# Nuclear Deterrence & Massive Retaliation



## Zipper730 (Nov 23, 2018)

It seems that, by the time SAC was created (1946), that the assumption was that, the enormous destruction of such weapons would deter the Soviet Union, and any other country for that matter, from causing any trouble. The ideas seemed to vary from bombing city after city with nuclear weapons and firebombing when we didn't have nuclear weapons for to coerce a surrender, others called for unloading the whole enchilada all at once: LeMay, for example had proposed exactly this in 1949 (133 nuclear weapons, and firebombing raids when nukes were not available), and this basically would become the model for the Cold War after that point.

The Korean War came along, and it turned into a conventional conflict: While President Truman had threatened to use nuclear weapons as a posturing gesture, he never seemed to be seriously inclined in using them (McArthur did want to unload 30-50 of them on cities in China, possibly parts of North Korea), and their use explicitly required Presidential authority, though McArthur managed to secure release authority from the JCS before he was relieved of command.

After the Korean War, there was a concern about being able to maintain a powerful military without bankrupting ourselves, and concerns that the Communists could start conflicts and revolutions wherever they wanted, force our response over and over again, and in doing so, bleed us dry. So, we wanted the conflict to be at our place of choosing rather than theirs. There were basically two ideas in place.

Maintaining a nuclear bombing force for general war against the USSR, PRC, and the Communist Bloc, and a smaller, conventional force to deal with local conflicts
Overwhelming response: Basically, regardless of the infraction -- we bomb the USSR, PRC, and Communist Bloc into the stone-age.
The latter seemed to be the general way things went, and from a historical context, it kept the peace, but only at tremendous cost if things went sideways by a relatively small margin. It left little option for anything other than total war with nuclear weapons. By 1962, it was assumed that half a billion people would die in the conflict another half billion injured, and the nuclear winter and fall-out would probably wipe out the sizable remainder (if not the entirety of humanity).

To make it worse, our policy was also predicated on first-strike: To the guys in the Air-Force, this was probably a pretty natural step, as their ideas were based on those of Hugh Trenchard and Giulio Douhet, who both espoused offensive operations (almost to the exclusion of anything else) and pre-emptive strikes (without declaring war).

Nuclear-weapons technology also changed

The first nuclear weapons were huge and could only be carried by a few bomber aircraft: This included the B-36 (required pretty much no modifications at all), the B-29/B-50, the B-47.
Nuclear weapons eventually shrank in size to around 2500-4000 pounds, at which point they could be carried by both bombers and fighter-bombers; from there they would shrink further to warheads that would typically weigh around 500 pounds, and some going all the way down to 50 pounds (W54) and could be carried on fighters as before, and even fitted into rockets, missiles, and artillery shells.
H-bombs started out as ideas (1945), to the Eniwetok Atoll test (1952), which was the size of a building and had liquid deuterium and tritium in it, the EC (Emergency Capacity) devices, which weighed around 40,000 pounds or so, and could only be carried by the B-36. They also had liquid deuterium and tritium in them, and since heat tends to naturally gravitate to cold, and hydrogen isn't a gas at room-temperature, the storage had to be heavily insulated, and still needed thermos flasks to resupply more deuterium and tritium: The fact that vaporizing Tritium is radioactive can't help much, but as if that wasn't bad enough -- in the event that such a weapon was deployed, it was unlikely for the bomber to escape the blast.
Eventually, they evolved into weapons that included a secondary stage of lithium deuteride (when bombarded by neutrons, lithium converts into tritium), which has fissile material wrapped around it and also stuffed in the middle: The first one of this type was still so big, only a B-36 could carry it, but soon, the size came down to sizes that would be around 7600 pounds, then from there, to around 6400 pounds, and eventually down to amounts that would even allow fighters to deliver megaton level death and destruction upon demand.
Basically, they got smaller and more devastating, and more aircraft, and aircraft types could carry them. So basically, fighters were largely expected to carry nuclear weapons and air-superiority wasn't seen as all that important. In addition, the numbers of nuclear weapons grew at, what seemed like an exponential rate, and the USAF had a great proclivity for getting spectacularly large budgets for themselves -- they did this many ways, but one of the best was effectively trying to assign as many targets as they possibly could justify (even beyond military necessity), so that they could order more bombs, and then use the number of bombs to justify the ordering of more aircraft and weapons to deliver them.

They got away with the boot-strapping tactic because they had a supercomputer that apparently helped them select targeting (and apparently not many people realized that computers can be programmed to do nearly anything -- garbage go in, garbage will also come out, and they probably used the secrecy card to hide their exact programming from anybody they didn't want to realize what they were doing -- while I think what they were doing was wrong, I gotta admit the idea had a certain simplicity and creativity to it)

Now most of you know all this, what I'm curious about was

Despite the fact that the proposal for a conventional force to handle local-conflicts, and nuclear forces to deal with general-war with the Soviet Union, China, and the Communist Bloc being proposed as early as 1953 (JCS), and overruled by the overwhelming force doctrine (1954), we still did retain a conventional force anyway, both in the USAF's overseas commands, and TAC: I'm curious if this was kind of a bureaucratic inertia thing (it takes time to phase things out and stuff), or simply because this would give the Army the ability to make grabs for assets needed for CAS and Air Superiority?
While the policy of Massive Retaliation and the New Look policy took effect in 1954, and involved the concept of a "spasm" or uncontrolled nuclear release that wouldn't stop until one side was completely, and utterly destroyed; by 1955 there was NSC-5440 that called for a conventional force to handle local conflicts, and a nuclear force to handle General War with the USSR, PRC, and the rest of the Communist Bloc: This plan was essentially similar to the Flexible Response plan that would be adopted by the US in 1961, and included options ranging from conventional force, to all-out nuclear-war. I'm curious why the USAF was able to disregard this memorandum and simply continue business as usual?
Starting around 1957: John Dulles had declared that the idea of a nuclear spasm would not necessarily occur, and proposals for "limited conflicts" could be considered, these plans were presumably nuclear, right? Also, did this policy annul the 1955 one?


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## XBe02Drvr (Dec 6, 2018)

Zipper730 said:


> by 1955 there was NSC-5440 that called for a conventional force to handle local conflicts, and a nuclear force to handle General War with the USSR, PRC, and the rest of the Communist Bloc:





Zipper730 said:


> I'm curious why the USAF was able to disregard this memorandum and simply continue business as usual?


You gotta remember that, although the USAF kept Congress enthralled with their sleight-of-hand accounting and doomsday ideology thus guaranteeing huge budgets, they didn't have total autonomy in determining US defense policy. The President was an infantry soldier, intimately familiar with the implications, opportunities, and vulnerabilities of boots on the ground, and he came to power at the height of the Korean war. His henchmen, the Dulles brothers, were steeped in the alternatives of diplomacy, intelligence gathering, propaganda potential, and special ops warfare.
While they appreciated the potential of strategic air warfare, they had had their noses rubbed in its shortcomings in WWII, so they weren't prepared to worship it like the doctrine of SAC demanded. OTOH, Congress and the public bought LeMay's bill of goods, so too much curbing of the juggernaut would come off as ignoring "the will of the people", and Eisenhower considered himself the people's servant.
LeMay in SAC and Rickover in the Navy's nuclear propulsion program developed so much personal influence that they were able to erect "temples of worship" and designate themselves Head Priest, if not Ultimate Savior and Keeper of the Faith. Woe betide the young officer who didn't pay proper homage!
I was a kid growing up at this time, playing "duck and cover" when the siren wailed, listening to discussions of current events, foreign policy, and world politics, and reading everything I could get my hands on. Your typical nerdy egghead kid, with no Facebook, video games, or skateboards to monopolize my time.
Cheers,
Wes

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## XBe02Drvr (Dec 6, 2018)

Zipper730 said:


> Starting around 1957: John Dulles had declared that the idea of a nuclear spasm would not necessarily occur, and proposals for "limited conflicts" could be considered, these plans were presumably nuclear, right?


No, the fear at the time was that a conventional "brushfire war" could go nuclear and result in the ultimate "spasm" if the core assets of either side were threatened. The threat of firebrands such as MacArthur in Korea or LeMay in SAC, or their counterparts on the other side of the curtain going off the deep end and setting off a terminal conflagration had all responsible parties shaking in their shoes. They only relented and allowed the Army tactical nukes for the express purpose of detering a Soviet led invasion of Western Europe. And there the risk of escalation was always an existential threat.
Cheers,
Wes

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## XBe02Drvr (Dec 6, 2018)

Zipper730 said:


> they had a supercomputer that apparently helped them select targeting (and apparently not many people realized that computers can be programmed to do nearly anything -- garbage go in, garbage will also come out


Garbage for sure, as the US was clueless as to what was going on behind the curtain. It wasn't until the deployment of the U2 at the tail end of the 50s and then the SR71 and satellite photography plus the submarine wiretaps, that we had much in the way of hard intelligence to base targeting on. Prior to that it was mostly smoke and mirrors. We could never hold a candle to the Soviets or the Chinese in HUMINT, and were slow to become sophisticated in the analysis of ELINT. A totalitarian society tends to produce more and better intelligence operatives, both in field and analysis work.
Cheers,
Wes

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## swampyankee (Dec 6, 2018)

Eisenhower was also interested in two things: making sure the balloon never went up and minimizing federal spending, _including_ _defense_ _spending_. Pushing reliance for deterrence from conventional forces to nuclear ones saved money.


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## Zipper730 (Dec 6, 2018)

XBe02Drvr said:


> You gotta remember that, although the USAF kept Congress enthralled with their sleight-of-hand accounting and doomsday ideology thus guaranteeing huge budgets, they didn't have total autonomy in determining US defense policy.


It sure seemed as if they did...


> The President was an infantry soldier, intimately familiar with the implications, opportunities, and vulnerabilities of boots on the ground, and he came to power at the height of the Korean war. His henchmen, the Dulles brothers, were steeped in the alternatives of diplomacy, intelligence gathering, propaganda potential, and special ops warfare.


Yes


> While they appreciated the potential of strategic air warfare, they had had their noses rubbed in its shortcomings in WWII, so they weren't prepared to worship it like the doctrine of SAC demanded.


Smart


> Congress and the public bought LeMay's bill of goods, so too much curbing of the juggernaut would come off as ignoring "the will of the people", and Eisenhower considered himself the people's servant.


So there was a limit as to what Eisenhower could do without appearing undemocratic?


> LeMay in SAC and Rickover in the Navy's nuclear propulsion program developed so much personal influence that they were able to erect "temples of worship" and designate themselves Head Priest, if not Ultimate Savior and Keeper of the Faith. Woe betide the young officer who didn't pay proper homage!


And there was little ability to curb this tendency?


> No, the fear at the time was that a conventional "brushfire war" could go nuclear and result in the ultimate "spasm" if the core assets of either side were threatened.


The problem is when the official doctrine is overwhelming response, some people saw that as a literal interpretation even when changes came along such as NSC 5440...


> The threat of firebrands such as MacArthur in Korea or LeMay in SAC, or their counterparts on the other side of the curtain going off the deep end and setting off a terminal conflagration had all responsible parties shaking in their shoes.


Understandably so. I'm surprised somebody didn't try and cut the guts out of LeMay's power-base to ensure he wouldn't trigger an uncontrollable disaster we didn't want in the US.


> They only relented and allowed the Army tactical nukes for the express purpose of detering a Soviet led invasion of Western Europe. And there the risk of escalation was always an existential threat.


That part of Europe was a powder-keg that fortunately didn't explode. I didn't know the issue of tactical nukes was such a big issue for the US Army?


> Garbage for sure, as the US was clueless as to what was going on behind the curtain. It wasn't until the deployment of the U2 at the tail end of the 50s and then the SR71 and satellite photography plus the submarine wiretaps, that we had much in the way of hard intelligence to base targeting on.


Actually LeMay had done overflights of the USSR up to around 1954-55 it seemed. The RAF also carried out overflights on either their own or both our behalf. The U-2 seemed to takeover after around 1956.

That said, I'm not sure what estimates we had as to what to hit correctly. However, there was a tendency for the USAF to boot-strap as I described regardless of reason.


> We could never hold a candle to the Soviets or the Chinese in HUMINT


I didn't now the Chinese were that good in HUMINT though Russia was legendary


> A totalitarian society tends to produce more and better intelligence operatives, both in field and analysis work.


Assuming the population isn't dumbed down by the fears of the dictator...



swampyankee said:


> Eisenhower was also interested in two things: making sure the balloon never went up


The balloon never went up? I assume you mean a mushroom-cloud?


> minimizing federal spending, _including_ _defense_ _spending_. Pushing reliance for deterrence from conventional forces to nuclear ones saved money.


Yeah but it means you only have one option -- nuke 'em. Without a conventional force for local conflicts, you have little to fall back on.


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## XBe02Drvr (Dec 7, 2018)

*** IGNORE THIS POST!! ***
FOR SOME REASON MY ANDROID DUPLICATED THIS POST WHEN I TRIED TO EDIT!!



Zipper730 said:


> So there was a limit as to what Eisenhower could do without appearing undemocratic?


Not "could", "would". Ike wasn't going to go to extreme lengths to publicly counter a program that Congress and the public were sold on. Besides, the hallmark of the cold war was uncertainty. Very few people besides the self-annoited prophets like LeMay and Rickover were absolutely sure what the real answers were. And the stakes for getting it wrong were immeasurable.



Zipper730 said:


> And there was little ability to curb this tendency?


Guys like these were like the weapons the advocated: valuable tools to have on your side, but dangerous to manage, as they could blow up in your face if mishandled.



Zipper730 said:


> I'm surprised somebody didn't try and cut the guts out of LeMay's power-base


Those that tried crashed and burned.



Zipper730 said:


> I didn't know the issue of tactical nukes was such a big issue for the US Army?


The Army felt the need to get on "the nuclear bandwagon" to preserve its prestige and funding, and had the sales pitch that it would reduce the expense of maintaining a huge mechanized army in Germany to counter the Warsaw Pact invasion threat. USN USAF& USAF bitterly opposed this, as it diluted their monopoly on nucs and released Armageddon triggers into "Irresponsible hands".



Zipper730 said:


> Actually LeMay had done overflights of the USSR up to around 1954-55 it seemed. The RAF also carried out overflights on either their own or both our behalf. The U-2 seemed to takeover after around 1956.


Very few pre-U2 overflights were successful deep penetrations. Most were peripheral overflights, and many were shot down. The vastness of the USSR and the capabilities of their air forces made successful overflight of targets in the heartland rare and costly.


Zipper730 said:


> Assuming the population isn't dumbed down by the fears of the dictator.


It's the very distrust, fear, and paranoia honed by growing up in a dictatorial police state that makes their Intel ops more effective than those raised in an open society. And believe me, those selected for that kind of work are promptly elevated above the general "dumbness" of the masses by training and education.
Cheers,
Wes

*** IGNORE THIS POST!! ***
MY DEVICE DUPLICATED IT WHEN I TRIED TO EDIT. CAN'T SEEM TO DELETE IT, EITHER!!

READ THE ONE BELOW.


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## XBe02Drvr (Dec 7, 2018)

Zipper730 said:


> So there was a limit as to what Eisenhower could do without appearing undemocratic?


Not "could", "would". Ike wasn't going to go to extreme lengths to publicly counter a program that Congress and the public were sold on. Besides, the hallmark of the cold war was uncertainty. Very few people besides the self-annoited prophets like LeMay and Rickover were absolutely sure what the real answers were. And the stakes for getting it wrong were immeasurable.



Zipper730 said:


> And there was little ability to curb this tendency?


Guys like these were like the weapons they advocated: valuable tools to have on your side, but dangerous to manage, as they could blow up in your face if mishandled.



Zipper730 said:


> I'm surprised somebody didn't try and cut the guts out of LeMay's power-base


Those that tried crashed and burned.



Zipper730 said:


> I didn't know the issue of tactical nukes was such a big issue for the US Army?


The Army felt the need to get on "the nuclear bandwagon" to preserve its prestige and funding, and had the sales pitch that it would reduce the expense of maintaining a huge mechanized army in Germany to counter the Warsaw Pact invasion threat. USN & USAF bitterly opposed this, as it diluted their monopoly on nucs and released Armageddon triggers into "Irresponsible hands".



Zipper730 said:


> Actually LeMay had done overflights of the USSR up to around 1954-55 it seemed. The RAF also carried out overflights on either their own or both our behalf. The U-2 seemed to takeover after around 1956.


Very few pre-U2 overflights were successful deep penetrations. Most were peripheral overflights, and many were shot down. The vastness of the USSR and the capabilities of their air forces made successful overflight of targets in the heartland rare and costly.


Zipper730 said:


> Assuming the population isn't dumbed down by the fears of the dictator.


It's the very distrust, fear, and paranoia honed by growing up in a dictatorial police state that makes their Intel ops more effective than those raised in an open society. And believe me, those selected for that kind of work are promptly elevated above the general "dumbness" of the masses by training and education.
Cheers,
Wes


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## Zipper730 (Dec 8, 2018)

XBe02Drvr said:


> *** IGNORE THIS POST!! ***
> FOR SOME REASON MY ANDROID DUPLICATED THIS POST WHEN I TRIED TO EDIT!!


It's happened to everybody once or twice for one reason or another, I usually just deleted the post and put in something like DUPLICATE DELETED or something.


> Not "could", "would". Ike wasn't going to go to extreme lengths to publicly counter a program that Congress and the public were sold on.


My guess is that they were sold on it because of the certainty of people like General LeMay? As for Eisenhower's unwillingness to publicly counter such a matter, I guess it would be that it'd appear undemocratic, unpatriotic, and probably creating an indecisive state of fear?

Regardless, NSC 5440 for example, wasn't public policy was it? The JCS knew about it, the President knew about it, and the Military knew about it right?


> Besides, the hallmark of the cold war was uncertainty. Very few people besides the self-annoited prophets like LeMay and Rickover were absolutely sure what the real answers were.


The problem was that their "certainty" gave us an all-or-nothing option, and possibly deterring conflict, but if wrong would have catastrophic consequeces (after all the only options were posturing or hurling everything, including the kitchen sink, the pot and saucepan at them). Fortunately the consequences were so scary that they never occurred, but we came awful close in many cases


> Guys like these were like the weapons they advocated: valuable tools to have on your side, but dangerous to manage, as they could blow up in your face if mishandled.


They seemed more like a liability...


> Those that tried crashed and burned.


Even the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the JCS?


> The Army felt the need to get on "the nuclear bandwagon" to preserve its prestige and funding


Like what somebody (it might have been you) said about how in those days if you didn't have a nuclear weapon, you weren't seen as "legitimate"?


> USN & USAF bitterly opposed this, as it diluted their monopoly on nucs and released Armageddon triggers into "Irresponsible hands".


Why would the US Army be irresponsible and the USAF/USN be responsible? Honestly it seems to fit the typical dynamics seen with power: The goal is to get to the top, than put every road-block in the way to ensure nobody else gets up there...


> Very few pre-U2 overflights were successful deep penetrations. Most were peripheral overflights, and many were shot down.


Only one was shot down (5/1/60), as for unsuccessful deep-penetrations -- you mean they were forced to divert?


> It's the very distrust, fear, and paranoia honed by growing up in a dictatorial police state that makes their Intel ops more effective than those raised in an open society. And believe me, those selected for that kind of work are promptly elevated above the general "dumbness" of the masses by training and education.


There was another thread I posted about what each nations had as advantages over each other, and one of them I added later -- intelligence and covert action capability: It requires the intellectual capacity of an academic, and the ability to think like a chess-master, combined with the physical capability of an athlete, the ability to flawlessly speak another language,, and the capacity for a level of savage yet dispassionate cruelty and violence normally only seen in violent psychopaths with the loyalty (or restraint) to not turn on their masters (sometimes errors were made in the last part).

It was meant to be both honest and irreverent at the same time


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## XBe02Drvr (Dec 9, 2018)

Zipper730 said:


> I usually just deleted the post and put in something like DUPLICATE DELETED or something


I couldn't get it to delete. It wouldn't do it. And when I tried to erase it by backspacing all the way through, it just popped right back up.



Zipper730 said:


> Regardless, NSC 5440 for example, wasn't public policy was it?


The clue here is NSC. Back in the day, few in the general public knew what the NSC was or what it did, and it's documents WEREN'T published in the mainstream media. No internet, no social media; access to information of all kinds was more arduous, complicated, and limited. Most folks had heard of the National Security Advisor, but that was about it.


Zipper730 said:


> They seemed more like a liability.


Try telling THAT to their face!



Zipper730 said:


> Even the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the JCS?


Those esteemed gentlemen were wise enough to pick their public battles. Those of less elevated status who chose to give battle generally met their comeuppance. LeMay and Rickover allegedly ate nails for breakfast and weren't averse to seasoning their meal with the occasional congressional committee chairman.





Zipper730 said:


> in those days if you didn't have a nuclear weapon, you weren't seen as "legitimate"?


"Hey Bro, you ain't got no nukes, you ain't sheeet, mon!"



Zipper730 said:


> Why would the US Army be irresponsible and the USAF/USN be responsible


The Navy considered itself the senior service, while the Air Force was busily shedding the trappings of its Army roots and reinventing itself as an elite outfit. Both prided themselves as being selective and rigorous in the commissioning process and revered the pomp and refinement of "an officer and a gentleman". The Army, OTOH, was full of ROTC brats, some of whom (horrors!) were allowed to reach high rank and even worse, battlefield commissions and "mustangs" with (OMG!!) prior enlisted experience were not kept in the lower ranks where they belonged, but allowed to reach senior command positions. (Scary thought!)​​


Zipper730 said:


> Only one was shot down (5/1/60), as for unsuccessful deep-penetrations -- you mean they were forced to divert?


We all know about Francis Gary Powers and the unused poison needle.
You missed the point. Prior to the U2, nothing we had could do a transcontinental overflight of the USSR and reliably survive. We used RB47s and P2V Neptunes for tangential overflights of the peripheries of the Soviet Union, and we lost quite a few of them. But the interior was a mystery until the U2, SR71, and eventually, satellite photography laid everything bare.
Cheers,
Wes

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## Zipper730 (Dec 10, 2018)

XBe02Drvr said:


> I couldn't get it to delete. It wouldn't do it. And when I tried to erase it by backspacing all the way through, it just popped right back up.


Oh well


> The clue here is NSC. Back in the day, few in the general public knew what the NSC was or what it did, and it's documents WEREN'T published in the mainstream media. No internet, no social media; access to information of all kinds was more arduous, complicated, and limited. Most folks had heard of the National Security Advisor, but that was about it.


I would have thought the President, and JCS would have known...


> Try telling THAT to their face!


You don't tell that to somebody's face!


> Those esteemed gentlemen were wise enough to pick their public battles. Those of less elevated status who chose to give battle generally met their comeuppance. LeMay and Rickover allegedly ate nails for breakfast and weren't averse to seasoning their meal with the occasional congressional committee chairman.


So, there was nobody who could (or would) hold them in line?


> "Hey Bro, you ain't got no nukes, you ain't sheeet, mon!"


Jamaican accent


> The Navy considered itself the senior service, while the Air Force was busily shedding the trappings of its Army roots and reinventing itself as an elite outfit. Both prided themselves as being selective and rigorous in the commissioning process and revered the pomp and refinement of "an officer and a gentleman". The Army, OTOH, was full of ROTC brats, some of whom (horrors!) were allowed to reach high rank and even worse, battlefield commissions and "mustangs" with (OMG!!) prior enlisted experience were not kept in the lower ranks where they belonged, but allowed to reach senior command positions. (Scary thought!)


So they viewed the US Army as rough, unrefined, and inexperienced?


> You missed the point. Prior to the U2, nothing we had could do a transcontinental overflight of the USSR and reliably survive. We used RB47s and P2V Neptunes for tangential overflights of the peripheries of the Soviet Union, and we lost quite a few of them. But the interior was a mystery until the U2, SR71, and eventually, satellite photography laid everything bare.


The U-2's entered service in 1956 right?[/quote][/quote]


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## XBe02Drvr (Dec 10, 2018)

Zipper730 said:


> I would have thought the President, and JCS would have known..


They did know, and so did anybody in the military and in government and students of same. It just wasn't discussed in the media, so wasn't high in the public consciousness. And war-fighting policy documents from NSC, JCS, DOD, etc were definitely NOT for public consumption!


Zipper730 said:


> So they viewed the US Army as rough, unrefined, and inexperienced?


...and undereducated, trigger-happy, and likely to start WW III. "They don't have any CLASS, Sir, no sense of global repercussions or responsibility!"


Zipper730 said:


> The U-2's entered service in 1956 right?


Yes, but there weren't many aircraft or trained pilots, and the elaborate top secret preparations for each mission, combined with weather constraints at launch, enroute, and recovery, kept the sortie rate low.
By 1960, the US was just starting to build a comprehensive picture of Soviet military and industrial infrastructure. Then came the drought of photographic intelligence in the early 60s at the height of the "missile race" until satellite photography became practical enough to take over.
Cheers,
Wes

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## Glider (Dec 10, 2018)

XBe02Drvr said:


> ​
> We all know about Francis Gary Powers and the unused poison needle.
> You missed the point. Prior to the U2, nothing we had could do a transcontinental overflight of the USSR and reliably survive. We used RB47s and P2V Neptunes for tangential overflights of the peripheries of the Soviet Union, and we lost quite a few of them. But the interior was a mystery until the U2, SR71, and eventually, satellite photography laid everything bare.
> Cheers,
> Wes


RAF Canberra's were used for deep penetration flights over Russia prior to the U2 often at the request of the US. Clearly we didn't have the numbers to do a comprehensive job but high priority areas were covered

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## XBe02Drvr (Dec 10, 2018)

Glider said:


> RAF Canberra's were used for deep penetration flights over Russia prior to the U2 often at the request of the US. Clearly we didn't have the numbers to do a comprehensive job but high priority areas were covered


That's interesting. Did you have the "big wing" high altitude version like the ones NASA flew here? How come a Canberra could survive SAMs and MIGs and an RB47 couldn't? And what about our B57s? Were they drastically inferior to your Canberras?
Our local Air Guard flew EB57s in the 70s in the Defense Systems Evaluation "Aggressor" mission in old tired Vietnam Vet birds which were a bitch to maintain, but they liked flying, and resented the mission. Their unit history was in interceptors, and they wanted back into the fighter fraternity.
Cheers,
Wes


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## Glider (Dec 10, 2018)

The Canberra was a remarkable aircraft with an ability to fly very high. Officially the service ceiling was about 48,000 ft but in 1957 one reached 70,000 ft so somewhere in the middle would be the real maximum.
RB47 had a much lower service ceiling one the Russians found very difficult to reach so an extra 10,000 ft would help ensure the Canberra safety. The B57 was a few years later in development, hence the advantages of using the Canberra.

There was a programme on this a number of year ago and one of the RAF pilots recalled their briefing which included the famous 'if anything happens to you we will deny all knowledge'. They simply refused to go unless this was rescinded in writing as they pointed out RAF pilots, in RAF flying gear in an RAF aircraft couldn't be just passed off, it was totally absurd. The Americans eventually gave in, and off they went.

Wiki also mentions this
_The PR7 variant of the Canberra, equipped with longer, fuel-filled wings and the Avon 109 engines, executed a 1953 reconnaissance flight over the Soviet rocket launch and development site at Kapustin Yar, although the UK government has never admitted the existence of such a flight. Warned by either radar or agents inside the British government, the Soviets slightly damaged one aircraft.[58][59] Further reconnaissance flights are alleged to have taken place along, and over, the borders of the Soviet Union in 1954 under the code name Project Robin, using the Canberra B2 WH726. The USAF also used the Canberra for reconnaissance flights.[60] The aircraft were no longer required after June 1956, following the introduction of the US Lockheed U-2 purpose-built reconnaissance aircraft; Project Robin was then terminated.[61] These RAF Canberra overflights were later featured in the 1994 BBC Timewatch episode; "Spies in the Sky", and included interviews with some of the Soviet MiG-15 pilots who had attempted to intercept them.[62] _

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## Zipper730 (Dec 10, 2018)

XBe02Drvr said:


> They did know, and so did anybody in the military and in government and students of same. It just wasn't discussed in the media, so wasn't high in the public consciousness. And war-fighting policy documents from NSC, JCS, DOD, etc were definitely NOT for public consumption!


Public consumption wasn't the point, Wes. Almost anybody would know that -- the fact is that those documents imply the intent of policy makers and it's important to ensure that the implementers of policy understand the official policy and agree to follow it (even if they don't like it).


> ...and undereducated, trigger-happy, and likely to start WW III. "They don't have any CLASS, Sir, no sense of global repercussions or responsibility!"


Were they?


> Yes, but there weren't many aircraft or trained pilots, and the elaborate top secret preparations for each mission, combined with weather constraints at launch, enroute, and recovery, kept the sortie rate low.


Okay, that makes sense...


> By 1960, the US was just starting to build a comprehensive picture of Soviet military and industrial infrastructure. Then came the drought of photographic intelligence in the early 60s at the height of the "missile race" until satellite photography became practical enough to take over.


And by around 1965, we seemed to have a full picture?



Glider said:


> RAF Canberra's were used for deep penetration flights over Russia prior to the U2 often at the request of the US. Clearly we didn't have the numbers to do a comprehensive job but high priority areas were covered


While it might sound silly to ask, but when did these overflights start? I figure they ended around 1960 for the same reason ours did?


> The Canberra was a remarkable aircraft with an ability to fly very high. Officially the service ceiling was about 48,000 ft but in 1957 one reached 70,000 ft so somewhere in the middle would be the real maximum.


I got a few questions around that if you can answer any

Was this the PR.7 or earlier variants?
Was the aircraft in typical reconnaissance configuration or was in some kind of stripped down layout for some kind of record-setting mission?
Was the aircraft able to fly efficiently at that altitude (though a bit pedantic: AoA increases as airspeed drops, and that increases drag and thrust down as you go higher)?
Was the airplane able to maneuver in any purposeful fashion or would it have basically stalled the instant you tried any turn?



> RB47 had a much lower service ceiling one the Russians found very difficult to reach so an extra 10,000 ft would ensure the Canberra safety.


The B-47 seemed by different accounts able to reach around 45000 to 50000+. Some described it as able to outmaneuver a MiG-15 at altitude, and a MiG-17 needed an afterburner to have enough energy to either stay with it in protracted turns, or to simply reposition for a second shot. Others described the MiG-17 as able to maneuver with it without incident.

The reason I take the high altitude claims with some seriousness is some were made by a USAF interceptor pilot.


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## fubar57 (Dec 10, 2018)

Yikes.....we're havin' us a good ole fashioned quote off here

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## Zipper730 (Dec 10, 2018)

fubar57 said:


> Yikes.....we're havin' us a good ole fashioned quote off here


I didn't see it as a competition, I just tend to respond to quotes in bulk. I'm not the only person to do this...


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## Glider (Dec 11, 2018)

Zipper730 said:


> While it might sound silly to ask, but when did these overflights start? I figure they ended around 1960 for the same reason ours did?


I don't know for certain but the PR version of the Canberra entered service in Dec 1952 and the overflight mission quoted was in March 1953 so I assume they started as soon as the Canberra was available as to when they stopped as far as the US were involved it was when the U2 became available.


> I got a few questions around that if you can answer any
> 
> Was this the PR.7 or earlier variants?
> Was the aircraft in typical reconnaissance configuration or was in some kind of stripped down layout for some kind of record-setting mission?
> ...




1) It was the PR7 that did the overflight
2) Standard configuration for the mission
3 + 4) Presumably it was able to fly efficiently or it wouldn't have been able to complete the mission 


> The B-47 seemed by different accounts able to reach around 45000 to 50000+. Some described it as able to outmaneuver a MiG-15 at altitude, and a MiG-17 needed an afterburner to have enough energy to either stay with it in protracted turns, or to simply reposition for a second shot. Others described the MiG-17 as able to maneuver with it without incident.
> 
> The reason I take the high altitude claims with some seriousness is some were made by a USAF interceptor pilot.



Personally I don't take a huge interest in record claims, as stripped down one off machines are not relevant, what matters is what can achieve in an operational combat role. In this case I was responding to the comment that deep penetration missions couldn't be undertaken safely prior to the introduction of the U2. Clearly the Canberra could, and did.


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## Zipper730 (Dec 11, 2018)

Glider said:


> I don't know for certain but the PR version of the Canberra entered service in Dec 1952 and the overflight mission quoted was in March 1953 so I assume they started as soon as the Canberra was available as to when they stopped as far as the US were involved it was when the U2 became available.


The U2 entered service in 1956.

While doing a search, I found this image interestingly







I'm curious if this is the same thing you're describing. This describes a record setting flight involving a Canberra that was fitted with a rocket motor within it's bomb-bay. The aircraft turned on the rocket engine and zoomed up to 70,000 feet. Even as they were coming up on (or at) 70,000 feet, they were still climbing at 8000 feet per minute. The limiting factor was the coffin corner. They shut down the engine and head back down.

At some point the Canberra did reach around 65,000 or 65,600 feet, which might been either the prototypes or the high altitude PR.7. Needless to say, I wouldn't want to be tasked with intercepting such an aircraft in a MiG-15 or MiG-17 -- it'd be a mission that you'd be doomed to fail no matter how hard you try -- which is frustrating as fuck!


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## XBe02Drvr (Dec 11, 2018)

Zipper730 said:


> This describes a record setting flight involving a Canberra that was fitted with a rocket motor within it's bomb-bay. The aircraft turned on the rocket engine and zoomed up to 70,000 feet. Even as they were coming up on (or at) 70,000 feet, they were still climbing at 8000 feet per minute.


I'm curious. Am I misinterpreting that drawing, or did that Canberra GLIDE all the way around that loop and arrive back at the starting point at 45K feet?? That's one hell of a L/D if so!! Hell, who needs a U2? In any case, a pretty fantastic machine for its time. Blows the socks off its contemporaries like the B45 and the IL28. How come our B57s couldn't pull off stunts like that?
Cheers,
Wes


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## Zipper730 (Dec 11, 2018)

XBe02Drvr said:


> I'm curious. Am I misinterpreting that drawing, or did that Canberra GLIDE all the way around that loop and arrive back at the starting point at 45K feet??


From what it seemed the rocket motor was shut down. I'm not sure if the engine went offline at anypoint.


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## Zipper730 (Jul 13, 2019)

While it was clearly discussed that NSC-5440 was known by the President, the JCS, and presumably the Secretary of Defense. Was there anybody in Congress who was aware of this, such as the head of the Senate Armed Services Committee?


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## nuuumannn (Jul 13, 2019)

Zipper730 said:


> At some point the Canberra did reach around 65,000 or 65,600 feet, which might been either the prototypes or the high altitude PR.7.



The Canberra that did this was not a PR variant, but a trials machine specifically converted; it was a B.6 model, serial WK163, that was lent to motor manufacturer Armstrong Siddeley then Napier, which fitted the Double Scorpion motor that enabled it to reach 70,000ft (70,310ft to be precise). This occurred on 28 August 1957. WK163 still exists and was flown on the airshow circuit in the early Noughties in Britain for awhile, but the sheer cost of operation has meant that it doesn't go out much these days.

Canberras set all manner of records in the Fifties. it was a remarkable aircraft. Here's a wee list on this page.

THE ENGLISH ELECTRIC CANBERRA RECORDS

I remember on a trip through Poland I went to the excellent MLP aviation museum in Cracow and it was explained to me that the Polish were given MiG-19s with which to intercept RAF Canberras that were operating with impunity over Eastern Europe. The MiG-19 couldn't reach the Canberras at all - they weren't very popular among the Polish apparently. The Chinese loved them however.


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## Zipper730 (Mar 27, 2020)

I'm curious if the Hungarian revolution in 1956 played a role in the decision making for overwhelming force and retaliation?


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## XBe02Drvr (Mar 27, 2020)

Zipper730 said:


> I'm curious if the Hungarian revolution in 1956 played a role in the decision making for overwhelming force and retaliation?


It reminded those who had any doubts, the meaning of ruthlessness.

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## GreenKnight121 (Apr 3, 2020)

XBe02Drvr said:


> I'm curious. Am I misinterpreting that drawing, or did that Canberra GLIDE all the way around that loop and arrive back at the starting point at 45K feet?? That's one hell of a L/D if so!! Hell, who needs a U2? In any case, a pretty fantastic machine for its time. Blows the socks off its contemporaries like the B45 and the IL28. How come our B57s couldn't pull off stunts like that?
> Cheers,
> Wes


Yes, you ARE misinterpreting it!

The aircraft took off from Luton using its normal jet engines, flew south-west (follow the little arrowheads in the marked flight path), and arrived at the "start point" off the coast at its "normal" 45,000' ceiling. At that point the rocket motor was activated, and the aircraft zoomed to 70,000 feet - at which point the rocket was shut off. The aircraft descended with its normal jets still in operation, and continued to fly under jet power back to Luton, where it landed.

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## XBe02Drvr (Apr 3, 2020)

GreenKnight121 said:


> At that point the rocket motor was activated, and the aircraft zoomed to 70,000 feet - at which point the rocket was shut off. The aircraft descended with its normal jets still in operation, and continued to fly under normal jet power back to Luton


Amazed those early generation jets stayed lit at 70,000 ft. I remember reading of US jets doing zoom climbs well above their service ceilings, flaming out, and restarting on the way down.

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## nuuumannn (Apr 9, 2020)

I remember a story told to me by a former Bomber Command pilot who had flown Canberras and Vulcans saying that during the 70s and 80s the RAF used the Canberra as a high altitude target and used to pit Lightnings and Phantoms, the RAF's interceptors du jour against them. Whilst the lightnings could get into a firing position, the Phantoms couldn't (US members, remember these were Spey engined Phantoms, not J79 engined ones, whose performance was better down low and rubbish up high).

As an aside, I remember reading something about the RAF requesting permission to intercept a U-2 using a Lightning and for years the USAF refused, until it didn't. The Lightning successfully intercepted it, much to the USAF's disappointment. British Airways lent a Concorde to the RAF as a target on occasion too, and the Concorde proved much harded to intercept because it cruised at supersonic speed. A Lightning could catch up to it, but couldn't maintain position.


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## GrauGeist (Apr 9, 2020)

Just about the only aircraft in existance that could not be intercepted, was the Archangel family, which included the SR-71.

In regards to nukes, it was successfully used as a deterrent when Eisenhower told Chairman Mao that he would light up China if they didn't back off of Taiwan. So there was some value to an atomic Arsenal.


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## Zipper730 (Apr 9, 2020)

nuuumannn said:


> I remember a story told to me by a former Bomber Command pilot who had flown Canberras and Vulcans saying that during the 70s and 80s the RAF used the Canberra as a high altitude target and used to pit Lightnings and Phantoms, the RAF's interceptors du jour against them. Whilst the lightnings could get into a firing position, the Phantoms couldn't (US members, remember these were Spey engined Phantoms, not J79 engined ones, whose performance was better down low and rubbish up high).


Though I know turbofans don't usually perform as good as turbojets at high altitudes, I was told that the two had similar thrust ratings. That said, one thing you're not factoring in is the Spey engined Phantoms had to be redesigned to accommodate the larger engine: This affected area rule.

Another variable I can think would affect things is turning circle: The Canberra and Vulcans could turn fly quite well at high altitude and could keep turning long after the F-4 would have lost the ability. The Lightning had better climb and acceleration, probably top speed than the Phantom that would all help it position itself for a shot. I would not be surprised if it was more nimble too.


> British Airways lent a Concorde to the RAF as a target on occasion too, and the Concorde proved much harded to intercept because it cruised at supersonic speed. A Lightning could catch up to it, but couldn't maintain position.


I always thought that was a myth.


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## XBe02Drvr (Apr 9, 2020)

nuuumannn said:


> Whilst the lightnings could get into a firing position, the Phantoms couldn't (US members, remember these were Spey engined Phantoms, not J79 engined ones, whose performance was better down low and rubbish up high).


In 1973, when HMS Ark Royal came to town to play ACM games with our resident combat training squadron, their Spey powered Phantoms and unorthodox tactics waxed our J79 birds and TopGun trained instructor pilots BADLY! In five days of nearly constant engagements, every single bird our side sortied was scored against, to zero kills for the home team. On two occasions, Buccaneer low level attack planes popped up into the fight from below, scored kills, and egressed safely. Airspace allocation set the ceiling at 25K, as there were civil jet routes overtop, so the altitude advantages of the J79 were somewhat curtailed. Still a mighty impressive demonstration.
Cheers,
Wes

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## nuuumannn (Apr 9, 2020)

Zipper730 said:


> Though I know turbofans don't usually perform as good as turbojets at high altitudes, I was told that the two had similar thrust ratings.



They do and they don't. It depends on what you want your engines to do. The fundamental point of difference is how the thrust is generated. With the big fans like the GENx engines and RR Trents, some 90 percent of the thrust generated is produced by the big 1st stage compressor, the big fan at the front. This enables efficiencies of economy at altitude, so performance wise. you get a whole heap more bang for your buck at altitude, because they are optimised for it. For a turbojet, you are going to run out of fuel to match range and cruise speeds of a big high bypass turbofan at a given load carrying capability.

Whilst the Concorde had impressive performance being able to supercruise, for its size it had rubbish range and had very little fuel in reserve when landing at the other end. Part of the problem of Concorde not catching on wasn't just the noise, but also its range and load carrying capacity. Airlines struggled to find viable routes for it.

Let's not forget that the F-100 engines in the F-15 and F-16, as well as the F-119 in the F-22 are low bypass turbofans. The Tu-144 Konkordski had afterburning turbofans in the NK-144s.


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## nuuumannn (Apr 9, 2020)

Zipper730 said:


> I always thought that was a myth.



Nope, very much took place. Consulting my Lightning references, the aircraft was a single example from 11 Sqn that was known to be something of a hot rod and it carried out practise interceptions on Concorde in 1985, but I don't know exact date. During the U-2 intercept, the Lightning reached an altitude of 88,000 ft in 1984, the same aircraft, XR749.


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## Graeme (Apr 9, 2020)

Hi Grant.

There are/were a number of Lightning pilots on PPRuNe who have posted in various threads debunking both the Concorde and the U-2 interception.

Here's one on the Concorde...


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## XBe02Drvr (Apr 9, 2020)

nuuumannn said:


> With the big fans like the GENx engines and RR Trents, some 90 percent of the thrust generated is produced by the big 1st stage compressor, the big fan at the front.


Essentially a big multi-blade, shrouded turboprop, minus the blade tip vortices with their attendant efficiency losses and earth shaking noise. Ever stand near a runway by the liftoff point of a departing Orion or Herc? That penetrating rumble you feel in your gut is pure wasted power spinning off the prop tips.
Cheers,
Wes

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## nuuumannn (Apr 10, 2020)

Graeme said:


> There are/were a number of Lightning pilots on PPRuNe who have posted in various threads debunking both the Concorde and the U-2 interception.



That's interesting Graeme, but are these guys saying those intercepts didn't take place because what they knew about the aircraft meant they couldn't, or are they saying they actually didn't take place? According to what I have seen written, the particular 11 Sqn Lightning demonstrated better performance and was specifically chosen for the intercepts. From what I read, as I wrote above, the Lightning could catch the Concorde but not keep up with it.


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## nuuumannn (Apr 10, 2020)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Ever stand near a runway by the liftoff point of a departing Orion or Herc?



Haven't no, but used to work on P-3s and C-130s many years ago. I go on engine runs on turboprops on a nightly basis tho.


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## Zipper730 (Apr 10, 2020)

XBe02Drvr said:


> In 1973, when HMS Ark Royal came to town to play ACM games with our resident combat training squadron, their Spey powered Phantoms and unorthodox tactics waxed our J79 birds and TopGun trained instructor pilots BADLY! In five days of nearly constant engagements, every single bird our side sortied was scored against, to zero kills for the home team. On two occasions, Buccaneer low level attack planes popped up into the fight from below, scored kills, and egressed safely. Airspace allocation set the ceiling at 25K, as there were civil jet routes overtop, so the altitude advantages of the J79 were somewhat curtailed. Still a mighty impressive demonstration.


So part of it had to do with the ceiling limits, and the fact that the RN:FAA pilots seemed to have better skills in Air-to-Air combat. I figured they would have held the edge from the late 1950's to the start of Top-Gun, but I guess it extended a little past that. I wouldn't be surprised if things improved from the 1960's all the way to 1975.



nuuumannn said:


> They do and they don't. It depends on what you want your engines to do.


High overall thrust, and high speeds.


> The fundamental point of difference is how the thrust is generated.


Well yeah, as I understand it: The turbojet is theoretically better at higher-velocity (particularly at high altitude) than the turbofans in terms of power-loss at altitude, and ability to operate at higher speeds (exceptions exist such as well designed low-bypass fans). Probably why most high-bypass fans generally operate at subsonic speeds.


> Whilst the Concorde had impressive performance being able to supercruise, for its size it had rubbish range and had very little fuel in reserve when landing at the other end.


It has a trans-antlantic range while flying at Mach 2.0, I wouldn't consider that to be trivial. There are routes that would profit from greater ranges, such as the ability to fly across the Pacific.


> Let's not forget that the F-100 engines in the F-15 and F-16, as well as the F-119 in the F-22 are low bypass turbofans. The Tu-144 Konkordski had afterburning turbofans in the NK-144s.


Correct, the earlier F100 had a bypass-ratio of around 0.72:1. This gave it better SFC than the J79, and more thrust than the J75. It might have lost more thrust (proportionally) than the J79 or J75 at altitude, and appeared to have a lower exhaust velocity (It's a guess, but I remember claims the J79 had a higher exhaust gas temp), and the F-15A didn't seem to be able to hold supersonic speed without afterburners (The XF8U-3, powered by the J75, could hold supersonic speed without afterburner). That said, the plane had a VMax switch which increased performance, and allowed it to run-down a MiG-25. As for the later F100 variants, from what I recall, the F-15E had a lower bypass-ratio (0.3?) that allowed it to hold some degree of supersonic speed without afterburner, though it didn't have the VMax switch.

As for the F119, it had a bypass-ratio of 0.3, and was capable of full-supercruise, and seemed to deliver good fuel economy.

From what I recall, low-bypass fans might be able to either generate more thrust on afterburner, and/or get better SFC while doing it (at least, there was one turbofan built around that idea, the JTF-17A), and the fan-air can provide a degree of cooling.



nuuumannn said:


> Nope, very much took place.


Considering it had an acceleration rate that even beat the F-104, and could even accelerate to, and maintain supersonic speed without afterburners, I'd guess that it wouldn't be that hard to position itself for an intercept. The limitations might be the radar (from what I was told the radar was fairly simple), and the missiles, a down-the-throat shot might be difficult to pull off (On one hand: The Concorde was a large target, and produced a good thermal return when at speed, so the seeker might pick it up further than most aircraft; On the other hand: The high closure rate of Mach 4+ would result in very little time to get a lock and shoot), and an attack from the rear would result in a poor closure rate and work against endurance limits.

The F-104's, F-4's and F-15's all seem like they'd have better odds for this kind of mission for the following reasons

F-104
Had a longer radius of action while supersonic than the Lightning making it possible to more effectively run down a plane from the rear

F-4
It had a better radar, so it could position itself better for an interception.
The AIM-7's could be used for an effective head-on shot, as they have decent range and can be fired from over 20 miles out.
While the plane might have similar endurance to the F-104 when supersonic, the fact that it could carry out a head-on interceptions owing to it's missiles and superior radar meant that it didn't have to close in head-on, merge, and get behind the aircraft's tail -- it could just splash the plane before the merge occurs.
The two-man crew helps keep the work-load down, so there's less likely something will go wrong.

F-106
Absolute radar range might have been as good or close to the F-4 Phantom, though engagement range was less
Interception radius was around 700 nm, which was less than the F-4, but superior to the English Electric Lighting
It could lob a nuclear-tipped missile in a head-on pass, and if not -- it could carry out a tail-chase.
It was resistant to jamming, though the Concorde had no ECM gear fitted, so no problem.

F-15
It had a very good rate of acceleration: Slightly less than the EE Lightning from breaks-release to lift-off, about the same as the F-4, and superior to the F-4 above 250 knots, and possibly equal or superior to the Lightning.
It had a good radar, which was better than the F-4's, possibly the F-106 at the time the F-15A entered service, and a top-speed that was better than all the other aircraft in the listing. Particularly if the VMax switch was used.
The radar and fire-control system was designed to be worked by one person, as on the lightning, but the ability to automatically compute interception vectors would have given it a clear edge.
The AIM-7 & AIM-120 both would have allowed a head-on-shot against the aircraft, and range was enough to allow a tail-chase.


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## Graeme (Apr 10, 2020)

nuuumannn said:


> That's interesting Graeme, but are these guys saying those intercepts didn't take place because what they knew about the aircraft meant they couldn't, or are they saying they actually didn't take place?



Dunno Grant - but they're fun reading and I particularly liked the "floor polisher" story regards the Concorde intercept. 
Here's the full version...

https://www.pprune.org/military-aviation/505899-concorde-chasing-2.html

And I found this here (note the next post by longer on)...

https://www.pprune.org/military-aviation/491374-really-fright-e-ning-3.html


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## nuuumannn (Apr 10, 2020)

Again, someone saying things didn't happen based on what they know rather than them saying they didn't happen outright. I think there's a bit of internet stretching regarding the 88,000ft flight which admittedly I might have encouraged. from what I have re-read (gulp), he intercepted the U-2 at 66,000 ft and did a zoom climb to 88,000ft at a different time, so never made a claim to intercepting a U-2 at 88,000ft.

Having read the Concorde thread, they are not saying it wasn't actually done, just that they believed it couldn't be done.


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## XBe02Drvr (Apr 10, 2020)

nuuumannn said:


> . I go on engine runs on turboprops on a nightly basis tho.


I never got to do that. Got plenty of practice taping the instrumentation umbilical to the wing, fuselage, and emergency exit while the engine run guys (top of the shop pecking order) stood around and kibitzed. As a mechanic with a pilot's license, I was an alien Intruder in their hard core blue collar culture, and never got to do any of the "good stuff". I did get plenty of practice at tires, brakes, lav dumps, daily walk arounds, outdoor lamp replacements, and towing with an open tug in wintertime.
I haven't seen an ATR or a Dash in years. All the service in these parts is Embraers, Canadairs, A320s, and the occasional 73. The ignorami flying public refer to anything with a prop on it as a "piston pounder" and protest loudly if asked to board one.
Cheers,
Wes

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## Zipper730 (Apr 10, 2020)

The U-2's stall speed being 94 knots sounds very suspicious: I'd figured they'd be a bit lower.


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## XBe02Drvr (Apr 10, 2020)

Zipper730 said:


> The U-2's stall speed being 94 knots sounds very suspicious: I'd figured they'd be a bit lower.


As gliders go, it was a "heavy jet". If you're going to 70,000 feet and flying at jet speeds, you're probably going to want a different airfoil than what a Schweitzer 2-32 uses.


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## Zipper730 (Apr 10, 2020)

XBe02Drvr said:


> As gliders go, it was a "heavy jet". If you're going to 70,000 feet and flying at jet speeds, you're probably going to want a different airfoil than what a Schweitzer 2-32 uses.


Yeah, but I've seen footage of it landing on a carrier (there was a proposal of using a U-2 off a carrier deck -- as completely nuts as that sounds) deck. It appeared to be moving greatly slower than an F-14.

Usually landing speed is 1.15 - 1.3 times the stall-speed for a carrier approach, and if 135 is the approach speed for an F-14, then you'd 103.8 - 117.4 knots. This thing was coming in pretty slow in comparison.


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## XBe02Drvr (Apr 11, 2020)

Zipper730 said:


> Usually landing speed is 1.15 - 1.3 times the stall-speed for a carrier approach, and if 135 is the approach speed for an F-14, then you'd 103.8 - 117.4 knots.


I might suggest your qualifications for making eyeball estimates of approach speeds might be a little thin? It takes an LSO thousands of hours of training and flying to do that. There are too many variables of wind, viewing angle, optical illusions, etc when viewing onboard, not to mention the additional distortions of lenses and resolution, and time lapse that video can introduce, to put much faith in that.
Squids are aided somewhat in that call by reading the approach indexer lights on the nose gear doors of their aircraft on approach. These are triggered by AOA sensors and display to all observers Fast, Onspeed, and Slow conditions of the approach. Ever see those on a U2?
I suspect a U2 is going to want the max possible wind over deck in order to make the softest possible touchdown for its relatively fragile airframe. Its wingspan is going to require wider foul lines and minimal deck parked aircraft; none aft of the forward JBDs.
Gliders are floaters on landing, and I'm sure the U2 is no exception. The problem is getting the speed down while keeping the engine throttled up enough to allow for a bolter. A splash off the angle would ruin everybody's day.
Cheers,
Wes


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## Zipper730 (Apr 17, 2020)

XBe02Drvr said:


> I might suggest your qualifications for making eyeball estimates of approach speeds might be a little thin? It takes an LSO thousands of hours of training and flying to do that.


Sure, I could concede being wrong. That said, I have some video clips I figure you might like to watch

U-2G


F-111B


The latter is merely for comparison.

Regardless, I have a Standard Aircraft Characteristics chart for the F-111B dated July 1, 1967.

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## tyrodtom (Apr 17, 2020)

You're not looking at that U2 from a stationary point, you're on a carrier going maybe 30 knots or more. 
And also into the wind,. Of how many knots ?

So that U2 may only be moving across the deck at 50 knots or so.


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## nuuumannn (Apr 20, 2020)

XBe02Drvr said:


> I haven't seen an ATR or a Dash in years.



There's 20 of them parked up at work at the moment! About a third of our combined fleet. The turboprop fleet works its a** off in this country and the airline gets its money's worth. The ATRs aren't much liked by pilots, hosties or engineers, although at our level A-Check work on them is easy. I did a couple of heavy checks on them years ago and they are a pig. Despite their low operating costs - 68 versus 50 pax with the same engine and roughly the same fuel load as a Dash, they are maintenance hawgs and spend more time on the ground than the Dashes. A C-Check in a Dash can take around 2 weeks. In an ATR, normally 6 to 8 weeks. Its been calculated that for every man-hour of work on a Dash, there are two for an ATR. The Dashes are hardier, more versatile, can land on smaller strips and are cheaper to maintain, yet we have a ton of ATRs. Damn beancounters.

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## Zipper730 (Apr 21, 2020)

tyrodtom said:


> You're not looking at that U2 from a stationary point, you're on a carrier going maybe 30 knots or more.


I was under the impression you'd generally operate around 25 knots for most purposes. This might not be "most" purposes however...


> And also into the wind,. Of how many knots ?


I have no idea as to that one. I'm not sure if there's even a generalized estimate for such matters...


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## XBe02Drvr (Apr 21, 2020)

nuuumannn said:


> The Dashes are hardier, more versatile, can land on smaller strips and are cheaper to maintain


Hey, they're descendants of the Caribou, Buffalo, Twotter, and Dash 7, what do you expect ? Runs in the family. Hereditary bushwhackers. When our airline decided to replace their Fokker27s, they got sales teams to demonstrate SF340s, Dash 8s, HS748s, ATR42s, and even refurbished YS11s. Our pilots got to fly them, and our mechs got to do dailies on them. DHC was savvy. They brought along the Director of Maintenance, a shift supervisor, and the head flight attendant from one of our sister Piedmont Commuters who'd been operating it for awhile, in one of their planes in Piedmont colors. It made a great hit with all our people, and DHC was very generous with their time and fuel. Even I, as a lowly mechanic, got a little right seat time after I showed the demo pilot my ATP. Our recommendation to management, Flight, Cabin, and Maintenance, was unanimous - get the Dash! The CEO decided otherwise, saying: "The SAAB is cheaper, and besides, it LOOKS like an airliner, not an overgrown Piper Cub!". The SAABs were still having teething problems, and were a factor in our eventual bankruptcy.
My ex, an American Eagle new hire FO, had an ATR72 blow its right engine at liftoff on her third day flying the line, her leg to fly. All the turbine wheels came unglued and spit the bits out the tailpipe. Fortunately, the containment held, but the aft fuselage looked like it had smallpox. The prop froze with its blades locked in beta, flat to the relative wind. Fortuitousiy, they were making a full length takeoff on the longest runway at O'Hare, so even though ostensibly past V1, they were able to get it down and stopped safely. She said there was so much drag on the right side that full reverse on the left engine could just about keep it straight on the runway. They got it off the active and stopped on a high speed taxiway, but couldn't make the hard left turn onto the parallel taxiway from a standstill into the working engine. Besides, they were surrounded with emergency equipment, and the Captain had to shut down the left engine in a hurry, as one of the CFR trucks was about to stuff its foam nozzle in the intake. Kathleen got to sit in the cockpit and unwind a bit while the Captain offloaded the passengers and apologized for the ruckus. The passengers all wanted to know what "the girl" did wrong to cause this terrifying incident.
Cheers,
Wes

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## XBe02Drvr (Apr 21, 2020)

Zipper730 said:


> I was under the impression you'd generally operate around 25 knots for most purposes. This might not be "most" purposes, however...





Zipper730 said:


> I have no idea as to that one. I'm not sure if there's even a generalized estimate for such matters...


Well here's a generalized estimate for you. It used to be considered that 35-40 knots wind over the deck was minimum for flight ops, in whatever combination of wind speed and ship speed it took to get there. Today's carriers top out in the low 30s hull speed, (officially anyway) so flight ops in a dead calm might be a shaky proposition. Dead calms aren't all that common at sea, so not usually a problem.
In the case of a U2, (did you notice how prone to bouncing it was?) you'd want the most possible wind over the deck to minimize impact velocity.
Cheers,
Wes


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## Zipper730 (Apr 21, 2020)

I never knew they'd operate with that much WOD. That said, you could see 90 knots during some of those approaches.


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## XBe02Drvr (Apr 21, 2020)

Zipper730 said:


> I never knew they'd operate with that much WOD. That said, you could see 90 knots during some of those approaches.


Huh? How did you get from 35-40 to 90 knots? Or are you talking aircraft approach speed relative to the deck? A typical fighter approach AIRspeed at lighter weights of 130 knots into 35-40 knots WOD would give you 90-95 knots deck impact speed. Correct.


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## Zipper730 (Apr 21, 2020)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Huh? How did you get from 35-40 to 90 knots? Or are you talking aircraft approach speed relative to the deck? A typical fighter approach AIRspeed at lighter weights of 130 knots into 35-40 knots WOD would give you 90-95 knots deck impact speed. Correct.


The U-2 approach. 

You said the normal WOD was around 35-40 knots over the deck, Tyrodtom said the U-2 could be crossing the deck at around 50 knots. So I figured that would be 85-90 knots for the U-2 approach.


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## tyrodtom (Apr 21, 2020)

Zipper730 said:


> The U-2 approach.
> 
> You said the normal WOD was around 35-40 knots over the deck, Tyrodtom said the U-2 could be crossing the deck at around 50 knots. So I figured that would be 85-90 knots for the U-2 approach.


With a stalling speed of 94 knots, I don't think so.


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## XBe02Drvr (Apr 21, 2020)

Zipper730 said:


> You said the normal WOD was around 35-40 knots over the deck


You did it again! If you're going to quote someone, at least quote them accurately. I said 35-40 knots WOD was a practical MINIMUM, not a "normal" operation. The example I gave of a 130 knot fighter is a bare minimum for a plane at its lightest possible landing weight, which is the only scenario that would work with only 35-40 knots WOD. Heavier or faster will require more.
In all those videos of flight deck recovery operations, didn't you notice how everybody's got all their gear strapped down tight, and any shirtsleeves that aren't are flapping in the breeze? It's a windy place up there.
Cheers,
Wes


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## Zipper730 (Apr 21, 2020)

tyrodtom said:


> With a stalling speed of 94 knots, I don't think so.


I was simply curious if the 94 knot figures was correct. So I was basing it on the footage. Which is why I wanted to know the WOD.

Looking at the velocity over the deck and minimums, it seems it's probably correct.


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## tyrodtom (Apr 21, 2020)

You really think you can judge the velocity of a aircraft just by looking at a video ?


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## XBe02Drvr (Apr 21, 2020)

tyrodtom said:


> You really think you can judge the velocity of a aircraft just by looking at a video ?


Of course he can! He's got X-ray vision, powered by Kryptonite.

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## Zipper730 (Apr 21, 2020)

*waves his white flag*

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## nuuumannn (Apr 22, 2020)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Hey, they're descendants of the Caribou, Buffalo, Twotter, and Dash 7, what do you expect? Runs in the family. Hereditary bushwhackers.



Yup, indeed. We've had them for 15 years and they get flogged, yet there's nary a scrap of corrosion on them. The ATRs however...Hmmm. We got our first '600s two years ago and they are going through their first C-Checks and they're finding corrosion in them already. I've never worked on Twotters. A mate has, says they're the business.


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## XBe02Drvr (Apr 23, 2020)

nuuumannn said:


> I've never worked on Twotters. A mate has, says they're the business.


I've only wrenched on one once, but Gibraltar Rock has nothing on the Twotter. Dead simple, rugged as hell, and about as bulletproof as they come. I've flown right seat in them several times dropping jumpers. What a blast! "The Herd" out of Pottstown PA, and other jump clubs. They were into canopy RW back then, so after a 12.5 exit and a very brief formation freefall, they'd pop high and practice formation work with their canopies. When they finally got down to the LZ, we'd be all loaded up with the next batch and ready for takeoff.
Jumpers are the ultimate party animals, and they like to take good care of their pilots. You've probably heard fairytales of Innuit customs of hospitality with overnight visitors. I can't vouch for the Innuit, but I can tell you jumpers are true believers!
Cheers,
Wes

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## nuuumannn (Apr 23, 2020)

XBe02Drvr said:


> I've only wrenched on one once, but Gibraltar Rock has nothing on the Twotter.



Looks like Viking will keep them going for awhile yet. Nothing replaces a Twotter, except another Twotter.

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## Zipper730 (May 3, 2021)

XBe02Drvr said:


> It reminded those who had any doubts, the meaning of ruthlessness.


And that would have meant that, even though proposals existed for limited conflicts instead of an all-out spasm in 1957, it would have likely been disregarded by the JCS?


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