# Could the IJN have launched a "Third wave" at Pearl Harbour?



## Freebird (Feb 3, 2008)

Would the japanese have been successful launching a "Third wave"?

*If the Japanese had found the US Carriers at Pearl Harbour,* should they have risked a third wave? 

If I have the data correct, the first wave landed back on the carriers at 10 am, the second wave at 12 noon. The Japanese spent another hour or two searching for the US Carriers, at which point it was decided by Nagumo that the risks of a third wave were too great. 

If the US Pacific carriers were all accounted for (either sunk at Pearl or seen at anchor in San Diego), *the Japanese could have re-armed the first wave aircraft for another attack and launched right away* without losing time searching for the Carriers.

The third wave as advocated by Genda would have targeted the fuel tanks, repair shops, sub base and the cruisers destroyers at Pearl {5 out of 8 cruisers 26 of 29 destryers were undamaged following the second wave}

What would have been the result?


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## magnocain (Feb 3, 2008)

It is my opinion that with heavyer losses, that IJN might of taken out the oil tanks and the repair yards that they so crucially missed.

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## FLYBOYJ (Feb 3, 2008)

If I remember right the first attacks resulted in a 10% loss of Japanese aircraft. A third wave, if netted the same result would of brought more damage but more losses - as high as 25%. IMO that third wave would of had to produce some commanding results.


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## Glider (Feb 3, 2008)

I believe that they should have gone for a third wave. The IJN had the advantage and should have made the most of it.

The USA would have been ready but had precious little to be ready with and the lhe losses moderate.


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## Soundbreaker Welch? (Feb 3, 2008)

I think they should have done it.


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## Arsenal VG-33 (Feb 3, 2008)

I think the Japanese could have succeeded in hitting the remaining vital facilities that were missed during the first 2 raids, but with heavier losses. By the time the 2nd wave arrived, there were already several US aircraft in the air putting up a fight. I think therefore it's safe to assume that a 3rd wave would have encountered perhaps even more airworthy US planes and AA fire. 

Also keep in mind that the US Pacific fleet not yet in port had by then been alerted, which was one of the fears of the Japanese admiral in command. There was the distinct possibility that a USN ship, either surface or submarine, or even a US patrol aircraft, could have spotted them and alerted the rest of the fleet.

They could have launched the 3rd wave, but they would be tempting fate if they did by remaining in the area waiting for their planes to return from the raid.


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## The Basket (Feb 4, 2008)

On the one hand...yes.
They launched an attack and they should have seen it through.

But they would have had heavier losses...and lost the element of surprise.

The war was just beginning and it was not going to be won or lost at Pearl. So they were right to break off and fight another day. 

Although in hindsight, the carriers were sunk at Midway so they should have continued the attack. Maybe the motto is that when you're winning...keep at it.


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## Konigstiger205 (Feb 4, 2008)

Well in any surprise attack in case you don't wipe out completely your enemy, sooner or later the surprise element is going to disappear...


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## fly boy (Feb 4, 2008)

japan could have done a third bombing but that would mean about a hour of reloading and refuling and the US carriers could have found them i think that had they done another strike the war would be longer in the pasific and Eurpoe


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## fly boy (Feb 4, 2008)

becuase the japanese planed to bomb dry docks and oil plants


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## syscom3 (Feb 4, 2008)

fly boy said:


> japan could have done a third bombing but that would mean about a hour of reloading and refuling and the US carriers could have found them i think that had they done another strike the war would be longer in the pasific and Eurpoe




The war in the pacific would have ended exactly on time due to the US receiving a fleet carrier every month beginning in middle 1943, and of course, the atomic bomb in 1945.

As for knocking out pearl harbor as a shipyard? Forget it. Not enough aircraft and payload to do the trick. Damage it, nothing else. The US would have repaired everything and restocked the oil farms by spring 1942.

As for losses, losing 20 plus aircrews in the 3rd strike, would bring their one day losses to the equivelant of one whole carrier air group. Not an auspicious way to start the war.


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## comiso90 (Feb 4, 2008)

If the Japanese were able to take out the fuel oil reserves, a third wave would have been worth 50% losses at that stage of the war...
The US would have been hamstrung for months

.


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## ccheese (Feb 4, 2008)

If the Japanese had launched a third wave, and taken out the fuel farm,
the submarine base with its shops, and a lot of other targets they missed,
their losses would have been 25 - 35 percent. By then the element of
surprise was lost. The US would have recovered, but it would have taken
longer. We may not have been able to save some of the battleships if they
had been plastered again.

Charles


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## syscom3 (Feb 4, 2008)

The US would have found enough tankers to get to Pearl and provide enough bunker and avgas to keep the war machine humming. After all, Hawaii isnt that far from the US.

As for fuel for the battleships? They werent going to sortie anytime soon so its a non issue.

50% losses? That would have a drastic impact on Japans capabilities. Thats almost like losing 1/2 of your carriers.

And remember one thing..... the Japanese did not have enough dive bombers and torpedo bombers (used in a level bomber mode) to hit every important target hard enough to destroy it.

The dive bombers only carried a 500 pound bomb. Hardly enough to cause extreme damage. The level bombers did not bomb individually, but as a group dropping on the "leader". Dropping 5 bombs on a single target would be devestating, but that technique in itself limits the number of targets.


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## renrich (Feb 4, 2008)

The IJN could have launched a third wave and probably should have. They could have done a lot of damage to the fuel storage tanks and some repair facilities and probably to a few more ships. The US carriers were too far away to have made successful attacks on Nagumo even if they could have located them. However, Nagumo's losses to triple A and fighters would have been heavy. I can't recall the exact numbers but his losses during the second wave attack were heavier than during the first wave and the Japanese pilots were quoted as saying they were surprised at how fast the defenses at PH reacted. With heavier air crew losses Nagumos's force would not have been as effective later. That was the problem the Japanese faced during the whole war. Finite numbers of men and materiel versus practically an enemy with unlimited resources. A clear case of letting the alligator mouth overload the aspirin ass. Yammamoto tried to tell his superiors that.


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## ToughOmbre (Feb 4, 2008)

Sure the Japanese could have launched a third wave. And they would have paid a price to take out the dry docks, ship repair facilities and oil storage. It would have caused the US Navy more headaches in the short term but the ultimate result would be the same. Japan sealed their fate by attacking PH in the first place. Yammamoto said he would run wild in the Pacific for 6-12 months, after that he could guarantee nothing. The big gamble by the Japanese turned out to be a very bad bet.

TO


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Feb 5, 2008)

I dont think they could have (okay yes it could have succeded some what) for these reasons:

a. They simply would not have because they did not know where the Carriers where.

b. The element of surprise was lost.


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## joy17782 (Feb 5, 2008)

Adler is right . Once surprize is not on your side then whats the point. The loses would have been great in trained crews . Look what happen too them at midway , they lost alot of aircrews they could,nt make up . and oil tanks ,well at that time we were the oil produceing capital of the world . uh thats one of the reasons they attacked us, drydocks well it would have ham string us but too what piont the lost of 35 too 40 aircrews that they couldnt replace , no they did the right thing. take what you can and get them the next time .There people on top knew they could never defeat us .


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## Freebird (Feb 5, 2008)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> I dont think they could have (okay yes it could have succeded some what) for these reasons:
> 
> a. They simply would not have because they did not know where the Carriers where.
> 
> b. The element of surprise was lost.



Adler I prefaced the question with *"if they had located the carriers", *(either in Pearl or known to be in San Diego). I agree with you that the fact they didn't find them historically was a huge part of Nagumo's decision. They made a big mistake by not having a way for their spies to get the message to Nagumo, and time the strike accordingly. 

As for surprise, they certainly would take higher casualties, but they results would have been well worth it i think, even if they had lost 50 or 60 craft. I also said *"if they had launched right away", *so that the first wave returning at 10 am is turned around and re-launched quickly before the second wave returns at noon. Because they waited until all planes were back, + another couple of hours looking for the carriers they lost the chance.

Besides the commonly cited "oil tanks" I think that sinking the destroyer fleet would also have been a huge blow to the US, they only had about 100 modern destroyers, so losing 29 at Pearl would be tough.

*Couple of questions for the experts...*

How long would it take a IJN carrier crew to re-arm refuel 20 bombers 10 fighters? {on each of 6 carriers}

Does anybody have a breakdown of the 29 Japanese planes lost, how many Zero's, Val's Kate's? 

If they did launch a third wave, could they use the Kate's for level bombing instead of torpedos, would that reduce the effects of flak? 

{They would be attacking Dd CL ships installations without armour, unlike the Battleships which were only minimally damaged by bombs due to heavy deck armour}


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## ToughOmbre (Feb 5, 2008)

freebird said:


> Does anybody have a breakdown of the 29 Japanese planes lost, how many Zero's, Val's Kate's?



9 Zeroes, 15 Vals and 5 Kates I believe.

TO


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## Glider (Feb 5, 2008)

I must admit that I don't think the losses would automatically have been large.
There was no need for any more torpedo bombers or for low level straffing. By sticking to bombing there was little for the US to defend themselves with. The fighters were almost completely out of the fight, Heavy AA was almost non existant and in 1941 not that efficient, leaving you with Heavy Machine Guns which are of very limited use (if any) against level bombers.

A better use of the IJN aircraft I would suggest, would be to throw everything into a search for the Carriers.

They would be ready for you certainly but would have been heavily outnumbered. I don't know how many aircraft the carriers were carrying at that moment but its unlikely to have been the full war compliment. Also its almost certain that wherever the carriers were they were almost certain to head back to Pearl after the attack and would be coming to you.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Feb 5, 2008)

freebird said:


> Adler I prefaced the question with *"if they had located the carriers", *(either in Pearl or known to be in San Diego). I agree with you that the fact they didn't find them historically was a huge part of Nagumo's decision. They made a big mistake by not having a way for their spies to get the message to Nagumo, and time the strike accordingly.
> 
> }



Ooops my bad. I somehow missed that.

If they had located the Carriers I believe they could have and should have attacked again.

I do believe they would have taken heavier losses however. Reasons:

a. The base is on alert, there is no more surprise factor.

b. The radar stations in Hawaii would have been more alert.

As I said. I believe in that case they could have pulled off a 3rd wave but it would have sustained heavier losses.


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## comiso90 (Feb 5, 2008)

If they would have hammered the fuel reserves, sub pens and repair facilities,
I dont think we would have been ready for the battle of Coral Sea. Australia would have been cut off and the Solomons would have been much tougher to take back.

.


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## syscom3 (Feb 5, 2008)

Glider, dont under estimate the AA that the US could have thrown up at the Japanese. Remember that many ships were untouched and could throw up a good barage. The IJN level bombers would be flying at medium altitude, straight and level and the planes vulnerable to damage. Dont forget that slight damage to these planes can be fatal damage when trying to return to a carrier.

As for the US fighters. Consider that the third wave would need three or more hours to organize from the moment the decision is made to attack and when they make their attack runs. The US could easily get a few dozen fighters in the air within that time frame and inflict damage or disrupt the Japanese formations. Enough to stop them? No. Draw blood? Yes!

And again, the question is if they had enough bombers (dive and level) to do lasting damage to the port. The answer is no.


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## Glider (Feb 5, 2008)

Its only one view but the HAA on the ships would have been very limited. Ships in harbour are surrounded by cranes, tall buildings ect. The HMG's lack the range to deal with planes at medium height.
Fighters would have been a threat but the IJN should have been ready for them. Its a risk but one that would have been worth taking.

Re the damage that the IJN could have inflicted, I do agree that they couldn't have achieved what they wanted but they should have done what they could.


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## syscom3 (Feb 5, 2008)

The ships in the harbor would have had mostly unrestricted arcs of fire.

Look at a map of the harbor where the ships were moored and compare it to where the shipyard facilities are.

As for fighters..... who knows. remember that the Enterprise airgroup arrived at Pearl in the waning moments of the battle. Imagine what a couple dozen Wildcats could do for defense!


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## drgondog (Feb 5, 2008)

freebird said:


> Would the japanese have been successful launching a "Third wave"?
> 
> If the Japanese had found the US Carriers at Pearl Harbour, should they have risked a third wave?
> 
> ...



First, the IJN could have launched a thrid strike. 

Second, If the carriers were in Pearl Harbor and had not damaged the Carriers on first two, they would have, in my opinion believed the risk was worth the postential to take out the carriers.

Last, given the two scenarios above - the attack would have completely focused on the carriers. Only if the carriers had been destroyed and they had assets in the air with bombs, would they have extended to attack POL and or Sub base as targets of opportunity rather than prime directive.

Remember, the Carriers were first priority of first strike and the second strike was more capital ships and mop up of Carriers and only with a. and b. were they going to launch the planned third strike.

Absent known location of Carriers you can imagine the agony thinking about 'going for broke' and putting escort fighters on the 3rd wave - or sending it in alone and risk extremely heavy losses to remaining US airpower but not risk zero CAP to an unexpected attack from the missing carriers?

IMO - Once they determined that the US Carriers were not at Pearl, I think there was zero chance they commit to third strike?


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## Haztoys (Feb 6, 2008)

One thing I've often wondered ...The Japanese really wanted the Carriers...At what point did the carriers leave PH...And how did the Japanese "not" know that the Carriers were gone ...I know they were keeping an eye on PH ... Strange...One peace of the puzzle I've never herd an answer too....


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## The Basket (Feb 6, 2008)

Attacking PH was to knock US out the war. The timing was part of the big Jap push against the Dutch and British in se asia. So they were already commited and so they were going to attack carriers or no carriers.

I agree that they could have totally destroyed everything at PH but it wouldn't have changed the outcome of the war. Just timing.

They were right to quit while winning. If the carriers had been there then that would have been the prize.


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## Glider (Feb 6, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> .
> 
> As for fighters..... who knows. remember that the Enterprise airgroup arrived at Pearl in the waning moments of the battle. Imagine what a couple dozen Wildcats could do for defense!



Your right, I had forgotten about the Enterprise airgroup. The Zero's and WIldcats would probably have given as good as they got and the losses heavier than I was thinking.

Who knows, it might have even played into the IJN hands. Had they suffered 'normal' losses from the start, they may have ramped up their training program earlier rather than later. Its one of those unknown 'what if' scenario's


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## drgondog (Feb 6, 2008)

The Basket said:


> Attacking PH was to knock US out the war. The timing was part of the big Jap push against the Dutch and British in se asia. So they were already commited and so they were going to attack carriers or no carriers.
> 
> I agree that they could have totally destroyed everything at PH but it wouldn't have changed the outcome of the war. Just timing.
> 
> They were right to quit while winning. If the carriers had been there then that would have been the prize.



I would tend to disagree that the IJN 'could have destroyed everything'. Contrast the tonnage and the number of facilities that were hit at Pearl against the tonnage and sorties against fewer targets at Rabaul or Truk - in neither case was the target destruction complete or nearly complete - over a two year span of attacks.

The quantity and sizes of the japanes bombs were adequate to breach 6-10" of steel but no where near enough to accomplish more than a few months of repairable damage or loss against the heavy land/portside assets.

I agree that a third strike may have done serious damage to some subs at dock, to the POL in storage and sink some more ships... but at the end of the day probably not enough to slow the build up to Coral Sea.. might have influenced build up from Atlantic, however.

Runways are easily repairable, dock facilities need direct hits with really big bombs to do irreparable damage, ditto for dry docks and machine shops. 

Reference the relative ease Germany had in bringing refineries and Ball bearing plants back into some production, quickly - and why they had to be bomber repeadtedly to take them out.

I suspect, except for missing carriers, that the key objectives were met by IJN. I also suspect if they thought the subs and POL were higher value they would have been hit second strike (first goes after Pearl and airfields).

We were hit badly enough that resisting in Java and Phillipines was not a serious option...


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## The Basket (Feb 6, 2008)

From what I've read, PH was either a knockout blow to keep US out of the war or to keep the US fleet from interfering from the SE Asian invasions.

My point was that PH could not in any way shape or form won the war for the Japs in one day...regardless of any damage they caused.

The Japs would have to march into the White House to win the war...which is why PH was just a plain dumb idea. 

But then again the Japs would have gone to war with the US over the Philipines so yeah...the Japs got in the first shot.


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## renrich (Feb 6, 2008)

The IJN knew the carriers were not in PH as the Japanese embassy sent that message in diplomatic code a day or so before the attack. Since we had broken that code, Washington deciphered that message. They did not notify Admiral Kimmel or Gen Short. They also told Tokyo that the BBs were not deploying torpedo nets. One would think that that information would be useful to Kimmel.


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## Freebird (Feb 11, 2008)

renrich said:


> The IJN knew the carriers were not in PH as the Japanese embassy sent that message in diplomatic code a day or so before the attack. Since we had broken that code, Washington deciphered that message. They did not notify Admiral Kimmel or Gen Short. They also told Tokyo that the BBs were not deploying torpedo nets. One would think that that information would be useful to Kimmel.



I've wondered if Kimmel was picked as a scapegoat to protect some others higher up the food chain...
I have always thought that the Army shouldn't have expected the Navy to provide *ANY* defence for Pearl, as there should be enough aircraft, AA army units to defend the base even if *ALL* the ships were away.



The Basket said:


> From what I've read, PH was either a knockout blow to keep US out of the war or to keep the US fleet from interfering from the SE Asian invasions.
> 
> *The Japs would have to march into the White House to win the war*...which is why PH was just a plain dumb idea.
> 
> But then again the Japs would have gone to war with the US over the Philipines so yeah...the Japs got in the first shot.



Basket, Pearl was just the start. And the Japanese did not have to "take the White House", only to make the re-conquest of east Asia so costly that the US would decline to do it. {as they were reluctant for an invasion of the Japanese islands in 1945.} They would have to strangle the Allied shipping, that would be #1 priority. 



syscom3 said:


> The war in the pacific would have ended exactly on time due to the US receiving the atomic bomb in 1945.



It might be possible for Germany {if not pulverized in '44-'45} would be able to develop a bomb to counter the US/UK's Manhattan project. It's not clear either way that *IF* Germany was not desperatly defending its territory from mid-1943 onwards, that they might have been able to develop an A-bomb as well.


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## renrich (Feb 14, 2008)

Freebird, I think you are exactly right that the army should have been responsible for defense of PH. Your point about who defends if the fleet is out is excellent. If a scapegoat was needed General Short should have had more culpability but it was disgraceful the way Kimmel and also Short were treated. There was blame to be allocated for many people but the plain truth was that the US was unprepared for a surprise attack at every level. I need to check my reference but I believe that Admiral Richardson who was CINCPAC before Kimmel was replaced by Kimmel because he kept asserting that the Pacific Fleet was a sitting duck at PH and needed to be moved back to the West Coast.


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## Wayne Little (Feb 15, 2008)

freebird said:


> Would the japanese have been successful launching a "Third wave"?
> 
> *If the Japanese had found the US Carriers at Pearl Harbour,* should they have risked a third wave?
> 
> ...



Would they have been successful? to some degree maybe but probably not, first the element of surprise was lost, the remaining American aircraft and AA would have exacted a reasonable toll on the incoming Japanese aircraft.The prize for a third attack would need to be a big one. IF the carriers were not there and subsequently discovered, then it probably would be game on, the Japanese figuring that they had the upper hand in Carriers and aircraft.

If the Carriers were at Pearl at the time of the attack they would have been heavily targeted in the first place, and most likely sunk, they would have been sitting ducks! A third wave would not have been necessary figuring that they had eliminated the primary objectives, Carriers and other Capital ships.

Now, all scenarios need to be based on the IJN turn around time to launch another strike. The last of the first wave departed around 8.30 and an approx flight time back to the carriers puts it at 10.00am. So from approx 9.30 to say 10.15 or longer the recovery process would have been in full swing. The aircraft would need to be transferred below decks to clear for other incoming aircraft AND the second wave. Debriefing, checking aircraft for damage, csualties etc. would have taken time. Launch and recovery of CAP fighters.
Then their is refuelling, rearming, transfer back to the flight deck and launch, if this happened quickly it most likely would still have overlapped the return of the second wave and been delayed, the first of which would have been arriving back over the carriers around 11.00. Fuchida did not arrive back on the Akagi until well after 12.00, probably closer to 1.00pm to give his full report of events.

Therefore by the time all was said and done, debrief, refuel, repair, re-arm, co-ordinate a new strike, launch and flight time to Pearl it would have already been mid afternoon the returning aircraft could well have been returning after dark? or close to it. Big Risk I think. Probably only taken if carriers at Pearl and only damaged or if discovered near Pearl, in which case they would have gone after the carriers rather than PH.

How does this sound? with so many if's but's and maybe's, option 2,3 or 4 could apply in the poll I don't think option 1 would fit in my opinion.


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## andie0712 (Feb 15, 2008)

Too many risks for another strike! 
Mr.Wayne Little's View Point is perpectly right.

In my opinion,
Third wave is not main factor of Paicific War, 
Third wave can not change anything.
No matter how Japanese couldn't win the war 

The meaning of Pearl harbor is End of Japanese Empire.
When IJN decided to attack Pearl harbor, Whole thing is fixed.

Attaking Pearl harbor is amazing success of WW2 aviation history.
But it is also national suicide for Japan.

Even If third wave destroyed whole things in Pearl harbor,
Could IJN win the U.S forces in Pacific area? 

For U.S Navy and Marines, 
To win the war with Japan, 
It's just a matter of time~~~~


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## syscom3 (Feb 15, 2008)

Wayne is correct about the timing for the 3rd wave.

From the time the last plane from the 2nd strike is landed untill the time the first plane from the 3rd strike takes off would be over one hour, closer to two.


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## plan_D (Feb 15, 2008)

How many U.S aircraft would be able to oppose the third wave; if it departed at 1 p.m ? I know the Enterprise was arriving at the scene when the Japanese were departing, but how many aircraft did it have and how many operational fighters did Pearl Harbour have after the first two strikes? 

To have a real idea you need to know the AA that was still operational at Pearl Harbour and the fighters available to the U.S forces. And then you have to take into account that the AA of the day was not going to be devastating to a medium level attack, if not in extremely large numbers it would only bloody the nose of the third wave without a decent number of U.S fighters present.


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## Freebird (Feb 15, 2008)

Wayne Little said:


> If the Carriers were at Pearl at the time of the attack they would have been heavily targeted in the first place, and most likely sunk, they would have been sitting ducks! A third wave would not have been necessary figuring that they had eliminated the primary objectives, Carriers and other Capital ships.
> 
> *Now, all scenarios need to be based on the IJN turn around time to launch another strike.* The last of the first wave departed around 8.30 and an approx flight time back to the carriers puts it at 10.00am. So from approx 9.30 to say 10.15 or longer the recovery process would have been in full swing. The aircraft would need to be transferred below decks to clear for other incoming aircraft AND the second wave. Debriefing, checking aircraft for damage, csualties etc. would have taken time. Launch and recovery of CAP fighters..



How long would it take to turn around 35 aircraft? (from each carrier). I would indeed depend on this, that's why I ask the question. If they could do this in about an hour, could they not launch them at about 11 and hold the second wave in the air until 11:30 or so?


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## renrich (Feb 15, 2008)

Found one of my books on PH. From Mitsuo Fuchida. He believed another attack should be mounted. His was almost the last AC to land after the second wave attack and he states that AC were already being rearmed, refueled and being made ready for another attack. The only document he knows of outlining Nagumo's reasons for withdrawing states: first attack inflicted all damage hoped for; enemy response had been unexpectedly prompt and losses would be disproportionate to damage inflicted; intercepted enemy messages indicated at least 50 large AC still operational and we did not know location of enemy carriers, subs and cruisers; did not want to remain in range of enemy landbased planes. Admiral Richardson was CINCUS and Kimmel replaced him prematurely because Roosevelt got upset at Richardson. Richardson was a blunt Texan(hooray for him) and told Roosevelt that the major units of the Pacific Fleet should be withdrawn to the mainland because PH could not be defended against an enemy attack because they had not enough planes to mount a 360 degree fulltime parol schedule. Of course that was exactly Kimmel's problem and one reason we were surprised.


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## Freebird (Feb 15, 2008)

renrich said:


> Found one of my books on PH. From Mitsuo Fuchida. He believed another attack should be mounted. His was almost the last AC to land after the second wave attack and he states that AC were already being rearmed, refueled and being made ready for another attack. The only document he knows of outlining Nagumo's reasons for withdrawing states: first attack inflicted all damage hoped for; enemy response had been unexpectedly prompt and losses would be disproportionate to damage inflicted; intercepted enemy messages indicated at least 50 large AC still operational and we *did not know location of enemy carriers*, subs and cruisers; did not want to remain in range of enemy landbased planes.



Thanks Renrich, I think the carriers were the main reason, the Japanese waited for some time for the scouts to find the carriers, as they didn't want to send out another attack wave until they found them. Also they didn't want to be surprised. I would think that if they had found destroyed 2 or 3 carriers in Pearl, there is a good chance that they wouldn't have finished the job on the battleships. (some of the TB's DB's that hit the BB's would have been busy with the carriers instead. 

Also I was thinking, with 6 carriers it's easier to manage things. Suppose that the 200 aircraft from the first wave land back on 4 carriers, and quickly prepare for the 3rd wave attack {along with about 60 aircraft held back from second wave} Then as the 4 carriers are launching the 3rd wave at about 11:30 or 12:00 there are still 2 carriers available to land those aircraft from 2nd wave that are low on fuel. When the 3rd wave departs, the remaining 40-50 or so aircraft can land on the other carriers.


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## Wayne Little (Feb 16, 2008)

freebird said:


> How long would it take to turn around 35 aircraft? (from each carrier). I would indeed depend on this, that's why I ask the question. If they could do this in about an hour, could they not launch them at about 11 and hold the second wave in the air until 11:30 or so?



Ok after checking, the first wave aircraft in fact began arriving back at the carriers just after 10.00am, as they were recovered they would have been moved to the forward end of the flight deck. Now the aircraft would not have been left there as by the time all aircraft were recovered it was around 11.00. (Sea conditions slowed the recovery process). The decks needed to be cleared for the second wave's arrival. The carriers actually headed toward Oahu to reduce the distance the returning second wave had to cover. 

During this time some aircraft would have been stowed below decks on the forward elevators,mainly Zeroes (forward hangar area)and Vals (Middle area)as these were their assigned positions below decks, the Kates however had to be moved to the rear elevators, once all recovery was complete, under normal circumstances. Now the majority of the attack aircraft in the first wave were Kates, so it is possible or probable that they were moved down the middle elevator and pushed to the rear below decks as other aircraft landed above them. (Zeroes and Kates) 

Recovery of the second wave commenced at around. 11.15 and took approx. an hour to complete.

This whole scenario of recovery, stowing below decks, checking aircraft, repairing, refueling, rearming and doing it twice in difficult sea conditions certainly would have slowed the entire process of co-ordinating a new strike.

The first wave took for the most part an hour just to land all aircraft, without doing anything else but move and stow the planes. So even if you were thinking quick turn around you couldn't do anything because the second wave was just minutes away and it was necessary to get them down asap, tired crews, damaged aircraft, fuel? Remember all crews would have been awake since about 04.00 or thereabouts.

Then you need information from all carriers, back to Akagi (flagship) as to how many serviceable aircraft and type are available what target(s)? ordnance requirement and especially how many crews are fit to go. and then you need a plan, when you don't know just what you will be up against? Then you need to distribute the plan for a co-ordinated attack.

One source says Genda did not want a third strike to include the kates (slower and more vulnerable?), now thats a problem because the majority of the Vals were used in the second wave from Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu. Only Shokaku and Zuikaku's Vals would initially be available from the first wave and they were in fact the least experienced Bomber crews.

So unfortunately the turnaround time was always going to be the problem, at this time the Japanese were in fact the best at carrier operations and there is not much chance that they could have created a sufficiently equipped third attack force from the first returning wave to mount a successful attack, be it against PH shore installations or Carriers. Time was simply against them.

Hope this helps the discussion.


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## renrich (Feb 16, 2008)

Remember also that in those days land based heavy bombers were considered a very real threat to warships by bothe the US and Japan.


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## syscom3 (Feb 16, 2008)

In the book "Shattered Sword", the author takes pains to emphasize the slow nature of IJN carrier ops because of two things:

1) The hanger decks were not ventilated and aircraft could not be warmed up below decks.

2) The elevators were slow and there's lots of wasted time for them to be going up and down spotting aircraft.


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## davparlr (Feb 16, 2008)

renrich said:


> Freebird, I think you are exactly right that the army should have been responsible for defense of PH. Your point about who defends if the fleet is out is excellent. If a scapegoat was needed General Short should have had more culpability but it was disgraceful the way Kimmel and also Short were treated. There was blame to be allocated for many people but the plain truth was that the US was unprepared for a surprise attack at every level.



You are right on saying that the US was unprepared at every level. As far as Kimmel is concerned my biggest questions concern these two messages, quoted from “At Dawn We Slept”, by George Prange. On November 27th, Marshall sent this message to Gen. Short:


> Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes …. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense... You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary…


. This is condensed and it does not include wishy washy words about not giving the Japanese reason to attack. Also, on the same day, Kimmel received this message from the Navy Department:


> This dispatch is to be considered *a war warning*…..an aggressive move by Japan is expected within *the next few days*.


. Again the missing words of this missive identify places other than Pearl Harbor as likely attack points. Now my concern is, why after months of unrest in the theater, and with the specific warnings known to have been sent, did Kimmel pursue the normal training procedures of the fleet being at sea during of the week and in port on the weekend. Why didn’t he rotate his fleet so half were out while half or in, or at least not have a pattern of training that enemy could predict. To me this is a failure of basic defensive thought, “don’t be predictable” and is similar in a basic tactical failure as Admiral Halsey’s bite on the Japanese feint gambit at Leyte Gulf, only more disastrous. Also, why didn’t he review Gen. Short’s long range reconnaissance procedures? He had assets to aid in that effort if Gen. Short’s measures were short. He had submarines, PBYs and destroyers, all of which could have made a decent screen. Instead, even with all the tornado warnings going off in the area, he decided to watch tv, thinking, “well, none have been seen around here.” It was Kimmel’s fleet and no matter what, he was responsible for its safety if he had resources to prevent a threat, and he did.

I have been heavy on Kimmel, but as you have said, similar comments could be made for Short, especially in regards to the first missive. In addition, all levels of command made poor decisions and very poor directions.

Of course they were scapegoats. That is what the military does, find the lowest to crucify, and let the upper guys go. If they could have gotten away with it, they would have laid the blame on the poor enlisted man looking at the radar scope or the junior officer that dismissed his report.


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## renrich (Feb 17, 2008)

Dav, the problem I have with the treatment of Kimmel is exactly as you said. The guys in Washington were playing CYA and Stark had been a lifelong friend of Kimmel. A nightmare scenario for the US might have been that not only would Nagumo launch a second strike but move in close with his BBs and CAs to give all the military installations a thorough bombardment and then hunt down Enterprise and Lexington and destroy them. He probably could have done it but it would have been uncharacteristic for a Japanese commander to display that much initiative and would have delayed or made impossible his future activities. That scenario would have probably lengthened the war by a year or more.


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## syscom3 (Feb 17, 2008)

renrich said:


> That scenario would have probably lengthened the war by a year or more.



Why a year or more?

The atomic bomb was going to be delivered on time in July 1945

The B29's were going to be delivered on time in 1944

The aircraft carriers were due in spring 1943, blah, blah, blah.

Nothing would change except for maybe when and where the battles for the south pacific would be fought.

The central pacific battles for the Gilberts, Marshalls and Mariana's would be fought right on schedule.


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## B-17engineer (Feb 17, 2008)

WEll I would think that the U.S. Would be on there toes after the 1st 2 waves and it would've been more costly then the first 2 waves


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## renrich (Feb 17, 2008)

Maybe a year is stretching it but I don't think we could have stopped the New Guinea invasion as Coral Sea may have done and I don't believe Midway would have happened in June. In 1941, the Navy only had 3 fleet oilers on the west coast so it would have taken a long time to replenish the tank farms. The key to the bombing of Japan was the base on Saipan although the A bomb could probably have been delivered from China. That scenario would have impacted the war in the ETO, probably Torch.


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## syscom3 (Feb 17, 2008)

renrich said:


> Maybe a year is stretching it but I don't think we could have stopped the New Guinea invasion as Coral Sea may have done and I don't believe Midway would have happened in June. In 1941, the Navy only had 3 fleet oilers on the west coast so it would have taken a long time to replenish the tank farms. The key to the bombing of Japan was the base on Saipan although the A bomb could probably have been delivered from China. That scenario would have impacted the war in the ETO, probably Torch.



In 1942, the USN had dozens of fleet oilers available, as well as dozens of commercial tankers to replenish the oil farms.

Dont you think that with the vast array of ships and men available in the fall of 1943, the US could begin its Central Pcific invasions regardless of what the Japanese had in the SW Pacific?


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## renrich (Feb 17, 2008)

Remember, this nightmare includes that Enterprise and Lex were sunk off PH. If there is no Midway or Coral Sea the IJN has 4 more big carriers plus 1 light and their air groups. We would not have been able to mount the Marshalls raids and get the operational experience. The Japanese probably would be able to occupy and get the air field operational on Guadalcanal. Wouldn't you think we would have to devote more forces to the defense of Australia to the detriment of offensive activities? During late 41 and 42, weren't we losing a lot of tankers in the Gulf and off the East Coast to U-boats? If I remember correctly in late 42,( after Santa Cruz?) we had only one carrier operational in the Pacific which was the damaged Enterprise. If she were sunk at PH, seems like we would be really short of CVs and probably CAs and CLs. In fact, both my uncles would have been MIA since they were in Salt lake City and Chicago.


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## syscom3 (Feb 17, 2008)

> Remember, this nightmare includes that Enterprise and Lex were sunk off PH. If there is no Midway or Coral Sea the IJN has 4 more big carriers plus 1 light and their air groups. We would not have been able to mount the Marshalls raids and get the operational experience.



A disaster of that magnitude would mean the Hornet, Yorktown and Wasp would be transfered all the sooner to the Pacific. With the Saratoga still afloat, that would mean we would have four carriers.

If the Coral Sea and Midway battles never took place, that still means they IJN has 6 carriers (although they each had an air group more like the US medium carriers).

In the early Fall of 1943, the USN was going to sail into the central Pacific with at least a dozen carriers all equipped with Hellcats, Dauntlesses and Avengers, which would deal some pretty nasty blows in the IJN.



> The Japanese probably would be able to occupy and get the air field operational on Guadalcanal. Wouldn't you think we would have to devote more forces to the defense of Australia to the detriment of offensive activities?



That wasn't untill July 1942. A full 8 months after Pearl. Even had they begun air operation from there, the war of attrition had begun, and they would not have been able to sustain any meaningfull operations.



> If I remember correctly in late 42,( after Santa Cruz?) we had only one carrier operational in the Pacific which was the damaged Enterprise. If she were sunk at PH, seems like we would be really short of CVs and probably CAs and CLs. In fact, both my uncles would have been MIA since they were in Salt lake City and Chicago.



Yes, we ran out of carriers in Dec 1942. But that just means the operational tempo changes untill the new carriers begin to get delivered to the fleet in 1943.


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## syscom3 (Feb 18, 2008)

Although its mostly not related to the subject of this thread, here are some numbers on the fleet carriers available to the USN and IJN at the end of 1943 (number in brackets is the stated AC capacity):

USN: Saratoga (88 ), Wasp (76), Essex (91), Bunker Hill (91), Yorktown (91), Lexington II (91), Intrepid (91), Independence (33), Princeton (33), Belleau Wood (33), Cowpens (33), Monterey (33), Langley (33), Cabot (33)
For 14 carriers (7 CV and 7 CVL) for 850 aircraft.

IJN: Kaga (90), Akagi (91), Soryu (71), Hiryu (73), Zuikaku (84), Shokaku ( 84 ), Ryujo ( 38 ), Zuiho (30)
For 6 CV and 2 CVL for 581 aircraft. Note that the actual AC capacity for the IJN CV's is in fact, less than that. The numbers show the capcity of pre 1941 AC and AC in disassembled state (and stowed). Actuall totals were more like 70.


What does this mean? It shows that the IJN was a doomed force at anytime after summer 1943. Whatever happened at Pearl or Midway was irrelevant.


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## Freebird (Feb 18, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> Although its mostly not related to the subject of this thread, here are some numbers on the fleet carriers available to the USN and IJN at the end of 1943 (number in brackets is the stated AC capacity):
> 
> USN: Saratoga (88 ), Wasp (76), Essex (91), Bunker Hill (91), Yorktown (91), Lexington II (91), Intrepid (91), Independence (33), Princeton (33), Belleau Wood (33), Cowpens (33), Monterey (33), Langley (33), Cabot (33)
> For 14 carriers (7 CV and 7 CVL) for 850 aircraft.
> ...



And it also assumes that the US does not lose any more carriers in late '42 or early '43 when they are still outnumbered by the Japanese.


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## syscom3 (Feb 18, 2008)

It still doesnt matter because the USN would still have qualitative as well as quantitative superiority.

In Summer of 1944, its even worse for the IJN.


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## renrich (Feb 19, 2008)

Just read an interesting story related by Thomas Moorer who was a young pilot of a PBY at PH. Later he became CNO. He said that in order to conduct a 360 degree search out of PH would require 36 to 40 AC. He said on a given day they would only would have six AC operational. This was before the attack. During they attack he was trying to get to the patrol plane base. After the attack all the PBYs were too damaged to fly except for two, one of which was his. Kimmel and his staff thought the IJN attack had been launched from the south west so his AC and the other were directed to search in that direction. During the takeoff there was so much oil on the water his windshield was covered up and he had to make an instrument takeoff. After they were airborne, one of the crew got out in front of the cockpit and cleaned the plexiglass with gasoline so they could see. I think there was a hatch in the nose of the AC but can you image cleaning the windshield while the plane was airborne?


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## ToughOmbre (Feb 19, 2008)

renrich said:


> Just read an interesting story related by Thomas Moorer who was a young pilot of a PBY at PH. Later he became CNO. He said that in order to conduct a 360 degree search out of PH would require 36 to 40 AC. He said on a given day they would only would have six AC operational. This was before the attack. During they attack he was trying to get to the patrol plane base. After the attack all the PBYs were too damaged to fly except for two, one of which was his. Kimmel and his staff thought the IJN attack had been launched from the south west so his AC and the other were directed to search in that direction. During the takeoff there was so much oil on the water his windshield was covered up and he had to make an instrument takeoff. After they were airborne, one of the crew got out in front of the cockpit and cleaned the plexiglass with gasoline so they could see. I think there was a hatch in the nose of the AC but can you image cleaning the windshield while the plane was airborne?



That's a great story ren. I've been studying and researching the attack on PH for most of my life and I've never heard about that PBY. Very cool.

TO


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## syscom3 (Feb 19, 2008)

And if Admiral Kimmel had paid attention to his defenses during November, he would have had far more PBY's operational.

And he could still put small ships offshore to patrol. No doubt a few would have been rapidly deposed of by the IJN, but they would have been able to send out an alarm.


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## Freebird (Feb 19, 2008)

renrich said:


> . Admiral Richardson was CINCUS and Kimmel replaced him prematurely because Roosevelt got upset at Richardson. Richardson was a blunt Texan(hooray for him) and told Roosevelt that the major units of the Pacific Fleet should be withdrawn to the mainland because PH could not be defended against an enemy attack because they had not enough planes to mount a 360 degree fulltime parol schedule. Of course that was exactly Kimmel's problem and one reason we were surprised.



Interesting, the CinC Singapore before the war Gen Dobbie had argued that preparations should be made for a defence line in Johore, {100 miles N of singpore} because the Island was not prepared for an attack was not really suited for defence. {the water barrier was too shallow the shoreline had dense vegitation which prevented good LoF}

He was retired before the attack, and his replacement was not as vocal about demanding that preparations be made.


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## renrich (Feb 20, 2008)

Very similar circumstances between Singapore and PH. The Moorer story goes on. His PatWing was sent to Australia where they were stationed at Darwin. During one of the air raids there he was trying to get his PBY out of the area and was shot down by the Nips. He was wounded but survived. Life was interesting for him in those days. Moorer got on my bad side a while back as I heard him being quoted(after his retirement from the Navy) as saying that civilians in this country had no business owning guns or something to that effect. He may have been misquoted or he may be senile but I crossed him off my list. I am sure that if he knew that he would be distressed. LOL


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## renrich (Feb 20, 2008)

Sys that idea of small picket ships was and is a good one. If you recall the Japanese did that and that was why the Doolittle raid had to launch prematurely. It is surprising no one in command thought of that. Part of the peacetime mentality.


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## syscom3 (Feb 20, 2008)

renrich said:


> .....Part of the peacetime mentality.



That my friend is exactly why we lost at Pearl, the Philipines and the Brits in Malaya/Singapore.


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## renrich (Feb 21, 2008)

TO, an excellent book on the PH attack is "Air Raid: Pearl Harbor!" It is a collection of recollections by participants edited by Paul Stillwell. It was published by The Naval Institute Press and copywrited in 1981. One article in it is by a Captain Taussig(ret) who was a young officer in Nevada during the attack. He was badly wounded and watched most of the attack from a litter. His article is a technical discussion of the inadequancies of the AA batteries and their fire control systems on the USN ships of that day. I have outlined on this forum before how the 5 inch dual purpose batteries were operated during that time frame based on conversations with an uncle who was a CGM on CA25 and was responsible for the 5 inchers on that ship. Taussig"s article verifys my uncle's explanations and reinforces my opinion which is that I wonder how they ever hit an airplane making an attack.


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## Freebird (Feb 21, 2008)

renrich said:


> TO, an excellent book on the PH attack is "Air Raid: Pearl Harbor!" His article is a technical discussion of the inadequancies of the AA batteries and their fire control systems on the USN ships of that day. I have outlined on this forum before how the *5 inch dual purpose batteries* were operated during that time frame based on conversations with an uncle who was a CGM on CA25 and was responsible for the 5 inchers on that ship. Taussig"s article verifys my uncle's explanations and reinforces my opinion which is that I wonder how they ever hit an airplane making an attack.



Is the 5 inch gun unsuitable for AA or is it just that particular model? I've been meaning to ask this for awhile. The British cruisers all used 4" AA guns as their secondary battery, but in 1939 the new class of "Dido" cruisers switched to 5.25" dual-purpose guns, replacing both the 6" 4" AA guns of earlier cruisers. *Were the 5.25" guns effective?* I notice that the next group of Colony class cruisers went back to the 4" AA.


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## fly boy (Feb 21, 2008)

i wonder what would happen to japan planes if we had p-51d's flying at the time and fully loaded


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## renrich (Feb 21, 2008)

There wasn't anything wrong with the 5 inch38 or 5 inch 25. An experienced crew could get off 20 rounds per minute. The ammunition and the fire control was the problem. Once they got proximity fuses that helped a lot. The British fire control was even more hopeless than the American. Think about Repulse and POW. POW was practically brand new and they could not defend themselves against level and torpedo bombers. Shooting down attackers with the ammo and fire control systems of the 3 inch, 4 inch and 5 inch cannons of that time was almost as hard as shooting pigeons on the fly with a breech loading 22 rifle.


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## drgondog (Feb 21, 2008)

renrich said:


> Very similar circumstances between Singapore and PH. The Moorer story goes on. His PatWing was sent to Australia where they were stationed at Darwin. During one of the air raids there he was trying to get his PBY out of the area and was shot down by the Nips. He was wounded but survived. Life was interesting for him in those days. Moorer got on my bad side a while back as I heard him being quoted(after his retirement from the Navy) as saying that civilians in this country had no business owning guns or something to that effect. He may have been misquoted or he may be senile but I crossed him off my list. I am sure that if he knew that he would be distressed. LOL



He wasn't mis quoted. His son, Tom,Jr was stockbroker that lived next door to me in Dallas. Tom voted for Reagan and Bush - his dad was left of Clinton and Mondale in many ways. Gun 'control' is one of them.

I asked him w/o going ballistic whether he thought the placement of the 2nd Amendment meant it was a Collective Right or an individual right and he responded 'it had a purpose where there were no police and we had a small standing army.

When I reminded him that our founders, Washington included, said 'beware of a large standing army' he was irritated but actually listened to my next point when I asked him how many police authorities were on standby to protect him from 'gand bangers' who didn't need no stinkin' license to purchase one?

This was during the Texas Right to carry law introduction - anyway I respected him and his service to the country - but, no he doesn't believe you and I should own a weapon. Remember, on a military post all the issue weapons are in lock up..so its a long way of life for him.


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## renrich (Feb 22, 2008)

Interesting Bill, I think that us ordinary people sometimes have a vision that all military members tend to be conservative in their politics. However, people who spend a lifetime in the military certainly have a different outlook on life than we do. To begin with, in our lifetimes, an individual in the military who followed the rules pretty much had a job guaranteed with a decent retirement at the end. That has not been true of those of us in private enterprise. They always had a form of socialised medicine and if they spent much time in the DC area they came into contact with many left leaning government employees. I like the advantages conferred by a volunteer professional military but maybe our founding fathers were prescient in more ways than they knew in their fear of a standing army. I have a cousin, lives in the DC area, was in the first graduating class of the AF Academy, now retired and he mirrors some of the same views as Moorer.


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## syscom3 (Feb 22, 2008)

Lets stay on subject.

The fire control of the day was sufficent to hit aircraft up to middle altitudes that were flying straight and level.


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## renrich (Feb 22, 2008)

It would have to be barrage fire, not aiming at a specific target unless a gun got lucky.The Nevada at PH mounted 8-5 inch 25s in single mounts, 4- 3inch 50s and 8-50 cal mgs. At the end of the war she mounted 16- 5 inch 38s in twin mounts, 8- 40mm quads and so many 20 mms I can't count them. If you are having a hard time hitting just add more guns. Somebody will get lucky. I went aboard Alabama at Mobile and it looked as if they put a 20 mm anywhere there was room. They may have said OK at battle stations if you have nothing to do, go grab a 20mm and shoot something down. Try not to hit the guys with white stars. Just kidding but they had them everywhere and lots of 40mm quads.


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## syscom3 (Feb 22, 2008)

The "Kates" were notoriously vulnerable to damage. Thats why a 3rd strike at Pearl would not be a cake walk. Just having a barrage means youre going to hit something, and hopefully it would be in the fuel tanks which would doom the aircrew to running out of fuel.


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## Freebird (Feb 22, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> The "Kates" were notoriously vulnerable to damage. Thats why a 3rd strike at Pearl would not be a cake walk. Just having a barrage means youre going to hit something, and hopefully it would be in the fuel tanks which would doom the aircrew to running out of fuel.



What would be the difference in effective US AA if the Kates were flying high level bombing. not torpedoes? {since the BB's CV's would already have been hit, the third wave would be almost all bombs} vs. tank farm, CA's DD's at dock, repair shops, etc.


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## syscom3 (Feb 22, 2008)

freebird said:


> What would be the difference in effective US AA if the Kates were flying high level bombing. not torpedoes? {since the BB's CV's would already have been hit, the third wave would be almost all bombs} vs. tank farm, CA's DD's at dock, repair shops, etc.



To hit the shipyard and tank farm, they would have to mass together. Flying around at 10,000 or so feet, the AA arcs would be perfect.

And remember, the torpedo effects were devestating because they hit the ships before there was any organized defensive fire.


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## Freebird (Mar 4, 2008)

Wayne Little said:


> Ok after checking, the first wave aircraft in fact began arriving back at the carriers just after 10.00am, as they were recovered they would have been moved to the forward end of the flight deck. Now the aircraft would not have been left there as by the time all aircraft were recovered it was around 11.00. (Sea conditions slowed the recovery process). The decks needed to be cleared for the second wave's arrival. The carriers actually headed toward Oahu to reduce the distance the returning second wave had to cover.
> 
> During this time some aircraft would have been stowed below decks on the forward elevators,mainly Zeroes (forward hangar area)and Vals (Middle area)as these were their assigned positions below decks, the Kates however had to be moved to the rear elevators, once all recovery was complete, under normal circumstances. Now the majority of the attack aircraft in the first wave were Kates, so it is possible or probable that they were moved down the middle elevator and pushed to the rear below decks as other aircraft landed above them. (Zeroes and Kates)
> 
> The first wave took for the most part an hour just to land all aircraft, without doing anything else but move and stow the planes. So even if you were thinking quick turn around you couldn't do anything because the second wave was just minutes away and it was necessary to get them down asap, tired crews, damaged aircraft, fuel? Recovery of the second wave commenced at around. 11.15 and took approx. an hour to complete.



OK but what about managing the first wave landings so that they were on 3 or 4 carriers only, then at about 11:15 stop landing aircraft on those carriers, to prepare for launch. 3 carriers would prepare the third wave, while the other 3 carriers would then land the second wave without it interfering with the re-arming. I realize that using say the 3 carriers to recover the second wave would lengthen the time needed, but I believe the "Kate's" had longer endurance so they could probably stay in the air for an extra 15 - 20 min without great trouble.

Once that the first wave reports the destrucyion of the carriers, airfields sinking of battleships the Japanese won't be expecting a Naval battle, couldn't they draft some sailors to help spot aircraft more quickly?

Also I checked the time for sunset in Hawaii, its about 5:50 pm, so even if the could launch at 1 pm, 75 - 80 min flight, 1 hour of attacks 75 min return still gives you over an hour to recover before sunset.


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## syscom3 (Mar 4, 2008)

The IJN had plenty of time for a 3rd wave. But not a 4th wave.

The losses they would take on the 3rd wave would be enough to take the fight out of them.

As for "splitting" up the carriers for different duties, it was possible. But that would not be to IJN doctrine at the time, so the probability of that happening is nil.


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## Freebird (Mar 4, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> As for "splitting" up the carriers for different duties, it was possible.* But that would not be to IJN doctrine at the time*, so the probability of that happening is nil.



With Nagumo in charge? That would be an obstacle, true enough.


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## Procrastintor (May 31, 2013)

I think that they could have done a third attack but it would have been a kamikaze attack on a large scale, we had a few P-40s up bringing hurt on the 2nd wave, so a 3rd would have had to deal with more Warhawks, more AAA and POSSIBLY the nearby carrier group's F4Fs and AAA if they could get within range fast enough. Basically, if the Japanese ships stuck around much longer, they wouldn't have had a chance to get home.


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## tyrodtom (Jun 1, 2013)

I'm not sure there were many Warhawks left for the third wave.
A lot were destroyed in the first wave's strike on Wheeler Field, lined up in neat rows.
Most that managed to get up for the second wave had been at the few dispersed fields.


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## Procrastintor (Jun 7, 2013)

Tyrod, that's probably true, but I forgot to mention, surviving ships would probably want to get out of the harbor, and probably towards the carriers which, as you may know, have little defensive armament, also, the USS Enterprise was very close at the time, in fact, a flight of 18 SBDs just happened to be on patrol from the Enterprise, which should have been there if it weren't for a storm, and they attacked the bombers, also, 5 P-36 Hawks and 3 P-40 Warhawks got up if I remember rightly.


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## richard schwab (Jun 16, 2013)

Admiral Nagumo Had several factors that influenced his decision not to launch a third strike. The US defenses were wide awake, a potential 30% loss rate among his aircrews was predicted. The time to arm and prepare a third strike would mean night landings for the returning aircraft. Not a Japanese operational practice. The fuel status of the fleets ships, the plan called for a strike and quick return. The failure to sink or even spot the US carriers exposed the Japanese fleet to surprise attack itself. The fear of US land bombers surviving the attack and going on the offensive.

Rich


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## parsifal (Jun 16, 2013)

there was not much fight left in Pearl Harbour after the second strike. What was worrying Nagumo and cause him to hesitate and then cancel the third strike was the unknown wherabouts of the US carriers. nagumo freeted that he was walking into an enormous trap...prophetic words, just six months too early.

The issue is whether such a strike was worth it. In tretrospect, possibly not. Taking out the fuel farms ids the often quoted missed objective, but how much would that really have hurt the allies. a lot is made of this, and perhaps it might have delayed meanigful American responses to the japanese for 6 months or so, but really how much difference was American activity from out of Pearl making to the progress of the war anyway....not a lot when you think about it. What the Japanese needed to do was establish their perimater, fortify, buld up reserves and then defeat the Americans sufficiently well to force them to a negotiated settlement. there was more chance of me winning the lottery to be honest.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 17, 2013)

Hitting the oil farms is not a 100% proposition. That is to say that just hitting them does guarantee a 100% destruction rate. What the destruction rate would have been is rather variable.


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## Glider (Jun 17, 2013)

I admit that attacking the Harbour would have had little impact on the war. However a conserted hunt for and attack on the Carriers would have been very different


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## AvengerFights (Jun 26, 2016)

The third strike would do not much harm to the US as the historian predicts. Instead the Japanese will suffer more losses which will impaired their conquests of Asia and Pacific Islands. First the surprise element is gone, all of the damaged ship AA guns will be put on full alert and in combined with those on the land. It will be quite disaster for the brittle Japanese plane who need to navigate on lower altitudes to score hit on the fuel depot. Before the Japanese faced the AA guns on the ground, they will have to contend with the remaining CAP which should be about 50 planes. The Americans could repaired those additional damage plane on the ground and still contribute to more Japanese losses. I think it was a wise move for Nagumo to retreat rather than listen to his junior staff to attack the oil depot as unpredictable might happen such as US Navy Carriers could be nearby. It is impossible for the Japanese to destroy the entire oil supply unless the Americans are sitting ducks. The Ploiesti Oil raid was only damaged 40% with 178 B-24s in 1943. Those Japanese planes carry less bombs than the B-24 and poorly armored thus suffer heavy losses, it will be impossible for the IJN to carry out their subsequent operation like Wake Island or those operation in East Indies with planeless carriers. The Pacific war might end early if the third strike was launched. In addition the US have large fleet oilers and other commercial types to deliver their oil stock. Even no refinery left they could brought fuel in their tanks from the Mainland to operate the War ship and refuel from oilers in the sea. The US have vast resources that the IJN could ever destroy.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 26, 2016)

Comparing Ploesti to Pearl Harbor is a little far fetched, don't ya think?!?


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## GrauGeist (Jun 26, 2016)

Disagree on several points:
First, there was little time to affect repairs on the fighters as the confusion and damage to the maintenance facilities would prevent any such thing during that morning's events.

There were several P-36 fighters sitting idle at several auxiliary fields that were untouched, but lacked ammunition.

A third wave could have been the most effective out of the all of the attacks IF they have focused on the fuel and oil dumps as well as the Sub pens...which were untouched in the attack.

Concentrating an attack on the storage facilities would have been a staggering blow of the Pacific fleet as there would have been no reserves available and thus depending solely on shipments from the West coast to keep the carriers and other surviving ships mobile. Also the loss of the Aviation fuel would have meant that Naval and Air Corps aircraft would have had to rely again, on whatever could be hurried over from the West coast.

Now, let's take this a step further: knowing that the fuel and oil dumps were destroyed and knowing that the Pacific fleet and Army elements were desperately low on fuel, the IJN could establish a picket line with their subs, targeting the tankers and oilers heading to Pearl from San Diego, San Pedro, Santa Barbara, San Francisco and points north and even the Panama canal.

This would have had disastrous and far reaching effects for U.S. operations in the Pacific - far more than was actually accomplished at Pearl, historically.


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## syscom3 (Jun 29, 2016)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Comparing Ploesti to Pearl Harbor is a little far fetched, don't ya think?!?


There are some fundemental differences between knocking out a refinery and setting fire to an oil tank.

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## BattleshipNightZ (Aug 8, 2016)

The American's were "waking up" (if not already "woken up"), so I believe they would have lost more aircraft. But even if Pearl Harbour had been "taken out", it would only have delayed America's victory. As I see no reason why retaking Pearl Harbour, would have been any different to any of the other "island hopping" attacks. Even if America lost the Pearl Harbour fleet, they had the two North Carolinas, the four South Dakotas and the four Iowa's (towards the end of the war); which combined with their air-craft carriers, it would have just taken longer to "wake the sleeping giant".


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## Sir Percy Ware-Armitage (Mar 31, 2017)

magnocain said:


> It is my opinion that with heavyer losses, that IJN might of taken out the oil tanks and the repair yards that they so crucially missed.




It seems it would have reduced the US Navy potentialities much longer however, other pertinent factors contributed to the IJN debacle in the next few months (quite well known facts from all participating on the present forum): the US code breaking played a definitive role in the IJN subsequent defeats and at Pearl Harbour and as at Midway, Nagumo's timidity added to the catastrophic long term consequences the IJN suffered.

Cherio!

Sir P.


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## Shortround6 (Apr 3, 2017)

A lot of the supporters of the 3rd wave over estimate the amount of damage that could have been done. A 3rd wave would NOT have finished off _everything_ left. And even supposedly vulnerable targets were harder than made out to be. 

Fuel tanks. 






Please note the each tank has a containment wall around it. Burning fuel from one tank could not run to adjoining tanks and set them on fire. 
There _may _have been different fuels in some of the tanks but the majority was bunker C which is pretty heavy stuff, yo have to heat it to just over the boiling temperature of water just to get it to flow through pipes, nozzles and to atomize so it burns in a boiler. 

Now Admiral Nimitz did say on a tour of the damage "Every drop of fuel in the Pacific theater of war is in top of the ground storage tanks five miles away over that hill. One attack plane could have strafed those tanks and destroyed our fuel supply." when listing 3 mistakes the Japanese made. 
This may have been a statement to help bolster morale. 




Sample of Bunker C. Setting fire to this stuff with MG ammo seems a bit dubious. Certainly ONE airplane setting fire to over a dozen tanks seems doubtful. Bunker C is what is left after tanking a lot of the better stuff (like gasoline) out of the crude stock so it is even harder to set on fire than crude oil at a well. Crude oil has a a bit of everything so the light stuff can help get the heavy stuff going. 

One old poster mentioned the 29 destroyers. Yes the Japanese could have attacked the destroyers or the subs but each ship/sub is going to require at _least _one direct hit. The Japanese simply do not have the number of aircraft to target the number of ships/subs/oil tanks/ docks that were left even assuming a superhuman standard of accuracy. 

A 3rd wave would have done more damage but not anywhere near the level most pro 3rd strike posters are expecting. AS far as destroying the dry docks, see the St Nazaire Raid, 4 1/2 tons of explosive in the bow of the destroyer that rammed the lock gates plus commandos placing charges on the lock gate machinery and the pumps. much of which was below the level of the dock that people and vehicles traveled on. A few 500lb aircraft bombs (with 250lbs ? of explosive) stand a very small chance of taking out a dry dock for very long.

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## The Basket (Apr 3, 2017)

Did Nagumo achieve his military objective?
If the Japanese fleet launched an attack on the 8th Dec then with possible land based bombers submarines and aircraft carriers on the hunt then maybe game over.
In my view, Nagumo achieved military objective and turned for home with minimal losses. Perhaps a little boring but the war is not going to be won in a day so keep the carriers safe for another day.

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## drewwizard (Dec 7, 2017)

Fortunately the Japanese naval commanders were known to turn and run during WWII. A third wave would have destroyed the fuel supplies on Hawaii. Remember that Hawaii is in the middle of no where. Without fuel, the carriers could not have sailed to reinforce wake island. (it would be a one way trip). They would probably have had to guard the Hawaiian Islands to insure tankers could arrive without being sunk by Japanese submarines or a return of the carriers. Raising the sunken ships would have been delayed for months. It would take months if ever to restock fuel in Hawaii given the logistics, and only if the tankers were rerouted from going to Europe. It's possible that Hawaii could have fallen a month later with little opposition. Very fortunate, we might be speaking Japanese in Hawaii today (not to mention that over half the land is owned by Japanese today).

The third wave would have seen very little opposition. Remember that virtually all the airplanes and facilities were destroyed. The few fighters that managed to take off the first time would have had a hard time refueling and reloading. Many of the ships that were fighting back originally either ran from the harbor, or were badly damaged and sinking. The army became awake, but headed for the beaches to repel a possible invasion.

The smart move by the Japanese would have been to send wave after wave until all the ordnance was expended. Then send in the escort ships to shell the islands while the carriers ran. Even if they lost the whole fleet, the damage done would have essentially taken us out of the pacific war and they would have been ahead. The carriers would have been stranded and siting ducks without fuel and resupply. Likely to then be recalled to the mainland to keep them from being lost. This could have gone really badly.


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## drewwizard (Dec 7, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> A lot of the supporters of the 3rd wave over estimate the amount of damage that could have been done. A 3rd wave would NOT have finished off _everything_ left. And even supposedly vulnerable targets were harder than made out to be.
> 
> Fuel tanks.
> View attachment 464340
> ...




The heavy crude looks to be hard to set on fire, and it is if you use a match. Incendiary bombs would have started a large fire with the spilling oil. Once the fire reached a critical size, it would have been unstoppable. It's a simple calculation of thermodynamic energy in the fuel creating very high temperatures. Once the fire gets big enough, the heat cracks the heavy fuel which feeds the fire more. Hitting the uphill tanks (or worse the one in the middle would have destroyed everything. Planes strafing the water lines from the dams would make sure there was no way to put out the fires (not that water is real effective on an oil fire, especially that size. 

No need to attack the ships. Without fuel, they are just decorations and you could return after the island was abandoned to finish things up at your leisure. We were hurt, but we could have easily been crippled. The attack was fortunately more a statement that the Japanese could do us damage. Just think of the repercussions of abandoning Europe in 1941 to protect Hawaii. Would England have fallen? Then Russia?


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