# Ready for El Alamein: ideal British tanks



## tomo pauk (Mar 25, 2011)

As results of lessons learned from Blitzkrieg of 1939-40, you, as the man responsible for tank development, have to create the armored force that would perform admirably within 2 years. You can choose building only lights, only haevies, or a combination of both. If you want to develop other AFVs based on your tanks, it's a plus 
The hardware you develop is from British bits bolts only; LL tanks will come in as they did historically.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 26, 2011)

Indeed, those ones wouldve' rocked


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## davebender (Mar 26, 2011)

State of the art during 1942. And you get them via Lend-Lease. 

Rather then worrying about 1942 Britain should be thinking about 1943 when Tiger and Panther tanks make their apearance. Britain needs the Comet tank during 1943.


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## Freebird (Mar 27, 2011)

davebender said:


> State of the art during 1942. And you get them via Lend-Lease.
> 
> Rather then worrying about 1942 Britain should be thinking about 1943 when Tiger and Panther tanks make their apearance. Britain needs the Comet tank during 1943.


 
Don't worry about 1942?  Heck there won't *be* a 1943 offensive if they lose in the desert in 41/42.

Dave, there would be no Shermans coming during 1942 *except* that after the fiasco at Gazala, Roosevelt pulled the Shermans from the US forces and sent them to the British. (originally intended to go to the 1st Armored IIRC), even then they only showed up in Oct '42 in limited numbers.

Tomo - your question:
_you, as the man responsible for tank development, have to create the armored force that would perform admirably within 2 years_

Ok, first thing I can't see that the British could do much different before July of '41, as they are desperate to replace tanks lost in France, and have no choice but to continue producing inferior designs rather than stop production. 
However in July 1941, the whole situation changes. With Hitler's attack on the Soviets, there is virtually no chance for a German invasion of the UK before the Spring of '42, so the British have some breathing room.
The first battles of the Crusader were in June 1941, and it was quickly evident that the tank had many faults, weak armour, small gun mechanical problems.
After taking stock of the British/Commonwealth tank production, this is what I would do:

Continue the Valentine Matilda II production in the UK, but look to upgrade them to a 6 pdr or 75mm as qickly as possible. The bulk of the tanks sent to Russia will be these types.

Drop production of the Covenanter immediately, it's cooling mechanical problems meant that it couldn't be sent to the desert. (It never was in combat as a tank)

Drop Crusader production in the fall of '41, after there are about 600 - 800 built. Instead, I would convert the Crusader design into an assault gun, with heavier armour and mounting a 25 pdr howitzer. Continue producing these until there is a good cruiser design tested ready. The British have already seen the StugIII in Greece, so use that as a basic design idea.

Instead of maximum Crusader Covenanter production, task the industry with design of a good replacement tank, and use excess production capacity to speed up the 6 pdr 17 pdr, and extra Matilda Valentine production.

The Canadian Ram prototype is available in June of '41, to replace Crusader production I would order as many Ram tanks as possible sent to the desert ASAP. It began production in Nov of '41, and about 100 per month were built. (total of 1,950 built in 20 months)

Keep in mind, in the beginning of '42 the Canadian Ram is the *best* Allied (non-Russian) tank and better than any other German or Italian tank.
The 6 pdr gun has better penetration than the PzIII's 50mm/L42, and better than the PzIV's short 75mm, or the M3Lee's 75mm/31, even better than the Sherman 75mm. Although the 6pdr HE shell is smaller than the 75mm, it's possible to equip some of the tanks with 3" howitzers if desired. (British 2 pdr 6 pdr tank guns were designed to be swapped with the 3" howitzer) The Ram's 87mm frontal armour is far superior than the PzIV's, Sherman's or Lee's 50mm, better than the Crusaders 40mm, and even the Matilda's 70mm. The tank was also fast reliable.

The Churchill project would continue as planned, except with a proper turret able to handle the 17 pdr or 25 pdr gun.
(a 40 ton tank with a 2 pdr in the turret is just a joke)

So how does this change the desert war? Without a British defeat at Gazala it's unlikely that there will be Shermans until 1943.
The British had about 800 tanks at Gazala, of which only 162 were the semi-effective Grants, the rest were all crap. Valentines were OK, but were slow, and the 1942 model had only a 2 pdr, the Crusader was fast, but had a weak gun, weak armour was prone to breakdowns.
That's the main reason why they lost at Gazala, at the end they only had a couple hundred tanks left.

At 2nd El Alamein, the British had 1,021 tanks operational, but apart from 285 Shermans 246 Grants, 3 Churchills, there were 811 "crap" tanks.  (421 crusaders, 167 stuart 223 Valentine 2 pdrs)

So at Gazala, (assuming about 850 British tanks) I estimate they could (by April '42) have shipped 300 - 350 Ram tanks, + 160 Grants, or about 450 - 500 good tanks. The remaining 350 - 400 tanks would be about 150 of the Crusader assault gun, and 200 - 250 of the less effective Crusader Valentine tanks.
With a superb anti-armour Ram tank a good assault gun the British have a good chance to win this battle.

By El Alamein, (assuming about 1,200 tanks as less are lost at Gazala - but no Shermans arrive) the British should have at least 650 Rams, 250 Crusader assault guns, perhaps 200 Grants and only 100 or so of the obsolete Valentines Crusaders


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## michaelmaltby (Mar 27, 2011)

Good analysis, Freebird. 

MM


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## Glider (Mar 27, 2011)

I think Freebird has it taped. Or as an alternative, design the new engine quickly and churn out the Cromwell. With its speed, armour and a 6 pd gun the Cromwell would be more than sufficient for the job.


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## michaelmaltby (Mar 27, 2011)

More on the RAM:

Canada's Tank Cruiser, Ram Mk I, Mk II (USA's M4A5) - World War II Vehicles, Tanks, and Airplanes

MM


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## Njaco (Mar 27, 2011)

davebender said:


> State of the art during 1942. And you get them via Lend-Lease.
> 
> Rather then worrying about 1942 Britain should be thinking about 1943 when Tiger and Panther tanks make their apearance. Britain needs the Comet tank during 1943.


 
Tiger Is appeared in NA in very late '42.


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## Freebird (Mar 27, 2011)

Glider said:


> I think Freebird has it taped. Or as an alternative, design the new engine quickly and churn out the Cromwell. With its speed, armour and a 6 pd gun the Cromwell would be more than sufficient for the job.


 
Ultimately, they may not see the Cromwell at all in it's historic form.
As produced in 1943 it was under-gunned with the 75mm gun. 

They ended up with a cascade of problems, and almost a dozen tank designs, because they were all rushed. The A23/A24 "Cavilier" development (which ended up with the Cromwell) was hampered by the specification that is use existing Crusader/Covenanter parts to ease production. The Crusader was near the end of its expansion limit, this resulted in a the Cavilier/Centaur/Cromwell being rather smaller faster, but unable to carry a decently powerful gun.

With the main difference being that Canadian production would provide cruiser tanks from the end of '41 - mid '43 - the British have the time to develop a really solid tank, not the rushed, hand-me-down Cavilier/Centaur family.

By mid '41, the Meteor engine is under development, the first example to be tested in the Crusader was Sept '41.

So the specification in mid '41 would be for a cruiser to follow the Ram tank, ready for production in early '43.
1.) It would use the Meteor engine.
2.) It would have a big enough turret ( turret ring) to support the Vickers-Armstrongs high velocity 75mm L/50 gun
3.) The armour should be at least comparable to the Rams.
4.) Road speed at least 28-30 mph

The tank produced would be much closer to the "Comet" than the "Cromwell", but hopeully without all the bad design choices and distractions (Covenanter, Centaur etc) it can be ready in early - mid '43, rather than late '44


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## tomo pauk (Mar 27, 2011)

Thanks for the input, fellas 
The only objection is that I've specified 'British bits bolts' in OP.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 27, 2011)

British bits and bolts?
Scrap the Liberty engine from the get-go. Get Rolls-Royce to give/sell Kestrel tooling to a tank engine factory. That solves the engine problem until 1944 or so. Scrap the Meadows flat twelve as soon as possible along with the Covenanter tank. Go with the Crusader but leave the bow MG turret on the first drawing board sketch. Fix drivers position and access for maintenance. Widen hull as much as possible or build a box that over hangs the track to get a bigger turret ring so you can mount the 6 pdr with a 3 man turret.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 27, 2011)

That's more like it 

What about armament? 6pdr + 25pdr combo, or something else? Is it to late to bother with pre-17pdr 3in gun (ordnance from the AA piece)?


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## Freebird (Mar 27, 2011)

tomo pauk said:


> Thanks for the input, fellas
> The only objection is that I've specified 'British bits bolts' in OP.


 
Mmm, you did. however you also specified


tomo pauk said:


> LL tanks will come in as they did historically.



You may not know this, but "Lend-Lease" was _not_ only supplied from the US, but from Canada also. 8)

Lend-Lease - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


> Britain's lend-lease arrangements with its dominions and colonies is one of the lesser known parts of World War II history.
> 
> President Roosevelt allowed Lend-Lease to purchase supplies from Canada, for shipment to Britain, China and Russia.
> Canada gave Britain gifts totaling $3.5 billion during the war; Britain used it to buy Canadian food and war supplies



By the time the British have passed the danger of Sealion, (Nov '40) and become aware that the Desert War with Italy (Compass - Dec 1940) will require large number of tanks to be sent to Egypt, it's really too late to have a _proper, superior_ tank developed shipped to the Desert in any numbers for Oct 1942, even if they could forsee future events at the beginning of '41. 

As for "Learning the Lessons of France", they didn't really know that anything was wrong in British tank development, France demonstrated the value of fast mobile tanks operating en masse vs slow British Infantry tanks. It was assumed that the upcoming Crusader tank would fit the bill. (Crusader arrived in Egypt May 1941) There wasn't really a tank crisis until the defeat at Battleaxe (June '41), and the opening of Barbarossa, which required great numbers of tanks to be sent to the Soviets.

The typical British WWII tank took about 2 years to develop.
Cavalier/Cromwell: Design specifications issued late 1940, design submitted early 1941, production begins Nov 1942.
Churchill: Specification summer 1939, production summer 1941
Comet: Specifications A34 1942, revised Jan 1943, production Sept 1944

The exception was the Covenanter (1,771 made) and the Crusader (5,300 made) which were ordered "Off the drawing board" and took about 18 months from acceptance to production, but the rushed process caused an inferior result.
(Covenanter production begins Autumn 1940, Crusader Mar 1941)

So unless the British are getting future events tips from Nostradamus  they can't anticipate the future tank design requirements until July 1941. At that point I would think that it would be better to modify the Cavalier/Cromwell design to an improved version, even if it would push back the start of production from Nov '42 until mid or even late 1943.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 27, 2011)

the 25pdr is going to be nothing but headaches as a tank gun. Lots of HE ability but the AP is only better than the 2pdr. Low velocity means short practical range. 

The British 3in AA gun wasn't much to write home about either. It is a left over WW I design and is both heavy for it's performance and a bit low powered for it's nominal length. 

While still being made in India at a very slow rate production had stopped in England a number of years before WW II.


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## Freebird (Mar 27, 2011)

Shortround6 said:


> British bits and bolts?
> Scrap the Liberty engine from the get-go. Get Rolls-Royce to give/sell Kestrel tooling to a tank engine factory. That solves the engine problem until 1944 or so. Scrap the Meadows flat twelve as soon as possible along with the Covenanter tank. Go with the Crusader but leave the bow MG turret on the first drawing board sketch. Fix drivers position and access for maintenance. Widen hull as much as possible or build a box that over hangs the track to get a bigger turret ring so you can mount the 6 pdr with a 3 man turret.


 
There are a few problems that I see with that. 

First, as mentioned above, I can't see how the British could anticipate the inadequate performance of the Crusader until the summer of '41.

Second, the Crusader is just too small at 18-19 tons to support future development.

Third, to redesign the Kestrel as a tank engine beginning in 1941 would be slower than using the Meteor which is already in the works. 

Fourth, even with an improved engine in the Crusader, it's still has the problem of it's weak armour, and the chasis just won't support the weight of an upgunned uparmoured variant.

By 1941, I firmly believe that the British need to develop a new, superior tank rather than try to shoehorn it into the Crusader hull. 

Rolls-Royce Meteor - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


> Meteor - it was developed from the Rolls-Royce Merlin aero-engine by W. A. Robotham and his chassis design and development division at Belper, as they were not involved in aero-engine work. With the aid of engineers from Leyland, who were engaged in tank work, he considered RR's two V12s. The Kestrel, while having more power than the existing "Liberty" or Meadows engines, did not provide the desirable 20 bhp per ton required, so the Merlin III was used.






tomo pauk said:


> What about armament? 6pdr + 25pdr combo, or something else? Is it to late to bother with pre-17pdr 3in gun (ordnance from the AA piece)?


 
The Crusader really can't support a 17 pdr or 25 pdr turret on it's small hull, it was tried on the Bishop, which is only about a ton lighter than the Crusader.


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## Freebird (Mar 27, 2011)

Shortround6 said:


> the 25pdr is going to be nothing but headaches as a tank gun. Lots of HE ability but the AP is only better than the 2pdr. Low velocity means short practical range.
> 
> The British 3in AA gun wasn't much to write home about either. It is a left over WW I design and is both heavy for it's performance and a bit low powered for it's nominal length.
> 
> While still being made in India at a very slow rate production had stopped in England a number of years before WW II.


 
Agreed. The 25 pdr could be used as an assault gun, but not for a primary turreted tank gun.
Thats why I think the Vickers HV 75mm would be the best option, but not for the small Crusader


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## tomo pauk (Mar 27, 2011)

freebird said:


> By the time the British have passed the danger of Sealion, (Nov '40) and become aware that the Desert War with Italy (Compass - Dec 1940) will require large number of tanks to be sent to Egypt, it's really too late to have a _proper, superior_ tank developed shipped to the Desert in any numbers for Oct 1942, even if they could forsee future events at the beginning of '41.



As said in OP, you (me, him, forum member...) 'have' almost 2,5 years to deploy respectable tank force. 



> As for "Learning the Lessons of France", they didn't really know that anything was wrong in British tank development, France demonstrated the value of fast mobile tanks operating en masse vs slow British Infantry tanks. It was assumed that the upcoming Crusader tank would fit the bill. (Crusader arrived in Egypt May 1941) There wasn't really a tank crisis until the defeat at Battleaxe (June '41), and the opening of Barbarossa, which required great numbers of tanks to be sent to the Soviets.



I'm not questioning that. Not in this thread 



> The typical British WWII tank took about 2 years to develop.
> Cavalier/Cromwell: Design specifications issued late 1940, design submitted early 1941, production begins Nov 1942.
> Churchill: Specification summer 1939, production summer 1941
> Comet: Specifications A34 1942, revised Jan 1943, production Sept 1944
> ...



So my 2,5 years seem like decent time 



> So unless the British are getting future events tips from Nostradamus  they can't anticipate the future tank design requirements until July 1941.



I'm don't state anyone can see future. We're discussing what could've fit the bill better. 
As for 'future tank design requirements', ticker armor, greater firepower, better mobility, along with good radios, sights, creature comfort were to be properties of any future tank. No need for Nostradamus to tell you.



> At that point I would think that it would be better to modify the Cavalier/Cromwell design to an improved version, even if it would push back the start of production from Nov '42 until mid or even late 1943.


 
Both Cavalier and Cromwell would've fitted nicely in discussion about British tanks deployed in late 1943/ early'44


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## Freebird (Mar 27, 2011)

tomo pauk said:


> As said in OP, you (me, him, forum member...) 'have' almost 2,5 years to deploy respectable tank force.



No, not actually, 2 years - no more.
And while a tank _could_ be developed in about 2 years from specification to production, you would have to add a few extra months to collect data to prepare to issue a new specification.
The Fall of France was 25 June 1940. Even assuming that you started work in July 1940, you have barely two years. Any tank that hasn't been produced by July 1942 isn't going to have enough time to be shipped to Egypt (~ 8 weeks), unloaded, fitted out for desert operations, issued to the troops and trained on.

Under your scenario there is just simply not enough time to develop deploy a new tank before El Alamein, nor have you given any plausible reason why the British would scrap the normal tank development cycle. 



tomo pauk said:


> I'm not questioning that. Not in this thread
> I'm don't state anyone can see future. We're discussing what could've fit the bill better.
> As for 'future tank design requirements', *thicker armor, greater firepower, better mobility*, along with good radios, sights, creature comfort were to be properties of any future tank. No need for Nostradamus to tell you.


 
Can you explain why they would scrap the Crusader design in 1940 and start over?
Even if you were "the man responsible for tank development," you can't just scrap the new tank design on a whim, you would be vetoed booted by Churchill Cabinet PDQ. 

Your idea is to "create the armored force that would perform admirably within 2 years."
Indeed, and the Crusader is a *brilliant*  tank, fast, well armoured (40mm compared to the 30mm of the Pz III or IV) and with the über 2 pdr which could blow through *all* German tanks in France 1940. Churchill the Tank commission felt that the 2 pdr was more than adequate for tanks that would be produced in 1941 1942, nor any reason that the Crusader wouldn't perform admirably.

So again, in the second half of 1940 what possible reason can you give that the UK would scrap the Crusader production to rush into a re-design?

Can you explain why the British would even be that concerned about 42/43 tanks, considering that in the summer of '40 defence of the UK was the critical need, and why there would be an urgent need for a fast cruiser tank in the Desert for a war that hadn't even started yet?



> Both Cavalier and Cromwell would've fitted nicely in discussion about British tanks deployed in late 1943/ early'44



...Which is exactly what you are talking about here.
You specified development following the Blitzkrieg of 39/40 (First British tanks in action in the Fall of France)
Again, the General Staff looked at the events in France, (exactly the scenario you specified) the specifications for the A23 (Cavalier/Cromwell) were issued in late 1940, and the first tanks arrived in Jan 1943.



> In mid-1940, the British were considering which tank should follow on from the new cruiser tanks then being developed. A specification was drawn up by the Directorate of Tanks and Transport which included the QF 6 pounder gun. This led to General Staff specification A23





> In late 1940, the General Staff set out the specifications for the new tank {A23}, and designs were submitted in early 1941





> Production began in November 1942. It would take considerable time for Rover to make ready production lines for the Meteor, and it was not until a few months later, in January 1943, that sufficient Meteor engines were available and the A27M Cromwell began production


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## tomo pauk (Mar 27, 2011)

freebird said:


> No, not actually. the Fall of France was 25 June 1940. Even assuming that you started work in July 1940, you have only two years. Any tank that hasn't been produced by July 1942 isn't going to have enough time to be shipped to Egypt (8 - 10 weeks), unloaded, fitted out for Desert operations, issued to the troops and trained on.



The Commonwealth troops managed to got trained on US tanks in no time (despite new guns, radios, engine, transmission, interior), so I'd say a month on a new tank of British origin would've been cool for a crew that has already seen some experience.
Saying that it would've took 8-10 weeks for tanks to arrive from UK to Egypt is way of the mark. Eg. it took RN ships 15 days to travel from Isles to Malta during Pedestal (granted, the transports used there were not the slowest available). That makes 20 days with same speed, perhaps 30 with regular transports. 



> Under your scenario there is just simply not enough time to develop deploy a new tank before El Alamein, nor have you given any plausible reason why the British would scrap the normal tank development cycle.



Two years to develop. 1st series shipped in August '42, Arriving in September, ready for Alamein in late October.
As for 'Brittsh scrapping the normal tank developing cycle', you'd have to be more specific on what tanks we're talking to. The best tank Brits produced prior Cromwell was Valentine, a private project. So the 'British normal tank developing cycle was far from flawless. 



> Can you explain why they would scrap the Crusader design in 1940 and start over?



Because the tank design was featuring 2 pdr (ditching anti-personal anti-AT-gun capabilities- Brits knew about that already in June '40), because armor was of questionable thickness layout, because it was to use riveting to join the armour slabs, because it was based on premise that only tanks (out of all weapon systems) are not to be developed further, during a major war?



> Even if you were "the man responsible for tank development," you can't just scrap the new tank design on a whim, you would be vetoed booted by Churchill Cabinet PDQ.



That would be beyond this thread 



> Your idea is to "create the armored force that would perform admirably within 2 years."
> Indeed, and the Crusader is a *brilliant*  tank, fast, well armoured (40mm compared to the 30mm of the Pz III or IV) and with the über 2 pdr which could blow through *all* German tanks in France 1940. Churchill the Tank commission felt that the 2 pdr was more than adequate for tanks that would be produced in 1941 1942, nor any reason that the Crusader wouldn't perform admirably.



If you can see any logic for weapon systems to be equally efficient* in 1942 as they were in 1940, that's cool. Because I don't.

*The ability to attack soft targets still lacking for 2pdr - not all tank targets are other tanks



> So again, in the second half of 1940 what possible reason can you give that the UK would scrap the Crusader production to rush into a re-design?



For reasons, see above. If you think Crusader I was that good, okay. 



> Can you explain why the British would even be that concerned about tanks, considering that defence of the UK was the critical need,



One of greatest sentences I've read in this forum 
Despite that critical need, they continued development of tanks. The tanks were not perfect (nor were on other countries; most of them were buying Britsh ones pfe-war anyway), hence this thread.



> and why there would be an urgent need for a fast cruiser tank in the Desert for a war that hadn't even started yet?



Now where did I say we need a 'fast cruiser tank'?? In 2011 we know there was 'Desert war', while Alamein was neatly defining both place AND time.



> ...Which is exactly what you are talking about here.
> You specified development following the Blitzkrieg of 39/40 (First British tanks in action in the Fall of France)
> Again, the General Staff looked at the events in France, (exactly the scenario you specified) the specifications for the A23 (Cavalier/Cromwell) were issued in late 1940, and the first tanks arrived in Jan 1943.



That makes 2 years and, say, 3 months before 1st tanks are rolled out? With specification issued in June 1940, 'my' tank force might just cut it for Alamein 
(Not that those ones would be Cromwels)


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## parsifal (Mar 27, 2011)

fantastic discussion guys, i applaud you all. these are good ideas. 

My two cents worth is that british technical failures in tank design are completely overblown. Their tanks in many respects were superior to german tanks of the period, with the two pounder argument one of the most overblown excuses for british tank failure that I have ever come acros. talk about the british army covering its tracks!!!!!! 

The real failure in British armour, was in the failure of its doctrine and TO&E. The british Infantry Division underwent just two major changes prior to 1942, and by that year was being dubbed by both its users and its opponents as the "Queen Of the Battlefield". By 1942, the Germans had no answer to a British Infantry Division, properly handled it could defeat any comparable organization the Germans could throw at it. With one proviso. it had to be properly led and managed, something that did not always happen in the British Army. As hitler said....their leadership was abysmal, the materiel was magnificent (paraphrasing) 

Unfortunately the same cannot be said about British armour formations. In comparison to the infantry, the british Armoured Division underwent no less than 17 changes in its TO&E prior to Alamein, a strong indication that something was really wrong. And still was largely a failure. The horrendous losses suffered by the british in their tank formations had little to do with poor design....if they had been using German tanks, the results would have been the same. The problem was that the Brits continued to think of their armour as latter day mechanised knights in armour, dashing about the battlefield, charging down the enemies guns, that sought of thing. This just got them destroyed most of the time, and reduced to irrelevance in the battle. Even at Alamein, I would challenge that is was the british (and Commonwealth) Infantry that won that battle....the armour simply poured through the breaches achieved by the Infantry.

So what would I concentrate on in my preparations. Basically nothing, just get the production and output organized. then I would concentrate on the supporting elements of the Divisional structure....less tanks per div, more support, more mobile artillery, and more Infantry and heavy AT support...getting the 2pounders replaced with aproper HE firing AT weapon (towed) and mechanized artillery support has to be a priority. Making changes to improve reliability, perhaps, but not a priority there even. Just making sure the military organization into which all this effort is being poured is correct and the doctrine in their use wel thought out. Something sadly lacking in the historical armoured operations.


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## Freebird (Mar 27, 2011)

tomo pauk said:


> The Commonwealth troops managed to got trained on US tanks in no time (despite new guns, radios, engine, transmission, interior), so I'd say a month on a new tank of British origin would've been cool for a crew that has already seen some experience.
> Saying that it would've took 8-10 weeks for tanks to arrive from UK to Egypt is way of the mark. Eg. it took RN ships 15 days to travel from Isles to Malta during Pedestal (granted, the transports used there were not the slowest available). *That makes 20 days with same speed*, perhaps 30 with regular transports. Two years to develop. 1st series shipped in August '42, Arriving in September, ready for Alamein in late October.



Sorry, no.
They didn't ship any convoys to Egypt in 1942, all of them went around the Cape, and had done so since "Tiger" in May 1941. Malta was so desparate for supplies in the summer of '42 that there was no way that they could trans-ship anything to Egypt, every ton that made it through to Malta from Gibratar was desperatley needed.
The problem was that with the italian capture of Cyrenecia in May '42, the convoys couldn't get by the Axis air forces 

*Feb 1942*, convoy MF5, all sunk or disabled.
*Mar 1942* convoy MG1 - Egypt to Malta, 4 transports, Two transports were sunk at sea, while the British 2 reached Malta. Both were sunk at anchor in Valetta harbour by German aircraft before unloading was completed.
*June '42* Harpoon - Gibraltar to Malta, 6 transports, 4 sunk. Two arrived in Malta with desperately needed supplies.
*June 42 * Vigorous Vigorous was heavily attacked by aircraft, torpedo boats and submarines over four days, threatened by a strong Italian battlefleet, and eventually returned to Alexandria. No transports reached Malta, 2 sunk, several damaged.
*August 1942* Pedestal 14 transports, 10 sunk (Ohio offloaded before sinking), 2 badly damaged (Rochester Castle brisbane Star) only two arrived safely at the cost of 7 RN ships sunk or badly damaged. Even with the Fuel supplies delivered Malta is still badly short of supplies

There was simply *NO WAY* that the admiralty was going to try to ship anything to Egypt via Malta in the second half of '42, nor could they have succeeded even if they had tried.
Your tanks for El alamein will arrive via the Cape - period. (sorry)





> As for 'Brittsh scrapping the normal tank developing cycle', *you'd have to be more specific on what tanks we're talking to*. The best tank Brits produced prior Cromwell was Valentine, a private project. So the 'British normal tank developing cycle was far from flawless.
> Because the tank design was featuring 2 pdr (ditching anti-personal anti-AT-gun capabilities- Brits knew about that already in June '40), because armor was of questionable thickness layout, because it was to use riveting to join the armour slabs, because it was based on premise that only tanks (out of all weapon systems) are not to be developed further, during a major war?



The normal British practice in the war was a 2.5 year development, with a 2 year cycle.
As I explained before, they took the Crusader "Off the drawing board" in mid '39, production begins mid 41. In the Summer of 1940 they started considering specifications for the replacement tank, issued the proposal in the fall of '40, proposal accepted early '41 and production begins at the end of '42.



> That would be beyond this thread



Tomo, your scenario has to make sense. You can have have space aliens drop the designers through a time portal  otherwise you will have a propoasal issued in the fall of 1940, and the tank delivered at the end of 1942, for use in 1943. 



> If you can see any logic for weapon systems to be equally efficient* in 1942 as they were in 1940, that's cool. Because I don't.
> *The ability to attack soft targets still lacking for 2pdr - not all tank targets are other tanks
> For reasons, see above. If you think Crusader I was that good, okay.


 
It's not what "I" think, it was the opinion of Churchill the British Chiefs, until there was some actual evidence to prove it wrong.



> One of greatest sentences I've read in this forum
> *Despite that critical need, they continued development of tanks*. The tanks were not perfect (nor were on other countries; most of them were buying Britsh ones pfe-war anyway), hence this thread.



Indeed they did, but they were not in urgent need to rush out a new designin June 1940


> That makes 2 years and, say, 3 months before 1st tanks are rolled out? With specification issued in June 1940, 'my' tank force might just cut it for Alamein
> (Not that those ones would be Cromwels)



Tomo, the proposal had to be discussed by the British tank board, which included Churchill the CIGS in the discussions. There is no way that they are going to be taking time off during Dunkirk France to have these discussions during June 1940. 

But, despite all the reasons that I've given why it doesn't make sense, your proposal is issued on July 1 1940 (The Cavalier/Cromwell A23 proposal about 3 months early)
Therefore you could the tank to begin production in Oct 1942, (about 3 months early) and arrive in the desert in Dec 1942. (about 3 months early)


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## Freebird (Mar 27, 2011)

parsifal said:


> fantastic discussion guys, i applaud you all. these are good ideas.
> 
> My two cents worth is that british technical failures in tank design are completely overblown. Their tanks in many respects were superior to german tanks of the period, with the two pounder argument one of the most overblown excuses for british tank failure that I have ever come acros. talk about the british army covering its tracks!!!!!!
> 
> The real failure in British armour, was in the failure of its doctrine and TO&E. The british Infantry Division underwent just two major changes prior to 1942, and by that year was being dubbed by both its users and its opponents as the "Queen Of the Battlefield". By 1942, the Germans had no answer to a British Infantry Division, properly handled it could defeat any comparable organization the Germans could throw at it. With one proviso. it had to be properly led and managed, something that did not always happen in the British Army. As hitler said....their leadership was abysmal, the materiel was magnificent (paraphrasing)


 
I largely agree with your points here, it was doctrine failure in the armour.

However there are a couple of points.
The Matilda II was a good tank for it's time
Cromwell was also a good tank 

The Crusader Covenanter were poor tanks however, mainly as a result of trying to skip the trial test phase.

2. Although there were huge problems with doctrine, an excellent tank *can* sometimes prevent a disaster.
The British attack at Arras in France was one such case, where the British tanks conducted an unsupported attack against the SS motorized division. It _could_ have resulted in a complete slaughter by German anti-tank guns, but the British were saved by the fact that the Matilda was almost completely immune to the German 37mm. Had they sent the Ram to the desert instead of the Crusader, it may well have saved the armour from the tactical mistakes, as except at short range the Ram was proof against almost everything other than the 88, while the Crusader was basically vulnerable to everything out to 1,500 or 2,000 yards.

3.) You are correct about the failure of British doctrine, except at Gazala. They did manage to gain the upper hand and trap the German armour in "The Cauldron", unfortunately the Germans managed to break out by overrunning the British armour. In this case the defeat *was* directly caused by the failure of the British tanks in a head to head match.



In any event, to sum up, Tomo's hypothetical seems to be this:
*Suppose that the British put out the A23/A24 proposal about 3 months early.*

Questions involved
1.) Would it arrive in time?
2.) Would it affect El Alamein if it did arrive before the battle?
3.) What would the tank look like?

IMO the answer to #1 is no, due to the reasons listed above.
#2 would also be no, due to the very limited numbers, and due to the reasons listed by parsifal.
For #3, would the tank be much different than the Cromwell?

Can anyone answer the points that I raised earlier?



freebird said:


> Second, the Crusader is just too small at 18-19 tons to support future development.
> 
> Third, to redesign the Kestrel as a tank engine beginning in 1941 would be slower than using the Meteor which is already in the works.
> 
> Fourth, even with an improved engine in the Crusader, it's still has the problem of it's weak armour, and the chasis just won't support the weight of an upgunned uparmoured variant.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 28, 2011)

I'll give a shot about:


> Second, the Crusader is just too small at 18-19 tons to support future development.
> 
> Third, to redesign the Kestrel as a tank engine beginning in 1941 would be slower than using the Meteor which is already in the works.
> 
> Fourth, even with an improved engine in the Crusader, it's still has the problem of it's weak armour, and the chasis just won't support the weight of an upgunned uparmoured variant.



Don't think Crusader is a good base for anything; it's the infantry tanks that were shining during the 1st half of war, and they deserve the development.

There is no need to wait for 1941 for Kestrel-based tank engine. Kestrel was not of any importance for RAF even prior WW2, so the working tank engine was very much feasible as early as 1939. 350 HP to power 20-30 ton tanks - better than what Germans have had to offer back then.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 28, 2011)

A few points.

1. the Kestrel. It was giving over 400hp in aircraft form in the early 30s WITHOUT a supercharger and on less than 87 octane fuel. Not a lot of development needed. Over 8000 produced of all kinds?
The Kestrel, displacement wise, was within 200cc of the initial engines used to power the Tiger tank and only 10% smaller than the final versions of the Tiger and Panther engines. It may not have meet the official requirement of 20 hp per ton for 30 ton tank but it certainly offered enough power for practical purposes until 1944 or so. 

2. Lets not confuse weight with size. The Crusader was 2 feet longer than a Valentine and about 1 inch shorter than a Cavalier or early Cromwell and the hull is about 4 inches shorter than a Comet. The suspension of 19 ton tank may not offer development to 30 ton tank but the actual hull size seems to have been OK, the later tanks did get a bit wider. 

3. The infantry tanks Shined but due to circumstance and were a lousy basis for further development. They were physically smaller and much slower. Speed may not be every thing but 12-15mph limits options. 

4. Sometimes tactics dictate weapons procurement and sometimes weapons procurement (or supply) dictate tactics. British tanks had NO HE ammo to silence dug in guns and Smoke was confined to just 2 tanks per company or squadron. Once an attack was started the tanks had two basic choices if fired upon by dug in guns. Withdraw and try to get the artillery fire plan modified to take in the change of threat or charge as quickly as possible until they were in effective MG range of the dug in guns and silence them with MG fire. If the British tanks had been supplied with HE ammunition for the 2pdr and 6pdr guns different tactics might have been employed at least some commanders. 
2pdr armed Crusaders carried an amazing amount of ammo in theory. 130 rounds of 2pdr ammo (all AP) and up to 4950 rounds of ammo for a single Machine gun. Trading some of this storage capacity for HE rounds wouldn't have hurt things one bit. 

5. The Crusader was not quite the tin clad some would have us Believe. That or the German guns weren't quite as good. The short German 50 is usually rated as penetrating 46mm at 500 meters and 36mm at 1000 meters. the long 50 adds about 500 meters to those ranges. The short 75mm is equally effective against ALL tanks over about 500meters because it is using HE shells to try to cripple suspensions as it has no hope of penetrating armor over 40mm at ranges much past 500 meters. 
That leaves the 88s and the towed 75mm-76mm At guns and the few long barreled MK IVs. Since the 75mm long guns can penetrate about 72-75mm of armor at 1500 meters upping the armor of the Crusader from 40mm to even 64mm (Cavalier hull front) doesn't buy much. All penetration figures at 30 degrees.


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## Glider (Mar 28, 2011)

The only observation I have on the above (which I agree with 100%) is the HE ammunition. HE did exist for the 2pd and the 6pd but for some stupid reason wasn't issued to the army for AT or tank guns until early 1944. I don't know when it was developed and its quite possible that it wasn't around in 1942 which is the period we are looking at.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 28, 2011)

Re. infantry tanks being smaller slower, being bad basis for further development: While the Matilda Valentine were indeed smaller than Cruisers, Churchill was a hefty piece of machinery. Don't think that 30 ton infantry tank (size between Matilda Churchill, featuring 3in armour in front, 2in at sides back, 6pdr, 400 HP Kestrel-derivative engine) was out of scope of British tank industry for 1941. The power to weight ratio on par with Pz-IIIH and newer, and Pz-IVF1 and newer.

Re Crusader (not) being tinclad: in the 'threat list' we need to include 5cm pak, with Crusader being well within capabilities of that gun. OTOH, for a tank that weighted circa 20 tons, armor thickness was generous.


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## Juha (Mar 28, 2011)

I think Tomo was speaking of this gun
The Vickers Model 1931
Produced 1931-39?
Weight 2,825 kilograms (6,230 lb)
Barrel length 3.225 metres (10.58 ft) L/43
Shell weight 6.5 kilograms (14 lb) (HE)
Caliber 75 millimetres 
Carriage cruciform
Elevation 0° to +90°
Traverse 360°
Rate of fire 12 rpm
Muzzle velocity	750 metres per second (2,500 ft/s)

In Romania…The Vickers/Resita model 1936/39 75mm AA gun was used by almost all ten Romanian AA regiments, throughout the war, and was much appreciated for its qualities in the anti-aircraft and also anti-tank role (as it was used in some desperate situations at Stalingrad). It remained in service until the early 50s, when it was replaced by Soviet built models. Source of Romanian part: WorldWar2.ro - 75mm Vickers antiaircraft gun model 1936/39

So if British could have put the gun into a tank turret as a stop-gap measurement while waiting for 17pdr as the real answer to their A/T problems or even built an A/T Valentine like Archer with the Model 1931 and used it like Germans used Marders. Valentine was reliable and small, so even if not perfect it was passable platform for heavy A/T gun.
One basic problem for British was their early lead in industrialisation, specs demanded tanks to be rail transportable but narrow gauge and narrow rail tunnels meant rather narrow hulls to which it was very difficult to install adequate turret ring for effective 3” gun with adequate AP performance against late German tanks. 

Juha


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## Juha (Mar 28, 2011)

To those who don't know the Vickers Model 1931, here is a photo on it, Finns called it 76 ItK/34 Vickers, our were 76.2mm.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 28, 2011)

Welcome back, Juha


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## Shortround6 (Mar 28, 2011)

tomo pauk said:


> Re. infantry tanks being smaller slower, being bad basis for further development: While the Matilda Valentine were indeed smaller than Cruisers, Churchill was a hefty piece of machinery. Don't think that 30 ton infantry tank (size between Matilda Churchill, featuring 3in armour in front, 2in at sides back, 6pdr, 400 HP Kestrel-derivative engine) was out of scope of British tank industry for 1941. The power to weight ratio on par with Pz-IIIH and newer, and Pz-IVF1 and newer.



Then you are not using them for "further development" but designing a whole new tank. 



tomo pauk said:


> Re Crusader (not) being tinclad: in the 'threat list' we need to include 5cm pak, with Crusader being well within capabilities of that gun. OTOH, for a tank that weighted circa 20 tons, armor thickness was generous.



The 5cm pak had essentially the same performance as the 50mm/60 tank gun. For a good part of the dessert war it was the Germans primary tank killer. Small and easy to dig in and conceal.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 28, 2011)

That is the gun but but the main problems with using it in a "what if" is how far out to you take the "what if". Being out of production for a few years before the war started means the British didn't have that many to begin with. Several projects actually proposed In WW II to use them came to nothing when the "supposed" stock of old guns/barrels couldn't be found. 
The gun tube was of WW I design and rather heavy for it's performance, 2250lbs for the barrel and Breech (not including recoil system) for 84mm of penetration at 1000yds at 30 degrees compared to the 17pdrs 1822lbs for 109mm penetration at 1000yds at 30 degrees. 
To use it as a tank gun requires a new recoil mechanism to be designed and built. An Archer style mounting might be able to use the existing recoil system but since the Archer required the driver to be out of his seat when the gun fired (the recoiling gun would have decapitated the driver) it was best used from ambush and trying to use it in the dessert would have been difficult. 
Better to use it's performance as a goal or bench mark and just build a new gun.


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## Freebird (Mar 28, 2011)

All good points Shortround. 
Obviously it would be better to have an improved Crusader with the 6pdr and HE ammo.




Shortround6 said:


> Since the 75mm long guns can penetrate about 72-75mm of armor at 1500 meters upping the armor of the Crusader from 40mm to even 64mm (Cavalier hull front) doesn't buy much. All penetration figures at 30 degrees.



Although it wouldn't penetrate the Ram's 87mm frontal armour, and would need to be within at 1,000 yards.



tomo pauk said:


> I'll give a shot about:
> Don't think Crusader is a good base for anything; it's the infantry tanks that were shining during the 1st half of war, and they deserve the development.



Thera already *is* an infantry tank in development, the A20 prototype was found to be unsuitable in the summer of 1940, so Vauxhall is working on the A22 Churchill, which will be produced by the summer of 1941. If you wanted to change the engine on the A22, it would delay the project by 6 months or more, and what benefit would it bring?



tomo pauk said:


> There is no need to wait for 1941 for Kestrel-based tank engine. Kestrel was not of any importance for RAF even prior WW2, so the working tank engine was very much feasible as early as 1939. 350 HP to power 20-30 ton tanks - better than what Germans have had to offer back then.


 
The problem is that Rolls-Royce doesn't have any spare production capacity to build engines, they are already short on Merlins. That's why the Meteor was built at Rover. Any new engine plant is going to need to be set up first



tomo pauk said:


> Don't think that 30 ton infantry tank (size between Matilda Churchill, featuring 3in armour in front, 2in at sides back, 6pdr, 400 HP Kestrel-derivative engine) was out of scope of British tank industry for 1941. The power to weight ratio on par with Pz-IIIH and newer, and Pz-IVF1 and newer.



Actually it was, there are no 6 pdrs available until 1942, they didn't switch production from the 2 pdr until late in 1941.

So, bottom line, would it make any difference?
The Churchill A22 design is in the works, and while a 400hp kestrel might be a bit faster better than the 350hp Bedford, it would delay production while they waited for engines to be produced. 

The A24/A27 project proposal that was put out in the fall of 1940 would proceed much along the same lines I don't see that there will be much improvement on that or that the Kestrel version could be produced any faster than the Meteor, as both involved taking an existing Aero engine and producing it at a new factory.


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## Juha (Mar 28, 2011)

Hello Shortround
I don’t have exact info on production of Model 1931 but Vickers delivered 12 to Finland in mid 1936 and 48 to Romania in March 1939. Because British armament industry worked at full capacity during the WWII, restart Model 1931 production as tank / AT gun would have meant reduction in some other gun production programs. But the gun would have been able to knock out all panzers the 8th Army met in 42 at least from 1000y and it had also HE round, something the other British tank / A/T guns were sorely lacking but the few CS tanks.
17pdr was clearly better gun but unavailable in 42.
On Archer, I’m well aware the decapitation risk to the driver, but I recall from photos on 17pdr on the 25pdr carriage that it had rather long recoil. I don’t recall seeing any photos on Model 1931 at full recoil but the gun being rather low and still capable firing at full 90 deg elevation I guess that its recoil was clearly shorter, so it might have been possible to install it so on Valentine chassis that driver could have stayed on his place during firing.

Juha


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## Freebird (Mar 28, 2011)

Juha said:


> So if British could have put the gun into a tank turret as a stop-gap measurement while waiting for 17pdr as the real answer to their A/T problems or even built an A/T Valentine like Archer with the Model 1931 and used it like Germans used Marders.



We seem to be discussing two different considerations here.
A.) What the British can do for 1942 (before El Alamein)
B.) What designs can be put forward in the second half of 1940, which with normal development will be available only near the end of '42. (but not a big factor at El Alamein)

They don't really need a stopgap AT in 1942, at the 6 pdr is very effective against all German tanks.
The Tiger doesn't show up until the very end of '42, nor do any Pz IV's with more than 50mm armour.

The problem with our discussions here is that the British don't have any spare industrial capacity to build new guns or engines in 1940 or early 1941.
The 6 pdr is already ready to go, but due to the desparate shortage after France, they couldn't switch over any 2pdr production until the second half of '41.
If they had *any* available gun production it would be making the 6 pdr, not the 1931 3" gun. 

Anyways, for part "A" (1942) it's unlikely that a _new_ tank design would arrive in time. (as mentioned earlier)

Although the Churchill was in production in 1941, it wasn't deemed suitable for the desert, as there were only 3 present at El Alamein. The main need was for cruiser tanks, that's why I suggested to use Lend-Lease Canadian Ram tanks, to fill the gap between the Crusader and the Cromwell.
The Crusader could however be converted into an assault gun, as it would use the existing chassis, with either a 6 pdr or an 18 pdr, and be available for Gazala/El Alamein. However this would only be if the British did find some other tanks to use instead of the Crusader (such as the Ram)
This in my opinion would be the best option.

For Part "B", I don't see that that a new infantry tank design would be in any way justified, as it would only delay the Churchill program. I don't see that I would do much different in 1940 in any event. Now perhaps in the summer/fall of '41 the Churchill could be revisited, to eliminate the bow howitzer, and put in a larger turret to accomodate the 17 pdr or 25 pdr.

If you did put out the A24/A27 project a couple of months early, would it change much? I can't see how it would either, from what they know at that point.
The 17 pdr wasn't even designed at that point, so it would be planned to use the 6 pdr.
The problem with the Kestrel engine is that there isn't a manufacturer available, and the poject's design (Nuffield) would prefer to use their own Liberty engine, which was in manufacture at the time.
The choice of the Tank Board was the correct one IMO, they didn't put their eggs all in one basket, by ordering 3 prototypes of the Cromwell (Cavilier, Centaur Cromwell) with the Meadows, Liberty Meteor respectively. The Meadows had some issues (as the Covenanter did too) and the Liberty wasn't deemed powerful enough. 
Since they had to build new production facilities for the RR tank engines, why would they build the Kestrel intead of the more powerful Meteor?


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## parsifal (Mar 28, 2011)

freebird said:


> I largely agree with your points here, it was doctrine failure in the armour.
> 
> However there are a couple of points.
> The Matilda II was a good tank for it's time
> ...


 A couple of minor points that are hardly even a different opinion. I agree that the Cruiser tank Ram was a superior tank to the Crusader, but I dont think the qualitative differences are as great as your post suggests, and I doubt it could have saved the British at Gazala. That last comment gives away my basic viewpoint on this crucial battle....I consider it to be a British defeat. I disagree that DAKs difficulties were the result of British initiatives. They were more the result of a breakdown in german C&C, and an overly ambitios plan by Rommel with the forces at his disposal. His continued reliance on a hook around the southern flank almost cost him the battle, as at certain key points like Bir Hacheim, he was held up and repulsed.

But, as usual, the British armour counterattacked in near feudal style, against prepared German defences. Unsupported this attack by the british armour was only ever going to achieve one result.

What concerns me in this debate, which really isnt a point you made FB, is this mania to align British tank development to what I call "the german disease". Scr*w the numbers, just go for quality. Wrong, wrong, so wrong!!!!! As the germans found out repeatedly, relying on quality at the expense of numbers is a sure way of being defeated. What was important in my view was finding ways of keeping the numbers up, and not worrying so much about getting the quality fixed. Quality is a "nice to have" element, bu far down in the list of priorities. To me the priorities are
1) Get the doctrine right
2) Adjust the TO&E to optimise the doctrine (all arms).
3) Ensure the numbers game remains in Allied hands. No tom foolery with the production lines
4) Once items (1), (2), (3) are under control, only then can quality issues be considered

To me, a worthy project is Valentine. It proved capable of up-gunning to 6 pdr, was heavily armoured and adequately armed. It was relatively easy to produce. To me, just what the brits needed


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## Freebird (Mar 28, 2011)

parsifal said:


> What concerns me in this debate, which really isnt a point you made FB, is this mania to align British tank development to what I call "the german disease". Scr*w the numbers, just go for quality. Wrong, wrong, so wrong!!!!! As the germans found out repeatedly, relying on quality at the expense of numbers is a sure way of being defeated. What was important in my view was finding ways of keeping the numbers up, and not worrying so much about getting the quality fixed. Quality is a "nice to have" element, bu far down in the list of priorities. To me the priorities are
> 1) Get the doctrine right
> 2) Adjust the TO&E to optimise the doctrine (all arms).
> 3) Ensure the numbers game remains in Allied hands. No tom foolery with the production lines
> ...


 
Good points, I'd like to expand further on Gazala, although outside of the scope of this thread. 
I've started a new "Western Desert" thread, so I'll invite your opinions there.

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww...t-british-tank-doctrine-28578.html#post774308



> 3) Ensure the numbers game remains in Allied hands. No tom foolery with the production lines



I agree with that, and that's why I have some major doubts that any new tank begun in 1940 would arrive before 1943.
I also doubt that given the crisis mode of the Battle of Britain that any firm decision on the A24/A27 would be taken earlier that actually happened, nor that it could have been improved upon at the time. (specification issued Oct 1940, proposal accepted jan 1941)

You are correct about doctrine faults, however given the properties of the 2pdr which equipped almost all the tanks, having no HE capability they were almost forced to try to seek out the German armour.
The Crusader was also shown to have serious faults, and to continue to produce 5,000 of them to keep having them slaughtered was pointless.
That's why I suggested it as I did, to send the Rams over instead, and convert the Crusader into an assault gun in late '41. Even if the 25 pdr was too heavy, mounting a 3" field gun would do the trick, giving the British a useful attacking weapon.


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## Juha (Mar 29, 2011)

Hello Freebird
on development times, the development of Archer, from beginning to first production machine took appr. 20 months but Germans developed their first Marders in appr 5 months. So an ad-hoc A/T vehicle based on proven chassis could be developed fairly fast when there was an urgent need. Also a gun with good penetration power and with a good HE round was a very useful weapon, even if British had problem to see that.

Juha


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## Freebird (Mar 29, 2011)

Juha said:


> Hello Freebird
> So an ad-hoc A/T vehicle based on proven chassis could be developed fairly fast when there was an urgent need. Also a gun with good penetration power and with a good HE round was a very useful weapon, even if British had problem to see that.
> Juha


 
The Germans and the Americans did tend to get things done quicker. 

But I do agree with you, that's what i was suggesting with a Crusader assault gun.
Although I can't see them doing this before mid-1941, as the UK urgently needs field guns for home defence, and you have to identify a need before trying to fix it.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 29, 2011)

From some point in the late thirties it seems the British had 3 tank engine programs going even before the Meteor. The Liberty (enough said) the Meadows flat 12 (also enough said) and Bedford twin six.If they could build a new factory (or retool one) to build a 1917 airplane engines it doesn't seem like too much of a stretch to plan for the factory to build a 1927 airplane engine. And/or Meadows to take up production of the Kestrel rather than the flat twelve.
A big problem in making large, high powered tanks is the transmission/steering gear. This may hold up development as much as anything else.


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## parsifal (Mar 29, 2011)

I largely agree with FB on this. Essentially what he is saying is that messing around with production by introducing radically new types is a mistake. This is because the overwhelming determinant on successful tank operations is NOT quality, its numbers. The germans chose the quality pathway and basically lost the (tank) war as a result. 

However within the parameters of the existing production program there were opportunities to shift things around a bit and not affect numbers. He is essentially advocating concentrating on the RAM tank, and putting less effort into the Crusader. Whilst I am not as critical about the Crusaders problems, there is no denying that the tank had its problems, and that as a design the RAM was a better overall package. What is attractive to FBs scenario, is that a changeover to RAM as the principal type in the desert could have been achieved with virtually no dispruption to output. Instead of constructing Crusaders, the factories devoted to this purpose could have converted to RAM production, with only minimal loss of output for a short period of time, IMO.

These other proposals have merits, in terms of getting a better product, however, they are all failing to sufficiently consider the the production bottlenecks they would cause. SRs comments about engine development are worthwhile, but it needs to be remembered that British tank engine development was the area where British AFV development started late, and showed all the signs of inadequate development. There simply was not a lot of time from when the british started to get back into the tank building game in a serious way (1939) and the time they were needed (1941-2). The British really had to make do with regard to engines. It is an attractive proposal also because it uses a better foreign produced engine (the Wright R-975 Whirlwind ) that was powerful, reliable, and available in virtually unlimited numbers

One word of caution I would say, however. In 1939 the canadians were an unknown force in AFV production. they had a pretty well established auto industry and a pretty strong proponent for armoured warfare (I apologise to the canadians, but ive forgotten his name). For the British to put their faith in the canadians, when they had no credentials to show that they could deliver, was asking a lot from the british army. The Ram tank was a development of the M3 and this in turn was a design resulting from British experiences at the front (given that the M3 was also a vast improvement of the M2, an observer in 1939 would have thought CIGS to be an utter madman to place greater faith on an untried colonial nation using an as yet unbuilt concept, based on an inferior design from a foreign power). For the brits to hang back on their evolution of the cruiser tank concept (which occurred in 1939, with the crusader its ultimate development) was asking a lot in terms of putting faith in an untried and unknown industrrial complex. as it turned out, the british need not have worried, the RAM was superior to the home grown designs in many respects. But that was not a known outcomee in 1939, which is when the decision to rely on the Canadians to that extent needed to be taken.


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## davebender (Mar 29, 2011)

A bit off topic but...
The Afrika Korps was starved of supplies most of the time. IMO the Battle of North Africa was mostly won by the RN.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 29, 2011)

parsifal said:


> The British really had to make do with regard to engines. It is an attractive proposal also because it uses a better foreign produced engine (the Wright R-975 Whirlwind ) that was powerful, reliable, and available in virtually unlimited numbers



It may have been powerful (only 50-150hp less than the kestrel), it was certainly compact (short), reliable was relative, hurried development of installation/s led to poor maintenance access (sound familiar?), less than the best cooling lead to high oil consumption and "virtually unlimited numbers" led to the Chrysler multi-bank engine, the GMC twin diesel and a smattering of Guiberson radial diesel engines in the M3 medium tanks in 1942. 

The Kestrel may have been a typical Rolls-Royce product. Cost and man hours of production may have taken back seats. While the basic engine needed little development, the Kestrel X was rated at 635hp at 2900rpm and 560hp at 2375 rpm for take off, unsupercharged with a 7:1 compression ratio, it might have taken a bit of work to productionize it using more fully interchangeable parts than the usual R-R hand final fit. 
Adjust the HP as you see fit but it was 78.5% the size of the Merlin and 33% bigger than the Whirlwind (and revved higher).
British treasury may have choked at the idea of using an expensive aircraft engine in a tank during peace time. 

As far as quantity over quality goes, your "Quality" tank needs to really be quality. A big gun and thick armor are of little good if the engine and transmission lead to numerous breakdowns before battle is joined (or while retreating) while tank that is too cheap simply can't do the job and provides little more than live target practice for the enemy. Anybody want another 500-1000 MK VI light tanks in the dessert in 1942?
A happy medium must be found and unfortunately for the British troops the numbers people hung onto some of the tanks in production (and the 2pdr) a bit too long. 
Don't get me wrong, I think the British A 13 tank was perhaps the best tank in France in 1940. But how much further had the British got by 1942?
Hoping the enemy doesn't progress much beyond the summer of 1940 by the summer of 1942 is being a little too hopeful.


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## parsifal (Mar 29, 2011)

The difficulties for the DAK, and the italians were certainly made worse by the RN, however there were also extended periods in the campaign where the RN could do virtually nothing to impede the flow of reinforcements and supplies. Most of the time the axis forces were receiving ample supplies.....the difficulty was that was receiving these supplies a long way from the front, and there was a wastage getting those supplies to where they were needed. This is where the germans defeated themselves. they never gave logistics a high priority, and their organizational arrangements were commensurately poor as a result. And of course the interdiction efforts by the RAF ought not be under-estimated either

The German failure to appreciate the importance of malta as the base from which the interdiction camapign was occuring is also a major factor in their defeat. If the island had been captured early....say in April 1941, instead of invading the more difficult and less important crete, the outcome of the entire campaign may have been totally different.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 30, 2011)

When we talk about quality, developing a 30 ton tank in 1940 (for use in late 1942) was hardly too expensive for 4 major combatants (tough luck for Germans passing on this). 
USA was producing by then M3, switching to M4, Soviets have had the T-34, Brits were deploying 40-ton Churchill. Even the Matilda II, produced from 1939 on, was already at 25 tons.
The 30 ton tanks were produced in 100 000+ copies in WW2 - proof they were nothing fancy, but right choice for the era.

BTW, do we have the cost for (not only) Brittish tanks of WW2 online?


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## parsifal (Mar 30, 2011)

_It may have been powerful (only 50-150hp less than the kestrel), it was certainly compact (short), reliable was relative, hurried development of installation/s led to poor maintenance access (sound familiar?), less than the best cooling lead to high oil consumption and "virtually unlimited numbers" led to the Chrysler multi-bank engine, the GMC twin diesel and a smattering of Guiberson radial diesel engines in the M3 medium tanks in 1942. _

err, you do know that the Ram used the M-3 chassis and hull, with a redesigned and flattedned turret and widened turret ring to accommodate the 6pdr gun. Whilst it had some amintenance issues, i think you are overstating the problems. All tanks have issues of one form or anaother. the Ram was no different, and as a generalization i would say its reliability and its maintainability were at least equal to most tanks of the period


The australian AC-1 to 4 tanks utilized 3 x V-8 chev truck motors that were pretty ingeniously coupled. though they were never used in combat, there was nothing wrong with this arrangement

_The Kestrel may have been a typical Rolls-Royce product. Cost and man hours of production may have taken back seats. While the basic engine needed little development, the Kestrel X was rated at 635hp at 2900rpm and 560hp at 2375 rpm for take off, unsupercharged with a 7:1 compression ratio, it might have taken a bit of work to productionize it using more fully interchangeable parts than the usual R-R hand final fit. 
Adjust the HP as you see fit but it was 78.5% the size of the Merlin and 33% bigger than the Whirlwind (and revved higher).
British treasury may have choked at the idea of using an expensive aircraft engine in a tank during peace time._ 

Kestrel sounds like a good possibility, though I suspect you are right about the cost


_As far as quantity over quality goes, your "Quality" tank needs to really be quality. A big gun and thick armor are of little good if the engine and transmission lead to numerous breakdowns before battle is joined (or while retreating) while tank that is too cheap simply can't do the job and provides little more than live target practice for the enemy. Anybody want another 500-1000 MK VI light tanks in the dessert in 1942?_ 

Mk VIs were on a par with german MkIs (except that the design was ten years older) and were responsible in large measure for the early victories. There was never even the slightest chance of them becoming the main operational type in 1942, as these had been overtaken by newer designs well before that time. slagging matches about the mk VI need to keep their design dates in perspective. they were designed in 1925-30, and were dirt cheap to build, easy to maintain and reliable. they were from the outset designated Light tanks, and fulfilled this task pretty well actually. Powered by 60hp Meadows engine, i am not aware of any significant reliability issues for this type. How do mk Vi tanks compare to the US contemporaries of the period...they dont, because there are no US tanks contemparaneous to the mkVI. 

Over its life span the mk Vi underwent a modest process of gradual improvement, including improved hull shape , improved suspension , some with rolls royce engines. major redesign with the intention of increasing engine power and reliability (reverting yet again to the RR engine) improved armouring fully synchro gearbox and simplified production was undertaken by Vickers in 1933. at this time the crew was increased from two to three men, with a redesigned two man turret. At about this time engine power was increased to 88hp, and though top speed decreased, power to weight and cross country mobility was enhanced with this subtype. Importantly, from 1933 radios were fitted , and a superior radio fitted from 1937. Of the 1300 AFVs on strength in the RTC in 1939, over 1000 were the mk vI.

Why was the mk VI so numerous if they were such duds as everyone assumes. To quote grove "as far as the RTC was concerned, these light tanks were relaible, and were better than nothing" A ringing endorsement of the Quantity over quality argument if ever there was one. And pre-occupation with having numbers on the ground did pay some dividends, it at least gave the RTC the opportunity to train its crews that in turn gave them the ability to win their stunning victories against the italians in 1940-41. 


your comments about reliability are overstating the issue. whilst the covenanter had problems, due mainly to a dodgy cooling system, there was nothing inherently wrong with british tank reliability, or with the engines they used. Once again we have this issue about numbers versus quality. there were breakdowns and failures, and these breakdowns and failures were more numerous than those expereinced by the germans, but such failures were not really decisive. what was decisive was that the numbers were on hand to defeat the germans. For the brits with their hurreied development and limited budgets, that meant cutting corners and accepting certain shortcomings in their tank development. I still think they made the right choices here. if they had deferred production until all the kinks were eliminated, or poured more resources into the product to make it better, they would have suffered a crisi in numbers, which was worse than having a somewhat dodgy engine..... , 

_A happy medium must be found and unfortunately for the British troops the numbers people hung onto some of the tanks in production (and the 2pdr) a bit too long. 
Don't get me wrong, I think the British A 13 tank was perhaps the best tank in France in 1940. But how much further had the British got by 1942?
Hoping the enemy doesn't progress much beyond the summer of 1940 by the summer of 1942 is being a little too hopeful_.

Sorry, but I fail to see your point here, and some of the comments are just downright wrong. I agree that a happy medium between quality and quantity needs to be found. I dont agree that the brits hung onto production of certain types too long or that the two pounder was kept in production too long. British tanks, in the main, remained on apar to their german counterparts throughout 1942. there was nothing wrong with the AT capability of the 2 pdr.; The drubbing the RTC got had nothing to do with its equipment. it had everything to do with poor TO&E and doctrine. As I pointed out in an earlier post, do you think the result would have been any different if the brits had been using german tanks in place of their own....not a chance. with regard to the 2pounder its problems stem from its ammunition, not the gun type. why a proper HE round was never developed, is beyond me. The Australians developed a 25pdr ATG for the AC-1, and fitted the 17 pdr to the AC-4 in 1943.

your last comment is just plain wrong. it assumes the brits were not progressing in their tank development at all after 1940. In so many ways this is just flat out wrong. there was significant development occurring and major advances in firepower, protection even in transmissions. The ultimate faltering of the british tank effort was due to the faltering british economy in the latter part of the war, not so mujch due to the failure of its tanks. it was cheaper and easier to use the Sherman, not necessarily better 9except in terms of standardisation and the old numbers game once again


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## davebender (Mar 30, 2011)

Why are your blaming Germany?

Italy was responsible for the Med and Malta was within spitting distance of Sicily. It was Italy that screwed up by failing to seize Malta during June 1940.


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## Freebird (Mar 30, 2011)

> Mk VIs were on a par with german MkIs (except that the design was ten years older) and were responsible in large measure for the early victories. There was never even the slightest chance of them becoming the main operational type in 1942, as these had been overtaken by newer designs well before that time. slagging matches about the mk VI need to keep their design dates in perspective. they were designed in 1925-30, and were dirt cheap to build, easy to maintain and reliable. they were from the outset designated Light tanks, and fulfilled this task pretty well actually. Powered by 60hp Meadows engine, i am not aware of any significant reliability issues for this type. How do mk Vi tanks compare to the US contemporaries of the period...they dont, because there are no US tanks contemparaneous to the mkVI.



Are we talking about the same thing here?
I think that Shourtround is talking about the he Cruiser mark VI Crusader, not the Light tank mk VI. 
The Crusader was a "Cruiser" but was in 1942 effectively a "light tank" at about 18 tons.

I'm in agreement with Shortround here, there is little point in sending more Crusaders by the spring of '42. 
IF IT DID have HE ammo, it might have helped, although the 40mm shell is way too small to be really effective.



> Shortround = _A happy medium must be found and unfortunately for the British troops the numbers people hung onto some of the tanks in production (and the 2pdr) a bit too long.
> Don't get me wrong, I think the British A 13 tank was perhaps the best tank in France in 1940. But how much further had the British got by 1942?
> Hoping the enemy doesn't progress much beyond the summer of 1940 by the summer of 1942 is being a little too hopeful._
> Parsifal = Sorry, but I fail to see your point here, and some of the comments are just downright wrong. I agree that a happy medium between quality and quantity needs to be found. I dont agree that the brits hung onto production of certain types too long *or that the two pounder was kept in production too long.* British tanks, in the main, remained on apar to their german counterparts throughout 1942. there was nothing wrong with the AT capability of the 2 pdr.;



Absolutely the 2 pdr was produced too long. The 6 pdr should have been produced in some plants from the fall of 1940. In July '41 there was no reason to delay the switchover in the UK, as there would no longer danger from invasion.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 30, 2011)

parsifal said:


> err, you do know that the Ram used the M-3 chassis and hull, with a redesigned and flattedned turret and widened turret ring to accommodate the 6pdr gun. Whilst it had some amintenance issues, i think you are overstating the problems. All tanks have issues of one form or anaother. the Ram was no different, and as a generalization i would say its reliability and its maintainability were at least equal to most tanks of the period



I am well aware of what the Ram was, since those were the issues in both the M3 and M4 tanks I don't see why the Ram should have been much different. Compared to some British and German tanks it would have been way ahead in reliability but let's not claim the Wright/Continental was trouble free. 



parsifal said:


> The australian AC-1 to 4 tanks utilized 3 x V-8 chev truck motors that were pretty ingeniously coupled. though they were never used in combat, there was nothing wrong with this arrangement


Most sources say Cadillac car engines but the point wan't that the Wright/Continental had such problems that it needed replacement but that the radial was NOT available in nearly unlimited quantities. Availability was limited to the point of 3 different substitutes being used (not counting the Australian one) 2 of which required the hull to be lengthened by about a foot in order to fit them in (bogie attachments had to be re-spaced also) 



parsifal said:


> Mk VIs were on a par with german MkIs (except that the design was ten years older) and were responsible in large measure for the early victories.......the 1300 AFVs on strength in the RTC in 1939, over 1000 were the mk vI.


Please don't get your knickers in a twist. I agree that the MK VI was a much better combat vehicle than the German MK I and even exceeded the MK II in some respects. I don't recall saying anything about the MK VI being a bad vehicle in 193-40 or even 41. 


parsifal said:


> Why was the mk VI so numerous if they were such duds as everyone assumes. To quote grove "as far as the RTC was concerned, these light tanks were relaible, and were better than nothing" A ringing endorsement of the Quantity over quality argument if ever there was one.


A ringing endorsement of stupidity is more like it. There was nothing wrong with 300 or 400 or 500MK VI tanks in the late 30s. But as soon as your probable opponents went to 15mm armor or better which the 12.7mm could not penetrate and they went to guns larger than 8mm which could penetrate areas of the MK VI tank, making hundreds more because they were cheap and reliable is false economy, paid for in blood by the troops that had to use them in combat. 
If used as recce vehicles they still had merit but using them to fill out cruiser squadron establishments is asking too much. 



parsifal said:


> your comments about reliability are overstating the issue.


I don't believe so. I was actually referring to the German Tiger and Panther here, sorry for the confusion, but it also applies to early T-34s and the KV series as well as some British tanks. You can have great paper specifications (big gun, thick armor) but if the tank design/construction is such that significant numbers of the tank either don't arrive at the start line of an attack or have to be left behind in a retreat then the design may not be as effective as a tank with a smaller gun and thinner armor. 
An argument for a middle of the road quality vs quantity. 
The British should have take a little bit of time to Iron a few kinks. Having to transport more tanks to a far away theater of operations and support larger workshops/recovery/transport organisations than would otherwise have been necessary to keep a similar front line strength is another false economy. Much like the Germans using three 18 ton wreckers to tow a single Tiger. Those three wreckers aren't doing anything else, like recovereing three MK IVs at the same time. 
The Liberty had a pretty spotty reputation as an airplane engine and it's form of construction (cylinders were actually separate cylinders with individual welded sheet metal water jackets)
File:Liberty L-12-1.jpg - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The thing was a coolant leak waiting to happen in addition to other problems. This somewhat dodgy engine (which was dodgy and known to be so 20 years earlier) was kept in production when the Meadows engine which was supposed to replace it came up a crapper. Not enough power? or more problems than fitting a radiator at the rear of the longer Crusader hull could fix?





parsifal said:


> Sorry, but I fail to see your point here, and some of the comments are just downright wrong. I agree that a happy medium between quality and quantity needs to be found. I dont agree that the brits hung onto production of certain types too long or that the two pounder was kept in production too long. British tanks, in the main, remained on apar to their german counterparts throughout 1942. there was nothing wrong with the AT capability of the 2 pdr.; The drubbing the RTC got had nothing to do with its equipment. it had everything to do with poor TO&E and doctrine. As I pointed out in an earlier post, do you think the result would have been any different if the brits had been using german tanks in place of their own....not a chance. with regard to the 2pounder its problems stem from its ammunition, not the gun type. why a proper HE round was never developed, is beyond me. The Australians developed a 25pdr ATG for the AC-1, and fitted the 17 pdr to the AC-4 in 1943.
> 
> your last comment is just plain wrong. it assumes the brits were not progressing in their tank development at all after 1940. In so many ways this is just flat out wrong. there was significant development occurring and major advances in firepower, protection even in transmissions. The ultimate faltering of the british tank effort was due to the faltering british economy in the latter part of the war, not so mujch due to the failure of its tanks. it was cheaper and easier to use the Sherman, not necessarily better 9except in terms of standardisation and the old numbers game once again



Well, lets look at the record. A-13, in production 1938-39? arguably one of the best tanks in the world at the time, that dodgy liberty engine and the world class 2pdr gun ( I am not being sarcastic, in 1938-39 it was leading the world in AP capability) and 30 mm armor, at least on the front. spaced armor on the turret sides. radio in turret and a 3 man turret with a cupola for the commander. Replaced ( but never in combat by Covenanter) New engine (already covered) and transmission but same armament/protection in a slightly lower form. 1700 built by the end of 1942, when do you pull the plug on a loser? Lost the cupola.
Next entry is the A15 Crusader, back to (or parallel?) the dodgy engine in a bad (cramped) installation Armor gets up to 40mm on the front with same fire power until the MK III version. 2000 or so 2pdr versions built,1400 of them in 1942, now things are looking a bit iffy. The 6pdr MK III does come on line but cuts the turret crew to 2 and still no cupola for the commander. 
since it takes time to implement front line knowledge there may be some excuse here but the Cavalier shows intertia at work or belt and suspenders when you have only one seamstress. Same dodgy engine, armor is now 64mm on the hull front. nice requirement in 1941 but rather behind the curve in 1943, when did the German MK III get 60mm on the hull? a less than 10% increase in turret ring diameter? Yep, another "we can't up grade because the turret ring is too small" design. Then come the Centaur and Cromwell. Not bad but just a little late and no room to upgrade which means time and effort spent on Avengers, Challengers and Comets. 

If the 2pdr had been seen as a fine gun in 1939-40 but in need of replacement in 1941-42 (it was seen as such actually) then designs put forth in 1940 should have been able to mount it or been upgraded beyond it more easily. the Germans were using the long 50mm in tanks from the Spring of 1942 and while the 6pdr wan't much later it was usually in 2 man turrets. The Germans also began fielding the long 75mm guns in the MK IV in the spring/summer and they didn't spring up over night. Circumstance helped the Germans put them in the MK IV but design work on the guns (or the towed version) started back in 1940. 
The British tank production may have faltered due to the economy in the later part of the war but British tank design actually hit it's stride with the Comet and Centurion. Somebody had finally leaned the lessons.


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## pinsog (Mar 30, 2011)

I think the best, and easiest thing the Brits could have done after the start of the dessert war would have been to immediately copy the German 88 trailer chassis and mount their 17 pounder on it. Then they could have used their crappy underarmed/underarmored tanks as prime movers to drag the thing around. Wouldn't be the best for attack, but it would have kept their positions from being overun when they were on the defense.


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## davebender (Mar 30, 2011)

8.8 cm FlaK 18/36/37/41 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
If you are referring to the 8.8cm FlaK36, that weapon was less then ideal in the anti tank role. Somewhat expensive (33,600 RM) and an easy target as it sat so high off the ground. 

7.5 cm Pak 40 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The smaller and dirt cheap (12,000 RM) 7.5cm PaK40 was close to perfect for a WWII era anti tank gun. IMO that's the one Britain should copy. Also an excellent WWII era tank main gun.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 30, 2011)

A bit of overkill and the British gunners would have cursed you until their 50th reunion if not longer. The 6pdr was more than enough to take-out any German tank short of a Tiger at any practical range and was much easier to dig-in and camouflage. 
Besides, the 17pdr didn't exist at the start of the dessert war


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## parsifal (Mar 30, 2011)

So, to get to the nub of tis alleged poor reliability and vulnerability issue, what would have happened if the Brits were equipped with German, or italian, or french, or US equipment. What evidence is there of catastrophic reliability failures in British tanks, and how does that compare with say the germans. If you really want to assess or compare the reliability of German tanks in say 1941, we should really look at the number of running tanks they could keep running during a major campaign. the best information I have available is what happened to them during Barbarossa. I dont have the figures in front of me right now but its not a good report card. Despite several pauses in the campaign, and a more leisurely rate of advance compared to what was happening in North Africa, the number of runners was down to about 10-30% by the end of the 4 month campaign. Most of the so-called german tank casualties during the 1941 camapign were not casualties, they were simply break downs mostly in engines followed by transmissions. This was not in the harsh conditions of winter, it was in the mild warm days of summer across flat terrain. I cannot recall even a single battle or camapign where the british suffered nearly such a catastrophic equipment failure.

If you want to compare with italians, that will be fine as well, only worse. The majority of the the tanks of the Gruppo Malletti, the italiantank force that resisted 7th armoured in 1940' could manage about 20 miles of movement before suffering a cooked engine. I would happily put the reliability of the Mk VI (Vickers) up against that record.

Then we have the US effort. We will never know th reliability of the contemporary of the Cruiser tanks, as it was never tested in combat. But I am willing to bet the reliability of the m-2, which the Americans were planning to build in quantity in 1940, before the M-3 was designed at british request, would have been diabolical. Compared to this the early marks of cruisers, even the mkVI, were light years ahead.

We could look at tactical mobility, such as power to weight and fording or climbing ability of british tanks. They are not likley to be superior to German equipment in this area, but they are known to be adequate, for the purposes they were put to. In terms of strategic mobility, I would say the british tanks were actually superior, because theey just kept going over such long distances, without proper maintence support. Dont believe me, look at the performace of 7armoured from September 1940 to March 1941 and see how many tanks remained running despite severe shortages in maintence and spare parts support. Its impressive, I can assure you.

Now, looking at the AT capabilities of british tanks, they were actually superior to their contemporary German counterparts. Th 2 pounder out performed the German 37mm and the shorter 50mm guns by quite amargin. Only with the arrival of the german MkIV specials and the Pz IIIJ was the 40mm gun outclassed. Not obsolete, just outclassed. And this happened when, and in what numbers???? Moreover, the answer presented by the brits to the MkIV (F-2) and Mk II (J) menace was entirely adequate, not outstanding, but adequate. They produced the Crusader Mk III with 6 Pounder gun. Sure this arrangement had some drawbacks, but not fatally so, as their success at various battles attests (will dig them out tonite) 

In point of fact the crusader III remained a competive tank, and in battle went reasonably well, though not outstanding. What defeated british tanks was not german tanks at all, in fact these desperate lunges they made in the desert were designed to entice the german armour into a head to head clash with the british armour. Why, because the brits knew they could win that sought of engagement. What the RTC could not win was the battle against stupid ideas. The british tanks were mostly lost to dug in ATGs which they could not engage effectively, and because they lacked proper support, could not deal with by any other means other than suicidal charges. If german tanks had been working under the same conditions as the british tanks the result would have been the same, even though they possessed the short barrelled 75mm. The 88mm could take out a Mk IV (German) at over 3miles over open sights. The germans avoided this type of massacre by having a balanced all arms team working together, not by the superiority of its tanks.

With regard to your comments about the Mk VI, all I can say is thank the lord you werent in charge of the british army in 1938. Those so-called stupid tanks, defeated a vastly more numerous enemy, pushed them back over 700 miles, then faced an enemy qualitatively far superior, doing a credible job. Why and how, when their AT capabilities were so obviously poor. The reason is because AT capability in tanks is about the least important issue for a tank. Tanks are mobile assault weapons, designed to exploit breakthroughs. The little Mk VI could do that just as well as any other tank of the time. And because they were there, and reliable, and ready, and properly trained, that made them an absolutely critical item in the british inventory at the time. Moreover, Light tanks continued to play a role in all armies until the end of the war, as something heavier and better than an armoured car, they made eminent sense. The updated versions of the Mk VI, the Mk VII and the Harry Hopkins were up to standard for light tanks.


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## parsifal (Mar 30, 2011)

davebender said:


> Why are your blaming Germany?
> 
> Italy was responsible for the Med and Malta was within spitting distance of Sicily. It was Italy that screwed up by failing to seize Malta during June 1940.



I blame the Axis, not germany. But by 1940, the germans were supposed to be the leader of the Axis alliance. They failed to excercise effective leadeship or support. The Italaians in 1940 lacked any means whatsover to contemplate an effective amphibious assault. They tried to amphibiously assault Corfu in roughly regimental strength, attacking less than a bn of irregular reservists, and lost. There was not the slightest chance of them getting control of malta in June, despite the weakness of the defences. Mines, airpower, the ground defences, and the RN stood between them and achiving that objective. It required something more from the Axis, and the only people who could deliver that were the germans. There were member of the german command who advocated a Med strategy, but they were ignored. Funny about that


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## Freebird (Mar 30, 2011)

davebender said:


> The smaller and dirt cheap (12,000 RM) 7.5cm PaK40 was close to perfect for a WWII era anti tank gun. IMO that's the one Britain should copy. Also an excellent WWII era tank main gun.


 
Too late in the game.
The Pak 40 entered production in Nov 1941, at which time they already had the 17 pdr design, it went into production in the fall of 1942. By the time the Pak 40 could be shipped to the Desert, and by the time that the British could capture one copy it it would be much later than the 17pdr which was a better AT gun anyways.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 30, 2011)

A few points if I may.

I don't believe I have said much, if anything, about the reliability of the MK VI light tank.

I don't want this to turn into a "my country is better than yours" argument. 

"But I am willing to bet the reliability of the m-2, which the Americans were planning to build in quantity in 1940, before the M-3 was designed at british request, would have been diabolical."

If you are referring to the M-2 medium tank you do realize that it used the same engine/transmission as the M-3 medium and Ram tanks and used, if not the same parts, the same design suspension? Why should it have been less reliable seeing as how it was a lighter tank? 

"Compared to this the early marks of cruisers, even the mkVI, were light years ahead."

Really?.........Then I guess your Idea of using the Ram tank doesn't hold water. 
Now the armament layout/tactical concept left a lot to be desired, being firmly rooted in 1918 but then that is not what we are taking about.

Trying to get back on subject, yes the 2pdr had better penetration than than the German short 50. the large margin is debatable. yes 15-25% (depending on who you believe) can be considered a large margin, on the other hand we are sometimes talking about the difference between 50mm and 42 mm or less at even longer ranges. While the 2pdr worked in the infantry tanks with their heavy armor it didn't work so good in the Cruiser tanks. Some of the German tanks having thicker armor in places than the cruisers may mean that the practical firing distance for each side was almost the same. 

I will cheerfully concede that the Germans used much better combined arms tactics but will reserve judgment on the MK IVs with the short 75. It did give the Germans capabilities the British did not possess. 
As far as integrating towed AT guns with tank units like the Germans did rather successfully, there wasn't much point for the British. A 2pdr towed gun (which just as hard, if not harder to dig-in than the German 50mm) gives no more range or punch to the unit that the guns already mounted in the tanks. Maybe if the towed 6pdrs had showed a bit earlier something could have been worked out?
Better artillery co-ordination would have been a big plus for the British, but in one famous case the battery tasked with supporting one attack got bogged down while shifting fire positions and reached it's second fire site late. It then proceeded to fire it's schedule of missions in order but delayed instead of skipping the 1st mission after the bogging incident and keeping up with the flow of the battle. If a significant number of the tanks had 75mm shell firing guns they might have been able to silence the German AT guns on their own or at least screened themselves with smoke shells and withdrawn. 

As for
"With regard to your comments about the Mk VI, all I can say is thank the lord you werent in charge of the british army in 1938. Those so-called stupid tanks, defeated a vastly more numerous enemy, pushed them back over 700 miles, then faced an enemy qualitatively far superior, doing a credible job." 

I don't believe I called the tanks "stupid". The decision to build 1000 of them while building 300 cruiser and infantry tanks was stupid. 

Just which "enemy qualitatively far superior" was this? 

If was the Italian Army in 1940 then I think we can see just how "qualitatively far superior" they were. The only army to put even more emphasis on numbers vs actual combat capability. 2500-3000 L3/33 tankettes?
Armor vulnerable to the 12.7mm in the MK VI light but for the most part it's own guns won't penetrate the British tank? 72 11/39 tanks on strength in 1940 in the desert. How many were runners? when do the 13/40s show up in any numbers? If the Italians had built another 100 11/39s instead of 300 of those tankettes things might have gone better for them. Of course they might need a lot better leadership on the tactical level too. 

"Moreover, Light tanks continued to play a role in all armies until the end of the war, as something heavier and better than an armoured car, they made eminent sense. The updated versions of the Mk VI, the Mk VII and the Harry Hopkins were up to standard for light tanks." 

Not really, the British themselves ditched the their own light tanks in favor of armored cars. While the 7.92 Besa was an improvement on the .303 Vickers gun for tank use the 15mm Besa was not an unqualified success. It took up more room in the turret and was harder to aim and fire. The MK VII and the Harry Hopkins offered no more firepower than the Daimler armoured car and the only the Harry Hopkins offered better protection. The Humber armoured cars offered firepower and protection on a level with the MK VI tanks (until the MK IV with it's 37mm gun) and Staghound and AEC cars were certainly a match for most light tanks if perhaps a bit lacking in cross country ability in bad going. 
The Americans persisted with light tanks from the M-3 series and M-5s (although at 16 tons the M-5 is pushing things) until they hit on the M-24 (and at 20 tons it is only light in comparison to 30ton+ tanks).
Most other late war light tanks were simply left overs or attempts to find mobility in really bad terrain/conditions that even 6 and 8 wheel all wheel drive cars could over come. they had no advantage in either fire power or protection over the later armoured cars.


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## davebender (Mar 30, 2011)

So did the Germans. They developed the Panzer II Ausf L (Luchs) for use by recon battalions but cancelled production after only 104 vehicles.


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## Freebird (Mar 30, 2011)

Shortround6 said:


> Trying to get back on subject, yes the 2pdr had better penetration than than the German short 50. the large margin is debatable. yes 15-25% (depending on who you believe) can be considered a large margin, on the other hand we are sometimes talking about the difference between 50mm and 42 mm or less at even longer ranges. While the 2pdr worked in the infantry tanks with their heavy armor it didn't work so good in the Cruiser tanks. Some of the German tanks having thicker armor in places than the cruisers may mean that the practical firing distance for each side was almost the same.


 
Shortround, do you know when the Germans introduced the HE for the 50mm? (Sprgr.Patr.38 )


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## Shortround6 (Mar 30, 2011)

I am guessing it was from the start of use of the gun, either 50mm. 

Maybe my sources are bad but it seems that German designations like Sprgr.Patr.39-1 didn't always indicate the year of adoption. You get things like Pzgr 39 for AP rounds for the converted russian 76mm guns? Good planning on the part of the Germans? Or it was the standard Pzgr 39 design adapted to the 76mm gun?
You have Pzgr 39 projectiles (or rounds?) for the short 50, the long 50 (same projectile?), the 7.5cm/43, the 7.5cm/L46, the 7.5cm/L48, the 7.62cm/L51, the 8.8cm/L56 and Pzgr39/42s for the 7.5cm/L70 and Pzgr 39-41 for the 8.8cm/L71. Those engineers must have been real busy in 1939


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## Juha (Mar 31, 2011)

On Pz IV
in fact British had same kind system as Germans, each sqn had 2 CS (Close Support) tanks armed with 3.7in, later with 3in and lastly with 95mm howitzer in order to have in hand smoke and HE support to gun tanks. Differences to Germans were that in German formations the ratio of support tanks was higher and Pz IIIs had also HE rounds and short barrel Pz IVs had also anti-tank rounds (AP and later also HEAT). British had either only AP or only smoke and HE except late war 95mm armed CS tanks which carried also few HEAT rounds.

Juha


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## tomo pauk (Mar 31, 2011)

Shortround6 said:


> I am guessing it was from the start of use of the gun, either 50mm.
> 
> Maybe my sources are bad but it seems that German designations like Sprgr.Patr.39-1 didn't always indicate the year of adoption. You get things like Pzgr 39 for AP rounds for the converted russian 76mm guns? Good planning on the part of the Germans? Or it was the standard Pzgr 39 design adapted to the 76mm gun?
> You have Pzgr 39 projectiles (or rounds?) for the short 50, the long 50 (same projectile?), the 7.5cm/43, the 7.5cm/L46, the 7.5cm/L48, the 7.62cm/L51, the 8.8cm/L56 and Pzgr39/42s for the 7.5cm/L70 and Pzgr 39-41 for the 8.8cm/L71. Those engineers must have been real busy in 1939


 
My uderstanding is that 'PzGr 39' indicates that projectile was of AP/APCBC (armour-piercing, ballistic cap) type, while 'PzGr 40' indicates APCR ( sub-caliber, approx. 2/3rds of weight of APCBC for better MV, rumor says Germans copied the concept from captured Polish AT rifle ammo; US nomenclature would've been HVAP?). 
The 'PzGr 39-41' indicates improved version of APCBC; applicable to some guns, not all. 
All those names are regardless to the gun.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 31, 2011)

The system sounds sort of the same but may have been very different in practice. The British assigned, as you say, two CS tanks per squadron. which means 6-8 per battalion? The Germans originally grouped the MK IVs into one company in the battalion, This company may have had one platoon of light tanks? so 12 or more support tanks per battalion. While platoons might be parceled out to the regular tank companies the support company could be held together and used in mass against important points of resistance. In the desert war with both sides chronically below full strength I would imagine the Germans really held an advantage here as even a couple of Breakdowns/non-replacements would seriously impact the British close support effort. 
The Early 3.7 was sometimes described as a mortar and fired a light projectile for it's size, going to the 3" actually didn't change effectiveness. Sources also differ as to wither the 3.7 actually could fire HE or was smoke only or could fire HE but very little (if any in some cases) was supplied. In any case it was only used in the A9, A10 and A13 series of cruiser tanks so the numbers used in North Africa would be rather small. 
The 3" is the close support weapon of the North African Campaign for all practical purposes against the Germans.


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## parsifal (Mar 31, 2011)

be careful quoting numbers of tanks on the basis of establishment stengths for both sides, but in particular for the Germans. the germans in April 1941 had less than 20 MkIvs at their disposal. In May 1942, they could call upon 36 mkIvs, and in October just 18. This generates significantly less HE firepower than the CS components of a full strength brit armoured Div, but here too field strengths seldom measured up to paper strengths


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## davebender (Mar 31, 2011)

I wouldn't quite go that far.

1935 Germany started without tanks, tank plants or engineers trained to build tanks. Consequently the next 6 years (through 1941) was a period of experimentation to determine what works. During this time frame the Panzer IV CS tank (7.5cm howitzer) was produced in small quantities to meet an immediate wartime need.

From 1942 onward Germany employed a main battle tank (either Panzer IV or Panzer V) armed with a 7.5cm main gun that was effective against both armored targets and soft targets. Infantry were supported by a battalion of 18 inexpensive StuGIII assault guns. The Tiger tank was manufactured concurrently in small quantities for use against fortifications.

At least that was the theory. Germany never had enough armored vehicles to meet wartime demands so all sorts of war emergency measures were implemented. The Panzer III tank remained in production through mid 1943 until the Panther tank entered mass production. Tiger tanks and StugIIIGs were employed as main battle tanks because nothing else was available. Inexpensive Marder and Hetzer SP AT guns were employed to provide additional anti-tank defense ILO main battle tanks and StuGIIIGs.


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## parsifal (Mar 31, 2011)

_I don't believe I have said much, if anything, about the reliability of the MK VI light tank_.

It appears we may have gotten crossed lines on this. I thought you were referring to the Mk VI light. its somewhat ironic that the brits achieved their greatest victories in the Desert using the least capable tank

_I don't want this to turn into a "my country is better than yours" argument._ 

neither do I, but if you think about it, I am not exactly giving the brits a ringing endorsement. If anything i am indicting them worse than anybody. I am saying they suffered such heavy losses because of german efficiency, and poor doctrine and leadeership. i am discounting the tank quality issue to the point of nothingness, for a number of reasons 


_"But I am willing to bet the reliability of the m-2, which the Americans were planning to build in quantity in 1940, before the M-3 was designed at british request, would have been diabolical."

If you are referring to the M-2 medium tank you do realize that it used the same engine/transmission as the M-3 medium and Ram tanks and used, if not the same parts, the same design suspension? Why should it have been less reliable seeing as how it was a lighter tank? _"

perhaps a little overstated in retrospect, but please note this is not stated as a fact, elsewhere in that post i did say, we dont have any hard data about the m-2 in combat conditions. Perhaps it is sufficient to say it was a poorly designed tank. There were differences between the m-2 and the m-3, as i understand it, a revised and strengtened suspension, I believe also the engine layout and cooling system was different....but perhaps not either. 


_Compared to this the early marks of cruisers, even the mkVI, were light years ahead."_
not the smartest thing ive ever said, i admit.....

_Really?.........Then I guess your Idea of using the Ram tank doesn't hold water._ 

I dont think because i dont think much of the m-2, that necessarily means the Ram or the m-3 were bad tanks. It is not necessarily a logical progression to say that


_Now the armament layout/tactical concept left a lot to be desired, being firmly rooted in 1918 but then that is not what we are taking about._

actually they can have an effect, which is why modern tanks have a lot of time and effort used up getting the layout right. It can afect things like armement stowage, wiring, transmission.....


_Trying to get back on subject, yes the 2pdr had better penetration than than the German short 50. the large margin is debatable. yes 15-25% (depending on who you believe) can be considered a large margin, on the other hand we are sometimes talking about the difference between 50mm and 42 mm or less at even longer ranges. While the 2pdr worked in the infantry tanks with their heavy armor it didn't work so good in the Cruiser tanks. Some of the German tanks having thicker armor in places than the cruisers may mean that the practical firing distance for each side was almost the same_. 

The problem with the 2 pdr was not its armour penetration, it was its lack of HE capability that damned it. This could have been amply compensated for by better support (Infantry and Artillery) but inexplicably the brits never got around to this


_I will cheerfully concede that the Germans used much better combined arms tactics but will reserve judgment on the MK IVs with the short 75. It did give the Germans capabilities the British did not possess. 
As far as integrating towed AT guns with tank units like the Germans did rather successfully, there wasn't much point for the British. A 2pdr towed gun (which just as hard, if not harder to dig-in than the German 50mm) gives no more range or punch to the unit that the guns already mounted in the tanks. Maybe if the towed 6pdrs had showed a bit earlier something could have been worked out?
Better artillery co-ordination would have been a big plus for the British, but in one famous case the battery tasked with supporting one attack got bogged down while shifting fire positions and reached it's second fire site late. It then proceeded to fire it's schedule of missions in order but delayed instead of skipping the 1st mission after the bogging incident and keeping up with the flow of the battle. If a significant number of the tanks had 75mm shell firing guns they might have been able to silence the German AT guns on their own or at least screened themselves with smoke shells and withdrawn._ 

This is in fact at the heart of the problem. whilst you are saying that you are prepared to concede the germans had better combined arms application, i sense you dont believe it to be the main problem. Not so deep under the surfacce, you believe the quality issue to be the central issue to the british failure. This is the old chestnut "the germans could have won by superior quality" when in fact superior quality is a periperal issue to winning . If we look at the operations of the 7th armoured septemeber -december 1940, we find the inferrior mk VI lights getting the better of the superior M11s and M-13s. Both tanks parks are pretty poor, but in theory the mk vis should have been trounced, but they werent. Not that infereior quality is avirtue, its not, its just that concentating on quality at the expense of quantity will lose a battle. 

Its not just artillery co-ordination that gives you all arms ability. You need a mix of supporting arms and good leadership as well as good training to achieve that. at battleaxe, for example, the germans used a combination oif minefields to channel the british armour, they also used their tanks to lure the british armour (crusaders) onto the AT screean, which in turn was well protected by both Infantry and artillery. german armour did very little of the killing, which was consistent with german training at the time. 


_As for
"With regard to your comments about the Mk VI, all I can say is thank the lord you werent in charge of the british army in 1938. Those so-called stupid tanks, defeated a vastly more numerous enemy, pushed them back over 700 miles, then faced an enemy qualitatively far superior, doing a credible job." 

I don't believe I called the tanks "stupid". The decision to build 1000 of them while building 300 cruiser and infantry tanks was stupid. _

I dont think you did either, but by not having 1000 mk vis you reduce the british tank availability from 1300 to 300, and rob the british of their greatest early war land victory That doesnt maqke good sense in my view 

_Just which "enemy qualitatively far superior" was this? _

I was referring to DAK. Sorry for the mix up


_If was the Italian Army in 1940 then I think we can see just how "qualitatively far superior" they were. The only army to put even more emphasis on numbers vs actual combat capability. 2500-3000 L3/33 tankettes?
Armor vulnerable to the 12.7mm in the MK VI light but for the most part it's own guns won't penetrate the British tank? 72 11/39 tanks on strength in 1940 in the desert. How many were runners? when do the 13/40s show up in any numbers? If the Italians had built another 100 11/39s instead of 300 of those tankettes things might have gone better for them. Of course they might need a lot better leadership on the tactical level too. _


Just a correction on the numbers, and a comment on the alleged lack of quality in the italian Army. The italians are just as bad as the british in trying to blame their own failures on the quality of their gear. Their equipment was slightly less capable than british and german equipment, but it was not the main course of their defeat. In fact their training and tactical concepts, coupled with an attrocious logistic system were the main course of their defeat. The australian 9 div used captured Italian equipment very extensively in their defense of Tobruk. most of the defending artillery, including their ATGs were captured italian equipment. they used M13s quite successfully (incidentally the germans had no problems using british equipment either, which suggests they were not too phased by the alleged poor quality british equipment. The numbers involved were incidentally 46 M11s in September, along with 197 CV 33s. 42 m-13s arrived in December, but were captured at tobruk and Derna. They were attached to the 'M' bn, which i think later was named Gruppo babini


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## Glider (Mar 31, 2011)

I have just read an interesting piece on an alternative gun for British Tanks at the start of WW2. The solution was based on the WW1 6pd as fitted to the British WW1 tanks. Using modern metals and design it would have resulted in a gun with an AT capability not far off the 2pd plus of course a decent HE shell. An interesting thought.


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## davebender (Mar 31, 2011)

Combat experience going back to WWI shows that an effective HE shell should be at least 75mm in size. 105mm is about perfect for general use, which is why it has been the most common size army light howitzer for 100 years.

Early 1940s automotive technology isn't advanced enough to carry the excellent L7 105mm/52 cannon. However Britain can scale it down to 75mm, producing something similiar to the German 75mm/48 cannon. The historical British 17 pounder was in the ball park but it was too large and heavy for general use. Britain needs to scale it down a bit as they finally did to produce the lighter and more compact 77mm HV cannon which armed the Comet tank. This same weapon can be mated to a light weight artillery carriage to produce the standard British anti tank gun ILO the historical 6 pounder / 57mm.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 31, 2011)

Woah, the L7 in WW2 talk 

I'd go for smooth bore gun all the way 8)


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## Glider (Mar 31, 2011)

I admit I was taken aback by talk of the 105. If you want a British, cheap, easily available gun then the large number of WW1 13pd guns might be of use. The M3 75mm was a French WW1 75 and this was its equivalent


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## Freebird (Mar 31, 2011)

davebender said:


> Combat experience going back to WWI shows that an effective HE shell should be at least 75mm in size. 105mm is about perfect for general use, which is why it has been the most common size army light howitzer for 100 years.
> 
> Early 1940s automotive technology isn't advanced enough to carry the excellent L7 105mm/52 cannon. However Britain can scale it down to 75mm, producing something similiar to the German 75mm/48 cannon. The historical British 17 pounder was in the ball park but it was too large and heavy for general use. Britain needs to scale it down a bit as they finally did to produce the lighter and more compact 77mm HV cannon which armed the Comet tank.



Given the critical shortage of production and delays in carriages etc, I don't see the British scaling down or manufacturing *anything* new in 40/41. If they are going to use a field gun, it should be the British made 18 or 25 pounder, otherwise import the the US made 3" gun.


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## parsifal (Mar 31, 2011)

The australian AC-2/3 introdued a cut down 25 pounder in a turret in 1942. Only 65 were ever made, but the conversion was considered quite successful. Armour penetration was reportedly as good or better than a 2 pounder, and possessed significant HE capacity. The intention was to use the type in the Jungle to take out japanese strongpoints, in the finish Australians used converted Matildas and Valentines for the purpose, along with Stuart Light Tanks. 

I dont think it necessary to put such a great effort into solving this problem and agree with FB, always look for the cheapest and easiest, least disruptive option


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## Shortround6 (Mar 31, 2011)

The 13pdr is a total non-starter for a number of reasons.
There are major differences between tank cannon and field guns even if they use the same ammo. There was darn little on the M3 tank gun that was interchangeable with the French 75 except the ammo. Different breech assembly, different recoil cylinders, different exterior barrel shape. 

As far as the 13pdr goes, there was no vast number available at the start of WW II. The number left over was certainly less than a few hundred if that, maybe only a few dozen. Production had stopped early in WW I in favor of the 18pdr. 
It had a velocity several hundred fps less than the French 75 let alone the more modern versions and a slightly lighter projectile. For conversion to a decent tank gun you need a new breech and new recoil cylinders/cradle.
About all you can use is the rifled tube and that is probably worn. 
Seeing as how they haven't been made for about 23-24 years you might as well build something else as there is no left over tooling to speak of either.


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## davebender (Mar 31, 2011)

Entirely possible but not during 1942.

Leopard 1 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Leopard I tank weighed 43 tons and was armed with a 105mm main gun. Late WWII tanks such as the Panther, Centurion, M26 and Stalin were as large as the Leopard I.


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## Shortround6 (Apr 1, 2011)

parsifal said:


> perhaps a little overstated in retrospect, but please note this is not stated as a fact, elsewhere in that post i did say, we dont have any hard data about the m-2 in combat conditions. Perhaps it is sufficient to say it was a poorly designed tank. There were differences between the m-2 and the m-3, as i understand it, a revised and strengtened suspension, I believe also the engine layout and cooling system was different....but perhaps not either.



we don't have any information on the M-2 in combat conditions and perhaps it did have some engine, drive line problems, I tend to think they were minor or easily straightened out as the drive line lasted well into the M4 production. As far as the M3 using a "a revised and strengthened suspension" I would hope so, the M2 weighed 38,000lbs, the M2A1 weighed 47,000lbs and the M3 started at 60,000lbs (Ram 65,000lbs). The fact that the suspension had to be strengthened to handle a 58% increase in weight is hardly surprising or a reflection on the design/ability of the original suspension. The fact that the M4 (66,000-70,000lbs?)used the same basic design suspension (suitably beefed up) until the HVSS began to be introduced in 1943 should tell us what we need to know. 
from the middle of the hull down the M2 was probably in with the world leaders, from the middle of the hull up it was a disaster (although it did have a sloped hull front  



parsifal said:


> The problem with the 2 pdr was not its armour penetration, it was its lack of HE capability that damned it. This could have been amply compensated for by better support (Infantry and Artillery) but inexplicably the brits never got around to this


The Armour penetration was just fine until some point in 1942. Aiming was bit of problem in the tanks and while HE rounds would have helped they would have had about 1/4 the explosive effect of the German 50mm guns. While better cooperation would certainly have helped, "amply" is perhaps too strong a word. Given the radio performance of the day and having to go through channels means that artillery support is usually going to be bit late, or insufficient or lacking in some way. Germans helped insure fire support in part by distributing fire support guns at lower levels than other armies despite, in the early war years, using radios at least as effectively as anybody else. 


parsifal said:


> This is in fact at the heart of the problem. whilst you are saying that you are prepared to concede the germans had better combined arms application, i sense you dont believe it to be the main problem. Not so deep under the surfacce, you believe the quality issue to be the central issue to the british failure. This is the old chestnut "the germans could have won by superior quality" when in fact superior quality is a periperal issue to winning . If we look at the operations of the 7th armoured septemeber -december 1940, we find the inferrior mk VI lights getting the better of the superior M11s and M-13s. Both tanks parks are pretty poor, but in theory the mk vis should have been trounced, but they werent. Not that infereior quality is avirtue, its not, its just that concentating on quality at the expense of quantity will lose a battle.



I believe you need a bit of both. I also believe that 'quality' needs to be all round. The best gun in the world and the thickest armor won't win if you can't get it to battle. Neither will it win the battle if a handful of super tanks control part of the battle field while enemy units go around them in areas were there are no tanks (or super AT guns) and get into the rear areas. On the other hand, trading 4 or 5 tanks (and crews) for every enemy tank destroyed is a very expensive way to gain victory. 
You have read more than I about the early desert campaign, did those MK VI lights win on their own or were there a few Cruisers in the mix to take out some of those Italian medium (cough,cough) tanks?




parsifal said:


> I dont think you did either, but by not having 1000 mk vis you reduce the british tank availability from 1300 to 300, and rob the british of their greatest early war land victory That doesnt maqke good sense in my view



I don't believe I ever said don't build any, infact I think in an earlier post I said 300-400-500 would have been fine. Call it 600 and use the money/ man hours/ material from the other 400 to build another 100-150 A13 cruisers. 1000-1050 tanks not 300, but 400-450 tanks with cannon, not machine guns.



parsifal said:


> Just a correction on the numbers, and a comment on the alleged lack of quality in the italian Army. The italians are just as bad as the british in trying to blame their own failures on the quality of their gear. Their equipment was slightly less capable than british and german equipment, but it was not the main course of their defeat. In fact their training and tactical concepts, coupled with an attrocious logistic system were the main course of their defeat. The australian 9 div used captured Italian equipment very extensively in their defense of Tobruk. most of the defending artillery, including their ATGs were captured italian equipment. they used M13s quite successfully (incidentally the germans had no problems using british equipment either, which suggests they were not too phased by the alleged poor quality british equipment. The numbers involved were incidentally 46 M11s in September, along with 197 CV 33s. 42 m-13s arrived in December, but were captured at tobruk and Derna. They were attached to the 'M' bn, which i think later was named Gruppo babini



The Italians have more justification in blaming their gear. In an Infantry battalion they had 2 weapons that were the equal or better than the British equivalent. Their Beretta submachine guns and their 81 mm mortars. Every other weapon was substandard or lacking in numbers or both. Modern Italian artillery was few in numbers. Left over or refurbished WW I artillery has some serious short comings. The Italian 47mm "AT" gun was not as powerful as many other guns of it's caliber (it was lighter and easier to move without vehicles). When it comes to AFV perhaps some of their armoured cars were world standard, Until the M13/40 tank shows up the less said the better. 
why don't you tell us how many British Cruisers were in these early battles in 1940 and if there were any Maltida's engaged before all the credit goes to the MK VI light tanks.

Both sides made extensive use of captured equipment. Perhaps more so than in any other theater. with supplies and reinforcements so short on both sides any, weapon (tank, AT gun, AA gun, mortar) was better than no weapon at all.


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## Shortround6 (Apr 1, 2011)

Entirely NOT possible during 1942.

Unless you believe that there no advances in barrel forging technology, metallurgy, and propellant technology in the 15 years or so between 1942 and the coming of the 105 L7 gun. The fact that the L7 didn't fire full bore AP rounds might have something to do with it being successful from a 43 ton tank without a muzzle brake.


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## parsifal (Apr 1, 2011)

_I believe you need a bit of both. I also believe that 'quality' needs to be all round. The best gun in the world and the thickest armor won't win if you can't get it to battle. Neither will it win the battle if a handful of super tanks control part of the battle field while enemy units go around them in areas were there are no tanks (or super AT guns) and get into the rear areas. On the other hand, trading 4 or 5 tanks (and crews) for every enemy tank destroyed is a very expensive way to gain victory._ 

I think that sums it up pretty well....the question is, were the brit tanks so inferior as to be labelled "responsible" for the defeats suffered in the desert. I say they werent. i say the culprit lies in the poor tactical handling of the material. Sure, having better tanks would have made it a lot easier, and sure, British tanks did leave a lot to be desired, but was it that poor as to receive the lions share of the blame....I am very doubtful of that, and suspect a good deal of blame shifting postwar. I smell monty in there somewhere......


_You have read more than I about the early desert campaign, did those MK VI lights win on their own or were there a few Cruisers in the mix to take out some of those Italian medium (cough,cough) tanks?_


_ why don't you tell us how many British Cruisers were in these early battles in 1940 and if there were any Maltida's engaged before all the credit goes to the MK VI light tanks._


There were no Matildas until December. No Cruiser tanks were committed until that time either. 
7th Armoured had on strength a total of 105 tanks (give or take), of which 48 were A9s and A-10s (21 and 27 respectively) at the time of the italian offensive (September)...this represented the total armoured strength available to the british at that time AFAIK. However many of these tanks were not working. i believe the main problem was excessive track wear, and in any case they seem to have been engaged in training. There were no Matildas until December, when 1st Army Tank Regiment (I think...am not at home again...will double check tonite and confirm) arrived in theatre.

During the December counteroffensive the matildas were a superweapon used very much in the manner you are describing. It dismayed the Italians to see that their ATGs were totally inneffective against the matildas. However, the matildas were a wasting asset. I know they were used in support at bardia, but thereafter I dont see any reports of their use until after the offensive was over. I suspect lack of maintenance was the problem, and there were very few spare parts or maintenence crews that knew how to service these monsters.

Mk VIs (and armoured cars) of 11 hussars remained at the cutting edge of the offensive throughout. they were there from the beginning, during the italian offensive ( September-November) right through to Beda Fomm. They were reliable and mobile, with radio comms, and good support to keep them going. This is what made them critical to the british victory. Put it this way, the brits would still have won without the matildas, but i doubt they would even have held egypt without the lowly mk VI on station.


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## parsifal (Apr 1, 2011)

Fitting a 105mm gun to any brit tank prior to the centurion (and then only with significant redesign) is beyond the realm of reasonable possibility. As a generalization, the turret rings of brit tanks were simply not big enough to even contemplate this. Both the germans and the Russians fitted large calibre weapons (128 and 122 mm, as well as 152mm) but these were in AFVs well beyond anything the brits were building at that time. You would have to contemplate the building of the Tortoise to think about this, and thisas 1944 as i recall, and totally against the numbes game i keep harping aboutn


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## Juha (Apr 1, 2011)

Hello Davebender
in fact German tank doctrine in early part of the WWII called for both Pz III armed with light gun with good penetration power but also capable to fire HE shells and a support tank with heavier gun for more powerful HE (Pz IV). What killed this was the impact of Soviet T-34s and KVs, turret ring of Pz III didn’t allow installation of bigger long barrel gun than the long 50mm, so the German MBT Pz III became obsolete. But the CS doctrine was so deeply dug in that the last Pz III version (N) was armed with the same short 75mm L/24 gun as the early Pz IVs, so when Pz III became incapable to function as an effective MBT its last version was modified to function as a CS tank. And even as late as in July 43 at Kursk Pz III was the 2nd most numerous tank in present in German panzer divs. So in 42 the MBT plus CS doctrine was still in force in panzer units. In Sept 39 WM had almost as many Pz IVs (IIRC 211 vehicles) as Pz IIIs because Pz III development took so long.

Juha


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## tomo pauk (Apr 1, 2011)

I do enjoy the discussion, regarding both the real issues of early-WW2 armored warfare, and the attitude of contributors.


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## parsifal (Apr 1, 2011)

parsifal said:


> There were no Matildas until December. No Cruiser tanks were committed until that time either.
> 7th Armoured had on strength a total of 105 tanks (give or take), of which 48 were A9s and A-10s (21 and 27 respectively) at the time of the italian offensive (September)...this represented the total armoured strength available to the british at that time AFAIK. However many of these tanks were not working. i believe the main problem was excessive track wear, and in any case they seem to have been engaged in training. There were no Matildas until December, when 1st Army Tank Regiment (I think...am not at home again...will double check tonite and confirm) arrived in theatre.
> 
> During the December counteroffensive the matildas were a superweapon used very much in the manner you are describing. It dismayed the Italians to see that their ATGs were totally inneffective against the matildas. However, the matildas were a wasting asset. I know they were used in support at bardia, but thereafter I dont see any reports of their use until after the offensive was over. I suspect lack of maintenance was the problem, and there were very few spare parts or maintenence crews that knew how to service these monsters.
> ...


 
I have to correct this, i am afraid, because i have made a lot of errors. initial numbers were correct, more or less, but there was a lot of shifting about of equipment, as reinforcements arrived. 

Western Desert Force had been reinforced, when on 24th September 1940, three new Armoured Regiments, plus other forces, arrived at Port Said. These were, 2nd RTR with Cruiser tanks (mainly A13, but with some A9 and A10s) and 7th RTR with 48 Matilda tanks and the 3rd Hussars which still had MKVI light tanks only. In October 2nd RTR joined 4th Armoured Brigade, while 3rd Hussars joined 7th Armoured Brigade. The Divisional Commander, Major-General O'Moore-Creagh, decided to transfer 'B' Squadron of 2nd RTR to 3rd Hussars and visa versa, which meant that each tank Regiment was able to have at least one Cruiser tank Squadron on its strength. 


7 RTR (matildas)started training with various infantry brigades, in their infantry support roll. The 11th Hussars were also strengthened by the addition of No.2 Armoured Car Company RAF with ten Fordson Armoured cars, who became ‘D’ Squadron 

O'Connor was ordered to attack in the area of Sidi Barrani, Sofafi and the saltpans of Buq-Buq, making use of the heavily armoured Matildas. However, the Italians had not been idle for the last three month, with a string of fortified camps now protecting Sidi Barrani. Three of these, Nibeiwa, Tummar East and Tummar West, lay to the south of the main position at Sidi Barrani and were manned by infantry, heavy artillery and tanks. An estimated 75,000 men were in or around Sidi Barrani, with about 120 tanks and 200 guns, with O'Connor having the 7th Armoured and 4th Indian Divisions. The British force consisted of 25,000 men and a total of 275 light, Cruiser and Matilda tanks.

contrary to the popular myth, the italian armour was unable to effectively resist because it was caught completely by surprise, not so much because of its obvius inferiority . The Italian armour was caught unmanned, for the most part, and destroyed by the Matildas of 7 RTR, before it even had a chance to engage properly. its commander, col Malletti died heroically, resisting the matildas, with an LMG firing from his hip.

The cruisers and the mkVIs were used mostly as mobile forces to outflank and isolate the successive italian formations on that day. The armoured battles wewre mostly fought by the matildas of 7RTR


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## Shortround6 (Apr 1, 2011)

According to one account there were Eight A9 cruisers with the 7th hussars at the battle of Battle of Girba on the the 16th of June 1940. I am not going to claim that they won the battle by themselves but the 7th apparently only had 4 MK VI s at this battle. the 7th claimed 9 L3's destroyed in a later stage of the battle (tank claims may be like aircraft claims, it's easier to count wrecks after the battle but who killed what?) and with the A9s out numbering the MK VIs two to one (in the 7th hussars) I doubt it was the MK VI's that did the majority of the tank killing. 11th Hussars claimed 8 L3's at this stage and there were some 2pdr at guns on the scene.


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## Juha (Apr 1, 2011)

Hello
did some checking on 1 Sept 39 WM had 211 Pz IVs but only 98 Pz IIIs.
At Kursk on 4 July 43 WM had 711 Pz IIIs, the most numerous panzer there was Pz IV (784) and 3rd most numerous was Pz V (200)

On British might be tanks. One answer might have been that WC and War Cabined would have been less enthusiastic to Bomber Campaign and so with less heavy bomber production there would have been opportunity to earlier production of Meteor engines, so a Cruiser with Meteor engine ie something like a Cromwell with 6pdr or 3” for the CS version.

Also Valentine as a backup if the new tank run into technical problems, at least the Valentine was very reliable and was the only British tank which Soviets wanted more, partly because they classified it as a light tank and as such it was well protected and reasonably well armed. And Valentine would have needed a version which would have been able to fire effective HE shell. A better version of Bishop?

Juha


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## Shortround6 (Apr 1, 2011)

Even the Germans only got a 128 in a rotating turret in the Maus which is the embodiment of quality over quantity taken to the extreme. A total waste of money man-hours and material. 
The Russians did better with the 122mm armed tanks. The 152 was a Howitzer which didn't have the recoil stresses of a high velocity gun. 

For an idea of what is involved with WW II guns we can look at the weights of some AA guns
American 90mm, this one was turned into a tank gun, 2445lbs for the barrel and breech for 2700fps with a 23.4lb shell
British 3.7in. 3,931lbs for 2600fps with a 28lb shell.
American 105mm, again this one was modified into a tank gun, never issued. 6575lbs for 2800lbs with a 32.75lb shell 

It amy have been used a few prototypes and this;
http://fc05.deviantart.net/fs28/i/2008/083/4/d/T_28_Tank_by_ElectronKing.jpg

1943 gun technology was not the same as 1955 gun technology.


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## parsifal (Apr 1, 2011)

i agree, as stated above the nearest the brits came to this sort of lunacy was the a-39 tortoise. 6 built, weight 78 tonnes, main armament 94mm (32 pounder, a development of the 3.9in HAA gun). Developed 1942, but not progressed with any urgency, could have been ready 1943. Was an SPG rather than a tank. probable deployment, if given priority early 1944. in the context of WWII requirements, a total waste of resources


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## davebender (Apr 2, 2011)

> German tank doctrine in early part of the WWII called for both Pz III armed with light gun with good penetration power but also capable to fire HE shells and a support tank with heavier gun for more powerful HE (Pz IV). What killed this was the impact of Soviet T-34s and KVs



Let's refer to the historical timeline.
1935. 
Germany funds development of the Panzer Mk III and Panzer Mk IV. This is a slow process as Germany has essentially no tank design or production capability during 1935.

9 Sep 1938. 
Germany funds development of the 32 ton VK3001 tank. Intended to replace both the Panzer Mk III and Panzer Mk IV.

September 1939. Britain and France declare war on Germany.
This changes priorities. Germany needs weapons ASAP. They cannot wait for the 32 ton VK3001 main battle tank.

September 1939. Panzer Mk III ausf F enters production.
This is the first mass production German medium tank. 435 produced Sep 1939 to July 1940.

October 1939. Panzer Mk IV ausf D, E and F enter production.
Similiar vehicles so I have lumped them together
229 Panzer IV D. Oct 1939 to May 1941.
233 Panzer IV E. Sep 1940 to April 1941.
487 Panzer IV F1. April 1941 to March 1942.

1941. Four VK3001 tank prototypes produced.

25 Nov 1941. Germany orders development of the Panther tank.

1942. VK3001 tank cancelled in favor of the larger Panther tank. The advanced VK3001 suspension is carried forward in the Panther design. Consequently Panther tank development is relatively fast. 

Aug 1943. Panther ausf A enters mass production. Only 21 months after development began! (850 pre-production Panther ausf D were rushed into service even sooner. As one would expect, these not fully developed Panther tanks had mechanical reliability problems.)

IMO Germany did not originally intend for the Panzer Mk III and Panzer Mk IV to enter mass production. The 32 ton VK3001 was intended to be the Heer main battle tank. It would have been capable against both soft targets and enemy tanks. WWII derailed these pre-war German tank development plans.


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## parsifal (Apr 2, 2011)

There is little evidence to support that. VK 3001 was a 32 ton prototype, afforded low priority with an expected introduction to service of 1942. It was never intended to fully replace the mk III and mk IV tanks merely to provide a heavier version of the mk Iv and was to act as a support element to the abteilung. It was to be armed with an L24 75mm short gun, the same as the mk IV, with the possibility of fitting a 105 mm L28 howitzer, but this came later. In fact, no armament and no turret of any kind was ever fitted to any of the 6 prototypes. 

guderian never thought much of this project. He always thought the main equipment of the panzers should be the mk III/IV combination. it seems that the VK3001 had overlapping roles. it was somewhat heavier than a mk IVand a revised suspension with innovative interleaved wheels. However in general layout it was similar to the earlier VK 2601, multi-turreted tank, eventually designated pzkpfwV, which were pretty much german interpretations of other multi-turreted tanks like the Char b and T-28. These were reasonably successful as a design, but never entered ful scale production, because their low speed precluded their effective use in a fast moving offensive formation like a panzer div. given one of the main problems with the Vk 3001 was the relatively low power and unreliability of its engine, it is likley that its low development priority and ultinate rejection was for similar reasons....it had no role in a mobile all arms formation like a panzer division.


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## Shortround6 (Apr 4, 2011)

davebender said:


> Let's refer to the historical timeline.



Yes, let's do that.



davebender said:


> September 1939. Britain and France declare war on Germany.
> This changes priorities. Germany needs weapons ASAP. They cannot wait for the 32 ton VK3001 main battle tank.
> 
> September 1939. Panzer Mk III ausf F enters production.
> This is the first mass production German medium tank. 435 produced Sep 1939 to July 1940.



I guess that depends on what you mean by mass production. 96 MK IIIE's made from Dec of 1938 until Oct 1939. MK IIIF is basically the same tank and while the first one doesn't role out the door until Sept 1939 that is not when the orders were placed is it? One source even says that the order for 1250 IIIGs was placed in January of 1939 but reduced to 800 in may of 1939 When Czech production of the 38(t) became available. Orders for 759 IIIH's were also placed in Jan of 1939 orders modified as time went on but with well over over 2,000 MK III tanks on order in Jan of 1939 it is a little tough to swallow the idea that it was NOT the Germans choice for their main battle tank or that they had to produce what they could because France and England declared war on them 8 months after they placed the orders.


davebender said:


> October 1939. Panzer Mk IV ausf D, E and F enter production.
> Similiar vehicles so I have lumped them together
> 229 Panzer IV D. Oct 1939 to May 1941.
> 233 Panzer IV E. Sep 1940 to April 1941.
> 487 Panzer IV F1. April 1941 to March 1942.



That rather conveniently skips over the 42 MK IVBs and 134 MK IVC built before Sept of 1939 and the fact that hundreds more were ordered back in Jan of 1938.

Just like airplanes, it takes many months if not a couple of years to tool up and get a tank factory producing in real numbers after an order is placed. 



davebender said:


> IMO Germany did not originally intend for the Panzer Mk III and Panzer Mk IV to enter mass production. The 32 ton VK3001 was intended to be the Heer main battle tank. It would have been capable against both soft targets and enemy tanks. WWII derailed these pre-war German tank development plans.



With thousands of MK IIIS and hundreds if not over thousand MK IVs on order Months before WW II started the Germans had a funny way of not intending to mass produce those tanks.


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## davebender (May 12, 2011)

> Unless you believe that there no advances in barrel forging technology, metallurgy, and propellant technology in the 15 years or so between 1942 and the coming of the 105 L7 gun. The fact that the L7 didn't fire full bore AP rounds might have something to do with it being successful from a 43 ton tank without a muzzle brake.



Achtung Panzer! - Prototypes !
WWII Germany actually produced a prototype high velocity 105mm tank cannon. If it will fit on a 25 ton Panzer IV ausf A chassis I think it could be made to fit in the turret of a 45 ton Panther, 51 ton Centurion or 55 ton Tiger tank.


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## Juha (May 12, 2011)

Hello Dave
why to bother
8,8cm L/71 had clearly better penetration power than that 10,5cm gun, even 17pdr (76,2mm) wasn’t far off even with APCBC (appr 95 vs 111mm at 30deg from 2000m)

Juha


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## davebender (May 12, 2011)

Because 105mm is the ideal size HE shell for supporting infantry operations. And tanks spend more time shooting at infantry then they spend shooting at enemy tanks.


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## Shortround6 (May 12, 2011)

davebender said:


> Achtung Panzer! - Prototypes !
> WWII Germany actually produced a prototype high velocity 105mm tank cannon. If it will fit on a 25 ton Panzer IV ausf A chassis I think it could be made to fit in the turret of a 45 ton Panther, 51 ton Centurion or 55 ton Tiger tank.


 No, the Germans didn't have a "prototype high velocity 105mm tank cannon". They had a modified 10cm field gun. It used two piece ammunition, shell loaded separately from the cartridge case. Fitting "on" a rather modified 25 ton tank chassis (accounts differ, it might have used only a six cylinder engine) is somewhat different that fitting "inside" a turret. The 10cm field gun barrel was interchangeable (not in the field) with the 15 cm sFH 18 barrel on the same carriage. They fit in Hummels, does that mean they can fit in a Panther turret? 
You may also want to look at modern 105 tank gun ammuntion and see the shell weights and MV used. 
The German gun used a 15.6kg projectile at about 805m/sec. 
105 HESH is about 11.25 kg at 730m/sec.
105 APDS is about 5.9kg at 1470m/sec.
Recoil is proportional to momentum, not energy. 
A modern 105 has about 2/3 the recoil impulse of the German WW II 105mm gun. In fact they are about 15% less than the German 88/71.
The barrels are also considerably lighter.


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## parsifal (May 14, 2011)

SR

I agree that the germans never had a 105 multi purpose gun in WWII. 

I am not challenging you on this, just curious. I am puzzled wher you say the 88mm and WWII artillery gun had greater recoil impulse than the modern 105mm. Exactly what is "recoil impulse".

Also, you say that recoil is a function of momentum, not energy. I would agree with that, but momentum is a measure of work, and work is a function of how much energy you put into an object.

The physics are

P = MV
where
P= momentum
M= Mass
V = Velocity of the object
If we disregard the effect of friction gravity etc, a unit with momentum is neither releasing or absorbing kinetic energy, neither is it releasing or storing any other enrgy, since energy can neither be created or destroyed, but can change from one form to another. But an object with momentum does possess potential energy, since if it decelarates it immediately transforms that latent enrgy that it possesses to some other form of energy. Thats why projectiles that are either accalarating or decelarating cause damage when they hit an object. 


For Force, the formula is

F=MA
where
F=Force
M= Mass
A = Accelaration of the object
this is a NM, which is to say that it is a unit of energy x distance

The SI unit of force is the newton (symbol N), which is the force required to accelerate a one kilogram mass at a rate of one meter per second squared, or kg·m·s−2. The corresponding CGS unit is the dyne, the force required to accelerate a one gram mass by one centimeter per second squared, or g·cm·s−2. A newton is thus equal to 100,000 dyne



and Work 
W=F.D
where
W=Work
D= Distance Travelled
The SI unit of work is the joule (J), which is defined as the work done by a force of one newton acting over a distance of one meter. This definition is based on Sadi Carnot's 1824 definition of work as "weight lifted through a height", which is based on the fact that early steam engines were principally used to lift buckets of water, through a gravitational height, out of flooded ore mines. The dimensionally equivalent newton-meter (N·m) is sometimes used instead; however, it is also sometimes reserved for torque to distinguish its units from work or energy.


This all suggests that energy plays a big, if indirect part in the amount of recoil that a gun possesses. Since newtons laws are in evidence with recoil issues (for every action their is an equal and opposite reaction) how can a 105mm round be more deadly, and have greater penetration if it has less recoil, and hence less kinetic energy in the projectile. Can you explain that please.


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## Shortround6 (May 14, 2011)

Kinetic energy is not momentum. 
Consider two rifle rounds. The 45/70 with a 405 grain bullet and the .243 Win with a 105 grain bullet. 
The 45/70 fires it's 405 grain bullet at 425m/s for 2370 Jules of energy. 
The .243 fires it's 405 grain bullet at 425m/s for 2820 Jules of energy.
Close enough but anybody who has fired the two rounds out of similar weight rifles will tell you the recoil is nowhere near the same, the 45/70 being much worse. 
If we multiply the weight of the bullet times the velocity to get the momentum (after converting to grams) we get what I will call a figure of merit of 11152 for the 45/70 and 6188 for the .243. 
Of interest is that if we take the .30-06 with a 180 grain bullet (11.66grams) and 820 m/s we get 3949 Jules but a figure of merit of 9561. 
There are other things that affect the recoil impulse, or the force trying to move the gun rearward. 
The weight (mass) of the propellant, now converted to gas going out the barrel, the "rocket" effect if you will. This is multiplied by a constant for velocity of the escaping gas and can be "tweaked" a bit for extremely high or low pressure guns. Depending on the gun this can add just a tiny bit to the recoil (.45ACP) or a significant percentage (6.5/300 Weatherby magnum.)Adding these two numbers together gives you the "force" going out the muzzle which, as you have noted HAS to be balanced (equaled) by the force going backward. 
For our rifle example we can take the figure of merit and divide it by the gun weight to get the velocity of the gun going backward (3.18m/s, 1.76m/s, 2.73m/s for the 45/70, .243, and 30-06 using a 3.5kg rifle and ignoring the powder charge) form this we can figure out the actual Jules of energy in the recoil. 

As far as the penetrating power of post war 105 guns goes, for kinetic energy rounds they all used sub caliber projectiles. Basic armor penetration is force (ft/lbs or jules) per sq in or sq cm of target. The Higher the force applied to the SAME AREA of target the higher the penetration. This is ignoring little details like shot breakup and what not  
An early APDS round used a core of about 4/7ths diameter or about 60mm diameter. The 60mm penetrator is trying to make a hole of 28.26sq/cm area vs the 86.54sq/cm area of the full bore 105 projectile. 
even if you change the formula to trying to push out a plug and sheer the armor at the perimeter of the "hole" the perimeter of the 60mm hole is 18.84 cm vs the 32.97cm perimeter of the 105 hole. Any mixture of the two theories/formulas is going to fall between. While the sub caliber projectile may have less total energy it is trying to do a lot less work. 
Modern fin stabilized projectiles can be as thin as 40mm or so.


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## renrich (May 14, 2011)

If this has been discussed before, please forgive me. Why, in the M4 Sherman, was it equipped with the 75 mm low velocity gun initially, when later on a high velocity 76 mm gun was fitted? It seems like the high velocity gun would have been fitted in the beginning.


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## Shortround6 (May 14, 2011)

renrich said:


> If this has been discussed before, please forgive me. Why, in the M4 Sherman, was it equipped with the 75 mm low velocity gun initially, when later on a high velocity 76 mm gun was fitted? It seems like the high velocity gun would have been fitted in the beginning.


 
the Sherman's 75mm gun was sort of a medium velocity with about 50% more velocity than the German 75mm in the early MK IV tanks and about 20% less than the long barreled MK IVs. 
The 76mm simply wasn't ready yet (at least in 1942) and the 3in gun as used in the M-10 tank destroyer, while it had the same performance, was actually an old cost defense/AA barrel that was both larger in size and much heavier than the 76mm later fitted which made it much harder to fit in the turret.


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## davebender (May 14, 2011)

WWII era American technology amazes me. We built the atomic bomb. Yet we couldn't build a decent torpedo, 75mm tank cannon, 20mm aircraft cannon or army light machinegun. Nor did American infantry have proper winter clothing prior to 1944. They froze during the 1943 winter in Italy.


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## Juha (May 14, 2011)

Hello Renrich
also it was a question of doctrine, US Army doctrine called tank destroyers to take main burden of panzer destroying, tanks main job was to race deep into enemy’s rear and kill infantry and soft targets. The medium velocity 75mm gun had clearly better HE round than the 76mm high velocity gun, so before D-Day for ex. Patton wasn’t interested in 76mm armed Shermans. 75mm could handle Pz IVs and IIIs and Allies thought that Panther was an another heavy tank and so not to be encountered too often. Normandy fighting awaked US Army leaders and troops, so the demand of more and still more Shermans with 76mm became loud.

Dave
US had a decent 76mm tank gun why there would have been demand for a decent 75mm tank gun. US 76mm was a accurate weapon and had more penetration power than than German 75mm L/43 and L/46 (the main guns of late Pz IVs) and had almost as good penetration power than Soviet 85mmL/53 tank gun of T-34/85. It wasn’t as good A/T weapon than excellent Panther’s 75mm L/70 or the British 17pdr (76,2mm) but was more accurate than the latter. So IMHO US 76mm wasa decent gun for its size.

Juha


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## Shortround6 (May 14, 2011)

Juha said:


> US had a decent 76mm tank gun why there would have been demand for a decent 75mm tank gun. US 76mm was a accurate weapon and had more penetration power than than German 75mm L/43 and L/46 (the main guns of late Pz IVs) and had almost as good penetration power than Soviet 85mmL/53 tank gun of T-34/85. It wasn’t as good A/T weapon than excellent Panther’s 75mm L/70 or the British 17pdr (76,2mm) but was more accurate than the latter. So IMHO US 76mm wasa decent gun for its size.
> 
> Juha



The US 76mm gun was also smaller and lighter than the Panther gun and the 17pdr and was an easier fit in the turret. It may also have had a higher rate of fire.


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## parsifal (May 16, 2011)

davebender said:


> WWII era American technology amazes me. We built the atomic bomb. Yet we couldn't build a decent torpedo, 75mm tank cannon, 20mm aircraft cannon or army light machinegun. Nor did American infantry have proper winter clothing prior to 1944. They froze during the 1943 winter in Italy.



There were variable reasons for a lot of that . in the case of the BAR, there was an unshakeable belief in its capabilities, despite what is plainly an inadequate design. To some extent these inadequacies were compensated either side of the spectrum, with a good support LMG in the 30cal, and a good self loading rifle, in the form of the garand. 

In the case of the aircraft cannon, I guess it was the belief that a heavy broadside of 0.50" HMGs was as good as a barrage of 20mm cannon. I dont buy that argument, but a little self delusion goes a long way and anyway, eight fifties is still a fairly formidable amount of firepower. 

The saga of the torpedo failures is more a saga of self delusion and outright sloth on the part of the Navy. They convinced themselves, on the basis of faulty test data, in turn the product of abridged ad inadequate testing regimes pre-war that their torpedo exploders were reliable. It takes years to build up stocks of torpedoes, so by the time they realized the problem, the war was half over. In the case of surface warships it was partly based on poor understandiong of ship roles. Well into 1943, there was this mistaken belief that gun armed cruisers were protecting the destroyers, when the truth was that cruisers were essentially targets. What is remarkable is that once the faults of the torpedoes in service were recognized, the US moved very quickly to redesign, produce and stockpile decent replacements.

The 75mm gun was the product of standardization, as regulated by the general Board. and thank goodness they did, because as the allies proved time an again, numbers counted far more than quality in determining victory. And standardization ensured that numbers were maximized, and the 75mm was adequate, if it fell short of outstanding


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## fastmongrel (May 17, 2011)

parsifal said:


> The 75mm gun was the product of standardization, as regulated by the general Board. and thank goodness they did, because as the allies proved time an again, numbers counted far more than quality in determining victory. And standardization ensured that numbers were maximized, and the 75mm was adequate, if it fell short of outstanding



As an anti tank gun when it first went into action the 75mm was outstanding, by the end of its war service as anti tank gun it was barely adequate. However I believe as a infantry support gun which lets face it was the primary job of a tank gun in WWII it was an outstanding gun for the duration.


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## Shortround6 (May 17, 2011)

fastmongrel said:


> As an anti tank gun when it first went into action the 75mm was outstanding, by the end of its war service as anti tank gun it was barely adequate. However I believe as a infantry support gun which lets face it was the primary job of a tank gun in WWII it was an outstanding gun for the duration.



That was pretty much the argument of the time. The lower velocity 75mm shells could be made with thinner walls and carried a noticeable difference in HE content than the 76mm HE shells.
The 75mm was perfectly good against MK IV tanks and worked pretty well against Panthers from the side/rear. Turns out the 76mm didn't work so well against the front of a Panther anyway so maybe the difference wasn't that great. Perhaps the 76mm should have been adopted sooner but they probably would have wanted an even higher percentage of tanks armed with 105 howitzers for HE work.


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## fastmongrel (May 18, 2011)

Shortround6 said:


> That was pretty much the argument of the time. The lower velocity 75mm shells could be made with thinner walls and carried a noticeable difference in HE content than the 76mm HE shells.
> The 75mm was perfectly good against MK IV tanks and worked pretty well against Panthers from the side/rear. Turns out the 76mm didn't work so well against the front of a Panther anyway so maybe the difference wasn't that great. Perhaps the 76mm should have been adopted sooner but they probably would have wanted an even higher percentage of tanks armed with 105 howitzers for HE work.



Someone on another forum (cant remember which) argued pretty persuasively that the 76mm was not the ideal weapon being neither fish nor fowl. Not good enough to be a pure anti tank weapon nor having a good enough HE shell to be a good infantry support weapon. He argued that the 105mm should have been the gun mounted on all Shermans but for a proportion of properly designed and Detroit built 17 pdr Fireflys to support the 105s. The only counter I could think of towards his ideas was ammo load the 105mm only carrying about 40 rounds as opposed to about 90 for the 75mm version.


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## Shortround6 (May 18, 2011)

Part of the 76mm problem was timing, it was ready for production, I believe, at th end of 1942. If it had been introduced into combat in 1943 it might have a better reputation. It could take on a Tiger from the front at greater distance than it could a Panther and against the sides/rear of a Tiger it would work hundreds of yards beyond the suicidally close range the 75mm needed. Due to it's higher velocity it also had a point blank range several hundred yds further than the 75mm. Being introduced when the Panther was becoming the Germans main battle tank (as far as production would permit) it's advantages were rather diminished. 
Problems with the 105 as a tank cannon may include a low rate of fire, a low velocity which means a short point blank range and needing more ranging shots at long range, couple that with the lower rate of fire and long range engagements get rather dicey. Both the power traverse and gyro stabilizer were deleted from the 105 tanks. Some sources say they were added back later in production. Lacking both the 105mm armed tanks would find it harder to do the rapid maneuver and "snap shooting" that allowed them to perform as well as they did with the existing guns. 
Since developments seldom operate in a vacuum, once the Germans realize the main (only?) US tank round is a HEAT round they can extend/beef up the bazooka plates, add more extra track, or even weld bars across the front, much like the vehicles in the middle east, whatever it takes to get some stand off distance to defeat the HEAT round.


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## davebender (May 18, 2011)

> Part of the 76mm problem was timing, it was ready for production, I believe, at th end of 1942


Rather late even if it had entered mass production ASAP. The German 7.5cm PaK40 entered service during November 1941. German vehicles armed with this weapon entered service during the spring of 1942.

USA Guns 75mm and 76mm calibre
*76mm Gun M1 L55*.
HE Shell. .9lb of explosive.
AP (M79). 109mm @457 meters. 30 degree slope.
APC (M62). 93mm @457 meters. 30 degree slope.
HVAP (M93). 157mm @457 meters. 30 degree slope.

German Guns 75mm and 76mm calibre (Tank AT)
*7.5cm L48* Penetration is the same for both tank and AT guns.
12,000 to 13,500 marks. Depending on version.
HE Shell. .66kg of explosive. Similiar to a German 75mm howitzer shell.
APCBC (Pzgr.39). 96mm @ 500 meters. 30 degree slope.
APCR (Pzgr.40). 120mm @500 meters. 30 degree slope.
HEAT. 100mm penetration at any range.
APDS (Pzgr.44). NA. 
I don't think Germany fielded an APDS round for the 7.5cm L48 cannon, as they did for 7.5cm/70 and 8.8cm cannons late in the war.


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## Shortround6 (May 18, 2011)

A. While the German towed gun started delivery in Nov of 1941 and the vehicle guns started in the spring of 1942 that was the L43 version of slightly lower performance. The L48 doesn't show up until 1943. As far as being "late" goes the 76mm gun could go through the front of a MK IV at 2000yds. The German gu could penetrate the Sherman at 1500yds or less so at any practical battle range both were vulnerable to each others guns. 
B. HVAP was scarce for the American guns in the summer of 1944 but availability got better during the fall/winter but still nowhere near unlimited supply. Germans by 1944 were non-existent for APCR (which is the same as HVAP, just a different name).
C. The Americans never used APDS during the war and I don't believe the Germans feilded any either in service with any AT gun. There is a lot of talk about such rounds on the internet but very few reference's in most books on the subject and unless somebody can figure out a way to change most accepted theorys of armor penetration and the way steel works as it penetrates I would rather doubt any service rounds of Pzgr.44,
"Timmy the powergamer" fantasies aside


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## davebender (May 18, 2011)

> As far as being "late" goes the 76mm gun could go through the front of a MK IV at 2000yds. The German gu could penetrate the Sherman at 1500yds or less so at any practical battle range both were vulnerable to each others guns.


WWII tanks, especially American tanks, spent a lot more time firing at soft targets then at enemy armored vehicles. The German 7.5cm cannon was a superior all around weapon in addition to being available in large numbers relatively early.


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## Shortround6 (May 18, 2011)

davebender said:


> WWII tanks, especially American tanks, spent a lot more time firing at soft targets then at enemy armored vehicles. The German 7.5cm cannon was a superior all around weapon in addition to being available in large numbers relatively early.


 
Superior how? 
and for which jobs? 
and superior to which American guns?
And which German 7.5cm cannon are we talking about?
Not including the short 7.5cm L24 and the Panthers L70 gun there 3 different 7.5cm tank/AT guns.


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## CharlesBronson (May 20, 2011)

There were at list 4 models of german 75mm tank guns, the L24, L43/48 and the panther L70, probably the L43/48 is the most equilibrate. yes it is a bit better than the one in the Sherman but is no related to the early L24 in any aspect.


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## Shortround6 (May 20, 2011)

while the L46 towed anti-tank gun (or armament of a number of self propelled anti-tank guns, Marders,etc) had the same performance for any practical purpose and used the same projectiles it used a totally different cartridge case.
Ammunition was no more interchangeable than the American 3in AT gun (M10 tank destroyer gun) and the 76mm gun in the Sherman and M-18. 

considerations for guns include not only the armor piercing performance and/or shell/HE weight but weight of the gun (tube/recoiling mass?) weight of complete equipment in towed guns. velocity for point blank range for direct fire guns, rate of fire, accuracy which is different than flat trajectory and barrel life. you can through in cost and a few other factors too.


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## stug3 (Oct 23, 2012)

70 years ago today


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## vinnye (Oct 25, 2012)

Had the Russians shared their design ideas from 1939 with Britain, we could have had a tank with sloping frontal armour and maybe the meteor engine and a high velocity 75mm main gun? That would have done quite nicely in the desert in1941.


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## yulzari (Oct 27, 2012)

Um, to return to the thread topic. 

On reading my way through the past postings on topic I have to agree that improving tactical use of combined arms is a key but we are looking for what could have been achieved in time. There was nothing to prevent a Centurion being made pre-war had the will been available but post Summer 1940 there were 2 key items in the pipeline that could have been made into the standard all purpose British/Canadian tank. The 6 pounder Valentine. Ideally Canadian diesel engined.

Yes one would have preferred a 75mm AP/HE gun and a 3 man turret faster tank but these would have been pipe dreams in the timescale.

The Valentine was reliable, reasonably armoured and able to be produced in quantity. It's speed _across the battlefield_ was not that much slower than others, even if it's road speed was poor. The 6 pounder was a good period anti tank gun with an adequate, if not good, HE round. Concentrate on this for all purposes and, in the background, work on the next generation Centurion with a full 17 pounder for mid 1944.

The 25 pounder is a red herring. Artillery needed all that could be made. It's best use is as support artillery.

Do not let the best drive out the good. Lots of Valentines actually on the battlefields, able to take on infantry and anti tank guns with HE and tanks with AP. You must have armour in quantity and the Sherman showed how a single standard tank can do that.

Even by the end of the war numbers of small low Valentines with 6 pounder APDS would remain a viable threat to a Panther or Tiger.


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## vinnye (Oct 28, 2012)

I like the Valentine as a standard tank. It was well thought of by many crews. A reliable workhorse unlike some of its peers!
More armour (sloped) and the high velocity 75 would make it even better. 3 man turret would be nice but not essential. Reliable radio equipment - as the Panzer crews had would be beneficial.


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## yulzari (Oct 28, 2012)

vinnye said:


> I like the Valentine as a standard tank.



I'm glad you do too vinnye. The key thing is to resist the temptation to make it another tank rather than a better Valentine. An ex-crewman told a friend of mine that the main problem of a 2 man turret was that was one less person to help maintain the tank and stand guard. He used it on the Eastern Front and preferred it to a T34 as he could hide more easily.


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## Glider (Oct 29, 2012)

I admit to not liking the Valantine as a standard tank, too small, to slow and no firepower. The Britsh had the ideal standard tank for the Desert, it was called the Sherman. Fast, reliable, good armour and the 75mm was a good gun for the time. 
The 75mm may not be as good as the 75mm L43 but the Pz IV f2 had thin armour and the two for all practical purposes balanced each other out.

If you want a British ideal tank then the Cromwell should have been ready in time, it wasn't but it shold have been and that would have been even better


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## vinnye (Oct 29, 2012)

If Leyland had not pulled out of the develepment in mid 1941 - it may have been possible to have the Cromwell earlier?


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## Glider (Oct 29, 2012)

The engine was the problem, the basic design of the tank changed little


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## yulzari (Oct 29, 2012)

The only firepower issue of the Valentine was 57mm HE rather than 75mm and one could have mixed bored out 6 pounders as 75mm HE infantry support with normal 6 pounders as anti armour tanks. I suspect the Valentine has an image problem in not looking 'cool' or doing anything 'cool'. It was not fast, but fast enough. It was not impressively armed but well enough to do the job. It was reasonably armoured but not very heavily so. It was subject to continuous careful evolution where each change was a step better but had no revolutionary changes. 

Designed in 1938 it could keep up with tank evolution until 1944 when a real 17 pounder/Meteor engined super Comet could supercede it, merging the design and development resources of the Matilda, Covenanter, Crusader, Centaur/Cromwell, Challenger and Churchill. Never mind the TOGs and Tortoise. Integrating the production resources into mass output of a single design. For El-Alamein a 6 pounder Valentine single standard tank was actually possible.

A bit of a hobby horse of mine, as some will recognise. I remain convinced it was the best choice that could be achieved, if not the best tank one could make.


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## Glider (Oct 29, 2012)

I think we are going to have to differ on this. The Valantine wasn't an improvement on the Matilda II. Similar armour, similar speed, similar size and same gun. The 6pd version was overgunned for its size not even having room for a co ax mg. It was hopelessly left behind in the evolution stages being too small to be developed.


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## vinnye (Oct 30, 2012)

Glider - you are correct - the engine was the problem. In the Wiki page on the Cromwell it says -
Leyland were lined up to produce the Meteor but withdrew in mid-1941 as they had doubts about being able to provide sufficient cooling
This was what I was referring to in my earlier post.
Had they been able to overcome the heating problem - they may have been able to field more of them sooner.

The Valentine may not have been much of an improvement over the Matilda ii - even looks like the early ones had the same turret?
But since we lost so much materiel at Dunkirk, any tank was a bonus.


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## yulzari (Oct 31, 2012)

You can get a 6 pounder in a Matilda II and they did but the key thing about the Valentine was that it was so much easier to make and used less resources to do so so you can have Valentines in quantity, real quantity. It was mediocre in the proper meaning of the word but this is a 'pile them high and sell them cheap' approach. It is about how much useable armour you can actually put into the front line and replace, not about how sexy a tank you can create.

Anyway, I have set out my stall, buyers may browse and decide for themselves how they want to spend their cash.


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## Juha (Nov 2, 2012)

I agree with yulzari, Valentine was smaller and cheaper and at least in Soviet Union worked much better than Matilda. It was the only British tank SU wanted more. It wasn'ta perfect tank but at its time the only reliable British gun tank and I meant the time before Cromwell.

Juha


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## stug3 (Nov 3, 2012)

88mm anti-tank gun that was captured and restored to working condition by Australian troops, 3 November 1942.






A salvo of bombs from Martin Baltimores of No. 21 Squadron SAAF explodes on enemy transport on the road between el Daba and Fuka, Egypt, at the start of the enemy’s withdrawal from the Battle of El Alamein. 465 Allied aircraft attacked the slow-moving columns retreating westwards along the coast road in the afternoon of 3 November 1942, destroying an estimated 300 vehicles.





Burnt-out trucks on the El Alamein battlefield, 3 November 1942.





Daylight attack on Tobruk harbour by five Consolidated Liberators of the 12th USAAF, which resulted in the destruction of the Italian Naval auxiliary vessel, BRIONI and extensive damage to the harbour installations.





From _The Rommel Papers:

Despite our frequent reminders, the vehicles promised by Barbassetti had still not arrived, and so the Italians had to march. Dense columns of vehicles were already streaming westwards. The Italian infantry marched off and soon the road was full of traffic. But the British soon spotted our move and attacked the coast road with about 200 Fighter-bombers. Their bomber squadrons were also extremely active that day.

The Afrika Korps alone was attacked no less than eleven times during the morning by strong formations of bombers.

At about midday I returned to my command post, only just escaping, by some frantic driving, a carpet of bombs laid by 18 British aircraft. At 13.30 hours an order arrived from the Fuehrer._

To Field Marshal Rommel

It is with trusting confidence in your leadership and the courage of the German-Italian troops under your command that the German people and I are following the heroic struggle in Egypt.

In the situation in which you find yourself there can be no other thought but to stand fast, yield not a yard of ground and throw every gun and every man into the battle. Considerable air force reinforcements are being sent to C.in C. South.

The Duce and the Commando Supremo are also making the utmost efforts to send you the means to continue the fight. Your enemy, despite his superiority, must also be at the end of his strength.

It would not be the first time in history that a strong will has triumphed over the bigger battalions. As to your troops, you can show them no other road than that to victory or death.

Adolf Hitler

_Rommel was to describe this as an ‘impossible order’ – he was ‘completely stunned’ by it. From now on he was to find his freedom of movement and decision making constantly curtailed by Hitler. If he wanted to preserve his Army he would have to find ways to circumvent Hitler in the future._


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## vinnye (Nov 3, 2012)

What do people think to the Crusader III - with 6 pounder gun? A lot of the earlier problems had been ironed out - so reliability no longer a big issue.
Maybe if this was available in quantity, its speed and gun would nave given PZIII and IV a run for their money?


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## Glider (Nov 3, 2012)

I agree they would have been a good response to the Pz III/IV. They were more vulnerable than the german tanks but both sides would have been capable of destroying the other which evens things up.


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## stug3 (Nov 4, 2012)

Handley Page Halifax B Mark IIs of No. 462 Squadron RAAF parked on the perimeter track at Fayid, Egypt, before a night sortie against enemy columns retreating after the Battle of El Alamein.





Battle Of Egypt: Thrill For British Tank Crew. Picture Shows: A near miss raises a column of sand near a British heavy tank, during the Eighth Army’s victorious advance. _(looks like a Grant)_





A Crusader II tank of the 9th Queen’s Royal Lancers, 2nd Armoured Brigade, 1st Armoured Division, moving at speed, 5 November 1942





Crusader tanks of the 9th Queen’s Royal Lancers, 2nd Armoured Brigade, 1st Armoured Division, moving at speed across the desert, 5 November 1942.





_Keith Douglas was now in the stream of British Armour breaking out from the bridgehead. His group of Crusader tanks were flying along at 30mph, flinging up huge clouds of dust and overrunning small groups of enemy all the time.

He found himself at the head of the whole 8th Army for a brief period of time, engaging enemy tanks at long distance – tanks which quickly turned tail. It was while he was stopped refuelling that he missed out on the brief ‘Battle of Galal station’ in which the remainder of his Squadron overcame a number of Italian tanks.

It was here that he went looting and he was soon kitted out in brand new German clothing – ‘everything apart from boots and socks’. He already had a Luger and a Beretta so went looking in the Italian tanks for a Beretta for a friend of his who had been wounded and evacuated:_
I approached a brand-new-painted MI3, with no sign of any damage, from which the crew had apparently fled at the sight of their comrades’ discomfiture.

There was a promising cask and a sack on the outside of the tank, which we opened. But the cask only contained water, and the sack nothing but little round tins with a smelly Italian kind of bully beef in them.

So I climbed on to the turret – the small side doors which stood open on most of the other tanks were closed. I prepared to lower myself through he top. It was dark in the turret, and I leant over the manhole first, trying to accustom my eyes to the darkness and to see if there were any Birettas on the side shelves inside. A faint sweet smell came up to me which reminded me of the dead horse I once saw cut up for our instruction at the Equitation School.

Gradually the objects in the turret became visible: the crew of the tank – for, I believe, these tanks did not hold more than two – were, so to speak, distributed round the turret. At first it was diflicult to work out how the limbs were arranged. They lay in a clumsy embrace, their white faces whiter, as those of dead men in the desert always were, for the light powdering of dust on them.

One with a six-inch hole in his head, the whole skull smashed in behind the remains of an ear – the other covered with his own and his friend’s blood, held up by the blue steel mechanism of a machine-gun, his legs twisting among the dully gleaming gear levers. About them clung that impenetrable silence I have mentioned before, by which I think the dead compel our reverence.

I got a Biretta from another tank on the other side of the railway line.

_Others had rather better luck in their searches:_
In the evening we closed into night leaguer, facing westwards again. Tom was in high spirits; he and Ken Tinker had found an Italian hospital, and their tanks were loaded inside and out with crates of cherries, Macedonian cigarettes, cigars and wine; some straw-jacketed Italian Chianti wine, some champagne, and a bottle or two of brandy, even some Liebfraumilch.

We shared out the plunder with the immemorial glee of conquerors, and _beneath the old star-eaten blanket of the sky
lay down to dream of victory._


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## Shortround6 (Nov 4, 2012)

A problem with the up gunned British tanks is that the turrets were back to 2 man turrets. While a 6pdr that penetrates is better than a 2pdr that bounces off the target the two man turret is a serious handicap. Rates of fire are lower than a _good_ 3 man turret and rates of engagement are even worse. Rate of engagement is how many separate targets the tank can engage in a given period of time. If the Commander is busy stuffing shells into the gun breech he is not spotting new targets/threats and not keeping up with the tactical situation. 

A Valentine with a 6pdr is little better than a fancy self propelled gun. 6pdr HE ammo was a scarce as hens teeth for the first year or two of the guns service and the lack of a machine gun meant the tank was of very, very little use for infantry support. When the Valentine X does show up with a co-ax MG the 1575 rounds provided (7 belts) cost 9 rounds of main gun ammo, down to 44 rounds. Crusader III carried 73 rounds of main gun ammo and up to 4950 rounds of MG ammo (22 belts). A Churchill III could carry 85 rounds of main gun ammo and 7875 rounds of MG ammo.


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## stug3 (Nov 5, 2012)

Sherman tanks of ‘C’ Squadron, 9th Queen’s Royal Lancers, 2nd Armoured Brigade, 1st Armoured Division, 5 November 1942





Lt General Bernard Montgomery, GOC 8th Army, standing in front of his personal Grant tank, 5 November 1942.


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## parsifal (Nov 5, 2012)

Luv the photos Stug....keep em coming mate


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## stug3 (Nov 12, 2012)

A German 88mm gun abandoned near the coast road, west of El Alamein, 7 November 1942.





The commander of a Stuart tank scans the ground ahead through field glasses before giving the order to advance, Cyrenaica, November 1942





A Grant tank and trucks make their way along a road flooded by recent rains while in pursuit of the enemy, 10 November 1942.





Grant and Lee tanks of ‘C’ Squadron, 4th (Queen’s Own) Hussars, 2nd Armoured Brigade, El Alamein position, Egypt, 7 July 1942.





2nd Lieutenant Winston Churchill of the 4th Queen’s Own Hussars in 1895


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## Juha (Nov 13, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> A problem with the up gunned British tanks is that the turrets were back to 2 man turrets. While a 6pdr that penetrates is better than a 2pdr that bounces off the target the two man turret is a serious handicap. Rates of fire are lower than a _good_ 3 man turret and rates of engagement are even worse. Rate of engagement is how many separate targets the tank can engage in a given period of time. If the Commander is busy stuffing shells into the gun breech he is not spotting new targets/threats and not keeping up with the tactical situation.
> 
> A Valentine with a 6pdr is little better than a fancy self propelled gun. 6pdr HE ammo was a scarce as hens teeth for the first year or two of the guns service and the lack of a machine gun meant the tank was of very, very little use for infantry support. When the Valentine X does show up with a co-ax MG the 1575 rounds provided (7 belts) cost 9 rounds of main gun ammo, down to 44 rounds. Crusader III carried 73 rounds of main gun ammo and up to 4950 rounds of MG ammo (22 belts). A Churchill III could carry 85 rounds of main gun ammo and 7875 rounds of MG ammo.



That's true, the very limited interior space was one of the drawbacks of the small size of Valentine. And as always, when the boffins failed to deliver, soldiers tried to improvise. Crews came up with a novel way of using a machinegun from inside the hull by fitting a solenoid-fired Browning MG into a 6-pdr shell-case. When needed, this was inserted into the 6-pdr breech and the solenoid cable connected, allowing the gunner to aim it using the main gun elevating gear, traverse and telescope. I have no idea, how much mg ammo they carried along.

Juha


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## Shortround6 (Nov 13, 2012)

Thank you for that information.


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## fastmongrel (Nov 13, 2012)

I cant see a Browning .303 fitting in a 6 pdr case with any ammunition. Looking at the top photo the case is only going to be about 75 to 80mm wide at its widest






In this photo it looks like the RAF Browning is going to be a tight fit





A picture just to give some idea of the size of the 6 pdr case. It might be possible to fit a Browning in the case but wheres the ammo belt going to go unless the base of the case was removed and the Breech of the Browning stuck out past the breech of the 6 pounder.


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## Juha (Nov 13, 2012)

fastmongrel said:


> ...It might be possible to fit a Browning in the case but wheres the ammo belt going to go unless the base of the case was removed and the Breech of the Browning stuck out past the breech of the 6 pounder.



IMHO that was the only reasonable solution anyway, otherwise one would have soon run into problems with spent catriages. But don't ask how they handled the belt etc. I haven't seen any photos or drawings on the system.

Juha


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## fastmongrel (Nov 13, 2012)

Gunner "Quick boss I need to fire the Browning" Tank Captain "Hang on a minute I have to open the breech get rid of the round up the spout pick up an unweildy bastard mix of MG and 6 pounder case load it fix it in place connect the firing solenoid and load the damn thing then make sure the belt isnt going to catch on anything" Gunner "Forget the bloody Browning load AP load load now theres a MkIII coming" Tank Captain " Oh shi..." Boom.


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## Juha (Nov 14, 2012)

Hello Fastmongrel
Old army saying here is "a lonely tank is a dead tank" so probably more like some tanks acting like female and some like male WWI tanks, or like 75mm and 17pdr Shermans in 44-45. I looked a photo of army .300 Browning and draw a conclusion that system would have been more practical with Besa. 

Juha


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## fastmongrel (Nov 14, 2012)

Hi Juha

As an ex Cheiftain tank loader it just seems to me a horrendously impractical device in what must have been already an undersized cluttered turret. Also as the breech of the Browning is inside the turret as it fires its going to fill the tank up with cordite fumes because the RAF Browning fired from an open bolt. Of course any M/G fired inside a confined space is bad but one that works off an open bolt and is contained entirely inside the turret is not going to be a nice experience for the gunner who will be deaf, blinded and coughing. At least the Boss can poke his head out the hatch.

Surprised no one came up with something more practical like an externally mounted M/G on the turret roof with a linkage to the mantlet for elevation. It could have worked, various tanks used a similar method for elevating rocket launchers.


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## Juha (Nov 14, 2012)

Hello fastmongrel
IMHO the cordite fumes should not have been an insurmountable obstacle, if in Valentine Mk IX there was a fan in the roof of the turret just for removing the fumes, at least there was one in Cromwell, PzKpfw IV, V, VI and VIB. The belt should not has been a problem, in the only lmg I have ever fired, KvKk 62 see:
http://img191.imageshack.us/img191/9459/fdf108373732003762kvkk623cr.jpg

a 100 round belt was put in a canvas bag, at least in my platoon there was no problems with that system. In Browning one problem would have been that the belt went in and spent catriages were ejected so forward, in Besa (and in KvKk 62) these happened clearly nearer the trigger, so one could put more of the gun inside the 6pdr catriage. I cannot recall anything special of the noise of the firing of KvKk 62, at least its noise didn't left any memory contrary to the firing a RPG or being rather near an explosions of ex-LW SC 50 bomb or 10kg A/T mine those noises were very powerful. On the other hand Suomi smg left impression of a toy gun it was so silent after the experience of firing my assault rifle. But of course I fired the Kvkk 62 only in the open or from a foxhole and not from a steel box.

Juha


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## fastmongrel (Nov 14, 2012)

Hi Juha

From experience the co axial M/G when fired in a Chieftain made a hell of a racket. Surprisingly actually louder than the 120mm firing which was more of a thump to your body than a noise. I often didnt wear a helmet when buttoned up in the turret because I am 6 foot (1.83m) tall and I kept clonking the bulky helmet on the various protuding parts that a tank turret insides is cluttered with, so I just wore a beret and headphones and learnt to duck. A Chief is laid out differently to a WWII british tank but still you are surprisingly close to the M/G.


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## Juha (Nov 14, 2012)

Hello
I checked the fan question, Valentine as well as Crusander got the ventilator fan when they got the 6pdr.

Juha


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## stug3 (Nov 15, 2012)

15.11.42 | Orwell Diaries 1938-1942
from George Orwell's diary-

_15.11.42

Church bells rung this morning – in celebration of the victory in Egypt. The first time that I have heard them in over two years._


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## Juha (Nov 18, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> ... 6pdr HE ammo was a scarce as hens teeth for the first year or two of the guns service ...



Even if not plentiful there were seemingly enough 6pdr HE during the Tunisia campaign for CW troops, production had been 396,000 HE shells in 1942 and was 1,865,000 in 1943, after which the production was sharply curtained.

Juha


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## yulzari (Nov 18, 2012)

British users have told me that 6 pounder HE was a prized item for US troops to swap their kit for them. Apparently UK rations were worth 3 US ones too. I got the same rate in the late 70's/early 80's. Tells you more about US rations than UK ones I suspect. Tinned cake and bacon roll could buy you anything other than weapons. I dare say they feed them better now.


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## Glider (Nov 18, 2012)

yulzari said:


> British users have told me that 6 pounder HE was a prized item for US troops to swap their kit for them. Apparently UK rations were worth 3 US ones too. I got the same rate in the late 70's/early 80's. Tells you more about US rations than UK ones I suspect. Tinned cake and bacon roll could buy you anything other than weapons. I dare say they feed them better now.



In the early 1970s I remember having Turtle soup in a ration pack. My parents didn't believe me so I took one home


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## Airframes (Nov 18, 2012)

Ah, the 1970s 24 hour 'ratpack'. Probably packed in 1950 (going off the price on the 'Mars Bar'; wrapper), full of heavy tins, designed to 'bung you up' for three days (life expectancy in a CEFO conflict), but apart from the tinned cheese, brilliant stuff! Want to swap three tins of cheese for an oatmeal block?


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## Juha (Nov 18, 2012)

IIRC all 6pdr HE was Made in UK, so US 57mm equipped TD units, if they got HE rounds, they were from British stocks

Juha


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## Juha (Nov 18, 2012)

In Finnish army, we had "guerilla food" packages, it incl. amongst other items, choco bar, raisin nuts mix and tinned liver casserole.

Juha


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## fastmongrel (Nov 18, 2012)

Airframes said:


> Ah, the 1970s 24 hour 'ratpack'. Probably packed in 1950 (going off the price on the 'Mars Bar'; wrapper), full of heavy tins, designed to 'bung you up' for three days (life expectancy in a CEFO conflict), but apart from the tinned cheese, brilliant stuff! Want to swap three tins of cheese for an oatmeal block?



I think there must have been a warehouse the size of the Moon stuffed with Korean war era ratpacks we still got them in about 1980. Mmmm tinned syrup pud with a melted Mars Bar used as a sauce....Drools.


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## fastmongrel (Nov 18, 2012)

Juha said:


> tinned liver casserole.
> 
> Juha



What did you do to deserve tinned liver casserole, get caught in bed with the colonels daughter?


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## Airframes (Nov 18, 2012)

And I defy anyone to tell the difference between 'Biscuits, Sweet, A' and 'Biscuits, Plain, B' - they were both made from sawdust, concrete dust and dead flies. Now back to the thread .....


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## Shortround6 (Nov 18, 2012)

Production figures for 6pdr ammo show about 1 round in 21 was HE in 1942. In 1943 production was about one round HE for every 5.6 rounds of AP (both varieties). Production in a given year does not mean issue on the front lines. And production over one year can mean big changes from the beginning of the year to end of the year and not an even distribution of production during a year.


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## Juha (Nov 19, 2012)

Hello Shortround
maybe the problem wasn't the scarcity of HE but the overproduction of AP shots, 20+ million 6 pdr AP shots seems to me excessive. At least the only rgt that was equipped with 6pdr tanks during Tunisia Campaigh I have some info , the North Irish Horse, seems to have had enough HE shells for their needs.

Juha


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## Juha (Nov 19, 2012)

fastmongrel said:


> What did you do to deserve tinned liver casserole, get caught in bed with the colonels daughter?



No, even if our Lt.Col had 2 daughters of right age and at least one of then was fairly good looking. It was a standard issue, and I happen to be a part of the minority which likes it.


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## stug3 (Nov 19, 2012)

A Stuart tank being refuelled from an RAF fuel bowser outside Sidi Barrani, 15 November 1942.






A Hawker Hurricane Mark IID of No. 6 Squadron RAF gives a demonstration of the firepower of its Vickers 40mm Type S anti-tank guns against derelict German tanks in the North African desert.


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## fastmongrel (Nov 19, 2012)

Juha said:


> Hello Shortround
> maybe the problem wasn't the scarcity of HE but the overproduction of AP shots, 20+ million 6 pdr AP shots seems to me excessive. At least the only rgt that was equipped with 6pdr tanks during Tunisia Campaigh I have some info , the North Irish Horse, seems to have had enough HE shells for their needs.
> 
> Juha



The 6pounder was also the standard training anti tank gun for the Royal Artillery during and for years after the war, possibly a lot of those AP were fired on ranges. I believe there were still 6 pounders and plenty of ammo in stock but not issued in the early 1970s when I was in the Territorial Army.


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## Juha (Nov 19, 2012)

Hello Fastmongrel
the production of all other AP rounds but APDS stopped in 44, in 45 they produded only APDS and HE for 6pdr and I'm not surprised that many of the 20+ million AP rounds produced were not used during the WWII. And yes 6pdr was still in 44 the most numerous A/T gun in InfDivs in ETO. And IIRC even in 1950 there were 6 6pdr in the ToE of the British inf.battalion even if they were to be replaced by BAT.

Juha


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## stug3 (Dec 3, 2012)

A Valentine tank crew in Tunisia reading letters by the side of their vehicle, December 1942.





Burnt-out Supermarine Spitfire Mark VC, ER621 ‘LE-B’, of No. 242 Squadron RAF, which was shot down near Tebourba, Tunisia.





Douglas A-20C, 42-33229 ‘A’, flys over the target area as bombs explode on enemy armoured units on the slopes of Djebel Bou Kournine, Tunisia, during a raid by 30 Bostons of No. 326 Wing RAF against 10th Panzer Division units which were holding up the advance of the 6th Armoured Division to Tunis.





Stuart 'Honey'


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## parsifal (Dec 6, 2012)

Stug, without a doubt, your photos are THE star attraction of this thread. Put simply, they are excellent . Great Stuff


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## stug3 (Dec 11, 2012)

General Montgomery, GOC 8th Army , inspecting a coastal defence gun at Benghazi, 7 December 1942.


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## parsifal (Dec 11, 2012)

it looks vey modern, esp for a coastal battery. looks about 6 or 8 in shell size. looks to be Italian origin. Anyone able to do better???


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## Shortround6 (Dec 11, 2012)

Twin 12cm guns? Standard Destroyer mount?


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## stug3 (Dec 11, 2012)

Yeah, I think Italian is the best bet since they were there for so long.


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## parsifal (Dec 11, 2012)

typical italian mount with the guns groupled so close together. Surprised though that the calibre is only 4.7['. The breeches seem a lot bigger. I notioce also that the guns' breech blocks have been removed....they wont fire without them


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## Vincenzo (Dec 12, 2012)

remove breech blocks was normal in withdrawn if guns can not moved


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## Jabberwocky (Dec 18, 2012)

Ratio of AP (all types) production to HE production by year for 6 lbr shot

1942: 20.2 to 1
1943: 5.7 to 1
1944: 12 to 1
1945: 09. to 1

There were about 22.3 million rounds of AP ammunition produced. There were only 2.8 million HE rounds produced. Maybe the marginal effectiveness of the 6 lbr HE shot and British doctrinal issues had something to do with this?


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## yulzari (Dec 18, 2012)

The 6 pounder anti tank gun would only occasionally have need to use HE as it was used and placed for fire against armour. The HE alternative for tanks was the 6 pounder bored out to 75mm and that used HE by preference so the proportions make sense if you combine them with the 75mm figures. You would not choose 6 pounder HE if you had 75mm available. But, if you did not, then 6 pounder HE was useful so you would want to have a few available (not least to swap with US 57mm A/T crews for kit and rations.)


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## vinnye (Dec 18, 2012)

I thought the perceived wisdom was that tanks were primarily for taking on anti tank guns and infantry targets - so needed more HE than arour piercing rounds?
So when they broke through / out of a position, they could wreak havok amongst the rear of the enemy?
In such cases, firing an armour piercing / sold shot against an anti tank gun was useless.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 18, 2012)

"perceived wisdom" changed with time and place.

In the 1930s some "experts" thought that "fleets of tanks" would roam the battlefield exchanging broadsides like ships at sea. 

Getting the enemy to waste his tanks on your dug in AT guns while your tanks chew up his back areas unhindered is the ideal but seldom achieved. 

In the 1930s the majority of tank guns and sighting equipment did not out range the capabilities of the machine gun so the lack of HE shells for 37-40mm guns with their 25-50gram explosive charges (US/British 75mm explosive charge was about 660-670 Grams) wasn't seen as that critical.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 18, 2012)

If one was in charge of Panzertruppen in 1940/41, the good, or excellent AT capability was maybe a number one requirement? Mid-war, the British brass arrived at the same conclusion?


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## parsifal (Dec 18, 2012)

> In the 1930s some "experts" thought that "fleets of tanks" would roam the battlefield exchanging broadsides like ships at sea.



Ive read accounts of some of the critical battles in NA that describe the tank battle component in exactly those terms, or more correctly, likened the movement and manouverings of the respective tank formations to that of battleships at sea. I dont think there were references or inferences to line of battle or broadsides, but in the open desert terrain liklening armoured vehicles to a battleship in some respects is not innaccurate 



> Getting the enemy to waste his tanks on your dug in AT guns while your tanks chew up his back areas unhindered is the ideal but seldom achieved.



I agree with the first part, but in relation to whether tanks broke through to chew up the rear areas of an oppnent, it happned at a tactical level at least all the time. It was not a rare event, though tactics were eventually learnt to counter it. At the beginning of the war, most nations, with the notable exception of the Germans, believed in the idea of the "conituous front". This spilled over into the desert, even after the experiences in France. It certainly happened against the italians, and was a critical reason for the success of Rommel in his first offensive. Eventually tactics were worked out to counter the armoured exploitation concept. They have various names...in France it was called "quadrillage defence, the british tended to refer to it as hedgehog defence, the Russians called it pakfronts. Not sure what term the Americans used. However, even though Infantry worked out methods to counter armoured brekthrough tactics, they werent always successful, as some of the experiences at Gazala and Tobruk demonstrate 



> In the 1930s the majority of tank guns and sighting equipment did not out range the capabilities of the machine gun so the lack of HE shells for 37-40mm guns with their 25-50gram explosive charges (US/British 75mm explosive charge was about 660-670 Grams) wasn't seen as that critical


.

The British Armoured warfare manual of 1938 expected tanks to engage enemy targets from around 1000m. not sure what they intended to engage enemy soft targets with at that range, but assuming they could, I doubt there were many MGs able to effectively engage enemy soft targets at that range.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 19, 2012)

parsifal said:


> I agree with the first part, but in relation to whether tanks broke through to chew up the rear areas of an oppnent, it happned at a tactical level at least all the time. It was not a rare event, though tactics were eventually learnt to counter it. At the beginning of the war, most nations, with the notable exception of the Germans, believed in the idea of the "conituous front". This spilled over into the desert, even after the experiences in France. It certainly happened against the italians, and was a critical reason for the success of Rommel in his first offensive. Eventually tactics were worked out to counter the armoured exploitation concept. They have various names...in France it was called "quadrillage defence, the british tended to refer to it as hedgehog defence, the Russians called it pakfronts. Not sure what term the Americans used. However, even though Infantry worked out methods to counter armoured brekthrough tactics, they werent always successful, as some of the experiences at Gazala and Tobruk demonstrate



Well, I did say "unhindered".  

Breakthroughs occurred a fair amount of the time. Unhindered Breakthroughs were the tanks ran into little or no opposition ( no reserves, no mobile "fire brigades", no worries about being cut off behind enemy lines) and had freedom to roam where and when they wished were somewhat rarer. 

1930s theory didn't really play out too well in 1940s reality even if the tanks were quite effective. 



parsifal said:


> The British Armoured warfare manual of 1938 expected tanks to engage enemy targets from around 1000m. not sure what they intended to engage enemy soft targets with at that range, but assuming they could, I doubt there were many MGs able to effectively engage enemy soft targets at that range.



Any decent co-axial mg could engage at 800-1000 meters ( or yards for a British 1938 manual?) just as well as a a ground mounted medium or heavy MG could engage at those ranges. In fact the ground mounted guns (Vickers, tripod mounted MG 34, 1917-1919 Brownings) were usually rated at being effective at even longer ranges.


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## stug3 (Dec 20, 2012)

Crusader and Valentine tanks negotiate boggy ground on a training course at Linney Head in Wales, 17 December 1942.


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## parsifal (Dec 20, 2012)

Even today, the tactics of Infantry remain basically the same as they were by 1943. Infantry engaging tanks directly do not move. If caught in the open you seek or make cover, even if that cover is a shallow slit trench. You form as best you can an integrated all round defence, if the weapons you have at hand are not suitable, you try to isolate the enemy armour from its support, if your weapons can engage the enemy tank, you do so. Tank fire versus dug in Infantry is remarkably inneffective, even when those tanks are equipped with 105mm guns firing HE or larger. As direct fire weapons the tanks are literally quail shooting with their heavy guns. And quite inneffective against the entrenhed Infantry, because direct fire weapons just cant hit them really (mortars and indirect fire weapons are needed for that) .In those situation the centre of you squads firepower shifts from the MGs and mortars to the AT weapons that you have available. In the 1930's the squad or more often the platoon weapon was the ATR. Against the light tanks of the 1930s these weapons were light, but had some chance of engagement at around 250m. MG fire at 1000 yards/metres, is going to do nothing against dug in Infantry, or Infantry in cover. By 1941, ATRs were pretty much obsolete, and really had been replaced by light ATGs of 50mm or below. 88mm weapons were not an Infantry squad based weapon. They were even a battalion based asset. At Halfaya pass, the German defences centred around just 12 dug in 88s fromm memory, making them a divisional asset.

Against tanks, ATGs of the 50mm variety could theoretically engage out to about 500 yards, but in reality the tanks needed to close to 250m or less for the ATGs to have much chance. that was certainly the 9th divs experices in Tobruk. Things would change if the tanks preented their flaks or rear to the ATGs as the Germans found in their March to May '41 assaults of the position. British tanks assaulting Axis Infantry positions found pretty much the same....50mm German ATG weapons were good pinning weapons out to about 400m, but really had to allow British tanks to close to under 250mm to be effective at killing them. The gane changers were the 88mm but more often the ex-Soviet 76.2 adapted to fire AT. An 88mm could engage British tanks with a fair chance of a kill, from more than 1800m. Against that, standard British techniques faltered. The Infantry positions could no longer be engaged with buttoned up MG fire or CS support. British tanks were forced to make near suicidal charges of these positions. It was that the Brits were unaware of the suicidal nature of these tactics, it was that that their solid shot main armaments couldnt help them. But even with the arrival of 75mm HE equipped tanks like the Grant, Allied armour had a very hard time against the German 88mm and the Italian 90mm batteries


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## vinnye (Dec 20, 2012)

Stug3 - thanks for posting the pics. I still think the Crusader was a pretty tank.
If it had been more reliable it may have been regarded more highly?
A 6pdr with HE capability (or ammo availability) when it first appeared would have been helpful!


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## fastmongrel (Dec 20, 2012)

vinnye said:


> Stug3 - thanks for posting the pics. I still think the Crusader was a pretty tank.
> If it had been more reliable it may have been regarded more highly?
> A 6pdr with HE capability (or ammo availability) when it first appeared would have been helpful!



The Nuffield organisation sent teams of engineers and upgrade kits to NA to sort out the problems with the Crusader and it ended up a lot more reliable by late 42 but by then it was too late its reputation was mud and the Commonwealth armies didnt want it. 

Apparently one of the major problems was that the cooling system was drained before it was loaded onto the ship then when the tank was unloaded they were driven to the railhead with a dry engine, no one thought to ask the tankmen or engineers to check the tanks had coolant. Another problem was the cooling fan drive which was a long chain that worked okay in the UK but of course in the desert the chains wore out at a frightenening rate.


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## vinnye (Dec 21, 2012)

That lack of communication about coolant being drained is a typical administration **** up!
No wonder the Crusaders did not have a good rep!
If I remember correctly there was a problem with air filters?
But I suppose you have to expect problems with any new vehicle - especially when it is rushed into production with mimimal testing, and going into a hostile environment
Still looks pretty though!


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## yulzari (Dec 21, 2012)

When it is pitch black, you are infantry and you hear the squeak squeak of tracks nearby, no tank is pretty.

IIRC with a combined infantry/armour assault the task of the tanks is to deny the enemy the opportunity to fire upon your infantry so that they can reach into the enemy position. Then it is pointy stick time.

The infantry's task is to protect the tanks from infantry A/T weapons.

Of course it is far far more confused in real engagements.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 23, 2012)

parsifal said:


> MG fire at 1000 yards/metres, is going to do nothing against dug in Infantry, or Infantry in cover.



Dug in infantry is no longer a "soft target". As for "Infantry in cover" I guess that depends on the definition of "Cover", is it actual "cover" ( some degree of protection, even a depression in the ground or tree?) or is it "concealment" (bushes, tall grass, corn field?) 



parsifal said:


> Against tanks, ATGs of the 50mm variety could theoretically engage out to about 500 yards, but in reality the tanks needed to close to 250m or less for the ATGs to have much chance. that was certainly the 9th divs experices in Tobruk. Things would change if the tanks preented their flaks or rear to the ATGs as the Germans found in their March to May '41 assaults of the position. British tanks assaulting Axis Infantry positions found pretty much the same....50mm German ATG weapons were good pinning weapons out to about 400m, but really had to allow British tanks to close to under 250mm to be effective at killing them. The gane changers were the 88mm but more often the ex-Soviet 76.2 adapted to fire AT. An 88mm could engage British tanks with a fair chance of a kill, from more than 1800m. Against that, standard British techniques faltered. The Infantry positions could no longer be engaged with buttoned up MG fire or CS support. British tanks were forced to make near suicidal charges of these positions. It was that the Brits were unaware of the suicidal nature of these tactics, it was that that their solid shot main armaments couldnt help them. But even with the arrival of 75mm HE equipped tanks like the Grant, Allied armour had a very hard time against the German 88mm and the Italian 90mm batteries



All true, I would point out that the British weren't entirely blind to the problem. At Halfaya pass the 25pdr unit that was supposed to fire in support of the tank attack had gotten bogged down in a wadi and did not reach their firing position in time. Now the British may have been in error in not using more guns (units) in support of the attack (subject to availability?) or deciding to go in alone without artillery support (poor communications?) or tank commander did what he could because even more units than the tanks and the artillery unit were on a time table and failure to attack would screw up the whole operation. (so did losing the vast majority of attacking tanks.) 

_Combined arms_ is a difficult thing to use properly even if things go _mostly_ right. 

Small caliber HE, while better than nothing, is not a game changer against well dug in AT guns. Troops on the sharp end may well have complained about the lack of HE ammo but since by not having it, they really had no idea of how effective ( or ineffective) it might be. If 600 grams or so of HE in a 75mm shell are not quite good enough then the 30-50 grams in a 37mm-40mm shell is going to make a pretty poor impression. (US 37MM HE ammo in M3 Light tank had about 38 grams). German 50mm/L60 HE had about 165 grams HE. Germans still provided a fair number of short 75mm armed tanks to _support_ the 50mm armed tanks. 
The 37-40mm HE shells may have been more important for morale ( both to raise friendly and lower enemy) than for actual destructive ability.


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## parsifal (Dec 24, 2012)

> Dug in infantry is no longer a "soft target". As for "Infantry in cover" I guess that depends on the definition of "Cover", is it actual "cover" ( some degree of protection, even a depression in the ground or tree?) or is it "concealment" (bushes, tall grass, corn field?)



Yes I would agree with that, but Infantry takes very little time to be dug in, particualalry in the Desert, where there are numerous wadis , river beds, 
Ive attached a typical example. 

Even hastily prepred position, say slit treches or a few sandbags weree effective cover against direct Light AT fire. And Allied Infantry was motorized, so could usually stay away fromthe enemy armour if caught in the open. Quite possible for them to see the armour sefveral hours ahead of arrival (from the dust) and prepare, or pull back to more easily defended position.


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## stug3 (Dec 26, 2012)

A Sherman tank with a Christmas greeting painted on its hull, Benghazi, 26 December 1942.





A Stuart tank comes to the rescue of a truck which has become stuck in soft sand near Nufilia, 26 December 1942.





The grave of a Scots Greys officer lies beside his Stuart reconnaissance tank, 26 December 1942.





A Crusader Mk II, often used out in front for reconnaissance and probing the enemy.


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## yulzari (Dec 26, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Infantry takes very little time to be dug in, particualalry in the Desert


In Oman digging in used to involve explosives. I don't know how a sangar would cope with solid AP shot Even if it is SA proof.


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## DonL (Dec 26, 2012)

@ parsifal

I want to tell you some first hand information that I could get as very young man from Veterans, from the Desert and Russia.

My Grandfarther was at the "Aufklärungsabteilung" 20th mot. infantry Division and as young man I was every year with him to Veteran meetings.

I have confronted the Veterans with my havy criticism about the intoduction of the 3,7-cm-PaK 36 (1936) as main ATG for the Infantry Units of the Wehrmacht, although there was at that time many men, that warned it was a too weak ATG (especially as main ATG) and the 5-cm-PaK 38 should be introduced instead as main ATG. 

All Veterans agreed with me that the 3,7-cm-PaK 36 was obselete as main ATG since the France campain, but they told me, that the 3,7-cm-PaK 36 was a very deadly and effective weapon to dug Infantry.
ATG positions, MG positions ansd small bunkers were attacked very effective with the 3,7-cm-PaK 36 with *direct* shooting. Also the 3,7-cm-PaK 36 could be easily moved with manpower.

All Veterans agreed that they wanted more 5-cm-PaK 38 as main ATG (1940/1941) against tanks, but they all sayed in union they don't want to miss the the 3,7-cm-PaK 36 as a very effective weapon against infantry, they all rated it much higher then the 7,5-cm-leichtes Infanteriegeschütz 18, because of the possibility of direct shooting and the possibility to move it in a near position to the enemy from manpower.

This wasn't told to me one or two times, but rather all spoken Veterans agreed with this statement.
They wanted more 5-cm-PaK 38 as main ATG, but also wanted a certain numbers of the 3,7-cm-PaK 36 as effective weapon against dug Infantry.

What is your opinion to this statements?


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## yulzari (Dec 27, 2012)

DonL
This resonates with my being told by british veterans of 1945 that they asked for more Boys A/T rifles as they could be easily moved on foot to fire into protected german defensive positions but be able to stand off from return SA fire. These days the term is anti materiel rifles.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 27, 2012)

I will go out on a limb and speculate as to why this may be so. 

We have 3 weapons in question, two are very similar in weight. The 3.7-cm-PaK 36 and the 7.5 cm le.IG 18. The 5 cm PaK 38 is about double the weight and while it _can_ be man-handled it is obviously in a somewhat different category. This does not include ammo. For a given weight the 3.7-cm-PaK 36 _will_ give many more shots even though each is less effective. 

Going for the two light weight guns the 3.7-cm-PaK 36 is much easier to use. It is direct fire, it has a "point blank" range of about 835-840 meters ( distance over which the round will neither rise above or fall below a tank sized target) it has 60 degrees of traverse making initial placement a bit less critical. With a bit of elevation if could reach out several thousand yds (about the limit of observation for the crew near the gun) with no other "fiddling". Max listed range is pretty useless without forward observers and a radio/field phone _net_ which over complicates things for this type gun. 

The 7.5 cm le.IG 18 on the other hand fired a much more useful shell but at a much lower velocity which limited it's "point blank" range to about 230 meters. Trying to get a shell into a gun slit/window/embrasure is going to be much more difficult. It could use it's 'charge' system ( propelling charge was in 5 increments?) to _lob_ shells into open topped pits much easier than the 3.7cm but this sort of thing needed _trained_ artillery men/ range charts/ observers and so on. It was more of a breech loading mortar that _could_ be fired direct. It's 12 degrees of traverse also meant that initial alignment with the target was more critical. It could provide a different sort of support to infantry than the 3.7cm gun. A bit slower in response, but faster than trying to get support from Division or Corp. It also had a practical rate of fire about 1/2-2/3 the AT guns. 

The 5-cm-PaK 38 fired an HE round with a little over 6 times the HE of 3.7cm but that still left it at about 1/3 or less of the HE of the 7.5 cm le.IG 18. You were not going to destroy bunkers or field fortifications with either of the smaller guns unless you could get the projectile _inside_ the position. The 7.5cm caliber was the smallest _practical_ size for destroying field fortifications but that does not mean it was done with a single shot. The extra weight of the 5cm-PaK 38 and it's ammunition probably made it less than popular for infantry support work for parts of the war, it offered little more _practical_ range for infantry support work than the 3.7cm.

My thoughts and they could be wrong.


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## parsifal (Dec 27, 2012)

Hmm, we do have a bit of a dilemma here. i do accept the accounts that you cite, but the people I have spoken to that fought on our side at tobruk were untroubled by the AFV mounted 3.7 and 50mm fire at their positions. And from phoitgraphic evidence, many of the "dug in" Infantry positions were not that well prepreed....sometimes just a gully, a depression in the ground, a slit trench, or even just a few rocks or sand bags thrown up in great haste. Of course the tobruk position did also have some parts of its line very well fortified. But the attacks in April '41 were against relatively unfortified positions. German direct fire support in those battles was considered very inneffective, and not because of crew failures or anything. It was a failure of the guns. Infantry positions that came under direct fire from tank mounted ATGS and MGs were pinned until nightfal usually, but then again, they could keep the German tanks pinned in return from 2pdr fire, and fire over open "sights" from the captured artillery positions (actually the captured guns did not have any ranging or sighting equipment, but the approach routes had been marked prior to the batle and this fire by the "bush artillery as it was called separated the panzergrenadiers from their tanks). The Australians then used the night and incessant artillery barrage to mask the repositioning of their armour (some of which was simply truck mounted 2 pdrs) to knock quite a few of the Germans AFVs the next morning and forced them to withdraw, leaviung the lead elements of motorised Infantry unsupported and outflanked. I forget how many tanks, but the prisoner haul was several thousand.

I know that is in direcdt contradiction to what you are saying. I dont doubt that there were experiences that ran completely different to our own. 

Perhaps there is no universal rule that we can apply to every situation


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## stug3 (Jan 17, 2013)

A Valentine tank crew relax after an action near Bou Arada, 13 January 1943.







A Valentine tank towing a trailer leads a column of lorries on the El Aroussa-Bou Arada road, 18 January 1943.






Tanks and vehicles advance toward Tripoli for the final battle of the campaign, 21 January 1943. In the foreground is a lorry-mounted 6pdr anti-tank gun.






A Chevrolet FAT (Field Artillery Tractor) towing a 25-pdr leads a column of other vehicles on a road during the 8th Army’s approach to Azizia, south of Tripoli, 27 January 1943.


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## stug3 (Jan 19, 2013)

Anti-aircraft fire over Algiers during a night raid.


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## fastmongrel (Jan 19, 2013)

Hi stug3 great pics keep them coming. I think you might have labelled the picture of the gun tractor wrong in post #185 it looks to me more like a Morris C8 Quad. Its very hard to tell because there is so much kit strapped to it but the Morris had a flush side with an angle form the front of the cab to the bodythe Chevrolet had a step in the side with the cab being narrower than the body and no angle. Mind there were so many variants that its very hard to distinguish, the main difference between the two is the windscreen which is angled back on the Morris and forward on the Chevrolet. 

I really like the Canadian Military Pattern trucks. People talk about a particular war winning weapon but forget that without a supply train your army is going nowhere and your fancy tank turns into a metal road block. Canada's truck building efforts (nearly a million vehicles iirc) did more than anything else Canada did to win the war.

Morris C8 Quad FAT





Chevrolet 8440 CMP FAT


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## stug3 (Jan 19, 2013)

I dont know about the trucks fm, I usually post the captions along with the pics as I find them on the interwebs.


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## stug3 (Jan 21, 2013)

A Matilda in the Western Desert, recaptured in Bardia, 3 January 1942.





I see at least 4 balkenkreuz on that sucker, they were probably more worried about 88s looking at them the wrong way than anything else.


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## vinnye (Jan 21, 2013)

I believe the German Army often used captured Allied Tanks for training purposes etc.
If they had sufficient numbers of them, they would use them in combat.
The Matilda was quite well thought of by some German crews because it was very resilient to their usual anti tank guns and rounds. At Dunkirk a counter attackby Matildas in the German flank caused great concern as they advanced with German shells bouncing off them. They were finally stopped by 88mm anti aircraft guns being depressed to shoot at them. Even a Matilda was no match for an 88!


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## tomo pauk (Jan 21, 2013)

IIRC the Arras was the place, the other British tanks playing the role there, too, eg. Matilda I (the MG armed predecessor).


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## parsifal (Jan 21, 2013)

It was a litle more complex than just the 88s stopping the British, and British tend not to acknowledge that the french, though late for the initial attack, saved the british in the latter stages of the battle.

The broad progress of the battle was as follows

During the afternoon of 21 May, the attack by the 50th Division and the 1st Tank Brigade was undetaken by a small detachment known as "Frankforce" and was progressing progressing south from Arras. This was to be the only large scale attack mounted by the BEF during the campaign. The attack was supposed to be mounted by two infantry divisions, comprising about 15,000 men. It was ultimately executed by just two infantry battalions, the 6th and 8th Battalions Durham Light Infantry supporting the 4th and 7th Royal Tank Regiment, totalling around 2,000 men, and reinforced by 74 tanks (some Matilda IIs). The infantry battalions were split into two columns for the attack. The right column initially made rapid progress, taking a number of German prisoners, but they soon ran into German infantry and SS, backed by air support, and took heavy losses.

The left column also enjoyed early success before running into opposition from the infantry units of Generalmajor Erwin Rommel's 7th Panzer Division. The defending forces—elements of motorized SS regiment "Totenkopf" (later to be expanded into SS-Division Totenkopf)—panicked after seeing their AT fire was inneffectivem nd they were overrun, their standard 37 mm (1.46 in) PaK 36/37 anti-tank guns proving ineffective against the heavily-armoured British Matilda tank. Rommel committed some of his armour to local counterattacks, only to find the guns of the Panzer II and Panzer 38(t) tanks could not penetrate the Matildas' armour. Desperate to prevent a British breakthrough, Rommel ordered the division's 88 mm (3.46 in) FlaK 18 anti-aircraft guns and 105 mm (4.1 in) field guns be formed into a defensive line and fire anti-tank and HE rounds in a last-ditch effort to stop the Matildas. The BEF's advance was halted with heavy losses. Then, with Luftwaffe support, Rommel launched a counter-attack, driving the British back. Frankforce had been repulsed.

The Germans pursued the British but were halted by French armour from the 3rd Light Mechanised Division (3rd DLM). The Somuas of the French formation saw the German forces stopped cold. French cover enabled British troops to withdraw to their former positions that night. Frankforce took around 400 German prisoners and inflicted a similar number of casualties, as well as destroying a number of tanks. Later on 23 May the 3rd DLM launched its own attack to try to exploit British success. The Luftwaffe and German reinforcements defeated the attack.

The operation had punched far beyond its weight; the attack was so fierce that 7. Panzerdivision after action reports state that it was believed it had been attacked by five infantry divisions. The attack made the German commanders nervous, and it appears to have been one of the factors for the surprise German halt on 24 May that gave the BEF the slimmest of opportunities to begin evacuation from Dunkirk.

The battle is historically credited with shaking the confidence of the German High Command (OKW). Rommel is noted to have written a report of an attack by hundreds of Allied tanks, which was likely a contributing factor to the halt of the German offensive for 24 hours (though Hermann Göring's promises that the Luftwaffe could finish off Dunkirk was also a major factor). The main British force consisted of only 58 machine gun armed Matilda Is and 16 QF 2-pounder gun armed Matilda IIs supported by a few lighter armoured vehicles. All but 1 of the tank losses were in Matilda Is I believe (according to the batallion histories at least). The delay by the OKW is one of the main reasons for the success of Operation Dynamo. For this reason, Frankforce, in spite of being repulsed, could be considered one of the few allied successes of the 1940 French campaign. In total, more than 40 British and 20 French tanks were lost in the battle, compared to roughly 12 lost by the Germans. Rommel noted in his diary that his division had lost 89 men killed, 116 wounded and 173 missing and captured.

While the British lost around 100 men killed or wounded in the attack, it is unknown how many French soldiers became casualties in the engagement,and how many casulaties they inflicted or prisoners they took. . The Germans lost 700 men, of which 400 were captured, all these were to British forces. The French successes are not included. These successes were mainly in the initial stages of the battle before the 88 mm FlaK 18s were brought about to engage the British forces.

Despite common misconception, the FlaK 18 was not used for the first time as an anti-tank gun at Arras. Several years earlier, during the Spanish Civil War, the German volunteer unit Condor Legion had used FlaK 18s against armour and other ground targets. Rommel realised the defensive power of the FlaK 18 and used it to great effect during his time commanding the Afrika Korps. Flak 18s would have been inneffective if they had not been issued with AT ammo before the battle. The Germans certainly already knew of its great AT potential, and had taken steps to exploit it.

On the British side, both Tank regiments that had participated were immediately reconstituted as Matilda II regiments.

•The 4th under their new Commanding Officer, W A O'Carroll DSO, and a new RSM Short, were re-organised and equipped at Twesledown near Aldershot before moving to East Grinstead to prepare for home defence.

•The 7th under their new Commanding Officer, R M Jerram DSO MC, Adjutant Capt (later Maj Gen) "Jock" Holden, and their existing RSM Fowler, also moved first to Twesledown. They then trained for six months in Braco, Scotland being despatched midway through that training to in August 1940 to Egypt.
.
The 7th sailed from Liverpool on 21 August 1940 for Egypt, their new Matilda Mk 2s sailing at the same time in a fast merchant ship. The small convoy, escorted from Cape Town by the appropriately named Australian cruiser "Hobart", arrived at Port Said on 24 September
battle hardened veterans now, with a superior tank, they were dangerous opponents for the Italians.....

Pictured is an image of the one of 7 RTRs Matildas being unloaded at Port Said.


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## vinnye (Jan 21, 2013)

Thankyou for the thorough reply Parsifal.
I was aware that the French were originally supposed to attack at the same time as the BEF units - but probably due to poor communication, that did not happen.
I was not aware that the French units had arrived to support the BEF units when they were forced to retreat by the LW and German Army units.
As you stated in your post the effect of this attack caused the OKW to delay their tanks progress whilst they re-evaluated the situation. 
Not a bad result for such a little force!


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## parsifal (Jan 21, 2013)

They are not all my words, pinched bits from various sources, including wiki, but the accounts are all cross referenced and cross checked, I can assure people. 

I wouldnt state categorically that the attack at Arras caused the delay, but it at least gauned some time at a critical moment. I think Gorings bombastic claims were more the reason for the german eventual failure to bag the BEF


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## Shortround6 (Jan 21, 2013)

The Blitzkrieg was still in it's infancy. The leading units of the German army were pressing close to the British and French units but much of the infantry were miles behind. There were large gaps in the German "held/occupied" areas ( using the terms loosely) and some German generals (usually in the rear) feared the leading elements could be cut off. This would have required better co-ordination than the British and French had shown so far but war is full of the unexpected. There may also be a question of just how combat ready those lead elements were. How full were their fuel tanks and ammo racks and how many of their broken down tanks caught up during the halt? 

After all Joachim Peiper would have won the Battle of the Bulge with just a few more drums of fuel, right


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## parsifal (Jan 22, 2013)

The Battle of France was a battle of contrasts. Generally contrast between German excellence and Allied myopathy.

Arras was the exception to the rule. The Germans were there in considerable strength, and resisted strongly, but were caught off guard by the British, which on this one occasion (up to that point), got their act together and were able to deliver a (relatively) co-ordinated attack, albeit on a woefully inadequate scale. Britsh troops had shown themselves fairly equal to the task defensively, but were inneffective in an offensive role, as were the French. 

Hitler , after the completion of the French campaign, in a conversation with Ciano described the British as good soldiers, very stubborn, but miserably led. I would accept that as a reasonable assessment. 

Heree and there though there were glimmers of superior leadership in the British Army. It would take another three years of bitter experiences for those dim sparks of leadership to ignite into a full fires of initiative and effective combat performance.


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## tomo pauk (Jan 22, 2013)

Fine posts, parsifal, many thanks.


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## stug3 (Jan 22, 2013)

The crew of a Humber Mk II armoured car open fire against enemy aircraft. Bombs can be seen exploding in the distance, 4 January 1943.






A lorry carrying infantry leaving the outskirts of Tarhuna during the advance towards Tripoli, 25 January 1943.


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## stug3 (Jan 28, 2013)

From The Rommel Papers
Rommel was about to be removed from his command. On the 28th January he wrote to his wife:

_ Dearest Lu

In a few days I shall be giving up command of the army to an Italian, for the sole reason that “ my present state of health does not permit me to carry on.” Of course it’s really for quite other reasons, principally that of prestige. I have done all I can to maintain the theatre of war, in spite of the indescribable difficulties in all fields. I am deeply sorry for my men. They were very dear to me.

Physically, I am not too well. Severe headaches and overstrained nerves, on top of the circulation trouble, allow me no rest. Professor Horster is giving me sleeping draughts and helping as far as he can. Perhaps I’ll have a few weeks to recover, though with the situation as it is in the East, what one would like is to be in the front line.


_A piper of the Gordon Highlanders plays from a Valentine tank as it drives into Tripoli past crowds of cheering locals, 26 January 1943






Sherman tanks during the advance along the coast road towards Tripoli, 27 January 1943.






The crew of a 40mm Bofors anti-aircraft gun watch the sky after a Stuka raid during the 8th Army’s advance on Tripoli, 29 January 1943


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## stug3 (Feb 3, 2013)

An American soldier advances cautiously at left with a sub-machine gun to cover any attempt of the German tank crew from escaping their fiery prison inside their tank following a duel with U.S. and British anti-tank units in Medjez al Bab area, Tunisia, on January 12, 1943.


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## Glider (Feb 3, 2013)

some first class photos here, many thanks


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## stug3 (Feb 4, 2013)

A Humber Mk II armoured car and crew of ‘B’ Squadron, 11th Hussars – the first vehicle to enter Tripoli, photographed on 2 February 1943.







General Sir Alan Brooke (Chief of the Imperial General Staff) and General Sir Harold Alexander (C-in-C Middle East) in the back of a staff car during Winston Churchill’s visit to Tripoli to thank the 8th Army for its success in the North African campaign, 4 February 1943.






Winston Churchill greets an officer of 51st Highland Division during his visit to Tripoli to thank the 8th Army for its success in the North African campaign, 4 February 1943.






25-pdr field guns and ‘Quad’ artillery tractors parade past Winston Churchill during his visit to Tripoli to thank the 8th Army for its success in the North African campaign, 4 February 1943.






The Prime Minister Winston Churchill gives a speech to men of the 8th Army at Tripoli, Libya, on 7 February 1943.


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## stug3 (Feb 4, 2013)

_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X_uyUZXF5SA_


Some nice Beaufighter footage.


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## vinnye (Feb 4, 2013)

I liked the Hurricane IID Tankbusters film. Especially like the flying tin opener logo!


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## stug3 (Feb 24, 2013)

An AEC Matador tows a 4.5-inch field gun across a wooden track built across soft ground on the border between Libya and Tunisia, February 1943.






A Scammell Pioneer recovery lorry tows a disabled Crusader tank into a REME workshop, February 1943.


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## vinnye (Feb 24, 2013)

Was the Crusader the only British tank with the mantlet outside the turret during WW2?


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## fastmongrel (Feb 24, 2013)

vinnye said:


> Was the Crusader the only British tank with the mantlet outside the turret during WW2?



The early Valentine, Matilda and some of the earlier Cruisers had external mantlets.


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## vinnye (Feb 24, 2013)

Why did the other tanks have an internal mantlet?
It was one of the reasons why it was difficult to upgrade the guns?


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## yulzari (Feb 24, 2013)

IIRC this was the reason why the Vickers HV 75mm gun could not fit the Cromwell turret it was supposed to be designed for. The Vickers had an external mantlet mount and the turret an internal one so the gun was too long to fit.

Considering that the Churchill was bodged to take a Sherman external mount I am at a loss to understand why they did not do something similar with the Cromwell for the Vickers HV 75mm.

Sudanese Staghounds were fitted with the AEC turret and Sherman external mantlets and guns post war so it looks like it might have been possible.


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## vinnye (Feb 26, 2013)

That explains one of the issues I had thought about with the fitting of larger guns to British designs. As you say Yulzari - it was done with the Churchill, so why not a similar fix for the Cromwell?


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## yulzari (Feb 26, 2013)

To be pedantically fair, the fitting of the ex Sherman mantlet/guns to Churchills was to use 75mm HE in Italy as the Churchills there had the 6 pounder. The UK was enlarging the barrels of new ROF 6 pounders to 75mm to use the same ammunition as the new standard for new Cromwells and Churchills. Even on the last Valentines.


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## stug3 (Mar 6, 2013)

General Montgomery with Lt-Col A C Clive of the Grenadier Guards in a turretless Stuart command tank, March 1943.






Bishop 25-pdr self-propelled gun in Tunisia, March 1943.






Guardsmen of the Scots Guards inspect a knocked-out German PzKpfw IV tank near Medenine, 12 March 1943.


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## stug3 (Mar 8, 2013)

British tank driver peering out of his Grant tank in North Africa, 1942.






Remains of German tanks form circular patterns in the sand at Sidi Rezegh in Libya.






Abandoned Italian respirators lying in the sand in the Western Desert.


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## stug3 (Mar 21, 2013)

Two Long Range Desert Group patrols meet in the desert.


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## parsifal (Mar 22, 2013)

The LRDG was formed specifically to carry out deep penetration, covert reconnaissance patrols and intelligence missions from behind Italian lines, although they sometimes engaged in combat operations. Because the LRDG were experts in desert navigation they were sometimes assigned to guide other units, including the Special Air Service and secret agents across the desert. During the Desert Campaign between December 1940 and April 1943, the vehicles of the LRDG operated constantly behind the Axis lines, missing a total of only 15 days during the entire period. Possibly their most notable offensive action was during Operation Caravan, an attack on the town of Barce and its associated airfield, on the night of 13 September 1942. However, their most vital role was the 'Road Watch', during which they clandestinely monitored traffic on the main road from Tripoli to Benghazi, transmitting the intelligence to the British Army Headquarters.

With the surrender of the Axis forces in Tunisia in May 1943, the LRDG changed roles and moved operations to the eastern Mediterranean, carrying out missions in the Greek islands, Italy and the Balkans. After the end of the war in Europe, the leaders of the LRDG made a request to the War Office for the unit to be transferred to the Far East to conduct operations against the Japanese Empire. The request was declined and the LRDG was disbanded in August 1945.

The Axis also had LRDG special forces, with the italians in particular having some impressively equipped units. The crews of A.S.37 put forth very favorable judgments on these vehicles; their four wheel drive and large diameter wheels prevented them from becoming easily bogged down. The A.S.37 principal defect lay in a silhouette too high and thus too visible.


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## stug3 (Mar 22, 2013)

British war correspondent Alan Moorehead's impression of the American army in Tunisia from Alan Moorehead: The Desert War Trilogy

_ In the drizzling rain little groups of infantrymen were drawn up to receive their last instructions. They were hardly more than boys, most of them, wonderfully tall and proportioned and looking very forbidding under their Nazi-like helmets.

Unlike the British battledress and equipment, which tends to hold a man stiffly upright, these boys were in a uniform which gave them plenty of free movement. The short and formless weatherproof jacket was scarcely a garment of beauty, but it allowed the men to walk in the easy stooping way to which they were accustomed.

Most of the American stuff was first-class, and even as good or better than the German. Their mess tins, water bottles, rubber-soled boots, woollen underclothes, shirts and windbreakers were all superior to the British equivalents and their uniforms in general were made of finer stuff.

The Garand rifle and the officers’ carbine were already regarded by many veterans as the best small arms on the front. As for their heavier equipment, it is doubtful if any army ever went to war so well supplied.

The only general criticism might have been that there was too much of it. Every other truck had a machine-gun mounted on its cabin. The self-propelling guns and the Long Tom guns were some of the heaviest artillery along the whole front. The diesel Sherman was certainly the best tank of its class.

The jeeps, at the other end of the scale, were unmatched, and the Germans loved to capture them for their own use, just as we had loved to get hold of a Volkswagen. The weapon-carriers and the command vehicles were all brand new, as were the signalling sets, the bulldozers for road-mending, and the electrical workshops.

It was the volume of this stuff, the intensity of the firepower that was so impressive. Possibly the troops could have done with a better heavy machine-gun and an improved mortar, but in general there was no question that they were the best equipped allied amiy at the front.

By European army standards the American rations were lavish to the point of extravagance – vast quantities of tinned meats, fruits and vegetables. In any American mess you could be sure of getting an excellent hot meat and vegetable stew, a plate of fruit, white bread and a cup of coffee.

Things like cigarettes, chewing-gum and toothpaste were handed out in a way that made the British soldiers gape. The Doughboy was always generous in sharing out his good things. As a British war correspondent I personally was given immediate hospitality wherever I went, and such things as maps and plans were discussed with me without hesitation._


A US tank crew pose in front of their Lee tank in Tunisia. Note the weighted 75mm gun.






US President F.D. Roosevelt inspects troops from a jeep during the Casablanca conference, January 1943.


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## stug3 (Mar 27, 2013)

Valentine tanks carrying infantry of the Black Watch, March 1943.






Bishop 25-pdr self-propelled guns in action near Grenadier Hill, 23 March 1943.






A Universal carrier escorts a large contingent of Italian prisoners, captured at El Hamma,


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## Bob_Semple_Airplane (Apr 5, 2013)

I wrote this a while ago on the topic of a British assault gun based off the Crusader. Armed with the 3 inch AA gun.

Englander Sturmgeschutz - Alternate History Discussion Board

Here's the pic:






In retrospect it looks like the superstructure shape has room for improvement.


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## stug3 (Apr 6, 2013)

A Sherman tank crosses an anti-tank ditch during the advance through the Gabes Gap, 6-7 April 1943.


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## stug3 (Apr 15, 2013)

This pattern of anti-aircraft fire provides a protective screen over Algiers at night. The photo, recording several moments of gunfire, shows a defense thrown up during an axis raid upon Algiers in North Africa on April 13, 1943.


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## vinnye (Apr 16, 2013)

Thanks for the link and the image Bob.
Had a read of the attached - very interesting! Shows that some of the guys at the front were highly innovative and were capable of adapting whatever was available to get the job done!


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## MacArther (Apr 19, 2013)

Bob_Semple_Airplane said:


> I wrote this a while ago on the topic of a British assault gun based off the Crusader. Armed with the 3 inch AA gun.
> 
> Englander Sturmgeschutz - Alternate History Discussion Board
> 
> ...


Awesome!


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## Glider (Apr 22, 2013)

vinnye said:


> Thanks for the link and the image Bob.
> Had a read of the attached - very interesting! Shows that some of the guys at the front were highly innovative and were capable of adapting whatever was available to get the job done!



The tragic thing is that if the people higher up the food chain had listened think of the difference it would have made and lives saved.


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## vinnye (Apr 22, 2013)

Totally agree Glider, seems those that should have been put in decision making positions were often unable to get there because of some upper class twit who got his job because of who he was, his family were or who's butt he'd kiss!


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## parsifal (Apr 22, 2013)

gotta put in some voice of dissent here. no question that the British command system was its weak point. However its not valid to blame it all on the higher leadership. in fact british higher leadership had vastly improved from WWI to WWII. 

In my opinion, the inertia that was so evident in the British Army in WWII was as much evident in the middle and lower levels of command as it was higher up. But having said that, there was also a measure of great initiaitive and originality as well. 

Blaming the higher leadership for all the woes in the British Army is about the same as those supporters of things German to blame all the failure German on Adolf Hitler. hitler made his share of stuff ups, but he was in no way solely or mosly responsible for the defeat of Germany. In the same way, the higher levels of British command made its fair share of bad calls, but they cannot be blamed, solely or mostly for the numerous British failures either.


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## Glider (Apr 23, 2013)

I agree with everything you say but in this case it was a seriously bad call. The one thing the British army lacked in the middlewar years was a way of taking on the German Armour. I don't think anyone is pretending that this would have been the total solution to the problem but it had a number of advantages.
a) It was cheap
b) There would have been no strain on the supply support or production front
c) It worked

There was still a need for a decent tank but it would have been a good start


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## Shortround6 (Apr 23, 2013)

The big problem with most of these schemes to build British tank/destroyers armed with 3" AA guns is that the vast stock of 3" barrels everyone is depending on didn't actually exist and the gun had been out of production for years. 







Sources disagree but it seems that 100 or fewer barrels were available and _some_ were used in the Churchill gun carrier, up to 50 while another 50 barrels (?) were mounted on 17pdr carriages when there was a shortage of 17pdr barrels. No record of combat use has shown up so far.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 23, 2013)

Too bad the British did not contemplated a JagdChurchill, with 17pdr in the superstructure. Or maybe the 17pdr on the M7 Priest, 'stead of the 105mm?


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## stug3 (Apr 23, 2013)

Priest 105mm self-propelled gun of 11th Royal Horse Artillery (Honourable Artillery Company), 1st Armoured Division, 22 April 1943.






Sherman tanks advance past a knocked-out 88mm anti-tank gun






Churchill tank in the Medjez-el-Bab area, April 1943.






A CMP truck and motorcycle of 11th Royal Horse Artillery (Honourable Artillery Company), 1st Armoured Division, Tunisia,






Stretcher bearers of the East Surrey Regiment, with a Churchill tank of the North Irish Horse in the background, during the attack on Longstop Hill, 23 April 1943.


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## Shortround6 (Apr 23, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> Too bad the British did not contemplated a JagdChurchill, with 17pdr in the superstructure. Or maybe the 17pdr on the M7 Priest, 'stead of the 105mm?



12-15mph tank chassis don't make _good_ tank hunters.

M7 needs tons more armor, once you get above the transmission casing in the front or the tracks on the side the armor was only 1/2 in (12.7mm) thick. The M7 was never intended for direct combat.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 23, 2013)

I'm not thinking about 'chasing' the enemy tanks, but more of a mobile AT (and direct HE) support for the Churchills armed with 2 or 6pdr guns. It would certainly offer better off-road mobility than towed 17pdr 
The M7 can receive an armor plate or two, it weighted some 23 tons as-is, combat ready. We can note, OTOH, that Archer, M-10/Achiles and M-36 were nothing more than LMG-proof AFVs; M-18 not even that?

Either of the AFVs would've bring to the table, as early as late 1942, something Allies lacked for a better part of the war - a self propelled AT gun that can go wherever the tanks can go, while being able to reliably kill any AFV Germans historically fielded.


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## Shortround6 (Apr 23, 2013)

And the M-10 was what? 

M7 was standardized Feb 1942 and the M10 was standardized June of 1942 (standardized=modifications to prototypes stopped, design approved for production.) 

October 1942 sees studies for mounting 90mm gun in M10 start, first design not so good so new design started March 1943, the T71 was classified "limited procurement" in Nov 1943 and standardized June of 1944. 

British study mounting the 17pdr in the M-10 but don't actually start doing it on a production basis until April of 1944. 

M-10s had 1 in of armor in many places where the M7 had 1/2in and it was sloped. not much different against real tank guns but at least it would stop 20mm shells


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## vinnye (Apr 23, 2013)

If there were problems with 3 inch and 17 pdr availability could the 25 pdr not have been produced more quickly to do the job?
I know the Bishop was a Valentine tank with a 25 pdr - would a Churchill hull have been better suited?


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## vinnye (Apr 23, 2013)

The inertia that caused problems for the British Army was also evident elsewhere - the lack of support for Frank Whittle is a good example.
When this barrier is removed, it is quite remarkable what progress can be made - Hobart's Funnies are good examples. 
( I know Percy did not design them - he was the figurehead for the specials team.)


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## Shortround6 (Apr 23, 2013)

25pdr has worse penetration than the 6pdr. It is ONLY a substitute AT gun for the 2pdr and then it depends on the ammo for the 2pdr. 

The British stayed with _cheap_ projectiles much too long. Plain uncapped shot is cheap and easy to make but it performs poorly, especially at higher velocities. The 2pdr didn't get APCBC shot until 1943 when it was way too late. APCBC shot would penetrate at 1000yds what the cheap shot wold at 500 yds. or penetrate at 500 yds what the cheap shot would at 100 yds.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 23, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> And the M-10 was what?



M-10 was a fine AFV, yet the 17 pdr can far better fulfill the "being able to reliably kill any AFV Germans historically fielded" criteria. 



> M7 was standardized Feb 1942 and the M10 was standardized June of 1942 (standardized=modifications to prototypes stopped, design approved for production.)
> 
> October 1942 sees studies for mounting 90mm gun in M10 start, first design not so good so new design started March 1943, the T71 was classified "limited procurement" in Nov 1943 and standardized June of 1944.
> 
> British study mounting the 17pdr in the M-10 but don't actually start doing it on a production basis until April of 1944.



Told you so  - a better part of the war passed until the (Western) Allies fielded a really potent cannon on tracked chassis. Many of the 17pdr-armed AFVs and M-36 were introduced in late 1944. 
The 17pdr-armed M7 might as well be the field, in-theatre modification. The British managed to create the Churchill 75mm NA (North Africa) modification; the turret-less, open topped vehicle should be an easier thing to modify.



> M-10s had 1 in of armor in many places where the M7 had 1/2in and it was sloped. not much different against real tank guns but at least it would stop 20mm shells



I've already proposed the aplique armor


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## Shortround6 (Apr 23, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> M-10 was a fine AFV, yet the 17 pdr can far better fulfill the "being able to reliably kill any AFV Germans historically fielded" criteria.



True but the M-10 was in action in March of 1943. Any conversion of an M-7 might have only beaten into action by 4-5 months. First M-7s go into action with the British at the Battle of El Alamein at the end of October 1942. 

and as far as getting 17pdrs go. From Wiki:

"These early weapons were known as 17/25-pounders and given the codename Pheasant. They first saw action in February 1943."

Any attempt to cobble together some Egyptian shop built tank destroyer in the winter of 1942/43 is going to using some mighty scarce resources. 

While the M-10 certainly cannot kill "any AFV Germans historically fielded" it could seriously put the hurt on any it ran up against when introduced and could continue to do so for the vast majority of AFVs it would encounter for the next 6-9 months. 

The problem is that both the British and the Americans dropped the ball at this point. They had a massive intelligence failure both in estimating enemy (German) tank production and with a few generals in command positions insisting that the M-10 was good enough With a little push the M-36 could have been being produced 6-7 months before it was. The British had ordered over 1000 M-10s in 1943 but they weren't delivered until 1944. Meanwhile M-10s were piling up so fast in US depots that over 200 were converted to M-35 artillery tractors. 

Such is the way of US weapons procurement sometimes. 

I am afraid that not only would there have been little support from "on high" for such a conversion program as you propose ( aside from a handful of conversions done at forward shops, not enough to affect even a single battle) but any one who pushed too hard for it was in danger of being put in charge of a weather station in Greenland. 



tomo pauk said:


> Told you so  - a better part of the war passed until the (Western) Allies fielded a really potent cannon on tracked chassis. Many of the 17pdr-armed AFVs and M-36 were introduced in late 1944.
> The 17pdr-armed M7 might as well be the field, in-theatre modification. The British managed to create the Churchill 75mm NA (North Africa) modification; the turret-less, open topped vehicle should be an easier thing to modify.



true, but the Allies didn't really have a "really potent cannon" to put on a tracked chassis aside from the US 90mm until the spring of 1943. 

The M-7 was a bit of a bodge as it was. The towed gun had it's wheels taken off and then the whole carriage, trail legs (shortened) and all was lowered into the hole in the middle of the chassis. Traverse was restricted and the gun could not be fired near full elevation without the breechblock hitting the floor. The 17pdr was a lot heavier and about 2 meters longer,












It may fit but you don't have much a fighting vehicle. More like a tracked gun which is not the same thing.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 24, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> True but the M-10 was in action in March of 1943. Any conversion of an M-7 might have only beaten into action by 4-5 months. First M-7s go into action with the British at the Battle of El Alamein at the end of October 1942.
> 
> and as far as getting 17pdrs go. From Wiki:
> 
> ...



I was wrong to 'locate' the 17pdr in the late 1942, sorry.



> While the M-10 certainly cannot kill "any AFV Germans historically fielded" it could seriously put the hurt on any it ran up against when introduced and could continue to do so for the vast majority of AFVs it would encounter for the next 6-9 months.



Indeed, apart from the odd Tiger, the M-10 was good enough for most of other targets. 
The 17pdr should add at least 500m to the distance the kill can be achieved? Once mounted at Churchill chassis, it will take an 88mm to destroy it, or a really good shot from one of the longer 75mm.



> The problem is that both the British and the Americans dropped the ball at this point. They had a massive intelligence failure both in estimating enemy (German) tank production and with a few generals in command positions insisting that the M-10 was good enough With a little push the M-36 could have been being produced 6-7 months before it was. The British had ordered over 1000 M-10s in 1943 but they weren't delivered until 1944. Meanwhile M-10s were piling up so fast in US depots that over 200 were converted to M-35 artillery tractors.
> 
> Such is the way of US weapons procurement sometimes.



All beligerents' AFV procurement was sometimes a 'comedy of errors'; eg. Soviets have had maybe the best choice of AFV guns and engines in ww2, yet the Germans in Kursk got them with the pants down.
The Sherman Firefly should've also receive more support?



> I am afraid that not only would there have been little support from "on high" for such a conversion program as you propose ( aside from a handful of conversions done at forward shops, not enough to affect even a single battle) but any one who pushed too hard for it was in danger of being put in charge of a weather station in Greenland.



Grenland being one of better places to be in ww2? Okay, maybe not for someone in CONUS 



> true, but the Allies didn't really have a "really potent cannon" to put on a tracked chassis aside from the US 90mm until the spring of 1943.



Yep, my mistake. 



> The M-7 was a bit of a bodge as it was. The towed gun had it's wheels taken off and then the whole carriage, trail legs (shortened) and all was lowered into the hole in the middle of the chassis. Traverse was restricted and the gun could not be fired near full elevation without the breechblock hitting the floor. The 17pdr was a lot heavier and about 2 meters longer,
> It may fit but you don't have much a fighting vehicle. More like a tracked gun which is not the same thing.



The M7/17pdr being a better proposal than the 'Pheasant'?


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## Ascent (Apr 24, 2013)

Alright it's a little late for this discussion but they did plan to put a 17pdr in a Churchill

Black Prince (tank) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## stug3 (Apr 24, 2013)

Salvaged German petrol cans or 'jerry cans' being inspected at a depot in the Western Desert, 21 April 1942. The robust German cans were considered far superior to the British 'flimsy' can and highly prized.






Troops carrying a dummy Stuart tank, April 1942.






A soldier takes a bearing from his Fordson WOT2 15cwt truck,






Troops examining captured German MG34 machine guns,


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## vinnye (Apr 24, 2013)

Yes the flimsy's were exactly that!
Whenever possible the Brit's used the Jerry can - far better made and robust design.


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## vinnye (Apr 24, 2013)

The Black Prince would have been a good addition in 1942, but led nowhere in 1944/5.
The Allies may have been better advised to make a Hetzer type anti tank AFV. 
The l ow profile would aid in hiding it even in the desert.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 24, 2013)

The Western Allies have had all the bits pieces to field Sherman Firefly in 1943. They could've also issued the APDS for the 75 and 76mm, too.

Hmm, what about Grant Firefly - ditching the 37mm turret in process? For AT purposes, somewhere between the SU-85 and SU-100 (once the APDS becomes available)? Sherman Firefly would be a better thing, undoubtedly, as would Ram Firefly 

added: the Hetzer was a way to utilize a cheap chassis that was beyond it's prime. The downsides (vs. the StuG-IIIG) being cramped interior, lower ammo count and restricted cannon traverse to the left. Downside vs. a tank being the lack of the rotating turret. Allies didn't needed to resort to such AFVs.


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## Shortround6 (Apr 24, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> Hmm, what about Grant Firefly - ditching the 37mm turret in process? For AT purposes, somewhere between the SU-85 and SU-100 (once the APDS becomes available)?



See below:



tomo pauk said:


> the Hetzer was a way to utilize a cheap chassis that was beyond it's prime. The downsides (vs. the StuG-IIIG) being cramped interior, lower ammo count and restricted cannon traverse to the left. Downside vs. a tank being the lack of the rotating turret. Allies didn't needed to resort to such AFVs.





By the time the 17pdr shows up in towed form you already have several chassis that take it in a rotating turret, had the powers that be simply OK'ed it or expressed any desire at all for it. 

A problem with trying stage ambushes in the dessert with limited traverse guns/AFV is that the approaches to the ambush site are a lot less restricted. The enemy armor/vehicles DO NOT have to drive down certain roads or though certain intersections. The may not have total freedom but they seldom are are as restricted as in Europe. And with few trees or buildings hiding is a lot harder especially if you have to pivot the tank destroyer to get on target.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 25, 2013)

Hetzer's chassis was way more cramped than Grant's (especially when the turret is deleted), the 17pdr was way more powerful than the 7,5cm. The W. Allies did not have had several chassis able to take the turreted 17pdr in early (whole?) 1943, there was one (one and half?  ) that I've already acknowledged:


> Sherman Firefly would be a better thing, undoubtedly, as would Ram Firefly


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## Shortround6 (Apr 25, 2013)

OK, it was one chassis but they were making the Ram, The Sherman and the M-10 on it. 

The Gun mount in the M-10 had been designed to take several guns (including the 105 howitzer although I don't believe any were built) and as the hole through the mantlet had to big enough to take the American 3" gun (which was a fat, heavy gun for it's caliber) fitting the 17pdr actually required a sleeve to fill up the space around the barrel. 

The Problem was getting somebody to OK the production/modification of M-10s with the 17pdr. 

The Grant was out of production when the 17pdr showed up so any attempt to mount 17pdrs on grant chassis would be work shop affairs. All M3 factories had been converted to M-4 production. 

The US had tried a wide variety of self propelled guns

See: United States Self Propelled Guns

just click on little pictures. 







Since a very similar (or better) concept had already been tried and rejected _twice_, see first effort






I doubt work shop conversions would have been approved. 

The US _tried_ a lot of stuff, getting something approved for production took a lot more doing.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 25, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> ...
> The Gun mount in the M-10 had been designed to take several guns (including the 105 howitzer although I don't believe any were built) and as the hole through the mantlet had to big enough to take the American 3" gun (which was a fat, heavy gun for it's caliber) fitting the 17pdr actually required a sleeve to fill up the space around the barrel.



Thanks for the details 



> The Problem was getting somebody to OK the production/modification of M-10s with the 17pdr.



Indeed. A quote from Wikipedia: "The British had planned to convert some 1,000 M10s into 17pdr armed variants for Normandy, but for some reason conversions were not started until April 1944."



> The Grant was out of production when the 17pdr showed up so any attempt to mount 17pdrs on grant chassis would be work shop affairs. All M3 factories had been converted to M-4 production.



Agreed.



> The US had tried a wide variety of self propelled guns
> 
> See: United States Self Propelled Guns
> 
> ...



The British army would/should initiate conversions. Unlike the Americans, they have have had the 17 pdr guns 



> The US _tried_ a lot of stuff, getting something approved for production took a lot more doing.



Agreed - all the belligerents were trying testing stuff, with better or worse results.


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## vinnye (Apr 25, 2013)

When I put the Hetzer forward, I was suggesting that a superb machine could be made from "surplus" chassis if the will was there. The Germans were fighting more defensive battles and so required more anti tank weapons. The Hetzer was in my opinion a pretty good one, small enough to hide in woods / rubble in town and had a good punch! Because most American and British tanks did not have a powerful enough gun to do anti tank work, a SPG type weapon with a 17 pdr would have been a useful addition to their armoured divisions.


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## Glider (Apr 25, 2013)

Going back to the title - Ready for El Alamein: ideal British tanks

Why hasn't anyone including myself said T34/76?

Fast, reliable, great protection, very low ground pressure, good gun probably little different to the Sherman 75, fairly small target.

OK a bit rough and ready on build and creature comforts but given the choice between this and a Valantine, Grant or a Crusader I would take the T34.

Only real contender is the Sherman which is a bit big for me.


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## Shortround6 (Apr 25, 2013)

Now you just have to get the t-34 to run in dessert for hundreds of miles. 

Chances of the British either getting several hundred T-34s from the Russians or building their own is zero


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## Glider (Apr 26, 2013)

Have to agree on that


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## vinnye (Apr 26, 2013)

Yes, good point, the T34 would have been a valuable asset if it could have been made reliable in desert conditions - and I do not see any reason why it could not be.
Also agree, Russia was not going to supply them or allow them to be manufactured by USA or Britain.


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## stug3 (Apr 27, 2013)

Men of the 2nd Sherwood Foresters firing a captured German MG42 machine gun, Tunisia, April 1943.


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## Glider (Apr 27, 2013)

Stug, I will never cease to be amazed by the variety of photos you have access to on almost any topic. Just saying thanks


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## stug3 (Apr 27, 2013)

Its not me Glider, its the internet, Im amazed at the stuff I run across every day that Ive never seen before. I wish it would have been around when I was a kid.


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## razor1uk (Apr 27, 2013)

Wonderful info and pictures Stug


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## Freebird (Apr 28, 2013)

yulzari said:


> Um, to return to the thread topic.
> 
> On reading my way through the past postings on topic I have to agree that improving tactical use of combined arms is a key but we are looking for what could have been achieved in time. There was nothing to prevent a Centurion being made pre-war had the will been available but post Summer 1940 there were 2 key items in the pipeline that could have been made into the standard all purpose British/Canadian tank. The 6 pounder Valentine. Ideally Canadian diesel engined.
> 
> ...



The Valentine tank is not the answer, it's a dead end path. It's too small, too cramped and too slow to be developed.
As Shortround mentioned, the 2 man turret was a major handicap, and the 6 pdr gun in these small tanks sacrificed
the 3 man turret.




vinnye said:


> When I put the Hetzer forward, I was suggesting that a superb machine could be made from "surplus" chassis if the will was there. The Germans were fighting more defensive battles and so required more anti tank weapons. The Hetzer was in my opinion a pretty good one, small enough to hide in woods / rubble in town and had a good punch! Because most American and British tanks did not have a powerful enough gun to do anti tank work, a SPG type weapon with a 17 pdr would have been a useful addition to their armoured divisions.



Vinnye, I had mentioned the assault-gun idea using the Crusader chassis about 4 pages ago. 
The 17 pdr is not available by the summer of 1942 in AFVs. Also, with a new tank likely having a very effective 6 pdr antitank gun, the assault gun or "hetzer" idea should have a dual purpose gun with HE, likely a 75mm one. 



parsifal said:


> I largely agree with FB on this. Essentially what he is saying is that messing around with production by introducing radically new types is a mistake. This is because the overwhelming determinant on successful tank operations is NOT quality, its numbers. The germans chose the quality pathway and basically lost the (tank) war as a result.
> 
> However within the parameters of the existing production program there were opportunities to shift things around a bit and not affect numbers. He is essentially advocating concentrating on the RAM tank, and putting less effort into the Crusader. Whilst I am not as critical about the Crusaders problems, there is no denying that the tank had its problems, and that as a design the RAM was a better overall package. What is attractive to FBs scenario, is that a changeover to RAM as the principal type in the desert could have been achieved with virtually no dispruption to output. Instead of constructing Crusaders, the factories devoted to this purpose could have converted to RAM production, with only minimal loss of output for a short period of time, IMO.
> 
> ...



Parsifal, I think you misunderstood my theory. 
There would be NO CHANGE in AFV development in 1940 or 1941, the British would put the Churchill into production, and would continue development work on the Cromwell I (Cavalier tank). The switch would occur in early 1942, when the trials of the Cavalier came back unsatisfactory.
At this point the British, realizing that the re-developed Cromwell/Centaur would take until at least 1943, should have asked the Canadians to increase production of the 6 pdr RAM, and ship models over to Egypt as quickly as possible. With the RAM essentially used instead of the Crusader, it would allow some Nuffield Crusader production to be switched over to a "Hetzer" type 75mm version of the Crusader.
BCCR Leyland would continue to develop the Cromwell/Centaur for follow on production.


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## Freebird (Apr 28, 2013)

Glider said:


> Going back to the title - Ready for El Alamein: ideal British tanks
> 
> Why hasn't anyone including myself said T34/76?
> 
> ...



Glider, I don't know if your proposal was serious for the T-34, but the Soviets were pretty intractable, they would hardly give tanks or blueprint to the British for consideration.

Sherman the only alternative? It's not the best design alternative, nor is it available in the summer of 1942.


There are a few things that I think should be clarified on this thread:

1.) "Ready for El Alamein" is not even possible, (unless the British have a crystal ball)
The British have no idea that when or where battle will occur in the future (El Alamein), so can't prepare tanks for this purpose. (And Tomo hasn't specified WHICH battle of El Alamein, 1st or 2nd?)
A better wording would be "Best British tank in production by the summer of 1942". British tanks will need to be produced by June of 1942, to allow time to ship them to Egypt (July August), then at least a month for training desert modifications (September) which would be ready for operations in the late Autumn (October/November).

2.) It seems that there has been a tendancy here to assume that a new tank design can be slapped together in a few months, when in reality issues such as cooling problems, delays in gun production etc often caused unforseen delays in tank production. Typical tank development from proposal, through design, to production was about 2 years, although the Cavalier was shortened to about 18 months by developing the design from an existing tank, the Crusader. (But the end product was rejected)

3.) Personally, I don't see how an "Ideal British tank" and "In production before summer 1942" is even possible, given only *what was known at the time*. 
They could develop the "ideal tank" or have a tank ready for summer 1942 production - _*but not both*_!

4.)The thread starting in the second half of 1940 pre-supposes that the British could have or should have done something differently, so I'd really like someone to point out what was the bit of information that was ignored?


Just to review, in the summer of 1940, (and taking into account the events of the Battle of France), Vauxhall are about to start production of the Churchill, and Nuffield will start production of the Crusader in early 1941. 
The Tank board discusses follow on tank production, and decides that to expidite development, the new tank should be based on an existing design, so they ask for proposals from both Nuffield Vauxhall for a new cruiser.
It should be capable of at least 25 mph, have better armour, and use the 6 pdr gun. (Despite the 2 pdr performing well in France against German tanks)

So my questions: *What other specifications were missed? What other lessons were ignored?*

In the beginning of 1941 (when it was decided to go forward with the Nuffield proposal) the British didn't know that any American tanks at all would be available, that Lend-Lease would be enacted, or that the resulting tanks (Grant/Sherman) would even be acceptable.
They didn't know that the Crusader would be inadequate against the Pz II or Pz III, as the only battles in the desert so far, the Matildas Cruiser Mk III Mk IV had performed admirably against Italian forces in Compass.
They also didn't know that the upgraded Crusader project (ie Cavalier) would turn out to be a dissapointment.

The crux of it is this, _if they had a crystal ball_ and could have known all these things, maybe they could have taken the slower route and developed a whole new design, but at the time, given the urgency of the situation, the Nuffield proposal was the best option for a tank that could be put into production quickly, with reduced time expected for design changes, production problems training.


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## Glider (Apr 28, 2013)

I am very aware that the Russians wouldn't give us the T34 but it was an allied tank that would have been very pretty much ideal. Don't quite understand your comments on the Sherman, as they did fight at El Alamein.

If your looking for a British built tank then the mistakes were made well before the battle. In my mind there was no reason for the design and build of the Valantine. It was so similar to the Matilda II, same gun, similar armour, similar speed, it was no better. The British knew that the 6pd was either in production or about to enter production so there is no excuse for designing a tank that couldn't be fitted with the 6pd as production numbers increased. After all the PzIII started with a 37mm and ended up with the 50mm L60 or 75 L24.

The Crusader was also no improvement on the tanks that went before it just a bit more reliable. The development of the Cromwell started in plenty of time and the dithering over the development and production cost the Army a lot of good men. The Cromwell should have and could have been ready in time for the battle. 

The problem the UK had was the lack of a decent engine. The US had a similar problem, used their initiative and used small aero engines, the UK didn't. They had a prototype engine ready in early 1942 which was too late.

The assult gun version of the Crusader I hadn't heard of before but despite all the evidence they didn't take up what was obviously a very good idea. 

The German had assult guns and the Pz III and IV so why the UK stuck to the outmoded Heavy or fast combination I have no idea.


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## razor1uk (Apr 28, 2013)

Some 'old guards' whom harked back to their youth and previous/preceding warriors times for cavalry infantry only versions, with some sidelong glances at other nations types usage of armour - the (old) brass was at times as nearsighted as it could be farsighted, and conservative to change/ideas that didn't fit with their personal their forces preconceptions and resistance to change - until its needed/too late.

Most nations with armour, followed us (and France) as we followed them (for possible sales) following WW1, and many aristocratics/neuvo-rich prevailed the idea of fast and heavier tanks to cavalry artillery; only really the Germans the Soviets had a more 'modern appreciation' for armour compared to most other users, well thats my gathered outlook upon then.

Things military generally advance 1 steps forward, 2 step back with another one sideways some other direction, like hop scotch...


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## tomo pauk (Apr 28, 2013)

freebird said:


> ...
> There are a few things that I think should be clarified on this thread:
> 
> 1.) "Ready for El Alamein" is not even possible, (unless the British have a crystal ball)
> ...



The "Best British tank in production by the summer of 1942" would be indeed a better wording. The "Ready for El Alamein: ideal British tanks" wording, however, rings much better. And yes, indeed, that should be 'Monty's Alamein' ie. the second battle.



> 2.) It seems that there has been a tendancy here to assume that a new tank design can be slapped together in a few months, when in reality issues such as cooling problems, delays in gun production etc often caused unforseen delays in tank production. Typical tank development from proposal, through design, to production was about 2 years, although the Cavalier was shortened to about 18 months by developing the design from an existing tank, the Crusader. (But the end product was rejected)



Well put.



> 3.) Personally, I don't see how an "Ideal British tank" and "In production before summer 1942" is even possible, given only *what was known at the time*.
> They could develop the "ideal tank" or have a tank ready for summer 1942 production - _*but not both*_!



It was known well before 1942 that heavy armor can shrug off AP shots, that some suspension types are better for higher speeds rough terrain than others, that bigger gun can defeat armor more easily, or at greater distances etc. British know that Matilda's 2 pdr cannot pierce the other Matilda (nor that towed 2pdr can), they also know that tanks under 15-18 tons are likely to be put out of action by German 3,7 or British 2pdr, while the 20+ ton tanks would defeat that threat. They can realistically assume that Germans would introduce better tanks and AT guns as they possibly can. They know that neither solid shot, nor MG is useful thing to overcome any decent field fortification, nor a well placed AT gun. 



> 4.)The thread starting in the second half of 1940 pre-supposes that the British could have or should have done something differently, so I'd really like someone to point out what was the bit of information that was ignored?



All posted just above?




> Just to review, in the summer of 1940, (and taking into account the events of the Battle of France), Vauxhall are about to start production of the Churchill, and Nuffield will start production of the Crusader in early 1941.
> The Tank board discusses follow on tank production, and decides that to expidite development, the new tank should be based on an existing design, so they ask for proposals from both Nuffield Vauxhall for a new cruiser.
> It should be capable of at least 25 mph, have better armour, and use the 6 pdr gun. (Despite the 2 pdr performing well in France against German tanks)



Their request sounds so right - there are other targets in the battlefield, not just tanks (= 2pdr is seen as useless vs. those), they were expecting that Germans would move on with their tanks AT guns, they were demanding the maneuverability so the future tanks could be able to envelope and cut off the enemy.



> So my questions: *What other specifications were missed? What other lessons were ignored?*



The British did not fielded a tank, filling the Tank Board specification ("capable of at least 25 mph, have better armour, and use the 6 pdr gun"), until D-day, ie. in mid 1944, with Cromwell. They were 1.5-2 years too late, and the Germans have, by that time, moved up the bar. They ignored the lesson about weapon system being good only if the timing is good.



> In the beginning of 1941 (when it was decided to go forward with the Nuffield proposal) the British didn't know that any American tanks at all would be available, that Lend-Lease would be enacted, or that the resulting tanks (Grant/Sherman) would even be acceptable.
> They didn't know that the Crusader would be inadequate against the Pz II or Pz III, as the only battles in the desert so far, the Matildas Cruiser Mk III Mk IV had performed admirably against Italian forces in Compass.
> They also didn't know that the upgraded Crusader project (ie Cavalier) would turn out to be a dissapointment.



They do know that main enemy is Germany, not Italy. They also know what the main enemy is capable for. Tailoring the next-gen tanks by the performance of the current-gen tanks vs. Italian forces would've been as short-sighted as possible.



> The crux of it is this, _if they had a crystal ball_ and could have known all these things, maybe they could have taken the slower route and developed a whole new design, but at the time, given the urgency of the situation, the Nuffield proposal was the best option for a tank that could be put into production quickly, with reduced time expected for design changes, production problems training.



There was no crystal ball when Supermarine was designing the Spitfire, yet that one turn out pretty well. There was not also the crystal ball when the Matilda II was designed; turned out pretty well, too. 
By Nuffield proposal, you mean Crusader?


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## vinnye (Apr 28, 2013)

I think one major design influence that was missed was the T34.


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## yulzari (Apr 28, 2013)

freebird said:


> 3.) Personally, I don't see how an "Ideal British tank" and "In production before summer 1942" is even possible, given only *what was known at the time*.
> They could develop the "ideal tank" or have a tank ready for summer 1942 production - _*but not both*_!
> 
> 4.)The thread starting in the second half of 1940 pre-supposes that the British could have or should have done something differently, so I'd really like someone to point out what was the bit of information that was ignored?
> ...



I could add that they asked Vickers for a high velocity 75mm to follow on from the 6 pounder but that never fitted the turrets being designed.

The whole essence of my championing the Valentine is simply that the thing worked. Yes a new design could be better but this one actually existed in production and could do the job adequately if not well. Do not let the best drive out the good. I have previously mentioned a Soviet tank commander who still preferred it to the T34 in 1945. 

Making it the sole production tank allows far greater numbers of useable tanks to be made available in the period up to 1943 and lets a truly new design be properly designed and tested and be put into quantity production before the end of 1943. Make your own choice of what that replacement design might be. I would go for a quasi Comet with the Vickers HV 75mm and a sloped glacis plate. This is the tank that would serve 1944/5.

As mentioned, nobody knew large quantities of US tanks would be available so that could not form part of the planning. The UK bankrupted itself buying arms from the USA by early 1941.


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## vinnye (Apr 28, 2013)

I agree with Yulzari, the Valentine may not have been the best tank in the world at the time (1941/2) but it worked - it was reliable, quite well armoured and available. Yes it would have been even better if it had been designed from the get go as a 3 man 6pdr turret version, but look at what other tanks were in service, the Matilda II = an Infantry tank, slow, well armoured, hard and expensive to produce. The Churchill was not that reliable when first produced but was a decent tank by British standards at the time. The Crusader - very pretty, but horribly unreliable at first. So, my vote is the Valentine.


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## Shortround6 (Apr 28, 2013)

The main attributes of the Valentine were that it was _cheap_ ( a reoccurring theme in British armament in the 30s and early 40s) and it was _more_ reliable than other British tanks. 

If you try to design a "3 man 6pdr turret version" with a PROPER turret and not a sardine can that will allow a gun and 3 men who are very friendly with each other, you need a bigger turret ring and fighting compartment, which means either a bigger hull or one that overhangs the tracks, in either case a large volume under armor which means, if you keep the same protection, a heavier tank. With the same engine mobility goes down. Reliability may go down, cost goes up. 

Please note that the first Valentine with a 6pdr lost not only a crewman, but the co-axial MG which effectively turned it into a SP AT gun and not a tank.


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## Freebird (Apr 28, 2013)

Glider said:


> I am very aware that the Russians wouldn't give us the T34 but it was an allied tank that would have been very pretty much ideal. Don't quite understand your comments on the Sherman, as they did fight at El Alamein.



Indeed, it did, but it wasn't supposed to. It was only after the debacle at Gazala that FDR gave us the Shermans that were intended for the US army.
The British need to be planning to use something else, as the Sherman wouldn't be available to the UK until the end of 1942 (barring a total disaster)



Glider said:


> The problem the UK had was the lack of a decent engine. The US had a similar problem, used their initiative and used small aero engines, the UK didn't. They had a prototype engine ready in early 1942 which was too late.



The US was also in a vastly better position, they didn't really *need* a front-line tank until the end of 1942, wheras the British do not have the luxury of a normal development time



Glider said:


> The assult gun version of the Crusader I hadn't heard of before but despite all the evidence they didn't take up what was obviously a very good idea.


 
The only way that this really works is if the British had asked Canada to provide quantities of RAM tanks in 1942, thus allowing some extra Crusader production to be completed as assalt guns. Otherwise the British still are producing large quantities of Crusaders into 1943



yulzari said:


> I could add that they asked Vickers for a high velocity 75mm to follow on from the 6 pounder but that never fitted the turrets being designed.
> 
> The whole essence of my championing the Valentine is simply that the thing worked. Yes a new design could be better but this one actually existed in production and could do the job adequately if not well. Do not let the best drive out the good. I have previously mentioned a Soviet tank commander who still preferred it to the T34 in 1945.
> 
> *Making it the sole production tank allows far greater numbers of useable tanks to be made available* in the period up to 1943 and lets a truly new design be properly designed and tested and be put into quantity production before the end of 1943. Make your own choice of what that replacement design might be.



Well no, it doesn't really help anything to do that, nor can you produce a greater number of tanks. There were already large numbers of Valentines produced, and as Shortround mentioned, it's a flawed tank with the 6 pdr stuffed in.
The Nuffield lines are already geared up to produce the Crusader, so to have the lines shut down for months while they re-tool to produce a dead-end design like the Valentine is pointless, nor do I see why the Nuffield lines would produce any more Valentines than Crusaders. The Crusader serves well enough in 1941, and the British are expecting it to be superceded in early 1942 by the Cavalier.

So you are committing to having only Valentines at El Alamein, where it is hopelessly outclassed by the Germans?



Shortround6 said:


> The main attributes of the Valentine were that it was _cheap_ ( a reoccurring theme in British armament in the 30s and early 40s) and it was _more_ reliable than other British tanks.
> 
> If you try to design a "3 man 6pdr turret version" with a PROPER turret and not a sardine can that will allow a gun and 3 men who are very friendly with each other, you need a bigger turret ring and fighting compartment, which means either a bigger hull or one that overhangs the tracks, in either case a large volume under armor which means, if you keep the same protection, a heavier tank. With the same engine mobility goes down. Reliability may go down, cost goes up.
> 
> Please note that the first Valentine with a 6pdr lost not only a crewman, but the co-axial MG which effectively turned it into a SP AT gun and not a tank.


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## Freebird (Apr 29, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> It was known well before 1942 that heavy armor can shrug off AP shots, that some suspension types are better for higher speeds rough terrain than others, that bigger gun can defeat armor more easily, or at greater distances etc. British know that Matilda's 2 pdr cannot pierce the other Matilda (nor that towed 2pdr can), they also know that tanks under 15-18 tons are likely to be put out of action by German 3,7 or British 2pdr, while the 20+ ton tanks would defeat that threat. They can realistically assume that Germans would introduce better tanks and AT guns as they possibly can. They know that neither solid shot, nor MG is useful thing to overcome any decent field fortification, nor a well placed AT gun.



Indeed, and the Cavalier project was designed to deal with all of those factors.




tomo pauk said:


> The British did not fielded a tank, filling the Tank Board specification ("capable of at least 25 mph, have better armour, and use the 6 pdr gun"), until D-day, ie. in mid 1944, with Cromwell. They were 1.5-2 years too late, and the Germans have, by that time, moved up the bar. They ignored the lesson about weapon system being good only if the timing is good.



Actually no.
The Cavalier filled all of those specifications ("capable of at least 25 mph, have better armour, and use the 6 pdr gun") by the spring of 1942, however the problems with cooling systems meant that it wasn't sent to the desert, but several hundred were built anyways and used for training and equipping UK based divisions. The Cromwell also fulfilled those specifications ("capable of at least 25 mph, have better armour, and use the 6 pdr gun"), , and production began in November 1942, although delays in producing the Meteor meant that it wasn't ready until Jan 1943. 

So by taking the quicker course of design (Nuffield's) it could be enter production in early 1942, although running the risk of not being fit for hot climates (as turned out to be the case)
The slower course of development (Aero engine) made for a much better tank, but delayed availability until 1943.



tomo pauk said:


> They do know that main enemy is Germany, not Italy. They also know what the main enemy is capable for. Tailoring the next-gen tanks by the performance of the current-gen tanks vs. Italian forces would've been as short-sighted as possible.



Yes, and the 2 pdr was more than capable of dealing with any existing German tank, yet they forsaw development of heavier tanks, and specified the 6 pdr for the Cavalier/Cromwell project for early to mid 1942, and expected the HV 75mm to be ready for the next tank design to come out a year or so after the Cavalier/Cromwell.



tomo pauk said:


> There was no crystal ball when Supermarine was designing the Spitfire, yet that one turn out pretty well. There was not also the crystal ball when the Matilda II was designed; turned out pretty well, too.



What if the Spitfire had been a total failure, did they have a better design ready to go? (They didn't)
What I mean is that they didn't know that they would need an alternate design to the Nuffield Cavalier until it failed its tests in early 1942, and then they scrambled to find some other option



tomo pauk said:


> By Nuffield proposal, you mean Crusader?



No, the follow on development, which became the Cavalier


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## yulzari (Apr 29, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> The main attributes of the Valentine were that it was _cheap_ ( a reoccurring theme in British armament in the 30s and early 40s) and it was _more_ reliable than other British tanks.
> 
> If you try to design a "3 man 6pdr turret version" with a PROPER turret and not a sardine can that will allow a gun and 3 men who are very friendly with each other, you need a bigger turret ring and fighting compartment, which means either a bigger hull or one that overhangs the tracks, in either case a large volume under armor which means, if you keep the same protection, a heavier tank. With the same engine mobility goes down. Reliability may go down, cost goes up.
> 
> Please note that the first Valentine with a 6pdr lost not only a crewman, but the co-axial MG which effectively turned it into a SP AT gun and not a tank.



Shortround6, I think we have been over this ground already so must agree to disagree. I will only say that the Valentine was designed around the 2 pounder 3 man turret because that was all that there was when it was designed pre war. If you design a 3 man 6 pounder Valentine you are making a new tank and the whole raison d'etre of my championing of the Valentine as the sole 1939/43 tank is that it is an existing design. The 3 man AP/HE 75mm turreted tank is the successor tank. A 3 man turret is certainly better not only for combat but also to allow an extra man to help maintain the vehicle, stand guard etc. However having many 2 man turreted 6 pounder/75mm ROF Valentines is better than not yet getting a new reliable 3 man turreted tank. Later 6 pounder Valentines show the co ax mg need not have been deleted.

Cheap meant easy production with less resources. Cheap is often bad but that is not necessarily the case.

Incidentally I have had it suggested that replacing the Valentine late 1943 onwards would leave many chassis for other uses and the Pzkw 38T was quoted as a similar situation. However tanks in combat use quickly wear out and become a maintenance problem. There would certainly be enough to make many Archers but the Hetzer relied on continuing new production Pzkw 38T type chassis not rebuilding old ones. The Valentine would be out of production by late 1943.


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## Milosh (Apr 29, 2013)

Why wouldn't the Soviets give the T-34 to the British when they did offer it to the the Americans?


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## Shortround6 (Apr 29, 2013)

yulzari said:


> I will only say that the Valentine was designed around the 2 pounder 3 man turret because that was all that there was when it was designed pre war.



No, it was designed around the 2 pounder *2* man turret. The 3 man turret came later. British cruisers had 3 man turrets as did the Matilda II. SO they knew the Valentine was substandard in that area when they ordered it. 



yulzari said:


> Later 6 pounder Valentines show the co ax mg need not have been deleted.



And that brings you back to the small size of the Valentine yet again. Once they got the machine gun into the co-axial mount they lost 9 rounds of 6pdr ammo in order to store 1575 rounds of MG ammo (7 belts/boxes) 44 rounds of main gun ammo. 
the Crusader with 6pdr carried 73 rounds of main gun ammo and 4950 rounds of MG ammo. 

How many MORE Valentines do you need for the same combat effect before they have to pull out of combat to reload? 



yulzari said:


> Cheap meant easy production with less resources. Cheap is often bad but that is not necessarily the case..



A large part of a tanks cost is the armor, a 17 ton tank is going to be a lot cheaper than a 26.5 ton tank. Of course you have to figure in what the 17 ton is leaving out, like combat ability. 

Unfortunately for the British they went _TOO_ cheap on a number of weapons. Cheap 3in mortars meant short range for the first part of the war, cheap 2pdr shot meant a less effect gun than better shot, cheap _light_ tanks (over 900 built) meant not enough cruisers or infantry tanks, cheap 25pdr shells meant a less effective artillery. A lot of this cheapness was paid for in blood.


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## Glider (Apr 29, 2013)

First of all thanks for the comments, most of which I agree with, however there are a couple of differences


freebird said:


> The US was also in a vastly better position, they didn't really *need* a front-line tank until the end of 1942, wheras the British do not have the luxury of a normal development time


True but the point I was trying to make was that both the US and the UK didn't have a suitable engine. The British went away, designed a new engine (in a rush) and ended up with delays to the engines, resulting in delayed new tanks and a lot of lost lives. The USA basically said, what engines have we got, identified some small aircraft engines, designed the tank around that, resulting in Shermans being available for the battle.


> The only way that this really works is if the British had asked Canada to provide quantities of RAM tanks in 1942, thus allowing some extra Crusader production to be completed as assalt guns. Otherwise the British still are producing large quantities of Crusaders into 1943


Asking Canada for RAMs would be a good start but converting a proportion of the Crusader production to the assult gun version would have been cheap, have limited impact on production and given the 'normal' Crusaders the support of an effective gun tank.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 29, 2013)

freebird said:


> Indeed, and the Cavalier project was designed to deal with all of those factors.
> ...
> The Cavalier filled all of those specifications ("capable of at least 25 mph, have better armour, and use the 6 pdr gun") by the springof 1942, however the problems with cooling systems meant that it wasn't sent to the desert, but several hundred were built anyways and used for training and equipping UK based divisions.



Since the tank was not combat worthy for the main battlefield the British were fighting, some two years already, we might assume that Cavalier did not filled the specifications. 



> The Cromwell also fulfilled those specifications ("capable of at least 25 mph, have better armour, and use the 6 pdr gun"), , and production began in November 1942, although delays in producing the Meteor meant that it wasn't ready until Jan 1943.



Talking about the production of a tank before it has the engine to run would be somewhat misleading? The 1st Cromwells should've been available to the units when, summer of 1943? It debuted in combat in 1944 (we should not 'blame' the tank design for that, realities of the war were such). So even if we take 1943 as a year the specification from 1940 was filled, that would mean a design one year too late - the Germans have upped the bar maybe 3 times, counting from Battle of France.



> So by taking the quicker course of design (Nuffield's) it could be enter production in early 1942, although running the risk of not being fit for hot climates (as turned out to be the case)
> The slower course of development (Aero engine) made for a much better tank, but delayed availability until 1943.



Whenever name 'Nuffield' and/or 'Liberty tank engine' is mentioned, one can bes sure that he is soon about to read the words 'problems', 'issues', 'not fit for Africa' etc. In a more positive way, would the Bedford engine (from Churchill) provide good reliable service in a cruiser tank?



> Yes, and the 2 pdr was more than capable of dealing with any existing German tank, yet they forsaw development of heavier tanks, and specified the 6 pdr for the Cavalier/Cromwell project for early to mid 1942, and expected the HV 75mm to be ready for the next tank design to come out a year or so after the Cavalier/Cromwell.



Okay.



> What if the Spitfire had been a total failure, did they have a better design ready to go? (They didn't)
> What I mean is that they didn't know that they would need an alternate design to the Nuffield Cavalier until it failed its tests in early 1942, and then they scrambled to find some other option


 
Maybe they shoudl've specified that 1st thing expected from the tank is to be reliable in certain temperature envelope? Maybe the good thing would've been to have more than one aero engine (ie. the tank derivation of it) to choose from, rather than only the derivation of the Liberty? Maybe it was not a good thing to have a producer of one engine that would try to nix any other engine to be installed in 'his' tank? Expecting from an engine, that developed issues in a tank weighting only 2/3rds as a future tank, to perform well in combat areas in 3/3rds heavy tank also seem like a good sales pitch, not like a result of good planing.


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## Freebird (Apr 29, 2013)

Milosh said:


> Why wouldn't the Soviets give the T-34 to the British when they did offer it to the the Americans?



The point is that they didn't offer it to the British before they entered the war, nor for some time afterwards. Had they even given a T-34 blueprints to Britiain as soon as the Nazis attacked them, it still wouldn't give enough time to reverse engineer a tank to fight in the desert. (Normandy - maybe)



Glider said:


> First of all thanks for the comments, most of which I agree with, however there are a couple of differences
> True but the point I was trying to make was that both the US and the UK didn't have a suitable engine. The British went away, designed a new engine (in a rush) and ended up with delays to the engines, resulting in delayed new tanks and a lot of lost lives. The USA basically said, what engines have we got, identified some small aircraft engines, designed the tank around that, resulting in Shermans being available for the battle.
> 
> Asking Canada for RAMs would be a good start but converting a proportion of the Crusader production to the assult gun version would have been cheap, have limited impact on production and given the 'normal' Crusaders the support of an effective gun tank.



I would agree with that.
The unfortunate fact is that the British spent most of the war designing in a rush and ordering things "off the drawing board"


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## razor1uk (Apr 29, 2013)

Britain has generally been better at desiging stuff/prototypes then 'fettling' it to spec than we have been at mass producing lots of stuff to spec..
Thats not to say what we do design is always great or the worst either, we still try and do what we can when were able..


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## Glider (Apr 30, 2013)

The bit that always frustrates me is that the UK had the designers. When they were given a free hand they could produce remarkable equipment, often the specs were too conservative and limited their scope.

Tank design went from the Comet and Churchill both of which had serious limitations to the Centurion a classic tank design if ever there was one. In Naval aircraft they went from the Firefly/Seafire to the Sea Fury


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## Freebird (May 4, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> Since the tank was not combat worthy for the main battlefield the British were fighting, some two years already, we might assume that Cavalier did not filled the specifications.



Well..... Maybe not.

In early 1942 the US made the Grant tank available, these were sent to the desert, and Shermans arrived in time for El alamein. However if there had been *no* alternative, they might have had to send the Cavaliers anyways and deal with the consequences. (who knows?)

And the British were not considering Africa as the primary combat theater, as the UK and Europe (Greece etc) were more important.
The fact that the British still placed an order for 500 Cavalier tanks means that the tank was still "combat worthy", just not ideal for North Africa. 



> Whenever name 'Nuffield' and/or 'Liberty tank engine' is mentioned, one can bes sure that he is soon about to read the words 'problems', 'issues', 'not fit for Africa' etc.



The Nuffield Liberty was used in the Crusader, and it performed well enough on trials in early 1941 (in the UK). The engine certainly had problems in it's first year in North Africa, but this was mainly the result of poor preparation during transport, lack of parts and lack of tank transports. The reliability of the Crusader from mid 1942 was much improved, still with the Liberty engine.

Having Churchill meddle with the tank procurment policies also caused problems in the North Africa. 



tomo pauk said:


> Maybe they shoudl've specified that 1st thing expected from the tank is to be reliable in certain temperature envelope? Maybe the good thing would've been to have more than one aero engine (ie. the tank derivation of it) to choose from, rather than only the derivation of the Liberty? Maybe it was not a good thing to have a producer of one engine that would try to nix any other engine to be installed in 'his' tank? Expecting from an engine, that developed issues in a tank weighting only 2/3rds as a future tank, to perform well in combat areas in 3/3rds heavy tank also seem like a good sales pitch, not like a result of good planing.



OK, the Aero engine was not derived from the Liberty. And the tank manufacturers could not "nix" other proposals.
And remember at the time that we are discussing (Autumn 1940 - Spring 1941) the British are not fighting the Germans in Africa, there is no urgent need for new tanks, as the Italians have just had a crushing defeat at the hands of the British, and the Matilda II outclasses the Axis (ie Italian) tanks. They have a new design (Crusader) ready to enter production, and expect the next generation (Cromwell/Cavalier) in about 18 months, or about the same time as the Germans would be expected to introduce a new tank.


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## stug3 (May 5, 2013)

A Crusader Mk.I passes a burning German Panzer IV.


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## tomo pauk (May 5, 2013)

freebird said:


> Well..... Maybe not.
> 
> In early 1942 the US made the Grant tank available, these were sent to the desert, and Shermans arrived in time for El alamein. However if there had been *no* alternative, they might have had to send the Cavaliers anyways and deal with the consequences. (who knows?)



Without US tanks, UK can send less tanks to the Soviets, and more to Africa. Canada can also provide Valentines and, possibly, Rams there. 
Cavalier was found to be unfit for UK already, so the chances for it to be sent there are close to zero IMO. From Wikipedia (looking forward for better data, of course):
_ The schedule had already slipped due to work on other projects and work to fit the 6 pounder to the Crusader tank and the first tank [Cavailer] began trials in March 1942. The tank was judged unsatisfactory; the Nuffield order was reduced to 500 tanks and the BRC&W design was looked at again._



> And the British were not considering Africa as the primary combat theater, as the UK and Europe (Greece etc) were more important.



By the time 1st Cavaliers rolled off the production line, there were was no ground fighting in W. Europe (bar partisan/anti-partisan activities); Greece was ancient history by then. British are pushed by Rommel-led Axis force towards Nile Suez - seems to me as a primary war theater for the UK, along with Burma.



> The fact that the British still placed an order for 500 Cavalier tanks means that the tank was still "combat worthy", just not ideal for North Africa.



Lets not bend the truth - the order was reduced to 500 tanks. Again, it was already judged as not combat worthy for the UK, let alone for the NA.



> The Nuffield Liberty was used in the Crusader, and it performed well enough on trials in early 1941 (in the UK). The engine certainly had problems in it's first year in North Africa, but this was mainly the result of poor preparation during transport, lack of parts and lack of tank transports. The reliability of the Crusader from mid 1942 was much improved, still with the Liberty engine.



Seems like all other UK US tanks performed without any major hiccups delays once scheduled went for Africa. As for the Liberty in Cavalier: someone thought that the 340 BHP engine in 20 to tank can make a good show when up-rated to 410 BHP, and installed in a 27 ton tank. Poor planing, or poor job? Or it was the 'our product can do it, other's cannot' thinking? British army falling to the Nuffield's sales pitch?



> Having Churchill meddle with the tank procurment policies also caused problems in the North Africa.



Maybe the stuff for another thread?



> OK, the Aero engine was not derived from the Liberty.



I was under impression that Nuffield Liberty shared the same genes with Liberty ww1 aircraft engine. Care to share so me info?



> And the tank manufacturers could not "nix" other proposals.



Thought so. Were any other engines (so, except Liberty and Meteor) proposed for Cavalier/next-gen tank?



> And remember at the time that we are discussing (Autumn 1940 - Spring 1941) the British are not fighting the Germans in Africa, there is no urgent need for new tanks, as the Italians have just had a crushing defeat at the hands of the British, and the Matilda II outclasses the Axis (ie Italian) tanks. They have a new design (Crusader) ready to enter production, and expect the next generation (Cromwell/Cavalier) in about 18 months, or about the same time as the Germans would be expected to introduce a new tank.



This thread covers the time between mid-1940 to mid/late-1942.


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## tomo pauk (May 5, 2013)

Something for yulzari  - Matilda with Soviet 76,2mm gun :











One might wonder how big a cannon would the Churchill wield with external mount...


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## vinnye (May 6, 2013)

Wow, that Matilda looks awesome!
Good find, thanks for sharing.


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## Glider (May 6, 2013)

What a find. I like the fact that it still has the UK WD number on the side


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## yulzari (May 6, 2013)

God bless the external mantlet.

I have never understood why, on finding the war's worst **** up of designing a turret and a gun which don't match, they didn't work up an external mantlet to fit the Vickers HV 75mm onto the Cavalier/Centaur/Cromwell/Churchill type turrets.

AEC managed to fit Sherman 75mm guns onto AEC turrets for Staghounds sold to Sudan.


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## tomo pauk (May 6, 2013)

The Sherman 75mm gun should fit at most places the 6pdr would fit?


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## MacArther (May 6, 2013)

Seems like just refitting current tanks with external mantlets that could house bigger guns might be the go-to solution. Probably wouldn't work in some older tanks, but you could at least get more 6-pounders and 75mm guns out on the field.


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## yulzari (May 7, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> The Sherman 75mm gun should fit at most places the 6pdr would fit?



Only if you fixed the Sherman mantlet to the outside of the front. Most Sherman mantlets came with a Sherman tank attached.

The British solution, and to simplify ammunition supply, was to enlarge the ROF 6 Pounder barrel to take the French 75mm based US 75mm round. I suspect the French/USA 75mm is too long in the breech to fit the existing 6 Pounder internal mantlet. The gun performance was the same either way with reduced armour penetration over the 6 Pounder.


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## tomo pauk (May 7, 2013)

Of course, you're right about the 75mm gun in UK service.

Seeing the Matilda with a decent gun, one might picture himself the Churchill in Soviet use, armed with their 57mm - the Tiger-hunting Winnie...


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## MacArther (May 7, 2013)

Something I've always been curious about, but never found anything looking for it: What was the performance of the 6 pounders bored out to accept 75mm? How did they rate versus the 75mm M2/M3?


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## tomo pauk (May 7, 2013)

Here is an interesting tool that might bring out the answer:

WWII Gun vrs Armour Calculator


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## fastmongrel (May 7, 2013)

MacArther said:


> Something I've always been curious about, but never found anything looking for it: What was the performance of the 6 pounders bored out to accept 75mm? How did they rate versus the 75mm M2/M3?



According to wikipedia the 75mm M3 and the Royal Ordnance 75mm have velocities of 2030 fps compared to 2050 fps for AP ammo. The British 75mm barrel was 2,850 mm long and the M3 barrel was 3,000 mm long so to all intents and purposes identical. The Royal Ordnance barrel looks slimmer though so might be lighter but often had a muzzle weight or muzzle break so there might not have been much in it.

edit: A bit more googling on the Royal Ordnance 75mm says the mv was 610 m/s which is 2000 fps though this might be for a used as against brand new gun.


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## yulzari (May 7, 2013)

MacArther said:


> Something I've always been curious about, but never found anything looking for it: What was the performance of the 6 pounders bored out to accept 75mm? How did they rate versus the 75mm M2/M3?



They are both firing literally the same round out of a barrel of virtually the same length so there was no real difference.

Reference external mantlets: they do mean that the weight of the weapon is pushed further forward so can easily overbalance the turret and require some form of counter weight at the rear which further stresses the turret rotation and turret ring bearings. 

I'll bet that 76.2mm Matilda had a damn crowded turret. They went to a Cavalier Turret to get the quite compact 6 Pounder onto a Matilda II in the UK so the UK could have fitted a 75mm into the Matilda II.


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## stug3 (May 12, 2013)

German troops surrender to the crew of a Stuart tank near Frendj, 6 May 1943.







A captured German Tiger I tank, 6 May 1943.






Troops with captured German Nebelwerfer rocket launchers, 7 May 1943.


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## stug3 (May 13, 2013)

Rhodesian troops of the 60th King's Royal Rifles in a Bedford MWD 15cwt truck in the Western Desert






Sappers of the Highland Division defusing German "S" mines. These contain 260 pieces of shrapnel and go off under slight pressure.


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## vinnye (May 13, 2013)

Seeing the Tiger knocked out - can not see any damage?
I was wondering how many were captured in good condition in Libya?
There is one in the tank museum in Bovington. I think a Churchill fired a round that ricocheted off the lower part of the 88 barrell and stuck in between the turret and body - immobilizing the turret. The crew bailed out and the tank was captured and given a close scrutiny to see if any weaknesses could be found.


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## tomo pauk (May 13, 2013)

There were no Tigers in Libya, the 1st ones in Africa were deployed in late 1942 in Tunisia.


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## vinnye (May 13, 2013)

You are of course correct Tommo Pauk, my bad.
Now I have my geography correct, were there other Tigers captured intact?
If so, what happened to them?


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## stug3 (May 13, 2013)

Maybe it ran out of gas.


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## vinnye (May 13, 2013)

That is a real possibility - there are no obvious signs of battle damage.
I thought that the German Panzer troops usually destroyed any vehicle that they had to abandon - unless they were pretty certain that they could recover the vehicle.


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## parsifal (May 13, 2013)

According to the tiger website, it belonged to the schwere Panzer-Abteilung 504. One tiger is recorded as having been destroyed that day, destroyed by the crew. The tank either broke down, and could not move, or far more likely simply ran out of fuel.

However, I consider this to be still a loss to enemy (alied) action, and most probably attributable to air power. The Tiger was a formidable opponent, and seldom lost to direct action. However many were lost to breakdowns, abandoned by crew, or ran out of fuel. The losses to fuel shortages were often due to the long term effects of air interdiction, and the breakdowns, well we dont actually know how many, but again shortages of spares at the front due to allied air activity and mechanical defects due to near misses and the like has to be considered a high probablity for such losses.

The worst day in Tunisia was in March, from memory, where 7 were lost in one day, 3 due to fires started by by near misses from aircraft carrying (I presume) incendiary loadouts.

Tigers acquired a fearsome reputation during and after the war. As one website reports....."Soon the sight of even one Tiger entering battle caused the blood in Allied troops to run cold. The Tiger’s high-velocity 88 mm main gun could outshoot anything they had, and armor piercing shells bounced off the Tiger’s thick armor – even from ranges as close as 50 meters. In an attack against Allied positions in the Medjerda river valley of northwest Tunisia not long after, s.Pz.-Abt. 501 reported that “fleeing enemy columns and tanks were observed as soon as the Tigers appeared.”

Over time, the fearsome and intimidating reputation of the Tiger grew to mythic proportions. Maj. Christopher W. Wilbeck noted in his study of German heavy tank battalions that whenever a German tank appeared, regardless of type, “_Among the Allied armies, units continually reported that Tiger tanks were in their sector or that they had destroyed Tiger tanks_.”

Though destroying a Tiger was high-risk bordering on suicide early in the war, disabling one was not. The Allies’ most successful anti-Tiger tactic in Tunisia was a retrograde maneuver, laying anti-tank mines guarded by antitank guns. When a Tiger was immobilized by a mine, antitank guns could take it under fire, or artillery fire was called in. Later in France, tactical air – fighter-bombers using rockets and bombs – proved the most effective countermeasure.

In March 1943 s.Pz.-Abt. 501 was succeeded by s.Pz.-Abt. 504. During the two months it operated in Tunisia before the surrender of all Axis troops in Tunisia, s.Pz.-Abt. 504 destroyed more than 150 enemy tanks and had a kill ratio of 18.8 enemy tanks for every Tiger lost".


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## vinnye (May 14, 2013)

I am not surprised that the Tiger had quite a high kill ratio - especially in Tunisia.
They had plenty of targets, and were usually very well handled by experienced crews.
Against them, in some cases were either light tanks or M3's with inexperienced crews.
They also had the advantage of being in well prepared dug in defensive positions. 
This means any attack is usually funneled by mines or terrain into the killing field.
The attacker knows they are going to take high losses in such cases.


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## stug3 (May 14, 2013)

British Long Range Desert Group- LRDG- patrol group leaving Siwa oasis, 25 May 1942






LRDG 30-cwt Chevrolet trucks


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## redcoat (May 14, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> , one might picture himself the Churchill in Soviet use, armed with their 57mm - the Tiger-hunting Winnie...


In the Italian and Northern European campaigns one troop out of each squadron of Churchill tanks was armed with the 6 pdr (with APDS) to give them some ability to deal with the heavy German tanks


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## redcoat (May 14, 2013)

parsifal said:


> In March 1943 s.Pz.-Abt. 501 was succeeded by s.Pz.-Abt. 504. During the two months it operated in Tunisia before the surrender of all Axis troops in Tunisia, s.Pz.-Abt. 504 destroyed more than 150 enemy tanks and had a kill ratio of 18.8 enemy tanks for every Tiger lost".


These are raw claims, they have not been confirmed by any research as far as I'm aware, and if true would mean that Tigers destroyed nearly half of the US and British tanks lost in the period these units were in operation in Tunisia.


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## parsifal (May 14, 2013)

redcoat said:


> These are raw claims, they have not been confirmed by any research as far as I'm aware, and if true would mean that Tigers destroyed nearly half of the US and British tanks lost in the period these units were in operation in Tunisia.



I agree, but then you would have to apply similar tests to the claims made by allied tankers as well. In the end we need figures of the admitted losses for each side, and put that up against the claims that are made by each side. 

Im no fan of the tiger, incidentally. I think its reputation is vastly overblown, and its real costs to german industry and the economy cleverly concealed. It was an expensive toy that acquired a fearsome reputation. How much of that reputation was real and how much imagined, is open to debate.


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## tomo pauk (May 15, 2013)

redcoat said:


> In the Italian and Northern European campaigns one troop out of each squadron of Churchill tanks was armed with the 6 pdr (with APDS) to give them some ability to deal with the heavy German tanks



That was a sensible thing to do, indeed. The 6 pdr APDS should be able to harm Tiger I (both vs. hull and vs. turret) and Panther G (turret, but not front hull, according to this).



redcoat said:


> These are raw claims, they have not been confirmed by any research as far as I'm aware, and if true would mean that Tigers destroyed nearly half of the US and British tanks lost in the period these units were in operation in Tunisia.



Seems like we need a thread about tank/AT claims and kills


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## redcoat (May 17, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> Seems like we need a thread about tank/AT claims and kills


That would be a king-size can of worms !!!!


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## parsifal (May 18, 2013)

Oh yes....there are previous member that claim not a single Tiger lost to direct enemy action in the whole of Normandy. Tigers are a sacred cow of the first order.....Im surpised we have not been attacked for our heresies even nowk


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## Shortround6 (May 18, 2013)

Why Yes, obviously you are not aware that NOT A SINGLE TIGER TANK was taken out by direct enemy fire. ALL TIGER losses are a result of the crews being _STABBED IN THE BACK_ by home front politicians.........


Oh, wait.....that was World War I, sorry


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## stug3 (May 20, 2013)

Chevrolet truck and its three man crew in the Western Desert. The gunner beside the driver is manning an Italian Breda machine gun, while the soldier in the back is ready with the Lewis gun.







Two fully loaded LRDG Chevrolet 30cwt trucks, 1942.


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## redcoat (May 24, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Oh yes....there are previous member that claim not a single Tiger lost to direct enemy action in the whole of Normandy. Tigers are a sacred cow of the first order.....Im surpised we have not been attacked for our heresies even nowk


The first Tiger lost to direct enemy fire in Normandy was taken out by a British Sherman with a 75mm gun firing at it's frontal armour !!!!!
The two tanks blundered into one another on a narrow lane, the Sherman crew reacted first and hit the Tiger on the drivers vision port wounding the driver and causing a small fire inside the tank. The Tiger's commander on hearing the cry of the wounded driver and seeing the smoke ordered the crew to bale out, the tank was then captured by the British who found it in full working order.


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## DonL (May 24, 2013)

> Oh yes....there are previous member that claim not a single Tiger lost to direct enemy action in the whole of Normandy. Tigers are a sacred cow of the first order.....Im surpised we have not been attacked for our heresies even nowk



That's not correct!
Soeren claimed that no *TigerII* was ever penetrated frontal from any enemy tank at the western front (especially battle of the bulge).
And till now there is no real prove for the contrary.


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## redcoat (May 25, 2013)

DonL said:


> That's not correct!
> Soeren claimed that no *TigerII* was ever penetrated frontal from any enemy tank at the western front (especially battle of the bulge).
> And till now there is no real prove for the contrary.


One of the first Tiger II's lost on the Western Front was lost when its crew abandoned it after being rammed by a British Sherman during Operation Goodwood. !!!!


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## DonL (May 25, 2013)

Is ramming frontal penetration?


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## redcoat (May 25, 2013)

DonL said:


> Is ramming frontal penetration?


In this case no, it hit it on the rear drive sprocket.


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## DonL (May 25, 2013)

So!!!!!, No one here in this forum ever claimed that no Tiger II was lost or abandoned by it's crew after my memory, only that no Tiger II was ever penetrated from the front, equal at which range from an enemy tank.


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## redcoat (May 25, 2013)

DonL said:


> So!!!!!, No one here in this forum ever claimed that no Tiger II was lost or abandoned by it's crew after my memory, only that no Tiger II was ever penetrated from the front, equal at which range from an enemy tank.


I never claimed that they had. 
I merely thought the story was interesting


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## stug3 (May 26, 2013)

A Churchill tank leaves a tank landing craft (TLC 121) during a combined operations exercise at Thorness Bay on the Isle of Wight, 27 May 1942


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## parsifal (May 26, 2013)

Looks wet


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## stug3 (May 29, 2013)

Grant tanks of 3rd Royal Tank Regiment in the Western Desert, 24 March 1942.











The driver of a Grant tank takes a closer look at a gouge in the armour plate made by a 50mm anti-tank round, Libya, June 1942.


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## vinnye (May 29, 2013)

That would have made your ears ring!


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## Glider (May 29, 2013)

He was a lucky boy


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## fastmongrel (May 29, 2013)

I hope he had his goggles on because chips of paint and dust off the inside of the plate would be swirling around at very high speed.


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## stug3 (May 31, 2013)

Rommel in his command vehicle 'Greif'







A truck mounted 6-pdr anti-tank gun in the Western Desert, 1942.






A 25-pdr field gun and 'Quad' artillery tractor in the Western Desert, 1942.






A 6-pdr anti-tank gun in action in the Western Desert, 1942.


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## vinnye (Jun 1, 2013)

Is it me or does the 6 pdr on the truck and as a field gun look quite a large gun BUT when you see a 6pdr in a tank it looks quite small?


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## fastmongrel (Jun 1, 2013)

vinnye said:


> Is it me or does the 6 pdr on the truck and as a field gun look quite a large gun BUT when you see a 6pdr in a tank it looks quite small?



It does doesnt it. I think though its all perspective even a small tank like a Crusader is a good bit bigger than what looks like a 1 ton size truck. If you compare it to a Valentine which is a real small tank the 6 pounder doesnt look so small.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 1, 2013)

vinnye said:


> Is it me or does the 6 pdr on the truck and as a field gun look quite a large gun BUT when you see a 6pdr in a tank it looks quite small?



Depends on the size of the truck;


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## stug3 (Jun 1, 2013)

A Stuart tank uses a knocked-out PzKpfw III tank as cover while observing the enemy, June 1942.






A knocked-out German PzKpfw III tank being examined by infantry.






A Bren gun carrier crew take the surrender of a survivor from a burning enemy tank.


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## fastmongrel (Jun 1, 2013)

Great pics again stug3 keep em coming


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## MacArther (Jun 3, 2013)

What about taking the Stuart and rushing the production slash development of the M8 HMC? Then, you can move onto the less than ideal but serviceable M8A1 with the M3 75mm gun (although, you won't see me fitting into that turret!).


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## stug3 (Jun 3, 2013)

MacArther said:


> What about taking the Stuart and rushing the production slash development of the M8 HMC? Then, you can move onto the less than ideal but serviceable M8A1 with the M3 75mm gun (although, you won't see me fitting into that turret!).




The additional weight might make it too slow for a scout/recon tank.


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## fastmongrel (Jun 3, 2013)

Isnt the M3 75mm gun a bit too big for a Stuart having seen one in a museum it was a tight squeeze with a 37mm gun. A Hetzer type vehicle with a 75mm might have been possible but still a bit snug for anyone other than Droopy and Sneezy.


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## tomo pauk (Jun 3, 2013)

No turret, though:


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## fastmongrel (Jun 3, 2013)

Tomo that looks like it would drive across country like a shopping cart with a missing wheel.


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## tomo pauk (Jun 3, 2013)

Anyway, here is it's companion, armed with Flakvierling. Dave ought to love this baby:


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## stug3 (Jun 3, 2013)

fastmongrel said:


> Isnt the M3 75mm gun a bit too big for a Stuart having seen one in a museum it was a tight squeeze with a 37mm gun. A Hetzer type vehicle with a 75mm might have been possible but still a bit snug for anyone other than Droopy and Sneezy.




I think MacArther was thinking more along the lines of the M8A1 which had a bigger, open topped turret with a howitzer or medium caliber tank gun.


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## fastmongrel (Jun 3, 2013)

Ahh got you was thinking of a tank not an SP gun. Even the M8 cant have had much room with an M3 gun in it and not much ammo a 75mm gun round is about twice as long as the 75mm howitzer round.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 3, 2013)

M8s have an open topped turret and no co-ax machine gun. They are NOT tanks, 46 rounds of 75mm howitzer ammo and 400 rounds of .50 cal ammo. drivers have to enter and exit through the the turret. 

The US built prototypes of an awful lot of "stuff". Since combat was at least 3000 miles away most of this "stuff" was never used in combat unlike some of the German "stuff".


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## stug3 (Jun 5, 2013)

Valentine tanks training in the Western Desert, 27 March 1942. A solidly armoured 'infantry tank', it only had a 2 pounder gun which had been useful when confronting the Italians but was no match for the German tanks.






A lorry-mounted 2-pdr anti-tank gun passes a destroyed German PzKpfw tank in the Western Desert, 2 June 1942.






A British infantryman takes the surrender of the crew of an enemy supply truck in the Western Desert, 2 June 1942.


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## stug3 (Jun 6, 2013)

A Sherman tank leaves a landing craft during an exercise on the North African coast, 1943.


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## MacArther (Jun 6, 2013)

stug3 said:


> I think MacArther was thinking more along the lines of the M8A1 which had a bigger, open topped turret with a howitzer or medium caliber tank gun.



Yep, that was the model I was looking at. Not ideal, but better than no HE and still out-ranges the other guns the Brits would be using on their tanks. Either use the M8 in the Direct fire role, or use the M8A1. Replace when possible with better designed tanks!


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## stug3 (Jun 9, 2013)

25-pdr field guns in action in the Western Desert, March 1942






Indian desert patrol, 1942. Dont know what vehicle that is. Staghound?


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## Glider (Jun 9, 2013)

I think its a Marmon-Herrington Mk II armoured car. These were designed and built in South Africa and used extensively in the Middle East.


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## stug3 (Jun 9, 2013)

Nice one Glider


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## stug3 (Jun 11, 2013)

Well, I dont think these Italians have to worry about a bayonet charge or frontal assault in this spot, huh? I bet they learned to watch where they sat pretty quick. Looks like a 20mm. Tunisia 1943


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## Shortround6 (Jun 11, 2013)

47mm AT/inf gun.


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## stug3 (Jun 11, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> 47mm AT/inf gun.



That is a *short* barrel, I guess that thing didnt get much velocity.


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## Civettone (Jun 11, 2013)

The Bohler 47/32 was an okay AT-gun ... for 1940 


I always liked the Crusader (Mk.III) tank. It just looks like a modern day tank! If it had better armour, I think it would have been perfect for El Alamein and up to Tunisia.

Kris


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## stug3 (Jun 12, 2013)

A CMP 3-ton truck carrying infantry passes along a road as bombs from Stuka dive-bombers explode in the distance, 4 June 1942


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## vinnye (Jun 12, 2013)

I always liked the Crusader - a pretty little tank, but the problem with the Mk III was the 3 man crew. The commander had to be loader and radio man!


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## stug3 (Jun 13, 2013)

Knocked out Valentines, 1942


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## Shortround6 (Jun 13, 2013)

Nice picture but I think they are Valentines.


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## MacArther (Jun 17, 2013)

Soooo....no further thoughts on the M8A1 or the M8 HMC? I'm not strategy minded, so would they be viable on the front lines for the British prior to more 57mm guns and 75mm guns arriving?


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## Shortround6 (Jun 17, 2013)

Lousy set up for front line use. Only machine gun was the .50 cal on top. while there were hatches in front plate they were for vision, drivers actually entered and exited through the turret. Ammo was in rather short supply, in use as SP guns they frequantly towed a limber (trailer) behind the vehicle with more ammo. And that is for the howitzer, not the 75mm tank gun. 

And finally the armor is none too thick. Upper hull front and sides have about 28mm of armor and turret front 38mm? You are in trouble against a MK III with a _short_ 50mm gun.


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## Glider (Jun 17, 2013)

A number of the K tanks did carry a 3in Howitzer instead of the 2 pd so I don't see what the M8 would have added


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## MacArther (Jun 18, 2013)

Glider said:


> A number of the K tanks did carry a 3in Howitzer instead of the 2 pd so I don't see what the M8 would have added


I was always led to believe that the 3in Howitzer was primarily used for smoke shells.


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## fastmongrel (Jun 18, 2013)

Your possibly thinking of the 3.7 inch breechloading mortar that equipped some pre war tanks, I think this only came with smoke rounds. The 3 inch was designed to fire HE rounds and smoke though it wasnt exactly a stellar performer.






British tank ammo the 3 inch is the 76x134R round.


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## fastmongrel (Jun 18, 2013)

A NZ Valentine firing its 3 inch


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## stug3 (Jun 18, 2013)

A Grant tank crew loading up with ammunition from a truck, June 1942











Stuart tanks in the Western Desert, 1942


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## Shortround6 (Jun 18, 2013)

fastmongrel said:


> British tank ammo the 3 inch is the 76x134R round.



The US 3 in Howitzer did not use the same ammo as the British 3 in tank "howitzer". 

The American cartridge case was about twice as long. 

The British 3in was a dual purpose (smoke/HE) gun, but it's muzzle velocity was 600-700fps. This was about what what the US howitzer ( a true howitzer, in that it's ammo was separate loading with zone charges) could do with it's lowest charge. Using it's highest charge the US howitzer was close in performance to the short 75mm gun used on early German MK IV tanks which by 1942 standards was out of date.


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## MacArther (Jun 18, 2013)

I will still argue that at least getting more 3 inch howitzer tanks or M8 and M8A1's would have been a good interim solution for North Africa. Using them into Tunisia or even Sicily/Italy? Probably not such a sound idea.

As to what the M8A1 might add...well it can theoretically engage tanks and soft targets at much longer ranges than the 40mm guns can, and it definitely has a better HE round (although that isn't saying much). Also, I would think (but not sure) that the M3/M5 Stuart's reliability and ease of maintenance would carry over to the M8 and M8A1. Also, just from what I've seen/remember the two Stuart models are pretty small and nimble, and while the bustle/turret on the HMC looks unwieldy, I do think that it is a much smaller target than a Grant/Lee, definitely smaller than a Sherman, and I'm not sure how it compares to a Valentine or Cruiser tank with a 3 inch howitzer.

Also, thanks for the correction on the rounds used by the 3 inch howitzer VS the 3.7 inch breech mortar.


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## nincomp (Jun 18, 2013)

fastmongrel said:


> Your possibly thinking of the 3.7 inch breechloading mortar that equipped some pre war tanks, I think this only came with smoke rounds. The 3 inch was designed to fire HE rounds and smoke though it wasnt exactly a stellar performer.



Although a little off subject, looking at the ratio of case volume (powder) to projectile size, it is easy to see why the 57mm round was better than the 75x350R (used by Sherman Tanks) for armor penetration, even when the 57mm used solid shot. 

For Americans in particular, another interesting comparison is the standard Sherman's "75" (75x350R) and the 17 pounder (76x583R) that the British used to upgun some of their Shermans into "Sherman Firefly" tanks for the invasion of Normandy. Guess which one did better against Tiger and Panther tanks? 
Relatively few Americans know that the Sherman Fireflys even existed, much less that the US had ignored the British insistence that they would be needed. 

-To be fair, the 75mm did have more effective HE performance for infantry support.


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## redcoat (Jun 18, 2013)

nincomp said:


> For Americans in particular, another interesting comparison is the standard Sherman's "75" (75x350R) and the 17 pounder (76x583R) that the British used to upgun some of their Sherman's into "Sherman Firefly" tanks for the invasion of Normandy. Guess which one did better against Tiger and Panther tanks?
> Relatively few Americans know that the Sherman Fireflies even existed, much less that the US had ignored the British insistence that they would be needed.
> 
> -To be fair, the 75mm did have more effective HE performance for infantry support.


The Sherman Firefly was a last minute modification that only reached the first British armoured units just before D-Day, it would have been impossible for there to have been enough built in that time to equip US armored units as well.

The US did actually order some Sherman Fireflies but they weren't delivered until it was too late for use in the European war.


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## fastmongrel (Jun 19, 2013)

redcoat said:


> The Sherman Firefly was a last minute modification that only reached the first British armoured units just before D-Day, it would have been impossible for there to have been enough built in that time to equip US armored units as well.
> 
> The US did actually order some Sherman Fireflies but they weren't delivered until it was too late for use in the European war.



The idea for the Firefly was first proposed in Jan 43 and design work started in June 43. Vickers started work in Aug 43 and it became an official Dept of Tank Design project in Sept. In Oct 43 the Army got in on the project and were very enthusiastic. The reason it was only becoming available in June 44 was that the gun barrel and cradle had to be specially made for the Firefly it was a different shape to the normal 17pdr, setting up a production line takes a long time. 

I wouldnt call 12 months from initial design to field use last minute especially for a large organisation like the military thats positively breakneck speed particulary as it took three times as long for the Cromwell to go from 1st design to production standard.

Actual conversion of a Sherman to a Firefly was relatively quick a box fresh Sherman went in one end of the workshop and came out the other end with a different turret as a Firefly in a week iirc. Britain wanted bare hulls with just running gear fitted and turret castings to modify but the lines in Detroit couldnt be interrupted for a relatively small special order so complete tanks had to be used which slowed things down.


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## tomo pauk (Jun 19, 2013)

One might contemplate the US 76mm with APDS round - the AP performance equal to the 77mm HV, whilst easier to pull for the US Sherman fleet?


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## MacArther (Jun 19, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> One might contemplate the US 76mm with APDS round - the AP performance equal to the 77mm HV, whilst easier to pull for the US Sherman fleet?



Ah, but would either of those been ready in time for the battle of El Alamein?


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## nincomp (Jun 19, 2013)

MacArther said:


> Ah, but would either of those been ready in time for the battle of El Alamein?


Only if a Time-Machine was involved.
Sorry for derailing the thread.
-Jim


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## parsifal (Jun 20, 2013)

in any event, a gun with enhanced AP performance in 1942 wasnt what the British needed so much as a gun that was both AP and HE effective. 6 pdr was more than adequate for ant-armour work 1942-4. What put the British in a world of hurt wasnt the german tank mounted weapons, it was the AT version of the 88mm, and taking a towed AT gun out was best done by HE, not AP. Thats was the very problem facing the British, their quite good 2pdr andf 6pdr tank mounted guns were quite good ATGs, but sucked as HE firing weapons


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## Glider (Jun 20, 2013)

A good start would be giving the tank HE ammo for the 6pd


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## fastmongrel (Jun 20, 2013)

Glider said:


> A good start would be giving the tank HE ammo for the 6pd



There was a proposal for a heavy 6 pdr HE round, it would have been longer and set deeper in the case. It would have had completely different ballistics and would have required a modified sight. I dont know when this was proposed probably about the time the 75mm was coming into British service. The standard 6 pdr HE round was okay but didnt have much explosive.


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## redcoat (Jun 20, 2013)

Glider said:


> A good start would be giving the tank HE ammo for the 6pd


Churchill tanks armed with the 6 pdr were issued with HE rounds in both the Italian and Northern European Campaigns.

One troop in each squadron of Churchills in both these campaigns retained 6 pdr armed Churchills in order to give them some ability to take on the heavier German tanks


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## yulzari (Jun 20, 2013)

fastmongrel said:


> There was a proposal for a heavy 6 pdr HE round, it would have been longer and set deeper in the case. It would have had completely different ballistics and would have required a modified sight. I dont know when this was proposed probably about the time the 75mm was coming into British service. The standard 6 pdr HE round was okay but didnt have much explosive.



That is right. The solution found to improving 6 pounder HE shells was to use a larger barrel and use standard issue allied 75mm HE. Not rebored as often is said. They simply made this change to new production ROF tank guns which gradually superceded the 6 pounder vehicles in service. 

As early production went to D Day preperations, this left the Italian front with the problem unsolved. Hence the Churchill 75mmNA improvisation to reuse Sherman 75mm guns and mantlets on Churchill 6 pounder turrets for infantry HE support whilst retaining some 6 pounder tanks for anti tank protection.

But back to pre El Alamein................


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## stug3 (Jun 21, 2013)

The crew of a British truck on the ground while their vehicle is bombed.


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## Jabberwocky (Jun 24, 2013)

I'm not sure if this has been brought up here before - the thread is long and the search function is a bit... flaky - but Tony Williams made an alternative timeline for an improved 57 mm HE lobber and general hole puncher: AN ALTERNATIVE 1930s BRITISH TANK GUN

The 'what if' proposal is based around the idea that a better gun than the 2 lbs could be fielded pre WW2, given the size limitations of British pre-war tanks. 

He takes the 57x307R cartridge of the 6 pdr 8 cwt gun as a starting point, updates it with modern (for the period) powder and puts it in a 43 cal barrel, which Tony gives as the limit for the machinery of the period.

Ammunition follows two streams - a large heavy HE shell with a low M/V (4 kg shell with a 540 m/sec muzzel velocity) and a APCR (HVAP) shell with a 1.8 kg round fired at 850 m/sec.

This gives us a HE round with 50% more filler than the standard 6 pounder, but reduced effectiveness AP round (~50 mm with a steel core at 1000 yards and 30 deg and ~70-75 mm with a tungsten core).

He also has a proposal for scaling the gun up, based around the 76.2x420R. Same procedure for the ammunition - a low velocity high capcity HE shell (9 kg at 500 m/sec) and a AP round with the ability to penetrate ~90-95 mm with steel core and ~130-140 mm with a tungsten core, roughly between the US 76 mm APCBC and the UK 77 mm APCBC in terms of performance.


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## tomo pauk (Jun 24, 2013)

UK did have had another chance for a better 'small gun' (vs. 2pdr), namely the adoption of either French or Czech 47mm - not that far fetched, if we consider the introduction of Swiss, Swedish and Czech weapons in the UK in late 1930s.
The AP and HE performance would've been in the league of the German short 5cm.


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## fastmongrel (Jun 24, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> UK did have had another chance for a better 'small gun' (vs. 2pdr), namely the adoption of either French or Czech 47mm - not that far fetched, if we consider the introduction of Swiss, Swedish and Czech weapons in the UK in late 1930s.
> The AP and HE performance would've been in the league of the German short 5cm.



Dont forget Belgian, US and French as well. Britain didnt seem to suffer from Not Invented Here syndrome when it came to guns. I can think of Minie musket (French) Snider breechloader (Swiss I think) Martini Henry rifle (Swiss/N American/British) Gatling, Hotchkiss and Nordenfeldt man powered MGs (US/Swedish) Lee Enfield (US/British) Lewis LMG(US/Belgian) Vickers HMG(US) and the 15 pounder Quick Firing gun (German)


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## stug3 (Jun 27, 2013)

Troops inspecting a German PzKpfw III tank, knocked out by a 2-pdr anti-tank gun in the Western Desert, 2 June 1942.


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## parsifal (Jun 27, 2013)

a two pounder knocked the turret off???? that seems very unlikely.....


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## Shortround6 (Jun 27, 2013)

ammunition explosion could lift the turret.


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## stug3 (Jul 2, 2013)

A South African sapper removing anti-personnel mines from protective containers, Egypt, July 1942.






A South African sapper carrying a stack of mines.


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## redcoat (Jul 2, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> ammunition explosion could lift the turret.


Indeed, internal explosions of the tanks own ammo was the usual cause of turret removal on destroyed tanks


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## tomo pauk (Jul 2, 2013)

An M-84 (Yugoslavian update of the T-72) with the turret blown up (due to ammo fire explosion), that landed on barrel 1st. Effort of of under-gunned outnumbered defenders of Vukovar, Croatia, autumn of 1991:


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## Civettone (Jul 2, 2013)

Cool pic, Tomo !


Kris


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## stug3 (Jul 3, 2013)

Major G J “Lemmie” le Mesurier, Officer Commanding No. 1 Squadron SAAF, standing by his Hawker Hurricane Mark IIB, BG971 ‘AX-V’, at LG 92, Egypt. On 3 July 1942 le Mesurier, flying BG971, led eleven Hurricanes to intercept a dive-bombing raid in the El Alamein area. While the aircraft of No. 274 Squadron RAF provided top cover the South African Hurricanes attacked a large formation of Junkers Ju 87Bs and succeeded in shooting down thirteen in what was to become known as the Alamein “Stuka Party”. The following day, le Mesurier was himself shot down and wounded. He did not return to the Squadron until the following September.







A Humber Mk II armoured car of the 12th Royal Lancers on patrol south of El Alamein, July 1942.






4.5-inch field gun firing at night against enemy armoured concentrations at El Alamein, July 1942.






Soldiers search the body of an Italian infantryman for identification, 11 July 1942


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## stug3 (Jul 6, 2013)

Grant and Lee tanks of ‘C’ Squadron, 4th (Queen’s Own) Hussars, 2nd Armoured Brigade, El Alamein, Egypt, July 1942.






The command post of 83rd and 85th Batteries, 11th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery at El Alamein, July 1942.






A 25-pdr field gun of 11th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, in action during the First Battle of El Alamein


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## fastmongrel (Jul 6, 2013)

Just a thought that occured looking at stug3s photo of a Lee and a Grant, did they ever operate without the turret as a form of self propelled gun.


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## parsifal (Jul 6, 2013)

The M3 chassis was used as the basis for some of the earlier M7 Priest SPGs. Most m7s hoiwever used the m4 sherman chassis


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## stug3 (Jul 8, 2013)

Rommel with Italian troops in the desert. The Semovente 75/18 SPG was probably the best AFV fielded by the Italians during the war.






The port facilities Tobruk had been bombed relentlessly, alternately by the British and the Germans.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 8, 2013)

Are you talking about just pulling the turret from an M3 and trying to use what was left as either a tank destroyer or SP artillery piece? 

Pulling the turret lowers the silhouette but also lowers the height of commander for observation purposes. 

The sponson mounted gun is not a very good set up for an artillery piece.

Basically the same gun ( same ammo anyway) when mounted on a half track had 40 degrees of traverse instead of 30 degrees and 29 degrees elevation instead of 20 degrees for more range. Even if pulling the turret allows for more ammo storage and working space for an extra crewman ( fuse setter/fitter/ loader) the M3 tank chassis is an expensive and limited chassis for a 75mm _artillery_ piece.


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## parsifal (Jul 8, 2013)

> Rommel with Italian troops in the desert. The Semovente 75/18 SPG was probably the best AFV fielded by the Italians during the war



There were probably better tanks designed and built (albeit in miniscule numbers), but the Semovente armed with the 75/18 gun was probably the best combination suited to Italian limited Industrial capacity at the time. Its a prime example of getting the most out of "off the shelf" technologies, by marrying existing technologies (the M13 chassis to the 75/18 gun) to achieve a really effective synergy of the two pieces of hardware. 

The Germans would have done well to look more closely at the 75/18 concept in their own AFV development, rather than design grandiose behemoths like the Tiger. A totally effective design, but almost totally completely imparactical due to its crushing development and unit costs.


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## stug3 (Jul 8, 2013)

parsifal said:


> The Germans would have done well to look more closely at the 75/18 concept in their own AFV development




I think they nailed it pretty well with the Stug III IV. If you mean they would have been better off using the resources that went into producing Tigers, Elefants and other similar monstrosities on cranking out more Stugs, I would agree with you.


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## parsifal (Jul 8, 2013)

yes, that is what mean....the panther was also a good design for the germans, if a little over complex and some would argue 9me included) still a little expensive, though not as flamboyant as the tiger. 

Its ironic that the Stug remainined under the control of the artillery branch of the heer (rather then the Panzer Truppen) for most of the war. im not sure how much that retarded the usage of the type as an AT platform, but it cant have helped.


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## fastmongrel (Jul 9, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> Are you talking about just pulling the turret from an M3 and trying to use what was left as either a tank destroyer or SP artillery piece?



Yes as an SP Artillery piece. I know there were considerably better vehicles but I was just wondering if in a pinch someone removed the turret to make an SP gun when nothing else was available. I have had a look inside a Grant at a museum and there isnt a lot of room for the crew of the 75mm because of the turret and its associated equipment. The Royal Artillery used the Bishop and that was a lash up that probably wasnt much better.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 9, 2013)

Well, for the US they already had the Half-track mounted version. Wider covered arc without moving the vehicle, greater elevation for greater range, more working space. Granted most of these weapons were planned for the tank destroyer command but The US had ordered 500 T30s ( half tracks with 75mm howitzers) and 324 T19s ( half tracks with 105mm howitzers) which filled the gap until the M7s showed up. 

The lash up Bishop shows some of the penalties with "quicky" conversions. Limited rate of fire, limited ammo capacity limited traverse ( and no "platform" to allow an easy swing.) and limited elevation that cut max range by around 1/3.


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## stug3 (Jul 10, 2013)

Quad artillery tractor and 25-pdr field gun of 9th Australian Division, July 1942.






German 621st Radio Intercept Company unit


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## stug3 (Jul 14, 2013)

Italian M13/40 knocked out by anti-tank guns near El Alamein, July 1942






Crusader Mk II






Humber Mk II armoured car in the Western Desert, 1942


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## redcoat (Jul 14, 2013)

fastmongrel said:


> Yes as an SP Artillery piece. I know there were considerably better vehicles but I was just wondering if in a pinch someone removed the turret to make an SP gun when nothing else was available. I have had a look inside a Grant at a museum and there isnt a lot of room for the crew of the 75mm because of the turret and its associated equipment. The Royal Artillery used the Bishop and that was a lash up that probably wasnt much better.


The M7 Priest, which was basically what you are suggesting, fought at the Second Battle of El Alamein.
The field conversion of any Grant tanks earlier than this would have been counter productive as until the Sherman arrived (also at the Second Battle Of El Alamein) the Grant was the best tank the British had, and they had nowhere near enough.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M7_Priest


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## stug3 (Jul 20, 2013)

A soldier inspects a dug-in German 88mm anti-tank gun abandoned during the enemy retreat in the Western Desert, July 1942.






An Australian soldier with a captured German MG 34 machine gun, July 1942.






Infantry manning a sandbagged defensive position near El Alamein, July 1942.






A 4.5-inch field gun of 64th Medium Regiment, Royal Artillery, in action in the Western Desert, 28 July 1942






4.5-inch field gun in action south of El Alamein, July 1942


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## stug3 (Jul 22, 2013)

Tank transporters carrying re-conditioned Crusader tanks back to the front line, 23 July 1942






A German 88mm anti-tank gun captured and destroyed by New Zealand troops near El Alamein, 17 July 1942.






Vickers machine gun team near El Alamein, July 1942.






A 25-pdr field gun of 11th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, in action during the First Battle of El Alamein, July 1942.


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## stug3 (Jul 26, 2013)

Famous picture of Special Air Service commander Colonel David Stirling and an SAS jeep patrol, 18 January 1943


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## Civettone (Jul 28, 2013)

stug3 said:


> Famous picture of Special Air Service commander Colonel David Stirling and an SAS jeep patrol, 18 January 1943


One of the most iconic pictures of WW2. Absolutely lovely !!


Kris


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## stug3 (Aug 15, 2013)

A Grant tank loaded onto a Diamond T transporter, August 1942. 






A Jeep being tested on sharp gradients in the Western Desert, 1942.


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## stug3 (Aug 30, 2013)

Crusader tanks in the Western Desert, 1942 







Crews of Crusader tanks resting beside their vehicles


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## fastmongrel (Aug 30, 2013)

I know the Crusader wasnt the best tank in the world (though not as bad as some people believe) but it is one of the best looking tanks ever built..


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## vinnye (Aug 31, 2013)

Totally agree, the Crusader was a good looking tank. I believe someone explained that a lot of the early reliability issues were down to poor preparation for transportation etc?


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## fastmongrel (Aug 31, 2013)

vinnye said:


> Totally agree, the Crusader was a good looking tank. I believe someone explained that a lot of the early reliability issues were down to poor preparation for transportation etc?



I read a book about the Desert campaign where it said that the radiators were drained before being shipped. No one thought to tell the people who had to drive them from the wharf to the rail head so the tanks were driving at low speed (no airflow) on an engine that was known for being a bit hot running with no water in the rad or block. Also the air cooling fans were driven by a chain that needed a lot of maintenance and was in the direct line of all the dust blowing though the fans. Nuffield sent over teams to sort out the problems and apparently the problems were solved but by that time the Army had lost confidence in them and only wanted US tanks.


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## stug3 (Sep 1, 2013)

A knocked-out PzKpfw IV Ausf F2 tank, 6 September 1942






A British 6-pdr anti-tank gun in action in the desert, 3 September 1942






British troops use rocks for shelter as a German Kettenkrad tracked motorcycle burns in the background, 10 September 1942.






‘Australians storm a strongpoint’. A posed portrait of Australian troops advancing during the Second Battle of El Alamein


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## MacArther (Sep 1, 2013)

One thing I've wondered is why the British didn't invest in TD temporary designs in the darker days leading up to El Alamein? Something along the lines of the German's mounting a 47mm on a Pzr I chassis with the gun shield and everything, except with a 6 pounder on a older chassis.


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## vinnye (Sep 1, 2013)

Some interesting footage of the 6pdr ;

_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8DBhto48bnM_


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## fastmongrel (Sep 1, 2013)

MacArther said:


> One thing I've wondered is why the British didn't invest in TD temporary designs in the darker days leading up to El Alamein? Something along the lines of the German's mounting a 47mm on a Pzr I chassis with the gun shield and everything, except with a 6 pounder on a older chassis.



AEC Deacon


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## vinnye (Sep 1, 2013)

Another view ;
http://www.warwheels.net/images/AEC_Deacon_leftfront_HAUGH.jpg


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## vinnye (Sep 1, 2013)

This would have been very useful ;
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4a/Archer_SP_17_pdr_Tank_Destroyer.jpg


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## MacArther (Sep 1, 2013)

I see the Deacon, but why not an older tank chassis?


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## vinnye (Sep 2, 2013)

The ARCHER 17pdr spg, from Wiki ;
The Valentine chassis was soon chosen, as it was in production but obsolescent as a tank in British use and was also one of the few chassis that could accommodate such a large gun.[citation needed]The engine in the Archer had a higher power rating than in the Valentine.[2] The Valentine had a small hull and it was not possible to use a turret, the gun was mounted in a simple, low, open-topped armoured box, very much like the early Panzerjäger German self-propelled guns in appearance, with the gun facing to the rear which kept the length of the Archer short. The mounting allowed for 11 degrees of traverse to either side with elevation from -7.5 to +15 degrees


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## MacArther (Sep 2, 2013)

But didn't the Archer only appear in 1944? A little late for El Alamein....


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## vinnye (Sep 4, 2013)

True, but the Valentine was available, so its chassis was available and the 17 pdr was being delivered (in small numbers) in late 1941.
So it was a bit of a stretch to get Archer for Alamein, but the components were there!


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## Shortround6 (Sep 4, 2013)

vinnye said:


> True, but the Valentine was available, so its chassis was available and the 17 pdr was being delivered (in small numbers) in late 1941.
> So it was a bit of a stretch to get Archer for Alamein, but the components were there!



No, they weren't. 

There were 4 17pdrs delivered in 1941. They were the prototype guns for testing. Approval for production came in the spring of 1942 after testing. There were There were 670-699 guns (not carriages) built in all of 1942. They wanted the M-10 chassis but since those would be late in coming they started work on the Archer. It took around a year for start of work to start of production ( the British had had enough of ordering things "of the drawing board".

Please add shipping time around Africa to time from factory door to service use in North Africa.


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## stug3 (Sep 9, 2013)

A newly-arrived Sherman tank being loaded onto a ‘Z’ craft to be taken ashore at Port Tewfik, Egypt, 9 September 1942. The American built tank was at last putting British armour on an equal footing with the firepower of the Panzers. -






A soldiers stops to inspect the grave of a German tank crew, killed when their PzKpfw III tank, seen in the background, was knocked out in recent fighting in the Western Desert, 29 September 1942


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## parsifal (Sep 10, 2013)

> A newly-arrived Sherman tank being loaded onto a ‘Z’ craft to be taken ashore at Port Tewfik, Egypt, 9 September 1942. The American built tank was at last putting British armour on an equal footing with the firepower of the Panzers



I think only the PzKpfw IV (F) was superior to the Shermasn, but all other tanks in DAKs inventory were not as good as the Sherman.. And there were pitifully few Mk IV specials availble compared to the Sherman. At the time of Alamein, I believe about 50, compared to over 250 Shermans


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## MacArther (Sep 10, 2013)

parsifal said:


> I think only the PzKpfw IV (F) was superior to the Shermasn, but all other tanks in DAKs inventory were not as good as the Sherman.. And there were pitifully few Mk IV specials availble compared to the Sherman. At the time of Alamein, I believe about 50, compared to over 250 Shermans


Yeah, but DAK had plenty of AT guns and 88s to knock out those Sherman's.


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## yulzari (Sep 11, 2013)

The key point about the Sherman (and Grant) was the ability of the 75mm (an ex pre-WW1 field gun design) to fire effective HE at anti tank guns. This was exactly what the British tanks lacked. It was almost incidental that the 75mm could cope with most german tanks at the time.


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## stug3 (Sep 19, 2013)

A Crusader tank of 4th Light Armoured Brigade in the Western Desert, September 1942. 






The crew of a Crusader tank prepare a meal in the Western Desert, September 1942.


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## stug3 (Sep 26, 2013)

A Stuart tank is silhouetted against the setting sun as its commander scans the horizon, 1942. 







AEC Mk I armoured car equipped with a 2-pdr gun in the Western desert 






Bishop 25-pdr self-propelled gun, 1942






Tank crews receiving instruction on the Grant tank, September 1942






Staff officers examine a newly-arrived Sherman tank sitting on a Scammell Pioneer tank transporter, 15 September 1942.


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## stug3 (Sep 27, 2013)

42nd Armoured Division Exercise, Near Malton In Yorkshire, 29 September 1942. The Commander in Chief Home Forces, General Sir Bernard Paget, with the Division Commander, Major General M C Dempsey, DSO, MC, watching the exercise from a Crusader tank.


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## vinnye (Sep 27, 2013)

I liked the AEC armoured car photo so had a look for some more info.
In the Wiki article, it said that the early ones had the Valentine turret with 2pdr fitted.
It also said some were modified in the field to take a Crusader turret with 6pdr?
Saw this photo - looks Crusader but not 6pdr?
Redirect Notice


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## yulzari (Sep 28, 2013)

I think you will find that it was the Staghounds that were fitted with Crusader 6 pounder turrets. The Danes used them post war.

The AEC had it's own 6 pounder turret and that ended up being fitted to rebuilt Staghounds post war in Sudan and Lebanon. In the Lebanese case with ROF 75mm guns with ex Sherman 75mm guns and mantlets in the Sudanese case. I believe that AEC still had the turrets to sell but had moved the chassis production facilities to civilian lorries post war so put surplus Staghounds under them with whatever guns they could acquire cheaply.


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## vinnye (Sep 29, 2013)

From the Wiki article ; AEC Armoured Car - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

"The Mk I was first used in combat in the North African Campaign late in 1942, where a few vehicles were reportedly fitted with a Crusader tank turret mounting a 6 pounder gun. "


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