# Would the British FAA have been better off with the Brewster Buffalo?



## pinsog (Jul 17, 2012)

The FAA suffered from lack of a good fleet fighter early in the war. Would the Brewster Buffalo have been better than any of the early war aircraft they had from 1939-42 until it could have been replaced by the Martlet?


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## Shortround6 (Jul 17, 2012)

Probably not. What ever the merits (or demerits) of the Brewster Buffalo as land based fighter it's landing gear suffered from weaknesses than severely limited Usage on US carriers. I doubt it would be any Better on British carriers. Whatever speed and firepower advantages it had don't count for much if the aircraft are unserviceable due to landing gear problems.


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## buffnut453 (Jul 17, 2012)

Bit of a "mixed bag" answer to this one - actually, that's pretty much the type of answer you get when asking Buffalo questions, it being something of the curate's egg. 

I think the worst of the undercarriage issues with the Buffalo occurred with the heavyweight F2A-3 variant (not saying there wouldn't have been problems with the earlier variants but probably not as many). It would offer longer range than the Sea Hurricane and better firepower and manoeuverability than the Skua. Also it had a shorter wingspan than the Sea Hurricane which might have made it easier to accommodate onboard the carriers (although I suspect the aircraft lifts would still have presented challenges on some carriers).


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## RCAFson (Jul 17, 2012)

The F2A-1 was faster than the Gloster Sea Gladiator, but the SG had 4 x .303MGs.

F2A-1 = 1 x .5" and 1 x .3", entered service Nov 1939.

The F2A-1 was faster than the Fulmar I/II but it lacked the Fulmar's folding wings, self sealing tanks and 8 x .303" MG armament. Entered service in June 1940, IIRC.


F2A-2 = 4 x .5", entered service in Oct 1940

The fixed wing Sea Hurricane 1B entered Service in March 1941, had 8 x .303MGs and Self Sealing tanks and was probably better than any F2A variant. Rugged and reliable in FAA service.

F2A-3 = 4 x .5". and armour , (however both -2 and -3 had landing gear reliability issues) entered service in Aug 1941. AFAIK, no SS tanks


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## buffnut453 (Jul 18, 2012)

Any FAA Buffalo would have been an adaptation of the F2A-2 but with self-sealing tanks as were specified and built into the B339Es procured for the RAF which were available in Singapore from March 1941. Agree the Sea Hurricane was rugged and capable in FAA service and, based on Brewster's (lack of) quality control, would probably have been more reliable than a Buffalo variant at sea...or at least more available (although cue diatribe on merits/limitations of in-line liquid-cooled engines -vs- air cooled engines). Benefits of 8x.303s -vs- 4x.50s are debatable although 6x.50s would be better - I'd probably give the Hurricane the edge on the armament front. As for airborne performance, a trial in India in 1942 between a weary ex-67 Sqn Buffalo and a Hurricane indicated up to 15,000ft the Buffalo had the advantage but above that altitude the Hurricane had the advantage. I'd need to go through the record cards for the F2A-2 to see how many undercarriage failures occurred although I accept that, with the extra weight of self-sealing tanks and armour plate, would have increased the likelihood of failure.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 18, 2012)

The F2A-1 was designed to accomodate 4 HMGs as shown by the Finn experience. The 44 B-239's that provided Finland such good service during the Continuation war (1941-44) were simply denavalized F2A-1 whose USN brethren (the first 11 off the assembly line) were already serving in a fleet squadron including carrier deployment. The landing gear issues were evidently beginning to appear, but had not yet become epidemic until the arrival of the F2A-3. IMO, I believe the FAA would have done very well with the F2A-1 especially during the Norwegian campaign, except that getting them into service in time to make a difference would have been a herculean (probably insurmountable) task. Assuming that the 44 F2A-1s had gone to the FAA in December 39- January 40, it might have been able to enter service and see combat off RN CVs by perhaps May, 1940, at the earliest and even that is a mighty stretch. I believe the (undelivered French order of Martlets began arriving in Britain during the early Fall of 1940, (the first land based a/c seeing combat in December, 1940) their season of greatest utility would have been brief. The Fulmar which would have been arriving a few months after the F2A, was undergoing its own accelerated introduction schedule that had it in combat by September, 1940. Fulmar had a number of service and handling advantages to recommend it, yet I believe that even a small number of F2A-1s would have made a significant difference in the Med and perhaps even Norway, assuming logistics issues did not pose a problem. The older RN CVs could have accomodated about a dozen F2A-1s but the lifts on the newer carriers (Illustrious and Formidable) were too small to accomodate their wing span. 44 F2As spread among the old girls of the fleet would have been more than enough to equip them as they were notoriously short of fighter a/c at the beginning of the war. The FAA was desparate enough to try and use a B-339B export Buffalo without an arrestor hook in the med as late as March 1941. As might be expected the trial wasn't a success, but neither was the B-339B. It would have been interesting to see F2A-1's in the hands of the very capable FAA Pilots whom I think would have done very well with it. As to the newer carriers, I think the adoption of the sea Hurricane forced the RN to adopt a permanent deck park for the first time, so its conceivable that a change in doctrine could have occurred, if they proved successful. I suspect, the F2A-2 would have been a welcome addition although I am sure its performace would have sufffered somewhat from added armor. The RN, given a choice between adopting a new Fairey aircraft into the fleet and one built in the USA and especially by Brewster... well that seems an easy choice whatever the F2As performance advantages.


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## yulzari (Jul 18, 2012)

If the FAA had taken on the Buffalo then what might have been sent to Malaya in lieu? Old Hurricanes, Mohawks, Gladiators? Given the choice I would opt for the Mohawk but were there enough? Tomahawks were reserved for UK and Middle East.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 18, 2012)

How about 44 Mohawks to Finland to replace the 44 F2A-1 ssent to the FAA. Unless you are talking strictly about renavalizing the B-339Bs, and Es?


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## Juha (Jul 18, 2012)

Hello Yulzari
there were 195 Mohawks in UK already on 16 Oct 40 and 9 more on the way (and 32 Belgian order Buffalos + 1 on the way) so there would have been enough Hawks for Malaya


The problem with F2A would have been the availability. If on the other hand the Finnish Gov would have taken the opportunity of an US loan in early 39 to purchage some 30-60 Hawk 75As (leftish parties and the head of Central Bank/the Bank of Finland opposed the loan), maybe then the F2A-1s would have been available to FAA in very early 40. The armament of F2A-1 was one .5 + one .30 in nose plus an optional .5 in each wing. IIRC USN didn't take the optional wing armament until early 40, but FAA would probably have taken the option as was FiAF, so IMHO the FAA fighters would have had an adequate armament. FiAF had only a few landing gear failures even if we installed a back armour for the pilot.

Juha


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## Shortround6 (Jul 18, 2012)

Something to consider is that the 1939/early 1940 Browning .50 cal fired at about 600rpm _at best_ on test stands. Long belt drags/high lift, pulling with G loads acting on the belts all slowed the guns down. And that is without synchronization. When synchronized the rate of fire could be as low as 450rpm. A four gun Wildcat in 1942 could be firing 3000-3200rpm A four gun Buffalo in 1940 could be firing 2000-2100rpm. (two at 500rpm and two at 550rpm). Now perhaps the FAA armorers could tweak the guns up a bit but??

The Early Brewster fighters carried 200 rounds per .50 cal gun. By the F2A-3 the wing guns had 400rpg ( if carrying full ammo) and the fuselage guns were carrying more ammo than the early planes ( books are not near me now). The F2A-1 had a 950hp engine compared to the 1100 hp engine used in the British Buffaloes. The Fins did add a bit of armor but there is going to be a definite limit as to how much "stuff" you can add to an F2A-1. 

I am not saying that the four guns in the Brewster are worse than eight .303s in a Fulmar but the difference is a lot closer than the four guns in a Wildcat and a Fulmar. 

The carrier landings are going to take a higher toll _on average_ than non-carrier landings. The arrested landings tending to slam the aircraft onto the deck.


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## Juha (Jul 18, 2012)

Hello Shortround6
The Finnish B-239s originally had 400rpg to the 2 wing hmgs, 200 rpg to the fuselage HMG and 600 rpg for the fuselage .30.

IIRC Fulmar Mk I didn't have any armour and F2A-1 was faster and climbed better and I bet had clearly better manoeuvrability. Against Italian bombers 8 x .303 might well have been more destructive but against He 111s I bet that F2A-1s armament would have been more effective (based on Finnish experience with .303s and .5s against DB-3s/DB-3Fs)

Juha


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## RCAFson (Jul 18, 2012)

Juha said:


> Hello Shortround6
> The Finnish B-239s originally had 400rpg to the 2 wing hmgs, 200 rpg to the fuselage HMG and 600 rpg for the fuselage .30.
> 
> IIRC Fulmar Mk I didn't have any armour and F2A-1 was faster and climbed better and I bet had clearly better manoeuvrability. Against Italian bombers 8 x .303 might well have been more destructive but against He 111s I bet that F2A-1s armament would have been more effective (based on Finnish experience with .303s and .5s against DB-3s/DB-3Fs)
> ...


 
The F2A-1 was faster than the Gloster Sea Gladiator, but the SG had 4 x .303MGs.

F2A-1 = 1 x .5" and 1 x .3" (as noted these are synchronized and have a very low RoF), entered service Nov 1939. 

Is the F2A-1 superior to the GSG? It is faster, but more poorly armed.

The F2A-1 was faster than the Fulmar I/II but it lacked the *Fulmar's folding wings, self sealing tanks and 8 x .303" MG armament*. Entered service in June 1940, IIRC.

You can't seriously propose that the F2A-1 was superior to a Fulmar I and 1 x .5" and 1 x .3" doesn't equal 8 x .303. Any fixed wing fighter is going to have severe draw backs in actual service, and if a fixed wing fighter is required, the logical choice is the Sea Hurricane.


F2A-2 = 4 x .5", entered service in Oct 1940, with no SS tanks, or armour; both of which were present on the Sea Hurricane 1B.

I found this series of RAF/FAA evaluations of the Buffalo:
http://www.warbirdforum.com/eagle.htm

Note the severe critiscism of the wing design, and the flight test versus a Hurricane. Also note that in the Hurricane/Buffalo test, the Buffalo had no armament, so the maneuverability of the Buffalo would have been greatly enhanced due to the lighter weight, and the article notes this in when reviewing level speed.


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## Juha (Jul 18, 2012)

Hello RCAFSon
if you don't know it, B-239 was the de-navalised F2A-1, as its armament, you have already quoted my earlier message.
FiAF also had 30 Gladiator Mk IIs, so we knew very well its weak and strong points and B-239 was clearly superior to it and had clearly better armament, at least according to all FiAF pilots I knew. FiAF B-239 didn't have SS tanks but it had a pilot back armour and it needed only ½ of the time that Fulmar Mk I needed to climb to 4500m to climb to 6000m.

FiAF also had 11 Hurricanes, 10 Mk Is and 1 Mk II and Finnish pilots thought that B-239 was clearly better. VVS also used many Hurricanes against Finns and there were several air combats between FiAF B-239s and VVS Hurricanes and as I wrote B-239 pilots were not impressed by Hurricane.

Juha


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## RCAFson (Jul 18, 2012)

Juha said:


> Hello RCAFSon
> if you don't know it, B-239 was the de-navalised F2A-1, as its armament, you have already quoted my earlier message.
> FiAF also had 30 Gladiator Mk IIs, so we knew very well its weak and strong points and B-239 was clearly superior to it and had clearly better armament, at least according to all FiAF pilots I knew. FiAF B-239 didn't have SS tanks but it had a pilot back armour and it needed only ½ of the time that Fulmar Mk I needed to climb to 4500m to climb to 6000m.
> 
> ...



Yes, but we are talking about fully navalized F2As, which were ultimately found to be unsuited for carrier use. The Goster SG did have inferior armament to the F2A-2 ( 4 x .5") but not to the F2A-1 which was its USN counterpart.

The point I have trying to make, is that at every stage of F2A development, it had no clear superiority over an existing FAA fighter and that the changes required for FAA service would have added so much weight that it's performance and reliability would have suffered greatly.


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## buffnut453 (Jul 18, 2012)

It had a huge range advantage over any FAA fighter except the Skua...and it beat that hands down in terms of performance. The F2A-2 could have been available pretty early on in 1940 had it been ordered (one Belgian airframe was captured in France) and it certainly would have been better than anything on the books at that time, although the Martlet arrived towards the end of that year. Even into 1941 when the Sea Hurricane arrived on the scene, it probably would have been effective for the types of opposition the FAA faced. I'm not disagreeing with questions of reliability, although Jim Maas believes the undercarriage problems in the F2A-2 were pretty much resolved (the F2A-3 was a totally different question). So I reckon the F2A-2 could have been effectively used...but it wouldn't have been a war-winner by any stretch, just a useful stop-gap until more capable aircraft were available.


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## Juha (Jul 19, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> Yes, but we are talking about fully navalized F2As, which were ultimately found to be unsuited for carrier use. The Goster SG did have inferior armament to the F2A-2 ( 4 x .5") but not to the F2A-1 which was its USN counterpart...



Now F2A-1 had the option for the wing guns, if you look its wings you will see the bulges for the rear ends of .5s were there already in F2A-1s. So its only a question whether one wanted to install the guns or not, and I'm pretty sure that FAA would have chosen to install them if it had got the planes.

Juha


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## Glider (Jul 19, 2012)

I recognise that the versions are different but on Crete of the navy fighters present the Buffalo was the one they wanted over the Gladiator and the Fulmar.

An interesting aside is that the RN knew they were in trouble re fighters. In Feb 1940 they asked for 50 folding wing Spitfires but it was calulated that this would prevent the production of 150 Spits for the RAF. At a time when the RAF were trying to build up their strength this wasn't considered practical.


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## RCAFson (Jul 19, 2012)

Juha said:


> Now F2A-1 had the option for the wing guns, if you look its wings you will see the bulges for the rear ends of .5s were there already in F2A-1s. So its only a question whether one wanted to install the guns or not, and I'm pretty sure that FAA would have chosen to install them if it had got the planes.
> 
> Juha



Yes, and then they could also watch as the aircraft's LG folded up after carrier landings, especially with armour and/or SS tanks added. The F2A-3/3 had strengthened LG, IIRC, and they still couldn't handle the extra weight.


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## RCAFson (Jul 19, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> It had a huge range advantage over any FAA fighter except the Skua...and it beat that hands down in terms of performance. The F2A-2 could have been available pretty early on in 1940 had it been ordered (one Belgian airframe was captured in France) and it certainly would have been better than anything on the books at that time, although the Martlet arrived towards the end of that year. Even into 1941 when the Sea Hurricane arrived on the scene, it probably would have been effective for the types of opposition the FAA faced. I'm not disagreeing with questions of reliability, although Jim Maas believes the undercarriage problems in the F2A-2 were pretty much resolved (the F2A-3 was a totally different question). So I reckon the F2A-2 could have been effectively used...but it wouldn't have been a war-winner by any stretch, just a useful stop-gap until more capable aircraft were available.



The Fulmar I had 155IG internally versus 135IG for the F2A. The Fulmar II began production in Jan 1941 and it had 155IG internally and a 60IG drop tank. It's doubtful that the useful range of the F2A was any better than a Fulmar.


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## Juha (Jul 19, 2012)

Hello RCAFson
Gladiator didn't have SS tanks nor pilot armour either, so maybe FAA would have satisfied with a F2A-1 without them, especially because the self-sealing of F2A-1 tanks would have been very difficult. Fulmar Mk I didn't have armoured windscreen, which was bad for so slow fighter (usually forced to attack from rear while slowly overtaking the target) and anyway it had vulnerable liquid cooled engine. Even if Cyclone wasn't super reliable it was robust.

Juha


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## Juha (Jul 19, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> The Fulmar I had 155IG internally versus 135IG for the F2A. The Fulmar II began production in Jan 1941 and it had 155IG internally and a 60IG drop tank. It's doubtful that the useful range of the F2A was any better than a Fulmar.



B-239 had max range of 1350km, Weal, Weal and Barker gives 1287km for Fulmar Mk I, max for F2A-3 was 2700km. I have a better source on Fulmar but it is in my attic.

Juha


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## RCAFson (Jul 19, 2012)

Juha said:


> Hello RCAFson
> Gladiator didn't have SS tanks nor pilot armour either, so maybe FAA would have satisfied with a F2A-1 without them, especially because the self-sealing of F2A-1 tanks would have been very difficult. Fulmar Mk I didn't have armoured windscreen, which was bad for so slow fighter (usually forced to attack from rear while slowly overtaking the target) and anyway it had vulnerable liquid cooled engine. Even if Cyclone wasn't super reliable it was robust.
> 
> Juha


The GSG predated the F2A-1. When the low firepower of the F2A-1 is taken into account, plus its lack of protection, it doesn't represent an advance over the GSG; it might make more intercepts but would score fewer kills per pass. Add more guns, SS tanks and armour and even if the LG doesn't break, the overall F2A-1 performance would probably fall to Fulmar levels, so why pay hard cash (since there's no lend-lease at this point), for an aircraft that has less firepower than a GSG, and no proven ability to operate from a CV with upgrade firepower, to say nothing about SS tanks and armour. The primary opponent that the FAA faced was bombers so 1 x .3 and 1 x .5" just doesn't do the job.

The Fulmar did have an armoured windscreen, according to the Fulmar I/II Pilot's notes.


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## RCAFson (Jul 19, 2012)

Juha said:


> B-239 had max range of 1350km, Weal, Weal and Barker gives 1287km for Fulmar Mk I, max for F2A-3 was 2700km. I have a better source on Fulmar but it is in my attic.
> 
> Juha


A-3 range was with 200IG of internal fuel, and the aircraft was not really combat capable at that weight, to say nothing of the hazards of trying to land back on the carrier, if necessary.


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## Juha (Jul 19, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> The GSG predated the F2A-1. When the low firepower of the F2A-1 is taken into account, plus its lack of protection, it doesn't represent an advance over the GSG; it might make more intercepts but would score fewer kills per pass. Add more guns, SS tanks and armour and even if the LG doesn't break, the overall F2A-1 performance would probably fall to Fulmar levels, so why pay hard cash (since there's no lend-lease at this point), for an aircraft that has less firepower than a GSG, and no proven ability to operate from a CV with upgrade firepower, to say nothing about SS tanks and armour. The primary opponent that the FAA faced was bombers so 1 x .3 and 1 x .5" just doesn't do the job.
> 
> The Fulmar did have an armoured windscreen, according to the Fulmar I/II Pilot's notes.



According to Brown at least Mk I didn't have, maybe it was retrofitted what is the date of the notes?
F2A-1 climbed better than GSG was clearly faster and surely dived better and .5 was more effective against protected bombers like those of LW had, against Italian bombers .303 was adequate. As a hint FiAF took off the two nose lmgs from Hawk 75As and put at first only one .5 in their place just to have a weapon in Hawk that could penetrate pilot's back armour and which could more easily knock out an engine.
And as I wrote the B-239s had the armour and more armament and a bit less powrful engine than that of F2A-1 and still was 30km/h faster than Fulmar Mk I and had vastly better roc and surely was more nimble.

Juha


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## parsifal (Jul 19, 2012)

My opinion is that the Buffalo represented a slightly better performance over its contemporary RN counterparts....the Sea gladiator, Fulmar and Skua. It was a significantly bette proposition to the Sea Gladiator and Skua because it had comparable firepower. It was equal to the Sea Gladiator in that both were single purpose aircraft. It was significantly inferior to the Fulmar in terms of firepower, and the Fulmar was a far more versatile aircraft because of its multi role capabilities. it had better range over the Dea Gladiator,, not sure about the Skua, and I think inferior to the Fulmar


If I were to rate importance of capabilities of each aircraft I think it would go something like this

1) Multi role capability (ther just arent enough slots or pilots available in the RN to have dedicated fighters onboard)
2) Reliability and rough weather handling (RN carriers had to often operate ant night and in poor weather...much more so than their USN cousins in the Pacific). Any aircraft with any stability or undercariage, or high landing speeds have problems and do very badly in this regard
3) Endurance or range RN fighters have to stay airborne for long periods, and they have to have a large ammunition supply. They are not needed for strike escort....most RN strike aircraft are night capable. But they need to stay airborne for as long as possible and have a lot of ammunition because they tend to get attacked over long periods by a lot of aircraft. 
4) Firepower. They need to be able to unload a lot of ammunition in a short space of time
5) rate of climb They need to be abloe to get to height quickly, for obvious reasons
6) Manoverability in the horizontal 
7) Protection

Given the above, I would rate as most suitable of the four, in order of preference, the following

1) Fulmar
2) Skua
3) Buffalo
4) Sea Gladiator

It might be arguable to swap (2) and (3). I dont think the Buffalo was as suited to RN needs overall as the Fulmar.


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## RCAFson (Jul 19, 2012)

Juha said:


> According to Brown at least Mk I didn't have, maybe it was retrofitted what is the date of the notes?
> F2A-1 climbed better than GSG was clearly faster and surely dived better and .5 was more effective against protected bombers like those of LW had, against Italian bombers .303 was adequate. As a hint FiAF took off the two nose lmgs from Hawk 75As and put at first only one .5 in their place just to have a weapon in Hawk that could penetrate pilot's back armour and which could more easily knock out an engine.
> And as I wrote the B-239s had the armour and more armament and a bit less powrful engine than that of F2A-1 and still was 30km/h faster than Fulmar Mk I and had vastly better roc and surely was more nimble.
> 
> Juha


 
David Brown (Aircraft profile 254 - Fulmar ) states that the prototype didn't have an armoured windscreen, but the production Mk1 did.

F2A-1 and GSG power to weight ratios are very similar, especially if more weight is added to the F2A-1, so I doubt that there's much difference in climb rates to typical combat altitudes. 


Both the RAF and FAAs opinions were pretty firmly in favour of lots of firepower. It's really doubtful that they could have been persuaded otherwise. The Gladiator/GSG did well everywhere it served and the main problem was that there wasn't enough of them and I can't see how a poorly armed F2A will produce more kills.


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## pinsog (Jul 19, 2012)

parsifal said:


> 1) Multi role capability (ther just arent enough slots or pilots available in the RN to have dedicated fighters onboard)
> (3). I dont think the Buffalo was as suited to RN needs overall as the Fulmar.




All the multi-purpose aircraft in the world won't matter if your ship is sunk because your multi-purpose "fighter" is too slow to catch the dive bombers and torpedo bombers that are attacking it.


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## parsifal (Jul 19, 2012)

pinsog said:


> All the multi-purpose aircraft in the world won't matter if your ship is sunk because your multi-purpose "fighter" is too slow to catch the dive bombers and torpedo bombers that are attacking it.



Agreed, but the fulmar was fast enough to do just that judging from its quite successful service record. So too were the Skua and the Sea Gladiator, though I will concede far less so. What separates the Brewster from at least the Fulmar and the Skua is that both these other aircraft could be used for other purposes. You might describe both the Fulmar and the Buffalo as adequate fighters, but thats all the Buffalo was. In addition to being an adequate fighter, the Fulmar was also an adequate recon aircraft, and a bit later, an adequate fighter bomber. Later still, it showed potential as an adequate night fighter. The skua was a less than adequate fighter but compensated for that by being a somewaht adequate D/B. 

And a fleet was just as vulnerable if it cant locate an enemy fleet or submarine as it is if is under air attack. RN carriers had a big problem, they had very limited carrying capacity, and even fewer aircrews to fill those places. They needed aircraft to do more than one thing so that they could achieve all round defnce from all types of threats. There just wasnt the space or the aircrews to afford the luxury of a dedicated fighter.

The only scenario where the Buffalo might score a few points is against strikes escorted by enemy high performance fighters. Here, the poor old Fulmar was being asked to do a lot. but I doubt the Buffalo gave that much of an advantgae even in that scenario. There wasnt much difference between a fulmar versus an Me 109, and a Buffalo versus a 109. both are going to be "in the gun".


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## Juha (Jul 19, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> David Brown (Aircraft profile 254 - Fulmar ) states that the prototype didn't have an armoured windscreen, but the production Mk1 did.



Sorry, I meant Eric Brown. So you have the Fulmar profile, lucky you. I once looked one copy at an second-hand bookshop whose owner had just got a vast collection of aviation books. But I thought that I might have enough info on Fulmar already so decided to before purhacing to check what I already have on Fulmar besides the article by E. Brown. On next day I was a bit lazy and it was rather late when I went to the shop, no more that Profile or many other items I had decided to buy.



RCAFson said:


> F2A-1 and GSG power to weight ratios are very similar, especially if more weight is added to the F2A-1, so I doubt that there's much difference in climb rates to typical combat altitudes.



There were not much difference in the rof of B-239 and of GSG.




RCAFson said:


> Both the RAF and FAAs opinions were pretty firmly in favour of lots of firepower. It's really doubtful that they could have been persuaded otherwise. The Gladiator/GSG did well everywhere it served and the main problem was that there wasn't enough of them and I can't see how a poorly armed F2A will produce more kills.



As I have wrote several times, 4 gun F2A-1 had fairly reasonable armament for a 1940 fighter.

Juha


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## Juha (Jul 19, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Agreed, but the fulmar was fast enough to do just that judging from its quite successful service record. So too were the Skua and the Sea Gladiator, though I will concede far less so. What separates the Brewster from at least the Fulmar and the Skua is that both these other aircraft could be used for other purposes. You might describe both the Fulmar and the Buffalo as adequate fighters, but thats all the Buffalo was. In addition to being an adequate fighter, the Fulmar was also an adequate recon aircraft, and a bit later, an adequate fighter bomber. Later still, it showed potential as an adequate night fighter. The skua was a less than adequate fighter but compensated for that by being a somewaht adequate D/B.
> 
> And a fleet was just as vulnerable if it cant locate an enemy fleet or submarine as it is if is under air attack. RN carriers had a big problem, they had very limited carrying capacity, and even fewer aircrews to fill those places. They needed aircraft to do more than one thing so that they could achieve all round defnce from all types of threats. There just wasnt the space or the aircrews to afford the luxury of a dedicated fighter.
> 
> The only scenario where the Buffalo might score a few points is against strikes escorted by enemy high performance fighters. Here, the poor old Fulmar was being asked to do a lot. but I doubt the Buffalo gave that much of an advantgae even in that scenario. There wasnt much difference between a fulmar versus an Me 109, and a Buffalo versus a 109. both are going to be "in the gun".



Buffalo had also enough range to escort work and 4 hours patrols, and Fulmar was also used as escort, at least during raids against Kirkenes and Petsamo in July 41 not very successfully. At least F2A-1 would have been harder victim to 109 pilots and adequate against Italian MC 200 and G.50bis.

Landing gear would have been a problem at first but according to Maas it was a soluble problem. Some strengthening and more pressure to tyres were what was needed to make the problem manageably according to him.

Juha


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## RCAFson (Jul 19, 2012)

Juha said:


> Buffalo had also enough range to escort work and 4 hours patrols, and Fulmar was also used as escort, at least during raids against Kirkenes and Petsamo in July 41 not very successfully. At least F2A-1 would have been harder victim to 109 pilots and adequate against Italian MC 200 and G.50bis.
> 
> Landing gear would have been a problem at first but according to Maas it was a soluble problem. Some strengthening and more pressure to tyres were what was needed to make the problem manageably according to him.
> 
> Juha


The Fulmars got separated from the Kirkenes Albacore strike which, unescorted, suffered heavy looses, although many of these were from Flak, but even so they didn't do too badly, shooting down an Me110 for the loss of two Fulmars. Over Petsamo, one Fulmar fighter-bomber was lost in combat, but here the Albacores and Swordfish only lost one aircraft.

A four .5" F2a strengthened for carrier landings? Then you are talking about the F2a-2 which entered service in Oct 1940, with no SS tanks; both of which were present on the Fulmar and Sea Hurricane 1B, which also had armour. Again, the FAA would have had to accept the f2A-2 without these mods, which is very unlikely, or wait until they could be fitted and accept the delay and the weak LG, which would put them into service after the Sea Hurricane.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 19, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> A four .5" F2a strengthened for carrier landings? Then you are talking about the F2a-2 which entered service in Oct 1940, with no SS tanks; both of which were present on the Fulmar and Sea Hurricane 1B, which also had armour. Again, the FAA would have had to accept the f2A-2 without these mods, which is very unlikely, or wait until they could be fitted and accept the delay and the weak LG, which would put them into service after the Sea Hurricane.



No RAFson, we (at least I) aren't talking about an F2A-2 with 4 HMGs. I have seen plenty of reliable sources that confirm the F2A-1 was designed to accomodate two wing mounted .5" HMGs. If you wish: America's Hundred Thousand, page 442 Table 70. Jim Maas, F2A Buffalo in action: page 4. "_*provision were made for fitting two 50 cal. mg in each wing just outboard of the main landing gear.*_" While the USN F2A-1 was not initially operated in this armament configuration, the subsequent, denavalized B-239's (production line F2A-1s that were stripped of all naval associated gear) were so equipped for the FiAF. The point being that whether the USN F2A-1s operated with the ful suite of guns, the FAA would most certainly have done as did the Finns. The B-239 was an F2A-1 without a tail hook or raft. It was essentially the same aircraft but one that exploited the option for the full suite of guns (three .5" and one .3" mgs). And what do you mean "strengthened for carrier landings." The F2A-1, -2 and -3 were built for the USN to be flown from carriers. They were designed for that purpose. The 54 F2A-1s were essentially all produced by January 1940. Initial models became available for training and familiarization in late 1939. VF-3 deployed aboard the Saratoga with their F2A-1s before switching to F2A-2s.

Also from Maas: page 7 _*"In the Spring of 1940, the Navy decided to install the optional .50 caliber mg in the wings of the F2A-1*_." The USN was finally catching up to the FiAF.


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## buffnut453 (Jul 19, 2012)

RCAFSon

But the Sea Hurricane wasn't available in Oct 1940. Per the FAA Museum website, the first Sea Hurris were taken on strength in Feb 1941. The RAF's Buffalos, with 4x50cals and self sealing tanks were available in late 1940 and, in all probability, had the FAA/RAF levied an order, could have been available earlier in 1940 - Belgian F2A-2 airframes were. Seat armour was locally produced for the RAF Buffalos based on drawings from Brewster - again, it's hard to imagine that not being feasible earlier. So from where do you get the "accept the delay" part?


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 19, 2012)

parsifal said:


> My opinion is that the Buffalo represented a slightly better performance over its contemporary RN counterparts....the Sea gladiator, Fulmar and Skua. It was a significantly bette proposition to the Sea Gladiator and Skua because it had comparable firepower. It was equal to the Sea Gladiator in that both were single purpose aircraft. It was significantly inferior to the Fulmar in terms of firepower, and the Fulmar was a far more versatile aircraft because of its multi role capabilities. it had better range over the Dea Gladiator,, not sure about the Skua, and I think inferior to the Fulmar
> 
> 
> If I were to rate importance of capabilities of each aircraft I think it would go something like this
> ...



Sorry Pars, can't agree with you. On a strictly performance basis I would rate the aircraft in each role: 

Air defense: (Naval CAP)

1) F2A-2 (4 x HMG) available late 1940 to early 1941 (mid to late 40 but for politics)
2) F2A-1 (3 x HMG, 1 x LMG) available early to mid-1940
3) Navalized B-339B (4 x HMG) mid to late 1940 (1940 USN F2A-2 production interrupted in favor of B-339B)
4) Fulmar (8 LMG) (available mid to late 1940)
5) Sea Gladiator (4 x LMG) (available 9/39)
6) Skua (4 x LMG) (available 9/39)

Air Control (air superiority / power projection) I don't include the GSG because with its short legs it couldn't perform effectively in that role.

1) F2A-2 (4 x HMG)
2) F2A-1 (3 x HMG, 1 x LMG)
3) B-339 (4 x HMG)
4) Fulmar (8 x LMG)
5) Skua (4 x LMG) 

My personal opinion, any day of the week, I'd prefer to have 3 or 4 HMG's than 8 lmgs, but that's JMO.
I like the Fulmar for a lot of reasons If I couldn't have the F4F, and the other three, I'd want the Fulmar. 
Given a choice, I'd have to go with performance and swallow the broken gear.


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## RCAFson (Jul 19, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> No RAFson, we (at least I) aren't talking about an F2A-2 with 4 HMGs. I have seen plenty of reliable sources that confirm the F2A-1 was designed to accomodate two wing mounted .5" HMGs. If you wish: America's Hundred Thousand, page 442 Table 70. Jim Maas, F2A Buffalo in action: page 4. "_*provision were made for fitting two 50 cal. mg in each wing just outboard of the main landing gear.*_" While the USN F2A-1 was not initially operated in this armament configuration, the subsequent, denavalized B-239's (production line F2A-1s that were stripped of all naval associated gear) were so equipped for the FiAF. The point being that whether the USN F2A-1s operated with the ful suite of guns, the FAA would most certainly have done as did the Finns. The B-239 was an F2A-1 without a tail hook or raft. It was essentially the same aircraft but one that exploited the option for the full suite of guns (three .5" and one .3" mgs). And what do you mean "strengthened for carrier landings." The F2A-1, -2 and -3 were built for the USN to be flown from carriers. They were designed for that purpose. The 54 F2A-1s were essentially all produced by January 1940. Initial models became available for training and familiarization in late 1939. VF-3 eployed aboard the Saratoga with their F2A-1s.
> 
> Also from Maas: page 7 _*"In the Spring of 1940, the Navy decided to install the optional .50 caliber mg in the wings of the F2A-1*_." The USN was finally catching up to the FiAF.


 


> *During 1940, the Navy decided to install the optional 0.50 cal guns in the wings of its F2A-1s, and immediately started to encounter landing gear failures because of the additional weight.* Later that year, VF-3 traded in its F2A-1s for more powerful F2A-2s, and the F2A-1s were returned to Brewster for modifications. Eight of them were remanufactured to F2A-2 standards, and were reissued to VS-201 for service aboard the escort carrier USS Long Island. By mid-1941, only one of these was left (BuAer 1393), and it remained with a training squadron until 1944.
> [/http://www.joebaugher.com/navy_fighters/f2a_2.html



I keep stating this but it doesn't seem to get through!

F2A-1 = 1 x .3 and 1x .5" and more weight = LG failures and this aircraft was simply too under armed for FAA use. 
F2A-2 = Sept 1940, after the Fulmar and by then SS tanks and armour were mandatory, and with these the LG starts to fail again...
F2A-3 = almost unusable due to LG failure - which is no surprise because these were built with armour and SS tanks.

The end result is that no version of the F2A ever met FAA requirements at any point in time.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 19, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> I keep stating this but it doesn't seem to get through!
> 
> F2A-1 = 1 x .3 and 1x .5" and more weight = LG failures and this aircraft was simply too under armed for FAA use.
> F2A-2 = Sept 1940, after the Fulmar and by then SS tanks and armour were mandatory, and with these the LG starts to fail again...
> ...



OK what doesn't seem to register is that you are GROSSLY exagerating the problem with the gear for the F2A-1. It really didn't become severe until the F2A-3. If it had been as bad as you claim the F2A-3 wouldn't have deployed neither would the F2A-2 or -1. The Finns certainly would have damned it. It worked very well for them over 3 years of intense fighting. B-239 ( 4xHMGs, minimal gear problems) = F2A-1 deployed with 4 HMGs (and suffered a premonitional gear problem during a hard deck landing). Aircraft landing on carriers occasionally land hard and break their gear. It happens, the aircraft gets fixed. It's a maintenance headache, not a debilitating problem, especially for an aircraft considerably lighter than the F2A-3.


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## parsifal (Jul 20, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Sorry Pars, can't agree with you. On a strictly performance basis I would rate the aircraft in each role:
> 
> Air defense: (Naval CAP)
> 
> ...



We will never know if a carrier borne Buffalo wulld do as well, worse, or better than the Fulmar as a fighter. We do know that it would not hav been able to fulfill many of the roles also undertaken. for example, fulmars were often used to shepherd SE fighters from Carriers to malta, because of the superior navigational capabilities of the fulmar. We also know that they played a role in the hunts for enemy shipping, including the bismarck, where they permitted strike aircraft to be freed up for strike purposes. 

having eight LMGs is less firepower than 2 x 20mm cannon, though I am unsure about 4 x 50s. But a smaller number of bang sticks is only better if you have accurate shooters, if not you need to rely on spraying the sky with bullets, in the hope you will hit something with your inexperienced pikots....

And the combat record of the Fulmar is not to be easily dismissed. just looking at 808 sqn, a not especially successful sqn, it achieved the following. "No.808 Naval Air Squadron was a single-engine fighter squadron that served on the Ark Royal until she was sunk, then helped support the landings at Salerno before joining the East Indian Fleet. 

No.808 Squadron was formed at Worthy Down on 1 July 1940, as a single-engine fighter squadron using the Fairey Fulmar I. This was soon replaced by the Fulmar II, before the squadron moved north to RAF Castletown in Caithness, to protect the Home Fleet's base at Scapa Flow. This was a brief assignment, and in the following month the squadron moved south to Donisbristle, where it joined HMS Ark Royal.

The squadron had an eventful time on the Ark Royal, claiming nineteen victories in ten months. After arriving in the Mediterranean at the start of November the squadron was involved in attacks on Italian airfields on Sicily on 9 November and in the inconclusive action off Cape Spartivento (as both observer a/c and as fighters) on 27 November. In May 1941 the squadron took part in the hunt for the Bismarck (again as observer a/c), and she was still on the Ark Royal when she was torpedoed on 13 November 1941. In the aftermath of this disaster No.808 was absorbed by No.807 Squadron"


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 20, 2012)

For example, from December thru the end of January 1942, VF-2 embarked on the Lexington continuously operated at a level of about 17 F2A-3s. It looks like (based on Lundstrom's day to day operational account of at sea periods) two F2As were lost in accidents unrelated to landing gear and there were about 2 or 3 hard landing associated landing gear related accidents. The Lex was able to keep at least 15 F2A-3's operational throughout that period, a number not too different than that of the squadrons operating F4F-3 and -3As. I am not a fan of the F2A-3, but its service during the first two months of the war when there was little else to put on the USN CVs, provides some indication that the aircraft, at that point not new to the fleet, was holding its own despite its _*notoriously weak gear.*_. The F2A-1 and -2 were lighter aircraft than the -3 even with their 4 HMGs. So, the problems with gear failure should have been and were less egregious than those of the -3.

Also RAFson, I want to apologize. I am quite tired tonight and find my patience to be a bit lacking. if my words appeared unduly sharp and I offended, mea culpa.


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## RCAFson (Jul 20, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> OK what doesn't seem to register is that you are GROSSLY exagerating the problem with the gear for the F2A-1. It really didn't become severe until the F2A-3. If it had been as bad as you claim the F2A-3 wouldn't have deployed neither would the F2A-2 or -1. The Finns certainly would have damned it. It worked very well for them over 3 years of intense fighting. B-239 ( 4xHMGs, minimal gear problems) = F2A-1 deployed with 4 HMGs (and suffered a premonitional gear problem during a hard deck landing). Aircraft landing on carriers occasionally land hard and break their gear. It happens, the aircraft gets fixed. It's a maintenance headache, not a debilitating problem, especially for an aircraft considerably lighter than the F2A-3.



Aircraft landing on carriers, using a hook, always land hard. A CV landing = about 100ft of deck roll, at most followed by a severe deceleration, and if you have ever seen an aircraft make an arrested landing, you will know what I'm talking about. The Finns experience with de-navalized F2A-1s tells us nothing about how they would fair on a carrier.

Peal harbour was on Dec 7th and the nearest carrier with F2A-3s was lexington:






First team, p26

so by 11 Dec, VF-2 was forced to "cease all operations until enemy contact became imminent" because of progressive LG failure. The Buffalo hasn't been a top pick for "worst fighter" for nothing, and there's no way the FAA would have ever accepted this aircraft for service; it just wasn't carrier ready and never would be.

"Also RAFson..." thanks, no worries.


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## Juha (Jul 20, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> The Fulmars got separated from the Kirkenes Albacore strike which, unescorted, suffered heavy looses, although many of these were from Flak, but even so they didn't do too badly, shooting down an Me110 for the loss of two Fulmars. Over Petsamo, one Fulmar fighter-bomber was lost in combat, but here the Albacores and Swordfish only lost one aircraft.



Now the separation of Fulmars from the strike planes seemed to have been intentional, at Kirkenes to distract Germans and at Petsamo the Fulmars used blocking tactics flying between Petsamo and the nearest German fighter base. Both formations lost 2 Fulmars, one of those lost near Petsamo seemed to has been lost because of engine failure, and the only lost Bf 110 was shot down by a Albacore rear gunner.



RCAFson said:


> A four .5" F2a strengthened for carrier landings? Then you are talking about the F2a-2 which entered service in Oct 1940, with no SS tanks; both of which were present on the Fulmar and Sea Hurricane 1B, which also had armour. Again, the FAA would have had to accept the f2A-2 without these mods, which is very unlikely, or wait until they could be fitted and accept the delay and the weak LG, which would put them into service after the Sea Hurricane.



In fact I'm talking about 3x.5+1x.303 F2A-1s, Finns were capable to do some mods by themselves so I suppose also FAA would be able to do something by thamselves and would probably have gotten some info from USN on the LG problems and their causes.

Juha


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## Kryten (Jul 20, 2012)

Not sure the Buffalo was suitable for replacing the Fulmar early in the war, simply because of the roles the Fulmar covered!

the extra crewmen in the fulmar were invaluable for recon and anti U-Boat operations, extra eyes are always a major advantage!


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 20, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> Aircraft landing on carriers, using a hook, always land hard. A CV landing = about 100ft of deck roll, at most followed by a severe deceleration, and if you have ever seen an aircraft make an arrested landing, you will know what I'm talking about. The Finns experience with de-navalized F2A-1s tells us nothing about how they would fair on a carrier.
> 
> Peal harbour was on Dec 7th and the nearest carrier with F2A-3s was lexington:
> 
> ...



If you have read the prior threads related to this topic you'll see I am not now nor have I ever been a great advocate of the F2A-3. My issue is the carrier sutiability of -1 or -2. But since you seem to be arguing that the -3 experience is indicative of what could be expected of the lighter -1 and -2 aircraft's carrier suitability, it's worth examining the Lundstrom quote more closer. The quote poses something of a conundrum. My earlier post implicitly referred to the F2A-3 exerience after PH to its removal from CV service on 25 January. My bad, I should have been more explicit. But the experience prior to Ramsey's December 11 comments is certainly worth examining.

VF-2 had been operating the F2A-3s for perhaps about 3-4 months prior to December 7 and had probably accumulated the bulk of the USN's experience with that new type (introduced to fleet service in summer 1941). During the attack on PH the Lex was and had been at sea conducting flight ops for some time prior to December 7. It was during that period that Ramsey cites the problems whose tally I had not included in my previous description. 

So, on December 11, Ramsey writes of 12 examples of progressive strut failure and 3 outright failures. I can imagine Ramsey with his maintenance officers generating a steady stream of alarming massages to BuAer alerting it to the problem. 

On December 13th Lex returned to PH and spent a day in port. The ship departed the 14th and commenced a series of at-sea periods including multi-week intervals of flight operations. Lundstrum and other sources cite the ops conducted as including IAP ASW and training missions. These are certainly not operations one would conduct with enemy contact imminent or with an aircraft responsible for air defense of your task force that was perceived to be at serious risk, unless Lexington's Admiral Brown, Captain Sherman or Air Group Commander Ault were incompetent; which they were not. So at one point Ramsey is reluctant to fly the F2A-3 and a week later he is flying them regularly on what are essentially routine ops. What do we make of this? Well Ramsey seeing the writing on the wall for the F2A-3 was anxious to dump them and get his hooks into the newer F4Fs (inbound as cargo carried by the Yorktown). So its possible he exagerates the progressive failure of the gear. That's just saavy politics. It's not a lie, but he sees the writing on the wall. 

However, the quote contains the line: "The squadron desparately required _*"reinforced struts to replace those in use"*_ This suggests the existence of an engineering fix.

So, the perhaps more likely scenario is that, during the Lex's brief time in port, VF-2 took possession of the "_reinforced struts"_ mentioned in the quoted text which might have been sent as a package for squadron organizational maintenance to install at sea, restoring the embarked aircraft to some semblance of operational capability, albeit temporary.

Well that's pretty much what happens with introduction of any new aircraft into the fleet. I've been through that process. You introduce a new aircraft and discover problems. You rush development of an engineering fix, then issue it to the fleet squadrons. The fix effectiveness may or may not be permanent and warrant subsequent work. In the case of the F2A-3 I assume the fix, if it existed and was issued, was anticipated to be temporary especially with Grumman's much faster production line and more robust F4F in the offing. Why bother to pursue a permanent solution? Just get it off the USN flight decks as quick as possible and replace them with Wildcats, which is what happened.

Your comments seem to be suggesting that the F2A-1's landing gear problems were so severe, that the USN deployed it to the Sara in 1940 AFTER adding the full armanent option and its associated added weight and then purchased the heavier F2A-2 and operated it from carriers until the F2A-3 bcame available in mid-1941. The F2A-3 was built to a navy specification that increased its weight even more which argues against a perception of the F2A-1 and -2's gear problems were considered serious except in retrospect with the -3. 

In my career, I've attributed to the Navy some actions that I've judged to be downright stupid but I stop short of imagining the USN and BuAer would intentionally acquire progressively heavier versions of a carrier based aircraft whose landing gear was judged and shown by experience to be unsound. At some point the USN modified nine sets of F2A-3 wings to accomodate the _*even heavier 20 mm cannon*_ instead of the standard .50's. (Mass) Maas also makes the point that landing gear failures decreased significantly simply by increasing tire pressure. 

I assure you, you don't need to remind me what it's like to land on an aircraft carrier. I've experienced dozens of landings in a 25+ ton aircraft during carrier quals and deployments on three different carriers, two of which were WW2 era (abeit modified to have an angle) flight decks including the Lexington (CVT-16) and the Hancock (CVA-19). Yes, you are correct, carrier landings are generally harder. Hopefully the hardest one you make doesn't happen when the ship is riding a swell causing it to rise and meet you halfway. But field landings can also be every bit as hard. I've been in aircraft that were planted on runways every bit as hard as any carrier landing I experienced. Over a period of 3 years, virtually all pilots are going to have a bad day and plant one on the runway. Some do it more often than others. We typically call the ones that do it repeatedly: "plumbers." So, the Finns extended experience does tell us something about the F2A-1. It held up well under trying combat conditions for over three years, including their share of hard landings, each being flown by a variety of pilots. Most imporatant of all, it was an aircraft designed from the start for carrier landings and had performed satisfactorily for the USN in that capacity.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 20, 2012)

Pars, on reflection, I'd probably choose a Fulmar over a B-339B, for its many good qualities and in hindsight for its excellent service.


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## parsifal (Jul 20, 2012)

Just be aware that i am not saying the fulmar was a better fighter. But its the utility of the fulmar over the brewster that makes the difference.

oddly enough, as a choice for the USN, i would pick the brewster over the fulmar. USN didnt need GP aircraft. They needed the best of each category that they could lay their hands on


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 20, 2012)

Not surpisingly, I agree with your assessment. The utility of the Fulmar in its varied roles was impressive. Everything I've read about it suggests it was an aircraft as sweet to fly as its elegant lines suggest.


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## RCAFson (Jul 20, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> In my career, I've attributed to the Navy some actions that I've judged to be downright stupid but I stop short of imagining the USN and BuAer would intentionally acquire progressively heavier versions of a carrier based aircraft whose landing gear was judged and shown by experience to be unsound. At some point the USN modified nine sets of F2A-3 wings to accomodate the _*even heavier 20 mm cannon*_ instead of the standard .50's. (Mass) Maas also makes the point that landing gear failures decreased significantly simply by increasing tire pressure.


 
You have to go back in time and look at the situation facing the USN in 39-40; It seemed to many that Britain was facing defeat during the BofB. Japan was rapidly re-arming and the need for new, high performance monoplane fighters was critical. There were demands for US built aircraft from all quarters and Grumman was having lots of trouble getting a new monoplane design sorted out (the F4F), and Brewster was the only other game in town. Consequently the USN held their nose and ordered the F2A, in small quantities, pending service evaluations. None of the F2A variants subsequently proved to be reliable in service, and as soon as practicable, the USN removed the F2A from carrier servive and then from front line service. The F2A only ever found itself in USN/USMC service because of a combination of dire events and a lack of alternatives.


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## Juha (Jul 20, 2012)

Kryten said:


> Not sure the Buffalo was suitable for replacing the Fulmar early in the war, simply because of the roles the Fulmar covered!
> 
> the extra crewmen in the fulmar were invaluable for recon and anti U-Boat operations, extra eyes are always a major advantage!



Hello Kryten
I and I believe also oldcrowcv63 are playing with the idea that FAA instead of FiAF had got the ex-USN F2A-1s early in 1940, a few months earlier than Fulmar arrived. It might well be a stretch that in that case F2A-1 could have operated from Glorious during later part of Norway Campaign but in any case the lifts of pre-Ark Royal RN carriers could handle it, so it might have been useful aboard those older carriers, Eagle, Furious and Hermes for ex in Med, it climbed clearly better than Fulmar and was 30+km/h faster but had more or less same range and loiter time. Against Italian bombers Fulmar might well be better armed but not against LW planes and F2A-1 could have hold its own against Italian MC 200 and Fiat G.50bis, same goes to F2A-2. F2A-3 was clearly an overburden plane.

Juha


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## RCAFson (Jul 20, 2012)

Juha said:


> Now the separation of Fulmars from the strike planes seemed to have been intentional, at Kirkenes to distract Germans and at Petsamo the Fulmars used blocking tactics flying between Petsamo and the nearest German fighter base. Both formations lost 2 Fulmars, one of those lost near Petsamo seemed to has been lost because of engine failure, and the only lost Bf 110 was shot down by a Albacore rear gunner.
> 
> 
> 
> ...



The FAA plan can be read here:
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/LondonGazette/38300.pdf
and it clearly states that the Fulmars were to have joined up with the Albacores prior to the attack:



> 2. A striking force consisting of 12 Albacores
> of No. 827 Squadron and 8 Albacbres of No. 828
> Squadron was flown off in one range at 1400 on
> 30th July. All aircraft were armed with torpedoes
> ...




Luftwaffe records confirm the loss of one Me110 to a Fulmar, and a Ju-87 to an Albacore forward gun.


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## Juha (Jul 21, 2012)

Hello RCAFson
Fulmars had their orders but the formation leader decided to ignore them because of the heavy AA fire, they overtook the Albacores but then the Fulmar leader decided to act according to his judgement. The Bf 110 crew survived and at least the pilot survived the war and visited Finland less than year ago, according to him they were shot down by an Albacore rear gunner. With the rear seat man onboard, it would have been very difficult for Fulmar attack them unnoticed during low level combat.

Juha


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## parsifal (Jul 21, 2012)

This is what is written up on the FAA website about the buffaloes in FAA service. Its hard to envisage the buffalo entering service in time to fight at Norway in april 1940, even if the Finnish order was acquired. FAA had a lot of trouble with the conversions as the following discussion shows:

"_The F2A Buffalo was the first monoplane carrier fighter of the USN, designed in response to a requirement issued in 1935 with specifications for a replacement for the Grumman F3F biplane equipping ythe USNs four carriers. Brewster Aeronautical Corporation developed a design for a modern monoplane fighter with an enclosed cabin and retractable landing gear.The F2A had a small barrel-shaped fuselage, small wings, retractable narrow-track landing gear and an enclosed cockpit. The undercarriage was insufficiently strong for carrier operations. Development of the F2A Buffalo began in 1936. The first prototype XF2A-1 flew on 2 December 1937. 

Since the aircraft was superior to the Seversky XNF-1 and its chief competitor, the Grumman XF4F-2 (Grumman F4F-2 Wildcat), was not ready, the Buffalo was initially selected as a new fighter for the US Navy. The Navy accepted the XF2A-1 during June of 1938 and ordered series production of the F2A-1 for its carriers. Fifty-nine aircraft had been built by 1939. Altogether, 750 were built. 

A total of 27 Buffaloes entered the Fleet Air Arm register. 26 Buffalo Is were diverted from a Belgium contract following the invasion by Germany in 1940. In September 1940, the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough tested Brewster serial 430 built for Belgium. Flight testing the Brewster Buffalo These are excerpts from reports from the UK to the USA and subsequently archived at the National Air Space Museum. 

The first RN delivery was to TOC 804 sqd at Hatston - tested on July 1940-September 1940 (AS422). By March 1941 Buffaloes were serving with 805 squadron based at Dekheila, HMS Eagle and Maleme. The aircraft saw limited action with the Fleet Air Arm. 

Early in 1941, as test pilot for the Royal Navy, Capt Eric Brown RN flew scores of aircraft from many nations, including a Belgian-order Brewster 339 at Royal Naval Air Station, Yeovilton along with a Grumman Martlet. He described them "They were both tubby little single-seat fighters with a very purposeful air about them,". Brown noted that there were 40 of these planes, acquired when Belgium fell to the Germans, and shipped to Britain aboard HMS Furious. They were assembled at Burtonwood, later an American base. 

Of the 27 Buffalo with the FAA only one is known to have been shot down- Aircraft AX813 failed to return from a patrol, after being shot down North West of Sidi Barrani on 17 June 1941 (Lt KL Keith taken POW, died of wounds 26 June 1941).

Service: 
With FAA, Australia, US Navy, navy of Finland, Belgium, and Holland 
Modifications: 
F2A-1 : first production version 
F2A-2 : upgraded engine, released October 1940 
F2A-3 : improved airframe, upgraded electronics 
B-239 : export version of F2A-1 
B-339 : export version of F2A-2 


One of the Belgian Buffalo subsequently entering FAA service

Fleet Air Arm history 

Total FAA 1939-1945: 27 
First delivered to RN: 1940.TOC 804 sqd Hatston tested 7.40-9.40 (AS422), 8.40 
TOC RN 10.40 (AS413) 
First squadron 1939-1945: as above and then 805 sqdn at Dekheila/HMS Eagle and 
Maleme 3.41. May 1941 to 759 sqdn Yeovilton 
Operational squadron: 804 sqdn at Hatston 7. 40, and 805 sqdn Dekheila/HMS Eagle and Maleme March 1941 
Last served with RN 1941/1942 


Aircraft Type: Brewster F2A Buffalo 
Mark: F2A 
Primary Role: Carrier borne Fighter 
First Flight: prototype was on 2 December 1937 
Date operating with FAA squadrons: 19401-1941 
Manufacturer: Brewster Aircraft Corp. 
Engine: One 1200 hp Wright R-1820-40 engine 
Wing Span: Length: Height: Wing Area: Wingspan: 10.67 m 
Length: 8.05 m 
Empty Weight: Max.Weight: Weight: 2957 kg 
Max. speed: 518 km/h 
Ceiling : 10000 m 
Range: 2400 km 
Armament: Four 12.7mm guns 
Crew: 1 
Squadrons: 759,760, 
804,805,813,885 
Battle honours: Mediterranean 
Additional references and notes: - 


Battle Honours and Operational History

Although only serving with the Fleet Air Arm for a relatively short time the Buffalo saw combat action in the Mediterranean. Elsewhere, the only US unit to use it in combat was an USMC squadron defending Midway. 
The one operation Fleet Air Arm squadrom with Buffalo, 805 Squadron formed in February 1941 with 12 Fairey Fulmar two-seat fighters, carrier capable, to support a planned invasion of Rhodes, off the coast of Turkey, held by Italians. Based at Maleme in northeastern Crete. Three Buffaloes (AS419, AS420, AX814) along with 6 more Fulmars flew in from Dekheila. The Buffalo flight commanded by Lt. Rupert Brabner, formerly Member of Parliament for Hyth. "The Buffalo was a delight to fly--very maneuverable (compared to the Fulmar). It would have been an excellent fighter but the guns could not be fired because the ends of the wires which were part of the interrupter gear, failed and 805 did not have the necessary spares." 

On 18th March, Lt. Brabner had his first skirmish, chasing a Ju88 without catching it--while flying a Fulmar, perhaps indicative of his opinion of the Buffalo. He was up again next day, mounted on AS419, only to turn back because of engine trouble. He crash- landed short of the airfield, and the Brewster flipped over on its back, fortunately without injury to the MP. A photograph shows it resting very sturdily on its plexiglass canopy. That seems to have been the Brewster's only sortie from Crete. By the end of April: "The two remaining Buffalos were also totally unservicable now." When German paratroopers over-ran Crete at the end of May, the Brewsters were apparently left in the boneyard. German photographers delighted in photographing their planes landing over the hulk of a derelict Brewster. Christopher Shores et al: Air War for Yugoslavia Greece and Crete 1940-41 (London: Grub Street 1987_)"


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 21, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> You have to go back in time and look at the situation facing the USN in 39-40; It seemed to many that Britain was facing defeat during the BofB. Japan was rapidly re-arming and the need for new, high performance monoplane fighters was critical. There were demands for US built aircraft from all quarters and Grumman was having lots of trouble getting a new monoplane design sorted out (the F4F), and Brewster was the only other game in town. Consequently the USN held their nose and ordered the F2A, in small quantities, pending service evaluations. None of the F2A variants subsequently proved to be reliable in service, and as soon as practicable, the USN removed the F2A from carrier servive and then from front line service. The F2A only ever found itself in USN/USMC service because of a combination of dire events and a lack of alternatives.





Well, I must admit, that's a version of history to which I had not been previously exposed, although I do see _as through a glass darkly _a history I recongize. I have never gotton the impression that the USN was "h_olding its nose_" at the delvery of F2A-1 or -2 products, quite the contrary, The it is my understanding that the USN wanted all the F2A-1s Brewster could produce; at least until the advent and promise of more powerful engines made the F2A-1 less desirable then a more modern aircraft. The USN was certainly holding its nose in having to deal with the Brewster corporation. The problem was Brewster couldn't fullfill its USN ontracts in a timely fashion. If Brewster had produced all 54 of the F2A-1s by late 1938 or early 1939 (especially before the XF4F-3 flew on 2/12/39), the USN might very likely have bought more of them. If that had forestalled the USN issuing the contract to Grumman for 54 F4F-3s, what a disaster of epic proportions that would have been. At the time, 54 aircraft constituted three squadron's allotment of aircraft It was a standard first order for a new aircraft and was probably all the government could afford in a pinch.

The F2A-1 had won the (early 1938) competition with the F4F-2 handily but couldn't get deliveries of the NACA-improved production model out the factory door. It was a better airplane that the F4F-2 and that's why the USN wanted it. Grumman went back to their drawing boards and thru 1938 produced a greatly improved version (the XF4F-3), essentially a different aircraft, that took to the air for the first time in ealy 1939. My understanding is that in 1939, Grumman was not having problems with the F4F airframe but with the P&W 1830-76 engine which was prone to overheating. The Grumman itself is reputed to have had landing gear problems, obviously not ever as severe as those of the F2A-3. My guess is that whatever the problems seen early in the history of the F2A-1 and -2, they were statistically similar to those of the Grumman. Clearly the Grumman's gear, designed for a heavier aircraft and backed by roughly a decade of engineering development proved more robust and accomodated weight gains the Brewster product could not.

The USN had taken delivery of only about half a squadron of what was clearly an aging design by the end of 1939. From wikipedia:

In *April 1939*, the Finnish government contacted the Roosevelt administration in a search to hastily acquire modern combat aircraft for its air force. On 17 October that same year, the Finnish Embassy in Washington, DC, received a telegram clearing the purchase of fighter aircraft. Prompt availability, and compatibility with 87-octane fuel, were the only requirements stipulated by the Finns.[45] *The U.S. Navy and State Department arranged to divert the remaining F2A-1 fighter aircraft,[N 9] in exchange for its order of F2A-2 Buffalos scheduled to be delivered later *(and hence sent to the U.S. Navy, instead).

(Of course at that point the F2A-1 wasn't yet the _Buffalo_.) Strapped for cash to buy advanced fighters? Let's make a deal! I'l give you my old model in exchange for a newer higher performing model. Of course, by then the question had become would the new model (F2A-2) compare favorably to the up and coming F4F-3? Turns out it did. 

However, the first F4F-3 flew in early 1939, was ordered into production 8/8/39 with the first USN squadron taking possession of its A/C in late 1940 which happened to be about the same time as the F2A-2 production order of 44 aircraft had been completed. I believe, that's about as good as Brewster ever got in production quantity and even then it was behind Grumman.

with respect to the carrier suitability of either the F2A-1 or -2

I have heard of one anecdotal instance of an F2A-1 gear failure during ops on the Sara during the summer of 1940. If you have references that cite additional *chronic* landing gear failures gear problems or failures of the F2A-1 and F2A-2 during carrier operations through their years of service (1940-41) I'd certainly be grateful to be enlightened. In the meantime, I can offer a record of the history of F2A-1 and -2's in USN service: While landing gear is mentioned as damaged in a number of incidents, it isn't in the context of chronic problems which would come from the maintenance records. When gear does collapse in the -2 the incident is identified.

http://www.warbirdforum.com/f2a1.htm

For the 42 F2A-2:

http://www.warbirdforum.com/buffno.pdf

Bureau No.	Squadron	Delivered	Carrier	Incidents in squadron service
1398	VF-3	9/16/40	CV-3	damaged 3/19/41
1399	"	9/13/40	"	
1400	"	"	"	Crash 10/2/40
1401	"	"	"	
1402	"	9/16/40	"	
1403	"	"	"	Crash 9/2/41
1404	"	10/7/40	"	
1405	"	"	"	
1406	VF-2 "	CV-2	
1407	"	10/14/40	"	Crash 1/29/41
1408	"	"	"	wing damage 8/1/41
1409	"	"	"	
1410	"	"	"	
1411	"	11/28/40	"	delivered late due to engine problem
1412	"	10/21/40	"	
1413	"	"	"	Belly landing 3/3/41
1414	"	"	"	
1415	"	" 
1416	"	10/25/40	"	
1417	"	"	"	
1418	"	"	"	
1419	"	"	"	*Landng Gear Collapsed CV-2 5/22/40*
1420	"	"	"	Crash 2/24/41
1421	"	"	"	Crash 4/1/41
1422	"	"	"	Deck Crash 3/3/41
1423	"	10/28/40	"	
1424	VF-3	10/28/40	CV-3	
1425	"	11/8/40	"	Crash 7/24/41
1426 Retained at Brewster
1427	VF-3	11/8/40	CV-3	Crashd 10/31/41
1428	"	11/5/40	"	
1429	"	11/12/40	"	
1430	"	11/8/40	"	Crashed 5/25/41
1431	"	11/18/40	"	
1432	"	11/19/40	"	Belly Landing 9/12/41
1433	"	11/28/40	"	
1434	"	11/19/40	"	
1435	"	11/18/40	"	
1436	"	11/27/40	"	
1437	"	11/28/40	"	Crashed, destroyed 12/23/41
1438	VF-2	11/28/40	"	
1439	"	11/28/40	"	

Bottom Line:

In a listing for the F2A-2 Bureau numbers 1397 - 1439, one Landing gear collapse is cited on 5/22/41 during ops on the Lexington during a deployment to Hawaii, and for an aircraft that had been in squadron service for 5 months and at sea operating for two months among a squadron of about 20 F2A-2s. That sounds to me pretty much like _fleet average_. Before that sea tour, the squadron would have flown out to the _boat_ for its carrier qualification period, during which each pilot would have landed his aircraft probably at least half a dozen times. Those are typically the hardest landings for an aircraft to shake off, as the aviators get the feel of their aircraft. Bottom line is the F2A-2 was like its older brother, a perfectly sound, if in hindsight, somewhat obsolescent carrier aircraft and either probably an improvement for the CAP role over what was in the FAA stable. 

As to the British nearly losing the BoB, well my understanding from revisionist historians is that that was never close to happening and was simply a Churchillian propaganda ploy to separate Uncle Sugar from his aircraft.


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## RCAFson (Jul 21, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> with respect to the carrier suitability of either the F2A-1 or -2
> 
> I have heard of one anecdotal instance of an F2A-1 gear failure during ops on the Sara during the summer of 1940. If you have references that cite additional *chronic* landing gear failures gear problems or failures of the F2A-1 and F2A-2 during carrier operations through their years of service (1940-41) I'd certainly be grateful to be enlightened. In the meantime, I can offer a record of the history of F2A-1 and -2's in USN service: While landing gear is mentioned as damaged in a number of incidents, it isn't in the context of chronic problems which would come from the maintenance records. When gear does collapse in the -2 the incident is identified.



Look at VF-2; Aircraft were being removed from service as their LG deteriorated, and progressive deterioration was being noted in nearly all the rest. Aircraft were then progressively removed from service as the LG reached it's limits. This is why the accident stats don't show a high number of LG failures.


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## RCAFson (Jul 21, 2012)

Juha said:


> Hello RCAFson
> Fulmars had their orders but the formation leader decided to ignore them because of the heavy AA fire, they overtook the Albacores but then the Fulmar leader decided to act according to his judgement. The Bf 110 crew survived and at least the pilot survived the war and visited Finland less than year ago, according to him they were shot down by an Albacore rear gunner. With the rear seat man onboard, it would have been very difficult for Fulmar attack them unnoticed during low level combat.
> 
> Juha



Regardless, the Fulmars were not with the Albacores when the Albacores were attacked.

You'll excuse me if I'm skeptical about that. None of the Albacores claimed an Me-110, while the Fulmars claimed 2 and a probable. Maybe there was another Me-110 loss not noted in the "incomplete" Luftwaffe loss register cited on the wikipedia page?


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 21, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> Look at VF-2; Aircraft were being removed from service as their LG deteriorated, and progressive deterioration was being noted in nearly all the rest. Aircraft were then progressively removed from service as the LG reached it's limits. This is why the accident stats don't show a high number of LG failures.



Do you have a reference for that? Or are you infering it from the website record? If not the website, I'd sure like to see it. From what I've gathered to date, the F2A-2s that weren't destroyed during regular ops were kept circulating among CV embarked squadrons (basically exchanges between VF-2 and VF-3) until they were put ashore when replaced by either F2A-3 or the F4F-3. In other words, the time to failure for the F2A--1 and -2 was long enough to be kept doing CV ops for up to a year at least. THat exceeds the RN FAA requirement for a gap filler and so ignoring the problems with the Brewster Company and the stuggle to accelerate introduction of the A/C to the FAA at warp speed, the F2A-1 would have enhanced the capability during its most problematic year.


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## RCAFson (Jul 21, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Do you have a reference for that? Or are you infering it from the website record? If not the website, I'd sure like to see it. From what I've gathered to date, the F2A-2s that weren't destroyed during regular ops were kept circulating among CV embarked squadrons (basically exchanges between VF-2 and VF-3) until they were put ashore when replaced by either F2A-3 or the F4F-3. In other words, the time to failure for the F2A--1 and -2 was long enough to be kept doing CV ops for up to a year at least. THat exceeds the RN FAA requirement for a gap filler and so ignoring the problems with the Brewster Company and the stuggle to accelerate introduction of the A/C to the FAA at warp speed, the F2A-1 would have enhanced the capability during its most problematic year.


 

Please read the last paragraph again:
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/at...better-off-brewster-buffalo-first_team_26.jpg
and note that the squadron was effectively grounded to prevent the loss of F2A-3s due to progressive LG failure ; the aircraft were not simply flown to destruction! Also not that 3 LG struts had already failed, but there are not 3 corresponding F2A-3 losses, because these aircraft were simply unservicable rather than written off.


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## buffnut453 (Jul 21, 2012)

But Oldcrow's post was about F2A-2s not F2A-3s. In the 1940 timeframe the FAA would have been looking at the F2A-2.


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## RCAFson (Jul 21, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> But Oldcrow's post was about F2A-2s not F2A-3s. In the 1940 timeframe the FAA would have been looking at the F2A-2.


 
The F2A-2 came out after SS tanks and armour would have been required. Add these and the LG begins to fail at an unacceptable rate.


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## buffnut453 (Jul 21, 2012)

And you know this because???


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 21, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> The F2A-2 came out after SS tanks and armour would have been required. Add these and the LG begins to fail at an unacceptable rate.



You actually have a pretty good point even with respect to the F2A-1. I think its time to do a weight study. The added weight that proved fatal to the landing gear won't come from the added twin .50's but it will accumulate with other changes to make it FAA combat ready. So, it's looking like we have a sliding scale. The lightest variant, F2A-1 flew carrier ops for a period of about a year, and was reasonably sound. The F2A-2 appeared to fair well over a similar time frame. In contrast the F2A-3 began to suffer chronic failure about 2-3 months after its introduction. My guess is that you could weigh the F2A-2 down to a GW short of the F2A-3 and it would still be an effective gap filler; although it wouldn't appear in service until late 1940 - early 1941. The F2A-1 remains a question, not so much for the gear issue in my mind, but how much weight gain will that lower-power Wright engine allow? Since I am on the road, and don't have mycopy of AHT, I can't do a decent weight gain analysis.
The FiAF was happy with minimal back armor and that was my going-in assumption. Would the FAA accept that sparse protection as readily as the FiAF? I doubt it, but I don't know how much armor/SS tanks the Skua or Gladiator had as an indicator or reference. In the end it may be a matter of just how desparate was the FAA for a high performance fighter. As desparate or committed as the IJN? As Desparate as the FiAF? I don't know the answer. I do feel certain the F2A-1 equipped as the Finn B239's would have been a real boost for the FAA during a period between the stop-gaps: GSG and Skua and adoption of the Martlet. JMHO


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 21, 2012)

Double Post 

Don't know how that happened???


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 21, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> The F2A-2 came out after SS tanks and armour would have been required. Add these and the LG begins to fail at an unacceptable rate.



RAF, There is undoubtedly a correllation between aircraft weight and gear failure time, which I don't think we know yet from the information at hand. the F2A-2 with armor (including bullet wind screen) and SS tanks isn't going to weigh quite as much as an F2A-3 because IIRC, there were other changes that increased its gross weight in addition to those two items. I don't know yet how much less such an F2A-2 would weigh or what else could be deleted without weight tables. The F2A variant weight data may be in the forum tech section, or someone may show pitty and clarify our mutual ignorance on this account by having ready access to AHT. 

Websites which provide perhaps a ball-park start for such an analysis is Joe Baugher's: 

Index of /navy_fighters

and Jack McKillop:

Brewster F2A Buffalo by Jack McKillop

Though frankly I don't think either provide enough information to be truly helpful. I didn't see any ammo capacity figures or engine weights, 

According to the web sites, the weights of each F2A version was.
1. F2A-1 empty 3,785 lbs., Gross wt: 5,055 lbs., Max T/O wt.: 5,370 lbs. (Assume includes the 2 additional .5" HMGs)
2. *B239* empty 3,900 lbs., Gross wt: 5,842 lbs., (assumd to include 2 additional .5" and the one .5" replacement gun, plus seat armor)
3. *F2A-2* empty: 4,576 lbs, Gross wt.: 5,942 lbs., Max T/O wt.: 6,890 lbs.
4. B339B/E/D: empty: 4,576 lbs, Gross wt.: 5,942 lbs., Max T/O wt.: 6,890 lbs ??? (couldn't find any numbers)
3. F2A-2 empty: 4,732 lbs., Gross wt.: 6,321 lbs., Max T/O wt.: 7,159 lbs.

Web sites really don't seem to provide enough additional information beyond these weights and the data is inevitably suspect with many just rehashing and perpetuating misinformation.


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## buffnut453 (Jul 22, 2012)

Ok, here are some more detailed weight charts for the F2A-1 and F2A-3 (sadly I don't have them for the -2):

F2A-1 F2A-3 
Empty: 3810.5 4765.3
Wing Group: 732.8 870.9
Tail Group: 107.0 107.0
Body Group: 820.3 895.7
Engine Section: 143.4 165.1
Powerplant: 1555.3 2087.9
Crew: 200.0 200.0
Fuel: 960.0 1440.0
Oil: 68.0 83.1
Armament: 437.6 (4xguns) 692.5
Equipment: 128.1 132.8

So the big-ticket items in terms of weight gain were the engine, the fuel and the extra ammo for the guns. If we assume the same engine went into the F2A-2 as the -3 (which it did) then we're looking at a total increase of approx 762lbs for fuel, ammo, and the longer fuselage. This total compares to approx 427lbs increase for other sundry items (213.5lbs added to the wing and fuselage groups and the same amount for "fixed equipment).


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## RCAFson (Jul 23, 2012)

According to the SAC data, the F2a-2 weighed 4253lb, empty, and all up weight with 160usg, 4 x .5in and 900rnds = 6194lb while the F2a-3 weighed 4894lb, empty, and all up weight with 160usg, 4 x .5in and 1300rnds = 7253lb

http://www.alternatewars.com/SAC/F2A-2_Buffalo_PD_-_1_May_1943.pdf
http://www.alternatewars.com/SAC/F2A-3_Buffalo_PD_-_1_December_1942.pdf

I have to admit that I find the F2A-3 performance figures, especially the climb rates, to be somewhat unbelievable, given the weight, power output and wing area of the aircraft. The wing loading is incredibly high for the F2A-3.


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## Trilisser (Jul 23, 2012)

Some comments:

1) The F2A was at least 50 km/h faster than the Fulmar or Sea Gladiator. This is, according to some, very little. Well, the Tempest was about 30 km/h (according to Frank Mason, 15 mph at about 20,000 ft if the Tiffie had a 4-bladed prop) faster than the Typhoon, and in many texts you'll find the former described as "greatly" faster...

2) According to a wartime lecture by Hans Wind, no. 2 ace of FiAF, the Hurricane was easy to shoot down and caught fire very easily. So apparently its SS tanks weren't too effective.

3) FiAF no. 1 ace, E. I. Juutilainen criticised wing armament (based on his experiences with the F2A) very heavily on the grounds that their dispersion was too great and the varying rate of fire between left and right wing guns caused greatly disturbing directional snaking. He suggested moving the wing guns either in the fuselage or the wing roots, i.e. he felt that closely mounted synchronized guns were far better than unsynchronized wing guns.

4) Though some undercarriage problems were encountered by FiAF too, it has to be remembered that they remained in service throughout the war basically without any spares support from the manufacturer. IIRC one Buffalo amassed nearly 1000 flying hours.

5) The field conditions weren't too easy. In Robert Winston's book "Lento Suomeen" a report is reproduced containing e.g. a Finnish complaint about how some minor rear fuselage damage was incurred after taxying through a 20 in high snow bank...


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 23, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> According to the SAC data, the F2a-2 weighed 4253lb, empty, and all up weight with 160usg, 4 x .5in and 900rnds = 6194lb while the F2a-3 weighed 4894lb, empty, and all up weight with 160usg, 4 x .5in and 1300rnds = 7253lb
> 
> http://www.alternatewars.com/SAC/F2A-2_Buffalo_PD_-_1_May_1943.pdf
> http://www.alternatewars.com/SAC/F2A-3_Buffalo_PD_-_1_December_1942.pdf
> ...



IIUC, you share the skepticism of some Naval aviators who flew and commented on the Buff F2A-3 performance. I believe there is an aneccdotal story passed among them that cast doubt on the company advertised performance of both the F2A-3 and F4F-4. Of course the user community was more than a bit disappointed at both designs when they arrived in those particular incarnations. I Believe Lundstrom quotes Grumman performance as ~1,800 to 20,000 ft while one pilot source found the F4F-4 climbed more like 1,500 fpm to 15,000. (page 140-141)

(One of the penalties suffered by the F4F-4 were somewhat redeemed in its FM-1 version whose decreased ammo supply (source of one complaint) was increased in an amount that negated the weight loss obtained by deleting two .5" HMGs. In that case, with the FM-1 largely flying from escort carriers providing a secondary ground support role. the increased firing time made more sense than a minute or two improvement in its time to climb to 30,000 ft, a capabiity more important in 1942 before the advent of the Hellcat and Corsair. 

To be fair, its possible your skepticism may be influenced by the decades of "trash talk" about the later "Buffaloes" and masked whatever few performance quality the bloated later-progeny may have possessed. As I understand it, the heavy export buffs didn't have the slightly more powerful engine of the F2A-3 and by many accounts related in this forum. Even those weren't THAT bad. I underestimated the time the B-239's spent in service for the FiAF. Evidently it was about 4.5 years of flying (early 1940 to early Fall 1944) and perhaps even longer, with just over 3 years in actual combat..


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## RCAFson (Jul 23, 2012)

The SAC data suggest that at 6194lb that the *F2A-2 had a time to 20,000ft of 10.4 minutes*, while at 7253lb the *F2A-3 had a time to 20,000ft of 10.2 minutes*, yet both aircraft had the same engine!

Obviously, this can't be true.


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## RCAFson (Jul 23, 2012)

Trilisser said:


> Some comments:



How much did the FiAF Buffalo weigh?


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 23, 2012)

For what it's worth,I found this on another forum. Interesting stuff *and note the dates given of the beginning of the landing gear failures...*

_1932: The Brewster Aeronautical Corporation is formed. The company build aircraft parts for the big manufacturers

1935: The USN accepts a Brewster design for a monoplane dive bomber, 

1936: Brewster and Grumman make bids for the Navy´s new fighter 

1937: Brewster’s fighter prototype flies in December. Production of the SBN will be done in the Naval Aircraft Factory as Brewster lacks the capability to produce the 30(!) planes the USN orders.


1938:

March: Brewster´s, Grumman´s and Sewersky´s prototypes are tested

June: The USN orders 54 Buffalos, Navy designation F2A-1

August: Brewster looks for partners. Brewster knows it lacks the capability to manufacture the fighters, while Consolidated Aircraft does not have a fighter on offer. Thus both companies merge. Production of aircraft parts remains in NYC, while Brewster’s successful design team and [edit] fighter production is moved to Buffalo(NY), 


1939:

May: Delivery of the F2A-1 begins. The USN is not amused about the late delivery. 

August – December: The UK, Poland, Finland and Belgium order almost 500 Buffalos


1940:

*February: VF-3 on USS Saratoga is fully equipped with F2A-1 and almost immediately begins to suffer landing gear malufunctions.*
March: Production of the F2A-2 starts

April: VF-3 gets it´s first F2A-3 and continues to experience landing gear troubles. BruCon´s engineers take notice and action! 

December: BruCon send mod-kits for the landing gear to the USN. After the installation no more landing gear failures occur. 


1941:

January: The USN orders 108 F2A-3 with self sealing fuel tanks. BruCo engineers conclude the two main 80 gallon tanks are too closely integrated into the wing structure that they are de facto unprotetable. They suggest the following stop gap measures; closing off one 80 gallon tank in a combat area, the installation of three smaller protected tanks with 80 gallons of fuel and a CO2 purging system for the remaining 80 gallon tank. USN officials appreciate the high quality of BruCon´s workmanship and especially the quick problem fixing, but they are sceptical about a total re-design of the wing structure. Until BruConn engineers tell them the fuel capacity after the re-design might be as high as 200 gallons if all five tanks are retained. At that point the USN officials almost start to drool and tell BruCon to go ahead ASAP.

May: the XF4F-4 with a folding wing is tested

June: the USN changes the specs for the F2A-4, they want the plane to have a folding wing. Since that folding mechanism sits roughly where the main fuel tanks are BruCon has to go back to square one. The engineers go to work, but not before requesting a large number of photos of the naval officers in charge of the Buffalo program. The pictures are immediately used for dart practice and other forms of aggression relief by BruCon engineers.

December 7th: The F2A-4 is not yet ready. Given the rather limited looses of naval fighters the USN does not want the production to start until all tanks are protected.



1942:

mid-January: In light of the massive setbacks in SEA the USN orders the production of the Buffalo to resume immediately. The F2A-3.5 as wiseasses call her, is basically an A-3 with the more reliable P&W-engine and it´s superior two stage supercharger, while still having the unsatisfactory fuel tank protection of the A-3. About 50 are send to units in the continental USA to free Wildcats for combat. The remaining 70 are send to Australia as Lend&Lease. 

Mid-February: the first F2A-4 rolls off the production line. Due to the protective measures, the re-desinged wing and the wing folding mechanism the two main fuel tank´s capacity has dropped form 160 gallons to 100. Thus total internal fuel is 180 gallons – 36 more than a Wildcat has. The USN is still pleased.

March: The first A-3.5 fighters arrive in Australia. RAAF pilots could hardly be happier to exchange their Wirraways for a real warplane. 

May: BruCon get an order for 1,000 de-navalized(=lighter) Buffalos. Internal fuel capacity of the fixed wing fighter is 200 gallons. 

June: after the Battle of Midway a surviving VMF-221 pilot says: “It is my belief that any commander that orders pilots out for combat in an F2A-3 should consider the pilot as lost before leaving the ground.” RAAF pilots acidly reply: “Anybody who enters a dogfight with a Zero should be considered insane!” 

July: Delivery of the P-45A to the USAAF starts. 5th AF has been utterly disappointed at the inability of the P-39 and P-40 to intercept high flxying Japanese bombers and equally impressed by the good performance of the F2A-3.5

September: The first P-45A arrive in Australia. It becomes a standing joke that a koala bear could out climb a fully loaded P-45, but the fighter get´s good ratings. The lower speed is not appreciated, the good performance over 15,000 get´s nothing but praise, firepower and protection are good, the almost bubbly canopy deeply impresses P-40 pilots, just like the excellent range(authors note: a P-40 with 161 gallons of internal fuel and a 75g drop tank had a combat radius of 300 miles, an OTL F2A-3 got 350miles with 160 gallons internal fuel only). Furthermore the P-45 still being a navy fighter needs about a third of a P-40´s take off distance, allowing the Buffalos to operate literally from half finished airfields no Army fighter could possibly use. 
This and the fine range wins the still overloaded and underpowered P-45 a lot of admiration. 


1943:

March: Grumman start the mass production of the F6F Hellcat

May: Production of Army and Navy Buffalos ends as more advanced fighters enter production, like the F6F, P-47 and BruCon´s F8F. The de-navalized Army version is called P-48. Both planes go by the name “Bison”.


Major technical changes to the TL: 


-Brewster merging with a bigger company resulting in well made planes that are delivered on time(with the exception of the first batch) that´s sooner than in OTL. 
-quick fix of landing gear failures, that remaind unfixed in OTL
-wing, fuel tank re-design
-change of engine


Please note: 
My F2A-3.5 and -4 have the Wildcat´s engine and a two speed, two stage supercharger. An actual F2A-3 had a less advanced 2-speed, 1-stage supercharger. With a normal load it climbed as fast to 10 and 20,000 feet as a P-39(4.5 and 9.2 minutes) But even with 300 pounds extra weight it beat the P-39 to 25,000 feet by 2 minutes(12/14). A typical P-40 needed 12 minute to reach 20,000 feet. I can not provide data for 25,000 feet, becasue the diagramm in my book ends at 17 minutes. By that time an Allison powered P-40 has reached appx. 23,000 feet and the climb rate is pretty flat already.

A Wildcat with unprotected tanks had a fuel capcity of 160 gallons. Self-sealing decreased that by 10% to 144g. I put the decrease for the Buffalo at 37% for the folding wing version(110g) and at 25% for the fixed wing version(120g)._


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 23, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> Ok, here are some more detailed weight charts for the F2A-1 and F2A-3 (sadly I don't have them for the -2):
> 
> F2A-1 F2A-3
> Empty: 3810.5 4765.3
> ...



Thanks BF, I think its fair to say (since the weight of a tail hook and raft aren't likely to tip the scales against it) that the F2A-1 was a viable candidate for an early effective higher performance gap-filler fighter for the FAA. To answer Parsifal's legitimate concern that there just isn't enough time to integrate the F2A-1 into the FAA to make a great contribution: To get it into service in the Spring of 1940, The USN would have had to allow preliminary FAA aircrew training on at least a few of the half dozen or so F2A-1s that slowly became available between June and November of 1939. Something similar to this was apparently done with later types although probably not so early in the production run. By late December (early January at the latest) there should have been enough F2A-1's available to outfit at least one or two squadrons of 12 aircraft each. Pilot's back armor installed prior to or post delivery. I would expect these F2A-1s (hopefully supplemented by Fairey Fulmars as these became operational) to have been effective through september 1941 when the Martlet I's were introduced. IIUC, the FAA was in such desparate straights that it would deploy small detachments of GSGs on its older decks just to provide them some sir defense capability, although I recall
reading that the RN's early philosophy was to depend on AAA and the carrier's armored box for its primary air defense. 

I don't know whether the logistics considerations of such a scenario make it unreasonable. I suppose that could be.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 23, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> For what it's worth,I found this on another forum. Interesting stuff *and note the dates given of the beginning of the landing gear failures...*
> 
> _1932: The Brewster Aeronautical Corporation is formed. The company build aircraft parts for the big manufacturers
> 
> ...


_

Good stuff FBJ, That's probably the initial incident I had heard about for the F2A-1. I suspect it was a hard landing and seen *in retrospect* as indicative of inherently non-robust design and the chronic problems the later, heavier aircraft would be subject to. 

Looking at the maintenance records of the F2A-1s its not clear what incident that may have been. What is clear is that nearly all appear to have been upgraded to the -2 variant later in their career so whatever problems they had weren't serious enough to cause them to be surveyed (retired). This batch of F2A-2s ended up as the fighter detachment VS-201 serving on the USS Long Island (CVE-1) in 1941-42. Once again another indication of the longevity of the F2A-1 on carrier flight decks. At least that's the way I interpret it._


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## jimmaas (Jul 23, 2012)

Ummmhhh....the timeline that is being quoted is from an 'alternate history' website, not one grounded in fact. For example, VF-3 could never have received a full complement of eighteen F2A-1's for the simple reason that the Navy never got that many - 43 of the 54 aircraft order were reallocated to Finland, to be replaced by 43 F2A-2's. (Yes, I know Finland got 44, Brewster was planning to manufacture and sell as many as 66 F2A-1's but the imminent end of the Winter War put a halt to the Model 239 production.)


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 23, 2012)

jimmaas said:


> Ummmhhh....the timeline that is being quoted is from an 'alternate history' website, not one grounded in fact. For example, VF-3 could never have received a full complement of eighteen F2A-1's for the simple reason that the Navy never got that many - 43 of the 54 aircraft order were reallocated to Finland, to be replaced by 43 F2A-2's. (Yes, I know Finland got 44, Brewster was planning to manufacture and sell as many as 66 F2A-1's but the imminent end of the Winter War put a halt to the Model 239 production.)



Hi Jim - enjoy your site...

So when did the fist one get to VF-3 and when was the first landing gear failure encountered?

Point to be made - I think the landing gear failures were happening well before the weight increases


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## jimmaas (Jul 23, 2012)

Actually, Dan Ford runs the Buffalo forum, not me. I don't know anything about running a webpage.

The F2A-1's were taken on charge by VF-3 in the first half of December 1939 - most on the 11th. 

I don't have specifics on dates for landing gear failures. Although I know some occured with the F2A-1 and -2, an interview with a VF-2 pilot ( http://www.warbirdforum.com/fire.htm ) suggests that the problem was really associated with the F2A-3, a much heavier aircraft. I've gone through the BuAer Change Orders for the F2A's and found Bulletin 1 for the F2A-3 dated 23 February 1942 [the references mentioned are from October-November 1941]:

"1. References (a), (b), (c) and (d) reported cases of damage to main landing gear tires and wheels, also to oleo struts and main landing gear struts due to hard landings.

2. VF-2 has reported that when tire inflation pressure is raised to sixty (60) pounds tire and wheel failures were almost entirely eliminated.

3. It is recommended that the air pressure in the main landing gear tires be increased to sixty (60) pounds in lieu of the original recommended thirty-five (35) pounds, for carrier operations."

Maybe it was a solvable problem.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 23, 2012)

Great info Jim, thanks!


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## Shortround6 (Jul 23, 2012)

jimmaas said:


> "1. References (a), (b), (c) and (d) reported cases of damage to main landing gear tires and wheels, also to oleo struts and main landing gear struts due to hard landings.
> 
> 2. VF-2 has reported that when tire inflation pressure is raised to sixty (60) pounds tire and wheel failures were almost entirely eliminated.
> 
> ...



Sounds like somebody dropped the ball. 
It sounds like the planes were landing hard enough to flatten the tire to point that the rim was hitting the ground/flight deck/folded tire sidewall. 

There were charts available showing the weight the available aircraft tires were supposed to handle at a range of pressures. If the tire wasn't working properly because of harder than normal landings either pump up the tires or shift to the next higher tire ( some times a matter of plys rather than changing sizes, depends if the original tire was the max ply model for that size) or? The information was available from the tire makers. The Chart I am looking at is for low pressure Firestone tires and was published in the "Aircraft handbook" by Colvin 1942 edition. I am sure it is not the complete line of tires. There is one column in one of the charts headed " Approx. collapsing load for full radial deflection, lb." this is roughly 3 times the max rated static load. Like I said, the information was available.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 24, 2012)

jimmaas said:


> Ummmhhh....the timeline that is being quoted is from an 'alternate history' website, not one grounded in fact. For example, VF-3 could never have received a full complement of eighteen F2A-1's for the simple reason that the Navy never got that many - 43 of the 54 aircraft order were reallocated to Finland, to be replaced by 43 F2A-2's. (Yes, I know Finland got 44, Brewster was planning to manufacture and sell as many as 66 F2A-1's but the imminent end of the Winter War put a halt to the Model 239 production.)



Jim, 

I am not familiar with an "alternate history website." As for grounded in fact if you've read the the entire thread I'd hope you would come to a different conclusion. The _alternate history _ originally suggested here (I only know one site where it is described) suggests that the Finns didn't get their 44 B-239 and that they were procured by the FAA instead. The Navy got 11 F2A-1s before the end of 1939 and in order for ~40 (or similar number) to be in FAA service as early as possible, some of these would have to have gone to the FAA as well. All done in exchange for higher performance F2A-2s. 

I believe that the Navy received about 5 F2A-1 before December 1, 1939. and 3 of those before September (from: 
http://www.warbirdforum.com/f2a1.htm)

If you are talking about Dan Ford's Annals of the Brewster Buffalo, this thread has a definite connection with the similar discussion on that site. You may be surprised to realize you have a bigger part in the current thread than you may realize going back a couple of decades in time and related to (I hope you are aware) the important part you played in the discussion on Dan Ford's site. I"ve always appreciated the photo in your *In Action* account of the Buffalo's history that showed the B-339 being handled on the HMS Eagle's flight deck and reproduced it on this thread.

Good to hear from you,

Mal


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## jimmaas (Jul 24, 2012)

The initial reaction, in November 1939, of the British Air Attache to Brewster's offer of 100 F2A's starting in March 1940 was "so fantastic, the production organization so indifferent, and the financial standing of the company and its setup so doubtful that I would be adverse to entering into any contract with this firm except with the most stringent safeguards." (quoted from "Brewster 339E Buffalo" by Jarmo Nikkonen in AAHS Journal Summer 1998 p 127) Although a test pilot flew one of the Model 239's intended for Finland and gave a positive report to the British, from everything I've seen the British had no interest in the 239 (F2A-1 equivalent) but wanted the 339 like those being built for Belgium. Because of the Air Attache's initial negative position when the F2A-1's might have been available, there was no way those could have been available in the spring of 1940 for the FAA to use.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 25, 2012)

jimmaas said:


> The initial reaction, in November 1939, of the British Air Attache to Brewster's offer of _*100 F2A's starting in March 1940 was "so fantastic, the production organization so indifferent, and the financial standing of the company and its setup so doubtful that I would be adverse to entering into any contract with this firm except with the most stringent safeguards.*_" (quoted from "Brewster 339E Buffalo" by Jarmo Nikkonen in AAHS Journal Summer 1998 p 127) Although _*a test pilot flew one of the Model 239's intended for Finland and gave a positive report to the British,*_ from everything I've seen *the British had no interest in the 239 (F2A-1 equivalent) but wanted the 339 like those being built for Belgium.* Because of the Air Attache's initial negative position when the F2A-1's might have been available, there was no way those could have been available in the spring of 1940 for the FAA to use.



Jim, 

Of course, I was not aware of the Air Attache's report, but reading the above, I have to wonder, who was the air attache' at the time. Was he RAF or FAA? If FAA, was he a senior officer (I'd assume so) who was thoroughly indoctrinated with the FAA's devotion to Multi-seat fighters for the RN's CV's? The interest in B-339s suggests that FAA procurement of navalized B-239s was not considered at all. The air attache's report seems terribly contradictory? He thoroughly pans the company but wants models of the B-339 that do not yet exist? 

Even the air attache' rendering of a completely negative report on procurement of the B-239 doesn't mean the aircraft wouldn't have been the right one for the FAA to asert a greater influence on events and it doesn't mean the procurement couldn't have been done. Such decisions are fairly common in the course of history and doesn't mean we should give up pondering the _might have beens_ had a different decision been made. Also, the report you cite describes events that appear to have occurred after the decision to send the B-239s to Finland. That's way too late for the argument being presented here. 

Are you saying you don't believe the F2A-1 would have been the right naval fighter in the hands of FAA pilots early in the war? Whatever the air attache's position or the subsequent decision of the British Purchasing Commission, that seems the relevant question posed by this thread. It's also a question you may be the best qualified person from a historical perspective to answer. 

Going back over the thread, I think Parsifal's suggestion (post #44) that, at least in 1939, the F2A-1 was a naval fighter design better suited to the needs of the USN than the FAA, whose perceived requirement for a multiseat-multirole fighter was a virtual cultural paradigm. I think this attitude might have been an even greater deterent to selection of the F2A-1 than the report of an air attache', especially one who may very well have been raised in the RAF's culture regarding the FAA as a second class air-arm of the RAF. At least until events forced the paradigm shift to single seat aircraft such as the GLoster Sea Gladiator, Martlet, Sea Hurricane and SeaFire.


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## jimmaas (Jul 25, 2012)

Mal,

The Air Attache was Group Capt. Pirie, definitely RAF. 

I remember Malcolm LeCompte raised the issue of this topic in a 1996 issue of the AAHS Journal (which seems, for the moment, to be misfiled in my mare's nest...err, library) and his conclusion was that the F2A-1 would have been invaluable at the time of fighting around Norway in 1940. But the British were not thinking of the Brewster as a naval fighter - their first assignment of the ex-Belgian 339B's was to a land-based squadron, 71 (and that didn't go well, of course). So I'm not sure that the mindset issue was so much two-seat versus single seat carrier aircraft, but rather carrier aircraft taking a (very) back seat to the air defence of Great Britain. 

The other odd thing in the 1940 order is that the British insisted on four .50 caliber machine guns, based on some early recognition that .303's were a tad lacking in punch. But when the Buffalo came into full service a year and a half later, in south-east Asia, providing .50 ammunition became a great problem (for both the British and the Dutch). I wonder what the situation in metropolitan Britain was in 1940 re .50 ammunition?


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 26, 2012)

The real weakness in this argument is then the timing and focus on mission. The RN-FAA hadn't yet experienced the inadaquacy of its aircraft or anticipated the need for an aircraft to establish air supremacy. I believe that first became critically apparent during the Norway campaign. However it looks like the Sea Gladiator was incorporated into the FAA stable prior to September 1939 which suggests there was some institutional awareness of a deficiency in that area. 
I can see the BPC, which I assume started its search for North American produced aircraft in late 39 - early 40, would have been seduced by the same prospect as the USN and at about the same time: the advent of the F2A-2 and wanted to get aboard that train too, not forseeing the end result once the aircraft was made acceptable for British service. 

It strikes me that the real issue, that hindsight has obscurred, is that in mid to late 1939, when such a decision would have to have been made to faciliate introduction of the F2A-1 into the FAA in time to see action in early to mid 1940, no one really knew what the war would require of its aircraft. Trying to put myself in the mindset of senior leaders in the infant FAA to understand what guided their thinking only works well if one is ignorant of the subsequent history; not to mention not fully cognizant of the peculiar culture that was British military aviation. The FAA, brought into existence in mid-1939, evidently couldn't yet operate in a proactive, visionary mode (and with probably a limited purse), until circumstances brought the full consequences of earlier decisions to the fore. It seems a case of a tantalizing _might-have-been_ that, due to circumstances unrelated to the desirability of the aircraft's performance or its production schedule, could _never have actually been_.

In other words, adoption of ANY foreign fighter wasn't sought because in mid to late 39 there wasn't yet a percieved to motivate the FAA to make such a move.


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## parsifal (Jul 26, 2012)

jimmaas said:


> Mal,
> 
> The Air Attache was Group Capt. Pirie, definitely RAF.
> 
> ...



One squadron was also briefly embarked on the Eagle. it was found to be inneffective in deck handling, and the lack of wing folding damned it from carrier operations. It became a strictly land based asset of the FAA, and even there saw only very limited operation....in Crete. 

It wasnt that the F2A was not acquired in rather substantial numbers. Thirty were acquired in 1939-40, which compares well to the 130 Swordfish on strength at that time, and the 30 odd Skuas on order. But very quickly the FAA determined that the F2A was not suited to their ship borne requirements. it was the right decision IMO


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## jimmaas (Jul 26, 2012)

Although some of the ex-Belgian aircraft started driting in in late 1940, they were really a 1941 addition, by which time Britain's domestic aircraft industry was Beaverbrooking away and the Brewsters were surplus to requirements. I know one or two 805 Squadron aircraft were trialed on _Eagle but I doubt a whole squadron. Since all naval equipment had been removed (notably the tailhook) it is not surprising that the ex-Belgian aircraft weren't seen as ideal for carrier ops. Maybe you could expand on the issue of wing folding, though. I've heard that before but I don't recall the Sea Hurricane's wings folded any better, and that aircraft had a greater span than the Brewster._


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## parsifal (Jul 26, 2012)

> The real weakness in this argument is then the timing and focus on mission. The RN-FAA hadn't yet experienced the inadaquacy of its aircraft or anticipated the need for an aircraft to establish air supremacy.



Prewar the FAA never thought that their carrier borne aircraft were going to attain "air superiority". The FAA did not establish itself as an independant air service until 1938, it was consequently dominated by RAF imports, and the RAF was dominated by ideas of the "bomber always gets through". 

Norway had virtually no impact on FAA thinking, because the few LW attacks made on RN ships were thought to be handled reasonably well by AA, which was considered at that time to be the only effective defence against air attack. The fact that AA ships did not seem to be enough doesnt seem to have sunk in. Even as late as November 1940, standard operating procedure for the FAA if a carrier was attacked was to strike down all aircraft to the hangar, clear the fuel line and fill them with CO2. The AA support would close to within 700 yards (inside the safe TD of a cruiser or a carrier) of the carrier, and a maximum of firepower put over the carrier to protect it from air attack. 

The person most responsible for the turn around in FAA atitudes was Cunningham. Eagles CAG was initially 3 Sea Gladiators, which were promptly shipped ashore to malta to become "Faith Hope Glory". I believe they were replaced by 6 ex RAF machines held in Storage at Alexandria. These machines had similar problems to the Buffalo, no multi role capability and no wing folding, but they could at least land on the carrier with a reasonable margin of safety. That was obviously considered more important than the obvious higher performance and firepower of the buffalo. The F2As that had been trialled on the Eagle somewhere about that time had been landed because of problems in their deck handling abilities, lack of wing folding and constant problems in the armament. (Ive also read from one source that they leaked fuel incessantly). As a result they were shipped off to Greece and Crete, where thankfully, and mercifully, they never returned. They were given a good review there, to be fair, but I believe that F2As spent most of the campaign there grounded and with jammed U/S armament. 

The RN NEVER operated on the principal of attaining "air superiority", not even on a localised basis, until much later in the war, when the resources and the carrier deck space was there to make such a concept an attainable goal. Seaborne air superiority is a a uniquely American concept (not even the Japanese believed they could achieve and hold air superiority from seaborne platforms) . The RN operated on the principal of providing credible air defence, of which ship board fighters are a part (right from the beginning). The RN never envisaged its carriers having toi operate within range of land based single engined fighters, and even though there were exceptions during the first year of the war , this remained substantially true. Where those exceptions did arise, it was generally against either weak opposition, or in conjunction with a specific operation....get in get out, as fast as you can. The RN was very successful at that kind of mission for the first two years of the war, and its apparently under performing a/c more than adequate to meet the requirements of that doctrine. And the so-called "inferior" types (such as the Skua and the Fulmar) proved highly successful as elements of that doctrine (no British carrier ever succumbed to air attack) . After the war in the RAN we adopted exactly the same strateegy. In a different age, with thankfully nobody actually shooting at us, we were among the first to adapt the A4 (a bomber) to the air defence role, and in the mission profile that we had for our carrier found them to be very good in the role. We used the A4s during the very first Afghan war (1979-81), when over 30 Bears were deployed to Yemen to provide armed recon for the Red Navy over the Indian Ocean, to intercept and escort out of our no-fly zones every "strike" the Russians simulated against us. Why did we use A4s? Because they could do their primary mission (Air strike) very well, and could be adapted to undertake a secondary role (air defence) reasonably well and cheaply. The RN in 1940 had the same issue...a very limited number of seaborne slots, and a need to make aircraft to do more than one thing per airframe. They also had to be reliable, stable platforms with as much firepower as could be brought to bear. performance was very much a secondary consideration. 

For large navies, like the USN, this is y and obsolete. For small navies it was, and still is, the way to go. F2As as a concept did not fit that philosophy, and they still wouldnt. 




> I believe that first became critically apparent during the Norway campaign. However it looks like the Sea Gladiator was incorporated into the FAA stable prior to September 1939 which suggests there was some institutional awareness of a deficiency in that area.
> I can see the BPC, which I assume started its search for North American produced aircraft in late 39 - early 40, would have been seduced by the same prospect as the USN and at about the same time: the advent of the F2A-2 and wanted to get aboard that train too, not forseeing the end result once the aircraft was made acceptable for British service.



I would agree that some less well informed officers in the RN might be "seduced" by the concept of having a dedicated fleet defence fighter. In 1943 there was a detour via the Seafire in that very direction. However in 1940, the realities prevented any such strategy....limited numbers of pilots, no prospect of a rapid expansion and a limited number of at sea billets. It was rapidly deduced that the F2A was not really suited to RN fleet defence requirements because of its poor deck handling and lack of wing folding. Think about Cunninghams problem, and you will rapidly deduce that the decision to not ship the F2A was absolutely the right thing to do. He received no FAA pilots from June until November from memory. He had a single carrier with just 22 slots available. He managed to scrounge a few ex RAF aircraft and possible 3 or 4 pilots from the RAF to fly them who I assume were taught how to fly them on carriers at some point. He was outnumbered at sea, needed to primarily keep tabs on the RM, and undertake offensive strikes as well. With such limited resources, there was absolutley no place for an aircraft that could only do one mission, reduced the air capacity of the one carrier available even more (down to 16 a/c from memory if wing folding was not available) and which seemed to have had reliabilty and deck safety issues. 



> It strikes me that the real issue, that hindsight has obscurred, is that in mid to late 1939, when such a decision would have to have been made to faciliate introduction of the F2A-1 into the FAA in time to see action in early to mid 1940, no one really knew what the war would require of its aircraft.



Correct to a degree, but there were enough officers in the service who were aware of the need for ship borne air defence to make this statement untrue. What damns the concept of an F2A led air defence inititiaive are the charactisitics of the aircraft iteslf, coupled with the massively restricted resources available to the RN FAA at that time.


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## parsifal (Jul 26, 2012)

jimmaas said:


> Although some of the ex-Belgian aircraft started driting in in late 1940, they were really a 1941 addition, by which time Britain's domestic aircraft industry was Beaverbrooking away and the Brewsters were surplus to requirements. I know one or two 805 Squadron aircraft were trialed on _Eagle but I doubt a whole squadron. Since all naval equipment had been removed (notably the tailhook) it is not surprising that the ex-Belgian aircraft weren't seen as ideal for carrier ops. Maybe you could expand on the issue of wing folding, though. I've heard that before but I don't recall the Sea Hurricane's wings folded any better, and that aircraft had a greater span than the Brewster._


_

Buffaloes were trialled on the eagle in in late 1940. The Bufaloes first arrived in the TO November, and it was somewhere between that time and January '41 that the landing trials were undertaken. i do not know how thorough they were. I do know that three aircraft were involved. Given that an air defence squadron at that time was 3 a/c, any number, even one aircraft, can be considered the equivalent of one squadron. But I will concede that I am not actually aware of the precise number trialled. 

There were three aircraft sent to Crete, so I expect it was three. The brewsters history after that becomes clearer. 805 Squadron formed Feb 1941 with 12 Fairey Fulmar two-seat fighters, carrier capable, to support a planned invasion of Rhodes, off the coast of Turkey, held by Italians. Based at Maleme in northeastern Crete, the squadron also had three Buffaloes (AS419, AS420, AX814) along with 6 more Fulmars flew in from Dekheila on 6 March 1941. The Buffalo flight was commanded by Lt. Rupert Brabner, formerly Member of Parliament for Hyth. The Brewsters were equipped with an antique post-and-ring sight, proof that they were Belgian 339Bs rather than the British 339E model. These three a/c, alonmg with the rest of the squadron were evidently intended to fly from HMS Illustrious, but after the heavy damage that carrier received in Jauuary the Squadron appear to have been a land baased unit. 

Sea Hurricanes were never adopted in a wing folding form. This was considered, but rejected, because it would have increased the cost of each airframe, and interfered with the flow of deliveries. 

The Royal Navy’s Fleet Air Arm lacked a 300 mph, modern fighter at the start of WW2. After unmodified RAF Hurricanes, attempting to escape Norway, had landed safely on the aircraft carrier H.M.S. Glorious in June, 1940, Winston Churchill enthusiastically endorsed the idea of producing a navalized Hurricane. It was selected for this purpose not only because of that. It was a very strong modular structure, and this allowed the wing folding issue to be somewhat addressed by the Sea Hurricanes being partially dismantled and hung like spare parts from the ‘roof’ of aircraft carrier hangars thereby not interferringwith overall capacities. it was blessed with a sturdy, wide-track undercarriage, much more suitable to deck landings than its successor, the Supermarine Seafire, and better than the Brewster. Its heavy and relaibale armament was a most welcome addition. These qualities more than offset its shortcoming that a folding-wing version of the Hurricane was never developed._


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 27, 2012)

Parsifal, as usual, your comments are detailed, well informed and to the point. I especially appreciate the Non-USN perspective on carrier ops for modest-sized navies and your comments on the scooter, which was a truly versatile aircraft. (One of my big regrets when on active duty was missing the opportunity to go through VF-126 instrument training detachment in San Diego that used TA-4Js for training flights.) You have provided a very different perspective on carrier ops than the one within which I was raised. I will only take some small issue with a couple of your points wrt to FAA adoption of the F2A and an airsuperiority mission for embarked FAA fighters. I believe your point about the lack of a AFAA air control mission is particularly relevant to adoption of the F2A-1. 

1. The export F2A-1 in FAA service would possess a tail hook. That's the way they were built, unlike the Belgium B-339B which in every account I have read did not, because the B-339B's did not come so equipped. I believe the lack of a folding wing would have posed minimal problems on the older carriers (Eagle and the Courageous class). Based on measurements, I believe its elevators could have handled the F2A-1 wing span. With an all F2A-1 airwing (which most probably would never have happened), I recall doing a measurement of the Hangar deck (I believe it was Eagle's but it's been awhile) and found dimensions that indicated the hangar could accomodate perhaps a dozen, or perhaps more F2A-1. It'll be a while before I get back home to look in my files for the original graphic depiction of plane and hangar to see which carrier and what is the actual number. A mixed airwing a 3-6 F2A-1 might include a dozen of so Swordfish. IIRC, Eagle's hangar capacity was about 24-30 folding wing aircraft, while that of the Courageous Class was about double that number. 

2. The fact that even a few GSGs were already embarked during the early war ops suggest the air defense deficiency was recognized to some extent and that triple A alone was insufficient. 
3. Soon after Norway, (circa 9/40 and thereafter in the Med, Fulmars, which were of course multirole (with minimal strike capability) aircraft were serving in an air defense role as a ready or standing CAP. 
4. HMS Audacity initially went to sea in September 1941 with a purely F4F airwing. It's primary mission was air defense from the threat posed by FW-200. (Possibly interpretable as establishing air control over the convoy). So when the need arose, the RN could respond when it had the equipment to do so. It certainly had the skilled pilots to do the job. 
5. By 1942, a typical RN carrier airwing was balanced between assets (F4F, Sea Hurricane and Fulmar) devoted to air defense and those devoted to strike. With the advent of the Sea Hurricane and eventually the Seafire, you had adoption of the deck park. (I believe one of a very few purely USN innovations)
6. You can't perform a mission if you don't have equipment capable of performing it. This is where I think perhaps Greg misses the full innovation value of the F2A-1. It had vitually all of the qualities we associate with modern fighters but it also had legs even longer than most US fighters of the early war years let alone those of other nations. In this aircraft, you could see in its infancy, the iability to project airpower over enemy territory _*from the sea*_. To its credit the RN seemed to have a history of quickly adopting whatever doctrine or equipment it needs at a given time. Had the RN had that ability (in the form of the F2A-1), I think it would have used the hell out of it. 

This is my final point: The way I see it, it was a tragedy that the RN FAA didn't have the F2A-1 when it could have been used to greatest effect. It was the one aircraft of its time that might have made a decisive, if temporary difference, _*in the role for which it was designed*_. The fact that it did make a difference for Finland mitigates the magnitude of the tragedy I (evidently alone) perceive to have occurred during 1940-41. I am glad the Finns had it, sad the RN didn't.

Ironically, this post was entered whilst awaiting a connecting flight in Helsinki Airport.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 29, 2012)

I can't help but wonder if there weren't a few soon to be independent (as in non-RAF) circa 1938 -1939 FAA pilots looking over their shoulders with some little envy at developments in the USN wrt to the F2A-1. That is just aviator-DNA and separate from organizational doctrine or policy. So while as an organization, FAA procurement may have been guided by perceptions of its future mission requirements, I wonder what individual pilots thought about their equipment compared to developments in other navies with significant embarked aviation components. (e.g. USN, IJN, France and visible on the near horizon, Germany)


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## RCAFson (Jul 30, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> I can't help but wonder if there weren't a few soon to be independent (as in non-RAF) circa 1938 -1939 FAA pilots looking over their shoulders with some little envy at developments in the USN wrt to the F2A-1. That is just aviator-DNA and separate from organizational doctrine or policy. So while as an organization, FAA procurement may have been guided by perceptions of its future mission requirements, I wonder what individual pilots thought about their equipment compared to developments in other navies with significant embarked aviation components. (e.g. USN, IJN, France and visible on the near horizon, Germany)


 
Very few F2As of any variant ever saw service in the USN and even fewer aboard USN CVs. In 1939 the FAA was not really behind either the USN or IJN in terms of CV aircraft design, IMHO, it was not till 1941/42 that the FAA really fell behind the USN and IJN in terms of design, as both the IJN and USN reequipped with new types while the FAA's planned aircraft were delayed due to lowered production and design priorities following the BofB.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 30, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> Very few F2As of any variant ever saw service in the USN and even fewer aboard USN CVs. In 1939 the FAA was not really behind either the USN or IJN in terms of CV aircraft design, IMHO, it was not till 1941/42 that the FAA really fell behind the USN and IJN in terms of design, as both the IJN and USN reequipped with new types while the FAA's planned aircraft were delayed due to lowered production and design priorities following the BofB.



RAFson, this seems wide of the mark to me. True only 10 of the 11 USN F2A-1s saw service in VF-3 on the Sara, and of these, it looks like 9 were evidently intermittently embarked for from 10 months to a year. During this time, the USN had in service a variety of aircraft including the flawed BT-1 which quickly evolved through the XBT-2 (first flight: 4/25/38 ) into the winning SBD design. The advanced TBD certainly outlived its service, but for its time appeared to be well advanced over the venerable Swordfish. Only war time service would show the inadaquacy of the TBD and USN Torpedoes in their very different role than that employed by the relatively antiquated but enormously useful SF armed with a superior weapon than what the USN was using. I think the Skua was a noble effort but don't believe it compares to either the F2A-1 or SBD as either a fighter or a dive bomber. On the other hand the legendary SF is truly immortal.

Different F2A variants saw USN service in squadrons as follows:

F2A-1: VF-3
F2A-2: VF-2, VF-3 and VS-201
F2A-3: VF-2

The number of all F2A variants constructed amounts to 11 x F2A-1 and 42 or 43 x F2A-2 and 108 x F2A-3s and can be compared to the number of GSG built: 98 and Skua: 192

I might also count VMF-221 but that really wouldn't count as their CV embarked service was AFAIK very brief being limited to the Wake relief mission.

IIRC, from reading Eric Brown's *Wings of the Navy* the FAA appeared to give brief consideration to replacing the Skua with the Vought SB2U armed with 4 .30" LMGs, but found it was not as significant an improvement as hoped. It's been a while since I read his account so it may be inaccurate.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 30, 2012)

During and prior to 1939: the IJN flew and introduced the A6M Zeke, the D3A VAL and the B5N Kate.


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## parsifal (Jul 30, 2012)

> The advanced TBD certainly outlived its service, but for its time appeared to be well advanced over the venerable Swordfish. Only war time service would show the inadaquacy of the TBD and USN Torpedoes in their very different role than that employed by the relatively antiquated but enormously useful SF armed with a superior weapon than what the USN was using. I think the Skua was a noble effort but don't believe it compares to either the F2A-1 or SBD as either a fighter or a dive bomber. On the other hand the legendary SF is truly immortal.




We are back to where we started I can see....TBD was a superior design only in top speed to the Swordfish. The Swordfish was a more stanle platform, slower, but more accurate. The Swordfish was a bigger aircraft, more suited to rough weather conditions. It had more space intermnally to put stuff, and was an overall stronger airframe, as its use as a divebomber and its ability to aerobat (allbeit at a very slow speed) were also qualities hidden in the appearance of the a/c, but present nevertheless. There were very good reasons why the Swordfish became a legend, and the unfortunate TBD a costly footnote in history.....

As far as superior armament, the problems with the Bliss Levitt were real enough, but not nearly as big a problem as the poor crew training and aircrafdt deficiencies. Ive just fnished reading a post war interrogation of the Japanese leader of the "Genzan" air corps which undertook the successful attacks on the PoW and Repulse in 1941. In theory, Japanese torpedoes could be dropped from 200feet and at speeds in exces of 250 mph. But at that speed less than 10% of launches ran true or detonated. Really, to have a better than 70% success rate, speeds had to be kept under 200mph and drop heights below 20 feet for the japanese. This means, quite frankly, that US torpedoes were not as bad as is often used to excuse the destruction and lack of success faced by the TBDs at Midway. British Torps faced similar reliability issues at Taranto, where about 30% either failed to detonate, and or failed to run true either in depth or heading. The problem with the TBD was not as much atributable to the admittedly poor torpedo as is so often presented. it was more to do with the aircraft and/or its crews. The aircraft was a dud as far as a day aircraft, and unfortuantely, thats all it could do.... 

Skua in no way compares to the SBD, but it has advantages over the f2a in terms of multi role capability, wing folding, reliability over the brewster. we have covered this previously, and made very clear why the Brewster was not suited at all to FAA requirements. Too specialized, not enough performance superiority to matter, unreliable armament, no wing folding, poor serviceability and possibly leaky fuel tanks . For a struggling service like the FAA this made it (the F2A) a totally unnacceptable mount


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 30, 2012)

parsifal said:


> We are back to where we started I can see....TBD was a superior design only in top speed to the Swordfish. The Swordfish was a more stanle platform, slower, but more accurate. The Swordfish was a bigger aircraft, more suited to rough weather conditions. It had more space intermnally to put stuff, and was an overall stronger airframe, as its use as a divebomber and its ability to aerobat (allbeit at a very slow speed) were also qualities hidden in the appearance of the a/c, but present nevertheless. There were very good reasons why the Swordfish became a legend, and the unfortunate TBD a costly footnote in history.....
> 
> As far as superior armament, the problems with the Bliss Levitt were real enough, but not nearly as big a problem as the poor crew training and aircrafdt deficiencies. Ive just fnished reading a post war interrogation of the Japanese leader of the "Genzan" air corps which undertook the successful attacks on the PoW and Repulse in 1941. In theory, Japanese torpedoes could be dropped from 200feet and at speeds in exces of 250 mph. But at that speed less than 10% of launches ran true or detonated. Really, to have a better than 70% success rate, speeds had to be kept under 200mph and drop heights below 20 feet for the japanese. This means, quite frankly, that US torpedoes were not as bad as is often used to excuse the destruction and lack of success faced by the TBDs at Midway. British Torps faced similar reliability issues at Taranto, where about 30% either failed to detonate, and or failed to run true either in depth or heading. The problem with the TBD was not as much atributable to the admittedly poor torpedo as is so often presented. it was more to do with the aircraft and/or its crews. The aircraft was a dud as far as a day aircraft, and unfortuantely, thats all it could do....
> 
> Skua in no way compares to the SBD, but it has advantages over the f2a in terms of multi role capability, wing folding, reliability over the brewster. we have covered this previously, and made very clear why the Brewster was not suited at all to FAA requirements. Too specialized, not enough performance superiority to matter, unreliable armament, no wing folding, poor serviceability and possibly leaky fuel tanks . For a struggling service like the FAA this made it (the F2A) a totally unnacceptable mount



It certainly wasn't my intent to argue the superiority of the TBD over any aircraft let alone the SF. It was an advanced design that fell short in a number of ways.

The above is as succinct a declaration of the inappropriateness of the F2A-1 as I have seen compiled in one spot. I could have collected these comments from the thread into as coherent an argument as you've given above but I felt your deck handling argument inherently weak based on my assumption that you were merely talking about a different aircraft: the hookless B-339B. 

I have no doubt whatsoever the F2A-1 would have provided good service to the FAA. They would have made it work IMO. As to the multirole capabilitis of the Skua? IMO, it was a terrible air-to-air platform which astonishingly managed some a2a kills. Wing folding becomes a non-issue with the adoption of the Hurricane, so why couldnt it have been done earlier? Multirole F2A-1? Their lackluster F2A-3 prodgeny were evidently used as search A/C and on ASW patrol and I see know reason why they couldn't have had the same multirole capability as the Fulmar or to some extent the Skua (obviously not as capable in the strike role). You make do with what you have. Some of these other points seem to me to be put forward as strawmen to attempt to mask the evident shortcomings in equipment capability of the FAA of the time. Unreliable armament? Please, what 50 cal. didn't have teething problems early in the war. If any organization could have solved them it was the FAA. Not enough performance superiority? What are you comparing it to? The GSG the Skua? The F2A-1 was essentially a modern fighter capable of over 300+ mph, rapid climb armed with 50 cal. guns. and a range of nearly 1,000 miles. (tanslating to a combat radius of about 200+ miles.). leaky fuel tanks? How leaky? So leaky they demanded the removal of the type from service? I doubt it, based on its history. The Skua's "multirole" capability meant it had to fly into ememy territory with its payload and fight its way back out. 

As to not suited to FAA service. I'd want the opinion of a pilot offered the opportunity to have a choice to fly a strike mission in an unescorted Skua or one with a few F2A-1s in company. JMHO


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## RCAFson (Jul 30, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> During and prior to 1939: the IJN flew and introduced the A6M Zeke, the D3A VAL and the B5N Kate.


 

The A6M2-11 did not enter service trials until July 1940:



> _The new version was so promising that *the Navy had 15 built* and shipped to China before they had completed testing. They arrived in Manchuria in July 1940...
> ...*After the delivery of only 65 aircraft by November 1940*, a further change was worked into the production lines, which introduced folding wingtips to allow them to fit on aircraft carriers. The resulting Model 21 would become one of the most produced versions early in the war.
> Mitsubishi A6M Zero - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia_



The Val:


> The D3A1 commenced carrier qualification trials aboard the Akagi and Kaga during 1940, while a small number of aircraft made their combat debut from land bases over China.
> Aichi D3A - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



SBD:


> _The Northrop BT-1 provided the basis for the SBD, which began manufacture in 1940. Ed Heinemann led a team of designers who considered a development with a 1,000 hp (750 kW) Wright Cyclone powerplant. A year earlier, both the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps had placed orders for the new dive bombers, designated the SBD-1 and SBD-2 (the latter had increased fuel capacity and different armament). The SBD-1 went to the Marine Corps in late 1940, and the SBD-2 went to the Navy in early 1941_
> Douglas SBD Dauntless - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



Only the B5N Kate could claim to be superior to a contemporary FAA design, but even here the history of this aircraft is quite confused, and the much superior B5N-2 variant was only coming into service by late 1941. AFAIK, even the B5N-1 was not in CV service during 1939.

Engine data for the B5N:


> _Engine
> (B5N1) One 770 hp Nakajima Hikari 3 9-Cylinder radial
> (B5N1 Model 12 ) 970 hp or 985 hp Sakae 11 14-Cylinder 2-row radial
> (B5N2) 1,115 hp Sakae 21 radial_
> http://www.angelfire.com/fm/compass/jtp.htm



It seems doubtful that the B5N1 was CV capable, and the first CV capable variant would probably have been the B5N1 Model 12, which is often called the B5N2. Here is a description of the B5N2 ( possibly a B5N1 Model 12) taking off:



> _On board Hiryu, attack leader Lieutenant Tomonaga watched as her nine escort fighters departed, led by the athletic and energetic Lt. Shigematsu Yasuhiro. Right after them, three Zeros under Lt. Tori Shigeru, whose shots was leading the morning's first combat air patrol watch, departed with similar alacrity. Getting Tomonaga's kanko in the air, however, was a different story altogether. Fully loaded, his plane weighed more than four tons, almost 400 pounds more than a dive-bomber, and more than a ton heavier than a Zero. Yet his horsepower-to-weight ratio was the lowest of the three types of carrier planes in the fleet. In a word, the Type 97 was a pig. He would need every ounce of power to make it off the deck.
> 
> The compound wind over Hiryu's flight deck generally needed to be around thirteen meters/second (twenty-six knots) to launch aircraft, but Tomonaga's Type 97s really were better off if the relative wind was closer to fifteen meters/second (thirty knots). This created problems for the older Kaga, whose top speed of twenty eight knots (on a good day) meant that she could barely launch her Type 97s if there was no wind. Too much wind, though, could be a problem in itself—at speeds above twenty-five meters/second the planes were impossible to control on the flight deck. On Hiryu, creating relative wind wasn't an issue—Yamaguchi's flagship had plenty of speed. But even under ideal conditions, Tomonaga's heavily laden bird still needed around 120 meters to make it into the air. On the shorter flight decks of Hiryu and Soryu this was problematic, particularly for the lead strike aircraft spotted at the head of the pack. Tomonaga's nose was almost atop the central elevator. From here it was 135 meters to the forward end of the flight deck—doable, but hardly comfortable.
> 
> ...



Obviously, these aircraft would have been problematic for TO from an older RN CV, and the B5N1 would have been impossible; it simply wouldn't have been operable from a CV, except under the most favourable conditions. In fact the Hosho was still operating the B4Y1 biplane TB at Midway:


> _Before its replacement, the B4Y1 had flown during the Second Sino-Japanese War and served at the Battle of Midway during June 1942, where eight of them were operated from Hōshō.[2] It was one of these planes from Hōshō which took photographs of the burning Hiryū on 5 June 1942.[3]
> _[2]: Shattered Sword, p453
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yokosuka_B4Y


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 2, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> Very few F2As of any variant ever saw service in the USN and even fewer aboard USN CVs. In 1939 the FAA was not really behind either the USN or IJN in terms of CV aircraft design, IMHO, it was not till 1941/42 that the FAA really fell behind the USN and IJN *in terms of design,* as both the IJN and USN reequipped with new types while the FAA's planned aircraft were delayed due to lowered production and design priorities following the BofB.



USN:
XF4F-2 first flown in September 1937 with design initiated prior circa 1936 
XF4F-3 first flight January 1939, introduction in early 1940.
XF2A-1 first flight in December 1937, Introduction (albeit at a Glacially slow pace) begun in May 1939. design in circa 1936
BT-1 first flight August 1935, design early 1935, BT-2/SBD-1 first flight April, 1938 design 1937, SBD introduction circa 1940
TBD-1 first flight April 1935, design 1934. introduction circa 1937

IJN: 

A6M Zeke: first flight 1939, design circa 1938
D3A Val: first flight January 1938, design 1937
B5M Kate: first flight: January 1937, design 1936

So please tell me what prompts you to believe the FAA designs were on a par with either naval air arm prior to 1940? What FAA designs possessed performance competitive to those of these two navies? Please cite the designs of the FAA, not simply the deficiencies of those of the IJN and USN.

If I can be presumptuous I might suggest a rewording of your statement to be:

"FAA designs circa (1937-40) were more appropriate for (or well suited to) its carrier's specific design atributes than those of other navies." 

Of the USN aircraft listed above only the folding wing F4F proved to be well suited to RN carriers while perhaps none of those of the IJN would have been.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 2, 2012)

I have to admit RAFson, your most recent post and the earlier ones of Parsifal have provoked me to consider some new aspects of this whole issue. First, considering the importance of the Mediterranean campaign, why was the FAA in March of 1941 so desparately short of fighter aircraft it considered deployment of the entirely carrier unsuitable B-339B?


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## parsifal (Aug 2, 2012)

Youve answered your own question. The FAA was short of three things. Carrier deck space to field dedicated specialist types. AC had to be multi role, or the FAA coulod not complete all that was expected of it. Secondly pilots, there was a critical shortage of them. Ive read sources that the grand total of aircrew additions in 1939 was just 16 pilots....in 1940 I recall it was about 80 pilots, but some of them were seconded to the RAF during the BoB. Thirdly there was a critical shortage of new airframes due to the priorities given to FC. The development of new types to replace the Fulmar/Albacore (principally the Firefly, a bit later the Fury, and the Barracuda) were all badly delayed by other priorities. The FAA did need a high performance fighter, I am not really disputing that, but they also had other problems that ruled out the usage of the Brewster early on.

The Brewster would have been useful, but far from a panacea, if the following issues could have been overcome

1) Additional carrier deck space (perhaps earlier introduction of CVEs
2) A much greater and plentiful supply of aircrew that could allow specialised aircraft onboard. 
3) Overcoming the relkiability and wing folding issues of the brewster prewar
4) Better foresight on the part of the FAA that did not blinker the FAA of the need to provide better more high performance a/c so that it could operate better in enemy controlled airspace


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## RCAFson (Aug 3, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> I have to admit RAFson, your most recent post and the earlier ones of Parsifal have provoked me to consider some new aspects of this whole issue. First, considering the importance of the Mediterranean campaign, why was the FAA in March of 1941 so desparately short of fighter aircraft it considered deployment of the entirely carrier unsuitable B-339B?



Because FAA aircrew training and aircraft production was crippled by the higher priority given to the RAF during and immediately after the BofB; the FAA actually loanded 50 pilots to RAF Fighter Command!. Fulmar production was limited to 25/month despite the desperate need for more and 25/month was barely covering the inevitable wastage rates incurred during a shooting war. The GSG had been out of production and no more were available, while the HSH was just entering service trials.


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## RCAFson (Aug 3, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> USN:
> XF4F-2 first flown in September 1937 with design initiated prior circa 1936
> XF4F-3 first flight January 1939, introduction in early 1940.
> XF2A-1 first flight in December 1937, Introduction (albeit at a Glacially slow pace) begun in May 1939. design in circa 1936
> ...




In CV service types 
1939
FAA = Swordfish, GSG, Skua
USN = TBD, F2F, SBC ( I won't include the F2A because it was essentially a failed experiment)
IJN = B4Y, A5M, D1A

1940
FAA = Swordfish, Albacore, GSG, Skua, Fulmar
USN = TBD, F3F, SBC, SBD ( I won't include the F2A because it was essentially a failed experiment)
IJN = B4Y, B5N-M12, A5M, A6M*, D1A, D3A was just entering CV service

1941 
FAA = Swordfish, Albacore, HSH, Fulmar II (this variant had dive bombing capability = 500lb bomb at 60deg at up to 310 knots)
USN = TBD, F3F, F4F, SBC, SBD
IJN=B4Y, B5N-M12, A5M, A6M, D1A, D3A
1942
FAA = Swordfish, Albacore, HSH, Fulmar II (this variant had dive bombing capability = 500lb bomb at 60deg at up to 310 knots)
FAA plan = Barracuda, Firefly
USN = TBD, TBF, F4F, SBD
IJN=B4Y, B5N-M12, B5N-2 ,A5M, A6M, D3A

The Swordfish was only used as frontline CV aircraft from 1939 because of Albacore production problems. 


*Production of the folding wingtip A6M-2-21 didn't begin until Nov 1940.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 3, 2012)

I must say, I am learning a bit about the FAA circumstances in 1941 (although not much directly germaine to the thread topic). Most of all, I am gaining a new and profound respect for Dwight Eisenhower.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 4, 2012)

You suggest that the F2A was a failed experiment when the F2A-1 and -2 equipped two of the USN's embarked fighter squadrons from 1940 through 1941. These two squadrons were the USN's premier units (VF-2 -3), before being progressively replaced by the seriously flawed F2A-3 and the more promising and capable F4F-3 and F4F-3A which incidentally didn't replace the F2A-2s then in service but rather were used to equip the squadrons using obsolescent biplanes. VF-2 itself reequipped with the newly acquired F2A-3, which suggests there was little official anticipation of the failure it would prove to be. (Not what you'd predict for a failed experiment) As has been stated repeatedly, the real issue limiting deployment numbers of the F2A was the failure of the company not the aircraft but of course, in retrospect Brewster's failure to produce was a blessing. Ignoring the F2A-1 -2, is IMO stacking the deck to make a point that IMHO is simply untenable. 

As an example of what appears to me to be an apparently biased perspective, you ignore in your accounting not only the service of the F2A-1 and -2 in 1941 but also the 81 Martlet-1s and IIIs most of which entered FAA service in 1940 and early 1941. Had the USA not been giving away aircraft to an embattled West, those F4Fs would have been taken in hand by the USN, completed to USN standards as F4F-3 or 3A and filled most of the remaining USN squadrons: VF-7, VF-42, VF-6 and VF-71 and half of VF-5. It seems a bit ungracious of you to neglect their contribution to the FAA stable and not include the F4F as “in service” regardless of whether USN or FAA. Although I do wonder why the roughly 60 surviving naval-equipped airframes were assigned to shore bases while the short-legged Sea Hurricane was introduced onto RN Flight decks. Could it have been the probable early (pre-Grumman TBF F6F) logistical and handling advantage of the HSH or a bit of NIH? Just wondering. In truth, from a purely risk-avoidance perspective, I’d rather land a HSH on board any CV than an F4F. I just like that wide stance as do I suspect most naval aviators would prefer. 

By your reasoning I could argue the Skua was a failed experiment that foreshadowed the overdue development of the Fulmar I and II, which finally brought to fruition the FAA goal of an effective carrier based multirole fighter. But I am wondering, did the Fulmar ever drop a 500 pound bomb on an enemy target or sink a ship. 

I have no problem calling the F2A-3 or export B-339s failed anything you care to call them, but to me that has no bearing on whether the F2A-1 or F2A-2 or even a hypothetical navalized B-339 could have made a difference flying from RN CVs in 1940-41. I think on this account we'll just have to agree to disagree.


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## RCAFson (Aug 4, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> You suggest that the F2A was a failed experiment when the F2A-1 and -2 equipped two of the USN's embarked fighter squadrons from 1940 through 1941. These two squadrons were the USN's premier units (VF-2 -3), before being progressively replaced by the seriously flawed F2A-3 and the more promising and capable F4F-3 and F4F-3A which incidentally didn't replace the F2A-2s then in service but rather were used to equip the squadrons using obsolescent biplanes. VF-2 itself reequipped with the newly acquired F2A-3, which suggests there was little official anticipation of the failure it would prove to be. (Not what you'd predict for a failed experiment) As has been stated repeatedly, the real issue limiting deployment numbers of the F2A was the failure of the company not the aircraft but of course, in retrospect Brewster's failure to produce was a blessing. Ignoring the F2A-1 -2, is IMO stacking the deck to make a point that IMHO is simply untenable.
> 
> As an example of what appears to me to be an apparently biased perspective, you ignore in your accounting not only the service of the F2A-1 and -2 in 1941 but also the 81 Martlet-1s and IIIs most of which entered FAA service in 1940 and early 1941. Had the USA not been giving away aircraft to an embattled West, those F4Fs would have been taken in hand by the USN, completed to USN standards as F4F-3 or 3A and filled most of the remaining USN squadrons: VF-7, VF-42, VF-6 and VF-71 and half of VF-5. It seems a bit ungracious of you to neglect their contribution to the FAA stable and not include the F4F as “in service” regardless of whether USN or FAA. Although I do wonder why the roughly 60 surviving naval-equipped airframes were assigned to shore bases while the short-legged Sea Hurricane was introduced onto RN Flight decks. Could it have been the probable early (pre-Grumman TBF F6F) logistical and handling advantage of the HSH or a bit of NIH? Just wondering. In truth, from a purely risk-avoidance perspective, I’d rather land a HSH on board any CV than an F4F. I just like that wide stance as do I suspect most naval aviators would prefer.
> 
> ...



No F2As or any of its variants ever flew a single combat mission from a CV, despite the considerable incentive for the USN to have continued to use this type after Pearl Harbour. The F2A-1, appears to have been used for protracted service trials, while the F2A-3 was demonstrably a failure. So trying to classify the F2A is problematic; IMHO it was never a true service type, rather it was a type which essentially flew very protracted, and ultimately unsuccessful service trials. The USN was never loathe to use a type for extended CV (IE the TBD) service and the failure to continue to use the F2A-2 suggests serious problems with all variants.

Regarding the Martlet, the first deliveries to Europe were via the cash and carry policy so these aircraft were not given away. 2ndly the Martlet required considerable modification, after UK delivery, before they even usable for shore based operations, and the fact that the HSH preceded the type into FAA CV service gives us more than a hint that this was so, especially when the FAA is making desperate attempts to fly the B339 off CVs in early 1941. This of course suggests that the F2A might have been used by the FAA as a CV based fighter; this would probably have been true in an extreme situation, where the type might have been able to by-pass proper service evaluations and trials. NIH never applied to the FAA! The first F4F type to win approval to enter USN CV service was the F4F-3, which carried a two-stage, two speed engine, production of which was problematic, so more potential F4F airframes would probably not have brought the type into USN CV service before 1941. In some ways the F4F had a analogous development to the A6M, where the earliest production types were not CV capable. Anecdotally, the F4F appears to have suffered a somewhat higher CV attrition rate than the HSH.

The Skua was not "a failed experiment" but rather an aircraft whose performance was no longer adequate and was withdrawn from service prematurely, on that account when the Fulmar arrived, rather than a type which was withdrawn due to it's own inherent defects. If the FAA had more decks available, then the Skua might have lasted a bit longer in a pure divebomber/recon role, where even the Roc would have had some utility.

The Fulmar never had a chance to fully exploit its potential as a fighter bomber, because the FAA rarely had the opportunity to bring enough CVs together to allow the Fulmar to act as a strike aircraft, or to demonstrate pre-war FAA CV operational doctrine. However during the Raid on Kirkenes and Petsamo, on July 31 1941, Fulmars did carry out a fighter-bomber mission. Although this mission was ultimately unsuccessful (surprise was lost due to Luftwaffe recon and German AW radar), it was one of the few examples of the FAA being able to undertake a multi-CV "fast carrier raid" where the Fulmar could undertake non fighter missions. The official dispatch makes for interesting reading:
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/LondonGazette/38300.pdf


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 4, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> No F2As or any of its variants ever flew a single combat mission from a CV


They never saw *"combat"* off a CV, but flew *"combat missions." *VF-2 flew patrols in the Pacific, look into VS-201 and operations off the USS Long Island (CVE-1) in the Atlantic.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 4, 2012)

The F4F-3A was created to compensate for the slow problematic introduction of the P&W double superchargeed engine. So whatever A/C didn't go to Europe would have been, as I said earlier, completed to USN (-3A) standards. By any Accounting you care to use, the F4F was in service in 1940.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 4, 2012)

F4F-3As were in production in 1940, 30 of which produced in 1940, and intended for Greece ended up in FAA hands in the Western desert and according to the FAA archive website: Grumman F4F Martlet (Grumman F4F Wildcat) aircraft profile. Aircraft Database of the Fleet Air Arm Archive 1939-1945 6 more were included in the french order but reached England sometime in 1940. That's enough F4F-3As to equip two USN squadrons. (I had never heard of this small (F4F-3A) batch before so I am not convinced it is accurate). Whether Britain paid for them or not is irrelevant, they were in FAA service. The fact that Britain paid for them does not change the fact that production for the USN was deferred throughout 1940 and 41. US National defense was made weaker by releasing those aircraft to the RN. On December 7, there were barely enough F4F-3 3As to equip the Enterprise and Saratoga squadrons and those of the land based marines. For awhile, at least one USN fleet squadron was equiped with essentially only -3As. Britain may have paid for these aircraft, but so did the USN and USA. 

you suggest that the RN FAA was busy modifying the F4F's so they weren't yet available for RN flight decks. At least one squadron is well known to have been operational by December 1940 and earlier: 804 at Hatston. 

from the FAA archive website:

"The first Wildcat used by the Fleet Air Arm were 53 Grumman G-36a Martlet I, and 6 Grumman G-36a Martlet III (F4F-3As) diverted from a French order which had not been delivered before the Fall of France in 1940. The aircraft were all delivered to the British Purchasing Commission on *23 August 1940* and transferred to the first FAA unit *804 Hatston on 7 September 1940* (eg AX827), *778 squadron* at Arbroath in *September 1940 *(eg AX826), *759 squadron* at Yeovilton in *October and November 1940 *(eg BJ555) and *802 squadron* at Donisbristle on *23 November 1940* (eg AL237). Further aircraft in 1940 were lost when 20 Grumman G-36a Martlet I diverted from an undelivered French orders sank with SS Ruperra which was torpedoed 500 miles NW of Ireland on *19 October 1940.*"

Further:

"The next Wildcat to be received by the Fleet Air Arm were in Spring of 1941, when 30 Grumman F4F-3a Martlet III ordered by Greek Purchasing Commission in August 1940 for shipment to Greece reached Port Suez in April 1941, then diverted to the Royal Navy under Lend-Lease transfer on 4 April 1941." 

These 30 aircraft were F4F-3A's slated for USN service that were diverted to Greece in 1940 and then to the FAA in early 1941.

From Wikipedia:

"The first 30 F4F-3As were released for sale to Greece, after the Italian invasion in November 1940. However, at the defeat of Greece in April 1941 the aircraft had only reached Gibraltar."


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## RCAFson (Aug 4, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> F4F-3As were in production in 1940,



When did the F4F enter CV squadron service in the USN? When did it enter CV squadron service in the RN?


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 4, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> When did the F4F enter CV squadron service in the USN? When did it enter CV squadron service in the RN?



Although I believe this to be an irrelevant point, as the carrier suitability trials had long been completed by early 1940. With so many F4Fs going overseas to foreign combatants, delivery to USN fleet squadrons was slowed considerably. Nevertheless, the first fleet squadron, VF-4, was F4F-3 and/or 3A equiped at the end of 1940. By the time the first Martlet's arrived in England the F4F was already accepted and proven as a CV capable fighter. In fact the Martlet Is were ostensibly obtained by the French for use from their carriers. If you choose to assign a CV capable aircraft to a land based squadron. It's still "in service." If you prevent your ally's ability to put it into CV service by buying virtually the entire production line of CV capable aircraft, it's still "in service." In other words, you are stretching the meaning of "in service" beyond recognition to suit a point that appears to me to be nothing more than rationalizing a state of affairs you don't wish to accept. To answer your question directly. The first deloyments of which I am aware are those aboard CV-4 (Ranger) and CV-7 (Wasp) in early 1941. AFAIK, the first FAA deployment was aboard the Audacity in September of 1941.


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## parsifal (Aug 4, 2012)

Martlet Is were mostly ex- G36 French Wildcats that had been ordered at the end of 1939, Grumman received a French order for 81 aircraft of model G-36A, to equip their new Joffre-class aircraft carrier: Joffre and Painlevé. The main difference with the basic model G-36 was due to the unavailability for export of the two-stage supercharged engine of F4F-3. The G-36A was powered by the nine-cylinder, single-row R-1820-G205A radial engine, of 1,200 hp (890 kW) and with a single-stage two-speed supercharger. The substitution of the two stage supercharger with a single stage unit affected the perforamce of the type. 

The G-36A had French instrumentation, radio, and gunsight. The throttle was modified to conform to French pre-war practice: the throttle lever was moved towards the pilot, (i.e., backward), to increase engine power. The armament was was six 7.5 mm (.296 in) Darne machine guns (two in the fuselage and four in the wings). The first G-36A was flown on 11 May 1940. The order as received by the FAA were basically as above, less the armament, and with unnaceptable control sticks, safety gear. It was found that these a/c leaked fuel profusely..... 

After the defeat of France, all contracts were taken over by Britain, but they were deleivered to the FAA in their French configuration. They were immedialtely referred to Blackburn, to attempt to convert them to FAA standards, but this did take time (though a few were converted and used to equip 804 sqn by August) . The throttle was modified again, four 0.50 in (12.7 mm) guns were installed in the wings, and most traces of the original ownership removed.The Martlets were modified for British use by Blackburn, which continued to do this for all later marks. The final Martlet Is were not fully converted until March 1941, and they continued to be probelematic because many of them continued to leak fuel and simply were deemed unsuitable for frontline carrier operations because of the lack of wing folding. This did not prevent them from being embarked on the Audacity, but it is interesting to note that this small carrier which was rated to embark 16 a/c normally, could only accomodate 6 of the non-wing folding versions of the Martlet Is. 

British gunsights, catapult spools, and other items were installed on the martlet Is by Blackburn. After initial attempts to fit British radio sets, it was decided to use the much superior American equipment.

The first ones entered service in August 1940, with 804 Naval Air Squadron, then stationed at Hatson in the Orkney Islands. The Martlet Mk I did not have a wing folding mechanism, and was therefore only used from land bases (with the one exception....Audacity).

In 1940, Belgium also placed an order for at least 10 Martlet Mk 1s. These were to be modified with the removal of the tailhook, however, after the surrender of Belgium, none were delivered and by May 10, 1940, the aircraft order was transferred to the Royal Navy. These had similar issues as the g-36, though not quite as bad. Six were taken over by the RN....these are probably the versions mentioned on the FAA website. 

Martlet Is were not in any way 1st line amaterial because of a number of reliability and stowage issues. Martlet IIs were not delivered until September 1941, and it is interesting to note that it was some time after this that the Martlet II was first embarked and used in as 
1st line capacity. I am given to understand that the USN also had issues with its early F4s, mostly to do with the amrmament and fuel system. The f4 is often toutyed as a 1939-40 design, but in reality it cannot be considered ready for frontline operations until mid 1941. This makes it in reality a newer type than the Zero, which had been entereing squadron service since Jaauary 1941. Its also a reason why the Fulmar should not be compared to either of these two....it was fit for combat on fleet carriers more than a year before its US counterpart.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 4, 2012)

It's certainly interesting history Pars, perhaps you'd provide a reference for the above? The only fuel issues of which I am aware were the ones attendant to the installation of the self sealing tanks and those occurred IIRC in late '41 and early 1942. It does appear to answer the question of why the FAA, in possession of a perfectly suitable CV capable aircraft, didn't use it for roughly a year. That suggests a nearly criminal level of irresponsibilty absent your history. It was also my understanding that the Martlet's use on Audacity were the folding wing versions and that the reason for the small number was the lack of a hanger leaving only the deck park space available of which there wouldn't have been much. Not disputing your statement, just didn't know they were Martlet I's. For example:

http://users.skynet.be/Emmanuel.Gustin/history/f4f.html where they are reported as Mk IIs.

So, considering I listed four FAA squadrons using the Martlet Is before the end of 1940, they were still in service, although from what you are saying, the USN BIS trial reports weren't worth the paper they were printed on. Moreover, the USN deployment by VF-41 and VF-7 in early 41 were at best premature and at worst, an excercise in futility with an A/C not yet suitable for CV service. I would definitely like to see those cruise reports.


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## parsifal (Aug 5, 2012)

I am not all that familiar with the USN intro duction and difficulties. I would stand corrected if you have the details about their prewar 9ie pre december '41) deployment. I also did not check about the naudacity deployment, so these may have been wing folding versions, though I am reasonably certain they were not. 

The FAA certainly had teething troubles with the Martlet I and I do know that precluded their use on carriers to a very significant extent. FAA had great success with the later Martlett in all its Marks. Martlet Is chalaked up a very impressive kill loss ratio of over 59:1, whilst overall the type managed about 50:1 exchange rate according to one source.

My main sources are books on the FAA by David Brown and Norman Polmar. Ive also got various squadron histories and a few other bits and pieces....yes I am an FAA nut, I confess.......


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## RCAFson (Aug 5, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Although I believe this to be an irrelevant point, as the carrier suitability trials had long been completed by early 1940. With so many F4Fs going overseas to foreign combatants, delivery to USN fleet squadrons was slowed considerably. Nevertheless, the first fleet squadron, VF-4, was F4F-3 and/or 3A equiped at the end of 1940. By the time the first Martlet's arrived in England the F4F was already accepted and proven as a CV capable fighter. In fact the Martlet Is were ostensibly obtained by the French for use from their carriers. If you choose to assign a CV capable aircraft to a land based squadron. It's still "in service." If you prevent your ally's ability to put it into CV service by buying virtually the entire production line of CV capable aircraft, it's still "in service." In other words, you are stretching the meaning of "in service" beyond recognition to suit a point that appears to me to be nothing more than rationalizing a state of affairs you don't wish to accept. To answer your question directly. The first deloyments of which I am aware are those aboard CV-4 (Ranger) and CV-7 (Wasp) in early 1941. AFAIK, the first FAA deployment was aboard the Audacity in September of 1941.



According to Tillman, Wildcat: The F4F in World War II, 2nd Edition,p.11, the F4F-3 completed carrier trials after November 1940 and entered CV squadron service in Jan 1941. Tillman also states: "_...the F4F-3A (production model of the X4F-6) was powered by the Twin Wasp and by the end of 1941 the marines had recieved 65 of the 95 ordered to that time. 30 intended for Greece were taken by the British as Martlet IIIs..._" So the F4F-3A entered service after the F4F-3 and did not delay the F4F-3 into service.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 5, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> According to Tillman, Wildcat: The F4F in World War II, 2nd Edition,p.11, the F4F-3 completed carrier trials after November 1940 and entered CV squadron service in Jan 1941. Tillman also states: "_...the F4F-3A (production model of the X4F-6) was powered by the Twin Wasp and *by the end of 1941 the marines had recieved 65 of the 95 ordered* to that time. *30 intended for Greece were taken by the British as Martlet IIIs.*.._" So the F4F-3A entered service after the F4F-3 and did not delay the F4F-3 into service.



Tillman's quote appears to be inaccurate or misleading on a number of accounts. While the marines may have received a few of the 65 F4F-3As that were produced for the USN, they certainly didn't get all. As I said before, in late 1941-42 VF-6 was flying nearly an entire squadron of F4F-3As according to Lundstrom in First Team. the above quite doesn't really tell you when the -3A's were actually received except by the end of 1941, so with your Tillman quote it remains an open question. I'll be checking my own sources and seeking others when I return home next week. On page 52 Lundstrom states the USN squadrons and PH facilities had about 17 F4F-3As and another 16 enroute as cargo, so roughly half the 65 were in Navy custody, not marine. As to when they were produced, as I said, that's an open question. The ones for Greece that ended up in FAA hands were evidently produced no later than February 1941 and the text in Wikipedia suggested November 1940 as when they were "released for greek purchase suggesting they were already produced. As I recall, Don Linn in the F4F In Action states the -3A model was produced due to delays in the -3 engine procurement to get aircraft into USN hands. Not sure what you mean about the F4F-3A "delaying the F4F-3 into service." Don't recall ever suggesting that. It is either a typo on my part or a misread on yours.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 5, 2012)

According to Lundstrom page 13(?) the 65 F4F-3A began to be delivered in March 41. No indication when the first batch of 30 were delivered. Only somewhat earlier. 4 F4F-3As were lost on dec 7 and the 16 enroute as cargo to PH had apparently been stripped from VMF squadrons on the west coast.


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## RCAFson (Aug 5, 2012)

parsifal said:


> The FAA certainly had teething troubles with the Martlet I and I do know that precluded their use on carriers to a very significant extent. FAA had great success with the later Martlett in all its Marks. Martlet Is chalaked up a very impressive kill loss ratio of over 59:1, whilst overall the type managed about 50:1 exchange rate according to one source.


 
The Martlet only rarely encounted fighter opposition, but even if only 4 Martlets were lost, that would imply total kills in the area of 200-250 which is very unlikely.

IIRC, the Sea Hurricane outscored the Martlet during Pedestal.


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## RCAFson (Aug 5, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Although I believe this to be an irrelevant point, as the carrier suitability trials had long been completed by early 1940. With so many F4Fs going overseas to foreign combatants, delivery to USN fleet squadrons was slowed considerably. Nevertheless, the first fleet squadron, VF-4, was F4F-3 and/or 3A equiped at the end of 1940. By the time the first Martlet's arrived in England the F4F was already accepted and proven as a CV capable fighter.



I have given you approximate dates for F4F-3 CV acceptance trials, and they were conducted in very late November and December 1940. AFAIK, no USN CV trials were conducted before these dates and the aircraft built to the French order did not conduct CV acceptance trials prior to their being received by the FAA after France fell. For various reasons, including the need for many mods to make them acceptable for FAA service, the FAA did not conduct CV trials on these aircraft until the Spring of 1941. Consequently, the aircraft was not CV rated until 1941.

Tillman states that VF-4 based at NAS Norfolk, received a single F4F-3 on Nov 26 1940, making it the first VF squadron to receive the F4F-3, but this was prior to the aircraft being approved for CV service.

BTW you might be interested in this thread:

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/fulmar-ii-versus-f4f-4-under-10-000-ft-29212.html


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 5, 2012)

_*The Fleet Air Arm aircraft went on to make many kills*. For example, the Greek delivered Wildcat were involved in convoy patrols, one Martlet piloted by Sub Lt R Griffon shot down a S.79, forced two others to jettison bombs, then hit by return fire attacking a fourth, dived vertically into sea 50m n of Ras el Milh on 28 December 1941. _


_*During 1942 the ratio of victories to losses for air combat for the F4F was 59 :1, and for the whole war the official figure for the F4FJFM was 69 :1*. *A large proportion of these victories was obtained against bombers and transports*, but the figures show that the Wildcat was not unsuccessful, especially in the first half of the war in the Pacific, when the Grumman design was the sole carrier-based fighter operating with the USN. _

Grumman F4F Martlet (Grumman F4F Wildcat) aircraft profile. Aircraft Database of the Fleet Air Arm Archive 1939-1945


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## RCAFson (Aug 5, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> _*The Fleet Air Arm aircraft went on to make many kills*. For example, the Greek delivered Wildcat were involved in convoy patrols, one Martlet piloted by Sub Lt R Griffon shot down a S.79, forced two others to jettison bombs, then hit by return fire attacking a fourth, dived vertically into sea 50m n of Ras el Milh on 28 December 1941. _
> 
> 
> _*During 1942 the ratio of victories to losses for air combat for the F4F was 59 :1, and for the whole war the official figure for the F4FJFM was 69 :1*. *A large proportion of these victories was obtained against bombers and transports*, but the figures show that the Wildcat was not unsuccessful, especially in the first half of the war in the Pacific, when the Grumman design was the sole carrier-based fighter operating with the USN. _
> ...



The FAA Archive also states: _The Fulmar played important roles in the early defense of Malta and the defense of Ceylon, and went on to account for nearly 1/3 of the aircraft shot down by the FAA in WWII_
IIRC, the Fulmar accounted for something like 120 kills, and if we take into account kills made by other fighters such as the Skua, GSG, HSH, Seafire and IIRC even the Roc made at least one kill, a kill ratio greater than 50-1 for the Martlet is not possible, since at least a 1/2 dozen were lost in combat, and an overall 69-1 for the F4F in USN/FAA 1942 service is fantasy.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 5, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> *The FAA Archive also states*: _The Fulmar played important roles in the early defense of Malta and the defense of Ceylon, and went on to account for nearly 1/3 of the aircraft shot down by the FAA in WWII_
> IIRC, the Fulmar accounted for something like 120 kills, and if we take into account kills made by other fighters such as the Skua, GSG, HSH, Seafire and IIRC even the Roc made at least one kill, a kill ratio greater than 50-1 for the Martlet is not possible, since at least a 1/2 dozen were lost in combat, and an overall 69-1 for the F4F in USN/FAA 1942 service is fantasy.


Just going by what the* FAA *Archives own website states.....


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## renrich (Aug 5, 2012)

By October 31, 1940, the FAA had received 81 Martlets. The first Martlet kill was on December 25, 1940. January, 1941, VF 7 replaces it's F3F1s with F4F3s. March , 41, the FAA receives it's first Martlett IIs. Early problems with Wildcats are fuel gauges inaccurate after SS tanks installed and the SS tank liners dissolving and stopping up fuel lines and gun stoppages when full loads of ammo carried. Field modifications are carried out.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 5, 2012)

A bit hamstrung withouth references and relying on inadequate web sources. Based on your post, My basic feling is Tillman while good in some respects may not be a reliable source for the this kind of information. When ever the carrier trials took place, the Grumman production line was occupied producing aircraft for foreign sales during 1940. That is very likely to have slowed down the delivery of USN F4F-3 -3A A/C and the CV acceptance process as well. Although there wer a few -3s in hand and they would likely have been undergoing a fairly rigorous period of testing from thei first appearance perhaps even Including CV work. The whole issue bears further investigation. 

Considering the foregoing, it seems a bit odd that the FAA continued to accept deliveries of the M-1 into late 1940 and the FAA archive web site states the Four squadrons previously listed accepted their M-1s prior to the end of 1940. With an aircraft so unsuited I am a bit surprised the delivery of the last batch wasn't deferred until Grumman had solved the problems. M-1s were still arriving in GB into the late Fall of 1940 as shown by the loss of 20 at sea.


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## parsifal (Aug 5, 2012)

I am doubtful about the claim kill ratios for the Martlet as well, but, in the same breath, I dont think its effectiveness for the FAA should be under-estimated. It represented a big step up in performance, reliability, range and effectivenes for the FAA (as was the Sea Hurricane), once its bugs were sorted out. But it is unrealistic to expect that the Martlet could have made any measurable difference to the FAAS overall position in 1940. The simple fact are the martlet was not ready for large scale carrier usage until 1941. 

Acknowledging the obvious value of the martlet doesnt diminish the effectiveness or importance of the Fulmar in any way. Fulmars were an outstanding success, and the basic concept was further developed and improved upon in the subsequent Firefly, which in many respects was the most successful fighter bomber in FAA servcie during the war. Most importantly Fulmars were ready, reliable, packed a heavy punch and multi role capable from early 1940, and thats a critical issue. The RN was at war from September 1939, and went to war unddermanned, and with poorly performing fighters. Trouble was, there was nothing in the pipeline...US or British that could fill that gap in 1939. Certainly not the F2A or the Wildcat, not in late '39 or '40. Not all that problem can be laid at the feet of the aircraft.....the RN simply did not have the pilots to put a dedicated single purpose fighter on the decks of its carriers at that time. Even if a relaible, wing folding with proper working armamanet had been available there were simply not enough pilots to fly them.....there are reasons why Fulmars were Fighter/recons, and Skuas were Fighter/D/B, and Swordfish rated as TSR (with D/B thrown in for good measure later on)......FAA a/c just had to be capable of doing more than one thing


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 5, 2012)

It looks like the first F4F-3A was completed in November 1940 and entered trials that month. So the first 30 F4F-3As (eventually released to Greece and subsequently the FAA) would have been produced sometime between that (late) November 1940 and March 1941. 

The Grumman F4F Wildcat

It also looks like a trickle of deliveries of F4F-3s were being delivered to the USN for testing starting in February, 1940. Carrier suitability trials would have started with extensive land based testing, assuming it was done in a manner similar to 20 years after WW2.

Ren, I've got a number of sources that state the F4F-3 began to equip VF-41 and VF-7 in December 1940, and at least one source indicates this actually began in November, 1940. I can imagine there is confusion between delivery and the start of squadron CV work-ups which evidently occurred starting in January 1941. That's actually pretty fast from squadron acceptance to embarked ops, which suggests to me there was some push involved, which, based upon the delay due to foreign orders, I can very well understand. I think there may be more going on here on both sides of the Atlantic than meets the eye or is to be found in the popular accounts.

The initial aircraft of the French G-36A variant off the assembly line was first flown in the US on 5/10/40. The FAA archive website claims FAA squadrons began receiving their Martlet-Is in September 1940 (one site even claims late August for the first delivery). 

Based on web-cited compilations, I am guessing that well over 100 G-36 and F4F-3 variants came off the Grumman assembly line in 1940 with the bulk of those going overseas. The distribution of the French order, considering what's been said about pilot shortages, I assume was split between providing airframes to training squadrons (Squadrons 759 778 ) for its student FAA pilots and as the FAA archive site states the rest went to equip two apparently operational landbased FAA squadrons (802 804). 
Tillman claims the Audacity Martlets were Mark II folding wing. I can see without a hangar, the fixed wing -Is could have been stored for use in a permanent deck park and simply moved about to allow flight ops to proceed as was typically done on USN CVs, so it is conceivable that Audacity's limited space did not preclude use of the few A/C she carried even if they were fixed wing as claimed by Wikipedia and the FAA archive website. It looks like even in the case of the F4F/Martlet we are back to an argument of what could have been done vs the wisdom of what was actually done. The stark example of the B-339 experiment on the Eagle suggests to me that more could have been done had the stars been oriented properly. IIUC, the Martlet III(B)s of the original Greek order (an essentially 1940s or early '41 product) did not possess arresting gear, yet they appear to have been used quite effectively from land bases in the Western desert after their arrival around April 1941 a mere month after the crisis in the Med that spurred the experiment.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 6, 2012)

Often a point can be made more clear by turning it on its head. I recall a number of comments in Eric Brown's Wings of the Navy that appear to be germain to this thread. One in which he discusses the Fulmar. IIRC, he says something like: "If the RN/FAA HAD (my emphasis) to have [mulitrole] multiseat aircraft, it is difficult to imagine one better suited to the need than the Fulmar." My perspective on the Fulmar was largely formed upon reading his quote and by my general appreciation of its elegant lines. Trying to imagine the US building a similarly capable aircraft has brought me to an acceptance of the contemporary technological parity of the aircraft, so I stand corrected as to whether the RN-FAA was technologically retarded. No matter how misguided I may consider the policy of sending a carrier to war with anything less to protect it from aerial attack than the best (as in highest performance) fighter-interceptor aircraft technology and the nation's industrial base can create. No need to repeat/recount the many justifications used to validate this policy. I understand them and have my own issues with them sufficient to define a separate thread. For now, its enough to say, from a USN doctrinal perspective, a carrier air wing with anything less than an F2A-1/-2 or Martlet I is sheer madness. But then, what would the world be without mad dogs and Englishman. By the way Parsifal, one can be a fan of the RN and FAA without endorsing every cockamamie thing it chooses to do or did. For me the heroism and battles fought by the FAA against long odds, whether the enemy be the Germans, the Italians, the Japanese or the RAF, more than earns them enormous respect and my undying admiration. 

As Ali G would say, Respek.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 6, 2012)

Just to preempt the inevitable lecture on how much the USN owes the RN FAA, I'll list them here as a far from complete but indicative of the depth of the legacy. Forget post war, its too lengthy to list, but just in WW2 the USN learned most of what it know about Fighter direction from the RN and RAF. Without the spur of the wealth of experience provided in the use of ASV in a variety of roles, it is difficult to imagine the USN reaching the level of effectiveness it ultimately enjoyed especially in post-1942 ops. There are probably more, but like my lapse on recalling my own argument about the Martlet III production impacting F4F-3 delivery, I can't think of them now. Getting old sucks.

On a personal level, working in airborne ASW during the latter half of my career you may not realize that USN professional gospel is that when it comes to ASW, Britain's armed forces are the teacher, the USN the pupil. This is a statement made more frequently than you might imagine.


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## parsifal (Aug 6, 2012)

Ill reply simply. For the USN, the fulmar was less than ideal. For the RN it was as good as they could get in 1940. There was nothing better that could fulfil all the specifications and requirements. 

The shortcomings of the FAA and the RN in carrier aviation stemed from 25 years of parsimony and and downright hostility from the RAF controlled air wings.

And yes the USN did, and does have a lot to learn from the RN with regard to carrier aviation. Closed hangars, multi role capability, rough weather handling, anglefd decks, mirror landing sytems, ski jumps, VStol technology, torpedo ordinance, night attack capability, ASW capability and tactics, are all areas that the RN either did, or does, hold a clear lead over the USN at some point. The USN holds a clear lead in other areas, most notably dedicated air defence, radar communications and overall aircreaft performance. Its not a question of getting all jingistic about the issue...these are clear aspects of carrier warfare.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 7, 2012)

Just to make sure you understand my _*cockamamie*_ comment (not knowing how fluent you are with american slang). A cockamamie idea is one that may sound crazy to the listener (me in this case) but every once in a while works. I would be remiss if I didn't make the observation that the RN's approach basically worked (although at some cost at times). IIRC, the RN lost but one CV to air attack and that one an old light carrier with perhaps more sentimental value that actual although of course during a time when all flight decks were precious. The events in the IO at that time could be considered a cautionary tale illuminating the difference in the air policies of both nations. However, it strikes me as the stage for one of the bal*siest moves of any Admiral during the war, when Somerville took a stab at bringing the IJN to battle with a RN fleet that, numerically at least, was vastly inferior to his opponents. As recounted in Fighting Admiral, it was a game attempt and if it had succeeded could have changed the balance of power in the PTO before Coral Sea and Midway. Of course in the end, Somerville did the smart thing and preserved his fleet but what an interesting *what if* flows from his attempt.

Leonard Birchall and the Japanese Raid on Colombo

which contains an important shout out for the effective RCAF recon.


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## RCAFson (Aug 7, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Just to make sure you understand my _*cockamamie*_ comment (not knowing how fluent you are with american slang). A cockamamie idea is one that may sound crazy to the listener (me in this case) but every once in a while works. I would be remiss if I didn't make the observation that the RN's approach basically worked (although at some cost at times). IIRC, the RN lost but one CV to air attack and that one an old light carrier with perhaps more sentimental value that actual although of course during a time when all flight decks were precious. The events in the IO at that time could be considered a cautionary tale illuminating the difference in the air policies of both nations. However, it strikes me as the stage for one of the bal*siest moves of any Admiral during the war, when Somerville took a stab at bringing the IJN to battle with a RN fleet that, numerically at least, was vastly inferior to his opponents. As recounted in Fighting Admiral, it was a game attempt and if it had succeeded could have changed the balance of power in the PTO before Coral Sea and Midway. Of course in the end, Somerville did the smart thing and preserved his fleet but what an interesting *what if* flows from his attempt.
> 
> Leonard Birchall and the Japanese Raid on Colombo
> 
> which contains an important shout out for the effective RCAF recon.



The RN started the war with four 30 knot CVs, Furious, Glorious, Courageous, and Ark Royal. By Nov 1941, 3 of these ships were lost (all but Furious), and the RN built four 30 knot armoured carriers by Nov 1941, so the total number of fleet carriers had only gone up by one, to five total, by April 1942. It is interesting to speculate would have happened if some or all of these CVs had survived. With 4 or 5 carriers Somerville would have had a lot more recon capability, and lot more offensive potential. If he could have caught the IJN carriers as they were attacking Ceylon, he might have been able to cripple or destroy the IJN CVs, as actually happened at Midway.


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## parsifal (Aug 7, 2012)

His best chance was to attack the japanese at dusk or before dawn. If only he had just a couple more ASV Albacores....a horse a horse my kingdom for a horse.....


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## RCAFson (Aug 7, 2012)

parsifal said:


> His best chance was to attack the japanese at dusk or before dawn. If only he had just a couple more ASV Albacores....a horse a horse my kingdom for a horse.....


 
I would argue that he needed more Fulmars because they would have been more survivable during daylight recon, so the Fulmars find the IJN during the day and provide the ASV Albacores with an approximate location for a night ASV recon and then a night strike. Apparently, an ASV Albacore found the IJN just at sunset (18:00), but it was damaged by a Zero. Given the latitude, it would have been completely dark in about another 1/2 hour.


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## vikingBerserker (Aug 7, 2012)

Last night I was reading _Airwar for Yugoslavia, Greece and Crete _by Christopher Shores and came across this on page 141:

"However Lt Cdr Black [805 Squadron on Crete] had early problems, for the Buffalos proved troublesome. He recalls:

The Buffalo was a delight to fly - very manoeuvralbe (compared to the Fulmar). It would have been an excellent fighter but the guns could not be fired because the ends of the wires which were part of the interrupter gear, failed and 805 did not have the necessary spares. At no point did I request the the Buffalos be exchanged for Sea Gladiators but I do remember that in the light of the inadequacy of Fulmars against CR 42s I requested that the Sea Gladiators, if not required for other operations, should be sent to Maleme, to reinforce 805."


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 7, 2012)

To complete the discussion on the F4F-3 development, it appears as though there were indeed considerable difficulties in getting the F4F ready for fleet service. It looks like engine overheating and fuel pressurization and supply problems. I suspect the production of the apparently service unready G-36A did contribute somewhat to a delay in solving the problem but not nearly so much as I had surmised. The initial four or so "production F4F-3s" appear to have been subjected to an intensive series of tests and mods to attempt to bring the type to servicable form, leading to the XF4F-5 and XF4F-6 as alternate forms, in addition to the Martlet Is, the former were apparently derived from the initial batch of a half dozen or so "pre-production models (Bureau numbers: 1844 to 1846 1847 to XF4F-5 and one of these early -3s becomes the XF4F-6, all with engine variants with single stage superchargers). The best description I've found of the F4F's development trials is, strangely enough, the difficult to read czech page: 

Grumman F4F-3 Wildcat :: Grumman :: USA

By the end of 1940 there were a grand total of 22 F4F-3 in squadron service apportioned to VF-41 and 71 in batches of 11 to each.

This compares to approximately 40 F2A-2 fighters in squadron service delivered starting in September 1940 through the end of the year.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 22, 2012)

Finally did a weight break down and comparison for the F2A-2 and F2A-3. Looks like the former is about 750 pounds lighter than the latter. Obviously not all of that is SST armor which in the F4F-3 amounted to about 400 lbs. The ammo load for the -2 was apparently 225 rpg while that of the -3 is listed as 325 rpg, but that only accounts for about 120 lbs. the -3 wing was over 130 lbs heavier and even the engine had gained about 200 lbs. over its predecessor. I suspect that about 400 lbs of the -3 weight gain was in armor. In contrast, the Finn B-239 version appears to have been perhaps only about 100 lbs heavier than a 4 HMG version of the F2A-1 upgrade completed in the summer of '40. All weight data inferred from AHT whose breakouts appear to have little to no connection to reality in their various combinations. The weights seem ok but how they are combined by model variant is bizarre. (e.g. the Finn B-239 is variously portrayed as a 4 gun fighter or 2 gun bomber. The fuel loads are mixed between fighter and bombers by prototype 110 gallon vs operational 160 gallon capacities.

Bottom line here is that I would expect an armor upgraded F2A-2 to be quite effective flown from a CV and not nearly as susceptible to landing gear failure as its overweight successor. Trouble is that SST are probably difficult to implement on the -2 based on its fuel tank construction. Without fuel tank protection, I doubt the FAA would have given it a second look, even if it had been in the market for a single seat fighter.


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## Juha (Aug 25, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> Regardless, the Fulmars were not with the Albacores when the Albacores were attacked.
> 
> You'll excuse me if I'm skeptical about that. None of the Albacores claimed an Me-110, while the Fulmars claimed 2 and a probable. Maybe there was another Me-110 loss not noted in the "incomplete" Luftwaffe loss register cited on the wikipedia page?



Sorry about a very late answer, had been very busy lately.
When we take a notice that 11 Albacores were lost during the Kirkenäs attack, the fact that none of the returning 9 crews claimed a Bf 110 doesn't prove anything conclusively. We have better info on Z./JG 77 (the Bf 110 unit) than on 14./JG 77 (the Bf 109 unit).

Juha


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## yulzari (Aug 25, 2012)

I feel impelled to quibble about the reiterated assertion that the FAA had to put up with the aeroplanes that the RAF decided they should have. It was their Lordships of the Admiralty not their 'Airships' of the Air Ministry who drew up the requirements for FAA aeroplanes. The RAF provided staff and training but exercised no real operational nor doctrinal control of the FAA so, if the aeroplanes sought and bought to meet the RN doctrine were poor choices, the finger should be pointed at the Admiralty not the Air Ministry (I except the madness that was the Roc).

One could postulate a dive bombing capable Fulmar and a RN willing to abandon torpedo attack diverting resources into effective anti shipping bombs and mines thus allowing all Fulmar fleet carriers. It is worth remembering that it was the FAA who funded and supported the early development of the Griffon. If half the resources devoted to Rocs,Firebrands, Barracudas etc. were used to move onto the Merlin Fulmar and then the Griffon Firefly then stocking FAA would have been far easier.

In respect of the original topic question, what would the FAA have done with the Buffalo. The only role vacant would be to replace Sea Gladiators as point defence for the fleet and a strike Fulmar would have been a more versatile candidate for that if the FAA saw itself as an aggressive force able to find the enemy at a distance and reach out and strike at him. Later in the war escort carriers needed an all weather strike force (Swordfish) and to destroy shadowing reconnaissance; for which the Martlet was perfectly adequate. The RAF could have used more Buffalos in the Far East and one could define particular circumstances where the Buffalo could have been of use to FAA squadrons but, in a overall doctrinal concept, the Buffalo was not what the FAA was looking for.


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