# Aerial Bombing Question



## Zipper730 (Jan 31, 2017)

I got a couple of questions regarding aerial-bombing, particularly level-bombing with iron-bombs...

I. Measuring Average Error

There's CEP which if i recall is the radius where half the bombs land. There's something like average/median radial error which I think is the radius in which 100% of the bombs fall. I'm curious if there's any way to convert between the two?

I'm also curious about if the average error is measured on where each bomb lands relative to where it should be, where each aircraft's bomb-track/bomb-train lands versus where it was intended to, or where the whole bomber formation/stream lands it's bombs versus where it should.

II. Bomb-Train/Track

This has to do with the fact that the bombs do not appear to all be released at the same time but over the course of a couple of seconds. Since each bomb follows a ballistic path after being released, would I be correct to assume that if one bomb is released a second ahead of the next they would land however many feet per second the bomber flies?


----------



## GregP (Feb 2, 2017)

For II. above, yes, that is correct. The theory was that if they all got dropped at the same time, and they missed, the entire load was wasted. If they "staggerd" then slightly, then there was a higher probability at least some would hit close enough to do some damage. Interestingly enough, there weere several planes that could release all at the same time.

The main problem with doing it was that, many times, the bombs would not quite fall completely aligned with the relative wind, and they would sort of rock around before settling out nose first. If they managed to hit one another while rocking around, they could and sometimes did explode right under the bomb bay, taking the bomber out or, at minimum, severely damaging it. There were more than a few instance of that happening. Thye solution arrived at was to slightly stagger the bomb releases, resulting in a typical bombing pattern. There were also some deliberate choices made on the order of release, some being simultaneous but not adjacent in the bomb bay. Serendipty happened and it was also an optimum solution, but they still occasionally had the "bombs exploded right under the bomb bay" missing aircraft report.

I'd have to go back and dig out for item I, and don't have time just now, but it'll probably get answered before I do. I'll probably look it up anyway as it is a good question. I have a couple of books on artillery mathematics, but that is not quite bombing error, although CEP is also involved with artillery fire. Lots of knowledgeable people in here. The math involved makes it apparent how complicated bombsites were. For instance, when a bomber released a bomb, the distance of fall is not the altitude of the aircraft. It is the altitude of the aircraft minus the altitude of the target. So dropping and getting hits on a mountain slope was not a simple thing to do, and was more of a learned art than a good calculation, sort of like getting a feel when dive bombing. 

The bomb also accelerates due to gravity, but not infinitely. Like a skydiver, it has a terminal velocity beyond which it will not go any faster due to air drag, just like an aircraft. It accelerates until thrust (gravity) equals drag. Each type had it's own Cdo and equivalent flat plate area. Artillery calculations are quite involved, and bombs are no less complicated to calculate. Artillery math can be boiled down into tables assuming no crosswind, and I'd think bombs are simular. The bombsite needs to look at the fall distance, make the time-of-fall computation accounting for the bomb type being dropped, and account for any entered crosswind components.

So it doesn't quite come out as though calculating the ballistics in a vacuum, as one might expect after taking a first course in college Physics.

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## Elmas (Feb 2, 2017)

There are many other parameters to be considered, for example the gradient of air density and air temperature from the ground to the bombing level.
This make the bombs skid on the air like a stone on a lake, with unpredictable results, sometime more than 10% of the bombiing level.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## GregP (Feb 2, 2017)

Lots of variables, to be sure. There are several good books on it. I like, "_Elementary Calculations in Artillery Fire_" as a good reference for those rounds.

I looked up CEP and it uses a bivariate Normal probability density function. So, if you have a CEP of, say, 100 meters, Then 50% will fall within 100 meters of target. Another 43% will fall between 100 m and 200 m; another 6.68% between 200 and 300 m; and only 0.32% outrside of 300 m.

So if you have 1,000 bombs dropped with a CEP of 100 m, then 500 will fall within 100 m, 930 will fall within 200 m, 997 will fall within 300 m, and the last 3 will be outside 300 m.

I made up the 100 m CEP above, so don't take that for WWII CEP accuracy! In tests, the Norden bomb bombsight demonstrated a CEP of just 27 m at medium altitudes. In practice, it wasn't quite so good, with 1943 CEP average at 370 m. As a result, the Navy turned to dive bombing and skip bombing.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Zipper730 (Feb 3, 2017)

GregP said:


> For II. above, yes, that is correct.


Okay, that's good to know.


> The theory was that if they all got dropped at the same time, and they missed, the entire load was wasted. If they "staggerd" then slightly, then there was a higher probability at least some would hit close enough to do some damage.


So you'd want the aim-point to be slightly ahead of the target, so when the first bomb start dropping out they'll land short, the bulk will land on the target, and the remaining few will go long...


> Interestingly enough, there weere several planes that could release all at the same time.


Do you know which planes could?

I know the Avro Lancaster had a series of buttons on the right-side of the bombardier's station (if I recall right) that could be used to adjust the release interval. I don't know what the settings were and if it could release all at once (unless it was carrying one bomb at least...)


> The main problem with doing it was that, many times, the bombs would not quite fall completely aligned with the relative wind, and they would sort of rock around before settling out nose first.


Like that wobbling/directional hunting thing that they'd sometimes do? I've seen that happen with some bombs coming out the bay...


> If they managed to hit one another while rocking around, they could and sometimes did explode right under the bomb bay, taking the bomber out or, at minimum, severely damaging it. There were more than a few instance of that happening.


I thought they had some kind of propeller/screw like device which was spun by the wind and after a certain number of spins, it would arm... I've seen a B-24 get a wing taken of by a falling bomb (it didn't blow up, but that bomber was doomed).


> Thye solution arrived at was to slightly stagger the bomb releases, resulting in a typical bombing pattern.


Honestly, up to this point, I thought the minimal interval was how quick the bomb-shackles could let go of all the bombs and they would all be able to clear the bay, lol.


> There were also some deliberate choices made on the order of release, some being simultaneous but not adjacent in the bomb bay.


I know the B-29 had an electronic sequencer so that they didn't have CG shifts as they dropped...


> they still occasionally had the "bombs exploded right under the bomb bay" missing aircraft report.


I assume the report was made by another crew?


> when a bomber released a bomb, the distance of fall is not the altitude of the aircraft. It is the altitude of the aircraft minus the altitude of the target.


Was the altitude of the target set on the bombsight, or guesstimated?


> The bomb also accelerates due to gravity, but not infinitely. Like a skydiver, it has a terminal velocity beyond which it will not go any faster due to air drag, just like an aircraft. It accelerates until thrust (gravity) equals drag.


And gravity pulls down with a force of 1g provided the bomb is going straight down and presumably some fraction if it's on an angle.


> Each type had it's own Cdo and equivalent flat plate area.


Cdo is like coefficient of drag? What's an equivalent flat-plate area?


> Artillery calculations are quite involved, and bombs are no less complicated to calculate.


And mathematics was never my strong point...


> Artillery math can be boiled down into tables assuming no crosswind, and I'd think bombs are simular. The bombsite needs to look at the fall distance, make the time-of-fall computation accounting for the bomb type being dropped, and account for any entered crosswind components.


How did they determine crosswind on land? On water, they'd probably use the shape of the waves...


> In tests, the Norden bomb bombsight demonstrated a CEP of just 27 m at medoium altitudes.


What constituted medium altitude?


> In practice, it wasn't quite so good, with 1943 CEP average at 370 m.


Was this based on each bomber, or the whole formation?


> As a result, the Navy turned to dive bombing and skip bombing.


The USN realized by 1940 that the Norden would be inadequate for ship-bombing if I recall. Dive bombing and torpedo bombing were already being used, they might have done some glide-bombing with PBY's, but I didn't know they did a lot of work on skip-bombing, though I know the USAAF did a lot of work with skip and masthead attacks.


----------



## Zipper730 (Feb 3, 2017)

Elmas said:


> There are many other parameters to be considered, for example the gradient of air density and air temperature from the ground to the bombing level.


Complicated stuff dropping a bomb through miles and miles of air...


> This make the bombs skid on the air like a stone on a lake, with unpredictable results, sometime more than 10% of the bombiing level.


Skid on the air?


----------



## GregP (Feb 3, 2017)

Looks like you need to do a bit of research, Zipper. You may be able to find a Norden bombsight handbook online or on ebay, and you'll need to look at bombardier handbooks for individual aircraft to find out the particulars of which could release in what order with wnat available timing settings.


----------



## tyrodtom (Feb 3, 2017)

If a bomb explodes close to the aircraft there's no way you can know if it was caused by AA getting a lucky hit right withing the stream of bombs or if a defective fuse allowed a bomb to detonate before it was armed. The only way someone could know was if a camera with ultra slow motion ability was filming during the bomb drop. Otherwise people are just guessing, because a bomb exploding can set off a unarmed bomb next to it far faster than the human eye can register the event.

The bombs have a arming propeller on the fuse that doesn't arm until it's dropped what is considered a safe distance from the dropping aircraft. The propeller has a wire holding it stationary until the bomb drops from the bomb rack.

The bomb can be dropped unarmed, with the arming wire still attached, it usually won't explode on contact with the ground, unless it hits something very hard, like bedrock, or thick concrete.

AF bases while I was in the USAF had drop areas away from the runways where aircraft could drop bombs that hadn't released when the aircraft were on it's mission.
It's called a hung bomb, no pilot wants to land with a hung bomb on his aircraft, just think of the possibilities.
So they fly over the drop area, do abrupt maneuvers, etc. to try and dislodge the stuck bomb, or drop bomb and bomb rack. 
They'd always drop the bombs unarmed, the bombs usually didn't detonate on impact. EOD went around later and detonated them in place.

When you remember how many bombs were dropped by the allies during WW2, and how many fuses were required, usually 2 per bomb, during the mass production required to keep up with those numbers, some less than perfect examples had to have slipped though whatever quality control they had.


----------



## GregP (Feb 4, 2017)

I think you are thinking of modern bombs, not WWII 500 - 1,500 pounders. Here's a pic of a 1,000 pound under a Corsair:







Perhaps it was fitted with a propeller arming device later, but they routinely dropped them without those, too. I know tehre a place for one to be mounted on the tail ofg the bomb.

I'd bet that if the pilots always had their preference, they'd ALWAYS have them!


----------



## wuzak (Feb 4, 2017)

It likely has a tail fuse


----------



## wuzak (Feb 4, 2017)

From _Catalog of Standard Ordnance Items_


----------



## GregP (Feb 4, 2017)

This, of course, under ideal conditions.

If you go to Joe Baugher's page and download his entire set of WWII serial number files, you can find a LOT of bombers that were damaged or lost from bombs exploding just beneath the aircraft, many with MACRs. So, if you are interested, you can spend a lot ot time reading about it.


----------



## stona (Feb 4, 2017)

tyrodtom said:


> The bomb can be dropped unarmed, with the arming wire still attached,



That was certainly the British system. The wire was on a reel fitted to the aircraft. It was locked electrically (using a solenoid) when the bomb aimer selected 'live' on his arming panel. If he did not do this then when the bomb dropped the wire would simply unwind of the reel and depart the aircraft with the bomb, which therefore remained 'safe'. It is most unlikely that such a bomb would subsequently explode.

It was not unknown for crews to drop entire loads 'safe' under the stress of combat. With the British system the absence of the arming wires(s), which had left with the ordnance, was irrefutable evidence. 
I am not familiar with the American system, but there is a USAAF figure for the 8th AF for loads dropped 'safe' which is surprisingly high. Unfortunately I can't find it at the moment.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Elmas (Feb 4, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> Complicated stuff dropping a bomb through miles and miles of air...
> Skid on the air?



Certainly you've been in an aeroplane in some "bumpy" flights.
After one of such flights, I personally didn't kiss the soil after landing, like the Pope often does, I literally did bite the soil...
Do you think that bombs are less subject to those "bumps" than you have been?


----------



## Joel Dobson (Feb 4, 2017)

The B-29s, and I think the B-24s and B-17s, had an electrical gadget in the bomb bay called the intervalometer, which would time the release of bombs.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## mikewint (Feb 4, 2017)

From Vietnam the result of two B-52 bombing runs. We were often asked to run BDAs after a 52 strike. The actual target was the tree-line so two separate misses

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## tyrodtom (Feb 4, 2017)

A lot


GregP said:


> I think you are thinking of modern bombs, not WWII 500 - 1,500 pounders. Here's a pic of a 1,000 pound under a Corsair:
> 
> 
> 
> ...



Just because it's on the aircraft, doesn't mean it's mission ready . I can see the cap on the front fuse well, no fuses, no boom.
They probably loaded bombs the same way we did, you load the bomb onto the aircraft, then you fuse it. 
Even aircraft with in internal bomb storage, you install the bomb on the rack before you fuse it. Because it's too easy to damage a fuse during the loading operation. Sometimes we might load the bombs hours before the fuses were installed.
There may be pictures out there of bombs sitting on a bomb trailer already fused, but by the time I was in the USAF they had changed that procedure, because of crews damaging fuses during loading. Nothing pisses a pilot off more than risking his butt to drop a bomb on a target, and then have it not go off.

We were using mostly Korean war era bombs during Vietnam, but at NKP we still saw WW2 era box finned bombs too, even some WW2 era British bombs. And most of our fuses were WW2.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Informative Informative:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## mikewint (Feb 4, 2017)

Tyro, your post reminded me of the "Instant LZ" bombs (old left-over 10,000lb bomb from WWII). Trying to find clearings in the jungle big enough for a helo to land was tough and naturally the VC knew where each one was located. Thus the 10,000lb instant LZ. The Army used CH-54 skycranes to drop them. The bomb made a 400 - 500yd clearing in the triple-canopy jungle and the shock wave pretty well knocked out anything for about a mile. That meant that the helo had to be at least at 6000ft to avoid the worst of the wave and thus it was tough to get one to hit where you wanted it to be and the massive explosion announced your arrival.

Reactions: Like Like:
3 | Like List reactions


----------



## tyrodtom (Feb 4, 2017)

By the time I was there in the Army in 71 they were dropping those instant landing zone bombs from C-130s.
The bomb was mounted on rollers, secured by big straps, with a parachute mounted where the tailfins normally would be.

With the better navigation aids on the C-130 accuracy was said to be better, and the greater speed made it safer for the dropping crew.

It was tried one time not too far from Pleiku, they tried for a mountain top landing zone. It missed .

Reactions: Informative Informative:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## mikewint (Feb 4, 2017)

Yea, that was the big problem, getting them just where you wanted them. Even in '65 the VC/NVA had every natural clearing pretty well staked out or had troops nearby. Was tough to get in and even tougher to get extracted


----------



## Greg Boeser (Feb 4, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> I got a couple of questions regarding aerial-bombing, particularly level-bombing with iron-bombs...
> 
> II. Bomb-Train/Track
> 
> This has to do with the fact that the bombs do not appear to all be released at the same time but over the course of a couple of seconds. Since each bomb follows a ballistic path after being released, would I be correct to assume that if one bomb is released a second ahead of the next they would land however many feet per second the bomber flies?



USAAF bombers were equipped with an intervalometer, which was set by the bombardier to drop the bombs in train at the selected interval. This was set by determining the ground speed of the a/c and the intended distance between bombs. The intervalometer calculated the time gap between bombs released. Alternatively, the bombardier could _salvo_ the bombs, which would actuate the release sequence with the minimum time to complete the sequence. Each bomb shackle required approximately 1/20 of a second to operate, so a plane carrying 20 bombs would be rid of its load in about a second. Assuming the a/c was travelling at a ground speed of 220 mph, even a salvo would string 20 bombs over 100 yards.


----------



## wuzak (Feb 4, 2017)

_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4nfCdTRXj10_


That is, literally, a tallboy bomb without the tail!


----------



## wuzak (Feb 4, 2017)

One wonders if a high capacity blast bomb would have been better.

The 8000lb HC bomb had more explosive in a lighter weight.


----------



## tyrodtom (Feb 4, 2017)

They used what they had. They really had no other use for a bomb that size during the Vietnam era. 
Couldn't hardly load it on a F-4, or A1, they maybe could lift that much weight, but it was too big in size. It would fit in a B-52.

Actually we called any bomb with a fuse extended a Daisy Cutter, ( it took a special booster to transfer the detonation from the fuse to the bomb body) But when the Tall Boy was used, it was THE DAISY Cutter.


----------



## Zipper730 (Feb 4, 2017)

tyrodtom said:


> The bombs have a arming propeller on the fuse that doesn't arm until it's dropped what is considered a safe distance from the dropping aircraft.


That's actually what it's called, an arming propeller? I like to know the correct terms for things (saying thingamabob sounds foolish...)



wuzak said:


> It likely has a tail fuse


What's the advantages and disadvantages of a tail-fuse?



GregP said:


> If you go to Joe Baugher's page and download his entire set of WWII serial number files, you can find a LOT of bombers that were damaged or lost from bombs exploding just beneath the aircraft, many with MACRs.


MACR = Missing Air Crew Report?



Elmas said:


> Certainly you've been in an aeroplane in some "bumpy" flights.


Yeah


> Do you think that bombs are less subject to those "bumps" than you have been?


Okay, you're talking about a bomb being bumped around by turbulence... I'm not sure why I didn't understand the way you said it.



Greg Boeser said:


> USAAF bombers were equipped with an intervalometer, which was set by the bombardier to drop the bombs in train at the selected interval.


I think that's what I saw on the Lancaster bombardier panel...


> This was set by determining the ground speed of the a/c and the intended distance between bombs.


And the minimum interval was 1/20th for a salvo, and that would place all the bombs over 322'8" at 220 mph; 352'0" at 240 mph

Were salvo releases normal for attacks on specific targets?


----------



## wuzak (Feb 4, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> What's the advantages and disadvantages of a tail-fuse?



Tail fuses seem to have been used when delayed detonation was desired.

Also, obviously, when skip bombing the ground or water could, potentially, interfere with the fuse mechanism.




Zipper730 said:


> And the minimum interval was 1/20th for a salvo, and that would place all the bombs over 322'8" at 220 mph; 352'0" at 240 mph



Not all 20 bombs would be falling from the same rack.

I think that if this method was used all racks of bombs (2 or maybe 4) would drop at the same time.


----------



## tyrodtom (Feb 4, 2017)

What I called a arming propeller was called a arming vane in the tech. manuals.

I don't think a tail fuse was a advantage, it was a failsafe. If the nosefuse didn't set the bomb off on impact, the tail fuse hopefully would. And both fuses had many delay options.
The tail fuses had a arming vane too that had to spin a set number revolutions before it armed.
I'm not acquainted with every US produced bomb from WW2, but the ones I have worked with all had 2 fuses, nose and tail.

The bomb in Greg's picture was not a finished ready for mission bomb, it had no fuse, nose or tail .

I can tell because I can see no arming wire, that was used to keep the arming vane from spinning.
The fuse was stored in a sealed container with a cotter pin thru the arming vane and a small hole in the fuse body.
After you installed the fuse in the bomb, you removed that cotter pin, and slid the arming wire thru the two holes, and secured the wire with a farnstock (sp) clip.
If the pilot or bombardier chose to drop armed bombs, the arming wire stayed attached to the bomb rack, and the arming vane was free to spin. If they wanted to drop unarmed bombs, the arming wire was released from the bomb rack with the bomb. The arming vanes couldn't spin. The bomb wouldn't explode on impact unless it hit something pretty solid.

And don't forget some fuses were designed to not explode on impact at all, but hours later to hamper recovery efforts. And some were designed with anti-withdrawal devices to kill bomb disposal personnel.


----------



## stona (Feb 5, 2017)

The British Automatic Bomb Distributor, which didn't require a made up word, did the same job as the American 'Intervalometer'. It had some quite sophisticated options.


----------



## stona (Feb 5, 2017)

Greg Boeser said:


> USAAF bombers were equipped with an intervalometer, which was set by the bombardier to drop the bombs in train at the selected interval. This was set by determining the ground speed of the a/c and the intended distance between bombs. .



This is correct, and it was usually related to the mission type. For example, when bombing using H2X with poor or no ground visibility, which the 8th AF knew to be far less accurate than some other methods, the 'intervalometer' was set to give a longer gap between the bomb releases. The assumed pattern was consequently quite large, a circle (yes, a circle) 3,300 feet in diametre.

Post operational analysis bombing attempted to use the pattern centres to estimate accuracy. Through 10/10 cloud using H2X accuracy is not a word I would have used, only pattern centres within five miles of the aiming point were used, any other were discounted. Average range error was 1.74 miles, deflection 1.4 miles and circular error 2.4 miles. No pickle barrels troubled by those results, though blind bombing using rather primitive radar is a worse case scenario  Through 4-5/10 cloud all those errors were roughly halved.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Greg Boeser (Feb 5, 2017)

wuzak said:


> Not all 20 bombs would be falling from the same rack.
> 
> I think that if this method was used all racks of bombs (2 or maybe 4) would drop at the same time.



The bomb shackles were wired to release in sequence. No shackle could release until the previous one had been activated, thus completing the circuit. This prevented the possibility of a bomb falling on a hung bomb. Hung bombs were fairly common.


----------



## Greg Boeser (Feb 5, 2017)

Going back to my manuals, the bomb racks on a B-26 operated either electrically for bombing or mechanically for salvoing unarmed bombs. So what I said earlier is correct for live bombs, but not for unarmed bombs.
This makes sense in that crews that suffered a malfunction of the electrical bombing mechanism could mechanically salvo the remaining bombs.


----------



## wuzak (Feb 5, 2017)

Greg Boeser said:


> The bomb shackles were wired to release in sequence. No shackle could release until the previous one had been activated, thus completing the circuit. This prevented the possibility of a bomb falling on a hung bomb. Hung bombs were fairly common.



You misunderstand what I say.

Depending on bomb sizes being carried, a B-17, for example, has 2 or 4 racks being used. The bombs in each rack have to go sequentially, but I don't believe each rack has to go sequentially.





B17 bomb bay by Tom South, on Flickr




B-17 Bomb Bay by Rick Hawkinson, on Flickr


----------



## Greg Boeser (Feb 5, 2017)

You are correct. Here's a picture of a B-24 releasing a mixed load of bombs from both bays.


----------



## swampyankee (Feb 5, 2017)

Dragging it back to WW2.

With the lack of navigational aids, the CEP, be it 100m or 400, was frequently dwarfed by the navigational error of not finding the right city. Until there were better navigation aids, there were times when CEP had to include navigation errors of miles.


----------



## Zipper730 (Feb 6, 2017)

wuzak said:


> Tail fuses seem to have been used when delayed detonation was desired.


Okay


> Not all 20 bombs would be falling from the same rack.


So, each shackle had to release from the bottom to the top in order?



tyrodtom said:


> What I called a arming propeller was called a arming vane in the tech. manuals.


Okay, so it's an arming-vane...


> And don't forget some fuses were designed to not explode on impact at all, but hours later to hamper recovery efforts. And some were designed with anti-withdrawal devices to kill bomb disposal personnel.


Time-delay and anti-disturbance fuses...



stona said:


> The British Automatic Bomb Distributor, which didn't require a made up word, did the same job as the American 'Intervalometer'. It had some quite sophisticated options.


Such as?


> This is correct, and it was usually related to the mission type. For example, when bombing using H2X with poor or no ground visibility, which the 8th AF knew to be far less accurate than some other methods, the 'intervalometer' was set to give a longer gap between the bomb releases. The assumed pattern was consequently quite large, a circle (yes, a circle) 3,300 feet in diametre.


How did they get a circle... the bomb release follows a line or a very narrow oval unless you're talking about the whole formation?


> Post operational analysis bombing attempted to use the pattern centres to estimate accuracy. Through 10/10 cloud using H2X accuracy is not a word I would have used, only pattern centres within five miles of the aiming point were used, any other were discounted.


They assumed a pattern center 3300 feet in diameter within five miles of the aiming point and ignored those that fell outside that?


> Average range error was 1.74 miles, deflection 1.4 miles and circular error 2.4 miles.


So they were on average 1.74 miles away from the target, had a CEP of 2.4 miles from the aiming point, and what's deflection? If I recall deflection has to do with leading a target by aiming ahead of it?



Greg Boeser said:


> The bomb shackles were wired to release in sequence. No shackle could release until the previous one had been activated, thus completing the circuit. This prevented the possibility of a bomb falling on a hung bomb. Hung bombs were fairly common.


Is this like one of those old series circuits that people had on christmas tree lights where one light goes out and everything goes dead at once and you have to spend a month and a day figuring out which light burned out?


----------



## BiffF15 (Feb 6, 2017)

Greg Boeser said:


> You are correct. Here's a picture of a B-24 releasing a mixed load of bombs from both bays.
> View attachment 364780



Greg,

Are you sure of that? It looks to me that the "small" bombs are from the B-24 further away in the picture, and the "big" bombs are from the nearer aircraft.

Cheers,
Biff


----------



## wuzak (Feb 6, 2017)

BiffF15 said:


> Greg,
> 
> Are you sure of that? It looks to me that the "small" bombs are from the B-24 further away in the picture, and the "big" bombs are from the nearer aircraft.
> 
> ...



I agree.

It looks like the near B-24 has dropped 8 bombs, 2 lots of 4.

The far B-24 has also dropped 8, but earlier and they have fallen further.

It does show that one bomb was released from each of the 4 racks at the same time.


----------



## wuzak (Feb 6, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> So, each shackle had to release from the bottom to the top in order?



You would have problems if they released from the top first.

But it is still not what I was saying.

For a B-17 to have 20 bombs on board they would be held on 4 racks - possibly 6 each on the inner racks and 4 each on the outer racks.

So the time taken to drop all is not 20 times the interval between bombs. More like 6 times.


----------



## stona (Feb 6, 2017)

swampyankee said:


> Dragging it back to WW2.
> 
> With the lack of navigational aids, the CEP, be it 100m or 400, was frequently dwarfed by the navigational error of not finding the right city. Until there were better navigation aids, there were times when CEP had to include navigation errors of miles.



In the analyses 'gross errors' were usually discounted. How an analysis was done was dependent upon the type of mission and many factors. In the example I gave above (H2X through cloud cover) any bombs that fell more than five miles from the target were ignored. This figure for bombs that were simply ignored is substantial. In the worse case scenario, bombing blind on H2X through 10/10 cloud, 41.5% of bombs fell more than five miles from the aiming point and were discounted.

US analysis was in some ways more detailed than British analysis, principally because bombing in daylight meant that the Americans could often see (and photograph) where the bombs from a Group fell. The British relied largely on individual bombing photographs, and anyway every aircraft carried a bomb aimer (bombardier) who used a bomb sight (no toggling on the leader at night) and every aircraft bombed individually.
The Americans used 'Group Pattern ' analysis in which a single set of error measurements were calculated for the bombs dropped by an entire Group. The object was to establish how well the bombs were aimed. The Americans established a 'pattern center', defined as the centre of a circle with 1000' radius in which most of the bombs fell. It was the displacement of this point from the aiming point which was used to calculate the bombing errors.
Here again many raids gave results which were rejected for analysis. Of 398 VISUAL raids by the 8th AF analysed from strike photographs in 1943, raids in which the famous pickle barrel might have been expected to feature, 113 (nearly 30%) were rejected from the analysis because_ "no coherent compact pattern was formed."_
The Americans had earlier attempted to use the Mean Point of Impact (MPI) to assess bombing errors. This was a method useful in some instances, like for example fighter bomber attacks on specific targets, but proved unsatisfactory for pattern analysis. The problem was that a relative few (2 or 3 from a Group of 21) stray 'sticks' of bombs falling outside the pattern might drag the MPI to the periphery of the main fall or even outside it.

It took some time for the British to realise that they simply couldn't navigate or bomb accurately by night, a lesson that in slightly different form had to be relearned by the Americans when they discovered that their results over continental Europe fell a long way short of those achieved on the practice ranges of the USA.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Milosh (Feb 6, 2017)

With bomber formations 500yd across and even wider, a lot of bombs are going to be spread out.


----------



## stona (Feb 6, 2017)

This is exactly so. It's why the 8th Air Force attempted to plot a pattern for an entire Group. 
It must be understood that any idea of precise bombing was long gone. Nobody was pretending that an individual building or facility could aimed at or be hit at will by successive individual aircraft. If it was the aiming point, and if a Group bombed accurately, then enough bombs would fall close enough to the aiming point to more or less guarantee a result.
As the 8th Itself explains in its 1943 analysis of bombing operations. 

_"...The necessity for this arises from the fact that the combat conditions in this Theater are such as to make it defensively impossible for individual aircraft to bomb, one at a time, a given target. Our bombers are forced to attack from tight defensive formations, the basic unit of which has been the Group, comprising up to 21 aircraft. In consequence, in formation bombing we are concerned primarily with the pattern or the Group bomb fall as a whole rather than with the individual bombs dropped by the several aircraft."
_
Underlined in the original.

What you have here is a description of a form of area bombing, though at the time this was written (October 1943) no such phrase would have been used by the USAAF.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Greg Boeser (Feb 6, 2017)

Biff and Wuzak,
That's what I get for making quick replies. Mea Culpa.


----------



## Zipper730 (Feb 7, 2017)

wuzak said:


> You would have problems if they released from the top first.


Common sense enough...


> But it is still not what I was saying.
> 
> For a B-17 to have 20 bombs on board they would be held on 4 racks - possibly 6 each on the inner racks and 4 each on the outer racks.


I'm starting to get punchy from being up a little late: To be clear, racks have shackles or shackles got racks?


> So the time taken to drop all is not 20 times the interval between bombs. More like 6 times.


Which would be mean they would all come out in six seconds and drape an area around 2200 feet long?



stona said:


> In the analyses 'gross errors' were usually discounted.


OK


> How an analysis was done was dependent upon the type of mission and many factors. In the example I gave above (H2X through cloud cover) any bombs that fell more than five miles from the target were ignored. This figure for bombs that were simply ignored is substantial. In the worse case scenario, bombing blind on H2X through 10/10 cloud, 41.5% of bombs fell more than five miles from the aiming point and were discounted.


And they called this precision bombing... lol


> The Americans used 'Group Pattern ' analysis in which a single set of error measurements were calculated for the bombs dropped by an entire Group. The object was to establish how well the bombs were aimed. The Americans established a 'pattern center', defined as the centre of a circle with 1000' radius in which most of the bombs fell. It was the displacement of this point from the aiming point which was used to calculate the bombing errors.


So where it fell relative to the center of the ring was how they counted it?


> The Americans had earlier attempted to use the Mean Point of Impact (MPI) to assess bombing errors. This was a method useful in some instances, like for example fighter bomber attacks on specific targets, but proved unsatisfactory for pattern analysis. The problem was that a relative few (2 or 3 from a Group of 21) stray 'sticks' of bombs falling outside the pattern might drag the MPI to the periphery of the main fall or even outside it.


So, the RAF factored each plane's bombing accuracy by itself?


> It took some time for the British to realise that they simply couldn't navigate or bomb accurately by night


That was like 1941 right?



Milosh said:


> With bomber formations 500yd across and even wider, a lot of bombs are going to be spread out.


I know this might sound like a silly series of questions: At one point didn't they go from the combat box over the target area to a more amorphous formation to bomb; then go back into the box?

And why did they switch from the earlier combat box formation to this?


----------



## stona (Feb 7, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> And they called this precision bombing... lol



First it is important to define the difference between precision and area bombing. The problem is that the two are often (even usually) confused with a selective bombing offensive, in which a group of related target all associated with the same activity are engaged (Oil Plan, Transport Plan etc) and a more general bombing offensive. A selective offensive can in fact be pursued by either area or precision attack. It is a distinction lost on many historians, particularly, I'm sorry to say US historians.
Webster and Frankland describe the factors influencing the decision better than me.

_"The choice between area and precision attack is primarily governed by operational factors; the choice between a selective and a general bombing offensive is a question of strategy."_

The USAAF pursued a selective bombing campaign and initially attempted to do this with precision raids. It was operational factors that inevitably lead to the selective campaign (which rarely deviated into anything like a general offensive) to be pursued by methods that looked a lot like area bombing.
The RAF also set out intending to carry out a selective campaign, despite the Trenchardist influence on its doctrine. The Western Air Plans certainly represent a selective campaign and the idea was that this be carried out by precision bombing. The difference between the two forces is that as the British were forced to give up any idea of precise bombing their strategy also shifted towards a more general bombing offensive which reached a zenith in Harris' area bombing campaign. Harris had to be cajoled into allowing his force to support the Americans in their selective campaign in the last two years of the war. He famously referred to the target systems of the various selective plans as 'panaceas'.



Zipper730 said:


> So where it fell relative to the center of the ring was how they counted it?



Not quite. Individual bomb strikes were not important, except to establish the centre of the pattern. It was the distance of the centre of the Group pattern from the aiming point which was used to assess how accurately a Group had bombed.




Zipper730 said:


> So, the RAF factored each plane's bombing accuracy by itself?
> That was like 1941 right?



Aircraft produced a bombing photograph which gave the position of the aircraft when it released its load, from which the bomb fall could be calculated. The images from many aircraft were combined to give a diagram of what had been hit.
It was not just the photograph that was used. EVERY aircraft on the raid produced a 'Sortie Report' the data from which was passed from Squadron to Group and then to Bomber Command's Operational Research Section (ORS). In the limited space here I will note that the key data were, target attacked, bombs dropped, time, height, heading and airspeed at bomb release, what was in the bomb sight and the bomb aimer's and pilot's report. Based on this vast amount of data the ORS produced a time histogram of the raid, this sheet was known because of its size as the 'table cloth'. It depicted the raid as it happened, minute by minute. Each half inch square represented one sortie and contained information about that sortie (aircraft, aiming point, whether the bomb release photograph had been plotted, even the bomb load).
This method was used from its introduction until the end of the war, though the analysis of the raw data became increasingly sophisticated, as did the information included in the 'table cloth', notably once pathfinders were included and factors like time of burn for markers were added..
Bomber Command could and did completely miss target cities right up to the end of the war, though numerous factors meant that the force was much more effective and accurate in the last two years than previously. In mid 1942 between 20% and 30% of bombs fell within three miles of the aiming point, by late 1944 this figure was hovering around 90% and Bomber Command often bombed more accurately by night than the 8th Air Force by day. It was cloud that so severely limited the 8th Air Force, in 1944 a large majority of its raids were conducted through 7/10 cloud or heavier. That's the weather in NW Europe.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Informative Informative:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## wuzak (Feb 7, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> To be clear, racks have shackles or shackles got racks?



There are 4 racks in a B-17. The two main ones are the in the centre, while two others are at the outside.

Each bomb is hoisted on a rack and held in place with a shackle.

So each rack can hold several bombs.





Taken from this post by ww2restorer.

The release sequences are shown in the top right hand corner.




Zipper730 said:


> Which would be mean they would all come out in six seconds and drape an area around 2200 feet long?



Only if the interval was set to 1s.

I don't know what the interval was typically set to, but it was probably less than 1s.

As you can see, the maximum number of stations on a rack is 13, but even with the smallest bombs not all could be used.


----------



## stona (Feb 7, 2017)

British bombers didn't generally have that problem! 
A combination of bomb distributor and selector allowed bombs to be dropped from various stations at various intervals. The interval could also be adjusted manually (literally by stopping the distributor arm) when dropping ordnance, like incendiaries, with very different terminal velocities. A longer interval could be counted by the bomb aimer.
Special distributors were developed for pyrotechnic dropping pathfinders with intervals up to 8 seconds.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## stona (Feb 8, 2017)

The maximum interval on the commonly used 16 and 32 way British distributors (Types VI and VII) was 0.5 seconds.

The scale on the selector starts at 0.05 secs and is marked in increments, 0.08 then 0.1 then continues around the outside in increments of 0.1 secs, subdivisions marked inside at 0.15, 0.25, 0.35 and 0.45 secs. 
Cheers
Steve


----------



## Zipper730 (Feb 8, 2017)

stona said:


> First it is important to define the difference between precision and area bombing. The problem is that the two are often (even usually) confused with a selective bombing offensive, in which a group of related target all associated with the same activity are engaged (Oil Plan, Transport Plan etc) and a more general bombing offensive.


General bombing offensives basically mean city busting?


> A selective offensive can in fact be pursued by either area or precision attack.


Which is defined whether the aiming is at specific targets, or a zone where the targets are known to be?


> _"The choice between area and precision attack is primarily governed by operational factors; the choice between a selective and a general bombing offensive is a question of strategy."_


Operational factors would be navigational and bombardment accuracy, enemy defenses, and bomber escorts; Selective would be a desire to destroy specific industry and targets where the other is to bomb 'em and burn 'em 'till they quit.


> The USAAF pursued a selective bombing campaign and initially attempted to do this with precision raids.


And that didn't work because of a lack of effective deep-penetration escort, stiffening enemy air-defenses, and accuracy that was sub-par...


> The RAF also set out intending to carry out a selective campaign, despite the Trenchardist influence on its doctrine.


This was from September 1939 to some point in 1940? If I recall, they chose a selective bombing campaign because of the size of the bombing force, the PM's personal opinions, and FDR's requests to avoid attacks on civilians.

Starting in May, it seem Churchill was more willing to adopt attacks on population centers but wanted to make sure the public was behind it before he'd do it. By July plans for incendiary raids were drawn up, but it wasn't until the Coventry raids that political unacceptable became political inevitable.


> The Western Air Plans certainly represent a selective campaign and the idea was that this be carried out by precision bombing. The difference between the two forces is that as the British were forced to give up any idea of precise bombing their strategy also shifted towards a more general bombing offensive which reached a zenith in Harris' area bombing campaign.


Actually by February 1941, there was a memorandum circulated that specifically stated that attacks on cities were aimed at demoralization by causing mass destruction and fear of death to the population down below.


> Harris had to be cajoled into allowing his force to support the Americans in their selective campaign in the last two years of the war. He famously referred to the target systems of the various selective plans as 'panaceas'.


Yeah, he was remarkably stubborn.


> Not quite. Individual bomb strikes were not important, except to establish the centre of the pattern.


That I seem to get


> It was the distance of the centre of the Group pattern from the aiming point which was used to assess how accurately a Group had bombed.


Understood


> Aircraft produced a bombing photograph which gave the position of the aircraft when it released its load, from which the bomb fall could be calculated. The images from many aircraft were combined to give a diagram of what had been hit.
> It was not just the photograph that was used. EVERY aircraft on the raid produced a 'Sortie Report' the data from which was passed from Squadron to Group and then to Bomber Command's Operational Research Section (ORS). In the limited space here I will note that the key data were, target attacked, bombs dropped, time, height, heading and airspeed at bomb release, what was in the bomb sight and the bomb aimer's and pilot's report. Based on this vast amount of data the ORS produced a time histogram of the raid, this sheet was known because of its size as the 'table cloth'.


Why did we not do this?


> Bomber Command could and did completely miss target cities right up to the end of the war


Chemnitz right?


> In mid 1942 between 20% and 30% of bombs fell within three miles of the aiming point, by late 1944 this figure was hovering around 90% and Bomber Command often bombed more accurately by night than the 8th Air Force by day.


What yielded this increased accuracy?



wuzak said:


> There are 4 racks in a B-17. The two main ones are the in the centre, while two others are at the outside.


So the walls are the racks...

Each bomb is hoisted on a rack and held in place with a shackle.[/quote]And each station has a shackle?


----------



## wuzak (Feb 9, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> So the walls are the racks...



No, the racks are the racks. The "wall" is round.




Zipper730 said:


> > Each bomb is hoisted on a rack and held in place with a shackle.
> 
> 
> And each station has a shackle?



No.

Only the stations that they are using would have shackles.


----------



## wuzak (Feb 9, 2017)

_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MHz3DBwYVyo_


This is loading bombs into a B-29.

Generally similar to the B-17, I believe.

What we have been calling the shackle is attached to the bomb before it is hoisted into position, and that then connects to the rack.

The hoisting starts at around 3:00 or 3:30, the connecting of the shackle to the rack happens around 4:45.

For the Silverplate B-29s the normal racks were removed and a new type of rack installed.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Feb 9, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> General bombing offensives basically mean city busting?
> Which is defined whether the aiming is at specific targets, or a zone where the targets are known to be?
> Operational factors would be navigational and bombardment accuracy, enemy defenses, and bomber escorts; Selective would be a desire to destroy specific industry and targets where the other is to bomb 'em and burn 'em 'till they quit.
> And that didn't work because of a lack of effective deep-penetration escort, stiffening enemy air-defenses, and accuracy that was sub-par...
> This was from September 1939 to some point in 1940? If I recall, they chose a selective bombing campaign because of the size of the bombing force, the PM's personal opinions, and FDR's requests to avoid attacks on civilians.



No. A selective campaign targets what we would now call target systems, oil, ball bearings, transport etc. The USAAF with rare exceptions always adopted this policy. A general bombing offensive might target far more nebulous objectives like enemy morale. In the case of the British effort it was an offensive to reduce German war production by any means possible. It degenerated into city busting, Harris is on the record stating that he was more interested in the acreage destroyed than factories flattened.

The method employed for a selective campaign might be precision or area bombing. The operational factors you identify determine which is achievable and whether there really is a choice. If you cannot reliably find or hit a relatively small target accurately (precision bombing)then you drop a lot of bombs in the area of that target in the expectation of hitting it (area bombing). The British (and I'm sure the American) did a lot of statistical analysis to work out how many sorties and what weight of bombs were required to guarantee the destruction of various targets.

The British chose a selective bombing campaign, as drawn up in the Western Air Plans because they thought it was the best application of the available air power. The re-think came when they realised that most crews couldn't find their targets, let alone hit them. The idea of a more general campaign was not new. For example, in WW1 the British attempted to bomb German or German occupied railway stations, but were not to bothered if the bombs missed the target and caused panic and damage elsewhere in the city/town. It was not considered a waste of effort.
You have to understand the bomber fleets of the major pre-WW2 powers as a deterrent. Everybody started with the intention of attacking purely military targets, not targeting civilians, in fact making a conscious effort to avoid civilian casualties. It wasn't long before this moral position started to slip on all sides and the RAF in particular had always had a strong influence from the Douhet/Mitchell/Trenchard line of doctrine. The RAF could not decide bombing policy in isolation, Britain is and was a democracy, not a military dictatorship. The gloves could only come off once sanctioned by the British government. By late 1940, much earlier than most appreciate, Bomber Command was pursuing its selective campaign by area bombing methods. On 30th October 1940, before Coventry was attacked, Sholto Douglas was writing to Peirse regarding attacking German towns and concluding

_"The objectives considered most suitable for these concentrated attacks_ [on towns] _are the sources of power, such as electricity generating stations and gas plants, and centres of communications; but where primary targets such as the oil and aircraft industry objectives are suitably placed in the centres of the towns or populated districts, they also might be selected."_

One glove was already off.

Coventry was bombed on 14th November 1940 and Mannheim was the British city chosen for reprisal for this attack, and also for the heavy raids on Southampton. The raid took place on the night of 16/17 December under the code name Operation Abigail Rachel. Bomber Command was given a special authorisation by the War Cabinet to carry out a 'general attack on the centre of a German city', and it was Bomber Command that chose Mannheim. 134 aircraft were sent to Mannheim (reduced fron the intended 200 )and did bomb the city, most bombs falling in residential areas, killing 34 people and injuring another 81. The special authorisation was precisely because, at this time, the British were still prosecuting a selective campaign.
British bombing policy evolved through 1941, there is a series of reports and mamoranda published in Volume IV of the official history, but any in depth discussion of these is beyond the bounds of a forum reply. On 18th August 1941 the infamous Butt Report was published, which showed just how inaccurate and ineffective Bomber Command's efforts had been.



Zipper730 said:


> Starting in May, it seem Churchill was more willing to adopt attacks on population centers but wanted to make sure the public was behind it before he'd do it. By July plans for incendiary raids were drawn up, but it wasn't until the Coventry raids that political unacceptable became political inevitable.
> Actually by February 1941, there was a memorandum circulated that specifically stated that attacks on cities were aimed at demoralization by causing mass destruction and fear of death to the population down below..



The debate about morale attacks did not really gather pace until May/June 1941 when Trenchard himself produced a memorandum advocating German morale as Bomber Command's primary target. On 2nd 1941 June Sir John Gill, Chief of the Imperial Staff, commented on the memorandum.

_"1. Lord Trenchard makes two points

(a)That our primary bombing target should be German morale
(b) That the building up of a strong bomber force should be given the highest priority.

The primary bombing target
2. There is, I think, general agreement that the Battle of the Atlantic must remain our chief preoccupation: after that our effort should be employed against the most profitable targets in Germany. The possibilities are:
(a) Morale
(b)Oil
(c) Transportation
The arguments in favour of attack on morale are set out in Lord Trenchard's paper"_ [Beyond the scope of a reply here].

Note that morale is top of the table. The debate continued for months, and it wasn't until *14th February 1942* (not 1941) that AVM Bottomley (Deputy Chief of the Air Staff) wrote to AM Baldwin (Acting AOC-in-C Bomber Command, pending Harris' arrival) instructing him that

_"...it has been decided that the primary objective of your operations should now be focussed on the morale of the enemy civil population and in particular of the industrial workers."_

Just one sentence in a directive of several hundred words, but now the gloves were really off. It had taken two and a half years of war before it happened.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Feb 9, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> What yielded this increased accuracy?



I missed this one 

Bomber Command's accuracy increased with improvements in operational efficiency.
There were many factors. Better training, better tactics, better and improved technology. This encompasses everything from 'broadcast winds' to Gee and H2S to the establishment of a path finder force and the complicated ballet of marking, backing up and main force bombing, all overseen by a master bomber, that typified a major raid in 1944/45.

Bomber Command almost overcame the problem of seeing in the dark, but like its American 8th AF ally, never overcame the vagaries of European weather. 

Cheers

Steve


----------



## wuzak (Feb 9, 2017)

stona said:


> _The primary bombing target
> 2. There is, I think, general agreement that the Battle of the Atlantic must remain our chief preoccupation: after that our effort should be employed against the most profitable targets in Germany. The possibilities are:
> (a) Morale
> (b)Oil
> (c) Transportation_



Interesting that (b) and (c) were the target systems which would turn out to be, probably, the most important targets and which would give the most decisive results - for the war effort.

Was the RAF's capabilities, at that time, a major reason that Morale was put to the top of the list?


----------



## stona (Feb 9, 2017)

Oil and transport systems featured in the Western Air Plans and along with an arguably more general target in _'the German war industry'_, meaning targets in the Ruhr, formed the backbone of Britain's strategic campaign. Other Plans had objectives like delaying _'..a German invasion of southern Holland, Belgium and France'_ and we know how well that went.
Bomber Command was certainly attempting a selective campaign against such target systems, albeit using area bombing techniques, throughout 1940 and into 1941. It was really the Butt Report, which demonstrated that Bomber Command was incapable of hitting these or any other targets that concentrated minds.

Trenchard made this point in the memorandum I mentioned above. I can't reproduce the whole thing here, but having outlined why the British are better at withstanding casualties than other nations, nonsense that he obviously believed at the time, he makes the core argument in this extract.
Excruciating prose alert, Trenchard was not one for a short concise sentence 

_"Taking all in all the percentage of Bombs which hit the Military target at which they are aimed is not more than 1% .
This means that, if you are bombing a target at sea, then 99% of your bombs are wasted, but not only 99% of the bombs are wasted, but 99% too, of the pilots and the training which went to produce them, and of all the machines and the labour and plant and raw material which went into their construction, and, further back, 99% of all the ships which have transported the raw materials and of the finance which purchased these raw materials are all equally wasted. So, too, if the bombs are dropped in Norway, Holland, Belgium or France, 99% do Germany no harm, but do kill our old allies, or damage their property or frighten them or dislocate their lives. It is more than wasted. If, however, our bombs are dropped in Germany, then 99% which miss the military target all help to kill, damage, frighten or interfere with Germans in Germany and the whole 100% of the bomber organisation is doing useful work, and not merely 1% of it.
So technical factors also point to the wisdom of striking at what is in fact Germany's weak point. We should therefore exploit to the uttermost this vulnerable spot in the German nation and we should bomb persistently military targets in every town in Germany and never let up on them."
_
This is really no more than a re-hash of the plan developed in 1917 by the Air Policy Committee, to terrorise the German civilian population, and points made in Trenchard's own 1919 despatch on the Independent Force's operations_. _It has been argued (notably by H A Jones) that Trenchard's retirement led to confusion over what exactly the RAF bombing policy should be, but with a vague notion that an attack on enemy civilian morale existed as a back up option should others fail.

As early as July 1941, just a month later, Bottomley was writing to Peirse that

_"I am directed to inform you that a comprehensive review of the enemy's present political, economic and military situation discloses that the weakest points in his armour lie in the morale of the civil population and in his inland transport system."_

There are literally hundreds of documents on the record throughout this period which all demonstrate a general slide into what would become Bomber Command's general bombing offensive, prosecuted by an area bombing campaign. The best source for these is not the very small selection I can quote in short forum replies, hopefully to illustrate this process, but in Volume IV (annexes and appendices) of the official history in which many are reproduced.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Feb 9, 2017)

This is an immense subject, I've spent years trying to understand it, and there are a few points I need to make, explanatory to those above.
First, the predisposition to bomb civilians in order to destroy their morale never left the RAF. In the inter-war years it resurfaced in 1923 as an official policy (as a response to the French air scare*) and would again, during WW2, in 1942. It was reinforced by aerial operations in colonial policing, so called 'air control', which was dependent on a willingness to bomb civilians. Between 1927 and 1935 an area bombing mentality informed the major manoeuvre exercises carried out by ADGB.
Within Bomber Command and the RAF, not the British government which was guided to a similar conclusion by a different route, it was always assumed that the precision campaign against military and industrial targets in Germany would only continue as long as Bomber Command remained too weak to launch a Trenchardian offensive against enemy cities. This is why the second point of Trenchard's 1941 memorandum emphasised the need for the build up of bomber forces. The Western Air Plans were designed to exploit the then available air power as best possible. They were designed not from a position of strength but of weakness. The move to a Trenchardian offensive came in 1942/43 as the Command started to gain sufficient strength. It had NOTHING to do with the coincidental appointment of Harris who somehow seems to get 'blamed' for it .
Cheers
Steve
* The then Major Archibald Sinclair made a long speech in parliament during the 'Air Estimates' debate (funding of the RAF) which sums this up better than I can. Check Hansard online.


----------



## Graeme (Feb 9, 2017)

Thread drift, but an interesting list of possible reasons for bombing errors - RAAF bombing manual 1943...


----------



## stona (Feb 10, 2017)

That's an interesting report. It has to be said that almost all of those errors should have been addressed in basic and operational training.
Bomber Command did much research into bombing accuracy and certainly acknowledged the classes of error listed above. It, however, considered the largest error, particularly contributing to under shooting and 'creep back' to be psychological rather than physical. Many crews saw what the wanted to see and if they saw something that looked like a target, then that was good enough. These errors occurred randomly throughout the crews attacking, but the cumulative effect was a systematic undershooting error.
This conclusion was included in a list sent out to the Bomber Groups which included other major sources of error. Pilots were considered to often approach the target taking no account of wind drift, and this could play havoc with the tracking system in the bomb sight, no matter how well the bomb aimer attempted to use it. Many bomb aimers thought that lobbing their bombs anywhere among the TIs was good enough, and that it was better to aim for an area where there was no fire rather than contributing to a target already engaged. This led to the completely unfounded charge by Bennett that half the main force crews didn't even use their bomb sights! 
Bomber Command termed these errors 'blitz-consciousness' and they could not for the most part be overcome by better training. The errors were mitigated by improved marking techniques (they never spread the same way twice and it was considered important to have the track pass directly over the target) and the position of the TIs. For Oboe marking it was decided to place the TIs 11/4 miles ahead of the 'Command Aiming Point' and also to adjust for cross winds, regardless of strength, by placing the markers upwind by 1/2 a mile. For H2S marking the markers were placed a full 2 miles ahead of the Command Aiming Point.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## mcoffee (Feb 10, 2017)

Two documents that should answer a lot of the questions regarding bombing:

Bombardiers Information File
Bombardiers' Information File : United States. Army Air Forces. Office of Flying Safety : Free Download & Streaming : Internet Archive

Terminal Ballistics Data, Vol I
Terminal ballistic data, volume I, bombing. :: World War II Operational Documents

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## swampyankee (Feb 10, 2017)

One thing to remember is that factories, even without special hardening are not fragile. The USAAF probably overestimated how easily a factory could be destroyed; a lot of the machines would survive, undamaged, near-misses that would kill everybody in the factory. Much like aircraft and pilots, factories' skilled -- and even semi-skilled -- workers are harder to repair and replace than the machines.


----------



## Zipper730 (Feb 11, 2017)

wuzak said:


> No, the racks are the racks. The "wall" is round.


Ok


> Only the stations that they are using would have shackles.


So the stations are attached to the racks, and a shackle is where bomb meets station?


> For the Silverplate B-29s the normal racks were removed and a new type of rack installed.


They also redesigned the bomb-bay correct?



stona said:


> No. A selective campaign targets what we would now call target systems, oil, ball bearings, transport etc.


Okay, I understand


> A general bombing offensive might target far more nebulous objectives like enemy morale.


Straight forward enough


> In the case of the British effort it was an offensive to reduce German war production by any means possible. It degenerated into city busting, Harris is on the record stating that he was more interested in the acreage destroyed than factories flattened.


Actually there seemed to be primary desire to bomb the population, with industrial objectives being a bonus in such cases, unless specifically added.

Harris said that he was told to not bomb anything unless told to do so and waste the cities. While my view of Harris isn't generally positive, I'll say that he was one of the most honest and tried to remotely tell the truth.


> The method employed for a selective campaign might be precision or area bombing. The operational factors you identify determine which is achievable and whether there really is a choice. If you cannot reliably find or hit a relatively small target accurately (precision bombing)then you drop a lot of bombs in the area of that target in the expectation of hitting it (area bombing). The British (and I'm sure the American) did a lot of statistical analysis to work out how many sorties and what weight of bombs were required to guarantee the destruction of various targets.


We both did...


> The British chose a selective bombing campaign, as drawn up in the Western Air Plans because they thought it was the best application of the available air power. The re-think came when they realised that most crews couldn't find their targets, let alone hit them.


There was a book called "Almost a Boffin" in which an officer described USSR penetration of the RAE; additionally Richard Overy described some errors with filming the bomb-drop.

My guess is that the Soviet penetration ended in 1941...


> The idea of a more general campaign was not new. For example, in WW1 the British attempted to bomb German or German occupied railway stations, but were not to bothered if the bombs missed the target and caused panic and damage elsewhere in the city/town. It was not considered a waste of effort.


Actually, in at least one case they wanted to set a city on fire; another they wanted to deliberately drop bombs sloppy to pound the population.

In some cases the population was the target, and the specified target the bonus


> You have to understand the bomber fleets of the major pre-WW2 powers as a deterrent.


If I recall, there was a general fear that any declaration of war would be met with an annihilating attack with bombs, incendiaries, and poison gas. They seemed to actually view poison gas as the biggest threat. Fortunately the Germans and UK never used them.


> Everybody started with the intention of attacking purely military targets


The RAF made such a decision because their bomber fleets weren't big enough, as well as Chamberlain viewing it as a war-crime. The Luftwaffe seemed to attack air-fields first, but soon was hammering the daylights out of Warsaw from what I remember.


> It wasn't long before this moral position started to slip on all sides and the RAF in particular had always had a strong influence from the Douhet/Mitchell/Trenchard line of doctrine. The RAF could not decide bombing policy in isolation, Britain is and was a democracy, not a military dictatorship.


Yes but when the circumstances "work out" political impossible becomes inevitable. Modern day most say it as "never waste a good crisis", but the principle is the same. Churchill seemed interested in bombing cities by May, 1940 and wanted to gauge the public reaction; by July, Abigail Rachael was starting to be drawn up.


> The gloves could only come off once sanctioned by the British government. By late 1940, much earlier than most appreciate, Bomber Command was pursuing its selective campaign by area bombing methods. On 30th October 1940, before Coventry was attacked, Sholto Douglas was writing to Peirse regarding attacking German towns and concluding
> 
> _"The objectives considered most suitable for these concentrated attacks_ [on towns] _are the sources of power, such as electricity generating stations and gas plants, and centres of communications; but where primary targets such as the oil and aircraft industry objectives are suitably placed in the centres of the towns or populated districts, they also might be selected."_
> 
> One glove was already off.


Correct


> Coventry was bombed on 14th November 1940 and Mannheim was the British city chosen for reprisal for this attack, and also for the heavy raids on Southampton. The raid took place on the night of 16/17 December under the code name Operation Abigail Rachel.


Yup, but the plan was drawn up in July of that year... around the time the Battle of Britain started.

I don't know if Churchill realized the raid on 8/24 was an accident or not and simply saw it as an opportunity to hit Berlin with the hopes that Hitler would go apeshit (not a hard conclusion to make) and divert attacks off the air-fields and onto the city; thus justifying the city-busting raids that would follow (This might be my modern views flavoring things -- I've openly said that "there's no such thing as an innocent politician" online, and view most politicians as sociopaths until I can prove they're not) and also taking the heat off the RAF, or; he thought they were deliberate and retaliated as war plans stipulated (attack airfields if cities get hit).


> Bomber Command was given a special authorisation by the War Cabinet to carry out a 'general attack on the centre of a German city', and it was Bomber Command that chose Mannheim. 134 aircraft were sent to Mannheim (reduced fron the intended 200 )and did bomb the city, most bombs falling in residential areas, killing 34 people and injuring another 81. The special authorisation was precisely because, at this time, the British were still prosecuting a selective campaign.


I didn't know a special authorization was required, I do know the media was asked to be silent on it.


> The debate about morale attacks did not really gather pace until May/June 1941 when Trenchard himself produced a memorandum advocating German morale as Bomber Command's primary target.


I'd almost swear I read a document dated February 23, 1941...


> On 2nd 1941 June Sir John Gill, Chief of the Imperial Staff, commented on the memorandum.
> 
> _"1. Lord Trenchard makes two points
> 
> ...


Was there any point at which the RAF risked being truly dismembered?


> The debate continued for months, and it wasn't until *14th February 1942* (not 1941) that AVM Bottomley (Deputy Chief of the Air Staff) wrote to AM Baldwin (Acting AOC-in-C Bomber Command, pending Harris' arrival) instructing him that
> 
> _"...it has been decided that the primary objective of your operations should now be focussed on the morale of the enemy civil population and in particular of the industrial workers."_


That sounds correct


> Just one sentence in a directive of several hundred words, but now the gloves were really off.


Correct


> I missed this one
> 
> Bomber Command's accuracy increased with improvements in operational efficiency.
> There were many factors. Better training, better tactics, better and improved technology. This encompasses everything from 'broadcast winds' to Gee and H2S to the establishment of a path finder force and the complicated ballet of marking, backing up and main force bombing, all overseen by a master bomber, that typified a major raid in 1944/45.


When you say "broadcast winds", do you mean get wind-data while in flight so you're up to date?


> Bomber Command almost overcame the problem of seeing in the dark, but like its American 8th AF ally, never overcame the vagaries of European weather.


That problem affected everybody eh?


----------



## stona (Feb 11, 2017)

There is a lot of nonsense written about Harris.

Harris followed orders and shortly before he took over Bomber Command the so called area bombing directive (itself not really a very good description) was in place.
Harris was an old school Trenchardian and believed with every fibre of his being that the best application of Bomber Command should reflect that doctrine. This doctrine had never gone away, what the RAF said publicly and believed privately, throughout the 1930s, were two different things.
It was Harris' adherence to his Trenchardian strategy that has left him open to criticism, not just in the official history, but even more with the increased availability of much original material since the 1970s. The core argument against Harris is that he refused to forego his area bombing campaign when the circumstance leading to its adoption, the inability to hit anything more precise than a city no longer applied. The implication is that a substantial portion of the hundreds of thousands killed by the bombing might have been spared had the general area campaign been stopped at the point when alternatives existed which offered the same or better chances of breaking the German war effort. This is a facile argument that divorces the development of British bombing from anything that happened before 1939. Harris was not alone in believing his campaign offered the best chance of breaking the German war effort, and he, unlike us, did not have the benefit of hindsight. It is a fact that when his command's effort was diverted to the pre-invasion effort the German war economy recovered substantially, whether due to the release of pressure previously applied by Bomber Command or other causes is something that few can agree on.
There was no clear and obvious alternative, as is often argued. Various plans were developed, some times concurrently, and in the end Harris did attack oil targets (beloved of the Americans)* and more heavily that the 8th Air Force itself*. He also attacked the transportation targets (so beloved of Tedder) despite advice from his own Operational Research Section that showed just how difficult such targets were to destroy. Eventually Harris did what he was told. He had to be cajoled, kicking and screaming, to the 'panacea' targets but when he did go after them he did so with the maximum effort his command could make, and did a very good job on them.

A final thought. We can not hope to understand the mindset of these men. We have all grown up in an era of aviation and air power. Harris was 11 years old when the Wright brothers made their first flight. Trenchard was 30 years old.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
4 | Like List reactions


----------



## wuzak (Feb 11, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> So the stations are attached to the racks, and a shackle is where bomb meets station?



The shackle is the part that supports the load of the bomb and connects it to the rack.

This is a shackle:



FLYBOYJ said:


>



A station is a point on the rack where the shackle can be attached. I am not sure if stations had different load ratings or if the space dictated the size of the bomb which could be carried (also dependent on what bombs were being carried in nearby stations).




Zipper730 said:


> They also redesigned the bomb-bay correct?



They had to for Thin Man (long and skinny, some consideration was given to using the Lancaster to carry this bomb, because of its size and shape), but I believe the Fat Man and Little Boy could fit in the B-29's forward bomb bay once the rack had been changed.


----------



## wuzak (Feb 11, 2017)

stona said:


> There was no clear and obvious alternative, as is often argued. Various plans were developed, some times concurrently, and in the end Harris did attack oil targets (beloved of the Americans)* and more heavily that the 8th Air Force itself*.



And more effectively, owing to the larger bomb sizes used by the RAF?


----------



## stona (Feb 11, 2017)

In August/September 1944 the Air Staff (and Portal) seem to have had a St Paul on the road to Damascus moment and suddenly seized on the Oil Plan with the fanaticism only recent converts can show. Okay, I'm exaggerating a bit, but you get the idea 
Portal would regain control of Harris' force from Eisenhower in mid September.

In October Harris despatched just 817 sorties (just over 4,000 tons of bombs) against the Allies supposed number one priority target, synthetic oil plants. This seems a poor effort until we look at the tonnage dropped by the 8th Air Force in the same period on such targets, just 3,256 tons. A double standard often operates against Harris.

From 1st June 1944 to 8th May 1945 Bomber Command despatched 15% of total sorties (22,000 of 155,000) in raids against oil targets, dropping 99,500 tons of bombs on them. The 8th Air Force sent 13% of its sorties (28,000 of 220,000) against similar targets, dropping 73,000 tons of bombs on them.
It is Harris who faces the charge that he could and should have done more, but I have never seen or heard such a charge levelled at the 8th Air Force. One has to ask why? The usual response is that Harris carried on his area offensive during this period too, and that that effort could have been devoted against the oil system, but this is to have a far to simplistic view of the criteria governing Bomber Command's targeting methods.

A final thought on this too. When Churchill wrote his infamous note to Portal on March 28th 1945, following the Dresden raid, which started

_"the moment has come when the question of bombing German cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, though under other pretexts, should be reviewed..." _

Portal thought the note was an attempt to divert responsibility for the bombing campaign away from Britain's political leadership and onto the military leadership. Given Churchill's support for Harris throughout the war and his bullying of the Air Staff into the bombing of East German cities in support of the Russians, one of which he was told would be Dresden, it must have seemed churlish at least. Portal asked him to withdraw the note, but also asked Bottomley to write to Harris for his views. Bottomley was quite diplomatic in his letter.

_"I am sure you will agree that [it] misrepresents the purpose of our attacks on industrial areas in the past, and appears to ignore the aim given by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their directives which have been blessed by the heads of government."_

Portal and Bottomley were not going to be fall guys for a government policy which now, as Germany was defeated, seemed unpalatable to some.

Harris' reaction was understandably incandescent. He wrote that it was _"abusive"_ and _"an insult both to the bombing policy of the Air Ministry and to the manner in which that policy has been executed by Bomber Command." _He never was much of a diplomat, and had anyway been arguing for years for more honesty in the portrayal of what his command was doing. It was the politicians, now trying to shift responsibility, who had balked at the suggestion.

With specific reference to Dresden, which always get dragged out in efforts to convict Harris, we should remember that this was not his idea either. In a letter of 27th January, sent by Bottomley and attaching the JIC report of 25th January in which attacks on East German cities were proposed he was effectively ordered to make the attacks. The last paragraph reads

_"3. I am therefore to request that subject to the qualifications stated above, and as soon as moon and weather conditions allow, you will undertake such attacks with the particular object of exploiting the confused conditions which are likely to exist in the above mentioned cities_ [Dresden, Leipzig, Chemnitz] _during the successful Russian advance."_

The important fact is that the general area bombing campaign was not Harris' policy, it wasn't the Air Staff's policy, it was the policy of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the UK government. To somehow blame Harris, or, worse, the men who served under him for this is ridiculous and revisionist.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## Robert Porter (Feb 11, 2017)

For as long as the Military has been subject to civilian i.e. political control, there have been efforts to shift responsibility and blame for actions undertaken by the military at the direction of the politicians, to the military when those actions may not be easily understood by the voting public, or worse when those actions might be viewed as "wrong". 

It is the nature of the political beast. The military has offered up many, far to many, sacrificial lambs to salve the uneasy conscience of those that sent them on their missions in the first place. I believe in the system, but it only works well when each party trusts the other, and that is unfortunately rare. 

Perhaps the best example I can give is the Vietnam war, where Johnson would personally select targets often with a huge time delay from receiving intelligence and then ordering the strike. Our politicians also made rather arbitrary decisions on what and where we could strike while our enemies had no such restrictions. 

Right wrong or indifferent it is often a confusing and difficult mission for the military to carry out political objectives. But it has always been easy for the politicians to shift the blame to the men in uniform or even their direct civilian leaders if necessary.


----------



## swampyankee (Feb 12, 2017)

Even though the politicians do (or at least should) control the military, there should also be some level of discussion between the military leadership and their political bosses; in Vietnam there was. Alas, McNamara was looking for a simple, easy to understand metric for progress to "victory." Since it didn't exist, he picked corpses. Pentagon briefers, frequently in uniform, would announce the daily body count: we killed 300 of the enemy this week. McNamara could have just as easily picked a different metric, like captured weapons (we got 400 AK-47s and 20 mortars this week!) or number of amputated right hands. I think weapons and ammunition would probably have been the best choice, though. So would having a South VIetnamese ally who wasn't pretty horrible to begin with.


There may have been a better way to fight the war in Vietnam. I've not been sold on the military knowing what it is, because much of McNamara's strategy was from the generals.


----------



## Robert Porter (Feb 12, 2017)

I would agree, having grown up watching the body count on TV. The pullout occurred when I was 15. I do believe in civilian control, the alternative is scary, but that requires that the civilians in charge know where to draw the line. Johnson was a micro manager. Others not so much. 

I don't claim that was why the war ended the way it did, but I can remember dinner table conversations from my parents and those of his generation and before all saying it would end the way it did years before. The most common refrain was that you could not fight a war if you could not take the war to the enemy, and allowing the enemy to have areas that he knew were safe from attack was tantamount to surrendering. We just took a lot longer to do so, and spent a lot more lives for a cause that was lost from the start.


----------



## swampyankee (Feb 12, 2017)

I have very little respect for McNamara, although he was neither stupid mor malicious. He was, however, I believe both arrogant and incapable of looking beyond a very narrow management perspective. He was, ultimately, a technocrat who could not recognize the moral aspects of war. He needed a simple way to keep score, not only for himself but for the people towhom he was responsible because, I think, he thought they were all unimaginably stupid.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Zipper730 (Feb 14, 2017)

wuzak said:


> The shackle is the part that supports the load of the bomb and connects it to the rack. . . A station is a point on the rack where the shackle can be attached.


So the rack has stations on it; the stations on it can be fitted with shackles to carry bombs... did I get it right?


> They had to for Thin Man (long and skinny, some consideration was given to using the Lancaster to carry this bomb, because of its size and shape), but I believe the Fat Man and Little Boy could fit in the B-29's forward bomb bay once the rack had been changed.


I still think the RAF made a good point about bomb-bays: Sometimes you are better off with one huge bay than two smaller ones


> And more effectively, owing to the larger bomb sizes used by the RAF?


And payload capacity to distance



stona said:


> In August/September 1944 the Air Staff (and Portal) seem to have had a St Paul on the road to Damascus moment and suddenly seized on the Oil Plan with the fanaticism only recent converts can show. Okay, I'm exaggerating a bit, but you get the idea
> Portal would regain control of Harris' force from Eisenhower in mid September.


Didn't the USAAF partially operate under Portal's control? If I recall correctly the bombing of Sofia was the RAF's idea but our planes were under their charge...


> In October Harris despatched just 817 sorties (just over 4,000 tons of bombs) against the Allies supposed number one priority target, synthetic oil plants. This seems a poor effort until we look at the tonnage dropped by the 8th Air Force in the same period on such targets, just 3,256 tons. A double standard often operates against Harris.


Correct


> From 1st June 1944 to 8th May 1945 Bomber Command despatched 15% of total sorties (22,000 of 155,000) in raids against oil targets, dropping 99,500 tons of bombs on them. The 8th Air Force sent 13% of its sorties (28,000 of 220,000) against similar targets, dropping 73,000 tons of bombs on them.


Where did the rest of the 8th AF's go?


> It is Harris who faces the charge that he could and should have done more, but I have never seen or heard such a charge levelled at the 8th Air Force. One has to ask why?


We had better PR...


> The usual response is that Harris carried on his area offensive during this period too, and that that effort could have been devoted against the oil system, but this is to have a far to simplistic view of the criteria governing Bomber Command's targeting methods.


No, he was operating under directive from Churchill...


> A final thought on this too. When Churchill wrote his infamous note to Portal on March 28th 1945, following the Dresden raid, which started
> 
> _"the moment has come when the question of bombing German cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, though under other pretexts, should be reviewed..."_
> 
> Portal thought the note was an attempt to divert responsibility for the bombing campaign away from Britain's political leadership and onto the military leadership.


Which was of course true


> Harris' reaction was understandably incandescent. He wrote that it was _"abusive"_ and _"an insult both to the bombing policy of the Air Ministry and to the manner in which that policy has been executed by Bomber Command." _He never was much of a diplomat, and had anyway been arguing for years for more honesty in the portrayal of what his command was doing.


Yeah, he generally was the most direct and made the best effort to tell the truth.



Robert Porter said:


> For as long as the Military has been subject to civilian i.e. political control, there have been efforts to shift responsibility and blame for actions undertaken by the military at the direction of the politicians, to the military when those actions may not be easily understood by the voting public, or worse when those actions might be viewed as "wrong".


Of course


> Perhaps the best example I can give is the Vietnam war, where Johnson would personally select targets often with a huge time delay from receiving intelligence and then ordering the strike.


Johnson was an idiot. I'm wondering why he did this, was he afraid of the military?


> I do believe in civilian control, the alternative is scary


Agreed


----------



## GregP (Feb 14, 2017)

I have no respect at all for McNamara and believe Lyndon Johnson to be nothing short of a criminal. He killed more US troops than anything else did with his meddling. Most of the guys I knew felt the same. The list of his (and his family's) deeds that were or should have been against the law is long.


----------



## stona (Feb 14, 2017)

RAF bomb bays were designed the way they were to carry anti-shipping weapons, it was in most requirements. This meant mines, but principally torpedoes and armour piercing bombs. Both tend to be long and thin. When the bomb bays were divided, and several were, they were divided longitudinally. 
When torpedoes got longer with the addition of an air tail it caused some difficulties. The Hampden was used as a torpedo bomber by Coastal Command and needed some surgery to make the weapon fit.
Many designs also featured wing cells for smaller bombs, the Air Ministry was very keen on what proved to be the almost useless 250lb GP bomb for attacking almost everything but ships.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## wuzak (Feb 14, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> So the rack has stations on it; the stations on it can be fitted with shackles to carry bombs... did I get it right?



Did you not watch the video from before?


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MHz3DBwYVyo&feature=youtu.be_


Starting at about 3:30

At 4:00 the shackle is fitted to the bomb







At about 4:38 they talk about lifting the bomb above its loading station and positioning the shackle.






at 4:50 the bomb is lowered and the shackle engaged, the bomb now being secure in its position.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## fubar57 (Feb 14, 2017)

wuzak said:


> Did you not watch the video from before?



Probably trying to figure out how the quote the video

Reactions: Bacon Bacon:
1 | Funny Funny:
3 | Like List reactions


----------



## Robert Porter (Feb 14, 2017)

fubar57 said:


> Probably trying to figure out how the quote the video


Oh, no, you did not... oh yes you did!


----------



## stona (Feb 20, 2017)

stona said:


> A final thought on this too. When Churchill wrote his infamous note to Portal on March 28th 1945, following the Dresden raid, which started
> 
> _"the moment has come when the question of bombing German cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, though under other pretexts, should be reviewed..." _
> 
> Portal thought the note was an attempt to divert responsibility for the bombing campaign away from Britain's political leadership and onto the military leadership. Given Churchill's support for Harris throughout the war and his bullying of the Air Staff into the bombing of East German cities in support of the Russians, one of which he was told would be Dresden, it must have seemed churlish at least.



Sorry to quote myself, but I found this written about the bombing campaign to come, whilst looking at an entirely different subject (Sealion). It was written on 8th July 1940.

_"When I look around to see how we can win the war I see that there is only one sure path. We have no continental army which can defeat the German military power. The blockade is broken and Hitler has Asia and probably Africa to draw from. Should he be repulsed here or not try invasion, he will recoil eastward, and we have nothing to stop him. But there is one thing that will bring him back and bring him down, and that is an absolutely devastating, exterminating attack by very heavy bombers upon the Nazi homeland."_

This was not written by Harris of course, but by Churchill. Fortunately the historian responsible for some of the best work on Churchill, Martin Gilbert, asked Harris to comment on this minute, which he did in 1982. Harris, as you would expect, did not disavow the principles behind Churchill's writing.

_"It was the origin of the idea of bombing the enemy out of the war, I should have been proud of it. But it originated with Winston."_

It is not quite true that the idea of a general bombing offensive originated with Churchill, but the idea of an _'absolutely devastating, exterminating attack', _as British government policy, certainly did.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
3 | Like List reactions


----------



## swampyankee (Feb 21, 2017)

There were a lot of military officers who were completely sold on strategic bombing as the war winner, all by itself (Mitchell, Douhet) Churchill may have been sold on strategic bombing, but it was not an idea he devised. He was looking for some way to strike at an enemy which was the most dangerous threat to the existence of British people -- not just Britain -- since the Plague. Give credit where it's due, and not all of the blame for the use of strategic bombing goes to civilians, which some seem to be saying. Churchill could be blind to his strategic incompetences, but so could Trenchard and Harris.


faber


----------



## stona (Feb 21, 2017)

Go back and read what Churchill wrote about bombing Germany in July 1940. He is not describing strategic bombing in the terms that RAF officers of the 1930s would have understood in a general bombing campaign (though Trenchard had argued for something like the 'Churchillian' offensive in the conferences of 1922/3 which laid the foundations of British offensive doctrine). They argued for a general campaign on Germany because even bombs that missed the intended targets, which were military or industrial, would still hit something German, including the civil population, and would not be wasted. The civilian population itself was not the primary target, and would not be until 1942, though few had any qualms about the inevitable loss of civilian lives..
Churchill was suggesting that the Germans themselves should be the primary target. This is an important distinction, as it was the latter that became government policy some two years later. Harris did not have any problem implementing the policy, he explicitly said that he would have liked to take the credit for it, but it was the Prime Minister's policy.

In an interview with AVM Tony Mason in 1977 Harris once again did not shrink from admitting the campaign from 1942, when he took over at Bomber Command, for what it was. But neither was he prepared to carry the can for others.

'I lived in a shower of directives from the day I took over to the last day of war. The directive when I took over was that I wasn't to specifically aim at anything unless ordered to do so and to blast the German cities as a whole.'

Which was exactly the case.


Cheers

Steve


----------



## stona (Feb 21, 2017)

The spat between Steel (DCAS) and Higgins (Director of Training and Staff Duties) in 1923 in response to a document circulated by Steel entitled 'War Aim' which sought to establish which enemy targets (meaning French targets) should be bombed, is illustrative of the hairs to be split.

Higgins was unequivocal.

"I think we should openly state, as, in future wars, air warfare will devolve into a struggle between the combatants to obtain moral superiority over the opposing civil populace, it is almost inevitable that a direct attack will be made by each side on the civil populace of the other. No doubt, with our usual skill at putting our enemies in the wrong in the eyes of the world we shall see to it that the enemy is the first to transgress international laws. But it is certain that in any national war in which we become involved we shall find ourselves within a few hours of the declaration of war carrying out bombing attacks with the object of causing panic and alarm among the civilpopulace of the enemy. Let us therefore face facts."

Nothing wrong with that you might think, it follows Trenchard's doctrine almost to the letter. Steel did not think so. His response.

"I cannot possibly agree [to Higgins' version]. In fact there is little difference between Higgins and myself as to the value of moral effect, but he wants to lay it down that we are to attack the civil population to produce the moral effect; I insist on laying it down that we adhere to the rules, and attack military objectives in the vicinity of populated areas, which would produce the moral effect we require...Higgins' version is almost diametrically opposed [to mine] from every point of view."

This confusion had not been properly resolved by 1939, though it was Steel's not Higgin's version that became the official public doctrine of the RAF.

This led to some odd plans, for example, to attack French aerodromes in the vicinity of Paris, where civilians might be found nearby, rather than those in Northern France which the bombers attacking Britain would presumably be taking off from.


Remember this debate took place in 1923, a certain Charles Portal, a mere Squadron Leader, attended many of the conferences as Trenchard's protege....a lot of nonsense is written about Harris 

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Zipper730 (Feb 21, 2017)

wuzak



> Did you not watch the video from before?


Yes I did, as I understand it

The shackle is attached to the bomb by prior to raising it up onto the correct station of the rack
The shackle attaches to a specified station on the rack by way of hooks
If I grasp this right: The rack has stations on it, on these stations a bomb with shackle can be fitted. I'm not sure where I got anything wrong.


stona (Steve)



> Sorry to quote myself, but I found this written about the bombing campaign to come, whilst looking at an entirely different subject (Sealion). It was written on 8th July 1940.
> 
> _"When I look around to see how we can win the war I see that there is only one sure path. We have no continental army which can defeat the German military power. The blockade is broken and Hitler has Asia and probably Africa to draw from. Should he be repulsed here or not try invasion, he will recoil eastward, and we have nothing to stop him. But there is one thing that will bring him back and bring him down, and that is an absolutely devastating, exterminating attack by very heavy bombers upon the Nazi homeland."_
> 
> ...


That makes enough sense: The politicians give the orders; then toss those who carried them out under the bus when they look sufficiently unpleasant. Not that Harris was very willing to carry them out, but he did what Churchill told him to do.


> It is not quite true that the idea of a general bombing offensive originated with Churchill


No, that originated a long time earlier. I'm not sure when the idea of bombarding population centers came into being, and by bombardment, I mean by bow & arrow, catapult, artillery shell, or by bomb carried aboard an airplane.

The idea of sacking and slaughtering a population (and for that matter *ALL* occupants) seem to have been around as long as we had populations to slaughter.

The first bombardment by air on a population center with the intent of terrorizing the population appear to be in 1914 by Zeppelin. The idea had been thought up a couple of years earlier by the Germans, and possibly a few years before that by a Science Fiction writer. Attacks were eventually carried out by fixed-wing aircraft, and the RFC & RNAS followed up with acts of reciprocal retribution (as well as attacks on zeppelin sheds).

There were also attacks aimed at specified targets, specified targets with hope that the bombs would also hammer the crap out of the population nearby. Trenchard seemed to be a proponent of this sort of thing.

Giulio Douhet advocated starting such an aerial war with a sneak-attack on air-fields, then hammering the population & targets that had an immediate and massive affect on the war effort (docks & harbors, ammo storage) by explosive, incendiary, poison gas, even proposals of bacteriological agents.

This is the reason...

Unescorted bomber formations were expected to get through with minimal losses

They felt the army and navy would never be able to mobilize (which is fundamentally flawed: Nations have various mechanisms to determine if things are going south and would start mobilizing ahead of the event)



> In an interview with AVM Tony Mason in 1977 Harris once again did not shrink from admitting the campaign from 1942, when he took over at Bomber Command, for what it was. But neither was he prepared to carry the can for others.
> 
> 'I lived in a shower of directives from the day I took over to the last day of war. The directive when I took over was that I wasn't to specifically aim at anything unless ordered to do so and to blast the German cities as a whole.'


Though there were many things about Bomber Harris not to like, I'd have to say that I liked the fact that he was generally the most honest.



> Steel did not think so. His response.
> 
> "I cannot possibly agree [to Higgins' version]. In fact there is little difference between Higgins and myself as to the value of moral effect, but he wants to lay it down that we are to attack the civil population to produce the moral effect; I insist on laying it down that we adhere to the rules, and attack military objectives in the vicinity of populated areas, which would produce the moral effect we require...Higgins' version is almost diametrically opposed [to mine] from every point of view."


Technically even if nobody was killed (outside the air-bases, factories, etc) it would be foolish to admit that it would have no affect on morale.

In December 1972 our raids on Hanoi had the same effect: The casualty rates were fairly low considering how much tonnage we dropped (we probably could have turned every city in North Vietnam into a flaming torch -- it would have been counterproductive to our goals as that would have killed our POW's).


swampyankee (faber)



> There were a lot of military officers who were completely sold on strategic bombing as the war winner, all by itself


Some did by itself, others felt that interdiction and even a little bit of CAS would be useful.

Churchill may have been sold on strategic bombing, but it was not an idea he devised.[/quote]It wasn't even his only plan to fight the war

Defeating the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine in the Atlantic was at one point, the #1 priority
The use of creating resistance movements was also something that he was a big proponent of
He supported the cross-channel invasion



> He was looking for some way to strike at an enemy which was the most dangerous threat to the existence of British people -- not just Britain -- since the Plague.


It was a plague...


----------



## Zipper730 (Mar 9, 2017)

stona said:


> The British relied largely on individual bombing photographs, and anyway every aircraft carried a bomb aimer (bombardier) who used a bomb sight (no toggling on the leader at night) and every aircraft bombed individually.


Unless I misunderstood, or missed a detail: Is this the mean point of impact or is this something else? I'm just curious why they US didn't compute the bomb-accuracy for every plane as the RAF did? We could often see better than they did...




Milosh said:


> With bomber formations 500yd across and even wider, a lot of bombs are going to be spread out.


Why the hell did we use formations this wide in 1944? Previously we were using 12 ship combat boxes one behind the other? At least that's a more narrow series of bomb-trains...




mcoffee said:


> Two documents that should answer a lot of the questions regarding bombing:
> 
> Bombardiers Information File
> Bombardiers' Information File : United States. Army Air Forces. Office of Flying Safety : Free Download & Streaming : Internet Archive
> ...


Thanks man, this rocks


----------



## stona (Mar 9, 2017)

The British used individual bombing photographs, along with other data from each aircraft, to build up the overall pattern of the bomb fall relative to the aiming point for the entire raid.

The Americans, bombing in daylight, could take fewer photographs or even film to show the bomb fall of each Group, easily extrapolated to generate an analysis of the entire raid.

Both air forces were trying to establish the same things, most importantly the concentration of the bombing and the accuracy of the bombing.
A good result depended on both these factors. There was no point in achieving a good concentration several miles from the target (inaccurate). Nor was there much good in spreading bombs widely, with the aiming point in the centre of the distribution (poor concentration). Neither stood any chance of destroying the intended target.

Concentration in time was also important, particularly to the RAF which had worked out that for incendiaries to be most effective (the bulk of ordnance carried for a typical area raid) they needed to be dropped in substantial quantities as quickly as possible in order to start a really good fire. Bomber Command became really proficient at this. In the famous Dresden raid 5 Group, which bombed first, dropped 881 tons of assorted ordnance on the city in just 15 minutes (22.13 - 22.28).
Let's put that 881 tons into some kind of perspective. 5 Group dropped 172 x 4,000lb 'cookies', 26 x 2,000lb HC bombs, 72 x 1000lb bombs, 648 x 500lb bombs, 197,178 4lb incendiary bombs and 8,250 4lb incendiary bombs with explosive charges (to discourage fire fighters). This was just the first wave.

No 8 (PFF) Group bombed between 1.21 and 1.45. Its 60 Lancasters included the master bomber, markers and illuminators and backers up. Along with the 10 tons of various markers it dropped 27 x 4,000lb 'cookies', 94 x 1,000lb bombs and 159 x 500lb bombs for a total of 125.7 tons of explosive.

No 1 Group bombed between 1.23 and 1.53 with 248 Lancasters. It dropped 145 x 4,000lb 'cookies', 101 x 2,000lb HC bombs, 111 x 500lb bombs for 397.3 tons of high explosive. It also dropped 312,666 x 4lb incendiaries, a total of 558 tons of incendiaries.

No 3 Group bombed between 1.25 and 1.55 with 151 Lancasters. It dropped 1 x 8000lb 'super cookie', 119 x 4,000lb 'cookies', 84 x 500lb bombs, for a total of 234 tons of high explosives. It also dropped 130,492 x 4lb incendiaries, 233 tons of incendiaries.

No 6 Group bombed between 1.27 and 1.45 with 65 Lancasters. It dropped 65 x 4,000lb 'cookies', 374 x 500lb bombs and 155 x 250lb bombs, 217 tons of high explosives.

The first wave, No 5 Group comprised 240 Lancasters, bombing in 15 minutes. That is better than one aircraft bombing every four seconds.
The second wave comprised about another 550 Lancasters, all bombing between 1.21 and 1.55, just 34 minutes. Again, better than one aircraft bombing every four seconds. Imagine that for half an hour.

Modern commentators don't know what 'shock and awe' really looked like.

Edit: I've just done a quick sum to show that the 2,660 tons of ordnance dropped in two waves of 15 minutes and 35 minutes for a total of just 50 minutes, largely exceeds the roughly 2,000 tons per day average dropped and delivered (by missile) across all of Iraq during the 43 days of the Gulf War.

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Informative Informative:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Milosh (Mar 9, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> Why the hell did we use formations this wide in 1944? Previously we were using 12 ship combat boxes one behind the other? At least that's a more narrow series of bomb-trains...



Formations were wider before 1944, Combat Box Formation For Bombers WWII - I Love WW2 Warbirds.com


----------



## stona (Mar 9, 2017)

The 'bomber box' is a much misunderstood concept, in the sense that many fail to understand that it comprised much more air than it did aircraft.
The diagrams in that link do a good job showing this.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## buffnut453 (Mar 9, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> Unless I misunderstood, or missed a detail: Is this the mean point of impact or is this something else? I'm just curious why they US didn't compute the bomb-accuracy for every plane as the RAF did? We could often see better than they did...



"Mean point of impact" is the average centre point of where 50% of all bombs landed. In Bomber Command, each aircraft individually bombed the target, hence improving the value of measuring MPI across the entire raid. Obviously, other data were also gathered and statistics generated. 

The US didn't compute bomb accuracy for every plane precisely because only few airframes carried a bomb aimer. Most of the bombers in a USAAF formation would toggle their bombs when the lead aircraft, with a bomb aimer, released it's load. Clearly one could calculate the MPI for the formation but it wouldn't tell you anything about the accuracy of bomb aiming across the formation/unit because everyone dropped based on one bomb aimer's decision.


----------



## tyrodtom (Mar 9, 2017)

Have you ever seen a railroad switching yard, chemical plant, or major aircraft/vehicle assembly plant ?
They're huge, usually covering acres of land, it's not a pin-point target.

It's best and safest for the bombers if they can all drop their bombs as close to the same moment in time as possible, you overwhelm the target's defense with more aircraft than they can shoot down in a given amount of time.


----------



## stona (Mar 9, 2017)

tyrodtom said:


> Have you ever seen a railroad switching yard, chemical plant, or major aircraft/vehicle assembly plant ?
> They're huge, usually covering acres of land, it's not a pin-point target.
> 
> It's best and safest for the bombers if they can all drop their bombs as close to the same moment in time as possible, you overwhelm the target's defense with more aircraft than they can shoot down in a given amount of time.



Yes and no. In terms of WW2 bombing a target like those above, even covering many acres, was a precision target. Bombing accuracy was such that even in good conditions of visibility (in which a small minority of raids were carried out, 14% of USAAF raids in late 1944) it was difficult to hit such a target and achieve the concentrations necessary to destroy it. In such ideal conditions about 35% of bombs (say 1 in 3) fell within 1,000 feet of the aiming point, but that leaves 65% which fell further away, sometimes literally miles away.

Bomber Command worked out that to destroy the facilities of a typical marshalling yard (railroad switching yard) required a bombing concentration of three bombs per acre over the entire facility to give a 75% chance of disabling it. Given an acre measures 22 yards by 220 yards you don't need a calculator to work out that to achieve this, even in ideal conditions the USAAF was going to have to drop a lot of bombs, and that means flying a lot of sorties against the target.
It required the 'pattern centre' of several Groups to be close to the aiming point and it required the patterns themselves to be sufficiently concentrated. Neither of these was a given, or easily achieved.



Cheers

Steve


----------



## buffnut453 (Mar 9, 2017)

tyrodtom said:


> Have you ever seen a railroad switching yard, chemical plant, or major aircraft/vehicle assembly plant ?
> They're huge, usually covering acres of land, it's not a pin-point target.
> 
> It's best and safest for the bombers if they can all drop their bombs as close to the same moment in time as possible, you overwhelm the target's defense with more aircraft than they can shoot down in a given amount of time.



I'm very familiar with the scale of the targets you mention but that has nothing to do with why the USAAF didn't need to measure the accuracy of each airframe.

Note that precision and accuracy are separate metrics. Dropping all the bombs at one time as aimed by one aircraft will achieve concentration of explosive force (i.e. good precision) but it may not achieve good accuracy. If the bomb aimer is off his game, then the entire formation will precisely bomb the wrong location. Bomber Command suffered its own problems, not least of which was aiming point creep as successive bombers toggled at the nearest edge of a conflagration rather than carrying on to the actual aiming point. However, the fact that each aircraft's aiming point was identified helped in the development of techniques and technologies to improve the situation.


----------



## stona (Mar 9, 2017)

buffnut453 said:


> I'm very familiar with the scale of the targets you mention but that has nothing to do with why the USAAF didn't need to measure the accuracy of each airframe.
> 
> Note that precision and accuracy are separate metrics. Dropping all the bombs at one time as aimed by one aircraft will achieve concentration of explosive force (i.e. good precision) but it may not achieve good accuracy. If the bomb aimer is off his game, then the entire formation will precisely bomb the wrong location.



What you are calling 'precision' was more normally called 'concentration', certainly by the British, but the point is valid. Achieving a good concentration of bombs, at or better than three bombs per acre, a mile away from the targeted marshalling yard will not damage it at all. (It might damage something else, therein lies one of the roots of area bombing theory.)

It was possible to miss an entire city, and by some margin. The British did this by night, but the Americans did it by day, particularly in bad weather when the ground was invisible to them.
I have somewhere the bombing photograph plots for a late 1942 Bomber Command raid on Cologne. It shows a good concentration which might have inflicted some serious damage on the city, if only it could have been moved about 10 miles to the south west!

Cheers

Steve


----------



## buffnut453 (Mar 9, 2017)

Sorry...I was applying my training as a targeteer and the current parlance just slipped out. It took all my effort to not start discussing Target Systems Analysis and how a large target like a switching yard, chemical plant or factory can be taken out of commission without the need to flatten both it and the surrounding several thousand square yards of real estate. Trying my level best not to apply the retrospectroscope and judge WWII practices by modern techniques.

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## tyrodtom (Mar 9, 2017)

My answer was more of a reply to zipper730 as to why they switched from groups in trail, to groups abreast.
It was trading survival of aircraft crews for bombing concentration.

When you bomb in trail, you're presenting the enemy with the opportunity to defeat you in detail, shoot you down one at a time.

When you go over the target in a brief time period, his AA defense has more targets in less time.


----------



## stona (Mar 9, 2017)

tyrodtom said:


> My answer was more of a reply to zipper730 as to why they switched from groups in trail, to groups abreast.
> It was trading survival of aircraft crews for bombing concentration.
> 
> When you bomb in trail, you're presenting the enemy with the opportunity to defeat you in detail, shoot you down one at a time.
> ...



Yes, but their is always a balance to be struck. In the American case an approach by the bombers on a narrow front was much easier for the escort fighters to protect.

The British, when operating in daylight, wanted to shorten their bomber stream by broadening the front on approach from two to three miles, only converging three to five miles from the target to bomb, in an effort to reduce losses to flak. It was Fighter Command which pointed out that protection was much more effective on a narrow front.
The British did not fly in daylight formations like the Americans, but in a 'gaggle'. All the bomber Groups endeavoured to reduce the length of the gaggle to eliminate the tail, which automatically broadened the front, and in the end they were left to get on with it and the fighters had to deal with it. Even in daylight every bomber bombed by itself, quite unlike American practice. 
By this time German resistance, certainly from Luftwaffe fighters, was nothing like that faced by the Americans eighteen months or so earlier in any case. Flak seems to have been a more important consideration.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Zipper730 (Mar 11, 2017)

stona said:


> The British used individual bombing photographs, along with other data from each aircraft, to build up the overall pattern of the bomb fall relative to the aiming point for the entire raid.
> 
> The Americans, bombing in daylight, could take fewer photographs or even film to show the bomb fall of each Group, easily extrapolated to generate an analysis of the entire raid.


I assume it required greatly more manpower to compute it the RAF way?

I assume the USAAF could compute the accuracy of each formation or each plane?


> Modern commentators don't know what 'shock and awe' really looked like.


Of course not, but that's exactly what the goal was: To kill hoards of people as spectacularly and brutally as possible and turn life at home into a living nightmare as frequently as possible. The idea was that the civilian population was the political center of gravity, and that's what should be battered to a bloody pulp.

The problem with the idea was that, morality aside (there's no point in bringing that up in something of this nature), such attacks usually created a greater desire for the people to rally around their government instead of turn on it. People also were usually concerned with escaping the insanity alive, so they usually fled the city, but didn't usually riot.

Dictatorships also have powerful measures in place to

Shamelessly propagandize and brainwash a sizeable portion of the population so as to ensure compliance
Arrest and detain trouble makers, and maintain the justification of this to the public
Brutally subdue, kill and/or terrorize those who won't comply with the previous two
Technically even democracies use propaganda and brainwashing to varying degrees, and in wartime powerful forces exist, some of which are extrajudicial, to hold-down a population. The difference is mostly that dictators are not held back by things like rule of law (he is the law), or a written constitution -- in the event such a written constitution exists, it is useless in that it's almost never enforced. Will of the public is less of a concern.

When it comes to coercive tactics, it usually only works when the country is unable to protect itself from attack, or becomes unable to retaliate. This seemed to be the case in both Germany and Japan

Germany was progressively torched and battered into ruin, as well as occupied from two sides: As a rule, morale collapsed the more the country was wrecked, however fighting continued right into the streets of Berlin. An exception being a brief period in 1944, when Goebbels revealed the so-called Morgenthau Plan to the German people (ironically the guy who came up with it was Harry Dexter White).

Japan had suffered massive destruction of their Navy and Army in various campaigns against the US, the UK, Australia, and NZ military forces, including the loss of some of their best pilots despite having initiated the war with a devastating series of sneak-attacks. Starting in 1944, the US began a massive mine-laying operation and enlisted the USAAF to join in, which succeeded in sinking enormous amounts of shipping and deprived the islands of resources and food (this was actually regarded as so devastating that had it begun earlier, it was considered to have been a war winner on its own); B-29's also entered service the same year and started carrying out raids into Japan mostly aimed at industrial targets, though largely ineffectual, with one incendiary raid carried out that year; raids intensified into early 1945 with Tinian and Iwo Jima taken, and starting on March 9/10, massive incendiary raids started that systematically roasted something like 65 or 67 cities and killed hundreds of thousands of people. Their ability to attack the US was limited to using hot-air balloons carried along the jet-stream aimed at the hope of starting forest fires (something I'm surprised didn't work spectacularly well to be honest as a mentally ill individual in 2006 managed to set a forest fire that torched over a hair over 254 square miles, and a grade-A douchebag managed to set an unambiguously intentional fire that destroyed almost 63 square miles of surface area and killed five firemen, for which he was sentenced to death), though there were concerns about their deployment of biological agents (which they did deploy on China) which would have caused serious death tolls (which I'm surprised they never implemented, though relieved). Their defensive capability against the US was quite limited due to the fact that many of their aircraft did not have high operating altitudes or service ceilings (the J2M, Ki-60, Ki-84, and Ki-100 seemed to be the best candidates), their night fighter force was fairly small, and bombing raids hampered production. This all occurred before the dropping of the nuclear bombs on August 6, and 9th of 1945, and feelers were already being extended prior to this as well. The nuclear bombs accelerated the end of the war by a few weeks (according to General LeMay), to a couple of months (USSBS). The Japanese did supposedly test a nuclear bomb at Konan on August 10th, but the country was already in shambles, and I'm not sure what ability they had to deliver this weapon what distance.



Milosh said:


> Formations were wider before 1944, Combat Box Formation For Bombers WWII - I Love WW2 Warbirds.com


If I read this right, the 12-plane box was used first, then an 18-plane formation followed by a 27-ship formation, and eventually using several 18-ship formations side by side and then several behind each other if I look at this right, and then finally bringing it down into the 500 yd x 200 yd 36 ship formation.

I'm surprised they would need 36 aircraft to provide coverage for themselves once they got fighter escorts, you'd think they'd be better off by using a whole line or series of lines of 12-ship formations.




buffnut453 said:


> The US didn't compute bomb accuracy for every plane precisely because only few airframes carried a bomb aimer. Most of the bombers in a USAAF formation would toggle their bombs when the lead aircraft, with a bomb aimer, released it's load.


I thought that was only done in some cases?


----------



## stona (Mar 11, 2017)

Manpower to debrief the crews, gather intelligence and interpret the bombing photographs was the least of the RAF's concerns. Assembling and understanding the data, interpreting it to make realistic assessments of every raid was just one vital aspect of the overall effort.
There were many, many cogs in the machine that was Bomber Command, some might be bigger than others, but they all had to work.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## pbehn (Mar 11, 2017)

Some info on picture taking by Bomber Command.

Photo Flash Bomb


----------



## Reluctant Poster (Mar 11, 2017)

The attached files are excerpts from the US Strategic Bombing Survey: Oil Division Report. Figure 7 illustrates how inaccurate WWII bombing really was. The table on page 4 of the report dispels the myth that the USAAF daylight raids were more accurate than the RAF night raids, in fact showing the opposite. Figures 6 & 8 demonstrate the greater effectiveness of the larger bombs dropped by the RAF. The larger bombs dropped by the RAF could, and sometimes did, permanently destroy a synthetic oil plant in one raid, which the USAAF could not do. A final point is that, according to the Germans, the longer duration of the RAF raids increased their destructiveness as damage control was not possible during the raid. Coupling all this with the fact, as been pointed out, that the RAF did devote a lot of effort to the oil campaign it is difficult not to come to the conclusion that the RAF deserves the lions share of the credit for the destruction of the German oil industry


----------



## Reluctant Poster (Mar 11, 2017)

The attached files are 8 AF reports on bombing accuracy. One of the more eyeopening facts is that the B-24 was a far less accurate bomber than the B-17. This fact alone makes it clear as to why the 8th AF preferred the B-17 to the B-24.


----------



## Reluctant Poster (Mar 11, 2017)

Charts comparing bombing accuracy of visual vs overcast.


----------



## stona (Mar 12, 2017)

Reluctant Poster said:


> A final point is that, according to the Germans, the longer duration of the RAF raids increased their destructiveness as damage control was not possible during the raid.



Good stuff there, thanks for that.

Just to clarify the point above, the 'longer duration' was not of each phase of the raid, which could be as little as 15 minutes for a typical 250 aircraft (the mantra was concentration, concentration, concentration). It was for the overall length of the attack. It was because city area attacks attacks were often made in two separate phases with a gap of up to two hours between. It was entirely intentional because the British had worked out what the Germans knew from experience, that it limited efforts at damage control, notably fire fighting, and gave the best chance of a really destructive fire.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## Robert Porter (Mar 12, 2017)

Take me awhile to digest this info but I thank you for it! Very interesting read!


----------



## pbehn (Mar 12, 2017)

stona said:


> Good stuff there, thanks for that.
> 
> Just to clarify the point above, the 'longer duration' was not of each phase of the raid, which could be as little as 15 minutes for a typical 250 aircraft (the mantra was concentration, concentration, concentration). It was for the overall length of the attack. It was because city area attacks attacks were often made in two separate phases with a gap of up to two hours between.



There was also a compromise made between concentration of bombing and defence of the bombers. Maximum concentration would be by 1000 bombers crossing the target in 10 minutes but that would also be a wonderful environment for night fighters. The bomber streams did not always follow identical routes with the idea of giving the German defence the maximum number of problems to solve as far as how many planes to have in the air or coming back for refuelling/re arming.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Zipper730 (Mar 13, 2017)

USAAF Day Bombing Questions

Early on did we bomb while in combat-box formation?
If we didn't, why did we later bomb in combat-box formation?
What advantages were there to each methodology?


----------



## Robert Porter (Mar 13, 2017)

Most of your questions can be answered here: WGBH American Experience . The Bombing of Germany | PBS it's a nice timeline that shows how when and why various tactics were used.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## BiffF15 (Mar 13, 2017)

Thanks RP!

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Milosh (Mar 14, 2017)

There is also *The Mighty Eighth* by Roger Freeman.


----------



## stona (Mar 14, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> USAAF Day Bombing Questions
> 
> Early on did we bomb while in combat-box formation?
> If we didn't, why did we later bomb in combat-box formation?
> What advantages were there to each methodology?



Do you mean why did each formation bomb on one leader/aimer rather than have each aircraft bomb independently?

The combat formations were a result of the need for mutual fire support, an inevitable result of attempting to fly self protecting formations through contested air space in daylight. It is an easy step from there to employing one experienced bombardier (or bomb aimer as we more correctly call him) to act for a close formation. It also means less of the complicated and expensive bomb sights are required.
Much is made of the lag between the leader bombing and the rest of the formation's bombardiers reacting to the fall of his bombs, but given the general accuracy of the bombing this fraction of a second is not relevant, particularly, as is often overlooked, the aircraft to bomb on this visual cue are already behind the leader.

Cheers

Steve

Edit: further to this, it is why the Americans tried to establish a pattern centre for each formation of aircraft to measure accuracy. There is quite a bit of arithmetic done to establish the expected area and dimensions of a typical pattern (which is also a measure of the concentration of the bombing) but it is the displacement of the pattern centre from the aiming point which can be used to assess the accuracy of the formation.
One obvious draw back to 'toggling on the leader' is that if he makes an error, dropping his bombs wide, then so will every other aircraft in his formation.

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Mar 16, 2017)

pbehn said:


> There was also a compromise made between concentration of bombing and defence of the bombers. Maximum concentration would be by 1000 bombers crossing the target in 10 minutes but that would also be a wonderful environment for night fighters. The bomber streams did not always follow identical routes with the idea of giving the German defence the maximum number of problems to solve as far as how many planes to have in the air or coming back for refuelling/re arming.



It was a little more complicated than that. It was in the period immediately after Harris took over at Bomber Command that concentration of the bombers became a priority. Indeed, Harris would write in his 'Despatch'

_"The tactical aim of Bomber Command in this period _[February-December 1942]_ can be described in one word 'concentration.'"_

It had become obvious that the haphazard routing of raids, almost every man for himself, was no longer tenable and that a concentration of the bombers in both time and space was desirable not just over the target but en route as well. In early 1942 data seemed to show that concentrating the bombers reduced losses, simple as that. The famous millenium raids were launched at least in part to show that a really big raid would saturate the defences and significantly lower losses. Harris wrote that

" [the] _force of 250-300 aircraft was wholly inadequate to saturate the then existing defences of a major industrial town of half a million or more inhabitants...It was becoming obvious that the degree of concentration we had achieved so far was not going to be good enough, but there was no previous experience to show whether it would be practical to put many hundreds of aircraft over a target at a rate of, say, ten a minute...this was six times as high as the concentration as had been aimed at towards the end of 1941."_

By mid 1942, on the back of more research, Bomber Command was aiming for concentrations of 150-200 aircraft per hour, both en route and over the target area. By late 1944 such was the concentration achieved that aircraft were passing over the target at rates of up to 900 per hour (5 Group achieved this over Dresden for example, at a time in early 1945 when the Luftwaffe night fighter force had become almost irrelevant).
It was the increased protection afforded by maximum concentration that led to efforts to minimise evasive manoeuvring, which was generally ineffective except against fighter attack and greatly reduced bombing accuracy whilst increasing the collision risk.

It wasn't until 1944 that the effectiveness of concentration in reducing losses began to be compromised. This was due in a large part to more effective technology and tactics used by the Luftwaffe night fighter forces. Concentration could hide individual bombers from GCI and AI radars, but could not prevent ground controllers directing fighters to the bomber stream during all phases of an operation, approach, attack and withdrawal. It was only now, as correctly noted by Pbehn above, that other tactics were adopted. 'Spoof' raids had worked in misleading the Germans or diluting their response, but took away from the overall weight of attacks on any given night. Bomber Command's reaction was to find ways of efficiently engaging several targets in order to reduce losses and divide defending forces whilst also increasing precision such that a target would not require subsequent raids to ensure its destruction. The command enjoyed rather more success with the former (change in tactics) than the latter (increased precision). Attacking several targets, approached by widely separated routes, attacking smaller targets with an H2S equipped force with NO sky marking (the markers were visible to fighters from very long range) were among the tactics adopted
Harris also effectively split his command, sending 5 Group with its own pathfinders, out as an independent 'second force.'
Despite this it was clearly understood that, as Dickins explained

_"The success of the enemy in finding the stream is proportionate to its length, but once in the stream the successful destruction of aircraft is proportionate to the concentration. It should be possible therefore, to calculate the length of the stream and concentration which would result in the least success for the enemy."_

Until now the limiting factor on the desired concentration had always been the balance between reduced losses and increased collision risk; now, for the first time the Luftwaffe was influencing the calculations.

There was no handbook for these operations, no one had ever done anything like this before. For example, you might say, as someone did at the time, an easy way of reducing the length of the bomber stream would be to increase its depth, by flying various groups at different altitudes. It seems reasonable until the effect of winds at different altitudes is taken into consideration, it was for this reason, and the inability to give reliable wind information ('Broadcast Wind') over a range of altitudes, that this method was not adopted. I suspect, and at least some senior officers at Group level did too, that experienced crews ordered to fly at lower levels would simply ignore the order and fly as high as they could, though this was never an official reason for not adopting the tactic. 
Nothing was obvious at the time and everything had to be rigorously examined and then, if deemed feasible, tested. If any aspect of Bomber Command's operations could be improved, then the method would be adopted. The entire system was much more sophisticated and far less random than many understand. Everything was designed to increase the levels of destruction inflicted on Germany's cities whilst maintaining losses at the lowest possible, and sustainable, levels.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Informative Informative:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## pbehn (Mar 16, 2017)

It is a fascinating read, some of it posted here. Advances in planes and electronics met by counter measures from the other side, changes in tactics met by new methods from the other side. For the British even at night and using window you cannot keep 1000 four engined bombers secret, I am sure they could be heard from miles away and travelling in a concentrated stream German pilots could find them simply from the turbulence they caused.


----------



## Zipper730 (Mar 16, 2017)

stona said:


> Do you mean why did each formation bomb on one leader/aimer rather than have each aircraft bomb independently?


I'd almost swear I saw in a documentary on the Schweinfurt raid that the bombers kind of went out of their combat box right over the target area; and into some kind of amorphous "formation" as they proceeded to bomb; then went back into their combat-box on their way out.

At that point it would appear each bombardier was aiming on his own


> The combat formations were a result of the need for mutual fire support


No, I get that... but over the target area, the threat stopped being the fighters and instead became the flak. The fighters usually didn't seem to attack over the target area except in specific circumstances it would appear to avoid getting blown up by flak as well, in such cases it would appear the fighters operated above a certain set altitude, and the flak below...


> Much is made of the lag between the leader bombing and the rest of the formation's bombardiers reacting to the fall of his bombs, but given the general accuracy of the bombing this fraction of a second is not relevant


That I know, it has to do with the reflex time of the brain. If my reflex time is a half a second off, it doesn't matter if I'm a half a second behind you anyway.


----------



## wuzak (Mar 16, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> I'd almost swear I saw in a documentary on the Schweinfurt raid that the bombers kind of went out of their combat box right over the target area; and into some kind of amorphous "formation" as they proceeded to bomb; then went back into their combat-box on their way out.



I believe they abandoned individually bombing a target at least 6 months earlier.

In the early heavy bomber raids over France, particularly at the sub pens, fighter opposition was not very strong and escort fighters could provide cover to the target, but flak was heavy and well aimed. As each aircraft aimed individually it had to fly a straight, level course for some time - it may have been minutes. Very good for the flak gunners to take aim.


----------



## pbehn (Mar 16, 2017)

wuzak said:


> In the early heavy bomber raids over France, particularly at the sub pens,.



France was occupied by the German military. In a French port with a German submarine facility they only had a real interest in that facility and presumed any raid would be against it, It is much easier to aim flak when your guns are deployed to defend one position.


----------



## Zipper730 (Mar 16, 2017)

wuzak said:


> I believe they abandoned individually bombing a target at least 6 months earlier.
> 
> In the early heavy bomber raids over France, particularly at the sub pens, fighter opposition was not very strong and escort fighters could provide cover to the target, but flak was heavy and well aimed. As each aircraft aimed individually it had to fly a straight, level course for some time - it may have been minutes. Very good for the flak gunners to take aim.


1. So until early 1943, they were using the combat box (either the 12 or 18 ship box) in and out, and breaking up to bomb individually over the target; then later on they would just bomb in the box formation as they proceeded?

2. When they bombed in the combat box, were they just using a bombardier/toggleer always?

3. Why when the P-51's and P-38J's entered the equation did they keep bombing in formation? With escort they could break up and bomb individually?


----------



## fubar57 (Mar 16, 2017)

LMAO

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Milosh (Mar 17, 2017)

3. The bombers had a hard enough time trying to get in formation to begin the mission and staying in formation and you want then to break up into smaller formations to bomb and then reform into a larger formation over enemy territory!

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Robert Porter (Mar 17, 2017)




----------



## wuzak (Mar 17, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> 1. So until early 1943, they were using the combat box (either the 12 or 18 ship box) in and out, and breaking up to bomb individually over the target; then later on they would just bomb in the box formation as they proceeded?



I'm not sure how they did it exactly. 

But it was probably before 1943.




Zipper730 said:


> 3. Why when the P-51's and P-38J's entered the equation did they keep bombing in formation? With escort they could break up and bomb individually?



Flak.


----------



## Zipper730 (Mar 17, 2017)

wuzak said:


> Flak.


Why would being in a formation reduce the odds of getting shot? I figure changing into an amorphous formation would be much harder to hit...


----------



## fubar57 (Mar 17, 2017)

So you would have the bombers coming in from all points of the compass trying to hit an aiming point and then as Milosh said, try to form up into a defensive box over enemy territory. Good God......


----------



## wuzak (Mar 17, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> Why would being in a formation reduce the odds of getting shot? I figure changing into an amorphous formation would be much harder to hit...



Time over target.


----------



## stona (Mar 17, 2017)

pbehn said:


> For the British even at night and using window you cannot keep 1000 four engined bombers secret, I am sure they could be heard from miles away and travelling in a concentrated stream German pilots could find them simply from the turbulence they caused.



Even with a fighter controller directing the night fighters to the stream successful interceptions were rare. When an experienced pilot did manage to get into and stay in the stream they did sometimes score multiple victories in a matter of minutes, but this was unusual.
During the BoB British fighters were directed to the Luftwaffe formations in daylight, needing only to be brought within visual range, generally two to three miles depending on conditions, before attempting an interception. Even so only about 60% of attempts (figures vary a bit either side of that number in different sources) resulted in successful interceptions.
The Germans were doing the same thing at night where the ground controller had to position a night fighter at least within its AI radar range of a potential target (this obviously varied throughout the war as the technology developed, but was always less than daylight visual range and always much less reliable than the human eye). The fighter then had to hope that its AI radar was working well enough to maintain contact to within visual range, which might be a few hundred feet. One of the many factors known to have caused the high losses of the Halifax was that

_"the greater visibility of the Halifax exhausts namely, about 1600ft. directly astern, enables an attacking fighter to attain and maintain contact more easily."_

Even in a best case scenario, where a night fighter found itself directly behind the most visible of the British bombers it had to be within about 500 yards. The single most important factor dictating the success or failure of the night fighter crews was the weather. In conditions in which, for what ever reason, the bombers were rendered more easily visible to the human eye they enjoyed more success, despite all the technology the Mk I eyeball was still the best tool available to the intercepting crews.
Against all the technology employed by the Luftwaffe to position its fighters in the stream and in a position to intercept a bomber the British were employing ever more sophisticated counter measures to prevent precisely that. This was a battle that the British eventually and conclusively won. Here is what Major Werner Hoffmann, Grupppenkommandeur of I./NJG 5 remembered of the Dresden raid.

_"The enormous mass of English flew over the city , whilst all our equipment was heavily jammed. I did not succeed in shooting any of these huge bombers down, one only saw them lit up for a fraction of a second when bombs exploded down below, the next moment they were swallowed up by the darkness again, and thus it was completely impossible to catch one. By this time, early 1945, the English completely jammed our radio and radar etc. We were practically dependent on our eyes, for all practical purposes we were blind again."_

I have read several accounts by night fighter pilots who knew they were in the stream, as evidenced by experiencing turbulence/prop wash, they may even have glimpsed a potential target, yet they failed to make an interception. It really was not as simple as it might seem to us. One can only admire the skill and tenacity of the relatively few night fighter crews who did achieve some considerable success.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Informative Informative:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## pbehn (Mar 17, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> Why would being in a formation reduce the odds of getting shot? I figure changing into an amorphous formation would be much harder to hit...


The combat box keeps the bombers separated in height and width, if planes bomb individually on one target then the flak just has to set up a "box" for the bombers to fly in to.


----------



## pbehn (Mar 17, 2017)

stona said:


> I have read several accounts by night fighter pilots who knew they were in the stream, as evidenced by experiencing turbulence/prop wash, they may even have glimpsed a potential target, yet they failed to make an interception. It really was not as simple as it might seem to us. One can only admire the skill and tenacity of the relatively few night fighter crews who did achieve some considerable success.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve


I agree completely however I was discussing the disposition of resources on both sides. If the RAF had just a single raid with one stream of 1000 bombers then the LW only have to find that stream and put all resources against it. That is three times as many targets in one area with up to three times more defending fighters.


----------



## stona (Mar 17, 2017)

pbehn said:


> I agree completely however I was discussing the disposition of resources on both sides. If the RAF had just a single raid with one stream of 1000 bombers then the LW only have to find that stream and put all resources against it. That is three times as many targets in one area with up to three times more defending fighters.



Quite so. In the early/mid war years Bomber Command could get away with simply overwhelming the Luftwaffe night fighter system (as based on the 'box' of himmelbett ) but the Germans were not daft and adopted their tactics to counter those of the British. Later several raids taking widely different routes to and from the target in combination with spoof raids, intruders and increasingly sophisticated counter measures were adopted by Bomber Command for the very reason you give.

Gebhard Aders rather old (late '70s) book "History of the German Night Fighter Force 1917-1945" is still the best book when seeking to understand the evolution of the Luftwaffe's night fighter force.
Theo Boiten's "Nachtjagd" of a slightly more recent vintage (late '90s) is a good read too.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## stona (Mar 17, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> I'd almost swear I saw in a documentary on the Schweinfurt raid that the bombers kind of went out of their combat box right over the target area; and into some kind of amorphous "formation" as they proceeded to bomb; then went back into their combat-box on their way out.



No, the Schweinfurt raid followed the normal tactics. Here's a photograph of some aircraft of the 306th BG over Schweinfurt on 14th October 1943, maintaining their formation in very heavy flak. This Group lost 10 aircraft on the raid.







I have never read an account which mentions the use of a different formation, nor that the German fighter or flak defences succeeded in breaking up the formations.

Just 88 of the 1,222 bombs dropped actually fell on the five plants attacked. The largest plant (Kugelfischer) suffered a limited loss of production for a six week period.
This for the loss of 60 B-17s and 600 men, another 142 fortresses returned with various degrees of damage, 5 crashed in England and another 12 were destroyed in crash landings at their airfield or were written off. 121 of the damaged bombers eventually returned to service. Another 5 fatalities and 43 wounded airmen were recovered from the returning bombers.
On the positive side, American gunners claimed 186 Luftwaffe aircraft as destroyed. The Luftwaffe in fact lost 38 aircraft shot down (eventually another 21 seem to have been written off or 'recycled') of the 670+ that made contact with the US formations, losing 29 pilots KIA or MIA and another 20 WIA.
In four full strength missions in seven days in October '43 (Bremen, Marienburg, Munster and Schweinfurt) the 8th Air Force lost 148 bombers, 50% of its daily average operational strength. This was the final nail in the doctrine of unescorted day time bombing, but at what a cost.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
3 | Informative Informative:
4 | Like List reactions


----------



## pbehn (Mar 17, 2017)

Great shot, showing also how difficult seeing the ground is even on a fairly clear day.

Reactions: Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Mar 17, 2017)

pbehn said:


> Great shot, showing also how difficult seeing the ground is even on a fairly clear day.



Yes, even on a cloudless day there were problems with haze, and then of course the Germans operated very effective smoke screens over sensitive targets, though I don't know if any or how many generators were available at Schweinfurt. 
That photograph also illustrates the density and accuracy of German Flak in late 1943.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## tyrodtom (Mar 17, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> I'd almost swear I saw in a documentary on the Schweinfurt raid that the bombers kind of went out of their combat box right over the target area; and into some kind of amorphous "formation" as they proceeded to bomb; then went back into their combat-box on their way out.
> 
> At that point it would appear each bombardier was aiming on his own
> No, I get that... but over the target area, the threat stopped being the fighters and instead became the flak. The fighters usually didn't seem to attack over the target area except in specific circumstances it would appear to avoid getting blown up by flak as well, in such cases it would appear the fighters operated above a certain set altitude, and the flak below...
> That I know, it has to do with the reflex time of the brain. If my reflex time is a half a second off, it doesn't matter if I'm a half a second behind you anyway.



The problem with getting your history from a TV documentary, is your assumption that all the film clips are from the subject being depicted. 
They're just stock film clips. To most film editors, one B-17 is the same as another, one airplane is as good as another. 
I've seen a TV documentary about Midway, complete with Hellcats and Corsairs.
I've seen Zeros shot down over Europe, i've seen Fw190's shot down in the Pacific, on TV.
Don't get your history from TV.

Reactions: Like Like:
4 | Agree Agree:
3 | Like List reactions


----------



## pbehn (Mar 17, 2017)

tyrodtom said:


> The problem with getting your history from a TV documentary, is your assumption that all the film clips are from the subject being depicted.
> i've seen Fw190's shot down in the Pacific, on TV.
> Don't get your history from TV.


No history of the Battle of Britain is complete without a shot of a Fw190 being hit and a squadron of Spitfire Mk Vs flying past. Germany's success in Barbarossa can easily be understood when you see all the Tiger and Panther tanks they had to send to Russia.

Reactions: Funny Funny:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Mar 17, 2017)

tyrodtom said:


> The problem with getting your history from a TV documentary, is your assumption that all the film clips are from the subject being depicted.



Those bloody Bf 109* Es* on a delivery flight, still wearing their stammkenzeichen, which feature in almost every documentary about the air war, often shown with footage of US daylight formations in 1943 or later! If I could burn that piece of film I would 
Cheers
Steve


----------



## Robert Porter (Mar 17, 2017)

The real shame to me is there are 1000's of hours of unpublished real footage, including gun camera footage, and most of that is being lost to age and degradation and improper storage. Most will never ever be seen again due to lack of funds as the technology to transfer and even enhance the content is readily available.


----------



## pbehn (Mar 17, 2017)

With the recent anniversaries there were a couple of documentaries on the Battle of Britain that managed to be less informative and less accurate than the movie "Battle of Britain and neither had Susannah York either.

_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rTC4M-jh42g_


----------



## fubar57 (Mar 17, 2017)

As a 12yr old, that was my favorite part of the movie

Reactions: Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## pbehn (Mar 17, 2017)

stona said:


> Yes, even on a cloudless day there were problems with haze, and then of course the Germans operated very effective smoke screens over sensitive targets, though I don't know if any or how many generators were available at Schweinfurt.


They frequently refer to "industrial haze" as if the smoke comes from the industry itself, even non industrial areas had this "haze" due to most people using black or brown coal and wood for heating.


----------



## stona (Mar 17, 2017)

It was one of the things that the Canadians, based up in Yorkshire, had to deal with. It obviously had an effect on visibility for their bombers taking off or landing in daylight over the surrounding higher ground. The bases were relatively rural, but not so far from major industrial areas. Think of all those cities in the southern half of the West Riding from Sheffield up through Leeds, then further north you have Middlesborough and the industrial centres of the North East.
Bomber Groups based further south in East Anglia enjoyed better conditions in their rural surroundings, further from industrial areas.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## pbehn (Mar 17, 2017)

stona said:


> Think of all those cities in the southern half of the West Riding from Sheffield up through Leeds, then further north you have Middlesborough and the industrial centres of the North East.
> Bomber Groups based further south in East Anglia enjoyed better conditions in their rural surroundings, further from industrial areas.


I live in Stockton which is next to Middlesbrough and under the flight path to/from what was Middleton St George bomber airfield. In the 1960s before the clean air act I remember every house throwing up plumes of smoke which hung above the region, from the Eston Hills nearby all you saw was a bank of grey.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Mar 17, 2017)

They don't call Middlesborough fans 'Smoggies' for nothing 

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Airframes (Mar 17, 2017)

With regards to 'TV History', I was recently given a boxed set of a DVD and book on the Battle of Britain, produced, or at least released, by the History Channel.
The DVD is almost reasonable, but with the usual stock footage, but the book isn't worth the paper it's printed on - _*not one*_ of the illustrations in the book is from the BoB period, let alone the Battle itself !


----------



## pbehn (Mar 17, 2017)

stona said:


> They don't call Middlesborough fans 'Smoggies' for nothing
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve


A bit of a cheek when Widnes had smoke generators in peacetime, easy to forget how chronic pollution used to be. When I started work Middlesbrough had 8 blast furnaces operating but the steelworks in nearby Stockton and Hartlepool had already closed.







A target for bombing was always a railway marshalling (switching)yard, it is easy to forget that all the shunting was done by steam locomotives which unlike express trains stay in one place in a cloud of smoke. I read a long time ago that the railways on Teesside were electrified but in the 1930s this was changed back to steam because a single raid on the electricity supply would cripple the system. There is still evidence of this electrified system close to my home, they look like white salt hoppers.


----------



## pbehn (Mar 17, 2017)

Airframes said:


> With regards to 'TV History', I was recently given a boxed set of a DVD and book on the Battle of Britain, produced, or at least released, by the History Channel.
> The DVD is almost reasonable, but with the usual stock footage, but the book isn't worth the paper it's printed on - _*not one*_ of the illustrations in the book is from the BoB period, let alone the Battle itself !


I waded through a completely idiotic documentary showing "dramatic new evidence" of how "the Germans missed the chance to beat the British" by not understanding their recon photos of Chain Home stations. They were clearly visible on German recon photos but the dull Germans were just too plain dumb to understand what they were. This completely ignores what I knew in the 1960s, that the Germans knew all (or most) about the Chain Home system and did try to attack it but were not successful in most cases and even when they were successful they didnt know it or take advantage. 

The whole program was complete BS, I have no idea why anyone would make it let alone allow its broadcast, it was in modern phraseology "fake history".


----------



## Zipper730 (Mar 19, 2017)

stona said:


> No, the Schweinfurt raid followed the normal tactics. Here's a photograph of some aircraft of the 306th BG over Schweinfurt on 14th October 1943, maintaining their formation in very heavy flak. This Group lost 10 aircraft on the raid.
> 
> View attachment 368796


Wait, I was talking about 8/17/43 not 10/14


----------



## pbehn (Mar 19, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> Wait, I was talking about 8/17/43 not 10/14



Actually you were not specific.



Zipper730 said:


> I'd almost swear I saw in a documentary on the Schweinfurt raid


----------



## stona (Mar 19, 2017)

The bombing was supposed to have been done in formation that day too. Some units were so badly shot up on the way in that they did effectively regroup after bombing. The 306th BG is a case in point. Henry C Cordery, a co pilot in an aircraft of that Group later wrote.

_"We came off the target and regrouped. I looked around us at the group and there wasn't much of us left. In my squadron we started with six ships; two three ship elements, and being in the lead ship I saw all five of them go down. Out of eighteen aircraft we had six left."_

That is a forced regrouping to reform some sort of mutually protective formation and to cover for huge gaps left by the aircraft shot down, not a planned manoeuvre. On the bomb run each aircraft would have to fly straight and level, no adjustments could be performed without compromising the bombing accuracy. If the Group had not reformatted prior to the bomb run it would have to do so afterwards. Losing 2 out of three aircraft in a Group is bound to cause problems with the formation. I doubt that anyone trained for losses on that scale.

Lt.Col. Beirne Lay, who flew to Regensburg that day would later write of his mission (in 'I Saw Regensburg Destroyed' which was a bit optimistic)

_"And then our weary, battered column, short 24 bombers, but still holding the close formation that had brought the remainder through by sheer air discipline and gunnery, turned into the target." _

The 100th BG, with which the Colonel was flying as an observer, had managed to maintain it's formation or reform it, prior to the bomb run.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Zipper730 (Mar 20, 2017)

fubar57 said:


> So you would have the bombers coming in from all points of the compass trying to hit an aiming point and then as Milosh said, try to form up into a defensive box over enemy territory. Good God......


I didn't mean individual bombers coming in from every direction converging on one spot and then trying to form into a box. What I meant was

Bombers would configure themselves in a series of 12-ship formations to avoid an excessively long precession: They would either all fly at the same range of altitudes at the start or operate at different altitude ranges

Each procession would come at the target from different directions: Preferably to obscure the intended target
If the bombers weren't at the same range of altitudes at the start: They would begin descending at predetermined points prior to or after making the turn to target (which ever would confuse the enemy more)
They would break up into an amorphous formation to allow individual bombing
Once clear of each other they'd start forming up and/or climb to the correct altitudes or continue as is.
Admittedly, wuzak pointed out that time over target would be minimized by just staying in formation and the 12-ship formations would probably be narrow enough to allow relatively narrow ring to plop all the bombs in. So the idea of breaking up and reforming would be avoided.

Fighter cover wasn't mentioned but would be added.


----------



## stona (Mar 20, 2017)

The bombers flew to the target in formation on a strictly predetermined route. Apart from anything else it was the only chance they had of their rendez vous with the limited escort planned. In the event this was not successful, leaving the bombers more exposed than they should have been, If you want details of the raids they are readily available. All the bombers assigned a particular target approached from the the same direction.

Here are a couple of diagrams showing the two raids, the routes flown and a lot of other information, from Donald Caldwell's 'Day Fighters in Defence of the Reich - A War Diary 1942-45' which I highly recommend.












I can't rotate them!

The track out over the North Sea on 14th October, returning without any attempt to reach the target is the B-24s of the 2nd B.D. Not only did they fail to make formation, hence abandoning the mission, but they took one of the P-47 escort Groups with them!

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Airframes (Mar 20, 2017)

Good stuff Steve.
I've rotated the maps for you.

Reactions: Like Like:
3 | Like List reactions


----------



## Milosh (Mar 20, 2017)

Zipp you just don't understand how hard it was to fly these a/c in formation even as an Element. Dimension X in the diagram is 50-60feet.

The 8th AF Bomb Groups had used various formation schemes with some degree of success beginning in 1942, but the Box Formation had eventually become a standard for all 8th AF group formations. The Box Formation was accepted at that time as the best arrangement of airplanes for maximum firepower, from all guns of all planes, while providing a bombing pattern with maximum effect.

The Combat Box Formation was made up of a number of basic airplane relationships. From the smallest to the largest, these formations were:


Element Formation: three planes
Squadron Formation: four Elements - twelve planes
Group Formation: three Squadrons – thirty-six planes
Wing Formation: three Groups – one hundred and eight planes

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Mar 20, 2017)

I'm starting to think that he is willfully misunderstanding 

Notice on the first raid the intensity of Luftwaffe attacks as the various bomber units approached the target. No wonder there was some reforming and adjustment of the formations following the bomb runs.
They were effectively harassed from Mainz to Regensburg, almost 200 miles as the crow flies.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## KiwiBiggles (Mar 20, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> I didn't mean individual bombers coming in from every direction converging on one spot



Digging back into a hazy memory of a long-ago reading of "The Dambusters" - not a particularly strong reference, I admit - I think that 617 squadron used to do this when dropping Tallboys and Grand Slams. The high-precision bomb-sights they used needed a long straight run in to stabilize, and so they would come in from dispersed compass points at carefully staggered intervals and altitudes, in an attempt to present a less-concentrated target for flak.

If this is correct, it must have been quite a spectacle, watching several heavy bombers converging on what would appear from the ground to be a single point at the same time, and then a rapid stream of bombs coming down. I would think that something like this would only be possible in an elite squadron like 617, with its much greater experience and training levels.


----------



## fubar57 (Mar 20, 2017)

stona said:


> I'm starting to think that he is willfully misunderstanding Steve



Yep, got that feeling from his first day on


----------



## Zipper730 (Mar 21, 2017)

Milosh said:


> Zipp you just don't understand how hard it was to fly these a/c in formation even as an Element.


I probably never could grasp it never having flown an aircraft. I have the following questions

These aircraft did periodically make gradual turns while in these formations?
Would it be difficult to make a gradual descent of say 5-degrees, followed by a level-off while in this formation flying level?

Would the bomb-sight's gyro topple in such a descent?



>


Using this image I might be able to illustrate (I'd have to use a bunch of them in copies to illustrate the point) my position


BTW: Stona, I'm not trying to be deliberately ignorant...


----------



## stona (Mar 21, 2017)

Yes, no and no.

The airmen of the USAAFs trained for this kind of flying and it took a long time and considerable skill. When the British started daylight bombing they could not fly such tight formations, they had never been trained for it, operating by night required different skills, so they flew a loose formation which they called a 'gaggle'. By this time the Jagdwaffe had almost vanished as a threat and escorts were very strong, so the need for US style defensive boxes no longer existed. British bombers were not sufficiently armed or armoured to survive in heavily contested enemy airspace by day in any case.

The Norden bomb sight was a tachometric sight which did require a straight and level run in to the target, even gentle manouevring would cause inaccurate bombing. There is an account somewhere of the procedure which American bombardiers followed in activating, programming and using the Norden sight, but I can't find it and don't trust my ability to recall the details accurately. I read different estimates for the length of the bomb run required, but the lowest I've seen is 40 seconds, which must have seemed an eternity to the crews.
The British Mk XIV was much superior in this respect, requiring just 10 seconds straight run to the target and unlike the Norden it could be used to bomb on the climb and glide. The Norden was better in certain other respects and both were excellent devices for the time, the best available to the Allies with the exception of the British SABS Mk II A, but less than 1000 of these were made.

Cheers

Steve

Edit: The time of the straight and level bomb run depended on how far from the target the bombardier engaged the 'stabilised bombing approach device' (SBAE). This might explain the different times in various accounts. Once the bombardier was confident that he had matched the reticle speed with the aircraft speed (so that the reticle would remain on the intended target and not creep away from it) he would engage the SBAE which then flew the aircraft to the correct release point, where the bombs were dropped automatically. If the reticle had drifted from the intended target the sight had no way of 'knowing' this and an error would result. For the final bomb run on the SBAE the immensely complicated Norden sight, perhaps the most complicated adding computator known to man at the time, acted as little more than a timer!
The Norden sight was no more accurate than others of the same era, but as MacFarland noted in 'America's Pursuit of Precision Bombing' there was something about the notion of precision and the technologies to achieve it that appealed to the American psyche in a way not applicable to Europeans. He wrote that for Americans 'precision' invoked:

_"Visions of frontier marksmen always hitting their mark - the guilty and never the innocent. It raised images of a special American way of war. It satisfied a deep seated American need for the moral high ground in war while satisfying an American hunger for technological achievement."_

There is certainly some truth in that, and the intention is admirable. Unfortunately in WW2 the intention was not realised in reality, and it often isn't today.

There is a lot of mythologising about the Norden sight, something other nations don't do about their equally or even more accurate sights. The USAAF acknowledged their own lack of precision, Spaatz in 1944 wrote:

_"We are becoming increasingly aware of our inability to achieve accurate bombing on some of our top priority targets."_

96% of all bombs dropped on Japan were dropped after 9th March 1945 and after Le May had effectively abandoned daylight precision bombing. This included two of the most indiscriminate weapons ever used, both dropped, paradoxically, with remarkable precision.

Given these factors, it is surprising that the myth of the Norden bomb sight, the 'Blue Ox', has survived to this day.

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## Zipper730 (Mar 22, 2017)

Steve,

1. Maneuvering & Faking out the Enemy: I'm not sure to what extent the USAAF would use dog-legs and other maneuvers to mislead the enemy interceptors into thinking the bombers were heading for one target, and not the other. I know the RAF did this all the time, however. I'm curious about how far-out or close-in did one expect and need to execute a dog-leg to mislead enemy fighter aircraft as to your target? 

2. Norden Bombsight Capabilities & Questions

Run to Target: If I recall the run-in time was around 30-seconds -- I have heard that number appear quite often (The Sperry required approximately a 60-second run-to target).
Realigning the Gyro: If I recall that too 540 seconds or 8 minutes and 40 seconds if it toppled.

Automated Release: I didn't know the release was simply timed and done automatically -- I was always under the impression the bombardier hit the release button, which pickled 'em off (though I am uncertain if that term was ever used in WWII). Were there both manual and automatic release modes?
3. Moral High-Ground: Well, I suppose there is a tendency for the US to try and maintain the appearance of the moral high-ground. The USAAF from 1942 didn't really care all that much about causing civilian deaths; they were simply worried about looking bad most of the times. Basically if somebody's got to do something really ugly, let the RAF do it! As time went on, things changed of course.

4. Stabilized Automatic Bombsight: In what ways were they superior or inferior to the Norden?


----------



## pbehn (Mar 22, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> 3. Moral High-Ground: Well, I suppose there is a tendency for the US to try and maintain the appearance of the moral high-ground. The USAAF from 1942 didn't really care all that much about causing civilian deaths; they were simply worried about looking bad most of the times. Basically if somebody's got to do something really ugly, let the RAF do it! As time went on, things changed of course.


As far as I can see this is purely a post war mentality projected on to WW2 thinking. The only reason I can see for it is that the US believed that they could perform precision daylight bombing long after the RAF knew it was frequently (mostly) impossible. The USAAF only started operations in 1942, getting the USAAF operational in the UK was a huge civilian engineering project. In WW2 9000 miles of runways/taxiways were laid in UK and approximately 1 million associated buildings. 
https://content.historicengland.org...concrete/nine-thousand-miles-of-concrete.pdf/

In 1942 the USAAF didnt really have a position on the subject just an ideal, they were just getting started. For US commanders and their staff weather conditions in Europe throughout the seasons were a surprise.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Mar 23, 2017)

The Norden bomb sight was connected to an automated bomb release system, just as the British MK XIV and SABS were. I think the confusion arises from the American method of 'pickling on the leader' when all but the lead 'bombardier' in a formation simply manually released their bombs when they saw the leaders drop. Even with this system the manual release button still activated a bomb distributor.
I have put 'bombardier' in inverted commas because, given a few bunches of bananas, you could probably train a chimpanzee to 'pickle on the leader' and the skills of the job were concentrated in just the lead bombardier alone.

Pbehn, that is not a post war mentality, it is a thinking that influenced American doctrine in the inter war years. It is quite different from the RAF, which paid public lip service to the idea of precision but always had a concept of area and moral bombing in its doctrine and it was an easy fall back to adopt. The British had been carrying out moral bombing in their imperial air policing, albeit on a much, much smaller scale, for years. The principal, that an attack on the morale of the enemy's civil population could be effective, was established. It was much harder for the Americans. The Americans did launch area raids, targeting, just like the British, the centres of conurbations but even the USSBS is in denial of this. It concedes in its Area Studies Division Report only that it considered in the report

_"...raids by the United States Army Air Forces flown under non visual conditions against industrial targets in cities where the bomb fall distribution was similar to that of an area raid."_

This is dishonest and wishful thinking. These were area raids, the Americans just would not call them that. The euphemism 'area type raids' appeared later.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Robert Porter (Mar 23, 2017)

I would not say the USAAF was at all in denial. The incendiary raids, especially in Japan, were by definition area raids and were designed precisely and knowingly to degrade civilian morale as well as attack the distributed manufacturing infrastructure. Certainly the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs were area attacks.


----------



## tyrodtom (Mar 23, 2017)

They surely used their best bombardiers as the lead bombardier.
But that was be no great secret to the Luftwaffe, fighters and AA concentrated on lead aircraft, when they could.

So there would be missions that the final lead bombardier position might have passed down through several aircraft.


----------



## stona (Mar 23, 2017)

tyrodtom said:


> They surely used their best bombardiers as the lead bombardier.
> But that was be no great secret to the Luftwaffe, fighters and AA concentrated on lead aircraft, when they could.
> 
> So there would be missions that the final lead bombardier position might have passed down through several aircraft.



I've read Luftwaffe accounts in which it is clear that the lead aircraft were targeted. Whether the Germans knew the American method I don't know. 
I'm not sure that all the aircraft of such a Group even carried a bomb sight.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## stona (Mar 23, 2017)

Robert Porter said:


> I would not say the USAAF was at all in denial. .



As far as the European war goes it certainly was. Even after the war it refused to actually use the phrases 'area attack' or 'area raid'. Only later did the phrase 'area type raid' start to appear in some Air Force documents. The quote above, from USSBS' Area Studies Division, even while allowing that the bomb fall was like an area raid, still emphasises that the attack was aimed at _'industrial areas within cities'_, which, frankly, is nonsense. The Americans simply aimed at the centre of the conurbation. Not a single H2X raid, was genuinely aimed at a specific military or industrial target, that would have been impossible and beyond the means of the technology. Whatever the official target in the planning, the reality is that these were just another type of area raid, and it is NOT coincidence that the bomb fall resembled exactly that.
The British, much more pragmatic and experienced in area bombing had a rather more sophisticated way of establishing the aiming point, but at least they were honest about it being designed to create maximum devastation and dislocation, not the destruction of any particular target(s).
The cover for area bombing, as in the Strategic Bombing Directives that followed the Normandy landings was_ 'important industrial areas'_. This was simply a euphemism for area bombing and was Harris' get out of jail card when Strategic Directive No. 2 seemed to be forcing him to comply with the oil and transport plans. It also served as a useful escape clause for the Americans who simply couldn't hit their specific targets with non visual bombing techniques, but could hit an _'important industrial area' _since any area of any city was bound to contain something that could be deemed important, anything from a telephone exchange to a cross road (though that might fall under the transport plan).

I don't know much about what went on in the Pacific, so I can't really comment. It seems that the raids you mention are often referred to as 'incendiary' raids, which is at least true.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Robert Porter (Mar 23, 2017)

I disagree, as of December 1943 the USAAF openly engaged in "city busting" or area attacks on Germany and other European targets. By the time US bombers were able to reach the Japanese home islands no attempt at precision bombing was even thought of.


----------



## stona (Mar 23, 2017)

Reading above it seems like I'm having a go at the Americans which is not my intention. Neither the British, nor the Americans were honest about their bombing policies in public, but the Americans do seem to have had difficulty coming to terms with what they were doing within their own Air Forces. This may have been as much an unwillingness to admit that the results achieved did not match expectation or doctrine. They were hardly alone in this 

Over Germany the US Air Forces adopted a looser set of rules for targeting than it did over areas of occupied Europe. The 8th Air Force's 'Bombardment Directive' of 27th June 1943, issued to implement Pointblank stated that

_"Any target in Germany is cleared for attack at any time."_

Unlike their Bomber Command colleagues, US air crews were not tied to one target but had an option, in certain circumstances to attack alternative targets. Both the 8th and 15th Air Forces adopted the same four basic rules to establish target priorities.

1*.Primary*. Visual attack on a war plant, rail facility or military target. Chosen by Air Force Headquarters in accordance with current bombing directives.

2. *Secondary*. Usually chosen by Air Force Headquarters in accordance with current bombing directives, with its location coordinated with the bombers' planned route and fighter protection.

a. Visual: an alternative target similar to the primary.

b. Nonvisual: Area attack on a city associated with either of the above.

3.* Last-Resort Target*. A tertiary target with the same qualifications as a secondary target.

4. *Target of Opportunity.* A target selected by the mission or individual bomber formation leaders, while in the air, when they are unable to attack any of the above targets. If weather or enemy action scatters a formation, all leaders and pilots are encouraged to seek targets of opportunity within specified limits. Forbidden over occupied Europe, but could be either visual or radar over greater Germany.

12th August 1943 saw the first area type raid by the 8th Air Force, when 106 bombers attacked Bonn as a target of opportunity.
After the adoption of H2S/H2X systematic area bombing commenced, the first such raid being on 27th September 1943. This was Eighth Air Force Mission No.104 which found the target city of Emden completely covered by clouds, but dropped 506 tons of bombs, on radar, through the cloud. This was the first ordered area raid. After this the Eighth Air Force's own targeting documents give the game away, despite later denial. For example, just one week later the targets for a raid on Frankfurt were listed as, primary, _'Frankfurt - city proper' _and secondary, _'any industrial area in Germany'._
I leave you to decide how those targets can be equated with precision bombing.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## pbehn (Mar 23, 2017)

stona said:


> Reading above it seems like I'm having a go at the Americans which is not my intention. Neither the British, nor the Americans were honest about their bombing policies in public, but the Americans do seem to have had difficulty coming to terms with what they were doing within their own Air Forces. This may have been as much an unwillingness to admit that the results achieved did not match expectation or doctrine. They were hardly alone in this
> 
> Over Germany the US Air Forces adopted a looser set of rules for targeting than it did over areas of occupied Europe. The 8th Air Force's 'Bombardment Directive' of 27th June 1943, issued to implement Pointblank stated that
> 
> ...


----------



## pbehn (Mar 23, 2017)

It makes perfect sense to target the lead aircraft in a formation as far as flak is concerned, you have longer too shoot at it.


----------



## stona (Mar 23, 2017)

Robert Porter said:


> I disagree, as of December 1943 the USAAF openly engaged in "city busting" or area attacks on Germany and other European targets..



Even earlier. It was Anderson who was promoting such attacks, he also made another significant change, an increase in the proportion of incendiaries carried by the 8th Air Force, another sure sign that precision was being abandoned.
However, at USSTAF headquarters Spaatz was waging a campaign of denial. He refused to get involved in British V-1 retaliation schemes or to openly acknowledge area bombing. Spaatz wrote to Lovett that

_"there is no doubt in my mind that the RAF wants very much to have the US Air Forces tarred with the morale bombing aftermath, which we feel will be terrific."_

He made it clear that he had no intention of allowing this to happen. Andersen became involved in the denial. On 21st July 1944, a day on which six separate Groups of 8th Air Force bombers attacked cities as targets of opportunity, he sent a new bombing policy to Dolittle and Twining pointing out Spaatz's intention to direct the bombers against precision targets and, almost incredibly, denying any intention to area bomb!
In October 1944 a refinement of the bombing rules produced the following.

_"It has been determined that towns and cities large enough to produce an identifiable return on the H2X scope generally contain a large proportion of the military objectives listed above_* _These centers, therefore, may be attacked as secondary or last resort targets by through-the-overcast bombing technique"
_
* [railway lines, junctions, marshaling yards, railroad or road bridges or other communications networks, any industrial plant. Oil storage plants and military barracks or camps, troop concentrations, motor transport or AFV parks, ordnance or supply depots. Ammunition depots, airfields etc.]

That covered just about every town and city in Germany, making it a legitimate target for area attack, and yet still the pretence was made that the US Air Forces were attempting a precision campaign, and this was maintained after the war.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## pbehn (Mar 23, 2017)

A strange academic discussion being had by some commanders, Dresden was bombed in the final months of the war, but still some bombs were dropped on Prague Brux and Pilsen. Bombing with a 40% incendiary load using H2X means you are not bombing an actual target but an area. Putting a telescopic sight on a shot gun will not allow you to shoot an apple off a boys head.


----------



## skiswimcycle (Mar 23, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> I got a couple of questions regarding aerial-bombing, particularly level-bombing with iron-bombs...
> 
> I. Measuring Average Error
> 
> ...


Interesting topic.


----------



## Robert Porter (Mar 23, 2017)

I would agree that there was both dissension and some degree of denial in both RAF and USAAF top brass. However I think the majority, to include Eisenhower, of the command staff openly understood that for any number of reasons precision bombing just was not possible to any great degree. Frankly Eisenhower and others agreed that the damage to morale and the necessity to tie up troops to some degree in fire fighting and AAA roles was a benefit. My guess would be that the dissenting brass were worried about public perception after the war more than anything else. And they were correct. There was a huge backlash when the extent of the civilian casualties was finally understood. But the backlash was mostly political not anti military. It was hard to be angry at the very folks that prosecuted the war to protect their respective homelands and stop the horrors Nazi Germany unleashed. 

The atomic bombing drowned most of the rest out, to this day there are any number of writers pro and con as to the necessity of those attacks and if they did or did not shorten the war. Personally I believe they did shorten the war, it is too easy to apply a current mindset to the decision makers of yesteryear and second guess them. I believe it was a decision that was not taken at all lightly and only after a lot of what if scenarios were played out.


----------



## stona (Mar 24, 2017)

Yes, there was a backlash, exactly as Spaatz and other Americans feared. Part of the issue is that Americans based in Europe understood that the debate about the moral justification for British area bombing (and to a much more limited extent its effectiveness) had already begun, during the war. I don't think this was the case for the American Air Forces bombing in Europe. Back home the pretence of precision was maintained and most Americans, including in the civil and military leadership, didn't really know what was going on. This is why Spaatz was able to say what he did about avoiding his forces being 'tarred with the moral bombing aftermath'. He knew that it was the British who would carry the can for this, and that suited him. I don't blame him, it's a sensible and pragmatic position to take 
Another important distinction is that while the US Air Forces did carry out area raids they never explicitly or intentionally targeted the morale of the civil population. The raids were always justified in terms of attacking military or industrial targets, even if in an imprecise way. Of course, to someone on the receiving end of an area raid this nicety made no difference, but it enabled the Americans to argue that, in Europe at least, they did not undertake 'morale' bombing. It was a very successful argument, today most people associate the attacks on German civil morale, in fact with German cities generally, with the RAF, not the USAAF. The argument has been backed for nearly 80 years by a soft propaganda campaign in which the great sacrifices made by US airmen on precision raids like Schweinfurt, Regensburg, Ploesti etc. are remembered (quite rightly) and become exemplars of US bombing, while the area attacks are quietly ignored.

I agree with your point about the atomic bombs, but they should not be considered in the context of the wider campaigns. They were quite exceptional. They definitely shortened the war and there is a good argument to be made that despite the terrible casualties inflicted on the Japanese more people on both sides might have died had either an invasion or an effort to starve the nation to death been undertaken instead.
The atom bomb became, in a way, the ultimate weapon for attacking an enemy's morale, but was used on a nation teetering on the brink of defeat and actively seeking a way to end the war. How well it might have worked a couple of years earlier is another question altogether.
We have to understand the factors affecting the decision makers at the time, hindsight was not available to them. I think the use of the atomic bombs was entirely justified, and I think, even with hindsight, the same decision would be made again.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Agree Agree:
3 | Like List reactions


----------



## swampyankee (Mar 24, 2017)

pbehn said:


> Putting a telescopic sight on a shot gun will not allow you to shoot an apple off a boys head.


It will if you don't mind shooting the head off with it; this is pretty much the definition of collateral damage.

I think that the allied air forces had found that a lot of pre-war hypotheses about the ease of destroying or even incapacitating targets like rail yards or factories had been far too optimistic, like the contemporary guesses about the effectiveness of heavy AA guns. When they found out that factories were much harder targets to destroy, even if the actually hit them, than had been thought, they concluded that targeting the factory workers would be the most practical way of disabling a factory.


----------



## stona (Mar 24, 2017)

swampyankee said:


> It will if you don't mind shooting the head off with it; this is pretty much the definition of collateral damage.



The British had come to the conclusion in in WW1, restated in the interwar years and then implemented in WW2 that what we now call 'collateral' damage was in fact useful damage, as long as it occurred in the right place, that is anywhere in the enemy's homeland. This was an easy conclusion to come to. If 98 out of every hundred bombs dropped missed the factory or plant at which they are aimed it was a consolation to think that killing the workers who work in those facilities or 'dehousing' them (in he parlance of the time), was equally useful and that those 98 bombs had not been wasted.

Neville Jones summed this up well in his 'The Beginnings of Strategic Air Power', writing about the 1917 plan devised by the Air Policy Committee to attack German morale.

_"This was perhaps the earliest plan to embody the philosophy upon which Trenchard founded his strategic policy in the post war Air Force. In the post-war plans the aim of that policy (that is, the terrorization of the civilian population) was to be achieved by selecting targets that were located in densely populated industrial areas, so that all the bombs which failed to hit the aiming points (ostensibly industries supporting the enemy war effort) would strike at the morale of the civilian population by destroying their lives and homes and disrupting the services (transport, water, gas and so on) on which they depended."_

There is little difference between the 1917 plans and those underlying the area bombing of WW2 by either the British or Americans. The British explicitly targeted enemy civilian morale, the Americans still _'ostensibly'_ targeted those_ 'industries supporting the enemy war effort'_, but the result was the same.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Agree Agree:
1 | Informative Informative:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Zipper730 (Mar 24, 2017)

WWII Mentality / Post-War Mentalities on Area Bombing

*Public Relations on USAAS Bomber Usage: Mitchell Era*
The general focus was on the use of bombers as defensive, against attacking ships. Essentially, the idea was that large bombers would be able to accurately hit ships at altitude beyond effective range of defensive guns and sink them effectively.

*Official Plan for USAAS Bomber Usage: Mitchell Era*
Mitchell had been far more forthcoming with the USAAS than the public, and had officially stated during his time in uniform that the plans would be for the intended Air Force to consist of around 50% fighter aircraft, 50% bombers, with 50% of the bomber force aimed for strategic ends, and 50% for tactical goals.

It would appear that Mitchell didn't have a definite view of fighters early on, and even saw dive-bombers as useful for military ends as he saw them used in WWI.

His attitude for targeting would include airfields, harbors/docks/shipyards, ammo dumps, railway marshaling yards. Back in the war, the Aviation Section of the Army Signal Corp did want to engage in retaliatory attacks on population centers, as did the RFC & RNAS, and later the RAF. They were told they were forbidden to engage in wanton and promiscuous attacks (presumably on civilians and population centers), though I'm not sure how open that definition was to interpretation.

He did appear to express an interest in precision attacks on land-based targets: They were to be undertaken by use of bombers with precision bombsights. Fighters were deemed essential for these types of raids.

It's possible that he said things face to face with certain people he trusted, but he didn't appear to mention in writing, anything about bombing civilians as a goal itself, except possibly as a revenge attack mounted under certain circumstances.

*Official Plan for USAAS: Post Mitchell Era*
Mitchell did say it was acceptable at the very least, under some circumstances, to bomb population centers as revenge for enemy attacks mounted under certain circumstances. At the most, he said it was acceptable to attack the entire population as a target unto itself.

He was now unburdened of his desire to express his true opinion, now out of uniform: These would likely have qualified as wanton and promiscuous attacks.

*Official Plan for Early-USAAC Bomber Usage*
The plans varied early on, from close-support, interdiction, to destroying specific targets of military nature; by the early 1930's they had committed to the idea of destroying the ability and willpower to wage war.

Close Air Support generally fell into disfavor because it was evidently difficult to locate exposed troop positions, and it also forever tied it to the Army
Interdiction was better as it didn't require strict (or even major) Army control
Strategic Bombing was favored because it was largely independent from the Army so it would be most ideal to an independent Air Force
While they believed Strategic Bombing would genuinely win wars: They also seemed to favor it because it satisfied their goals


An Independent Air Force
A defense structure with departments for Land (Army), Sea (Navy), and Air (Air Force), with the Air Force getting the lions share of the budget.
They often glossed over the exact details of the morale aspect, because it was generally viewed as a butcher job on innocent and defenseless people. There were varying attitudes in the international community on the use of bombers for such purposes


The 1899 Hague Convention: Forbade the use of bombardment including airships firing projectiles on undefended targets; while a bomber isn't the same as an airship, and bombs aren't projectiles; bombs do follow ballistic paths and are fundamentally similar. The spirit was there
The 1922 Hague Convention Draft: Forbade any attacks on population centers to terrorize the population within. Needless to say, few nations signed on because they wanted to do it, and the UK saw it as part of their Air Control of colonies.
There were proposals for an International Bomber force: Viewed (rightly so) as a threat to national sovereignty; as hypocrisy to others: It forbade nations to use poison gas on civilians, yet allowed itself to attack such offender with poison gas until surrender
*Official Plan for Mid/Late USAAC Bomber Usage*
Their plans had generally focused now on precision bombing, possibly for the following reasons


It was the Great Depression and the idea that one can do the maximum amount of damage with the least amount of bombs probably resonated well with lots of people of different political stripes
The mission role of maritime patrol and coastal defense was a good justification for the development of bombers, and accuracy was favored.
Bombing population centers and killing civilians by the tens of thousands was viewed negatively

Causing misery/terror to civil populations could be done anyway by fucking up the transportation system, knocking out power, and the inevitable stray bomb.
*Official Plans for USAAF Bomber Usage Pre-WWII*
The plans revolved around using heavy-bombers for carrying the war to Germany & Japan

For the Germans, the goal was that of denial with terror attacks on populations to be used as a last-resort; the goal though was to subdue the country; then land a cross-channel assault onto the continent. Close Air Support was to commence after that.
For the Japanese, the plan was to use attacks on airfields, and incendiary area attacks on cities because we viewed them as subhuman.

*Actual Attitude on Use of Bombers in WWII: USAAF*

Europe: Generally there was little moral issue about bombing population centers; the primary concern was looking bad from a historical standpoint. At least that was early on. As bomber forces built up; the head of the USAAF had actually thought it would be a good idea to start carrying out area-bombing raids rather than attacking specific targets. After the Schweinfurt Raids: We carried out an area-bombing raid on Munster, and the idea of day-bombing was questioned before long-ranged fighters started to come online.

I'm not sure how much the transport plan was favored the by the USAAF: If they liked it, it would appear the Oil Plan ranked higher on the list. The idea of removing the Luftwaffe from the skies seemed to also be well-favored as well.

After long-ranged fighters appeared on the scenes, the bombing raids seemed to include attacks on specific targets, attacks aimed at both population and specific targets, and naked attacks on population centers.

Pacific/Japan: We viewed the Japanese as subhuman. Our goals initially were to light all the paper cities of Japan on fire, after plastering their air-fields. We couldn't do it because of range issues, and the Japanese quickly made this worse.

It's likely that the USAAF bigwigs didn't like the idea of the B-17's and B-24's being used for hitting merchant ships at low altitudes, instead of playing roles in pivotal naval battles from 8,000 to 25,000 feet, and sinking merchant ships too. 

I'm not sure how many industrial targets there were out in the Pacific, but the heavy bomber force was mostly used against military bases and strongholds.

By the time the B-29's came online: It seems that there were some that wanted to torch Japan as well as before, though others like General Hansel would prefer to hit industrial targets possibly on slight principle, but also possibly because it was a practical way to damage Japan's ability to fight. Mining operations also seemed to be aimed at denial and coercion.

The first incendiary raid was done in 1944, but wasn't done in massive scale until 1945: I'm not sure if there was really much concern about looking bad at home. Most people in the US seemed to be thrilled with the cool fireworks, and seemed quite happy to see the Japanese burn. Counter-arguments for the few that objected were


There are no innocent civilians in Japan
There are no civilians in Japan
Accusations of being disloyal, a traitor, etc.
We then dropped a nuclear bomb on Japan and at that point a few people were stunned by that, but the previous top two arguments were employed. I'm not sure if it was understood the effects of birth defects from radiation exposure, but if that wasn't the case -- it was merely a more shocking city busting raid.

One huge explosion instead of hundreds or thousands of little ones
Loads of fires are produced in either case, but in this case it occurs in one flash rather than thousands of fires created over the course of a few minutes.
Damage is done way faster than a normal fire-bombing raid
All it takes is one plane to get through dropping one bomb to do what hundreds had previously done

The argument that it ended the war faster is probably true: The question is how much faster, and I figure it probably shortened things by a few weeks. General LeMay made an estimate of two to six weeks and I'd have estimated around four weeks as an in the middle estimate.

This estimate is different than the United States Straetgic Bombing Survey which still stated we would not have to invade and occupy.


----------



## Zipper730 (Mar 24, 2017)

stona said:


> The Norden bomb sight was connected to an automated bomb release system, just as the British MK XIV and SABS were. I think the confusion arises from the American method of 'pickling on the leader' when all but the lead 'bombardier' in a formation simply manually released their bombs when they saw the leaders drop. Even with this system the manual release button still activated a bomb distributor.


Okay, so to be clear on that last part: There is an automated release feature which releases on a timer and another system that involves hitting a manual release which activates the bomb-distributor, and that system then releases the bomb in specified interval sequence?


----------



## Robert Porter (Mar 24, 2017)

A nice bit of research on myth busting the Norden Bombsight. This was written by a Canadian student in 2009. Worth a read.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Robert Porter (Mar 24, 2017)

These documents may help. Section 6 of the BIF document covers the Norden Bombsight usage.

The other document is a classbook for bombardier trainees during WW2. By the way I found these documents and lots of others here: View Items

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Old Wizard (Mar 24, 2017)




----------



## stona (Mar 25, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> Okay, so to be clear on that last part: There is an automated release feature which releases on a timer and another system that involves hitting a manual release which activates the bomb-distributor, and that system then releases the bomb in specified interval sequence?



Essentially, yes.
The automatic system actually flies the aircraft to the release point where it triggers the bomb distributor. I wrote that for this final part of the bomb run, once the sight has been locked onto the aiming point, the sight acts as little more than a timer, but it was an infinitely more complicated instrument than that.
As soon as a bombardier hits a manual release button/switch it does indeed activate the bomb distributor.

The Norden sight was a superb bomb sight, the best in the world when it first became available and only surpassed (then only marginally) several years later. The problem was never the sight, it was the over estimation of its capabilities by some in the USAAF and the mythologising of it in the media as a result of propaganda around it. Challenging the myth in no way diminishes the qualities of the sight itself. If the USN had been prepared to allow it, Bomber Command would have been using it too. In the event the British Mk XIV was as good a sight, both the Norden and Mk XIV had slightly different strengths and weaknesses but I doubt either the British or the Americans would have wanted to swop in 1943 

As an interesting aside, Bomber Command referred to the Mk XIV/T1* bomb sight as an 'area sight', despite the fact that it was as accurate as the Norden (it is very difficult to make direct comparisons when there are so many variables) whilst referring to the SABS sight as a 'precision sight'.
We should not ignore the German Lofte 7D sight either. Like the Norden and SABS this was a tachometric sight and like the Norden was connected to a system which effectively allowed the sight to fly the aircraft automatically to the target and release the bombs. the SABS did not do this (nor did the Mk XIV), as simpler system called the Bombing Direction Indicator displayed necessary course corrections to the pilot on later versions, earlier ones required the bomb aimer to call out corrections to the pilot as seen in many old war films. The British even considered using some captured Lofte sights, but this provoked a near mutiny at Farnborough where the boffins were developing the British sights!

Cheers

Steve

* The T1 was an American built Mk XIV. The Sperry Gyroscope was approached by the British to produce it, though eventually it was subcontracted to the A.C. Spark Plug Company, a division of General Motors. Sperry itself was at capacity producing equipment for the American forces, but Sperry engineers were desptached to Michigan to oversee production of the T1. Eventually 23,000 T1 sights were produced for the British in the US (many went into Canadian built aircraft), mass production starting around May 1942.
A.C Spark Plug in turn sub contracted to several other firms, some had previously produced items ranging from pin ball machines, typewriters, thermostats or cameras, but that's what a war time economy will do, properly organised, and the Americans certainly knew how to organise their economy to win a war..

Reactions: Informative Informative:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Mar 25, 2017)

Robert Porter said:


> These documents may help. Section 6 of the BIF document covers the Norden Bombsight usage.



That BIF is a great source of information to understand the US systems. There is a nice little bit explaining 'pattern bombing', the official phrase to describe 'pickling on the leader'.







'Intervalometer' is an American made up word for an automatic bomb distributor. I admire the way you guys butcher the language...sometimes 

The problem with a word like 'intervalometer' is that it is jargon, and jargon does not usually explain itself. To someone with no knowledge of bombing systems it is gibberish. The phrase automatic bomb distributor on the other hand is self explanatory. The uninformed might not know exactly what it was or how it worked, but they would have a good idea what it did, automatically distribute bombs.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Funny Funny:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Robert Porter (Mar 25, 2017)

We do like to invent words, my brother invented one as well. He came home one day covered in mud and my Mom asked him what happened. He said he fell down a hill because he could not get any "gription" which I assume was a contraction of grip and traction. I kind of like it!

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## pbehn (Mar 25, 2017)

People who invent things have to invent words or names for their inventions, then the French have to invent another word to prevent the Anglicisation of their language.

Reactions: Winner Winner:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Mar 25, 2017)

I'm not sure who developed the first automatic bomb distributor (or intervalometer if you prefer), it is probably one of those things that several air forces developed independently and more or less simultaneously as larger (more numerous) bomb loads became normal and automation became more accurate than a man with a watch, or counting in his head.

Is it necessary to invent a word for the device? Only if you want a one word definition, I suppose. It doesn't matter anyway, except that intervalometer is a horrible and inelegant word 

Cheers

Steve


----------



## pbehn (Mar 25, 2017)

I think your objection to intervalometer is on logic grounds all meters are concerned with intervals of something. Didnt they need to spearate the fall of bombs for safety too, I think I read somewhere about bombs detonating when hitting each other under the aircraft.


----------



## stona (Mar 25, 2017)

pbehn said:


> I think your objection to intervalometer is on logic grounds all meters are concerned with intervals of something. Didnt they need to spearate the fall of bombs for safety too, I think I read somewhere about bombs detonating when hitting each other under the aircraft.



The separation of the bombs regulated the length of the pattern (assuming similar bombs) but could also be used to compensate for the different aerodynamics and trajectories of different ordnance, like incendiaries and, in the British case, something like the 500lb No 4 Cluster Projectile.
I suppose there was always a possibility of bombs exploding beneath the aircraft, even when dropped with fractions of a second delays. Some tail pistols were effectively armed as soon as the arming wire was withdrawn as the bomb fell from the aircraft, some did have arming vanes which would take a short distance to unscrew the pistol arming fork from the striker spindle (leaving the latter freely floating on the creep spring, resistance of which was overcome when the bomb hit something solid, an inertia block behind the striker would drive it into the detonator percussion cap, overcoming the resistance of the spring. This is difficult to explain without looking at the exploded view of the device I have in front of me  )
The vanes on the commonly used No.27 nose pistol spun off to reveal the pressure plate within a few feet of the aircraft, I think it required 6-8 revolutions from memory, meaning any impact on the pressure plate could detonate the bomb.
I can't recall any first hand accounts of such a thing, but that doesn't mean it didn't happen.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## swampyankee (Mar 25, 2017)

pbehn said:


> People who invent things have to invent words or names for their inventions, then the French have to invent another word to prevent the Anglicisation of their language.



France, Germany, and a number of other countries have quangos that control their languages, sort of like the U.S. has the Fed to control it's money supply.

Reactions: Funny Funny:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Mar 25, 2017)

As a speaker of French as a second language I would just like to point out that in the case of France the Academie Francaise does not control the language. It does publish the 'official' dictionary of the French language, but as far as usage goes it has no legal powers and acts in a purely advisory capacity. People, including French people, often tell me that in, for example, official publications, unauthorised words cannot be used, but this is not the case.

The British have the Oxford dictionary to refer to, but it has recently resorted to adding 'here today, gone tomorrow' words (often associated with technology or 'yoof' culture) that don't do much to enhance its reputation.

Just saying.

Steve


----------



## pbehn (Mar 25, 2017)

stona said:


> As a speaker of French as a second language I would just like to point out that in the case of France the Academie Francaise does not control the language. It does publish the 'official' dictionary of the French language, but as far as usage goes it has no legal powers and acts in a purely advisory capacity. People, including French people, often tell me that in, for example, official publications, unauthorised words cannot be used, but this is not the case.


I speak French and worked in France for years, you are correct, but there is a certain nationalism about the language. They complain about "English" words like "le parking" (a car park) and "le washing" (a laundomat/self service washing centre) however they are surprised to hear that in English they are a car park and laundrette, the French have merely chosen a new word that happens to be "English" and then complain about the English invading their language. The most bizarre experience I had was concerning metal testing. The industry standard test of impact strength is the "Charpy" test, invented by a French metallurgist. However it was the Americans and British that made this test universal, in WW2 it was introduced to get over the problems with the Liberty ships. The French see Charpy as an American test and an English word. In French it is "essai de resilience" while in English it is "Charpy test". For Germans it is kerbschlagbeigeversuch which makes perfect sense if you speak German, literally "prism-hit-bend-test" a short description of what is done. A similar test on a larger sample is called a "Battelle Drop weight tear test", while Battelle is also a French name the test is named after the Battelle memorial institute, which is still a big organisation in USA.





stona said:


> The British have the Oxford dictionary to refer to, but it has recently resorted to adding 'here today, gone tomorrow' words (often associated with technology or 'yoof' culture) that don't do much to enhance its reputation.


This has always been the case, words come and go. Much of military English language was formed by the British Commonwealth and USA forces being in France words like sortie and "toodleoo" (from a tout a l'heure) were youth culture in ww1.

I believe there were more problems with bombs when the weight of the bombs was used to open the spring loaded bomb doors.

Reactions: Informative Informative:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## michaelmaltby (Mar 25, 2017)

The 1066 Norman invasion did much to set a French_ tone_ to what had become Anglaise, by then. To my mind language must be _used_ ... in everyday life .... to remain healthy and vital. Trying to _shape _the evolution of a language, by decree or otherwise, is folly, to my mind. 
English has become the language it has because the everyday users of the language had/have confidence in their surroundings and the freedom to use their language freely.

A small but vibrant culture, Estonia, one million domestic speakers GOT, has participated in major changes of vocabulary usage with _the exodus_ of the Soviet Russians and their various customs and institutions. Meanwhile, Estonians in Canada, USA, Australia and elsewhere kept a parallel branch of the language alive ... but in exile.


----------



## Robert Porter (Mar 25, 2017)

I agree language is and must be a living breathing thing (Latin anyone?) to survive. However some innovations and usages are less than optimal. I recall the "Valley Speak" period in the late 80's and have to admit to being sorely tempted to commit homicide several times.


----------



## stona (Mar 25, 2017)

Robert Porter said:


> I agree language is and must be a living breathing thing (Latin anyone?) to survive. However some innovations and usages are less than optimal. I recall the "Valley Speak" period in the late 80's and have to admit to being sorely tempted to commit homicide several times.



Our version involves the 'yoof' putting 'like' or 'innit' at the beginning or end of every sentence 

Some words can make a comeback. 'Hipster' is now used to describe someone who most definitely did not exist in the jazz age 

Cheers

Steve


----------



## michaelmaltby (Mar 25, 2017)

".... I recall the "Valley Speak" period in the late 80's and have to admit to being sorely tempted to commit homicide several times."
Cockney rhyming slang, anyone ..? 
"Apples and pears"
"Bristol cities"


----------



## stona (Mar 25, 2017)

michaelmaltby said:


> "....
> Cockney rhyming slang, anyone ..?
> "Apples and pears"
> "Bristol cities"



But the trick is not to actually say the rhyming part, as in 'I'll have a quick butcher's at that puncture for you."

You have to know that having a 'butcher's' is having a "butcher's *hook*', that is, a *look* at the puncture.

'Bristols' is another case in point.... "Nice pair of Bristols on that!"

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Funny Funny:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## pbehn (Mar 25, 2017)

stona said:


> 'Bristols' is another case in point.... "Nice pair of Bristols on that!"


Yes, you dont want to look like a berk. 

shire hunt

Reactions: Funny Funny:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Mar 25, 2017)

Also 'shop front', an example where the rhyming bit is usually spoken. This is a minefield 
Cheers
Steve

Reactions: Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Robert Porter (Mar 25, 2017)

My wife's father was born and raised within the sound of the Beau Bells, and when he tied one on I could never understand a word he said. Well I could understand the words but not the combinations!


----------



## pbehn (Mar 25, 2017)

Robert Porter said:


> My wife's father was born and raised within the sound of the Beau Bells, and when he tied one on I could never understand a word he said. Well I could understand the words but not the combinations!


I hope no Cockneys read this! they are the Bow bells, from St Mary le Bow

St Mary-le-Bow - Wikipedia

destroyed in the blitz and rebuilt.


----------



## Robert Porter (Mar 25, 2017)

Believe it or not thats what I typed! Then looked at it and said no that can't be right.


----------



## Robert Porter (Mar 25, 2017)

Last time I visited England, I went to see the church and even have a picture of me standing outside of it somewhere.


----------



## michaelmaltby (Mar 25, 2017)

.... so ... back to bombing ....


----------



## pbehn (Mar 25, 2017)

Robert Porter said:


> Believe it or not thats what I typed! Then looked at it and said no that can't be right.


Street and place names in UK can be very strange


----------



## pbehn (Mar 25, 2017)

Robert Porter said:


> Believe it or not thats what I typed! Then looked at it and said no that can't be right.


Street and place names in UK can be very strange


----------



## pbehn (Mar 25, 2017)

michaelmaltby said:


> .... so ... back to bombing ....



I believe there were more problems with bombs when the weight of the bombs was used to open the spring loaded bomb doors.


----------



## stona (Mar 25, 2017)

Spring loaded doors featured on a few British designs of the early 1930s I seem to remember (I'm thinking of something like the Wellesley for some reason). Larger and later bombers had powered bomb bay doors. Someone might know if the spring loaded system was retained in other bomb cells?
Cheers
Steve


----------



## Airframes (Mar 25, 2017)

Blenheim, and I believe Anson used spring-loaded bomb doors.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Mar 25, 2017)

I once saw a reference to a 'bomb undershield' which I noted having no idea what it was or what purpose it served. Maybe this had something to do with forcing spring loaded doors?
Cheers
Steve


----------



## pbehn (Mar 25, 2017)

stona said:


> I once saw a reference to a 'bomb undershield' which I noted having no idea what it was or what purpose it served. Maybe this had something to do with forcing spring loaded doors?
> Cheers
> Steve


The Wellington Bomber

This link mentions undershields (page 9), Iread a while ago that there was a mesh placed beneath bombs in aircraft which was broken when dropped but I cant find it again, so it is aerodynamic until the bomb is dropped.

I seem to remember reading that spring loaded bomb doors ran in to problems (hardly surprising) as the bomb load or number of bombs increased then the size of the doors and strength of the springs increased. On release of bombs if any were hung up for a few seconds an individual bomb was not heavy enough to open the door. That means the pilot is flying with an armed loose bomb rattling on the bomb doors which a heavy bump on landing means it drops on the runway. This in addition to the obvious loss of accuracy, could you program in the door opening time to a Norden or other bomb sight?


----------



## BiffF15 (Mar 25, 2017)

You could probably program or put in the circuit for the doors to open, however, if they didn't open then the sequence would be interrupted and no bombs would drop (hopefully). I was under the impression that the doors were opened early to allow for manual opening should they malfunction. I would hate to fly that far, through that much hell to not drop.

Cheers,
Biff

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Mar 26, 2017)

BiffF15 said:


> I was under the impression that the doors were opened early to allow for manual opening should they malfunction. I would hate to fly that far, through that much hell to not drop.
> 
> Cheers,
> Biff



That was certainly normal procedure for the RAF and I think it was for the USAAF too.

It would be unfortunate to fly all the way to the target, only to be unable to drop the bomb load, but a surprising number of loads were dropped 'safe' by crews of all air forces.This might seem incomprehensible, but I'm sitting with a recording of this morning's Grand Prix in the background with a cup of tea and couple of slices of Marmite toast, not freezing my arse off in a noisy bomber confronted by searchlights, flak and fighters.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## tyrodtom (Mar 26, 2017)

Most fuses have to fall quite a distance before they're armed. No armorer is going to put a quick arming fuse on a bomb on a bomb dropped at high altitude, it'd be a waste of a specialized fuse, and a needless danger to the crew.

Quick arming fuses were for low altitude missions, and usually smaller bombs too.

Not every fuse could be used with every bomb. Just because a fuse was quick arming didn't mean it was also quick exploding. A lot of quick arming fuses had delay built in, the delay was after the bomb struck, giving the aircraft time to get out of the immediate area before the bomb exploded.

The M112A1 tail fuse for example took about 80 to 100 air travel to arm, meant for low level use. It had defferent delays that could be installed, one 4 to 5 seconds delay, another 8 to 15 seconds delay. They could be used on up to 300 lb GP bombs, the similiar M113A1, and M114A1, could be used on the bigger 500lb GP and semi-AP bombs up to 2000lbs.

Some fuses delay could be adjusted on the nose cap, some had to be assembled with different delays before they were installed on the bombs.

There were a lot of fuses, and a lot of different missions profiles for them to fit. The one book I have on WW2 aircraft fuses ( USA only ) has over 30 different fuses, and that's not a complete list.


----------



## stona (Mar 26, 2017)

The two pistols/fuses I cited were in common use on British bombs. Both were armed once the vanes had spun a relatively few times. As soon as the bomb was released the arming wire would be pulled out and as soon as the bomb hit the air stream the vanes would start to spin. It doesn't take long or far for the vanes to spin the fairly few revolutions to arm the bomb.
This would render the majority of bombs dropped on a typical raid liable to detonation. At the beginning of the war Bomber Command dropped about 25% of high explosive bombs with long delay pistols or fuses, usually incorporating an anti-removal/anti-tamper device. This figure diminished as the war progressed and more and more targets were saturated with more powerful, instantaneously exploding bombs.

Take the No. 27 nose pistol already mentioned. This was commonly used for general bombardment.
As the bomb was loaded the closed end of the safety fork (which prevented the rotation of the arming vanes) was fitted with an arming wire, attached to the aircraft. The safety pin at the opposite end (open end) of the fork was now removed. When the bomb was released the safety fork was removed by the arming wire and retained on the bomb carrier. The arming vanes rapidly spun off ( I can count 12 rotations required on my diagram, but it could be a couple more or less, counting threads on a shaft is not easy!), exposing the pressure plate attached to the striker. This would happen with the bomb still close to the aircraft. Any significant blow to the pressure plate would force it and the striker inwards, breaking the shear wire and forcing the striker point on to the detonator percussion cap, thus initiating the detonation chain. Given that most bombs were fused for instantaneous detonation this means that the bomb would explode immediately, and not far from the aircraft.
Whether a bomb was ever likely to receive a suitable impact in the correct place to detonate is another question altogether. I have never read an account when this happened, but it was theoretically possible.
Even the simplest fuses had creep springs and shear wires fitted below or to the striker, ensuring that a solid impact was required to initiate detonation, a glancing blow would not do it.

The crucial point is the amount of time after the bomb left the aircraft for it to be armed. I don't think it took far or long for the vanes to unwind in a 200mph wind. Given that most British bombs used in general or area bombardment had zero delay (they were fused for instantaneous detonation) delay is completely irrelevant.

Some fuses were very complicated and elaborate devices but most of those commonly used were not. Perhaps the simplest of all was the Tail Pistol No. 58 Mk I used on both the Grand Slam and Tallboy bombs. The reason for this was that in operating in such a simple, mechanical, way it was very unlikely to malfunction (essentially the heavy striker had only to bend a piece of cross shaped brass on impact). The bombs to which it was fitted were neither plentiful, nor cheap, and duds were extremely undesirable.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## tyrodtom (Mar 26, 2017)

I not familiar with British WW2 fuses, but I an with USA WW2 fuses, because we were still using them when I was in USAF munitions in the 60's.
Most of the fuses we used at NKP were of the quick arming , not instant arming, medium delay type for low altitude use.

I see no logic in using a quick arming fuse for a bomb dropped from high altitude, though I can see that a bomb dropped from high altitude needs no delay, except a very long delay in some to hinder recovery efforts .

I suppose the logic in using a quick arming fuse is that's it's mechanically simple, the less there is to that could go wrong, the less that will go wrong. Also cheaper to make.
Most fuses are little mechanical marvels, when you using them by the millions, economics have to come into play.


----------



## stona (Mar 26, 2017)

tyrodtom said:


> I suppose the logic in using a quick arming fuse is that's it's mechanically simple, the less there is to that could go wrong, the less that will go wrong. Also cheaper to make.
> Most fuses are little mechanical marvels, when you using them by the millions, economics have to come into play.



I think you have hit the nail on the head. 

Some more complicated and expensive fuses/pistols were used. Nos 53 and 53A (no chance of a mix up then) gave a 30 or 60 minute delay. The No.37 Mk V could be set for delays from 6 to 144 hours by a combination of acetone (in a breakable ampoule) and celluloid discs and included an anti-removal device. Although I suspect you know exactly what the various parts I have mentioned are, a description of this device would fill a couple of pages. It was complicated and expensive and, unsurprisingly, rarely used. 
A good example of the cost versus effect of a device is provided by the No. 845 Anti-Disturbance Nose Fuse. When fully armed this electrically initiated device would trigger an instant detonation on even a slight movement of the bomb. It was abandoned in 1943, manufacturing costs were high as it was a complicated device, and since the Germans had a similar device of their own they understood that freezing the fuse would temporarily cut off the electrical supply rendering it temporarily ineffective. The problem was handling it quickly before it warmed up !

The British did use some barometric fuses (Nos. 860 and 896 nose and Nos. 867,885 and 886 tail were common examples) but mainly in flares, target indicators, and other pyrotechnics for marking.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## tyrodtom (Mar 26, 2017)

The British anti-disturbance fuse you're describing sounds a lot like the fuse the US was still using during the 60's, seems like I can remember from school that it was developed by the British, and we adopted it. But that school was 50 years ago.

How to disarm it was classified above our clearance and need to know while we was in school, but EOD was in on it's method of safe removal. I figured out on my own it probably involved extreme cold.

There was a bad accident with a anti-disturbance fuse at Cam Ranh Bay. A fire( sabotage) on the flight line threatened a whole line of aircraft. A flight line crew member tried to remove the fuses from the bombs to make them less likely to explode if the fire spread.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Mar 27, 2017)

If it was armed it would be sensitive to any movement, but the system was quite complicated. It was only after the arming vanes had wound out and the arming spindle broken off that the sequence, which included a 20 second delay to allow the bomb to come to rest, could completed. The bomb had to hit something hard enough to cause the relevant parts to be driven forward (essentially an inertia ring, held back by a spring, this was a nose fuse) to initiate the arming sequence. After this, the firing circuit would be completed, except for a mercury tilt switch. Any subsequent movement of the bomb would cause the mercury to move, completing the circuit.

Unfortunately accidents are always possible, and one or two British fuses were unpopular with the armourers who evidently thought they were a bit dodgy and potentially dangerous.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Informative Informative:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Robert Porter (Mar 27, 2017)

Best way I know to defuse any bomb is hit it with a bigger one! EOD would not be a good career choice for me of that I am certain. My hat is off to those that can. Me I prefer to read about it.


----------



## tyrodtom (Mar 27, 2017)

Not just movement of the bomb could set the fuse off, but any movement of the fuse itself, like unscrewing it.
But the bomb would have to be armed for the anti-tampering devices to work , you'd think.

But the fuse had a red tag that went on it, that warned that once installed it was not to be unscrewed. The tag was removed before flight.

But it would be hard to determine exactly what happened at Cam Rahn Bay, everyone who was close enough to witness the events, died in the explosions
.
They did know there wasn't enough time or people available to start the aircraft and move them, or to remove the bombs, but they could defuse the bombs. The detonating explosives in any fuse are a lot more sensitive to high temperatures than the explosives in the bomb itself.


----------



## stona (Mar 27, 2017)

tyrodtom said:


> Not just movement of the bomb could set the fuse off, but any movement of the fuse itself, like unscrewing it.
> But the bomb would have to be armed for the anti-tampering devices to work , you'd think.



Yes indeed. Very often a bomb, once uncovered, would be rolled or otherwise moved in an effort to access the fuses/pistols....with fatal consequences. If the fuse was readily accessible, then any attempt to remove it would have the same consequences.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## wuzak (Mar 28, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> WWII Mentality / Post-War Mentalities on Area Bombing
> 
> *Public Relations on USAAS Bomber Usage: Mitchell Era*
> The general focus was on the use of bombers as defensive, against attacking ships. Essentially, the idea was that large bombers would be able to accurately hit ships at altitude beyond effective range of defensive guns and sink them effectively.
> ...



I'm not 100% sure, but I believe that Mitchell was OK with bombing cities. Where he differed from Trenchard and Douhet is that he didn't think that the bomber would always get through, and that the number one priority for the air force was to destroy the enemy's air force.

Reactions: Informative Informative:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## pbehn (Mar 28, 2017)

The problem with the "bomber will always get through" theory was that it didnt mention how many didnt get back.

Reactions: Agree Agree:
1 | Winner Winner:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Zipper730 (Mar 28, 2017)

wuzak said:


> I'm not 100% sure, but I believe that Mitchell was OK with bombing cities. Where he differed from Trenchard and Douhet is that he didn't think that the bomber would always get through, and that the number one priority for the air force was to destroy the enemy's air force.


He was okay with it, but wasn't too open with expressing it at first except possibly to a few people in specific circumstances. Later on he became more open.

The idea of knocking out the air-force on the ground was highly desirable: In truth the bombers usually did often get through, but the issue was how many.


----------



## Zipper730 (Mar 28, 2017)

stona said:


> Essentially, yes.
> The automatic system actually flies the aircraft to the release point where it triggers the bomb distributor. I wrote that for this final part of the bomb run, once the sight has been locked onto the aiming point, the sight acts as little more than a timer, but it was an infinitely more complicated instrument than that.
> As soon as a bombardier hits a manual release button/switch it does indeed activate the bomb distributor.


So what circumstances were the manual mode used over the non manual auto-release?


> We should not ignore the German Lofte 7D sight either. Like the Norden and SABS this was a tachometric sight and like the Norden was connected to a system which effectively allowed the sight to fly the aircraft automatically to the target and release the bombs. the SABS did not do this (nor did the Mk XIV), as simpler system called the Bombing Direction Indicator displayed necessary course corrections to the pilot on later versions, earlier ones required the bomb aimer to call out corrections to the pilot as seen in many old war films. The British even considered using some captured Lofte sights, but this provoked a near mutiny at Farnborough where the boffins were developing the British sights!


Why not just use the Lotfe? Regardless, what advantages did SABS have over us?


----------



## stona (Mar 29, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> So what circumstances were the manual mode used over the non manual auto-release?
> Why not just use the Lotfe? Regardless, what advantages did SABS have over us?



When using the Norden to aim then the automatic mode would have been used, it was an integral part of the system.

Why not use a T-34, or an 88mm flak gun? Nobody had a monopoly on good ideas or equipment. The Mk XIV was as good as the Lotfe and the SABS was better. It's one thing incorporating some aspects of another device into your design but quite another reverse engineering it for mass production, particularly when you already have an equivalent device in development. I don't know how many intact and usable Lotfe sights fell into our hands, but I vaguely remember that the discussion was about fitting them to Blenheims, which might not have been a brilliant idea.

The SABS was statistically the most accurate bomb sight of the war, its why No. 617 (and 9) Squadrons used it to drop extremely large bombs onto extremely precise targets, like viaducts, V-1/V-2 sites and battle cruisers. No. 617 Squadron achieved an average radial error of 125 yards from 20,000 feet in the period February to March 1945. In the same period another 'precision' squadron, No. 9, using the Mk XIV achieved an average radial error error of 195 yards. This is the best comparison we have between the two British sights.
Comparisons are difficult, it is not just the sight that influences accuracy. In this period, visually, the USAAF was typically placing about 30% of bombs within 330 yards of the target, which is widely comparable to Bomber Command with its Mk XIV by day, but the skill of the bomb aimers/ bombardiers becomes an important factor.
No 617 Squadron was a specialist precision bombing unit, and who knows how many hours they spent over the practice ranges, honing their skills.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## pbehn (Mar 29, 2017)

stona said:


> The SABS was statistically the most accurate bomb sight of the war, its why No. 617 (and 9) Squadrons used it to drop extremely large bombs onto extremely precise targets, like viaducts, V-1/V-2 sites and battle cruisers. No. 617 Squadron achieved an average radial error of 125 yards from 20,000 feet in the period February to March 1945.




The issue is further complicated by the nature of "earthquake bombs" themselves. The RAF crippled the Tirpitz by hitting close but not the ship itself, not knowing this they made another raid which hit and sank it. The raid on the V3 site hit it when actually it was supposed to narrowly miss, more devastation is caused by the bomb exploding deep under the foundations, in any case the V3 site was wrecked. On a viaduct they didnt want to hit it, if the bomb struck a column it may well just explode above ground, exploding alongside but deep underground destroyed the bridge and its foundations. The bombing height was also a compromise between accuracy and the speed of the bomb, in theory the bomb should be supersonic or close to it for maximum penetration but the height needed for this affected accuracy.


----------



## wuzak (Mar 29, 2017)

pbehn said:


> The bombing height was also a compromise between accuracy and the speed of the bomb, in theory the bomb should be supersonic or close to it for maximum penetration but the height needed for this affected accuracy.



And the height at which a Lancaster could actually carry the bombs (especially the Grand Slam).

Reactions: Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## swampyankee (Mar 29, 2017)

pbehn said:


> The issue is further complicated by the nature of "earthquake bombs" themselves. The RAF crippled the Tirpitz by hitting close but the ship itself, not knowing this they made another raid which hit and sank it. The raid on the V3 site hit it when actually it was supposed to narrowly miss, more devastation is caused by the bomb exploding deep under the foundations, in any case the V3 site was wrecked. On a viaduct they didnt want to hit it, if the bomb struck a column it may well just explode above ground, exloding alongside but deep underground destroyed the bridge and its foundations.



I think the USAAF had units of comparable skill, but that kind of accuracy could not be realized in anything other than small unit raids. As an aside, at least one of the bombs dropped on the Tirpitz went through the ship and detonated underneath.


----------



## pbehn (Mar 29, 2017)

wuzak said:


> And the height at which a Lancaster could actually carry the bombs (especially the Grand Slam).


He He Wuzak it could be a topic all by itself, for example the Tirpitz was at sea level but a viaduct isnt. I saw a video with the bomber of the V3 site discussing the raid. He said he was instructed to aim at it and it was hoped that the inaccuracy in the system as a whole would produce a narrow miss. He hit the concrete but near the edge so the bomb did wreck all the underground workings and tunnels.


----------



## stona (Mar 29, 2017)

In all cases the bombs were aimed at the targets, I have both heard and read several first hand accounts to confirm this.

Tirpitz had been attacked twice previously with 'Tallboys' the worst damage being done by a tallboy which hit the bow, passing through to explode in the water. She was certainly damaged by near misses. On the successful November raid, both British and US reports agree that the most damaging strike was the second (arguably) direct hit which passed through decks and armour before detonating in a filled wing tank near the torpedo bulkhead of the port engine room.









The dome at Wizernes was undermined by the bombs, but, again, the bomb aimers aimed at the dome. Some near misses were almost guaranteed given an average radial error (at that time) of close to 200 yards.

Several direct hits were scored on viaducts and similar, but most remember the near miss from a Grand Slam bomb which collapsed a substantial portion of the Schildesche Railway Viaduct, near Bielefeld, because the RAF had started to film these raids for propaganda purposes.

Tall Boys were dropped operationally from as high as 18,000ft, but Grand Slams from around 12,000 ft.

Cheers

Steve

Edit: the bomb illustrated above blew the port side and bottom of the ship out (and the torpedo bulkhead in) from frame 98 to frame 132 and across roughly 1/3 of her beam.
Bomber Command's ORS report (S.218) on the attack was published in May 1945.

Reactions: Informative Informative:
4 | Like List reactions


----------



## pbehn (Mar 29, 2017)

Our posts overlapped Steve, you cannot tell a bomb aimer to deliberately miss. With the Tirpitz a hit was the desired result though a near miss was almost as good. With the V3 and viaducts a narrow miss was preferred, the only way to get this is to aim to hit it.

Reactions: Agree Agree:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## pbehn (Mar 29, 2017)

It just occurred to me that a hit on the bow is possibly further away from the aiming point than a near miss amidships.


----------



## stona (Mar 29, 2017)

It was a good hit. When USN divers examined the wreck after its final sinking they estimated that this bomb (from the September 15th raid) had destroyed the front 100' of the bow and buckled or ruptured the 'shell' plating for 150'. The front 120' of the ship was flooded to some extent. None of this damage had been repaired by the time of the final raid. Had the Allies known this they probably wouldn't have bothered with the succeeding raids, Tirpitz was going nowhere.

It is generally accepted now that Tirpitz sustained three direct hits on the final November raid, the first near turret 'Bruno' the second as above, and the third near turret 'Caesar'. Nearly 16,000lbs of of high explosive will seriously ruin your ship. Several other bombs landed to the port side of the ship, three of them were close enough to inflict more serious damage.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## pbehn (Mar 29, 2017)

Not questioning that it was a good hit or not, just that if you take the funnel as the aiming point then it is possible to be closer to the funnel and miss the ship than a hit in the bow is. I was just discussing accuracy, in this case a hit is not always more accurate in terms of the bombing than miss is. Happily most targets are not the shape of a battleship.


----------



## Zipper730 (Apr 1, 2017)

stona said:


> When using the Norden to aim then the automatic mode would have been used, it was an integral part of the system.


So basically it would be almost never unless it didn't release automatically, or for some sort of training purpose?


> The SABS was statistically the most accurate bomb sight of the war, its why No. 617 (and 9) Squadrons used it to drop extremely large bombs onto extremely precise targets, like viaducts, V-1/V-2 sites and battle cruisers. No. 617 Squadron achieved an average radial error of 125 yards from 20,000 feet in the period February to March 1945. In the same period another 'precision' squadron, No. 9, using the Mk XIV achieved an average radial error error of 195 yards. This is the best comparison we have between the two British sights.
> Comparisons are difficult, it is not just the sight that influences accuracy. In this period, visually, the USAAF was typically placing about 30% of bombs within 330 yards of the target, which is widely comparable to Bomber Command with its Mk XIV by day, but the skill of the bomb aimers/ bombardiers becomes an important factor.


Thought this might sound redundant, but average radial error = CEP, or 100% of the bombs falling in the radial error?

As for skill and precision that obviously goes a long-way.

The next questions I'm going to ask go quite a bit away from World War II but have to do with bombing carried out with various Cold War Equipment all the way up through Vietnam. I'm curious as to the CEP's achievable by bombers such as the B-47 and B-52 early on (1955 - 1965), and later (1965-1972).


BTW: I haven't been posting much because of a criminal justice course that requires a power-point created and creating a power-point with bibliographies frankly are exasperating.


----------



## fubar57 (Apr 1, 2017)

The last question could be asked in the appropriate era...Other Eras WW2Aircraft.net Forums

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Apr 1, 2017)

Average radial error and circular area probable are not the same.
Average radial error is precisely that, the average displacement of all the bombs dropped from the aiming point. It is a good measure of both accuracy and precision. It's why the British used it for specialist precision bombing units like No. 617 Squadron. They also used it for the fighter bombers of the tactical air forces.
Circular error probable is the radius of a circle, centred on the aiming point, within which 50% of the bombs will fall.
Cheers
Steve

Edit : CEP is a good measure of accuracy (what percentage of bombs fall close to the target) but not precision/concentration (the overall number of bombs that fall close to the target). 50% of bombs may fall within 300 yards of the aiming point, but 20% may fall literally miles away.

You can achieve a very precise/concentrated bomb fall, but which falls a long way from the aiming point, which is precise but inaccurate.

You can achieve a much less precise/concentrated bomb fall which is accurately centred on the aiming point, which is accurate but imprecise (see CEP above)

You can achieve a concentrated bomb fall accurately centred on the target, which is both accurate and precise. A small average radial error shows these criteria to have been met which is why the system was used to assess the accuracy and precision of the specialised precision bombing squadrons.

Reactions: Informative Informative:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## Zipper730 (Apr 4, 2017)

fubar57 said:


> The last question could be asked in the appropriate era...Other Eras WW2Aircraft.net Forums


I can do that: I'm just unsure if it would be logical to create a thread that would basically be a duplicate on another forum.




Stona said:


> Average radial error and circular area probable are not the same.
> Average radial error is precisely that, the average displacement of all the bombs dropped from the aiming point. It is a good measure of both accuracy and precision. It's why the British used it for specialist precision bombing units like No. 617 Squadron. They also used it for the fighter bombers of the tactical air forces.


Did the USAAF or USN ever use Average Radial Error at all?


----------



## stona (Apr 5, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> I can do that: I'm just unsure if it would be logical to create a thread that would basically be a duplicate on another forum.
> 
> 
> Did the USAAF or USN ever use Average Radial Error at all?



We've already discussed what method the USAAF used.
I don't know about the USN. Given that it tended to be bombing small targets which require both precision and accuracy to hit, it wouldn't surprise me if they did calculate average radial error.

CEP seems to have become a fairly standard method, dating back to its use for the fall of artillery. I would suppose the strikes from an artillery barrage and the bomb fall from a bomber formation have a lot in common, but the application of common sense rather than any expertise (which I don't have in such analyses) can lead to erroneous conclusions 

Cheers

Steve


----------



## fubar57 (Apr 5, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> I can do that: I'm just unsure if it would be logical to create a thread that would basically be a duplicate on another forum.



.....but it's OK to duplicate here???


----------



## Zipper730 (Apr 5, 2017)

fubar57 said:


> .....but it's OK to duplicate here???


I don't mean responding to two people at once, I mean creating essentially a redundant thread. This thread is about bombing accuracy, so I figure it might be frowned upon to place a thread that's essentially the same in another forum.

Do we understand each other?


----------



## pbehn (Apr 5, 2017)

Stona, was there any separation between bombing error in the North /South and East/West (fore aft/port starboard) It is referred to as a radial error but I would think it would be an ovoid shape depending on altitude and other factors.


----------



## stona (Apr 6, 2017)

The actual pattern of bombs might well be non circular, but radial error is calculated as a function of a circle. In the most extreme example, if all the bombs fell in a straight line across the target, they would delineate (in this hypothetical case, literally) the diametre of an imaginary circle and a radial error can be calculated.

The average radial error can be greater than the CEP (obviously). For Typhoons attacking nine 'pin point targets' in late 1944/early 1945 the average radial error was 158 yards, but 50% of bombs fell within 130 yards of the target (the CEP).

Some targets required a different analysis. For attacks on a railway line only the error to each side of the target is relevant. This the British called a 'line error'. For British fighter bombers in the same period the average line error was 69 yards, but 50% of bombs fell within 50 yards of the target. Because these errors are line errors they do not represent an average radial error or CEP, for all we know the 320 bombs plotted might have extended for miles either side of the railway line!

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Zipper730 (Apr 6, 2017)

I'm curious if members would prefer it if I would create a thread on the Cold War era forum? The moderators, would I get in trouble?

It's about the technology and speed at the time...


----------



## GregP (Apr 27, 2017)

No, we don't Zipper. This is a WWII forum, not a post-WWII forum. You'd be better off using the correct forum and staying on-topic, creating another thread for subjects that wander off-topic. Basically, one thread should have one central question. Other subjects are properly in another post. That way, you can find them later instead of remembering that it was discussed somewhere, but you can't ever FIND it again.

Cheers.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Zipper730 (Apr 28, 2017)

Okay

Reactions: Optimistic Optimistic:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Koopernic (Apr 29, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> So basically it would be almost never unless it didn't release automatically, or for some sort of training purpose?
> Thought this might sound redundant, but average radial error = CEP, or 100% of the bombs falling in the radial error?
> 
> As for skill and precision that obviously goes a long-way.
> ...




CEP "Circular Error Probable" refers to the radius of the circle within which 50% of bombs fall.

Typically, for a Gaussian distribution, 47% of the remaining bombs fall within one and two CEP radii and the remainder outside that.

I think everyone measured differently. I suspect the Germans may have used 60% CEP instead of 50% because its close to the 63% of the Gaussian distribution.

The CEP was easiest to evaluate from post strike analysis.


----------



## swampyankee (Apr 29, 2017)

There was a lot of exaggeration, possibly most from the USAAC/USAAF, about how accurate high-altitude bombing could be. 

Complicate that with the limited load capacity of bombers of the era, overestimation of the vulnerability of factories and other targets, and underestimation of the vulnerability of bombers to interceptors, and you have a perfect set up for failure on strategic terms, and that is exactly what happened to the USAAF's original bombing strategy.


----------



## Zipper730 (Apr 30, 2017)

I'm curious if the bombsight technology we developed influenced the fire control system on interceptors? I ask because some of the interceptors we used were automated up the wazoo to levels that were often unnecessary.

As a comparison

Norden Bombsite

With airspeed, heading, and altitude...
The bombsite is adjusted so as to compute the ground-speed and predict correct impact point...
The site is basically run on a timer at that point, ticking down until...
Bomb release
USAF Radar & Fire Control Systems: F-86D, F-102A, F-106A, etc

Target is acquired with radar and locked on
Fire control system computes interception vectors, and gains control over the aircraft to maneuver it into position for...
Weapons release, and then
Breakway
While a bit off topic, I'm just curious if the level of automation used for interceptor FCS is based on...

The NBS
Coincidentally to the operational needs of an interceition


----------



## stona (Apr 30, 2017)

swampyankee said:


> There was a lot of exaggeration, possibly most from the USAAC/USAAF, about how accurate high-altitude bombing could be.
> .



Every single air force with a bomber was guilty of that exaggeration. 
In the case of the British, in the 1930s, this even led to a roughly ten year flirtation with the idea of precision bombing which ran contrary to everything it had stood for 1916 and which wouldn't finally be abandoned until 1942. There were many reasons for this flirtation, I would argue primarily the realisation that the service simply didn't have enough bombers, let alone suitable bombers, to carry out a strategic campaign,meaning it would have to attempt something which was contra-doctrinal or risk losing it's independent bomber force altogether.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## pbehn (Apr 30, 2017)

stona said:


> Every single air force with a bomber was guilty of that exaggeration.


Companies trying to sell things tend to be enthusiastic. I have some sympathy with the USA military and manufacturers on this. The theoretical question of hitting a target from a high altitude is different from hitting targets in Europe and Japan which have huge and unknown (in USA) wind speeds at those altitudes.


----------



## swampyankee (Apr 30, 2017)

A war game referee deciding if a practice bomb is close enough to destroy something is also different than a target's destruction being decided by laws of physics.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## wuzak (Apr 30, 2017)

pbehn said:


> Companies trying to sell things tend to be enthusiastic. I have some sympathy with the USA military and manufacturers on this. The theoretical question of hitting a target from a high altitude is different from hitting targets in Europe and Japan which have huge and unknown (in USA) wind speeds at those altitudes.



The problem for the USAAF was that they tested the Norden bomb sight in unrealistic conditions. That is, at altitudes below what would actually be used (around 10,000ft rather than 20,000-30,000ft), in clear desert skies and with no simulated opposition, either from fighters or flak.

Then they took these results and used them to claim the incredible accuracy the Norden allowed, talking up the "pickle barrel" accuracy. And their propagandists ran with it.


----------



## pbehn (Apr 30, 2017)

wuzak said:


> The problem for the USAAF was that they tested the Norden bomb sight in unrealistic conditions. That is, at altitudes below what would actually be used (around 10,000ft rather than 20,000-30,000ft), in clear desert skies and with no simulated opposition, either from fighters or flak.
> 
> Then they took these results and used them to claim the incredible accuracy the Norden allowed, talking up the "pickle barrel" accuracy. And their propagandists ran with it.


Well they would wouldnt they? No one would say "no chance of hitting anything there on five days out of six"


----------



## Shortround6 (Apr 30, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> I'm curious if the bombsight technology we developed influenced the fire control system on interceptors? I ask because some of the interceptors we used were automated up the wazoo to levels that were often unnecessary.
> 
> As a comparison
> 
> ...




They were about 10 years apart in timing. 

And when you are talking about stopping nuclear armed bombers just how much "aid/help" to the pilots in *ALL WEATHER *conditions is too much or unnecessary?


----------



## Koopernic (Apr 30, 2017)

swampyankee said:


> I think the USAAF had units of comparable skill, but that kind of accuracy could not be realized in anything other than small unit raids. As an aside, at least one of the bombs dropped on the Tirpitz went through the ship and detonated underneath.



I don’t think that American Tacticians or Strategists exaggerated the Norden bombsight as much as underestimated the effects of European cloud cover and the ferocious German resistance. Also formation bombing produces a spread of bombs related to the dimensions of the formation.

I am not overly impressed with SABS II or the supposed unique accuracy of 617 squadron in bombing the stationary and moored Tirpitz (Operation Catechism 12 December 1944). Both the USAAF (Norden) and Luftwaffe (Lofte 7) had gyro stabilised wind and motion correcting bombsights that were as good and crews that could and did perform their drills just as well and courageously in the face of equally or more terrible opposition. (There was no fighter opposition to catechism due to treachery of the German officer who was in command at the Wassermann radar station, he certainly sent confusing information and was in contact with Norweigen Resistance who were agents of the British)

The Tirpitz had a dimension of 250m x 36m which would produce a deck area of 4500sqm. The Lancasters attacked from staggered altitudes of 12000ft up to 16000ft. At that altitude the Tirpitz had a dimension of 0.7% to 7% of altitude. It's the same area as a 76m/84 yard diameter circle. The average radial error of 125 yard often quoted for the SABS II subtends a circle smaller than the length of the Tirpitz's length. The deck area of the Tirpitz is probably around 4500sq meters and the area of the 125 yard circle is less than 40,000 sq meters. Assuming that 30 bombs are aimed and 15 are dropped within that circle then the average chance of a hit for each individual bomb is about 12%. Get 15 bombs in that circle and the compounded chances of a hit are 1-0.88ˆ15 or 89%. This doesn't take into account the clustering of the bombs about the centre. Perhaps 'line errors' are more appropriate given the Tirpitz's dimensions.

I'm thinking of the 1942 Fw 200C4 Condor attack on Convoy Faith in which the Focke Wulf seemed to hit a 12-15 knot ships from similar altitudes about 33% of the time with a stick of either 2 or 4 bombs. The escort ships used their speed and manoeuvrability to narrowly evade several bombs as the fall time would have been around 30 seconds but the cargo vessels were too slow.

Some of of the USAAF bridge busting raids using B-26 would have been equally impressive and certainly more important than sinking a crippled stationary battleship in Norway while Germany was surrounded on all sides.

It's plausible that in similar circumstances of no air opposition that Luftwaffe Dornier Do 217M could have conducted a similar raid with a single SC 1700kg bomb, a pair of 900L drop tanks and additional 700L fuel tank in the rear torpedo bay bomb bay. The straight line distance Murmansk-> Tromso->Edinburgh is less than 2400km/ 1440 miles.

Part of the SABS 2 bombsights reputation comes from the fact it was used with elite squadrons. The standard MK 14 bombsight was used by average crews as well as elites. The Mk 14 couldn't calculate the offset required to compensate for target motion by tracking target or wind rift like the Norden, SABS or Lofte 7 but it could be set up with an wind drift estimate calculated elsewhere e.g. The path finders. It's Trick was bombing in a slide or while manoeuvring. It was used at night so target tracking was mute or used at low level facing forward in a mosquito.

The Luftwaffe also had the Fritz-X guided bomb which was aimed by a computing bombsight and would have had the same accuracy as a normal but was terminally guided. Corrections were possible 500m in range and 300m in cross range.

A practised bombardier could manage to guide 50% of the bombs to within a 15 m (50 ft) radius of the aiming point, and about 90% hit within a 30 m (100 ft) radius (other sources say 60% hits within 4.6 metre radius)


----------



## stona (May 1, 2017)

pbehn said:


> Companies trying to sell things tend to be enthusiastic.



As do services, including air forces/air arms, competing for a slice of an always limited and sometimes severely limited military budget. This was particularly true of the relatively newborn RAF competing against the Royal Navy and to a lesser extent the Army in the 1920s and 1930s.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## stona (May 1, 2017)

swampyankee said:


> A war game referee deciding if a practice bomb is close enough to destroy something is also different than a target's destruction being decided by laws of physics.



This applied to the criteria by which bombers were judged to have successfully shot down fighters and by which fighters failed to shoot down bombers in many pre-war exercises. The referees simply pandered to, or indulged, the prevailing prejudices.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## stona (May 1, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> I am not overly impressed with SABS II or the supposed unique accuracy of 617 squadron in bombing the stationary and moored Tirpitz (Operation Catechism 12 December 1944).



You can't make any meaningful comment on the accuracy of any sight based on one raid. Of the aircraft attacking, eighteen were equipped with the SABS and twelve with the Mk XIV sight and nobody knows whose bombs went where (see Bomber Command's ORS Report S.218). It is, in the context of a discussion of the accuracy of SABS, almost completely irrelevant. In any case three bombs struck Tirpitz and at least another seven (maybe ten, depending who you believe) landed within the torpedo nets, three very close to the ship, which is remarkably accurate bombing. Six of twenty nine bombs dropped either hit or landed close enough to severely damage the target. Whether a specially trained Norden equipped unit of US bombers in Europe could have come close to this is a moot point as it couldn't have carried a tallboy to make the attempt. The Americans had earlier declined to make the Norden sight available to the British.
The facts are that the SABS, of which less than 1,000 were ever made, in the hands of No. 617 Squadron, achieved an average radial error of 125 yards in all assessed operations between January and March 1945. Given that many of these raids were with special ordnance almost all were assessed.
The Mk XIV bomb sight, used by two other specially trained 'precision' squadrons achieved an error of 195 yards in the same period. The SABS was statistically and in reality a more accurate sight. The above figures were rarely achieved by US bombers equipped with Norden sights, which might explain why British interest in it quickly waned and it was rejected when finally offered late in the war.
ALL US bombers were supposed to be precision bombing, at least as far as the public back home was concerned, yet their results were often worse than those achieved by the RAF's area raids at night. In the last quarter of 1944, for bombs dropped by the USAAF in Europe under conditions of good visibility (as the RAF enjoyed for 'Catechism' ) the figures show that B-17s dropped 13.1% and B-24s a mere 8.8% within 500 feet/ 166 yards of the aiming point with the Norden sight.
The main draw back of the SABs when compared with the Mk XIV (though not the Norden) was the tactical limitations imposed by a long, straight and level bomb run. The Mk XIV required a ten second run and could be used in a climb or glide, allowing a greater degree of tactical freedom, though Bomber Command still attempted to limit evasive manoeuvres. The SABS was also complicated and difficult to manufacture and required skilled maintenance, certainly when compared with the Mk XIV.
Cheers
Steve

Reactions: Informative Informative:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## Koopernic (May 3, 2017)

stona said:


> You can't make any meaningful comment on the accuracy of any sight based on one raid. Of the aircraft attacking, eighteen were equipped with the SABS and twelve with the Mk XIV sight and nobody knows whose bombs went where (see Bomber Command's ORS Report S.218). It is, in the context of a discussion of the accuracy of SABS, almost completely irrelevant. In any case three bombs struck Tirpitz and at least another seven (maybe ten, depending who you believe) landed within the torpedo nets, three very close to the ship, which is remarkably accurate bombing. Six of twenty nine bombs dropped either hit or landed close enough to severely damage the target. Whether a specially trained Norden equipped unit of US bombers in Europe could have come close to this is a moot point as it couldn't have carried a tallboy to make the attempt. The Americans had earlier declined to make the Norden sight available to the British.
> The facts are that the SABS, of which less than 1,000 were ever made, in the hands of No. 617 Squadron, achieved an average radial error of 125 yards in all assessed operations between January and March 1945. Given that many of these raids were with special ordnance almost all were assessed.
> The Mk XIV bomb sight, used by two other specially trained 'precision' squadrons achieved an error of 195 yards in the same period. The SABS was statistically and in reality a more accurate sight. The above figures were rarely achieved by US bombers equipped with Norden sights, which might explain why British interest in it quickly waned and it was rejected when finally offered late in the war.
> ALL US bombers were supposed to be precision bombing, at least as far as the public back home was concerned, yet their results were often worse than those achieved by the RAF's area raids at night. In the last quarter of 1944, for bombs dropped by the USAAF in Europe under conditions of good visibility (as the RAF enjoyed for 'Catechism' ) the figures show that B-17s dropped 13.1% and B-24s a mere 8.8% within 500 feet/ 166 yards of the aiming point with the Norden sight.
> ...




The Norden couldn't be measurably less accurate than the SABS 2. 

In principle the SABS 2 worked the same way and didn't add any computational refinements: Both sights were gyrostabilised, calculated the true ground speed of the aircraft by tracking an object near the target or the target itself. This was done by the bombardier setting the speed of variable speed electric motors that moved the optics till the target remained steady in the cross hairs.. The motion of the optics was linearised to account for the bombsights angle of view and altitude hence the speed of the motors was proportional to the ground speed.

They used this true speed over ground to calculate offsets to compensate for target motion and or winds.

What the SABS Bomb sight had to achieve in bombing the Tirpitz was +/- 0.28 (0.56) degrees accuracy for the beam and +/- 2.0 (4.0) degree for the length of the Bismarck which isn't very high.

Neither sight had Ballistic data for the bomb. The bombardier used tables and dialled in bomb fall time, bomb trail error (compared to a bomb dropped in vacuum) and air speed.

Probably the most impressive level bombing successes was achieved by the lofte 7D carried on three Fw 200 Condors of III/KG40 who in July 1943 attacked Convoy Faith. Each of the 3 Fw 200 dropped 4 250kg bombs and achieved 4 hits on 3 moving ships sinking 2 and burning out one. The attacks were carried out from 15000 ft under fire from the escorts.

I have no doubt the Norden could achieve almost as well.

Nor can I imagine the Norden and SABS 2 were ever compared apples to apples. The Americans bombed deep inland targets that could be hard to identify and only the lead bomber of the widely spread formation aimed. 617 squadron however had a clearly identifiable target in Tirpitz. No mistakes. However 617 bombing accuracy was terrible the month before under operation obviate due to the German fog cloud.

The Tallboy was a very precisely made and large dense supersonic armour piercing bomb resistant to deviations due to wind gusts that weighed over 10000lbs. The USAF was dropping 1000lb light case GP bombs with a blunt nose. The smaller slower falling bomb would have more manufacturing variation and be more effected by wind disturbances. The USAAF used CEP because the method of evaluation was to draw a circle of radius of the typical CEP with a compass around the aim point, count the total number of craters inside and if there wasn't 50% to slightly enlarge the circle and add in the additional craters till 50% of the total bombs were counted. If you want mean radial errors you have to individually measure distances from the crater to the aim point. Apart From being slow to evaluate it didn't make sense with formation drops nor provide an idea of bomb density. Most US CEP must have been form formation drops that covered hundreds of yards. In addition B-24/B-17 bombed from higher altitudes and the dispersion increases.

The MK 14 continuously told the bombardier where the bombs would fall as the aircraft manoeuvred allowing the crew to continuously adjust the flight path till the cross hairs were on target. It more or less worked like the Luftwaffe Stuvi 5B with BZA dive and slide bombing sight though it was the pilot the operated to Stuvi.

The SABS, Norden and Lofte 7 guided the aircraft to the release point upon which the cross hairs were placed.

I don't believe the SABS was superior to the Norden. In accuracy The Norden could have a supplementary device added that alllowed bombing during the climb or dive.

The German Lofte 7 was highly regarded. It was easy to maintaining durable and so tended to work and its optics could track the target much earlier than the Norden.


----------



## stona (May 3, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> I don't believe the SABS was superior to the Norden. In accuracy The Norden could have a supplementary device added that alllowed bombing during the climb or dive.
> .



Nor do I, but the much vaunted Norden was no better which explains why the RAF rejected it when it was finally offered. The Mk XIV was considered to be the equal of the Norden by the RAF boffins, though I am unaware of any British comparative testing of the Norden and Mk XIV. 

The RAF's 'precision' squadrons achieved better accuracy with the SABS and MK XIV than the USAAF achieved with the Norden. Of course those RAF squadrons were trained for precision bombing, but then so, theoretically, were all those USAAF bombardiers. Time and time again the reinforcement and repetition of the US doctrine of 'precision bombing' appears in all sorts of documents, and some officers ended up jumping through some very odd hoops to reconcile this with the bombing accuracy actually achieved, even in good visual conditions.

When Bomber Command looked at data for 57 late 1944 night raids against _'lightly defended'_ targets (like French marshalling yards, easily within Oboe range), it found the mean overall systematic error to be 300 yards and the mean random error to be 385 yards. The Mk XIV bomb sight was investigated as a possible source of error, but it was concluded that the device should give an accuracy of _"about 130 yards"_ at 10,000 feet, that is only about 30% of the random error. The same report added that the SABS had an *operational *error of 120 yards at 10,000 feet (another report says 125 yards) and 170 yards at 16,000 feet.
For_ 'heavily defended'_ targets, a sample of six were analysed, all in Germany, the two errors rose to 1080 yards (systematic) and 1460 yards (overall average). The scientists felt the errors were weighted by the relative inaccuracy of the H2S marking used on one of the six raids. Clearly the error caused by the accuracy of the bomb sight used was a small percentage of the overall errors. Tactics and bombing techniques had a far larger impact on the accuracy of bombing than any error in the bomb sights used. The most critical factor in bombing accuracy was always the weather.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Koopernic (May 3, 2017)

stona said:


> Nor do I, but the much vaunted Norden was no better which explains why the RAF rejected it when it was finally offered. The Mk XIV was considered to be the equal of the Norden by the RAF boffins, though I am unaware of any British comparative testing of the Norden and Mk XIV.
> 
> The RAF's 'precision' squadrons achieved better accuracy with the SABS and MK XIV than the USAAF achieved with the Norden. Of course those RAF squadrons were trained for precision bombing, but then so, theoretically, were all those USAAF bombardiers. Time and time again the reinforcement and repetition of the US doctrine of 'precision bombing' appears in all sorts of documents, and some officers ended up jumping through some very odd hoops to reconcile this with the bombing accuracy actually achieved, even in good visual conditions.
> 
> ...



Very good clear data. I suspect there was very little difference between the SABS 2, Norden or Lofte 7 in terms of instrument error. What would make a difference is factors that automated the sight and reduced crew workload. This then alleviates the crew stress and time overload in combat. Post war bombers had Doppler radar to measure ground speed which was fed into the inertial navigation system from whence it was available to the bombsight. This would have eliminated the need to track a ground target and greatly alleviated crew workload. Storing bomb fall data in memory that automatically updates every factor also does this. 

When the AZON bomb was used in Europe its accuracy was worse than free fall bombs. Under heavy FLAK the bomb aimer would end up making less corrections due to sensory overload and what was thought maybe would make a quick correction, hope for the best, and allow the pilot to take evasive action. There was some electronic records taken of the stick inputs. In the Far East acurate high altitude FLAK was less of a problem and the AZON could be controlled as planned.

The crews of 617 squadron were no doubt not only technically skilled they had the ability to execute their drill without being effected by massive stress and distractions. I wouldn't call it courage maybe resolve, moral certitude, pragmatism. Not sure. I knew a Swedish guy who could execute a somersault in a ski mobile skidoo. I asked how he learned and he said he built a ramp in his backyard and was fearless of getting hurt once he had worked out how to do it. I suspect he would have made a good bombardier. He had infinity girlfriends.

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (May 4, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> I suspect there was very little difference between the SABS 2, Norden or Lofte 7 in terms of instrument error.



Probably hard to measure anyway, and being a very small factor in the overall errors measured operationally. Accuracies achieved by all these sights on peaceful bomb ranges were very different for those achieved operationally, with the exception of the SABS, but it was a very special case, used in a special way, and hardly comparable with the others which equipped the majority of the combatant bomber forces.

The British did test the Lofte sight and were impressed with it, though not enough to cause them to abandon or alter the Mk XIV (the SABS came along later).

Post war the RAF used developments of the Mk XIV/T-1 sight in its V-bombers. The SABS seems to have been a dead end, and as far as I know nobody has written a reference for it, nor do any exist in the public domain.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## stona (May 4, 2017)

Apparently the figures taken from the analysis of those fifty seven raids on lightly defended targets are quoted in Wikipedia as definitive figures for the Mk XIV bomb sight. A perfect example of how data taken out of context and misused can lead to confusion and errors. The correct context for those figures is exactly as I posted above; they certainly do not represent definitive operational errors for the Mk XIV sight.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## Zipper730 (May 9, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> They were about 10 years apart in timing.
> 
> And when you are talking about stopping nuclear armed bombers just how much "aid/help" to the pilots in *ALL WEATHER *conditions is too much or unnecessary?


I was talking about the philosophy of use of automation, not the technology being exactly the same




Koopernic said:


> I am not overly impressed with SABS II or the supposed unique accuracy of 617 squadron in bombing the stationary and moored Tirpitz (Operation Catechism 12 December 1944).


Was SABS II better able to calculate the ballistics of bombs at supersonic speeds? I remember being told we had trouble calculating ballistics for bombs dropping at supersonic speeds?


> Some of of the USAAF bridge busting raids using B-26 would have been equally impressive and certainly more important than sinking a crippled stationary battleship in Norway while Germany was surrounded on all sides.


I have no idea to be honest.


> Neither sight had Ballistic data for the bomb. The bombardier used tables and dialled in bomb fall time, bomb trail error (compared to a bomb dropped in vacuum) and air speed.


Could we do this too?


----------



## Cpt. John (May 9, 2017)

Ok, the ww2 USAAF bombing run was pretty accurate. Some bombardiers could be really accurate and hit the target with 80-85% of precision.Then the bomb sight, was vary good. I think was the best one in the 1940s.But at an alt. of 25.000ft it's very difficult to spot the target so , the man was everything, not the machine .Then , the istruments could help him to bomb it .


----------



## stona (May 9, 2017)

Cpt. John said:


> Some bombardiers could be really accurate and hit the target with 80-85% of precision..



That doesn't mean anything at all. There is no such thing as a percentage of precision. The accuracy of bombing in good visual conditions, where the bombardiers could see the target with the Mk 1 eyeball, has already been posted in this thread.
Cheers
Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## wuzak (May 10, 2017)

Cpt. John said:


> Ok, the ww2 USAAF bombing run was pretty accurate. Some bombardiers could be really accurate and hit the target with 80-85% of precision.Then the bomb sight, was vary good. I think was the best one in the 1940s.But at an alt. of 25.000ft it's very difficult to spot the target so , the man was everything, not the machine .Then , the istruments could help him to bomb it .



I wouldn't be surprised if 80-85% was the percentage of bombs dropped on the country that was the target of the raid.


----------



## GregP (May 10, 2017)

I would.


----------



## Koopernic (May 10, 2017)

stona said:


> Probably hard to measure anyway, and being a very small factor in the overall errors measured operationally.
> 
> Post war the RAF used developments of the Mk XIV/T-1 sight in its V-bombers. The SABS seems to have been a dead end, and as far as I know nobody has written a reference for it, nor do any exist in the public domain.
> 
> ...



Wikipedia says that coastal command mosquitos which used the Mk.XIV with a radar Altimeter didn't have the 10'second run up restriction which to me suggests that the 10 second run up was only to let the altimeter or variometer stabilise. Post war V force bombers received a Doppler navigation radar to update the INS "green satin" that could measure true ground speed and drift and this could be fed into the Mk.14 directly rather than being manually set. At that point the SABS had no advantage. When Britain dropped its first a-bomb in Maralinga from a Vulcan it was from 30,000ft using the MK.XIV after a radar run up. The bomb was of target 40 yards in azimuth and 100 yards down range. Besides bomb fall times of 50 seconds and targets that were 10km ahead of the bomber couldn't realistically be tracked.


----------



## Koopernic (May 10, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> I got a couple of questions regarding aerial-bombing, particularly level-bombing with iron-bombs...
> 
> I. Measuring Average Error
> 
> ...



Mean racial error is roughly standard deviation. If you assume a Gaussian or Normal curve distribution 68% of bombs should fall within one standard deviation. Since CEP is 50% of bombs so mean radial error is roughly 36% greater than CEP. (From 68/50) Bomb accuracy like IQ is Bell Shaped.

Roughly 50% of bombs within one CEP, 47% greater than one CEP but less than two CEP and 3% outside of that.


----------



## Zipper730 (May 11, 2017)

stona said:


> Post war the RAF used developments of the Mk XIV/T-1 sight in its V-bombers. The SABS seems to have been a dead end, and as far as I know nobody has written a reference for it, nor do any exist in the public domain.


I would have never thought they'd have developed the Mk.XIV over a gyro-stabilized system, but looking at Koopernic's data regarding the Vulcan's bomb/nav system using data fed from the doppler-updated INS into the Mk.XIV, those accuracy figures look fantastic.

Provided the numbers are right, that provides mean radial error (for an oval at least) of 271.7 feet, and a CEP of 213.9 to 215.6 feet. That looks better than our B-52's at the same altitude. I'm not sure what era this was from, but that looks better than some of our stats from Vietnam.




Koopernic said:


> Wikipedia says that coastal command mosquitos which used the Mk.XIV with a radar Altimeter didn't have the 10'second run up restriction which to me suggests that the 10 second run up was only to let the altimeter or variometer stabilise.


Makes sense to me


> Post war V force bombers received a Doppler navigation radar to update the INS "green satin" that could measure true ground speed and drift and this could be fed into the Mk.14 directly rather than being manually set.


What period of time was the Doppler and Green-Satin system used?


> When Britain dropped its first a-bomb in Maralinga from a Vulcan it was from 30,000ft using the MK.XIV after a radar run up. The bomb was of target 40 yards in azimuth and 100 yards down range.


Wait... it successfully landed a bomb 300 feet ahead of and 120 feet to the side of the aim point?


----------



## pbehn (May 11, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> I'm not sure if I'm missing anything here, but if I do my math 63+27 = 100%: Am I correct to assume it's 27% instead of 26%.


63 + 27 = 90

63% +27% only equals 90% when they are percentages of the same.

Gaussian function - Wikipedia
Standard deviation - Wikipedia


----------



## Zipper730 (May 12, 2017)

Deleted


----------



## pbehn (May 12, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> I'm sorry, I meant 37%. I'm not sure why I made such a silly miscalculation



I give up.


----------



## Zipper730 (May 12, 2017)

Uh, I don't know how to do either the Standard Deviation or the Gaussian function. Algebra is the highest I've gone in math -- you'll have to bear with me.

Regardless am I supposed to use 1.26 x CEP = Average Radial Error?


----------



## pbehn (May 12, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> Uh, I don't know how to do either the Standard Deviation or the Gaussian function. Algebra is the highest I've gone in math -- you'll have to bear with me.
> 
> Regardless am I supposed to use 1.26 x average radial error to get CEP?


I dont know it is not my subject and it wasnt my post, I just pointed out that 26 + 64 doesnt equal 100 On almost every issue you seem to want the most simplistic answer to complex questions. To understand CEP read about it but to understand it you need a basic knowledge of statistics.

wiki says this.
The original concept of CEP was based on a circular bivariate normal distribution (CBN) with CEP as a parameter of the CBN just as μ and σ are parameters of the normal distribution. Munitions with this distribution behavior tend to cluster around the mean impact point, with most reasonably close, progressively fewer and fewer further away, and very few at long distance. That is, if CEP is _n_ meters, 50% of rounds land within _n_ meters of the mean impact, 43% between _n_ and _2n_, and 7% between _2n_ and _3n_ meters, and the proportion of rounds that land farther than three times the CEP from the mean is approximately 0.32%.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (May 12, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> When Britain dropped its first a-bomb in Maralinga from a Vulcan it was from 30,000ft using the MK.XIV after a radar run up. The bomb was of target 40 yards in azimuth and 100 yards down range. Besides bomb fall times of 50 seconds and targets that were 10km ahead of the bomber couldn't realistically be tracked.



If this is Operation Buffalo, then a low yield (3 kiloton) version of the 40 kiloton 'Blue Danube' weapon was dropped from 35,000 ft and from a Valiant on 11th October 1956. The aircraft was WZ366 of 1321 Flight, 49 Squadron, piloted by Squadron Leader T Flavell. Both he and the bomb aimer, Flight Lieutenant E Stacey, were awarded the Air Force Cross for their part in the operation.

There has been much criticism of this series of tests, but the original plan, to drop a 40 kiloton weapon to explode at 1,200 ft was abandoned because of worries that the fuzing system might fail causing an explosion at ground level. The 3 kiloton weapon, which functioned perfectly, exploding at 500 ft as planned, was a safety compromise.
Operation Antler, a series of tests designed to perfect the Blue Danube and Red Beard warheads were planned for Maralinga in September/October 1957, but were cancelled when plans were made for the the second phase of the British nuclear programme, the dropping of the first thermo-nuclear megaton weapons in what would be known as Operation Grapple. Maralinga was not a suitable venue, Christmas (Kiritimati) Island and Malden Island were the selected venues instead.
Incidentally the first series of Grapple tests, between 15th May and 19th June 1957, three weapons were dropped dropped from 45,000ft, again by three different Valiants (XD818, XD822 and XD833) of 49 Squadron, exploding at 8,000ft above Malden Island to prevent the fireball touching the ground and causing "excessive radiation problems." Further weapons were dropped in subsequent tests over Christmas Island before the final two were detonated, suspended from tethered balloons. In September 1958 Britain's 'H-Bomb' was available to the V bomber force.

The Valiant was the only British bomber to drop a live nuclear weapon, neither the Victor nor the Vulcan ever did. The ban on atmospheric testing probably ensured this.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Koopernic (May 13, 2017)

stona said:


> If this is Operation Buffalo, then a low yield (3 kiloton) version of the 40 kiloton 'Blue Danube' weapon was dropped from 35,000 ft and from a Valiant on 11th October 1956. The aircraft was WZ366 of 1321 Flight, 49 Squadron, piloted by Squadron Leader T Flavell. Both he and the bomb aimer, Flight Lieutenant E Stacey, were awarded the Air Force Cross for their part in the operation.
> 
> There has been much criticism of this series of tests, but the original plan, to drop a 40 kiloton weapon to explode at 1,200 ft was abandoned because of worries that the fuzing system might fail causing an explosion at ground level. The 3 kiloton weapon, which functioned perfectly, exploding at 500 ft as planned, was a safety compromise.
> Operation Antler, a series of tests designed to perfect the Blue Danube and Red Beard warheads were planned for Maralinga in September/October 1957, but were cancelled when plans were made for the the second phase of the British nuclear programme, the dropping of the first thermo-nuclear megaton weapons in what would be known as Operation Grapple. Maralinga was not a suitable venue, Christmas (Kiritimati) Island and Malden Island were the selected venues instead.
> ...



The "book" I used was on the Topic of the Vulcan, however description for the 3kt blue Danube test did mention that the Valiant was used.

Bomb error was 100 yards down range of target and 40ft (not 40 yards) cross range to 40ft.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Old Wizard (May 13, 2017)




----------



## pbehn (May 13, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> Uh, I don't know how to do either the Standard Deviation or the Gaussian function. Algebra is the highest I've gone in math -- you'll have to bear with me.
> 
> Regardless am I supposed to use 1.26 x CEP = Average Radial Error?


Zipper you seem to misunderstand what statistics are about. People collect information and compile them to make sense and draw conclusions. The normal or gaussian curve is frequently used because many sets of data form a Gaussian curve or spread. In specific fields with specific data the gaussian curve may be useless or inaccurate. In tems of new born babies (as an example) babies height and weight will have a spread which is Gaussian or normal but the spread of boys and girls isnt because 99% are either boys or girls and about 51% of babies are boys. CEP was developed because munitions are specific, bombs and missiles spread around an aiming point are similar to a Gaussian spread in some cases and different in others. CEP was developed to provide useful information on targetting, it may be possible to convert to another measure or it may not. Some Laser guided missiles hit the target or they self destruct and so they have no spread on impact. CEP is also not a measure of accuracy it is a measure of "grouping" around a mean point, the difference between this point and the aim point is the "bias" which is also a useful measure as it shows up errors in the aiming system.

Reactions: Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Robert Porter (May 13, 2017)

To add to what pbehn said above. Statistical analysis is certainly useful, but typically the more variables involved, the more difficult it gets to derive useful information from the data collected in a statistical fashion. And of course that assumes the data collected is both accurate and complete. The fact that there are many sources of data for bombing campaigns in WW2 is the source of a lot of confusion. Since there is no single agreed to source. Different groups gathered different data during different years etc. For instance there is not even an agreed to percentage of total bombs dropped to total of unexploded bombs. It varies, depending on the source, from a low of about 2% to figures as high as 40% that I have seen. I would imagine the truth is somewhere in between. 

There were times when bomb damage assessment could not reliably be performed, weather, other priorities, equipment failure etc. Then there is of course a somewhat subjective nature to BDA, when one is counting impacts in a built up area it can be difficult to discern each individual impact, some are buried under rubble some were obliterated by subsequent overlapping impacts. 

All of this means that while every effort was made to obtain accurate information for each bombing it was just not always possible. In some cases statistical means were used to "fill in the gaps" in data, in other cases there was a real effort to identify effectiveness of certain formations, bomb size and type, bomb loads etc. Very little of this data was gathered during peacetime, a lot of it was done "on the fly" during the war. 

In essence any effort to apply mathematically rigorous analysis to something that happened almost 80 years ago with missing and conflicting data sources is foredoomed to failure. There is a lot of good data to be derived but there is no one magic formula such as you appear to be trying to apply. This truly requires extensive research almost month to month and being aware of how data collection, and with what emphasis, was used. It is why authors, good ones anyway, spend literally years in musty archives attempting to tease out ever last piece of relevant data.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## pbehn (May 13, 2017)

Robert, good post, only one thing I would add is that in WW2 your enemy deliberately tried to stop you getting good data and introduced false data for propaganda and defense purposes, I am thinking here about the lies spread about V1 and V2 hits on London, British lies that resulted in changes to the targeting that produced less hits not more for the Germans.

This happens even today, with the tragic arguments about whether a building is or was a hospital and who told who what and when.

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (May 14, 2017)

To add to the excellent points above, the Americans used group pattern analysis precisely because they couldn't distinguish individual bomb strikes, but could more often (but by no means always) discern group patterns. The US analysts used 'vertical' photographs taken by PR aircraft accompanying the missions, 'vertical' photographs taken by some of the bombers and, for blind bombing, 'scope' photographs taken of the H2X display (one every sixteen seconds on the bomb run up to bomb release, others less frequently).
The Americans analysed each group's bomb fall, from all its aircraft, as if it was the result of a single aiming operation.

The British, by night, didn't even attempt to to see individual bomb strikes, they were estimated by a rather complicated extrapolation from the bombing photograph which all the bombers took.

Both air forces undertook BDA by photographic reconnaissance, but this too was fraught with difficulties, some mentioned above. The best data came very late in the war, when the men of the various allied ORS were able to examine recently bombed areas as they fell into allied hands. This is why some of the data for tactical operations, and for the strategic bombers in a tactical role, in direct support of ground operations, is so good.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## pbehn (May 14, 2017)

Another point just occurred to me. Watching old video on "The World at War" some USA bombers released all bombs together, while others were on some sort of spaced release about half a second between each bomb. In the latter case only the first bomb was actually released onto the target.


----------



## stona (May 14, 2017)

There was discussion about the US intervalometer (British automatic bomb distributor) earlier. The settings obviously altered the size of each bomber's pattern, or more correctly the distribution of its salvo. An American analysis from 1943 explains.

_"A ship's load will be dropped in a train, by intervalometer or manually, producing a "stick" of bursts along the track. From typical altitudes (20,000-25,000 feet) the sticks from each plane depart widely from the theoretical rectilinear equispaced configuration, and sticks from different ships are usually mingled in quite haphazard fashion. The resulting aggregate of bomb bursts on the ground take the form of a very irregular cluster or "blob", in which practically no system or order is discernible. This cluster is known as the "pattern" but it should of course be pointed out that it is a pattern by courtesy only; the many careful probability studies which have been made on the assumption that aircraft can drop bombs in a true pattern with equally spaced rows and columns bears no relation to the type of bombing now under discussion."
_
The size of a bomb pattern varied widely according to many factors, intervalometer settings, altitude, type of ordnance etc., but the average US pattern in 1943 covered an area 3,700 feet (1128 m) long and 2,500 feet (762 m)wide.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Informative Informative:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Zipper730 (May 14, 2017)

pbehn said:


> Zipper you seem to misunderstand what statistics are about. People collect information and compile them to make sense and draw conclusions.


I understand that, so there's no confusion here...


> The normal or gaussian curve is frequently used because many sets of data form a Gaussian curve or spread. . . CEP was developed because munitions are specific, bombs and missiles spread around an aiming point are similar to a Gaussian spread in some cases and different in others. CEP was developed to provide useful information on targetting, it may be possible to convert to another measure or it may not.


So, in some cases they aren't even compatible? Certain laser-guided ordinance being an example?


> CEP is also not a measure of accuracy it is a measure of "grouping" around a mean point, the difference between this point and the aim point is the "bias" which is also a useful measure as it shows up errors in the aiming system.


I thought accuracy was basically how close you hit to where you actually intended to hit?


> Another point just occurred to me. Watching old video on "The World at War" some USA bombers released all bombs together, while others were on some sort of spaced release about half a second between each bomb. In the latter case only the first bomb was actually released onto the target.


I'm surprised nobody connected the dots. I'd have figured if the bombs came out in 3-6 seconds, I'd have started bomb-release 1.5 to 3 seconds before the target was reached. That way if some bombs landed long, the earlier releases would have struck their target, if I landed short, the late releases would smack the target. Also when it came to releases, it seemed the first few bombs started to come out, then the bulk came out in the middle, then a few more came out at the end (at least looking at the B-52, it looked like that).



stona said:


> To add to the excellent points above, the Americans used group pattern analysis precisely because they couldn't distinguish individual bomb strikes, but could more often (but by no means always) discern group patterns. The US analysts used 'vertical' photographs taken by PR aircraft accompanying the missions, 'vertical' photographs taken by some of the bombers and, for blind bombing, 'scope' photographs taken of the H2X display (one every sixteen seconds on the bomb run up to bomb release, others less frequently).


There were photo-reconnaissance P-38's and stuff along with B-17's and B-24's with photo-flash bombs and the H2X scopes to analyze impacts (how does that work, when the radar return starts changing from a building being altered in shape)?


> The Americans analysed each group's bomb fall, from all its aircraft, as if it was the result of a single aiming operation.


And since we had been planning to use formation bombing for self-defense, it was the most simple way of analyzing all the data in one fell swoop...


> The British, by night, didn't even attempt to to see individual bomb strikes, they were estimated by a rather complicated extrapolation from the bombing photograph which all the bombers took.


And they collated all the photographs, and then used them to roughly estimate each aircraft's accuracy, each squadron, and so on...


> There was discussion about the US intervalometer (British automatic bomb distributor) earlier. The settings obviously altered the size of each bomber's pattern, or more correctly the distribution of its salvo. An American analysis from 1943 explains.
> 
> _"A ship's load will be dropped in a train, by intervalometer or manually, producing a "stick" of bursts along the track. From typical altitudes (20,000-25,000 feet) the sticks from each plane depart widely from the theoretical rectilinear equispaced configuration, and sticks from different ships are usually mingled in quite haphazard fashion. The resulting aggregate of bomb bursts on the ground take the form of a very irregular cluster or "blob", in which practically no system or order is discernible._


So all the bombs sort of mixed in with the bomb-trains of all the other aircraft in the formation?


> The size of a bomb pattern varied widely according to many factors, intervalometer settings, altitude, type of ordnance etc., but the average US pattern in 1943 covered an area 3,700 feet (1128 m) long and 2,500 feet (762 m)wide.


And, to recap, the formations used in 1943 were around 2340 feet wide, and narrowed to 500 yards or 1500 feet by 1944?


----------



## Shortround6 (May 14, 2017)

"I thought accuracy was basically how close you hit to where you actually intended to hit?"

*Accuracy* is a much abused or overworked word and needs to taken in context. 

How close you come to where you actually intend to hit might be called _practical _accuracy. It is dependent on the _mechanical _accuracy of the weapon/weapon system as in rifle bullet and rifle or the consistent fall of a an aircraft bomb. However you then need figure in the accuracy (or limits) of the sighting system plus the effects of environment as in differences due to temperature or cross winds/headwinds or visibility. For moving platforms (aircraft/ships/tanks etc) the steadiness of the platform comes into consideration and then you finally get to the human error or human differences. 

If somebody quotes test range "accuracy" what they _may_ be measuring is the _mechanical _accuracy of the weapon or system with the fewest variables. It gives the best numbers but will probably never be equaled in the field. Measuring results in the field throws everything together and while useful from a planning standpoint has so many variables that trying to isolate any one factor to work on it for improvement is very difficult. 

For instance if you are getting a result of a CEP error of xxx when bombing from 20,000ft on city YYY do you need a better bomb sight?, or better weather forecasting (wind direction/speed at different altitudes)?. a steadier bomber ( less yawing/oscillating)? or maybe you need more quality control on the tail fins on the bombs (better uniformity/fewer dents/dings) so the bombs actually fall closer to each other. 
Or maybe you need to put a better head rest on the bomb sight so the bomb aimers in different planes have a more consistent eye position when looking through the sight if individual bombing? 

For proper analysis you need a combination of the two. WHY isn't performance in the field coming close to test results? 

Unless you are sure that various sources are comparing the same thing and doing it the same way (same conditions) things can get very confusing very quickly.


----------



## stona (May 15, 2017)

I have already described the 'table cloth' produced for a British raid. It gave a timeline for the raid and information on when and where every aircraft bombed.

The point made about the pattern actually created by a formation in practice, as opposed to a theoretical model, is that it made the probability studies on which the number of bombs and bombers required to destroy a target had been calculated irrelevant. Bombs simply didn't fall in the neat theoretical rows and columns used as a basis for the studies.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## pbehn (May 15, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> I understand that, so there's no confusion here...
> 
> *Obviously there is some confusion because you said this:-*
> 
> ...

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Reluctant Poster (May 21, 2017)

wuzak said:


> _View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MHz3DBwYVyo_
> 
> 
> This is loading bombs into a B-29.
> ...



An interesting film showing a very dangerous occupation. The telling quote is " We've lost too many men..." My uncle was an amourer in WWII. He had a few stories to tell about fatal accidents involving bombs or machine guns.


----------



## Reluctant Poster (May 21, 2017)

stona said:


> To add to the excellent points above, the Americans used group pattern analysis precisely because they couldn't distinguish individual bomb strikes, but could more often (but by no means always) discern group patterns. The US analysts used 'vertical' photographs taken by PR aircraft accompanying the missions, 'vertical' photographs taken by some of the bombers and, for blind bombing, 'scope' photographs taken of the H2X display (one every sixteen seconds on the bomb run up to bomb release, others less frequently).
> The Americans analysed each group's bomb fall, from all its aircraft, as if it was the result of a single aiming operation.
> 
> The British, by night, didn't even attempt to to see individual bomb strikes, they were estimated by a rather complicated extrapolation from the bombing photograph which all the bombers took.
> ...


Anyone interested in the allied efforts at bomb damage assessment should read this book:Amazon product
_View: https://www.amazon.com/Targeting-Third-Reich-Intelligence-Campaigns/dp/0700616829_
Another interesting read is:Amazon product
_View: https://www.amazon.com/Science-Bombing-Operational-Research-Command/dp/0802096298/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1495372785&sr=8-1&keywords=the+science+of+bombing+operational+research+in+raf+bomber+command_

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Old Wizard (May 21, 2017)




----------



## stona (Jun 15, 2017)

Whilst looking through some 'Bomber Command stuff' for information relating to Lancaster armour (still haven't found it!) I did find, in Henry Probert's biography of Harris, the text of a letter written to Trenchard on 14th April 1943 which explains Harris' views on 'panacea targets' in his own words. Trenchard had earlier written to Harris, asking how he might counter those asking why the German rubber industry in Hannover was not being targeted.

_"What your critics say about the rubber industry in Hannover applies with equal force to the rubber industry all over Germany, upon which we have already wreaked considerable incidental damage while carrying out operations of a more general description. I do not believe in 'panacea' targets, eg oil, rubber, ball bearings. Specialising on one such means that the enemy concentrates all his defences, and nothing else in Germany, including morale and housing is likely to suffer. If the 'panacea' fails all is lost. Finally I distrust experts and specialists on 'panacea' commodities...for example a fortnight after we were told Germany was nearly on the rocks for oil she staged the biggest campaign in history [Russia] using billions of gallons. Not even the 'oily boys' attempted to laugh that off. They just hid their heads for a spell and now raise the same song again."_

Overy has summed up Harris' hostility to panaceas. He wrote that his hostility arose

_"because he [Harris] realised that an enemy economy and social structure could not be dislocated by an attack on just one of its many elements with the prospect of forcing a decision."
_
A strange contradiction on the issue of morale is that in 1947 Harris himself would concede:
_
"The idea that the main object of bombing German industrial cities was to break the enemy's morale proved to be totally unsound; when we had destroyed almost all the large industrial cities in Germany the civil population remained apathetic, while the Gestapo saw to it that they were docile, and in so far as there was work for them to do, industrious."
_
And yet various German historians have since disagreed. Horst Boog (whatever you make of him) wrote.
_
"If the morale of the civilian population is defined as their will to continue to work for the war effort, then German morale was not broken. But it was certainly weakened, as recent studies have revealed, especially in cities suffering heavy attacks. People continued to do their duty in a fatalistic and apathetic mood, and this did not increase their devotion to the political cause and to productivity."
_
Gotz Bergander, who has written extensively about Dresden and interviewed many people who suffered under the bombing, something Harris could never have done, goes even further.
_
"In reality, the air raids on cities shook the foundations of the war morale of the German people. They permanently shattered their nerves, undermined their health and shook their belief in victory, thus altering their consciousness. They spread fear, dismay and hopelessness. This was an important and intentional result of the strategic air war, of this warfare revolution."
_
History is almost by definition an ever evolving organism. We cannot draw an arbitrary line post war at, say, the publication of the USSBS and imagine that it gives the definitive account of the campaigns.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Bacon Bacon:
1 | Like Like:
1 | Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## buffnut453 (Jun 15, 2017)

Great post, Steve. We are talking about large system-of-systems activities where it's often hard to associate cause and effect. For example, the German oil production industry was one of many vital target categories but hitting that alone won't eradicate existing stockpiles, hence the tactical and operational impacts are unlikely to be felt for some considerable time. 

Harris's use of the term "panacea" is, perhaps, not the best application of the English language. "Silver bullet" might be a more apposite aphorism relative to killing the monster that was Nazi autarky.


----------



## stona (Jun 15, 2017)

buffnut453 said:


> Harris's use of the term "panacea" is, perhaps, not the best application of the English language. "Silver bullet" might be a more apposite aphorism relative to killing the monster that was Nazi autarky.



Yes. In every example I've seen Harris puts the word 'panacea' in inverted commas which is a slightly odd use even for the time. I think he knew that opponents had latched on to his use of the word and was in some way detaching himself from it, though not from his principles and objection to such targets.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## buffnut453 (Jun 15, 2017)

Perhaps. I suspect he was not objecting to the targets per se but, rather, to the focus on a single target type as being the one to hit in order to win the war. He had a clear view of the complexity of national economy and the need to engage a range of target types to achieve strategic victory. Facilities producing oil, rubber and ball bearings were all important targets but so were many others, including the entire logistics train from stockpiles to tactical distribution ("warehouse to warrior" if you will).


----------



## Zipper730 (Jun 19, 2017)

stona said:


> A strange contradiction on the issue of morale is that in 1947 Harris himself would concede:
> _
> "The idea that the main object of bombing German industrial cities was to break the enemy's morale proved to be totally unsound; when we had destroyed almost all the large industrial cities in Germany the civil population remained apathetic, while the Gestapo saw to it that they were docile, and in so far as there was work for them to do, industrious."_


Ironic isn't it?


> And yet various German historians have since disagreed. Horst Boog (whatever you make of him) wrote.
> _
> "If the morale of the civilian population is defined as their will to continue to work for the war effort, then German morale was not broken. But it was certainly weakened, as recent studies have revealed, especially in cities suffering heavy attacks. People continued to do their duty in a fatalistic and apathetic mood, and this did not increase their devotion to the political cause and to productivity."
> _
> ...


Yeah, but it didn't stop them from continuing.

Hiroshima and Nagasaki almost failed if it wasn't for a final thousand plane raid that happened to interfere with a plot to overthrow the emperor and prevent a recorded message getting out. I suppose it trimmed a 2-6 weeks off the war


----------



## tyrodtom (Jun 19, 2017)

The thousand plane raid number must be including escorts too. There were 400 B-29's over Japan on Aug 14 during the day, and 300 that night.
The blackout during the raid might have added some confusion to the plot to stop the Emperor's broadcast, but the real cause of it's failure was just inept planing.


----------



## stona (Jun 20, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> Yeah, but it didn't stop them from continuing.



No, but they didn't want to continue against the western powers, they were pushed into a corner on this one.

There will be endless debate about the achievements of the strategic bombing offensives, but, as I've said before, we must ask the correct questions. 
The first question should not be to ask what the German economy achieved under the bombing, but what it might have achieved had there been no bombing campaigns. 
The second question should be to establish the resources devoted by Germany to defending the campaign (from manpower to artillery, ammunition, aircraft, etc.) 
The third should be to establish the resources devoted to mitigating it's effects (from dealing with the bombed out population and destroyed housing stock, building massive underground factories and other bomb proof structures like U-boat pens or V-2 launch sites). The answers to the second two questions are unclear, but they required a huge effort in manpower and materiel when Germany could least afford either.
The last question, for me, would be the effect on the morale of the population, despite this being a primary target at the time. Time has shown that the effect was much greater and more debilitating than the authors of the post war reports ('panacea merchants' to a man) were prepared to concede. I've waded through every page of everyone of them, and they are all written to some extent confirm a prejudice. This applies more to the BBSU report on which Zuckerman's baleful influence is obvious.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Agree Agree:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## tyrodtom (Jun 20, 2017)

Anyone familiar with the work world knows there is a great deal of difference between the production you can get out of people that are well rested, not worried about what they're going to encounter when they get home, and people tired , wondering if they'll even have a place to sleep that night.

Reactions: Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Jun 20, 2017)

tyrodtom said:


> Anyone familiar with the work world knows there is a great deal of difference between the production you can get out of people that are well rested, not worried about what they're going to encounter when they get home, and people tired , wondering if they'll even have a place to sleep that night.



The British and Germans knew it. One of the great successes of the Light Night Striking Force was not in the physical damage a few 500lb bombs or 'cookies' could do but in causing widespread air raid alarms all over the Reich. The problem with the effect of this kind of disruption is that it is not easily quantifiable, you can't measure what effect getting up in the middle of the night and going into shelter had on Herr or Frau Average's productivity, but it was certainly significant and the Germans acknowledged this. On longer nights many of the LNSF's Mosquitoes would make two raids, maximising the disruption throughout the night. Even if we can't measure the effect most can imagine being woken once or twice a night by air raid alarms, taking to shelter and awaiting the all clear. It is hardly an experience likely to increase one's productivity the next day. The aircraft don't have to drop bombs anywhere near you to cause the disruption, but the possibility that they might is in itself stressful.
Cheers
Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Jun 20, 2017)

Re: the moral or indirect effects of bombing.

Imagine you are a German soldier called Wilhelm T and you receive this letter from your wife Ingeborg.

_"Dear Bill, At the moment it is once again unbearable; day and night ceaseless alarms. This tears so much at the nerves that are anyway already shattered, that I'm afraid I will go mad if the war with all its terrible consequences does not end soon. Yesterday and today the bombers were in Munster, at midday today in Hamm. When will it be Soest's turn? I dare not go out of the house, I don't dare settle down to sleep. I drift along in constant crisis and torment."
_
Soest is a small town about 30 miles east of Dortmund, 35 miles south east of Munster.

The letter was sent in May 1944. This clearly demonstrates the crisis faced by Ingeborg, but it must have had an effect on her absent husband too. This is the effect so hard to quantify and hugely underestimated by the airmen and economists who prepared the post war reports.
A Berlin school teacher, Lilo G made the following diary entry in January 1944

_"You rightly observe that the nerves are slowly destroyed. Every evening you wait for the alarm. In the night you wake with a start because you believe that the siren has sounded. Then if it sounds, you go weak at the knees, you hurry, put things on (shirts, three pairs of stockings etc., because whatever you have on is sure to be saved.)"_

This is just two examples, but millions of Germans were living under the same stress and fear.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## buffnut453 (Jun 20, 2017)

stona said:


> The British and Germans knew it. One of the great successes of the Light Night Striking Force was not in the physical damage a few 500lb bombs or 'cookies' could do but in causing widespread air raid alarms all over the Reich. The problem with the effect of this kind of disruption is that it is not easily quantifiable, you can't measure what effect getting up in the middle of the night and going into shelter had on Herr or Frau Average's productivity, but it was certainly significant and the Germans acknowledged this. On longer nights many of the LNSF's Mosquitoes would make two raids, maximising the disruption throughout the night. Even if we can't measure the effect most can imagine being woken once or twice a night by air raid alarms, taking to shelter and awaiting the all clear. It is hardly an experience likely to increase one's productivity the next day. The aircraft don't have to drop bombs anywhere near you to cause the disruption, but the possibility that they might is in itself stressful.
> Cheers
> Steve



I have 3 sons. The first was...well, the first and hence will always be the experimental model. The second was great and was sleeping through the night at 2 months old. The youngest was the exact opposite. We didn't have a complete night's sleep until he was 2 years old. Thus I can tell you from personal experience that enduring disruption of sleep is absolutely EXHAUSTING and affects productivity, sense of humour and many other intangibles. And that was just a baby. Throw into the mix fears of actual bodily harm and I can only imagine the deleterious impact of the combined bombing campaign.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## pbehn (Jun 20, 2017)

stona said:


> Re: the moral or indirect effects of bombing.
> 
> Imagine you are a German soldier called Wilhelm T and you receive this letter from your wife Ingeborg.
> 
> ...


The problem was that the people doing the bombing were not the people Bill was fighting. Theories about bombing an enemy into submission never took into account an army bent on revenge as an ally.


----------



## buffnut453 (Jun 20, 2017)

pbehn said:


> The problem was that the people doing the bombing were not the people Bill was fighting.


Correct, but Wilhelm would be far more worried about his family than would his American counterpart on the other side. The additional worry and stress must have impacted the effectiveness of individual Axis soldiers. As Stona points out, though, quantification of those impacts is incredibly difficult.



pbehn said:


> Theories about bombing an enemy into submission never took into account an army bent on revenge as an ally.


The pre-war theory that a strategic air campaign could somehow induce an enemy to capitulate was massively overstated. Just compare the bomb loads of aircraft available in 1939, when the Wellington was considered a heavy bomber, with those of the Lancaster and B-29. Yet even the big, 4-engined heavies couldn't force the issue on their own. On the flip side, revisionist theories that claim the strategic air campaign had little or no impact on the Axis war effort massively understate the reality. Yes, German production increased throughout most of the war but the constant drain on resources of reconstituting factories, machinery and transportation, the requirement to equip, man, train and sustain air and ground defences, and the lost productivity due to workforce casualties MUST have had a considerable impact on Germany's overall war effort. Just because the Axis continued producing aircraft, tanks, bullets and bombs does not mean they were doing it as well as would have been the case had the strategic bombing campaign not happened.


----------



## Greyman (Jun 20, 2017)

buffnut453 said:


> The pre-war theory that a strategic air campaign could somehow induce an enemy to capitulate was massively overstated.



Luckily the theory was never fully put to the test and everyone pulled their punches. Things might have taken a different turn if the Wellingtons and Heinkels added chemical weapons to the HE and incendiary combo.


----------



## buffnut453 (Jun 20, 2017)

Greyman said:


> Luckily the theory was never fully put to the test and everyone pulled their punches. Things might have taken a different turn if the Wellingtons and Heinkels added chemical weapons to the HE and incendiary combo.



Fair point...but I'm glad it wasn't put to the test.


----------



## stona (Jun 20, 2017)

The people doing the bombing were the people 'Bill' was fighting. The people being bombed were the ones enabling Bill to keep fighting. The ones trying to stop, mitigate or deal with the results of the bombing were not available to reinforce Bill at the front. Every ton of concrete and steel used to protect vital targets from bombing could not be used elsewhere. Every plank of wood or pane of glass used to make a damaged property habitable could not be used elsewhere etc.etc.
It's what total war means.

I very much doubt that the citizens of any German city would agree that any punches were pulled.


----------



## Greyman (Jun 20, 2017)

stona said:


> I very much doubt that the citizens of any German city would agree that any punches were pulled.



You think the German public would be indifferent to the idea of having thousands of tons of poison gas dropped on them in addition to what was already happening? I think they would dislike that notion very much and were glad that 'punch was pulled'.


----------



## pbehn (Jun 20, 2017)

The theories were based on populations being free to express an opinion and demanding an end to hostilities. There was no account given to mad men not allowing any such sentiments or the civilian population being more terrified of occupation and certain death rather than bombing with its chances.


----------



## wuzak (Jun 20, 2017)

stona said:


> The people doing the bombing were the people 'Bill' was fighting. The people being bombed were the ones enabling Bill to keep fighting. The ones trying to stop, mitigate or deal with the results of the bombing were not available to reinforce Bill at the front. Every ton of concrete and steel used to protect vital targets from bombing could not be used elsewhere. Every plank of wood or pane of glass used to make a damaged property habitable could not be used elsewhere etc.etc.
> It's what total war means.



Well put Steve.

Just look at the anti-aircraft defences. Many thousands of men were manning those, while it also involved a significant number of light, medium and heavy guns. All of which would have been very welcome at the front for fighting against the armies of the allies.

An example of how bombing affects construction was the Dams raid. 

Some say the Dams raid was not a great success, others a total failure and some say it was a success.

Its effects may have been short lived in some ways, such as the dam walls being repaired quickly, flood waters receded, etc. But in other ways they lasted until the end of the war.

Some 25,000 people were transferred from the construction of the Atlantic wall to make repairs on the dams. That must have delayed the completion of sections of the defences.


----------



## Zipper730 (Jun 21, 2017)

tyrodtom said:


> The thousand plane raid number must be including escorts too. There were 400 B-29's over Japan on Aug 14 during the day, and 300 that night.


I remember hearing a thousand, I guess they were wrong.


> the real cause of it's failure was just inept planing.


How so?



stona said:


> No, but they didn't want to continue against the western powers, they were pushed into a corner on this one.


In either case, they didn't really have the means to rise up against their government, which had ample resources to keep them in line.


> There will be endless debate about the achievements of the strategic bombing offensives, but, as I've said before, we must ask the correct questions.
> The first question should not be to ask what the German economy achieved under the bombing, but what it might have achieved had there been no bombing campaigns.


The problem is, it's hard to prove a negative: It doesn't mean there's no answer, but it's difficult to tease it out.

While the Germans probably stepped up production prior to the start of the war, the intensified bombing succeeded in causing them to step it up further and further. It's likely that they would have stepped it up anyway had the war advanced, but it's possible that the war taken towards the population centers at first had a stimulus effect at first.

When you exercise, you actually produce microscopic tears in your muscles: The problem is generally short term, as those fibers repair themselves, and then thicken and strengthen to allow themselves to produce more power. As a result, you get stronger and stronger.

As the raids became increasingly more damaging, more and more effort was required to repair everything, kluge factories into place, and get going. Germany had enormous untapped potential which it didn't use at first, but eventually, the ultimate point of failure was air-defense and oil.

Giulio Douhet had pointed out the importance of swiftly taking out air-defenses immediately when initiating a strike, though his premise was that of a sneak-attack, which is usually frowned upon. Billy Mitchell had also talked about how bombers would either need escorts or would need to have air defenses suppressed first in order to perform bombing raids.

In practice, even in 1941, bombers were used as bait, so as to sucker German fighters into the air. The idea was that they could shoot them down without too many bombers getting shot full of holes in the process. By 1944 the idea was repeated but with substantially larger raids, and airfields were also subjected to both bombing and strafing attacks.

Oil was also recognized as a target by the USAAC's Air Corps Tactical School (The RAF probably did too): As early as 1940-1941, the RAF would focus on these targets. When the Area-Bombing directive took hold, these targets were struck far less, and often as diversionary strikes. Starting in 1944: Oil became a priority, and these targets took a massive hammering, and the effect was substantial.

Since nearly motorized vehicle runs on fuel: It basically had a catastrophic effect on all these vehicles. Aircraft consume large quantities of gas, and often weren't able to fly very often, which made it possible to carry out ever more devastating raids.

While Germany would have been greatly more dangerous, economic wise, had they not been struck; one could counter argue that had oil been attacked continuously from 1940-1941, instead of left alone from 1941-1944, and then attacked in earnest, the war would probably have ended in a similar or shorter time.


> The second question should be to establish the resources devoted by Germany to defending the campaign (from manpower to artillery, ammunition, aircraft, etc.)


The fact is that air-defenses were allocated to protect the country regardless of USAAF day-strike, or RAF night-strike. I'd instinctively think that trying to flatten a city would invite more flak, but attacks on oil would presumably generate massive shifting of defense resources as well.


> The third should be to establish the resources devoted to mitigating it's effects (from dealing with the bombed out population and destroyed housing stock, building massive underground factories and other bomb proof structures like U-boat pens or V-2 launch sites).


Underground factories, U-Boat Pens, and V-2 launch sites I would put separate as these targets were not usually aimed squarely at the populace, but at the specific target.


> The British and Germans knew it. One of the great successes of the Light Night Striking Force was not in the physical damage a few 500lb bombs or 'cookies' could do but in causing widespread air raid alarms all over the Reich.


Sleep deprivation...



pbehn said:


> The problem was that the people doing the bombing were not the people Bill was fighting. Theories about bombing an enemy into submission never took into account an army bent on revenge as an ally.


Especially when the Army might have civilian relatives.


> The theories were based on populations being free to express an opinion and demanding an end to hostilities. There was no account given to mad men not allowing any such sentiments or the civilian population being more terrified of occupation and certain death rather than bombing with its chances.


Of course.

In fact on that note, I'm curious what degree of rioting occurred in Hiroshima and Nagasaki after the nuclear weapons were deployed upon them.




Greyman said:


> Luckily the theory was never fully put to the test and everyone pulled their punches. Things might have taken a different turn if the Wellingtons and Heinkels added chemical weapons to the HE and incendiary combo.


I'm not sure how much poison gas the Germans had early on. Later on they'd have the G-series which were and are just awful substances. The British could lay down more poison, but the Germans had nastier stuff later on.

I'm not sure what kind of bioweapons the Germans had, but the British had planned to use Anthrax. If I recall it was expected to produce a 50% death toll to pneumonic effects and varying degrees from others. It would have been so devastating it would have made our nuclear bombs appear trivial by comparison.


----------



## pbehn (Jun 21, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> In fact on that note, I'm curious what degree of rioting occurred in Hiroshima and Nagasaki after the nuclear weapons were deployed upon them.


None,but the nuclear raids did not cause the largest loss of life more died in Toyko. Pre war theories also didnt consider a population dutifully doing as their emperor told them because he was a god. If Hirohito hadnt ordered surrender then Japan would have fought to the end, as they had in many island battles.


----------



## tyrodtom (Jun 21, 2017)

Inept planing.
They didn't know who was with them.
They didn't know who or where their chief opponents were, to neutralize them.
When you're planing a coup, those are understood by most to be essential to it's success.


----------



## stona (Jun 21, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> I
> While Germany would have been greatly more dangerous, economic wise, had they not been struck; one could counter argue that had oil been attacked continuously from 1940-1941, instead of left alone from 1941-1944, and then attacked in earnest, the war would probably have ended in a similar or shorter time..



Oil was attacked by the British from the beginning of the war. The problem was that Bomber Command could not find the targets, let alone hit them. This would not become possible for years. Harris' comment about 'oily boys' and the huge use of oil by the Germans for Barbarossa, at a time when there supply and reserves was supposed to be critical is entirely valid. The economists who advised the targeting committees knew that oil was a potential weak link in the German war economy, but had no concept of how difficult it was to damage.
If we look at oil targets, they were prioritised in the earliest Directives as early as 13th April 1940 (as part of W.A 6 and W.A.8). As of June 1940 oil was demoted in priority, the new top priority being the German aircraft industry, hardly surprising given that the BoB was about to begin. By 13th July oil was back up the list because though_ "the reduction of Germany's oil resources will not have an immediate effect on the activity of the GAF....the effect when felt will be permanent."_ Oil was one of two priority targets given to Peirse in October 1940 and he waged a 'precision' campaign against it until March 1941 with absolutely no results whatsoever. I could carry on like this over the next several years. It was not until Harris took charge at Bomber Command that the specific targeting of oil plants was subsumed by the area bombing campaign, but it never fell off the various lists of priorities.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Juha2 (Jun 21, 2017)

Hello Stona
in fact bombing did some damage to German oil production. I had time to check only three first weeks of Oct 1940 but in the night 14./15. Oct 40 Hydriewerk in Pölitz was hit, production was stopped for about 4 weeks. and in the night 15./16. Oct 1940 Gelsenberg Benzin A.G. was hit, production stop for 4-5 weeks.


----------



## stona (Jun 21, 2017)

Part of the problem is that all the British knew of the results of those two raids was that a 'large oil tank' was set on fire at Kiel. 
Oil is another complicated target system and without resources to go after a substantial part of the system, and keep doing so, the chances of any meaningful success were negligible. 

At this time (late 1940) Bomber Command could rarely muster 100 aircraft. A typical oil raid might be the one against the Leuna plant at Meresburg, flown on the night of 18/19 November, by 11 Whitley's. 

Move forward to 9/10 January 1941 and a huge effort, 135 aircraft (60 Wellingtons, 36 Blenheims, 20 Hampdens and 19 Whitleys), the biggest raid of the month by a substantial margin, was made against oil targets in Gelsenkirchen. Only 56 aircraft reported bombing the designated targets, but in fact none were hit, bombs being distributed over the surrounding towns of Buer, Horst and Hessler as well as Gelsenkirchen itself. That's in an arc 2-4 miles radius to the North and West of the centre of Gelsenkirchen and was actually not bad by the standards of the time, but the Germans were not sure what the targets were. Compare that to the resources devoted to oil targets in the combined bombing offensive just a few years later!

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Zipper730 (Jun 21, 2017)

stona said:


> Oil was attacked by the British from the beginning of the war.


Didn't know that, I thought it started in 1940. Apologies.


> The problem was that Bomber Command could not find the targets, let alone hit them. This would not become possible for years.


Navigation issues?


> Harris' comment about 'oily boys' and the huge use of oil by the Germans for Barbarossa, at a time when there supply and reserves was supposed to be critical is entirely valid.


I never heard such a comment?


> Part of the problem is that all the British knew of the results of those two raids was that a 'large oil tank' was set on fire at Kiel.


So they couldn't tell how much of the refinery was destroyed, and how much oil had been burned away?


> Oil is another complicated target system and without resources to go after a substantial part of the system


I'm not sure I really understand


> At this time (late 1940) Bomber Command could rarely muster 100 aircraft. A typical oil raid might be the one against the Leuna plant at Meresburg, flown on the night of 18/19 November, by 11 Whitley's.


Was that 100 that could be deployed at once, or in the inventory?


> Move forward to 9/10 January 1941 and a huge effort, 135 aircraft (60 Wellingtons, 36 Blenheims, 20 Hampdens and 19 Whitleys), the biggest raid of the month by a substantial margin, was made against oil targets in Gelsenkirchen. Only 56 aircraft reported bombing the designated targets, but in fact none were hit, bombs being distributed over the surrounding towns of Buer, Horst and Hessler as well as Gelsenkirchen itself. That's in an arc 2-4 miles radius to the North and West of the centre of Gelsenkirchen and was actually not bad by the standards of the time, but the Germans were not sure what the targets were.


So nagivation was part of the problem, and the fundamental accuracy was the other?



> Compare that to the resources devoted to oil targets in the combined bombing offensive just a few years later!


Noteworthy...

Reactions: Funny Funny:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Jun 22, 2017)

Shortly after the outbreak of the war, ignoring the ten squadrons of Battles and two of Blenheims detached from the command and operating in France as the Advanced Air Striking Force, Bomber Command's front line strength was 23 squadrons comprising about 280 aircraft.

2 GROUP. Nos. 21, 82, 107, 110, 114, 139 Squadrons (101 Squadron non-operational) equipped with Blenheims.

3 GROUP. Nos. 9,37,38,99,115,149 Squadrons (214 and 215 Squadrons non operational) equipped with Wellingtons.

4 GROUP. Nos. 10, 51, 58, 77, 102 Squadrons (78 Squadron non operational) equipped with Whitleys.

5 GROUP. Nos. 44,49,50,61,83, 144 Squadrons (106 and 184 Squadrons non operational) equipped with Hampdens.

This represents a pale imitation of the strategic bombing force into which the command would evolve within four years. The maximum bomb loads of these four aircraft types varied from 1,000 lbs (Blenheim) to 8,000 lbs (Whitley, but not at any range). Only the Whitley squadrons of 4 Group had any training in night bombing. With the exception of the Blenheim they could all reach most of Germany, with the exception of the extreme east.

1940 was effectively the beginning of the war for Bomber Command. The first problem in September 1939, which made most pre-war plans instantly obsolete, was that the German armies moved East over the Polish border rather than West across the Low Countries and France as everyone had anticipated. The nearest point in Poland from Bomber Command's airfields is about 700 miles, so there wasn't much that could be done to aid the Poles from the air.
The severe restrictions placed on bombing at the outbreak of the war were only starting to be loosened in 1940. How severe were those restrictions? No targets of any kind were to be raided on German soil. Bombers could only fly over Germany for the purpose of dropping leaflets. The neutrality of Belgium and Holland was to be respected, meaning direct flights to Germany were impossible. Long approach flights were made over the small German coastline on the North Sea, or further south over France. Belgian and Dutch defences regularly, and legitimately, fired on wayward British aircraft which strayed over their territory. German naval vessels might be attacked, but not when alongside a dockyard wharf (for fear of causing civilian casualties) etc. etc.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## buffnut453 (Jun 22, 2017)

Zipper730,

A couple of answers about your oil-based questions. Battle Damage Assessment (BDA - today it's called Combat Assessment) of any target can be hard to do with certainty. Take a typical oil facility. If the facility has been entirely eradicated, then it's a pretty simple question to answer...but only for that facility (more on that later). However, it's really, REALLY hard to quantify damage if the place isn't obliterated. For example, major components may appear undamaged to aerial reconnaissance but, in reality, they're riddled with shrapnel and useless. Conversely, If the target is hit with a few bombs, was critical damage achieved or did we just destroy non-essential components? If the storage tanks are hit, how do we know how full they were or how much oil was in the pipes etc?

Oil is not a "target". It's a "target system" with many components - extraction, refining, storage, transportation/distribution etc. It's also highly distributed, with hundreds of individual facilities, each of which is relatively small given the precision and accuracy that could be achieved by night bombing in the period 1939-1943 (as noted by Steve above). Add to that complexity that oil doesn't operate on a "use when produced" model like electrical power generation and so it's hard to quantify the impact of hitting an individual target facility. There isn't a semi-developed country today, and there wasn't one in the late 30's, that didn't have a strategic stockpile of oil and associated byproducts. Thus it would take a concerted effort over a considerable length of time to even demonstrate any impact on the oil industry, and even then it's rather like whack-a-mole because the adversary will repair or replace destroyed or damage facilities. 

If the Allies made it clear we were just going after oil in 1940, then the Germans would simply put more defences near the oil facilities which would increase the threat to our bombers and reduce the likely impact of any attacks. We should also bear in mind that the German Army, despite it's vaunted "Blitzkrieg" tactics was actually far less mechanized than the Allies. Much of the Wehrmacht logistic train was still horse-drawn. I'm not suggesting that oil wasn't vital...simply that the situation was far more complex than the "oily boys" made out. I think Harris fundamentally understood all these concepts. It was only when the Allies brought numerical superiority to the day and night air campaigns, and could achieve daylight localized air superiority, that the sheer weight of bombing force was able to degrade the German war machine to the extent that it did. Bombing oil was part of the solution but it could never be the "silver bullet" target that many believed it to be.


----------



## stona (Jun 22, 2017)

Very well put above.

It was well understood by the British, as reflected in the bombing directives after the fall of France, that even a successful campaign against the German oil system would not produce immediate results for precisely the reasons explained in the post above. A successful campaign would lead to an ultimate collapse, somewhat like falling off a cliff edge, and this is precisely what happened in June/July 1944.
Other factors were particular to Germany. She had a large dependency on synthetic oil products, and production of these was concentrated in a relatively few plants, making them a viable target system given the state of the air war (quite unlike the often cited power grid). The territorial losses to the successful campaigns of the Red Army deprived the Germans of alternative sources of oil. Despite all this the USSBS, acknowledged that Germany's primary source of energy was coal and considered the Transport Plan as much a success as the Oil Plan.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## Shortround6 (Jun 22, 2017)

The Oil Plan could only affect part of the logistics picture as the primary fuel for transportation _inside _Germany or most of the occupied territory was coal. Coal fired locomotives, coal fired tugs/shipping in the rivers/canals/ coastal areas. 
Oil/gas shortages would affect the combat arms much more as they were much more dependent on liquid fuel. Horses weren't quite the answer to that (despite using horses/cattle to move aircraft at times) as horse drawn wagons have a much lower payload than most trucks. They also consume more pounds/KG of feed per ton mile/km of cargo moved. Horses being used for draft purposes don't last long on grass. They may be able to live on grass but their ability to pull wagons of several tons for a number of hours a day on a grass diet is very limited. 

As far as damage assessment goes. I was a firefighter for 33 years, trying to assess building damage (structural integrity ) is hard enough when you have access to the inside of a building. Trying to do it from pictures taken from several miles away (10,000ft or more) even with telephoto lenses would be darn near impossible.


----------



## stona (Jun 22, 2017)

The Transport Plan did lead to serious problems moving coal about the Reich. Just about every index relevant shows a steep decline, starting about August/September 1944. The USSBS interviewed Dr. Ganzenmuller, Deputy Director General of the Reichsbahn, who stated that the capacity of Germany's rail yards had fallen to 40% of rated capacity in the last months of 1944 and to just 20% in the spring of 1945. The USSBS comments on Ganzenmuller's remarks note

_"Attempts to shift business to unaffected or repaired yards resulted in overcrowding of these yards, with lowered capacity for the handling of mixed train loads...other yards, physically capable of classifying freight, were at a standstill because of the inability of neighbouring yards or R.B.D.to dispatch freight to them."_

In other words, the railways were in the throes of a terminal collapse.

It wasn't just the railways. In 1943, 12.3% of movements of coal (and coke) from the Ruhr were by canal or the Rhine. This fell consistently through 1944 to a low in November of just 0.6%.
The damage to the waterways didn't just hinder the movement of coal products. Between April and September 1944 about 100 prefabricated sections of U-boats were transported from the Ruhr and the Weser valley to assembly yards at Bremen, Hamburg and Lubeck every month. After the Dortmund-Ems canal was breached, on 23rd September 1944 a total of just 65 sections were transported northwards during the rest of the war, less than 10 a month.

The Strategic bombing campaigns were a huge undertaking and wide ranging. It is fashionable today to focus on one part of the campaigns and attempt to draw conclusions relevant to the overall effort. This is just lazy and leads to the sort of trite and ignorant opinions about strategic bombing during WW2 one can find posted all over the internet, and elsewhere.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## buffnut453 (Jun 22, 2017)

Hi Shortround,

Great point about coal-fired locomotives. I agree that horses were not a truly viable alternative to the loss of oil production, and certainly not a good replacement for units that were already mechanized. However, the sheer number of horses used by the Wehrmacht is staggering (see this link about horses in WW2). I know this is Wikipedia but I think it's valid for illustrative purposes. Ignore the "national stock" and focus on the numbers used by the military.

Also, appreciate your thoughts on quantifying damage. I did BDA on a couple of occasions and, even with modern technology, it can be challenging. Having looked at some of the WW2 imagery, I'm astounded at the results the Photo Interpreters achieved.

Cheers,
B-N


----------



## Shortround6 (Jun 22, 2017)

I have seen Steel piping draped like cooked spaghetti over machinery in a few factories. Steel turns "plastic" at certain temperatures and looses strength. It didn't melt into puddles or even go from round pipe to flat (ok maybe a bit oval) but sure went from straight to some rather Daliesque curves. Fire can also ruin wiring even if large steel objects (lathe frames?) are relatively undamaged. 
Trying to judge damage to steel at a distance could be very difficult. In a nest of pipes are one or two pierced by bomb fragments and can be replaced? Has the nest/ network been reduced to rubble? Have the pipes, even if still in place suffered enough heat damage to no longer hold working pressure?


----------



## buffnut453 (Jun 22, 2017)

And that's before we even consider structures that look intact and useable but, in reality, are deathtraps because heat has catastrophically diminished the physical strength of the structure.


----------



## stona (Jun 22, 2017)

buffnut453 said:


> I did BDA on a couple of occasions and, even with modern technology, it can be challenging. Having looked at some of the WW2 imagery, I'm astounded at the results the Photo Interpreters achieved.



Area bombing did simplify the problem somewhat. The British simply estimated the acreage of a target city devastated and didn't worry to much about specific targets within the devastated area. Even this could be difficult. The British post raids report on Hamburg noted that smoke obscured much of the evidence of destruction, but that the _"amount of residential damage is very great." _
The Germans agreed. The cumulative damage caused by Operation Gomorrah was estimated by the local authorities to be the destruction or damaging of 61% of Hamburg's houses and apartments. Similarly, 580 business premises and 2,632 shops were damaged or destroyed. 900,000 people evacuated the city and had to be looked after. The initial figure for those killed was 31,647, later revised to 38,975. The British didn't realise just how successful (in their terms) the raids had been.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## wuzak (Jun 22, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> The Oil Plan could only affect part of the logistics picture as the primary fuel for transportation _inside _Germany or most of the occupied territory was coal. Coal fired locomotives, coal fired tugs/shipping in the rivers/canals/ coastal areas.
> Oil/gas shortages would affect the combat arms much more as they were much more dependent on liquid fuel. Horses weren't quite the answer to that (despite using horses/cattle to move aircraft at times) as horse drawn wagons have a much lower payload than most trucks. They also consume more pounds/KG of feed per ton mile/km of cargo moved. Horses being used for draft purposes don't last long on grass. They may be able to live on grass but their ability to pull wagons of several tons for a number of hours a day on a grass diet is very limited.
> 
> As far as damage assessment goes. I was a firefighter for 33 years, trying to assess building damage (structural integrity ) is hard enough when you have access to the inside of a building. Trying to do it from pictures taken from several miles away (10,000ft or more) even with telephoto lenses would be darn near impossible.



Coal was also the basis for synthetic oil production, so disrupting its transport also had an affect on the oil production situation, particularly as the Germans relied more on synthetic oil the further the war went.

Synthetic oil production also had side products - such as fertilisers and explosives. These were also, obviously, disrupted by the Transportation Plan.

But those were byproducts of the Transportation Plan? Which was designed to restrict movement of troops, equipment and supplies for the Germans in defence against the invasion?


----------



## Zipper730 (Jun 22, 2017)

stona said:


> Shortly after the outbreak of the war, ignoring the ten squadrons of Battles and two of Blenheims detached from the command and operating in France as the Advanced Air Striking Force


And that was it's own command?


> Bomber Command's front line strength was 23 squadrons comprising about 280 aircraft.
> 
> 2 GROUP. Nos. 21, 82, 107, 110, 114, 139 Squadrons (101 Squadron non-operational) equipped with Blenheims.
> 
> ...


29 total squadrons 23 operational squadrons, 6 non-operational.


> This represents a pale imitation of the strategic bombing force into which the command would evolve within four years.


If I recall by 1945 they could hurl as many as 1200 or 1300 aircraft in one raid, of which a few hundred went to a primary target, and the rest formed diversionary strikes to secondary targets, correct?


> The maximum bomb loads of these four aircraft types varied from 1,000 lbs (Blenheim) to 8,000 lbs (Whitley, but not at any range).


And the Lancasters could carry 12,000 to 14,000 pounds, and Mosquitoes around 2,000-3,000 to most all of Germany...


> Only the Whitley squadrons of 4 Group had any training in night bombing.


That's all? I thought at least all of Five Group were trained in that...


> The severe restrictions placed on bombing at the outbreak of the war were only starting to be loosened in 1940. How severe were those restrictions? No targets of any kind were to be raided on German soil.


Why? They were at war...


> The neutrality of Belgium and Holland was to be respected, meaning direct flights to Germany were impossible.


Which was later fixed because of the fact that Belgium and Holland were occupied by Nazi Germany.



buffnut453 said:


> A couple of answers about your oil-based questions. Battle Damage Assessment (BDA - today it's called Combat Assessment) of any target can be hard to do with certainty. Take a typical oil facility. If the facility has been entirely eradicated, then it's a pretty simple question to answer...but only for that facility (more on that later). However, it's really, REALLY hard to quantify damage if the place isn't obliterated. For example, major components may appear undamaged to aerial reconnaissance but, in reality, they're riddled with shrapnel and useless. Conversely, If the target is hit with a few bombs, was critical damage achieved or did we just destroy non-essential components? If the storage tanks are hit, how do we know how full they were or how much oil was in the pipes etc?


I would just figure you'd just fly a bunch of missions in rapid succession. You'd want to not only damage the hell out of the facility, but light off as much oil as you could (at least some proportion of incendiaries), and also kill salvage and repair teams (time-delay bombs).


> Oil is not a "target". It's a "target system" with many components - extraction, refining, storage, transportation/distribution etc.


Wouldn't you focus mostly on the refinery and the storage? Crude oil is mostly a black/brown/green sludge, though when refined it becomes the proper grades of POL & Natural Gas; the refinery only can refine so much oil at a time, the storage facility can hold it theoretically indefinitely until it's needed (or it gets blown up).


> It's also highly distributed, with hundreds of individual facilities, each of which is relatively small given the precision and accuracy that could be achieved by night bombing in the period 1939-1943.


Okay, I understand that.


> Add to that complexity that oil doesn't operate on a "use when produced" model like electrical power generation and so it's hard to quantify the impact of hitting an individual target facility.


True, but it would be logical to conclude that they would invariably use oil for various things. Air defense for example, bomber missions, mobile equipment.


> There isn't a semi-developed country today, and there wasn't one in the late 30's, that didn't have a strategic stockpile of oil and associated byproducts.


The stocks go under storage right? I remember there was a suspicion that the Germans had underground stocks...


> If the Allies made it clear we were just going after oil in 1940


What targets were typically hit in 1940? Oil, railway yards, docks and shipping yards?


> the Germans would simply put more defences near the oil facilities which would increase the threat to our bombers and reduce the likely impact of any attacks.


But weren't there heavy defenses over the cities too?


> We should also bear in mind that the German Army, despite it's vaunted "Blitzkrieg" tactics was actually far less mechanized than the Allies. Much of the Wehrmacht logistic train was still horse-drawn.


Now, I did not know that!


> I think Harris fundamentally understood all these concepts.


Explaining his resistance to attacking target systems other than population centers. Churchill however wanted city-busting raids because he liked the mass-destruction produced: I would not be surprised if he not only wanted the destruction to coerce surrender, but also to intimidate for the future.

General Anderson (USAAF) said when pushing for Operation Clarion that he didn't expect it would shorten the war, but he figured that Germany being hammered from all directions by thousands of airplanes would scare the shit out of people and would be passed down from generations, and make them shit their pants at the thought of ever waging a war again. He didn't use those words exactly, but the point was there.


----------



## wuzak (Jun 22, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> 29 total squadrons 23 operational squadrons, 6 non-operational.



So glad you did the maths.

Reactions: Funny Funny:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Zipper730 (Jun 22, 2017)

I figured you'd appreciate that, Wuzak


----------



## wuzak (Jun 22, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> If I recall by 1945 they could hurl as many as 1200 or 1300 aircraft in one raid, of which a few hundred went to a primary target, and the rest formed diversionary strikes to secondary targets, correct?



They could send 1,000 bomber raids in 1942. But not necessarily 1,000 effective bombers.




Zipper730 said:


> And the Lancasters could carry 12,000 to 14,000 pounds, and Mosquitoes around 2,000-3,000 to most all of Germany...



And the Whitley could carry 2,000-3,000lb of bombs to Italy. Though it took a while to get there.




Zipper730 said:


> That's all? I thought at least all of Five Group were trained in that...



Not at that time.




Zipper730 said:


> Why? They were at war...



Probably because they didn't want the war to expand too much.

Reactions: Funny Funny:
3 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Jun 23, 2017)

The 'thousand bomber raids' were little more than stunts organised by Harris as part of his ongoing campaign to secure a future for his Command. They did prove an opportunity to assess the effects of even greater concentrations of bombers in saturating German defences, but this principle had already been established in the earlier raids. 2 hours had been allowed for the 234 bombers to bomb Lubeck, just 90 minutes was the planned period for 1,000 aircraft to attack Cologne.
On the back of his successes against Lubeck and Rostock he raised the idea of a thousand bomber raid with Portal and Churchill, who were both proved impressed with the idea. Harris probably failed to mention that he had barely 400 aircraft with operational crews engaged in regular front-line operations. Within Bomber Command he did have a large number of aircraft at the conversion units attached to Groups operating four engine bombers and in the Command's own OTUs (91 and 92 Groups). This secondary strength would be crewed by instructors (many ex-operational crew) and by crews in the latter stages of their training. Even so, there was still less than 1,000 aircraft available. Harris approached Joubert at Coastal Command who promised 250 aircraft, and Training Command which promised 50, though most proved unsuitable and only 4 flew on the raid.
Unfortunately for Harris the Admiralty subsequently refused to allow Coastal Command aircraft to take part in the raid. This was part of a long running battle over the control of maritime air power between the RAF and the Senior Service for which there is no space here. Suffice to say the the Admiralty could see that helping Bomber Command achieve success in it's ambitious plan was hardly likely to enhance Coastal Command's chances of building up a long range force to counter the U-boat threat.
Bomber Command now effectively lowered the bar for crews to take part in the raid, enabling more aircraft and crews from Training Command to take part. Every aircraft was still supposed to take off with an experienced pilot, but 49 of the 208 aircraft sent by 91 Group were flown by pupil pilots, some from the 'bottom half' i.e. early stages of their training. It was a terrible gamble, but it enabled 1,047 bombers to take off for the raid, all but the 4 Wellingtons provided from Training Command from Bomber Command's own resources.
In addition to these aircraft 49 Blenheims from 2 Group, 29 aircraft from Fighter Command and 15 from Army Cooperation Command would carry out intruder operations over and around German night fighter airfields.
Substantial damage was caused to Cologne, and more than 450 people killed for the loss of 41 aircraft.
Subsequent 1000 bomber raids to Essen and Bremen (which didn't make the 1000 mark) were far less successful (particularly Essen) and raids on this scale using so many secondary units were not repeated. 
The major beneficiaries of the raids were Harris and Bomber Command. In today's parlance we would say that they raised the profile of both, Harris was firmly in the public eye where he would remain throughout the war, and after.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## pbehn (Jun 23, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> Why? They were at war...
> .


Yes war had been declared, but in the early days some still hoped that Hitler could be persuaded to pull out of Poland. This is exactly the same as in the first Gulf War when Saddam was given the option to pull out of Kuwait before he was kicked out.


----------



## stona (Jun 23, 2017)

The real reasons were complicated, dating back to the reluctance of the Chiefs of Staff to inflict civilian casualties on moral grounds, contrary to the wishes of the RAF. In 1928 one of Trenchard's papers was deemed unacceptable and

_"a departure from accepted principles of war" _because_ "civilian life will be endangered to an extent which has hitherto not been contemplated under International Law."_

In the late 1930s the British perceived themselves to be in a position of weakness as far as attacks on the morale of the civilian populations were concerned. The British love a committee, and the succinctly named 'Joint Planning Sub-Committee of the Situation in the Event of War with Germany in 1939' made this clear in a report of 26th October 1936.
Three types of air attack against Germany were perceived as having any chance of success, and the first of these was attacks to demoralise the German people

_"by methods similar to those we foresee the Germans themselves using against us."_

But this came with a strong caveat.

_"Any attempt to demoralise the German people before German air attacks could demoralise our own people would operate under a severe handicap. London is an objective of far greater national importance than Berlin, and for many reasons presents an easier and more effective target for German attack than Berlin does for the Allied air forces...German preparations for air attack are much in advance of our own.Moreover a military dictatorship is likely to be much less susceptible to popular outcry than a democratic government. It is, consequently, unsafe to assume that under our present programme our air force, even with the cooperation of the French, will be able, by attacking the morale of the German people, to produce an effect in any way comparable with that which would result from German air attack against our own."_

The British would bend over backwards to avoid causing civilian casualties in Germany for fear of German retaliation against her own civilian population. It was only after the Germans had targeted civilians, not just in Britain, that British restrictions began to be loosened.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Milosh (Jun 23, 2017)

stona said:


> named 'Joint Planning Sub-Committee of the Situation in the Event of War with Germany in 1939' made this clear in a report of* 26th October 1939*,immediately prior to the start of the war.



Steve, isn't this date after the start of WW2?


----------



## stona (Jun 23, 2017)

Milosh said:


> Steve, isn't this date after the start of WW2?



It certainly is. I've amended my post to give the correct date which is *OCTOBER 1936.
*
Apologies for any confusion.

The British reluctance to bomb indiscriminately continued into 1940. On 4th June the DAS (Douglas) wrote to Portal.

_"7. It is realised that it is extremely difficult to identify and attack the oil objectives in the absence of adequate moon conditions. During the remaining dark night, therefore, you should continue as at present to bring about continuous disruption and dislocation of German war industry, particularly in those areas within range where the aircraft industry is concentrated...The oil targets should be selected as first objectives, alternative objects being aircraft factories, and after that any self illuminating targets which are otherwise identifiable.*

8. In this connection your attention is drawn to paragraph 3 of the new Bombardment Instructions...*In no circumstances should night bombing be allowed to degenerate into mere indiscriminate action, which is contrary to the policy of His Majesty's Government."
*_
My bold.

Two years later Harris would argue, quite correctly from a technical point of view, that his area bombing was anything but indiscriminate. The people on the receiving end might well have thought otherwise._
_
*In the context of the entire document this seems to be a reference to power stations.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## buffnut453 (Jun 23, 2017)

Zipper730,

You've been asked this before but I really, REALLY wish you'd quite including multiple quotes into a response. It makes it really hard to answer or comment on your many questions...but I'll try.

In terms of where to focus effort, that depends on where you get most bang for your buck - how many of each target type (extraction, refining, storage and distribution) do you have to hit and how easy are the targets to hit. If you only have one extraction site but multiple refining and storage locations, it's clearly easier to go after extraction. 

You can fly a bunch of missions in quick succession but, again, that only takes out one facility. The whole production capability is distributed so the other sites are merrily producing while you focus on one site. As soon as you shift to take out the other sites, the first site will be repaired and back up and running. As previously noted, it's a "whack-a-mole" problem. There simply weren't the resources available to hit every oil facility with the kind of persistence needed until very late in the game. 

Your comment "True, but it would be logical to conclude that they would invariably use oil for various things. Air defense for example, bomber missions, mobile equipment" confuses me. I was making the observation that, unlike electricity, oil doesn't go straight from the refinery to the user. I think you're missing my key point that there were strategic oil and byproducts reserves and so simply hitting refining capabilities isn't going to have any immediate, sizeable impact on the enemy's war effort. Over time it will but it won't bring the war machine to a grinding halt. 

Storage takes many forms - storage at refineries prior to and after the refining process, storage at transportation hubs, mass strategic reserves (again, highly protected and distributed - you didn't want your strategic fuel reserve being taken out in a single bombing raid), and local storage near to the point of use. Just think how many thousands of storage sites there were at the national level...it was a really tough task to target them all as individual facilities. Also, many were collocated with other targets...which gets us back to Harris' concept of simply destroying as much of Germany's war-making capacity as possible.

Cities were heavily defended but it's easier to hit a city than it is an oil facility. To obtain any degree of precision and accuracy typically required low-level attacks which would expose the bombers to far more AAA, particularly the smaller calibre weapons, than was the case during the city raids.

Finally, you ask about bomber targets in 1940. Steve will probably chime in with more accurate info but a fair amount of effort was dedicated to the German Kriegsmarine trying to attack surface combatants and submarines in port. Much of Germany's vital infrastructure remained out of range of the available bomber resources in 1940.


----------



## stona (Jun 23, 2017)

buffnut453 said:


> a fair amount of effort was dedicated to the German Kriegsmarine trying to attack surface combatants and submarines in port.



They also started looking for German naval targets virtually from the get go. The first Bomber Command mission of the war took place on 3rd September and involved a Blenheim reconnaissance aircraft, 18 Hampdens and 9 Wellingtons which all went looking for German warships. The Blenheim photographed some north of Wilhelmshaven, but the bombers did not find them.
That Blenheim, N6215, was the first British aircraft to cross the German coast in WW2.

Raids against the Kriegsmarine started the next day and various shipping searches continued for the rest of 1939 and into the first months of 1940. At this time Bomber Command could only attack ships in the open sea or moored in harbour waters, not alongside a dockside wharf. On 17th March 1940 German aircraft, attacking Scapa Flow, dropped bombs on land killing one civilian and wounding seven more. On 19/20 March Bomber Command was authorised to attack the seaplane base at Hornum. This was a reprisal attack and the first on a German land target. The gloves were not off, but they were being loosened.

April 1940 saw a slight shift of priorities with the Norwegian campaign, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were among vessels unsuccessfully attacked as early as the 4th and 5th April and the Kriegsmarine was a constant target. Sometimes it assumed the highest priority, as in the anti U-boat effort in the second quarter of 1941.

Cheers

Steve


----------

