# Ideal Luftwaffe starting 1/1/1936



## wiking85 (Mar 5, 2014)

Your challenge is to build the ideal Luftwaffe starting the first of January 1936; you have total control over engine and airframe development, production, training, organization and officer placement/promotion. If you are really hardcore you can even set building priorities in terms of factories for both engines and airframes.


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## Gixxerman (Mar 5, 2014)

I think one of the prime things necessary is to sort out a proper system of oversight control.
Allowing mini-fiefdoms empires led to the huge waste of effort resources (when it was obvious shortages were going to be likely) in various silly pet projects as well as the countless examples of wasteful duplication failure to maximise on the technical advances that were achieved.
Big personalities can sometimes drive an organisation in a positive direction but quite clearly in the case of the LW it was a massive problem, ultimately.
But in a state like the nazi one it was not only tolerated but encouraged.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 5, 2014)

Trouble is you don't know _why_ certain engine projects were delayed or what some of the cures were. It is easy to say "just give project XX more money and resources" and the problems ( whatever they were) would be solved _when I need them to be solved for my scenario/plan._
Metallurgy and knowledge of vibration problems and metal fatigue were making lots of progress at the time as were other areas. 

I have no idea why some of the Luftwaffe gun programs took as long as they did, MG 151 was _supposed_ have been combat tested in Spain in 1938, some use may have been made of it as a fixed gun in bombers or seaplanes in 1940 but it was not used as a motor cannon until 1941. Without the belt feed MG 151 some types of aircraft (specifically single seat long range escort fighters) are not practical or at least severally limited.


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## davebender (Mar 5, 2014)

DB601 and Jumo211 engines are production ready or close to it. They will be your 1st Generation engines. Development and production will be fully funded. Production rate will be matched to give aircraft designers their preferred engine type.

Development of larger DB603 and Jumo213 will begin immediately. They will be 2nd Generation engines. Development and production will be fully funded. Production rate will be matched to give aircraft designers their preferred engine type.

Paired variants of V12 engines will be developed as happened historically. They are an option for bombers and transport aircraft.

Development and production of BMW132 and Bramo323 radial engines will be fully funded. Production rate will be matched to give aircraft designers their preferred engine type.

No V24 engine. No large radial engine. Late 1930s Germany cannot afford these uncertain programs when war is staring them in the face. 

Jet engine development at historical rate. However we may opt to mass produce Jumo004A engine starting 1943.

*Single engine fighter aircraft.*
Me-109 powered by DB601 engine. Superseded by Fw-190 powered by DB603 engine.

*Long range fighter / recon aircraft.*
Fw-187 powered by DB601 engines. Improved DB601 / DB605 engines will allow this aircraft to remain in production until at least 1945.

*Single engine dive bomber / CAS aircraft.*
Ju-87 powered by Jumo211 engine. Cannon armed variant will be produced from beginning in addition to dive bomber version.

*Heavy dive bomber.*
Ju-88. Initially powered by Jumo211. Improved version powered by Jumo213.
.....Torpedo bomber variant.
.....Night fighter variant.

*Long range level bomber.*
He-111 initially as that's all you have. Replace with DB606 powered Do-317 during 1941.
.....Dornier needs a major airframe contract. That's the deciding factor for production of Do-317 rather then Ju-288.

*Medium Transport aircraft.* This aircraft accomplishes most transport missions.
Ju-52 initially. Superseded by Jumo211 powered Ju-252.

*Strategic transport aircraft.* Maintain at least one geschwader for missions that require huge range / payload.
Ju-290 powered by Jumo213 engines.
.....Having 100 or more such aircraft would be very handy in the event of naval blockade. Can also support rapid deployment of military units.


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## GregP (Mar 6, 2014)

No real need to change anything in 1936. The real need is to get rid of Herman Goering. Anyone competent could have done better and might have succeeded in many areas where the RLM and Luftwaffe were deficient by virtue of good leadership.

In Adolph Hitler and Herman Goering ... two men less suited to planning a world beating aerial armada can hardly be imagined.

ANYTHING would have been better, maybe even choosing at random from within the Luftwaffe.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 6, 2014)

DB-601 and Jumo 211 are given. The 211 needs a modification for prop gun. Once the development of basis engines is done, next series of research is for greater RPM, rating the engines for higher octane fuel, and development of two stage variants. Water/alchocol injection, intercooling. BMW to develope a 14 cylinder radial, with most if not all modifications as for the V-12s.
Work on air cooled turbines. Will come in handy for jet engines (less need for rare materials) and turbo (in case it proves better than a two stage supercharging). Start developing jet engines. Those don't need hi-oct fuel, props, reduction gears, additional superchargers, intercoolers, MW-50, there is no adwerse torque on take off, one can be fast even with one engine. Shortcoming is fuel economy, hence the need for better piston engines.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 6, 2014)

Diesel engines could also use some development, the most likely users being long range marine patrol aircraft and transports. 
Armament: belt fed stuff is mandatory for calibers smaller than 37mm. Use 6-8 LMGs in single engined fighters, alternatively mix those with MG FF, until you have a proper belt-fed 20mm cannon. A belt-fed MG-FF might provide the Bf-109 with 3 cannons pretty early. For a bigger air-to-air cannon, neck up the Flak 20mm cartrige, so the shell of circa 200-250 g can be fired at 700-750 m/s and at 600+ rpm in a belt-fed gun. For air-to-ground work, start with 37mm, later move to 50 mm.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 6, 2014)

And here we go 

"DB601 and Jumo211 engines are production ready or close to it."

While the DB 601 was running in Jan of 1936 first contract was not placed until Feb 1937 and first series (not prototype) engine delivered Nov 1937. 

Wiki is a bit confusing on the Jumo 211. 
" first prototyped at Jumo's Dessau plant in 1935 and started testing in April 1936" is a little confusing?
" Limited production of the 1,000 PS Jumo 211A started in April 1937 at Dessau, with just over 1,000 completed before full production was started at Magdeburg in July" 1000 engines in 3-4 months was higher production than any other aircraft engine in the world at the time. and does not line up with 
"The first prototype aircraft powered by the 211A appeared in late 1937" First prototype aircraft flies with a Jumo 211 in late 1937 yet by this time they well over 1000 completed engines? 

No matter how you look at, in reality, the DB 601 and Jumo 211 are NOT ready for production or close to it in Jan of 1936, they are a year and half or more away. 

AS for the DB 603 and Jumo 213; How about seeing if DB _really_ has the 601 sorted out before sending them onto another engine. And try getting the Jumo 211 to run at, say 2600rpm ( initial ones ran at 2200rpm) before trying for 3200rpm. Jumo 213 was NOT larger than the 211. It "just" ran at higher rpm. 

"Development and production of BMW132 and Bramo323 radial engines will be fully funded. Production rate will be matched to give aircraft designers their preferred engine type."

Well, this seems like _another_ allied victory. Build both a 26.8 liter 9 cylinder radial and a 27.7 liter 9 cylinder radial (3.3% difference) and let the airframe makers "pick"?


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## rinkol (Mar 6, 2014)

One thing that is a bit of a mystery is the Bramo 329 which was cancelled in favor of the BMW 14 cylinder engine developments with Bamo being folded into BMW. The BMW 801 seemed to take a lot of work to reach a serviceable form. Would the 329 have been a better bet? Reportedly it was achieving 2000 hp on the test stand when it was cancelled.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 6, 2014)

One wonders just how good or bad the BMW-139 was?


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## wiking85 (Mar 6, 2014)

rinkol said:


> One thing that is a bit of a mystery is the Bramo 329 which was cancelled in favor of the BMW 14 cylinder engine developments with Bamo being folded into BMW. The BMW 801 seemed to take a lot of work to reach a serviceable form. Would the 329 have been a better bet? Reportedly it was achieving 2000 hp on the test stand when it was cancelled.



I doubt it, they were taking the same path using different engines as a starting point:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bramo


> In design terms the 323 was basically a dead-end with little growth potential. By the start of the war its 1,000 hp was already at the low end of the performance scale, and use was limited to transports and bombers. In order to build a 1,500 hp-class engine Bramo started development of a two-row version of the engine as the Bramo 329, mirroring similar developments at BMW who were trying to scale up their Pratt Whitney Hornet into the two-row BMW 139. Design of both engines was well advanced in 1939 when BMW bought Bramo, and cancelled work on the 329 to concentrate on what would become the excellent BMW 801.


The BMW 801 was pretty much just the two projects merged into one after the 139 had its issues; they took the best of both and made the 801.

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/engines/bmw-139-information-13261.html



tomo pauk said:


> One wonders just how good or bad the BMW-139 was?


Not bad, but superseded by the merging of the 329 and 139 projects. The 801 was the result of the best of both.


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## wiking85 (Mar 6, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> And here we go
> 
> "DB601 and Jumo211 engines are production ready or close to it."
> 
> ...


That's kind of hard to say, Dessau was the original producer of all new types of Jumo engines; they weren't a mass production facility, rather they custom built the new engines in small batches; so the limited production of the Jumo 211A in April 1937 was the beginning of production, it just took time to get the mass production facilities tooled up the new engine. So in effect it was already in mass production in April 1937, it just took time to get the mass production facilities ready to make it while the custom small batch jobs were being done at Dessau to get them into service until the assembly line type facilities took over the Dessau moved on to new developments.

As to the DB601, it was ready in early 1937, but it had to wait for the contract to be signed before it could start tooling; there wasn't a Dessau like facility for DB to start 601 production early until the mass production facilities were tooled. IMHO the problem was probably that the LW wanted to certify that the DB 601 was ready before contracting its mass production, which resulted in delay, especially as at this point Udet was taking over the Technical Branch and was cleaning house personnel-wise, so that resulted in a bigger delay than usual.


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## davebender (Mar 6, 2014)

Did BMW139 have a running prototype as of January 1936? If not how can we justify starting the program from scratch when 1936 BMW132 engine requires further development and we are about to start new programs for DB603 and Jumo213 engines?


Carbureted DB600 engine.
Historically nobody wanted this engine except RLM. They forced Daimler-Benz to produce it rather then beginning production with fuel injected DB601. Retooling from DB600 to DB601 cost Daimler-Benz money and delayed engine production. That should not be allowed to happen. DB601 should be mass produced at Genshagen beginning January 1937 as Daimler-Benz wanted.


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## wiking85 (Mar 6, 2014)

davebender said:


> Did BMW139 have a running prototype as of January 1936? If not how can we justify starting the program from scratch when 1936 BMW132 engine requires further development and we are about to start new programs for DB603 and Jumo213 engines?


What further development? It was pretty close to topped out by 1936 and the only real major gains were to be made by moving up the displacement ladder, which really only made sense by melding two versions of the engine together (or 7 cylinder versions of it). 
I agree that in 1936 it made sense to fund the DB603 and not stop. However the Jumo 213 wasn't even a glimmer in the eye of an engineer until 1938 or 39. No one knew that it was possible until the study about a high pressure cooling system was completed in 1939. At that point funding it was very much a good idea, but until then its kind of hard to tell. Arguably it took until the Jumo 211F proved the cooling system worked for the Jumo 213 project to really get off the ground.



davebender said:


> Carbureted DB600 engine.
> Historically nobody wanted this engine except RLM. They forced Daimler-Benz to produce it rather then beginning production with fuel injected DB601. Retooling from DB600 to DB601 cost Daimler-Benz money and delayed engine production. That should not be allowed to happen. DB601 should be mass produced at Genshagen beginning January 1937 as Daimler-Benz wanted.


Agreed, but the problem was the RLM was thinking politically; they needed an engine in 1936 in case things got unpleasant as a result of Hitler's foreign policy. Also it was a make work project designed to bolster employment too, plus it gave DB experience with producing a modern V12 engine, which was also the rationale behind producing the early marks of the Bf110 despite it being virtually useless until 1939 when it got the DB601.

Edit:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daimler-Benz_DB_600_series
it seems your TL is a bit off; the 601 entered its first powered flight testing in June 1936; it wouldn't have been ready that much sooner than it was ordered in February 1937. IMHO it seems like it perhaps lost about 4-5 months at most in terms of production, while netting Daimler with no experience producing the DB600 series. So it actually made sense to get the earlier 600 in production and modify existing lines to add in the fuel injector than wait until 1937 and begin not only tooling but any experience with the type at all, which would reduce early production of the 600 series.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 6, 2014)

davebender said:


> Did BMW139 have a running prototype as of January 1936? If not how can we justify starting the program from scratch when 1936 BMW132 engine requires further development and we are about to start new programs for DB603 and Jumo213 engines?
> ...



Why flog out the 9 cylinder, if the current state of art allows design of 14 cyl radial? At any rate, it will have 50% more power, give or take. Development of 9 cylinder can be continued by Bramo's engineers, BMW's can do the 14 cylinder. Going with BMW 139 will possibly allow for service use maybe a year earlier than 801?

BTW, we are NOT about to start the Jumo 213 and DB 603; see post #6.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 6, 2014)

davebender said:


> Carbureted DB600 engine.
> Historically nobody wanted this engine except RLM. They forced Daimler-Benz to produce it rather then beginning production with fuel injected DB601. Retooling from DB600 to DB601 cost Daimler-Benz money and delayed engine production. That should not be allowed to happen. DB601 should be mass produced at Genshagen beginning January 1937 as Daimler-Benz wanted.



Since the major differences between the 600 and the 601 were in the induction system how much of loss in tooling was there? Need new lathes or fixtures for the crankshafts? Need new machinery for making pistons or con rods? new casting cores for crankcase or cylinder blocks? 
2281 DB 600s were built. 

I would also like to know where this fully developed/ ready to go fuel injection system was hiding. 

Junkers went through a number of versions of the Jumo 210 before the "G" version got fuel injection and started appearing in production planes in 1938. Test versions would obviously be available earlier but the idea that DB had a fully developed/ready to go fuel injection system in 1936 and was _forced_ not to use it by the RLM is going to take a LOT of proof. As will the complementary idea that the supercharger drive and supercharger design used on the DB 601 was already designed and sitting on a shelf while DB was _forced_ to use an older design supercharger and single speed drive on the DB 600.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 6, 2014)

dup post


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## wiking85 (Mar 6, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> Since the major differences between the 600 and the 601 were in the induction system how much of loss in tooling was there? Need new lathes or fixtures for the crankshafts? Need new machinery for making pistons or con rods? new casting cores for crankcase or cylinder blocks?
> 2281 DB 600s were built.
> 
> I would also like to know where this fully developed/ ready to go fuel injection system was hiding.
> ...



I don't think he's saying that it was purposely held back, but rather that waiting would have made its introduction quicker; I disagree with that view and agree that he needs to demonstrate proof that that was possible, while also considering the experience that would be lost without producing any DB600s.


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## davebender (Mar 6, 2014)

> Why flog out the 9 cylinder, if the current state of art allows design of 14 cyl radial?


1936 Germany has aircraft powered by BMW132 engine and that won't change for at least five years. You've got to maintain full support for the engine program. So why not make improvements such as adding fuel injection system currently being employed on BMW VI engine?


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## tomo pauk (Mar 6, 2014)

Giving a product support, and/or limited development is one thing. Allocating the resources of both Bramo and BMW, plus Governmental funds, to an engine that is already 'behind he curve', while passing on development of a 50% more powerful one is a waste of those resources. Sort of Bristol neglecting Hercules because of Pegasus, or Wright neglecting R-2600 because of R-1820.


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## DonL (Mar 6, 2014)

The BMW 132 was on a continuous development also with fuel injection from 1934 till end of production.
To claim it was not or the BMW 801 influenced this development in a wrong way is totaly wrong. The development of the BMW 132 was the base of the 801.

The advertisement of a big radial engine was 1935 and totaly rational, because the BMW engineeres were specialist of radial engines and not liquid cooled engines since 1929, also the engineers from Bramo. Both companies were the most important engine companies from 1932-1938 of Germany and it was more then right and rational to integrate them in the development of high performance military engines.

A failure was the long wait of the fusion of both companies. Bramo was owned since 1935 from the RLM/Germany but no fusion with BMW till 1938 and no new engine factory till 1938/39. This was a big mistake. Fusion both companies at 1936 and funding a new engine factory at 1936/37 just as Junkers and Daimler Benz.
One of my personal important points to built a LW from 1936 onwards. 

An other realy important point at 1936 to fund in agreement with BMW, Junkers and Daimler Benz, component supplier of modern all around production tools for development and to enlarge production of this tools.

Next points will follow.


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## stona (Mar 6, 2014)

I don't think that there was much wrong with the Luftwaffe development between 1936 and the outbreak of the war. You can put any nations aircraft development under the microscope and pick holes in it.

By 1939 the Luftwaffe was equipped with one of the two best single engine fighters in the world, arguably the best dive bomber in the world, one of the best medium bombers in the world (if the Ju 88 wasn't THE best) and a pretty decent aircraft capable of taking on many different roles in the Bf 110. Others have already mentioned the Ju 52 which was also pretty good for its day.

I'd ask what exactly did the Germans do wrong?

Cheers

Steve


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## wiking85 (Mar 6, 2014)

stona said:


> I don't think that there was much wrong with the Luftwaffe development between 1936 and the outbreak of the war. You can put any nations aircraft development under the microscope and pick holes in it.
> 
> By 1939 the Luftwaffe was equipped with one of the two best single engine fighters in the world, arguably the best dive bomber in the world, one of the best medium bombers in the world (if the Ju 88 wasn't THE best) and a pretty decent aircraft capable of taking on many different roles in the Bf 110. Others have already mentioned the Ju 52 which was also pretty good for its day.
> 
> ...


Making the Ju88 a dive bomber, medium bomber, and the main bomber when it was designed as a fast, light, level bomber in 1935.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 6, 2014)

By 1939 the Ju-88 was not in LW service. Even during the BoB it was used in just a few units. By 1939, the DB-engined Bf-109 were few and far between either. The more numerous Jumo-engined examples were decent, but nothing spectacular. The Do-17 was once before fast, adding 'features' cut the speed.

The spectacular succeses of LW prior BoB have much more to do with catching enemy at sleep, attacking the enemy that can't compete in number of A/C on disposal, quality of German crews, doctrine, cooperation, number of sorties, capturing enemy airfields by Heer, rather than with supposed great features of German A/C.


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## DonL (Mar 6, 2014)

stona said:


> I don't think that there was much wrong with the Luftwaffe development between 1936 and the outbreak of the war. You can put any nations aircraft development under the microscope and pick holes in it.
> 
> By 1939 the Luftwaffe was equipped with one of the two best single engine fighters in the world, arguably the best dive bomber in the world, one of the best medium bombers in the world (if the Ju 88 wasn't THE best) and a pretty decent aircraft capable of taking on many different roles in the Bf 110. Others have already mentioned the Ju 52 which was also pretty good for its day.
> 
> ...



The advertisement of the Bomber B with a 2000 PS engine. This advertisement got the whole german engine development in the wrong direction.
The advertisement of the Bomber A with coupled engines and dive bombing capacity, also a big factor of the wrong engine development (coupled engines DB 606). No dive bombing for the He 177!

Too much focus of dive bombing at the Ju 88 and Do 217.
If dive bombing then only 50-55 degree, to be able pull out the bombs from the internal bomb bay.
Also dividing of the Ju 88 development, because the original intention was a fast bomber.

To prefer the Me 110 over the FW 187.

In summary this were very big mistakes and especially cost at least 3 years of engine develppment of the DB 603 and Jumo 213!


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## Shortround6 (Mar 6, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> The spectacular succeses of LW prior BoB have much more to do with catching enemy at sleep, attacking the enemy that can't compete in number of A/C on disposal, quality of German crews, doctrine, cooperation, number of sorties, capturing enemy airfields by Heer, rather than with supposed great features of German A/C.



Some of the quality (_experience)_of the German aircrew came from the hundreds of He 111 bombers powered by DB 600 engines even if the planes themselves were no longer in front line combat service when the war started. 

A small bit of the success/usefulness of the Bf 110 may also come from the long range radios they had.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 6, 2014)

DonL said:


> In summary this were very big mistakes and especially cost at least 3 years of engine develppment of the DB 603 and Jumo 213!



I am not so sure about the delay in Jumo 213. While I have no doubt it caused some delay the original Jumo 211 ran at 2200rpm. You have to walk before you can run and getting the Jumo 211 up to 2700rpm is going to have to happen before you can get it up to 3250rpm. You also have to convince Junkers to get rid of that G-O-D awful supercharger impeller they were using and get at least into the 1930s with impeller design 

Copying the Russian intake didn't hurt either. Trying to start the Jumo 213 earlier _might_ have lead to a model using C3 fuel (higher boost) and less RPM which may mean the 1750hp version using B4 doesn't get their much quicker? 

Did the DB 601N delay the 601E and 605?


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## DonL (Mar 6, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> By 1939 the Ju-88 was not in LW service. Even during the BoB it was used in just a few units. By 1939, the DB-engined Bf-109 were few and far between either. The more numerous Jumo-engined examples were decent, but nothing spectacular. The Do-17 was once before fast, adding 'features' cut the speed.
> 
> The spectacular succeses of LW prior BoB have much more to do with catching enemy at sleep, attacking the enemy that can't compete in number of A/C on disposal, quality of German crews, doctrine, cooperation, number of sorties, capturing enemy airfields by Heer, rather than with supposed great features of German A/C.



The production of the Bf 109 E1 began January 1939 and 1100 were built in the first 8 month of the year 1939.
Also the LW had the Ju 87, He 111, Do 17 and Ju 52 at the beginning of the war (1939) all in decent numbers.

Which other Air Force at 1939 had such aircrafts?
To my opinion you can rate the Ju 87,He 111 and Do 17 at 1939 as very good aircrafts (state of the art) also the Ju 52.

To claim this a/c's were average compare to other Air forces in 1939 is to my opinion wrong


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## davebender (Mar 6, 2014)

He-177A.
He-177B.
Do-317.
Ju-288.

Late 1930s Germany cannot afford two heavy bomber programs. Bomber A and Bomber B programs should be combined into a single competition. Winner gets the entire level bomber contract.


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## DonL (Mar 6, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> I am not so sure about the delay in Jumo 213. While I have no doubt it caused some delay the original Jumo 211 ran at 2200rpm. You have to walk before you can run and getting the Jumo 211 up to 2700rpm is going to have to happen before you can get it up to 3250rpm. You also have to convince Junkers to get rid of that G-O-D awful supercharger impeller they were using and get at least into the 1930s with impeller design
> 
> Copying the Russian intake didn't hurt either. Trying to start the Jumo 213 earlier _might_ have lead to a model using C3 fuel (higher boost) and less RPM which may mean the 1750hp version using B4 doesn't get their much quicker?
> 
> Did the DB 601N delay the 601E and 605?



To my sources and technical understanding the Jumo 213 is from the development steps and intention very simular to the DB 605.

Both the Jumo 211 as well as the DB 601 were both constructed without any knowledge or integration of pressurised water cooling. The engine block and head were constructed without this knowledge, especially the cooling lines through the engine. Both companies expiremented heavily from 1938 till 1940/41 with pressurised water cooling and integrated it in the Jumo 211 and DB 601. But this integration was limited through the construction of the two engines without any knowledge about pressurised water cooling. The limits were the DB 601E (2700 rpm) and the Jumo 211 F (2600rpm) both in production late 1940 early 1941.

Daimler Benz constructed the DB 605 with the knowledge of pressurised water cooling and other cooling lines for more power and better cooling.
To my understanding the Jumo 213 was constructed to the same parameters, new and better cooling lines through the engine for more and better power and cooling, this was the essential difference to the Jumo 211.

The Jumo 213 reached more power and especially more RPM then the DB 605 mainly through an other basic design philosophy (also Jumo 211), because he was heavier/more stable built and from much better alloys. The DB 605 was a save alloy engine, the Jumo 213 wasn't.

To my sources the first ideas of the Jumo 213 existed at 1938, first prototype engines were built at 1940, but as I mentioned before all at a smal priority. My idea and believing is that the Jumo 213 could also be developed in the same timeline as the DB 605, because both developments had the same intention and goal and the same timeline to get the knowledge. THe development of the Jumo 222 clearly prevented such a concentrated development of the Jumo 213.

The same development steps are necessary for the DB 603, because it was an enlarged DB 600 from the pantograph. If you develop a DB 603 from 1937, he would have had all the same steps as the DB 601 till the DB 605, but to my opinion there would much more time to do basic engine work, to sort out the reliable problems.

To my opinion there would be more work to develop the DB 603 (without reliable problems) as to develop the Jumo 213.

THe rest is tuning from the base, also an other supercharger or impeller, but both engines would be in production at 1942 and Germany had more time to change the production or parts of the production and could realy concentrate on the power output without intensive basic engine work to sort out any "basic" reliable problems.

Development steps Jumo 211:

Jumo 211A 2200 RPM released 1937
Jumo 211 B 2400 RPM released end of 1938
Jumo 211 F 2600 RPM released 1940


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## DonL (Mar 6, 2014)

davebender said:


> He-177A.
> He-177B.
> Do-317.
> Ju-288.
> ...



Bomber B is a fast medium bomber not a heavy bomber, read the advertisemnet, also the Do 217 was a medium bomber not a heavy bomber.


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## stona (Mar 6, 2014)

DonL said:


> To claim this a/c's were average compare to other Air forces in 1939 is to my opinion wrong



Exactly. The Luftwaffe in 1939/40, the war started in September, was equipped with some of the best aircraft in the world. It also had some of the best trained and certainly most experienced aircrew in the world. Across the board it was the best equipped of any air force. 
Of course mistakes were made, everyone else made them too, but overall the Luftwaffe did pretty well.
The fact that no long term strategic planning was done, causing the Luftwaffe to come up short by the start of Barbarossa, is an entirely different subject, just as doctrinal (dive bombing or strategic bombing, the entire 'zerstorer' concept) questions are.
In the years leading up to the war the Germans produced some of the best aeroplanes and aero engines of their time.
Cheers
Steve


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## davebender (Mar 6, 2014)

Terms such as "Fast Medium Bomber" and "Heavy Bomber" are beside the point. These type aircraft programs are expensive. 1936 Germany has resources to fund one of the programs properly. Or they can half fund both programs and get the historical results. 

I vote for funding one level bomber program properly and cancelling the other. Pick one. It should replace the He-111 NLT 1942.


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## wiking85 (Mar 6, 2014)

DonL said:


> To my sources and technical understanding the Jumo 213 is from the development steps and intention very simular to the DB 605.
> 
> Both the Jumo 211 as well as the DB 601 were both constructed without any knowledge or integration of pressurised water cooling. The engine block and head were constructed without this knowledge, especially the cooling lines through the engine. Both companies expiremented heavily from 1938 till 1940/41 with pressurised water cooling and integrated it in the Jumo 211 and DB 601. But this integration was limited through the construction of the two engines without any knowledge about pressurised water cooling. The limits were the DB 601E (2700 rpm) and the Jumo 211 F (2600rpm) both in production late 1940 early 1941.
> 
> ...



AFAIK the DB605 was mainly different via an increased bore size and larger displacement, while the Jumo 213 was the same displacement, built smaller, but with higher rpm.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daimler-Benz_DB_605


> The primary differences between the 605 and 601 were greater displacement, higher revolutions, higher compression ratio and a more powerful supercharger. Through careful study the engineers determined that the cylinders could be bored out to a larger diameter without seriously affecting the strength of the existing block. *The difference was minimal, increasing from the 601's 150 mm cylinder bore to the 605's 154 mm, but this increased the overall displacement from 33.9 litres to 35.7*. Altered valve timing increased the inlet period and improved the scavenging to give greater volumetric efficiency at higher speeds, which improved the maximum allowable RPM from 2,600 in the 601 to 2,800 in the 605. The combination of these changes raised power output from 1,350 PS (1,332 hp) to 1,475 PS (1455 hp). The engine was otherwise similar, notably in size, which was identical to the 601. However, its weight did increase from 700 to 756 kg.
> 
> In other ways the engine was essentially identical to the 601, being a 12 cylinder, inverted-V (with the crankshaft above the cylinders) design. Both used dual Bosch magnetos firing twin spark plugs for ignition. Fuel injection was powered by a pump supplying up to 90 bar and the oil system used three pumps with a separate 35 litre oil tank. The supercharger was fairly advanced for the era in that it used a barometrically controlled hydraulic clutch (fluid coupling) which allowed the system to automatically compensate for changes in altitude.
> 
> One major design difference was the switch from ball bearings to sleeve bearings which, when combined with increasingly poor grades of lubricants, led to serious problems in service, including engine fires; initially, for example, the use of emergency power was forbidden. Although Daimler-Benz redesigned the bearings and added oil slingers and their associated coolers, the RLM considered the DB 605 to be a "sick engine" and the problems had not been fully resolved by the end of the war.[2]



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jumo_213


> When the Jumo 211 entered production in the late 1930s it used an unpressurized liquid cooling system based on an "open cycle". Water was pumped through the engine to keep it cool, but the system operated at atmospheric pressure, or only slightly higher. Since the boiling point of water decreases with altitude (pressure) this meant that the temperature of the cooling water had to be kept quite low to avoid boiling at high altitudes, which in turn meant that the water removed less heat from the engine before flowing into the radiator to cool it.
> 
> By contrast, the 1940 Daimler-Benz DB 601E used a pressurized coolant system that ran at the same pressure regardless of altitude, raising the boiling point to about 110°C. This allowed it to use considerably less water for the same cooling effect, which remained the same at all altitudes. Although otherwise similar to the Jumo 210 in most respects, the 601 was smaller and lighter than the 211, and could be run at higher power settings at higher altitudes, making it popular in fighter designs. The 211 was relegated to "secondary" roles in bombers and transports.
> 
> ...


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## DonL (Mar 6, 2014)

THe original intention of the DB 605 was the same as at the Jumo 213, the bored out cylinders were a benefit, but not the original intention.
The intention was to fully integrate the pressurised water cooling. We have also seen a new engine without bored out cylinders.

Take a look at the DB 601E he had a dry weight of 785kg, the bigger DB 605 A only of 756kg.


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## wiking85 (Mar 6, 2014)

DonL said:


> THe original intention of the DB 605 was the same as at the Jumo 213, the bored out cylinders were a benefit, but not the original intention.
> The intention was to fully integrate the pressurised water cooling. We have also seen a new engine without bored out cylinders.
> 
> Take a look at the DB 601E he had a dry weight of 785kg, the bigger DB 605 A only of 756kg.



AFAIK the only major difference between the 605 and the 601E was the larger bore of the 605. The cooling system was the same and overall the entire engine block was the same. That and the sleeve bearings instead of ball bearings (was that due to allied bombing of ball bearings?).

The Jumo 213 was significantly different than the 211, being built smaller and stronger, which made it a different engine. The only design similarity between the 213 and 605 was the pressurized cooling system. That's why the 605 had less power than the 213, which was designed to take maximum advantage of the new cooling system, rather than the 605, which just increased its displacement and got lower power than the 213 as a result. The 605 wasn't a full redesign, it was just a bigger bore 601E.

Also I don't think you're right about the 213 being 3 years delayed; in fact I think that at best it would have been ready at the end of 1941 if further 211 refinements were cancelled after the success of the Jumo 211F and Jumo 222 was placed on low priority, with all the resulting engineering resources being placed on the 213 from 1940. At best its cleared for mass production by the end of 1941 and phases in by mid-1942, rather than being cleared in March 1943 and being delayed by Allied bombing until 1944. 

Now the DB603 is a different story; had it not been cancelled in 1937 and retained funding, perhaps especially if the DB604 wasn't attempted, then yes I think a 1700PS or better engine could be fully reliable by mid-1941. It would have been excellent for a Ta-152, Do-217, Ju88 development, four propellor He177, and several other aircraft. That was a major mistake of the RLM, which I think came from Udet; considering the original spec resulted from the Wimmer T-amt, which was under Milch's tenure, if we avoid having Wever die and Udet rising to prominence, then the DB603 isn't cancelled and is mass produced from 1941 on. So we have a four propellor He177, a mass produced Do-217, probably and early Ju388 or at least 88S and G, not to mention a Ju188. Probably even a He111 with the DB603. We also probably get more RLM funded Daimler factories to production the DB603...perhaps an early Ostmark type facility? IIRC Ostmark was not planned on until 1941, so with the DB603 being developed and probably ready by 1940-41 having something to produce it in the thousands would be needed in 1938 or so. Right after Austria is annexed it could end up in construction like the Nibelungenwerke, which IIRC was started in 1939. Given the wasted investment in the VW factory at Wolfsburg having a large engine factory started in 1938 ready for 1940-41 makes total sense and in fact more so than building VW in 1939 then never using it to full capacity.


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## DonL (Mar 6, 2014)

wiking85 said:


> AFAIK the only major difference between the 605 and the 601E was the larger bore of the 605. The cooling system was the same and overall the entire engine block was the same. That and the sleeve bearings instead of ball bearings (was that due to allied bombing of ball bearings?).
> 
> The Jumo 213 was significantly different than the 211, being built smaller and stronger, which made it a different engine. The only design similarity between the 213 and 605 was the pressurized cooling system. That's why the 605 had less power than the 213, which was designed to take maximum advantage of the new cooling system, rather than the 605, which just increased its displacement and got lower power than the 213 as a result. The 605 wasn't a full redesign, it was just a bigger bore 601E.
> 
> ...



I don't fully disagree to your opinion, but there are differences between the Db 601E and and the Db 605.

Why was the RPM of the larger DB 605 (2800 RPM)higher then the DB 601E (2700 RPM)
Also the DB 605 was layout to one handle mode, the DB 601E not and the DB 605A was lighter then the DB 601E.

The DB 603 was mainly cancled through the Bomber B advertisement. I don't want a Bomber B nor a 2000 PS engine advertisement at 1937, to me it is nonsense. 
Also the Bomber A only with four engines.

So,
1. DB concentrate on the DB 601 and DB 603 development without DB 604X and DB 606
2 Junkers concentrate on the Jumo 211 and after experience and experiments with pressurized cooling system on the Jumo 213. Further development on the Jumo 211 would be cancled after the F. Also the development of the 004. No Jumo 222 development
3. BMW and Bramo concentrate on development of the BMW 801 from 1936/37 and later on the development of the 003

4. No destroyer development or concept, it will die with the FW 187 in production instead of the Me 110.
5. Also I'm not a fan of this whole experiment with Ju 188 and Ju 388, the Ju 88 did pretty well and the goal is to concentrate on her to make her better as fast bomber, nightfighter and naval- striking aircraft. The Do 217 will do the other jobs.
6. Messerschmitt should only concentrate on the Bf 109 to make her better and the development of the Me 262


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## parsifal (Mar 7, 2014)

Quality is one issue, but my opinion is that German aircraft quality was pretty good throughout the war. They might have done better, but this was not the primary problem for the LW

LWs main problems early in the war were 

1) Shortages in production
2) Over-emphasis on whole airframe production, not enough effort on replacement engines
3) Insufficient effort on the pilot replacement programs....as the war progressed German pilots became less and less well trained 
4) Linked to the above a shortage of training aircraft

If the luftwaffe could overcome its logistic issues, it would have won the BoB and would not have been bled white in its other campaigns. this was not a function, or a result of poor aircraft designs. it was a function of a generally poor support element. If the numbers had been there, the quality issue would not have mattered

One issue in the technology is the short range of its fighters. Longer range would have been a significant tactical advantage for the Germans. 

Another technical improvement for not much outlay would be to convert from drum fed cannon to a belt feed system. 60 round drums for the 20mm cannon is just such an unneccessary constraint on the firepower of the fighter forces


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## tomo pauk (Mar 7, 2014)

DonL said:


> The production of the Bf 109 E1 began January 1939 and 1100 were built in the first 8 month of the year 1939.
> Also the LW had the Ju 87, He 111, Do 17 and Ju 52 at the beginning of the war (1939) all in decent numbers.
> 
> Which other Air Force at 1939 had such aircrafts?
> ...



English is not my 1st laguage. I've read the sentence that begins as 'by 1939' as 'at start of 1939'. I'd welcome a clarification.
The Ju-87B in was exceptional aircraft if the opponent does not have a capable defense - it's by no means a perfect aircraft. The Do-17 and He-111 were about as good, or just slightly better than many other similar bombers - Wellington, Hampden, Whitley, SB-2, DB-3, SM-79, Fiat BR.20, CANT Z.1011 and 1007, Martin B-10 and 167, PZL.37. Ju-52 was as good as DC-3 or HP Harrow.

So I will say that German A/C were as capable as what the rest of industrialized world was fielding. It were other factors, listed in above post, that made LW superior from 1939-42 (bar RAF).


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## Shortround6 (Mar 7, 2014)

As a quibble the JU 52 was not actually that good as an all-round transport. It might have been pretty good at short, rough field work but it was slow, short ranged, and cramped. Not surprising considering that it was designed in 1930 as a larger version of the 1926 W 33 transport. By the late 30s it was quite possible to haul more payload faster and further on the same amount of power (fuel).


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## tomo pauk (Mar 7, 2014)

What about fighters? The Bf-109 will be the standard issue. By the time it acquires a 1000+ HP engine install the drop tank facility, maybe reinforce the horizontal stabilator, so the struts can be eliminated; install retractable tail wheel? Should boost range and speed. 
When to introduce 'another iron in the fire', what to expect from that one?


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## wiking85 (Mar 7, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> What about fighters? The Bf-109 will be the standard issue. By the time it acquires a 1000+ HP engine install the drop tank facility, maybe reinforce the horizontal stabilator, so the struts can be eliminated; install retractable tail wheel? Should boost range and speed.
> When to introduce 'another iron in the fire', what to expect from that one?


Single engine fighter-wise I don't think there is anything to do differently than the LW did historically. The FW190 was perfect for its time, the only thing one could hope for would be less engine issues with the BMW 801. Once the war was on its hard to just phase out the Me109, especially when the 209 and 309 were failures. I would say start working on the Ta-152 with DB603 in 1941 though, rather than 1943 and waiting for the Jumo 213 and detouring into the Fw190C/D.

Other than that the Me262 is very much were they should go with jets and avoid all the rocket detours and other jet designs.

In terms of two engine aircraft, I'm in favor of the Bf110 as a gunship/ground attack/fight-bomber. Beyond that the Fw187 is a necessity for long range escort/air superiority fighter. Working on the Me210 is worthwhile without the dive bombing requirement, provided it is understood that it isn't necessary if it doesn't work out in testing. The Do335 is worthwhile for a back up.

As far as nightfighters the Ju88C/G is the only way to go for me, though having the Bf110 as a stopgap along with the Do215 makes sense in production terms. Don't bother with the He219 IMHO. A nightfighter Me262 is a viable research path too, as is the do335. But enhancing the Ju88 into better and better nightfighters until the jet age makes total sense.


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## stona (Mar 7, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Quality is one issue, but my opinion is that German aircraft quality was pretty good throughout the war. They might have done better, but this was not the primary problem for the LW
> 
> LWs main problems early in the war were
> 
> ...



These are precisely the kind of problems I was referring to as a lack of strategic planning.

I'm surprised that a drop tank wasn't introduced for the Bf 109 earlier. The first drop tank equipped Bf 109 to appear in a British CEAR was White 11, WNr. 4900, a Bf 109E-1 flown by Fw.H.Schmidt of 6./JG 53 which force-landed at Wheelstead Farm, Old Romney on 30 November 1940. 

You could say the same thing about the adoption of drop tanks by the US 8th AF escort fighters too. As I said before all sides made what, in retrospect, were easily fixable mistakes.

None of this has anything to do with the aeroplanes developed from 1936 until the beginning of the war.

Cheers

Steve


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## wiking85 (Mar 7, 2014)

stona said:


> These are precisely the kind of problems I was referring to as a lack of strategic planning.
> 
> I'm surprised that a drop tank wasn't introduced for the Bf 109 earlier. The first drop tank equipped Bf 109 to appear in a British CEAR was White 11, WNr. 4900, a Bf 109E-1 flown by Fw.H.Schmidt of 6./JG 53 which force-landed at Wheelstead Farm, Old Romney on 30 November 1940.
> 
> ...



Part of the problem was not having a good design in service; the plywood version was defective and the early aluminum version wasn't without issues. The aluminum option was costly in terms of aluminum, which Germany may or may not have been able to afford; having the Fw187 in service though reduces or eliminates that need to have drop tanks in service for the Me109. Drop tanks too do not solve the serious historical issue of too few fighter pilots, which resulted in a surplus of fighters to operational pilots during the BoB! Then we get into fuel issues for training and how the lack of having good staff planning from 1936 on really screwed things up (aka keep Walter Wever alive and a lot of these issues never appear).


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## DonL (Mar 7, 2014)

> English is not my 1st laguage. I've read the sentence that begins as 'by 1939' as 'at start of 1939'. I'd welcome a clarification.
> The Ju-87B in was exceptional aircraft if the opponent does not have a capable defense - it's by no means a perfect aircraft. The Do-17 and He-111 were about as good, or just slightly better than many other similar bombers - Wellington, Hampden, Whitley, SB-2, DB-3, SM-79, Fiat BR.20, CANT Z.1011 and 1007, Martin B-10 and 167, PZL.37. Ju-52 was as good as DC-3 or HP Harrow.
> 
> So I will say that German A/C were as capable as what the rest of industrialized world was fielding. It were other factors, listed in above post, that made LW superior from 1939-42 (bar RAF).



Messerschmitt Bf 109 ? Wikipedia
Messerschmitt Bf 109 ? Wikipedia

This links are in german, at the Bf 109 E link is written production start was January 1939 and at the first 8 month 1100 were built.
At the Polen link you can see the strenghts report of 2. September 1939, there were 219 E1 compare to 95 B/D.




> 3) Insufficient effort on the pilot replacement programs....as the war progressed German pilots became less and less well trained
> 4) Linked to the above a shortage of training aircraft




This is some issue I'm very curious about:

To my opinion this was mostly the mistake of Jeschonnek, because it had no priority on his personal to do list and he was convinced the war is over at 1942. I'm not sure the LW had not enough training a/c's. I have done a little research of numbers till September 1939 and till 1945. Perhaps someone can show comparable numbers for the RAF or France Air Force. I think a comparation to the USA would be not constructive.

German trainers built or commanded to training units till end of 1939

Klemm Kl 25: 359
Klemm Kl 35: 500
Albatros Al 101: 83

Focke-Wulf Fw 44. 1702
Bücker Bü 131: 1500
Bücker Bü 133: 100
Gotha Go 145 : 1192
Arado Ar 66: 1356
Arado Ar 76: 193
Focke-Wulf Fw 56: 514
Heinkel He 72: 767
Heinkel He 42: 203
Focke-Wulf Fw 58: 1200

Arado Ar 65: 70
Heinkel He 45: since 1939: 400
Heinkel He 46: since 1939: 400
Heinkel He 51: since 1939: 150

In summary = 10689 training a/c's

German trainers built or commanded to training units till end of 1939-1945

Klemm Kl 35: 800

Bücker Bü 131: 1500
Bücker Bü 181: 2.681
Messerschmitt Bf 108: 650
Arado Ar 96: 2891
Arado Ar 68: since 1940: 400
Focke-Wulf Fw 58: 470
Siebel Si 204: 1.216

In summar y= 10608 training a/c's

From 1930-1945 ~ 21300 a/c's

So if we only look at real trainers: Albatros Al 101: 83, Klemm Kl 25: 359, Klemm Kl 35: 1300, Focke-Wulf Fw 44: 1702, Bücker Bü 131: 3000, Bücker Bü 133 100, Gotha Go 145 : 1192, Arado Ar 66: 1356, Arado Ar 76: 193, Heinkel He 42: 203, Focke-Wulf Fw 56: 514, Heinkel He 72: 767, Bücker Bü 181: 2.681, Messerschmitt Bf 108: 650, Arado Ar 96: 2891, Focke-Wulf Fw 58: 1670, Siebel Si 204: 1.216

In summary: 19877 

Note: many underpowered frontline a/c's like Ju 87A, Me 110B, Do 17, He 111, Bf 109 B/D later E's were also commanded to the training units.

Compare to other Air Forces are this realy inferior numbers?


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## stona (Mar 7, 2014)

wiking85 said:


> Part of the problem was not having a good design in service; the plywood version was defective and the early aluminum version wasn't without issues. The aluminum option was costly in terms of aluminum, which Germany may or may not have been able to afford; having the Fw187 in service though reduces or eliminates that need to have drop tanks in service for the Me109. Drop tanks too do not solve the serious historical issue of too few fighter pilots, which resulted in a surplus of fighters to operational pilots during the BoB! Then we get into fuel issues for training and how the lack of having good staff planning from 1936 on really screwed things up (aka keep Walter Wever alive and a lot of these issues never appear).



The drop tank carried by Schmidt was the aluminium version. From Dave Wadman.

A subsequent report on this aircraft appears in CEAR Serial No.33 No.3/179 of 20 December 1940 which states: 

"Crashed on 30.11.40 at Old Romney. This aircraft was fitted with extra oil tank of two gallons capacity and pipe lines for extra fuel tankage. The aircraft has now been examined but no extra fuel tank was found. The fuel line however, runs down to the bottom of the fuselage near the external bomb rack and it is assumed that a jettisonable auxiliary tank had been carried. This assumption is strengthened by the fact that a metal, streamlined petrol tank was found in the country* which could be slung to the bomb rack of a Me 109. The capacity of this tank is approximately 90 gallons (the tank is damaged and the capacity cannot be definitely ascertained). This would give an extra range to the aircraft of about 450 miles at normal cruising speed, or rather more than double the usual range. A further report will be issued if and when a tank is found in situ."

* In this context 'country' means the countryside......may not be obvious to non native English speakers.

The pressed steel tank, made to an identical pattern to the aluminium version, came much later. If these two were new rather than 70 years old, and freshly painted, they would be indistinguishable.







Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Mar 7, 2014)

wiking85 said:


> Single engine fighter-wise I don't think there is anything to do differently than the LW did historically. The FW190 was perfect for its time, the only thing one could hope for would be less engine issues with the BMW 801. Once the war was on its hard to just phase out the Me109, especially when the 209 and 309 were failures. I would say start working on the Ta-152 with DB603 in 1941 though, rather than 1943 and waiting for the Jumo 213 and detouring into the Fw190C/D.



As an airframe (ie. we will forget about the engines for a brief moment), the Fw-190 was offering several things superior to the Bf-109: 
-somewhat a bigger wing that, combined with a more generous fuselage volume, allowed for more armament, ammo fuel
-wide set, inward retracting U/C
-far better field of vision
-far better rate of roll, much due to stiff wing with two main spars, span-vise reinforcements and big ailerons
-covered main U/C and retractable tailwheel, for better streamlining

So indeed, too good a fighter to pass on. Would it be possible to introduce it earlier, say, just for the BoB? The BMW 139 was offering excellent power (_Short-term power (5 min): 1410 HP at 4500 m altitude
Increased short-term power (30 min): 1270 HP at 4900 m altitude_, via HoHun), but the reliability was not that good. Maybe install the DB-601A as power egg, so the radial engine can be installed without much of problems? In case the Jumo-211B is rated for 5 min power (ie. comparable with DB-601A), we might use those power eggs instead of DB-601As. The inter-cooled Jumo-211J with C3 fuel for 1941, in case radial is still running late?
I'd have it with 2 weapon stations per each of two wing halves, each station holding either 2 LMGs, or one cannon. Preferably total of 8 MG-15s, each with ~500 rounds for BoB. 
From 1941-42, in 'my Luftwaffe', the engine would be either 14 cyl radial, from 1942-43 the 2-stage DB-601 or Jumo 211. Ie. no DB 603 or Jumo 213.



> Other than that the Me262 is very much were they should go with jets and avoid all the rocket detours and other jet designs.



One might want the single engined jet, too, so the piston jobs can be replaced quickly. 



> In terms of two engine aircraft, I'm in favor of the Bf110 as a gunship/ground attack/fight-bomber. Beyond that the Fw187 is a necessity for long range escort/air superiority fighter. Working on the Me210 is worthwhile without the dive bombing requirement, provided it is understood that it isn't necessary if it doesn't work out in testing. The Do335 is worthwhile for a back up.



The Fw-187 should come in handy, until it's replaced with 2-stage Fw-190s. The push-pull fighter might be a good alternative, the design need to be started ASAP, so even on two DB-601s or Jumo 211s the aircraft can perform. With those two and Ju-88, there should not be need for Bf-110, Mtt can concentrate on 109 and jet(s).



> As far as nightfighters the Ju88C/G is the only way to go for me, though having the Bf110 as a stopgap along with the Do215 makes sense in production terms. Don't bother with the He219 IMHO. A nightfighter Me262 is a viable research path too, as is the do335. But enhancing the Ju88 into better and better nightfighters until the jet age makes total sense.



Agreed that Ju-88 should get the priority. Maybe trying also the push-pull fighter as a NF?


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## parsifal (Mar 7, 2014)

RAF and Commonwealth home produced trainers that i know of

Airspeed Oxford: 8586
Avro anson: 11020
Tiger Moth: 8868
DH86: 62
DH93 30
Miles Magister 1303
Miles martinet: 1325
Miles Master: 3520
CAC Wirraway: 900
CAC wackett: 250
Proctor: 1143

Thats a total of about 37500. Germany produced under 10000 dedicated trainers before and during the war that it could realistically use. Both side of course used operational types in their OTUs


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## wiking85 (Mar 7, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> As an airframe (ie. we will forget about the engines for a brief moment), the Fw-190 was offering several things superior to the Bf-109:
> -somewhat a bigger wing that, combined with a more generous fuselage volume, allowed for more armament, ammo fuel
> -wide set, inward retracting U/C
> -far better field of vision
> ...


Agreed.



tomo pauk said:


> So indeed, too good a fighter to pass on. Would it be possible to introduce it earlier, say, just for the BoB? The BMW 139 was offering excellent power (_Short-term power (5 min): 1410 HP at 4500 m altitude
> Increased short-term power (30 min): 1270 HP at 4900 m altitude_, via HoHun), but the reliability was not that good. Maybe install the DB-601A as power egg, so the radial engine can be installed without much of problems? In case the Jumo-211B is rated for 5 min power (ie. comparable with DB-601A), we might use those power eggs instead of DB-601As. The inter-cooled Jumo-211J with C3 fuel for 1941, in case radial is still running late?
> I'd have it with 2 weapon stations per each of two wing halves, each station holding either 2 LMGs, or one cannon. Preferably total of 8 MG-15s, each with ~500 rounds for BoB.
> From 1941-42, in 'my Luftwaffe', the engine would be either 14 cyl radial, from 1942-43 the 2-stage DB-601 or Jumo 211. Ie. no DB 603 or Jumo 213.


The BMW139 was not viable AFAIK; it needed to be revised into the 801 due to experience merged in from Bramo. Merge the two radial engine companies sooner and start the 14 cylinder radial sooner and we are all set, but using the early development apparently was not a viable option. 

As to using an liquid cooled inline, there was a lack of DBs and a lack of Jumo performance at altitude where the fighters were needing it. A jumo powered fighter would be stuck well below 20,000 feet. Increase DB production early on with greater investment in its production and a FW190 powered DB601 is potentially viable, but is there a guarantee that it would perform as well as the radial engine design? The smaller width changes the design, as did the long nose C and D series, which changed its flight characteristics that made it so memorable in the A-series. You can't power-egg a single engine fighter with fuselage based engine, you need a new fuselage otherwise you gain unnecessary drag and weight by having to brace the smaller liquid cooled inlines in a wider radial designed airframe. 



tomo pauk said:


> One might want the single engined jet, too, so the piston jobs can be replaced quickly.


Sure, but there was never any single engine powerful enough to make this work. Post-war it would be fine, but given the technical constraints up to 1945-46 its just not viable; have it be backburner research for 1946.




tomo pauk said:


> The Fw-187 should come in handy, until it's replaced with 2-stage Fw-190s. The push-pull fighter might be a good alternative, the design need to be started ASAP, so even on two DB-601s or Jumo 211s the aircraft can perform. With those two and Ju-88, there should not be need for Bf-110, Mtt can concentrate on 109 and jet(s).


Push pull had too long of a lead time to be ready by 1944; it would have to start development in the mid-1930s. If there was enough foresight, having jumo of db powered push-pull fighters would have been indeed awesome by 1942-43. The problem is starting the research early enough. A smaller Do-335 in 1942-43 would have been ideal IMHO.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dornier_Do_335
The project didn't really start until 1939 and it took serious development before the Do-335 could even be contemplated in 1942 when the design started. I looked into the pre-official project and it wasn't able to be moved up without starting push-pull fighter research in 1935/36.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Göppingen_Gö_9
Even having the concept research start in 1937 wasn't enough; I don't buy the complaint that Goering cancelled research in 1940, as the Go-9 flew in 1941 after the supposed cancel order. 

https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dornier_Do_335
You'd have to start in 1935 with the Go-9 to get something like that ready by 1942 in combat. As to the Fw187 I think it has viability until about 1943; at that point there are too many other more viable options (not the Me210/410). Then its all about the Ta-152 IMHO. 




tomo pauk said:


> Agreed that Ju-88 should get the priority. Maybe trying also the push-pull fighter as a NF?


Sure, but the development of the push-pull meant it wasn't ready until late 1944, which is too late.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 7, 2014)

Going for the "push-pull" falls into the trap that so bedeviled the Germans in history. Going for the technological "superior" solution despite the increased development problems. It is not a question of "can it be made to work?" but "can it be made to work _quickly_ and _easily?_) compared to the "conventional" solution (a normal twin). 

A "normal" twin had little or no problem with gun location (no through the hub or sychro problems). Not much problem with radar location (you don't want antenna _behind_ a propeller). A 'normal' twin has both engines located somewhat near the center of gravity and not fighting for fuselage space with other things. 

Somethings in WW II were a matter of timing of weeks or a few months. Having a "good" solution in early 1943 may be better than a "better" solution in late 1943 or a "best" solution in early 1944.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 7, 2014)

Normal twin role should be fulfilled with Fw-187 and Ju-88. The Germans have had no problems to either fire their cannon through the prop after 1940, nor to fire it synchronized (talking about air-to-air stuff). The layout is superior when it comes down to drag. During normal operations, ther is no torque reaction with identical engines. Despite the layout, the DO-335 managed to have plenty of fuel, good punch and bomb bay.



wiking85 said:


> ...
> The BMW139 was not viable AFAIK; it needed to be revised into the 801 due to experience merged in from Bramo. Merge the two radial engine companies sooner and start the 14 cylinder radial sooner and we are all set, but using the early development apparently was not a viable option.



We don't know certainly how much more the 139 was problematic, compared with 801. Both have had the issues, and I agree that an earlier work on them should yield a viable engine earlier. 



> As to using an liquid cooled inline, there was a lack of DBs and a lack of Jumo performance at altitude where the fighters were needing it. A jumo powered fighter would be stuck well below 20,000 feet. Increase DB production early on with greater investment in its production and a FW190 powered DB601 is potentially viable, but is there a guarantee that it would perform as well as the radial engine design? The smaller width changes the design, as did the long nose C and D series, which changed its flight characteristics that made it so memorable in the A-series. You can't power-egg a single engine fighter with fuselage based engine, you need a new fuselage otherwise you gain unnecessary drag and weight by having to brace the smaller liquid cooled inlines in a wider radial designed airframe.



Lack of DBs doesn't have to occur if one really starts planning in 1936 and further. The power of Jumo-211B, above 5 km, was in the ballpark with DB-601A (eg. at 6 km, 30 min rating, it was 830 PS for 211B vs. 850 for the 601A with new supercharger, vs. 800 PS for the 601A with old supercharger).OTOH, it would be a good idea to rate the 211 for the 5 min power rating, along with existing 30 min and take off rating (1 min)
The ~1000 HP V-12s in the 'pre-190' will not equal the capabilities of the historical Fw-190s of 1941/42, bar reliability (and that is not unimportant). We have, however, other benefits of the airframe, as I've listed above.
The power egg indeed enables the designer to have easy job to install the radial engine. The Soviets have had no problems to come out with La-5, nor the Japanese with Ki-100. Since I will not put any armament in fuselage, the task is even easier.
The roll rate maybe did not was a strong point for the D-9 as it was for Antons, but few if any complaint can be heard about that. The Antons were good rollers, but were not miracles of maneuvering.




> Sure, but there was never any single engine powerful enough to make this work. Post-war it would be fine, but given the technical constraints up to 1945-46 its just not viable; have it be backburner research for 1946.



Several things can help. 1st start the design job on jets earlier. 2nd, start 1st with centrifugal compressors, put axial compressors on a backburner. 3rd, start developing the air cooled turbine blades.



> Push pull had too long of a lead time to be ready by 1944; it would have to start development in the mid-1930s. If there was enough foresight, having jumo of db powered push-pull fighters would have been indeed awesome by 1942-43. The problem is starting the research early enough. A smaller Do-335 in 1942-43 would have been ideal IMHO.
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dornier_Do_335
> The project didn't really start until 1939 and it took serious development before the Do-335 could even be contemplated in 1942 when the design started. I looked into the pre-official project and it wasn't able to be moved up without starting push-pull fighter research in 1935/36.
> 
> ...



You do have the Do-18 flying in 1935. Actually, the Do-16 uses the push pull concept in 1922. SOme aircrfat were using the concept in ww1 IIRC. The idea is there, better get to the job to produce the push pull aircraft ASAP.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 7, 2014)

Handley Page V 1500 in 1918. 

can we _please_ stop the idea that "push pull" was new or innovative or even German in the 1930s. 

Please note the use of 2 bladed propellers on the tractor engines and 4 bladed props on the "pushers". 
Close coupled "push-pulls" had problems with disturbed airflows on the Pusher props. Dornier may have had patents on extension shafts or thrust bearings transferring the "thrust" to the air-frame without going through the engine but the idea was not new and with out a fair distance between the props was _less efficient_ than 4 tractor propellers. So for a 4 engine plane you had to trade reduced frontal area/drag for lower efficiency of the rear propeller. 

The idea was there but please point out the number of aircraft that have used the idea since the end of WW II in any numbers? 

The Cessna 337






was probably the biggest user by far and the air flow of both the forward and rear props is not the best due to the large fuselage. This plane also points out another fact. You don't get two engines into the frontal area of one as you still need scopes/bumps/bulges for the cooling of the 2nd engine. It is less than using 2 engine nacelles.


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## wiking85 (Mar 7, 2014)

No one was claiming it was a German invention or unique to the 1930s. The problem was creating a high performance push-pull fighter/fast bomber/night fighter with high output engines before late 1944. It was a hard development that took time.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 7, 2014)

Just trying to head off another contributor. 

I am totally baffled as to why the Do 335 is repeatedly held up as _the_ solution to Germany's high speed piston engine aircraft needs in near the end of the war. It may have been fast but it seems to have a lot of other things going against. More of a "solution"
in search of a problem than the answer to a real question.

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## wiking85 (Mar 7, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> Just trying to head off another contributor.
> 
> I am totally baffled as to why the Do 335 is repeatedly held up as _the_ solution to Germany's high speed piston engine aircraft needs in near the end of the war. It may have been fast but it seems to have a lot of other things going against. More of a "solution"
> in search of a problem than the answer to a real question.


It was a back up in case jet research didn't produce an operational aircraft by the end of the war, then it was just another 'let's throw what we've got at the enemy' situation in desperation in late 1944.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 7, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> ...
> The idea was there but please point out the number of aircraft that have used the idea since the end of WW II in any numbers?
> 
> ...



The DO-16 and Do-18 make together 420 pieces. Not overwhelming a number, but that was between the wars.



wiking85 said:


> No one was claiming it was a German invention or unique to the 1930s. The problem was creating a high performance push-pull fighter/fast bomber/night fighter with high output engines before late 1944. It was a hard development that took time.



Quirk is that one don't need high output engines in order to extract high performance out of push pull aircraft. One can have decent speed even with Jumo 211s on board.


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## wiking85 (Mar 7, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> The DO-16 and Do-18 make together 420 pieces. Not overwhelming a number, but that was between the wars.
> 
> 
> 
> Quirk is that one don't need high output engines in order to extract high performance out of push pull aircraft. One can have decent speed even with Jumo 211s on board.



For a small aircraft though they need to worry about torque and several other issues stemming from the unique engineering challenges of building two rotating propellors at each end of the fuselage; they also need to work on an ejection seat otherwise the pilot could not bail out at all in case of emergency lest he get chopped up by his rear prop. Apparently there was a lot of issues that had to be worked out to get performance that would actually make the project worthwhile; just having a marginal edge over the traditional twin engine fighters isn't worth the problems that come with a push-pull design on a fighter (on a bomber its a different story). I for one though don't know why they didn't try and do a push-puller layout for a strategic bomber. I know some versions of the Amerika Bomber had this layout, but you'd think it would be a viable option for the Bomber A.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 7, 2014)

Sorry if it was like I was claiming that Germans, or Dornier in particular, invented the push pull layout. That was not the case.

The torque emanating from two 1000-1200 HP engines is certainly much smaller than there it is fromtwo 1600-1800 HP ones; those were 'tamed' in Do-335 case. Americans and British were managing to handle the torque of single 2000-2800 HP engine in reasonably sized airplanes. Calling the push pull design business having "the unique engineering challenges" is a bit too much for me, though.
The ejection seat is one way to do it, and Germans were not shy to deploy that piece of machinery in 'classic' aircraft. Too bad for them that ejection seat was not employed on major scale.
Another way to do it is to have explosives to detach rear prop, as the Mixmaster had. BTW: were the P-38 pilots afraid that they might hit the horizontal stabilator when ejecting from the A/C? 



> Apparently there was a lot of issues that had to be worked out to get performance that would actually make the project worthwhile; just having a marginal edge over the traditional twin engine fighters isn't worth the problems that come with a push-pull design on a fighter (on a bomber its a different story).



The Do-335 was some 140 km/h faster than Me-410, when on same engines. Both have bomb bays. But, one can survive P-47 or P-51 infested airspace, the other cannot. Seems worth the effort.


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## stona (Mar 7, 2014)

wiking85 said:


> they also need to work on an ejection seat otherwise the pilot could not bail out at all in case of emergency lest he get chopped up by his rear prop.



It was thought at the time that an ejection seat and the removal of the rear propeller and part of the tail assembly was needed to enable a pilot to bail out. It wasn't so, of the handful of pilots who did abandon a Do 335 at least one made a completely 'normal' exit from an intact aircraft after both the tail jettison and ejection seat had failed.

The ejection seat was dangerous, one pilot made a wheels up landing after the seat failed to operate following a fire on a test flight, only to have it work as he touched down, throwing him from the aircraft and depositing him on the runway. A more serious, and fatal in at least one instance, problem was the propensity for the jettisoned hood to strike the pilots head, rendering him unconscious or even killing him. 

The Do 335 wasn't seen as the solution, just a solution and an aircraft capable of many roles. Just look at the size of the thing 

Cheers

Steve


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## wiking85 (Mar 7, 2014)

stona said:


> It was thought at the time that an ejection seat and the removal of the rear propeller and part of the tail assembly was needed to enable a pilot to bail out. It wasn't so, of the handful of pilots who did abandon a Do 335 at least one made a completely 'normal' exit from an intact aircraft after both the tail jettison and ejection seat had failed.
> 
> The ejection seat was dangerous, one pilot made a wheels up landing after the seat failed to operate following a fire on a test flight, only to have it work as he touched down, throwing him from the aircraft and depositing him on the runway. A more serious, and fatal in at least one instance, problem was the propensity for the jettisoned hood to strike the pilots head, rendering him unconscious or even killing him.
> 
> ...



IMHO its worth researching just in case, but its mooted by the invention of the jet engine.


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## davebender (Mar 7, 2014)

Consensus appears to support pushing DB603 and Jumo213 V12 engines to completion followed by mass production. I agree.

Every aircraft historically powered by BMW801 will perform as well or better powered by the V12s. So why spend resources developing and producing the big radial engine?


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## wiking85 (Mar 7, 2014)

davebender said:


> Consensus appears to support pushing DB603 and Jumo213 V12 engines to completion followed by mass production. I agree.
> 
> Every aircraft historically powered by BMW801 will perform as well or better powered by the V12s. So why spend resources developing and producing the big radial engine?



The Fw190A. No other engine will give it that performance; the FW190C/D were no where near as maneuverable.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 7, 2014)

davebender said:


> Consensus appears to support pushing DB603 and Jumo213 V12 engines to completion followed by mass production. I agree.



What consensus? I'm against those two 



> Every aircraft historically powered by BMW801 will perform as well or better powered by the V12s. So why spend resources developing and producing the big radial engine?



The 'big radial engine' is, in absence of much improved or big V-12s, German best bet. Not just the engine (yes, it does need work to iron out the bugs, but so will need every other one; even the DB-601E, 605A, 603A, just to name these, were either not allowed to operate on full spec initialy, or were problematic in other way) gives plenty of power at all alztitudes, but German installation was almost perfect. Closely cowled due to fan, with thrust-producing exhaust stacks. Install the external intakes and you earn extra 10 mph higher up, as proved by tests.



wiking85 said:


> The Fw190A. No other engine will give it that performance; the FW190C/D were no where near as maneuverable.



Partially agree. 
If the Fw-190 gets 2-stage DB-601 or Jumo 211, then it will perform even better. The historical Fw-190 C D were as heavy as overweight Fw-190A-8 (~4300 kg in combat trim), there was no way those will be as maneuverable as early Antons, weighting 3800-3900 kg.


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## wiking85 (Mar 7, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Partially agree.
> If the Fw-190 gets 2-stage DB-601 or Jumo 211, then it will perform even better. The historical Fw-190 C D were as heavy as overweight Fw-190A-8 (~4300 kg in combat trim), there was no way those will be as maneuverable as early Antons, weighting 3800-3900 kg.



They wouldn't be the FW190 though. Not sure how they would have performed with the different balance resulting from using an altered fuselage due to the different engine size and more limited power:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BMW_801#Specifications_.28BMW_801_C.29


> Length: 2,006 mm (79 in)
> Diameter: 1,290 mm (51 in)
> Dry weight: 1,012 kg (2,226 lb)



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daimler-Benz_DB_601


> Length: 1,722 mm (68 in)
> Dry weight: 590 kg (1,320 lb)


http://kurfurst.org/Engine/DB60x/DB601_datasheets_A1.html
Diameter: 739mm

So the DB601 was shorter and much less wide, so the FW190 fuselage could be build much more narrowly. That changes the performance and makes it pretty much a different aircraft than the FW190.


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## DonL (Mar 7, 2014)

wiking85 said:


> The Fw190A. No other engine will give it that performance; the FW190C/D were no where near as maneuverable.



I also want the BMW 801 with the FW 190A as stop gap between 1941 till end 1942, till the introduction of the D-9 and afterwards as fighter bomber with a radial.
But I disagree to your claim, why the hack rated Eric Brown and other allied Pilots the D-9 as one of the best WWII fighter and as much state of the Art as the Mustang; P 47 and Spitfire?


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## wiking85 (Mar 7, 2014)

DonL said:


> I also want the BMW 801 with the FW 190A as stop gap between 1941 till end 1942, till the introduction of the D-9 and afterwards as fighter bomber with a radial.
> But I disagree to your claim, why the hack rated Eric Brown and other allied Pilots the D-9 as one of the best WWII fighter and as much state of the Art as the Mustang; P 47 and Spitfire?



Do you have a link for his quote on that? I've only ever seen him evaluation of the A-series. I think a DB601/5 equipped FW190 designed around that engine would be very good too, its just that we don't have any idea what it would perform like, even though apparently Tank did propose some versions of the FW190 according to Wikipedia, though supposedly he said it never was considered with anything but the radial.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 7, 2014)

wiking85 said:


> They wouldn't be the FW190 though. Not sure how they would have performed with the different balance resulting from using an altered fuselage due to the different engine size and more limited power:
> ...
> So the DB601 was shorter and much less wide, so the FW190 fuselage could be build much more narrowly. That changes the performance and makes it pretty much a different aircraft than the FW190.



Don't get me wrong, but I'm not dazzled with any particular aircraft designation. Cat needs to catch mice, the color of the cat is irrelevant.
The Fw need to push with Fw-190-type aircraft by all means. But since we can't bet that the radial engine will be 100% ready for operations earlier than historical, we need an engine as a back-up. The only reason I look after the Jumo 211 is because they are offered as a power egg, so the subsequant radial engine installation can be straight forward, both because of piping and CoG issues. It also had less cooling drag than the DB-601 installation on Bf-109E. We won't build the 190 too narrow.
Performance is bound to suffer*, the 1300-1400 PS vs. 1000 PS is a huge difference. But we will have an aircraft that has good punch, far better roll, superior field of view, superior layout of U/C both when retracted and extended (= better rough field capability streamlining), more internal fuel - seems worth the effort. 
Once the radial engine is ready, then, by all means, proceed with it.

*Instead of 640-660, maybe around 600 km/h?


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## davebender (Mar 7, 2014)

DB603 had prototypes running during 1937. BMW801 was only a draft blueprint. I find it difficult to believe BMW801 would be production ready before DB603 if both programs receive similar funding. More likely the opposite is true. DB603 will be in mass production first and nobody will want to switch to BMW801 which was less reliable and less powerful when running on similar quality fuel.


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## wiking85 (Mar 7, 2014)

davebender said:


> DB603 had prototypes running during 1937. BMW801 was only a draft blueprint. I find it difficult to believe BMW801 would be production ready before DB603 if both programs receive similar funding. More likely the opposite is true. DB603 will be in mass production first and nobody will want to switch to BMW801 which was less reliable and less powerful when running on similar quality fuel.



I think we can agree that a DB603 powered fighter designed from the ground up around the 603, such as an early Ta-152 optimized for low and high altitudes would be formidable, certainly as good as the Typhoon, but much sooner. With an early DB603 that option is viable perhaps instead of the FW190; so long as the engine if available, I don't see why it wouldn't be.


















The Fiat G.56 certainly only needed the 603 to be possible:


> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiat_G.55
> Fiat G.56
> The Fiat G.56 was basically a Fiat G.55 with a German Daimler-Benz DB 603 engine. Two prototypes were built, flight tests starting in March 1944.[10] On 30 March, Commander Valentino Cus reached speeds of 690/700 km/h (430/440 mph).[18] Official maximum speed was 685 km/h (426 mph) and the aircraft was armed with three 20 mm MG 151/20s, one firing through the propeller hub, the other two installed in the wings.[19] While performance was excellent, the aircraft proving superior to both the Bf 109K and Bf 109G and Fw 190A, outmanoeuvring [2] all types in testing, production was not allowed by the German authorities.[10]



















tomo pauk said:


> Don't get me wrong, but I'm not dazzled with any particular aircraft designation. Cat needs to catch mice, the color of the cat is irrelevant.
> The Fw need to push with Fw-190-type aircraft by all means. But since we can't bet that the radial engine will be 100% ready for operations earlier than historical, we need an engine as a back-up. The only reason I look after the Jumo 211 is because they are offered as a power egg, so the subsequant radial engine installation can be straight forward, both because of piping and CoG issues. It also had less cooling drag than the DB-601 installation on Bf-109E. We won't build the 190 too narrow.
> Performance is bound to suffer*, the 1300-1400 PS vs. 1000 PS is a huge difference. But we will have an aircraft that has good punch, far better roll, superior field of view, superior layout of U/C both when retracted and extended (= better rough field capability streamlining), more internal fuel - seems worth the effort.
> Once the radial engine is ready, then, by all means, proceed with it.
> ...


Do you have info about the Fw190 Jumo 211 power egg?


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## tomo pauk (Mar 7, 2014)

Out of curiosity, what kind of RPM and manifold pressure would the DB-603 be capable for, if available earlier?


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## wiking85 (Mar 7, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Out of curiosity, what kind of RPM and manifold pressure would the DB-603 be capable for, if available earlier?


Look at the DB603A as an example of what that would be. It would probably be reasonably reliable (80 hours between overhaul) by 1941.


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## DonL (Mar 7, 2014)

davebender said:


> DB603 had prototypes running during 1937. BMW801 was only a draft blueprint. I find it difficult to believe BMW801 would be production ready before DB603 if both programs receive similar funding. More likely the opposite is true. DB603 will be in mass production first and nobody will want to switch to BMW801 which was less reliable and less powerful when running on similar quality fuel.



This claim is wrong! The DB 603 needs all the steps of the DB 601 till the DB 605 to have a performance of 1600-1750PS. It is an ilusion to think you can put the DB 603 in mass production *before 1942*

Also if you got the fusion of BMW and Bramo earlier (1936) as I said in my earlier post, there is a good chance to have the BMW 801 at mass production 1940. Radials are simplier and didn't need pressurised water cooling, also the BMW 139 was much further developed then a DB 603. I thought this thread should be realistic and not some mythical myths.

Also to think you could develop a Ta 152 fast without the development of the FW 190-D9 is simply a myth. Anybody must develop the ring cooling for example and the new fulsage and so on.....
The Ta 152 *was developed from the FW 190 C and D-9)*

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## tomo pauk (Mar 7, 2014)

wiking85 said:


> Look at the DB603A as an example of what that would be. It would probably be reasonably reliable (80 hours between overhaul) by 1941.



The DB-603A was allowed for 2700 rpm and 1.40 ata. And was not reliable until late 1943 on those settngs. Though smaller (ie. in theory more amenable for bigger RPM), the DB-601E was allowed only for 2500 rpm in late 1941, and 1.30 ata. 
Sorry, I don't buy that DB-603 would be allowed for more stress (ie. rpm + ata) than the DB-601E in 1941, or ever.


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## wiking85 (Mar 7, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> The DB-603A was allowed for 2700 rpm and 1.40 ata. And was not reliable until late 1943 on those settngs. Though smaller (ie. in theory more amenable for bigger RPM), the DB-601E was allowed only for 2500 rpm in late 1941, and 1.30 ata.


Considering it was only developed for about 12 months before being cancelled in 1937, then did nothing until it started preparing fora mid-1939 racing stunt that never happened, it got funding restored in 1940 at a limited level, as the DB604 was given even greater priority. That wallowed as the 603 showed more promise and in 1941 it started to really enter into production planning. By 1942 it was in service after 1 initial year of development, followed by minor work in 1939 and then serious work from 1940-41. Without the delay in development it would continue through 1937, 38, 39, and 40 before entering production at 1750PS in 1941 at 1943 levels of reliability. Compared to the historical development from June 1936-June 1937, then 1939-1941 before entering production in 1942 is a roughly comparable time frame, though historically 1939 was at best a very limited partial development year. That is why it wasn't reliable until 1943. Had 1939 been a fully funded development year, it would have been reliable by late 1942, rather than a year later. The work done on the DB601 wasn't really that useful for the 603, due to the differing cooling issues and need to build the 603 stronger due to high output. Only uninterrupted funding and time from mid-1936 onward was needed to get it ready by mid-1941 for relatively reliable service.




tomo pauk said:


> Sorry, I don't buy that DB-603 would be allowed for more stress (ie. rpm + ata) than the DB-601E in 1941, or ever.



Did I claim that it would? In fact it doesn't need to due to large displacement per cylinder.


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## wiking85 (Mar 7, 2014)

DonL said:


> This claim is wrong! The DB 603 needs all the steps of the DB 601 till the DB 605 to have a performance of 1600-1750PS. It is an ilusion to think you can put the DB 603 in mass production *before 1942*


Not really, as in 1940 the DB603 was offering 1750PS, but wasn't yet reliable due to its low level of development. Also the 603 had a lot of different cooling and engineering issues due to its larger displacement per cylinder and overall larger size. With full scale support from 1936-1941, it should be ready to go at 1750PS by June 1941 considering that would be exactly 5 years of development. Historically it took about that long to make the 603 reasonably reliable.



DonL said:


> Also if you got the fusion of BMW and Bramo earlier (1936) as I said in my earlier post, there is a good chance to have the BMW 801 at mass production 1940. Radials are simplier and didn't need pressurised water cooling, also the BMW 139 was much further developed then a DB 603. I thought this thread should be realistic and not some mythical myths.


I don't disagree about the radials. However the only reason it was further ahead of the DB603 historically is due to the cancellation of funding and development from 1937-1939.



DonL said:


> Also to think you could develop a Ta 152 fast without the development of the FW 190-D9 is simply a myth. Anybody must develop the ring cooling for example and the new fulsage and so on.....
> The Ta 152 *was developed from the FW 190 C and D-9)*


Why can't developing an aircraft from the beginning around the DB603 or Jumo 213 rather than adapting an existing aircraft have resulted in something better than the FW190C/D by 1942 if the engine is available by 1940-41. I'm not suggesting that such an aircraft would have the high altitude performance of the Ta-152H, but the lower altitude performance of the Ta-152C is realistic (minus boost systems).


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## tomo pauk (Mar 7, 2014)

Wiking85 said:



> Did I claim that it would?



Indirectly, you did claim it would. 
The setting with 2700 rpm and 1.40 ata (= DB-603A in late 1942) represents far greater stress than 2500 rpm and 1.30 ata (= DB-601E in late 1941). The stress due to the rpm goes up with square (ie. non linear increase) - increase the rpm by 10%, the stress is increased by 21%. 
If your DB-603 cannot provide greater rpm and boost, then it does not give the power good enough to reliably 'beat' the BMW-801. So one ends up with a heavier powerplant than it was the 801, and the end result is not a gain in performance maneuverability, but loss.

Now I know that DB-603 was hampered by on/off funding support. What is often overlooked is how much the knowledge gained from development of the DB-601 series contributed in development of DB-603.

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## wiking85 (Mar 7, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Now I know that DB-603 was hampered by on/off funding support. What is often overlooked is how much the knowledge gained from development of the DB-601 series contributed in development of DB-603.



How much did? I haven't found any info about that, if you have some I would appreciate it.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 7, 2014)

I don't know for certain. What I do know is that the work on in-house engines does not happen with one part of engine development department firmly walled away from another. 
We can take a look at superchargers installed in DB engines prior 1943, to see the techincal advance: the supercharger for the 1st DB-601As have had 12-blade impeller. Changed to 13-blade one in later 601As. The DB-601E received a 16-blade impeller. The DB-605A received a somewhat bigger supercharger. I don't have many informantions about the SC of the DB-600, nor I do have any informations about the change of impeller's blade profile. 
Other changes, from 601A to 601E included: much increased valve overlap, port polish, increased ignition advance, cams in 'racing trim', additional air passage for better running on low settings etc.  link (corrections additions welcome)
Assuming that the DB-603 have had all of these things improvements place already in 1940/41 is not something I'd believe.

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## DonL (Mar 7, 2014)

> The BMW 132 was on a continuous development also with fuel injection from 1934 till end of production.
> To claim it was not or the BMW 801 influenced this development in a wrong way is totaly wrong. The development of the BMW 132 was the base of the 801.
> 
> The advertisement of a big radial engine was 1935 and totaly rational, because the BMW engineeres were specialist of radial engines and not liquid cooled engines since 1929, also the engineers from Bramo. Both companies were the most important engine companies from 1932-1938 of Germany and it was more then right and rational to integrate them in the development of high performance military engines.
> ...




1936:

- intensivation of the development of the MG 131 and MG 151

1937:

- No Bomber B advertisement and no advertisement for a 2000 PS engine
- funding of the DB 603
- advertisement of a new 1600 PS engine till 1941
- advertisement of the Bomber A with four gondulas (He 177 is favorite after the shown plans and wood model)
- order to FW to rebuilt the FW 187 as two seat long range and bad weather fighter.
- order to FW starting to plan and to develop a new fighter for the new big radial engine of BMW/Bramo

1938: 

- dividing the development of the Ju 88, continuing the fast Bomber as planed and new development of dive capacity till 55 degree
- funding of the offered Do 217 to develop
- comparation flight between the Me 110 and the FW 187
- canceling of the Me 110 to mass produce and developing stop of the Me 210
- order to put the FW 187 (two seater) in mass production
- mass production of the Ju 88 as fast level bomber

- In production Bf 109, FW 187 (beginning), Ju 87, Do 17, He 111, Ju 88 (beginning), Ju 52 and FW 200 

1939:

- mass production of the Ju 88 with dive capacity
- order of the FW 190 A0
- order to enlarge the pilot training program
- order to enlarge Genshagen factory
- order to built engine factory at Wien (Ostmark) for DB 603 tooling
- oder of more prototypes of the Do 217 planed engine DB 603
- order of more prototypes of the He 177 planed engine DB 603
- order to stop mass production of the Do 17


- In production Bf 109, FW 187, Ju 87, Do 17 (end), He 111, Ju 88, Ju 52, FW 200 and FW 189 

1940: 

- starting mass production of the FW 190 A
- order to enlarge the production of the Do 215 Kautz III (DB 601) as stop gap night fighter till the start of the mass production of the Do 217
- order to develop the FW 190 further for the new big inline engines DB 603 and Jumo 213
- order to develop out of the fast Bomber Ju 88 a fast night fighter Ju 88 (jumo 211/213)
- advertisement of a new transport aircraft with Jumo 211 engines

- In production Bf 109, FW 190A (beginning), FW 187, Ju 87, Do 215 night fighter, He 111, Ju 88, Ju 52, FW 200 and FW 189 

1941:

- order to develop out of the FW 190 A a fighter bomber
- oder of the first batch of the new inline engines DB 603 and Jumo 213 (Prototypes and pre production)
- order of FW 190 C/D prototypes for Jumo 213/Db 603
- order of the Ju 252 prototypes
- order of the FW 190 F/G prototypes fighter bomber (BMW 801)
- order of a smal preproduction series He 177 A with four Db 603
- order of a smal preproduction series Do 217 with two DB 603
- order of smal preproduction series of the Ju 88 nightfighter Jumo 213
- order to start mass production of the Ju 88 night fighter with Jumo 211
- order to stopp mass production of the He 111 and retooling to the He 177
- order to stop mass production of the Do 215 and retooling to the Do 217

- In production Bf 109, FW 190 A, FW 187, Ju 87, Do 215 night fighter (end), He 111 (end), Ju 88, Ju 52, FW 200 and FW 189 

1942:

- order to stop production of the FW 200
- order to mass produce DB 605 (Genshagen)
- order to mass produce DB 603 (Ostmark)
- oder to start mass production of Jumo 213 (90 % of the production capacity)
- order to start mass production of the Do 217
- order to start mass production of the He 177
- order to start mass production of the Ju 88 at all versions with the Jumo 213
- order to stop mass production of the FW 190 A 
- order to start mass production of the FW 190 F/G fighter bomber BMW 801
- order to start mass production of the Fw 190 D-9 Jumo 213
- order to start production of the Ju 252 Jumo 211
- order to start to develop the FW 190 D-9 further to a high altitude fighter Ta 152 

- In production Bf 109, FW 190 A (end) FW 190 F/G (beginning), FW 190 D-9 (beginning), FW 187, Ju 87, Do 217 (beginning), He 177 (beginning), Ju 88, Ju 52, FW 200 (end) and FW 189 

1943:

In production: Bf 109 "G" DB 605 (hopefully better through concentration of Messerschmitt as the original), FW 190 D-9 (Jumo 213), FW 187 (DB 605), FW 190 F/G (BMW 801), Ju 88 (70% of the production night fighter Jumo 213, 30 % naval/nornal strike aircrafts Jumo 213), Ju 87 (reduced production Jumo 211), Do 217 (DB 603), He 177 (DB 603), Ju 252 (Jumo 211), Ju 52 and FW 189


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## davebender (Mar 7, 2014)

DB603 only needs to produce 1,600hp with 25 hour reliability to beat 1941 version of BMW801. That's not a terribly high performance bar.


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## wiking85 (Mar 7, 2014)

davebender said:


> DB603 only needs to produce 1,600hp with 25 hour reliability to beat 1941 version of BMW801. That's not a terribly high performance bar.


At a lower RPM it could easily reach that at 100 hours between overhauls in 1941. By 1942 1750PS is very doable with around 100 hours assuming continuous funding since 1936 and a DB604 program that either doesn't exist or is cut off and assuming nothing silly like the DB613 or the DB609 taking away resources from development.
.


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## davebender (Mar 7, 2014)

Focke-Wulf Ta 153 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
If Focke Wulf fighter aircraft is designed for DB603 engine from beginning the wings will be in right place to make aircraft balance without adding a rear fuselage plug. Hence performance should be slightly better then Fw-190D9.

Not sure how you would do the reverse conversion (from DB603 to BMW801). Perhaps fuselage plug would be forward of the wings. If nothing else the additional nose space should improve BMW801 cooling.


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## DonL (Mar 7, 2014)

wiking85 said:


> At a lower RPM it could easily reach that at 100 hours between overhauls in 1941. By 1942 1750PS is very doable with around 100 hours assuming continuous funding since 1936 and a DB604 program that either doesn't exist or is cut off and assuming nothing silly like the DB613 or the DB609 taking away resources from development.



The funding wouldn't be *before* 1937, The first prototype was built 1936/37 and offered at 1937 to the RLM. Only 1 prototype.
It was a direct development out of the DB 600 with a pantograph, at the same technical level as the DB 600 from 1936.
So a funding and development couldn't begin *before* 1937 on the technical base of a DB 600!

So you want to tell us that this engine was further developed then a BMW 139 which was in the air for the first time 1938 and started development 1935?

A DB 603 has to have major basic engine work to sort out the reliability problems, plus all steps of the DB 601 to the DB 605 which include direct fuel injection, pressurised water cooling, more boost, more rpm etc. This must be all developed to function proper.

The original DB 603 1941/42 was a harum scarum engineered engine, where at a short time, all learned experiences were put together without real testing and engineering to the bigger engine deplacement. It had major problems!

So funding a development of the DB 603 since 1937 could offer a DB 603A at 1942 in mass production, nothing else.

A DB 603A on 2500 RPM offers 1510 PS on 2400 RPM something about 1380/1400 PS and more then 2400 RPM at 1940/41 are total illusion. Where is the big advantage of such an engine in mass production at 1941?

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## tomo pauk (Mar 8, 2014)

wiking85 said:


> ...
> 
> 
> Why can't developing an aircraft from the beginning around the DB603 or Jumo 213 rather than adapting an existing aircraft have resulted in something better than the FW190C/D by 1942 if the engine is available by 1940-41. I'm not suggesting that such an aircraft would have the high altitude performance of the Ta-152H, but the lower altitude performance of the Ta-152C is realistic (minus boost systems).



The rest of the post is already covered.
The Ta-152 minus a 2 stage engine is not a Ta-152. The Ta-152C was to be equipped with a two stage DB-603L or 603LA, and if the historical power levels are expected, than they need 'boost systems' (water injection) since there was no inter-cooler. 



davebender said:


> Focke-Wulf Ta 153 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> If Focke Wulf fighter aircraft is designed for DB603 engine from beginning the wings will be in right place to make aircraft balance without adding a rear fuselage plug. Hence performance should be slightly better then Fw-190D9.
> 
> Not sure how you would do the reverse conversion (from DB603 to BMW801). Perhaps fuselage plug would be forward of the wings. If nothing else the additional nose space should improve BMW801 cooling.



Tail plug is not something that should cause worries. If we have a V-12 engine with plenty of power, but not overly heavy, to supplant the 801, then tail plug will not be needed anyway.


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## Denniss (Mar 8, 2014)

A 1940s DB 603 could be in the range of 1200-1300 PS assuming a development level similar to the 1000PS 601A (no pressurized water cooling, B4 fuel, without special one-minute rating).

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## tomo pauk (Mar 8, 2014)

To do the justice for the DB-603A, here is the power graph, with added red line for the BMW-801D operating unrestricted, the power deduced for the amont needed for turning the cooling fan. The DB-603A will have substantial power advantage between 1.5 and 6 km, even when operating on 'relaxed' setting (2500 rpm and 1.30 ata), due to it's variable speed drive for the supercharger. The blue squares denote the power of the DB-628, one of the 1st German two-stage engines, based on DB-605. 







One will now ask: what kind of performance increase will our 'Fw-190C' have vs. it's radial counterpart? The comparable Fw-190D-9 was good for 685 km/h at 6.6 km (without MW injection, 1600 PS at 5.3 km, no ram, pink squares line on the graph) vs. the 660 km/h at 6.3 km for the Fw-190A-3 (1440 PS at 5.7 km, no ram). Above 7 km, the 'Fw-190C' should be as fast as the D-9, even when on 'relaxed' rating (2500 + 1.3 ata), or maybe a tad slower since the exhaust thrust was already smaller than it was the case for the 213A. Call it 670 km/h at 7 km, vs 655 for the A-3?
What our BMW can do about that? It can use external air intakes. The internal air intakes spoil the harvesting of ram effect, as we can see comparing the full throttle heights of the engines installed in Tank'f fighters. The gain in FTH is only 600 m for the Fw-190A-3 (5.7 km vs. 6.3), against 1.3 km for the Fw-190D-9 (5.3 km vs. 6.6). The external air intakes can earn up to 30 km/h.(link) Call it 20 km/h and the 'new' Fw-190A-3 can be fast every bit as the 'Fw-190C'. It should be also at least as good climber (lighter engine) and more maneuverable.

Exhaust thrust at Notleistung: BMW-801D - ~260 lbs at 5.7 km, DB-603A - 284 lbs at 5.7 km, Jumo 213A - 340 lbs at 5.3 km (~325 at 5.7 km)


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## Glider (Mar 8, 2014)

I have been thinking about this for a while and to be honest believe that the Luftwaffe got a lot of things right. Their development of the 109, 110, He111, Ju88, Ju87, He115, Ar 196 for the start of the war were all pretty much on the nose. The only significant alteration to these aircraft would be to remove the dive bombing ability from the Ju88. It would have reduced development time and increased performance. Imagine the BOB with the Do17 replaced by a faster Ju88, it would have been a significant problem.
As follow development, the Fw190 was a world beater when it entered service and the Do217 was second to none as a medium bomber. 

Re aircraft the two areas where the Luftwaffe made mistakes were not developing a heavy bomber and not replacing the Ju52 with a DC3 like transport. There is no reason to doubt that Germany could have got a license to build the DC3 after all Japan did. As for the bomber, the He 177 as a four engine design from the start without dive bombing ability would have been a first class bomber, again they almost got it right.

A properly integrated version of Coastal Command designated and trained to work with the navy would have been invaluable in the Battle of the Atlantic. The Condor was good at its job but they needed more of them and more importantly co-ordinated tactics. 

The biggest change for the Luftwaffe would be the training and support side. Training was always seen as a second tier area with the aircraft often used on operational missions in particular the transport units. In the RAF and US forces front line pilots were rested and used to train new crews. They often moaned and bitched about it, but it did ensure that training was done by people with front line experience, it also kept them alive, so when they re-joined squadrons the squadrons got a number of pilots who already knew how to fly and fight in combat. They often need training in the latest tactics, but they were experienced pilots who knew the basics. This was often not the case for the Luftwaffe, where trainers (and test pilots) had limited experience. 

Commanders in the first half of the war tended to be bomber trained and lacked the understanding as to how to deploy fighters. They also lacked the confidence to stand up to the leaders when changes were demanded as they owed their position more to political influence, than ability. 

Finally the production and training should have been on a war footing from the start of the war. I know this applied to the whole of the German war machine but its worth a mention.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 8, 2014)

Many times in these debates we tend to overlook the fact that Germany was against four, if France is counted in, major powers Each of those have had capabilities to match German industry in quantity, if not even in quality. One cannot hold for too long against that. What ever minor mistakes Germans did in these design procurement, they didn't have a capable ally to help them out. Unlike what Allies had.


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## parsifal (Mar 8, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Many times in these debates we tend to overlook the fact that Germany was against four, if France is counted in, major powers Each of those have had capabilities to match German industry in quantity, if not even in quality. One cannot hold for too long against that. What ever minor mistakes Germans did in these design procurement, they didn't have a capable ally to help them out. Unlike what Allies had.



no, they didnt. Germany has been estimated at controlling about 15% of world GDP in 1938. The US was about 40%, but did not enter the war until the end of 1941....outside the parameters of the scenario. Britain and the Commonwealth accounted for about 10-12% of world GDP, but did not begin really to re-arm until 1938. France controlled about 6% of world GDP. Italy about 2%. The USSR really could not be measured by these standards,neither could japan, but variously they have been estimated to be about 10% and 4%. The rest of the world accounted for the rest....about 11%...

The problem is that Germany was preparing for war from about 1935, whilst her two principal opponents did not begin rearmament until 1938-9, and even though the Germans didnt have a lot of numbers on the ground, they had undertaken design work, stockpiled resources, and organized their industries and workforces. this gave them a huge lead in the early part of the war. The French estimated in 1939 that it would take 2 years for them and the British to catch the German lead and begin serious offensive moves....which was a remarkably accurate estimate when you think about it.

Germany began the war on her own, matched up against france, britain and Poland. That was a considerable risk. By 1940, she had eliminated Poland and France, gained italy as an ally, and was receiving a large amount of help and technical exchange from the USSR. She had virtually the whole mof Europe to draw resources, expertise, design help and the like from. She chose not to exploit those advantages very well, but the potential; was there. Britain did not begin to receive substantial help from the US until the 2nd quarter of 1941. They had received some critical assistance like the destroyers for bases arrangements, but assistance until 1941 was strictly cash and carry, and that placed a limit on the extent of help received from the US to whatever resources the British could lay their hands on, and that wasnt much.

In addition, whilst Germany had no real assistance technically from either Italy or Japan, both these countries were a resource drain for the British. The British had to find the resources to try and counter both these threats, and more resources spent on these threats, meant less resources that could be used against the Germans, including R&D costs. 

If we assume that Japans GDP was met by half that amount by the Brits, and Italy was matched , then Britains 12% GDP is reduced to 8%, to counter 15% for the germans. The Germans from June 1940 until 1941 had roughly twice as much resources as Britain, until she decided to open a second front in June 1941. She squandered the potential of occupied Europe and alienated the local populations, but that came later , after 1941, for the most part


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## davebender (Mar 8, 2014)

I'm under the impression land speed record attempt used DB603 prototype number two.


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## davebender (Mar 8, 2014)

There's more then one way to solve the same problem. If 1936 Germany opts not to begin immediate development of DB603 and Jumo213 V12 engines they should make a beeline for 2,000hp V24. Stand firm on the original 2,000hp specification and get that engine into mass production during March 1942. It will be contemporary with American R2800 radial engine.

Meanwhile I would stick with DB601 / DB605 for Me-109 and Fw-187 fighter aircraft. V24 engine is for Ju-88 neuer/Art and Do-317 level bomber (which replaces He-111).

Speaking of Fw-187....
If Germany mass produces this fighter aircraft they don't need Fw-190 and it's expensive radial engine program. Focke Wulf would be just as happy to build 20,000 Fw-187s as they would 20,000 Fw-190s.


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## stona (Mar 8, 2014)

davebender said:


> Speaking of Fw-187....
> If Germany mass produces this fighter aircraft they don't need Fw-190 and it's expensive radial engine program. Focke Wulf would be just as happy to build 20,000 Fw-187s as they would 20,000 Fw-190s.



And how would it fare in 1944/5 against a Spitfire XIV, a late P-51 or a Tempest?

Steve


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## DonL (Mar 8, 2014)

stona said:


> And how would it fare in 1944/5 against a Spitfire XIV, a late P-51 or a Tempest?
> 
> Steve



I have no doubts that a from 1938-1944 developed Fw 187 with DB 605 A, AS or D fare very good against this a/c's.
But that's not the point, in my LW the FW 187 is planed as multirole long range escort, especially maritim, light destroyer, light night fighter and also interceptor.
But as a strategic complement a/c and I think without this whole up and downs (retooling) of the Me 110 production and no Me 210 weather planed nor produced, 10000 a/c's are possible

From the data's we have discussed this enough, and I don't do it again,if a german a/c will ever match the speed or has more speed then your named counterparts, it would be the FW 187. The FW 187 is a multirole Hornet but 1939.

The development of the FW 190 A; D, F, G and also the BMW 801 are indispensable. Also the FW 190 would always be produced in superior numbers compare to the FW 187. Also what Dave didn't understand, that both a/c's didn't stand in any direct link, because the original production of the Me 110 was from "second rated" a/c companies and both a/c's had different engines. So to replace the FW 190 with the FW 187 makes not any sense any single moment.


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## stona (Mar 8, 2014)

DonL said:


> I have no doubts that a from 1938-1944 developed Fw 187 with DB 605 A, AS or D fare very good against this a/c's.................
> 
> So to replace the FW 190 with the FW 187 makes not any sense any single moment.



I have serious doubts about the development potential of such a small aeroplane. A similar problem existed with the RAF's Whirlwind.

On the second point I agree 100%. There was definitely a place for a developed Fw 187 (if it lived up to its potential) but not as a _replacement_ for the Fw 190 series. 

Cheers

Steve


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## DonL (Mar 8, 2014)

I thought we have discussed this and you has also the book from Mr. Hermann.

The FW 187 was planed from the beginning to the 35 Liter 1000PS engine advertisemnet of the RLM (DB 601 and Jumo 211), compare to this the Westland Whirwind was constructed around the Peregrines, that's a major difference.

Also your comparation of the size between the FW 187 and Westland Whirlwind is not correct.

Westland Whirlwind:

Length: 9.83 m
Wingspan: 13.72 m
Height: 3.35 m
Wing area: 23.2 m²

Fw 187 A0:

Length: 11,20 m
Wingspan: 15,48 m
Height: 3,85 m
Wing area: 30,20 m²

compare to Lockheed P-38:

Length: 11,53 m
Wingspan: 15,85 m
Height: 3,00 m
Wing area: 30,42 m²

The FW 187 has nearly the same size as the Lockheed P-38, why do you think that a P 38 has development potential but not the FW 187 from your size argumentation. The FW 187 has good more size then the Whirlwind and was constructed from the beginning to bigger engines.


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## davebender (Mar 8, 2014)

Nothing prevents Germany from building 50,000 Me-109s rather then 30,000 Me-109s plus 20,000 Fw-190s. DB605 engine was more fuel efficient then BMW801 so this option saves some aviation gasoline. Furthermore most of the fuel saved is high octane C3. 

Cancelling the expensive BMW801 engine program doesn't mean BMW engineers would be idle. After completing development of BMW132 radial the entire development staff can be assigned to BMW 003 jet engine. That design morphed into highly successful Altar jet engine during late 1940s. With more development resources perhaps BMW can get their jet engine into production before 1945.


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## wiking85 (Mar 8, 2014)

stona said:


> I have serious doubts about the development potential of such a small aeroplane. A similar problem existed with the RAF's Whirlwind.
> 
> On the second point I agree 100%. There was definitely a place for a developed Fw 187 (if it lived up to its potential) but not as a _replacement_ for the Fw 190 series.
> 
> ...



Fully agree. It was not big enough to be a night fighter for instance, nor able to mount Schragmusik. An enlarged FW187 maybe, but then it wouldn't have been the FW187 and lost is selling point! It might have been okay for the Jabo role, but that's wasting it on something it couldn't do well. Keep it as a long range escort, air superiority fighter, and fast interceptor. Let the FW190 be the workhorse fighter and fighter-bomber. Phase out the Me109 in favor of a combo of the Fw187 and a Ta-152/3, while the latter could also function as a long range jabo/train buster due to its better fuel economy and therefore range. Also a high altitude interceptor of course. So we have three fighters and their variants: FW187, Fw190, and Ta-152/3. Night fighter would still be the Ju88G.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 8, 2014)

I don't buy that Fw-187 with DB-601/605 is a cheaper thing to have than Fw-190 with BMW-801. The opposite should be true, maybe two 187s for three 190s?
Now about performance. If we take a look at this performance graph (HoHun's work? Fw test results and estimates, plus calculated lines), the Fw-187 with DBs is just about as good as Bf-109 with same engines. Granted, it will be better as a platform for multiple cannons than the 109, but I don't see any performance gains nor great savings. The Fw-190 with DB-603A or with BMW-801 and external intakes will be as good as 187 with DB-605s. The 190 would be even better with a two stage engine, plus what ever advantage listed several times here) it had over the Bf-109. 

By 1944, the role of high performance fighters needs to be assumed by jets anyway.


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## wiking85 (Mar 8, 2014)

DonL said:


> The funding wouldn't be *before* 1937, The first prototype was built 1936/37 and offered at 1937 to the RLM. Only 1 prototype.
> It was a direct development out of the DB 600 with a pantograph, at the same technical level as the DB 600 from 1936.
> So a funding and development couldn't begin *before* 1937 on the technical base of a DB 600!



So you want to tell us that this engine was further developed then a BMW 139 which was in the air for the first time 1938 and started development 1935?

A DB 603 has to have major basic engine work to sort out the reliability problems, plus all steps of the DB 601 to the DB 605 which include direct fuel injection, pressurised water cooling, more boost, more rpm etc. This must be all developed to function proper.

The original DB 603 1941/42 was a harum scarum engineered engine, where at a short time, all learned experiences were put together without real testing and engineering to the bigger engine deplacement. It had major problems!

So funding a development of the DB 603 since 1937 could offer a DB 603A at 1942 in mass production, nothing else.

A DB 603A on 2500 RPM offers 1510 PS on 2400 RPM something about 1380/1400 PS and more then 2400 RPM at 1940/41 are total illusion. Where is the big advantage of such an engine in mass production at 1941?[/QUOTE]

First of all the BMW 139 never became a viable engine and it had to be altered into the 801. So using the 139 as a comparison is not helpful. 
As to the rest of what you have to say about the DB603 there are some fallacies there. Historically the DB603 suffered from having to restart in 1940 by building prototypes that incorporated developments from the 601 series which didn't scale to the 603, which had unique engineering challenges due to having a bigger engine and having different cooling issues. So first they had to waste time figuring out the existing work on the 601 didn't scale to the 603, which took until at least 1941, as they needed time to build the prototypes, design bigger parts for them based on 601 research, figure out they didn't work, and starting over; that puts us at square one in 1941. So from 1941-43 they worked on designing and building specific parts for the unique engineering issues of the 603, which previous developments did not help. So 2-3 years from the point that they realized they went down the wrong path with 601 developments being shoehorned into the 603. 

Assuming that funding wasn't cut off in 1937 after the first prototype was built based on the DB600 means they start from that point testing the engine and finding specific developments of fuel injectors and cooling systems for the 603 that are 603 specific instead of trying 601 developments on the 603. So we don't lose time on that dead end. So from 1937 we are basically starting from where they were in late 1940/early 1941 historically. From 1937-41 is around 4 years development time that was pretty much lost; considering it took from 1941-43 to make the DB603 reliable, which was 3 years, by 1941 they should have been able to get a 1600hp engine with a minimum 100 hours between overhauls. You can't take the OTL engine as it was with the false starts stemming from trying to shoehorn 601/5 developments into the 603 and make predictions off of that; rather you need to assume they would develop unique parts for the 603 from the get go as they were learning about fuel injection design for the large engine and its unique cooling issues that didn't apply to the 601/605. I'm not saying that some of the research on the 601/5 didn't help to a degree, but it hurt too. Mass production could start planning in 1940 (really 1938-9 if we are talking about just getting the building and assembly lines laid out and built) as by then the major machine tool would have been figured out by then; its a matter of getting specialist machinery once the engine is cleared in Spring/Summer 1941, which puts mass production to Autumn/Winter 1941 at the latest, assuming worst case scenario of 5 years development before being fully cleared (Summer 1936-Summer 1941). Limited production could begin earlier with a smaller plant a la Dessau, while the mass production in a place like Ostmark could start limited production (500 units or so, which is half capacity) if planning started in 1938, the buildings were built in 1939, the major assembly line generic stuff and powerplant machinery is installed in 1940, and machine tools are installed over the course of 1940-41 along with training workers at that point). By 1942 full scale mass production would start, but limited mass production could start by Autumn 1941. That would be at least at the 1600hp mark, with the reliable 1750hp phased in during 1942, probably about the same time the early Jumo 213 is cleared and starts phasing in at 1750hp.


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## DonL (Mar 8, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> I don't buy that Fw-187 with DB-601/605 is a cheaper thing to have than Fw-190 with BMW-801. The opposite should be true, maybe two 187s for three 190s?
> Now about performance. If we take a look at this performance graph (HoHun's work? Fw test results and estimates, plus calculated lines), the Fw-187 with DBs is just about as good as Bf-109 with same engines. Granted, it will be better as a platform for multiple cannons than the 109, but I don't see any performance gains nor great savings. The Fw-190 with DB-603A or with BMW-801 and external intakes will be as good as 187 with DB-605s. The 190 would be even better with a two stage engine, plus what ever advantage listed several times here) it had over the Bf-109.
> 
> By 1944, the role of high performance fighters needs to be assumed by jets anyway.



You are aware that the graph from Hohun estimated the FW 187 C heavy fighter/ night fighter which was heavily armoured plus schräge musik and had a take of weight of 7100kg.
So please tell me which Bf 109 with DB 605A engines ever reached 680 km/h in a level flight? The G6 without gondulas was good for 650 km/h at it's best days.



> It was not big enough to be a night fighter for instance, nor able to mount Schragmusik.



The plans for schräge musik existed, confirmed at Mr. Hermanns book (2 x MG 131)


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## wiking85 (Mar 8, 2014)

DonL said:


> You are aware that the graph from Hohun estimated the FW 187 C heavy fighter/ night fighter which was heavily armoured plus schräge musik and had a take of weight of 7100kg.
> The plans for schräge musik existed, confirmed at Mr. Hermanns book (2 x MG 131)



I stand corrected. But it loses it maneuverability with this, so will be a different aircraft in effect; what advantage would this offer over a Jumo 213 powered Ju88G?


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## stona (Mar 8, 2014)

This is just the same silly diversion.....plans......estimates.......but nothing real. I don't think it serves this thread to go there........again.

Twins invariably cost more than singles. Didn't a P-38 cost the same as two P-47s ? I may have remembered that wrongly.

If you can develop powerful enough engines to lift your required armament in an aircraft with one engine then the benefits of developing a type with two engines need to be substantial to be worth it. In the example above it was the range of the P-38 that made it worthwhile, particularly in the PTO.

Cheers

Steve


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## davebender (Mar 8, 2014)

> funding a development of the DB 603 since 1937 could offer a DB 603A at 1942 in mass production


If it happens that way so be it. DB603 produces 1,900hp when running on same C3 fuel as 1942 version of BMW801 engine.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 8, 2014)

Steve, it was one P-38 for two P-51s. Your last passage in post #102 is right on the money.



DonL said:


> You are aware that the graph from Hohun estimated the FW 187 C heavy fighter/ night fighter which was heavily armoured plus schräge musik and had a take of weight of 7100kg.
> So please tell me which Bf 109 with DB 605A engines ever reached 680 km/h in a level flight? The G6 without gondulas was good for 650 km/h at it's best days.



I admit that I didn't remember re. Fw-190C as being a night fighter project. 
The Bf-109G-2 was able to beat 660 km/h mark on 2600 rpm and 1.30 ata, but I've never seen a any test data for the G-2 on Notleistung (2800 rpm, 1.42 ata). The G-6 was a step back in aerodynamics of the 109, with gun bulges, fixed tailwheel and wing bumps for U/C.
The 187V2 seem to be at 545 km/h vs. serial produced A-0 at 530 km/h?

BTW, the Fw-187 with 2000-3000 HP on board should burn much more fuel per mile than Fw-190 with 1500-1800 HP - not such a great proposal for ww2 Germany. It would not roll as good, would be a significantly bigger target, pilot would lack a 360 deg field of vision, and will have two engines to impair his field of vision. 
Basically, all the arguments in P-38 vs. P-51 debates apply: the twin is cool when the engines are in 1100-1300 HP range. Once the engines are in 1600 HP range, the single engined job is a better choice.


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## stona (Mar 8, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Steve, it was one P-38 for two P-51s.



Thanks, that makes sense as the P-47 was a complex and presumably expensive machine to produce.

No one, not even the Americans as some seem to believe, had limitless supplies of cash and there were many military projects and programs competing for that cash, not just aviation related.

Steve


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## rinkol (Mar 8, 2014)

It should be noted hat scaling up an engine operating close to the edge, such as the DB601, by increasing cylinder dimensions introduces a host of issues including mechanical stresses, lubrication, and thermal issues. It is not a straightforward proposition. And DB certainly struggled with serious problems afflicting the higher powered versions of the DB601 and the DB605. One of the fundamental issues with virtually all of the DB engines was that the use of a dry cylinder liner aggravated thermal issues. The DB609 received new cylinders with wet liners - I don't know how these worked out, but suspect there must have been strong motivations for making such a major change. Admittedly, the V16 configuration of the DB609 was questionable - probably the only way of ever building a V16 that would be satisfactory for aircraft use would be to effectively split it into a pair of V8s as was done by Chrysler.

For sure there was room to rationalize the DB engine development programs. Certainly, the double V12 DB engines were more trouble than they were worth and should have been dropped at an early stage. Also, the surface evaporation engine cooling schemes were another waste of time and effort. And as noted, the DB609 was a questionable concept. There were many other abortive engine developments, particularly those involving various supercharger arrangements. Aside from the lack of focus, it is not clear to me exactly why DB had so much trouble with two stage superchargers. Does anyone know exactly what the situation was with the DB601D?


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## DonL (Mar 8, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Steve, it was one P-38 for two P-51s. Your last passage in post #102 is right on the money.
> 
> 
> 
> ...



As I have written in my plans the FW 187 is a strategic complement a/c, it replace the Me 110 at the original LW. At the beginning of the war till 1942/43 it had the same duties as the Me 110, except in my plans I have a stop gap night fighter with the Do 215 Kautz III. (enlarge Genshagen production at 1939). 
The FW 187 with DB 60x was planed with a 12,45m fulsage and 1300 Liter internal fuel.
In my plans the FW 187 is only a light night fighter to hunt enemy night fighters through her speed (1-3 Gruppen).
After 1942 it could be fill shortages, because with the FW 187 you has also the option to develop her as an one seater interceptor (plans from Mr. Hermanns book) with a take off weight of 6100kg also 1300 Liter internal fuel.

Compare to this, the FW 190A till the A8 had only 540 Liter internal fuel and the BMW wasn't as fuel efficient then the DB 605, especially at cruising speed.
Also after the plans in Mr. Hermanns book, the FW 187 could carry 900 Liter in drop tanks, which made 2200 Liter fuel, I think that's enough for long range normal and maritim support.

Edit:



> I don't buy that Fw-187 with DB-601/605 is a cheaper thing to have than Fw-190 with BMW-801. The opposite should be true, maybe two 187s for three 190s?



After the original FW clearance from 1940 to the RLM, for the last two FW 187 A0, the FW 187 (incl. 2 x Jumo 210) was 137911 RM.
So my estimation at a real mass production with 2 x DB 60x will be at 150000 RM.
That's original the double price of a Bf 109 (incl. engine) and 50000 RM less of a Me 110. At the moment I have no price for the FW 190 A.


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## DonL (Mar 8, 2014)

rinkol said:


> It should be noted hat scaling up an engine operating close to the edge, such as the DB601, by increasing cylinder dimensions introduces a host of issues including mechanical stresses, lubrication, and thermal issues. It is not a straightforward proposition. And DB certainly struggled with serious problems afflicting the higher powered versions of the DB601 and the DB605. One of the fundamental issues with virtually all of the DB engines was that the use of a dry cylinder liner aggravated thermal issues. The DB609 received new cylinders with wet liners - I don't know how these worked out, but suspect there must have been strong motivations for making such a major change. Admittedly, the V16 configuration of the DB609 was questionable - probably the only way of ever building a V16 that would be satisfactory for aircraft use would be to effectively split it into a pair of V8s as was done by Chrysler.
> 
> For sure there was room to rationalize the DB engine development programs. Certainly, the double V12 DB engines were more trouble than they were worth and should have been dropped at an early stage. Also, the surface evaporation engine cooling schemes were another waste of time and effort. And as noted, the DB609 was a questionable concept. There were many other abortive engine developments, particularly those involving various supercharger arrangements. Aside from the lack of focus, it is not clear to me exactly why DB had so much trouble with two stage superchargers. Does anyone know exactly what the situation was with the DB601D?



Mostly I agree with your post.
Next to the DB 606 and DB 610 coupled engines, the DB 604X (since 1938 ) for the Bomber B project was also a wast of time and resources.
The info with the use of a dry cylinder liner that aggravated thermal issues is new to me.

But I disagree with your supercharger statement, the DB 601 E and DB 605 supercharger offered with ram effect a very good altitude performance.
The DB 605 AS with the enlarged DB 603 supercharger was also very good. Till now, I have no criticism on the DB single stage supercharger with a hydraulic clutch


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## rinkol (Mar 8, 2014)

The DB601E and DB605 were decent performers when introduced, but their altitude performance was soon eclipsed by that of the two stage Merlins and the US engines with turbosuperchargers. The DB605AS had a much needed improvement in altitude performance, but was late; it did not appear in numbers until 1944, well after the service introduction of the two stage Merlin. It also seems to have been an improvisation necessitated by the failure or at least non-availability, of the advanced DB605 derivatives, such as the DB605D (initial version), DB605L, DB616, DB621, DB625, and DB 628.

While we are on the subject of misguided efforts, another one worth noting was the HZ-Anlage. Realistically, this was never going to be useful except perhaps in reconnaissance aircraft. The weight of the engine installation would have probably been increased by 50% due to the fuselage mounted engine and all the associated ducting without any increase in takeoff power. Obviously, the increased weight, fuel consumption and loss of fuselage space would impose severe limitations on the payload of any aircraft using it. 

The Germans were not alone in unsuccessful engine development programs. The various "hyper" engine development efforts in the US never amounted to anything and were a serious waste of resources.


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## DonL (Mar 8, 2014)

parsifal said:


> no, they didnt. Germany has been estimated at controlling about 15% of world GDP in 1938. The US was about 40%, but did not enter the war until the end of 1941....outside the parameters of the scenario. Britain and the Commonwealth accounted for about 10-12% of world GDP, but did not begin really to re-arm until 1938. France controlled about 6% of world GDP. Italy about 2%. The USSR really could not be measured by these standards,neither could japan, but variously they have been estimated to be about 10% and 4%. The rest of the world accounted for the rest....about 11%...
> 
> The problem is that Germany was preparing for war from about 1935, whilst her two principal opponents did not begin rearmament until 1938-9, and even though the Germans didnt have a lot of numbers on the ground, they had undertaken design work, stockpiled resources, and organized their industries and workforces. this gave them a huge lead in the early part of the war. The French estimated in 1939 that it would take 2 years for them and the British to catch the German lead and begin serious offensive moves....which was a remarkably accurate estimate when you think about it.
> 
> ...



I agree with mostly of your post.

Some things I want to add or do a statement.

Can you please name the technical help germany received from the UDSSR?

I understand the intention of you post and I agree with you, but weather the nazi ideology nor the leadership had any interest in any help or support. This was system immanent, as you can best see at the murdered jews, which could be workers, farmers, engineers or soldiers.

The whole system was from the beginning on the looser side, because it/they didn't want any cooparation or help, it was forbidden from their racist ideology.

To come back to you post, I think the most technical help came from Scoda and Gnome Rhone. I can't see much else.

But I agree with you that 100% of this issue goes to the leadeship of the nazi regime and other german people which were involved.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 8, 2014)

DonL said:


> As I have written in my plans the FW 187 is a strategic complement a/c, it replace the Me 110 at the original LW. At the beginning of the war till 1942/43 it had the same duties as the Me 110, except in my plans I have a stop gap night fighter with the Do 215 Kautz III. (enlarge Genshagen production at 1939).
> The FW 187 with DB 60x was planed with a 12,45m fulsage and 1300 Liter internal fuel.
> In my plans the FW 187 is only a light night fighter to hunt enemy night fighters through her speed (1-3 Gruppen).
> After 1942 it could be fill shortages, because with the FW 187 you has also the option to develop her as an one seater interceptor (plans from Mr. Hermanns book) with a take off weight of 6100kg also 1300 Liter internal fuel.
> ...



The Ta-152 was outfitted with wing fuel tanks, that about doubled internal fuel tankage (up to 1065L total, if all 6 inter-spar stations were used). Also the late Doras in some versions were to carry fuel in wing tanks. Both Ta-152C and Doras have had basically identical wing as it was on Fw-190A. In case one wants to turn the Fw-190 into a LR fighter, that can be done without much of compication.
The BMW-801 was consuming fuel at maybe 50% greater rate than DB-601/605. Trick is that Fw-187 uses 2 DBs, making it's total fuel consumption 1/3rd greater than of Fw-190A.
I do agree that the Fw-187 with DB's would be a good asset, however, against RAF, in MTO and in SU. I'd try to employ it solely as a high performance, long range fighter.


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## wiking85 (Mar 10, 2014)

Out of curiousity what is the time frame it would take to get a low altitude Jabo type FW-190C or Ta-152C into service with the DB603 not being cancelled in 1937? Assuming its being developed in parallel with the FW190A that is. Is 1942 too early?


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## DonL (Mar 10, 2014)

I would say at the same time line as a FW 190 D-9, so end of 1942 beginning of 1943.

But the question is why? 
You would have the BMW 801 and radials could always take more damage then liquid cooled inlines, which would be better for a Jabo.
The BMW 801 was optimized for low to mid altitude and the new big inlines are needed to give the german fighters and bombers better altitudes, which is much more easy with there given horsepower.


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## wiking85 (Mar 10, 2014)

DonL said:


> I would say at the same time line as a FW 190 D-9, so end of 1942 beginning of 1943.
> 
> But the question is why?
> You would have the BMW 801 and radials could always take more damage then liquid cooled inlines, which would be better for a Jabo.
> The BMW 801 was optimized for low to mid altitude and the new big inlines are needed to give the german fighters and bombers better altitudes, which is much more easy with there given horsepower.


Long range operations due to the better fuel consumption rates of the liquid cooled engine compared with the radials. They have longer range then without needing more fuel. Not only that though, but the fact that the DB603 didn't need C3 fuel to achieve 1800PS would also help, as the DB603 with B4 would generate 1750hp, which IIRC you agreed with. Using C3 with the DB603 would generate 2000hp or so and increase range due to the higher octane allowing for better compression rates. Also getting it into service about then would be helpful for later development of the high altitude version, which was going to be delayed due to the failure of the 'Kangaroo Pouch' on the historical FW190C. Then we don't need the FW190G with permanent externally mounted fuel tanks, which made them more vulnerable to ground fire anyway radial engine or not. It also removes the need for long range heavy fighters like the Ju88 that was used for train busting, freeing them up for more profitable tasks like night fighting or bombing. 

Plus the lower altitude FW190C/Ta-152C would be an excellent longer range fast recon aircraft.

Edit:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BMW_801#Specifications_.28BMW_801_C.29


> Specific fuel consumption: 0.308 kg/(kW·h) (0.506 lb/(hp·h))


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daimler-Benz_DB_603#Specifications_.28DB_603A.29


> Specific fuel consumption: 0.288 kg/(kW·h) (0.474 lb/(hp·h))


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## tomo pauk (Mar 10, 2014)

The C3 was allowing up to 1900 PS (in low gear, 1.58 ata) or up to 1700 PS (in high gear, 1.65 ata) for the BMW-801D. Tests were performed in late 1943 (serial produced Fw-190A-5 as a test bed), applied in 1944. link Unfortunately, I don't know the limits for the 801D on B4 fuel, indeed don't know if it was ever allowed for the B4. Help!
The DB-603A was using only 410 L/h in max cruise setting, vs. 460 for the BMW-801D, while making more power in same setting, 1400 vs. 1180 (801, high gear). That the LW never pushed for the DB-engined Fw-190 seem like quite a blunder, even if we consider problematic DB-603A in 1943.


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## DonL (Mar 10, 2014)

You should take in mind, that you have only a given production capacity.
I have said this again in this thread, this is to my opinion not a mythical myth thread.

What do you do with the BMW production capacity? Do you think you can easily retool radial engine factories to inline factories?
There are some thinks to think over. The BMW 801 is in production, it is a good engine for a Jabo, the FW 190 A is in production with the BMW 801 and it is not difficult to make this a/c in a Jabo. And every FW 190 F/G with 4 x 20mm MG's could do the train busting with the same effect as Ju 88.

You can't have it all!


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## tomo pauk (Mar 10, 2014)

I did not suggested that 801s are canceled. You might read in my posts that I think those were fine engines (despite problems), with superb installation, and well matched to the 'rest' of the historical Fw-190. I've suggested some things, namely the earlier start more focused development, and a more wide application of external air intakes that were test proven to increase altitude capabilities. 
With that said: what were excellent choices in 1942, were proven to be not up to the task in 1944. The DB-603A (as only historical engine that can be installed on the Fw-190 airframe in winter of 1943/44, ie. when mattered, in reasonable numbers) was offering a straightforward, timely simple way of increasing the performance of the 190. Looking at power charts, the performance of the DB-powered 'Fw.190C' should be pretty close to the historic Fw-190D-9, but was available a full year earlier.
Earlier in the thread, I also proposed two-stage BMW-801, turbo 801 (with hollow blade turine, allowing for compact installation), along with two stage derivatives of the DB-601 and Jumo 211 lines. That is until the jets catch up.


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## wiking85 (Mar 10, 2014)

DonL said:


> You should take in mind, that you have only a given production capacity.
> I have said this again in this thread, this is to my opinion not a mythical myth thread.
> 
> What do you do with the BMW production capacity? Do you think you can easily retool radial engine factories to inline factories?
> ...



Agreed; the FW190A and F were both necessary and would use up radial engine production; inline liquid cooled engines were better for bombers and some fighters; clearly there needed to be a inline high altitude fighter, which is what the FW190C/TA152C would be; rather than building up major radial engine capacity, save some for the DB603, such as having a Ostmark factory built earlier for it. Upping DB engine capacity is better than more radials; frankly the only use for the 801 IMHO is for the FW190; all other uses would have better results with an inline engine due to better fuel economy and altitude performance. IMHO a major issue was building up so much BMW capacity during the war, which should have gone into getting inline production up earlier; saving the radials for just the fighters would decrease the production capacity needs.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 10, 2014)

Any thoughts about a real 'Schnellbomber', ie. a fast bomber? Hopefully with close to no guns? Was the dive bombing requirement such a bugaboo?


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## DonL (Mar 10, 2014)

@ tomo my post 116 was a direct answer to wikings post not yours, sorry for not quoting.

Edit:



> 1938:
> 
> *- dividing the development of the Ju 88, continuing the fast Bomber as planed *and new development of dive capacity till 55 degree
> - funding of the offered Do 217 to develop
> ...


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## wiking85 (Mar 10, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Any thoughts about a real 'Schnellbomber', ie. a fast bomber? Hopefully with close to no guns? Was the dive bombing requirement such a bugaboo?


I've been a major proponent of it on alternate history forums. It would be lighter, faster, easier to make (such as the Ju88 being delayed by modification complications in actual mass production like with its 90 degree rotating wheel to handle the modified nose to deal with diving), and less fuel consuming. 
I think a German Mosquito in the form of the Ju88 with two crew and no defensive guns would be a fine aircraft and very difficult to intercept, especially if it can do shallow dives to gain speed. In fact I did a thread on that subject:
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/ju88-luftwaffes-mosquito-34542.html

With increasingly powerful engines it would have been a true 'Schnellbomber'. Using the DB603 in 1942 would have turned it into a serious threat in the East, not sure about over Britain though, except at night; the Mosquito did not do well initially during the day in 1942 IIRC.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 10, 2014)

Germans can do better than Ju-88. The wing area of the 88 was 25% greater than of Mosquito, A-20 or Pe-2. That means greater drag, = less speed. The annular radiator was probably a sensible choice, but 'embedded' wing radiators should earn few mph on their own. The low set wing 'steals' space for an unrestricted bomb bay. Bombs under external hard points kill performance. With high set wings, the possibility is there to carry the 1800 kg bomb as the Ju-87D was capable for. The max caliber of bombs in the Ju-88 bomb bay was 50 kg?


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## wiking85 (Mar 10, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Germans can do better than Ju-88. The wing area of the 88 was 25% greater than of Mosquito, A-20 or Pe-2. That means greater drag, = less speed. The annular radiator was probably a sensible choice, but 'embedded' wing radiators should earn few mph on their own. The low set wing 'steals' space for an unrestricted bomb bay. Bombs under external hard points kill performance. With high set wings, the possibility is there to carry the 1800 kg bomb as the Ju-87D was capable for. The max caliber of bombs in the Ju-88 bomb bay was 50 kg?


Which version of the Ju88? Also the wing area was expanded from the A1 to A4/5 series due to the high wing loading issue; supposedly the A4/5 wing design improved maneuverability and lift without drag penalty due to aerodynamic efficiency. All that was lost was due to increased weight, again supposedly.

I wonder how the V1 or 2 prototype of the Ju88 sans third crew member and defensive armament would have done.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_88


> The first two prototypes, Ju 88 V1 and V2, differed from the V3, V4 and V5 in that the latter three models were equipped with three defensive armament positions to the rear of the cockpit, and were able to carry two 1,000 kg (2,200 lb) bombs, one under each inner wing panel.





> The aircraft's first flight was made by the prototype Ju 88 V1, which bore the civil registration D-AQEN, on 21 December 1936. *When it first flew, it managed about 580 km/h (360 mph)* and Hermann Göring, head of the Luftwaffe was ecstatic. It was an aircraft that could finally fulfill the promise of the Schnellbomber, a high-speed bomber. The streamlined fuselage was modeled after its contemporary, the Dornier Do 17, but with fewer defensive guns because the belief still held that it could outrun late 1930s-era fighters. *The fifth prototype set a 1,000 km (620 mi) closed-circuit record in March 1939, carrying a 2,000 kg (4,410 lb) payload at a speed of 517 km/h (320 mph)*. However, by the time Luftwaffe planners like Ernst Udet had their opportunities to their own "pet" features added (including dive-bombing by Udet), the Ju 88's top speed had dropped to around 450 km/h (280 mph)


Keep in mind this was with the Jumo 211A.

The front wheel proved very problematic, but wasn't part of the original design:


> Production was delayed drastically by developmental problems. Although planned for a service introduction in 1938, the Ju 88 finally entered squadron service (with only 12 aircraft) on the first day of the attack on Poland in 1939. Production was painfully slow, with only one Ju 88 manufactured per week, as problems continually kept cropping up.





> The first five prototypes had conventionally operating dual-strut leg rearwards-retracting main gear, but starting with the V6 prototype, a main gear design debuted that twisted the new, single-leg main gear strut through 90° during the retraction sequence, much like that of the American Curtiss P-40 Warhawk fighter. This feature allowed the main wheels to end up above the lower end of the strut when fully retracted [N 1] and was adopted as standard for all future production Ju 88s, and only minimally modified for the later Ju 188 and 388 developments of it. These single-leg landing gear struts also made use of stacks of conical Belleville washers inside them, as their main form of suspension for takeoffs and landings.



From the German Ju88 article about the developments of the Ju88A:
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_88


> Ju 88 A-1 (1940)
> Wingspan : 18.25 m
> Length: 14.36 m
> Height: 4.85 m
> ...



Same engines and speed, larger wing area and length. Apparently the new wing design wasn't the issue. The engine upgrade came with the A4, which was after the A5. The A5 was just the early introduction of the new wing design before the new Jumo 211s were available in 1941.



> Ju 88 A-4 (1941-1944) [ edit ]
> Purpose: dive bomber capable
> Wingspan: 20,08 m
> Length: 14.36 m
> ...





tomo pauk said:


> The max caliber of bombs in the Ju-88 bomb bay was 50 kg?


They could take 2x 250kg bombs in the primary bomb bay, but otherwise only 50kg bombs. 
I agree that the Ju88 could have been better designed, but the original design was pretty good until it was compromised by the dive bombing and extra crew/defensive armament and external bomb racks.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 10, 2014)

I was referring to the 'regular' wing, like the A-4 or C-6 were outfitted with. The Ju-88A-0, and presumably prototypes (?) were outfitted with a wing that was of 5% smaller area.
This Shnellbomber should be also a fine platform for night fighter gear.


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## wiking85 (Mar 10, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> I was referring to the 'regular' wing, like the A-4 or C-6 were outfitted with. The Ju-88A-0, and presumably prototypes (?) were outfitted with a wing that was of 5% smaller area.
> This Shnellbomber should be also a fine platform for night fighter gear.


But as the numbers I showed demonstrated the greater wing area did not penalize the Ju88's speed from the A-1 to A-4/5. I agree that keeping the original wing length (not sure if the A-1 did) would be better in terms of overall weight, but it did not seem to come with a drag penalty; in that case it is in fact more in the Ju88's favor to have a larger wing to reduce landing speeds, increase maneuverability and lift in flight, and have a stronger wing in general even with the minor weight penalty.

This design without rear armament and third crew member is ideal IMHO:


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## tomo pauk (Mar 10, 2014)

The wing area of the three allied bombers can be sated as 100%. The A-1 would be at 124.5% (vs Mosquito), the A-4 would be at 129.5%. In other words, the mere 4% of the increase of wing area between different Ju-88s should mean few km/h of dfference, ie. well within the production tolerances. The difference in wing area of 24.5 or 29.5% should produce a more notable speed difference.
The bigger wing of the historic Ju-88 vs. Mosquito was needed - additional crew members are weight penalty, ditto for the MGs ammo they would be using, plus one must provide a suitable accommodation for those, and that demands more volume, that again drives both weight and size up. Bigger weight size: more fuel needed. More fuel = more weight. More weight = bigger wing.
Sort of a weight creep, or weight spiral that goes up.


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## wiking85 (Mar 10, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> The wing area of the three allied bombers can be sated as 100%. The A-1 would be at 124.5% (vs Mosquito), the A-4 would be at 129.5%. In other words, the mere 4% of the increase of wing area between different Ju-88s should mean few km/h of dfference, ie. well within the production tolerances. The difference in wing area of 24.5 or 29.5% should produce a more notable speed difference.
> The bigger wing of the historic Ju-88 vs. Mosquito was needed - additional crew members are weight penalty, ditto for the MGs ammo they would be using, plus one must provide a suitable accommodation for those, and that demands more volume, that again drives both weight and size up. Bigger weight size: more fuel needed. More fuel = more weight. More weight = bigger wing.
> Sort of a weight creep, or weight spiral that goes up.



Fair enough, a more speed oriented design would require less wing area. Still I wonder then how much different the V1 prototype design was from the A-1's wing. Keep in mind though that the Mosquito was also made of wood, so weighed less than the aluminum Ju88, so could afford a smaller wing. It also had a second potential bomb bay, which increased the weight vs. the Mosquito. AFAIK the A-1 wing was fine provided the weight was kept down in terms of the defensive armament, no dive modifications, and no external bomb racks. The V1 prototype of course was lighter than a production model would be due to IIRC no fitted armor or full kit out that a combat model would have. Still, even a 330mph top speed Ju88 with a cruise speed around 300 mph would be very tough to properly intercept in 1940-41. That would be with the Jumo211B engine, so having a Jumo211F or J would increase the speed nicely if all else remained the same. A later Jumo 213 or DB603 engine upgrade would also offer a major increase, provided the original design concept is kept.


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## rinkol (Mar 10, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> The wing area of the three allied bombers can be sated as 100%. The A-1 would be at 124.5% (vs Mosquito), the A-4 would be at 129.5%. In other words, the mere 4% of the increase of wing area between different Ju-88s should mean few km/h of dfference, ie. well within the production tolerances. The difference in wing area of 24.5 or 29.5% should produce a more notable speed difference.
> The bigger wing of the historic Ju-88 vs. Mosquito was needed - additional crew members are weight penalty, ditto for the MGs ammo they would be using, plus one must provide a suitable accommodation for those, and that demands more volume, that again drives both weight and size up. Bigger weight size: more fuel needed. More fuel = more weight. More weight = bigger wing.
> Sort of a weight creep, or weight spiral that goes up.



One question that arises concerns whether the Hs 127 was a missed opportunity - supposedly the prototype demonstrated an excellent performance. Unfortunately, very little information that would support a comparative assessment has survived.


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## wiking85 (Mar 10, 2014)

rinkol said:


> One question that arises concerns whether the Hs 127 was a missed opportunity - supposedly the prototype demonstrated an excellent performance. Unfortunately, very little information that would support a comparative assessment has survived.


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henschel_Hs_127


> The maiden flight of the Hs 127 V1 was at the end of 1937. The plane was smaller and lighter than the Ju 88 and had a very good top speed of 565 km/h (353 mph), but the Ju 88 was chosen because of its bigger bomb load.



Looks pretty similar to the early Ju88 prototypes:
Ju88:





Hs127


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## DonL (Mar 10, 2014)

To my opinion compromises must made.

From sources, this 50kg bomb issue, was clearly a RLM mistake, because it was an explicit requirement of the RLM advertisement of 1935.

From my own research, the fulsage of the Ju 88 had enough volume to take other internal bomb loads and bigger bombs, but the development and the sub-division of the fulsage was in 1937/38 in such an advanced stage, that you have to complete reconstruct the whole fulsage for other requirements.

It is a big hindsight that it was't changed the whole war and to me the only explanation is, that a reconstruction would take too much time and effort.
The original fulsage could take 1400kg internal bomb load

I haven't written or changed this requirement in this thread, because it was said, changes from 1936.
From all I have researched you can built a Ju 88 to the same external dimensions, but with an other sub-divisioned fulsage to take 1400-1500kg internal bomb load with 250kg or 500kg bombs.

So to me the Ju 88 is also the best design next to the Mosquito for a fast bomber.


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## wiking85 (Mar 10, 2014)

AFAIK the major factor in preventing a reworking of the internal bomb bays was the need to get new jigs, which was deemed too costly. The structural reworking would have been very possible, but it would have altered the production lines too much to be easily phased in. That's why the Ju188 was settled on, because it was basically keeping the Ju88 design with a new cockpit that didn't require new jigs for the majority of the aircraft.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 10, 2014)

The timer starts with 1936, the 1st flight of the Ju-88 prototype was at the end of that year. We should have enough time. If not, the non-issue of dive bomb requirement should save some time, as would non-adding of new crew positions armament ammo.
We don't have any production of the Ju-88, so there is no change in production tooling.


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## wiking85 (Mar 10, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> The timer starts with 1936, the 1st flight of the Ju-88 prototype was at the end of that year. We should have enough time. If not, the non-issue of dive bomb requirement should save some time, as would non-adding of new crew positions armament ammo.


Agreed. The prototype was still in design by 1/1/1936:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_88


> Junkers presented their initial design in June 1936,


The changes in the design stage shouldn't be that big of a delay.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 10, 2014)

Better rethink the wing location ASAP. A complete sentence is:



> Junkers presented their initial design in June 1936, and were given clearance to build two prototypes (Werknummer 4941 and 4942).


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## DonL (Mar 10, 2014)

Thank you for this post wiking, do you have a source to me for the jigs?

Also your post confirmed my opinion that the general design of the Ju 88 could do the job of a fast bomber.

Edit:

Ok then an immediately order at 1936 to my plan would be

- redesign of the Ju 88 internal fulsage to take bombs till 1000kg up internal, with the same external dimensions.


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## wiking85 (Mar 10, 2014)

DonL said:


> Thank you for this post wiking, do you have a source to me for the jigs?


I do not, its a hunch given the long lead time that was mentioned about getting jigs together in "arming the luftwaffe" by Edward Homze. It was also mentioned as a reason they couldn't reproduce the Hs123 in 1944, due to the jigs being destroyed in 1940. 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henschel_Hs_123


> However, the Henschel factory had already dismantled all tools and jigs in 1940.


I suppose it took a fair about of specialized design and production resources to get these ready. Homze mentions there was a 2-3 year lead time on tooling pre-war and during the early stages due to major mismanagement and too much demand on the machine tool industry, which was not as forward thinking as other countries, especially the US. Homze also claims that Germany was short some 30,000 engineers for all demands of the military services and industry.

Arguably the problem would have also been the loss in production experience and the need to scrap the specialized machine tools developed for Ju88 production that boosted output. Budrass did an article about how experience created the armaments miracle in production after 1942 and used the Ju88 and aviation industry as a model (ignoring major issues though IMHO):
http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp905.pdf

This book has some disagreement with that perspective
http://www.amazon.com/dp/0786465212/?tag=dcglabs-20



DonL said:


> Also your post confirmed my opinion that the general design of the Ju 88 could do the job of a fast bomber.


It wasn't perfect as Tomo points out, but should be sufficient even without too much hindsight altering the original design.


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## BiffF15 (Mar 10, 2014)

Just think how many more types, varients, etc. of aircraft, tanks, vehicles they could have had with 30k more engineers.

Cheers,
Biff


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## wiking85 (Mar 10, 2014)

BiffF15 said:


> Just think how many more types, varients, etc. of aircraft, tanks, vehicles they could have had with 30k more engineers.
> 
> Cheers,
> Biff



IIRC it was more needed in terms of testing at Rechlin, in the machine tools industry, and in repair depots behind the lines.


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## Denniss (Mar 11, 2014)

Evne the forward bay in a Ju 88 could only hold 50 kg bombs, never heard or seen evidence of anything larger.


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## wiking85 (Mar 11, 2014)

Denniss said:


> Evne the forward bay in a Ju 88 could only hold 50 kg bombs, never heard or seen evidence of anything larger.


William Green's Warplanes of the Third Reich mentions being able to fit 2x 250kg bombs in addition to the 50kgers.


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## wiking85 (Mar 11, 2014)

Other than the bomb bay limitations and external bomb racks the V5 prototype of the Ju88 seems like the ideal version of the 1936 design. The aerodynamics was sound; I'll post a picture later about the changes to the prototypes.
Edit:






Also the 'Schnellbomber' version S-series (sorry about the bad scan, what's blurred isn't that important):


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## wiking85 (Mar 11, 2014)

So assuming we get our pet project, a 330mph top speed defenseless non-diving 2 crew Ju88 with a modified bomb bay using two Jumo 211B engines, it would not be the primary bomber of the Luftwaffe at any period; it would be a specialist aircraft, as it lacked the payload and range to be a medium bomber; this leaves us with the He111 as the primary level bomber in 1939. Without the Ju88 getting all of the OTL resources, including Heinkel production facilities producing for the Ju88, the He111 would be the most numerous bomber IMHO and the Do17 would have already been phased out in 1939. Assuming they have proper planning the LW could order the He111H to be prepared first instead of the He111P, the DB601 equipped unit, due to the large Jumo production capacity. The He111P was ready IOTL for mass production in November 1938, but was stymied in production due to the lack of DB engines; here if the He111H is produced in late 1938 first, then mass production could be ordered for this type for nearly a year; historically the H-series was ready in March and lacked production resources due to the Ju88 program eating up 50% of all aviation production resources (yet turned out only about 5 dozen units for all of 1939), but still delivered over 400 Heinkel bombers by September. A 5 month head start and more production resources would mean that the Do17 is totally out of production and service in 1939, while the Heinkel is in deep production by September 1939; assuming the Ju88 is ready for production in March 1939, as it has been predicted it would be if the dive requirement isn't added, then it too can phase in about 1 Geschwader pre-war. But its need is relatively low and can be built up by May 1940 without issue; in the meantime the Heinkel 111 is the workhorse of the LW: it can do just about everything they need in 1939-40 minus recon, CAS, and night fighting. With proper planning I don't see why by the start of the invasion of France there couldn't be well over 2000 units produced, so there is a deep reserve and full ration strength at the front of this model.

Despite limited Ju88 production resource with an early start and less technical issues that cropped up thanks to the landing gear in late 1939 would also probably see even more Ju88s in service by May 1940 than historically due to the cheaper, easier to produce, and less resource requiring Ju88 design we proposed. It would have much more survivability without escort due to its high speed, assuming it only uses its internal bomb bay, so less losses in 1940-41. What would be its best use then once France is beaten and we know the BoB is pointless?


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## DonL (Mar 11, 2014)

You don't realy want to built this bomber without any ETC'S?
To my opinion such a fast bomber must also be able to carry 3000kg with the racks (ETC's), alone to have the flexibility.

1. Should this version be the only version till a nightfighter, or do you also want a normal Ju 88 with 55 degree dive capacity?
2. From where should come the engines for the Heinkel 111? At 1939/40 the He 111 was flieing DB 601.


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## wiking85 (Mar 11, 2014)

DonL said:


> You don't realy want to built this bomber without any ETC'S?
> To my opinion such a fast bomber must also be able to carry 3000kg with the racks (ETC's), alone to have the flexibility.


IMHO the Ju88 was a specialist airframe and shouldn't carry anything externally except for a fighter-bomber version like the Mosquito. Otherwise a medium bomber like the He111 or Do217 should be carrying the heavy loads; if you are taking on 3000kg externally for the Ju88 then it has to be structurally strengthened even more, which adds more weight, which means less range and speed, thus compromising the design. Its not worth it, because the Ju88's main selling point is its speed; once that is compromised it loses its purpose and its job can be done better by a slower medium bomber with more armor and defensive guns and carry a heavier load further.



DonL said:


> 1. Should this version be the only version till a nightfighter, or do you also want a normal Ju 88 with 55 degree dive capacity?


I'm totally against a dive bombing version. This version is a speed bomber, recon aircraft, nightfighter/intruder, and perhaps gunship. It was too big to reliably dive, which is why it was restricted to glide bombing early on (55 degree attacks).



DonL said:


> 2. From where should come the engines for the Heinkel 111? At 1939/40 the He 111 was flieing DB 601.


The He111 was mostly using the Jumo 211 as of March 1939 when the H-series (Jumo engined) was ready. The DB series, which was very small, the P-series, was ready earlier due to the better DB performance, but there were just too few engine available. IIRC by September 1939 only 400 engines a month were being produced from all factories; a year earlier it was even less. Meanwhile Jumo had triple or quadruple the number of engines.


BTW as an aside I'm wondering why DB never tried to go the Jumo route and work on a smaller DB that used higher RPMs. The DB605 was bigger and though it used a similar cooling system and ran with higher RPM it was only equivalent to the Jumo 211J in terms of output. AFAIK the 605 never broke the 1500hp mark.
So perhaps instead of a DB603, which we agree is problematic, why not go for a Daimler Benz version of the Jumo 213?


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## DonL (Mar 11, 2014)

THe He 111 H was built after or during BoB with Jumo engines.
Not any He 111 was built 1939 with Jumo engines.

After my plan this is impossible

I need also the fast Ju 88 with racks (ETC's) to carry bigger bomb loads till the Do 217 is in service and to my opinion a dive version till 55 degree is needed for a maritim strike aircraft. The LW need especially at 1940-1942 a maritim strike aircraft for the, Atlantic (from France), Mediterranean Sea, Channel and North Sea.

Also to my plan I have the Fw 187 and Do 215 (stop gap nightfighter), there is not any single room to enlarge any other production capacity of a/c's and especially engines, because to my plan I have already enlarged Genshagen beginning 1939


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## wiking85 (Mar 11, 2014)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel_He_111


> The H variant of the He 111 series was more widely produced and saw more action during World War II than any other Heinkel variant. Owing to the uncertainty surrounding the delivery and availability of the DB 601 engines, Heinkel began tests with the 820 kW (1,100 hp) Junkers Jumo 211 powerplants. The somewhat larger size and greater weight of the Jumo 211 engines were unimportant considerations for a twin engine design, and the Jumo was used on almost all early-war bomber designs. When the Jumo was fitted to the P model it became the He 111 H.
> 
> The He 111 H-1 was fitted with a standard set of three 7.92 mm (.312 in) MG 15s and eight SC 250 250 kg (550 lb) or 32 SC 50 50 kg (110 lb) bombs. The same armament was used in the H-2 which started production in August 1939.[47]* The P-series was gradually replaced on the eve of war with the new the H-2, powered by improved Jumo 211 A-3 engines of 820 kW (1,100 hp).[47] A count on 2 September 1939 revealed that the Luftwaffe had a total of 787 He 111s in service, with 705 combat ready, including 400 H-1 and H-2s that had been produced in a mere four months.[48]* _Production of the H-3, powered by the 895 kW (1,200 hp) Jumo 211 D-1, began in October 1939. _The experiences during the Polish Campaign led to an increase in defensive armament. MG 17s were fitted whenever possible and the number of machine guns was increased to seven. Normally one MG 17 would be installed in the nose, one in the ventral position, dorsal position and one in each waist window position. The two waist positions received an additional MG 15 or 17. On some Heinkels a permanent belt-fed MG 17 was installed in the tail.[47]
> 
> After the Battle of Britain, smaller scale production of the H-4s began. The H-4 was virtually identical to the He 111 P-4 with the DB 600s swapped for the Jumo 211D-1s.[49] This variant also differed from the H-3 in that it could either carry 2,000 kg (4,410 lb) of bombs internally or mount one or two external racks to carry one 1,800 kg (3,970 lb) or two 1,000 kg (2,210 lb) bombs. As these external racks blocked the internal bomb bay doors, a combination of internal and external storage was not possible. A PVR 1006L bomb rack was fitted externally and a 835 L (221 US gal) tank added. The PVR 1006L was capable of carrying a SC 1000 1,000 kg (2,210 lb) bomb. Some H-4s had their PVC racks modified to drop torpedoes.[49] Later modifications enabled the PVC 1006 to carry a 2,500 kg (5,510 lb) "Max" bomb. But 1,000 kg (2,200 lb) "Hermann" or 1,800 kg (3,970 lb) "Satans" were used more widely.[50]



I have multiple books, including specialist books on the He111, that confirm this. The Ju88 as a naval bomber was a bust; the He111 level and torpedo bomber was much more useful. The trick is getting the Italian aerial torpedo into production pre-war, which is very easy considering the KM held the license to do so since 1938!


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## DonL (Mar 11, 2014)

I have also several books and the engl. wiki articel is wrong from the timeline!

The He 111 P series was with DB 601 engines and this engine wasn't deliverable until December 1938/January 1939, that are the same month were the Me 110 and Bf 109 started with the production. And now the englisch wiki want to tell me that next to the 834 P series also 400 H series were built at 1939?
This is wrong!
The Jumo 211 was at the beginning exclusive for the Ju 87 and Ju 88 and not until enough were produced, it was also delvered to Heinkel. The timeline from the english wiki is wrong.

I totaly disagree with your analyse about the Ju 88 as maritim strike aircraft, also the Ju 88 was equiped with torpedos. The Ju 88 was the a/c what was most dangerous at Malta beginning 1941 and at Kreta 1941 to the english navy. 
The He 111 was ok but far away from the performance of the Ju 88 with it's possibility to dive.

The trick is to do more research and funding for the F5B before the war. The whole funding between 1936-1940 was 100000 RM for a Aircraft Torpedo, this was one of the biggest jokes and mistakes. Not until Tarent has shown what was possible, the funding was massively increased.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 11, 2014)

wiking85 said:


> BTW as an aside I'm wondering why DB never tried to go the Jumo route and work on a smaller DB that used higher RPMs. The DB605 was bigger and though it used a similar cooling system and ran with higher RPM it was only equivalent to the Jumo 211J in terms of output. AFAIK the 605 never broke the 1500hp mark.
> So perhaps instead of a DB603, which we agree is problematic, why not go for a Daimler Benz version of the Jumo 213?



We have said this before many times but it seems to need repeating. 

When you increase the rpm the stress on the crankshaft and reciprocating parts and the crankcase go up with the *square* of the speed. going from 2200rpm to 2700 rpm increases the stress loads by 50%. You need a stronger crank, stronger con rods, stronger pistons, a stronger crankcase to keep things from flexing and better bearings. Friction also goes up with the square of the speed so you have 50% more power lost to friction. Not a really big deal but you don't get 22.7% increase in power you think are going ot get from the RPM increase

Going from 2400rpm to 3200rpm increases these loads by 77%. 

The higher the RPM the more problems you can run into with vibration, especially harmonic vibration.


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## wiking85 (Mar 11, 2014)

DonL said:


> I have also several books and the engl. wiki articel is wrong from the timeline!
> 
> The He 111 P series was with DB 601 engines and this engine wasn't deliverable until December 1938/January 1939, that are the same month were the Me 110 and Bf 109 started with the production. And now the englisch wiki want to tell me that next to the 834 P series also 400 H series were built at 1939?
> This is wrong!


That's not what the article is saying at all; it is including all other previous types of He111 prior to the H and P series as well, which were still in service. A DB600 naval series for instance was produced, not to mention the lower performing pre-DB601 and Jumo 211 engine equipped series.



DonL said:


> The Jumo 211 was at the beginning exclusive for the Ju 87 and Ju 88 and not until enough were produced, it was also delvered to Heinkel. The timeline from the english wiki is wrong.


Source on that? I have a book on the He111 that confirms the wikipedia article:
Heinkel He 111 (Black Cross, Vol. 4): Amazon.co.uk: Karl-Heinz Regnat, Regnat Karl-Heinz: Books
The author also produces RLM and Heinkel documents showing this too.



DonL said:


> I totaly disagree with your analyse about the Ju 88 as maritim strike aircraft, also the Ju 88 was equiped with torpedos. The Ju 88 was the a/c what was most dangerous at Malta beginning 1941 and at Kreta 1941 to the english navy.
> The He 111 was ok but far away from the performance of the Ju 88 with it's possibility to dive.
> 
> The trick is to do more research and funding for the F5B before the war. The whole funding between 1936-1940 was 100000 RM for a Aircraft Torpedo, this was one of the biggest jokes and mistakes. Not until Tarent has shown what was possible, the funding was massively increased.


Luftwaffe Aerial Torpedo Aircraft and Operations in World War II: Harold Thiele: 9781902109428: Amazon.com: Books
The Luftwaffe and the War at Sea 1939-1945: As Seen by Officers of the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe: David C Isby: 9781861762566: Amazon.com: Books
Sea Eagles: Luftwaffe Anti-Shipping Units 1939-1941 (Luftwaffe Colours): Chris Goss: 9781903223550: Amazon.com: Books
Sea Eagles Volume Two: Luftwaffe Anti-Shipping Units 1942-45 (Luftwaffe Colours): Chris Goss: 9781903223567: Amazon.com: Books

These books confirm that the He111 was preferred for torpedo operations and level bombing due to its lower wing loading and low speed performance, which was critical for torpedo drops, as they could only be dropped at around 200mph, which was pretty low for the Ju88, especially this faster one we mention here. Also the dropping aircraft needs to maneuver pretty quick to get away from defensive fire of the attacked ship, which the bigger wings of the He111 work best at. 

As to your claim that the Ju88 was the most dangerous, how many He111s were there? In 1940 the He111 was the most dangerous during Norway and again during the Arctic convoy campaign.


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## wiking85 (Mar 11, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> We have said this before many times but it seems to need repeating.
> 
> When you increase the rpm the stress on the crankshaft and reciprocating parts and the crankcase go up with the *square* of the speed. going from 2200rpm to 2700 rpm increases the stress loads by 50%. You need a stronger crank, stronger con rods, stronger pistons, a stronger crankcase to keep things from flexing and better bearings. Friction also goes up with the square of the speed so you have 50% more power lost to friction. Not a really big deal but you don't get 22.7% increase in power you think are going ot get from the RPM increase
> 
> ...



I understand your point, yet the DB603 has serious issues as well; we know the Jumo 213 was more reliable in terms of time between overhauls and just as powerful with slightly less fuel consumption than the 603. I'm not saying its a panacea option, but perhaps given that DB was skittish about getting too involved in further aero-engine and required more investment than Jumo in terms of factories to have it just focus on improving the DB601/5 instead of focusing on multiple projects or even just the DB603. All engineering talent focused on the DB601 from 1936 on with no investment in any other DB engine is also a potential viable path.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 11, 2014)

The DB 605A beat the 1500 PS mark already in late 1943, when the ban on Notleistung was lifted. See the chart here (scroll to the bottom) - 1500+something was rating at 2.1 km. The later AM and ASM versions got to 1800 PS, the 605D even to 2000 PS in case both C3 and MW-50 were available.
The DB-605 have had the displacement of 35.7 L, vs. 35 L for the Jumo 211/213. Seems not enough difference to debate about? About the high RPM capabilities of the Jumo 213 - that came with a price. The price was weight gain of some 30% vs the 211, so the Jumo 213 weights as much as the DB-603 of 44L of displacement. Another price tag, this one much more serious, was in timing - the engine was almost too late to matter for the ww2, especially the powerful two stage variants.

Maybe the LW in sea combats would've been far better served with 500-2000 kg bomb used in skip bombimg, or maybe with mast-height bombing, than to go for a torpedo? One can do skip bombing even with Bf-109 or P-39, let alone with Fw-190, Hellcat or Mosquito.


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## wiking85 (Mar 11, 2014)

My understanding was the 1800-2000hp was the result of engaging MW boost rather than standard power.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 11, 2014)

Of course. There is no such thing as a free lunch.


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## wiking85 (Mar 11, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Of course. There is no such thing as a free lunch.



That's my point, Daimler did not produce a base 1750hp with the DB605. They could have done something like the Jumo 213 and gotten a heavier engine with higher base rpm rather than going the 603 route of high displacement. The 603 potentially offers an earlier high hp option, but so too could the DB605 if modded like the Jumo 213 by 1942, which is the predicted 'ready' date of the 603 anyway.


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## Denniss (Mar 11, 2014)

wiking85 said:


> William Green's Warplanes of the Third Reich mentions being able to fit 2x 250kg bombs in addition to the 50kgers.


Lot of BS in this book, should I mention MG 151 as cowl gun in the Bf 109K?

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## rinkol (Mar 11, 2014)

wiking85 said:


> BTW as an aside I'm wondering why DB never tried to go the Jumo route and work on a smaller DB that used higher RPMs. The DB605 was bigger and though it used a similar cooling system and ran with higher RPM it was only equivalent to the Jumo 211J in terms of output. AFAIK the 605 never broke the 1500hp mark.
> So perhaps instead of a DB603, which we agree is problematic, why not go for a Daimler Benz version of the Jumo 213?



I think lubrication was a weakness of the DB 605. Unlike Rolls Royce or Junkers, DB never went to arrangements where oil was pumped through the crankshaft. AFAIK, the Junkers 211 series engines did not have bearing problems to the same extent as the DB605.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 11, 2014)

Wiking85 said:



> That's my point, Daimler did not produce a base 1750hp with the DB605. They could have done something like the Jumo 213 and gotten a heavier engine with higher base rpm rather than going the 603 route of high displacement. The 603 potentially offers an earlier high hp option, but so too could the DB605 if modded like the Jumo 213 by 1942, which is the predicted 'ready' date of the 603 anyway.



They might, but, with DB-603 in the pipeline, one might say why bother? As you may now, the next-gen DB (for 1942 on) for my LW would be the two stage engine, not the high RPM engine  The DB-601 derivative weighting 2000 lbs dry would be a lousy match for the main costumer of the DB-601/605 line, the Bf-109.

added: the manual for the Ju-88 notes only 50 kg bombs in bomb bay to be carried


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## Shortround6 (Mar 11, 2014)

The DB 605 was pretty much useless as a bomber engine (or heavy aircraft engine) once you get past the 1475-1500 Mark. Much like some of the late war Merlins while the _PEAK_ 1-5 minute ratings went up, the climb and max cruise ratings did not. 

You need the 603 or Jumo 213 for the higher climb and cruise ratings _and_ the fact they can use the higher power levels without needed additional maintenance or affecting overhaul life, like using water injection?MW 50 or over boosting bring on. 

Please note that R-R _never_ changed the RPM of either the Merlin or Griffon, They were able to use increased boost pressure instead. An option not really open to the Germans or at least not to the extent it was to the British due to fuel. 

Do not really compare simple RPM, Piston speed is the more accurate comparison of the strain on bearings and corrected piston speed is even better. Corrected Piston speed is the piston speed divided by the square root of stroke/bore ratio. Under square engines get the number reduced and over square ones get it raised to account for the bigger (heavier) pistons. 

For example the Merlin is 3000fpm ( 6in stoke X 2 for every revolution) but is corrected to the sr. rt. of 6/5.4 x 3000 for 2846.

A DB 605 at 2700rpm is 2835fpm but is corrected to 2782

A DB 603 at 2700rpm is 3190fpm but is corrected to 3026

A Jumo 213 at 3250rpm is 3520fpm but is corrected to 3200. 

These are theoretical numbers and in actuality would be affected by actual piston and con rod weight as opposed to a "correction" factor but help explain _why_ certain engines were limited to certain rpms without major changes. Allison required a new crankshaft with bigger counter weights that weighed 27lbs more than the old crankshaft to go from 3000 rpm to 3200 rpm, it would fit in the old crankcases though for even more crankshaft life. Some engines did not have extra room in the crankcase.

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## wiking85 (Mar 12, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> The DB 605 was pretty much useless as a bomber engine (or heavy aircraft engine) once you get past the 1475-1500 Mark. Much like some of the late war Merlins while the _PEAK_ 1-5 minute ratings went up, the climb and max cruise ratings did not.
> 
> You need the 603 or Jumo 213 for the higher climb and cruise ratings _and_ the fact they can use the higher power levels without needed additional maintenance or affecting overhaul life, like using water injection?MW 50 or over boosting bring on.
> 
> ...


Fair enough. Thanks for the explanation. All I'm saying is the 213 and 211 had the same displacement, which was also the same as the 605. Theoretically it was possible to go the 213 route with a DB engine, but given the limited engineering capabilities of Daimler for aero engines compared to the Jumo it makes sense why they didn't. Having the DB603 probably would result in an earlier production engine of a high output aero engine rather than redesigning the DB601/5.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 12, 2014)

DB probably had as much or more engineering capability in total, it's just that it was scattered all over the place. They not only had well over a dozen aircraft engine projects but naval MTB engine projects, tank engine projects and car/truck engines.


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## wiking85 (Mar 12, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> DB probably had as much or more engineering capability in total, it's just that it was scattered all over the place. They not only had well over a dozen aircraft engine projects but naval MTB engine projects, tank engine projects and car/truck engines.


Which is why I mentioned aero-engine capacity specifically; in terms of overall capacity I agree. In terms of aero engine projects one has to wonder what they could have achieved by focusing only on 1 or 2 engines rather than the plethora of projects...just like Jumo.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 12, 2014)

Engines are not developed in a vacuum. While the aero engine dept might be the last word on superchargers, one of the diesel depts might have a good idea about bearing metals or piston rings. Diesels, while lower power often stress certain parts muchhigher than a gasoline engine. The car/truck dept might have a good idea about how to cast engine blocks with a lower scrap rate. Allison improved their engine blocks by adopting a casting technique from a pair of artist/sculptors. Ford developed a casting method for making R-2800 parts, centrifugal casting, metal was poured into a group of molds on a spinning turntable and used the centrifugal force to help the metal flow into the molds and force the air out leaving fewer air pockets/flaws.

One does wonder what the earlier cancellation of _some_ projects might have lead to. 
P&W (and perhaps a few other companies) often pitted two design teams against each other in a 'friendly' rivalry. With P&W it was the R-2800 team against the R-4360 team.


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## buffnut453 (Mar 12, 2014)

***MEANINGLESS DRIVEL ALERT!!!***

Just wanted to preface my comment by a disclaimer that my interjection has little to do with this deep and interesting discussion....

However, in answer to the question "Ideal Luftwaffe starting 1/1/1936" the answer has to be a Luftwaffe that's still equipped with gliders. I may let them have a few marsh-mellow shooters so the officers don't get bored during dining-in nights but that's about it. The history of the 1940s would be much different had they been so equipped!

Pretty much sums up my thoughts on the matter!


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## bobbysocks (Mar 12, 2014)

you actually have a pretty good thought on the gliders. you can launch a glider with a truck or a catapult and that doesnt take much fuel. and up until late 43 the interior of germany was pretty safe to fly in...for german planes. the lw and germany should have pressed forward with basic pilot training for all children and boys too young for military service. even planes like the Klemm Kl 107, and the 2 seater 35 would have been economical enough to train students. at the end of the war i have read where some units still had fuel and airplanes but no one to fly them. actually i think germany and the lw were sitting pretty good in 39. the aircraft were top of the line and they were sucessful. it is not the fault of the 109s and 110s that the BoB wasnt a decisive win for germany. germany was just not in the position either resourcewise, etc to keep up in the great airplane race. they introduced the 190 but stuck mainly with those 2 air frames ( 109 and 190 ). i think they should have had a successor to the 109 in the works ( at least in prototype ) by 1940. how possible and practical that was with the type and production of engines...i havent a clue. i admire you guys who can throw out all that kind of info....manifold pressures, hp ratings...supercharger type. that is all way beyond my research or interest at this point....but i like to read it.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 14, 2014)

The engine layout of the Do-18 was employing the additional shaft to power the rear prop; was thinking all the time that rear prop was attached directly to the reduction gear. 







Think that we might toss in some historic piston engines from second half of 1944. Eg. the BMW-801S (or 801TS) was making circa 200 PS more than the 801D at most of the altitudes. Please note that the power in the table, at least for the 801S, was not deduced for the needs of the cooling fan*. Eg. the take off power was not 2000 PS, but 1930, with allowance for the fan. AT 18700 ft, the power was probably down for 50-60 PS, ie. 'net' power was at 1640-1650 PS. 
Using overbosting in the 801S (1.82 ata, vs. 1.58/1.65 ata for the 801D), the max power in second supercharger gear was probably around 1800-1850 PS, no ram, but at somewhat lower altitude. For the 801D, it was just above 1650, no ram. The fuel consumption was probably horrendous vs. the DB engines  The duration of the Notleistung was 5 minutes, vs. 3 min for the 801D.
The production of the Fw-190A-9, featuring the BMW 801S, started in Autumn of 1944. The A-9 was some 20 km/h faster than the A-8, but barely faster than lightweight more streamlined 190s with less fuel, lighter armament ammo, like eg. Fw-190A-3.
Original table is to be found at AEHS site.






*many thanks for Denniss, who provided that data here


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## tomo pauk (Mar 15, 2014)

A table kindly provided my Paul (Micdrow). Seems like the most streamlined Ju-88s was incapable to go faster than 500 km/h, when carrying bombs? Though, the Jumo 211A was weakest of the bunch. Black rectangles under the wings show whether the aircrfat was outfitted with dive brakes. The influence of the external payload is evident.
The Ju-88B eventually evolved into Ju-188.

addition to the previous post: the Germans started with tests pertaining the overboosting the BMW-801D at leas as early as Spring of 1943. 'Simple' over-boosting, ie. without additional C3 injection to serve as anti-detonant liquid, like MW-50. link (yes, that web site is simply great)


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## wiking85 (Mar 15, 2014)

Very interesting infographic. Where did it come from? Also I think we clearly can see what the Ju88 design was capable of in terms of speed if it had retained its initial design. Add in more powerful engines and things just get better.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 15, 2014)

Drag is cruel, as stated once by Bill (drgondog).
Paul posted the schematics in this thread. People might also want to check out other ladeplans mentioned there. Eg. if the layout of wing spars of the Ju-88 was really as it is depicted in the post #2 there (ie. too close to each other), there is o wonder the wing fuel tankage was far smaller than it would be with spars set more apart. In case the Ju-88 gets built as a high wing A/C, extra fuel can be carried in fixed tanks above the bomb bay, too.


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## wiking85 (Mar 15, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Drag is cruel, as stated once by Bill (drgondog).
> Paul posted the schematics in this thread. People might also want to check out other ladeplans mentioned there. Eg. if the layout of wing spars of the Ju-88 was really as it is depicted in the post #2 there (ie. too close to each other), there is o wonder the wing fuel tankage was far smaller than it would be with spars set more apart. In case the Ju-88 gets built as a high wing A/C, extra fuel can be carried in fixed tanks above the bomb bay, too.



Fair point. Part of the issue was that the spec was issued for short ranges, as Germany thought it would only be fighting France, Czechoslovakia, and maybe Poland, rather than Britain. Of course when the spec was issued it was understood that the Ju88 was a specialist airframe that wouldn't be expected to be a jack of all trades, master of none; Wever's LW expected a longer range heavy bomber and medium range medium bomber; the Ju88 was to be a light short ranged bomber. Of course thanks to hindsight in term of organization and design we can suggest improved versions of the OTL aircraft. Still though I think the Ju88 should remain a limited production airframe for specialist roles, rather than a longer range medium bomber that would replace the He111/Do217.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 15, 2014)

The range the He-111-H16 was capable to carry 2000 kg of bombs (8 x 250 kg), all internally, was 1885 km. The range of the Ju-88A-4 when carrying 1800 kg bomb (externally) was 3100 km. Opposite wing rack carried a drop tank?
The H16 was carrying external 1000 kg bomb to the range of 2465 km, vs. the Ju-88A1's range of 2930 km, or Ju-88A5's 4200 km; the Junkers carrying 2 x 500 kg.
Seems like the Ju-88 was a better LR bomber?


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## wiking85 (Mar 15, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> The range the He-111-H16 was capable to carry 2000 kg of bombs (8 x 250 kg), all internally, was 1885 km. The range of the Ju-88A-4 when carrying 1800 kg bomb (externally) was 3100 km. Opposite wing rack carried a drop tank?
> The H16 was carrying external 1000 kg bomb to the range of 2465 km, vs. the Ju-88A1's range of 2930 km, or Ju-88A5's 4200 km; the Junkers carrying 2 x 500 kg.
> Seems like the Ju-88 was a better LR bomber?


First of all where are your He111 numbers from? In my copy of Black Cross's He111 book the H16 was capable of 2700km with 1000kg external bombload or 2900km with internal 1000kg. 

There is also the question of fuel consumption, IIRC the He111 required less to achieve the same range, especially when using internal bomb loads vs. the Ju88s external loads. Also the He111 had better defenses than the Ju88A4, while the later lost its speed considerably when using external loads.

Edit:
Also couldn't the He111 also fit drop tanks if needed?


Also keep in mind that the Ju88A4 was only available after 1941 in small numbers; it took a while to phase that in. By then if we have the DB603 developed from 1936 without interruption we could have the Do217 available, which would best the Ju88A4. From 1938-41 the He111 was better than the Ju88 A1 and A5; by the time the A4 showed up the Do217 was in service and was better than the A4. So start phasing out the He111 in 1941 in favor of the Do217.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 15, 2014)

The two tables about the H16 can be found here, scroll a bit. The Ju-88 does come a bit late to the fray (how much later due to airframe alterations strengthening, so it can dive bomb and have better defenses?), but even the early A-1 of BoB vintage was capable for excellent bomb loads vs. range values. The He-111 was a fine workhorse, by 1940/41 Germans can field a better bomber, though.
I'd love to see a more 'formal' data re. Ju-88, too.


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## wiking85 (Mar 15, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> The two tables about the H16 can be found here, scroll a bit. The Ju-88 does come a bit late to the fray (how much later due to airframe alterations strengthening, so it can dive bomb and have better defenses?), but even the early A-1 of BoB vintage was capable for excellent bomb loads vs. range values. The He-111 was a fine workhorse, by 1940/41 Germans can field a better bomber, though.
> I'd love to see a more 'formal' data re. Ju-88, too.



::Junkers Ju88::
::Junkers Ju88::

Reactions: Like Like:
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## wiking85 (Mar 15, 2014)

I think you're Ju88 numbers are way off:
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_88#Technische_Daten


> Ju 88 A-1 (1940)
> Fuel: four tanks in the wings with a total of 1680 l, optional - instead of bombs carried internally - a tank in the front load space with 1,220 l and 1 tank 680 liters in the rear load space = maximum of 3580 l
> Range : 2030 km with 3580 l of fuel in the wings and fuselage tanks
> 
> ...


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## tomo pauk (Mar 15, 2014)

There are no my numbers in play


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## wiking85 (Mar 15, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> There are no my numbers in play



???



tomo pauk said:


> The range the He-111-H16 was capable to carry 2000 kg of bombs (8 x 250 kg), all internally, was 1885 km. The range of the Ju-88A-4 when carrying 1800 kg bomb (externally) was 3100 km. Opposite wing rack carried a drop tank?
> The H16 was carrying external 1000 kg bomb to the range of 2465 km, vs. the Ju-88A1's range of 2930 km, or Ju-88A5's 4200 km; the Junkers carrying 2 x 500 kg.
> Seems like the Ju-88 was a better LR bomber?



Where are these Ju88 numbers from? I cannot substantial them, only contradict them.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 15, 2014)

I just listed the values from the table attached at post #166 here. 'Bombenlast' means bomb load, 'Luftstrecke' is range.


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## wiking85 (Mar 15, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> I just listed the values from the table attached at post #166 here. 'Bombenlast' means bomb load, 'Luftstrecke' is range.



Yeah, I think those numbers are wrong or the range numbers are what you would get with maximum fuel, but no bombs.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 15, 2014)

At any rate, I will not bet my house on any of those sets of numbers. If we're to go by Wkipedia's numbers (2030 km with 2 x SD 1000), that is still 150 km farther than He-111-H16 with all internal 2000 kg (8 x 250 kg) bomb load.


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## Denniss (Mar 15, 2014)

Some Ju 88 A-1 rangetables here:
Beim-Zeugmeister: Seite 6 - Ju 88 A-1, Rüstzustand B, Beladefall 4

A 1941 Ju 88 A-4/D-1 manual claims ~2400 range with full internal fuel (Rüstzustand C, 3480l in wings and bomb bays). This value is probably with up to 30% tactical reserve but without bombload. This is given for aircraft without Ladeluftkühler so most like early version with Jumo 211F. 211J-equipped A-4 have ~2250 km range.
All these values for maximum continuous power. The Ju 88D-1 is just shown with LLK, having about 100km more range than the A-4 with LLK (both Rüstzustand C)


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## wiking85 (Mar 15, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> At any rate, I will not bet my house on any of those sets of numbers. If we're to go by Wkipedia's numbers (2030 km with 2 x SD 1000), that is still 150 km farther than He-111-H16 with all internal 2000 kg (8 x 250 kg) bomb load.



That's only with maximum possible fuel, so is using much more than the H16 for that range and doesn't include the He111 being fitted with external tanks to increase its range.


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## wiking85 (Mar 15, 2014)

Denniss said:


> Some Ju 88 A-1 rangetables here:
> Beim-Zeugmeister: Seite 6 - Ju 88 A-1, Rüstzustand B, Beladefall 4
> 
> A 1941 Ju 88 A-4/D-1 manual claims ~2400 range with full internal fuel (Rüstzustand C, 3480l in wings and bomb bays). This value is probably with up to 30% tactical reserve but without bombload. This is given for aircraft without Ladeluftkühler so most like early version with Jumo 211F. 211J-equipped A-4 have ~2250 km range.
> All these values for maximum continuous power. The Ju 88D-1 is just shown with LLK, having about 100km more range than the A-4 with LLK (both Rüstzustand C)



My German isn't great, but I didn't see any ranges on that website.


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## Denniss (Mar 15, 2014)

wiking85 said:


> My German isn't great, but I didn't see any ranges on that website.


You can calculate this from the last two rows, showing fuel usage and TAS.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 15, 2014)

wiking85 said:


> That's only with maximum possible fuel, so is using much more than the H16 for that range and doesn't include the He111 being fitted with external tanks to increase its range.



What is the fuel volume for the He-111-H16 when carrying 8 x 250 kg of bombs internally? Where would the drop tank(s) go, in order not to interfere with bombs dropping?


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## Denniss (Mar 15, 2014)

The H-16 had 2425kg internal fuel with 2t of bombs and no option to carry more fuel in drop tanks (max weight reached).


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## tomo pauk (Mar 15, 2014)

My point exactly. 2400 kg of fuel would mean around 3300 l?
Now, if my math German are any good, here is how the Ju-88 (1939 model) would've fared when trying to attack the target at circa 1100 km (ie, range of excess of 2200 km). Cruising would be at 5000m. It will use dive bombing, hence the need to climb back at 5000m. Outgoing speed would be 350 km/h, returning at 360 km/h. The external bombs waste some 40-70 km/h of speed*, plus how much the racks? A thing well known when trying to compare P-38 with Mosquito.
Part of those 520 L will be used to warm up and take off.

* that also decreases the range


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## l'Omnivore Sobriquet (Mar 15, 2014)

My little contribution...
I think the quest for 'ideal' Lufwaffe should reckon with a few bonds of historical truth, events and choices. Which I list below. 
I will therefore submit more of a 'positive' Luftwaffe making good choices, in fact, by late 1941 early 1942 rather than an ideal one starting (deviating) from 1936 onwards. Sorry for that.

Let me explain.
From 1936 onto 41 I see things much as they were, and pretend the following points should be adhered to :

- Herr Wever dies as he historicaly died. The 'Sturz mafia' wins over (that is dive-bombing becomes Lw's favoured attack doctrine.)

- Fw-187 looses its gamble and remains an outsider, on a half-tolerated private venture basis. Hotly defended by its maker all the time, no doubt. Similarly the He-100.
The Bf-110 gets all the glory for the Polish unopposed massacres, the inflated reputation at the beginning of the battle of France and its already deflated one at the end (yes!), does the carrer we know in the Battle of Britain, into Barbarossa and the first Nachjagd squadrons...(moonlit naked eye fashionned then)
I think it is too much to ask the RLM to have it all right from the beginning : discard the Bf-110 as 'not good enough' in 1937 and order the Fw-187 instead at that point [seems beyond reality.] Heavy twin fighters were a novelty at the time, I think its Holland's Fokker twin boomed one that pionneered it in the 1935 or 36 Paris Air Show. Their tactical employ was anybody's guess then, so having RLM choosing a crew of two for a plane of two engines, sided by single-engined ones manned by single crews, is something that should keep us within the bonds of reality, at that point of history. Let Messerschmmitt take it all.
The Bf-110 was after all a tight and narrow fuselage designed around a sitting pilot's cross-section, flew well and seemed fast enough etc. Only the Americans were having it right with the P-38 concept, and indeed Focke-Wulf. (Hurting as it does, the masterpiece Westland Whirlind _was_ too small for the proper concept of a useful twin-engined fighter weapon, of that era.) (Mig 19, F-5 and YF-17 showed the light twins valuable, but at other times.)

- Just as Rolls-Royce put the Griffon on the back burner in the late 30's to concentrate on an urgent realisation of the 'normal' Merlin, so does Daimler-Benz with their own 'inflated' Db-603 : its development is to be withheld as in reallity it was, for the sake of urgent fulfilment of the 'normal' Db-600 then 601.
Considering the British exemple, I think it is fair that RLM does order Daimler to stop toying with their 'world rekord speed car venture' engine and start complete and produce Db-601s for the Messerschmitts instead...
Which doesn't mean RLM has to _hate_ Db-603, at all. Just think Rolls-Royce, London. 

- Hm. I think it impossible to discard the German aim for a bright new 2nd generation _Kampfluzeug_ (or _Avion de combat_ as we called it, same words, same mission), which means : go ahead with the Bomber B program !
Urgh !
I simply cannot imagine a 1938 1939 Lufwaffe, RLM, Göering, doing away with the promises and technological appeal of a new bomber designed from scratch to their requirements, fast, high, mighty powerful, safe to its German crew, with barbettes all 'round, sleek and neat looking. All that coming from a high profile field that was after all cutting edge of world's scientific and technical progress : aviation in the late 30's !, the very mark of humankind on its pioneering way to new achievments... (no space conquests then...yet) (today it would be, hum, plasma screens, mobile-phone bracelet computerized watches ???)
"What, a brand new Kampfflugzeug with all the latest gimmicks, technological breakthroughs, clean lines and wunderbar performances to dominate Europe, Central Asia and much of the rest for the coming decade ?? Ach... Nein ! Ve preffer our 1936 converted airliners and flying pencils, bolt-on gondolas, pantalonned stukas : no way !"
Can you imagine that ? I can't.
So, to keep the matter realistic for a German Luftwaffe in a German 1938 we need a running Bomber B program, and we need a Jumo 222. 
And planify a smart industrial production of it all please, well in advance of course...

- Worse : the absence of RLM advertisements for a true replacement of the Bf-109, soon enough, may be astonishing, but those actually issued for an advanced developpement of the Bf-110 really shouldn't.
Which means : Me-210 !
The inglorious saga does not have to be as bad as it got, but the beginning should be the same. Including a mediocre design, to say the least, undetected at first, believed workable some time after.

Let's keep it short and summerise :
1. Main choices of the 1936-39 period mostly untouched. 
Stukas and medium bombers, aufklärern (reco and spotter planes) in numbers, swarms of fighters and Zestörern (destroyers) : the 'ideal' Lutfwaffe should begin as the Luftwaffe did. Same types, same engines and same priorities. It was coherent and rather effective when you think of it, with just a touch of dary choices and novelties (stukas and massive presence of tactical reconnaissance and prowling destroyers). Realisticaly it allows for some marginal errors of jugments, that can be corrected soon after.
2. Engines.
Jumo 211 and 213, Db601 and 605 given full priorities, scaled-up Db603 on the back burner for urgency matters, BMW untouched, and Jumo 222 in grand design stages for a while. Jumo 213 suffers from Jumo 222 involvment, not much room for a change in all that. Coupled Db-606 idem, but four separate gondolas for the Bomber A project already an accepted backup, if noticably a 2nd choice then (not sturz capable!)
3 planes.
Same as historically. 
Ju-88 has the same place it had. Keep the Fw-190 option as it was. He-100 and Fw-187 are loosers, but nonetheless could be acknowledged for their design qualities and potential, and alternative choices (range for the He-100, performances and dogfight behaviour for a one-man crew for the Fw-187) that might be handy should something happen in the war situation. Or industry... They lost a contest, but could be kept on a well-wishing slow development basis.
4. Bomber B and Jumo 222 : go ahead for the wunderkampflugzeug ! and its super engines !
5. Give the Me210 an interrested start, as Mr Messerschmitt seems to insist so much...


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## l'Omnivore Sobriquet (Mar 15, 2014)

*Now let's see what we can do.*

Remember that the successes of 1939-1940 had to solidify the choices stated above, good or bad.
*

For the 1936-1940 period :*
- Make Daimler Benz fully comply with your objectives. They're old bourgeois and grand capitalists, yes, but you are nazies. DO NOT engage in cold war with them. Make them cooperate smoothly by flattery, greed or sudden terror (i.e hot war.) Have them co-finance and build that big factory you dream of, anyway make sure that by 1940 everything runs in oil, gains steady momentum in prodution capacity, just as you see their own initiatives with a relaxed benevolent eye.

- Allow existing alternative designs, already well advanced, to carry on their potentful way. Tactically (strategicaly?), and technologicaly they're bound to bear fruits some way. A small scale production cannot hurt either. (note that in those days it was certainly easier to impose some 85% of standardisation over the prodution of war machines, rather than (try) to enforce a full 100% on the various real-world industrial actors, all with their own ways-to-do, in-house formation courses of personnel etc.. This is my theory, it was not numeric economy then. Letting companies build their own alternative products, up to a certain extend (about 15% I'd say), had to be more efficient on the whole than the ideal 100% common production.)
I'm thinking of Focke-Wulf and the Fw-187 certainly.

- Consider news of a possible Jumo-213 using the same block as the 211(s) for all its worth. This has to be very interresting, and could fit existing designs or soon to be, rather fine. It conflicts both jumo 222 and jumo 211 developpment at this stage but already is a good candidate for being the main engine of the Lufwaffe in not a too distant future. Is it a safer bet at this stage than the brand new 222 ? well yes, already. But there are Jumo-211 developments to work on first.

*
1941-early1942 :*
- Put the 'scaled-up' Db-603 back on the front burner. It has potential and you like this engine, just as you like good complacant and smoothly reliable yet inventive Daimler-Benz's managers... Make them stop work on anything else (in the aviation field) than Db601 Db605, and now Db-603 too. Good boys. Start considering applications for the 603 (Do-217 at least.)

- Express your worries and begin open questionning of priorities at Jumo : regarding the state of advancement of the much needed Jumo-213, an engine that will take the place of the 211s on the large Jumo facilities, expected by a good deal of new aircrafts or variants. And regarding the troubles of the 222, suddenly made worse as the Bomber B needs to be heavier than first planned. This should raise professionnal concerns, cold blooded and considering options.

- For the Me-210 as for the Bomber B, it is too soon yet for a dramatic reversal of decisions, but an open questionning at this stage will have positive consequences not too far ahead. At the minimum for both programs, pre-industrialisation on a large scale had now to be acknowledged perilous or premature, and reconversion of a good part of it (half) a most serious work shedule.

- Put the four separated engines He-177B on prototype stage, 2nd choice and non diving as it may be, as soon as the dary architecture of He-177A is confirmed troublesome. After all this new war with 'inferior Ussr' could be a good application for that '2nd rated' but reliable variant of the heavy bomber.

- Keep the historical dedication to the Fw-190 and its BMW engine. Surely the engine will be much needed for many aircrafts considering the lateness of the new Jumos.


*Spring-summer 1942 :*

This is here, to me, that the 'ideal' Lufwaffe should start diverging.

- Bomber B, Jumo 222. Patatras ! Engine still not ready, the remaining pre-set industrialisation of aircraft cells now certain to be set too soon in place. Harsh decisions required now.
Do away with the Jumo-222, that is put it on the back burner (and develop with little means whatever version that promises to reach operational status someday.)
Give the Ju-288C a chance, the one equipped with the coupled Db-606 (610), providing their installation is not too much buried in the wing as the He-177A experience is now telling. One should not forget that the Ju-288 was very modern and potent, and unlike much written on it quite well adapted for LW's future historical needs. (good survivability in hostile skies, well adapted for small to medium strikes with escort, in a 'raider' spirit.)

- Put the He-177B into production immediately, with whatever engines available at first. Keep its employ against Russia, as the war there seems to 'last a bit'. First versions probably underpowered, but Russia under equipped against it. He-177B is a stop-gap both for the He-177A (until troubbles are out) and the Bomber-B, whether the late coming Ju-288C gives satisfaction, simply arrives, or not. Germany cannot affort large scale strategic bombing anymore, so limited production but without delays. A good tool.
In the East like in the West dive bombing is clearly out of fashion, thanks to thick anti-aircraft defenses, now to be met about everywhere. So drop diving requirements on any large plane now. Udet is long dead too.

-Put Daimler's Db-603 in full operationnal status and production, now. 
The Do-217 version with enlarged wings will welcome it fine. 
Also the He-219. Like many I reckon the soundness of Milch's decision to favor the Ju-88G over the He-219 for a standard night fighter, but considering that Jumo-213 in any scenario had to come noticably later than the Db-603, that Ju-88 equipped with BMW where rather inferior, and that the Bomber Offensive was by now certain to last and gain momentum : just give clear orders to Heinkel to set up 50ac/month production without, that's important, without hesitations. 
Besides, when Jumo-222 will become available on a moderate scall one must remember how good a He-219 equipped with such engines had to be : if rather a luxury but this time a superior bomber-destroyer than even a true Ju-88G, by night if not by day, and a good Mosquito pursuer night and day of historical consequences, even in small number (jumos 222, no radar aerial by day.) The He-219 option for limited serial production is good because, with Db-603s it is better than BMW Ju-88s for 1943, stil very good in the 1944 brands and the only forseeable recipent for later coming Jumo-222 (let the Do-217 have its Db-603s instead) and therefore superior to Ju-88G then... Filling quality demands for later 1944-45 needs (night and day pursuit or destroyer, reconnaissance too). If always in small number and expensive...

- Put Fw-190C into final developpement and aim production for somewhere in 1943. This does obvious betterments in the west and barely needs comments. Of course plannify a Jumo-213 equipped Dora version too, then later complete redesigns for both in the Ta-152 C and H breeds. Fw-190C could be put in moderate production at first considering availabilities. History will then increase demand.

- Set-up a competition for a replacement single fighter using Db's 603. This should return Me-309, Fw-190C (hurried) then Ta-152C (big promises from Kurt Tank), and probably some adapted He-100. Order the hurried Fw-190C whoever wins he competition ! (bound to be delayed by 'not ready' problems, Messerschmitt prbbly wishing to substitute the Me-209 in place of the Me-309, Focke-Wulf the 'redesigned' Ta-152...) Fw-190Cs then Ds have to be put in production without delay as soon as engines are available. Small quantities at first eventually, but they must hit the Staffeln soon to put problems into the Westerners' offensive, make them loose comfort and derail their plans.

- It is hard to believe but reallity must now be faced in all its horror : Messerschmidt has just produced an incurable horrible brat in place of the expected crown prince. Nothing will save it except major surgery. It is a this stage that the Focke-Wulf 187 should make its historical entry. Yes, as an industrial stop-gap for the Me-210 katastophe... With good Db-601s - we supposed the type on continued development - and soon with Db-605s. It is not too late to order sizable quantities in the face of the Me-210 disaster. It will take time to implement mass production (moderate) but this is a decision that could have been taken quite easely then, 'soundly'. Even ignoring how positively history would actualy respond to such an introuction later on (American heavy bombers coming en masse by day, eastern front really lasting this time.. needing more in depth 'work' for which the Fw-187 was perfect, alone or as an escort.) What to do with the reworked Me-210, i.e. Me-410 coming late,r depends on availabilities. But it is a good aircraft, if not revolutionnary anymore. 

-Big bat time for the Jumo company ! Must have them sort out and put in production the - all of a sudden - 'so obviously prioritary' Jumo-213... Expected to fit about everything in the standard Luftwaffe from Fw-190D to Ju-88G and 188. I'm quite positive that by following the reasonnable points I've made above, the Jumo-213 could reach operations 6 to 9 months earlier than it did, perhaps a year ?
Make sure they make something out of the Jumo-222 castle, with limited means this time but within forseable future. Let them choose technical requirements themselves. Have something that works, above 2000 hp. 

-Put Me-110 back on production as historicaly, for Nachjagt rank and file urgencies until some Me-410 or Me-262 replaces it, in the same role.

-You can now concentrate on jets and rockets, see what it gives.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 16, 2014)

Quite a time line 

Now what about the venerable Stuka? What kind of improvements to have there? When to cancel the production, if at all?


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## l'Omnivore Sobriquet (Mar 16, 2014)

For the Stuka by early 1942 it was too soon to cancel anything. Putting the latest version in production, sticking with new field requirements the obvious next step. 
The ambitious replacement Ju-187 is certainly a victim or the wastages of Ju-288 et al. saga, so doesn't get build. The Jabo Fw-190 imposes itelf in increasing obviousness. 
Note that a Jabo (i.e "JagtBomber" - fighter-bomber) Fw-187 has good potential too, taking with better success the task of more in-depth strikes attributed to Bf-110 and some Ju-88 before. But it's the 190 as historicaly that gets the bulk of Jabo.

The Stuka armed with 37mm guns under each wing was a difficult ship to fly, and therefore quite dangerous to be sent zig-zaging above dense battle-fields, but as we know could find a few 'old-hands' to put it into good use there. But that doesn't save a declining career.

I do not know enough the realities of night air-to-ground fighting so cannot tell but it seems the Ju-87 with its goods maneuvrability and safety in low speed flight (when normally laden), 2 pairs of eyes sitting in not too bad a view-spot, could become a good 'night ground hunter'. 
Something in between the Po-2 little harasser and the rocket-equipped P-61 converted to opportunity patrols at the end of the Europpan war.
It certainly got this missions through time and forced events, yet I wonder if it could have been more thouroughtly planified.

A specialised version of the Fw-189 twin-boomer could have been interesting too for the role. (featuring a new nacelle reasonnably armoured, with a single pilot in front in a Fw-190 style cockpit, then a small bomb bay that can also be epuipped with guns or fuel tanks, then a second crew member in a good view&shoot disposition. 20 mms guns at wing roots, perhaps smaller calibres in the nose, if there's room. I think it should have remained light enought to maintain the 189's flight qualities.)


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## tomo pauk (Mar 16, 2014)

I was thinking along two possible axes of development. Each includes a cannon, 20 to 37mm, that would be fired through the prop shaft. Somewhere at the start of this thread Ive suggested that Jumo modifies the 211 line of engines to allow for the prop cannon. So the further development of the Ju-87A/B would include a cannon, and will retain dive brakes all the way. Maybe it would be good to modify the U/C, something along what the Il-2 had. Installation of the 37mm would probably dictate rehashing of the crew compartment?
The Fw-190 could also use such modification, maybe also giving it the dive brakes? Ideally it would be a combination of Yak-9T's and A-36's best features? Obviously, the V-12 engine need to be employed, preferably a modification capable of sing the C3 fuel, for more power down low. The wing root guns will have their ammo relocated to the wings, so there is more space for the 37mm ammo. The pilot's quarters would also need relocation a bit back? Some armor for the cooling system is also needed.


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## stona (Mar 16, 2014)

l'Omnivore Sobriquet said:


> - Make Daimler Benz fully comply with your objectives. They're old bourgeois and grand capitalists, yes, but you are nazies. DO NOT engage in cold war with them.



What do you think that the RLM did with Daimler Benz historically?

Daimler-Benz was a large company with plants and subsidiaries all over Germany. It's principal plant in the Berlin area was at Marienfelde. The Genshagen plant was built as a modern facility expressly to produce aero engines.

Here is not the place for the Machievellian ins and outs of the RLM v DB negotiations that led to the establishment of the Genshagen plant, but let's stick to the facts.

The Daimler-Benz Motor Company Genshagen was formed in January 1936 as a subsidiary of Daimler-Benz AG to produce aero engines. 

The Marienfelde plant became a repair and parts plant according to RLM (_not Daimler Benz_) wishes. 

The new company was capitalised to the tune of RM 14 million,13.75 million from the RLM and a nominal 0.75 million from Daimler Benz. This capital was soon increase to RM 20 million,entirely at RLM expense. Daimler-Benz retained an option to buy the new plant.

The plant was built in eight months. The first engine, a DB 600 made from parts from Marienfelde, was completed in February 1937. 

The skilled labour force came from Daimler Benz's South German plants and from BMW. There were 5,813 workers by the summer of 1937. This was only achieved by direct intervention from the RLM. You can imagine how thrilled BMW were to lose skilled workers and engineers to a competitor. I don't believe such enforced management of skilled labour would have been possible in one of the democracies, but, as you said, Daimler Benz were dealing with the Nazi state.

I would suggest that both the level of investment and speed with which the plans were effected would imply that production of Daimler-Benz aero engines was a priority for the RLM in the late nineteen thirties and that the RLM more or less dictated the way in which Daimler Benz operated. It did this politically and financially.

Cheers

Steve

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## l'Omnivore Sobriquet (Mar 16, 2014)

Yes, many thanks Steve. Great infos.
And with all that, it seems the RLM was still sightly, unsatisfied with, well, Daimler-Benz AG. I wouldn't have been, but apparently they were. Go figure...


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## tomo pauk (Mar 16, 2014)

Any thought about the night fighter(s)? How big should it be? Maybe employ a smaller NF 1st (no such need anyway this early, no excess engine power to haul around half a dozen cannons and many crew members), later substituted by a larger NF as a dedicated bomber killer? Or simply modify the Schnellbomber for NF duties?

How should the air-to-air weaponry be developed? Air-to-ground?


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## wiking85 (Mar 16, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Any thought about the night fighter(s)? How big should it be? Maybe employ a smaller NF 1st (no such need anyway this early, no excess engine power to haul around half a dozen cannons and many crew members), later substituted by a larger NF as a dedicated bomber killer? Or simply modify the Schnellbomber for NF duties?
> 
> How should the air-to-air weaponry be developed? Air-to-ground?



As far as early night fighters the Bf110 if production in this scenario, would be fine until the Ju88 was adapted to the role. The Do215B is good too, as would be modifying older Do17s into night fighters. Initially one Geschwader would be enough through 1941. 

I'd say making a beeline for the MG151 series should be done as quickly as possible, along with 30mm cannons. Anything over 30mm should not be used for air-to-air combat, but for ground attack the 50mm autocannon might be worthwhile. Rockets as soon as they are conceived of should be worked on for AA and air to ground attacks for jabos.


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## wiking85 (Mar 16, 2014)

Long range Strategic bombers:
I think we all agree that a four propellor He177B would be ideal. Assuming its available in Geschwader strength by Spring/Summer 1942 with the DB603 in the four separate engine layout, what are its targets? I imagine something in Russia, but what?


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## stona (Mar 17, 2014)

l'Omnivore Sobriquet said:


> And with all that, it seems the RLM was still sightly, unsatisfied with, well, Daimler-Benz AG. I wouldn't have been, but apparently they were. Go figure...



That had more to do with the failure of Daimler Benz to deliver on many of its promises. Just about every major player in the German aircraft industry was guilty of this. There were also systemic problems in the way that the German industry developed engines and airframes which could lead to a three way argument between the manufacturer of the engine/power egg and the manufacturer of the airframe with the RLM in the middle, deploying its usually woeful management techniques 
Cheers
Steve


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## rinkol (Mar 17, 2014)

stona said:


> That had more to do with the failure of Daimler Benz to deliver on many of its promises. Just about every major player in the German aircraft industry was guilty of this. There were also systemic problems in the way that the German industry developed engines and airframes which could lead to a three way argument between the manufacturer of the engine/power egg and the manufacturer of the airframe with the RLM in the middle, deploying its usually woeful management techniques
> Cheers
> Steve



It is interesting to note how many aircraft designs were proposed with engines that never became available or were much delayed. The original He 219 design was based on the DB 603G. The majority of He 219s were produced with the DB603A, an engine that left the plane underpowered in the opinion of Eric Brown. Another example concerns the Hs 130A, which was intended to use the DB 601D with two stage supercharger.

Of course DB wasn't alone. Certainly there was lots of blame to go around. I suspect there was an environment where management had to exude optimism, with failures needing to be offset by new (and unrealizable) promises.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 17, 2014)

wiking85 said:


> Long range Strategic bombers:
> I think we all agree that a four propellor He177B would be ideal. Assuming its available in Geschwader strength by Spring/Summer 1942 with the DB603 in the four separate engine layout, what are its targets? I imagine something in Russia, but what?



Seems to me that we'd run out of DB 603s 
Joke aside, I'd rather see the 4-mot designed around easily available engines, like DB-601 or Jumo 211. Later to receive the BMW 801s, in case the DB-603 starts replacing the 801s in the Fw-190.
The targets should be factories and oil facilities, obviously (if can be reached), but also troop concentrations, bridges, railroad junctions, provided the guided bombs are developed and produced. A decent LR fighter would be needed, like Fw-187 or, with greater internal fuel tankage, the Fw-190.


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## wiking85 (Mar 17, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Seems to me that we'd run out of DB 603s
> Joke aside, I'd rather see the 4-mot designed around easily available engines, like DB-601 or Jumo 211. Later to receive the BMW 801s, in case the DB-603 starts replacing the 801s in the Fw-190.
> The targets should be factories and oil facilities, obviously (if can be reached), but also troop concentrations, bridges, railroad junctions, provided the guided bombs are developed and produced. A decent LR fighter would be needed, like Fw-187 or, with greater internal fuel tankage, the Fw-190.



Like we said before plan an Ostmark for the DB603 the moment Austria is annexed; it should be partially up and running by mid 1941.

Would a 3000 liter internal fuel (and externally mountable 900 liter drop tank) FW187 with DB605s or later Jumo 213s (with two stage superchargers) that is pressurized be able to reach the Urals and return? Supposedly the 1942 variant had that configuration which gave it excellent range and high altitude performance for long range escort, but I didn't see hypothetical range tables.

Also any clue about the efficacy of the SD 1000 bomb was good for troop concentration carpet bombing? I read it wasn't intended as an AP bomb, but rather a fragmentation bomb. The He177 could carry six for a max internal load of 6 tons, which would have rough against a concentration of Soviet troops in the open:
http://www.warbirdsresourcegroup.org/LRG/bombs.html

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel_He_177#Specifications_.28He_177_A-5.2FR2.29


> 6 × 1,000 kg (2,204 lb) bombs (6,000 kg/13,227 lb total)


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## tomo pauk (Mar 17, 2014)

Distance between Smolensk and Sverdlovsk/Yekatarinburg (located in Urals) is circa 1110 miles, or circa 1700 km. Ie. about the distance between London and Brest-Litovsk, on today's Polish-Belarus border. So any bomber using ww2 technology will be ill able to undertake the task (bar B-29?). From Smolensk to Kuybishev/Samara is 740+ miles (1190 km), comparable with distance between London and Breslau/Wroclaw in today's Poland. This is feasible on ww2 technology, but it's a long shot indeed, demanding impeccable navigational piloting skills. Your, or anybody's escort fighters might not be up to the job on such a distance? 
From Rostov to Baku is ~690 miles; the oil facilities should burn easier than machine tools? In case your bombers are damaged, the Turkey might offer a safe place for crash landing?
Sevastpol to Tbilisi, in case you aim for the aircraft factory based there, is 600 miles. Worth a try?

Installing the Jumo 213, especially the two stage engines, it's a thing of distant future. If at all feasible on the Fw-187, due to increased weight vs. DB-601/605? I'd rather have the really powerful engines on the Fw-190/Ta-152. Those two were capable to carry 1000+ L of fuel internally (264+ US gal, ie. like the P-51 with fuselage tank). Should give 700 mile escort radius?
3000 L is 792 US gals (almost twice as the late P-38s), I doubt that such amount of fuel was ever envisioned for the Fw-187? Better bet would be 2000 L internally and 2 big drop tanks?

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## wiking85 (Mar 17, 2014)

IIRC the He177A5 could do 2800 miles (not kilometers) with 200kg of bombs. 
Heinkel He 177 data


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## Shortround6 (Mar 17, 2014)

You also have to consider that the Germans did NOT have unlimited resources and basically every 4 engine bomber is two twins NOT built. Some savings in aircrew. Granted the Germans did not get a lot out of the 1170 or so HE 177s they did build and perhaps switching from coupled engines to 4 separate engines may have improved serviceability and availability. The Germans simply could not build anywhere the size bomber fleets the Allies did. HE 177 production was under 10% of the B-17s built. Throw in the B-24s, and about 15,000 British 4 engine bombers and wither the Germans build 1200 or 2400 isn't going to make a whole lot of difference.


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## stona (Mar 17, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> You also have to consider that the Germans did NOT have unlimited resources and basically every 4 engine bomber is two twins NOT built. Some savings in aircrew.



Suitable air crew for a bomber force is an important consideration. The RAF was able to draw educated young men from the universities of the entire 'Old Commonwealth' and then some. 
Nearly one in five was Canadian and there were substantial numbers of Aussies, Kiwis and South Africans as well as many from other nations (Caribbean nations are often shamefully overlooked) combined with those from occupied European nations (Dutch, Poles Czechs, French,Norwegians etc) 
It was also able to train them in the relative safety of countries far from the conflict. Such luxuries were not afforded the Luftwaffe.
Cheers
Steve


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## DonL (Mar 17, 2014)

From my technical understanding it was impossible to put more or much more internal fuel to the FW 187.

From Mr. Hermanns Book the Jumo driven FW 187 A0 (11,20m lenght) got 1100Liter, 2 x 245 Liter in wing tanks and 620Liter in a fulsage tank.

At the FW 187 C (DB 605) version the fulsage was lenghten from 11,20m to 12,45m, to my opinion we had also seen this upgrade with the DB 601 and the fulsage tank got 880 Liter and the wing tanks were shortened to the bigger engines to 2 x 210 Liter.

At best will I can't see where the FW 187 could get a significant internal fuel upgrade, perhaps except as a single seat fighter. (100-200Liter?)

To have an a/c with 2000Liter internal fuel is to my opinion to construct a total new a/c but not an a/c which has much in common with the FW 187. 

To keep in mind an a/c must have a controllable/good flight characteristics, you can't put fuel randomly anywhere to the a/c and especially as much as possible.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 17, 2014)

wiking85 said:


> IIRC the He177A5 could do 2800 miles (not kilometers) with 200kg of bombs.
> Heinkel He 177 data



I've went through some data there, the most believable would be the GL/C-E2 blatt (sheet) for the He-177A-3/R-2, A-5 and A-6. Seems like the A-3/R-2 was good for range, with allowances, for 2030 miles (3270 km) with 2000 kg of bombs. That would give the radius of under 1000 miles, with outward leg being flown at 305 km/h at 1.5 km of altitude. Not a healthiest speed or altitude 
On a more realistic setting (415 km/h towards the target, flying at 5 km), it would be a range, with allowances, of 1650 miles (2660 km), or radius of 800 miles. 
Calculated (theoretical?; no allowances) range of the A-6 on max continuous power would be 2600 miles (3640 km) when carrying 1000 kg of bombs, altitude of 4 km. Circa 1250 km of radius? Allowances for take off, extra fuel burn to climb to 4 km and 30 min reserve on economical cruise cut that by 10%? That would make a realistic radius of 1100-1150 miles?

Any corrections and additions are welcomed. Original table courtesy alejandro-8.

Seems like the He-177 would be quite en asset to attack Baku oil fields, since no other German aircraft could undertake that job? The good escort fighter would be a necessity.


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## wiking85 (Mar 17, 2014)

So the Caucasus and anything West of the Urals is fair game. That leaves Operation Eisenhammer on the table, plus an oil campaign against Baku and other oil producing areas in the USSR. Not only that, but a mining campaign in the Caspian Sea against Soviet shipping, which would interdict both oil transport and imports via Iran from the West.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 17, 2014)

The aircraft factory in Saratov, producing Yak fighters, is mere 410 miles away from Rostov. Stalingrad is circa 200 miles away. Of course, one does not need 4-engined jobs to attack those.
The advent of heavy bomber might put the pressure on Soviets to invest more into high altitude fighters (undermining the Il-2 production?) and installation of heavier firepower on their fighters (cuts performance on 1200 HP fighters). Maybe the Spitfire V gets more use by Soviets?

Now about the guns. The largest caliber installed in the single engined fighters of ww2 might be the NS-45, a 45mm cannon firing a 1+ kg shell at 260-280 rpm and muzzle velocity of 780 m/s. This might be considered something of an overkill for the aircraft carrying it. Even the NS-37 was. So maybe going to the equivalent of the early post war N-37 cannon, ie. 37mm, 400 rpm, 690 m/s? Germans already have the shell, that need to be mated to the smaller casing propellant to create a 'mid-power' round. Or maybe neck-out the MK-101/103 ammo casing, arriving at maybe 35mm, for a 600-700 g shell? The MV need to be at modest value, 650-700 m/s, so the recoil and cannon's weight are not excessive.
Next smaller bracket might be taken by a cannon similar to the Soviet late war and post war 23mm cannons, that were making from 550 to 1200 rpm, depending on the design. Shell weight was 200g, cannons were firing at ~700 m/s and weighted ~40 kg. Germans might neck out the casing of 20 mm Flak to arrive on a comparable cartridge, use of electrically primed ammo will make synchronized fire easier. The resulting cannon might replace and supplant the MG-FF, 3-4 installed in the Fw-190, 1 installed in the Bf-109. Prime armament for night fighters, both in front-firing and oblique installations.
The MG-FF might use the bigger load of the ammo in the drum, like the 90 rounds drum fitted on the outer wing cannons of the Fw-190A-3 and later. Just in case the new cannons take more time than anticipated, develop the belt feed like the Japanese did? Three of these, or two + one 23mm would pack quite a punch from the Bf-109.
All of these cannons are ill suited as turret guns, so something smaller is needed. A 15 mm cannon, but not as big powerful as the MG 151. Something at 20-25 kg, ~800 rpm, 700-750 m/s?


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## Shortround6 (Mar 17, 2014)

Ah, no. It is 1400km from Minsk to Kazan which is well short of the Urals. it is about 1000km from Donetsk to Atyrau at the north end of Caspian Sea. Or 1280km from Donetsk to Baku. 

How far behind the lines to want your "strategic" bomber bases to keep them from being attacked by the VVS? 

This web site makes it real easy to find distances between cities. : Distance.to - Distance calculator worldwide

Please remember that "operational" radius is often around 1/3 of range not 1/2. 

Mining operations, to be successful, require placing mines in a shipping channel not just dumped into a large body of water.


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## wiking85 (Mar 17, 2014)

There was the pre-war Soviet airbase at Mariupol or even in Crimea for souther operations. Smolensk was viable as an airbase; the German air defense on the Eastern front before Kursk 1943 was pretty solid, so in 1942 they are going to be able to defend a closer to the front airbase pretty readily, given their radar advantage; leading up to and during Kursk the Soviets tried to hit German airfields near the front and got slaughtered in the process. It wasn't until the turn west after Kursk by the Luftwaffe that the Germans lost control of the skies over their airbases in the East.


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## stona (Mar 18, 2014)

Unfortunately, whilst a strategic bombing force would be a lovely thing to have by 1942, I have to inject a dash of reality. For this to be achieved the entire balance of the Luftwaffe would have to have been changed from at least the mid 1930s onwards. This would require a completely different doctrine to that actually employed.
If you have your strategic bombers, do you still have the medium bombers and dive bombers that made such a huge contribution to your early 'Blitzkrieg' successes? The Luftwaffe as it was balanced in 1939/40 was almost the ideal tool, given the technical restraints of the time, to carry out the sort of operations for which it had been designed.
The pot is only so deep and you can't have it all. You might reconfigure your Luftwaffe differently only to fall flat on your face in France, 1940.
Cheers
Steve


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## wiking85 (Mar 18, 2014)

stona said:


> Unfortunately, whilst a strategic bombing force would be a lovely thing to have by 1942, I have to inject a dash of reality. For this to be achieved the entire balance of the Luftwaffe would have to have been changed from at least the mid 1930s onwards. This would require a completely different doctrine to that actually employed.
> If you have your strategic bombers, do you still have the medium bombers and dive bombers that made such a huge contribution to your early 'Blitzkrieg' successes? The Luftwaffe as it was balanced in 1939/40 was almost the ideal tool, given the technical restraints of the time, to carry out the sort of operations for which it had been designed.
> The pot is only so deep and you can't have it all. You might reconfigure your Luftwaffe differently only to fall flat on your face in France, 1940.
> Cheers
> Steve



Considering that in the very best case scenario the strategic bombers don't enter production until mid-1941 France in 1940 would not be affected. The He111 acted as strategic/operational bombers in that operation. Do17s and He111s made up the vast majority of bombers in service in 1940 historically, with limited Ju88s in service as only 67 have been produced in 1939 and there were only 5 months worth of serious production by the time of the Battle of France:
Luftwaffe Campaign Orders of Battle
Even Ju87 service was limited by the time of France. About 341 Stukas were serviceable by May 10 1940. Of the two dive bombing aircraft in service at the time there were only about 4-500 hundred operational. That was out of a bomber force of over 2000. So historically the dive bombers were about ~22% of the bomber force of single and double engine bombers in France. If we have a strategic bomber force under construction and development, it has no effect on France whatsoever, as the dive bombing Ju87 would still be in service, as it was conceived of pre-Udet and didn't affect strategi doctrine, rather enhanced it, as there was a place for it in the balanced doctrine. Remember that the Ju87 was conceived of as an extra accurate operational/strategic bomber rather than a CAS aircraft. The lack of a dive bombing Ju88 (or rather glide bombing to as steep a degree as the Ju88 wasn't a true 90 degree diver AFAIK due to frame buckling) may make an impact, but considering that it would be available in larger numbers earlier without the dive modifications, I don't think that that would have a significant effect on the events of France.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_88#Operational_history


> *Some 133 Ju 88s *were pressed into the Blitzkrieg, but very high combat losses and accidents forced a quick withdrawal from action to re-train crews to fly this very high-performance aircraft. Some crews were reported to be more scared of the Ju 88 than the enemy, and requested a transfer to an He 111 unit.[29] By this time, major performance deficiencies in the A-1 led to an all-out effort in a major design rework. The outcome was a longer, 20.08 m (65 ft 10 1⁄2 in) wingspan, from extended rounded wing tips that had already been standardised on the A-4 version, that was deemed needed for all A-1s; thus the A-5 was born. Surviving A-1s were modified as quickly as possible, with new wings to A-5 specifications.


All of this is possible before France if the Ju88 was actually in service pre-Poland and these deficiencies remedied before the BoF starts.


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## Denniss (Mar 18, 2014)

He 177 data table:
1st row is with almost full internal fuel and external loads, second row with medium fuel load and third row with max internal fuel. The second/third rows are of aircraft with reduced performance due to attached engine flame dampers.
The calculated(?) ranges obviously miss fuel reserve, it was quite common to have 15-30% more range from reserve fuel (reserved for combat situation requiring higher engine settings)


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## stona (Mar 18, 2014)

wiking85 said:


> Considering that in the very best case scenario the strategic bombers don't enter production until mid-1941 France in 1940 would not be affected. .



This is 'what iffery'. If the Germans decide to develop a strategic bombing force in the 1930 it would require a change in doctrine which would mitigate against the development of the large medium bomber and dive bombing forces. There might be no dive bombers at all!
In your scenario the parallel development of a large four engine bomber force has no impact on the historical development of the Luftwaffe. This seems highly improbable to me. There are only limited resources and you can't have everything. You seem to be simply adding on one of the most resource intensive (in men and materiel as well as the manufacturing base) and expensive elements of any air force (strategic bombers) to the Luftwaffe at no cost to other developments whatsoever.
Cheers
Steve


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## wiking85 (Mar 18, 2014)

stona said:


> This is 'what iffery'. If the Germans decide to develop a strategic bombing force in the 1930 it would require a change in doctrine which would mitigate against the development of the large medium bomber and dive bombing forces. There might be no dive bombers at all!
> In your scenario the parallel development of a large four engine bomber force has no impact on the historical development of the Luftwaffe. This seems highly improbable to me. There are only limited resources and you can't have everything. You seem to be simply adding on one of the most resource intensive (in men and materiel as well as the manufacturing base) and expensive elements of any air force (strategic bombers) to the Luftwaffe at no cost to other developments whatsoever.
> Cheers
> Steve



No, the Ju87 was entering service before Walter Wever's death and they had a balanced doctrine. Dive bombing had a place in their doctrine, as it was an operational first doctrine. Until the He177 is ready for production, they have no choice but to build up their existing designs of bombers, which means dive bombers for precision operational/strategic bombing against Poland, France, and Czechoslovakia (their planned enemies), while having a medium bomber fleet to conduct level bomber against defended targets where dive bombing would be inappropriate. 
I recommend reading this book out the development of LW doctrine:
The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-1940: James S. Corum: 9780700609628: Amazon.com: Books

Strategic bombing doesn't mitigate dive bombing, as US doctrine demonstrated. Medium bombers fill the operational/strategic role until the heavy bombers are ready, so doctrine is pretty much as per OTL, as CAS was actually pretty low on the LWs priorities in France and Poland. They were developing the He177 throughout this period too, as it had entered testing in 1939 after a major dive bombing redesign under Udet in 1937-38. Major resources were already being spent on the Bomber A project including having the Schwechat factory in Austria built; it sat idle in 1941 when it was supposed to be producing strategic bombers, but the He177 wasn't approved until 1942 historically. Strategic bombing development change very little from the historical timeline other than we avoid the dive bombing development and the coupled engine development, both of which if anything claimed extra resource over the four engine, non-diving version we are suggesting here, as it required major redesigns, which were funded by the RLM, extra materials per bomber due to the strengthening of the airframe, and increased the complexity of the aircraft. That doesn't factor in all the extra testing that historically needed to happen, major redesigns, including the four engine He177B that was built and tested starting in 1943. All the lost prototypes and production versions due to engine fires cost a lot of time and resources too; the hand built prototypes weren't cheap and all the coupled DB601s that were used were expensive, not to mention the design and production costs for those. Discarding the expensive dive requirement, upweighting, coupled engine project, etc. will actually cost less in this scenario than the historical investments into the Bomber A project in 1939-42. 

This wasn't a zero sum issue in 1939-42 for the Bomber A due to the fact so many resources were wasted on it to make the dive requirement and coupled engines work that would have been saved otherwise. As it was the LW had a strong balanced doctrine historically anyway and made use of the technology in production when the war started, which means that anything going into the He177 won't matter to the 1939-41 campaigns until the bomber actually enters production. Otherwise all else really remains the same, except for the waste on a lot of projects that we are eliminated here (Me210, DB606, lots of other engine development issues, Ju88 and Do217 dive requirement, etc.). The major change will be a non-diving Ju88 that has a lot less production resources in this scenario due to it retaining its original design spec. It won't be delayed in service, the Do17 will be phased out in 1938 as planned, while the He111 will the be primary bomber in larger numbers thanks to prioritizing it over the Ju88 (which only had 133 units in service by May 1940 historically anyway, so more He111s will be very helpful) and the H-series over the P-series. 

In this scenario then we have a stronger LW, as it will have more bombers overall, while having no outdated ones like the Do17. The Ju87 is unaffected, while the one issue that might exist is the Bf110; I'm not sure it should even be built, as a serviceable one wasn't even really ready by the time of the Polish Campaign (in limited numbers) due to the lack of powerful enough engines until the Db601 became available in enough numbers. Eliminating the He111P series would help free up DB601s for fighters, be it the Fw187 or Bf110. 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_France#Luftwaffe


> In 1940, the Luftwaffe was a broadly based force with no constricting central doctrine, other than its resources should be used generally to support national strategy. It was flexible and it was able to carry out both operational, tactical and strategic bombing effectively. Flexibility was the Luftwaffe's strength in 1940. While Allied air forces in 1940 were tied to the support of the army, the Luftwaffe deployed its resources in a more general, operational way. It switched from air superiority missions, to medium-range interdiction, to strategic strikes, to close support duties depending on the need of the ground forces.* In fact, far from it being a dedicated Panzer spearhead arm, less than 15 percent of the Luftwaffe was designed for close support of the army in 1939,[74] as this aspect was not its primary mission.*[75]



Quoted books:
Buckley, John (1998 ). Air Power in the Age of Total War. UCL Press. ISBN 1-85728-589-1.
Corum, James. 'The Luftwaffe's Army Support Doctrine, 1918–1941' in The Journal of Military History, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Jan. 1995), pp. 53–76
Corum, James. The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform. Modern War Studies. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 1992. ISBN 0-7006-0541-X.
Corum, James. The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918–1940. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 1997. ISBN 978-0-7006-0836-2


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## stona (Mar 18, 2014)

You've still got to find the resources to develop a strategic bombing capability using a large capacity four engine bomber in the 1930s if you want it to be ready by 1941/2, presumably for operations in the East as it's already too late for meaningful operations against the UK.
This sort of force consumes immense resources and something else will have to be given up.
Where are the raw materials coming from? Where are the aircraft going to be built? Who will build them? Where are the engines coming from? Where are the crews coming from? Where is the fuel coming from? Who will support them in the field and where? etc etc
Cheers
Steve


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## wiking85 (Mar 18, 2014)

stona said:


> You've still got to find the resources to develop a strategic bombing capability using a large capacity four engine bomber in the 1930s if you want it to be ready by 1941/2, presumably for operations in the East as it's already too late for meaningful operations against the UK.
> This sort of force consumes immense resources and something else will have to be given up.
> Where are the raw materials coming from? Where are the aircraft going to be built? Who will build them? Where are the engines coming from? Where are the crews coming from? Where is the fuel coming from? Who will support them in the field and where? etc etc
> Cheers
> Steve



Again, what is different from the historical situation that needs to be given up? What extra resources are required above and beyond the historical development? All that's happening here is LESS development of the original He177. We can had the demonstrators that were supposed to be ordered for the Do19 and Ju89, of which only some of the examples were completed. If we don't produce the Bf110 then we can give up the early non-service 'practice' versions, which will be more than enough resources for these demonstrators. Otherwise the resources are the same or less than what was spent historically to get the HE177 in production by 1942.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel_He_177#Design_and_development
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel_He_177#Prototypes 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel_He_177#Production


> Production[edit]
> 
> Eight prototypes were completed, followed by 35 pre-production He 177 A-0s (built by Arado and Heinkel) and 130 Arado-built He 177 A-1s. The early aircraft in this batch were used for further trials, and after a brief and unhappy operational debut the remainder were also withdrawn from service. From late 1942 they were replaced by 170 He 177 A-3s and 826 A-5s, both later models having 1.60 meter longer rear fuselages and slightly lengthened engine nacelles for use with the newer DB 610 "power systems".[17]
> 
> ...


The resources were already used historically. If we don't waste resources on over production of the Ju88 we can start cutting back on the He111 production to free up early resources for the He177, but the resources were there historically and historically spent starting in 1942. The only issue is moving it up by 6 months. 

Heinkel already had a factory ready to go for He177 production by mid-1941, but it sat idle waiting for the go ahead to put the aircraft into production:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel


> an additional Heinkel-Süd facility in Schwechat, Austria, after the Anschluss in 1938.



Seeing as we are avoiding the Me210 disaster, there will be plenty of resources not wasted in 1941 that would be available for production of the He177 too. Then there is the historical resources spent on the He177.
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel-Werke_Oranienburg
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernst_Heinkel_Flugzeugwerke


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## stona (Mar 18, 2014)

So you would forego part of the He 111, and Ju 88 production. That will have repercussions later. 

You'll also ditch the Me 210 and possibly the Bf 110. So the entire zerstorer/heavy fighter concept, so beloved of the RLM goes out the window and only single engine fighters are produced? What happens if your long range bombers need long range escorts?

The He 177 is a red herring. It was a deeply flawed design. As late as early 1942 Walter Blaist (responsible for He 177 engine testing at Rechlin) was still producing long lists of fundamental changes which should be made to this one aspect of the design alone. Two of his recommendations were accepted (moving the oil tank to a less dangerous position and complete redesign of the exhaust system).
Let's not mention the wing!

He 177s were built at Heinkel Rostock and Oranienberg and by Arado at Brandenburg/Neuendorf. I don't know where the Wiki info comes from but having a factory and having it set up to produce a particular type, notably a complex multi engine bomber, are two different things.

Incidentally one four engine bomber does not equate, in terms of materiel or labour, to two twins. Far from it.

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Mar 18, 2014)

If I may cut in:
Our fellow member Wiking85 is a firm proponent of the Fw-187 with DB engines, so the twin engined fighter will get built in his time line. The He-177 is just a name for a heavy bomber that, in his time line, has four separate engines and, if I get it right, has no dive bomber's capabilities.

One 4-engined bomber should be more expensive than two 2-engined ones, but should also haul more bombs over same range, while using less crew per bombs carried? Provided, of course, that both 2- and 4-engined designs are armed with guns, like most of ww2 aircraft.

added: here is the cost of major US combat aircraft. FWIW


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## wiking85 (Mar 18, 2014)

stona said:


> So you would forego part of the He 111, and Ju 88 production. That will have repercussions later.
> 
> You'll also ditch the Me 210 and possibly the Bf 110. So the entire zerstorer/heavy fighter concept, so beloved of the RLM goes out the window and only single engine fighters are produced? What happens if your long range bombers need long range escorts?
> 
> ...





tomo pauk said:


> If I may cut in:
> Our fellow member Wiking85 is a firm proponent of the Fw-187 with DB engines, so the twin engined fighter will get built in his time line. The He-177 is just a name for a heavy bomber that, in his time line, has four separate engines and, if I get it right, has no dive bomber's capabilities.
> 
> One 4-engined bomber should be more expensive than two 2-engined ones, but should also haul more bombs over same range, while using less crew per bombs carried? Provided, of course, that both 2- and 4-engined designs are armed with guns, like most of ww2 aircraft.



Thanks Tomo, you took the words out of my keyboard.

Basically here is the scheme I'm envisioning:
1936:
-Bomber A with four propellor design
-Keep the Wimmer team together in the TA, and don't promote Udet. Richthofen stays in Development, while Jeschonnek gets sent to Spain (never becoming CoS, but rather replacing Richthofen as head of CAS)
-DB603 stays in development
-Bf110 cancelled (Wever wanted it cancelled along with everyone else in the RLM including Milch, Goering forced it through)
-FW187 green lit
-Ju88 V3 prototype is the basis of the Ju88 (three crew, rear gunner, two bomb hard points externally to carry up to 1 ton bombs); it stays as a level bomber with shallow dive capability (35 degrees)....later upgrade to bigger wings when combat experience proves it necessary (can't jump up development too much with hindsight)

1937:
-Jumo 222 project started on low priority, Jumo 211 remains major priority for Jumo
-no DB606 project; DB remains focused on only two engines DB601 and 603
-keep Ural Bomber prototypes as demonstrators for training and development (10 Do19s, 15 Ju89s as planned)
-keep spec for Hs129
*-Beef up pilot training schools*

1938:
-start planning for Ostmark engine factory upon annexation of Austria for DB603s
-finance some expansion for Jumo and DB factories (rather than building new ones)
-order Heinkel to make a Jumo 211 based version of He111 (H-series) refuse DB601 (P-series) for bombers
-*when He111H is ready in late 1938 (historically when P-series was ready) order it mass produced as the main bomber, giving it priority*
-phase out Do17 by end of year and order a level bombing Do217 'heavy' medium bomber with BMW 801 or DB603 engine
-keep Hs123 in production
-order KG100 formed as a full Geschwader rather than Kampfgruppe

1939:
-Ju88 based on V3 prototype should enter production in March, but will have limited resources and will be used as multirole aircraft; should be 1 Geschwader combat ready by September with another 1 forming, have a heavy fighter/strafer version ready in Kampfgruppen strength for France
-Fw187 should enter production by June 1939 and not be available for Poland, but will be ready for Norway and France (3 Geschwader by May 1940)
-upon return of the Condor Legion (March) order a naval bombing unit formed at Geschwader strength based on He111H, should be ready by end of 1939 with experience from Spain, start 2nd Geschwader forming when first is ready
-Ostmark should have completed the basic structures by the end of the year and beginning installing basic infrastructure like the power plant; tooling begins in mid-1940 and will continue through 1941
-Do26 accepted as long range naval recon aircraft, FW200 not accepted; any on hand will be used, but no more built.

By the start of the war there should be a minimum of 1200 or more He111Hs delivered as they are the main airframe in my Luftwaffe. The lack of Bf110 production saves up resources in the meantime. The Do17 and older He111s are phased out and used for training, while any Ju52s at training schools are used for the transport fleet. Ju87 production is the same as OTL.
By April 1940 the Fw187 makes it appearance over Norway with drop tanks with 1 Geschwader, while the remaining two Geschwader are saved for use over France.
The DB603 should be delivered to the He177B testing in its pre-production form, not yet production ready, but fine for testing purposes. The He177 will enter production by July/August 1941 with this engine, which will start mass production in limited quantities at Ostmark in mid-1941. 

The He111H is the main bomber until 1941 when the He177 enters production, so starts sapping resources from 111 production. Ju88 remains unaffected; as soon as there are sufficient engines for both the He177 and Do217, the 217 will enter production (1942). In 1942 the Do217 and He177 starts phasing out the He111. By the end of 1943 the He111 is to be mostly phased out of production, with limited production to keep spare parts in circulation for remaining airframes in service. 

When Jumo 213 is ready in 1942/3 it will be phased in to replace the 211 and all 211 engined aircraft will adapt to the 213. Also there should be some Do217s using the 213 too. He177 should test out the 213 too. 

FW190C should be worked on from 1940-41 and hopefully would be in mass production in 1943. Fw190D should be worked on too. Better versions of the Fw187 are to be worked on, as should the Me109. 

Older Do17s should be initially converted to night fighter variants (Do215B), rather than draw resources with continued Do17/215 production. Ju88C/G later on when production is more established. 

By 1943 there should be enough high powered engines to boost performance of the Ju88, Do217, and He177, with at least 1750hp for take off. There of course will be work on the two stage supercharger version of Jumo and DB engines. 

If Jumo 222 ever becomes viable phase it in in limited numbers for use either with an upgraded Do217 or He177/277. Maybe a Ju188/388.

Jet engines and airframes remain as per historical development.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 18, 2014)

I'll return at the moment to the supposed German anti-Soviet 'oil' campaign. The catch is that Germans did not intended to destroy Soviet-held oil fields refineries, but rather to capture them. 
IIRC, Maikop fields were producing only 10% of what Baku oil fiels were making. Grozny oil fields were at 20% of Baku? So any bombing of said oil fields will need to wait until a) Germans are definitely certain that those cannot be captured, and b) Germans have adequate force of heavy bombers and their escorts close enough. So the decision to bomb Baku will be issued when, November of 1942? That would mean it is too late for any meaningful large scale operations until snow rain are gone, like April/May 1943? Way too late for anything? The Soviets can have some Spitfire IXs by that time, supported by radars.


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## wiking85 (Mar 18, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> I'll return at the moment to the supposed German anti-Soviet 'oil' campaign. The catch is that Germans did not intended to destroy Soviet-held oil fields refineries, but rather to capture them.
> IIRC, Maikop fields were producing only 10% of what Baku oil fiels were making. Grozny oil fields were at 20% of Baku? So any bombing of said oil fields will need to wait until a) Germans are definitely certain that those cannot be captured, and b) Germans have adequate force of heavy bombers and their escorts close enough. So the decision to bomb Baku will be issued when, November of 1942? That would mean it is too late for any meaningful large scale operations until snow rain are gone, like April/May 1943? Way too late for anything? The Soviets can have some Spitfire IXs by that time, supported by radars.



Joel Hayward: Luftwaffe vs. Soviet Oil - Prof. Joel Hayward's Books and Articles
October was the earliest bombing of Grozny, so the Germans could start hitting Baku then, but that's assuming no other changes that would result in an earlier attack on the oil fields or perhaps mining of Atyrau oil terminal if you want to stop Soviet oil shipments from Baku reaching the rest of the USSR. Baku oil was shipping north to either Astrakhan, shut down by bombing historically, or north to the Atyrau area for dispersal to the rest of the USSR.
The He177B could operate from either Crimea or Mariupol on the Sea of Azov due to the major Soviet airbase that was there that could house the strategic bombers and have a milder climate for winter. An October operation against Baku from Mariupol would not be an issue in winter due to the milder Black Sea climate and of course the more mild climate over the Caspian around Baku. Plus they can attack at night, as Baku is very easy to approach that way thanks to water reflection, as British planners noticed in Operation Pike:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Pike


> Subsequent analysis of the photography by the PDU revealed that the oil infrastructure in Baku and Batum were particularly vulnerable to air attack as both could be approached from the sea, so the more difficult target of Grozny would be bombed first to exploit the element of surprise. Oil fields were to be attacked with incendiary bombs, while tests conducted at the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich revealed light oil storage tanks at the oil processing plants could be detonated with high explosives.



Navigating against British coastal targets during the Blitz was the easiest navigation, as the British noticed too for their night mining of German ports on the North Sea (Hamburg) during 'Gardening' operations.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 18, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> One 4-engined bomber should be more expensive than two 2-engined ones, but should also haul more bombs over same range, while using less crew per bombs carried? Provided, of course, that both 2- and 4-engined designs are armed with guns, like most of ww2 aircraft.]



When looking at that chart it would be well to remember that the A-28, A-29, A-30 ( Lockheed Hudsons) used roughly the same engines as the B-17 and B-24 only without Turbos. Or that while the B-17 used four 9 cylinder engines the B-26 "twin" used two 18 cylinder engines. 

Germans are pretty much going to be using the Jumo 211 or DB 600 series engines either in pairs or fours so the difference in engine costs is pretty much going to double instead of bouncing around like the American engine costs.


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## parsifal (Mar 19, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> I'll return at the moment to the supposed German anti-Soviet 'oil' campaign. The catch is that Germans did not intended to destroy Soviet-held oil fields refineries, but rather to capture them.
> IIRC, Maikop fields were producing only 10% of what Baku oil fiels were making. Grozny oil fields were at 20% of Baku? So any bombing of said oil fields will need to wait until a) Germans are definitely certain that those cannot be captured, and b) Germans have adequate force of heavy bombers and their escorts close enough. So the decision to bomb Baku will be issued when, November of 1942? That would mean it is too late for any meaningful large scale operations until snow rain are gone, like April/May 1943? Way too late for anything? The Soviets can have some Spitfire IXs by that time, supported by radars.



The other problem with a major four engined effort against strategic targets is that it leave the bread and butter issues for the LW really short. Historically the LW entered Russia with about 2900 a/c. by the end of July, after a months extremely hard fighting and massive successes, the numbers of operational aircraft available at the front had dropped massively, to just over 1000. It recovered after the pause at Smolensk, and then plummetted again after Typhoon. 

Operational numbers were always poor in Russia. Best month after 1941, prior to 1945, was June 1942, with Richthofen at the helm of LF-4, serviceability rates were just under 70%. During the winter months they plummetted to around 40% or less.

Point is that the LW even historically lacked the depth to maintain sustainability, and on the eastern front they absolutely needed every aircraft they had to keep up the pressure on the ground Level bombers were forced to go quail hunting to support the exceptionally hard pressed ground formations, and from 1941 on, the LW was called upon to more or less constantly act as fire brigades, which gave them no rest or ability to recover. 

Soviets were not particularly vulnerable to an oil campaign. They had plenty of reserves, and alternative (if less significant) fields beyond the Caspian sea and in the Central Asian Republics. hitting Soviet oil installations and infrastructure early would have hurt, but it would have hurt the Germans more by reason of the resources they would need to suck out of their other programs to achieve this. Even the hated Me210 did quite well on the EF. It was never a problem with quality for the Germans, they always held marked qualitative advantages over the Russians, it was always a problem with numbers, or more correctly the lack of numbers. Frittering LW strength away on distractions like the Soviet Trans Caucasus Oil fields would only serve to bring about an even earlier defeat for the Germans.


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## wiking85 (Mar 19, 2014)

parsifal said:


> The other problem with a major four engined effort against strategic targets is that it leave the bread and butter issues for the LW really short. Historically the LW entered Russia with about 2900 a/c. by the end of July, after a months extremely hard fighting and massive successes, the numbers of operational aircraft available at the front had dropped massively, to just over 1000. It recovered after the pause at Smolensk, and then plummetted again after Typhoon.
> 
> Operational numbers were always poor in Russia. Best month after 1941, prior to 1945, was June 1942, with Richthofen at the helm of LF-4, serviceability rates were just under 70%. During the winter months they plummetted to around 40% or less.
> 
> ...



I understand your point, however you are ignoring several major issues: 1 being that the LW under Udet badly mismanaged production and replacements, which created this negative feedback loop historically; there is also the issue of being ordered to do wasteful missions on other fronts when the efforts would have been far more helpful in the East: Steinbock and the Baedekker Blitz for one. Then there is the issue of the V-2 and V-3 projects and the massive waste there. Jeschonnek deserves major blame for constantly raiding schools for instructors to put at the front, men with irreplaceable skills. Stupid decisions too like the Stalingrad and Demyansk airlifts among others wore down the LW, as did going for unobtainable objectives, which creates massive logistic issues that wore down the LW in the East (going for Moscow after the muddy season in November 1941, the Caucasian campaign). Then there were stupid moves like the Tunisian campaign and trying to defend forward in the Mediterranean especially at Sicily that really wore down the LW. 

Beyond that there was the poor decision making by Goering that put the LW in the position of being the 'army's whore' to quote Richthofen. Instead of conducting appropriate missions like logistics interdiction the LW was shoehorned into army support, which has serious consequences; take for instance the battle of Kursk: prior to the offensive the one operational rail line into the bulge was bombed only once by a weak force, because the LW was ordered to conduct raids on the front lines, even when they had some breathing space to actually do something with airpower that might have a wide operational or strategic impact on the war.

How badly misused the LW was in Russia, especially after 1941:
The German Air War in Russia: Richard Muller: 9781877853135: Amazon.com: Books

The final point I want to make is about Soviet oil; 90% came from the Caucasus, most of the rest from Central Asia. While the Soviets certainly did have fields outside of that, they were very minor at this point and accounted for at best 3% of Soviet oil output. The one major source outside of the Caucasus was Iranian oil, which went to the Soviets during the war for the most part. That could be interdicted by the mining of Atyrau, which was the primary oil station for it during the war, not to mention Caucasian oil from Baku (which alone accounted for something like 70% of Soviet output. 
As to Soviet oil reserves, can you quote a figure on that? AFAIK it was about 15 million tons of oil (crude). Compared to Germany that was huge, but considering how oil dependent the Soviets were that's not as much as you'd think given that their agriculture was totally dependent on tractors and were thirsty for oil; they could survive on rationing, but that means demechanizing agriculture, which results in millions more deaths due to starvation and serious morale problems, even if they had to take horses away from the army and demobilize millions of men and women (from the military and industry) to work in agriculture. Taking out Soviet oil, while not a panacea, would create massive problems for the Soviets that their reserve and Iranian oil cannot solve. 

Operation Eisenhammer would be another good choice about a focused effort, maximum return attack for strategic bombing. Historically nearly 1200 He177s were built and they did very little despite having trained crews for them and fuel used on training and various flights for when they were used; having a functional aircraft instead given the historical resources spent on the project, would have them actually put to use; the LW had the trained units ready to go, but the machines were not functional historically, so with actual functional units they could actually conduct operations without affecting historical operations, due to the fact they spent the resources and had them sit idle historically. Even a single Geschwader could conduct minimal numbers of attacks on the Moscow-Upper Volga power stations in 1942 and get major benefits from those without impacting historical LW operations. 

Then there are historical strategic attacks that sucked up medium bombers that could have been used at the front:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel_He_111_operational_history#Eastern_Front


> The He 111 operated in the same capacity as in previous campaigns on the Eastern Front. The bomber was asked to perform strategic bombing functions. The tank factory at Gorkovskiy Avtomobilniy Zavod (GAZ) was subjected to a series of heavy attacks throughout June 1943. On the night of 4/5 June, He 111s of Kampfgeschwader 1, KG 3, KG 4, KG 55 and KG 100 dropped 161 tonnes (179 tons) of bombs, causing massive destruction to buildings and production lines. All of GAZ No. 1 plant's 50 buildings, 9,000 m (29,500 ft) of conveyers, 5,900 pieces of equipment and 8,000 tank engines were destroyed.[56] However, the Germans made an error in target selection. The GAZ plant No. 1 produced only the T-70 light tank. Factory No. 112, the second-biggest producer of the more formidable T-34, continued production undisturbed. Soviet production facilities were repaired or rebuilt within six weeks. In 1943, Factory No. 112 produced 2,851 T-34s, 3,619 in 1944, and 3,255 in 1945.[56] The Luftwaffe had also failed to hit the Gorkiy Artillery Factory (No. 92) or the aircraft plant where the Lavochkin La-5 and La 5FN were made.[56] The Luftwaffe failed to disrupt the Soviet preparation for the coming battle, but the He 111 had proved capable of operating in a strategic role.
> 
> The He 111 also formed the core of the strategic bombing offensive later in the year. During the Soviet Lower Dnieper Offensive He 111 Geschwader performed strike missions. Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring issued an order to General Rudolf Meister's IV. Fliegerkorps on 14 October 1943:
> 
> ...


This could have been done by the He177s which historically sat idle due to technical failings.



> During operations on the Eastern Front in early 1944, often carried out in daylight at about 6,000 m (19,690 ft) or higher, losses were relatively light. The Soviet Air Force, equipped mainly for low-level interception and ground-attack roles, was able to do little to hinder the high-flying bombers.


Here is another issue too; the Soviets, scared of the German strategic bombing capabilities, will divert production to higher altitude fighters that would be useless for frontline service at standard East Front altitudes (Mig-3), which would eat up Soviet resources that where used for front line service historically. Consider the diversion of resources and the loss of efficiency in dispersion of factories caused by the German reaction to Western strategic bombing. If the Germans were to conduct it themselves, on a more limited scale obviously, the Soviets would be forced to react by diverting resources from offensive front line uses to defensive ones to protect industry against this threat; it becomes a 'fleet in being' in a sense, where the Soviets have to react to the threat even if it sits idle after its initial usage, simply due to the threat it could attack again, which helps the German ground forces and tactical/operation LW forces, who now don't have to deal with the full usage of Soviet resources against them.


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## wiking85 (Mar 19, 2014)

I suppose we could also ask the question: how about there are no He177s constructed and the Bomber A is abandoned before mass production starts?
2,400 more medium bombers from 1942-44 (though probably more due to greater experience with those airframes and efficiencies due to larger scale production of existing models)?


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## Shortround6 (Mar 19, 2014)

wiking85 said:


> Then there are historical strategic attacks that sucked up medium bombers that could have been used at the front:
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel_He_111_operational_history#Eastern_Front
> 
> This could have been done by the He177s which historically sat idle due to technical failings.



Goring can "intend" whatever he wants, even with 1000 bombers the chances of him disrupting the Russian arms industry to a significant extent when the allies needed many times 1000 bombers to disrupt the German arms industry doesn't look like a good bet. _Everybody_ *over estimated* the effectiveness of bombing the factories. It did have effects but the Germans by Oct 1943 should known better than anyone (being on the receiving end) just how difficult it was to knock out production by a large percentage for more than short (weeks) period of time. 




> Here is another issue too; the Soviets, scared of the German strategic bombing capabilities, will divert production to higher altitude fighters that would be useless for frontline service at standard East Front altitudes (Mig-3), which would eat up Soviet resources that where used for front line service historically. Consider the diversion of resources and the loss of efficiency in dispersion of factories caused by the German reaction to Western strategic bombing. If the Germans were to conduct it themselves, on a more limited scale obviously, the Soviets would be forced to react by diverting resources from offensive front line uses to defensive ones to protect industry against this threat; it becomes a 'fleet in being' in a sense, where the Soviets have to react to the threat even if it sits idle after its initial usage, simply due to the threat it could attack again, which helps the German ground forces and tactical/operation LW forces, who now don't have to deal with the full usage of Soviet resources against them.



Trouble is without a rather different He 177 ( speaking of engine capability not reliability) the Soviets don't really need to change fighter types. Bomber service ceiling changed considerably depending on load. perhaps I am reading the charts provided by Tomo wrong (My German is about non-existent) but the Ceiling for the _loaded_ He-177 may be only 6.55km or under 22,000ft. Operational altitude would be even lower. On the way back out or with lighter bombloads and less fuel The HE 177 may very well hit 8000 meter "service" ceiling often listed for it. While the Yaks and LA series fighters were at their _best_ below 4000 meters that doesn't mean they could not reach 8-10000 meters. For He 177s running at 6-7000 meters _without_ escorts the Russians don't need a different fighter type. 

Now if you could come up with turbo chargers ( or two stage superchargers) for the German engines used in the He 177, no matter how they were arranged on the wing, you may be able to fly high enough to get away from Yak-7/9s and LA-5s. But then were are into a whole new "what if".


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## wiking85 (Mar 19, 2014)

Soviet industry was far more concentrated than German industry was. German dispersal was a function of their pre-war economy being based on subcontracting and small dynamic firms; the Soviets were based on massive concentrated factories in the US model with all work being done under one roof, which was a major problem if they start getting bombed, which the quote about He111 raids on Soviet industry in 1943 indicate. The soviets were far more vulnerable than the Germans were historically to bombing of factories. Now, we should also not forget to mention that US strategic bombing is downplayed far more than it should be, as it pretty much collapsed the German economy by 1944. It was pretty much only going after Germany deeply from 1943-44, so within about 16 months they had smashed Germany up very badly and would have done so sooner if they focused on the right targets earlier. Really most of the damage was done in 1944 after Big Week wrecked the German fighter arm (which was already badly worn down in the Mediterranean in 1943), so the collapse was actually due to a short period in 1944, rather than 1943-44. 

Also to your point about Soviet fighters anything over 15,000 feet was very uncomfortable for pilots without pressurized cockpits, which Soviet fighters mostly lacked. Even if they were able to reach 22,000 feet, they lack optimal performance at that height, so having something designed for higher altitude like that will require some specialized bomber killers, especially as the standard Soviet fighter was not designed to kill an armored, well defended bomber like the He177B. Sure they can use the P47 and Spitfire, but their standard fighters are not going to be especially good at shooting them down any more than the Me109 was at shooting down the B17.

Don't forget here the Germans would have the Fw187, so they could be escorted. But this leaves out that the Soviets lacked an integrated radar defense system due to the wide open spaces of Russia and lack of sufficient radar to guard everything. So the He177 can slip through, just as the He111 was able to do and attack targets without the Soviets being able to get fighters formed up and to altitude in time. Individual fighters going after bomber boxes did not do well. The Germans discovered the problems with that tactic early on so would form up into coordinated groups to attack from multiple directions, but that took time to organize, which the Germans were able to do due to their integrated radar system, something the Soviets lacked historically and would not have been able to form due to the factors I listed above. So at best Soviet defense is going to be based on how much AAA they can put around any possible target and fighter attacks on outgoing He177s after they made their attack; this also assumes there is no escort, so if the Germans are escorted by Fw187s, then forming up fighters are going to get attacked and distracted, which lets the He177s get away, which was a major issue the Germans had historically with Allied escorts preventing 'big wing' fighter groups from coordinated attacks on Allied bombers.


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## Denniss (Mar 19, 2014)

No need for Turbos or two-stage superchargers, use DB 605AS as basic engines and you have a far better high-alt performance (althout you lose a little for take-off).
I found a doc "Flugstreckentabelle He 177 A-3/R2" which states fuel calculation is done with 10% higher usage for some safety margin.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 19, 2014)

The DB-605AS is a bit too late?

The He-177s best cruising altitude when carrying a bomb load was, once we forget about the unrealistic 1.5 km, at 5 km. At least so it is stated at the alejandro's table. That altitude is well within scope of VVS fighters. With 415 km/h on max continuous power, with bombs they are not going to run away either. By mid/late 1942, the Soviets have a powerful 37mm cannon that fires through the prop; the cannon bagged a reasonable amount of aircraft, historically. 
So the other things must be considered: how good is Soviet air devfence network? It was pretty good above Moscow in 1941/42, IIRC. By late 1942, it should be better? In case Germans can field a reasonable number of capable ranged escorts, the VVS has a problem. But, if LW is geared more towards long range capabilities, who conducts the army support? Are the Stormoviks free to bomb along the front line, and the LW is ill able to return the favor?


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## wiking85 (Mar 19, 2014)

Denniss said:


> No need for Turbos or two-stage superchargers, use DB 605AS as basic engines and you have a far better high-alt performance (althout you lose a little for take-off).
> I found a doc "Flugstreckentabelle He 177 A-3/R2" which states fuel calculation is done with 10% higher usage for some safety margin.



Maybe by 1944, because the DB605 didn't get the restrictions taken off of it until late 1943 for start and emergency power. Using 1450 HP engines would probably be fine for the He177B, but the problem is it couldn't use its full power for years. Being limited to 1310HP is not a viable option then:
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daimler-Benz_DB_605
Ironically that's when the DB603 was declared reliable! So much for 605 developments influencing the 603, they problems were worked out in tandem, rather then 605 first then 603 using the developments.

Might as well use the DB603 from 1941/2 on for higher HP, even with a lower altitude. Also note the performance of the DB606/10 with the historical He177A5 isn't necessarily the performance of the DB603 equipped He177B:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel_He_274#Specifications_.28He_274_V1.29


> Powerplant: 4× *Daimler-Benz DB 603A* 12-cylinder inverted-vee engine, 1,750 PS (1,726 hp; 1,287 kW) each
> Performance
> 
> *Service ceiling: 14,300 m (46,920 ft)*


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## vikingBerserker (Mar 19, 2014)

Why would the Soviets not do what they did and move their industry far beyond the reach of German Aircraft?


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## wiking85 (Mar 19, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> The DB-605AS is a bit too late?
> 
> The He-177s best cruising altitude when carrying a bomb load was, once we forget about the unrealistic 1.5 km, at 5 km. At least so it is stated at the alejandro's table. That altitude is well within scope of VVS fighters. With 415 km/h on max continuous power, with bombs they are not going to run away either. By mid/late 1942, the Soviets have a powerful 37mm cannon that fires through the prop; the cannon bagged a reasonable amount of aircraft, historically.
> So the other things must be considered: how good is Soviet air devfence network? It was pretty good above Moscow in 1941/42, IIRC. By late 1942, it should be better? In case Germans can field a reasonable number of capable ranged escorts, the VVS has a problem. But, if LW is geared more towards long range capabilities, who conducts the army support? Are the Stormoviks free to bomb along the front line, and the LW is ill able to return the favor?


Moscow's defense system was the best in the country and probably second best in the world after Berlin in 1941. The only thing they lacked was gunlaying radar, which came later from British LL. They had trouble engaging bombers at night.
But then again you cannot use Moscow's system as a model for the rest of the country, due to it being the largest concentration of defensive systems in the country. There were far too many targets to defend to have that sort of concentration elsewhere. For instance Moscow's and the Upper Volga;s power infrastructure was virtually undefended the whole war; in 1943-44 the Germans noticed it was pretty ripe for bombing, but had squandered their chance to get at it, due to being pushed back from effective range of the stations. Also note that Moscow wasn't the prime target for going after the Soviet weapons industry. Going after the undefended power stations and transmission stations outside of the city would have a far greater impact than actually hitting the factories themselves. 

Again the LW had the He177 in service IOTL, but they were grounded due to technical issues; they won't require any more resources than were spent on the He177 IOTL; little changes for the LW in terms of resources by having a functional, four engine He177, as the coupled engine version was built to 1200 units and actually formed combat Geschwader that sat around waiting for their aircraft to become functional, basically sitting out the war. The only significant change is they actually being able to fly in this scenario. The major difference would be fuel usage vs. OTL, but considering the He177A series did fly a lot of training and combat missions (like the Steinbock raid and around Stalingrad) avoiding things like that would mean those resources are spent more profitably against Soviet industry and power infrastructure, rather than later against political targets like London.


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## wiking85 (Mar 19, 2014)

vikingBerserker said:


> Why would the Soviets not do what they did and move their industry far beyond the reach of German Aircraft?


They would eventually, but that overloads the power infrastructure and disrupts production in the meantime. It also increases the distances that shipping raw materials must travel, plus how far parts need to travel from one area to the next, not to mention to get to the front; assuming they evacuate everything to the Urals and there is no power problems from that, or logistics issues from limited rail networks having to support extra factories and population, then 1942 is pretty much lost for the moving factories in terms of output like 1941 was. Then we have the increased cost of transporting everything further than they historically needed to, which slows down replenishment from factories and wears down the rail infrastructure from having to move rolling stock over much greater distances. There would be consequences.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 19, 2014)

Soviets can move much of their industry (and most of it is already beyond LW reach in 1942). On the other hand, the oil fields and much of that infrastructure will remain on their spot.


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## vikingBerserker (Mar 19, 2014)

But they did, and it was quite successful. The Russians traded space for time.

Below is a posting I found on the Axis History and is supposedly a quote from an article by Colonell G.S. Kravchenko 1967. However I will point our I do not have access to the original article.


"On June 23rd 41 mobilisation production plans went into force. On June 24th the Evacuation Council was set up and on the 30th the State Defense Committee was organised with Stalin as its head. In July 41 300,000 railway wagons were in operation in August 185,000 in September 140,000 in October 175,000 in November 123,000. In the July November period 1,503 industrial enterprises were evacuated to the east. It took two and a half years to erect a blast furnace before the war but furnaces No. 5 and 8 were erected in eight monthes at Magnitogorsk. In October tank building plant No.183 was working in November it was evacuated and in December it resumed production. Tank production went from 4,177 in the second half of 41 to 11,021 in the first half of 42. 
Military production increased 180% in the urals in 1942 compared to 41 200% in the Volga area and 140% in Western Siberia. 
In 1942 4.4 million industrial workers were trained or re-educated. The number of women operating for example forging and press machines rose from 11% 1941 to 50% end of 42. 
The Germans siezed or put out of action 31,850 big and small industrial enterprises. German industrial capacity in 41 including conquered countries was :- 
31.8 million tons of steel against the Soviets 18.3 
rolled stock 22.5 m.tons against Soviets 13.1 
coal 506mt against Soviets 165.9mt 
stock of metal cutting machines 1694 thousand Soviet 58.4 thousand "


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## parsifal (Mar 19, 2014)

At the beginning of the war the whole of the Transcaucasus accounted for 72% of Soviet Oil production as a whole, with the main concentrations being around Baku, with an annual output of 25.4 million tons. By 1945, however, Bakus output had slumped to less than 12 million units. And the Soviets showed NO signs of economic collapse because of that slump. The reason for that is because during the war they had greatly increased outputs in their eastern MDs.

According to Sohbet Karbuz


"_Meanwhile, the enemy was closing in on Baku. On September 9, 1942, martial law was declared in Transcaucasia. The danger of an attack on Azerbaijan was becoming more likely. The emergency measures which had been prepared beforehand were set into operation-Azerbaijanis began closing the functioning wells with plans, if necessary, to explode the wells themselves so that the Germans wouldn't get a single drop of oil.

Because of the crisis, the State Defense Committee decided to transfer the main forces of oil-workers and oil enterprises of Baku to the regions of Volga, Ural Mountains, Kazakhstan and Central Asia for the enforcement of the oil extraction there. In October, 1942, more than ten thousand oil workers left for these eastern parts.

All the nine drilling offices, oil-expedition and oil-construction trusts as well as various other enterprises with their staffs were transferred to an area near Kuybishev, (Russia Federation in Tartarstan near the Ural Mountains north of Kazakhstan). This city soon came to be known as "the Second Baku".

Despite the severe frost the drillers started searching for oil and thanks to day and night working, the Bakuis in the region of Povolzhye increased the fuel extraction in "Kinelneft" trust that first year by 66% and by 42% in entire region of Kuybishev. As a result, five new oil and gas fields were discovered and huge oil refinery construction projects were undertaken, including the first pipe line between Kuybishev and Buturslan was built that same year.

Beginning in late 1943 drilling work in Baku was reestablished. However, the sealing off of a number of wells turned out to be a tragedy. Many of them were impossible to restore. Eventually, the oil extracting had considerably been reduced by the end of the war: in 1945 only 11.5 million tons of oil was extracted_".

So, the attacks on Baku and the Caucasus were not only contrary to German war strategy of capruring these fields intact, they also would have little or NO EFFECT on Soviet war making potential. Even with a 60% reduction in Bakus output ther was no effect on the Soviets. they were absolutely rolling in oil.

Soviet Committee on Defence had specified a 2 year reserve of oil in 1940. im not certain if that was reached, but there is no reason to show that they didnt. If they had a 2 year reserve, and the attacks began in 1943, the war would be over before any effect on the Soviet operations became apparent.


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## wiking85 (Mar 20, 2014)

vikingBerserker said:


> But they did, and it was quite successful. The Russians traded space for time.
> 
> Below is a posting I found on the Axis History and is supposedly a quote from an article by Colonell G.S. Kravchenko 1967. However I will point our I do not have access to the original article.
> 
> ...



I'd have to fact check what he's saying, because 1960s Soviet history wasn't exactly honest; they were still claiming lend lease made no difference and that they suffered less than 10 million dead in WW2. As to the specific claim about tank production, keep in mind that the number he is quoting for the second half of 1941 was a depressed number due to the invasion, evacuations, and capture of factories, so of course the first half of 1942 was going to be better because factories were back in operation after being moved. What he's not saying is how that figure compares to the first half of 1941 before the invasion.
So there is already number massaging to make Soviet achievements seems bigger than they were, which was a facet of 1960s era Soviet history about WW2.
I'd be very curious if modern Russian historians could validate his numbers with access to the archives. 



parsifal said:


> At the beginning of the war the whole of the Transcaucasus accounted for 72% of Soviet Oil production as a whole, with the main concentrations being around Baku, with an annual output of 25.4 million tons. By 1945, however, Bakus output had slumped to less than 12 million units. And the Soviets showed NO signs of economic collapse because of that slump. The reason for that is because during the war they had greatly increased outputs in their eastern MDs.


Source? And they also were receiving all the Iranian oil, not to mention avgas from the US via Siberia. So they could survive the slump, though it did hurt, thanks to, as you say, increased effort on other fields, but mainly due to foreign imports. Those imports could mostly be blocked by mining of Atyrau as I mentioned earlier, as Iranian oil was coming in via that port.




parsifal said:


> According to Sohbet Karbuz


Who?



parsifal said:


> "_Meanwhile, the enemy was closing in on Baku. On September 9, 1942, martial law was declared in Transcaucasia. The danger of an attack on Azerbaijan was becoming more likely. The emergency measures which had been prepared beforehand were set into operation-Azerbaijanis began closing the functioning wells with plans, if necessary, to explode the wells themselves so that the Germans wouldn't get a single drop of oil.
> 
> Because of the crisis, the State Defense Committee decided to transfer the main forces of oil-workers and oil enterprises of Baku to the regions of Volga, Ural Mountains, Kazakhstan and Central Asia for the enforcement of the oil extraction there. In October, 1942, more than ten thousand oil workers left for these eastern parts.
> 
> All the nine drilling offices, oil-expedition and oil-construction trusts as well as various other enterprises with their staffs were transferred to an area near Kuybishev, (Russia Federation in Tartarstan near the Ural Mountains north of Kazakhstan). *This city soon came to be known as "the Second Baku"*._


_
By whom and was it just for propaganda or something that was actually said by the locals? The government could call it that in propaganda, but that means nothing.




parsifal said:



Despite the severe frost the drillers started searching for oil and thanks to day and night working, the Bakuis in the region of Povolzhye increased the fuel extraction in "Kinelneft" trust that first year by 66% and by 42% in entire region of Kuybishev. As a result, five new oil and gas fields were discovered and huge oil refinery construction projects were undertaken, including the first pipe line between Kuybishev and Buturslan was built that same year.

Click to expand...

What was the pre-expansion production and what was post expansion production? Raw numbers are more helpful than unqualified percentages. How big were those 5 fields that were discovered and what does 'huge' mean in terms of refining capacity built? How would it not be vulnerable to bombing?



parsifal said:



Beginning in late 1943 drilling work in Baku was reestablished. However, the sealing off of a number of wells turned out to be a tragedy. Many of them were impossible to restore. Eventually, the oil extracting had considerably been reduced by the end of the war: in 1945 only 11.5 million tons of oil was extracted

Click to expand...

_


parsifal said:


> ".
> 
> So, the attacks on Baku and the Caucasus were not only contrary to German war strategy of capruring these fields intact, they also would have little or NO EFFECT on Soviet war making potential. Even with a 60% reduction in Bakus output ther was no effect on the Soviets. they were absolutely rolling in oil.
> 
> Soviet Committee on Defence had specified a 2 year reserve of oil in 1940. im not certain if that was reached, but there is no reason to show that they didnt. If they had a 2 year reserve, and the attacks began in 1943, the war would be over before any effect on the Soviet operations became apparent.


As I said above the Soviets were getting all of Iranian oil from 1941 on via the Caspian, so they could survive Baku oil being cut in half, but they did suffer consequences in 1942-43 over the drop in oil output. Plus the Iranian oil shipment could be stopped up by mining the oil station at Atyrau, which well within range of the He177 and Do217 from Rostov or even Mariupol. 

Also what is a two year reserve in 1940 compared to the massive consumption rates of 1941-42? How much was lost in the attacks by the Germans and how much was destroyed? Beyond that its not like the Soviets couldn't have underanticipated consumption rates, all powers did in WW2.


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## parsifal (Mar 20, 2014)

> Who?



r. Sohbet Karbuz was born in Istanbul in 1965. He received his Bachelor of Science and Masters of Science degrees from the industrial engineering department of Istanbul Technical University, his PhD degree in natural sciences from the Technical University of Vienna and Postgraduate Diploma in economics from the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna.
He currently works at Observatoire Mediterraneen de l’Energie (an energy industry association) in Paris as director of its hydrocarbons division.
Before joining the OME in 2004, he was with the International Energy Agency in Paris, where he worked for as head of non-OECD energy statistics section and as administrator in the energy technology policy division. Previously, he worked as research associate and manager at several institutions in Austria, Turkey and Germany.
His main areas of interests are oil and natural gas markets, geopolitics, energy security, energy modeling and scenario building.
He is considered one of the foremost specialists on Soviet era energy policies and production






> By whom and was it just for propaganda or something that was actually said by the locals? The government could call it that in propaganda, but that means nothing.



Youd have to ask the guy above about where it came from. 

Baku began the war as a critical element of Soviet Oil production, but it didnt stay that way. In 1937 Soviet Oil Production amounted to 10.7 million tons. This was considered the minum requirement incidentally of the wartime Soviet economy by the Committee of Defence.

In 1940 there was a production spike, as the Soviets stepped up to meet German Oil requirements as well as their own. Output spiked at 34 million tons. 1941 was another big year, at 33 million tons. Unquestionably the ability of Baku to operate enabled this production spoke to occur. Thereafter however, Baku and the Transcaucasus was steadily decommissioned as the threat of German occupation began to loom large. By July 1942, 1125 of the roughly 1800 wells in the Baku and Azerbaijan regions had been demolished, and this is reflected in Soviet oil production figures from 1942-5

In millions of tons, Soviet outputs were as follows 

22.0	18.0	18.2	19.4

This is still well above the baseline numbers of 1937. Moreover, as a percentage of this, the transcaucasus was no longer as critical as it had been. Production in 1945 was about 11 million tons, so the Soviets were almost self sufficient, with or without Transcaucasus oil. 

Imports from overseas never exceeded 4% of total production, so whilst that still might amount to a not inconsiderable 1 million tons or so, in the overall scheme of things, it was small fry for the Soviet economy. The most important contribution of foreign imports were in the high quality POLs which the Soviet petrochemical industry had a great deal of trouble with 



> What was the pre-expansion production and what was post expansion production? Raw numbers are more helpful than unqualified percentages. How big were those 5 fields that were discovered and what does 'huge' mean in terms of refining capacity built? How would it not be vulnerable to bombing?



I dont know exactly, but more than half the POL workforce had been moved to the Urals and Central Asian economic zones by 1942. All I can say is that the shift to cent5ral Asian oil was substantial. Baku alone as an oil supply produced 25.4 million tons of the 34 million tons in 1940, and the remainder of the transcaucasus amounted to between 5 and 8 million tons. Altogether that accounts for somewhere between 30 and 33 million tons of the production totals. That's between 80 and 90%. By 1945, the whole of the Transcaucasus accounted for 11 million of the 19.5 million tons produced. Thats roughly 50% of total output. The Transcaucasus was still a critical part of the Soviet Oil production capability, but it was no longer the ace in the hole that it was in 1940. 




> As I said above the Soviets were getting all of Iranian oil from 1941 on via the Caspian, so they could survive Baku oil being cut in half, but they did suffer consequences in 1942-43 over the drop in oil output. Plus the Iranian oil shipment could be stopped up by mining the oil station at Atyrau, which well within range of the He177 and Do217 from Rostov or even Mariupol.



Iranian Oil is largely irrelevant. In 1938 it produced less than 1 million tons of oil. in 1941, the british empire overall produced 7.4 million tons from the entire empire, including Burma, Iraq, iran and the gulf. Im not sure if those figures include Curacao, if they do, you can forget iranian oil as anything other than a distraction.

if there is any drop in production of any commodity, there are consequences, and so that of course includes oil. but was oil supply a critical factor in constraining Soviet production or military activities. I would suggest not. Their biggest constraints in 1942 were getting the available manpower trained up, and recovering from the shortages of artillery and aircraft that they wer still recovering from. In all of the contemporary material Ive see, oil shortages were never cited as a major constraint holding back the Soviets, partilcualry in 1942-3, which are the critical years. if youve got material that says diferently, Id love to see it.l 



> Also what is a two year reserve in 1940 compared to the massive consumption rates of 1941-42? How much was lost in the attacks by the Germans and how much was destroyed? Beyond that its not like the Soviets couldn't have underanticipated consumption rates, all powers did in WW2.



We dont know the figures for the two year reserve, but in 1937 the annual consumption rate was pretty close to the production rate. Production at that time was 10.7 million tons. Whether this 2 year reserve was for the entire economy or just for military operations, I dont know. For the Japanese, their 18 month reserves were just for military operation,as was the reserve by the Italian Navy (which was a 2 year reserve and around 1 million tons). At a guess I would say it was for military operations only, and that for the Soviets around 30% of total consumption was for military purposes. if that guess is even close to right, that means their 2 year reserve was about 6-8 million tons 

German interdiction of Soviet Oil reached its peak in 1942, and not by aircraft, but by physical occupation and interdiction of the rail and road links to Baku. Im not aware of significant interdiction of the Vaspian Sea, which in any event was linked by underwater pipeline from the middle of 1942 to western Kazakhstan. The Germans talkjed a lot about aerial interdiction, but in the end never had the resources to spare to undertake such an operation. They had maybe 35 aircraft, for example, to try and interdict the Black sea during the siege of Sevastopol. Germany was losing steamand power by the latter half of 1942, and simply diod not have the resources to spare for this kind of frippery.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 20, 2014)

Cool stuff, Parsifal.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 23, 2014)

Some additional data about German engines. 
The DB-601C and D were two-stage developments of the DB-601 line. Dimensions were much like the DB-601E. Dry weight was 685 kg (25 kg more than 601E). Max RPM was 2700, the compression ratio was 7.2:1 - both values as the 601E. Take off power was 1300 PS. The rated altitude was at 8000 m, the 'Steig und Kampfleistung' there was 1120 PS ( ie. 1105 HP at 26250 ft, 1105 HP; vs. 4900m and 1200 PS for the 601E). Unfortunately, I don't have values for Notleistung of the 601C/D. I also don't know whether the inter-cooler was used. Fuel was 87 oct - very much likely that no inter-cooler was used?
My understanding is that the only important difference between C and D was the prop reduction gear ratio, being 0.49 and 0.53 respective.
The data is from my newly-acquired 'Flugmotoren und Strahltriebwerke' book  If they only dealt more with the ww2 piston engines...

The same book claims that all improvements of the DB-601 series were incorporated in the development of the DB-603.


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## wiking85 (Mar 23, 2014)

Any info on the Jumo 222?

Also to your point about the 601 improvements 'being incorporated into the development of the 603', that only indicates that those improvements were added to the process, not that they were integral to making the 603 reliable and functional. I haven't denied that the 601 improvements were included in the development process, but rather that the 601 innovations added nothing that uninterrupted 603 development from 1936 couldn't have added on its own and perhaps even better without having to try and add in smaller engine developments to a larger engine.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 23, 2014)

Re. 603: I have no problems admitting that more resources, earlier on, would've make the engine a more useful asset. What I do not agree is that DB would've had the DB-603A running on 2700 rpm and 1.40 ata already in 1941.

Re 222: yes, the 5 page chapter is in the book. I didn't have much time to consume it, and there is only 10 days since my eye laser surgery was done - small print in the whole book, along with even smaller quoted text and picture captions, is quite tiring at this time. At any rate, the new issue of the book that covers only Junkers engines is deadlined for June/July, so that is my next buy. Hopefully, my picture about the Jumo 222 will be complete then  
From the table: Jumo 222 A/B weighted, dry, 1084 kg. Power for take off was 2000 PS at 1.42 ata, Steig und Kampfleistung was 1980 (!!) PS at 6400 m; all at 2900 RPM. The 222 E/F have had increased bore/volume, two-stage (and two-speed?) supercharger and intercooler, T.O. rating was 2500 PS at 3000 RPM and 1.5 ata, S. K.leistung was 1750 PS at 2900 RPM and 9400 m. Weight 1370 kg dry. With MW-50, TO power was 2900 PS.
The 222 C/D received increase in stroke/volume, single-stage two-speed s.charger, 1180 kg dry. TO power 3000 PS, rated height was 5300 m, the power at that altitude is not stated.


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## wiking85 (Mar 23, 2014)

Thanks! I'm curious about whether there is any reference about the reasons it never became ready, i.e. technical vs. bureaucratic problems


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## rinkol (Mar 24, 2014)

I recall someone posting information on a DB patent application for a two stage supercharger arrangement on another forum. Basically, the idea was to have single stage superchargers mounted on each side of the engine (rather than on one side as for the common DB 601/603/605 variants) with one supercharger feeding the other. This seems like a reasonable arrangement and would seem like a logical choice for the DB 601C/D, but I don't have any definite information as to the actual configuration. In any case, it seems unlikely that there would be an intercooler as this would likely result in a larger weight difference with the DB 601E. It would be interesting to find out what the problems were with this line of development. This was apparently a serious development as the design of the Hs 130A was based on this engine and its non-availability adversely affected the viability of that aircraft.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 25, 2014)

Seems that Jumo 222 have had it's fair share of developmental problems, by the book 'Flugmotoren und Strahltriebwerke'. 
It took from March 1940 until October of 1941 for the Jumo 222 (a pair of them) to actually power an aircraft on their own - the Ju-288V-5. That is despite passing the 100 hour test in April of 1941. The main problems were corrosion, vibrations and damaged bearings. 
The RLM wanted more from the Ju-288 now (crew to 4 members, increased payload), and the engine of 2000 HP was not enough. The book states that the engines' prototypes installed in Ju-288 prototypes were also incapable to develop full power of 2000 PS either, while experiencing issues. So, despite some engines that were capable to do do the 100 hr test twice, RLM was of the opinion that Jumo 222 cannot develop 2000 PS. Hence they cancelled the Jumo 222 program on 24th Dec 1941. The Ostmark factory will be equipped for production of the DB-603; previously it was expected that factory will produce 1000 of Jumo 222 monthly.
The book then names several issues that were plaguing the design even after cancellation, namely the master and connecting rod assemblies, the bearings (change of materials was attempted), damaged pistons, rough running (the attempted cure was the change in firing order), coolant turned into steam damaging the cylinder heads. We're at Spring of 1942 already, and the 'improved' prototypes of the engine experience the issues. How distant is the really workable and reliable engine?
Despite all of those issues and the cancelled contract, the Jumo attempted at increase of swept volume to 49.85 L by increasing the bore from 135mm to 140mm, in order to achieve the take off power of 2500 PS. The book mentions the take off power, acommplished on the test bench on 26th May 1942, of 3000 PS. In the same time, the Ju-288V 9 took off with Jumo 222A/B that were providing 2500 PS for take off (??). That engines were from 'baureihe 3', ie. 'production series 3'.
After the DB-606 and 610 developed issues on their own, Jumo received a contract, on 5th August 1942, for the series production to be undertaken in Prague. The 1st engines from there are expected from October of 1944. However, due to the ongoing work on Jumo 211 versions and the Jumo 213, there is no enough workshop space and test stands to iron out the bugs of the 222 and prepare the design for mass production. (Hence my '??' above: whatever A/C was taking off on the 222 on assumed full power, it was more of a calculated risk, rather than a product of confidence in the engine?)
At the start of December 1942, the 1st 100 hr test was passed by 'baureihe 3' Jumo 222A/B with 2500 PS for take off, clearing that engine for mass production. But, because of the realities of war, the Bomber B, J-288 and Jumo 222 were cancelled in summer of 1943. The other Jumo engine got priority, namely the Jumo 213, since it was an important part of the fighter program. After heavy bombing of Dessau in April 1944, the design team of the 222 was moved in Oberursel.

The book further mentions the development of ever more powerful variants, but that comes into 'too little, too late' category even more than the early 222A/B.


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## wiking85 (Mar 25, 2014)

Thanks for typing that up. It undermines Budrass's contention that the 222 was killed by administrative order, rather than technical issues. Hope you're feeling better after your surgery.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 25, 2014)

Thanks, everything is okay 
It is pretty clear that Jumo 222 have had issues with about any important part. Maybe, with more support from RLM, and satisfaction with, say, 1800 PS for the start, the engine would be in use from some time in 1942. But the same (ie. development with more support) would be true for DB-603 or BMW-801, so the 222 has no advantage? And it would be heavier and more expensive than those two.


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## wiking85 (Mar 25, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Thanks, everything is okay
> It is pretty clear that Jumo 222 have had issues with about any important part. Maybe, with more support from RLM, and satisfaction with, say, 1800 PS for the start, the engine would be in use from some time in 1942. But the same (ie. development with more support) would be true for DB-603 or BMW-801, so the 222 has no advantage? And it would be heavier and more expensive than those two.


Yeah, it seems that the 2000hp engine was a bridge too far technically for the era. Instead it would make more sense to go for the 603, 801, and later when it becomes possible the 213 (with four valves per cylinder, rather than the historical 3).
BTW glad to hear you're feeling better.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 26, 2014)

There was also possibility of the Jumo 211 with 4 valves per cyl. 
Further, the RLM was of the opinion that BMW should concentrate on radials, and the merger with Bramo sealed the 'deal'. Interestingly enough, BMW was designing two V-12s in mid 1930s, the bigger, BMW 117 of 36 L, was capable for 905 PS on 2320 rpm, dry weight 525 kg. The 'F. und S.' book gives as much as 1100 PS at 2580 rpm for take off power, but it is unclear to me whether it was just a test stand value, or something really achieved during flights - the 117 was never more than an experimental engine, and all work on it was cancelled in 1937. The book claim that mentioned 905 PS was max continuous power at SL. For quite a light engine, the 1100 PS value does not sound reliable.
Same fate fell on the BMW 116, engine of 20.76 L and 470 kg. Power values were 750 PS on 3000 RPM for take off, and 620 PS at 2700 rpm for max continuous at SL. That one was cleared for mass production, but concentration on radial engines meant cancellation.

The book mentions several times that direct injection amounted for savings in fuel consumption by 10-15%, depending on engines. Due to more even fuel distribution - no too lean and too rich running cylinders?

Few posts were for a long range maritime patrol aircraft. The main victory would be to put those on Kriegsmarine command? More produced Do-26s? The Fw-200 with diesels? A dedicated LR MP aircraft? Time to consider in-flight refueling?


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## wiking85 (Mar 26, 2014)

On naval recon the Do26 seems like the only viable option; its ready to go, so no need to reengineer the Fw200, which would take too much time, while in flight refueling requires way too much experimenting and training to pull off by 1940. At that point is just better to go with a seaplane that rendezvous with a seaplane tender in the Atlantic. All they need is to get the Hohentwiel system in service, which was technically possible from 1938 on, they just needed the concept to develop it.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 26, 2014)

A sea plane tender in the Atlantic depends too much on whether the RN will discover it or not? How about a supply submarine to top-off the fuel and oil tanks?


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## Shortround6 (Mar 26, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Same fate fell on the BMW 116, engine of 20.76 L and 470 kg. Power values were 750 PS on 3000 RPM for take off, and 620 PS at 2700 rpm for max continuous at SL. That one was cleared for mass production, but concentration on radial engines meant cancellation.



It also wasn't going to do much of anything the Jumo 210 wasn't going to do. 19.7 liters and 442kg?



> The book mentions several times that direct injection amounted for savings in fuel consumption by 10-15%, depending on engines. Due to more even fuel distribution - no too lean and too rich running cylinders?



Could very well be, I believe British evaluations credited it with about that amount of fuel savings. 



> Few posts were for a long range maritime patrol aircraft. The main victory would be to put those on Kriegsmarine command? More produced Do-26s? The Fw-200 with diesels? A dedicated LR MP aircraft? Time to consider in-flight refueling?



KISS (Keep It Simple Stup*d) FW 200 _properly_ redesigned for the role rather than 'quicky/cheap' conversion. Beef up structure a bit and if needed plumb under wing bomb racks for drop tanks. In-flight refueling won't by much except to top off tanks at start of mission while still in friendly airspace. Germans have enough problems with engines without trying to come up with a "new" diesel for limited application.


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## wiking85 (Mar 26, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> A sea plane tender in the Atlantic depends too much on whether the RN will discover it or not? How about a supply submarine to top-off the fuel and oil tanks?



IIRC supply ships for German surface warships did have a reasonable success rate staying out of the RN's net, while the 'Milchkuh' Uboats did not have that success. IIRC it was the US entry into the war that really shut down Atlantic supply operations for the KM.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_tanker_Altmark
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_Type_XIV_submarine


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## Shortround6 (Mar 26, 2014)

Landing seaplanes in the Atlantic is waaaaay too risky. Flying boats usually tried to land/take off in sheltered coastal waters. You need Maritime recon every day, every week, every month, weather permitting. weather permits flying over the ocean a lot more than it permits landing in ocean.Just google "atlantic convoy pictures"


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## tomo pauk (Mar 26, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> It also wasn't going to do much of anything the Jumo 210 wasn't going to do. 19.7 liters and 442kg?



Yep, no much point in muddling with the 116. The BMW 117 was to offer a better base for an really useful engine, had Germans/RLM decided to go for that one.



> KISS (Keep It Simple Stup*d) FW 200 _properly_ redesigned for the role rather than 'quicky/cheap' conversion. Beef up structure a bit and if needed plumb under wing bomb racks for drop tanks. In-flight refueling won't by much except to top off tanks at start of mission while still in friendly airspace. Germans have enough problems with engines without trying to come up with a "new" diesel for limited application.



Agreed that, if one wants a battle-worthy Fw-200, a proper modification would be necessary. Not sure whether the new diesels are needed - the Jumo 205 was offering 880 PS for take off in 1940 on 595 kg, the Bramo 323 offered 1000 PS (1100 with C3 fuel) on 550 kg. The 207A was offering the same 880 PS, but were heavier, at 805 kg (weight with turbo?). The 207B (for Ju-86) was at 1000 PS, the up-rated 207C 1100 (for Bv-222) PS for TO. 
The radial will offer somewhat lighter weight, but the fuel consumption was 1/3rd greater. Diesels will not be for a limited application, all transports and plenty of training airplanes can use those.


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## wiking85 (Mar 26, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Agreed that, if one wants a battle-worthy Fw-200, a proper modification would be necessary. Not sure whether the new diesels are needed - the Jumo 205 was offering 880 PS for take off in 1940 on 595 kg, the Bramo 323 offered 1000 PS (1100 with C3 fuel) on 550 kg. The 207A was offering the same 880 PS, but were heavier, at 805 kg (weight with turbo?). The 207B (for Ju-86) was at 1000 PS, the up-rated 207C 1100 (for Bv-222) PS for TO.
> The radial will offer somewhat lighter weight, but the fuel consumption was 1/3rd greater. Diesels will not be for a limited application, all transports and plenty of training airplanes can use those.


Frankly the bombing role is overrated anyway; the utility is far more with convoy spotting for Uboats.
As to the Bramo vs Jumo, the former required the more expensive and more scarce Avgas, while the Jumo could use the cheaper and more plentiful diesel fuel with better fuel consumption rates. For long range recon then the diesel is a must. IIRC the Jumo 205 was only using 6 cylinders too.
I'm surprised more German aircraft didn't use diesels given their secondary role (such as the Ju52 transports).


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## Shortround6 (Mar 26, 2014)

The Diesels are limited application, they only make sense if the flight is long enough that the combined weight of the engines and fuel are less for diesel than for the gasoline engine. Short range flights with diesel engines simply means less payload. The Jumo diesels did alright with long steady speed flights but had problems with rapid or frequent throttle changes (which rather rules them out for trainers). Lufthansa tried them as did the Luftwaffe and the while a 1940/41 diesel may have been better, the mid/late 30s diesels required too much maintenance. The Ju 207 weighed at least as much as a Jumo 211 and at times was offering around 20% less power.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 26, 2014)

wiking85 said:


> Frankly the bombing role is overrated anyway; the utility is far more with convoy spotting for Uboats.
> As to the Bramo vs Jumo, the former required the more expensive and more scarce Avgas, while the Jumo could use the cheaper and more plentiful diesel fuel with better fuel consumption rates. For long range recon then the diesel is a must. IIRC the Jumo 205 was only using 6 cylinders too.
> I'm surprised more German aircraft didn't use diesels given their secondary role (such as the Ju52 transports).



See above and please look at the Jumo diesels again, only 6 cylinders but 12 pistons and two crankshafts. See: http://www.enginehistory.org/Diesels/CH4.pdf

These are not cheap or easy to produce engines.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 26, 2014)

Indeed, the LR MPA must be used to find out convoys and dispatch the acquired data to the subs. The Jumo diesels (204, 205, 207, 208 ) did indeed use only 6 cylinders, but also 12 pistons - each cylinder was shared by two opposing pistons. 
The Jumo 208 was being developed from 1939, it featured different cylinder dimensions (bore increased from 105 to 130 mm), hence the volume was increased from 16.6L to 25.5 L. I don't know the weight. Power was 1500 PS for take off, 1100 PS was Steig Kampfleistung at 10000 m through use of turbocharger. Engine remained in prototype stage.
From 1940, another diesel was tested, the Jumo 223. A 24 cylinder engine - with 48 pistons!? Due to small cylinders (80mm bore, stroke 2 x 120 mm), the permissible RPM skyrocketed at 4400 rpm, the power was at 2500 PS for take off. The engine weight went also considerably up, at 1400 kg (with turbo?). Remained at prototype stage. Cylinder layout was similar to the Napier Deltic, but with 4 cylinder blocks, rather than 3. A 'diamond' layout, we might say.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 26, 2014)

One does wonder how much sooner the 213 might have shown up if Junkers hadn't been fooling around with these diesel engines.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 26, 2014)

Diesels at least powered aircraft in service. The Jumo 222 did not. The diesel-outfitted LR MPA can be a force multiplier even in 1939-43. For Jumo 213, even if it enters service earlier than historically, it is too late to do much.


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## wiking85 (Mar 26, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> One does wonder how much sooner the 213 might have shown up if Junkers hadn't been fooling around with these diesel engines.



Not developing the Jumo 222 (or at a lower level) and avoiding the Jumo 223 and 224 would only help. I think that the limiting factor on Jumo 213 introduction is the start of the development of the pressurized cooling system, which wasn't started until 1938 and only with the success of the Jumo 211F was the 213 seriously pursued. I think best case maybe a production introduction some time in mid/late 1942, rather than mid-1943.



tomo pauk said:


> Diesels at least powered aircraft in service. The Jumo 222 did not. The diesel-outfitted LR MPA can be a force multiplier even in 1939-43. For Jumo 213, even if it enters service earlier than historically, it is too late to do much.


Which is why we need the DB603 in development uninterrupted


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## Shortround6 (Mar 26, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Diesels at least powered aircraft in service. The Jumo 222 did not. The diesel-outfitted LR MPA can be a force multiplier even in 1939-43.



Even 8-112 Fw 200s a month _with NO changes_ would be a force multiplier if the crews were well trained. An inaccurate sighting report is just about useless.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 26, 2014)

An oddball design, feasible in case the engine allows enough space for a drive shaft to use prop gun tunnel - the Ki-64. Used variants of the DB-601Aa engine (1939 technology), should give the late war fighters a good run for for their money. Shortcoming was the surface cooling system. With conventional cooling system it would be slower, unless better engines are installed, like 601E or 605A.

Kawasaki Ki-64 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

http://www.airwar.ru/image/idop/fww2/ki64/ki64-2.gif


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## wiking85 (Mar 26, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> Even 8-112 Fw 200s a month _with NO changes_ would be a force multiplier if the crews were well trained. An inaccurate sighting report is just about useless.



Sure, but its not ideal given the fuel constraint issues that having the diesel push-puller Do26 would solve, not to mention it frees up FW to focus on other projects, while giving Dornier a contract until the Do217 is ready.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 26, 2014)

How about more/earlier helicopters? Not for combat duties.


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## wiking85 (Mar 26, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> How about more/earlier helicopters? Not for combat duties.



To what purpose? More were not built due to limited utility. I don't think they were worth it during WW2, but worth researching during it.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 26, 2014)

Transport to/from demanding terrains, to/from rain soaked or show covered airstrips? Landing light artillery right when needed, not where the wind drifts the glider? Swift evacuation of men from places not easily accessible for conventional transports?


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## wiking85 (Mar 26, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Transport to/from demanding terrains, to/from rain soaked or show covered airstrips? Landing light artillery right when needed, not where the wind drifts the glider? Swift evacuation of men from places not easily accessible for conventional transports?



I don't think there was enough range or power to do most of that.

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## tomo pauk (Mar 26, 2014)

Flettner Kolibri was flying well on 160 PS, range 170 km. 
The Fa 223E have had range of 437 km, or 700 km with additional fuel. Bomb load 500 kg (1100 lbs) for the Fa 223A. All on 1000 PS Bramo 323. All data from Wikipedia.


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## wiking85 (Mar 26, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Flettner Kolibri was flying well on 160 PS, range 170 km.
> The Fa 223E have had range of 437 km, or 700 km with additional fuel. Bomb load 500 kg (1100 lbs) for the Fa 223A. All on 1000 PS Bramo 323. All data from Wikipedia.





> Although the Fa 223 is noted for being the first helicopter to attain production status, production of the helicopter was hampered by Allied bombing of the factory and only 20 were built.





> Good handling in bad weather led the German Air Ministry to issue a contract in 1944 to BMW to produce 1,000 units. However, the company's Munich plant was destroyed by Allied bombing raids after producing just 24 machines.[6]


These are limitations....


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## tomo pauk (Mar 26, 2014)

Those were limitations for anything Germans made from late 1943 on, nothing to do with designs themselves.


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## wiking85 (Mar 26, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Those were limitations for anything Germans made from late 1943 on, nothing to do with designs themselves.



Other than not being ready until 1942 when it becomes hard to get them into wider service quickly enough to stay ahead of Allied bombing.
Don't get me wrong, I think they were worthwhile given that they had better performance than I thought, but given the late introduction date, I'm not sure if there can be meaningful production.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 27, 2014)

The thread starts in 1936, and the Fw-61 was 1st flown in June 1936. Ie. 3 years before 1st jet was flown. Should have an useful helicopter 3 years before an useful jet?

Any point in big autogiros?


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## Shortround6 (Mar 27, 2014)

I think we have been over this before. It took quite a while for helicopters to become _load carriers._ At the WW II level of development there were a few missions they could perform but in general they couldn't do much of anything a conventional aircraft could not do. And the conventional aircraft would be cheaper to build and cheaper to operate. 
Unless you _really_ need the vertical take-off and landing the helicopter wasn't quite ready. Sikorsky took around 3 tries to get the rotor they wanted and this counts the the R-4 as the first try. 

Using an engine of the same power as the Flettner Kolibri this aircraft 







could carry a pilot and 3 passengers, cruise at around 120mph, range 460 miles and take-off (ground run) in 550-600ft. The basic airframe dates from 1932. 

The Germans might have done better to build more/better small utility transports than spending the time and effort that they spent on "trick" aircraft.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 27, 2014)

Good points. 
Maybe going to something like up-scaled Storch, with Argus 410/411, to carry a 500-700 kg payload?

added: layout of the Jumo 223 diesel:

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/1003/PeterS/JunkersJumo223x-section-red.jpg

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/1003/PeterS/JunkersJumo223internals-red.jpg


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## Shortround6 (Mar 27, 2014)

Germans had a bit of problem in that they had no 200-600hp radial engine. They should have had one as Czechoslovakia had several in 1938. Radial being lighter than a V-12 of the same power and at the speeds these things are going the difference in streamlining is minor, especially when you start seating the passengers side by side. Germans maybe took a few too many machine tools out of Czechoslovakia? or had them making other things?

For another comparison of early Helicopter "utility" compare a Sikorsky S-51 with R-985 engine : Sikorsky H-5 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

To the de Havilland Beaver with R-985 engine; de Havilland Canada DHC-2 Beaver - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Beaver could take-off and land to clear 50 ft obstacle in 380 meters. 

While the American "Grasshoppers" could get in and out of some rather small areas the addition of just flaps (small ones) and more power could also transform aircraft Post war Super Cub : Piper PA-18 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Lycoming O-290 was being built during WW II so there is no technical reason the plane could not be built earlier. 

Now if you _need_ less than a 100 meter landing space then a Helo or autogyro are your only choice but it is _possible_ to get planes to land/take-off in only a few hundred meters. 

German air transport was a rather neglected area in WW II with the Ju 52 being too old and most of the "solutions" being too big, too complex, too late and built in too few numbers. They may have shown the way for future post war tactical transports but in the numbers provided could not transport the tonnage needed into the fields used in the weather conditions of the time.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 27, 2014)

The Argus 410/411 engines were air cooled, at 700 lb for 460 HP, or 850 lb for 590 HP. Usnig the Argus 410, the Ar 96 entered service in 1939. They can also use another similar engine, Czech Walter Sagitta, 820-850 lbs for 520-550 HP, available to them from Spring of 1939. The BMW-produced Hornet, until the BMW factories are tooled up to produce something more important?
The R-985-SB engine weighted 640 lbs, making 400-450 HP. 

Granted, the German use of captured assets can be described only by worst words.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 27, 2014)

Czech Avia company had a 7 cylinder radial (737cu in) of 215kg (with some accessories) and 280 hp take-off and capable of 200hp at 3000 meters max continuous on 74 octane fuel. A 9 cylinder version (with a bit more stroke) was good for 440hp take-off for 260 kg and 360hp at 2750 meters max cont. on 85 octane. 

Walter had around 5 different sized of radial engines from 476 cu in to 1336 cu in (the big ones used a very long stroke) with weights from 163 KG to 360kg and powers from around 150 to 450hp. Most of the engines running on 73 or 80 octane. 

There were also two series of engine (one with 105mm X 115mm cylinders the other with 118mm X 140mm cylinders) of 4, 6 and 12 cylinders and a few other small (or tiny) engines.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 27, 2014)

The Siemens-Halske company was offering 9 cyl radials in late 1920s/early 1930s, the Sh 20 was making 540 PS for take off, weight 415 kg, or 475 kg (with gearbox?). Sh 22 B was making 650 PS on 490 kg. 
With all said, seems that Germans did have quite a choice of under 700 PS engines. Especially once the foreign factories are captured.


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## rinkol (Mar 27, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Indeed, the LR MPA must be used to find out convoys and dispatch the acquired data to the subs. The Jumo diesels (204, 205, 207, 208 ) did indeed use only 6 cylinders, but also 12 pistons - each cylinder was shared by two opposing pistons.
> The Jumo 208 was being developed from 1939, it featured different cylinder dimensions (bore increased from 105 to 130 mm), hence the volume was increased from 16.6L to 25.5 L. I don't know the weight. Power was 1500 PS for take off, 1100 PS was Steig Kampfleistung at 10000 m through use of turbocharger. Engine remained in prototype stage.
> From 1940, another diesel was tested, the Jumo 223. A 24 cylinder engine - with 48 pistons!? Due to small cylinders (80mm bore, stroke 2 x 120 mm), the permissible RPM skyrocketed at 4400 rpm, the power was at 2500 PS for take off. The engine weight went also considerably up, at 1400 kg (with turbo?). Remained at prototype stage. Cylinder layout was similar to the Napier Deltic, but with 4 cylinder blocks, rather than 3. A 'diamond' layout, we might say.



I'm mystified as to why they didn't use three sets of Jumo 207 cylinder blocks in a triangular layout (i.e., the same general configuration as the Napier Deltic) for the Jumo 223. Surely, this would have saved a lot of development effort.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 27, 2014)

Or maybe not 

See: Napier Deltic - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## tomo pauk (Mar 27, 2014)

Maybe 3 sets of Jumo 204 (as the Deltic) or 205 cylinder blocks? 2500 PS on 1800 kg? 
BTW, Continuing a development of 28.5 L diesel (Jumo 204), instead of going for a considerably smaller 16.6L (Jumo 205) would be a better proposal both on the on the short and long run?


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## rinkol (Mar 27, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> Or maybe not
> 
> See: Napier Deltic - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



The material about the piston phasing is interesting - it just goes to show how easy it is to overlook these sorts of engineering issues.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 28, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> ...
> The Germans might have done better to build more/better small utility transports than spending the time and effort that they spent on "trick" aircraft.



Wonder if something akin the An-2 'Colt' would've been good for the German war effort - a non-nonsense transport biplane with 1000 HP engine?


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## wiking85 (Mar 28, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Wonder if something akin the An-2 'Colt' would've been good for the German war effort - a non-nonsense transport biplane with 1000 HP engine?



Certainly couldn't hurt. Also it would have been a fine airplane for paras and VIPs.


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