# Hellcat vs Spitfire - which would you take?



## wuzak (Apr 24, 2013)

Inspired by the discussion in the other thread - given the choice, would you take the Hellcat or Spitfire as a pure fighter?

In the other thread it was suggested that the Hellcat's performance was similar to the Spitfire Mk V. Which of those would be your preference?

Of course the F6F's real Spitfire contemporaries are the IX, VIII and XII. Are the later model Spitfires more able than the early production Hellcats?

The main performance advantage for the Hellcat is range. How much of a factor is that in your decision process?


----------



## redcoat (Apr 24, 2013)

As a pure fighter the Spitfire IX has a clear edge, but without question the Hellcat was the better carrier aircraft.
So if I was flying off a carrier I would choose the Hellcat, but if it was merely about which I would rather go into combat in, it would have to be the Spitfire.


----------



## VBF-13 (Apr 24, 2013)

Let me put it this way. Both these planes are flying on fumes while the P51 is going right by them and as a fighter the P51 could do virtually anything these could do.


----------



## vinnye (Apr 24, 2013)

I would choose the Spitfire - probably even if I were to fly from a carrier. Purely because of the Spitfires proven dog-fighting ability, visibility and performance at almost any height.
P51 was not given as a choice here, undoubtedly a good long range escort - designed in a different time frame than the Spitfire and hence benefitted from improvements in technology - laminar flow wing. Was probably not even as good as a Seafire when used from a carrier - had really poor low speed handling.


----------



## stona (Apr 24, 2013)

In the context of the original question I'd take the Spitfire. It was simply a better air superiority fighter.

It's a no brainer that the Hellcat was a better carrier aircraft and a formidable fighter in its own right, but that wasn't the question.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Dislike Dislike:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## nuuumannn (Apr 24, 2013)

> It's a no brainer that the Hellcat was a better carrier aircraft and a formidable fighter in its own right, but that wasn't the question.



Yep. Spitty. Wouldn't it make more sense to compare the Seafire with the Hellcat or are we still going on about the latter's potential use in Europe?


----------



## fastmongrel (Apr 24, 2013)

I would take a Spitfire as homeland defence. A Seafire as CAP against Kamikazes and a Hellcat everywhere else.

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## GregP (Apr 24, 2013)

I'd take the Hellcat if operating from a carrier or for any misson, regardless of base, outside the range of the Spirtfire, plus any ground attack mission regardless of base or range. 

For land-based, non-ground attack mssions within the range of a Spitfire, I'd take the Spitifre.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Marcel (Apr 24, 2013)

I'd take an me262.


----------



## buffnut453 (Apr 24, 2013)

I'd take a Spitfire - it's waaaaayyy prettier!

(It's just as good a reason as anyone else's!)

Reactions: Bacon Bacon:
1 | Like Like:
1 | Dislike Dislike:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## davebender (Apr 24, 2013)

So does Me-109G and quite a few other 1943 fighter aircraft. F6F would be preferrable only for CV operations.

Offer the F4U and we could have a serious contest vs 1943 European fighter aircraft.


----------



## bobbysocks (Apr 24, 2013)

i'd take the spit. i know of a mustang pilot who while coming back from a mission over the channel saw a spit on patrol and decided to play with the guy and bounced him. the spit ended up playing with him instead. he walked away with a little more humility and a lot more respect for that plane.


----------



## VBF-13 (Apr 24, 2013)

buffnut453 said:


> I'd take a Spitfire - it's waaaaayyy prettier!


Sure it is. But that son-of-a-gun didn't pay 19:1.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## davebender (Apr 24, 2013)

F6F didn't pay 19:1 either while fighting world class opponents.


----------



## parsifal (Apr 24, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> Sure it is. But that son-of-a-gun didn't pay 19:1.



neither did the F6f. weve covered this many times


----------



## parsifal (Apr 24, 2013)

This is a hard question. Spitfire was available from 1939, and was competitive throughout the war. it was not much of a ground attack aircraft either, with some unforgiving flight characteristics. As a carrier plane, its debut was pretty por, but by 1945 it was the best CAP fighter of either Navy, and with one of the lowest operational loss rates in the BPF, and indeed for both Navies. By 1945, however the decisive carrier fights had been won. In terms of "stretchability", the Spifire was capable of more development, and remained in service as a frontline aircraft for a lot longer 

Hellcat was just what was needed in the midwar period. it was tough, fairly fast, heavily armed, and protected, good at carrier operations, possessed good range and made a meal out of it enemies, though not the 19:1 being claimed (they are the claims made for it, and especially annoying is the totally spurious claim that it achieved 19:1 against the zero...it was more like 4:1 against the zero in the air...still good, but not the fantastic ans spurious claims that are so often t4rotted out to promote it as some kind of uber fighter) .....nevertheless its combat record is undoubtedly very high....and it wasnt against an enemy that was second rate......it did well against the Germans when ranged against them as well).

I think you have to give a qualified answer here. For the Pacific, its the Hellcat....availability, the right package, an effective combat sysatem. In Europe, where carrier operations in the last half of the war were not as important, the Spit was probably more valuable. It contributed to the early defensive victories, and remained competititve against the opposition to the end.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## VBF-13 (Apr 24, 2013)

Just busting chops, guys. That's what that smiley-face was for. The claim that thoroughbred paid anywhere from $40.00 to $41.80 should really be reserved for its own thread. 

PS: I'm equidistant on either of these as a fighter, that's why I can't decide.


----------



## wuzak (Apr 24, 2013)

Well, what are the advantages of each.

Spitfire V and F6F similar in speed. Climb? Spitfire outturns F6F?

Spitfire XII climbs better at low altitudes, is faster than the V and F6F and turns just as well as V. 

Spitfire IX is faster then the V, XII and F6F, has better climb and still turns like its brothers.

Spiftries all come with 2 x 20mm + 4 x 0.303" - though 4 x 20mm was an option (rarely used). F6F has 6 x 0.50". I guess tha answer to which has better firepower lies in one of many threads strewn about the place....


----------



## Jabberwocky (Apr 24, 2013)

The closest direct contemporaries are the Spitfire Mk VIII and the F6F-3.

Spitfire VIII first entered service in Nov 1942, but didn't get into actual combat until June 1943
The F6F-3 first entered service in April 1943, but didn't get into combat until the end of August 1943.

The Spitfire VIII is basically a Mk IX with a few aerodynamic refinements, 40% more internal fuel and a bit more weight. Compared to the Hellcat, it has a minor speed advantage at all altitudes, significant advantage in climb and a significant disadvantage in range. The Hellcat has better armour and is generall more rugged, better control harmony and better view over the nose. Armament is a bit of a wash.

Cut out some of the beef and granite needed for the Hellcat to make it a carrier fighter and I'd put the two aircraft at level pegging. As it stands, I'd prefer the Spitfire VIII for any land based mission apart from ground straffing/bombing. I'd prefer the Hellcat for all carrier based missions apart from point defence.


----------



## wuzak (Apr 24, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> Yep. Spitty. Wouldn't it make more sense to compare the Seafire with the Hellcat or are we still going on about the latter's potential use in Europe?



Early Seafires were based on Spitfire Vs. They had much teh same attributes, but were slower. Seafires skipped the whole 2 stage Merlin thing and went for teh Griffon - in teh XV. But that was later in the war.


----------



## Maxrobot1 (Apr 24, 2013)

Hmm. How much weight would the Hellcat lose if a version was built without the wing-fold mechanism and tail hook assembly?
An considering all the mods performed on the Spitfire series, what if the Hellcat was allowed to progress with, say a bubble canopy? 
And considering all the engine variants in Spits, how about Hellcats with R3350s? Remember the Griffin was a far cry from the early Merlins.


----------



## GregP (Apr 24, 2013)

The F6F was 19 : 1 against all air-to-air only opponets combined. 

There is not enough data for anyone to say what the air-to-air ratio was versus any particular opponent, and it didn't achieve 19 : 1 agasint the combination of air-to-air, AAA, and combined operational losses. Of course, none of the OTHER fighters achieved the level of the F6F against only air-to-air opponents. Again, if you include AAA and combined operational losses, even the F4U falls to very pedestrian levels and only has about 2/3 of the success of the F6F in air-to-air only. The only reason people seem to want to include AAA and operations for the F6F is to lower the ratio, but if there is no data for their pet aircraft then it is hard to agree on a lower ratio for it. The argument simply degenerates.

Most people who quote stats for fighters only use the air-to-air stats because the pilot cannot see and avaoid an AAA shell and has NO control over mechanical failures. It seems to be only the Hellcat that pushes people to want to include AAA and operations, but they rarely go back and include that data with their claims for other fighters. In many cases, the combined data are simply not there to use.

I have yet to see any data for any British aircraft that includes the entire war, all theaters, broken out by victories over fighters, bombers, and ground kills, with losses to enemy aircraft, AAA, and combat and non-combat operational losses. That is no slap to anything British at all. Maybe the data simply do not exist in ways that can be correlated into a single table format. I don't know, but would LOVE to find data by country that can be used to compare things fairly.

If anyone knows where such data can be found (as in the US Navy reports compiled after WWII in 1946) for other than U.S. types, maybe you could share a source that can be bought (if a book or written report) or accessed if avilable online. Most of the data for US losses and victories exist ... and we all would love to find the rest. Not solely for ranking purposes but more for completeness and fairness. 

Let the chips fall where they fall. Perhaps it would also serve to answer the best and worst of threads, too. The top dog could easily turn out to be the Bf 109 for kills per sortie.


----------



## wuzak (Apr 24, 2013)

Maxrobot1 said:


> Hmm. How much weight would the Hellcat lose if a version was built without the wing-fold mechanism and tail hook assembly?



The Seafire III was around 20-25mph slower than the Spitfire V - but the Merlin 50 in the Seafire had a lower rated altitude. The Spitfire V with Merlin 50M had a similar speed, but that was even lower altitude rated.

The Seafire XV had the Griffon VI, which was a single speed 2 stage engine. With +15psi boost it would comfortably outrun and outclimb a Hellcat. Not sure if the Griffon VI got to use +18psi, and wonder what the performance would be for that. +21psi would require higher grade fuel, and I doubt the navy would like to store two types of aviation fuel.



Maxrobot1 said:


> An considering all the mods performed on the Spitfire series, what if the Hellcat was allowed to progress with, say a bubble canopy?



The bubble canopy didn't make much, if any at all, performance difference to the Spiftire series.




Maxrobot1 said:


> And considering all the engine variants in Spits, how about Hellcats with R3350s? Remember the Griffin was a far cry from the early Merlins.



True, there were major performance differences between the engine variations in the Spitfire. But there were options that the Spitfire and/or the Seafire missed out on. 

Merlin 61s were going into Spitfires in 1942 - but the Seafire never got them. As with the 65, 66 70 versions of the 60-series (rated at different altitudes). 

The Spitfire never got the Merlin XX 2 speed supercharged engine. That was supposed to go into the Spitfire III, but the XXs went to Hurricanes instead. I imagine that the Seafire III would have had its performance transformed with the Merlin XX.

Griffons were going into Fireflies from 1942, but didn't get into Seafires until 1944.




Maxrobot1 said:


> how about Hellcats with R3350s?



Not sure that R-3350s would give much advantage in wartime Hellcats. First, they were single stage, compared to Hellcat's 2 stage engine. They were heavier, but didn't give much power advantage.

And wartime R-3350s weren't the most reliable.


----------



## Aozora (Apr 24, 2013)

As a land-based fighter the Spitfire, from Mk VIII onwards, wins. 

As an all-round carrier fighter the F6F was only really beaten by the F4U: however the F4U was only really tamed enough to undertake large scale carrier ops in late 1944 (noting, too, that Eric "Winkle" Brown hated the Corsair in all of its forms). The Seafire III was really too limited; although it made a great low-medium altitude CAP fighter it couldn't be used to escort the FAA's Avengers, nor could it range far enough from carrier groups to intercept Kamikaze raids.


----------



## GregP (Apr 24, 2013)

The F4U did not have the success the Hellcat had in the PTO and was in service almost exactly as long.

The Hellcat flew 66,530 action sorties, shot down 1,445 bombers and 3,718 fighters for a total of 5,163 victories. Air to air losses were 270, with 533 to AAA and 340 operational, all on action sorties (total action sorties losses = 1,163. They lost another 1,298 on non-action sorties, on ground, or on a ship that sunk. Total losses to all causes were 2,461. Air-to-air kill to loss ratio (5163 / 207) is 19.1 : 1.

The Corsair flew 64,051 action sorties, shot down 478 bombers and 1,662 fighters for a total of 2,140 victories. It had 189 losses in air-to-air, 349 to AA, and 203 operational for an action sorties total loss of 768. Total non-actional sorties losses were 856. Total losses to all causes were 1,624. Air-to-air kill to loss ratio (2140 / 189) is 11.3 : 1.

Simple math. The Hellcat wins hands down in the air-to-air mode versus all opponents. That's all that was claimed ... air-to-air kill to loss.

Data from US Navy document OPNAV-P-23V No, A129 dated 17 June 1946 ... not from me. I should not have to post this again. Go download the document. 93% of the victories were claimed by single seat fighters and the bulk of the remainder were claimed by 2-seat dive bombers or lone search planes. The enemy plane must be seen to crash, disintegrate in the air, be enveloped in flames, descend on friendly territory, or that its pilot and entire crew be seen to bail out. The vast majority were over water and any planes "force landing" were usually lost unless they rigged a mast and sailed it home. Didn't happen very often. There weren't large bomber streams with a bunch of gunners all shooting at the same target and claiming it for Navy fighter claims and NO airframes were reclaimed to fly later over the ocean. Any that crashed in the jungle werre likewise not recovered unless within yards of a jungle runway.


----------



## CobberKane (Apr 24, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> Sure it is. But that son-of-a-gun didn't pay 19:1.


 Nope. But it didn't score the great majority of it's kills against paper mâché opposition either.
Oh boy, here we go again...


----------



## GregP (Apr 25, 2013)

Cobber,

If your rugby team loses, the circumstances don't matter ... you lost. It's the won and lost column that counts. Same for the Hellcat. It PERFORMED when the it was all on the line ... better than anything else did. Ergo, Hall of Fame performance that reads better than anything else that flew. What else do you need? Infinite replays like the 1972 basketball Olympics until your side wins?

Why not post figures including bomber and fighter victories, AAA, enemy A/C losses, and combat operational losees, and non-combat losses to back up your assertions? C'mon, I posted all that above.

Show me otherwise without the noise about quallity of opposition and all that stuff. It achieved what it acheived. So did the Soviets, Japanese, Germans, Italians, etc. Numbers don't lie unless they are lies in themselves, and these aren't. We're not talking about flukes in sports. This was combat, for life and death. Nobody "gave" the other side anything or "threw" the game. They won or died ... or sometimes flew home if they could get away from the other guys.


----------



## Marcel (Apr 25, 2013)

Nope, numbers don't lie, but they don't tell the whole story usually and there is room for intepretation. Based on post#25, the Hellcat did slightly more sorties than the Corsair and shot down significantly more enemy a/c. Based on this, one could conclude that the Hellcat was better. But what if 50% of the Corsair sorties were groundattack sorties against only 10% of the Helcat's, that would give the numbers a whole different meaning. (taking these numbers out of thin air, it's just an example). I can think of many other factors that could explain the difference, none of which has anything to do with one a/c being better than the other. With other words, it's very hard for anyone to prove himself right in these 'best of' discussions.


----------



## nuuumannn (Apr 25, 2013)

> The Spitfire VIII is basically a Mk IX with a few aerodynamic refinements, 40% more internal fuel and a bit more weight.



Well, not particularly. The VIII was based on the HF.VII airframe without the pressurised cabin - that one was modified with the extra bits and pieces, retractable tailwheel etc; the IX was literally a V airframe fitted with the Merlin 61.



> Early Seafires were based on Spitfire Vs. They had much the same attributes, but were slower. Seafires skipped the whole 2 stage Merlin thing and went for the Griffon - in the XV. But that was later in the war.



Yes, so what's wrong with comparing the Seafire with the Hellcat? The Seafire has more in common with the Grumman fighter than its land based counterpart, simply because the Hellcat was designed as a carrier fighter (and before anyone says "but there were land based ones, too" - it was designed for carrier ops). So, which was better? Seafire XV or Hellcat?


----------



## buffnut453 (Apr 25, 2013)

GregP said:


> Simple math. The Hellcat wins hands down in the air-to-air mode versus all opponents. That's all that was claimed ... air-to-air kill to loss.



But it's not. The Buffalo had the best kill-to-loss of WWII at around 26:1. But I'm happy to stick with your "simple math" justification.

I do think it's a bit tough comparing the Hellcat--which fought in one theatre and was flown by one service (ok, 2 if you count USMC and USN and I'm discounting Brit use of the Hellcat 'cos it was, frankly, negligable in terms of kills) for the last 2.6 years of the war when the Allies clearly had the upper hand--with the Spitfire which flew in every theatre and was in service for the entire 6-year duration of the war.


----------



## nuuumannn (Apr 25, 2013)

Yes, I agree, Buffnut. The two were designed as fighter interceptors, but with very different timescales, histories and uses, it's a tough one to make an even comparison. The Spitfire was the only Allied fighter in production before and after the war and was built in greater numbers than any other Allied fighter of WW2. It was built in a large number of variants and sub-variants with different capabilities and armament and served with a large number of nations' armed forces in many different theatres - every theatre the British armed forces served in, for a start. 

The Hellcat, although it had an illustrious career was not around for nearly as long, did not serve with nearly as many armed forces and was not built in anywhere near the same number of variants and sub-marks - not to forget that it was purely designed for carrier operations with naval forces. Yes, Hellcats served with the French forces in Indochina post-war, but apart from FAA use in Europe, the Hellcat's combat career was almost exclusively confined to the PTO.

Performance wise, the Spitfire Mk.VIII -as mentioned earlier does compare closest to the F6F-3 Hellcat, but later Griffon engined Spits could easily out-perform the Grumman fighter - except in range, but then they were designed for ops over Europe, not far ranging missions over water, like Hellcats regularly carried out. How can a real comparison of both types in combat, in terms of enemy aircraft shot down etc be made? More Spitfires served in so many more theatres and in such differing combat environments with a vastly more varied type of opposition, making it impossible to provide a realistic comparison or complete and accurate kill figures for the Spitfire. This was made easy for the Grumman since since the figures provided come from one source, the US Navy. Simple numbers do not illustrate anywhere near the sets of criteria required for combat comparison between the two. For example; Spitfires had combat against other Spitfires, against jet fighters, flying bombs, aircraft flown by the Japanese, Germans, Egyptians, Israelis, Pakistanis, Vietnamese, Indonesians (I'm sure I've missed out a few), need I say more.


----------



## GregP (Apr 25, 2013)

We've had this before BuffNut,

The Buffalo in FInish service accounted for a miniscule portion of Buffalo operations. Take a representaive sample of at least 75% and it just sucks. About 43 aircraft out of 503 built are NOT a representative sample.

The Finns did well, nobody else did even a tenth as well. Since the Germans shots down the early Russian opposition in incredible numbers, the finns did the same thing. 

Atypical at best.

Any sample shoud include at least 75% of the planes and be random. Taking the few Finns isn't random. Taking the USN as a sample IS because they operated over 90% of all Hellcats. SO why not take the entire US Navy, with almost all, but not quite all, of the species?

The Finns had less than 50 Buffalos out of 503. Fold them in with any selection of 280 or more Buffalos and you get a very poor performance.

I choose a large percent because we HAVE the data and it IS bad .. for the Buffalo.


----------



## nuuumannn (Apr 25, 2013)

Oh, and I also forgot about training. The Hellcat pilots were trained by two principal sources, the British/FAA and the US Navy and the majority of them (except the British/Commonwealth and French) came from one country; the United States. Pilots who flew Spitfires were from all over the world and endured vastly different standards of combat training, therefore had far less predictable abilities as combat airmen. This alone makes comparison betwen the two types in actual combat impossible.


----------



## GregP (Apr 25, 2013)

Combat performance is what counts. It's NOT how you prepare for the game, it's the score at the end that is remembered.

Performance in WWII is the ONLY measure that counts. The rest are excuses for not performing as well as the real winner. Don't make excuses.

Kind of like the underdog winning the gold ... he or she simply did it better when it counted and won the gold.

Same with fighters. The groups and squadron didn't get to pick their assignments, but they DID get to perform. There is a "best" for air-to-air (Hellcat) and a "best" for air-to-ground (don't know yet ... never thought about it in these terms). 

C'mon, use data, not emotion or nationalism. I already said the Bf 109 might come out on top and I'm from the U.S.A. Anybody have the DATA?


----------



## stona (Apr 25, 2013)

Unless two aircraft are flying at the same time, in the same theatre, against identical opposition and carrying out similar missions, kill ratios are _utterly irrelevant_ as a means of comparing different aircraft]. 

You could for example compare the Spitfire and Hurricane in the Battle of Britain to get a measure of their relative performance, but even that would be weighted by factors easy to overlook. 

I see someone beat me to the Buffalo's stunning success. I'm surprised it wasn't adopted wholesale by all air arms on that evidence 

Cheers

Steve


----------



## GregP (Apr 25, 2013)

You're making excuses. Take the performance as a TYPE, not a small sample, and let tyhe chips fall. The Finnish Buffalos are less than 10% of the Buffalos. The classic statistical trap is the 10% sample that does NOT work as an indicator of the whole. See W. E. Demming for an explanation.

It doesn't fly in the least. 

Quit stating your preference and state the numbers that cover a LARGE sample of the population.

Make it anything over 60% of the type. FM-2 and F4F are the same type ... both are Wildcats. The difference is like the difference between the P-51 and the P-51B. Both had different engines, but both were Mustangs.

You'd have a hard time the engineeering world without sufficient proof. Opinions don't provide it.


----------



## stona (Apr 25, 2013)

Do you think that comparing the ratios of a Spitfire flying in the BoB and a Hellcat flying in the Pacific is a valid comparison? I don't, in fact it is a nonsense.

The success of the Finnish Buffalos is an illustration of why. If you had figures for the Hellcat flying in a comparable campaign to another fighter (even the Finnish Buffalos) then they might be relevant. No such figures exist. Since the Hellcat never flew in a meaningful way in the ETO it is impossible to make any ratio comparisons between it and any of the fighters that operated in that theatre.

Some aircraft did operate in both. How do the P-38s figures in the ETO compare with its figures in the PTO? Anybody know?

At the moment you are attempting to compare apples and oranges. It is all "sound and fury, signifying nothing" to quote the bard.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## GregP (Apr 25, 2013)

Typical apologist. The Spirfire was a family of fighters. Each "generation" competed against each opposite generation. The comparions are equal ... if not, the differences are minor.

Stop apologizing and supply numbers for your favorite type. The Hellcats were developed and the Bf 109's were developed and the Spitfires were developed and were replaced in service as indicated by losses and developments by the other side.

The Spitfire and Bf 109 flew through the war. The numbers equal out or one side was not as good at development, pilot training, or SOMETHING.

No excuses ... numbers. I wonder if they exist. I see a lot of opinions. I have one too, and it isn't obvious from my posts. Show your numbers that support your claims or acknowledge the Hellcat as number one.

C'mon, NUMBERS. Show it, with references. I did.

Refute it with victories and losses, broken out to victories over enemy aircfaft, enemy aircraft shot down, losses to AAA, and operations, combat and non-combat or be seen as an apologist for your favorite type or nationality. If you can't, stop arguing. I'm asking for numbers and sources, not trying to defend the Hellcat.

Not trying to harp on anyone ... trying to get the NUMBERS ... no prejudice here, it falls where it does. Show me something better than the Hellcat! 

With the broken out numbers.

Typical missons for Hellcats were for 4 - 12 against whatever was in the air. If more were required, it was an attack and more were launched. Overclaiming was at a a minimum over the ocean ... not many aircraft involved in most situations ... there's nowhere you can escape to except a ditching or an escape. Forced landing is not an option.


----------



## nuuumannn (Apr 25, 2013)

> Combat performance is what counts. It's NOT how you prepare for the game, it's the score at the end that is remembered. Performance in WWII is the ONLY measure that counts. The rest are excuses for not performing as well as the real winner. Don't make excuses.



Rubbish, Greg. Not when comparing aircraft types. You know all too well that quality of individual, pilot training, maintenance, environment all affect performance on the day. This figure of 19 to 1 for the Hellcat doesn't apply to the aircraft alone, so you can't keep banging on about it like it's the only thing that counts. There's nothing saying that the same ratio would not have been achieveable by the pilots using different aircraft.

As for figures and numbers of Spitfire victories, can't say I have them - are there any out there for every combat the Spitfire was involved in? I doubt it, but like I said earlier, on what basis are such figures going to be justified? Your figures for the Hellcat are the use of the type by one service against one enemy in one combat arena. The Spitfire was in action and scored victories in multiple services with varying quality of pilots using different means of determining victories against many different opponents in many different combat arenas. This means your figures are meaningless. Spitfire and Hellcat combat ratios are incomparable. Who are you to say that if the USN used Spitfires/Seafires instead of Hellcats, then the same figures would not have been achieved at any rate? This also makes your numbers meaningless. 



> Or be seen as an apologist for your favorite type or nationality. If you can't, stop arguing.



Ouch! Is this really necessary, Greg?


----------



## GregP (Apr 25, 2013)

Rubbish Nuuumannn. They did what they did and one has to come out on top. There are NO equal war thearters. There are NO equal pilots. We only have the RESULTS and they are what they are.

You are apologist for your favorite type, whatever that is and I have my suspicion. 

No numbers, no result.

I HAVE numbers. See Post #25. Post yours. Notice no numbers since post 25? 

Is there a reason? I think so. Figure it out. Either the Hellcat is the best or you can't prove it otherise with believable numbers from a believable source.

If you can, do it with the numbers or be shown to be an apologist.


----------



## nuuumannn (Apr 25, 2013)

> I HAVE numbers.



And I have proven to you that your figures are meaningless. Just because you refuse to see any one else's reasoning other than your own doesn't justify it any further.



> If you can, do it with the numbers or be shown to be an apologist.



Gee, and I thought we were having a discussion about aircraft. Sorry Greg, what's the point in continuing? You are being unreasonable.


----------



## fastmongrel (Apr 25, 2013)

Oh great another playground scuffle about fighter claims. We havent had one of these since about Oh let me see yesterday was it.

I have the numbers that show that the RAF shot down every plane the LW had in the BOB. I have the numbers that show that the LW shot down the Soviet airforce twice in 1941.


----------



## nuuumannn (Apr 25, 2013)

C'mon then Mongrel, let's see 'em, THEY ARE ALL THAT MATTER!


----------



## wuzak (Apr 25, 2013)

Correct me if I'm wrong, but wasn't Japanese air power on the wane before the Hellcat arrived in numbers in the PTO?


----------



## wuzak (Apr 25, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> Yes, so what's wrong with comparing the Seafire with the Hellcat?



There is nothing wrong with comparing them.

I was just trying to point out that Seafire development lagged that of the Spitfire, and that the Seafire could have been better earlier.




nuuumannn said:


> So, which was better? Seafire XV or Hellcat?



Apart from range I would have to pick the Seafire XV. The only problem is that it turned up late.


----------



## wuzak (Apr 25, 2013)

A side question: Seafire or Firefly?

Apparently the Royal Navy requested a navalised version of the Spitfire in 1938. The proposal was for Fairey to build them. Instead the RN ended up buying the Firefly. Two different sorts of fighter, but which would have been better for the FAA in WW2?

And if the Seafire is chosen over the Firefly does that affect Griffon development at all?


----------



## redcoat (Apr 25, 2013)

stone said:


> Some aircraft did operate in both. How do the P-38s figures in the ETO compare with its figures in the PTO? Anybody know?Cheers
> 
> Steve


In the Pacific the P-38 was the highest scoring USAAF fighter aircraft, in Europe the P-38 had the worst kill/loss ratio of any of the fighters used by USAAF being credited with destroying 1,771 enemy aircraft for the loss of 1,758 P-38s,


----------



## Jabberwocky (Apr 25, 2013)

GregP said:


> Rubbish Nuuumannn. They did what they did and one has to come out on top. There are NO equal war thearters. There are NO equal pilots. We only have the RESULTS and they are what they are.
> 
> You are apologist for your favorite type, whatever that is and I have my suspicion.
> 
> ...



By this logic, the fm2 was far superior to the F4U 4


----------



## stona (Apr 25, 2013)

redcoat said:


> In the Pacific the P-38 was the highest scoring USAAF fighter aircraft, in Europe the P-38 had the worst kill/loss ratio of any of the fighters used by USAAF being credited with destroying 1,771 enemy aircraft for the loss of 1,758 P-38s,



Thank you redcoat. 

That illustrates my point perfectly. An aircraft successful in one theatre had an almost 1:1 kill ratio in another.

How do we know that it would have been any different for other aircraft from the PTO operating in the ETO? We don't and never will, which is also my point.

Two _very_ different environments. At least apples and oranges are both fruits.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## nuuumannn (Apr 25, 2013)

Based on past posts, I don't think Greg agrees with you, Steve!



> does that affect Griffon development at all



I don't really think so, Wuzak, since its development went back further than the Firefly, so if it was not proceded with, the engine would have been earmarked for the fighter prototypes and production aircraft it was fitted to at any rate.


----------



## Aozora (Apr 25, 2013)

All I can see is that this thread is starting to replicate the earlier one on the Hellcat and Corsair in Europe. Bottom line is that both were fine fighters and did exactly what was advertised on the box - the F6F was designed to beat the Japanese and that's exactly what it did; it was capable of beating or equaling the_ best_ carrier and land based fighters the Japanese could design, plus it could give the likes of the Fw 190 and mid-late Bf 109s a run for their money, which is no mean feat for a carrier based fighter loaded down with all the extra equipment, ruggedness and weight that the role entailed.

The Spitfire was developed into one of the best short-medium range fighters available, and was adapted to becoming a fine long-range reconnaissance aircraft, plus it performed reasonably well as a fighter bomber when called on to do so.

As far as I'm concerned there was no real _direct_ comparison between the Hellcat or Spitfire because their designs were so far apart in time, philosophy and purpose. The Allies should be grateful that both were available at the right times.


----------



## VBF-13 (Apr 25, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> The Hellcat, although it had an illustrious career was not around for nearly as long, did not serve with nearly as many armed forces and was not built in anywhere near the same number of variants and sub-marks - not to forget that it was purely designed for carrier operations with naval forces.


That's because they got it right the first time.



stona said:


> Unless two aircraft are flying at the same time, in the same theatre, against identical opposition and carrying out similar missions, kill ratios are _utterly irrelevant_ as a means of comparing different aircraft.


Don't forget the same pilot at the stick in each of these aircraft. 



wuzak said:


> Correct me if I'm wrong, but wasn't Japanese air power on the wane before the Hellcat arrived in numbers in the PTO?


What's this, propaganda?
-Mae West, _My Little Chickadee_ (1940) 



redcoat said:


> In the Pacific the P-38 was the highest scoring USAAF fighter aircraft, in Europe the P-38 had the worst kill/loss ratio of any of the fighters used by USAAF being credited with destroying 1,771 enemy aircraft for the loss of 1,758 P-38s,


Redcoat, he asked how the _figures_ compared. What are the _figures_ on the P38s in the PTO?


----------



## Glider (Apr 25, 2013)

If your in the RN then you take the Hellcat. If your in the RAF you take the Spit.


----------



## stona (Apr 25, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> Redcoat, he asked how the _figures_ compared. What are the _figures_ on the P38s in the PTO?



The P-38s kill ratio in the Pacific was 11:1

It was more than ten times more successful there than in the ETO, but I suspect Greg already knew that.

If you were choosing an aircraft simply on something as simplistic as kill ratios then you would probably fly an FM-2 with a tremendous ratio of 33:1.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## VBF-13 (Apr 25, 2013)

stona said:


> The P-38s kill ratio in the Pacific was 11:1


Thanks. Just to satisfy my own morbid curiosity do you have a raw data citation for those claims?


----------



## nuuumannn (Apr 25, 2013)

> That's because they got it right the first time.



You are kidding, right? D'you expect us to take that seriously?


----------



## wuzak (Apr 25, 2013)

If they had got it right first time, wouldn't all Hellcats have subsequently been powered by R-2600s instead of R-2800s?


----------



## Shortround6 (Apr 25, 2013)

They got it right the the first time because they were practically handed the R-2800 with two stage supercharger on a plate. 

Actually Grumman did an exceptional job, but then they had already done several design studies of planes powered by R-2600s. They had the R-2800 with two stage supercharger for the F4U already well along in development. 

They were NOT trying to adapt a 1000hp plane to a 1500-2000hp engine. They were NOT saddled with engine that had a long and tortured development. 

ANY successful airplane needs a good designer or team, a good engine, timing and a fair amount of luck. 

Luck in being designed at the _right_ time, luck in freedom from crashes in early development ( or purchasers that will over look that), luck in availability of parts and accessories and luck in a whole lot of areas. 
Sometimes luck in the form of other companies being able to take-over production/responsibilities to allow concentration on a new design.


----------



## beitou (Apr 25, 2013)

What is a 2 stage supercharger or a 2 speed 2 stage engine?


----------



## Milosh (Apr 25, 2013)

wuzak said:


> If they had got it right first time, wouldn't all Hellcats have subsequently been powered by R-2600s instead of R-2800s?



The F6F looks like a F4F on steroids.


----------



## Shortround6 (Apr 25, 2013)

beitou said:


> What is a 2 stage supercharger or a 2 speed 2 stage engine?



A two stage supercharger has one supercharger outlet blowing into the inlet of a second supercharger. The required pressure being built up in two stages rather than one. 

At 23,000ft or so the Merlin two stage supercharger was compressing the air about 5.2 times what normal air pressure is at that altitude. No single stage supercharger could come close to that at the time.


----------



## DonL (Apr 25, 2013)

> All I can see is that this thread is starting to replicate the earlier one on the Hellcat and Corsair in Europe. Bottom line is that both were fine fighters and did exactly what was advertised on the box - the F6F was designed to beat the Japanese and that's exactly what it did; it was capable of beating or equaling the best carrier and land based fighters the Japanese could design, *plus it could give the likes of the Fw 190 and mid-late Bf 109s a run for their money*, which is no mean feat for a carrier based fighter loaded down with all the extra equipment, ruggedness and weight that the role entailed.



Do you have any substained data's for such a claim?
I have seriously my doubts that a F6F-3 or F6F-5 could match with the FW 190 A4, A6, A7, A8 and the Bf 109 G2, 6, 10, 14.
Both german a/c's are clearly faster and could outclimb the F6F every time besides other advantages.

After this report:
F4U-1D, F6F-3, and FW190-A5 Comparison Report

the Fw 190 A5 (a fighter bomber version) was superior to the F6F-3 except turning and no german fighter was ever a turn fighter. German tactics were boom and zoom and to fight in the vertical and not in the horizontal.
Where are the data's and numbers that a Hellcat could match with the fighter versions of the Fw 190 and Bf 109 G ?


----------



## beitou (Apr 25, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> A two stage supercharger has one supercharger outlet blowing into the inlet of a second supercharger. The required pressure being built up in two stages rather than one.
> 
> At 23,000ft or so the Merlin two stage supercharger was compressing the air about 5.2 times what normal air pressure is at that altitude. No single stage supercharger could come close to that at the time.


Thank you.


----------



## Marcel (Apr 25, 2013)

DonL said:


> Do you have any substained data's for such a claim?
> I have seriously my doubts that a F6F-3 or F6F-5 could match with the FW 190 A4, A6, A7, A8 and the Bf 109 G2, 6, 10, 14.
> Both german a/c's are clearly faster and could outclimb the F6F every time besides other advantages.
> 
> ...


If I understand correctly, to give "a good run for their money" means that it was no sitting duck, the other aircraft realy have to work to beat it. It doesn't actually mean that it actually matched the other aircraft's performance.


----------



## Readie (Apr 25, 2013)

Not really a fair comparison?

Fighter/interceptor. Spitfire.

I have to go with the defender of the realm.


Carrier borne bruiser. Hellcat












Cheers
John


----------



## DonL (Apr 25, 2013)

Marcel said:


> If I understand correctly, to give "a good run for their money" means that it was no sitting duck, the other aircraft realy have to work to beat it. It doesn't actually mean that it actually matched the other aircraft's performance.



I agree, but where is then any reason to choose a Hellcat over a Spitfire?
As we know the Spitfire could match the german fighters or was superior.

To my estimation a Hellcat could possible match the performance of the Hurricane against the Bf109E, if at all.

To my opinion there is no question to choose, the Spitfire every time.


----------



## Marcel (Apr 25, 2013)

DonL said:


> I agree, but where is then any reason to choose a Hellcat over a Spitfire?
> As we know the Spitfire could match the german fighters or was superior.
> 
> To my estimation a Hellcat could possible match the performance of the Hurricane against the Bf109E if ever.
> ...


except if you needed long legs and a carrier based aircraft. 
I think both aircraft did well in their respective role. In that perspective you are absolutely right, there is no reason to prefer the Hellcat over the Spit in the ETO. On the other side, the Spitfire did not perform brilliantly better than the Hellcat against Japan. So in that case, I would say that there are no pressing arguments to choose the Spit over the Hellcat either. 

The Hellcat did perform a whole lot better against the Japanese than the Hurricane, so I'm not so sure about your statement about that. 

I should actually stay out of these kinds of pointless debates. How do you compare a steak to a potato?


----------



## Readie (Apr 25, 2013)

Marcel said:


> How do you compare a steak to a potato?



Depends on the recipe and how good a cook you are I suppose 
Bon Appetite
Cheers
John


----------



## GregP (Apr 25, 2013)

Well Steve, 

At 1771 air-to-air victories against 1758 combat losses in the ETO, the P-38 ranks third in USAAC fighter aircraft air-to-air kill-to-loss right behind the P-51 (4950 air-to-air victories against 2520 combat losses in the ETO) and the number one P-61 (58 air-to-air victories against 25 combat losses in the ETO).

Personally, I would tend to discount anything that didn't fly at least 20,000 sorties just to preclude the odd outliers. That would leave out the P-61, making the P-38 second to the P-51 with the P-47 coming in third (3082 air-to-air victories against 3077 combat losses) in the ETO.

All this, of course, ignores ground kills. If you want to include them, the numbers are available. I'm sure you have them or you wouldn't have posted the numbers. If you do, the P-38 ranks third in overall victories (all theaters combined) behind the P-51 and F6F, but the air-to-air best kill-to-loss ratio is still the F6F. The Buffalo in US service, more than 400 of them, had a combined victory total, all theaters included, of 13. Pitiful. The Beaufighter and Avenger did much better, and the P-39 was more than 10 times better in US service. So 10 Buffalos were about as effective as one P-39. As I said, pitiful.

They don't break out the P-51 kills into Allison and Merlin and they had completely different engines. All the FM-2 had was an uprated version of the same powerplant in the same airframe with the same propeller. Sorry, it is a Wildcat and belongs in the Wildcat family lumped with the F4F data.

If wanting a fair comparison makes me unreasonable, then I am. Circumstances don't matter; the people fought what they faced with what they had, and lower-priority theaters got the bottom of the barrel equipment. I'd much rather have the actual numbers. If looks could do it, then the MiG-3 would be up near the top instead of near the bottom.

I am not the boss in here and did not mean to imply I was, but it sure seems like asking for some substantiation generates a lot of sour grapes. So be it. If you can ever dig up some real numbers and substantiate them, maybe we can have some meaningful duscussions on actual versus fictional combat performance.

If not, be happy, it beats the converse.


----------



## redcoat (Apr 25, 2013)

GregP said:


> Well Steve,
> 
> At 1771 air-to-air victories against 1758 combat losses in the ETO, the P-38 ranks third in USAAC fighter aircraft air-to-air kill-to-loss right behind the P-51 (4950 air-to-air victories against 2520 combat losses in the ETO) and the number one P-61 (58 air-to-air victories against 25 combat losses in the ETO)..


Actually it's fourth, the Spifire in USAAF service in the ETO had a kill/loss ratio of 1.34:1


----------



## VBF-13 (Apr 25, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> You are kidding, right? D'you expect us to take that seriously?


Nuuumannn, are you playing a game? I think you are. I think you're playing the How-Could-It-Have-Been-Improved game. I think that explains why you think I'm kidding. I'm not. You guys now even got me looking under the hood in that little game. I'm looking at what these Hellcats did. I'm looking at the very modest changes in the variations. Grumman got these aircraft good enough the first time around and it knew it and when to let good enough alone. That's all I was saying. I wasn't playing any game.


----------



## GregP (Apr 25, 2013)

In US service the Spitfire ranks 8th in total victories (or 9th if you separate the F4F and FM-2) with 379, 15 of which came in the ETO. I don't have the Spitfire losses in US service broken out by theater. I have those data for the P-38, P-39, P-40, P-47, P-51, P-61, and A-36. Since the Spitfire only had 15 ETO victories in US service, I'd bet the action sorties are less than 20,000. That kind of takes it out of the running similar to the way I removed the P-61 due to not enough sorties to be significant. 

Where did you find the losses for Spitfires in US service in the ETO?

In total victories for types in US service the worst was the Mosquito with 1 victory for the entire war scored in the MTO. The performance by the Mosquito is no doubt due to employment as a tactical and weather recinaissance platform and a bomber. We only got 40 Mosquitos from Canada and slighty more than 100 from Great Britain. The majority were bombers or recon platforms and weren't armed. I do not know the circumstances of the victory, but being unarmed doesn't make for a lot of air-to-air kills.


----------



## Glider (Apr 25, 2013)

If I remember correctly it was an air to air collision whilst the Mosquito was taking evasive manoeuvers. The 109 didn't make it home but the mossie did


----------



## wuzak (Apr 25, 2013)

GregP said:


> In US service the Spitfire ranks 8th in total victories (or 9th if you separate the F4F and FM-2) with 379, 15 of which came in the ETO. I don't have the Spitfire losses in US service broken out by theater. I have those data for the P-38, P-39, P-40, P-47, P-51, P-61, and A-36. Since the Spitfire only had 15 ETO victories in US service, I'd bet the action sorties are less than 20,000. That kind of takes it out of the running similar to the way I removed the P-61 due to not enough sorties to be significant.



Sorry Greg, in one statement you say that the Spitfire had 379 victories in US service, then say it only had 15 in the ETO and make your success assumptions based on that. 

20,000 sorties - that seems a number used to make the field very narrow. How many aircraft in US service achieved 20,000+ sorties?


----------



## Jabberwocky (Apr 25, 2013)

wuzak said:


> Sorry Greg, in one statement you say that the Spitfire had 379 victories in US service, then say it only had 15 in the ETO and make your success assumptions based on that.



I have also seen 394 claims credited to Spitfires in USAAF service. 

The vast majority of USAAF Spitfire kills were achieved in the MTO, with the 31st and the 52nd Fighter Groups. 194.5 were credited as confirmed, 39 probables and 124 damaged to the 31st, the 52nd claimed 152.33 confirmed, 22 probables and 71 damaged.

8th AF Spitfires flying with the 4th Figher Group claimed either 13 or 15 air to air kills. I've seen both figures used in a variety of official sources, so I'm not sure which is more accurate. 8th AF Spitfire losses were are generally given as either three or four lost to air to air fire, and another 11 lost to ground fire. There were also five other losses on ops, due to mechanical failures or accidents, and two losses on the ground.

There were also eight losses and two claims while USAAF squadrons were temporarily attached to the RAF.

ETO/MTO combined loss list gives 244 Spitfire losses while in USAAF use, to all causes. At a quick look, I can find 52 losses to air to air causes and another 90 where cause is not listed.


----------



## wuzak (Apr 25, 2013)

Sorry, I should have made my point clearer Jabberwocky. Greg was discounting the Spitfire win/loss ratio based on the 15 kills in the ETO, not the overall record of 379-394 kills by USAAF Spitfires.


----------



## VBF-13 (Apr 25, 2013)

wuzak said:


> If they had got it right first time, wouldn't all Hellcats have subsequently been powered by R-2600s instead of R-2800s?


Correction, then. They got it right the F6F-3rd time, lol. 



Shortround6 said:


> They got it right the the first time because they were practically handed the R-2800 with two stage supercharger on a plate.
> 
> Actually Grumman did an exceptional job, but then they had already done several design studies of planes powered by R-2600s. They had the R-2800 with two stage supercharger for the F4U already well along in development.
> 
> ...


You play the hand you're dealt. That is to say I'm not taking anything away from the Spitfire. On luck, I'm sorry, I'm having a lot of trouble swallowing that. The FMs and TBMs, of course, happened in order to free up Bethpage.


----------



## Aozora (Apr 25, 2013)

DonL said:


> I agree, but where is then any reason to choose a Hellcat over a Spitfire?
> As we know the Spitfire could match the german fighters or was superior.
> 
> To my estimation a Hellcat could possible match the performance of the Hurricane against the Bf109E, if at all.
> ...


 
I made myself perfectly clear "Bottom line is that both were fine fighters and did exactly what was advertised on the box" And no I didn't say the Hellcat could beat the German fighters, but neither would it have been easy meat, as some seem to imply, which was no mean feat for a carrier based fighter which was not designed for the purpose of beating the 109 or 190.



Aozora said:


> As a land-based fighter the Spitfire, from Mk VIII onwards, wins.
> 
> As an all-round carrier fighter the F6F was only really beaten by the F4U...


----------



## buffnut453 (Apr 25, 2013)

Well it seems my deliberate attempt to be ironic was taken waaayyy too literally and created quite a kerfuffle. However, the "simple maths" is now looking more complex as we caveat it by a minimum number of sorties and as a cross-section of entire aircraft production (although I'm not sure the latter is entirely valid - combat sorties, yes, but aircraft production isn't entirely relevant since many aircraft never actually flew on combat operations). 

Ah well, must learn to be less subtle next time and put big, flashing "I'M ONLY JOKING" signs at the beginning and end of my post.


----------



## VBF-13 (Apr 25, 2013)

DonL said:


> I agree, but where is then any reason to choose a Hellcat over a Spitfire?


Bombing, Don. Do you see this? The "G" is for bombing. It constituted half the hours in this one month of training. "F," gunnery, was the easy part. As a fighter, the ETO probably didn't need the Hellcat, you're probably right about that.


----------



## VBF-13 (Apr 25, 2013)

buffnut453 said:


> Well it seems my deliberate attempt to be ironic was taken waaayyy too literally and created quite a kerfuffle. However, the "simple maths" is now looking more complex as we caveat it by a minimum number of sorties and as a cross-section of entire aircraft production (although I'm not sure the latter is entirely valid - combat sorties, yes, but aircraft production isn't entirely relevant since many aircraft never actually flew on combat operations).
> 
> Ah well, must learn to be less subtle next time and put big, flashing "I'M ONLY JOKING" signs at the beginning and end of my post.


Let that be a lesson for you. When you imply by comparison the Hellcat was ugly, those are fighting words.


----------



## GregP (Apr 25, 2013)

Hi Wuzak,

Regarding post #74, I have 15 victories in the ETO and 364 in the MTO for Spitfires in US service. 

I only have ETO sortie data for seven types (listed previously). The highest was the P-47 at 423,435 combat sorties. All the rest have more than 23,000 sorties except for the P-61 which only flew 3,637 combat sorties in the ETO. I chose 20,000 because it was a bit smaller than the second lowest sortie count for the seven types for which I have data.

Jabberwockey,

Where are you finding the data? Does it have victories, losses broken out and sorties available? Would you post the source so I can look at it? If so, Thanks!


----------



## MikeGazdik (Apr 25, 2013)

I'm not even going to read all of the other posts, because I know where this thread is going!!! As buffnut said, have to go Spitfire because it is so dang pretty!!! And as far as the original question "pure fighter", it again is the Spit. If I am a pilot, I want the Spit. If I am a General, I want the Hellcat. It is THE better weapon. It can do more missions than the Spit. But that is not the question at hand.

Hellcat vs Spitfire is like Glock vs Colt 1911. One selection is ugly as hell and works, the other is sexy as hell and works.


----------



## buffnut453 (Apr 25, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> Let that be a lesson for you. When you imply by comparison the Hellcat was ugly, those are fighting words.



Truth hurts, dunnit!?!


----------



## Jabberwocky (Apr 26, 2013)

GregP said:


> Jabberwockey,
> 
> Where are you finding the data? Does it have victories, losses broken out and sorties available? Would you post the source so I can look at it? If so, Thanks!


 
The losses data is from my own research and cobbled together from the work of others and a number of sources - mostly copies of various USAAF documents like the 8th AF loss list (I think this is still available online), Spitfire serial number searches, RAF movement cards and other sources like Halley and Morgan and Shacklady. It's not exactly complete (particularly for the MTO, where the majority of operations were) and a lot of the loss/cause information is conflicting.

I was collecting the information about seven or eight years ago, when I was unemployed and thinking of writing a book on either USAAF Spitfires or Hawker Typhoon operations. Unfortunately (or fortuantely), I only got about 1/2 way through the basic information collecting stage before I got a job. Still, something for retirement.

A surprisingly large amount of the 600 or so Spitfires used by the USAAF were 'hacks': second hand war weary aircraft passed on by the RAF and used for general flying. They tended to get mis-treated - about 40 of the 'losses' I have listed are ground incidents or mechanical failures.


----------



## Conslaw (Apr 26, 2013)

As a point-defense fighter, I'd rather have a Spitfire; but for almost any other purpose, I'd rather have a Hellcat. In the world of the hypothetical one-on-one dogfight, the Spitfire would have the edge. In a hypothetical two-on-two dogfight, the Spitfire should stay home. In a two-on-two battle, most of the Spitfire's advantages are nullified with beam-defense techniques. Offensively in this type battle the F6F's deflection shooting capabilities become a greater advantage. The long firing time of the .50 machine guns becomes more of an advantage than the hitting power of the Spits' 20mm cannon.


----------



## GregP (Apr 26, 2013)

Thanks Jabberwockey. I have a lot of data that is somewhat partial, too. Sort of working on it now since it seems to be tough finding an engineering job right now ... 

That's why I finally cracked the PDF restrictions on the USAAF Victory Credits LIst for WW2 and am trying to post it. I simply got around to it due to having the time and inclination ...


----------



## nuuumannn (Apr 26, 2013)

> Nuuumannn, are you playing a game? I think you are. I think you're playing the How-Could-It-Have-Been-Improved game. I think that explains why you think I'm kidding. I'm not.



Once again, VBF, I think we are misinterpreting each other here. Nope, that's not the game I'm playing at all. The reson why I asked that question is because while I have no doubt about your knowledge of the Hellcat - and before we get on the wrong track, I actually think the Hellcat was an awesome aeroplane; I got the opportunity to get a close look at one in the UK once and it really impresses me as a machine - and lets face it, its combat record was exemplary - now I've got that out of the way - I don't actually believe you really know that much about the development of the Spitfire with a statement like that. They most certainly got it right the first time. The Spitfire Mk.I was contemporary to the F4F Wildcat and it was a superior performer to that aeroplane. The only fighter that could match it in an even contest in 1938 when the Mk.I first appeared was the Bf 109. There are only two instances where the Spitfire's performance was no match for its enemies, the Spit Mk.V with the Bf 109F and Fw 190, both the same time period, and the advent of jet fighters; even then, it still remained in service as a fighter until the early 1950s with the RAF and longer with other services.

As for the Merlin, simply speaking, as a basic block it underwent little transformation; bigger superchargers were fitted, which dramatically increased its performance and other modification, like American Bendix Stromberg injection carbs were fitted over the British SU carb to the 60 series engines, but not much actually changed on the engine itself. It remained the same bore and stroke throughout its long career.

Don't get me wrong (which I think you and Greg have); I don't think the Spitfire is 'superior' to the Hellcat - and I'm not doing this for any patriotic sense of loyalty (Geez, give me a break!); it's just that it is very difficult to compare the two (how many times have I had to write the same thing?), particularly their combat careers, which are so vastly different it makes comparison of figures meaningless, and reading through these posts, I'm not the only one who thinks so. If I had the choice of a carrier fighter, I'd choose the Hellcat hands down, but the thread title is, which one would we take if we had the choice, and yes, my choice is obvious. That doesn't make me an apologist, it makes me a realist. Why wouldn't I choose the Spitfire after the information I have provided? You guys are American and that makes you naturally gravitate to the Hellcat, and again, why wouldn't you? It's a great aeroplane with a great pedigree and combat history.


----------



## VBF-13 (Apr 26, 2013)

Nuuumannn, I think we see these aircraft in pretty much the same way. 

On my comment, I just plum took you out of context. When you said the Hellcat "was not built in anywhere near the same number of variants and sub-marks," I took that as though you were questioning why. No wonder my comment didn't make sense. You weren't. 

On the Spitfires, credit me with beyond just a speaking acquaintanceship. But there’s a lot I can stand to learn, that’s right.


----------



## nuuumannn (Apr 26, 2013)

No worries VBF. Box of fluffies then? (That's slang for everything's good - in case you're wondering.)


----------



## CobberKane (Apr 26, 2013)

GregP said:


> Cobber,
> 
> If your rugby team loses, the circumstances don't matter ... you lost. It's the won and lost column that counts. Same for the Hellcat. It PERFORMED when the it was all on the line ... better than anything else did. Ergo, Hall of Fame performance that reads better than anything else that flew. What else do you need? Infinite replays like the 1972 basketball Olympics until your side wins?
> 
> ...


 
Luv ya, big fella - you are absolutely my favourite large, slow moving target.


----------



## GregP (Apr 26, 2013)

Ah, mutual love ...


----------



## VBF-13 (Apr 26, 2013)

buffnut453 said:


> Truth hurts, dunnit!?!


You're brutal. But yeah, it does!


----------



## beitou (Apr 26, 2013)

What was the opinion of the Spitfire of the US pilots who flew them?


----------



## VBF-13 (Apr 26, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> No worries VBF. Box of fluffies then? (That's slang for everything's good - in case you're wondering.)


You saved me from looking it up.


----------



## VBF-13 (Apr 26, 2013)

beitou said:


> What was the opinion of the Spitfire of the US pilots who flew them?


Darn, I was just going to mention that! It's like you read my mind. 

There was a pilot in my Dad's club of retirees who was very big on these. I think he may have flown them, I'm not sure. But, that club was a lot of pilots, and I've never heard one bad word out of them on the Spitfire. Quite the contrary, I've always heard it held in the highest regard. And that's the truth.


----------



## vinnye (Apr 26, 2013)

It would be interesting to hear what the former Eagle Squadron pilots thought of their Spitfires.
I do remember seeing one American pilot who flew in the BOB in a Spitfire , spoke very favourably about them.


----------



## Readie (Apr 26, 2013)

beitou said:


> What was the opinion of the Spitfire of the US pilots who flew them?



Loved the Spitfire.
Who wouldn't in all honesty.


----------



## GregP (Apr 26, 2013)

We have heard from some of them at the Planes of Fame and they mostly loved it. A few loved it in the air, but found the Griffon engine models to be a bit nose-heavy, especially on wet ground where you could nose over while not touching the brakes when the gear digs in. 
Mostly, they said you got used to it but it was disconcerting coming from a plane with no nose-heaviness while on the gear. 

Several commented on the stick that pivots in the middle saying they didn't think they'd like it when they saw it, but found it to be quite natural in actual use. One said he'd love to have fitted the Spitfire stick into a P-51.

The only real negative comments were short range, relative fragility compared with US types, and a small bit of difficulty with the radio, which somehow seemed to have a slight tendency to get wet. Maybe these two guys simply flew Spitfires with some hastily-repaired battle damge over the radio? Sounds like a sealer job would handle it.

As for general flying characteristics, ALL said it was a fine aircraft and a joy to fly, and they didn't want to give them up.


----------



## CobberKane (Apr 26, 2013)

The spitfire always seems to have been somewhat more than the sum of its parts. In terms of performance it was generally up there with the opposition, but it's trump card always seems to have been its impeccable flight manners, something hard the quantify in performance data. I can see how pilots moving to something like the the P-47 would have been aghast. Compared to the spitfire the thunderbolt was a fighter that did some things very badly and some things amazingly well. It would have taken a complete reset of the pilots instincts and tactics coming from the spitfire to the P-47, much more so than from, say, the spitfire to the mustang.


----------



## parsifal (Apr 26, 2013)

I honestly think the success or failure of a given type has more to do with its tactical situation that it finds iteself in. Spitfires did quite well flying defensively in 1940. They did less well in 1941-2 over western europes in an offensive role. There was strategic success, but tactically it was pretty one sided. Partly due to the quality of the opposition, something also to do with the limits of the spitfire itself 9limited range mostly), and a lot to do with poor strategic concepts. The Spitfire did recover, and by 1943-4, was back in the game and giving better than what it was suffering. opinion, but at least arguable. In the pacific (land based), success for the spitfire was prolematic. Case in point was the darwin Wing, where the zeke remained a formidable foe. I am convinced that this was due to incorrect tactical employment. Many of the pilots in the Darwin wing were ETO vets, where the fundamental advantage over German energy fighters was to get into a manouvre battle. Against the japanese this was fundamentally the wrong tactics to use against the Zeke.

At sea , the seafire had a terrible start, but by 1944, operational techniques were improving, to say nothing of the carriers on which they were embarked. seafires were not suited to CVEs and were in their wrong element in the super still conditions off Salerno. Operational techniques were also faulty. By 1945 this situation had been addressed, such that by 1945, the whole results had turned around.

So the spitfire/Seafire war experience was a bit patchy, whereas the Hellcat, operating from a single user, in a single tactical situation, never had that issue. Certainly the hellcat was an aircraft made for the job, but is it fair to compare a single purpose a/c used for just the purpose it was designed for, to an aircraft used for many different situations, and stretched to the limits of its design as far as application was concerned


----------



## GregP (Apr 26, 2013)

Let's see, the Hellcat was used as a fleet defense CAP fighter, an air superiority fighter, an escort fighter for torpedo and dive bombers, a night fighter, a photo-reconaissance plane, a ground attack fighter-bomber, for picket duty, and even as a radio contolled drone bomb.

Doesn't seem to be exactly a single-purpose aircraft. The only thing the Spitfire did the Hellcat couldn't do was to be employed for high Mach number research. And it certainly could fly farther afield than the Spitfire, so they're about even in employment uses.

At least, I have found all of these uses in past readings since I am a big Hellcat fan. Love the Spitfire, but the Hellcat was quite versatile in its own right.


----------



## wuzak (Apr 26, 2013)

The Hellcat benefitted from tactics developed using Wildcats to combat the Zeros. Not sure if teh Darwin Spitfires had that experience on which to draw.


----------



## GregP (Apr 26, 2013)

Don't believe they did. 

If I recall, the Darwin Spitfire pilots were fresh from the ETO where they were sure of their tactics. The common belief in here seems to be that that PTO equipment would not do well in the ETO, but the reverse was certainly true in the case of the Darwin Spitfires. The "decreased quallity" Japanese pilots had them for breakfast. Might have been different if they were given some in-theater indoctrination, and I believe almost all the world's Air Forces anf Naval aviation arms instituted that after WWII ... lesson learned.


----------



## tomo pauk (Apr 26, 2013)

Were the Spitfires used at Darwin tropicalised? How good/bad was the radar coverage there?


----------



## GregP (Apr 26, 2013)

You know Tomo, I've never heard about the radar available or the timeframe when it came into common use. I KNOW some of the ships had it, so it follows the ground installations did, too ... but I've not seen much data elaborating about either Allied OR Japanese radar covereage around Australia. Maybe it's still top secret and they had Kangaroos with radar vision who would kick or punch the nearest bloke when they saw a Japanese aircraft ... naaaahhhhh. 

Must have had radar, but be damned if I know where it was located, what the coverage was, or when it started covering. Thanks for the new topic to look into! Since Australia didn't exactly suffer a fatal invasion, the coverage must have been adequate for the defense assets available to respond.


----------



## raumatibeach (Apr 26, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> You saved me from looking it up.



You can also reply "all sh#t and feathers " if things aren't going well


----------



## VBF-13 (Apr 26, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Case in point was the darwin Wing, where the zeke remained a formidable foe.


This would make an interesting thread. I don't know much about that campaign but those bombings covered a vast area and those Spitfires were in tough.


----------



## VBF-13 (Apr 27, 2013)

GregP said:


> Must have had radar, but be damned if I know where it was located, what the coverage was, or when it started covering. Thanks for the new topic to look into! Since Australia didn't exactly suffer a fatal invasion, the coverage must have been adequate for the defense assets available to respond.


Greg, from what little I know, that wasn't the problem. The Zekes were the problem.


----------



## VBF-13 (Apr 27, 2013)

raumatibeach said:


> You can also reply "all sh#t and feathers " if things aren't going well


I'm improving my diction every minute around here.


----------



## Wildcat (Apr 27, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> The Zekes were the problem.


They were part of, but not the only problem faced by the Spitfire wing.
Bad tactics - relying on the "big wing" concept, pilots fought as individuals not in element formations, poor gunnery skills.
Poor leadership on many occasions
Armament problems - 20mm cannons were prone to failure due to freezing
Mechanical problems - propeller CSU failures were frequent and caused many losses
Short range - lack of drop tanks until later in the campaign
lack of spare parts due to being at the end of a long supply chain.
All of this is detailed in the excellent book "Darwin spitfires" by Anthoney Cooper - recommended reading to those interested.


----------



## GregP (Apr 27, 2013)

Thanks Wildcat!

The Zekes might not have been quite such a problem with good radar coverage ... advantageous starting position is a good thing. But poor leadership, poor tactics, freezing cannons (why didn't they freeze in the ETO and get fixed?), etc might have made great radar coverage relatively useless. Especailly without drop tanks in any offensive attempts.


----------



## Wildcat (Apr 27, 2013)

G'day Greg, re the cannon problems you'll find this of interest :-
1 Fighter Wing's Spitfire VC cannon scandal | Darwin Spitfires, the real battle for Australia - 9/53/23 London signal Spitfire system aircraft modification manifold


----------



## GregP (Apr 27, 2013)

Very interesting Wildcat, but the temperature over Darwin at 30,000 fet is about the same as over France or Germany ... pretty constant. Don't see how Darwin made a difference unless the Darwin area had enough rain to render all the guns wet ... seal the damned wings!

The Hamilton-Standard prop was VERY reliable (and still IS!). We could have simply sent props to reploace the British props until they solved the mystery ... which they WOULD have done ... and DID in the event. Each side could have stepped in and helped the other ... it's called cooperation against a common enemy. But politics makes things tough when simple calls between engineers can solve things. Wish Sir Stanley Hooker had talked with Allison! But the USAAF didn't WANT the 2-stage supercharger, they wanted turbochargers, so the Allison without the T/C wasn't altitude rated, byt teh USAAC got what they ordered.

Both sides could have done better with one another and simply didn't. Pity, it COULD have been magic, huh? Think about an Allison with a 2-stage RR supercharger (after the intake issue was solved), a Merlin with Allison rods and nose case, and props / armament being worked cooperatively by two countries. Might have won in 1944 ... and many fewer people would have died.


----------



## wuzak (Apr 27, 2013)

GregP said:


> Very interesting Wildcat, but the temperature over Darwin at 30,000 fet is about the same as over France or Germany ... pretty constant. Don't see how Darwin made a difference unless the Darwin area had enough rain to render all the guns wet ... seal the damned wings!



Average Annual Rainfall for Darwin is approximately 1.7-1.8m. And almost all of that comes in a 6 month period (ie, the wet season).




GregP said:


> The Hamilton-Standard prop was VERY reliable (and still IS!). We could have simply sent props to reploace the British props until they solved the mystery ... which they WOULD have done ... and DID in the event.



The de Havilland prop was licence built version of the Hamilton Standard - but I am guessing it was slightly different to fit the British output shafts, which were different to US SAW splined shafts.




GregP said:


> a Merlin with Allison rods and nose case, and props / armament being worked cooperatively by two countries. Might have won in 1944 ... and many fewer people would have died.



While rods may have fitted they weren't that necessary for Merlins in WW2 - the RR units were strong enough, and when they stepped up the power they strengthened components such as the rods.

The nose case wouldn't have worked. By the time Allison went to the simple spur reduction gear set Merlins had been in service 4 or 5 years. Maybe more. 

Armaments were shared, to some extent.

The RAF operated may US aircraft, most of which had the 0.50". The Hispano drawings were sent to the US for manufacture. The British gave the US a cavity magnetron in 1940, transforming US research and development in radar technologies. They also revealed the Whittle and (IIRC) handed over plans.


----------



## fastmongrel (Apr 27, 2013)

One thing that has occured to me with the problems over Darwin is not so much the temperature at 30,000 ft being roughly the same as over Europe but the temperature difference. Taking off in temps hot enough to fry an egg on the wings (sometimes with very high humidity) and then climbing hard to 30,000 must have put tremendous strain on oils and coolants. Not surprising if CSUs failed when the oil in the gearbox went from the consistency of water to treacle in a matter of minutes.


----------



## GregP (Apr 27, 2013)

The Merlin nose case is a POS for a minor fault. They spray the oil into the gears on the inward-turning side (into the gears as they rotate towards aeach other). All they needed to do was move the oil spray nozzle to the outgoing side, as in the Allison, and oil impact would have been fine. As it is, the main gears wear badly due to the incoming oil when the gears mesh .. NOT a good thing. Also the Merlin requires torqueing the heads every 25 hours and the Allison doesn't require it at all. Maintenance is less with the Alllison.

All were supercharged, but only the P-38 was turbocharged in quantity. Not the P-39 or P-40.

The result was VERY predictable ...

If you aren't an engine rebuilder, the above isn't apparent, but it is if you have to deal with it.

The Allison has 7,000 parts and the Merlin has 11,000 parts. YOU figure it out ... less parts is better and when oriented to perform best are reliable. The Allison nose case does. All it needed was a 2-stage supercharger which Sir Stanley Hooker could have designed and provided but which was NEVER asked for by the USAAF. Allison offered it on at beast 3 occasions and was turned down each time. 

If your primary customer declines to pay for the options and development offered, and the wartime competition doesn't help ... and if you ar a SMALL shop, then the USAAF gets what it ORDERS, not what it NEEDS. The turbo was eliminated by the War Materiel Board for the P-39 and P-40, not by the USAAF ... the single turbo P-40 built performed quite well if you believe the reports. The P-63 with Aux-stage blower would fight a P-51 to a draw ... but was given to the Soviet Union ... go figure ...


----------



## wuzak (Apr 27, 2013)

GregP said:


> The Merlin nose case is a POS for a minor fault. They spray the oil into the gears on the inward-turning side (into the gears as they rotate towards aeach other). All they needed to do was move the oil spray nozzle to the outgoing side, as in the Allison, and oil impact would have been fine. As it is, the main gears wear badly due to the incoming oil when the gears mesh .. NOT a good thing. Also the Merlin requires torqueing the heads every 25 hours and the Allison doesn't require it at all. Maintenance is less with the Alllison.



Greg, while that may all be true, the Allison didn't have the same nose case in '41/'42 as it did later in the war. The original nose case was a bit of a disaster. The Merlin's nose case had been in use for several years before Allison changed over.

Torquing of the head bolts, number of components, etc, are side issues.


----------



## Aozora (Apr 27, 2013)

GregP said:


> Very interesting Wildcat, but the temperature over Darwin at 30,000 fet is about the same as over France or Germany ... pretty constant. Don't see how Darwin made a difference unless the Darwin area had enough rain to render all the guns wet ... seal the damned wings!


 
Here are some pages from the Australian technical reports, identifying the problem with the gun heating ducts as "faulty design", leading to the ducts breaking:









> The defect not due to lack of care during assembly. The soundness of the joint depends on having piping with true circular ends. The ends of the pipe were slightly oval and irregular in shape _(see photographs crossed out_). Fitting made from 16 SWG (see photograph) securing the pipe to the locating ring were made and fitted to the heater piping of this and other aircraft found defective. This attachment to the fitting of pipe by two P.K.K 1/8" screws.


----------



## VBF-13 (Apr 27, 2013)

Wildcat said:


> They were part of, but not the only problem faced by the Spitfire wing.
> Bad tactics - relying on the "big wing" concept, pilots fought as individuals not in element formations, poor gunnery skills.
> Poor leadership on many occasions
> Armament problems - 20mm cannons were prone to failure due to freezing
> ...


It never made sense to me that that air wing would be whipped so badly. There had to be more to it. The Spits vs. the Zekes in a dogfight is a wash, in my opinion, at worst. I can see the problems they had, now. Very much appreciate this, Wildcat.

EDIT: They'd have been better off in Wildcats for that kind of broader-coverage defense, seems like.


----------



## parsifal (Apr 27, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> Were the Spitfires used at Darwin tropicalised? How good/bad was the radar coverage there?



Not as advanced as the fully integrated systems in the ETO, but more extensive than suggessted here. Not sure of the USAAC coverage, which was there, but came later. For the RAAF 31 radar unit was moved to Dripstone Caves, just north of Darwinn, 5th Feb 1942. Was not ready when the first raids hit 19 Feb, but was operational from the 6th March. First successful detection was 16th March.

I know of at least 5 other stations that were set up in the NT region during the war. There was no shortage of radar, and coverage was okay. Not as extensive as the ETO, but Japanese raids were seldom unnoticed. That wasnt the problem. as wildcat rightly corrects me there were a multitude of problems, thopugh I would poinnt out that Spitfires lack of success was also mirrored by the other main types deployed into this TO. But the Spits carried with them high expectations of defeating the Japanese, which were never realized. One can either surmise that the Spits were a failure or the quality of the opposition was better than expected.....in this part of the war, there had not been the vicious attrition oin Japanese pilots that had occured further east. The Zeke was a formidable opponent when flown by a competent pilot, and the tactics employed by the Spitfires were the wrong ones to use against the japanese. 

Wherever the Japanese retained a modicum of experience in their pilots, they flew rings around their opponents. This applied to both US and RAAF equipment and both British and American types. what set the Spits apart is that it had been expected they would wrest air superiority from the Japanese at least over Darwin, and this was not achieved. It was a bitter lesson for the Allies....the Japanese still had some teeth on occasion


----------



## tomo pauk (Apr 27, 2013)

Thanks for the feedback. My idea is that Spitfires with tropical filters were slower of less RoC than regular ones, such Spitfires having almost no performance advantage vs. Zero, while the Zero can turn much tighter than Spitfire.

Howdy, Greg, lets cross antlers one more time  :



GregP said:


> ....
> Each side could have stepped in and helped the other ... it's called cooperation against a common enemy. But politics makes things tough when simple calls between engineers can solve things. Wish Sir Stanley Hooker had talked with Allison! But the USAAF didn't WANT the 2-stage supercharger, they wanted turbochargers, so the Allison without the T/C wasn't altitude rated, byt teh USAAC got what they ordered.



The single-stage V-1710s were altitude rated, the turbo V-170s were sea level rated.



> Both sides could have done better with one another and simply didn't. Pity, it COULD have been magic, huh? Think about an Allison with a 2-stage RR supercharger (after the intake issue was solved), a Merlin with Allison rods and nose case, and props / armament being worked cooperatively by two countries. Might have won in 1944 ... and many fewer people would have died.



If USAF wants/needs two stage V-1710, it can use Allison's design. Not that it would make the war shorter by more than a month.



GregP said:


> ...
> The Allison nose case does. All it needed was a 2-stage supercharger which Sir Stanley Hooker could have designed and provided but which was NEVER asked for by the USAAF. Allison offered it on at beast 3 occasions and was turned down each time.



Once the Sir Hooker's design is applied, tested and put into production, there is ample time for many US-built engines (Packard Merlin included) to be designed used.



> If your primary customer declines to pay for the options and development offered, and the wartime competition doesn't help ... and if you ar a SMALL shop, then the USAAF gets what it ORDERS, not what it NEEDS. The turbo was eliminated by the War Materiel Board for the P-39 and P-40, not by the USAAF ... *the single turbo P-40 built performed quite well if you believe the reports.* The P-63 with Aux-stage blower would fight a P-51 to a draw ... but was given to the Soviet Union ... go figure ...



Where are the reports? Was there ever the turbo P-40? The war-time P-63 (-A) vs. war-time Merlin P-51 (B-K) would see the P-63 going down in flames. What use could we invision for the P-63 in USAF inventory? Why would they need a fighter that has hard time to make 410 mph in 1944, let aloe for the fighter that is totally unsuitable for the tasks the P-51, P-38 and P-47 were doing on daily basis in the last ~18 moths of the war?


----------



## CORSNING (Apr 27, 2013)

WOW! Now you did it tomo. The P-63A-8/10 could outclimb, outturn and outroll the P-51B-K. At lower altitudes the speeds were fairly close. I'm not home right now, but I could probably locate proof fairly easy. There, now flame that.

Jeff


----------



## CORSNING (Apr 27, 2013)

I think I'm in agreement with most that comparing the land based Spitfire to the carrier based Hellcat is like comparing the Firefly to the Mustang.


----------



## wuzak (Apr 27, 2013)

CORSNING said:


> I think I'm in agreement with most that comparing the land based Spitfire to the carrier based Hellcat is like comparing the Firefly to the Mustang.



It was suggested that the F6F could do a land plane role.

This comparison came about because the observation in another thread that the Hellcat's performance was about on par with the Spitfire V's.


----------



## VBF-13 (Apr 27, 2013)

parsifal said:


> One can either surmise that the Spits were a failure or the quality of the opposition was better than expected.....in this part of the war, there had not been the vicious attrition oin Japanese pilots that had occured further east. The Zeke was a formidable opponent when flown by a competent pilot, and the tactics employed by the Spitfires were the wrong ones to use against the japanese.
> 
> Wherever the Japanese retained a modicum of experience in their pilots, they flew rings around their opponents. This applied to both US and RAAF equipment and both British and American types. [...] ....the Japanese still had some teeth on occasion


I don't think there's any cause to be indirectly campaigning against the successes of the Hellcats, here, Parsifal. Wildcat I think summarized the reasons for the failures of this air wing quite adeptly. Taking all those reasons into account, this could have been 1945, and the same result. 

Put a little differently, you're starting to sound like Wikipedia. Namely,

"The U.S. successes were not only attributed to superior aircraft, but also from 1942 onwards, they faced increasingly inexperienced Japanese aviators as well as having the advantage of increasing numerical superiority.[N 6]" 

Grumman F6F Hellcat - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 

Do you know what that statement cites to? One damn magazine article. 

Let's get a grip. These Spitfires were facing a crack outfit, that's true. And your boys fought very audaciously and courageously. But this War would have been over in 1943 had we had those Hellcats in 1942. And if you're still equivocating on that, let's get on with it, directly, in a thread where it's at least relevant. Here, it's marginally-relevant, if it's anything.


----------



## CORSNING (Apr 27, 2013)

Well then, I'd have to agree that the F6F could do a land plane role. BUT, it would probably not do it as well as a fighter that was designed from the start as a point defence interseptor. The F6F was designed for shipboard operation. That means a lot of extra size and weight compaired to a land based interceptor. If it had been designed as such it would probably have looked more like a F8F. 
Compairing the Hellcat to the Spitfire V seems off a little. They are nearly 2 years appart from entering operational service. It is hard to take the large Hellcat and strip it down to point interceptor. So it seems to me the best way to compair is to rig up the Spifire for carrier duty and then compare: Seafire III.
Height in meters / Speed in mph / Climb in fpm.

Height...Seafire III......F6F-5
S.L.......303/2500....318/3500
.1,000...318/2525....322/3440
.2,000...334/2550....333/3380
.3,000...348/2574....345/3180
.4,000...349/2590....358/2955
.5,000...344/2435....373/2605
.6,000...338/1960....376/2225
.7,000...330/1575....390/1835
.8,000...321/1175....383/1435
Maximum velocities: Seafire III 351/10,500ft. F6F-5 392/19,200ft.
Flight weights are: Seafire: 6,750-7,100 lbs. F6F-5: 12,406-12,420 lbs.

NOTE 1: In TAIC REPORT NO. 17 The F6F-5 reached 409 mph/21,600ft.

All performance figures are from wwiiaicraftperformance.org. One odd note: the Seafire speed figures are at +16 lbs. boost and the climb figures are at +9 lbs. boost. I do not know if the Seafire was cleared for +16 lbs. boost with the Merlin 50 engine.


----------



## tomo pauk (Apr 27, 2013)

CORSNING said:


> WOW! Now you did it tomo. The P-63A-8/10 could outclimb, outturn and outroll the P-51B-K. At lower altitudes the speeds were fairly close. I'm not home right now, but I could probably locate proof fairly easy. There, now flame that.
> 
> Jeff



No flame from me, Jeff 
You know, I'm sure, that LF fighters were mostly able to "outclimb, outturn and outroll" the Merlin Mustang. And they fared badly vs. the P-51, unless the P-51 pilot got cocky and let his speed altitude went low. Looking at the charts at US Hudred thousands, the achieved (not claimed by the Bell) speeds, even at low altitude the P-51 has some 20 mph advantage, especially the P-51B without fuselage tank (V-1650-3), and the P-51D (V-1650-7). Curiously enough, the tests of the P-51D yield better results than NAA claim/guarantee.
BTW, once the fighters are flying faster than 350 mph (indicated), the P-51 has the best rate of roll (here)



> One odd note: the Seafire speed figures are at +16 lbs. boost and the climb figures are at +9 lbs. boost. I do not know if the Seafire was cleared for +16 lbs. boost with the Merlin 50 engine.



This is what I have about some Merlins (M50 included); unfortunatelly, the Seafire is not mentioned:


----------



## CORSNING (Apr 27, 2013)

Unfortunately you are correct about almost all data for the P-63 coming from Bell. I believe that had a lot to do with the USAAF disentrest in the A/C. 
If you look closely at the roll rate graph you will notice that the P-63's ROLL rate does not decrease after 275 mph as fast as it increased up to that speed. If you continue the P-63A-1's line at the declining rate it would still have a slight advantage over the P-51B-1 at 390 mph. The P-63 was fully maneuverable up to its top speed much like the Mustang. If you look in AHT you will notice that it outturned the P-51B. It also says something about outturning the P-38. I don't have my AHT with me but I remember the statement that when the P-63 used its maneuvering flaps there wasn't many A/C it couldn't outturn. 
Now about that 20 mph P-51 advantage at low altitudes:

Height.....P-51B 75"Hg..P-51D 72"Hg..P-63A-10 75"Hg
S.L..........388..............377...............383
.1,000.....404...............390...............394
.2,000.....418...............423...............407
.3,000.....421...............415...............415
.4,000.....420...............413...............421
.5,000.....430...............419...............423
.6,000.....442...............431...............422
.7,000.....443...............445...............412
.8,000.....437...............434...............407
.9,000.....430...............422...............394
10,000....421...............401...............376
11,000....411...............380...............N.G.
12,000....393...............N.G...............N.G.
METERS...MILES PER HOUR-----------------
The P-51B is with the V-1650-7 engine. The -3 speeds are very similar at low altitudes.


----------



## tomo pauk (Apr 27, 2013)

> Unfortunately you are correct about almost all data for the P-63 coming from Bell.



The data from your table is also from Bell? 



> I believe that had a lot to do with the USAAF disentrest in the A/C.



I'm not sure what to make out of that comment? BTW, this flight test, conducted at Wright Field gives only 366 mph at SL, WER + ADI. Other graphs seem either too early for stipulated engines P-63 versions, and/or are calculated values.



> If you look closely at the roll rate graph you will notice that the P-63's *climb rate* does not decrease after 275 mph as fast as it increased up to that speed. If you continue the P-63A-1's line at the declining rate it would still have a slight advantage over the P-51B-1 at 390 mph. The P-63 was fully maneuverable up to its top speed much like the Mustang.



By 'climb rate' I guess you mean 'rate of roll' - a typo?
It is unfortunately that we don't have the roll rate data for the P-63 above 300 mph. The graph at AHT gives 10% lower rate of roll for the P-63 than the NACA comparison, the drop in roll rate is sharp past 300 mph, and there is no other data for that, like the stick force - not sure what to think about that. But the P-63 certainly should be regarded as a better 'roller' than the P-51.



> If you look in AHT you will notice that it outturned the P-51B. It also says something about outturning the P-38. I don't have my AHT with me but I remember the statement that when the P-63 used its maneuvering flaps there wasn't many A/C it couldn't outturn.



At the pg. 422 of the AHT it's stated that 'No maneuver position was provided for the flap system'. It was the P-38 that was renown for tight turns, once the flaps received 'maneuver' setting, from P-38F-15 onward.


----------



## CORSNING (Apr 27, 2013)

tomo,
I was at work earlier and didn't get a chance to thank you for the information in post 128. Thanks man.
Data for the P-63A-10 came from a graph at Mike's sight. It is titled COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE OF P-63 AIRPLANES. Its marked CONFIDENTIAL at the bottom and top. Down on the lower left it dated 5 JUNE 1944. Three A/C are listed: P-63A-10, P-63C-1 and P-63E-1. Under the date is the following: HDD,JWA.RHR.FWR.
It appears to be a military graph but by the date I would guess the C-1 and E-1 are calculated. This is around the correct period for the A-10 testing, so who knows.
Actually AHT does give the same roll rate at 275 mph as the NACA graph. Look at the graph on page 410. I think the 100 degrees per second on page 416 is a misprint. The graph in AHT takes a nose dive around 320. I think I'll stick with the NACA until more info is published.
Your right about the "no maneuver position" statement. Right before that it states,"A flap position indicator consisting of a paint stripe along the flap near the leading edge was visible to the pilot." I wonder what that (the statements back to back) is all about?
I totally agree with your statement about the P-38 with maneuvering flaps being renown for tight turns. In AHT concerning the P-63's turning ability on page 417 you will find:"It was better than a P-38J if the latter (P-38) did not use a maneuver flap setting, and about the same if the P-38 did." I couldn't locate another quote I recorded from AHT about the P-63 that stated," With flaps down part way it was superior to most anything else in the air." Back to page 417 it continues,"Against the P-51B the P-63 could get on the Mustang's tail in three to four turns and P-63 performance got relatively better with increasing turning speed."

AHT ON ROLLING:
Pages 415-416: "P-63 rolling performance was outstanding. Army tests showed Kingcobra ailerons were excellent; all test pilots agreed. Action was rapid with light but positive forces, and good control feel was present at all times without any dead spot or overbalance. Roll performance was tested against other aircraft; it was much better than a P-38, and also better than a P-51B." " It rolled exactly on its longitudinal axis, and you could maintain perfect altitude." It had rapid response AT ALL SPEEDS.

Jeff

I forgot to thank you again for catching that "RATE OF CLIMB". Should have been ROLL RATE.


----------



## CobberKane (Apr 27, 2013)

wuzak said:


> It was suggested that the F6F could do a land plane role.
> 
> This comparison came about because the observation in another thread that the Hellcat's performance was about on par with the Spitfire V's.[/
> 
> ...


----------



## wuzak (Apr 27, 2013)

CORSNING said:


> Well then, I'd have to agree that the F6F could do a land plane role. BUT, it would probably not do it as well as a fighter that was designed from the start as a point defence interseptor. The F6F was designed for shipboard operation. That means a lot of extra size and weight compaired to a land based interceptor. If it had been designed as such it would probably have looked more like a F8F.
> Compairing the Hellcat to the Spitfire V seems off a little. They are nearly 2 years appart from entering operational service. It is hard to take the large Hellcat and strip it down to point interceptor. So it seems to me the best way to compair is to rig up the Spifire for carrier duty and then compare: Seafire III.
> Height in meters / Speed in mph / Climb in fpm.
> 
> ...



How about comparing the Seafire XV?


----------



## parsifal (Apr 27, 2013)

> I don't think there's any cause to be indirectly campaigning against the successes of the Hellcats, here, Parsifal.



No-ne is. Whats happening though is a subtle campaign to sing the invincibility of the Hellcat, which it was not.



> Wildcat I think summarized the reasons for the failures of this air wing quite adeptly. Taking all those reasons into account, this could have been 1945, and the same result.




Im not disagreeing with Wildcat. He isnt saying that the wrong tactics were used, he is also not saying that the zero was not a formidable enemy. He is saying there were other factors, which i agree with. Dont try to create dissension when ther isnt any.




> Put a little differently, you're starting to sound like Wikipedia. Namely,
> 
> "The U.S. successes were not only attributed to superior aircraft, but also from 1942 onwards, they faced increasingly inexperienced Japanese aviators as well as having the advantage of increasing numerical superiority.[N 6]"
> 
> Do you know what that statement cites to? One damn magazine article.



I dont think there is any doubt that the quality of US a/c improved as the war progressed. Im certainly not claiming that they werent. but quality of aircraft is a relatively minor factor in determing how air wars are won. The US could have won the war flying wildcats till the end. there was no need to spend the time and trouble going to the hellcat. i see it as a largely wasted effort. They could have built a "stretched" Wildcat and achieved much the same result. Thats different to what wiki is saying.

If quality is relatively secondary, why do people spend so much time developing new types, and if Im right,, what were the main determinants of success in the air?

Answering the first question, because every advantage, even if relatively minor, is worth pusuing when mens lives are at stake. And little things can add up to big things, if you have enough of those little things.

In answer to the second question, the very things you are attempting to shout down out of the equation....numbers and pilot quality (in which i would include superior tactics) are the very determiniants that rank by far the highest in importyance in winning an air war. Even higher is superior logistics....the ability to replace losses, and the USN held all these aces by the end of 1942. 



> Let's get a grip. These Spitfires were facing a crack outfit, that's true.



They were facing the 202nd Kokutai, and to some degree the JAAF 5th Air Div. These were good units, but not "crack units". They just were not subjected to the same elevels of attrition facedf by 25th Flotilla and 6Ad in Eastern NG and Solomons. Once the Japanese lost their edge in quality, the one ace they had was gone and their lightweight a/c became a liability 



> And your boys fought very audaciously and courageously.



Thanks for the patronising comments, we Australians really appreciate that sort of talk. 



> But this War would have been over in 1943 had we had those Hellcats in 1942.




There is zero (no pun intended) to support that. In fact until tactics were changed (about October 1942), the hellcat would have been just another flying targert for th4e Japanese. Until the pilots had learned new techniques, the logisitc situation improved and the numbers game licked, ther is no evidence from any campaign to say that quality will beat quantity. The Germans found this on the eastern front and over France 1942. Intorucing a new type too early, like the Hellcat, would probably, if anything have slowed down the US march to superiority in 1942, and may have allowed the japanese to recover. 

Dont make claims that are obviously spurious and baseless 



> And if you're still equivocating on that, let's get on with it, directly, in a thread where it's at least relevant. Here, it's marginally-relevant, if it's anything



It is relevant here, because spurious claims about the invincibility of the Hellcat are being made. Half this thread is about the hellcat, and how it compares to the Spit. Both had their strengths, and both had their weqaknesses. You cannot get more relavant than that.


----------



## tomo pauk (Apr 28, 2013)

CORSNING said:


> [snip]



Hi, Jeff, I'm starting the new thread about the P-63, so we don't drive this one off-topic.


----------



## GregP (Apr 28, 2013)

Tomo, Regarding post#122, you are wrong in almost everything you said.

The turbo V-1710's were altitude rated. The P-38's with turbochargers were rated at 24,900 to 27,000 fet at Military power. The XP-38 was rated at 25,000 feet (-11/-15 engines). The P-38K was rated at 27,000 feet (-75/-77 engines). The P-38J was rated at 24,900 feet (-89/-91 engines). Otherwise, why have a turbo? Get real. P-38's had a problem at altitude, but it was mostly the cockpit heater after the intake and fuel issues were solved.

We might have liked the 2-stage supercharger, but we already HAD a turbo system for altitude ... that the USAAF deleted from the P-39 and P-40. I mentioned the 2-stage supercharger because maybe it would have been used instead of hoarded for the high-altitude bombers that were used to great effect to help win the war in Europe since it turned much slower and didn't require exotic metals in short supply (like Tungsten).

There was NEVER ample time in WWII after the phony war was done. It was a fight all the way and if we had the Hooker supercharger, we would not have needed to produce Merlins except for British export, which we could have done and did.

At the musuem where I volunteer, we have had former Curtiss employees come in and tell that they worked on the turbo P-40 and that it flew, but was not proceeded with. I don't have the reports ... they are word of mouth reports (but strangely, all mention the same numbers ...), only their recollections of the events at the time. The fate of the turbo prototype is unknown to me, as are the fates of the last Bell fighters packed into trailers and supposedly hauled away to a farm. I tried to find them and buy them, but the trailers are quite good at escape and evasion so far.

If you think these guys (with NO reason to make anything up) are liars, then by all means don't believe them, macht nichts to me and we don't have to agree. Either way, it's OK. There are LOT of things posted in here I KNOW are false because I work on the planes we have including Axis aircraft, occasionally fly in them, and talk with the pilots.

The Allisons we built when I worked for Joe Yancey were strong and reliable. Only 1 real failure to date since I met Joe, and it was due to incorrect hookup of the oil and coolant lines ... and did NOT result in a forced landing. They were able to fly it down normally and call Joe for help. They were embarassed when they saw they had connected things wrong but were happy with later performance. From my experience, if it had been fitted with an integral 2-stage supercharger like the later Merlins, it would have been a good thing. As it was, the Aux stage external supercharger in the P-63 was a good performer (we have two ready for overhaul) but the package was bigger than an integral unit and the maintenance of piston aircraft when jets were becomming the darlings of the sky was quite marginal in a LOT of cases ... NOT what you need for a WWII-era high-power V-12 aircraft engine. I think they were just letting the piston aircraft break so they could buy jets, and have heard that on more than one occasion from former maintenance people in the military at the time.


----------



## wuzak (Apr 28, 2013)

GregP said:


> The turbo V-1710's were altitude rated. The P-38's with turbochargers were rated at 24,900 to 27,000 fet at Military power. The XP-38 was rated at 25,000 feet (-11/-15 engines). The P-38K was rated at 27,000 feet (-75/-77 engines). The P-38J was rated at 24,900 feet (-89/-91 engines). Otherwise, why have a turbo? Get real. P-38's had a problem at altitude, but it was mostly the cockpit heater after the intake and fuel issues were solved.



Greg, the engines were sea level rated.

The job of the turbocharger was to supply sea level air pressure to the carburettor deck. The rated altitudes you list are for the turbocharger.

The term sea level rated means that at full throttle the full throttle height was 0ft. For an altitude rated engine the throttle plate can only be fully open at the rated height. Below that height the engine has to be throttled to prevent overboosting of the engine.

The V-1710-25 (F1R) was rated at 1150hp @ 12,000ft, for example. The V-1710-27 (F2R) and V-1710-29 (F2L) were rated at 1150hp @ 25,000ft _with turbocharger_.

The supercharger gear ratio for the -25/F1R was 8.80:1. The ratio for the -27/F2R and -29/F2L was 6.44:1. Thus the supercharger in the -25F1R was spinning faster than in the -27/F2R and -29/F2L, and thus made more boost. More boost than could be used by the engine below 12,000ft.



GregP said:


> We might have liked the 2-stage supercharger, but we already HAD a turbo system for altitude ... that the USAAF deleted from the P-39 and P-40.



The turbo on the XP-39 was installed poorly. Well, more to the point, the intercooler was poorly installed and caused excessive drag.

The P-40 was a quick development of the P-36 to use the V-1710, and was never intended to use a turbocharger.




GregP said:


> I mentioned the 2-stage supercharger because maybe it would have been used instead of hoarded for the high-altitude bombers that were used to great effect to help win the war in Europe since it turned much slower and didn't require exotic metals in short supply (like Tungsten).



Maybe if each of the 10,000 P-38s only required one turbo more types could have used them?

Or perhaps the 15,000+ P-47s soaked up a lot of those exotic materials in its, very much larger, turbocharger?




GregP said:


> It was a fight all the way and if we had the Hooker supercharger, we would not have needed to produce Merlins except for British export, which we could have done and did.



Maybe, if Allison was able to supply sufficient quantities. The US was clever when it cleared Packard to manufacture Merlins for Britain to specify that a third of production was to be used in US aircraft.

Maybe if Allison pushed their 2 stage design harder?




GregP said:


> At the musuem where I volunteer, we have had former Curtiss employees come in and tell that they worked on the turbo P-40 and that it flew, but was not proceeded with. I don't have the reports ... they are word of mouth reports (but strangely, all mention the same numbers ...), only their recollections of the events at the time. The fate of the turbo prototype is unknown to me



As far as I am aware there was never a turbo P-40, nor was there amy intention to design or build a turbo P-40.

There were the XP-37 and YP-37s which may have persuaded the USAAC to order the P-40 with the single stage altitude rated engine.

Neither the XP-46 or XP-53 were designed for, or featured, a turbocharger. The XP-53 became the XP-60 when fitted with a Merlin 28 (V-1650-1). The XP-60 looked pretty slick.

An order for XP-60As was given in late 1941 (before Pearl Harbor). The XP-60A featured a V-1710 with B-series turbo. This aircraft did fly. In late 1942 it flew without the turbo, as the installation was considered a fire hazard. The prototype flew with the turbo later and achieved a top speed of 420mph @ 29,000ft and climb to 25,000ft in 12.4 minutes (data from _Vees for Victory_). Considering that the turbo version first flew after the XP-51B its performance would not have been considered sufficient for production orders.

Cinsidering the family likeness of the P-60 to the P-40 (at least before they tried out an R-2800) I would think it likely that the ex-Curtiss employees are remembering this aircraft.




GregP said:


> as are the fates of the last Bell fighters packed into trailers and supposedly hauled away to a farm. I tried to find them and buy them, but the trailers are quite good at escape and evasion so far.



Which are the "last Bell fighters"? P-63s?

That sounds a lot like the stories of Spitfires buried in the Northern Territory, or spirited away in a disused mine in Queensland, or buried in their packing cases in Burma!




GregP said:


> If you think these guys (with NO reason to make anything up) are liars, then by all means don't believe them, macht nichts to me and we don't have to agree.



Liars, no. They may have misremembered or been misinformed back in the day. Or it may be that Curtiss referred to the P-60 as a variant of the P-40. Who knows?


----------



## Aozora (Apr 28, 2013)

wuzak said:


> Greg, the engines were sea level rated.
> 
> The job of the turbocharger was to supply sea level air pressure to the carburettor deck. The rated altitudes you list are for the turbocharger.
> 
> The term sea level rated means that at full throttle the full throttle height was 0ft. For an altitude rated engine the throttle plate can only be fully open at the rated height. Below that height the engine has to be throttled to prevent overboosting of the engine.


 
From the Allison V-1710 Service School Handbook: 















F-2, -5, -10, -15, -17, -21, all Sea Level Rated, were used on the P-38.

The manuals can be found Here: Allison V-1710 Documents Manuals


----------



## CORSNING (Apr 28, 2013)

wuzak said:


> How about comparing the Seafire XV?



wuzak,


As far as I know the Seafire XV just missed WW2. So you have to change Cats to a Bear. I don't think you want to go there.


Jeff


----------



## VBF-13 (Apr 28, 2013)

parsifal said:


> I dont think there is any doubt that the quality of US a/c improved as the war progressed. Im certainly not claiming that they werent. but quality of aircraft is a relatively minor factor in determing how air wars are won. The US could have won the war flying wildcats till the end. there was no need to spend the time and trouble going to the hellcat. i see it as a largely wasted effort. They could have built a "stretched" Wildcat and achieved much the same result. Thats different to what wiki is saying.



Parsifal, the only part of that Wikipedia quote I referenced you’re not agreeing with is this part: "The U.S. successes were not only attributed to superior aircraft.” You're agreeing with this part: “*ut also from 1942 onwards, they faced increasingly inexperienced Japanese aviators.” As a matter of fact that’s your whole rationalization for everything PTO, pilot experience. It’s not only your rationalization for the successes of the Hellcats. Here, while ignoring everything Wildcat and others enumerated, it’s your lock-stock-and-barrel rationalization for the failures of your own Spitfires. Here’s what says that, these excised parts from your former reply:



parsifal said:



One can either surmise that the Spits were a failure or the quality of the opposition was better than expected.....in this part of the war, there had not been the vicious attrition oin Japanese pilots that had occured further east. The Zeke was a formidable opponent when flown by a competent pilot, and the tactics employed by the Spitfires were the wrong ones to use against the japanese.

Wherever the Japanese retained a modicum of experience in their pilots, they flew rings around their opponents. This applied to both US and RAAF equipment and both British and American types. [...] ....the Japanese still had some teeth on occasion.

Click to expand...


You’re on a personal crusade to rationalize everything PTO in terms of pilot experience. That’s what you come down to. That’s why you isolated that factor and dramatized it as the one-size-fits-all rationalization for the failures of these Spitfires, as well, to the exclusion of everything else said. And I in good faith credit your War heroes for their audacity and courage and you interpret that as a smart-crack. Well, but of course. These were inexperienced pilots. Crediting them for their heroism is but tantamount to patronization. That’s in effect how obsessed you are with that pilot experience rationalization.*


----------



## wuzak (Apr 28, 2013)

CORSNING said:


> wuzak,
> 
> As far as I know the Seafire XV just missed WW2. So you have to change Cats to a Bear. I don't think you want to go there.
> Jeff






> Seafire F Mk. XV NS.493 which is representative of production Mk. XV aircraft subsequent to about the 100th aircraft was sent to this
> Establisment for measurement of level speed performance and position error, and the results of these tests are dealt with in this Part of the Report.



Period of test - 13th-21st June 1944.

Seafire F Mk. XV Trials


----------



## tomo pauk (Apr 28, 2013)

Great posts, wuzak and Aozora. The Allison manual is also available in our 'Technical' sub-forum.


----------



## CORSNING (Apr 28, 2013)

wuzak said:


> Period of test - 13th-21st June 1944.
> 
> Seafire F Mk. XV Trials



wuzak,

If you continue to look through wwiiaircraftperformance.org you will find in the JAPAN section a report DATED: 26 January 1943. In this report the Tony I type three (Ki.61-1) is compared to the FM-2, F6F-5, F4U-1D, F4U-4, F7F-3 and the F8F. But the Bearcat did not reach operational service until after WW2 ended.


"No.802 Squadron became the first to use the Seafire Mk.XV when it reformed in England in May 1945. On 11 August the Squadron embarked on HMS Queen, ready to deploy to the Pacific, but a few days later Japan surrendered,".

Supermarine Seafire Mk.XV

Jeff


----------



## GregP (Apr 28, 2013)

The Allison had mixed ratings. Some but not all of the P-39 and P-40 engines were sea level rated. Some P-38’s used the same dash numbers as a P-40 variant, as the F4R was used in both the P-38 and the P-40K. The engine setup in the P-38 was turbocharged and the P-40K was not. The basic F4R did have a sea level rating but, in the P-38, it also had a rating when turbocharged at altitude. It is call turbo-normalizing and the critical altitude is where the turbocharger starts to fall off below the sea level rating.

So, while the F2, F5, F10, F15, F17, and F21 engines have a sea level rating, all the units installed in P-38’s had turbochargers except for British Model 322 ordered without them. The turbo engines have a sea level rating and a critical altitude where sea level power can be maintained. Not all the numbers between F2 and F31 were used and there are 17 F series Allisons of which 6 are called “sea level rated” in non-turbocharged installations. The other 11 F series engine varieties are “altitude rated.” The 18 varities of E series engines are similar to the F series internally except for the nose case to attach to a driveshaft instead of to a propeller, but all were altitude rated. So 6 of 17 F series varieties have a sea level rating and, if installed in a turbocharged P-38, also have a critical altitude where they continue to produce sea level power. That is NOT a “sea level rated” power system.

So, you have 35 E and F series engine varieties collectively (more if you count left and right turning engines separately), 6 of which are sea level rated in non-turbocharged installations. All the P-38 installations except the British-ordered Model 322 units had turbochargers and had rated altitudes where sea level power could be maintained, and all the rest of the 29 varities of Allison V-1710 were "altitude rated" whether turbocharged or not.

Aozora yoiu might have noticed in your bottom chart above that all the listing have a Mil altitude line. For the non-turbo planes it is usually around 12,000 feet. For the P-38's it is usually 25,000 feet. For the non-turbo engines, this is the altitude where the single stage supercharger will drop below rated military power if you go any higher. For the turbo planes, this is the altitude where the turbocharger cannot maintin military power if you go any higher.

I believe I stated in post #136 that the turbo V-1710's were all altitude rated. I didn't mention the sea level rated non-turbo units because I was thinking about adaptaion of the 2-stage supercharger to the Allison engine similar to the Merlin 2-stage installation specifically for European higher altitude use.

Wuzak, regarding you reply to my post #136, we're so far apart it probably not worth discussing it. 

I DO agree the XP-39 turbo installation was poor and needed development. The P-39 was too small for much development, but it could have easily worked on the P-63 ... but turbos were in short supply anyway. The P-40 WAS intended for a turbo but never got it according to the designer. If he had the turbos, he could have found space for them, but he never had them for production use. In the P-38 turbo installations, the engine system (includes a significant portion of the airframe) is rated at altitude, not the turbocharger. Put the turbo on another engine and the altitude will change. The aircraft and systems have a collective single altitude rating. 

Let's say it's not worth arguing over any further between us. Sorry you can't make the airshow. Looks like one of our P-38's might not make it, and it is based at Chino ... the former "Honey Bunny" seems to have a leaky propeller seal ... Hope they can get it fixed this week and make the flying portion of the show!


----------



## parsifal (Apr 29, 2013)

> Parsifal, the only part of that Wikipedia quote I referenced you’re not agreeing with is this part: "The U.S. successes were not only attributed to superior aircraft.”




Dont try to put words into my mouth. To clarify, I do agree with this. 



> You're agreeing with this part: “*ut also from 1942 onwards, they faced increasingly inexperienced Japanese aviators.” *


*


Absolutely. In 1941, the average combat hours (ie not including training hours) for Japanese carrier aviators was over 800 hours. Their training times varied, but on average were about 500 hours. it took nearly three years for a japanese recruit just to get his wings, and another 2 years to get his Carrier qualifications. There was not a single avaitor embarked in 1941 with less than 5 years flying experience

By 1944 (January), IGHQ was reporting the average training time for Japanese pilots in the IJN was down to 150 hours. Sakai gives an anecdotal confirmation of what was happening in "Zero". by years end training times were down to less than 50 hours. Pillots were no longer receiving any operational training, they were just joining combat units and getting shot down in droves. 

The sources for this are numerous, but if you want to source primary material, I recommend Kaigun Senji hensei yzuri, which are the quarterly returns and reports to Imperial Naval Headquaters, including their various training commands.

US pilots that had been trained prior to December 1941 had plenty of hours in training, but no combat experience. Pilots that entered the training schools from December 1941 through to December 1942 received about 250 hoiurs primary flight training, before getting assigned to an OTU for final training. They were receiving about another 150 hours or so in the OTUs before progressing to full fledged combat units. Aircrew qualifying for for carrier ops had about another 6 months or so of additional training. On average, it took about 12-18 months to train a pilot to combat standard, and about 18-20 months for carrier qualification. 

The USN aircrews that fought in Phil sea had about 500 traiing hours and a further 4-600 hours of combat flight time
I forget the source for that but its an okay source....not a magazine article. 

So in my opinion, there is no doubt, Japanese aircrew decreased dramatically in expereince, Allied aircrew were slower, but steadily imcreased in experience. and its experience that makes the difference in flying ability. By June 1944, we have allied crews with about 1000 hours of flight experience, up against Japanese crews, a few with a lot of expereince, but the majority with about 100 hours experience (and no combat experience). 




As a matter of fact that’s your whole rationalization for everything PTO, pilot experience. It’s not only your rationalization for the successes of the Hellcats. Here, while ignoring everything Wildcat and others enumerated, it’s your lock-stock-and-barrel rationalization for the failures of your own Spitfires. Here’s what says that, these excised parts from your former reply:

Click to expand...


Misquoting me again I see. Im not disagreing with Wildcat,and hes not disagreeing with me. He says, if you check back, that Zeroes were partof the problem. He adds a series of issues that also affected the Spit performance. He doesnt say that (japanese) pilot quality was not a factor, and ive known him lonmg enough to know that elsewhere he says exactly that.

I dont say that Pilot quality was the only issue. Neither do I say that airframe capability was not a factor. But what i do say is that pilot quality was a relatively important issue, whilst airframe quality was a less important issue. And I also say that there are many other issues that affected the outcome as well. 

There is no persoanl crusade here, other than to keep the issues in perspective

So that you dont misquote me in the future

PILOT QUALITY IS NOT THE ONLY ISSUE AFFECTING THE OUTCOME OF AIR WARS 





You’re on a personal crusade to rationalize everything PTO in terms of pilot experience. That’s what you come down to. That’s why you isolated that factor and dramatized it as the one-size-fits-all rationalization for the failures of these Spitfires, as well, to the exclusion of everything else said

Click to expand...

.

Nope, incorrect. Im not a persoanal crusade, except one, to get to the truth, and not let anyone pedal online propaganda as "the truth". Applies equally to the LW ra ra boys, and now , it seems, the USN ra ra boys. 

Have another read of my previous poistings. If you do, you will find that I acknowledge pilot experience as a factor. Improved tactics is another. Numbers is another. Logistics is another. I did forget to mention good leadership. Then ther are other factors like which run a distant second. Among them is the quality of the aircraft being flown. you could add the US having the initiave, superior airfield construction, better fleet support, better SAR. 

What I am saying, is that aircraft quality is not amajor determinant in achiving a winning position in an air war. There are plenty of examples where that is amply demonstrated, such as over Germany in 1944-5. Despite having superiority of certain types, like the Me 262, the germans were still losing aircraft at tn exchange rate of around 6:1 by years end. 





And I in good faith credit your War heroes for their audacity and courage and you interpret that as a smart-crack.

Click to expand...


Yes I do, because i dont think your compliments are genuine




Well, but of course. These were inexperienced pilots.

Click to expand...


Wrong again. The pilots of the Spitfire wing were the most experienced in the RAAF, led by the top scoring ace in the RAAF, Clive Caldwell. What they lacked was experience in the Spitfire. Caldwell had chalked up impressive victories in Tomahawks against the Germans, using turning fights to shot down many aircraft. he is credited with shooting down 5 German aircraft in one engagement. 




Crediting them for their heroism is but tantamount to patronization. That’s in effect how obsessed you are with that pilot experience rationalization.

Click to expand...


Your assuming that I believe the Spitfire Wing to be an inexperienced outfit. It was not, at least against other opposition. What it lacked was experience in the Spit, and secondly, how to use the Spit against the Japanese. 

The Spitfire Wing went into axction in March 1943, at a time the USNs reports on the Zeroes weaknesses were beginning to be circulated. I believe that Caldwell would have had access to these reports, but for whatever reason, he and his command chose not to follow the recommendations of that report. I am convinced that Caldwell, a man held in almost godlike awae in the RAAF, believed that with the Spit, he an his men could return to the turning manouvre battles that had yieloded such great results for them June-November 1941. They had fought the Japanese in 1942 armed mostly with P-40s , able to survive, but with meagre pickings. It seems almost certain that there was a belief that turning fights could be again utilized. 
I believe*


----------



## GregP (Apr 29, 2013)

There are many of us in here that feel aircraft quality WAS a big factor ... along with the other factors. And many in here believe you could never achieve a position of superiority with and inferior aircraft and inferior tactics.

Since WWII is long since over, this is sort of supposed to be a diuscussion, not a dictatorship or a bar fight. You may be right and others may be right ... or neither may be right. We aren't fighting the war today, so it's tough to take 20-20 hindsight and come out with all the correct answers since the lessons can be interpreted differently depending on your resources available to respond.

Sometimes strong words generate stronger replies, demanding ever stronger responses on both sides where frank statement of opinion was intended originally. Ever happen to you? It's happened to me. I can easily post two sentences and somehow get 51 replies attacking my character, knowledge and integrity. Now THAT's a freindly response that will generate frank discussion, isn't it?

The Darwin Spitfires were lost in 1943 when Japanese tactics were already known by anyone who flew combat in the PTO. They blew it. As I recall they lost anywhere from 26 - 32 Spit V's while the inferior Japanese pilots and equipment lost a few bombers, 3 Zeros and 1 Ki-43. Did I get it wrong? If so, please let us know.

Maybe they weren't quite so inferior as generally thought.

Cheers to you down under.


----------



## parsifal (Apr 29, 2013)

The quality of the aircraft does make a differnce, but it is not critical to winning an air war. There are many examples to prove that. Eastern Front is a great example, Defence of the reich is another. Air war over North Africa and Malta is another. British Carrier operations 1940-43 is another good example. Williason murray shows very clearly, further, that air to air action is not even amajor determinant of who wins an air campaign. Most losses arent even related to enemy fighters in most situations, so the quality of the fighters makes little difference as to who wins the air battle. Its as brutal as that.

The operations over Darwin and in that general TO are a perfect microcosm of how air wars are won. Despite the losses being heavily one sided....the RAAF and USAAF lost over 130 a/c Feb to November '43 whilst the Japanerse lost only 35, the campaign was a clear Alied victory. The Japanese aim had been to deny the allies the use of Darwin for any offensive operations in the air, in this they failed, with B-24s and Beafighters, B25s and some other major types able to mount sustained operations, including a highly successful mining operation off the main oil outlets of the NEI. In the finish the Japanese were forced to withdraw their air assets, having failed to deny the Allies the use of this forward base, despite having lost a fraction of the aircraft that the allies had lost. moreover, both the allies and the Japanese had lost the majority of their aircraft to causes other than enemy fighter action. It was a re-run of the RAFs campaign over France and the low countries 1941-3, dogged application of airpower despite the losses, and abslutely no evidence that superior fighters produce disproportionate losses. The Spitfires, by any sensible analysis, should have won the battle hands down if that were the case. Modern types are needed mostly to improve survivability, and also to improve the implied threat they impose, but in terms of actual losses, fighters dont amount to much. 

And here is why I say that the Hellcat, whilst a superior design, and "nice to have" was anything but essential to victory for the USN. They could have done the job with Wildcats or even Buffaloes at a pinch. Neither of these later two types were so badly outclasssed that they were not capable of gradual improvement "to keep up with the japanese". What the Hellcat did, was give greater striking power in the FB role and improve survivability for the aircrew, but there is no evidence to support the claims they were critical to the US victory


----------



## Wildcat (Apr 29, 2013)

Guys, I've started a new thread "spitfires over Darwin" as I believe it deserves greater discussion.


----------



## DonL (Apr 29, 2013)

> The quality of the aircraft does make a differnce, but it is not critical to winning an air war. There are many examples to prove that. Eastern Front is a great example, Defence of the reich is another. Air war over North Africa and Malta is another. British Carrier operations 1940-43 is another good example. Williason murray shows very clearly, further, that air to air action is not even amajor determinant of who wins an air campaign. Most losses arent even related to enemy fighters in most situations, so the quality of the fighters makes little difference as to who wins the air battle. Its as brutal as that.



This is to my opinion a wrong *overall* summary, because it only functions, if one enemy is much stronger in economics and supply.
If both enemys are *equal* in economics, supply and training, the whole statement and summary is obsolete, because then the better weapon system and tactics are decisive.
You can only fight an attrition war if you are stronger. 

This is one reason why to my personal opinion Montgomery was only an average to poor general, because he only could fight attrition battles.


----------



## Aozora (Apr 29, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Wrong again. The pilots of the Spitfire wing were the most experienced in the RAAF, led by the top scoring ace in the RAAF, Clive Caldwell. What they lacked was experience in the Spitfire. Caldwell had chalked up impressive victories in Tomahawks against the Germans, using turning fights to shot down many aircraft. he is credited with shooting down 5 German aircraft in one engagement.
> Your assuming that I believe the Spitfire Wing to be an inexperienced outfit. It was not, at least against other opposition. What it lacked was experience in the Spit, and secondly, how to use the Spit against the Japanese.


 
Well this is wrong for a start - the Spitfire Wing (sometime nicknamed "Churchill Wing") was composed of two English based Australian Spitfire squadrons, that had fought over Europe, 452 and 457(RAAF) Squadrons, as well as 54 Sqn, also English based with experience over Europe. 



> Nonetheless, the two RAAF Spitfire squadrons in the UK - No 452 under the command of seven victory ace Sqn Ldr Raymond Thorold-Smith, and No 457, led by Sqn Ldr Ken James - together with the RAF's experienced No 54 Sqn, under Sqn Ldr Eric Gibbs, were ordered to move to Australia. Accordingly, No 452 Sqn was withdrawn from operations on 23 March 1942 while No 457 ceased active operations on 31 May. (Osprey Aircraft of the Aces 87: Spitfire Aces of Burma and the Pacific, Thomas, page 7)



Seems to me there's a lot of heat being generated in this debate, but not much light:



> The Spitfire wing's performance on this date (2 May 1943) would generate a great deal of ill-informed and unjustified criticism, much of which emanated from Australia's US allies. (Thomas, 13)
> 
> 'I pulled away to port and to the rear, and finding I had only 22 gallons of fuel left I returned to base, landing with just two gallons to spare.'
> 
> ...



Re GregP's comments "26 - 32 Spit V's while the inferior Japanese pilots and equipment lost a few bombers, 3 Zeros and 1 Ki-43. Did I get it wrong? If so, please let us know."



> With the change in Japanese priorities in the face of Allied successes elsewhere in the Pacific, the 12 November raid was the last time that the
> Australian mainland was attacked, although occasional reconnaissance sorties continued. John Smithson's successes meant that in nine months
> of action No 1 Fighter Wing had been credited with *a total of 65 enemy aircraft destroyed** for the loss of 15 pilots in combat. Although standby was maintained, the war had now largely moved away. Whilst the Spitfires would see further action, the reality was that by early 1944 there were few Japanese aircraft left in the Southwest Pacific. (Thomas 26)


 *Include several Ki-46s which had been almost invulnerable until the arrival of Spitfires.

Please don't try and say the Spitfire Wing overclaimed by some 2,000%...


----------



## bobbysocks (Apr 29, 2013)

you can wage a war with inferior hardware as long as you have overwheling numbers or resources more vast than your enemy. from what i read of the eastern front the LW usually always outscored the VSS. but when the VSS lost 25 planes they replaced them with 50. when the LW lost planes...or more importantly pilots they were hard pressed to get trained replacements. had the VSS been as hamstrung as the LW and not able to replace planes and pilots as they did....something would have had to drastically change.


----------



## GregP (Apr 29, 2013)

From "Hellcat versus Spitfire" to Montgomery? Now that's what I call an on-topic discussion ...


----------



## RCAFson (Apr 29, 2013)

CORSNING said:


> Well then, I'd have to agree that the F6F could do a land plane role. BUT, it would probably not do it as well as a fighter that was designed from the start as a point defence interseptor. The F6F was designed for shipboard operation. That means a lot of extra size and weight compaired to a land based interceptor. If it had been designed as such it would probably have looked more like a F8F.
> Compairing the Hellcat to the Spitfire V seems off a little. They are nearly 2 years appart from entering operational service. It is hard to take the large Hellcat and strip it down to point interceptor. So it seems to me the best way to compair is to rig up the Spifire for carrier duty and then compare: Seafire III.
> Height in meters / Speed in mph / Climb in fpm.
> 
> ...



You can find the climb figures here:
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/f3.jpg
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/lf3.jpg

It seems to me that the F6F-5 came along somewhat later than the Seafire III (full production was late April 1944 according to Dean). The Seafire III Merlin engines were always cleared for 16/18lb boost. Seafire III testing was done with the snowguard in place, but this was removed on combat aircraft, plus combat aircraft had more efficient exhaust stubs, and were about 10mph faster than the above numbers

Boscombe Down tests of the F6F-3 showed the following:


> _
> Climb performance
> Max. rate of climb in Main supercharger gear = 2260 ft/min at 5400 feet.
> Max. rate of climb in Aux. Lowspeed supercharger gear	= 1880 ft/min at 20500 feet.
> ...





Note that the same test showed that the F6F-3 was not suitable, at that point (Sept 1943), for high altitude interceptions because of the R2800's problems with high altitude magneto failures, which IIRC, also effected the P-47.


----------



## redcoat (Apr 29, 2013)

DonL said:


> This is one reason why to my personal opinion Montgomery was only an average to poor general, because he only could fight attrition battles.


If he was only average to bad, you have to wonder how bad were the ones before him were !!!!!

ps: It also brings into question how good Rommel and the other German generals were if they were continually getting beaten by a 'poor' general


----------



## DonL (Apr 29, 2013)

redcoat said:


> If he was only average to bad, you have to wonder how bad were the ones before him were !!!!!
> 
> ps: It also brings into question how good Rommel and the other German generals were if they were continually getting beaten by a 'poor' general



Every trained monkey can fight an attrition battle, if he had superior numbers of troops, tanks, artillery and aircrafts and the supply to replace this superior numbers!


----------



## redcoat (Apr 29, 2013)

DonL said:


> Every trained monkey can fight an attrition battle, if he had superior numbers of troops, tanks, artillery and aircrafts and the supply to replace this superior numbers!


There must have been a great shortage of trained monkeys in the Allied armies in the early part of the war then.


----------



## parsifal (Apr 29, 2013)

Attrition wars are influenced by outright numbers, but outright numbers are not solely the preserve of good production. If that were the case the germans who were the second most powerful economy in the world, would have won the war. They were several orders of magnitude stronger than the Soviet economy for example. Against the Americans, one has to remember that nearly 60% of US production never left the continental US. Against Britain, the British economy was exhausted by 1944, and the british were overly obseessed with defending the home territories for too long. Britain in 1940-41, it was heavily outgunned by the German economy. The Japanese economy was much smaller, but it still had potential to reach respectable proportions, but was hampered by poor usage of shipping and poor home organization.

Wars of attriution do need a solid production base, but they also need careful planning and a good overall support base. otherwise that production is just wasted. As the Germans found in 1944.....Another example of attrition wars that might considere is again German, but this time one that they almost won. in the Atlantic, the germans came to within an ace of winning the war, using a lesser amount of resources. had the allies not reorganized their ASW and convoying efforts, despit numbers, they would have lost. In the end, they achieved numbers and organizational advantages, and woon the critical battle of the war. 

Aircraft types whilst important dont make a huge difference in an attrition battle. the LW enjoyed huge qualitative advantages on the eastern front, and over Africa. but like all things, quality comes at a price. Are you better off having all your eggs in relatively few baskets, or a large number of eggs in many baskets? The problem with the "few good eggs" model in the context of WWII is that both the many eggs and the few eggs are subject to losses that are mostly independant of quality or enemy action Most aircraft are lost due to wear and tear, flak damage, weather, getting lost, landing or take off accidents or the like. Its different today, where every aircraft is a major investment. In 1940-45, aircraft were cheap and expendable, and the numbers count for much. If you have numbers, you can assume a ready supply of replacement airframes and pilots,and other materials like fuel and ammunition. if you dont, you are going to lose.... eventually.

And for the Hellcat argument, I am not disputing that the aircraft was excepitional. it performed its role better than any other aircraft in the war. but was it worth it. Development and production of the F6F came at a cost, exactly what that cost i have no idea. Lets say, however that it cost the equivalent of 5 Essex Class carriers. Lets say that instead of developing the Hellcat, the Americans had built 5 extra carriers, and simply opted for an improved Wildcat airframe. And then they went into battle at Phil sea.....with abother 400 Wildcats over the 500 or so Hellcats they historically fielded (in other words 900 average fighters compared to 500 exceptional fighters). Would they have done better, worse, or about the same? history shows us, time and again in the war, that where a force had the numbers, and the support echelons to support that advantage, they would win every time (I admit there are limits....going to war with biplanes in the jet age isnt going to work...at some stage you do need to invest in technology in order to "keep up with the jone's) . There is not one instance I can think of strategically where an opponent that opted to forego the numbers advantage in favour of technical superiority, actually won their battle strategically. They might run amok for a time but were always brought to ground in the finish.


----------



## bobbysocks (Apr 29, 2013)

probably was. how many peace time promoted generals started off the war and ended up being replaced because they couldnt cut the mustard?


----------



## GregP (Apr 29, 2013)

What about the badly outnumbered Swedes who fought off all intruders with their teenage king leading the charge? What about the American Revolution? What about the British who outfought numerically-superior opponents in their empire for centuries? Lots of African tribes gained voctory over numerically superior opponents due to being able to spring an anbush under cover of the jungle. In these smaller cases, it is both strategic and tactical becasue the forces are small enough that a battle can encompass all the resources ... so tactics and strategy amount to the same thing.

Wars of attrition are awful and the people who start them should be executed after the war is over. The idiots who start them are somehow never among the "attrited," but should be.

Regardless of sthrength, a superior technology will give even the smaller side a winning edge today. A single city with MIRV nuclear missiles could probably get makor concessions from most countries around the world. Glad there aren't many of THOSE!

Generally, I agree, but am not sure WWII qualifies since modern weapons were being employed. Up through WWI ... yes. Once weapons progressed far enough for trench warfare to become inpossible ... maybe not. Once general airlift and air power came on the scene, I think tactical employment of the assets became much more important than the sheer number of assets.


----------



## parsifal (Apr 29, 2013)

I would very much like to debate those examples you mentioned greg, but to take a leaf out of your book I think we should try and keep the discussion a bit more relevant. 

For the record I dont agree with your historical analogies, but my comments were in the context of WWII examples. Before and since, there may be exceptions.


----------



## GregP (Apr 29, 2013)

Yah, off subject ... and we can both probably find examples going both ways.

It's possible we could have won without the Hellcat and Corsair ... but we didn't, so I'll stick with the real events. They are hard enough to disect without throwing in "what ifs," at least for me. Whenever I come up with one, nobody seems to like it much.

Have a good evening!


----------



## VBF-13 (Apr 29, 2013)

parsifal said:


> VBF-13 said:
> 
> 
> > And I in good faith credit your War heroes for their audacity and courage and you interpret that as a smart-crack.
> ...


So you don’t just hate Hellcats, you read minds, too. Boy, that’s awesome.



parsifal said:


> The US could have won the war flying wildcats till the end. there was no need to spend the time and trouble going to the hellcat. i see it as a largely wasted effort. They could have built a "stretched" Wildcat and achieved much the same result.


Let me just leave you with this. From a guy who knew these machines better than you right down to how many turns it took on the crank to lift up that landing gear. Butch O'Hare, to the President of the United States, on what was needed in terms of a new fighter aircraft: "Something that would go upstairs faster.” Ewing and Lundstrom, _Fateful Rendezvous: The Life of Butch O'Hare_ (2004). But I’m sure you already talked yourself into your theory so I shan't take up more of your time on it. Have a nice night, or whatever it is, there, in Australia. Twenty-eight turns, by the way.


----------



## Aozora (Apr 30, 2013)

Don't know where to begin with Parsifal's specious reasoning, except to say that the ultimate extension of such thinking would be to say that the Soviets would have won the war without the T-34 or KV or JS tanks, because they could have poured sufficient BT-7s and infantry into each attack, regardless of cost. Why bother with the Yak-9 or La-5 7 because enough LaGG 3s would have _eventually_ overwhelmed the German fighters? Similarly all the Americans needed to do was churn out enough P-40s and F4Fs because it was too expensive to develop the P-51B/C series and the F6F. It would have meant accepting far higher casualties in trained pilots and aircrew - but _eventually_ quantity would win and, hey, if it means more blood is spilled, at least you're saving money. Thankfully for all of us America could afford both quantity and quality, and, thankfully for the USN, a mere 500 Hellcats were more than enough to destroy the JNAF at a low cost in casualties. I'll bet every USN fighter pilot thought the F6F was worth it.


----------



## GregP (Apr 30, 2013)

Good points Aozora, if worded a bit inflamatorily. I might nave tended to try to discuss it, but I had similar thoughts in less direct language. Why study Military Science if all you have to do is produce more? As a member of two military services in the past, I think Military Science is much more than simple production. If it isn't, I wasted a lot of study ... and I saw first hand what superior tactics and planning can accomplish.

But, you can argue it either way logically if you ignore certain aspects of it ... ask most who have tweaked Israel the wrong way what THEY think. They don't have the issues WE have with retaliatory military missions. Ask anyone who really pissed off the U.S.A. ... there are consequences. In my memory, it isn't very wise to affront the British, either.

Conventional wisdom from the age of ancient weapons doesn't survive things like cluster bombs from a small source in the right place. or a fuel-air munition taht can level a city block. People can't hide from an infrared scan so the enemy, if he HAS that, KNOWS where you are and can assign resources, even small ones, to handle it with sufficient technology.

BIG changes in warfare in the last 50 years ...


----------



## parsifal (Apr 30, 2013)

> Don't know where to begin with Parsifal's specious reasoning




Not my reasoning, read Murray etal for the basis of the theory. 




> , except to say that the ultimate extension of such thinking would be to say that the Soviets would have won the war without the T-34 or KV or JS tanks, because they could have poured sufficient BT-7s and infantry into each attack, regardless of cost.



Ther is an obvious limit on obsolescence verus numbers. BT-7s were eventually used to good effet, once the tactical concepts that had led to their slaughter in the opening months had been worked out. The Romanians or the germans are perhaps a better example of how suposed obsolescence matters for little in winning battles. MkII and II tanks should have been slaughtered by T-34s, but were not. At Stalingrad, the Rumanian Mk 35 should have been wiped on the floor by the T-34/76s they faced, but were not. Why?. Because the tactical handling of those Axis formations was so superior. 

WQith regard to the Russians, having settled on the T-34, for a while, the Russians enjoyed a technical superiority over their Axis counterparts. In that time they gained the necessary breathing space to gain experience and organaise and train competent mobile formations. by the time of Stalingrad that was generally the case, as the comments by manstein attest to. Then the Germans reacted, and introduced new and improved existing types that technically overtook the T-34 advantage. However, by that stage the Soviet formations were competent and the T-34 was good enough....a clear case of relying on numbers to achieve the desired outcome. If anything the examples you cite actually strengthen the case, that in the end its the numbers that count. sure you need equipment that is at least competitive, but when you start to chase the technology God at the expense of everything, you are on the clear road to defeat. Small to medium advantages in tech dont amount to much. It becomes a problem when the performance difference is so great that no amount of skill or numbers will win the day. 




> Why bother with the Yak-9 or La-5 7 because enough LaGG 3s would have _eventually_ overwhelmed the German fighters?




In point of fact, the soviets never bested the German fighters, be they LAGG-3, Yak-9s or whatever. At an early stage the Soviets realized this, and also realized that gaining air superiority does not necessarily mean winning the fighter combats, or that air superiority is necessary to affect the outcome of the overall campaign. Particularly in the wide exapanses of the Eastern Front. Soviet Fighters were there for a dual primary purpose....to try and keep their Sturmoviks alive long enough to provide the decisive firepower at the point of breakthrough , and secondly to make it costly enough for the german strike aircraft to not make a difference. In this they were singulalry successful, which explains why LAGG-3 units were still extant in 1944, and I-16 units stil operating in 1943. With that philosophy it mattered not whether your people were flying the best, or the 2nd best, either approach would succeed if you had the numbers. and the Soviets, depite a weaker industrial base than the Germans always had the numbers. 

Novikov, the head of the VVS during the war, incidentally agrees and subscribes to "my" theory. 



> Similarly all the Americans needed to do was churn out enough P-40s and F4Fs because it was too expensive to develop the P-51B/C series and the F6F.



P-51 is a different matter, because there were no long range escorts available to take the fight to Germany. If the technology doesnt exist, you need to invest the time and effort. 

In the case of the F4F versus the F6f, there is a clear advantage of the F6f because of its enhanced ground strike capability and air combat capability...but otherwise you have to weigh up the obvious benefits of the F6F against its overall cost to the war effort. How much less capable was the f4F to the F6F at killing Japanese, or more pertinantly, defending the fleet from enemy attack. I again ask the hypothetical question, which none of you are willing to tackle....which is the better option...500 Hellcats or 900 Wildcats (hypothertical figures). I think the Wildcat was a good enough killing machine and its ability to be there in greater numbers will offset its lesser performance. 



> It would have meant accepting far higher casualties in trained pilots and aircrew



Absolutely no evidence to support that Im afraid. If the Wildcats are there in greater numbers, the japanese are going to be more worried than ever in tactical situations because they are still vulnerable to wildcats as they are to F6Fs, and there are likley to be more F4Fs in the "low tech" scenario.




> - but _eventually_ quantity would win and, hey, if it means more blood is spilled, at least you're saving money.




Absolutely not. Numbers save lives, not costs lives. Provided your equipment is competitive....and thats the great risk...if you languish at the bottom end of the tech tree, you risk outright obsolescence....then what do you do other than get yourself shot down and lose wars.

And in wars, the individuals survival counts for nothing sorry to say. its about national survival...how best to ensure the national interest....numbers or quality...forget the survival of the individual, they count for nothing in war 



> Thankfully for all of us America could afford both quantity and quality, and, thankfully for the USN, a mere 500 Hellcats were more than enough to destroy the JNAF at a low cost in casualties. I'll bet every USN fighter pilot thought the F6F was worth it.




Thankfully, wars are not run by pilots. unfair, but a cold reality. Wars are fought by the nations leaders and its generals and admirals. I think the war would have ended 6-12 months earlier without the Hellcat, if decisions in 1939-40 had been made to upgrade the Wildcat and build more carriers. Instead of a single fleet with 500 Hellcats in 1944 destroying the Japanese, the USN could well have had one fleet with 500 Wildcats in 1943, and another by early 1944. Thats the dividend. im not saying have the same number of Wildcats, Im saying from the savings made not designing and developing the Hellcat, one may well have 4 or 5 additional Carriers and a fully worked up attack fleet from the middle of 1943, instead of the end of 1943. 

Its about building up momentum faster and in greater strength.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Apr 30, 2013)

This is a really good discussion guys. Just keep it civil. We are all friends here...


----------



## GregP (Apr 30, 2013)

6 - 12 months EARLIER without the Hellcat? Been eating mushrooms?

You'll have to lay that one out since it shot down more enemy aircraft than any other US fighter (air-to-air) and got there in 1943, a mere year and a half after we entered the war ... and was there to the end. Buffalos and F4F's were obsolescent when the war started ... and we were supposed to soldier along like the German (who lost by the way) did with the Bf 109 and Fw 190?

Naahhh ... it's like fighting in Viet Nam against M-16's with Kentucky Long Rifles .... would have been a slaughter.

I think there wil be some slight disagreement with your theory in here ... but I could be mistaken.


----------



## parsifal (Apr 30, 2013)

> 6 - 12 months EARLIER without the Hellcat? Been eating mushrooms?



Possibly.......


_



You'll have to lay that one out since it shot down more enemy aircraft than any other US fighter (air-to-air) and got there in 1943, a mere year and a half after we entered the war ... and was there to the end. Buffalos and F4F's were obsolescent when the war started ... and we were supposed to soldier along like the German (who lost by the way) did with the Bf 109 and Fw 190

Click to expand...

?_


It still took 1.5 years to get into action, and from memory the first instance of frontline combat was about Septemeber was it not, with the first serious enagagements occurring November, during Galvanic.

If the Hellcat had been cancelled in (1939???) with some of the R&D going into an improved Wildcat, and the balance of the costs of the new type going into carrier production, we might have seen 4 or 5 Essex ready by Feb-March 1943, and a further 4 or 5 within a year of that. instead of messing about with CARTWHEEL the USN could have gone straight for the jugular in early 1943, with Wildcats, good enough to win at guadacanal, and good enough to keep the Japanese on the back foot for the remainder of the war. If the offensive had moved into gear fromFebruary, the Japanese would have collapsed that much quicker. 




> Naahhh ... it's like fighting in Viet Nam against M-16's with Kentucky Long Rifles .... would have been a slaughter.




The Vietnamese fought their wars against the French with baasically out of date Soviet war surplusses, and won 




> I think there wil be some slight disagreement with your theory in here ... but I could be mistaken.




Ya think.....


----------



## GregP (Apr 30, 2013)

Parsifal, I have NO idea how you think and do not disrespect you, but I know you've never been in military service by your posts. If you had, then we'd not be so far apart. You have ideas that civilians have, not military people, even enlisted people. If you have served, you were released from it or resigned.

That's OK, but civilians should NEVER try to start and prosecute a war ... it's suicide for more than just the people who do it. Since you're an obvious civilian, maybe you should refrain from telling us all how war should be waged. Historical anecdotes don't change good tactics or strategy. Attrition isn't an option these days with BIG weapons and sensors that make hiding almost impossible.

Study military science and your perspective may be somewhat different. Maybe not ... depends on your convictions. 

The ONLY purpose of war is to get the enemy to the peace table so it stops. All else is rubbish unless you intend to rape and pillage the population. If you do these days, the world may respond somehwat harshly. When war starts, the politicians have failed and should be replaced immediately , but probably can't be due to political reality in the country that starts the war. Once the enemy realizes he is beaten, he will negotiate and stop the war. Destroy as much as possible as quickly as possible and ask the other guys to stop occasionally during the conflict. 

Doesn't mean you are really enemies ... it means they can't prosecute the war any further and have to acede to the demands.

Also doesn't solve the initial dispute ... so it may well start again ...


----------



## RCAFson (Apr 30, 2013)

GregP said:


> That's OK, but civilians should NEVER try to start and prosecute a war ... it's suicide for more than just the people who do it. Since you're an obvious civilian, maybe you should refrain from telling us all how war should be waged.



Please tell us which wars the USA has fought where the civilians weren't in charge?


----------



## Aozora (Apr 30, 2013)

parsifal said:


> I think the war would have ended 6-12 months earlier without the Hellcat, if decisions in 1939-40 had been made to upgrade the Wildcat and build more carriers. Instead of a single fleet with 500 Hellcats in 1944 destroying the Japanese, the USN could well have had one fleet with 500 Wildcats in 1943, and another by early 1944. Thats the dividend. im not saying have the same number of Wildcats, Im saying from the savings made not designing and developing the Hellcat, one may well have 4 or 5 additional Carriers and a fully worked up attack fleet from the middle of 1943, instead of the end of 1943.
> 
> Its about building up momentum faster and in greater strength.



Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence: Please show us any _ evidence_ that the procurement and development of the U.S Carrier fleet was adversely affected because BuAer chose to develop the F6F rather than "expand" the F4F design. 

If the assumption continues to be that developing and procuring the Hellcat deprived the USN of five carriers, please explain why funding the development and production of increased numbers of "improved" F4Fs would not have had a similar, if not worse effect? 

Read what actually happened, read the timelines.

eg: World Aircraft Carriers List: US Fleet Carriers, WWII Era



> _The first units were initially scheduled for completion in 1944, but production was rushed due to war_. These ships formed the mainstay of US WWII fast carrier forces, and the US postwar carrier fleet. All ships served in the Pacific from completion to the end of hostilities.



I can put a far stronger case that had submarine torpedo development been properly handled and more submarines built, and had better submarine tactics been developed the Pacific war would have ended 18 months earlier, with fewer carriers and fewer F4Fs.


----------



## drgondog (Apr 30, 2013)

The arguement "F6F vs no F6F but a lot more F4F's" seems to miss an obvious point. Give the remaining F4F's to the poor second hand equipped USMC and snatch their Ensign Killers away for Fleet ops. You can make a far better case to scrap F6F and replace with F4U.

The Marianas Turkey shoot would have the same result with F4U-1A's.

@Parsifal - the analogy of building more Essex carriers by sacrificing F6F development probably doesn't work because ALL the US shipyards were 100% 7x24. I don't believe priorities could be shifted from Liberty Ships as fast our Merchant shipping was finding eternal resting spots on the bottom of the Atlantic and Gulf.


----------



## VBF-13 (Apr 30, 2013)

drgondog said:


> The Marianas Turkey shoot would have the same result with F4U-1A's.


From all the accounts I had heard, and a number of those had been first-hand accounts, they rated in the air as exceptionally as did the Hellcats. But then that wasn't anything just about every Naval aviator at the time didn't know.


----------



## parsifal (Apr 30, 2013)

> Parsifal, I have NO idea how you think and do not disrespect you, but I know you've never been in military service by your posts. If you had, then we'd not be so far apart. You have ideas that civilians have, not military people, even enlisted people. If you have served, you were released from it or resigned.



Actually I served for 8.5 years in the RAN as a PWO (thats principal warfare officer) serving on various ships in the RAN, including a carrier and a DDG. After that I served as a civilian for nearly 10 years as an instructor. 

Part of my job was the tactical handling of weapon systems....to think outside of the square in their relative value and military application. im not a Tech, im an Operations analyst, with gold on my shoulder to boot

I was paid to think like this....and no I left the service because I eventually got a better offer, still doing the same thing to this day, less the bangy bits.

(Edit: actually this is not quite true. I did get a better offer, but I left after being medically discharged. Had volunteered for the Antarctic re-supply ship, but was injured on the trip down...never did get to see the Antarctic) 




> That's OK, but civilians should NEVER try to start and prosecute a war ... it's suicide for more than just the people who do it. Since you're an obvious civilian, maybe you should refrain from telling us all how war should be waged. Historical anecdotes don't change good tactics or strategy.



Im not decorated, but I have been mentioned in official reports for my record, and represented my country as a queens medallist My grandfather fought at Gallipoli and Palestine. My stepfather fought at Stalingrad, and the Eastern Front for three years. My wifes grandfather fought for Zhukov. All these men are decorated for their service,including an iron cross, a Gallipoli Star and an Order of Lenin. You dont know sh*t about my record, but you are so far wrong and deliberately offensive its not funny. 

Is that enough service record and military exposure for you?




> Attrition isn't an option these days with BIG weapons and sensors that make hiding almost impossible.



Not today, at least in the sense of its traditinal application, but in the context of WWII, attrition was THE battle that had to be fought




> Study military science and your perspective may be somewhat different. Maybe not ... depends on your convictions.



Ive spent 30 years doing just that




> The ONLY purpose of war is to get the enemy to the peace table so it stops. All else is rubbish unless you intend to rape and pillage the population.




So, i see youve read a bit of Clausewitz.....who's the make believe soldier here?




> If you do these days, the world may respond somehwat harshly. When war starts, the politicians have failed and should be replaced immediately , but probably can't be due to political reality in the country that starts the war


. 

A misquote of Clauswitz again....he actually said "war is an extension of policy" so dis-associating war and policy is anathema, and I for one would never trust a soldier with policy. Winning the war, yes, what to do with that victory, sorry, not happening.

And in the context of WWII, winning meant paying the piper......



> Once the enemy realizes he is beaten, he will negotiate and stop the war. Destroy as much as possible as quickly as possible and ask the other guys to stop occasionally during the conflict.
> 
> Doesn't mean you are really enemies ... it means they can't prosecute the war any further and have to acede to the demands.



Not applicable in WWII, where the policy of unconditional surrender was adopted at an early stage and stuck to until the end. Churchill never said this, but I believe he thought it...you cannot negotiate with pure evil, and negotitating just encourages them to come back for another go later on. His thinking did produce some good results...whilst there has been a huge amount of tension in the world, and oodles of small wars, a return to total War has thankfully eluded us. partly because of the MAD principal, and partly because Churchill showed us how to deal with pure evil




> Also doesn't solve the initial dispute ... so it may well start again



I agree...the only reason I took the time to respond to you inane post was because you took the trouble to try and insult me and drag down the military traditions of my family.


----------



## parsifal (Apr 30, 2013)

> @Parsifal - the analogy of building more Essex carriers by sacrificing F6F development probably doesn't work because ALL the US shipyards were 100% 7x24. I don't believe priorities could be shifted from Liberty Ships as fast our Merchant shipping was finding eternal resting spots on the bottom of the Atlantic and Gulf.[



It wasnt lack of dockyard space that limited the military build up in the USN, it was money. The 1940 war program (as modified by the war emergency additions) called for the construction of 6 Iowas, 5 Montanas, 26 Essex, 6 Midway, over 60 CLs, 24 Baltimores, , 4 Des Moines, 4 Worcesters and 6 Alaskas. There were about 1000 DDs and DEs from memory. Of these hulls, more than 70% were started in some form or another. many were cancelled half constructed. For the Essex class, more than half were not laid down until 1943+, the very time when maximum demands were being made on US shipyards. The US had to delay the construction of approved designs, designs that proved to be absolute war winners, because there was insufficient money in 1940 to build them. Money being siphoned off to companies like grumman to design, build and set up production of aircraft like the Hellcat. nice to have, but hardly essential war materiel. 

Scrap the F6F program, make do with the F4F, build carriers like hotcakes from 1940, and you will defeat the Japanese far earlier than historical.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Apr 30, 2013)

1. No one I repeat, no one will question someones service on this. As a veteran, I find it on the verge of offensive.

2. Both of you calm down. Don't let this get out of hand.


----------



## drgondog (Apr 30, 2013)

parsifal said:


> It wasnt lack of dockyard space that limited the military build up in the USN, it was money. The 1940 war program (as modified by the war emergency additions) called for the construction of 6 Iowas, 5 Montanas, 26 Essex, 6 Midway, over 60 CLs, 24 Baltimores, , 4 Des Moines, 4 Worcesters and 6 Alaskas. There were about 1000 DDs and DEs from memory. Of these hulls, more than 70% were started in some form or another. many were cancelled half constructed. For the Essex class, more than half were not laid down until 1943+, the very time when maximum demands were being made on US shipyards.
> 
> *If I understand your point in the recount of the 1940 War Program, the planned build up plus associated emergency funding and resource allocations were well underway in 1942 with no notion one way or another that the F6F was required to defeat the IJN or for that matter that the F4F was adequate.
> 
> ...



Building Carriers like 'hotcakes' is a concept I am struggling with, even if the funding had been made available (doubtful). The US was really struggling with financing the sustained production ramp in early 1944 and in fact started the wind down in early 1944.

The F6F, F7F and F8F all diverted resources from say more Essex class carriers, more submarines, but there was no certainty that the war would end in 1945, nor (IMO) was there anything directly affecting Japan more than the USN submarine fleet and B-29s. Had more Essex Carriers been available in 1943, it is conceivable that the Marianas and Iwo would have been taken earlier save for the lack of USMC and USA infantry assets to take and hold the ground? I don't see those reserves coming from ETO/MTO given the priorites of "Defeating Germany First". 

The US submarine fleet, along with Commonwealth assets to aleeser but tangible degree was the primary force strangling the homeland. The B-29s took until late 1944 to attain sufficient assets and solve enough problems to go truly operational in the attack against Japan. Essex Class carriers would have been very vulnerable to Kamikaze with no real solution either with F4F or F6F defending. You could argue they were more vulnerable if only F4F were CAP shield, as the Yorktown, Hornet, Lexington, etc were in 1942 and 1943.

F4F (and F6F and F4U) were popcorn farts in comparison with Lemay era B-29 raids on Japanese cities - and more Essex class carriers combined with more F4Fs don't seem to be the answer to accelerating the presence of the B-29 torching Japan at night.

Don't see how Essex class carriers accelerate the transition of enough assets from ETO/MTO to PTO to even Contemplate an Invasion of Japan earlier than late 1944.

What am I missing when considering all the moving parts?

Regards,

Bill


----------



## parsifal (Apr 30, 2013)

I think the funding was possible, but it would have required cutbacks in other programs. If I was to critique my own position, its weakness is not that is was impossible, but that it was dangerous. In 1940 cutting back on replacement aircraft had to assume that the aircraft in the existing inventory, the f4F was good enough for the duration, and that the japanese could be defeated relatively quickly. Neither was a given in 1940 (as you say). The Americans were forced to design, develop and construct the Hellcat (and others) because there was no gurantee that their Fleet air arm would not become totally obsolete if they relied on a the F4F. 

Thats a given, but this is about the relative worth of various aircraft. in my opinion, the hellcat was a superlative aircraft. but as experience would show, an unneccessary one. And thats whats getting up peoples noses. But you have to stand back and look dispassionately at what was needed and the quality of the opposition. As it turns out, the F4F would have been enough to win the war, and if the carriers were available earlier, because of the savings in the R&D of 1940, the war would have cost less lives and ended sooner. 

With regard to the "build carriers like hotcakes" remark, I dont know what the cost of the f6F program was but I assume fairly substantial. The logic is simple...build more carriers sooner and you put a LOT more pressure on the Japanese quicker. They will collapse at a geometric rate if you do. Somoeone metioned building more subs....a great idea, but stuck on a fixed timeline. Subs were inneffective for the USN until after September 1943 for technical and operational reasons,,,,not because of numbers....Essex class and F4Fs were available from 1940, with no significant impediements to operations other than availability.

Its true that submarines caused a great deal of damage to the Japanese. However, the American carriers caused a huge diversion of effort by the japanese. 67% of the Japanese war economy was devoted to building aircraft, and about 70% of that effort went iinto fighting the Americans on their Pacific and SWPac fronts. If the Americans dont field a credible carrier force, the Japanese have the resources to build more shipping and more escorts, and their overall economy ramps up a lot more than it did. The USN Carrier ops were critical to take the ground, take the fight to the enemy, destroy his air asets and destroy his fleet. 



> F4F (and F6F and F4U) were popcorn farts in comparison with Lemay era B-29 raids on Japanese cities - and more Essex class carriers combined with more F4Fs don't seem to be the answer to accelerating the presence of the B-29 torching Japan at night.




I like the way you put that....very eloquent. B-29s did cause a lot of damage, and did a lot with regard to firebombing and of course the atomic bombs they dropped. however, capturing the bases needed for them required carriers and marines,further, without the B-29s, the allies would have had to delay bombing until they got within B-24 range (possibly after the capture of Okinawa). Dont know if the b-24 could carry an Atomic Bomb, but given that the lanc was thought possible to do so, i assume that as well. Given also that the US did not get their B-29s bombing effectively until 1945, there isnt a big loss of time due to the need for closer bases....and of course theres always the argument that simply cutting Home islands off might be enough to win....certainly enough to put the Japanese djini back in the bottle, fully contained and starving.


----------



## RCAFson (Apr 30, 2013)

If the USN had another 2 or 3 fleet carriers in mid to late 1942, the IJN carrier fleet would have been wiped by the end of 1942, and by early 1944 the USN/USMC/RN, equipped with massive numbers of FM-2s assaults Okinawa before the IJA can turn it into a fortress, cutting Japan off from her empire,, and effectively ends the war in the Pacific.

Hypothetically speaking, of course.


----------



## parsifal (Apr 30, 2013)

finally someone who might agree with me...


----------



## fastmongrel (Apr 30, 2013)

parsifal said:


> finally someone who might agree with me...



I dont agree with you but its certainly an interesting proposal. I do agree with you that there was more stretch in the Wildcat.


----------



## RCAFson (Apr 30, 2013)

parsifal said:


> finally someone who might agree with me...



I'm not sure that I agree that cutting the Hellcat program could result in more carriers, sooner, but I think that it is fair to say that more carriers sooner would require more fighters sooner and that the F4F/FM2 had to be at least 50% cheaper and faster to build than the F6F. So no Hellcat program = many more FM-2 fighters, sooner, than in the OTL


----------



## Shortround6 (Apr 30, 2013)

Well, depending on your enemy to be dumb enough not to improve their own aircraft significantly in 3-4 years is a pretty risky strategy. 

The bulk of the better Japanese types show up in small numbers, late in the war and flown by poor pilots. 

If the Japanese had fielded a sort of big wing Ki-44 (something half way between the Ki-43 and the Ki-84) as a REPLACEMENT for the Ki-43 _in_ 1943 and had fielded a truly improved Zero (Kinsei engine) at about the same time, depending on the F4F certainly would have been a battle of attrition.

With the majority of aircraft losses often being operational in nature ( engine failure,running out of gas, bad landings, etc) one can look at combat losses two ways. One- it doesn't make much difference in actually capability since so few actual engage in combat. or two- you better concentrate on quality since so few of the planes built will actually engine the enemy, and if you try to overwhelm the enemy with numbers of poorer performing planes (needing 900 for combat instead of 600) then there are going to be another several hundred lost (along with some pilots) due to operational causes.


----------



## RCAFson (Apr 30, 2013)

Jabberwocky said:


> The closest direct contemporaries are the Spitfire Mk VIII and the F6F-3.
> 
> Spitfire VIII first entered service in Nov 1942, but didn't get into actual combat until June 1943
> The F6F-3 first entered service in April 1943, but didn't get into combat until the end of August 1943.
> ...



The Spitfire VIII has a very similar range to the Hellcat with full internal fuel, 740sm at 220mph versus 762sm at 244mph:

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spit8adsaussie.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f6f/f6f-3-ads.jpg

and range with DTs wasn't much different either.


----------



## DonL (Apr 30, 2013)

Very good post Shortround6!

To my opinion the aircraft and tactic doctrine of the Japanese were obsolete the whole WWII, especially at 1942-44. 
The major concentration on turnfight aircrafts and tacticts were a heavy mistake. The Ki-44 and Ki 61 were the right direction but much too late and with too less performance.
As I have written before in this forum, Japanese a/c's (especially the Zero) would be outdated with it's introduction at the ETO.
Nonetheless the F6F was necessary and the right decision to get back the technology and tactical advantage, but the performance and killratio of the F6F must be looked at this heavy mistake of the Japanese.
To my opinion every firstrated fighter at the ETO (Spitfire V, especially IX, Bf 109F-4, G2-14 and Fw 190 A3-8 or D-09)would had managed the same killratio against the Japanese a/c's as the F6F, witn the difference that the F6F was carrier based.

To the carrier building issue, I have serious doubts.
To my books the Essex was built in 18 month and was delivered 15 month *before* the deadline through the three shift work. I can't see how anybody or anyone could accelerate the building of this ship class. Also any new ship and weapon system needs at least 6 month training.
So I don't see were are the time for Essex carrier was before middle of 1943.
Also I could claim the LW should built FW 187 (DB powered) since 1939 like hotcakes and the LW will win BoB, the same speculative claim and to my opinion as parsifals Essex claim without substained.


----------



## redcoat (Apr 30, 2013)

parsifal said:


> the british were overly obseessed with defending the home territories for too long.


When the might of the German army is only 21 miles away the obsession is understandable.


----------



## parsifal (Apr 30, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> Well, depending on your enemy to be dumb enough not to improve their own aircraft significantly in 3-4 years is a pretty risky strategy.
> 
> The bulk of the better Japanese types show up in small numbers, late in the war and flown by poor pilots.
> 
> ...



There is a risk of being overtaken such that the existing crop of fighters would no longer be effective. But that wasnt going to happen with Ki44s, Ki61s, or even Ki84s, for very different reasons.

Firstly, the fixation on aircraft technology at the expense of any other issue is falling into the same trap as I alluded to at the beginning of this discussion. Fighter technology is important, but numbers are far more important. provided (and thats a big proviso) your aircraft remain competitive (ne not necessarily superior) thats good enough, provided you have your other ducks lined up. 

The main killer of Japanese aircraft in 1943 was not fighter aircraft. The allied aircraft did do some good work, but the biggest threat to the Japanese was the relentless pounding undertaken by the bomber forces, particlualrly the b-24s that by now were entering the TO in considerable numbers. P-40s were the main operational types of the RAAF (which was still fielding nearly 50% of the air forces at this time) and a mix of P-40s, Wildcats, with a few Corsairs and P-38s in the US inventory. With the exception of the Corsairs and the P-38s, none of these fighters were as good as the opposition they faced, yet the allies were still able to win and not just by numbers alone. 


This is a pretty good online reference that I would recommend

http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/ajrp/ajrp2.nsf/WebI/Chapters/$file/Chapter3.pdf?OpenElement

(edit: i dont think the link worked...the reference is


Japanese air operations
in New Guinea
Shindo Hiroyuki
Chapter 3

its available online)

You will see from this that in 1943 there was no possibility of a "big wing" being formed in the main TO. 6AD, for example, with responsibilities for the whole of eastern PNG had a single Sentai at its disposal (about 30 fighters). by July, the Japanese had 24 and 25 air flotillas at Rabaul and 4AD. Each of these formations, based on new Britain, were supposed to have had about 100-130 aircraft each, with a total of about 130 fighters, however in November when halsey hit Rabaul with a combined Carrier and land based series of strikes, ther were no more than 200 aircraft at the base. However, even this figure is misleading. as noted in Kanes History of the USMC operations, a note by the senior staff officer of the 25th flotilla gives a real clue as to why the japanese could no longer put up effective resistance (and why investing in the very latest fighter techs was a waste of time)....

" In the beginning of the war, during 1942, if 100% of the planes were available for an attack one day, the next day 80% would be available, on the third day 50%. In 1943, at any one time, only 50% of the planes were ever available, and on the next day following an all-out operation only 30% would be available. By the end of 1943, only 40% at any one time would be serviceable. In 1942, the low availability was due to lack of supply; from 1943 on, it was due to lack of skill on the part of maintenance personnel and faulty manufacturing methods. Inspection of the aircraft and spare parts, prior to their delivery to Rabaul, was inadequate, and there were many poorly constructed and weak parts discovered. The Japanese tried to increase production so fast that proper examination was impossible

Japanese naval aviation had begun the war with 2,120 aircraft of all types, including trainers. In April 1943, after 16 months of heavy fighting, the total strength stood at 2,980, which meant that the manufacturers had been able to do little more than keep pace with combat and operational losses. In the succeeding year, the production rate nearly doubled, but losses soared also; there were 6,598 planes on hand in April 1944, but the standard of construction had deteriorated badly. 

Even more serious than the sag in the quality of naval aircraft maintenance and production was the steady attrition of experienced flight personnel. The pilots who began the war averaged 800 hours of flying time, and many of them had combat experience in China. Relatively few of these men survived until the end of 1943; a great many died at Coral Sea and Midway and in air battles over Guadalcanal. Others crashed trying to stretch the limited range of Vals and Kates to cover the long stretch between Rabaul and Guadalcanal. The replacements, pilots and aircrews alike, could not hope to match the worth of the men whose places they too". 

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/II/USMC-II-V-1.html

Peeling off production or resources to build Ki44s, or any other type would have also resulted in the collapse of the Japanese air defences. They were literally living a hand to mouth existence by April 1943. 


In the SWpac after Guadacanal what was missing from both sides were carriers. But this hurt the Allies far more than it did the japanese. Guadacanal had sapped the carrier strengths of both sides, and both sides (with one or two exceptions) were not in a good position to use their carriers offensively. If the Allies had had two or three additional carriers, Hellcat armed or F4F armed, they would have been able to win the war. But they didnt. In order to have additional carriers in late 1942, the US would have needed to build more carriers inn 1940. Money would have been needed for that. one source might have been to forego, or postpone the hellcat program. There may have been other possibilities, but it was the shortage of carriers at the end of 1942 that made possible continued Japanese resistance and a prolonging of the outcome for another 2 years. 

F4Fs, and P-40s proved capable of handling anything the japanese could field right up to the end. They were not superior, in fact towards the end they were decidedly inferior, but the japanese had so many other problems of their own that these disadvantages in the air counted for little. Thats what having the initiative and using it does....it puts your enemy on the rack and ought not be under-estimated. What killed the Japanese were the deep carrier strikes, the unrelenting pounding they received from long range bombing, the attrition on their fleet (particularly their destroyers) and the increasingly merciless submarine campaign. These factors combined to destroy any chance the Japanese may have had, and completely nullified any advantage their fighters may have enjoyed. Fighters in fact were necessary, but not necessary to win the war. Thres a difference. There are no instances of f4Fs or P-40s being completely overwhelmed by the Japanese fighters, and no instances of the japanese being able to thwart the progress of air operations, even in places like darwin.


----------



## Aozora (Apr 30, 2013)

parsifal said:


> It wasnt lack of dockyard space that limited the military build up in the USN, it was money. The 1940 war program (as modified by the war emergency additions) called for the construction of 6 Iowas, 5 Montanas, 26 Essex, 6 Midway, over 60 CLs, 24 Baltimores, , 4 Des Moines, 4 Worcesters and 6 Alaskas. There were about 1000 DDs and DEs from memory. Of these hulls, more than 70% were started in some form or another. many were cancelled half constructed. For the Essex class, more than half were not laid down until 1943+, the very time when maximum demands were being made on US shipyards. The US had to delay the construction of approved designs, designs that proved to be absolute war winners, because there was insufficient money in 1940 to build them. Money being siphoned off to companies like grumman to design, build and set up production of aircraft like the Hellcat. nice to have, but hardly essential war materiel.
> 
> Scrap the F6F program, make do with the F4F, build carriers like hotcakes from 1940, and you will defeat the Japanese far earlier than historical.


 
Once again I ask for any direct evidence that the F6F program actually cost the USN 5 carriers, nor have you supplied any evidence that making do with an improved F4F and building it in larger numbers would have been a war-winning strategy and that it would have defeated the Japaneses far earlier. 

How do you propose that the USN suddenly start churning out carriers like hotcakes in 1940, and what other programs would be sacrificed? For example, scrap the TBF and churn out "improved" TBDs? 

I reiterate, extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.


----------



## RCAFson (Apr 30, 2013)

Aozora said:


> Once again I ask for any direct evidence that the F6F program actually cost the USN 5 carriers, nor have you supplied any evidence that making do with an improved F4F and building it in larger numbers would have been a war-winning strategy and that it would have defeated the Japaneses far earlier.
> 
> How do you propose that the USN suddenly start churning out carriers like hotcakes in 1940, and what other programs would be sacrificed? For example, scrap the TBF and churn out "improved" TBDs?
> 
> I reiterate, extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.



Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think Parsifal was speaking hypothetically ("might have") about the comparative cost of the F6F and Essex class programs, and was not drawing a concrete conclusion or comparison. Certainly cancelling one or more Iowa class BBs would have permitted more resources to have been allocated to carrier production, but even 2 more Yorktown or Wasp class CVs would have made a huge difference (as would fewer RN CV losses prior to Dec 1941).


----------



## Milosh (Apr 30, 2013)

Which carriers could have been available earlier if the Wildcat had been improved?

ID Name Commission 
CV -1 Langley (AV-3) 
CV -2 Lexington 14Dec27
CV -3 Saratoga 16Nov27
CV -4 Ranger 4Jun34
CV -5 Yorktown 30Sep37
CV -6 Enterprise 12May38
CV -7 Wasp 25Apr40
CV -8 Hornet 20Oct41
CV -9 Essex 31Dec42
CV-10 Yorktown II 15Apr43
CV-11 Intrepid 16Aug43 
CV-12 Hornet II 29Nov43 
CV-13 Franklin 31Jan44 
CV-14 Ticonderoga 8May44 
CV-15 Randolph 9Oct44
CV-16 Lexington II 17Feb43
CV-17 Bunker Hill 24May43 
CV-18 Wasp II 24Nov43 
CV-19 Hancock 15Apr44 
CV-20 Bennington 6Aug44 
CVL-22 Independence 14Jan43
CVL-23 Princeton 25Feb43 
CVL-24 Belleau Wood 31Mar43 
CVL-25 Cowpens 28May43
CVL-26 Monterey 17Jun43 
CVL-27 Langley II 31Aug43 
CVL-28 Cabot 24July43
CVL-29 Bataan 17Nov43
CVL-30 San Jacinto 15Dec43
CV -31 Bonhomme Richard 26Nov44
CV -38 Shangri-La 15Sep44 
CV "Robin" May43 to Jul43 loan of HMS Victorious


----------



## RCAFson (Apr 30, 2013)

Milosh said:


> Which carriers could have been available earlier if the Wildcat had been improved?



More and better F4F/Martlets sooner _"might" _mean fewer RN CVs are damaged, allowing the RN to loan one or more carriers to the USN sooner than in the OTL. How much did the F6F program cost and would the money saved have allowed for repeat Wasp or Yorktown class CVs? That's the question to be asked, IMHO.


----------



## parsifal (Apr 30, 2013)

> Once again I ask for any direct evidence that the F6F program actually cost the USN 5 carriers,




Check back on the post where I made that statement. I prefaced that by saying, and have said it several times now, that I have no idea of the actual savings that could be made by not proceeding with the Hellcat development and production program. all ive said is that I thought it would be substantial, and suggested it might be as much as the equivalent of 5 carriers. Im not claiming it, just suggesting that it might be that much. 

It cost coca Cola about $6million USD in the '60s to develop the aluminium ring pull can for soft drinks. care to estimate what it might cost to develop an aircraft with exactly 28 cranks to work the undercarriage might cost. 




> nor have you supplied any evidence that making do with an improved F4F and building it in larger numbers would have been a war-winning strategy and that it would have defeated the Japaneses far earlier.



The Japanese fought the f4f and its derivatives for the entire war. there is no evidence that the F4F was inneffective or outclassed by the japanese at any stage. There is no evidence to provide as far as winning the war earlier, because it never happened. how can i provide you with evidence of something that was never done?: What I can show you is that initiative and momentum in military operations counts for a lot. beyond that, you are on your own.. 




> How do you propose that the USN suddenly start churning out carriers like hotcakes in 1940, and what other programs would be sacrificed? For example, scrap the TBF and churn out "improved" TBDs



There is a difference between scrapping the Hellcat and scapping the TBF programs. TBDs were clearly obsolete in 1940, F4fs were not. That should have been apparent in 1940, if proper systems analysis had been undertaken and proper intell reports listened to. I have already indicated that there is a severe danger in not proceeding with the f6f, but history does show that the F4F was an adequate fighter until the end of the war....the TBD was not (an effective torpedo bomber). 




> I reiterate, extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.




My claims are this. There is no evidence of the P-40 or the F4F being at serious disadvantage in the air war. There is no evidence that fighter combats were the main reason for Japanese defeat. Japan was defeated in the air, and comprehensively, because of a whole range of factors. Fighter performance counts for little in terms of overall losses, provided your fighters remain competitive. Having the best on the street is nice to have, but not cruciaal. In the pacific carriers were the critical determinant of who would win. In early 1943 the Allies had just about run out of carriers, and this slowed the pace of offensive operations and gave the Japanese a breather that then allowed them to string the war out for several years. Give the allies several more carriers at that critical moment in the war, and they would shorten the war. It would not matter if the carriers had Wildcats or Hellcats embarked, because at that moment the japanese had next to no fighters to resist them, and those that they did have did not make the F4F at all obsolete. the F4F continued to be effective at least until 1945. Not outstanding, but good enough. Later when they (the Japanese) did have more fighters, they were lacking in other areas, such as logistics and replacements (pilots and machines) and their pilots were of poor quality. In that scenario, the quality of the fighters is of minimal importance. Kepping the pressure up is of major importance. The question is...did the American screw the pooch by not building more carriers....did they make this choice so that they could have an unneccessary fighter? I think they did.


----------



## VBF-13 (Apr 30, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> The bulk of the better Japanese types show up in small numbers, late in the war and flown by poor pilots.


I hate to tell you, Short, but that's way overrated. If you know anything about U.S. Naval aviation training from January 1943 onwards, and you accept Parsifal's Japanese training hours in his Post #145, you'll see that, in a heartbeat. The Japanese aviators were well ahead of us in training hours in their combat aircraft of choice or assignment until around the middle of 1944. By the time the Kamikazes emerged, they had roughly half the hours we had, but still, were sufficiently endowed. Give the SBD and the F6F aviators around 90 training hours in those combat aircraft, and the TBF/TBMs a little more, while the F4F/FMs a little less. I'm not vouching for Parsifal's Japanese numbers. Accepting them, though, that's how it was.


----------



## Aozora (May 1, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Check back on the post where I made that statement. I prefaced that by saying, and have said it several times now, that I have no idea of the actual savings that could be made by not proceeding with the Hellcat development and production program. all ive said is that I thought it would be substantial, and suggested it might be as much as the equivalent of 5 carriers. Im not claiming it, just suggesting that it might be that much.
> 
> It cost coca Cola about $6million USD in the '60s to develop the aluminium ring pull can for soft drinks. care to estimate what it might cost to develop an aircraft with exactly 28 cranks to work the undercarriage might cost.
> 
> ...



My claim is this;

Your formula, more carriers, more F4Fs, does not guarantee that the Pacific War would end a year earlier, or that the Island Hopping campaigns would have met with success. That's only your unsupported belief. 

As you have also admitted you have no idea whether dropping the F6F program would have allowed funding for more carriers, so I don't know why you bothered to bring that red herring up because it is a meaningless "argument". I could argue, with more evidence, that the money the Navy would have wasted on more carriers and F4Fs would have been better spent on developing effective submarine and aircraft torpedoes, and building more submarines, as well as developing a far more effective strategic and tactical use of submarines. THAT would have beaten the Japanese even more quickly, because the submarine campaign truly did have the potential to give the US all the initiative and momentum it needed..


----------



## DonL (May 1, 2013)

Aozora said:


> My claim is this;
> 
> Your formula, more carriers, more F4Fs, does not guarantee that the Pacific War would end a year earlier, or that the Island Hopping campaigns would have met with success. That's only your unsupported belief.
> 
> As you have also admitted you have no idea whether dropping the F6F program would have allowed funding for more carriers, so I don't know why you bothered to bring that red herring up because it is a meaningless "argument". I could argue, with more evidence, that the money the Navy would have wasted on more carriers and F4Fs would have been better spent on developing effective submarine and aircraft torpedoes, and building more submarines, as well as developing a far more effective strategic and tactical use of submarines. THAT would have beaten the Japanese even more quickly, because the submarine campaign truly did have the potential to give the US all the initiative and momentum it needed..



My claim is, where are the manpower and recources to built this carriers faster?
Parsifal is very busy to claim almost unachievable claims for the Allied, but deny obvious what ifs for the axis, to me this are claims from a quacksalver.


----------



## parsifal (May 1, 2013)

> Your formula, more carriers, more F4Fs, does not guarantee that the Pacific War would end a year earlier, or that the Island Hopping campaigns would have met with success. That's only your unsupported belief.



Giving a precise number is probably not such a good idea. But ther is plenty of evidence to support the other parts of the issue. 

F4Fs proved themselves throughout 1943 of maintinaing control of the situation and providng quite effective fleet defences. There should be nothing controversial about that. They, along with P-40s and a smattering of more modern types were quite capable of keeping the Japanese on a conatanst state of crisis throughour that long year year, as evidenced by the reports given by the Japanese themselves. 

And ther should also be little argument that carriers were the key to the successful allied offensive. Just about every credible account on the Pacific war agrees with that.

So, putting the two elements together should not be hard. Here we have an adequate fighter and a critical element for victory. We also know that the Japanese in 1943 were in an absolute parlous state as far as maintaining a credible air presence. Their fighters had been reduced to unimportance by means other than the Hellcat by that stage, there is no evidence, whatsoever to suggest that things might turn around after 1943. That, by any standard you want to apply means the F6F was superfluous to final victory. nice to have, effective, the best of the best. I have no problem with using those descriptions of the hellcat. But not esential to winning the war. Not even esential to keeping own losses down as the operations in 1943 clearly show. 




> As you have also admitted you have no idea whether dropping the F6F program would have allowed funding for more carriers, so I don't know why you bothered to bring that red herring up because it is a meaningless "argument".




The thread is about F6F versus Spitfire. Which was more valuable? Determining value does not mean looking at basic figures. It means looking at the critical impoprtance of a given weapon system to the final outcome. Air victories are meaningless unless they contribute in some way to the final victory. The Hellcat certainly contributed to the US victory, but the pertinent question is did it make that much difference? Obviously we have to use some Obfuscation and speculation as well as some extrapolation here, which you guys, as the defenders of the right and pure are bound to exploit to serve your purposes. But in my opinion, there is no evidence that the Allies were wanting pre-Hellcat, pleanty of evidence they were coping just fine without it, and plenty more evidence they needed carriers to finish the japanese off after the bruising guadacanal and Kokoda campaigns. 




> I could argue, with more evidence, that the money the Navy would have wasted on more carriers and F4Fs would have been better spent on developing effective submarine and aircraft torpedoes, and building more submarines, as well as developing a far more effective strategic and tactical use of submarines. THAT would have beaten the Japanese even more quickly, because the submarine campaign truly did have the potential to give the US all the initiative and momentum it needed


..


I would nbever say impossible, but if you think about it, even though achievable at a far lower cost, was really extrapolating to the point of hyperbole. Getting the US submarines and torpedoes to work is not about force availability, so much as developing the weapon systems commanders and command systems to work properly. and that is on a fixed timeline. You cannot prodeuce effective commanders or command systems are defective until subjected to actual combat experience. and that could not happen in 1940...it had to wait until 1942, and then folow a fixed timeline to get to the point of efficiency. 

I will try and see if there are any generic R&D costs associated with the F6F program. I do have some figures on the LW R&D program for the wqar and how much was spent on specific items. Its quite a lot of money, even for relatively small technology advances


----------



## parsifal (May 1, 2013)

DonL said:


> My claim is, where are the manpower and recources to built this carriers faster?
> Parsifal is very busy to claim almost unachievable claims for the Allied, but deny obvious what ifs for the axis, to me this are claims from a quacksalver.



The US in 1940 had nasically the same shipbuilding potential that it had in 1942. There was plenty of unused capacity in 1940, but fiscal restrictions limited the size of the build. 

From one Quacksalver to another I guess


----------



## GregP (May 1, 2013)

What is a Quacksalver? 

Sounds like something I once ate in an Eastern European restaurant ... but probably isn't.


----------



## parsifal (May 1, 2013)

well, to begin, the cost of the Essex Class is given in this article

Evolution of the ESSEX-CLASS FLEET CARRIERS

It says the cost per unit was $70-$78 million per copy, but I dont know if this figureha been adjusted or is contemporary. Im going to assume its a contemporary figure.


----------



## DonL (May 1, 2013)

parsifal said:


> The US in 1940 had nasically the same shipbuilding potential that it had in 1942. There was plenty of unused capacity in 1940, but fiscal restrictions limited the size of the build.
> 
> From one Quacksalver to another I guess



How do you want to get a three shift work from a nation and workmen, that are not at war?
That the Essex carrier could be built during 15 to 20 month was only possible through this three shift work. Essex was 15 month earlier ready then the deadline, how do you want to get this in peacetime? With which explanation?
Perhaps the neutrality and the spirit of neutrality of USA was more singlesided and not so much neutral, if you claim such a workbuilding at peacetime (1940)?!


----------



## wuzak (May 1, 2013)

parsifal said:


> The thread is about F6F versus Spitfire. Which was more valuable?



Actually, it was Spitfire vs F6f - *which would you rather have as a pure fighter*.


----------



## parsifal (May 1, 2013)

Done some preliminary investigation into the naval appropriations and ship construction costs. These are more online notes than anythng cohernet just yet, but i thought it worthwhile to post just the same....

Janes (1944) has the following entries regarding ship costs and naval appropriations

Naval appropriations

1943: $27.5 Billion
1944: $28.5 billion
1945: $24.1 Billion

Selected ship costs

Iowas BB $100,000,000
Midway Class: $74,000,000
Essex Class:: $68.9million
Enterprise (completed May 1938) $25.8 million
Alaska Class: $74 million 
Baltimore CA: $39.3 Million 
Cleveland CL: $31 million 
Atlanta Claa: $23.2 million
Brooklyn CL (1938) $19.4 million
Fletcher DD: $11.4 million
Gato SS: $6.3 Million

: 
April 20 1940 - Fairfax Newspapers (Aus reports the following)

U.S. NAVY PLANS.
Huge Appropriation.
BUILDING ACCELERATED.
I WASHINGTON, April 19. (A.A.P.)
The Senate approved the expenditure of $963,797,000 (£A301,I86,875), of the total provided when it passed the Navy Appropriation Bill. This sum is more than 2,000,000 dollars (£A625,000) below the figure approved by the House oi Representatives.
The Acting Navy Secretary, Mr Compton, reported that two battleships would be completed four months ahead of schedule, that submarine construction had been hastened by from two to six months, and destroyer construction from 1 to 7 months.
In February last the House of Representatives passed the bill, which involved the expenditure of $906,000,000 (£A301.875.000) A proposal to spend $1,000,000 dollars (£312,500) on improving the harbour at the Island of Guam in the Western Pacific, was eliminated.]

Conways

The proposed FY41 (June 1940 to June 1941) funded only 2 BBs (Bb63 and 64), a single carrier of new design (CV9), 2 Cruisers (CL57 and 58) 7 DDs and 7 submarines despite much larger authorised expansion. USN acquisitions went through a two stage process, basically authorisation to increase the fleet size (which flip flopped from ship numbers, to tonnages and then back again). However in April/May 1941 this program was expanded on orders from the president to a greatly expanded effort, and fully funded, which was the critical constraint at that time. This greatly expanded effort was not part of the above-mentioned procurement program.

On the basis of the above, the US spent about $460 million of its $963.7 Million exapansion program on ships, of which, just $68 million was for a single carrier. Allowing for small ships, that might expand to $500 million,give or take. Potentially that means they were spending up to $400 million on new aircraft. I wonder how much of that was spent on R&D, and how much of that $400million was spent on the F4U and F6F programs?


It should be noted that the fiscal appropriations are differnt to the strength authorisations that were enacted under the Vinson Bill of 14 June 1940. In that Act, for FY42 (beginning June 19410 a further expansion of the Fleet was authorised, but this was brought forward, and expanded by order of the president in April 1941.

I will post the summary of the Vinson Act, which carried the US to a wartime footing in the next post


----------



## parsifal (May 1, 2013)

The Vinson Act of June 14 1940

"To establish the composition of the United States Navy, to authorize the construction of certain naval vessels, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the authorized composition of the United States Navy in under-age vessels as established by the Act of May 17, 1938 (52 Stat. 401), is hereby further increased by one hundred and sixty-seven thousand tons, as follows :
(a) Aircraft carriers, seventy-nine thousand five hundred tons, making a total authorized under-age tonnage of two hundred and fifty-four thousand five hundred tons.
(b) Cruisers, sixty-six thousand five hundred tons, making a total authorized under-age tonnage of four hundred and seventy-nine thousand and twenty-four tons.
(c) Submarines, twenty-one thousand tons, making a total authorized under-age tonnage of one hundred and two thousand nine hundred and fifty-six tons : Provided, That the foregoing total tonnage for aircraft carriers, cruisers, and submarines may be varied by thirty-three thousand four hundred tons in the aggregate so long as the sum of the total tonnages of these classes as authorized herein is not exceeded: Provided further, That the terms used in this or any other Act to describe vessels of designated classes shall not be understood as limited or controlled by definitions contained in any treaty which is not now in force.
Sec. 2. The President of the United States is hereby authorized to construct such vessels, including replacements authorized by the Act of March 27, 1934 (48 Stat. 503), as may be necessary to provide the total under-age composition authorized in section 1 of this Act.
Sec. 3. The President of the United States is hereby authorized to acquire or construct naval airplanes, and lighter-than-air craft, and spare parts and equipment, as may be necessary to provide and maintain the number of useful naval airplanes at a total of not more than four thousand five hundred, including five hundred airplanes for the Naval Reserve; and the number of useful nonrigid lighter-than-air craft at a total of not more than eighteen.
Sec. 4. The President of the United States is hereby further authorized to acquire and convert or to undertake the construction of seventy-five thousand tons of auxiliary vessels of such size, type, and design as he may consider best suited for the purposes of national defense.
Sec. 5. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury of the United States not otherwise appropriated, such sums as may be necessary to effectuate the purposes of this Act, including not to exceed $35,000,000 for shipbuilding ways, shipbuilding docks, and essential equipment and facilities at naval establishments for building or equipping any ship, herein or heretofore authorized, and, in addition, not to exceed $6,000,000 for essential equipment and facilities at either private or naval establishments for the production of armor or armament: Provided, That equipment and facilities procured for the production of armor or armament pursuant to the authority contained herein may be leased, sold, or otherwise disposed of, in the discretion of the Secretary of the Navy, when no longer required for use under naval contract.
Sec. 6. The allocation and contracts for construction of the vessels herein authorized as well as the procurement and construction of airplanes and spare parts, shall be in accordance with the terms and conditions provided by the Act of March 27, 1934 (48 Stat. 503), as amended.
Sec. 7. Vessels of the following categories shall hereafter be deemed under age until the number of years indicated have elapsed since completion : Battleships, twenty-six years ; aircraft carriers and cruisers, twenty years; other combatant surface craft, sixteen years; submarines, thirteen years.
Sec. 8. The construction, alteration, furnishing, or equipping of any naval vessel authorized by this Act, or the construction, alteration, furnishing, or equipping of any naval vessels with funds from any appropriation available for such purposes, contracts for which are made after June 30, 1940, shall be in accordance with the provisions of Public Law Numbered 846, Seventy-fourth Congress, approved June 30, 1936, unless such course, in the judgment of the President of the United States, should not be in the interest of national defense.
Sec. 9. For the purpose of modernizing the United States ships New York, Texas, and Arkansas, alterations and repairs to such vessels are hereby authorized at a total cost not to exceed the sum of $6,000,000. This sum shall be in addition to the total appropriation expenditures for repairs and changes to each of these vessels as limited by the Act of July 18, 1935 (49 Stat. 482; U. S. C, title 5, sec. 468a).
Sec. 10. The provisions of section 4 of the Act approved April 25, 1939 (53 Stat. 590, 592), shall, during the period of any national emergency declared by the President to exist, be applicable to naval public works and naval public utilities projects in the Fourteenth Naval District for which appropriations are made or authorized : Provided, That the fixed fee to be paid the contractor as a result of any contract entered into under the authority contained herein, or any contract hereafter entered into under the authority contained in said Act of April 25, 1939, shall not exceed 6 per centum of the estimated cost of the contract, exclusive of the fee, as determined by the Secretary of the Navy.
Sec. 11. In the discretion of the President, there is hereby authorized and established a Naval Consulting Board of seven members to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among eminent civilians in the fields of industry, science, and research, to serve during the pleasure of the President. This Board is hereby authorized to make recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy in any matter concerning the Naval Establishment and the national defense. The members thereof shall serve without compensation, but shall be reimbursed for all expenses incurred incident to their travel and employment as members of the Board. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, not to exceed $25,000 to effectuate the purposes of this section.
Approved, June 14, 1940".


If the 79000 tons of authorized carriers had been brought forward to fiscal year FY41, the US would have received three carriers at roughly the same time as CV9. The commissioning date for Essex was December 1942, whilst the following ships were May 1943 and september 1943. These three ships in total would have cost $204 million dollars. If repeat yorktowns had been accepted, i estimate the cost of tese ships in 1941 dollars to be about $40-50 million a copy, or a total of $120-150 million dollars. The US could have had these ships and simply delayed the f6f program by a few months. They could have had three extra carriers by aboiut April 1943 and ensured the defeat of Japan at a critical moment. F6F arrivals might have been delayed by something like 4 or 5 months.

It was just a matter of re-ordering priorities, and i think it was a golden opportunity missed. The US should have built their carriers first and then their uber fighters if they really felt the urge to build them. They could have done without themn completely, but there was no knowing that in 1940.

The abovementioned is sometimes referred to as the "11% expansion program". It was soon overtaken by successive and massive expansions to the naval building program, most significantly the "70% expansion program" which was authorized August 1940 (but Im unsure when this part was actually funded)

The following is a pretty good list of the various expansions in the USN naval building programs

http://www.shipscribe.com/shiprefs/usnprog/fy3941.html

which makes a bit of a mockery of the claim that the US was somehow hardpressed in termsof dock space and or labour to absorb these expansions in their building programs. The facts are they did expand what they were building, and didnt incur significant delays due to cramped dockyards or shortages of labour. this was not Nazi Germany ("muddle heaven"). The US had been planning for and arranging its dockyards since at least 1933 for the ability to massively expand at short notice. The program worked very smoothly, but it could have been even better.


----------



## parsifal (May 1, 2013)

yes, I see. my apologies. The thread has developed as it hs. hopefully this discussion will run its course and will get back on track. I apologise for my part in this.


----------



## VBF-13 (May 1, 2013)

Aozora said:


> Once again I ask for any direct evidence that the F6F program actually cost the USN 5 carriers, nor have you supplied any evidence that making do with an improved F4F and building it in larger numbers would have been a war-winning strategy and that it would have defeated the Japaneses far earlier.
> 
> How do you propose that the USN suddenly start churning out carriers like hotcakes in 1940, and what other programs would be sacrificed? For example, scrap the TBF and churn out "improved" TBDs?
> 
> I reiterate, extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.





Aozora said:


> My claim is this;
> 
> Your formula, more carriers, more F4Fs, does not guarantee that the Pacific War would end a year earlier, or that the Island Hopping campaigns would have met with success. That's only your unsupported belief.
> 
> As you have also admitted you have no idea whether dropping the F6F program would have allowed funding for more carriers, so I don't know why you bothered to bring that red herring up because it is a meaningless "argument". I could argue, with more evidence, that the money the Navy would have wasted on more carriers and F4Fs would have been better spent on developing effective submarine and aircraft torpedoes, and building more submarines, as well as developing a far more effective strategic and tactical use of submarines. THAT would have beaten the Japanese even more quickly, because the submarine campaign truly did have the potential to give the US all the initiative and momentum it needed..


Aozora, you're on this carriers-issue, and I'm not going to purport, here, to throw you off track on it. On this next logical issue, though, provided that carriers-issue is licked, namely, this F4F issue, I'll offer this. This F4F, of course, as we're all well-aware, was a Grumman product, a Grumman aircraft. Chance-Vought, in other words, knew about the issues relative to these F4Fs. Leroy Grumman knew about those issues much more intimately than anybody, though, including, I'll even propose, the U.S. Navy Department. As such, I'll submit, when, as early as 1941, the F6F was in concept development, that said something, meaningful, relative to this F4F issue. Just off the top of my head, fitting an engine into those that could get that aircraft up higher and quicker, radically beefing-up the undercarriage to improve its stability and enable it to withstand harsher landings, grooving the wing-loading for better maneuverability and performance while dive bombing, as well as just fitting the hydraulics into there, were very big issues. In other words, sure, one can propose anything one wants, but it's not as though those issues weren't already considered and resolved. Grumman weighed those issues relative to its product well before the F4Fs even tangled with the A6Ms. Let's make up our minds on those issues but in the light of giving that manufacturer its due diligence on same, I'm saying.


----------



## CORSNING (May 1, 2013)

Hellcat/Spitfire. Well I guess it all boils down to if you are an Admiral or a General........Period!
There, that's all I got to say about that.

Goodnight Guys, Jeff


----------



## buffnut453 (May 1, 2013)

CORSNING said:


> Hellcat/Spitfire. Well I guess it all boils down to if you are an Admiral or a General........Period!



Admiral or an Air Marshal if you please!!!


----------



## Njaco (May 1, 2013)

wuzak said:


> Actually, it was Spitfire vs F6f - *which would you rather have as a pure fighter*.



You guys argue over the goofiest crap. Its Hellcat vs Spitfire - which would you take?


----------



## VBF-13 (May 1, 2013)

Njaco said:


> You guys argue over the goofiest crap. Its Hellcat vs Spitfire - which would you take?


Well whatever it was now it's Hellcat vs. Spitfire - wouldn't you rather have carriers and Wildcats?


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (May 1, 2013)

Personally I like: "Hellcat vs. Spitfire: We don't question peoples service."


----------



## parsifal (May 1, 2013)

If im going to have my service record questioned because ive taken a different view to the conventional wisdom, i reserve the right to react vigorously. not outside the forum rules...that means no biting back, but it does mean I have the opportunity to present my case, and stick it to em, albeit in a positive way. 

If Im not allowed to defend myself in at least that way 9ie constructively) then there is something very wrong in this place.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (May 2, 2013)

parsifal said:


> If im going to have my service record questioned because ive taken a different view to the conventional wisdom, i reserve the right to react vigorously. not outside the forum rules...that means no biting back, but it does mean I have the opportunity to present my case, and stick it to em, albeit in a positive way.
> 
> If Im not allowed to defend myself in at least that way 9ie constructively) then there is something very wrong in this place.



My comment was not directed at you. You did nothing wrong.


----------



## parsifal (May 2, 2013)

okay, sorry about that. surely you can at least appreciate my tetchiness, if not condoning it


----------



## Aozora (May 2, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> Well whatever it was now it's Hellcat vs. Spitfire - wouldn't you rather have carriers and Wildcats?



Bloody Wildcats! Pooh and wee in the gardens, yowling in the middle of the friggin' night right next to the window, spray their friggin' marker pee over the back door. Screw Wildcats and give me Spitfires any day!


----------



## VBF-13 (May 2, 2013)

parsifal said:


> If im going to have my service record questioned because ive taken a different view to the conventional wisdom, i reserve the right to react vigorously. not outside the forum rules...that means no biting back, but it does mean I have the opportunity to present my case, and stick it to em, albeit in a positive way.
> 
> If Im not allowed to defend myself in at least that way 9ie constructively) then there is something very wrong in this place.


To tell you the truth neither do I appreciate it too much when I make a flattering comment and I'm accused of insincerity by somebody who happens to think he's a human lie detector. But maybe that's just me.


----------



## VBF-13 (May 2, 2013)

Aozora said:


> Bloody Wildcats! Pooh and wee in the gardens, yowling in the middle of the friggin' night right next to the window, spray their friggin' marker pee over the back door. Screw Wildcats and give me Spitfires any day!


Faster than a speeding bullet. More powerful than a locomotive. Able to leap tall buildings in a single bound. Look! Up in the sky! It's a bird! It's a plane! It's...a Hellcat!

Enough said.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (May 2, 2013)

Ok guys, lets get this back on track. One last time, lets keep it civil...


----------



## parsifal (May 2, 2013)

The whole point of the position Ive taken is that essentially whilst the helcat was an excellent aircraft, was it a necessary aircraft. I dont think ive done enough to say or claim "case proven". in reality you can never do that with a hypothetical. That principal applies whether you are changing cigarette brands, or replacing your current fighters with a new, as yet unproven fighter (eg the JSF). You never really know what will happen until you try it. 

But what I think should be ovious is that the hellcat was not 'low hanging fruit". It came at a cost, i think a big one, one that added to the length of the war, because it had to, to a greater or lesser extent, rob the US of other weapons that it also needed at a critical juncture. Its a fair argument to point out that my perfect 2013 hindsight wasnt available in 1940. But that isnt the point either. Whilst I have gone off topic a little in assuming which of the two aircraft was the most valuable, rather than just the best straight up performer, I am merely pointing out that it wasnt all beer and skittles with the Hellcat. It had its downsides when it became a part of the US inventory. you could say the same thiing about the US iowas....they were expensive, and put a big hole in the US budget, but there you have it.

So, the hellcat came at a price, was it worth it. Thats a matter of opinion. i dont think it was

What about the Spitfire? well, thats a tough one for me because of my commonwealth and British biases. I cant be as hard on the Spit because of that. But I think I wouldhave to say that Spit had faults of its own. I think they were different though to the hellcats. I think the Spitfire was absolutely necessary to the allies through to 1942, in the same way as the Mustang was from 1944. The allies needed the Spitfire in the early stages to survive. in a defensive war, fighters assume greater importance for obvious reasons, and in reality there was nothing available that could quite do what the Spit was able to do. certainly not the hurricane.

But, did the Brits hang onto the Spit too long. Offensively it had severe limits, mostly because of its range. Should the british have ditched the Spit after 1942 and built (probably) US aircraft like the Mustang under licence? Would they have not been better served with hoards of British built Mustangs, rather than hords of British built Spits. Whereas the problem with the hellcat was when its carreer should begin, the problem with the Spitfire was when its career should end.


----------



## stug3 (May 2, 2013)

I think the FM-1 2 sort of fits parsifal's scenario as they were developed for the smaller escort (Jeep) carriers and were refined to accentuate the most practical qualities of the Wildcat. They also served til the end of the war.


----------



## wuzak (May 2, 2013)

parsifal said:


> But, did the Brits hang onto the Spit too long. Offensively it had severe limits, mostly because of its range. Should the british have ditched the Spit after 1942 and built (probably) US aircraft like the Mustang under licence? Would they have not been better served with hoards of British built Mustangs, rather than hords of British built Spits. Whereas the problem with the hellcat was when its carreer should begin, the problem with the Spitfire was when its career should end.



If the British wanted to use their Mustangs, which they did get from the US, in the same role as the USAAF did, then maybe it was a better choice to retool to make them.

But if they wanted to do that, why wouldn't they have put more effort into making long-range Spitfires?

The main difference between the Mustang and the Spitfire in terms of range was the amount of fuel they carried. Spits didn't carry much compared to the Mustang.

But as has been stated here before, the Spitfire VIII was tested in a configuration which would have enabled it to perform long range escorts, at least as far as Berlin. By both the UK and the US.

Some tweaks here and there would have reduced the Spitfire's drag, and extended its range. I think drgondog has shown in the past that one area that Spitfires suffered compared to Mustangs was in the angle of the windscreen. Another is the 20mm cannon barrels protruding - remove them and reduce the drag (though, would you rather have 2 x 20mm + 2 x 0.50"s/4 x 0.303"s? or 4 x 0.50"s?). These moves would also increase top speed - the cannon barrels were worth about 8-10mph. Re-engineer the radiator ducts with more optimal entry and exit sizes (IIRC Smith said the outlets were too big) and have fully adjustable radiator flaps (2 positions of the Spitfire IIRC).

A lot of these things were relatively minor changes. Certainly not as much of a change as required to bring the Mustang into production in the UK.

The ultimate would be, of course, to get the XIV with long enough range to escort to Berlin, or further. Or to bring forward Mk 21 production. If long range was a desired feature of British aircraft the new wing for the 21 surely would have featured far more tankage?


----------



## VBF-13 (May 2, 2013)

stug3 said:


> I think the FM-1 2 sort of fits parsifal's scenario as they were developed for the smaller escort (Jeep) carriers and were refined to accentuate the most practical qualities of the Wildcat. They also served til the end of the war.


The FMs couldn't "go upstairs," that issue was still there. They continued to see combat off the jeeps and in addition to that were in large part put to base-defensive and various utility uses.


----------



## parsifal (May 3, 2013)

@ wuzak

Bur isnt the LR spitfire you are thinking about a Mustang under another name. I did prefac my suggestion about building Mustangs as (probably)....if the same result can be done cheaper by "stretching the Spitfire, at a cheaper price....all the better. But it didnt happen......you raise a very good point...why didnt the Brits feel the need for extra range. I dont get that at all...


----------



## drgondog (May 3, 2013)

parsifal said:


> @ wuzak
> 
> Bur isnt the LR spitfire you are thinking about a Mustang under another name. I did prefac my suggestion about building Mustangs as (probably)....if the same result can be done cheaper by "stretching the Spitfire, at a cheaper price....all the better. But it didnt happen......you raise a very good point...why didnt the Brits feel the need for extra range. I dont get that at all...



The Brits DID wish to build Mustangs in GB. The primary stated issue was the detraction of critical resources from US production to duplicate and start production in UK... The high level talks progressed into early 1944. I suspect there were politics at play on both sides of the pond.


----------



## wuzak (May 3, 2013)

drgondog said:


> The Brits DID wish to build Mustangs in GB. The primary stated issue was the detraction of critical resources from US production to duplicate and start production in UK... The high level talks progressed into early 1944. I suspect there were politics at play on both sides of the pond.



There was some discussion earlier about the possibility of Mustang I kits being shipped over and assembled in the UK, with Rolls-Royce installing the Merlin in the airframe. But since North American were not far behind RR in testing a Merlin Mustang I think the decision was to allow NAA to re-engineer the Mustang where appropriate and build the production models.


----------



## OldSkeptic (May 3, 2013)

wuzak said:


> Inspired by the discussion in the other thread - given the choice, would you take the Hellcat or Spitfire as a pure fighter?
> 
> In the other thread it was suggested that the Hellcat's performance was similar to the Spitfire Mk V. Which of those would be your preference?
> 
> ...



When? In 1939, or 1940 or 1941 or 1942 or even most of 1943 I'd take the Spitfire .. because it existed then. 
The Hellcat wasn't even a dream in the designers eyes in the first few years of the war.

Late war, over Europe it would have been slaughtered. It could barely make 400mph.
Fine against also ran 300mph zero, against an (equivalent time) Fw-190d or late 109G .. a target. 
The sort of plane the Luftwaffe _expertane_ would have relegated to the juniors as a training exercise, while they carefully watched the skies for the Spits, Mustangs and Tempests.


----------



## parsifal (May 3, 2013)

That is just a wrong statement too. Hellcats only saw limited service in Europe, but there was extensive use of Wildcats, which even i admit is a significantly lower performing aircraft. There weree also considerable numbers of hurricanes up against bf 109fs FW190As and Bf109gs. Neither the Wildcat or the Hurricane (similar aircraft in terms of performance) were ever considered a target by the Germans. They undertook some pretty hazardous operations, and whilst losses were heavy (for the hurricae) were able to complete their respective missions with few mission defeats. 

This is the same argument in another guise. Fighters are important, and they can shoot down enemy aircraft. but they dont win air campaigns (with the singular exception of the Mustang, which makes it a very unique aircraft). There is no evidence in 1944, of the germans being able to do any decisive shoot downs from which they could then claim even air parity. 1944 was the year of defeat for the LW. They did most of the dying, not the other way around in that year. 

Hellcats rank pretty high in the performance rankings for the allies, there is no reason to say they would suffer unreasonable losses in Europe compared to other types.


----------



## DonL (May 3, 2013)

Sorry parsifal,

but at North Africa the LW could take air superiority with relative less effort with the JG 27 (till September 1941 only the half of the Squadron and only Bf109 E's).

The Bf 109 F-4 was clearly superior to the Hurricane II and the pilots didn't fear or had much respect neither to the Hurricane II nor to the P40.
From pilot statements, they had some kind of respect, but they found both types easy to fight with the Friedrich.
Also that only one Geschwader was able to take air superiority don't speak for the Hurricanes.

It was much much harder for the LW and the JG27 after the arriving of Spit's in numbers summer/autumn 1942 and the germans lost air superiority.

THe kill ratio of the Friedrich was 4:1 or better against both types (Hurricanes and P40).


----------



## parsifal (May 3, 2013)

For USN F6Fs, the only action over Europe transpired during the invasion of southern France in August 1944. USS Tulagi with VOF-1 (Lieut. Comdr. WF Bringle, USN) and USS Kasaan Bay embarking VF-74 (Lieut. Comdr. HB Bass, USN), both squadrons, operating F6F-5s, provided coverage for the landings. VF-74 also operated a 7-plane F6F-3N night fighter detachment from Ajaccio on the island of Corsica. On the day of the invasion, 15 August, VF-74 flew 60 sorties, VOF-1, 40 sorties, all ground support missions.

On the morning of 19 August, a four-plane division of VOF-1 pilots spotted the first German aircraft, three He-111s. The Americans were too short on fuel and could not attack. Two of the Americans were forced to land on HMS Emperor due to their fuel state. Later that day, two He-111's were spotted by another VOF-1 division and were promptly shot down, this occurring near the village of Vienne. Lieut. Poucel and Ens. Wood teamed up to bring down one and Ens. Robinson brought down the second. Soon thereafter, in the same vicinity, Ens. Wood shot down a third He-111 that had made the mistake of appearing on the scene. That same morning, a four-plane division of VF-74 pilots led by Lieut. Comdr. Bass brought down an Ju-88, sharing the kill, and in the afternoon another division attacked a Do-217 with split credits to going to Lieut. (j.g.) Castanedo and Ens. Hilliard.

On 21 August, pilots from VOF-1 shot down three Ju-52 transports north of Marseille. Two were credited to Lieut. (j.g.) Olszewski; one went to Ens. Yenter. Operating for two weeks in support of the invasion, these two squadrons were credited with destroying 825 trucks and vehicles, damaging 334 more and destroying or otherwise immobilizing 84 locomotives. German aircraft shot down were: VOF-1: 6, VF-74: 2. 

Although the two navy squadrons lost some 17 aircraft, combined, all were to ground fire or operational accidents. This in itself says volumes as to why fighters in themselves are generally not the main cause of losses, but thats another story. There were none shot down by German aircraft. Among the 7 pilots lost (2 from VOF-1 and 5 from VF-74) was the CO of VF-74, Lieut. Comdr. H. Brinkley Bass, USNA 1938, twice awarded the Navy Cross in early actions including Operation Torch, killed by antiaircraft fire while strafing near Chamelet on 20 August. 

There were no US, USN or otherwise, F4Us in action in the European Theater.

The Fleet Air Arm employed the F6F and also the F4U. The only fighter-to-fighter FAA F6F action took place in May 1944. On 8 May, F6F's from the Fleet Air Arm's No. 800 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. SJ Hall, DSC, RN), off HMS Emperor, while escorting a flight of Barracudas was attacked by a mixed group of about 30 Me-109's and FW-190's. Two F6F's were lost, one, probably, to anti-aircraft fire (one source indicates that both F6Fs were lost in a mid-air collision, not to any German fire of any kind); the Germans reportedly lost 2 Me-109's and one FW-190. The FW-190 was claimed by Sub-Lieut. Ritchie. 

On 14 May, 800 Squadron's leading scorer, Sub-Lieut. Ritchie (now with 4.5 victories) added an He-115 to his tally and the shared another He-115 with the CO of 804 Squadron, Lieut. Comdr. Orr, giving him a total of 6 victories for the war. 

Prior to these actions, FAA F6F's were used for anti-aircraft suppression on raids against Tirpitz on 3 April 44 (Operation Tungsten). These included - from Emperor - 800 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. Hall) and 804 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. SG Orr, DSC, RNVR).

FAA F4U's also participated in Operation Tungsten with 1834 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. PN Charlton, DFC, RN) and 1836 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. CC Tomkinson, RNVR) off Victorious, flying high cover for the raid. This was a role the FAA Corsairs of 1841 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. RL Bigg-Wither, DCS bar, RN) would repeat, flying off Formidable in Operation Mascot on 17 July and with 1841 joined by 1842 Squadron (Lieut. Comdr. AMcD Garland, RN) in Operation Goodwood in late August. No contact was made with any German aircraft. Indeed, the FAA F4U's never did tangle with any German aircraft, though not for lack of trying.


----------



## parsifal (May 3, 2013)

Greetings fellow quacksalver....you are back,



> but at North Africa the LW could take air superiority with relative less effort with the JG 27 (till September 1940 only the half of the Squadron and only Bf109 E's).




I assume you mean September 1941

Over malta, it was pretty dire, however LW claims just dont reconcile to the numbers of Hurricanes actually delivered. The LW claim 42 Hurricanes shot over Malta Jan to May, more than half credited to the JG26 leader (muncheberg???) However, that number greatly exceeds the actual number of Hurricanes deployed to the island. Beginning in November 1940, 12 were flown off Argus, however only 4 arrived at the island. After the arrival of the LW, a further reinforcement was flown in from Ark Royal. 12 flown off, 11 arriving at malta.

In March the RAF records that 5 Hurricanes were also lost in operational accidents. I dont have the figures for the other months, at least in a compllete form. On the 27 March a further 24 Hurricanes were despatched to Malta from Ark Royal, 1 was lost enroute. There was no further reinforcement of the island until after June.

At the end of May, the RAF has on strength either 16 or 19 Hurricanes on the island. 

Net total reinfoircements of hurricanes to the island November 1940-June 1941 was 48 hurricanes, 15 known losses to noncombat related causes but more very likley. There were 19 left available at the end, so the maximum possible number of shoot downs by the LW in that time is 14 aircraft. If we assume non combat losses for April and May to be about 4 a/c for each month, then the LW may have shot down a maximum of 6-9 Hurricanes in that 6 month period. 

Polmar says that Me 109Es were the initial SE fighters for FKX, arriving at the end of January. There were already 26 Me 110s at that time. Between January and June 1941 Berg records that the following fighter German fighter reinforcements were delivered to the TO

March 32 Bf110
April: 40 Bf109
May: 42Bf109, 18Bf110

The whole reason for the germans attacking Malta was to suppress the island and render it inneffective as a forward allied base. In order to do that they needed to stop the flow of supplies getting to the island. In that period, November'40 to June 1941, there are 7 convoys arriving Malta. Despite the clear superiority of the LW over the RAF in both numbers and quality, their advantage is not achieving much at all. Italian shipping continues to be lost at a steady rate, and LW activity does not prevent Force K and the Subs coninuing operations effectively from the island through to the end of May

In the same period, the MTO receives the following Tomahawk and Hurricanes (not including the Hurricane Is - not IIs that ive mentioned) 

Jan 22 Hurri I
Feb 18 Hurri I
Mar 6 Hurri I
April:46 Hurri I, 25 Tomahawks
May: 65 Hurri I 21 Tomahawak, 16 Beafighter I 

I dont know a lot about the Hurricane operations in the western Desrt at this time, but I do know a little about the Tomahawk operations. In June, AFAIK there were two squadrons equipped 250 sqn (RAF) and 3 Squadron (RAAF). These two squadrons lost 6 Tomahawks to enemy fighters June to Septemeber and claimed 17 aircraft shot down. I dont call that winning air superiority, on the basis of numbers. And from June through to November, Rommel was unable to make any significant gains on the ground, so strategically the Germans failed to capitalize at all on the claimed air superiority you are suggesting. far from it. it that period there were several failed attempts to take Tobruk, and the British felt strong enough to mount their own offensive (albeit it was unsuccessful). Thats hardly the stuff that axis air superiority should lead to. If they did have it, which I refurte that they did, they did nothing useful with it. 



> The Bf 109 F-4 was clearly superior to the Hurricane II and the pilots didn't fear or had much respect neither to the Hurricane II nor to the P40


.

Hmm, that too doesnt add up completely. I agree that the F-4 was superior in performance, but I dont think that total losses per sortie for either side were that significantly different. Caldwells combat experiences belie your claims

"On 26 June 1941, while escorting bombers attacking Gazala, Libya, Caldwell destroyed an aircraft in air-to-air combat for the first time, during his 30th sortie. He downed a German Messerschmitt Bf 109E, piloted by Leutnant Heinz Schmidt of I gruppe, Jagdgeschwader 27 (JG 27), over Capuzzo, he followed this claim with a 'half share' of a Bf 110 on III./ZG 26 and 2 Ju-87s of II./Sturzkampfgeschwader 2 (StG 2—Dive Bomber Wing 2) on 30 June.

While flying to his base alone, over north west Egypt on 29 August 1941, Caldwell was attacked by two Bf 109s, in a simultaneous approach at right angles. His attackers included one of Germany's most famous Experte ("expert", or ace), Leutnant Werner Schröer, also of JG 27, in a Bf 109E-7. Caldwell sustained three separate wounds from ammunition fragments and or shrapnel; his Tomahawk was hit by more than 100 7.9 mm bullets and five 20 mm cannon shells, but he shot down Schröer's wingman, and heavily damaged Schröer's "Black 8", causing Schröer to disengage. On 23 November, Caldwell shot down an Experte, Hauptmann Wolfgang Lippert, Gruppenkommandeur (Group Commander) of II./JG 27, who bailed out. Lippert had struck the stabiliser and following capture had his legs amputated but ten days later a gangrene infection set in and he died on 3 December.For this action Caldwell was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross. Caldwell shot down five Junkers Ju 87 (Stuka) dive bombers in a matter of minutes on 5 December. For this he was awarded a Bar to his DFC. 

Caldwell scored another striking victory in February 1942, while leading a formation of 11 Kittyhawks from 112 Sqn (Pole) and 3 Sqn (RAAF). Over Gazala, he sighted a schwarm of Bf 109Fs flying some 2,000 ft higher. Caldwell immediately nosed into a shallow dive, applied maximum power and boost, then pulled his Kittyhawk up into a vertical climb. With his P-40 "hanging from its propeller," he fired a burst at a 109 flown by Leutnant Hans-Arnold Stahlschmidt of I./JG 27, who was lagging behind the others. Stahlschmidt's fighter "shuddered like a carpet being whacked with a beater" before spinning out of control. Although the Kittyhawk pilots thought that the 109 had crashed inside Allied lines, Stahlschmidt was able to crash-land in friendly territory."

When flown by a good pilot, the Kittyhawk, and the earlier Tomahawak was not "intimiidated" at all by the german aircraft. Caldwell 




> From pilot statements, they had some kind of respect, but they found both types easy to fight with the Friedrich.
> Also that only one Geschwader was able to take air superiority don't speak for the Hurricanes.



Well the above actions disprove the claim. If air superiority had been achieved, the allies would not be able to patrol, and would not have been able to inflict such heavy air defeats on the Germans. I fear just another Quacksalving effort here

It was much much harder for the LW and the JG27 after the arriving of Spit's in numbers summer/autumn 1942 and the germans lost air superiority.



> THe kill ratio of the Friedrich was 4:1 or better against both types (Hurricanes and P40)


.

Over Malta the Germans might have shot down 6 Hurricanes in air combat January to June 1941. Over the western desert, June to the end of August the two P-40 squadrons lost 6 aircraft to enemy fighters, with just one man very nearly eaqualling that loss rate single handed. More than a little quackslaving going on here isnt there....


----------



## DonL (May 3, 2013)

You should take a look at Shore's books, there you can see the kill ratio of the Friedrich from Day to Day against the P40 and Hurricane.
Shores books are very well researched, the P40 and Hurricane were both very clearly outclassed from the Friedrich (Bf 109F)

Your summary to Malta are Bf 109E's and I haven't claimed that the E's had the same performance as the Friedrichs, far from that.
The first Bf 109F's were arriving at the desert September 1941, after that the axis had clearly air superioty after Shore.

Your claims with the aircraft carriers are simply wrong, you can't speed up building a ship with money, if workermen work already 24 hours a day in a 3 worhshift. (3 x 8 hours = 24 hours)
It is impossible from simple maths!
You only can start the building earlier and that is a political decision and you didn't claimed that!


----------



## Readie (May 3, 2013)

Its a bit like picking a worthy Shirehorse over a sleek thoroughbred racing horse 
Each has their own value and its horses for courses....
Cheers
John


----------



## Glider (May 3, 2013)

Looking at HSores books, the official records and other publications there can be no doubt that the 109F was far and away the best fighter in the ME until the Spits started to arrive and reduce the losses.

Using Shores latest book the following are the comments for the days combats mention before

26th June 1941 
The RAF claimed 2 x me109 and 1 x G50 destroyed and lost 2 x Hurricane I and 1 x Tomahawk
The Axis forces claimed 1 x Hurricane and 3 x P40 and lost 1 x Me109E crashed, 1 x Me109E 30% damaged, 1 x Me109 25% damaged 2 x Me109 damaged on the ground by bombs

29th August 1941
RAF claimed 1 x me109 and lost 1 x P40 damaged Caldwell was the claimer and flew the damaged aircraft
Axis claimed 1 x P40 Caldwells and lost 2 x Ju88 shot down by AA fire

23rd November this was a very busy day
RAF Claimed Destroyed
6 x Ju87
9 x Me109
1 x G50
1 x Me110

Probable
4 x Ju87
4 x Me109
1 x G50
1 x Ju88

The RAF Lost
12 x Hurricanes
4 x P40
1 x Beaufighter
1 x Boston

Axis Forces Claimed
10 x Hurricanes
7 x P40
1 x Boston
1 x Beaufighter

Axis Forces Lost
2 x Me109
7 x Ju87
1 x Me110
2 x Ju88
1 x G50
1 x S79, 1 x S81 and 1 BR20 destroyed on the ground.

edit - I should add that the Italians figures which are included in the above nos for the 23rd were for for 5 x Hurricanes and 4 x P40. Seeing how close the Axis Claimed figures were for the 23rd compared to the RAF losses the Italians were clearly capable of taking care of themselves


----------



## RCAFson (May 3, 2013)

Doubtless the 109/E/F had a big advantage over the Hurricane I. The 109F, especially, would have had an advantage over the Hurricane II and a hyothetical Hurricane I/Merlin 45, but not to the same degree. Improved Hurricanes = higher Luftwaffe losses and lower Commonwealth losses.


----------



## tomo pauk (May 3, 2013)

As we can see from Glider's post, for each Bf-109F LW lost, the RAF lost more than 5 Hurricanes II during 23rd Nov 1941. The performance difference was comparable akin to the F4U vs. Zero situation.


----------



## RCAFson (May 3, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> As we can see from Glider's post, for each Bf-109F LW lost, the RAF lost more than 5 Hurricanes II during 23rd Nov 1941. The performance difference was comparable akin to the F4U vs. Zero situation.



Sorry, but I don't see a break down by Hurricane type

I've got the latest edition of Mediterranean Air War and the breakdown is:

7 Hurricane II shot down, (and one crash landed but it is unclear if this was from combat)
2 Hurricane I shot down. 
3 Tomahawk shot down
1 Boston III shot down
a few others lost to flak and operationally.

2 x 109f4 shot down
7 x ju-87 shot down
1 x 110 shot down
1 x ju-88 crash landed due aerial combat
1 x ju-88 destroyed by aerial bombing
1 x G50 shot down
3 ( s81, s79, br20) via ground attack.

On the whole, IMHO the Commonwealth won the fight that day, as they mostly lost low cost fighters while inflicting much higher cost losses in return.

BTW, the main combat between the Hurricane IIs and Axis AFs occured when 23 Hurricane IIs intercepted 33 ju-87s escorted by 7 109f4 and 13 G.50s and probably 5 more G.50s. The Hurricanes shot down 7 Ju-87s and one G.50. The Hurricanes stuck to their mission and inflicted severe losses on the Ju-87s.


----------



## Glider (May 3, 2013)

I admit to not getting that. By your numbers 12 single engined fighter losses against 3 is a win for the RAF? 
As for the others it proved once again that the Ju87 when caught by fighters is very vulnerable and the 110 and Ju88 were always going to struggle against single seaters.

Plus of course the Italians should not be ignored


----------



## Shortround6 (May 3, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> Doubtless the 109/E/F had a big advantage over the Hurricane I. The 109F, especially, would have had an advantage over the Hurricane II and a hyothetical Hurricane I/Merlin 45, but not to the same degree. Improved Hurricanes = higher Luftwaffe losses and lower Commonwealth losses.



How does putting a crapper engine in the Hurricane I than was put in the Hurricane II help? 

Hurricane II: First flew on 11 June 1940 and went into squadron service in September 1940. Granted it takes a while to get them in really large numbers but? 

Spitfires with Merlin 45s don't show up until the beginning of 1941. 4-5 months later. Both engines are restricted to 9lbs boost to begin with?


----------



## RCAFson (May 3, 2013)

Glider said:


> I admit to not getting that. By your numbers 12 single engined fighter losses against 3 is a win for the RAF?
> As for the others it proved once again that the Ju87 when caught by fighters is very vulnerable and the 110 and Ju88 were always going to struggle against single seaters.
> 
> Plus of course the Italians should not be ignored



Right, so the UK lost the BofB because the RAF had an unfavourable exchange rate against the 109E? 

The Hurricane's mission was to stop or disrupt the Ju-87's mission, which was to destroy the Commonwealth ground forces, and they did that.


----------



## RCAFson (May 3, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> How does putting a crapper engine in the Hurricane I than was put in the Hurricane II help?
> 
> Hurricane II: First flew on 11 June 1940 and went into squadron service in September 1940. Granted it takes a while to get them in really large numbers but?
> 
> Spitfires with Merlin 45s don't show up until the beginning of 1941. 4-5 months later. Both engines are restricted to 9lbs boost to begin with?



I've said this to you several times now, that giving the Merlin 12/45 to the Hurricane I will give it an advantage over the Merlin III - I think that anyone can see that that 12 and especially the 45 would give it better performance than with the III. If the 12 or 45 was no better than the III, why did the Spitfire change to the 12/45?


----------



## Glider (May 3, 2013)

Clearly this has nothing to do with the BOB. Also the Hurricanes took part in a number of missions that day and not all of them were to intercept Ju87's. Some were fighter escort convering bombers and others were fighter sweeps.


----------



## parsifal (May 3, 2013)

The point is. The Germans did not win air superiority, as is claimed, and the major losses had nothing to do with the fighting in the air. More aircraft were lost to "other causes" than were lost to enemy fighters. A lot more. 


For the Germans to be able to validly claim air superiority they would need to be able to achieve, overall (ie not just fighter to fighter) heavily one sided losses against the Allies, and deny the allies the ability to undertake significant operations. neither of those two things happened. In the battles cited the Axis lost 19 a/c to the allied 21. thats an exchange ratio of 1:1 not 4:1. The allies at no stage in this period were inhibited from undertaking operations. The Germans, despite the obvious superiority of their fighters did not achieve anything significant on the ground, or at sea between June and December.


It would be useful to obtain a bigger dataset before attempting to call this. But on the basis of the very limited data provided, all this does is more or less reinforce what ive been saying.Despite obvious advantages in performance for the German Fighters (clapped out Hurricane Is versus brand new Me 109Fs, it should not be hard to work out who has the performance advantage here), loss rates were almost the same, and at no stage were the allies denied freedom of manouvre in the air.


----------



## parsifal (May 3, 2013)

> I admit to not getting that. By your numbers 12 single engined fighter losses against 3 is a win for the RAF?



Numbers are not relevant unless it can adversely affects operations in some way. If the Allies were able to complete ther mission, or deny the Germans the ability to complete their mission, it was a victory. I agree, however the fighter losses are disportionate. Then again, this is just another variation of the BoB. Perhaps the Hurricanes were going after the bombers and actting defensively against the Axis fighters.

Once again its the totals that are relevant, and i count 13 Allied losses to 16 Axis losses. With the data presented, you cannot draw any other conlcusions other than the losses were similar. No advanatage either way....the hurricanes were good enough to pull a draw at minimum. 



> As for the others it proved once again that the Ju87 when caught by fighters is very vulnerable and the 110 and Ju88 were always going to struggle against single seaters.



So why is it valid to discount some Axis losses from the air battle? I dont get that at all?????



> Plus of course the Italians should not be ignored



Yep agree entirely. Italian pilots were probably the best of any nationality in the TO, but not the most agrressive.


----------



## RCAFson (May 3, 2013)

Glider said:


> Clearly this has nothing to do with the BOB. Also the Hurricanes took part in a number of missions that day and not all of them were to intercept Ju87's. Some were fighter escort convering bombers and others were fighter sweeps.



The BofB was won because FC shot down more bombers than the Luftwaffe could afford, and they thwarted the bomber's mission which was to destroy UK industry and cow the population. Similarly, the WDAF's mission was prevent the Axis bombers from destroying the 8th Army while allowing their own (including Hurribombers) to attack the Axis ground forces and in this they were generally successful.. Yes, there were other missions that day, and generally the Hurricanes gave as good as they got. It is also interesting to note that FAA Mk 1 Hurricanes were involved in a lot of the fighting.


----------



## parsifal (May 3, 2013)

Precisely. the air battle is not the end, it is a means to the end. The fighter to fighter combats are even less relevant. They exist simply to aither ensure ones own bombers get through, or to deny the enmy bombers get through. Only in very rare situation does the numbers of fighters lost become an issue, like the losses are unable to be replaced, or the losses prevent freedom of action in subsequent operations. No evidence of that here, though the loss of 7 Ju87s must have hurt the Germans, given the numbers they had available. The loss of 12 hurricanes is more or less irrelevant to the allied capability. In the preceding months (June to November) they had received over 840 Single engined fighters, more than half of them Hurricane Is. Do you think they cared about the loss of 12 hurricane that day?

In that same period the Germans had received 58 Ju87s. The loss of 7 ju87s represented a loss of more than 10% of the likley available force structure. we dont know how many Stukas were damaged. No wonder the hurricanes were going for the Ju87s....it was one of the germans' achilles heels.


----------



## RCAFson (May 3, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Once again its the totals that are relevant, and i count 13 Allied losses to 16 Axis losses.



In terms of airframe weight plus aircrew numbers, and thus cost, the Allies clearly won the exchange.


----------



## DonL (May 3, 2013)

Simply ridiculous to the issue we are discussing here!
Analogy from Wildcat to Hellcat to Hurricane and Spitfire!
But you two can believe in your myths.

It realy absurd at fighter comparison discusion!


----------



## parsifal (May 3, 2013)

didnt quite work out the way you thought Quacker?

It is very relevant to determine the role of fighters in the overall airpower equation. fighters are there for two main purposes. 

1) Deny the enemy the ability to undertake air missions except at unreasonable and unsustainable cost
2) Assist your own strike aircraft to survive long enough to complete their mission. 

Anything else is just big boys playing with their toys

Regards

Quacker


----------



## Glider (May 4, 2013)

The Axis air forces did not get air superiority simply because they didn't have the numbers, that is clear. It had nothing to do with the quality of the pilots or the aircraft.

To ssay that on a day when however you look at it the RAF lost far more fighters than the Axis airforces. On a day when the vulnerable Ju87's sufferred heavy losses and the other Axis losses were also aircraft well known to be vulnerable to single seat fighters. Is proof that the Hurricane and P40 were a good match for the Me109 is a leap I cannot see.

To sum up, the RAF had air superiority because they had the greater numbers, but the 109 was a better fighter by some margin over the P40 and Hurricane. 
It isn't the case that the the RAF had air superiority because they had fighters that were close to the quality of the 109.


----------



## parsifal (May 4, 2013)

Id agree that neither side had air superiority. Not as sure about the numbers, though highly likley that the RAF had a big and clear advantage. 

However to get this back to the point at issue. The claim is that if your fighters are heavily outclassed you are going to sufffer big losses. From ther it depends on how you view the issue. if you want to compare fighter and fighter, like quackers, then in this case ther is a big differnce, and this does suggest obsolescence of the hurricane. I dont have any argument there on that score. However I dont see that as relevant, and further it is not necessarily the case either. It may well be the case the Allied fighters were more or less ignoring the Axis fighters and were going for a specific target....probably the Ju87s by the look of it. Viewing the airpower effects overall there is little difference in the loss numbers, and that kinda vindicates the RAF, and helps to prove the hypothesis. Going for superiority of fighter design is more or less meaningless and pointless in the overall scheme. Except in some very specific and unique situations. this aint one of em. The British and the Germans came away with similar losses. The Germans suffered most of their losses in their strike aircraft, the Allies suffered their losses mostly in their fighter formations. As a percentage of their respective force structures, the Germans suffered a loss rate of about 12% from their Ju87s in the TO, the Allies suffered 1.4% from their available Hurricanes in the TO. That is not a defeat. its a victory iun fact. The Germans are going to run out of bombers far quicker than the Allies are going to run out of fighters. 10 more raids like that, and the allies wont even need to get airborne....the Germans can fly off, go round in circles for a while, whilst the allied fightes stay home an drink tea, because after 10 combats like that., there are no bombers to worry about.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (May 4, 2013)

parsifal said:


> didnt quite work out the way you thought Quacker?



Is it necessary to resort to name calling?


----------



## parsifal (May 4, 2013)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Is it necessary to resort to name calling?



No problems , I was having a pointed joke with him, after this....



> Parsifal is very busy to claim almost unachievable claims for the Allied, but deny obvious what ifs for the axis, to me this are claims from a quacksalver.



I didnt even know what a quacksalver was, when i looked it up I just laughed. I thought"very clever...obvious attempt at insult, but i like it", hence giving it back to him for him to enjoy as much as I have.

Theres heat in this kitchen, I know, but its like a game at the moment. im enjoying it


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (May 4, 2013)

I missed that post. Carry on...


----------



## VBF-13 (May 4, 2013)

DonL said:


> Your claims with the aircraft carriers are simply wrong, you can't speed up building a ship with money, if workermen work already 24 hours a day in a 3 worhshift. (3 x 8 hours = 24 hours)


I think I can squeeze in right here. It wasn't only that, Don. The U.S. didn't need carriers. To turn this tide, we needed what we built, the F6Fs and F4Us. This War wasn’t a carrier-war. Strictly-speaking, it was an aircraft-war, and our F4Fs were outclassed. Even after we had upgraded in the FMs, those were outclassed. And don't for a minute believe those F6Fs and F4Us racked up those batting averages against minor league pitching. The Japanese aircraft were still formidable. While their pilots had suffered a drop in terms of experience, understand, they had begun with vastly more experience. And, in terms of pilot-training, they still had more in that aircraft than our pilots had in ours, right up through around the middle of 1944. We just embarrassed that aircraft and those pilots so badly in those F6Fs and F4Us that to this day they're still making excuses for it. The problem with the F4Fs and FMs was, they couldn't "go upstairs.” While they remained “downstairs,” they couldn't out-turn the A6Ms. We very well could have built more carriers and flooded those and the skies with F4Fs and FMs, but that would have been about the dumbest thing we ever did. And, do you know what? That’s probably why we didn’t do it.


----------



## RCAFson (May 4, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> I think I can squeeze in right here. It wasn't only that, Don. The U.S. didn't need carriers. To turn this tide, we needed what we built,



With respect, IMHO, the tide turned at Midway and it was only for the lack of 1 or 2 more carriers that the IJN CVs weren't fully wiped out in the carrier battles at Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (May 4, 2013)

DonL said:


> Your claims with the aircraft carriers are simply wrong, you can't speed up building a ship with money, if workermen work already 24 hours a day in a 3 worhshift. (3 x 8 hours = 24 hours)



Although you had 3 shifts, there were overlaps as many plants during WW2 in the US had employees working 10 - 12 hour shifts 6 days a week, sometimes 7. I had family members who worked in defense plants during WW2, sometimes they didn't get a day off for 6 months!


----------



## drgondog (May 4, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> I think I can squeeze in right here. It wasn't only that, Don. The U.S. didn't need carriers. To turn this tide, we needed what we built, the F6Fs and F4Us. This War wasn’t a carrier-war. Strictly-speaking, it was an aircraft-war, and our F4Fs were outclassed.
> 
> *Maybe you need to jump out a little. The Battle of Coral Sea and Midway were Carrier-Aircraft war and by luck and crafty planning between Dec 7, 1941 and early June 1942 we manage to Not run out of Carriers. We brought what we had, and had we lost three and only killed two IJN carriers - Hawaii was toast and we begin all over again from West coast of US for a VERY long pacific war. Note that neither F6F or F4U (or B-17 or B-26) were factors but the F4F was crucial there and crucial at Guadalcanal - another pivot point that was crucial to preserve Australia from Japanese invasion.*
> 
> Even after we had upgraded in the FMs, those were outclassed. And don't for a minute believe those F6Fs and F4Us racked up those batting averages against minor league pitching. The Japanese aircraft were still formidable. While their pilots had suffered a drop in terms of experience, understand, they had begun with vastly more experience. And, in terms of pilot-training, they still had more in that aircraft than our pilots had in ours, right up through around the middle of 1944. We just embarrassed that aircraft and those pilots so badly in those F6Fs and F4Us that to this day they're still making excuses for it. The problem with the F4Fs and FMs was, they couldn't "go upstairs.” While they remained “downstairs,” they couldn't out-turn the A6Ms. We very well could have built more carriers and flooded those and the skies with F4Fs and FMs, but that would have been about the dumbest thing we ever did. And, do you know what? That’s probably why we didn’t do it.



Short answer. No ground war, no Island campaign, no steady advance from Guadalcanal if US defeated at Midway.. and defeat is measured in Carrier-aircraft capability to project tactical security 200 miles from the fleet carrying troops, CB's, Supplies and landing craft.

F6F and F4U - marvelous fighters. Pretty useless with Fleet force projection to 'unmolest' itself' on the bottom in December 1941 through June 1942 in PTO - while German U-Boats are stretching Admiral King to the limit in the Atlantic.


----------



## parsifal (May 4, 2013)

> I think I can squeeze in right here. It wasn't only that, Don. The U.S. didn't need carriers.



Unbelievable. Are you saying that if the Japanese had carriers, and the US chose, or lost their carriers, and did not build any, they could still win. If so, are you serious. Lets just look at the implications of this for a mnute. How would the US provide logistic support to it forward bases, including Hawaii if the Japanese have 10 carriers, and they have none. How does their fleet get around? An aircraft, even an F4 Phantom or F-15 Eagle, is useless if it lacks the fuel, the ammunition the construction materials, to build and supply airfields. Without a carrier fleet, the US isnt able to undertake effective force projection into enemy territory. 

The nearest equivalent we have here is the 1943 situation, where neither side had an effective carrier fleet. Even with massive material superiority, the Allies struggled to control or make headway against the Japanese. And that was without either side having carriers. If the Japanese had a significant carrier force and the allies did not, the allies simply could not mount any offensive operations whatsoever,and would have been hard pressed to hold any ground the Japanese wewre truly determined to take. 

Without carriers the US would have been forced to sue for peace on the japanese terms 




> To turn this tide, we needed what we built, the F6Fs and F4Us. This War wasn’t a carrier-war. Strictly-speaking, it was an aircraft-war, and our F4Fs were outclassed.




No evidence to support that. The experiences of the RN clearly disprove that. Despite being chronically equipped with inferior fighters, and heavily outnumbered to boot, and faced by an opponent far more numerous and as dangerous as the japanese, the British did not lose a single carrier to air attack (except the inneffectual Hermes), and managed to challenge control of enemy controlled waters to the point of changing an entire campaign. Without carriers it was at the least, very difficult to excercise sea control. Exactly the same applies in the Pacific.

Having the Hellcat and F4U were big advantages, but not having a carrier was critical to the outcome of the war....F4Fs did have the runs on the board, and Japan was already in deep trouble ever before the Hellcat or the Corsair had time to make an effect. There is no evidence that Hellcats were responsible for their impressive killtallies, simply because of the performance of the aircraft. None. There is plenty of evidence, that the F4F, in the environments of the later ewar period were still effective aircraft, more than able to complete their allotted tasks and more than able to be effective, and chalk up reasonable kill tallies of their own. 

The Pacific war was a war of aircraft, thats true, but the aircraft was so much more than a group of pilots poncing around from island to island shooting up japanese bases, or shooting down aircraft. 




> Even after we had upgraded in the FMs, those were outclassed.



Agreed, but what were the bad effects arising from that. I can show you many examples of Wildcats continuing to be very effective despite that obvious obsolescence. 



> And don't for a minute believe those F6Fs and F4Us racked up those batting averages against minor league pitching. The Japanese aircraft were still formidable. While their pilots had suffered a drop in terms of experience, understand, they had begun with vastly more experience.



Completely agree



> And, in terms of pilot-training, they still had more in that aircraft than our pilots had in ours, right up through around the middle of 1944.




And yet, until about March 1944the major body blows to Japanese capability had been achieved by carriers armed with F4fs. This just serves to underline the fact that the hellcat, despite its obvious superiority, was not really needed to prosecute the japanese. Not so for the Carriers. They proved to be absolutely critical at every stage of the war. 



> We just embarrassed that aircraft and those pilots so badly in those F6Fs and F4Us that to this day they're still making excuses for it.




I dont think the japanese have got much to be embarrassed about. At iwo, for example, what do you do when you are hit by concentrated raids of 5 or 600 aircrafdt, each one of them with a pilot that on average has 10x the experience your group has, and still outnumbering you by more than 10:1 as well. If the Japanese had not been given the opportunity to recover after the '42 campaigns, the war would have eneded earlier, with or without the Hellcat. The Hellcat was one part of the US victory, but in the end, it was not a critical or essential part. There was no way of knowiung that early in the war,m but thats how it finished panning out. 



> The problem with the F4Fs and FMs was, they couldn't "go upstairs.” While they remained “downstairs,” they couldn't out-turn the A6Ms.



So what. To engage enemy fleets, the strike aircraft had to get low, all the action occurred below 10000 ft. Its a disadvantage, but a disadvantage that meant absolutely nothing to the outcome of the major battles. 



> We very well could have built more carriers and flooded those and the skies with F4Fs and FMs, but that would have been about the dumbest thing we ever did. And, do you know what? That’s probably why we didn’t do it.


One could argue with equal force that the dumbest thing the US ever did was forego carrier production in FY'41 so that they could design and build an aircraft they didnt really need. They took the path they did, because that was the prudent thing to do. Thats not what this discussion is about. Weve got it wrong anyway, but it has evolved into "was the hellcat necessary to win the war?" Answer is "No". To the supplementary issue youve raised in your last posting, "Carriers were not really necessary to win the war?" Are you kidding of course they were.


----------



## wuzak (May 4, 2013)

parsifal said:


> One could argue with equal force that the dumbest thing the US ever did was forego carrier production in FY'41 so that they could design and build an aircraft they didnt really need.



In 1941 they really didn't know what they would need by 1944/45. So, getting higher performance aircraft would have to be, as you say, prudent.

In 1941 they also didn't know how many carriers they would need. Well, I suppose they already had a stab at it and commissioned the ones they thought were required.

So, how much did an F4F and F6F cost? I presume that if the F6F isn't proceeded with the the F4F with be produced instead of F6Fs at a ratio of better than 1:1. So how much money is saved in production? How much is saved in engineering cost?

Now, you have saved the design cost of the F6F - but you will probably expend more money on developing and improving the F4F.

Any engineering resources you save at Grumman cannot be used to build your carriers - dissimilar skill sets required.

So there must be some ship yards lying around during the war that are completely idle? A huge untapped workforce that is not dedicated to war production, ood production, or some other essential service?

Maybe the plan is to cut construction of other ships to free up resources? Liberty ships, perhaps? Destroyers, cruisers, battleships?

Where are you going to build carriers?


----------



## Aozora (May 4, 2013)

parsifal said:


> One could argue with equal force that the dumbest thing the US ever did was forego carrier production in FY'41 so that they could design and build an aircraft they didnt really need. They took the path they did, because that was the prudent thing to do.


 
Why assume that carriers were sacrificed in favour of building one particular model of fighter? It would be more logical to assume that the USN didn't build more carriers in FY '41 because they required more battleships, cruisers, destroyers etc. Also not forgetting that battleships were still considered to be more important than carriers in USN doctrine right up until Pearl Harbor, which forced a rethink.


----------



## parsifal (May 4, 2013)

Aozora said:


> Why assume that carriers were sacrificed in favour of building one particular model of fighter? It would be more logical to assume that the USN didn't build more carriers in FY '41 because they required more battleships, cruisers, destroyers etc. Also not forgetting that battleships were still considered to be more important than carriers in USN doctrine right up until Pearl Harbor, which forced a rethink.



Im not assuming, but there is some extrapolation in there. The only ones doing the assuming here are you guys, who have produced nothing and just keep mouthing the same dogmas ovber an over again with absolutely nothing to support your positions. 

Some pages back i posted figures for the budget of FY41 (the "11% Construction plan) and the subsequent Vinson plan (the so called "70% expansion plan") which was to become the build plan for FY42 but was brought forward to April 1941.

In FY 41 the Americans gave 960 million USD to the Navy. Of that they spent 406 million on major warship construction . They allocated around 50 million to base upgrades and other ancillary work. Just one carrier, or 68 million, was authorised

The rest we dont exactly know how was spent, but aircraft procurement and development was in there somewhere. Rough rule of thumb is that aircraft taken from the shelf at that time cost around 20-30K USD per copy (new aircraft are a different matter....rough rule of thumb for the 1st year of production of a new type is about 50-60K USD, including development and setting up production costs....rough but something to work from). In FY41, the Navy received about 500 new aircraft, give or take, which on the above figures would cost them around 20 million USD.

After all that we are still left with 520 million unaccounted for. There arent many things left in the bottom of the tin. There mighht have been a few million spent on light forces like PT boats and ASW ships, but not much more. There might have been an expansion of training facilities....Ive no idea how much, buct say 50million. We still have $450 million or so left unaccounted for. The only major ticket item I can think of is R&D of which aircraft development has to be high on the list.

Lets say that $300 million of that $450 million unaccounted budget was spent on aircraft development. What aircraft are under development. The Corsair had flown in 1939, but was still being worked on. Hellcat was a major ticket item for research in FY41. The Americans were also working on improvements to existing designs and the TBF. Not sure about the Helldiver, but lets assume yes.

I cant give you a figure for the cost of hellcat development, but it has to be substantial. its not just the cost of the aircraft, it the tooling up costs, as well . Given the proportion of US naval aircraft production that was devoted to the Hellcat in 1943....the first year of fruition for the money spent on its development in 1940-41, one can validly claim that at least 50% of that $300million was spent getting the Hellcat up to par and on carrier decks. Roughly 60% of US carrier aircraft production in 1943 was Hellcat production, so I am being conservative.

If the US spent $150 million on Hellcat production, they could have put an additional 6 Enterprise style carriers into production. if they had wanted to put F4fs and , SBD (and not worried about a torpedo bomber at all) they would have needed at least another 1000 aircraft ordered (to cover training and normal wear and tear). That adds another $40 million to the budget, so in reality they could have added 4 or 5 Enterpise cl;ass (at 1938 prices....if the cost had gone up the number would be less. Lets be conservative and say they build 3 additional carriers with F4F and SBD airgroups. These ships are off the shelf design and will be appearing before the completion of CV9 (the Essex). They are smaller, less well protected, but easier to build.

3 additional carriers, with airgroups at the end of 1942 is a game changer. A new fighter in 1944 (basically) is good, but not essential 
1I assume


----------



## VBF-13 (May 4, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> I think I can squeeze in right here. It wasn't only that, Don. The U.S. didn't need carriers. To turn this tide, we needed what we built, the F6Fs and F4Us. This War wasn’t a carrier-war. Strictly-speaking, it was an aircraft-war, and our F4Fs were outclassed.
> 
> *Maybe you need to jump out a little. The Battle of Coral Sea and Midway were Carrier-Aircraft war and by luck and crafty planning between Dec 7, 1941 and early June 1942 we manage to Not run out of Carriers. We brought what we had, and had we lost three and only killed two IJN carriers - Hawaii was toast and we begin all over again from West coast of US for a VERY long pacific war. Note that neither F6F or F4U (or B-17 or B-26) were factors but the F4F was crucial there and crucial at Guadalcanal - another pivot point that was crucial to preserve Australia from Japanese invasion.
> *
> Even after we had upgraded in the FMs, those were outclassed. And don't for a minute believe those F6Fs and F4Us racked up those batting averages against minor league pitching. The Japanese aircraft were still formidable. While their pilots had suffered a drop in terms of experience, understand, they had begun with vastly more experience. And, in terms of pilot-training, they still had more in that aircraft than our pilots had in ours, right up through around the middle of 1944. We just embarrassed that aircraft and those pilots so badly in those F6Fs and F4Us that to this day they're still making excuses for it. The problem with the F4Fs and FMs was, they couldn't "go upstairs.” While they remained “downstairs,” they couldn't out-turn the A6Ms. We very well could have built more carriers and flooded those and the skies with F4Fs and FMs, but that would have been about the dumbest thing we ever did. And, do you know what? That’s probably why we didn’t do it.





drgondog said:


> Short answer. No ground war, no Island campaign, no steady advance from Guadalcanal if US defeated at Midway.. and defeat is measured in Carrier-aircraft capability to project tactical security 200 miles from the fleet carrying troops, CB's, Supplies and landing craft.
> 
> F6F and F4U - marvelous fighters. Pretty useless with Fleet force projection to 'unmolest' itself' on the bottom in December 1941 through June 1942 in PTO - while German U-Boats are stretching Admiral King to the limit in the Atlantic.


From 7 December 1941 through 1 October 1945 we lost five carriers and six escort carriers and were already building carriers. On the performance of our early F4Fs you built up a house of cards and knocked it down and in so doing ignored what those F4F pilots, the aces, included, were telling us they needed. Chance-Vought and Grumman delivered that, and then our pilots delivered. It's not that hard.


----------



## VBF-13 (May 5, 2013)

wuzak said:


> Now, you have saved the design cost of the F6F - but you will probably expend more money on developing and improving the F4F.


The FMs are what you're looking to, there, Wuzak. They're the upgraded F4Fs. That's why Grumman, aware of those constraints, had to go from scratch.


----------



## parsifal (May 5, 2013)

> In 1941 they really didn't know what they would need by 1944/45. So, getting higher performance aircraft would have to be, as you say, prudent.



Agreed, doesnt affect any assessment of the net value of the hellcat to the allied victory. Neither does it cast dispersions on the excellence of the hellcat as an aircraft. Thats how we stuffed up your thread...I apologize once again.



> In 1941 they also didn't know how many carriers they would need. Well, I suppose they already had a stab at it and commissioned the ones they thought were required.



The Americans in their planning leading up to the war actually did have a good idea of how many carriers they would need. There was a good deal of disquiet that the british would not survive in 1940, so the US began building what is called a "two Ocean Navy". A navy that could fight both the Germans and the Japanese single handedly. The US believed that the germans would eventually get around to building their vaunted "Z" plan, and it was known that the japanese already had 10 carriers, with the capacity for conversions for about 4 more. The Americans planned, in the event of a British surrender, to take large passenger liners and convert them to extermporised carriers. Initially it was planned to build an additional 6 Yorktowns, but with the abrogation of the treaty limits this was hurriedly changed to the Essex class. The research done on the liner conversions was not completely wasted, it was used in the design of the Escort Carriers, but because Britain did not collapse, there was no need to institute the emergency program. There was still a need to contain the Japanese, and in FY42 a further 4 Essex were authorised (this was greatly expanded to nearly 17 carriers by years end....it still wasnt enough....during that year a number of the Cleveland class CLs were taken iin hand for conversion to Light carriers). The USN knew that it needed carriers, lots of em, which makes the decision to build just one carrier in FY41 unexplainable. 




> So, how much did an F4F and F6F cost? I presume that if the F6F isn't proceeded with the the F4F with be produced instead of F6Fs at a ratio of better than 1:1. So how much money is saved in production? How much is saved in engineering cost?



Its a great question, and Im not going to pretend that I know the answer precisely. But I have an idea.

The Tiger tank is populalrly estimated to have cost around RM312K per copy. Thats probably a fair estimate, give ofr take. But in 1942, when the first 100 or so rolled off the lines, the cost per units was more than double that. As time progressed and the production run got biger, the establishment costs thinned out and the cost per unit came down.

In the case of the Hellcat, I wouldsay that overall, its cost was not much greater than the F4F. there wouldnt be much in it, put it that way. But its the first year of production that the cost really hits home. By 1943 the averge cost of a P-51 was about 60K USD. If we assume 50K for both the Hellcat and the F4F, we are not going to be too far off. However we also need to take into account the cost of developing the hellcat. it was a wartime development, unlike the F4F, so its development is not "free" in the same sense that the f4fs development can be considered "free". We dont actually know the development cost of the Hellcat, but its going to be somewhere between$100 and 200 million. For that first year of production - 1943, the cost of 1000 F4Fs will be $500 give or take ( in 1943 dollars). For the same Hellcats, in the same time frame,. but factoring in the estimated development costs, the overall cost of the 1000 F6Fs is about $700 million, or about 40% more 



> Now, you have saved the design cost of the F6F - but you will probably expend more money on developing and improving the F4F.



Ah yes, but improving an existing design costs a fraction the cost of building a whole new type from scratch. Developing a replacement for the Spitfire was far moreexpensive than improving the Spitfire



> Any engineering resources you save at Grumman cannot be used to build your carriers - dissimilar skill sets required.



Agreed



> So there must be some ship yards lying around during the war that are completely idle? A huge untapped workforce that is not dedicated to war production, ood production, or some other essential service?



There was plenty. The US had been developing shipyard capacity since 1933 for just this eventuality...a rapid expansion at short notice. In FY41 and FY42 (actually from April 1941), the navy at a stroke of a pen went from an replacement only to an 11% expansion program, followed 66 days later by a 70% increase in tonnage. It did this effortlessly and without any major hitches. 

The constraqint was always money for the USN, not dockyard or labour capacity 



> Maybe the plan is to cut construction of other ships to free up resources? Liberty ships, perhaps? Destroyers, cruisers, battleships


?


USN was chronically short of shipping and DDs as well as modern cruisers in 1941. They should have scrapped the 6 Iowas completely and the 5 Alaskas they were planning, which would have given tham an additional $540 million for new construction. No argument they made mistakes in naval construction. But thats not the point. they also made mistakes pushing ahead with the Hellcat. Perhaps a delay, to builod three carriers (plus CV9) in FY41, delay development of the Hellcat until FY42, which would mean it start entering squadron service around June 1944, rather than November 1943. That would make no difference to the conduct of the war. having 3 additional carriers at the end of 1942 would have changed the war completely. 




> Where are you going to build carriers?



In the same yards that CV10-12 (authorised in the 70% xpansion plan of August 1940). There was absolutely no shortage of dockyard space for the USN in 1940....there was in 1942-3, but not in 1940


----------



## Glider (May 5, 2013)

Sorry but I must disagree with any thought of delaying the F6. There are debates all around over the Zero vs the F4 but suffice it to say that the advantages of one were more than matched by the advantages of the other. However if you delay the F6 then you are talking about the F4 going up against the A6M5 which was a lot faster then the F4 (or FM2), daved as fast and maintained its advantage in agility. 

You are giving the aerial advantage back to the IJN

As for the building of the BB's I can understand the Iowas going ahead. All the contracts for the purchase and build would have been signed and the cash saved would have been little and the shipbuilding capacity was in place. The Alaskas though I do agree were a huge waste of resources. More cruisers to give flexibility and AA cover would have been cheaper.


----------



## parsifal (May 5, 2013)

> Sorry but I must disagree with any thought of delaying the F6. There are debates all around over the Zero vs the F4 but suffice it to say that the advantages of one were more than matched by the advantages of the other. However if you delay the F6 then you are talking about the F4 going up against the A6M5 which was a lot faster then the F4 (or FM2), daved as fast and maintained its advantage in agility.



A6M5 did not enter significant squadron service until March 1944. From the end of the campaign in Guadacanal, until the introduction of the A6m5....about 13 months, the main operational type was the A6m3, which was midway between the A6m2 and the A6M5 in terms of top speed and gernal performance. But in reality there was not a lot of difference between the A6M5 and the earlier A6M2. 

From the beginning of the war until mid 1943 the Japanese had lost 6200 aircraft. Their production and pilot training schemes was barely keeping pace with losses. This was against mostly types of indifferent quality.....F4Fs, and P-40s for the most part. More importantly, the quality of the pilots in that early part of the Pacific war was much higher than in the later part. These types were easily handling the challenges being thrown up by the Japanese throughour 1943. Mostly because after guadcanal and Kokoda, the Japanese were in extremely serious situation. They had about 100 fighters in Rabaul, and about 30 over New Guinea. Despite the fact that most bombing raids were unescorted, the Japanese air strength continued to rupture. There were a couple of noteworthy events in that period up to March 1944. The air strength in New Guinea was decimated, not by allied fighters, but by allied bombers. Allied bombers hit Hollandia and destroyed well over 100 aircraft in a single stroke. Allied bombers hit the Japanese transports at Bismarck sea, easily brushing past the escorting Zeroes and sinking many ships and destroyers. Finally, Halsey, at last with carriers available and amajor amphibious operation at empress Augusta Bay under threat from gathering Japanese seapower at Rabaul was forced to act and commit his carriers to a major raid of Rabaul. It was a success, but not because of thehellcat, and not because of the losses....It showed the japanese that rfabaul as a basae was no longer defensible.... 

The greatest impact on Japanese airpower (apart from the incessant grinding attrition being meted out day after day was in theseries of raids undertaken in November 1943. There were two elements to the raids, a land based component and the carriers strikes undertaken by Halsey. It offers the best insight as to the relative worth of the F6F against relatively competent enemy pilots, but it also marked the end of effective resistance in the South pacific, airpowerwise, despite a very credible defence by the Japanese

"Later that day, 78 Fifth Air Force planes–North American B-25s of the 3rd, 38th and 345th bombardment groups, escorted by Lockheed P-38s from the 39th and 80th fighter squadrons and the 475th Fighter Group–attacked Rabaul and were intercepted by 112 Zeros. Rabaul's air defenses, under the overall command of Rear Adm. Jinichi Kusaka, included three carrier groups that had been dispatched there just the day before, while their ships underwent refit in Japan. The caliber of the pilots was reflected in their performance. Warrant Officer Kazuo Sugino from the carrier Zuikaku's air group was credited with shooting down three enemy planes. Shokaku's carrier group included Warrant Officer Kenji Okabe, famed for scoring seven victories in one day during the Battle of the Coral Sea, but its star in the November 2 air battle was Petty Officer 1st Class (PO1C) Takeo Tanimizu, who scored his first of an eventual 32 victories by downing two P-38s. From light carrier Zuiho, Ensign Yoshio Fukui downed a B-25 but was then himself shot down, possibly by Captain Marion Kirby of the 475th Group's 431st Squadron. Fukui survived with a burned right foot and insisted on returning to action. The loss of nine B-25s and nine P-38s earned the November 2 raid a place in Fifth Air Force annals as 'Bloody Tuesday,' but the Japanese recorded 18 Zeros destroyed or damaged in addition to bomb damage to Rabaul's ground installations.

The Japanese needed a more powerful naval force to destroy the American beachhead. Admiral Mineichi Koga, commander of the Combined Fleet, dispatched Vice Adm. Takeo Kurita's Second Fleet, comprised of the heavy cruisers Takao, Maya, Atago, Suzuya, Mogami, Chikuma and Chokai, the light cruiser Noshiro and four destroyers, from Japan to Rabaul. Chokai and a destroyer had to be detached on November 4 to tow two transports that had been crippled by American air attacks to the northwestern Pacific base at Truk in the Caroline Islands. A Consolidated B-24 spotted the rest of Kurita's fleet off the Admiralty Islands and duly reported 19 ships heading toward the western entrance of St. George's Channel at Rabaul. The Second Fleet's arrival was bad news to Admiral William F. Halsey, commander of U.S. Navy forces in the Southwest Pacific. With most of the U.S. fleet preparing to invade the Gilberts, he did not have one heavy cruiser to oppose Kurita's powerful veterans. He did, however, have a small carrier detachment, Rear Adm. Frederick C. Sherman's Task Force (TF) 38, which had supported the bombardment of Buka and Bonis.

The carriers Saratoga and Princeton were fueling from the tanker Kankakee northwest of Rennell Island when Halsey sent them a dispatch on November 4, ordering, 'Task Force 38 proceed maximum formation speed [to] launch all-out strike on shipping in Rabaul and north thereof (order of targets: cruisers, destroyers). Retire thereafter….'

Rabaul was then believed to have as many as 150 aircraft–quite a hornet's nest for two carriers to stir up. Even the aggressive Halsey knew the risks involved, but Saratoga and Princeton were the only weapons at his disposal that had a realistic chance of neutralizing the threat to the Bougainville beachhead. Joined by the anti-aircraft cruisers San Diego and San Juan and nine destroyers, the flattops headed north.

The weather favored TF 38 when it arrived at its designated launching point, 57 miles southwest of Cape Tokorina and 230 miles southeast of Rabaul, on the morning of November 5. The sea was smooth, allowing the destroyers to keep station, while overcast skies lessened the chances of being observed by Japanese patrol planes. Saratoga's Air Group 12, headed by Commander Henry H. Caldwell, sent every plane it had into the sky–33 F6Fs, 16 TBFs and 22 SBDs. Princeton sent up 19 Hellcats and seven Avengers. Lieutenant Commander Joseph J. Clifton, leader of Saratoga's fighter squadron VF-12, later said, 'The main idea of the orders was to cripple all of them that we could rather than concentrate on sinking a few.'

Two hours after launching, the 97 planes reached their targets–Simpson Harbor, the inner anchorage at Rabaul, and the outer roadstead at Blanche Bay–and a curtain of AA fire. Again the Americans got a break from the weather, which was so clear over Rabaul that they could see for 50 miles. That was especially welcome under the circumstances, because although Sherman and Caldwell had trained their aircrews rigorously to hit moving targets, they had not had time to prepare a detailed plan of attack for the Rabaul strike–much of it was worked out by group and squadron commanders over their radios.

The Japanese already had a total of 59 A6M3 Zeros in the air, but they had expected the Americans to break into small groups as they neared the targets. Instead, Caldwell simply directed one large formation through the gantlet of AA fire, letting it split into smaller groups only at the last moment before making their attacks. Unwilling to go through their own flak, the Zeros milled around while 'Jumping Joe' Clifton's Hellcats went after them.

Ignoring the curtain of AA shellfire, Caldwell led his group across Crater Point in order to swing upwind of the enemy ships. Then his SBDs deployed and the TBFs went down low to start their torpedo runs. By then, the Japanese ships were either steaming for the harbor entrance or taking evasive action. One heavy cruiser fired its main 8-inch gun battery at the TBFs. As they pulled up from their attacks, the SBD and TBF pilots found themselves dodging over or around ships for four or five miles. Miraculously, all but five fighters and five bombers emerged from the wild melee, although most of the survivors suffered some damage. Casualties amounted to seven pilots and eight crewmen killed or missing.

Caldwell, who had been directing the dive bombers from above, found himself and one of Princeton's Hellcats being chased by eight Zeros. His rear turret was disabled and his photographer, Paul T. Barnett, was dead, but Caldwell managed to fend off his attackers with his nose machine gun. Lieutenant H.M. Crockett of Princeton's VF-23 took more than 200 hits in his Hellcat–and a few in himself–yet he managed to land aboard Princeton without flaps, while Caldwell brought his Avenger back to Saratoga 'with one wheel, no flaps, no aileron and no radio.'

Total American losses in the attack came to 13 aircraft–far fewer than the 49, including 20 probables, claimed by the Japanese. While the Hellcat pilots were credited with 21 victories and the TBFs and SBDs claimed another seven, the Japanese recorded the loss of only two Zeros and their pilots: PO1C Hiroshi Nishimura from Zuikaku, and Zuiho's Chief Petty Officer Kosaku Minato".(Source History Net.com and World War II magazine) - see next post for comment.


----------



## parsifal (May 5, 2013)

(from previous post)
So in summary, other aircraft had destroyed or disabled over 20 Zeroes,, zeroes that were being flown by competent piloits for the last time, the best the Hellcats could do was destroy just two aircraft. Hardly a critical contribution to the war effort. eventually, of course, they did, but only after the hard work and sacrifice had so softened the Japanese up as to make them vulnerable. Essentially all the hellcats were doing was moving in to take the credit and clean up the kudos.






> You are giving the aerial advantage back to the IJN



Absolutely not. The Americans very nearly gave the initiative away in early 1943 when they ran out of carriers. Only by the most extraordinary efforts by the 5th and 13th AFs and the RAAF (and some RNZAF) units was it just possible to maintain pressure on the Japanese. If carriers had been available at that point, a lot more pressure would have been posible....The Hellcat certainly did NOT turn the tide of the air battle in the pacific. That honour goes to the US carriers and their 1942 air groups. The Japanese were prevented from recovery, not by the efforts of the Hellcat groups, but by the unceasing, and costly sacrifices made by the B-24s, B-25s Beauforts and A-20s (and other strike aircraft) that just kept attacking no matter what. It was not won by a group of johny come lately Hellcats that arrived late for the party, and at the beginning were inneffective. 

By postponing the Hellcats entry, for 1943 you are giving up the loss of a very few aircraft. By adding a few moree carriers with F4fs as the fighter component, you are maintaining the pressure at a time when the japanese cannot effectively resist. 



> As for the building of the BB's I can understand the Iowas going ahead. All the contracts for the purchase and build would have been signed and the cash saved would have been little and the shipbuilding capacity was in place.



The Iowas were not authorized and financed until FY41 and FY42. A couplewere authorized FY43 but were cancellled along with the Montanas. The US could just as easily have ordered carriers in place of the Iowas. You could have 3 or 4 Yorktowns for every one Iowa. That makes no sense in my book


----------



## Aozora (May 5, 2013)

parsifal said:


> We dont actually know the development cost of the Hellcat, but its going to be somewhere between$100 and 200 million. For that first year of production - 1943, the cost of 1000 F4Fs will be $500 give or take ( in 1943 dollars). For the same Hellcats, in the same time frame,. but factoring in the estimated development costs, the overall cost of the 1000 F6Fs is about $700 million, or about 40% more



You're waaaaay overestimating design and development costs, by at least a factor of 100. For instance, in 1934 the Air Board granted Boeing $275,000 for the design and development of the Boeing Model 299 the prototype of four engine heavy bomber which later became the B-17 - an additional $400,000 came out of Boeing's own funds: designing and developing the prototype took 153,000 man hours and $675,000. 1940 Contract for designing Northrop XP-61 = $1,367,000. Contract for designing and developing P-47 = $550,512. Grumman F7F = $1,077,400. $100 to 200 million for the F6F, which was basically an extrapolation of the F4F using many of the same construction techniques and design features and which would have been able to use the same tooling? = yougottabekiddingright!?

Assuming the F6F-3 cost $50,000 thus 1,000 x 50,000 = 50,000,000 ie; 50 million not 500 million.

O


----------



## Shortround6 (May 5, 2013)

parsifal said:


> A6M5 did not enter significant squadron service until March 1944. From the end of the campaign in Guadacanal, until the introduction of the A6m5....about 13 months, the main operational type was the A6m3, which was midway between the A6m2 and the A6M5 in terms of top speed and gernal performance. But in reality there was not a lot of difference between the A6M5 and the earlier A6M2.
> 
> From the beginning of the war until mid 1943 the Japanese had lost 6200 aircraft. Their production and pilot training schemes was barely keeping pace with losses. This was against mostly types of indifferent quality.....F4Fs, and P-40s for the most part. More importantly, the quality of the pilots in that early part of the Pacific war was much higher than in the later part. These types were easily handling the challenges being thrown up by the Japanese throughour 1943.




And this is pretty much the heart of the matter. The Japanese not only dropped the ball on aircraft development, they kicked it out of bounds high up into the stands. 

We know _NOW_ that the F4F may have been able to soldier on but if the Japanese had been a bit more on the ball (or stopped chasing pie in the sky fighters) depending on the F4F could have turned out very badly. 

The Zero went from a 950-1000hp engine to a 1130hp engine very soon and then stalled for almost 4 years (actually did stall, the A5M8 never made production). Depending on the Japanese to NOT develop a 1300-1400hp Zero in 1943-44 would be poor planning. 

Similarly the JAAF dropped the ball and kicked it out of bounds. over 5,000 Ki 43s were 3-4,000 too many. Depending on the Japanese to KEEP a 1100hp two gun fighter as their MAIN fighter until 1944 would also be poor planning on the US part. 

The US would still have won but it would have been a much harder, more costly battle.


----------



## parsifal (May 5, 2013)

You have got to be kidding. Youve omitted the cost of setting up the dies and presses, the costs associated with setting up the factory spaces and delivery systems, the costs of developing trainers and training systems. Moreover comparing development costs in 1934, under peacetime conditions has no relationship to developing under the streeses of wartime conditions. 

We once had to develop a new fridge handle for a domestic refrigerator. It cost over a million dollars just in design work and a further five million in setting up the production lines to assemble that. Thats from the 1970s, and my source was my late father. 

The B-29 cost $3 billion in 1940s dollars to develop

http://forum.armyairforces.com/Desi...arison-B29-Superfortress-to-Manhattan-m218316

Some typical costs for aircraft types is available here

Price of WW2 Aircraft | C Strohmeyer's Weblog; Life, Business

For the Hellcat there was a bit of an issue, they needed to develop new engines to make it fly, which had to have added costs to the basic development. 


The following article is also worth a look. Relevantly it states

"On a mid-1941 visit to Great Britain, General H.H. Arnold assured the British that
the United States would not lag behind the great air powers of the world in the quality of
its equipment. Thus in May 1941, the Materiel Division urged manufacturers to push for
full exploitation of research and development. Once the United States entered into war,
the renewed need for production resurfaced. The dilemma of the search for the “more and
better” weapons was overshadowed by the “quantity versus quality” issue"


Thats intersting, because given the timing of the statemnent, it was a comment obviously directed toward the amounts of money being spent by the Germans in their R&D budget. In 1940 the germans wewre spending 1 in 5 of their Luftwaffe budget on R&D. In 1940 they allocated RM5200 million to the LW, which means they were spending about RM1.0 Billion on R&D. Converting RM to dollars is very difficult, but a rate of about 3 to 1 is probably as good as any. At that rate the Germans were spending $300 million or so on R&D alone each year, so it makes a lot of sense that the USN would spend $2-300 million on their reseaerch given Hap Arnolds comments. 

http://www.taphilo.com/history/WWII/USAAF/stats/warproduction.pdf

As far as me not being able to add up, well, ill give you that one...


----------



## parsifal (May 5, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> And this is pretty much the heart of the matter. The Japanese not only dropped the ball on aircraft development, they kicked it out of bounds high up into the stands.
> 
> We know _NOW_ that the F4F may have been able to soldier on but if the Japanese had been a bit more on the ball (or stopped chasing pie in the sky fighters) depending on the F4F could have turned out very badly.
> 
> ...



DG said the same thing, more or less,and I had to agree with him. As i agree with you. Ive modified my position a little because of that.......there isnt a need to abandon the Hellcat, but it wasnt absolutely necessary in August or September 1943. There is a stronger case for later in the war, but not mid-'43. Moreover Roosevelt was saying exactly what Im saying.....dont delay production pursuing unrealistic new designs......make do with the designs you have for the moment.

No denying that from the perspective of 1940, the USN needed the Hellcat. But ther is also no denying they needed more cariers, lots of em, and fast. In this regard it was the Americans that dropped the ball. Ordering just one carrier as war clouds were looming.....what were they thinking!!!!!

Like all these things, some kind of bal;ance is really what was needed. Thats why im saying dont cancel the F6F.....its way too effective to allow that, but defer it until after CV9, 10 11 and 12 had been voted into the budget. Better yet, cancel the Essex class and build repeat Yorktowns in 1940. At half the cost of an essex, they are the best value carriers the US ever produced.


----------



## drgondog (May 5, 2013)

Glider said:


> Sorry but I must disagree with any thought of delaying the F6. There are debates all around over the Zero vs the F4 but suffice it to say that the advantages of one were more than matched by the advantages of the other. However if you delay the F6 then you are talking about the F4 going up against the A6M5 which was a lot faster then the F4 (or FM2), daved as fast and maintained its advantage in agility.
> 
> You are giving the aerial advantage back to the IJN
> 
> As for the building of the BB's I can understand the Iowas going ahead. All the contracts for the purchase and build would have been signed and the cash saved would have been little and the shipbuilding capacity was in place. The Alaskas though I do agree were a huge waste of resources. More cruisers to give flexibility and AA cover would have been cheaper.



Glider - the F4U was in production. USN designated it the Ensign Killer as it struggled in Sea Trials, even as Brits approved it - but one simple fact remains. The USN could have done very well with F4U on carriers in late 1942/early 1943 and never missed a beat to the end of the War.. more operation accidents? - Yes. .. better air to air capability vs IJN in 1943?... - Hell Yes. Simplified logistics? - Yes.

I'm not disagreeing your argument of F4F vs F6F, just pointing to a better alternative relative to a.) procurement dollars, and b.) significant leap in Fleet Air performance earlier than F6F.


----------



## wuzak (May 5, 2013)

I don't have much infor on development costs.

Except these from _American Secret Pusher Fighters of World War II_:

The XP-54 preliminary engineering data and wind tunnel models were purchased by the USAAC for $39,700. The initial contract cost for building the XP-54 was $647,343.

The USAAC requested that the XP-54 feature a pressurised cabin. This was added later with a fixed price contract of $125,000.

Still less than $1m for an aircraft that is far more complicated than the F6F.

The XP-55 phase 1 contract (engineering data and powered wind tunnel model) was $44,000.
The Army weren't convinced so didn't continue teh program at that time. Curtiss proceeded with a small scale test bed with their own funds. Eventually the USAAC started the program up again and contracted $1,222,894 with Curtiss for 3 prototypes and 1 mockup.

The initial contract cost for the XP-56 was $361,500, for one prototype. A second prototype was added to teh program, but I can't see for what cost just at the moment. The program, like the others, had major cost overruns. Nearly $240k in additional funding was required. But the XP-56 was a highly experimental aircraft which used new materials (magnesium) and new manufacturing techniques (truly stressed skin monocoque, all welded using a process Northrop had to invent!).


----------



## Aozora (May 5, 2013)

parsifal said:


> You have got to be kidding. Youve omitted the cost of setting up the dies and presses, the costs associated with setting up the factory spaces and delivery systems, the costs of developing trainers and training systems. Moreover comparing development costs in 1934, under peacetime conditions has no relationship to developing under the streeses of wartime conditions.
> 
> As far as me not being able to add up, well, ill give you that one...


 
No, you've got to be kidding to say that setting up dies and presses etc, plus factory space etc cost at least 100 times that of design and development, when much of the available tooling and factory space was already available - the biggest costs would be transferring production of the F4F and TBM to General Motors and building a new plant, no 3, for the Hellcat. As an example of building a new factory from scratch in 1940 it cost Ford $14.3 million to build _and_ tool up a huge new factory for the R-2800. 

Setting up and resetting dies and presses, which were already in use for the F4F, would not have cost hundreds or even tens of millions because they are not being built from scratch - taking your fridge handle analogy, it would cost, say, 5 times the cost of Hellcat design and development. In total your $700 million, give or take, is still waaay over the likely costs of design, development, production and distribution of the first 1,000 Hellcats

And I did include other design and developments costs, including the F7F which was a little more complex than the F6F, and was designed and developed under the "stresses of wartime conditions"



parsifal said:


> For the Hellcat there was a bit of an issue, they needed to develop new engines to make it fly, which had to have added costs to the basic development.


The R-2800 had already been designed and developed and was already flying and well tested in several thousand aircraft. The -10 and propeller used by the F6F-3 was identical to the -8 already being used by the F4U, except for a downdraft carburettor.


----------



## parsifal (May 5, 2013)

so the germans are spending $300 million on development, your claiming the US was spending pin money to develop their crop of aircraft. I take it therefore that Hap Arnold lied to the british, and the Americans are genius's able to develop all aircraft for next to nothing (except the b-29, which cost billions for some inexplicable reason), sorry im not buying what your tryng to sell. if that were the case, we would see aircraft types in WWII every 6 months instead of trying to spin existing types out for 20 years or more, even in WWII


----------



## Glider (May 5, 2013)

drgondog said:


> Glider - the F4U was in production. USN designated it the Ensign Killer as it struggled in Sea Trials, even as Brits approved it - but one simple fact remains. The USN could have done very well with F4U on carriers in late 1942/early 1943 and never missed a beat to the end of the War.. more operation accidents? - Yes. .. better air to air capability vs IJN in 1943?... - Hell Yes. Simplified logistics? - Yes.
> 
> I'm not disagreeing your argument of F4F vs F6F, just pointing to a better alternative relative to a.) procurement dollars, and b.) significant leap in Fleet Air performance earlier than F6F.



Hard to disagree with this.


----------



## Aozora (May 5, 2013)

parsifal said:


> so the germans are spending $300 million on development, your claiming the US was spending pin money to develop their crop of aircraft. I take it therefore that Hap Arnold lied to the british, and the Americans are genius's able to develop all aircraft for next to nothing (except the b-29, which cost billions for some inexplicable reason), sorry im not buying what your tryng to sell. if that were the case, we would see aircraft types in WWII every 6 months instead of trying to spin existing types out for 20 years or more, even in WWII


 
R D quite clearly means more than R D on designing and building prototypes; it includes the whole range of aeronautical research including designing and building engines, which, during the 1930s/40s, was a lot more expensive than designing airframes, research into aerodynamic theory and development etc etc. How do you think NACA, for example, was funded? I'm not buying your $700 million for _one_ fighter - well over twice the entire German R&D budget for their_ entire _aircraft industry.

The B-29 cost so much because everything about it was brand new; physically, aerodynamically and in engineering terms almost everything had to be designed from scratch, tested and developed for production, including developing and attempting to de-bug the engines alongside of the aircraft. Several new factories - not just one, each much larger than the Grumman plant for the F6F. Also five airfields built in China at a cost of $200 million because of the graft and corruption endemic to the process, while there were other unknown costs on top of that, plus developing the supply lines in areas where there was no logistical support for an aircraft like the B-29: after the China debacle the whole lot had to be moved to the Marianas with new airfields, yet more supply lines etc etc. - the B-29 was a whole new ball game compared with designing and building a fighter which was using existing design and construction techniques and a well developed engine.

Please, point me to WW 2 aircraft which were designed to suffice for 20 years.


----------



## VBF-13 (May 5, 2013)

drgondog said:


> Glider - the F4U was in production. USN designated it the Ensign Killer as it struggled in Sea Trials, even as Brits approved it - but one simple fact remains. The USN could have done very well with F4U on carriers in late 1942/early 1943 and never missed a beat to the end of the War.. more operation accidents? - Yes. .. better air to air capability vs IJN in 1943?... - Hell Yes. Simplified logistics? - Yes.
> 
> I'm not disagreeing your argument of F4F vs F6F, just pointing to a better alternative relative to a.) procurement dollars, and b.) significant leap in Fleet Air performance earlier than F6F.


You're painting with way, way too broad a brush. Beware of the conclusions you reach. 

Let's get back to the carriers and the F4Fs, for a moment, and touch again on that theory. On the carriers, are we playing a game, or do we really want to know? If we really want to know, we think of things like this. You referenced earlier our performance at Coral Sea and Midway. We lost carriers, there, sure. They didn't get the Enterprise, did they? You guys go on about our sacrificing carrier-building for the F6F. What do you think we were doing? We commissioned the Princeton and Essex in 1942, the Franklin and Independence in 1944, and a plethora of other, lighter carriers, in between. We were building carriers. The way this theory goes, we stopped. On the F4Fs, improve them? How? They ended up through two manufacturers, and they couldn't be improved, but marginally. Grumman knew that. That's why the F6Fs.

Now let's get to this pilot-training advantage the U.S supposedly had over these poorer-trained Japanese pilots as also referenced in Wikipedia of all things and totally-unsupported in fact (follow the citation, and see it for yourself). I already went over that, but evidently it didn't get across. Again, go back to Parsifal's post #145. Look at "150 hours," in January 1944. What do you think that was, they took somebody off the street and put him in a Zeke and he's a pilot? That was after three months on trainers, which was after three months on biplanes, which was after three months physical training, which was after three months classroom instruction--or, if it wasn't that, that's close enough to what it was. That "150 hours" was 50 hours more than the U.S. pilots had in our combat aircraft. In January 1944, they were still ahead of us in pilot-training. If you can trust that "150 hours," that's what that means.

Let's finish here with the Zeke. It could turn inside anything. It was also very, very hard to hit. Think of trying to hit a falling feather. Those are the kinds of descriptions I've heard, over and over. And, it had longevity. It was built right, that's why. Credit the manufacturer for that. Hell, I have a 27-year-old Mitsubishi TV. I wouldn't trade it for anything.

PS: I debate TVs, too...


----------



## Glider (May 5, 2013)

USAAF Training was about 260 hours and the USN a bit more than that as they had to deck qualify which obviously took extra time and practice. There were some comments earlier in the thread about there being slack in the RAF training scheme. The only reply I can give is that I wish it was so. From roughly the end of the BOB to mid 1942 RAF training wasn't as good as the US training but after that it at least matched it. If there was any slack in the RAF system it was used to try and fill the gaps in the training given.


----------



## parsifal (May 6, 2013)

> R D quite clearly means more than R D on designing and building prototypes; it includes the whole range of aeronautical research including designing and building engines, which, during the 1930s/40s, was a lot more expensive than designing airframes, research into aerodynamic theory and development etc etc. How do you think NACA, for example, was funded? I'm not buying your $700 million for _one_ fighter - well over twice the entire German R&D budget for their_ entire _aircraft industry.




I agree that engine development was a significant cost area in the research side of the equation, but I dont buy the argument that the R2800 was an "off the shelf" design so it doesnt enter into the cost analysis for the Hellcat. The fact that this engine was used in other aircraft does represent a cost saving overall, but in the context of 1940-42, the only other aircraft that were using it....albeit in an experimental way, were the P-47, F4u and F6F. Even though R2800 was designed for Kartvelli's, and the F4U preceded the F6F in terms of prototype development, it was the hellcat that was either the first, or one of the first types to use it operationally. Further, Grumman wasted more than 18months trying to perfect the "Turbosupercharged" R2600.

Im reasonably certain now that the figures you are quoting are for prototype deliver, and not the development costs. Case in point is the b-17. The individual unit cost of a B-17, mid 1943 was $201000 USD without communications or armament. Some sources say the cost was in excess of $350000. I suspect the huge differences arise from either the time scale, or what you were actually buying. But I dont think it valid to try and claim that the development work needed to get the very first Type 299 (in adjusted 1940 dollars) was less or even slightly more than the unit costs of the completed design. There are hidden costs you are choosing to ignore here 

Very much the case with the Hellcat. Its development stems back to the F4F2, extends through to the aerodynamic studies for the F4U, must take into account the immediate predecessor of the hellcat, the XF5F, which eventually completely foundered, though parts of the work done on it were used in the Tigercat. There were three XF6F-1 prototypes that I know of, and i belive similar numbers of XF6F-2 9only based on a photo, I admit that is captioned "XF6F-2 in flight, and shows threee of them....maybe youve got better data on that) and a similar number of XF6F-3s. If the numbers of protoypes comes to 9.....$50000 dollars aint going to cut it for even one prototype. And thats without even looking at the technology development.

Ive managed to dig out the history of plant number 3. I'll give a bit more backgropund tonite, but I can tell you it cost a lot more than $14 million. It was begun in 1941, aimed at employing 20000 workers in that one plant, and was complete or nearly complete at the end of 1941. It wasnt comissioned until June 1942, but was already undertaking component manufacture from January. That makes sense...the company would be busy training its workforce , which would include plant executives, skilled labour, semiskilled labour and unskilled labour. Involved in a secondary way would be the construction workers actually building the plant....it took almost a year to complete, and the various tradesman and other workers needed to actually set up the production lines . Iam not certain but its easy to see that at least 30000 workers, either directly or indirectly would be invollved in the construction and in training and eventual component manufacture for at least two year. Kets be conservative and assume the average wage of each worker was $20 per week, and only 20000 on average were employed in setting up the factory. 100weeks x 20000 workers x $20 per week is $4000000 for astart (and that doesnt include things like materials costs, licence fees, goivernment charges and the like). Not part of the research budget, but most definately part of the development basket. And remember, production of the F6F till the end of 1941 was an astounding 10 aircraft......by how many workers?

As for me claiming $700 million for one type. I never claimed that. I said my best guesstimate of the US Navy's R&D budget was $520 million, of which I thought $250million was an appropriate estimate for aircraft R&D. Note thats R and D...two separate bits to consider. I said that the F6F was a major part of that estimated $250million, and thought it not unreasonable to attribute a $100million cost. Given how the discussion has gone, im prepred to concede that it was probably not as high as $100million. But less than a million? Rubbish!!!! 




> The B-29 cost so much because everything about it was brand new; physically, aerodynamically and in engineering terms almost everything had to be designed from scratch, tested and developed for production, including developing and attempting to de-bug the engines alongside of the aircraft.




No argument that the Superfortress was a massively more complex project than anything that preceded it, but everything you are saying about the B-29 can be applied (albeit with less vigoiur) to the F6F program. 



> Several new factories - not just one, each much larger than the Grumman plant for the F6F. Also five airfields built in China at a cost of $200 million because of the graft and corruption endemic to the process, while there were other unknown costs on top of that, plus developing the supply lines in areas where there was no logistical support for an aircraft like the B-29:



There was only one factory for the F6F, but it was the biggest to date that had been constructed. Why is the b-29 subject to all those other constrictions, and not the F6F (or any other type). sorry, this explanation just does not cut it. 



> after the China debacle the whole lot had to be moved to the Marianas with new airfields, yet more supply lines etc etc. - the B-29 was a whole new ball game compared with designing and building a fighter which was using existing design and construction techniques and a well developed engine


.


These are not development costs, once out the factory it becomes an operational cost. F6F had similar, but less intense issues of its own. Its just that Grumman was very good at solving their problems (pity they cant do that today)




> Please, point me to WW 2 aircraft which were designed to suffice for 20 years.



Spitfire, Me109, P-47, F6F, F4U, P-51. Admittedly some of these were not a full 20 years, and admittedly some were completely redesigned during their life cycle, but on the basis that it only costs "about $50K" to produce a new type in the 1940's why the hell did the owners of these designs stretch them well beyond what their original design specification. the answer is because designing and developing a completely new type is a very expensive excercise, and it was far cheaper and easier to strech existing designs rather than bring in new ones


----------



## Aozora (May 6, 2013)

Mmmm, yeah, guess I can accept up to $100 million - where you threw it way out and made things look a little sqiffy was your $700 million for development + 1,000 F6Fs; as for 1,000 F4Fs costing $500 - yeaeeah the USN would have cheered F4Fs costing 50¢ each! _However_, as with the Spitfire v Hurricane debate I would suggest there were, historically, more constructive alternatives to retarding the development and service introduction of the Hellcat.


----------



## parsifal (May 6, 2013)

Ive learnt something about me over the years Aozora...never trust me with a maths question.....Ive always struggled with those zero numbers.....


----------



## VBF-13 (May 6, 2013)

Glider said:


> USAAF Training was about 260 hours and the USN a bit more than that as they had to deck qualify which obviously took extra time and practice. There were some comments earlier in the thread about there being slack in the RAF training scheme. The only reply I can give is that I wish it was so. From roughly the end of the BOB to mid 1942 RAF training wasn't as good as the US training but after that it at least matched it. If there was any slack in the RAF system it was used to try and fill the gaps in the training given.


I'm talking about in the combat aircraft. A good round number for that for the USN encompassing all types would be around 100 hours. That would apply from January 1943 on. Give one morning or afternoon for their carrier-qualifications. Double those hours if you throw in the trainers and triple them if you include the biplanes.


----------



## drgondog (May 6, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> *Glider - the F4U was in production. USN designated it the Ensign Killer as it struggled in Sea Trials, even as Brits approved it - but one simple fact remains. The USN could have done very well with F4U on carriers in late 1942/early 1943 and never missed a beat to the end of the War.. more operation accidents? - Yes. .. better air to air capability vs IJN in 1943?... - Hell Yes. Simplified logistics? - Yes.
> 
> I'm not disagreeing your argument of F4F vs F6F, just pointing to a better alternative relative to a.) procurement dollars, and b.) significant leap in Fleet Air performance earlier than F6F.*
> 
> ...



Please go back to debating TV's. You will sound more clever and win more arguments. You are debating me on points I haven't expressed, confusing my points with those advanced by others.


----------



## parsifal (May 6, 2013)

sorry DG but sometimes you just crack me up. Remind never to get clever with you please

Sorry VB, but that was funny


----------



## drgondog (May 6, 2013)

Parsifal - one of my favorite girlfriends and long standing dear friend to this day is from Oz. Whenever I wandered into a debate ring from her, she kicked my ass - and still does.

I learned some lessons there and working on New Zealand now...


----------



## VBF-13 (May 6, 2013)

drgondog said:


> Please go back to debating TV's. You will sound more clever and win more arguments. You are debating me on points I haven't expressed, confusing my points with those advanced by others.


Due to your formatting, I can't reference your reply in its entirety, here, as this is the only part that copies. Thus, if you’d care to re-format, you know, try again, by all means, be my guest. If you could do it less antagonistically, so much the better. I’d be more than happy to answer your questions, where I think can.


----------



## drgondog (May 6, 2013)

Try what? I simply pointed out that you weren't debating with me based on any arguments I advanced in the discussion. You picked something up in the ether and the TV you were debating steered you in the wrong direction.

Summary - I didn't Ask you any questions. I wasn't 'writing' to respond to anything you said - that interchange you quoted was between Glider and me. You leaped into the discussion and sank to the bottom of the pool.. you have not experienced 'antagonism' but you stumbled on 'response to the clueless'... 

I have been there before and it taught me some lessons regarding 'answer the question' and also 'don't answer when the question has not been asked'.

Do I need to reformat?


----------



## drgondog (May 6, 2013)

Glider said:


> USAAF Training was about 260 hours and the USN a bit more than that as they had to deck qualify which obviously took extra time and practice. There were some comments earlier in the thread about there being slack in the RAF training scheme. The only reply I can give is that I wish it was so. From roughly the end of the BOB to mid 1942 RAF training wasn't as good as the US training but after that it at least matched it. If there was any slack in the RAF system it was used to try and fill the gaps in the training given.



Glider - I wouldn't be hard on RAF flight training. It wasn't talent that pressed RAF delivery, it was capacity and weather. One of the rare things the US did was get a massive flight training program and infrastructure in play 1938-1939.

After that weather was the dominant differentiator between GB and US conditions.

Not to mention large dollars expended in many trainer airframes to integrate into Primary, Basic and Advanced. GB was strained to get enough Spits, Mossies, Lancs and the other necessities required to fight a war, with neither the manpower or material or manufacturing strength in US. Canada was also a major player.


----------



## beitou (May 6, 2013)

How much combat training did allied pilots get? By that I mean was there any disimiliar aircraft fighting training, sort of WW2 top gun programme or was that left to in service squadron training?


----------



## drgondog (May 6, 2013)

The last step before combat for USAAF was Advanced training in the airlane you would take to combat or close (i.e. P-40 in Advanced, Brief Clobber Collage in ETO, P-51 in combat). When the stateside pilot arrived in ETO up to mid 1944 he went to Goxhill to familiarize himself with ETO standards and doctrine - then he went to his assigned combat org.

No Top Gun until Top Gun and Red Flag during Vietnam.

From Dec 1943 to May 1944 my father had 200 hours in P-40 and AT-6. When he arrived in England he shot 3 touch and go's plus one landing and one take off in a P-51B June 2, reported to 355th FG on June 5th, flew his first combat mssions the next day and shot his first airplane down the next evening (June 6).

By this time most replacement pilots from flight school had 150 hours combined in Primary and Basic, then 100-200 in Advanced before being assigned to a combat group...Fighter pilots were on the high side, multi engine pilots on the low side.


----------



## VBF-13 (May 6, 2013)

drgondog said:


> Try what? I simply pointed out that you weren't debating with me based on any arguments I advanced in the discussion.


Oh, is that what you _simply_ did? Read it, again.



drgondog said:


> You picked something up in the ether and the TV you were debating steered you in the wrong direction.


You are provocative, aren't you? 



drgondog said:


> Summary - I didn't Ask you any questions. I wasn't 'writing' to respond to anything you said - that interchange you quoted was between Glider and me. You leaped into the discussion and sank to the bottom of the pool.. you have not experienced 'antagonism' but you stumbled on 'response to the clueless'...


We have private messaging for private discussions. This is a public forum, the last I checked.



drgondog said:


> I have been there before and it taught me some lessons regarding 'answer the question' and also 'don't answer when the question has not been asked'.


I’ll certainly mind that when it comes to replying to you, not a problem.



drgondog said:


> Do I need to reformat?


No, everything you said copied.


----------



## VBF-13 (May 6, 2013)

beitou said:


> How much combat training did allied pilots get? By that I mean was there any disimiliar aircraft fighting training, sort of WW2 top gun programme or was that left to in service squadron training?


The USN hours were split up the same way, around 100 in the trainers and 100 in the combat aircraft.


----------



## Glider (May 6, 2013)

beitou said:


> How much combat training did allied pilots get? By that I mean was there any disimiliar aircraft fighting training, sort of WW2 top gun programme or was that left to in service squadron training?



This link might be of interest

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/raf-pilot-training-ww2-26347.html


----------



## VBF-13 (May 6, 2013)

drgondog said:


> From Dec 1943 to May 1944 my father had 200 hours in P-40 and AT-6.


Drgondog, may I? Just on this? This would mean our fathers got in at right around the same time. These training hours are remarkably similar. Just substitute the SNJ/SNV for the AT-6 and the SBD for the P-40, and they're bookends. 

PS: And it's my pleasure to make your acquaintance. FWIW...


----------



## parsifal (May 6, 2013)

Ive got a book at home somewhere dealing blow by blow with Phil Sea. I will try and dig it out. but the guy states very clearly that the average hours for the US flyers was about 500 hours of training time and about the same in combat experience. thats about 1000 hours all up. 

Ive also got the Japanese reports I mentioned earlier, which is backed up in the USSBS about Japanese training times. I got the experience levels for early war from Al nofi's book on the Pacific war.

There was a huge difference in experience levels between the average Japanese flyer and the average US flyer. There were a dwndling number of very experienced Japanese flyers who were able to take the zero up and usually survive, and sometimes thrive.....

In Australia, our air force rotated flyers back and forth between OTUs (Operational training Units) and frontline combat units. The new graduates on comletion of their flight training would be assigned to an OTU, where they rubbed shoulders and learnt the trade with the experienced flyers fresh from the front. The idea was that the experienced guys would teach the newbies how to survive. All the books I have read suggest the US used a similar system. It was far superior to both the japanese and German systems, where the poor new r3ecruits were thrown into the front straight from flight school. The difference was this, in the allied (Australian at least ) system the replacements being fed into the frontline formations had a modicum of survival skill passed onto them by the surviving verterans that had flown with themn at OTU.

There is no comparison between the unit capabilities of axis to allies in the early war, compared to the unit capabilities of axis to allies late in the war. And further, the japanese Air forces were so elitist at the beginning that they actualkly became vulnerable to losses....they couldnt replace the losses to attrition as efficiently as the allies. Its the same reason that the numbers game will win every time....the Japanese aircrew numbers had no depth, and so were susceptible to attritional losses. Thats precisely how they lost, not some magical uber fighter. That helped, because it sped up the attrition rate....it didnt cause or begin the attrition. The Japanese were already bled white before the Hellcat ever arrived on the scene


----------



## bobbysocks (May 6, 2013)

drgondog said:


> Brief Clobber Collage in ETO, P-51 in combat
> 
> *did he get clobber college at Goxhill or when he got to the 355ths base?? like your dad, mine only got a couple hours "familarzation" time in a war weary 51B before heading to the group. there he got a few more but not that much time before his first mission. i talked to guys who went in afterwards and they got a lot more hours and some actual training in tactics at clobber college.*
> 
> ...



i dont know how they had it set up when your dad got to the UK. but later on the replacement pilots were in a "waiting pool" and as they needed replacements the fighter groups (both 8th and 9th AFs..and maybe even the 15th??) would send up a representative to pitch for their group. basically the only reason my dad went to the 357th was they needed 9 pilots and he was in a group with 8 other guys that went through training together. they volunteered to go there so they could all be in the same group.


----------



## drgondog (May 7, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> Drgondog, may I? Just on this? This would mean our fathers got in at right around the same time. These training hours are remarkably similar. Just substitute the SNJ/SNV for the AT-6 and the SBD for the P-40, and they're bookends.
> 
> PS: And it's my pleasure to make your acquaintance. FWIW...



My father was in Class 40-A for Cadet Training and graduated from flight school in March 1941. Snatched into Training command as an instructor and languaished there unto he commanded the 322 AAFFTTD in Miami Ok (RAF/RCAF Primary Basic Flight Training school, and esaped Training Command by volunteering for B-26s in August 1943. Then to Fighters in Nove 1943 and on to ETO in May 1944.


----------



## VBF-13 (May 7, 2013)

drgondog said:


> My father was in Class 40-A for Cadet Training and graduated from flight school in March 1941. Snatched into Training command as an instructor and languaished there unto he commanded the 322 AAFFTTD in Miami Ok (RAF/RCAF Primary Basic Flight Training school, and esaped Training Command by volunteering for B-26s in August 1943. Then to Fighters in Nove 1943 and on to ETO in May 1944.


Ah. I was figuring your father for induction in 1942, just going straight up through the program, so to speak. I see.


----------



## drgondog (May 7, 2013)

bobbysocks said:


> i dont know how they had it set up when your dad got to the UK. but later on the replacement pilots were in a "waiting pool" and as they needed replacements the fighter groups (both 8th and 9th AFs..and maybe even the 15th??) would send up a representative to pitch for their group. basically the only reason my dad went to the 357th was they needed 9 pilots and he was in a group with 8 other guys that went through training together. they volunteered to go there so they could all be in the same group.



In Advanced, at Sarasota, he had only 4 1/2 hours of AT-6 and 4 hours in a BC-1 and speculate it was instrument "under the hood" time. When he first started training in the P-40 he already had more than 1800 hours and a lot of AT-6, BT-13 and B-26 time (~400 hours each) to add to about 400 hours of PT-19 time as an instructor pilot.

Most pilots did go into a pool while at FTG, but my father was fast tracked by Clay Kinnard who was at that time 355th Deputy CO who was anxious to get him there.


----------



## VBF-13 (May 7, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Ive got a book at home somewhere dealing blow by blow with Phil Sea. I will try and dig it out. but the guy states very clearly that the average hours for the US flyers was about 500 hours of training time and about the same in combat experience. thats about 1000 hours all up.
> 
> Ive also got the Japanese reports I mentioned earlier, which is backed up in the USSBS about Japanese training times. I got the experience levels for early war from Al nofi's book on the Pacific war.
> 
> There was a huge difference in experience levels between the average Japanese flyer and the average US flyer. There were a dwndling number of very experienced Japanese flyers who were able to take the zero up and usually survive, and sometimes thrive...



Oh, boy, now we’re right on top of it. The Battle of the Philippine Sea. That’s the one that really bothers you, isn’t it? Tell you what, let’s go there. I’ll ask the questions, you find the answers.

It’s 19 June 1944. Those pilots on both sides were inducted, when? They were inducted in the Summer to Fall 1942. How do we know that? That’s how long it took.

The Summer to Fall 1942 was six to nine months out from the bombing of Pearl Harbor. The Japanese, just as we, were training new pilots, every day, before, during, and after Pearl Harbor. They had the population, the boys, just as we had. They had their “Pensacola,” too. I don’t recall bombing their training stations. Do you? 



parsifal said:


> There is no comparison between the unit capabilities of axis to allies in the early war, compared to the unit capabilities of axis to allies late in the war. And further, the japanese Air forces were so elitist at the beginning that they actualkly became vulnerable to losses....they couldnt replace the losses to attrition as efficiently as the allies. Its the same reason that the numbers game will win every time....the Japanese aircrew numbers had no depth, and so were susceptible to attritional losses. Thats precisely how they lost, not some magical uber fighter. That helped, because it sped up the attrition rate....it didnt cause or begin the attrition. The Japanese were already bled white before the Hellcat ever arrived on the scene


Moving on, 545 aircraft, 408 go down, we lose 38. In a single day. According to Ray Spruance. Do you think our F4Fs and FMs could have done that? We were equal in pilot training. Don’t forget that. We lost experienced pilots from Pearl Harbor through Midway, too. The Japanese weren’t the only ones. Were they?

Think about it...


----------



## bobbysocks (May 7, 2013)

drgondog said:


> In Advanced, at Sarasota, he had only 4 1/2 hours of AT-6 and 4 hours in a BC-1 and speculate it was instrument "under the hood" time. When he first started training in the P-40 he already had more than 1800 hours and a lot of AT-6, BT-13 and B-26 time (~400 hours each) to add to about 400 hours of PT-19 time as an instructor pilot.
> 
> Most pilots did go into a pool while at FTG, but my father was fast tracked by Clay Kinnard who was at that time 355th Deputy CO who was anxious to get him there.



ah, i never realized your dad was an instructor...that changes things dramatically. i knew a couple guys who were in the same boat....had to jump through some hoops to get from being a trainer to the eto.


----------



## bobbysocks (May 7, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> Moving on, 545 aircraft, 408 go down, we lose 38. In a single day. According to Ray Spruance. Do you think our F4Fs and FMs could have done that? We were equal in pilot training. Don’t forget that. We lost experienced pilots from Pearl Harbor through Midway, too. The Japanese weren’t the only ones. Were they?
> 
> Think about it...



ok now i have to ask as i dont really know....how many planes and pilots did we lose in the PTO between pearl and midway? and how many did the IJN lose? i am going to venture a guess and say the japanese could not field as many airmen as the US could.....we had enough resources to let airmen do so many missions and go home. the germans and japanese didnt have this kind of resource to draw from.


----------



## drgondog (May 7, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> Moving on, 545 aircraft, 408 go down, we lose 38. In a single day. According to Ray Spruance. Do you think our F4Fs and FMs could have done that? We were equal in pilot training. Don’t forget that. We lost experienced pilots from Pearl Harbor through Midway, too. The Japanese weren’t the only ones. Were they?
> 
> Think about it...



Think about 200 downed for 76 losses in F4F. Which country replaces losses fastest. Which country (except for relatives of pilots lost) loses critical resource the most and placed in the worst tactical situation for the 'next' battle, and the 'next', and the 'next'.

Parsifal is addressing the fact that FM's and F4F's weren't ideal but they could at that stage of the war continue to be formidable if not overpowering against IJN - without F6F.


----------



## drgondog (May 7, 2013)

Yes. Another top ace for the 355th, Gordy Graham, had exactly the same path. When he came to the group my father was 354FS CO and wearing the hat of Deputy Group CO to replave Kinnard - Vice Stewart, as well as Dragon at the gate giving check rides to bomber pilots transitioning to 2SF. Gordy later made three stars.

Gordy labored under another handicap, namely having the nickname "Ace" when he came to the Group.. loaded with real 'aces'...but he flew every position in the squadron including Blue 4 at ass end and earned the respect of the Squadron. He became a 'real ace' (air) in a little over four months when there weren't a lot of opportunites until late November through Mid January.


----------



## parsifal (May 7, 2013)

drgondog said:


> Think about 200 downed for 76 losses in F4F. Which country replaces losses fastest. Which country (except for relatives of pilots lost) loses critical resource the most and placed in the worst tactical situation for the 'next' battle, and the 'next', and the 'next'.
> 
> Parsifal is addressing the fact that FM's and F4F's weren't ideal but they could at that stage of the war continue to be formidable if not overpowering against IJN - without F6F.



Not sure if this helps, but it gives a broad overview of the training regimes for each nation.

At Phil Sea the losses were very one sided. Gotta bear in mind that this was a significant moment in the war. Japanese strikes were badly co-ordinated, and with orders to ignore the American fighters. they US victory was asmuch about excellent fighter control and dense flak defences as it was about the unquestionable high quality fighter control and the good quality aircraft. 

More US aircraft than 35 were lost due to non-combat reasons than combat reasons. In the riposte when the US CAGs struck back, many aircraft....from memory about 114 were ditched because they tried to hit the Carriers at long range and then got lost in the fading light. Which just underlines the point that even though it was the zenith of Hellcat success, they still could not get the better of the "other causes" reasons for lost aircraft. Attrition still remained the main reason for US losses. Not sure about the japanese on this occasion, I just dont have the data for their non-combat losses. It had tobe high, because some estimates put the losses to the japanese to the dfending cap at just over 100. These have to be estimates, we just dont know how effective each element of the defenses were. 

By the time the US hit the 1st Mobile Fleet, there were just 35 Japanese fighters left, to fight well over 200. These guys were the last of the last of the Japanese experienced fliers. They fought like tigers, and were very effective in their zeroes. They limited the damage to the now completely disorganized, and vulnerable Japannese fleet, to just one carrier. The Japanese should have lost everything by rights, but their fliers performed so well, and fought the US so effectively that they managed to get most of their ships out of Dodge

The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia: Aircraft Pilots


----------



## RCAFson (May 7, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Done some preliminary investigation into the naval appropriations and ship construction costs. These are more online notes than anythng cohernet just yet, but i thought it worthwhile to post just the same....
> 
> Janes (1944) has the following entries regarding ship costs and naval appropriations
> 
> ...



I haven't found the cost of F6F production, but I did run across an interesting figure; Castle Bromwich (the factory built for Spitfire II production) cost over 4 million pounds or about $20 million US, however taking into account relative costs ( a KGV class battleship cost 7 million pounds) it seems likely that Castle Bromwich, if built in the USA would have equalled an Essex class carrier in cost.


----------



## parsifal (May 7, 2013)

drgondog said:


> Yes. Another top ace for the 355th, Gordy Graham, had exactly the same path. When he came to the group my father was 354FS CO and wearing the hat of Deputy Group CO to replave Kinnard - Vice Stewart, as well as Dragon at the gate giving check rides to bomber pilots transitioning to 2SF. Gordy later made three stars.
> 
> Gordy labored under another handicap, namely having the nickname "Ace" when he came to the Group.. loaded with real 'aces'...but he flew every position in the squadron including Blue 4 at ass end and earned the respect of the Squadron. He became a 'real ace' (air) in a little over four months when there weren't a lot of opportunites until late November through Mid January.



In relation to the salient question that was put to you "could the F4fs do as well?" not individually, but collectively yes. By mid 1944, the key limit on American force projection was not aircraft numbers, or pilots, or pilot experience. by the time of Phil sea, the Americans were in plentiful supply of all three. The biggest constraint holding them back was carrier numbers. If the USN had access to a further 4 carriers at that time, a not unreasonable assumption given the earlier discussions, but equipped with F4Fs rather than F6Fs, instead of fielding 956 a/c for the battle, they would have been fielding about 1250 a/c for the battle. Instead of (roughly) 500 Hellcats in the CAP force, there would have at least 750 fighters to call in. To understand what the Japanese were up against, you have to understand the details of their attack. They had counted on significant intervention by Kakutas LBA assets to weaken the American defences preemptively. This never happened, lthough Kakuta lied that he was attacking and inflicting damage on 5th fleet. 

So, we can pretty much disregard Kakutas efforts. What then were the compositions of the 4 main raids of 1st mobile fleet? How do they compare to the expected opposition, or the projected opposition that would be put up by a CAP consisting of at least 750 Wildcats. 

Here are the broad details of the 4 raids undertaken by Ozawa

A/c attacjhed to the various 1st mob fleet :476

at least 20 search aircraft lost to "other causes....did not return"


"The first Japanese strike (Raid I), consisting 16 Zero fighters, 45 Zero fighter-bombers, and 8 Jills, was launched at 0830 by Carrier Division 3. These were detected by American radar at 1000 at a distance of over 150 miles (280 km). Mitscher promptly recalled the fighters over Guam and, at 1019, gave the order to launch all available fighters from his carriers. All carrier groups turned into the wind and commenced launching at 1023, with the Japanese 75 miles (140 km) away. The Japanese strike paused to regroup at about this time, giving the Americans time to stack their fighters at a suitable altitude for interception and to fly off all bombers on their flight decks. Raid I was intercepted by over 30 fighters and lost 42 aircraft to the Hellcats and the American antiaircraft fire (estimated losses to AA are 14), at a cost to the Americans of a single fighter and a bomb hit on South Dakota that killed 27 men but did negligible structural damage.

Strike - 69 a/c
Escort 16 zeroes
CAP 30 Hellcats
Losses to a/c 28
losses to AA 14
Total Japanese losses :42
Returned: 27 a/c

The second Japanese strike (Raid II) was the largest of the day. It was launched from Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 at 0856 and was composed of 53 Judys, 27 Jills, and 48 Zeros. Raid II made the mistake of flying over the Japanese van group and lost two aircraft to friendly fire from the nervous gunners. Another eight were damaged and forced to return to their carriers. Raid II was detected by American radar at 1107 at a distance of 115 miles (210 km) was intercepted at 60 miles (110 km) by the Hellcats, which shot down about 70 Japanese aircraft. The surviving Japanese wasted much of their firepower on unsuccessful attacks on picket destroyer Stockham, then attacked Lee's battle line. One Jill struck Indiana at the waterline, but its torpedo failed to explode. A small group of Judys broke through to Montgomery's task group and scored some very near misses on Wasp and Bunker Hill. The Japanese lost a total of 97 aircraft from Raid II.

Strike - 128 a/c
Escort 48 zeroes
CAP (Unknown) Hellcats
Losses to a/c 70
losses to AA 27 9estiated) 
Friendly fire: 10 (8 damaged)
Total Japanese losses :97
Returned: 31



Raid III was launched at 1000 from Carrier Division 2 and consisted of 15 Zero fighters, 25 Zero fighter-bombers, and 7 Jills. This group was diverted too far north by a garbled report from the third reconnaissance group. Most returned to their carriers, but about 20 received a corrected sighting report and turned south, avoiding Lee's battle line and attack Clark's task group. They were detected 99 miles (180 km) out and intercepted at 1300 at a distance of 50 miles (90 km) by 40 Hellcats. Seven Japanese aircraft were lost.


At this point there was a brief lull in the battle, during which Mitscher sent out a search mission. It failed to find the Japanese fleet.

Strike - 47 a/c
Escort 15 zeroes
CAP 40 Hellcats
Losses to a/c 7
losses to AA 0 
Friendly fire: 0 
Total Japanese losses :7
Returned: 40



Raid IV was launched at 1100 from Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2. It consisted of 30 Zero fighters, 9 Judys, 27 Vals, 10 Zero fighter-bombers, and 6 Jills. These were also mislead by the garbled sighting report from the third reconnaissance group and found no targets at first. One group headed for Rota. On the way, they ran across Montgomery's task group but were unable to score any hits. A somewhat larger group headed for Guam. These aircraft had already jettisoned their ordnance in preparation for landing when they were intercepted by 27 Hellcats from Cowpens, Essex, and Hornet. Many of the Japanese planes had lowered their landing gear and were sitting ducks. The Hellcats destroyed 30 out of the 49 aircraft, and the remaining 19 landed in such a damaged state that they were judged beyond repair. A total of 73 aircraft out of the 82 in Raid IV were destroyed or damaged beyond repair".

Strike - 82 a/c
Escort 30 zeroes
CAP 27 Hellcats
Losses to a/c 30
losses to AA 24(????) 
Friendly fire: 0 
Crashed: 19
Total Japanese losses :73
Returned: 9

According to these accounts, by the Japanese, they had about 75 fighters aircraft available for CAP operations when the Americans. 31 aircraft had been held back during the day as defending CAP, so out of the 107+31 survivors, 75 were fighters ready and available for CAP operations that afternoon. There were 116 Zero fighters, so despite all that effort by the USN, very successful I will say, they had managed to destroy about 50-60 fighters during the offensive phase of the operations. fighter losses were approaching that number at Santa Cruz with around 38 F4fs, poorly controlled, in the box seat. 

It should be very clear that the Japanese airstrikes did not stand a chance, regardless of whether there were F6Fs, or F4fs waiting for them. Id even suggest that Buffaloes could have done the job


----------



## Aozora (May 7, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Some pages back i posted figures for the budget of FY41 (the "11% Construction plan) and the subsequent Vinson plan (the so called "70% expansion plan") which was to become the build plan for FY42 but was brought forward to April 1941.
> 
> In FY 41 the Americans gave 960 million USD to the Navy. Of that they spent 406 million on major warship construction . They allocated around 50 million to base upgrades and other ancillary work. Just one carrier, or 68 million, was authorised
> 
> ...


 
Not much point in looking at FY '41 spending while talking about having three additional carriers and their airgroups at the end of 1942. What's wrong with at least two-three additional carriers and airgroups by, say, March 1942? 

Funding for the _Yorktown_ Class (_Yorktown_ and _Enterprise_ (CV6 7)) was in FY '34, with _Hornet (CV8 )_ being added in FY '39; the latter was laid down 25/9/39 and commissioned 20/10/41. It was these, along with_ Saratoga_, _Lexington_ _Wasp_ that fought in some or all of the main battles in 1942 through to early 1943. 

In order to have two-three extra carriers in 1942 (and pretending that the "black shoe" BB Navy conceded that the "brown shoe" CV boys deserved to have more carriers, and gracefully sacrifice two _South Dakota_ class BBs) the spending would have to be made in FY '39 at the latest, *not* FY '41 to guarantee that the carriers would be operational and reasonably well trained and efficient in time to make an impact at either the Coral Sea or Midway, plus the Campaign in and around the Solomons. 

For the same carriers to be available by the end of 1942 funding would have to been made in FY '40 - the Essex Class carriers, which were funded in FY '41, via the supplementary programs of May and July 1940 were not launched and or fully trained until May 1943 - _Essex (CV9)_ was commissioned 31/12/42 but was still on a shake down cruise, with Hellcats, in March 1943. Same goes for increased numbers of F4Fs, SBDs, TBMs etc which would have had to have been ordered during FY 41 to have had any effect on the Pacific war.

As it was the Hellcat was not funded until FY '42 (contract January 7 1942 - FY '42 started June 1941), well after all of the major ships with which the USN fought the war had been ordered and funded, including the Essex class carriers. Ships ordered in FY 42 - two carriers CV20 21, Light cruisers CL101 102, sixty destroyers and 23 submarines. Thus, to argue that funding the F6F somehow adversely affected the availability of carriers and aircraft during the important battles and campaigns to mid-1943 is drawing an extremely long bow. Info from Conway's pages 88-89 Aircraft Carrier Photo Index: USS ESSEX (CV-9)


----------



## parsifal (May 8, 2013)

> Not much point in looking at FY '41 spending while talking about having three additional carriers and their airgroups at the end of 1942. What's wrong with at least two-three additional carriers and airgroups by, say, March 1942?




not 100% sure what your getting at here, so apologies if I am misunderstanding you. But FY '41 was from June 1940 to June 1941. like FY42, it was brought forward to April 1940, with the bill that voted the funding for it approved 20April 1940. This became known as the 11% expansion plan, and construction began in June 1940. It included just one additional carrier, USS essex, a new design that even though it was built in record time, had some delays as changes were made to it during construction. Essex was commissioned December 1942, but would take many months before it was fully operational.

The USN could have had two Hornets instead of the one Essex, and still had $19 million left over for air groups (or anything really). Because the hornets were a well known design, my opinion is that they would have been able to comission probably2-3 months earlier,, and be ready for operations maybe 4-5 months earlier. 

As indicated above FY42 was from June 1941, but like FY41 the construction approvals were brought forward to April '41. This contained 3 additional carriers, not sure when the funding was approve, but these ships were commissioned around 9 months after Essex. After that it gets a bit blurred, as the Americans added program after program, and ships were being completed in 1944-5 like hotcakes 



> Funding for the _Yorktown_ Class (_Yorktown_ and _Enterprise_ (CV6 7)) was in FY '34, with _Hornet (CV8 )_ being added in FY '39; the latter was laid down 25/9/39 and commissioned 20/10/41. It was these, along with_ Saratoga_, _Lexington_ _Wasp_ that fought in some or all of the main battles in 1942 through to early 1943.




Yeah okay happy with all of that, but the construction times for a peacetime economy are not the same as the construction times in wartime. Whether wartime helped or hindered can vary....for the japanese it blew their construction ties out of the water, for the US, well for propaganda, admittedly, but they reckoned they could build a liberty ship from start to finish in 10 days. in reality the construction times wer more like 6 months, but even that is very impressive. 



> In order to have two-three extra carriers in 1942 (and pretending that the "black shoe" BB Navy conceded that the "brown shoe" CV boys deserved to have more carriers,



There was a bit of that, but that argument is so overblown. in fact the US Battleship admirals had been clamouring for additional carriers since at least the time of the fleet excercises in 1928. They may have under-estiated that carriers were more than just a support act for the BBs, but by 1939 the USN was advocating for about 20 carriers in the event of a British collapse, and (i think....0 about a total of 15 carriers in the event of a war against japan. The U&SN mucked about a bit getting new designs, and they mucked around some more with the socalled passenger liner conversions, but this still does not explain the inexplicable. With war clouds looming, and believing they needed at least 15 carriers, why in the first year of the war, did they complete a measely 1 CV, and lay down just one more. That is such a lapse of judgement, even on the asessments they had made themselves. 



> and gracefully sacrifice two _South Dakota_ class BBs) the spending would have to be made in FY '39 at the latest, *not* FY '41 to guarantee that the carriers would be operational and reasonably well trained and efficient in time to make an impact at either the Coral Sea or Midway, plus the Campaign in and around the Solomons.



I'd have to say you are wrong on that. There was no need, or indeed likleihood of the FY'39 budget being affected. There was a similar unlikelihood of FY'40 being affected. The first wartime carrier was not laid down until FY'41 (in 1940, and this was for a very expensive new type. if the USN had stuck to the original plan and built 2 Yorktowns, they could have done it quicker, and cheaper. If they had made savings elswhere (and I think the most obvious is from the F6F program and its associated elements) for FY'41, thatwould have yielded maybe 2 more carriers. The f6F program would have come in FY42, and entered service about 9-10 months after it actually did. Hell, if people have so little faith in the F4F (which i dont share) the USN could even have tried its luck with the XF5F, its trial and tests were very promising as I understand it..... 




> For the same carriers to be available by the end of 1942 funding would have to been made in FY '40 - the Essex Class carriers, which were funded in FY '41, via the supplementary programs of May and July 1940 were not launched and or fully trained until May 1943



Nope, Essex was commissioned December 1942, and undertook accelarated shakedown trial before transferring to the pacific Fleet in May as you say. Despite being labelled "accelarated" they were in fact slowed by the fact she was a lead ship of a new class. If Yorktowns had been built in her place, they can reasonably be argued as entering service probably around August 1942 (for the lead ship) thru to May'43 for the fourth ship, and shakedown times proabably half that of the Essex. this means that in December 1942, instead of just the Enterprise, the USN would probably have 3 x Enterprise/Hornets, and by May assuming no losses, 5 x Hornet/Enterprises 9possible 6....im unsure about the Saratoga) 



> - _Essex (CV9)_ was commissioned 31/12/42 but was still on a shake down cruise, with Hellcats, in March 1943. Same goes for increased numbers of F4Fs, SBDs, TBMs etc which would have had to have been ordered during FY 41 to have had any effect on the Pacific war.




Nope, again, being an off the shelf design there are no lead times to worry about like the hellcat. The additional F4fs could have been ordered in the accelarated FY42 with production beginning March '42 and squadron delivery probably around August. Finding the pilots at that time would be difficult, but solved by about Christmas.....with all the other losses suffered in the US carrier fleet, they had a surplus of carrier trained pilots by then. 



> As it was the Hellcat was not funded until FY '42 (contract January 7 1942 - FY '42 started June 1941), well after all of the major ships with which the USN fought the war had been ordered and funded, including the Essex class carriers. Ships ordered in FY 42 - two carriers CV20 21, Light cruisers CL101 102, sixty destroyers and 23 submarines. Thus, to argue that funding the F6F somehow adversely affected the availability of carriers and aircraft during the important battles and campaigns to mid-1943 is drawing an extremely long bow. Info from Conway's pages 88-89



R&D for what was to become the F6F began as far back as 1938. Development of the R2800 and the turbo-supercharged R2600 can at least partially be laid at the feet of the F6F. The development and additional wind tunnel test underrtaken under the F4U program can be attributed to the development of the F6F. The development of the XF5F a predecessor of the XF6F and linked to its development was begun in 1939, and carried on until just before December '41 (I think... I couldnt be bothered checking). The construction of factory number 3 dates back to the beginning of 1940 for the materials, with actual construction beginning in January 1941. The raising and training of manpower for this new factory began, I estimate from about June 1941. The factory iteself began F6F component manufactiacture from January 1942, some 6 months before its official commissioning date and well before the type itself had been accepted and contracts signed. Things were moving fast, but no way was the f6F R&D (including the factory stuff) funded all from FY42.


----------



## stug3 (May 8, 2013)

Haha, look at this old thread-

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/f4f-fm-2-alone-would-have-won-war-pto-20875.html


----------



## VBF-13 (May 8, 2013)

bobbysocks said:


> ok now i have to ask as i dont really know....how many planes and pilots did we lose in the PTO between pearl and midway? and how many did the IJN lose? i am going to venture a guess and say the japanese could not field as many airmen as the US could.....we had enough resources to let airmen do so many missions and go home. the germans and japanese didnt have this kind of resource to draw from.


I can't answer those questions off the top of my head. Whatever those answers are, they had to be around a wash, just going off how the major battles went. My point was the Japanese weren't the only side to lose experienced pilots at that stage in the War. Let's give that factor a wash, too. We've been analyzing off just the Japanese losses of their experienced pilots and that makes that analysis lopsided. On the rest, sure. And a good case could be made we over-built, too, right down the line. But let's not just generalize from that. Did the Japanese just stop training their pilots? Were their training programs interrupted, in and way, shape, or form? I don't see any evidence they were. And neither does it make sense those programs would have been interrupted right in the middle of a War they started and even less sense that would have happened as early as 1942 when those 545 pilots would have been inducted.


----------



## VBF-13 (May 8, 2013)

drgondog said:


> Think about 200 downed for 76 losses in F4F. Which country replaces losses fastest. Which country (except for relatives of pilots lost) loses critical resource the most and placed in the worst tactical situation for the 'next' battle, and the 'next', and the 'next'.


Unless there's evidence their training programs were interrupted I don't see them at any disadvantage replacing losses with fresh pilots and aircraft. 



drgondog said:


> Parsifal is addressing the fact that FM's and F4F's weren't ideal but they could at that stage of the war continue to be formidable if not overpowering against IJN - without F6F.


That's one thing he's saying, yes. To put the reason for the F6Fs in those terms we were less concerned with "formidable" and more concerned with "overpowering."


----------



## VBF-13 (May 8, 2013)

parsifal said:


> More US aircraft than 35 were lost due to non-combat reasons than combat reasons. In the riposte when the US CAGs struck back, many aircraft....from memory about 114 were ditched because they tried to hit the Carriers at long range and then got lost in the fading light.


They couldn't find our carriers because we had our lights off. When we finally risked turning them on, it was a little late. Those losses had nothing to do with the competence of that aircraft and about 90% of those pilots were rescued. There were Japanese subs in that area, that's why that task force was "dark."

Back to my first question. When were those 545 inducted? You're well-read. When do you think?


----------



## vinnye (May 8, 2013)

I would have thought that standard operating procedure would have been for the fleet to be "dark" during War time.
It was a very courageous decision to "turn the lights on". Even with the lights on - it was difficult to get the aircraft down safely.
But respect is due to the guy who put his neck on the line to make that decision.


----------



## bobbysocks (May 8, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> I can't answer those questions off the top of my head. Whatever those answers are, they had to be around a wash, just going off how the major battles went. My point was the Japanese weren't the only side to lose experienced pilots at that stage in the War. Let's give that factor a wash, too. We've been analyzing off just the Japanese losses of their experienced pilots and that makes that analysis lopsided. On the rest, sure. And a good case could be made we over-built, too, right down the line. But let's not just generalize from that. Did the Japanese just stop training their pilots? Were their training programs interrupted, in and way, shape, or form? I don't see any evidence they were. And neither does it make sense those programs would have been interrupted right in the middle of a War they started and even less sense that would have happened as early as 1942 when those 545 pilots would have been inducted.



remember too that they had been fighting for some time now in china and other areas....so their resources were already being taxed. they had to occupy those areas and that takes manpower. they had a population but not enough to meet all their needs. plus their material resources had to be proiritized. yes they could have had the manpower and money but at the cost of something else....


----------



## parsifal (May 8, 2013)

stug3 said:


> Haha, look at this old thread-
> 
> http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/f4f-fm-2-alone-would-have-won-war-pto-20875.html[



Stug, I cant get access to the link youve poted....only to the forums main page. Id like to see what was said, and how it was discussed if possible

Thanks


----------



## parsifal (May 8, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> They couldn't find our carriers because we had our lights off. When we finally risked turning them on, it was a little late. Those losses had nothing to do with the competence of that aircraft and about 90% of those pilots were rescued. There were Japanese subs in that area, that's why that task force was "dark."
> 
> Back to my first question. When were those 545 inducted? You're well-read. When do you think?



Ive already given you an answer to your post. Your salient question was how would F4Fs do in a fight like Phil Sea. Answer: individually not better, as CAG, probabaly as good or better because there would be more of them in the scenario i outlined. 

For the record. CarDiv 1 and 2 had about 6 months service time, the other CAGs had 3 months (for one group) and 2 months for the other. The Japanese had lost nearly all their Carrier pilots in the battles of 1942, then they were again decimated in the battles against the allies in 1943. They had begun rebuilding their pilot base for a third time beginning in January 1944. 

However this figure of 6 months is misleadingly high. Because of the fuel crisis affecting the IJN, it was necessary to move the 1st Mobile Fleet from Singapore to Tawi Tawi. There was fuel available at Tawi Tawi (extremely high octane, which made their ships vulnerable, but at least they could move), but no airfield. Consequently for the time the fleet was based at Tawi Tawi, the CAGs had no opportunity to train. 

Most sources say that CarDiv 1/2 had an average of about 120 hours ...that primary training AND combat time. There were a few experts with a lot more experience than that.....probably around 30-35 pilots. The other CAGs had on average less than 100 hours. Some accounts claim less than 50 hours....Im doubtful of that figure, but cant categorically rule it out either. 

The Japanese since before the outbreak of the war had had their training programs restricted, severely, by the acute fuel shortages since at least July 1941. They never really recovered from that restriction. Later, they also suffered from a shortage of suitable advanced training aircraft, and also a lack of good instructors. They tried to address this by moving new recruits out too the front directly, to learn on the job. This was a disaster for them. Pilots need the hours, in a safe environment, to get familiar and confident. Germans did similar things to their aircrew, but were not as acutely affected as the japanese.

There is some variation in various accounts given on the amount of experience in the USN CAGs. Some do put it as low as 300 hours (and dont specify if that is combat experience and Basic, or just combat). Most sources however, give a much higher figure....between 300 and 400 Training time (about 250 in induction....but additional "top up" training as they were rotated back and forth). Many (more than half) were reported as having more than 500 hours combat (or perhaps hours in a front line squadron...most accounts dont differentiate). It would not be wrong or innaccurate, or misleading (like mentioning the number 409 and Hellcat in the same sentence, or claiming Hellcat losses were just 35, which they werent) to estimate USN airmen in the fleet CAGs as having around 700-1000 hours expereince by June 1944. They were extremely experienced flyers. Which is one reason why by that stage it took time to get into combat for new pilots.


----------



## gumbyk (May 8, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Stug, I cant get access to the link youve poted....only to the forums main page. Id like to see what was said, and how it was discussed if possible
> 
> Thanks



Its here: http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/f4f-fm-2-alone-would-have-won-war-pto-20875.html


----------



## parsifal (May 8, 2013)

bobbysocks said:


> ok now i have to ask as i dont really know....how many planes and pilots did we lose in the PTO between pearl and midway? and how many did the IJN lose? i am going to venture a guess and say the japanese could not field as many airmen as the US could.....we had enough resources to let airmen do so many missions and go home. the germans and japanese didnt have this kind of resource to draw from.



I have some figures somewhere on this, but im not sure where....ill try and dig them out.

ive also recently read that to march 1943, the Japanese had lost 6200 aircraft since the outbreak of the war. Since before Coral Sea, Yammamoto had complained about the loses in expereienced pilots in a memo as i recall to the Naval Headquaters staff.....the japanese Admiralty.

The Allies lost around 1000 aircraft in the opening 3 months of the war, very very roughly. There were around 200 lost in malaya, 250 lost in the Phillipines, about 180 at PH, around 200 lost in Malaya, about 100 lost in Burma, and around 150 lost in NEI. Bits and pieces lost in Northern Australia and New uinea, and elsewhere. Pilot losses were significantly les than that.

There is no definitive number for the overall japanese losses, let alone for a given part of the war. However it was about 46000, of which at least 17000 were lost to "other causes". Because its impossible to give a complete picture, the USN Ra Ra boys and hellcat fan club members have a field day with this...saying their claimed victories are gospel. Doesnt perturb them that every other air force has had to revise down their war time claims universally. A really big share of Japanese losses were inflicted by the USN....around 15000 in fact, but a number of these were due to flak and a number due to F4fs and other types. At least 6000 of these losses (also absorbed by the Army, so the figures dont add up) were expended as Kamikazes, and about a similar number in conventional combats in 1945. Large numbers of aircraft were shot up on the ground, because of fuel shortages.

hellcats are credited with about 5500 air victories in the PTO, which might be about right, but the 19:1 propaganda so often pushed forward as to its superiority is a total crock. Hellcat losses need to include losses to all causes in order to compare apples to apples, and when you do that the ratio of wins to losses, drops to about 4 or 5:1. Stil very impressive, but not an uber fighter.


----------



## bobbysocks (May 8, 2013)

the other issue isnt the number of carrier based planes and experienced pilots...but how many aircraft carriers did they have left for them to launch off of???? i know they lost several carriers at midway...how many did they lose at CS?? if you have really no chance to put those planes on carriers ( or an island ) ramping up your production and training is somewhat fruitless. you can punch out several thousand planes a month like germany did but to build a carrier is going to set you back years. those resources can be better shifted to something else.


----------



## VBF-13 (May 8, 2013)

bobbysocks said:


> remember too that they had been fighting for some time now in china and other areas....so their resources were already being taxed. they had to occupy those areas and that takes manpower. they had a population but not enough to meet all their needs. plus their material resources had to be proiritized. yes they could have had the manpower and money but at the cost of something else....


This is how it was:

WWII Imperial Japanese Naval Aviation Page
WWII Imperial Japanese Navy Aircraft

"At the beginning of World War II, the Imperial Navy had created the finest naval aviation corps in the world. Japanese aircraft were at least the equals of anything then flying in the West, and in some cases (as with the legendary Zero fighter) were substantially better. Japanese aircrews were superbly trained and had been battle tested in the conflict in China during the late 1930's. When war tore across the Pacific in December 1941, the IJNAF was more than a match for any of its opponents. It is not surprising , then, that Japanese aviators scored victory after stunning victory during the first six months of the war, from the attack on Pearl Harbor, through the sinking of the British men-of-war Prince of Wales and Repulse, to the fearsome raids on northern Australia and the IJN's rampage through the Indian Ocean in April 1942. *Only after the defeat at Coral Sea and the debacle at Midway was this force finally able to be engaged on nearly equal terms*. Throughout the war, the IJNAF remained a potent weapon, though Japanese equipment was eventually outclassed by newer American models, and relentless attrition began to take its toll on pilot quality. Even in defeat, though, the IJNAF refused to wilt away, finally immolating itself in the form of the Kamikaze air corps." (emphasis supplied)


----------



## VBF-13 (May 8, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Ive already given you an answer to your post. Your salient question was how would F4Fs do in a fight like Phil Sea. Answer: individually not better, as CAG, probabaly as good or better because there would be more of them in the scenario i outlined.
> 
> For the record. CarDiv 1 and 2 had about 6 months service time, the other CAGs had 3 months (for one group) and 2 months for the other. The Japanese had lost nearly all their Carrier pilots in the battles of 1942, then they were again decimated in the battles against the allies in 1943. They had begun rebuilding their pilot base for a third time beginning in January 1944.
> 
> ...


You didn't answer my question.


----------



## parsifal (May 8, 2013)

youd better clarify instead of playing games then hadnt you


----------



## parsifal (May 8, 2013)

bobbysocks said:


> the other issue isnt the number of carrier based planes and experienced pilots...but how many aircraft carriers did they have left for them to launch off of???? i know they lost several carriers at midway...how many did they lose at CS?? if you have really no chance to put those planes on carriers ( or an island ) ramping up your production and training is somewhat fruitless. you can punch out several thousand planes a month like germany did but to build a carrier is going to set you back years. those resources can be better shifted to something else.



The followinglink give s a good summary of carrier losses for all protegonists that put them to sea

Fleet carriers sunk in World War 2


----------



## VBF-13 (May 8, 2013)

parsifal said:


> youd better clarify instead of playing games then hadnt you


Settle down. It was right at the bottom of the post you just replied to. When were those 545 Japanese pilots at the Battle of the Philippine Sea inducted into the Navy? When do you think?


----------



## stug3 (May 8, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Stug, I cant get access to the link youve poted....only to the forums main page. Id like to see what was said, and how it was discussed if possible
> 
> Thanks



Here ya go-

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/f4f-fm-2-alone-would-have-won-war-pto-20875.html


----------



## parsifal (May 8, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> Settle down. It was right at the bottom of the post you just replied to. When were those 545 Japanese pilots at the Battle of the Philippine Sea inducted into the Navy? When do you think?



Playing games as ever i see. You already think you know dont you. Im going to say no idea. They didnt enter flight school until the end of 1943 at the earliest. But enlighten us please......this will be funny im sure


US Naval training inductee rates are listed here

The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia: U.S. Order of Battle

An example of typical training and experience for the USN Phil Sea aircrew can be found with Georgr Bush Senior

"Upon hearing of the Pearl Harbor attack, while a student at Phillips Academy in Andover, Massachusetts, George Bush decided he wanted to join the Navy to become an aviator. Six months later, after graduation, he enlisted in the Navy on his 18th birthday and began preflight training at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. After completing the 10-month course, he was commissioned as an ensign in the US Naval Reserve on 9 June 1943, several days before his 19th birthday; making him the youngest naval aviator then. 
After finishing flight training, he was assigned to Torpedo Squadron (VT-51) as photographic officer in September 1943. As part of Air Group 51, his squadron was based on USS San Jacinto in the spring of 1944. San Jacinto was part of Task Force 58 that participated in operations against Marcus and Wake Islands in May, and then in the Marianas during June. On 19 June, the task force triumphed in one of the largest air battles of the war".

Thats nearly three years of flight training before exposure to heavy combat. if he is typical, what would be the normal hours chalked up by a pilot in training per year in the US.....200 hours????


----------



## parsifal (May 8, 2013)

stug3 said:


> Here ya go-
> 
> http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/f4f-fm-2-alone-would-have-won-war-pto-20875.html



Yep, working now, thanks

Similar arguments to those we are having here. The guy does have a point n my opinion, though he does say some things I would disagree with.

Basically, this is my hypothesis, backed up by some anaysis. Provided that the fighters are within cooe of each other, the side flying the aircraft of higher performance might get some marginal advanatages insofar as own losses, expressed as losses per 100 sorties. Insofar as the enemy is concerned, ther is not evidence to support the notion that enemy losses go up because of poorer fighter quality, again expressed as losses per 100 sorties. Of course, lowering ones own losses means that you generate the opportunity to improve the experience levels of your formations, and then from there, you do get into a position of holding a decisive advantage. You can do that with numbers as well. 

Case in point. USN relied mostly on carriers for force projectikon. The numbers of carriers determined how much pain they could bring to bear on th enemy. with a finite number of carriers, it did make sense to equip them with the best that was available. i have no argument with any of that.

However, what if you altered your wartime build strategy so as to increase the supply of carriers, or more accurately, altered the build so that carriers arrived earlier. If that meant sacrificing or postponing the introduction of the hellcat, but meant you would have more F4Fs earlier, would that be a better strategy? I think it would. F4F was a competitive fighter throughout the war, having the numbers would give you increased survivability, and you would be delivering body blows at a time when the Japanese were not in a position to resist. 

Ill quote shattered sword the same as the banned guy with regards to Pilot (and aircraft ) supply

Page 10: "In addition to [the Midway carriers], two other carriers ought to have been sortied [Shokaku and Zuikaku.] Zuikaku was nominally operational, but her air-group was not and would not be fully reconstituted for months."

Page 90: "When the war had opened, Kido Butai's air groups had been full strength, although without as many spare aircraft as would have been optimal. But by June 1942, the situation had deteriorated. At the time of Pearl Harbor, Akagi had carried sixty-six aircraft; now she had just fifty-four. Kaga had been cut from seventy-five to sixty-three. Soryu and Hiryu had come down from sixty-three apiece to fifty-four apiece. Nominally, each squadron (fighter, bomber, and torpedo bomber) should have been allotted three spare aircraft, for a total of nine per ship. None were now carried by any ship in Kido Butai, and Kaga was the only ship that still retained an oversized squadron of twenty-seven torpedo bombers. The rest of the ships were all operating eighteen aircraft squadrons, with no spares. In a nutshell, each of the Kido Butai carriers had suffered a 16 percent decrease in their fighting power since December. Any casualties to the operating air groups, even damaged aircraft, would immediately impact the tactical cohesion of the air units, since there were no spare aircraft to feed into the formations. ... Nagumo thus had a grand total of 248 aircraft aboard his ships. By way of comparison, Kido Butai's six carriers had brought around 412 aircraft to the Pearl Harbor operation. Nagumo was thus fighting the decisive battle with only 60 percent of the airpower he might reasonably have expected as recently as May."

Page 91: "If the aircraft situation was threadbare in the frontline carriers, it was far worse in the second-line carrier divisions. They were scraping up pilots and aircraft in any way they could to try and cobble together air groups, yet in most cases were falling short. Junyo's case is illustrative. Recently comimssioned, she was designed to carry fifty-four aircraft. Her dive-bonber group seems to have been reasonably intact and was composed of fifteen Type 99 aircraft. Her fighter group, however, was another matter. It was still in the midst of being activated and was in complete disarray. Twelve of the eighteen Zeros on board ship were actually aircraft from the 6th Ku. Yet 6th Ku was itself three planes and several pilots short of its nominal thirty-six plane establishment (the remaining twenty-one aircraft being with Nagumo). Not only that but 6th Ku apparently didn't have enough aviators to man its own aircraft. Nor could Junyo's aviators fill all the gaps. Indeed, Junyo's air group for the battle contained only five of its own pilots. The remainder were four 6th Ku pilots, a trio of aviators (one of whom was fresh out of flight school) on temporary attached duty (TAD) from Shokaku, and two more TAD fliers from Ryujo!"

this was BEFORE Midway!!


----------



## parsifal (May 8, 2013)

I also notice JoeB made the following comments, remmber this debate does not assume additional carrier availability for the US earlier....people should pay attention to Joes comments however

"Wildcats as only carrier fighters would probably not have prevented an Allied victory in the Pacific War, so great was Allied numerical superiority becoming by 1944; but it would have made it a much harder slog, with undoubtedly more carrier losses (note that while CV's operating F4F's at least one CV was seriously hit or sunk in almost every case where carrier TF's came under Japanese air attack, compare that to the F6F period), as well as more losses among escorted attack a/c. The FM-2 handled itself pretty well even against later Japanese fighter types when it met them, in the overall circumstances of combat at that time, but had major deficiencies in speed as interceptor, and in range as offensive fighter, compared to the F6F and F4U, which also meant more risk to carriers.

For land based fighters, range was an even more important factor since getting closer wasn't just a matter of ramping up risk to a carrier by moving it closer to its target but having to seize more islands and bases and bypass fewer of them, since each new base had to be within land based fighter range of the previous one (moving up the coast of New Guinea, for example, carriers generally not available in that theater).

P-40's did widely serve until 1945 in China, and also did well enough, real outcomes in the range of 1:1 or even a bit better against even the later Japanese fighter types, and generally had some advantage over the Army Type 1, their main opponent for most of the war. The Japanese were so outnumbered that 1:1 fighter kill ratio, broadly what they could hope for with the Type 1 and Zero against well flown P-40's and F4F's, wasn't anywhere near good enough from their POV. But from Allied POV, the extra advantage of the later fighters was very welcome in pure fighter combat, and as mentioned it had other important implications such as carrier losses with F4F/FM rather than F6F's and having to stage landings supported by land based fighters at closer intervals with P-40 compared to P-38 (or other long range fighters)".

And further along

"As already mentioned, the FM-2 could handle later Japanese fighers, in the overall circumstances at the time. That was shown in operations in the Philippines where CVE's were left pretty much on their own. The FM-2's claimed result for all of Sep '44-end of war, v the Type 3 (Tony) for example was 29:0, a claim but OTOH Type 3's proved unable to down FM-2's. FM-2's also downed Type 4's (Frank). And the FM-2's overall claimed fighter v fighter ratio was 26:1 v 15+ for both F6F in F4U in that same period, Sep 44-end of war. Many of the claims in all cases were fighter types serving as kamikazes, but there's no evidene the FM-2 was a much less capable fighter combat a/c in actual practice, against those opponents at that time. Only around 15-20% of F6F and F4U fighter combat losses were against the latest types (Frank, George, Jack) per USN stats, most of the opposition remained the older types, anyway.

Intercepting kamikazes OTOH was a weakness of the FM-2, although again it could do it, in the Lingayen Gulf landings the CVE's alone protected the landing force, which underwent intense kamikaze attacks and suffered a number of hits, but numerous enough kamikazes always had some successes. So the FM-2 could and did perform that role, but its slow speed was a definite practical weakness, whereas in fighter combat it was also a weakness in theory, but it's hard to find evidence it made much difference in practice.

FM-2's served as ground support fighter bombers more often than CV/CVL based F6F's. The FM-2 carried a lighter load, but fighter bomber results against land targets, especially well concealed Japanese field fortifications, were not usually very dramatic anyway. The main effect was on morale of friendly ground forces. And F6F's and F4U's didn't sink many ships. So, the FM-2 was a lesser fighter bomber but I don't think that makes much difference.

The problem with intercepting fast attackers is the most serious deficiency of the FM-2 in late war operations, especially since it wouldl ikely lead to higher ship los(s)"


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (May 9, 2013)

Starting to get a bit heated. Play nice everyone. You all know the rules. There have been enough warnings given.


----------



## Glider (May 9, 2013)

I cannot get rid of the feeling that given pilots of equal quality the FM2 would be at a significant disadvantage against late war Japanee fighters and be at a smaller disadvantage against the A6M5. We know that the pilot quality wasn't the same and the USN generally were able to control their forces more effectively with RADAR and command and control. Its for those reasons that the FM2 was able to more than hold its own, not because the aircraft was as good as the opposition.

Re defending against suicide bombers. A lot of those were obsolete fighters, bombers, trainers aircraft that the FM2 would ahve had a performance advantage. In a straight race faster attacking aircraft would ahve had a decent chance of getting through simply because the FM2 wasn't that fast.


----------



## parsifal (May 9, 2013)

Id agree with you that the FM-2 was approaching obsolescence. I dont agree that the A6M5 would be greatly superior, obviously i think some.....but not a generational difference that would render the Wildcat a deathtrap. 

If the Japanese could somehow get a break in the relentless batle being prosecuted against them, they might gain time and breathing space to train pilots of reasonable quality. Put a half decent pilot in a Frank or a Tony, or similar, against an FM-2
and there is a serious problem for the Wildca. but theres a problem. If the Allies have been hammering harder than historically continuously since Coral sea, with no lull in operations such as occurred from January'43 through to about october '43, then as the Japanese I dont think you will ever get the opportunity to even half recover like they did. I think by early '44, instead of having pilots with maybe 100 hours experience, you will throwing guys with maybe 20 hours experience. Now, I would very much like to hear fom the flyers in this place. What happens when you have the numbers advantage, and your fliers have 40 or 50 times the experience of the enemy.The enemy has an aircraft faster more manouverable and more heavily armed than your mount, but you outnumber him by about 5:1 and your guys know what they are doing, and the fast guy doesnt. What happens in that scenario. 

Dont underestimate the advantage that inititiave will give to your people


----------



## Glider (May 9, 2013)

Fair points


----------



## Conslaw (May 9, 2013)

I agree that the USN probably could have won the war with the F4F/FM2. It would have taken more losses, but US material superiority (and pilot training) was so superior that the US still would have won. The Wildcat was no great shakes, but two Wildcats were dangerous to any enemy. I take issue though with any argument that the Hellcat would have delayed victory. The Hellcat was essentially available in lockstep with the availability of the war-built carriers. Other than the CVEs (which usually deployed with FMs), as each new carrier was sent into battle, it had F6F fighters. Even the Bunker Hill which was supposed to get Corsairs, shipped out with Hellcats. The F6F was at least as well-suited to its primary role of naval air superiority fighter as the Merlin-engined P-51 was for the bomber escort mission. The Hellcat had the range to escort loaded bombers on any practical mission. It was as easy as any 2000 horsepower fighter could be to fly and land on carriers. It was easy enough to build that one factory could turn out fighters for all the fast carriers. It was a stable gun platform, well-suited to deflection shooting. It had enough speed to dominate the A6M zero and compete on an even basis with late-war Japanese fighter. It was a good fighter-bomber and nightfighter.


----------



## drgondog (May 9, 2013)

parsifal said:


> .
> 
> If the Japanese could somehow get a break in the relentless batle being prosecuted against them, they might gain time and breathing space to train pilots of reasonable quality. Put a half decent pilot in a Frank or a Tony, or similar, against an FM-2
> and there is a serious problem for the Wildca. but theres a problem. If the Allies have been hammering harder than historically continuously since Coral sea, with no lull in operations such as occurred from January'43 through to about october '43, then as the Japanese I dont think you will ever get the opportunity to even half recover like they did. I think by early '44, instead of having pilots with maybe 100 hours experience, you will throwing guys with maybe 20 hours experience. Now, I would very much like to hear fom the flyers in this place. What happens when you have the numbers advantage, and your fliers have 40 or 50 times the experience of the enemy.The enemy has an aircraft faster more manouverable and more heavily armed than your mount, but you outnumber him by about 5:1 and your guys know what they are doing, and the fast guy doesnt. What happens in that scenario.
> ...



I never flew combat and have a lot less time than Joe. Having said that the number one thing about flying in high tension/agitation circumstances is that you do the right things instinctively about controlling your aircraft. That comes only with repetitive training and familiarity.

Add the additional factors of a.) choosing to engage, b.) manuevering for advantage against an opponent that sees you, and c.) manuvering with skill, without having to think 'control', with the aircraft as part of you (i.e. situational awareness and ability to keep your opponent in sight without 'thinking about your controls) - just 'doing it.

A 300 hour total time pilot, average, is far better able to do this than a 200 hour pilot. A 2000 hour pilot may be every bit as good as the 10,000 hour pilot by contrast - given the same talent.

The other differentiator is attitude. Aggressiveness comes with confidence.

There are few exceptions in the low time bandwidth


----------



## parsifal (May 9, 2013)

Not having or delaying the hellcat is a cost, not a benefot. essentially what im trying to get you guys to do is undertake some sort of cost benefit analysis. Ther are a lot of ifs to what im suggesting. What was the actual cost of the hellcat program, did it cause a delay in the building of the wartime carrier fleet, how would the US have known that they might not need the Hellcat. These are all valid questions as to practicality, but the questions raised still dont diminish or deflect the hypothetical Im chalenging you guys with. Essentially it goes like this

If the US was able to get 3 or 4 additional carriers early in 1943, in exchange for delaying the hellcat program by 8 or 9 months, would the US war effort have been better off or worse off than the historical model? The question is not, if the hellcat wasnt built, and no benefit arises from that? That would obviously be a negative effect. The question is, how much is maintaining the initiative and forward movement of an offensive worth?


----------



## parsifal (May 9, 2013)

drgondog said:


> I never flew combat and have a lot less time than Joe. Having said that the number one thing about flying in high tension/agitation circumstances is that you do the right things instinctively about controlling your aircraft. That comes only with repetitive training and familiarity.
> 
> Add the additional factors of a.) choosing to engage, b.) manuevering for advantage against an opponent that sees you, and c.) manuvering with skill, without having to think 'control', with the aircraft as part of you (i.e. situational awareness and ability to keep your opponent in sight without 'thinking about your controls) - just 'doing it.
> 
> ...



Thanks DG, very helpful, and i can see that you "get it"

I am NOT a SAS guy, but at one stage in my career, I undertook tactical training with a few SAS guys along with our boarding teams. . In exercise we got absolutely trounced by these guys. they were bloody good. one of their secrets was maintaining forward momentum. Once they got the initiative, those guys dont let go of it easily. they dont advance blindly....that just gets you killed, but once they have their opponents backpedalling, no matter how much defensive fire you bring down on them, they keep moving, generally in stages to provide covering fire. Before you know it they are in your flanks and your drawing enfilading fire. I think thats the same principal as what im advocating here. Get the initiative, and in a strategic sense, dont give your opponent the slightes opportunity for recovery. For us guys directing, you cant afford to stop thinking....that can get people killed as well, but its important to keep the forwar momewntum as much as possible....


----------



## drgondog (May 9, 2013)

IMO - this was the greatest single factor in 8th/9th AF success against LW when they were turned loose in 1944. Attack, attack, attack was the standard. Conversely, very talented and experienced LW fighter pilots were neutered by Goering doctrine to avoid fighter combat - or be sacked.

LW could have, in my opinion, inflicted serious casualties and stripped 8th FC of many future great leaders and fighter pilots in April through October 1943 timeframe by reversing the policy and attacking US fighters as a matter of course while the US pilots were seriously tethered in defensive posture close to the bombers - giving LW complete option to engage or not.


----------



## parsifal (May 9, 2013)

Yes, i agree. I also think that the Mustang was one of those rare aircraft that is the exception to the rule. Ive expressed the opinion here and elsewhere, that fighters alone dont win air campaigns, because the cause of losses is simply too diverse. but the Mustang took what a losing proposition and turned it aroud completely. I acknowledge your point....they got more than a litle help fom the germans themselves....but the campaign October 43 through to June 44 should have been an unmitigated disaster for the USAAF. If Id been around August '43, I would have been saying to the 8th commanders, "give it up boys!!!" " You havent a chance!!!", But they proved sce[tics like me Im wrong. The US air victory that winter should not be under-estimated


----------



## VBF-13 (May 9, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Playing games as ever i see. You already think you know dont you. Im going to say no idea. They didnt enter flight school until the end of 1943 at the earliest. But enlighten us please......this will be funny im sure


I don’t know where you’re getting this “playing games” thing from. I asked you about their training programs. I thought it would have occurred to you to have looked into those facts before you formed your opinions. It’s obvious to me now you have a somewhat different methodology that doesn't entail looking into facts.


----------



## parsifal (May 9, 2013)

so, what is your opinion on their training times


----------



## Glider (May 9, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> I don’t know where you’re getting this “playing games” thing from. I asked you about their training programs. I thought it would have occurred to you to have looked into those facts before you formed your opinions. It’s obvious to me now you have a somewhat different methodology that doesn't entail looking into facts.



I have taken an interest in the different training programs that were put in place and would appreciate a source for the training receieved by the Japanese forces both Army and Navy if you have one.

It does seem a leap in faith to state that both sides had smilar training. There was a period between 1940 and 1942 when RAF training wasn't as complete and comprehensive as the USAAF. This changed as resources buuilt up and we were no longer alone in the fight with Russia.

Comparing Japanese and RAF training I do not pretend to know the details but I do know that the RAF had far fewer problems than the Japanese forces. Fuel wasn't a problem, by early 1942 training bases, equipment and trainers both manpower and aircraft were not an issue. There were two main reasons for this. By late 1940 the UK were geared up to training 7,000 pilots a year up from 300 a year in 1935 Japan wasn't close. The books that I have read on this all mention that the training may have been in theory good but the numbers were low as training as in the Luftwaffe didn't have the same priority. 

So if you could point me to a source for your comments I would appreciate it.


----------



## parsifal (May 9, 2013)

Glider said:


> I have taken an interest in the different training programs that were put in place and would appreciate a source for the training receieved by the Japanese forces both Army and Navy if you have one.
> 
> It does seem a leap in faith to state that both sides had smilar training. There was a period between 1940 and 1942 when RAF training wasn't as complete and comprehensive as the USAAF. This changed as resources buuilt up and we were no longer alone in the fight with Russia.
> 
> ...




Shattered Sword has some comments about the issue, which Ive already posted. You can also get some preliminary idea of the japanese problems from the following 

Imperial Japanese Navy Air Force in WWII
This guy gives an opinion that I basically agree with


Pilot training in WW2 | Forums

Our own Forum has a number of threads, including this one

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/wwii-naval-pilot-training-426.html

Being an American centric site, it plays up the strengths and advantages of deflection shooting. In my opinion, ddeflection shooting was just one trick in a whole range of techniques. It was not especially important, and wasnt a uniquely american consept. And the japanese used it far more than is suggested in that thread.

The US Navy produced an Intell report in December 1942, entitled "Tactical Training and Trends" which is partly reproduced at Lone Sentry. It states in part

"The Japanese Army and Navy have two classifications for their pilots and bombardiers, namely: "Division I" and "Division II". This classification is based on combat experience, initiative, and combat ability. 

The pilots and bombardiers of Division I usually have had approximately 4 years combat experience in China. This Division totals about 1,500 pilots, including Army and Navy. 

The performance of the personnel of Division II is not comparable with that of Division I, as was demonstrated during the Port Darwin bombardment of March 19 when the pilots and bombardiers of Division I, in one flight of 18 bombers, sank 11 of 17 ships on their first time over, from a height of 24,000 feet. Meanwhile, the personnel of Division II were indiscriminately bombing the airfield and hangars. Recent reports have indicated that the Japanese, in order to conserve their first-line pilot strength, are sending out their less-experienced pilots on routine missions with the leader alone coming from their first-line group. 

The first-line Japanese pilot is well trained and resourceful, and handles his plane in a skillful manner; he will initiate attack, is aggressive in combat, and is a fighting airman not to be underestimated. It is also noteworthy that they will change their methods with alacrity whenever they find their aerial operations successfully countered. They are alert, and quick to take advantage of any evident weakness. A disabled plane will receive more fire than other planes in formation. Stragglers are sure to be concentrated on, and a gun not firing is a sure point of attack. Several instances have also been reported where our airmen have been machine-gunned from Japanese planes while parachuting to earth. Our airmen should delay opening the parachute when forced to leave the plane. 

While there is little information available concerning the number of pilots being trained in Japan, conservative estimates placed this figure at 360 per month prior to December 7, 1941, and concluded that there were at that time approximately 9,750 trained pilots, many of whom had seen service in China. It is estimated that the Japanese have lost approximately 400 planes per month for the first 5 months of the war. Thus the rates of loss and replacement are approximately the same. The above estimated Japanese losses and production of pilots apply to a period when very little opposition was encountered by the Japanese, and it is safe to assume that when the United Nations undertake a more determined offense, the losses will be at a substantially higher rate. It is reasonable to assume that the Japanese have anticipated this and have increased the production of trained pilot personnel to meet this expected higher monthly loss. Therefore, a fair inference would be that Japan must at the present time be turning out, at the minimum, 600 to 700 new pilots per month in order to take care of losses and provide for expansion of the air forces. 

In Japan it has been the tradition that Naval officers are of a higher type than officers of the Army, and it has been observed that in planes of corresponding type, the naval pilot is much harder to combat, and that apparently the materiel, quality of personnel, and training in the Naval Service are of a higher standard than in the Japanese Army Air Forces. However, morale is undoubtedly high in both services". 


This article is also worth looking at

Failure of the Japanese pilots training program | Military History Forum


Just few ideas from someone who doesnt know, and hasnt a clue


----------



## Njaco (May 9, 2013)

Stop with the sarcasm and can we please keep everything to one post.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (May 10, 2013)

Njaco said:


> Stop with the sarcasm and can we please keep everything to one post.



Yeah I told them to play nice as well. I love being ****ing ignored over and over, thread after thread. Same **** different thread.


----------



## cimmex (May 10, 2013)

Well, “Parsifal” is on his favorite playground (naval) now and as usual in that case I cannot see any relevance to the thread title since several pages.
cimmex


----------



## parsifal (May 10, 2013)

More than happy to move back on topic. we have drifted a lot. 


One of the biggest advantages conferred onto the Hellcat in relation to the Spitfire was its effective combat radius. Im not so sure. According to Nijbour in his book on the Seafire, Seafires undertook operations whilst attached to the BPF out to 180 miles. The Hellcats they had embarked were rated as having a combat radius of 230 miles. Ive seen one or two instances where this range extendded out to 260 miles. I have not seen any operational evidence of sorties in real combat beyond that range.

Yet the combat range of the Seafire is often quoted as having a combat range of 400 miles, whilst the Hellcat is out to 870 miles. Ive never heard of Hellcats in normal operation undertaking strikes at that range. Some sources even claim the Hellcat as having a range of 1200 miles. 

So what is the truth about the combat ranges of these aircraft. Seems to me that the range of both types is wildly erratic from reality.


----------



## wuzak (May 10, 2013)

Are those ranges or radii?


----------



## Aozora (May 10, 2013)

First a gratuitous diversion...








Followed by Spitfire V/Seafire I, II and III PNs





and Corsair II-IV PNs Pratt Whitney R-2800-8 which is all but identical to the R-2800-10 in the F6F

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## parsifal (May 10, 2013)

well I like the diversion. not even sure what the secomnd attachments say, but it looks very interesting.

All i can say is that when the BPF was stepping up to deliver strikes on the japanese mainland in 1945, its seafires were able to undertake offensive operations out to the 180 mile mark. these were fighter escort missions. The fleets Corsairs and Hellcats were able to undertake similar fighter escort missions out to 220 or 230 miles ( to be honest I forget which). When operating in the FB role the seafire was very short legged (I dont have the figures), whilst the american types were about 150 miles (again, not completely sure, would have to check).

I am not aware of any operational strike by Hellcats, American or british, that were carried out beyond the 260 mile range that i mentioned earlier. Im more than happy to sit back and be corrected, but actual strikes and historical events would need to be produced. its all very well to bring out the fuel consumption rates and capacitires, but these are really not establishig the operational ranges of the types. you can only really do that by looking at their service histories.


----------



## Shortround6 (May 10, 2013)

As has been noted in the F6F in Europe thread (and in others) a LOT of the ranges bandied about are _yardstick_ ranges. and not true ranges or operational ranges. 

Mission profiles and requirements can drastically shorten ranges. For carrier use how much of an allowance is made for time on station or time in combat area and how much time is allowed for finding the carrier upon return and orbiting while the aircraft are recovered. Being the last one/s down could be a white knuckle experience, especially if an earlier landing crack-up had fouled the deck for a while. 

Going over the operational histories shows us what the planners thought were _prudent_ ranges to operate over with acceptable risks.


----------



## nuuumannn (May 10, 2013)

The Spitfire, the Hellcat or... the lovely Miranda Kerr?


----------



## parsifal (May 10, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> As has been noted in the F6F in Europe thread (and in others) a LOT of the ranges bandied about are _yardstick_ ranges. and not true ranges or operational ranges.
> 
> Mission profiles and requirements can drastically shorten ranges. For carrier use how much of an allowance is made for time on station or time in combat area and how much time is allowed for finding the carrier upon return and orbiting while the aircraft are recovered. Being the last one/s down could be a white knuckle experience, especially if an earlier landing crack-up had fouled the deck for a while.
> 
> Going over the operational histories shows us what the planners thought were _prudent_ ranges to operate over with acceptable risks.



I agree with all of what you say. but again, i cant think of a single instance where hellcats operated in a combat mission further at ranges greater than 260 miles, and the more usual range was 230 miles. I know that the Seafire was used repeatedly at ranges out to 180 miles. That means, in my book the Hellcat had an effective range dvantage over the Sefire of 50-80 miles


----------



## parsifal (May 10, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> The Spitfire, the Hellcat or... the lovely Miranda Kerr?




Yes, I think I died and am in heaven


----------



## VBF-13 (May 10, 2013)

parsifal said:


> so, what is your opinion on their training times


Parsifal, I don't have much time right now, but I'll get into this. I'll at least explain better where I'm coming from. Right now I just want to make a few other replies, and get out. Don't go away, or I'll come looking for you, lol.


----------



## VBF-13 (May 10, 2013)

Njaco said:


> Stop with the sarcasm and can we please keep everything to one post.


Sarcasm is a means of expressing a point. All Parsifal is saying by that is he thinks I'm off my nut. I can take it. He's not getting personal and I'm not offended. For what it's worth...


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (May 10, 2013)

We are saying stay on topic and play nice.


----------



## VBF-13 (May 10, 2013)

Aozora said:


> First a gratuitous diversion...


What were we talking about?


----------



## Conslaw (May 10, 2013)

As I recall, on the last day of the Battle of the Philippine Sea (Marianas), the day after the main US strike, there was talk of sending only F6Fs on a long-range bombing strike against the fleeing Japanese fleet. The reason why F6Fs only were to be sent was that F6Fs flying at their best economical speed with a drop tank and a 500 lb bomb would get to the Japanese fleet quicker than a strike by TBFs. SB2C and SBDs were out of the question. A quicker strike was a shorter strike with the range between the fleets opening by as much as 50 miles per hour. I can't remember if they actually sent out a strike, but the fact that it was even considered showed that in some cases the combat radius of the F6F was longer than the dive bombers and the torpedo planes.


----------



## Jugman (May 10, 2013)

The *total program cost* of the B-29 was about $3 billion. To put $3,000,000,000 in proper context, this is about 2.5 times the *total* direct expenditures spent on aviation by the Army from FY1921 through FY1941! 

The cost of actually desgining an aircraft is largely labour cost. I don't have any figures but a rate between $1-2 per man-hour seems about right. Add to this the cost of building the prototypes (including any static test frames, mockups, and scale models),flight testing, and tooling.

As of September 6, 1940 Boeing had contracts worth at least $3.7M related to the B-29. This is for 2 XB-29s, a static frame, a mockup, and wind tunnel data. The third XB-29 and the 14 YB-29s probably add another $15-20M. So development cost was ~$20-25M range.

I very much doubt the F6F cost more than $1M to design. This is about all the money that would be saved. The Grumman factory was going to be expanded reguardless if the F6F goes into production. Even if the expantion didn't take place, the decision was made after Pearl Harbor. To late to increase carrier production. In any event you must sacrifice light cruisers or merchant ships to get more carriers.


I strongly recommend everyone read: The Army Air Forces in World War II Vol. VI: Men and Planes . It's a long read though.


----------



## parsifal (May 10, 2013)

Rememeber, however, that this is a research and development cost. research is one element of cost, and by most evaluations, relatively low expense. The problem is that research leads to design, and design is a bit of a black art. Not everyone can do it. Its a highly technical element, relying on both experience and flair at the same time.

The development side is much more managerial and in my opinion more costly in its establishment. In the case of the hellcat, you have the costs of building the factory (the biggest in the world to that time), employing and trainng a workforce of at least 20000 people, the materials costs, establishing the supply chain, and probably a lot of other things we havent thought of. 

Bottom line is we dont have a final figure on the costs of R&D for the Hellcat. We have some circumstantial evidence......the 500million unnaccounted for in the 11% exapansion bill, the 300 million spent by the LW in 1940 on R&D, along with Hap Arnolds statements that the USAAF was matching them, and the costs of building factories in other countries being some of them. It didnt cost $1m to get the f6F to squadron service, but neither do I now think it cost $100m. I think its somewhere in between.

Im surprised, but I dont think we can satisfactorily answer this. But I guess this debate ended up being about testing whether people could think laterally or not. Is having the biggest, meanest fighter on the block necessary or the most important element to winning? I dont think it is. I think it is one element for victory, but ther are many others, and many of them are more important. One element of the war that I think caused it to be extended unneccessarily was the carrier drought that curtailed the US offensives in 1943 in the PTO. Thats really what this debate got fown to....not as much about the feasability. And, as I suggested above, it needs people to think a little outside their traditional comfort zones.

And of course, there are things mixed into this debate that are completely extraneous. I believe there aree some who dont want this issue debated rationally. Its fine, it comes with the territory. weve gotta stay focussed and unperturbed


----------



## VBF-13 (May 10, 2013)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> We are saying stay on topic and play nice.


OK, I can see that puts me in kind of a spot. That is to say, just before this admonition, I obliged myself on some rationale on an off-topic digression this thread took over the past several pages. Namely, that was on the Japanese pilot-training programs throughout the years of the War. I'll let that go for the next big opportunity. However, let the record reflect, that's only because I know from a past thread you like Franziskaner beer. I wouldn't do it for anybody else.

PS:


----------



## Njaco (May 10, 2013)

and somebody just got an infraction for the snarky post that was made after Chris and I warned everyone. This isn't a joke. I know we laugh and rib each other but some here have an agenda with other members that disrupts threads and causes friction. The Mods and Admins are done with it. If you can't at least respect each other, go find another sandbox to be nasty in - just don't let the cat bury you.


----------



## parsifal (May 12, 2013)

You can always

1) Start another thread, and produce your evidence
2) PM the person that you want to quiz 

Just some suggestions, to stop the rupturing of this thread


Even though Im probably one of the branded troublemakers, I can see the mods frustrations very clearly. Dont mess around any more, thats my advice


----------



## VBF-13 (May 12, 2013)

Njaco said:


> and somebody just got an infraction for the snarky post that was made after Chris and I warned everyone. This isn't a joke. I know we laugh and rib each other but some here have an agenda with other members that disrupts threads and causes friction. The Mods and Admins are done with it. If you can't at least respect each other, go find another sandbox to be nasty in - just don't let the cat bury you.


I wasn't making light of your admonition to play nice. For what it's worth...


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (May 12, 2013)

You are not the one that got the infraction.


----------



## VBF-13 (May 12, 2013)

I know. It was the proximity, though, and I was joking. I just wanted him to understand I wasn't joking about not playing nice. I take that seriously, too.


----------



## Jugman (May 13, 2013)

Parsifal read the section "Resources for Research and Development" in chapter five. 

Total cost to get the F6F into production was in the range of $10-40M*. This is moot for three reasons: 
1 Post Pearl Harbor money really was not an issue anymore.
2 This money would probably be spent on Grumman anyways.
3 What the Navy lacked most was means to get aircraft into combat. To get more fleet carriers earlier you need to go back to at least mid 1940.


----------



## parsifal (May 13, 2013)

Jugman said:


> Parsifal read the section "Resources for Research and Development" in chapter five.
> 
> Total cost to get the F6F into production was in the range of $10-40M*. This is moot for three reasons:
> 1 Post Pearl Harbor money really was not an issue anymore.
> ...



Dont know about the 10 million side, but 40 million seems at least plausible. Going back to 1940 is exactly where you need to go. Construction for the factory the factory for the Hellcat was begun in ealy 1941, the materials needed for its construction begun in 1940, and the workforce needed for construction (1940) and production (1941). Component manufactiuree began in January 1942, and the contrcts for serial production in mid 1942. Delivery of the first production hellcats was occurring by the end of 1942 and in a high levle of delivery by about April or May.

The development side occurred from the beginning of 1940, and was at a high rate of consumption by the ebeginning of 1941. That had to have been financed in FY41, which means the funds are set aside, or guranteed or whatever other mechanism the US administration was using to give surety to its aircraft builders, in 1940. The research for the development of this fighter was not voted until 1940, so in a sense you are right. if it hadnt been the F6F, that money would have been used to build something else....probably the Xf5f. But as i6t happened, it was used to build the f6F....


----------



## Jugman (May 14, 2013)

The pre-war expansion of Gruuman had nothing to do with the F6F. The contract for the two F6F-1s is dated Jun 30, 1941 and the first production order for F6Fs is dated January 7, 1942. Work on plant #3 (the plant built specifically for the F6F) did not begin untill August.

Funding for new aircraft came from generals fund set aside in the budget for that purpose. Contracts typically were of the fixed-price pay-later variety. Untill the contract for the XF6F-1s was signed the F6F just wasn't a factor.


----------



## parsifal (May 14, 2013)

I have to respectfully disagree that "nothing happened with the F6F until mid 1941". Design wise studies can be traced as far back as 1938 with changes in the F4F2, further design (and some development) continued with the R2800 development, and the extended wind tunnel test that were undertaken in 1939. There were monies allocated to the Xf5F project, and Grumman knew that it was going to need to expand its factory space, for the new fighter (whatever form that might take) from at least 1940, and the company was spendinding some money on the new factory from early 1940 on the new factory, and a lot of money on the building from at least japanuary 1941. It had begun training its workforce from the middle of 1941 and had begun component manufacture from January 1942. These are not small ticket items. It might be possble to argue on technical grounds that it wasnt the Hellcat, but it was expenditure that can be laid at the feet of what was to become the hellcat. it was, in effect, the Hellcat under another name. 

Arguing that it was expenditure being absorbed by the company is another furphy that i have been waiting for someone to raise. Whether or not the expenditure was company funds or government funds is irelevant, as irrelevant as saying research not bearing the label F6F but eventually used as a critical element of the F6F, is not a cost that can be laid at the feet of the F6F. if it was used in the design and development of the F6F and its production, its a cost that needs to be acknowledged. if the money was private or public, it was national wealth still spent in a certain direction, and in a controlled wartime economy, like the US economy of 1940, every dollar counts. 

There are no free lunches in wartime


----------



## Shortround6 (May 14, 2013)

parsifal said:


> and Grumman knew that it was going to need to expand its factory space, for the new fighter (whatever form that might take) from at least 1940, and the company was spendinding some money on the new factory from early 1940 on the new factory, and a lot of money on the building from at least japanuary 1941. It had begun training its workforce from the middle of 1941 and had begun component manufacture from January 1942. These are not small ticket items. It might be possble to argue on technical grounds that it wasnt the Hellcat, but it was expenditure that can be laid at the feet of what was to become the hellcat. it was, in effect, the Hellcat under another name.



Grumman went from producing F4Fs at 2-3 dozen a month to over 100 month during 1941, it also started producing Avengers during this time. This is one way they "trained" the larger work force. It is also the reason for early plant expansion, not hopes or plans for a future fighter contract. 
Please remember that ALL Grumman production EXCEPT the F6F was shifted to other companies/factories. Including production of the J2F Duck. 

Claiming that plant expansion or work force expansion PRIOR to the F6F contracts were due to the F6F is misleading. 

Grumman had built something like 500 planes from it's start in 1930 up until Sept 1939. It was going to need to expand to handle the production needs just of the F4F and Avenger.


----------



## parsifal (May 14, 2013)

David Anderton in his book "Hellcat" (Janes Publishing Company 1984) at Page 22 states that all hellcat production was undertaken exclusively by Grumnman, unlike most other grumman products, which were built under licence, particullarly General Motors or its subsidiaries. And almost all Hellcats were built in a new plant (the biggest to date in north america), built specifically for the new Grumman fighter that was eventually to be the f6F. ....work comenced on the construction of this plant in 1940, and it was completed in 1941.... ive paraphrased him, but this is an accurate rendition of his words. 

i dont know, but this guy seems to be a recognized expert on the Hellcat. the book is a pretty good reference.

So I dont think it is misleading to say the factory was built for the Hellcat. maybe a little incorrect, since it might well have been used to build the f5F instead, had that fighter been adopted, but good enough. If the choice on the navy fighter had been XF5F, instead of the Hellcat, we'd be sitting here arguing about the F5f rather than the F6F. but that isnt how things panned out. It was the hellcat that was selected (for good reason), the design and research for the hellcat began well before 1941 (Source: "F6F Hellcat" by Hal Andrews, http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/hist-ac/f6f-5.pdf). It doesnt matter that the new fighter was the Hellcat. The Navy already had a new fighter in the XF4U under design. They decided that was too risky and embarked on the development of at least two other prototype designs that i know of....the F6F and the F5F, both of which i think were done at the expense of carrier construction. I think a better priority would have been to continue development of the F4U, delay development of the F6F until FY42 increase production of F4f (which was done in existing factory space from the summer of 1941 anyway) abandon Essex production in FY 41, and instead build 4 Yorktowns instead of the measely 1 Essex they actually authorised.

The net difference in terms of revenue expenditure for FY41 should be relatively neutral. The Essex cost nearly $70m to design and build, we think the total cost of the hellcat was about $10-40million, probably closer to $40m, A Yorktown cost about $25-30 million per copy in 1940-1 dollars, and putting existing designed and ready aircraft about a further $4m per ship. Thats a total cost of about $116m, compared to $124m for a single essex and a similar number of Hellcats (320). But the clanger is that there would be carriers available at a time when historically the US did not have carriers. planes on decks is worth far more than planes with no carriers, and carriers (in fighting trim) delievered early, when the enemy has none, is a war winner in my opinion.


----------



## Shortround6 (May 14, 2013)

Grumman Wildcat production: 1988 aircraft from Sept 1937 to May 1943.
Eastern Aircraft delivers the bulk of the F4Fs but doesn't deliver the first one until August 1942. 

Grumman Avenger production: 2293 from August of 1941 to December 1943.
Eastern Aircraft production: 7546 from Nov 1942 to Sept 1945. 


Production Contract for F6F placed Jan 7, 1942 , *5 months* before first flight of a prototype. 

It takes one heck of a crystal ball gazer to break ground on a factory in 1940 for a plane that won't be ordered for another year and half. 

Since the Navy didn't get into talks with General Motors (Eastern Aircraft) until AFTER Pearl Harbor it is also a little difficult to figure out back in 1940 WHO would be making the other Grumman products while the "new" factory built the "future" fighter. 

It wound up that Eastern and other companies took over the rest of the Grumman products and it wound up that F6F production stayed at the Bethpage plant but claiming that was the "plan" in 1940 is quite a stretch.


----------



## VBF-13 (May 14, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> Grumman Wildcat production: 1988 aircraft from Sept 1937 to May 1943.
> Eastern Aircraft delivers the bulk of the F4Fs but doesn't deliver the first one until August 1942.
> 
> Grumman Avenger production: 2293 from August of 1941 to December 1943.
> ...


This is a good analysis. Let me add just a little detail to it. First, let's understand some overall rationale.

The A6Ms were whipping us in dogfights. They were maneuverable, long-ranged and fast. Even while employing special tactics so as to not have to play to their strengths, our F4Fs were barely coping. We had the machine on the books to turn the tide, namely, in the F4U, but those still needed refinement. In the meantime, Grumman's new concept, the XF6F, was gathering momentum. It was billed to be able to go into production very quickly, once the green light was given. Although it resembled the F4F, it was a completely new design, right down to the last nut and bolt. The Navy placed its first order on June 30, 1941, more than five months out from our entry into the War, and Grumman turned its entire Bethpage plant to it. The first flight took place only one year later, on June 26, 1942, and production planes were coming off the line only five months after that. As the designers and engineers refined and perfected it, the very first prototypes were virtually hand-built by the company's most skilled tradesmen.

EDIT: We knew the F4Fs would have trouble with the A6Ms, that's why we were building better aircraft, that's the bottom-line.


----------



## parsifal (May 14, 2013)

> Grumman Wildcat production: 1988 aircraft from Sept 1937 to May 1943.
> Eastern Aircraft delivers the bulk of the F4Fs but doesn't deliver the first one until August 1942.



Which fits nicely with the timetable for the projected new carriers. Bringing a new source of F4Fs online meshes perfectly with the strategy. Arrivin




> Grumman Avenger production: 2293 from August of 1941 to December 1943.
> Eastern Aircraft production: 7546 from Nov 1942 to Sept 1945.



Not sure of the relevancce of this..... 



> Production Contract for F6F placed Jan 7, 1942 , *5 months* before first flight of a prototype.



USN began looking for aa replacement to the F4F in *1938*, not 1942. Everybody knew big orders were coming from the times of the planned expansions and before that even. 



> It takes one heck of a crystal ball gazer to break ground on a factory in 1940 for a plane that won't be ordered for another year and half.



No, not at all. The British had anticipated similar requirements and implemented their shadow factory sytems even before designs had been finalised. Everyone knew that expansions were coming. If it hadnt been the F6F, it would have been an F5F, or an improved F4F. If Gruman had not done anythng, it probably would have been an F4U. 




> Since the Navy didn't get into talks with General Motors (Eastern Aircraft) until AFTER Pearl Harbor it is also a little difficult to figure out back in 1940 WHO would be making the other Grumman products while the "new" factory built the "future" fighter.



Nobody knew. But everybody knew that anexpansion was coming, and everybody knew that they had to be ready if they wanted a share of the gravy train




> It wound up that Eastern and other companies took over the rest of the Grumman products and it wound up that F6F production stayed at the Bethpage plant but claiming that was the "plan" in 1940 is quite a stretch.




What can I say....your statements are in direct contradiction to the quoted source. Much as i respect your knowledge you should be able to understand why I would prefer a printed source. Your basis for saying "not possible" dont wash, because other allied nations were using exactly the same principal....build a factory, THEN find a design to build in it. My country' DAP plant was built on exactly that principal. It still a cost that should be attributed to the development cost of the winning design.


----------



## parsifal (May 14, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> This is a good analysis. Let me add just a little detail to it. First, let's understand some overall rationale.
> 
> The A6Ms were whipping us in dogfights. They were maneuverable, long-ranged and fast. Even while employing special tactics so as to not have to play to their strengths, our F4Fs were barely coping. We had the machine on the books to turn the tide, namely, in the F4U, but those still needed refinement. In the meantime, Grumman's new concept, the XF6F, was gathering momentum. It was billed to be able to go into production very quickly, once the green light was given. Although it resembled the F4F, it was a completely new design, right down to the last nut and bolt. The Navy placed its first order on June 30, 1941, more than five months out from our entry into the War, and Grumman turned its entire Bethpage plant to it. The first flight took place only one year later, on June 26, 1942, and production planes were coming off the line only five months after that. As the designers and engineers refined and perfected it, the very first prototypes were virtually hand-built by the company's most skilled tradesmen.
> 
> EDIT: We knew the F4Fs would have trouble with the A6Ms, that's why we were building better aircraft, that's the bottom-line.



There is no evidence to support that in a strategic sense. i have no problem in conceding or acknowledging that the F4F was outclassed in a dogfight situation. But in all the major enagements that the F4F was in its element (fleet defence) and it grappled the A6M, the F4F, in numbers of aircraft (not just the A6M, but also the aircraft that mattered....the Kates and Vals being escorted) the Wildcat was doing better than holding its own. it was winning. Aircraft similar or inferior to the F4F had put the Japanese on the rack by early 1943, and there is absolutely no evidence to support the notion that things were going to change soon. None. 

The idea that hellcat "won the air battle" is one of those urban myths. They did a lot of excellent work, but by the time they arrived on the scene in Septemeber, the Japanese were already on the canvas as far as losing air superiority was concerned. It had been won by the bombers, and the very aircraft you are claiming as not having any chance against the japanese. The reason....back to where this all started...having a fighter that is the biggest and meanest on the block does not gurantee air superiority. In fact its a relatively minor issue unless you have other factors working for you. Loss rates dont change much either if the force was an enlarged F4F force compared to a smaller, later F6F force.

Conclusion: F6F was a fantastic but unneccessary fighter. USN made poor choices in production prioorities to acquire it. By which time the hard work had already been done by other aircraft.


----------



## Shortround6 (May 14, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Not sure of the relevancce of this.....
> 
> USN began looking for aa replacement to the F4F in *1938*, not 1942. Everybody knew big orders were coming from the times of the planned expansions and before that even.
> 
> ...



I don't think your explanation washes very well. 

The relevance of the Avenger production is to show that Grumman had way more orders for aircraft than it could meet with it's exiting prewar plant. Grumman was still getting orders for the J2F Duck, it was getting orders for the G-21 Goose and G-44 Widgeon and orders for the Wildcat and Avenger were in much greater numbers than any previous Grumman orders. It needed a bigger plant JUST to meet the existing and anticipated F4F and Avenger orders. 
Grumman ALREADY had the designs to fill the new factory space. The fact that three of the designs had to be farmed out to other companies to MAKE space for F6F production should show that the Plant that built the F6F was NOT a plant in search of a product. 
By the time the first few F6F production aircraft are rolling out the factory door (Dec 1942) Grumman is making about 100 Avengers per month and had been making 90 or more F4F's a month since March 42. 

Without this factory that you claim should be charged to the F6F costs the US Navy would have been in very dire straights indeed to fill it's _existing_ carrier flight decks in late 1942/ early 43. 

Perhaps the cost of converting the GM automobile plants should be charged to the F6F (or what ever theoretical F4F replacement you come up with) but that cost comes way too late to make any difference in carrier construction.


----------



## parsifal (May 14, 2013)

At what point after May 1942 was the USN ever shoirt of F4Fs. At what point did the Avenger become an effective torpedo bomber. The latter was a very effective aircraft but it was not effective in its allotted role until well after 1943. There were no shortages of F4Fs after Coral Sea that I know of. The factory was NOT essential to the American war effort, or at least, not as essential as securing a better supply of carriers. 

Its not my explanation either. You are arguing with the author of a pretty solid reference. good luck with that. I notice not a shred of evidence to support your claims incidentally. funny that....


----------



## parsifal (May 14, 2013)

Another source for you to have an argument with

Dispatch Archive


Relevantly it states "All Hellcats were manufactured by Grumman at the Bethpage, Long Island plant. Grumman, already building F4F Wildcats, TBF Avengers, and J2F Ducks, was forced to expand their facilities and their workforce to meet the needs of the Navy for its newest fighter."...which suggests the plant was expanded primarily to accommodate the new fighter, not meet any expansion of the existing programs. Some sources also say it was a brand new plant built from the ground up. is that incorrect. if so, what is your source?

yhis source also disagrees with your timeline for Eastern Aircraft produced F4Fs

http://weaponsandwarfare.com/?p=4960

Relevantly it says

"The final production variant built by Grumman was the long-range reconnaissance F4F-7 with increased fuel capacity, camera installations in the lower fuselage and armament deleted. Only 20 were built, but Grumman also produced an additional 100 F4F-3s and two XF4F-8 prototypes. With an urgent need to concentrate on development and production of the more advanced F6F Hellcat, Grumman negotiated with General Motors to continue production of the F4F-4 Wildcat under the designation FM-1. Production by General Motors’ Eastern Aircraft Division began after finalisation of a contract on 18 April 1942, and the first of this company’s FM-ls was flown on 31 August 1942. Production totalled 1,151, of which 312 were supplied to the UK under the designation Martlet Mk V (later Wildcat Mk V)."

Admittedly production did not get underway until the end of August, but its what it doesnt say that is interesting. Negotiations did not start until January 1942...if factory 3 had not been expanded and orders received pre-war , there is no reason not to expect grumman to have entered into a licence agreement with eastern before January/ April. It could just as well have been january/April 1940 or january April 1941. We are back to where we stsrted...factory number 3 was expanded to meet the expoected demands of the new fighter project, which is exactly what it did.


----------



## Shortround6 (May 14, 2013)

parsifal said:


> At what point after May 1942 was the USN ever shoirt of F4Fs. At what point did the Avenger become an effective torpedo bomber. The latter was a very effective aircraft but it was not effective in its allotted role until well after 1943. There were no shortages of F4Fs after Coral Sea that I know of. The factory was NOT essential to the American war effort, or at least, not as essential as securing a better supply of carriers.
> 
> Its not my explanation either. You are arguing with the author of a pretty solid reference. good luck with that. I notice not a shred of evidence to support your claims incidentally. funny that....



Maybe it wasn't short of F4Fs _because_ Grumman was making 90 or more a month in that factory you claim wasn't needed? 
Factory had it's opening day ceremony Dec 7 1941, Prior peak F4F production was 47 planes back in April of 1941. Production topped only 30 planes a month in 3 other months until Jan 1942. 

It may have taken a while for the Avenger to become an effective torpedo bomber but what was the alternative in the summer/fall/winter of 1942?

and by alternative the Devasator had been out of production for a couple of years so there are *NO REPLACEMENTS* and *NO NEW AIRCRAFT* to equip squadrons with. 

Your idea is now to use _LOTS_ of carriers with F4Fs and Dauntless's and nothing else? It may have taken a while for the Avenger to become effective in it's "allotted role" but that is more of a problem with the torpedo than the aircraft isn't it? 

What kind of proof do you want?

Some production figures are from Grumman Aircraft since 1929 by Rene Francillon (dates for production by Grumman and Eastern Aircraft)
Some are from America's Hundred Thousand. 
Some are from here, Exhibit 6. 

Funny that, but I guess they are not good enough for you.


----------



## Shortround6 (May 14, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Another source for you to have an argument with........
> 
> Admittedly production did not get underway until the end of August, but its what it doesnt say that is interesting. Negotiations did not start until January 1942...if factory 3 had not been expanded and orders received pre-war , there is no reason not to expect grumman to have entered into a licence agreement with eastern before January/ April. It could just as well have been january/April 1940 or january April 1941. We are back to where we stsrted...factory number 3 was expanded to meet the expoected demands of the new fighter project, which is exactly what it did.





Building the Navy's Bases in World War II [Chapter 16]

"Bethpage, N.Y. -- The carrier-based fighter program required several expansions to the Grumman plant facilities at Bethpage, Long Island, N.Y. The first of these additions was begun on March 8, 1942. Included in the project was a wood-frame, two-story, 60-by-270-foot office building, on concrete footings and piers; also a U-shaped, 481-by-343-foot hangar, with brick walls and timber roof trusses.

In September 1942, a 480-by-840-foot additionwas started for the wing-assembly plant. This extension was erected with brick walls on structural-steel framing. Columns of steel, salvaged from the New York World's Fair, were spaced to form 20-by-40-foot bays. The roof was supported by 40-foot, laminated wood beams. The building was windowless. Open areas around three storehouses were enclosed to provide two sections, 230 feet long and 120 feet wide. The plant addition was occupied on October 5, 1942, and the warehouses were in use by the end of the year, although construction on the projects was not complete until July 1943.

In march 1943, construction was begun on another project, to provide a similar addition to the assembly shop. This extension was 420 feet wide and 502 feet long and was divided into assembly area and shops. Steel girders were used instead of laminated wood beams. Six, 100-by-320-foot warehouses, with cinder-block walls and structural-steel framing, were erected. On July 4, 1943, airplane production was begun in the assembly area of this addition. The warehouses had been put in use the previous May.

In November 1943, construction commenced on a building to house engineering and experimental work. The structure, 400 by 780 feet, had steel framing and 8-inch brick walls with 4-inch cinder-block lining. Most of the building was windowless. Its main portion was put in service by July 15, 1944.

By these wartime additions the Navy doubled the manufacturing facilities of the plant."

Now these additions are not described by Number (plant 2 or 3) but in Francillon's book (page 14) under 1940 it says " Construction of Plant 2, the main production facility during the war, was begun."

In 1941 number of employees tripled. (page 15)

Page 16, " As the Navy and Allies needed more Grumman designed aircraft than could be produced in the company's fast growing facilities at Bethpage (Plant 3 was opened in March), the Navy Dept instructed Grumman to transfer production of Wildcats and Avengers to the Eastern Aircraft Division of the General Motors Corporation and that of Ducks to Columbia Aircraft Corporation...........As a result of this programme, the last Grumman built Duck, Wildcat, and Avenger were delivered respectively in March 1942, May 1943 and December 1943."

I hardly think that the Grumman stopped production of the Wildcat in Sept or Oct of 1942 when Eastern first started and then waited until April/May to pop out 20 F4F-7s. 

Avengers were being made by both Grumman and Eastern Aircraft for just over a year. 

Grumman got their _First_ contract for Avengers Dec 30 1940, 285 TBF-1s and 1 XTBF-2. 
First Production Avenger (from Plant 2) was rolled out Jan 3 1942, Production hit 60 planes per month in June 1942, Production peak _FOR Grumman_ was 163 planes delivered in August 1943. 

all From Francillon's book.

Now Plant 3 _may or may not_ have wound up as Grumman's largest plant. It may have wound up dedicated to F6F production ( as Plant 2 may have after Avenger production shut down). But it sure doesn't look like like "Plant 3" was "planed" in 1940 to be the future plant for the F6F to the extent that if it had not been built the US could have built another carrier for service in 1943/43. 
Grumman paid for Plant 2 themselves I believe, unless you can show proof other wise.


----------



## parsifal (May 15, 2013)

> Maybe it wasn't short of F4Fs _because_ Grumman was making 90 or more a month in that factory you claim wasn't needed?




I never said they werent needed. i said the factory was exapanded to accommodate the new fighters everybody knew were coming. Given that F4F production peaked when it wasnt being produced at bethpafe, what stopped that from occurring earlier. thats the issue you need to come to grips with. I think the expansion of Bethpage was done to accommodate the new fighter, which happened in the end to be the F6F. i think that was an uecessarary expansion, at least as a priority over earlier carrier deployment. The same reault could have been achieved if the factory had been expanded FY42, which means it would have begun serial production of the F6F in late'43 instead of early'43. 



> Factory had it's opening day ceremony Dec 7 1941, Prior peak F4F production was 47 planes back in April of 1941. Production topped only 30 planes a month in 3 other months until Jan 1942.



No question production needed to be increased, bu the US already had capacity that could absorb this. Grumman chose not to do that....they wanted more of the pie than that. 



> It may have taken a while for the Avenger to become an effective torpedo bomber but what was the alternative in the summer/fall/winter of 1942


?

Once the shortcomings of the Bliss Levitt were known, production of the TBF should have halted, with the CAGs replacing those squadrons with SBDs, until the topredo issues were solved. TBFs might be a shiny nice aircraft but as a weppon system they were a dud until the torpedoes were fixed. SBDs were an incomplete weapons package, but better than the inneffective torpedo squadrons Fitch the VTs until they can justify their existence.... 




> and by alternative the Devasator had been out of production for a couple of years so there are *NO REPLACEMENTS* and *NO NEW AIRCRAFT* to equip squadrons with.



Wise after the fact, that much I will grant you, but putting Devastators on the carriers was a waste of time as well. These a/c were obsolete, and their wepons also defective. Far better to have SNDs in their place until a suitable VT was fully worked up...




> Your idea is now to use _LOTS_ of carriers with F4Fs and Dauntless's and nothing else? It may have taken a while for the Avenger to become effective in it's "allotted role" but that is more of a problem with the torpedo than the aircraft isn't it?




Four is not "lots", but its enough to maintain momentum during your winter 1943. Aircraft losses would actually decrease if that occurred as the allies would lessen the need to just slug it out with the Japanese in the SWPA from land bases. 



> What kind of proof do you want?
> 
> Some production figures are from Grumman Aircraft since 1929 by Rene Francillon (dates for production by Grumman and Eastern Aircraft)
> Some are from America's Hundred Thousand.
> ...




steady up, let me have a look first....


----------



## parsifal (May 15, 2013)

Building the Navy's Bases in World War II [Chapter 16][/url]



> Bethpage, N.Y. -- The carrier-based fighter program required several expansions to the Grumman plant facilities at Bethpage, Long Island, N.Y. The first of these additions was begun on March 8, 1942. Included in the project was a wood-frame, two-story, 60-by-270-foot office building, on concrete footings and piers; also a U-shaped, 481-by-343-foot hangar, with brick walls and timber roof trusses.
> 
> In September 1942, a 480-by-840-foot additionwas started for the wing-assembly plant. This extension was erected with brick walls on structural-steel framing. Columns of steel, salvaged from the New York World's Fair, were spaced to form 20-by-40-foot bays. The roof was supported by 40-foot, laminated wood beams. The building was windowless. Open areas around three storehouses were enclosed to provide two sections, 230 feet long and 120 feet wide. The plant addition was occupied on October 5, 1942, and the warehouses were in use by the end of the year, although construction on the projects was not complete until July 1943.
> 
> ...



Very useful information, which tends to confirm that the plant underwent steady expansion in 1942-3. Doesnt say though that the plant was built in 1940, or what was happening in 1940-41, which is what we are interested in....



> Now these additions are not described by Number (plant 2 or 3) but in Francillon's book (page 14) under 1940 it says " Construction of Plant 2, the main production facility during the war, was begun."



which is not inconsistent with what ive said. Why was the plant built? I think the answer was to accommodate the navy's plans for a new fighter....not "to accommodate the Navy's plans for expansion, though it seems it ended up doing that as well, for a time. 



> In 1941 number of employees tripled. (page 15)



Anderton says it differently....he says the hellcat program from '41 employed more than 20000 people. Maybe 20000 = three times the 1040 workforce. 



> Page 16, " As the Navy and Allies needed more Grumman designed aircraft than could be produced in the company's fast growing facilities at Bethpage (Plant 3 was opened in March), the Navy Dept instructed Grumman to transfer production of Wildcats and Avengers to the Eastern Aircraft Division of the General Motors Corporation and that of Ducks to Columbia Aircraft Corporation...........As a result of this programme, the last Grumman built Duck, Wildcat, and Avenger were delivered respectively in March 1942, May 1943 and December 1943."



This is very good information for which I commend you. However it doesnt prove or decide anything either way. The way Im reading that is that more carrier aircraft were needed and as a result of that two things happened....there were further exapansions at the grumman plant, and Wildcat and TBF production (ignoring Duck production) were moved off site, from March 1942. This could have happened anytime. And if the F6F had not been built, we would have been no worse off in 1942, and most of 1943. Additional orders for F4Fs could have been placed by the Navy, and Grumman would have found it necessary to seek licence production earlier than it did. thats not an additional cost, like the F6F program generated....its a managerial war production issue that required a bit of administration. 



> I hardly think that the Grumman stopped production of the Wildcat in Sept or Oct of 1942 when Eastern first started and then waited until April/May to pop out 20 F4F-7s.


. yep probably, but also probably not in the exapanded area set aside for the F6F, which appears to have been built progressively from 1940-43



> Avengers were being made by both Grumman and Eastern Aircraft for just over a year.
> 
> Grumman got their _First_ contract for Avengers Dec 30 1940, 285 TBF-1s and 1 XTBF-2.
> First Production Avenger (from Plant 2) was rolled out Jan 3 1942, Production hit 60 planes per month in June 1942, Production peak _FOR Grumman_ was 163 planes delivered in August 1943


. 

which confirms thay already had considerable capacity, but needed more for the f6F, which they built....but at what cost in other production priorities. And TBF was another unecessary aircraft until it had a weapon that would actually work




> Now Plant 3 _may or may not_ have wound up as Grumman's largest plant. It may have wound up dedicated to F6F production ( as Plant 2 may have after Avenger production shut down). But it sure doesn't look like like "Plant 3" was "planed" in 1940 to be the future plant for the F6F to the extent that if it had not been built the US could have built another carrier for service in 1943/43


. 


I dont think it was planned that way either. But gruman I think undertook exapansion of its production facilities to grab a bigger slice of the pie for the replacement fighter that they, and a lot of other people, knew was comiing. It may have been F4F, it may have been F5F, or it may have been F6F (it may have been something else entirely. As it traspired, it was the f6F that was built at bethpage, and it was Bethpade that was being greatly expanded from 1940, to build fighters and TBFs that had next to no impact on the early fighting through to late 1943. The Navy could have re-rdered its priorities, survived on existing production faciltiers and had its decisive carriers by early to mid'43. 



> Grumman paid for Plant 2 themselves I believe, unless you can show proof other wise.




Which means what....its still investment capital being squandered on a project not absolutely necessary for the immediate war needs. Private, public, heck, even if the japanese were paying for it, it still represents the expenditure of resources that could have been used elsewhere. The plant was built for a purpopse....to build aircraft....this would have been done on the understanding or the belief that a lot of money was going to be spent by government in thaat area of military acquaisition. The govt would have had to "promise" that money up front at least from FY41, the same as they dont pay for ships until delivered...they still have to show they have the money, the same as the rest of us....


----------



## zjtins (May 15, 2013)

Hellcat over Spit. Range and ruggedness. The rest of the factors the pilots would try to control to his benefit. Range lets you follow the Spit back to land and then destroy ala ME262.
Ruggedness lets you take some hits and keep going, something the Spit was NOT known for.


----------



## drgondog (May 15, 2013)

zjtins said:


> Hellcat over Spit. Range and ruggedness. The rest of the factors the pilots would try to control to his benefit. Range lets you follow the Spit back to land and then destroy ala ME262.
> Ruggedness lets you take some hits and keep going, something the Spit was NOT known for.



Ruggedness over rated for air superiority fighter - otherwise you should take P-61 over Hellcat.

P-47D very rugged - but took backseat to Mustang as air superiority fighter.

Range permits greater tactical footprint and when fighters are comparable in performance, gives the edge to the longer range fighter


----------



## Shortround6 (May 15, 2013)

parsifal said:


> which confirms thay already had considerable capacity, but needed more for the f6F, which they built....but at what cost in other production priorities. And TBF was another unecessary aircraft until it had a weapon that would actually work.
> I dont think it was planned that way either. But gruman I think undertook exapansion of its production facilities to grab a bigger slice of the pie for the replacement fighter that they, and a lot of other people, knew was comiing. It may have been F4F, it may have been F5F, or it may have been F6F (it may have been something else entirely. As it traspired, it was the f6F that was built at bethpage, and it was Bethpade that was being greatly expanded from 1940, to build fighters and TBFs that had next to no impact on the early fighting through to late 1943. The Navy could have re-rdered its priorities, survived on existing production faciltiers and had its decisive carriers by early to mid'43.



You seem to be under a misapprehension that some american companies were much bigger than they were in 1939-40. 

They did expand tremendously during the war but many of them started 1-2 years (or more) behind the British expansion and shadow factories.

A Short Grumman Production History:

FF model, 64 built Between Dec 1931 and Nov 34. Parts later supplied to Canada for a batch. 
J2F Duck, 315 built between April 1933 and March 1942, I don't now how many by late 1940.
F2F-1, 56 built between Oct 1933 and Oct 1935
F3F, 169 built between March 1935 and May of 1939.
XSBF, 1 in Dec 1935.
G-21 Goose, appears to be 57 from May 1937 to late (Nov?) 1940
F4F, 106 from July 1940 through Dec 1940, does not include prototypes? 
Avenger is taking shape on paper if not mock-up? 
Widgion makes first flight in 1940. 
Grumman builds ONE F5F in 1940 and is working on ONE P-50.

Grumman is certainly expecting more business but also, even by going to multiple shifts, cannot handle existing business. Some expansion is needed even without Avenger production. 
Claiming at this stage that production can be farmed out to the Auto makers (who are not even close to shutting down in 1940) is really using 20/20 hindsight. 

If we accept the idea that the war could have been won with the F4F we also have to look at the production of fighters. There were 7825 F4Fs built and 12,275 F6Fs built for a total of 20,100 Grummans, granted much of the 1945 production do not see combat. (or even a training squadron) Now how many F4Fs are going to be needed? 1/2 the total? 60%? 70% Even with Eastern Aircraft tooled up and running Grumman is going to have to make thousands more F4Fs than they did historically and that probably cannot be done in the 1939-40 plant. 


The whole "don't make torpedo bombers" thing is a red herring. 
Given the "knowledge" that the torpedoes don't work was it actually harder to fix the torpedoes than play silly buggers with aircraft and ship production? 

How long did it take and how much did it cost to fix the torpedo problem _once they admitted they had one?_

AS for US excess capacity in car production see;

U.S. Automobile Production Figures - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

US car factories don't shift until very late 1941/early 1942.


----------



## zjtins (May 15, 2013)

> Ruggedness over rated for air superiority fighter - otherwise you should take P-61 over Hellcat.
> 
> P-47D very rugged - but took backseat to Mustang as air superiority fighter.




Overrated, no. And P-61 does not perform like a Hellcat its not an absolute... aside from the question was Hellcat or Spit.

Mustang took over when most of the Good German Aces were dead, there were grossly outnumber in most cases and fuel was very limited. I am not knocking what the P-51 contributed merely pointing out by the time the P-51 had numbers there was little doubt in the outcome. 

Also the P-51 was pushed into service in part due to low cost vs the P-47 and P-38.


----------



## bobbysocks (May 15, 2013)

the mustang was pushed into service because of the dire need for long range escorts. in the fall of 43 the 8th AF loses were so horrific that they suspended daylight bombing beyond what could be covered by escorts....which basically left the whole heart of germany untouched. that doesnt sound like there was little doubt about the outcome. the LW was still a strong and viable threat that had to be dealt with....they might have been hurting but they werent beat at this time.


----------



## Njaco (May 15, 2013)

> Mustang took over when most of the Good German Aces were dead, there were grossly outnumber in most cases and fuel was very limited. I am not knocking what the P-51 contributed merely pointing out by the time the P-51 had numbers there was little doubt in the outcome.



So why bother? Why need a long range fighter? Why anything. Germany was done, beat, fried, wasted in 1943. No aces, the planes were just "modest successes" - just a cool laid-back war. Just sit back and wait for the end.


----------



## drgondog (May 15, 2013)

zjtins said:


> Overrated, no. And P-61 does not perform like a Hellcat its not an absolute... aside from the question was Hellcat or Spit.
> 
> *I was addressing your statement regarding the importance of Rugged in air superiority. The Zero kicked the living crap out of Allied Fighters in 1941-1943 with not much to say about it. Rugged is very important if the other guy is on your ass and won't let go... but if the other guy has more firepower, is faster and more manueverable (Spit) usually one of those will work for you in combat. Hellcat had range, and could fold its wings, could carry an external ordnance load and was 'tougher' - and it was painted an impressive Blue. *
> 
> ...



You are incorrect again. They P-51A was not even ordered until June 1942 when the USAAF finally got off its dead ass - as reports from UK were raving about the potential of the Merlin/Mustang X. The A-36 was ordered to keep the line going as NAA was given a contract for the P-51B, then most of the P-51A orders were re-written to P-51B. Until the Brits took over and converted a great airframe to a great fighter at all altitudes, the Army had not even started the Flight Tests of the XP-51 - allegedly because it wasn't ordered by the Army - only the Brits. 

Short answer - the US Army screwed up big time and Arnold freely admitted it - then threw resources at North American to get it to the ETO.

It was ramped to a two factory production line because it was going to be the best long range fighter available in Europe for 8th AF Strategic Operations.

If you read a little deeper into operational histories you will note how OUTNUMBERED the Mustang was over Germany until May 1944. The Battle for Germany starting over during Big Week and running through to D-Day saw the P-51B destroying more German aircraft than all the P-47C and D victory credits combined from April 1943 through June 6... despite flying 4-6x the number of sorties than the P-51B/C.


----------



## Aozora (May 15, 2013)

zjtins said:


> Mustang took over when most of the Good German Aces were dead, there were grossly outnumber in most cases and fuel was very limited. I am not knocking what the P-51 contributed merely pointing out by the time the P-51 had numbers there was little doubt in the outcome.
> 
> Also the P-51 was pushed into service in part due to low cost vs the P-47 and P-38.



Don't know where you got this horse pucky from - the USAAF strategic bombing campaign almost died in October 1943 because of a lack of escort fighters and because the Luftwaffe were knocking down too many B-17s and B-24s; there were still lots of good pilots available to the Luftwaffe. As it was the P-38s and P-47s were struggling, partly because of the weather conditions, but mainly because of poor tactics on the part of 8th FC. The only reason the campaign was able to be revived was because of the availability of the P-51 coupled with a change of leadership in 8th FC and a change in tactics. 

Do some quality reading before making ridiculous assertions.


----------



## VBF-13 (May 15, 2013)

Njaco said:


> So why bother? Why need a long range fighter? Why anything. Germany was done, beat, fried, wasted in 1943. No aces, the planes were just "modest successes" - just a cool laid-back war. Just sit back and wait for the end.


I know an opportunity when I see it...



parsifal said:


> The idea that hellcat "won the air battle" is one of those urban myths. They did a lot of excellent work, but by the time they arrived on the scene in Septemeber, the Japanese were already on the canvas as far as losing air superiority was concerned.


So why bother? Why need a better bomber-fighter? Why anything? Japan was done, beat, fried, wasted in 1943. No aces, they were "losing air superiority" - just a cool laid-back war. Just sit back and wait for the end.


----------



## parsifal (May 16, 2013)

zjtins said:


> Hellcat over Spit. Range and ruggedness. The rest of the factors the pilots would try to control to his benefit. Range lets you follow the Spit back to land and then destroy ala ME262.
> Ruggedness lets you take some hits and keep going, something the Spit was NOT known for.



the range difference between hellcat and seafire III is not as much as might be expected. Hellcats operated out to a maximum of 230-260 miles, unless you have combat examles to the contrary. seafires were undertaking offesnsive escort missions out to the 180 mile radius. Thats a good range advanatage to the hellcat, but not decisive.


----------



## parsifal (May 16, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> I know an opportunity when I see it...
> 
> 
> So why bother? Why need a better bomber-fighter? Why anything? Japan was done, beat, fried, wasted in 1943. No aces, they were "losing air superiority" - just a cool laid-back war. Just sit back and wait for the end.




Because in 1940-41, when the f6f was being designed and developed, nobody knew what the next generation of Japanese aircraft were going to be like. Total obsolescence does make a difference, but the f4F for the entire duration was never outclassed to that extent. moreover, my position is not that better technology is uneeded or undesirable. but the thing the US needed the most in 1943 was extra carriers. not a new fighter (which did not appear in numbers until November). That could have come later, and no impact on US progress would have occurred. Give the US additional 3 or 4 carriers in early 1943, and big changes to the war are likely.

If the US had taken a risk, and just relied on the Corsair for its 1944 (late) and 1945 frontline operations (not that 1945 operations would have arisen), would not have suffered because of the absence of the hellcat in the inventory....provided the numbers are there. Shortround has presented some information that does make me think twice about that second assumption, I will grant you.

ive never said that defeating the japanese was easy. you did. On numerous occasions. Which not only direspects the japanese, it also disrespects the US and allied flyers who died trying to defeat them.

What I did say, (and am repeating for the gazillionth time), is that slight differences in performance, wont affect the loss exchange rates very much, unless there are other factors assisting. Interesting that you have tried to use an argument that concerns the germans....despite our good friends claims about them being outnumbered, in fact in the actual battles, they significantly outnumbered the escorting mustangs (and others) undertaking the deep penetration raids into germany in 1944. The US had vastly better pools of replacement aircraft and pilots. the US had better trained pilots than previous, and better tactics. the germans had arguably better tech (but not decisive), a modicum of good pilots, massive logistic problems (shortages of fuel mostly) and poor tactical direction. They were not ready for the effect of the long range Mustangs...result, a decisive, war winning victory by the US.

if the US Hellcats had been facing in like numbers, with good logistic support, better trained pilots, and a range of other issues, things would have been different with the hellcat. The US would still have won, but these "other factors" that you refuse to acknowledge, would have made a big difference to the exchange rates. One "other factor not normally considered' but which im suggesting, is the importance of maintaining the initiative and the pressure on the japanese. and this seems to have slackedned, or lessened in early 1943, the most obvious reason being a lack of carriers. 



However, if the US had not received the hellcat, but had received an adequate supply of Wildcats plus 4 additional carriers in early 1943, they would not have needed to slow down their offensive against the japanese, as they did, and i think there is every possibility that the war would have concluded sooner. 

Im not saying technology is unimportant. im not saying it was easy, im not saying you dont need "anything". im saying that the Hellcat was not as decisive as it is made out to be, and it wasnt reponsible for the japanese losing air superiority to the US. it helped, it was very effective, but it did not single handedly win the war in the pacific.


----------



## zjtins (May 16, 2013)

> A number of air forces had already tried this including both the RAF and Luftwaffe. They found, contrary to Douhet's thesis, that the single engine fighters were more than able to catch a multi-engine bomber and outgun it easily. The RAF had worried about this before the start of the war and had decided in the mid-1930s to produce an all night-bomber force, but when the war started they had these planes operate during the day. Both forces lost so many planes during initial operations that they quickly switched to night operations.
> 
> The USAAF reasoned that their bombers' higher altitudes and more powerful defensive gun load would be enough to turn the tide in favour of the bomber. The limited numbers of B-17's made large scale operations impossible until late 1943, with only small, well-escorted raids being made in the meantime over France to shake out the crews and planes.
> 
> ...



So from Feb 1944 to summer (D DAY from other sources) I do not believe the P51 laid waste to all of the Luftwaffe in the west. The P-38 and P-47 had more experienced pilots (in general) and were more numerous till around Aug-Oct 1944. That means (to me) the majority of the fighter aircraft between Feb 1944 - Jun 1944 were not from P51's. If you have data to the contrary please present it. 

They did not know then but we know now the air raids on Germany did only a modest affect on the production of necessary material, aside from keeping troops home as anti-aircraft units which was a significant factor. It was in Oct 1944 when we went after transportation and fuel that shut Germany down. However US, English And Russian production ramped up so high by late 1943 we all were outproducing our losses so yes the fate of Germany was sealed although what people thought back then was not so accepting.


----------



## Glider (May 16, 2013)

zjtins said:


> So from Feb 1944 to summer (D DAY from other sources) I do not believe the P51 laid waste to all of the Luftwaffe in the west. The P-38 and P-47 had more experienced pilots (in general) and were more numerous till around Aug-Oct 1944. That means (to me) the majority of the fighter aircraft between Feb 1944 - Jun 1944 were not from P51's. If you have data to the contrary please present it.


Do you have anything to support your belief?


----------



## Shortround6 (May 16, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Because in 1940-41, when the f6f was being designed and developed, nobody knew what the next generation of Japanese aircraft were going to be like. Total obsolescence does make a difference, but the f4F for the entire duration was never outclassed to that extent. moreover, my position is not that better technology is uneeded or undesirable. but the thing the US needed the most in 1943 was extra carriers. not a new fighter (which did not appear in numbers until November). That could have come later, and no impact on US progress would have occurred. Give the US additional 3 or 4 carriers in early 1943, and big changes to the war are likely.
> 
> If the US had taken a risk, and just relied on the Corsair for its 1944 (late) and 1945 frontline operations (not that 1945 operations would have arisen), would not have suffered because of the absence of the hellcat in the inventory....provided the numbers are there. Shortround has presented some information that does make me think twice about that second assumption, I will grant you.



Thank you 

Just so we are clear, I am not saying you are either right or wrong about not needed the Hellcat, given the way things played out you may very well be right about not NEEDING the Hellcat although things would have been much tougher. 
I am not disagreeing about the need for more carriers in late 1942, early 43 or the effect they would have on the war as a whole, you have studied that much more than I. 

I am disagreeing with idea that funding the design/research/development of the F6F and the funding of increased production capacity for that aircraft would have paid for the extra carrier/s.
Especially the amounts spent in the 1940/41 time frame when it would have had to have been spent in order to affect carrier production for 1943. 

By the end of 1942 it appears that Grumman was building more F4Fs in one month than they had built total aircraft in their best years before 1940. Even going to triple shifts will not give you a 12 fold increase in production so SOME investment in Grumman production starting in 1940 was needed just to fill the historic needs for F4F in late 1942/early 1943. 

Further down on the page/link I gave you is a description (without dollar amounts) of the work the Navy paid for at the 5 GM plants that made up Eastern Aircraft including the construction of two runways for the testing of the finished aircraft. 
The GM Plants performed admirably and got work done and planes completed AHEAD of schedule but they only completed 20 aircraft by the end of Dec 1942 and that includes an Avenger or two. Even converting existing plants and work forces is neither quick or easy. And before the US was in a shooting war????

Perhaps the US did spend too much money setting up factories that only paid off in production in late 1943/44 when the war was already decided (but not won, the allies were going to win at that point, the questions remaining were when and at what cost) but the big investment came too late to affect programs for major ships needed in 1943.


----------



## Jugman (May 16, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Arguing that it was expenditure being absorbed by the company is another furphy that i have been waiting for someone to raise. Whether or not the expenditure was company funds or government funds is irelevant, as irrelevant as saying research not bearing the label F6F but eventually used as a critical element of the F6F, is not a cost that can be laid at the feet of the F6F. if it was used in the design and development of the F6F and its production, its a cost that needs to be acknowledged. if the money was private or public, it was national wealth still spent in a certain direction, and in a controlled wartime economy, like the US economy of 1940, every dollar counts.



Research in many respects is a "joint product". Much like the cost of growing bacon can not be separated from the cost of growing ham, seperating the intellectual impact of some design from another is imposable. How does one go about measuring the impact of the G-33 (A proposed development of the F4F-2 with a R-2600) on the G-36 (F4F-3 ) and G-50 (F6F)? The cost of paper studies is rather small and inconsequential. The detailed engineering of a design and its actual construction is were the bulk of the cost of designing lies and that doesn't start typical untill there is a contract in the works. The Navy didn't approach Grummon untill Jun 1941 for a counterpart to the F4U.

The source of funding is extremly important. The fact that it was Grumman's money and not the Navy's means that it has little or no bearing on naval decision making. Another point the US economy was not a wartime economy in 1940 and it was never "controlled".



parsifal said:


> So I dont think it is misleading to say the factory was built for the Hellcat. maybe a little incorrect, since it might well have been used to build the f5F instead, had that fighter been adopted, but good enough. If the choice on the navy fighter had been XF5F, instead of the Hellcat, we'd be sitting here arguing about the F5f rather than the F6F. but that isnt how things panned out. It was the hellcat that was selected (for good reason), the design and research for the hellcat began well before 1941 (Source: "F6F Hellcat" by Hal Andrews, http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/hist-ac/f6f-5.pdf). It doesnt matter that the new fighter was the Hellcat. The Navy already had a new fighter in the XF4U under design. They decided that was too risky and embarked on the development of at least two other prototype designs that i know of....the F6F and the F5F, both of which i think were done at the expense of carrier construction. I think a better priority would have been to continue development of the F4U, delay development of the F6F until FY42 increase production of F4f (which was done in existing factory space from the summer of 1941 anyway) abandon Essex production in FY 41, and instead build 4 Yorktowns instead of the measely 1 Essex they actually authorised.



The F4U, F5F, and FL were ordered at the same time (mid 1938 ). They all had their first flights in April-May of 1940. By which time there were *FOUR* Essex class carriers on order. By September there was an additional *SEVEN*. Money was not the issue. Even so, the total spent in FY40 on airframe, engine, and propeller R&D from all sources (government and private) was in the $30-$40M or one Yorktown class. 

The only way to get more fleet carriers sooner is to free up slips. This can only be done by postponing or canceling battleships. That was not very likely to happen.


----------



## drgondog (May 16, 2013)

zjtins said:


> So from Feb 1944 to summer (D DAY from other sources) I do not believe the P51 laid waste to all of the Luftwaffe in the west.
> 
> *They didn't, nor did I say that they did. What I said is that the P-51B, (with a force that started in Devember 1943 with one FG, the 354th, built up to six operational Mustang Groups by the 1st week of May, 1944 and to seven by D-Day 6th of June, 1944) destroyed more German fighters in the air than ALL of the P-47C and P-47D's that flew air combat against the Luftwaffe for the 8 months preceeding P-51 Operation and the siz months after initiation of P-51 Operations.
> 
> ...



We went after Transportation and Fuel in May 1944 - If you wish to become acquainted with material and useful facts in this debate, look to "Inside the Third Reich"-Speer, USSBS, "A few Great Captains" and "Forged in Fire" - Dewitt Cooper, "Air Force Spoken Here" - Ira Eaker, "Day Fighters in Defense of Germany" - Caldwell.


----------



## tomo pauk (May 16, 2013)

Great stuff, Bill.


----------



## parsifal (May 16, 2013)

> The F4U, F5F, and FL were ordered at the same time (mid 1938 ). They all had their first flights in April-May of 1940. By which time there were *FOUR* Essex class carriers on order. By September there was an additional *SEVEN*. Money was not the issue. Even so, the total spent in FY40 on airframe, engine, and propeller R&D from all sources (government and private) was in the $30-$40M or one Yorktown class.
> 
> 
> The only way to get more fleet carriers sooner is to free up slips. This can only be done by postponing or canceling battleships. That was not very likely to happen.



Im not agreeing with your other comments, its just that we do need to move the debate along, and the issue is debateable. 

However the above excerpt is clearly wrong, easily determined by just really basic checking. There were NOT four carriers laid down in April 1940 (or even 1941).... (discounting those actually completed from prewar orders, and even then, theree werent four under construction). The ships at issue are the Essex class, and just looking at ther commencement dates, for the first 5 in the series (the ones that did the majority of heavy lifting for the Navy) we get the following 

"The fourth Yorktown (CV-10) was laid down on 1 December 1941 at Newport News, Va., by the Newport News Shipbuilding Drydock Co. as Bon Homme Richard; renamed Yorktown on 26 September 1942; launched on 21 January 1943, sponsored by Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt; and commissioned on 15 April 1943 at the Norfolk Navy Yard, Capt. Joseph J. ("Jocko") Clark in command" (DANFS)

USS Intrepid (CV11) was laid down 1 December 1941 (Wiki)
USS Hornet (CV12) was laid fown 31 August 1942
USS Franklin (CV13) was laid down 7 December 1942

"The fourth Ticonderoga (CV-14) was laid down as Hancock on 1 February 1943 at Newport News, Va., by the Newport News Shipbuilding Dry Dock Co.; renamed Ticonderoga on 1 May 1943, launched on 7 February 1944, sponsored by Miss Stepha nie Sarah Pell, and commissioned at the Norfolk Navy Yard on 8 May 1944, Capt. Dixie Kiefer in command" (DANFS again)

1 ship was authorized in April 1940, and a further 4 in July 1940. "Authorizing" is not commenced...there was a two stage process for ship funding in the US....authorization and then "voting" the funds. "Authorizing" meant the money was reserved, but not spent, "voting" meant the funds were actually taken "out of the bank" and spent. "Commencement would happen some time after "voting", and took time for the administration to catch up with thelegislature, and for materials and other resources to be allocated) As indicated above 1 ship (Essex) on the 19 April 1940, and voted FY41. This was the essex. Four ships were then authorized under the Vinson Bill, in June 1940, but not voted until FY42. To be fair, defence spending for FY42 was brought forward three months to April '41. 

These ships (and others were laid down at the height of the naval expasion, when bill after bill was voted and shoip after ship was laid down. Roosevellt had been steadily expanding shipbuilding in the US since 1933, there was never much shortage in capacity until the shipping crisis of '42, and even then thanks to Kaiser, that was a crisis fairly well absorbed. Its a safe generalization to say that the US was never lacking in shipyard capacity during the war. What it lacked was money


----------



## parsifal (May 16, 2013)

Deleted....double post


----------



## Njaco (May 16, 2013)

I think this thread has turned into a history quiz..............


----------



## Conslaw (May 16, 2013)

Lack of carriers in the first 9 months of 1943 limited American offensive operations. As 1943 progressed, there was less and less of a shortage of F4F fighters. Some of the f4f groups that were deployed from islands in the Solomon Islands could have been deployed to carriers. IMHO it would have been wise to cancel the Alaska class large cruisers or two of the 4 South Dakota battleships. The Alaska was launched in December 1941 and only made it into service in 1945.


----------



## parsifal (May 17, 2013)

Njaco said:


> I think this thread has turned into a history quiz..............



Yes, we are off topic, yes we are curently in the rough, yes we are wandering aimlessly with no sense of direction, yes, there are muffled jabs going on at each other. Still hope the thread hangs in there. I keep thnking of my kid sons favourite movie "cars" and that car completely wrecked and being towed away, saying "dont retire me coach, i can still race!!!!

Dont you just love this place....


----------



## Jugman (May 17, 2013)

I never said they were under construction. I said they were _ ordered_. From _U.S Aircraft Cariers: An Illusrated Design History_ By Norman Friedman page 134:



> The Essex class began with a single hull, planned in 1939 for construction under FY 41 program, to absorb tonnage still available under the vinson-trammeli act. That law authorized sufficient tonnage to bring the United States up to the totals allowwable under the Washington Naval Treaty, and so constituted a tonnagw limit even after the experation of that treaty. A 20 percent expansion program 0f 17 may 1938 added 40,000 tons to the originally permitted 175,000, providing for the Hornet and also fo 20,000 tons of new carrier, which became CV 9. Beside the statutory total tonnage limit, there was also a 23,000-ton limit on individual carriers imposed by the London Naval Treaty of 1936. The new Carrier design was funded under the FY 40 program for construction in FY 41.
> 
> By that time, however, it was clear that the U.S. Navy needed much more rapid expansion. The "Two Ocean Navy" Act of 14 Jun 1940 provided for three more carriers (CVs 10-12)-which had already been ordered under CNO directive of 20 May. Upon the fall of France, Congress voted an additional 70 percent expansion, with another seven fleet carriers (CVs 13-19) being ordered under a 16 August 1940 directive. Two more initial series, CVs 20-21, were ordered under a further expansion program, just after the outbreak of war on 15 December1941. hull nos. 22 through 30 were absorbed by the Independence-class conversions of light-cruiser hulls, and the first eleven ships absorbed the available slips for the first two years of the war....


----------



## zjtins (May 17, 2013)

> Do you have anything to support your belief?



You got anything to refute that?


----------



## Glider (May 17, 2013)

zjtins said:


> You got anything to refute that?



I take that to be a no, you don't have anything to support your view.


----------



## zjtins (May 17, 2013)

> I take that to be a no, you don't have anything to support your view.



Back at you


----------



## parsifal (May 17, 2013)

Guys, this thread is on a cliff edge. the mods are watching. If the thread has to go out, make it something relevant at least. "Back at you" is just childish rubbish. 

Pick it up guys........please......


----------



## FLYBOYJ (May 17, 2013)

*zjtins - I telling you flat out, you're a condescending SOB and you better change your attitude QUICKLY or you stay here will come to an abrupt end. I'm only tell you this once! STOP ACTING LIKE AN @SSHOLE OR YOU'RE OUT OF HERE!!!!*


----------



## parsifal (May 17, 2013)

Jugman said:


> I never said they were under construction. I said they were _ ordered_. From _U.S Aircraft Cariers: An Illusrated Design History_ By Norman Friedman page 134:



Thats basically sying the same thing.....but not very clearly. To get a better understanding of how the US acquisition apparatus worked at that time, I recomend Conways, at page 88 gives pretty good explanation, which runs as follows

In US practice Congress _authorised _ the funding to build ships. and then _votes_ the funds as they became available. Voting of the funds occurs in a fiscal year, therefore building programs are referred to as FY25 etc. FY 41 was from June 1940 to June 1941. 

After being authorised AND then voted (by bill of congress, the President then had to enact that bill in order to get ships started. In 1940 and 1941 (FY41 and FY42) the president brought forward the authorisation dates, to allow some construction to be undertaken earlier than it should.

The treaty limits by 1939 were largely of academic value by 1939. Many of the participants were already at war by 1939, so whilst the US gave passing deference to it,it really didnt affect the shipbuilding process at all in terms of tonnages. What the treatry system did do was lock the US into building already existing designs that were largely treaty designs. they did this to speed up the construction and delivery times....by orders of the Navy secretary the Navy ordered repeat designs of existing trety ships rather than delaying deliveries whilst designs exploiting the full design possibilities were worked up. later in the war there were exceptions to this, but, except for the Alaskas, this was not the case in 1940. 

What the Navy did with its ships....largely freeze the designs to speed up deliveries, it should have done with aircraft deliveries. The US fielded the best ships of any combatant IMO, yet these ships were treaty designs, which frustrated many admirals, because they were denied the latest and best ships that coud have been designed. The Navy secretary should have applied the same principal to aircraft in my opinion....ordering repeat orders for existing designs rather than delaying and awaiting the delivery of more modern types. The US surface fleet was able to win its war convincingly with existing designs, so to could the air arm have won their war with more or less the existing designs of 1941. Better designs could have waited and there would have been no effect on the US capability, and the US could have maintained a great deal of pressure when it counted. 

So, even though the Navy was planning for a greatly expanded naval program as early as 1938 (something Ive already spoke about) the Essex was not authorised until FY41, and a further three not until FY42. This is reflected in the laying down dates of these ships....Essex was not commenced until April 1941, and the others, not until well into 1942. 

FY41 was never 1939. It refers to what is authororized for the period June 1940 to June 1941. Ships dont usually appear or commence before that (with one or two exceptions when the president directly intervened). Sometimes, if money was short, a ship authorised in one FY could be delayed to a following year, but genereally the US was bringing construction forward in the lead up to war. 

Despite all that, the actuall commencement dates for the Essex was as they were, and this had little or nothing to do with 1938-1940. The USN planned expansions from that date, but the funding was not really authorised until much later.


----------



## VBF-13 (May 17, 2013)

Njaco said:


> I think this thread has turned into a history quiz..............


There's a purpose behind this "history," Chris. It's to discredit the record of the F6Fs based on nothing better than opinions of Japanese incompetence. Just as with the record of the P51s, the presumption should be reasonably-competent opposition. Japan had as many people as Germany to train their pilots and manufacture their aircraft, as those populations were virtually identical. Somebody wants to rebut that presumption and say German incompetence was the decisive factor in the record of the P51s, the burden is on them to come forward with evidence, not personal opinion, and not hearsay opinion. Further, don't shift the burden. Don't say, in effect, if you don't believe the boats and planes in the Bermuda Triangle were abducted by alien spacecraft, prove otherwise. That's another thing you see going on, here, when this relentless campaign gets stuck for evidence. 

Yes, this is off-topic. Yes, I said I'll let it alone. Somebody insidiously started it back up, again, though, didn't he? This time, I mean it. I don't care, anymore.


----------



## Matt308 (May 17, 2013)

Confucius say, "Young man not know much."


----------



## CobberKane (May 17, 2013)

It seems to me it would be a huge reach to say the Hellcat's record rests entirely on the substandard quality of the IJN and IJA airforces; it was obviously an excellent carrier plane. But that doesn't mean it's not valid to examine the quality of the opposition as ONE factor in the Hellcats success. After all, the original question was comparing the Hellcat to the Spitfire, and as for the most part they fought in different theatres, comparing the opposition they faced is reasonable. Certainly during the time they served simultaneously the Hellcat would seem to have a kill loss ratio several times better the Spitfire (or at least no-one seems to be claiming 19:1 for the British fighter). Was it then several times better in terms of overall performance. And if not, what other factors, including the quality of the opposition, contributed to the Hellcats record?
Re the previous post, my understanding is that later in the war Japan was effectively blockaded. Wouldn't it have been at a serious disadvantage in manufacturing potential? Also, prewar Germany was besotted with aviation and prepped large numbers of young men as future pilots, whereas the Japanese Airforces were conceived as small, highly trained forces without the same consideration for the infrastructure required to replace ongoing aircrew losses. And wouldn't it be fair to say that the Spitfire in the ETO was facing for the most part competitive designs in the Fw190 and (with qualification)Bf 109, whereas the Hellcat was facing predominantly obsolescent designs, with a much higher proportion of them being unarmoured light and medium bombers?
The degree to which any of these factors contributed to the Hellcat's much higher kill/loss record may be debatable, but to dismiss them wholesale seems to leave us with a very dicey conclusion; that there was nothing in the tactical situation the Hellcat faced that contributed to it's stellar record and its success in air to air combat relative to the spitfire is a reflection of it's superiority as a fighter. This is much easier to refute; show me the figures! What characteristic or performance parameters of the Hellcat made it better? Was it faster, more manoeuvrable, better climbing to a degree that might have made it more effective than the Spitfire by a factor of several times, even had it been transposed to 1944 Europe?. If the answer is no it is reasonable to then ask; what other factors might have contributed to that vaunted 19:1 figure? And aside from the different tactical situations, which must include an assessment of the opposing forces, what else was there?


----------



## Coyote (May 17, 2013)

The Hellcat was at the right place at the right time. It was a great plane that could dish out punishment and also take a great deal and still bring its pilot home. Grumman was known for making durable fighters. The Hellcat was the right combination to defeat most Japanese aircraft and hold its own against the Frank and George. The Spitfire was a great plane also. It was made for a different set of circumstances. Comparing the two is very much apples and oranges. But if I had to pick one I'm taking the Hellcat. Why? Durability. I'm sure the Spit could take some hits. But few fighters could take what a Hellcat could and still come home.


----------



## wuzak (May 17, 2013)

Coyote said:


> The Hellcat was at the right place at the right time. It was a great plane that could dish out punishment and also take a great deal and still bring its pilot home. Grumman was known for making durable fighters. The Hellcat was the right combination to defeat most Japanese aircraft and hold its own against the Frank and George. The Spitfire was a great plane also. It was made for a different set of circumstances. Comparing the two is very much apples and oranges. But if I had to pick one I'm taking the Hellcat. Why? Durability. I'm sure the Spit could take some hits. But few fighters could take what a Hellcat could and still come home.



I think the idea with the Spitfire was to use its performance and agility to avoid getting hit.


----------



## Coyote (May 17, 2013)

wuzak said:


> I think the idea with the Spitfire was to use its performance and agility to avoid getting hit.



This is true. But don't under-estimate the agility and performance of the Hellcat. While not on the level of a Spit, she could turn and burn.


----------



## CobberKane (May 18, 2013)

Apples and oranges indeed. Choosing one over the other requires us to define the circumstances in which we might make the choice, given that the two aircraft were designed for different purposes. The Spitfire was surely the better front line interceptor and air superiority fighter, the Hellcat was very much the better carrier fighter, which necessarily involved air to ground capability. Great planes both. but while I'm happy to agree that the Spitfire could never have done what the Hellcat did in the PTO, I also think it's a major stretch to suggest the Hellcat could have replicated its Pacific performance in the ETO.


----------



## vinnye (May 18, 2013)

Well put CobberKane. For short range sir superiority from land has to be the Spitfire.
For carrier ops - has to be the Hellcat.
Simples really!


----------



## VBF-13 (May 18, 2013)

CobberKane said:


> I also think it's a major stretch to suggest the Hellcat could have replicated its Pacific performance in the ETO.


I don't know about that. The Germans were facing the same kinds of constraints the Japanese were facing at roughly the same time and for much the same reasons, namely, aircraft obsolescence, fuel shortages, and expedited training programs. I don't have anything specific on that experience in my files. Here's pretty much the spot the Japanese Army Air Force was in and how those training programs evolved throughout the War and why and when they eventually collapsed. This is from MILITARY REVIEW, November 1945, Volume XXV, Number 8, Command and General Staff School, Leavenworth KS, pp. 55-56:

"The Present System

Early Japanese successes after 7 December 1941 caused little change in their pilot training system. By 1943, however, the part Allied airpower played in Europe and the Pacific landing operations encouraged the Japanese to regard airpower as the dominating factor in modern warfare. New conscription laws were passed by the Diet and a large-scale call-up of recruits to the Air Forces was made. A new Air Preparatory School was opened in Otsu, similar to the one in existence in Tokyo, and expansion of the flying training units followed in 1944. 

At the beginning of 1944, advanced training was conducted at four or five long-established Flight Training Schools _(Hiko Gakko_) in Japan (which also had the responsibility of forming new units and re-forming old units withdrawn from combat), and by eighteen Flying Training Regiments (_Kyoiku Hikoreutai_), most of them outside of Japan. Both were responsible for supplying pilot replacements to front-line units, and during their four months of training pilots received intensive instruction in pilotage, air gunnery, bomb and torpedo-bombing, navigation, aircraft maintenance and crew procedure. 

On joining the operational flying regiment the pilot was not considered fit for immediate combat operations and received from two to six months’ further training within the unit. Because of increased Allied air activity in the combat theaters, however, it was found that operational requirements did not permit the Japanese to carry out to the full this operational training of pilots, and many were sent on an operation with little or no combat training. Cognizance of this deficiency resulted in the formation in overseas areas in 1944 of Advanced Training Units (_Reusei Hikota_i) and providing operational training for personnel drawn from front-line units and advanced flying training establishments. Meanwhile the Flying Training Regiments (_Kyoiku Hikoreutai_) had been increased in number and their name changed to Flying Training Units (_Kyoiku Hikotai_). Advanced flying training schools in Japan were also reorganized and relieved of the responsibility of supplying front-line units with personnel replacements. 

Had training plans gone smoothly the Army Air Force would have been in a position to turn out 20,000 pilots per year. Among the factors that upset the training program, it is believed the following are salient: 

1) A shortage of training aircraft, 

2) Use of inferior quality training aircraft, 

3) Interruptions to the training program due to reorganization,

4) Difficulty of transporting training aircraft to operational training areas, 

5) Loss of training areas such as Formosa and the Philippines due to allied advances, and the consequent interruption of training programs, 

6) Shortage of fuel for training purposes, 

7) Strategic bombing of Japanese installations. 

A further disruption of training programs would have resulted as the scope of the Allied operations widened. Bomber and fighter strikes against training establishments in the Empire destroyed much of the remaining trainer aircraft, and repair facilities and fuel stocks rapidly decreased. Although the Japanese Army Air Force had a workable system for pilot training, interference with the training program coupled with the dissipation of partially-trained pilots on suicide missions could not but lead to a lower quality of flying opponent for the Allied Air Forces."


----------



## Coyote (May 18, 2013)

Just give a Bearcat and I'll take ya all on.


----------



## Jugman (May 18, 2013)

parsifal said:


> So, even though the Navy was planning for a greatly expanded naval program as early as 1938 (something Ive already spoke about) the Essex was not authorised until FY41, and a further three not until FY42. This is reflected in the laying down dates of these ships....Essex was not commenced until April 1941, and the others, not until well into 1942.



That is simply incorrect. (see Naval Vessel Programs and Legislation) As can be seen CV-9 through CV-19 were funded with FY 41 funds. The dates these ships and CV-20 CV-21 were laid down on are:

CV-9 28-Apr-41
CV-16 15-Jul-41
CV-17 15-Sep-41
CV-10 1-Dec-41
CV-11 1-Dec-41
CV-18 18-Mar-42
CV-12 3-Aug-42
CV-13 7-Dec-42
CV-20 15-Dec-42
CV-19 26-Jan-43 
CV-15 10-May-43
CV-14 1-Feb-43
CV-21 13-Sep-43

Most of the the early ships were built on new slipways that were still under construction when they were laid down. CV-9 was built on the same ways as CV-8. IIRC followed by CV-12 then CV-21. CV-10 followed BB-58 and I believe CV-18 followed BB-59.


----------



## parsifal (May 18, 2013)

CV 16 (USS Lexington ex USS Cabot) was part of the "70% expansion", which eventually included seven carriers. 

These additional carriers were authorised under the Vinson Bill of June 1940. As such this ship, and all the other carriers mentioned were part of the expansion programs authorised after FY40 (my mistake....Essex was planned FY40, but did not commence construction until FY41). FY40 had its last expansion added April 1940, and only authorised one carrier, the Essex. 

The ships authorised under the Vinson Bill were for the following year, but were brought forward 3 months on orders of the president.

A good source for this material is found here....I have a hard copy and its my main resource in this debate


US Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated Design History - Norman Friedman - Google Books


The USN had originally estimated that these ships authorised under the Vinson Plan would not be ready before 1944, it was only by good fortune and extraordinary construction efforts that they could be commissioned roughly 18 months ahead of schedule. Which only serves to reinforce the case that the US had its priorities wrong when it started to look for a new replacement carrier fighter in 1940. It shouold have soldiered on with the types available, built carriers in FY 40-41, and only thenn, sought funding for a new fighter. It was only by the best of sheer dumb luck that they came out of this mess as well as they did.


----------



## Glider (May 18, 2013)

VBF the information in your posting is very interesting. If Japan had increased training in 1941 when war was declared the battle would have been much harder. To start in 1943 was too late


----------



## Coyote (May 18, 2013)

Glider said:


> VBF the information in your posting is very interesting. If Japan had increased training in 1941 when war was declared the battle would have been much harder. To start in 1943 was too late



Not only that. They needed to rotate their front line pilots to give them a break. Many of their best pilots flew till they died. That was a major mistake.


----------



## Shortround6 (May 18, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Which only serves to reinforce the case that the US had its priorities wrong when it started to look for a new replacement carrier fighter in 1940. It shouold have soldiered on with the types available, built carriers in FY 40-41, and only thenn, sought funding for a new fighter. It was only by the best of sheer dumb luck that they came out of this mess as well as they did.



You have yet to show that the funding _SPENT_ on the F6F in 1940-41 actually impacted the carrier program in any significant way. 

Grumman production capability could not have filled the carrier decks without being expanded over pre-war size/capability no matter which fighter they were building. 

Grumman doesn't a production contract for the F6F until Jan 7 1942 and then it is for the -1 model with Wright R-2600 engine, contract is amended later, A contract for the -3 with R-2800 is placed in March of 1942. 

These contracts are way too late to affect carrier funding in 1940. And if not placed for the F6F they would have been placed for additional F4Fs over and above what was already on order, savings would be?????

BTW in Jan 1941 Grumman F4F-3 (fixed wing) replace Grumman F3F-1 Biplanes with squadron VF-7. Several other US Navy Squadrons are still flying biplanes.


----------



## VBF-13 (May 18, 2013)

Guys, there’s another part that comes before this. As I had to hand-type this, I couldn’t cut and paste it, I didn’t bother with that part. As early as 1933, the Japanese Navy and Army Air Corps pilots were recruited at as early as fifteen years of age into their Reserves. You wonder why their training programs took so long? There’s your answer. This part is just the part from the start of the War, upwards and onwards. Their training had to ramp-up as they could no longer cut it with their Reserves program.


----------



## parsifal (May 18, 2013)

The problems in the japanese training system are complex,and cant be explained by a single factor. It starts with a relatively narrow and limited education base/Basically the better educated the society as a whole, the greater choices available to the military for technical jobs like engineers and aircrew. narrow that base down and you have a problem. The Japanese attempted to remedy that by taking young men and training them......educating them that means, from a young age.

But having got to that point, the Japanese training regime was also hampered by a lack of experienced instructors and training aircraft. They could opnly train pilots in relatively small groups, an in relatively small numbers. In situations like the China war, where losses were low, this really didnt matter....pilots entered combat units and had plenty of leasd time to learn the trqade so to speak.

Finally, in the months leading up to Pearl Harbour, Japan was being hit by an acute fuel shortage. Thats why they went to war, after all. Deceisions were made in the lead up to war, from July I think, to curtail training as a fuel saving measure. It was hoped that the Americans would throw in the towel and make terms, the Japanese never envisaged a long war. After their initial onslaught was unsuccessful (I wont say defeated, since they managed to conquer about 30% of the worlds land mass), they realized they had to replace and expand their air arm, but by then, 1943, things were even worse for them. Many of the pilots with experience were dead, the Japanese were locked into a vicious attrition batle that they could not step back from, the fuel shortages were even more acute, and this forced them to send out inadequately trained pilots to the front "to learn the hard way". That was a receipe for disaster.....so many died "learning" that the quality just fell through the floor. By the time the Hellcat arrived it was all but over.


----------



## parsifal (May 18, 2013)

> You have yet to show that the funding _SPENT_ on the F6F in 1940-41 actually impacted the carrier program in any significant way.



ah no, but we do know that carrier production was at least in part curtailed by money, and that the US, according to Hap Arnold was at least equalling the Germans in 1940 in terms of aeronautical R&D. The LW was spending about $300m per year in 1940 on R&D. If we assume an equal split between Army and Navy, and an anual R&D budget of say $200m for the Navy, thats a lot of ships.

Saying that new aircraft development is cheap, or not likley to affect other budget decisions, is even more innaccurate than me trying to say it directly affected carrier production. R&D for aircraft costs a lot of money if you think about the whole package. 



> Grumman production capability could not have filled the carrier decks without being expanded over pre-war size/capability no matter which fighter they were building.



As history does show, it didnt have to be Grumman. Grumman was directed to diversify in 1942, and brought Eastern into the process (and others)....they could just as easily have done that in 1940




> Grumman doesn't a production contract for the F6F until Jan 7 1942 and then it is for the -1 model with Wright R-2600 engine, contract is amended later, A contract for the -3 with R-2800 is placed in March of 1942.
> 
> These contracts are way too late to affect carrier funding in 1940. And if not placed for the F6F they would have been placed for additional F4Fs over and above what was already on order, savings would be?????



The decisions about A replacement fighter (which eventually was the F6F) was made in 1939 and 1940. Decisions about expanding grumman production capability were made in 1940. This was the critical moment in history, not in 1942 when it was too late




> BTW in Jan 1941 Grumman F4F-3 (fixed wing) replace Grumman F3F-1 Biplanes with squadron VF-7. Several other US Navy Squadrons are still flying biplanes.




And the Japanese went to war with Nates and Claudes as their main operational types. The Army Type 1 there were about 100 in service, and the Type O navy fighter about 350 or so. 

The US would have done fine with the F4F as their main operational type until the midlle of 1944 at least.


----------



## VBF-13 (May 18, 2013)

One more thing. I don't want to start a riot around here, but if any of you are assuming they ran out of pilots after Midway, assume, again. While they lost aircraft when those carriers went down, pilots weren't in all that aircraft, and some were rescued, as were others on those carriers. Besides that, they didn't go with all their marbles at Midway. They had other carriers and pilots, and still had cushion in their reserves. But, we maybe can have Midway out in another thread. Remember, this is about Spitfires and Hellcats, lol.


----------



## Shortround6 (May 18, 2013)

parsifal said:


> ah no, but we do know that carrier production was at least in part curtailed by money, and that the US, according to Hap Arnold was at least equalling the Germans in 1940 in terms of aeronautical R&D. The LW was spending about $300m per year in 1940 on R&D. If we assume an equal split between Army and Navy, and an anual R&D budget of say $200m for the Navy, thats a lot of ships.



I am having a little trouble following the math here. You jump from the German $300 million to an _estimated_ US $400 million and then ASSUME the Navy spent 1/2. The US must have spending an awful lot of the budget on R&D. 

From one source: [2-3

TOTAL "DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY DOLLAR EXPENDITURES" in 1940 = $ 907,160,000

According to your estimate 22% of that money was spent on aeronautical R&D??

From : Budget of the US Navy: 1794 to 2004

1939 = $673,792,000
1940 = $1,137,608,000
1941 = $4,465,684,000
1942 = $21,149,323,000
1943 = $31,043,134,000

You estimate that the US Navy spent 17.58% of their ENTIRE 1940 budget on aeronautical R&D ??





parsifal said:


> Saying that new aircraft development is cheap, or not likley to affect other budget decisions, is even more innaccurate than me trying to say it directly affected carrier production. R&D for aircraft costs a lot of money if you think about the whole package.



Planes were a LOT cheaper back then. Bell got $245,000 for XFL-1 Airabonita program of which $125,000 was for the airplane. US contracts were a bit different back then too. Plane was "supposed" to do 339mph. For EVERY ONE MPH over 343mph Bell would get $1500. BUT for EVERY ONE MPH under 335mph Bell would forfeit $1500. Similar clauses for weight. 

For the Army 1937 persuit _design_ competition there were 7 bids 2 Bell, 2 Curtiss, 3 Seversky ranging from $201,500 to $246,500. For the price the Army would get ONE prototype aircraft, engineering data, a wind tunnel model and a free-spinning model. 1/5 -1/4 million PER prototype single engine pursuit plane ACTUALLY ordered. 

Army R D had spent under 1 million dollars on the Continental O/V-1430 engine TOTAL, not one year and about 1/2 million on the Lycoming O-1230 engine TOTAL, not one year. 

You would have to buy an AWFUL lot of prototypes to spend 200 million dollars in 1940. 



parsifal said:


> As history does show, it didnt have to be Grumman. Grumman was directed to diversify in 1942, and brought Eastern into the process (and others)....they could just as easily have done that in 1940



And that saves you what? The Eastern plants had to be nearly gutted. Equipment and tools placed in storage(US Navy paid for two warehouses to be built to store car tooling and rented at least one more) , new tools and equipment purchased and installed, workers retrained, air strips built,etc. 
Converting car plants was not free. 






parsifal said:


> The decisions about A replacement fighter (which eventually was the F6F) was made in 1939 and 1940. Decisions about expanding grumman production capability were made in 1940. This was the critical moment in history, not in 1942 when it was too late



Correct, but since the actual cost or money spent *IN* 1939-40 was minimal (paper studies, preliminary drawings) the opportunity to SHIFT money doesn't really exist in 1939-40. 



parsifal said:


> The US would have done fine with the F4F as their main operational type until the midlle of 1944 at least.



Hindsight is a wonderful thing. The fact that, as mention before, the Japanese FAILED to improve the Zero and Oscar anywhere near the extent that other nations improved their aircraft for more than THREE years OR provide better replacements in anything approaching significant quantities is not something the US could count on.

Edit> some additional costs from a book on the Wright Tornado engine. Cost of the Tornado engine program from start to cancellation was about 6.5 million dollars. Cost of the P W R-2800 program until successful type test or first production model (?) was 8 million dollars. Cost of the P W R-4360 program to same level was 25 million dollars. Cost of the R-4360 was spread over 4 years?


----------



## Aozora (May 19, 2013)

parsifal said:


> The US would have done fine with the F4F as their main operational type until the midlle of 1944 at least.



So essentially you're saying, with the benefit of 70 years of hindsight, that the USN in 1940-42 should have slowed design and development of the F6F, knowing that the Japanese would be unable to develop a successor to the best carrier borne fighter of its generation, confident that the best carrier force in the world would be broken up at Midway, with a complete awareness that there would be an increasingly steep decline in the quality of Japanese pilots and aircrew, starting at Midway and continuing through the battles around the Solomons and New Guinea: all this while determining that the F4F was all that would be needed up until mid-1944? Yeah, right!


----------



## CobberKane (May 19, 2013)

I guess what we have here are a couple of ways to interpret the Hellcats great record in the PTO. Firstly, that a 19:1 kill loss ratio (taken as read) demonstrates that the Hellcat was an excellent fighter, and there is no reason to believe it couldn't have done the same over Europe. The second view is that the Hellcat was indeed an excellent fighter, but the fact that contemporaneous fighters like the Spitfire IX/VIV, P-51 and P-47D could not match the Hellcat's record in the ETO, in spite of at least equalling it's performance, suggests that conditions in the Pacific were more conducive to shooting down enemy aircraft than conditions over Europe.
To my mind the first proposition can be dispensed with pretty easily. If the Hellcats stellar record in the PTO was attributable to the characteristics of the aircraft we would be able to identify some feature that made it a more effective fighter (by a factor of two or three times) than the other aircraft mentioned. Quite simply, there is no such feature. In fact, compared to those aircraft, the Hellcat would come a creditable fourth in most parameters of performance.
That leaves us with the second proposition; excellent as it was, Hellcat's great performance in the PTO also rested largely on the tactical situation it found itself in, and the fact that contemporaneous marks of the Spitfire with at least equal performance could not match this record in the ETO indicates that the tactical situation there made shooting enemy aircaft down more difficult.
Personally I'm going for option two, because unlike option one there is no major sticking point. It might be that the Japanese pilots weren't as good, or their aircraft, or the number on highly vulnerable bombers being put up, but there were factors that worked heavily in the Hellcat's favour.
Unless of course, we introduce another possibility: the pilots flying the Hellcats in The Pacific were way better than the pilots flying Spits in the ETO. Anyone want to take that on?


----------



## OldSkeptic (May 19, 2013)

Cobber , this one still going on?? You're points are well made.

To summarise, depends on where you are. In the ETO in late '43 the Luftwaffe had 109Gs and the 190A's with higher revs and boost.
These were formidable planes and though not nearly at the peak it was in the BoB, the Luftwaffe hadn't declined in average pilot ability to the levels seen in late '44 and 45.

So if you were taking off from land airbases and going up against that, you would struggle a lot in a Hellcat, especially since a lot of the combat had again got back to higher altitudes by then (because they were escorting).

It was a heck of a good plane in its environment, but outmatched by the P-51Bs, Spit IXs, P-47s plus the late model 190As and 109Gs of that time. 
I'd rather be in a P-47. Yes you struggled under 20,000ft, but you'd at least have excellent performance at 30,000+ft.
Where is the 'safe altitude' of the Hellcat? Nowhere. High up you've got the 109Gs, mid altitude the 190As. All faster 

*Basically you have roughly the performance of a Spit Mk V, which got hammered in 41... what chance in late 43????*

Look at the performance specs, test in Sept 43 (F6F Performance Trials). From the report:

_Climb performance
Max. rate of climb in Main supercharger gear	= 2260 ft/min at 5400 feet.
Max. rate of climb in Aux. Lowspeed supercharger gear	= 1880 ft/min at 20500 feet.
Time to reach 10,000 ft. = 4.65 minutes
Time to reach 20,000 ft. = 10.0 minutes
Change gear height	= 9200 feet

Level speed performance
Max. T.A.S. at max. permissible power (rich mixture) = 315 mph (274 knots) at 2000 ft. in Main supercharger
Max. T.A.S. at max. permissible power (rich mixture) = 371 mph (322 knots) at 18700 ft. in Aux. Low Speed supercharger._ 

Now the Bearcat, that was something else... While the Hellcat was ok'ish and great in the PTO, but not competitive in the ETO at the time it was introduced, the Bearcat could have well have held its own. That was an impressive plane by any measure. A choice between that even a late model Spit IX would be a no-brainer. Not so much against against a Spit XIV though, though at mid/low altitudes I'd pick the Bearcat.


----------



## CobberKane (May 19, 2013)

Sorry, didn't mean to be going in circles. I agree the Bearcat is a much more reasonable comparison for late war fighters in the ETO. The Hellcat did its job in the PTO in exemplary fashion, and even if, God forbid, an invasion of Japan had been necessary, had the Bearcat not been available I'm sure the Hellcat could have finished the job in similar fashion against what the Japanese had left. It's pretty predicable what would have happened if the Japanese had sent their obsolescent aircraft against, Bearcats, Tigercats, Sea Furies and Sea Hornets.


----------



## tomo pauk (May 19, 2013)

We might want to recall that one of planes that were brought down by (not only) Hellcats was the Yokosuka D4Y (Judy), and that dive bomber was 10-15 mph faster than F4F. The 'Marianas turkey shooting' not happening with F4F being the only CV interceptor? How well the USN bombers would've fared without F6F shepherding them towards Japanese CVs?


----------



## Ivan1GFP (May 19, 2013)

Glad we are sort of back on topic. The off-topic discussion makes interesting reading though.

My vote is for the Spitfire without a doubt. I would probably pick a Mk.XIV given a choice as a pure Air Superiority fighter. If I am equipping a carrier air force, the Hellcat is the easy choice.

As others have mentioned, performance-wise, a Hellcat is similar in performance to the Spitfire Mk.V which was obsolete in the ETO by 1942. Even the USN recognised that the Hellcat was pretty much finished by 1945 and due to be replaced by the Bearcat.

Regarding Bearcat, Yes, in performance numbers, it was a hot aeroplane, but it had its share of problems as commented on by Corky Meyer: The outter wing panels were intended to break off if over-stressed. The problem is that they didn't necessarily break off in pairs, so even a Blue Angel pilot managed to get himself killed when only one outter wing panel came off. My understanding is that the problem was never adequately solved even with the installation of explosive bolts to blow both outter wings off at the same time.

- Ivan.


----------



## VBF-13 (May 19, 2013)

parsifal said:


> The problems in the japanese training system are complex,and cant be explained by a single factor. It starts with a relatively narrow and limited education base/Basically the better educated the society as a whole, the greater choices available to the military for technical jobs like engineers and aircrew. narrow that base down and you have a problem. The Japanese attempted to remedy that by taking young men and training them......educating them that means, from a young age.
> 
> But having got to that point, the Japanese training regime was also hampered by a lack of experienced instructors and training aircraft. They could opnly train pilots in relatively small groups, an in relatively small numbers. In situations like the China war, where losses were low, this really didnt matter....pilots entered combat units and had plenty of leasd time to learn the trqade so to speak.
> 
> Finally, in the months leading up to Pearl Harbour, Japan was being hit by an acute fuel shortage. Thats why they went to war, after all. Deceisions were made in the lead up to war, from July I think, to curtail training as a fuel saving measure. It was hoped that the Americans would throw in the towel and make terms, the Japanese never envisaged a long war. After their initial onslaught was unsuccessful (I wont say defeated, since they managed to conquer about 30% of the worlds land mass), they realized they had to replace and expand their air arm, but by then, 1943, things were even worse for them. Many of the pilots with experience were dead, the Japanese were locked into a vicious attrition batle that they could not step back from, the fuel shortages were even more acute, and this forced them to send out inadequately trained pilots to the front "to learn the hard way". That was a receipe for disaster.....so many died "learning" that the quality just fell through the floor. By the time the Hellcat arrived it was all but over.


They trained the same way the Luftwaffe trained, Parsifal. "During the years leading up to the attack upon Pearl Harbor, some lessons for combat training were learned by the Japanese during the conflicts in Manchuria and China in 1931 and 1937, _but the study of the German Air Force made by Yamashita, then Inspector General of Aviation, in 1940-41, undoubtedly formed the basis for much of the modern training program_." Ibid., p. 54. 

PS: The Luftwaffe program was shaken for much the same reasons, too, and at around the same time.


----------



## CobberKane (May 20, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> They trained the same way the Luftwaffe trained, Parsifal. "During the years leading up to the attack upon Pearl Harbor, some lessons for combat training were learned by the Japanese during the conflicts in Manchuria and China in 1931 and 1937, _but the study of the German Air Force made by Yamashita, then Inspector General of Aviation, in 1940-41, undoubtedly formed the basis for much of the modern training program_." Ibid., p. 54.
> 
> PS: The Luftwaffe program was shaken for much the same reasons, too, and at around the same time.


 
Sorry Oldskeptic, I just can't help myself. VB, there seems to be a guarded assertion going on that the Hellcats record in the ETO is applicable to comparing it to the contemporary Spitfire as an air to air weapon? Or not, if I'm reading something between the lines that isn't there. Are you concluding that the quality of Japanese fighter pilots from, say, late 1943 (when the Hellcat commenced it's heroics) was comparable to the Luftwaffe? If so, would you nominate some other strategical or tactical factor that explains the Hellcats much better kill loss ratio, or alternatively something about the Hellcat itself compared to the Spit?


----------



## OldSkeptic (May 20, 2013)

CobberKane said:


> Sorry Oldskeptic, I just can't help myself. VB, there seems to be a guarded assertion going on that the Hellcats record in the ETO is applicable to comparing it to the contemporary Spitfire as an air to air weapon? Or not, if I'm reading something between the lines that isn't there. Are you concluding that the quality of Japanese fighter pilots from, say, late 1943 (when the Hellcat commenced it's heroics) was comparable to the Luftwaffe? If so, would you nominate some other strategical or tactical factor that explains the Hellcats much better kill loss ratio, or alternatively something about the Hellcat itself compared to the Spit?



Even more so that the Germans the Japanese banked on a quick war, without anything like the manufacturing, logistic and training infrastructure need for a war of attrition.

At the beginning there is little doubt that German and Japanese pilots were way ahead on skills and tactics than Allied ones.
In both cases (less so for the Germans) when they were gone, they were gone. As the training infrastructure was insufficient to replace the losses.

The very nature of carrier operations, the geography of the Pacific and the poor pilot protection of their planes meant that they suffered far greater and faster losses of their original skilled core than the Germans did.

So it didn't take long before their collective skill level deteriorated. Meanwhile the US was building its skills, with far greater training systems and of course far more of their experienced pilots surviving (creating a training and leadership core). By late 43, early 44, the US had a superior (in many, though not all, ways) plane in the Hellcat, with superior trained new pilots. Plus a hard core of surviving ones who, by the laws of combat evolution, had learned to fly and fight effectively with good tactics and skill, forming a hard core of the senior operational officers. That's a fatal combination.

The Japanese threw away their best very quickly, then when it was impossible for them to replace them they retained the same tactics they had used with their experienced pilots*. Those could pull them off, but their later brethren couldn't. If they had changed tactics, accepting their lower skill levels, they could have made more of an impact. Still lost of course, but maybe not quite so disastrously (for them that is).

But they were far too brave. Brains beats bravery every day. There is a point, which the Japanese went way past, where bravery becomes counter productive.

Which is why the Wehrmacht was so so dangerous, they were brave and brainy.... Even at the end, they were still better than us.

*They made the same mistake with their soldiers too.


----------



## VBF-13 (May 20, 2013)

CobberKane said:


> Sorry Oldskeptic, I just can't help myself. VB, there seems to be a guarded assertion going on that the Hellcats record in the ETO is applicable to comparing it to the contemporary Spitfire as an air to air weapon? Or not, if I'm reading something between the lines that isn't there. Are you concluding that the quality of Japanese fighter pilots from, say, late 1943 (when the Hellcat commenced it's heroics) was comparable to the Luftwaffe? If so, would you nominate some other strategical or tactical factor that explains the Hellcats much better kill loss ratio, or alternatively something about the Hellcat itself compared to the Spit?


Cobber, I told you I wasn't concluded on the issue, and that I don't have anything specific in my files on it. You're categorically-concluded, right? Why don't you get up there and hit? Let's see what you got.


----------



## zjtins (May 20, 2013)

> Do you have anything to support your belief?


Moderator: how do I answer this one when all I get are questions with no supporting information themselves.


----------



## fastmongrel (May 20, 2013)

I am not a moderator but all I can say is if you keep shooting off non sequiturs dont be surprised if they shoot straight Back At You


----------



## Glider (May 20, 2013)

If it helps all I was trying to do was to find out if there was anything behind your view. If its only a view with nothing to support it then there is no point trying to debate it with you, as you can always just retreat to your view and ignore any evidence. If you have facts to support your view then we have something to debate with.

Example: If I was to say that its my view that the world is flat then you can bury me with facts and evidence but I only have my view so the facts mean nothing. If I say I believe the world is flat beacuse of A B and C. Then you can debate it by proving that A B and C is a load of bull.

As you didn't supply anything to support your view then as far as I am concerned your statement of your view is closed and not worth the effort.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (May 20, 2013)

zjtins said:


> Moderator: how do I answer this one when all I get are questions with no supporting information themselves.





Glider said:


> If it helps all I was trying to do was to find out if there was anything behind your view. If its only a view with nothing to support it then there is no point trying to debate it with you, as you can always just retreat to your view and ignore any evidence. If you have facts to support your view then we have something to debate with.
> 
> Example: If I was to say that its my view that the world is flat then you can bury me with facts and evidence but I only have my view so the facts mean nothing. If I say I believe the world is flat beacuse of A B and C. Then you can debate it by proving that A B and C is a load of bull.
> 
> As you didn't supply anything to support your view then as far as I am concerned your statement of your view is closed and not worth the effort.



*The man said it perfectly - now stop being a friggin twit and either participate accordingly or go find another sand box to play in! In the mean time may I suggest you reading this thread;*

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/basic/few-ground-rules-new-folks-7159.html


----------



## zjtins (May 20, 2013)

> Do you have anything to support your belief?
> You got anything to refute that?



This is what started it all. I was asked again to provide yet more information YET the requester failed to provide anything to show it was not true. I actually have the link but wanted to see if the question has any merit and to date it has not been supported. I read the rules and have not broken any in this chain of discussion. I merely wanted an accuser to provide information contrary to what is established. I thought that was the purpose of any forum.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (May 20, 2013)

zjtins said:


> I merely wanted an accuser to provide information contrary to what is established.



So with that said (and maybe in the spirit of humoring "stupid") I'll post your original comment...



> So from Feb 1944 to summer (D DAY from other sources) I do not believe the P51 laid waste to all of the Luftwaffe in the west. The P-38 and P-47 had more experienced pilots (in general) and were more numerous till around Aug-Oct 1944. That means (to me) the majority of the fighter aircraft between Feb 1944 - Jun 1944 were not from P51's. If you have data to the contrary please present it.



*So now I'll pose this to you - what information data, reference material, and documents do YOU have to support this??????*


----------



## Njaco (May 20, 2013)

I didn't know a QUESTION had to have supporting evidence. Why ask a question if you already have the information?


----------



## CobberKane (May 20, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> Cobber, I told you I wasn't concluded on the issue, and that I don't have anything specific in my files on it. You're categorically-concluded, right? Why don't you get up there and hit? Let's see what you got.


 
If you mean I'm sure the Hellcat would have found things tougher over Europe, I guess I'm as sure as I can be, for the previously mentioned reasons. That said, I don't think it would have been embarrassed, either. Comparing the Hellcat to contemporary Spitfires, there were still plenty of Vs doing good low altitude work in 1944 - that's a role I could see the hellcat doing as well, or maybe better. And while it's been covered in other threads Still really don't get why the Hellcat and Corsair didn't replace the Seafire in the MTO unless, as was suggested, the reasons were economic and political rather than military


----------



## zjtins (May 20, 2013)

> So with that said (and maybe in the spirit of humoring "stupid") I'll post your original comment...
> 
> So from Feb 1944 to summer (D DAY from other sources) I do not believe the P51 laid waste to all of the Luftwaffe in the west. The P-38 and P-47 had more experienced pilots (in general) and were more numerous till around Aug-Oct 1944. That means (to me) the majority of the fighter aircraft between Feb 1944 - Jun 1944 were not from P51's. If you have data to the contrary please present it.
> So now I'll pose this to you - what information data, reference material, and documents do YOU have to support this??????


Thank you at least it was not a prove it but a pointed response. I am not going to respond to 'prove it' as so far this simply leads to more 'prove it' regardless amount or type or information and that is not a discussion

I will supply it give me a bit, I did not save the link. But I was able to find a graph of fighter wings in Europe by aircraft type and month of deployment/change. After I find it I will also modify it change it to show percent of cumulative count so over time we can see how the change over the P-51's occurred.


----------



## VBF-13 (May 20, 2013)

CobberKane said:


> If you mean I'm sure the Hellcat would have found things tougher over Europe, I guess I'm as sure as I can be, for the previously mentioned reasons. That said, I don't think it would have been embarrassed, either. Comparing the Hellcat to contemporary Spitfires, there were still plenty of Vs doing good low altitude work in 1944 - that's a role I could see the hellcat doing as well, or maybe better. And while it's been covered in other threads Still really don't get why the Hellcat and Corsair didn't replace the Seafire in the MTO unless, as was suggested, the reasons were economic and political rather than military


Cobber, the ETO isn't really one of my strengths. That is to say, on this issue, I'd be going more on intuition than knowledge. That means, I'm flying on fumes. That means, I can't get into this dogfight. That means, I'd need to gas up on knowledge, first. 

In a manner of speaking...


----------



## zjtins (May 20, 2013)

US 8th Air Force Aces, Mustang and Thunderbolt fighter pilots in WW2

Looking at the list of the top ten US aces and there bio's, 9 of the top ten flew P-47's before P51's or were all P47 aces.

Here looks like P-51 became 50% of around D-day, that's when the German's were down to 400 fighters on that front.

And another quote from the one of the websites 



> All other parameters being equal, it was the radius of the Lightning which allowed the ETO daylight bombing offensive to succeed at a time when losses were high and long term success questionable. By the time Mustang numbers built up in the ETO, the Luftwaffe had already crossed the knee in the Lanchesterian attrition war curve and defeat was inevitable. While the much admired P-51 made a critical contribution, it is worth noting that cumulative deployments of the Merlin powered P-51 matched the P-38 only as late as the end of 1944, which is clearly at odds with the established mythology. With the 8th AF, the long range escort load was shared equally by the P-38 and P-51 throughout the decisive first half of 1944.


----------



## drgondog (May 20, 2013)

zjtins said:


> US 8th Air Force Aces, Mustang and Thunderbolt fighter pilots in WW2
> 
> Looking at the list of the top ten US aces and there bio's, 9 of the top ten flew P-47's before P51's or were all P47 aces.
> 
> ...



Why don't you get three books, curl up and read them. Olynyk's Stars and Bars and Freeman's Mighty Eighth and Miller's Fighter Units and Pilots of the 8th AF. You will get the transition dates for the conversions for each squadron.

Then get USAF Study 85 and load up in spreadsheet or go to the USAFHRC and pick the Victory credits, then match to aircraft by transition date - or buy my Our Might Always - History of the 355th, Volume I when published. I have done all that.

You need to do it yourself simply because you have so few facts to defend your POV in this forum where soooo many guys havd soooo much more fact and opinions based on facts than you have demonstrated so far.


----------



## Njaco (May 20, 2013)

....because if its not on a website, its fiction.




> Looking at the list of the top ten US aces and there bio's, 9 of the top ten flew P-47's before P51's or were all P47 aces.



I'd like to know how many of the German experten (thats German for 'ace') flew the Bf-109 before the Fw-190 or stayed with it - ya know, that mediocre German fighter that only had modest success.


----------



## Aozora (May 20, 2013)

zjtins said:


> US 8th Air Force Aces, Mustang and Thunderbolt fighter pilots in WW2
> 
> Looking at the list of the top ten US aces and there bio's, 9 of the top ten flew P-47's before P51's or were all P47 aces.
> 
> ...





> All other parameters being equal, it was the radius of the Lightning which allowed the ETO daylight bombing offensive to succeed at a time when losses were high and long term success questionable. By the time Mustang numbers built up in the ETO, the Luftwaffe had already crossed the knee in the Lanchesterian attrition war curve and defeat was inevitable.



Eeeee a website drawing from very few sources beats in depth research EVERY time! Do you actually read, digest and understand _books_?


----------



## drgondog (May 20, 2013)

zjtins said:


> US 8th Air Force Aces, Mustang and Thunderbolt fighter pilots in WW2
> 
> Looking at the list of the top ten US aces and there bio's, 9 of the top ten flew P-47's before P51's or were all P47 aces.
> 
> ...



BTW - the plot of operational FG's is a.) wrong for 8th AF Fighter Command, and b.) wrong for 8th and 9th AF Fighter command combined. For example the 55th FG, the first P-38 FG diverted from MTO. It went operational in Mid October. No more until the 20th went operational in December.

So in combined 8th and 9th AF - October- there were seven P-47 FG's (4, 56, 78, 352, 354, 355, 356), one P-38, zero Mustang. Simple math P-38 = 1/8 = 12%. Check your plot - it should read july =0, aug = 0, sep = 0, Oct = 12.5% but it shows P-38 ramping in July up to 20% (instead of zero)

At end of December there were 9 P-47 FG (4, 56, 78, 352, 353, 355, 356, 358, 359 -all 8th), two P-38 Groups (55, 20) and one Mustang Group (354 - 9th AF). Simple math 
P-38 = 2/12 = 16.6%, P-47= 75%, Mustang = 1/12 = 8.25%, .
*Your chart has P-38 =15%, P-47=70%, P-51 = 15%*

At the end of February there were 12 P-47 FG (4, 56, 78, 352, 353, 355, 356, 358 (9th), 359, 361, 362 (9th), 365 (9th)), 2 P-38 (20, 55 (8th)), 4 Mustang (4, 354, 357, 363). Simple math 
P-38 = 2/18 = 11.1%, P-47 = 12/18 = 66.7%, Mustang =4/18= 22.2%,

*Your chart has P-38=21% , P-47 =58%% , P-51=21% * 

At the end of May, 1944 there were 15 P-47 (36 (9th), 48 (9th), 50 (9th), 56, 78, 353, 356, 358 (9th), 362 (9th), 365, 368, 371, 373, 404, 405, (all 9th); there were 6 P-38 Groups (20, 55, 364, 479 (all 8th), 367, 370 (9th AF), 9 Mustang (4, 339, 352, 354 (9th), 355, 357, 359, 361, 363). Total 8th/9th = 30. P-38 = 6/30 = 20%, P-47= 15/30 =50%, P-51= 9/30 = 30%

*Your chart has P-38 = 18%, P-47 = 41%, P-51= 41%*

At end of December 13 P-47FG = (36, , 48, 50, 56 (8th), 354 (converted from P-51), 358, 362, 365, 371, 373, 404, 405, 406); 2 P-38 (367, 368 (9th)) and 13 Mustang FG (4, 20, 55, 339, 352, 353, 355, 356, 357, 359, 361, 364, 479 (all 8th))
Total = 28. P-38 = 2/28= 7.1%, P-47 = 13/28= 46.4%, Mustang = 13/28 = 46.4%.

*Your chart for Dec has zero P-38s, 15% for P-47 and 85% for P-51.*

Do your own research or find better sources.


----------



## wuzak (May 20, 2013)

zjtins said:


> US 8th Air Force Aces, Mustang and Thunderbolt fighter pilots in WW2
> 
> Looking at the list of the top ten US aces and there bio's, 9 of the top ten flew P-47's before P51's or were all P47 aces.
> 
> ...



If P-38s and P-47s were causing great attrition in the Luftwaffe, then how can you explain:

 The Schweinfurt/Regensberg mission? Sure there weren't any P-38 units around, but there were P-47 units. But the Luftwaffe waited until the P-47s had to turn back.
 Schweinfurt II. This was in October 1943. Still no escort to anywhere near the target.
 The emergency long range fighter program which spawned Frankenstein's monster - the XP-75? If the P-47 was doing teh job, then why the need for a new long range fighter to be developed quickly? Note that the XP-75 program diverted resources (from both Fisher and Allison) away from the XB-39/V-3420 powered B-29 program.


----------



## CobberKane (May 20, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> Cobber, the ETO isn't really one of my strengths. That is to say, on this issue, I'd be going more on intuition than knowledge. That means, I'm flying on fumes. That means, I can't get into this dogfight. That means, I'd need to gas up on knowledge, first.
> 
> In a manner of speaking...



You poor fool! Can you see how I've duped you into thinking I might know what I'm talking about? (Fade to maniacal laughter...)


----------



## parsifal (May 20, 2013)

> I am having a little trouble following the math here. You jump from the German $300 million to an _estimated_ US $400 million and then ASSUME the Navy spent 1/2. The US must have spending an awful lot of the budget on R&D.



The 11% expansion bill which was authorised in April 1940, spent a little over $400m on new ships. It spent about $30m on new facilities. I dont have figures for new or replacement aircraft, but if we assume 1000 we are going to be very generous. Thats not the entire budget for the Navy, in fact the expenditures of the various expansions are over and above budget expenditures I understand. 

I can only see where about $500m of that $907m was spent. where did the remainder (about $400m or so) go???? 
Given that Hap Arnold at the time (or just slioghtly later) was stating German R&D expenditures were being matched, and that we have at least $400m of just one part of Naval expenditures unnaccounted for , why is it unreasonable to suggest $200m on aircraft R&D???

Quoting budget expenditures for expenditures not covered in the budget seems more than a little disingenuous.... 




> From one source: [2-3
> 
> TOTAL "DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY DOLLAR EXPENDITURES" in 1940 = $ 907,160,000
> 
> ...




Iam not going to falsely claim that Im am sure, but quoting budegetry estimates here is clearly misleading. The whole purpose of these special enactments, like the Vinson Bill and the 11% expansion bill., were to vote extra funds for military exapansions not covered in the budget. i will look at your source when I can (havent done that yet), but if it is what it says it is, then it is clearly not the whole story for defence funding, because not all defence funding at that time was included in the budget. . 



> You would have to buy an AWFUL lot of prototypes to spend 200 million dollars in 1940.




Which is deliberatly misrepresenting what ive been saying. im not going through the proess for you again. 



> Hindsight is a wonderful thing. The fact that, as mention before, the Japanese FAILED to improve the Zero and Oscar anywhere near the extent that other nations improved their aircraft for more than THREE years OR provide better replacements in anything approaching significant quantities is not something the US could count on.



Its a risk, but it was far less risk than the one they took by pinching on carrier production. Only by the best of sheer luck were they able to bring the competion dates of 7 carriers forward from 1944-5 some 18months on average. thats a much biger risk than soldiering on with the F4f.


----------



## VBF-13 (May 20, 2013)

CobberKane said:


> You poor fool! Can you see how I've duped you into thinking I might know what I'm talking about? (Fade to maniacal laughter...)


Oh my goodness. Well, then. Once bitten, twice shy.


----------



## Shortround6 (May 21, 2013)

parsifal said:


> The 11% expansion bill which was authorised in April 1940, spent a little over $400m on new ships. It spent about $30m on new facilities. I dont have figures for new or replacement aircraft, but if we assume 1000 we are going to be very generous. Thats not the entire budget for the Navy, in fact the expenditures of the various expansions are over and above budget expenditures I understand.
> 
> I can only see where about $500m of that $907m was spent. where did the remainder (about $400m or so) go????
> Given that Hap Arnold at the time (or just slioghtly later) was stating German R&D expenditures were being matched, and that we have at least $400m of just one part of Naval expenditures unnaccounted for , why is it unreasonable to suggest $200m on aircraft R&D???
> ...



From Wiki:
"
18 aircraft carriers
2 Iowa-class battleships
5 Montana-class battleships
6 Alaska-class cruisers
27 cruisers
115 destroyers
43 submarines
15,000 aircraft
The conversion of 100,000 tons of auxiliary ships
$50 million for patrol, escort and other vessels
$150 million for essential equipment and facilities
$65 million for the manufacture of ordnance material or munitions
$35 million for the expansion of facilities
The expansion program was scheduled to take five to six years, but a New York Times study of shipbuilding capabilities called it "problematical" unless planned "radical changes in design" are dropped."

In the Spring of 1939 the Army placed first contracts for the P-40. $12,872,898 bought 524 air frames. $24,566.60 averaged out ( no engines, propellers, guns, radios and other GFE). Allison got a contract for 837 engines for $15,000,000. 
Granted these are Army planes and engines and are pre 1940 but like the prices for prototypes given earlier are intended to give a frame of reference for aircraft prices at the time. 

Even allowing that Navy aircraft are bigger, or more complicated/expensive than army 1937-39 pursuit planes $200 million is an awful lot of money in 1940 for aircraft R&D (research and development), it is even an awful lot of money for production. 

Grumman sales (Civil and Military) were;

1938 = $4,905,000
1939 = $4,482,350
1940 = $8,811,295
1941 = $21,858,681
1942 = $143,155,931
1943 = ??????????
1944 = $324 million.

cost of a carrier? from a website, take it for what you think it is worth "The original contract called for Essex class carriers to be constructed at the $40 million mark, but after many improvements and upgrades made during the hectic days of the war the price was closer to $70-78 million per carrier"

Granted not all funds "authorized" by a given bill or act are voted to spent that year and not all "funds voted to be spent" are actual spent (change hands) that same year. But by the same token just because a company gets or signs a contract on a certain does not mean they got ALL the money on that date. 

level of funding for the F6F "program" in 1940 is peanuts. There is little more than a few paper studies. until Sept when things pick up a bit, A wooden mock up is inspected on Jan of 1941. Little, if any, money changes hands until the contract for TWO prototypes is signed 30 June 1941 and even then????
I don't know the terms of the THIS contract but Pre-war aircraft contracts usually called for the aircraft (or engine) to be built at company expense and paid for ONLY upon successful completion of acceptance tests or performance trials. Plane crashes before tests are completed? too bad for the company. 

I am sorry but unless you can show WHERE portions of the 200 million for NAVY R&D were going it seems a rather far fetched number as it _may_ be larger than total amount spent by the Navy on production planes in 1940/41. Grumman only got about 15.3% of that in total sales in the two years and that includes, for Grumman commercial and foreign sales. Through in Vought, Brewster, Curtiss and Douglas and you still be hard pressed to spend 200 million on Navy planes in 1940 and 41.


----------



## parsifal (May 21, 2013)

The program wiki is referring to (and you are relying on) is the Vinson Bill, sometimes known as the two ocean Navy, sometimes known as the 70% expansion bill. It was eventually pared back for FY42 to seven carriers, because of the delays getting the full plan implemented quickly enough. Even so, with seven carriers (and other similar reductions in other classes) it was still estimated that it would be late '44 before any of those seven would be ready. in the finish, they were ready 12 months before that, but that was not how it looked in 1940. 

It does well, incidentally, to look at the full article, since the source you drew this from, also says......

"On June 17, a few days after German troops conquered France, Chief of Naval Operations Harold Stark requested *four billion dollars* from Congress to increase the size of the American combat fleet by 70% by adding 257 ships amounting to 1,325,000 tons. On June 18, after less than an hour of debate, the House of Representatives by a 316–0 vote authorized *$8.55 billion* for a naval expansion program, giving emphasis to aircraft. Rep. Vinson, who headed the House Naval Affairs Committee, said its emphasis on carriers did not represent any less commitment to battleships, but "The modern development of aircraft has demonstrated conclusively that the backbone of the Navy today is the aircraft carrier". 

However, whilst these ships were authorized in 1940, not all of them received funding in the immediately following funding year. It took time for all of them to be commenced. But then, also there were many subsequent amendments in '41-3 that added may ships, cancelled others, never commenced others. For example, none of the planned Montanas were ever begun, and the Alaskas were also cut back. On the ohter hand, DD and DE construction was greatly expanded 


The plan that saw the first Essex Class (literally USS Essex) commenced, along with an extremely modest building program for other ships (Ive previously posted the details, but it was basically 1 carrier, 2 BBs about 7 cruisers and 14 DDs....along with odds and ends). That 11% expansion, which was authorised and funds voted as part of FY'40 but comencing FY'41 (dont ask me to explain that, Im lost too), had a price tag of $907million, however only $400m was spent on ships. Where was the rest of the money spent...not on bases....that came later, or under other fiscal allocations. With regard to carrier production, it was originally envisaged to build repeat yorktowns, but in the finish, someone insisted that the Essex be built. That too was a mistake.....building a new class inevitably slowed down delivery, and greatly increased unit costs. The Essex cost 68million, whilst Hornet cost about 25 million.....


I know you and most here believe that aircraft development was more or less free, and are eager to say that the US were all geniouses able to build world beating aircraft for no cost. I am unable to produce for you the proof you need to show otherwise. I do know what the germans were spending on aircraft development (and that comes from a good source), and it was a LOT of money. And I do know that Hap Arnold assured the British that the US was bettering the German investment (and that also comes from a good source), that statement was about the end of 1940. These are facts that we do know. We also know that big items for development in the USN air inventory were its replacement fighters. Lots of other programs, im sure, and I cant pin down what it actually cost to design, AND develop a given type (but incidentally the contract price for the hellcat was $35000 per copy in 1945....to put you out of your misery) was. But sorry if this annoys you, but I simply dont buy the argument that the generation of aircraft designed and developed to win the cause for freedom was done using "pin money". There are simply too many unanswered questions and circumstantial peices of evidence for me to accept such a crass argument. Saying I havent proven my case is one thing, and fair enough. Saying that it cost a few thousand dollars to design develop and organise production is much harder to accept. And still doesnt explain these enormous holes in the fiscal bottom lines ( which I could do for the abovemenetioned Vinson program as well).


----------



## DonL (May 21, 2013)

I will through in some numbers from official german papers.

Development bills of:

Ju 288 from 1938-1944 = 90 million RM
Ju 88 1935-1943 = 32 million RM
Ju 87 1933- 1943 = 17 millon RM

That are the official development bills from Junkers for the timeline and only for development.

Compare to around 80 millions for one Hipper or Deutschland class and 160 million for one Scharnhorst or Gneisenau.
I have my doubts that a/c's were this expensive compare to advanced Navy ships.


----------



## Hop (May 21, 2013)

> And while it's been covered in other threads Still really don't get why the Hellcat and Corsair didn't replace the Seafire in the MTO unless, as was suggested, the reasons were economic and political rather than military



I think it was simply that the Seafire was available to the FAA in larger numbers, and earlier, than the Hellcat. According to a December 1942 Ministry of Aircraft Production report from a visit to the US, scheduled Hellcat deliveries were 4 in Jan, 8 in Feb, 10 in March, 15 in April, 20 a month after that. 

A summary of FAA operations for August, September and October 1943, dated December 1943, says "Two Hellcat squadrons have formed and two more are in the process of forming."


----------



## VBF-13 (May 21, 2013)

Hop said:


> I think it was simply that the Seafire was available to the FAA in larger numbers, and earlier, than the Hellcat. According to a December 1942 Ministry of Aircraft Production report from a visit to the US, scheduled Hellcat deliveries were 4 in Jan, 8 in Feb, 10 in March, 15 in April, 20 a month after that.
> 
> A summary of FAA operations for August, September and October 1943, dated December 1943, says "Two Hellcat squadrons have formed and two more are in the process of forming."


Yeah. I think maybe too there may have been somewhat of an under-appreciation in the ETO of just what the Hellcat could do. At least, at the start, before there were any workouts. You don't throw the horse in the race right out of the barn.


----------



## Njaco (May 21, 2013)

I'm curious. Why the need for the P-51 or any long-range fighter if the LW was finished by 1943 as our esteemed colleague contends?


----------



## VBF-13 (May 21, 2013)

Njaco said:


> I'm curious. Why the need for the P-51 or any long-range fighter if the LW was finished by 1943 as our esteemed colleague contends?


They weren't finished after the Battle of Britain and the Invasion of Russia but they were up against much the same limitations the Japanese were up against after the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway. Was their capacity to deal under those limitations better than the capacity of the Japanese? That's a very interesting question.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (May 21, 2013)

Njaco said:


> I'm curious. Why the need for the P-51 or any long-range fighter if the LW was finished by 1943 as our esteemed colleague contends?



Oh come on! You know he is the most aforementioned authority on the topic.

1. He had a job in the DoD. He could tell you, but he would have to kill you.

2. He heard it from a friend, who heard it from a friend. (To the tune of REO Speedwagon)

Just like he tried to claim the Blackhawk was immune to .50 cal, even when someone who flew it in combat told him otherwise.

If he did not read it somewhere on the internet (and a Video game manual I suspect), then it is not worth researching.

I will stop now, before I start doing the stuff that I warn others about.


----------



## drgondog (May 21, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> Yeah. I think maybe too there may have been somewhat of an under-appreciation in the ETO of just what the Hellcat could do. At least, at the start, before there were any workouts. You don't throw the horse in the race right out of the barn.



Actually - it's an under appreciation by the forum members, the AAF never remotely considered either the F4U or the F6F, nor would numbers of either really be more than the Mustang, given the USMC and USN had very high priorities for both.

So what it boils down to is 'pro-forma' performance against the adversary with the escort mission in mind, or the CAS mission in mind. It really boils down to the P-47 vs the F6F as the range is reasonably close, the engine is close, the load carrying ability is close. The P-47D-25 and above should be compared to the F6F-5, but the F6F-5 also falls into operational window of P-47M and N... where the F6F can out turn the P-47 but that is about all there is.

Based on wing loading the F6F could probably out turn the Fw 190, Bf 109 but probably not the Spit IX but all three were faster and could climb better - matching comparative models of each. 

All three could out dive the F6F, were faster and roll better - even the 109 through most of the range of speeds and stick forces. All three had better power loading so acceleration was better than F6F.

I haven't looked at all the charts so there could be distinctions based on altitude and power settings - but the key performance profiles should be 25,000 feet and 15,000 feet if F6F was relegated to heavy bomber and medium bomber escorts - or SL for CAS.

So, F6F has range and load carrying ability over Spit IX - but is at a disadvantage compared to Spit in air combat, and for most altitudes at a disadvantage to the P-51B/D at WEP in everything but turn. Why 'buy' F6F in Europe?


----------



## VBF-13 (May 21, 2013)

drgondog said:


> Actually - it's an under appreciation by the forum members, the AAF never remotely considered either the F4U or the F6F, nor would numbers of either really be more than the Mustang, given the USMC and USN had very high priorities for both.
> 
> So what it boils down to is 'pro-forma' performance against the adversary with the escort mission in mind, or the CAS mission in mind. [...]


We had the right fighter in our corner in the ETO in those P51s. For what it's worth, I knew one of those boys.*



drgondog said:


> [...] It really boils down to the P-47 vs the F6F as the range is reasonably close, the engine is close, the load carrying ability is close. The P-47D-25 and above should be compared to the F6F-5, but the F6F-5 also falls into operational window of P-47M and N... where the F6F can out turn the P-47 but that is about all there is.


Now there’s the weight-class we're looking for. Not to take anything away from the F6Fs, the P47s packed the bigger punch. Not to take anything away from the P47s, leave the bombing-fighting to the F6Fs.



drgondog said:


> Based on wing loading the F6F could probably out turn the Fw 190, Bf 109 but probably not the Spit IX but all three were faster and could climb better - matching comparative models of each.
> 
> All three could out dive the F6F, were faster and roll better - even the 109 through most of the range of speeds and stick forces. All three had better power loading so acceleration was better than F6F.
> 
> ...


I can’t go there. I just don’t know enough. I’ll point this out, though. Every fighter Mike Tyson KO’ed had charts exceeding his reach and height.

*I love that. They're all in their 70's and 80's, and they're still calling themselves "boys." Those ones I knew are all gone, now. RIP, boys.


----------



## zjtins (May 22, 2013)

> I'm curious. Why the need for the P-51 or any long-range fighter if the LW was finished by 1943 as our esteemed colleague contends?



If you are so curious why not re-read what I wrote and not take it out of context? Today we know the Germans had no ability to win the war in late 43 due to material shortages. We could have simply not used the P51 and kept the bombing closer and used more low level twin engine and fighter bombers. Once we had a foot hold in Europe the range became less important. The US could have built more P-47s and P-38 with more internal fuel and drop tanks. The big losses in late 43 were from twin engine destroyers (read the P-38 page and if you really want to get) The Defeat of the German Air Force Which the P38 could easily handle.


I also said they were not aware of it at the time.


----------



## Njaco (May 22, 2013)

I'll stick to my books and primary resources and not what flickers across a screen.

Not taken out of context? What context? You have maintained across several threads that the LW was done by 1943, there was no need for long range fighters and that the 8th AF bombing campaign was useless. I'm sorry, but actual history disputes every claim you've made. Or maybe now its just your opinion and we all know about opinions.....


----------



## drgondog (May 22, 2013)

zjtins said:


> If you are so curious why not re-read what I wrote and not take it out of context? Today we know the Germans had no ability to win the war in late 43 due to material shortages. We could have simply not used the P51 and kept the bombing closer and used more low level twin engine and fighter bombers. Once we had a foot hold in Europe the range became less important.
> 
> *You should be aware that Allied High Command were seriously concerned that a strong LW would contribute to a failure of the Invasion? So, they drafted ARGUMENT as a goal to destroy the LW via Daylight operations? That daylight operations were halted over Germany with the disastrous Oct 14, 1943 attck on Scweinfurt? Your lack of knowledge is appalling.*
> 
> ...



Extracting the Strategic Bombing Survey Chart you will note that they cite 
Q1 LW Losses West (including RAF, 8th and 9th AF) Total = 2130 a/c destroyed in the air
Q2 LW Losses West (including RAF, 8th and 9th AF) Total = 3057 " " " "
Q1 P-38 Contribution (8/9 AF) = 88/2130 = 4.1% --- Q2 = 90/3057 = 2.9%
Q1 P-47 Contribution (8/9 AF) =560/2130 = 26.3% -- Q2 = 409/3057 = 13.4%
Q1 P-51 Contribution (8/9 AF) =399/2130 = 18.7% -- Q2 = 972/3057 = 31.8%

It looks like the P-38 was really hammering the LW doesn't it? 

Research - become better informed


----------



## zjtins (May 22, 2013)

> Not taken out of context? What context? You have maintained across several threads that the LW was done by 1943, there was no need for long range fighters and that the 8th AF bombing campaign was useless. I'm sorry, but actual history disputes every claim you've made. Or maybe now its just your opinion and we all know about opinions.....


Logistically true, but you implied the fighting was over something I never implied or stated.


----------



## zjtins (May 22, 2013)

> It looks like the P-38 was really hammering the LW doesn't it?


Since The USAAF pulled the P-38 instead of supporting it (just as the cold temp high altitude problems were solved) we will never know.

But logistically the Germans were running out of war material and could only produce a few more planes than they actually did.
The bombing was not as effective as though during WWII. So had an alternate approach could have been taken (low level twin engine bombers and fighter bombers, In much larger numbers numbers and they may have done worse, the same or better but the results would still be the same, the Allies were going to win regardless. They simply were building faster than they were losing planes and crew (as can be said for tank, ships too). The Germans were running out of material and had no place left to get them.


----------



## drgondog (May 22, 2013)

zjtins said:


> Since The USAAF pulled the P-38 instead of supporting it (just as the cold temp high altitude problems were solved) we will never know.
> 
> *Ahhh not exactly, the 8th AF gave them to the 9th and 15th AF. The 9th used them as Ground support and the 15th as mix of escort and CAS... they replaced the P-38 with a better aircraft for long range escort, cheaper to buy, cheaper to fly, cheaper to maintain - and far more effective at cutting the LW than all the P-38s used in ETO and MTO since Nov 1942.*
> 
> ...



You are a curiously stubborn, ill informed, fella. The most effective Strafer in MTO and ETO was the Mustang by an order of magnitude over the P-38 as far as strafing Axis aircraft was concerned. The Mustang was credited with destroying more German aircraft on the ground than the MTO and ETO P-38s and P-47s combined.. so why would you make the comment


----------



## bobbysocks (May 22, 2013)

zjtins said:


> Since The USAAF pulled the P-38 instead of supporting it (just as the cold temp high altitude problems were solved) we will never know.
> 
> But logistically the Germans were running out of war material and could only produce a few more planes than they actually did.
> 
> ...



and of course we know the ending to the story...they didnt in 43.


----------



## Shortround6 (May 22, 2013)

parsifal said:


> . But sorry if this annoys you, but I simply dont buy the argument that the generation of aircraft designed and developed to win the cause for freedom was done using "pin money". There are simply too many unanswered questions and circumstantial peices of evidence for me to accept such a crass argument. Saying I havent proven my case is one thing, and fair enough. Saying that it cost a few thousand dollars to design develop and organise production is much harder to accept. And still doesnt explain these enormous holes in the fiscal bottom lines ( which I could do for the abovemenetioned Vinson program as well).






parsifal said:


> I know you and most here believe that aircraft development was more or less free, and are eager to say that the US were all geniouses able to build world beating aircraft for no cost.



Exaggeration is going to get us nowhere. Neither are veiled (or not so veiled) insults. 

" When Germany invaded Poland in 1939, NACA had only 500 employees and a modest budget of a little more than $4 million. The war transformed the NACA. It grew from one research facility--the Langley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory in Hampton, Va -- to three: Ames Aeronautical Laboratory and the Aircraft Engine Research Laboratory in Cleveland, Ohio. Employment peaked at 6,077 employees in 1945 and the budget that same year was almost $41 million."

https://sites.google.com/site/drwordenbriefingngsrc/1935-1950-naca

There were numerous collage or university research centers. Some manufacturers (even of light planes) had connections with specific collages or universities for things like stress analysis or aerodynamics. This allowed professors and students some real world experience/problems and saved the aircraft company the cost of full time employees that could do that type of work ( some companies only designed one some what simple type of aircraft ever few years in the 30s).

The US went from about 12 wind tunnels at the beginning of the war to around 40 at the end of the war. Only ONE of the wind tunnels were owned by an aircraft company (Curtiss) at the Beginning of the war. A lot more of of them were company owned by the end of the war. Aside from Langley (only wind tunnels over 10ft) and Wright field wind tunnels were at Standford University (1919), University of Michigan (1925), New York University (1925), Cal Tech (1930), MIT (1937). 

It wasn't "Free" or "No Cost". But it sure wasn't the result of a 200 million dollar funding dump in one year either.

The US was also different in that the size of both the industry and the size of the market were much larger than other countries and the industry as a whole was much less dependent on government subsidies or contracts. Both Wright and P W had out stripped Bristol and Armstrong Siddeley in sales on new radial engines and were developing new models WITHOUT government money. If the Government wanted to by them (or pay them to work on a project thought up by the government) all well and good but Better R-1820s and R-1830 and the R-2600 and R-2800s were coming even if the government wasn't paying for them. 
The US was NOT a controlled economy (in certain ways) during the war and sure wasn't before the war. Workers were free to come and go as they pleased. After the government "fixed" wages after a fashion, companies were still free to offer different health benefits or pensions or climate ( Buffalo New York in the winter or California) to lure away each others workers. The Gov could NOT tell workers "we are shutting down the XXX aircraft project and you will now move to the ZZZ shipyard and work on an aircraft carrier". 




parsifal said:


> Lots of other programs, im sure, and I cant pin down what it actually cost to design, AND develop a given type (but incidentally the contract price for the hellcat was $35000 per copy in 1945....to put you out of your misery) was. But sorry if this annoys you, but I simply dont buy the argument that the generation of aircraft designed and developed to win the cause for freedom was done using "pin money". There are simply too many unanswered questions and circumstantial peices of evidence for me to accept such a crass argument. Saying I havent proven my case is one thing, and fair enough. Saying that it cost a few thousand dollars to design develop and organise production is much harder to accept. And still doesnt explain these enormous holes in the fiscal bottom lines ( which I could do for the abovemenetioned Vinson program as well).



The $35,000 dollar figure may be for a late war contract, early ones may have been more, and would seem to be for a bare air frame, no engine, prop, guns, radio, etc. That or Grumman was WAAAAY better at making aircraft than ANY other US aircraft maker. 

But sorry if this annoys you, but I simply don't buy the argument that the generation of aircraft designed and developed to win the cause for freedom was done using hundreds of Millions of dollars per design (OK an exaggeration). 
Things got real complicated DURING WW II. P W took 3-4 years of PEACE time work, 8 million dollars and 3500 test hours to get the R-2800 into production. It took them from 1940 to 1944, 25 million dollars 15,000 test hours and 23 test engines to get the R-4360 to about the same same level. ANd the R-4360 used R-2800 cylinders (at least to start). 

Comparing post war prices and policies to pre war or early war prices and policies is a mistake. 

IF it costs $50,000 or so to build a bare airframe and companies were bidding $200-250,000 for a prototype and engineering data, what do you think it was really costing them? Granted they expected to make a bit of money on a production contract but low balling the prototype work TOO much could put the company out of business. 

For some "circumstantial pieces of evidence" on the other side, Grumman priced the G-21 Amphibian "Goose" starting at $68,000 in 1937, With engines and accessories although optional interiors could run the price up. I doubt they anticipated sales in thousands so R D of that model has to built into the price. The Lockheed 14 Airliner (turned into the Hudson) started at about $85,000 in 1937. Same thing, anticipated sales in the hundreds, if the R D was in the tens of millions for one design how do they price the plane so low? Lockheed ( the second company) at this point had built fewer than 200 planes combined of the models 10 and 12.

What in the F6F (features) warrants millions of dollars of R&D? A fairly normal wing, the fold has already been used on the Avenger and F4F, Landing gear seems to be a Boeing Patent, Operates like P-36/40 landing gear? The engine was certainly used by other aircraft (except for down draft carb) Early Prop was the dead same one as used on the F4U and Hamilton Standard was pretty much the world standard, they were going to build props for 2000 hp engines with or without the F6F. 

Navy was going to have to spend Money to expand production facilities even if they used Buffaloes. Especially if they used Buffaloes? No savings there. And Production expansion is NOT R D. 

Your chain of logic seems a bit off.

1.Germans were spending 300 million (on what?).
2. Arnold tells the British we are spending more. (on what?)
3, you claim 400 million. That is more than the German 300 million but did Arnold say 400 million? or 1/3 more? or quantify it? 
4, you then split 400 million between the Army and Navy, seems equal but aside from declaring that both got an equal share is there any proof?
5. Army was trying for turbo supercharged multi engine bombers with pressure cabins, remote power turrets, etc. Navy had SOME multi-engine flying boats. equal need for research? 
Army _PROJECTS_ include the B-27, B-28, B-30, B-31, B-32 ( and BTW the B-29 was first ordered August 1940), B-33 and B-33A. B-35 Flying wing was ordered in Sept 1941 (1/3 scale flying models were flying earlier. Convair B-36 prototypes were ordered November 1941 (before Pearl Harbor). 

Douglas had spent about $4 Million between 1936 and 1942 on the B-19 bomber project. It takes a lot of imagining to figure out spending that much or more on a single engine fighter of no great technical difficulty. 

There may very well be hundreds of dollars "missing" from these abbreviated accounts. Doesn't mean the Navy spent it on aeronautical R D or at least enough to pay for a carrier to be in service about the time the first few dozen F6Fs roll out the factory door. 

I would say you are very far from proving your case.

I may not have "proved" mine but it seems that circumstantial evidence can be used both ways.


----------



## parsifal (May 22, 2013)

DonL said:


> I will through in some numbers from official german papers.
> 
> Development bills of:
> 
> ...




Thanks for that information, which suggests these claims by the American members here, of being able to develop a given type for about $250K as sheer fantasy. Its as uncomfortable for me as im sure it will be for you, but whether wittingly, or unwittingly, your figures corroborate, to a degree what Im saying . There is a massive risk in what Im saying.....we al know that comparing cash rates for different countries is dangerous. I have to accept that. But in 1938, the rough exchange rate, dollars to RM was about 2.5, as i understand it. Give or take

If we take the risk and convert the figures you give to US dollars, we get the following indications


Ju 288 from 1938-1944 = $36 million....give or take
Ju 88 1935-1943 = $12.8$....give or take
Ju 87 1933- 1943 = $6.8 million....give or take

That are the official development bills from Junkers for the timeline and only for development.

around $32(USD) millions for one Hipper (compared to $25 million for CA Boston) 
$64 million for one Scharnhorst or Gneisenau. (compared to $70million for the Alaskas and $100million for the Iowas) 



I dont know much about the Ju288 or Ju88 development programs.....but did they involve massive factory exapansions for more than 20000 workers? I doubt it. But assumning that your figures DO include setting up the production lines, we either have to come to two conclusions.......either the germans were hopelessly inefficient in their aircraft industry, or, these figures for the hellcat are a total crock. Frankly, for once, I am in the camp of the Germans. They were quite efficient designers and builders, and the costs you are giving are far more truthful and to the mark than this figure of "it only costs $50000 to make one the most deadly aircraft in history available for mass production". 

As far as your last statement, well maybe, case is unproven for me, but I respect your POV on this


----------



## DonL (May 22, 2013)

Hello Parsifal,

the development program from Junkers for the Ju 88 and the Ju 87 included the Junkers Jumo 211 engine.
The Junkers factory developed 1935 from 9500 workmen to 25000 workmen 1938 and 165000 workmen 1944.
The Ju 88 was the biggest bomber production program of the RLM , so I think Junkers developed 1939 and 1940 around another 20000-30000 workmen. 

Junkers produced around 15000 Ju 88 (1939-1945) , 6000 Ju 87 (1937-1944), 900 Ju 86 (1935-1939), 3000 Ju 52 (1932-1945)
Junkers produced also 6500 Jumo 210 engines (1934-1938 ), 68000 Jumo 211 (1937-1945) and 9000 Jumo 213 (1942-1945)

Other productionseries were very smal.

The development program of the Ju 288 included the Jumo 222 engine and the building of the Flugmotorenwerke Ostmark at Wien (1940) with a goal of 1000 engines per month.
Only 22 Ju 288 were ever produced and something about 100 Jumo 222 engines. 
It was the most expencive RLM program from 1934 to 1945 and the most expencive mistaken investment.

Edit: Expansion of the Ju 88 production:

69 (1939); 2208 (1940), 2780 (1941); 3094 (1942); 3260 (1943); 3234 (1944); 355 (1945)

Note: Next to the Bf 109 (around 30000) and the FW 190 (20000) the Ju 88 (15000) is ranking far away from other productions (He 111, Ju87 and Me 110 all around 6000) at place 3 of all produced a/c's for the LW.

At 1940 and 1941 it was the most numeric produced a/c of the LW, even more then the Bf 109, 1693 (1940); 2764 (1941)



> I dont know much about the Ju288 or Ju88 development programs.....but did they involve massive factory exapansions for more than 20000 workers? I doubt it.



I think you will correct this sentence after my numbers for the Ju88.


----------



## Shortround6 (May 22, 2013)

parsifal said:


> "it only costs $50000 to make one the most deadly aircraft in history available for mass production".



Please tell me it what post I wrote the quoted part? 

You are the one who keeps talking about a few thousand dollars. There is a large difference between a few thousand dollars or even 50,000 dollars and 25-40 million dollars.

You are also ignoring the differences between basic R D, design of ONE aircraft and building new factories and lumping the three together. 

From Joe Baugher's website on the B-19 "the aircraft was formally accepted by the Army in June of 1942. The Army paid Douglas $1,400,064 for the XB-19. However, the company had spent almost 4 million dollars of its own funds on the project, so Douglas managed to lose money on the XB-19. " Unless Douglas was lying to it's stock holders about what it really lost. 

I would also note that the German planes quoted went through Multiple engine changes, Multiple models over 6-10 years and in some cases dozens of prototype aircraft vs TWO initial prototypes for the F6F. 

Is one entitled to wonder if ANY of the Jumo engine programs got charged to the aircraft development mentioned? 

And even if it doesn't, 12.8 million US ( 1/2 to 1/3 what you need for a carrier) for the JU-88 covered what? the A series with two wing sizes? 5 variants? Any of the B series or Ju 188? the C series fighters (9-10 variants)? the D series photo recon variants 4-5 variants? and so on for the G, H, P, R, S and T series aircraft. 

I would say there was a considerable difference between the Ju-88 program and the F6F program. The F6F program branched out a bit later (but by no means the number of variations as the JU-88 ) but by then it is too late for your idea.

Additional information: from : http://www.uboat.net/technical/ju88.htm

"including a staggering 104 prototypes for its 60 different versions"

Now maybe a some of those were post 1943 and don't count for the 12.8 million total but I think it _really_ puts the two programs in perspective considering you are comparing a twin engine plane of almost twice the size and weight to a single engine fighter.


----------



## Aozora (May 22, 2013)

zjtins said:


> Since The USAAF pulled the P-38 instead of supporting it (just as the cold temp high altitude problems were solved) we will never know.



Actually the USAAF discovered it had a more effective, less expensive fighter and decided use it to cut the losses before things got worse. The P-38 was better used elsewhere, such as in the Med or Pacific.



zjtins said:


> But logistically the Germans were running out of war material and could only produce a few more planes than they actually did.
> The bombing was not as effective as though during WWII. So had an alternate approach could have been taken (low level twin engine bombers and fighter bombers, In much larger numbers numbers and they may have done worse, the same or better but the results would still be the same, the Allies were going to win regardless. They simply were building faster than they were losing planes and crew (as can be said for tank, ships too). The Germans were running out of material and had no place left to get them.


 
Read this and tell us what you see; look under "_European Theatre of Operations_" - sorry, it contains factual material so it might be hard to read 

Losses: Army Air Forces in World War II

Now, would the casualty rate have gone up or down in 1944 if the Luftwaffe was in the desperate straits you imagine? 

Then again, because the Luftwaffe was so spent, the USAAF could have sent over swarms of computer gamers in Harvards and Stearmans, thus starving Germany out like a plague of locusts and who cares about casualty rates amongst the crews?


----------



## DonL (May 22, 2013)

> I would say there was a considerable difference between the Ju-88 program and the F6F program. The F6F program branched out a bit later (but by no means the number of variations as the JU-88 ) but by then it is too late for your idea.
> 
> Additional information: from : Junkers Ju-88 - Technical pages - German U-boats of WWII - Kriegsmarine - uboat.net
> 
> ...



At the end you can say (simplified) the whole Ju 88 program with all prototypes and tasks is a Douglas A-20, Douglas A-26; North American B-25; Martin B-26 and Northrop P-61 and this all in one aircraft.

This is exaggerated but hits to my opinion the nail.


----------



## VBF-13 (May 22, 2013)

Matt308 said:


> Confucius say, "Young man not know much."



A little codicil to that signature line of mine, Matt. For what it may be worth around here...

_You’d scarce expect one of my age  
To speak in public on the stage,  
And if I chance to fall below 
 Demosthenes or Cicero,  
Don't view me with a critic's eye, 
 But pass my imperfections by.  
Large streams from little fountains flow, 
 Tall oaks from little acorns grow; 
 And though now I am small and young, 
 Of judgment weak and feeble tongue,  
Yet all great, learned men, like me 
 Once learned to read their ABC._


----------



## altsym (May 22, 2013)

@ zjtins. Well the Luftwaffe certainly wasn't finished by 1943, or 44, or 45. I think combined they had around 2500 claims in 1945.
I mean they were nowhere near the force they started as, but the Luftwaffe was still very dangerous even near the end. 

Cheers.


----------



## parsifal (May 22, 2013)

> Please tell me it what post I wrote the quoted part?



You didnt. Check back though. at one point claims were being made that R&D could cost as litle as $12000 per model. Thats what this is in response to



> You are the one who keeps talking about a few thousand dollars. There is a large difference between a few thousand dollars or even 50,000 dollars and 25-40 million dollars.



If you are prepred to agree to 25-$40 million dollars for Hellcat development, I would be a very happy man



> You are also ignoring the differences between basic R D, design of ONE aircraft and building new factories and lumping the three together.




nope. im saying R &D is two separate things, but the cost of getting a new design onto the carrier decks is that combied cost. 




> From Joe Baugher's website on the B-19 "the aircraft was formally accepted by the Army in June of 1942. The Army paid Douglas $1,400,064 for the XB-19. However, the company had spent almost 4 million dollars of its own funds on the project, so Douglas managed to lose money on the XB-19. " Unless Douglas was lying to it's stock holders about what it really lost.



That would mean the B-19 cost less to "R&D" than a Ju87. Im not buying that either. The Ju87 was a smaller, simpler earlier design relying on off the shelf technologies. Can you say the same for the B-19. Youve just finished lecturing me about how far behind the US aircraft industry was in 1938-40. That would suggest a need for much greater injections of capital into the system. Yet here we still are, trying to argue that a four engined (the largest to date at that time) with new engine techs, new armamenent and lord knows what else, still cost less than the lowly Stuka. you have gotta be kidding either me or yourself, or both. 




> I would also note that the German planes quoted went through Multiple engine changes, Multiple models over 6-10 years and in some cases dozens of prototype aircraft vs TWO initial prototypes for the F6F.



We dont exactly know what DoNLs figures are for. he says development, which I assume means exclusinve of productiopn and delivery costs (I hope he is not trying to say the entire production run of Ju88s cost just $12.8 million dollars.....thats roughly $800 per airframe if is saying that. I further assume it includes production setup, design and development of the prototypes. all good

Saying that the F6F involved just two proprypes is not correct. One has to look at the whole package. There, were, to begin with the F4F-2 designs, then there was the Xf5F proptypes. there were from some sources at least three F6F-1 proportypes, I forget how many F6F-2 and from memory 3 F6F-3 propotypes. This is typical American hyperbole. Saying there were just two prototypes is correct....so long as you ignore all the duds they tried and discarded along the way....And in the end....so what, weve already well established that the building of propotypes is your "pin money" scenario. 



> Is one entitled to wonder if ANY of the Jumo engine programs got charged to the aircraft development mentioned?




Of course....questions allover the place. But small change compared to the claims made that it didnt cost much to get the Hellcat up and running....Raising all these red herrings looks like the mark of desperate men to me...desperate for people like me to stop asking embarrassing questions about what is obviously a sacred cow in US aeronautical folklore



> And even if it doesn't, 12.8 million US ( 1/2 to 1/3 what you need for a carrier) for the JU-88 covered what? the A series with two wing sizes? 5 variants? Any of the B series or Ju 188? the C series fighters (9-10 variants)? the D series photo recon variants 4-5 variants? and so on for the G, H, P, R, S and T series aircraft.
> 
> I would say there was a considerable difference between the Ju-88 program and the F6F program. The F6F program branched out a bit later (but by no means the number of variations as the JU-88 ) but by then it is too late for your idea.



Id agree that there is not much comparability between what was done with the Ju88 and the F6F. But the F6F was not all beer and skittles. It was part of the overall USN replacement fighter program, which spanned four different aircraft types, and at least three different engines. Not in the same league as the Junkers, but then, hardly the "50000" claimed by some either....


----------



## DonL (May 23, 2013)

> From Joe Baugher's website on the B-19 "the aircraft was formally accepted by the Army in June of 1942. The Army paid Douglas $1,400,064 for the XB-19. However, the company had spent almost 4 million dollars of its own funds on the project, so Douglas managed to lose money on the XB-19. " Unless Douglas was lying to it's stock holders about what it really lost.





> That would mean the B-19 cost less to "R&D" than a Ju87. Im not buying that either. The Ju87 was a smaller, simpler earlier design relying on off the shelf technologies. Can you say the same for the B-19. Youve just finished lecturing me about how far behind the US aircraft industry was in 1938-40. That would suggest a need for much greater injections of capital into the system. Yet here we still are, trying to argue that a four engined (the largest to date at that time) with new engine techs, new armamenent and lord knows what else, still cost less than the lowly Stuka. you have gotta be kidding either me or yourself, or both.



Here we go, that's very interesting, because I have very exact datas about the Ju89 Uralbomber from 1935-1937.

Cost sheet to the RLM:

Ju89 V1:
Dummy building: RM 150 441; Aerodynamic and Structural Calculations: RM 301 388; experiments: RM 6000, construction of the a/c with 4 x DB-600 engines: RM 1,128,000; equipment: RM 1,033,764; Changes: 63,600 RM; production of a second Fuselage front part: RM 18,968; flight tests and flight testing: RM 109 487.

Ju89 V2: 1,558 Millionen RM.

Ju89 V3 Bruchzelle (I think destruction fuselage) 175.824 RM. 

In summary 4,545472 Millionen RM.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_89


----------



## Glider (May 23, 2013)

zjtins said:


> If you are so curious why not re-read what I wrote and not take it out of context? Today we know the Germans had no ability to win the war in late 43 due to material shortages.



My understanding is that Germany produced approx 20,600 aircraft in 1943 but had the material, shortages whatever to produce approx 35,000 in 1944. 
I also understand that they produced about 13,500 tanks in 1943 and almost 19,000 in 1944 and production of the 105mm FH18 almost doubled between 1943 and 1944

I would further contend that had Germany put its factories onto a full war footing in 1939, they would have easily been able to produce in 1943 what they produced in 1944 and the outcome of the war in Russia could easily have been very different. 

So if can you tell us more about your source of information re the shortage of resources it would be appreciated.


----------



## zjtins (May 23, 2013)

> @ zjtins. Well the Luftwaffe certainly wasn't finished by 1943, or 44, or 45. I think combined they had around 2500 claims in 1945.
> I mean they were nowhere near the force they started as, but the Luftwaffe was still very dangerous even near the end.



One of many quotes of data of what happened. I am not disagreeing with these facts. BUT BDA AFTER THE WAR showed the affect of strategic bombing was far less that what they thought during the war. The USAF changed future tactics based on the post war BDA comparisons. In Vietnam the us went after harbor mining and electrical power stations and relay stations base don WWII post war BDA. They chose not to target Electrical stations as they though to well defend and the Germans coudl easily repair the damage and temporarily accommodate it by the electrical net from other areas. The Brits did it a few times and after the war it turns out the Germans had a hard time dealing with the damage. But AT THE TIME THE ALLIES DID NOT KNOW THIS.
Of course during the war everyone went after what they thought meant the most for the cost. 
BUT other choices could have been made that in the end were just as good or better.
Also the P-51 stats are skewed as large numbers of P-51s were brought on the line AND given free reign to attack ground targets at around the time the Germans training was dropping drastically, fuel was rapidly diminishing, experienced pilots in the Luftwaffe were diminishing and even the ammo was becoming suspect due to lack of materials and the use of slave labor.
~1400 ME262'S were built but only ~400 or so saw action. 
TODAY with 20/20 hindsight Germany had no cards left in late '43, the tide had irrevocably turned but alot of people had to die first. Germany simply was running out of resources it was a massive war of attrition. Whether it was over 6 months earlier or later due to some technical wonder or some strategic or tactical move it was still over.


----------



## zjtins (May 23, 2013)

> I would further contend that had Germany put its factories onto a full war footing in 1939, they would have easily been able to produce in 1943 what they produced in 1944 and the outcome of the war in Russia could easily have been very different.


Open a new thread.


----------



## drgondog (May 23, 2013)

zjtins said:


> In Vietnam the us went after harbor mining and electrical power stations and relay stations base don WWII post war BDA.
> 
> *And ignored the single most important targets - the dikes to the rice paddies..due to interference from Johnson and McNamara*
> 
> ...



I wish that you could stand in front of an audience of vets of the 8th AF, RAF, Allied infantry and armor - and make that silly statement. You would be able to cut the utter contempt with a wooden spatula.


----------



## DonL (May 23, 2013)

Coming back to some numbers.
From the FW 187 two seater series I have also exact datas, but I think they are only the construction, building and material costs without development (dumys, experiments, aerodynamik caculation etc..).
But what is realy interesting how fast the bill and workours droped even by a preproduction series of 6 a/c's inclusive the first prototype.

FW 187 V4: (first twoseater prototype)
100578,60 workinghours = 105922 RM + 89211,47 RM (material) = 195134 RM for the first prototype
For the next* two* A0 preproduction aircrafts:
73373,63 workinhours = 77710,29 RM + 75397,77 RM (material) = 153108,06 RM each
For the next/last *three* A0 preproduction aircrafts:
64489,62 workinhours = 68136.41 RM + 74774,46 RM (material) = 142910,87 RM each

I think here was Focker Wulf pretty efficient.


----------



## VBF-13 (May 23, 2013)

Guys, I think the F6Fs were around $50,000, starting, and cut down pretty substantially once Bethpage got rolling with them. Look in Thruelsen, _The Grumman Story_.


----------



## Glider (May 23, 2013)

zjtins said:


> Open a new thread.



Fair enough but what about the rest of the posting that dealt with resources and production. 

_My understanding is that Germany produced approx 20,600 aircraft in 1943 but had the material, shortages whatever to produce approx 35,000 in 1944. 
I also understand that they produced about 13,500 tanks in 1943 and almost 19,000 in 1944 and production of the 105mm FH18 almost doubled between 1943 and 1944_

_So if can you tell us more about your source of information re the shortage of resources it would be appreciated_

Or to put it another way. If Germany was out of resources at the end of 1943, where did the resources come from to build all this equipment in 1944?.


----------



## DonL (May 23, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> Guys, I think the F6Fs were around $50,000, starting, and cut down pretty substantially once Bethpage got rolling with them. Look in Thruelsen, _The Grumman Story_.



I have very serious doubts, that a mass produced Hellcat will be ever at $50000, because a P51 was not at $50000 at 1945 and I think from the weight of the a/c's and the P&R 2800 the Hellcat must be much more expensive. Something about $75ooo looks realistic.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (May 23, 2013)

DonL said:


> I have very serious doubts, that a mass produced Hellcat will be ever at $50000, because a P51 was not at $50000 at 1945 and I think from the weight of the a/c's and the P&R 2800 the Hellcat must be much more expensive. Something about $75ooo looks realistic.



Unit cost $35,000 in 1945 

Ferguson, Robert G. "One Thousand Planes a Day: Ford, Grumman, General Motors and the Arsenal of Democracy." History and Technology, Volume 21, Issue 2, 2005. 

pp. 149–175

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grumman_F6F_Hellcat#Bibliography


----------



## DonL (May 23, 2013)

Is this including the engine?
How do you think it is possible after this list:
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/interesting-usaaf-costs-37213.html

How can a carrier operated a/c, which was much heavier (so more material) then the presented fighter, also with the P&R 2800 engine being this cheap, compare to the P40 and the P51? 
To me it looks unlogic.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (May 23, 2013)

DonL said:


> Is this including the engine?
> How do you think it is possible after this list:
> http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/interesting-usaaf-costs-37213.html
> 
> How can an carrier operated a/c, which was much heavier (so more material) then the presented fighter with the P&R engine being this cheap, compare to the P40 and the P51? To me it looks unlogic.


The engines, radios and guns were usually furnished by the government AKA "GFE." They might not haven been included in that price - one would have to read the contract between Grumman and the USN to see what was considered a "deliverable."

It also depends how many were ordered and built - the more built, the unit cost came down. Money wasn't necessarily made on selling the entire aircraft. Most if not all manufacturers make their real profits on post-delivery support, meaning spare parts.

From that site;

_"Average cost per airplane is the weighted average on all programs approved during a designated fiscal year and represents the estimated cost of a complete airplane ready for flyaway, including factory installed ordnance and radio equipment. *Costs exclude equipment installed at modification centers and airplane spare parts. Unit costs reflect renegotiation of contracts only to the extent of reductions in contract prices for future deliveries but do no reflect reductions in price effected by cash refunds."*_


----------



## DonL (May 23, 2013)

> The engines, radios and guns were usually furnished by the government AKA "GFE." They might not haven been included in that price.



That makes sense compare to the prices of the posted list, because the production numbers of P 40, P 51 and F6F are very close with the P-51 and P 40 in the lead.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (May 23, 2013)

DonL said:


> That makes sense compare to the prices of the posted list, because the production number of P 40, P 51 and F6F are very close with P 51 and P 40 in the lead.


It also depends what equipment was ordered and what other requirements were placed in the contract - two different branches of the US Armed Forces were ordering aircraft to their specifications. Things like paint, tires, radios and even test reports on some of the material purchased to manufacture the aircraft are also considered in the cost.


----------



## drgondog (May 23, 2013)

I agree DonL's point and your answer Joe. I don't believe the F6F cost the USN $35K including all GFE. Usually the price for an a/c in serial production during WWII seemed to be close to a function of weight when compared with other a/c in its class.

I don't know the answer but I would be hugely surprised if the F6F was less than the P-51, and would believe it to be closer to P-47 (and F4U)...


----------



## VBF-13 (May 23, 2013)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Unit cost $35,000 in 1945
> 
> Ferguson, Robert G. "One Thousand Planes a Day: Ford, Grumman, General Motors and the Arsenal of Democracy." History and Technology, Volume 21, Issue 2, 2005.
> 
> ...


"During the war, he [Grumman] bargained hard with suppliers to bring the cost of the Hellcat from $50,000 down to $35,000. Fortune magazine said that Grumman produced more pounds of airframe for the taxpayer's dollar than any other aircraft company."

Joe and all, meet the man:

Aviation Inventor Leroy Grumman He Bucked Convention To Make Better Airplanes - Investors.com


----------



## parsifal (May 24, 2013)

It might be time to come up for air and look at the unit cost of a Spitfire for comparison. 

I have two general references that may be of some interest. In 1939 the estonians ordered 12 Spitfires from Britain at a contract (delivered) cost of 12500 pounds per copy. I dont know what the exchange rate for pounds to dollars was in 1939, but for years it about 2:1. if correct, that makes the delivery cost of a Spit in 1939 as about $25000 per copy 

Another newspaer clipping relating to Churchills 66th Birthday talks about a present from the NEI govt to Britain for 7 Spits at a roll out of the factory price of 5000 pounds. 

The best source i found is at the end of this link

diary

If you add up the cost elements, the price comes to 8850 pounds for a fully functional Spitfire in 1940. Thats about $17698


This raises an interesting and a bit cheeky question......disregarding the cost of the pilot and support elements.....which is more effective.....1 Hellcat, or 1.98 Spits.......Would you lose 2 Spits for every 1 Hellcat given an equal situation.....

For reference, wiki records an Me 109G-6 Unit cost at 42,900 RM
(G-6, Erla-Werke, 1943), which is roughly $21000 (but not comparable to the 1940 costs) 



Ive got no real opinion on this, but was curious about how people felt.


----------



## DonL (May 24, 2013)

Hello Parsifal,

the exchange rate for pounds to dollars was in 1940 from german Wiki: 1 pound was $4,03.
The heavy break-in was September 1949: 1 pound was $2,80. (at once)



> For reference, wiki records an Me 109G-6 Unit cost at 42,900 RM
> (G-6, Erla-Werke, 1943), which is roughly $21000 (but not comparable to the 1940 costs)



This number is without engine, with engine the the BF 109G was between 70000-75000 RM

If we look at the list about fly ready USAF a/c's which was posted in this thread, the numbers are very in common

Bf 109G: $33000-38000 with engine (depends on produktion year)
Spitfire: $ 35000 (?)
P40: $48000 (1943)
P51: $51000 (1944)

To my opinion this numbers make sense, perhaps the Spit is a little cheap, but I think the Spitfire also cost between $35000-40000 depending on the production year. I think the Hellcat costs between $70000-80000 (depending on the production year) with engine and full equiped.

What is the most suspicious at your posted link is the price of the engine.
A DB 601 was at 27000-29000 RM, the DB 605 wasn't much cheaper = ~ $14000
The RR Merlin was only at $8000, also he had the same dry weight as the DB 601 and both engines had the same technical level, with the Merlin 60, I think the Merlin had a higher technical level (from materials and twostage supercharger and boost).

So this number is suspect to me, because the Merlin price was around only 57% of the DB 601 engine.


----------



## parsifal (May 24, 2013)

Yeah didnt really look at the material all that closely, just posted it for interest really. If your numbers are good, it makes the $35000 for a hellcat a bit suspicious looking.


----------



## zjtins (May 24, 2013)

> Or to put it another way. If Germany was out of resources at the end of 1943, where did the resources come from to build all this equipment in 1944?.


Yet another misquote. This would go better it you stop redefining what I said. 
In 43 they we starting to go short on critical materials they were not 'out' till 44. One of the best example I can think of is the move away from further development and use of Mk103 high velocity 30mm cannon to the MK108. The MK108 in addition to stamped housing and such use less chrome and other critical materials needed for high strength steel. The Mk108 being low velocity and low chamber pressure did not need the really good metals. 
Round casings were being made with steel instead of brass in volume in '44, Armor on tanks changed from armor plate to essentially plain steel (at first on specific a tank and locations and later essentially all armor).
Yes Germany stepped up in 43 to a war footing but were using materials they generally had on hand and not actually mining more except coal and iron which they have indigenous. Once Norway and the other northern countries fell they were out of new bauxite and other materials. Somewhere in early 44 they had only what they had on hand.


----------



## DonL (May 24, 2013)

Why?

The $35000 are without equipment and engine.



> The engines, radios and guns were usually furnished by the government AKA "GFE."


----------



## Tante Ju (May 24, 2013)

DonL,

May I ask from where do you take your numbers? They look very detailed.


----------



## DonL (May 24, 2013)

Which numbers do you mean Tante Ju?

Edit:

The numbers of the FW 187: Dietmar Herrmann, der vergessene Hochleistungsjäger
The numbers for the Ju 89: http://www.flugzeug-lorenz.de/index.php?id=114
The numbers of the Bf 109: Posted here and in german Forums.
The numbers of other Junkers a/c: http://www.flugzeugforum.de/content/ and partly wiki or books
The numbers for the USAF a/c's: http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/interesting-usaaf-costs-37213.html


----------



## Glider (May 24, 2013)

zjtins said:


> Yet another misquote. This would go better it you stop redefining what I said.
> In 43 they we starting to go short on critical materials they were not 'out' till 44. One of the best example I can think of is the move away from further development and use of Mk103 high velocity 30mm cannon to the MK108. The MK108 in addition to stamped housing and such use less chrome and other critical materials needed for high strength steel. The Mk108 being low velocity and low chamber pressure did not need the really good metals.
> Round casings were being made with steel instead of brass in volume in '44, Armor on tanks changed from armor plate to essentially plain steel (at first on specific a tank and locations and later essentially all armor).
> Yes Germany stepped up in 43 to a war footing but were using materials they generally had on hand and not actually mining more except coal and iron which they have indigenous. Once Norway and the other northern countries fell they were out of new bauxite and other materials. Somewhere in early 44 they had only what they had on hand.



Clearly Germany wasn't 'out' of resources until late in the war or they wouldn't have produced all that equipment in 1944. They wouldn't have been short in 1943 or they wouldn't have had the material to produce the equipment in 1944.

All nations did everything they could to maximise production and cut whatever corners they could. There are any number of examples from allied nations as well as Axis. There is no doubt that Germany had to get around this probably more than most. The important thing is that they did get around them and significnatly increased their production.

No if you can show how the shortages impacted the number of tanks, guns and aircraft produced then please do. The following are some sources that I can supply.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_aircraft_production_during_World_War_II
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_armored_fighting_vehicle_production_during_World_War_II

Now if you would like to supply yours it would only be fair


----------



## Tante Ju (May 24, 2013)

Yes I was thinking of price and cost numbers DonL, sorry for not making that very clear... thank you for posting them again!


----------



## zjtins (May 24, 2013)

The quality of the tanks went from full armor to plain steel. So a 100% loss of high end armor.
Shell casings went from brass to steel so although I cant find a count, the 8mm rifle and kurze rounds went to steel, the 20mm AA round went to steel and others. This meant fast wear and more 'stuck' rounds due to improper casing expansion contraction and rust. 
ME109 FW190 went to wooden props from Al tail planes and flaps all adding weight to current fighters.
Apparently in early '44 nitrogen plants could not keep up with enough fixed nitrogen for fertilizer and ammo so the crops in 44 were without the help of nitrogen fertilizer as all went to ammo production.
Tanks rounds were almost void of Tungsten which was the better anti tank AP round. 
By mid 44 planes for several of the later jet aircraft (HE163, GO229) were of mainly wood and steel tubing construction due to lack of Aluminum. 
The jet engines never had a good life usually quoted in the 10's of hours, mail due to no good steels due to shortages of additive to the metals.
Most of the propellents were reduce to black powder charges for rockets or and other projectiles. 
They slowed stop building many bomber types just so they could build fighters. from that measure the total aircraft number increase are not nearly as good. 

Yes they built stuff but it was not as good as it was originally intended and in many cases and not as good as it needed to be. All a direct result of the limitations on the German industry due to more war material becoming non existent.


----------



## fastmongrel (May 24, 2013)

zjtins said:


> The quality of the tanks went from full armor to plain steel. So a 100% loss of high end armor.
> Shell casings went from brass to steel so although I cant find a count, the 8mm rifle and kurze rounds went to steel, the 20mm AA round went to steel and others. This meant fast wear and more 'stuck' rounds due to improper casing expansion contraction and rust.
> ME109 FW190 went to wooden props from Al tail planes and flaps all adding weight to current fighters.
> Apparently in early '44 nitrogen plants could not keep up with enough fixed nitrogen for fertilizer and ammo so the crops in 44 were without the help of nitrogen fertilizer as all went to ammo production.
> ...



Were do you begin


----------



## zjtins (May 24, 2013)

With some facts showing Germany how Germany would find the materials they needed when the country is devoid of most of the critical metals.


----------



## altsym (May 24, 2013)

Where are you getting this information?


----------



## Glider (May 24, 2013)

fastmongrel said:


> Were do you begin


No idea, it's the idea that German anti tank guns needed something else to penetrate allied tanks. I always thought they were pretty good at it.


----------



## zjtins (May 24, 2013)

> No idea, it's the idea that German anti tank guns needed something else to penetrate allied tanks. I always thought they were pretty good at it.


I know its an aircraft thread but your own search of this forum website will give you the performance for Tungsten vs APBC or other.


----------



## zjtins (May 24, 2013)

Current German minging from the USGS, note nowhere on here are the materials for high end steel, jets engines, etc. SO where were they going to get those materials? 
Alumina
Aluminum, Primary
Ammonia
Barite
Bentonite
Bromine
Cadmium
Diatomite
Feldspar
Ferrochromium
Graphite
Gypsum
Hydraulic Cement
Indium
Industrial Sand And Gravel (Silica)
Iron Ore
Kaolin
Marketable Potash
Natural Iron Oxide Pigments
Peat
Pig Iron
Quicklime And Hydrated Lime, Including Dead-Burned Dolomite
Raw Steel
Selenium
Soda Ash


----------



## zjtins (May 24, 2013)

Elimination of German resources only 1150 pages have at it
Elimination of German resources for war - United States. Congress, United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Military Affairs - Google Books


----------



## Glider (May 24, 2013)

zjtins said:


> I know its an aircraft thread but your own search of this forum website will give you the performance for Tungsten vs APBC or other.


We are discussing resources and Tungsten wasn't needed for anti tank guns, they did well without it


----------



## Njaco (May 24, 2013)

I dunno......

German Crude Steel Production.
1940 = 21.5 million metric tons
1943 = 30.6 million metric tons

German Aluminium Production
1940 = 265.3 000 metric tons
1943 = 432.0 000 metric tons

German Iron Ore Production
1940 = 29.5 million metric tons
1943 = 56.2 million metric tons

German Coal Production
1940 = 364.8 million metric tons
1943 = 429.0 million metric tons

from "WWII Data Book" by John Ellis pgs 275, 276, 277

It doesn't look as dire as you contend. Looks like production actually increased. Now what are your sources?


----------



## Aozora (May 24, 2013)

zjtins said:


> The quality of the tanks went from full armor to plain steel. So a 100% loss of high end armor.


  :grab: ?????


----------



## VBF-13 (May 24, 2013)

DonL said:


> Why?
> 
> The $35000 are without equipment and engine.
> 
> ...


Hello Don,

Do me a favor, here, slow down. In the sum of just three replies you've managed to cut down what Joe told you to the one sentence you've got referenced, above. I'm not saying you're talking yourself into that $75,000 on the F6Fs. But, let's see. I'm trying to understand what's behind that figure. 

I don't have the Navy/Grumman contract on the F6F in my hip pocket but I might be able to manage to get one with some time and effort. Let's just call it I know people. If I do, of course, this thread is welcome to it. Short of that, this is how I have you on figuring these costs. Let's just keep this simple and compare as against these fly-ready, out-the-door P51s, which we have at $51,000 per machine. You're reasoning a fly-ready F6F couldn't have started at that price and through efficiencies of scale and hard negotiating ended up at $35,000 per machine, unless that was without the engine. Am I right about that? Is that all you've got? Or, is there more?

I'd also like to know what Joe thinks on whether it's conceivable these F6Fs ended up ferry-ready at $35,000. Joe, how about it? I'd take it an expert opinion. That's why it'd be important to know.


----------



## GregP (May 24, 2013)

The only figure I can find for the Hellcat says it cost about $50,000 flyaway, probably late-war but noit so indicated. People who quote price usually take the lower number for some reason.

Also, the costs of many WWII items were sometimes reported minus GFE (government furnished equipment), such as engine, propeller, radios, and AGE (aerospace ground equipment) such as generators to help start a dead-battery aircraft and the like. Many times the government supplied the instruments so they would be standard, including gunsights and any radar / avionics that were used. 

The Hellcat is not complicated and is easy to repair, but uses a complex engine (R-2800). To me, $50K seems very likely for the airframe minus the GFE cost but installed anyway.


----------



## VBF-13 (May 24, 2013)

That was quick. Thanks very much, Greg.


----------



## GregP (May 24, 2013)

You're welcome. Come see the Planes of Fame if you can ...


----------



## VBF-13 (May 25, 2013)

GregP said:


> You're welcome. Come see the Planes of Fame if you can ...


I'd love to. Maybe one day I'll be out there and look you good boys up.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (May 25, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> Hello Don,
> 
> Do me a favor, here, slow down. In the sum of just three replies you've managed to cut down what Joe told you to the one sentence you've got referenced, above. I'm not saying you're talking yourself into that $75,000 on the F6Fs. But, let's see. I'm trying to understand what's behind that figure.
> 
> ...



I think the only way we can find out for sure is to see a contract, Again the $35,000 might have been per unit without GFE. Grumman may have also considered production numbers were they have a reduced profit margin but made up for it with units delivered. They could have also taken a slight loss per unit knowing that the real profits were going to be in after delivery support (spares). I'm speculating here but maybe someone can find info on Grumman's F6F contract with the Navy.


----------



## Ruud (May 26, 2013)

Me personally, i'd take the F6F. I'd much rather get shot at in a F6F than burnt up trying to get out of a Spitfire.


----------



## parsifal (May 26, 2013)

Ruud said:


> Me personally, i'd take the F6F. I'd much rather get shot at in a F6F than burnt up trying to get out of a Spitfire.



I didnt quite get this. Are you suggesting the Spitfire was more of a fire risk than the hellcat. Thats a first for me, if Im reading you correctly. If so, why do you say that?


----------



## altsym (May 26, 2013)

Did the Japanese have an equivalent to the German 2cm 3cm Minengeschoß?


----------



## GregP (May 26, 2013)

The Spitfire was a lot of things ... but able to take punishment like an F6F, no way! The Spitfire is much more delicate than an F6F ... having sat in and worked on both (F6F-3 and Mk IX).

Nothing wrong with the Spit at all but, if I knew I were to be taking fire, I'd choose a Hellcat every time ... if given the choice. Anyone who wouldn't has simply never been inside both airframes. Just personal opinion. The R-2800 is renowned for taking battale damage and still flying home, even with a cylinder shot away. Can't say the same for the Merlin. The structure of the F6F is MUCH more rugged.


----------



## Ruud (May 26, 2013)

F6F is RUGGED. The Spitfire having the fuel tank sitting right in front of you... Every BoB RAF pilot's worst nightmare was being burned up while getting shot down.

Doesn't make one superior to the other. Just makes me want to pick the Hellcat as with my eyesight and reflexes, there is no way i am surviving for long in a dog fight.


----------



## parsifal (May 26, 2013)

well, we have these observatioons to go by, which is more than I can contribute. But what is a more scientific or methodical way to measure "ruggedness". I would suggest one way to approach this issue would be to compare airframe weights.....get rid of the engines, the armour, the fule, the armament.....what do the respective airframes weigh? Another good surrogate measure might be to know the number of fasteners...literally the numbers of nuts, bolts and rivets, used to hold the things together.

The Spit did have a reputation of being lightweight, or fragile, but ive wondered how that might be measured. I think it fair to say as well, that it probably also had a higher and better performance arc to the Hellcat, and probably a heavier punch. Which makes an aircraft more survivable....being able to absorb more punishment, or having the performance to get out of trouble in the first place. A lot of that is a function of the opposition and skills of the pilots flying the aircraft.


----------



## Glider (May 27, 2013)

altsym said:


> Did the Japanese have an equivalent to the German 2cm 3cm Minengeschoß?


I don't think so but am not certain. A number of Ki61's had the germen 20mm cannon


----------



## nuuumannn (May 27, 2013)

> The Spitfire was a lot of things ... but able to take punishment like an F6F, no way! The Spitfire is much more delicate than an F6F



I have to agree with you, Greg, the Hellcat could take a heck of beating by comparison to the Spitfire. Designed as a carrier aircraft this is a given.



> I'd much rather get shot at in a F6F than burnt up trying to get out of a Spitfire.



There's a certain flawed logic to this  although its a bit like the excuse supporters of the Halifax use to compare their favourite to the Lancaster; you were more likely to survive being shot down in a Halifax than in a Lancaster. The response is, of course that you are also more likely to get shot down in a Halifax than in a Lancaster. (not saying that's the case between the Spit and F6F, before anyone misreads the comparison!)


----------



## Aozora (May 27, 2013)

Ruud said:


> The Spitfire having the fuel tank sitting right in front of you... Every BoB RAF pilot's worst nightmare was being burned up while getting shot down.


 
Didn't happen as much as you think because the Spitfire's fuel tanks were reasonably well protected with layers of "linatex", plus a fireproof bulkhead directly behind - however, because there was high octane avgas in close proximity to explosive devices, hot engines or bullets, some pilots did suffer. Unfortunately the Hurricane had a worse record because there was no fireproof bulkhead between the instrument panel and direct-feed fuel tank (the fuel from the wing tanks was pumped into the fuselage tank then to the engine) until late in the battle, after Dowding insisted that something be done, plus the lower cockpit was completely open to the wing root fuel tanks.

Agreed that the F6F was rugged cf the Spitfire, but it had the advantages of a structure made for heavy carrier operations, plus a radial engine and several years of operational experience behind the design. As with the usual myths of the Spitfire being hard to build, it wasn't as delicate as it looked.


----------



## CobberKane (May 28, 2013)

Compared to the Zero or Oscar the Spitfire was a tank. Compared to the Hellcat it was made of tinfoil. Of course, you could argue that the the Spitfire's agility was its armor, but at the end of the day it depends on the opposition. I'd take the Spit in the ETO against the German fighters, and the Hellcat by a mile against the Zeros and Oscars


----------



## GregP (May 28, 2013)

Well said Cobber. No pilot thinks he will be a target for the enemy and fights accordingly, When he is ambushed, the toughness of the plane comes into play. 

If he isn't ambushed, the Spitfire is as strong as required or more so. If he is, it is better than Zero at taking hits, but not by much. The moral is to stay alert and NOT be a target. Most Spits weren't ambushed and were quite good at dodging attacks and shooting the enemy. Sadly, not all.


----------



## zjtins (May 29, 2013)

> German Aluminium Production
> 1940 = 265.3 000 metric tons
> 1943 = 432.0 000 metric tons


That says what they built not what they had left. Once Norway and other non contiguous countries (to Germany) were back in allies hands where Germany get the raw materials come from?
You said nothing of nickel, chrome etc. necessary for high strength steals in armor, guns engines etc.

And tungsten enabled guns to go through more armor. I never read where a tanker said yes I chose to use lesser capable round. Did it make a difference I do not know but it was an indication of reduced resources impacting capability not just production rates.


----------



## altsym (May 29, 2013)

Germany: 28,499,000 metric tons of steel output in 1944. 113,996,000 total production of steel in 1944 ( includes Belgium, Northern France, Meurthe et Moselle, Protectorate (Bohemia-Moravia), Netherlands, Poland).


----------



## Njaco (May 29, 2013)

I'm not arguing that material supplies were in great demand during the last 2 years of the war even though manufacturing of planes, tanks, etc rose to their highest levels during 1944. BUT you seem to HYPOTHESIZE that Germany was totally out of any material since 1943 and what they did make was nothing more than paper machete. Numbers don't impress you, facts don't impress you, books don't impress you and even primary sources don't impress you. I'm sorry if I or just about everyone else here doesn't use Wiki as a source. I just couldn't find production numbers for WWII on Youtube.


----------



## RCAFson (May 29, 2013)

altsym said:


> Germany: 28,499,000 metric tons of steel output in 1944. 113,996,000 total production of steel in 1944 ( includes Belgium, Northern France, Meurthe et Moselle, Protectorate (Bohemia-Moravia), Netherlands, Poland).



No, no, no!!! Complete fantasy. See here for the facts:

Axis History Forum • German Steel Production

and the USSBS European summary for WW2:

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: over-all ... . - Full View | HathiTrust Digital Library | HathiTrust Digital Library


----------



## parsifal (May 29, 2013)

> Once Norway and other non contiguous countries (to Germany) were back in allies hands where Germany get the raw materials come from?



Two basic issues here....norway remained under German control until surrender....it was never retaken. secondly whilst i get what you are trying to say....that Germany suffered from a shortage of raw materials and this got worse as they lost territory, thats not a function of industrial output. its not even a direct function of the strategic air offensive. The advances by the Russians 9mostly) and the allies (to a lesser extent), had more to do with these shortages.

Germany did suffer from a transport problem, as the RAF turned to destroying the rail infrastructure. this was sped up by the allied interdiction campaigns in '43-4. To that extent there is an element of truth to some of what your saying. but I would suggest you are taking a few half truths and twisting them out of proportion to serve your purposes.


----------



## fastmongrel (May 29, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Two basic issues here....norway remained under German control until surrender....it was never retaken. secondly whilst i get what you are trying to say....that Germany suffered from a shortage of raw materials and this got worse as they lost territory, thats not a function of industrial output. its not even a direct function of the strategic air offensive. The advances by the Russians 9mostly) and the allies (to a lesser extent), had more to do with these shortages.
> 
> Germany did suffer from a transport problem, as the RAF turned to destroying the rail infrastructure. this was sped up by the allied interdiction campaigns in '43-4. To that extent there is an element of truth to some of what your saying. but I would suggest you are taking a few half truths and twisting them out of proportion to serve your purposes.



I shouldnt worry parsifal zjtins has been put out of our misery by FlyboyJ


----------



## parsifal (May 29, 2013)

oh well, I knew that was coming.....


----------



## parsifal (May 30, 2013)

not that great. I asked this question some time back. It had a theoretical range advantage of several hundred miles, but in reality I can find no instances of it ever being used operationally at ranges greater than 230-260 miles. The Seafire III at the end of the war was undertaking offensive operations out to the 180 mile mark, so the effective range difference is about 80 miles. Thats significant, but its not war winning.


----------



## nincomp (May 30, 2013)

I am beginning to wonder if this is a thread that will never die.
Have you ever driven by a traffic accident and told yourself "I will not look. I will not gawk." A few moments later you find yourself staring and saying to yourself "Ugh... I shouldn't have looked." That is how this thread is for me. I swear that I won't take a peek ... but here I am... again.


----------



## Arnold Katz (May 30, 2013)

There is no real choice. It's the F6F hands down. For power, range and maintenance, especially Hellcats R2800 engine beats 
Spitfires in line, especially on maintenance issues.


----------



## fastmongrel (May 30, 2013)

Arnold Katz said:


> especially on maintenance issues.



What maintenance issues.


----------



## drgondog (May 30, 2013)

Arnold Katz said:


> There is no real choice. It's the F6F hands down. For power, range and maintenance, especially Hellcats R2800 engine beats
> Spitfires in line, especially on maintenance issues.



How about firepower, speed, maneuverability, climb, dive, ceiling?


----------



## VBF-13 (May 30, 2013)

drgondog said:


> How about firepower, speed, maneuverability, climb, dive, ceiling?


Why don't we evaluate it this way? What did the Spitfire have over the Zero in terms of combat effectiveness? We'll throw out Australia, as the Spitfire was stretched, there. Load them up and put them against one another. I'm seeing you describing a Zero, here, too, for the most part, and I see these machines as a wash, basically. And look at what the Big Cat did to the Zero.


----------



## parsifal (May 30, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> Why don't we evaluate it this way? What did the Spitfire have over the Zero in terms of combat effectiveness?
> 
> Seafires were considered by the BPF, who fielded all three of the major Allied Carrier Fighters (Hellcat, Corsair and Seafire III) to be the best defensive fighter in their inventory. They were credited with from memory 55 kills during the okinawa campaign, had the lowest rate of deck landing accidents and loss rates of all those three
> 
> ...


----------



## VBF-13 (May 30, 2013)

parsifal said:


> And who ground the JAAF and IJN pilots into the dust....not the Hellcats. They came in after the hard work had been done basically.


Yeah, I recall somebody having tried to establish that proposition, earlier, in this thread. FWIW, the Mustangs stepped in at much the same spot in the ETO. Didn't they?


----------



## RCAFson (May 30, 2013)

Here's an interesting article on the Seafire. It states that by wars end it achieved a lower loss rate than F4Us flying the same missions:

http://donaldnijboer.com/pdfs/kamakazikiller.pdf

The use of the 90 gal DTs really made the difference as the fighter then had much more endurance and did not have to land so frequently to refuel thus reducing the accident rate.


----------



## drgondog (May 30, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> Yeah, I recall somebody having tried to establish that proposition, earlier, in this thread. FWIW, the Mustangs stepped in at much the same spot in the ETO. Didn't they?



No, they didn't.. what they did do, however is go after German fighters that pulled out of range of P-47s and Spits.

If you were a modest student of airpower in ETO you might have known that neither the P-47 nor Spitfire were able to prevent the LW from stopping
deep strategic bombing by the US - dead in its tracks between the August 6, 1943 and October 14, 1943 Schweinfurt attacks. The P-47 was powerless to stop the LW Fighter arm and the P-38 was ineffective.

There was a reason that the 8th AF lost more KIA than the Marines in WWII. IIRC, between the RAF and USAAF, their losses KIA exceeded the combined US/Commonwealth KIA in PTO. After Midway, the IJN was a shell of its former self and it was the F4F that carved the heart out of that pilot pool. Try to recall instances of combat in the PTO in which the USN (or USAAF or RAAF or RNZAF) lost 30 or more shot down in air combat in a day in the PTO after Midway?

The PTO simply didn't meet the intensity test of the Battle of Germany.


----------



## altsym (May 30, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> No, no, no!!! Complete fantasy. See here for the facts:
> 
> Axis History Forum • German Steel Production
> 
> ...


Its the same numbers lol.


----------



## RCAFson (May 30, 2013)

altsym said:


> Its the same numbers lol.



you stated German steel production as:



> Germany: 28,499,000 metric tons of steel output in 1944. 113,996,000 total production of steel in 1944 ( includes Belgium, Northern France, Meurthe et Moselle, Protectorate (Bohemia-Moravia), Netherlands, Poland).



The total for German occupied Europe in 1944 was ~28.5 million metric tons, not ~114 million metric tons.


----------



## parsifal (May 30, 2013)

Seafires over the years have come in for a lot of criticism about their deck handling characterisitics. Some of it is justified. The performance of the Seafires IIs during torch and later off Sicily were abysmal. What isnt made apparent is the massive improvement that was made on that poor record in 1945. Neither are the reasons for the failures well understood, or how they were overcome. Seafires went from just about the worst aircraft on the deck (from an operators POV) to one of the best. There were good reasons why they remained in service until 1953....they got good at working in the FAA. 

The main problems in 1943 were

1) Weak landing gear...a clear aircraft problem....this led to aircraft not being able to use full power on take off, and this in turn caused an even higher attrition rate. There were also some complaints about poor fields of vision whilst taking off or landing....I think a function of the low deep cockpit and the long nose of the Seafire. Later the Griffon engined types had problems with the rotation of the props, and the undercarriage issues crept back in because the old LIII undercariage was re-sued on an aircraft with 600 additional HP. 
2)Still air conditions in the med that meant it was difficult for aircraft to get enough lift under the wings, especially with small, slow carriers operating at generally below 15 knots. 
3)As alluded to above the carriers being used in 1943 were generally not fleet carriers. they wre generally Escort cariers, operating under less than ideal conditions.
4)Aircrews completely unfamiliar and inexpereienced on the type

by 1945, many of these problems had been eliminated or reduced. the Seafire III had somewhat strengthend landing gear (though this did remain a problem), the type was finally operating from faster, larger fleet carriers which meant beter operating conditions (more air under the wings), crews that finally knew the type and what its limits were. Losses were still heavy to non-operational causes, but far more tolerable than 2 years previous. It took aboutn a month to chew through the supply of Seafire4s, whereas during Torch, they had just about ran out of planes after only two days or so.

But then, what was the record of the Hellcat or the F4U when operating from escort carriers? With poorly trained crews? in conditions less than ideal for carrier operations (which are different to land based types)??


----------



## altsym (May 30, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> you stated German steel production as:
> 
> 
> 
> The total for German occupied Europe in 1944 was ~28.5 million metric tons, not ~114 million metric tons.


Yeah 28.5 million m-tons. The 114 m-tons I used because the quarter report only went to 4.44, I averaged it for the whole year, hence 114 m-tons. 
Anyways my point was for *zjtins* as he/she said that Germany had run out of raw materials by 1943, clearly, he/she was in error.


----------



## GregP (May 31, 2013)

If you check the US Navy records, the Hellcats shot down 5,163 enemy aircraft in 66,530 action sorties, most all in the PTO. The F4U Corsair shot down 2,140 in 64,051 action sorties, also mostly in the PTO. The F4F Wildcat shot fown 1,327 in 15,553 action sorties.

Looks like a clear case for the Hellcat as the big winner to me in the PTO.


----------



## parsifal (May 31, 2013)

A lot is made of the impressive loss ratios achied by the F6F during 1943-5 . Ther is no denying that it achieved impressive results, but questions are seldom asked about how where when such losses were achieved.

The Hellcat is credited with the destruction of about 4000 Japanese aircraft whilst losing about 200 or so of their own number. What isnt talked about is that the 4000 they destroyed or were responsible for represent the total losses attributed to the hellcat (the 4000 does not include non-operational Japanese losses...in total they amounted to about 17000 of the total 45000 Japanese aircraft lost during the war), whilst the Hellcat losses dont include total losses whilst on operations. Total losses for Hellcats from all causes within the types operational areas amounted to about 2000 aircraft. On that basis the exchange ratio is anything but the claimed 19:1 exchange rate. More like 2:1. moreover, it is actually impossible to separate losses to air combat to "other" losses sustained. Towards the end, the Japanese were not really worrying about fighting the Hellcats. They were too busy concentrating on getting their Kamikazes through to worry too much about losses .

The following is a bit of a summary taken from the following link on Kamikaze losses during the Okinawa campaign. Its losses to all causes, and about 30% of losses are estimated to be from flak. However the remaining losses have to overwhelmingly be at the hands of Hellcats....there really werent many other types in the operational areas....

Kamikaze Damage to US and British Carriers

Japanese Naval Planes Used from Oct. 1944 to the end of the Okinawa Campaign1 
(including Escorts) 

Sortied 2,314 
Returned 1,086 
Expended 1,228 

Okinawa Campaign Losses2 

During just the Okinawa campaign, the Japanese Army and Navy combined lost 1,900 aircraft in suicide attacks, 2,255 in combat operations, 2,655 in operational accidents and more than 1,000 that were destroyed on the ground. In contrast, the USN lost 565 aircraft and the British Pacific Fleet lost 203 - 32 destroyed by Kamikazes, 30 in the accidental hanger fire on Formidable, 33 in combat, 61 (mostly Seafires) in deck-landing accidents and 47 from other causes. As the British Pacific Fleet started out with 218 operational aircraft, these losses put a severe strain on the replenishment system. 

USN Ships Sunk and Damaged by Kamikazes3 
Sunk Damaged 
Ship Type Qty Ship Type Qty 
CVE 3 (sunk) 
CV 16 (damaged)
DD 13 (sunk)
CVL 3 (damaged)
DE 1 (sunk)
CVE 17 (damaged)
DMS 2 (sunk)
BB 15 (damaged) 
SC 1 ( sunk)
CA 5 (damaged)
AM 1 (sunk)
CL 10 (damaged)
APD 3 (sunk)
DD 87 (damaged)
LST 5 (sunk)
DE 24 (damaged)
ATO 1 (sunk)
SS 1 (damaged)
Auxiliary 1 (sunk)
DM 13 (damaged)
PC/PT 3 (sunk)
DMS 15 (damaged) 
AGP/AGS 3 (sunk) 
AH 1 (sunk)
AK/AKA/AKN 6 (sunk) 
AM 10 (damaged)
AO 2 (sunk)
APA/APD/APH 30 (damaged) 
ARL 2 (sunk)
ATF 1 (sunk)
AV/AVP 4 (sunk)
CM 1 (sunk)
LST 11 (damaged)
PC/PT 3 (sunk)
YDG/YMS 7 (damaged)
Total 288 

Not included in the the totals in this section are Japanese Army planes used as Kamikazes and Escorts. In the US Strategic Bombing Survey report, there is an estimate of 2,550 Kamikaze sorties being flown from all services. This number apparently does not include Escorts. Some 475 of these Kamikazes, or 18.6 percent, were effective in securing hits or damaging near misses. It is not clear if these totals include strikes on British vessels, but I suspect that they do not. 

Aircraft losses in this section from "Bombers versus Battleships" p. 324. 

These totals include ships which were struck on multiple but separate occasions. For instance, USS Ticonderoga and USS Franklin were both hit twice and USS Intrepid suffered a total of five kamikaze hits. Eliminating this multiple counting, the total number of major USN warships struck were 9 aircraft carriers, 2 light carriers, 16 escort carriers and 15 battleships. The great majority of these ships were hit during the Okinawa campaign, with 24 ships being sunk and 198 damaged. 
At the time of surrender, the Japanese had more than 9,000 planes in the home islands available for Kamikaze attack, and more than 5,000 had already been specially fitted for suicide attack to resist the planned invasion. 

However, if we assume that 60% of losses October'44 through to April '45 are from Hellcats, then they shot down about 2400 of their 4000 in that last 12 months of the war, whilst losing 565 to do it. Thats around 5:1 exchange rate, but it also means that the Hellcats were suffering a much higher wastage rate earlier in the war, when we can assume the japanese were more proficient in the air. To destroy about 1600 enemy aircraft in the air, the Hellcats lost about 1200 or so of their own number. Thats an exchange rate much closer to 1:1. I am not saying these losses were in air combat....only 200 were lost to the japanese that way, but the point is that a lot of Hellcats were lost destroying those 4000-9000 Japanese aircraft.


----------



## DonL (May 31, 2013)

GregP said:


> If you check the US Navy records, the Hellcats shot down 5,163 enemy aircraft in 66,530 action sorties, most all in the PTO. The F4U Corsair shot down 2,140 in 64,051 action sorties, also mostly in the PTO. The F4F Wildcat shot fown 1,327 in 15,553 action sorties.
> 
> Looks like a clear case for the Hellcat as the big winner to me in the PTO.



Are this claims, or proven shot downs crosschecked on Japanese lost lists?
Claims imply nil to nothing.


----------



## parsifal (May 31, 2013)

Thats another part of the problem. Its impossible to cross check because many of the records on the japanese have been lost or destroyed. All we have are disjointed records and claims.

its not even possible to conclusively determine the total japanese losses, let alone the causes of those losses. 

All we know is that in the last 18 months of the war, the japanese suffered attrociously one sided losses. It doesnt suit the victors to ask too many in depth questions like "how" or "when" or "why"!!!!


----------



## GregP (May 31, 2013)

Those are official US Navy victory credits.

The 19 : 1 ratio is accurate for air-to-air combat only, which is what is claimed. The total losses on action sorties that resulted in the 5,163 victories were 270 lost to enemy aircraft (the source of the 19 : 1), 453 due to A/A, and 340 due to operational issues on the action sorties, either going to or from the target area. These include running out of fuel, an engine that quits for mechanical reasons, etc. So, the total losses on action sorties were 1,163, and 823 for air-to-air loses plus A/A losses. However, the data for other WWII aircraft are not avilable (as far as I know, unless they are quoting other US Navy aircraft from the reports) in such detail and the ratios quoted by most people for other planes are for losses to enemy aircraft only. If that's what is claimed for one type, seems logical to do an apples-to-apples comparison for all types.

There were other Hellcat losses as well, on non-action sorties, that have nothing whatsoever to do with combat. All types have these losses and they do not figure into combat statistics since they aren't in combat.

So the ratios are: 19 : 1 for air-to-air only, 6.3 : 1 if you include Air-to-air and A/A losses, which almost nobody includes when they make claims for other planes. I don't know anyone who includes operational losses on action sorties that occur away from combat in the kill ratio. The only reason it comes up for the US Navy is because the data are available.

Losses to A/A are not usually counted because the pilot cannot see an antiaircraft shell coming and cannot dodge it if he did. You stand a pretty good chance of being shot at by A/A if you attack a warship ... and much less of chance if you attack many ground targets. An airfield will be defended with A/A, and other military targets as well, but something like a train will only have very few or no guns to shoot back at an aircraft. So the A/A losses are directly depended on the A/A at the target and the skill of the gunners, not really on the aircraft.

I'd say that, to be fair, if you want to count the A/A losses for the US Navy, then how do you get those data for such planes as the Bf 109, Fw 190, Spitfire, Hurricane, etc.? I haven't ever seen these data from British or Axis aircraft, but would surely like to. Anybody know where these data can be found? Or if they even exist? If so, maybe we could get some decent comparisons going.


----------



## DonL (May 31, 2013)

GregP said:


> Those are official US Navy victory credits.
> 
> The 19 : 1 ratio is accurate for air-to-air combat only, which is what is claimed. The total losses on action sorties that resulted in the 5,163 victories were 270 lost to enemy aircraft (the source of the 19 : 1), 453 due to A/A, and 340 due to operational issues on the action sorties, either going to or from the target area. These include running out of fuel, an engine that quits for mechanical reasons, etc. So, the total losses on action sorties were 1,163, and 823 for air-to-air loses plus A/A losses. However, the data for other WWII aircraft are not avilable (as far as I know, unless they are quoting other US Navy aircraft from the reports) in such detail and the ratios quoted by most people for other planes are for losses to enemy aircraft only. If that's what is claimed for one type, seems logical to do an apples-to-apples comparison for all types.
> 
> ...



I have serious doubts, that you can claim "official US Navy victory credits" as accurate.
We have learned in this forum that every national victory credits are exaggerated, if they were crosschecked with the enemy loss lists.

From official German loss lists from Freiburg, which are accurate till the end of 1944, all claims from USAF a/c's (fighter, bomber and fighter bomber) were highly exaggerated. For which reason do you claim, the claimed victories in the PTO are accurate?


----------



## drgondog (May 31, 2013)

DonL - strip out US heavy bomber claims and match up against Caldwell, Prien, etc and US Fighter Command credits against LW loss lists are pretty accurate.

I have researched quite a few of the 1944 battles as well as corresponded with Caldwell, Prien, Muller, etc and began to run across a common thread. Namely, a significant percentage of claims and subsequent credits for US involved German a/c crash landing. When looking at the other side, many crashed a/c were less than 60% damaged and did not enter the 'Loss' column record. 

Unfortunately the destruction of so much LW data prevents an in depth records exam of both operational reports as well as Quartermaster summaries.


----------



## DonL (May 31, 2013)

@ drogondog

I think both the heavy bomber claims and the fighter bomber claims are heavily exaggerated. I'm aware that the claims of the USAF fighter are much more accurate.
The intention of my post was, to show that's not this easy, to claim official national victory lists as accurate.
If we look at the last 3-4 years discusion about official german victory lists and the heavy dispute about this issue in this forum, where are two irreconcilable groups in this forum, I'm very careful in the meantime to claim national victory lists as accurate.


----------



## parsifal (May 31, 2013)

rough rule of thumb for the RAF was that their claims exceeded actual losses inflicted by about 30%. Thats according to Forsyth. However there are many exceptions to that generalization, and especially early in the war, there are some very gross overclaims. 

Also, it seems that the bigger the battle, the biger margin of error crept in, as pilots would claim the same aircraft as their own. 

no-one was immune from this. asa Forsyth states in his book....claims should not be viewed as any sort of relaiable indication of loses, more an indication of air activity.

Its an uncomfortable fact that we all need to get used to.


----------



## altsym (May 31, 2013)

GregP said:


> I'd say that, to be fair, if you want to count the A/A losses for the US Navy, then how do you get those data for such planes as the Bf 109, Fw 190, Spitfire, Hurricane, etc.? I haven't ever seen these data from British or Axis aircraft, but would surely like to. Anybody know where these data can be found? Or if they even exist? If so, maybe we could get some decent comparisons going.



John Manrho and Ron Putz broke down the cause of Luftwaffe losses very accurately during Operation Bodenplatte as follows:

*47 per cent by Allied AAA*
23 per cent by Allied fighters
*5 per cent by German Flak*
5 per cent in accidents
*5 per cent by either Allied AAA or fighters* (assume 2.5% flak, 2.5% fighters) 
3 per cent from technical failures
1 per cent from fuel starvation
11 per cent to unknown causes (could be any combination of the above, unverified so we cannot assume anything)

54.5% do to flak/AAA, 25.5% due to fighters.


----------



## GregP (May 31, 2013)

We only have the data we have. My take on it is that if someone shot an enemy aircraft to the point it had to depart the battle and crash lands, he gets a victory. Some don't agree with that and that's OK. I don't really have any issues with the definitions as long as they are used consistently across the board. Therein lies the rub. Looking at it another way, if we haven't got the data to check and verify everything from WWII by now ... 70+ years later, then we are probably stuck with what data we have.

What we have for at least SOME of the data are the victory credits awarded by a country to their service pilots. In the case of the US Navy, their awards went through the best verification they could have at the time slightly after the war ended and were tabulated in a specific report. I have yet to see the USAAF data tabulated in a mnanner similar to the Navy, and have not seen any other data tabulated that way in a single report. The only source I have found for data broken out by types in a manner allowing some decent analysis is the Navy data from OPNAV-P-23V No. A129 dated 17 June 1946.

As soon as I can find some data that are accumulated in a manner allowing analysis or at least tabulation in a spreadsheet or other computer application, I'd like to do a comparison. Right now, it's tough. 

Some people even want to include non-combat losses in with combat statistics. In the vast majority of cases, fighters and bombers didn't attack alone and it was well known whether a loss was operational on the way to or from a target, was as a result of combat, and whether the loss was due to A/A or to an enemy aircraft. Perhaps not in ALL cases, such as if nobody came back, but for most surely. I'm pretty sure that if our guys knew that, then so did the Japanese, Germans, British, Soviets, etc.

If we can't agree on what data to count across the board, then maybe tabulating it for analysis won't solve anything even we had the data. The real challenge is finding the data, accumulating it, and making a useful tabulation of the results. And then getting people too agree on what they want to count.

I doubt seriously the loss data for most Axis aircraft is available in a fashion that allows us to determine whether or not the loss was on an action sortie, was due to A/A, was non-combat related, etc. But it would be nice to find it and have a good discussion and maybe it does exist.

Meanwhile, I won't argue too had about it in here and certainly won't question primary sources.

The only Japanese ace I have heard talk was Saburo Sakai in the mid-980's in Arizona at the old Doug Champlin Fighter Museum at Falcon Field, Mesa, Arizona. He was there for an American Fighters Aces Association meeting that was open to the public and, afterward was given a ride in Bill Hane's P-51. In his talk, he said the arrival of the Hellcat in numbers signaled the loss of the war to the Japanese pilots since they were being beaten pretty regularly from that point forward. Seemed like a nice fellow and got along well with the US aces in attendance. And I realize his is only one opinion and perhaps not in line with everyone's opinion.

Has anybody else heard talks from other Japanese WWII pilots? If so, what did they say?

Several in here have heard talks by former Luftwaffe wartime pilots. It would be nice to also heard a summary of what was said at the time.


----------



## tyrodtom (May 31, 2013)

When a aircraft gets damaged in a air to air engagement, and is attempting to limp home, then encounters AA, goes down.
Who makes the determination, from the evidence left ? Maybe a live pilot from a relatively soft crash landing, or maybe a dead pilot with just a smoking hole in the ground left of him and his aircraft. And all kinds of varibles in between those two extremes possible too. 
All you'd have left is maybe the after action account of the AA crew, and a after action account from the allied pilot, but with no way maybe of tieing the incidents together.


----------



## altsym (May 31, 2013)

Well I don't dispute the Manrho/Putz figures, as that area of Belgium/France have the heaviest AAA in all of Europe, for it being the V-1 rocket corridor.
I suppose with the Allies, the fighter would get the shared kill. Or they would mark as one damaged (fighter), one kill (AAA battery) for the same plane.
Or it got filed as part of the 11% unknown cause. Regardless, its one of the more accurate 'after the fact' reports I've ever seen. Kudos on the research.


----------



## GregP (May 31, 2013)

Where can I find the Manrho/Putz figures?


----------



## altsym (May 31, 2013)

In their book: Operation Bodenplatte - The Luftwaffe's Last Hope. Chapter 13 'Aftermath', pages 272-302.


----------



## GregP (May 31, 2013)

Thanks altsym!


----------



## drgondog (May 31, 2013)

GregP said:


> What we have for at least SOME of the data are the victory credits awarded by a country to their service pilots. In the case of the US Navy, their awards went through the best verification they could have at the time slightly after the war ended and were tabulated in a specific report.
> 
> *Please tell us the process by which the pilot and his witness either submitted an attested and signed report immediately post action and/or were interviewed by the Squadron Intelligence Officer before forwarding to Review Board? Why wait until after the War if it was anything more than collecting and documenting claims?*
> 
> ...



MACRs probably have far more validity than any USN similar report - simply because many losses were duly noted in a KU or J report for any US aircraft loss found on the Continent through 1944...the Pacific Ocean didn't reveal many clues with respect to losses and the Japanese records are poor to non-existent. The combination is what I used to compile the 355th FG Loss statistics and the rest of the 8th AF (WIP).

Absent such processes as Existed within say 8th AF for both losses and victory credits how do support USN process 'better'?


----------



## GregP (May 31, 2013)

You know drgondog, I wasn't there and do not know the complete details, having been born after the report was created. Maybe you could tell me how it was done. Volunteers at our Museum who flew for the Navy just post-war say it was a well considered report. They were certainly closer to it than I was or am.

One thing is that the report is victory awards by the Navy, not a claims list. One of the things they DID was to cross-check the claims with the after action reports for accuracy. If there are people who doubt the Navy, fine. That's their perrogative and I would not attempt to change their mind. I'll take it at face value and would accept British, German, or Japanese data from official military reports before any civilian revisionist reports. I doubt if any report summarizing a 5+year long war is 100% accurate, but if all the national lists are even 95% accurate, then we could still make some very valid comparisons. I probably would not trust Soviet data simply due to their history of rewriting the facts to fit the new party line. 

As for what is so special, I posted the report number and, unusually so, it is availavle online for download. You probably already have it in your pdf fliles. Most of the USAAF data I have seen listed individually doesn't tell you the vicitim type or the type of the victor for individual data, just the name, rank, unit, date, victories awarded. So the US Navy tables that list action sorties, victories over fighters, bombers, losses on action sorties, losses on non-action sorties, especially by aircraft type are in a form I prefer since the essential data is there.

I have seen the USAAF WWII data in scanned form, but the scanning is terrible, generates WAY too may OCR errors when that is attempted, and I'm not going to type in tens of thousands of records for fun. Maybe if I get REALLY bored. I might work on it with someone, but don't want to tackle that one alone. Likely if I did and even if it were 100% correct, most wouldn't believe it anyway. If they don't buy into official victory lists, why would they think any better of an honest attempt to collect the data for later analysis?

And if you don't credit the OPNAV report, that's fine. You may be right. And you may be ignoring a good source. You certainly have turned up with and shared some data in here before, so maybe you have different totals?


----------



## VBF-13 (May 31, 2013)

drgondog said:


> No, they didn't.. what they did do, however is go after German fighters that pulled out of range of P-47s and Spits.
> 
> If you were a modest student of airpower in ETO you might have known that neither the P-47 nor Spitfire were able to prevent the LW from stopping deep strategic bombing by the US - dead in its tracks between the August 6, 1943 and October 14, 1943 Schweinfurt attacks. The P-47 was powerless to stop the LW Fighter arm and the P-38 was ineffective.
> 
> ...


While there's a lot of truth to that, it's really nonresponsive. Your conclusion, too, in your last sentence, I don't know where you got that from. The bottom-line is, you're not really being full of news, here. It's conceded why we needed this new aircraft. It came in at a time when Germany was hurting for the most part as much as Japan was, and for much the same reasons. There's your issue.


----------



## GregP (May 31, 2013)

The people in the PTO might disagree with the inrensity test part. Wasn't as widespread since Islands are smaller than continents, but intensity-wise, the Japanese put up as much fight as anybody in the world did. Didn't generate the losses of D-Day, but landings on small islands were fought just as hard by smaller forces. I daresay that tropic weather was every bit as hard on troops as winter weather, ruined eqipment, clothes and food much more quickly, and had a much wider variety of bad things borne by mosquitos, snakes, etc. than continental Europe.

Each was a deadly challenge and I'd hate to have to choose which one to go fight in.


----------



## drgondog (May 31, 2013)

GregP said:


> You know drgondog, I wasn't there and do not know the complete details, having been born after the report was created. Maybe you could tell me how it was done. Volunteers at our Museum who flew for the Navy just post-war say it was a well considered report. They were certainly closer to it than I was or am.
> 
> *Greg - you are such a sly devil.. You can say FU in so many clever ways by pointing out that neither you nor I were there.. and then leaning to your always convenient fall back of referencing 'phantoms at the hanger' to support your thesis - rather than point to a well documented source pool of Victory CLAIMS prior to AWARDS.
> 
> ...



So, for the simple minded folk like myself that don't operate on faith rather than fact. Tell us the USN/USMC approach to post action de-briefing and recording and reporting of Claims as the individual squadrons reported, then transformed claims to awarded credits. Show us the representative USN version of Encounter Reports, verification steps in the process, submittal of claims to a higher Review Board and walk us through that award to documentation to Roll up into 1946 Report?

Surely the Encounter Reports and the associated Victory Credit Board notice to the pilot of his credit has a USN/USMC analogue for you to be passionately devoted to 'Truth ".

Does a repository of the original documented claim/witness reports exist? If so, where? if not, why not?


----------



## VBF-13 (May 31, 2013)

drgondog said:


> MACRs probably have far more validity than any USN similar report - simply because many losses were duly noted in a KU or J report for any US aircraft loss found on the Continent through 1944...the Pacific Ocean didn't reveal many clues with respect to losses and the Japanese records are poor to non-existent. The combination is what I used to compile the 355th FG Loss statistics and the rest of the 8th AF (WIP).
> 
> Absent such processes as Existed within say 8th AF for both losses and victory credits how do support USN process 'better'?


This may be of relevance, here. Greg turned us onto this link. Look at the full link to get an appreciation of what really went on in this study. Note, here, as regards this enemy aircraft destroyed in combat, the authors were conscious of the issue of over-claiming, and methodically dealt with it the best they could. That's not to say, give them a medal. It is to say, sure, one has to factor that in, absolutely. 

ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED IN COMBAT
Airborne enemy aircraft claimed destroyed by naval aircraft, in aerial combat only. Planes destroyed by own anti-aircraft fire or in suicide crashes are not included. Enemy aircraft reported as “probably destroyed” are not included. Squadron claims, as made in ACA-1 or other action reports, are the basis for these figures. They thus represent the evaluations only of the squadron intelligence officer, squadron commander, and in some cases the air group commander. However, rarely was there any further evaluation by higher authority of squadron claims with respect to airborne enemy aircraft.

In evaluating pilot claims for ACA-1 reports squadron intelligence officers were instructed to follow the definitions of “destroyed” established for the command or theater. Subsequent to early 1944 this was the standard Army-Navy definition that the plane must be seen to crash, disintegrate in the air, be enveloped in flames, descend on friendly territory, or that its pilot and entire crew be seen to bail out. Prior to this time the definitions varied between commands, but the definitions used in the principal naval theater (SoPac) were at least equally stringent.

The degree to which squadron intelligence officers and commanders succeeded in eliminating duplicating and optimistic pilot claims is not known, but it is believed the amount of overstatement is relatively low. Since 93% of all enemy aircraft claimed destroyed by Naval aircraft were claimed by single-seat fighters and the bulk of the remainder were claimed by two-place dive bombers and by lone search planes, the tremendous duplication of gunners’ claims experienced by air forces operating large formations of heavy bombers with multiple gun positions is largely eliminated. Duplication of claims between fighter planes can be more easily controlled by careful interrogation.

Over-optimism has always been difficult to control. During the early part of the war, before standard definitions were in force, before full-time trained Air Intelligence Officers were available to apply them, and before the need for conservative operational intelligence was fully appreciated, action reports may often have overstated enemy losses. Evidence from the Japanese has tended to indicate that in SOSB of the early actions, and even as late as the Rabaul raids of early 1944, there was such overstatement.

It must be remembered, however, that the bulk of Naval aerial engagements in the Pacific did not involve the mass combat of Europe. Even the large-size engagements seldom involved more than 30 of our planes against 30 of the enemy’s at any one time within visible range of any one point. By far the greatest number of engagements involved only 1 to 8 of our planes, or the same number of the enemy’s. Thus in the main the claims under this heading, off set as they are by the exclusion of planes classified as “probably destroyed”, are believed to be near the truth, with only local exception, and to be as conservative as those of any major airforce.

http://www.history.navy.mil/download/nasc.pdf


----------



## altsym (May 31, 2013)

drgondog,

How fast were claims in the 8th airforce was officially recognized? The reason I ask is because the Luftwaffe had a very stringent approval process for the confirmation of aerial victories.

• One plane, one kill. No shared kills
•	Without a witness, a Luftwaffe fighter pilot had no chance to have his victory claim confirmed. Such a claim, even if filed, would not pass beyond group level.
•	The final destruction or explosion of an enemy aircraft in the air, or bail-out of the pilot, had to be observed either on gun-camera film or by at least one other human witness. The witness could be the German pilot's wingman, squadron mate, or a ground observer of the encounter.
•	There was no possibility, as with some RAF and USAAF pilots, of having a victory credited because the claiming officer was a gentleman and a man of his word. The German rule was simply "no witness – no kill."
•	The German system was impartial, inflexible, and far less error-prone than either the British or American procedures. German fighter pilots had to wait several months, a year, or sometimes even longer for a kill confirmation to reach them from the German High Command.

How close was the American system to the above?


----------



## fastmongrel (May 31, 2013)

altsym said:


> •	The German system was impartial, inflexible, and far less error-prone than either the British or American procedures. German fighter pilots had to wait several months, a year, or sometimes even longer for a kill confirmation to reach them from the German High Command.



Yet this near perfect system still enabled the LW to shoot down every Spitfire RAF possesed, at least twice in 1940 and then shot down every single aircraft the VVS possesed in 1941. 

Personally I couldnt care less what pilot X shot down and whether airforce Y had a better system than airforce Z. These threads monotonously turn into nationalistic pissing contests.


----------



## altsym (May 31, 2013)

IF you don't care.. or can't contribute positively, Then why answer? Perhaps your vain attempt to start a pissing contest. Nothing nationalistic with me. 
It was just a question, so if you know the answer, I'm all ears.


----------



## fastmongrel (May 31, 2013)

altsym said:


> IF you don't care.. or can't contribute positively, Then why answer? Perhaps your vain attempt to start a pissing contest. Nothing nationalistic with me.
> It was just a question, so if you know the answer, I'm all ears.



You made a statement that the German system was impartial, inflexible, and far less error-prone than other systems. I merely pointed out that even this system was error prone and allowed LW pilots to get credits where no plane was shot down. No airforce in any war since 1912 when aircraft were first used in a military role can claim to have a perfect or anywhere close to perfect system of claims and credits. Parsifals idea that on average claims were around 30% higher than genuine victories seems to be on the money in my admittedly limited reading of fighter combat. 

I have never flown in combat and I currently only hold a Micro-Light license but I have been in several situations where adrenaline was pumping and I know that what the brain remembers is not always what happened. This is human nature and is not to be seen as criticism of anyone or any airforce.

I might not have a dog in this fight but as a member of this forum I am allowed to comment as the moderators see fit. If your not happy with my comments press the button at bottom left and feel free to report me.


----------



## drgondog (May 31, 2013)

altsym said:


> drgondog,
> 
> How fast were claims in the 8th airforce was officially recognized? The reason I ask is because the Luftwaffe had a very stringent approval process for the confirmation of aerial victories.
> 
> ...



8th AF VCB Review and decision ~ 6 weeks elapsed time from date of claim.

If you Believe Tony Wood recap of LW Credits, the LW was only 2:1 over claim despite theoretical combat film. When you match up LW Credits for 8th Bombers and Fighters, and match up to ALL USAAF losses including ditching in Channel or North Sea, crashing upon crossing Channel, sanctuary in Sweden and Switzerland it is pretty consistent 2:1. I have researched over 80 significant 8th AF battles and have rarely found LW credits better that 1:2 against actual losses reflected by 8th AF for all causes.


----------



## altsym (May 31, 2013)

Thanks drgondog. I don't believe any claims, unless I can cross check, or some other reputable person with documentation can or did before me. 
I still have questions of 8th AF claims, which don't jive with some JG 11, JG 26, and JG 27 loss reports, but that's for another thread. Thanks again.

@ fastmongrel, I don't need to report anything a trivial as what you posted, the mods here have a hard enough time moderating.


----------



## parsifal (May 31, 2013)

No awards system has withstood close scrutiny. They all, without exception tend to buckle when placed under the microscope. This leads to the inescapable conclusion that the efforts of the fighters, whilst absoolutely essential, did not actually win battles except with onbe or two very notable exceptions (Battle of britain, Defence of the reich being the two i can think of)

Ive no doubt the germans would have a very good and thorough awards and confirmation system. It was still hopelessly innacurate, as many post war studies have shown. It also suffered, at times from higher than normal levels of political interference, and with regards to own losses can be shown to hide losses by keeping write offs on strength long after it was obvious they would never fly again. 

This gets off topic anyway. The point that needs to be taken from all this, is that the lions share of losses for the Japanese were taken long after the Japanese had stopped trying to challenge seriously the US control of the air. Rather like the russians on the eastern front, where air superiority was a "nice to have" but "nonessential" pre-requisite for their style of warfare, the japanaese came to concentrate more than 50% of their air efferts in the last year of the war on strikes against US surface targets, mostly extremely vulnerable (but potentially very dangerous) Kamikaze attacks. Germans did something similar in 1944 over germany, when they decided to concentrate on the bombers.

For the japanese, this tacit surrender of the air battle did not come as a result of the Hellcat. That just put the nail in the coffin. it didnt come as a result of the Wildcat, or any other fighter. these all helped, but the Japanese could have tolerated these losses and still be competitive in the air. What killed it for them was the relentless attacks by the allied bomber forces, that attacked and attacked and just kept coming. They forced the japanese to react when they really needed to pull back rest and recuperate.. That moment was just after Guadacanal and Kokoda. The limit placed on the allied success was their lack of carriers. If they had had a viable carrier force just after guadacanal, it would have been even uglier for the japanese than it was.


----------



## wuzak (May 31, 2013)

GregP said:


> The people in the PTO might disagree with the inrensity test part. Wasn't as widespread since Islands are smaller than continents, but intensity-wise, the Japanese put up as much fight as anybody in the world did. Didn't generate the losses of D-Day, but landings on small islands were fought just as hard by smaller forces. I daresay that tropic weather was every bit as hard on troops as winter weather, ruined eqipment, clothes and food much more quickly, and had a much wider variety of bad things borne by mosquitos, snakes, etc. than continental Europe.
> 
> Each was a deadly challenge and I'd hate to have to choose which one to go fight in.



I believe that the "intensity test" was in reference to the air war, not to the ground war.


----------



## GregP (May 31, 2013)

OK, it's pretty hard to get the concentration of aircraft over the ocean from carriers the same as over Europe since the quantity of planes are limited by carrier capacity or whatever was stationed at an atoll or island.

In that case, Drgondog has a point. Individual fights might have been just as tough, but there were fewer of them at any one time.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jun 1, 2013)

Alright everyone, it is starting to get heated. Calm down and post in a respectful manner. 

Only and final warning...


----------



## Procrastintor (Jun 1, 2013)

Hey, how many times has that Zitjin fellow been banned under different usernames? Seems like a lot...


----------



## GregP (Jun 1, 2013)

Hye Procrastinator, love your artwork! Looks like an "N" model?


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jun 1, 2013)

Procrastintor said:


> Hey, how many times has that Zitjin fellow been banned under different usernames? Seems like a lot...



Why does it seem like a lot? If someone is banned they can't create a new account. The site has features to prevent that.


----------



## fastmongrel (Jun 1, 2013)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Why does it seem like a lot? If someone is banned they can't create a new account. The site has features to prevent that.



Erm respectfully got to 100% disagree with you on that one Adler. I am a computer moron but I could create sock puppets quite easily unfortunately trolls can create sock puppets using various tricks, a quick google brings up plenty of ways the saddoes can do it. Sock puppet creators often use the same tricks paedophiles use to cover there tracks.


----------



## vinnye (Jun 1, 2013)

What the hell is a sock puppet?


----------



## Juha (Jun 1, 2013)

altsym said:


> drgondog,
> 
> How fast were claims in the 8th airforce was officially recognized? The reason I ask is because the Luftwaffe had a very stringent approval process for the confirmation of aerial victories.
> 
> ...



That "One plane, one kill. No shared kills" might have led to some pulling of rank cases when in some other a/fs where shared kills were allowed, the kill might have been simply shared.
IIRC at least Barkhorn was deemed so reliable claimer that later in his caree he didn't necessarily need a witness and he still remained very reliable claimer, maybe with exception the time when he was nearing his 300.
As you know at least some of the LW stars got their medals within days when their claims reached the number of kills needed to certain medal. I have never heard that anyone of them was later informed that"sorry, but the confirmation process didn't accept some of your claims so after all you are not allowed your medal. Give it back, please".


----------



## fastmongrel (Jun 1, 2013)

vinnye said:


> What the hell is a sock puppet?



Someone who sets up multiple accounts with different logins and ip addresses. Often when they have been banned also sometimes done so that they can agree with themselves when they are losing an argument. 

I reckon that a member who was banned recently was a sock puppet who has been banned at least twice in the past on this forum and has been banned multiple times on 2 other forums I lurk on. I wont name him because he is a special ops undercover agent for International Rescue and he might come round one night and kill me with his mighty ninja keyboard skills.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jun 1, 2013)

fastmongrel said:


> Erm respectfully got to 100% disagree with you on that one Adler. I am a computer moron but I could create sock puppets quite easily unfortunately trolls can create sock puppets using various tricks, a quick google brings up plenty of ways the saddoes can do it. Sock puppet creators often use the same tricks paedophiles use to cover there tracks.



Yes it can be done, but there are features in place that catch most of them.


----------



## altsym (Jun 1, 2013)

Juha said:


> That "One plane, one kill. No shared kills" might have led to some pulling of rank cases when in some other a/fs where shared kills were allowed, the kill might have been simply shared.
> IIRC at least Barkhorn was deemed so reliable claimer that later in his caree he didn't necessarily need a witness and he still remained very reliable claimer, maybe with exception the time when he was nearing his 300.
> As you know at least some of the LW stars got their medals within days when their claims reached the number of kills needed to certain medal. I have never heard that anyone of them was later informed that"sorry, but the confirmation process didn't accept some of your claims so after all you are not allowed your medal. Give it back, please".


True yes. I do agree that those rules were not 'set in stone' so to speak. Its like when Marsielle went to go find the Hurricane he shot down. I guess he wanted his tally to expedite the process to make the 100 victory club. Then theres others like Hartmann, who had to wait some time to get there medals. I've also seen photos of kill marks on rudders, where the kill that was suppose to get there awards, had a "?" mark where the victory bar was suppose to be. Indicating its been a long time.


----------



## VBF-13 (Jun 2, 2013)

If the pilot said, "I mean it, I mean it, I mean it, I mean it," only then would I trust it. Oh, if it's in Wikipedia, too.


----------



## nincomp (Jun 2, 2013)

fastmongrel said:


> I wont name him because he is a special ops undercover agent for International Rescue and he might come round one night and kill me with his mighty ninja keyboard skills.



Hey, wait a minute! That bum must have stolen my resume! I hate it when that happens.
Just so you all can sleep soundly at night, I promise to reduce the danger from my mighty ninja keyboard skills by typing with one hand only. 
Oh, please let me know if anyone still gets keyboard-related injuries. If so, I will type with only one finger.
You are welcome.


----------



## altsym (Jun 2, 2013)

nincomp said:


> Hey, wait a minute! That bum must have stolen my resume! I hate it when that happens.


----------



## Njaco (Jun 2, 2013)

Even under new identities, banned members usually rear their ugly heads because most of the time they never correct the reason they were banned in the first place. 

Attitude and poor netiquette.


----------



## VBF-13 (Jun 2, 2013)

Yeah, the Gestapo will catch them. 

Just teasing. You're doing a fine job. Stay in there and pitch.


----------



## renegate326 (Nov 17, 2013)

Hellcat won the war in the Pacific and Spitfire has managed to survive in a battle took place in its own turf. 
In terms of impact definitely the Hellcat is the greater legend .

Reactions: Dislike Dislike:
3 | Like List reactions


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 17, 2013)

renegate326 said:


> Hellcat won the war in the Pacific and Spitfire has managed to survive in a battle took place in its own turf.
> In terms of impact definitely the Hellcat is the greater legend .



A bit biased are you not. Seems to me you just have a problem with anything that comes from that Island to your north. 

To say that the Spitfire just managed to survive, and that it had less of an impact on the war is pretty ridiculous.


----------



## Njaco (Nov 17, 2013)

I'm getting the popcorn...................

Reactions: Bacon Bacon:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## tomo pauk (Nov 17, 2013)

... and bacon

Reactions: Bacon Bacon:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## renegate326 (Nov 17, 2013)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> A bit biased are you not. Seems to me you just have a problem with anything that comes from that Island to your north.
> 
> To say that the Spitfire just managed to survive, and that it had less of an impact on the war is pretty ridiculous.



Less impact than Hellcat and I'm certainly not alone on this. I don't have the exact figures but Hellcat must have destroyed more enemy aircraft than Spitfire. As I said, Hellcat won a huge war in the Pacific more decisively than the Spitfire won a battle and that is the difference. I don't think this is a biased opinion.

Reactions: Bacon Bacon:
1 | Dislike Dislike:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 17, 2013)

renegate326 said:


> Less impact than Hellcat and I'm certainly not alone on this. I don't have the exact figures but Hellcat must have destroyed more enemy aircraft than Spitfire. As I said, Hellcat won a huge war in the Pacific more decisively than the Spitfire won a battle and that is the difference. I don't think this is a biased opinion.



To use a term you seem so eager to use...

Apples and Oranges

The Spitfire had a major impact on the European Theater of operations. Much more than the Hellcat did in Europe. It managed more than just surviving in the BoB. Without the Hurricane and Spitfire, the RAF might have been destroyed by the Luftwaffe. No England in the war, no place for the allies to stage their invasion from to rescue your country. 

Sure the Hellcat had more of an impact in the PTO, but the Spitfire had more in the ETO. So again, apples and oranges. At least in the regards that you are trying to compare them.

Think about it a bit...

And while your at it, try not disrespect your friends to the north so much.

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## DonL (Nov 17, 2013)

You can also say the Spitfire won the war in the desert!

Without the Spitfire, the Bf 109 had clearly the upperhand on the Hurricane and P40, this changed after the arriving of the Spitfire in numbers.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## wuzak (Nov 17, 2013)

Daer I suggest that the Spitfire was there when the war was to be won - but the Hellcat wasn't?

That is to say, by the time the Hellcat showed up the tide of war in the Pacific had already turned against the Japanese.


----------



## tomo pauk (Nov 17, 2013)

The war in the Pacific was, on the Allies side, won by efforts of the men in P-38/39/40, F4F, Hurricane, SBD2, Catalinas, just to name a few. Once the F6F arrived in numbers (late 1943), the IJN's mighty spear was nothing more than a stick, and F6F indeed helped great deal to shatter stick to pieces. Not to take away anything from F6F.
Spitfire did it's task in around Europe, far earlier than F6F did it's in Pacific.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Juha (Nov 17, 2013)

DonL said:


> You can also say the Spitfire won the war in the desert!
> 
> Without the Spitfire, the Bf 109 had clearly the upperhand on the Hurricane and P40, this changed after the arriving of the Spitfire in numbers.



Agree and if we believe König, especially the arrival of mk IX changed the game for 109 pilots.


----------



## silence (Nov 17, 2013)

renegate326 said:


> Hellcat won the war in the Pacific and Spitfire has managed to survive in a battle took place in its own turf.
> In terms of impact definitely the Hellcat is the greater legend .



My eyes bleed....


----------



## fastmongrel (Nov 17, 2013)

renegate326 said:


> Less impact than Hellcat and I'm certainly not alone on this. I don't have the exact figures but Hellcat must have destroyed more enemy aircraft than Spitfire. As I said, Hellcat won a huge war in the Pacific more decisively than the Spitfire won a battle and that is the difference. I don't think this is a biased opinion.



The Bf109 shot down more aircraft than the Hellcat and Spit combined. Therefore it was a better aircraft and won the war single handed. Oops no it didnt impact is not measured by statistics. No Hellcat and US Corsairs, Wildcats and P38s still stomp on Japan. No Spitfire (backed up by the essential Hurricane) and Germany might get to stomp on Britain, if not full defeat then Britain gets to be a vassal state and signs her life away. No Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier, no Fortress Brittania, no invasion of Europe and a new Dark Age spreads over Europe it might be under a Swastika or it might be under a Red Star who knows. Whichever flag Europe is doomed.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 17, 2013)

fastmongrel said:


> The Bf109 shot down more aircraft than the Hellcat and Spit combined. Therefore it was a better aircraft and won the war single handed. Oops no it didnt impact is not measured by statistics. No Hellcat and US Corsairs, Wildcats and P38s still stomp on Japan. No Spitfire (backed up by the essential Hurricane) and Germany might get to stomp on Britain, if not full defeat then Britain gets to be a vassal state and signs her life away. No Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier, no Fortress Brittania, no invasion of Europe and a new Dark Age spreads over Europe it might be under a Swastika or it might be under a Red Star who knows. Whichever flag Europe is doomed.



And in that case, France is either speaking German or Russian today...

Reactions: Like Like:
5 | Like List reactions


----------



## nuuumannn (Nov 17, 2013)

> And in that case, France is either speaking German or Russian today!



Prost!/Nastarovnye!


----------



## Airframes (Nov 17, 2013)

renegate326 said:


> Hellcat won the war in the Pacific and Spitfire has managed to survive in a battle took place in its own turf.
> In terms of impact definitely the Hellcat is the greater legend .



Please stop spouting b*ll*cks and accept the facts recorded here by more than one member. Some of your claims are ridiculous and, I suspect, deliberately aimed at provoking argument. Either that, or you really do live in a parallell universe !


----------



## silence (Nov 17, 2013)

if his universe is parallel to ours then at least they don't intersect.

Reactions: Bacon Bacon:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## CobberKane (Nov 17, 2013)

I think it would be fair say the Spitfire GAVE more to the UK than the Hellcat did to the US. The Hellcat provided a fighter that greatly contributed to American dominance in the second half of the Pacific war, but at the time of it's deployment it was the best of two good options. Had it not existed the job could have been done by the F4U (I'm sure the carrier issues would have been sorted much more quickly if it were the only game in town.) The FM-1 was also a decent fighter in its circumstances. On the other hand, the Spitfire gave the Brits a design available at the outset of war which was a top rank fighter from the get go, and continued to be so right through to the final curtain. It was expected that the Spitfire would become obselete as the war progressed, but every time a potential replacement challenged it (Whirlwind, Typhoon) an upgraded Spit proved better than the new design. That's quite a contribution, and one unmatched by any other allied aircraft.


----------



## CobberKane (Nov 17, 2013)

fastmongrel said:


> Someone who sets up multiple accounts with different logins and ip addresses. Often when they have been banned also sometimes done so that they can agree with themselves when they are losing an argument.
> 
> I reckon that a member who was banned recently was a sock puppet who has been banned at least twice in the past on this forum and has been banned multiple times on 2 other forums I lurk on. I wont name him because he is a special ops undercover agent for International Rescue and he might come round one night and kill me with his mighty ninja keyboard skills.



Furthermore, I wish to refute the vile rumours that I, Cobberkane, am actually Fastmongrel's sock puppet. When I say he is the most erudite, knowlegable and - let's get it out there - well hung individual on this forum my opinion is utterly legitimate.


----------



## tyrodtom (Nov 17, 2013)

CobberKane said:


> Furthermore, I wish to refute the vile rumours that I, Cobberkane, am actually Fastmongrel's sock puppet. When I say he is the most erudite, knowlegable and - let's get it out there - well hung individual on this forum my opinion is utterly legitimate.



That's more than we really wanted to know.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 17, 2013)

Please keep it civil.


----------



## Matt308 (Nov 17, 2013)

Now we are debasing ourselves to compare WWII airplane performance statistics with our genitalia size. Funny. But not appropriate. Because if that logic were true, perhaps South Africa might have won the bloody war.


----------



## parsifal (Nov 17, 2013)

renegate326 said:


> Less impact than Hellcat and I'm certainly not alone on this. I don't have the exact figures but Hellcat must have destroyed more enemy aircraft than Spitfire. As I said, Hellcat won a huge war in the Pacific more decisively than the Spitfire won a battle and that is the difference. I don't think this is a biased opinion.



Nope. wrong again. The USN has official claims against the IJN and IJA. There were in total, 45000 a/c lost by the IJA/IJN. Nearly 20000 of these were lost to non-operational causes, training accidents, transit flights and the like. That leaves around 25000 lost to combat causes. The USN claims in total 19000 victories, which includes its AA victories, about 4500 a/c. Carrier based fighters claim about 7000 a/c, with the lions share being to Hellcats. These are claimed losses, which is really more a measure of air activity than actual losses. Freeman has estimated that the difference between claims and actual losses were about 2/3....that is, for that 7000 claimed, it might be 5000 actual. but lets apply claims for both side and see where we go


For the battle of Britain, the claimed losses for the LW were well over 3000 alone July to October. Actual losses were less, but we are dealing in claims for both, simply because i couldnt be bothered dealing with you with anything other than a cursory manner. 

Between January and December 1941, the LW lost another 5000 aircraft to the RAF in all TOs. Thers 8000 lost to the RAF alone. British bombers, like everyone might be responsible for 10%, AA losses about 400 in 1940, and about 650 or so in 1945....say 1000 to be easy. Bombers and AA account for about 2000 in that period. That leaves Hurricanes and Spits and a few other odds and ends. Spits accounted for about 70% of the fighter command claims in 1941, and about 40% in 1940. A good guesstimate therefore might be 50/50 between Spits and Hurricanes for that time period. if i read Freeman I will get a better figure, but your not really interested in the truth, are you...

by that roiugh estimate Spits in 16 months were responsible for about 4500 German aircaft losses. In the first 16 months of the hellcats service it was responsible for the loss of about 2000 japanese aircraft (to the end of 1944).

So no, the hellcat did not do more to win the war, in terms of raw numbers at least as the Spitfire.


----------



## CobberKane (Nov 17, 2013)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Please keep it civil.



Sorry, no offence intended


----------



## silence (Nov 17, 2013)

tyrodtom said:


> That's more than we really wanted to know.



Oh, God, my eyes are bleeding again...


----------



## cimmex (Nov 18, 2013)

parsifal said:


> by that roiugh estimate Spits in 16 months were responsible for about 4500 German aircaft losses.


Where and when? Germany never had a strengths of 4500 combat aircrafts at all.
cimmex


----------



## fastmongrel (Nov 18, 2013)

cimmex said:


> Where and when? Germany never had a strengths of 4500 combat aircrafts at all.
> cimmex



I think Parsifal is only talking of claims not actual losses.


----------



## fastmongrel (Nov 18, 2013)

CobberKane said:


> Furthermore, I wish to refute the vile rumours that I, Cobberkane, am actually Fastmongrel's sock puppet. When I say he is the most erudite, knowlegable and - let's get it out there - well hung individual on this forum my opinion is utterly legitimate.



(Channeling Jane Austen) Why thank you sir you are too kind but pray do not talk of such things or people will gossip at the next County Ball and a lady has only her reputation.


----------



## cimmex (Nov 18, 2013)

fastmongrel said:


> I think Parsifal is only talking of claims not actual losses.


You can only claim aircrafts which were there…I wonder what his intention is...

cimmex


----------



## fastmongrel (Nov 18, 2013)

cimmex said:


> You can only claim aircrafts which were there…I wonder what his intention is...
> 
> cimmex



I dont know his intentions but claims by their very nature dont mean the aircraft existed. RAF pilots claimed to have shot down He113 fighters.


----------



## parsifal (Nov 18, 2013)

According to Murray (Luftwaffe Attrition) the Luftwaffe had lost 20000 A/c to all causes between 1939 and the end of 1941. About 70% of those were lost to combat causes, and a lot less than 50% of the 1941 totals were suffered on the eastern Front. According to Caldwell, in 1943, about 14% of Luftwaffe combat losses were suffereed on the Eastern Front. Even if it was double that in 1941 (which in itself is unlikely, given the poor showing of the VVS in 1941), at least 70% of LW losses were suffered on either the western or southern fronts. 

The quarterly strength returns for the LW from 1939 through to the end of 1941 were as follows (Operational Serviceable Source Ellis, which in turn is based on the LW Quartermeisters strength returns):

1939 (at outbreak): 3468
12/39: 3800
3/40: 4158
6/40: 3684
9/40: 3015
12/40: 3465
3/41: 4296
6/41: 4264
9/41: 4461
12/41: 3552

Some mention needs to be made of german ready reserves. According to Murray, Germany entered the war with about 6 weeks of ready reserve aircraft, which are not included in the above figures. These are generally not included in the LW strength returns, but neither are they well reported in other sources....they are often just wild guesses) Germany in the opening months had mostly obsolete or worn out types in their reserve parks, so a disproportionate amount of production was used to bring these reserve formations up to a modern park. by the battle of france the Germans had managed to pretty much normalise their reserve parks in terms of having up to date types in their stores. The BOF and the BoB more or less reduced those reserves to zero, though I am not relying on those "hidden losses" to show the extent of LW losses.

It certainly is true that the LW more or less maintained its frontline strength in this period. However, what is not shown here are the new arrivals accepted by the LW from new production 

There is a considerable difference in the source material available as to the numbers of new aircraft received by the LW 1939-41. If we assume that the whole of 1939 production, including that received 9/39 to 12/39 was taken up normalising the LW reserve parks and establishing the initial strength returns for the LW, we get the following production figures

Murray:

1940: 10826
1941: 12401

The LW entered the war and emerged at the end of 1941 with basically the same number of a/c on strength. That means that the entire production of 1940-41 were taken up restoring reserves, or replacing losses. remember though, i have not included the 1939 figures to try and offset the skewed reserve situation the germans were facing in 1939. 

On the basis of Murray's figures, the LW managed to achieve a wastage rate of about 22000 aircraft 1940-41

According to the HMSO statisical index, the LW accepted the following new returns 1940-41. The HMSO records are different because they include aircraft of foreign manufacture trainers and gliders.

1940: 11257
1941: 14540

Using the HMSO figures, the results are slightly worse for the LW. They produced roughly 25000 a/c in the time period, according to this source.

Whichever way you want to cut it, the LW was suffering heavy losses, even during its relatively pain free period of victories. Some of these aircraft just fell out of the sky, some just wore out. A lot were lost to combat. How many to fighters...dont know, but Foremans day to day accounts, suggest around 70% were being lost to fighter activities. Westermann estimates LW losses to Flak to be a somewhat higher proportion, but both these analysts agree, the LW was taking heavy losses in this period.

I think more than reasonable to claim the Spitfire was responsible for a big share of that.


----------



## cimmex (Nov 18, 2013)

still missing where and when (16 month)happened those 4500 Spitfire claims.
cimmex


----------



## Milosh (Nov 18, 2013)

cimmex said:


> Where and when? Germany never had a strengths of 4500 combat aircrafts at all.
> cimmex



TABLE XII
German Aircraft Strength

May 11, 1940 June 21, 1941
Close Recce 335 440 
Long-Range Recce 322 393 
Single-Engine Fighters 1,356 1,440 
Night Fighters 263 
Twin-Engine Fighters 354 188 
Bombers 1,711 1,511 
Dive Bombers 414 424 
Ground Attack 50 
Coastal 240 223 
TOTAL 4,782 4,882 

Strategy for Defeat: The <i>Luftwaffe</i> 1933-1945

In 1940 German produced some 10,826 a/c of which 7103 were fighters and bombers yet in a year the Luftwaffe only increased it strength by ~100 a/c.


----------



## parsifal (Nov 18, 2013)

You would have to read one of the day by day, blow by blow accounts. The best books i have on this are the series put out by John Foreman. There are others, perhaps even better than his, but if you do read them, you will see his squadron by squadron tallies give about a 60/40 kill ratio, split between the hurricanes and Spits in the RAF. The Middle East is a little more opaque, and i expect a higher percentage of kills will go to Lend Lease and the like, but given the heavy losses suffered by the LW in that time frame, i dont think it at all excessive to claim 4500 kills by Spitfires.


----------



## cimmex (Nov 18, 2013)

I doubt that there are even 4500 German planes within the range of Spitfires.
cimmex


----------



## Milosh (Nov 18, 2013)

For the Luftwaffe, the spring of 1941 offered the last easy campaign. Nevertheless, even before "Barbarossa," aircraft losses were rising ominously. Operations in the Balkans, as well as an increased effort against British cities to disguise the redeployment to the east, pushed the loss rate (all aircraft) from 2.6 percent (written off) in January 1941 to 7.2 percent in April, and to 7.5 percent in May.49 The loss rate for bombers (written off) climbed in the same period from 4.8 percent in January, to 5.5 percent in February, to 8.6 percent in March, to 10.6 percent in April, and to 12 percent in May.

Strategy for Defeat: The <i>Luftwaffe</i> 1933-1945


----------



## cimmex (Nov 18, 2013)

Mylosh, that all may be right but Parsifal is talking about 4500 losses to Spitfires within 16 month and this is what I don’t believe.
cimmex


----------



## DonL (Nov 18, 2013)

The numbers from Parsifal are not correct to my sources.
The building numbers are much less.

Numbers new built 1940:

combat aircrafts: 7730 

Junkers Ju 87 *603*; Messerschmitt Bf 109 *1693*; Junkers Ju 52 *388*; Fieseler Fi 156 *170*; Junkers Ju 88 *2208*;
Heinkel He 111 *756*, Dornier Do 17 *275*; Dornier Do 215 *92*; Dornier Do 217 *20*; Focke-Wulf Fw 200	*36*; 
Henschel Hs 126 *368*; Focke-Wulf Fw 189 *38*; Messerschmitt Bf 110 *1083*

Seaplanes: 269
Trainers: 1870
Gliders: 378

Numbers new built 1941

combat aircrafts: 9636

Junkers Ju 87 *500*; Henschel Hs 129 *7*; Messerschmitt Bf 109 *2764*; Focke-Wulf Fw 190 *228*; Junkers Ju 52 *502*
Fieseler Fi 156 *431*; Junkers Ju 88 *2780*; Heinkel He 111 *950*; Dornier Do 215 *6*; Dornier Do 217 *277*; 
Focke-Wulf Fw 200 *58*; Henschel Hs 126 *5*; Focke-Wulf Fw 189 *250*; Messerschmitt Bf 110 *784*; 
Messerschmitt Me 210 *94*; 

Seaplanes: 183
Trainers: 1121
Gliders: 1461

This numbers include *all* aircrafts, also aircrafts of foreign manufacture, trainers and gliders

I have very serious doubts, that the LW lost 20000 a/c's to all causes at 1940 and 1941, because the numbers didn't fit with the production and strenghts of the LW.

Also I have very serious doubts to parsifals data's because of an other post in an other thread.

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/av...lous-spitfire-claims-38811-2.html#post1068136

Here parsifal claimed that the LW lost *150000 * a/c's to all causes.

From several german sources this is unpossible, because the LW only got from September 1939 -Mai 1945 

combat aircrafts: 98322
Traines, gliders and Seaplane: 15277
New buit: 113609
Aircrats before September 1939: 10000

In summary *123609*
This numbers include *all* aircrafts, also aircrafts of foreign manufacture, trainers and gliders

To several german sources the losses to all causes were between 100500 and 104000, therefrom 92.000 combat aircrafts

If the numbers of 20000 lost LW a/c's to all causes 1940/1941 came from the same sources as the 150000 lost LW a/c's to all causes the whole war, they are simply wrong and totaly exaggerated.
Also the claim of 4000 LW losses to the Spitfire at 1940/41 is to my opinion totaly exaggerated.

My sources:

LuftArchiv.de - Das Archiv der Deutschen Luftwaffe 
then Luftfahrtindustrie, then Produktion III

Groehler („Stärke, Verteilung und Verluste der dtn Luftwaffen im 2.Wk“)
Uziel "Arming the Luftwaffe“

Edit:

Note: several thousands aircrafts were also in repair every year *and they didn't count to the given strenghts, because they were out of service,* also a/c's which were reconstructed.

combat aircrafts:

Numbers of Repair 1940: 2459
Numbers of Repair 1941: 3376

trainers, gliders, seaplanes 

Numbers of Repair 1940: 2964 ( 2900 trainers)
Numbers of Repair 1941: 2768 ( 2651 trainers)


----------



## parsifal (Nov 18, 2013)

cimmex said:


> Mylosh, that all may be right but Parsifal is talking about 4500 losses to Spitfires within 16 month and this is what I don’t believe.
> cimmex



How did the LW manage to lose 22000 aircrafdt in in two years? And to whom? We think it was mostly the allies, and the allies say that the spit was a major element of its inventory. if it wasnt the Spit, and fighters were doing the lions shar of the kiling, which aircraft then? 
The averge life expectancy of a given airframe was about 10 months for the USAAC. German attrition was always a bit higher than that, even though its sortie rate was fairly low in comparison. Why were they losing aircraft at that rate.

You need to read a bit more. I cant produce the minutaue of losses in countless actions on all fronts, but its there if you look for it. As I said, have a look at some of the better daily front wide accounts such as Foreman and you will get the brakdown you are looking for.

Of course, you could always produce evidence of your own to refute the claim, but ive never seen you do anything like that in all our various discussions over the years.


----------



## DonL (Nov 18, 2013)

parsifal said:


> *How did the LW manage to lose 22000 aircrafdt in in two years? *And to whom? We think it was mostly the allies, and the allies say that the spit was a major element of its inventory. if it wasnt the Spit, and fighters were doing the lions shar of the kiling, which aircraft then?
> The averge life expectancy of a given airframe was about 10 months for the USAAC. German attrition was always a bit higher than that, even though its sortie rate was fairly low in comparison. Why were they losing aircraft at that rate.
> 
> You need to read a bit more. I cant produce the minutaue of losses in countless actions on all fronts, but its there if you look for it. As I said, have a look at some of the better daily front wide accounts such as Foreman and you will get the brakdown you are looking for.
> ...



I very seriously doubt this, it doesn't fit the production, repair and given strenghts numbers of the LW, far from it.
To me it is obvious that Murray count the repair and recronstruction numbers as losses, *but you can't loose an a/c two times*.
The repair a/c's were out of service and didn't count to any statistic, till the point they come back.

After my sources the General Quartiermeister disposes 120030 combat aircrafts from 01.09.1939 to May 1945, built 98322, reconstruction 1988, repair 30817, as you can see disposes numbers differs majorly from built numbers.

And I'm convinced that the major mistake of Murray is to count disposes numbers compare to given strenght, instead of real losses of built a/c's.

After this the LW lost 1940/1941 roundabout 12000-15000 a/c's to all causes, more 12000 through the repair numbers.


----------



## parsifal (Nov 18, 2013)

Most of what you are saying i disagree with, but then this is a very old argument. I would just point out that from the outset, my figures were never intended to be completely accurate....not that they are significantly different to yours.

This is the point that i based my statements on. Firstly that the production figures were approximate. Secondly, that the loss numbers were based on claims, not actual numbers. 

The same can be said about the Hellcat numbers. The japanese records indicate a total of between 40-45000 a/c lost with most analyses being toward the lower figure. The Japanese records show that 17000 a/c were lost to attritional causes....noncombat losses. The USAAC claims around 10000 (an approximation, please none of this petty nitpicking), the USN claims 19000 aircraft destroyed, of which about 6000 were attributed to the hellcat. Of course these claimed losses dont add up, as i have said many times, claims are merely an indicator of air activity, not a true record of actual losses. that is a universal truth that applies to all claims tallies. 

So, in your zeal to attack the british records, the reputationof the spitfire, me, and all things british, because they prevented your country from completing its deadly intent, and the claims and loss figures so as to defend your beloved Luftwaffe, just bear in mind the context and preposition of this conversation. the figures are approximate, and they are based on claims. If you are going to be particulalr about the Spitfire and the RAF, how about applying the same level of scrutiny to the hellcat.


----------



## DonL (Nov 18, 2013)

What is this for an argumentation?

You claimed in an other thread the LW lost the whole war 150000 a/c's to all causes (also that the RAF destroyed 60000 LW a/c's), I have presented in my post 645, numbers of german built aircrafts in summary 123609 a/c's the whole war from different sources. Also you can look here, which post confirmed my numbers.

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/technical/aircraft-production-1939-45-a-4218.html

In this thread you claimed a loss of roundabout 22000 a/c's to all causes of the LW at 1940/41, also here I presented numbers of built a/c's and repair numbers and I have related your datas from this thread to the 150000 claim, because I think they are from the same sources.

But this source is wrong, because the LW couldn't have lost 150000 a/c's to all causes, if only 123600 were ever built and roundabout 20000-25000 a/c's were found by the allieds. 
And it is a very big difference if 150000 a/c's were lost or only roundabout 100000 a/c's. 50000 a/c's are a very big difference.

German statistic isn't this easy with built numbers, repair numbers and disposal numbers, because an a/c could be deposed several times through repair.

This has nothing to do with "my beloved LW" or to attack the spitfire, I have only presented given numbers from different sources and that it is my opinion that your claimed numbers, are heavily exaggerated through different reasons and mainly your sources.


----------



## wuzak (Nov 18, 2013)

DonL said:


> In this thread you claimed a loss of roundabout 22000 a/c's to all causes of the LW at 1940/41, also here I presented numbers of built a/c's and repair numbers and I have related your datas from this thread to to the 150000 claim, because I think they are from the same sources.



I believe he is using numbers of *claims* of aircraft destroyed (ie by fighter pilots), rather than the number of losses recorded by the Luftwaffe.


----------



## DonL (Nov 18, 2013)

> According to Murray (Luftwaffe Attrition) the Luftwaffe had lost 20000 A/c to all causes between 1939 and the end of 1941. About 70% of those were lost to combat causes, and a lot less than 50% of the 1941 totals were suffered on the eastern Front. According to Caldwell, in 1943, about 14% of Luftwaffe combat losses were suffereed on the Eastern Front. Even if it was double that in 1941 (which in itself is unlikely, given the poor showing of the VVS in 1941), at least 70% of LW losses were suffered on either the western or southern fronts.



To my understanding such a post isn't only a claim of pilots or RAF reports more a claim of a fact through a source.
And through my presented numbers I have very serious doubts about this source and claims.


----------



## parsifal (Nov 18, 2013)

wuzak said:


> I believe he is using numbers of *claims* of aircraft destroyed (ie by fighter pilots), rather than the number of losses recorded by the Luftwaffe.



Exactly, because the other sid3e of the ledger is the hellcat claims. You cannot compare apples to oranges. if you want to get to the actual losses its a lot mor work, and you have to claim hellcat actual victories to Spitfire actual victories. 

DonL has an altogether different agenda, and involves me and a long history with him. im not buying into it at all....there are too many black marks on both our names and too many totally trashed threads because of it


----------



## DonL (Nov 18, 2013)

Actually I have posted in this thread several times, that for me the Spitfire is the better a/c then the Hellcat through different reasons.

Mostly the Spitfire was in service from the beginning of the war till the end and was confronted to my opinion with equal enemy aircrafts most of the time and showed great performance the whole war.
I rate all german aircrafts (mainly Bf 109 and FW 190) higher then the Zero or any other japanese airplane. The Hellcat was comming to service, as the japanese were very long over their best performance and the Zero and other japanese a/c's were simply outdated from performance.
The Hellcat was a good aircraft, but to my opinion the Spitfire was better and proved this through it's performance against better enemy a/c's as the japanes a/c's the whole war.

Here I have only responded through your claimed numbers in this thread and also I was irritated of your claimed numbers in the other thread and we had no chance to discuss this issue, because the other thread was closed and it was an opportunity to come back to this issue.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 18, 2013)

I give it 3 more posts before cheap shots are taken...


----------



## silence (Nov 18, 2013)

I'll see your three and raise you one.


----------



## parsifal (Nov 19, 2013)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> I give it 3 more posts before cheap shots are taken...



Nope...because im not bying into this silly argument any further. time to take my hands off the wheel for a while.


----------



## CobberKane (Nov 19, 2013)

parsifal said:


> How did the LW manage to lose 22000 aircrafdt in in two years?



Maybe they had a delivery contract with Australia Post.

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## cimmex (Nov 19, 2013)

Well, it’s dangerous making a statement like
“by that roiugh estimate Spits in 16 months were responsible for about 4500 German aircaft losses” and then trying to back up that claim by throwing in more doubtful overall numbers. IMO this does not help to raise the credibility of a forum.
cimmex


----------



## Njaco (Nov 19, 2013)

> ... but you can't loose an a/c two times.....



Yes, you can. I've read reports where a/c were heavily damaged, even with a dead pilot, and still repaired to fly again.


----------



## Milosh (Nov 19, 2013)

Didn't they find 3 WNr during restoration of the Smithsonian Fw190A-8?


----------



## cimmex (Nov 20, 2013)

I have that book concerning the restoration at Smithsonian too. Indeed the plane was obviously converted from an A-7 to *F-8* standard. *One* old W-Nr was found when all the paint was stripped down but the book gives no hint to any combat damage. BTW the plane was count as new plane in the inventory list…
cimmex


----------



## DonL (Nov 20, 2013)

This is the difference in german statistic between built and despose (here, reconstruction and repair count too), but from my logic, you can only loosse an a/c *one* time. Because also the repaired or reconstructed a/c is the old one built a/c and not an other one.

If one a/c (for example Nr. 1000) was three times heavily damaged and got three times a big indusrty repair, this are not three losses to my logic, it is a loss, when it is not anymore repaired but scraped.

So I disagree with Njaco.


----------



## BiffF15 (Nov 20, 2013)

DonL said:


> This is the difference in german statistic between built and despose (here, reconstruction and repair count too), but from my logic, you can only loosse an a/c *one* time. Because also the repaired or reconstructed a/c is the old one built a/c and not an other one.
> 
> If one a/c (for example Nr. 1000) was three times heavily damaged and got three times a big indusrty repair, this are not three losses to my logic, it is a loss, when it is not anymore repaired but scraped.



DonL,

I'm on the fence regarding how a military accounts for an airplane. If a plane is shot down, say he dead sticks it in, and is subsequently repaired and flown then:

Does the "kill" get rescinded? Does the opposing force count that plane as destroyed and the repaired one as "new"? Does the military that owened the airplane never strike it off or does it?

The reason I ask is I've seen the USAF take two different F-15's, that suffered some event, and "mate" the good sections together to make an aircraft they put back in the inventory. How would you handle that accounting wise?

Cheers,
Biff

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## buffnut453 (Nov 20, 2013)

Kill still counts. Repaired aircraft are considered "new" but typically the measure is available front-line strength rather than a total profit/loss count across a country's aircraft manufacturing and air combat activities.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## DonL (Nov 20, 2013)

BiffF15 said:


> DonL,
> 
> I'm on the fence regarding how a military accounts for an airplane. If a plane is shot down, say he dead sticks it in, and is subsequently repaired and flown then:
> 
> ...



Hi Biff, very interesting questions.

For your F15 example, to me one a/c is lost and one is repaired, which one depends on the manufactor and which indenfication number the new one is flying.

The other question is tricky and I think it is the issue why I started the discussion with parsifal.

If someone claimed an Airforce had over 150000 total losses to all causes, but only 123000 a/c's were built something is wrong. If you count/add the repair and reconstruction numbers, the numbers will nearly match and perhaps are accurate.
But at which time then you specify a loss as a loss? Everytime an a/c will be send back to the industry to got a repair (so it is for tihs time out of service)?

For example, Marseille's 17 killes at one day, are heavily discussed all over the world and many people didn't accept that 17 kills, because 4-5 aircrafts managed to got back heavily or very heavily damaged, some were written off some were reapaired.

A written off a/c is to me a loss, a repared a/c is to me no loss from logic.


----------



## BiffF15 (Nov 21, 2013)

DonL said:


> Hi Biff, very interesting questions.
> 
> For your F15 example, to me one a/c is lost and one is repaired, which one depends on the manufactor and which indenfication number the new one is flying.
> 
> ...



DonL,

I'm in agreement that in the event two aircraft are "created" from one, that the flying example carries the tail number from one of the two. However, in this case (I don't know how the USAF did it's accounting), both aircraft I would think were scratched off the list. Once the parts and pieces were turned into a flying airplane again then the tail number used would have to be "un-written" off.

If an Air Force claims to have destroyed more aircraft than available then I would think something was wrong with the math. However, I could see where parts are pooled and flyable aircraft rise from the ashes. In this case I would think if it was destroyed again, it would count as another airframe from a "post engagement view". An example is two planes get shot up and crash land. Both were witnessed to crash land and are passed as "kills" to the pilots who shot them down. Those two aircraft are then "recycled" into a flyable airframe which subsequently gets shot down again. Do you take away a kill from the previous guys, or not "award" one to the third pilot? I would think all three get kills awarded. One version of accounting. The military whose pilots did the shooting down would account for three aircraft "destroyed", and the military who lost those aircraft would count either two or three losses. I would count it as three losses but that's just my view, and that's based on how not how many I got from the factory, but how many aircraft I lost to combat operations. These are my opine only.

As for Marseille's kill record (17 in a day). If the planes landed then I would think it's not a kill, if they crashlanded (not on the airfield) then I would think it's a kill. I've read that the allied records do not support his 17 in a day claims but have not seen any proof.

Cheers,
Biff


----------



## BiffF15 (Nov 21, 2013)

Hellcat or Spitfire?

If I were flying in the PTO I would choose the Hellcat. If I were flying in Europe, then the Spit.

However, if it were up to me I would probably have been flying a P-51 with the Griffon motor / contra prop configuratin, equipped with both GM-1 and MW-50... in 1942!

Cheers,
Biff


----------



## drgondog (Nov 21, 2013)

As I mentioned earlier, the Mission-primary and Mission-secondary are the determinants.

Air superiority fighter - all altitudes then Spitfire within 200 mile radius, from 200 to 350 - Hellcat
Recon - Spitfire
Fighter Bomber - Hellcat
Fleet bomber escort (10,000 to 15K) - Hellcat only because of range advantage.
Fighter Sweeps within 300 miles - Spit
Dogfighter any altitude - Spit

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## Glider (Nov 21, 2013)

Showing my age here, but I get liking a post and unliking a post, but can someone tell me what Give me bacon is supposed to imply?


----------



## Airframes (Nov 21, 2013)

Ah, that's for_ really _liking a post!

Reactions: Bacon Bacon:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## parsifal (Nov 21, 2013)

buffnut453 said:


> Kill still counts. Repaired aircraft are considered "new" but typically the measure is available front-line strength rather than a total profit/loss count across a country's aircraft manufacturing and air combat activities.



Id never thought of that.....it might account, at least in part, th chronic mismatch in losses and numbers that applies to all nattionalities. My previous posts related clearly to claims and not confirmed kills...I did that because the Hellcats claims are very clearly laid out in the USN post war report on claims (and this has since been very heavily challenged, because it does not reconcile to Japanese records). The same will, i expect, apply to the RAFs claims against the Luftwaffe. The claims will be greater than the actual losses, and, now that you have clarified the issue of multiple kills can occur on the same airframe. 

I should have cottoned onto this earlier. Many times aircraft are "written off" but are salvaged to create a "new aircraft. Sometimes this mighht inolve canibalisation of one damed airframe to ressurrect two other airframes written off.

it explains a lot for me.


----------



## Aozora (Nov 21, 2013)

parsifal said:


> I should have cottoned onto this earlier. Many times aircraft are "written off" but are salvaged to create a "new aircraft. Sometimes this mighht inolve canibalisation of one damed airframe to ressurrect two other airframes written off.
> 
> it explains a lot for me.



Here's an interesting article on the logistics of the RAF during the Battle of Britain; the comments about the civilian repair depots are interesting:

View attachment Logistics of Battle of Britain.pdf


An aircraft which looks like a wreck could be repaired:








And end up looking like this...

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## USS Enterprise CV-6 (Mar 31, 2014)

I can't see where the Spitfire has an advantage
Hellcat=376 mph 
Spitfire=363 mph
Hellcat Night Fighter=2x20mm cannons, 4x.50 caliber machine guns 
Spitfire=2x20mm cannons, 4x.303 Lewis Machine Guns
Weren't the .50 caliber guns better then the .303s?


----------



## Shortround6 (Mar 31, 2014)

Spitfires used Lewis Machine guns?

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## rochie (Mar 31, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> Spitfires used Lewis Machine guns?



Yup co pilot climbed out onto wings to reload them !

Reactions: Bacon Bacon:
1 | Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## USS Enterprise CV-6 (Mar 31, 2014)

bobbysocks said:


> i'd take the spit. i know of a mustang pilot who while coming back from a mission over the channel saw a spit on patrol and decided to play with the guy and bounced him. the spit ended up playing with him instead. he walked away with a little more humility and a lot more respect for that plane.



Yes, and since when does a P-51 have legs?


----------



## USS Enterprise CV-6 (Mar 31, 2014)

GregP said:


> The only figure I can find for the Hellcat says it cost about $50,000 flyaway, probably late-war but noit so indicated. People who quote price usually take the lower number for some reason.
> 
> Also, the costs of many WWII items were sometimes reported minus GFE (government furnished equipment), such as engine, propeller, radios, and AGE (aerospace ground equipment) such as generators to help start a dead-battery aircraft and the like. Many times the government supplied the instruments so they would be standard, including gunsights and any radar / avionics that were used.
> 
> The Hellcat is not complicated and is easy to repair, but uses a complex engine (R-2800). To me, $50K seems very likely for the airframe minus the GFE cost but installed anyway.



I read the Hellcat cost 35k


----------



## USS Enterprise CV-6 (Mar 31, 2014)

I still like the Hellcat better


----------



## USS Enterprise CV-6 (Mar 31, 2014)

rochie said:


> Yup co pilot climbed out onto wings to reload them !



Sorry, I read wrong. It said 4x.303 Browning Machine guns, not Lewis


----------



## USS Enterprise CV-6 (Mar 31, 2014)

I would go for the Hellcat for everywhere. I read the Hellcat had quite a bit more armor then the Spitty


----------



## USS Enterprise CV-6 (Mar 31, 2014)

Glider said:


> Showing my age here, but I get liking a post and unliking a post, but can someone tell me what Give me bacon is supposed to imply?


I was wondering that too.


----------



## Shortround6 (Mar 31, 2014)

USS Enterprise CV-6 said:


> I read the Hellcat cost 35k



Nice trick, In 1943 an R-2800-51 (C-46 engine with two speed/single stage supercharger) could cost $26,400.00 depending on contract. Throw in the prop, machine guns, radios and instruments and Grumman must have been giving the plane away. 

AN F6F may have cost 35k but that would be for _just_ the bare airframe, without government furnished equipment (GFE). GFE included engines, props, radios, some instruments, armament( guns) and some other parts.


----------



## Totalize (Mar 31, 2014)

I seem to recall a statement from the great John Wayne in Flying leathernecks (yes I know its just a movie) something to the effect (I am paraphrasing) that his pilots better take care of their (hellcat) machines as they cost the taxpayer's $500,000 each. If you multiply that by x15 in today's dollars that would make each plane ~$7.5Million each.

As for which I a/c I would take, the operational requirements and environment each operated in were quite different from each other. For Europe the Spit is the better choice hands down but for the pacific I would choose the Hellcat. Actually, I would choose the Corsair but thats not a choice here.


----------



## USS Enterprise CV-6 (Mar 31, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> Nice trick, In 1943 an R-2800-51 (C-46 engine with two speed/single stage supercharger) could cost $26,400.00 depending on contract. Throw in the prop, machine guns, radios and instruments and Grumman must have been giving the plane away.
> 
> AN F6F may have cost 35k but that would be for _just_ the bare airframe, without government furnished equipment (GFE). GFE included engines, props, radios, some instruments, armament( guns) and some other parts.


Well, once again Wikipedia lies


----------



## USS Enterprise CV-6 (Mar 31, 2014)

Totalize said:


> I seem to recall a statement from the great John Wayne in Flying leathernecks (yes I know its just a movie) something to the effect (I am paraphrasing) that his pilots better take care of their (hellcat) machines as they cost the taxpayer's $500,000 each. If you multiply that by x15 in today's dollars that would make each plane ~$7.5Million each.


I am positive the Hellcat even with everything does not cost $500,000 each


----------



## Garyt (Mar 31, 2014)

> Hellcat Night Fighter=2x20mm cannons, 4x.50 caliber machine guns
> Spitfire=2x20mm cannons, 4x.303 Lewis Machine Guns
> Weren't the .50 caliber guns better then the .303s?



You know, what armnament is better is a real tough question that seems to be tough to answer.

What I use as a real, real rough method is 2 .50 cal = 1 20mm, 2 .303 cal = 1 .50 cal

Again, real real rough. Not all 20 mm's are created equal - the earlier Zero's 20mm's were plagued by low velocity and a bit low rate of fire compared to other 20's. Not to mention they did not have ballistic properties close to their other machgine guns. Look at the German 30mm MK108 with the "mine shell" ammor - good rate of fire, low velocity, and a huge explosive load compared to other shells. The low velocity makes perhaps not the best against fighters, but against bombers it would seem to be a great weapon.

But by far most Hellcats carried the 6 50's. The Spit's 20mm Hispano was a pretty good weapon for rate of fire and velocity, so I'd put them close to equal.

A couple other things to consider - cowl mounted guns were marginally more effective than wing mounted ones to to harmonization issues, and there is an advantage of having weapons with the exact same ballistic qualities as well. and we have not even touched on magazine capacity, measured in how many seconds you can fire on target.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## redcoat (Mar 31, 2014)

USS Enterprise CV-6 said:


> I can't see where the Spitfire has an advantage
> Hellcat=376 mph
> Spitfire=363 mph


If you are comparing a Spitfire and the Hellcat, which first became operational in 1943, the earliest Mark of Spitfire you should use is the IX with a top speed of 408 mph which became operational in mid 1942.

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Dislike Dislike:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Mar 31, 2014)

Cannon were the more effective armament. Only the US persisted with machine guns by the end of the war but then they were trying to shoot down fighters, not bombers and the .50calibre machine gun did this perfectly well. The British may have been too by 1944/5 but their move to cannon had occurred earlier. 
Whereas Typhoons and Tempests were cannon armed many later Spitfires used cannon in combination with .50 calibre machine guns, not .303,in the 'E' wing. Mk 21 onward carried 4 x 20mm cannon.

You can debate the relative penetration and efficiency as much as you like, but there is a reason why, post war, cannon superceded machine guns entirely.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## USS Enterprise CV-6 (Mar 31, 2014)

Garyt said:


> You know, what armnament is better is a real tough question that seems to be tough to answer.
> 
> What I use as a real, real rough method is 2 .50 cal = 1 20mm, 2 .303 cal = 1 .50 cal
> 
> ...



Thanks for that! That helps me a lot


----------



## USS Enterprise CV-6 (Mar 31, 2014)

redcoat said:


> If you are comparing a Spitfire and the Hellcat, which first became operational in 1943, the earliest Mark of Spitfire you should use is the IX with a top speed of 408 mph which became operational in mid 1942.



I would still take the Hellcat. In my opinion, the Hellcat is WAAAAAAY prettier and way tougher


----------



## USS Enterprise CV-6 (Mar 31, 2014)

The Hellcat had more scores then the Spitty. That is the bottom line here. Hellcat was more effective, and was a fighter. I read (maybe not reliable, but maybe) that the Spitty was supposed to be an intercepter and had way less range then the Hellcat.

Reactions: Dislike Dislike:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## Garyt (Mar 31, 2014)

> Mk 21 onward carried 4 x 20mm cannon.
> 
> You can debate the relative penetration and efficiency as much as you like, but there is a reason why, post war, cannon superceded machine guns entirely



In principle I fully agree - give me 4x20mm any day vs a .50 cal setup. 

When you look at a 2x20mm mixed with 7.x mm machine guns - it gets a lot closer.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## USS Enterprise CV-6 (Mar 31, 2014)

redcoat said:


> If you are comparing a Spitfire and the Hellcat, which first became operational in 1943, the earliest Mark of Spitfire you should use is the IX with a top speed of 408 mph which became operational in mid 1942.



This is a matter of opionin. What the Hellcat lacks in speed it makes up for in armor. What the Spitfire lacks in armor is makes up for in speed. It would come down to the skill of the pilot. If the pilots were both rookies, with the same level of training but on the different aircraft, it would just come down to luck or which one you like better.

Reactions: Dislike Dislike:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## buffnut453 (Mar 31, 2014)

USS Enterprise CV-6 said:


> The Hellcat had more scores then the Spitty.



Care to provide some evidence for that statement?


----------



## Aozora (Mar 31, 2014)

USS Enterprise CV-6 said:


> The Hellcat had more scores then the Spitty. That is the bottom line here. Hellcat was more effective, and was a fighter. I read (maybe not reliable, but maybe) that the Spitty was supposed to be an intercepter and had way less range then the Hellcat.



No argument the F6F was a high scoring fighter. Then again, the Hellcat did not have to fight against fighters of similar performance in a Battle of Britain, nor did it spend a couple of years flying over France and the Low Countries in a situation where the enemy held a tactical advantage, nor was it used in a theatre where its primary role was that of a low-altitude tactical fighter-bomber. Different scenarios, so hard to compare relative scores so easily.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## fastmongrel (Mar 31, 2014)

USS Enterprise CV-6 said:


> This is a matter of opionin. What the Hellcat lacks in speed it makes up for in armor. What the Spitfire lacks in armor is makes up for in speed.



How much armour did the two aircraft carry.


----------



## redcoat (Mar 31, 2014)

USS Enterprise CV-6 said:


> the Hellcat is WAAAAAAY prettier


I can't make up my mind on whether you are blind, deluded, or merely insane.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Garyt (Mar 31, 2014)

> The Hellcat had more scores then the Spitty. That is the bottom line here.



I find it difficult to give much credit to kills a fighter gets when over 10% of it's kills were from a battle called a "Turkey Shoot" 

OK, maybe not fully 10%, some of those Japanese planes were destroyed by AA fire as well. But close to 10% none the less.

In all seriousness though, these kills came from a target rich enviroment like the Pacific in which the Hellcats usually outnumbered the opposition, had great advantages in pilot training, and logistics advantages as well. IIRC if a Zero had a pilot of decent skill flying it, they were competitive against the Hellcat.

The Harlem Globetrotters have the best record of any professional basketball team for the last 30 years or so - but if you always play the Washington Generals, you SHOULD have the best record in sports.


----------



## Shortround6 (Mar 31, 2014)

In a dogfight with both planes close to base the Hellcat is in trouble. It is slower, can't climb as well, neither one has a real advantage in dive ( one may start quicker but be limited in top dive speed?), but the Spitfire can turn better. Hellcat is running out of options. 

Armor can keep you from becoming dead, it often does NOT allow you to continue the fight with performance unimpaired. A couple of holes almost a foot across from 20mm shells in either fuselage or wing _WILL_ slow you down even if they do no other damage. 

Spitfire pilot has several choices for breaking combat almost at will. The F6F pilot does not.

The F6F is a lot better at a number of other jobs than the Spitfire though.


----------



## Garyt (Mar 31, 2014)

I've just re-thought my position.



> he Hellcat had more scores then the Spitty. That is the bottom line here.



I agree. Now, the ME109 Had more kills than any other fighter, there are a handful of numbers out there but even using conservative numbers it had well over 10,000 kills, including a 25:1 loss ratio for Finnish flown aircraft.

So therefore, based on judging planes by their kills, the ME109 was at least twice as good as any Aliied fighter.

Reactions: Like Like:
3 | Like List reactions


----------



## USS Enterprise CV-6 (Mar 31, 2014)

Aozora said:


> No argument the F6F was a high scoring fighter. Then again, the Hellcat did not have to fight against fighters of similar performance in a Battle of Britain, nor did it spend a couple of years flying over France and the Low Countries in a situation where the enemy held a tactical advantage, nor was it used in a theatre where its primary role was that of a low-altitude tactical fighter-bomber. Different scenarios, so hard to compare relative scores so easily.



You make a good point.


----------



## USS Enterprise CV-6 (Mar 31, 2014)

redcoat said:


> I can't make up my mind on whether you are blind, deluded, or merely insane.



Hey, it is my opinion. You can think the pile of ugliness called the Spitfire is pretty, but the Hellcat is way prettier in my opinion


----------



## USS Enterprise CV-6 (Mar 31, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> In a dogfight with both planes close to base the Hellcat is in trouble. It is slower, can't climb as well, neither one has a real advantage in dive ( one may start quicker but be limited in top dive speed?), but the Spitfire can turn better. Hellcat is running out of options.
> 
> Armor can keep you from becoming dead, it often does NOT allow you to continue the fight with performance unimpaired. A couple of holes almost a foot across from 20mm shells in either fuselage or wing _WILL_ slow you down even if they do no other damage.
> 
> ...


I still think the Hellcat could shred the Spitty, because it can if I think it can


----------



## Jabberwocky (Mar 31, 2014)

On the kill claim numbers:

I've never seen a firm number, but from my own estimates using the Fighter Command War Diaries and other sources, the Spitfire had around 5,800-6,200 claims in the ETO alone. To that you'd have to add PTO, MTO and CBI kills - admittedly a lesser number, but certainly several thousand as Spitfires over Malta claimed ~600 kills in 1942 alone and at least 300 in 1943 over Sicily.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## USS Enterprise CV-6 (Mar 31, 2014)

buffnut453 said:


> Care to provide some evidence for that statement?


Sure. As said by Aozora: No argument the F6F was a high scoring fighter. The Hellcat had 5,223 air-to-air kills. How many air-to-air did your Spitfire have?


----------



## USS Enterprise CV-6 (Mar 31, 2014)

Jabberwocky said:


> On the kill claim numbers:
> 
> I've never seen a firm number, but from my own estimates using the Fighter Command War Diaries and other sources, the Spitfire had around 5,800-6,200 claims in the ETO alone. To that you'd have to add PTO, MTO and CBI kills - admittedly a lesser number, but certainly several thousand as Spitfires over Malta claimed ~600 kills in 1942 alone and at least 300 in 1943 over Sicily.


Do you know how many were air-to-air?


----------



## USS Enterprise CV-6 (Mar 31, 2014)

buffnut453 said:


> Care to provide some evidence for that statement?


Also, Wikipedia says: Hellcats were credited with destroying 5,223 aircraft while in service with the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps and the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm This was more than any other Allied aircraft.


----------



## pbehn (Mar 31, 2014)

in the BoB ...no contest


----------



## bobbysocks (Mar 31, 2014)

USS Enterprise CV-6 said:


> Well, once again Wikipedia lies



and maybe once again??

_Also, Wikipedia says: Hellcats were credited with destroying 5,223 aircraft while in service with the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps and the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm This was more than any other Allied aircraft. _

you are trying to fit one shread of information to qualify something as the best. it doesnt work that way....apples are apples...oranges are not


----------



## redcoat (Mar 31, 2014)

USS Enterprise CV-6 said:


> Sure. As said by Aozora: No argument the F6F was a high scoring fighter. The Hellcat had 5,223 air-to-air kills. How many air-to-air did your Spitfire have?


The figures given for the Spitfire are all air to air, the RAF didn't count ground kills


----------



## Glider (Mar 31, 2014)

Both were excellent aircraft and the number game is in my opinion superfluous. Both shot down considerable numbers of the enemy and there are many factors that could be brought into play none of which would add anything to the debate.

As to the original question _Hellcat vs Spitfire - which would you take?_
My simplistic reply would be - if I was flying from a carrier I would take the Hellcat, if from land the Spitfire. One has a performance advantage the other handling, robustness and range needed for carrier operations.

Reactions: Bacon Bacon:
1 | Like Like:
3 | Like List reactions


----------



## KiwiBiggles (Mar 31, 2014)

I think all we can really take from this conversation is that someone in Oklahoma _really_ likes the Hellcat.

Reactions: Like Like:
3 | Like List reactions


----------



## USS Enterprise CV-6 (Mar 31, 2014)

Glider said:


> Both were excellent aircraft and the number game is in my opinion superfluous. Both shot down considerable numbers of the enemy and there are many factors that could be brought into play none of which would add anything to the debate.
> 
> As to the original question _Hellcat vs Spitfire - which would you take?_
> My simplistic reply would be - if I was flying from a carrier I would take the Hellcat, if from land the Spitfire. One has a performance advantage the other handling, robustness and range needed for carrier operations.


I agree. I would rather take the Hellcat for a CV and Spitty from the land. I mean, I love the Hellcat, but it wasn't as good operating from a ground base as the Spitty.


----------



## USS Enterprise CV-6 (Mar 31, 2014)

KiwiBiggles said:


> I think all we can really take from this conversation is that someone in Oklahoma _really_ likes the Hellcat.



Yes, he does


----------



## USS Enterprise CV-6 (Mar 31, 2014)

I think the Spitty and the Hellcat are pretty equal in skill. Like I would probably take the Hellcat into most missions, and Spitty for taking out bombers and close fighters. If it was from a carrier, I would take the Hellcat just because it is in _my opinion _ way prettier


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Mar 31, 2014)

USS Enterprise CV-6 said:


> *I think the Spitty and the Hellcat are pretty equal in skill*. Like I would probably take the Hellcat into most missions, and Spitty for taking out bombers and close fighters. If it was from a carrier, I would take the Hellcat just because it is in _my opinion _ way prettier



WRONG, especially if you're talking later model Spits. Do your homework!!!

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Dislike Dislike:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## USS Enterprise CV-6 (Mar 31, 2014)

FLYBOYJ said:


> WRONG, especially if you're talking *later model* Spits. Do your homework!!!



Hey, there was 2 versions of the Hellcat: F6F-3 and F6F-5 (not including the night fighter version). There was a lot (don't know exactly, but you do) of Spits. It would come down to the skill of the pilot and the determination. A TBF Avenger could take out a B-29, if it was a good enough version. Also, it says, "Which would you rather go into combat in?" And I would prefer the Hellcat


----------



## USS Enterprise CV-6 (Mar 31, 2014)

It is *MY OPINION*


----------



## GregP (Mar 31, 2014)

Which Spits are you calling "later model" Spits?

I'm only asking because someone might say something like, "The Spitfire 21 was VASTLY superior to the Hellcat!"

To which I'd reply, "All 120 of them?"

From the XIV onward they made fewer than 3,000 Spitfires against 12,400+ Hellcats, of which almost 6,500 were F5F-5's.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## wuzak (Apr 1, 2014)

I would suggest that the Spitfire V (1940/41) was a match for the Hellcat (1943).

The Spitfire IX (1942), VII, VIII, XII (1943), XIV (1944), XVIII, 21, 22 (1945) were better than all versions of the Hellcat.

Reactions: Like Like:
4 | Like List reactions


----------



## GregP (Apr 1, 2014)

I would suggest it wasn't and they weren't. They were not carrier-capable and didn't have range. The Hellcat could turn with a Zero for at least PART of a complete turn and the Spitfire, in most versions, could not.

So ... again, if I were flying from a land base, I might choose a Spitfire or a Hellcat (Hellcat for me and Spitifre for others), but it would be a Hellcat hands down if I were flying from a carrier and needed to go more than a short distance and actually land back aboard.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## wuzak (Apr 1, 2014)

Being on a carrier is the only reason to prefer a Hellcat.

Spitfires could out-turn the Zero - provided it was flown at speed favourable to the Spitfire.


----------



## GregP (Apr 1, 2014)

Things are not always provided.

As Saburo Sakai knew very well.

The F6F was EXPERT at shooting down the opposition, is large quantities.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Apr 1, 2014)

USS Enterprise CV-6 said:


> Hey, there was 2 versions of the Hellcat: F6F-3 and F6F-5 (not including the night fighter version). There was a lot (don't know exactly, but you do) of Spits. It would come down to the skill of the pilot and the determination. A TBF Avenger could take out a B-29, if it was a good enough version. Also, it says, "Which would you rather go into combat in?" And I would prefer the Hellcat



And there were 23 or 24 versions of the Spitfire, navalized versions as well as high altitude versions. You're talking a lot of nonsense to people who have not only been in this community for many years but who also have worked on and flown airplanes INCLUDING some of these same warbirds, so unless you have some real world experience aside from your meaningless opinions, I suggest you sit down and shut up, you might learn something!!!!

I'm going to tolerate your youthful antics and novice comments for the time being but I suggest, as a newbe you read some of the forum rules before you go shooting your mouth off about things you know little or nothing about.

Reactions: Dislike Dislike:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## USS Enterprise CV-6 (Apr 1, 2014)

FLYBOYJ said:


> And there were 23 or 24 versions of the Spitfire, navalized versions as well as high altitude versions. You're talking a lot of nonsense to people who have not only been in this community for many years but who also have worked on and flown airplanes INCLUDING some of these same warbirds, so unless you have some real world experience aside from your meaningless opinions, I suggest you sit down and shut up, you might learn something!!!!
> 
> I'm going to tolerate your youthful antics and novice comments for the time being but I suggest, as a newbe you read some of the forum rules before you go shooting your mouth off about things you know little or nothing about.


Hey, the question simply says, "Which would you rather take into combat?" And all I am saying is that I would prefer the Hellcat. Why am I not allowed to have an opinion exactly?
Not trying to be rude, but why am I not allowed to?

Reactions: Dislike Dislike:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## BiffF15 (Apr 1, 2014)

USS Enterprise,

This is a great forum and yes you are allowed to post your opinons. The part that makes this a great forum is the seriously large amount of coporate knowledge on tap here. Realize when (not if) you post an opinon it might be challenged by someone usually using referencing or having actual first hand data. I've changed my opinon (gained new knowledge) on many things since I started participating here.

Look at this as a place of learning, and where your opinons will get vetted (proved or disapproved). I have stated things on here and have been "jumped". I learned to make my point in the form of a question, or do more homework after being questioned. Don't take it as a personal attack, take it as a comparision of opinons backed up with references.

The majority of folks on here are great and regardless if I disagree I learn something in the process!

Cheers,
Biff

Reactions: Bacon Bacon:
1 | Like Like:
3 | Like List reactions


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Apr 1, 2014)

USS Enterprise CV-6 said:


> Hey, the question simply says, "Which would you rather take into combat?" And all I am saying is that I would prefer the Hellcat. Why am I not allowed to have an opinion exactly?
> Not trying to be rude, but why am I not allowed to?





BiffF15 said:


> USS Enterprise,
> 
> This is a great forum and yes you are allowed to post your opinons. The part that makes this a great forum is the seriously large amount of coporate knowledge on tap here. Realize when (not if) you post an opinon it might be challenged by someone usually using referencing or having actual first hand data. I've changed my opinon (gained new knowledge) on many things since I started participating here.
> 
> ...



Kid - listen to Biff, BTW he used to drive F-15s, again you might learn something.....


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Apr 1, 2014)

USS Enterprise CV-6 said:


> I agree. I would rather take the Hellcat for a CV and Spitty from the land. I mean, I love the Hellcat, but it wasn't as good operating from a ground base as the Spitty.



What does it matter if it is flying from a carrier top, or from ground base? Once its in the air it operates the same?


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Apr 1, 2014)

USS Enterprise CV-6 said:


> I still think the Hellcat could shred the Spitty, because it can if I think it can



What?


----------



## stona (Apr 1, 2014)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> What does it matter if it is flying from a carrier top, or from ground base? Once its in the air it operates the same?



Getting a Spitfire/Seafire back on the carrier would be one of the challenges I wouldn't fancy  Definitely not an easy aeroplane to operate from carriers, it wasn't designed for that.

Carriers also have a nasty tendency to be surrounded by vast tracts of ocean which, given the Spitfire's limited range, is also not something I'd be terribly excited about 

You are right of course that once in the air it makes no difference, which is why I went for the better dogfighter, the Spitfire, in a post about 1,000 years ago. 

Cheers

Steve


----------



## USS Enterprise CV-6 (Apr 1, 2014)

FLYBOYJ

I am allowed to have my opinion and you may have yours. It is an opinion question and there is no wrong answer. 

I respect your opinions and ask you respect mine.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Apr 1, 2014)

USS Enterprise CV-6 said:


> FLYBOYJ
> 
> I am allowed to have my opinion and you may have yours. It is an opinion question and there is no wrong answer.
> 
> I respect your opinions and ask you respect mine.



It's all good - but be prepared to back up your opinions. Again I suggest you READ some of the posts for new members and UNDERSTAND how we work here...


----------



## parsifal (Apr 1, 2014)

Hellcat turn radius at its optimum combat speeds was about 670 feet. optimum turn radius for a spitfire @ 12000 feet and at sustained speeds in excess of 300 mph was 676 ft. On the face of it, the Hellcat can out turn a spitfire (by about a smidgeon), but we are not comparing apples to apples here. The speeds art which the Spitfire is making that turn are significantly greater than for Hellcat. If you compare the turn radius at similar speeds, the Spitfire will out turn the Hellcat by a comfortable margin.

RAAF tests conducted in 1943 after the drubbing it received at the hands of the A6M3 revealed that at lower speeds, the Zeke could easily out turn the Spit, but at higher speeds the tables were turned and the Spit could sustain a turn rate equal to or better than the Zeke. this was never matched by the Hellcat, except at speeds that the Zeke couldnt even be flown at. 

There is no question in my mind, the Spitfire was a more manouverable plane in the horizontal plane.

Hellcat always held a range advantage over the Spit, but not by much. In 1945, when the BPF committed Hellcats, Corsairs and Seafire IIIs to the battles off Japan, Hellcats and Corsairs were found to have an effective combat radius of just over 230 miles. Seafires were 175 miles. The Seafire XV, which just missed the war, had comparable range to the Hellcat, whilst the Seafire 47 had greater effective combat radius and endurance to the F6F 

One of the great pieces of misinformation relates to the Seafire accident rates. When first deployed, in 1942-3 it suffered an attrocious accident rate. This was found to be be related to :

1) Pilot inexperience with the type and hurried conversion training
2) Placement of the type on escort carriers which lacked deck length and the ship speed to get enough wind under the wings of the Seafire to make operations safe and reliable. hellcats were generally not operated from the decks of escort carriers
3) related to the above the low wind conditions into which they were first operated contributed to a high attrition rate
4) weak land gear which frequently failed in landings

Seafire IIIs operating with the BPF in 1945 were exclusively operated from the decks of fleet carriers, which levels up the playing field vis a viz the Hellcat operations. A lot of time was spent in preparing the air crew to using the type, and the new version of the Seafire had revised landing gear. wind conditions, deck spaces and ship speed were all much better suited to the characteristics of the Seafire than the CVEs that it was first placed on. Such was the success of these changes, the Seafire IIIs in the 1945 operations that the type enjoyed the lowest attrition rate of the three fighter types used by the BPF, and given that attrition rates in the BPF were about the same as the USN overall, this brings into focus that the Spitfire, properly prepred, was at least as good as the hellcat in deck handling operations.

Seafires were found by the BPF to be the most effective weapon against the Japanese suicide aircraft, the superior firepower and better low altitude handling and performance of the Seafire being particularly useful.

There is no question both types had their strengths and their weaknesses, and each type contributed greatly to the allied victory. However after the war, a lot of hyperbole has been written about both types , but in particular the hellcat, for which its proponents cannot be persuaded away from. 



0 ,


----------



## USS Enterprise CV-6 (Apr 1, 2014)

FLYBOYJ said:


> *Kid* - listen to Biff, BTW he used to drive F-15s, again you might learn something.....



How do you know my age?

I could be older then you


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Apr 1, 2014)

USS Enterprise CV-6 said:


> How do you know my age?
> 
> I could be older then you



Ok, enough - take a few days off and come back when you pull your head out of your butt.


----------



## parsifal (Apr 1, 2014)

that was a train wreck waiting to happen

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## parsifal (Apr 1, 2014)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> What does it matter if it is flying from a carrier top, or from ground base? Once its in the air it operates the same?



in terms of the engineering issues, absolutely correct, but in terms of tactics and role, it is not necessarily the case the naval fighter has exactly the same role as a land based fighter. 

The theory at least is that a land based fighter is basically an air denial weapon. its there to either try and deny control of the airspace to an enemy intruder. if operating in an offensive role, its there to win air supremacy, or failing that air superiority. 

For carrier based aircraft, only once in WWII was a naval based carrier air group tasked with actually winning air superiority on a permanent basis, and that was off the coast of japan in 1945. At other times the naval fighter when used offensively was tasked with temporarily suppressing enemy airspace whilst something specific was achieved by the strike aircraft. Examples of that might be the raids over Rabaul or Truk. When operating defensively, which was the more usual role, the aim was to deny control of airspace over the Task Force, and the most important role in that scenario was not to engage and destroy enemy fighters so much, in the manner of land based air, but to above all else, to get in and destroy the enemy strike aircraft or at least prevent them from attacking effectively. Phil sea was a classic example of that. 

The difference is subtle, i know, buts its real, and it is significant


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Apr 1, 2014)

stona said:


> Getting a Spitfire/Seafire back on the carrier would be one of the challenges I wouldn't fancy  Definitely not an easy aeroplane to operate from carriers, it wasn't designed for that.
> 
> Carriers also have a nasty tendency to be surrounded by vast tracts of ocean which, given the Spitfire's limited range, is also not something I'd be terribly excited about
> 
> ...



I agree.

He however was saying that a Hellcat does not operate well from a land base...


----------



## gjs238 (Apr 1, 2014)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Kid - listen to Biff, BTW he used to drive F-15s, again you might learn something.....


----------



## BiffF15 (Apr 1, 2014)

I think I would pick a Spit Mk14 with the bubble canopy.

Pros:
Spit - faster, lighter, better power to weight ratio, more maneuverable, better visibility
Hellcat - legs, air cooled engine

If the fight requried both aircraft to take off and fly a long distance prior to their engagement then the Hellcat could fight longer. If the fight allowed both to takeoff at light fuel weights then the advantage I would think would go more to the Spit (power to weight would be greater).

Regardless of the altitude the fight starts the lower it goes I think the greater the advantage the Spitfire will have (lighter weight / wing loading) and it should have a speed advantage as well. 

Of course this is my opinon but I welcome disenting points of view.

Cheers,
Biff

PS: I think it might be a bit more "even" of a fight between the F8F Bearcat and the late model Spit...


----------



## Clayton Magnet (Apr 1, 2014)

All the advantages stated by BiffF15 would still be applicable in a Mark IX or VIII, albiet less pronounced. However, available more than a year before the first Hellcats.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## RCAFson (Apr 1, 2014)

GregP said:


> I would suggest it wasn't and they weren't. They were not carrier-capable and didn't have range. The Hellcat could turn with a Zero for at least PART of a complete turn and the Spitfire, in most versions, could not.
> 
> So ... again, if I were flying from a land base, I might choose a Spitfire or a Hellcat (Hellcat for me and Spitifre for others), but it would be a Hellcat hands down if I were flying from a carrier and needed to go more than a short distance and actually land back aboard.



The Spitfire had much lower wing loading than the F6F and it could out roll the F6F through most typical combat speed ranges:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/naca868-rollchart.jpg


----------



## wuzak (Apr 1, 2014)

BiffF15 said:


> I think I would pick a Spit Mk14 with the bubble canopy.
> 
> Pros:
> Spit - faster, lighter, better power to weight ratio, more maneuverable, better visibility
> ...



British tactical trials showed the Spitfire XIV was superior to the Bf 109G and Fw 190A when carrying a 90 UKG drop tank which was half full. I guess this holds true for the Spitfire vs the Hellcat too?


----------



## Njaco (Apr 1, 2014)

OMG! Those last few pages were....... entertaining??!!?? For the record, Wikipedia as a source for your opinion will give you a very, very poor and ultimately wrong opinion! 



> ...For carrier based aircraft, only once in WWII was a naval based carrier air group tasked with actually winning air superiority on a permanent basis, and that was off the coast of japan in 1945....



I'm gonna play Devil's advocate and say you might have missed one, Parsifal!

Trägergruppe 186 was also operational in the early days of the war before finally becoming StG 1.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## wuzak (Apr 1, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Hellcat always held a range advantage over the Spit, but not by much. In 1945, when the BPF committed Hellcats, Corsairs and Seafire IIIs to the battles off Japan, Hellcats and Corsairs were found to have an effective combat radius of just over 230 miles. Seafires were 175 miles. The Seafire XV, which just missed the war, had comparable range to the Hellcat, whilst the Seafire 47 had greater effective combat radius and endurance to the F6F



I would think that the Seafire XV was technically feasible for 1943, since the similarly powered Spitfire XII went into service then. Of course there were other considerations and priorities.


----------



## GregP (Apr 1, 2014)

Hey parsifal, where did you find the minimum turn radius for the Spitfire ... or the Hellcat?

I haven't seen those tests and would like to do so.

Thanks!


----------



## bobbysocks (Apr 1, 2014)

i dont care what i take off on or from...but i sure do care where i land and i would prefer a long piece of god's green earth to short narrow moving ship that is upteen feet above the water. when you come in all shot up plunking down on a carrier might be impossible and i would perfer to belly in than ditch in the sea. i want firemen, medics, and rescue teams chasing me and reaching me with in a minute or two....rather than inflate my mae west...crawl out ( maybe bleeding in shark infested waters ) and inflate a dingy and wait for that slow boat to reach me... there is no guarentees you are going to come back in as good of shape as you left...or come back at all for that matter.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## parsifal (Apr 1, 2014)

Njaco said:


> OMG! Those last few pages were....... entertaining??!!?? For the record, Wikipedia as a source for your opinion will give you a very, very poor and ultimately wrong opinion!
> 
> 
> 
> ...




This one youll have to explain Chris. I confess, in the words of my mentor, Sgt Shultz...."I know nothsing"

I looked up felgrau site which gave me this on Tragergruppe 186

Trägergruppe 186

Gruppenkommandeure (I./186):

Maj Walter Hagen, 15.9.39 - 5.7.40
Gruppenkommandeure (II./186):

Maj Walter Hagen, 39 - 15.9.39
Maj Heinrich Seeliger, 15.9.39 - 5.7.40
II./186 was ordered formed 1.8.38 at Bug/Rügen, but was cancelled 22.10.38.

Reformed 1.11.38 in Kiel-Holtenau: 4. (Stuka)/186 with Ju87B, and 6.(Jagd)/186 on 15.11.38 with Bf 109B from 4./JG136.

5.(Jagd)/186 was formed 15.7.39.

On 10.9.39 Stab I (Stuka)/186 was formed in Kiel-Holtenau, together with 1. and 2./186, and 4./186 were renamed 3./186. Stab II (Jagd)/186 was also formed, but the new 4. (Jagd)/186 was not formed until 11.10.39.

Trägergruppe 186 now consisted of the following units:

I. (Stuka)/186 with 1. - 3. Staffeln, Ju 87B
II. (Jagd)/186 with 4. - 6. Staffeln, Bf 109B

On 29.2.40 a new 4./186 was formed from 2./JGr. 101. On 27.6.40 4./186 moved to Köln-Ostheim, and was renamed 3./Erprobungsgruppe 210.

TrGr. 186 was disbanded 5.7.40, I./186 became III./St.G. 1 and II./186 became III./JG77.

If that is correct, what was its mission as a formation?


----------



## parsifal (Apr 1, 2014)

GregP said:


> Hey parsifal, where did you find the minimum turn radius for the Spitfire ... or the Hellcat?
> 
> I haven't seen those tests and would like to do so.
> 
> Thanks!



Spitfire is easy, Mike Williams has the data, and ive also read in the RAAF combat testing flights dated in 1943. 

Hellcat is much harder, and if youve got information, please post. In the meantime I will try and locate the reference for my source. 

Both aircraft were manouverable, but you and I are on the opposite sides of the fence, insofar as which was the more manouverable.

Edit

This is not the source of my claim, but it does give some very valuable insights of what the hellcats oponents thought of the Hellcat. The book title is Target: Rabaul: The Allied Siege of Japan's Most Infamous Stronghold, By Bruce Gamble. Warrant Officer Sadumo Komachis account of the power and potency of the Hellcat was particulalry enlightening, but he does maintain the Zeke could still out turn the Hellcat. Its just that the hellcat could hold it for long enough to usually bring down a Zeke that it was chasing.

However the RAAF test actually show that the Spit, at speeds above 300 mph could turn inside of a Zeke.


----------



## GregP (Apr 2, 2014)

You are probably right about being on opposite sides of the fence.

Minimum turn radius has everything to do with the strength of the airframe and the excess power. For instance, the airframe might well handle, say. +6 g, but the aircraft might not have enough excess power to stay level in a 6 g turn. If so, then he can stay level at 6 g. If not, he descends to maintain speed and g or backs off on the g's until he CAN stay level. I am under the very strong impression that no WWII fighter aircraft had enough excess power to handle a sustained 6 g turn, and would love to find out I am wrong from some hard data.

So, while I might believe differently from you, I don't really have hard data to argue with.

Therefore, I wanted to read the reports and see for myself. If the data exist, it would be good to have. I'll start digging on it.

Cheers.


----------



## RCAFson (Apr 2, 2014)

GregP said:


> You are probably right about being on opposite sides of the fence.
> 
> Minimum turn radius has everything to do with the strength of the airframe and the excess power. For instance, the airframe might well handle, say. +6 g, but the aircraft might not have enough excess power to stay level in a 6 g turn. If so, then he can stay level at 6 g. If not, he descends to maintain speed and g or backs off on the g's until he CAN stay level. I am under the very strong impression that no WWII fighter aircraft had enough excess power to handle a sustained 6 g turn, and would love to find out I am wrong from some hard data.
> 
> ...



The USN conducted flight trials between the A6M-5 and the F6F-5:



> Rolls of the Zeke 52 were equal to those of the F6F-5 at speeds under 200 knots and inferior above that speed, due to high control forces.
> 
> The Zeke 52 was greatly superior to the F6F-5 in slow speed turns at low and medium altitudes, its advantage decreasing to about parity at 30,000 ft. In slow speed turns it could gain one turn in 3 and 1/2 at 10,000 ft.
> http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/japan/ptr-1111.pdf



Given the low wing loading of the A6M the results were pretty predictable.


----------



## fastmongrel (Apr 2, 2014)

Njaco said:


> OMG! Those last few pages were....... entertaining??!!?? For the record, Wikipedia as a source for your opinion will give you a very, very poor and ultimately wrong opinion!



They were very entertaining. I was thinking of starting a sweepstake on how many posts before USS E got the ban stick but I didnt move fast enough 

Back to the subject did the Seafire III get any boosting for tackling Kamikaze, water or Nitrous would have given a nice kick. I know very little about the Hellcats engines but I believe some versions got water boost.


----------



## parsifal (Apr 2, 2014)

well, we might not be able to agree on which aircraft was the better, but in one important area, there is no contest.

This video is of the Seafire 47. The only example in the world still flying with the Griffon engine. Just listen to that growling throaty roar. if you are not moved by that, you have no soul people


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_YioXYhbVPA_

Reactions: Bacon Bacon:
3 | Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## KiwiBiggles (Apr 2, 2014)

The sound is great. But contra-props on film has to be the funniest aircraft video ever!


----------



## GrauGeist (Apr 2, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Just listen to that growling throaty roar. if you are not moved by that, you have no soul people


Ok call me a heretic, then... 

To me, there's nothing more moving than the sound of a radial engine at work!


----------



## parsifal (Apr 2, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> Ok call me a heretic, then...
> 
> To me, there's nothing more moving than the sound of a radial engine at work!



Philistine Americans, what will we do with you


----------



## gjs238 (Apr 2, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> Ok call me a heretic, then...
> 
> To me, there's nothing more moving than the sound of a radial engine at work!




_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=glHRIJTGwAU_


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jh8RqGrvM5g_


----------



## GregP (Apr 2, 2014)

I love both the V-12's and the radial sounds. So. I'm with you on both accounts. My favorite fighters were radials ... unless I happen to be next to a V-12 at the time, then I'm not so sure.

So, I'm one of those guys who never met a high-performance aircraft he didn't like.

As to which turns best or which WAS the best at some mission, it will NEVER be settled, but we ALL want to see them fly anytime was can see it and, better yet, hitch a ride.

I wasn't the biggest P-40 fan unit I got a ride in one. Now I love them! ... and can't wait for the next one.

Call me names.

- Greg

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## parsifal (Apr 2, 2014)

GregP said:


> I love both the V-12's and the radial sounds. So. I'm with you on both accounts. My favorite fighters were radials ... unless I happen to be next to a V-12 at the time, then I'm not so sure.
> 
> So, I'm one of those guys who never met a high-performance aircraft he didn't like.
> 
> ...



The only name I think that you could be called is "true believer"


----------



## GrauGeist (Apr 2, 2014)

Don't get me wrong, I certainly appreciate the sound (performance) of a V-12

I had heard many V-12 types, but the one that impressed me most was a Jumo211 on a stand in the back of a machine shop in Santa Ana (Orange County, California), back in 1980. The gentleman that owned it had been a teenager in Czechloslovakia when the Luftwaffe established a base nearby. His love for aircraft and entheusiasm landed him a job as a helper there and over the years learned to be a mechanic and machinist's assistant. So years later, he located and rebuilt a Jumo211 and kept it on a test-stand specially built for the engine.

He fired it up for me one afternoon, and I had never heard anything so raw and powerful sounding before...it was certainly a memorable moment.

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## GregP (Apr 2, 2014)

Best one for me was one night in the 1980's when I went to an "invitation only" event at Doug Champlin's Fighter Museum in Mesa, Arizona. They had an art show and I bought prints signed by Erich Hartmann and Saburo Sakai (who was the guest speaker at the event). Later they fired up the Fw 190D they had. It is the same one now in Seattle.

Sounded wonderful once it warned up and settled into a loping idle.

Here's the same aircraft in Seattle ... years later:


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kCKd3CHQzUY_

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Clayton Magnet (Apr 2, 2014)

Are you sure thats not an A5?


----------



## GregP (Apr 3, 2014)

Actually I'm not. I googled "Fw 190D" and this came up. The paint scheme LOOKS like the A-5 now that you mention it. Damn ... I'll look for a video of that Fw 190D running up. Don't lknow if they started it again and made an assumption ... never a good idea, I suppose.


----------



## GrauGeist (Apr 3, 2014)

Yet another great sounding radial!


----------



## Clayton Magnet (Apr 3, 2014)

A cool video none the less, thanks for sharing


----------



## USS Enterprise CV-6 (Apr 3, 2014)

Just noticed something: The question says: "Which would you take as a pure fighter?". As a pure fighter, a would take the Spit, mainly because I don't know how a plane deigned for a carrier is more of a 'pure fighter' than a land based plane


----------



## pbehn (Apr 3, 2014)

USS Enterprise CV-6 said:


> Just noticed something: The question says: "Which would you take as a pure fighter?". As a pure fighter, a would take the Spit, mainly because I don't know how a plane deigned for a carrier is more of a 'pure fighter' than a land based plane



It is a pure fighter that can survive repeated take offs and landings off a carrier and be able to stow below deck so generally heavier.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## GrauGeist (Apr 3, 2014)

USS Enterprise CV-6 said:


> ...mainly because I don't know how a plane deigned for a carrier is more of a 'pure fighter' than a land based plane


Regardless of it's intention as a naval or land-based design, a fighter's qualifications are to primarily engage in battle with like-designed enemy aircraft as a primary role.

Technically, there is no difference between a Fw190 and a F4U in their intended role, for example. The only difference between a navalized aircraft and a land-based aircraft falls in it's equipment, the naval aircraft generally being equipped with such things like a tail-arresting hook, folding wings (not always) for below-deck storage, certain max-weight airframe criteria, landing gear that dampens the "bounce" on landing and in many cases, the ability to remain afloat for a period of time if they are forced to "ditch".

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## l'Omnivore Sobriquet (Apr 3, 2014)

Hellcat or Spitfire ? which one, hm, would I take ?
Well, being not a Sobriquet but a real flesh and blood amateur pilot, I think a proper English attitude would induce a polite step away from the Griffon Spitfire...
With admirative "no thanks" and a good spotter's place to look at, and listen.

Safe, large, powerfull, slippery aerobatic, comfortable, usable even as a Vip transport, I would naturally lean for that Grumman cat. Always welcome by the ground crew too... A complete high sport sweater.
Obviously, no competition for the one i'd actually choose.

Spitfire of course.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## USS Enterprise CV-6 (Apr 3, 2014)

pbehn said:


> It is a pure fighter that can survive repeated take offs and landings off a carrier and be able to stow below deck so generally heavier.



I thought it meant which was designed specilly for air-to-air, not just for air-to-air but able to survive ditching.


----------



## pbehn (Apr 3, 2014)

USS Enterprise CV-6 said:


> I thought it meant which was designed specilly for air-to-air, not just for air-to-air but able to survive ditching.




Look at a Spitfire landing on terra firma then look at a hellcat landing on a carrier. To cope with a carrier deck landing a fighter has to be reinforced in many areas so it is heavier. There are other areas like sink rate which others can explain better than I The spitfire was an interceptor with few equals but it took years to make it an effective and safe carrier plane the seafire. However living on the worlds larges aircraft carrier (Great Britain) I can say all Spitfires were excellent carrier planes its just USA carriers were constructed about 400 miles too short.

Reactions: Bacon Bacon:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## parsifal (Apr 3, 2014)

pbehn said:


> Look at a Spitfire landing on terra firma then look at a hellcat landing on a carrier. To cope with a carrier deck landing a fighter has to be reinforced in many areas so it is heavier. There are other areas like sink rate which others can explain better than I The spitfire was an interceptor with few equals but it took years to make it an effective and safe carrier plane the seafire. However living on the worlds larges aircraft carrier (Great Britain) I can say all Spitfires were excellent carrier planes its just USA carriers were constructed about 400 miles too short.



This is simply based on some rather dubious assumptions. The Zeke was one of the most lightly constructed aircraft of the war, along with the strike aircraft that it fought alongside. These aircraft were all successful designs that could operate equally from land or sea platforms despite their light construction . Heavy bracing was essentially an American, more specifically a Grumman idea, that they moved away from in their post war designs anyway. The japanese lightweight designs did not show any signs of break up gear failure or the like of which i am aware.

The nearest comparable type to the zeke for a land based plane was the JAAFs Ki43. There is not a lot of difference in the weights of these two aircraft, apart from the increased weight of armmament and tankage for the zeke.

The problems with the Seafire were specific to that type, which were addressed in the later marks, as you suggest....but although admitedly the type was always a handfull on the deck. Early marks of the seafire had weaker landing gear, narrow track landing gear, horrible stall characterisitcs, and poor forward vision that all added up to making it a mule when it came to carrier operations. Some of these issues were never addressed, but the later marks of the type sort of addressed what they could, and then there was a change to the Griffon engine, which opened up a whole new range of issues. . The Griffon powered Seafires had a tendency to swing badly on take off, but apprently this vice was dealt with in the Seafire 47 series (Ive forgotten exactly how, but its deck handling was much better than the Seafire XV)

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Shortround6 (Apr 3, 2014)

Seafire 47 used contra-rotating props which went a long way to reduce swing and torque effects.


----------



## tomo pauk (Apr 4, 2014)

pbehn said:


> ... However living on the worlds larges aircraft carrier (Great Britain) I can say all Spitfires were excellent carrier planes its just *USA carriers were constructed about 400 miles too short*.



That was an excellent one 



parsifal said:


> This is simply based on some rather dubious assumptions. The Zeke was one of the most lightly constructed aircraft of the war, along with the strike aircraft that it fought alongside....)



The Zero was not that lightly constructed. From here:

_This weight-saving design would indicate that the craft is flimsily built but such is not the case, for its strength compares favorably with many American-built planes._


----------



## davparlr (Apr 4, 2014)

For pure dog fighting, its hard to beat a Spitfire. Comparing contemporaries, it appears the Spit is superior to the F6F in almost every important respect, except, maybe, ruggedness. Both the Spit IX 66 and the Spit XIV were substantially faster over the envelop, climbed better, and probably out turned the equivalent standard F6F-3 and the F6F-3 w/water/F6F-5.


----------



## Glider (Apr 4, 2014)

Totally agree and the differences were not marginal. In climb there was almost a 2,000 ft min advantage to the Spit IX at low level. With that sort of advantage you don't need to rely on the turn, the Spit would happily fight in the vertical


----------



## stona (Apr 4, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> The only difference between a navalized aircraft and a land-based aircraft falls in it's equipment, the naval aircraft generally being equipped with such things like a tail-arresting hook, folding wings (not always) for below-deck storage, certain max-weight airframe criteria, landing gear that dampens the "bounce" on landing and in many cases, the ability to remain afloat for a period of time if they are forced to "ditch".



Navalised as in Spitfire to Seafire or specifically designed for carrier operations?

They are not the same. Both will have an increased weight due to the sort of equipment you mentioned and this will impact performance. However aircraft designed for carrier operations typically had different flight characteristics, particularly in a landing configuration which might (or might not) have an effect on performance as a 'pure fighter', whatever that is.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Shortround6 (Apr 4, 2014)

Things tended to diverge or change with time. In the early 30s there wasn't much difference between a land fighter and a carrier fighter (just how much bigger was that cow pasture than the carrier deck?  except the extra weight of the carrier equipment but with 600hp engines every pound counted. In the late 30s and the coming of monoplanes the difference still wasn't that great as many land based fighters still landed at around 80mph and big wing ones ( Hurricanes and Spitfires) tended to "float" onto runways anyway. 
AS power, speed and weight all increased with longer land runways being built the carrier planes became more specialized, their take-off and landing space didn't increase as much (if at all) compared to the land based planes and now they needed not only "just" attachment points and arrestor hooks and flotation and extra paint, but structural reinforcing to handle the arrestor landings and different sink rates and larger wings or different airfoils, etc. 
How close the carrier plane came to land based plane performance varied with time and what other sacrifices one or the other made ( in the early .30s the armament was pretty much a constant. two rifle caliber machine guns with 500-600rounds per gun)


----------



## stona (Apr 4, 2014)

Other aerodynamic devices were fitted to carrier aircraft. An example would be wing fences to intentionally stall a section of wing during landing. These were not required on most land based aircraft and add drag.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## GrauGeist (Apr 4, 2014)

stona said:


> Navalised as in Spitfire to Seafire or specifically designed for carrier operations?
> 
> They are not the same. Both will have an increased weight due to the sort of equipment you mentioned and this will impact performance. However aircraft designed for carrier operations typically had different flight characteristics, particularly in a landing configuration which might (or might not) have an effect on performance as a 'pure fighter', whatever that is.
> 
> ...



If we look at my entire post, we'll see how my comment was intended:



> Originally Posted by *USS Enterprise CV-6* ...mainly because I don't know how a plane deigned for a carrier is more of a 'pure fighter' than a land based plane
> 
> Originally Posted by *Graugeist* Regardless of it's intention as a naval or land-based design, a fighter's qualifications are to primarily engage in battle with like-designed enemy aircraft as a primary role.
> 
> Technically, there is no difference between a Fw190 and a F4U in their intended role, for example. *The only difference between a navalized aircraft and a land-based aircraft falls in it's equipment*, the naval aircraft generally being equipped with such things like a tail-arresting hook, folding wings (not always) for below-deck storage, certain max-weight airframe criteria, landing gear that dampens the "bounce" on landing and in many cases, the ability to remain afloat for a period of time if they are forced to "ditch".



So when we view the entire comment, we'll see that this was intended to make the point that Naval or Land-based fighter aircraft had the same mission objective in regards to the statement of: "_I don't know how a plane deigned for a carrier is more of a 'pure fighter' than a land based plane_"


----------



## parsifal (Apr 4, 2014)

> The Zero was not that lightly constructed. From here:
> 
> This weight-saving design would indicate that the craft is flimsily built but such is not the case, for its strength compares favorably with many American-built planes.



It was an exceptionally well designed aircraft, and derived a great deal of strength because of that that design. but as HP Willmott in
Zero - A6M states very clearly..... " the whole philosophy of the Zero was dedicated to the fast, lightly built attack craft for use in offensive operations, there was no patience or ability, given the limited horsepower available for armour protection, or great rigidity in the airframe. As a consequence, the Zero was scarcely airworthy by western standards, but for Japan the design was exactly what was required. With no armour, lightness of airframe and absolute minimum of internal fasteners and fixing parts, the early zeroes weighed 4300 lb to the Spitfires 5332 lb, and possessed less than half the numbers of rivets and other fasteners". The lack of rigidity and structural strength meant the zero had a marked tendency to crumple in combat" Though all of this is well borne out by the Zekes combat experiences, the aircaft in terms of flight characteristics was able to absorb heavy flight strain because of the very reason of its light airframe weight and good design. remember, the original claim was that a heavy bracing of the airframe was necessary for an aircraft to be used in carrier operations, but clearly,, the Zeke, with about half the weight of a Hellcat, disproves that. The Zeke suffered weakness in the airframe that led to other problems, but ive never heard of it failing stucturally at a higher rate than its peers because of that light airframe and lack of frame intergity.


----------



## GregP (Apr 4, 2014)

Altogether a very inaccurate description of the Zero. 

It was VERY airworthy and stronger at the ultimate load factor than many western designs, including the Hellcat. It could not take nearly as much battle damage, but battle damage has nothing to do with airworthiness. The structure is quite rigid and it flies extremely well. Whoever wrote that probably hadn't ever SEEN a Zero up close and looked at the workmanship. It is quite well built and rugged.

It is made from thinner aluminum and lacks armor and self-sealing tanks due to a lower horsepower engine, but there is NOTHING wrong with the airframe unless it sustains battle damage. That;s when the light structure reveals weakness and not before.


----------



## Aozora (Apr 4, 2014)

According to Wikipedia:



> Every possible weight-saving measure was incorporated into the design. Most of the aircraft was built of a new top-secret 7075 aluminium alloy developed by Sumitomo Metal Industries in 1936. Called Extra Super Duralumin (ESD), it was lighter and stronger than other alloys (e.g. 24S alloy) used at the time, but was more brittle and prone to corrosion[6] which was countered with an anti-corrosion coating applied after fabrication.



The citation is: Yoshida, Hideo."History of wrought aluminum alloys for transportation." Sumitomo Light Metal Technical Reports 2005 (Sumitomo Light Metal Industries, Ltd., Japan), Volume 46, Issue 1, pp. 99–116.

There is a link to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/7075_aluminium_alloy#History which suggests that Alcoa developed a similar alloy in 1943 http://www.alcoa.com/mill_products/catalog/pdf/alloy7075techsheet.pdf


----------



## fastmongrel (Apr 5, 2014)

Did naval planes have the aluminium structure anodised to prevent corrosion.


----------



## parsifal (Apr 5, 2014)

whether or not people choose to believe the zeke was strong or weak is a different question, The original question posed was that weight penalties applies to carrier aircraft because they needed to be stronger. Not true. the Zeke proves that. It was half the weight of a Hellcat, and according to Greg, a stronger overall airframe. we do not need to prove that issue one way or the other, I happen to equate its airframe strength to its ability to absorb combat damage, but it may well be valid to also note that did not suffer major structural failures as a result of its operations generally 

The problems with the spitfires carrier operations had nothing to do with its overall weight or indeed, its overall airframe strength. It had a problem in its undercarriage strength and spacing. Somewaht addressed in the later marks


----------



## Garyt (Apr 5, 2014)

I know this thread is about which was better, Hellcat or Spitfire, but the Hellcat's kill ratio against the Zero and other planes seems to be part of the Hellcat's calling card. 

I think everyone acknowledges that the Hellcat had the advantage of better pilots against the Japanese pilots.

What I think though is often overlooked at least somewhat is the better radar and aerial radio communication the US had.

The US was far better at vectoring it's planes properly, as well as having better "intelligence" about where and when to expect Japanese planes. I would hazard to guess in the absence of factual information that Japanese planes were more often suprised by US planes in encounters.

Both the vectoring and intelligence are huge force multipliers. Just for an example as to how much of a force multiplier this was I'm going to use something on a bigger scale dealing with ships, not just planes. The US had the sucess it did at Midway largely because of advance knowledge, and being able to in essence "vector" defense forces there, and also have surprised the opponents.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Njaco (Apr 5, 2014)

> It was VERY airworthy and stronger at the ultimate load factor than many western designs, including the Hellcat. It could not take nearly as much battle damage, ....



I think you guys are agreeing on the same thing just definitions are different. This statement here probably sums up best the point each and every one of you are trying to make. The Zero was strongly built BUT its material was light and allowed it be susceptible to battle damage. 

and its something I believe the Zero was built as......


----------



## parsifal (Apr 6, 2014)

Garyt said:


> I know this thread is about which was better, Hellcat or Spitfire, but the Hellcat's kill ratio against the Zero and other planes seems to be part of the Hellcat's calling card.
> 
> I think everyone acknowledges that the Hellcat had the advantage of better pilots against the Japanese pilots.



This is the post war myth machine hard at work.

The Hellcat is claimed to have achieved a 19:1 kill/loss ratio against all Japanese aircraft, because something just over 5000 Japanese aircraft of all types, to all causes were lost to the hellcat, whilst combat losses for the Hellcat are quoted as being around 200-300, depending on what source you care to refer to. This was not a 19:1 ratio against the Zeke, and more to the point, Hellcats did not down 19 Zekes in the air for every Hellcat lost in the air. Further still, if a true measure of Zeke capability versus Hellcat wants to be realistically appraised, we should remove the last 9 months of the war for both sides. This obviously will greatly favour the Japanese, but in that 10 month period, over 5000 Japanese aircraft were deliberately lost as Kamikazes, of which something over 2000 were Zekes. How on earth that can it be claimed as a level playing field and a true reflection of each types capabilities is totally beyond me. And in fact its not intended for that purpose. what it is intended is a post war propaganda purpose, to promote the absolute supremacy of American Arms in a world of emerging nations eager to buy or acquire the best weapons. There was a commercial and neo-imperialist imperative to this myth. 

Probably something like 90% of Hellcat losses were at the hands of the Hellcat, to about 50% for the Zeke. Excluding the Kamikazes, something like 4000 of the Zekes were lost in air combat, of which about 2000 can be attributed to the Hellcat (very roughly). 2000 to 270 is still a huge margin for victory, brought about in large measure by the way the hellcat was brought to battle. The US Fast Carriers would appear out of nowhere, strike with 8 or 900 aircraft, against maybe 50 and decimate the defenders. in the one or two occasions that the Japanese did get off the canvas enough to make a stand up fight of it, such as at Phil Sea, there were so many other factors at work against the Japanese that the Hellcats undeniable qualitative advantage really was of secondary importance. such was the material, manpower, training and technological advantages held by the US by the end of 1943.

Incidentally, to achieve those 5000 air victories, the USN did not lose 300 hellcats, more like 1900 airframes were written off


----------



## GregP (Apr 6, 2014)

The Hellcat kills do not include kamakazes that were lost in attacks by hitting their targets or the sea. It includes manned enemy aircraft shot down in combat. Also, the claims in the Pacific were vastly more accurate than in the ETO because there were mo really big air battles with 1,000 planes taking on a large number of fighters and AAA. It was mostly a few aircraft against a few aircraft, rendering tracking the result exponentially easier for all concerned to keep track of during combat.

The Hellcat earned its reputation the hard way, in combat against enemy planes being sortied against it. Don't leave out anything. There in nothing inflated about the Hellcat. It was a very effective fighter, and remains one of the best Naval fighters of all times, plane for plane.

I don't happen to subscribe to the popular 19 : 1 because I believe reliability is a factor. I think all fighters should be evaluated with airborne victories against losses to both enemy aircraft and airborne operational losses, too. I would omit flak losses because nobody can dodge flak since you can't see it coming. If you do it that way, the Hellcat STILL comes out on top by a comfortable margin.

Alternately you could consider all airborne victories against all airborne losses of aircraft for any reason. If you do it that way, the Hellcat STILL comes out on top by a comfortable margin.

When I say "comes out on top," I mean for US aircraft. I don't have the real numbers for the Bf 109 or the Spitfire, or any other types since I have not been able to find the war summaries for other than US aircraft. I HAVE been looking for them.

I advocate lumping FM-2's in with all the other Wildcats and all Buffalos together, not just the very few Finnish successes as a type. The Finnish experience is less than a 10% sample, which is statistically meaningless. Going on with some simple rules, I'd would ignore the ground kills for airborne effectiveness since they are not airborne targets and were not defending in any manner. That is considered sacrilege by the Mustang guys who had a good time shooting up grounded German planes, but ground kills were never recognized by anyone until they became a large factor in the ETO.


----------



## GrauGeist (Apr 6, 2014)

Well, technically speaking, kamikaze aircraft were manned aircraft and the F6F's tally does include the downing of these.

You'll find that the Spitfire's victory includes the downing of the V-1, even though it was truly un-manned.

I find that in a case where a type downs an enemy aircraft, manned or unmanned, it counts as a valid claim. If the Hellcat didn't down a kamikaze, that was one more imminent threat to Allied assets much like the potential harm a V-1 posed if it wasn't intercepted.


----------



## GregP (Apr 6, 2014)

Actually, I meant to say the Hellcat victories, which included kamakazes, did NOT include kamakazes they didn't shoot down themselves. That is, the Hellcat did not get credit for kamakazes that were lost to other than Hellcats. 

To me, a V-1 is not an aerial victory. The target is unmaneuvering and defenseless. 

At least a kanakaze could try to avoid being shot dow, WAS an airborne manned aircraft, and probably was faster than a combat type since it probably had much equipment removed. It was important to shoot down V-1's and there should be a V-1 category for some recognition, but it was NOT an aerial victory in the classic sense of the word.

Classically an aerial victory was a victory over an airborne, manned enemy aircraft that could reasonably be expected to be armed in the vicinity of a combat area. That leaves out V-1's and ground kills, though they would merit a separate category.

I'm sure the recognition of ground kills and V-1's was due to the local commanders wanting to keep up morale in their squadrons when such kills were getting to be more frequent. Nevertheless, it goes against all recognition prior to late WWII.


----------



## GrauGeist (Apr 6, 2014)

There were many occasions were a V-1 "defended" itself by detonating, taking the interceptor with it. Of course, it wasn't due to a thought process on the V-1's part, but "tipping" or shooting at it posed a serious risk whereas shooting down a transport or glider, which also counted as a victory, was not as capable of defending itself like a bomber or fighter could.

In WWI, pilots were awarded credits for downing dirigibles, zepplins and spotting ballons, too...


----------



## pbehn (Apr 6, 2014)

GregP said:


> Actually, I meant to say the Hellcat victories, which included kamakazes, did NOT include kamakazes they didn't shoot down themselves. That is, the Hellcat did not get credit for kamakazes that were lost to other than Hellcats.
> 
> To me, a V-1 is not an aerial victory. The target is unmaneuvering and defenseless.
> 
> ...



The V1 carried 1 ton of explosives. It was small and faster than many allied interceptors in level flight, shooting one down was a challenge.


----------



## GregP (Apr 6, 2014)

A dirigible is a manned airborne aircraft that was armed. Sometimes so was a spotting balloon, though sometimes also not armed. I would award the dirigible, but not the balloon. At least the poor balloon spotter could be winched down and probably live. Not so the dirigible.

And I still would not award an aerial victory for a V-1. no matter what. We are just coming into a time when unlanned, armed combat aircraft are being deployed and they might very well should be a victory since they are defending themselves and even attacking on their own, but an unmanned reconnaissance drone? No way. If they start awarding those, it's just trying to make themselves look good.


----------



## pbehn (Apr 6, 2014)

GregP said:


> A dirigible is a manned airborne aircraft that was armed. Sometimes so was a spotting balloon, though sometimes also not armed. I would award the dirigible, but not the balloon. At least the poor balloon spotter could be winched down and probably live. Not so the dirigible.
> 
> And I still would not award an aerial victory for a V-1. no matter what. We are just coming into a time when unlanned, armed combat aircraft are being deployed and they might very well should be a victory since they are defending themselves and even attacking on their own, but an unmanned reconnaissance drone? No way. If they start awarding those, it's just trying to make themselves look good.


I dont know if they (V1s) were awarded as victories in the same way as a combat aircraft, however from what I read about the early days of the Zeppelins shooting one down was a very very difficult thing. They had defensive fire and you had to get so close there was a real danger of hitting it.


----------



## stona (Apr 6, 2014)

GregP said:


> And I still would not award an aerial victory for a V-1. no matter what.



No matter what? Well, it doesn't matter because those at the sharp end considered it an aerial victory. 

The Luftwaffe awarded points (which counted towards various awards) for forcing a bomber out of formation. 

The people who are the intended victims of these machines made the decisions, we, from the comfort of our armchairs don't have any right to challenge them. I expect the people on whom the V-1s were falling would gladly have given any pilot who destroyed one ten victories. It maybe difficult for someone from a country never bombed in a meaningful way to understand why the British and Germans adopted such measures.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## buffnut453 (Apr 6, 2014)

I'm pretty certain the RAF treated V-1 "kills" as a category separate from air-to-air kills against manned aircraft. In "Aces High", the compendium of aces from the Commonwealth air arms, the "Diver" aces were only included in the second volume which included additions/corrections to the first volume, the "Diver" aces being grouped in their own section. This suggests (to me, at least) that V-1 kills were not grouped together with other air-to-air victories by the Commonwealth air forces.

GregP rightly identifies radar and radio comms as vital contributing factors to the Hellcat's success. According to Layton's "And I Was There", we should also add signals intelligence from tactical interception of radio comms from Japanese formation leads. Apparently, this was a major contribution to the Marianas Turkey Shoot.


----------



## rinkol (Apr 6, 2014)

GregP said:


> At least a kanakaze could try to avoid being shot dow, WAS an airborne manned aircraft, and probably was faster than a combat type since it probably had much equipment removed.



The kamakaze aircraft carrying external ordnance would have been at a severe performance disadvantage. Also, I would expect that most of the pilots involved in these missions would have had minimal training even by the Japanese standards of the time.

Without disputing that the Hellcat and its pilots were very good, as others have noted, they enjoyed a host of advantages, including the very important one of being a major component in an integrated air defense system combining effective air surveillance and command and control capabilities. The US Navy had the initiative and could dictate the terms of the engagements. 

Aside from this, the Zero should have been replaced by newer aircraft, but these were never available in the required numbers.


----------



## pbehn (Apr 6, 2014)

buffnut453 said:


> I'm pretty certain the RAF treated V-1 "kills" as a category separate from air-to-air kills against manned aircraft. In "Aces High", the compendium of aces from the Commonwealth air arms, the "Diver" aces were only included in the second volume which included additions/corrections to the first volume, the "Diver" aces being grouped in their own section. This suggests (to me, at least) that V-1 kills were not grouped together with other air-to-air victories by the Commonwealth air forces.
> 
> GregP rightly identifies radar and radio comms as vital contributing factors to the Hellcat's success. According to Layton's "And I Was There", we should also add signals intelligence from tactical interception of radio comms from Japanese formation leads. Apparently, this was a major contribution to the Marianas Turkey Shoot.


I think you would have to, Squadron Leader Joseph Berry of No. 501 (Tempest) Squadron, shot down 59 V-1s, and Wing Commander Beamont destroyed 31....it is still an example of skill that should be recognized, other pilots just couldnt do it.


----------



## GregP (Apr 6, 2014)

V-1 kills ARE a separate category from aerial victories, so the guys at the sharp end of the stick agree with me. More properly, I agree with them; they made the decision well before I was born and cared at all. It matters to the people who were there in fighters; might not matter to you, Steve, and I would not try to convince you otherwise.

Ground kills are also separate from aerial victories. It blurs a bit when you look at something like a victory over a Ju 52. Was it armed or not? It might well be awarded since Ju 52's were known to be armed in some cases.

This just goes to show that if we ever tackle a list of victories in here, we better start with the ground rules! If we award V-1's and ground kills as victories, I think I'd decline to use the numbers.


----------



## buffnut453 (Apr 6, 2014)

Don't disagree...I was simply observing that V-1 kills were treated separately and I'd be surprised if they were included in a master list of Spitfire victories (assuming such a number exists). Also agree that ground rules need to be set for comparing kills and losses to ensure we're comparing, as much as is humanly possible, apples to apples. There are still many variables that make direct comparisons extremely difficult, hence the length and circularity of this discussion - the Hellcat served primarily in the Pacific while the Spit served primarily in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa which make it very hard to come up with substantive conclusions other than individuals' personal opinions (eg "I like the Hellcat" or "I like the Spitfire"...or the occasional wierdo who likes both!!  )


----------



## pbehn (Apr 6, 2014)

GregP said:


> V-1 kills ARE a separate category from aerial victories, so the guys at the sharp end of the stick agree with me. More properly, I agree with them; they made the decision well before I was born and cared at all. It matters to the people who were there in fighters; might not matter to you, Steve, and I would not try to convince you otherwise.
> 
> Ground kills are also separate from aerial victories. It blurs a bit when you look at something like a victory over a Ju 52. Was it armed or not? It might well be awarded since Ju 52's were known to be armed in some cases.
> 
> This just goes to show that if we ever tackle a list of victories in here, we better start with the ground rules! If we award V-1's and ground kills as victories, I think I'd decline to use the numbers.




However, I did read from a pilot who did the diver patrols that was the very best part of the war. Flying the fastest aircraft available over the south of England in the summer and occasionally taking on a rocket designed to kill his countrymen resulting in a massive explosion. Sure a V1 was easier than Galland but all together it was necessary and worth it. From his point of view it was just a skill issue you wernt killing anyone just saving lives.


----------



## GregP (Apr 6, 2014)

I agree. It was probably great fun requiring great skill, as well as very necessary. V-1's were not escorted. 

I would not say it is worth less, just not an aerial victory in the classic sense. Doesn't mean it wasn't necessary and doesn't mean it was less valuable. All it means is a V-1 victory falls into a different class of victory.


----------



## bobbysocks (Apr 6, 2014)

remember at that time they were awarding ac destroyed on the ground a kills towards ace statis...so a v1 would probably count.


----------



## VBF-13 (Apr 6, 2014)

So getting back to the question, what's the consensus? I'm getting confused. Is it the Hellfire or the Spitcat?


----------



## pbehn (Apr 6, 2014)

Seafire hellspit hellfire and damnation ...... the one that was pretty


----------



## redcoat (Apr 6, 2014)

bobbysocks said:


> remember at that time they were awarding ac destroyed on the ground a kills towards ace statis.


Not in the RAF.


----------



## Glider (Apr 6, 2014)

Its the Spitfire, from the Mk IX on its faster, leaves the Hellcat for dead in the climb, is more agile and looks better.


----------



## GregP (Apr 7, 2014)

No doubt the Spitfire over land or not too far from base and the Hellcat over water any appreciable distance from land.


----------



## vinnye (Apr 7, 2014)

For me its got to me the Spitfire for air to air combat due to its speed, climbing ability etc, for fighter bomber role maybe the Hellcat?


----------



## GregP (Apr 8, 2014)

Maybe anything farther away than a Spitfire can reach and still get home.


----------



## wuzak (Apr 8, 2014)

GregP said:


> Maybe anything *slightly* farther away than a Spitfire can reach and still get home.



Fixed that for you Greg.

The main range advantage the F6F has, I guess, is teh ability to hang off more and larger drop tanks.

That said, I think a XIV with a full 90 UKG drop tanks would go further than the F6F on internal fuel and still be able to out fly it.


----------



## GregP (Apr 8, 2014)

Well, an F6F with no drop tanks, flying from a carrier in the middle of the ocean ... is flying a mission the Spitfire could not fly under any circumstances. That's why I said anything requiring a carrier would merit the Hellcat EVERY time.

So, take the range of the Spitfire. Anything farther away than that would merit the Hellcat flying from a carrier. 

That's assuming it is over water. If it is over land, then ferry the Spitfire forward to a land base and have at it. The Spitfires could NOT fly the South Pacific missions simply due to range considerations while the Hellcats could easily do so since the landing field could move toward the target.

When Seafires came into play, then the range would be less of a concern and they could go where the carrier went while they were still in flying shape. But the Hellcats always still had the potential for greater range and payload capability. You could hang 4,000 pounds of ordnance under an F6F-5, 2,000 of which would be on the centerline. No Spitfire came anywhere NEAR that capacity ... and wasn't designed to do so either, so that statement is NOT a knock on the Spitfire. 

The Spits had a completely different mission from the outset and were probably the best in the world at that mission.

Comparing these two is ludicrous and is really searching for missions that both would fly. Almost by definition, there aren't many. Hellcats DID fly combat air patrol like the Spirfires, but mostly in places where no Spitfire would ever be seen ... like the middle of the Pacific Ocean or over an island that could only be approached from a long overwater stretch. So the operational overlap was necessarily very small and not really worth an argument. Most of the time, you'd take a Spitfire for the missions the Spitfires were assigned to and a Hellcat for the missions the Hellcats were assigned to because the other one would not be a real option. You COULD assign a Hellcat to defense of the UK from land ... but most were being used at sea and simply weren't available for the task. Now if there were a few Hellcats lying around unused and if there were pilots and ground crews available, maybe the argument could be real. But if there weren't any Spitfires available for the mission you wanted the Hellcat for then the argument would be moot. If you don't HAVE the Spitfires for the preferred Spitfire mission, then by all means use Hellcats for it if you have them.

It goes back to the old, "Don't tell me it can't be done. Tell me what it takes to GET it done." attitude.


----------



## wuzak (Apr 9, 2014)

No doubt that the Hellcat was a superior carrier fighter.


----------



## parsifal (Apr 9, 2014)

with regard to range, 1942-5 the Hellcat held the advantage, though in 1945, with the use of the LIII subtype, the differences were surprisngly minor. The BPF found the effective combat radius of the hellcat was 230 miles whilst the seafire II was about 180 miles.

The biggest advantage held by the hellcat was not range, though that was real enough. It was the ability of the F6F to haul bombs a lot further, and more of them each mission. The problem with the seafire wasnt that it was effective, or lacked range, or even, in the finish, that it suffered a really unusual accident rate. Its biggest problem was that it was simply too specialised. it was designed, built and used as a point defence interceptor, and in this role it was proven superior to the hellcat. thats why (or one of the reasons why) the BPF relied mostly on the Seafire over the other two fighters, as its main flet defence fighter. It was better low down compared to either US fighter. but there were so many things that it could not do, that the US birds could do better, that it made no real sense to retain the type on the limited capacity British carriers. The Sea Fury was a much better proposition in that respect


----------



## GregP (Apr 9, 2014)

Love the Sea Fury. 

One of the premier pistons, if ever there was one. There were probably around 10 piston fighters that could be easily interchanged with little effect ... other than spares, maintenance, and training requirements. I was addressing operational capabilities.


----------

