlwind.

"Altogether, I feel we may be very glad indeed to have as many Whirlwinds as we can get in the near future both as anti tank weapons and in order to attack bombers as they become less and less vulnerable to rifle calibre machine gun fire, but we shall be glad enough to drop them when the Hawker fighter comes into heavy production."

The "Hawker fighter" refers to what would become the Typhoon. Hopefully no one was holding their breath in anticipation.

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Nov 4, 2014)

Now that the anti-tank A/C is mentioned several times - what to do next for that task? Earlier introduction of the Hurricane IIC, maybe underslung cannons for other A/C, or installation on the twin engined A/C? Maybe try an installation on the Airacobra, provided it can fit?


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## Shortround6 (Nov 4, 2014)

The 20mm Hispano works great as an anti-tank gun as long as the tanks have 14.5mm armor or thinner. Once the armor goes to 30mm the Hispano becomes more of nuisance than an effective weapon. 

You can pretty much forget shooting through the top armor. Think about it, if you use a low approach, say a 30 degree dive the shells will hit at about about 60 degrees from perpendicular to the armor and the armor will by twice it's nominal thickness then you have the tendency of the shells to ricochet (or deflect) at near that angle and the top armor may act 2 1/2 times thicker or more than it's actual thickness. Beyond the ability of the 20mm Hispano to penetrate. 
You can also pretty much forget firing in a steep dive, works great from the target impact point of view but what altitude do you have to stop firing at and start pulling out so your fighter doesn't make an intimate contact with mother earth? 

Off course if you can find _enough_ suicidal pilots Westland's other great warplane was ready to step up and take on the tanks.


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## stona (Nov 5, 2014)

In the impossible scenario when German tanks were rolling across English beaches the job of destroying them would have been the Army's, not the RAF's, and Dowding knew this perfectly well.

The cost cutting operations with which Dowding and many other senior airmen of the day were familiar, whereby a few aircraft could cow into submission some troublesome tribesmen in some far flung imperial outpost, without the expense in blood and treasure of boots on the ground, were hardly going to work against a more organised enemy and certainly not against another '1st world' army.

It's a lesson still not learnt today.

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Nov 5, 2014)

I dont think i necessarily agree with that completely. Sure having utterly obsolete equipment is likely achieve defeat and a high own casualty count. but if achieving high end technology is to be paid for in low numbers in the force availability, something the Germans tried on the eastern front, and lost abysmally then the high tech scenario doesnt work any better than the low tech one.

In the modern sense, the most advanced APCs are the American Bradley, and a bit older, but same basic idea is the German marder. Both have proven to be pretty much unmitigated disasters. Not because theres anything particularly wrong with either design....quite the contrary. Both are the ants pants when it comes to what they are, you cant get a better APC than the Bradley. but they are horrifically expensive and for that reason their deployment has been far too constricted for them to be considered effective battlefield hardware. Too few Bradleys mean they get over used, and most end up in the repair workshops rather then be out in the field.

Low tech, to the point of obsolescence is bad. High tech, to the point of affecting availability is worse. The best bet is to maintain a level of technological competitiveness, but not go all out for technical supremacy. You need to keep numbers up, but you also need to expend enough resources to retain a credible technology parity of sorts......


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## tomo pauk (Nov 5, 2014)

The 20mm won't work against the Axis tanks of 1941 and better, unless it is installed in a dive bomber, so the firing can be done at a favorable angle vs. top armor. 

For a step further, the 2pdr HV pom-pom might be the choice, unless we got the Class S in time? Once the APSV ammo is available (erstwhile for the Littlejohn adapter, but can be fired without one), should further bolster the AP capabilities.


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## wuzak (Nov 5, 2014)

parsifal said:


> In the modern sense, the most advanced APCs are the American Bradley, and a bit older, but same basic idea is the German marder. Both have proven to be pretty much unmitigated disasters. Not because theres anything particularly wrong with either design....quite the contrary. Both are the ants pants when it comes to what they are, you cant get a better APC than the Bradley. but they are horrifically expensive and for that reason their deployment has been far too constricted for them to be considered effective battlefield hardware. Too few Bradleys mean they get over used, and most end up in the repair workshops rather then be out in the field.




_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aXQ2lO3ieBA_


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4f2XbOY9kcg_


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5E8DQSHkhGE_

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## Shortround6 (Nov 5, 2014)

No Tomo, the dive bomb approach will NOT work, at least not well. Even the dive bombers are pulling out of the dive at 1500-2000ft (500-666yds) to give themselves time to pull out. 

*Maybe* you could put a 2pdr Pom-Pom in the bomb-bay of a Wellington and use it to strafe a column 

While it is pretty much just a scaled up Maxim or Vickers gun it scaled _way_ up 





And runs about 550lbs for the LV versions, that is for gun alone with no mount and may or may not include water, These guns used two different types of belt feed (raly ones used Fabric belt) and the chances of the belts making it to the end _without_ jamming in a plane pulling "G"s would be pretty slim.


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## Edgar Brooks (Nov 5, 2014)

A tank track, hit by a 20mm shell, is broken, making the tank immobile, and pilots knew enough to come in from the side, if at all possible. 
As Steve said, tanks, once ashore, are the job of the Army, and 30mm isn't proof against a 25lb shell, never mind a dedicated anti-tank gun. The invasion fleet would have been the target for the RAF, and, as far as I know, the invasion barges didn't have 30mm armour.
That takes us through 1941, when it was thought that an invasion was still likely, and the first Hurricane IID was built, and ready for trials, in November that year; the 40mm cannon was found capable of destroying both the Mk.III Mk.IV tanks. With those guns, it was a diving approach, to 240mph, level out at 50' and attack from the side.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 5, 2014)

I'm afraid that a track of a medium tank will not fear of what a 20mm shell can do to it. Had that been the case, the beligerents wouldn't moved to, erstwhile, 23-30mm, and then to 37-40 mm AT guns for airborne platforms, and above 3in for ground platforms. The track, looking from the front, represents a far bigger target than when looking from the sides.
The 20mm Hispano should be capable to penetrate armor of the Pz-I and Pz-II with AP ammo, though.
I cannot agree either that, at least for period that includes 1940 and on, that targeting the tanks were strictly a domain the Army. In this thread, the quartet of 20mm was mentioned as being regarded by the RAF brass as the potent AT weapon, whether in Whirlwind or 'Hawker's fighter'; the 40mm was being developed for airborne AT job.


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## yulzari (Nov 5, 2014)

The 1940 RAF concept was to throw the secondary units into the ground battle. Hence the retention of trained and experienced pilots in the likes of Anti Aircraft Co operation units. My source on this moved into front line service by early 1941 but I presume that the 1941 idea was much the same,albeit with better machines. The air would have seen Bothas and Henleys reverting to their design duties for example.

This would leave the front line fighters to defend in the air and the front line bombers to attack sea and port targets. 

Armour is not the exclusive target on the ground. The German Army depended upon horses for transport. Hence the British instructions for all horses in the area near a German assault to be shot to deny them as replacement haulers. Tanks depend upon soft skinned transport for their fuel and ammunition and these are quite vulnerable to even a mid course trainee pilot with a Hawker Hart or a Tiger Moth and 25lb bombs. Even the Home Guard weapons were easily capable of taking off a tanks track.

Thus the RAF decision was to seek better bomber killers for 1941, not better ground attack aeroplanes. My (passed away) ex RAF contact remembers being peripherally involved with the 40mm S gun ammunition trials and told me that the anti tank rounds were lower priority than the HE rounds as the prime target was to be ships and barges in any German invasion fleet.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 5, 2014)

It might be _possible_ to break a track with 20mm gun fire, the question is how _probable_ it is. and since not all tracks are created equal, just because you can break the tracks of 5-10 ton tanks(or half-tracks) does not automatically mean you can break the tracks of 20-25 ton tanks. 

Firing at the side of tank gives you a better opportunity to hit suspension parts, like roadwheels (with their sometimes rubber tires), springs, shock absorbers and other stuff that, if damaged, might cause a tank to throw a track. This all results in a 'mobility' kill. Which is fine if the tank is on the march, If it is already engaged in battle (firing on friendly positions/vehicles) a mobility kill turns it into a pillbox/bunker still shooting at your ground troops. 

And I am afraid that any high ranking RAF officer who told the Prime Minster that stopping enemy tanks on English beaches/shores "was not *the* RAF's job" would find himself commanding an army support squadron on the Northwest Frontier (Afghanistan) in short order. 

It might not be the job the RAF wanted or the job they pinned their hopes of an independent air service, equal in stature and prestige to the Army and Navy, on but it certainly was _one_ of their jobs or else a tremendous amount of money had gone down the crapper in terms of army co-operation aircraft and specifications/trials for tactical bombers like the Hawker Henley.


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## stona (Nov 5, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> In this thread, the quartet of 20mm was mentioned as being regarded by the RAF brass as the potent AT weapon, whether in Whirlwind or 'Hawker's fighter'; the 40mm was being developed for airborne AT job.



By Dowding, not the RAF and in the same letter in which he emphasised cannon armament as being capable of destroying bombers which were becoming more heavily armoured and which were THE primary target of his command.

Fighter Command was not trained for close air support in 1940 and it was the doctrine of the time that destroying enemy vehicles_ on the battlefield_ was the Army's job. 

In May 1940 an Army officer in France, requesting air support would have to telephone London to make his request. He'd be lucky to get anything within hours, the average response time was about three hours.

It wasn't until May 1941 that the War Office _demanded_ that the RAF should be prepared to support the Army in the same way that the Luftwaffe did for its army, particularly against tanks.
This led to an incandescent reaction from Slessor (then Director of Plans at the Air Ministry) who questioned the Army's tendency to ask the RAF to do a job it should be doing itself and stating plainly that it was the job of the Army's anti-tank weapons to destroy enemy tanks on the battlefield. The RAF's job, he said, was to prevent enemy forces from functioning due to shortages of 'fuel, food and ammunition'.
He was supported by Basil Embry, who knew a thing or two about attacking German columns, who warned that the casualty rate amongst aircraft carrying out what we would now call close air support would be out of proportion to any results achieved.
The Air Ministry and RAF were implacably opposed to these sorts of operations.

The dive bomber concept was rejected by the RAF in the 1930s and it is a fact that as late as early 1941 no RAF fighter was equipped to carry a bomb (or bombs). Ground attack was something on the agenda. During the first Libyan campaign of December 1940/January 1941 strafing was carried out against Italian forces with machine guns. The RAF's first fighter bomber attack was made by 607 squadron in October 1941. In North Africa 80 squadron fitted eight 40lb bombs to its old Hurricane Is in November 1940 to become the first 'fighter bombers' in that theatre.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Nov 5, 2014)

It is also a fact that many RAF fighters carried 4 small bombs during WW I, They carried 4 small bombs in the 1920s and into the early 30s. They had squadron after squadron of "army cooperation aircraft" that carried a pair of 230-250lb bombs ( or sometimes four 116lb bombs) all during the 30s. Which seemed to disappear just before WW II or got little press. They did order 200 Henley dive bombers even if they didn't use them as such. Over 1700 Lysanders? 

It might not have been Fighter Command's job to attack tanks on the battlefield but fighter command was NOT the entire RAF. 

Perhaps memories of the losses involved in trench strafing made them reluctant to engage directly over the battlefield again, or given the horrendous losses for minimal result in the Battle for France made them not want to repeat the process. 

Not to pick too much on the British the US did the same thing, P-26s carried bombs, P-35s carried bombs, export Hawk 75s could carry all kinds of bombs* (domestic P-36s couldn't ?) and many people _claim_ the P-40 was _intended_ for ground support with no bombs and just two .50 cal MGs. P-39s couldn't carry bombs? 
Why did the US drop the fighter bomber ( or trench strafer) concept right _before_ WW II?

*Factory Brochure for Hawk 75 lists a single 500lb under the fuselage as an option and a 100lb bomb under each wing as an option and under wing loads (each wing) of 5 30lb fragmetation, 5 25lb chemical, 3 50lb demolition _standard_.

Max bomb load given as 850lbs, one 500lb bomb, two 100lbs bombs and six 25lb bombs. And yet the P-40 _couldn't carry_ bombs until the C model? 

I think there was a lot of game playing with procurement and budgets rather than actual capability of the aircraft.


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## stona (Nov 5, 2014)

Those aircraft carrying a few bombs under the wings were precisely what I was referring to earlier when I mentioned cowing tribesmen in some far flung imperial out post into submission. The RAF was able to demonstrate that it was a very cost effective way of policing certain parts of the Empire and that contributed directly to its survival as an independent service.

It was not about to give up that independence in 1939/40 and become a subsidiary of the Army. This attitude was ingrained in the first generation of RAF officers, some of whom found themselves at senior posts at the Air Ministry by this time. It is the reason for Slessor's immoderate response to the War Office's 'demand'.

Even later, when a machinery for close air support was established in 1943/5 it was manned by two separate services neither of which had much experience of cooperating with the other before 1941/2 and it was operating in the face of sustained hostility from the junior service. The high command of the RAF was fundamentally opposed to the role and the Army General Staff were largely unfamiliar with air power and unable to appreciate either its potential or drawbacks. The relationship, particularly in Europe was characterised by a lack of commonality, bitterness and recrimination.

In 1940/41 the Army had demanded dive bombers, as they had seen successfully employed by the Germans. The RAF successfully resisted this and the Army never had a say in the types of aircraft deployed. At the time this was taken as proof of the RAF's unwillingness to cooperate and fuelled demands for an independent Army air arm.

When, finally, a joint school of instruction was set up the Army again was not satisfied. 

"The object of the course has been confined almost entirely to teaching the soldier about the Air Force, a statement that might be qualified by substituting - to teach the Army what the Air Force thinks the Army ought to know about the Air Force."

As late as 1944 the Army was still complaining.

"In matters of high policy affecting the two Services the Army has deferred to the Air Force in almost every instance..... Whether a policy of appeasement was ever profitable is a matter of opinion. In any case it is difficult to believe in it under the present circumstances where, superficial affability and goodwill on the one hand, and behind the scenes criticisms and back biting on the other, constitute a poor substitute for genuine cooperation."

Never under estimate the influence of doctrine, dogma and inter service rivalries on what actually happened at the sharp end.

Cheers

Steve


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## gjs238 (Nov 5, 2014)

Perhaps the US Navy/Marines did it best with their organic air support.


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## Edgar Brooks (Nov 5, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> It might be _possible_ This all results in a 'mobility' kill. Which is fine if the tank is on the march, If it is already engaged in battle (firing on friendly positions/vehicles) a mobility kill turns it into a pillbox/bunker still shooting at your ground troops. .


An immobile tank is a static target, and the crew would know that. When the A-10 was first shown at Farnborough, I got talking to one of the crew, who was walking around, carrying one of the 30mm rounds; somebody got very sarcastic "What would that do to a Russian tank?" "On its own, not a lot, but fire enough, and something's going to break, so we can come round again and plaster it properly."


> And I am afraid that any high ranking RAF officer who told the Prime Minster that stopping enemy tanks on English beaches/shores "was not *the* RAF's job" would find himself commanding an army support squadron on the Northwest Frontier (Afghanistan) in short order.


Can I, as gently as possible, point out that RAF officers were in the job because they wanted to defend their country and (even more so)the people in it; it's why we had scores of volunteers arriving here, from all over the world, with the sole aim of stopping the Nazis in their tracks. If it involved flying a Lysander-come-cannon lash-up, there would have been aircrew queueing up for the task; civilians volunteered to disappear into bunkers, so that they could emerge after the first invaders had passed, to carry out acts of sabotage. They all knew that their lives would be very short, but they still wanted to do it.
Churchill's War Cabinet, as well as civilian M.P.s, had regular meetings with senior officers of all the fighting Services, in which they (allegedly) worked out ways to cooperate with each other; though we didn't have a Goering in the RAF, Leigh-Mallory was, apparently, a nasty piece of work (as could be Sholto-Douglas, at times,) but shirking his responsibilities was not one of his traits.


> It might not be the job the RAF wanted or the job they pinned their hopes of an independent air service, equal in stature and prestige to the Army and Navy, on but it certainly was _one_ of their jobs or else a tremendous amount of money had gone down the crapper in terms of army co-operation aircraft and specifications/trials for tactical bombers like the Hawker Henley


What the RAF wanted, first and foremost, was the defeat of the enemy, because the alternative was slavery and death for their friends and family. The RAF was also equipped with aircraft ordered by the Air Ministry, in direct contact with a government Minister, so they basically had to do as they were told, and with what they were given; incidentally, the concept of the Hawker Henley as light day (not tactical, and definitely not a dive) bomber was dropped in December 1936, with the order reduced to 200, and all airframes to be converted to target-towing. The RAF/Air Ministry's requirements changed, and the RAF lower order had to change with it.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 5, 2014)

I would like to point out that times and weapons had changed a bit from 1940 to the 1970s. With rocket pods and especially guided missiles a stationary tank is in great danger from a "second" attack from specialized anti-tank aircraft (or other AT weapons). If the 1940/41 aircraft had _only_ 20mm cannon it's ability to cause fatal damage is no greater on the second pass than the first. It was not uncommon for crews in immobilized tanks to continue to fight their tanks. It rather depended on the threats. Wacking big AT gun getting ready for a second shot? crew bails out as fast as they can. Bunch of angry infantry with small arms? Stay in the tank and shoot back rather than bail out and hide behind tank clutching a few pistols and a submachinegun. 

Can I also, as gently as possible, point out that I wrote "_high ranking RAF officer_" which rather excludes the bulk of the squadron pilots and squadron commanders and even a number of group/wing commanders. At least that was my intention when I wrote. The vast majority of of the RAF pilots did an amazing job and often gave their lives in gallant attacks that sometimes failed to achieve the desired results due to poor aircraft, poor training, and poor doctrine. The vast majority would have flown those Lysanders with lashed on 20mm guns and done so knowing what their chances were. 
May I also point out that the rest of sentence is saying that any *high* ranked officer who complained or balked at co-operating with army _should_ have demoted and sent to the most unpleasant RAF outpost in the empire, at the least. Which, in my opinion, is hardly casting a slur on the pilots who did fly and fight with such sacrifice during the war. 

As for the Hawker Henley, perhaps the book I was reading was wrong.'The British Bomber since 1914" by Francis Mason. In the entry on the Henley ( starting page 306) he refers to it several times as a dive bomber, even saying ""A production order under specification 42/36 for 350 dive-bombers had been places with Gloster, and preparations had....." Yes, by some point in 1938 they had given up on the dive bombing idea but he puts forth the theory that it was as much due to equipment problems as a real change in what they really desired. Dive bombers needing constant speed propellers to keep from over-speeding the the engine in the dive (although some managed with two pitch props) and since England was short of constant speed props (and would be even into 1940). 
BTW there was a plan in 1940 to use the Henleys as a 'last ditch' bomber and airframe L3276 was trialed at Boscombe Down with two 112lb and eight 20lb bombs under the wings. Up to 150 aircraft were to be pulled from the training units and converted by No 5 Maintenance unit.


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## Edgar Brooks (Nov 6, 2014)

The Henley used the same (fabric-covered) wing as the Hurricane, which, with them, was restricted to a maximum diving speed of 380; this increased to 450 with metal wings. Risking the Henley losing its wing covering was not an option, and the metal wings were late, for the (more important) Hurricane, so the Henley had no chance.
All of the carefully-laid plans, for the RAF, were torn up and thrown away, with the (never allowed-for) defeat of France, hence the desperate ideas that were promulgated at the time.


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## stona (Nov 6, 2014)

Close Air Support was simply not seen by the RAF as a role it should play.

It was developed after a fashion in North Africa under men like Coningham and Montgomery. The latter not often seen as a forward thinking officer, yet it was he who ensured that the Army Headquarters and that of the RAF Desert Air Force were located together and insisted that senior air staff officers shared his mess.

The situation was rather different in Europe and when Montgomery returned in early 1944 he was alarmed by it. He wrote in May that a 'definite gulf' existed between the armies and their supporting Air Forces and that success depended on each Army and its accompanying Air Force being welded into a single entity.
His words fell on deaf ears. Both Coningham who would command the 2nd TAF and Tedder, serving as Eisenhower's deputy were by now disillusioned with Montgomery. The various headquarters were far apart. 21st Army Group at Portsmouth, the Air C-in-C at Stanmore and Coningham at Uxbridge. At exactly this time Montgomery embarked upon a morale raising tour leaving his Chief of Staff (De Guignand) to deal with the senior airmen which also caused much resentment. Don't underestimate the egos of some of these men.

Even in late 1944 the Army was still complaining that cooperation didn't exist and that the RAF seemed to disapprove of any attempt by the Army to become familiar with the problems of air support. The prevailing attitude of the RAF was that the Army should state the problem and that the RAF should decide on the solution. 

The RAF was hardly prepared for carrying out close air support on the eve of the invasion in 1944. It did have the benefit of aircraft more suited to the job, though NONE were designed with that job as a primary function, and it did have the benefit of a system of control developed in North Africa. The latter would require rapid development in the coming months.
It had neither in 1940 when some (who didn't have the benefit of our hindsight) genuinely believed that a cross Channel amphibious operation mounted by the Germans was a real possibility. As Edgar has intimated above, this was a possibility that had not been considered before the war. The Fall of France was an unforeseen catastrophe of epic proportions and led to all sorts of desperate schemes, none of which, thankfully, were ever tested for real.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Nov 6, 2014)

Edgar Brooks said:


> The Henley used the same (fabric-covered) wing as the Hurricane, which, with them, was restricted to a maximum diving speed of 380; this increased to 450 with metal wings. Risking the Henley losing its wing covering was not an option, and the metal wings were late, for the (more important) Hurricane, so the Henley had no chance.
> All of the carefully-laid plans, for the RAF, were torn up and thrown away, with the (never allowed-for) defeat of France, hence the desperate ideas that were promulgated at the time.



The Henley may have had no chance as a dive bomber 'as equipped' but it was ordered as one and at the time it was ordered this would have figured into the planning/procurement of other weapons. 
What the actual planned use of the Henley was is certainly subject to question, no dive brakes ( a more important factor than fabric covered wings) but then the Vought Vindicator didn't have dive brakes either (_planned to use reversible propeller_ and was forced to dive at shallower angles. British didn't have a dive bombing sight, one in the works or??? The Henley (and even the Battle) _were_ stressed for 70 degree dives and pull-outs. Of course with 3 to 4 years between issue of requirement/s and first service squadron getting aircraft what was planned vs what actually happened took more than few turns. 
You can have more than one change in doctrine or perceived mission in 3-4 years.


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## parsifal (Nov 6, 2014)

Attacking the armoured elements of a tank formation is hard, and not very effective with either guns, bombs or even rockets, in the context of the 1930-50 techs. For guns, perhaps 5% of total losses of tanks were due to shell hits. It didnt matter the calibre of the guns, they were all hopelessly inaccurate. During Kursk, for example, there are accounts of Soviets losing 90 tanks to Stuka attacks out of a force structure of about 200 tanks. Soviet records show they had 7 tanks temporarily immobilised in that battle. During Korea, Sea Furies on the HMAS Sydney carried out repeated airstrike over a 3 month period, using 20mm cannons mostly, and claimed to have knocked out 60 T-34s in that period. Post battle ground confirmation show that 7 tanks were knocked out, and these were just as likely the result of rocket and bomb carrying Fireflies.

So, attacks against tanks themselves is a waste of time really, and making dedicated anti tank killing aircraft an even bigger waste of resources. Doesnt mean that attacking armoured formations is a waste of time. quite the contrary. Attacking the formation is very productive. Those Sea Fury attacks were very effective at pinning the advancing Chinese, destroyed nearly 2000 soft skinned vehicles and tore up up and destroyed the Chinese logistic systems very effectively. those stuka attacks at Kursk, didnt kill many Soviet tanks, but they slowed them down, and gave the Germans time to prepare and defeat them on the ground. this is what the RAF shiuld have been preparing for in the 1930s, biplane army co-operation or not. Fighter defences in those kinds of battles are fairly inneffective, except if you have air superiority to air supremacy air state. Anything less and your 100 knot biplanes can operate. They will suffer heavier losses than desirable to flak, but acceptable in my opinion, and no worse than modern equipment like a Battle. If you can achieve air parity, and have 500 biplanes instead of 100 more modern monoplanes, the 500 plane biplane option is the better option, against soft skinned targets which should be the focus of your interdiction efforts


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## gjs238 (Nov 6, 2014)

View attachment 276089

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


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## parsifal (Nov 7, 2014)

now that was not a waste of resources.....


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## stona (Nov 7, 2014)

Getting rid of it soon. Apparently cutting the 300 A-10s (and all their support/training infrastructure) will save just 1% of the USAAF's annual budget of around 110-140 billion dollars (depending how you calculate it and who you believe). 

In more good news for the US tax payer, the A-10 only costs $18K an hour to operate which is a lot less than say and F-16 (around $40k) or the F-35 (put in a figure with a lot of zeros after it) which is supposed to eventually take on its role.

Cheers

Steve


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## fastmongrel (Nov 7, 2014)

stona said:


> F-35 (put in a figure with a lot of zeros after it) which is supposed to eventually take on its role.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve



Yes the F35 (particulary the STOVL version) too expensive to risk below 1,000 feet anywhere near a guy with an AK47 plus if it has a full warload it will have enough fuel for one pass and then dash for for the tanker with an eye on the fuel guage. I bet the grunts cant wait for that to come along and protect them.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 7, 2014)

A-10, now that's a flying infantryman....err, a flying tank


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## gjs238 (Nov 7, 2014)

stona said:


> Getting rid of it soon. Apparently cutting the 300 A-10s (and all their support/training infrastructure) will save just 1% of the USAAF's annual budget of around 110-140 billion dollars (depending how you calculate it and who you believe).
> 
> In more good news for the US tax payer, the A-10 only costs $18K an hour to operate which is a lot less than say and F-16 (around $40k) or the F-35 (put in a figure with a lot of zeros after it) which is supposed to eventually take on its role.
> 
> ...



RE: A-10 retirement: It seems the issue is not the budget, it's the A-10 *maintainers*.

_To hit [F-35] IOC in August 2016, the Air Force has a number of requirements. One of those is to have 1,100 trained maintainers available across the US. Of that 1,100, *the Air Force planned to draw 800 maintainers from the pool of A-10 crews* out there. _

Read the whole article:
The F-35A Might Be Late. And It’s Because of the A-10. | Intercepts | Defense News


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## merlin (Nov 9, 2014)

Re: the Henley - according to Goulding Moyes - "Originally designed and built with fabric-covered wings, as on early production Hurricanes, K5115 was given all-metal stressed-skin wings in August, and made its first flight in this form on the 20th ('37)." With its deep fuselage it was able the carry 2 x 250lb bomb-load internally, though according to Peter Smith, it hard wing hard-points to carry four 250lb bombs! Moreover, Thetford wrote: "There will always be speculation as to why the high performance Henley (of which the RAF had 122 in Service in September 1939) was never issued to first-line light bomber squadrons as it could carry 750lb of bombs and was much superior to the Fairey Battle.
(I have done a Thread about the Henley before).

I agree with others, that the RAF for some bizarre reason that to co-operate with the Army would somehow compromise the 'Independence' - and that was the most important consideration!! Also, the RAF didn't like specialised aircraft - dive-bombers could only dive-bomb, whereas Fighters, could (and did) become fighter-bombers!

If some of the Henleys were used in France '40, and achieve better than the Battles, then past the BoB improved versions could have gone on to be a success - the Lw would have found Hurricanes escorting Henleys a very confusing sight!!


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## stona (Nov 9, 2014)

merlin said:


> I agree with others, that the RAF for some bizarre reason that to co-operate with the Army would somehow compromise the 'Independence' - and that was the most important consideration!!



It's been described as 'Junior Service Syndrome'.

The newly formed RAF never felt itself completely safe from re-absorption into the Army or at least falling under control of the Army and fought tooth and nail to avoid any such possibility. This varied from building up the bomber force as the ultimate deterrent (that didn't work) to offering itself as a cheap solution to rather petty little potential wars in the far flung outposts of Empire (which definitely did work).

Working in close cooperation with the Army on or over the battlefield was simply not regarded as a suitable role for the RAF (by the RAF) and many senior RAF officers believed it could potentially compromise the Service's independence.

Contrary to the post invasion myth, I like to call it 'the myth of the cab rank', this was an on going problem right until the end of the war, though things definitely got much better later. There was genuine and close cooperation between more junior officers from both services, but they didn't have a dog in the fight, they wanted to finish the war and go home.

Cheers

Steve


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## Glider (Nov 9, 2014)

I admit that I don't see the co operation between the Army and the RAF as being less than very close for the last 24 months of the war. Lessons were learnt in the Middle East, tested in the UK before the invasion and constantly modified and improved until the wars end.

A good example being the integration of RAF control units with Army units often in the front line.

Can anyone give me some examples of the lack of co operation between the forces


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## stona (Nov 9, 2014)

Glider said:


> Can anyone give me some examples of the lack of co operation between the forces



Look back in this thread to see what the Army was saying in 1944. This is from an official, on the record, report.

"In matters of high policy affecting the two Services the Army has deferred to the Air Force in almost every instance..... Whether a policy of appeasement was ever profitable is a matter of opinion. In any case it is difficult to believe in it under the present circumstances where, superficial affability and goodwill on the one hand, and behind the scenes criticisms and back biting on the other, constitute a poor substitute for genuine cooperation."

There was cooperation at a more junior level in Europe from 1943 onwards, but it was always an uphill battle. The senior officers of neither service generally backed it.

Cheers

Steve


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## Glider (Nov 9, 2014)

I have looked and there is precious little to support your view. The fact that the RAF had a 2nd Tactical Airforce gives some idea re the effort to support the Army. The size of the 2 TAF, the planning that went into its development and the testing of the ideas before it went into battle are also practical examples of the commitment involved.

The paper you quote from could be talking about the commitment the RAF gave to Bomber Command and its demands on the nations resources for limited benefit, in which case I would agree with you but not that the RAF gave a low priority to supporting the Army from mid 1943 onwards


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## parsifal (Nov 10, 2014)

I think Id have to go with Glider on that one Steve. RAF always diverted huge resources to the strategic bombers, but insofar as committments were made for close air support, its just not logical to say the RAF didnt understand the value of CAS by late '43. What evidence have you to base the assertion that they didnt understand or value CAS as they needed to?


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## stona (Nov 10, 2014)

Well I'd start with the fact that from the invasion until VE day the 2nd TAF flew many more armed reconnaissance sorties than close air support.

A typical example might be No. 83 Group RAF (2nd TAF) for which I have the exact figures to hand. Between August 1944 and February 1945 it flew 15,157 sorties classified as "immediate and prearranged support sorties" and 24,169 'armed reconnaissance' sorties. 

The myth of the cab rank would have us believe that the 2nd TAF was circling overhead just waiting for a call from a controller to dive to the aid of the Army, whereas in fact it spent most of its time doing its own thing.

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Nov 10, 2014)

Thanks, Steve, for the input in (not only) this thread.


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## stona (Nov 10, 2014)

While we are on the subject of cooperation or lack thereof we might look at the efforts during 'Market Garden'.

Despite the fact that there were close air support procedures, however inadequate, in place since D-Day the British 1st Airborne Division went to Arnhem completely unversed in these procedures and lacking the means to contact tactical aircraft. It was something that the Army's planners simply hadn't thought about. 

Now I'm not suggesting that Typhoons might have been a decisive advantage in the fighting in and around Arnhem given the confused and close quarters nature of the confrontation, WW2 fighter bombers were more or less useless in this context, but the fact that little or no thought had even been given to the issue speaks volumes. 
Tactical aircraft might have been more useful in preventing German movement and the concentration of reinforcements. The weather was grim but had improved by the time the Poles dropped into a shooting gallery.

This was September 1944 and we are talking about an airborne operation in which the RAF must also have been involved.

Even the old Desert Air Force which had cooperated more closely with its Army than any other, many of the close air support procedures later adopted had their roots in North Africa, was always keen to do its own thing.
In January 1945 and now in Italy the DAF reported:

"The most noticeable feature of our activities has been the switching of the major part of our effort from the direct support of the Eighth Army in the battle area, to the interdiction of the enemy's communications. With the present stalemate on the battle front, brought about by atrocious ground conditions, it became obvious our forces could be better employed elsewhere."

In NW Europe the 2nd TAF was fortunate to have plenty of fighter bombers and pilots available and was usually able to carry out its close support operations at no significant cost to its other operations. Ground offensives inevitably saw a rise in close support sorties flown to meet Army demands but armed reconnaissance was never compromised to the point where the Germans ever felt that they could ignore the possibility of air attack in their rear areas. This was something the RAF had been happy to do since 1939.

Cheers

Steve


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## Glider (Nov 10, 2014)

Taking these points one at a time


stona said:


> Well I'd start with the fact that from the invasion until VE day the 2nd TAF flew many more armed reconnaissance sorties than close air support.


Prior to the landing there would be little if any need for CAS missions whereas Armed Reconnaissance missions which could be described as seek and destroy missions would predominate.


> A typical example might be No. 83 Group RAF (2nd TAF) for which I have the exact figures to hand. Between August 1944 and February 1945 it flew 15,157 sorties classified as "immediate and prearranged support sorties" and 24,169 'armed reconnaissance' sorties.


So they performed over 39,000 missions against the Germans of which 24,000+ were seeking targets of opportunity and the rest planned missions against a known target. If the RAF hadn't considered GA to be a priority then the 24,000 missions wouldn't have been flown. 



> While we are on the subject of cooperation or lack thereof we might look at the efforts during 'Market Garden'.
> Despite the fact that there were close air support procedures, however inadequate, in place since D-Day the British 1st Airborne Division went to Arnhem completely unversed in these procedures and lacking the means to contact tactical aircraft. It was something that the Army's planners simply hadn't thought about Steve


For Market Garden the 2TAF were tasked with supporting the first wave of the landing and then supporting the forces trying to reach the bridges, tasks they put a lot of effort into and achieved great success. It is true that they were not tasked with supporting the later drops a fatal error but equally the fault of the planners not just the RAF. The 9th Airforce did try to suppress the AA guns and paid a heavy price losing 25 P47's on these duties on the 18th September alone.
At the time of Market Garden 84 groups typhoon wings were supporting the drive of the First Canadian Army up the Belgian coast. The 2TAF may not have been supporting the Army in the manner in which we now might recognise as being of best use, but they were supporting the Army. 
This also questions the view that the RAF did their own thing. If the Army had wanted to hold the thrust up the coast and deploy the aircraft in support of the attack on the bridges then I have little doubt the RAF would have complied.


> "The most noticeable feature of our activities has been the switching of the major part of our effort from the direct support of the Eighth Army in the battle area, to the interdiction of the enemy's communications. With the present stalemate on the battle front, brought about by atrocious ground conditions, it became obvious our forces could be better employed elsewhere."


Does anyone disagree with this decision? Throwing aircraft at troops that are well dug in and not moving is only going to achieve little at a significant cost. The best use of airpower in this situation is as stated to attack communications, infrastructure and supply. Its a bit like complaining that the U Boat campaign and the USN submarine campaigns were failures as they didn't concentrate on warships but on merchant ships.
Also for this to be taken as an example of the RAF doing their own thing, then where is the evidence that the Army asked them to do something else, or disagreed.

Finally are there many examples of requests for air support not being answered? IN the fog of war there will be some but not many


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## Aozora (Nov 10, 2014)

A couple of documents on British tactical ops that might prove useful:

View attachment Brit Tact Inf 1.pdf

View attachment Brit Tact Inf 2.pdf

View attachment Brit Tact Inf 3.pdf


View attachment Tactical Air Doctrine Africa 1942-43.pdf


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## Aozora (Nov 10, 2014)

stona said:


> Look back in this thread to see what the Army was saying in 1944. This is from an official, on the record, report.
> 
> "In matters of high policy affecting the two Services the Army has deferred to the Air Force in almost every instance..... Whether a policy of appeasement was ever profitable is a matter of opinion. In any case it is difficult to believe in it under the present circumstances where, superficial affability and goodwill on the one hand, and behind the scenes criticisms and back biting on the other, constitute a poor substitute for genuine cooperation."
> 
> ...



What "official" are we talking about here? While it may have been the view of a small minority of "officials" and higher ranks, you will be hard pressed to find documentation from the people _that actually mattered_, showing that inter-service co-operation at higher levels was not achieved.

If the senior officers of neither service backed inter-service co-operation, how on earth was 2 TAF formed? Who told the army to co-operate with 2 TAF? Which "senior officers" are you referring to?



stona said:


> Well I'd start with the fact that from the invasion until VE day the 2nd TAF flew many more armed reconnaissance sorties than close air support.
> 
> A typical example might be No. 83 Group RAF (2nd TAF) for which I have the exact figures to hand. Between August 1944 and February 1945 it flew 15,157 sorties classified as "immediate and prearranged support sorties" and 24,169 'armed reconnaissance' sorties.
> 
> ...



Do you know what "armed reconnaissance" actually was? The objective was to range behind enemy lines and interdict and disrupt movement by German ground forces, as well as attacking supply lines etc (plus attacking the Luftwaffe). 

In other words the Armed Recce missions were still a form of army support. It would have been ridiculous and pointless to limit army-cop-op sorties to "cab-rank" missions over the front lines, if the Germans were still able to move unhindered behind the front lines. 

That's the advantage of having a flexible Tactical Air Force. It was not just limited to being glorified artillery for the troops on the front-lines, it was also capable of attacking the enemy well behind the front lines. 

From Shores and Thomas 2 TAF vol 4:











Note, here (outlined in green) that even those operations instigated by the RAF were mostly directed against German supply and transport.






The "myth of the cab-ranks" is a phrase you've coined based on what evidence? Who actually believes that 2 TAF spent most of its time circling overhead, waiting for a call from the army? Can you quote from any quality source showing that the myth existed?


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## stona (Nov 10, 2014)

Armed reconnaissance is NOT close air support. It is what we might now call interdiction and was something the RAF always considered a job it could do, depriving the enemy of freedom of movement, food and ammunition as discussed about 1,000 post ago in this thread. It objected to intervening on the battlefield and was only brought kicking and screaming to some sort of compromise in 1943 (a little earlier in North Africa).

In September 1944 The First Allied Airborne Army had no Air Support Signals Unit or training in air/ground cooperation. One Staff Officer had been sent from the 1st British Airborne Division to Normandy to learn how air support was arranged but nothing came of it. (He'd been sent to Bradley's US 12th Army Group's Air Effects Committee but never seems to have come back.) He could have learnt something as the Americans had a better developed system than the British.

A US study of air support operations in support of Market Garden would later say that without the ability to control aircraft from the ground (each airborne division had been allocated two US air-support parties and one was allocated to First Airborne Corps Headquarters, but none had ever worked with the troops they were to accompany and the operators were unfamiliar with the wireless sets they had to use, they unsurprisingly proved ineffective) the bomb line became a restriction denying the close support the airborne units required.

The weather didn't help and No. 83 Group of RAF 2nd TAF and the IX TAC of US Ninth Air Force were specifically forbidden from operating in the battlefield area when troops or supplies were being landed or dropped.

On 18th September 97 CAS sorties were flown in support of 82nd Airborne fighting around Nijmegen. On 22nd September 119 sorties were flown in support of 101st Airborne fighting around Eindhoven.

British airborne troops at Arnhem received their first air support from No. 83 Group on 23rd September, the official history (War Office Narrative) declines to give a number mentioning 'a few' sorties on this day. The first drops had been on the 17th, in the intervening six days there was NO close air support at all.
22 sorties were flown on 24th and 81 on the 25th. These are insignificant numbers in the context of a major allied operation.
According to the 83 Group Daily Intelligence Summary they asked to fly more sorties but their pleas were 'disregarded'.

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Nov 10, 2014)

> Well I'd start with the fact that from the invasion until VE day the 2nd TAF flew many more armed reconnaissance sorties than close air support. A typical example might be No. 83 Group RAF (2nd TAF) for which I have the exact figures to hand. Between August 1944 and February 1945 it flew 15,157 sorties classified as "immediate and prearranged support sorties" and 24,169 'armed reconnaissance' sorties.



I dont see how that proves the point one way or the other. As a percentage, it means around 61% of combat missions were flown as "patrol" missions against targets of opportunity. Thats remarkably similar to the German experiences. in 1942, in support of Fall blau, Richthofens LF4 flew just under 70% of its missions as armed recon missions. I dont see the difference. 

neither does this number suggest one way or the other whether the British ground forces were calling in these airstrikes once they arrived. what happened once these "armed recon" missions were there? Were they directed onto targets by communication with the ground forces? Maybe maybe not, but this comment does not prove it either way. 



> The myth of the cab rank would have us believe that the 2nd TAF was circling overhead just waiting for a call from a controller to dive to the aid of the Army, whereas in fact it spent most of its time doing its own thing.




Maybe, but your comments just here dont show that its a myth or otherwise. it does show that the proportion of "armed recon" missions was about the same as the LWs effort from 1942. Thats about it.


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## Aozora (Nov 10, 2014)

stona said:


> Armed reconnaissance is NOT close air support. It is what we might now call interdiction and was something the RAF always considered a job it could do, depriving the enemy of freedom of movement, food and ammunition as discussed about 1,000 post ago in this thread. It objected to intervening on the battlefield and was only brought kicking and screaming to some sort of compromise in 1943 (a little earlier in North Africa).



Of course armed recces weren't direct air support; nevertheless 2 TAF was providing air support for the army, either directly or indirectly, in 1944. The idea that air support is somehow only relevant when it's directly over the front lines is a little anachronistic.

There was no need for direct ground support in Western Europe in 1943, so its irrelevant to complain that the RAF (apparently) wasn't interested in the concept until 1943. The fact is, once the concept was proven in North Africa the RAF in Europe engaged in a major restructuring to create 2 TAF. That included learning how to make its squadrons and wings mobile enough to operate from bases close to the front lines, and to move once more territory was liberated by the armies.



stona said:


> In September 1944 The First Allied Airborne Army had no Air Support Signals Unit or training in air/ground cooperation. One Staff Officer had been sent from the 1st British Airborne Division to Normandy to learn how air support was arranged but nothing came of it. (He'd been sent to Bradley's US 12th Army Group's Air Effects Committee but never seems to have come back.) He could have learnt something as the Americans had a better developed system than the British.
> 
> A US study of air support operations in support of Market Garden would later say that without the ability to control aircraft from the ground (each airborne division had been allocated two US air-support parties and one was allocated to First Airborne Corps Headquarters, but none had ever worked with the troops they were to accompany and the operators were unfamiliar with the wireless sets they had to use, they unsurprisingly proved ineffective) the bomb line became a restriction denying the close support the airborne units required.
> 
> The weather didn't help and No. 83 Group of RAF 2nd TAF and the IX TAC of US Ninth Air Force were specifically forbidden from operating in the battlefield area when troops or supplies were being landed or dropped.



The only thing all this proves is that one large-scale operation failed badly because of hurried and poor planning; it does not prove that the RAF or 2 TAF failed to provide good air support, whenever possible, from D-Day to VE-Day.

It would be good to see the evidence that there was, or is a "Cab Rank myth."


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## stona (Nov 11, 2014)

The crucial difference between armed reconnaissance and close air support in this context is that the former is entirely an RAF operation carried out, in a tactical sense, completely independently. The RAF might _or might not_ act on any request or intelligence it received from another source or service. It was this independence that the RAF was so keen to preserve.

Close air support missions were flown at the request of another service and the aircraft were to some extent under the control of that service. Senior RAF officers felt that this compromised their independence in 1939/40 and they had not changed their minds in 1944. Senior army officers felt that they were bending over backwards to pander to the RAF's sensibilities and that the RAF was acting like a spoilt child, the junior service syndrome. Senior RAF officers thought, with some justification, that their Army counterparts did not understand either the limitations or capabilities of close air support.

The idea that this lack of trust had no knock on effect on the more junior officers who were genuinely trying to cooperate is ridiculous. The training, personnel, equipment and infrastructure to develop a really effective system was dependant on cooperation at the highest level and this was sadly lacking even in 1944.
The November 1944 report (BTW it is entitled 'Notes on Air Support, June-October 1944) I quoted above acknowledges this:

_"The difficulties are usually greatest at the higher levels, and decrease at the lower end of the scale. At the first point where practical executive action has to be taken, the difficulties begin to disappear, and from there downwards, in nine cases out of ten, there is no problem"_

It wasn't just a British problem. The May 1943 Field Manual 100-20, 'Command and Employment of Air Power' published in the light of experience gained during TORCH declared air power to be an independent and co-equal force, the command of which was to be centralised in the hands of a senior air commander, _responsible only to the overall theatre commander_. 
Mission types were prioritised. First to secure air superiority, second attacks on enemy troop concentrations, supplies and communications _outside the battle area_. Finally came close air support with the caveat that such missions would be difficult to control, expensive, least effective and only justified at critical periods.

Does this sound familiar? Given the official stance of both the RAF and USAAF as late as 1943, months before the invasion, it is remarkable that a system of close air support was implemented at all. Much credit for it goes to individual officers, in the case of the British working on the experience of the DAF. It is no accident that names from the DAF crop up in the 2nd TAF, most notably Coningham and Broadhurst, both of whom had had 'difficulties' with more senior RAF officers over their promotion of close air support. 

The British first used CABRANK in Italy in November 1943 during operations to clear the line of the river Sangro. The aircraft reported to a controller (ROVER) who controlled a sector and it was he who would assign target, often marked by artillery. 

The Americans had a more closely integrated system developed by Major-General Quesada of IX TAC, what he called armoured column cover. He was able to keep a flight of four P-47s (replacing themselves every 30 minutes or so) over armoured spearheads during daylight hours. Controllers in the leading tanks could call the aircraft in whenever and wherever needed. This system was first used on 26th July 1944, the second day of COBRA, and proved very effective.
A post war US study showed that these operations absorbed between 30 and 60 per cent of the available air strength of a TAC, equivalent to one Fighter Group (US) per armoured division. The RAF's second TAF demonstrably devoted much nearer the lower figure to its CAS missions.

Cheers

Steve


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## Edgar Brooks (Nov 11, 2014)

First, let's dispel this myth that the RAF diverted resources into bombers; aircraft were built to the Air Ministry's requirements, with the agreement (and financial resources) of the government. The RAF were (and still are) given the aircraft, and told to get on with using them, so they did/do their best with what they're given.
I have a report on the tactics used by Spitfire fighter-bomber Squadrons of 2nd. TAF, and would expect the Typhoons to have been the same. Under the "Outline of Operations," sub-heading "Direct Co-operation with First-Line Troops," it says that there were three main aims:-
a/. The attacking of targets which were supplied in advance by the Army to the Air force through regular channels. It used to take some time before the attack on the supplied target could be carried out.** Thus this method of co-operation could only be effective when the front was more or less stabilised or in the case of immobilised points of resistance such as dug-in artillery or tanks.
b/. Attacks on targets passed to the pilot from the Contact Car. The pilot who was linked by R/T to the Contact Car could attack any target upon receipt of instructions. The target could be a small one and even mobile.
[/COLOR]** I suspect that, as these were waiting to be called in, so probably forced into a figure-of-eight manoeuvre, this is the origin of the "cab rank" description. During b/. if only one pilot had direct communication with the ground, again the other aircraft might have had to circle, until they could be called in by him.
While flying normally, the finger-four was the standard formation, moving into echelon in the direction they were about to turn towards the target, just before diving in.


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## stona (Nov 11, 2014)

I don't have time to type up a breakdown of the operational control of a 2nd TAG Group or even the details of how attached ASSU's worked.
The British system actually worked quite well for pre-planned air support strikes (there were problems, but more related to a series of safe guards implemented over security concerns). It was simply not fast enough to deal with impromptu requests from forward units where speed was of the essence. The British Army report to which I have already referred, not published until November 1944, identified the problems. The failure was not in the communication system itself but in the number of links in the chain (I have a schematic somewhere but can't find it) and most importantly the time spent discussing the request between the Army and RAF staffs before any orders were issued.
The solution was rather complicated and actually put another link in the chain ( what became known as Forward Control Posts or FCPs) which were staffed by a senior RAF Controller, typically a Wing Commander, and which could short circuit the system. This controller could step in in urgent cases and handle the request. From an FCP he could talk to the troops on the ground, the RAF/Army Control Centre and airborne aircraft. 
This system did not become fully developed until further decentralisation of command and the introduction of the Contact Car in late 1944. These cars were RAF vehicles, part of an RAF unit, and were often manned by an experienced pilot as what we now call a Forward Air Controller.
The British never really adopted the US system of 'Contact Tanks' to control aircraft overhead. The first use I can find is by the North Irish Horse with modified Sherman's in March 1945.

Let's dispel any idea that the system ever worked like a well oiled machine. Between 16th and 18th August 1944 the 1st Canadian Army listed 52 (that's FIFTY TWO) occasions on which it was attacked by allied fighter bombers. These attacks had killed 72 and wounded 119 officers and men and destroyed 12 vehicles. On one occasion an artillery spotter aircraft had even attempted to ward of the attacking Typhoons.
Canadian 1st Army was far from alone in this experience and warned that provision of air support might soon became a deterrent to ground operations rather than a stimulant for them. It's all in a 1st Canadian Army report entitled _'Attacks by allied A/C on own Tps - 18 and 19 Aug 1944'_
The Canadians took their own initiative leading to a complaint from Coningham to AVM Robb at SHAEF on 29th August that the Canadians were setting their bomb line too far forward, thus depriving his pilots of profitable targets.
Yep, everyone was getting on just fine!

Cheers

Steve


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## yulzari (Nov 11, 2014)

One thing that has not been mentioned here is fuel. Allied forces in NW Europe in 1944 were critical in fuel. Generals were lying and cheating to steal each others supplies so as to be able to drive their units forward. The Germans had control of the Channel ports into 1945 and also control over the mouth of the Schelde and Rhine. Every operation had to justify its fuel cost and operations were also mounted direct from Britain for this reason.

Another thing not mentioned is artillery. Soldiers prefer artillery support. It doesn't go away to refuel. It works as well at night as during the day, or in fog and rain if you can define the target. Whatever the technical merits, or otherwise, a cultural difference between the US and Commonwealth forces was the reliance placed upon artillery fire for close support by Commonwealth commanders. I believe the French army further south had the same leaning towards artillery fire. Had the column advance moved as planned then the airborne forces in Market garden would have been within range of Army and Divisional artillery support but let us not digress too far into that affair.


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## stona (Nov 11, 2014)

Armed reconnaissance was by far the most profitable use of the fighter bomber in WW2. As Coningham said of the effect of the North West African Tactical Air Force operating in Italy in late 1943 on the prospect of potential German counter attacks directed on Foggia or Naples.

_"The preventative factor is the air war on enemy supply and communications, and the killing element in every enemy attack is the fighter bomber. This is especially the case in Italy where the weight of the attack depends upon the roads."_

The effect of armed reconnaissance on German tactical mobility was significant and sometimes decisive. In 1945 the ORS 2nd TAF agreed when it wrote that armed reconnaissance was 

_"the most important of all tactical air work, because of the restrictions it imposes on enemy movement."_

Slessor, Embry and all those other officers, fighting for the independence of their Service must have been pleased to hear it. So would the US authors of Field Manual 100-20.

Cheers

Steve


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## Kevin J (May 10, 2019)

OldSkeptic said:


> The U-Boat pens in south eastern France should never have been allowed to be built. That should have been BC’s #1 target and not allowed to hit anything else until the Germans gave up trying to build them.
> 
> Woeful.


The RAF didn't have big enough bombs to destroy them so the raids were discontinued in 1942. 
Submarine pen - Wikipedia 
Night bombing of coastal targets is feasible at nighttime, it was the city raids at nighttime that only became feasible with area bombing.
For daylight bombing of Brest, only the Spitfire IIa with the fixed drop tank or the Spitfire Vb with the 30/45 gal drop tank are available before 1942. Lorient can only be reached by Whirlwinds with 90 gal drop tanks. Bordeaux, La Rochelle, La Pallice and St-Nazaire are too far. The Whirlwind didn't have the altitude capability to counter the Bf 109F which would have been its main opponent and the Spitfire IIa was too slow and cumbersome due to its fixed tank. 
That's where the 1942 Dieppe raid comes in. It was an attempt to steal an enigma machine. If you can't destroy the pens then get an enigma machine and you will know where the U-Boats are.


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## Kevin J (May 10, 2019)

OldSkeptic said:


> Stripping down the Lanc and getting another 50mph out of it would have given the German nightfighters a much harder job. Their pursuit curve would have been much harder and they would have had to have ran at full(er) throttle for far longer periods, thus reducing their loiter time and forcing them back to the ground. This is particularly so for the Me-110s which were the backbone of the German NFs.
> 
> To achieve maximum effectiveness the German NFs ran at economical cruising as much as they could to enable them to hit multiple targets. Even a short time at max power to catch a faster bomber would have crippled that. Instead of being able to attack 3 or 4 or 5 bombers in a night they would have been forced down to 1 or 2. It would have slashed the BC loss rates.


I like the idea of a Lanc with just a tail turret. It worked well for the Superforts on their night missions over Japan.


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## wuzak (May 11, 2019)

Kevin J said:


> That's where the 1942 Dieppe raid comes in. It was an attempt to steal an enigma machine. If you can't destroy the pens then get an enigma machine and you will know where the U-Boats are.



Rather an overkill to commit 237 ships, 74 squadrons of fighters and bombers and over 10,000 men to capture a device that an example of which had been given to them by the Polish before the war, also considering that another device, which was fully operational, had been captured intact a year prior.

In comparison, the operation to steal a warzburg radar system, which was carried out in early 1942, a few months before Dieppe, required only 120 men, a small number of transport aircraft and a small number of RN support vessels.

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## Kevin J (May 11, 2019)

wuzak said:


> Rather an overkill to commit 237 ships, 74 squadrons of fighters and bombers and over 10,000 men to capture a device that an example of which had been given to them by the Polish before the war, also considering that another device, which was fully operational, had been captured intact a year prior.
> 
> In comparison, the operation to steal a warzburg radar system, which was carried out in early 1942, a few months before Dieppe, required only 120 men, a small number of transport aircraft and a small number of RN support vessels.


IIRC the Germans had added an extra rotor.


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## Kevin J (May 11, 2019)

KiwiBiggles said:


> If you were converting the Spitfire to a radial engine, a fully-worked installation like that on the Fw 190, La 5 or Tempest II would be nice, but by no means essential. As far as I can tell the Ha-112 installation in the Kawasaki Ki-100 was a very hasty lash-up, with extra fairing being tacked onto the fuselage behind the air and exhaust exits. Despite this, the new fighter was 300 kg lighter than its inline progenitor, and had correspondingly better performance and handling. So a quick-and-dirty conversion of the standard Hercules power-egg installation to fit the Spitfire firewall, with some tin stuck on behind to make it look nice, would be a pretty good start.
> 
> Although the dry weight of a Hercules is about 500 lb greater than a single-stage Merlin (or about 300 lb more than a two-stage), once the weight of the cooling system is also considered, there really can't be much in it weight-wise. And the Hercules is of course shorter than a Merlin, so installed on the same firewall in a Spitfire V would give pretty much the same balance.


If you're going to put a Hercules on anything, I would go for a Defiant. Boulton Paul were going along that path in their tender for the requirement that the Blackburn Roc won. So what about a Boulton Paul Roc based on the Defiant using the Hercules engines: wings that would fold upwards like a Corsair: maybe started as a two seat turret fighter with an option to replace the turret and gunner with a fuel tank and armament in the wings. Would have been a winner.


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## wuzak (May 11, 2019)

Kevin J said:


> IIRC the Germans had added an extra rotor.



For the Navy only. And only for U-Boat communications.

The Luftwaffe and the Heer used the 3 rotor.


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## Kevin J (May 11, 2019)

Shortround6 said:


> This seems like another one of those ideas/projects that requires working on a version of plane that will NOT be very good in service for 1 to 2 years so you can be ready with a tooled up production line _when_ the version of the engine you really want to use shows up.
> It also requires a fair amount of jiggery-pokery to get it to work.
> 
> AS for availability of Hercules engines, details seem to be a bit sketchy but it took until Dec of 1941 to get the first 200 Short Stirlings.
> ...


Another easier alternative perhaps would have been a Hercules power egg bolted on instead of a Merlin power egg on a Miles M20. Again IIRC something like this was projected but with retractable undercarriage. You'd still be looking at a 1942 service entry.


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## fubar57 (May 11, 2019)

Was the Dieppe Raid just a raid? | Legion Magazine


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## Shortround6 (May 11, 2019)

Kevin J said:


> Another easier alternative perhaps would have been a Hercules power egg bolted on instead of a Merlin power egg on a Miles M20. Again IIRC something like this was projected but with retractable undercarriage. You'd still be looking at a 1942 service entry.


Bristol Hercules power egg.









ALthough on the Beaufighter it wasn't quite a power egg as they moved the oil cooler out into the wing. 

Please notice the honking big air intake on top which makes sighting a bit of problem on single engine planes. 

There may be a way around that but you no longer have a "power egg" but a rather customized engine installation which is going to take time to sort out. 

And when you are done do you really have any sort of improvement? The radial engine installation, unless doing something completely different from what the British were doing in 1941/42 is going to have way more drag than the Merlins set up and way less exhaust thrust so all the extra power goes into fighting the drag and weight.


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