# Pearl Harbor, 7th December 1939.....



## Lucky13 (Jan 2, 2010)

Not an what if, just a question of curiousity....

How would the USN have handled the '41 attack if it had came two years earlier, would it have suffered worse, could it have responded like it did two years later, how did the USN and IJN compare in '39?


----------



## Shinpachi (Jan 2, 2010)

An interesting thread, Lucky13 but I'm always not good at "what if" story except machine mechanisms


----------



## B-17engineer (Jan 2, 2010)

Will await response too. Had me scared there Jan... I was like 1939!


----------



## Night Fighter Nut (Jan 2, 2010)

From what I've read, and in my humble opinion, I believe it would have been a little worse. The Japanese were going through a massive aviation modernization program through much of the 1930s while the U.S., being an isolationist nation at the time, were taking their time. The big thing that saved our bacon in '41 was that our carriers were not in the harbor when the Japanese attacked. Had those carriers been in the harbor, we would have lost Midway. Looking through my Military Aircraft encyclopedia, many of our planes were designed either in the late '20s or early '30s. Still we had a much larger industrial base and source of raw materials than Japan had. Infact that was the big reason Japan went to war in the Pacific in the first place. They needed more raw materials to support an ever growing Imperial economy and they wanted to be like the West. They wanted to be a superpower and dictate their own terms in trade. United States would not work with them. Since we held several territories in the Pacific at that time, they figured they needed to cripple the United States to prevent them from stopping Japan from doing a land grab. 

Actually the question would really hinge on one particular problem.
I think I remember that it was us who showed the Japanese how to do torpedo bombing. The only problem we had with torpedo bombing at the time was the water had to be deep and the harbor wide. We didn't know how to drop torpedoes in a small shallow harbor and still hit shipping. The Japanese solved that by putting wooden blocks on the back of the torpedoes so they wouldn't go so deep when dropped. I don't remember what date that was when they solved this. If it was after '39 then the attack on Pearl Harbor couldn't have happened.


----------



## Njaco (Jan 2, 2010)

I don't think the concept would have occurred without the British at Taranto. Until then, it was just an idea until the Brits proved it could work. You have to understand that the aircraft at that time wasn't really considered a major component of warfare, at least not to the extent it was by the end of the war or even '41. So convincing military leaders it was feasable without Taranto would have been difficult.


----------



## GrauGeist (Jan 2, 2010)

In the year preceeding the attack on Pearl, the Japanese used Karisima Bay to practice in. The depth of the bay, (which is comparable to Pearl) led them to alter thier torpedoes.

The aircraft found at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 differed very little from the aircraft that were there in 1939. The fact that the entire world was erupting in flames all around the U.S. seemed of little importance to the people in Washington who were managing to not only hold the purse-strings closed, but keep thier head in the sand at the same time.


----------



## Night Fighter Nut (Jan 2, 2010)

Njaco said:


> I don't think the concept would have occurred without the British at Taranto. Until then, it was just an idea until the Brits proved it could work. You have to understand that the aircraft at that time wasn't really considered a major component of warfare, at least not to the extent it was by the end of the war or even '41. So convincing military leaders it was feasable without Taranto would have been difficult.



I accept that. I never heard of Taranto.  Can you tell me more about it?


----------



## Night Fighter Nut (Jan 2, 2010)

GrauGeist said:


> In the year preceeding the attack on Pearl, the Japanese used Karisima Bay to practice in. The depth of the bay, (which is comparable to Pearl) led them to alter thier torpedoes.
> 
> The aircraft found at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 differed very little from the aircraft that were there in 1939. The fact that the entire world was erupting in flames all around the U.S. seemed of little importance to the people in Washington who were managing to not only hold the purse-strings closed, but keep thier head in the sand at the same time.



As for the torpedoes, Perhaps they would have discovered this earlier if they were planning to attack earlier.  I was just thinking of the idea to torpedo bomb in a harbor. If the idea already existed well before '39 then may the solution to the problem have been found earlier as well?

That is correct about the aircraft but Germany just started the war in '39 and most U.S. citizens didn't want to get entangled in yet another European war. I don't think that anyone knew this would be a world war until after Japan attacked. I think most people at that time wanted to remain an isolationist nation. I remember reading that FDR kept telling the people that the U.S. wouldn't get involved even though he personally felt that we should. Not saying that what Washington did was correct but politicians being what and who they are did what they did so that they could get re-elected. What do you think?


----------



## GrauGeist (Jan 3, 2010)

Alot of our military leaders saw the storm clouds gathering on the horizon. And when the U.S. placed an embargo on exports to Japan, they knew the clock was ticking.

The majority of nations, the U.S. included, lagged behind in aircraft development and new threat upgrades all the while the belligerent nations were producing top of the line machines. That should have been a serious wakeup call right there.


----------



## syscom3 (Jan 3, 2010)

In 1939, wasnt the US fleet based at San Diego instead of Pearl? An attack on Hawaii might be problematic if the fleet isnt there.


----------



## GrauGeist (Jan 3, 2010)

The U.S. Pacific Fleet relocated it's headquarters to Hawaii in 1941, but Pearl Harbor has been a primary fleet base since the late 1800's.


----------



## vikingBerserker (Jan 3, 2010)

I think Chris made a very valid point, The Battle of Taranto is what gave the Japanese the idea of using aircraft and in 39 IJN only had 6 commissioned CV's in total.

The military facilities at Pearl Harbor in 39 were nowhere near what they were in 41 and I don't believe Midway had any facilities of note. If they were able to, it would have been a great time to invade and conquer them both.


----------



## GrauGeist (Jan 3, 2010)

Actually, Pearl Harbor was pretty well developed by 1939.

Much of the building and dredging of the harbor occurred during the earlier part of the century. The latest significant addition was the drydock, which was rebuilt during WWI.


----------



## Wayne Little (Jan 3, 2010)

First of all the IJN didn't have 6 Fleet carriers in 39, nor did they have the aircraft to do the job...the first examples of the Zero hadn't even been made yet, and at that time they didn't actually have a reason to pick a fight with the US, they were more interested in expanding their interests in China....


----------



## vikingBerserker (Jan 3, 2010)

I'm not so sure it was fully developed:

"Development of Pearl Harbor under the National Defense construction program, together with the fortification of other Pacific island possessions, was begun in the fall of 1939."

Pearl Harbor and the Outlying Islands: US Navy Base Construction in World War II


----------



## GrauGeist (Jan 3, 2010)

Matter of fact, in '39, the Japanese were in Manchuria pushing up against the eastern borders of Soviet Russia. The Japanese were anticipating a war with Russia, not the U.S. at that time. The non-aggression pact between Germany and Russia plus the U.S. export restrictions changed alot of things...


----------



## parsifal (Jan 3, 2010)

Japan was heavily engaged in China, attempting to force the KMT to the surrender table. There was a sizable faction that wanted to strike against the Soviets, believing the Russians to be weak and easily defeated. There was no reall reason to attack the west at that point, because the west was not applying effective pressure against Japanese agression.

However, a hypothetical battle would nevertheless have been interesting. The Japanese would have been able to field the Akagi, Kaga,, Hiryu (possibly, she was completed July 1939, but I am unsure as to when she was fully worked up), and Soryu. Hosho was an old training carrier, the Zuikakus were still under construction, as were the Shohos. Ryujo was being rebuilt.

The Americans would have been able to field the two Lexingtons, the Ranger, and two of the Yorktowns. One, possibly two carriers would need to stay in the Atlantic

So that means the Japanese would have four carriers to to the US 4 or 5. Japanese carriers would have gone to war with Claude fighters, Kate torpedo Bombers and either Val or A4N1 divebombers. The US would have gone to war with F3Fs 
SB2U Vindicators and TBD Devastators

The US economy was at a very low state of readiness, having not been mobilized by British Lend lease money. The US was short of first line destroyers, her fleet speeds would have been around 18 knots, to allow her battle wagons a chance to keep up, and thjis would have made the USN highly vulnerable to Japanese I-Boat attacks as they executed their Orange war plan and fought their way across the Pacific. . There would have been an even greater gap in the pilot training and experience levels than was the case in 1941. There would have been no radar, no sonar (in the USN) and no MAGIC Intelligence to assist the USN at that stage 

My money is that the japanese would still have been defeated, but the US would have suffered much greater losses than she did historically, and these losses would have been at sea and not in port, where salvage could be undertaken


----------



## Njaco (Jan 3, 2010)

Night Fighter Nut said:


> I accept that. I never heard of Taranto.  Can you tell me more about it?



Battle of Taranto - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

"The naval Battle of Taranto took place on the night of 11 November 1940 – 12 November 1940 during World War II. The Royal Navy launched the first all-aircraft naval attack in history, flying a small number of aircraft from an aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean Sea and attacking the Italian fleet at harbour in Taranto. The effect of the British carrier-launched aircraft on the Italian warships foreshadowed the end of the "big gun" ship and the rise of naval air-power."


----------



## Night Fighter Nut (Jan 3, 2010)

Wayne Little said:


> First of all the IJN didn't have 6 Fleet carriers in 39, nor did they have the aircraft to do the job...the first examples of the Zero hadn't even been made yet, and at that time they didn't actually have a reason to pick a fight with the US, they were more interested in expanding their interests in China....



That is correct. The main torpedo plane, D3A1 Val, that attacked Pear Harbor didn't go into service until 1940 and the Zero was only just starting to see service in March '39... Source: Rand McNally Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft.


----------



## syscom3 (Jan 3, 2010)

GrauGeist said:


> The U.S. Pacific Fleet relocated it's headquarters to Hawaii in 1941, but Pearl Harbor has been a primary fleet base since the late 1800's.



The Pacific Fleet spent a lot of time in San Diego. It wasnt untill sometime in 1940 that FDR ordered the fleet moved to Pearl.

I would say that the IJN is going to have to be able to sail its fleet at a moments notice when the USN was actually at Pearl.


----------



## Night Fighter Nut (Jan 3, 2010)

This is great. You learn so much when you throw out a hypothetical question.


----------



## Shinpachi (Jan 3, 2010)

The 11th of February 1940 was glorious 2600th anniversary of the Empire but the Japanese people were tired of the long war in China and domestic recession.

To encourage people, the government held a grand ceremony on the 10th of November but another new war would have been too much for the ceremony. War in China was enough for them.


----------



## Wayne Little (Jan 4, 2010)

Night Fighter Nut said:


> That is correct. The main torpedo plane, D3A1 Val, that attacked Pear Harbor didn't go into service until 1940 and the Zero was only just starting to see service in March '39... Source: Rand McNally Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft.



Hey Night Fighter Nut, just want to correct your info...your source doesn't sound right for Zero service in 39.

The A6M is universally known as the Zero from its Japanese Navy type designation Type 0 Carrier Fighter, taken from the last digit of the Imperial year 2600 (1940). when it entered service.
First operational Zero was the A6M2 Model 11 used in China in 1940, the Pearl Harbor Zero was the A6M2 Model 21.

The Aichi D3A1 Model 11 Val Type 99 ‘Val’ was a Dive Bomber , it’s designation type was also taken from the last digit of the Imperial year 2599 (1939). It was ordered by the Japanese Navy in Dec 1939, it entered service in 1940 and was pretty much unchanged at Pearl Harbor

The Nakajima B5N Type 97 Carrier Attack Bomber "Kate" was the standard torpedo bomber of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) for much of WWII. First flew in 1937, (Imperial year 2597) and ordered into production soon after as the B5N1, the Pearl Harbor version was the B5N2.

Cheers Wayne


----------



## Night Fighter Nut (Jan 4, 2010)

Wayne Little said:


> Hey Night Fighter Nut, just want to correct your info...your source doesn't sound right for Zero service in 39....Cheers Wayne



Thanks Wayne, it's possible. I find that many books are not always right depending on the extent of research done by the writer.  Can you point me in the right direction so as to find accurate information?


----------



## Njaco (Jan 5, 2010)

If it was soo easy as pointing to correct info it would'nt be so fun to research!!


----------



## Night Fighter Nut (Jan 6, 2010)

Njaco said:


> If it was soo easy as pointing to correct info it would'nt be so fun to research!!



I would love to research all this info. Travel to the different places and meet those who were actually there. Some of my info comes from the Arizona memorial in Hawaii and some from the old vets who were still alive. I was stationed in Hawaii for three years and you hear about Pearl Harbor more often because of its proximity. Our barracks still had the bullet holes in it. I just find that the more you learn, the less you know and I would be the first to admit I don't know everything. Should someone have new information that I don't know, tell me where you found it and I will look it up and be eternally greatful.


----------



## Shinpachi (Jan 6, 2010)

How are you, Night Fighter Nut?
I recommend you "Osprey Aviation Elite" or Bunrindo's "Famous Airplanes of the World(Japanese language)" but it would be quite a long way for you to be competitive with Wayne. He knows about the Japanese aircrafts better than the Japanese. I have already given up and go on my way


----------



## Wayne Little (Jan 7, 2010)

Night Fighter Nut said:


> I would love to research all this info. Travel to the different places and meet those who were actually there. Some of my info comes from the Arizona memorial in Hawaii and some from the old vets who were still alive. I was stationed in Hawaii for three years and you hear about Pearl Harbor more often because of its proximity. Our barracks still had the bullet holes in it. I just find that the more you learn, the less you know and I would be the first to admit I don't know everything. Should someone have new information that I don't know, tell me where you found it and I will look it up and be eternally greatful.



Will post some stuff on the weekend for you...



Shinpachi said:


> How are you, Night Fighter Nut?
> I recommend you "Osprey Aviation Elite" or Bunrindo's "Famous Airplanes of the World(Japanese language)" but it would be quite a long way for you to be competitive with Wayne. He knows about the Japanese aircrafts better than the Japanese. I have already given up and go on my way



.....

You are too kind, Domo Arigato Shinpachi san


----------



## Wayne Little (Jan 10, 2010)

Here ya go NFN, Couple of books that may help....David Aiken, Pearl Harbor authority helped with info in the Osprey book.

and try this link....

PEARL HARBOR HISTORY ASSOCIATES, INC.


----------



## Shinpachi (Jan 10, 2010)

David Aiken
He has been a friend of mine since 2004 but I didn't know he is such a great writer
Thanks for your information, Wayne.


----------



## Wayne Little (Jan 10, 2010)

Shinpachi said:


> David Aiken
> He has been a friend of mine since 2004 but I didn't know he is such a great writer
> Thanks for your information, Wayne.



No worries, he's been involved in a few writing projects...had correspondence with him myself periodically!


----------



## Njaco (Jan 10, 2010)

I have that book by H.P. Wilmott. A must have for any Pearl Harbour armchair historian. Fantastic book!


----------



## Freebird (Jan 10, 2010)

GrauGeist said:


> Matter of fact, in '39, the Japanese were in Manchuria pushing up against the eastern borders of Soviet Russia. The Japanese were anticipating a war with Russia, not the U.S. at that time. The non-aggression pact between Germany and Russia plus the U.S. export restrictions changed alot of things...



Actually, it was the severe thrashing that Zhukov gave the Kwangtung Army in 1939 that was the main reason for the change in opinion, it was realized that a war with the Soviets would be a meat-grinder


----------



## Night Fighter Nut (Jan 13, 2010)

Thanks for showing that book Wayne. I agree with Shinpachi san. You are very knowledgable when it comes to aircraft.


----------



## Night Fighter Nut (Jan 14, 2010)

To carry this further, now we know that the face of the Pacific war would have been drastically different if Pearl was invated in '39. Just for the sake of discussion and to carry this a little further before this thread is dead. What if Japan, tired of waring with China and looking for easier prey to show a measure of success for its people, mean while wanting to expand its borders, Pulls out of China and decides to start taking islands? Starting with Hawaii in '39. What would that really look like? My guess would be that they would have to physically take and occupy the Hawaiian islands. Then where would the counter attacks come from and what would they look like? Just for the sake of discussion.


----------



## syscom3 (Jan 14, 2010)

Night Fighter Nut said:


> .... now we know that the face of the Pacific war .......



Farce?

You think the war in the Pacific was a farce?


----------



## parsifal (Jan 14, 2010)

Sys

I dont think he was meaning "farce". He said "face", which has a different meaning


----------



## Freebird (Jan 15, 2010)

Night Fighter Nut said:


> To carry this further, now we know that the face of the Pacific war would have been drastically different if Pearl was invated in '39. Just for the sake of discussion and to carry this a little further before this thread is dead. What if Japan, tired of waring with China and looking for easier prey to show a measure of success for its people, mean while wanting to expand its borders, Pulls out of China and decides to start taking islands? Starting with Hawaii in '39.




Hawaii would not be the first, Hawaii is worth nothing to Japan. 

Now in July 1940, they could take Indonesia over "for protection" or something like that.


----------



## syscom3 (Jan 15, 2010)

freebird said:


> Hawaii would not be the first, Hawaii is worth nothing to Japan.
> 
> Now in July 1940, they could take Indonesia over "for protection" or something like that.



Exactly. they needed the oil and mineral resources of SE Asia as fast as possible.

Remember though, the Japanese needed to build up their staging bases in Vietnam as soon as possible. These were needed to attack Malaya and the NEI.


----------



## parsifal (Jan 16, 2010)

In 1939, the US had an army of about 100000 an air force that was moribund and a navy lacking in many respects. If I were the Japanese and I had made the decision to attack the US, I would do so by a complete pullout of China to begin with, yielding an army in excess of 30 divisions. This would gurantee access to far eastern oil until after the attack on the US. Then I would invadde both Hawaii (virtually undefended in 1939, as well as most of the west coast of the US. The Jap[anese demonstrated in 1941 that they had the ability to land up to 10 divisions simultaneously, which was not significantly changed from 1939. They also demonstrated in China and Malaya of their ability to conduct rapid advances over vast distances. With 10 divisions in the first wave, supported by at least another 20 behind thatm the Japanese might be able to conquer half the US without significant opposition from the US forces. After that it becomes difficult to determine the outcome......


----------



## GrauGeist (Jan 16, 2010)

So if they went ahead and committed to a concerted invasion, what key areas on the mainland would they have targeted? One factor that the Japanes would have encountered in invading the U.S., unlike many of the other places they attacked, would be an armed civilian population, too...

I would also suspect the Japanese would have included the Panama Canal as a primary target in addition to the west coast of the U.S.


----------



## parsifal (Jan 16, 2010)

I dont know US political and industrial geography well enough, but i suspect there would habve been plenty of objectives to choose from....San Diego, Los Angeles, San Francisco, later the Texas oilfields and as you say the Panama Canal.

No doubt there would have been an effective resistance in the US, but the Japanese advance would have been rapid, with any civilian resistance likley to be met with extreme barbarism on the part of the Japanese....a US equivalent to the rape of Nanking is very likley


----------



## syscom3 (Jan 16, 2010)

parsifal said:


> I dont know US political and industrial geography well enough, but i suspect there would habve been plenty of objectives to choose from....San Diego, Los Angeles, San Francisco, later the Texas oilfields and as you say the Panama Canal.
> 
> No doubt there would have been an effective resistance in the US, but the Japanese advance would have been rapid, with any civilian resistance likley to be met with extreme barbarism on the part of the Japanese....a US equivalent to the rape of Nanking is very likley



The Japanese never had the amphibious and logistical assets to ever invade Hawaii, let alone the mainland US. The concept of them having this hypothetical capability is more in the realms of fantasy than "what if".

The best they could do is station a bunch of subs near the main ports and then get results as good as, or even better than what the Germans got with Operation Drumbeat.

The main Japanese thrust must always be into SE Asia, followed by advances into the shipping lanes going to Australia.


----------



## parsifal (Jan 16, 2010)

They would not be amphibious lifts in the sense western nations consider amphibious lifts, but the Japanese DID lift have the amassed capacity to lift 10 Divisions, albeit Gallipoli style, with some light landing craft to support.

The 1941 invasions were supported by the following mercantile additions:

147 troop transports, with an average dislacement of between 5 and 10000 tons, and a lift capacity for each transport of around 4000 men. 6 Hospital ships, 101 oilers and ammunition ships (not all used), 14 armed merchant cruisers, 18 aircraft transports (generally 6-8000 tons each), 6 Seaplane Carriers. Its true what you say about there being a shortage of landing ships, that would allow opposed landings to be undertaken efficiently, however, many of the merchant transports carried up to 20 Daihatsu LCs enabling them to discharge their cargoes directly across the beach, as they did in the Phillipines and Malaya. 

Whilst the Japanese landing capability was not efficient, it was there, and certainly sufficient to land tens of thousands of troops in a single wave. They had the capacity to land on the continental US provided there was no great level of armed opposition. Given the state of the US army in 1939, this was a given.....


----------



## syscom3 (Jan 16, 2010)

parsifal said:


> Whilst the Japanese landing capability was not efficient, it was there, and certainly sufficient to land tens of thousands of troops in a single wave. They had the capacity to land on the continental US provided there was no great level of armed opposition. Given the state of the US army in 1939, this was a given.....



And just exactly how were these light infantry divisions supposed to be resupplied?


----------



## parsifal (Jan 16, 2010)

syscom3 said:


> And just exactly how were these light infantry divisions supposed to be resupplied?




In the same way as they managed to keep their frontline forces "supplied" in the Pacific in 1942-3. At that time Japanese shipping was attempting to import supplies from South East Asia bring it home to Japan for processing, and ship out munitions to the garrisons in the central and southern Pacific. In 1942 they were supporting the equivalent of 10 divisions....in 1943 it had risen to about 20 Division, with about 30% less shipping, though I grant you by that time they were not meeting their re-supply needs.

Because of the split needs of the Japanese war machine (suppying the troops on one hand, whilst trying to organise an import regime on the other) a rough approximation is that they could utilise about 2.5 million tons of shipping for direct military needs (in fact I know they used less than that initially...about 1 million tons to be precise) 

In this scenario, if all the Japanese shipping is thrown into the military effort initially, we have 6 million tons of shipping to support up to 30 Divisions in the attack forces. Given that only 4 million tons was needed to support the Anmerican forces fighting in Normandy (with ports of departure in the US), it seems entirely plausible to me that the Japanese unmotorized Infantry formations could be kep adequately supplied.

In 1939, Japan had strategic oil reserves for about two years of operations. If they captured the required resources on the US mainland, allowed say 6 months for repair of the facilities, they could use the same shipping to do two different tasks....on the outward journey they carry war munitions and replacements, on the return journey they carry raw materials plundered from the US mainland. 

The question in this hypothetical is not that the Japanese could initiate the operation, but whether they could finish it. The US has great potential and great powers of recivery. If invaded like that it would take them less than a year to field a force approachiing 50 Divisions. In two years it would double. They could call on ther resources of Canada, and limited resources from England. I dont think, in the finish, the Japanese could complete the task, but they could certainly initiate it, and might have a better chance of getting a negotiated peace that then gives them a free hand in east asia


----------



## Night Fighter Nut (Jan 17, 2010)

syscom3 said:


> Farce?
> 
> You think the war in the Pacific was a farce?



I never said farce. I said "face" or that which is presented for all to see.


----------



## Night Fighter Nut (Jan 17, 2010)

Parsifal, it is indeed an education whenever you have your say. One thought occured to me. I would think the Japanese would have to take Hawaii as a strategic base in conjunction with landing on the west coast. It would simplify the supply chain to future operations wouldn't it? I don't think they would try to take the west coast though since the majority of the United States industrial might was in the East and it would create for the Japanese the same thing the Germans had with Russia. That is to say a very long supply chain and not able to reach the country's industrial base. What do you think?


----------



## syscom3 (Jan 17, 2010)

How many of you realize that in 1939, the IJN only had four fleet carriers available?


----------



## parsifal (Jan 17, 2010)

NFN

Yes capturing Hawaii would simplify the re-supply issue. I also agree that taking the west coast does not defeat the US, not even conquests as far east as texas defeats the US. And the logistical issues are what would defeat the Japanese in the finish, though the ability for the Japanese to achieve deep penetrations of enemy territory is well demonstrated by their China incursions. The area of occupied China is bigger than France, the low countries and Germany combined. 

If the Japanese capture the west coast ports or put them under threat, what is the USN, the primary weapon to retaliate, going to do. As Sys points out the Japanese only had 4 fleet carriers (assuming the hiryu is recommissioned in time), plus they had the Ryujo and the Hosho. The Japanese did have 6 seaplane carriers, to cover their landings. I dont see the USN doing very well at all in this scenario because they would have no safe bases to operate from....its Tshushima all over again in my opinion.

If the USN suffers a heavy one sided defeat and the Japanese offer reasonable terms, I see it as possible for the hJapanese to achieve their goal of a free unfettered hand in east asia as a result of peace negotiations. Its still a long shot, and as you say most unlikely for the Japanese to pursue, but an interesting what if just the same


----------



## GrauGeist (Jan 17, 2010)

The Japanese had, by 1939: 

6 aircraft carriers: The Soryu and Hiryu, Ryujo and Kaga, Akagi and Hosho. Also often overlooked, are the IJA aircraft transports used to ferry Army aircraft.

They had 10 battleships, 16 Heavy Cruisers, 17 Light Cruisers, 113 Destroyers, a decent amount of submarines and other surface vessels.

Thier merchant ships numbered over 2,000, accounting for well over 5 million tons.

I think the Japanese were pretty well equipped for bringing a fight to the U.S., especially in light of the fact that the Japanese had battle tested crews and equipment by 1939, and the U.S. didn't and was, quite honestly, not prepared for any kind of fight at that point in time...


----------



## syscom3 (Jan 17, 2010)

Only four were fleet carriers capable of 30+ knots. The others were suitable only for escort duties.

Just WTF are your IJN carriers going to do against the Lexington/Saratoga/Yorktown/Enterprise?

*You think the USN is just going to roll over and play dead??????????????????????????*

Come on you genius's that think that the Japanese could invade Hawaii, let alone the US mainland. What are your D+15, D+30, D+60, D+90, D+120, D+180 D+360 plans? *These dates are what the allied SHAEF planners looked at for the ETO/MTO operations plan for 1944/1945.* It is not unreasonable for the same type of issues to be put before the IJN/IJA .... what are you going to do???????????????

Are you telling me the the Japanese are going to execute the most sophisticates amphibious invasions in history without the proper amphib assets, without any type of doctrine and without any type of logistic support???????

Are you telling me that an invasion force of the magnitude you are proposing is going to sail several thousand miles without detection? Rightttttttt ..... theyre never going to be seen ...... theyre invisible. 

*Come on .... think about it .... remember those D-day + x dates ..... think you might want to factor the US manpower and industrial mobilization dates into the equation??? *


----------



## GrauGeist (Jan 17, 2010)

Sys, I'm playing Devil's advocate here, working out a scenario...

In all honesty, if the Japanese fleet can steam halfway across the Pacific and kick our ass on 7 December 1941, what makes anyone consider that they couldn't put something together a couple years earlier when the clouds of war weren't as obvious on the horizon? Also, the Japanese would have had the luxury of time on thier side to complete a thorough plan with followup plus thier codes hadn't been broken at this point in time, either.

As of 1939, the U.S. Navy had 5 aircraft carriers, 15 battleships, 18 heavy cruisers and 19 light cruisers, etc...not all of these assets were in the Pacific, and most hadn't been placed on a heightened state of readiness since the war in Europe hadn't taken off yet.

Keep in mind that the U.S. lost 6 carriers during the war, 5 of which were lost in 1942, during the height of Japanese naval power. (this does not include escort carriers)

The P-39 wasn't ready for action yet, the P-40 was just getting under way in production and the B-17B was the current model in production. That meant that the front line fighters the Army had, was the P-36 and early P-40...the Navy had the F2 Buffalo and the F4F in it's early form, which was still undergoing development.

I think that the United States military would NOT roll over, but given the events and thier indication of a poor war-readiness that unfolded in 1941, such as Pearl Harbor, the Phillipines and other assets that came under initial attack, it shows that this would have been a real uphill fight.


----------



## parsifal (Jan 17, 2010)

Its a difficult operation, but the question here arose as a result of it being assumed the Japanese would react in a certain way and attack specific targets. Thats about as dangerous as it gets, because if there was one thing the japanese demonstrated pre december '41, was that they were unpredictable. Yammamoto basically intimated that if Japan wanted to take on the Americans, they had better be prepared to fight all the way to Pennsylvania Avenue. This hypothetical builds on that summation.

Now you mentioned what would the USN be doing whilst this was going on. If the Japanese undertook a smash and grab, occupying all the ports on the west coast, then the ability of the US to react becomes very difficult. You are trying to compare the historical situation faced by Japan and the very real limits placed on her strategic choices as a result of shipping limits. All very true, but fails to take into account that the Japanese were attempting to support two supply lines and not one. The first was the raw materials merchant shipping lanes from the Indies to Japan. The second was the munitions lines from Japan to the garrisons. Now, if there was just one front for the japanese to worry about, then they have the resources of their entire shipping fleet at their disposal. If this attack takes place prior to the violation of Dutch and Norwegian neutrality, they also have access to nearly 7 million tons of neutral shipping to continue to bring in non military cargoes like oil and rice from the Indies to Japan. Shipping is not going to be a constraint under those circumstances. The Japanese can call upon almost their entire merchant marine for a single front war. They are simply not going to have anything like the logistics problems they had historically. The Americans do not have an effective sub fleet in 1939, so losses to Japanese shipping are going to be minimal 

You mention that the USN would not sit idly by while their country was invaded, and I agree, they would likely implement some variation of their war plan Orange, and the Japanese would implement a variation of their reaction to it. In 1941, the USN had considered a War Plan Orange style reaction to the invasion to the Phillipinnes, and shelved it....they knew that they would more than likley lose most of their fleet if they tried. In 1943 -4 they did finally, and successfully implement a war plan orange variant, but with massive reinforcement, fast battleships, Hellcat fighters, Essex class carriers, Fletcher class destroyers, Gato class subs, to name just a few of the technological advantage they needed to bring into effect enmasse. In 1939 they had none of those things, and would suffer from no effective bases for thousands of miles and no effective fleet train. It would have been a disaster waiting to happen.

You suggest that a similar amount of planning would be required to invade the continental US in 1939, as was required in Normandy/France in 1944. This however fails to take into account the differnt opposition levels and experience of the respective defenders. In 1944, the Germans were still the most well trained army in the world, and could call on an army of 39 Divisions. The defenders had had 4 years to entrench and improve their positions, and potentially could call on the resources of several hundred further divisions. Small wonder that the Allies had to go to extraordinary lengths to plan for this invasion.

By comparison, in 1939, the west coast of the US might be defended by the best part of a division, with perhaps another two divisions at some notice. It would have been critical to withold some of that 100000 man army for further exansion and training. There were no tanks, pitifully few AT weapons and no combat experience. Against that we have 10 Divisions of battle hardened veterans, backed by at least 500 tanks, and oodles of fight. Why would it be necessary to put the same effort into what would essentially be an unopposed landing(s) to one where an inexperienced army was landing into the teeth of enemy opposition. I just dont see that there is any comparison. 

One might argue that the Americans would get some advance warning, but judging by their efforts pre-Pearl harbour, I dont see this as doing them a hell of a lot of good. The more US resources that get sucked into this maelstrom the better actually.....the best option in my opinion would be to retreat to the Rockies and hold out in the mountains until the country could mobilze itself. A forward defence, or worse a naval defence is about the worst thing the US could elect to do in these circumstances


----------



## Night Fighter Nut (Jan 18, 2010)

That's about what I thought. It would take time for what was then a neutral nation to mobilize and make some kind of concerted effort. I think it would be imperative for the U.S. to hold the mountains at any rate. In the mean time the European theater would be just picking up steam I think. England may have a bigger fight due to a lack of extra materials from the U.S..

As I recall, Germany had an alliance with Japan as well though I don't know the date of that alliance nor how that may play out.


----------



## renrich (Jan 18, 2010)

One factor being ignored in this discussion about a fantasy involving an invasion of the continental US by the Japanese in 1939 is that the the regular army of the US was indeed small and poorly equipped in that time period. However, the reserve or national guard forces, though also poorly equipped, were fairly numerous and would constitute a serious opponent for any invasion force, especially one as poorly equipped,( from a modern mechanised point of view,) as the Japanese army would have been. There were also, in 1939, many veterans of WW1 in the US which could have been armed and immediately gone into combat. Another point is that in 1939, just like today, the civilian population of the US was probably more heavily armed than any other population of a large modern country in the world. Not only were there guns in almost every household but ammunition was available in every hardware and corner grocery store in every small town in America. Any Japanese army would have been essentially foot soldiers with little if any mechanised or armor capability. Essentially, an invasion and the subsequent occupation of any part of the US would have not been that much different from the American Revolution except for the repeating rifles and automatic weapons. Another factor which would have played a major role in the attitude and morale of the defending forces would have been the racial overtones. The Japanese were considered to be subhumans by most Americans. An attack by these "primitive barbarians" would have unleashed all the racist characteristics which underlie the American psyche. If the Japanese could be brutal and uncivilised during WW2, the Anglo American could be equally or even more so in 1939. The Japanese could never have landed and resupplied a large enough force to have had any chance of conquering and subduing even a portion of the US. Trying to do so would have been the same as sentencing the force to death.


----------



## parsifal (Jan 18, 2010)

Traditionally it was the communists who organised the best resistance movements. This happened in Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and China most prominanetly, but in fact in every country that resistance movements were set up, it was the communisists who played the biggest part in the successful prosecution of the resistance war. Even in western europe, where SOE played such a crucial role in arming and assisting the French resistance, it was the communists that provided the organizational skills to rally and organize the civil population into resisting the occupying forces. The reasons for this are varied, but mostly due to the fact that from a very early point in their existence, the communists had learned to act and organise civil resistance even before the war had begun. They had the clandestine organizations, the secret methods of communication and the like. None of the other resistance movements came close to being effective in any sense....even in Poland it was the communists who provided a great deal of organising ability to the Polish resistance, though they were not actually in control. And as far as I am aware, the communist movement in the US was virtually nonexistent in 1939

The other thing about resistance movements is that they generally take a lot of time to organise before they have any real effect. Titos partisans were not any sort of resistance until well into 1943 and they had access to all manner of weapons, including tanks and artillery. The Soviet resistance movements were very similar....though resistance was promulgated for all bypassed red army formations, and a good deal of anti-german sentiment manifested within 3 months of the invasion, it was not until the latter part of 1942 that the Soviet partisans began to have any real effect. The french resistance was the same. 

Whilst American sentiment might lend itself to civil disobedience, they lacked the clandestine orhganizational skills to have any reall effect in the short term. Perhaps after two years of the war an effective resistance may have occurred, but in terms of an immediate and spontaneous resistance movement, it would have been similar to all the others....inneffective until it was too late. 

The great problem for the Americans would not be manpower....thats relatively easy to overcome in such a large country as the US. But delivering coherent and trained formations from that mass of humanity is the real problem, and the number one problem facing the US army in WWII. To illustrate the point, the US began to mobilize in the latter part of 1940....full rearmament began before June 1941, and continuing all the way through 1942. At the end of 1942, the US had no more than five divisions world wide ready for offensive operations, with perhaps another 5 capable of defensive operations...by the time of Normandy this figure had risen to about about 40 Divs in total....the expansion of the American army was a painfully slow process because of the small size of the training cadre. In this scenario, the training cadre would be even smaller,, because at least a portion of the army would be needed to fight in the front lines. 

Whilst the Japanese army is considered inferior in the west, it fought in fact virtually unsupplied from 1944 on, and in places like Guadacanal, even earlier. When it was supplied it demonstrated time and again just how dangerous it could be. These guys fought Zhukovs siberians (who in turn defeated Germany's finest) in 1939, and whilst defeated, demonstrated their proficiency nevertheless. Against untrained troops it demonstrated it could defeat them with ease. And this is precisely what would happen in an invasion 39 scenario. The US would be forced to commit untrained, poorly armed formations to battle, that would fall apart just like the Soviets (in 1941) , the Chinese and the filipino troops did when they were committed in an untrained state. The US forces would have been steamrolled if they tried to fight in anything but the most favourable defensive positions. Any attempt at offensive action for the first two years would more than likley have ended in a debacle, and given the US military's penchant for elan and the attack at all costs, this seems a very likley outcome to me. Encirclements and pockets in the hundreds of thousands to rival the east front are not out of the question 

IN 1942 Australia was faced with the prospect of an invasion. By then it had the best part of 10 Divisions deployed, with a total manpower strength approaching 700000 men. To that force was added a further two divisions of US Infantry. The Japanese believed they would need a force of ten divisions and a million tons of shipping to conquer Australia. The armed forces at the Austrlian governments disposal had had around two years of miliatary training, but were inadequately armed. Despite this they were far better from a readiness point of view than the US would have been in 1939. And yet the Australian army agreed with the Japanese assessment....if the Japanese had invaded, the Australians did not think they could stop them


----------



## renrich (Jan 18, 2010)

What needs to be understood about the US in 1939 was that it was a much more rural country than it is today. These rural areas were loaded with hunters and people in agribusiness who were used to using guns for extermination of varmints and predators and for recreation. The problem the Japanese would face is that they would only have a very small force that could be landed and supplied. It would not be a resistance movement they would face or an insurrection because they would not be allowed to conquer much territory but the armed citizen would constitute a militia and they, along with reserve, national guard and regular troops would simply overwhelm the Japanese force. See Bunker Hill and Concord. A Japanese invasion of the west coast would be akin to a mouse crawling up an elephant's leg with rape on his mind.


----------



## parsifal (Jan 18, 2010)

Nice analogy about the elephant than the mouse. Unfortunately, you are making assumptions that I simply cannot fathom. You believe that the japanese would be landing with a limited force, and would be overwhelmed by large forces of irregular troops, drawn from the back woods country of the US. In fact the Japanese would be invading with an initial invasion wave of between 5 and 10 division, just in the initial assault waves, initially to capture the port and airfield facilities on the west coast, and then to move rapidly as possible west. The initial assault waves would outnumber any defenders by at least twenty to one, and behind that would be following another 25 Divs to continue the advance. Against this would be a regular force of perhaps 2 Divs, backed up by an unlknown irregular force, which you believe would organize, arm and train itself immediately, and do so managing to avoid all the failures that are the trademark of untrained militias, simply because they are American. Give me a break. These formations in open warfare, if they could be thrown together in the 3-6 months of a campaign like this, would be absolutely mown down eith only their patriotism and elan to rely on. 

You are grossly underestimating the effectiveness of the Japanese soldier in these conditions. They managed to defeat Chinese forces whilst outnumbered at least 10-1, they overran untrained, but organized western armies in the far east with ease, in this scenario they would have the full resources of their China Expeditionary forces, with a massive advantage in numbers quality experioence, equipment and supply, yet you believe they are going to be stopped by farmers armed with privately owned rifles, based on the premise that they could do it during the American civil war.....sorry, I just dont buy it, and to take your analogy just a little further, think in fact it would be the elephant trying to rape the mouse to be honest. 

In the finish, all that you say would have an effect - eventually. The US country boys would make easily trained and effective soldiers. The Japanese would run into supply and resistance difficulties. They would ultimately be defeated, but there would be a terrible cost, and the objective in my mind would not be to subjugate the US, but to seeks terms from them ina variation to the "strike south" policy in Japan


----------



## syscom3 (Jan 18, 2010)

The Japanese desperately needed the oil resources of SE Asia before they committed any forces to a wild goose chase in Hawaii, let alone the mainland US.

The USN in 1939 was capable of inflicting blows upon the Japanese off of Hawaii, and to think the IJN is not going to not suffer any ship losses is rubbish. And any IJN ship thats damaged off of Hawaii meant a very long sail back to any port capable of repairing it. 

Now what about that fantasy invasion of the US mainland? You think the Japanese invasion fleet is going to steam at 30 knots to the mainland? Try 5 - 10 knots. Think its all going to be done with zero detection? LOL!!!! Do the Japanese have enough tanker assets to supply the fleet? Nope. Ever consider that the cycle time for a cargo ship to go from Tokyo to San Fran and then back is something like 45 days? Think of the number of merchant vessels that will be doing absolutely nothing for multiple weeks at a time. Now think about how the US will be mobilizing its industrial base at 15 day intervals with multiple rail lines supporting its logistics lines.

Then factor in the geography of the west coast. Rugged mountain ranges along the coast followed by even more rugged mountains followed by deserts and then more rugged mountain ranges. And that doesn't even count several hundred miles of prairie and steppes before they would even be within range of the industrial centers of the midwest. And this is going to be done by a few divisions of light infantry? LOL!!!!!

Now about Hawaii ... think of this. Oahu is big enough for the defenders to maneuver within interior lines of communications. Plus its small enough to defend in depth, with naval gunfire support from Pearl. That's recipe for a tough nut to be cracked by a Japanese force who never had the training, eqmt and doctrine to land a multi-division force on a defended beach, manned by soldiers who had to fight with their backs to the wall.

Allied experiences off of Salerno in late 1943 were still marked by poor planning and execution. And that was with two large invasions already under their belt. Do you think the IJN is going to do everything flawlessly in 1939 with no experience? LOL!!!!!

The Normandy planners could only land five divisions with a invasion distance of less than 100 miles. And even then, the allies could only land an additional division every day. As more troops went ashore, more and more shipping was required for supplies. How are the Japanese going to do anything to the contrary? Pull off the largest invasion in history, one that was equal to, or larger than Olympic/Coronet?

As for the US forces arrayed against them, there was plenty of WW1 heavy weapons available. Including large gun batteries that covered major ports and installations. And if they land outside of these guns, they still have to march through mountains with clearly defined choke points that could hold them for quite some time. Think Anzio and Monte Cassino. A couple of MG's holding up battalions.

And I will repeat this: US manpower and industrial mobilization. More and more and more and more equipped troops as the weeks pass. You think in "days". I think in months.


----------



## Night Fighter Nut (Jan 18, 2010)

As I remember, the Japanese always wanted to perform any negotiations from a position of strength. One of the major reasons they didn't surrender when they already knew the war was lost. I believe the Japanese, at the end of the war, wanted to have at least one major victory before discussing terms or surrender in order to save face. So the senario of only taking the major ports and holding them as a barganing chip for keeping other holdings in the Pacific makes sense.


----------



## Night Fighter Nut (Jan 18, 2010)

As for the defense of Oahu, I was stationed there for three years as part of the 25th Infantry Division (Light) and have walked all over that island and several others as well as part of military exercises (ie. war games). I was a light infantryman for several years and I have had the chance to work with the Japanese army in a joint exercise called Yamasakura in I think was '85 or '86. Having said that, I am very familiar with the defenses of those islands both historical and present because I have physically seen them. Before any attack, the Japanese plan their actions well in advance and take into account as many possiblities as can be dreamed up and plan counter measures for them. They would have spies watching the fleet's movements as they did before the Pearl Harbor attack. An agressor such as the Japanese in this made up scenario would have the benefit of prior planning and counter planning taking into account the situation they faced before engaging. To suggest that they would just run off and do something without planning is not Japanese thinking. Knowing Oahu's defenses as I do, it is very possible for a large force to hit hard and fast and take the island. In fact it is believed by those who lived there, and I have talked to them, that had the Japanese had an invading force with them, they could very well have taken all the islands.


----------



## Shinpachi (Jan 19, 2010)

Hello, Night Fighter Nut.
Your experience in Hawaii is very precious and looks fantastic.

Anyway, it was impossible for Japan to attack Pearl Harbour in Dec 1939 as the idea was only stated in Yamamoto's brains and it was not until September 1941 that IJN began discussion about the plan.
Majority was insisting to draw the US fleet closer to Japan to attack. Also IJN fleet was to return to Japan on Dec 5, 1941 if the diplomatic negotiation in Washington might have resulted well.

Sorry. This may have nothing to do with the theme but I am convinced that Japan will never attack Pearl Harbour again. Recently I can't identify who is a Japanese or not. See 
_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SJXyQbv-_W0_

Thanks.


----------



## Night Fighter Nut (Jan 19, 2010)

Shinpachi said:


> Sorry. This may have nothing to do with the theme but I am convinced that Japan will never attack Pearl Harbour again. Recently I can't identify who is a Japanese or not. See
> _View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SJXyQbv-_W0_
> 
> Thanks.




Greetings Shinpachi san, no need to feel sorry.  Our thread is only to discuss the what if's and is pure fantasy. A kind of mental exercise to determine the possible outcomes based on what we know. All very friendly and your point of view would be most appreciated.


----------



## Shinpachi (Jan 19, 2010)

I was afraid of my post being understood wrongly but you have caught it correctly.
Thanks Night Fighter Nut! 
I respect your charity relationship in Osaka


----------



## Night Fighter Nut (Jan 19, 2010)

Thank you Shinpachi san. Here is a link to the history of the Holy Family Home in Osaka incase you are interested.

Holy Family Home

I think it refers to a book call, "A bridge of love from east to west." These books are rare but fortunately I have one of them.


----------



## parsifal (Jan 19, 2010)

I agree that the chances of a japanese attack on the US in 1939 were basically nil, but the question arose from the assumption that Japan did attack at that time. Ehat would be the possibilities. Then people started to anticipate a predictable path of attack for the japanese and did not consider the possibilities of a direct attack on the US. They still believe it to be impossible, and likely to not even get off the ground. 

I disagree. But I do think it would end badly, unless the Japanese were able to achieve some sort of negotiated peace that gave them a freer hand in the Far East....a sort of "sudatenlandent" or "anschliss" on a massive scale. 

Shin, NFN is completely correct, this is not intended as any sort of indictment of the Japanese, at least not from me, we are just exploring the strategic possibilities


----------



## GrauGeist (Jan 19, 2010)

Agreed, this is a great "what if" that is exploring the possabilities, and I've enjoyed it so far. 

I know I was the one that put up the scenario of the Japanese assisting the Germans in the Gibraltar assault "what if" scenario, but if you think about it, the history of warfare has been full of situations that came about by a chance decision or an unlikely event occuring that people of the time wouldn't have thought possable or logical.


----------



## renrich (Jan 19, 2010)

Sys has made some cogent points about an invasion of the US west coast in 1939 by Japan and those points are why I don't believe the Japanese could do more than land a small force somewhere and that force would be annihilated, those that were not already drowned, by local military forces. Under those conditions it would be a mistake to underestimate the capability of the National Guard in the various states. Those guard units would be lightly armed but so would the Japanese forces. I have a topo map of the US on my wall and if an invasion force did effect a lodgment the physiographic features would all be in favor of the defense. The ground favored the defense in Italy and the ground in the western US makes Italy look benign.


----------



## parsifal (Jan 19, 2010)

I dont agree with Sys's appraisal. He knows that to make the landing at normandy was against heavily defended beaches. He might not know that the Divisional slice for an allied Infantry Division was about three times that of a Japanese Infantry Division in 1939. In 1939 the heaviest Japanese Infantry Division had a Divisional slice of just under 20000 men, but one adapted for amphibious work had been pared down to under 15000 men. The divisional slice for an allied division attacking in Normandy after the landings was in excess of 55000 men, not including corps or army support assets that were regulalry attached. 

By nightfall on June 6, more than 200,000 had made it ashore and secured French coastal villages. Within weeks, supplies were being unloaded at Utah and Omaha beachheads at the rate of more than 20,000 tons per day. By June 11, a further 526,000 troops, 55,000 vehicles, and 105,000 tons of supplies had been landed on the beaches. Thats just five days after the initial landings, without the benefit of any established port facilities. A key for this scenario would be the capture of a functioning port, much the same as the germans had to do in the norwegian campaign. In fact an invasion of the US west coast in 1939 has many similarities to the Norwegian situation, and the terrain far worse than anything in the US, I would expect. 

I do not see any great similarity to the Italian campaign, where the German opposition amounted to the order of 15-20 divs. In this scenario, the Americans could possibly call on two regular Divs, perhaps some marine assets, a limited number of National Guardsman (after the invasion) and some months after that, some irregular formations. Against that they would be up against more than 0.5-1 million battle hardened veterans which in turn has access to more shipping than was allocated to supporting the Normandy campaign. And Normandy was an operation where the fighting was against around 70 enemy divs, and the fighting intensity (and hence ammunition expenditure) proportional to the size of that campaign. In this hypothetical the logistic demands despite the large numbers of troops would be a fraction of that....l 

The difference between Norway and US'39 is the distances needed to make the landing. The Japanese however demonstrated their ability to make landings on a large scale at moderate distances from their home ports in the opening days of WWII, brushing aside with ease even regular formations that resisted them. The question for me is, if they were given the ability to concentrate all their shipping to support a continental invasion against virtually no landward opposition, could they pull it off. I think that they could. The japanese incidentally compared to a 1939 US Infantry Division, were not "lightly armed". The principal firepower of an Infantry Div is its artillery, statistically generating well over 60% of the total enemy casualties . In 1939 the principal artillery pieces in both armies were 105 and 75 mm artillery pieces, but the Japanese had an extra battalion of guns attached, 36 to 24, and in addition they had fully integrated their artillery support guns directly into their battalions, adding a total of a further 18 artillery pieces to their gun parks. The Japanese in 1939 were not "lightly armed". They were in fact more comprehensively equipped than the US army at that time. The big reorganizations of the US army did not begin until 1940-41 . 

At sea, the USN may have offered resistance, but judging by what happened to them in the immediate days of Pearl Harbour, this is unlikley to go well for them. IN fact, there is no reason to prevent tha Japanese from pulling off a Pearl Harbour style attack into San Diego itself. If the US carriers are caught whilst in Harbour, the US would be in a mess of hurt. If Panama was to be captured (and at that time there was less than a battalion defending it, the Atlantic Fleet would be weeks, if not months away from entering the battle. If all the ports on the west coast were captured, along with Pearl itself, the USN would be forced to operate from the periphery of the battle, from Dutch Harbour, or American Samoa, both of which would have been totally inadequate for a sustained campaign 

Its interesting to compare the equipment of the two air arms at that time. The Japanese would be equipped with A5Ms , D3A Vals and B5N Kates. The US had two squadrons of F2As (but these were grounded in 1939 following undercarriage problems, F3Fs, Sb2Us and TBDs. The Fighters in both navies were relatively inneffective compared to the wildcat/zero fighters of 1941, and the US strike aircraft relatively more vulnerable due to their low speeds. Neither side had any armour protection or self sealing tanks, and radios would have been somewhat of a novelty. There were no fast american battleships, which reduces the US fleet speeds to under 20 knots. I dont know where this idea that invasion convoys approach at 5-10 knots....Japanese amphib convoys had a typical approach speed of around 15 knots, making them a difficult target for the US BBs to intercept.


----------



## Night Fighter Nut (Jan 20, 2010)

As I recall, American naval aircraft had a much shorter range than Japanese naval aircraft. I think this may also have a limiting effect on American striking ability.

For an offensive to be successful you have to have at least one of two things in your favor. One is momentum, the other is numbers. In the initial stages of an assualt, be it beach or otherwise, communication is essential. Should the Japanese say strike in the early hours of morning on a surprise attack. Initial communications would be fast and incoherent because of panic. The standard rule of a commander is not to believe the first reports because they are always wrong. This is still practiced today. A good defense, if prepared in advance, has an initial force manning the front line with a mobile reserve force to throw in once its knows where the main force of the attack is or should some point of the defense start to crumble. The initial confussion would delay the movement of any counter force and if the attacking momentum isn't halted the front line would be very hard pressed to hold. Most defenses at that time were run along a line similar to trench warfare. Usually not very deep defensively. Once a section of that line is broken, the attackers file through the hole and attack the other defenses from the side and rear. Granted that the rugged coastline favors the defenders.

With numbers you have a senario similar to the Normandy beach landing unless the attack is a complete surprise. Then it would be relatively easy to land a large force and establish a position to move inland from and secure key strategic points. Of course holding those positions is another matter.


----------



## Night Fighter Nut (Jan 20, 2010)

Light infantry usually refers to assets the infantry unit itself posesses. Infantry units, as I recall, are named as regular, light, mechanized, or airborne. Each is defined by the assets that are organic to the unit. It doesn't mean they can't have other units attached to them. The can be a part of an armored force and still be called light.


----------



## Shinpachi (Jan 20, 2010)

Thanks Night Fighter Nut, parsifal and GG for your care.
I understand this place is to enjoy the what-ifs but the assumption seemed less realistic to enjoy as if what if Japan had atomic bombs prior to US. 

I would rather be interested in how Japan-US could have avoided the war.
Thanks again for your great assisstances and please take my apology if I may have disturbed you.

PS: I'll check the Holy Family Home again well. Thanks Night Fighter Nut for the information.


----------



## Night Fighter Nut (Jan 20, 2010)

What could have been done to avoid the war? My thoughts would be better communication between countries. Hmmm. Ok guys, lets follow Shinpachi sans request and get our creative juices flowing.  It seems so much easier to estimate what one could do in war, lets see what the possibilites are for waging all out peace. Options... Hmm. Usually in that time period there was either a mutual truce, non-agression pact, or peace through superior firepower. Shinpachi san, what was the likelyhood of the people requesting the Emperor to do something and the likelyhood that he would listen? Hipothetical of course. Also what do you think other countries could do to draw Japan into dialog?


----------



## Night Fighter Nut (Jan 20, 2010)

Still, what could Japan do to draw other countries into dialog?


----------



## parsifal (Jan 20, 2010)

Avoiding war with Japan in the preWWII environment would have been very difficult. The Japanese government was militaristic and expansionist, and pursuing policies of closed door economic and political "spheres of influence. The US government was far more liberal and was supporting an open door free market economy, with little or no interest in overseas politics. The two ideologies were mutually exclusive, and on a pathway to collision for a long time prior to the war.


In order to avoid war, the US would have needed to adopt a fundamentally different approach to Japan. Massive rearmamnt from about 1918, and direct interevention in China....meeting Japanese aggression head on with a massive retalitory response every time the Japanese stepped over the line. No signing of the Washington Naval Treaties. The Japanese would have been overwhelmed militarily and ultimately politically.

The chances of any of this happening are even more remote than the japanese invasion scenarios we are talking about


----------



## renrich (Jan 20, 2010)

Micheal, your points about how to avoid a war with Japan are well made. The Japanese government lacked a fundamental understanding of the west and how they would react to Japanese aggression and what their capabilities were when they reacted.

Where we disagree on the invasion scenario is that I don't believe the Japanese in 1939 had the capability of putting a large force ashore on the west coast and supporting that force once ashore. A west coast invasion would bear some resemblance to Torch, in November, 1942. Torch was mounted by the Allies with a partnership between the British and Americans. The landings were made against lightly defended objectives. The big difference between Torch and the fantasy Japanese invasion is that Torch had almost complete mastery of the air and sea and their landing forces were much smaller than proposed in the Japanese fantasy and the distances involved were much, much smaller. Many other factors were present but, to me, the chances of a succesful invasion by a Japanese force large enough to be effective in 1939 were about the same as for the opposite event to take place, a successful invasion of Japan in 1939 by US forces.


----------



## parsifal (Jan 20, 2010)

renrich said:


> Micheal, your points about how to avoid a war with Japan are well made. The Japanese government lacked a fundamental understanding of the west and how they would react to Japanese aggression and what their capabilities were when they reacted.
> 
> Where we disagree on the invasion scenario is that I don't believe the Japanese in 1939 had the capability of putting a large force ashore on the west coast and supporting that force once ashore. A west coast invasion would bear some resemblance to Torch, in November, 1942. Torch was mounted by the Allies with a partnership between the British and Americans. The landings were made against lightly defended objectives. The big difference between Torch and the fantasy Japanese invasion is that Torch had almost complete mastery of the air and sea and their landing forces were much smaller than proposed in the Japanese fantasy and the distances involved were much, much smaller. Many other factors were present but, to me, the chances of a succesful invasion by a Japanese force large enough to be effective in 1939 were about the same as for the opposite event to take place, a successful invasion of Japan in 1939 by US forces.




I'll concede this...against a well defended beach defence, such as those that existed at norandy, the Japanese stood little or no chance. They did not develop amphibious technique to near the same degree as the Allies, and would have struggled against well defended targets. However, against lightly defended, or poorly defended targets the Japanese were as proficient as the allies, if not better, because their basic Infantry units in 1939-43 were better trained and organized with organically generated firepower so that they could operate more or less autonomously once ashore. this was a feature lacking in allied formations until the end of the war. 

To make this fantasy scenario work, the Japanese need to have shipping, lots of it, and surprise. If either of these two ingredients are missing, the mission would fail. But if they managed to get ashore in numbers, and with reasonable supply to back them up, the US land forces are simply not strong enough or well organized enough to resist them effectively.

As for the US being able to do the same in reverse....possibly, but have not looked at the details sufficiently to say for sure.


----------



## syscom3 (Jan 20, 2010)

The Japanese have the distinction of having the only two amphib operations in the Pacific to have been thrown back to the sea in abject failure. Wake Island and Bataan.

Now lets play fantasyland and say that 20 Japanese light divisions did get ashore on the west coast. There are only three worth while places to attack. Southern Cal, San Fran and Seattle. Which one are you going to take, because the others are several hundred miles away from each other. How are your forces going to operate over those distances that were in 1939, only really accessible by train? 

Now you say you are going to split your forces? For what? Get defeated in detail as the US industrial might gets mobilized?

Light infantry you say? Well, the IJA was never known for being mechanized like the Allies and Germans were. For all practical purposes, there isnt enough industrial capacity in Japan to build the numbers of tanks (all of which were horrible designs) and trucks to do the task at hand.

You are going to march eastwards over trackless and waterless deserts through incredibly rough deserts. Then you are going to march through one of the great mountain ranges in the world only to find out you still need to go march several hundred miles through the great plains just to find out you need lots of boats to cross the Mississippi river. And all of this will happen without losses, or timetable upsets when the harsh realities of summer in the desert and winter in the mountains?

And of course, the US industrial power will not do anything for months at a time and the Japanese army will be quickly supplied and reinforced by sea from bases 4000 miles away?


----------



## parsifal (Jan 20, 2010)

_The Japanese have the distinction of having the only two amphib operations in the Pacific to have been thrown back to the sea in abject failure. Wake Island and Bataan._

You should also add Milne Bay. There were several rather small affairs on Saipan and I think even Okinawa, all of which ended in failure. And for the allies there was the even bigger defeat at Dieppe and on the islands of Kos and one other that I forget now. The assaults on Iwo, Pellieu and Biak were all nasty affairs that by any objective analysis should be considered defeats. In Burma there were also several allied small scale amphib operation in the Arakan that were failures. 

And lets not forget that the japanese undertook more amphibious operations with less troops, across a wider theatre of operations than any other nation in history 

_Now lets play fantasyland and say that 20 Japanese light divisions did get ashore on the west coast. There are only three worth while places to attack. Southern Cal, San Fran and Seattle. Which one are you going to take, because the others are several hundred miles away from each other. How are your forces going to operate over those distances that were in 1939, only really accessible by train? _

Dont know, but i do know the Japanese were able to penetrate into the interior of China, with far worse terrain and far less infrastructure in 1937-38, with little difficulty. They were stopped in China by logistical difficulties and incresing levels of resistance by the Chinese, but only after having travelled approximately half the distance from the east coast to the west USA. I would say that the Japanese would have little diffulty in operating in the conditions that existed on the west coast USA in 1939, wher the levels of infrastructure were far more extensive, and the logistics far less demanding.

_Now you say you are going to split your forces? For what? Get defeated in detail as the US industrial might gets mobilized?_

Of course the Japanese have to split their forces If a Japanese Division is superior to a US Division in 1939, and the Americans have two divisions (unmobilized and not in position), and the Japanese are attacking with an assault force of say 6 Division, with another 14 following that, and they have the demonstrated and proven ability to operate in bad terrain and advance rapidly, what do you think they are going to do? 

_Light infantry you say? Well, the IJA was never known for being mechanized like the Allies and Germans were. For all practical purposes, there isnt enough industrial capacity in Japan to build the numbers of tanks (all of which were horrible designs) and trucks to do the task at hand._


Their tanks were not great, but in 1939 they were superior to anything available to the US Army. The best tank available to the US in 1939 was the M2, a predecessor to the Grant, minus the hull mounted gun. In the entire US there were the grand total of 18 of these tanks in existence in 1939, and there were no tanks actually in production until June 1940. To get even these grossly inferior vehicles off the production lines, with crews to man them and commanders to lead them would have taken more than a year to organize from the initial attack in December 1939.

Against this the Japanese had over 1500 tanks in total, all of which can be considered superior to the American Tank. These included the Type 89 (with a 57mm short barrelled gun, the Type 95 with a 37mm gun equal to the US machine in firepower. There were more than 100 Type 97s far superior to anything the US might hope to produce for at least two years). And there were hordes of tankettes and other AFVs all of which had proven useful in China, which at that time had formations better equipped than the US Army 

Despite the low output of trucks that I agree with, the Japanese nevertheless managed to undertake major land based offensives, with very rapid rates of advance in Manchuria (in 1931), in China (1937-39, and again 1944-5), and also in Burma (1942). They wre the masters at improvisation and I do not see any great reason to suggest that this would not be repeated in this hypothetical... 


_You are going to march eastwards over trackless and waterless deserts through incredibly rough deserts. Then you are going to march through one of the great mountain ranges in the world only to find out you still need to go march several hundred miles through the great plains just to find out you need lots of boats to cross the Mississippi river. And all of this will happen without losses, or timetable upsets when the harsh realities of summer in the desert and winter in the mountains?_

Err yes, I dont see the terrain in the US as being any more formidable than that faced by the Japanese in their advances in China in 1937-39, in Manchuria in 1931, in Burma in 1942, or perhaps most tellingly of all, across the Owen Stanley Mountains in 1942. The Japanese were not easily defeated by terrain, had the training the equipment and the organization to use their Infantry in such terrain, whilst carrying sufficient firepower at Battalion level to overpower most opposition they were likely to encounter in those conditions. In 1942, until their (ie the Japanese) supply ran out, AIF combat verterans had a hard time stopping them and this was done only after the Japanese, outnumbered and out of supply, had managed to advance to within 30 miles of Moresby. The Americans sent to fight them in the counteroffensive, were unable to cope with the Japanese at all, virtually falling apart as formations, despite having spent nearly a year in specialised jungle training. You might say the US was defeated by the terrain, but if, as you say the terrain on the west coast is that bad, I would think that would favour the Japanese rather than hinder them. 

On the great plains, it would be more difficult, but again the japanese did demonstrate that they could handle even this type of warfare....remember your US formations are heavily outnumbered and lacking in mechanization in 1939, and the industrial capacity of the US is just not going to have much effect in the 3-6 months this campaign is occurring. It took the US economy more than two years to transform from a peacetime footing to a wartime economy, even with the massive injection of British Cash and carry funds to boost it along. In 1939 the US economy was sluggish and unresponsive, still recovering from the effects of the depression in many respects. I think the plains would be overcome by numbers....if we assume a month to overpower the coastal defences, occupy the ports and get them functioning, a month of fighting to cross the mountains, with say a loss of a division to both sides in this fighting, the Japanese are going to emerge from this battle with the equivalent of 29 divisions for the plains fighting to say 1.5 US regular Divs, say 3 National Guard units, and lets be generous say 2 Divs of these irregulars. As the Japanese this is a situation crying out for the standard Japanese Hook tactics, and as the American lines crack under this pressure, the rout begins with nowhere to hide....because we are on the plains remember...... 

_And of course, the US industrial power will not do anything for months at a time and the Japanese army will be quickly supplied and reinforced by sea from bases 4000 miles away?_

The Japanese were able to act more quickly than their opponents in 1941 when operating 2-3000 miles from their home bases, on mutiple fronts, and without the benefits of neutral shipping to support them. If the Japanese have neutral shipping to keep their domestic economy going, and can then concentrate their entire 6million tons of national shipping to the single front in this scenario, I actually think they would be better supplied than their scattered forces in 1941 could be. They demonstrated the speed that they could advance in China against stiffer oppositon than the US could put up in 1939, so why would I doubt their ability to advance quickly in this situation?????


----------



## GrauGeist (Jan 20, 2010)

I'm not sure that the Japanese would want to stray out into the midwest, when a vast majority of thier needs could be met with West coast resources. Southern California was rich with oil, agriculture, cattle dairy resources. If they were able to entrench themselves on the west coast, they would be in a good position to negotiate terms.

It was mentioned earlier that the Rockies would make a good barrier against further eastward invasion, and I would imagine the invading forces would have see this, and even think of it as a defensive barrier against U.S. forces from the east as well.


----------



## parsifal (Jan 21, 2010)

Quite possibly, but I'm just looking at following through on Yammamotos requirements for victory over the US, namely they needed to force the US to the surrender table if they declared war.


----------



## Shinpachi (Jan 21, 2010)

The Way to the Pearl Harbour
==================
Author: Shinpachi


1840-42 
First Anglo-Chinese War
China lost Hongkong to the Great Britain.
Western nations were to control China.

This news scared the Japanese goverment when they were enjoying dull peace and Japan was to collect further information about the incident from China directly and through Dutch to cope with the future threat from the western nations.

1853-54 
A US fleet led by Commodore Perry visited Japan to demand open the country.
Tokugawa Government accepted a treaty which was called unfair-treaty afterward, with US and opened the nation but it brought no merits to Japan. The government was to lose its reliability and fall 15 years later.
This was the end of Samurai Era.

1868 
Meiji Revolution
New Japanese government began quick westernization.

1870 
Imperial Japanese Army and Navy were founded respectively.
Hypothetical enemy was Russia for the army and America for the navy.

1894 
First Sino-Japanese War
Japan obtained Taiwan.

1899-1913 
Philippine-American War
US obtained the Philippines as a colony.

1904 
Japan-Russia War
Japan obtained South-Sakhalin.

1911 
Japan combined Korea
This was considered effective to prevent Russia from their advancing to the south, toward China and Japan.

1914 
First World War
As a member of the allies, Japan obtained Chin Tao in China from Germany

1918-1925 
Siberian Intervention
The western allies and Japan joined but obtained nothing.
It was said an official sightseeing trip of the soldiers.

1937 
Second Sino-Japanese War
It continued till 1945 when Japan was defeated

1938 
Japan declared new control plan over the east asia.
This was to obstruct the US interest in China

1939 
US announced abandonment of Treaty of Commerce and Navigation and it expired in Jan 1940 automatically.

1940
In September. Japanese troops advanced to the north French Indo-China to cut the US/British supply route for Chinese military.

Japan, Germany and Italia signed the Tripartite Pact in the same month.

1941 
In July. Japanese troops advanced to the south French Indo-China to obtain the natural resources in the future

In the same month, ABCD Line was formed to make the economic sunction against Japan effective by
A for America, B for Britain, C for China and D for Dutch.
Embargo against Japan was taken place.
Japan was to lose 80% of the crude oil supply from US.

1941 
In December, Japan attacked Pearl Harbour.



There were a range of war, war, war, war.........
There were Not no chances but NO INTENTION to avoid the wars in the both sides.

/End


----------



## Night Fighter Nut (Jan 21, 2010)

I saw a training film once that showed how the Japanese were able to move through rough terrain quickly. It was like watching ants cover uneven ground by employing carried mini bridges. As I recall, the Japanese were also masters of camouflage at that time. Setting up in the mountains in covered and consealed positions would give them the advantage over troops coming across the plains and having to attack up hill. Americans didn't really use camouflage for the most part at that time as I understand.


----------



## Night Fighter Nut (Jan 21, 2010)

Thank you Shinpachi san, much of this I didn't know. Some I've heard but not in any depth. Ok, so the first moves of Japan were defensive in wake of Western powers looking for colonies and empire expansion. That makes perfect sense. Do I understand this correctly Shinpachi san? So the first steps then to prevent later war could have been the introduction of business in China rather than conquering it and making it a colony. Nation building to further business interests. What do you think Shinpachi san?


----------



## renrich (Jan 21, 2010)

Bottom line, to me, regardless of Japanese infantry capability, is that the japanese did not have the sea capability to land a large enough force and sustain it to be effective against the west coast. Torch landed about 100000 troops and could supply it because of light opposition, short distances and combined US and British sea lift. Was not the Stuart tank deployed in 1939? Nope it was not available in 1939!


----------



## parsifal (Jan 21, 2010)

Ren

I cant say that I can be sure about any of this, but on the face of what I do know, I think I have to disagree with you on this issue. 

Torch was an operation that was severely limited by the horrendous losses to shipping that had occurred up to that time. The allies had approximately 18 million tons of shipping, but needed at least 7 million tons to keep England on a subsistence economy. They needed another three million tons to keep worldwide trade going, about 1.5 million tons to keep the North African and middle eastern fronts afloat, about half a million tons (at that stage) to maintain the arctic convoys, about 4 million tons to maintain the Pacific Front. I am not entirely sure of the shipping available for Torch, but I doubt it was more than a million tons. And the re-supply line was back to the US, not England, because of the fuel and food shortages that Britain was suffereing at that time. Only by robbing some of these committments of shipping could the operation be undertaken, since allied worldwide shipping committments at that point were in deficit. 

Added to this was the simple shortages of troops and the political considerations that influenced the force structure. The operation had to be seen as a primarily American operation, because of past clashes between Vichy and the british, but the Americans had only 5 Divs available that were combat ready, and some of these formations had to be retained stateside to act as cadrers for the further expansion of the army and others were already in the Pacific. I used to know (but cant recall precisely now) but the operation was limited to the three American Divisions, and some lesser number of British troops. The hundred thousand that you refer to incidentally is only the initial US units used in the actual landing. The operation had floating reserves and secondary reserves on top of that that rapidly expanded the bridgehead numbers.

Compare this to the hypothertical situation we are looking at....Instead of 1 million tons of shipping, we have about 6 million tons of shippiing. Instead of a 3 000 mile supply line, we have a supply line about 4500 miles. Instead of 10 divs of opposition (the Vichy garrison in French North Africa, with unknown intentions post landing) wehave two partially equipped defendeing divisions, initially not exceeding 50000 men. By my calculations the Japanese should be able to get considerable assets ashore in the first five days of the invasion. I think they were able to land in excess of 150000 men in the opening days of their southern drives, admittedly scattered halway across the Pacific. Why couldnt they repeat that on the west coast?. There would be huge floating reserves, admittedly, but once a port was captured, the inflow of reinforcements would happen extremely quickly. This is what happened in Norway...once Oslo and Kristiansand had been captured, German reinforccments just poured in such that within 7 days thay went from less than a division committed overall, to over 8 divisions landed, organized and attacking. That was a very short hop, across the Baltic, but also supported by something less than 300000 tons of shipping. Saying that the Japanese dont have the landing capacity ignores the achievements they did carry out historically. Saying they dont have the shipping under the circumstances I described is simply not adding up the logistic realities properly (when compared to other operations of a similar nature). I dont understand the thinking here. 

Looking at the US AFV development pre-war is extremely depressing. They had less than 100 combat capable tanks overall, and fewer than 300 in total, including protoypes. Most of their tanks were armed with nothing better than an MG. Reliability remained very low. There were just 18 "modern, gun armed tanks, and no tanks were under production at the time the war broke out. The Stuart was developped from the M2A4 as was the M3. However development of the Stuart did not start until July 1940, and the M3 was even later than that. The 37mm gun of the M2 could penetrate about 1 inch of steel which was enough to deal with the types 95 and 89, but not really enough to deal with the Type 97. The vast majority of US tanks would have been hopelessly outclassed in this situation, since the Japanese mediums were equipped with heavier 57mm guns, short calibre, but still superior in AP performance to the 37mm weapon. The M2 only had armour protection of about 10mm (from memory), which meant it was even more vulnerable than the Type 95. There were no armoured formations as such, though the US Cavalry was partially mechanized, but mostly retained as horsed units with some motorized and mechanized formations mixed with those horsed units.

The Japanese had very successfully used an armoured brigadde with supporting Infantry and armour attached during the fighting in 1937-38. This formation had proven crucial to the breakthroughs and encirclements in China. It adopted extremely advanced ideas (for the time....it was formed in 1933, and consisted of three regiments of armour, equipped with Type 89s, later replaced by Type 95s and finally Type 97s, an Infantry regiment, artillery regiment, and engineer and recon company, all motorized). The Brigade had operated with great effect in the opening attacks on China, but had been broken up in 1938, after the Japanese believed it was no longer needed. That decision was immediately reversed after Khalkin Gol, with the Japanese planning to form no less than ten armoured Divisions. This was overly ambitious, and the Japanese had not formed any divisions by the outbreak of the war, though they had reformed a number of independant armoured regiments to support their Infantry. If they had been a little more realistic and reformed say two of the independant amoured mixed brigades, they would have enjoyed a massive advantage over the Americans in 1939.


----------



## syscom3 (Jan 21, 2010)

Night Fighter Nut said:


> I saw a training film once that showed how the Japanese were able to move through rough terrain quickly. It was like watching ants cover uneven ground by employing carried mini bridges. As I recall, the Japanese were also masters of camouflage at that time. Setting up in the mountains in covered and consealed positions would give them the advantage over troops coming across the plains and having to attack up hill. Americans didn't really use camouflage for the most part at that time as I understand.



All infantrymen of WW2 could move quickly over rough terrain. Nothing special about the IJA about that. 

But terrain dictates logistics. And the rougher the terrain, the more difficult it is to keep the troops supplied.

The topography of the US western states is so rough in every location, and is several hundred miles "deep", that the Japanese would need months if not years of engineering work and supply buildup to strike eastwads across multiple mountain and desert ranges, through many types of weather.

The only thing the Japanese could do is land their troops and watch them go no further than the coastal areas. And all the while, the US manpower and industrial engine revs up.


----------



## renrich (Jan 21, 2010)

It is hard to believe that Japan had 6M tons of shipping to devote to one campaign in 1939. Are you sure of those figures? As far as distances all of Torch was not supplied from the US but also from the UK as well. Any invasion of the US west coast by Japan would have to be ready to deal with the likelihood of British and Commonwealth naval forces becoming involved also. Would a Japanese invasion force leave Hawaii in their rear? By the way the distance from Tokyo to Los Angeles is more than 5400 miles. In 1939, does Japan have the suitable tankers to keep a naval force fueled for that difference.

Further research shows that in 1941 the Japanese merchant marine comprised 6M tons of shipping total. Of that 3M tons was needed for the home islands. I doubt they had 6M tons in 1939. How do they get 6M tons for an invasion?


----------



## parsifal (Jan 21, 2010)

renrich said:


> It is hard to believe that Japan had 6M tons of shipping to devote to one campaign in 1939. Are you sure of those figures? As far as distances all of Torch was not supplied from the US but also from the UK as well. Any invasion of the US west coast by Japan would have to be ready to deal with the likelihood of British and Commonwealth naval forces becoming involved also. Would a Japanese invasion force leave Hawaii in their rear? By the way the distance from Tokyo to Los Angeles is more than 5400 miles. In 1939, does Japan have the suitable tankers to keep a naval force fueled for that difference.
> 
> Further research shows that in 1941 the Japanese merchant marine comprised 6M tons of shipping total. Of that 3M tons was needed for the home islands. I doubt they had 6M tons in 1939. How do they get 6M tons for an invasion?



I acknowledge your corrections concerning distances, and even acknowledge that some supply for Torch was drawn from England, though I maintain that the majority of supply was drawn from the US directly, and not England as such. This arrangement was repeated for Overlord as well, with replacements being shipped directly from New York rather than England as such.

If the Commonwealth gets involved the matter does change, but the assumption I have made is that the British would stay out of the fight. Australia barely knew the Us existed until after the fall of Singapore, and the ABD (later ABDA) alliance was not formed until after IndoChina was occupied.

If the Japanese pull out of China, and dont show aggressive tendencies toward southern Asia, they will be seen to be complying with a whole host of League resolutions. This would curry a lot of favour with the neutrals and the appeasement lobby of the times. Neutral shipping could be used under those circumstances to augment Japanese imports. Japan wiould have access to the southern areas resources, without the need for conquest.

With relations improving, resources flowing the Japanese would have access to an additional 7million tons, at least, of merchant shipping from the neutrals. With improved relations (following a pullout of China), the support of the neutrals, no treaty obligations to the US and no US membership of the League, this situation might find the US more isolated than you think. If the Japanese can keep the conflict isolated and limited to just the US and Japan, then all of the Japanese shipping fleet becomes available for this operation. 

Finally you asked if Pearl would be captured as part of this . I think it should be, as should Wake and Midway and Guam. With the exception of Pearl, none of these places were defended in 1939. Pearl had about two battalions according to an article by Shelby Stanton that I have somewhere


----------



## Shinpachi (Jan 22, 2010)

Night Fighter Nut said:


> Thank you Shinpachi san, much of this I didn't know. Some I've heard but not in any depth. Ok, so the first moves of Japan were defensive in wake of Western powers looking for colonies and empire expansion. That makes perfect sense. Do I understand this correctly Shinpachi san? So the first steps then to prevent later war could have been the introduction of business in China rather than conquering it and making it a colony. Nation building to further business interests. What do you think Shinpachi san?



Your understanding is correct and no nation should not rely on their military power when they do business.
Japan was wrong on this point.


----------



## parsifal (Jan 22, 2010)

_All infantrymen of WW2 could move quickly over rough terrain. Nothing special about the IJA about that. 

But terrain dictates logistics. And the rougher the terrain, the more difficult it is to keep the troops supplied.

The topography of the US western states is so rough in every location, and is several hundred miles "deep", that the Japanese would need months if not years of engineering work and supply buildup to strike eastwads across multiple mountain and desert ranges, through many types of weather.

The only thing the Japanese could do is land their troops and watch them go no further than the coastal areas. And all the while, the US manpower and industrial engine revs up._

Ah not true, though not entirely relevant either. Japanese personal kit in 1941 featured rubber soled, split toed canvas boots, far superior to the hobnailed boots issued to allied troops. Their uniforms were generally more practical and suited to conditions than those issued to the allies at that time. Their battalion artillery was man portable, something not generally available to the Us or westermn allies. Their trenching tools were also able to be used as an aid in rough terrain or in wet conditions, again something not available to the western allies until much later.

The Japanese also proved to be masters of using mechanized units in rough terrain. even at this early stage the advance of the mixed brigades Type 89s down the Peking Hankow railway in 1937 indicated the adeptness the Japanese could use armour in rough terrain. 

Moreover, I dont think the Rockies are any significant impediment to a Japanese advance. I acknowledge that there was no interstate road system, but there were quite good local roads, and a number of rail crossing of the mountains. In where roads outside of the Beijing are were basically non existent for military purposes, the Japanese advanced more than 900 miles down the Peking/Hankow Railway, in conditions of heavy mud, crosiing several mountain ranges in the process, and then successfully defeated the Chinese (who outnumbererd them) to take the city of Hankpw and continue their advance southward. Later the Japanese tackled the even more difficult terrain in Burma and the Owen Stanleys which are even more formidable than the Rockies, with no infrastructure to support them and very nearly pulled it off. 

I have attached the following images for consideration:

1) US Rail net - 1918
2) Chinwsw rail net 1933
3) Images of the terrain in Wisconsin
4) Images of the terrain typical in the region around Hankow

Saying the Rockies are an impenetrable barrier is akin to the french saying the Ardennes are impassable. Given the ability of the Japanese to overcome far worse terrain to defeat their enemies clearly demonstrates that the japanese would have had sufficient infrastructure in the form of the rail network and the local road network to undertake their crossing of the mountain regions you are now pinning you hopes on.


----------



## Night Fighter Nut (Jan 22, 2010)

syscom3 said:


> All infantrymen of WW2 could move quickly over rough terrain. Nothing special about the IJA about that.
> 
> But terrain dictates logistics. And the rougher the terrain, the more difficult it is to keep the troops supplied.
> 
> ...



I agree there is nothing special about infantry moving quickly over rough terrain. I've done it myself. What was interesting was the way they did it through dense jungle. It was faster than how we currently do it now unless you continually drop daisy cutters and napalm. The western US is not rough in every location. You living in Orange county should know that. I use to live in Huntington Beach, Riverside, and Monterey. I've been up and down the coast highway 1. I agree there is plenty of rough terrain but there is also several open access that go inland. Monterey bay area is a deep harbor with gentle rolling hills and lots of agriculture. Not to mention all the roadway infrastructure so that farm machinery and trucks can get in and out. Then there is Hunter Ligget which is lots of rolling hills. I know because I was with the 7th Div. there and have walked those hills. No challange. And since there is lots of agriculture, ie trucks, chances are they would confiscate those that didn't get away or distroyed and use them to move men and equipment. Why walk when you can take and use what already exists?

Santa Barbara is not deep but open. There are cliffs behind the town and one major roadway going North and South. Not worth taking but it can be held and used to bottleneck any reenforcements heading North in a delaying action. Not to mention ship artillary batteries pounding anything that comes up that road which would be out of range of anything the reenforcements could bring up that road. All they would need is a spotter and you would have a devil of a time finding him. The mountainous terrain of the Sierra Nevadas favors the defender. He who gets there first and holds it would be in a great position. Good prior planning would take this into account. Remember, any assualt is done after much planning. Looking at all the details.


----------



## Night Fighter Nut (Jan 22, 2010)

Shinpachi said:


> Your understanding is correct and no nation should not rely on their military power when they do business.
> Japan was wrong on this point.



Wrong perhaps but not unusual for the times considering the empire building that has plagued man since the dawn of time. I'm probably wrong but it is my feeling that only in recent history the idea of empire building by conquering other countries has deminished in some small degree. Then again Iraq took Quwait.


----------



## Night Fighter Nut (Jan 22, 2010)

parsifal said:


> _4)
> 
> Saying the Rockies are an impenetrable barrier is akin to the french saying the Ardennes are impassable. Given the ability of the Japanese to overcome far worse terrain to defeat their enemies clearly demonstrates that the japanese would have had sufficient infrastructure in the form of the rail network and the local road network to undertake their crossing of the mountain regions you are now pinning you hopes on._


_

Not to mention that Japan has lots of mountainous terrain in which to practice their tactics and movements. The mountains of South East Asia are steeper with very dense jungle. Although the Rockies are much more rugged than hills in Wisconson. I'm not sure about the Owen Stanleys. I believe that it has very think jungles around it but the Rockies had lots of snow and parts of it are only passible during certain times of the year. The mountain range in question now are the Sierra Nevadas. Much of California's coast are cliffs except in a few of the areas I mentioned earlier. If I was going to do a landing. I would go through Monterey. It has a deep port able to handle large ships if only a few at a time. The terrain slopes gradually into farm country for quick access to the rest of the state promoting rapid movement and it was very lightly, if at all, defended. There is also a naval academy there so there is opportunity for intel gathering._


----------



## Freebird (Jan 22, 2010)

syscom3 said:


> The Japanese never had the amphibious and logistical assets to ever invade Hawaii, let alone the mainland US. The concept of them having this hypothetical capability is more in the realms of fantasy than "what if".
> 
> The best they could do is station a bunch of subs near the main ports and then get results as good as, or even better than what the Germans got with Operation Drumbeat.
> 
> The main Japanese thrust must always be into SE Asia, followed by advances into the shipping lanes going to Australia. The Japanese desperately needed the oil resources of SE Asia before they committed any forces to a wild goose chase in Hawaii, let alone the mainland US.



I agree with Syscom, a massive invasion of the US was just not in the plans of Japan, even if it had been possible.

However, I could certainly see a "spoiler" attack of a few 1,000 men in some key locations, to freak out the West coast residents (and especially polititians), which would severely hamper overseas war efforts


----------



## renrich (Jan 22, 2010)

A small landing on the west coast ala Dieppe would certainly have serious repercussions among politicians and constituents. LOL

The phto of the diesel units and container cars certainly looks strange. Very few diesel ngines in 1939. My father worked for the MKT (Katy) RR and they did not get any diesels until well after WW2.


----------



## parsifal (Jan 22, 2010)

Its not a WWII picute, just trying to get some idea of the terrain in the Northwest. It is not that different to the topography around Hankow.

I agree that the Japanese were never planning to invade the continental US, and certainly had no reason to in 1939. They still believed they could win their war in China, and disdained the west as weak and inneffective. They believed they couold continue their war with no repercussions.

However this debate arose as a result of assumptions being made that the Japanese would act in a certain way, and then, given any circumstance, the Japanese could not undertake an invasion. The first assumption is very dangerous, the second is downright wrong.

If however Japan declared war in 1939, without making any adjustments to the situation in China, this would be an unmitigated disaster for the Japanese. They would simply be repeating the mistakes of Pearl Harbour allover again, two years earlier. They would be less prepred for the fight as the US was, and simply be driven to defeat the same as she was. Perhaps by extrapolation the Japanese would be defeated by 1943, rather than 1945.


----------



## renrich (Jan 22, 2010)

The Pearl Harbor attack was an unmitigated disaster, for the Japanese.


----------



## parsifal (Jan 22, 2010)

I agree Ren, finally we have some common ground.


----------



## Freebird (Jan 23, 2010)

renrich said:


> The Pearl Harbor attack was an unmitigated disaster, for the Japanese.



Not on its own, the Axis had a good chance to defeat the Allies, but poor strategy doctrine sealed the deal

But perhaps a more interesting plausible scenario, suppose that Japan had occupied Dutch territory along with French in the fall of 1940, would the US intervene to protect the Dutch colonies?


----------



## renrich (Jan 23, 2010)

FB, I think that the day the US got in the war was the day the the Axis was doomed because Hitler had already attacked the USSR and there was no way the Axis could win short of a miracle weapon like a nuclear bomb. On the other hand, if Japan had done as you mentioned, I don't believe the US would have gotten in when they did. Ultimately, unless Hitler changed his whole personality, the US would have gotten in but Japan might have been able ultimately to negotiate a deal with the US to keep the Dutch and French colonies under the guise of letting them have self government. You know the drill.


----------



## Night Fighter Nut (Jan 23, 2010)

Isn't it amazing how far this thread has come.


----------



## parsifal (Jan 23, 2010)

Night Fighter Nut said:


> Isn't it amazing how far this thread has come.



Yep


----------



## Freebird (Jan 24, 2010)

renrich said:


> FB, I think that the day the US got in the war was the day the the Axis was doomed because Hitler had already attacked the USSR and there was no way the Axis could win short of a miracle weapon like a nuclear bomb.



It was possible IMO, but only if the Axis started from Pearl + 1 with a *total* combined sub offensive against Allied shipping (but that's another thread). 



renrich said:


> On the other hand, if Japan had done as you mentioned, I don't believe the US would have gotten in when they did. Ultimately, unless Hitler changed his whole personality,



In the summer/fall of 1941, I am convinced that there was a "Quid pro Quo" between the US and Anglo/Dutch, to enter the war if Japan attacked. There is simply no way in hell that the British Dutch would provoke the Japanese without a cast-iron guarantee.

There are some hints of this in British documents, but never admitted (AFAIK) in US sources.

However I don't believe that there was any arrangement in 1940. The Japanese would not have the fully organized bases in Indochina, but they should have enough carrier air power to get the job done.

During the BoB it's doubtful that the British could or would spare much of anything to send East



renrich said:


> the US would have gotten in but Japan might have been able ultimately to negotiate a deal with the US to keep the Dutch and French colonies under the guise of letting them have self government. You know the drill.



That would be their goal


----------



## renrich (Jan 25, 2010)

I don't believe that FDR could have been able to convince the Congress to declare war on Japan in 1941 or possibly even 1942 if the Japanese had invaded Indo China or the Dutch East Indies and maybe even the British in Hong Kong and Malaya. He could not get the US public ready to declare war against Germany during 1941 because of Britain or the USSR and the US voter was even less interested in colonies in Asia. I would bet that FDR was actually relieved when PH happened, aside from the casualties, and I know Churchill was. If Japan attacking the US was like a mouse crawling up an elephant's leg with rape on his mind, then Germany, with the US in the war with Britain and the USSR was in the position of a rat with the same mission in mind.


----------

