# Spitfire mk VB/Seafire vs Zero



## Major (Apr 13, 2008)

Spitfire mk VB/Seafire mk IB/Seafire mk IIc/Seafire F mk IIIb vs Zero

Spitfire mk Vb/Seafire mk IB

Crew: one pilot 
Length: 29 ft 11 in (9.12 m) 
Wingspan: 36 ft 10 in (11.23 m) 
Height: 11 ft 5 in (3.86 m) 
Wing area: 242.1 ft² (22.48 m²) 
Empty weight: 5,090 lb (2,309 kg) 
Loaded weight: 6,622 lb (3,000 kg) 
Max takeoff weight: 6,770 lb (3,071 kg) 
Powerplant: 1× Rolls-Royce Merlin 45, Merlin 46, Merlin 50 (spitfire only), or Merlin 55 (spitfire only)

Seafire mk IIIb:

Role: Single-seat Shipboard Fighter-bomber 
Engine(s): 1x Rolls-Royce Merlin 50, Merlin 55, or Merlin 55M
Armament: 2x 20 mm Hispano cannon with 120 rpg and 4x .303 cal Browning machine guns with 350 rpg 
Ordnance: 1x 500 lb or 2x 250 lb bombs 
Maximum Speeds: Maximum speed 352 mph at 12,250 ft, maximum cruising speed 310 mph at 20,000 ft 
Service Ceiling: 33,800 ft 
Range: 725 miles
Empty Weight: 5,400 lb 
Normal Weight: 7,100 lb 
Wingspan: 36 ft 10 in 
Length: 30 ft 3 in 
Height: 11 ft 2 in at airscrew 
Wing Area: 242 sq ft 

Zero (A6M2)

Crew: 1 
Length: 9.06 m (29 ft 9 in) 
Wingspan: 12.0 m (39 ft 4 in) 
Height: 3.05 m (10 ft 0 in) 
Wing area: 22.44 m² (241.5 ft²) 
Empty weight: 1,680 kg (3,704 lb) 
Loaded weight: 2,410 kg (5,313 lb) 
Max takeoff weight: kg (lb) 
Powerplant: 1× Nakajima Sakae 12 radial engine, 709 kW (950 hp) 

Sooo, who would win?? 

Note: The Seafire was tested against against the Zero, and it outmanuvered it at low speeds.


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## parsifal (Apr 14, 2008)

The zero Mk 2 had the following statistics

Specification of A6M2 Navy Type 0 Carrier Fighter Model 21: 
One Nakajima NK1C Sakae 12 fourteen cylinder air-cooled radial, rated at 940 hp for takeoff, 950 hp at 13,780 feet. 
Performance: Maximum speed 331 mph at 14,930 feet. Cruising speed 207 mph. Initial climb rate 4517 feet per minute. Climb to 19,685 feet in 7 minutes 27 seconds. Service ceiling 32,810 feet. Normal range 1160 miles. Maximum range 1930 miles. Radius of turn with entry speed of 230 mph was 1118 feet. Entering a 180 degree steep turn with an entry speed of 230 mph, the fighter could complete the turn in 5.62 seconds, with an exit speed from the turn of 189 mph. At slower speeds, the turning radius was 612 feet. Normal positive g-load factor was 7g, with a safety factor of an additional 1.8g. Normal negative g-load factor was 3.5g, with a safety factor of an extra 1.8g. 
Dimensions: Wingspan 39 feet 4 7/16 inches, length 29 feet 8 11/16 inches, height 10 feet 0 1/16 inches, wing area 241.5 square feet. Weights: 3704 pounds empty, 5313 pounds loaded, 6164 pounds maximum. Fuel capacity: Internal fuel capacity was 114 Imp gall. One 72.6 Imp. gall drop tank could be carried underneath the fuselage. Armament: Two 7.7-mm Type 97 machine guns in the fuselage decking and two 20-mm Type 99 cannon in the wings. Two 132-pound bombs could be carried on underwing racks


I dont have figures for the radious of turn for the either the Sppitfire, ir the Seafire. Do you have them,so that we can compare. I assume your claim "the Spit can outmanouvre the zero at low speeds is a claim that they can ou turn the zero....seems a bit unbelivable, but would like to see your figures first.

If you are referring to dive speeds, roll rate (above 300 knots) and combat after October 1942, when new tactics against the zero had been worked out, almost certainly you are correct. But difficult to accept if the combat is early 1942, using the tactics of the time
Before I make any conclusions, however, would like to see your source, and the figures you have


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## Major (Apr 14, 2008)

Spitfire



Supermarine Seafire - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Im not completely sure that this is accurate, but I have seen it stated on multiple sites, just search "supermarine seafire".


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## HoHun (Apr 14, 2008)

Hi Parsifal,

>I assume your claim "the Spit can outmanouvre the zero at low speeds is a claim that they can ou turn the zero....seems a bit unbelivable, but would like to see your figures first.

I wondered about this bit too, but I guess Major's "it outmanuvered it" can be read either way, and he probably meant that the Zero outmaneouvred the Spitfire like we expect.

Alfred Price's "Spitfire - A Complete Fighting History" quotes Patuxent River trials of a captured A6M5 against a Seafire LIIC, and the A6M5 was found to be superior in low-speed turns at all altitudes. Somewhat surprisingly, the A6M5 also held a speed advantage at high altitudes over the Seafire LIIC, owed to the former's two-speed supercharger providing better altitude power than the latter's single-speed, low-altitude optimized supercharger.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## parsifal (Apr 14, 2008)

Characteristics for the Spit IX

Spit IX Performance
Turn Performance 
300mph	1,000ft	5,000ft	10,000ft	15,000ft
One 360	12.5s	12.9s	14.0s	16.0s
Two 360s	27.7s	28.9s	32.3s	36.7s
250mph 
One 360	12.5s	13.5s	15.5s	16.6s
Two 360s	28.9s	30.8s	34.1s	38.1s
Sustained 
No Flaps	16.3s	18.1s	19.7s	23.2s
Full Flaps	16.9s	18.4s	20.4s	23.3s
Best Flap	none	none	none	full
Speed/best	150mph	145mph	140mph	105mph
Corner Speed and Radii (1,000ft):
Speed: 270mph
Radius: 531ft
Sustained Turn Speed: 160mph
Sustained Turn Radius: 609ft
Full Flaps Speed: 120mph
Full Flaps Radius: 473ft
Corner Times	1,000ft	5,000ft	10,000ft	15,000ft
180 degrees	6.2s	6.6s	7.2s	8.0s
360 degrees	13.8s	14.6s	16.2s	18.1s
Roll Rate:
150mph: 5.0s
200mph: 3.7s
250mph: 4.2s
300mph: 5.4s
350mph: 7.9s
400mph: 11.4s
Minimum Full-Flaps Full-Power Split-S altitude:
150mph: 900ft
200mph: 1000ft
250mph: 1500ft
300mph: 1800ft


The way I read those figures, the Spit IX could indeed turn inside a Zero, but its entry and exit speed, and time taken to complete the manaouvre were so slow, and so much time taken, that the zero would basically be behind the Spit IX in next to no time....remeber, this is for speeds below 300 knots. Would not apply for anything above that

Spit V was better in a turn, but I dont yet have the details


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## parsifal (Apr 14, 2008)

Hi HoHun Major

I have posted the performance arcs for the Spit IX, which is all i could find at short notice. These figurres suggest to me that in order to ou-turn the Zero, the Spit would need to bleed an awful lot of speed to do it.. It appears to me that the Zero would have completed its turn a second or two faster, and have a lot more airspeed remaining at the completion of that manouvre, than its Spitfire opponent. The slightly smaller turn radius is only achieved, if the Spitfire is carrying out the manouever very slowly. Moreover the turn radii given for the zero are for what might be termed "normal dogfight speeds", ie around the 250-300 knot range, so it may in fact be thye case that the turn radius of the Spit is actually greater, at dogfight speed.

So my conclusion on this bit of information is that whilst the Spit may (and its only a "may") turn more tightly than a zero, it does it so slowly and awkwardly as to render itself a sitting duck in the air.

The Spit would be far better to dive or roll in which case it has the inherent advantage.

I wanted to know your opinions, however, about the so called Zeroes agility. I have seen this statement allover the place. I assume that by saying the zero was "agile" they meant it had good accelaration, ie recovery of airspeed in level flight. But is this necessarily a true statement....if you look at the power to weight, of say the A6M2, which had a 950 hp engine, to pull around 5300 lbs of weight. This gives a power to weight ratio of 0.18:1. Compare this to the Spit, which has a loaded weight of about 7000 lbs (depending on which mark, and for a Spit V about 1475 hp, this gives a power to weight ratio of 0.21:1. If I assume similar drag co-efficients for the two aircraft (very suspect, but i just dont know what they are) for the zero and Spit, does this mean the Spit will regain airspeed at the rate of 21/18 compared to the Zero??? I have not taken into account the performance arcs or altitude in this very crude comparison


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## HoHun (Apr 15, 2008)

Hi Parsifal,

>The slightly smaller turn radius is only achieved, if the Spitfire is carrying out the manouever very slowly. 

From a look at weights and wing areas, I don't think the Spitfire would be able to match the smallest turning radius of the A6M.

However, it might be possible for a Spitfire to match the fastest turn rate of an A6M at a larger radius. This really depends on the exact flying weight of the Spitfire, the engine type it's using, and the boost pressure that can be used with the engine.

An early tropicalized Spitfire V at +9 lbs/sqin would be much inferior to the "temperate" Spitfire V at +16 lbs/sqin as it was later used against the Fw 190 menace. Likewise, the Seafire variants were pretty heavy due to the carrier equipment they carried, but if they had a low-altitude engine, that might have compensated for some of the extra weight in a sea level fight.

>I wanted to know your opinions, however, about the so called Zeroes agility. I have seen this statement allover the place. I assume that by saying the zero was "agile" they meant it had good accelaration, ie recovery of airspeed in level flight. 

Something not often mentioned is that the A6M also had a good roll rate at low speed. This would enable it to change the direction of its turn quickly, which is an important aspect of agility, too.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## claidemore (Apr 15, 2008)

From the australian trials of Spit MkV vs "Hap" (A6M3 Model 32). 

This report gives some very good suggestions for tactics of Spitfire vs Zekes and Haps (Zeros). Basically they recomendation was to use high speed tactics, loops, climbing turns etc against the Zero, and to avoid low speed fighting completely. 

Claidemore


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## HoHun (Apr 15, 2008)

Hi Claidemore,

>From the australian trials of Spit MkV vs "Hap" (A6M3 Model 32). 

Do you know the engine type used in that Spitfire (and ideally weight, boost and ejector type as well)?

I've just prepared a comparison for a number of fighters including the Seafire LIIc with a Merlin 32 engine (because I found good data for that variant here: Seafire L Mk. IIC Trials ).

The result is interesting because it shows that the Seafire LIIc with the Merlin 32 running at +18 lbs/sqin can almost match the A6M2's turn rate at sea level. There is some uncertainty about the maximum lift coefficients, and that of the Seafire might be a little higher than shown but not high enough to reach the A6M2 turn rate as indicated in the graph.

However, this is at low altitude where the Merlin 32 is at its best. At 5 km and at 10 km, the Seafire really loses a lot of ground to the other types in that graph.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## claidemore (Apr 15, 2008)

HoHun,

Those trials were done in July and August of 1943, and the only info on the Spit is that it was a 'regular' Mark VC, normal combat weight without drop tanks. 

One high altitude trial was done with a 'special' Spitfire, which I would guess would be a high alt version, possibly even a PR MKIV?


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## parsifal (Apr 15, 2008)

maybe there is some truth to the claim that the spit could out-turn the Zero in certain low speed situations???? I am not so sure now...


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## Flyboy2 (Apr 15, 2008)

I think we could look at the combat record. It is my understanding that the Spitfire pilots where ordered to dive in on a Zero and not engage in a turning engagement. As much as I love the Spit, the Zero was one of the most manuveurable planes in World War II and if anybody consults a variety of sources, they will come up with the same results.


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## kool kitty89 (Apr 16, 2008)

Ki 43-II was even more maneuverable though, about equal at low speeds but it kept it better at high speeds. (demonstrated in HoHun's chart)


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## claidemore (Apr 16, 2008)

The big advantage of the Ki43 Hayabusa would be it's roll rate. It would get into the turn quicker than any of it's contemporaries, particularly at lower speeds. Concensus was that it was more manueverable than the Zero. Watching video of the 'nimble' Oscar, I'm always impressed by what an acrobatic little fighter it is.


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## FLYBOYJ (Apr 16, 2008)

claidemore said:


> The big advantage of the Ki43 Hayabusa would be it's roll rate. It would get into the turn quicker than any of it's contemporaries, particularly at lower speeds. Concensus was that it was more manueverable than the Zero. Watching video of the 'nimble' Oscar, I'm always impressed by what an acrobatic little fighter it is.


Heard the same thing - it had a split butterfly flap that enabled it to turn on a dime.


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## parsifal (Apr 16, 2008)

I have always believed that the two Japanese mainstays, the Zero, and the oscar, were the dogfighters par excellance. Even if there is some ultra specialized situation that a spit might out-turn the zero (which I seriously doubt anyway), by far the better option is to dive and roll. We all know that the lightweight zeroes and Oscars just cannot compete in those areas, so why risk a quaestionable turning manouvre against them


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## HoHun (Apr 27, 2008)

Hi Parsifal,

>maybe there is some truth to the claim that the spit could out-turn the Zero in certain low speed situations???? I am not so sure now...
 
Actually, if you look at the graph you'll see that the Seafire reaches the same sustained turn rate as the A6M only at a higher speed, meaning that its turn will have a greater radius. However, in a real turning fight the speed would tend to decay rather quickly, and the planes would typically fly at the lowest possible speed - and that's where the Seafire can't match the turn rate of the A6M because it reaches the stall boundary.

And there is another thing to consider - the fuel fraction of both types is quite different, with the A6M carrying relatively (and probably absolutely, too) more fuel than the Seafire. If you'd calculate the same set of graphs for a situation where both fighters have used 50% of their fuel, the A6M would fly at a lower percentage of its take-off weight than the Seafire, and that wold improve its turn rate markedly.

The question really is what you'd like to consider a typical encounter profile - as long as the A6M is flying offensive operations at long range, the "50% fuel for both" case is probably not so far off.

By the way, I suspect there might be one Spitfire that outturns even the low-altitude optimized Seafire LIIc, and that's the Spitfire V when boosted to +25 lbs/sqin 

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## HoHun (Apr 27, 2008)

Hi Flyboyj,

>Heard the same thing - it had a split butterfly flap that enabled it to turn on a dime.

Do you know more about this butterfly flaps? I've read that they could be deployed very quickly by pushing a switch on the control column, and also that they could be deployed asymmatrically, but I'm not sure that this can be correct - I'm aware of no other WW2 fighter featuring anything similar.

I figure that with the Ki-43 rebuilds done by Tischler's company, there should be enough hard information on the type to know the system's workings, if we could somehow tap this source ... 

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Micdrow (Apr 27, 2008)

Some of you may find this link interesting.

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/flight-test-data/spitfire-vs-different-models-zeros-9133.html


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## parsifal (Apr 27, 2008)

Hi Micdrow

Have read the article, and it appears to conclusively solve the issue. Thanks very much for taking the time to send me the link. Excellent research btw

As you probably are aware, RAAF experience with the Spit against the Zeke in the darwin area was quite mixed. I have attached an extract from one of my books (Parnell Lynch, Australian Air force Since 1911, JW Books 1976). Its not a primary source, and has errors, but it tends to corroborate what you say. One raid seems to indicate the loss of eight spits, to what I later found, tentatively, to be the loss of just 3 Zekes/Haps. Another dogfight later that month (May), saw the loss of three Zekes to just one Spit, but I have not researched the Zeke losses as thoroughly for this engagement, so they may just be claimed losses, and not confirmed losses.

I believe the RAFF misused its Spits at this time, trying to dogfight the Spits against the zekes.This i also believe was due to the best employment of Spits in Europe against the LW was to aerobat the Spit against its opponents. The pilots flying the Spits at this time over Darwin were led by officers who had had experience over Europe. IMO they were applying the wrong lessons to the combats that they now found themselves in. The document you have found is dated 29 May,, a few weeks after the disasters earlier in the month (and before that as well). Perhaps the report was commissioned to drive the point home to the Darwin Wing....dont dogfight with Zekes....seems logical at any rate.


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## Micdrow (Apr 27, 2008)

Your welcome parsifal and a very interesting read, thanks

Like you I tend to beleive that the RAAF used the wrong doctrine when first fighting the Japanese. As you said they where lead by ETO theater doctrines and not pacific. Aircraft where totally different including conditions. Its been awhile since I researched pacific theater though when I did I found that finding exact numbers of losses on the Japanese side seemed very hard to find. 

Part of this was due to the construction of the zero. How many damaged zero's never made it back due to combat damage will probably never be known for sure. 

I should go back through the Australian Archives. They did a lot of fighting with the Oscars also but I don't remember seeing any info about them there. Might be worth a search again of the Archives.


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## parsifal (Apr 27, 2008)

Australian report frequently appear to refer to what were actually Oscars, as zeroes. Both A/C have similar profiles at a distance. The units in my page extract identify the japanese formation deplyed in the Darwin, which suggests that at least a portion of A/C identified as "Zekes" in the combat repports are more than likley "Oscars".


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## Micdrow (Apr 27, 2008)

You may find this report of interest also parsifal, link below.

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/technical/japanese-attack-darwin-10736.html


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## HoHun (Apr 27, 2008)

Hi again,

>And there is another thing to consider - the fuel fraction of both types is quite different, with the A6M carrying relatively (and probably absolutely, too) more fuel than the Seafire. 

Here is another graph on relative turn performance.

I have added a graph for the A6M2 at what I consider an equivalent fuel weight as for a fully-fueled Spitfire V. Gain: about 1.5 degrees per second.

Additionally, I have added a graph for a fully tropicalized Spitfire Vb running at +9 lbs/sqin, which appears to have been typical at least early on.

You can see that the difference in sustained turn between the two types at equivalent fuel load is 6 degrees per second. That means the A6M2 can make good 180 degrees in just 30 s ...

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## JoeB (Apr 27, 2008)

parsifal said:


> One raid seems to indicate the loss of eight spits, to what I later found, tentatively, to be the loss of just 3 Zekes/Haps. Another dogfight later that month (May), saw the loss of three Zekes to just one Spit, but I have not researched the Zeke losses as thoroughly for this engagement, so they may just be claimed losses, and not confirmed losses.


Those would be claims, reported Japanese fighter losses were only 4 Zeroes and one Army Type 1 (Oscar) in the whole 1943 Darwin campaign, March-September 1943. Those losses, as given in Senshi Sosho ('War History Series' the Japanese official history), have also appeared in print in a number of non-Japanese books. One example is "Spitfire V Aces" by Alfred Price in the Osprey series, and another recent excellent book on all air ops over and on the peripheries of Australia, with full two sided accounts, is "Soleil Levant sur L'Australie" by Bernard Baeza. Also the English translation of "Japanese Naval Fighter Unit and Aces of WWII" and the abridged English version of "Japanese Army Air Force Fighter Units and Their Aces", both by Hata and Izawa, give the names of pilots lost in that campaign.

The following is a compact chronology per Price, but the Japanese losses are the same in other references, and pilot names are from Hata/Izawa except as noted. Price has a couple of dates wrong too that I noticed. The Japanese fighter opponents were Zeroes of the 202nd Air Group, in all except one combat, as noted, and it's only incidents that included Japanese figthters:
March 2 '43: Spits claim 2 Zeroes and a 'Kate' (none present) for no loss; Japanese claim 3 P-39's and Buffaloes (none of either type present!) for no loss.
March 15: Spits claim total 9 for 4 Spits lost; Japanese claim 8 defending fighters for 1 Zero lost (PO2c Seiji Tajiri) and 8 'Betty's' damaged.
May 2: Spits claim total 7 for 5 Spits lost or probably lost to enemy action out of 14 total Spit losses; Japanese claim 21 without loss, though 7 each Betty's and Zeroes were damaged.
May 10: Spits claim 2 Zeroes v one Spit damaged beyond repair; Zeroes caught from above while strafing lose 1 (PO Kunio Sakai, wreck found) plus 1 crashed on the way back (PO Tadao Yamanaka). 'Soleil' has more detail on this incident from Japanese side than I'd seen seen before.
May 28: Spits claim 3 Betty's for loss of 2 Spits; Japanese claim 4 v. 2 Betty's lost (first bomber losses of the campaign) and 1 crashlanded on return.
June 20: Spits claim 9 bombers and 5 fighters for 3 Spits. This raid was the only one by the Japanese Army: they claimed 9 Spits for loss of 1 'Oscar' (1Lt Shigeto Kawata) of the 59th Sentai and 1 'Sally', plus 2 Sally's and 2 Lily's forcelanded near base.
June 28: Spits claim 2 bombers and 4 fighters for 2 Spits crashlanded; JNAF claims not known, 1 Betty crashed on landing, another and 3 Zeroes damaged.
June 30: Spits claim 7 total for 5 Spits to e/a + 2 to engine failure; Japanese claim 16 Spitfires for 1 Betty crashlanded.
July 6: Spits claim 9 for 6 Spit to e/a + 2 to engine failure; Japanese claim 14 Spits for 2 Betty's lost, 2 crashlanded and 2 Zeroes damaged.
Sept 7: Spits (intercepting heavily escorted 'Dinah's') claim 5 Zeroes for 3 losses; Japanese claim 13 Spits for 1 Zero lost (PO1c Yoshio Terai).

Joe

Reactions: Informative Informative:
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## Micdrow (Apr 27, 2008)

Great info there Joe!!!


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## parsifal (Apr 27, 2008)

Joe

I agree, your research is very impressive, and i mean absolutely no disrespect, but the figures and some other things are causing some disquiet for me

I can and will put together an accurate list of RAAF losses for the specified time period you have nominated. Your list is very close to what I believe are the actual losses, but still think there are a couple of errors.

I cannot be nearly as certain as you about Japanese losses, and am the first to admit that my data and research are crumby when compared to your stuff. however, what you are saying is not gelling with a lot of other sources

For example, you mention that the sdsole resistance was the 202nd Kokutai. This is not the case, In fact an analysis of just one airfield in the area, Babo (at the end of the VogelKop peninsula), reveals the presence of the following units at various times

Japanese Units Based At Babo
202nd Kokutai (formally 3rd Kokutai - Zeros) early 1943 - March 1944 
311th Hikotai of the 153 Kokutai - (A6M3-5 Zeros)
753rd 732nd Kokutai - Betty (possibly based)
JAAF 7th Air Division
61st Sentai (Ki-49 Helen)
24th Sentai, 1st Chutai (Ki-43-II Oscar) Sumatra May 1943 to Dagua 
34th Sentai (Ki-48 Lily) 1943 
59th Sentai (Ki-43-II detachment) Malang 3-43 - 4-43 to But maybe longer
70th 73rd Dokuritsu Chutai (Ki-45 Nick)
45th Sentai (Ki-45 Nick) 16 arrive February 19, 1944 to Wakde 
75th Sentai (Ki-48 Lily)
25th Special Base Unit (Betty Topsy Transports)

RAAF sources say that there were about 330 aircraft in the T/O, from elements of both the 23rd AF of the IJNAF and the 7th AD of the JAAF. 

I am suspecting that the losses you are quoting are just those that relate to the 202nd, when in fact there were a lot of other units in the area. If there were a lot of other formations, it follows that there were a lot of other losses as well. 

Determining Jap losses is an extremely difficult affair, and for that reason I would much prefer a co-operative approach to the problem, rather than getting into some P*ss*ng competition about who knows more. Who knows, we may all learn something from our collective knowledge.

I have to go, but will try and put that list of RAAF losses, and claims made in a couple of hours


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## parsifal (Apr 28, 2008)

Tentatively, I think losses in the theatre for the allies were as follows

Mar 15: 3 Spit (AR619, 620 BS 231)

Apr 19: 2 Hudson (A16-183 197)
Apr 26: 1 Beaf (A 19-59)

May 2: 8 Spit
May 4: 1 Beaf (A 19-60)
May 9: 1 Beaf (A 19-72)
May 19: 2 Hudson (A19-28 29)
May 28: 2 Spit

Jun 4: 1 B-24 (USAAF) 
Jun 22: 2 Beaf (A19-62, 113)
Jun 23: 1 B-24 (USAAF)
Jun 30: 3 B-24 (USAAF)
4 Spit (BR 528, 490, 530 EE 670)
Jul 24: 1 Beaf (A 19-62)
Jul 26: 8 Spit

Aug 14: 1 B-24 (USAAF...was salvaged)
Aug 21: 2 Beaf (A 19-62 113)

Sep 7: 3 Spit (EF 558, LZ 884, BR 549) 
Sep 9 : 1 Boomerang (Bombed)


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## Wildcat (Apr 28, 2008)

Parsifal, this is what I have for Spitfire losses due to enemy action in this period.

Mar 15 :- 452 sqn - 2 spits
54 sqn - 2 spits

May 2 :- 457 sqn - 1 
452 sqn - 2
54 sqn - 1
Plus a further 10 a/c lost due to fuel or engine problems.

May 10 :- 457 sqn - 1 (hit the ground whilst dogfighting)

May 28 :- 457 sqn - 2

Jun 20 :- 452 sqn - 2

Jun 30 :- 452 sqn -1
54 sqn -4

July 6 :- 457 sqn - 3
452 sqn - 1
54 sqn - 1

Sep 7 :- 452 sqn - 2
54 sqn - 1


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## DauntlessDriver (Apr 28, 2008)

Hmmm... lookin' at this... I would suspect that the "boil-down" is this...

The Spitfire Mk.V is more maneuverable than the Zero at low speeds... but the Spitfire is heavier than the Zero... how is this so? I would think lighter means less maneuverable in a fight.


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## FLYBOYJ (Apr 28, 2008)

DauntlessDriver said:


> The Spitfire Mk.V is more maneuverable than the Zero at low speeds... but the Spitfire is heavier than the Zero... how is this so? I would think lighter means less maneuverable in a fight.


What makes you think the Spitfire Mk.V is more maneuverable than the Zero at low speeds !!!!!!


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## parsifal (Apr 28, 2008)

Wildcat said:


> Parsifal, this is what I have for Spitfire losses due to enemy action in this period.
> 
> Mar 15 :- 452 sqn - 2 spits
> 54 sqn - 2 spits
> ...



Thanks Wilcat. Your figures are pretty close to mine. Do you have total figures for the Darwin theatre (ie all types). 

Also do you have any estimates on Japanese losses in this period a well. Thats the $64 question really, and one that nobody wants to tackle.


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## HoHun (Apr 28, 2008)

Hi Driver,

>The Spitfire Mk.V is more maneuverable than the Zero at low speeds... but the Spitfire is heavier than the Zero... how is this so? I would think lighter means less maneuverable in a fight.

You're right with the latter ... with regard to the former, let me try to explain the diagrams: In the turn rate comparison, the main thing is to get a high sustained turn rate at whatever speed, which means that you have to look for the peak of the graphs.

How far to the right the graph runs below the peak mainly determines how much energy and power reserve there is for an instantaneous turn ... if you pull into an instantaneous turn at a faster speed than that for the maximum turn rate, you'll gain a bit of turn rate while speed decays.

Once you've reached maximum turn rate, there is no quick pulling back to increase the turn rate anymore unless you can sacrifice some altitude for that.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## JoeB (Apr 28, 2008)

parsifal said:


> For example, you mention that the sdsole resistance was the 202nd Kokutai. This is not the case, In fact an analysis of just one airfield in the area, Babo (at the end of the VogelKop peninsula), reveals the presence of the following units at various times
> 
> Japanese Units Based At Babo
> 202nd Kokutai (formally 3rd Kokutai - Zeros) early 1943 - March 1944
> ...


Babo is in Irian Jaya, ie. western New Guinea in the then Dutch East Indies. The raids to the Darwin area were flown from Timor, only place within reach of the Darwin area by even the long legged Japanese single engine fighters. There was more than one thing going on, elements of the 202nd were also used in Western NG before and after the Darwin operations.

But I'm not assuming the 202nd was the only fighter unit involved over Darwin or by some extension claiming it was the only one anywhere in the Dutch East Indies. I'm quoting specific Japanese descriptions of each Darwin raid, which specifically say it provided the escort, giving the number of planes in each case, on the specific dates in my summary above except one, the JNAF raids. That other raid, June 20 1943, was by the JAAF, escorted by the 59th Sentai, lost 1 'Oscar'. Altogether those include each date on which the Darwin Spits recorded combats with Japanese fighters (they intercepted unescorted recon a/c etc on some other days). Neither the Navy nor Army say they did any of those missions jointly (w/ exception of 202nd's escort of Army 70th Ind Chutai 'Dinahs' in Sep '43) and they very rarely did, so no plausible reason to assume that.

Most of the other units you mentioned were not fighters. I did mention the losses of non-fighters over Darwin in the list. The 753rd AG was the 'Betty' unit in the Navy raids, the 61st and 76th Sentai's provided the bombers on the Army's single escorted raid.

Of the other fighter units you listed:
24th Sentai: defensive duty in Sumatra, then action v 5th AF in Western NG (where Dagua is), no battle credit for Darwin, which 59th did get, see Hata/Izawa "Japanese Army..." pgs. 125 and 154.
Ki-45 units: the Spits didn't claim to encounter any twin engine fighters
153 Kokutai: was an E13A 'Jake' recon seaplane unit for at least most of its existence, the pacificwrecks.com site where that list came may have that wrong, anyway 202nd was the Navy fighter unit in Timor escorting Navy raids on Darwin.

The other fighter unit in the immediate area was the 934 Kokutai, Type 2 Float Fighters (A6M2-N 'float Zero' or 'Rufe') which engaged Beaufighters in defensive fighter-fighter missions on a number of occasions in that period but didn't meet Spits.

I don't see any good reason so far to doubt that the 202nd AG (and 59th Sentai on that one occasion) were the only fighter units met by Spits over Darwin. I think the best course for further learning about the Japanese side of things is to read the sources mentioned above which give that info. Fresh eyes so to speak on that might lead to more convincing arguments why to doubt the basic completeness of those accounts. Or alternatively positive evidence of other Japanese losses or involvement by other units would be more convincing. 

Now, in my frank opinion, doubt about the completeness of those Japanese losses mainly, though implicitly, rests on the idea the Spits couldn't have overclaimed that much. But plenty of WWII fighter units overclaimed that much and more, including Brit/CW ones in some other cases, and certainly the Japanese did; in this case 202nd and 59th were credited with around 110 Spits v 31 (or perhaps fewer) actually downed.

On Spit losses, I just quoted Price to give general picture of claims and losses on each side, my main point was the Japanese fighter losses, which I cross referenced a few other places. He has 31 ostensible Spit combat losses, plus other non-combat ones on combat missions. I'm sure "Soleil" throws more light on that, very detailed on both sides; so far I just skimmed through for new info on Japanese stuff. Might be worth remembering though, we're assuming all the Japanese losses were due to combat. Their accounts don't actually say *that*. 

Joe


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## Wildcat (Apr 28, 2008)

parsifal said:


> Thanks Wilcat. Your figures are pretty close to mine. Do you have total figures for the Darwin theatre (ie all types).


No, I haven't looked into that as of yet.



parsifal said:


> Also do you have any estimates on Japanese losses in this period a well. Thats the $64 question really, and one that nobody wants to tackle.


Again no, the only losses I have are the ones JoeB provides! I'm hoping that French book gets translated and becomes available here.



JoeB said:


> Babo is in Irian Jaya, ie. western New Guinea in the then Dutch East Indies. The raids to the Darwin area were flown from Timor, only place within reach of the Darwin area by even the long legged Japanese single engine fighters. There was more than one thing going on, elements of the 202nd were also used in Western NG before and after the Darwin operations.


I was always under the impression that most of the Darwin raids were only staged through Timor, the a/c coming from bases further away, such as Babo. I think this is what Parsifal was gettin at.

Joe, on Aug 10, 1943, F/O Young and P/O Coombes of 452 sqn claimed one Pete destroyed and one damaged in a combat off Millingimbi Is. What unit would they be from? From the floatplane base at Taberfane?
Also after the 2nd May raid, 4 Beaufighters from 31 sqn were dispatched to attack the Japanese strike force once they landed at Penfoei, this they did claiming 2 fighters and 2 bombers left burning. I don't suppose you have any info about these claims regarding whether these a/c were actually destroyed or merely damaged.


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## slaterat (May 1, 2008)

You have to be willing to keep an open mind when cross referencing claims/kills from WW II. Sometimes you might not believe or like what you find.
Overall I suppose the average unit overclaimed 100%,but it can vary greatly. Some units and pilots claims can be verified at 80%+ 
As a general rule the larger the fight the greater the overclaiming. The AVG did some shocking overclaiming in Burma too, that was often matched by their JAAF opponents.


Slaterat


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## parsifal (May 1, 2008)

we are kinda stuck, I guess. One thing is clear, the spits over Darwin suffered relatively heavy casualties. Would they have done better if equipped with the other RAAF mainstay of the time, the Kittyhawk?


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## HoHun (May 1, 2008)

Hi Parsifal,
>Would they have done better if equipped with the other RAAF mainstay of the time, the Kittyhawk?

With regard to the Spitfire tactics, I read a couple of comments on these by USAAF pilot Clay Tice, who flew P-40s with 9th FS (I believe) from Darwin. Clay typed these on Avsig forum while reading a book by the title "Spitfires over Darwin". (Unfortunately, I don't have his original posts anymore as the program that stored them ate the database.)

The comment I best remember was something like: "I'm glad we did not have any combat experience like the British and just scrambled at the first sign of danger, attacking the Japanese flat-out with no regard for formation tactics."

Apparently, the Spitfire outfit thought it could apply the lessons learned in the Battle of Britain, and they were not ready to listen to the pilots who already had experience fighting the Zero. They seem to have favoured radar over coast watcher reports though radar was unreliable and did not have the range of the coast watcher network, and along with the delay caused by assembling their formations, this usually left them in a poor position for an intercept.

At least, that's what I remember from that Avsig thread some ten years back - I'm sorry I can't offer anything more specific, but as the database is gone, I have to rely on my imperfect memory.

On a more general line, when I Clay Tice about their tactical doctrine of the time, his answer showed that the tactical expertise of Chennault's Flying Tigers was not transferred to Clay's unit at least. He was also unaware of the results of the evaluation of the Akutan Zero and commented that if the USAAF ever distributed the report to the combat units, it certainly did not reach him.

Another Pacific War veteran, MF Kirby (P-39 and P-38), commented that their hit and run tactics were not the result of tactical training (which had only consisted of tight "welded wing" formation training and one-versus-one dogfighting between aircraft of the same squadron) but rather out of "fear". In my opinion, that was a very modest way of telling the audience that the pilots in his squadron independendly assessed the relative strengths of US vs. Japanese fighters and recognized that dogfighting was not going to yield results. 

It's my impression that both Clay's and Kirby's units frequently relied on "drag" tactics against Japanese fighters (when equipped with the fast P-38 - they were not very confident in the speed advantage of the earlier types).

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## parsifal (May 1, 2008)

Thankyou HoHun

What are "Drag tactics"


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## Wildcat (May 1, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Apparently, the Spitfire outfit thought it could apply the lessons learned in the Battle of Britain, and they were not ready to listen to the pilots who already had experience fighting the Zero. They seem to have favoured radar over coast watcher reports though radar was unreliable and did not have the range of the coast watcher network, and along with the delay caused by assembling their formations, this usually left them in a poor position for an intercept.



AFAIK there were no Coast Watchers in the Darwin area from 1943 onwards. There were CoastWatchers on Bathurst Is in early 42, however they were only utilised until the Radar sites were up and running. I believe Radar was the only form of early warning from Jan 43 onwards.



Parsifal said:


> Would they have done better if equipped with the other RAAF mainstay of the time, the Kittyhawk?


I guess we'll never know, when RAAF P40 squadrons defended Darwin from Aug 42-Jan 43 they never encountered Zero's and all the Japanese raids were conducted by night during this period. Dick Cresswell from 77 sqn downed a Betty during one of these night raids. However when the 49th FG defended Darwin with P40's I have the following claims.

22 Mar 42 - 1 C5M Babs PO Shigiki Mari and PO Shinobu Nagasawa killed.

28 Mar 42 - 2 Apr 42 - 2 Bettys and 1 Zero for 1 P40 lost

4 Apr 42 - 2 zeros and 3 Bombers for 2 P40s lost

25 Apr 42 - 8 Bombers and 3 Zero's (PO1c Shiro Murikami killed)

27 Apr 42 - 3 bombers and 4 Zero's for 4 P40's lost

13 Jun 42 - 2 Zeros ( WO Katsuji Matsushima and Mikio Tanikawa killed) for 3 P40's lost.

14 Jun 42 - 4 Zeros for 1 P40 lost

15 Jun 42 - 6 Zeros for 2 P40's lost

16 Jun 42 - 1 Bomber and 1 Zero for 3 P40's

30 Jul 42 - 6 bombers and 3 Zero's for 1 P40 lost

23 Aug 42 - 7 Betty's and 8 Zero's (Lt Tanadsune Tokaji, PO Nobutoshi Furukawa, PO Isutzo Shimizu and PO Yoshijuki Hirata killed) 1 P40 lost.


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## HoHun (May 1, 2008)

Hi Parsifal,

>What are "Drag tactics"

Drag tactics have the defensively engaged (=attacked) fighter in a section fly a path that enables the free fighter of the section to attack the bogey trailing the engaged fighter.

There are various implementation of these tactics like the sandwich and the half-split, but they work even if a section gets separated and re-joins during the battle.

It requires coordination between the pilots though and is facilitated by a performance advantage over the enemy. From what I heard from Clay and Kirby, they considered neither the P-39 nor the P-40 to have this kind of performance advantage over the Zero.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## HoHun (May 1, 2008)

Hi Wildcat,

>AFAIK there were no Coast Watchers in the Darwin area from 1943 onwards. There were CoastWatchers on Bathurst Is in early 42, however they were only utilised until the Radar sites were up and running. I believe Radar was the only form of early warning from Jan 43 onwards.

Thanks for the correction - I'm afraid I must have confused a separate discussion of coast watchers with the Darwin raids history discussion. If I only had the original posts!

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## JoeB (May 1, 2008)

slaterat said:


> 1...when cross referencing claims/kills from WW II. Sometimes you might not... like what you find.
> 
> 2. The AVG did some shocking overclaiming in Burma too, that was often matched by their JAAF opponents.


1. In all frankness that's what I see in statements that we're 'stuck' on Japanese fighter losses over Darwin. They are pretty clearly stated in quite detailed accounts, what would be necessary to get 'unstuck'; for them to agree better with Spit claims? I think that's actually the answer from some points of view.

2. That's a good comparison. Using the same kind of sources (the relevant vol. of the Japanese official history, in that case Vol.34, corroborated by research by people like Izawa etc among veterans) Japanese losses were on average around 40% of the AVG's claims for its whole period of operations, Dec '41 to early July '42. The overclaiming was much worse than that in some early combats in Burma (featuring such typcially overclaim increasing factors as: unit new to combat, big furball combats, actual kill ratio ~1:1 or even against the claimants), but their claims were considerably more accurate later on (more accuracy friendly situations: more AVG experience, smaller combats, real kill ratio considerably in favor of the AVG). 

Counting the same way, what each side recorded as losses in specific combats for which both sides give a specific account, the AVG had about a 3:1 kill ratio v Japanese fighters, all of them JAAF, around 70% Type 97's (Nate), remainder Type 1's (Oscar) and a few Type 2 2-seat fighters (Nick). So IOW when we compare the AVG's or USN sdn's in Solomons or RAAF Kittyhawks in New Guinea 1942 v Spit results over Darwin, we are comparing apples and apples basically as long as we use comparable Japanese sources. Those who would claim this misrepresents the *relative* outcomes of different Allied units not only have to raise residual doubt about completeness of Japanese accounts at Darwin but show they are *less* complete than those in the other situations among which we're comparing Allied performances. 

In fact Darwin is one of the cases where they are relatively more likely to be complete: mainly JNAF, more of whose original records survived (to be quoted in the official history) and simple set piece battles with units involved, even pilots involved, named in detail. Completeness of known accounts is a real issue in some cases, we touched on it already for August 15 1945 Seafire/Zero combat. The only accounts I've seen have 1 Zero lost and 1 pilot WIA plane not lost from two different Air Groups, but in that case it's more plausible other units might have been involved, losses the Japanese attributed to F6F's were really to Seafires, etc in multiple engagements of small formations of at least 3 air arms in the same area (still we can't state the 7 or 8 Zero losses to Seafires 8/15/45 as fact, or even some subset the claimants were *really* sure about; it just didn't work that way).

Joe


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## JoeB (May 1, 2008)

Wildcat said:


> However when the 49th FG defended Darwin with P40's I have the following claims.
> 
> 22 Mar 42 - 1 C5M Babs PO Shigiki Mari and PO Shinobu Nagasawa killed.
> 
> ...


There was one other relevant engagement, and another Zero loss in one engagement you mentioned:
March 14 '42 Japanese raid on Horn Island, the 49th claimed 4 and actually downed 2 Zeroes, of the 4th Air Group (Ltjg Nobuhiro Iwasaki, PO1c Genkichi Oishi) for 1 loss. The Zero opponents in all other engagement were 3rd Air Group.
Jul 30: PO Shigeru Mukaki was lost ("Soleil Levant sur L'Australie" by Baeza)
August 23: "3/202 Kokutai" by Pajdosz/Zbiegniewski says another Zero was lost whose pilot survived, not named, but "Soleil" doesn't mention it.
Otherwise the apparent Zero losses were the pilots you named.
Other losses of non-fighters:
March 28: 1 Nell, not escorted so not counted below
April 4: 3 Betty's lost (7 were claimed, also 4 Zeroes damaged).
April 25: 4 Betty's outright 1 ditched 1 forcelanded due to combat, 2 others operational
April 27: 1 Betty lost
Aug 23: 1 Betty plus 1 destroyed in a crashlanding

The 49th FG's total record in the period was 10-11 Zeroes and 12 escorted bombers per Japanese accounts for 19 P-40's, while Spits downed 5 fighters (4 Z's+1 Oscar) and 14 escorted bombers (including all 'force lands'/'crashlanded' in both cases) for mid 20's+ Spit combat losses, again not counting interceptions of unescorted non-fighters in either case. 

Joe

Reactions: Informative Informative:
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## Wildcat (May 2, 2008)

Joe, great info mate, thanks for the input. I've been looking at the claims made by the Spits against Japanese Dinahs over Darwin and was wondering if you had any others to add. AFAIK Dinah's weren't encountered by the 49th ??

6 Feb 43 - 1 Ki-46 destroyed (Lt Kurasuki Setaguti Lt Fumio Morio)

7 Mar 43 - 1 Ki-46 destroyed (Lt Yutaka Tonoi Lt Chokiti Orihara)

23 May 43 - 1 Ki-46 damaged

18 Jul 43 - 1 Ki-46 destroyed (Capt Shunji Sasaki Lt Akira Eguchi)

17 Aug 43 - 4 Ki-46's destroyed ( Lt Kyuichi Okomoto Lt Yasuro Yamamoto).
(Lt Saburo Shinohara Lt Hideo Ura). (Lt Shir-Ichi Matsu-ura Lt Kiyatoshi Shiraki) and (Sgt Tomihiko Tanaka Sgt Kinji Kawahara)

6 Nov 43 - 1 Ki-46 damaged

12 Jun 44 - 1 Ki-46 destroyed (Lt Katsutoshi Tsutsui Lt Keisuke Shimazaki)

20 Jul 44 - 1 Ki-46 destroyed (Lt Kyoshi Iizuka Lt hisao Ito)

All Japanese aircrew KIA.


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## slaterat (May 7, 2008)

I think a lot was expected from the Spit Vs at Darwin and consequently , that political pressure may have lead to some of the above average overclaiming. 

Although the Trop Spit V was faster than some of the other allied fighters that had struggled against the Zero, it wasn't enough to dominate the Zero. The Spit v still had to deal with the same problems of the other RAF fighters combating the zero; How to extract oneself from a bad situation. The 20 mph speed advantage of the trop spit V over the zero wasn't enough to guarrantee an escape. The zero isn't really dominated until it goes up against the big fast American iron.

Slaterat


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## kool kitty89 (May 7, 2008)

It also had an altitude performance advantage.


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## John Davies (Jun 17, 2008)

David Brown's book "The Seafire" (Ian Allan, 1973) is interesting here. On p156, he gives a comparison of the Seafire and Zero. The Fleet Air Arm recognised that at its best fighting speed, around 180 knots, the Zero would certainly turn inside the Seafire. Standard doctrine was therefore to keep speed up between 220 and 280 knots, alternately climbing and diving in a series of near-stall turns that would change the Seafire's direction more rapidly than the Zero's, and eventually enable a firing position to be reached. If the Zero attempted to increase speed to match the Seafire, it would lose enough of its manoeverability to allow the Seafire to keep its edge. Combat records show that these tactics were pretty successful. if I read Brown's figures aright, the kill ratio was about 10:1 in the Seafire's favour. 

But while the seafire was an excellent aircraft in the air, it was not a good naval aircraft. Losses in deck-landing accidents were another matter entirely, of course! The basic Spitfire airframe had never been designed for the regular crunch and violent decelleration that was a carrier fighter's lot, and if you wanted to ship an air wing which would stay mostly airworthy, you probably needed to shop with the Grumman Ironworks.


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## kool kitty89 (Jun 17, 2008)

The Sea Hurricane was better in that respect, wasn't it? Though the liquid cooled engine was still a disadvantage. (though the Merlin was used on several FAA a/c, like the Fulmar, Airefly, and Baracuda)

A bit off topic, but Gloster's F.5/34 fighter is an interesting possibility... (though a more powereful engine, Pegasus/Taurus would be needed)


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## parsifal (Jun 17, 2008)

The real ultimate development of the British carrier Fighter par excellance was the Sea Fury, which is the logical successor IMO to the F/5 a spec


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## kool kitty89 (Jun 17, 2008)

It certainly was, but it came a bit late, and with all the ultimate piston engined fighter developments it was soon superceded by jets. (though like the USN's Corsair's they stayed around longer than the land based fighters, particularly in fighter-bomber roles)


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## slaterat (Jun 17, 2008)

The two major limitations of the Sea Hurricane were its short range and non folding wings. Being liquid cooled wasn"t a problem as the merlin was very reliable. It had a sturdy undercarriage , a strong airframe nice handling and a good view over the nose for carrier landings.


Slaterat


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## kool kitty89 (Jun 18, 2008)

The reasons the USN disliked liquid cooled engines iirc, wasn't the reliability (actual reliability of contemporary liquid and air cooled engines of the period being pretty similar) but the need to store large amounts of glycol coolant (admitedly not really more dangerous than aviation fuel) and, more importantly, the need to use fresh water. (an important, and limited resourse at sea)

With reliability in mind, the Taurus (for the Gloster fighter), with its troubled development, would probably be out anyway, and it would probably be best off with the Pegasus, or an American engine (preferably the R-1830, like was preferred on the Beaufort) though overall the Hercules would probably be the best, assuming there wouldn't be problems meeting the larger engine to the airframe. (with the necessary weight gain of further development, and increased fuel, armament, and external stores, more power would be needed to keep performance up)

But if this is going to be discussed further a separate topic should be started. (a very interesting topic though, a few older threads on it -both alternate FAA fighters and the Gloster plane-, but not very in depth or long discussions)

gloster F.5/34 - Google Search

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/gloster-f-5-34-a-3606.html

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/alternate-faa-fighter-3009.html


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## John Davies (Jun 18, 2008)

Going back to the tactics Seafire pilots used against the Zero, a number of points emerge. 

Firstly, the Zero could turn inside the Seafire, so the solution was not to engage in a turning battle, instead to alternately climb and dive, effectively changing direction more rapidly than the Zero until a firing position was achieved. At the top of a near-stall turn, where G is very low, effective wing loading is also very low, and as long as there is enough airflow over the control surfaces for them to work, very rapid changes of direction are possible. The Seafire/Spitfire airframe had controls that stayed effective at low airspeeds, which today's pilots say makes it one of the nicer warbirds to land, in spite of its narrow-track undercarriage.

Secondly, combat effectiveness is not solely a function of the theoretical performance of the airframe; in this case which could turn tighter. It is a function of many things, among them both the performance of the airframe, and the tactics used to exploit both your strengths and the enemy's weakensses. (Plus maintenance, levels of pilot training, pilot experience, morale, good leadership, and a whole lot else!)

Thirdly, FAA tactics were designed to make sure they fought on their terms and not on the enemy's. FAA pilots were instructed never to allow their speed to decay into the Zero's best fighting range (about 180 knots), and engage in a turning battle. That would be fighting on the enemy's terms, and a recipe for defeat. Instead, they were instructed to keep the speed up, between 220 and 280 (a nice broad range giving lots of room for manoevre) and "boom and zoom". The 10:1 favourable kill ratio shows it worked.

Finally, presumably Spitfire pilots fighting Zeroes could have used the same tactics, and probably did. Fighter pilots are intelligent and resourceful people, and would soon have found out what worked. If the Seafire could obtain a very favourable 10:1 kill ratio over the Zero, Australian Air Force Spitfire claims are probably quite reliable, and may not be inflated at all.


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## JoeB (Jun 18, 2008)

John Davies said:


> If the Seafire could obtain a very favourable 10:1 kill ratio over the Zero, Australian Air Force Spitfire claims are probably quite reliable, and may not be inflated at all.


The 10:1 you cite is a claim. I don't see how one claim can measure or validate the accuracy of another claim.

Seafire v Zero was covered earlier in this thread (or anyway several times counting all related threads  ). There was only one combat between the two types that be documented from two sides. That was morning of August 15 1945: Seafires in rare use as escorts on offensive mission were credited w/ 7 Zeroes for 1 loss. But known Japanese accounts gives losses to Seafires that morning as: Lt. T Honma of the 252nd Air Group bailed out WIA, and CPO S. Yamada of 302nd Air Group WIA but apparently landed safely. A number of other losses were attributed to F6F's (which also made a lot of claims similar time and place, overlapping combats). Source is Maru Special, "Pacific War Sea-Air War Series". Honma's detailed account is given in "Sky of August 15" by Hata.

However the real comparison to make in trying to figure out real results is the relative clarity of the situation and completeness of opposing accounts. In August 15 '45 case there's some room for doubt about completeness, and room for confusion about losses due to Seafires or F6F's, though the full claims of the Seafires are hardly likely (nor the full F6F claims, nor any typical WWII claims).

In Darwin 1943 in contrast, detailed published Japanese losses mostly link back to a privately published monograph by a retired JMSDF officer, commissioned by a Western researcher. He compiled and translated the handwritten action reports of the 202nd Air Group over Darwin.
-those reports survived complete and intact for each Darwin mission
-the 202nd was the only Zero unit over Darwin per multiple Japanese sources (in the single raid by Army a/c, a 59th Fighter Regiment 'Oscar' was also downed)
-there were no other Allied units making claims at the same time
-they had a 500 mile return trip: fewer questions about damaged v lost than in actions right over their own a/f's as in 1945

There's little reasonable doubt about the Zero losses over Darwin or the high overclaim ratio by the Spits. Again the best recent published source IMO is Baeza "Soleil Levant sur L'Australie". 

Besides Aug 15 '45, Seafires claimed a few other Japanese fighter types without loss (I think the claimed ratio was actually a little higher than 10:1, August 15 was IIRC their only air combat loss), but it's not clear if any of those other a/c were acting as fighters, rather than kamikazes: the Seafires were on defensive CAP missions. For comparison, the FM-2, which was mostly also used for carrier (CVE) defense in late war claimed 18[3] fighter type a/c for 7 air combat losses, 26:1, Sept '44-Aug '45 (Naval Aviation Combat Statistics). So even if we had enough of a sample to say much about Seafire v Zero (we don't) we'd have to put it in the context of the particular mission (with kamikaze/fighter confusion in some cases) and of 1945 Pac War air combat overall, very different, in many more ways than just tactics, from air combat v a still pretty first string Zero unit like the 202nd AG in 1943.

Joe


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## HoHun (Jun 18, 2008)

Hi John,

>Secondly, combat effectiveness is not solely a function of the theoretical performance of the airframe; in this case which could turn tighter. 

Hm, turn rate was actually found to be one of the least important aspects of fighter performance in WW2. In fact, in marked contrast to the high-priority performance parameters top speed and climb rate, turn rate generally decreased as fighters were developed towards higher combat effectiveness during the war.

> It is a function of many things, among them both the performance of the airframe, and the tactics used to exploit both your strengths and the enemy's weakensses.

In this context, it's worth noting that not knowing the enemy's strenghts and your own (relative) weaknesses can have a negative impact on your combat record. 

From two P-39 and P-40 veterans (both late re-equipped with P-38s), I heard that they considered themselves outperformed (at altitude) or at least well-matched by the A6M they met, and the P-40 pilot assured me that his unit was never informed about the test results and tactical conclusions the US Navy had gained from flight testing the Aleutian A6M. The P-40 pilot also told me that the RAAF Spitfire pilots were warned about the Zero's superior manoeuvrability, but refused to believe in these warnings as they considered the Spitfire to be superior to not only the P-40, but also to the A6M in any respect.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## kool kitty89 (Jun 18, 2008)

Roll rate is also an important component in maneuverability (in many ways more important than turning ability) and was something the Zero was lacking in. (particularly at high speeds) (though the Ki 43 is a different story)

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/polls/f4f-wildcat-versus-p-40e-tomahawk-13281-2.html


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## John Davies (Jun 18, 2008)

The account of a Zero/Seafire combat which was recorded by both sides is fascinating, and I confess I wasn't aware of it. My figures were drawn from a few pages at the back of Brown's "The Seafire", in which he lists every Seafire combat.

I suppose the point here is that these were based on pilots' combat reports, and (as figures from the Battle of Britain show beyond all doubt!), even if everyone is being honest, and even if there are strict rules about what constitutes a valid claim, claim figures will still run well ahead of actual kills. But even allowing for that, I'd still maintain that the FIII and LIII, the marks used in the Pacific, had a quite definite edge over the Zero.

One point I was definitely wrong about, and on reflection should I certainly not have made; conclusions drawn from the performance of the Seafire are certainly not tranferrable to the Spitfire Mk V, and especially not if the Spitfire was burdened with the horrible big tropical filter, which knocked a chunk off its performance. While the first Seafires were basically adapted Mk Vs, by the time they got up to the LIIC, they had developed an aircraft with a much higher performance at low to medium level, especially in rate of climb and accelleration, and the LIII, used in the Pacific, had a higher performance again.


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## renrich (Jun 18, 2008)

The US Navy had intel that described quite accurately the performance characteristics of the A6M in the fall of 1941, long before the Aleutian Zero was tested. I would like to see the statistics showing that Seafires had a 10 to one kill ration against A6Ms. The USN's preference for air cooled engines was at least partly based on the fact that a radial air cooled engine is much less likely to get disabling damage in combat than a liquid cooled engine.


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## HoHun (Jun 18, 2008)

Hi Koolkitty,

>The reasons the USN disliked liquid cooled engines iirc, wasn't the reliability (actual reliability of contemporary liquid and air cooled engines of the period being pretty similar) but the need to store large amounts of glycol coolant (admitedly not really more dangerous than aviation fuel) and, more importantly, the need to use fresh water. (an important, and limited resourse at sea)

Interesting background, I hadn't been aware of this! What's the source? 

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## slaterat (Jun 19, 2008)

Hohun

Yes I found that quite interesting too. It makes sense with the limited room on a carrier but it didn't seem to be a concern for the the FAA.

I also think that the merlin 32 powered Seafire that you mentioned in another post, would have sufficient performance to dominate a zero.

These seem contradictory to me Joe.

10:1 you cite is a claim. I don't see how one claim can measure or validate the accuracy of another claim.

Besides Aug 15 '45, Seafires claimed a few other Japanese fighter types without loss (I think the claimed ratio was actually a little higher than 10:1, August 15 was IIRC their only air combat loss), but it's not clear if any of those other a/c were acting as fighters, rather than kamikazes: the Seafires were on defensive CAP missions. For comparison, the FM-2, which was mostly also used for carrier (CVE) defense in late war claimed 18[3] fighter type a/c for 7 air combat losses, 26:1, Sept '44-Aug '45 (Naval Aviation Combat Statistics). 
So even if we had enough of a sample to say much about Seafire v Zero (we don't) we'd have to put it in the context of the particular mission (with kamikaze/fighter confusion in some cases) and of 1945 Pac War air combat overall, very different, in many more ways than just tactics, from air combat v a still pretty first string Zero unit like the 202nd AG in 1943.



Slaterat


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## kool kitty89 (Jun 19, 2008)

Sorry, but I can't seem to find the sourse for that. (it was from another discussion on navy a/c)

And now that I think about it more I'm not sure the fresh water issue was specifically for the USN. (I haven't seen it much mentioned, though it should logically be important, though maybe just a disadvantage than condemning atribute)

The issue of carrying glycol coolant is menyioned several places (including wikipedia) as the Navy supposedly disliked storing the flamable substance. But thins doesn't seem to make sense as 1. it's not really any more dangerous than gasoline which also has to be carried for the a/c, and in much larger quantities than coolant. and 2. the coolant could be stored as non-flamable (except in extreme conditions) pre-mixed 70/30 water/glycol mix. (which was the coolant for the V-1710 from the begining of operational use, unlike the far more dangerous, and less cooling efficient 100% glycol used in the early Merlins)

Of course pure water cooling could also be used (as all German engines did iirc) and most of the glycol using engines could probably have been modified to use such without excessive difficulty.


Thare's more reason to the Navy's prefrence though. I'm not sure of the whole history behind it, but in addition to what Renrich said about a better chance of getting back with engine damage, there are also some specific events that effected this as well I think. (I can't remember specifically, but in the '20's iirc there were some navy a/c designs which were adapted from water cooled engines to radial engines, and performance, reliability, and servicability markedly increased)


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## John Davies (Jun 19, 2008)

"I would like to see the statistics showing that Seafires had a 10 to one kill ration against A6Ms."

As I said, I got my figures from the records of every Seafire combat, listed in Appendix Three of David Brown's "The Seafire". (Ian Allan, 1973). He lists fifteeen A6Ms destroyed, for the loss of one Seafire pilot shot down and killed by an A6M, so my rough approximation of 10:1 erred very much on the side of caution. These figures do not include probables or damaged, or combats with other Japanese aircraft. But as I also said, these are based on pilots' combat reports.

If you can't get hold of a copy of Brown, I could try scanning the relevant pages into a doucument and attaching it, but I'm afraid playing with our scanning programme usually involves a great deal of time and blasphemy, so I cannot guarantee to succeed with it soon or indeed at all.


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## parsifal (Jun 19, 2008)

The trouble with many of the western based sources is that trhey have relied on claimed kills rather than going into the japanese source(s) about confirmed losses. More recent researchers that have started to cross check the Japanese confirmed lossdes to the claimed losses, have realized that the immediate post war accounts are quite innaccurate.

But thats not the end of it. Unfortunately, many of the japanese records are innaccurate, in that they are incomplete, so the true extent of Japanese losses, from the japanese side cannot always be pinpointed accurately from that direction either.

In short, the true extent of Japanese losses is one of the most least understood, and most innacurately documented subject areas of WWII that there is.


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## renrich (Jun 19, 2008)

My question on Seafire kills versus "Zeros" come from a fact that Allied pilots were well known for identifying any Japanese aircraft as a "Zero." Incidently, when the USN first actually encountered the A6M in combat, some of them misidentified it as a bomber because of the longish canopy. If one looks at a cutaway diagram of a liquid cooled engined fighter it is easy to see that there are a great many spots mainly in the cooling section for the engine that a shell fragment or rifle caliber round can cause damage that will cause the engine to overheat and fail. The liquid cooled engine has most of the vulnerabilities of the radial engine plus all that cooling system. The other advantage of the radial type for the USN was that for a given horsepower the radial was lighter. Of course, that weight advantage was somewhat offset by the superior streamlining of the inline engine.


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## John Davies (Jun 19, 2008)

Brown's Appendix 3 does distinguish between combats between Seafires vs Zeroes, and Seafires vs other Japanese types. Combats are recorded individually, in some detail, noting area, mark and serial number/codes of Seafire involved, name of pilot, type of enemy aircaft, and outcome. 

However, we could be moving into difficult territory here. Accepting that information based on pilots' combat reports may not be completely accurate, what is to be done? If we are only to accept victory statisitics which are validated both by the claim records of one side and the loss records of the other, we are going to get into some very real difficulties 

You've already pointed out that Japanese records are not all complete. But if we try to apply this criterion consistently across the board, we are going to have to ask all sorts of awkward questions. To suggest only one possible example, now that parts of the Kremlin archive are open to Western researchers, has anyone checked Hartmann's total? This sort of thing opens up a real can of worms!


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## JoeB (Jun 19, 2008)

slaterat said:


> These seem contradictory to me Joe.
> 
> 10:1 you cite is a claim. I don't see how one claim can measure or validate the accuracy of another claim.
> 
> For comparison, the FM-2, which was mostly also used for carrier (CVE) defense in late war claimed 18[3] fighter type a/c for 7 air combat losses, 26:1, Sept '44-Aug '45 (Naval Aviation Combat Statistics).


Those specific points maybe you think are contradictory? I don't. The post I was responding to seemed to say the claimed 10:1 ratio of Seafires over Zeroes in 1945 indicated that the *actual Zero losses* over Darwin in 1943 were perhaps close to what the Spitfires claimed. But there's no logical relationship between the *level* of claims of one unit and the *accuracy* of claims of another unit.

In contrast I was comparing too like things, claims v claims. Seafires claimed 10:1 in 1945, so what were some other ca. 1945 claimed ratio's by older type Allied fighters?, let's put the Seafire claims into context, that's all. FM's claimed 26:1 fighter-fighter, ie. a 10:1 claim wasn't particuarly high for an older type fighter in 1945 usually defending carriers, often against kamikazes. I wasn't inferring anything about how many enemy a/c Seafires and FM's *actually* downed.

On Japanese losses being a difficult subject in general, yes, but in part IM frank O because of resistance to what their records tell us even when pretty clear. In Darwin again the losses are from the orginal combat reports (kodochosho in JNAF terminology) of the only unit involved per many sources. And, with a 500 mile trip back to base and no air-sea rescue function to speak of, it's hard to imagine a lot of other Zero losses without pilot losses. Who ever failed to record disappeared pilots in their own then-secret records? And why did no other evidence of those pilots' existence and loss ever surface since (there's a lot of stuff written in Japan, and on internet too, about individual pilots). At some point a historically rigorous approach requires postive evidence of significant errors in apparently complete sources or they have to be accepted as the most probable facts, and we've passed it in the Darwin case. For example, in the whole Pacific War, not just Darwin area, there's no case I know of where Japanese accounts specifically cover a mission* (like the details given for each of the JNAF Darwin raids) but fail to mention a loss for which there was positive wreck/POW/body evidence on the Allied side. Shouldn't there be at least one such case if those records are really so 'uncertain' (and it's implied 'understated')?

And, when we compare Darwin 1943 to eg. Guadalcanal, Darwin 1942, Port Moresby 1942, etc. we're comparing against the same kind of Japanese Navy records, it's apples and apples, unless we further assert that the 202nd's combat reports were less complete in 1943 than the same unit's reports in 1942, or other similar units in '42-43. 

In the August 15 1945 case as I said there's a bit more room for doubt, because of multiple units involved both sides, more room for interpretation on 'loss' v. 'damage' of planes close to their bases, and I don't happen to know if those published 252nd and 302nd accounts are from actual combat reports. But if one reviews more such cases (1945 over Japan) there's no doubt Allied (almost all US actually) fighters still were credited with substantially more enemy planes than they downed. *Every* published Japanese account of Homeland defense combats can't be incomplete or mistated. It's quite believable, given other incidents, that the FAA Seafires August 15 only shot down that one 252nd AG Zero and hit but didn't down a 302nd machine, though credited with 7. But it's only one combat either way. I agree as was stated that *if* there had been a lot more combats Seafire v. Zeroes flown by 1945 JNAF pilots, the Seafire probably would have done well, as did every other Allied fighter in 1945.

*there's a case in Malaya 1942 where a wreck/body of JAAF fighter doesn't correspond to any loss given in the Japanese official history, but in that case the original records themselves aren't available, so no details of that mission are mentioned: sharp contrast to Darwin where each combat the Allies recorded is also described in fair detail in the JNAF combat reports.

Joe


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## HoHun (Jun 19, 2008)

Hi Renrich,

>If one looks at a cutaway diagram of a liquid cooled engined fighter it is easy to see that there are a great many spots mainly in the cooling section for the engine that a shell fragment or rifle caliber round can cause damage that will cause the engine to overheat and fail. 

For an actual analysis, you'd also need to add the probability of the vulnerable spot to be actually hit in a damaging way by said shell fragment or rifle calibre round.

Rifle-calibre machine guns definitely were badly lacking in effectiveness against liquid-cooled engined fighters in the air-to-air role, and almost completely replaced by heavy machine guns or cannon by the end of the war.

As rifle-calibre machine guns were quite light in comparison to other weapons and were fairly efficient at firing a high number of small projectiles, I think we can safely rule out the hypothesis that hitting vulnerable spots with individual rounds was an efficient way of bringing down enemy fighters in air-to-air combat. Else we'd have seen fighters increasing the number of rifle-calibre machine guns when they were facing enemy types with liquid-cooled engines instead of reducing them. 

For example the Luftwaffe might have considered to equip the Me 109 with small underwing gondolae with MG 81Z machine guns against the P-51 top cover ... 6400 rifle-calibre rounds per minute for a weight penalty equivalent to that for a single 12.7 mm Browning M2.

That this version never saw combat, never was tested, and even never was considered at all shows that the "vulnerable to rifle bullets" hypothesis - or the related "volume of fire" hypothesis - does not accurately describe the reality of WW2 air combat.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## HoHun (Jun 19, 2008)

Hi Kookitty,

>Sorry, but I can't seem to find the sourse for that. (it was from another discussion on navy a/c)

Ah, too bad. I think such decisions influencing the long-term policy of a service branch are quite important for the technical development, so I try to learn as much about them as possible when the opportunity presents itself. Still interesting even without a source, though 

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## HoHun (Jun 19, 2008)

Hi Koolkitty,

>Roll rate is also an important component in maneuverability (in many ways more important than turning ability) and was something the Zero was lacking in. (particularly at high speeds) (though the Ki 43 is a different story)

Hm, do you have any data on the Ki-43 roll rate? I believe I haven't seen anything in this regard yet.

As far as the A6M roll rate is concerned, note that the NACA chart does not indicate a stick force for the A6M, so it's difficult to compare this graph to those of the other fighters.

At low speeds, I'd expect the A6M to have a rather aerobatic roll rate as it was designed for manoeuvrability in that speed regime. Note that the ailerons had aerodynamic booster tabs that re-configured into damping tabs when the flaps were extended to keep the aircraft controllable for landing. This seems to be an expression of a design intended for unusally high roll rates. (See Robert Mikesh's "Zero", or John Deakin's article in his "Pelican's Perch" online column.)

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## renrich (Jun 19, 2008)

Obviously, the rifle caliber MG was not as well suited to take down WW2 AC as the .50 cal or the various cannon. I can't remember the exact number but the RAF determined that a certain number of 303 rounds had to hit a bomber to bring it down which with a two second burst which meant that they needed 8 guns with a certain rate of fire. Seems like it was around 161 hits. My point is that if Bob Johnson had been flying a liquid cooled engined fighter rather than a P47 in his famous flight where the FW sprayed him with rifle caliber rounds in several firing passes, he probably would not have made it home because his coolant would have leaked out. If one reads Lundstrom, "The First Team," the Wildcat fighter pilots learned that a Zero on their tail, if he had run out of 20 mm rds, did not pose a great threat. It was called the "pin cushion" tactic. They would not have felt that way if their engine had been liquid cooled.


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## John Davies (Jun 19, 2008)

As well as preference, there is also the question of availability. American engine builders produced a whole series of excellent, sturdy, reliable, high-powered radial engines. But they did not produce an inline equivalent of the Merlin until Packard started building them under licence. The closest, the Allison, was a decent engine at low to medium levels, but tended to run out of breath higher up, and was not a real rival to the Merlin, the Griffon, or indeed the Daimler-Benz or Jumo series of inline power plants. 

So American airframe builders designed to use the engines which were available from American engine builders. The results were usually very successful. The question of what was available (quickly, under war conditions, without a long development and gestation period) almost certainly had more influence than any purely theoretical considerations.

On a seperate but related point, by late war, rifle-calibre machine guns were indeed considered quite ineffective. According to Brown, some FAA Seafire pilots did not use theirs, for this reason, and were occasionally required to explain, in official returns, why not.

As for the general question of carrier fighter design, my opinion is that we did not produce a good carrier fighter until the Sea Fury, which came on the scene very late. The Seafire was an effective aircraft in the air, but a horribly fragile aircraft to deckland. 

It demanded considerable precision on the approach, because with its low wing loading (especially when returning from a sortie with empty tanks), it could easily float over the wires and into the barrier. Just when you needed to see exactly what you were doing, that big engine would block all view of the deck. The hook was placed under the rear fuselage in the Merlin-engined Seafires, not right at the tail as in American designs. This was a consequence of the Spitfire airframe's chronic centre-of-gravity problem (Jeff Quill explains this very clearly in "Spitfire"), but it did mean it was easier to fail to pick up the wires than with an American aircraft. Panels which were slightly bent out of shape due to poor shipboard maintenance conditions could begin to vibrate, giving a false impression of a pre-stall buffet when in fact airspeed was still comfortably above the stall, making the pilot reluctant to reduce speed, and thus setting the aircraft up for a float. The ASI was not positioned so as to easily allow a quick glance. All things considered, it is a tribute to the pilots that the Seafire deck-landing accident rate was not higher than it was.

One FAA pilot said he liked the instrument panel layout of American aircraft, and in contrast considered many British panel designs looked as if they had been laid out by the office charwoman!

This was a consequence, of course, of the pre-war situation. RN Admirals who were mostly interested in battleships, and naval aviation under the control of the RAF, which saw it very much as a side-line, and devoted its efforts to land-based designs. Why do you think we were so glad to use so many Wildcats, Hellcats, and Corsairs? 

Indeed, the FAA took the Corsair to sea before the USN considered it ready, and learned to tame it, basically because at that point the FAA was absolutely desperate for anything that would fly, fight, and had a decent performance. And BTW if you read Hanson's "Carrier Fighter", you'll see the FAA developed a considerable affection for the "bent-winged bast*rd" ! But that's another story, and posssibly a bit off-topic for this thread.


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## HoHun (Jun 19, 2008)

Hi Renrich,

>My point is that if Bob Johnson had been flying a liquid cooled engined fighter rather than a P47 in his famous flight where the FW sprayed him with rifle caliber rounds in several firing passes, he probably would not have made it home because his coolant would have leaked out. 

If an attacker can aim at his leisure at point-blank range at a defenseless target flying straight and level without any defensive manoeuvring ... maybe, but that's hardly representative of typical WW2 air combat.

>the Wildcat fighter pilots learned that a Zero on their tail, if he had run out of 20 mm rds, did not pose a great threat. It was called the "pin cushion" tactic. They would not have felt that way if their engine had been liquid cooled.

Oh, well - that's a guess about a feeling ... you'll probably admit that this is not really the genuine scientific approach 

I believe that there might be data around somewhere that could help us to get a more reliable impression of engine survivability. Loss rates of differently engined aircraft types under comparable conditions ... that's a much better way towards an accurate assessment than anecdotes.

So far, I've not seen any actual data on radial vs. inline engine survivability, and unfortunately conventional wisdom and myth are hard to tell apart in the absence of data.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## renrich (Jun 19, 2008)

It may not meet your standards of statistical evidence but at the 1944 fighter conference, a large group of service and company test pilots and there were British pilots present voted on which American engines inspired the most confidence-79% voted R2800, 17% voted Merlin, 1% voted V1710. Quote from "America's One hundred Thousand" "There is no question pilots worried about vulnerability of cooling systems in liquid cooled engines especially in the face of heavy fire directed at them during ground attack missions." Look at the coolant radiator assembly in the P51, how large it is and where it is located with no protection and remember that most hits on an AC either from the ground or from the air took place in the after part of the AC (because of not enough lead.) Couple that with all the coolant lines running to the engine. One 30 cal ball round either hitting a coolant line or that radiator can put that engine out of action. Look at the statistics of the P51 losses in Korea flying air to ground missions versus those of the F4Us and ADs. Look at a cutaway of the P38 and plot the area of fragile, unprotected and essential cooling parts versus that of a P47. I hope one does not need to be a statistician to intuitvely grasp which aircraft is most vulnerable to enemy fire.


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## John Davies (Jun 19, 2008)

You are absolutely right, air-cooled radial engines were more resistant to damage than liquid-cooled inlines. The problem was that they also had more drag, which meant higher power was needed to achieve the same level of performance, which meant higher fuel consumption. So while an airframe designed for an inline could in theory be adapted for a radial, the result was likely to be either degraded performance or reduced range or both. 

Hawkers did some design studies about fitting the Hercules to a Hurricane airframe, in case the supply of Merlins was interrupted by bombing of the factories, but took it no further than the drawing-board. I don’t think they built a prototype. A series of Lancasters fitted with the Hercules showed no worthwhile improvement in performance over the Merlin-based marks, in spite of the higher nominal horsepower of the Hercules.

The solution, of course, is to make the whole airframe bigger, so you finish up with a fighter the size of a P-47 or a Hellcat, which can both absorb the power of a big radial, and carry the necessary tankage. Here American designers had a great advantage over their European counterparts. 

Aircraft like the Spitfire, Hurricane and Bf-109 were designed with no practical knowledge of what their combat environment was likely to be. Indeed, around 1936, any kind of high-performance monoplane was a huge innovation for most fighter squadrons. By the time the USA came into the war, they had at least had the opportunity to observe for two years how things were working out in practice, and to draw the necessary conclusions.


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## kool kitty89 (Jun 19, 2008)

If you also look at the (late) pre war US aircraft, most are radial engines up to the advent of the V-1710. For fighter designs, predominantly the R-1820 and R-1830. This includes the only operational "modern" monoplane fighters in service up to 1940. (prior to the P-40 being introduced) For the USAAC the P-36 was their highest performance fighter. (the P-35 behind that) And the Navy had the F2A, the F4F soon superceding it around the same time the P-40 was introduced)


And you also have to remember that the Hercules engines used on RAF bombers had significantly porrer altitude performance than the contemporary Merlins used on the same design. (even though the low altitude rated merlins Merlins)


And the problem with the V-1710 being that it was designed to be either used in low-medium altitude aplications, or with turbocharging. (the only production fighter to use such being the P-38 ) With which it was quite compeditive with the Merlin, but not all designs could practically adapted incorporate such a sustem though. (the P-51 probably could have been modified to use a turbo, but switching to the Merlin was far simpler)

Eventually the folly in ignoring conventional supercharging for high alt aplications (an AAC policy) was realized and was developed for the Allison, first being a simple 2-stage (auxiliary) supercharger being added to the excessories section, with no intercooler. The first of these types were available in small numbers farily early after the US entrance in the war (in early 1942) and were used experimentally, notably on the XP-39E/XP-76 design. And later utilized on the P-63, the P-63's engine (while still lacking an intercooler) encorporated Water injection which boosted WEP form 1,500 hp to 1,800 hp. Similar engines were used experimentally on the XP-40Q and XP-51J.
Finally more advanced engines were introduced with improved 2-stage supercharging with intercooling. These were used on late model P-63's and some experimental designs, but didn't see service with the US durring WWII.


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## HoHun (Jun 19, 2008)

Hi Renrich,

>It may not meet your standards of statistical evidence but at the 1944 fighter conference, a large group of service and company test pilots and there were British pilots present voted on which American engines inspired the most confidence-79% voted R2800, 17% voted Merlin, 1% voted V1710. 

It's certainly interesting in showing that the good reputation of radial engines was in fact already established during WW2. However, of course it doesn't tell us if they were any more survivable in combat.

>One 30 cal ball round either hitting a coolant line or that radiator can put that engine out of action. 

Rifle-calibre rounds were found to be badly lacking effectiveness in actual combat - both as fixed forward firing armament and as flexible defensive armament.

One .30 ball round might be able to put an liquid cooled engine out of action, but the actual combat experience shows that this was so unlikely to happen that the rifle-calibre machine turned out to be a rather poor weapon.

That means that the liquid-cooled engine practically proved to be rather insensitive against rifle-calibre fire in actual air-to-air combat. The theoretically assumed vulnerability did not translate into a practically relevant factor in air-to-air combat.

(Rifle-calibre machine guns were mostly used in the surface-to-air role because they were available on the battlefield for other purposes, so no similar observation is possible for surface-to-air combat.)

>Look at the statistics of the P51 losses in Korea flying air to ground missions versus those of the F4Us and ADs. 

Hey, actual statistics? Where can I find them? 

>Look at a cutaway of the P38 and plot the area of fragile, unprotected and essential cooling parts versus that of a P47. I hope one does not need to be a statistician to intuitvely grasp which aircraft is most vulnerable to enemy fire.

It's easy to see how one might arrive at the impression that the radial is a more survivable engine, but that doesn't mean that first impression will be realistic.

The survivability advantages of the sturdily-built B-17 over the B-24 with its thin, flexible wing and the constantly leaking gasoline lines in its bomb bay are just as obvious - and yet, if you look at the actual combat results, the B-24 was more survivable than the B-17, albeit only by a small margin. Similarly, the advantages of the robust landing gear of the Fw 190 over the flimsy construction of the Me 109's appears obvious, but again a look at the available data sets shows that this had no discernible impact on accident rate or maintenance status of the operational units.

I'd not be suprised if the reputed survivability advantage of the radial engine would be far less important than the books repeating the WW2 pilot opinion would have us believe. We shouldn't forget that due to the larger frontal area of the radial engine, it's more susceptible to damage after all - great if the radial can come home with a cylinder shot away, but if we take into account that the same flak shell might have missed the smaller inline engine altogether, which engine really holds the advantage?

(Maybe all of this should go into the current "engine survivability thread"?)

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## kool kitty89 (Jun 20, 2008)

The radial may be larger in diameter, but is far shorter than an inline, and the vulnerablie areas are simply spread out differently. Obvioulsy when comparing a large engine like the R-2800 to the Merlin etc, it will be more extreme, but for a more comperable engine like the R-1830 Twin Wasp it's a bit different.

But this discussion belons more in the thread Ho Hun mentioned perviously in the P-40E vs F4F-3 thread. http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/engines/engine-survivability-13581.html


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## Glider (Jun 20, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Hi Renrich,
> 
> >
> I'd not be suprised if the reputed survivability advantage of the radial engine would be far less important than the books repeating the WW2 pilot opinion would have us believe. We shouldn't forget that due to the larger frontal area of the radial engine, it's more susceptible to damage after all - great if the radial can come home with a cylinder shot away, but if we take into account that the same flak shell might have missed the smaller inline engine altogether, which engine really holds the advantage?



I think the difference is that the frontal area of a large proportion of the in lines is similar to the Radial when you include the frontal area of the cooling system. Typhoon and P40's are two first class examples, late P38's are another and those such as the Mossie had a lower frontal area but looked at from above have a larger cross section than a radial.
The cooling systesm was very vulnerable to any small piece of flak, debris or small calibre bullet.


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## John Davies (Jun 20, 2008)

Air-to-air combat was a dangerous occupation, but ground attack against massed light flak was plain murder. Hanson, in "Carrier Fighter", writes of carrying out ground attack missions in his Corsair, against well-defended Japanese airfields, at a height between five and ten feet. One new pilot simply could not make it, and kept ballooning up to about thirty feet (low enough, in all conscience). He was killed on his first sortie. In contrast, Hanson seems to treat his unit's few encounters with Japanese aircaft in the air as light relief; opportunities for some entertaining target practice.

I'd expect the vulnerability of a liquid-cooled engine to be far more important in ground attack than in fighter vs fighter combat. It might be possible to establish a fairly accurate comparison here. Does anyone know the comparative attrition rates of Typhoons and P-47s on ground attack duties in Northern France in 1944? Same enemy, similar duties, one aircooled engine, one liquid-cooled. I confess I do not have the figures; but they'd certainly be interesting if anyone does.


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## kool kitty89 (Jun 20, 2008)

The arrangement of the cooling system, radiator, and oil cooler on the P-40 (seen above) is one of the best on liquid cooled-engined fighter designs in the war with the entire group packed under the engine making a very small target, the entire vulnerable engine area is limited to the immidiate vicinity of the engine, unlike other designs with long cooling kines running to spread out (wing or belly mounted) radiators.
(and similarly the P-39.P-63, albeit inside the rear fusalage allong with the engine, but in a similarly compact layout)

THe ultimate of this bing the Il-2 with the radiator mounted directly behind the engine within the nose and heavily armored. (strangely the oil cooler was mounted in a very vulnerably position on the belly, something finally corrected in the Il-10)


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## renrich (Jun 20, 2008)

Interesting that all this discussion of vulnerability of engines leaves out the german BMW radials versus the liquid cooled DBs. JD, you make some excellent observations. However, earlier you intimated that the FAA solved the problems of operating the Corsair off of carriers before the USN. Perhaps you did not mean it exactly as I have stated but that is a myth. If one examines the chronology of the Corsair history, the FAA did not even get any Corsairs to familiarise with at Quonset Point, RI, much less deploy on carriers, until after the USN had identified and pretty much rectified the various factors which hampered the early Corsairs. By the time that was done the preparations to deploy Hellcats on carriers were already well underway so the Corsair with it's superior performance was delayed in use on carriers for about a year. As far as radials being less apt to succumb to battle damage because of the absence of the liquid cooling system. I have been a homebuilder since 1962. I don't need statistical evidence for me to know that a single family or multi family residence is more likely to burn down because of external causes if it has a wood shingle roof than if it has a fire resistant composition roof. To me, that is a direct analogy. As far as Mustang losses in Korea, I have read that somewhere but won't bother to try to find the exact source. I have a golf course to explore. Pinon Hills in Farmington, NM. Supposed to be one of the best public courses in the US.


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## JoeB (Jun 20, 2008)

see next


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## JoeB (Jun 20, 2008)

renrich said:


> As far as radials being less apt to succumb to battle damage because of the absence of the liquid cooling system.
> 
> As far as Mustang losses in Korea, I have read that somewhere but won't bother to try to find the exact source.


It is intuitive that liquid cooled planes would generally have higher loss rates, the question is how much.

On F-51 and F4U in Korea, suprisingly there isn't AFAIK an accurate complete tally of F4U sorties. The standard stat of F-51 is 341 combat losses (almost all to AA or unknown/flying into terrain counted as 'combat') in 62,607 combat sorties, .54%, quoted in McLaren "Mustangs over Korea", among other places.

But here's a more micro comparison adding up sorties and losses from the monthly and semi-annual reprots of the 4 Marine F4U sdns in Korea early in the war, using August and September 1950, the most intense period of combat in the first phase of the war. They lost 10 F4U's in action in 3,170 total combat sorties, .32%. In same two months 36 F-51's were lost to AA and 4 to 'enemy action unk' in 9,688 'effective' sorties (FEAF Monthly Summary Dec 1950), .41%. It's higher but not dramatically so. The total war F-51 loss rate was higher than early war rate because enemy AA became more formidable in the static phase of the war later on. Different statistic keeping (which sorties and losses to count as combat) might affect the above comparison somewhat.

The big discrepancy in loss rates in Korea was between jets and props. The F-80's total combat loss rate was only .15%, and even excluding air superiority missions early in the war, still a lot less. That was also the comparison that F-80 pilots were accurately predicting when forced to convert back to F-51's early in the war, their reluctance often quoted. The same thing was seen in F9F v naval props, perhaps they were more rugged than piston planes, but most obviously they simply moved faster and were therefore harder to hit for the AA typically encountered.

Another thing to remember though is that the F4U had a significantly higher loss rate to AA than the F6F in apples v apples carrier operations in 1945 as has been discussed before, it wasn't the best example of rugged radial plane.

Another set of stats to put air v liquid cooled in some context is a USN loss survey for Sept '44-Aug 45, single engine radial losses (not all fighters). Overall 501 a/c were hit and 193 of them lost. 23 of 37 hit in the engine were lost, of course air cooled in all cases ("WWII Fighter Conflict" by Price, p.59). So, even an increase to 37 out of 37 wouldn't have affected the overall losses much in that sample. Of course a plane like the P-51 had a cooling system which substantially increased the area of the 'engine incl cooling system' compared to a radial, so the 37 could also have gone up, but still the impact on overall losses might not be dramatic.

On F4F 'pin cushion' tactic, that's mentioned in enough places, sourced back to quotes and reports of the time, to be more than an 'anecdote'. OTOH in that case like most there isn't a set of rigorous scientific statistics establishing the exact effect of such a tactic, or how much such a tactic explains of the substantial superiority in realworld (w/ everything as it was, not 'woulda shoulda coulda') combat effectiveness F4F's displayed over P-40's, v Zeroes, in 1942.

Joe


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## renrich (Jun 21, 2008)

JB, Good stuff in your post. other factors that might affect the stats are, did Marine and Navy pilots press their attacks lower and longer because their operations were more dedicated or trained for ground support than AF pilots and did prop plane pilots do likewise because of having more fuel endurance and because of slower speeds and maneuverability issues? I was under the impression that Marine and Navy pilots flew the majority of ground support missions in the early going in Korea.


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## JoeB (Jun 21, 2008)

renrich said:


> JB, Good stuff in your post. other factors that might affect the stats are, did Marine and Navy pilots press their attacks lower and longer because their operations were more dedicated or trained for ground support than AF pilots and did prop plane pilots do likewise because of having more fuel endurance and because of slower speeds and maneuverability issues? I was under the impression that Marine and Navy pilots flew the majority of ground support missions in the early going in Korea.


Strike altitude and tactics (especially whether planes went back for multiple runs on the *same target*, a proven good way to get shot down) is a potential issue in comparing ground strike loss rates between any different air arms, I agree. The same would potentially be true comparing Typhoon and P-47 loss rates as someone suggested.

But, non-rigorously but reading a lot of original combat reports I don't see evidence of a big difference there between naval services and AF early in the Korean War. Both tended to raise altitudes later in the war to keep losses under control against proliferating Communist AA. The same was actually true in 9th AF in WWII, too high losses resulted in more closely enforced instructions to stay higher. Very low altitude strafing wasn't viable day after day against field forces well equipped with AAA.

Marine air in Korea was always on a smaller scale than AF. I'm not comparing Navy air because their mission profiles tended to be different on average, whereas Marine F4U and F-51 tasking was pretty similar (in fact later on 1st Marine Air Wing was under the operational control of 5th AF and F4U and F-51tasking was pretty much identical). Early on, the Marine task organization for close support was superior (and well publicized in the press, as Marine successes often are); in terms of coordination but what F4U's and F-51's were trying to do was pretty similar. Also as you suggested early criticism (ca. July 1950) of AF close support was also because it was mainly performed by F-80's which had limited payload and little endurance over the battlefield, being based in Japan. By August-September the 5th AF had converted more sdns back to F-51's, based in Korea. However later on F-80's were based in Korea, carried similar payloads to F-51's, and F-80 losses were still a lot lower. Also, at least some Communist POW's voiced the opinion F-80's were more effective because there was less warning of their approach.

Joe


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## John Davies (Jun 21, 2008)

Renrich, thanks for your comments. A comparison between the surviveability of inline and radial-engined German fighters would be interesting. The reason I suggested comparing the attrition rates of the P-47 and the Typhoon in Northern France in 1944 is that it is as close as one can get to an “other things being equal” test; similar duties, same enemy, different type of power plant. If anyone has the figures, I’d be very interested.

I agree with you that a liquid-cooled power plant intuitively ought to be more vulnerable; all those radiators and pipes just waiting for something to cut them. My suspicion (and I confess it is no more than that) is that this was much more of a factor in ground attack than fighter-vs-fighter combat. 

There is probably a simple reason for this. In fighter-vs-fighter combat, the vast majority of rounds fired missed. Johnnie Johnson, in his autobiography “Wing Leader”, expressed a low opinion of Fighter Command gunnery. He considered the average pilot was capable of bringing off a no-deflection shot from dead astern at medium range, but could not be relied upon to achieve anything more demanding. In his opinion, except in the case of a few good marksmen, deflection shooting was largely a waste of time. 

This may be the reason why there were so few aces. Admittedly, Johnson raises this in the context of a conversation with Beurling, who was an exceptional marksman, but it does give pause for thought. In typical English country style, Johnson suggests shooting for the pot with a twelve-bore was excellent training for a fighter pilot. He says that someone who could “bring down a curling widgeon in the dusk” would have no trouble hitting an enemy aircraft!

I suppose the reasons are pretty simple. A fighter pilot had to concentrate on a lot more than just shooting. He also had to fly his own aircraft, (a fairly high workload in itself) and most important of all, pay attention to not getting shot down himself. In contrast, a ground-based gunner simply had to lay off his deflection and let fly. Even if the relative speeds were much faster, so he did not have long to aim at a small, fast-moving target, it still looks like an easier task. Also, there were often an awful lot of them. Bob Stanford Tuck hated flying against light flak. He considered that a lone fighter had a fair chance against one light flak emplacement, little against two, and this was how he was shot down in 1942. I do not know what he would have thought of the massed batteries both the Germans and Japanese used to defend airfields late in the war. 

Turning to the Corsair, I admit I do not know its full development history, so your comments are very interesting. Thanks. 

I do recommend “Carrier Fighter” by Norman Hanson, if you can get hold of a copy. It is a quite splendid book. Hanson flew with one of the FAA Corsair squadrons. Although much of their work was appallingly dangerous, it is clear he was an aggressive optimist, and coped well. Mind, if you were not an aggressive optimist, I suppose you would not be a fighter pilot. He absolutely loved flying this big powerful brute of an aircraft.

At the end of the war he and his fellow-pilots were planning to take their carrier’s entire air wing of Corsairs in formation under the Sydney harbour bridge. They reckoned that compared with the sort of thing they had been doing on a daily basis on operations, this would be dead easy. Senior brass got wind of it, and threatened mass court-martials, so they never did. Pity about that. 

Hanson mentions two problems with the early Corsairs; a low canopy which unduly restricted vision, later replaced by something much better, (and the FAA certainly had some of those early canopied aircraft, I’ve seen pictures), and an undercarriage with too much bounce in it, necessitating a modification to the oleos. My impression from Hanson is that neither problem was fully solved by the time the FAA took its first Corsairs into action, but they were sorted shortly afterwards. 

I’m quite prepared to accept that the USN had solved most of the Corsair’s problems fairly early on, but delayed taking them to sea. But there is a whole world of difference between solving problems under test conditions, and trying the beast out under operational conditions and finding out how it works in such an environment. 

I don’t think the FAA deserves especial credit for commissioning the Corsair for carrier operations before the USN. The FAA had a very powerful incentive. Desperation. The FAA had a very urgent need for adequate numbers of high-performance aircraft, and would basically take anything and everything that would fly and fight.

Desperation was also the reason for the Seafire. The Merlin 32 powered LIIC, and the FIII and LIII, both powered by versions of the Merlin 55, were very effective aircraft in the air. Combat reports show they were more than a match for most of their opponents, both Japanese and German, and were even just about a match for the Fw190. But it was an absolutely horrible carrier aircraft. Take the difficulties of deck landing it, making accidents more likely than with aircraft properly designed for carrier operations. (Which I’ve covered in detail in another post). Add the fact that when an accident did occur, the Seafire’s comparatively fragile structure was much more likely to sustain severe damage than, for instance, one of the products of the Grumman Ironworks. It was basically an aircraft that should never have been taken to sea, and would not have been, if British industry had produced a credible alternative in adequate numbers. For that we had to wait for the Sea Fury. 

And that, as everyone knows, is because the FAA entered WW2 with some good carriers, more building, and no high-performance naval aircraft whatsoever. As a piece of purely mutton-headed thick-witted “planning”, that takes some beating!


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## renrich (Jun 21, 2008)

JD, good stuff in your post, again. What you are saying about poor marksmanship by fighter pilots is, I suspect, the rule rather than the exception. The USN pilots were exposed to a lot more gunnery training, especially full deflection shooting, than probably any other flyers. Just like with wing shooting, though, some have the aptitude for it and many don't. That poor marksmanship is the very reason, I believe, that a radial engined airplane was somewhat less likely to sustain crippling damage than the other liquid cooled engine AC. During the BOB, I would bet that the HE111s brought down, especially because of the rifle caliber weapons used by the Brits, succumbed often to damage to the cooling systems of the inline engines. If the British pilot got lucky, one 303 ball round, in the right place could put an engine out of use, even if the pilot was a poor shot and could not hit the enemy with the prescribed number of bullets that statistics dictated. Re, Corsair, the fifth production Corsair, in Nov. 42, has the seat raised and a new canopy fitted. Those changes are implemented on the 689th production AC. Sep 25, 42, initial carrier tests are performed by the 7th production AC with 4 landings made on CVE26, USS Sangamon. Problems noted are: cowl flap actuators leak, engine oil leaks from valve push rods, forward view is poor, AC bounces on landing and swings because low tail wheel puts flaps close to deck. June 1, 1943, RN squadron #1830 is formed at Quonset Pt RI using Corsair Is. July 15, 1943, VF17 is aboard the new carrier, Bunker Hill with F4U1s, for it's shakedown cruise, they are promised the new raised cockpit F4Us upon return to Norfolk. As you can see the USN already had a full squadron operating off a carrier only 45 days after the RN began familiarising it self with F4Us off a land base. The problem was that even though a fix for the problems was found in short order, it took a while for that fix to become incorporated into the production line. As you said, the RN and the USN were desperate to get the airplanes into the fight and they had to make do with early production AC and with field modifications. How would it have been to have been the pilot of that first F4U with it's deck landing problems lining up for that first landing on that tiny CVE flight deck? I bet his A-hole was puckered up so tight you couldn't drive a hat pin up it with a sledge hammer!


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## HoHun (Jun 22, 2008)

Hi Glider,

>I think the difference is that the frontal area of a large proportion of the in lines is similar to the Radial when you include the frontal area of the cooling system. 

Good point, and interesting picture!  I have actually toyed with the thought of measuring out areas of comparable fighters' systems in threeviews, but I'm afraid I don't really have sufficiently detailed threeviews.

>The cooling systesm was very vulnerable to any small piece of flak, debris or small calibre bullet.

That small calibre bullets were generally considered ineffective shows that this was not a significant vulnerability in air-to-air-combat at least.

I'd agree with John that air-to-ground actions might have a different threat profile. However, bomber defensive guns would tend to face the attacker at similar aspects as ground-based guns, and small-calibre bullets were considered ineffective in that role, too.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## HoHun (Jun 22, 2008)

Hi Renrich,

>I don't need statistical evidence for me to know that a single family or multi family residence is more likely to burn down because of external causes if it has a wood shingle roof than if it has a fire resistant composition roof. To me, that is a direct analogy.

I don't doubt the cause-effect relationship between a piercing hit by a rifle-calibre bullet on the cooling system and the resultant loss of the engine 

However, the question really is how likely it was to achieve such a piercing hit with a rifle-calibre bullet. The historical answer is: so unlikely that the warring parties gave up on trying, and replaced the rifle-calibre guns with heavy machine guns or even cannon wherever possible.

It's possible that the heavier guns used had a higher chance of achieving that critical piercing hit so that the cooling system was indeed a significant area of vulnerability again, but lacking data, we can't tell for sure. (I just point this out to avoid the impression I consider the cooling system invulnerable - it most definitely was not 

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## HoHun (Jun 22, 2008)

Hi Joeb,

>They lost 10 F4U's in action in 3,170 total combat sorties, .32%. In same two months 36 F-51's were lost to AA and 4 to 'enemy action unk' in 9,688 'effective' sorties (FEAF Monthly Summary Dec 1950), .41%. It's higher but not dramatically so. 

Thanks for the data! Food for thought there 

>Another thing to remember though is that the F4U had a significantly higher loss rate to AA than the F6F in apples v apples carrier operations in 1945 as has been discussed before, it wasn't the best example of rugged radial plane.

I didn't follow all the details of the earlier discussion, but if we'd conclude that different aircraft types of generally similar layout and technology could have significantly different survivability, that would make our task of data analysis quite a bit harder ...

>Another set of stats to put air v liquid cooled in some context is a USN loss survey for Sept '44-Aug 45, single engine radial losses (not all fighters). Overall 501 a/c were hit and 193 of them lost. 23 of 37 hit in the engine were lost, of course air cooled in all cases ("WWII Fighter Conflict" by Price, p.59).

Ah, that's interesting - while liquid engines are not mentioned, the statistics seem to illustrate (my conclusion) that the majority of losses were caused by damage to vulnerable systems shared by liquid-cooled and air-cooled engines. With Price' table in front of you, would you say this conclusion is justified?

>On F4F 'pin cushion' tactic, that's mentioned in enough places, sourced back to quotes and reports of the time, to be more than an 'anecdote'. 

The anecdotal nature is due to the pilots who did not survive flying in the sights of a Zero for a prolonged time did not come back to have the 7.7 mm holes counted. (It would be interesting to know the number of holes in the machines that made it back, though.)

>how much such a tactic explains of the substantial superiority in realworld

Flying straight and allowing yourself to be shot at? I'd be delighted to see the cause-and-effect relationship of that move to a general "substantial" combat superiority explained 

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## HoHun (Jun 22, 2008)

Hi Renrich,

>The USN pilots were exposed to a lot more gunnery training, especially full deflection shooting, than probably any other flyers. Just like with wing shooting, though, some have the aptitude for it and many don't. 

From Clay Tice and MF Kirby, who flew USAAF P-40 and P-400 (P-39) respectively early in the war, I heard that they gunnery training was almost non-existent, with one of the two mentioning that his only training consisted in strafing a raft anchored off-shore - while flying in close formation with the wing leader, wich almost precluded aimed fire.

If that's typical for USAAF training early in the war, the better combat results achieved by the US Navy with rigorous gunnery training would seem to come as no surprise ...

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## renrich (Jun 22, 2008)

Henning, I have quoted Lundstrom, "The First Team," on several occasions. You owe it to yourself to try to get a copy. I am positive you would get much out of it. He goes into much detail about the USN pilot and gunnery training. As far as I know, that book is the best researched and most authoritative one on that particular subject(USN fighters, first six months of the war) available. Example: he makes a real attempt to match the kills by both sides to the extent of naming the IJN and USN pilot. I never really understood the implications of full deflection shooting until I read his book(the second time.)


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## HoHun (Jun 22, 2008)

Hi Renrich,

>Henning, I have quoted Lundstrom, "The First Team," on several occasions. You owe it to yourself to try to get a copy. 

Is the exact title "First Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway"? Seems it is out of print, but I'll keep my eyes peeled! (I just closed another gap in my collection when I purchased a copy of Brown's "Wings of the Navy" last Friday ...)

>I never really understood the implications of full deflection shooting until I read his book(the second time.)

Well, what are the implications? Now you've roused my curiosity! 

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## renrich (Jun 22, 2008)

That is the correct title. There is a second volume entitled. "The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign," that pretty much finishes the year 1942. He was supposed to be working on a third book which would be a continuation but it has not been published. The implications of full deflection shooting which he says was only taught in any detail by the USN of all the airforces were many. He also points out that some ETO pilots mastered deflection shooting on their own and used it to good effect. Full deflection shooting was mainly used against enemy bombers because it gave the defensive gunners almost impossible firing solutions. However once it was mastered it gave the pilot a lot of confidence in any type of firing run. It was time consuming to learn which is one reason it was not taught in detail by other air forces and it required a certain amount of visibility over the nose which most European and USAAF fighters did not have. In following his diagrams I had my wrists all twisted up trying to understand the maneuvers of a full deflection firing run(which means that at the moment of opening fire your nose is pointed at 90 degrees to the flight path of the target) He also goes into detail about the training of the USN pilot before and during the war as well as the IJN pilot. Both books are a good read, very detailed and authenticated. Some on this forum are familiar with the books. I wish that all the members who are biased toward the point of view that the ETO was the "only war" could read them.


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## John Davies (Jun 23, 2008)

Slightly away from the main course of the discussion, but worth mentioning....

Welcome to the official web site for the Fleet Air Arm Museum


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## renrich (Jun 23, 2008)

JD, if memory serves the RN in WW1 had one of the better fighters in the war, the Sopwith Triplane.


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## John Davies (Jun 23, 2008)

Renrich yes, we did. And in WW1 we also had all sorts of interesting innovations coming in at an enormous rate. Like flying-off platforms on the turrets of capital ships, short flying-off platforms on lighters towed by destroyers (head into 15 knots of wind at about 30 knots giving a total of 45 and with an aircraft with a low stalling speed you just wind it up and go!), plus a great deal more besides.

Then after the war the RN was run by admirals who were mostly interested in developing new and better battleships, and naval aviation was put in the hands of the RAF, who for different reasons also saw it very much as a sideline, so as a result we went into WW2 with NO high-performance naval aircraft at all.

I can't help thinking you organised things better in the USA!


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## John Davies (Jun 23, 2008)

Coming back to the inline vs radial debate, it’s surely important to remember that this was only ONE factor. It’s easy to concentrate on it, because it is tangible and obvious. But other factors, including intangible ones, may be more important. Precisely because they are intangible, and therefore hard to put numbers to, they may be ignored. But they could still be overwhelmingly important.

Training, tactics, good leadership, even high morale, can all make a huge difference to casualty rates. And above all adaptability and the ability to learn FAST, because tactics as taught in training sometimes proved to be either ineffective or even suicidal in real combat. This means not being hidebound, and being prepared to throw the rule-book away if it wasn’t working. Some leaders had the courage of their convictions, and did what worked, whether it was "authorised procedure" or not. Others did not, and stuck to the book.

For instance, in “Carrier Fighter”, Hanson describes the standard ground-attack with guns doctrine as they were taught. Approach in a shallow dive, pull out into a low firing pass, then pull up slightly and depart the area. As he says, against the very heavy light AA defences of many Japanese airfields, this would have been suicide, for two reasons. Firstly, Japanese light AA was very effective and aggressive. Secondly, it is hard to judge the pull-out with enough accuracy. When a high-performance monoplane pulls out, for a brief distance it will “mush”; i.e its attitude may be level or even slightly nose-up, but its trajectory will briefly continue downwards. Pull out too high and you make a lovely target; pull out too low and you mush into the ground. Either way you are probably dead.

So they developed a new technique, of taking their Corsairs in fast and very very low indeed, and this seemed to work. And don’t ever go back for a second pass. Typhoons in Northern France seem to have developed similar techniques. There were many accounts of them coming back with quite large bits of foliage embedded in the leading edges. That thick wing may have been draggy, but it was very strong! 

By the way, I’ve seen a video clip of a Spitfire “mushing” into the ground at a display. It is very distressing to watch, so I will not give the URL. 

Now of course there were attempts made to feed back the lessons of combat into operational training. Pilots were sometimes “rested” by being posted to an operational training unit to educate the next generation. But the system was not perfect. 

For instance, I’ve read the autobiography of an FAA pilot who flew Swordfish under extremely demanding conditions, until he was basically burned out. (Hunting U-Boats off very small escort carriers in the north Atlantic winter, usually in appalling weather conditions, out of sight of the convoy, with primitive and unreliable homing aids). He was posted to head an OTU equipped with Barracudas, a very different type of aircraft indeed. As he was the first to admit, he did not do a very good job there.

For myself, I’d rather have flown an inline-engined aircraft in a squadron that was well led and used effective tactics, than a radial engined aircraft in a squadron which was not.


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## drgondog (Jun 23, 2008)

renrich said:


> That is the correct title. There is a second volume entitled. "The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign," that pretty much finishes the year 1942. He was supposed to be working on a third book which would be a continuation but it has not been published. The implications of full deflection shooting which he says was only taught in any detail by the USN of all the airforces were many. He also points out that some ETO pilots mastered deflection shooting on their own and used it to good effect. Full deflection shooting was mainly used against enemy bombers because it gave the defensive gunners almost impossible firing solutions. However once it was mastered it gave the pilot a lot of confidence in any type of firing run. It was time consuming to learn which is one reason it was not taught in detail by other air forces and it required a certain amount of visibility over the nose which most European and USAAF fighters did not have. In following his diagrams I had my wrists all twisted up trying to understand the maneuvers of a full deflection firing run(which means that at the moment of opening fire your nose is pointed at 90 degrees to the flight path of the target) He also goes into detail about the training of the USN pilot before and during the war as well as the IJN pilot. Both books are a good read, very detailed and authenticated. Some on this forum are familiar with the books. I wish that all the members who are biased toward the point of view that the ETO was the "only war" could read them.



Rich - the USN probably was better organized for aerial gunnery training pre-WWII. Having said that the USAAF realized that they needed to start doing so and formed the first training propgrams in June 1941.

The initial training ranged from shooting skeet to movie projections - both distinctly lacking in stick and rudder co-ordination. It wasn't until early 1942 that Advanced training on tow targets for both fighter pilots and gunners were a standard part of the training and only in mid 1942 did the USAAF integrate RAF training into Operational theatres - especially for 8th AF.

Nobody graduated from Advanced as a Fighter pilot by mid 1943 w/o passing the aerial Gunnery program. IIRC correctly ~10% was the minimum passing grade for the high deflection tests.

In early 1944 the frangible bullet technology for ballistics and safety made it feasible to shoot at modified 'real a/c' starting with the A-20 and then by August 1944 - the TP-63 - but the K-14 was also being installed along with computing gunsights in the B-29 and those technologies were almost good enough to replace the actual airplane as a target in gunnery practice up to about a 45 degree deflection shot.


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## HoHun (Jun 23, 2008)

Hi Renrich,

>Full deflection shooting was mainly used against enemy bombers because it gave the defensive gunners almost impossible firing solutions. 

Hm, what exactly does he mean by "full deflection shooting"? It could apply to temporary firing solutions or to tracking shots, or (obviously  to both.

I'd tend to think that the US Navy thought of tracking shots because they were emphasized at the time, and virtually required against bombers, but temporary firing solutions (Shaw calls them snapshots, I believe) are of great value in fighter-vs.-fighter combat, especially if using a highly effective battery of four or six 12.7 mm machine guns against an unprotected target like the A6M. (Though high-deflection shots tend to attack from angles not usually protected by armour anyway.)

Of course, gunnery training has a huge impact on combat success, and a pilot trained for "full deflection" tracking shots would probably be able to apply his skills to snapshot situations, too. However, it would be interesting to know if there was a doctrine covering snapshots, too.

>I wish that all the members who are biased toward the point of view that the ETO was the "only war" could read them.

I never thought the war in Europe was the "only war", just the "only war that counted"  Only joking, of course, but I believe "Europe first" was probably the correct historical decision.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## HoHun (Jun 23, 2008)

Hi John,

>For instance, in “Carrier Fighter”, Hanson describes the standard ground-attack with guns doctrine as they were taught. Approach in a shallow dive, pull out into a low firing pass, then pull up slightly and depart the area. 

Highly interesting - in "They gave me a Seafire", Mike Crosley describes how his squadron thought up a coordinated attack scheme that would have all of the Seafires of the formation over the target at the same time, coming from different directions and making exactly one firing pass. I think they had no losses to flak when applying these tactics over Japan, though he cautiously advises that one or two of their losses to unknown causes might qualify.

By the way, Crosley's "They gave me a Seafire" (about his war years in the Fleet Air Arm) and especially his "Up in Harm's Way" (he became test pilot after the war, flying a broad range of military and civilian aircraft - and he invented the head-up display) rank high on my list of favourite books. Judging from your area of interest, I'd say you would really enjoy these, too 

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## renrich (Jun 23, 2008)

Henning, I said what I said about the members here with respect, not being critical. There is more emphasis on the ETO because many members are from Europe and there are few if any from Japan. Bill, thanks for your insight on gunnery training. As a matter of fact one of my uncles was an IP flying P39s, ugh, and P47s and he talked to me about gunnery training and the emphasis on it during the war. Interestingly his unit did their gunnery training on the Gulf Coast near Corpus. When one thinks about it I guess over the Gulf is a safe place to shoot live rds at a sleeve. He also told me that they often were jumped by F4Us while in gunnery training and his P47s stood no chance in the hassles. They could not get the Corsairs to go up real high with them. JD, I recently read a book by a Brit about the Battle of the Atlantic and he went into some detail about the difficulties the FAA had prewar as well as during the war getting good equipment. The sad thing is that, as you intimated, the RN was at the forefront of aviation combined with naval power when WW1 ended. As I remember the RN tried to utilise AC off of the Engadine during Jutland for scouting or maybe even bombing. However when the RAF took over all flying, against the strong advice of David Beatty, the FAA languished as well as Coastal Command. When WW2 began, the USN and IJN were light years ahead of the RN in most ares of naval aviation. Of course the US Army tried the same tactics of getting control of naval aviation but thoughtful heads prevailed. Even during WW2 Coastal Command and the FAA were treated like red headed step children and could not get the AC needed. An instance was the difficulty that Coastal Command had in getting VLR bombers for anti sub work. Bomber Harris said that it would detract from his bombing if a squadron or two were diverted to anti sub work. As you know the VLR patrol planes were really the antidote for the u-boat threat.


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## HoHun (Jun 23, 2008)

Hi Renrich,

>Henning, I said what I said about the members here with respect, not being critical. 

Well understood - I just couldn't resist trying to be funny 

>However when the RAF took over all flying, against the strong advice of David Beatty, the FAA languished as well as Coastal Command. 

Hm, I've just browsed into Brown's "Wings of the Navy", and he actually attributes a lack of boldness (or vision) on part of the institutions that drafted the specifications for naval aircraft for the poor state of the art in WW2. I'm not sure that this means he blames the RAF - it's my impression that the specifications were prepared by the Royal Navy, but I'll admit that I'm not really sure of that.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## JoeB (Jun 23, 2008)

HoHun said:


> >On F4F 'pin cushion' tactic, that's mentioned in enough places, sourced back to quotes and reports of the time, to be more than an 'anecdote'.
> 
> The anecdotal nature is due to the pilots who did not survive flying in the sights of a Zero for a prolonged time did not come back to have the 7.7 mm holes counted. (It would be interesting to know the number of holes in the machines that made it back, though.)
> 
> ...


I think it should be obvious, the tactic wasn't 'to fly straight and allow yourself to be shot at' but that assuming a Japanese fighter got behind you don't try to turn, exposing the cockpit (and other vital parts) to deflection shots. If energy to dive do that, otherwise skid and bob up and down but again don't turn. By early 1944 the 5th AF's tactics manual had a similar admonition for P-40's out of energy with 'Zero' on tail, but the USN/USMC apparently reached the conclusion earlier. And there weren't necessarily a lot of unknown cause loss disappearances of F4F's in the Guadacanal campaign (as Renrich suggested it might be useful to actually read about it, to try to understand some of these issues). It's beyond what I would call anecdotal.

Joe


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## HoHun (Jun 24, 2008)

Hi Joe,

>I think it should be obvious, the tactic wasn't 'to fly straight and allow yourself to be shot at' but that assuming a Japanese fighter got behind you don't try to turn, exposing the cockpit (and other vital parts) to deflection shots. 

Even assuming the F4F could be exposed to fire of that sort for a longer period than the P-40, the Wildcat's markedly inferior performance meant it would be exposed for a longer period before being able to pull away from the Zero, so I don't see any actual advantage there. I certainly don't see the cause of the "substantial" combat superiority my question actually aimed for in these "pincushion tactics" either.

>And there weren't necessarily a lot of unknown cause loss disappearances of F4F's in the Guadacanal campaign (as Renrich suggested it might be useful to actually read about it, to try to understand some of these issues). It's beyond what I would call anecdotal.

If there are statistics on the number and calibre of hits the F4Fs that went down during the Guadalcanal campaign received in that book, please quote it. Without these, I'm afraid the idea that the F4F was impervious to 7.7 mm bullets is in fact a textbook example for anecdotal information. I fully appreciate that 7.7 mm was a rather ineffective calibre in general, and I certainly believe that "pincushion tactics" were sound advice for F4F pilots who where outflown by an A6M, cannon shells or not, but I don't think we even have clear evidence that the durability of the F4F was above average, much less that its survivability was a war winning attribute that made up for its inferior performance.

If you'd ask me for the likely reason of the good results of the USN's F4F units, I'd suggest that the extensive gunnery training as well as the realization that they would be up against an opponent dissimilar to their own fighters - which lead to the development of cooperative tactics to counter a superior enemy - are high on the list of suspects.

I think the good combat results of the P-40-equipped American Volunteer Group, which was based on Chennault's accurate analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the Japanese aircraft, show that the P-40 was able to achieve similarly good results against the Ki-43, which had characteristics comparable to the A6M even if it lacked the latter's cannon armament.

However, while the Navy adjusted their tactics according to the information they had about the A6M, the USAAF seem to have ignored Chennault's findings ...

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Glider (Jun 24, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Hi Renrich,
> 
> >Henning, I said what I said about the members here with respect, not being critical.
> 
> ...



I would agree with what Brown says, the evidence is there in the designs. Why did anyone design the Albacore to replace the Swordfish? its basically the same with a cockpit.
Why did anyone design the Fulmar, probably one of the worst fighters introduced after the war began, and then to replace it with another two seater, the Firefly when everyone had more than sufficient experience with single seaters.
Even the Walrus was replaced with the Sea Otter, again basically the same aircraft with the engine turned around.


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## parsifal (Jun 24, 2008)

*Why did anyone design the Albacore to replace the Swordfish? its basically the same with a cockpit.*

To improve crew conditions mainly, and slightly improve the serodynamic qualities of the FAAs TSR A/C

*Why did anyone design the Fulmar, probably one of the worst fighters introduced after the war began, and then to replace it with another two seater, the Firefly when everyone had more than sufficient experience with single seaters.*

Fulmars for the RN represented a cheap and easy expedient. based on a twin seat bomber, discarded by the RAF, it was an easy excercise to convert it to a fighter. At the time the conventional wisdom in the FAA was that you needed a navigator for over water flights.

Despite this, the Fulmar was operationally an outstanding success. RN carriers were generally required to operate outside the primary range of the Axis fighters. Against the lumbering torpedo and D/B ranged against it they were quite effective, and contributed to the RNs ability to maintin a logistic lifeline to malta, and other places. later they fulfilled a valuable F/B role as well.

The Firefly was an altogether different, and superior machine, that unfortunately never really got the chance to show its potential. It was an impressive machine, with good payload, performace and range capabilities, that postwar made it an ideal ASW and surface strike machine, again with the backdrop of cheap development costs looming as a factor.


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## Glider (Jun 24, 2008)

I don't disagree with most of what you say but the comment was that Brown in _"Wings of the Navy", and he actually attributes a lack of boldness (or vision) on part of the institutions that drafted the specifications for naval aircraft_

The examples I believe prove that point. To design the Albacore at almost the same time that the USA are designing the Avenger alone proves the point.

To call the Fulmar a success is stretching it more than a little and to even consider an abandoned bomber design to be the basis of a fighter again proves the point. The Wildcat had a similar development timescale to the Fulmar as did the Zero, would anyone seriously back the Fulmar?
Any success that the Fulmar achieved was despite its performance not because of it. I do know that the FAA preferred the Buffalo in every way to the Fulmar.

The Firefly was a great success that is true, but not as a fighter which it was designed to be. Can you name any other fighter introduced in any couuntry in late 1942 that only had a max speed of 316mph?


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## parsifal (Jun 24, 2008)

Points taken and acknowledged. However, ther are a few mitigating circumstances that perhaps are worth noting. 
Firstly, RN control of the FAA was not restored until 1938. that left them with precious little time in which to develop decent types, and undertake a proper expansion program. At the outbreak of the war, the FAA was receiving the grand total of 16 pilots _per year_. Moreover, there just was not the time, or the money, to invest properly in new types. 

However, the FAA had a few key advantages over that of the other naval air services. The first and most important was their ability to strike at night. Admittedly this was more a function of the aircrew, rather than the aircraft, but the slow speed of both the swordfish and the Albacore made it that much easier to adpt to Night Flying. Moreover, from 1941 onwards, both the Albacore and the Swordfish were fitted with ASV radar, something not even considered at the time by the USN, and which further enhanced their ability to locate targets, and attack them at night or poor visibility.

Lastly the Albacore was almost as good as the Swordfish at foul weather flying. I am reading a book at the moment "Arctic Convoys" by Richard Woodman, in which he describes both the Albacores and the Swordfish flying off from carriers in conditions where ther were waves more than 50 feet high. This was an issue considered in the prewar planning 9and hence design) by the RN


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## Glider (Jun 24, 2008)

The tragic thing is that if they had trusted the designers and given them free reign we may well have had something special. Look at the Sea Fury just after the war. We went from designing/building some of the worlds worst carrier aircraft, to one regarded as a classic in one mighty bound.


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## renrich (Jun 24, 2008)

Another tragic "anecdote" was that on some arctic convoys the AC used to protect the convoy was the MkI Hurricane which was outclassed by the opposition while in the holds of the merchant ships, being shipped to the Soviet Union, were later Mks of the Hurricane, much more suited to the task of protecting the convoy.


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## parsifal (Jun 24, 2008)

*Another tragic "anecdote" was that on some arctic convoys the AC used to protect the convoy was the MkI Hurricane which was outclassed by the opposition while in the holds of the merchant ships, being shipped to the Soviet Union, were later Mks of the Hurricane, much more suited to the task of protecting the convoy*

Yes Woodmans book makes that observation as well


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## JoeB (Jun 24, 2008)

HoHun said:


> 1. Even assuming the F4F could be exposed to fire of that sort for a longer period than the P-40, the Wildcat's markedly inferior performance...
> 
> 2. If there are statistics on the number and calibre of hits the F4Fs that went down during the Guadalcanal campaign received in that book,
> 
> ...


1. Back to a common theme, 'markedly inferior' isn't well grounded in fact when it comes to *combat effectiveness v the Zero* which is what we're talking about. The F4F was slower than the P-40 but turned better (your 'calculated' graphs showed IIRC P-40 and F4F as similar, both much inferior to Zero, but that's at odds with tests v captured Zeroes which showed the F4F's turn performance closer to the Zeroes than other US fighters, though still inferior). There's no formula to resolve a speed disadvantage/turn advantage into a *quantified* combat effectivness advantage/disadvantage.

2. Such stats are virtually never available which means all discussion of 'tactics' is therefore 'anecdotal'. The idea of not turning when trapped by a Zero, but rather skid, bob up and down and/or cut throttle to make the enemy overrun (again not 'fly straight and level') is still one of a few specific USN/USMC tactical adjustments *to the Zero* that can be found to been employed *in 1942* by more than a few people. 

3. That was almost surely one factor, but how do we establish its relative weight among all factors?

4. But flown by a different air arm, one with no more (or even less) in common with the JNAF than the USN had with the USAAF. It doesn't seem to help much in trying to resolve a difference in result by P-40 and 'markedly inferior' F4F v the Zero said to be caused by the difference between USN and USAAF. Also, 3/4 of the AVG's fighter kills were Type 97's and they met no Type 1's at all until they'd been fighting mostly successfully for several months: stuff like morale, confidence in teammates and leaders etc are also huge factors in fighter combat effectiveness, but aren't 'tactics', nor are they even the same as individual pilots' technical skill.

5. Again, you're repeating a statement not supported by references actually studying that question, which you admit you haven't read (a basic though not only one is Lundstrom). 

Chenault's only impact on the USN was that one USN officer, James Thach, developed a unique tactic (quite different from AVG's) inspired in part by Chennault's reports (though the Zero wasn't a particularly 'dissimilar' plane to the F4F). He tested it in combat at Midway, but it was not widely used until 1943. USN and USMC units in combat made tactical adjustments to Zeroes, the 'pin cushion' idea was one, shaking a Zero by high speed roll was another that seemed to be learned in actual combat. However systematic feedback of specific anti-Zero lessons into the training system was again, post 1942, a *result* of the 1942 campaign (including evaluation of the Ryujo Zero captured during it, F4F v captured Zero report only published in early Nov 1942), not an explantion of it.

The JNAF itself concluded from ops in China that the highly aerobatic and idividualistic tactics it often displayed there were not optimum, and JNAF fighter doctrine by 1942 emphasized coordinated firing runs by the 3 plane shotai; USN documents from late 1942 say the Zeroes in the Solomons favored hit and run attacks with initial altitude advantage. Again, there is a real historical topic of tactics, not 'tactics' as all purpose fudge factor to make opinions of combat effectiveness based on 'calculated' graphs of performance match uncooperative actual combat results. 

Joe


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## renrich (Jun 24, 2008)

Joe, you make some good points. Glad you mentioned the 3 plane shotai and the hit and run tactics of the IJN. The popular conception of Japanese tactics with the A6m was the dogfight which we know, by way of Lundstrom, is not true with the well trained IJN pilots of 42 and early 43. To me, it is interesting that the IJN was using formations similar to the vic of the RAF. Of course their pilots during the time mentioned were, on the whole, much more experienced and better trained than the RAF. The Thach Weave was brilliant and was used with modification in later wars, I believe.


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## HoHun (Jun 24, 2008)

Hi Joe,

>1. Back to a common theme, 'markedly inferior' isn't well grounded in fact when it comes to *combat effectiveness v the Zero* which is what we're talking about. 

I wrote "markedly inferior performance", and you know it. You even quoted it verbatim. 

This is the n-th time you're opposing something I never said. Classical trolling technique, called "strawman" in internet communities, and "manipulation technique #1" by the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer when he summarized the 38 most common trolling techniques back in 1831.

Either you stop that **** and keep it honest, or you're on my ignore list. Last warning.

Just so that this is clear: I think your posts are pretty interesting, that you know your stuff, and I actually agree with a lot of what you say - certainly with more than you appreciate -, and I'm ready to concede that some of my points are personal opinion that no-one is required (or expected) to agree with.

The only problem I have with you is that while I pay you the respect you deserve, you keep consistently answering my posts as if I wrote something I never did - which is pretty low. Just stop that, and I'm sure we can be friends. I actually thought we had managed to overcome the "cheap rhetoric tricks" phase when you made your well-thought-out repsonse in that other thread, and I outlined where I agreed with you and where not. I thought this was a really good example for productive disagreement, even if it was a bit of an effort to summarize it that nicely - for both of us.

It's really a shame that you think it's necessary to attack another aviation enthusiast in such an abject manner when we could have a perfectly civilized discussion. I will certainly miss your better posts when you force me to put you on my ignore list, but I really, really tired of you trying to pull the same old transparent strawman trick on me again and again, so I guess I'll just live without the good bits in your posts.

I'll even assure you that in my opinion, you don't need any tricks to be give your opinion additional weight - your knowledge of aviation history is entirely undisputed, and I certainly listen to you carefully even where I disagree. You really don't need to act like one of the common "gottawin" players who crowd most internet fora because you have the broad knowledge that makes an informed discussion possible without any dubious districtations.

I certainly hope that you recognize that I'd never spend so many words of praise on anyone I'd consider a troll, so please take this as an offer to start our discussion over on a basis on mutual respect. However, I can promise you that if you use trolling techniques, I'll treat you like a common troll anyway.

So make your choice now - if you decide to start over, I'll gladly consider your above post to never have been written.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## John Davies (Jun 26, 2008)

One of the most surprising things about the FAA in WW2 was just what an effective fighting force it was, despite the limitations of its equipment. For instance, it was the Blackburn Skua which sunk the Koningsberg, the first time a major war vessel in commission had been sunk by air attack in WW2, or indeed at any time, unless I am very badly wrong. The Skua did not have an impressive performance, but on this occasion it certainly did the job.

The Fulmar shot down more enemy aircraft than any other FAA fighter, which is not a bad record for an aircraft with such poor performance figures. It is this sort of thing which often leads me to distrust paper comparisons. 

It was certainly effective against bombers, and was well liked because it had excellent deck-landing characteristics. This had a worthwhile effect on attrition rates. Remember, FAR more Seafires were lost in deck-landing accidents than to enemy action, which in turn had a marked effect on squadron readiness and effectiveness rates. Good fuel and ammunition capacity enabled the Fulmar to mount standing patrols, and not necessarily to have to land after one combat. 

With respect, I doubt if Fulmar/Buffalo comparisons have much validity. As far as I know, the Buffalo was never issued to front-line FAA squadrons. 

Moving on, I have read that it was the success of the Taranto attack which led the Japanese to conclude this sort of thing was feasible, and thus indirectly inspired Pearl Harbour. The Swordfish was certainly a very effective aircraft. The RAF was using them as late as 1944, to hunt e-boats at night off the Normandy beaches, because they had nothing better. In this version, the “Stringbag” (so called because it could be used to carry anything) had a huge ventral radome and rocket rails under each wing, and was flat out at about 70 knots. 

It was certainly a very difficult for an enemy fighter to shoot down. With is low speed and very docile handling, standard defensive doctrine was to go into a very tight turn just above the sea and try to tempt the enemy fighter to fly into the water, which is one reason why it survived fairly well in hostile environments like the Med.

The Swordfish’s extreme docility also made it useful in other roles. It helped close the air gap above the Atlantic convoys, without which the war could not have been won. Many of the convoy carriers were really small; bulk grain ships and oil tankers with their superstructures razed and a flat deck constructed on top (because neither type needed derricks to discharge their cargo). With visibility down to about 50 yards, a gale blowing down the deck, and the stern rising and falling thirty or forty feet, a Swordfish could be landed, just about. It would have been certain suicide in a more modern, high-performance, aircraft.

These are probably the reasons for the Albacore, a biplane developed as late as 1939, and built as late as 1943. If the Swordfish concept had proved successful in service, why not just update it a bit? The Swordfish outlasted the Albacore in service, of course. The Albacore’s modified Taurus engine had its problems. Also the aircraft was not nearly as “chuckable” as the Swordfish.

The Barracuda, the FAA’s first monoplane bomber, was NOT well liked by its crews. Apart from being underpowered, it had a nasty habit of anaesthetising its pilots with a spray leakage of a hydraulic fluid containing ether, which led to a whole series of fatal crashes. But it still put the Tirpitz out of action for three months. (Operation “Tungsten”)

FAA personnel were very good at improvisation. With their level of equipment, they had to be. One slightly incredible “secret weapon” defence, used by both Fulmar and Barracuda crews, if an enemy fighter got on their tail, was to throw out a bundle of a few hundred leaves of toilet paper, bound with a rubber band. When it hit the slipstream, the band would break, and the fighter pilot would be presented with a large and disconcerting cloud of “things” in his path. It seems this sometimes caused them to swerve and break off the attack. Of course, the fact that FAA crews even contemplated using such a defence is a measure of their desperation.

The Firefly was an update of the Fulmar concept, and was, again, a fairly effective aircraft, even if it didn't look too good on paper.

The FAA “two seat fighter” concept resulted from a design philosophy very different to that adopted by the USN. The FAA decided to make room for a navigator, considered essential for operations in the open ocean, even if this meant a performance penalty. USN doctrine was to make fighters comparable in their performance to the best land-based machines, and just make sure their pilots could handle the navigation. On balance, USN doctrine was much sounder, and the FAA’s choice reflected the disarray caused by divided responsibilities between the RN and RAF in pre-war years. However, all things considered, the FAA really did not do too badly, despite the various deficiencies of its equipment.

On a different tack altogether, I was surprised to learn that the Japanese were still using something like the antiquated three-aircraft vic as late as 1942, or even 43. According to Johnnie Johnson, RAF's Fighter Command learned to abandon it, and copy the Luftwaffe's more flexible "finger four" formation, by the end of the Battle of Britain, i.e late 1940. That, of course, was the first occasion the Luftwaffe came up against thoroughly modern, professional, opposition, and in the high-threat environment that resulted, both sides had to learn very fast indeed. By 1941, I doubt if anyone in the world was more professional, or more battle-seasoned, than the two forces that had faced each other in that conflict.


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## HoHun (Jun 26, 2008)

Hi John,

>The Fulmar shot down more enemy aircraft than any other FAA fighter, which is not a bad record for an aircraft with such poor performance figures. It is this sort of thing which often leads me to distrust paper comparisons. 

"Paper comparisons" ... hm, you have joined only recently so you're probably not aware of this, but I have rejected that term as unprofessional a couple of times in the recent past.

Here is the relevent quote from the preface of Robert Shaw's "Fighter Combat - Tactics and Maneuvering". In case you do not know the book (since it's not really a book on historical air combat): It has been called the fighter pilots' bible - by fighter pilots.

"Much of what you will read here has been derived from personal flight experience, engineering analysis of fighter performance data, and 'bar talk' with other fighter pilots."

Shaw's "engineering analysis of fighter performance data" describes what often is called "paper comparison" in internet discussions. Obviously, such a comparison is an important tool - it's my impression that the undeserved bad reputation it seems to have with internet communities is mostly built upon the popularity of comparisons with other aircraft types that the type in focus would not realistically be likely to meet in actual combat.

>According to Johnnie Johnson, RAF's Fighter Command learned to abandon it, and copy the Luftwaffe's more flexible "finger four" formation, by the end of the Battle of Britain, i.e late 1940. 

Bader in "Reach for the Sky" modestly points out that unlike sometimes reported, it was not his idea to adopt the Luftwaffe formation, and in his "Flying Start", Bader's long-time wingman Hugh "Cockie" Dundas admits to having actually made that suggestion. Dundas proceeds to explain how Bader went up with a flight of four to test the idea immediately, braving the cannon fire from the Luftwaffe fighters in their quest for better tactics. They did in fact find out that their first attempt had not been quite perfect when Dundas' aircraft got shot up - ironically, after the war he learned that his attacker had been Mölders, allegedly the original inventor of the Finger Four formation (though it has also been suggested that the invention actually goes back to Lützow, not Mölders).

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Glider (Jun 26, 2008)

John
I agree with nearly everything you say but feel the Skua had a poor press. I think it it was a good match to the Ju87B and was possibly better at looking after itself against fighters.
Re the Fulmar/Buffalo comparison, I based it on 805 squadron who were equipped with both aircraft on Crete. Lt Cdr Black the squadron leader comments
The Buffalo was a delight to fly - very manoeuvrable (compared to the) Fulmar. 
He continues by saying that at no time did he request that Buffalos be replaced by Gladiators, but he did request that in the light of the inadaquacy of Fulmars against CR42's that any spare Gladiators should be sent to the support of 805 squadron.
The Buffalo didn't take much part in the action due to a lack of spares.

Source Air War for Yugoslavia, Greece and Crete. 1940-41


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## John Davies (Jun 27, 2008)

I never knew the FAA had taken the Buffalo into combat. Learn something new every day! As for Shaw's book, is it still obtainable, or do I seach s/sources?


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## Glider (Jun 27, 2008)

I had to buy a second hand copy.


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## John Davies (Jun 27, 2008)

“Paper comparisons”; HoHun, you are perfectly right, I should not have used the term. And you are also perfectly right in emphasising that comparing performance figures is only one tool in assessing an aircraft’s effectiveness, albeit a valuable one.

I suppose I was trying to make a more general point. It is easy, indeed very tempting, for us to concentrate on these figures, because they are objective, quantified and accessible. But other factors, some of which are intangible, and therefore very hard to quantify, may be just as important, or even more important, than performance figures. But precisely because they are intangible, they may not get all the attention they deserve. 

For instance, there is the whole area of tactics, and good or poor leadership. This can make all the difference.

There are other figures, like combat reports, which even though they may be subject to distortion and overclaiming, can still give a useful indication of the “proof of the pudding”. And this can lead us to ask interesting questions, like just how did an aircraft like the Fulmar, with a very unprepossessing set of performance figures, rack up such a score, shooting down more enemy aircraft than any other FAA fighter?

There is also the question of the quality of the opposition. This brings in not only the performance figures of their aircraft, but their tactics, leadership, etc.

There is the question of where an aircraft stands historically. For instance, some of the early monoplane fighters gained a reputation for being “difficult”, because their pilots were used to flying biplanes, many of which were rather more docile. Of course, by the standards of what came later, these were not especially “difficult” aircraft, but the step up from biplane to monoplane was a big one.

Then there is the question of “what is the alternative”, a question which in the real world tends to dominate decisions. Consider the Typhoon. Its thick high-drag wing section restricted its performance. The tail tended to fall off in a fast dive. The engine tended to catch fire on starting, and to asphyxiate the pilot with exhaust fumes, necessitating full oxygen mask use at all times, even at low level. It was an aircraft that should never have been put into production, or at least should have been sent back for a very prolonged period of sorting out. In peacetime it would have been. But without it, the RAF would have been far less effective as a ground-attack force after D-Day, and that might have had a real effect on the course of the battle. And of course the Typhoon gave us the Tempest, which was a great aircraft, and was also the direct ancestor of the Sea Fury.

Or consider the Seafire, which is where we came in. By any reasonable standards, an aircraft with its deck-landing characteristics should never have been sent to sea. It was effective enough in the air, (its kill ratio against both Zeroes and other enemy aircraft shows that beyond any reasonable doubt) but this effectiveness was purchased at a very high cost in deck accidents. But what were the alternatives? Either to have no fighters that could combat enemy aircraft on equal terms, or to become totally dependent on USA production, with the possibility that if USN demand took up all US production capacity, the RN would be left without fighter cover. That was NOT an acceptable alternative; hence the Seafire, with all its problems. 

So to understand what went on, we begin to get into politics, or even international relations! Tricky; but how can we avoid it?

Finally, there’s the most important factor, the men. In Hanson’s “Carrier Fighter”, there is a very memorable photo of him and three of his wingmen, walking away from their aircraft after a sortie. You don’t see guys like that these days. They have the most tremendous dash and swagger. A modern armed service today would almost certainly consider them a bit TOO dashing for today’s very expensive, computerised, procedures-driven mission profiles and aircraft. And a great many civilians would certainly see them as far too macho and politically incorrect! By today’s standards, they are an extinct species.

That’s why I’m so keen on biographies and, even better, autobiographies, of the men who fought. They give us a fascinating view into a world that has now vanished. 

BTW something completely different. That book title, “They gave me a Seafire”…. (and yes, I must get a copy). It sounds suspiciously like a reference to the A25 song.


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## HoHun (Jun 27, 2008)

Hi John,

>For instance, there is the whole area of tactics, and good or poor leadership. This can make all the difference.

Absolutely, it's really the combination of man and machine that counts - if one neglects the one, one can't learn much about the other 

>Or consider the Seafire, which is where we came in. By any reasonable standards, an aircraft with its deck-landing characteristics should never have been sent to sea. It was effective enough in the air, (its kill ratio against both Zeroes and other enemy aircraft shows that beyond any reasonable doubt) but this effectiveness was purchased at a very high cost in deck accidents. But what were the alternatives? 

Good point, and it highlights an aspect that occasionally is overlooked in discussions here: restrictions that limit the choice an air force may have regarding the type to be used in a specific role.

For example, one important restriction for the FAA's choice of a fighter aircraft for the North Atlantic convoy duty was the requirement to be able to take off from an escort carrier. The F4F-3 made it, the heavier F4F-4 (which according to Brown with its folding wings was what the Admiralty really had wanted) just barely made it, and the Fulmar with a take-off run of 960 ft in calm conditions compared to the F4F-4's 640 ft could hardly make it. It's long endurance might have been of excellent use over the North Atlantic, and it wouldn't have encountered superior land-based fighters there, but whatever its qualities, it was "out" due to the restrictions for the role.

>That’s why I’m so keen on biographies and, even better, autobiographies, of the men who fought. 

Roger on autobiographies!  I really enjoy the personal perspective conveyed by these - not only because it's more vivid, but also because often the hopes and difficulties at a specific point in the war are much better captured than by more general books that tend to be "tainted by hindsight".

>BTW something completely different. That book title, “They gave me a Seafire”…. (and yes, I must get a copy). It sounds suspiciously like a reference to the A25 song.

Hm, I hadn't been aware of this before ...

The A25 Song

But it's a genuine treasure! 

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## John Davies (Jun 27, 2008)

Sorry, finger trouble....


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## John Davies (Jun 27, 2008)

Henning fyi the A25 was the FAA's Accident Report Form. The Royal Navy loves slightly archaic language, and in characteristic style it began something like "To my Lords Comisioners of the Admiralty, I have the honour and duty to report......

There was then a blank space, in which the luckless pilot would have to fill in something like... "that on the third of July 1944, I totally misjudged my landing approach to HMS "Victorious", bounced my Corsair over both barriers and destroyed seven of His Majesty's aircraft in the forward deck-park".

There are many different versions of the song. The one you found seems to be the only one that exisits on-line. There probably isn't a single authorised text, because no doubt people made up their own verses to commemorate especially spectacular incidents aboard their own carrier.

Hanson, in "Carrier Fighter", has a telling observation to make. Carrier ops were unusually stressful, not only because you did not have a whopping great airfield to land on, but because there was absolutely no relief, no way of getting away from it. You could not walk out of the gates of the airfield and spend a free afternoon strolling in the countryside. You were crammed in a poorly-ventilated steel hull with over a thousand other guys. Even in your free time, you knew your Corsair was witing for you on the next deck up. And that was the life, no getting away from it for weeks at a time. 

So they did what they could to amuse themselves, gathered around the wardroom piano, drank beer and sang. Some of the songs have been collected. Others have not. My feeling is that the ones we still have carry a wonderful flavour of those long-ago lost days.

My personal favourite line is "I get my commission from Supermarine"; a neat double-meaning. Commission as in Commissioned Officer, or as in the commission on a sale? Because of course whenever a young officer bent a Seafire beyond repair, the government had to buy another one from the manufacturers.

Maybe we should start a new thread on surviving aircrew songs! There were quite a lot of them.


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## renrich (Jun 28, 2008)

HoHun, I have Shaw's book. Still trying to understand the high yo yo in ACM between a high wing loaded AC versus a low. A book which puts the paper performance question in perspective and has shaped my opinions quite a lot is Linnekin's "80 Knots to Mach 2" Dean in his book actually uses it as a reference. Linnekin is an aero engineer, test pilot and flew props and jets operationally in the USN. If he is still alive, it would be a hoot to have him on this forum. The British certainly contributed a great deal to the F4F4 being a dog in performance by their insistence on 6 guns. There were actually some F4F4s late in the production run which reverted to 4 guns.


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## HoHun (Jun 28, 2008)

Hi Renrich,

>The British certainly contributed a great deal to the F4F4 being a dog in performance by their insistence on 6 guns. There were actually some F4F4s late in the production run which reverted to 4 guns.

Hm, I admit that I thought the same, and was surprised that Brown didn't mention it as he actually served as a squadron's armament officer, too.

However, with regard to the weight comparison, the Bureau of Aeronautics Standard Aircraft Characteristics for the F4F-4 point out: 

"Model FM-1 has 4-.50 cal. guns and 1720 rds. ammunition, with gross weight 75 lbs greater than F4F-4. The performance is based on the F4F-4 weights."

Of course, it would have been possible to reduce the number of rounds carried for an actual reduction in weight, but at least for the FM-1, this appears not to have been the goal when changing to the four-barrel battery. Things might have been different for the FM-2, for which I don't have data handy at the moment.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## renrich (Jun 28, 2008)

Dean shows empty weight of F4F3, F4F4 and FM2 respectively as 5426, 5778 and 5328.


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## HoHun (Jun 28, 2008)

Hi Joe,

Well, this was my offer:

"So make your choice now - if you decide to start over, I'll gladly consider your above post to never have been written."

No answer is an answer too - you're on my ignore list now.

Kind regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## HoHun (Jun 28, 2008)

Hi everyone,

Since Joe decided not to accept my offer to consider his post never written, I'll go into a bit more detail of what I found flawed in what he has actually written ...

>Back to a common theme, 'markedly inferior' isn't well grounded in fact when it comes to *combat effectiveness v the Zero* which is what we're talking about. 

I've already pointed out that Joe truncated my quote "markedly inferior performance" so that he could play his favourite card, the combat record of the USN, and pretend it contradicted my statement. In reality, the markedly inferior performance of the F4F vs. the A6M is a well-documented fact, and the good combat record of the USN was achieved in spite of that inferior performance.

Note that Joe uses the term "combat effectiveness" as if it were a property of the aircraft on the same level that performance is a property of an aircraft. As the results of combat - the only way to measure "combat effectiveness" - are dependend both on men and machines, and on the men and machines of the opposing side as well -, this is a misconception, and Joe has been using this misconception in many threads to downplay the importance both of performance and of tactics.

>your 'calculated' graphs showed IIRC P-40 and F4F as similar, both much inferior to Zero, but that's at odds with tests v captured Zeroes which showed the F4F's turn performance closer to the Zeroes than other US fighters, though still inferior

Note the insidious use of quotation marks around 'calculated'. I could tell you that I consider Joe a honest guy, or I could tell you that I consider him a 'honest' guy ... and you'll know exactly that I think he is a liar if I use the version with quotation marks.

So how comes he thinks he can get away with a poorly-hidden insult on my honesty here? No idea - he certainly did not ask if he could see my calculations before he put the quotation marks up there.

In fact, he has tried to bad-mouth my calculations before, sight unseen ... this is what I wrote back then:

>>My advice is to ask "May I see your math, please?" the next time you're about to launch a post that tries to downplay the significance of a quantative analysis.<<

Though that shut him up for the moment, it's obvious that he did not take the advice. He certainly did not ask for my math, whether to learn anything from it or to find a mistake, and I'm fed up with being sniped at by a guy who deliberately chose to preserve his ignorance regarding the very thing he's "criticizing".

With regard to possibly contradicting data ... those who have actually sorted through different data sets while analyzing performance are aware that there is much conflicting data around, and that it is a routine occurrence to have something contradicting something else. Quantitative analysis is an excellent tool to sort out such contradictions.

That much just as to provide the background for readers who have not followed the discussion in other threads and might wonder what's going on here - I don't intend to spend any more time on this, but I thought I'd provide at least this brief explanation for those who migth have been surprised by the course this thread took.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## parsifal (Jun 28, 2008)

what were the performance differences between the F4F-3 and the F4F-4? I have always thought that despite the extra armament, the F4F-4 had some performance increases over its predecessor?


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## HoHun (Jun 29, 2008)

Hi Parsifal,

>what were the performance differences between the F4F-3 and the F4F-4? I have always thought that despite the extra armament, the F4F-4 had some performance increases over its predecessor?

It appears that the F4F-3 was equipped with either the R-1830-76 or the R-1830-86, while the F4F-4 was equipped with the R-1830 exclusively. (The FM-1 had the R-1830-76, too.) 

The R-1830-76 and -86 seem to have had identical ratings, so it really comes down to flying weight, with the lighter version performing better.

An article by Leo J. Kohn that prefaces my FM-2 manual reprint includes a table with the following gross weight figures:

F4F-3: 7065 lbs
F4F-4: 7964 lbs
FM-1: 7404 lbs

According to a quick calculation, the lighter weight should result in the following performance advantages for the F4F-3 over the F4F-4:

Top speed: +5 km/h
Inital climb rate: +2.3 m/s
Sea level turn rate: +2.8 deg/s

It doesn't look like there is anything the F4F-4 gained over the F4F-3 with regard to performance, unless you include firepower and deck space area in the comparison.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## kool kitty89 (Jun 29, 2008)

The F4F-3A used the single stage R-1830-90 (of 1,200 hp) due to shortages of the 2-stage engines, and thus had poorer altitude performance.

The Martlet I used a Wright Cyclone 9 R-1820-G205 of 1,200 hp with a single-stage 2-speed supercharger. (same as used on the Brewster B-339D with the Dutch)

Export version of the F4F-4 (the Martlet IV) used the R-1820-40 of 1,200 hp with single-stage 2-speed supercharger, which was tuned for higher altitudes than the -G205 iirc. (same engine as the F2A-2/3)

WW2 Warbirds: the Grumman F4F Wildcat - Frans Bonn


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## parsifal (Jun 29, 2008)

I have several book references to report

1. Hamlyn Concise Guide to American Aircaft Of WWII, Chancellor Press, first published 1982 my version 2002
2. Encyclopedia Of World Aircraft, Paul Eden Sof Moeng, Silverdale Books 2002
*F4F-4*
Powerplant: 1200 HP P&W R-1830-86, source 2 says R-1830-36 
Max Speed: 318 @ 19400 ft
Service Ceiing 39400 (yeah right), range 770 nm
Initial Climb : 1950 ft per min
Weights: Max T/O weight 7952 lb
Armament 6 x 0.5", and 2 x 100 lb bombs

*F4F-3*
Powerplant: 1200 HP P&W R-1830-76 
Max Speed: 328 mph (528 kph) at 21,000 ft (6,400 m). 
Service Ceiing 37,500 ft (11,278 m) 
range : 845 miles 
Initial Climb :2,265 ft/min 
Weights: : 8,152 lb (seems wrong to me) 
Armament : 4x Browning M2 0.5" (12.7mm) machine guns with 430 rpg in wings, 2x 100 lb (45 kg) bombs

So according to these sources, I think you are right, the performance is better in the older mark. The exceptions appear to be max ceiling.

However the performance differences are so minor, I would have thought the extra firepowe more than offset that. If it didnt, why would people simply remove the extra two guns, like the RAAF did with some of its Buffaloes in Malaya??


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## John Davies (Jun 29, 2008)

renrich said:


> The British certainly contributed a great deal to the F4F4 being a dog in performance by their insistence on 6 guns. There were actually some F4F4s late in the production run which reverted to 4 guns.



It depends on the projected mission profile, or in plain language who you think you will be shooting at. If you are a USN pilot fighting Zeroes, you don’t need too much firepower, because the Zero is quite lightly built, lacks armour and self-sealing fuel tanks, and tends to come apart fairly easily when hit. But you most certainly do need all the manoeverability you can squeeze out of the airframe. So four guns are the choice for you.

On the other hand, if you are an FAA pilot keeping the Fw200 Condors off the North Atlantic convoys in winter, manoerverability doesn’t matter so much. Firepower, however, does. You are attacking a large, sturdy, Teutonic aircraft. Your job is to inflict terminal damage on the enemy’s pilots, airframe or engines, and you may only have time for one firing pass before he vanishes into the murk. So the more lead you can sling the better. This is why the Admiralty specified six guns.

The performance figures people have researched do not seem to show a great difference between four and six gun versions of the Wildcat. I’d suggest there is one figure which is not accessible, but is probably very important indeed. The rate of roll. This is of great importance in fighter-vs-fighter combat. 

Adding an extra gun and its ammunition, on each side, in effect increasing the weight devoted to armament by 50%, will greatly increase the roll inertia that a control input from the ailerons has to overcome in order to initiate or stop a roll. This is colloquially called “flywheel effect”. Increasing the mass of the wings and their contents either reduces the roll rate, or increases stick forces, or both. 

This would not be of great importance when fighting a Condor, but could be life or death when fighting a Zero. This may be the reason why the six-gun Wildcat had the reputation of being a “dog”, even when figures for top speed and rate of climb are not that different.


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## ponsford (Jun 29, 2008)

Regarding F4F-3 versus F4F-4, from F4F Performance Trials :

Detail Specification For Model F4F-3 Airplane
Gross weight: Normal fighter, (110 gallons): 6895 lbs., Overload fighter, (147 gallons): 7432 lbs.
High speed at sea level: Normal fighter: 278 mph. Overload fighter: 277 mph
High speed at max. critical altitude 22,000 ft.: Normal fighter: 326 mph. Overload fighter 336 mph (that looks like an error to me)
Time to climb to 20,000 ft.: 7.6 minutes

F4F-3 #1845 / #1848 R-1830-76
Full load weight: 6260 lbs / 7065 (7300 at take off)
Max speed at critical alt.: 331 at 22,000 ft. / 331 at 21,000 ft.
Time to climb 20,000 ft. ` 10.5 minutes / 10 minutes

Detail Specification For Model F4F-4 Airplane
Gross weight: Normal fighter, (110 gallons): 7426 lbs., Overload fighter, (144 gallons): 7972 lbs.
High speed at sea level: Normal fighter: 275 mph. Overload fighter: 274 mph
High speed at critical altitude 19,400 ft: Normal fighter: 318 mph. Overload fighter: 316 mph.
Time to climb to 20,000 ft: 12.7 minutes.

F4F-4 #4058 R-1830-86
Gross weight: 4 gun: 7370 lbs., 6 gun 7921
Vmax at critical altitude (19,400 ft): 319 mph (7370 lbs)
Time to 20,000 ft: ~12 minutes

Whether -3 or -4, the Wildcat’s performance doesn’t seem to me to be in the same class as any contemporary Spitfire mark.


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## renrich (Jun 29, 2008)

JD, your points are well made but I think that the early Martlet which was originally scheduled for France and wound up in the FAA had only the four 50s and was quite successful against the Condor. In the early going in the pacific the performance of the F4F3 was more on par with the A6M but when the F4F4 replaced the F4F3 with two more guns, less ammo per gun and the folding wings, that additional weight really hampered the performance and the only way the USN pilots survived was by superior tactics and because of the ruggedness of the AC. I believe that the RAFs insistence on the 6 guns was based on their belief that a certain number of hits(statistically) was needed to bring down a bomber and the overall level of gunnery training in the FAA or RAF was not, at that time, equal to that of the USN. A number of the kills for F6F3s were against the big Kawanishi flying boats which were pretty rugged unlike some of the IJN fighters and the 4 -50s were ample. The thing to remember is that in an AC of the Wildcat's size and HP, 400 or 500 pounds made a big difference in rate of climb and overall maneuverability. That is the reason that the FM2 went back to the 4-50s. If you remember, the early F8Fs had only 4-50s also to save weight.


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## ponsford (Jun 29, 2008)

I’ve read through this thread twice now and was unable to find any figures on the Zero or Spitfire V from flight tests or manufactures’ data bearing on aircraft performance characteristics such as speed, climb, roll rate (excepting the NACA chart) turn. I can’t believe that’s really the case after 10 pages of discussion. Could someone please point out to me where in this thread basic performance data of the Zero is cited, i.e. max speed at SL Critical alt, climb in ft/min, roll rate, turn in deg/sec at specified alt? I must have missed it. Frankly I think the Spitfire – Zero comparison is less interesting than a F4F – Zero comparison. In my view, based on performance data of the Spitfire from trials and what I understand Zero performance to have been, the Spitfire is a class better in performance than the Zero with the exception of turn. The F4F and the Zero, on the other hand, may be closer in performance, at least in basic performance characteristics such as level speed, climb and roll. Without the numbers, however, how can one say?

Ok, on my third read through I found this from parsifal:


> Specification of A6M2 Navy Type 0 Carrier Fighter Model 21:
> One Nakajima NK1C Sakae 12 fourteen cylinder air-cooled radial, rated at 940 hp for takeoff, 950 hp at 13,780 feet.
> Performance: Maximum speed 331 mph at 14,930 feet. Cruising speed 207 mph. Initial climb rate 4517 feet per minute. Climb to 19,685 feet in 7 minutes 27 seconds. Service ceiling 32,810 feet. Normal range 1160 miles. Maximum range 1930 miles. Radius of turn with entry speed of 230 mph was 1118 feet. Entering a 180 degree steep turn with an entry speed of 230 mph, the fighter could complete the turn in 5.62 seconds, with an exit speed from the turn of 189 mph. At slower speeds, the turning radius was 612 feet. Normal positive g-load factor was 7g, with a safety factor of an additional 1.8g. Normal negative g-load factor was 3.5g, with a safety factor of an extra 1.8g.


Thanks parsifal. At least we have something now to compare. The 4517 ft/ min climb figure seems doubtful though... Do you know the source for those figures parsifal?


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## parsifal (Jun 29, 2008)

Hi Richard

I happen to believe that the decision to put six guns and folding wings on the Wildcat was the right one, notwithstanding what i consider to be a very marginal drop in performance. 

Firstly the design work for the F4F-4 was done before the US had really become that aware of the Zero. And packing the maximum amount of firepower against strike aircraft was the right decision. Being able to shoot down the attack aircraft has to be the number one priority for a carrier based fighter, not shooting down enemy fighters. If the strike aircraft get through, , and damage or sink the carrier, the whole Task Group is then placed at risk. The fighters of themsleves are expendable.

And as things happened to turn out, the F4F-4 was still competitive against the zeke. It was built like a brick dunny and could out dive and I believe out roll a zeke. Even though a zeke was not strong, it could still absorb some punishment, and having 6 guns instead of four meant that you only needed to keep the zeke in your sights for 2/3 the time that it might take an F4F-3.

Now the wing folding was critical to US success. It meant that overnight their standard Fighter component on their carriers went from about 18 fighters, to over 30. By comparison, the Japanese carriers were embarking about 18-24 Fighters, so the US went fom parity, to superiority in the numbers department. This proved crucila in the 1942 battles

I would also hotly dispute that the USN flyers were that much better than FAA pilots at shooting. Ther was no comparison in the flight training of an FAA pilot to your standard garden variety RAF Jock. It took over a year to train fleet air arm crews, at the beginng of the war the RN was receiving just 16 pilots per year (although this changed rapidly. Whilst I have heard that the USN practced deflection shooting to amuch greater extent than any body else, USN training times for their aircrew were nowhere near as thorough as the early war FAA. Later on, as the need for numbers grew, the FAA did drop its standards, so the later 1942 FAA pilots were not quite as good, but in 1940-42 (warly), the FAA boys showed exceptional skill in the air. As an example, though not an air combat issue, just 18 swordfish, attacked and disabled 3 Italian Battleships, in the middle of the night. Compare the damage they did, to the Japanese in PH, and the amount of damage per aircraft for the british aircraft is FAR in excess of that achieved per a/c by the IJN pilots


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## John Davies (Jun 29, 2008)

renrich said:


> ......the overall level of gunnery training in the FAA or RAF was not, at that time, equal to that of the USN. ........ The thing to remember is that in an AC of the Wildcat's size and HP, 400 or 500 pounds made a big difference in rate of climb and overall maneuverability. .



True; and Johnnie Johnson would probably have agreed with you, (I've quoted him in an earlier post) and he certainly knew what he was talking about. And yes, you are quite right, UK authorities did work on a pretty crude statistical notion of how many bullets you needed to spray into the target area to ensure a kill. I can't help wondering if they made a clear distinction between rifle calibre and .50 weapons?

However, it is also worth remembering that a good many FAA pilots were trained in the USA by the USN. Hanson ("Carrier Fighter") gives an account of his basic and advanced training, if I remember rightly at Penescola. (I don't have my copy to hand ATM). So maybe some of them were taught how to shoot? 

I take your point about the undesireability of adding weight to a small fighter. I'd still emphasise that if you have to add weight, a fairly outboard position in the wings is one of the worse places to do it.

Seafire squadrons in the Pacific theatre were authorised to remove both the wingtips and the outer .303 MGs from their aircraft, leaving one cannon and one MG (probably as an insurance against cannon feed jams) on each side. This combination simulataneously increased roll rate and reduced stick forces. Since the basic Spitfire airframe was highly manoeverable to begin with, the results must have been fairly startling. But it all goes to show that weight far out in the wings of a fighter is NOT a good idea! 

The decision whether or not to adopt this modification was left at squadron level, and not all of them did it. But the fact it was so much as considered suggests to me that even the Merlin-55 equipped Seafire LIIIs and FIIIs needed every edge they could get against the Zero. They had a pretty impressive performance. They were highly manoeverable aircraft, with an impressive rate of climb, angle of climb, and rate of accelleration. The tactics Brown describes in "The Seafire" of keeping the speed well up above the Zero's best fighting range, and proceeding in a series of near-stall turns, obviously worked, to judge from combat reports. But even so, the FAA clearly treated the Zero with considerable respect.

Which leads me to the obvious conclusion that if the pilots of a pretty advanced development of the Merlin-engined Seafire had to work hard at it to get a decisive advantage over the Zero, then anyone who went up against a Zero in a Wildcat had to be a real hero!


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## John Davies (Jun 29, 2008)

While we’re on the subject of the Wildcat, here’s a bit of light relief……

All taildraggers swing a bit on takeoff, but the Wildcat more than most. This was due to a combination of a big torquey radial, a narrow undercarriage, a short fuselage and a fin (“vertical stabiliser” in American) and rudder that could have been bigger, and indeed were enlarged in the later ones.

So before you open the throttle you wound in a lot of rudder trim to compensate. Now the fun starts….

The rudder trimmer in the early Wildcats (and for all I know in all of them) worked in the opposite to the natural sense; i.e you wound the wheel to the left to apply right trim and vice versa. There was also a trim indicator, which did go round the right way, which meant that when the trim wheel was being wound one way, the indicator was going the other way. Are you confused yet?

Of course, from time to time the inevitable happened, and some luckless sprog wound in a handful of trim not to compensate for but to accentuate the swing. Once the throttle was opened, no pilot in the world had a leg strong enough to force the rudder pedal over against the combined forces of swing and mis-trim, and he would very soon find himself facing the way he had just come. 

Some very spectacular incidents resulted. Apparently some pilots actually managed to take off in this manner. I never heard of an accident in which anyone was killed. Grumman built their aircraft very strongly! However, it was a bit unfair on other users of the airfield. It never, to my knowledge, happened afloat, because no pilot is going to do that more than once, so it tended to happen during training ashore.

In a way, it’s kind of comforting. It shows that British designers did not have a monopoly of mutton-headed anti-ergonomic cockpit design.


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## Glider (Jun 29, 2008)

ponsford said:


> I’ve read through this thread twice now and was unable to find any figures on the Zero or Spitfire V from flight tests or manufactures’ data bearing on aircraft performance characteristics such as speed, climb, roll rate (excepting the NACA chart) turn.



This may help with the Spitfire V for speed and climb

Spitfire Mk VB W.3134 Report


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## renrich (Jun 29, 2008)

I have read that the Wildcat was very easy to groundloop in a landing on dry land but the arresting gear on a carrier helped in that respect. According to Lundstrom, I believe, the design of the F4F4 was undertaken after the USN knew about the Zero performance. Some of the USN pilots said the F4F4 flew like a loaded torpedo plane! No question that the folding wings was the correct decision so as to get more VFs on board. The FAA may have been well trained but again according to Lundstrom the prewar gunnery training of the USN was superior to all other air forces and the overall training of the USN and IJN was the best in the world. Lundstrom-" In terms of actual flying hours, the Navy's aviation program in the mid 1930s probably offered the most comprehensive training schedule of all the world's air forces." In the USN, the 1935 syllabus was a one year course involving 465 hours of ground school and 300 hours of flight. In 1939, it was recommended that the syllabus be shortened to seven months with 207 flight hours. The syllabus began after a month at a flight school with ten hours of instruction where if the student was apt, he soloed. ( I soloed after ten hours of dual. When I got up in the air, I looked at the empty right seat and asked the Lord to please let me get back on the ground again safely.) The VF wings before 1940 averaged from 3500 to 1500 flight hours. The VF wings in 1940 averaged 1000 to 600 flight hours. The VF wings 1941 averaged 600 to 300 hours. The VF wings in 1942 averaged 300 flight hours. If the six guns was the correct decision for the F4F4, why did they go back to four guns on the FM2 and why the four guns on the F8F?


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## HoHun (Jun 29, 2008)

Hi Parsifal,

>So according to these sources, I think you are right, the performance is better in the older mark. The exceptions appear to be max ceiling.

I'd say this is probably a misquoted data point then. Ceiling is tied rather closely to flying weight, with the lighter aircraft enjoying a clear advantage if everything else is unchanged.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## HoHun (Jun 29, 2008)

Hi John,

>On the other hand, if you are an FAA pilot keeping the Fw200 Condors off the North Atlantic convoys in winter, manoerverability doesn’t matter so much. Firepower, however, does. 

Good point - from Brown's books, I'd say the British were really impressed by the Fw 200's fighting abilities early in the war, so the six guns might have been necessary (or at least highly desirable) from their point of view.

>Adding an extra gun and its ammunition, on each side, in effect increasing the weight devoted to armament by 50%, will greatly increase the roll inertia that a control input from the ailerons has to overcome in order to initiate or stop a roll. 

Hm, this would be right only if the six-gun fighter had indeed had 150% of the ammunition supply of the four-gun fighter, but it seems that the lightly-armed variant carried more ammunition, so the difference was not as great as it might have been.

But you hit the nail on the head with the differentiation between roll rate and roll acceleration - this is an important detail often missed in performance discussions! 

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## HoHun (Jun 29, 2008)

Hi Ponsford,

>I’ve read through this thread twice now and was unable to find any figures on the Zero or Spitfire V from flight tests or manufactures’ data bearing on aircraft performance characteristics such as speed, climb, roll rate (excepting the NACA chart) turn. 

With regard to Spitfire data, see:

WWII Aircraft Performance

F4F data:

Untitled Document

A6M data is hard to find - the best guess would be the TAIC intelligence summary for which I don't have an online resource. It seems that climb rate does not match the published engine ratings in that TAIC chart, though.

In general, there is only so much you can learn from un-processed data because of the variability of data from multiple sources, or even contradictions within a single source occassionally. That's the reason for conducting a quantitative analysis that leads to "generic" data, like this one:

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/polls/f4f-wildcat-versus-p-40e-tomahawk-13281.html#post364448

(If the direct link doesn't take you right to the correct post, it's #25 in the linked thread. The P-40 data is from Perils P40 Archive Data )

>Frankly I think the Spitfire – Zero comparison is less interesting than a F4F – Zero comparison. 

I don't know how the F4F came to play such a big role in this thread, but it's in fact a Seafire vs. Zero discussion 

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## JoeB (Jun 29, 2008)

HoHun said:


> 1. Since Joe decided not to accept my offer to consider his post never
> 
> 2. In reality, the markedly inferior performance of the F4F vs. the A6M is a well-documented fact, and the good combat record of the USN was achieved in spite of that inferior performance.
> 
> ...


1. Huh? 
2. No actually 'markedly inferior" is not documented. To again refer to a reference you've been told about, have said 'maybe I should read' but obviously haven't read, see Lundstrom's discussion of the early informal and formal F4F v captured (Ryujo's from the Aleutians) Zero in late 1942 ("First Team in the Guadalcanal Campaign" p 534-5). The first tests concluded the F4F was slightly faster. The next ones, probably more carefully conducted, gave the general result with which we're famillar now (or should be): the two were around equal in speed at sea level, then Zero relatively slightly faster up to 19k ft (best speeds less than 20mph apart); both trials agreed the Zero was somewhat better in a continuous turn (not a lot, not as much of an advantage as over the P-40), Wildcat rolled substantially better at high speed, F4F dived a little better or same, Zero climbed substantially better in general. Not markedly inferior even in those basic stats.

Anyway you made that comment wrt to F4F v P-40 not F4F v Zero. It's definitely not 'well documented' that the F4F was 'markedly inferior' in performance to the P-40E, that depends what area of performance you emphasize between two a/c more dissimilar than the F4F and Zero were.

3. There are separate individual plane factors. Those consist in turn of measureable aerodynamic performance (speed, sustained turn rate, radius, etc) and other (armament, ruggedness, cockpit visibility behind or for gunnery, favorable handling for gunnery? etc). There is overall combat effectiveness of the plane. There is combat effectiveness of a fighter unit equipped with the plane. 

The second thing, overall combat effectiveness of the plane itself, would be illustrated as follows: randomly select similarly trained test pilots of similar background. Assume you could convince them to seriously try to kill each other in real air combat in various scenario's, not a race, and not just a mock dogfight. Let them go at it and see what happens. The more the effectiveness difference, the higher the kill ratio. The separate individual plane characteristics will determine which plane is more effective in that 'all else equal' situation but there is no way to calculate the kill ratio upfront just using the performance stats. IOW a single index of effectiveness and the individual stats are related things but not the same thing. Of course the effectiveness of a unit equipped with the plane is another thing, no confusion or misconception about that except maybe by you.

4. If your graphs say the F4F turned a lot worse than the Zero and head to heads said not as well but not big difference, I'll go with the trials (though trials of captured a/c aren't 100% certain either). And again if you really don't want to debate don't, but 'I'm on ignore' then you launch into another long response with lots of ad-hominem, what does 'ignore' mean then  ?

Joe


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## ponsford (Jun 29, 2008)

Thanks for the link Glider:

Spitfire VB
Max speed: 371 mph at 20,100 ft.
Climb: 3250 ft/min at 15,200 ft.
Time to 20,000 ft. 6.4 minutes

Thanks for the links HoHun. I appreciated your analysis of the F4F and P-40. Have you done a similar analysis for the F4F versus Zeke? I would find that of interest.

Here’s an interesting online article on Zero performance:
 ZERO-SEN Model 21 Performance: Unraveling Conflicting Data by Richard Dunn

Speeds summarized fwiw:

Zero 21:
(1) 316 m.p.h. at 16,570 ft. (Taylor, p.253); 
(2) 316 m.p.h. at 16,400 ft. (General View, appended chart)
(3) 321 m.p.h. at 20,000 ft. (Mikesh, p. 123)
(4) 326 m.p.h. at 16,000 ft. (Reardon, p.113)
(5) 331.5 m.p.h. at 14,930 ft. (Francillion, p. 16)
(6) 332 m.p.h. at 16,570 ft. (Caiden, p. 158)
(7) 336 m.p.h. at 19,685 m.p.h. (Green, p.46)
(8) 345 m.p.h. ( Sakai , p.48).

Dunn is pushing Sakai’s figures. I’m not entirely convinced by his argument.

More US Zero data below:

Informational Intelligence Summary No. 85: Flight Characteristics of the Japanese Zero Fighter
Max speed sea level: 270 mph
Max speed critical height: 326 mph
Climb sea level: 2750 ft/min.
Climb 15,000 ft: 2380 ft/min.

Zero-2 A6M2, USAAF Material Command (Actually Navy figures from San Diego)

Vmax sea level 277 mph
Vmax 16,000 ft 335 mph
Climb sea level 2710 ft/min
Climb 15,000 ft 2480 ft/min

Mitsubishi Type 0 MK2-SSF Hamp Airplane, AAF No. EB-201 Flight Test Engineering Branch

All flight tests were performed at rated power and no data is available at maximum emergency power, 2600 RPM and 40" Hg. manifold pressure.

Maximum speed at high critical altitude = 15,300 ft. (2400 RPM and 36" Hg. man. press.) = 308 MPH

Rate of climb at sea level (2400 RPM and 36" Hg. man. press.) = 3260 ft/min.
Rate of climb at low critical altitude, 7000' (2400 RPM and 36" Hg. man. press.) = 2980 ft/min.

TAIC Report No. 17, Combat Evaluation of Zeke 52 with F4U-1D, F6F-5, and FM-2
Max speed: 335 mph at 18,000 ft.

TAIC 38: Zeke 52

Max speed at sea level: 291 mph 44” HG
Max speed at critical alt. 19,400 ft.: 326 mph 44” HG.


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## ponsford (Jun 29, 2008)

John Davies said:


> Which leads me to the obvious conclusion that if the pilots of a pretty advanced development of the Merlin-engined Seafire had to work hard at it to get a decisive advantage over the Zero, then anyone who went up against a Zero in a Wildcat had to be a real hero!



Hi John: I take your point and tend to agree with the gist of it. It would take balls... or numbers, discipline and good tactics.


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## ponsford (Jun 29, 2008)

parsifal said:


> The zero Mk 2 had the following statistics
> 
> Specification of A6M2 Navy Type 0 Carrier Fighter Model 21:
> 
> Performance: Maximum speed 331 mph at 14,930 feet. Cruising speed 207 mph. Initial climb rate 4517 feet per minute.



Hi parsifal: After reading Dunn's article I presume your figures are from Francillion? That 4517 ft/min must be a typo. That can't be right. It's just too far removed from other available data sets to be believable.


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## kool kitty89 (Jun 29, 2008)

Yes, that ~4,500 ft/min figure is wrong for max sustained climb, but fairly commonly stated. (including some history TV programs) Similar to the claims of the Curtiss-Wright CW-21 Demon being sometimes listed with a 4,500-5,000 ft/min initial climb. (probably acheived with zoom) Actual initial climb for the A6M-2 should be ~3,000-3,200 ft/min. (the CW-21 and Ki-43 being similar)

Some performance figures from US testing may be high (both speed and climb) due to use of high octane fuel, not available to the Japanese.


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## parsifal (Jun 29, 2008)

ponsford said:


> Hi parsifal: After reading Dunn's article I presume your figures are from Francillion? That 4517 ft/min must be a typo. That can't be right. It's just too far removed from other available data sets to be believable.



My sources probably were Francilion, but to be honest, I am not sure. But to double sheck my figures, I just pulled oput two of my general refereences, to confirm if I was correct, or not 

The sources are 

"Zero A6M", H. P. Willmott, Bison Books, 1980
"Combat Aircraft Of WWII", Iain Parsons, Ure Smith Books 1978

I have attached the relevant extract from the first source FYI. Can do the same for the second, if you need confirmation. 

Both sources list the initial climb as 4500 ft per min. There are some slight differences in max speed, and some of the other stats, which i am not sure of


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## HoHun (Jun 30, 2008)

Hi Ponsford,

>Here’s an interesting online article on Zero performance:
 ZERO-SEN Model 21 Performance: Unraveling Conflicting Data by Richard Dunn

I found this article quite interesting, and it made me go and look for A6M data myself. Interesting to see that Mike has included A6M data on his site in the meanwhile, I'm going to have to check it out to see if there is anything I haven't seen yet 

Here is a summary of the various data sets on the A6M I found ... obviously, there is a lot of variation in performance between the individual tests, illustrating why I'm not overly suprised by possibly contradicting data on the Zero.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## HoHun (Jun 30, 2008)

Hi Ponsford,

>Thanks for the links HoHun. I appreciated your analysis of the F4F and P-40. Have you done a similar analysis for the F4F versus Zeke? I would find that of interest.

Roger, here it is ... A6M2 data based on the TAIC (Akutan Zero) data, F4F-4 data based on the Buerau of Aeronautics Standard Aircraft Characteristics.

F4F-4 data is for MIL because this is the highest power setting for the type I'm aware of. A6M2 data is for WEP for the same reason 

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## HoHun (Jun 30, 2008)

Hi Parsifal,

>"Zero A6M", H. P. Willmott, Bison Books, 1980

Hey, I like that book  Since you're quoting the publishing year 1980, is it the original edition with the number "6" on the dust jacket? I thought the entire series was pretty good - I have "1" through "6", but I don't know if there were more ...

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## parsifal (Jun 30, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Hi Parsifal,
> 
> >"Zero A6M", H. P. Willmott, Bison Books, 1980
> 
> ...



Nah, its not a "6". But it seemed like a pretty good book just the same, I like it as a dependable and interesting "general" reference for the zero. The appendices are the best bit.

Its the only one I have, though I have a similar sort of reference for the Hellcat.

Also like the squadron/signal pubs, have a few of them. 

I didnt think the 4500' per minute fugure was all that outrageous, but then I am not that good a student. Without having thought about it too much, I just assumed that the zeke with its ultra light construction, would be a top notch climber. Conversely, it also made sense to me, in my school boyish way of looking at these issues, that it would be a poor diver for pretty much the same reason....bit like the feather you see floating down from the ceiling, as compared to the piece of lead that might represent the Wildcat. No doubt I will stand corrected by the time we are all done here, but thats okay....I am here to learn


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## kool kitty89 (Jun 30, 2008)

For 1941 3,200-3,400 ft/min is pretty darn good. And comparing the power loading, the A6M-2 has decent power loading, but not as good as many european contemporaries ie Spitfire and Bf 109. (Zero is ~.179 hp/lb normal loaded, compared to Bf 109F-2 at ~.205 which managed around 3,850 ft/min)


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## parsifal (Jun 30, 2008)

kool kitty89 said:


> For 1941 3,200-3,400 ft/min is pretty darn good. And comparing the power loading, the A6M-2 has decent power loading, but not as good as many european contemporaries ie Spitfire and Bf 109. (Zero is ~.179 hp/lb normal loaded, compared to Bf 109F-2 at ~.205 which managed around 3,850 ft/min)



Im no expert, but it occurs to me that the 3285 figure is remarkably close to the "time to height" figures, than initial climb. The 4500 ft per min appears to be for the first 5000 ft or so, when the lift is at a maximum. 

Perhaps the 4500 ft per minute is the initial climb rate, and not comparable to a sustained climb rate? Even so IMO it would the most appropraite number to quote for the Zeke, since the combat that it would be most likley to engage in would be against torpedo bombers, or Dive Bombers, both of which are at some stage going to be below 5000 ft in their attack runs.

Do you have figures for the Initial climb, that is climb to say 4500 ft. If so, are they in conflict with that quoted figure?

Regards

Parsifal


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## HoHun (Jun 30, 2008)

Hi Parsifal,

>Nah, its not a "6". But it seemed like a pretty good book just the same, I like it as a dependable and interesting "general" reference for the zero. 

Absolutely!  I just asked for the "6" out of curiosity, I'm pretty sure the content is exactly the same.

>I didnt think the 4500' per minute fugure was all that outrageous, but then I am not that good a student. Without having thought about it too much, I just assumed that the zeke with its ultra light construction, would be a top notch climber. 

That's actually a good thought - climb rate is dominated by power and weight.

You could make a rough estimate like this:

Engine power: 1050 HP maximum, or roughly 770 kW.

Weight: about 2500 kg mass, meaning roughly 25000 N weight.

If all of the power were converted to climb rate directly, we would get:

Power = Force * Speed, or 

770 kW = 25000 N * v, so that

v = 770 kW / 25000 kN = 30.8 m/s

That's extremely fast and of course unrealistic, but we know the upper limit now.

Two considerations can give us a more realistic figure: 

1) Some of the power is required to keep the aircraft going against the drag at the relatively low speed at which it climbs. Let's guess this is 300 HP.

2) The useful power delivered by the propeller is always less than the power delivered to the propeller. Let's guess our efficiency is 80% here.

So we get:

(Engine Power - Drag Power) * Efficiency = Force * Speed, or 

(770 kW - 220 kW) * 0.8 = 25000 N * v, so that

v = (770 kW - 220 kW) * 0.8 / 25000 kN = 17.6 m/s

This is roughly 3500 fpm, or 1000 fpm less than the 4500 fpm we were discussing.

Of course, we were required to guess two figures here, but you can see that power is an important parameter, and adding for example 10% extra power gives more than 10% climb rate increase because the power lost to drag will not increase. You can also see that climb rate is inversely proportional to weight, so if your aircraft is only half as light, it will climb twice as good.

(If you look into the details, you'll find that the power lost to drag depends on weight too - that's why a big wing can be an advantage in a climb. The calculation I posted accounts for this, and for a fair number of additional complications not mentioned here.)

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## renrich (Jul 1, 2008)

According to Eric Brown the Condor(Kurier) had a very weak spine as well as vulnerable gasoline lines and was not a very robust AC and very susceptible to gunfire. The early F4F3s had an initial rate of climb of more than 3000 fpm.


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## Soren (Jul 1, 2008)

The A6M2 climbed at around 3,250 to 3500 ft/min, which is higher than any Allied fighter of the period.

As for turn performance, the Zero, throughout its versions easily outturns any Allied fighter. 

Now a highly boosted Spitfire V should be able to follow the Hap through a sustained turn at high speed, no problem, there are other a/c capable of that as-well, but all the Hap pilot has to do is pull in tighter the stick and he's away, the Spitfire simply can't hope to follow. 

The Zero turns a LOT tighter than any Spitfire, which is what the Japanese pilots took advantage of when fighting it, pulling such tight turns that the Spitfire pilots were forced to utilize energy tactics if they were to survive. Now unfortunately the British hadn't developed efficient tactics against a fighter like the Zero when they came to fight it in the pacific, and were forced to learn it the hard way just like the US years before.


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## HoHun (Jul 2, 2008)

Hi Renrich,

>The early F4F3s had an initial rate of climb of more than 3000 fpm.

According to my calculation, it arrives at 3000 rpm almost spot-on, almost matching the A6M2 ... but this favourable comparison is due to the power peak the R-1830-86 provides at low altitude with the supercharger in "neutral" gear.

Still, the F4F-3 due to its lighter weight (I used the 7065 lbs from the table accompanying Kohn's article) has more of an advantage over the heavy F4F-4 than one might think at first ... here are the graphs.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## John Davies (Jul 6, 2008)

Soren said:


> The A6M2 climbed at around 3,250 to 3500 ft/min, which is higher than any Allied fighter of the period.
> 
> As for turn performance, the Zero, throughout its versions easily outturns any Allied fighter.
> 
> ...



I'm very sorry, but that's quite simply incorrect. Brown in "The Seafire", (Ian Allen, London, 1973), quotes the rate of climb figures for the Seafire LIII (the main variant used in the Pacific) as 4,160 fpm at sea level and 4,310 fpm at 6,000 feet, this powered by a Merlin 55M with its boost sytem optimised for low to medium levels. The FIII, the other version used in the Pacific, climbed at 3,650 fpm at sea level. Climb for 6,000 feet is not given. But anyway, the FIII slightly outperforms the climb figures for the Zero you give, and the LIII well outperforms them. The Seafire was remarkable not only for its high rate of climb, but its steep angle of climb, and was one of the very few allied fighters to nullify one of the Zero's main advantages; the Japanese pilots could no longer out-climb an opponent.

To add a little context to those figures, the Seafire LIIC, which as far as I know was only used in the European theatre, had a maximum rate of climb of 4,600 fpm, using a Merlin 32 with +18 lbs boost, which suggests a short life and a merry one for the engine!

The Zero did NOT out-turn the Seafire, easily or otherwise. What FAA pilots found was that the Zero had a tighter radius of turn, but the Seafire had a much higher rate of turn; i.e it was going around a larger circle, but going round it sufficiently faster to keep safely ahead of the Zero. In a full 360 degree circle, the Seafire would get all the way around first, but the Zero would travel a shorter distance, going around a smaller circle; but going around it more slowly.

Of course, this was not ideal. The Seafire pilot's aim was to get behind the Zero, to acheive a firing position, not hurtle merrily along in front. So the FAA used the tactic of alternate climbing and diving turns, in efect a series of near-stall turns, to get behind the Zero. These tactics worked from the first, so I am not sure why you suggest the British forces "had not developed efficient tactics". 

Also, the Zero's best fighting speed was found to be about 180 knots. The Seafire's was anywhere between 220 and 280, which was a nice broad range giving lots of room for manoevre. FAA doctrine was to keep speed up into their own range. If the Zero pilot attempted to match this, his own manoeverability would degrade, and again give the Seafire the edge. The Zero was only really a very manoeverable aircraft at its best fighting speed. Controls, and especially ailerons, became much heavier at higher speeds. This greatly increased the effort needed to horse the aircraft about, and reduced rate of roll, vital in combat. In contrast, the Seafire excelled in the rolling plane. I'm sorry I do not have degree per second figures, but Brown does comment that it was exceptional in its ability to enter a hard roll sharply and positively, and reverse its turn quickly. The only enemy fighter which had an advantage was the Fw190, and even there, the advantage was not a large one.

"Proof of the pudding"? FAA Seafires shot down either 15 or 16 Zeroes for the loss of one of their own. The loss was because the pilot, Sub-Lt Hockley, suffered a radio failure, and was not aware of the need to break until it was too late. He had the appalling bad luck to be killed on the last day of the war.

BTW I know those kill figures are based on pilots combat reports. Brown's Appendix Three lists every Seafire combat individually, so I suspect when he was doing his research he simply went down to the Public Record Office and got the original squadron documents out. And I know everyone over-claimed, which does NOT imply dishonesty. In the heat and confusion of battle, it is impossible to be completely accurate, and all fighter pilots were optimists. If they weren't, they would never have been fighter pilots in the first place. But even allowing for a bit of over-claiming, it is clear that the variants of Seafire deployed in the Pacific enjoyed a decisive superiority over the Zero. 

It has been suggested that a kill should only be regarded as authentic if it is confirmed by the documents of BOTH sides; one side's combat reports, and the other side's loss records. I'm sorry, but I am not going to go there. Even assuming that everyone's records are complete, accurate and available (a VERY large assumption), if we applied that consistently, we'd have to revise the combat totals for everyone; Hartmann, Kojedub, Bong, Johnson, Boyington, the lot. Safer, I think, to simply say that all combat reports overclaim a bit, and leave it at that.

Seafires did have some real weakenesses. They were a poor deck-landing aircraft, and short of range. Both these disdavatages were because the design was an adaptation of a land-based design. But by early 1945, FAA squadrons in the Pacific had to some extent overcome both problems. Deck-landing accidents were down to well under 2% of sorties, and by scrounging some 89 gallon drop tanks designed for P-40s, they had got the strike radius up to over 200 nautical miles, and patrol endurance on station up to over three hours; respectable figures by any standards.

The Seafire's reputation had been crucified by the fiasco at Salerno, where they were badly misused, resulting in a casualty rate of 10% of aircraft written off per sortie in deck-landing accidents, plus many more minor accidents. Understandably, it took a long time to recover.

As for what the RAF and RAAF's experience was with their Spitfires against the Zero; sorry, I haven't a clue! I'd suspect a lot had to do with the Mark (the Mark VIII, deployed late in the Pacific war, had a much higher performance than the Mark V), and the tactics used. I think the title of this thread can lead to some confusion, as it is about comparing both the Spitfire Mk V and the Seafire with the Zero. The fact is, the Sptifire Mk V and the Seafire LIII/FIII were very different aircraft; different performance, different tactical enviroments, different services, and very probably different tactics too. So comparisons which are valid for one will not be valid for the other. 

The Seafire LIII and FIII were specifically optimised for performance at low to medium levels. They were very effective aircraft. Also, the FAA learned very fast, and as a "poor relation" service, was usually very good indeed at improvisation. It had to be; but in a war where the ability to learn and adapt fast often made the difference between life and death, this was no bad thing.


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## Glider (Jul 6, 2008)

Interesting post, I knew that they used P40 tanks but didn't know how much difference it made.
Thanks


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## HoHun (Jul 6, 2008)

Hi John,

>The Zero did NOT out-turn the Seafire, easily or otherwise. What FAA pilots found was that the Zero had a tighter radius of turn, but the Seafire had a much higher rate of turn; i.e it was going around a larger circle, but going round it sufficiently faster to keep safely ahead of the Zero. 

Hm, I guess this is a bit like the turn rate comparison I posted earlier in the thread ... a bit difficult to interpret. I have prepared a new turn rate comparison for the A6M2 and the Seafire LIII - it doesn't seem to leave much room for the Seafire LIII out-turning the Zero by turn rate if both go for the optimum rate turn.

>The Seafire LIII and FIII were specifically optimised for performance at low to medium levels. 

The Seafire LIII certainly was a pure low-altitude aircraft. The A6M2 would seem to have an advantage above 4000 m altitude in all of the main performance criteria, though the medium-altitude FIII would compare more favourably at these altitudes.

I guess it would be more meaningful to see a comparison against the heavier but more powerful A6M3 and A6M5 variants, but I'm afraid I have no good engine data on these aircraft as the TAIC data seems a bit suspect ...

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## John Davies (Jul 6, 2008)

Glider said:


> Interesting post, I knew that they used P40 tanks but didn't know how much difference it made.
> Thanks



Thanks. I’m glad you found it informative. A few more points; and please note I’m away from home tonight, and writing without access to my reference books, completely from memory (so please check and correct as necessary!)

1) Tanks; there were already extra tanks available for the Seafire/Spitfire series. They came in three sizes; 45 gals, 90 gals, and a huge 180 gal ferry tank. They were “slipper” tanks, i.e the upper surface of the tank fitted flush to the lower centre section of the aircraft. They were not quite the best thing ever to come out of the Supermarine design office. Actualy, they were pretty horrible. Because the connection to the aircraft’s fuel system was not accessible when the tank was in place, it was impossible to inspect it and make sure it was properly connected. So sometimes they did not feed properly. Also, sometimes they hung up and would not jettison. FAA Seafire wings in the Pacific were issued with 45 gal slipper tanks, which did not extend their range enough. One wing scrounged some 90 gal slipper tanks from the RAF. Because of the inherent faults of these tanks, they were restricted to flying CAPs close to the fleet. The other wing scrounged 89 gal P40 tanks from the RAAF. These worked very well, (they were hung on the central bomb carrier, and the fuel connection was visible and positive) and Seafires so equipped ranged far and wide, sometimes to the far side of Honshu.

2) The rate of climb figures I quoted for the Seafire in my last post are at full combat boost, which was sustainable for five minutes. I don’t know what happened in the sixth minute. Maybe the conrods came out through the sides of the crankcase. However, if a Seafire pilot was fighting a Zero, he’d use combat boost, so these seemed to be the figures to quote. Climb figures at maximum sustainable boost are less, but still very respectable. I’ll dig the figures out of Brown, if anyone wants them, when I get home. 

3) “The Seafire” by David Brown, seems to be the only standard work on the aircraft. Yes, I know it is not best practice to rely too much on one source, but there doesn’t seem to be much else. If anyone can recommend another source, please let me know. I'd be interested. Brown seems to have done his research well, and to use his data with care. It is long out of print, but it still seems to be available from THE SEAFIRE - BROWN, DAVID. There also seems to be a paperback edition available at Amazon.ca: The Seafire: David Brown: Books. I don’t know about this one. My copy is the hardback.

4) The Seafire LIII and FIII used versions of the Merlin 55. Now if my memory serves me right, this was the engine fitted to the Spitfire Mk VIII, which was designed as the ultimate Merlin Spitfire. Note, the Seafire LIII/FIII was NOT a hooked Spitfire VIII. The Spitfire VIII had various aerodynamic improvements, which the Seafire LIII/FIII did not. If you think of a Spitfire VIII powerplant in a navalised Spitfire Mk V airframe, you’ll not be too far off. Navalisation included a hook (of course), some longitudinal strengthening, so the aircraft did not come apart as the hook engaged, catapult attachment points, and most importantly of all folding wings. The previous mark, the Seafire LIIC, had quite startling performance, but did not have folding wings, so its usefulness was severely limited.

5) Bearing in mind the foregoing, comparisons with the Zero which treat the Seafire LIII/FIII as very approximately equivalent to the Spitfire Mk VIII will not be too far out. Same powerplant, similar (but not identical) airframe. Comparisons with the Zero which treat the Seafire LIII/FIII as equivalent to the Spitfire Mk V will be very misleading. Early Seafires had been basically hooked Spitfire Mk Vs, but by the time the Seafire FIII/LIII series arrived (which were the marks used against the Japanese) a good deal of development had taken place. Add to this the fact that many RAAF Spitfire Mk Vs seem to have used the horrible deep tropical filter (good for a performance penalty of 30 mph any day) and you can see that to throw them in with the marks of Seafire used against the Japanese is really not comparing like with like, and bound to lead to confusion.

6) Keeping track of the development of any WW2 combat aircraft is difficult, as modifications and tweaking were constant. But the Spitfire/Seafire series is one of the more difficult. There were well over thirty marks, most of which were in service during WW2. This is not counting sub-types within marks, which were legion, let alone field modifications. Offhand, I cannot think of another major combat aircraft whose development history is quite so complex. Keeping track of it is a bit of a nightmare. This is NOT helped by some sources who are downright sloppy with their use of data. For instance, I can think of one online source which quotes a range for the Spitfire Mk V which makes it obvious that one of the slipper tanks was in use; but they don’t say which size. That’s only one example of many. There are many others. 

7) One of the beauties of this sort of forum is that it provides a venue where these details can be sorted out. And, as a newcomer, may I say how much I have been impressed by the standards of courtesy shown by the vast majority of posters? Compared with some online environments, it is really very pleasant. It is nice to be debating with people who know how to disagree (sometimes quite strongly), while still remaining completely courteous about it.


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## Glider (Jul 7, 2008)

I know its digressing a little but on Malta they didn't have any long range tanks for the Spitfire so they used two 45 gallon drop tanks from Hurricanes and put them under the fuselage, not the wings. It did look a bit odd but obviously worked and they could be dropped.
Presumably they had a similar improvement on the range of the Spitfire.


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## kool kitty89 (Jul 7, 2008)

Did they ever use the 108 US Gal (90 imp) cylinderical paper tank on the belly of the Spit/Seafire? (tank used for Hurricane ferry flights on the Hurricane's wing pylons, and sometimes used by P-51's) 

I'd immagine it would have been easier than the 2x 45 gal Hurri tanks. (assuming there was enough ground clearance)

And didn't some Spits have pylons for wing tanks?


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## HoHun (Jul 7, 2008)

Hi John,

>If anyone can recommend another source, please let me know. I'd be interested. 

At least with regard to performance data, WWII Aircraft Performance is quite interesting as it reproduces tests for various Seafire models with Merlin 46, Merlin 32, Merlin 50, Merlin 55 and Merlin 55M.

>4) The Seafire LIII and FIII used versions of the Merlin 55. Now if my memory serves me right, this was the engine fitted to the Spitfire Mk VIII, which was designed as the ultimate Merlin Spitfire. 

The Spitfire VIII (Like the Spitfire IX) actually had a 60 series Merlin engine, which had a two-speed, two-stage supercharger with intercooler so that it was more of a high-altitude engine. The Merlin variants used on the Seafire all had a single-speed, single-stage supercharger, in the case of the Merlin 55M even with a "cropped" supercharger impeller to further boost low-altitude power.

Here is a good overview of Merlin engines:

Rolls-Royce V1650 Merlin Engine

Accordlingy, the Seafire really was much like a Spitfire V in its performance characteristics, with the additional weight and drag of the carrier equipment leaving it without the excellent high-altitude performance the Spitfire IX and VIII were famous for. I'm not sure why the Merlin 60 series was not used for the Seafire - the rearward centre-of-gravity position Crosley describes would probably have been improved by the fitting of the two-stage engine, just as it was later improved by mouting the Griffon. Maybe the extra weight that did not result in any extra low-altitude power for take-off was the reason to stay with the single-stage Merlins?

>Add to this the fact that many RAAF Spitfire Mk Vs seem to have used the horrible deep tropical filter (good for a performance penalty of 30 mph any day) [...]

Hm, I believe there were different tropical filter versions and I'm not sure which one AB320 used, but the penalty doesn't seem to have been quite that heavy: "This aircraft was fully tropicalised; this included an air cleaner installation whose fairing produced an external bulge beneath the nose, and tropical radiator and oil cooler installations."

Spitfire Mk.VB (Tropical) AB.320 Report

I have extended my comparison to include a Spitfire Vb running at +9 lbs/sqin that is equivalent to AB320. As you can see, the Seafire LIII with its cropped supercharger easily outperforms the tropicalized Spitfire Vb below 3 km, but at 4 km and above, the Spitfire Vb really is superior.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## parsifal (Jul 7, 2008)

* But even allowing for a bit of over-claiming, it is clear that the variants of Seafire deployed in the Pacific enjoyed a decisive superiority over the Zero. *


I have to respond to that by saying that the large kill advantage enjoyed by the seafire over the Zeke, was mainly because of poor pilot qulaty, rasther than the inherent weaknesses of the zeke design. in the hands of a skilled pilot, a zeke was still a formidable opponent. The evidence of this is harder to find, as the war progresses but its there. The performance of the Phil Sea survivors, against the US counterattack, where just 35 zekes gave good account against more than 200 attackers, with a heavy Hellcat presence. This at least suggests, that inthe hands of an experienced pilot, the zeke was an adversary desrving of respect. One wonders how the seafires would have performed if they had been up against decnt pilots in 1942. in 1943, the land based equivalents of the sefire, at Darwin apparently did not do that well at all. This, i believe was because the pilots that flew them tried to employ dogfight tactics against the Zeke, which was a dogfight machine perfecto.


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## John Davies (Jul 7, 2008)

Thanks all of you. Of course the Spitfire Mk VIII had a Merlin 60! (That'll teach me not to post late at night and tired and from memory without any books handy!) And I even know a group of people who are in the early stages of restoring a Mk VIII. I really ought not to have dropped that, and I hope none of them are reading this! My apologies, anyway. I very much stand corrected, and am perfectly happy to.

The Merlin 55M had a cropped supercharger impeller precisely because it was designed for use at low to medium level. If the air is dense enough, there is less point in using up engine horsepower to motor a supercharger. This meant that almost the full power of the engine was available for climb, or acceleration, or takeoff (Seafires were not usually catapulted, they usually wound up and went). Obviously, at higher altitudes, where the air is thinner, a supercharger is needed to pack a full charge of fuel/air mix into the engine to get a decent performance, even a two-stage supercharger with intercooler. 

The RN saw the Seafire as being primarily tasked with the defence of the fleet. They saw this, logically enough, as taking place at low to medium level, so optimised performance for those levels. The Seafire would out-perform most carrier fighters up to about 10-12,000 feet. Brown has some figures on pounds-per-horsepower, which makes it plain that the Seafire's power-to-weight ratio was higher than the Hellcat or Corsair; in its best range. But at higher altitude, the big American aircraft came into their own because their engines were better supercharged. Going from memory, again, but I'm pretty sure they had two-stage set-ups.

Drop tanks; the problem was indeed ground clearance. A circular section tank of any useful capacity would foul the ground in the three-point attitude. The tanks designed for the P-40s had an oval, flattened section, for the same reason. They fitted the Seafire's central bomb rack very well. I confess I hadn't heard of what the Malta Spitfires used.

This meant that the Seafire's usefulness as a strike aircraft was restricted. If you carried a drop tank, you couldn't carry a bomb. If you carried a bomb, you were restricted to limited range on internal fuel. And in any case, it was difficult for the Seafire to deliver a bomb with any accuracy. A good deal of guesswork was involved. 

Some RAF Spitfires were equipped to carry a 250 lb bomb under each wing. Apparently this sometimes caused structural problems. Seafires were not. Rockets were not fitted to Seafires until after the war. So if a Seafire was used for ground attack, its weapon was mostly its cannon, which did lay down a useful path of splinter damage each side of the direct impact area; but then just think of all that vulnerable liquid-cooling pipework waiting for a round from light AA. I'm surprised the FAA didn't lose any in this sort of mission. Mostly, they were tasked as escort/cover to proper strike aircraft, or as interceptors in a defensive role. This they did very well, hardly surprising, as that was what the basic airframe had originally been developed for.

I can understand why RAF/RAAF pilots might have tried to dogfight the Zero in their Spitfires. Until it met the Zero, the Spitfire had been the dogfighter supreme, exploiting its ability to to turn inside its opponents. So using tactics that had been successful against other opponents must have been tempting. But fighting the Zero in a turning battle around the Zero's best fighting speed would have been simply asking for trouble. 

I've already covered FAA doctrine; keep your speed up into your best range, fight on your terms, not his, never try to match the Zero's radius of turn, exploit your higher rate of turn. Most fighter vs fighter combat is about playing to your aircraft's strengths and to your opponents weaknesses, so it seems that the FAA had it well worked out, possibly better than the RAF.

Poor Japanese pilot quality in the closing stages of the war: I must confess, I had wondered about that. Brown gives an account of a Seafire pilot who did fight a Zero, on the Zero's terms (a turning battle around 180 knots), and won. He should not have done. He should have died. Unless, of course, the Japanese pilot was not very good. It's an intangible factor, unpredictable, impossible to quantify, and likely to be as important as everything else put together.

Comparisons/equivalency between the Seafire LIII and the Spitfire Mk V? I'm still not happy about this, because of one factor; the Seafire's startling rate of climb at full combat boost. I haven't seen figures which suggest that the Spit Mk V matched the Seafire in this respect (although figures I have seen are infuriatingly vague, and don't make plain if they are referring to continuous maximum or to five minute combat power for the Spit, so thanks very much for the detailed info on the various marks of Merlin!).... but anyway, a rapid and steep climb was especially useful against the Zero, and FAA tactics obviously exploited it to the full. 

Henning thanks VERY much for the graphs on rate of climb. Loads of good info there, and I confess I haven't absorbed it all in detail yet, but they really do fill in a lot of the gaps. The comparison with the Spit Mk V is especially interesting. It seems to confirm what Brown suggests, the Seafire LIII had an edge up to about 10-12,000 feet, and rather runs out of steam higher up. In other words, it was good at what it was designed for; the defence of the fleet at low to medium altitudes.

Tropical filters; there were two main kinds, the Vokes and the Aboukir. One was quite small and discreet. The other one was huge, and hung below the nose looking rather like a pelican's beak. Trouble is, I can't remember which was which. (Help, someone?). But anyway, I have seen a performance penalty of 30 mph quoted for the big one, and I have seen pictures of RAAF Spitfire Mk Vs fitted with it. It cannot have helped.


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## John Davies (Jul 7, 2008)

Henning thanks again for the graphs. Having had some time to absorb them, they really do show just what a highly specialised aircraft the Seafire LIII was; also just what a substantial edge it had within its area of specialisation, and just how comparatively useless it was outside it. Fortunately the RN used it within its area of specialisation, which doubtless is a major reason for its success.

I’d got roughly the same picture from a close reading of Brown. But a good visual presentation is much more striking. It can also convey much more information. So I am very grateful indeed.

One of the things I have already come to love about this forum is the amount of good hard info that is available from it. I get so TIRED of some of the stuff that is around in published sources; rates of climb quoted without making it clear if this is at normal max or full combat boost, a best rate of climb quoted without saying at what altitude the aircraft achieved it (good one, that, and far too common); I’ve even seen one source say the Seafire was deployed on CAP “because it was an efficient high-altitude fighter”, the one thing which by any reasonable standard it was not. So this forum is a welcome breath of fresh air, and I tell you it is a complete education for me!


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## Wildcat (Jul 7, 2008)

John Davies said:


> Tropical filters; there were two main kinds, the Vokes and the Aboukir. One was quite small and discreet. The other one was huge, and hung below the nose looking rather like a pelican's beak. Trouble is, I can't remember which was which. (Help, someone?). But anyway, I have seen a performance penalty of 30 mph quoted for the big one, and I have seen pictures of RAAF Spitfire Mk Vs fitted with it. It cannot have helped.



All the MkVc spitfires which defended Darwin were fitted with the bulky Vokes filter. I'm not very knowledgable in this field, but it's worth mentioning the fact that the RAAF did trial a locally built air filter to replace the vokes in the hope to improve its performance at high altitude. IIRC the improvement was hardly worthwhile and not adopted. Someone else might be more clued up on this then me.

Pic I took of a RAAF MkVc with Vokes filter as fitted to spitfires of 79sqnRAAF in the Pacific.


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## HoHun (Jul 7, 2008)

Hi John,

>Henning thanks again for the graphs. Having had some time to absorb them, they really do show just what a highly specialised aircraft the Seafire LIII was; also just what a substantial edge it had within its area of specialisation, and just how comparatively useless it was outside it. 

You're welcome, and I fully agree with your assessment  

Not a Seafire story, but I believe Pierre Clostermann in his book mentions a mission with 'clipped and cropped' Spitfires excorting Hurribombers, describing how nervous they were because they knew they were flying at the top of their "good" altitude band. If they had met Luftwaffe aircraft, they'd have had a hard time climbing above them to start the fight with an advantage.

>I get so TIRED of some of the stuff that is around in published sources; rates of climb quoted without making it clear if this is at normal max or full combat boost, a best rate of climb quoted without saying at what altitude the aircraft achieved it (good one, that, and far too common)

Absolutely! I have to say that members of the community have done much more to address this shortcoming than the authors of the books that fill our shelves. Mike William's site (WWII Aircraft Performance) is a regular treasure for example, but many other people have contributed valuable data as well - improving our understanding of WW2 aviation far beyond what one might learn from the books 

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## HoHun (Jul 7, 2008)

Hi Wildcat,

>Pic I took of a RAAF MkVc with Vokes filter as fitted to spitfires of 79sqnRAAF in the Pacific.

Thanks a lot for the great pictures!  The one with the reflection on the starboard glazing of the canopy is most intersting - seldom does the bulged look show so clearly in a photograph!

I have to admit that the looks of the Vokes filter are slightly shocking indeed. In addition to the drag penalty it applied, it also reduced the useful ram effect to insignifant proportions. In my analysis, I had to reduce it to 15 % ram efficiency to match the historical figures, while normally I'd use 60 to 70 %. You can see from the graphs that, unlike for the Seafire LIII, there is hardly a difference in full throttle height between the speed and the climb graphs of the Spitfire Vb trop. Looking at that gigantic filter, I'm ready to believe that this is perfectly realistic 

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## John Davies (Jul 7, 2008)

Henning,

Looking at your excellent graphs a bit more, it seems possible to move towards some fairly definite conclusions.

1)The Seafire LIII enjoyed a decisive performance advantage over the Zero, in both speed and rate of climb, provided it stayed within its best fighting height, i.e below about 12,000 feet.

2) FAA tactics for fighting the Zero in a series of alternating climbing and diving turns, (as I’ve described in previous posts) exploited this intelligently, and worked well, despite the Zero’s tighter radius of turn. 

3) Without this performance advantage, the tactic would not have worked. If the Zero had been able to out-climb the Seafire in the climb phase of the manoevre, it could have bounced it in the dive phase of the manoevre, and shot it out of the sky. In reality, of course, it was the other way around, and it was almost always the Seafire which shot the Zero down, which is exactly what you would expect from your data. 

4) Turning to the Spitfire Vb trop, the picture is very different, and rather dismaying. It is not nearly so clear what the Spitfire Vb trop could do against the Zero. The Zero can out-turn it at any level. Up to about 15,000 feet the Zero can also out-climb it. Above that height the Spitfire’s climb advantage is too small to be decisive. So the tactics the Seafire LIII used would not have worked for the Spitfire Vb trop, because the aircraft’s characteristics did not allow them. Traditional Spitfire tactics of relying on the aircraft’s ability to turn inside most things would not have worked either, because the Zero was the great exception. In fact, the Spitfire Vb trop’s only decisive advantage appears to be that it was faster than the Zero at all altitudes. That suggests that ambush tactics might have worked; one fast pass, then get out as fast as possible. Staying around to fight would probably have been a very bad idea. All things considered, I am not at all surprised they had a rough time of it.

5) The story from Closterman is very interesting. Possibly a comparison between the performance of the Seafire LIII and the Spitfire Mk V LF (i.e cropped and clipped) might reveal quite close similarities.


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## slaterat (Jul 7, 2008)

I don't know why the volkes filter on the Spit V was so large. It is much larger than the volkes filter on the Hurricane. The Spit V loses 16 mph in top speed from 370 to 354. The Hurricane II loses 5 mph from 340 to 335.
The loss in climb is greater too, although because of the different superchargers I'm not sure if they can be fairly compared. ie the Hurricanes best climb is its initial climb ,while the spit V is at 14-15,000 ft.

Although the volkes filters are often criticized in many books, the arguement for their installation is that without them , in dusty conditions , the merlins would of worn out very rapidly, leaving the planes with an even greater performance handicap.

Slaterat


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## parsifal (Jul 7, 2008)

slaterat said:


> Although the volkes filters are often criticized in many books, the arguement for their installation is that without them , in dusty conditions , the merlins would of worn out very rapidly, leaving the planes with an even greater performance handicap.
> 
> Slaterat




But the issue is how much less efficient were these filters in comparison to the opposition. I have seen MC202s fitted with a sand filter, for desert operations, with nowhere near the drag and weight penalties that the Vokes filter appear to impose. So, if the italians could produce a more efficient filter, what went wrong for the allies to produce something like this thing?


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## Parmigiano (Jul 7, 2008)

Totally different technology, i.e. the DB601 of the MC202 (and of the Bf109 Trop) had fuel injection, the Merlin had carburettors.
Probably the DB needed a much smaller 'box' at equal air volume.


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## John Davies (Jul 8, 2008)

I think the reason for the Vokes filter was plain bad design. The Supermarine design office must have been incredibly busy during WW2, and was possibly a bit over-stretched. The Spitfire was developed through nineteen marks during WW2. They got up to the Spitfire 21 before the war ended, but numbers XV and XVII were Griffon-engined Seafires. Earlier, Merlin-engined marks of Seafire had their own numbering system outside the Spitfire series. Confusing, isn’t it? Now add the development of sub-types within marks, the whole Seafire series, and a good deal more besides. I can’t think of another basic airframe that was subjected to such intense and continuous development over such a long period.

Britain was short of everything in WW2; not just materials, but also skilled labour. The Vokes monstrosity looks to me as if it was designed by the junior draftsman on a bad day. Later, (by 1944) it was replaced by something much better. The Spitfire Mk VIII mostly served overseas, and most (or perhaps all, I’m not sure) were fitted with a neat little “Aero-Vee” filter which looked like a slight forward extension of the carburettor air intake, and was such a tidy installation that you had to look twice to see it was there. It was also fitted to all Seafire FIIIs and LIIIIs

Interestingly, the Vokes monstrosity was briefly fitted to some Seafires; and to the worst-performing Seafires at that. (The Mk IIC) The result was an aircraft that could be out-performed by the Wildcat Mk IV. The recipe? Take one Spitfire Mk Vc. Now add a hook, reinforced slinging points, catapult attachment points (“catapult spools”), and longitudinal strengthening so the aircraft does not separate into two pieces as the hook engages. All this adds a bit over 10% extra weight and some drag. Now, if you are serving in the Mediterranean, add the horrible Vokes filter, which according to Brown meant a further performance penalty of up to 25 mph speed and 300 fpm climb. Unsurprisingly, the FAA decided they would rather accept the risk of rapid engine wear.

The Admiralty pretty rapidly concluded that this was not what they needed. Since the majority of over-water interceptions took place at low to medium level, and certainly below 20,000 feet, Supermarine rapidly developed the Seafire LIIC with the Merlin 32, which had a very useful performance at low to medium level. It did quite well against Bf 109s, held its own against the Fw190, and could just about catch the Ju88, which not all Spitfires could. However, it did not have folding wings, which restricted its usefulness. 

The LIIC was followed by the FIII, which did have folding wings, and was a capable medium level fighter. It was produced in quite small numbers, (103 in all) as the FAA relied on its Hellcats and Corsairs at medium to high level, where they excelled. 

The real successor to the LIIC was the LIII. Like the FIII, it had folding wings. At low level (up to about 12,000 feet), the Seafire LIII was an excellent aircraft. 

As far as I know, in this (admittedly specialised) area, the Seafire LIII was unmatched by any other carrier-based fighter of its time, (except possibly another Seafire, the LIIC) and had the edge over a good many land-based fighters too. It might have been designed as a specialised low-level Zero-killer. Both Henning's graphs and the data in Brown make that very clear. It was produced in larger numbers than any other mark of Seafire. (Over 1100). 

Also, as we've seen, (thanks for those graphs, again!) the Seafire LIII's characteristics were quite different from the basic Spitfire V. This means that trying to reach conclusions based on treating the two aircraft as alike will be highly misleading. Quite posssibly the Spitfire Mk V LF (cropped and clipped) that the RAF used in Europe had a similar performance to the Seafire LIII. I haven't seen the figures, but they were both specialised low-level variants. But that's not the variant of Spitfire the RAAF had at Darwin.

As for how the FAA Seafire squadrons might have done if they had gone up aginst the Zero before 1944, that's an interesting question. Because of course they would not have had the LIII. It did not reach the squadrons until February 1944. 

If they had had the Seafire 1B, which first went to sea in the autumn of 1942, they might have had the same problems as the RAAF had with their Spitfire Mk Vs, because the Seafire 1B was a very similar aircraft. If they had had the Seafire IIC, which was available shortly afterwards, they would probably have done a good deal worse, because this was basically a hooked Spitfire Mk V plus quite a lot of extra naval gubbins, which of course reduced its performance. (The 1B had been a very basic conversion, which did not receive the full kit of naval bits and pieces) But if they had had the Seafire LIIC, which was at sea from May 1943, the Zeroes would have had quite an ugly shock, because this was the fastest-climbing mark of Merlin Seafire of them all, at least at low to medium level. It was even better in the climb than the LIII, reaching 4,600 fpm at full combat boost at 6,000 feet, an extraordinary figure. And as we have seen, the FAA's successful tactics against the Zero exploited the LIII's high rate of climb to the full, so with the LIIC they might have worked even better.


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## HoHun (Jul 8, 2008)

Hi Parmigiano,

>Totally different technology, i.e. the DB601 of the MC202 (and of the Bf109 Trop) had fuel injection, the Merlin had carburettors.

Hm, I don't think this had much to do with it. The advantage of the Axis fighters was the "clamshell" shutter of their air filters that made it possible to feed unfiltered air under ram pressure to the engine once the aircraft was above the altitude at which dust was usually found. This air filter type was an Italian invention, and it seems to have been highly successful - though it inevitably surrendered a bit of performance in comparison to filter-less aircraft, too.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## HoHun (Jul 9, 2008)

Hi John,

>As for how the FAA Seafire squadrons might have done if they had gone up aginst the Zero before 1944, that's an interesting question. Because of course they would not have had the LIII. It did not reach the squadrons until February 1944. 

Hm, if we're talking about such a late date, it might be better to bring in a later Zero variant with a two-speed supercharger for comparison.

The problem is that there is little good data on these later Zero variants. The TAIC intelligence manual provides some engine data for the Sakae 11, 21 and 31A as used in the A6M2, A6M3 and A6M5 respectively, but it looks awfully generic to me, and it doesn't seem to match the performance graphs also provided by TAIC too well in my opinion.

I've included an A6M3 comparison, based on the assumption that the TAIC engine data for the Sakae 21 is correct, and that the A6M3 gained no net drag over the A6M2, its smaller wing making up for any effects of the larger engine (in high-speed flight).

Note that this is a relatively rough estimate only - however, A6M test data is entirely inconsistent (as you can see from the graphical summary I posted earlier in this thread), and at least the A6M3 data point of 540 km/h at ca. 5 km is closely matched by my calculation - though one really has to ask why the Australians would select the gear change altitude (where the aircraft is especially slow) as a reference point.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## parsifal (Jul 9, 2008)

Examples of the C202 with sand filter. As can be seen it was a much more clean fiting aerodynamically speaking


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## Soren (Jul 11, 2008)

John Davies,

It is simply not true that the Seafire turned at a higher rate than ANY version of the Zero. The A6M2, 3 5(a,b,c) all enjoyed a considerably higher turn rate than the Spitfire Seafire at all speeds up to 275 mph where the elevators would stiffen up to a level where the average pilot would find it hard to achieve full elevator authority.

As for the Seafire's climb rate, it didn't go past 4,100 fpm AFAIK, which is the same as the A6M5.

The A6M5's performance was as follows:
Max SL speed: 485 km/h (WEP)
Top speed: 565 km/h at 6km (WEP)
Climb rate: ~4,200 ft/min


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## John Davies (Jul 12, 2008)

Soren said:


> John Davies,
> 
> It is simply not true that the Seafire turned at a higher rate than ANY version of the Zero. The A6M2, 3 5(a,b,c) all enjoyed a considerably higher turn rate than the Spitfire Seafire at all speeds up to 275 mph where the elevators would stiffen up to a level where the average pilot would find it hard to achieve full elevator authority.
> 
> ...



The problem with this sort of performance comparison is the figures are pretty meaningless unless the source also specifies some extra data; like what mark are we talking about, at what height, and at what speed, is the rate of climb or rate of turn obtained, are we talking about normal continuous power or 5 minute emergency power, etc etc? Brown, who is my main source, is better than most, and seems to have done his research well, but even so he is not perfect. 

Anyway, for the Seafire LIII, the main mark deployed in the Pacific, he quotes 4160 fpm at sea level, which accords pretty well with your 4,100 fpm, but the higher rate of 4,310 fpm at 6,000 feet, both at full combat boost. These figures are fairly close to Henning’s calculated figures, if my reading of his excellent graphs, and conversions from metres per second to feet per minute are anywhere near right. The graphs also show that the Seafire LIII’s climb advantage over the A6M2 ran out after about 8,100 feet, making it plain that this version of the Seafire was very much a low-level special. 

As for rate of turn, Brown is unequivocal about this. I must admit, this did surprise me a lot, because I was under the impression that nothing turned inside a Zero, but it’s all there on page 156 of the hardback edition. 

He says that the Seafire’s rate of turn (i.e degrees per second around a 360 degree circle) was greater than the Zero’s, even though the radius of its turn was also greater; i.e the Seafire was going around a larger circle, but going round much faster; BUT (and it’s a vitally important “BUT”), only if the Seafire pilot kept his speed up into his best fighting range, and above the Zero’s best fighting speed…. because, as you quite correctly state, the controls of the Zero tended to stiffen up as speed increased. The aim was therefore to keep the speed up into the range where the Zero’s manoeverability deteriorated. Pilot reports I've read, as well as Jeff Quill's "Spitfire", (a highly recommended read, BTW) suggest that the Spitfire's elevators remained light and positive at all normal speeds, but the ailerons did tend to stiffen above about 300. I expect the Seafire was much the same, as it was the same basic airframe.

Brown gives the Zero’s best fighting speed as 180 mph, and the Seafire’s as anything between 220 and 280 mph. 

Incidentally, I was a little puzzled by one thing. Brown quotes speeds in mph, but to the best of my knowledge the ASIs of naval aircraft were calibrated in knots. However, his figures seem to check out well enough in mph against other published sources, so they are probably about right. Brown is also quite clear that at the Zero’s best fighting speed, which he gives as about 180 mph, both its rate of turn and its radius of turn were quite definitely superior to the Seafire’s. 

I think I may have quoted Seafire fighting speeds in knots in an earlier post. If so, my mistake. 

This was why the FAA’s Air Fighting Notes made it clear that when fighting a Zero, it was very important to keep the speed up into the Seafire’s best range, and fight in a series of climbing and diving near-stall turns. Being drawn into slowing down to the Zero’s best speed was a recipe for disaster, so FAA pilots were strongly briefed not to do it.

Unfortunately, Brown does not give any figures for either radius of turn at different speeds, or rate of turn at different speeds, for either the Seafire or the Zero. It is this sort of thing that so often annoys me about printed sources. 

Going back to page 12 of this thread, Parsifal comments that pilot quality may have had more to do with it than anything else. I have to agree. On p128 of the hardback edition, Brown describes a combat where Sub-Lieutenant G.J. Murphy, RNVR, took on not one but two A6M5s, in a turning battle, at their best fighting speed, not his, and shot them both down. (Maybe he hadn’t read the FAA’s Air Fighting Notes !) By any reasonable standards, he should not have won. He should have been shot out of the sky. This suggests that by this stage, well towards the end of the war, the Japanese pilots the Seafires met were not very good, and this may have as much to do with the Seafire’s excellent kill ratio as anything else.

Two final points; firstly, quoted differences of a couple of hundred feet per minute one way or the other probably don’t mean very much in practice. Quoted best rate-of-climb figures will have been derived from tests with a new aircraft in top condition, flown by a test pilot. How much service an individual aircraft has seen, what standards of maintenance are like, the way it is rigged, and pilot technique, can all account for at least 5% difference one way or the other, and if we are talking of rates in the 4,000 fpm range, that’s 200 fpm, or about the quoted difference between Seafire and A6M5. So perhaps the only really safe conclusion is that both these aircraft had a best rate of climb somewhere over 4,000 fpm, and both were far ahead of any other carrier-based fighters of the period in this respect. 

Secondly, the best-climbing Seafire of all was the LIIC, which was capable of 4,600 fpm at 6,000 feet at combat boost. Compared to this, the later-mark LIII, which was capable of the lower rate of 4,310 at the same height, seems like a retrograde step. Or maybe not. 

On p22 of the hardback edition, Brown comments that the Merlin 55 and 55M, fitted to the FIII and LIII, had “….an automatic boost control and barometric governing of the full-throttle height. Hitherto these had had to be controlled by the pilot, and only experience could give an individual the ability to make the most of the engine’s performance, at its best only under certain conditions of outside air temperature and atmospheric pressure.”

Now I confess I don’t really know enough about the care and feeding of large supercharged liquid-cooled piston aero-engines to understand exactly what that means in practice. If anyone can educate me, please do. 

But I suspect it means that to get the best out of the LIIC’s Merlin 32 meant fiddling with fine adjustments on the engine controls, feasible under test but undesirable in combat, whereas the LIII’s full power was obtainable just by pushing the lever forward. So while it had a lower theoretical rate of climb than the LIIC, it was more easily attainable in practice. 

So, quite possibly, the mark with the less favourable rate of climb according to the numbers might perform better in a practical situation in combat. Quite honestly, the further I get into the data, the more confused I get. It is very clear that there are no simple answers.


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## Soren (Jul 12, 2008)

John Davies,

Brown has made some strange comparisons in his time and was perhaps a bit too fond of the Spitfire, so I wouldn't take what he says as gospel. 

HoHun's tables are more accurate as they rely on the undeniable real world physics, so they are excellent reference points.

But that put aside, in terms of max turn rate I can tell for a fact that the A6M Zero's was considerably higher than that of the Seafire Spitfire's up to 275 mph, where the elevator forces reached a level where it was hard to achieve full deflection. So Brown's claim that the Seafire/Spitfire could complete a 360 faster just simply isn't true if the Zeke pilot is pulling full deflection.

But all in all we pretty much agree though, on the climb rate issue as-well, 200 ft/min is really not important in combat, esp. not if you're line abreast at 300y and you both enter a climb cause then there was plenty of time for you to blow the enemy fighter to pieces.


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## John Davies (Jul 12, 2008)

Soren said:


> John Davies,
> 
> Brown has made some strange comparisons in his time and was perhaps a bit too fond of the Spitfire, so I wouldn't take what he says as gospel.
> 
> ...



I must admit I was never too happy about relying on one main source too heavily. Trouble is, there isn’t much written about the Seafire. David Brown’s book seems to be about the only full-length treatment, and it does seem to be mostly well researched. 

He has been described as a “Seafire apologist”, but on the other hand he does give a pretty good account of its failings, and as well as performance statistics he does produce some very interesting other figures. Like 26 pounds per square foot wing loading. That’s a Seafire’s wing loading with only a little fuel left; low enough to float in the ground effect for quite some distance if the approach speed is even a tiny bit too fast. Not a problem on a big grass field, which was what the basic airframe had been designed for, but on deck this means a float over all the wires and into the barrier if the pilot does not get his approach lined up absolutely exactly right. Add to that very light elevators, with stick forces measured in ounces, so unintended changes of attitude can all too easily occur, plus very poor ahead vision in the landing attitude, and I suppose it is a tribute to everyone that there were not more aircraft written off in the barriers than was in fact the case. Also a measure of just how desperate the FAA was to contemplate taking such an aircraft to sea in the first place.

There was one UK printing of the book in hardback, in 1973. There’s one for sale on ebay right now (Item number: 270246568016, if anyone is interested). The United States Naval Institute thought well enough of the book to re-publish it in paperback in 1989, which suggests that it is a reasonably good source. If it was rubbish, presumably they would not have taken it on. 

But turn inside a Zero? Although Brown is quite unambiguous, I must confess I did wonder if he had got that bit right. Which I suppose leaves two closely related questions; why did the FAA Air Fighting Notes technique of keeping the speed up and fighting in a series of alternately climbing and diving turns work? Because descriptions of individual combats, presumably drawn from pilots combat reports, make it plain they did. And secondly, why did the Seafire establish such an excellent kill ratio against what does seem to have been a more nimble opponent? The FAA lost ONE Seafire to A6M5s, and that was because of a radio failure. The pilot didn’t hear the warning to break. 

I’m perfectly happy to accept you are right, and at any given speed, the Zero was superior in both radius and rate of turn. But what if the two aircraft were flying at different speeds, if the Zero was at about 180 mph trying to pull as tight a turn as possible, and the Seafire was at about 250-ish plus? Then you might get the “larger turn radius but higher turn rate” situation Brown describes. As I said in my last post, he is infuriatingly vague about specific turn rates, specific turn radii, and how these changed for both aircraft as speed changed. Of course, to allow such a situation to arise, the Zero pilots would be failing to exploit the best characteristics of their aircraft. 

Maybe it really does very largely come down to pilot quality, and by the time the Seafire arrived in the Pacific, most of the better IJN pilots were already dead…….. killed off by the USN, no doubt!


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## parsifal (Jul 12, 2008)

Hi John

I thought Hennings graphs show that Zeke was faster in a sustained turn , could outclimb it above 3000 metres (roughly), and also enjoyed a speed advantage above a certain height. Perhaps we should ask Henning to give a plain english instruction on how to read is graphs???

For the record I am a great fan of the Zeke, but I would be surprised if the A6M5 could outperform the late war seafires. Tactics, pilots, and dive/speed as wel as roll rate made the Seafire a better propsition IMO. My earlier comments were just trying to point out that your comparisons were not on a level playing field. Given two pilots of equal quality, it would be a much closer affair than the 16:1 ratio you had reported.


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## John Davies (Jul 13, 2008)

parsifal said:


> Hi John
> 
> I thought Hennings graphs show that Zeke was faster in a sustained turn , could outclimb it above 3000 metres (roughly), and also enjoyed a speed advantage above a certain height. Perhaps we should ask Henning to give a plain english instruction on how to read is graphs???
> 
> For the record I am a great fan of the Zeke, but I would be surprised if the A6M5 could outperform the late war seafires. Tactics, pilots, and dive/speed as wel as roll rate made the Seafire a better propsition IMO. My earlier comments were just trying to point out that your comparisons were not on a level playing field. Given two pilots of equal quality, it would be a much closer affair than the 16:1 ratio you had reported.



You are quite right, a lot depends on height. As I read Henning's graphs, the Seafire outclimbed the A6M3 Zero by roughly 500 fpm up to about 3,000 feet. That is a significant advantage, and enough to make a real difference in combat. According to the graphs, the A6M3 reached its best rate of climb around 7,500 feet, by which point the Seafire's rate of climb had deteriorated to well below the Zero's rate.

Henning's calculated values differ bit from figures I've seen quoted. He places the Seafire's best rate of climb at about 3,000 feet, whereras figures I've seen place it at about twice that. But despite that, the principle remains the same. The Seafire held the advantage in climb very low down, the A6M3 (and almost certainly the A6M5 too) did so above that.

So it would be very interesting to know at exactly what height the encounters between Seafires and A6M5s took place. This is just where Brown is annoyingly vague. He refers to a couple of occasions where Seafires on "Jack" patrols intercepted (and splashed) A6M3 kamikazes runing in at 500 feet. And he says that the majority of over-water interceptions took place fairly low down. But he does not give specific heights for most of the combats he describes and lists. It's a pity, because this would really shed a lot of light on the matter.

I suppose if I really wanted to know badly enough, I could get a reader's ticket to the Public Records Office and request sight of the original pilots' combat reports. This is in accordance with the best research methods, which are always to go back to primary sources wherever possible. Secondary sources (i.e any published book) are always influenced by the author's biases and selection of material. But I don't have time, and there is too much else to do, as ever.

There is another possible factor. Most Seafire/A6M5 combats took place in 1945. By then the IJN was short of fuel, and some of what it had was poor quality and improperly refined. The FAA had spent much of January 1945 attacking the Sumatran oil refineries. So, were the engines of the A6M5s the Seafires met in 1945 running on the proper brew, and developing full power? There is such a lot that it is not really possible to know at over sixty years distance.


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## Soren (Jul 13, 2008)

Parsifal,

I am unaware of what stick force figures Henning has used for his calculations or what engine power (Or thrust) figures he has used, all of which are very influential on the final outcome of the calculations. So if he could provide them then we would get a more complete picture.

I speculate that Henning is using too low power figures for the A6M3, as in reality the A6M3 climbed at some 4,500 ft/min while running on WEP (1,130 HP), while the 200 kg heavier A6M5 climbed at some ~4,200 ft/min and was faster because of extra thrust provided by newly designed exhaust pipes.

Now on the other hand the A6M3 is surprisingly fast in Hennings calc's, some 10 km/h faster than the listed speed of the A6M5 in many books (565 km/h), while in reality the A6M5 was the faster of the two as far as I can tell from my sources. But perhaps these figures are not for when running on WEP??


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## Soren (Jul 13, 2008)

John Davies,

The 16:1 kill ratio I personally doubt very much, and it is undoubtedly an overblown figure. The RAF RAFN's confirmation procedures weren't the most thurough in the world.

Now that having been said I am in no doubt about the Spitfire Seafires superiority over the Zeke, as long as they didn't get suckered into a turn and burn dogfight. The Zero's achilles heel was its low redline speed and high control forces above 275 mph, and once the Allies knew about it they started blasting it out of the sky in increasing numbers.

A Spitfire or Seafire pilot in the hot spot with a Zeke on his tail could do as the USN pilots did; Roll over, dive dive dive, pull out, climb climb climb and vupti you've suddenly turned the tables and have gained an energy advantage over the trailing Zeke. This was the no.1 evasive tactic if you had a Zeke on your tail, anything else being extremely hazardous, the very reason behind why it was important NOT fly at low alt in areas where there were Zeros present. 

When operating in areas where Zeros were present the USN RAFN fighters flew high enough for them to be able to escape by diving away if they were unlucky enough to be unsuspectingly bounced by Zeros.


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## John Davies (Jul 13, 2008)

Soren said:


> John Davies,
> 
> The 16:1 kill ratio I personally doubt very much, and it is undoubtedly an overblown figure. The RAF RAFN's confirmation procedures weren't the most thurough in the world.
> 
> ...



I'm quite prepapred to admit that the FAA's claims are a bit exaggerated. Everyone overclaimed to some extent, because in the heat and confusion of battle, it's impossible to be really sure; also all fighter pilots are optimists, or they would not be fighter pilots! But even knocking off a bit for over-claiming, it is still an impressive record. 

Since low level was the area where the Seafire did have a climb advantage over the Zero (the Zero's best rate of climb came in higher up), the FAA seem to have used a mirror-image of the tactic you describe; pull into a hard climb, exploiting the Seafire's high rate and angle of climb to the full, break into the enemy, then dive, then if needs be climb again; classic "boom and zoom" tactics, as you describe. A power to weight ratio of about four and a half pounds per horsepower meant very good accelleration, as well as a very good rate and angle of climb, in its best height range.

Of course, if anyone else tried this tactic; if you tried it in a fighter with a more usual climb rate (say about 2,750-3000 fpm, rather than the Seafire's 4000 fpm plus), it would be suicide. (And this includes the Spitfire Vb trop with that horrible great filter nailed on the front!) But the results indicate that the Seafire could do it and get away with it, pretty consistently.

Obviously, it was important not to leave it too late to break into a climb once the Zeroes were on the way down. The Seafire's sole loss to A6Ms was when an experienced pilot (he was leader of his section) suffered a radio failure, did not get the warning, and left it too late.

Interestingly, Johniie Johnson, in his autobiography "Wing Leader", describes a comparable tactic used by pilots of the Spitfire XII against FW 190s. The Mk XII was the first griffon-engined version. It had a single-stage supercharger, and like the Seafire LIII was very much a low-level special, with a pretty startling performance in its best height range, and not-so-very-much outside it.

The tactic Johnson described was to draw the FWs down; in effect to allow yourself to be bounced, and as the FWs were on the way down, (but presumably before they had got too close!) to out-accellerate them, break into them, climb above them and turn the tables. He said the first time he flew with a Mark XII squadron, he was not at all happy about this, because it went flatly against everything he had learned as a fighter pilot, but the squadron leader assured him that it did work.


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## drgondog (Jul 13, 2008)

Soren said:


> Parsifal,
> 
> I am unaware of what stick force figures Henning has used for his calculations or what engine power (Or thrust) figures he has used, all of which are very influential on the final outcome of the calculations. So if he could provide them then we would get a more complete picture.
> 
> ...




Soren - I finally had some spare time and I am nearly finished with the modifications to Gene's well done performance spreadsheet - by incorporating the ability to insert Hp as a function of altitude and also insert air density at that altitude. Gene's model, which uses EAS - assumes constant Hp and SL for his calcs, as well as constant density (at SL). EAS will require SQRT(RHOalt/RHOsl) which is simply 1 on the deck.

All of these fighters had different strike zones for peak performance 'bands'

One of the issues to obtain better values for Turn calcs at same altitude is to get the Hp at the altitudes we wish to compare and there will be variations depending on supercharger and turbo designs.


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## Soren (Jul 13, 2008)

Excellent Bill, looking forward to see them.


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## JoeB (Jul 13, 2008)

John Davies said:


> I'm quite prepapred to admit that the FAA's claims are a bit exaggerated. Everyone overclaimed to some extent, because in the heat and confusion of battle, it's impossible to be really sure; also all fighter pilots are optimists, or they would not be fighter pilots! But even knocking off a bit for over-claiming, it is still an impressive record.


Gee, this has been gone over a bunch of times, there just weren't many combats between Zeroes and Seafires. This 16:1 keeps coming up as if maybe the simplification of the fraction 160/10 or 64/4. No, there was 1 known Seafire loss to Zeroes, in the *only* combat between the two where it's known the Japanese opponents were fighters and not kamikazes, on the last morning of the war August 15 1945, claiming 7 Zeroes. The Japanese losses per their accounts were only 1 Zero lost pilot bailed out WIA and one other pilot WIA but plane apparently not destroyed (see posts above). In all other cases the Seafires were defending carriers close in and it's likely most or all the fighter types they claimed were kamikazes. There just isn't a sufficient track records to draw any firm operational conclusion about Seafire v Zero. Though also as mentioned multiple times, *every* Allied fighter of 1945 that *did* have a significant track record v the Zero claimed to have had a substantial exchange ratio advantage, and where real results are known the typical result was at least some advantage (though usually signficantly more than 'a bit' had to be knocked off the claims, sometimes a lot, as typical throughout WWII).

As always, calculation of performance is an interesting exercise, but the assumptions used can vary the results significantly. Good to see the thread at least getting into that a little. I doubt we'll resolve it though to the point where presented calculations can be treated as solid facts as to how the real a/c really performed in the real situation, there's always be significant doubt, IMO, if trying to draw conclusions based on relatively small performance differences.

And, we still haven't found the formula by which we can convert a couple 10's mph or few 100 fpm speed or climb difference into a % advantage in effectiveness in combat in the hands of the same pilot. All we know from basic logic is we'd rather have a faster plane, *if* it was at least as good in all other performance measures. Once there's a small advantage in one category and a small disadvantage in another, there's no way to resolve that deductively in terms of combat effectiveness, it's a matter of opinion. Where planes differ a lot in performance, then it's obvious. I'm still not convinced that intensive study of small performance differences is very meaningful to understanding air combat results in WWII.

Joe


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## HoHun (Jul 13, 2008)

Hi John,

>He said the first time he flew with a Mark XII squadron, he was not at all happy about this, because it went flatly against everything he had learned as a fighter pilot, but the squadron leader assured him that it did work.

He was right to be unhappy - these are rather dangerous tactics, and the main reason they worked was that the Luftwaffe pilots were not aware of the increased performance of the Spitfire XII. Inviting high-flying fighters to dive on one's own formation is rather dangerous even if they have a performance disadvantage as trying to even out an energy advantage by climbing is a rather slow way, and trying to evade an enemy attack by turning can be very difficult if the enemy formation splits up to attack - pretty much standard tactics.

(I'm sure you're aware that it was Johnnie Johnson who said "Turning doesn't win battles".)

Clostermann's unhappiness with the "cropped" Spitfire he was flying had the same roots as Johnson's - as Boelcke pointed out, one should hold as many advantages as possible before the fight begins, and altitude is a rather important advantage.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## John Davies (Jul 14, 2008)

JoeB said:


> Gee, this has been gone over a bunch of times, there just weren't many combats between Zeroes and Seafires. This 16:1 keeps coming up as if maybe the simplification of the fraction 160/10 or 64/4. No, there was 1 known Seafire loss to Zeroes, in the *only* combat between the two where it's known the Japanese opponents were fighters and not kamikazes, on the last morning of the war August 15 1945, claiming 7 Zeroes. The Japanese losses per their accounts were only 1 Zero lost pilot bailed out WIA and one other pilot WIA but plane apparently not destroyed (see posts above). In all other cases the Seafires were defending carriers close in and it's likely most or all the fighter types they claimed were kamikazes. There just isn't a sufficient track records to draw any firm operational conclusion about Seafire v Zero. Though also as mentioned multiple times, *every* Allied fighter of 1945 that *did* have a significant track record v the Zero claimed to have had a substantial exchange ratio advantage, and where real results are known the typical result was at least some advantage (though usually signficantly more than 'a bit' had to be knocked off the claims, sometimes a lot, as typical throughout WWII).
> 
> As always, calculation of performance is an interesting exercise, but the assumptions used can vary the results significantly. Good to see the thread at least getting into that a little. I doubt we'll resolve it though to the point where presented calculations can be treated as solid facts as to how the real a/c really performed in the real situation, there's always be significant doubt, IMO, if trying to draw conclusions based on relatively small performance differences.
> 
> ...



Of course, there weren’t that many combats between Zeroes and Seafires (possibly not enough to make up a “statistically valid sample", whatever that means) …… but what there were seem to indicate a decisive advantage for the Seafire, at least within its best height band. At least as significant as the Zeroes shot down is the Seafire’s sole loss; one only, and that because of a radio failure. 

I’m not quite sure that your point is in emphasising that some Zeroes lost to Seafires were kamikazes. Fighter vs fighter combat may get a lot of the glamour and glory, but splashing kamikazes before they hit the ships was a far more valuable and important job, and if the Seafire had not had a performance advantage, it could not have caught them.

IJN records of aircraft lost not according with FAA kill records; well yes, we’ve been here before. But if I had to trust one or the other, I’d tend to trust the FAA. By the end of the war the IJN was in pretty complete disarray. From other documents I’ve seen, their “official view” was also pretty completely divorced from reality….. emphasising the need for a “firm belief in victory” in mid-1945, when it was obvious that the war was lost. I hardly think IJN records at this stage of the war are reliable enough to base any firm conclusions on.

Besides, there are two general points; firstly, authoritarian regimes, be they Nazi, Fascist, Soviet or Tojo’s military government, are a bit prone to shooting the messenger if they don’t like the message. This leads to all sorts of information distortion, because people become understandably unwilling to pass on information that might be unwelcome. Records from a free society will almost certainly be more reliable. 

Secondly, as I’ve pointed out twice already in this thread, if we are to take the position that a kill is only considered valid if it is confirmed by the records of both sides, and if we are to be consistent, then we have to revise every successful fighter pilots’ total; Hartmann, Kojedub, Bong, Johnson, the whole lot of them. Let’s not go there. That’s not a sensible position to take by any standards. It is also completely impractical, because it assumes all the records from all sides are complete, accurate and available, which is a very large and very fragile assumption. Safest, I think, to say that at over sixty years distance, it is impossible to be really sure; that everyone over-claimed a bit, (maybe, as you say, more than a bit) and leave it at that.

As for whether details of aircraft performance are important in understanding what went on; of course they are not the only thing that’s important. That’s obvious. There was a lot more besides; tactics, pilots, training, leadership, morale, maintenance standards, etc etc. 

But that’s not to say that aircraft performance was not important. Tactics were designed to exploit the strengths of your aircraft’s performance and the weaknesses of your enemy’s, going into battle in an aircraft with an inferior performance can have a disastrous effect on morale, etc etc. It all fits together, each aspect is one part of the whole, and every aspect affects the other aspects.

As for speed being the most important performance variable; sorry, I’m not convinced. Yes, it was important. But rate of climb and manoeverability are also of great importance, and overall, assuming aircraft of fairly closely comparable performance, I wouldn’t like to isolate one performance variable as the most important. Looking at tactics, it seems that pilots of all sides did their best to force the combat into areas where they held the advantage and their opponents did not. A Zero pilot would try to get his opponent to fight in a turning battle at about 180 mph, the Seafire pilot would, if he was wise, respond by refusing to slow down. He would use his higher rate of climb at low level to best effect to “zoom and boom”, fighting in a series of climbing and diving near-stall turns. I’m not quite sure what the poor unfortunate flying the Spitfire V trop could do, as there doesn’t seem to be any area at any height where he could exploit a decisive performance advantage of any kind.


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## Soren (Jul 14, 2008)

> if the Seafire had not had a performance advantage, it could not have caught them.



John Spitfires caught and brought down V-1's, so are you now going to suggest that means they were faster ?

You jump to conclusions rather quickly, esp. regarding the above and that because only a single Seafire was lost to a Zero it must in your opinion have been because the Seafire was better. Ever thought about the guys behind the controls or the circumstances in which the various victories were gained ? Like JoeB points out the Seafires pretty much only achieved to shoot down Kamikaze Zeros.

You have to be a bit more objective on the subject.


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## John Davies (Jul 14, 2008)

Soren said:


> John Spitfires caught and brought down V-1's, so are you now going to suggest that means they were faster ?
> 
> You jump to conclusions rather quickly, esp. regarding the above and that because only a single Seafire was lost to a Zero it must in your opinion have been because the Seafire was better. Ever thought about the guys behind the controls or the circumstances in which the various victories were gained ? Like JoeB points out the Seafires pretty much only achieved to shoot down Kamikaze Zeros.
> 
> You have to be a bit more objective on the subject.



I'm sorry, but that's completely unwarranted. I don't "Jump" to conclusions. I try to reach them, on the basis of the information and evidence available. Of course I've "thought about the guys behind the controls". I've commented more than once in this thread that pilot quality is probably the most important factor of all. Have you actually been reading any of my posts? As for telling me I "need to be more objective"; well first of all there is no such thing as objectivity (balance is another matter, and I do try to reach that), and secondly, it isn't for you or anyone else to tell me what I "need" to be. That's for me to judge. I suppose I ought to add that this sort of sententious remark is characteristic of someone who has run out of good points to make, and is now resorting to "argumentum ad hominem".


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## John Davies (Jul 14, 2008)

HoHun said:


> Hi John,
> 
> >He said the first time he flew with a Mark XII squadron, he was not at all happy about this, because it went flatly against everything he had learned as a fighter pilot, but the squadron leader assured him that it did work.
> 
> ...



I think I agree with you. Johnson describes flying along in his borrowed Mk XII, rather uneasily looking up at a formation of FWs; above them. They refused to come down to play. I tell you, it would terrify me!


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## Soren (Jul 14, 2008)

John Davies said:


> I'm sorry, but that's completely unwarranted. I don't "Jump" to conclusions. I try to reach them, on the basis of the information and evidence available. Of course I've "thought about the guys behind the controls". I've commented more than once in this thread that pilot quality is probably the most important factor of all. Have you actually been reading any of my posts? As for telling me I "need to be more objective"; well first of all there is no such thing as objectivity (balance is another matter, and I do try to reach that), and secondly, it isn't for you or anyone else to tell me what I "need" to be. That's for me to judge. I suppose I ought to add that this sort of sententious remark is characteristic of someone who has run out of good points to make, and is now resorting to "argumentum ad hominem".




Run out of arguments ?? John so far your only argument for the Seafires superiority over the Zero seems to be that just one got shot down and that because of a radio failure, now that's a failure to be objective IMO.

Also as for staying low against FW's, well that's pretty much committing suicide. Why ? Because the FW-190 is faster at low alt than the Spitfire (Unless the Spit XII could top 580 km/h at SL) and has absolutely no problem following a Spitfire's maneuvers at high speed, the FW190 is infact far more maneuverable at high speed. Furthermore the FW190 dives and zoom climbs a lot better..

So as you might imagine it was not a very good idea for a Spitfire to fly low where'ever there were FW-190's present, hence the RAF's strict advice for its pilots not to do this.


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## Soren (Jul 14, 2008)

According to my sources the Spitfire Mk.XII's top speed at SL was 560 km/h.

At 1.42ata the FW-190A-5's top SL speed was 567 km/h.

At 1.65ata the FW-190A-5's top SL speed was 580 km/h.

So the reason the FW's didn't come down to play might be because they hadn't seen the Spitfires, cause the FW-190 was clearly the faster of the two, and with a considerable height advantage those Spitfires were easy baits.


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## claidemore (Jul 14, 2008)

I seem to remember the kill/loss ratio of the Ta152 being touted as an indicator of its superiority (as well as it's performance and supposed handling characteristics). 

Shouldn't a similar statistical record of Seafire vs Zero carry the same weight?

If we are being impartial and objective?


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## JoeB (Jul 14, 2008)

John Davies said:


> 1. I’m not quite sure that your point is in emphasising that some Zeroes lost to Seafires were kamikazes. Fighter vs fighter combat may get a lot of the glamour and glory, but splashing kamikazes before they hit the ships was a far more valuable and important job, and if the Seafire had not had a performance advantage, it could not have caught them.
> 
> 2. IJN records of aircraft lost not according with FAA kill records; well yes, we’ve been here before. But if I had to trust one or the other, I’d tend to trust the FAA.
> 
> ...


1. It's not the downing kamikazes (or bombers, or transports for that matter if that was the key target at a particular moment) was unimportant, it's that the exchange ratio between the attacking fighters and those targets isn't meaningful, can't be compared to exchange ratio's of true fighter combat. The Seafire may have been an effective kamikaze interceptor but that ratio isn't really relevant to that. As already stated, the FM-2 fulfilled a similar mission to the Seafire in '45 and had a considerably higher exchange ratio (against fighter types), does that mean its performance was better for catching kamikazes?, no the exchange ratio is just not relevant to that. Exchange ratio is a relevant measure (though still not the only one) for true fighter-fighter combat.

2. Anyone who takes *any air arm's* WWII claims at face value of discounted 'a bit' and ignores evidence of opposing losses (with excuses of course) is just kidding themselves and creating a fantasy world of air combat analysis. It's been done for years, but still leads to contradictory, and wrong, conclusions (the great majority of WWII fighter types claimed ratio's >1 against opposing fighters, I guess they were all successful?; all our children are above average, it's about the same thing but less reason for mushy analysis of fighters than children  ).

3. What specific case can you give where losses in Japanese (or anybody else's actually) records are understated, evidence besides the opposing claims being higher? Allied losses were much less than Japanese claims, and often much less than German claims (though not always in latter case) too, why doesn't that call Allied loss records into question? The system of govt strictly dictated the accuracy of loss records? That's not a serious argument IMO. It needs at least some date by date specific evidence.

We saw in Darwin 1943 case that the complete 'kodochosho', original action reports, of the 202nd Air Group survived; numerous accounts of theirs say it was the only Zero unit involved. They showed 4 Zero losses in the whole campaign, with the names of the pilots lost, and names of the other pilots on the missions. The Spits were credited with several times that many Zeroes. But no evidence of wrecks, bodies or POW's challenges any of the results of individual missions described in the Japanese reports. What objective basis is there to reject those Japanese accounts?, talking about 'Tojo' and 'saving face', 'proof' via cultural sterotype  ? Denying the light Zero losses over Darwin and high overclaims by the Spits there is 'denial' in the pejorative sense, no way around it. 

And there's no reason to disbelieve the Seafires claimed 7 Zeroes August 15 '45 but only downed 1, considering innumerable examples of overclaims as great in combats throughout WWII by all air arms including British. There is more doubt in that case, for the reasons I already gave, the same Japanese were also engaging F6F's that morning and attributed a bunch more losses to them, there could have been some mix ups, and the greater vagaries of 'losses' suffered over own territory (do wheels up landings count? etc). But saying it was 7 or 'a bit less' is a pseudo-fact. No valid conclusion can be drawn from such as assumption. It's just assuming the conclusion you want. 

4. You're essentially saying we have to ignore a clear fact, that claims (or official victory credits) in WWII fighter combat exceeded actual opposing losses, often by a lot, because it would cause what you consider to be an awkward situation. *That's* not a serious position. 

Anyway individual scores and overall results aren't the same thing. In many cases we reasonably surely know, eg. 5 a/c were credited but only 1 or 2 really downed, but we seldom know which of the 5 credits actually represent those 2 losses. There's anyway no imperative to restate individual scores, we simply have to keep in mind the real scores were almost always lower, and more importantly we have to fairly consider who's score was amassed in air arms and situation where the claiming was more or less accurate. That's the other key concept which keeps getting ignored, 'overclaim' is not some constant which we can factor out across the board and then ignore, it varied *a lot* from air arm to air arm, unit to unit in different situations and campaigns in WWII. 

5. I agree, but the bulk of the thread is about about performance stats. Or, non-accurate approaches like drawing conclusions about fighter effectiveness from the absolute level of a *claimed* ratio that was possibly mostly against fighter types acting as kamikazes.

6. I just gave speed as example. My point is we can say the faster plane is superior if equal in all other respects, *or* the better climbing plane is superior if equal in all other respects, *or* etc, but once we have planes where one is a bit faster but the other climbs a bit better or etc., there's no solid analytical framework to resolve that into which plane was better based on stats. And that's usually the case between any two planes close enough in performance to even have to debate which would be more effective in the hands of equal pilots.

Joe


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## Soren (Jul 14, 2008)

claidemore said:


> I seem to remember the kill/loss ratio of the Ta152 being touted as an indicator of its superiority (as well as it's performance and supposed handling characteristics).
> 
> Shouldn't a similar statistical record of Seafire vs Zero carry the same weight?
> 
> If we are being impartial and objective?



Well lets see Claidemore, were the RAFN Seafires fighting against overwhelming numbers of enemy a/c piloted by well trained pilots ?? And did it actually fight everyone of its kills ?? Didn't think so. 

Considering all the circumstances the Ta-152H's 11/0 (Or 12/0) kill/loss ratio is remarkable and was only achieved because it was clearly superior to everything else in the air. Remember all kills were from dogfights with capable enemy fighters, and the Ta-152H won every time. But the Kill/loss ratio is but the final proof, as the performance figures speak for themselves.

Basing superiority entirely on Kill/loss ratio is ignorant and useless and gets you nowhere nearer the truth. You need to take everything into account, such as the circumstances under which the said a/c had to operate, how well trained the pilots who flew it were, the performance of the a/c, pilots opinions from both sides, aerodynamics, how well trained were the opposing pilots, what a/c was it up against and how many ?? All of which was covered in our debate about the Ta-152H.


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## Glider (Jul 14, 2008)

Just a couple of comments Soren.

Were the Seafires heavily outnumbered? Yes
Were the 152's heavily outnumbered? Yes
8 Seafires against 18 Zeros who had the bounce

Were the Seafire Pilots better trained/experienced - Yes
Were the 152 pilots better trained/experienced -Yes

Was the 152 far better than anything it was likely to meet in the air - Yes
Was the Seafire far better than the Zero - NO it was close

Were the 152's tied to escorting bombers -No
Were the Seafires tied to escorting the bombers - *Yes *
Escorting Avengers none of which were lost and one of which was awarded a kill.

The Claims. The pilots combat reports describe 
One Zero shared between two pilots as Blazing Nicely after its undercarrige dropped
One Zero fired at from 100 yards and the pilot bailed out
One Zero shot down by one pilot but no details
One Zero shared between 2 pilots but no details
One Zero shot down after his engine was on fire and his undercarrige dropped
One Zero shot down at 100 yards with hits on the engine and cockpit that burst into flames, the plane rolling overonto its back and plummeting into cloud
One Zero claimed after its wing root caught fire (given a probable)
One Zero shot down after its tail was shot off.

I am certainly not going to claim that all these claims turned into actuals but I do believe that the Japanese reports of its losses are on the low side.

As for the Spitfire that was shot down being due to a radio problem that is mentioned in the reports. The reason for this is because the leader was shot down in the the first bounce and despite a number of radio calls from the other members of the unit there was absolutely no reaction. He flew straight and level until hit.

All the details are in Royal Navy Acces of WW2 ISBN 978 1 84603 178 6


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## Soren (Jul 14, 2008)

Just a couple of points you missed:

1. The Ta-152 pilots fought against well trained Allied pilots
2. Most of the Zeros shot down by the Seafires were Kamikaze a/c

There's a BIG difference.


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## Soren (Jul 14, 2008)

Glider said:


> Was the 152 far better than anything it was likely to meet in the air - Yes
> Was the Seafire far better than the Zero - NO it was close



Well Glider that's essentially what I've been saying from the start, so where is it exactly we disagree ??


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## Glider (Jul 14, 2008)

Soren said:


> Just a couple of points you missed:
> 
> 1. The Ta-152 pilots fought against well trained Allied pilots
> 2. Most of the Zeros shot down by the Seafires were Kamikaze a/c
> ...



I understood that they only shot one Western aircraft down A Tempest and there is a question mark over the loss of a 152 at almost the same time. But even so the German pilots were not just ordinary squadron pilots, they were selected. In general, the difference in quality between the German Pilots and the opponents was probably similar between the Seafire Pilots and the Japanese.

All the Zero's shot down in the above combat were not Kamikaze, they were ordinary fighters. There is also evidence that it was a well planned attack involving three fighter groups, a decoy flight of 2 Zero's, the main attack force of 12 fighters who attacked from above and behind and a third flight of four fighters that made a head on attack on the bombers shortly after the start of the battle. Individually the Japanese pilots were less well trained but its likely that the leaders were as good as anyone, no beginners can co-ordinate like that.


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## Glider (Jul 14, 2008)

Soren said:


> Well Glider that's essentially what I've been saying from the start, so where is it exactly we disagree ??



On the almost aggressive reply you made to the following posting

_Originally Posted by claidemore 
I seem to remember the kill/loss ratio of the Ta152 being touted as an indicator of its superiority (as well as it's performance and supposed handling characteristics). 

Shouldn't a similar statistical record of Seafire vs Zero carry the same weight?

If we are being impartial and objective?_

His comments were pretty much spot on. The pilots in those 152 would have stood an excellent chance of achieving the same results had they been in say FW190D's. They were an exceptional group of pilots.


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## Soren (Jul 15, 2008)

Exceptional group of pilots ? Hardly Glider, some of them were very experienced, others not so much, and the pilots they were flying against were all well trained and flying capable a/c.



> I understood that they only shot one Western aircraft down A Tempest and there is a question mark over the loss of a 152 at almost the same time



The Ta-152 shot down more than one Western Allied fighter, read Willy Reschke's book. Furthermore it has been confirmed that a P-51 was shot down by a Ta-152H, you can ask Erich about this.

And there is no question mark over the lost Ta-152, it crashed for no apparent reason as Reschke says, diving out of formation and into the woods before reaching the target area.

The Seafire vs Zero incident can't be compared at all and so is anything from spot on.

But moving on to the Zero vs Seafire subject:

Like JoeB said:
_No, there was 1 known Seafire loss to Zeroes, in the *only* combat between the two where it's known the Japanese opponents were fighters and not kamikazes, on the last morning of the war August 15 1945, claiming 7 Zeroes. The Japanese losses per their accounts were only 1 Zero lost pilot bailed out WIA and one other pilot WIA but plane apparently not destroyed (see posts above). In all other cases the Seafires were defending carriers close in and it's likely most or all the fighter types they claimed were kamikazes._

Now 1 for 1 doesn't sound very onesided to me.


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## Juha (Jul 15, 2008)

Soren
Quote: ” Basing superiority entirely on Kill/loss ratio is ignorant and useless and gets you nowhere nearer the truth. You need to take everything into account, such as the circumstances under which the said a/c had to operate, how well trained the pilots who flew it were, the performance of the a/c, pilots opinions from both sides, aerodynamics, how well trained were the opposing pilots, what a/c was it up against and how many ?? All of which was covered in our debate about the Ta-152H.”

Soren, from which units were the claimed Soviet victims of Ta-152 pilots? Did their toverits saw that they were shot down by FW-190s or Ta-152s? If you don’t know the answers you are comparing apples and oranges. You accept LW claims as true kills and LW losses were accepted as losses only if victim’s formation members saw that the victim was shot down by an enemy plane.

Juha


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## Glider (Jul 16, 2008)

Soren said:


> But moving on to the Zero vs Seafire subject:
> 
> Like JoeB said:
> _No, there was 1 known Seafire loss to Zeroes, in the *only* combat between the two where it's known the Japanese opponents were fighters and not kamikazes, on the last morning of the war August 15 1945, claiming 7 Zeroes. The Japanese losses per their accounts were only 1 Zero lost pilot bailed out WIA and one other pilot WIA but plane apparently not destroyed (see posts above). In all other cases the Seafires were defending carriers close in and it's likely most or all the fighter types they claimed were kamikazes._
> ...



To achieve 1 for 1 loss ratio, the Zero must have become fireproof, be able to fly without a tail and land without a pilot who bailed out.
Not likely


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## drgondog (Jul 16, 2008)

Soren said:


> The Ta-152 shot down more than one Western Allied fighter, read Willy Reschke's book. Furthermore it has been confirmed that a P-51 was shot down by a Ta-152H, you can ask Erich about this.
> 
> And there is no question mark over the lost Ta-152, it crashed for no apparent reason as Reschke says, diving out of formation and into the woods before reaching the target area.



Soren - being a devil's advocate. If there was a known reason for the lost Ta 152, there would be 'no question mark", correct? If there was 'no apparent reason" wouldn't you say it raises a question? 

I can think of several possibilities.

1.) Heart attack - not likely but possible death and loss of control
2.) Saw something at his six and evaded, losing control and crashing - possible and more probable than a heart attack.
3.) hit and killed by golden BB from the ground - not likely depending on location
4.) hit from behind by another fighter - possible, but hard to know. If this happened and the fighter in question was also shot down there would not have been a claim. What was the cloud cover like. Possible for boom and zoom?
5.) Sudden structural failure
6.) Loss of key control linkage like elevators
7.) Pilot tired and fell asleep.

Which one of these are you (or Willi) Certain of so that there is no "question mark".

As to Ta 152 inventory. Are all accounted for from each operational unit to which they were deployed? Are all the pilots for those ships accounted for when the war ended?

If so, where are the references? and what is the referenced disposition of each one?

If not, what is the explanation?

In short, claiming that no Ta 152's were lost in combat is interesting and serious researchers would test that claim by at least asking the above questions.

Simply stated - Willi R. is not likely to be in possession of any knowledge of the above questions unless 1.) every Ta 152 deployed was under his personal command, b.) he has the squadron/Group records, c.) there is verification from Focke Wulf/Tank that all deployed Ta 152s were in fact deployed to one squadron/Group and that the number in fact matches with that Group's records.

Does this documentation exist?

If not, how does one make a claim about Ta 152H loss/kill statistics other than - "it was a damn fine airplane"


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## JoeB (Jul 16, 2008)

Glider said:


> The Claims. The pilots combat reports describe
> One Zero shared between two pilots as Blazing Nicely after its undercarrige dropped
> One Zero fired at from 100 yards and the pilot bailed out
> One Zero shot down by one pilot but no details
> ...


And I'll reiterate, I won't absolutely state the single loss was a/c of Lt. T. Honma, 252nd AG.

But, vivid and specific descriptions of enemy a/c downed, believed to described separate enemy losses, just are not proof of actual *separate* enemy losses. That's seen again and again by anybody who has compared claims with loss records in WWII (or Korea, similar technology of combat). The kind of details you present are useful and interesting but also exist in almost all other cases, or at least did exist when the credits were awarded, even if since lost. 

It seems likely Honma's and Yamada's a/c represent more than two of those claims, plausibly all 7, given furball combat with difficult initial situation and perceived numerical disadvantage, especially given no previous true fighter combat experience in those particular FAA units. Those are all common elements in cases of higher overclaims.

The 252nd AG flight reporting contact with British a/c consisted of 10 Zeroes, but there were F6F's around as well. Honma's personal account (in "Sky of August 15" by Hata) has the opponents as a mixture of 'Spitfires' and F6F's, in basically a single combat. Honma bailed out WIA plane on fire, downed by a Seafire by all accounts. Lt Cdr. M Hidaka crashlanded, cause or enemy a/c type not given. CPO N. Yoshinari was credited with a Seafire. Honma and WO K. Yoshida were both credited with TBF's (only 1 FAA Avenger was downed, no USN ones downed by fighters in the area/time). 

The 302nd Air Group flight of which CPO S. Yamada was part consisted of 4 Raiden ('Jack') and 10 Zeroes. The only specific attribution to Seafires was Yamada's wounding, a/c not mentioned as destroyed; they attributed 4 a/c losses to F6F's, claiming 1 F6F.

Probably none of the Japanese fighters met near or over Japan that morning were kamikazes. The *previous* fighter type kill credits of Seafires were probably mostly or all kamikazes, in defensive ops near carriers, not those on August 15. 

Also I still reiterate, high claims by one side, in general, do not constitute any proof that reported losses on the other side were 'low'. There are just too many cases involving too many air arms and units where the opposing loss reports are pretty airtight as to completeness of units involved (which again is true over Darwin, but not quite true here, I grant, though main issue here is F6F/Seafire overlapping combats, still 7 losses just to Seafires seems highly improbable), and just don't include loads of claims of the other side. Documented cases of specific records which seriously understate losses are just about non-existent, for anybody, for all the times that's suggested.

Joe


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## Glider (Jul 16, 2008)

It would be nice to know if there were any gun camera films to help sort this out.


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## Juha (Jul 17, 2008)

JoeB
thanks a lot for Your analyze on the 15 Aug 45 air combat. I always like your analytical messages and how your always try to find the truth by carefully studing info from both sides.

Juha


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## Soren (Jul 17, 2008)

drgondog said:


> Soren - being a devil's advocate. If there was a known reason for the lost Ta 152, there would be 'no question mark", correct? If there was 'no apparent reason" wouldn't you say it raises a question?
> 
> I can think of several possibilities.
> 
> ...



Bill,

The cause behind every other Ta-152 loss is known except that single one. And it absolutely couldn't have been caused by enemy action as both Willy and his wingman saw him just dive out of formation and into the woods, no tracers, smoke, enemy a/c or damage to Stattler's a/c was observed. 

So that leaves only a few possible explanations, either he fell asleep, got a heart attack (rare yes, but when have you ever heard of this before besides this ??) or mechanical malfunction (Highly unlikely as he didnt respond).


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## Strawn (Jul 17, 2008)

Why is it that every thread I visit to review aircraft performance seems to always end up with a reference to the Ta 152H?


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## Soren (Jul 17, 2008)

Ask Juha, it was he who found the need to stray off topic.


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## Juha (Jul 17, 2008)

Soren
read the tread, I don't bring the Ta-152 to this thread,

Juha


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## JoeB (Jul 17, 2008)

Glider said:


> It would be nice to know if there were any gun camera films to help sort this out.


It might help, but in my observation gun camera shots don't always sort things out, even when the actual pictures still exist and are known to correspond to a particular action. I have in mind right now 2-3 different sometimes published gc shots among 7 USAF F-94's credited to Soviet MiG-15's in Korea in the same combat. The clearest shot shows a Marine F9F, which were the actual opponents. There were no other opponents, and just 1 F9F was downed: extensive evidence in declassified records up to originally 'top secret' level. The shots were of the same plane, but you can't tell looking at them. Not fakes AFAIK, but inadvertent duplicate credits using gun camera. And while the Soviet policy seemed to require gc shots of kill credits, only 2-3 of the 7 official credits in that combat have known gc shots.

Also many surviving gc shots just show a plane in the aiming reticle of another, not its definite destruction (true of the clearest shot in the series mentioned above). As policy some AF's required image of a bail out or disintegration, but rigorous enforcement of such rules was another matter. Other AF's had a policy of allowing interpretation of non-definite gc evidence to award a kill, but the policy either way was only one variable, the practice could differ either way.

So, the fact that gc shots once existed for a combat, but we no longer have the images (vast majority of cases) doesn't help much IMO in evaluating a claim. There's no way to tell anymore what level of rigor was really used in assessing destruction and weeding out duplicates.

You need the other side's records to evaluate fighter combat IMO. If you can't get them or believe them, you just can't do it accurately, in general with some exceptions (eg. still existing clear images of single Japanese targets of single USN PB4Y's hitting the water or totally enveloped in flame).

Joe


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## Soren (Jul 17, 2008)

Juha said:


> Soren
> read the tread, I don't bring the Ta-152 to this thread,
> 
> Juha



It was actually claidemore, my apologies.


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## drgondog (Jul 17, 2008)

Soren said:


> Bill,
> 
> The cause behind every other Ta-152 loss is known except that single one. And it absolutely couldn't have been caused by enemy action as both Willy and his wingman saw him just dive out of formation and into the woods, no tracers, smoke, enemy a/c or damage to Stattler's a/c was observed.
> 
> So that leaves only a few possible explanations, either he fell asleep, got a heart attack (rare yes, but when have you ever heard of this before besides this ??) or mechanical malfunction (Highly unlikely as he didnt respond).



I don't want to hijack the thread.. we can pick up later how any knows what the operational statistics and operational inventory was from beginning to war's end?


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