# How effective were gunners in planes?



## Watanbe (Jun 6, 2008)

Was it rare for a plane to actually be shot down by the defensive armaments of planes, inparticular bombers. How many planes were actually shot down by Gunners in planes. Im particularly interested in the large twin and 4 engine bombers. 

Did the guns only put of a field of fire and act as a deterrant for attack, or did actually effective shoot down quite a few planes. Im thinking the former.


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## magnocain (Jun 6, 2008)

Pilots could actually be hit by a gunner's bullet, injuring the pilot and making him turn home, removing the threat.


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## The Basket (Jun 6, 2008)

Deterrant. Stops the fighter coming up the exhaust pipes. And he has to keep his speed up so he has less shooting time.

Escort fighters certainly were more vital than gunners.


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## Kurfürst (Jun 6, 2008)

It wasnt rare. Concentrated firepower from bombers on single attacking fighters could be effective. Look at Schweinfurt, one side of the coin is that the American bomber formations were decimated, but there was considerable German fighter losses as well. All of those were to bomber gunners, no escort fighters there at all.

I also recall some the story told in a book by a Hungarian Stuka pilot.. Stuka Ds were flying in formation over Russia, 9 of them... they met Aircobras, one Cobra tried a lone attack on them.. received fire from 18 barrels, 480 rounds going for him per sec... he went down. Even more remarkable, theres a story of an old Hungarian recce He 111P over Russia... got attacked by FOUR Soviet fighters.. again sole attacks... it claimed to have shot down 3 of them - some burned, exploded so theres some truth in their story - the fourth gave up.

Of course fighters generally had their time over bombers, but it wasnt that easy for them, nor was the story written before it happened..


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## parsifal (Jun 6, 2008)

I think Bomber defensive tactics are the exact opposite to Fighter. For a bomber the important thing is to stay in formation, stay close to the rest of the formation, and provide as much mutual support apossible. For a fighter, its manouever, and speed,and attacking from the unexpected direction etc. I think its obvious that the inherent advantage lies with the fighter, but there are defensive measures that the bombers can take

At night the procedure is fundamentally different, and almost the opposite again. The fighter stalks the lone bomber, and attempts to pick him off. The bomber does not mutual support like his day cousins. If he detects the NF, the best defences was to manouver, as violently as possible. The idea being to become "unacquired".


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## kool kitty89 (Jun 6, 2008)

Unless you consider the Mossie's (or other fast-bomber) tactics, trade armament for speed and maneuverability to evade interception. (not going to happen on a 4-engine heavy...)


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## eddie_brunette (Jun 6, 2008)

The Mapping Mission

On June 16 1943 a request went out for a special mission, a single ship unescorted mapping mission over hostile territory. Capt. Zeamer and crew eagerly volunteered.

Taking off at 4 A.M. to make use of darkness to cover at least part of the mission 'Old 666' and crew headed for Bougainville, where they were instructed to make a reconnaissance of the Japanese airfield there to determine logistics and enemy strength.

The flight would require flying over 600 miles of open sea to even reach the target. By 7:40 AM with only 22 minutes of flight-time remaining to complete his mission, Old 666 was intercepted by no less than 17 Japanese Fighters.

After making a pass at the heavily armed tail the fighters came in against the normally lightly armed nose only to find that this specific bomber possessed much heavier forward firepower, resulting in two A6M Zeros being shot down. 20mm cannon shells from a third Zero smashed into the cockpit and nose wounding both Zeamer and Sarnoski before being shot down itself. Sarnoski crawled out of the nose to seek first aid attention but when a second wave of fighters attacked nose on he returned to his guns. He shot down an incoming Ki-46 Dinah before collapsing on the guns.[2]

The second wave knocked out the oxygen system and forced the bomber to dive from 25,000 ft to 10,000 ft, where the crew could breathe normally, in just a matter of seconds.

By 8:45 AM the American bomber was over open seas and the enemy fighters, low on ammunition and fuel, were forced to turn back to Bougainville, most of the crew had been wounded in varying degrees and the aircraft was shot full of holes. It was during the return flight that Zeamer lost consciousness and Sarnoski, still manning his guns, died.

Upon landing the co-pilot told the ground crews, "Get the pilot last. He's dead!" He was not, and Zeamer lived to receive the Medal of Honor, but Sarnoski's Medal of Honor was awarded posthumously. In one of the most decorated flights in history, the rest of the entire crew received Distinguished Service Crosses.

I cant remeber how many they shot down, but it was more that 5 I think

edd

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## syscom3 (Jun 6, 2008)

The defensive firepower of the bombers certainly was a deterrent and could be quite deadly at times.

Thats why the LW settled on front attacks, so as to minimize the number of guns that could be brought to bear on them at one time.


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## JoeB (Jun 6, 2008)

eddie_brunette said:


> The Mapping Mission
> 
> I cant remeber how many they shot down, but it was more that 5 I think


I don't know the other side of that particular incident, but as a rule if a bomber of any country was attacked by multiple fighters and claimed 5, the real number was probably less, could often be zero. 

Bomber claims were as a rule highly overstated. A rule of thumb in ETO was that even after analyzing claims for duplications, reasonable credit awards to crews (in view of reasonable evidence from crews' perspective, morale etc) would be 4 times as many a/c as the Germans actually lost, in comparison to the estimate that fighter credits would be only around 1.3 times enemy losses. When comparing known cases both those estimates seem optimistic (most fighter claims in WWII were less accurate than that) but the point is that even the side awarding credits had some idea the bomber credits were more overstated than fighter credits.

One real example approximately equates to the rule of thumb: B-29 credited victories and actual Japanese losses in the particular attacks covered in "B-29 Hunters of the JAAF" by Henry Sakaida, in the daylight phase from late '44-Feb 45 over Japan. There were 214 official 'destroyed' credits to the B-29's in the actions described and 52 Japanese fighters actually lost. But, at least 14 bombers were rammed in those attacks, sometimes by more than one fighter; this surely biases the claim accuracy upwards from what it would be against wholly conventional attackers.

And, another real example in more difficult conditions shows B-29 credits in a harsher light: Over Korea B-29's were officially credited with 27 MiG-15's, but probably only 3 MiG-15's were actually downed by them. This is based on apparently complete Soviet accounts corresponding to every MiG credit to B-29's except one, in which a Chinese MiG was lost as compared to 2 credits. In contrast US fighter credits v MiG-15's in Korea were approximately in line with the WWII estimate, overstated by only around 1/3.

Those two examples happen to be B-29's but it was not a special B-29 problem; the early PTO B-17 claim accuracy was more like the ~10% in Korea than the ~25% v. partly ramming attacks over Japan. When those units first received B-17E's with tail guns, they recorded several combats where the Japanese, taken by surprise, suffered heavy losses attacking from astern as against B-17D's: those losses don't pan out in Japanese accounts for the most part. But, that doesn't mean they didn't have to exercise more caution v a B-17E from astern...

In general the effectiveness of bomber defensive fire was mainly deterrence, throwing off aim or forcing too long range attacks by less determined pilots. Bombers sometimes downed fighters, but the impression we'd get on average from taking first hand accounts of bomber gunners and even official credits at face value would be highly distorted, more so than case of fighter-fighter claims or official credits (though we shouldn't rely on those either as a rule).

Joe


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## Erich (Jun 6, 2008)

Sys and others the LW fighter force turned towards the back of the bombers in June/July of 44 as standard for nearly all JG's due to the fact that only the tail gunner would be present, and once eliminated the bomber remained ineffective to defend itself and could be torn apart by heavy cannon


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## syscom3 (Jun 6, 2008)

Erich, I thought the head on attacks brought the most devastation, as like what happened with the 447th BG.


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## HoHun (Jun 7, 2008)

Hi Watanbe,

>Was it rare for a plane to actually be shot down by the defensive armaments of planes, inparticular bombers. 

It was a frequent occurrence. However, the chances were still weighted heavily in favour of the interceptors.

Here two diagrams illustrating the difficulties of firing from a bomber's defensive positions ...

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## syscom3 (Jun 7, 2008)

Hohun, now magnify that by 30 or so, as most bombers were in a group with multiple guns aimed at the same target.


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## HoHun (Jun 7, 2008)

Hi Syscom,

>Hohun, now magnify that by 30 or so, as most bombers were in a group with multiple guns aimed at the same target.

Massed firepower certainly increased the chances of fighting off interceptors, as can be verified from the German practice to count a "final kill" of a bomber than had dropped out of formation with 2 points towards promotions and awards, but to count the hit that made it drop out of formation with 3 points.

However, I'd say a straight multiplication might be too simple - on one hand, bombers not directly attacked would not get a zero-deflection shot, and on the other hand, they'd get a larger target silhouette when shooting with deflection.

Additionally, there is the issue of operational use of the firepower. There is a well-known comment by a US officer claiming that at any time, only one in ten gunners actually fired at the target that he could have fired at theoretically.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)


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## Tony Williams (Jun 7, 2008)

This issue is dealt with in some detail in *Flying Guns – World War 2: Development of Aircraft Guns, Ammunition and Installations 1933-45*. Here is an extract:

On combat operations, the American bombers in the ETO expended 26.3 million rounds of .50" ammunition in 1943, and 36.2 million in 1944; the wartime total was 72.3 million rounds. (In October 1943, the ammunition consumption reached a peak of 632,773 rounds per operational day.) That corresponds to nearly 12,000 rounds for every enemy aircraft claimed shot down by the bombers. Because, as we have seen above, these claims were often far higher than the actual German losses, a more realistic average would probably exceed 40,000 rounds for every destroyed German fighter. 

In comparison, the American fighters expended 26.6 million .50" rounds and 262,189 20 mm rounds, and claimed the destruction of 5222 enemy aircraft in the air and 4250 on the ground. That corresponds to 2810 rounds per enemy aircraft claimed as destroyed. Because the fighter claims were usually much closer to reality, a very rough but reasonable estimate would be that a fighter was ten times more efficient as a gunnery platform than a bomber. 

Some commanders were quite sceptical about the effectiveness of this form of defensive armament. In April 1943 Colonel Claude E. Putnam, commander of the 306th BG, gave as his opinion that four gunners needed to fire simultaneously at an enemy fighter to have a 50% probability to bring it down. Worse, he estimated that to only one in ten of the gunners who theoretically had a firing opportunity actually opened fire. His colleague of the 308th BG, T.R. Milton, shared his doubts, and feared that the defensive guns were often more a hazard than a protection, because the danger of “friendly fire” in a dense formation was high.​


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 7, 2008)

Interesting stuff Tony....

BTW today I work for the 306th Flight Training Group - our lineage goes back to the 306th BG...


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## Watanbe (Jun 8, 2008)

Very interesting! Do you think it would have been a better idea to reduce the armaments and crew numbers of the bombers in an attempt to make them lighter and faster. Was the fighter escort effective enough from 1944 onwards to make such an idea viable?


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## Tony Williams (Jun 8, 2008)

The question of defensive armament for bombers was a complex one, and the answer would vary a lot depending on the circumstances. In particular, are you talking about just stripping guns from a gun-armed plane, or designing a plane to be gunless in the first place? The latter approach does of course provide much better performance.

In a 1943 study, the RAF concluded that the most efficient form of bomb delivery was a small, very fast, unarmed night bomber (as the Mosquito was proving). However, if they had to go for day bombing they would need a heavy defensive armament which would drive up the size of the plane considerably. But at that time, they didn't believe in escort fighters.

Logically, once there were sufficient escort fighters to provide cover it would have made sense to minimise the time of risk by making fast gunless bombers. The problem with that is the psychological one. I do not doubt that the bomber crews took great comfort from the fact that they had guns and were able to fight back - an important boost to morale.

To complicate matters further, if fast gunless day bombers were used there was arguably less need to group them in defensive clusters, or even to escort them. It could have made more sense to send them in small groups on a variety of courses and altitudes to confuse the defences, while using the long-range escorts to travel to the enemy airfields and harry their defending fighters.


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## Juha (Jun 8, 2008)

HoHun, thanks a lot for those bullet patterns
now, ball turret seems to be very effective.

On general. I agree with Joe B that one cannot draw very much from claims, what really mattered is the real results.

Sometimes the gunners were very effective. For ex on 29 Sept 40 the combat between 9./KG 55 and 79 Sqn over Irish Sea. 9. Staffel lost one He 111 and 2 other were so damaged that they were forced to turn back (out of 9 He-111s) but He-111 gunners shot down 3 Hurricanes out of 11.

Juha


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## Glider (Jun 8, 2008)

When discussing the effectiveness of Bomber defences, I think its worth remebering that the aim of a bombers defences was not to shoot down the attacking fighter. It was to stop the bomber being shot down.

If a bomber hit an enemy fighter and made it leave the fight, then that was almost as important as shooting it down.

A lot of emphasis is given to how many were shot down, its natural. However, a mission where the bombers got home with few if any casualties after an attack was a great success, even if no fighters were shot down


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## renrich (Jun 8, 2008)

Very interesting discussion. Brings to mind a question: I wonder how many people were killed on the ground by bullets, shells and shrapnel? The friendly fire in a bomber formation is one question. It seems impossible for bombers not to be inadvertant targets for other bomber's defensive fire. In the Pacific, there are a number of examples of our AC in the CAP during a raid being shot down by fire from US vessels and sometimes the ships themselves became victims of friendly fire. By the way, I believe that the radio gunner in the B17 was deleted fairly early in the war and late in the ETO the waist gunners were left at home with the positions sealed up.


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## drgondog (Jun 8, 2008)

renrich said:


> Very interesting discussion. Brings to mind a question: I wonder how many people were killed on the ground by bullets, shells and shrapnel? The friendly fire in a bomber formation is one question. It seems impossible for bombers not to be inadvertant targets for other bomber's defensive fire. In the Pacific, there are a number of examples of our AC in the CAP during a raid being shot down by fire from US vessels and sometimes the ships themselves became victims of friendly fire. By the way, I believe that the radio gunner in the B17 was deleted fairly early in the war and late in the ETO the waist gunners were left at home with the positions sealed up.



Rich - the late model G's had 'sealed' up waist guns to get the gunners out of the cold slipstream (as well as tail gunner's backside.) That would have been from early 1944 forward IIRC. It had a gimbal similar to the cheek guns.

I think they realized the radio hatch gun was worthless, but good psychlogically speaking. I still see a lot of late 1944 shots with it still intact.

I didn't realize that late in the war they left the waist gunners home -


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## davparlr (Jun 8, 2008)

I think an interesting question would be how did the German pilots feel about attacking bomber formation of many boxes, how did it affect their strategy, did it rush their decision making or cause them to make lower probability of success attacks, did it cause a high degree of anxiety? I am sure they would have perfered they were lightly armed. Also, what was the bomber kills against fighter kills during the time when escorts were not available (unfortunately, we won't know how many fighters attacks were aborted by damage, etc. or how many bomber attacks were aborted).

I am not sure bullet counts tell a lot, we had plenty of bullets. Lower Pk of each bullet can be made up of lots of bullets.


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## renrich (Jun 8, 2008)

I think I remember reading in a book, it may have been a "Wing and a Prayer," where the author said on some missions late in the war where weight and fuel was a real consideration and fighter opposition was expected to be light, the waist gunners and guns were left off and another point I seem to remember is that sometimes only one waist gunner was carried(to man one side or another.) Was that common practise in B24s? I believe the radio gun was deleted not only because of weight and ineffectiveness but because that opening led to a draft that froze the radioman and the waist gunners. At one point I read that there were more crewmen in the hospital from frostbite than from battle wounds. Sometimes the effectiveness of bomber defensive guns was a big factor. In Lundstrom, he speaks of a formation of TBDs(I think) that drove off a Zero with well coordinated fire from the aft 30 cal mgs. Of course a fighter pilot might might be a little more leary of attacking a formation of bombers when the defensive fire is well directed when the deep blue sea waits below.


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## JoeB (Jun 8, 2008)

renrich said:


> Very interesting discussion. Brings to mind a question: I wonder how many people were killed on the ground by bullets, shells and shrapnel? The friendly fire in a bomber formation is one question. It seems impossible for bombers not to be inadvertant targets for other bomber's defensive fire.


A big reason for civil defense measures like warning sirens and shelters was protection from falling flak shells and fragments, not just enemy bombs. There are stories from various wars of the sound of flak fragments raining down, very dangerous if outdoors but pretty easily addressed by taking cover.

Looking at B-29 mission reports from Korea: their defensive guns were pretty ineffective downing MiG-15's, of questionable deterrence value even in that situation: the opposing fighters were closing so fast it might have been hard for them to realize they were under fire! But at least the B-29's seldom shot each other up, proper procedures and training seemed to avoid that for the most part (with a few exceptions).

On unarmed (or much more lightly armed) day bombers it would be rare for a particular exsting plane to be able to evade interception just by removing its defensive armament, in practical bombing operations. Another situation is bombers designed and optimized from get go to avoid interception. That was the great hope in the 1930's, and true in certain real situations (Soviet SB's v Italian CR32's and German fighters pre Bf109, over Spain), also true of some WWII bombers but in usually limited roles (Mosquite, Ar234) and again that was the original concept of most postwar jet bombers. But such immunity was always temporary till a faster fighter came along. You couldn't be sure it would still be true by the time the plane was operational in large numbers (many arguments in favor of expanding such a concept in WWII are using hindsight in that key respect).

Daylight bombers with light armament could be rapidly destroyed when caught by opposing fighters. Heavily armed bombers could significantly slow down and limit their losses to opposing fighters, especially if a particular interception wasn't numerous, and/or friendly fighters were around to break it up after awhile. What heavily armed bombers couldn't do in almost cases was inflict cumulatively unacceptable losses on the intercepting fighter force by themselves, but the intercepting fighters would eventually inflict cumulatively unacceptable losses on unescorted day bombers.

Night bombers were a different situation, can't be discussd as smooth continuation from heavily armed day bombers. WWII era night fighter attacks were almost always from astern and usually below: top and forward firing armament was almost completely useless at night. If the night fighters adopted particular tactics of approach and upward firing armament, then even tail and bottom gunners would rarely see them until the nightfighter had opened fire. Even if gunners did see night fighters before the fighters fired, doctrine in some AF's/theaters was not to fire first in case the fighter hadn't already spotted the bomber.

Joe


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## syscom3 (Jun 8, 2008)

Renrich, I think the B17's and B24's also had their belly turrets removed in the later months of the war.

In 1945, the fighter escorts were so numerous and the quality of the LW so poor, it was no longer needed to have those gun positions.

Plus the aircraft gained in performance by not having the weight and drag acting on it.


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## renrich (Jun 9, 2008)

I wonder how much energy a 50 cal bullet would have falling from 20000 feet or so and would it still be spinning or would it be tumbling. Likewise, what would a 20mm or 30mm cannon shell be doing after falling from that altitude and would it explode when it hit the ground(or a person, horse or cow.) Soren, where are you when we need you?


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## kool kitty89 (Jun 9, 2008)

Well the meantime,

Some 30mm HE shells had self-destruct mechanisms, others would only arm when there was sufficient spin iirc. (would disarm when it slowd down) But the latter would obviously still be dangerous. 

Komet weapons: MK 108 cannon

Don't know about the 20mm.


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## trackend (Jun 10, 2008)

Any lump of metal falling from over a few hundred feet won't do you a lot of good if it hits you. 
During the BOB and the Blitz collecting shrapnel and spent rounds became a real past time for many kids, hence the invention of the Butterfly bomb.
By maiming the kids you block the hospitals.


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## ODonovan (Mar 22, 2018)

I haven't studied comparative kill stats, but I have read some things former Luftwaffe pilots wrote. One said something to the effect of, "Every time you attacked an American bomber formation, your life flashed before your eyes" (not an exact translation). Another described attacking American bombers as "like picking up a porcupine that was on fire." That tells me a lot.

Also, everything I've read said flak was a much greater danger to American bombers than German fighters and that American bombers gave as well as they got. The fighters didn't have nearly the ability to absorb damage as the bombers. Looking at it impartially, and noting the fighters couldn't damage a bomber without facing almost directly at one (all forward firing weapons), I would imagine the number of fighters damaged versus destroyed when going up against bombers was MUCH greater than any other type of fight. Even if a fighter didn't get shot down, a couple .50 rounds into an engine or prop would tend to fark up a German pilot's day.



-Irish


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## swampyankee (Mar 22, 2018)

I think it’s pretty conclusive that the gunners could not adequately defend bombers against competent opposition and that the gunners reduced the bomb load that could be carried to a given target. The question is whether they reduced the bomb load enough to increase net casualties. 

The two waist gunners and their guns and ammunition in a B-17 or B-24 probably weighed about 1,000 lb, which had to come out of fuel or bombload. Depending on range, that can be as much as 25%, which means that many more bombers are needed for a given effect on a target: 100 planes instead of 80, and each aircraft craft has a larger crew, say ten instead of eight.


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## billrunnels (Mar 23, 2018)

Our P-51 escort aircraft all but eliminated enemy fighter attacks late in the war. Otherwise, our greatest defense was the fire power of a close formation in flight preventing them from passing through it. A B-17 tail gunner friend of mine was credited with downing an ME-262. Obviously the skill of the gunner played a big part in their success.

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## parsifal (Mar 23, 2018)

would you say bill that the defensive firepower of the box formations was generally successful, or generally not successful in stopping or deterring enemy fighters diving through that box formation?

At the end of the day, those guns are there for protection purposes rather than bringing down the enemy. Bringing down the enemy was a bonus, but surviving the attack was surely the more important task....


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## billrunnels (Mar 23, 2018)

parsifal said:


> would you say bill that the defensive firepower of the box formations was generally successful, or generally not successful in stopping or deterring enemy fighters diving through that box formation?
> 
> At the end of the day, those guns are there for protection purposes rather than bringing down the enemy. Bringing down the enemy was a bonus, but surviving the attack was surely the more important task....


I think successful if tight enough. You are correct our guns were for defensive protection. The same was true with our fighter escort. They were not looking for a fight. Their goal was to protect the bomber stream.

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## pbehn (Mar 23, 2018)

I believe the defensive fire of the bomber formation reduced losses by a huge amount simply by making the attacking aircraft keep their speed high. Without it, attacking aircraft could approach as slowly as they liked as if shooting at a towed target. Ultimately they couldn't keep losses down to an acceptable level, but they did have some effect and did cause enemy losses, though not enough.

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## yulzari (Mar 23, 2018)

kool kitty89 said:


> Unless you consider the Mossie's (or other fast-bomber) tactics, trade armament for speed and maneuverability to evade interception. (not going to happen on a 4-engine heavy...)


Night encounters were very different to day and the data is not interchangeable but an RAF bomber taking a 'corkscrew' evasion of a night fighter was all but impossible to follow and the night fighter had to go back to finding a new target.

On a different tack; Fairey's experience with the gunner in the Fairey Battle led them to (pre-war) abandon the position feeling that the fire of a hand held machine gun was not worth the extra weight and drag so the Fulmar (and it's light bomber ancestor) and the Firefly did without and smoothed the crew position into the fuselage instead.

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## airminded88 (Mar 23, 2018)

billrunnels said:


> I think successful if tight enough. You are correct our guns were for defensive protection. The same was true with our fighter escort. They were not looking for a fight. Their goal was to protect the bomber stream.



As the LW fighter force diminished in effectiveness towards the end of the war it was flak concentrations that became the most dangerous enemy assets against the bomber formations.

Cheers


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## airminded88 (Mar 23, 2018)

billrunnels said:


> Our P-51 escort aircraft all but eliminated enemy fighter attacks late in the war. Otherwise, our greatest defense was the fire power of a close formation in flight preventing them from passing through it. A B-17 tail gunner friend of mine was credited with downing an ME-262. Obviously the skill of the gunner played a big part in their success.



An Me-262 credit for a gunner must have been a huge achievement taking into consideration the greater proximity speed the jet fighter had compared to conventional interceptors.
I read sometime ago that frontal attack from Me-262s were useless as there was no time to align an accurate salvo due to the combined closing speed. Therefore, it was either by the flanks or the rear that the jets preferred to attack the heavies.

Cheers


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## airminded88 (Mar 23, 2018)

Bill,
During the those final days of the air war over Europe when the Me-262 entered the fray, did you and your peers receive sufficient information from intelligence officers about it?

Cheers


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## billrunnels (Mar 23, 2018)

airminded88 said:


> An Me-262 credit for a gunner must have been a huge achievement taking into consideration the greater proximity speed the jet fighter had compared to conventional interceptors.
> I read sometime ago that frontal attack from Me-262s were useless as there was no time to align an accurate salvo due to the combined closing speed. Therefore, it was either by the flanks or the rear that the jets preferred to attack the heavies.
> 
> Cheers


My tail gunner friend said the 262 came around the tail of his B-17 and he sawed part of one wing off with fire.


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## billrunnels (Mar 23, 2018)

airminded88 said:


> Bill,
> During the those final days of the air war over Europe when the Me-262 entered the fray, did you and your peers receive sufficient information from intelligence officers about it?
> 
> Cheers


Sufficient information to be concerned. The ME-262 was the fighter aircraft of the future in 1945. We considered it to be a deadly strike force.


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## stona (Mar 23, 2018)

There are plenty of accounts from Luftwaffe pilots that acknowledge the effectiveness of the combined fire from an American bomber box.

However, whereas they became increasingly wary of attacking the heavily escorted formations that were commonplace late in the war they would always avail themselves of an opportunity to attack an isolated or unescorted bomber formation. It's not that this was necessarily easy, but it was a lot_ easier_ than fighting through a well positioned and handled escort group.

The most deadly enemy of a Luftwaffe day fighter in the last two years of the war was not the American bombers, but their escorts.

The RAF, operating at night, had rather different priorities. Some Bomber Command Groups had an aggressive policy on engaging night fighters, 5 Group being a case in point. This was proven to lead to more 'friendly' fire incidents in the bomber stream and gradually abandoned. Defensive fire definitively revealed the bomber's position, and the bombers friend was stealth in the darkness. Bomber Command gunners generally acted as look outs and would only engage a night fighter if they were certain an attack was developing. Often a burst of fire would persuade the fighter to break away find a less alert target. Any gunner seeing an attack develop would call for an evasive manoeuvre, a corkscrew to port or starboard depending on the position of the fighter. This was a violent manoeuvre, an attempt to lose the fighter and get lost in the darkness. Accurate gunnery from a cork screwing bomber was impossible, men were injured in cork screwing bombers, thrown about and hitting various hard or pointy bits inside the fuselage.

I have read accounts from bomber crews who saw a nightfighter, sometimes at very close range, but felt the fighter had not seen them. They let it go on its way rather than reveal their position to it, or any others lurking in the bomber stream.

Cheers

Steve

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## airminded88 (Mar 23, 2018)

I have always been fascinated by how sharply different was the daylight bomber war from its nocturnal counterpart when it comes to bombers vs interceptors.
How the presence and the absence of light dictated the rules and mechanics of combat.

Cheers


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## billrunnels (Mar 24, 2018)

airminded88 said:


> I have always been fascinated by how sharply different was the daylight bomber war from its nocturnal counterpart when it comes to bombers vs interceptors.
> How the presence and the absence of light dictated the rules and mechanics of combat.
> 
> Cheers


In the month of March, 1945 the RAF Mosquito Bombers dropped incendiary bombs on Berlin some 28 to 30 nights in a row. On a couple of occasions I saw them going in at a lower altitude as we were letting down following our mission. They were all over the sky. I marvel at how they managed to avoid running into each other in the darkness. It was a sight to behold.

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## yulzari (Mar 24, 2018)

Night fighting was indeed a different world to day fighting and early electronic technology played an increasing part.
By late 1944 some RAF bombers were equipped with rear AGLT Automatic Gun Laying Turrets, (Rose Richards 2x 0.5" guns & FN121 4x0.303") with Village Inn radar gun laying.

Rather than explain their use I leave it to an actual WW2 gunner to tell his tale: The Village Inn – 460 Squadron

In more technical detail: Automatic Gun-Laying Turret - Wikipedia

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## wuzak (Mar 24, 2018)

billrunnels said:


> In the month of March, 1945 the RAF Mosquito Bombers dropped incendiary bombs on Berlin some 28 to 30 nights in a row.



Was that not March 1944?


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## wuzak (Mar 24, 2018)

billrunnels said:


> You are correct our guns were for defensive protection. The same was true with our fighter escort.



It wasn’t always the case.

In early 1944 Doolittle took over from Eaker and the role of the escorts changed. Instead of simply protecting the bombers, the fighters were tasked with destroying the Luftwaffe. To some degree, the bombers were the bait.

This was the lead up to d-day.

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## billrunnels (Mar 24, 2018)

yulzari said:


> Night fighting was indeed a different world to day fighting and early electronic technology played an increasing part.
> By late 1944 some RAF bombers were equipped with rear AGLT Automatic Gun Laying Turrets, (Rose Richards 2x 0.5" guns & FN121 4x0.303") with Village Inn radar gun laying.
> 
> Rather than explain their use I leave it to an actual WW2 gunner to tell his tale: The Village Inn – 460 Squadron
> ...


Very informative. Thanks for sharing


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## billrunnels (Mar 24, 2018)

wuzak said:


> Was that not March 1944?


It was while I was there in 1945.


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## stona (Mar 24, 2018)

yulzari said:


> By late 1944 some RAF bombers were equipped with rear AGLT Automatic Gun Laying Turrets, (Rose Richards 2x 0.5" guns & FN121 4x0.303") with Village Inn radar gun laying.



'Some' was not very many. Only two squadrons, Nos. 460 and 49 were initially selected to receive the equipment. From Harris' 'Despatch'.

_"The equipment was first used operationally by No. 460 Squadron on the 20/21st July 1944. Whilst the equipment worked well generally, it was obvious from the first that negative identification required care and great restraint by gunners. To make matters worse, trouble was experienced with I.R. filters fitted to the transmitting lamps, and I therefore decided to operate A.G.L. (T) aircraft only under certain conditions and when other aircraft were not likely to be encountered...When the equipment was working well, numerous contacts, chiefly friendly, were made. It was apparent, however, that gunners mistrusted the Type 'Z' identification and were loath to fire blind at what they thought might be friendly aircraft..."_

It was far from an outstanding success, and when a third squadron (No. 635 from 8 Group) was selected for trials with the equipment it received No. 460 Squadron's aircraft.

At the end of the war there were just four squadrons fitted with the A.G.L. system. No. 49 Squadron from No. 1 Group amd Nos. 635, 582 and 35 from No. 8 Group.

Harris summed up thus.

_"To sum up, A.G.L. (T) gave promise to becoming one of the greatest assets to the defence of heavy bombers at night, but unfortunately, no completely successful identification system was found and there was no practical scheme for one before the end of the war. Moreover, it has been found that the present Mark of A.G.L. (T) is most difficult to keep in seviceable condition, and when unserviceable puts a gunner at a distinct disadvantage owing to the restrictions in view which the extra equipment imposes. A.G.L. (T) Mark III, or, as is likely to be, Mark IV, should offer very distinct advantages over Mark I as the necessity for continuous search with the Mark I is most tiring to the air gunner."_

It's also worth noting the parlous state of the Luftwaffe Nachtjagd by late 1944. In December 1944 it flew 1,070 sorties and shot down just 66 bombers, representing only 0.6% of enemy sorties over Germany.

Cheers

Steve


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## Dimlee (Mar 24, 2018)

Corkscrew evasion. 
Nice picture explaining this maneuver.
CorkScrew

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## pbehn (Mar 24, 2018)

Dimlee said:


> Corkscrew evasion.
> Nice picture explaining this maneuver.
> CorkScrew


Not mentioned in the text is that as the war progressed the length of bomber streams became shorter I believe towards the end it was down to around 600 bombers crossing the target in 20 minutes (Stona posted some info). Each bomber was much closer to the rest than most liked to think about so evasive action was limited. Starting turning and diving massively increased the chances of a collision. One pilot was decorated for completing his mission after his aircraft was damaged and he was wounded, his matter of fact point of view was that he was safer in the bomber stream than trying to get out of it and heading home alone.


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## stona (Mar 24, 2018)

In 1943 when concentrations of at least 1000 aircraft per hour were recommended, two evasive manoeuvres were also recommended.

First, to evade flak, a deliberate and level turn away from the threat.

Second as a defence against fighters and described as a 'combat manoeuvre' was the extended corkscrew. The gunners were supposed to lay down defensive fire in conjunction with the pilot's manoeuvring, but on the evidence of written accounts, and a personal discussion with an ex-gunner, I'm sure that this would have been difficult to say the least. 
A long winded report described the manoeuvre.

_"The extended corkscrew commences with a straight dive which is converted into a turn of about 60 degrees, losing height by about 1,800 ft. This is followed by pulling out of the dive and climbing as sharply as possible in the opposite direction with full power, gaining as much height as possible. The whole manoeuvre is then repeated exactly as before."_

The report further states that this tactic made deflection shooting by the fighter difficult and it was also likely that the fighter would overtake the bomber as it slowed down in the climb. It did allow that a bomber might instead make a steep diving turn towards the darkest part of the sky, but weaving was not recommended as it did little to throw off the interception.

Cheers

Steve


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## swampyankee (Mar 24, 2018)

I suspect that the least effective gunners on USAAF bombers were the waist gunners, partly because they seemed to have the least effective sighting systems, the greatest likelihood of attacks with high crossing velocity and, possibly, the highest level of physical discomfort. 

I think there was an optimal amount of armament for a WW2 heavy day bomber. None probably wouldn't work, even with escorts, but too much definitely wouldn't work, as demonstrated by the YB-40, which could not carry a bomb load. Adding defensive weapons increases the crew and decreases bomb load, so the combination increases the number of aircraft required for a given effect on target and increases the number of casualties for each aircraft lost. Luftwaffe fighters were between 50 and 100 percent faster than B-17s or B-24s, so they weren't that restricted in their attack trajectories, and the tight formations used by heavy day bombers made evasive maneuvers difficult, easing conditions for the interceptors.


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## billrunnels (Mar 24, 2018)

swampyankee said:


> I suspect that the least effective gunners on USAAF bombers were the waist gunners, partly because they seemed to have the least effective sighting systems, the greatest likelihood of attacks with high crossing velocity and, possibly, the highest level of physical discomfort.
> 
> I think there was an optimal amount of armament for a WW2 heavy day bomber. None probably wouldn't work, even with escorts, but too much definitely wouldn't work, as demonstrated by the YB-40, which could not carry a bomb load. Adding defensive weapons increases the crew and decreases bomb load, so the combination increases the number of aircraft required for a given effect on tadrget and increases the number of casualties for each aircraft lost. Luftwaffe fighters were between 50 and 100 percent faster than B-17s or B-24s, so they weren't that restricted in their attack trajectories, and the tight formations used by heavy day bombers made evasive maneuvers difficult, easing conditions for the interceptors.


Every mission I was on we carried the maximum bomb load bonbay space on the B-17 would accomodate. The pay load had top priority. Not always were the gas and oil tanks filled to capacity to lower gross weight. Also removable of the nose cheek guns, the radio room gun and operating with one waist gunner helped. On my last mission we were in the air 11 hours 30 minutes and carried a maximum load of 12 500lb bombs to the target.

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## Milosh (Mar 24, 2018)

Testing done by the USAAF found that the bullet pattern from a B-17 during ground testing had the following results for 12 rounds to 600yds:
ball turret > dia. 15' - 8.3mils
upper turret > dia. 21' - 11.7mils
chin turret > dia. 23' - 12.6 mils
waist(closed) dia. 26' - 14.3mils
side nose > dia. 34' - 18.7mils
tail turret > dia 45' - 25mils

For the B-24 it was:
ball turret > dia. 15' - 8.3mils
upper turret > dia. 20' - 11.2mils
nose turret > dia. 23' - 12.9mils (Emerson)
nose turret > dia. 35' - 19.3mils (Motor Prod.)
waist(closed) dia. 23' - 12.9mils
waist(open) dia. 63' - 35.6mils
tail turret > dia 35' - 19.3mils

taken from: "Gunner" ISBN 1-55046-332-2

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## Milosh (Mar 24, 2018)

B-17 bomb load chart.


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## soulezoo (Mar 29, 2018)

Does anyone have any information as to why the tail gun would be so pitiful in its spread, especially compared to the ball or nose/chin turrets?


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## Greyman (Mar 29, 2018)

The tail armament was essentially hand-held guns mounted on a central pillar and not attached firmly to a powered turret.


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## Glider (Mar 29, 2018)

Some interesting information on the effectiveness of the RAF automatic Gun Laying Turret often known as the Village Inn which was starting to be used in limited numbers in the last six months of the war.
The radar had a range of 20 miles and helped the gunner train and open fire on unseen attacking fighters.

To test this on the 11/12th September nine bombers equipped with this were placed at the rear of the bomber stream to encourage attacks. All nine returned and two of them were attacked by fighters.
One bomber (PB355) piloted by F/O Burns was attacked once and fought the fighter off without damage, the other had a much harder time. PB354 piloted by F/O Hay was attacked by three nightfighters a total of ten times over a period of twenty nine minutes. Such was the ferocity of the attacks the rear turret had to be resupplied by ammunition taken from the front turret and when you consider the rear turret carried 2,500 rpg, that's a lot of action.

I have just found a link to the action mentioned above, worth a read
Wayback Machine

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## Hoosier Hot Shot (Mar 29, 2018)

Tony Williams said:


> This issue is dealt with in some detail in *Flying Guns – World War 2: Development of Aircraft Guns, Ammunition and Installations 1933-45*. Here is an extract:
> 
> On combat operations, the American bombers in the ETO expended 26.3 million rounds of .50" ammunition in 1943, and 36.2 million in 1944; the wartime total was 72.3 million rounds. (In October 1943, the ammunition consumption reached a peak of 632,773 rounds per operational day.) That corresponds to nearly 12,000 rounds for every enemy aircraft claimed shot down by the bombers. Because, as we have seen above, these claims were often far higher than the actual German losses, a more realistic average would probably exceed 40,000 rounds for every destroyed German fighter.
> 
> ...


As a belly turret gunner on a B-24, I won’t argue with your figures but I am quite certain that aerial gunners served as a strong deterrent against fighters.
Can you imagine a defenseless bomber under attack by a fighter?

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## YF12A (Apr 5, 2018)

First off, to Mr. Runnels, it is a great pleasure to find out you flew with my, now using his Wings in Heaven, neighbor, then Col. William Raper. He took Command of the 303rd B/G in October 1944 after being in the 306th B/G from its' start in 1942 after he was rescued from being shot down in the Battle of Midway. A very small world indeed!

On to the topic, my neighbor told me more than once that, in his experience, the waist gunners and all related equipment should have been removed to save weight for other purposes and with more ammunition going to other gunners who, to him, seemed more effective. The Radio operator was going to be their no matter what, but what a crummy field of fire he had.

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## billrunnels (Apr 5, 2018)

YF12A said:


> First off, to Mr. Runnels, it is a great pleasure to find out you flew with my, now using his Wings in Heaven, neighbor, then Col. William Raper. He took Command of the 303rd B/G in October 1944 after being in the 306th B/G from its' start in 1942 after he was rescued from being shot down in the Battle of Midway. A very small world indeed!
> 
> On to the topic, my neighbor told me more than once that, in his experience, the waist gunners and all related equipment should have been removed to save weight for other purposes and with more ammunition going to other gunners who, to him, seemed more effective. The Radio operator was going to be their no matter what, but what a crummy field of fire he had.


Col. Raper was correct in his analysis and they moved in that direction near the end of the war.

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## stona (Apr 6, 2018)

Hoosier Hot Shot said:


> As a belly turret gunner on a B-24, I won’t argue with your figures but I am quite certain that aerial gunners served as a strong deterrent against fighters.



Everything I've seen and read from the German side confirms that. Defensive fire caused less experienced attackers to make half hearted attacks, often engaging and breaking off at very long range. They also forced difficult tactics on the attackers. Head on attacks could be devastating, but were very difficult to make successfully and were generally beyond the ability of the barely trained pilots coming into the Luftwaffe late in the war.

All this is reflected in the Luftwaffe claims. A relative few claimed a lot of the bombers shot down. These were the men who had survived long enough to gain the experience to make successful attacks. Their's is the gun camera footage shown at the fighter schools (and now on the internet). The rest rarely, if ever, hit a bomber, never mind shot one down.

It was the defensive capability of the bombers that led to the very heavy armouring of the attacking fighters. The Fw 190 A-8/R2 carried nearly 200 Kg of extra armour, over that of the standard fighter version, making it heavy and vulnerable to US escort fighters. The Germans found themselves having to escort their own heavy fighters in order to protect them, a use of resources they could ill afford.

Defensive fire from bombers was effective in these ways, not necessarily by shooting down dozens of fighters.

Then there is the morale issue. You cannot reasonably to ask men to fly aircraft into hostile air space at speeds and altitudes at which the enemy's air defence system is perfectly capable of making interceptions with its fighters with no means to protect themselves. This was an argument acknowledged by the British, operating at night, when the vast majority of air gunners never fired their weapons in anger. The majority never saw the fighter that shot them down, but they still had their guns.

Cheers

Steve

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## pbehn (Apr 6, 2018)

Hoosier Hot Shot said:


> As a belly turret gunner on a B-24, I won’t argue with your figures but I am quite certain that aerial gunners served as a strong deterrent against fighters.
> Can you imagine a defenseless bomber under attack by a fighter?


I remember reading an account by a Spitfire pilot assisting with withdrawal over France, passing the bomber formation at a safe distance to escort a "straggler" he was very, very happy that he was assisting it rather than attacking it. The psychological effect of several thousand guns pointed at you must have been overwhelming, almost impossible to believe you wouldn't be hit.


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## Dimlee (Apr 8, 2018)

Interesting article, it was mentioned in the forum earlier but not in this topic yet (probably).

A Failure of Intelligence

This part relates to current topic:
_"Smeed and I agreed that Bomber Command could substantially reduce losses by ripping out two gun turrets, 
with all their associated hardware, from each bomber and reducing each crew from seven to five. 
The gun turrets were costly in aerodynamic drag as well as in weight. The turretless bombers would have flown 
50 miles an hour faster and would have spent much less time over Germany. The evidence that experience did not reduce losses 
confirmed our opinion that the turrets were useless. The turrets did not save bombers, because the gunners rarely saw the fighters
that killed them. But our proposal to rip out the turrets went against the official mythology of the gallant gunners defending
their crewmates. Dickins never had the courage to push the issue seriously in his conversations with Harris. 
If he had, Harris might even have listened, and thousands of crewmen might have been saved."_

Please note that the article is about Bomber Command so above conclusion relates to night bombers only.
And I'm not sure about 50 mph gain...


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## billrunnels (Apr 8, 2018)

Dimlee said:


> Interesting article, it was mentioned in the forum earlier but not in this topic yet (probably).
> 
> A Failure of Intelligence
> 
> ...


I question the 50 mph gain also.


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## Shortround6 (Apr 8, 2018)

It can be fact checked by comparing speeds of the fully equipped bombers with the speeds of converted bombers used as transports after the war. 
However be careful to compare speeds at similar power settings and weights as you fly very far at full power.


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## yulzari (Apr 8, 2018)

Dimlee said:


> Interesting article, it was mentioned in the forum earlier but not in this topic yet (probably).
> 
> A Failure of Intelligence
> 
> ...


Given the Bomber Command record the operational planners would have probably shouted hooray and immediately further loaded up the bombers to use up the weight and fuel saved and leave the crews flying at the same heights and speeds as before. That is what happens when you measure results by tonnage dropped.

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## pbehn (Apr 8, 2018)

yulzari said:


> Given the Bomber Command record the operational planners would have probably shouted hooray and immediately further loaded up the bombers to use up the weight and fuel saved and leave the crews flying at the same heights and speeds as before. That is what happens when you measure results by tonnage dropped.


It sounds callous but the operational planners had a point. There was a limit to the bombs that could be carried in a bomb bay and a reduction in weight and drag of crew and turrets automatically means a reduction in weight of fuel. There are many ways to present statistics, on very long range missions the Halifax cost four times more in planes and crew than a Lancaster per ton of bombs dropped. The bomber stream was for mutual protection, and all had to fly at the same speed. Travelling faster reduces the losses both to AA and fighters.

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## swampyankee (Apr 8, 2018)

The questions "would casualties drop?" and "would casualty _rates _drop?" don't necessarily have the same answer: removing a turret, the gunner, and the ammunition could increase bomb load by anything from 20 to 100%, and reducing the number of sorties required in proportion, increase the casualty rate, but reduce total casualties, directly, by fewer sorties, and indirectly by smaller flight crews. 

Overall, I think history shows that the best place to put guns for day bombers is on the escorting fighters.


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## Shortround6 (Apr 8, 2018)

I don't know how true it is but somebody suggested that BC could have reduced losses by instructing crew to fly at max lean mixture instead most economical. Yes this would shorten range a bit but many missions were not flown at max distances. Difference might only be 15-20mph but every bit should help and was something that could be explored without ripping out turrets and such.

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## pbehn (Apr 8, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> I don't know how true it is but somebody suggested that BC could have reduced losses by instructing crew to fly at max lean mixture instead most economical. Yes this would shorten range a bit but many missions were not flown at max distances. Difference might only be 15-20mph but every bit should help and was something that could be explored without ripping out turrets and such.


I have read the same, of course all theory. But what was the total weight of the mid upper turret and its operator and ammunition? They were routinely not used because no one saw anything and taken off for Lancasters carrying the upkeep and grand slam bombs. The front turret was taken off the Halifax just to increase speed. When 50% of losses are due to ground fire it is an obvious calculation that the less time you take covering that ground means lower losses.


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## stona (Apr 9, 2018)

The contention is from Freeman Dyson, who, to put it mildly, had an axe to grind with Basil Dickins who ran Bomber Command's ORS, Harris, The RAF, the Air Ministry and just about anyone else who refused to listen to his histrionic outbursts during the war.
He does make some valid points, but everything he wrote was coloured by his own preconceptions.
Just saying.
Cheers
Steve


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## J.A.W. (Apr 12, 2018)

AFAIR - USN PB4Y Liberators were particularly aggressive in combat, esp' towards their enemy counterparts,
- even when ranging well out into the oceanic wastes - with little prospect of rescue, if things went badly..

Hard-as - those guys certainly were, real - 'we take no quarter, & offer none' - types, in both Atlantic, & Pacific..


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