# Could the British have sent enough aircraft to Singapore to make a difference?



## Freebird (Jul 23, 2010)

Since I've been reading about the Malaya campaign, it seems that the british may had enough troops, they were just short of aircraft and perhaps a few dozen tanks. (and competent leadership  )

Could they have sent enough aircraft pilots there within 6 weeks or so?

What would be the best strategy to counter the Japanese advantages in the air?

Positions on 7 dec 1941:

2 regiments of the Japanese 18th division (23rd 56th regiments) attack at the Malaysian airfield/port of Kota Baharu.
3 regiments of the Japanese 5th division land at Singora Patani, Thailand. Two columns attack down the Singora-Jitra and the Patani-Kroh roads.

7 Dec 1941 the British in Malaya have 2 Indian divisions (9th 11th), the Australian 8th division and about 2 mixed brigades in Singapore itself. 

The Indian 11th division has the 6th brigade defending the road leading to Jitra, while the 15th defends the road through Kroh. the 28th brigade is in reserve at Ipoh. The Indian 9th division has the 8th brigade + a battalion of the 22nd defending Kota Baharu, while the remaining 2 battlaions of 22 brigade defend Kuantan. The Indian 12th Brigade is in army reserve.

Two brigades of the Australian 8th division (22nd 27th brigades) are defending Johore, the third is in Singapore



Questions:
*1.) Aircraft: * Aircraft: What aircraft could they send to Singapore within a month or so?
*2.) RAF Leadership* Was there an effective leader that could sort out the mess in Malaya?


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## michaelmaltby (Jul 24, 2010)

Doomed. 

MM


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## Colin1 (Jul 24, 2010)

British command and control in the theatre was appalling.
Terence Kelly alludes to this in his book _Spitfires and Hurricanes at War _. Aircraft lacked any form of early warning, leading to needless losses, one such example being the destruction of 4 new-in-theatre Spitfire IXs, taken out halfway along their take-off run by Japanese fighters that they didn't know were there.

I don't read up on ground offensives but I've no reason to believe the situation was any better there.

More aircraft into a FUBAR like that would likely only be reflected in more losses.


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## parsifal (Jul 24, 2010)

Singapore could have been held in my opinion, but it would have required fundamental changes in priorities that would probably lead to massive defeats in other theatres.

Drawing a ridiculously long bow, if the North African campaign could have been brought to a conclusion, by not allowing the e Greek situation to distract them, the British would have had substantial forces to divert to the theatre before the war. Something like 1500 aircraft, perhaps fifty warships, including 3 or 4 carriers, and perhaps 5 or so divs. Some of these resources would have to go to India or Burma, but substantial amounts of battle hardened troops and aircraft would have been available. Under those circumstances the whole equation changes. But the chances of that happening are very slender in my opinion. There was a bigger chance these forces would be used in the USSR than them going to the far East.....


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## buffnut453 (Jul 24, 2010)

Actually, the British didn't have sufficient ground forces to defend the Malay peninsula. One major shortfall was tanks - they had none. The Japanese made most effective use of their tanks to storm British infantry positions. Coupled with this issue was the poor quality of most of the Indian units in Malaya. The rapid expansion of the Indian Army in 1940 led to the "milking" of units - taking experienced officers, SNCOs and JNCOs from one unit and using them as a nucleus around which to build new units. Many of the Indian Army units were not well trained from a tactical perspective. One can only imagine the horror these soldiers endured when attacked by Japanese tanks, a weapon few, if any, of the Indian soliders had seen before and against which they had no defence.

More aircraft would undoubtedly have helped. The 4 squadrons of fighters in all of Malaya and Singapore simply had too many tasks to do any of them successfully: air defence of airfields and Singapore, army cooperation (tactical reconnaissance and strafing), bomber escort, air defence over convoys etc etc. Colin1 is right that lack of early warning was pivotal, as was the absence of a ground control system for directing fighters - the commanding officers of 2 of the Kallang Buffalo squadrons had to split their time between the units they were supposed to be leading and running the operations room in Air HQ. Coupled to the control issue was the inability of the command to get radios working in the fighter aircraft due to the lack of the right "crystals". Provision of ground defence for airfields in the form of AAA guns was also desperately required - in Burma, the British took to using peasant carts and positioning them to look like AAA as a deterrent which patently didn't put off the Japanese at all!

Another major shortfall was photographic reconnaissance. The Japanese had been undertaking PR missions over northern Malaya for some time prior to the conflict. The RAF in Singapore had no aircraft capable of undertaking a reciprocal mission until 2 Buffalos were locally converted for the role, but even then the tasking was rather unimaginitive. Indeed, AHQ Far East displayed a marked lack of imagination in the employment of their limited air assets. They seem to have been stuck in the 1930s in their tactical usage of aircraft - bombers were to be used to attack shipping and airfields while fighters were only useful for strafing troops on the roads. Only 2 attempts at strafing airfields with fighters were attempted, both in January 1942 and both dismal failures owing to the lack of leadership by the squadron commander tasked with the mission. This lack of tactical agility is in stark contrast to the forces defending Burma which did undertake a number of successful strafing missions, both by the AVG and RAF fighters, against Japanese-held airfields in Thailand.

The key to Singapore's survival was the success of Operation MATADOR - the occupation by British troops of forward areas in Thailand. The key location was Singora (or Songkhla as it was sometimes referred to). Denial of this major port would have considerably slowed the Japanese offensive, buying time for British reinforcements to arrive in the theater and deploy effectively rather than being committed piecemeal into the fighting.

Sorry for the long post but I hope it's of interest and generates further discussion.

Cheers,
B

P.S. Don't know where Colin1 gets the reference for Spits as they didn't start appearing in Burma until 1943 (Singapore fell on 15 Feb 42)


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## syscom3 (Jul 24, 2010)

There was also serious questions about the leadership of the generals, admirals and politicians charged with defending the empire.

They acted and thought along prewar colonial attitudes. The commonwealth troops were in a good part, defeated from the top.


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## buffnut453 (Jul 24, 2010)

The key challenge in defending the British Empire was that it was impractically large. It was hugely vulnerable to any revisionist force/power that could concentrate military force in one area. This is precisely what the Japanese were able to achieve. 

I agree many of the British military and civilian leadership had their heads in the sand. The only Army unit that was reasonably trained for the type of fighting undertaken during the Malayan Campaign were the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. Their CO was thought of as being slightly mad by his peers in Singapore but his approach was proved correct in battle.

There were also tremendous communication problems between the various military leaders in Singapore, a situation not helped by Brooke-Popham being CINC-FE but only in charge of Army and RAF personnel: the RN retained their own CINC. The problem came to a head with the planning for Force Z's sortie up the eastern Malay coast when Adm Phillips misunderstood the statement that the RAF could not provide permanent air cover over northern Malaya and took that to mean he had no air support at all for his mission.

So many mistakes, so many missed opportunities....


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## Colin1 (Jul 24, 2010)

buffnut453 said:


> Don't know where Colin1 gets the reference for Spits as they didn't start appearing in Burma until 1943 (Singapore fell on 15 Feb 42)


You are indeed correct
the Spitfire incident took place in Burma, not Singapore - my apologies.


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## davebender (Jul 24, 2010)

I agree. Fix the leadership issues and Malaya can hold without reinforcements. The same applies to American defense of the Philippines. If you fail to fix the leadership then you are just throwing additional units away.


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## Glider (Jul 24, 2010)

If the question was Could the British have sent enough aircraft to Singapore to have control of the air. The simple awnser is yes the RAF had over a dozen squadrons of Spit V's achieving nothing in the South East of England. 

Do I believe these resources would have been wasted with the leadership that was in place, Yes


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## syscom3 (Jul 24, 2010)

Glider said:


> If the question was Could the British have sent enough aircraft to Singapore to have control of the air. The simple awnser is yes the RAF had over a dozen squadrons of Spit V's achieving nothing in the South East of England.
> 
> Do I believe these resources would have been wasted with the leadership that was in place, Yes



Having the airplanes in place is one thing. Keeping them supplied is another.

They might have made things interesting for Japanese for a bit. But in the end, they too would have perished, if just from attrition.


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## buffnut453 (Jul 24, 2010)

Part of the leadership problem in Malaya/Singapore was decision paralysis. Percival thought he was up against at least 5 Japanese divisions so all along he fought a defensive campaign with no attempt to concentrate British forces and deal a telling blow to the Japanese. On the air side, as already noted, there just weren't enough aircraft to defend the area and, afer the atrocious losses in the first few days of the campaign which were largely due to the lack of early warning, the priority became air defence for reinforcement convoys and not squandering aircraft unnecessarily. 

An extra 5 squadrons of Spitfires might have made all the difference in the world if they could have gained some measure of air superiority over the IJAAF, freeing the Buffalos to undertake Army co-op tasks at which they performed very well. See Tsuji for comments about the effectiveness of RAF strafing runs by "Hurricanes" although the protagonists were actually Buffalos of 21/453 Sqn. However, the lack of early warning and the Spitfire's relatively short range would both have remained key hindrances to success of the Spit in Malaya.


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## buffnut453 (Jul 24, 2010)

davebender said:


> I agree. Fix the leadership issues and Malaya can hold without reinforcements. The same applies to American defense of the Philippines. If you fail to fix the leadership then you are just throwing additional units away.



Not sure it's quite that simple. As noted previously, most of the "British" troops were actually unseasoned Indian units which could barely do the basics - drill and fire a rifle. I still think it would have been difficult to hold Malaya without additional, more experienced ground forces. That said, more dynamic leadership might have recognised that the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were onto something and applied their training approach to all Army formations within the command. However, even that would not have solved all the issues. Malaya, being a peninsula, is very hard to defend because ultimately the flanks are open to the sea, enabling the Japanese to land forces behind the British front line and cause chaos. The only true way to save Singapore was to stop the Japanese landing in force at Singora.


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## Freebird (Jul 24, 2010)

First off, yes it would work wonders if the British had not had the greek fiasco.
But suppose we take as a starting point the last week of November, 1941.
Could the British have made adequate preparations with what they had on hand or could ship there in time?


Let's take these ideas one by one.

*1.) Aircraft: * Aircraft: What aircraft could they send to Singapore within a month or so?
It was agreed by before the war that Malaya should have ~28 squadrons (336 aircraft), but by the beginning of december there are 16 squadrons, (9 RAF, 5 RAAF, 2 NZ) with 158 aircraft in service, probably at least 1/3 of them obsolete crap.

The problem is shipping aircraft from the UK takes way too much time.
Where could they get aircraft?

1.) *Canada* - In 1941 Canada makes Hurricanes (CC F Thunder Bay), Hampdens Bolingbrokes (Fairchild), and the Harvard (a Texan). There is also the training program, which should be able to supply some pilots, although not as experienced as desired.
It would be far easier to ship them across the pacific than to send them all the way around the cape.
Were the 50 Hurricanes that arrived in Jan '42 shipped from the UK?

2.) *Australia* The problem is that there is a limited supply of aircraft, which have to be brought in from the UK. Are the Aussies building Beaufighters in 1941?
My source give only 165 RAAF aircraft in Dec 1941, including trainers those in the Solomons (excluding Malaya) 

Would the Wirraways/Harvards have been any use against the Japanese?
Could Australia afford to send aircraft or pilots to malaya?

*Middle East/ India* the only other way to get aircraft would be from ME or India command. Could the ME afford to lose any fighters? 
I can't seem to find if there were any Hurri or Buffalo fighter squadrons in India/Persia that could be sent tp Malaya as a stopgap measure. Does anyone have this info?


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## buffnut453 (Jul 24, 2010)

Freebird,

The only Buffalo squadron not engaged in the defence of Malaya and Singapore was 67 Sqn which was based at Mingaladon, Burma. 805 Sqn FAA had a few in North Africa but they were ex-Belgian airframes and hence differed slightly from the RAF Buffalos in the Far East.

Australia had only just started manufacture of Beauforts - the Beaufighter would not arrive for some time. 

Wirraways were used in Malaya - 6 of them were retained and converted for use as ad hoc "dive bombers". 

Probably the best way to get additional aircraft to the Far East would be the redeployment of Spitfire or Hurricane units from the UK or other theatres. Resupply might have been problemmatic but sending twice as many aircraft as were needed by a squadron would provide a starting point for war reserves.

Cheers,
Mark


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## davebender (Jul 24, 2010)

That cuts both ways. Japan did not have all that many aircraft during December 1941. Nothing at all like what Germany had to face from 1943 onward in places like Tunisia, Sicily and Salerno. Furthermore airpower is inheritly less effective in the jungle. Well trained and led British troops could have simply shrugged off the Japanese air raids just as German soldiers did.


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## parsifal (Jul 24, 2010)

Australia was not manufacturing Beaus until much later in the war. DAP rolled out its first Beaforts just prior to the outbreak of hostilities. It had substantial orders with the US, but only some Hudsons (and of course the Buffalo) had been delivered by the outbreak of hostilities.

The RAAF had accepted the appraisal that the Buffalo was sufficient to deal with the Japanese fighters. The intell being received was attrocious, and the assessments were coloured by white supremacist claptrap. The Buffalo was not deployed in sufficient numbers, though it was not that heavily outnumbered anyway. There have been raging debates about that, but I remain totally unconvinced about how badly the RAF was outnumbered. it was outnumbered, but not hopelessly so. The odds wereprobably longer over Britain in 1940, just to put it into perspective.

What was missing was numbers, AND quality. And there were no local sources of supply, and no real overseas sources for aircraft supply. Even more telling however, was the lack of experience (though ther were some very notable exceptions to that, such as some of the Australian squadrons) , this applied to both the air and ground forces being committed. Australian formations were better trained than the Indians, but they cracked too when faced with the battlehardened Japanese formations (both air and ground). The conduct of the air battle is more obscure, but no better handled at a staff level than the ground war

Whats needed was a wholsesale transfer of forces from another theatre. Since shipping was in short supply, these formations would have to come from the only active theatre then in play....the med. A wholsesale redeployment to the far east probably means abandonment of Malta, and probably Tobruk, and the transfer of at least 200 aircraft with seasoned crews. If the ANZAC formations are withdrawn, there are probably 5 divs (6, 7 9 Aus, 2 NZ and 18 Br Divs) and the approximately eight RAAF squadrons deployed into that theatre (along with the NZ air assets as well). The air formations had fought with distinction in the Levant and over the western desert, were thoroughly trained and tested, and flying aircraft better than the equipment in the far east (tomahawks for the most part). The capabilities of the 9th Aus and 2 NZ could have matched anything the Japanese had thrown at them in Malaya, and the 7th was to prove its mettle at Kokoda. The 6th had been defeated at crete, but its experiences there would still be useful in the malayan context (the similarities in the type of battle are striking to be honest)


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## Colin1 (Jul 24, 2010)

I don't think manufacture and supply was the principal problem

As per the piece I submitted in Polls: A6M2 vs Hurricane II

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/polls/hurricane-mk-iic-vs-a6m2-zero-18853-3.html#post696640

the problem lay with how the aerial assets were implemented once in-theatre. There was never an instance where even most of the Hurricane contingent was serviceable, the best that could be achieved was around a dozen, although frequently less.

There was no attempt to withold the Hurricanes from action until a sizeable force of serviceable aircraft could be built up. Consequently, a coherent plan for a properly planned defence could not be devised. Aircraft that were serviceable were often damaged staging through refuelling strips that were gouged by heavier aircraft. Knee-jerk command decisions simply put aircraft into the air as soon as they were flyable, and finally, early warning for the incoming raids was non-existent.

Small, ineffectual (wrt the sizes of the formations that they invariably faced) pockets of fighters were almost always flown off too late against an enemy who was waiting for them.


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## Wildcat (Jul 24, 2010)

freebird said:


> 2.) *Australia* The problem is that there is a limited supply of aircraft, which have to be brought in from the UK. Are the Aussies building Beaufighters in 1941?
> My source give only 165 RAAF aircraft in Dec 1941, including trainers those in the Solomons (excluding Malaya)
> 
> Would the Wirraways/Harvards have been any use against the Japanese?
> Could Australia afford to send aircraft or pilots to malaya?



The RAAF was in no way capable of supplying more aircraft and aircrew to Malaya, in fact at the outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific, Australia did not possess one dedicated fighter squadron to defend the Australian mainland. The RAAF's most capable aircraft in this period would have been the Hudson, even then we didn't have enough and they were spread thin all over the place - 2 sqn's at Malaya/Singapore, 2 sqn's in the NEI's and a single flight at Rabaul. All these units took severe losses at the hands of Japanese fighters. The Wirraway was outclassed as a fighter - just look at what happened to 24 sqn at Rabaul. Even in large numbers, Wirraways simply wouldn't survive in Malaya against Japanese air superiority.
As Parsifal mentioned, Beauforts were just beginning to come off the production lines at DAP, in fact the handful that were sent to Singapore were quickly rejected as not combat ready and were sent back to Australia. Off the top of my head one or two of these aircraft stayed to be used in the unarmed reconnaissance role.


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## Freebird (Jul 24, 2010)

Wildcat said:


> The RAAF was in no way capable of supplying more aircraft and aircrew to Malaya,



That's what I figured.
Did they have enough pilots?
Could they send 40 - 60 pilots, assuming that aircraft could be found?



parsifal said:


> Whats needed was a wholsesale transfer of forces from another theatre. Since shipping was in short supply, these formations would have to come from the only active theatre then in play....the med. A wholsesale redeployment to the far east probably means abandonment of Malta, and probably Tobruk, and the transfer of at least 200 aircraft with seasoned crews.



Well according to British doctrine, the Med was more important than the CBI, so assume that you can't strip out the assets without replacement. 



Colin1 said:


> the problem lay with how the aerial assets were implemented once in-theatre. There was never an instance where even most of the Hurricane contingent was serviceable, the best that could be achieved was around a dozen, although frequently less.
> 
> There was no attempt to withold the Hurricanes from action until a sizeable force of serviceable aircraft could be built up. Consequently, a coherent plan for a properly planned defence could not be devised. Aircraft that were serviceable were often damaged staging through refuelling strips that were gouged by heavier aircraft. Knee-jerk command decisions simply put aircraft into the air as soon as they were flyable, and finally, early warning for the incoming raids was non-existent.
> 
> Small, ineffectual (wrt the sizes of the formations that they invariably faced) pockets of fighters were almost always flown off too late against an enemy who was waiting for them.



Agreed.
OK, question 2 first. 
*2.)* *RAF Leadership*

It should have been obvious in the fall of '41 that war was coming to Malaya, and that the RAF command there was woefully inadequate.
So, in the second half of November, who would you send to replace Brook-Popham?
I would think Keith Park, but he's needed in Malta.
Perhaps the best candidate would be Hugh Dowding, who in 1941 is in the US on an RAF mission.


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## buffnut453 (Jul 24, 2010)

davebender said:


> That cuts both ways. Japan did not have all that many aircraft during December 1941. Nothing at all like what Germany had to face from 1943 onward in places like Tunisia, Sicily and Salerno. Furthermore airpower is inheritly less effective in the jungle. Well trained and led British troops could have simply shrugged off the Japanese air raids just as German soldiers did.



Colin,

You're quite right. According to the Japanese Monograph dealing with the air campaign for Malaya and Singapore, the IJAAF never managed to replace losses so any substantive extension to the duration of the campaign would have been presented huge problems for the IJAAF.

Cheers
B


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## buffnut453 (Jul 24, 2010)

freebird said:


> So, in the second half of November, who would you send to replace Brook-Popham?



Problem is the second half of November is too late to influence anything. If the Army and RAF has not been training for realistic missions for several months, appointing a new commander isn't going to make a difference. What was needed was an earlier acceptance that the forces assigned to Malaya were inadequate and the relocation of additional RAF and Army units in mid-41 to enable acclimatisation and working up of appropriate tactics. Of course, nobody in their right mind would redeploy forces from existing combat zones to reinforce an area which, at that time, was not under attack.


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## buffnut453 (Jul 24, 2010)

parsifal said:


> The intell being received was attrocious, and the assessments were coloured by white supremacist claptrap.



Parsifal,

Can you please specify what intelligence was atrocious? Was it all bad? Also, can you cite sources please?

Many thanks,
Mark


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## parsifal (Jul 24, 2010)

Main source is "The Pacific War" by Joh Costello, London 1981, various extracts, but most relevantly pages 103-107, where he deals in some detail with the British preprations to defend Singapore. Similar comments and reports received by the predecessor to Brook Peopham (I believe his name was Dobbie), where it was argued that airpower was a cheaper and surer way of protecting the port than battleships and ground troops. Brooke Popham on his arrival read a report by the recently arrived navala attache from Tokyo, that assessed Japanese airpower capabilities. I believe this mans name was Bond (not James incidentally), who was instructewd by Popham not to overrate the capabilities of the Japanese air force. In other words the report was doctored from the start for political reasons. 

On the basis of this doctored repport, Popham declared Japanese aviators were hopeless, short sighted and their best equipment was about the standard of the A4. He declared " Let England have the Spitfire and the Hurricane" ....Buffaloers are3 quite good enough to defend Malaya"....

Costello also seems to be relying on the book "Great Britain and the Origins Of the Pacific War", by Lowe P (Oxford 1977) in making those claims. He ,akes similar statements, and is mentioned in Costellos bibliography

There are other sources that make very similar claims about British utter misreading of Japanese capabilities, and the abilities of the Buffalo in particular to being and adequate type on which to base the malayan defence 

Ther are also pertinent comments by Parnell and Lynch in their 1 volume history of the RAAF and even the venerable Eddie Bauer makes some refernces to these assessments


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## LDSModeller (Jul 24, 2010)

488 Squadron recieved 9 Mk II Hurricanes
to replace it's destroyed Buffaloes.
The Hurricanes did not even receive squadron codes. On Jan 27 1942, out of the nine, 2
were destroyed on the ground at Kallang and 7 badly damaged all within
a days of receipt during a Japanese bombing raid.

One thing that perhaps needs to be said here, is that Singapore was destined
to be lost, not withstanding the Pukka Sahib mentality of the British Ruling class 
(Civilian/Military) and the brave fighting by British/Commonwealth servicemen/women
(notably Highlanders, gave the Japanese troops, looking to cross the causeway, a very
bloody nose).

Comments by Fl Lt John "Hutch" Hutcheson B flight commander 488 Squadron Kallang-Singapore
might help bring things into perspective.

Quote
"many people have laid the blame for loss of Malaya/East Indies on Britain. This is not just....

Great Britain had been through Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain, and a heavy reverse in the
Middle East. All the men and equipment lost had to be made good.

....... the amount of lend lease equipment being made available to Britain
was of no account. Much of this equipment was obsolete and only accepetd to keep
faith with the American manufacturers after the fall of France.
I myself saw cases and cases of American aircraft that were destined to remain
crated. They were of no operational use and past their day. Britain had to supply all needed
equipment or a very big proportion of it. She had to re-arm herself against posible German
attack and re-equip the Middle East forces.

Imagine how badly off we would have been if we had lost the Middle East instead of Malaya.

Possibly if we had diverted sufficient equipment to Malaya to hold it, the Japanese would not have
attacked, which would mean that the entry of America at that stage anyway would have been
very problematical.

To make Singapore strong enough to make it obvious to the Japanese that it would be a very tough nut, 
would have required equipment and men intended for the Middle East should be diverted with a consequent
weakening of Egypt and the whole Middle East.

Remember also that the war was very real in the Middle East, but only a threat as far as the Far East was
concerned.

There was always the chance that it might be avioded.

Sir Robert Brooke-Popham has often been criticised because he said that Singapore could withstand any assault.
What else could he say? Come and attack us Japan? We could only offer feeble resistance. certainly it
was a bluff, but he had no choice.

Still this is not a political arguement. It is the Story of Singapore as I a fighter pilot saw it. ......."
End quote: 
From Last Stand Singapore-The Story of 499 Squadron RNZAF (by Graham Clayton)

Obviously for the Armed Forces and civilians interned by the Japanese they felt betrayed, and some who
escaped were counted as cowards for not surrendering to the Japanese.

Sorry for the long dialogue but hopefully it will help in the discusion

Regards

Alan


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## buffnut453 (Jul 24, 2010)

I haven't read Costello - must check that one out. I think we need to be careful about linking Brooke-Popham's public statements to what he truly believed. His "Hyper Hurricanes...Buffalos are good enough for Singapore" comment was made during a question-answer session with journalists. B-P could hardly have gone into such a setting stating "Well, I think the Buffalo is a crock and we're going to get massacred if the Japanese attack us." 

The comment about using aircraft to defend Malaya because they're cheaper than troops or battleships was entirely in-line with concepts of policing the Empire between the wars. The thinking was that aircraft were more easily redeployed and hence could meet threats in different locations more rapidly than other forms of military force. Modern doctrine refers to the "ubiquity of air power" which is, in a sense, what was being sought by this policy. Such an approach was fine so long as the main opponent was outside attacking range but as soon as Japanese forces moved into French Indo-China in mid-41, the holes in the Malaya defence strategy became woefully apparent.

Finally, my personal research into FECB indicates that they actually had a pretty good handle on the capabilities of Japanese aircraft. This is based on accessing original documents at the National Archives in Kew, as well as the British Library and Imperial War Museum. The key shortfall seems to have been the means of presenting this information to the aircrew because none of the fighter in Far East Command had intelligence officers on-staff.

Cheers,
Mark


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## Freebird (Jul 25, 2010)

buffnut453 said:


> Problem is the second half of November is too late to influence anything. If the Army and RAF has not been training for realistic missions for several months, appointing a new commander isn't going to make a difference. What was needed was an earlier acceptance that the forces assigned to Malaya were inadequate and the relocation of additional RAF and Army units in mid-41 to enable acclimatisation and working up of appropriate tactics. Of course, nobody in their right mind would redeploy forces from existing combat zones to reinforce an area which, at that time, was not under attack.



Yes, I havn't given you much, have I? 

As you correctly point out, there's not really much that can be done earlier (regarding aircraft). 
From the Fall of France -> Nov 1940 Britain's #1 concern was the threat of invasion.
> Nov 1940 Greco-Italian war, Britain sends aircraft to Lemnos Crete. Also building up DAF for "Compass"
>Feb - April 1941 Britain is sending troops aircraft to Egypt dealing with Rommel's offensive in the desert.
> Mar -> May sending troops aircraft to Greece, then defending Greece Crete.
>Jun -> Dec 1941 sending urgently needed aircraft supplies to the Soviets.

There wasn't really any respite where they could deal with the situation in Malaya.
Not until matters become critical in Nov could the high command turn it's attention to Malaya.

Well, I'll be generous, I'll give you from the beginning of Nov.  That's 5 weeks. Suppose that you were put in charge, what would you do about the air forces in Malaya?
Assuming that the Med can't be weakened either.
(I'll post a different thread about the ground situation)


OK, about aircraft.
The British did see the need for more aircraft, they just ran out of time to send them. 

There was also a window of oppertunity to assemble proper air defence for Singapore, if it was done quickly. There was a Japanese air raid the first day of the conflict, but there were no major air raids on Singapore again until Dec 30, however it became almost daily after that.
The best option is to get aircraft from the US if possible, rather than stripping existing aircraft already in other theaters. In the fall of 1941, the US is making at least 200 P-40's per month (D E), 200 P-39's, ~150 P-38's, had just started production of the P-51A, and were about to start production of the P-47.

In fact the British have several hundred aircraft in the US (bought or L-L) including the P-40D and the P-39D's which were considered unsuitable for combat in the ETO.

Suppose instead of crating these aircraft up to spend weeks or months on a ship bound for Africa, the British ask Roosevelt to send the P-40's to Hawaii on a US aircraft carrier, to takeoff a few hundred miles south of Hawaii. (similar to the Malta fly-offs)
From a position about 350 miles south of Hawaii, they could fly to the US Navy airfield on Palmyra Island, then across the South Pacific via Kiribati, Samoa, Fiji, N. Caledonia to Australia. This tactic had already been used to send aircraft to Egypt and to the Soviets across Africa via the Takoradi Air Route

By Dec 7 1941, the US has already completed the airfields on Fanning island Kanton Island, but are still building the one on Penrhyn Island.
All of these flights are also within the P-40's 900 mile range (w/drop tanks) although the Fanning to Kanton leg is at the maximum range.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 25, 2010)

Some of the Aircraft for the Flying Tigers were flown in from across Africa, the Middle East and India. 
The problems with these long distance ferry flights are many, and long over water flights with single engine aircraft just add to the navigation problems. 
Planes arrive needing a fair amount of maintenance.
Delivery's get strung out as planes experience maintenance issues along the way. A bad magneto, fouled plugs or even a blown fuse can delay a particular plane for several days. I have read an account of an American pilot whose Unit (equipped with rather tired P-40s from a training unit) was redeployed from California to the east coast right after Pearl Harbor. While most of his unit made it fairly quickly they wrote off at least one plane and it took him (by far the worst performance of the unit) 15 days to make it across the US due to mechanical malfunctions and weather. 
While this is still much quicker than crating the planes and sending by ship through the Panama Canal it does point out that long range multi hop ferry flights were nowhere near as routine as they seem today.
You also have a logistics problem, each P-40 is going to need roughly 200 gallons of fuel for each stop. For 50 planes that is 10,000 gals (or 30 tons) per airfield on the route. While some Airfields may have enough fuel others are going to need it brought in. By ship means lots of pre-planning, by air means lots of transport flights which might not be readily available in the fall/Winter of 1941/42. You are probably going to need a twin engine plane (Lockheed Hudson, or C-47, Blenheim?) to act as a navigator for every 4-6 fighters.

Could it be done? yes.
Was it done? yes.
But not at a few days notice. 
It took planning, preparation and logistics.


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## davebender (Jul 25, 2010)

Here is a better source. It has the complete Japanese OOB for December 1941.
Pacific Theater, Order of Battle, 8/7.12.1941

*Japanese 25th Army* (i.e. tasked to invade Malaya)
25th Army, Southern Expeditionary Army, Imperial Japanese Army, 8.12.1941
5th Infantry Division.
18th Infantry Divsion.
56th Infantry Division.
Guards Infantry Division.
3rd Armored Brigade. 216 light tanks total.

*Japanese 3rd Army Air Force Division* (i.e. S.E. Asia. They supported the Malaya operation).
3rd Army Air Force Division, Imperial Japanese Army, 8.12.1941
35 x modern Ki-43 fighter aircraft. Plus a bunch of antiques like the Ki-27.

*IJN 22nd Naval Air Flotilla.* Based in South Vietnam.
22nd Naval Air Flotilla, 11th Air Fleet, Imperial Japanese Navy, 7.12.1941
132 modern G3M and G4M medium bombers. These aircraft sank TF Z.
25 x modern A6M2 long range escort fighters.

All told Japan had only about 200 modern combat aircraft committed to the Malaya operation. Compared to several thousand modern British and American aircraft in the Mediterranean during 1943. Japanese aircraft (and ground forces) committed to the Philippines were much smaller. 

I find it difficult to believe that a couple hundred Japanese aircraft made a decisive difference. British forces in Malaya were defeated on the ground by a smaller number of invading Japanese troops who had superior training and leadership. The same goes for the American defeat in the Philippines.


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## dennis420b (Jul 25, 2010)

well a longer defense would have, needed resupply, that would require that Navy to get involved, there would have been a showdown between opposing navy's, and given the situation, i give it to the Japanese, so i say doomed.


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## buffnut453 (Jul 25, 2010)

Davebender,

I don't know the source for your IJAAF ORBAT data but, according to Japanese sources, the following fighter units and strengths were available:

59 x Ki-43 of the 64th and 59th Sentai
108 x Ki-27 of the 1st, 11th and 77th Sentai

All these fighters were concentrated on Phu Quoq Island or on the airfields on the French Indochina mainland nearby. 

Kind regards,
Mark


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## buffnut453 (Jul 25, 2010)

dennis420b said:


> well a longer defense would have, needed resupply, that would require that Navy to get involved, there would have been a showdown between opposing navy's, and given the situation, i give it to the Japanese, so i say doomed.



We can what-if 'til the cows come home on this one. I tend to agree that longer defence would have required additional resupply but, again, that cuts both ways. The Japanese were stretched very thin logistically. A longer campaign would have hurt the Japanese as much, if not more, than the British. Even with a major Naval victory, the Japanese would have had to land sufficient forces and supplies in Thailand to maintain operational and tactical momentum. Singora was the key to Japan's attack. Without it, Yamashita would have faced a much longer over-land invasion from Indochina through Thailand during the height of the Northwest Monsoon when most roads in the region (except those nice metalled roads in Malaya) turned to quagmires.


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## davebender (Jul 25, 2010)

Do you have historical data to support this claim?

Japanese forces which invaded Malaya were short on ammunition and other such consumable supplies. I suspect the British defenders were better supplied then the Japanese invaders.


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## buffnut453 (Jul 25, 2010)

davebender said:


> Do you have historical data to support this claim?
> 
> Japanese forces which invaded Malaya were short on ammunition and other such consumable supplies. I suspect the British defenders were better supplied then the Japanese invaders.



Sorry Dave but who's your question addressed to? Dennis, me or someone else? Just wondering...


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## Freebird (Jul 25, 2010)

dennis420b said:


> well a longer defense would have, needed resupply, that would require that Navy to get involved, there would have been a showdown between opposing navy's, and given the situation, i give it to the Japanese, so i say doomed.



OK, I've edited the original post a bit, so let's confine this discussion to the Malaya/Singapore/DEI air campaign. I'll post a separate thread about the ground war so that we don't get mixed up. 8)



buffnut453 said:


> Davebender,
> 
> I don't know the source for your IJAAF ORBAT data but, according to Japanese sources, the following fighter units and strengths were available:
> 
> ...



That's closer to what I've seen.
Falk gives a figure of 600 Japanese aircraft used in Malaya/Singapore, including those sent during the campaign as reinforcements, and presumably including non combat patrol recce units.


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## renrich (Jul 25, 2010)

dennis touched on this but how are the British to get the aircraft to Malaya and keep them supplied with gasoline, etc. when they don't have control of the sea. The US faced the same problem in the PI. The Japanese controlled the sea in that part of the world, just as Britain did the English Channel and practically speaking, the Allies could not wrest control of the sea from the IJN. A little later, the US kept pumping airplanes into the battle in SE Asia, (Java, Sumatra) and all they did was lose the airplanes.


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## buffnut453 (Jul 25, 2010)

renrich said:


> dennis touched on this but how are the British to get the aircraft to Malaya and keep them supplied with gasoline, etc. when they don't have control of the sea. The US faced the same problem in the PI. The Japanese controlled the sea in that part of the world, just as Britain did the English Channel and practically speaking, the Allies could not wrest control of the sea from the IJN. A little later, the US kept pumping airplanes into the battle in SE Asia, (Java, Sumatra) and all they did was lose the airplanes.



That was the purpose behind the string of airfields through Burma. The idea was to stage aircraft from India through Burma to Malaya. Again, resupply convoys continued to reach Singapore unopposed through a fair proportion of January 1942 - and that was after the Force Z debacle. I have no doubt that the Japanese would have struggled to disrupt British supplies if Singora had been held by British/Thai forces in Dec 41.


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## LDSModeller (Jul 25, 2010)

davebender said:


> Do you have historical data to support this claim?
> 
> Japanese forces which invaded Malaya were short on ammunition and other such consumable supplies. I suspect the British defenders were better supplied then the Japanese invaders.



One of the things which helped the Japanese was the fact that British/Commonweatlh
personel vacated their bases without destroying fuel/ammunition/food supplies.

All the Japanese had to do was move in and use them -Japanese referred to them
thereafter as Churchill Supplies.

This fact really peeved off the more southern island defenders knowing that
Japanese aircraft shooting/bombing them, were using their own fuel and ammo
against them

(from Last Stand Singapore- Graham Clayton (his father served witth 488 Sqn at Kallang)


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## renrich (Jul 25, 2010)

Nevertheless, the IJN had sea control, and they did cut off convoys to Malaya just as they did to Sumatra and Java. They also caught and sank many ships trying to evacuate those areas. In the long run, after losing sea control the Aliess were doomed in the PI, Malaya and the Indies.


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## buffnut453 (Jul 25, 2010)

Renrich,

We need to be a tad careful here. If the Japanese invasion of Singora had failed, then there would have been no need for Force Z to sail north in early Dec 41. Thus your statement that the Japanese would have had complete control of the sea must be questioned.

With intact airfields in northern Malaya still occupied by the RAF, and a complete string of reinforcement airfields running back through Burma to India, it's pretty reasonable to assume that supplies could have arrived in Singapore right through Jan 42 if not further into that year. 

Cheers,
Mark


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## Freebird (Jul 25, 2010)

LDSModeller said:


> One of the things which helped the Japanese was the fact that British/Commonweatlh
> personel vacated their bases without destroying fuel/ammunition/food supplies.
> )



Indeed, and a good portion of that was the inexperience of the defending troops, breakdowns in communication led to many of these, Bde/Div HQ's didn't inform airbases of impending withdrawl timetable, bridges not blown due to comm breakdown etc.



buffnut453 said:


> That was the purpose behind the string of airfields through Burma. The idea was to stage aircraft from India through Burma to Malaya. Again, resupply convoys continued to reach Singapore unopposed through a fair proportion of January 1942 - and that was after the Force Z debacle. I have no doubt that the Japanese would have struggled to disrupt British supplies if Singora had been held by British/Thai forces in Dec 41.



Even if the RAF lose the northern airbases the Japanese have some difficulties with controlling approaches to Singapore, as they are still 300 miles away. There is a large gap between the 8 northern airbases and Singapore, with only 2 near Kuala Lumpur and Kuantan in the middle.


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## dennis420b (Jul 25, 2010)

With some radar and better command and control than yes, you may even be able to get some bombers in there then and become a large thorn in the side of the IJN. But the fog of war is a difficult obstacle to overcome, and we have the benefit of hind sight, and I still think that the outcome would be the same, as the Japanese would have just applied more pressure to the area.


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## davebender (Jul 25, 2010)

> In the long run, after losing sea control the Aliess were doomed in the PI, Malaya and the Indies.


WWI Germany lost sea control on 4 August 1914. None the less, Lettow-Vorbeck and his tiny Schultztruppen force retained control over German East Africa for more then 18 months against odds many times worse then what Britain faced in 1941 Malaya. That's the difference good training and leadership provide.

If Malaya and/or the Philippines hold out largely intact I've got to assume the invasion of French North Africa and publicity stunts like the Doolittle Raid would be cancelled. Instead virtually the entire USN (less some ASW assets) plus a generous slice of the RN would show up before the end of 1942. The American and British public would demand such action.


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## buffnut453 (Jul 25, 2010)

dennis420b said:


> With some radar and better command and control than yes, you may even be able to get some bombers in there then and become a large thorn in the side of the IJN. But the fog of war is a difficult obstacle to overcome, and we have the benefit of hind sight, and I still think that the outcome would be the same, as the Japanese would have just applied more pressure to the area.



Maybe so, Dennis, but any additional pressure applied by the Japanese could only be done at the expense of other activities. The NEI could not have been taken before the capture of Singapore but Japan took a huge gamble, and greatly overstretched herself, in seeking to take on the Phillipines, Pearl Harbor and Malaya simultaneously. Time was the key issue. Yamashita needed a quick victory because he knew he lacked the resources to sustain pressure. Conversely, the British needed more time to build up resources. I firmly believe that a longer campaign would have been extremely damaging to Japan, potentially fatal.


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## parsifal (Jul 26, 2010)

with regard to the Japanese air units deployed into Indochina, it should be noted that from December 23, some of the formations (roughly half in fact) began redeployment to western Thailand, in prepration for the attck into Burma. Also the Ki-43s arriving as replacements for the Ki-27s were not reinforcements, they were replacements, as some of the formations in the air fleet attacking Malaya were re-equipping with the oscars, not expanding their formations. One other thing, Navy bombers were not escorted by army fighters, or vice versa. In fact the long range escorts and fighter sweeps were the express responsibility of the Yamada Detachment with 25 Zeroes on strength. Until well into the second week all except one of the army sentais were primarily the defending the beacheads at pattani.

The Jap[anese forces in Malaya were very stretched, and had to make up by quality what they lacked in numbers


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## buffnut453 (Jul 26, 2010)

parsifal said:


> with regard to the Japanese air units deployed into Indochina, it should be noted that from December 23, some of the formations (roughly half in fact) began redeployment to western Thailand, in prepration for the attck into Burma. Also the Ki-43s arriving as replacements for the Ki-27s were not reinforcements, they were replacements, as some of the formations in the air fleet attacking Malaya were re-equipping with the oscars, not expanding their formations. One other thing, Navy bombers were not escorted by army fighters, or vice versa. In fact the long range escorts and fighter sweeps were the express responsibility of the Yamada Detachment with 25 Zeroes on strength. Until well into the second week all except one of the army sentais were primarily the defending the beacheads at pattani.
> 
> The Jap[anese forces in Malaya were very stretched, and had to make up by quality what they lacked in numbers



Parsifal,

I'd love to know where you get your information. The units and numbers I have quoted were deployed before 7 Dec. None of the Ki-27 units re-equipped with Ki-43s during the battle - all the Ki-43s were amassed in the 64th and 59th Sentai but reinforcements to replace losses in those units were still problemmatic. 

Please, please read "Bloody Shambles" and "Japanese Army Air Force Fighter Aces and Their Units, 1931-1945" by Hata Ikuhiko, Izawa Yasuho and Chris Shores. The 1st and 11th Sentai commenced operations from Singora Airfield on 8 Dec and the airfield was used as a staging post by Ki-43s the following day for further raids against RAF airfields (on 8 Dec, the Ki-43s had escorted Army bombers for the initial wave of attacks against Sungei Patani and other RAF airfields in the north). The Army had responsibility for air defence over the Army invasion forces, primarily using Ki-27s for that role) and the Ki-43s had the express role of achieving air superiority over Northern Malaya. 

According to "Bloody Shambles", apart from one possible engagement with a Hudson on 8 Dec, 22nd Air Flotilla A6Ms weren't encounted by the RAF until after they moved to Kota Bharu on 26 Dec (in other words, it seems reality is the exact opposite of your statement), with the first engagements involving RAF aircraft occurring in mid-Jan 42.

Kind regards,
Mark


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## timshatz (Jul 26, 2010)

Other people have already said it but I'll toss a few lines in, just for the hell of it. 

Singapore was Doomed (MM) but could've been held if the priorities had changed (Parsifal), those changes would've required losses in other theatres that would've been far more severe than the loss of Singapore. The loss of Singapore was an emotional shock to the British Empire, but it was not an economic or strategic shock. Singapore showed the Asians that the British could be beaten by other Asians. However, the supplies that came from there could be replaced from other locations.

Singapore was a backwater where generally second rate officers ended their careers. The day started at 7:30am and ended at Noon because it was too hot to work. The equipment was second rate, the training was generally inferior. It was an Empire outpost, not a bastion it was portrayed to be. 

Lastly, WW2 showed that while Airpower could not win a campaign, you could lose a campaign without it. So, British Airpower was second rate at Singapore and the Japanese trashed it (by a combination of Air and Ground attack, Japanese agressiveness and British incompetence). But even if the British had first rate airpower, they still would've lost Singapore. First rate aircraft flown by generally good but inexperienced pilots, with second rate (or third rate) leadership and an Army that wasn't ready to fight anyone ready to fight back effectively would've led to the same loss the British ended up with. Maybe with more losses to the Japanese, maybe a slightly longer campaign, but the same result in the end.


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## syscom3 (Jul 26, 2010)

Dont forget that even if Singapore held out, the Japanese still had their eyes on their prize .... the oil fields of the NEI, of which Sumatra was included.

The Japanese would have eventually enveloped Singapore from the west and shut down the adjacent sealanes.

Its fate would have been the same as Corregidore.


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## buffnut453 (Jul 26, 2010)

But the whole purpose behind attacking Malaya and Singapore was to get to the Dutch East Indies. The Japanese didn't want their flanks exposed by attacking the DEI without first subduing Singapore which offered airfields, coastal defences etc. there were inherent risks in taking the DEI because the Japanese forces could have been cut off from resupply. Again, if the British could have prevented Japanese domination of Thailand, there would have been ample opportunity for resupply via sea and by aircraft staging through Burma. Japan was reassigning units between the Phillipines, Malaya, Burma and the DEI in order to complete their objectives. Interrupt that process of reallocation and the entire Japanese offensive would have bogged down completely. The simply didn't have the forces to sustain pressure for the long haul - ie more than 3-4 months at most.


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## syscom3 (Jul 26, 2010)

buffnut453 said:


> But the whole purpose behind attacking Malaya and Singapore was to get to the Dutch East Indies. The Japanese didn't want their flanks exposed by attacking the DEI without first subduing Singapore which offered airfields, coastal defences etc. there were inherent risks in taking the DEI because the Japanese forces could have been cut off from resupply. Again, if the British could have prevented Japanese domination of Thailand, there would have been ample opportunity for resupply via sea and by aircraft staging through Burma. Japan was reassigning units between the Phillipines, Malaya, Burma and the DEI in order to complete their objectives. Interrupt that process of reallocation and the entire Japanese offensive would have bogged down completely. The simply didn't have the forces to sustain pressure for the long haul - ie more than 3-4 months at most.



The Japanese would have moved northwards from Java up the length of Sumatra.

Just because Singapore holds out, doesnt mean the PI does. And then its pretty much a simple jump from Borneo, to Java, then to Sumatra. Sort of like what happened historically.


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## buffnut453 (Jul 26, 2010)

syscom3 said:


> The Japanese would have moved northwards from Java up the length of Sumatra.
> 
> Just because Singapore holds out, doesnt mean the PI does. And then its pretty much a simple jump from Borneo, to Java, then to Sumatra. Sor tof like what happened historically.



Yes, but that would still leave British-held Malaya and Singapore between DEI and the rest of Japanese forces.


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## timshatz (Jul 26, 2010)

buffnut453 said:


> Yes, but that would still leave British-held Malaya and Singapore between DEI and the rest of Japanese forces.



Which brings up an interesting point. 

Whereas the Allies and, especially the US, could island hop, neutralizing Japanese bases and moving closer to Japan, could the Japanese do the same thing?

My belief is they could not. For two reasons, one, the reason why the US could island hop is it was the strategically stronger of the Japanese/US war. The Japanese had to hold all the turf the us could possible take whereas the US could go where it wanted to because it could bring more power to any point it chose to attack, especially in the later part of the war. 

Secondly, the US did not need the Territory it bypassed or attacked from a economic standpoint. The US could and did fight the war with little (possible, any) raw supply from the Pacific. The Japanese did not have that luxury as they need almost all the raw materials required for their war machine from the territories they counqured. As a consequence, having an Allied base in their rear, even a supressed one, gave the oposition the option of attacking lines of communication. What was a supressed base could turn into a position to jump off from in an strategic counterattack/advance.


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## Freebird (Jul 26, 2010)

timshatz said:


> Other people have already said it but I'll toss a few lines in, just for the hell of it.
> 
> Singapore was Doomed (MM) but could've been held if the priorities had changed (Parsifal), those changes would've required losses in other theatres that would've been far more severe than the loss of Singapore. The loss of Singapore was an emotional shock to the British Empire, but it was not an economic or strategic shock.
> Lastly, WW2 showed that while Airpower could not win a campaign, you could lose a campaign without it. So, British Airpower was second rate at Singapore and the Japanese trashed it (by a combination of Air and Ground attack, Japanese agressiveness and British incompetence). But even if the British had first rate airpower, they still would've lost Singapore. First rate aircraft flown by generally good but inexperienced pilots, with second rate (or third rate) leadership and an Army that wasn't ready to fight anyone ready to fight back effectively would've led to the same loss the British ended up with. Maybe with more losses to the Japanese, maybe a slightly longer campaign, but the same result in the end.



I disagree with your conclusion, the "army" of the British Aussie units were able to fight the Japanese, but the Indian troops that were facing the japanes for the first 6 weeks were unmotivated inexperienced. With more effective resistance the campaign could have been much different



syscom3 said:


> Dont forget that even if Singapore held out, the Japanese still had their eyes on their prize .... the oil fields of the NEI, of which Sumatra was included.
> 
> The Japanese would have eventually enveloped Singapore from the west and shut down the adjacent sealanes.
> .






buffnut453 said:


> But the whole purpose behind attacking Malaya and Singapore was to get to the Dutch East Indies. The Japanese didn't want their flanks exposed by attacking the DEI without first subduing Singapore which offered airfields, coastal defences etc. there were inherent risks in taking the DEI because the Japanese forces could have been cut off from resupply. Again, if the British could have prevented Japanese domination of Thailand, there would have been ample opportunity for resupply via sea and by aircraft staging through Burma. Japan was reassigning units between the Phillipines, Malaya, Burma and the DEI in order to complete their objectives.



Agreed. If the British are able to give a solid resistance to the Japanese in Malaya it would prevent attacks on other more distant targets. 

Let's review the timeline here:
Western Forces
8 Dec Japan invades Malaya
There are 3 CW divisions in Malaya in the first 6 weeks, + a few other brigades.

the 11th Indian is basically destroyed by the attacks of the 6th of Jan.
the 9th Indian has been mauled during the fighting of Dec.
The 8th Australian hands the japanese a bloody nose in an ambush, but 1 brigade of the division is destroyed in the fighting of the 19th/20th as the green Indian brigade guarding the flank gives way.

So by the 20th of Jan, the Japanese have dealt a crushing blow to all 3 Allied divisions.
The Japanese 15th army launchs their main attack into Burma on Jan 20 *after* they have effectively neutralized all of the allied divisions, and they are confident of victory.
No other attacks are made by west force until the Japanese invade DEI on 14 Feb *after* Singapore has been effectively defeated (Japanese forces capture the water supply ammo dumps on 13 Jan and capture/neutralize all allied airpower, Singapore's fate is sealed.
Now, if the British had managed to hold back the Japanes in northern malaya, or repulsed the assault on Singapore, the DEI invasion would be postponed, as they needed to use the troops aircraft from the malaya campaign to hit DEI.

Eastern Central Force
The Japanese only make landings in Dutch Borneo (11 Jan) *after* the main US force has been bottled up in Baatan, and the air 7 naval forces have been neutralized.
If there had been an effective Allied air force in southern Philippines for example, I doubt that the Japanese would have attacked DEI Borneo.


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## davebender (Jul 26, 2010)

> Allies and, especially the US, could island hop, neutralizing Japanese bases and moving closer to Japan, could the Japanese do the same thing?



Japan hopped across half the Pacific during a 4 month period (Dec 41 to Apr 42). It took the USN over 3 years to cover that distance in reverse.


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## buffnut453 (Jul 26, 2010)

davebender said:


> Japan hopped across half the Pacific during a 4 month period (Dec 41 to Apr 42). It took the USN over 3 years to cover that distance in reverse.



But most of those islands were undefended in 1941 but the Japanese turned them all into fortresses of varying scales. The key problem was that the Japanese "tide of conquest" - a great red wave sweeping across the Pacific - providing a buttress against attacks on the homeland was, in reality, a series of defended islands with huge expanses of ocean in between, with the consequence that many of the islands could simply be bypassed. Japan couldn't afford that luxury in the DEI or Malaya because both provided war-critical raw materials.


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## dennis420b (Jul 26, 2010)

The British do not know that the Japanese are stretched thin, or their overall intentions. With little time to assess your enemy, to take a guess at what was happening is literally a stab in the dark. Look at Force Z, that is a prime example of the allies not knowing the Japanese capabilities or readiness to react. After such a loss, there would have been a natural want to be conservative, maybe to the point that they decided that Singapore would not have been defensible, or just to costly to defend. The allies did seem to be totally took back by the swiftness of the Japanese attacks.


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## buffnut453 (Jul 26, 2010)

dennis420b said:


> The British do not know that the Japanese are stretched thin, or their overall intentions. With little time to assess your enemy, to take a guess at what was happening is literally a stab in the dark. Look at Force Z, that is a prime example of the allies not knowing the Japanese capabilities or readiness to react. After such a loss, there would have been a natural want to be conservative, maybe to the point that they decided that Singapore would not have been defensible, or just to costly to defend. The allies did seem to be totally took back by the swiftness of the Japanese attacks.



Dennis, 

I entirely agree. The key to the entire Japanese strategy was Thailand. Like I keep saying, robust British and Thai defence of Singora would have exposed all the risks inherent in the Japanese plan - no reinforcements, no logistics chain, no ability to sustain operations for an extended period.


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## parsifal (Jul 27, 2010)

buffnut453 said:


> Parsifal,
> 
> I'd love to know where you get your information. The units and numbers I have quoted were deployed before 7 Dec. None of the Ki-27 units re-equipped with Ki-43s during the battle - all the Ki-43s were amassed in the 64th and 59th Sentai but reinforcements to replace losses in those units were still problemmatic.
> 
> ...



Hi Mark

You are right I should read these sources that you refer to. But in making the statements that I have I was relying on some reasonable sources. They happen to corroborate the source posted by Davebender, Niehorsters Orders Of battle site.

My main sources include the following 

Japanese Army Forces Order Of Battle - Vols I II (564 Pages) Victor Madej Pennsylvania Printing house 1981

The Struggle For Malaya; Hammer EJ, Stanford University Press, 1976


Order Of Battle Of the Japanese Armed Forces - Military Intelligence Division US Department Of the Army 5th Edition (the final version - I saw this and made copies of bits of it when I was on exchange in the US)

Japanese Army In the Pacific other details unknown, but it was written by an ex-member of IGHQ so it might be Kogun...I have photocopies of bits of this book

Japanese Armed Forces Handbook 1939 -45 ; AJ Barker Ian Allen 1979

Niehorsters site, which substantially follows the information contained in the abovementioned references. 

I also have access to the US Military atlas of WWII, which is absolute gem. Its owned by a friend of mine, based in Canberra, and has lots of information on this subject. 

I also use the USSBS which devotes a chapter to this subject. The USSBS summary says that the JAAF fileded 550, whilst the Navy deployed 175 aircraft. However it also says the Allies fielded 350 aircraft in Malaya at the start of the campaign. My guess this includes everything in Indochina, including the aircraft deployed in the north of the territory (and which took no part in the battle) and the transports which i think at that time were based in Hainan. 

I also own a copy of Australia In the War Of 1939-45, the 22 volume official history, which is useful, but not a great source 

3rd air fleet at the beginning of the campaign had about 350 aircraft attached. In addition there were three squadrons on loan from the 5th air fleet, so the numbers were somewhat higher than normal. In the coming days I can do a detailed head count if you like and give what I think was deployed at the beginning of the campaign 

As far as the zero issue, well I do stand by the statement, but I will double check, but might I suggest this particular issue, which we always argue about, is not that relevant to the matter discussed here. The point that was raised was the strength of the JAAF (and IJN) air units in the campaign, was it not?


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## buffnut453 (Jul 27, 2010)

Hi Parsifal,

My intent was not to go over old ground again...we've done this waltz often enough already!

Hmmm, friend in Canberra and you did an exchange job in the US - are/were you Aussie armed forces? Just wondering...

I can't find reference to Hammer's book. She did write "The Struggle for Indochina" - is that the volume to which you refer?

In addition to the books mentioned, I'd also recommend the essay "Air Operational Leadership in the Southern Front: Imperial Army Aviation's Trial to be an 'Air Force' in the Malaya Offensive Air Operation" by Hisayuki Yokoyama (found in "British and Japanese Military Leadership in the Far Eastern War 1941-1945" edited by Brian Bond and Kyoichi Tachikawa (Cass, 2004)). Finally, there's the Japanese Monograph No.55 "Southease Area Air Operations Record, Phase 1 - November 1941-February 1942" which contains interesting, if somewhat contradictory, high-level information on IJAAF operations and losses. 

Cheers,
Mark


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## Freebird (Jan 17, 2011)

buffnut453 said:


> Dennis,
> 
> I entirely agree. The key to the entire Japanese strategy was Thailand. Like I keep saying, robust British and Thai defence of Singora would have exposed all the risks inherent in the Japanese plan - no reinforcements, no logistics chain, no ability to sustain operations for an extended period.



The problem was that Roosevelt had given Churchill a guarantee to intervene on the Allied side, provided however that the Japanese were the aggressor. While the forward deplyment (into Thailand) made perfect sense from a military perspective, the japanese invasion would be spun to be deploying to protect Thailand from British aggression.
Rather like the situation in Belgium, while it made sense to deploy forward and prepare positions, it wasn't possible (until the 11th hour) due to political considerations. 




buffnut453 said:


> That was the purpose behind the string of airfields through Burma. The idea was to stage aircraft from India through Burma to Malaya. Again, resupply convoys continued to reach Singapore unopposed through a fair proportion of January 1942 - and that was after the Force Z debacle. I have no doubt that the Japanese would have struggled to disrupt British supplies if Singora had been held by British/Thai forces in Dec 41.



The plan to move the aircraft Eastward was the wrong direction, as it involved transiting Africa, and then supplying the air armies through the Middle east, which was already a war zone. The better plan would have been to fly aircraft westwards across exisiting bases in the Pacific



renrich said:


> dennis touched on this but how are the British to get the aircraft to Malaya and keep them supplied with gasoline, etc. when they don't have control of the sea. The US faced the same problem in the PI. The Japanese controlled the sea in that part of the world, just as Britain did the English Channel and practically speaking, the Allies could not wrest control of the sea from the IJN. A little later, the US kept pumping airplanes into the battle in SE Asia, (Java, Sumatra) and all they did was lose the airplanes.



The US never put a decent size fighter force into NEI.
The fuels situation was not a problem at all. the British ( Dutch) had 3 big overseas refineries making Avgas. One was in Aruba, one was in Abadan, and the third was Palembang, Sumatra. (Right across the straight from Singapore) 
The Dutch had also prepared a good number of airfields for use. Now, as it turned out they were really only used by the US bomber crews, who had trouble using dutch bombs. However, US or British fighters could have used Dutch .303 or .50 cal ammo without problems 

One last thing, as long as the allies hold Sumatra malaya the Japanes *do not* have control of the seas, specifically the straights of Malacca.


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## parsifal (Jan 17, 2011)

_I disagree with your conclusion, the "army" of the British Aussie units were able to fight the Japanese, but the Indian troops that were facing the japanes for the first 6 weeks were unmotivated inexperienced. With more effective resistance the campaign could have been much different_

It could have been different, but the troops you are talking about simply were unavailable. And the british and Austraqlian units were only marginally better than the indian troops at halting the japanese. The British in particular were obsessed with protecting their flaks, and covering their lines of communication. Every time the Japanese hooked them, the british obliged and fell back, The Australians made a decent stand, but lost far more than they killed, particulalry in terms of ewquipment....they had to be pulled back to Singas After that one battle the Australians were little better than a battlegroup. 

_Agreed. If the British are able to give a solid resistance to the Japanese in Malaya it would prevent attacks on other more distant targets._



I agree too, but the problem is it was never going to happen....the allies, particulalry the british could not deal with the fast moving "Infantry Blitzkrieg tactics used by the Japanese. The could not understand that all they had to do was hold firm, make sure they have a credible counterattack force, and then crush the enveloping hook as they emerged from the Jungle. It took the British more than two year to work this out....the Aussies kinda had it worked out by the end of 1942


_Let's review the timeline here:
Western Forces
8 Dec Japan invades Malaya
There are 3 CW divisions in Malaya in the first 6 weeks, + a few other brigades.

the 11th Indian is basically destroyed by the attacks of the 6th of Jan.
the 9th Indian has been mauled during the fighting of Dec.
The 8th Australian hands the japanese a bloody nose in an ambush, but 1 brigade of the division is destroyed in the fighting of the 19th/20th as the green Indian brigade guarding the flank gives way.

So by the 20th of Jan, the Japanese have dealt a crushing blow to all 3 Allied divisions.
The Japanese 15th army launchs their main attack into Burma on Jan 20 *after* they have effectively neutralized all of the allied divisions, and they are confident of victory.
No other attacks are made by west force until the Japanese invade DEI on 14 Feb *after* Singapore has been effectively defeated (Japanese forces capture the water supply ammo dumps on 13 Jan and capture/neutralize all allied airpower, Singapore's fate is sealed.
Now, if the British had managed to hold back the Japanes in northern malaya, or repulsed the assault on Singapore, the DEI invasion would be postponed, as they needed to use the troops aircraft from the malaya campaign to hit DEI.

Eastern Central Force
The Japanese only make landings in Dutch Borneo (11 Jan) *after* the main US force has been bottled up in Baatan, and the air 7 naval forces have been neutralized.
If there had been an effective Allied air force in southern Philippines for example, I doubt that the Japanese would have attacked DEI Borneo._

This is the same mistake as was made in the Dieppe thread....it assumes a perfect strategy for the allies to an historical japanese plan, and makes no allowance for altered japanese plans and forces. and the japanese had plenty of reserves they could call on at short notice, far more than the British could ever hope to find. 

If the battle in northern Malaya had been more successful for the british , the Japanese wouold have committed their strategic reserve, the 15th army, which would have been in action in a day or two. They would have also called on elements of 14th army, sitting in Palau, waiting for Singas to fall....perhaps a week away from deployment. They had two or three divs ready for immediate shipment in Japan, to cover just such an eventuality.

A more successful British battle in the opening days of Mala would have succeeded inmaking the japanese mad, and thats about it


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## Freebird (Jan 26, 2011)

parsifal said:


> This is the same mistake as was made in the Dieppe thread....it assumes a perfect strategy for the allies to an historical japanese plan, and makes no allowance for altered japanese plans and forces.



No, I'm not at all. The purpose of this thread is to look at the options ramifications of any of these actions. 



parsifal said:


> and the japanese had plenty of reserves they could call on at short notice, far more than the British could ever hope to find.
> If the battle in northern Malaya had been more successful for the british , the Japanese wouold have committed their strategic reserve, the 15th army, which would have been in action in a day or two.



Would they comit the 15th army? very likely.
In a day or two? Not a chance!
The Japanese do not have any reserves to commit at short notice, and in doing so they will have to scrap other plans. 

Lets look at their reserves:
The 15th army (33 55 div) is tasked with capturing Thailand, and is engaged in December with gaining control of the northern portions of the country. Although Thailand signed an armistice on Dec 21, there was still some resistance from the population.
By early 42 the 15th is on the Thai/Burmese border preparing for the Burma campaign. 

The Japanese are very short of shipping throughout the war, but especially in the first few months when they are building up forces in Truk, Pulau Rabaul etc etc, and sending occupying forces supplies to the Gilberts, Ellice, Solomons various other Pacific territories.

The Japanese Imperial Guards division was scheduled to join the Malay campaign after invading SE Thailand, but was forced to travel *overland* to Malaya, and the first regiment from the division doesn't arrive until early Jan.
The limited capacity of the Thai rail net is heavily taxed with supplying two Japanese armies (15th 25th) so they don't really have the option of moving many troops around.

The only real available reserve is the 56th division in Japan, which would have to use the limited shipping to transport to Malaysia.
Had the Malay campaign gone beadly for the Japanese, they could indeed call on some units of the 15 th army, but that would of course destroy any chance of a January attack on Burma. 



parsifal said:


> They would have also called on elements of 14th army, sitting in Palau, waiting for Singas to fall....perhaps a week away from deployment.



14th area army? The were busy invading the Philippines.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_Fourteenth_Area_Army
Again, any forces drawn in to Malaya from the Central or Eastern Force
would push back pland to attack Borneo Indonesia



parsifal said:


> They had two or three divs ready for immediate shipment in Japan, to cover just such an eventuality.



Which divisions are you talking about?
The 56 division is sent to Thailand in early '42, to join the 15th army attack on Burma.
Again, the Japanese logistics is quite strained, they simply don't have loads of transport available.



parsifal said:


> A more successful British battle in the opening days of Mala would have succeeded inmaking the japanese mad, and thats about it



No, it would have delayed attacks on Burma Indonesia, caused Japanese casualties which they could ill afford, and burned up the limited Japanese logistics capabilities.


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## Freebird (Jan 26, 2011)

parsifal said:


> It could have been different, but the troops you are talking about simply were unavailable.



No, actually there are available trained troops, and the transport to get them there.
I'll go into some detail on this in the following post.



parsifal said:


> And the british and Austraqlian units were only marginally better than the indian troops at halting the japanese. The British in particular were obsessed with protecting their flanks, and covering their lines of communication.



I would disagree.
The Indian troops were almost all raw, poorly equipped and with minimal training, and furthermore they had much less enthusiasm to fight for "King Empire" than the British or Commonwealth troops.
If you look at the performance of the individual battalions, the better trained equipped British Aussie forces were able to give solid resistance to the Japanese, but were flanked or forced to fall back as supporting troops gave way.
The performance of the 1st Leicesters at Jitra, the Argyll Surtherlands and the Australians were contrasted by the fragile and often disorganized resistance of the Indians 



parsifal said:


> Every time the Japanese hooked them, the british obliged and fell back, The Australians made a decent stand, but lost far more than they killed, particulalry in terms of ewquipment....they had to be pulled back to Singas After that one battle the Australians were little better than a battlegroup.



They were only two brigades to begin with, so the loss of most of a brigade was a crippling blow.


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