# Comparison of Pacific, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean, and North Atlantic naval combat



## Schweik (Jan 25, 2021)

Premise: the real naval air war in WW II was in the Pacific. Everything else was a sideshow. The convoy battles in the Atlantic and Med were fought with antiquated relics while the real air war in the region was being fought further south over land in the Desert War.

Fighter and strike aircraft opposition in the North Atlantic and Med were not on par with the Japanese aircraft in the Pacific, and the Fleet Air Arm had some kind of serious procurement problem which prevented them from developing modern, capable aircraft. The long delays and ultimate failure of projects like the Firefly, the Seafire and the Barrcuda meant that the Royal Navy was compelled to use US aircraft such as the "Martlet" and the "Tarpon", and later on the Hellcat and Corsair, as well as antiquated relics like the Fairey Swordfish. This led to their to largely staying out of the fight in the Pacific until the last year of the war.

When they did briefly tangle with the Japanese off the coast of Ceylon in 1942, the RN was trounced and the Fairey Fulmar and Hurricane were all but annihilated. The Fulmar was a major disappointment as a fighter and struggled to cope with first tier fighter aircraft while also proving unable to intercept modern Axis bombers in any Theater. They were adequate for fending off more obsolescent aircraft such as the FW 200 condor, He 115 and He 111.


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## Schweik (Jan 25, 2021)

A provisional chart with all the basic stats, for comparison, of the main WW2 carrier aircraft and single-engined dive bombers involved in naval operations. Not complete, but I'll add to it / correct it per feedback. I will also make another chart later for multi-engined strike aircraft. I'm manly missing data on Japanese aircraft, if someone who knows those numbers could help out that would be grand.
I also assume some of the Stuka stats are a bit off, but I'm ready to correct them.

I'm also not sure on the combat history of the RN ships so help there would be appreciated. How many warships did they sink.

*Aircraft* -- Strike rng (hvy) - Strike rng (lt) - Scout rng - Direct fly rng - bomb load - air combat - radar - Spd - Crus- DiveB -Torp
TBD ------------ 150 ------------ 175 -------------- ??? --------- 435 ------ 1000/1600 --- Poor ------ No --- 206 - 128 - No -- Yes
TBF ------------ 259 ------------ 300 -------------- ??? --------- 1215 ----- 1600/2000 --- Marginal - 1942? - 275 - 153 - No - Yes
SBD-3---------- 250 ------------ 325 -------------- 400 --------- 1300 ----- 500 /1000 --- Good ------No --- 250 - 185 - Yes - No
SB2C ----------- ??? ------------ 276 -------------- ??? --------- 1100 ----- 1000/1600 --- Fair -------1944? - 281 - 158 - Yes - No
D3A ------------ ??? ------------ ??? -------------- ??? ---------- 915 ------ 550 / 870 ---- Fair ------- No --- 240 - 184 - Yes -- No
D4Y ------------ ??? ------------ ??? -------------- ??? ---------- 910 ------ 550 /1100 ---- Fair ------- No --- 340 - ??? - Yes -- No
B5N ------------ ??? ------------ ??? -------------- ??? ---------- 978 ------ 1100/1760 --- Bad ------ No --- 235 - 161 - No -- Yes
B6N ------------ ??? ------------ ??? -------------- ??? --------- 1085 ----- 1100/1760 --- Poor ------1943 -- 300 - 207 - No -- Yes
Swordfish ------ 175 ------------ 225 -------------- ??? --------- 522 ------ 1500/1670 --- Bad ------1940 -- 143 - 131 - Yes-- Yes
Albacore ------- ??? ------------ ??? -------------- ??? ---------- 710 ------ 1670/2000 --- Bad ------1940 -- 161 - 140 - Yes-- Yes
Barracuda ------ ??? ------------ ??? -------------- ??? ---------- 810 ------ 1500/1650 --- Poor -----1943 -- 240 - 195 - No -- Yes
Skua ----------- ??? ------------ ??? -------------- ??? ----------- 760 ------ 500/???? ----- Fair ------ No? -- 225 - 187 - Yes-- No
Ju87B ---------- ??? ------------ ??? -------------- N/A ---------- 370 ------ 1100/1540 --- Poor ----- No --- 236 - 209 - Yes-- No
Ju87R ---------- ??? ------------ ??? -------------- N/A ---------- 492 ------ 1100/1540 --- Poor ---- No --- 236?- 209?- Yes-- No
Ju87D ---------- ??? ------------ ??? -------------- N/A ---------- 683?------ 1100/2204 --- Fair -----No --- 210?- 160?- Yes-- No

Direct fly range means test range with a normal bomb load but not an actual strike.

Barracudas range was reportedly reduced 30% in the Pacific.

*Combat history: Warships Sunk* (not counting Pearl Harbor) (this is what I could find with quick googling)
D3A ----------- 1 x Aircraft Carrier, 2 x Heavy Cruiser, 11 x Destroyers, 1 x Merchant cruiser, 1 x Oiler
D4Y ----------- At least one Carrier (Princeton) and Franklin crippled.
B5N ----------- At least two Carriers
B6N ----------- None I could find?
SBD ----------- 6 x Carriers, 14 x Cruisers, 6 x Destroyers, 15 x military transports
TBD ----------- None?
TBF ------------ 2 x Super-battleships (shared), 3 carriers (shared, Philippine sea), 1 heavy Cruiser (Taffy 3 / Samar) - also destroyed 2 enemy torpedos at Samar
SB2C ---------- 2 x Super-battleships (shared), 3 carriers (shared, Philippine sea)
Swordfish ----- ? 2-3 Battleships at Taranto and a _lot_ of merchant ships, Bismark damaged. At least 22 U-boats.
Albacore ------ ?
Skua----------- ?
Barracuda----- ?
Ju 87----------- ?

*A few points:*
We must keep in mind there is a big difference between range from a land base vs. range in carrier ops. Stukas only operated from land, most of the others did both land based and carrier based strikes and scout missions. Range is considerably longer for land based operations because it's much easier to find your way 'home' and takes less time to land, and less time between landings. On the other hand planes on a land base are out of the fight once their target moves out of range, unless there is another closer base they can fly to, while carriers can go anywhere (so long as they survive)

In addition to the above, the D3A and B5N of course also contributed to the 4 Battleships lost at Pearl Harbor. It's hard to say which one got which ships though, most I think got hit with both bombs and torpedoes.

Ceylon battle had far more losses for the British in three days (8 warships + 23 merchant) than they suffered in 12 days during Pedastal (4 warships + 9 merchant). Half of the Axis air attacks in Pedastal also resulted in either no sunk or (3 of the 7) 'no damage'.

Combat aircraft used by the Allies in the Pacific were equivalent to the combat aircraft used in the Desert War at the same time, but the aircraft fighting in the Med were at least a generation older and more obsolescent, objectively.


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## nuuumannn (Jan 25, 2021)

Schweik said:


> Premise: the real naval air war in WW II was in the Pacific. Everything else was a sideshow.



What is the point of this? Are you saying that nothing else mattered, or that the naval battles in the Pacific were more important or what? This to me looks like yet another dick comparing exercise...

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## Schweik (Jan 25, 2021)

I just think the main event was in the Pacific. Of course other Theaters mattered. The land war in China mattered too, but the most important land war in WW2 was between the Germans and the Soviets, and after that between the Germans (and Italians) and the Western Allies. The most important naval combat zone was the Pacific.

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## nuuumannn (Jan 25, 2021)

Schweik said:


> The most important naval combat zone was the Pacific.



So, what's your point? If you already are convinced of this, why do this?

Over heard in NO other naval conflict zone in WW2; "Gee, this bombing's pretty heavy", "Well, at least the Japanese are getting SOOO MUCH WORSE from the US Navy in the Pacific, because its sooo much more IMPORTANT than what we're going through..."

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## nuuumannn (Jan 25, 2021)

Sorry mate, you have to excuse the cynicism, but this discussion seems pointless and it is loaded with the expectation that somehow other campaigns are diminished in significance because of the sheer numbers of ships sunk, aircraft that were shot down and so on in the Pacific. This is almost an invite to controversy.

So what if the Pacific was more important than the Med? What does that prove?

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## RCAFson (Jan 25, 2021)

Barracuda II at Boscombe Down:

_P9816 from June 1943 investigated range and the effect
of torpedo (810 miles maximum 650 miles practical) and
alternatively six 250 Ib bombs (780 and 625 miles). ASV
radar aerials cost 5% in range, and flying with hot air to
the engine reduced range by 11%. Range on P9867 with
single bombs up to 2,000 lb on centreline was similar to
the torpedo figure. (Mason, The Secret Years). (_It's unclear if these are NM_)_

Radius with 6 x 250lb bombs, with 65IG allowances for combat and loiter was 178nm at 140knots cruise (4.25hrs in the air - Friedman) My estimate for radius with a 116IG DT (filled to 80IG) and 2 x 500lb bombs would be about 320nm with allowances for combat and loiter and ~900nm range with allowance only for TO and climb.

_Recon range with a 116IG DT was ~1000nm at 131 knots._

Albacore range with a torpedo was 809nm at 101 knots with 293IG internal fuel. Recon range was 1038nm internal fuel and 108IG DT and 1148nm with full internal fuel and DT (400IG total) (Friedman)


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## SaparotRob (Jan 25, 2021)

FWIW the TBD should get a “shared” at least for the sinking of the HIJMS Shoho. It might have even launched a working torpedo or two during the Lae/Salamaua raids.


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## Admiral Beez (Jan 25, 2021)

Schweik said:


> I just think the main event was in the Pacific.


This is a discussion forum. What are you asking us to discuss?


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## SaparotRob (Jan 25, 2021)

I don’t think our friend Schweik was trivializing other theaters of action. As far as naval aviation v. naval aviation goes, the Pacific had the truly impressive OPPOSING fleets. Not much floating opposition for the RN in Europe and the Med (well, after Taranto that is). I’m mostly interested in the PTO myself. I think the original post might have just been worded a bit off.

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## SaparotRob (Jan 25, 2021)

Then again, this is a position that could be discussed.

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## Schweik (Jan 25, 2021)

Admiral Beez said:


> This is a discussion forum. What are you asking us to discuss?



Just whether or not the premise is true. These are issues which kept coming up on another (TBD vs. Swordfish) thread. None of it seemed controversial to me, but others insisted otherwise. So we are going to dig deep into some of the records and see what it looks like.

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## Schweik (Jan 25, 2021)

SaparotRob said:


> I don’t think our friend Schweik was trivializing other theaters of action. As far as naval aviation v. naval aviation goes, the Pacific had the truly impressive OPPOSING fleets. Not much floating opposition for the RN in Europe and the Med (well, after Taranto that is). I’m mostly interested in the PTO myself. I think the original post might have just been worded a bit off.



That's part of it, the other part is the surface warships and the aircraft involved. I love the Savoia Marchetti SM 79, I have a pretty good model of one behind me as I type this. But it was not a state of the art warplane in 1940, let alone 1941 or 1942. 

The fighting was just as heroic and interesting, and I am frankly just as interested in it, but I don't think it was quite on the level as the Pacific War in terms of scale or the kit involved.


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## Admiral Beez (Jan 25, 2021)

Schweik said:


> Just whether or not the premise is true.


I’m sorry I’m thick, but what’s the premise? What is your proposition in support of a conclusion? That’s a premise.


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## SaparotRob (Jan 25, 2021)

Decades ago, the then time mayor of New York City, John V. Lindsey, said on an interview he served in the Navy. He was asked about Kamikaze attacks. He said they just pointed all the guns up and fired. He said they called it a “British Barrage”. 
Did the USN borrow anti-air tactics from RN?


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## Schweik (Jan 25, 2021)

Admiral Beez said:


> I’m sorry I’m thick, but what’s the premise? What is your proposition in support of a conclusion? That’s a premise.



Oh you mean like an opening salvo?

Honestly part of why I started the thread is because everything I posted in the OP has been self-evident to me for 30+ years, and the more I've learned about the war since I was a kid, many of my older ideas have changed, but all of those positions are just more supported by the data, at least in my interpretation. At least two people on the other thread this one is forked from insisted that several if not all of those conclusions are wrong. For example, the Swordfish was a world class bomber, the Sea Hurricane and Fulmar had "excellent" records etc. The convoy fights in the Med were bigger battles than took place in the Pacific, and etc. Frankly, I find the very idea baffling, so this thread is meant to explore that, in detail. If I'm wrong about all that, I'm ready to learn.

But here is an opening salvo. The two largest air-naval engagements in the mid-war between the Royal Navy and the Axis took place in 1942 - the battle off the coast of Ceylon in April of 1942 and Operation Pedestal in August of that same year. That Ceylon duel was really the only substantial engagement between the Royal Navy and the IJN before 1945, unless you count the sinking of the Rodney and the Repulse. IMO the results of that engagement prove that the Japanese were a more formidable opponent for the Royal Navy than the combined Italian and German forces facing the Allied convoy in Operation Pedestal.

To support that conclusion, I propose that between April 5 and 8 the IJN wroght more havoc than the losses of the entirety of operation Pedestal which went on for 12 days, and suffered fewer losses themselves in the process. Specifically the Japanese sunk twice as many ships for half the losses in aircraft, and in one quarter of the time.

At least according to Wikipedia, in and near *Ceylon*, the IJN almost all on April 5, destroyed 5 front line warships, 3 second line warships, 23 merchant ships, and 40 aircraft:

1 x Carrier (Hermes)
2 x Heavy cruisers
2 x Destroyers
1 x "Armed merchant cruiser"
1 x Corvette
1 x Sloop
23 x Merchant ships
40+ aircraft

The Japanese also lost "20+ aircraft"

During *Pedestal *3-15 August, according to Wikipedia the Germans and Italians destroyed 4 warships and 9 merchant ships, and 34 aircraft:

1 x Aircraft Carrier + 1 damaged
2 x Light Cruisers + 2 damaged
1 x Destroyer
9 x Merchant ships +3 damaged
34 aircraft destroyed

and the Axis lost 2 x submarines and "40-60 aircraft "

During the fight in Ceylon, both the Hurricane and the Fulmar proved to be badly outmatched by the Japanese A6M fighter. In the Med, such as above Malta, both the Hurricane and the Fulmar proved almost as unable as the Gladiator to stop front-line bomber raids (such as by Ju 88s) though they were able to take down older Italian and German aircraft such as the SM 79, 82, or 84.


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## GrauGeist (Jan 25, 2021)

I don't have numbers on hand, but the Ju87 did account for a considerable number of ships during it's service life.
Dunkirk, Crete, the Black Sea, the Med and so on, all were the Stuka's hunting spots.

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## Schweik (Jan 25, 2021)

Yes Stukas did, they were very accurate dive bombers, and dive bombers in general tend to survive pretty well in combat so long as they aren't forced to fly in big formations like they did with Stukas in the BoB. Their main limitation was range, which was not quite up to naval standard, limiting them to those choke points you mentioned. 

In places like the Med and North Atlantic though, the Stuka was only part of the arsenal faced by the RN. One other was the Ju 88 which proved to be pretty good in the maritime role. But most of the Axis strike aircraft available were decidedly on the obsolescent or obsolete side, certainly by the time of Pedestal. He 111, SM 79 (one of the better strike aircraft, but very vulnerable), SM 82, CANT 506 and 1007, SM 84, etc.

I'm going to pull up some of the combat records so we can take a look at them.


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## GrauGeist (Jan 25, 2021)

Don't overlook the shipping the Do217 accounted for.

As it stands, the top three should be the SBD, Ju87 and the D3A. While the Stuka didn't match the Dauntless or Val for tonnage, it does stand at the top of the list for overall vessels sunk.

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## Schweik (Jan 25, 2021)

I am familiar with some of the Do 217's strikes using the two guided bombs / missiles, the Fritx-X and Hs 293. Those weapons proved very potent, sinking one hapless Italian BB and half-wrecking another and sinking one RN Cruiser and smashing up multiple Allied ships. The strikes hit hard but the Do 217s seemed to get wiped out really fast. It's also striking how quickly the Allies seemed to adjust to the new weapons (which were a technological leap that seemed to be about 20 years ahead of their time) with jamming etc.

I would agree for single-engined strike aircraft that were operational in time to matter in any way, your list of SBD, D3A and Stuka sounds right. That is what I would have said too. On paper the B7N looks pretty badass but it came too late. Also, some of the guys from the other thread will tell us that the Skua, the Swordfish, and the Albacore, and maybe even the Barracuda as well were all in the running or better than the others.

If we bring in multi-engined strike aircraft it gets more interesting. Also fighter bombers including Fw 190s and Hellcats and Corsairs started scoring some hits on naval targets later in the war. That G-55 Torpedo fighter version might have been quite a success if events hadn't doomed it.


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## GrauGeist (Jan 26, 2021)

Not to diminish the RN/FAA types, but their numbers aren't as high as the "Big three" and this is mostly due to the Western Axis not having the surface fleet numbers as the Japanese did.
The "Stringbag" most certainly proved itself, especially when it counted.

The Ju87, SBD and D3A all operated in a target-rich environment (the Dauntless was most often the one-legged man in an ass kicking contest), so their numbers will be much higher.

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## Schweik (Jan 26, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> Not to diminish the RN/FAA types, but their numbers aren't as high as the "Big three" and this is mostly due to the Western Axis not having the surface fleet numbers as the Japanese did.
> The "Stringbag" most certainly proved itself, especially when it counted.



I think it was good in the early war, but I believe it lingered a bit too long, and the Albacore shouldn't have been it's (intended) replacement. It did bring airborne radar to the game very early on, as did the Albacore, and both aircraft could pinch hit as dive bombers. But I think the agonizingly slow speed and extreme vulnerability to fighters (and flak / light AAA, if the enemy has their act together) makes them dangerously obsolete at least for daytime bombing.



> The Ju87, SBD and D3A all operated in a target-rich environment (the Dauntless was most often the one-legged man in an ass kicking contest), so their numbers will be much higher.



Well the RN aircraft did too in the Med, at least for a while. The RN Carriers couldn't hold up to land based German strike aircraft or they could have done a lot more. On the other hand it's certainly up for debate if the US Carriers could have held their own. I think prior to 1943 it's debatable. Ranger made it in there a few times, and they had a short but ugly fight with the Vichy French. But I don't think they ever got in a knock-down / drag-out with the Luftwaffe. Once USN has Hellcats and then Corsairs, I think they can handle anything the Luftwaffe had, but that wasn't until the Med had become an Allied lake.


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## GrauGeist (Jan 26, 2021)

The Ranger's SBDs did ravage Vichy ships in Morrocco and then again, up in the Baltic, sending German shipping to the bottom (while hoping the Tirpitz would come out and play) - they did encounter some German aircraft, the F4Fs driving them off.

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## Stig1207 (Jan 26, 2021)

Not the Baltic, you probably meant the North Sea.


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## Schweik (Jan 26, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> The Ranger's SBDs did ravage Vichy ships in Morrocco and then again, up in the Baltic, sending German shipping to the bottom (while hoping the Tirpitz would come out and play) - they did encounter some German aircraft, the F4Fs driving them off.



Ranger and the other US Carriers lost I think the majority of their planes in a short but pretty brutal air battle with the Vichy during Torch. The French lost more but not a whole lot more. It was largely US made Hawk 75s vs Wildcats too which is pretty ironic.


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## Schweik (Jan 26, 2021)

Stig1207 said:


> Not the Baltic, you probably meant the North Sea.



Getting into the Baltic would have been pretty bold !

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## GrauGeist (Jan 26, 2021)

Yes, my bad, the Tirpitz was holed up on the North Sea side of Norway, however, the Ranger's compliment still gave the Germans hell during Operation Leader.

In regards to the Ranger's operation off Morocco, her F4Fs downed quite a few Vichy fighters and caught scores more on the ground. The SBDs holed the Jean Bart and sank several other ships and in the process, lost very few aircraft.
If I recall right, the score was 15 aerial victories for zero losses.


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## Schweik (Jan 26, 2021)

No, it was a lot more bloody than that. I have the battle in MAW, I'll look it up and transcribe it


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## SaparotRob (Jan 26, 2021)

Nope. Just the SBD, JU-87 and D3A. The rest are just noise. Sorry.


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## Admiral Beez (Jan 26, 2021)

Schweik said:


> IMO the results of that engagement prove that the Japanese were a more formidable opponent for the Royal Navy than the combined Italian and German forces


Well sure, the combined German and Italy navies were tiny compared to the RN, and both played into the three areas of RN expertise: battleships, ASW, and small sized night/all weather carrier strikes by slow, yet robust biplane bombers.

The Japanese were a different foe that the RN was not trained or optimized to fight. Had the Japanese played the British game, that of sending submarines and penny packets of surface ships without carriers against the RN the Japanese would be in trouble. Had the British played the Japanese game, that of sending one or two carriers with biplane bombers against the Kido Butai, the British are toast. The RN has one primary role, defend the home islands and its supply routes, projecting power or flag waving in the far east is a secondary affair at best. By the 1930s the Australians realized Britain didn't care about their defence and started reaching out to Washington. 

Mind you, take the RN and the FAA of late 1944 against the IJN and I'd say both sides are closer to each others areas of expertise. The RN would be bringing five to six radar-equipped armoured fleet carriers with 50+ aircraft CAGs of Corsairs, Hellcats, Seafires, Tarpons and Barracudas, along with fast KGV class battleships, strong ASW and a reasonable fleet train.

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## Schweik (Jan 26, 2021)

In 1944 the IJN was broken

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## Admiral Beez (Jan 26, 2021)

Schweik said:


> In 1944 the IJN was broken


IDK, they still had the fight in them at Leyte Gulf in October 1944, fielding three carriers, nine battleships, 20 cruisers and over 300 aircraft. This force was met and destroyed by massively superior USN forces (including 34 aircraft carriers!), and yet still the IJN managed to kill three USN carriers and over 200 US aircraft. 

Swap out the USN forces at Leyte Gulf with a purely British force of 5-6 Illustrious/Implacable class carriers, 4-5 KGV battleships and a dozen cruisers, and I'd give the Japanese good odds against the British.

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## Schweik (Jan 26, 2021)

Fair points! But they were pretty much out of competent pilots by then, I think the three CVEs they got were hit by kamikazes. Those were dangerous but ultimately not a winning strategy...

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## Admiral Beez (Jan 26, 2021)

Schweik said:


> Fair points! But they were pretty much out of competent pilots by then, I think the three CVEs they got were hit by kamikazes. Those were dangerous but ultimately not a winning strategy...


Good point. But did the BPF have competent pilots, I expect there was a lot of new, green aircrew in the rapidly expanding FAA. At what stage can we say the British and Japanese were on equal terms as far as ships, aircraft and pilots? 

Basically at what point has the USN knocked down the IJN and the Germans/Italians and time itself improved the RN? IMO, we need the RN to replace its Swordfish, Albacores, Sea Hurricanes and Fulmars with folding wing Martlets, Seafires, Barracudas and Tarpons. At the same time we need the Japanese to have carriers with full CAGs with the latest A6M variants and experienced pilots. That's our starting point of a fair fight.


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## RCAFson (Jan 26, 2021)

Admiral Beez said:


> Well sure, the combined German and Italy navies were tiny compared to the RN, and both played into the three areas of RN expertise: battleships, ASW, and small sized night/all weather carrier strikes by slow, yet robust biplane bombers.
> 
> The Japanese were a different foe that the RN was not trained or optimized to fight. Had the Japanese played the British game, that of sending submarines and penny packets of surface ships without carriers against the RN the Japanese would be in trouble. Had the British played the Japanese game, that of sending one or two carriers with biplane bombers against the Kido Butai, the British are toast. The RN has one primary role, defend the home islands and its supply routes, projecting power or flag waving in the far east is a secondary affair at best. By the 1930s the Australians realized Britain didn't care about their defence and started reaching out to Washington.
> 
> Mind you, take the RN and the FAA of late 1944 against the IJN and I'd say both sides are closer to each others areas of expertise. The RN would be bringing five to six radar-equipped armoured fleet carriers with 50+ aircraft CAGs of Corsairs, Hellcats, Seafires, Tarpons and Barracudas, along with fast KGV class battleships, strong ASW and a reasonable fleet train.


The combined KM and RMI equalled about 1/2 to 2/3 of RN strength but they also had their land based AFs that the RN was also forced to fight and the result was grinding attrition for the RN, with losses equalling new construction, so that the RN could not expand as planned to meet the IJN. OTOH, the IJN (and USN) was able to expand rapidly from Sept 1939 so that by Dec 1941 the RN no longer had the planned equality or, with the French navy, superiority over the 3 main Axis navies. 

The RN never had any intention of abandoning any part of the Empire/Commonwealth or allowing the combined Axis naval strength to exceed the RN's - it took 2 and 1/3 years of war to allow the IJN, in combination with the KM and RMI to gain the upper hand.


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## Admiral Beez (Jan 26, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> The RN never had any intention of abandoning any part of the Empire/Commonwealth


Maybe the RN didn't, but their overseers in Westminster and Whitehall made it so. For starters, canceling the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1921 whilst not increasing RN forces in the Pacific beyond sailing HMS Hood and Repulse through the area once in the mid 1920s demonstrated to all the lack of interest in defence of ANZ. Britain had the largest navy in the world throughout the interwar period until surpassed by the USN during the Second World War, but posted hardly any first rate or large warships east of Suez. 

There's no reason that three Courageous class carriers couldn't be stationed at Singapore or Hong Kong in the 1920s and early 1930s as a show of force to Japan and anyone else, such as Thailand. The British had the money, since they were spending billions on the Singapore base.

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## RCAFson (Jan 26, 2021)

Admiral Beez said:


> Maybe the RN didn't, but their overseers in Westminster and Whitehall made it so. For starters, canceling the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1921 whilst not increasing RN forces in the Pacific beyond sailing HMS Hood and Repulse through the area once in the mid 1920s demonstrated to all the lack of interest in defence of ANZ. Britain had the largest navy in the world throughout the interwar period until surpassed by the USN during the Second World War, but posted hardly any first rate or large warships east of Suez.
> 
> There's no reason that three Courageous class carriers couldn't be stationed at Singapore or Hong Kong in the 1920s and early 1930s as a show of force to Japan and anyone else, such as Thailand. The British had the money, since they were spending billions on the Singapore base.



The USN based a very large part of it's navy at PH. How'd that work out for them? Placing a large part of the RN in the far east would have created a very tempting target for a surprise IJN attack and would not have been a strategically or tactically sound idea. OTOH, Singapore was strengthened as far as possible, and the RN maintained a very large proportion of it's submarines in the far east.


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## Peter Gunn (Jan 26, 2021)

I don't think you'd get much argument that Whitehall and Westminster rather left ANZ hanging after 1919.

Suppose though, the RN had stationed three carriers at Singapore or Hong Kong. Combined with the shift from California to Pearl Harbor for the USN, Imperial Japan would definitely be feeling the pressure from the Western fleets, perhaps pushing them to attack sooner or driving them to the diplomatic table instead.

Although by late 1941 I'm sure it would be hard for the RN to justify keeping such valuable resources tied up outside of the theater of war the they were actively engaged in, at least until Pearl Harbor.

Also for the Pearl Harbor attack the IJN was blessed with some pretty good fortune to pull off total surprise.


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## Schweik (Jan 26, 2021)

RN n the 1930s was in a similar position to the US today - _huge_ expensive navy, too big to keep modernizing to the rapidly evolving standard, spread all over the world and teetering closer to obsolescence with the technology of the previous era.


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## RCAFson (Jan 26, 2021)

Peter Gunn said:


> I don't think you'd get much argument that Whitehall and Westminster rather left ANZ hanging after 1919.
> 
> Suppose though, the RN had stationed three carriers at Singapore or Hong Kong. Combined with the shift from California to Pearl Harbor for the USN, Imperial Japan would definitely be feeling the pressure from the Western fleets, perhaps pushing them to attack sooner or driving them to the diplomatic table instead.
> 
> ...



All they had to do was add up the number of RN carriers and battleships in service in Dec 1941, then subtract the minimum that the RN had to allocate to the ETO/MTO and they could calculate pretty easily the combined RN/USN strength that could be allocated to the Pacific. The RN started the war with 4 fleet carriers and had added 4 more by Dec 1941 but then lost 3 from Sept 1939 to Nov 1941. With no war the RN alone would have had carrier superiority over the IJN.

The IJN KB had 6 fleet carriers in Dec 1941, but 3 of these were added after 1939. The IJN had planned to knock out at least two USN fleet carriers at PH.


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## RCAFson (Jan 26, 2021)

Schweik said:


> RN n the 1930s was in a similar position to the US today - _huge_ expensive navy, too big to keep modernizing to the rapidly evolving standard, spread all over the world and teetering closer to obsolescence with the technology of the previous era.


After 1936, the RN had no lack of funding and the UK was building ships to the absolute limit of it's ship building capacity, which even in the mid 1930s was greater than all the Axis powers combined. With no war, the RN would have had a navy by Jan 1942, that was larger than all the Axis navies combined plus the RN was modernizing it's older ships as well, with Renown, Warspite, QE and Valiant being completely rebuilt, with more planned (including Hood), but cancelled due to war.

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## Admiral Beez (Jan 26, 2021)

Peter Gunn said:


> I don't think you'd get much argument that Whitehall and Westminster rather left ANZ hanging after 1919.
> 
> Suppose though, the RN had stationed three carriers at Singapore or Hong Kong. Combined with the shift from California to Pearl Harbor for the USN, Imperial Japan would definitely be feeling the pressure from the Western fleets, perhaps pushing them to attack sooner or driving them to the diplomatic table instead.
> 
> Although by late 1941 I'm sure it would be hard for the RN to justify keeping such valuable resources tied up outside of the theater of war the they were actively engaged in, at least until Pearl Harbor.


Agreed. But my suggestion on a large RN deployment to the Pacific was for the 1920s and early 1930s, when Japan was rapidly rearming, when the Anglo-Japan alliance was over, when ANZ was feeling vulnerable and before 1936-38 when war in Europe became inevitable and thus requiring the fleet to be recalled to home waters. Throughout the 1920s and early 30s the China Station was a backwater, with perhaps Hermes or Eagle making a tour, combined with a few cruisers, destroyers and perhaps a submarine squadron. It's noteworthy that HMS Prince of Wales in Dec 1941, twenty years after the alliance with Japan ended and after 30 years of rapid IJN expansion, was the very first time a British dreadnought battleship entered the Pacific. A British fast fleet carrier never once entered the Pacific in the interwar peace, whilst Japan was building a squadron of these same fast fleet carriers. Considering that the British Empire depended on its Indian, SEA and ANZ territories for so much of its strategic resources and manpower, its neglect of the area's defence, especially during the European peace is almost criminal.

It was to the absolute statement below that I was replying. *Never*, includes the period or relative European peace above.


RCAFson said:


> The RN *never* had any intention of abandoning any part of the Empire/Commonwealth

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## RCAFson (Jan 26, 2021)

Admiral Beez said:


> Agreed. But my suggestion on a large RN deployment to the Pacific was for the 1920s and early 1930s, when Japan was rapidly rearming, when the Anglo-Japan alliance was over, when ANZ was feeling vulnerable and before 1936-38 when war in Europe became inevitable and thus requiring the fleet to be recalled to home waters. Throughout the 1920s and early 30s the China Station was a backwater, with perhaps Hermes or Eagle making a tour, combined with a few cruisers, destroyers and perhaps a submarine squadron. It's noteworthy that HMS Prince of Wales in Dec 1941, twenty years after the alliance with Japan ended and after 30 years of rapid IJN expansion, was the very first time a British dreadnought battleship entered the Pacific. A British fast fleet carrier never once entered the Pacific in the interwar peace, whilst Japan was building a squadron of these same fast fleet carriers. Considering that the British Empire depended on its Indian, SEA and ANZ territories for so much of its strategic resources and manpower, its neglect of the area's defence, especially during the European peace is almost criminal.
> 
> It was to the absolute statement below that I was replying. *Never*, includes the period or relative European peace above.



???? What! The RN regularly operated battleships in the Pacific during the interwar period, and even after Sept 1939 and the RN always maintained carriers and battleships in the IO with Glorious operating in the IO in Oct 1939.

The Naval limitation treaties ensured that the IJN was much smaller than the RN (and IJ economic strength was a fraction of the British Empire/Commonwealth) so the threat from the IJN was really non-existent until tensions in Europe became acute after 1936, and then the UK opened the doors to the treasury to strengthen the RN, to match and exceed the combined Axis build-up.


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## Schweik (Jan 26, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> The Ranger's SBDs did ravage Vichy ships in Morrocco and then again, up in the Baltic, sending German shipping to the bottom (while hoping the Tirpitz would come out and play) - they did encounter some German aircraft, the F4Fs driving them off.



As promised, I posted all the losses from Torch Allies vs. Vichy Nov 7 -12 and the air combat comes out to 25 lost by the French and 56 by the Americans and British

Operation Torch Air Battle

Next will be Pedestal

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## Schweik (Jan 26, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> After 1936, the RN had no lack of funding and the UK was building ships to the absolute limit of it's ship building capacity, which even in the mid 1930s was greater than all the Axis powers combined. With no war, the RN would have had a navy by Jan 1942, that was larger than all the Axis navies combined plus the RN was modernizing it's older ships as well, with Renown, Warspite, QE and Valiant being completely rebuilt, with more planned (including Hood), but cancelled due to war.



Not saying they lacked funding (modern US Navy doesn't either) saying there were too many ships to modernize and they obviously struggled bureaucratically in managing the whole mess.


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## Admiral Beez (Jan 26, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> The RN regularly operated battleships in the Pacific during the interwar period...


When, which ones? You might get a battleship visit to Ceylon, Aden, Singapore or other Indian Ocean bases, like HMS Ramillies shown here at Freemantle, I/O (not interwar, ETO at least) but into the Pacific? Not in anything I've seen. 

I'm definitely interested, but I see no evidence of any interwar RN battleship or fleet carriers in the Pacific.

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## Schweik (Jan 26, 2021)

Except the Prince of Wales and the Repulse...

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## Admiral Beez (Jan 26, 2021)

Schweik said:


> Except the Prince of Wales and the Repulse...


Again' I'm referring to interwar RN support of Britain's Pacific territory in reply to...


RCAFson said:


> The RN *never* had any intention of abandoning any part of the Empire/Commonwealth



Once hostilities commenced, many British battleships entered Pacific waters. HMS Prince of Wales arrives at Singapore on Dec 4th, but did not venture in the Pacific (and only just, by entering the Gulf of Thailand) until hostilities commenced. Others got further into the Pacific, including HMS Anson arriving at Hong Kong in August 1945 to oversee Japan's surrender, and I believe the first RN battleship to visit Hong Kong since before the First World War. Which is my point, even during the European peace before Munich in 1938 or even the Remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936, Britain failed to deploy any of its battleships or fast fleet carriers to remind Japan that Britain cares about the Pacific.

While I can't can't find any British battleships or fleet carriers in the Pacific, the PTO did get two RN battlecruisers in 1923-24, but when you look at the map you see that Britain took great care not to come anywhere close to Japanese territory. HMS Hood and Repulse stayed in the Indian Ocean, heading dead south from Singapore, around Australia, to enter the Pacific near Adelaide on Australia's south coast. Then they headed northeast straight for Hawaii and Vancouver, avoiding any notion of waving the flag to Japan. HMS Hood and Repulse should have gone to Hong Kong after Singapore, then the British concession in Shanghai, and then sailed south to PNG and Australia. Britain spent the 1920s afraid to offend Japan, and declined to forward deploy its battleships or fast fleet carriers to the Pacific (i.e. Japan's backyard, not the I/O) when European circumstances allowed for it.

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## Admiral Beez (Jan 26, 2021)

Schweik said:


> RN n the 1930s was in a similar position to the US today - _huge_ expensive navy, too big to keep modernizing to the rapidly evolving standard, spread all over the world and teetering closer to obsolescence with the technology of the previous era.


It's not unlike the circumstances that FSL Admiral Fisher found in the early 1900s, a Royal Navy filled with bad ships scattered everywhere, or as Jackie Fisher put it, “Too weak to fight, and too slow to run away”. 

Memories by Admiral Fisher


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## RCAFson (Jan 26, 2021)

Admiral Beez said:


> Again' I'm referring to interwar RN support of Britain's Pacific territory in reply to...
> 
> Once hostilities commenced, many British battleships entered Pacific waters. HMS Prince of Wales arrives at Singapore on Dec 4th, but did not venture in the Pacific (and only just, by entering the Gulf of Thailand) until hostilities commenced. Others got further into the Pacific, including HMS Anson arriving at Hong Kong in August 1945 to oversee Japan's surrender, and I believe the first RN battleship to visit Hong Kong since before the First World War. Which is my point, even during the European peace before Munich in 1938 or even the Remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936, Britain failed to deploy any of its battleships or fast fleet carriers to remind Japan that Britain cares about the Pacific.
> 
> While I can't can't find any British battleships or fleet carriers in the Pacific, the PTO did get two RN battlecruisers in 1923-24, but when you look at the map you see that Britain took great care not to come anywhere close to Japanese territory. HMS Hood and Repulse stayed in the Indian Ocean, heading dead south from Singapore, around Australia, to enter the Pacific near Adelaide on Australia's south coast. Then they headed northeast straight for Hawaii and Vancouver, avoiding any notion of waving the flag to Japan. HMS Hood and Repulse should have gone to Hong Kong after Singapore, then the British concession in Shanghai, and then sailed south to PNG and Australia. Britain spent the 1920s afraid to offend Japan, and declined to forward deploy its battleships or fast fleet carriers to the Pacific (i.e. Japan's backyard, not the I/O) when European circumstances allowed for it.



There was no war in the far east that called for RN attention and there was a defacto alliance between the UK and USA regarding Japan. HMS Hood's most important 'flag waving' in the Pacific occurred in places like San Francisco where she arrived to an enthusiastic welcome. 

The RN chose to deploy it's main units in well defended bases, rather than scatter the fleet where it could be destroyed in detail, by smaller navies that achieved local superiority in numbers.


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## SaparotRob (Jan 26, 2021)

RE: post 48.
During the ‘20’s, wasn’t it still customary for nations to pay curtesy calls to other nations? I have the impression that it wasn’t considered sabre rattling at all but appreciated.

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## Admiral Beez (Jan 26, 2021)

If I was allocating British warships to the Pacific through 1941 it wouldn‘t be carriers or battleships, as this plays into the IJN strengths in surface and air to surface warfare. No, I want submarines.

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## slaterat (Jan 27, 2021)

Admiral Beez said:


> I'm definitely interested, but I see no evidence of any interwar RN battleship or fleet carriers in the Pacific.



You need to look harder. The battleships were old and slow, the PR team was the Battle cruisers, who made multiple trips to the Pacific, including Honk Kong and Japan in the 1920s. Check out this website for some information on this matter. There is also a shot of the Cornwall and Hermes in Singapore in 1935.

https://world-war.co.uk/

In the early 1930s the big ships were showing their age and lining up for expensive rebuilds, and the Flag waving was largely passed on to the County Class cruisers, with many stationed in the Far East.

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## Schweik (Jan 27, 2021)

Battleships also used an incredible amount of fuel, and were expensive (both literally, and in terms of logistics) to move around

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## Admiral Beez (Jan 27, 2021)

Schweik said:


> Battleships also used an incredible amount of fuel, and were expensive (both literally, and in terms of logistics) to move around


Yes, deploying fleet CVs and BBs to the Pacific would represent a significant and overt investment in Britain’s defence of its Pacific empire. That’s sort of the point.

The reasons listed in posts above for why Britain did not deploy battleships to the Pacific seem accurate. I would also add that Britain saw the Pacific as a back water, not worthy of the expense. That‘s why I was surprised to see this claim, and asked for specifics.


RCAFson said:


> The RN regularly operated battleships in the Pacific during the interwar period...


When? What ships? 

The only example I can find of a British battleship in the Pacific between the wars is HMS Nelson, shown here transiting the Panama Canal in 1931 enroute to visit the Panama Pacific port of Balboa and USN ships based there. After which she turned around went back to the Atlantic.







Here's HMS Malaya's trip in 1921, note she went to Singapore and then declining to enter the Pacific turned right for home, HMS Malaya, battleship - British warships of World War 1

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## Schweik (Jan 27, 2021)

I don't disagree with your premise. Nice photo of that BB.

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## Dimlee (Jan 27, 2021)

The thread is good (Thanks, Schweik).
The premise is confusing, however. (Sorry, Schweik). Is it _knocking at the open door_, as we say in Russian?
An impartial analysis of different theaters is always welcome, of course.
It's interesting to compare such aspects as the effectiveness of weapons systems, tactics, etc. Not the "volumes", where Pacific wins hands-down.


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## Schweik (Jan 27, 2021)

Well both are significant in this case (sorry Dimlee)


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## Schweik (Jan 28, 2021)

Admiral Beez said:


> Good point. But did the BPF have competent pilots, I expect there was a lot of new, green aircrew in the rapidly expanding FAA. At what stage can we say the British and Japanese were on equal terms as far as ships, aircraft and pilots?
> 
> Basically at what point has the USN knocked down the IJN and the Germans/Italians and time itself improved the RN? IMO, we need the RN to replace its Swordfish, Albacores, Sea Hurricanes and Fulmars with folding wing Martlets, Seafires, Barracudas and Tarpons. At the same time we need the Japanese to have carriers with full CAGs with the latest A6M variants and experienced pilots. That's our starting point of a fair fight.



The tipping point of the war was clearly somewhere between mid 1942 and early 1943. The closest we have was Ceylon, but I think the specific kit of the British fleet and FAA were part of what makes the comparison. Clearly the British had very good pilots or you wouldn't see ships being sunk by Swordfish and Albacores or enemy planes being downed by Gladiators, Sea Hurricanes, Skuas and Fulmars.

And we can see the difference skill makes not just in the late war performance decline of the Japanese, but also within the US - the very highly trained USN pilots had a very good record with the SBD, while the Marines and Army pilots, who had much less training on the type particularly in true high-angle dive bombing, had a fairly dismal record with exactly the same aircraft - sometimes in the same place like off the coast of Guadalcanal. So clearly the quality of the plane alone is not enough to make all the difference.

That said, I definitely agree with your proposed re-arming of the FAA, (I posted roughly the same myself) but that is actually precisely what we were arguing about in the other thread (Swordfish vs Devastator) which spawned this one. Certain people felt very strongly that the FAA aircraft like the Swordfish were just as good as anything else flying and that they faced down tougher opposition than the IJN in the Malta convoys for example specifically at Pedestal, where the claim was made that the RN was fighting 600 enemy aircraft. I pointed out that most of those planes were obsolete Italian types many of which were just Spanish Civil War era biplanes and trimotor bombers, seaplanes and liaison planes and so forth, and that due to the very limited range of the best available planes like the Stuka and Bf 109 it's unrealistic to claim that the Pedestal convoy was up against anything like the IJN / IJA forces in the big Pacific showdowns, but my point was dismissed and the debate just got more heated. That's why I opened this thread so we could further explore some of the (to me) ludicrous claims made about the Fulmar and Sea Hurricane having outstanding combat records etc., without continuing to derail that one, as many other people were complaining about the thread drift.

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## RCAFson (Jan 28, 2021)

Schweik said:


> The tipping point of the war was clearly somewhere between mid 1942 and early 1943. The closest we have was Ceylon, but I think the specific kit of the British fleet and FAA were part of what makes the comparison. Clearly the British had very good pilots or you wouldn't see ships being sunk by Swordfish and Albacores or enemy planes being downed by Gladiators, Sea Hurricanes, Skuas and Fulmars.
> 
> And we can see the difference skill makes not just in the late war performance decline of the Japanese, but also within the US - the very highly trained USN pilots had a very good record with the SBD, while the Marines and Army pilots, who had much less training on the type particularly in true dive bombing, had a fairly dismal record with exactly the same aircraft - sometimes in the same place like off the coast of Guadalcanal. So clearly the quality of the plane alone is not enough to make all the difference.
> 
> That said, I definitely agree with your proposed re-arming of the FAA, (I posted roughly the same myself) but that is actually precisely what we were arguing about in the other thread (Swordfish vs Devastator) which spawned this one. Certain people felt very strongly that the FAA aircraft like the Swordfish were just as good as anything else flying and that they faced down tougher opposition than the IJN in the Malta convoys for example specifically at Pedestal, where the claim was made that the RN was fighting 600 enemy aircraft. I pointed out that most of those planes were obsolete Italian types many of which were just Spanish Civil War era biplanes and trimotor bombers, seaplanes and liaison planes and so forth, and that due to the very limited range of the best available planes like the Stuka and Bf 109 it's unrealistic to claim that the Pedestal convoy was up against anything like the IJN / IJA forces in the big Pacific showdowns, but my point was dismissed and the debate just got more heated. That's why I opened this thread so we could further explore some of the (to me) ludicrous claims made about the Fulmar and Sea Hurricane having outstanding combat records etc., without continuing to derail that one, as many other people were complaining about the thread drift.



How is an SM79/82 or other trimotor strike aircraft any more obsolete than a Nell or Betty? What were the comparative weapon loads? What were the primary IJN recon aircraft and how do they compare to RMI recon aircraft? 

" _Certain people felt very strongly that the FAA aircraft like the Swordfish were just as good as anything else flying..._" This statement is a bit over the top, especially after we've just had an in depth discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the Swordfish. We've also discussed in some detail how the RN's carriers had no choice but to close to within range of the Luftwaffe's superior strike aircraft, and that the JU-87R could carry a heavier bomb load than the Val and could carry a 250kg bomb at least as far as any realistically feasible Val strike range.

Which Allied carrier had the largest IJN strike directed against it in 1942? Which allied navy carrier force faced the strongest assembly of IJN carriers?

What was the largest IJN strike endured by USN carriers prior to Philippine Sea? 

How many IJN strike sorties did USN carriers endure in 1942? How does the total of all IJN strikes directed against USN carriers in 1942 compare to total Axis strike sorties directed against Pedestal alone?

What was the heaviest bomb to strike a USN carrier in 1942?

Please support your last statement with some facts and sources.


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## Admiral Beez (Jan 28, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> How is an SM79/82 or other trimotor strike aircraft any more obsolete than a Nell or Betty?
> What were the comparative weapon loads?
> What were the primary IJN recon aircraft and how do they compare to RMI recon aircraft?
> Which Allied carrier had the largest IJN strike directed against it in 1942?
> ...


I count nine individual questions and a closing demand. Isn’t that a little over the top? 

This is a discussion forum, not an inquisition.

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## Schweik (Jan 28, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> How is an SM79/82 or other trimotor strike aircraft any more obsolete than a Nell or Betty? What were the comparative weapon loads? What were the primary IJN recon aircraft and how do they compare to RMI recon aircraft?



They seem to compare quite well. Lets do some of that.

*Japanese Recon*
E8N - obsolete biplane scout aircraft flown from a few battleships,. Range 558 miles, 190 mph, 2 x LMG
F1M - an obsolete but apparently quite scrappy biplane floatplane scout / fighter, flown off of Battleships and Cruisers. Range 460 miles. 230 mph, 2 x offensive LMG, 1 x defensive
A6M2-N - Floatplane fighter. Top speed 270 mph. Range 730 miles. Armament 2 x LMG, 2 x 20mm.
H6K - Big, somewhat obsolescent flying boat. Speed 210 mph. Range 2900 miles. Armament 4 x LMG and 1 x 20mm. Can carry two torpedoes or 2,200 lb bombs.
H8K - Big state of the art four engine flying boat. Speed 290 mph. Range 4000 miles. Armament 5 x 20mm and 4 x LMG. 2 x torpedoes or 4,400 lbs bombs
E13 - Standard Japanese scout flying from Cruisers. Speed 234 mph, range 1,200 miles. One defensive LMG.
Ki-46 - High speed twin engine recon plane. Speed 375 mph, range 1,500 miles. One defensive LMG.

*Italian / German Recon*
Ro. 43 - Obsolescent Italian biplane scout. Range 500-930 miles. Speed 190 mph. Arms 2 x 7.7mm (I think one defensive)
Ro. 44 - Similar to Ro.43
AR-196 - Armed float plane scout often flown from ships. Range 670 miles, speed 193 mph, 2 x 20 mm and 2 x LMG (defensive)
CANT Z.506 - Trimotor flying boat. Top speed 220 mph. Range 1,200 miles. 1 x HMG, 3 x LMG. Can carry one torpedo.
BV 138 - Weird (but well armed) little German trimotor flying boat. Speed 177 mph, range 760 miles, 2 x 20mm, 1 x HMG, up to 3 LMG. (small numbers)
FW 189 - Light twin engined German scout. 214 mph. 580 mile range. 2 x LMG, 2 x LMG (defensive) (small numbers)*
He 115 - Heavy twin engined seaplane scout. 203 mph. 1,300 mile range. 1 x LMG, 1 x LMG (defensive) . One torpedo, mine or 2,700 lbs of bombs. (small numbers)
Caproni 310 - Light twin engined Italian scout. 227 mph, 1,050 mile range. 2 x LMG, 1 x LMG (defensive) (small numbers)
Caproni 313 - Light twin engined Italian Scout. 268 mph. 1050 mile range. 2 x LMG, 1 x LMG (defensive)
Fw 200 - German four engined maritime patrol. Speed 240 mph, range 2,200 miles, 1 x 20mm, 1 x HMG, 4 x LMG. (small numbers)

* not sure if those were used in Maritime role or not

*Japanese Strike*
G3M - Japanese Navy twin engined bomber - 233 mph,, 2,700 mile range, 1 x 20mm, 4 x LMG, 1 x torpedo or 1,800 lb bombs
G4M - Japanese Navy twin engined bomber - 266 mph, 1,700 mile range, 1 x 20mm, 4 x LMG, 1 x torpedo or 2200 lb bombs
Ki-21 - Japanese Army twin engined bomber - 300 mph, 1,700 mile range, 1 x HMG, 5 x LMG, 2200 lb bombs
Ki-48 - Japanese Army twin-engined bomber - 314 mph, 1,500 mile range, 3 x LMG, 1764 lbs of bombs
Ki-49 - Japanese Army twin engined bomber - 306 mph, 1,200 mile range. 1 x 20mm and 3 x HMG, 2 x LMG. Armorand & self-sealing tanks. 2200 lb bombs.
B5N - Japanese torpedo bomber - Speed 235, range 978, 1 x torpedo
D3A - Japanese dive bomber - Speed 240 mph, 915 mile range, 550 / 870 lbs bombs
D4Y - Japanese dive bomber - Speed 340 mph, 910 mile range, 550 / 1100 lbs bombs

*Italian / German Strike*
Fiat BR.20 - Italian twin-engine bomber - Speed 270 mph, range 1,700 miles, 3 x HMG, bombs 3530 lb
SM. 79 - Italian Trimotor bomber - Speed 290 mph, range 1600 miles, 2 x HMG, 2 x LMG, bombs 2,645 lbs or 1 torpedo**
SM. 84 - Italian trimotor bomber - Speed 290 mph, Range 1100 miles, 4 x HMG, bombs 2,000 lbs or 1 torpedo
CANT 1007 - Italian trimotor bomber - Speed 285 mph , Range 1100, 2 x HMG, 2 x LMG, bombs 2,645 lbs / 4900 lbs or 2 x torpedoes
He 111 - German twin engined bomber - Speed 270 mph, Range 1,400 miles, 1 x 20mm, 1 x HMG, 7 x LMG, bombs 4400 / 7900 or one or two torpedoes
Ju-87B - German dive bomber - Speed 236 mph, range 370 miles, 2 x LMG, 1 x LMG (defensive), bombs 1100 lbs / 1540 lbs
Ju-87D - German dive bomebr - Speed 240 mph, range 683 miles , 2 x 20mm, 2 x LMG (defensive) bombs 1100 lbs / 1540 lbs
Ju-87R - German dive bomber - Speed 220 mph, range 492 miles*, 2 x LMG, 2 x LMG (defensive), bombs 1100 lbs
Ju-88 - German schnellbomber - Speed 290 mph, range, 1,100 miles, 5 x LMG, bombs 2000 lbs / 6660 lbs

* Wikipedia says a strike range of 220 miles
** It says two but in practice they only carried one


> " _Certain people felt very strongly that the FAA aircraft like the Swordfish were just as good as anything else flying..._" This statement is a bit over the top,



Do you have a more nuanced version of this statement? Post it then.



> especially after we've just had an in depth discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the Swordfish. We've also discussed in some detail how the RN's carriers had no choice but to close to within range of the Luftwaffe's superior strike aircraft, and that the JU-87R could carry a heavier bomb load than the Val and could carry a 250kg bomb at least as far as any realistically feasible Val strike range.



Are you claiming that all the Ju-87 used against Pedestal or the previous convoys were Ju-87R with extended range? Because I'd love to see the numbers on that. For Pedestal I saw Ju 87D and Ju87B. How many Ju-87R were flying?



> Which Allied carrier had the largest IJN strike directed against it in 1942? Which allied navy carrier force faced the strongest assembly of IJN carriers?
> 
> What was the largest IJN strike endured by USN carriers prior to Philippine Sea?



I'll answer this if you tell me what was the largest number of strike aircraft in any raid in Pedestal or one of the other Med convoys.



> How many IJN strike sorties did USN carriers endure in 1942? How does the total of all IJN strikes directed against USN carriers in 1942 compare to total Axis strike sorties directed against Pedestal alone?
> 
> What was the heaviest bomb to strike a USN carrier in 1942?
> 
> Please support your last statement with some facts and sources.



That's a lot of work you are asking me to do lol. Count every sortie against all US carriers in 1942? Maybe somebody else will do that for you.

I still say the Skua, the Fulmar and the Sea Hurricane were pretty lousy fighters with a bad combat record.

*EDIT: Added the Ki-48 Lily bomber and E8N scout plane, removed the B6N which wasn't available until 1943.*

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## Admiral Beez (Jan 28, 2021)

Schweik said:


> I still say the Skua, the Fulmar and the Sea Hurricane were pretty lousy fighters with a bad combat record.


The Fulmar had a good record as a fighter, it’s the top scoring FAA of all time. Yes, the Axis gave the Fulmar what it needed in the form of unescorted Stukas and Sparrowhawks, but that’s not the Fulmar’s fault. Put the Fulmar against any Axis monoplane single seat fighter and it‘s toast, but that wasn’t really part of the Fulmar’s combat experience. 

But Skua, damn that’s no fighter you FAA/AM fools.

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## SaparotRob (Jan 28, 2021)

Even though I know better I just can’t see the Swordfish as a dive bomber.


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## RCAFson (Jan 28, 2021)

Schweik said:


> I still say the Skua, the Fulmar and the Sea Hurricane were pretty lousy fighters with a bad combat record.



You need to provide something more than that, simple repetition doesn't cut it.


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## RCAFson (Jan 28, 2021)

Schweik said:


> That's a lot of work you are asking me to do lol. Count every sortie against all US carriers in 1942? Maybe somebody else will do that for you.



Actually it's not hard at all. The IJNAF only attacked USN carrier TFs during ~ 6 battles in 1942.


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## RCAFson (Jan 28, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> Actually it's not hard at all. The IJNAF only attacked USN carrier TFs during ~ 6 battles in 1942.



Bougainville = 18 Bettys (plus a few more sorties against other carrier raids)

Coral Sea = 51 = 33 Val and 18 Kate

Midway = 28 = 18 Val and 10 Kate (two strikes)

Eastern Solomons = 27 Vals

Santa Cruz = 109 = 58 Vals and 51 Kates.
------------------------------------------------------

= ~224 IJN strike aircraft sorties against USN carrier TFs in all of 1942. 

BWOC, the IJN flew about 180 attack sorties against units of the BEF on 5 and 9 April 1942.

The Axis AFs flew about 230 attack sorties against Pedestal alone during the time it was escorted by carriers.

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## Schweik (Jan 28, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> You need to provide something more than that, simple repetition doesn't cut it.



Well, I already posted the results of their encounters with Japanese fighters in the Indian Ocean and that was pretty dismal


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## RCAFson (Jan 28, 2021)

Schweik said:


> They seem to compare quite well. Lets do some of that.
> 
> *Japanese Recon*
> F1M - an obsolete but apparently quite scrappy biplane floatplane scout / fighter, flown off of Battleships and Cruisers. Range 460 miles. 230 mph, 2 x offensive LMG, 1 x defensive
> ...



You missed the IJN Nakajima E8N 'Dave' : Nakajima E8N ~190mph and ~500nm range. It was used for recon during 1942.
and the E7K/E7K2 'Alf' Kawanishi E7K `~170mph and 1000nm range.


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## RCAFson (Jan 28, 2021)

Schweik said:


> *Japanese Strike*
> G3M - Japanese Navy twin engined bomber - 233 mph,, 2,700 mile range, 1 x 20mm, 4 x LMG, 1 x torpedo or 1,800 lb bombs
> G4M - Japanese Navy twin engined bomber - 266 mph, 1,700 mile range, 1 x 20mm, 4 x LMG, 1 x torpedo or 2200 lb bombs
> Ki-21 - Japanese Army twin engined bomber - 300 mph, 1,700 mile range, 1 x HMG, 5 x LMG, 2200 lb bombs
> ...



Neither the D4Y or B6N played any role as a carrier strike aircraft in 1942. 

Only 25 D4Ys were built from early 1942 to early 1943, when it was put into volume production. AFAIK, it only flew a single sortie as recon aircraft at Midway. 

The B6N did not enter production until Feb 1943.

All Variants of the JU87B onward could carry DTs but as we've discussed, this was rarely necessary because RN carriers had to operate within range of non DT equipped JU87s. JU87B/R max bomb load was 1000kg and Ju87D 2000kg,

I gave you an example of the JU87Rs sinking HMS Southampton at ~300 miles from Sicily.

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## RCAFson (Jan 28, 2021)

Schweik said:


> Well, I already posted the results of their encounters with Japanese fighters in the Indian Ocean and that was pretty dismal



The Sea Hurricane had a very positive kill ratio during the Harpoon and Pedestal Convoys, 28 victories vs 8 losses, IIRC (_Malta, the Spitfire Years_). Only land based Fulmars encountered IJN aircraft during the attack on Ceylon and they and RAF Hurricanes did about as well as the USMC fighters on Midway.


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## SaparotRob (Jan 28, 2021)

Did the Fulmars and RAF Hurricanes do as well as the USN fighters at Midway?

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## SaparotRob (Jan 28, 2021)

Sorry. I’m bored.


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## Peter Gunn (Jan 29, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> The Sea Hurricane had a very positive kill ratio during the Harpoon and Pedestal Convoys, 28 victories vs 8 losses, IIRC (_Malta, the Spitfire Years_). Only land based Fulmars encountered IJN aircraft during the attack on Ceylon and they and RAF Hurricanes did about as well as the USMC fighters on Midway.


Considering the Marine units were flying mostly Buffalo's... (20 out of 26 total)

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## Peter Gunn (Jan 29, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> Actually it's not hard at all. The IJNAF only attacked USN carrier TFs during ~ 6 battles in 1942.


Only 6? Well hell I'm sure the BPF could shrug that off no sweat.

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## Schweik (Jan 29, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> Bougainville = 18 Bettys (plus a few more sorties against other carrier raids)
> 
> Coral Sea = 51 = 33 Val and 18 Kate
> 
> ...



I think you are doing some really creative cherry-picking here, I'll unpack it when I have more time later today.


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## Schweik (Jan 29, 2021)

Peter Gunn said:


> Considering the Marine units were flying mostly Buffalo's... (20 out of 26 total)



Right. The Sea Hurricane had a "terrific" combat record similar to the Brewter Buffalo in the Pacific... I guess it all depends what you consider good.

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## Schweik (Jan 29, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> Neither the D4Y or B6N played any role as a carrier strike aircraft in 1942.
> 
> Only 25 D4Ys were built from early 1942 to early 1943, when it was put into volume production. AFAIK, it only flew a single sortie as recon aircraft at Midway.



There was only one E8 "Dave" at Midway, flying from the Battleship Haruna, but you felt compelled to put that in. Right?

I never states I was making a Midway a cutoff, as Pedestal was several months later than Midway. I was comparing aircraft active in 1942. There were D4Y stationed in the Pacific through the second half of 1942.



> The B6N did not enter production until Feb 1943.



You got me here, that was an oversight. I just saw first flight in 1941. It's what I get for being hasty.



> All Variants of the JU87B onward could carry DTs but as we've discussed, this was rarely necessary because RN carriers had to operate within range of non DT equipped JU87s. JU87B/R max bomb load was 1000kg and Ju87D 2000kg,



The point about the Stukas and their normally very limited range, and same for the MC 202 and Bf 109s available) is that while you implied Pedestal was under attack by 600 aircraft, the reality is that 1) most of those 600 planes were not modern aircraft and many were not even really combat aircraft (rather recon or liaison), and 2) only a small percentage of the actually effective strike aircraft could attack the convoy at any one time.

The TO&E posted by Slaterat showed 26 x Ju 87D from I/StG 3, and 14 x Ju 87B & R . So that means at the very most, there were maybe a dozen Ju-87R flown by Italian pilots. Probably more like half a dozen. The elite StG 2 unit which sunk Southampton was in Russia by then.

The only relatively effective long range Strike aircraft available to the Axis during Pedestal were the 144 x Ju-88A they had stationed in Sicily. No doubt the reason they had so many of these in Theater is that they were the only really effective maritime strike aircraft the Axis had at the time. These were pretty good strike aircraft, though nowhere near as lethal of ship killers as say, the D3A. Or the Stuka. But the problem was their range far outstripped that of any of their fighter escorts. Even if you count the 8 x Bf 110C and 12 x Ju88C heavy fighters that were in Theater, these may best Skuas or Fulmars but would have a hard time against even Sea Hurricanes, let alone any of the land based fighters. This and the prevalence of the obsolescent Italian Trimotors in the force breakdown perhaps explains why so many of the air strikes against Pedestal resulted in "no damage".

Basically the only real danger zone was when they were coming within range of the German fighters (and Stukas) near Sicily and / or Tunis. The vast majority of this impressive force of 600 aircraft were no threat to Pedestal and the ones which could credibly attack did so piecemeal, and in much smaller number.



> I gave you an example of the JU87Rs sinking HMS Southampton at ~300 miles from Sicily.



I don't know the actual distance to the target but the Southampton was sunk more than a year before Pedestal, during Operation Excess.

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## Glider (Jan 29, 2021)

I know I have a habit of looking at things in a simplistic way but its served me well over the years. There can be no doubt that the Fulmar and the Sea Hurricane performed well when they had to. However it's also clear that this was almost certainly down to the skill of the pilots, the air intercept directors as well as the tactical situation they were in plus of course the majority of the opposition were unescorted.

It's also true that the Hurricane was inferior to the Me109E a fact that has been shown in many areas of conflict, and a Zero was at least as good as the 109E. There are comparison tests undertaken by Allied pilots which proved that the Zero was every bit as good as the Spit V so its ascendency over the Hurricane is unquestioned. Its worth remembering that the Allied Airforces in the Far East considered the Hurricane to be obsolete when matched against the Ki43 let alone anything else.

To believe that the Sea Hurricane and the Fulmar were even close to parity to the Zero or Ki43 is far from reality

Looking in from the outside there seems to be little difference between the dive bombers, the main difference would be in the quality of the training. Some types / versions had more range but in actuality all seemed to have had sufficient range for the jobs they were asked to do.

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## Schweik (Jan 29, 2021)

Glider said:


> I know I have a habit of looking at things in a simplistic way but its served me well over the years. There can be no doubt that the Fulmar and the Sea Hurricane performed well when they had to. However it's also clear that this was almost certainly down to the skill of the pilots, the air intercept directors as well as the tactical situation they were in plus of course the majority of the opposition were unescorted.



Unescorted and obsolete



> It's also true that the Hurricane was inferior to the Me109E a fact that has been shown in many areas of conflict, and a Zero was at least as good as the 109E. There are comparison tests undertaken by Allied pilots which proved that the Zero was every bit as good as the Spit V so its ascendency over the Hurricane is unquestioned. Its worth remembering that the Allied Airforces in the Far East considered the Hurricane to be obsolete when matched against the Ki43 let alone anything else.
> *
> To believe that the Sea Hurricane and the Fulmar were even close to parity to the Zero or Ki43 is far from reality*
> 
> Looking in from the outside there seems to be little difference between the dive bombers, the main difference would be in the quality of the training. Some types / versions had more range but in actuality all seemed to have had sufficient range for the jobs they were asked to do.



Agree with 90% of that. The dive bombers range was significantly different - I was being pretty generous with the Ju 87D I don't think it's actual strike range was anywhere near that far. But even if that was right, D3A is still ~300 miles longer range, which matters a lot in naval combat.


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## Admiral Beez (Jan 29, 2021)

SaparotRob said:


> Did the Fulmars and RAF Hurricanes do as well as the USN fighters at Midway?


Provided the "escorting" Zeros cooperate by their usual chasing of individual glory rather than staying by their charges the Fulmars and especially the faster Hurricanes would have made mincemeat out of the matchstick incendiaries, AKA Vals and Kates. There's nothing in the IJNAF that can withstand a few seconds of eight .303 in the backside.

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## Schweik (Jan 29, 2021)

Admiral Beez said:


> Provided the "escorting" Zeros cooperate by their usual chasing of individual glory rather than staying by their charges the Fulmars and especially the fastest Hurricanes would have made mincemeat out of the matchstick incendiaries, AKA Vals and Kates. There's nothing in the IJNAF that can withstand a few seconds of eight .303 in the backside.



They got a few chances at Ceylon but didn't get very many, for example in one of the clashes a squadron of Hurricanes caught a squadron of D3A on their own but they only got 4 of them (one later crash landed on the carrier). Probably because the Vals in particular were hard to catch - very agile, good dogfighters. Wildcats had trouble getting them too sometimes. The 'Kates' were more sitting ducks.

To be fair, Stukas could be like that too. I know in the MTO the land based DAF fighters sometimes caught them and mauled them but sometimes most of them got away. They had a trick they did to produce oily smoke during a dive and a sharp spiraling turn which made it look like they'd been hit and were going down. Like the D3A they were slow but quite agile.


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## RCAFson (Jan 29, 2021)

Glider said:


> To believe that the Sea Hurricane and the Fulmar were even close to parity to the Zero or Ki43 is far from reality
> .



Who said that? But the same is certainly true of the F4F-3/4 and Zero.


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## RCAFson (Jan 29, 2021)

Schweik said:


> They got a few chances at Ceylon but didn't get very many, for example in one of the clashes a squadron of Hurricanes caught a squadron of D3A on their own but they only got 4 of them (one later crash landed on the carrier). Probably because the Vals in particular were hard to catch - very agile, good dogfighters. Wildcats had trouble getting them too sometimes. The 'Kates' were more sitting ducks.
> 
> To be fair, Stukas could be like that too. I know in the MTO the land based DAF fighters sometimes caught them and mauled them but sometimes most of them got away. They had a trick they did to produce oily smoke during a dive and a sharp spiraling turn which made it look like they'd been hit and were going down. Like the D3A they were slow but quite agile.



The Stuka and Ju88 were armoured with SS tanks, as were most Axis aircraft in the ETO/MTO.


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## Schweik (Jan 29, 2021)

Ah, no, the F4F-3 was roughly on par with the Zero, likely due to training and tactics as much as anything else. I doubt I'm the only one who would point this out.

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## Schweik (Jan 29, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> The Stuka and Ju88 were armoured with SS tanks, as were most Axis aircraft in the ETO/MTO.



Hurricanes routinely made short work of Stukas regardless of any armor, though they often failed to even intercept Ju 88s (due to speed and altitude) such as over Malta.


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## RCAFson (Jan 29, 2021)

Schweik said:


> Unescorted and obsolete
> 
> 
> 
> Agree with 90% of that. The dive bombers range was significantly different - I was being pretty generous with the Ju 87D I don't think it's actual strike range was anywhere near that far. But even if that was right, D3A is still ~300 miles longer range, which matters a lot in naval combat.


.

The JU87D had and could use DTs, so it's range was variable depending upon mission requirements. As we've discussed the RN had to come to within range of even the most heavily loaded Ju87s.


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## RCAFson (Jan 29, 2021)

Schweik said:


> Hurricanes routinely made short work of Stukas regardless of any armor, though they often failed to even intercept Ju 88s (due to speed and altitude) such as over Malta.



The Martlets and F4F-4s had the same (actually worse because of their slow climb rate) issues.


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## RCAFson (Jan 29, 2021)

Schweik said:


> Ah, no, the F4F-3 was roughly on par with the Zero, likely due to training and tactics as much as anything else. I doubt I'm the only one who would point this out.


The USMC pilots at Midway begged to differ. They stated very clearly that they believed the F4F-3 to be completely outperformed by the Zero and the USN TAIC report comparing the F4F-4 to the Zero states the same about the F4F-4. The difference in weight between an F4F-3/4 is only about 400lb, with both aircraft having the same engine. OTOH, the Sea Hurricane 1B is ~900lb lighter than an F4F-4 and has ~20% more power.


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## RCAFson (Jan 29, 2021)

Schweik said:


> There was only one E8 "Dave" at Midway, flying from the Battleship Haruna, but you felt compelled to put that in. Right?
> 
> I never states I was making a Midway a cutoff, as Pedestal was several months later than Midway. I was comparing aircraft active in 1942. There were D4Y stationed in the Pacific through the second half of 1942.
> 
> ...



The IJN flew a single sortie with an experimental D4Y in all of 1942, AFAIK, but the 'Dave" and 'Alf" flew dozens of recon sorties in 1942 because the IJN regularly used their cruiser seaplanes for Recon during their carrier battles.

I didn't make a Midway cutoff either, but I am comparing the USN and RN in 1942 (and earlier for the RN for specific examples).

The Stukas could and did carry DTs as did the 109s but again, the RN had close to within range of the Axis air bases, so range wasn't an issue for the Axis aircraft. In any even you obsess about range when the typical carrier battle in 1942 rarely featured strikes by either side that exceeded 200nm. The Stukas they flew against Pedestal were carrying a much heavier bomb load (1 x 500 and 2 x 250KG bombs according to a post war pilot interview) than a Val. The RMI trimotor bombers were at least as good as the IJNs long range TE bombers, not to mention the HE111.

As we've seen the IJNAF launched lots of piecemeal attacks in 1942.

The JU87R range didn't shrink from 1941 to 42, as per the reference I provided earlier and it was ~690nm with a 500kg bomb and two DTs.


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## RCAFson (Jan 29, 2021)

Schweik said:


> They got a few chances at Ceylon but didn't get very many, for example in one of the clashes a squadron of Hurricanes caught a squadron of D3A on their own but they only got 4 of them (one later crash landed on the carrier). Probably because the Vals in particular were hard to catch - very agile, good dogfighters. Wildcats had trouble getting them too sometimes. The 'Kates' were more sitting ducks.
> 
> To be fair, Stukas could be like that too. I know in the MTO the land based DAF fighters sometimes caught them and mauled them but sometimes most of them got away. They had a trick they did to produce oily smoke during a dive and a sharp spiraling turn which made it look like they'd been hit and were going down. Like the D3A they were slow but quite agile.



I think you are referring to the Fulmars intercepting the D3A strike after Hermes was sinking or sunk.


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## Schweik (Jan 29, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> The USMC pilots at Midway begged to differ. They stated very clearly that they believed the F4F-3 to be completely performed by the Zero and the USN TAIC report comparing the F4F-4 to the Zero states the same about the F4F-4. The difference in weight between an F4F-3/4 is only about 400lb, with both aircraft having the same engine. OTOH, the Sea Hurricane 1B is ~900lb lighter than an F4F-4 and has ~20% more power.



Well, the aircraft itself certainly was inferior to the Zero in many ways, but the combat record was much better.

For example during June the 4th at Midway, the Wildcat squadrons lost 19 x F4Fs, breaking down as follows:

VF-3 (Yorktown) - 5 lost
VF-6 (Enterprise) - 1 lost (ditched near the carrier)
VF-8 (Hornet) - 12 lost (one ditched near the carrier)

They claimed 45 Japanese planes, they actually got 29. That's still in their favor. That is from First Team.

Compare that the debacle with the Hurricanes and Fulmars off of Ceylon, against the same opponents.

On 5 April, the Japanese lost 7 aircraft while the British lost 26 . This included (per Wikipedia):

8 x Hurricanes from 30 Sqn
8 x Hurricanes from 258 Sqn
4 x Fulmar from 803 and 806 NAS
6 x Swordfish from 788 NAS

Here is the breakdown of one of the engagements at 7:40 AM - 21 Hurricanes from 30 Sqn and 6 Fulmars from 803 and 806 NAS scrambled from Ceylon bases and intercepted a raid by 14 x D3A bombers (with another 38 D3A nearby also flying a strike), escorted by 9 x A6M. The fighters "attacked the bombers before any bombs were dropped". In the resulting air battle 5 x D3A and 1 x A6M were shot down, vs. 8x Hurricanes and 3 x Fulmars.

Later, 19 D3A from Shokaku attacked the harbor and sunk the "merchant cruiser" HSM Hector, being attacked by 258 Sqn RAF Hurricanes. The Hurricanes shot down one D3A and damaged another, losing another 8x Hurricanes.

As we know between 5 and 8 April the IJN sunk 31 ships _and_ bombed Ceylon.


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## Admiral Beez (Jan 29, 2021)

Schweik said:


> Compare that the debacle with the Hurricanes and Fulmars off of Ceylon,


This is one example, just one. Using but one example is confirmation bias. The F4F fought across the Pacific, giving multiple points of reference. In the case of the Hurricane, one example at Ceylon is about as informative as none. We could just as easily compare the Dewoitine D. 520 or Yakovlev Yak-9 to the Zero. Using a sole point of reference does not make a conclusion. We see the same silliness with the Spitfire, citing its defeat over Darwin as an indication of the Zero's technical superiority. 

The big difference, IMO is the bag of meat in the chair. Put combat experienced and Zero-familiar pilots into those Ceylon Hurricanes and Darwin Spitfires and you'll see different results.

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## SaparotRob (Jan 29, 2021)

Peter Gunn said:


> Considering the Marine units were flying mostly Buffalo's... (20 out of 26 total)


You tell ‘em, Gunn!

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## Juha3 (Jan 29, 2021)

Admiral Beez said:


> This is one example, just one. Using but one example is confirmation bias. The F4F fought across the Pacific, giving multiple points of reference. In the case of the Hurricane, one example at Ceylon is about as informative as none. We could just as easily compare the Dewoitine D. 520 or Yakovlev Yak-9 to the Zero. Using a sole point of reference does not make a conclusion. We see the same silliness with the Spitfire, citing its defeat over Darwin as an indication of the Zero's technical superiority.
> 
> The big difference, IMO is the bag of meat in the chair. Put combat experienced and Zero-familiar pilots into those Ceylon Hurricanes and Darwin Spitfires and you'll see different results.



Hurricanes over Singapore or over DEI did not particularly shine either, so two more examples even if Ki-43s made also contributions, especially over Malaya.

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## Schweik (Jan 29, 2021)

Juha3 said:


> Hurricanes over Singapore or over DEI did not particularly shine either, so two more examples even if Ki-43s made also contributions, especially over Malaya.



Or in Burma

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## RCAFson (Jan 29, 2021)

Schweik said:


> Well, the aircraft itself certainly was inferior to the Zero in many ways, but the combat record was much better.
> 
> For example during June the 4th at Midway, the Wildcat squadrons lost 19 x F4Fs, breaking down as follows:
> 
> ...



The IJNAF achieved surprise against Ceylon on 5 April and many of the Fulmars and Hurricanes lost that day were shot down as they were taking off, some with their LG still extended. 

BWOC, the USMC received accurate radar warning and used radar GCI to make a perfect interception and bounce of the IJN formation, yet the ultimate results were about the same as at Ceylon. At Midway there was a single IJN strike of 72 strike aircraft and 36 Zeros. 

The two IJN strikes against Ceylon were composed of (5 April) 91 strike aircraft and 36 Zeros and (9 April) 91 (mainly Kates) strike aircraft and 41 Zeros plus 85 Vals and 9 Zeros in a 2nd strike directed initially at Hermes. During the 9 April strikes the RAF/FAA defence was not caught on the ground and the kill/loss ratio was not as bad as on 5 April, but the defending fighters were still outnumbered 2-1 by Zeros. The RAF also achieved complete surprise against the KB as 9 Blenheims bombed the KB's flagship although they sunsequently suffered severely from the CAP and an encounter with the Zeros and some Vals returning from the Hermes strike.


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## Schweik (Jan 29, 2021)

That is a bit misleading because not all of the Japanese aircraft - or fighters - were in the same place, and not all of the fighters were actually engaging the Hurricanes. Nor were the losses the same. The Hurricanes and Fulmars consistently lost at a rate of about 2-1 or worse, similar to the Buffalo and the P-39, whereas F4F units, including those flown by the Marines, were able to achieve rough parity.


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## Peter Gunn (Jan 29, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> The IJNAF achieved surprise against Ceylon on 5 April and many of the Fulmars and Hurricanes lost that day were shot down as they were taking off, some with their LG still extended.
> 
> BWOC, the USMC received accurate radar warning and used radar GCI to make a perfect interception and bounce of the IJN formation, yet the ultimate results were about the same as at Ceylon. At Midway there was a single IJN strike of 72 strike aircraft and 36 Zeros.
> 
> *SNIP*


Yes, and the MAJORITY of those USMC fighters (20 out of 26) were Buffalos, not F4Fs.

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## RCAFson (Jan 29, 2021)

Peter Gunn said:


> Yes, and the MAJORITY of those USMC fighters (20 out of 26) were Buffalos, not F4Fs.



The USMC pilots had few kind words for the F4F-3, and seemed to consider them as no better than the F2A-3s.


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## RCAFson (Jan 29, 2021)

Schweik said:


> That is a bit misleading because not all of the Japanese aircraft - or fighters - were in the same place, and not all of the fighters were actually engaging the Hurricanes. Nor were the losses the same. The Hurricanes and Fulmars consistently lost at a rate of about 2-1 or worse, similar to the Buffalo and the P-39, whereas F4F units, including those flown by the Marines, were able to achieve rough parity.



Being able to hit the enemy with your full force and with an altitude advantage certainly helps doesn't it? You completely ignored the tactical disadvantage that the RAF/FAA fighters suffered from on 5 April. This also highlights the fact that fighters with an altitude advantage or parity, as in a meeting engagement with/by carrier fighters gave Allied Pilots tactical options when faced by Zeros.


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## Schweik (Jan 29, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> The USMC pilots had few kind words for the F4F-3, and seemed to consider them as no better than the F2A-3s.



Even if that were true, which it is not, the combat records of the two types in Theater can show us that there was a big difference. Just as there was with the Hurricane of the Fulmar. Which is why the RN adopted the Martlet .

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## RCAFson (Jan 29, 2021)

Some info regarding the A5M-4 and the defences encountered by the early USN carrier raids and the reason that Lexington was attacked by unescorted Bettys at Rabaul:

_The two principal aviation units within the 24th Air Flotilla were the Chitose Air Group (kōkūtai) and the Yokohama Air Group. Authorized strength for the Chitose group was thirty-six twin-engine land attack planes (medium bombers) and forty-eight carrier fighters. Somewhat inexplicably the group lay in a backwater of Imperial Navy air allocations despite its direct confrontation with the United States Pacific fleet. Its bombers were obsolescent Mitsubishi G3M2 Type 96 land attack planes [NELL], an improved version of the twin-tailed mediums that in 1937 had bombed China from bases in Formosa and the homeland. Most crews were veterans of the previous December’s strikes on Wake. The fighters were not the new Zeros, but rather Mitsubishi A5M4 Type 96 carrier fighters. The Yokohama Air group was equipped with huge Kawanishi H6K4 Type 97 flying boats [MAVIS], capable of extremely long patrol missions..._


_In Rabaul and at Truk, admirals also labored over important decisions. Rear Admiral Gotō, commanding 24th Air Flotilla, felt a raid on Rabaul was inevitable. From the search reports, he deduced that the American carrier force would steam to within 200 miles of Rabaul and strike at dawn. Ready as his own striking force he had eighteen land attack planes from the 4th Air Group. The same unit had twenty-six fighters at Rabaul as well, but none had the range to fly 450 miles to the target and back again. Sixteen were Mitsubishi A5M4 Type 96 carrier fighters [CLAUDE], and even with drop tanks their radius of action was only 250 miles. The ten Mitsubishi A6M2 Zero fighters at Rabaul did not, as yet, have drop tanks. Some members of Gotō’s staff suggested to him that they wait until the next day to counterattack, but he had determined to attack that afternoon without fighter escort if need be. At 1310, Gotō ordered the 4th Air Group to sink the American carrier reported that morning. The Yokohama Air Group was also to maintain contact with one Type 97 flying boat, and to prepare for a dawn torpedo strike the next day. At Truk, Vice Admiral Inoue arranged to concentrate his surface ship strength (four heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and destroyers) to execute a night attack after dark on 21 February. _(Both excerpts From _First Team_)

So the A5M was actually fairly numerous in the Pacific in 1942 nor were Zeros universally fitted with DTs. The last excerpts also shows much of the outright insanity displayed by the IJN higher command.

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## Schweik (Jan 29, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> Being able to hit the enemy with your full force and with an altitude advantage certainly helps doesn't it? You completely ignored the tactical disadvantage that the RAF/FAA fighters suffered from on 5 April. This also highlights the fact that fighters with an altitude advantage or parity, as in a meeting engagement with/by carrier fighters gave Allied Pilots tactical options when faced by Zeros.



They weren't at an altitude disadvantage in both engagements, even in the first one some of the Hurricanes were already at altitude. There were also many other engagements between A6M or Ki 43 with Hurricanes (into 1944!) and the latter always had the same outcome, pretty much - bad to dismal.


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## Schweik (Jan 29, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> So the A5M was actually fairly numerous in the Pacific in 1942 nor were Zeros universally fitted with DTs. The last excerpts also shows much of the outright insanity displayed by the IJN higher command.



Neither one of those statements are true.


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## RCAFson (Jan 29, 2021)

Schweik said:


> Even if that were true, which it is not, the combat records of the two types in Theater can show us that there was a big difference. Just as there was with the Hurricane of the Fulmar. Which is why the RN adopted the Martlet .




_- (a) As evidenced by statements of pilots who flew them in
actual combat, the performance of the F2A-3 and F4F-3 types of air-
Planes is markedly inferior to that of the Japanese 00 1 Sento Kl -
Fighter in speed, maneuverability, and rate of climb. The fact that.
Marine Fighting squadron 221 gave such an excellent account of it-
self should not be allowed to becloud this fact, but is directly _.
attributable largely to an exceptionally fine organization of fight-
ing pilot personnel and apparent great vulnerability of enemy
bombers. In view of the foregoing it is recommended that F2A-3 and
F4F-3 type airplanes be not assigned as equipment for use in combat,
but be retained for use at training centers only. (MAG 22 CO report)_


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## RCAFson (Jan 29, 2021)

Schweik said:


> Neither one of those statements are true.



Lundstrom details the stationing of 64 A5M-4s in the areas raided by USN carriers and the early war lack of Zero DTs which led to an unescorted raid being slaughtered. You're quick to point out such details in the MTO, but not so much in the Pacific.


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## Schweik (Jan 29, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> _- (a) As evidenced by statements of pilots who flew them in
> actual combat, the performance of the F2A-3 and F4F-3 types of air-
> Planes is markedly inferior to that of the Japanese 00 1 Sento Kl -
> Fighter in speed, maneuverability, and rate of climb. The fact that.
> ...



That's just one report - fighter pilots don't like having an airplane roughly on parity with the enemy. That means a 1-1 exchange ratio on average when they engage enemy fighters, which isn't good for survival let along glory. Yet it was still far better than the Hurricane or Fulmar or Skua did against Zeros. Or for that matter the Spitfire Mk V. 

The F4F was inferior in turn rate and definitely in rate of climb to the Zero. Speed depended on the Altitude - the F4F had better high altitude performance. It also had much better dive and high speed handling, two ingredients that proved critical in fighting with the Japanese aircraft. And of course, much better protected and more heavily armed. All this plus a lot of good gunnery training and the Thach weave, meant that F4F units did fairly well against the Zero. The Hurricane, Fulmar, etc. not so much. That's the reality and the historical record.

Eric Brown had this to say about the Martlet: "faster and more maneuverable than the Sea Hurricane"

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## RCAFson (Jan 29, 2021)

Schweik said:


> That's just one report - fighter pilots don't like having an airplane roughly on parity with the enemy. That means a 1-1 exchange ratio on average when they engage enemy fighters, which isn't good for survival let along glory. Yet it was still far better than the Hurricane or Fulmar or Skua did against Zeros. Or for that matter the Spitfire Mk V.
> 
> The F4F was inferior in turn rate and definitely in rate of climb to the Zero. Speed depended on the Altitude - the F4F had better high altitude performance. It also had much better dive and high speed handling, two ingredients that proved critical in fighting with the Japanese aircraft. And of course, much better protected and more heavily armed. All this plus a lot of good gunnery training and the Thach weave, meant that F4F units did fairly well against the Zero. The Hurricane, Fulmar, etc. not so much. That's the reality and the historical record.
> 
> Eric Brown had this to say about the Martlet: "faster and more maneuverable than the Sea Hurricane"



This report:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/japan/intelsum85-dec42.pdf
compares the F4F-4 with the Zero:

page 5 indicates the measured speeds of the Zero:

SL = ______270mph (SAC data states F4F-4 as 284 mph)
5000ft =___287mph
10000ft =__305mph

Page 9 compares the Zero and F4F-4: and states that at all altitudes above 1000ft the Zero is superior in speed and equal below 1000ft. This kinda suggests that the F4F-4 was a bit slower than the official stats.

The FAA received detailed performance reports on the Martlet II and IV and both were inferior to the Sea Hurricane IB in climb and level speed and considerably inferior to the Sea Hurricane IIA/B/C. Some early fixed wing Martlets had no armour or SS tanks and were mainly used for training, and these aircraft are what Brown must have been referring to. Under about 15K ft the Sea Hurricane 1B was superior to the F4F-3/4 in speed and had a considerably better climb rate than the F4F-3/4, because it had a much better power to weight ratio and the same wing area.

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## Schweik (Jan 29, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> Lundstrom details the stationing of 64 A5M-4s in the areas raided by USN carriers and the early war lack of Zero DTs which led to an unescorted raid being slaughtered. You're quick to point out such details in the MTO, but not so much in the Pacific.



The section you quoted from First Team was from one small raid, the Marshall Islands raid February of 1942. Shortly after that they were retired or sent to China. Pretending that the A5M was a significant part of the IJN force in 1942 is ludicrous. How many of those A5M were in action by Coral Sea? As I pointed out already, *TWO* A5M fighters were on the _*Shōhō*_ at that time. 

By contrast, at the time of Pedastal, the 'massive Axis air armada' of 600 planes that you bragged about was at least half flying boats, biplanes, and other obsolete types. Only about a third could be called modern.


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## Schweik (Jan 29, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> This report:
> http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/japan/intelsum85-dec42.pdf
> compares the F4F-4 with the Zero:
> 
> ...



Yes but you are *cherry picking*

This chart says F4F-3 had a top speed of over 330 mph
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-3-1845-performance.jpg

This chart says F4F-3 had a top speed of 334 mph
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-3-1848-performance.jpg

This chart says F4F-3 has a top speed of 330 mph at 19,000 ft and 336 at 22,000 ft
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-3-detail-specification.pdf

This report says F4F-4 has a top speed of 319 mph
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-4-4058.pdf

This report says F4F-4 has a top speed of 318 mph
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-4-4058.pdf

This report says F4F-4 has a top speed of 316 mph
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-4-02135.pdf

This chart says F4F-4 has a top speed of 316-318 depending on the load
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-4-detail-specification.pdf

We all know that test conditions can change performance. How much fuel they put in, what altitudes are flown, and what kind of external fixtures are present. This is true for all aircraft, American, British, and Axis as well.

Could a Martlet loaded down with maximum possible fuel, some extra gear and maybe an extra antenna or bomb shackles fail to exceed 300 mph? Quite possible. Was that the norm? I don't think so.


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## RCAFson (Jan 29, 2021)

Schweik said:


> The section you quoted from First Team was from one small raid, the Marshall Islands raid February of 1942. Shortly after that they were retired or sent to China. Pretending that the A5M was a significant part of the IJN force in 1942 is ludicrous. How many of those A5M were in action by Coral Sea? As I pointed out already, *TWO* A5M fighters were on the _*Shōhō*_ at that time.
> 
> By contrast, at the time of Pedastal, the 'massive Axis air armada' of 600 planes that you bragged about was at least half flying boats, biplanes, and other obsolete types. Only about a third could be called modern.



Perhaps you can provide some sources for your claim regarding the A5M-4 being "retired". You were quick to point out the presence of obsolescent RMI fighters, but now you try to reject the obvious and well documented use of obsolescent aircraft by the IJN in 1942. If the IJN hadn't used the A5M-4 then what would they have replaced them with? Zero and most carrier aircraft production was hopelessly inadequate in 1942, forcing the IJNAF to use older types. 

So you don't think the IJNAF had large numbers of "_flying boats, biplanes, and other obsolete types_"? The IJNAF was much more than just the aircraft on their fleet carriers.


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## RCAFson (Jan 29, 2021)

Schweik said:


> Yes but you are *cherry picking*
> 
> This chart says F4F-3 had a top speed of over 330 mph
> http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-3-1845-performance.jpg
> ...



Sorry but some of those are based upon prototypes or Grumman provided Specs rather than actual aircraft kitted out in 1942 armament, armour and SS tanks. The UK tests of the Martlet II and IV were well documented and were combat ready examples. The Martlets (F4F-3/4/A/B) also had single stage engines with FTHs of 14-15K ft versus the two stage engines in the F4F-3/4 with FTHs of ~20K ft, but then most naval air combat occurred at lower altitudes.


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## RCAFson (Jan 29, 2021)

Schweik said:


> They weren't at an altitude disadvantage in both engagements, even in the first one some of the Hurricanes were already at altitude. There were also many other engagements between A6M or Ki 43 with Hurricanes (into 1944!) and the latter always had the same outcome, pretty much - bad to dismal.




This is the conclusion of an article about the 5 April raid:

_"It is impossible to say with any degree of confidence what difference it may have made if the Hurricanes and Fulmars had been scrambled in good time, but it seems fair to suppose that they would likely have accomplished more at less cost than they actually did. All four means by which early warning might have been given failed. First, the Catalina that spotted some of the Japanese aircraft failed to recognize or report them. Then the Japanese avoided both the ground warning system and the Fulmar patrol by flying well off the coast during their approach flight. The fourth trip wire, radar, also failed, due to there being only one operational station and to it being sited too far north and suffering from a number of technical and operational problems. The radar failure was undoubtedly crucial. The difference that early warning could make was demonstrated just four days later, when the Japanese attacked Trincomalee. That day, the local radar station detected the Japanese at a range of 91 miles [146 km]. The early warning got the defending fighters airborne in good time and allowed them to draw first blood, when one section of Hurricanes bounced three Zeros and shot down two of them, and no serviceable fighters were caught on the ground. Something of the sort might have happened at Colombo, but 5 April 1942 was one of those days when, on the early-warning front, nothing went right. _" 
https://ufdcimages.uflib.ufl.edu/AA/00/06/81/82/00012/Fall-2014.pdf

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## Admiral Beez (Jan 29, 2021)

Juha3 said:


> Hurricanes over Singapore or over DEI did not particularly shine either, so two more examples even if Ki-43s made also contributions, especially over Malaya.


I thought we were looking at IJNAS Zeros vs. RAF Hurricanes? I think in the right hands the Hurricane would be about as able as the P-40.


Schweik said:


> Or in Burma


The Zero fought Hurricanes in Burma? What the heck were was the IJNAS doing in Burma?

As an aside, you have to feel badly for the Hurricanes in Malaya. Early January 1942 the first batch arrive, the maintenance guys work around the clock to assemble the aircraft, and then the still mostly (except for the last three sleepless weeks) inexperienced Buffalo pilots transition over to Hurricanes. They didn't have a chance to acclimatize to their aircraft before they were all dead. The Dutch took over some of these Hurricanes and suffered the same fate.

Imagine instead if in the spring of 1941 two hundred Hurricanes with BoB-experienced pilots arrive. That would make for a fair comparison with the Zero.

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## RCAFson (Jan 29, 2021)

The emphasis of this discussion should not be on aircraft, but upon the tactical and grand tactical/strategic situations in which the combats occurred. Aircraft performance is overstated as a factor in determining the outcome of an engagement. Rather, it is typically determined by who has the advantage of surprise and/or numbers. As General NB Forrest stated:

*"Get there firstest with the mostest"*

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## special ed (Jan 29, 2021)

There is a National Geographic video and magazine article about the underwater wreckage at Truk, if I remember right. Impressive underwater shots of ships with decks covered with equipment, trucks, supplies and one A5M4. I always wondered why they would be receiving an A5M4.


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## Admiral Beez (Jan 29, 2021)

special ed said:


> There is a National Geographic video and magazine article about the underwater wreckage at Truk, if I remember right. Impressive underwater shots of ships with decks covered with equipment, trucks, supplies and one A5M4. I always wondered why they would be receiving an A5M4.


The Germans kept such detailed records of everything, to their determent at Nuremberg, but the Japanese seem to record nothing.


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## SaparotRob (Jan 29, 2021)

Admiral Beez said:


> The Germans kept such detailed records of everything, to their determent at Nuremberg, but the Japanese seem to record nothing.


From my foggy memory, the Japanese destroyed everything.


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## Admiral Beez (Jan 29, 2021)

SaparotRob said:


> From my foggy memory, the Japanese destroyed everything.


Meanwhile they’d leave piles of aircraft to be captured.

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## SaparotRob (Jan 29, 2021)

I had actually meant documentation but yeah, lots of those planes. It’d been nice if a few more of those planes had been “rescued”.

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## Admiral Beez (Jan 29, 2021)

SaparotRob said:


> I had actually meant documentation but yeah, lots of those planes. It’d been nice if a few more of those planes had been “rescued”.


I wonder how much documentation the Japanese high command, IJN and IJA had. From the Baltic and Russia, the Nazi Einsatzgruppen would send detailed reports back to Berlin on exact numbers of civilians they had murdered. I get the sense the Japanese weren’t nearly as bureaucratic, instead just getting on with atrocities without reporting back to some central office.

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## SaparotRob (Jan 29, 2021)

Much of the Japanese documentation was destroyed by the bombings. A lot was destroyed by battle. You’re going to have to ask Robert Ballard for help if you want to see Kaga’s log book. However, much was willfully destroyed to protect themselves. There’s also willful misrepresentation. Special Unit 731(?). When testing biological and electronic weapons on civilians and POW’s, they referred to the test subjects as “rabbits”.


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## SaparotRob (Jan 29, 2021)

But yeah, just having fun in Malaya, Nanjing, and points east. Just some good old traditional brutality.

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## Admiral Beez (Jan 29, 2021)

SaparotRob said:


> But yeah, just having fun in Malaya, Nanjing, and points east. Just some good old traditional brutality.


Had the British and Empire troops known what the Japanese had in store for any captured troops or civilians they might have prepared and trained for a fight to the finish. Instead, about 90% of the 145,000 British forces (and thousands of civilians) in Malaya survived to fall into Japanese hands, where they were tortured and murdered. At Dunkirk, the Germans did the British expectations of defeat no favours - they should have consulted the Chinese on how to fight the Japanese and what to expect if they fail.

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## Schweik (Jan 29, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> Perhaps you can provide some sources for your claim regarding the A5M-4 being "retired". You were quick to point out the presence of obsolescent RMI fighters, but now you try to reject the obvious and well documented use of obsolescent aircraft by the IJN in 1942. If the IJN hadn't used the A5M-4 then what would they have replaced them with? Zero and most carrier aircraft production was hopelessly inadequate in 1942, forcing the IJNAF to use older types.
> 
> So you don't think the IJNAF had large numbers of "_flying boats, biplanes, and other obsolete types_"? The IJNAF was much more than just the aircraft on their fleet carriers.



Let me clarify since you seem confused here. By "Retired" I mean that the A5M4 was moved to tertiary districts and / or training duties. The single minor engagement you mentioned in February 1942 is I believe the only significant combat A5M4 had with the US Navy. Only two were operational at Coral Sea. The standard fighter for the IJN was the A6M, as we all know quite well. There were also some A6M2-N floatplane fighters. And of course the Army had the Ki-43. 

I say again, the A5M4 was not a significant part of the Japanese forces engaged with the USN in the Pacific in 1942.


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## Schweik (Jan 29, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> This is the conclusion of an article about the 5 April raid:
> 
> _"It is impossible to say with any degree of confidence what difference it may have made if the Hurricanes and Fulmars had been scrambled in good time, but it seems fair to suppose that they would likely have accomplished more at less cost than they actually did. All four means by which early warning might have been given failed. First, the Catalina that spotted some of the Japanese aircraft failed to recognize or report them. Then the Japanese avoided both the ground warning system and the Fulmar patrol by flying well off the coast during their approach flight. The fourth trip wire, radar, also failed, due to there being only one operational station and to it being sited too far north and suffering from a number of technical and operational problems. The radar failure was undoubtedly crucial. The difference that early warning could make was demonstrated just four days later, when the Japanese attacked Trincomalee. That day, the local radar station detected the Japanese at a range of 91 miles [146 km]. The early warning got the defending fighters airborne in good time and allowed them to draw first blood, when one section of Hurricanes bounced three Zeros and shot down two of them, and no serviceable fighters were caught on the ground. Something of the sort might have happened at Colombo, but 5 April 1942 was one of those days when, on the early-warning front, nothing went right. _"
> https://ufdcimages.uflib.ufl.edu/AA/00/06/81/82/00012/Fall-2014.pdf



Nothing seems to have gone right in any of the engagements between the Hurricane and Japanese fighters. You keep posting subjective analysis as if it is proof of anything, but it's just a single data point (that you happen to like a lot).


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## Schweik (Jan 29, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> Sorry but some of those are based upon prototypes or Grumman provided Specs rather than actual aircraft kitted out in 1942 armament, armour and SS tanks. The UK tests of the Martlet II and IV were well documented and were combat ready examples. The Martlets (F4F-3/4/A/B) also had single stage engines with FTHs of 14-15K ft versus the two stage engines in the F4F-3/4 with FTHs of ~20K ft, but then most naval air combat occurred at lower altitudes.



You don't actually know that. There is no reason to assume that one specific test you mention is more accurate than the 5 other tests I posted. The consensus was that the Wildcat could fly well over 300 mph and was in fact faster than the A6M at higher altitude. Exact performance would depend on fuel load, equipment and atmospheric conditions etc. as I mentioned already, but you are just cherry picking the (outlier) data that suits your preconceptions or patriotic ideals.


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## RCAFson (Jan 29, 2021)

Schweik said:


> Let me clarify since you seem confused here. By "Retired" I mean that the A5M4 was moved to tertiary districts and / or training duties. The single minor engagement you mentioned in February 1942 is I believe the only significant combat A5M4 had with the US Navy. Only two were operational at Coral Sea. The standard fighter for the IJN was the A6M, as we all know quite well. There were also some A6M2-N floatplane fighters. And of course the Army had the Ki-43.
> 
> I say again, the A5M4 was not a significant part of the Japanese forces engaged with the USN in the Pacific in 1942.



Again, if the A5M4 wasn't there what would have replaced it? The USN also engaged A5M4s during their carrier raids but regardless the A5M4 was present in the Pacific and an important part of IJNAF air defences.


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## Schweik (Jan 29, 2021)

Admiral Beez said:


> I thought we were looking at IJNAS Zeros vs. RAF Hurricanes? I think in the right hands the Hurricane would be about as able as the P-40. The Zero fought Hurricanes in Burma? What the heck were was the IJNAS doing in Burma?



There were Zeros operating in Burma sometimes, though the main Japanese fighter was obviously the Ki-43, which was devastating opponent to the Hurricane, and no they did not do as well as the P-40, the continued to get slaughtered while the P-40 actually did quite well in that Theater. There were similar problems in the MTO.



> As an aside, you have to feel badly for the Hurricanes in Malaya. Early January 1942 the first batch arrive, the maintenance guys work around the clock to assemble the aircraft, and then the still mostly (except for the last three sleepless weeks) inexperienced Buffalo pilots transition over to Hurricanes. They didn't have a chance to acclimatize to their aircraft before they were all dead. The Dutch took over some of these Hurricanes and suffered the same fate.



I agree, the Allies were off balance in the first few weeks of the war.



> Imagine instead if in the spring of 1941 two hundred Hurricanes with BoB-experienced pilots arrive. That would make for a fair comparison with the Zero.



Yes, though much better with Spitfires.


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## RCAFson (Jan 29, 2021)

Schweik said:


> You don't actually know that. There is no reason to assume that one specific test you mention is more accurate than the 5 other tests I posted. The consensus was that the Wildcat could fly well over 300 mph and was in fact faster than the A6M at higher altitude. Exact performance would depend on fuel load, equipment and atmospheric conditions etc. as I mentioned already, but you are just cherry picking the (outlier) data that suits your preconceptions or patriotic ideals.



We can toss out the prototype tests and the spec sheet data.

_This report says F4F-4 has a top speed of 319 mph
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-4-4058.pdf_

_This report says F4F-4 has a top speed of 318 mph
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-4-4058.pdf_

Those tests were done at 7370lb, or about 200lb lighter than the F4F-3 and yet they don't show the climb rate or speed claimed for the F4F-3. Note also how the aircraft failed to meet the guaranteed values.

What consensus? How can you possibly state that the F4F was faster than a Zero at any altitude when the USN tested them side by side and reported that the "_Zero was faster at all altitudes above 1000ft_"? 
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/japan/intelsum85-dec42.pdf


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## Schweik (Jan 29, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> Again, if the A5M4 wasn't there what would have replaced it? The USN also engaged A5M4s during their carrier raidsm but regardless the A5M4 was present in the Pacific and an important part of IJNAF air defences.



What do you think?

There were two Japanese units mentioned as being in the Marshall Islands in February 1942 on that page in First Team you were quoting from: the Chitose Air Group , which (briefly) had the A5M4, and the Yokohama Air Group which had bombers and seaplanes.

The biography of Hiroyoshi Nishizawa, who was in the Chitose Air Group, mentions that he arrived in New Britain on 3 February in 1942. *It states that his unit received their first A6M2s that same week. He was assigned his A6M2 number F-108 on February 10*. 

Does that answer your question?

Interestingly by the way, the Yokohama Air Group also received 12 x A6M2-N, Zero seaplane-fighters in April, with which they managed to shoot down a B-17 and a B-24 in May and July of that year.


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## RCAFson (Jan 29, 2021)

Schweik said:


> What do you think?
> 
> There were two Japanese units mentioned as being in the Marshall Islands in February 1942 on that page in First Team you were quoting from: the Chitose Air Group , which (briefly) had the A5M4, and the Yokohama Air Group which had bombers and seaplanes.
> 
> ...



Right now tell me that the RAI wasn't replacing their older aircraft as well. We know that the A5M-4 was present at Rabaul and at Coral Sea.


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## Schweik (Jan 29, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> Right now tell me that the RAI wasn't replacing their older aircraft as well. We know that the A5M-4 was present at Rabaul and at Coral Sea.



I can tell you that by *August 1942*, more than half of the supposedly incredible Axis force of 600 aircraft arrayed at various points around the Med to intercept Pedestal were obsolete 1930's vintage types like the Cr 42, G.50, Ro.37, SM 79, Z.506, Z1007, Z501, BR20, S.66 (!!), He 111

There were 57 modern fighters (39 x Bf 109 and 27 x MC 202) and 182 modern bombers (Ju 88 and I'm being generous to include Ju 87).

During the air battles in the Pacific much earlier in *May *and *June of 1942 *as best I can determine the Japanese had* 2 *obsolete type A5M2 fighters which you brought up in a futile comparison, all of the rest of their strike aircraft were at least as modern and just as capable as the best of the Axis air armada at Pedestal.

So in that sense they were doing better than the Americans who still had Buffaloes and Vought Vindicators at Midway and Devastators on their carriers.


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## RCAFson (Jan 29, 2021)

Schweik said:


> I can tell you that by *August 1942*, more than half of the supposedly incredible Axis force of 600 aircraft arrayed at various points around the Med to intercept Pedestal were obsolete 1930's vintage types like the Cr 42, G.50, Ro.37, SM 79, Z.506, Z1007, Z501, BR20, S.66 (!!), He 111
> 
> There were 57 modern fighters (39 x Bf 109 and 27 x MC 202) and 182 modern bombers (Ju 88 and I'm being generous to include Ju 87).
> 
> ...



How are the SM79, Z.506, Z1007, BR20 and HE111 which were typically armoured and some had SS tanks less effective than a Nell or Betty ? The Z501 and S.66 were still useful for ASR. The CR42 and G.50 were still useful aircraft and better armed and generally better performing than the A5M-4. 

The IJN could put the A6M into front line roles because they could use the A5M in secondary roles. The fact is that Kate and Val were passed their due dates as well.


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## Schweik (Jan 30, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> How are the SM79, Z.506, Z1007, BR20 and HE111 which were typically armoured and some had SS tanks less effective than a Nell or Betty ? The Z501 and S.66 were still useful for ASR. The CR42 and G.50 were still useful aircraft and better armed and generally better performing than the A5M-4.



Right. But all but two of the A5M was retired from the front line by the time of Coral Sea, as was the Nell for the most part, while the CR 42, G.50 Z.506, BR 20 etc. are still expected to face the British fleet, as part of this famous 600+ plane air armada you kept mentioning that was arrayed against Pedestal, and which you claimed was superior to anything the Japanese could muster in the Pacific.

I am here to help you come to grips with how ridiculous that is.

As for the relative quality of the Japanese and Italian or early German strike aircraft, I'll do my own analysis of the chart I posted earlier, but that is partly subjective. What is _objective_ is how many ships were sunk by the Japanese strike aircraft, and how many fighters shot down by Japanese fighters. The only one out of the stable of Italian antiques that seemed to be able to kill ships was the S.79 but at immense cost (even Skuas and Fulmars could shoot them down). Most of the others, including ostensible replacements or upgraded versions like the S.84 had miserable combat records



> The IJN could put the A6M into front line roles because they could use the A5M in secondary roles. The fact is that Kate and Val were passed their due dates as well.



Be real. The Japanese produced 10,000 A6M, they only made 1,000 A5M (starting in 1935) - and most of those were not actually needed any more by 1942.


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## Schweik (Jan 30, 2021)

(and when I say they weren't needed 1942, they couldn't hold up to modern Allied fighters, and were too slow to catch most Allied bombers, so there was no point in retaining them in combat units in front line areas)


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## RCAFson (Jan 30, 2021)

Schweik said:


> Be real. The Japanese produced 10,000 A6M, they only made 1,000 A5M (starting in 1935) - and most of those were not actually needed any more by 1942.




_"When the war in the Pacific broke out, the Japanese Navy had a total of
521 carrier fighters on strength of which 328 were A6M2s equipping most
of its first-line units." (Francillion, p365). _



Zero production from April 42 to March 43 was 1689 but in the same period IJNAF combat and operational fighter losses totaled 1590. IJNAF Combat and operational losses from Dec 41 to March 42 = 300. High combat and operational losses meant that the A5M-4 was needed as Zero production was barely meeting the loss rate. (data from USSBS _JAPANESE AIR POWER_)

EDIT: data is for IJNAF.


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## Schweik (Jan 30, 2021)

The combat losses you are speaking off (for Zeros) started at Coral Sea (May 42), and that was at a small scale in terms of fighters lost - I think about 20 or 30. It didn't start really ramping up until Midway (June) and then Guadalcanal (August) and New Guinea (Kokoda trail started in July) started intensifying. *By Coral Sea, it seems like just about all of the A5M2 still with the fleet had already been replaced*. Similar to but a little faster than the Devastator being replaced in the USN. Most of the fighter losses in and around New Guinea were Ki-43.

"operational fighter losses" sounds like it includes Ki-43. They built about 5,900 of those.

To put it in perspective, the Japanese produced 10,000 A6M during the war.

*By comparison,*

Prior to their surrender in Sept 1943, the Italians produced about 1,700 modern fighters (260 x MC 205, 1,100 x MC 202, about 200 x Re 2001, 220 x Re 2002), 1,100 x MC 200, 680 x G.50 (some of which went to export) and about 1,800 x CR 42 and 1,000 x CR 32. These slow production runs meant the Italians took a long time to replace their more antiquated biplane and open cockpit fighters with their more modern types.

The FAA acquired ~600 Fulmars, They eventually built 2,600 Seafires by the end of the war. They built 1,700 Firefly's in a production run which went into the 1950s. I couldn't figure out the number of Sea Hurricanes produced as it's mixed in with the Hurricane numbers, but they seem to have been largely retired or pulled back to tertiary duties after Pedestal.

The Germans had no such limitations of course but by mid-1942 most of their best stuff was going to the Russian Front. After Stalingrad that sharply increased as we know.

By comparison to the above, 10,000 Zeros looks pretty impressive. Yes various WW II powers built large numbers of land based fighters but until the second half of the war, even the Americans didn't produce that many Navy fighters (they made 7,800 Wildcats*, many of which went to the British or to low-intensity Atlantic Theater etc.). The Japanese had a land war to consider in China, but their _Navy _was almost completely focused on taking out the American and ANZAC forces (their brief punitive raid into the Indian Ocean served to keep the RN away for a long time). After Pearl Harbor they quite efficiently completed the modernization of their fleet and air armadas, with almost all highly modern aircraft. Their carrier based fighters were more than capable of taking on land based fighters, unlike those of the RN, their Battleships and heavy cruisers were largely state of the art, and their destroyers could take out capital ships with their superb Long Lance torpedoes. They had the most formidable navy in the world by the time of Midway. Only luck and attrition, a much slower rate of production and training, broke them down. But that wasn't telling in 1942.

So your insistence that the A5M was a major part of the Japanese air fleet in 1942 is yet again, laughable. They were not involved in any major combat operations in the Pacific after 1941 that I know of.

* Hellcat production was enormous - 12,000 and they had Corsairs and modern land based fighters like P-38s, P-47s and P-51s, but these were not in Theater in any numbers before 1943 - just a handful of P-38s in New Guinea)


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## RCAFson (Jan 30, 2021)

The combat and operational losses from the USSBS were for the IJNAF only. IJAAF losses are listed separately. The USSBS data came from the IJNAF post war records.


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## slaterat (Jan 31, 2021)

I like the comparison of Ceylon , Midway and Darwin as all were similar attacks by the KdB on land based facilities. I researched this some time ago , at least partly inspired by a thread on another forum. Most of my numbers are from Bloody Shambles by Shores and Cull except for the Midway numbers but feel free to fact check the ones I use. I also believe that at Midway the forces engaged at roughly co alt where as many Fulmars, Hurricanes and P 40s were shot down on take off. Also remember 258 Squadrons planes included 5 clapped out Hurricane Mk1s.

Battle/ Plane type/ Kills/ losses/ Sorties loss rate
Midway/ F2a/F4F / 2/ 15 / 24/ 62%

Darwin/ P40 / 1/ 10/ 11/ 90%

Ceylon/ Hurricane/Fulmar/ 10/ 30/ 71/ 42%

Interesting results, more to come.

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## slaterat (Jan 31, 2021)

No lets compare sorties required per kill at these three battles

Midway/ sorties/kills/ ratio/( lower is better)
Zero /36/15/2.4
F2F/F3F/24/2/12

Darwin
Zero/27/10/2.7
P40/11/1/11

Columbo
Zero/36/14/2.5
Hurricane/27/7/3.85

Trincomalee
Zero/41/8/5
Hurricane/16/5/5.3

So at Trincomalee, where the radar at least worked, it was a tie between Hurricanes and Zeros of the KdB even though the Hurricanes were out numbered three to one.

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## Schweik (Feb 1, 2021)

That's an incorrect analysis of Darwin. Don't know if that's based on a single day or what, but this is a more complete analysis

The USAAF 49th Fighter Group over Darwin: a forgotten campaign | The Strategist

The count was 19 fighters lost vs. 19 enemy aircraft lost ( 1 x Ki-46, 7 x A6M and 12 x G4M bombers). They actually did a lot better than the Spitfires.


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## XBe02Drvr (Feb 1, 2021)

Very interesting thread, to which I'm Johnny-come-lately.
I tend to question the initial premise that the PTO was the only, or the most significant, naval air battle of the war. We Americans tend to think of the Pacific as the "big show", but then again we've never been in danger of being starved out through attrition of merchant shipping. I can understand our UK friends' differing take on this. It may not have been as spectacular or as dramatic, but I think the Battle of the Atlantic was just as crucial to the eventual allied victory. Despite the lack of fleets of fast carriers duking it out in aerial battles, it did involve aviation and warships (mostly submersible) in a fight for control of the seas, which is, after all, what naval warfare has been about since time immemorial. Aviation hasn't changed that. CVEs, DEs, LRB24s, Dumbos, and Sunderlands aren't as glamorous as Essex Class carriers, but they saved our collective posteriors just the same.
Where would we have been without Churchill's "unsinkable aircraft carrier"? Waiting for the B36 to come to life? Supporting the British North African army all by ourselves through Uboat infested waters?
The tide was not truly turned in the Atlantic until May-June of 1943, by which time other fronts were already swinging in our favor.
Just a thought.

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## Schweik (Feb 1, 2021)

Totally reasonable points, and I wouldn't refute any of that. I was only comparing naval air war (and naval air vs. land based air).

I was thinking recently in fact of how the u-boat / submarine warfare in WW2 was much more important than most people realize including in the Pacific. Two of the three IJN carriers lost in the Battle of the Philippine Sea were sunk by US Submarines, not the strike aircraft. In fact the whole issue of range was quite telling because the US planes, the newest of which (SB2C) having a bit shorter range than the old SBD, they were so far out at the edge of their range envelope that we ended up losing a bunch of them to ditching, and I suspect worry about their near future fate was affecting their bombing accuracy. The US was lucky with the Submarine attacks and that the Japanese just didn't have a strong enough air-fleet to overcome their CAP.

In a way, all the submarine warfare (and countermeasures against) them during WW2 were precursors of our own era with the extra emphasis on Stealth. With all the recent saber rattling in the Taiwan strait I've been thinking a lot about the next gen naval war. We may find out in not too long whether aircraft carriers are still relevant, or if they are the Battleships of our era.

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## XBe02Drvr (Feb 1, 2021)

Schweik said:


> We may find out in not too long whether aircraft carriers are still relevant, or if they are the Battleships of our era.


I think they are at the end of their supremacy for large scale conflicts, along with nuclear submarines, whose reactors have reached the limits of their silencing capabilities. Future conflicts will favor those navies who are close enough to the scene to deploy ultraquiet diesel boats.

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## Schweik (Feb 1, 2021)

I wonder what a drone carrier would look like. Drones and SM2 missiles and some kind of supersonic cruise missiles.... in a vehicle that could submerge. Maybe go hit the underwater geothermal charging station lol


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## RCAFson (Feb 1, 2021)

Schweik said:


> That's an incorrect analysis of Darwin. Don't know if that's based on a single day or what, but this is a more complete analysis
> 
> .



Those are analysis of KB single strikes , including the Darwin raid.


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## Schweik (Feb 1, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> Those are analysis of KB single strikes , including the Darwin raid.



There was many more than one Darwin raid... the article I posted is the history of the main, (I think the only?) P-40 unit which was actively involved in the defense of Darwin, the 49th FG, from March to August 1942. The same unit went on to New Guinea where they continued to encounter both A6M and Ki-43 with increasingly positive victory ratios, using more or less the same aircraft (P-40s).


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## RCAFson (Feb 1, 2021)

Schweik said:


> There was many more than one Darwin raid... the article I posted is the history of the main, (I think the only?) P-40 unit which was actively involved in the defense of Darwin, the 49th FG, from March to August 1942. The same unit went on to New Guinea where they continued to encounter both A6M and Ki-43 with increasingly positive victory ratios, using more or less the same aircraft (P-40s).



KB = Kido Butai, the IJN fast carriers.


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## Schweik (Feb 1, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> KB = Kido Butai, the IJN fast carriers.



Is there some reason to assume that their fighter squadrons were more lethal than the ones flying from Formosa or say, the Tainan Kōkūtai on New Guinea?


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## RCAFson (Feb 1, 2021)

Schweik said:


> Is there some reason to assume that their fighter squadrons were more lethal than the ones flying from Formosa or say, the Tainan Kōkūtai on New Guinea?



The topic was a comparison of KB raids.


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## Schweik (Feb 1, 2021)

The topic of the OP was comparing the Theaters - Pacific with Med, and North Atlantic too. Narrowing it down to one raid seems like a cherry pick ...

He also showed _one _F2A combat, _one_ P-40 combat, and _two_ Hurricane. Which again, looks like consciously sifting to find just the right dataset.


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## Schweik (Feb 1, 2021)

The whole thing about the radar not working, being outnumbered, caught having to scramble etc., all of that was routine for Allied fighter units especially in the first half of the 1942. The beginning of the war was one continuous screaming emergency. Most of the initial battles like in the Philippines, Malaysia and Java were one-sided slaughters. P-40 units at Port Morseby and Wildcat units at Guadalcanal were routinely outnumbered. The defenders at Darwin were as well. Almost the entire RAAF 75th Fighter Sqn at Port Morseby had severe dysentery during the battle of Milne Bay and nearly a quarter of them had Malaria. I remember listening to an interview with one of the guys talking about how the gas bubbles of a full fledged stomach meltdown affected you as you rapdly descended from 20,000 ft to Sea Level trying to escape a zero, and how they had to tuck their trousers into their boots so as not to have diarrhea sloshing around the cockpit. The runways were incomplete, partial mud pits, many of these pilots were sleeping in tropical heat under little more than a tarp and (if they were lucky) a mosquito net. Most of the P-40, P-39 etc. pilots in the first few months of 1942 had almost no training on type. I think the same is true for most of the Marine pilots flying F2A and Wildcats. The odds were steeply against them.

In some cases, once they got their feet beneath them, they were able to make their machines work well enough to harm the enemy as much as they were being harmed. This was true of the 49th FG and the RAAF 75th and 76th squadrons, and most of the carrier based Wildcat squadrons, and the Marine flyers of the Cactus Air Force or Wake Island. It was not true to the same extent for the RAF units at Ceylon or the P-39 units in the Solomons or the F2A Buffalos at Midway.

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## RCAFson (Feb 1, 2021)

Schweik said:


> The topic of the OP was comparing the Theaters - Pacific with Med, and North Atlantic too. Narrowing it down to one raid seems like a cherry pick ...
> 
> He also showed _one _F2A combat, _one_ P-40 combat, and _two_ Hurricane. Which again, looks like consciously sifting to find just the right dataset.



The topic of posts 141/142 was a comparison of the KB raids at Darwin, Ceylon and Midway and was a logical extension of the current discussion in the thread. Your shifting the discussion to comparing carrier *raids* to twin engine bombing *campaigns* is more than a bit apples to oranges.

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## Schweik (Feb 1, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> The topic of posts 141/142 was a comparison of the KB raids at Darwin, Ceylon and Midway and was a logical extension of the current discussion in the thread. Your shifting the discussion to comparing carrier *raids* to twin engine bombing *campaigns* is more than a bit apples to oranges.



That is completely disingenuous and laughable. He tried to narrow the focus to divert attention from the poor record of the Hurricane and Fulmar fighters against the Japanese. I could also add the Spitfire to that but I'm kind of convinced that most of the problems they had at Darwin were organizational and maintenance related - though the short range of the Spit also was a factor. 

The issue is comparing the Theaters for the overall Naval Air War. Specifically the performance of fighters and strike aircraft came up. Cherry picking one specific attack to the exclusion of dozens of others is more than a bit dubious. Just face the reality and move on. The Hurricane couldn't handle combat with the A6M. It had it's day, that day was just two years before Ceylon.


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## RCAFson (Feb 1, 2021)

Schweik said:


> That is completely disingenuous and laughable. He tried to narrow the focus to divert attention from the poor record of the Hurricane and Fulmar fighters against the Japanese. I could also add the Spitfire to that but I'm kind of convinced that most of the problems they had at Darwin were organizational and maintenance related - though the short range of the Spit also was a factor.
> 
> The issue is comparing the Theaters for the overall Naval Air War. Specifically the performance of fighters and strike aircraft came up. Cherry picking one specific attack to the exclusion of dozens of others is more than a bit dubious. Just face the reality and move on. The Hurricane couldn't handle combat with the A6M. It had it's day, that day was just two years before Ceylon.



You continually shift the discussion rather than actually replying to the posts 141/142. Your reply was this:

_"That's an incorrect analysis of Darwin. Don't know if that's based on a single day or what, but this is a more complete analysis_

_The USAAF 49th Fighter Group over Darwin: a forgotten campaign | The Strategist_

_The count was 19 fighters lost vs. 19 enemy aircraft lost ( 1 x Ki-46, 7 x A6M and 12 x G4M bombers). They actually did a lot better than the Spitfires."_

So you tried to shift the discussion from KB carrier raids to a land based TE bombing campaign.


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## GrauGeist (Feb 1, 2021)

The Darwin raid on 19 February 1942, was comprised several waves of aircraft from the Akagi, Hiryu, Soryu and Kaga: A6M, D3A and B5N as well as land-based G3M and G4M bombers.

Subsequent attacks were conducted both by IJN and IJA aircraft.

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## Schweik (Feb 1, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> You continually shift the discussion rather than actually replying to the posts 141/142. Your reply was this:
> 
> _"That's an incorrect analysis of Darwin. Don't know if that's based on a single day or what, but this is a more complete analysis_
> 
> ...


 
I started this thread to compare the two Theaters. Remember this all started with your ridiculous claims that the air combat in the Pacific Theater paled in commparison to the convoy fights in the MTO with the fleet of 600 Italian and German planes. As this discussion started to focus on the specific aircraft, first strike planes and now especially fighters- I summarized all the combat involved with Hurricanes and FAA naval aircraft in Ceylon, because that was about the only maritime related air strikes the FAA or RAF got into in the Pacific by that time. This was in contrast to the combined naval and land air war in the MTO such as at Pedestal and the other Malta convoys.

We were already, incidentally, discussing land based bombers such as the G4M and G3M specifically. Both are IJN strike aircraft equally capable of attacking land or sea targets.

Then slaterat posted _one_ raid at Darwin involving P-40s, and the _one_ raid on Midway, and compared it to _two_ raids involving the Hurricanes at Ceylon. Both of which I had already posted.

(There were other IJN carrier raids in the Pacific besides Midway, just FYI.)

I just pointed out the obvious gap in the record, there was plenty more combat involving the exact same fighters in the same spot. You may have decided that the discussion should stop whenever you or someone you agrees with makes a point - but I never signed a contract saying I agreed with anything you posted or think.

And the truth is, I almost never do.

So, here's the thing, I am free to speak my mind, so I posted the results of the US P-40 units involvement in the defense of Darwin, which did not match the trend slaterat was trying to establish. And I guess you really didn't like that. If I include later activity from that same unit from Port Morseby you will like it even less. And also (obviously) if we include other Japanese naval strikes against US carriers, it could trigger got knows what.

If you want to start a thread called "Cherry pick air battles which put your favorite aircraft in a favorable light" go right ahead. The 111 raids on Darwin and other North Australian bases also by the way did include attacks on shipping, according to Wikipedia on the Jan 12 raid there were 11 vessels sunk, but ships were still getting sunk in 1943.

I think the point of discussing these things on this forum though is to establish what really happened and learn about it. Not scramble desperately and cherry pick data to try to make it look like the side you identify with never made a mistake. That seems pretty pointless, we can all easily read what happened.

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## RCAFson (Feb 1, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> The Darwin raid on 19 February 1942, was comprised several waves of aircraft from the Akagi, Hiryu, Soryu and Kaga: A6M, D3A and B5N as well as land-based G3M and G4M bombers.
> 
> Subsequent attacks were conducted both by IJN and IJA aircraft.



The only part of the raid looked at in posts 141/142 was that by the KB aircraft.


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## RCAFson (Feb 1, 2021)

Schweik said:


> I started this thread to compare the two Theaters. Remember this all started with your ridiculous claims that the air combat in the Pacific Theater paled in commparison to the convoy fights in the MTO with the fleet of 600 Italian and German planes. As this discussion started to focus on the specific aircraft, first strike planes and now especially fighters- I summarized all the combat involved with Hurricanes and FAA naval aircraft in Ceylon, because that was about the only maritime related air strikes the FAA or RAF got into in the Pacific by that time. This was in contrast to the combined naval and land air war in the MTO such as at Pedestal and the other Malta convoys.
> 
> We were already, incidentally, discussing land based bombers such as the G4M and G3M specifically. Both are IJN strike aircraft equally capable of attacking land or sea targets.
> 
> ...



Posts 141/142 specifically looked at KB carrier raids and the relative efficacy of Allied fighter defense to those raids. Rather than specifically reply to the post, you try to shift the discussion to something else.


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## SaparotRob (Feb 1, 2021)

I don’t know who’s “winning”, but this tempestuous thread has been very informative for me. I’m somewhat familiar with American involvement in the PTO but not so much. So guys, I gotta tell ya, every post is a logical “counter” to the previous one. However, it seems the needle is stuck on box scores and not differences in these campaigns. 
This thread has made me aware of similarities though. Such as trying to fly unfamiliar, clapped out, deficient aircraft while unbelievably ill with tropical illness. 
That is certainly a difference between SWPA and the North Atlantic campaigns.

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## GrauGeist (Feb 1, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> The only part of the raid looked at in posts 141/142 was that by the KB aircraft.


Which, in my post, were A6M, D3A and B5N aircraft.

Perhaps my English isn't up to par, but I was fairly sure that A6M, D3A and B5N is universally accepted as describing Imperial Japanese Navy types.

In regards to the Allied aircraft at Darwin, 10 P-40s were returning from an aborted flight and ended up flying into the midst of the attack. Several were caught whilst landing, a couple were able to "touch and go" but were still shot down. Some tried to fight the A6Ms and lost. One was able to down two D3As but was shot down in turn.

All other aircraft on site were destroyed on the ground - there was not enough warning to enable a "scramble" or disbursement.

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## Schweik (Feb 1, 2021)

SaparotRob said:


> I don’t know who’s “winning”, but this tempestuous thread has been very informative for me. I’m somewhat familiar with American involvement in the PTO but not so much. So guys, I gotta tell ya, every post is a logical “counter” to the previous one. However, it seems the needle is stuck on box scores and not differences in these campaigns.



That's because the thread started from that kind of argument on another thread. I'm hoping this one will expand knowledge of the relative times and places. I'm very interested in both the MTO and the Pacific, particularly in 1942 and early 1943, which were really the turning points in the war. It's fascinating how the Allies rallied across the globe, more or less at the same time.



> This thread has made me aware of similarities though. Such as trying to fly unfamiliar, clapped out, deficient aircraft while unbelievably ill with tropical illness.
> That is certainly a difference between SWPA and the North Atlantic campaigns.



Deficient, maybe. Unfamiliar, definitely. But actually they were brand new, not clapped out. Literally taken out out of their crates and assembled just a couple of weeks before they went into combat. If anything they were too new, hadn't had their 'shakeout' - they were part of the very first shipment of P-40E-1 delivered to the Theater, diverted to Australia after Java fell while they were on the way across the Pacific. Some of the rest of them were sunk in their crates on other ships.

These pilots had never flown high performance aircraft like a P-40 and they crashed half of them in landing accidents just making their way from southern Australia to Darwin and then New Guinea. Many had never flown an aircraft with retractable landing gear. They were incredibly brave guys in extremely trying conditions.

Gradually they did figure out how to use the new aircraft successfully against the Japanese, but at the cost of many lives. Milne Bay was a really important victory, famous in Australia but not as well known in the US as Coral Sea or Midway but in a way just as important. If the Japanese would have captured Southern New Guinea / Port Moresbey it would have been really bad. The majority of the Australia military including almost all of their air force was already heavily committed in North Africa and other Theaters, fighting with the British. Darwin and some of the other far-northern towns were already getting plastered by Japanese bombers and people were really worried about an invasion (which may not have been realistic in terms of Japanese plans but they had no way of knowing that). The ground victory at Milne Bay and the Kokoda Trail was won by Australian militia, basically. It was one of the first ground victories against the Japanese Army which had just steamrolled the British in Malaya and the Americans in the Philippines.

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## SaparotRob (Feb 1, 2021)

I don’t know where I got the clapped out part from, perhaps I was thinking of Mk1 Hurricanes. I now remember that there had been new P-40’s that had “teething” problems. I thought that was in the Philippines.

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## Schweik (Feb 1, 2021)

SaparotRob said:


> I don’t know where I got the clapped out part from, perhaps I was thinking of Mk1 Hurricanes. I now remember that there had been new P-40’s that had “teething” problems. I thought that was in the Philippines.



It was very similar issue there as well, brand new P-40E-1 had arrived very shortly before the attack, they had just converted and not completed their shakeout yet. But at least some of those pilots had experience flying earlier model P-40s (B/C)

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## GrauGeist (Feb 1, 2021)

It might be interesting to know that the US carrier Langley had been in Darwin offloading aircraft shortly before the Japanese attacked.
It was seen and it's berth position noted by Japanese recon before the attack, too.

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## SaparotRob (Feb 1, 2021)

I don’t know where I read it but I think seaplane tender U.S.S. Langley was reputed to have the best galley in the Pacific.

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## Schweik (Feb 2, 2021)

I think they have a model of it in the Pennsacola naval air museum, (along with about a dozen other carriers, all in 1/72 scale, with their aircraft)







She was crippled and later scuttled just about a week after the first Darwin raid (on February 27). Carrying 32 x P-40s with their crews to be taken to Java, she was attacked by 16 x G4M bombers (in turn escorted by 15 x A6M fighters) off the coast of Java. The G4M were carrying bombs rather than torpedoes, and initially the Langley was able to evade, but then they changed tactics and bracketed with bombs, hitting it with 5 bombs and setting it on fire. Escorting destroyers took the surviving crew off (including, probably, the cook).

Most of the Langley crew ended up on the oiler _USS Pecos_, and then most of them died on March 1, 1942 when _Pecos_ itself was sunk by Japanese dive bombers from the _Sōryū_ and the _Kaga. _232 crew from both ships (out of 317 on the _Pecos_ and 468 on _Langley_) were picked up by the destroyer _USS Whipple_. Many other survivors were reportedly left to drown in the sea due to fear of a submarine attack.

The 32 fighter pilots on Langley on their way to Java were transferred to the Destroyer _USS Edsal_l, which was then sunk, also on March 1, by Japanese aircraft and surface ships off the coast of Java. She ran into the heavy cruiser _Chikum_a and the battleships _Hei_ and _Kirishima_, all of which opened fire at long range, but after shooting back Edsall fled and the heavy guns initially failed to score any telling hits. She was then attacked by IJN D3A divebomebrs from the _Kaga_, _Hiryū_ and _Sōryū_ which succeeded in immobilizing Edsall. She was then reportedly sunk by guns from the Hei, while the action was filmed by a cameraman on the cruiser _Tone_.

This is _Edsall_ just as it was sinking, according to Wikipedia. The Japanese thought it was the British destroyer _HMS Pope_.






There were several survivors of the _Edsall_, but the Japanese only picked up a few, leaving the rest on the water. The bodies of six navy sailors from _Edsall_ and five USAAF pilots were later found decapitated in a mass grave in the East Indies.

Tough times in early 1942...

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## SaparotRob (Feb 2, 2021)

I’ve seen pictures of the”Covered Wagon” in her glory days but never have I seen that one of the sinking of U.S.S. Edsall.
It brings home what happened off Samar in a way that words can’t. Granted it’s not a Fletcher class but I can imagine that being U.S.S. Johnston.

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## Schweik (Feb 2, 2021)

That image is from a 90 second video that was shot, if anybody can find that I'd love to see it.

I'm still hoping the cook from the Langley made it to the Whipple and survived the war to open a great restaurant in New Orleans...

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## Schweik (Feb 2, 2021)

Found a video about it (audio narrative with photos)

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## SaparotRob (Feb 2, 2021)

That is a very compelling still of U.S.S. Edsall under attack. That crew going through that hell after days of attack. It doesn’t get the press that other actions got but it’s no less significant nor heroic. Same for the ABDA fleet. 
I hope that Chef did make out just fine too!


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## Peter Gunn (Feb 2, 2021)

Now you guys made me hungry...


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## Schweik (Feb 2, 2021)

Getting back to the Hurricane, I am not sure what the problem(s) were or was precisely, but I'm developing some theories.

*First the positive: *

Hurricane was reasonably fast, certainly comparable to the two main Japanese fighters and fast enough to catch most of the bombers. As fast at the Wildcat and only a little slower than the P-40 or P-39 at least at altitude.
It was certainly more than well armed enough
Had pretty good altitude performance, probably better than the Wildcat or the Zero, definitely better than the P-40C, E or K
Had a pretty good climb rate, again probably better than the Wildcat or the P-40, inferior to the Zero and (at least on paper) the P-39,
Was more maneuverable than most of the other Allied fighters, definitely had the best turning circle out of all of them.
Had radios, unlike a lot of the Japanese fighters
*Then the negative*

Though probably fast enough, it wasn't _that _fast - no speed advantage over the Japanese fighters,
Didn't have a very high dive speed or dive acceleration (though I think this is debated)
Cannon armament ran out of ammo very quickly (at least the earlier models) and seemed to be subject to stoppages
Altitude and climb seem to have been seriously affected by the climate, which may be a big one (more on this in a minute)
Slow rate of roll (this is also debated)
The thing about climate is this - both in the Pacific / CBI and in the MTO, Hurricanes seemed to perform below spec in the *Tropical weather*. This shows up in some of the tests on WWIIaircraftperformance. It could be a fluke, many of those tests seem to be one-offs and quite a few seem to show anomalies. I have a theory that maybe the Tropical conditions caused some issues with the engine, or maybe the cooling system, and maybe also the air-frame - in the torrid air and dusty or dirty conditions. Just a hunch, but there seems to be a similar issue with the P-39 and the F2A* which did so poorly in the Pacific but seemed to thrive in the colder weather in Russia. I am also not sure about the prevalence of the infamous Vokes filter, which was heavily criticized in the Western Desert. I know it was sometimes used in Burma I'm not sure about Ceylon etc.

The other issues with roll and dive speed perhaps not being strengths of the type may have affected the ability to perform an *escape maneuver. *This was always critical in air combat, but particularly so in the Pacific where the Japanese fighters could almost always outmaneuver Allied fighters if combat went on long enough. I know that Wildcat, P-40 and P-39 pilots (and later on Corsair and Hellcat too) had a standard escape maneuver against the Japanese which consisted initially of a rapid split S and power dive, and later I heard pilots describing a weird kind of outside roll that then also turned into a power dive. Apparently this was harder to for a pursuing fighter to track and shoot at. Both methods took advantage of good rate of roll, as we know the A6M had poor high speed roll and problems with torque. The Wildcat pilots also did their rolling scissors / Thach Weave, and the P-38 pilots did a shallow high speed climb on max boost.

I don't know if such an escape maneuver was done with Hurricanes or not, for all I know it was, but I have never read about it.

I know the P-40 pilots also pretty quickly worked out that they could overboost their engines for as much as 30% more power (or even more) once they were down on the deck and used this on several occasions to escape pursuit. The Australians from 75th Sqn RAAF described doing this exact thing at Milne Bay.

I don't know if this was ever done overboosting with Hurricanes and Merlins or not. I can't think of any reasons why it couldn't have been. I know standard allowed boost ratings were steadily increased on the Merlins but maybe not quickly enough to avert disaster in the field.

Anyway that is my $.02 on that subject.

*I know the Finns got a lighter, less kitted out F2A, and the Russians stripped their P-39s, but I believe these measures were also attempted in the Pacific by mechanics in the field.

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## Schweik (Feb 2, 2021)

I should also add, that in the MTO and the Pacific, the Hurricane units seemed to do very well in attacking bombers, they just had trouble with the more advanced enemy fighters.


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## XBe02Drvr (Feb 2, 2021)

Schweik said:


> I should also add, that in the MTO and the Pacific, the Hurricane units seemed to do very well in attacking bombers, they just had trouble with the more advanced enemy fighters.


Might have also had something to do with tactics and training. If you're used to being one of the more nimble guys on the block, you may not be prepared for an encounter with a ninja.


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## slaterat (Feb 2, 2021)

I have posted this before and I will again. This "myth" of the superiority of the Zero over the Hurricane just won't die.

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## Schweik (Feb 2, 2021)

Could you summarize that, i.e. who wrote it, what is says, based on what data, and turn it right side up so it's easier to read?


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## XBe02Drvr (Feb 2, 2021)

Schweik said:


> Could you summarize that, i.e. who wrote it, what is says, based on what data, and turn it right side up so it's easier to read?


And how about sending it in a format my Android can read?


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## slaterat (Feb 2, 2021)

It is written by Terence Kelly, a Hurricane pilot of 258 Squadron, who actually fought against Zeros and KI 43s. So its based on combat experience.



XBe02Drvr said:


> And how about sending it in a format my Android can read?


What would that be?


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## slaterat (Feb 2, 2021)

Here are some files on Hurricane dive performance.

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## slaterat (Feb 2, 2021)

The Hurricane was an ok diver, better than the F4F and the Zero.

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## slaterat (Feb 2, 2021)

Try this


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## GrauGeist (Feb 2, 2021)

So if the Hurricane was superior to the A6M, how was it that the battle over Ceylon saw the Hurricane get beaten so badly?

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## RCAFson (Feb 3, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> So if the Hurricane was superior to the A6M, how was it that the battle over Ceylon saw the Hurricane get beaten so badly?



This was addressed in earlier posts; on 5 April the IJNAF achieved nearly complete surprise. On 9 April things were a bit more equal but the Hurricanes were still badly outnumbered.

The Hurricane II wasn't really 'superior', but not inferior either, if flown to take advantage of it's strengths.


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## GrauGeist (Feb 3, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> ...if flown to take advantage of it's strengths.


You mean like Nichizawa, who was downing F6Fs with an A6M as late as 1944?

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## XBe02Drvr (Feb 3, 2021)

slaterat said:


> Try this


That comes to me as a ".bin" file, which my phone refuses to open. The image shows a logo that resembles Adobe Acrobat, but my Acrobat won't open it. How about ".doc" or ".rtf", or ".pdf"?


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## RCAFson (Feb 3, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> You mean like Nichizawa, who was downing F6Fs with an A6M as late as 1944?



Yeah, the A6M never had any upgrades, did it?


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## GrauGeist (Feb 3, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> Yeah, the A6M never had any upgrades, did it?


About as much as the Hurricane.

Not much difference between the A6M2 and the A6M5 when compared to what the Allies were fielding at the time...


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## Glider (Feb 3, 2021)

This is part of an official RAF summary of the air war over Burma and it couldn't be clearer in stating that the Hurricane was outclassed by the Ki43. I should add that on this forum there was an official comparison between the Zero and the Spit V and the result was that the Spit V was in many cases was matched and sometimes inferior to the Zero. So unless the Hurricane has had a major boost in performance that makes it better than the Spit V, my money is on the Ki43 and Zero when up against the Hurricane

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## Schweik (Feb 3, 2021)

"All Allied aircraft except the Hurricane at present enjoy advantages of dive, straight and level speed, zoom, and in the case of the Spitfire, climb, when compared to all but the latest types of Japanese aircraft."

Yah I think that is pretty definitive, and matches what I have always read. Slaterats performance tests however do seem to indicate Hurricane could reach very high dive speeds. Maybe the issue was more dive-acceleration than ultimate dive speed? 

This issue of diving was also mentioned many times in the MTO, where it was also a standard escape maneuver for Kittyhawks but not Hurricanes.


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## RCAFson (Feb 3, 2021)

Glider said:


> This is part of an official RAF summary of the air war over Burma and it couldn't be clearer in stating that the Hurricane was outclassed by the Ki43. I should add that on this forum there was an official comparison between the Zero and the Spit V and the result was that the Spit V was in many cases was matched and sometimes inferior to the Zero. So unless the Hurricane has had a major boost in performance that makes it better than the Spit V, my money is on the Ki43 and Zero when up against the Hurricane
> View attachment 611148



Ground attack Hurricanes were heavily loaded with armour, armament (typically 4 x 20mm or 12 x BMGs) carried external hard points with bombs and trop filters. These aircraft are not comparable to Hurricanes configured as pure fighters. They were strike aircraft and suffered for it.

We can get a very good look at comparable A6M2 and Hurricane IIA performance via these three references:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/Hurricane_II_Z-2974_Level.pdf 
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/Hurricane_II_Z-2974_Climb.pdf

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/japan/intelsum85-dec42.pdf

And with boost limited to 9.5lb(instead of 12 or 14-16 by late 1942-44) the Hurricane IIA has a much superior climb rate compared to the tested A6M2 and is generally faster, and of course far superior to an F4F-4.


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## Schweik (Feb 3, 2021)

Hurricanes were relegated to ground attack due to their extremely poor performance in air to air combat, not the other way around.


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## RCAFson (Feb 3, 2021)

Schweik said:


> Hurricanes were relegated to ground attack due to their extremely poor performance in air to air combat, not the other way around.



Compared to Luftwaffe types the Hurricane was obsolescent by 1941 and this led to a relegation to the ground attack role and production and development was directed toward ground attack. Not surprisingly this led to issues when combating lightweight IJAAF fighters at low altitudes, which is where ground attack Hurricane most frequently encountered fighters.

Similarly, the F4F-4 was phased out in favour of the lightweight FM2, as superior naval fighter types were introduced which took over fleet carrier fighter roles.


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## Schweik (Feb 3, 2021)

So are you saying that Hurricane IIB, IIC etc. were ground attack types? Because I believe those saw extended use in Burma, and took heavy losses.

The only one I know of as a dedicated ground attack type was the IID with the big 40mm guns and those had somewhat limited success from what I remember reading. MK IV later had the ability to be configured as a ground attack or fighter type.

Are you saying that the FM2 was a ground attack design?

I would say though the design certainly had limitations, and was barely adequate, with good training and the right tactics the Wildcat clearly held it's own in air to air comabat through 1943. The Hurricane was basically phased out of air to air combat (as much as it could be) in the Western desert by the end of 1941 or early 1942.

In Burma and India they seemed to remain in use longer and their aircrews suffered for it. Even the Mohawk was considered better.

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## Schweik (Feb 3, 2021)

I would say it was obviously also obsolescent compared to the predominant Japanese Navy and Army types by the end of 1941. As was the Sea Hurricane, though it could still be useful in places where it didn't face land based fighters or carrier aircraft. The Fulmar was obsolescent when it came out.


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## RCAFson (Feb 3, 2021)

Schweik said:


> So are you saying that Hurricane IIB, IIC etc. were ground attack types? Because I believe those saw extended use in Burma, and took heavy losses.
> 
> The only one I know of as a dedicated ground attack type was the IID with the big 40mm guns and those had somewhat limited success from what I remember reading. MK IV later had the ability to be configured as a ground attack or fighter type.
> 
> ...



The IIB/C/D and MkIV were used as ground attack aircraft and configured for that role, which led to increased weight and much reduced performance and almost constant operations at low altitude where IJAAF almost always had an altitude advantage. 

I am saying that the F4F-4 was phased out as it's original role was taken over and the airframe redesigned and repurposed. 

The F4F-4 was clearly inferior to the Hurricane II as a fighter aircraft so any successes that it had were due to the unique tactical situations in which it operated. Logically, a better performing aircraft, should do at least as well.


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## Schweik (Feb 3, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> The F4F-4 was clearly inferior to the Hurricane II as a fighter aircraft so *any successes that it had were due to the unique tactical situations in which it operated. * Logically, a better performing aircraft, should do at least as well.



Putting aside the rivalry for the moment, can you really be sure all this is true?

This is I think one of the dilemmas of understanding WW2 air combat, or any military history. How much of what happened is down to morale, to weather and environment, to logistics, to training and discipline, and just plain luck, and how much due to the properties and performance of kit? This is an issue going far back into history - how much of an advantage were iron spearheads over bronze? How much did the longbow matter at Agincourt compared to the weather and the terrain?

Once you get into as artificial an environment as four miles into the sky and 300 mph, the kit starts to matter a lot more. One man with a pointy stick - or one man with an automatic rifle - is only so much different than another. But we know for sure that an I-16 was at an almost insurmountable disadvantage against a Fw 190. But the skill of the pilot, the rain or fog, the quality of maintenance, training and discipline, all these things still did matter of course. It's hard to determine precisely how much. But we still see aces flying Buffalos and Fiat G.50s in 1943. 

When it comes to Hurricane II vs. F4F-4, I don't see such a sharp difference in performance. Speed is about the same, Hurricane turns better, Wildcat probably rolls slightly better (I show Hurricane Mk I at 64 degrees per second at 230 mph, 30 lbs of force, Wildcat at 69 degrees per second. Hurricane Mk II is probably a bit worse), dive is a bit confusing in light of slaterats evidence, but pilots seemed to say that the Hurricane dived poorly. I don't know how to reconcile that. Hurricane climbed a bit better - so long as the engine was performing properly. But there are a lot of reports of overheating. Hurricane also had a radiator which made them a bit more vulnerable to gunfire. Japanese pilots were trained to target the radiator.

The Hurricane had heavier guns, but only 60 rounds of ammunition for the 20mm when you are talking about the IIC. I would say therefore that the Wildcat is actually a bit better armed. (I know that many wouldn't agree with that). The four wing cannon apparently also affected maneuverability on the Hurri.

Overall, I'd say on paper performance looks similar. I certainly wouldn't rate the Hurricane as better. So the difference could be training or circumstantial, or even luck, but considering the number of iterations I'd say there is a pattern which shows the F4F had the edge.

For example, many papers have been written about Agincourt. It has been proven definitively that longbows can't shoot through iron armor. Elaborate tests have been done which show the extreme difficulty of the environment for the French. Some people concluded that the longbow wasn't really a factor. But the thing is, there was more than that one incident. English victories at Crecy and Poitiers also hinged on the longbow. So did victories in Scotland and Flanders and as far away as Spain and Italy, and Lithuania. Taken together, it's enough variety in all the other random factors to assume that the longbow really did make a difference, just like everyone said it did back in the 14th and 15th century.

I don't think the relative success of the F4F was a fluke, though I can't be certain what the actual reason was. I don't think it was pilot training because my understanding is that the FAA and RAF pilots were well trained.

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## Glider (Feb 3, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> Ground attack Hurricanes were heavily loaded with armour, armament (typically 4 x 20mm or 12 x BMGs) carried external hard points with bombs and trop filters. These aircraft are not comparable to Hurricanes configured as pure fighters. They were strike aircraft and suffered for it.
> 
> We can get a very good look at comparable A6M2 and Hurricane IIA performance via these three references:
> 
> ...



I am sorry but you are now saying that the Hurricane II was heavily loaded with armour and that is the reason why it's performance suffered? I thought the Mk IV was the GA version with extra protection

I haven't been able to find the actual flight test comparison between the Spit V and Zero A6M3 but I have found a good summary which follows. In summary below 20,000 ft the Zero had a number of significant advantages over the Spitfire and over 20,000 ft the Spitfire was able to start gaining the upper hand. Unless you believe that a Hurricane II has a better performance than a Spitfire V, your argument holds little, if any, water. I obviously recognise that a Ki43 is different to a Zero but its characteristics are very similar, speed, agility, acceleration are of the same order

Link is as follows
darwinspitfires.com/index.php?page=spitfire-vc-versus-the-zero 

It should also be noted that air to air combat over Burma was very unusual, the vast majority of sorties were GA missions so of course the aircraft are going to be equipped with bomb racks and other additions. It's a fact of life. All allied aircraft spent most of the time on GA missions. It should also be noted that a number of Ki43 aircraft had similar additions so it wasn't always one sided.
All the links I know (including the one you posted) state that to combat the Japanese fighters you need to keep the speed above 300 mph. A Hurricane after spending some time in Burma would be lucky to get over 300mph beside which the Japanese fighters also had a similar top speed, and had a better acceleration so the difference is marginal.


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## SaparotRob (Feb 3, 2021)

As long as we’re all gathered here together, would the proper pronunciation of Ki-43 be “kay eye” or “kee” 43?


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## Glider (Feb 3, 2021)

Personally I say Kye but have no idea if that's right or wrong

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## nuuumannn (Feb 3, 2021)

Schweik said:


> Maybe the issue was more dive-acceleration than ultimate dive speed?



I've been recently reading a good assessment of the main protagonists over Britain in 1940 and it discusses the merits and drawbacks of the Bf 109E, Spitfire Mk.I and Hurricane Mk.I and while the consensus was that at that time, although the Hurricane was a good sturdy gun platform, it was slow compared to the Bf 109, depending on altitude, between 10 mph and 30 mph, which in 1940 performance was a huge margin. yet, Hurricanes regularly defeated Bf 109s in combat. Statistically speaking, Bf 109s shot down more Hurricanes and Spitfires than Spitfires and Hurricanes shot down Bf 109s during the Battle of Britain period, however.

Now, the Bf 109 was faster than the Hurricane at almost all altitudes and its advantage was diving slashing attacks from heights of around 30,000 feet. The entire 'Hunter' ethos of the Jagdgruppen was at play here, since the Bf 109 had a superior climb and dive speed to both the British fighters, not to mention the disadvantage the Merlin engined aircraft suffered when following a Bf 109 in a bunting manoeuvre and their engine cut out. In the vertical plain, the Bf 109 was king.

Problem was, engagement usually began at lower altitudes than those the Bf 109 began from and descended quite rapidly into a one v one melee, and this is where the Spitfire and Hurricane came into their own. The Spitfire was the best dogfighter of the three, apparently and could out turn the Bf 109 with ease, the Hurricane was more manoeuvrable than the Bf 109 at low speeds and attempting to turn with a Hurricane cost many an aspiring Jaeger his life. If a Bf 109 attempted to steepen his turn to cut in on either British fighter it could be disastrous for the German - the aircraft's slats could automatically deploy, often asymmetrically, which would cause the aircraft to jerk about in the turn, throwing the pilot's aim and before he knew it, the British fighter was on his tail. Because of the Bf 109's high wing loading, there were examples, and trials by the British with a captured example verified this, where Bf 109s lost their wings in attempting to turn with the British fighters. His only defence was to take advantage of that superior dive speed and make for the Channel and home.

In the heat of battle, the Bf 109E's cockpit was a frantic place - in the early Emils power management was a juggling act, as the propeller pitch control was on the instrument panel, not the side console next to the power lever, which meant the pilot was moving his hands from the power lever to the pitch lever to the joystick to prevent the prop from overspeeding during manoeuvring, the early models not having a constant speed governor, being variable pitch only. This of course lost the pilot vital seconds and was something that expert pilots could get round, but they did complain about it and later models had the pitch lever where it should have been, and later models had a constant speed prop.

In the context of 1942 in the Far East, the Hurricane was no match for the Zero, including low speed manoeuvring, but it could accelerate away from the Zero in a dive - the very tactics it's former adversary used against it two years earlier. In retrospect, the Zero was not very fast, but over Singapore didn't need to be, and US and later British fighters only extended the speed gap, even after the Zero received modifications to improve its performance, but right until the end of the war, Allied pilots were warned to never dogfight the Zero at low speed.

All of this shows that combat is a multifarious thing and that performance figures don't always guarantee victory to the better machine.

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## Schweik (Feb 3, 2021)

Yes good points - that is kind of what I was getting at. There are a lot of smaller factors that come into play, some of which we 'air chair' historians don't always think about. When I read pilot interviews, hoping to get some sort of detailed comparisons of strengths and weaknesses like you outlined above, they so frequently seem to gloss over that and when they do talk about the aircraft, they often mention things I would never think about, like was there a rearview mirror, how good the view was in general, weather the seat was comfortable, whether they had a good cockpit heater, whether it had a "relief tube", how easy was the radio to use, whether it leaked oil a lot, and especially - how tricky were they to takeoff and land. A fighter pilot might only get in one or two air to air engagements in their life, or none, but they had to take off and land for every mission. There are a lot of small details like managing the prop pitch as you said, or using rudder trim which was a big deal in the P-40 (or the lack of trim tabs, which was a big deal on other aircraft)

Features which may have ended up very good, like leading edge slats, could be a big problem when they were first introduced. Most good combat planes had to go through a shakeout before they could really function properly. Lots of little adjustments needed to be made.

And then there was adapting an aircraft to the conditions where they were going to fight. Aircraft like the A6M, the Hurricane, the P-40, the Bf 109 and the Wildcat were used in combat from the freezing arctic down to the torrid Equatorial Tropics. From very dry and dusty to very, very humid and wet; from thin air at high altitude to thick air at near sea level.

I once read a really detailed analysis of all the problems they had with the Spitfire at Darwin and it was sobering - there were so many ways that so many things could go wrong. It was a huge amount of small issues, as simple as cleaning up the ammunition before loading it, that could make the difference between life and death. And of course those persistent problems that the manufacturer couldn't seem to grasp like the heater and the electrical system in the P-38, or the leaky valves on the cooling flaps on the early F4U. Or humidity that fogged up the windscreen in the SBD. If those weren't figured out, the plane couldn't be used to win in combat.

Those are some of the interesting things that start to emerge when the conversation gets a bit deeper. And that's how we turn an intractable argument into something fun and enlightening.

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## nuuumannn (Feb 3, 2021)

Agree completely, Schweik.



Schweik said:


> (or the lack of trim tabs, which was a big deal on other aircraft)



This was a problem with the Bf 109 throughout its career. Over long periods of time, it was tiring to fly, not least because of its tiny cockpit, but also because it was fitted with ground adjustable tabs only. The hori stab was variable incidence and was controlled by a wheel on the left side of the cockpit beside the seat. It was next to the flap wheel, which was identical in size, the idea being that when extending the flaps, the trim could be adjusted simultaneously to match the changing attitude and prevent the aircraft from 'ballooning', but, that was the only means of trimming the aircraft in flight.

In the Bf 109, the torque from its prop also added to the discomfort of lengthy time in the air, apparently, the pilot needed to have left boot in at all times and although the rudder was asymmetric in profile, it did little on take off since the rudder was practically useless at low speed. 

One other problem the Bf 109 had that potentially affected its combat performance was deflection of the joystick. Because of the lack of room in the cockpit, the joystick between the pilot's legs was limited in movement. The bigger the pilot, the worse the issue became. The British carried out a trial using a Bf 109 and came to the conclusion that this seriously affected its manoeuvrability. The Hurricane, by contrast had a larger cockpit and during manoeuvres did not have the same issue - Hurricane pilots had an easier time of it in the throes of manoeuvring.

Nevertheless, the Bf 109 was quite a machine, and the success its pilots had is probably a reflection of them and their skills as much as their mount's abilities as a fighter.

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## RCAFson (Feb 3, 2021)

Glider said:


> I am sorry but you are now saying that the Hurricane II was heavily loaded with armour and that is the reason why it's performance suffered? I thought the Mk IV was the GA version with extra protection
> 
> I haven't been able to find the actual flight test comparison between the Spit V and Zero A6M3 but I have found a good summary which follows. In summary below 20,000 ft the Zero had a number of significant advantages over the Spitfire and over 20,000 ft the Spitfire was able to start gaining the upper hand. Unless you believe that a Hurricane II has a better performance than a Spitfire V, your argument holds little, if any, water. I obviously recognise that a Ki43 is different to a Zero but its characteristics are very similar, speed, agility, acceleration are of the same order
> 
> ...



_"I am sorry but you are now saying that the Hurricane II was heavily loaded with armour and that is the reason why it's performance suffered? I thought the Mk IV was the GA version with extra protection"_

I stated: "_were heavily loaded with armour, armament (typically 4 x 20mm or 12 x BMGs) carried external hard points with bombs and trop filters._" The KI43II might have had bomb rack capability but it was rarely used as a ground attack aircraft. 

Hurricanes flew thousands of ground attack sorties in Burma and the number lost to Ki43s was very small. An analysis of KI43/Hurricane combats via Shores ( Air war for Burma) indicates that the KI43s almost always attacked from above, which is hardly surprising, given the ground attack role assigned to the Hurricanes

Where does the A6M3 come into this? We know from USN/USAAF side by side testing that the F4F-4 was completely outperformed by the A6M2 yet USAAF tests show that the Hurricane IIA has generally better performance than their tested example of the A6M2, and that was without the use of overboost on the USAAF Hurricane. 

The Spitfire V/M46 comparison to theA6M3 handicapped the Spitfire because it didn't permit it to use overboost, which the high altitude rated Merlin46 requires at low altitude for best performance. When the RAAF Spitfire V/M46 testing was redone with overboost, the performance results applied to the Spitfire/A6M3 tests shifted completely in the Spitfire's favour, except for turn radius and other maneuverability factors.


See my posts here for more info:

Japanese Zero vs Spitfire vs FW 190

A Critical Analysis of the RAF Air Superiority Campaign in India, Burma and Malaya in 1941-45

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## SaparotRob (Feb 3, 2021)

I think the USN/USAAF kinda had a hunch, before side by side testing, that the Zero outclassed the F4F.

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## Glider (Feb 3, 2021)

Taking your points one at a time



RCAFson said:


> I stated: "_were heavily loaded with armour, armament (typically 4 x 20mm or 12 x BMGs) carried external hard points with bombs and trop filters._" The KI43II might have had bomb rack capability but it was rarely used as a ground attack aircraft.


The difference between a Hurricane IIA and a IIB is of course 4 x LMG, as the armour would be the same, hardly a massive difference. 4 x 20mm is of course a lot more but it was the standard fit. The RAF could have limited the Hurricane to 8 x LMG or 2 x 20mm as often done in the Middle East but didn't as GA was the only reason the Hurricane was kept in service.


> Hurricanes flew thousands of ground attack sorties in Burma and the number lost to Ki43s was very small. An analysis of KI43/Hurricane combats via Shores ( Air war for Burma) indicates that the KI43s almost always attacked from above, which is hardly surprising, given the ground attack role assigned to the Hurricanes


I agree with this and the number lost to the Ki43 was small because as I stated the number of air to air combats in this area was very low.



> Where does the A6M3 come into this? We know from USN/USAAF side by side testing that the F4F-4 was completely outperformed by the A6M2 yet USAAF tests show that the Hurricane IIA has generally better performance than their tested example of the A6M2, and that was without the use of overboost on the USAAF Hurricane.


The A6M3 comes into it because the test clearly shows that the Spitfire V was clearly inferior to the A6M3 at the altitudes that the combats in Burma often happened. As a result to believe that the Hurricane was better than the Zero would mean the Hurricane was better than the Spit V which it clearly wasn't.


> The Spitfire V/M46 comparison to theA6M3 handicapped the Spitfire because it didn't permit it to use overboost, which the high altitude rated Merlin46 requires at low altitude for best performance. When the RAAF Spitfire V/M46 testing was redone with overboost, the performance results applied to the Spitfire/A6M3 tests shifted completely in the Spitfire's favour, except for turn radius and other maneuverability factors.


This limitation in the boost allowed to the Spitfire isn't mentioned and to be honest lacks logic, why would the allies limit the boost used. If you have a link that shows the test in more detail I would appreciate it.

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## Schweik (Feb 3, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> An analysis of KI43/Hurricane combats via Shores ( Air war for Burma) indicates that the KI43s almost always attacked from above, which is hardly surprising, given the ground attack role assigned to the Hurricanes



Being attacked from above was an almost universal condition for Allied fighters in 1942.

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## RCAFson (Feb 4, 2021)

Glider said:


> Taking your points one at a time
> 
> 
> The difference between a Hurricane IIA and a IIB is of course 4 x LMG, as the armour would be the same, hardly a massive difference. 4 x 20mm is of course a lot more but it was the standard fit. The RAF could have limited the Hurricane to 8 x LMG or 2 x 20mm as often done in the Middle East but didn't as GA was the only reason the Hurricane was kept in service.
> ...



Plus the IIB/C underwing hardpoints and stores and trop filters.

Sorry, but the A6M3/Spitfire V/M46 test doesn't show that because the Spitfire was denied the use of 16lb boost. Here's an RAAF test with boost limited to 9lb:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/Spitfire_Vc_Australian-Test.pdf :

Speed at SL = 268

Speed at 10K ft = 312

Speed at FTH = 365

Here's the speeds obtained with 16lb boost:

_"AL794 - 6 SEPT YOUR L847 4 SEPT [1943]_

_SPITFIRE AIRCRAFT (.)_

_3 SPITFIRE MARK 5 AIRCRAFT GIVEN EXTENSIVE TEST FLIGHTS HERE_

_SUCCESSIVELY WITH EACH OF FOLLOWING TYPES OF AIR INTAKE ASSEMBLY AND ENGINE COWLING (A) ORIGINAL TROPICAL (B) NEW TROPICAL WITH BYPASS VALVES AND (C) TEMPERATE. AVERAGE MAXIMUM SPEEDS WERE AS FOLLOWS._

_(1) AT SEA LEVEL (A) 312 (B) 318 (C) 316._

_(2) AT10,000 FEET (A) 355.5 (B) 355. 6 (C) 360 MPH._

_AT FULL THROTTLE HEIGHT (A) 357 (B) 358.5 (C) 363 MPH._

_CONSIDERED THAT IMPROVEMENTS IN SPEED WERE TOO SMALL TO WARRANT DEPARTURE FROM ORIGINAL TYPE TROPICALISATION.
HENCE NEW SCHEME WILL NOT BE APPLIED RETROSPECTIVELY TO MARK 5 AIRCRAFT.
LATEST TROPICAL AIR INTAKE WITH BYPASS VALVE WILL BE INCORPORATED MARK 8 AIRCRAFT."_

I don't have the full test, just the results as per above.

The boost levels were not explicitly stated but there's no other explanation for the speeds obtained. Here's a Spitfire V/M45 tested at 16lb boost:

Spitfire Mk V AA.878 Report

Speed at 16lb boost/10K ft = 357

Merlin 46 power curve:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/Merlin_46_47_Power_Chart.jpg


The A6M3 outperformed the A6M2 but it's really the A6M2/Hurricane II performance that we're discussing since the A6M2 was the type encountered at Ceylon and the type that was compared side by side with the F4F-4 in the USN/USAAF trials.


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## GrauGeist (Feb 4, 2021)

Interesting:
Everyone's whipping out charts, quoting statistics and making wistful comparisons as if that *may* just possibly change what really happened.

And in the end, what actually transpired cannot be changed...

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## Schweik (Feb 4, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> Plus the IIB/C underwing hardpoints and stores and trop filters.



Trop filters may have been part of the problem for the Hurricanes, as this was frequently mentioned, until they got an improvement over the Vokes.

However, underwing and / or under belly hard points were again, very common for Allied WW2 fighters, particularly in 1942 -43. The Wildcats were not always fitted with these (since they could not carry a heavy bomb load) and that may have been one of their advantages. But they were sometimes, for example at Wake Island. I don't know how ubiquitous that was.

Another issue for Navy aircraft in general is maintenance. Land based Aircraft in Pacific Islands (or in the North African desert) were often maintained and stored in appalling conditions. On the Islands particularly they rarely had proper hangers and really could barely keep aircraft and parts out of the dust and wind and humidity. I live in the sub-Tropics myself and those kinds of conditions (like permanent moisture) do bad things to many kinds of machines. Both pilots and ground crew were frequently plagued by biting insects, tropical diseases, terrible heat and various other problems (fungus, bad food) all of which were likely to affect maintenance and performance.

On a carrier by contrast, the aircraft could be taken fully out of the elements, the parts and fluids could be kept comparatively pristine. They had all the equipment they needed, and though the crews and maintenance personnel may have been working very hard for very long hours, at least they (probably) had comparatively good food and comfortable berths to sleep in. Regular showers. Clean bathrooms.







This might have been another advantage of carrier aircraft like both the A6M and F4F

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## Rato Marczak (Feb 5, 2021)

Schweik said:


> Neither one of those statements are true.



And the last Claude combat missions in Pacific were flown in May/1942 (source: Claringbould/South Pacific Air War, vols.2 & 3)

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## Schweik (Feb 5, 2021)

To be fair though, I think there were still a few Ki-27 around, at least in Burma or China, for a bit longer.


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## GrauGeist (Feb 5, 2021)

Schweik said:


> To be fair though, I think there were still a few Ki-27 around, at least in Burma or China, for a bit longer.


There were quite a few "obsolete" Japanese types in use to the end of, and after, the war in the CBI theater.


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## Schweik (Feb 5, 2021)

True. I think Ki-27s were in some semi-significant engagements both early and mid-war. They were kind of hard to catch because they were so incredibly nimble. By the very end of course they were throwing any and everything into the mix.

Ki-27 is the only other obsolescent fighter type I can think of, they made a fairly large number of them too (3,300). Except maybe the Ki-45 but that's a bit more modern.


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## RCAFson (Feb 5, 2021)

Rato Marczak said:


> And the last Claude combat missions in Pacific were flown in May/1942 (source: Claringbould/South Pacific Air War, vols.2 & 3)



For a Pacific based A5M-4 to engage in a recorded combat mission also requires an Allied AF aircraft to be present to engage it. The lack of combat missions doesn't imply or require a lack of A5M-4s.

For example, the CVL Zuiho was part of the Midway operation and might have engaged the USN carriers if the battle had continued and she carried a complement that included 6 A5M-4s:

Imperial Flattops


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## Schweik (Feb 5, 2021)

But per the original debate - that doesn't really balance out ~300 some odd biplanes, flying-boat bombers, open cockpit fighters, cloth covered trimotors etc. that were supposedly far more deadly than the entire IJN fleet and naval air forces arm, and yet launched multiple strikes against a British convoy that resulted in "no damage".


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## RCAFson (Feb 5, 2021)

Schweik said:


> But per the original debate - that doesn't really balance out ~300 some odd biplanes, flying-boat bombers, open cockpit fighters, cloth covered trimotors etc. that were supposedly far more deadly than the entire IJN fleet and naval air forces arm, and yet launched multiple strikes against a British convoy that resulted in "no damage".



Now, who said " _that were supposedly far more deadly than the entire IJN fleet and naval air forces arm.._"? The fact is that the IJNAF had a large number of obsolescent aircraft in service in 1942. Also the " _'300' some odd biplanes, flying-boat bombers, open cockpit fighters, cloth covered trimotors etc.._" is a bit of a strange statement given that you've already admitted that many of these were just as capable as the IJN front line TE bombers, and I've pointed out the utility of other aircraft for recon, ASW and ASR.


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## Schweik (Feb 5, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> Now, who said " _that were supposedly far more deadly than the entire IJN fleet and naval air forces arm.._"? The fact is that the IJNAF had a large number of obsolescent aircraft in service in 1942.



Far fewer, in fact it isn't really comparable. By the time of Pedestal almost none.



> Also the " _'300' some odd biplanes, flying-boat bombers, open cockpit fighters, cloth covered trimotors etc.._" is a bit of a strange statement given that you've already admitted that many of these were just as capable as the IJN front line TE bombers, and I've pointed out the utility of other aircraft for recon, ASW and ASR.



I think that was in your head. We haven't actually made the detailed comparison yet. I posted the stats, at some point I'll take a deeper dive into it.


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## GrauGeist (Feb 5, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> For example, the CVL Zuiho was part of the Midway operation and might have engaged the USN carriers if the battle had continued and she carried a complement that included 6 A5M-4s:


At the Battle of Midway, CVE Zuiho had a compliment of 12 A6M2 Type 21 fighters and 12 B5N2 torpedo bombers and the CVE Hosho had a compliment of 8 B4Y1 torpedo bombers.
AV Kamikawa Maru had a compliment of 8 A6M2-N fighters and 4 E13A scouts, CVS Chitose had a compliment of 16 A6M2-N fighters and 4 E13A scouts, CVS Chiyoda and CVS Nisshin were carrying midget subs instead of aircraft.

There were no A5M aircraft present in the Japanese fleet in or near the battle of Midway.

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## SaparotRob (Feb 5, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> At the Battle of Midway, CVE Zuiho had a compliment of 12 A6M2 Type 21 fighters and 12 B5N2 torpedo bombers and the CVE Hosho had a compliment of 8 B4Y1 torpedo bombers.
> AV Kamikawa Maru had a compliment of 8 A6M2-N fighters and 4 E13A scouts, CVS Chitose had a compliment of 16 A6M2-N fighters and 4 E13A scouts, CVS Chiyoda and CVS Nisshin were carrying midget subs instead of aircraft.
> 
> There were no A5M aircraft present in the Japanese fleet in or near the battle of Midway.


I’m impressed.


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## RCAFson (Feb 5, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> At the Battle of Midway, CVE Zuiho had a compliment of 12 A6M2 Type 21 fighters and 12 B5N2 torpedo bombers and the CVE Hosho had a compliment of 8 B4Y1 torpedo bombers.
> AV Kamikawa Maru had a compliment of 8 A6M2-N fighters and 4 E13A scouts, CVS Chitose had a compliment of 16 A6M2-N fighters and 4 E13A scouts, CVS Chiyoda and CVS Nisshin were carrying midget subs instead of aircraft.
> 
> There were no A5M aircraft present in the Japanese fleet in or near the battle of Midway.



_"29 May 1942: Depart for Battle of Midway.
Assigned to Midway Invasion Force, Second Fleet under VADM Nobutake Kondo. Composition: Crudiv 4: ATAGO (flag), CHOKAI; Crudiv 5 MYOKO, HAGURO; Batdiv 3 KONGO, HIEI; Desron 4: YURA with Desdiv 2 MURASAME, SAMIDARE, HARUSAME, YUDACHI; Desdiv 9 ASAGUMO, NATSUGUMO, and MINEGUMO; ZUIHO and close escort plane guard MIKAZUKI. *(ZUIHO had embarked six A5M, six A6M and twelve B5N attack planes.) "*_
Imperial Flattops

This source states 12 x A5M4s:
Orders of Battle - Battle of Midway and Aleutians - Battles of the Pacific - World War II - NavWeaps

_Shattered Sword_ supports the Combined Fleet numbers.

The B4Y1 was a biplane TB.

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## GrauGeist (Feb 5, 2021)

Interesting, because the Shoho was the last carrier to have operational A5M types and was due to trade them for A6Ms when she returned for refitting, however, the Battle of Coral Sea interfered with those plans.

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## Schweik (Feb 5, 2021)

Whether it was 6 of them or none of them, it boils down to the same - a negligeable part of the Japanese force. As opposed to more than half of the Axis force during Pedestal.


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## GrauGeist (Feb 6, 2021)

Schweik said:


> Whether it was 6 of them or none of them, it boils down to the same - a negligeable part of the Japanese force. As opposed to more than half of the Axis force during Pedestal.


Actually, if Kido Butai had held back and allowed the slower fleet to accompany them, then there would have not only been a considerable concentration of AA, but also an additional 20 torpedo bombers and 36 additional fighters.

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## Schweik (Feb 6, 2021)

But not too many A5M or biplanes...

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## RCAFson (Feb 6, 2021)

Schweik said:


> Whether it was 6 of them or none of them, it boils down to the same - a negligeable part of the Japanese force. As opposed to more than half of the Axis force during Pedestal.



The IJN embarked 10 x E8s, 6 x A5M4s and 8 x D4Y1s at Midway.

Really, more than half of the Axis force during PEDESTAL? To quote myself:

_"The Axis aircraft were operating from 'unsinkable aircraft carriers' and had much more staying power than IJN carrier aircraft as a consequence.

The 89 CR42, G.50, Re2000, and Mc200s were at least as good as the A5M4 Claude which was still a common aircraft in the 1942 IJN inventory. Biplane and flying boat recon aircraft were still common in the IJN.

The 78 x M202 and Re2001 were as good or better than the Zero.

I counted 176 trimotor RAI bombers - these all had similar performance to the G3M Nell and G4M Betty and typically the same or better bomb loads and many carried torpedoes. Again, the IJN was never able to assemble a Multiengine strike force this large against the USN from 1942 to mid 1944.

41 x JU87 = 164 x D3A1 Vals in terms of bomb load.
144 Ju88 = 1126 x D3A1 Vals in terms of bomb load.

total strike bomb load = 1290 x D3A1 Vals.

These aircraft alone probably had more striking power than the IJN ever assembled in the mid war period and to them we can add 10 x He111Hs

The 43 x Bf109Fs were far superior to the Zero and to any Allied naval fighter at that time. The 8 x Bf110C was also faster than any Allied naval fighter and had fearsome firepower and would be devastating to Allied strike aircraft. In the fighter bomber role they were extremely hard to intercept."_

And we can add 4 x Do24T flying boats.

so excluding the 89 older RAI fighters, we get a total of 504 'modern' (comparable or better than IJNAF frontline aircraft), out of 659 Axis aircraft. of course all the older RAI fighters were still more than a match for any USN or FAA strike aircraft, with most being superior to the A5M4. 

The USN encountered the A5M4 during the USN carrier raids on Toroa and Roi–Namur (losing 4 SBDs to A5M4s) while A5M4s hit the cruiser Chester with a light bomb and 8 x G3M Nells nearly hit the same cruiser. F4F-3/3A fighters tangled with the A5M4s, shooting down only one and inflicting heavy damage on another while receiving damage to several Wildcats. 5 Nells. (proving too fast for the Wildcats who managed only a single kill after bomb release) made a low level glide bomb attack and bracketed Enterprise with 250kg bombs, with the nearest falling 30 yards from the carrier, causing some damage.

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## SaparotRob (Feb 6, 2021)

Damn! This is a great thread.

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## Schweik (Feb 6, 2021)

I'm sure this is all very convincing to you, but you seem to have had your mind made up before any data emerged on any of this.



RCAFson said:


> The IJN embarked 10 x E8s, 6 x A5M4s and 8 x D4Y1s at Midway.
> 
> Really, more than half of the Axis force during PEDESTAL? To quote myself:
> 
> _"The Axis aircraft were operating from 'unsinkable aircraft carriers' and had much more staying power than IJN carrier aircraft as a consequence. _



The Japanese also had numerous island air bases which were involved in the various conflicts in 1942-43. Or do you consider Truk, Lae, Rabaul etc. sinkable?



> _The 89 CR42, G.50, Re2000, and Mc200s were at least as good as *the A5M4 Claude which was still a common aircraft* in the 1942 IJN inventory. Biplane and flying boat recon aircraft were still common in the IJN. _



And yet, this is also demonstrably not true. Here is the main problem: there were not 89 x A5M4 deployed _anywhere_ in the Pacific by May, let alone by the time of Pedestal (August)_. _There appear to have been 6 in the carrier fleet at the time of Midway. 89 > 6_. _Nor do the 34 obsolete fighters (CR 42 and G.500 based on Sardinia compare to A6M or Ki-43). The light recon aircraft flying from Cruisers and Battleships (E13, E8) are another category which is comparable to the 11 x Ro.37 which were at Sardinia and the 3 x CR 25 at Sicily, though the IJN also had the somewhat dangerous F1M (definitely superior to Ro 37 or CR 25) and the highly lethal A6M2-N floatplane fighters available.

It is in the realm of fighter and strike aircraft however where the German-Italian forces were the most clearly deficient. This is because nearly all of their first rate fighters (especially) and dive bombers were down further south slugging it out in the Desert, trying to win the Battle of El Alamein. Along with all of the best Anglo-American fighters and light / medium bombers. Leaving only basically the dregs and the third tier to fight the maritime battles.



> _The 78 x M202 and Re2001 were as good or better than the Zero. _


Debatable. Definitely not better. I would say that the proof of this is in their fighter opposition, which was the same types of aircraft both in the Pacific and MTO: - P-40s, Hurricanes, Spitfires, P-39s, and later on, P-38s. They did about as well in each Theater.



> _I counted 176 trimotor RAI bombers - these all had similar performance to the G3M Nell and G4M Betty and typically the same or better bomb loads and many carried torpedoes. Again, the IJN was never able to assemble a Multiengine strike force this large against the USN from 1942 to mid 1944. _



But they didn't have the same kind of combat record. They did not kill ships at the same rate. The only effective ship killer among the Italian trimotors was the SM.79,

The 24 x Z506 flying boat / bombers had a poor combat record. Due to it's perceived excessive vulnerability to fighters it was relegated mainly to recon after the Greek campaign*.
The 23 x Z1007 also had a poor combat record, I couldn't find that they had sunk any RN ships though I'm ready to be proven wrong.
The 34 x S.84** had a truly dismal combat record. So far as I can determine, those type only ever hit one enemy ship, damaging the HMS Nelson in 1941. Losses were devastating on almost every mission where they made contact with the enemy.
The 5 x Br 20 were considered obsolete during the Manchurian war, considered unacceptably vulnerable to damage (and prone to burning) even by the Japanese, who had to retire them early.
The 2 x Cr 42 "Dive bombers" were not in the same league as any Japanese strike aircraft.

We can put the 10 x Z.501 and the 2 x S.66 in the same category as the older IJN flying boats such as the H6K.

The 60 x SM 79, though antiquated, were probably comparable to the G3M and Ki-21, as were the He 111. But 12 of those SM 79 were designated for recon.

The Ju 88 is a closer match to the G4M, Ki-48 and Ki-49.



> _41 x JU87 = 164 x D3A1 Vals in terms of bomb load.
> 144 Ju88 = 1126 x D3A1 Vals in terms of bomb load. _
> 
> _total strike bomb load = 1290 x D3A1 Vals. _



A laughable comparison which has already been thoroughly debunked. If bomb load was the determinant of success in naval air war, the B-17 and the Lancaster would have been the best ship killers of the war. And yet, we know that was not the case. It doesn't matter how many tons of bombs you carry if you can't reach your target, if you can't hit your target, and if you can't survive encountering your target (or defending fighters protecting it).



> _These aircraft alone probably had more striking power than the IJN ever assembled in the mid war period and to them we can add 10 x He111Hs _



Another completely absurd statement. The He 111s proved to be too vulnerable against Allied fighters (including Hurricanes) which is why they had been moved to Maritime operations.



> _The 43 x Bf109Fs were far superior to the Zero and to any Allied naval fighter at that time. The 8 x Bf110C was also faster than any Allied naval fighter and had fearsome firepower and would be devastating to Allied strike aircraft. In the fighter bomber role they were extremely hard to intercept." _



Some here would agree with you that the Bf 109F was superior to the Zero, but their combat record in 1942 against Allied fighters - the_ same_ Allied fighters in both Theaters, was roughly the same. Heavy slaughter in the first few months of the year, followed by increasing parity and a slight inferiority by the end. Allied types like the Spitfire V struggled against both the A6M and the Bf 109F. Lets not forget that training is also a factor. I would suggest that say Kidō Butai or Tainan Kōkūtai air units were as well trained and motivated as JG 27 or 77, but I am not sure about all those CR 42 and CANT 1007 units.

As for the 110 which you seem to think (do you really) is so effective, in historical reality, the Bf 110 _was_ deployed several times against Allied strike aircraft, some of the very same types used in the Pacific. Of those, only the Blenehim proved to be vulnerable. The Bf 110 performed so poorly and took such devastating losses in North Africa that they were withdrawn to Crete to contend with Skuas and Sea Gladiators, against which they could still hold their own.

On top of this, the Japanese had over 1,500 x Ki-45 which were at least as good as Bf 110s



> And we can add 4 x Do24T flying boats.



Neat aircraft, though not quite up to the standard of the H8K flying boat.



> so excluding the 89 older RAI fighters, we get a total of 504 'modern' (comparable or better than IJNAF frontline aircraft), out of 659 Axis aircraft. of course all the older RAI fighters were still more than a match for any USN or FAA strike aircraft, with most being superior to the A5M4.



By my count - 66 modern fighters (Bf 109 and MC 202), and 232 modern (or nearly modern) strike aircraft (144 x Ju 88 + 40 X Ju 87 + 48 SM.79*** ). That ads up to 298 or less than half of the Axis force. Which was exactly my original point. It's also the case, and this is significant, that the very short range of the small number of modern fighters meant that they could not be used to escort the (admittedly, impressive number of) 144 x Ju 88s except when they were very close to base, which severely limits their effectiveness.

The Japanese by contrast, as we know, could escort their bombers very long distances with excellent fighters, and their naval fighters were as good as any land based types.

Seeing as the SBD was able to survive several encounters with A6M, it's very unlikely that they would prove highly vulnerable to CR 42s or G.50s. I don't think they would be dominating TBFs either. Both were used in the MTO.



> The USN encountered the A5M4 during the USN carrier raids on Toroa and Roi–Namur (losing 4 SBDs to A5M4s) while A5M4s hit the cruiser Chester with a light bomb and 8 x G3M Nells nearly hit the same cruiser. F4F-3/3A fighters tangled with the A5M4s, shooting down only one and inflicting heavy damage on another while receiving damage to several Wildcats. 5 Nells. (proving too fast for the Wildcats who managed only a single kill after bomb release) made a low level glide bomb attack and bracketed Enterprise with 250kg bombs, with the nearest falling 30 yards from the carrier, causing some damage.



You are really reaching very hard for this. As I already pointed out,

1) This was a very minor action in *February* 1942
2) The Japanese units stationed in this area upgraded to A6M and A6M2-N _that same month_, Nishizawa got his Zero just two days after this engagement.
3) Even in February, there were barely any A5M in the fleet, certainly not 300 of them. There weren't even 30 in the Marshals.

*So if you want to restrict the comparison to just between the Marshall Islands prior to Feb 3, 1942 and Pedestal in August of 1942, then you would have a point, but we never did restrict the discussion in that way. The fact is that more than 95% of the fighters which were in the combat areas and within range of Allied aircraft, bases or ships in 1942 were the superb Ki 43, A6M2, and A6M2-N types, which were still at the peak of their effectiveness and (particularly in the case of the IJN) flying with excellent highly trained pilots as good or better than any in Germany, the UK, the US or anywhere else.*

By comparison as we have already seen in some detail, more than half of the Axis aircraft involved at the time of Pedestal were second or third tier types.

We also tend to forget that the RN also had friendly land based (DAF or 12th AF) aircraft operating within range during some of the Pedestal convoy, which also played a role.

The A6M2-N by the way, of which several were deployed to the Marshals and others to the Aleutians and Solomons, was a _far_ superior combat weapon than all of the German or Italian float planes like the Ro 37, Ro 41, the Ar 196, He 115 etc.

* The Z.506 was mainly known to Allies for being 'hijacked' by POW's and stolen. One Z.506 did once manage to shoot down one of two Blenheims that attacked it. 20 x Z.506 were on Sardinia and 4 in Sicily, according to the book.
.** 18 x in Sardinia and the rest in Sicily, according to the book scan Slaterat posted
*** 12 Sm.79s were listed as "reconnaissance"


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## RCAFson (Feb 6, 2021)

These are all the strikes flown against USN carrier TFs in the Pacific:

Bougainville = 18 Bettys (plus ~5 more Nell sorties against Enterprise)

Coral Sea = 51 = 33 Val and 18 Kate

Midway = 28 = 18 Val and 10 Kate (two strikes)

Eastern Solomons = 27 Vals

Santa Cruz = 109 = 58 Vals and 51 Kates.
------------------------------------------------------

= ~229 IJN strike aircraft sorties against USN carrier TFs in all of 1942.

The Axis flew about 80 strike sorties against the Illustrious TF on 10 Jan 1941 (before Illustrious entered Malta harbour).

The IJN flew about 180 attack sorties against units of the BEF on 5 and 9 April 1942.

The Axis AFs flew about 230 attack sorties against Pedestal alone during the time it was escorted by carriers or about the same as the number of strikes flown against all USN carriers during 1942.


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## Schweik (Feb 6, 2021)

And yet, here once again you are not applying a consistent standard. You accuse me of moving goalposts with great outrage, but this is rather bold. We know perfectly well there were more than 28 sorties flown at the Battle of Midway, just that most of the original sorties were against Midway island because they hadn't yet found the American fleet, and they were devastated before they could strike at the US carriers. That is quite an artificial distinction.

Since when did we agree that only strikes against carriers count? Transports don't count? Other surface ships? Other merchant ships? I already listed just a few of the Japanese Naval air strikes around Australia around the time of the first Darwin raid in early 1942, did you count those? I believe your original claim was that the Axis air forces arrayed against Pedestal were (and this is a direct quote): "_*far more powerful airforces than the IJN ever gathered*, after Pearl Harbour and prior to Philippine Sea. "_ 

A statement impressive in it's passion, it's patriotic fervor, and one might say, intense dedication to a particular group in WW2, but not in any way consistent with reality.

Just like the comparison of the handful of A5M and E8 to 300 obsolete Axis aircraft - pretending that there were only 28 sorties at Midway is just not on the level.


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## RCAFson (Feb 6, 2021)

Schweik said:


> I'm sure this is all very convincing to you, but you seem to have had your mind made up before any data emerged on any of this.
> 
> 
> 
> The Japanese also had numerous island air bases which were involved in the various conflicts in 1942-43. Or do you consider Truk, Lae, Rabaul etc. sinkable?



Yes, and those unsinkable islands were guarded by numerous A5M4s, However, USN carriers did not have to transit past IJNAF island bases to escort convoys, so aside from the early raids they generally avoided contact with IJNAF land bases. However, due to the nature of FAA carrier ops in the ETO/MTO contact with Luftwaffe/RAI land based aircraft was inevitable and unavoidable.




> And yet, this is also demonstrably not true. Here is the main problem: there were not 89 x A5M4 deployed _anywhere_ in the Pacific by May, let alone by the time of Pedestal (August)_. _There appear to have been 6 in the carrier fleet at the time of Midway. 89 > 6_. _Nor do the 34 obsolete fighters (CR 42 and G.500 based on Sardinia compare to A6M or Ki-43). The light recon aircraft flying from Cruisers and Battleships (E13, E8) are another category which is comparable to the 11 x Ro.37 which were at Sardinia and the 3 x CR 25 at Sicily, though the IJN also had the somewhat dangerous F1M (definitely superior to Ro 37 or CR 25) and the highly lethal A6M2-N floatplane fighters available.




The fact that the IJN was numerically weaker than the combined Luftwaffe/RAI is not disputed! The plain fact is that the A5M4 made up about 35% of IJNAF fighter strength on 7 Dec 1941 and gradually declined. The IJN was able to concentrate A6M2s in carriers and in strategic land bases because they could allocate A5M4s to other areas:

_"When the war in the Pacific broke out, the Japanese Navy had a total of
521 carrier fighters on strength of which 328 were A6M2s equipping most
of its first-line units." (Francillion, p365)._

But we have seen that even the A5M4, armed with two .303 Vickers MGs could give a good account of itself against SBDs, and the 'obsolete' RAI fighters all had at least 2 x .5in MGs and all had as good or better performance than the A5M4.



> It is in the realm of fighter and strike aircraft however where the German-Italian forces were the most clearly deficient. This is because nearly all of their first rate fighters (especially) and dive bombers were down further south slugging it out in the Desert, trying to win the Battle of El Alamein. Along with all of the best Anglo-American fighters and light / medium bombers. Leaving only basically the dregs and the third tier to fight the maritime battles.



???? At Pedestal alone the Axis deployed:

The 78 x M202 and Re2001 and 43 BF109Fs and 8 Bf110s = 129 'modern' fighters.

I counted 176 trimotor RAI bombers - these all had similar performance to the G3M Nell and G4M Betty and typically the same or better bomb loads and many carried torpedoes plus
41 x JU87, 144 Ju88 and 10 x He111 = 371 strike aircraft for Pedestal alone. These aircraft were separate from those deployed in Africa.




> Debatable. Definitely not better. I would say that the proof of this is in their fighter opposition, which was the same types of aircraft both in the Pacific and MTO: - P-40s, Hurricanes, Spitfires, P-39s, and later on, P-38s. They did about as well in each Theater.



The USN was pretty clear when it stated that Luftwaffe aircraft (and aircrew) were superior to IJNAF aircraft. The unarmoured, non SS tank equipped Zero would not have been accepted by any ETO/MTO AF.





> But they didn't have the same kind of combat record. They did not kill ships at the same rate. The only effective ship killer among the Italian trimotors was the SM.79,
> 
> The 24 x Z506 flying boat / bombers had a poor combat record. Due to it's perceived excessive vulnerability to fighters it was relegated mainly to recon after the Greek campaign*.
> The 23 x Z1007 also had a poor combat record, I couldn't find that they had sunk any RN ships though I'm ready to be proven wrong.
> ...



All flying boats were vulnerable to fighters.

IJAAF strike aircraft never engaged USN ships, AFAIK. The Nell and Betty were terribly vulnerable to fighters when used for low altitude strikes. If Axis strike aircraft did poorly, part of that at least was due to FAA fighter cover. The fact is that in general the Axis aircraft had as good or better performance as their IJN counterparts. Why not just admit this and move on?





> A laughable comparison which has already been thoroughly debunked. If bomb load was the determinant of success in naval air war, the B-17 and the Lancaster would have been the best ship killers of the war. And yet, we know that was not the case. It doesn't matter how many tons of bombs you carry if you can't reach your target, if you can't hit your target, and if you can't survive encountering your target (or defending fighters protecting it).



We are talking about dive bombers that have up to 8 times the bomb loads of the Val, and they sank dozens of Allied warships.



> Another completely absurd statement. The He 111s proved to be too vulnerable against Allied fighters (including Hurricanes) which is why they had been moved to Maritime operations.



Yeah, no fighters at sea! The He111 was far tougher than any 1942 IJAF strike aircraft.




> Some here would agree with you that the Bf 109F was superior to the Zero, but their combat record in 1942 against Allied fighters - the_ same_ Allied fighters in both Theaters, was roughly the same. Heavy slaughter in the first few months of the year, followed by increasing parity and a slight inferiority by the end. Allied types like the Spitfire V struggled against both the A6M and the Bf 109F. Lets not forget that training is also a factor. I would suggest that say Kidō Butai or Tainan Kōkūtai air units were as well trained and motivated as JG 27 or 77, but I am not sure about all those CR 42 and CANT 1007 units.



You're really reaching here. The performance, payload and protection of ETO Axis aircraft was superior to the IJNAFs, end of story.



> As for the 110 which you seem to think (do you really) is so effective, in historical reality, the Bf 110 _was_ deployed several times against Allied strike aircraft, some of the very same types used in the Pacific. Of those, only the Blenehim proved to be vulnerable. The Bf 110 performed so poorly and took such devastating losses in North Africa that they were withdrawn to Crete to contend with Skuas and Sea Gladiators, against which they could still hold their own.



This is just too far out there... The Me110 was devastating against Allied strike aircraft and had enough firepower to rack up hundreds of kills against Allied 4 engine bombers.



> On top of this, the Japanese had over 1,500 x Ki-45 which were at least as good as Bf 110s



The KI45 didn't really enter combat until late 1942 and was a complete non-factor in the naval airwar.








> By my count - 66 modern fighters (Bf 109 and MC 202), and 232 modern (or nearly modern) strike aircraft (144 x Ju 88 + 40 X Ju 87 + 48 SM.79*** ). That ads up to 298 or less than half of the Axis force. Which was exactly my original point. It's also the case, and this is significant, that the very short range of the small number of modern fighters meant that they could not be used to escort the (admittedly, impressive number of) 144 x Ju 88s except when they were very close to base, which severely limits their effectiveness.
> 
> The Japanese by contrast, as we know, could escort their bombers very long distances with excellent fighters, and their naval fighters were as good as any land based types.



So you exclude aircraft that generally outperformed their IJNAF counterparts, to come up with a meer ~300 aircraft, but all of these far surpass what the IJNAF could field.



> Seeing as the SBD was able to survive several encounters with A6M, it's very unlikely that they would prove highly vulnerable to CR 42s or G.50s. I don't think they would be dominating TBFs either. Both were used in the MTO.



The SBD did not fare well against the A5M4, much less the Zero and the A24 proved less than successful in the ETO.



I'll leave off here. The rest is just repetitive.


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## RCAFson (Feb 6, 2021)

Schweik said:


> And yet, here once again you are not applying a consistent standard. You accuse me of moving goalposts with great outrage, but this is rather bold. We know perfectly well there were more than 28 sorties flown at the Battle of Midway, just that most of the original sorties were against Midway island because they hadn't yet found the American fleet, and they were devastated before they could strike at the US carriers. That is quite an artificial distinction.
> 
> Since when did we agree that only strikes against carriers count? Transports don't count? Other surface ships? Other merchant ships? I already listed just a few of the Japanese Naval air strikes around Australia around the time of the first Darwin raid in early 1942, did you count those? I believe your original claim was that the Axis air forces arrayed against Pedestal were (and this is a direct quote): "_*far more powerful airforces than the IJN ever gathered*, after Pearl Harbour and prior to Philippine Sea. "_
> 
> ...



Yeah, the KB directed itself against an unsinkable aircraft carrier at Midway, and only flew a handful of strikes against the USN carriers. At Ceylon I only counted the KB strikes against RN ships, and excluded the strikes against airbases. 

The Axis employed 659 aircraft for Pedestal of which over 500 would have been at least as good as top line IJNAF aircraft. The most aircraft the IJNAF ever massed against an Allied naval force at sea, prior to Philippine Sea was against the BEF and Ceylon in April 1942.

Again, your claim of '_300 obsolete Axis aircraft_' during Pedestal is nonsensical since nearly every aircraft used was a least as well performing as their IJN counterparts and over 500 (of 659) were as good or better than the best aircraft IJN deployed in Mid 1942.


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## Schweik (Feb 6, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> Yeah, the KB directed itself against an unsinkable aircraft carrier at Midway, and only flew a handful of strikes against the USN carriers. At Ceylon I only counted the KB strikes against RN ships, and excluded the strikes against airbases.
> 
> The Axis employed 659 aircraft for Pedestal of which over 500 *less than 300 were anywhere near as good as baseline IJNAF aircraft*.



Fixed it for you. That helps put it all into perspective. That is why 3rd and 4th string aircraft like Skuas and Fulmars, Gladiators and Sea Hurricanes could play any role at all. Once they had to contend with first line German aircraft they had to turn around and go back where they came from. Just like the (equally obsolescent) RN forces at Ceylon.

*By trying over and over to pretend that A5M4 was a major part of the IJN air fleet you have completely discredited yourself. *Just because you want something to be true doesn't make it actually true in the historical record, which we can all easily check.

As for Ceylon, the British also had land aircraft which you conveniently forget. The US were outnumbered as well at Coral Sea but made out much better, as I have already pointed out.



> Again, your claim of '_300 obsolete Axis aircraft_' during Pedestal is nonsensical since nearly every aircraft used was a least as well performing as their IJN counterparts and over 500 (of 659) were as good or better than the best aircraft IJN deployed in Mid 1942.



Show me where SM.84, He 111, Z.1007, Z.506 ever sunk any significant number of ships in 1942. _That _is the criteria of what makes a strike aircraft, not your assessment of performance or weight of bombs carried. If bomb tonnage was all that mattered, as I said previously, the Lancaster would have been the biggest ship killer of the war, and we know that certainly was not the case.

Show me one Italian OR German aircraft which sunk as many major warships as the D3A?

*Combat history: Warships Sunk* (not counting Pearl Harbor) (this is what I could find with quick googling)
D3A ----------- 1 x Aircraft Carrier, 2 x Heavy Cruiser, 11 x Destroyers, 1 x Merchant cruiser, 1 x Oiler
D4Y ----------- At least one Carrier (Princeton) and Franklin crippled.
B5N ----------- At least two Carriers
SBD ----------- 6 x Carriers, 14 x Cruisers, 6 x Destroyers, 15 x military transports
TBD ----------- None?
TBF ------------ 2 x Super-battleships (shared), 3 carriers (shared, Philippine sea), 1 heavy Cruiser (Taffy 3 / Samar) - also destroyed 2 enemy torpedos at Samar. Numerous U-boats.
SB2C ---------- 2 x Super-battleships (shared), 3 carriers (shared, Philippine sea)
Swordfish ----- ? 2-3 Battleships at Taranto and a _lot_ of merchant ships, Bismark damaged. At least 22 U-boats.
Albacore ------ ?
Skua----------- ?
Barracuda----- ?
Ju 87----------- ?

At least according to Wikipedia, in and near *Ceylon*, in 5 days the IJN April 4-9, destroyed the following -

1 x Carrier (Hermes)
2 x Heavy cruisers
2 x Destroyers
1 x "Armed merchant cruiser"
1 x Corvette
1 x Sloop
23 x Merchant ships
40+ aircraft

The Japanese lost 20+ aircraft







During *Pedastal *in 12 days (3-15 August), according to Wikipedia the supposedly incredible air fleet of Germans and Italians destroyed the following:

1 x Aircraft Carrier + 1 damaged
2 x Light Cruisers + 2 damaged
1 x Destroyer
9 x Merchant ships +3 damaged
34 aircraft destroyed

and lost 2 x submarines and 40-60 aircraft

Notice, most of the air attacks resulted in "no damage". This was definitely not the case when IJN attacked the RN.


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## Thumpalumpacus (Feb 6, 2021)

Comparing anti-shipping crew values of IJN vs ETO Axis seems a little skewed. D3A pilots trained for this stuff and were some of the most highly experienced aircrew in the world at the time.

No doubt the Allies suffered in the Med at the hands of German/Italian air forces, but when one thinks of both equipment and training both, I think the Allied navies in the Pacific suffered more, with the possible exception of the Crete evacuation.

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## RCAFson (Feb 6, 2021)

> Notice, most of the air attacks resulted in "no damage". This was definitely not the case when IJN attacked the RN.



The RN had aircraft carriers with carrier fighters defending Pedestal and they did so successfully. The IJN attacked RN ships that had no air cover. The USN deployed fragile carriers and poorly performing F4Fs, combined with poor GCI which resulted in a poor showing for the USN carriers in 1942.


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## GrauGeist (Feb 7, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> The RN had aircraft carriers with carrier fighters defending Pedestal and they did so successfully. The IJN attacked RN ships that had no air cover. The USN deployed fragile carriers and poorly performing F4Fs, combined with poor GCI which resulted in a poor showing for the USN carriers in 1942.


wow..."fragile carriers" and "poorly performing F4Fs".

The Yorktown took a severe beating not once, but twice and would have been saved if it weren't for being torpedoed.
Those "poorly performing F4Fs" made a showing against veteran IJN pilots because they were well-built and performed above and beyond what was expected of them.

Might want to take those Union Jack tinted glasses off to get a better look at what happened in the PTO.

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## Schweik (Feb 7, 2021)

And everywhere else lol


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## RCAFson (Feb 7, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> wow..."fragile carriers" and "poorly performing F4Fs".
> 
> The Yorktown took a severe beating not once, but twice and would have been saved if it weren't for being torpedoed.
> Those "poorly performing F4Fs" made a showing against veteran IJN pilots because they were well-built and performed above and beyond what was expected of them.
> ...



I've posted the total number of strikes flown against USN carriers in 1942, and they resulted in the loss of 3 USN fleet carriers. Lexington blew up because of a flawed AVGAS system, and at Midway Yorktown was stopped dead in the water by a 250kg bomb hit.

It was the USN themselves that stated that the F4F-4 performed poorly, with a very poor climb rate:

_"Fighting Six spent the last few days of March learning about the new model Grumman they would take into battle. They were not impressed: “The planes are like a TBD with a fish,”(7) a grave insult. On 1 April, Gray led a division of four F4F-4s out to the Enterprise at sea for training exercises. He observed the mock torpedo attack on the carrier by Torpedo Six, then landed on board to demonstrate to the air department the features of the F4F-4. That day the squadron took delivery of fifteen F4F-4s just arrived from the West Coast. This was the beginning of a big exchange of aircraft, so Fighting Six would have all available F4F-4s. Gray turned over most of his F4F-3s to Fighting Three and ended up with twenty-three F4F-4s and four F4F-3s. Fighting Six was the first carrier fighting squadron to attain the recommended operating strength of twenty-seven airplanes._

_On 3 April with the Enterprise back in port, Fighting Six shifted back to NAS Pearl Harbor to install new gear and commission the factory-fresh planes. Three days later Gray shot off a rocket to Halsey offering his opinion of the Grumman F4F-4 fighter.(8) The performance of the folding wing Wildcat was “exceedingly unsatisfactory.” The weight, he felt, simply was too much for the available horsepower, a fact most detrimental to the aircraft’s climb and maneuverability. He noted that the F4F-4 had the “feel of a fully loaded torpedo plane.” In tests, VF-6 pilots discovered that the climb rate of a fully loaded F4F-4 was only 1,500 feet per minute up to 15,000 feet. Thereafter even that anemic climb rate fell off drastically to 600 feet per minute at 22,000 feet of altitude. Gray found it took almost forty minutes and nearly half of the fuel supply to coax an F4F-4 up to 32,000 feet..." (Lundstrom, First Team)._

After Midway, where 28 IJN strike aircraft, in two strikes were able to penetrate the USN GCI directed air defence where the USN had about 60 available fighters, Nimitz sent off a message urgently requesting Merlin engined fighters:

_"..Spruance and Browning rated the Grumman Wildcat "greatly inferior'' in comparison with the nimble Japanese
Zero. On 20 June Nimitz relayed their fears to King, noting the "extreme and apparently
increased superiority performance of 0 fighters'' was mitigated only by the vulnerability
of Japanese planes and the superior tactics of the U.S. Navy fighter pilots. "Overall results
have been bad and will be serious and potentially decisive with improvement that must
be expected in enemy tactics.'' Remarkably he called for army Curtiss P-4OF Warhawk
fighters to replace navy F4F Wildcats and Brewster F2A Buffaloes in all marine fighting
squadrons defending forward bases *and even asked that the P-4OF "or comparable type"
be tested for carrier suitability*; In the meantime the F4F-4s must be lightened, and their
ammunition supply increased even should that require reverting to four guns in place of six.
The swift introduction of the Vought F4U-1 Corsair fighter was an "absolute priority.'' Thus
after Midway the top fleet commanders experienced a serious crisis of confidence over the
effectiveness of the basic U.S. carrier fighter, a worry that would soon influence Fletcher's
most controversial command decision..."
(Black Shoe carrier Admiral, p.200)_

The problems in USN GCI fighter direction are detailed in Friedman's _Fighters Over the Fleet_, but it exacerbated the issues with the F4F-4, since they had such a poor climb rate that it was essential that radar GCI directed them accurately and in sufficient numbers to break up the IJN attacks. By Mid 1942, the RN FAA had had over two years experience with radar GCI and they used it to make effective use of the Fulmar, for example, which had a similarly poor rate of climb:

_"The aircraft on board the British carriers were inferior to the
attackers [PEDESTAL] in performance, but that was more than balanced by superior
tactics based on radar fighter direction. The US Navy agreed that at this
point British fighter control was superior. In July 1943, with the US
carrier force badly drawn down, Victorious operated with Saratoga in the
Southwest Pacific. Because her fighter-control techniques were considered
superior, she was made fighter carrier, with all the fighters of both
carriers on board: thirty-six Martlets and twenty-four US F4F_-4s." (Friedman, Fighters Over the Fleet)

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## Schweik (Feb 7, 2021)

And yet, oddly, the F4F did much better against all the best Axis fighters (including both Bf 109 and A6M) than the Hurricane or Sea Hurricane did, let alone the obsolescent Fulmar, Skua, or Sea Gladiator. The Dauntless, like it's Japanese counterpart the D3A, sunk _far_ more warships than the Swordfish or Albacore ever did, and the American fleet defeated the Japanese fleet, while the RN fleet, even with considerable support from land based aircraft, was crushed.

The Fleet Admirals would love to have had a carrier born P-40F, it was 40 mph faster than a Wildcat or a Hurricane, and was a much more lethal combat aircraft, but even in the unlikely event it could be made to handle carrier takeoffs and landings (they could take off from carriers but I don't think that landing gear could handle the landings) they couldn't for the same reason they stopped using the F4F-3, because the wings didn't fold.

A P-40F by the way, was a _far _cry from a Hurricane. As I've pointed out repeatedly, both types of fighters, along with all the other Anglo-American types, saw combat side by side in both the MTO and the Pacific. P-40F/L was used mostly in the MTO (equipping 5 US fighter wings, 2 RAF Sqns and 1 Free French) but it was also used in the Pacific, by the 49th Ftr Group. The P-40F/L units held their own quite well against both Luftwaffe and Japanese opponents, (unlike the Hurricane) but it was never going to be a carrier aircraft. That just shows you that the communiques from that particular moment in the war were not necessarily reflective of the reality or the position over time. For a brief time everybody wanted the P-40F, then newer generation of fighters started to arrive.

At the time that memo was sent, the full lessons of Midway hadn't sunk in, the main pertinent to this discussion and the F4F-4 being the success of Sqn leader and Lt Commander Jimmy Thach. While some Wildcat units got slaughtered at Midway, as we have already discussed, First Team shows us that Jimmy Thach did quite well during that same battle. His new combat tactic the soon to be universal Thach Weave, enabled his small flight of 6 x F4F-4 Wildcats to fend off a much larger flight of 20 x A6M and shoot down 3 A6M at the cost of 1 Wildcat.

I don't remember ever seeing a Hurricane unit fight off a numerically superior number of A6Ms (or Ki-43s) let alone manage a ratio like that.

Thach was the first to demonstrate that with the correct tactics the Wildcat could take advantage of it's flight characteristics relative to the A6M. As these tactics and other guidelines were systematically spread through the Navy fighter squadrons, they managed to achieve parity with the A6M and Ki-43 units they encountered. This cannot be said of the Hurricane, the Fulmar, or the Skua.

The Hurricane, compared to the Wildcat or Martlet, was not fully a carrier fighter. It was really only a CAP fighter. All it could be used for was defending the fleet, especially against the kind of strikes that the convoys often encountered - small numbers of unescorted and often obsolescent bombers or miscellaneous maritime patrol or sea planes - He 115, Ar 196, SM. 79, CANT 1007, Z.506, FW 200 and etc. Hurricanes could also contend with Ju 87s, and if they could catch them, Ju 88s. But by the time of Pedestal the Hurricane was hard pressed to hold it's own against a Bf 109F or G, an MC 202, or an A6M or Ki-43.

According to Armored Carriers.com, the main flaw of the Sea Hurricane was it's poor range and endurance:

_The Sea Hurricane’s range was recorded as about 450 miles. But it was loiter time that meant the most for carrier operations.
*Sea Hurricanes carried only enough fuel to sustain themselves for 1 hour at combat power, and 4.5 hours at full-economical settings. The Fulmar and Martlet could stay aloft for 2 hours and 2 hours 45 minutes under combat power, and 6 hours economical.*
The consequence of this was carriers being forced to turn into the wind far more often to take-off and land Sea Hurricanes. So they were often held as 'alert' aircraft on the deck while their longer-legged stablemates maintained the CAP._

This is just another example of why range is so important in carrier operations. Now the Fulmar had decent range (Wildcat was significantly better), but the Fulmar didn't have much of a chance against any modern fighters, especially Zeros, while the Wildcat certainly did as the historical record shows us.

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## Schweik (Feb 7, 2021)

By the way, in your assessment of naval operations between the USN and IJN in 1942, you overlooked a pretty big one - the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands. 

This was 2 x US carriers (_Hornet_ and _Enterprise_) vs. 4 x IJN Carriers (_Shōkaku_, _Zuikaku_, _Zuihō_, and _Jun'yō_)
Total number of aircraft was 136 aircraft on the USN side, 199 on the IJN side.

USN lost 1 carrier sunk (_Hornet_), and another heavily damaged (_Enterprise_) Japanese had two heavily damaged (_Shokaku_ and _Zuiho_) 
USN also lost 1 destroyer
US lost 81 aircraft, IJN lost 99

This adds a bunch of sorties to the number of Japanese sorties for 1942, as the Japanese made several consecutive strikes. I'll count up the totals later.

During the Battle Hornet was hit by a damaged dive bomber, you can see the attack here






Here just before





and right after

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## Schweik (Feb 8, 2021)

USN pilots were heavily trained in deflection shooting, which was not necessarily typical in all Air Forces (I know that some of the early units in the DAF had no air to air gunnery training at all, this was a major complaint of Clive Caldwell). Skillful deflection shooting was one of the things which made the Thach Weave and other tactics developed by the Wildcat pilots work

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## XBe02Drvr (Feb 8, 2021)

Can any rational person look through stars and stripes spectacles, then swap them for union jack spectacles and recognize they're still looking at the same scene from the World Cherry Picker Championships? As a Naval Aviation fanboy, I'm finding this thread highly entertaining.

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## Peter Gunn (Feb 8, 2021)

"The 78 x M202 and Re2001 and 43 BF109Fs and 8 Bf110s = *129* 'modern' fighters."

Just to cherry pick a stat or two, Shattered Sword documents the KdB with *113* A6M's in their OOB, so not a whole lot of difference there. And no, I do not consider 1 M202 or 1 Bf110 equal to two or three A6M's, that's just ridiculous.

I think you are also missing a bigger point here that may or may not have been mentioned and here's a question for you.

*What was KdB's true superiority in naval conflict in 1941-1942?*

Do you think even "just" the four carriers KdB brought to Midway would have had that many attacks on the Pedestal convoy for "no damage"? If so you are deluding yourself.

To save time I'll just go ahead and answer the above question.,

KdB could plan, prepare and launch a coordinated strike from SIX aircraft carriers using some of the finest naval aircraft of their generation being flown by some of the best naval aviators in the world. We're talking over 350 aircraft with a heavy fighter escort. *THAT* is why KdB would have shredded the Pedestal convoy and its escorting RN carrier force. You make much of the German and Italian bombers being better by a factor of X over their IJN counterparts, what you fail to realize or take in to account is that the AXIS may have been trained to bomb things on land, their IJN counterparts trained to bomb _and torpedo_ fast moving/maneuvering targets on water. Big difference.

A fully constituted KdB in the summer of '42 had the potential to sweep ANY opposing force sent against it from the seas, armored decks or not. You doubt that, look no further than the excellent torpedo attack on Yorktown, neither the Germans nor the Italians could have pulled that off IMHO. And that was with a handful of attack aircraft being shot at/down by those poorly performing F4F's and some of the finest AA fire in the world, bar none shooting at them. They still pulled off a classic anvil/hammer attack, something the MTO AXIS air fleets were incapable of.

That the poorly preforming USN F4F's and the fragile flimsy flattops they were operating from went toe to toe with them and gave as good (or better) than they got I'll leave for you to explain.

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## Schweik (Feb 8, 2021)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Can any rational person look through stars and stripes spectacles, then swap them for union jack spectacles and recognize they're still looking at the same scene from the World Cherry Picker Championships? As a Naval Aviation fanboy, I'm finding this thread highly entertaining.



I'm not cherry picking jack shit and I'm not wearing any spectacles. There's only one person in here doing that, don't lump me in with him. I'm just picking apart his delusions.


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## Schweik (Feb 8, 2021)

Peter Gunn said:


> "The 78 x M202 and Re2001 and 43 BF109Fs and 8 Bf110s = *129* 'modern' fighters."



He's also seriously exagerrating the number of MC 202 etc. available. The document posted by slaterat

which you can see here 

Swordfish vs Devastator

Only shows 27 MC202 stationed on Pantelleria (51 Stormo). The text says 10 Re 2001 flew in from Rome to Sardinia, and "26 other fighters Re2000s, Cr 42s and MC 200 wof Reparto Volo and 54 Stormo CT were available in flights on Pantelleria and at Palermo Boccadifalco, Reggio Calabria, Castelvantrano and Sciacca *for base defense*.

That's 37, maybe a few more, nowhere near 78.


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## Glider (Feb 8, 2021)

Schweik said:


> USN pilots were heavily trained in deflection shooting, which was not necessarily typical in all Air Forces (I know that some of the early units in the DAF had no air to air gunnery training at all, this was a major complaint of Clive Caldwell). Skillful deflection shooting was one of the things which made the Thach Weave and other tactics developed by the Wildcat pilots work


An often stated but as far as I am aware, totally incorrect belief. RAF pilots had 25 flying hours plus of course ground instruction, dedicated to shooting, excluding some initial camera gun experience. I am not saying that this was sufficient for actual combat, just that they had a fair bit of training and pretty similar to any other airforce including the USN.


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## RCAFson (Feb 8, 2021)

Schweik said:


> By the way, in your assessment of naval operations between the USN and IJN in 1942, you overlooked a pretty big one - the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands.
> 
> This was 2 x US carriers (_Hornet_ and _Enterprise_) vs. 4 x IJN Carriers (_Shōkaku_, _Zuikaku_, _Zuihō_, and _Jun'yō_)
> Total number of aircraft was 136 aircraft on the USN side, 199 on the IJN side.
> ...



This is what I posted (post 231):

_"These are all the strikes flown against USN carrier TFs in the Pacific:

Bougainville = 18 Bettys (plus ~5 more Nell sorties against Enterprise)

Coral Sea = 51 = 33 Val and 18 Kate

Midway = 28 = 18 Val and 10 Kate (two strikes)

Eastern Solomons = 27 Vals

*Santa Cruz = 109 = 58 Vals and 51 Kates.*
------------------------------------------------------
*
= ~229 IJN strike aircraft sorties against USN carrier TFs in all of 1942*.

The Axis flew about 80 strike sorties against the Illustrious TF on 10 Jan 1941 (before Illustrious entered Malta harbour).

The IJN flew about 180 attack sorties against units of the BEF on 5 and 9 April 1942.

The Axis AFs flew about 230 attack sorties against Pedestal alone during the time it was escorted by carriers or about the same as the number of strikes flown against all USN carriers during 1942."_

For a variety of reasons. the KB, in 1942, never concentrated it's full strength against a USN carrier TF and never launched a full strike that actually connected with a USN carrier TF, and it was the RN, at Ceylon, who encountered the strongest assembly of KB carriers pitted against an Allied carrier TF. It seems obvious that the USN would have lost the battle of Midway if the USN carriers had been detected prior to the attack on Midway Island, and/or before Nagumo planned a 2nd strike against Midway island, and then dithered about an immediate launch against the USN carriers.


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## RCAFson (Feb 8, 2021)

Peter Gunn said:


> "The 78 x M202 and Re2001 and 43 BF109Fs and 8 Bf110s = *129* 'modern' fighters."
> 
> Just to cherry pick a stat or two, Shattered Sword documents the KdB with *113* A6M's in their OOB, so not a whole lot of difference there. *And no, I do not consider 1 M202 or 1 Bf110 equal to two or three A6M's, that's just ridiculous.*



Who said that? Or did you just make it up?

I


> think you are also missing a bigger point here that may or may not have been mentioned and here's a question for you.
> 
> *What was KdB's true superiority in naval conflict in 1941-1942?*
> 
> Do you think even "just" the four carriers KdB brought to Midway would have had that many attacks on the Pedestal convoy for "no damage"? If so you are deluding yourself.



Why is the KB always considered this unstoppable force able to launch an overwhelming strike against a carrier TF with all six fleet carriers, or even four carriers, when historically, they were never able to deliver on that premise? 



> To save time I'll just go ahead and answer the above question.,
> 
> KdB could plan, prepare and launch a coordinated strike from SIX aircraft carriers using some of the finest naval aircraft of their generation being flown by some of the best naval aviators in the world. We're talking over 150 aircraft with a heavy fighter escort. *THAT* is why KdB would have shredded the Pedestal convoy and its escorting RN carrier force. You make much of the German and Italian bombers being better by a factor of X over their IJN counterparts, what you fail to realize or take in to account is that the AXIS may have been trained to bomb things on land, their IJN counterparts trained to bomb _and torpedo_ fast moving/maneuvering targets on water. Big difference.



By Aug 1942 (remember Pedestal was just one operation) the Axis AFs in the ETO/MTO had flown *THOUSANDS* (yes I am shouting) of strike sorties against Allied naval and merchant ships. The Axis AFs were fully trained in maritime strike operations and the Luftwaffe were considered by the USN as superior to the IJN:

*"*
_Information Bulletin · No. 29_

_Antiaircraft Action Summary · World War II
October 1945
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
UNITED STATES FLEET_

..._ENEMY TACTICS AND EQUIPMENT_
_German
German air attacks against our surface forces were more effective than those of the Japanese, prior to the latter's use of suicide tactics, for the following reasons:
_

_German aircraft were superior._
_German pilots possessed greater skill._
_German attacks were more highly co ordinated._
_Our own air defense was weaker._
_Our surface forces were not as modern or heavily armed as those in the Pacific_."



> A fully constituted KdB in the summer of '42 had the potential to sweep ANY opposing force sent against it from the seas, armored decks or not. You doubt that, look no further than the excellent torpedo attack on Yorktown, neither the Germans nor the Italians could have pulled that off IMHO. And that was with a handful of attack aircraft being shot at/down by those poorly performing F4F's and some of the finest AA fire in the world, bar none shooting at them. They still pulled off a classic anvil/hammer attack, something the MTO AXIS air fleets were incapable of.



But the KB was never 'fully constituted' against USN carrier TFs and performed poorly against it, in terms of coordinated strikes with the KBs full strength. The fact that the IJNAF was able to penetrate USN CAP at Midway, to repeatedly hit and cripple Yorktown with two strikes of 18 and 10 aircraft each speaks volumes about the poor performance of USN radar GCI and F4F-4 performance. The USN was quite open about this and yet when the USN's own criticisms are brought up it gets ignored or considered an insult. USN AA performance in 1942 varied from poor prior to Santa Cruz to excellent at Santa Cruz. See Lundstrom for a analysis of USN AA performance.



> That the poorly preforming USN F4F's and the fragile flimsy flattops they were operating from went toe to toe with them and gave as good (or better) than they got I'll leave for you to explain.



This has been explained and I've referenced the explanations. What I don't understand is why pointing out known deficiencies in USN carriers and aircraft is considered a slight on the USN? Rather, it should be remembered that they overcame these issues with solid tactics, training and Intel, but we also have to bear in mind that the IJN also made many mistakes.


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## RCAFson (Feb 8, 2021)

Schweik said:


> He's also seriously exagerrating the number of MC 202 etc. available. The document posted by slaterat
> 
> which you can see here
> 
> ...



Page 453:
_"From Torino Caselle via Pisa to Decimomannu came 153° Gruppo CT with 21
MC202s, 2° Gruppo Aut. CT with 19 Re2001s
362° Squadriglia of 22° Gruppo Aut. CT with 11 Re2001s_
page 454_:
27 MC202 stationed on Pantelleria (51 Stormo)_."
---------------
78


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## Schweik (Feb 8, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> Why is the KB always considered this unstoppable force able to launch an overwhelming strike against a carrier TF with all six fleet carriers, or even four carriers, when historically, they were never able to deliver on that premise?



They certainly _did_ deliver on the premise with both 4 and 5 fleet carriers, with devastating effect on the British at Ceylon (both ships and aircraft) and the Americans at Santa Cruz (ships but not so much aircraft). The RN air defense (fighters and AA) was just inadequate, whereas the USN was able to wreck the Japanese air fleet.



> By Aug 1942 (remember Pedestal was just one operation) the Axis AFs in the ETO/MTO had flown *THOUSANDS* (yes I am shouting) of strike sorties against Allied naval and merchant ships. The Axis AFs were fully trained in maritime strike operations and the Luftwaffe were considered by the USN as superior to the IJN:



No they were not. The *GERMANS* were considered superior in *ONE REPORT* - (I am _not _shouting I just want to make sure you can read it) which you keep bringing up over and over again. You conveniently forget that at least half of the supposedly overwhelming force faced by Malta convoys in the Med were *ITALIAN*, and often flying extremely obsolete aircraft, relics of the Spanish Civil War. 





















Not that Italian pilots weren't good, many of them were and they did sink some RN ships, but taken as a whole, the Italian air forces were not anywhere near the standard of the Luftwaffe, nor was the Luftwaffe itself trained, designed or necessarily ready for maritime operations. Some of them were, but many were pressed into service from other Theaters, with experience and training almost exclusively in warfare over land.

As just one example of where the the modern German - Italian extremely limited range limited their use in Maritime warfare, the USS Wasp sailed twice to Malta to deliver fighters (to within the very short range of Spitfire Mk Vs). Both time the ships were packed with Spitfires and only flew 11 Wildcats for CAP, which was considered sufficient. Neither time were they attacked, despite the Axis desperation to prevent the reinforcement of Malta because the fighters were out of range to escort any bombers that could actually sink ships. Wasp then sailed to the Pacific where she was promptly sunk by a Japanese submarine.

You keep posting that one Navy report, and I could easily post one refuting your point. But that would make the debate even more obfuscated. I could bring up commentary by Eric Brown on how superior he thought the Martlet was to the Sea Hurricane, or by German or Japanese or Australian or British pilots on how badly they felt the Hurricane performed in air to air combat against German or Japanese fighters. Or mid-war analysis by various officers theorizing about what was good and what wasn't (including both sides of the debate about the F4F-4 within the US Navy). But the plural of anecdote is not statistic. Those are subjective analysis. You are cherry picking, and obfuscating the issue I suspect quite on purpose.



> But the KB was never 'fully constituted' against USN carrier TFs and performed poorly against it, in terms of coordinated strikes with the KBs full strength.



The KB did very well against RN forces.



> This has been explained and I've referenced the explanations. What I don't understand is why pointing out known deficiencies in USN carriers and aircraft is considered a slight on the USN? Rather, it should be remembered that they overcame these issues with solid tactics, training and Intel, but we also have to bear in mind that the IJN also made many mistakes.



It isn't in the least controversial, what is controversial is that you are very selectively picking data points and trying to prove something that isn't real, namely that the Wildcat was inferior to the Sea Hurricane or Fulmar. As bad as the Wildcat was, they were able to make it work against modern enemy carrier and land based fighters. The same is not true for the RN types.

Let me state it outright - the F4F was _not_ an ideal carrier aircraft, it certainly _was_ a flawed design, and the F4F-4 was decidedly inferior to the F4F-3. A really *ideal* WW2 carrier fighter didn't exist in 1941 or 1942*, but of what was available worldwide, the A6M2 was the closest to the ideal and certainly the best in the world (excellent on the Tactical level, less so (due to attrition factors), on the Strategic), the Wildcat, as flawed as it was and certainly inferior in many ways to the A6M, was _far superior_ to all the other Allied types. The Sea Hurricane, Fulmar, Sea Gladiator and Skua were all way down the list, barely adequate emergency stop gap measures _at best_. And as we know, no other navy had operational carrier fighters.

The problem is not that other people can't admit that the Wildcat was deeply flawed, it's that you can't admit that there was any flaw in _any_ RN or RAF aircraft, including and in particular the Swordfish, Albacore and Fulmar, all of which were poorly thought out designs and / or woefully obsolete.

The Seafire, Barracuda and Firefly were also basically disasters too but I don't want to open that can of worms yet. Lets stick to 1942 for now.

* That would arrive later in the form of the Hellcat, and later stll, the Corsair.


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## Schweik (Feb 8, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> Page 453:
> _"From Torino Caselle via Pisa to Decimomannu came 153° Gruppo CT with 21
> MC202s, 2° Gruppo Aut. CT with 19 Re2001s
> 362° Squadriglia of 22° Gruppo Aut. CT with 11 Re2001s_
> ...



And yet he lists _none _of those extra units in the available air strength, presumably because they arrived late (on the 11th or 12th -Indomitable was bombed on the 12th) and did not necessarily participate in any of the fighting. He lists a total of 659 aircraft, *of which only 540 were serviceable. And more than half were very obsolete Italian aircraft.*


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## Dimlee (Feb 8, 2021)

Schweik said:


> The Dauntless, like it's Japanese counterpart the D3A, sunk _far_ more warships than the Swordfish or Albacore ever did



Probably PTO was richer in targets? Just thinking aloud.

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## RCAFson (Feb 8, 2021)

Schweik said:


> As just one example of where the the modern German - Italian extremely limited range limited their use in Maritime warfare, the USS Wasp sailed twice to Malta to deliver fighters (to within the very short range of Spitfire Mk Vs). Both time the ships were packed with Spitfires and only flew 11 Wildcats for CAP, which was considered sufficient. Neither time were they attacked, despite the Axis desperation to prevent the reinforcement of Malta because the fighters were out of range to escort any bombers that could actually sink ships. Wasp then sailed to the Pacific where she was promptly sunk by a Japanese submarine.



The Spitfires that flew off Wasp each carried 90IG DTs and were launched about 600nm from Malta, or about the same distance as Hornet's launch of the Doolittle B-25s against Tokyo.


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## RCAFson (Feb 8, 2021)

Schweik said:


> And yet he lists _none _of those extra units in the available air strength, presumably because they arrived late (on the 11th or 12th -Indomitable was bombed on the 12th) and did not necessarily participate in any of the fighting. He lists a total of 659 aircraft, *of which only 540 were serviceable. And more than half were very obsolete Italian aircraft.*



The text states 659 front line axis aircraft and that number is only reached by adding all the aircraft stated. Aircraft serviceability always varies from day and day and even hour to hour, and the same was true on carriers.

We've already discussed the relative performance of IJN and RAI aircraft, and the majority (over 300) of the RAI aircraft had comparable or better performance than IJN aircraft, and many of the older aircraft were designated for Recon, ASW and ASR roles.


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## RCAFson (Feb 8, 2021)

Dimlee said:


> Probably PTO was richer in targets? Just thinking aloud.



FAA strike aircraft basically ran out of targets in the MTO after the Axis collapse in Africa and the Italian surrender.


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## Glider (Feb 8, 2021)

Dare I make an observation

Comparing the Japanese capability with the Luftwaffe.
There can be no doubt that in the first half of the war the Japanese were the best naval air power around. There aircraft were at least as good as the best in the world combined with training that was in many ways better than any other power. The Luftwaffe were far from well equipped and where they were equipped they lacked the training. Their aerial torpedo's were exceptionally poor and few in number. It was so bad that the Germans asked for and received the blueprints for the Japanese type 91 torpedo in August 1942. They then only built about 70 and relied on Italian torpedo's. The Luftwaffe specialists were integrated into the normal Luftwaffe bomber units and used on normal bombing missions during the BOB losing the core of the highly trained crews in these actions.
In Mid November 1941 6/KG 26 in Greece had eighteen torpedo's barely enough for one attack, so normal bombs had to be used.

Later on the pendulum had swung. The IJN were basically using the same aircraft and the experienced crews hadn't been replaced. However the Luftwaffe had developed a number of new weapons and the technology to support them was much improved. The biggest being the introduction of the Do 217, He177 and the use of remote control bombs.
They also had (until 1943) the use of an Italian training school to teach the Luftwaffe crews on torpedo tactics.

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## Schweik (Feb 8, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> This is what I posted (post 231):
> 
> _"These are all the strikes flown against USN carrier TFs in the Pacific:_
> 
> ...



Which is *wrong* - there were three waves of strikes. The IJN also had 202 naval combat aircraft, not including seaplane scouts etc. This included:

82 x A6M2 (22 on _Shokaku_, 21 on _Zuikaku_, 19 on _Zuiho_, 20 on _Jun'yo_)
63 x D3A (21 on _Shokaku_, 24 on _Zuikaku_, 18 on _Jun'yo_)
57 x B5N (24 on Shokaku, 20 on _Zuikaku_, 6 on _Zuiho_, 7 on _Jun'yo_)

So you undercounted there were 120 bombers. But here is the thing - There was more than one wave of strikes I posted a summary. *Running total of sorties in bold on the right.*

First strike on the 26th Oct 1942 was 64 aircraft from three carriers (41 bombers - 21 D3A, 20 B5N +2 more in a command role) at about 7:40 am -* 64 bombers + 23 fighters*
Then _Shokaku_ launched a second wave of 19 x D3A escorted by 5 x A6M at 8:00 am - *83 bombers + 28 fighters*
Then _Zuikako_ launched 16 x B5N escorted by 4 x A6M - *99 bombers + 32 fighters*
During the initial contact in the morning, two SBD dauntless scouts by the way, unescorted, were able to hit _Zuiho_ with two 500 lb bombs and taking their flight deck out of action. 
Tgen, due to some confusion after a Japanese attack, the first 15 SBDs had to strike without their escort, and were attacked by 12 x A6M. Nevertheless, losing 2 with another 2 forced to jetison bombs and escape. 11 of them nevertheless attacked and hit _Shokaku_ with at least 3 bombs.

Second wave continued on the 26th continued as 17 x D3A and 12 x A6M from the _Jun'yo_ at 9:14- *116 bombers + 44 fighters*
By this point _Hornet _was all but sunk, _Enterprise_ was damaged by two bombs, _Zuiho_ and _Shokaku_ were damaged. But the Japanese spotted Enterprise and knew they needed to attack.

The third wave was launched on the 26th at 13:06 Jun'yo launched 7 x B5N and 8 x A6M - *123 bombers + 52 fighters*
Zuikaku simultaneously launched her their strike of 7 x B5N, 2 x D3A, and 5 x A6M *- 132 bombers + 57 fighters*
then at 15:35 Jun'yo launched another strike of 4 x D3A and 6 x A6M - *136 bombers + 63 fighters*
This battle, pitting 2 x US carriers (without any land based fighter defense) against 4 x IJN carriers, is a pretty close comparison to Ceylon, incidentally. It was a Japanese victory, but two of their carriers were put out of commission for months and had to return to Japan for repairs, and more importantly, unlike the clash between these same IJN units and the British five months earlier, the exchange in aircraft lost was even, in fact slightly favoring the Americans. And as we know, Japanese aircraft losses meant a much higher toll in dead or missing crew.

you also forgot many other smaller actions, and undercounted others.

For example on *7 August 1942*, the Saratoga attacked what was then Japanese positions at Guadalcanal during the invasion by the Marines. Allied transports and amphibious vessels conducting landing operations were attacked by 27 x G4M escorted by 17 x A6M of the elite Tinian Kōkūtai . They were engaged by 8 x F4F, shooting down 5. The bombers missed the ships.

Then 9 x D3A attacked, but were intercepted by 15 x F4F, losing 5. 

The Japanese forces never attacked Saratoga directly in this action (basically due to random luck), but they did attack naval ships and engaged Saratogas fighters.

the *Naval Battle of Guadalcanal* of 13-15 November pitted aircraft from one US carrier (_Enterprise_) plus land based planes, vs one Japanese (_Jun'yo_) - all that was available after Santa Cruz - with sizable surface fleets on both sides.

The US lost 2 x CLs, 7 x DD's with 2 x CA heavily damaged, 1 x BB damaged. 
The IJN lost 2 x BB, 1 x CA, 3 x DD, and 7 x transports (4 more shot up after being beached)

More telling, the US lost 36 aircraft while the Japanese lost 64.

In the *Eastern Solomons*, (Aug 24-25) which you mentioned - the IJN had 177 aircraft available on carriers and land bases, and also launched multiple strikes. *Again running totals on the side in bold.*

at 14:50 27 x D3A and 15 x A6M launched from _Shokaku_ and _Zuikaku - _*27 bombers- 15 fighters*_
then at 16:00, they launched a second wave of 27 x D3A and 9 x A6M - _*54 bombers - 24 fighters*

_*So what I see here is a lot of very careful filtering and cherry picking, trying to present both the IJN and the USN in the worst possible light, underplay Japanese activity and capability, while exaggerating (and really grasping at straws) to try to pretend that the Hurricane, Sea Hurricane, and / or Fulmar were still contenders as fighters in 1942. They were perfectly suited to seeing off Condors or chasing down a CANT 1007, but against the IJN or Japanese Army, they couldn't hold their own any more than they could against BF 109s and MC 202s.*_


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## Schweik (Feb 8, 2021)

Glider said:


> Dare I make an observation
> 
> Comparing the Japanese capability with the Luftwaffe.
> *There can be no doubt that in the first half of the war the Japanese were the best naval air power around. There aircraft were at least as good as the best in the world combined with training that was in many ways better than any other power. *The Luftwaffe were far from well equipped and where they were equipped they lacked the training. Their aerial torpedo's were exceptionally poor and few in number. It was so bad that the Germans asked for and received the blueprints for the Japanese type 91 torpedo in August 1942. They then only built about 70 and relied on Italian torpedo's. The Luftwaffe specialists were integrated into the normal Luftwaffe bomber units and used on normal bombing missions during the BOB losing the core of the highly trained crews in these actions.
> ...



I would say the Japanese were in sharp decline by mid-1943, though they still had a bite. The Germans were certainly continuing to improve.



> The IJN were basically using the same aircraft and the experienced crews hadn't been replaced. However the Luftwaffe had developed a number of new weapons and the technology to support them was much improved. The biggest being the introduction of the Do 217, He177 and the use of remote control bombs.
> They also had (until 1943) the use of an Italian training school to teach the Luftwaffe crews on torpedo tactics.



Overall I think this assessment is pretty accurate, though as incredibly advanced and deadly as the remote control bombs were, they had a fairly limited impact because

they were not used in large numbers
the aircraft that launched them (Do 217 and He 177) proved to be exceedingly vulnerable in action, though on paper they look quite capable*
and the Anglo-Americans were quick to employ countermeasures such as jamming
The rather grim Japanese equivalent of the guided bombs etc. was the kamikaze, which while wasteful, could be quite effective.

* this may be because they had to operate beyond the range of potential escorts. All I can say is if you read the day to day operations, they got shot down rapidly. Squadrons were swiftly depleted and had to be rotated out.


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## RCAFson (Feb 8, 2021)

Schweik said:


> Which is *wrong* - there were three waves of strikes. The IJN also had 202 naval combat aircraft, not including seaplane scouts etc. This included:
> 
> 82 x A6M2 (22 on _Shokaku_, 21 on _Zuikaku_, 19 on _Zuiho_, 20 on _Jun'yo_)
> 63 x D3A (21 on _Shokaku_, 24 on _Zuikaku_, 18 on _Jun'yo_)
> ...



I only counted strikes that made contact with USN carrier TFs and I excluded non strike aircraft from the totals. The IJN had a record of poor recon and subsequently launching strikes that didn't make contact with their intended targets,


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## RCAFson (Feb 8, 2021)

Glider said:


> Dare I make an observation
> 
> Comparing the Japanese capability with the Luftwaffe.
> There can be no doubt that in the first half of the war the Japanese were the best naval air power around. There aircraft were at least as good as the best in the world combined with training that was in many ways better than any other power. The Luftwaffe were far from well equipped and where they were equipped they lacked the training. Their aerial torpedo's were exceptionally poor and few in number. It was so bad that the Germans asked for and received the blueprints for the Japanese type 91 torpedo in August 1942. They then only built about 70 and relied on Italian torpedo's. The Luftwaffe specialists were integrated into the normal Luftwaffe bomber units and used on normal bombing missions during the BOB losing the core of the highly trained crews in these actions.
> ...



Perhaps you can comment on PQ17 and PQ18?


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## Schweik (Feb 8, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> I only counted strikes that made contact with USN carrier TFs and I excluded non strike aircraft from the totals. The IJN had a record of poor recon and subsequently launching strikes that didn't make contact with their intended targets,



You still missed about 50 sorties at least, I haven't checked through all the battles.


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## Schweik (Feb 8, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> Perhaps you can comment on PQ17 and PQ18?



I would say, tragic, high drama (I enjoyed a couple of documentaries on PQ 17) but they were not adequately protected. Decent fighter cover should have protected easily from He 115, He 111, Fw 200 etc. USS _Wasp_ was supposed to help support these northern convoys (and could have, I think) but wasn't deployed for PQ 17.

HMS Avenger did a better job protecting PQ 18. But Sea Hurricanes and Swordfish seemed to have trouble with BV 138s. One Sea Hurricane was lost to an He 115. But they did drive off or break up a lot of the bomber attacks and shot down a bunch of unescorted He 111s and Ju 88s. Which it should do.

The wiki notes that the limited range and endurance was a problem for the Sea Hurricanes:

_"Colthurst decided that the Sea Hurricanes henceforth would fly standing patrols of 25 minutes duration per fighter, to ensure that some were always available to break up Goldene Zange formations, even if they were too slow and ill-armed to inflict many losses. The captain of Ulster Queen resolved to ignore the standing orders to keep station and steer towards incoming aircraft instead "_

Still the Sea Hurricanes undoubtedly spelled the difference between the failure of PQ 17 and the success of PQ 18. They accounted for most of the 44 German aircraft lost.

I still think Martlets would have been more effective, if only for their greater loiter time.

Had those German strike aircraft been escorted by fighters like A6M or Ki 43, I think PQ 18 would have been doomed.


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## Glider (Feb 8, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> Perhaps you can comment on PQ17 and PQ18?



Happily

PQ17 as is well known suffered huge loses to the Luftwaffe and U-boats once the convoy was forced to scatter. Until then the convoy more than held its own against considerable air attacks. There were some losses certainly but the Luftwaffe paid a price. 
It was when the convoy split did the serious losses started which was inevitable. I think 24 vessels were sunk and its notable that the Luftwaffe only sank eight of them in conditions that were ideal and five Luftwaffe aircraft were lost. 

PQ18
This was a different convoy. It had an escort carrier but also other advantages compared to PQ17. The close in defence was much stronger and Coastal Command had a working base in Russia equipped with Hampden torpedo bombers, Catalina's and PR Spitfires. On the German side there were 60 Ju88 plus 46 x He111 and 27 Ju88 torpedo bombers. They had one major handicap, Goering had issued a firm order that the primary target wasn't the convoy, it was the carrier. He was desperate to sink a carrier.

The first attack was 20 x Ju88 who did a high level bombing attack that hit nothing but also didn't lose anyone despite the Hurricanes being launched to intercept.
The second attack was deadly. 17 x Ju88 dive bombed whilst 43 torpedo bombers attacked sinking eight transports. Seven aircraft were lost or crash landed on return all by AA fire
Two more attacks took place totalling 21 He115 which achieved nothing and one was shot down by AA fire. Sea Hurricanes were launched but they were not able to intercept and one was lost when attacking a shadowing Bv138.

Then Goering got involved again. He was furious that that the Carrier hadn't been attacked and ordered Kg26 the principle Torpedo unit to concentrate all its aircraft on the carrier. To quote Cajus Bekker in the Luftwaffe War Diaries '_Thus they were sent to their doom'_

The first attack on the Avenger involved the He111 having to fly the length of the convoy with predictable results three were shot down, two had to abandon the attack and jettison the torpedo's.
The second was a dive bomber attack which did nothing and one plane was damaged.
The Third was another torpedo attack two ships were torpedoed and seven aircraft shot down

The fighting continued and at the end ten merchant ships were lost but it broke the back of the naval strike arm of the Luftwaffe. Forty Nine aircraft had been lost including 42% of the entire Luftwaffe torpedo bomber crews.

Points of Interest
1) The AA fire of the convoy was very effective and was better than most people believe. 
Note I am not claiming that it equalled USN standards. Indeed in PQ17 was a USN destroyer and she became a very important part of the defence, in particular for her long range shooting. Far better than any RN destroyer

2) The Sea Hurricanes main benefit was in the breaking up attacks as opposed to shooting the enemy down. They had some success but not what you would expect against unescorted bombers.

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## RCAFson (Feb 8, 2021)

Schweik said:


> I would say, tragic, high drama (I enjoyed a couple of documentaries on PQ 17) but they were not adequately protected. Decent fighter cover should have protected easily from He 115, He 111, Fw 200 etc. USS _Wasp_ was supposed to help support these northern convoys (and could have, I think) but wasn't deployed for PQ 17.
> 
> HMS Avenger did a better job protecting PQ 18. But Sea Hurricanes and Swordfish seemed to have trouble with BV 138s. One Sea Hurricane was lost to an He 115. But they did drive off or break up a lot of the bomber attacks and shot down a bunch of unescorted He 111s and Ju 88s. Which it should do.
> 
> ...



HMS Avenger carried 8 or 10 Sea Hurricanes (nominally 12 but she couldn't operate that many at one time) and some Swordfish ASW aircraft. The PQ18 Sea Hurricanes only claimed or were credited with 7 kills (5 from Avenger and two from a CAT ship), IIRC, as the heavily armoured Luftwaffe aircraft, with SS tanks, were hard to kill with .303mgs. Of course most IJNAF aircraft didn't have this kind of protection. The majority of Luftwaffe aircraft shot down were due to RN AA.

The Luftwaffe flew approximately 600 strike sorties against Arctic Convoys from April to Sept 1942.


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## RCAFson (Feb 8, 2021)

Glider said:


> Points of Interest
> 1) The AA fire of the convoy was very effective and was better than most people believe.
> Note I am not claiming that it equalled USN standards. Indeed in PQ17 was a USN destroyer and she became a very important part of the defence, in particular for her long range shooting. Far better than any RN destroyer
> 
> 2) The Sea Hurricanes main benefit was in the breaking up attacks as opposed to shooting the enemy down. They had some success but not what you would expect against unescorted bombers.



1) HMS Ulster Queen (6 x 4in, 1 x quad pom-pom and several 20mm) claimed 4 x AA kills during PQ18. USS Wainwright was the destroyer described above, but really her gunnery was not exceptional. Lundstrom rather carefully examined USN AA in the Pacific and it was no better than the RN's despite some claims to the contrary. The main issue being the massive AA overclaiming by the USN which has created a rather false impression of USN AA effectiveness prior to the massive use of 20mm, 40mm Bofors, and then VT ammo. Lundstrom assessed 10 AA kills, total, for Coral Sea (3), Midway (3) and Eastern Solomons (4), and 25 at Santa Cruz (the USN claimed over 200 AA kills during these 4 actions including 127 at Santa Cruz!), or about the same as the total AA kills for PQ18.

2) HMS Avenger's Sea Hurricanes flew 59 sorties during PQ18, and engaged Luftwaffe aircraft during 31 sorties, claiming 5 certain, 3 probable's and 13 damaged. (Smith)

During all the Artic Convoys, about 605K tons comprising 100 merchant ships were lost, 94 by enemy action, including 37 ships sunk by Luftwaffe aircraft.

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## Schweik (Feb 8, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> HMS Avenger carried 8 or 10 Sea Hurricanes (nominally 12 but she couldn't operate that many at one time) and some Swordfish ASW aircraft. The PQ18 Sea Hurricanes only claimed or were credited with 7 kills (5 from Avenger and two from a CAT ship), IIRC, as the heavily armoured Luftwaffe aircraft, with SS tanks, were hard to kill with .303mgs. Of course most IJNAF aircraft didn't have this kind of protection. The majority of Luftwaffe aircraft shot down were due to RN AA.
> 
> The Luftwaffe flew approximately 600 strike sorties against Arctic Convoys from April to Sept 1942.



You are right, I should not have assumed. I gave the Sea Hurricane far too much credit. 7 kills from 600 sorties by unescorted (and mostly obsolete) bombers is pathetic. According to a German source only 22 German aircraft were lost to all causes.


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## RCAFson (Feb 8, 2021)

Schweik said:


> You are right, I should not have assumed. I gave the Sea Hurricane far too much credit. 7 kills from 600 sorties by unescorted (and mostly obsolete) bombers is pathetic.



The main Luftwaffe strike aircraft were generally better performing, carried heavier bomb loads and were far better protected than IJN aircraft.

600 Luftwaffe sorties is for all the Arctic Convoys run from April to Sept 1942 (Arctic Convoys were run from late 1941 to 1945). Only PQ18 included a CVE. The other April - Sept 1942 convoys relied on solely on AA, which shot down about 10% of all Luftwaffe strike sorties.


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## Schweik (Feb 8, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> The main Luftwaffe strike aircraft were generally better performing, carried heavier bomb loads and were far better protected than IJN aircraft.



If bomb loads were what mattered, the Lancaster would have been the best ship-killer of the war. But that wasn't the case was it?

Glider also made an interesting point:

_"Their aerial torpedo's were exceptionally poor and few in number. It was so bad that *the Germans asked for and received the blueprints for the Japanese type 91 torpedo* in August 1942. "_

If that is true, it's quite telling. Without any torpedoes (or with very few truly functional ones), the Germans were really limited in their effectiveness. No wonder the Ju 87 was their only real ship-killer.



> 600 Luftwaffe sorties is for all the Arctic Convoys run from April to Sept 1942 (Arctic Convoys were run from late 1941 to 1945). Only PQ18 included a CVE. The other April - Sept 1942 convoys relied on solely on AA, which shot down about 10% of all Luftwaffe strike sorties.



The thing is, if there were say, 200 sorties from D3A bombers, I think everyone reading this thread including you knows perfectly well that carrier and all the merchant ships would have been sunk.

If there were unescorted bombers attacking an IJN carrier, they almost certainly would have met the same fate as those torpedo bombers at Midway - total annihilation.

Against a US carrier, well we have a good documented example.

*Yest another action involving USN carriers in 1942 that RCAFson forgot in his summary - **a small fight off of Bougainville**. *






This is one of the G4M in question, shortly before it crashed. It was shot down by USN Ace and Medal of Honor winner, Edward "Butch" O'Hare

During this fight on Feb 20, 1942, 17 x G4M1 bombers took off from Rabaul and flew 390 miles East to the location of the recently detected USS Lexington. They attacked in two flights. The first nine were initially intercepted by 6 x F4F-4 that were flying CAP, which shot down 5 of the G4M including the commander, which forced them to regroup. They made their attack run, but were interecepted by 6 more Wildcats, which shot down 3 more (for the loss of 2 x F4F). One G4M escaped to head home, but was intercepted by an SBD-3 and shot down.

Then a second group of 8 x G4M attacked, and with most of the CAP chasing the original wave, only 2 x F4F were available to intercept them in time. One was O'Hare. One of the F4F had a gun malfunction. O'Hare shot down 5 x G4M single-handedly. The remaining 3 x G4M were then caught by the returning CAP of F4Fs and shot down.

The result ? All 17 x G4M were shot down. That is what should have happened to unescorted bombers stalking PQ-18.

So that is another 17 sorties to add to your list by the way.

RCAFson will probably claim that this is because is because the G4M did not have self-sealing fuel tanks, but I can point out many examples of nearly identical massacres of Ju 88s and He 111s in North Africa by Tomahawks and Kittyhawks, using basically the same (or less) armament as the F4F-4. The G4M were basically the same as an He 111.

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## Schweik (Feb 8, 2021)

As for the SM 79, CANT 1007, SM 84, Z 506 etc., they were vulnerable enough that _Fulmars_ routinely shot them down.

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## slaterat (Feb 8, 2021)

Some things not being considered here.

Eric Brown rated the Zero >Sea Hurricane>F4F , but believed that they were all close in relative performance. Although he is sometimes contradictory he at least flew all three of them...

Overall the KB mission into the Indian Ocean failed to achieve its main objective, the destruction of the RN Eastern Fleet. The attacks on Ceylon were broken up and did not do a lot of damage. I quote from Blooody Shambles, "Damage at Columbo and Tricomalee was fairly easily repaired, and generally the strikes had not been anywhere near as effective, as catastrophic for the recipients, or as cheap for the attackers, as had been those on Pearl harbor and Port Darwin."

The KB had a glass jaw. Their carriers exhibited poor fueling practices and woeful damage control. Quite similar to their aircraft philosophy.

The RN had already lost three fleet carriers , before the Pacific war even started.

Given parity in numbers I believe that four armoured RN carriers could meet and defeat 4 IJN carriers in 1942. The FAA superiority in night operations potentially being a decisive factor.

The RN air CAP was far more effective than the IJN. A mixed force of radar directed, radio equipped Martlets and Sea Hurricanes, would be far superior to the gang bang parade, employed by the IJN. This cost them dearly at Midway.


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## RCAFson (Feb 9, 2021)

Schweik said:


> *Yest another action involving USN carriers in 1942 that RCAFson forgot in his summary - **a small fight off of Bougainville**. *
> 
> View attachment 612001
> 
> ...



Umm...No.

I stated in post 231:
_These are all the strikes flown against USN carrier TFs in the Pacific:_

_*"Bougainville = 18 Bettys* (plus ~5 more Nell sorties against Enterprise) [the Enterprise attack was another raid]_

_Coral Sea = 51 = 33 Val and 18 Kate_

_Midway = 28 = 18 Val and 10 Kate (two strikes)_

_Eastern Solomons = 27 Vals_

_Santa Cruz = 109 = 58 Vals and 51 Kates.
------------------------------------------------------_

_= ~229 IJN strike aircraft sorties against USN carrier TFs in all of 1942. (_*My addition was incorrect and this adds up to 238 including the 5 Nell sorties*_)_

_The Axis flew about 80 strike sorties against the Illustrious TF on 10 Jan 1941 (before Illustrious entered Malta harbour)._

_The IJN flew about 180 attack sorties against units of the BEF on 5 and 9 April 1942._

_The Axis AFs flew about 230 attack sorties against Pedestal alone during the time it was escorted by carriers or about the same as the number of strikes flown against all USN carriers during 1942."_

But in fact you're correct that only 17 Bettys were involved. 15 were shot down (at least one by an SBD) or ditched near their bases and only 2 landed at IJN bases. This raid is covered in Chapter Five of _First Team, Vol.1._

Regarding Santa Cruz, this is a summary by Lundstrom, in _First Team Vol2_:


"_Even while Nagumo’s Kidō Butai fought and retired northwest, another combatant entered the lists. Kakuta’s Junyō, with Kondō’s Advance Force, pounded northeast toward Nagumo. Anxious to attack as soon as possible, Kakuta instructed the Junyō to launch her first wave at 0905 at an estimated 280 miles. Led by the group commander, Lt. Shiga Yoshio, the attackers numbered twelve Zeros and seventeen Type 99 carrier bombers under Lt. Yamaguchi Masao.50 With the Junyō’s strike, the Japanese had hurled 138 aircraft* (*42 fighters*, 57 carrier bombers, 36 carrier attack planes, *and 3 contact planes) against the American carriers, almost twice as many planes as Kinkaid sent in return..._

_At 1306 the Junyō dispatched her second wave: the strike leader was Lt. Irikiin Yoshiaki, with eight Zeros (five Junyō, two Zuikaku, and one Zuihō), led by Lt. Shirane Ayao (Zuikaku), and *seven Type 97 carrier attack planes (six with torpedoes*) led by Lieutenant Irikiin. The fifteen planes departed at 1313 on 120 degrees to search 260 miles. To the north the Zuikaku independently mounted the 1st Carrier Division’s third attack wave at the same time: the strike leader was Lt. (jg) Tanaka Ichirō (Zuihō), with five Zeros (three Zuikaku, two Shōkaku) led by Lt. (jg) Kobayashi Hōhei (Shōkaku); *two Type 99 carrier bombers* (one Shōkaku, one Zuikaku) led by PO1c Hori Kenzō (Zuikaku); and *seven Type 97 carrier attack planes (five Zuihō, two Zuikaku—six with 800-kilogram bombs*) led by Lieutenant Tanaka. That two very junior officers led the Zuikaku strike epitomized the great loss in aviation leaders suffered by the Japanese._

_The Junyō’s third wave of six Zeros and *four Type 99 carrier bomber*s departed at 1535_."

So we have

57 Vals
36 Kates
6 Kates
2 Vals
6 Kates
4 Vals
------
= 111 strike sorties at Santa Cruz. This was a very confusing action and I missed two strike aircraft. but added an extra strike aircraft at Bougainville, *so that makes a total of 239 strike sorties directed at, and engaging, USN carrier TFs in 1942*.


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## RCAFson (Feb 9, 2021)

Schweik said:


> If bomb loads were what mattered, the Lancaster would have been the best ship-killer of the war. But that wasn't the case was it?
> 
> Glider also made an interesting point:
> 
> ...



As Glider well knows the Luftwaffe was employing very efficient RAI torpedoes by mid 1942 and *against PQ18 most Luftwaffe TBs carried two torpedoes each*. The Luftwaffe sank 18 (of 37, as already stated) Arctic Convoy merchant ships with torpedoes from May-Sept 1942 and after that the survivors were redeployed to the Med to face Operation Torch.


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## Schweik (Feb 9, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> Umm...No.
> 
> I stated in post 231:
> _These are all the strikes flown against USN carrier TFs in the Pacific:_
> ...




Ok, well you should put the dates next to the engagement so it's clearer.



> _Eastern Solomons = 27 Vals _




*Those 27 Vals struck twice, at 14:50 and at 16:00 - check again. So that is 54 sorties right there.*



> _Santa Cruz = 109 = 58 Vals and 51 Kates. _




Which is again, way off. The correct number is 136 bombers.



> _The IJN flew about 180 attack sorties against units of the BEF on 5 and 9 April 1942. _




And the BEF also had the support of land based RAF fighters. Let's also remember in the real world, *HMS Hermes was sunk by the first 32 D3A "Vals" which found it*, despite the help of 6 Fulmars from 273 Sqn RAF, with another 6 from 803 and 806 squadron arriving too late (Hermes was already under the waves). So it _didn't_ require 180 attack sorties to sink it, nor were there any other strikes on any other RN carriers that day that I am aware of, were they? * If not, then in reality it was just 32 strike aircraft sorties that the British actually dealt with while they still had a carrier to attack. After that, this raid doesn't count according to your own absurd criteria that you slyly try to use to pretend that Midway only involved 28 IJN sorties!.*



> = 111 strike sorties at Santa Cruz. This was a very confusing action and I missed two strike aircraft. but added an extra strike aircraft at Bougainville, *so that makes a total of 239 strike sorties directed at, and engaging, USN carrier TFs in 1942*.



It was a confusing action I agree, but you are still making a mistake, I'll go through later and show it. In the meantime, the engagement in the Eastern Solomons was not so complex, you just missed the second wave of strike aircraft, and the attack on Hermes was over by the time 32 dive bombers had attacked.


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## Schweik (Feb 9, 2021)

slaterat said:


> Some things not being considered here.
> 
> Eric Brown rated the Zero >Sea Hurricane>F4F , but believed that they were all close in relative performance. Although he is sometimes contradictory he at least flew all three of them...



He rated the Sea Hurricane as slightly better in a dogfight, but the Martlet as better as an overall carrier aircraft. And the Martlets he flew were not as capable as a Wildcat.

The reason being, to quote again from Armoured Carriers.com:

The main flaw of the Sea Hurricane was it's poor range and endurance:

_The Sea Hurricane’s range was recorded as about 450 miles. But it was loiter time that meant the most for carrier operations.
*Sea Hurricanes carried only enough fuel to sustain themselves for 1 hour at combat power, and 4.5 hours at full-economical settings. The Fulmar and Martlet could stay aloft for 2 hours and 2 hours 45 minutes under combat power, and 6 hours economical.*
The consequence of this was carriers being forced to turn into the wind far more often to take-off and land Sea Hurricanes. So they were often held as 'alert' aircraft on the deck while their longer-legged stablemates maintained the CAP._ 



> The KB had a glass jaw. Their carriers exhibited poor fueling practices and woeful damage control. Quite similar to their aircraft philosophy.



It's easy to make that claim in retrospect, but there were few aircraft carriers which did well after bombs and torpedoes started detonating on or in them. RN carriers didn't seem to have such an outstanding survival rate compared to USN or IJN carriers. As you said...



> The RN had already lost three fleet carriers , before the Pacific war even started.



And that was back when a Sea Gladiator or a Swordfish was still in the game and the Sea Hurricane looked modern!



> Given parity in numbers I believe that four armoured RN carriers could meet and defeat 4 IJN carriers in 1942. The FAA superiority in night operations potentially being a decisive factor.



Not if the IJN detected them during the day, because the IJN strike aircraft far outranged the RN / FAA aircraft and the Japanese fighters would totally dominate FAA fighters, at least the British made ones. Maybe if you had Hellcats....



> The RN air CAP was far more effective than the IJN.



That's a bold statement that requires some backup.



> A mixed force of radar directed, radio equipped Martlets and Sea Hurricanes, would be far superior to the gang bang parade, employed by the IJN. This cost them dearly at Midway.



You would certainly need some longer range aircraft to augment the Sea Hurricanes, since they were only good for CAP (for short durations, note during PQ-18 they suggested 25 minute missions!)

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## Schweik (Feb 9, 2021)

Eric Brown on the Martlet I

_"The initial climb rate was one of the most sensational aspects of the performance of this little fighter. At 3300ft/min there was nothing around to touch it, and it was no slouch in level flight. Although we were to find that level speed was slower than that claimed, with top speed of 265 knots (491km/h) at 15,000ft (4570m) and about 248 knots (459km/h) at sea level, it was as good as the Hurricane Mk I and, in so far as we were aware at the time, the fastest fighter available for embarked operations. It was also a manoeuvrable aeroplane with a good rate of roll, but it needed plenty of stick handling on the part of the pilot to get the best out of it. By comparison with its British counterparts it was more stable to fly and therefore heavier to manoeuvre. "_

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## GrauGeist (Feb 9, 2021)

slaterat said:


> Given parity in numbers I believe that four armoured RN carriers could meet and defeat 4 IJN carriers in 1942. The FAA superiority in night operations potentially being a decisive factor.


This statement fascinates me.
Please tell me, if you would, how the Royal Navy would be able to launch effective air attacks at night, against Japanese elements, in 1942.

This is with the understanding that the IJN was well trained and well versed in night warfare.


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## RCAFson (Feb 9, 2021)

Schweik said:


> Eric Brown on the Martlet I
> 
> _"The initial climb rate was one of the most sensational aspects of the performance of this little fighter. At 3300ft/min there was nothing around to touch it, and it was no slouch in level flight. Although we were to find that level speed was slower than that claimed, with top speed of 265 knots (491km/h) at 15,000ft (4570m) and about 248 knots (459km/h) at sea level, it was as good as the Hurricane Mk I and, in so far as we were aware at the time, the fastest fighter available for embarked operations. It was also a manoeuvrable aeroplane with a good rate of roll, but it needed plenty of stick handling on the part of the pilot to get the best out of it. By comparison with its British counterparts it was more stable to fly and therefore heavier to manoeuvre. "_



The only problem is that these aircraft were not combat and carrier ready. The actual Martlet II/IV aircraft had climb rates of half of the above figures, as did the F4F-4. 265 knots = 305mph. Sea Hurricane IB Vmax was 315mph at 7500ft. Normal climb rate was over 2000fpm (10min to 20k ft) and combat climb was about 3500fpm. Martlet II/IV was somewhat slower.

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## RCAFson (Feb 9, 2021)

Schweik said:


> Ok, well you should put the dates next to the engagement so it's clearer.
> 
> 
> 
> ...



No, the 2nd wave of 27 Vals failed to make contact with the USN TF.

I have carefully tallied the number of strikes at Santa Cruz and presented the numbers (111) in the prior post.



> And the BEF also had the support of land based RAF fighters. Let's also remember in the real world, *HMS Hermes was sunk by the first 32 D3A "Vals" which found it*, despite the help of 6 Fulmars from 273 Sqn RAF, with another 6 from 803 and 806 squadron arriving too late (Hermes was already under the waves). So it _didn't_ require 180 attack sorties to sink it, nor were there any other strikes on any other RN carriers that day that I am aware of, were they? * If not, then in reality it was just 32 strike aircraft sorties that the British actually dealt with while they still had a carrier to attack. After that, this raid doesn't count according to your own absurd criteria that you slyly try to use to pretend that Midway only involved 28 IJN sorties!.*



Hermes was sunk before any Fulmars arrived as were the other ships sunk by that strike. The Fulmars attacked after the Vals had finished their strikes. Of course there was no fighter cover over the two RN heavy cruisers sunk on 5 April. I didn't include the IJN strikes directed at Ceylon on 5 and 9 April.


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## Glider (Feb 9, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> 1) HMS Ulster Queen (6 x 4in, 1 x quad pom-pom and several 20mm) claimed 4 x AA kills during PQ18. USS Wainwright was the destroyer described above, but really her gunnery was not exceptional. Lundstrom rather carefully examined USN AA in the Pacific and it was no better than the RN's despite some claims to the contrary.


The Ulster Queen (a converted ferry) did exceptionally well largely down to Captain and the effectiveness of the crew. During attacks when he saw a group of approaching torpedo bombers he would leave the defensive ring and head directly at the incoming aircraft. As a result he put his gunners in a good position to fire but also disrupted the attacking formation.

Re the USS Wainwright we will have to agree to disagree on this. She was became very important to the defence of the convoy while she was there, not because of the number of aircraft she shot down, but because of her ability to keep attacking formations away from the convoy. This was due to her accurate long range fire which was far better than the average RN fleet destroyer.
On the 4th July while approaching the convoy to refuel, she was credited with keeping one attack at such a distance that the torpedo's were not a threat, on a second attack that got closer she shot down one of the senior officers. Officially she wasn't part of the convoy escort being assigned to the Cruiser escort but happened to be refuelling and was in the right place at the right time. When she finished refuelling and was about to leave the convoy another large group of He111 approached and split into two groups. She opened fire at one group starting at 10,000 yards and kept firing until it was considered to be too close to the convoy, when she switched to the second group. Of the first group only one bomber launched its torpedo which missed and of the second group two ships were hit. 

A couple more comments

1) If the Germans were totally happy with the Italian Torpedo's they wouldn't have asked for the blueprints of the Japanese torpedo's. The main problem with the Italian torpedo's was they didn't work that well in shallow water.
2) Germany lost 42% of its trained torpedo bomber crews. That shows how few they had to start off with

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## RCAFson (Feb 9, 2021)

Glider said:


> The Ulster Queen (a converted ferry) did exceptionally well largely down to Captain and the effectiveness of the crew. During attacks when he saw a group of approaching torpedo bombers he would leave the defensive ring and head directly at the incoming aircraft. As a result he put his gunners in a good position to fire but also disrupted the attacking formation.
> 
> Re the USS Wainwright we will have to agree to disagree on this. She was became very important to the defence of the convoy while she was there, not because of the number of aircraft she shot down, but because of her ability to keep attacking formations away from the convoy. This was due to her accurate long range fire which was far better than the average RN fleet destroyer.
> On the 4th July while approaching the convoy to refuel, she was credited with keeping one attack at such a distance that the torpedo's were not a threat, on a second attack that got closer she shot down one of the senior officers. Officially she wasn't part of the convoy escort being assigned to the Cruiser escort but happened to be refuelling and was in the right place at the right time. When she finished refuelling and was about to leave the convoy another large group of He111 approached and split into two groups. She opened fire at one group starting at 10,000 yards and kept firing until it was considered to be too close to the convoy, when she switched to the second group. Of the first group only one bomber launched its torpedo which missed and of the second group two ships were hit.
> ...



This is from _Destroyer Captain_, by Roger Hill, and gives some insight into the RN's viewpoint on USS Wainright's gunnery:

_Two American destroyers and the Somali came across from the
cruiser squadron to fuel in turn. Just as the first was picking up
the pipe from the sea, he caught sight of the Blohm and Voss. He
hauled out and blazed away with all his guns; his rate of fire was
more impressive than his accuracy. It was really funny to see this
one destroyer firing away, and all the convoy and escort, including
the anti-aircraft ships, sitting and watching. The general opinion
was, he just had to celebrate the 4th July._

it wasn't exceptional and probably no better than Ledbury's.

The Axis powers all exchanged info on various devices, including torpedoes, and it really didn't mean much and the RAI torpedoes had an excellent operational record.

This is a series of stories about HMS Scylla during PQ18 and after:

https://www.world-war.co.uk/scylla_story.php

but probably every destroyer or larger ship would have similar stories.

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## RCAFson (Feb 9, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> This statement fascinates me.
> Please tell me, if you would, how the Royal Navy would be able to launch effective air attacks at night, against Japanese elements, in 1942.
> 
> This is with the understanding that the IJN was well trained and well versed in night warfare.



Night strikes against ships at sea are exceedingly difficult unless the aircraft are equipped with ASV radar to find their targets, which the FAA aircraft had, and the IJNAF didn't (until ~mid 1943). The only successful USN torpedo attack at Midway was a night attack by an ASV equipped PBY.


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## Peter Gunn (Feb 9, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> Who said that? Or did you just make it up?



Merely referencing your constant belittling of IJN equipment, training and pilot performance in comparison to their MTO AXIS counterparts. (over a couple of threads)



RCAFson said:


> I
> 
> Why is the KB always considered this unstoppable force able to launch an overwhelming strike against a carrier TF with all six fleet carriers, or even four carriers, when historically, they were never able to deliver on that premise?



Not considered "unstoppable", just far ahead of both the RN and the USN when it came to massed carrier attacks. Yes yes, Taranto, I'll give the RN that ONE shot but not on the same scale.

Never able to deliver? So Pearl Harbor was an accident? How's the Hermes career post March 1942, or Dorsetshire and Cornwall? Or the mass of merchant ships sitting on the bottom of the Indian Ocean?



RCAFson said:


> By Aug 1942 (remember Pedestal was just one operation) the Axis AFs in the ETO/MTO had flown *THOUSANDS* (yes I am shouting) of strike sorties against Allied naval and merchant ships. The Axis AFs were fully trained in maritime strike operations and the Luftwaffe were considered by the USN as superior to the IJN:



I think Glider already addressed this earlier up thread.

_


RCAFson said:



Information Bulletin · No. 29

Click to expand...

_


RCAFson said:


> _Antiaircraft Action Summary · World War II
> October 1945
> Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
> UNITED STATES FLEET_
> ...



One might pay close attention to issue #5.




RCAFson said:


> But the KB was never 'fully constituted' against USN carrier TFs and performed poorly against it, in terms of coordinated strikes with the KBs full strength. The fact that the IJNAF was able to penetrate USN CAP at Midway, to repeatedly hit and cripple Yorktown with two strikes of 18 and 10 aircraft each speaks volumes about the poor performance of USN radar GCI and F4F-4 performance. The USN was quite open about this and yet when the USN's own criticisms are brought up it gets ignored or considered an insult. USN AA performance in 1942 varied from poor prior to Santa Cruz to excellent at Santa Cruz. See Lundstrom for a analysis of USN AA performance.



Must be why the USN lost those battles.

Criticism of the USN isn't "ignored" or "considered an insult" far from it, but it's your constant flag waving over the RN and belittling of everything from Pearl Harbor to Midway as a cakewalk for the USN compared to RN's operations in the MTO or even off Ceylon. You contend that the RN faced much harder and more numerous opposition on a magnitude so much greater than the USN did in the Pacific that they can't be compared. Perhaps a re-evaluation of some of your statements is in order.

You're free to expound your ideas, but make no mistake, the KdB would have absolutely savaged the RN in the Indian Ocean in March of 42 and Sommerville knew it, hence his tactics. Fletcher had no choice at Coral Sea (hence his tactics), he had to stand and fight, and fight he did, he did have the option to wait for TF16 had KdB shown up in force, but it was still GAME ON. After all, SOMEONE had to man up and help defend Australia, the RN sure as hell wasn't capable of it.

And whether you like it or not, or acknowledge it or not, the IJN and the USN were the varsity squads of carrier air warfare, the BPF was never more than the size/capability (after a training session with U.S.S. Saratoga) of a Task Group in the Pacific War.



RCAFson said:


> This has been explained and I've referenced the explanations. What I don't understand is why pointing out known deficiencies in USN carriers and aircraft is considered a slight on the USN? *Rather, it should be remembered that they overcame these issues with solid tactics, training and Intel, *but we also have to bear in mind that the IJN also made many mistakes.



Sorry, I don't believe you mean any of that.

This all reminds me of a fella I used to know, he was a big, dyed in the wool Hurricane fan, at the slightest inference that the P-40 _might_ have been equal to the Hurricane he'd be off on a tear. God forbit you mentioned to him that it might actually be a better plane than the Hurricane. Hell, I remember going a couple of rounds with that guy over his contention that the Mustang wasn't as good as late marques of the Hurricane, and that he could _prove_ that with facts.

You all can continue, I'll read but I'm out on this one, it smacks too much of those hurricane/P-40/Mustang "debates" years ago.

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## Schweik (Feb 9, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> Hermes was sunk before any Fulmars arrived as were the other ships sunk by that strike. The Fulmars attacked after the Vals had finished their strikes. Of course there was no fighter cover over the two RN heavy cruisers sunk on 5 April. I didn't include the IJN strikes directed at Ceylon on 5 and 9 April.



The records state that 6 Fulmars got there before or as Hermes was attacked, and 6 more arrived after she was sunk.

Far more important to the ongoing debate I am referring to your claim that "_*The IJN flew about 180 attack sorties against units of the BEF on 5 and 9 April 1942.*_ "

I'd really like to hear how you arrive at that number. If you are only counting strikes that found and attacked Carriers, this doesn't track. The only attack against a RN carrier was on *April 9*

After launching attacks against the port city of Trincomalee at 7:00 in the morning, a recon plane from Haruna spotted the Hermes and the KB launched 80 x D3A at 10:35. The first group of D3A, consisting of 32 dive bombers, found and immediately sunk Hermes. Not all of them actually got to drop bombs before Hermes was clearly done for, so they were forced to seek out other targets - The HMES Hollyhock, the Athelstone, the tanker Sergeant and the cargo ship Norvikien.

By your own criteria, the main argument you have been making for the last 15 pages -- the claim that the IJN launched 180 sorties against the BEF but only 27 at Midway (etc.) is complete B.S. - only 32 Japanese bombers attacked before the RN carrier was *gone.*

This is from the Wiki:

_"They were spotted off Batticaloa, however, by a Japanese reconnaissance plane from the battleship Haruna.[41] The British intercepted the spot report and ordered the ships to return to Trincomalee with the utmost dispatch and attempted to provide fighter cover for them.[42] The Japanese launched 85 Aichi D3A dive bombers, escorted by nine Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters, at the two ships. *At least 32 attacked them and sank them in quick order despite the arrival of six Fairey Fulmar II fighters of No. 273 Squadron RAF. *Another six Fulmars from 803 and 806 Squadrons arrived after Hermes had already sunk. The rest of the Japanese aircraft attacked other ships further north, sinking the RFA Athelstone of 5,571 gross register tonnage (GRT), her escort, the corvette Hollyhock, the oil tanker SS British Sergeant and the Norwegian ship SS Norviken of 2,924 GRT.[43] "_

They list their source as Bloody Shambles Vol II, which I don't have but I'm sure somebody here does.


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## Schweik (Feb 9, 2021)

Peter Gunn said:


> You all can continue, I'll read but I'm out on this one, it smacks too much of those hurricane/P-40/Mustang "debates" years ago.



I love how y'all keep lumping me together with him. I'm not doing anything other than you did right there- calling him on his BS.


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## RCAFson (Feb 9, 2021)

Peter Gunn said:


> Merely referencing your constant belittling of IJN equipment, training and pilot performance in comparison to their MTO AXIS counterparts. (over a couple of threads)



IOWs, you made it up. Placing all the naval AFs into their proper historical context isn't belittling, rather it's discussing naval aviation history. The IJNAF deployed aircraft that would not have been acceptable to any other AF, this gave them lightweight aircraft with good performance by naval AF standards but it came at a real cost in survivability. The IJNAFs aircraft were not modern by 1942 land based AF standards, nor were most naval AFs aircraft, but the RN was pitted against a very powerful land based AF with better performing and more modern aircraft than those deployed in the Pacific. This is just a fact, and any "belittling" is being done by those who pretend this isn't true.




> Not considered "unstoppable", just far ahead of both the RN and the USN when it came to massed carrier attacks. Yes yes, Taranto, I'll give the RN that ONE shot but not on the same scale.
> 
> Never able to deliver? So Pearl Harbor was an accident? How's the Hermes career post March 1942, or Dorsetshire and Cornwall? Or the mass of merchant ships sitting on the bottom of the Indian Ocean?



Against carrier TFs. Yes, the KB did hit Dorsetshire and Cornwall and then Hermes (obsolete with no aircraft onboard) with large strikes and this was arguably the highwater mark for the IJN carriers after PH, but they never located the BEF and Somerville's carriers and they never launched their full strength against a USN carrier TF. It's a historical fact that KB never massed it's full strength against any Allied carrier TF, and the closest they came to that was their 5 fleet carrier raid on Ceylon. 



> I think Glider already addressed this earlier up thread.



I don't think anyone has really addressed the massive weight of Axis AF attacks on the RN and Commonwealth navies in the ETO/MTO from April 1940 onward. We've only looked at tiny snippets of the big picture. Against the Arctic Convoys just from April - Sept 1942, they flew 600 strike sorties, against Pedestal alone, they flew ~220, if we added up all Axis AF attacks in 1942 directed against RN and Commonwealth navies it would be in the thousands, and far higher than what the IJNAF was able to do in 1942.





> One might pay close attention to issue #5.



Yes, the USN, by their own admission, was facing a weaker AF in the Pacific, with stronger forces of their own. 






> Must be why the USN lost those battles.



In some cases they did lose and/or won because of gross errors by the IJN. 



> Criticism of the USN isn't "ignored" or "considered an insult" far from it, but it's your constant flag waving over the RN and belittling of everything from Pearl Harbor to Midway as a cakewalk for the USN compared to RN's operations in the MTO or even off Ceylon. You contend that the RN faced much harder and more numerous opposition on a magnitude so much greater than the USN did in the Pacific that they can't be compared. Perhaps a re-evaluation of some of your statements is in order.



I'm not the one flag waving. I am discussing the naval airwar in historical context.

Y


> ou're free to expound your ideas, but make no mistake, the KdB would have absolutely savaged the RN in the Indian Ocean in March of 42 and Sommerville knew it, hence his tactics. Fletcher had no choice at Coral Sea (hence his tactics), he had to stand and fight, and fight he did, he did have the option to wait for TF16 had KdB shown up in force, but it was still GAME ON. After all, SOMEONE had to man up and help defend Australia, the RN sure as hell wasn't capable of it.


??? We know what happened historically at Ceylon in April 1942, and the RN was defeated, but the losses were not severe and the KB never even located the RN's fleet carriers. Coral Sea was not about an invasion of Australia, and no Fletcher didn't have to fight and wouldn't have until reinforced, if the full KB arrived. By defending Ceylon, and the IO the RN was also defending Australia and also the entire Allied strategic situation. But I think your comments here, might be considered 'flag waving' N'est-ce pas? 



> And whether you like it or not, or acknowledge it or not, the IJN and the USN were the varsity squads of carrier air warfare, the BPF was never more than the size/capability (after a training session with U.S.S. Saratoga) of a Task Group in the Pacific War.



More flag waving on your part. Historically, USN Fleet Admiral King repeatedly asked for RN carriers in 1942. We all know that by 1944/45 the USN had expanded radically.




> Sorry, I don't believe you mean any of that.



Yes, I'm sure you do, and that's why it's so difficult to have a calm and rational discussion about certain topics.



> This all reminds me of a fella I used to know, he was a big, dyed in the wool Hurricane fan, at the slightest inference that the P-40 _might_ have been equal to the Hurricane he'd be off on a tear. God forbit you mentioned to him that it might actually be a better plane than the Hurricane. Hell, I remember going a couple of rounds with that guy over his contention that the Mustang wasn't as good as late marques of the Hurricane, and that he could _prove_ that with facts.
> 
> You all can continue, I'll read but I'm out on this one, it smacks too much of those hurricane/P-40/Mustang "debates" years ago.



More flag waving.


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## Schweik (Feb 9, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> IOWs, you made it up. Placing all the naval AFs into their proper historical context isn't belittling, rather it's discussing naval aviation history. The IJNAF deployed aircraft that would not have been acceptable to any other AF, this gave them lightweight aircraft with good performance by naval AF standards but it came at a real cost in survivability. The IJNAFs aircraft were not modern by 1942 land based AF standards, nor were most naval AFs aircraft, but the RN was pitted against a very powerful land based AF with better performing and more modern aircraft than those deployed in the Pacific. *The RN was pitting their obsolescent biplanes and not quite fighters against an array of Spanish Civil War era antiques from Italy (also biplanes, cloth covered trimotors etc.) and a handful of good but exceedingly short range German planes.* This is just a fact, and any "belittling" is being done by those who pretend this isn't true.



Fixed it for you.

I don't see anyone claiming the F4F was a superb aircraft, it's really you who insists, against all the evidence, that woefully obsolete (or badly designed) aircraft like the Sea Hurricane, Fulmar, Skua, Swordfish and Albacore were superb, or at least better than everyone elses, and also simultaneously pretending that 1930's era Italian planes were more dangerous than the deadly dive bombers of the IJN carrier battlegroups.

Even though it only took 32 of them to sink a RN carrier...


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## RCAFson (Feb 9, 2021)

Schweik said:


> The records state that 6 Fulmars got there before or as Hermes was attacked, and 6 more arrived after she was sunk.
> 
> Far more important to the ongoing debate I am referring to your claim that "_*The IJN flew about 180 attack sorties against units of the BEF on 5 and 9 April 1942.*_ "
> 
> ...



I have Bloody Shambles Vol II and Hermes was sunk prior (at 10:55) to the Fulmars arriving (12:15), as were the other Allied ships in the area. The Fulmar pilots saw sinking ships and incorrectly assumed that one of them was Hermes, and this has led to many incorrect accounts since then. Hermes was long gone before any Fulmars arrived.

By units of the BEF I meant Cornwall and Dorsetshire on 5 April, (53 Vals despatched according to Shores but 88 according to Stuart ) and Hermes on 9 April (85 Vals despatched) and I must confess that I made a mistake here as I incorrectly tallied the numbers of IJN strike aircraft despatched on both occasions at ~180 when the actual number was 138 according to Shores and 173 according to Stuart:
Leonard Birchall and the Japanese Raid on Colombo - Canadian Military Journal

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## Schweik (Feb 9, 2021)

So wait a minute, strikes against the RN which never find carriers but attack port facilities and cruisers count as attacks on carriers in your model, but strikes against the USN which don't find the carriers don't count?

How do you count aircraft that arrived after the only carrier present was sunk?


Is there some reason why your big argument uses different standards for the RN vs the USN?


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## RCAFson (Feb 9, 2021)

Schweik said:


> Fixed it for you.
> 
> I don't see anyone claiming the F4F was a superb aircraft, it's really you who insists, against all the evidence, that woefully obsolete (or badly designed) aircraft like the Sea Hurricane, Fulmar, Skua, Swordfish and Albacore were superb, or at least better than everyone elses, and also simultaneously pretending that 1930's era Italian planes were more dangerous than the deadly dive bombers of the IJN carrier battlegroups.
> 
> Even though it only took 32 of them to sink a RN carrier...



You were claiming the F4F was a superb aircraft and presenting prototype performance figures rather than those for combat ready aircraft. I pointed out it's actual performance, just as I've pointed out the actual performance of all the aircraft under discussion. The problem here is that many people prefer to flag wave rather than have an honest discussion free of nationalist pretensions.


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## RCAFson (Feb 9, 2021)

Schweik said:


> So wait a minute, strikes against the RN which never find carriers but attack port facilities and cruisers count as attacks on carriers in your model, but strikes against the USN which don't find the carriers don't count?
> 
> How do you count aircraft that arrived after the only carrier present was sunk?
> 
> ...



I didn't count the two strikes directed against Ceylon on 5 April (91 strike aircraft) and 9 April (91 strike aircraft) . The IJN launched 4 strikes on 5 and 9 April. two strikes (182 strike aircraft) against Ceylon and two strikes (~138 to 173 strike aircraft) against units of the BEF.


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## Schweik (Feb 9, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> I didn't count the two strikes directed against Ceylon on 5 April (91 strike aircraft) and 9 April (91 strike aircraft) . The IJN launched 4 strikes on 5 and 9 April. two strikes (182 strike aircraft) against Ceylon and two strikes (~138 to 173 strike aircraft) against units of the BEF.



You can only have *one* standard when you are making a comparison between two things. They must share this standard for the comparison to be meaningful.

You aren't using the same criteria quite obviously, for example with Eastern Solomons - their second strike (maybe - I haven't checked) didn't find the carriers they were looking for. Well, that is exactly what happened for all but 32 of the aircraft that went looking for British carriers at Ceylon. 

if the criteria is just sent a strike out against "units of" a carrier group, then the USN numbers are much higher.
if the criteria is actually bombed or tried to bomb a carrier, then the RN numbers are much lower.
You can't have it both ways mate.

(And if the criteria is just air attacks against shipping there a ton more you missed. Like those ones I posted earlier around Java)

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## Peter Gunn (Feb 9, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> More flag waving.



Pot, meet kettle.

I'll break it to you gently, you're the last one on this board to be accusing anyone of that, just sayin'.

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## Schweik (Feb 9, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> You were claiming the F4F was a superb aircraft



Please show me where I ever wrote that. Maybe you confused "better than a Hurricane" with "superb". There is a LOT of mileage between a Hurricane in 1942 and "superb"



> and presenting prototype performance figures rather than those for combat ready aircraft. I pointed out it's actual performance, just as I've pointed out the actual performance of all the aircraft under discussion. The problem here is that many people prefer to flag wave rather than have an honest discussion free of nationalist pretensions.



No, as you, me, and everyone else reading this thread knows very well, I was literally posting links to ALL the performance figures from WW2aircraftPerformance.org except the one you cherry picked. Please show me where those were all "prototype" performance figures. There is always variance in testing.

You have been quoting from First Team a lot. *Here is what First Team says about the F4F-4 (volume 1, page 140 - link via google books here:

Top speed 278 knots / 320 mph*, initial climb 2,190, 12.4 minutes to 20,000 feet. Did he cherry pick that? Because it's very similar to the numbers I posted.

Who precisely has their thumb on the scale here? Who is emphasizing outlier data and demanding we ignore everything else?

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## slaterat (Feb 9, 2021)

Really? lol


Schweik said:


> Who precisely has their thumb on the scale here? Who is emphasizing outlier data and demanding we ignore everything else?



I don't think the KdB would of lasted 2 weeks against the combined forces of the axis in the Mediterranean. Their tinder box carriers would of been quickly put on the bottom of the sea with their poor air cap and damage control. These are two very different theaters and different tactics and equipment. The much tighter waters of the Mediteranean, infested with aircraft and submarines, lead to the development of the armoured carrier and the sophisticated and effective air defense of the FAA. Conducting air strikes at night also became a specialty. The open waters of the Pacific lead to longer ranged aircraft with an emphasis on offence but limited to daylight flying only.


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## GrauGeist (Feb 9, 2021)

slaterat said:


> I don't think the KdB would of lasted 2 weeks against the combined forces of the axis in the Mediterranean.


Pretty sure Japan was an Axis nation, too...

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## fubar57 (Feb 9, 2021)

That would certainly tip the odds in favour of the Axis over the KdB

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## Schweik (Feb 10, 2021)

slaterat said:


> Really? lol
> 
> 
> I don't think the KdB would of lasted 2 weeks against the combined forces of the axis in the Mediterranean. Their tinder box carriers would of been quickly put on the bottom of the sea with their poor air cap and damage control. These are two very different theaters and different tactics and equipment. The much tighter waters of the Mediteranean, infested with aircraft and submarines, lead to the development of the armoured carrier and the sophisticated and effective air defense of the FAA. Conducting air strikes at night also became a specialty. The open waters of the Pacific lead to longer ranged aircraft with an emphasis on offence but limited to daylight flying only.



Nice spin on the whole thing I'll give you that.

I think every aircraft carrier, even to this day, is pretty much a 'tinderbox', they are full of aviation fuel, bombs, machine gun and cannon ammunition, torpedoes, mines, AAA ammunition, and fuel, hydraulic fluid and all kinds of other flammable substances used by the ship itself. Any time a bomb or torpedo goes off in, on or near one it's a potential catastrophe. But I see no evidence to assume that Japanese carriers were in any way inferior to USN or RN types. Those armored decks didn't seem to save RN CVs getting sunk right and left - they lost 14 which is a lot considering they weren't part of any major carrier battles.

Compare Zuikakau with Indomitable (the carrier at Pedestal) - 1942 vintage for both:

Launched: 1939 (Z) / 1940 (P)
Displacement: 32K tons loaded (Z) / 29K tons loaded (P)
Speed: 34.5 knots (Z) / 30 knots (P)
Range: 7K miles (Z) / 11k miles (P)
AA: 16 x 5 In, 36 x 25mm (Z) / 16 x 4.5 in, 48 x 40mm, 10 x 20mm
Aircraft: 72+12 (Z) / 50 (P)

Zuikaku is faster and carries 22 more aircraft. Indomitable has more AA and a longer range. I don't see that as sufficient to make a vast difference. Nice to have a few more AA guns and armored decks but I think I'd rather have 20 Zeros protecting the fleet.

Which brings me to Japanese CAP, it was undoubtedly the best naval fighter protection in the world in 1942. Who was better? Sea Hurricanes and Skuas? Fulmars? Nor was the US CAP as good either.

And the famous night attacks... it's a neat trick - getting them working on Swordfish in 1940 is a _really_ neat trick, and Taranto was a triumph. But by 1942 trading night attacks at short range for not being able to do day attacks at all is not much of a trade. Nor was airborne radar unique to British aircraft. PBY Catalina's were doing low-level night attacks at Guadalcanal, and sunk a bunch of ships that way. They eventually had multiple "Black Cat" squadrons in the Solomons and elsewhere doing night ops. They put radar on TBF / TBM Avengers as well, starting in late 1942, and widespread by 1943 (becoming standard on TBF-1 and TBF-1D). Avengers even shot down a few aircraft in night combat in 1944.

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## Schweik (Feb 10, 2021)

I'd really like to see evidence that the British navy, fleet air arm, or carrier fleet was specifically developed to fight in the Med. It's certainly not my area of expertise by any stretch but I find that very unlikely.

Swordfish and Hurricanes have very short range because they were built in the 30s and not very aerodynamic.


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## GrauGeist (Feb 10, 2021)

By the way, when people refer to "armored deck", I'm fairly sure they're aware that only 65% of the deck was armored. And the armor was only 3" (7.8cm) thick.
The fore-deck and afterdeck were half that and the elevators were not armored.

These were not impervious ships and were just as vulnerable to torpedoes and AP bombs as any other warship.

What made the USN's "fragile" carriers survive bombing attacks, was their superior fire control.

Of the 12 US carriers sunk during WWII, only three were sunk outright by aircraft (2 by kamikaze, 1 by bombers).
1 was sunk by gunfire from a warship, 4 were torpedoed by submarines (1 German, 3 Japanese) and 4 were scuttled (the IJN helped in one scuttling by torpedoes from destroyers Akigumo and Makigumo).
Of those 12, only 4 were fleet carriers.

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## RCAFson (Feb 10, 2021)

Schweik said:


> Please show me where I ever wrote that. Maybe you confused "better than a Hurricane" with "superb". There is a LOT of mileage between a Hurricane in 1942 and "superb"
> 
> 
> 
> ...


This is from First Team, V1 (from my post 240):

It was the USN themselves that stated that the F4F-4 performed poorly, with a very poor climb rate:

_"Fighting Six spent the last few days of March learning about the new model Grumman they would take into battle. They were not impressed: “The planes are like a TBD with a fish,”(7) a grave insult. On 1 April, Gray led a division of four F4F-4s out to the Enterprise at sea for training exercises. He observed the mock torpedo attack on the carrier by Torpedo Six, then landed on board to demonstrate to the air department the features of the F4F-4. That day the squadron took delivery of fifteen F4F-4s just arrived from the West Coast. This was the beginning of a big exchange of aircraft, so Fighting Six would have all available F4F-4s. Gray turned over most of his F4F-3s to Fighting Three and ended up with twenty-three F4F-4s and four F4F-3s. Fighting Six was the first carrier fighting squadron to attain the recommended operating strength of twenty-seven airplanes._

_On 3 April with the Enterprise back in port, Fighting Six shifted back to NAS Pearl Harbor to install new gear and commission the factory-fresh planes. Three days later Gray shot off a rocket to Halsey offering his opinion of the Grumman F4F-4 fighter.(8) The performance of the folding wing Wildcat was “exceedingly unsatisfactory.” The weight, he felt, simply was too much for the available horsepower, a fact most detrimental to the aircraft’s climb and maneuverability. He noted that the F4F-4 had the “feel of a fully loaded torpedo plane.” In tests, VF-6 pilots discovered that the climb rate of a fully loaded F4F-4 was only 1,500 feet per minute up to 15,000 feet. Thereafter even that anemic climb rate fell off drastically to 600 feet per minute at 22,000 feet of altitude. Gray found it took almost forty minutes and nearly half of the fuel supply to coax an F4F-4 up to 32,000 feet..." (Lundstrom, First Team)._

After Midway, where 28 IJN strike aircraft, in two strikes were able to penetrate the USN GCI directed air defence where the USN had about 60 available fighters, Nimitz sent off a message urgently requesting Merlin engined fighters:

_"..Spruance and Browning rated the Grumman Wildcat "greatly inferior'' in comparison with the nimble Japanese
Zero. On 20 June Nimitz relayed their fears to King, noting the "extreme and apparently
increased superiority performance of 0 fighters'' was mitigated only by the vulnerability
of Japanese planes and the superior tactics of the U.S. Navy fighter pilots. "Overall results
have been bad and will be serious and potentially decisive with improvement that must
be expected in enemy tactics.'' Remarkably he called for army Curtiss P-4OF Warhawk
fighters to replace navy F4F Wildcats and Brewster F2A Buffaloes in all marine fighting
squadrons defending forward bases *and even asked that the P-4OF "or comparable type"
be tested for carrier suitability*; In the meantime the F4F-4s must be lightened, and their
ammunition supply increased even should that require reverting to four guns in place of six.
The swift introduction of the Vought F4U-1 Corsair fighter was an "absolute priority.'' Thus
after Midway the top fleet commanders experienced a serious crisis of confidence over the
effectiveness of the basic U.S. carrier fighter, a worry that would soon influence Fletcher's
most controversial command decision..."
(Black Shoe carrier Admiral, p.200)_

The problems in USN GCI fighter direction are detailed in Friedman's _Fighters Over the Fleet_, but it exacerbated the issues with the F4F-4, since they had such a poor climb rate that it was essential that radar GCI directed them accurately and in sufficient numbers to break up the IJN attacks. By Mid 1942, the RN FAA had had over two years experience with radar GCI and they used it to make effective use of the Fulmar, for example, which had a similarly poor rate of climb:

_"The aircraft on board the British carriers were inferior to the
attackers [PEDESTAL] in performance, but that was more than balanced by superior
tactics based on radar fighter direction. The US Navy agreed that at this
point British fighter control was superior. In July 1943, with the US
carrier force badly drawn down, Victorious operated with Saratoga in the
Southwest Pacific. Because her fighter-control techniques were considered
superior, she was made fighter carrier, with all the fighters of both
carriers on board: thirty-six Martlets and twenty-four US F4F_-4s." (Friedman, Fighters Over the Fleet)


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## Tom17 (Feb 10, 2021)

Schweik,
'Those armored decks didn't seem to save RN CVs getting sunk right and left - they lost 14 which is a lot considering they weren't part of any major carrier battles'.
The RN lost 5 CVs during WW2.
3 to torpedo (u-boat) _Courageous, Eagle_ and _Ark Royal;_ 1 to surface gunfire , _Glorious;_ and 1 to air attack, _Hermes _
AFAIK none of them had armoured decks ( _Illustrious_ onwards)
Tom

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## Peter Gunn (Feb 10, 2021)

Schweik said:


> Nice spin on the whole thing I'll give you that.
> 
> *But I see no evidence to assume that Japanese carriers were in any way inferior to USN or RN types.* Those armored decks didn't seem to save RN CVs getting sunk right and left - they lost 14 which is a lot considering they weren't part of any major carrier battles.


Actually IJN carriers were perhaps inferior in design, they did not have armored decks and their hangars were totally enclosed, kinda' the worst of both worlds. Shattered Sword gives a good comparison (albeit a quick two paragraphs or so) on this. The enclosed hangars apparently magnified bomb hits in said hangars as the force of the explosion had no where to vent. Also they IJN crews couldn't dump ordinance out of an open side like the USN carrier crews could.

USN = No armored decks but open hangars for ventilation/ordinance disposal and the ability to warm up aircraft in the hangar.
RN = Armored decks with good ventilation although not open to the sea like USN ships.
IJN = No armored decks and no ventilation or ordinance disposal capability i.e. worst of both worlds.

Other than that I agree with you pretty much on the carriers.

Cheers

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## Schweik (Feb 10, 2021)

Tom17 said:


> Schweik,
> 'Those armored decks didn't seem to save RN CVs getting sunk right and left - they lost 14 which is a lot considering they weren't part of any major carrier battles'.
> The RN lost 5 CVs during WW2.
> 3 to torpedo (u-boat) _Courageous, Eagle_ and _Ark Royal;_ 1 to surface gunfire , _Glorious;_ and 1 to air attack, _Hermes _
> ...



Hmmm, yeah that's what I get for believing google, I was a bit too hasty there.

Wikipedia mentions 8:

Ark Royal (CV)- sunk by U-boat
Audacitiy (CVE)- sunk by U-boat 
Avenger (CVE)- sunk by U-boat 
Courageous (CV)- sunk by U-boat 
Dasher (CVE)- sunk by 'unknown explosion'
Eagle (CV)- sunk by U-boat
Glorious CV)- sunk by batleships Scharnhorst and Gniesenau
Hermes (CV)- Sunk by IJN bombers

Note I'm using the acronyms "CV" and "CVE" just to distinguish between fleet carriers and escort carriers. Some of these also look like conversions from other ship types.

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## Schweik (Feb 10, 2021)

Peter Gunn said:


> Actually IJN carriers were perhaps inferior in design, they did not have armored decks and their hangars were totally enclosed, kinda' the worst of both worlds. Shattered Sword gives a good comparison (albeit a quick two paragraphs or so) on this. The enclosed hangars apparently magnified bomb hits in said hangars as the force of the explosion had no where to vent. Also they IJN crews couldn't dump ordinance out of an open side like the USN carrier crews could.
> 
> USN = No armored decks but open hangars for ventilation/ordinance disposal and the ability to warm up aircraft in the hangar.
> RN = Armored decks with good ventilation although not open to the sea like USN ships.
> ...



Fair enough- and interesting I wasn't aware, or I guess I'd seen it but hadn't thought about it - of the open sides of the US CVs.

Still, I don't think any of this makes that much difference except around the margins. One or two bombs yeah damage control can maybe handle it. IJN carriers survived bomb hits many times too. US did seem a little better about it, but if they got hit just right or with too many bombs, they were done. There are of course some extreme cases like the _Franklin_, but a lot of that I think (good and bad) comes down to luck.

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## SaparotRob (Feb 10, 2021)

Dimlee said:


> Probably PTO was richer in targets? Just thinking aloud.


I was going to post something very similar myself.


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## Schweik (Feb 10, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> This is from First Team, V1 (from my post 240):
> 
> It was the USN themselves that stated that the F4F-4 performed poorly, with a very poor climb rate:
> 
> ...



So your whole, frequently reposted statistical analysis of IJN sorties vs. RN / USN carriers is shown to be B.S., and all you can resort to is repeating the same mid-war report you already posted three times, and some subjective commentary by a modern author?

Here are some of the objective facts:

The F4F, in various forms remained the main Naval and Marine Corps fighter for the US until late 1943 when the F6F finally started to arrive. The Marines started to get some F4U Corsairs from February 1943 but in small numbers, and it took a while to figure out how to use it. It was the F4F, undoubtedly a mediocre design, which held the line against the IJN, and along with some land based types, and in fact broke the back of the Japanese naval air forces in WW2
That report you posted was only one side of a debate about the F4F-F, and was not the last word.
With the right tactics, including but not limited to Thach Weave, the F4F became a viable opponent to the excellent Japanese fighters (despite it's mediocre performance)
The same is also true for many land based types such as the P-40 and in the Pacific, China, and the MTO, and the P-38 and F4U in the Pacific
No Hurricane unit ever did successfully make this kind of adaptation in any Theater however and by the end of 1942 they were no longer operating as front line fighters
The Hurricane and Sea Hurricane by contrast, were marginal performers (similar to the Wildcat) but with _extremely _limited range and endurance, as noted by numerous British pilots and commanders
The Fulmar was a marginal performer and a marginal dogfighter, and was too slow and low-flying to intercept many Axis bombers
The US_ could _have certainly acquired Sea Hurricanes if they wanted them, God knows enough Hurricanes were being produced including in Canada,
but instead it was the other way around, the British acquired as many Martlets and later Hellcats as they could get.

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## Schweik (Feb 10, 2021)

By the way, the Samar Island engagement with Taffy-3 et al, _did _include Japanese naval air attacks - On Oct 25, 20 x D3A bombers escorted by A6Ms, which were intercepted by FM-2 fighters from VC-10 originally from the Gambier Bay. I haven't yet found all the details of this engagement but there were at least two claims*

Also on Oct 25, starting at 10:47, several USN ships came under kamikzae attack - according to Wikipedia the first kamikaze attack from an actual kamikaze unit in WW II.
_USS CVE Kitkun _bay destroyed a kamikaze aircraft at 11:08
_USS Fanshaw Bay_ took a near miss at around the same time
_USS White Plains_ took a near miss with 11 sailors injured
_USS Kalinin Bay_ was hit and severely damaged
_USS St. Lo _was sunk by a kamikaze

I do not know what type of aircraft made up the kamikaze unit.

*"_After the sinking of the GAMBIER BAY, Ensign McGraw also landed on the MANILA BAY and, on the afternoon of the 25th, he was launched with other pilots from that ship. During this afternoon flight his group intercepted a formation of ten to twenty Vals flying in to attack the escort carriers. McGraw, in this engagement, shot down one Val and one Zeke.
Action on the 25th was fast and furious. Lieut. J. R. Jackson made one direct hit on a Japanese heavy cruiser with a five-hundred-pound bomb. Ens. W. C. Shroyer made two direct hits on a heavy cruiser with five-hundred-pound bombs. Lt. (jg) C. F. Hunting shot down a Zeke._"

There were also apparently attacks by Land based bombers, with FM-2's from Gambier Bay making claims on the 24th. Per the Gambier bay survivors website:

_"On October 24th Ens. Courtney assisted in breaking up an attack on American transports by more than 15 twin engine bombers. He was credited with assisting in destroying one Sally and the probable destruction of one Lily. The same day Lieut. R. W. Roby shot down one Lily and assisted in shooting down one Sally and Lieut. Seitz shot down a *Sally* _[Ki-21]_. Lt. (jg) Phillips probably destroyed two Zekes and Lt.(jg) Dugan down *two Sallys*. On the same day, Joe McGraw and others in a CAP flight intercepted a group of fifteen to twenty-one twin engine bombers escorted by six to eight Zekes. McGraw destroyed two* Lilys* _[Ki-48]_ and damaged a third."_

This was obviously much later than 1942 but unless it is proven that these were actually Betty's or something, it puts paid to the notion that land based Japanese bombers never attacked US Navy ships. I seriously doubt it was the first time, as such bombers were based near other naval combat zones, but I haven't checked my books yet.

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## SaparotRob (Feb 10, 2021)

Off the top of my head, we’re comparing 1st and 2nd generation carriers (close enough). Akagi and Kaga were conversions. At their time of “construction” nobody knew what to do with carriers. The earlier RN carriers were pretty much in the same boat. The early American aircraft carriers, CV-2 and CV-3 were the coolest looking aircraft carriers ever built.

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## SaparotRob (Feb 10, 2021)

I’m not looking through Star Spangled glasses but I do have a pair of Ray-Bans.

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## SaparotRob (Feb 10, 2021)

SaparotRob said:


> Off the top of my head, we’re comparing 1st and 2nd generation carriers (close enough). Akagi and Kaga were conversions. At their time of “construction” nobody knew what to do with carriers. The earlier RN carriers were pretty much in the same boat. The early American aircraft carriers, CV-2 and CV-3 were the coolest looking aircraft carriers ever built.


I was actually going somewhere with this but then, you know.


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## Schweik (Feb 10, 2021)

I like the ones converted from battleships, especially if they still had some of their big guns. I know they weren't ideal in many ways,. but they look tough.

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## SaparotRob (Feb 10, 2021)

The Lexingtons had twin 8”(?) gun turrets right by the island.

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## Schweik (Feb 10, 2021)

SaparotRob said:


> The Lexingtons had twin 8”(?) gun turrets right by the island.








Yeah I think Saratoga too, right?

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## Schweik (Feb 10, 2021)

Apparently Lexingtons big guns were taken off and made into shore defense cannon in March 42


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## RCAFson (Feb 10, 2021)

Schweik said:


> So your whole, frequently reposted statistical analysis of IJN sorties vs. RN / USN carriers is shown to be B.S., and all you can resort to is repeating the same mid-war report you already posted three times, and some subjective commentary by a modern author?
> 
> Here are some of the objective facts:
> 
> ...





F4F-4 = 1200hp, 7975lb and 260sq ft wing area (F4F-4A/B = ~7800lb)

Sea Hurricane IB = 7015lb, 1300hp (12lb boost) or 1440hp (16lb boost) and 258sq ft wing area

Compute the power to weight ratio of a Sea Hurricane IB and an F4F-4

Compute the wing loading of each aircraft.

Which aircraft is likely to turn better?

Which aircraft is likely to climb better?

Which will likely have a shorter TO run?

Did USN F4F-4 pilots complain about poor climb rates? Did they complain about poor maneuverability? Did they complain about high fuel consumption during climbs?

Liquid cooled engines have lower specific fuel consumption at high power settings, so the Merlin will use less fuel during combat and during climbs.

At Midway, F4F-4s that didn't engage in any combat began running out of fuel after 4hrs.

Finally, for a look at why the Sea Hurricane was retired, compute the power to weight ratio and wing loading of the folding wing FM2 and the Seafire III.

The Sea Hurricane IIA/B/C missed Pedestal but served for another two years aboard RN CVs and CVEs.

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## SaparotRob (Feb 10, 2021)

Schweik said:


> Apparently Lexingtons big guns were taken off and made into shore defense cannon in March 42


But still, cool?


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## SaparotRob (Feb 10, 2021)

I think we’ve established that the Wildcat and Hurricane were less than optimal naval aviation supremacy aircraft. That would definitely be a factor in comparing the different theatres. 
In the North Atlantic, fleet defense didn’t require first rate fighters. Breaking up unescorted bomber attacks was the task, not attacking/counter attacking opposing fleets. The convoys would put as much distance as possible from hostile airfields. Fulmars, Sea Hurricanes and Martlets would suffice if only to disrupt attacks. Anti-aircraft weapons were perpetually upgraded and increased as soon as practicable. 
There may be some similarities between the PTO and the MTO, however. 
Consider Axis airfields as unsinkable aircraft carriers. RN fleets maneuvering to avoid the “flight decks” of opposing air fleets. Scrambling aircraft up to altitudes those planes were not enthusiastic about reaching (No supporting data, just what I got from this thread). The quality of Allied aircraft was far more important in the Med and was found lacking. The attacks on the Med convoys were more incessant than the attacks on the American forces by the IJN/IJA. The LW possibly had superior planes to the IJN but no Air Force in the world could match the IJN in training, experience and dedication in anti ship warfare. At least up to the Battle of Santa Cruz. 
The PTO was a battle between opposing air fleets launched from aircraft carriers as well as unsinkable aircraft carriers. Henderson Field, Rabaul, etc. It involved land based aircraft crewed by navy, army and marine personnel. Both side’s air forces were (for the most part) trained in anti ship warfare. The Axis air forces in the PTO may have had less robust planes but they had the craft to put ordnance on target. 
This may be where comparison differs. The PTO aircraft were designed (some better than others) and crewed anti ship specialists. The raids were fewer but more intense.

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## SaparotRob (Feb 10, 2021)

This thread brought up the attacks on the American task forces during the battle of Santa Cruz. Drachinifel just did the fourth of a series of videos on Guadalcanal fleet actions. “IJN 2/USN 2”. It really goes into the attacks on the American fleet. I usually space out on after-action reports but this one was entertaining. 
He also has a separate video on anti-aircraft guns “enforcing the no-fly zone”. 
And yes, he has one on armoured vs unarmoured carriers.

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## Schweik (Feb 11, 2021)

SaparotRob said:


> I think we’ve established that the Wildcat and Hurricane were less than optimal naval aviation supremacy aircraft. That would definitely be a factor in comparing the different theatres.
> In the North Atlantic, fleet defense didn’t require first rate fighters. Breaking up unescorted bomber attacks was the task, not attacking/counter attacking opposing fleets. The convoys would put as much distance as possible from hostile airfields. Fulmars, Sea Hurricanes and Martlets would suffice if only to disrupt attacks. Anti-aircraft weapons were perpetually upgraded and increased as soon as practicable.
> There may be some similarities between the PTO and the MTO, however.
> Consider Axis airfields as unsinkable aircraft carriers. RN fleets maneuvering to avoid the “flight decks” of opposing air fleets. Scrambling aircraft up to altitudes those planes were not enthusiastic about reaching (No supporting data, just what I got from this thread). The quality of Allied aircraft was far more important in the Med and was found lacking. The attacks on the Med convoys were more incessant than the attacks on the American forces by the IJN/IJA. The LW possibly had superior planes to the IJN but no Air Force in the world could match the IJN in training, experience and dedication in anti ship warfare. At least up to the Battle of Santa Cruz.
> ...



I get the sense you are a well-meaning, impartial observer in this big stupid debate, but I feel compelled to point out that almost all of that is completely wrong. So wrong in fact, that I need to throw in the towel after this post. But here are some points in no particular order.

In the Atlantic, the main threat (by far) was actually submarines. The most important aircraft were PBYs, Sunderlands, B-24s (PB2Y) and TBFs in the ASW mode. Sea Hurricanes were adequate to see off the occasional Fw 200..
Submarines were pretty substantial part of the threat in the Med too. And the Pacific. But only in the Pacific did you also have hard core fleet actions, carrier vs. carrier, battleship vs. battleship. 
The Hurricane was a great fighter in 1940 during the Battle of Britain. By 1941 however, it had really gone past it's "use by" date. Even the Russians didn't want them any more.
The Sea Hurricane was a completely inadequate carrier fighter, partly because you can't have a carrier fighter with a 400 mile range and a 1 hour combat endurance, and partly because it was just an obsolete fighter that couldn't contend with land based fighters, or _especially_ with the A6M. All they could do is CAP and they were very bad at that, read the history of PQ 18 as an excellent example, they couldn't even shoot down lumbering seaplanes like BV 138s and He 115s.
The Fulmar was just an inadequate design from the get-go. WW2 propeller engines, especially in the first half of the war, were just not powerful enough to power a 2-man fighter sufficiently to be anything other than a glorified scout. It was sufficient to intercept slow, unescorted bombers at low altitude, but that's not enough for a carrier fighter.
Don't even get me started on the Skua.
The Wildcat was a somewhat mediocre design, inferior in performance to the A6M, which through good tactics and training - and leveraging it's better traits, turned out to be a moderate success. It was substantially better both as a fighter and especially as a naval fighter than a Hurricane let alone a Sea Hurricane. It had 2.5 times the endurance and twice the range for one thing. It was also better armed and more agile. It was the Wildcat which broke the IJN air arm, more than any other aircraft. RCAF has grossly exaggerated the deficiencies of the F4F, cherry picking one evaluation over all others, but in reality while there was a controversy in mid-1942, by the end of that year and for most of the next year, they were still successfully relying on the F4F to protect the fleets and escort bombers and more, and did so with success. Using tactics like the Thach weave and other standardized guidelines which became part of the training for all fighter pilots, they made it work. Much like Allied fighter pilots did with Spitfire Mk Vs and P-40s in the Western Desert.
The Martlet was originally an export version of the Wildcat with a civilian airliner engine. It was far less capable than a Wildcat. And yet even so, it was far more effective than the Hurricane or Fulmar and the RN tried to get as many as they could. Gradually they improved the Martlet but it was always a step behind what the USN was using.
The Mediterranean _Naval_ Air War (as distinct from the War over the Desert in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia) was definitely _not _anywhere _near_ as intense as the Pacific War. It was the minor leagues. Nowhere near the same scale as the Pacific War. The Pacific War was more or less continuous, with vicious engagements breaking out every few weeks, with no holds barred, and no quarter asked or given. It had everything the Med convoy fights had plus a lot more. Much bigger and many more surface ships. Much better and more effective torpedoes (on the Japanese side), many more aircraft carriers, and more modern everything.
The convoy fights like Pedestal were up against almost entirely unescorted, obsolete Italian bombers and / or unescorted (though better) German bombers like the Ju 88. The latter was nearly impossible for a Hurricane to intercept (either over the fleet or over Malta) but more or less average land based fighters like P-40s easily shot them down. Only when the convoy drew within close range of the German air bases and within range of Bf 109s and MC 202s were they under any serious threat that was in any way comparable to the sea battles in the Pacific, and then only for a short time. The RN basically broke under that strain.
The fact that RCAFson managed to apparently convey the impression that these were comparable in any way proves the futility of this debate.
The A6M was _by far_ the best naval fighter of the war until the Hellcat arrived in Sept 1943. F4U's were very good but they were land based at first. It was better than all carrier fighters and at least the equal of any land based fighter in the world in 1942.
The fragility of Japanese aircraft, especially the A6M and Ki 43, is exagerrated. It mattered, but much more in terms of attrition warfare than in specific engagements.
Similarly, the D3A was the second most lethal ship killer in WW2, the first being the SBD.
The fact that so little of the reality of all this seems to be apparent, is testament to the tireless propagandizing of RCAFson. His ludicrous claims that the USN suffered fewer attack sorties than the RN hold about as much water as the HMS Hermes hull on April 10, 1942, but it becomes one of those arguments where if you continue, you look as delusional as the guy you are debating. So I'm gonna take a break for a while.

My final thought is, we all have our favorites, our allegieances, and so on, but if you appreciate history, you learn to accept your favorites warts and all, acknowledging the reality for what it was, it just makes it all that much more interesting and fun. Obfuscating the truth is not only pointless, it's just pathetic. It undermines the whole point of fora like this one.

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## RCAFson (Feb 11, 2021)

Schweik said:


> The Wildcat was a somewhat mediocre design, inferior in performance to the A6M, which through good tactics and training - and leveraging it's better traits, turned out to be a moderate success. It was substantially better both as a fighter and especially as a naval fighter than a Hurricane let alone a Sea Hurricane. It had 2.5 times the endurance and twice the range for one thing. It was also better armed and more agile. It was the Wildcat which broke the IJN air arm, more than any other aircraft. RCAF has grossly exaggerated the deficiencies of the F4F, cherry picking one evaluation over all others, but in reality while there was a controversy in mid-1942, by the end of that year and for most of the next year, they were still successfully relying on the F4F to protect the fleets and escort bombers and more, and did so with success. Using tactics like the Thach weave and other standardized guidelines which became part of the training for all fighter pilots, they made it work. Much like Allied fighter pilots did with Spitfire Mk Vs and P-40s in the Western Desert.
> The Martlet was originally an export version of the Wildcat with a civilian airliner engine. It was far less capable than a Wildcat. And yet even so, it was far more effective than the Hurricane or Fulmar and the RN tried to get as many as they could. Gradually they improved the Martlet but it was always a step behind what the USN was using.




The Martlet II/IV were equivalent to the F4F-4A/B and the F4F-4A/B had generally better performance than the F4F-4 under 15K ft (where most carrier combat took place). For a brief comparison of the F4F-4 and F4F-4B see page 3 paragraph 5 of this report:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-4-02135.pdf

Note the climb rates reported above and remember that the aircraft was tested at full military power.

There are numerous USN adverse reports on the F4F-3/4, and I have quoted from several of these reports. There's the report quoted by Lundstrom (Lundstrom devotes nearly a whole chapter detailing the F4F-4 adverse reports) regarding flight trials by USN carrier pilots of the F4F-4. There's the adverse reports by USN carrier F4F-4 pilots after Midway and the adverse reports by MAG22 pilots based on Midway Island and the side by side tests of the Zero and F4F-4. There's the adverse reports in USN carrier action reports such as CV-6's:

_Our fighters, F4F-4's, are completely outclassed by Japanese "0" fighters in speed, climb, and maneuverability.
Action Report: 4-6 June 1942 (Serial 0137)_

and Yorktown's:

_(c) F4F-4 Airplanes
The fighter pilots are very disappointed with the performance and length of sustained fire power of the F4F-4 airplanes. THE Zero fighters could easily outmaneuver and out-climb the F4F-3, and the consensus of fighter pilot opinion is that the F4F-4 is even more sluggish and slow than the F4F-3. It is also felt that it was a mistake to put 6 guns on the F4F-4 and thus to reduce the rounds per gun. For the opposition now being encountered the combination of 4 guns and 450 rounds per gun is much superior to the 6 guns with 240 rounds per gun. Many of our fighters ran out of ammunition even before the Jap dive bombers arrived over our forces; these were experienced pilots, not novices. It is strongly urged that the Navy be supplied with a fighter that is at least equal of the Zero fighter. It is believed that 4-50 caliber fixed machine guns give sufficient fire power for carrier based fighters, especially in view of the loss of performance involved in adding two additional guns_. Battle of Midway: USS Yorktown Action Report


, and there's the adverse report by Nimitz to Admiral King, and numerous others. Your comments above show your woeful ignorance on this topic which you try to disguise by claiming that I cherry picked them to show the F4F-4 in a bad light. Yes, the USN developed tactics to enable the F4F-4 to deal with the Zero, and so did FAA pilots develop tactics to enable the Fulmar, for example, which had a similar climb rate (under ~10K ft) and turn radius to the F4F-4 (and Martlet II/IV) to also cope with superior performing Axis aircraft. 

The F4F-3/4 was better armed (when the gun jam issues were sorted out) than the Sea Hurricane IB/ IIA ( not the /C) but it had substantially lower climb rates and was slower under 15K Ft where most carrier combat took place and poorer turn radius, roll rates and substantially lower climb rates, and most of these can be confirmed by simply calculating the wing loading and power to weight ratios. The F4F-4 has about 23% more fuel than a Sea Hurricane IB but weighs about 14% more and uses more fuel at higher power settings, so yes the F4F-4 has better range and endurance (by 10-20%), but not by a factor of 2 and 2.5!

When we compare wing loading and power to weight ratios of the Sea Hurricane IB to the Zero we note that the Zero has a substantial advantage in wing loading, but remarkably has a lower power to weight ratio, than the Sea Hurricane IB under about 11K ft, indicating that the two aircraft would have been very close in climb rates to ~20K ft.


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## SaparotRob (Feb 11, 2021)

Schweik said:


> I get the sense you are a well-meaning, impartial observer in this big stupid debate, but I feel compelled to point out that almost all of that is completely wrong. So wrong in fact, that I need to throw in the towel after this post. But here are some points in no particular order.
> 
> In the Atlantic, the main threat (by far) was actually submarines. The most important aircraft were PBYs, Sunderlands, B-24s (PB2Y) and TBFs in the ASW mode. Sea Hurricanes were adequate to see off the occasional Fw 200..
> Submarines were pretty substantial part of the threat in the Med too. And the Pacific. But only in the Pacific did you also have hard core fleet actions, carrier vs. carrier, battleship vs. battleship.
> ...


I actually agree with you on all points!
I was just trying to steer the conversation back to the comparison of theater operations and away from using stats to prove an inferior airplane was a world beater. As to all the other threats, it would have taken a few more pages to address and I was running out of steam. How so many forum members can write such long and scholarly tomes is beyond my abilities. As to specifics, I fully confess to babbling thoughts off the top of my head. I’ll leave fact checking to you guys... and I won’t argue.

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## SaparotRob (Feb 11, 2021)

My favorite Allied fighter is the Brewster Buffalo. You want to talk about “warts and all”?

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## Glider (Feb 11, 2021)

CR42 rocks

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## WARSPITER (Feb 14, 2021)

Damn.... with fruit prices going up I thought I could get some here but it looks like all the cherries have been picked.......

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## slaterat (Feb 15, 2021)

Schweik said:


> I get the sense you are a well-meaning, impartial observer in this big stupid debate, but I feel compelled to point out that almost all of that is completely wrong. So wrong in fact, that I need to throw in the towel after this post. But here are some points in no particular order.



Then why did you start this thread in the first place?



Schweik said:


> In the Atlantic, the main threat (by far) was actually submarines. The most important aircraft were PBYs, Sunderlands, B-24s (PB2Y) and TBFs in the ASW mode. Sea Hurricanes were adequate to see off the occasional Fw 200..



The FW 200 was a very dangerous plane to attack. Well defended and armed and armoured for its time. Much tougher nut to crack than any IJN bomber.



Schweik said:


> The Hurricane was a great fighter in 1940 during the Battle of Britain. By 1941 however, it had really gone past it's "use by" date. Even the Russians didn't want them any more



Hurricanes claimed more than 6000 ea destroyed in WW2, more than any other allied fighter. Front line service from the very beginning of the war to the end.





Schweik said:


> The Sea Hurricane was a completely inadequate carrier fighter, partly because you can't have a carrier fighter with a 400 mile range and a 1 hour combat endurance, and partly because it was just an obsolete fighter that couldn't contend with land based fighters, or _especially_ with the A6M. All they could do is CAP and they were very bad at that, read the history of PQ 18 as an excellent example, they couldn't even shoot down lumbering seaplanes like BV 138s and He 115s



The sea Hurricane was quite successful as a fighter and was used in this role until 44. Positive K/D ratios, winning critical battles. The safe landing of 10 hurricanes from 46 Squadron on the Glorious by RAF pilots who had never landed on a carrier before proved how well the Hurricane was suited to naval ops. Your endurance figure is a crock. No one flies at combat power for an hour. A merlin XX will consume 100 gallons/hour @ 3000 rpm and 9 lbs boost. A more realistic mission profile like the one, for the martlet, would be 15 mins combat, 30 gallons, 1.5 hours loiter 45 gallons, leaving 20 gallons for warm up and takeoff.



Schweik said:


> The Fulmar was just an inadequate design from the get-go. WW2 propeller engines, especially in the first half of the war, were just not powerful enough to power a 2-man fighter sufficiently to be anything other than a glorified scout. It was sufficient to intercept slow, unescorted bombers at low altitude, but that's not enough for a carrier fighter.



The Fulmar did offer other advantages, decent endurance, good ammo load, and folding wings. Although I have not come across the numbers for all FAA aircraft I have read the the old Fulmar shot down more ea than any other FAA aircraft with 122 kills.



Schweik said:


> The Wildcat was a somewhat mediocre design, inferior in performance to the A6M, which through good tactics and training - and leveraging it's better traits, turned out to be a moderate success. It was substantially better both as a fighter and especially as a naval fighter than a Hurricane let alone a Sea Hurricane. It had 2.5 times the endurance and twice the range for one thing. It was also better armed and more agile. It was the Wildcat which broke the IJN air arm, more than any other aircraft. RCAF has grossly exaggerated the deficiencies of the F4F, cherry picking one evaluation over all others, but in reality while there was a controversy in mid-1942, by the end of that year and for most of the next year, they were still successfully relying on the F4F to protect the fleets and escort bombers and more, and did so with success. Using tactics like the Thach weave and other standardized guidelines which became part of the training for all fighter pilots, they made it work. Much like Allied fighter pilots did with Spitfire Mk Vs and P-40s in the Western Desert.



By sentenece, true, false, false, false false and false



Schweik said:


> The Martlet was originally an export version of the Wildcat with a civilian airliner engine. It was far less capable than a Wildcat. And yet even so, it was far more effective than the Hurricane or Fulmar and the RN tried to get as many as they could. Gradually they improved the Martlet but it was always a step behind what the USN was using



The Martlet were just as effective as the F4F below 15,000 ft and in FAA service the Fulmar and the Sea Hurricane were much more effective than the Martlet.



Schweik said:


> The Mediterranean _Naval_ Air War (as distinct from the War over the Desert in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia) was definitely _not _anywhere _near_ as intense as the Pacific War. It was the minor leagues. Nowhere near the same scale as the Pacific War. The Pacific War was more or less continuous, with vicious engagements breaking out every few weeks, with no holds barred, and no quarter asked or given. It had everything the Med convoy fights had plus a lot more. Much bigger and many more surface ships. Much better and more effective torpedoes (on the Japanese side), many more aircraft carriers, and more modern everything



This quote displays almost a total ignorance of the war in the Mediterranean, which was along drawn out bloody affair with continuous action for more than three years. Malta was the most bombed place on the planet for much of that time.



Schweik said:


> The convoy fights like Pedestal were up against almost entirely unescorted, obsolete Italian bombers and / or unescorted (though better) German bombers like the Ju 88. The latter was nearly impossible for a Hurricane to intercept (either over the fleet or over Malta) but more or less average land based fighters like P-40s easily shot them down. Only when the convoy drew within close range of the German air bases and within range of Bf 109s and MC 202s were they under any serious threat that was in any way comparable to the sea battles in the Pacific, and then only for a short time. The RN basically broke under that strain.



Show me any proof you have that p 40s shot down more Ju 88s than Hurricanes. In Pedestal alone Hurricanes shot down 9 or 10 Ju 88s , while the Martlets got 1. The Ju 88s the Hurricanes had trouble catching were mainly the high altitude snoopers, that with a slight dive would very shortly be over safe ground in Sicily. Allison engined P40s were in capable of reaching the altitude necessary too catch these Ju 88s. A Kittyhawk I 's absolute ceiling was less than 30,000 ft. it took 33 minutes just to climb to 28, 000 ft. A tropical Hurricane IIa can reach 30,000 ft in 17.2 minutes with an absolute ceiling of 34,000 ft.




Schweik said:


> The fact that RCAFson managed to apparently convey the impression that these were comparable in any way proves the futility of this debate



Once again ,why did you start this thread?



Schweik said:


> Similarly, the D3A was the second most lethal ship killer in WW2, the first being the SBD



Show me your numbers and sources.

Thanks looking forward to your replies.

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## Glider (Feb 15, 2021)

slaterat said:


> The FW 200 was a very dangerous plane to attack. Well defended and armed and armoured for its time. Much tougher nut to crack than any IJN bomber.


I would argue that there was little difference between the Fw200 and the IJN bombers in vulnerability. It had a well known structural weakness in the fuselage, its defence in most versions was based on Mg's, its operating altitude was surprisingly low and its loss rate was quite high considering the number of combats it had.


> Hurricanes claimed more than 6000 ea destroyed in WW2, more than any other allied fighter. Front line service from the very beginning of the war to the end.


Which doesn't stop it being well past its sell by date in 1942. remembering that the RAF considered it totally obsolete in Burma by 1944


> The sea Hurricane was quite successful as a fighter and was used in this role until 44. Positive K/D ratios, winning critical battles.


The Hurricane wasn't used as a fighter in 1944, it was only kept in front line service in Burma because of its effective use as a low level bomber


> The Fulmar did offer other advantages, decent endurance, good ammo load, and folding wings. Although I have not come across the numbers for all FAA aircraft I have read the the old Fulmar shot down more ea than any other FAA aircraft with 122 kills.


True but misleading. I don't have the numbers to agree or disagree with the number of kills it was credited with but wouldn't be surprised if the number of fighters claimed, didn't reach double figures, because most of its combats were against unescorted bombers.


> By sentenece, true, false, false, false false and false


To be honest I find this a totally condescending response which doesn't do you justice. People can argue till the cows come home which was the better in combat but what cannot be argued is that the Wildcat in all its forms had a much better range and that is absolutely critical in a naval fighter


> Show me any proof you have that p 40s shot down more Ju 88s than Hurricanes. In Pedestal alone Hurricanes shot down 9 or 10 Ju 88s , while the Martlets got 1. The Ju 88s the Hurricanes had trouble catching were mainly the high altitude snoopers, that with a slight dive would very shortly be over safe ground in Sicily. Allison engined P40s were in capable of reaching the altitude necessary too catch these Ju 88s. A Kittyhawk I 's absolute ceiling was less than 30,000 ft. it took 33 minutes just to climb to 28, 000 ft. A tropical Hurricane IIa can reach 30,000 ft in 17.2 minutes with an absolute ceiling of 34,000 ft.


A detailed breakdown of the Air War over the Desert would almost certainly support the statement that P40's shot down more Ju88 than the Hurricane, but I have a life to live.

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## RCAFson (Feb 15, 2021)

Glider said:


> I would argue that there was little difference between the Fw200 and the IJN bombers in vulnerability. It had a well known structural weakness in the fuselage, its defence in most versions was based on Mg's, its operating altitude was surprisingly low and its loss rate was quite high considering the number of combats it had.


The FW200 had armour and SS tanks. Are you saying that armour and SS tanks were useless? Eric Brown considered that a head-on attack to kill the pilots was the safest way to shoot down the FW200.



> Which doesn't stop it being well past its sell by date in 1942. remembering that the RAF considered it totally obsolete in Burma by 1944
> The Hurricane wasn't used as a fighter in 1944, it was only kept in front line service in Burma because of its effective use as a low level bomber


The Sea Hurricane served as carrier borne fighter into 1944 and scored kills in 1944. What exactly does Burma have to do with the naval air war?



> True but misleading. I don't have the numbers to agree or disagree with the number of kills it was credited with but wouldn't be surprised if the number of fighters claimed, didn't reach double figures, because most of its combats were against unescorted bombers.


A large number of Fulmar kills are confirmed in the various books detailing the airwar in the MTO and over Malta. This is a partial list of kill claims:
Fulmar II versus F4F-4 under 10,000 ft.



> A detailed breakdown of the Air War over the Desert would almost certainly support the statement that P40's shot down more Ju88 than the Hurricane, but I have a life to live.



The P40 was not carrier capable. Sea Hurricanes shot down a number of Ju-88s.

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## Glider (Feb 15, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> The FW200 had armour and SS tanks. Are you saying that armour and SS tanks were useless? Eric Brown considered that a head-on attack to kill the pilots was the safest way to shoot down the FW200.


No I am saying that both had their strengths and weaknesses and they evened out. In the Fw 200 the main issues was the structural weakness and low practical operating height of only 10,000 ft. At least one was shot down by a Hudson.
That said I wasn't aware of any armour on the Fw200 apart from the normal pilots seat.



> The Sea Hurricane served as carrier borne fighter into 1944 and scored kills in 1944. What exactly does Burma have to do with the naval air war?


Simple really. A Sea hurricane was heavier than an RAF Hurricane and would have had a worse performance, and the RAF considered the Hurricane obsolete.

As for the use of the Sea Hurricane in 1944, yes a few were in service but as far as I am aware not in area's where they were likely to meet single engine fighters.


> A large number of Fulmar kills are confirmed in the various books detailing the airwar in the MTO and over Malta. This is a partial list of kill claims:


I thank you for the list which seems to confirm my guess re the success of the Fulmar against fighters, remembering that these are claims awarded and almost certainly optimistic.
2 x 110
1 x 109
2 x CR42


> The P40 was not carrier capable. Sea Hurricanes shot down a number of Ju-88s.


I know the above. 
However the statement of yours that I was replying to, was showing proof that the P40 shot down more Ju88's than the Hurricane and I am confident that a search through that series would supply the evidence you asked for.

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## slaterat (Feb 15, 2021)

Glider said:


> The Hurricane wasn't used as a fighter in 1944, it was only kept in front line service in Burma because of its effective use as a low level bomber



The "Sea Hurricane" was used as a fighter till 44, you are misquoting what I said. I agree on its extended use in Burma though.



Glider said:


> Which doesn't stop it being well past its sell by date in 1942. remembering that the RAF considered it totally obsolete in Burma by 1944



I don't ever recall saying that the Hurricane wasn't obsolete in 1944, as a fighter, in fact it was. So was the Zero by then as well.



Glider said:


> To be honest I find this a totally condescending response which doesn't do you justice.




Given some of the other condescending comments posted in this thread I find my comment quite mild, but I do agree that it is below my standards and I will endeavor to do my best to keep it civil, even when others show disrespect.



Glider said:


> A detailed breakdown of the Air War over the Desert would almost certainly support the statement that P40's shot down more Ju88 than the Hurricane, but I have a life to live.



If you stand by your statement you should support it, otherwise it is rather hollow. I have supplied proof of Sea Hurricanes shooting down 9 Ju 88's in Operation Pedestal alone. I have a copy of "Hurricanes Over the Sands" which covers 8 of 14 hurricane Squadrons in the DAF and a quick count shows around 100 Ju88 kills. How many Ju 88s do you think Hurricanes shot down in 1940 over Europe? How many over Malta form 40-42? How many from the other 6 Hurricane squads over the dessert?

Here is the original quote from Schweik referring to the Ju 88 that is proven untrue.



Schweik said:


> The latter was nearly impossible for a Hurricane to intercept (either over the fleet or over Malta) but more or less average land based fighters like P-40s easily shot them down.







Glider said:


> No I am saying that both had their strengths and weaknesses and they evened out. In the Fw 200 the main issues was the structural weakness and low practical operating height of only 10,000 ft. At least one was shot down by a Hudson.
> That said I wasn't aware of any armour on the Fw200 apart from the normal pilots seat.




Here is some information on the FW 200 and how to attack them, you will see that it was quite well armoured , as well as having the advantage of 4 engines .

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## RCAFson (Feb 15, 2021)

Glider said:


> No I am saying that both had their strengths and weaknesses and they evened out. In the Fw 200 the main issues was the structural weakness and low practical operating height of only 10,000 ft. At least one was shot down by a Hudson.
> That said I wasn't aware of any armour on the Fw200 apart from the normal pilots seat.



All naval strike aircraft operated at low altitude, but the Condor could and did conduct higher altitude bombing missions, but these were not terribly effective.




> Simple really. A Sea hurricane was heavier than an RAF Hurricane and would have had a worse performance, and the RAF considered the Hurricane obsolete.



And yet the Sea Hurricane easily outperformed the Martlet II/IV and the Sea Hurricane IIC was about even with an FM2.



> As for the use of the Sea Hurricane in 1944, yes a few were in service but as far as I am aware not in area's where they were likely to meet single engine fighters.
> I thank you for the list which seems to confirm my guess re the success of the Fulmar against fighters, remembering that these are claims awarded and almost certainly optimistic.
> 2 x 110
> 1 x 109
> 2 x CR42



Fulmars shot down a number of fighters, as confirmed by various works on the naval airwar in the ET0/MTO and the total kills is very close to the claims list. The role of the Fulmar was to shoot down or drive off threats to the fleet.



> I know the above.
> However the statement of yours that I was replying to, was showing proof that the P40 shot down more Ju88's than the Hurricane and I am confident that a search through that series would supply the evidence you asked for.



Given JU88 losses to Hurricanes during the BofF and BofB alone, that seems unlikely.


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## Thumpalumpacus (Feb 15, 2021)

slaterat said:


> Positive K/D ratios, winning critical battles.



I'm struggling to think of one "critical" battle the Sea Hurricane won.

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## RCAFson (Feb 15, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> I'm struggling to think of one "critical" battle the Sea Hurricane won.



Pedestal for one.


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## Thumpalumpacus (Feb 15, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> Pedestal for one.



I'd say the seamen fought that one through, with an able assist from the air. Should be noted that 13 vessels were sunk despite the Sea Hurricanes being present. I think the sailors get the credit for that one.

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## Glider (Feb 15, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> All naval strike aircraft operated at low altitude, but the Condor could and did conduct higher altitude bombing missions, but these were not terribly effective.


I have yet to find such an example. The normal operating height seems to have been 10,000ft. There were cases when they flew higher but that was normally due to the weather. I did find one that was shot down on a 'normal' bombing mission against a land target but the height wasn't mentioned. These were rare as the aircraft and specially trained crews were more valuable on maritime missions. Also reliability is often mentioned as a key issue.

Most of my information is from Eagles over the Sea Volumes 1 and 2. I am still trying to read them but there is a lot of good information


> And yet the Sea Hurricane easily outperformed the Martlet II/IV and the Sea Hurricane IIC was about even with an FM2.


And once again we can argue about performance but the single biggest difference between the two is range, where the Wildcat in every version has a much greater range, something no one has tried to disagree with. A critical factor in carrier combat.
The Wildcat was a carrier aircraft with all the other advantages and as for actual combat performance FM2's were being deployed in the front line right to the end of the war. In fact I think I am right in saying the they shot down two Me109G fighters over Norway towards the end of the war.



> Fulmars shot down a number of fighters, as confirmed by various works on the naval airwar in the ET0/MTO and the total kills is very close to the claims list. The role of the Fulmar was to shoot down or drive off threats to the fleet.



Which explains why most of the combats were against unescorted bombers. Few, very few were against fighters. 
I am looking and have found a D520 where the French pilots reported that he had been shot down by a Hurricane, However no Hurricanes were in the area and the Fulmar pilots had reported combat. Have you found anything?



> Given JU88 losses to Hurricanes during the BofF and BofB alone, that seems unlikely.


You could well be right on this.

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## RCAFson (Feb 15, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> I'd say the seamen fought that one through, with an able assist from the air. Should be noted that 13 vessels were sunk despite the Sea Hurricanes being present. I think the sailors get the credit for that one.



Those ships were sunk after the carriers turned back. IIRC, no ships were sunk (except HMS Eagle via submarine) whilst under the carriers CAP.

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## RCAFson (Feb 15, 2021)

Glider said:


> I have yet to find such an example. The normal operating height seems to have been 10,000ft. There were cases when they flew higher but that was normally due to the weather. I did find one that was shot down on a 'normal' bombing mission against a land target but the height wasn't mentioned. These were rare as the aircraft and specially trained crews were more valuable on maritime missions. Also reliability is often mentioned as a key issue.
> 
> Most of my information is from Eagles over the Sea Volumes 1 and 2. I am still trying to read them but there is a lot of good information
> 
> ...



This is an excerpt from Hughes' _Flagship to Murmansk _but in the book the prior pages state that the attacking FW200 aircraft were at 15000ft and conducting level bombing attacks:
( https://www.world-war.co.uk/scylla_story.php ) starting here:
_"It is now August 1943, and Scylla is escorting convoys between the UK and Gibralter..."_

Again, the Sea Hurricane had 97IG of fuel versus 120IG for a Martlet II/IV / F4F-4 but the F4F-4 is considerably heavier and has to use Military Power to exceed even the Fulmar II's climb rate. Consequently, their actual range in combat didn't greatly exceed the Sea Hurricane. This is just a matter of arithmetic and looking at fuel consumption rates at various power settings at all but econ cruise, shows that in combat there's really not much difference, especially if both aircraft have to climb above 15K ft.

The FM2 is not an F4F-4 and the FM2 was specially lightened with a much more powerful engine and has the almost the same power, fuel capacity, and weight as a Sea Hurricane 1B but with the advantage of folding wings.

Yes, in 1942 a Fulmar (from HMS Eagle IIRC) shot down a D520 during an engagement with Vichy AF fighters.

FM2 vs Sea Hurricane 1B:

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/wildcat-VI-ads.jpg


https://ww2aircraft.net/forum/attachments/wp_20141126_001-jpg.277620/

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## Thumpalumpacus (Feb 15, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> Those ships were sunk after the carriers turned back. IIRC, no ships were sunk (except HMS Eagle via submarine) whilst under the carriers CAP.



In other words, the Hurricanes missed a significant part of the battle that they helped decide?

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## RCAFson (Feb 15, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> In other words, the Hurricanes missed a significant part of the battle that they helped decide?



The CAP prevented any merchant ship losses prior to the carriers having to turn back due to the proximity of Sicily. The battle was decided by the Sea Hurricanes because had Axis AF strike aircraft sank even one or two merchant ships prior to the carriers turning back then Malta might have been starved into submission.

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## Thumpalumpacus (Feb 15, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> The CAP prevented any merchant ship losses prior to the carriers having to turn back due to the proximity of Sicily. The battle was decided by the Sea Hurricanes because had Axis AF strike aircraft sank even one or two merchant ships prior to the carriers turning back then Malta might have been starved into submission.



Doesn't sound very decisive to me. How many a/c did those Hurris shoot down or deter before exiting the battle? How many Axis planes were able to attack due to their short range?


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## Glider (Feb 15, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> Yes, in 1942 a Fulmar (from HMS Eagle IIRC) shot down a D520 during an engagement with Vichy AF fighters.


I need to go but have found a more detailed description of the Fulmar vs D 520 combat in Dust Clouds in the Middle East.

Two D 520 saw Fulmars of 803 Squadron and approached to attack when Lt Martin reporte he was about to attack when he was shot down by a fighter. The British attributed the shooting down to AA fire from the ships.
What's interesting is what comes next. 6 x D 520 in three flights of two aircraft saw six x Fulmars and attacked claiming three Fulmars shot down. 803 Squadron lost three Fulmars that day with one crew picked up. A fourth was so badly damaged it was written off and a fifth was damaged. The losses were so bad the RN had to request the RAF to provide additional fighter cover for the fleet.
Most of the D 520 were damaged to some degree by the aa fire from the ships.

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## RCAFson (Feb 15, 2021)

Glider said:


> I need to go but have found a more detailed description of the Fulmar vs D 520 combat in Dust Clouds in the Middle East.
> 
> Two D 520 saw Fulmars of 803 Squadron and approached to attack when Lt Martin reporte he was about to attack when he was shot down by a fighter. The British attributed the shooting down to AA fire from the ships.
> What's interesting is what comes next. 6 x D 520 in three flights of two aircraft saw six x Fulmars and attacked claiming three Fulmars shot down. 803 Squadron lost three Fulmars that day with one crew picked up. A fourth was so badly damaged it was written off and a fifth was damaged. The losses were so bad the RN had to request the RAF to provide additional fighter cover for the fleet.
> Most of the D 520 were damaged to some degree by the aa fire from the ships.



That was a flight of Fulmars that were bounced by D520s during the Battle for Syria.

The combat I'm taking about happened during a naval Malta operation.


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## RCAFson (Feb 15, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> Doesn't sound very decisive to me. How many a/c did those Hurris shoot down or deter before exiting the battle? How many Axis planes were able to attack due to their short range?



Jeez, man read the thread... Over 200 Axis strike sorties were engaged by the CAP prior to the carriers having to turn back and no ships were lost due to aerial attack. Sea Hurricanes splashed about 20 Axis aircraft, IIRC.

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## Thumpalumpacus (Feb 15, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> Jeez, man read the thread... Over 200 Axis strike sorties were engaged by the CAP prior to the carriers having to turn back and no ships were lost due to aerial attack. Sea Hurricanes splashed about 20 Axis aircraft, IIRC.



I'm thinking Wildcats did that pretty often around Guadalcanal, too.


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## RCAFson (Feb 15, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> I'm thinking Wildcats did that pretty often around Guadalcanal, too.



When?


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## Thumpalumpacus (Feb 15, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> When?



24 planes on 7-8 Aug 42.


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## RCAFson (Feb 15, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> 24 planes on 7-8 Aug 42.



On 7 Aug the IJNAF sent 27 Bettys (18 x Zero escorts) and 9 Vals (on a one way mission) from Rabaul. The Bettys bombed from 12000ft and, no surprise, hit nothing (two or three were lost IIRC to F4Fs) while the Vals, despite their claimed range could only carry 2 x 60kg bombs each and managed to damage a destroyer; several were shot down by F4Fs with the survivors ditching. Not a terribly impressive raid, and the decision to send the Vals on a one way mission, armed with only 2 x 60kg bombs each bordered on outright insanity. The USN had ~65 F4Fs and lost 15 with more damaged, mainly to Zeros, as they bounced the F4Fs. Only about a 1/3 of the F4Fs intercepted the raids along with some SBDs were also attacked by the Zeros.

On 8 Aug 23 x Bettys (7 x Zero escort) attacked with torpedoes and sank a transport and damaged a destroyer. 18 Bettys were lost, 13 from AA and 5 x CAP. The unarmoured, non SS tanked Bettys were nightmarishly vulnerable to massed CIWS fire from the 50 odd naval and transport ships of the transport force assembled off Guadalcanal. The USN carrier TFs was some ways to the east, well out of sight, and was not attacked.


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## Glider (Feb 16, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> That was a flight of Fulmars that were bounced by D520s during the Battle for Syria.


I wouldn't be to sure of the bounce as a reason for the losses. After all they were Naval fighters over the fleet that has a modern set of radars and a very experience fighter control. 
At the very least they would have had some warning that the enemy aircraft were approaching.

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## RCAFson (Feb 16, 2021)

Glider said:


> I wouldn't be to sure of the bounce as a reason for the losses. After all they were Naval fighters over the fleet that has a modern set of radars and a very experience fighter control.
> At the very least they would have had some warning that the enemy aircraft were approaching.


 In June 1941 radar was still rare in the eastern MTO and naval radar always had problems detecting aircraft flying over land. According to _Dust Clouds over the Middle Eas_t, the Fulmars encountered two D520s, and (according to a French pilot) shot one down, but RN AA gunners also claimed it, the surviving D520s returned to a nearby base, and informed command that 6 Fulmars were patrolling over the fleet, and they promptly despatched 6 D520s who bounced the Fulmars, shooting down three.
The same thing happened numerous times to almost every fighter type in WW2. The Fulmars were bounced, just as a similar number of F4F-4s were bounced by Zeros on 7 Aug 1942 over Guadalcanal, where the USN had even more modern radar equipment, and the F4Fs suffered a similar fate.

BTW, the confirmed Fulmar kill of a D520, I mentioned earlier occurred on 18 May 1942 off Algeria. The Fulmar was flown from HMS Argus.


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## Thumpalumpacus (Feb 16, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> [...] several were shot down by F4Fs [...]
> 
> [...]18 Bettys were lost, 13 from AA and 5 x CAP.



18 + "several" = ?

Here, how many airplanes did the Sea Hurri shoot down in combat, total? The Wildcat in its various forms shot down around 1300. What's the SH got? The Wildcat has about 6:1 kill ratio, too. Got any Hurri numbers about that?

I'm really not convinced that a Sea Hurricane was very useful. Feel free to educate me further, but be aware I'm pretty skeptical of its impact on the naval war.

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## RCAFson (Feb 16, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> 18 + "several" = ?
> 
> Here, how many airplanes did the Sea Hurri shoot down in combat, total? The Wildcat in its varios forms shot down around 1300. What's the SH got? The Wildcat has about 6:1 kill ratio, too. Got any Hurri numbers about that?
> 
> I'm really not convinced that a Sea Hurricane was very useful. Feel free to educate me further, but be aware I'm pretty skeptical of its impact on the naval war.



How can you skeptical about something which you know little about?

5 Vals were shot down but AA probably got one and maybe shared in another kill. F4Fs claimed 14 Val kills despite there only being 9 present.

6-1 is based upon kill claims and the actual number was far less than that. About 7900 F4F/Martlet/FM1/FM2s were built versus 600 Fulmars and a similar (probably 400-500 as not all ~600 Hurricanes transferred to the FAA were converted to Sea Hurricanes) number of Sea Hurricanes. The actual kill loss rate of the F4F is probably worse than for the Fulmar or Sea Hurricane. Actual Sea Hurricane kill-combat loss rate for PQ18, Harpoon and Pedestal was 33-9. I'd guesstimate that total kills versus combat losses was about 50-60 - ~15.

The Fulmar's kill loss rate was about 3-1; 89 actual kills versus 34 losses as detailed by Shores et al, in various Books, in the MTO, and IOTO

You need to read Lundstrom's two volume _First Team_, which looks at almost all USN naval air combat in the Pacific in 1942.


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## Thumpalumpacus (Feb 16, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> The actual kill loss rate of the F4F is probably worse than for the Fulmar or Sea Hurricane. Actual Sea Hurricane kill-combat loss rate for PQ18, Harpoon and Pedestal was 33-9. I'd guesstimate that total kills versus combat losses was about 50-60 - ~15.
> 
> The Fulmar's kill loss rate was about 3-1; 89 actual kills versus 34 losses as detailed by Shores et al, in various Books, in the MTO, and IOTO
> 
> You need to read Lundstrom's two volume _First Team_, which looks at almost all USN naval air combat in the Pacific in 1942.



Okay.


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## Stig1207 (Feb 17, 2021)

slaterat said:


> Hurricanes claimed more than 6000 ea destroyed in WW2, more than any other allied fighter. Front line service from the very beginning of the war to the end



Is there a break down of which periods and in which theatres these claims were made? It is my impression that the Hurricanes kill claims topped with the BoB and then fell off drastically. Perhaps a couple of thousand claims to the end of 1940, but where would thousands of kills be claimed from 1941 on?

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## slaterat (Feb 23, 2021)

The source is , The hawker Hurricane by Francis K Mason. No break down into theaters is provided.

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## Peter Gunn (Feb 23, 2021)

slaterat said:


> The source is , The hawker Hurricane by Francis K Mason. No break down into theaters is provided.


Claims, no source docs for confirmation then? We get to use claims for the hurricane but not the F4F?


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## Thumpalumpacus (Feb 23, 2021)

I'm still waiting to hear how many planes the Sea Hurricane shot down through the course of the war.


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## Admiral Beez (Feb 23, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> I'm still waiting to hear how many planes the Sea Hurricane shot down through the course of the war.


From who? Why don't you Google that yourself and tell us?

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## Thumpalumpacus (Feb 23, 2021)

Admiral Beez said:


> From who? Why don't you Google that yourself and tell us?



I wanted to hear it from the guy who was arguing the SH was the more significant airplane. I'm having trouble finding totals myself, but I reckoned that him arguing so vigorously for its effectiveness meant that he had data.

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## Admiral Beez (Feb 23, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> I wanted to hear it from the guy who was arguing the SH was the more significant airplane. I'm having trouble finding totals myself, but I reckoned that him arguing so vigorously for its effectiveness meant that he had data.


I don’t think that data exists, at least no anything I’ve seen online. For the FAA the MTO was mostly a Fulmar affair, the I/PTO one of the Seafire, Martlet, Hellcat and Corsair. I think the Sea Hurricane wasn’t given the opportunity to shine. Replace all the Fulmars in the MTO with Sea Hurricanes and we should see good kill numbers, and maybe fewer carrier hits.

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## Thumpalumpacus (Feb 23, 2021)

Admiral Beez said:


> I don’t think that data exists, at least no anything I’ve seen online. For the FAA the MTO was mostly a Fulmar affair, the I/PTO one of the Seafire, Martlet, Hellcat and Corsair. I think the Sea Hurricane wasn’t given the opportunity to shine. Replace all the Fulmars in the MTO with Sea Hurricanes and we should see good kill numbers, and maybe fewer carrier hits.



That's what I'm seeing online, a paucity of information. From various bits I see about 35 claims for the type, but that stands the obvious likelihood of being incomplete information and not something I'd go to bat with. I've got an open question at a blog concerning RN aviation ops in WWII

I admit I'd be surprised if its wartime tally approached the Wildcat's, but I'm open to information and amenable to correction.


Admiral Beez said:


> I don’t think that data exists, at least no anything I’ve seen online. For the FAA the MTO was mostly a Fulmar affair, the I/PTO one of the Seafire, Martlet, Hellcat and Corsair. I think the Sea Hurricane wasn’t given the opportunity to shine. Replace all the Fulmars in the MTO with Sea Hurricanes and we should see good kill numbers, and maybe fewer carrier hits.



I've no doubt it was a significant improvement for the FAA.


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## Admiral Beez (Feb 23, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> I've no doubt it was a significant improvement for the FAA.


Perhaps not, but the Sea Hurricane offers a faster ROC and top speed over the Fulmar. When HMS Illustrious and Formidable were dive bombed and crippled the strikes were picked up on radar but the Fulmars were too slow to intercept. Mind you, without folding wings each carrier could only carry a few Hurricanes, so that reduces the CAP.

Now, give the FAA a folding wing Sea Hurricane with an engine optimized for naval ops and we’re talking true fleet air defence. And hell, let’s throw in a four blade prop, and underwing 40mm cannon pods for antiship work.

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## Thumpalumpacus (Feb 23, 2021)

Admiral Beez said:


> Perhaps not, but the Sea Hurricane offers a faster ROC and top speed over the Fulmar. When HMS Illustrious and Formidable were dive bombed and crippled the strikes were picked up on radar but the Fulmars were too slow to intercept. Mind you, without folding wings each carrier could only carry a few Hurricanes, so that reduces the CAP.
> 
> Now, give the FAA a folding wing Sea Hurricane with an engine optimized for naval ops and we’re taking, and he’ll, let’s throw in a four blade prop and underwing 30mm cannon pods for antiship work.
> 
> View attachment 613765



Sure, and that non-folding-wing issue was probably a major driver behind adopting the Martlet given the latter plane's limitations; more planes aboard, with better combat radius, gives more operational flexibility. Not all advantages of a type are in performance, necessarily.

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## Admiral Beez (Feb 23, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> Sure, and that non-folding-wing issue was probably a major driver behind adopting the Martlet given the latter plane's limitations; more planes aboard, with better combat radius, gives more operational flexibility. Not all advantages of a type are in performance, necessarily.


The disconnect of the Illustrious class designers is noteworthy. Make a carrier with 22ft wide lifts, without any single seat fighter to operate from it.

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## Thumpalumpacus (Feb 23, 2021)

Admiral Beez said:


> The disconnect of the Illustrious class designers is noteworthy. Make a carrier with 22ft wide lifts, without any single seat fighter to operate from it.



Agreed. A weapons platform is only as good as its weapons. While I understand the FAA's doctrine about 2-seater fighters (in my layman's understanding, the back-seater was ideally to help navigate back aboard, as well as provide recon eyes), it seems odd to me to accept such performance drawbacks in fighters that would likely be operating in close waters near land-based single-seaters. Perhaps they envisioned operating along with land-based fighters? I don't know.

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## Admiral Beez (Feb 23, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> Agreed. A weapons platform is only as good as its weapons. While I understand the FAA's doctrine about 2-seater fighters (in my layman's understanding, the back-seater was ideally to help navigate back aboard, as well as provide recon eyes), it seems odd to me to accept such performance drawbacks in fighters that would likely be operating in close waters near land-based single-seaters. Perhaps they envisioned operating along with land-based fighters? I don't know.


They clearly had a change of heart with Indomitable, having a wider forward lift. Though the smarter choice might have been to leave the lifts and fold the wings. 

At 45ft long and 22ft wide the lifts on the Illustrious class could fit every single engined, prop-powered carrier aircraft ever made, right up to the Fairey Spearfish, Gannet and Douglas A-1 Skyraider. There’s nothing wrong with the Illustrious‘ lift dims.

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## RCAFson (Feb 23, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> That's what I'm seeing online, a paucity of information. From various bits I see about 35 claims for the type, but that stands the obvious likelihood of being incomplete information and not something I'd go to bat with. I've got an open question at a blog concerning RN aviation ops in WWII
> 
> I admit I'd be surprised if its wartime tally approached the Wildcat's, but I'm open to information and amenable to correction.
> 
> ...



I stated earlier: _Actual Sea Hurricane kill-combat loss rate for PQ18, Harpoon and Pedestal was 33-9. I'd guesstimate that total kills versus combat losses was about 50-60 - ~15_. Those are all kills verified via comparisons of Axis and FAA records via Shores et al. I also stated earlier that F4F production totaled ~7900 versus 600 Fulmars and ~400-500 Sea Hurricanes and it would be rather amazing if either aircraft had as many kills as a fighter with 13 -16 times the production.

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## RCAFson (Feb 23, 2021)

Admiral Beez said:


> Perhaps not, but the Sea Hurricane offers a faster ROC and top speed over the Fulmar. When HMS Illustrious and Formidable were dive bombed and crippled the strikes were picked up on radar but the Fulmars were too slow to intercept. Mind you, without folding wings each carrier could only carry a few Hurricanes, so that reduces the CAP.
> 
> Now, give the FAA a folding wing Sea Hurricane with an engine optimized for naval ops and we’re talking true fleet air defence. And hell, let’s throw in a four blade prop, and underwing 40mm cannon pods for antiship work.



In the above examples, RN radar didn't detect the raid in time for an adequate GCI response, and in both cases there was a shortage of Fulmars and other naval aircraft in the MTO, so the blame shouldn't be placed solely on the Fulmar.

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## Thumpalumpacus (Feb 23, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> I stated earlier: _Actual Sea Hurricane kill-combat loss rate for PQ18, Harpoon and Pedestal was 33-9. I'd guesstimate that total kills versus combat losses was about 50-60 - ~15_. Those are all kills verified via comparisons of Axis and FAA records via Shores et al. I also stated earlier that F4F production totaled ~7900 versus 600 Fulmars and ~400-500 Sea Hurricanes and it would be rather amazing if either aircraft had as many kills as a fighter with 13 -16 times the production.



Fair enough, and thanks for the info. I'm interested most in the comparison of the Sea Hurri vs the Wildcat/Martlet.

It would seem the two types had similar kill-loss ratios once combat was engaged.


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## Admiral Beez (Feb 24, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> In the above examples, RN radar didn't detect the raid in time for an adequate GCI response, and in both cases there was a shortage of Fulmars and other naval aircraft in the MTO, so the blame shouldn't be placed solely on the Fulmar.


Good point, and if we swap out Fulmars for Hurricanes we'll have even fewer aircraft, so a worse GCI response. What the MTO needed was AFD carriers that had their full 48-56 unit CAGs with an emphasis on fighters. Each of Formidable and Illustrious should have sailed with >36 Fulmars.


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## slaterat (Mar 28, 2021)

Admiral Beez said:


> Good point, and if we swap out Fulmars for Hurricanes we'll have even fewer aircraft, so a worse GCI response. What the MTO needed was AFD carriers that had their full 48-56 unit CAGs with an emphasis on fighters. Each of Formidable and Illustrious should have sailed with >36 Fulmar



That is quite contrary to the FAA practice. The fact is that the Fulmar's performance, particularly its poor rate of climb, was not up to the role of defending the fleet in 42. That is precisely the reason the hooked Sea hurricane was created. The Sea Hurricane/Fulmar duo was used in a high/ low air defense pairing. The system was a compromise but it worked quite well in Harpoon and Pedestal. I suppose the FAA might of preferred a force comprised solely of Martlets had they been available in sufficient numbers, which they weren't until 43 .


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## RCAFson (Mar 29, 2021)

slaterat said:


> That is quite contrary to the FAA practice. The fact is that the Fulmar's performance, particularly its poor rate of climb, was not up to the role of defending the fleet in 42. That is precisely the reason the hooked Sea hurricane was created. The Sea Hurricane/Fulmar duo was used in a high/ low air defense pairing. The system was a compromise but it worked quite well in Harpoon and Pedestal. I suppose the FAA might of preferred a force comprised solely of Martlets had they been available in sufficient numbers, which they weren't until 43 .



Under 10-12k ft there was very little difference in Fulmar II and Martlet II/IV climb rate. A Fulmar II that "pulls the plug" might even out climb a Martlet. 

As demonstrated by HMS Victorious, in warm climates, AFD carriers with small lifts could operate a small permanent deck park of Sea Hurricanes.


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## Schweik (Apr 1, 2021)

Fulmar was a disaster as a carrier fighter and the Sea Hurricane was too, just look at PQ 18


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## RCAFson (Apr 2, 2021)

Schweik said:


> Fulmar was a disaster as a carrier fighter and the Sea Hurricane was too, just look at PQ 18


There weren't any Fulmars on HMS Avenger and the Sea Hurricanes performed well, but were hampered by their .303MG armament against armoured TE bombers.


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## Schweik (Apr 2, 2021)

I never said there were Fulmars on the Avenger - I was referring the inability of the problems with the Sea Hurricanes to intercept and shoot down lumbering second tier bombers and float planes, the problems they had with the poor flight endurance etc.

As for being hampered by .30 cal guns, a much more limited (2 gun) .30 cal armament didn't seem to be a problem for Ki-27s and early Ki-43s faced with Chinese and RAF bombers.


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## Schweik (Apr 2, 2021)

And same for the A5M


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## Thumpalumpacus (Apr 2, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> There weren't any Fulmars on HMS Avenger and the Sea Hurricanes performed well, but were hampered by their .303MG armament against armoured TE bombers.



Part of being a good fighter plane is bringing the right weapons to the battle. As we say here in Texas, you don't bring a knife to a gunfight. 

If the Hurricane's armament was insufficient to down more than a handful of unescorted torpedo bombers while losing four of their own in the process, I'd say that says something about the Hurricane's utility as an air-superiority fighter at that point in the war.

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## GregP (Apr 2, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus,

You are asking for kill and loss data that have been chased around by many people without actual success since WWII. The U.S.A. has some fairly reliable kill and loss data for WWII simply because the U.S.A. invested time and effort into a study of same AFTER the war. The USAAF/C came up with the "Army Air Forces Statistical Digest of World War II" dated Dec 1945 and the U.S. Navy came up with "Naval Aviation Combat Statistics Wolrd War II" dated 17 Jun 1946. Both are vailable in pdf form online. These studies were done using the avilable information and combat reports at that time, and are likely the best that can be done since nobody else to date has done anything better except to try to sew doubts about them somehwat unsuccessfully. They remain the best source for combat statistics for the U.S.A., and do NOT show individual kills and losses. You can find those for the USAAF in "USAF Study 85," but that document is not readable as text and must be painstakingly entered line by line if you want to get anything useful from it electronically. It IS available online as a pdf, but a text OCR program cannot read it since it is a copy of a report printed with a dot matrix printer that was sometimes a bit out of line. You can read it manually, but it just doesn't translate well digitally.

I have not come across any primary source documents for the entire war for any other nation that are anywhere near as comprehensive as these two reports are, but there are some partial reports. In the UK, they seem to be obsessed with the Battle of Britain or operations in some specific battle or battle set, and not with the war as a whole. Fair enough but not very useful unless you are looking at that particular battle or action. Good luck coming up with ANY primary source documents from the USSR. There are a couple of places to look for German claims, but the German records are incomplete due to war damage and some lost records. Some people claim to have data about actual German aircraft production (I know, unrelated to victory claims), but they only have the allocated werknumers for approved production, not the acutal production deliveries. Its like a list of allocated serial numbers; not actual deliveries.

I have a pretty good tabulation of what I have found over 40+ years of looking, but actual totals of victories are a tough thing to find. You CAN find things like actual totals for some single mission or single ongoing action.

Kill-to-loss ratios for air combat are a thing of some national pride and I seriously doubt the accuracy of the numbers. In the U.S.A., if a plane was damaged during air combat, stayed aloft during the fight, but suffered an engine failure on the way home after the action, it was likely recorded as an operational loss since it didn't happen during actual combat. But the damage that caused the loss DID happen in combat, and it SHOULD be a combat loss. Breaking out what really happened, even from these well produced reports can be difficult.

The subject of what actualy constitutes a "kill" is also a subject of debate. Some people say that if a plane was shot at, damaged, and forced to land during combat, but was later recovered and repaired ... it was not a kill. I say bunk. The job of the fighter pilot in combat was to knock enemy aircraft out of the mission and/or to disrupt the attack in progress. Sending a plane down is exactly that, achieving the mission. Yet the debate rages in some arenas and a lot of people are obsesed with matching up recorded kills with the losses the enemy actually reported. This despite the fact that both Hitler and Stalin were reliably reported to only be happy with positive combat reports. Handing either one of these two guys a bad combat loss report could result in death or, at least, demotion. So, just how reliable WERE the reported loss figures and what exactly did they call a "loss?" The definitions used at the time are largely lost to history.

Good luck finding hard data for "Sea Hurricanes" broken out from just "Hurricanes." Actually, good luck finding hard data on just "Hurricanes" that encompass the entire war. I've been trying but, to date, have only what might be termed partial success myself.

Cheers.

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## RCAFson (Apr 2, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> Part of being a good fighter plane is bringing the right weapons to the battle. As we say here in Texas, you don't bring a knife to a gunfight.
> 
> If the Hurricane's armament was insufficient to down more than a handful of unescorted torpedo bombers while losing four of their own in the process, I'd say that says something about the Hurricane's utility as an air-superiority fighter at that point in the war.



3 of the Sea Hurricanes were lost to 'friendly fire'. The cloud cover also made for very difficult interception conditions and Avenger's small flight deck made it hard for her to put many fighters up at one time. OTOH, no Sea Hurricanes were lost due to landing accidents despite the conditions.

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## Thumpalumpacus (Apr 2, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> 3 of the Sea Hurricanes were lost to 'friendly fire'. The cloud cover also made for very difficult interception conditions and Avenger's small flight deck made it hard for her to put many fighters up at one time. OTOH, no Sea Hurricanes were lost due to landing accidents despite the conditions.



I defer to your knowledge regarding the cause of Hurri losses (and I appreciate the info), but that doesn't obviate my main point, which is that they weren't very effective in PQ18. Didn't shoot down very many attackers, nor deter them from launching attacks.

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## Schweik (Apr 2, 2021)

GregP said:


> Thumpalumpacus,
> 
> You are asking for kill and loss data that have been chased around by many people without actual success since WWII. The U.S.A. has some fairly reliable kill and loss data for WWII simply because the U.S.A. invested time and effort into a study of same AFTER the war. The USAAF/C came up with the "Army Air Forces Statistical Digest of World War II" dated Dec 1945



Is this that same document? Or is the 1946 version different?


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## RCAFson (Apr 2, 2021)

GregP said:


> Thumpalumpacus,
> 
> You are asking for kill and loss data that have been chased around by many people without actual success since WWII. The U.S.A. has some fairly reliable kill and loss data for WWII simply because the U.S.A. invested time and effort into a study of same AFTER the war. The USAAF/C came up with the "Army Air Forces Statistical Digest of World War II" dated Dec 1945 and the U.S. Navy came up with "Naval Aviation Combat Statistics Wolrd War II" dated 17 Jun 1946. Both are vailable in pdf rorm online. These studies were done using the avilable information and combat reports at that time, and are likely the best that can be done since nobody else to date has done anything better except to try to sew doubts about them somehwat unsuccessfully. They remain the best source for combat statistics for the U.S.A., and do NOT show individual kills and losses. You can find those for the USAAF in "USAF Study 85," but that document is not readable as text and must be painstakingly entered line by line if you want to get anything useful from it electronically. It IS available online as a pdf, but a text OCR program cannot read it since it is a copy of a report printed with a dot matrix printer that was sometimes a bit out of line. You can read it manually, but it just doesn't translate well digitally.
> 
> ...


The Best sources for kill loss rates are from books that carefully examine the combat reports of both sides, and then compare kill claims to reported losses. Lundstrom's two volume _First Team_, and works like Shore's _Hurricanes over Malta_, and _Malta the Spitfire Year_, are also excellent


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## RCAFson (Apr 2, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> I defer to your knowledge regarding the cause of Hurri losses (and I appreciate the info), but that doesn't obviate my main point, which is that they weren't very effective in PQ18. Didn't shoot down very many attackers, nor deter them from launching attacks.



The Sea Hurricanes shot down five for one loss (Hurricats got a couple more, IIRC) but they also forced the Luftwaffe to use tight formation attacks and then the AA really went to work on them.

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## Thumpalumpacus (Apr 2, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> The Sea Hurricanes shot down five for one loss (Hurricats got a couple more, IIRC) but they also forced the Luftwaffe to use tight formation attacks and then the AA really went to work on them.



Sure, and as such the Germans suffered heavy losses even as they sank what, 12 ships? The point is that fighters against unescorted bombers should do better than that, in my humble opinion. If the lightweight armament they carried was stymied to a degree by German armor, that indicates to me that the Hurri was not up on the times in terms of armament.

This is especially, to me, significant in the case of the Sea Hurricane, because it was expected that their primary opposition would indeed be bombers, rather than fighters. If you know you're going to be bustin' bombers, you might want a cannon or two on your birds.

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## Schweik (Apr 2, 2021)

The main problem with the Sea Hurricane wasn't the armament, it was the endurance. For example the Wiki notes: "[Royal Navy commander]_Colthurst decided that the Sea Hurricanes henceforth *would fly standing patrols of 25 minutes duration per fighter, to ensure that some were always available to break up Goldene Zange formations*, even if they were too slow and ill-armed to inflict many losses. The captain of Ulster Queen resolved to ignore the standing orders to keep station and steer towards incoming aircraft instead_.[42] "

Combat performance was also pretty bad, during PQ 18 insufficient in many cases to shoot down unescorted He 111s or even lumbering, unescorted He 115 float planes on several occasions or for example to prevent even slower Blohm and Voss BV 138 flying boats from driving Swordfish away from U-boats they were trying to attack.

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## RCAFson (Apr 2, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> Sure, and as such the Germans suffered heavy losses even as they sank what, 12 ships? The point is that fighters against unescorted bombers should do better than that, in my humble opinion. If the lightweight armament they carried was stymied to a degree by German armor, that indicates to me that the Hurri was not up on the times in terms of armament.
> 
> This is especially, to me, significant in the case of the Sea Hurricane, because it was expected that their primary opposition would indeed be bombers, rather than fighters. If you know you're going to be bustin' bombers, you might want a cannon or t wo on your birds.



The problem with this argument is that the Sea Hurricane had far more performance than a Martlet and if the Sea Hurricane was having problems intercepting Luftwaffe bombers then the Martlet would do a lot worse and we have to balance that with a probable higher kill rate when an interception did happen. 

The 4 x 20mm cannon, Sea Hurricane IIC, was just entering service as the Battle for PQ18 was being fought.

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## Schweik (Apr 2, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> The problem with this argument is that the Sea Hurricane had far more performance than a Martlet and if the Sea Hurricane was having problems intercepting Luftwaffe bombers then the Martlet would do a lot worse and we have to balance that with a probable higher kill rate when an interception did happen.
> 
> The 4 x 20mm cannon, Sea Hurricane IIC, was just entering service as the Battle for PQ18 was being fought.



The Sea Hurricane had inferior or equivalent performance to the Martlet (depending on the specific metric and specific version of each aircraft) and less than half the endurance. The 20mm cannon armed versions didn't do much better in combat, partly because their guns were limited to 60 rounds.

During PQ 18, Sea Hurricanes were not only having problems intercepting Axis bombers, once intercepted they had a very hard time shooting them down. One He 115 (top speed 203 mph) held off four Sea Hurricanes and shot one down. It's only armed with 1 x 7.92mm defensive machine gun. A drum fed MG 15. 

By comparison Wildcats shot down several H6K and H8K float planes, the latter with a top speed of 290 mph and an armament of 5 x 20mm cannon (with two turrets) and 5 x 7.7mm machine guns. The H8K was also armored and had some self-sealing fuel tanks. USMC Brewster Buffalos even shot those down.

I don't think the He 115 would have fared well in the Pacific, and obviously neither would the Sea Hurricane. That's why the RN wanted Martlets.

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## Thumpalumpacus (Apr 2, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> The problem with this argument is that the Sea Hurricane had far more performance than a Martlet and if the Sea Hurricane was having problems intercepting Luftwaffe bombers then the Martlet would do a lot worse and we have to balance that with a probable higher kill rate when an interception did happen.



Perhaps. But the discussion is about armament and not performance.



RCAFson said:


> The 4 x 20mm cannon, Sea Hurricane IIC, was just entering service as the Battle for PQ18 was being fought.



Yet the FAA saw fit to procure Grummans all the same, both Martlets and Hellcats. Apparently they didn't have a problem with .50s, but as your own statements lay out, the .303 had issues dealing with those German bombers. Perhaps the FAA considered the .50 a suitable compromise between weight (hence performance), trigger-time, and hitting power? By 1942, I'd reckon a .303 to really only be suitable against fighters, or unarmored bombers.

Do you happen to know which model Ju-88s were involved in this battle, and what was their armor layout? I'm having trouble finding it, but I'm curious. Was it the A-17 torp bomber variant? My understanding is that the armor was centered around the crew-space, but I could well be wrong.

I appreciate your patience with what might seem dumb questions.

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## Schweik (Apr 2, 2021)

It was mostly He 111


Thumpalumpacus said:


> Perhaps. But the discussion is about armament and not performance.



It isn't. He's basing that on a single assessment of the Wildcat based on who knows what conditions, and ignoring a half dozen others all of which you can read for yourself here

WWII Aircraft Performance

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## Thumpalumpacus (Apr 2, 2021)

Schweik said:


> It was mostly He 111



Odd, given that the Hurricane didn't seem to have much problem downing them in the BoB.



Schweik said:


> It isn't. He's basing that on a single assessment of the Wildcat based on who knows what conditions, and ignoring a half dozen others all of which you can read for yourself here
> 
> WWII Aircraft Performance



I was talking specifically about my discussion with him being about the armament deficiencies of the Hurricane. I'm of the opinion that a fighter sent up with arms that won't get the job done is worse than useless, insofar as one is sacrificing expensive pilots with low potential returns.

Thanks for the link, off to do some reading.


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## Schweik (Apr 2, 2021)

There were Ju 88s too, I think mainly A-4 type, and a variety of float planes (BV 138, He 115). I don't know if any other specific subtype of Ju 88 were available but PQ 18 took place in summer / fall of 1942 so it's not a very late design.

I think there was a big difference between attacking bombers in big, relatively slow moving formations vs. in faster moving more ad-hoc attacks.

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## Thumpalumpacus (Apr 2, 2021)

Schweik said:


> There were Ju 88s too, and a variety of float planes (BV 138, He 115). I don't know the specific subtype but PQ 18 took place in summer / fall of 1942 so it's not a very late design.



I know the different airframes involved, was just curious which one had armor enough to reject eight .303s and assumed that the -88, being the latest, would likely be that one.



Schweik said:


> I think there was a big difference between attacking bombers in big, relatively slow moving formations vs. in faster moving more ad-hoc attacks.



Absolutely. On top of your point here, there's also the fact that the combat is happening immediately above the sea rather than at altitude -- such combat forces altitude into any decision-process any of the pilots would be making. You have much less room to recover, and the ground (or sea in this case) doesn't miss.


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## RCAFson (Apr 2, 2021)

Schweik said:


> The Sea Hurricane had inferior or equivalent performance to the Martlet (depending on the specific metric and specific version of each aircraft) and less than half the endurance. The 20mm cannon armed versions didn't do much better in combat, partly because their guns were limited to 60 rounds.
> 
> During PQ 18, Sea Hurricanes were not only having problems intercepting Axis bombers, once intercepted they had a very hard time shooting them down. One He 115 (top speed 203 mph) held off four Sea Hurricanes and shot one down. It's only armed with 1 x 7.92mm defensive machine gun. A drum fed MG 15.
> 
> ...



The BV138 and HE115 were commonly encountered over PQ18 and both aircraft would duck into the ever present cloud cover to escape interception and a Martlet would do worse than the Sea Hurricane in the same conditions. The sole SH loss was to a HE115, and by 1942 these had their defensive armament increased with extra armour added. Condemning an aircraft on the basis of a single combat, is more than a bit weird, to say the least. 33 verified HSHIB kills from June to Sept 1942 versus 9 losses, speaks for itself and several of those losses were from Axis fighters over Pedestal.

Sorry, but that's a lot of nonsense. The HSHIB weighed ~7000lb and had 1440HP. The Martlet II/IV weighed 7750lb and had 1200hp. The Martlets were completely outperformed by the Sea Hurricane. The numbers don't lie and power to weight and wing loading heavily favoured the Sea Hurricane. 

The IIC carried 91RPG of 20mm.


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## Schweik (Apr 2, 2021)

Wiki for PQ 18 says:

35 x Ju 88 A-4 dive bombers, 
28 He 111 H-6 level bombers
14 x Ju 88 A-4 torpedo bombers
He 115s (number not listed)
FW 200
Bv 138

It doesn't say how many He 115, FW 200 and Bv 138 but probably just a few of each.

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## Thumpalumpacus (Apr 2, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> The BV138 and HE115 were commonly encountered over PQ18 and both aircraft would duck into the ever present cloud cover to escape interception and a Martlet would do worse than the Sea Hurricane in the same conditions. The sole SH loss was to a HE115, and by 1942 these had their defensive armament increased with extra armour added. Condemning an aircraft on the basis of a single combat, is more than a bit weird, to say the least. 33 verified HSHIB kills from June to Sept 1942 versus 9 losses, speaks for itself and several of those losses were from Axis fighters over Pedestal.
> 
> Sorry, but that's a lot of nonsense. The HSHIB weighed ~7000lb and had 1440HP. The Martlet II/IV weighed 7750lb and had 1200hp. The Martlets were completely outperformed by the Sea Hurricane. The numbers don't lie and power to weight and wing loading heavily favoured the Sea Hurricane.
> 
> The IIC carried 91RPG of 20mm.



Then why did the FAA go with Grummans, Corsairs, and Fulmars as the war went along?

Perhaps Schweik's point about endurance is on point.


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## RCAFson (Apr 2, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> Perhaps. But the discussion is about armament and not performance.
> 
> 
> 
> ...



Fighters armed with 8 x .303s had shot down several thousand Axis aircraft by Mid 1942, but it was becoming ineffective by then as Lufwaffe aircraft had increased performance and extra armour.

The FAA procured what it could get, as they didn't have the luxury to pick and choose. The FAA initially got Martlets because took over French and Greek contracts.

What does a Hellcat, which appeared in mid/late 1943 have to do with a HSH1B which first showed up in early 1941? Maybe absolutely nothing? Even if the Hellcat had poorer performance, like the Martlet, the fact that it had folding wings would make it preferable to a HSH, but of course the Hellcat was far superior to the Martlet and Sea Hurricane. The FAA had no opinion on the .5in and they got them because that's what the Martlet came with. The early .5in were actually pretty miserable with a slow RoF and frequent gun jams, but by mid 1942 these kinks were being worked out.


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## Schweik (Apr 2, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> The BV138 and HE115 were commonly encountered over PQ18 and both aircraft would duck into the ever present cloud cover to escape interception and a Martlet would do worse than the Sea Hurricane in the same conditions.



If you read the accounts, this was not the only means by which they survived. Admitteldy the BV 138 was fairly heavily armed. The He 115 certainly wasn't.



> The sole SH loss was to a HE115, and by 1942 these had their defensive armament increased with extra armour added. Condemning an aircraft on the basis of a single combat, is more than a bit weird, to say the least. 33 verified HSHIB kills from June to Sept 1942 versus 9 losses, speaks for itself and several of those losses were from Axis fighters over Pedestal.



I'm not 'condemning an aircraft over a single combat" - it's just an example. The failure at Pedestal overall is the basis worthy of condemnation. Certainly many RN offiicers felt that way. And unlike with the Wildcat they were not able to find a way to adapt the Sea Hurricane to the conditions.



> Sorry, but that's a lot of nonsense. The HSHIB weighed ~7000lb and had 1440HP. The Martlet II/IV weighed 7750lb and had 1200hp. The Martlets were completely outperformed by the Sea Hurricane. The numbers don't lie and power to weight and wing loading heavily favoured the Sea Hurricane.



In real life, in terms of top speed and dive, roll and acceleration, the Martlets were better. The extra weight in the Martlet was largely fuel! The minor edge held by the Sea Hurricane at takeoff rapidly diminished as the Wildcat used up fuel, and the Sea Hurricane had to go back down and land. Also, under Tropical conditions Hurricanes did not achieve spec performance.

Assessments from a race conducted by the Royal Navy found that even the Seafire was at best 9 knots faster than the Wildcat:

Erik Brown noted: "The Wildcat [was] faster and more maneuverable than the Sea Hurricane, "


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## Schweik (Apr 2, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> The FAA had no opinion on the .5in and they got them because that's what the Martlet came with. The early .5in were actually pretty miserable with a slow RoF and frequent gun jams, but by mid 1942 these kinks were being worked out.



FAA pilots didn't necessarily feel that way, for example Henry Adlam noted, after a mock combat with a Seafire:

"Adlam came out of the experience with renewed confidence in his Martlet, largely because he felt the "0.5 calibre shells from six Browning machine guns" (Thus narrowing the Martlet down to a Mk II, III or IV) would present him with a key advantage over the Seafire IIC "

And of course, Spitfires were made with .50 cals in the wings to replace the .303s so I think they did recognize it's merits.


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## RCAFson (Apr 2, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> Then why did the FAA go with Grummans, Corsairs, and Fulmars as the war went along?
> 
> Perhaps Schweik's point about endurance is on point.



Fulmars? Only 600 built. Sea Hurricanes, about 500 as we've discussed. F4F series about 7900, IIRC including the FM2 which finally achieved HSH1B performance figures in 1944. The Sea Hurricane had fixed wings and the the folding wing was the real big advantage of the Martlet II/IV over the Sea Hurricane, just as the F4F-4 replaced the fixed wing F4F-3, despite the poorer performance of the -4. Right? The Seafire III was only retained because it had folding wings.

Schweiks point about endurance is no point at all. In combat the air cooled P&W or Curtis engine used a lot more fuel than the Merlin and it used more for climb as well. The difference in endurance in actual combat conditions was small.

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## RCAFson (Apr 2, 2021)

Schweik said:


> FAA pilots didn't necessarily feel that way, for example Henry Adlam noted, after a mock combat with a Seafire:
> 
> "Adlam came out of the experience with renewed confidence in his Martlet, largely because he felt the "0.5 calibre shells from six Browning machine guns" (Thus narrowing the Martlet down to a Mk II, III or IV) would present him with a key advantage over the Seafire IIC "
> 
> And of course, Spitfires were made with .50 cals in the wings to replace the .303s so I think they did recognize it's merits.



The Seafire IIC had 2 x 20mm cannon and 4 x. 303mgs.

Seafire IIC had ~1500hp and weighed less than 7000lb, Any Martlet would be completely outperformed by a Seafire IIC and you have to be completely ignorant of basic arithmetic to believe otherwise. Again, power to weight and wing loading tell the story.


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## Thumpalumpacus (Apr 2, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> Fighters armed with 8 x .303s had shot down several thousand Axis aircraft by Mid 1942, but it was becoming ineffective by then as Lufwaffe aircraft had increased performance and extra armour.



Yes, that was my point. I wasn't saying that armament was never good, but that -- in line with your own comment about its ineffectiveness against uparmored combatants -- by 1942 it was, indeed, akin to bringing a knife to a gunfight, against bombers, apparently.


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## Thumpalumpacus (Apr 2, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> What does a Hellcat, which appeared in mid/late 1943 have to do with a HSH1B which first showed up in early 1941? Maybe absolutely nothing?



Remember, we were talking about armament.

Also, belay the snark, okay?


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## Thumpalumpacus (Apr 2, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> The Sea Hurricane had fixed wings and the the folding wing was the real big advantage of the Martlet II/IV over the Sea Hurricane, just as the F4F-4 replaced the fixed wing F4F-3, despite the poorer performance of the -4. Right? The Seafire III was only retained because it had folding wings.



There's another reason why the Sea Hurricane wasn't all it's cracked up to be, then. Think I mentioned something about that earlier in this thread.


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## Schweik (Apr 2, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> The Seafire IIC had 2 x 20mm cannon and 4 x. 303mgs.
> 
> Seafire IIC had ~1500hp and weighed less than 7000lb, Any Martlet would be completely outperformed by a Seafire IIC and you have to be completely ignorant of basic arithmetic to believe otherwise. Again, power to weight and wing loading tell the story.



FAA pilot *Henry "Hank" Adlam.* The Disastrous Fall and `Triumphant Rise of the Fleet Air Arm from 1912 to 1945 *>* RCAFson

Of these two, _one_ person actually flew a Martlet.


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## Schweik (Apr 2, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> Fulmars? Only 600 built. Sea Hurricanes, about 500 as we've discussed. F4F series about 7900, IIRC including the FM2 which finally achieved HSH1B performance figures in 1944. The Sea Hurricane had fixed wings and the the folding wing was the real big advantage of the Martlet II/IV over the Sea Hurricane, just as the F4F-4 replaced the fixed wing F4F-3, despite the poorer performance of the -4. Right? The Seafire III was only retained because it had folding wings.



They certainly could have made more Fulmars and they could have made or converted thousands more Sea Hurricanes (god knows they had far more Hurricanes than anyone needed or wanted). There is a reason why 7900 F4F were built, it certainly wasn't foreordained at the time of Pedestal or PQ 18.



> Schweiks point about endurance is no point at all. In combat the air cooled P&W or Curtis engine used a lot more fuel than the Merlin and it used more for climb as well. The difference in endurance in actual combat conditions was small.



Your _opinion _while clearly of huge significance to you in all of these discussions, means very little to me. In this thread and others, you have made it abundantly clear that you don't care about facts, reality, or data, you just have a pressing need to insist that any and every FAA and RAF aircraft was THE BEST and had no flaws in comparison to other types, including and especially when it's very obvious that the opposite is true.. There is no other way to characterize it. So I definitely don't expect to change your mind about anything. You are impervious to facts, logic, or reason.

The extremely poor combat endurance of the Sea Hurricane was the major issue raised by all of it's critics within the FAA (which seems to be most of the people who wrote down opinions about it). It is mentioned in every single description of the aircraft I have ever read.

For others reading the thread, I suggest, don't rely on my opinion. Read what the pilots and historians said about it. Some direct quotes about the Sea Hurricane from Armoured Carriers:

"_Fortunately there was little to separate the Martlet and Hurricane in terms of combat performance, *except in the key area of endurance*. _"

"Ark Royal was offered three Sea Hurricanes in July 1941. Old ex-RAF aircraft, the single-seaters were barely capable of 300kmph at 18,000ft, and although they had the same armament as the Fulmars, they had only half the ammunition capacity *and less than half the patrol endurance*. Comparative trials showed that the Fulmar II’s performance below 10,000ft was rather better than the Hurricane’s and so although the latter would have been useful for patrols above the Fulmar’s ceiling, the carrier declined the offer."

_"16. *The short operational endurance of the Hurricane* and small amount of ammunition carried must result in frequent turns into wind to land on aircraft which have been in combat, greatly aggravating the position in regard to flying off others or maintaining sections standing by to fly off. "_

_*"Endurance*
The Sea Hurricane’s range was recorded as about 450 miles. But it was loiter time that meant the most for carrier operations.
*Sea Hurricanes carried only enough fuel to sustain themselves for 1 hour at combat power, and 4.5 hours at full-economical settings. The Fulmar and Martlet could stay aloft for 2 hours and 2 hours 45 minutes under combat power, and 6 hours economical.*
The consequence of this was carriers being forced to turn into the wind far more often to take-off and land Sea Hurricanes. So they were often held as 'alert' aircraft on the deck while their longer-legged stablemates maintained the CAP."_

That is to say, the Sea Hurricane had a 1 hour endurance, the Fulmar had a 2 hour endurance, and the Martlet had a 2 hours 45 minute endurance. Still not great for a navy fighter, but better than a Fulmar and _far _better than a Sea Hurricane. Since basically everyone in the FAA acknowledged that the Sea Hurricane and Martlet were roughly equivalent in performance (with the latter clearly pulling ahead as later models became available) having a fighter which could remain available for combat almost three times as long, and could fly out to twice the distance, was obviously the better option. That is why the Sea Hurricane was never really developed as a fighter.

The to be charitable, very long and difficult teething period if not to say outright failure of the Seafire and the disappointing performance of the Firefly meant that the FAA needed to continue to use US types like the Corsair and the Hellcat, as well as the later model Martlets, right to the end of the war. With bombers similarly, the antiquated Swordfish and the marginal Albacore (ultimately given up to go back to the Swordfish) gave way to the disastrous Barracuda which meant most FAA ships were flying Avengers for strike and ASW aircraft.

I'm sorry if anyone other than RCAFson finds any of this offensive, the US also had many failed designs. We have talked about the TBD Devastator. The Vindicator was a marginal (at best) strike aircraft. The F2A may have worked out for the Finns but the Buffalo was a _disaster_ for the US Navy and not much better for the British. The US Mk 13 etc. torpedo was one of the worst procurement fails of the entire war, and etc. I don't have to go through the whole list. Frankly the Wildcat / Martlet wasn't that great, it's just that there wasn't much competition for it in the Allied sphere. It was clearly inferior to the A6M except in the crucial aspect of suitability for attrition war.

The fact that Allied pilots including some of our relatives and ancestors had to contend with not always the best kit in their struggle to survive and overcome the enemy is one of the more interesting aspects of studying something like WW2. But if every discussion about specific kit turns into a war in which any admission of flaws or design failures is treated like an attack on patriotic values then we can't actually have the kinds of discussions we like to engage in here.

You and slaterat managed to bore everyone to death with your highly creative and relentless cherry picking in this thread. I really didn't have the time available to get that far into the weeds any more with someone who clearly isn't interested in the truth, but I have finished a big project and have more time now. And I do in fact remember the spurious claim by RCAFson trying to compare Japanese strikes against the RN vs. the USN, pretending the strike on HMS Hermes was vastly larger than it was. I'm ready to argue all of those points if necessary.

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## Thumpalumpacus (Apr 2, 2021)

All nations produced eagles, and produced flying pigs. Slapping flags over a discussion of aircraft kinda misses the point. I don't think I'm unusual in thinking that much of the difference came down to the pilots, and even that isn't about what flag they served, but how cognizant they were in some terribly chaotic conditions.

That said, equipment does matter.


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## Schweik (Apr 2, 2021)

You are right, and it's absolutely a bit of both. Situational awareness was of huge importance. Training was of huge importance. We tend to forget about things like health (having dysentery or malaria made it really hard to fly! But some people had to anyway) and comfort (arctic cold, tropical heat and humidity, biting insects, all take a toll on things like sleep).

Maintenance, the availability or viability of things like radio, ammunition, fuel, all major issues.

But indeed, there were also some limits to what you could do in a given aircraft. An I-153 is hard pressed against a Fw 190, no matter how good the pilot is.

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## Thumpalumpacus (Apr 2, 2021)

Schweik said:


> You are right, and it's absolutely a bit of both. Situational awareness was of huge importance. Training was of huge importance. We tend to forget about things like health (having dysentery or malaria made it really hard to fly! But some people had to anyway) and comfort (arctic cold, tropical heat and humidity, biting insects, all take a toll on things like sleep.
> 
> Maintenance, the availability or viability of things like radio, ammunition, fuel, all major issues.
> 
> But indeed, there were also some limits to what you could do in a given aircraft. An I-153 is hard pressed against a Fw 190, no matter how good the pilot is.



Exactly. A fighter plane is a weapons system, and that weapons system includes airframe, powerplant, armament, avionics, and operator(s). Just as the speed of a convoy is limited by its slowest ship, so too is a weapons system limited by its weakest link.


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## RCAFson (Apr 2, 2021)

Schweik said:


> If you read the accounts, this was not the only means by which they survived. Admitteldy the BV 138 was fairly heavily armed. The He 115 certainly wasn't.



I have read the accounts. There was only the single instance where a BV138 or HE115 survived without escaping into cloud. 




> I'm not 'condemning an aircraft over a single combat" - it's just an example. The failure at Pedestal overall is the basis worthy of condemnation. Certainly many RN offiicers felt that way. And unlike with the Wildcat they were not able to find a way to adapt the Sea Hurricane to the conditions.



Sure you are. Yeah, so Malta fell and the Axis won WW2 - Not! What "failure at Pedestal" are you talking about? Malta survived because the HSH1B won the battle for air supremacy over the Convoy.




> In real life, in terms of top speed and dive, roll and acceleration, the Martlets were better. The extra weight in the Martlet was largely fuel! The minor edge held by the Sea Hurricane at takeoff rapidly diminished as the Wildcat used up fuel, and the Sea Hurricane had to go back down and land. Also, under Tropical conditions Hurricanes did not achieve spec performance.



Nonsense. Martlet II/IV = ~7750lb and ~1200hp versus ~7000lb and ~1440hp with both aircraft having similar frontal area and wing area. You don't have to be a rocket scientist to figure out which aircraft performs better. 

Martlet II/IV performance is well documented and both were slower and climbed slower than the HSH1B. 




> Assessments from a race conducted by the Royal Navy found that even the Seafire was at best 9 knots faster than the Wildcat:
> 
> Erik Brown noted: "The Wildcat [was] faster and more maneuverable than the Sea Hurricane, "



Seafire IIC/M46 (the first operational Seafire) = 342mph at 20700 ft in instrumented Boscombe Down testing= faster than any variant F4F and much faster than a II/IV which were both less than 300mph at any altitude. HSH1B = 315mph at 7500ft and 308mph at ~18K ft., again faster than the Martlet II/IV and of course a much higher climb rate.

Eric Brown documents the performance in _*Wings of the Navy*_ and he states these numbers:

_"With the arrival of folding-wing Martlet Mk IIs to replace
our fixed-wing Mk Is during the summer of 1941. No 802
Squadron began preparations to embark aboard the tiny
escort carrier HMS Audacity, a converted German merchant
vessel of 5,600 tons. The Martlet Mk II had been tested at
Boscombe Down where it had been found to weigh about
1,000 to (454 kg) more than the Mk I, but then. apart from
the somewhat heavier Twin Wasp engine. it had wing-
folding, with the inevitable weight penalty that such imposed,
and toted an extra pair of 0-5-in Colt-Browning M-2s.
Understandably, this extra weight had some affect on per-
formance and Boscombe Down testing revealed a maximum
speed in MS gear of 254 knots (471 kmh) TAS as 5,400 ft
(1 647 m) and the same speed in FS gear at 13,000 ft (3 965
m), a range of 773 nm (1 432 km) being achieved at 15,000 ft
(4 575 m) cruising at 143 knots (265 kmvh) IAS at full
throttle in weak mixture and MS gear."_

_254knots = 292mph. _

The Martlet I also had no armour or SS fuel tanks and flew only a handful of combat sorties. Brown states that he flew the Martlet II from HMS Audacity.

Eric Brown, (_*Duels in the Sky*_*,* P.210) states that the Hurricane IIC could out roll, out turn and out dive the F4F-4. The Hurricane IB would do even better. above 15K ft the F4F-4 was a bit faster than the HSH1B but this is almost academic because combat at these altitudes was rare, especially given it's poor climb rate, and the F4F-4 wasn't available to the FAA. In 1943 and 1944/5 the FAA received the FM1 and FM2.

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## RCAFson (Apr 2, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> Remember, we were talking about armament.



The FAA didn't specify the .5in MG, as I've stated and a Hellcat had a fully debugged and improved BMG. In mid 1941 it was not apparent that the .5in BMG was better than the .303 BMG.


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## RCAFson (Apr 2, 2021)

Schweik said:


> They certainly could have made more Fulmars and they could have made or converted thousands more Sea Hurricanes (god knows they had far more Hurricanes than anyone needed or wanted). There is a reason why 7900 F4F were built, it certainly wasn't foreordained at the time of Pedestal or PQ 18.



Fairey had limited production facilities and the Fulmar plant had to close to retool to build the Barracuda, So no, they could not build more Fulmars and the same is true for Sea Hurricanes as it would have meant diverting aircraft from other duties and the UK/Canada didn't have enough surplus capacity to do this. In 1942 every Allied fighter was in short supply and only the USA was in a position to supply the needed capacity as it's production expanded rapidly in 1943/44.




> Your _opinion _while clearly of huge significance to you in all of these discussions, means very little to me. In this thread and others, you have made it abundantly clear that you don't care about facts, reality, or data, you just have a pressing need to insist that any and every FAA and RAF aircraft was THE BEST and had no flaws in comparison to other types, including and especially when it's very obvious that the opposite is true.. There is no other way to characterize it. So I definitely don't expect to change your mind about anything. You are impervious to facts, logic, or reason.


The fact that you can't do simple arithmetic to work out power to weight ratios and wing loading is not my problem.



_



"16. *The short operational endurance of the Hurricane* and small amount of ammunition carried must result in frequent turns into wind to land on aircraft which have been in combat, greatly aggravating the position in regard to flying off others or maintaining sections standing by to fly off. "

Click to expand...

_
Yet, not a single PQ-18 HSH1B ran out of fuel or suffered a serious deck landing accident. The primary problem was really Avenger's limited ability to launch and recover aircraft. A Sea Hurricane IA (Hurricat), after Avenger departed, flew a combat sortie, engaged aircraft at full throttle (shooting down an HE111 in several firing passes) and then flew 240 miles to a Soviet airfield for total time in the air of 2:25. (some sources state 2:45)



> _*"Endurance*
> The Sea Hurricane’s range was recorded as about 450 miles. But it was loiter time that meant the most for carrier operations.
> *Sea Hurricanes carried only enough fuel to sustain themselves for 1 hour at combat power, and 4.5 hours at full-economical settings. The Fulmar and Martlet could stay aloft for 2 hours and 2 hours 45 minutes under combat power, and 6 hours economical.*
> The consequence of this was carriers being forced to turn into the wind far more often to take-off and land Sea Hurricanes. So they were often held as 'alert' aircraft on the deck while their longer-legged stablemates maintained the CAP."_



2 hours at full throttle for a F4F/Martlet???  C'mon don't waste my time.

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## Schweik (Apr 2, 2021)

No, not 2 hours. I agree, it would be ridiculous to assume it had the same endurance as a Fulmar when we know the F4F had longer range. The quoted figure is *2 hours and 45 minutes. *Go look at the site yourself. Do you think they are part of a conspiracy? I believe it is a UK site.

To be precise, the quote mentioned combat power which is not the same as full throttle.


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## Thumpalumpacus (Apr 2, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> The FAA didn't specify the .5in MG, as I've stated and a Hellcat had a fully debugged and improved BMG.



I didn't say they specified them. I said they bought them, and that decision must have some reason behind it. What do you think it is?


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## RCAFson (Apr 2, 2021)

Schweik said:


> No, not 2 hours. I agree, it would be ridiculous to assume it had the same endurance as a Fulmar when we know the F4F had longer range. The quoted figure is *2 hours and 45 minutes. *Go look at the site yourself. Do you think they are part of a conspiracy? I believe it is a UK site.
> 
> To be precise, the quote mentioned combat power which is not the same as full throttle.



According to the *FAA data sheets*:

Loiter endurance of a Wildcat IV = F4F-4B= *Martlet II *with 120IG of internal fuel (SS tanks) =______ 3.4 hours at 181mph at 15k ft.
Economical endurance of a Wildcat IV = F4F-4B=* Martlet II *with 120IG of internal fuel (SS tanks) = 2.9 hours at 238 mph at 15k ft.

Economical endurance of a *HSH1B* with 97IG internal fuel =_________________________________________ 2.7 hours at 208mph at 20k ft.

So, yes an advantage for the Martlet, but not a huge advantage.

*Fulmar endurance of 6 hours is with the 60IG slipper DT!!!*

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## Schweik (Apr 2, 2021)

Obviously it all depends on the precise throttle settings etc., overload fuel etc., and you will try to find the most advantageous looking ratio you can. But I remain unconvinced. That armored decks website is basically made up of testimonials from veterans who actually flew the planes. So again, I don't think they are making up their numbers. Which also state that both the Martlet and the Fulmar could fly for 6 hours at 'economical' throttle settings.

I repeat what they said: 1 hour combat flight endurance for the Sea Hurricane, 2 hours for the Fulmar, 2 hours 45 minutes for the Martlet.

They also have a lot of interesting testimonials, like this:

_"Hurricanes! Scramble the Hurricanes!” The fitters in the cockpits pressed the starter-buttons, and the four Merlins opened up with a blast of sound and a gust of blue smoke. As we scrambled up the wings, the crews hopped out the other side, fixing our straps with urgent fingers. Connect R.T.; switch on. Ten degrees of flap. Trim. Quick cockpit check. The ship was under full helm, racing up into wind— and we were off and climbing at full boost on a northerly vector to 20,000 feet, heads swivelling. Down to 12,000; alter course; climb to 20,000 again. And there they were, a big formation of 88’ s below us. One after another we peeled off and went down after them. They broke formation as they saw us coming, and Brian and I picked one and went after him. He turned and dived away, and we stuffed the nose down, full bore, willing our aircraft to make up on him. At extreme range we gave him a long burst; bits came off and smoke poured out of one engine, and then he vanished into the thickening twilight. We hadn’t a hope of catching him and making sure; already he had led us away from the convoy; and so, cursing our lack of speed, we re-formed, joined up with Steve and Paddy, the other members of the flight, and started to climb back to base. _
— Hugh Popham, RNVR: Sea Flight - The Wartime Memoirs of a Fleet Air Arm Pilot "

Now this guy seems to be saying, even with an altitude advantage, Hurricanes couldn't catch Ju 88s in a dive. And yet I've seen you claim they had great dive performance. But pilot after pilot after pilot has stories like that. Who should I believe?

Slipper drop tanks are not normally conducive to combat.


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## RCAFson (Apr 2, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> I didn't say they specified them. I said they bought them, and that decision must have some reason behind it. What do you think it is?



The USN allowed the sale to France (and then LL to the UK for the Martlet II which was the first ordered by the FAA) but insisted on standardized armament and so it was .5in BMGs or nothing. 

Even Eric Brown, who was in love with the Martlet and often fails to distinguish between the Martlet I and early Martlet II, with no SS tanks, armour or folding wings, noted that the early .5in BMGs were less reliable than the .303 BMG.


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## Thumpalumpacus (Apr 2, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> The USN allowed the sale to France (and then LL to the UK for the Martlet II which was the first ordered by the FAA) but insisted on standardized armament and so it was .5in BMGs or nothing.



The French Wildcats were shipped without armament, with the plan to put 7.5(?) mm guns upon arrival, no? The Brits installed .50s themselves on those planes, so far as I remember reading about.


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## GrauGeist (Apr 2, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> F4F-4 wasn't available to the FAA.


Yes it was.
Designated Martlet IV by the FAA.


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## RCAFson (Apr 2, 2021)

Schweik said:


> Obviously it all depends on the precise throttle settings etc., overload fuel etc., and you will try to find the most advantageous looking ratio you can. But I remain unconvinced. That armored decks website is basically made up of testimonials from veterans who actually flew the planes. So again, I don't think they are making up their numbers. Which also state that both the Martlet and the Fulmar could fly for 6 hours at 'economical' throttle settings.
> 
> I repeat what they said: 1 hour combat flight endurance for the Sea Hurricane, 2 hours for the Fulmar, 2 hours 45 minutes for the Martlet.
> 
> ...



I really wish you could perform simple arithmetic and forget the fairy tales. I am sorry to be sharp but this is getting tedious in the extreme. Aircraft engines burn fuel in predictable quantities which were measured and used for range and endurance data. Use the numbers available.

So the Hurricanes climb to 20K ft at full boost ( about 6.5-7min to 20K ft), dive to 12K ft, then climb to 20K ft (= ~10min total climbing) ...how well do you think a Martlet II/IV or F4F-4 would do in that scenario, given their lethargic climb rate that left USN pilots cursing their F4F-4s ability to climb? How much fuel would they waste in the ~25min of climbing that they would have to do?

In any event the JU88 was fast in a dive but a Hurricane could catch them, but given the visibility it's not surprising that it got away. However, a Martlet would never have made that interception to begin with.

Fulmar range and endurance:
Boscombe Down trials:
_"Fuel consumption trials were carried out with N4021, which showed a maximum still air range of approximately 950 miles from a total fuel capacity of 155 gallons. This was obtained with a weak mixture at 5000 ft using 1600 rpm and 2 lb/sq.in boost. The speed was 142 mph IAS, which was a little lower than the best speed for comfortable control. This was achieved at 150 mph IAS with 1650 rpm and 1.2 lb/sq.in, but the range was slightly reduced at 925 miles. The maximum endurance was 6.18 hours. Further consumption trials were made with X8641, fitted with a jettisonable 60-gallon overload fuel tank under the fuselage near the wing trailing edge. The maximum still air range was found to be 1100 miles at 5000 ft and 140 mph IAS (1750 rpm, 0 lb/sq.in boost) with an endurance of 7 hours" _

The above figures are no reserve range. With a standard reserve and allowance for TO and climb endurance was 5.5hrs with the 60IG tank and 4.5hrs with internal fuel at 152knots (~175mph).

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## RCAFson (Apr 2, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> Yes it was.
> Designated Martlet IV by the FAA.



Martlet IV (redesignated Wildcat IV in 1944 after the Martlet moniker was dropped) was an F4F-4B with a single stage engine:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/wildcat-IV-ads.jpg


The Wildcat V was an FM1 which was more or less identical to the F4F-4 but with 4 x .5in BMGs. The FAA never got any F4F-4s with the two stage engine.


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## RCAFson (Apr 2, 2021)

Thumpalumpacus said:


> The French Wildcats were shipped without armament, with the plan to put 7.5(?) mm guns upon arrival, no? The Brits installed .50s themselves on those planes, so far as I remember reading about.



Only a handful were delivered that way. It would have taken a lot of work to fit an 8 gun .303 armament to a Martlet. Why didn't the French go with the .5in? Why did they feel that the 7.5mm was the better gun?


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## Admiral Beez (Apr 3, 2021)

Schweik said:


> Fulmar was a disaster as a carrier fighter


The Fulmar is the FAA’s top scoring fighter of all time, with 122 air combat kills to only 14 air combat losses, and produced nine FAA aces – more than any other aircraft type for the whole war. Not bad since it was introduced a year into the war and begun to be withdrawn through 1942.

HMS Illustrious and Formidable were badly damaged yes, but no RN carrier was sunk by air attack when protected by the Fulmar. Hardly a disaster. Yes, a faster, better rate of climb, single seat fighter like the Martlet, Sea Hurricane or Seafire would have certainly done better. But let’s hear what Admiral Sommerville thought of the Fulmar, though his closing sentence is a bit of a backhanded compliment.

“_The Fulmars of ARK ROYAL contributed in no small measure to the safe arrival of the convoy at its destination. On 23rd July formations of enemy aircraft were intercepted on three occasions. On the first occasion, two were shot down for certain and another two probably destroyed, whilst the survivors which reached the fleet were in no state to carry out an accurate attack._

_On the second occasion, as the Fulmars were about to intercept, the bombers released their bombs on the destroyer screen and immediately withdrew. Finally an attempted T/B attack was completely broken up and driven off, leaving two aircraft shot down with another damaged and possibly lost._

_On 25th July the only enemy formations to approach the fleet were once again thoroughly routed. A force of torpedo bombers withdrew before the fighters could reach it and the only high level bombing attack was intercepted about 15 miles from the fleet, when four enemy planes were destroyed for certain with one probably destroyed and two more damaged. All bombs were jettisoned._

_One Italian officer survivor stated he had been shot down by a Hurricane. It is evident that the enemy hold our Fleet Air Arm fighters in higher esteem than do our own Fulmar pilots.”_

_(Signed) J. F. SOMERVILLE,_

_Vice-Admiral, Force H_

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## GrauGeist (Apr 3, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> Martlet IV (redesignated Wildcat IV in 1944 after the Martlet moniker was dropped) was an F4F-4B with a single stage engine:
> http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/wildcat-IV-ads.jpg
> 
> 
> The Wildcat V was an FM1 which was more or less identical to the F4F-4 but with 4 x .5in BMGs. The FAA never got any F4F-4s with the two stage engine.


You stated that the "F4F-4 wasn't available to the FAA"
The Martlet IV IS an F4F-4, suffix B denoting the Cyclone engine and cowling arrangement.
But it is of the F4F-4 series, therefore, the FAA did receive F4F-4s...


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## RCAFson (Apr 3, 2021)

GrauGeist said:


> You stated that the "F4F-4 wasn't available to the FAA"
> The Martlet IV IS an F4F-4, suffix B denoting the Cyclone engine and cowling arrangement.
> But it is of the F4F-4 series, therefore, the FAA did receive F4F-4s...



F4F-4 denotes a two stage P&W engine. The F4F-4B is not an F4F-4.

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## Thumpalumpacus (Apr 3, 2021)

RCAFson said:


> Only a handful were delivered that way. It would have taken a lot of work to fit an 8 gun .303 armament to a Martlet. Why didn't the French go with the .5in? Why did they feel that the 7.5mm was the better gun?



Perhaps because they were already making parts and ammunition for it and wanted logistics commonality?

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## slaterat (Apr 3, 2021)

Re discovered this lost site. The Small force of Sea Hurricanes available to operate from the Avenger performed quite well, making PQ 18 a success. The Avenger operated only 6 Sea Hurricanes and 3 Swordfish, with another 6 sea Hurricanes disassembled as spares.

HMS Avenger aircraft carrier profile. Aircraft Carrier Database of the Fleet Air Arm Archive 1939-1945

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## GregP (Apr 3, 2021)

Hi Schweik and RCAFson,

The book shown earlier, Statistial Digest 1946, is NOT the same as the WWII digest. It is for 1946. There is one for every year, more or less. The "special edition" was for the entire war. Links below.

1) USAAF Statistical Digest of World War II: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a542518.pdf

2) Naval Aviation Combat Statistics of WWII: https://www.history.navy.mil/conten...s/naval-aviation/aviation-monographs/nasc.pdf

These have bare statistics and do NOT give individual statistics. Also, the USAAF and US Navy/Maries did NOT save exactly the same data in their records, so comparisons are difficult except at the macro level. For instance, the USN/MC break out combat losses into losses due to enemy aircraft, AAA, and operational losses. The USAAF does not do that. Then, the USAAF breaks out victories into ground kills and air kills. The USN/MC does not do that.

So, we have losses broken out for the Navy/Marines but not the victories, and victories broken out into air and ground for the USAAF but not for the Navy/Marines.

It's almost as if they specifically don't WANT you to be able to compare the data, and that is likely the actual case. Who says interservice rivalry doesn't exist? But, there ARE some useful data in these studies. It is also useful to recall that the USAAF and the USN/MC had wildly different combat experiences. In the ETO, you had 1,000-plane raids with a LOT Mof aircraft engaging each other at times. Anyone who bailed out or went down and wasn't shot on the way down could usually return to service and crash-landed airplanes could be recovered or at least scrounged for parts. In the PTO, you usually had small units of 4 or 8 aircraft encountering anywhere from 1 to 12 enemy aircraft, mostly over water. If anyone went down any real distance away from home, they were usually lost and the aircraft were just gone. It is a LOT easier to keep track of potenital victories in a sky with a few airplanes in it than it is in a sky with 1,000 ariplanes flitting about.

The difference in experience between carrier air combat and air combat over land was tremendous, especially if you talk with people who have done both in WWII where modern nav aids weren't avialable.

Cheers and happy statistics, if those actually exist, that is.

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