# Japanese air power in a hypotetical invasion of the USSR in 1941



## Jenisch (Dec 15, 2011)

Hello,

I'd like to propose a discussion about the Japanese air power in a hypotetical invasion of the Soviet Union, followed the German invasion in 1941. 

While many people point out the technical and doctrinal superiority of the Red Army destroying any plausible chance of a Japanese victory, I never heard anything regarding how the Japanese air power would interact in this scenario.

What are your views?


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## vikingBerserker (Dec 15, 2011)

IIRC during the Battle of Khalkhin Gol the Soviets lost more aircraft, but they were able to establish air superiority.


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## davebender (Dec 15, 2011)

Ki-27. Single engine fighter. Superceded by Ki-43 from 1942.
Ki-21. Twin engine level bomber. Superceded by Ki-49 from late 1941.
Ki-30. Light bomber.
Ki-32. Light bomber. Superceded by Ki-48 from 1941.


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## Jenisch (Dec 15, 2011)

vikingBerserker said:


> IIRC during the Battle of Khalkhin Gol the Soviets lost more aircraft, but they were able to establish air superiority.



In Khalkhing Gol, the Soviets obtained air superiority because they started to employ energy tactics with their more sturdy latest I-16's, together with the use of experience pilots and plenty of replacements of both pilots and aircraft. The Japanese suffered with low commitment of the air force, resulting in fadigued pilots without replacements, and were also forbidden to attack any rear targets (including airfields).

In this scenario, I think the situation could be different. The Zeros would play an active role in the decisive Eastern Manchuria battlefront, and they already proved themselfs being capable of conduct massacres of the Polikarpovs in China. With those Polikarpovs often being piloted by Soviet volunteers. The same Polikarpovs constituted the majority of the VVS in 1941.

Another consideration is pilot training. The VVS training levels declined considerably following it's pressed expansion in the late 1930's. The Japanese would face an horde of recruites, which even the Ki-27's and A5M's being flown by experienced Japanese pilots probably would be able to hurt them. The VVS fighter tactics in WWII were mainly focused in the defensive role, given little flexibility. This likely to be maintened in this scenario. It was a major factor in the great losses it suffered from the LW, and this only start to change in 1944.

Due to the absence of the naval production, we would see an emphasis Japanese in aircraft production, modernization and pilot training in this scenario. I just can't estimate this.

Ah, and I would like to say that political details should not be include here. The objective of this topic is have opinions about the Japanese air power influence in a hypotetical German-Japanese invasion of the USSR.


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## Juha (Dec 15, 2011)

In fact there was at least one big bomber raid on against the Soviet a/fs resulting heavy air fighting in Mongolian airspace during Khalkhin Gol fighting.

IMHO JAAF would not like to see IJNAF arriving its turf, the rivalty between IJA and IJN was rather fierce, so IMHO no Zeros outside the coastal areas.

During the later part of Winter War Soviet fighters flew fairly deep into Finland's airspace utilising drop tanks, strafing airfields and trains etc, not very defensive activities.

Juha


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## Jenisch (Dec 15, 2011)

Juha said:


> In fact there was at least one big bomber raid on against the Soviet a/fs resulting heavy air fighting in Mongolian airspace during Khalkhin Gol fighting.



Yes. And it was a victory for the IJAAF. It was the only time in Nomonhan when the IJAAF doctrine was used like it should be. Further bombings were not allowed because this one, which originated from the Kwantung Army HQ without Tokyo's approval. Tokyo only authorized massive aerial operations to support the planned IJA third offensive, which Zhukov demolished with his own offensive.



> IMHO JAAF would not like to see IJNAF arriving its turf, the rivalty between IJA and IJN was rather fierce, so IMHO no Zeros outside the coastal areas.



The coastal areas were just the decisive scenario. Also, the IJN was responsible for long range bombing in the Japanese air services, so a lot of action from the Zeros would occur. Their long range also would be an advantage in the vast Soviet territory, which the Germans only had with the arrival of the Fw 190.



> During the later part of Winter War Soviet fighters flew fairly deep into Finland's airspace utilising drop tanks, strafing airfields and trains etc, not very defensive activities.



I told in WWII.


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## davebender (Dec 15, 2011)

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth/soviet_union_east_and_south_asia_1987.jpg\
I wonder if the IJN might make an amphibious landing north of Vladivostok. Take the fortified port from the rear rather then having the IJA attack it head on. That would give the IJN a piece of the action separate from the IJA main effort in Manchuria.


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## michaelmaltby (Dec 15, 2011)

davebender, I agree. That is the only way to do it ... if you are co-ordinating your efforts with your Axis partner - June 22, 1941.

A Pearl Harbor type carrier strike immediately followed by amphibious landings - and drive west across the Trans Siberian RR.

MM


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## Jenisch (Dec 15, 2011)

*Strategies and tactics in Japanese plans of Siberian invasion*

_The lines of strategies and tactics in Japanese plans to Siberian invasion basically after the Indochina occupation, with some reinforcements from Japan proper, the Imperial forces planned the next operations:

*Naval bombardments preceded the subsequent disembarkations from Shumushuand Paramushiro in Kamchatka, to occupy Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky other forces from Karafuto enter in North Sakhalin and make some landings in Alexandrovsk and Ohka; optionally other forces landed in Kommadorsky islands and Anadyr in North Pacific area.

*As similar naval operations from Hokkaido and North Honshu against Nikolayevsk, Soviet Bay, and Vladivostok. Some naval forces navigated inside of Amur River against Konsomolsk and striking Khabarovsk.

*Later if followed with landings for occupying Ohkostk and Nagaevo; another option was possibly occupation of Southeast Yakutsk area also

*Aerial operations were leaving against Petropavlovsk, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, Konsomolsk, Blagoveschesk, Chita, Ulan-Ude and possibly Ulan-Bator and Irkutsk. The principal points Trans-Siberian (Vladivostok/Ulan-Ude and/or Irkustk-Krasnoyarsk lines) and Baikal-Amur lines (incomplete in period) was taken with airborne or paratrooper forces

*Land operations was simultaneous leaving against Khabarovsk, Birobidjanand Blagoveschensk with massive artillery strikes and entering infantry accompanied with Armored forces at same time other forces advance from East Outer Mongolia to occupied Ulan Bator.

*Other advances were the entry in West Outer Mongolia, along the land incursion at Irkutsk area for taken the Trans-Siberian and Baikal-Amur link.

*Another optative operation implied the finalizing the occupation of West Outer Mongolia, enter in Tannu-Tuva andinvasion at Krasnoyarsk how springboard of possibly operation against Novosibirsk and Central Asia.

*Japanese observations over nature of Siberian front*

Although the Kwantung Army had been reinforced, the Russo-German War-about which the Japanese Army had held such great expectations-was not turning out favorably for Germany, despite Hitler's boasts. A serious problem consequently demanded resolution: How could the beefed-up Kwantung Army pull through the rigorous cold of a Manchurian winter?

By their very nature, armaments must be perfectly adapted to combat methods and to battlefield topography; the optimum application of military force cannot otherwise be manifested.

There was thus a strong requirement that operations and armaments be linked together. In the Japanese Army, however, military material was geared to hypothetical mobile operations against the Soviet Union. This implied fighting on the Continent, in severe cold, amidst sparse population, and with inconvenient transportation facilities. Operations of such a type were characterized by light weapons, large-scale logistical systems, and a plethora of horses.

*After the finish of Japanese operations in Siberia*

If war broke out with the Soviet Union, a most important problem would arise: how to terminate hostilities? The General Staff feared that Russian territory was so boundless that Japan would be unable to deal a finishing blow to the enemy.

Within the Army, the prevailing and popular opinion concerning the solution to this problem was to employ stratagem (subversion) simultaneously with military operations-as Colonel Akashi had so successfully done during the Russo-Japanese War.

The Army therefore placed as much importance upon "political sabotage" as it did upon field operations, in planning for hypothetical operations against the Soviet Union. Research was pursued and preparations laid for implementing certain aspects of the over-all program._

Japanese-planned Republic of the Far East

Additional info in the source.

In 1941, the Japanese would likely hit the Soviets in their heart in Eastern Manchuria before try extreme expasionism like the mentioned possibility of enter in central Asia.


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## vikingBerserker (Dec 15, 2011)

Because of Khalkhing Gol, the Soviets left a considerable air force in the Siberian Far Eastern Military Districts even after the Germans invaded; in fact 37% of their strength was located there when Germany invaded. As of June 22nd, 1941 the Soviets had 2,272 Old Fighters, 161 New Fighters (Laggs/MIGs/Yaks), 1,445 Old Bombers, 55 New Bombers, 349 Attack Aircraft, plus FAC Recon for a total of 4,592 Aircraft with 5,031 pilots. Against that what could the Japanese field? When Pearl Harbor occurred, there were only something like 400 Zero's in service so I would guess there were half of them in June?

Soviet Data from _Soviet Air Power in World War 2_ by Yefim Gordon


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## davebender (Dec 15, 2011)

Shatter the Soviet Union into pieces as happened to Imperial Russia during 1918. When nations such as Ukraine, the Don Republic and the Far East Republic become independent again terminating hostilities will not be a problem.


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## Jenisch (Dec 15, 2011)

vikingBerserker said:


> Because of Khalkhing Gol, the Soviets left a considerable air force in the Siberian Far Eastern Military Districts even after the Germans invaded; in fact 37% of their strength was located there when Germany invaded. As of June 22nd, 1941 the Soviets had 2,272 Old Fighters, 161 New Fighters (Laggs/MIGs/Yaks), 1,445 Old Bombers, 55 New Bombers, 349 Attack Aircraft, plus FAC Recon for a total of 4,592 Aircraft with 5,031 pilots. Against that what could the Japanese field? When Pearl Harbor occurred, there were only something like 400 Zero's in service so I would guess there were half of them in June?



The Germans would be the major treat, and there's little doubt were the Soviets would concentrate their planes.

About the numbers, well, if the Japanese would attack the Soviet Union, aircraft production would be expanded right away. As well as Army equipment production.

While the Soviet numbers were impressive, there's the quality problem to be considerated as well. Together with the critical Transiberian railway to be targeted. 

It would be interesting if someone provides a map with the major Soviet airfields in the region, to us see how vulnerable they would be to Japanese attacks.


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## Jenisch (Dec 15, 2011)

davebender said:


> Shatter the Soviet Union into pieces as happened to Imperial Russia during 1918. When nations such as Ukraine, the Don Republic and the Far East Republic become independent again terminating hostilities will not be a problem.



This was considerated if Japan had to fought the USSR alone. Many historians say that Japan didn't attacked the USSR because Khalkhin Gol. I think this was perhaps true for that momment. But the Japanese, the Army that had more power specifially, never gave up of the idea. War between Imperial Japan and the Soviet Union just a question of time. And in fact happened, with Stalin's Manchuria offensive in '45.

Hitler didn't even need to defeat the Soviets totally. If this Japanese invasion just provide him with more time to occupy the territories and exterminate even more of the population, he could have done enough damage to prevent the continuation of the Soviet effort.


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## vikingBerserker (Dec 15, 2011)

Jenisch said:


> The Germans would be the major treat, and there's little doubt were the Soviets would concentrate their planes.



The bulk of these air assets were actually left in the Soviet East due to the concern of Japan's intention



> About the numbers, well, if the Japanese would attack the Soviet Union, aircraft production would be expanded right away. As well as Army equipment production.


 Assuming you are refering to Japanese production I think that was one of their greatest weaknesses was the inability to rapidaly expand their production. They had already been at war for almost 10 years. Now when it comes to Army Equipment IMO the Japanese Tanks/Armoured vehicles were simply no match for the Soviets.





> While the Soviet numbers were impressive, there's the quality problem to be considerated as well. Together with the critical Transiberian railway to be targeted.


 I would agree with that, but I'm not sure the difference in aircraft (old/new mix) was all that much different between the 2, however I'm having a problem finding Japanese Air strength as of June 1941.



> It would be interesting if someone provides a map with the major Soviet airfields in the region, to us see how vulnerable they would be to Japanese attacks.


 The Russian Airfields in this area appear to be nothing more then dirt strips. I can find some major locations but it's not all of them. The one thing I'll say about most of the Soviet aircraft at this time, they could pretty much operate out of almost anywhere. 

I think the Soviets have a better Heavy Bomber and Ground Attack capability, I think the Japanese have an edge over the Soviets fighter wise (aircraft experiance) but some of them would be tied up defending Japan Proper and fighting in China at the same time.


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## Jenisch (Dec 15, 2011)

vikingBerserker said:


> The bulk of these air assets were actually left in the Soviet East due to the concern of Japan's intention
> 
> Assuming you are refering to Japanese production I think that was one of their greatest weaknesses was the inability to rapidaly expand their production. They had already been at war for almost 10 years. Now when it comes to Army Equipment IMO the Japanese Tanks/Armoured vehicles were simply no match for the Soviets.



I agree. The Axis industrial system was a [email protected] Even so, if together against the Soviets, they would outperform them.

About the IJA, well, it was inferior. But in Eastern Manchuria the terrain was not much suitable to tanks. They also learned some lessons in Khalkhin Gol. Consideration also should be gived to the fact that even a draw could be a defeat for the Soviets if they couldn't replace their losses.

Another thing is that the IJN would block the Soviet Pacific and Artic ports. This would surely hurt. With a lesser need to build U-Boats to sunk the Lend Lease ships, Hitler would be able to maintein a constant tank production. If i'm not wrong, in 1942 he choose to focus in U-Boat production, and this cost 10-15% less tanks produced.

I found those figures in Wik:

_In 1940 the Japanese Army Air Service consisted of the following:

33,000 personnel
Over 1,600 aircraft (including 1,375 first line combat aircraft).
The aircraft were organized into 85 Squadrons; 
36 fighter
28 light bomber
22 medium bomber
Total military in August 1945 was 6,095,000 including 676,863 Army Air Service.

The IJNAS had over 3,089 aircraft in 1941 and 370 trainers.

1,830 first line aircraft including: 
660 fighters, 350 Mitsubishi Zeros[9]
330 Carrier based strike aircraft
240 land based twin engined bombers
520 seaplanes (includes fighters and reconnaissance) and flying boats._

Personal note: interesting to see the low number of trainers, and therefore the low number of elite pilots the IJN created.

Of course, some of this force would be needed in China and the defense of the Home Islands. And the IJAAF data is 1940 data. Wik is not the best source unfortnately.


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## Jenisch (Dec 15, 2011)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitsubishi_A6M_Zero:

_On 13 September 1940, the Zeros scored their first air-to-air victories when 13 A6M2s led by Lieutenant Saburo Shindo attacked 27 Soviet-built Polikarpov I-15s and I-16s of the Chinese Nationalist Air Force, shooting down all the fighters without loss to themselves. By the time they were redeployed a year later, the Zeros had shot down 99 Chinese aircraft._

Quiet impressive, even if was a surprise from a new machine. If someone has info if any Soviet pilots, and specially their skill level that were flying those Polikarpovs, share.

Until late in the war, the Soviets didn't conducted "free huntings", which was a major cause for the Luftwaffe's success. The Zeros, with their excellent range, would be able to hold patrols for hours in the Soviet airspace. I think they would shoot down a lot of Soviet planes using this advantage.


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## Juha (Dec 16, 2011)

Jenisch said:


> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitsubishi_A6M_Zero:
> 
> _On 13 September 1940, the Zeros scored their first air-to-air victories when 13 A6M2s led by Lieutenant Saburo Shindo attacked 27 Soviet-built Polikarpov I-15s and I-16s of the Chinese Nationalist Air Force, shooting down all the fighters without loss to themselves. By the time they were redeployed a year later, the Zeros had shot down 99 Chinese aircraft._
> 
> ...



Now Zeros debut was very impressive but the real Chinese losses were 13 destr and 11 damaged planes. For Sino-Japanese Air War, a very good on-line source is Håkan's excellent site, see the 13 Sept 40 combat info from here: http://surfcity.kund.dalnet.se/sino-japanese-1940.htm

And Soviet fighter flew free hunting missions during the Winter War, which was fought from 30 Nov 1939 to 13 March 40, so during WWII

Juha


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## davebender (Dec 16, 2011)

I think it would be more accurate to say the IJA were poorly equipped compared to the Red Army. Japanese Army training was very good by WWII standards and certainly better then what Soviet soldiers received after Stalin's purges. 

Until late in the war all IJA tanks were small, weighing 8 to 15 tons. Japan copied or tried to copy a lot of German equipment such as the DB601 aircraft engine. If Japan anticipates a full scale war with the Soviet Union they need a larger tank. Japan could produce a variant of the 22 ton Panzer III ausf F with a locally manufactured cannon. The Panzer III was not a large tank but it was considerably better then existing IJA light tanks and able to cope with early war Soviet armor such as the BT-7.


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## davebender (Dec 16, 2011)

IMO that suggests Japan wasn't losing many pilots prior to 1942. Hence no need for mass production of replacement pilots.


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## tyrodtom (Dec 16, 2011)

A couple of questions .

Where is the fuel coming from for this adventure? Seeing as how in the real world, Japan needed allied forces crippled in Asia so they could take over oilfields in Burma and Indonesia. How is Japan going to fuel their war machine ? Also where are they getting their steel, or iron ore ?

Also since a large portion of the Japanese army was involved in China during the real WW2, this new adventure against Russia will require a drawdown of forces from China. So Japan is fighing in Russia while a undefeated China does nothing ? I don't think so.


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## Nikademus (Dec 16, 2011)

tyrodtom said:


> A couple of questions .
> 
> Where is the fuel coming from for this adventure? Seeing as how in the real world, Japan needed allied forces crippled in Asia so they could take over oilfields in Burma and Indonesia. How is Japan going to fuel their war machine ? Also where are they getting their steel, or iron ore ?



Same place they got their resources when the "Move South" plan was initiated....their Reserves. 



> Also since a large portion of the Japanese army was involved in China during the real WW2, this new adventure against Russia will require a drawdown of forces from China. So Japan is fighing in Russia while a undefeated China does nothing ? I don't think so.



Not necessarily. Japan managed to build the Kwangtung Army to peak strength in Manchuria in 42 when a preposed invasion of Russia was actively contemplated (but eventually shelved). Ideally, they SHOULD scale back or withdrawl completely as they envisioned, but its admittedly unlikely. Chiang wasn't going to do squat either way. His biggest goals were preserving his power base and making his "allies" do all the real fighting. He also had a historical tendancy to be more concerned over what Mao was doing along with certain problem Warlords as well as members of his own corrupt regime. China (aka the KMT) would be unlikely to do anything other than reoccupy anything the IJA gives up to consolidate positions in order to reinforce Manchuria.


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## RCAFson (Dec 16, 2011)

The Red Army in Siberia was also very strong prior to it being largely withdrawn to defeat the Germans at Moscow. It is possible that the Soviets might have defeated the Japanese Army to the point where a withdrawal of Soviet forces could still take place in time to save Moscow.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 16, 2011)

(while I do acknowledge that OP asks specifically about air power)

If IJA goes with it's forces vs. Soviets, but ground forces remain in China, what does that gain for Japan? No boots, no territory - that would be much akin to BoB, with IJA flying over Amur, doing their damage, receiving some losses, with nothing to show for it. In the mean time, Chinese can harass Japanese ground troops at will. Unlikely at any rate.

Now, Japanese army abandons China to mount a invasion on Siberia, and they succeed (for the sake of discussion). What are the gains for Japan? Just another territory that need to be held, without any resources Japan may use. And while doing so, their oil reserves are cut thin. Why bother?


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## davebender (Dec 16, 2011)

So was the Red Army in western Russia, at least on paper. 

Red Army leadership was crippled by Stalin's purges. If you are going to fight the Soviet Union then 1938 to 1942 is the best possible time. Hit them while they are still in a state of Stalin induced leadership chaos.


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## davebender (Dec 16, 2011)

That would never happen. China was Japan's highest priority from the 1890s right up to 1945.


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## Nikademus (Dec 16, 2011)

davebender said:


> That would never happen. China was Japan's highest priority from the 1890s right up to 1945.



Most likely yes. But not due to priority....rather pride. Frank McClynn recently pointed out that had the Army dominated government played it's cards smarter, they'd have aquiecsed to FDR's insistance on a "Free China" and focused on the SRA (South option). Conversely, such a maneuver would have allowed the North option more flexability. The author pointed out that economically speaking, China offered far less for Japan's needs than the SRA..or Manchuria for that matter....and the Russian threat, if eliminated (hypothetically speaking) would secure Manchuria and allow the Japanese to focus on Southern threats.

This is backed up by Edward Drea's analysis of the Imperial Japanese Army, which sought to disentangle itself from China by 43....assuming the concessions they wanted were granted. The Army leaders were not stupid (Stubborn....but not stupid) They realized China was their "Vietnam" and couldn't commit major ground troops there indefinately. The large troop presence, as pointed out in this thread, also put a cramp on the IJA's ability to respond to other situations and threats. Permanent occupation of China was never part of their plan.


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## tyrodtom (Dec 16, 2011)

The move south was to replace those reserves they used in that move, the move north has no payback in oil, it just uses it.

I admit the Nationalist weren't much of a threat, but it Japan weakened it's army in China then Mao might see it as a opportunity.


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## davebender (Dec 16, 2011)

KMT China tied down the bulk of the Japanese Army for about 15 years, simultaneously defeating Mao's communist forces. That meets my definition of a serious threat.


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## tyrodtom (Dec 16, 2011)

Well if they are a threat, then that can't be good for Japan's plan for the move north.

And i'm not even going to comment on your other statement.


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## Nikademus (Dec 16, 2011)

Japanese military policies were not directed solely by the quest for economic autarky. There were also questions of national defense and the protection of their existing empire 'as is'. Traditionally the Japanese Army saw Russia as the gravest threat to their national security while obviously....the Imperial Navy saw the United States as it's most likely and dangerous threat. In terms of economics, Manchuria represented to many Japanese as their equivilent to the American Frontier in the West. It had vast resources and lebensram for future settlers and the Japanese Army was paranoid about Russian encroachment (of which there was alot.......border clashes being so prominent and regular...one which turned into Nomanhan in 39)

Eventually the Imperial GHQ split on the North vs South strategy. Nomanhan obviously had an influence here as prior to that the Army held the Russians in contempt. It could also be argued (and was by "northerners") that that incident only proved that Russia was the greatest threat to Japanese security. 

Point being, moving north wasn't about securing Oil (other than the oil in Manchuria that is), it was about securing Japan's flank. For US citizens....imagine Canada as a great armed dictatorship with a big standing army. But there are also naval threats to deal with. Which gets priority? which is the most likely to boil over? Hypothetically speaking, a weakened/eliminated USSR (with German help of course) would have been of great benefit to Japan militarily speaking.....had all the cards gone the way it was theorized. 

re: Mao....assuming Japan got what it wanted from Chiang and pulled back or out......it would be Chiang's problem. Mao was pretty smart. Without a Japanese invader to focus on, he might have been willing to cut a deal with Japan. All speculative of course.


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## RCAFson (Dec 16, 2011)

davebender said:


> So was the Red Army in western Russia, at least on paper.
> 
> Red Army leadership was crippled by Stalin's purges. If you are going to fight the Soviet Union then 1938 to 1942 is the best possible time. Hit them while they are still in a state of Stalin induced leadership chaos.



How do you explain the Soviet victory at Khalkhin Gol?


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## Juha (Dec 16, 2011)

Hello
One important aspect in Japanese eagerness to subdue China was that they needed it as a market for their industry, that became especially important after the WWI and during and after the Great Depression, when at first Chinese and later European amd US markets were closed to Japanese products which caused unemployment and social restlessness in Japan. That got Japanese leading circles to think that they needed a secure large market area for their products, to which role they thought China would fit perfectly.

Juha


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## Juha (Dec 16, 2011)

RCAFson said:


> How do you explain the Soviet victory at Khalkhin Gol?



Very good and important question.

Juha


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## Nikademus (Dec 16, 2011)

Juha said:


> Very good and important question.
> 
> Juha



And one hard to explain in one or two paragraphs. Coxx's book afterall was over 700 pages! In a nutshell.....The USSR won because Stalin and Zhukov committed themselves to this battle whereas the Kwangtung Army HQ never realized what was developing and treated the situation as more of a typical border incident vs. the major brew haha that the USSR percieved it to be. Stalin wanted to make a statement......and Zhukov, so authorized committed his forces more decisively and brought in the logistics to support his goals. It hardly went all rosy for him and his forces but in the end their side 'achieved' it's objectives. The Japanese committed primarily a new and green division (The 23rd) which also was a smaller new triangular style division which in turn committed it's forces piecemeal, including at the end a couple regimental groups from another Div. Logistics and firepower wise, committment was peacemeal. 

Despite this the battle resulted in comprable casualties. But the "victory" was not about losses.....it was about objectives. Thats why even the IJA admitted that it had "lost" the battle. They didn't achieve their objectives while the Russians and their Mongolian allies sat on the contested terrain. Confusion over just what was going on around Nomanhan extended all the way back to GHQ in Tokyo which butted heads with the Kwangtung Army staff officers.

One should also keep in mind that while Nomanhan was the biggest and most well known "border clash" between Japan and Russia, there were others, and Russia didn't win all of em and all were fairly bloody for both sides. So both sides ended up having a grudging respect for the others......save for the most hotheaded Kwangtun Midgrade Staff Officers who continued to rattle their sabres.


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## Juha (Dec 16, 2011)

IIRC SU won if not all then almost all of those border clashes. And on Khalkhin Gol, in fact Soviet kept it local, they didn’t began the conflict and didn’t attack clearly Manchurian areas, on the other hand Japanese began the conflict and also tried to invade areas in Mongolia proper. And Kwantung Army committed almost every means they had to spare, they committed them peacemeal, yes, but they sent there their tank regiment, that attack didn’t went well and their HQ heavy artillery units. Plus of course one regiment fron 7th Div and sundry other units.

Juha


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## davebender (Dec 16, 2011)

Japan wanted to control China by keeping it weak and divided into small states ruled by warlords. That simply isn't compatible with the KMT who wanted a unified China. For that matter it isn't compatible with Mao either. The difference is that Mao was a military weakling prior to 1945 and so posed no threat to Japanese control.


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## Nikademus (Dec 16, 2011)

davebender said:


> Japan wanted to control China by keeping it weak and divided into small states ruled by warlords. That simply isn't compatible with the KMT who wanted a unified China. For that matter it isn't compatible with Mao either. The difference is that Mao was a military weakling prior to 1945 and so posed no threat to Japanese control.



I'm not sure the Japanese 'Northerners' quite knew themselves what they wanted out of China proper. Certainly they wanted official recognition of Manchukuo by the Chinese and other nations. When midline staff officers triggered the invasion of China proper it was expected that Chiang would give in to their demands allowing them to withdrawl. Didn't happen. Chiang just withdrew into the interior and fed off US lend lease. 

Obviously they wanted a China favorably disposed towards them....who didn't. Most foreign powers wanted China to be if not weak....then at least subsidiary. Roosevelt allegedly (per a recent author) wanted to prop up Chiang's regime as the premier Asian power in the region who would of course....be favorably disposed economically towards the US. Basic point....everyone wanted something. Britian wanted to maintain the status quo of it's own empire. Certainly Japan wanted to do the same. By 1943 they certainly wanted "out" militarily. Permanent occupation as I mentioned, was never in their plans...outside of Manchukuo that is.


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## michaelmaltby (Dec 16, 2011)

"... How do you explain the Soviet victory at Khalkhin Gol?"

Better tanks, more planes, they didn't underestimate their enemy (Japan), better leadership, AND, there had been minor incursions in the areas before ... so the Soviets were prepared. They had the artillery range mapped for all the ground the Japanese took, and punished them. It was June and there only a few hours of darkness in which the Japanese could operate. 

The Japanese command hoped that Communist Russia would stumble and be swamped .. it didn't happen. Stalin put Zhukov in charge and removed all political interference.

Russia was strong in 1939 and industrialized ....

(all sources, Alvin Coox, Nomonhan)

MM


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## Jenisch (Dec 16, 2011)

RCAFson said:


> How do you explain the Soviet victory at Khalkhin Gol?


 
First, I will post a part of the foreword of J. Edward Drea's book, Nomonhan: Japanese-Soviet Tactical Combat, 1939:

_Today the U.S. Army stresses the concept of fighting outnumbered and winning. To achieve that difficult feat of arms will require thorough preparation and intensive, realistic training before the first battle of the next war. This account of how the Imperial Japanese Army prepared for its "'first battle"' should help us profit from the Japanese experience against a formidable Soviet enemy. While it points out errors, it also identifies several Japanese strengths *which almost prevailed* against the greatest concentration of armor and mechanized forces then known._


Now, a synopsis from the book:

_Before World War II, the Irnperial Japanese Army (IJA) developed an offensive tactical doctrine designed to allow its infantry forces to fight successfully against a superior foe. the Soviet Union. A battle test of that doctrine's effectiveness occurred from June through August 1939 along the Outer Mongolian Manchurian border. This essay follows the daily combat operations of the IJA's 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division, for a two-month period. During that time, the 2 /28th Infantry was in constant contact with Soviet combined arms forces. 

In July the battalion participated in offensive operations against Soviet units commanded by General Georgi K- Zhukov When Japanese tactical doctrine failed against a Soviet combined arms force, the Japanese went on the defensive. Japanese officers, however, regarded defensive doctrine as transitional in nature and adopted it only to gain time to prepare for a counterattack. Defensive doctrine dictated that terrain be held until the resumption of offensive operations that would destroy the enemy. A lack of flexibility doomed the Japanese defensive effort. General Zhukov secretly marshalled his forces and in mid August used his armor columns to spearhead a double envelopment of the static Japanese units in a position defense. The Soviets encircled the Japanese units. including the 2/28th Infantry, and the Japanese survivors had to fight their way back to friendly lines. 

The 2/28th Infantry's War Diary provides a vivid day-by-day account of its combat operations. This in turn allows the examination of how the Japanese applied their tactical doctrine on the battlefield_ The datednose tried to use an aggressive tactical doctrine to compensate for materiel and equipment deficiencies in their army. Such an approach was successful as long as the Japanese could conduct bold offensive operations. When they were forced to adopt a defensive posture. however. discrepancies between tactical doctrine and battlefield reality became apparent_ These problems. applicable to any army, highlight fundamental difficulties of force structure, preconceptions of potential enemy capabilities. and the role of doctrine in a combat environment. An examination of small unit tactics is particularly useful to illustrate, the dynamics of doctrine as expressed on the battlefield._

Another point:

_While the overwhelming Soviet qualitative and quantitative materiel superiority ultimately defeated the Japanese at Nomonhan. the defeat cannot be ascribed to materiel deficiencies alone, A tactical doctrine designed for infantrymen that stressed offensive action to achieve a quick victory was pitted against a doctrine which emphasized combined arms and protracted warfare. The Japanese decision to fight a war of attrition against the superior Soviet Red Army was, in retrospect, a mistake._

Air power (which I will enter in detail later):

_The IJA remained an infantryheavy force, It always lacked sufficient armor because armor was unaffordable (actually, the Japanese changed their mind about this later). Japanese strategic thought opted for the aircraft._ 

Source: http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/drea2/drea2.asp

My conclusions:

* As already mentioned in the text, the IJA showed great inflexibility in this battle, pressing it forward even after realized it didn't enjoyed advantages it belived to have, such as in artillery.

* The IJA disregarded Intelligence, and was caught by a massive enemy pincer offensive. This offensive consisted of three tank brigades and two mechanized brigades (with infantry support). The entire Sovit force consisted of three rifle divisions, two tank divisions and two more tank brigades. About 500 BT-5 and B-7 tanks, two motorized infantry divisons, and over 550 fighters and bombers. The Mongolians committed two cavalry divisions.

By contrast, at the point of attack the Kwantung Army had only Lieutenant General Michitarō Komatsubara's 23rd Infantry Division, which with attached forces was equivalent to two light infantry divisions.

Source: Battles of Khalkhin Gol - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Zhukov's offensive was a surprise and massive. If the Japanese had attack him in the same way with a similar force, it's possible that he would be defeated as well. This can be boosted by Drea's mention of the IJA offensive actions in the first quote his book I bolded: "which almost prevailed..."

* While the Red Air Force eventually overcomed the Japanese Army Air force with quantity, better tactics and aircraft, the Japanese didn't explored their air power advantage, specially in the first two months when it existed. As Drea points out, the IJA realied heavily in aircraft. One of the reasons it lacked modern equipment. When when this advantage was lost, in sum with the others, the situation could not have been worse. The non employment of the air force in the enemy's rear was also a preponderant factor for Zhukov's offensive be succesfull, because not only his supplies could arrive without aerial interference, but any interference of Japanese aircraft to spot any discrepancys from what he was doing existed at all.

Therefore, I don't see the quality of the IJA as being a critical problem for an invasion of the USSR in 1941. The Japanese (the Kwantung Army more precisely), lost in Nomonhan by it's own mistakes. After the Nomonhan fight, the Army started several modernization programs, with the artillery school receiving a lot of attention. The IJA got rid of it's stereotypes of the Soviets, and was much better prepared to fight them in a new conflict. Specially if this conflict had ocurred in 1941, with the USSR hard pressed by the Germans, and the decisive theater of operations being the hilly and treeless Eastern Manchuria terrain, much more suitable to IJA tactics even before Nomonhan. They would also count with the IJN to dominate the coast and provide logistics and air support, as well as conduct amphibious landings in strategical locations.

I belive the Nomonhan Incident could have changed history, in the sense the IJA lost prestige and the IJN took over. I already read this in some sources, and also that the Emperor was furious with the Army because Nomonhan, and more so because it iniciated an undeclared war without authorization than from the defeat itself. Because in the military field, the Japanese seems to have lost only by their incompetence in try continue a conflict when it was clear they need to pull out to make some adjustments.


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## Jenisch (Dec 16, 2011)

I also would like to mention that the Japanese, despite their problems, really start to develop some excellent modern equipment by the time the Pacific war broke out.

Some tanks:

Type 4 Chi-To - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Type 3 Chi-Nu - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Type 4 Chi-To - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

They also adopted the Type 100 sub machine gun by 1942, had projects of APC's, projects to produce German weaponry and other things. 

It's also worth to remember they started to develop "modern" aircraft (by the Western standards) before the war started. The Ki-84 fighter, the A7M fighter, the Ki-67 bomber. All started to be projected before the war. 

The problem with Japan in my view was that with it's economy and military resources, it was not enough to wage war with the minimum of safety against China and the US and Britain. It was simple too much for them. The United States was the main problem of course. It was really a shame for them that they (and Hitler) underestimated the American potental.


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## Jenisch (Dec 16, 2011)

wede11 said:


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Attention all WWII air forces, bomb the spammer!


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## vikingBerserker (Dec 16, 2011)

The most advanced tank Japan had in service in 1941 was their Type 97 Chi-Ha Medium tank. It sported a 57mm main gun and 2 x 7.7mm. Armor was 25mm, had a crew of 4 and a speed of 24mph. 

Facing them would be Over 1,000 tanks [After the German Invasion Stalin left 19 Reserve Divisions with 1,200 tanks in Mongolia (World War II magazine, Jul 2003)] including the T-34 which was first deployed in the Far-East sporting a 76.2mm cannon, 2 x 7.62mm MGs 47-65mm armor a crew of 4 and a speed of 25mph. 

The best tank Japan had was almost an equal to the Soviet BT-7 Light Tank (45mm 2 x 7.62mm MG, 22mm armor and a speed of 53mph). There would be no contest.


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## vikingBerserker (Dec 16, 2011)

Jenisch said:


> Attention all WWII air forces, bomb the spammer!



Perhaps he is suggesting that Japan invade the Soviet Union using a Cheap Mulberry Outlet as a base. Hmmm pretty sneaky!


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## Juha (Dec 17, 2011)

Now here has been a bit overstatements of Soviet strength 
Actually they had:
2 Rifle/Infantry divisions (57. and 82.)
1 Motorized Rifle Div (36.)
2 Tank Brigades (6. and 11.)
3 Motor Armoured/Mechanized Brigades (7., 8. and 9., the last one was transferred from reserve on 21 Aug)
1 Machine Gun Brigade
2 Mongolian Cavalry Divisions (6. and 8., at least the 6. had only two Cav.Rgts)

In Reserve
1 Airborne Br. (212.)

When the Soviet counter attack began on 20 Aug on Japanese side the badly mauled 1. Tank Corps (in fact it had been only a size of a weak tank regiment) was withdrawn but Japanese had committed instead a Artillery Corps of four heavy artillery regiments and a mortar regiment.

Also a border guard infantry regiment had arrived as reinforcement to the reinforced 23. Infantry Div. And because the Mongolian troops have been counted on the other side, its worth to mention that on Japanese side there were four Manchuoko cavalry regiments. And the rest of the elite 7. Division, one of its regiments had already attached to 23. Div, began to arrive just as the Soviet offensive began and was thrown against the Soviet spearheads.

The strength numbers in Wiki article are right so Soviet side had 1½ more troops than Japanese side, overwhelming superiority in tanks and a slight superiority in numbers in artillery pieces (Soviet counted also their medium (82mm) mortars into their arty pieces) but Japanese had clearly more heavy pieces.

Juha


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## Nikademus (Dec 22, 2011)

Juha said:


> IIRC SU won if not all then almost all of those border clashes. And on Khalkhin Gol, in fact Soviet kept it local, they didn’t began the conflict and didn’t attack clearly Manchurian areas, on the other hand Japanese began the conflict and also tried to invade areas in Mongolia proper. And Kwantung Army committed almost every means they had to spare, they committed them peacemeal, yes, but they sent there their tank regiment, that attack didn’t went well and their HQ heavy artillery units. Plus of course one regiment fron 7th Div and sundry other units.
> 
> Juha



Not really. Most of the clashes were inconclusive with a rather big one occuring in Eastern Manchuria in which after very bloody fighting the Japanese retook the contested position (a commanding height of course). Casualties were secondary to objectives there as in Nomanhan. In re: Nomanhan, there's no disputing some of the qualitive edges the Russians had in equipment but tanks in particular are not the magic bullet they are often portrayed. Despite outnumbering the Japanese 8:1 in that dept the Russian AFV force didn't distinquish itself in particular anymore than the Japanese force did save that given the few 100 or so they brought, the Japanese tank force didn't do terribly either. Casualties again at the end of the Nomanhan conflict were comparable so Soviet postwar claims of "crushing" victories i take with a serious grain of salt. Coxx is more precise on Japanese casualties which he estimates at 16,640. According to Krivosheev, Soviet casualties amounted to about 15,925. The Russians as mentioned "won" by their committment and clearer objectives, not to mention holding the contested ground at the end. But they hardly "crushed" their opponents conveying images of helpless Japanese troops being mown down by a superior armored and mechanized force. Didn't happen that way. The Russians continued to take the threat of IJA intervention seriously enough to maintain strong forces in the Far East even after the German invasion though they tapped it for experienced troops replacing them with conscripts.


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## Juha (Dec 22, 2011)

Hello Nikademus
Yes I had forgotten the Amur River Incident in 1937 and the Changkufeng Incident in 1938, which Japanese ”won”

Yes Soviet exaggerated the Japanese losses, IIRC in his memoirs Zhukov wrote that his forces almost annihilated Japanese 6th Army when in essence they almost annihilated their main opponent, 23rd Div (it lost ¾ of its strength) and badly mauled 7th Div (lost appr. 1/3 ), 8th BGU suffered amost as badly but other units much less. On Soviet armour, while I don’t appraise much Japanese “human bullit” tactics, I do appraise the use of petrol filled soda bottles by 26th Inf.Rgt of 7th Div. In fact it was a more crude form of the more sophisticated Molotov Cocktails used by Finns during the Winter War as their main infantry A/T weapon. Even I got training how to make and use them during my compulsory military service. SU kept troops not only in Siberia but also along whole of its long Southern border, Stalin remained as suspicious as ever during WWII.

Juha


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## Jenisch (Dec 22, 2011)

The cocktails were used becase the units didn't have much AT guns. But the IJA was not stupid. They would provide the necessary AT guns if they did have an idea of what was coming to them. It's because things like those that I disagreed with the hiistorians that say the IJA proved so inferior in Nomonhan and therefore Japan didn't attacked the USSR in 1941.

Another question I launch for those historians is that the IJA himself belived that the main theater would be in Eastern Manchuria, in a well covered terrain suitable to IJA infantry tactics. I don't know why people talk so much of the Soviet tanks in the Mongolian plains. 

I don't want to praise the IJA as a high tech army, which surely it wasn't, but neither it was composed by a bunch of idiots just launching Banzai charges against their enemies like some say. Critics to the IJA like Coox did in this book are just critics. Every Army, Air Force and Navy has defects, which would appear more or less depending on the situation the force be employed.


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## Juha (Dec 23, 2011)

Hello Jenisch


Jenisch said:


> The cocktails were used becase the units didn't have much AT guns. But the IJA was not stupid. They would provide the necessary AT guns if they did have an idea of what was coming to them. It's because things like those that I disagreed with the hiistorians that say the IJA proved so inferior in Nomonhan and therefore Japan didn't attacked the USSR in 1941.



Nobody used Molotov Cocktails if they had better A/T weapons in hand, altogether too risky weapon for the user. Japanese were stupid if they didn't anticipate massive use of tanks by the Soviets, SU was well known of its vast tank fleet at least from mid 30s and had used a couple hundreds tanks during the Changkufeng Incident, which happened in fairly limited area, just a year before. Japanese simply didn't have enough A/T guns and didn't get a good one before they got their 47mm A/T gun ready. It was smallish but good for its size but units began to get it only was that in 1943.



Jenisch said:


> Another question I launch for those historians is that the IJA himself belived that the main theater would be in Eastern Manchuria, in a well covered terrain suitable to IJA infantry tactics. I don't know why people talk so much of the Soviet tanks in the Mongolian plains.



Now Soviets happened to be fairly good in forest warfare themselves.



Jenisch said:


> I don't want to praise the IJA as a high tech army, which surely it wasn't, but neither it was composed by a bunch of idiots just launching Banzai charges against their enemies like some say. Critics to the IJA like Coox did in this book are just critics. Every Army, Air Force and Navy has defects, which would appear more or less depending on the situation the force be employed.



Japanese Army had good infantry tactics, very good moral, good small scale artillery tactics, but wasn't used to massive use of arty like Soviet Army which had always and its predessor theRussian Army had since 16th Century, regarded artillery as very important arm. And Japanese had that habit to launch Banzai charges, which helped US troops for ex. on Guadalcanal, Tarawa and Kiska. SU infantry also had good firepower because it was partly armed with semi-automatic rifles, had good LMG and plenty of mortars. And against good infantry with plenty of firepower Banzau charges were just stupid.

Juha


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## Jenisch (Dec 23, 2011)

Juha said:


> Japanese simply didn't have enough A/T guns and didn't get a good one before they got their 47mm A/T gun ready. It was smallish but good for its size but units began to get it only was that in 1943.



Why do you think they didn't have much AT guns? Simply because they didn't expected much tanks. 

About the quality of their AT guns in Nomonhan, they were not world beaters, but were adequated against Soviet armor (apart from the non-employed KV-1 tank).

The 47mm gun started to be received in '42: Type 1 47 mm Anti-Tank Gun - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

It wasn't used in great numbers mainly because the Japanese were involved in the Pacific War and the IJN receive top priority. 



> Now Soviets happened to be fairly good in forest warfare themselves.



I doubt they would be superior to the Japanese. Specially with other considerations of an invasion.



> Japanese Army had good infantry tactics, very good moral, good small scale artillery tactics, but wasn't used to massive use of arty like Soviet Army which had always and its predessor theRussian Army had since 16th Century, regarded artillery as very important arm.



The Japanese didn't desconsiderated artillery. The problem was their arm proved inferior in Nomonhan, when they thought it was the opposite. They corrected the problerm after.



> And Japanese had that habit to launch Banzai charges, which helped US troops for ex. on Guadalcanal, Tarawa and Kiska. SU infantry also had good firepower because it was partly armed with semi-automatic rifles, had good LMG and plenty of mortars. And against good infantry with plenty of firepower Banzau charges were just stupid.



The Banzai charges were only used as a last resource to break away from an enemy encirclement or not be captured. Against poorly armed enemies they were also employed.



> SU infantry also had good firepower because it was partly armed with semi-automatic rifles, had good LMG and plenty of mortars.



The firepower of the IJA was not much different from the German Army, and they were experts in close quarters and night combat. They preffer to conduct their attacks on this form.


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## tyrodtom (Dec 23, 2011)

You use of the double negative " didn't desconsiderated" is confusing. Do you simply mean the Japanese considered artillery? Or What ?

There are so many instances of the Japanese army using the Banzai charge at other times other than last resort, i'm surprized you'd make the statement that they only used it as a last resort. There's several examples at Saipan, Iwo Jima, Guadalcanal, and others where early use of the banzai needlessly wasted men.

My own father fought at Guadalcanal, in his opinion, the Japanese seemed too eager to die. A more thought out use of their soldiers abilities would have inflicted more casualties on the US troops.


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## Juha (Dec 23, 2011)

Jenisch said:


> Why do you think they didn't have much AT guns? Simply because they didn't expected much tanks.



As I wrote, to provocate SU in late 30s and to expect that SU won't use much armour was silly



Jenisch said:


> About the quality of their AT guns in Nomonhan, they were not world beaters, but were adequated against Soviet armor (apart from the non-employed KV-1 tank).



So one could expect, BT series tanks were not heavily armoured but clearly Japanese were not altogether satisfied with their 37mm Type 94 A/T gun because they in addition to the development of 47mm A/T gun began to develop 37mm Type 1 A/T gun as a stopgap measure.



Jenisch said:


> I doubt they would be superior to the Japanese. Specially with other considerations of an invasion.



I don't know if they were superior but I doubt that Japaneses were superior to Russians, especially if Japan was the aggressor and so the fighting would have been on the home turf of Siberian troops.





Jenisch said:


> The Japanese didn't desconsiderated artillery. The problem was their arm proved inferior in Nomonhan, when they thought it was the opposite. They corrected the problerm after.



Now Japan did not have production potential to challenge SU in artillery power.





Jenisch said:


> The Banzai charges were only used as a last resource to break away from an enemy encirclement or not be captured. Against poorly armed enemies they were also employed.



Now as tyrodtom wrote that wasn't so, for ex. the first reinforcemets to Guadalcanal, an elite unit, was wasted in a banzai charge at their first contact with US Marines




Jenisch said:


> The firepower of the IJA was not much different from the German Army, and they were experts in close quarters and night combat. They preffer to conduct their attacks on this form.



The first part of your claim isn't true, much of the infantry firepower in early WWII was based on LMGs and medium mgs and in those categories German MG 34 was clearly superior to the Japanese weapons.

Juha


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## michaelmaltby (Dec 23, 2011)

".... the Japanese seemed too eager to die. A more thought out use of their soldiers abilities would have inflicted more casualties on the US troops."

Throughout Nomonhan, Alvin Coox claims the Japanese soldiers admired the way the Soviet soldiers "died" -- i.e. refused to be taken alive - kept a grenade for themselves or whatever.

Think of battles of the past - The Carthaginians against Rome - on Italian turf. Cannae and Lake Trasamin Hannibal's soldiers cut Rome's armies to death. Crippling wounds that disembowel or demobilize. After the battle the Carthaginians finish off the wounded -- standard practice BTW for all armies of the time.

Japan was the only "sword infantry" in WW2 -- ceremonial doesn't count . Their tactics were ancient - adapted to the 20th century -- but _ancient_. They lost to the USSR and they lost to the USA and _they woke up and thrived _ in a global market place. 

At Nomonhan launched the first-ever night tank attack.

MM


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## Juha (Dec 23, 2011)

Hello MM
the Soviet way of self sacrifice was more effective than the Japanese, to keep firing from your dugout to the last and then blow oneself to pieces is more effective in killing enemies than run towards enemy mg-position while waving a sword or a rifle.

Juha


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## vikingBerserker (Dec 23, 2011)

But in 1941 the Soviets had T-34's stationed in that area. I don't see IJA's armor being able to deal with them very well.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 24, 2011)

What would be the quantities of T-34 east from Ural in 1941/42? 
I've read a short biography of Zhukov some time ago, and it mentioned about him asking from Stavka reserves, in late 1941, some tanks and fighters. Stavka (effectively Stalin) said: forget about any additional tanks, but I'll send you the planes.


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## vikingBerserker (Dec 24, 2011)

I'm not 100% sure on the numbers but I think 2-300, I know that was the first area they were stationed and the Japanese were aware of them. The other 1,000 appears to have been the BT-7


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## Jenisch (Dec 24, 2011)

Hey Michael, if you have Coox book, what is his opinion of the Japanese capability to take Siberia in 1941?


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## michaelmaltby (Dec 25, 2011)

".... you have Coox book, what is his opinion of the Japanese capability to take Siberia in 1941?"

Hi Jenisch ...  Merry Christmas to you in sunny .BR 

I read Alvin Coox in the year 2000 - a very depressing read, I recall. The book doesn't look beyond September, 1939. However in his "conclusions and consequence" Summary, he suggests that until Nomonhan the Japanese were looking at Soviet territory as an expansion zone - and that after their thorough defeat (and it _was_ a thorough defeat, it revealed weakness in Japanese thinking at many levels) Japan turned away from Soviet territories and looked to conquest by Sea - ultimately Pearl Harbor.

BTW - Japan remained fearful of the Soviets right up to August, 1945 when the Soviets attacked them -- achieving complete surprise when they attacked . If that seems a bit of a contradiction - Japan and the Soviets had a peace treaty .... which the Soviets kept reassuring the Japanese they were going to RENEW .... right up to moment of attack. (Source for the latter, David Glantz, August Storm).

Chairs,

MM


Merry Christmas to all, reverence from Japan,  :


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2J7rl3am5tA_


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## Elmas (Dec 25, 2011)

Sorry, I have to edit this post......
My English is not as good as I would like.....


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## Jenisch (Dec 25, 2011)

> michaelmaltby Hi Jenisch ...  Merry Christmas to you in sunny .BR



Thank you mate, equally to you and everybody here. Only here in the south where I live it's not so sunny, despite being summer now. lol 



> The book doesn't look beyond September, 1939. However in his "conclusions and consequence" Summary, he suggests that until Nomonhan the Japanese were looking at Soviet territory as an expansion zone - and that after their thorough defeat (and it _was_ a thorough defeat, it revealed weakness in Japanese thinking at many levels) Japan turned away from Soviet territories and looked to conquest by Sea - ultimately Pearl Harbor.



Actually he tells this. Perhaps you read an old edition. In Google Books this part is not avaliable.

About Nomonhan changing the Japanese expansionist policy, I don't know if Coox relies in primary sources for this, because there's no conclusive evidence showing they really did this. This thesis is held by Western and Russian historians per deduction. I do not doubt the Japanese did take this course, but also thinking in obtain resources for a possible showdown with the Soviets later.


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## michaelmaltby (Dec 25, 2011)

".... there's no conclusive evidence showing they really did this. This thesis is held by Western and Russian historians per deduction. I do not doubt the Japanese did take this course, but also thinking in obtain resources for a possible showdown with the Soviets later."


First: the question you posed is NOT on Coox's agenda in the book, "Nomonhan".

Second: there _is _definitive intelligence on what the Japanese were thinking: *Richard Sorge* (Stalin's German spy in Japan). 

[from Wikipedia]

"... Sorge transmitted information toward the end of September 1941 that Japan was not going to attack the Soviet Union in the East.

"This information made possible the transfer of Soviet divisions from the Far East, although the presence of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria necessitated the Soviet Union's keeping a large number of troops on the eastern borders..."

MM


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## Jenisch (Dec 25, 2011)

michaelmaltby said:


> ".... there's no conclusive evidence showing they really did this. This thesis is held by Western and Russian historians per deduction. I do not doubt the Japanese did take this course, but also thinking in obtain resources for a possible showdown with the Soviets later."
> 
> 
> First: the question you posed is NOT on Coox's agenda in the book, "Nomonhan".



Nomonhan: Japan against Russia, 1939 - Alvin D. Coox - Google Livros

Page 1052.



> Second: there is definitive intelligence on what the Japanese were thinking: Richard Sorge (Stalin's German spy in Japan).



Sorge provided what he found to be likely info for 1941 and 1942 (in case the Germans captured Stalingrad).

Here's two sources that contradicts Coox thesis:

_The oil supply problem resulting from the embargo was so severe (a supply of 800 million liters per year vs. 5,400 required), that a quick resolution by military or diplomatic means was essential. The Army calculated that on the basis of oil supply alone, resources were insufficient to simultaneously pursue conflicts in the south and the north. *So plans for a war with the Soviet Union were shelved*._

http://www.warbirdforum.com/south.htm

The World At War: Banzai! Japan 2/5 ::

Information provided at 8:36

True, the occupation of Southern Indochina was a consequence of the South Group policy, which perhaps was because Nomonhan. But even if was, this was not the only reason. Hitler's pact with Stalin and non warning of the Barbarossa were apparenly just as decisive.


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## michaelmaltby (Dec 25, 2011)

"... Here's two sources that contradicts Coox thesis..."

Your losing me, Jenisch ... what *thesis *do you claim Coox is advocating - certainly neither western or Soviet IMHO, 

MM


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## Jenisch (Dec 25, 2011)

michaelmaltby said:


> "... Here's two sources that contradicts Coox thesis..."
> 
> Your losing me, Jenisch ... what *thesis *do you claim Coox is advocating - certainly neither western or Soviet IMHO,
> 
> MM


 
The Japanese didn't attack the Soviet Union by "fear". There's no conclusive evidence of this.


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## michaelmaltby (Dec 25, 2011)

"... The Japanese didn't attack the Soviet Union by "fear". There's no conclusive evidence of this."

Don't follow, Jenisch .... *no one is claiming this *.... however, the outcome of the 1904-05 Russo-Japan conflict made Japan complacent about Russian resolve .... the Communists weren't the Czarists however. Japan _should_ have recognized "fear" of the Soviets ... but they didn't. [Having been beaten, Japan's next pick was the USA ... another misestimation]. 

MM


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## parsifal (Dec 25, 2011)

Only just saw this thread, am late, so my apologies.

One needs to step back from this scenario and taker a long hard look at all the constraints and opportunities available to both sides. In no particular order here are a few observations I habe made over the years.

The Japanese Manchurian garrison was heavily outnumbered from 1937 right through to 1945, with one period in exception. The Soviet Far Eastern forces from 1939 numbered about 1.6 million men, dropping to about 900000 during June = December 1941. By extraordinary efforts by the local commanders, local manpower drafts were able to restor manpower levels to around 1.3million men in the Far East, though quality of the fillers was not nearly as good as the Siberian vets that had been pulled out of the Far Eastern Forces.

Japanese Manchurian garrisons were heavily outnumbered during most of that period....reached a peak of 1.1 million in 1945. Japan was on the Strategic Defensive from 1939-45, and were alsway worried about Soviet intentions. Soviets prepred for both defence and attack.

Despite their weaknesses in men and materiel, the hotheads in the Kwangtung Army had designs on Soviet Far Eastern provinces in 1939, and plans were under prepration for large scale attacks into Siberia. Sorge was feeding detailed information on Japanese plans and actions from 1937. The strike north group was in the first instance overrulled by the advocates of the Greater East Asia group of nutters (ie conquer China) and then the strike south group. Japan simly did not have the manpower or the military resources to fight the Chinese, AND the Soviets at the same time. As time progressed they didnt have the resources to fighht the Soviets alone.

If the Japanese had wanted to attack the Soviets the Styrike North Group needed a victory, that why Khalkin Gol is so important. For the Japanese to take on the Russians, they would have to not be involved in China in the first place. They would have to attack no later than Summer 1940, because any later their army is going to blown out of the water. No attack on China gives them access to oil etc, and a total of 40 divs to attack. The Japanese Army has not the logistic support to attack anywhere except on direction through the eastern provinces toward Vladivostock. They need Vladivostock as a point of suppy, but the port is one of the most heavily defended and fortified regions in the world....more heavily defended than the Maginot line. Seaborn assault is out of the question, the Japanese have only one option, through the flat lands of Mutanchiang....and this was also a heavily defended passage. 

In all, Japan did not attack the USSR for good reason .....they could win such a fight.....and they knew it


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## Jenisch (Dec 25, 2011)

parsifal said:


> They would have to attack no later than Summer 1940, because any later their army is going to blown out of the water.



You want to mean that even if the IJA was not in China in 1941, it didn't have a chance by lack of resources?


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## michaelmaltby (Dec 25, 2011)

".... You want to mean that even if the IJA was not in China in 1941, it didn't have a chance by lack of resources?"

Yep! [in hindsight]

MM


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## Jenisch (Dec 25, 2011)

michaelmaltby said:


> ".... You want to mean that even if the IJA was not in China in 1941, it didn't have a chance by lack of resources?"
> 
> Yep! [in hindsight]
> 
> MM


 
If the IJA was not in China, then I don't see much a way to the government put brakes in the Army after the Barbarossa. Stalin would take measures to counter this, but the problem would be how much Hitler would be benefited or not.


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## michaelmaltby (Dec 25, 2011)

Help ..... 

MM


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## Jenisch (Dec 25, 2011)

michaelmaltby said:


> Help .....
> 
> MM



Ok Michael, will admit my pro Japanese sentiment and stop. The Soviet question was not lucrative. It was better take the resources in the Pacific from the "decadent" democracies and perhaps fight the reds later. Period.


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## michaelmaltby (Dec 26, 2011)

".... It was better take the resources in the Pacific from the "decadent" democracies and perhaps fight the reds later. "

An Island's got to do what an Island's got to do, Jenisch .....  ... there is, of course, a PRICE to pay for _all _behavior ... .

MM


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## tyrodtom (Dec 26, 2011)

The Japanese Army couldn't even defeat China, a fight they chose. 
China, a country that had practically no modern manufacturing base, all their arms and most of their supplies came from other countries. It seems they could chase the Nationalist all over China, but never pin down enough of them to decisively defeat them. Chiang Kai-shek was much more concerned about putting down the Communists than expelling the Japanese. I wonder how much success Japan would have had in China, if Chiang hadn't been fighting two wars, with the Japanese being the secondary threat?

If Japan couldn't even defeat a backward China, how could they even have any chance against a fairly modern, industrialized power like Russia.


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## michaelmaltby (Dec 26, 2011)

Well said. 

MM


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## Zeke_Freak (Dec 26, 2011)

Apparently some IJN pilots that were training specifically for the Pearl Harbor attack were under the impression that they would be attacking the Soviets instead. With their experience in China they were primed for action. Overall, I think a Japanese invasion of the USSR at that time would have been effective in splitting red army concerns, probably lending more aid to German forces than doing much for Japan. The biggest effect IMO, would have been not being able to attack the US naval forces in Dec 1941, postponing the US entry into WWII. Probably the best approach would have been for Japan to back off in China, appeasing the US, then striking the USSR in conjunction with German forces.


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## Zeke_Freak (Dec 26, 2011)

tyrodtom said:


> The Japanese Army couldn't even defeat China, a fight they chose.
> China, a country that had practically no modern manufacturing base, all their arms and most of their supplies came from other countries.



Uhm... I think your understimating the sheer manpower China could field, not to mention the US had Japan in a resource 'choke hold'. All things considered, China was a much tougher proposition than you are suggesting. Meanwhile the USSR was relatively weak and recovering from Stalin's purges, with next to no navy, and virtually cut off from foreign aid, and they would be fighting on two fronts.


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## tyrodtom (Dec 26, 2011)

I'm aware China had plenty of manpower, far more than they could ever begin to equip, sometimes more than they could even feed, without external help.


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## RCAFson (Dec 26, 2011)

Zeke_Freak said:


> Uhm... I think your understimating the sheer manpower China could field, not to mention the US had Japan in a resource 'choke hold'. All things considered, China was a much tougher proposition than you are suggesting. Meanwhile the USSR was relatively weak and recovering from Stalin's purges, with next to no navy, and virtually cut off from foreign aid, and they would be fighting on two fronts.



The Red Navy was in a poor strategic position since it was divided amongst several main bases, but it was hardly "next to no navy":



> _*By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, cadre ships of the USSR Navy numbered 3 battleships, 7 cruisers, 59 flotilla leaders and destroyers, 218 submarines, 269 torpedo-boats, 22 guard-ships, 88 mine-sweepers, 77 submarine-chasers and several other ships and boats as well as auxiliary vessels.* 219 ships including 3 battleships, 2 heavy and 7 light cruisers, 45 destroyers and 91 submarines were under construction. In terms of their tactical characteristics and operational effectiveness the Soviet surface ships were up to foreign analogues with which foreign fleets were equipped. They were notable for their high speed parameters, proper safety characteristics, sufficient survivability, operability and unsinkability. These cruisers and destroyers were armed with highly-reliable long-range 180-mm and 130-mm artillery complexes.
> _
> The Soviet Navy at the Outbreak and During the Great Patriotic War: Introduction



The USSR received western aid and trade through 3 main ports, of which Vladivostok was only one.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 26, 2011)

Compared to even France or Italy (the "3"s of the 5-5-5-3-3 big Navys) the Soviet navy was distinctly second rate and due to the " divided amongst several main bases" which boils down to the Baltic fleet, the Black sea fleet and the Far East fleet the chances of concentrating what they did have was remote. 
The 3 existing battleships date from before WW I in design and initial construction. Trying to get even one of them to the Far East would be a long and difficult task.

Of the 7 Cruisers 2-3 were old WW I types with 13cm guns in casements and on the broadside, of the 15 guns only 8-9 could actually fire in one direction at best. There was one odd ball with four 18cm guns in single turrets, two one each end of the ship and only 4 modern Kirov class cruisers. 2 in the Baltic, 2 in the Black sea and a further 2 still under construction in the Far East. The Soviets had nothing bigger than a Destroyer/leader in the Far East in 1940/41 and not many of them.


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## bobbysocks (Dec 26, 2011)

ok so the japs didnt have the resources to fight in china and the ussr...so they keep china but abandon their interest in the ussr... and in doing so, set their sites on _weaker_ nations....the us, the uk and all the commonwealth nations?? did they think the uk and the us were just going to give them up because the supply lines were long or something? with the ussr...you already kicked that bull in the ass once you are going have to keep your eye on it....namely now pin a substancial number of troops and machinery there "just in case". so you are already basically fighting on 2 fronts!! i just dont see how they could think that if they didnt have the resouces for war with the ussr they could successfully do battle with the us, uk and CW....for very long and win or keep it.

as for fighting in china...that is the same as fighting in the ussr. the sheer size of the land you have to occupy and subdue is staggering and a defensive weapon in and of itself as tyrodtom illuded to. the defending army can retreat hundreds of miles making the attacker out run it supply. EVEN if the attacker could execute a precision strike and capture the govenment....it would take forever to quell all the insurgencies. conversely, for the south pacific...the mass one would have to defend would be a tool for the attacker. the islands are isolated and supply extremely vunerable. to take and hold these you would have to have huge resources....which japan didnt but the allies did...although not at the onset of the war.


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## vikingBerserker (Dec 27, 2011)

Today I received _Air War Over Khalkhin Gol - The Nomonhan Incident _by Kotelnikov because this thread really interested me. On page 65 is states this:

"In general, the Khalkhin Gol battles appeared to be a rehearsal, a preparation for similar war that was to be fought on the Pacific coast and would begin two and a half years later. During the first phase of the combat actions, the Japanese had better equipment and better trained personnel whereas the Soviet empire was often equipped with older aircraft and their pilots lacked combat training and practice. However, as soon as the Soviet Union received their newer fighters and bombers and properly trained aces arrived to pass on their expertise to the others, the situation changed radically. By the end of the conflict, the Japanese could no longer offset their losses, and had to rely on obsolete equipment such as the Ki-4 and Ki-10 biplanes, and the Japanese pilots also became overtired and demoralized, a direct result of flying too many missions with too few hours of rest in-between, and they seemed to loose their inherent 'will-to-win' spirit'. In that situation, a crushing defeat was the lost logical outcome."


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## Shinpachi (Dec 28, 2011)

This post is to show my deep respect to vB's earnest research.
I am not interested in Nomonhan at all and its following what-ifs either.

In any local books about the incident, I have never read any description that JGHQ supported the battle.
They did not only support the battle but ordered Masanobu Tsuji - a Commander of Kanto-gun (Kwantung army) to 
withdraw his troops immediately after the first conflict.

Conflicts with Soviet Union were not their immediate concern when they were busy in China.
It was Commander Tsuji's dogma but I guess that the Japanese had been misunderstood that they were 
interested in Soviet territory so soon. Total war with Soviet Union might have come but that would not have been 
before the victory in China even if there had not been Pearl Harbor.

After ww2, Tsuji answered an interview "I could have won Nomonhan if JGHQ had fully supported me". 
Selfish. For your knowledge, He is regarded as "Absolute Evil" in my country.


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## vikingBerserker (Dec 28, 2011)

Very interesting, thank you for your input Shinpachi!


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## michaelmaltby (Dec 29, 2011)

".... Very interesting, thank you for your input Shinpachi!"

MM


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## Shinpachi (Dec 29, 2011)

You are welcome, vB and MM and please take my apology if I may have interrupted your serious/enjoyable discussion but, taking this opportunity, let me recommend you to research about Masanobu Tsuji a little more if you should not know him well.

He is an interesting guy - he never paid respects to his senior officers/commanders and possibly to IJA itself.
He never hesitated to forge his commanders' signature in official documents because he always thought he was justice. 
He committed not only Nomonhan but Chinese Massacre in Singapore and Bataan Death March one after another.

In spite of these crimes (plus many others), he survived not only the war and the military tribunal by the allies but became a member of the House of Councillors.
One of the biggest mysteries in Japanese history will be - he is still respected by his hometown people as a celebrity.
I guess they simply don't know what he did during the war but It's very interesting for me to understand our own culture.

Thanks.


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## bobbysocks (Dec 29, 2011)

shinpachi, that answered the question i was going to ask....as to why he is regraded as an "absolute evil" by your people. and dont feel you are interrupting anything here. your opinions are just as important as other. i for one, would like to hear your thoughts on issues like the one we are discussing.


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## vikingBerserker (Dec 29, 2011)

I totally agree, you are as important of a member here as anybody else, I always welcome your opinion - I've learned a lot from it.


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## Shinpachi (Dec 29, 2011)

Thank you very much for your so warm words, bobbysocks and vB!

Mr Ryotaro Shiba - 
He once served the Kanto-gun as a tank driver and is also one of the best-seller non-fiction novelists I respect once said
"I collected many data and had many interviews with the survivors to write about the Nomonhan but gave up. Why?
I would die from anger."


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## parsifal (Dec 30, 2011)

Hi Shinpachi


I dont understand why the japanese would view Nomonhan as different to any other battle the Japanese were ibvoled in?


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## Shinpachi (Dec 30, 2011)

Frankly, I am not necessarily understanding well yet how you, westerners, saw/see it but what I was taught at school was that the Nomonhan Incident was nothing but a temporary local collision as neither Soviet Union nor Japan wanted it to extend to total war. 

As a common knowledge here since then, the incident was an excess reaction by Kanto-gun wishing to show their distinguished military service. Dai-hon-ei (Japanese GHQ) did not support such their intention from the beginning.

Following is from my own research.
JGHQ ordered Kenkichi Ueda - Commander of Kanto-gun to stop the battle in July but his reply by telegraph was "We continue fighting".
So, JGHQ decided to look the course of event for the time of being.
However, this telegraph was turned out to be a forged one by Masanobu Tsuji after ww2.


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## vikingBerserker (Dec 30, 2011)

Wow! I'm really surprised he was not punished more then he was. IMO the incident is really not that well known, at least in the US. I never really heard about it until being on this board.


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## Shinpachi (Dec 30, 2011)

In my impression too, the older Japanese tried to forget the incident as soon as possible.
When I was a college student, I read a few non-fiction books about the incidnet. I was surprised to know that they had rushed into the battle with no sufficient information about the Soviet forces. 

Masanobu Tsuji suddenly disappeared during his trip in Indochina around 1961.
He is thought killed by someone there.


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## gjs238 (Dec 30, 2011)

Masanobu Tsuji - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Very disturbing.


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## Shinpachi (Dec 30, 2011)

Thanks for your kind followup, gjs238.
Description seems brief but gets to the point well.


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## michaelmaltby (Dec 30, 2011)

Shinpachi San. you may be interested in how I learned about - and became fascinated by - Nomonhan/Gulkin Gol .... 

In the '60s when I was a student of history at university I rode a motorcycle - a Matchless 500cc single (derivative of Norton Manx IIFC . It was torquey and LOUD and I used to get tickets for late-night riding on the twisty Ottawa Capital Area roads . I couldn't afford the tickets so I used to Go To Jail (literally) for the overnight required to "pay" the ticket. One Friday night there was a *Hungarian f*ellow in the same cell as I was -- in for some scam or other  -- and he had been a Soviet POW in Siberia after being captured on the Eastern Front with German allies. He talked about these Japanese POWs that were in the same camp - different barracks - but same labor camp. I remarked that the Soviets hadn't even engaged Japan at that time and he laughed and said "No, no, 1939" ... different war".

I couldn't believe it and had to know more. It's only being discussed now ...... (better late than never we say in Canada )

MM


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## Shinpachi (Dec 30, 2011)

Wow, MM. That is very interesting information
Kanto-gun did not grasp how many soldiers were captured by the Soviets but, as MIA was about 2,000, they estimated POW would be upto the number.
I hope they could come home together with 'new comers' after ww2.
Thank you very much!


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## michaelmaltby (Dec 30, 2011)

Coox is very sympathetic to Japan on the issue of POWs. Shinpachi .... the Japanese did not hold many Soviets ... in the final days the Soviets took many Japanese (through confusion). When the exchange took place the Soviets dictated that it was to be 1:1 ... and the Soviets never revealed _how many more_ they were holding .... It was a tragic mis-adventure for the Japanese people ...

MM


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## Shinpachi (Dec 30, 2011)

If my memory is correct, Coox once joined a discussion in Japan and could speak very good Japanese.
Thousands of Japanese POWs came home as a keen communist in late 1940s
Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin apologized about the Soviet's unfair treatment of POWs in ..... 1993 when he visited Japan as President of Russia but I heard POW's hardship was beyond our imagination.

Thank you very much, MM, for your kind and good understanding/sympaty for their tragedy!


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## michaelmaltby (Dec 31, 2011)

"... Thousands of Japanese POWs came home as a keen communist in late 1940s".

That's interesting .... did the Party continue to fascinate them as their lives evolved ... back in Japan? 

My wife is Estonian (born in Canada) .... the Soviets deported 1000s of Estos, Balts and other tribes to Siberia for no crime except being what they were ... and in THAT sense their fate was no better or worse than your countrymen POWs. Remember - the Tsar Great Peter built St. Petersburg with slave labour.

New Year's Greetings from Toronto

MM


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## vikingBerserker (Dec 31, 2011)

That's pretty interesting MM.


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## Shinpachi (Dec 31, 2011)

Most of them realized new Japan's reality as a democratic nation soon to be an ordinary citizen.
It is interesting for me knowing the historical relationship with you over the Eurasian Continent, MM
Thanks again for your information.

A Happy New Year.


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## cherry blossom (Jan 4, 2012)

Shinpachi said:


> ...
> In any local books about the incident, I have never read any description that JGHQ supported the battle.
> They did not only support the battle but ordered Masanobu Tsuji - a Commander of Kanto-gun (Kwantung army) to
> withdraw his troops immediately after the first conflict.
> ...



The Japanese policies leading to clashes with the Soviet Union over 1938-9 may not have originated solely in Manchuria or be due only to Colonel Masanobu Tsuji. The Vice Chief of the Imperial Japanese Army from August 1937 to December 1938 was Lieutenant-General Tada Hayao (多田 駿 which I think is sometimes also read as Tada Shun). In January 1938, Tada and the Chief of Staff Prince Kan'in attempted to see the Emperor to petition him to seek peace with China. According to Michael Barnhart's “Japan Prepares for Total War” page 112, Tada was willing to enlarge the Changkufeng Incident in July 1938 to put pressure on the Japanese Government to break off fighting against China (Tada had earlier transferred significant forces North of the Wall). Although Tada had been moved from his position after December 1938, it is possible that those attempting to oppose the war with China were also important in encouraging an aggressive policy in Manchuria. 

I apologise if you are not interested in Nomonhan but do your Japanese sources discuss such conflicts amongst the Tokyo leadership? For example, Barnhart references Bōeichō, Daihon'ei rikugubu, vol. 1, 553-54 but that probably only relates troop movements rather than motivations.


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## Jenisch (Jan 4, 2012)

Shinpachi said:


> After ww2, Tsuji answered an interview "I could have won Nomonhan if JGHQ had fully supported me".


 
I always belived on this, BINGO! Thank you Shimpachi, in the West we are too much subjected to a Soviet/Russian view of the conflict in Mongolia. It's interesting to see what the Japanese think about it.

Don't know if it's truth, but a member in other forum posted something supporting this:

*The other thing to consider is very few of the Japanese units actually retired, even when the situation went bad. The Quality of the units was also somewhat suspect, with the 23rd Division being one of the worse units in China.

The battle had several distinct phases, and the Japanese came within a whisker of winning several times. Before they got screwed over by logistics or their own High command.

When the Elite 26th Regt was on the west side of the river they got attacked by a huge amount of armour. Infantry in the open with 4x 37mm ATG's, and 12x Regimental guns dating from 1906. There is No Cover, its just a flat plain with some grass.
Result was the Infantry took out around 70 odd tanks (10-30 more killed by the guns, I forget the exact number), and caused the Russians to withdraw. Then they had to withdraw as they had no supplies left.

Equally on the east bank the Japanese did what they do best. They launched a series of infantry assaults at night. Pulling back into cover during daytime to avoid the massed Soviet arty. They managed to destroy 7 of the 8 Soviet Bridges. Some were destroyed by suicide teams infiltrating short distances. The last ridge would have been reached in another night or two's attack. Which was well within the capabilities of the 23rd Div.
However the high command ordered the attack to pull back to its start line. This was due to them wanting to carry out a coordinated grand offensive with the Japanese heavy artillery now being emplaced.

In the final phase of the battle the Ioki Detachment Gave such a kicking to overwhelming soviet forces, that the Unit commander was relieved of his command. The Soviets attacked with an armoured Division, and get stopped dead by a Japanese cavalry company with some light support. The Soviets had to use reserve units including Airborne troops, but still found it tough going.*

About the air power, the new Soviet planes and tactics certainly helped them, but in my view was not the only factor. The Japanese doctrine always called for offensive, and the Kwantung Army Air Force couldn't launch offensive operations by the IGHQ orders, as well as have replacements for tired pilots. 

Of course that if Stalin wanted to put more strenght against the Japanese if they won, they would have problems. The problem is the Japanese were aware of this, that's why they didn't let the Nomonhan Incident to escalate. They were not yet ready for a war against the Soviets.


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## Nikademus (Jan 4, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> The Japanese Army couldn't even defeat China, a fight they chose.
> China, a country that had practically no modern manufacturing base, all their arms and most of their supplies came from other countries. It seems they could chase the Nationalist all over China, but never pin down enough of them to decisively defeat them. Chiang Kai-shek was much more concerned about putting down the Communists than expelling the Japanese. I wonder how much success Japan would have had in China, if Chiang hadn't been fighting two wars, with the Japanese being the secondary threat?
> 
> If Japan couldn't even defeat a backward China, how could they even have any chance against a fairly modern, industrialized power like Russia.



Japan won every major battle vs. China at the Army Group level. (there were some army or below army level defeats of course like the Changsha battles....no army in WWII won EVERY single skirmish/battle) China's army could not as a whole stand in the field with the far more professionally trained and equipped Imperial Japanese Army, a fact Chiang and his KMT cronies were well aware, hence their "Lets you and him fight" policy throughout WWII despite FDR's vision of Chiang becoming an Asian leader.

Many people assume Japan was trying to "Conquor" China aka through a complete military invasion and occupation. That was never Japan's goal, nor did they have the resources to occupy such a huge country....a fact they were well aware of. What they wanted after mid level officers got the ball rolling was for Chiang to come to terms favorable to Japan after which Japan would withdraw it's troops which would then have freed up one of the IJA's arms for other concerns......including the Russian bear. Problem was that Chiang refused to come to the table...and after the early costly defeats on the battlefield, mostly refused to fight as well and withdrew into the far interior of China. Chiang was also far more worried about Mao and internal threats from within his own party than the Japanese. It was a complicated situation. To oversimplify it....China became Japan's "Vietnam" a conventional war that bogged down into a stalemate by simple fact of the country's huge size and an enemy "government" that refused to come to terms. The US "won" all it's major battles in Vietnam too with it's superior firepower and total air domination but ultimately "lost" it's war as well.

My copy of Coxx's book is currently packed away but from what i recall. (and apologies if I get some things muddled) he did summarize the Kwantung buildup in mid-late 41 to it's peak strength which was formidable and could have if nothing else, fully occupied the Soviets in the Far East depriving Stalin of even trading out trained men and equipment in exchange for raw recruits. Would it have altered the war? Possibly. A Soviet collapse after the disasters of 41 was not out of the realm of possibility. But in the end the Northerners lost out to the Southerners. A northern attack posed serious risk for potential gains that were less solid...."possible" link up with Germans....."possible" defeat of Soviets.....etc etc. But in addition to the spectre of Nomanhan and costly bogged down battles there were serious questions about who would benefit the most......why risk the Bear's teeth for Hitler's sake? In the end the Northern argument hinged on eliminating the Soviet "Threat" to Japanese long term security but the plan did not inspire confidence. The Southern argument on the other hand seemed more downhill and the potential resource riches were tangible.....Japanese autarky.


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## tyrodtom (Jan 4, 2012)

I'm a Vietnam vet, i'm quite aware of the parallels.


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## Jenisch (Jan 4, 2012)

Nikademus said:


> A northern attack posed serious risk for potential gains that were less solid



Roosevelt and Churchill were supporting Stalin, just like they were supporting Chiang. Even before the Lend-Lease, the Americans were already selling weaponry for the Russians. Since the "Chinese Incident" was already reason to fear an oil embargo, if they attacked Russia, then an embargo would be much likely. If the Russians resisted, as they already proved capable in 1939, then Japan would be doomed. The Southerners didn't won for nothing, their plan was better.


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## Shinpachi (Jan 5, 2012)

I did not know Russians were so proud of their battles in Nomonhan.
Masanobu Tsuji would have been happy to hear that.

Hayao Tada had nothing to do with the incident.
He is famous here as a man who only made sound remarks to his nation to be defeated by ambitious Hideki Tojo.
I was born in the same town as he. So, I should be more proud of him...


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## Jenisch (Jan 5, 2012)

Shinpachi said:


> I did not know Russians were so proud of their battles in Nomonhan.
> Masanobu Tsuji would have been happy to hear that.



LOL!


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## Jenisch (Jan 6, 2012)

Hey Shinpachi, I just found this: Nomonhan - Masanobu Tsuji - Google Livros

You can confirm that Tsuji really wrote this book? (don't know if was not a mistake from Google, didn't find it in other places)


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## Shinpachi (Jan 6, 2012)

He got famous after ww2 because he became a bestseller writer based on his experience.
That had not only made the allies harder to punish him but made him possible to become a politician.
Absolute Evil can do anything.


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## Jenisch (Jan 6, 2012)

You know Shinpachi, I don't understand many articles from Nomonhan I read here in the West. They always mention how well-equipped Zhukov forces were, the limitations of the IJA that Tsuji mentioned, and the Japanese failure to detect the Soviet offensive. But in the conclusion, all of them mention that the IJA didn't attacked in 1941, because it proved vastly inferior in Nomonhan. I simply don't see a sense in this. It would be like say the Red Army was incapable because the Winter War (and many belived so, including Hitler). If the Japanese had attacked with full support and still ended defeated, then I would agree with this. You people in Japan naturally have a much better view of this conflict IMHO.


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## Shinpachi (Jan 6, 2012)

As I said, I am not interested in the Nomonhan Incident because Japanese army was not ready for making war with the Soviet Union.
To fight seriously, IJA would have to stop all war in China and needed full supports from the navy but it was too early.
Nomonhan was Tsuji's dogma and not a sane battle from every angle.


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## JoeB (Jan 6, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> You know Shinpachi, I don't understand many articles from Nomonhan I read here in the West. They always mention how well-equipped Zhukov forces were, the limitations of the IJA that Tsuji mentioned, and the Japanese failure to detect the Soviet offensive. But in the conclusion, all of them mention that the IJA didn't attacked in 1941, because it proved vastly inferior in Nomonhan. I simply don't see a sense in this. It would be like say the Red Army was incapable because the Winter War (and many belived so, including Hitler).


I agree. It's completely a myth that the Japanese didn't go to war with the USSR in 1941 because of the Nomonhan incident in '39. The IJA, rightly or not, did not think that the 1939 war showed them to be inferior to the Soviets. Moreover and as you point out, the Nomonhan War was a 'Winter War' scale operation relative to the 'Barbarossa' scale that a 1941 Japanese attack on USSR would have been (of course the Winter War was much larger than Nomonhan, and Barbarossa much larger than any Japanese attack on USSR would have been, but relatively speaking it's a reasonable comparison). 

Also, an attack in 1941 would have been eastward from Manchuria into the Soviet Maritime Province (area along the Pacific coast), not on the western border of Manchuria, with Mongolia, where the Nomonhan incident occurred. The terrain in the east was very different, forested and with mountains in places, not like the open treeless plains of the Mongolian border which were probably the best terrain for mechanized forces of any theater in WWII except maybe eastern Libya-western Egypt.

As mentioned, there was still a very serious high order strategic issue of whether the IJA had enough spare strength to launch a campaign against Russia without an actual withdrawal in China. They thought they had sufficient strength, but it certainly would have dictated a more passive approach in China, and would have made any military reaction to Anglo-American economic warfare much more difficult. And it required that the Soviets start withdrawing forces from the Far East to meet the German attack, which at first they did not do, but had began doing in the second half of '41, or at least Japanese intelligence concluded so. And even then, the most basic question is what could such an attack have achieved for Japan strategically, even assuming it was militarily successful? Again it would have been a fairly limited objective attack to seize the portion of the USSR east of Manchuria, not somehow march west a few 1000 miles to Moscow, as some seem to imagine when the idea is brought up.

But the defeat at Nomonhan absolutely did not rule out an attack on the Soviets from the IJA POV. If anything it was the opposite. Alvin Coox was mentioned earlier in the thread. His great book 'Nomonhan', in the later chapters details the IJA's plans for attacking the Soviets in 1941, and the large buildup in IJA forces in Manchuria after the 1939 war. The IJA had an active plan to attack the Soviets in the late summer-fall of 1941, after the Germans had attacked though not in diplomatic coordination with them. It was only shelved by the Imperial Cabinet after the Anglo-American oil embargo that same summer.

Joe


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## michaelmaltby (Jan 6, 2012)

"... there was still a very serious high order strategic issue of whether the IJA had enough spare strength to launch a campaign against Russia without an actual withdrawal in China. "

If Japan as an Axis Partner *had *attacked the Soviets - the ONLY way it could have worked was a "Pearl Harbor" in the Soviet east- seizing facilities and driving west using the rail lines. Leap-frogging .... like they did in the islands. A successful co-ordinated attack such as that - in Stalin's deep rear in June 1941 - would have changed the course of Barbarossa, IMHO.

MM


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## Jenisch (Jan 6, 2012)

JoeB said:


> I agree. It's completely a myth that the Japanese didn't go to war with the USSR in 1941 because of the Nomonhan incident in '39. The IJA, rightly or not, did not think that the 1939 war showed them to be inferior to the Soviets. Moreover and as you point out, the Nomonhan War was a 'Winter War' scale operation relative to the 'Barbarossa' scale that a 1941 Japanese attack on USSR would have been (of course the Winter War was much larger than Nomonhan, and Barbarossa much larger than any Japanese attack on USSR would have been, but relatively speaking it's a reasonable comparison).
> 
> Also, an attack in 1941 would have been eastward from Manchuria into the Soviet Maritime Province (area along the Pacific coast), not on the western border of Manchuria, with Mongolia, where the Nomonhan incident occurred. The terrain in the east was very different, forested and with mountains in places, not like the open treeless plains of the Mongolian border which were probably the best terrain for mechanized forces of any theater in WWII except maybe eastern Libya-western Egypt.
> 
> ...



People underestimate Showa Japan saying it didn't have great interest for modern equipament. Dr. Jiro Horikoshi for example, could not put armor in the Zero only because it didn't have a more powerful engine to fit with the IJN specifications. Yes, most Zeros were vulnerable, but in compensation they did have an excellent range - with the only competitor early in the war in this regard the still less numerous P-38. The Zero, as well as the Ki-43, were offensive fighters. As long as the Japanese could use them to bomb the hell of the enemy, they were adequate machines to provide cover for the bombers. Some people point it was just the Allies change to energy tactics and all was lost for them. Not so simple in my view. Even because it's a myth the Japanese themselfs didn't used such tactics.

Other excellent Japanese aircraft like the Ki-84 fighter, the Ki-67 bomber and the B7A carrier attack aircraft were being developed before the war. All could not enter in service earlier and in numbers because the war with the US and lack of resources, combined with the war in China prevented this.

The IJA had several modern tank and vehicle designs. Unfornately, most could not reach production or only few numbers were avaliable due to the resources being placed in the IJN due to the Pacific War. 

There were defects in the IJA? Surely, everyone had deffects. I think the IJA was not the best Army around, specially in terms of technology, but neither they were hordes of soldiers just employing Banzai charges like some people say. They were enemies to respect, and surely were respected by their enemies (unfortnately not so vice versa, specially for poor civilians and their prisioners).

I considerate the "Chinese Incident" as worst thing that could have happened to Imperial Japan. It put them in conflict with the US, and consequentely not allowed them to perhaps crush the Soviets with Hitler. This could have resulted the Axis victory in the war.


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## tyrodtom (Jan 6, 2012)

You will have a hard time finding any battles where the Japanese Army did not use a Banzai charge at least once. Several times even in the early stages of the battle.

It was a problem that some Japanese commanders recognized. Banzai charges were discouraged by the commanders at Iwo Jima and Okinawa, but they still occured on a small scale, at the last.


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## Jenisch (Jan 7, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> You will have a hard time finding any battles where the Japanese Army did not use a Banzai charge at least once. Several times even in the early stages of the battle.
> 
> It was a problem that some Japanese commanders recognized. Banzai charges were discouraged by the commanders at Iwo Jima and Okinawa, but they still occured on a small scale, at the last.



Well, there are reports of human wave attacks by the Soviets against both the Finns and the Germans. Not at the sterotype scale thought. The US Army also frequentely launched frontal attacks against the enemy in Europe. The Banzai charges are not much different IMHO. Particularly when the Japanese were in the offensive.


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## tyrodtom (Jan 7, 2012)

You need to study infantry tactics if you think frontal attacks and Banzai charges are similiar, IMHO.

It's true the Soviets did use human wave attacks on the eastern front, but one thing the human wave attack has in common with the Banzai attack is it's usual failure against a entrenched opponent.

But you weaken your argument when first you say the Japanese didn't employ the Banzai frequently, then you switch to other forces used it too.


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## Jenisch (Jan 7, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> You need to study infantry tactics if you think frontal attacks and Banzai charges are similiar, IMHO.
> 
> It's true the Soviets did use human wave attacks on the eastern front, but one thing the human wave attack has in common with the Banzai attack is it's usual failure against a entrenched opponent.
> 
> But you weaken your argument when first you say the Japanese didn't employ the Banzai frequently, then you switch to other forces used it too.



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banzai_charge:

_Banzai charge (from the Japanese battle cry "banzai") was a term applied during World War II by the Allied forces to human wave attacks mounted by infantry forces of the Imperial Japanese Army. The name Gyokusai (Japanese: 玉砕, honorable suicide; literally "jade shards") was however used by the Naikaku Johōkyoku (Cabinet Information Bureau) and the media of the Imperial Japanese regime. These attacks were usually launched as a suicide attack to avoid surrender and dishonor or as a final attempt at maximizing the odds of success in the face of usually numerically superior Allied forces._

This is a Wikipedia mistake?


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## tyrodtom (Jan 7, 2012)

I don't disagree with Wiki's definition of a Banzai attack, but you seem to have no idea what you call a " frontal attack" is, as carried out by the U.S. Army, Marines etc. is.


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## Jenisch (Jan 7, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> I don't disagree with Wiki's definition of a Banzai attack, but you seem to have no idea what you call a " frontal attack" is, as carried out by the U.S. Army, Marines etc. is.



Mate, I really don't understand much. But I like to risk talk some things. 

I understand you mentioned the Banzai charge as a defect of the IJA. While it frequentely lead to high casualities, it was not a predominant Japanese tactic. Specially when they had air support and more flexibility to use their other tactics, like it would be in a hypotetical Japanese invasion of Russia. That's my point.


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## Shinpachi (Jan 7, 2012)

Nice talk guys but my father did not want to get back to the IJA


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UR5XPd3YW9E_


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## tyrodtom (Jan 7, 2012)

The JA learned a lot of lessons fighting in China, that weren't so successful when used against better armed and trained opponents. 

But their change of fighting tactics late in the war at Iwo Jima and Okinawa shows they were still capable of learning from earlier mistakes.

The Army going into Russia in 40-42 wouldn't be using the better thought out tactics of the 44-45 Japanese Army.


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## Jenisch (Jan 7, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> The JA learned a lot of lessons fighting in China, that weren't so successful when used against better armed and trained opponents.
> 
> But their change of fighting tactics late in the war at Iwo Jima and Okinawa shows they were still capable of learning from earlier mistakes.
> 
> The Army going into Russia in 40-42 wouldn't be using the better thought out tactics of the 44-45 Japanese Army.



But it would be in it's " natural environment". Like JoeB mentioned, the IJA had all it's tactics to fight against Russia in Eastern Manchuria. This is the reason why it achived it's objective in Changkufeng (only to be expelled later due to lack of support), despite massive enemy numerical superiority and total lack of air support. 

And I think it's not fair put all the weight in the Army. The Japanese Air Services and the IJN certainly would make a lot of noise as well. The Polikarpovs and their inexperience pilots were mauled by the Luftwaffe, and there's no reason to belive they would not be from the Japanese. After this, the Soviet troops and supply lines would be mauled as well.


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## JoeB (Jan 7, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> The JA learned a lot of lessons fighting in China, that weren't so successful when used against better armed and trained opponents.


But this leaves out a very major chapter of IJA history, its great successes against western Allied troops in the opening campaigns of the Pacific War through May 1942, when Japan captured territory over an enormous expanse in a short time. The IJA was aided in those campaigns by Japanese superiority in air and at sea, but also consistently defeated Allied armies with inferior (Japanese) numbers. Of course these Allied armies were far from the best the Allies fielded in WWII. The British Armies in Malaya and Burma were generally second-string collections of forces which could be spared by an already highly stretched British Empire; the 'US' force in the Philippines was mainly a still poorly trained Philippine National Army with US support and leadership; the Dutch Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL) was already cut off from the German occupied Netherlands even before the Pacific War. However, the fact remains the IJA showed up very well against those Allied forces, and often defeated them with manuever. But even when frontal assault was used as a tactic, those Allied armies could not always stand up to it. Japanese infantry attacks were very fierce; they didn't only work against the Chinese.

IMO, it's partly leftover Allied propaganda from the WWII era which leads us to ignore or explain away the early IJA successes in relatively 'stand up fights' with numerically superior (though less well supplied) Allied armies, then overemphasizes IJA defeats in later Pac War battles where their position was entirely hopeless. It's true that some Japanese field commanders (as in the early attempts to retake G'canal) underestimated enemy strength and quality, but their own numbers and firepower were usually insufficient to overcome any competent enemy of such relative strength. Again, I think biased wartime accounts, and later first hand oriented accounts focused on honoring American servicemen, tend to blow out of proportion the importance of inferior IJA infantry tactics at G'canal. No army with the IJA's lack of numbers, weapons and supply at G'canal could have overcome any reasonably competent army possessing the positions, numbers, supply and weapons of the US Marine (later also US Army) defending force. The key to such campaigns was the air/sea struggle to reinforce and resupply the islands, which the Japanese lost at G'canal, and coudn't even contest in some later island campaigns.

Given the IJA performance v the Allies in Malaya, Burma, Philippines and DEI in 1941-42, they probably would have had overall qualitative superiority against the Soviets in the infantry-friendly terrain of Eastern Manchuria/Maritime Province as well. Red Army quality in '41 was very spotty, and the Soviets like the western Allies left relatively lower quality forces in the Far East.

Joe


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## Jenisch (Jan 7, 2012)

A major problem for the Soviets was the vulnerable Transiberian. If the Japanese managed to cut it, they would be doomed.


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## Jenisch (Jan 7, 2012)

While an interesting subject, I don't think there's much sense in discuss this. Perhaps only in case the Sino-Japanese war didn't started in '37. The Western Allies would never let Japan link up with Hitler. The Japanese didn't started such war just because the oil question.


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## tyrodtom (Jan 7, 2012)

When one side attacks first without even the formality of a declaration of war , they tend to do well.

The allies should not have been as unprepared as they were. I'm not so sure it was the superority of the JA, or the gross incompetence on the part of the allies, or maybe a little of both.

But we seemed to have learned faster from our failures than the Japanese. Maybe with the JA's go for broke policy whenever things didn't go well ( Banzai) didn't leave any survivors to learn from.


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## Juha (Jan 7, 2012)

JoeB said:


> ...Given the IJA performance v the Allies in Malaya, Burma, Philippines and DEI in 1941-42, they probably would have had overall qualitative superiority against the Soviets in the infantry-friendly terrain of Eastern Manchuria/Maritime Province as well. Red Army quality in '41 was very spotty, and the Soviets like the western Allies left relatively lower quality forces in the Far East.
> 
> Joe



I'm not sure on that, Siberian units deployed in early 42 against Finns were good quality troops with good forest fighting tactics, definitely better in forest than German regular infantry in 1941. If IJA would have attacked Eastern Siberia, it would have been Soviet troops which had been fighting in their home turf not IJA.

Juha


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## Jenisch (Jan 7, 2012)

Juha said:


> I'm not sure on that, Siberian units deployed in early 42 against Finns were good quality troops with good forest fighting tactics, definitely better in forest than German regular infantry in 1941. If IJA would have attacked Eastern Siberia, it would have been Soviet troops which had been fighting in their home turf not IJA.
> 
> Juha



On advantage to the Japanese side was a concentrated attack in Eastern Manchuria. The Soviet troops were dispersed over a large area. The critical objective was the Transiberian, very close to them:







*Consideration only to the the red line.

If they cut the Transiberian, the Soviets could resist, but the outcome would be already decided.

About the Siberian troops, well, in the winter I do not doubt of their superiority. Otherwise, they would be competitive to the Japanese. But again, isolated army comparisons are not correct. Air and naval (the Japanese planned amphibius landings in several places) superiority can change the things decisvely. The Soviets were also in a not very good position to replace lost men and equipment. I do do not doubt of them, but also do not doubt of the Japanese.


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## Shinpachi (Jan 8, 2012)

As you may know, Jenisch, 73000 Japanese troops once stayed there during the Siberian Intervention(1918-1922) even after other allies came home.
IJA's conclusion was that the future war with the Soviet Union would be their last choice because they had not been interested in Siberia as a territory with severe climate and the ground of hard harvest. Target should not be the north.


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## Juha (Jan 8, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> On advantage to the Japanese side was a concentrated attack in Eastern Manchuria. The Soviet troops were dispersed over a large area. The critical objective was the Transiberian, very close to them:
> 
> 
> 
> ...



It's not enough to cut it it also must be kept cut. Much also depended where it would be cut. Soviets were aware of the vulnerability of Trans-Siberian railway, so they probably had stockpiled much in Eastern Siberia. But as LW found out, or USAF and USN during Korea, the problem was how to keep the railways cut, not how to cut them. And in heavily forested areas the effects of airpower is fairly severely limited, of course centres of population and bridges etc are still fairly easy to find.

Juha


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## Jenisch (Jan 8, 2012)

Shinpachi said:


> As you may know, Jenisch, 73000 Japanese troops once stayed there during the Siberian Intervention(1918-1922) even after other allies came home.
> IJA's conclusion was that the future war with the Soviet Union would be their last choice because they had not been interested in Siberia as a territory with severe climate and the ground of hard harvest. Target should not be the north.



I know. I'm just arguing about the military aspects.


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## Jenisch (Jan 8, 2012)

Juha said:


> It's not enough to cut it it also must be kept cut. Much also depended where it would be cut. Soviets were aware of the vulnerability of Trans-Siberian railway, so they probably had stockpiled much in Eastern Siberia. But as LW found out, or USAF and USN during Korea, the problem was how to keep the railways cut, not how to cut them. And in heavily forested areas the effects of airpower is fairly severely limited, of course centres of population and bridges etc are still fairly easy to find.
> 
> Juha



Yeah Juha. But as I told before, I wouldn't underestimate the Japanese infrantry capability. The training of the Japanese soldier was probably the harshest in the world, and the winter in Manchuria was very severe. They trained for war with the Soviets for decades as well.


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## Shinpachi (Jan 8, 2012)

Motivation is also an important factor to win.

IJA soldiers may have looked a fighting machine but they were not machines.
They fought for their nation and that was all.
Please consider.


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## tyrodtom (Jan 8, 2012)

I have nothing but respect for the individual Japanese fighting man, soldier, sailor, or airman.

But I feel nothing but utter contempt for their command structure that would lead them into, and then leave them in impossible situations, where, because of their culture, there was no escape, except death.


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## Shinpachi (Jan 8, 2012)

Thanks tyrodtom for your thoughts over your older opponent.

In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, 20,000 IJA soldiers were killed in vain before their commander noticed he had better bring the bigger cannons from the homeland even if taking time. But soldiers could fight because they had strong motivation.

If it had been in 1941, I wonder the result because they had no reason to fight.


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## Jenisch (Jan 8, 2012)

The IJA didn't showed motivation to the death in the Pacific? The Russians that motivated the IJA, not the Americans. Therefore, I don't know why they would not show motivation. "Spiritual power" was also the main topic for the IJA training.


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## tyrodtom (Jan 8, 2012)

It's a poor commander that depends on his soldier's " spiritual powers" to make up for his bad tactical planning.


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## Jenisch (Jan 8, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> It's a poor commander that depends on his soldier's " spiritual powers" to make up for his bad tactical planning.


 
Ah, that depends. Hitler didn't belived the Germans were racially superior, specially against the Slavics? The Red Army didn't have the Political Commissar until 1942? The Japanese also had their "defect". But like the others, this didn't prevented them from achive successes.


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## parsifal (Jan 8, 2012)

JoeB said:


> But this leaves out a very major chapter of IJA history, its great successes against western Allied troops in the opening campaigns of the Pacific War through May 1942, when Japan captured territory over an enormous expanse in a short time. The IJA was aided in those campaigns by Japanese superiority in air and at sea, but also consistently defeated Allied armies with inferior (Japanese) numbers. Of course these Allied armies were far from the best the Allies fielded in WWII. The British Armies in Malaya and Burma were generally second-string collections of forces which could be spared by an already highly stretched British Empire; the 'US' force in the Philippines was mainly a still poorly trained Philippine National Army with US support and leadership; the Dutch Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL) was already cut off from the German occupied Netherlands even before the Pacific War. However, the fact remains the IJA showed up very well against those Allied forces, and often defeated them with manuever. But even when frontal assault was used as a tactic, those Allied armies could not always stand up to it. Japanese infantry attacks were very fierce; they didn't only work against the Chinese.
> 
> IMO, it's partly leftover Allied propaganda from the WWII era which leads us to ignore or explain away the early IJA successes in relatively 'stand up fights' with numerically superior (though less well supplied) Allied armies, then overemphasizes IJA defeats in later Pac War battles where their position was entirely hopeless. It's true that some Japanese field commanders (as in the early attempts to retake G'canal) underestimated enemy strength and quality, but their own numbers and firepower were usually insufficient to overcome any competent enemy of such relative strength. Again, I think biased wartime accounts, and later first hand oriented accounts focused on honoring American servicemen, tend to blow out of proportion the importance of inferior IJA infantry tactics at G'canal. No army with the IJA's lack of numbers, weapons and supply at G'canal could have overcome any reasonably competent army possessing the positions, numbers, supply and weapons of the US Marine (later also US Army) defending force. The key to such campaigns was the air/sea struggle to reinforce and resupply the islands, which the Japanese lost at G'canal, and coudn't even contest in some later island campaigns.
> 
> ...




Hi Joe

In fact i would extend this assessment to further than the first year of the war. On the ground, the US never got the better of the japanese man for man in jungle fighting. After the fighting around sanananda and Gona, the US only occasionaly engaged in deep penetration campaigns against the IJA in that terrain. The US contented itself with using massive amounts of firepower to take out key stongholds, generally airfields and port installations, and then leaving the remainder of the garrison to "wither on the vine". Thats code for not having the skills or the willingness to take casualties fighting battles against an enemy prepared to fight to the death in the trackless jungle. 

In assessing IJA capabilities in the jungle, one has to be mindful of the acute disadavantages that they were forced to fight under for much of the war. I am not making exceuses fior the japanese when i say that...their leaders willingly embarked on a major campaign knowing the disadvantages they would be fighting under. Lacking proper heavy artillery support, virtually no airlift capability with little or no direct ground support from the air, uisually starving and often not even enough supplies to put boots on the soldiers (try walking in the jungle without boots sometime....its not pleasant), relatively lightly does not produce a balanced indication of IJA fighting capabilities. The US camapaigns across the pacific, including those that captured key bases in New Guinea, were not jungle campaigns and were not a balanced assessment of IJA fighting capabilities.

If you want to gauge actual combat effectivenes of the IJA, you have to search hard for what might be termed a level playing field. Perhaps the nearest might be the IJA counterattacks into the Arakan in Burna, or their defensive campaigns near Wau or later in the Finnisterre ranges against the australians. Yamashitas defensive campaign in the PI in 1944-5 might also be worth having a look at. none of these camapaigns are anything like a fair fight but they are at least more equal in terms of the firepower that could be brought to bear supporting the ground troops. 

Saying the Japanese were not effective fighters is ultimately offensive to the allied soldiers who fought them. If they were so weak, why did the US take so long to defeat them. Its the same failure as when people try to argue the Russians were not effective in fighting the germans. Ultimately, it reflects worse on the germans themselves who were defeated by these so-called "inferior troops".


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## parsifal (Jan 8, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> A major problem for the Soviets was the vulnerable Transiberian. If the Japanese managed to cut it, they would be doomed.



Not really, though it was useful to retain control of the rail line. all of the manpower, the factory space, most of the raw materials needed to build and maintain the Soviet Far eastern Armies could (and were) raised in the far east. We are talking about an area of land several times biger than western Europe, and a local population and miliotary infrastrructure able to raise and maintain a military force of over 1.5 million men. Whilst Siberia was the "wild west" of the USSR 1900-01940, major efforts had been made by ther Soviets 1920-40 to decentraliase and colonise this region. The two empires may share a common frontier, but their respective areas of high development were separated by hundreds of miles of trackless tundra, forest, mountain ranges, swamplands and deserts..... 

And getting to the rail line from Japanese Manchuria is quite impossible except in one sector of the front, and this route ....the Mutanchiang gap is more heavily fortified than the Maginot line. The light Infantry that makes up most of the IJA was going nowhere through that path. One other pathway might exist on the far side of the Black Mountains though the NW of Manchuria (to attempt to breack the line as it passes south of Baikal) but here too the IJA would be pitting its light infantry against far greater numbers , and far more heavily equipped soviet forces, that would have behind them the industrilal support and manpower reserves of the eastern Urals complex. This land is incidentally heavily forested and swampy, served by a single light rail link back to Hailar....the nearest rail head and airfield, some 240 miles from the front. Soviet settlements, principally Chita were far more substantial and extensive, and much closer to the front. There is lilttle prospect of success in this TO.


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## tyrodtom (Jan 8, 2012)

I've think i've made clear that I though the Japanese soldier was a tough to beat oponent, but his mid level, and higher command structure was not up to the task.
Probably the most abused and neglected soldier of his era was the Japanese fighting man. 

I've no doubt the troops sent to invade the Pacific and Siberian area's of the USSR would be handicapped by the same supply and support the JA seemed to suffer through everywhere else they fought.


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## Jenisch (Jan 8, 2012)

Parfisal, while I certainly will considerate what you say, this leaves the question of what the IJA thought about this. They didn't make such considerations for the geopgraphy of the country they considerated their main expansion goal? I remember that Edward J. Drea mentioned in an interview that the IJA didn't fought well in the Pacific, because it was not prepared for it. While the material inferiority against Russia was mentioned, it was just the opposite in terms of readiness.


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## parsifal (Jan 9, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> Parfisal, while I certainly will considerate what you say, this leaves the question of what the IJA thought about this. They didn't make such considerations for the geopgraphy of the country they considerated their main expansion goal? I remember that Edward J. Drea mentioned in an interview that the IJA didn't fought well in the Pacific, because it was not prepared for it. While the material inferiority against Russia was mentioned, it was just the opposite in terms of readiness.



Didnt fight welll....are you kidding??? it fought with a great deal of distinction both offensively and defensively. What defeated it on the atolls had nothing to do with the fighting qualities of the IJA, its officers, or its equipment. It was a question of who controlled the oceans around them, and the skies above them. The US gained control of these areas always before applying massive force multipliers to assist their ground assaults. When these force multipliers were removed, the US did far less well against the japanese.

In the Jungle camapaigns proper, the Japanese proved themselves an effective and intractable opponent, even when outnumbered and outgunned. It didnt matter whether they were on the attack or the defence. They planned, for example, to take Port Moresby, an area with a reinforced Brigade of AIF troops with about the same sized force....an RCT. They fought in Kokoda with a similar RCT, against at least two Allied Divs, and were only defeated with difficulty. They fought at guadacanal in the worst possible conditions, against an enemy well dug and in strength.....the Japanese were never able to corordinate their attacks properly and were never given anything like adequate fire support or supply. They planned to assault Midway with just a single regiment, and , despite the reviosionist claims in Shattered sword and other articles after thje fact, the opinioons of the troops defending was that had they gotten to shore would have pulverized the Allied defenders.

Sure its easy to say they did do well in the attack, and to a degree I would agree with that, but that does not take into account the mitigating situations they often found themselves in.

My advice, forget the nancy smancy revisionist accounts written from the comfort of an air conditioned desk and an iced tea on the side like shattered sword. Talk to the vets that had to fight these little B*ggers. They could fight and fight very well. They often won their fights, though nothing of strategic importance


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## Nikademus (Jan 9, 2012)

agree with Pars. and JoeB. The IJA was far more than just an org that "Banzai" charged, nor was it made up only of officers who believed in fighting to the death above all else. Even at Nomanhan there were a number of seasoned officers who were disdainful of wasteful operations that did not further their objectives. In terms of tactics, the IJA specialized in a number of them that were directly attributable to their early war successes. Emphasis on night attacks, coupled with the Piston tactics displayed at Nomanhan gave them some impressive local successes despite being outnumbered and stuck out on unfavorable terrain. Their fluency in hooking (flanking) manuevers gave the British coniption fits in Burma and Malaya (and were present during the drive in the PI's are another example. This ability was only countered through a combination of embracing the enemy's tactics (Slim) coupled with a massive influx of air supply. Defensively, the IJA were ingenious in constructing interlocking and mutually supporting positions and proved capable of holding off or even defeating a force far stronger in material firepower and superior in air support. There was a reason why Island Hopping was devised.

There were flaws and weaknesses of course, but those have been well vented. I agree too that to continually treat the IJA as an inferior opponent only serves to take away from the bravery and professionalism of those that defeated them.


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## Jenisch (Jan 9, 2012)

Parsifal, you think that in 1941 an IJA success would be unlikely, or even without China it would? You gave the IJA reasoning ability, which many people don't do. But, if they were capable of reasoning, they would be even more capable of reasoning about their pior expansionist target - the Soviet Union. Shinpachi is correct when the mentioned the Japanese wanted to conclude the war in China before engage the Soviets. In 1941, they pressed for engage them despite the ongoing war in China, and for a simple reason: the Germans were in the game, taking most of the Soviet capability.

Coox mentioned in his book that the Japanese had the hability to conquer Siberia in the desesperated situation of 1941. The problem was the southerns didn't won the argument because the risks this would represent, particularly an oil embargo from the now Soviet allied Western Powers. Not to mention their increased support to China. The Japanese were not fearful from the Soviets like some authors claim. They represented a very real threat for them in medium and long term. There was their treat in the source rich Manchuria, as well as the the support of Mao in the China they wanted so much to control to their economical benefit. The vulnerability of the Japanese Home Islands to attack, particularly form the air, is a problem even today, and therefore they needed a large defensive perimeter. The Soviet resources and living space were also of interest. The Japanese also wanted to be a superpower, and therefore the Soviets and the Western colonists needed to be expelled for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere to succeed.


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## parsifal (Jan 9, 2012)

I dont believe it possible for the Japanese to make much headway in Siberia for a number of reasons. Even in the darkest days of 1941, the Soviets never allowed their frontline military strength to drop below certain levels. prior to the German attack, Soviet force levels were around 1.4 million men in the far east, and around 2-3000 a/c. thats far more than was needed for a defensive mission. Japan had been a major focus of Soviet military design for more than 20 years.....it was a long held objective of the soviets to take back what they had lost at the turn of the century. So, far from it being a possibility of Japan to attack Russia, it was actually problematic as to when or how the Soviets would invade Manchuria. 

The german invasion changed all that. Siberia became a resource for munitions, equipment and manpower. Force levels to December dropped to about 900000 but in the winter of 41-2 the Soviets restored manpower levels to 1.2 million men (though the quality of that manpower was questionable). That would have been enough in terms of manpower, and equipment wise the Red Army remained more or less full strength (according to the book "Claws of the Bear), but the limiting factor/problem remained twofold....a lack of logistics sufficient to support offensive operations, and a lack of transport needed to support large armies at long distances. Neither of these problems could be solved until the germans were defeated. In addition, the Russians wanted their best and most experienced personnel to lead the attack in 1945. The transfer of manpower from west to east in 1945 was just manpower, incidentally. The army that transferred to siberia collected new equipment basically as it detrained.

So, throughout the war, the Soviets maiontained force levels that was either postured for an attack on the japanese, or, able to counter any attack mounted by the japanese. The Japanese were on the defensive in manchuria, fearful for most of the war of Soviet attack, not planning an attack themselves. there were some hotheads in the Kwantung Army that thought otherwise, but they were overruled. 

If the russians pulled up because of a shortage of munitions and logisitc transport to support an attack, the japanese would have been immeasurably worse off in this area. In the period 1940-42, their industrial base could support offensive operations for a fraction of their army....if the southern area operations is anything to go by, they could support maybe 10-12 divisions on offeensive operations, they simply lacked the supply....the food, the uniforms, the guns to support larger offensives on the scale seen in Europe. They had large numbers of troops, but only a fraction of these could move, or attack at any given time. look at what happened in China.....basically nothing happened for 4 years until, driven by desperation, and only at the cost of robbing all other commands in China, was a rather fitful effort made by about 6 Divs in Southern China in 1944-5. That represented about as much as the japanese could muster offensively by that stage. That is not enough to trouble the soviets in any way, despite the excellent fighting qualities of the IJA. Logistics is a completely different matter to fighting ability. The japanese made first class soldiers, and third class supply officers.


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## JoeB (Jan 9, 2012)

parsifal said:


> If the russians pulled up because of a shortage of munitions and logisitc transport to support an attack, the japanese would have been immeasurably worse off in this area. In the period 1940-42, their industrial base could support offensive operations for a fraction of their army....if the southern area operations is anything to go by, they could support maybe 10-12 divisions on offeensive operations, they simply lacked the supply....the food, the uniforms, the guns to support larger offensives on the scale seen in Europe. They had large numbers of troops, but only a fraction of these could move, or attack at any given time.


The IJA General Staff plan to invade the Soviet FE in 1941 featured 22 IJA divisions. Various back and forth included plans for operations from 16-24 divisions. The focus was, again, on the Maritime Province, not campaigns across vast distances to the west. See Coox.

Again we should specially note that successful IJA operations against western armies always had the Japanese outnumbered. This point is naturally de-emphasized in western accounts, though hardly a secret. It's probably worth the risk to overly repeat it, to counteract the tendency to forget it.

I think examples of IJA campaigns after 1942 tend to be misleading in analyzing IJA capability in 1941, in a number of ways. One tangent can be to focus on the ability of Japanese forces to soak up a lot of Allied resources and time in hopeless defenses to the last man, whether on smaller islands or larger ones with jungle hinterlands. In a mission to delay an opponent in a hopeless defensive struggle, the Japanese were unsurpassed, nobody came close. But, it's not too relevant to considering an offensive campaign in eastern Manchuria. And, even late Pac War IJA offensives in places like China and India were hobbled by more extreme resource constraints than in a notional war v USSR where Japan didn't attack the US. Still, it's again worth nothing that the Japanese were heavily outnumbered in their late war offensives but still gained some ground against the British, and loads against the Chinese. IJA offensives in China were seldom outnumbered less than 2:1, and often a lot more than that; again numbers must be considered, not only the fact that Chinese forces didn't qualitatively measure up to those of the west or Soviets, on average at least.

Again IMO the best qualitative comparison to a notional Japanese attack in the Soviet Far East would be the 1941-42 IJA campaigns against western armies in Philippines, Malaya, Burma and DEI. They usually had considerably smaller numbers, but faced the second string of already overstretched opponents, and were simply and demostrably superior man for man and unit for unit of combat power on paper. The IJA forces had not only individual bravery but pretty skillful leadership at higher levels, and a good grasp of maneuver (which is also how they often defeated much larger Chinese forces). The Soviet forces in FE might have done much better than western forces did in those real campaigns v the IJA despite the USSR's already overstretched military situation, but it's also plausible IMO that Japanese performance would have paralleled that in the early Pac War campaigns, and generated surprising success for them, and humiliating defeat for more numerous defenders (though Soviet forces might have been only slightly numerically superior, depending on assumptions).

Joe


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## parsifal (Jan 9, 2012)

I think the scale of the front would defeat them. With 16-24 divisions, they would be facing a force of at least 50-70 Russian Divisions. But as you say, there is a qualitative edge with the IJA, though I doubt it is as marked as the IJA in the PI or Malaya demonstrated. 

Plus its a question of the size of the front. In the PI and Malaya, the forces committed did not exceed two Japanese Armies....thats the equivalent of two Western Corps. There was the 16th Army, committed somewhat later in the NEI, the South seas Detachment (roughly a divisional sized force), the units committed to Burma, and some odds and ends elswhere....all up about 10 divisions. at the end of that 4 month campaign, the japanese were at the end of their tetgher supply wise, moreover the none of these campaigns involved large numbers of transports or long overland supply lines. where that happened, the Japanese rapidly ran out of puff, such as in China (incidentally, in China, the usual odds were far worse for the japanese....usually around 6-8:1 against them....they could not move in China, however because of supply difficulties. 


I have no problem arguing the quality of the japanese army. Either offensively or defensively. however, arguing that the IJA was a well supplied army capable of deep penetration overland advances is simply not true. Try looking at their assessments for invading Australia, for example, and see what the main stumbling blocks were seen as. They could never do that (undertake large scale continental style military operations) . neither did their industrial base have near the capacity to sustain a long haul land campaign of high intensity such as occurred on the European eastern front 41-5. germany was hard pressed even to maintain such a battle. Japan demonstrated in spades what happens to an army insufficiently supplied in her operations in China.....spectacular advances, followed by years of stalemate and an inability to move. In a war in Siberia including the maritime provinces the same result would occur, only the Soviets, unlike the Chinese have a far greater ability to recover and counterattack. 

Moreover, there is no way to attack the Maritime provinces except through one relatively narrow gap, and this section of front was the most heaviliy fortified piece of ground in the world at that time....more heavily fortified than the franco-German frontier, for example. The seaward defences of both Vladivostock (and to a lesser extent the other main port at Sovietskaya Gavan) were heavily defended, including defences against seaward attack.....the Russians and then the Soviets had been working on these defences since 1905. It is not overstating the case to say these were impregnabale fortesses, and unassaultable from the sea. 

The battle the Japanese would have found themselves locked in in a soviet scenario was precisely the sort of battle they were not equipped to fight very well......they would need loads more heavy artillery, loads more (and better tanks) and most impoprtantly loads more wheeled transport. They would have needed a huge engineering capability and ammunition supply, above what they actually possessed. perhaps these weaknesses could have been addressed, but i doubt it. far from seeing the possibilities of a Japanese attack on the USSR, with or without a german attack in the west, we should be looking at how long they could hold out from a Soviet attack in 1942 or 1943 in Manchuria. If the Soviets had been able to solve their transport problems early (perhaps by even more lend lease trucks), the Soviets would have been able to steamn roll the Japanese in manchuria fairly rapisly in my opinion.

In a scenario of the Japanese attacking the USSR, one has to accept a quid pro quo. I assume no attack on the west, and a wholsesale withdrawal from China. if that occurs, there is a significant increase in allied capability in the west, and a significant corresponding reduction of effort by the germans to copunter that. Instead of 80% of the heer being available for operations on the east front, it might drop to 50%, as the remainder would be needed to counter the aincreased allied presence in the west. maybe not as divisions on the ground, but perhaps as increased flak or airforce.......


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## Jenisch (Jan 11, 2012)

Parsifal, what you mentioned let clear why the Japanese only wanted to attack in 1941, if the Soviets drastically reduced their manpower. And if the area was so heavily defended, then my impression is that Nomonhan did little difference, as the Japanese probably knew this. I think an attack against the Soviets therefore, could only come after the "Chinese Incident" was conclude.


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## Nikademus (Jan 11, 2012)

Frank McLynn recently promoted that theory in his new book on the Burma campaign. In it he postulated that the Japanese High Command's smartest move (in hindsight of course) would have been to aceed to FDR's demands that Japan remove itself from China thus taking away a major political divide between the US and Japan in the process. Such a move would have allowed them to focus on the on the Southern strategy with the possibility of forcing the US into a declaration of war based on defending Western Colonial interests (obviously the PI's would need to not be attacked prior to any such action by the US)

However as the author saw it....the Japanese generals were inflexible and tried to do it all and keep it all. Stay in China....contemplate war with the Russians....contemplate (and eventually implement) war with the US/Britian. North/South options combined. Politically speaking such a withdraw from China would have been difficult, given the percieved loss of Face of the military. The Northern movement tended to be the most fanatical (the Imperial Way) and insisted on continuing in China. Had Japan withdrawn from China proper but stayed in Manchuria, this might still have caused continued friction with the US but less so than with the full on invasion of China proper. In relation to this scenario, the withdraw back from China would have given the Northerners more assets to play with for the preposed invasion of Russia. IIRC, Caputo noted that the Japanese did attempt a final compromise with the US that went along those lines.....withdraw back to the status quo of the early-mid 30's but this was sumarily rejected by the Roosevelt administration.


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## Jenisch (Jan 11, 2012)

Nikademus, since the US and Britain were supporting Russia, how do you think their reaction would be if Japan had pulled out of China just to attack the Soviets?


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## Nikademus (Jan 11, 2012)

I believe that any scenario which doesn't involve a direct attack on the US would be a difficult situation for the Roosevelt administration. While it is true that the US military was building itself up for a possible war, this is often mistaken for public support of a war. The reality was that the US and many within the government were still largely isolationist and anti-war. Did the US declare war on Germany during the BoB? That was an interesting point that McClynn made in his book.....which really made one think because it was so obvious. If the US public didn't rush to Britian's defense when the island itself was under attack? Why would one expect the US to go to war in defense of their colonies.......especially given the virolent anti-colonial sentiment within the JCS. 

As such.....I think a Japanese attack on Russia (already at war with Germany) would not have induced a war declaration from the US. Similar would be a Japanese attack on Britian alone in the SRA.


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## parsifal (Jan 11, 2012)

Hi nik


I would appreciate your thoughts on the posts I have made in the following thread

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww...kari-japanese-attack-pearl-harbour-31077.html

To me it was not just a case of the FDR administration bracing for war. they knew it was coming, and maybe even wanted war, judging by the diplometic exchanges leading up to PH. I reject the notion that the administration knew in advance of PH, but they sure seem to have known war was coming, and actually wanted it to "sort out the Far East"....


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## Jenisch (Jan 12, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Hi nik
> 
> 
> I would appreciate your thoughts on the posts I have made in the following thread
> ...



http://www.warbirdforum.com/south.htm:

_1. The war between Japan and the US, Britain, British Commonwealth countries, and the Netherlands was a consequence of Japans "advance to the south". 

2. As with most wars, the origins of this one (as well as many errors in its prosecution) are permeated with miscalculations about how determined the adversary is. 

3. Japanese national policy in this period was dominated by the military. If the Army and the Navy agreed on the approach to a particular issue (which seldom happened), the government was almost certain to go along. 

4. Middle rank officers in both branches were much more aggressive in their plans and more determined to go to war than their superiors. Eventually this belligerent attitude percolated upward. 

Up to the mid-1930s the Japanese policy was that of the Army: Northern advance, southern defense. This was a long-standing strategy dating back to incursions in Korea in the 19th century. In the mid-1930s the Navy advanced a competing "southern advance, northern defense" policy for two reasons: it wanted to justify obtaining a larger share of the defense budget and it recognized the importance of the strategic materials, particularly oil, in that region. It called for a peaceful expansion, however. In 1936 this policy was put on an equal footing with the Army policy, but this equilibrium was upset in 1937 when the Sino-Japanese War broke out and shifted the balance of power back to the Army. With the outbreak of the European war, Japanese policy (supported by both the Army and the Navy) was one of non-involvement because of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact of August 1939 and their rough handling by the Soviets in the Nomonhan incident of the same year. The middle rank officers, however, campaigned for using this distraction of European powers as an opportunity for expansion. 

In the first half of 1940 two things happened that had a profound effect: the Army concluded that it could not win militarily in China using its current approach, and Germany's successes in Europe convinced the Japanese that Britain would soon be defeated and they needed to take action soon or "miss the bus." Consequently, the Army switched to a southern strategy that became national policy in July 1940 with some modifications made by the Navy. It called for settling the China conflict first and then moving into Indochina, although it left open the option of moving south even before things were settled in China on the grounds that this would block supplies to the Nationalist forces. It was based on the unrealistic hopes that a diplomatic settlement was possible in China (serious negotiations called the Kiri Project were underway with Chiang Kai-shek in the summer of 1940), and that war with Britain was possible without intervention by the US. The Navy objected to the latter assumption. 

In September 1940, Japanese troops began marching into northern Indochina as part of the southern advance and the tripartite pact between Japan, Germany, and Italy was signed. In response, the negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek collapsed and the US and Britain imposed the first round of economic sanctions. Senior Japanese naval officers were convinced that even if Germany defeated Britain, a southern advance would ultimately lead to war with the US. By March 1941 the hard line being taken by the US regarding Japanese expansion caused the Army to come around to the Navy view, and plans were being drawn up that assumed that a war with the US was almost unavoidable. 

Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 greatly reduced the threat in the north, thereby giving Japan more flexibility in the south. In July Japanese troops marched into southern Indochina, and in retaliation the US and Britain froze Japanese assets and imposed a complete embargo. The oil supply problem resulting from the embargo was so severe (a supply of 800 million liters per year vs. 5,400 required), that a quick resolution by military or diplomatic means was essential. The Army calculated that on the basis of oil supply alone, resources were insufficient to simultaneously pursue conflicts in the south and the north. *So plans for a war with the Soviet Union were shelved*. The foreign ministry was assiduously pursuing a negotiated settlement with the US right up to October 1941, and was willing to make significant concession in China. Roosevelt, however, believed that the best way to avoid or defer the war was to take a hard line. Consequently, the initiative failed (to the relief of the Army) and in mid-October the Konoe cabinet resigned and General Tojo became Prime Minister while retaining his position as Army Minister. Subsequent events are known to all. 

I found the position Japan found itself in to be wonderfully summed up by the circular scenario developed by the operations section of the Japanese naval general staff in August 1940. To prepare for hostilities with Britain and the US, Japan would need to occupy Indochina for the raw materials. But this would cause the US to impose an embargo, which would in turn force Japan to seize the Dutch East Indies for oil. The latter would cause the US to go to war. Not exactly the order of events, but close enough. Unfortunately for Japan but predictable by those with more economic and political realism, the events would proceed far too quickly for it to make use of the resources and adequately prepare for war [my observation]. 

Another interesting observation the authors made was that although the Navy knew it was not prepared to take on the US and could possibly have prevented or delayed the war, it did not attempt to do so. The reason given is that for years the Navy had been demanding an increasing share of the defense budget to prepare for this war, and it would have lost face and influence to the Army if it admitted at this point that it was not up to the task._


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## Nikademus (Jan 12, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Hi nik
> 
> 
> I would appreciate your thoughts on the posts I have made in the following thread
> ...




Costello’s book does make a strong case for suggesting that FDR not only was, as you said, bracing for war but actively sought to make it a reality. While it is easy to condemn him thus as a “warmonger” (and some have), I viewed this at the time as him looking at “The Big Picture” in which he clearly saw that the US could not survive or thrive in a world dominated by military dictatorships. Certainly his view on Nazi Germany was clear as the “undeclared war” in the Atlantic showed amidst growing German frustration at the degrees made by the FDR administration and the actions of its navy. Also fascinating in his book was how the development of Japanese industry, including those useful for military purposes were funded by US companies despite government attempts to steer those interests toward Chinese markets…..but capitalism isn’t about brinkmanship or good deeds…..you go where the money is…and in the early 20’s Japan was a better investment.

McLynn’s book takes things one step further however and criticizes what the author saw as FDR’s personal (meaning FDR….not the US government) obsession with China and his “vision” of making China, and Chiang’s KMT the premier Asian power in the region. As realized by FDR, this dominant China would then be a benevolent and lucrative economic partner to the US. Win Win for us. The British were confused and exacerbated by FDR’s obsession with Chiang whom they saw more realistically as a fascist sham and hopelessly corrupt leader who promised all and delivered nothing. Yet the US looked down its nose at Britain for having “colonies” Economic imperialism comes in many forms. Even within the US government there was frustration (per McClynn) at FDR’s love affair with Chiang. Growing indications compiled in the State Department all pointed to his (Chiang) simply sucking the teat dry on US provided Lend Lease in return for vaporware. Marshall in particular, a champion of Stillwell was driven to virtual despair by FDR’s benevolence towards Chiang until finally mid-war at least. The amount of money and material we sent to Chiang was embarrassing. After reading McClynn’s book it was no wonder to me that Mao quickly triumphed and the US public was left to wonder how we “lost China” to the Communists.

Naturally the Japanese saw things differently in Asia. THEY wanted to be the premier Asian power and did have some legitimate grievances with the US, starting with its hypocrisy. (US debuts Monroe Doctrine in North America that declares the entire American hemisphere under its Sphere of influence and will react…..militarily if necessary to any outside intrusion (mainly aimed at European powers at the time))…This whether the Central or South American nations wanted it or not. Yet here was the US interfering in Asian matters. The Japanese saw US Asian policy thus as highly hypercritical given this……how can a country that declares it’s local neighborhood off limits to all foreign influences justify poking it’s nose into someone else’s neighborhood?

More recently, the Japanese seethed at the rampant racism displayed in California in the 1920’s and which continued to plague relations up to WWII. This racism (white over yellow) was a major factor in Western foreign policy and also in military preparation and led to a severe underestimation of Japanese potential and capabilities. This anger and perceived inferiority complex helped fuel the Japanese’ own brand of racism as their string of military victories piled up from the first Sino-Japanese conflicts through the Russo-Japanese war (in which the Japanese felt extremely slighted during the peace settlements despite having won the conflict) and through being on the winning side of WWI. Japanese militants began a campaign of showing the West….particularly the US as a mutt like race of lazy self centered individuals and thus would lead to a severe underestimation of US capabilities and resolve. (save for a few non firebrands like Yamamoto). Hate begets hate…..angst begets angst. Misunderstanding and conflicting agendas lead to schism. Japan modeled itself along Western lines yet as they saw it, they were being denied the same spoils as the “corrupt” West already held the keys too. Haves vs. the Have Nots.

This is not to say that the West was solely responsible for Japanese militarism, but it was part of the process. As McClynn stated, Japanese militarists didn’t simply “appear” out of the woodwork in 1931 anymore than Hitler’s Nazi party. There were reasons, underlying factors and influences, including the foreign policies of other nations. The rise of the Japanese right in 1930’s Japan was also influenced by internal problems within Japan exacerbated by the Great Depression. Edward Drea’s book on the rise of the Imperial Japanese Army gives very good info on this as well as Japanese views on China. 

The Japanese decision for war was as you already related, driven by the embargo on resources vital to that nation but also by the successes of its Axis partner Germany as well. The militarists saw late 41 as a now is the best time period that if not grasped, would be lost. Many knew that war with the US could be ruinous but humans have a great capacity for fatalism and as Drea and other resources have stated, it was felt by many of the hard liners that it was better to die by the sword than live in chains, which is honestly how many Japanese saw the West in regards to its Asian policy.

As a friend of mine said to me long ago, ‘It wasn’t what they (The Japanese) did that was so wrong….it was “how” they did it” What he meant was, the reasons for Japan….and Germany’s war are as old as humanity itself. The Have Nots want what the Haves ‘have’. No western nation wasn’t guilty of the same thing in one form or another (including economic imperialism) at one time or another during its lifespan. The Japanese military and its government however forever shamed itself in its brutal treatment of subject peoples and prisoners of war…..which of itself was a direct result of Japan’s attempt to fanaticize its population and indoctrinate it into an Orwellian type nightmare. Putting aside these actions and focusing on the why though is key to a better understanding of why nations do what they do and reminds that there are two sides to every story and different views. The Japanese saw things very different than the US did. 

I think…therefore I babble. All this is to help clarify that while yes….I believe FDR was pushing for war…and while in more recent times I see that he wasn’t nearly the perfect leader I thought he was when i was younger (he was one of my heroes)…especially in regards to his foreign policies (Stalin is another big miss) But I think that Big Picture wise….he was right in the end. You can call him a warmonger and his motives were not totally pure but along with Churchill’s stance against Hitler, it was the right move at the right time. He made some tremendous errors too it seems. But overall I think humanity came out better than the alternative. WWII remains probably the closest thing to“good” war humanity has ever fought. Japanese and German actions during that war justified the total war that was brought down on them. Churchill’s quote comes to mind on Democracy being the worst form of government….except for all the others. Reading Ostkrieg right now……humanity at it’s most honest and brutal in the pursuit of land and resources. Chilling read. However in my old age I am increasingly focused on the hows and whys so it’s a necessary read.


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## JoeB (Jan 12, 2012)

parsifal said:


> I think the scale of the front would defeat them. With 16-24 divisions, they would be facing a force of at least 50-70 Russian Divisions. But as you say, there is a qualitative edge with the IJA, though I doubt it is as marked as the IJA in the PI or Malaya demonstrated.
> 
> (incidentally, in China, the usual odds were far worse for the japanese....usually around 6-8:1 against them....they could not move in China, however because of supply difficulties.
> 
> ...


According to Coox, the Soviet strength was more like 30 divisions in the criticial period, and their divisions were smaller. He notes however that the Soviet force weakened in part after ther Sorge spy ring in Germany gave the Soviets intel that the Japanese were leaning toward attacking the Americans, British and Dutch instead.

As far as Japanese and Chinese numbers, I based that on the Nationalist Chinese official history of the war, which wasn't likely to understate their own numbers. When Chinese numerical superiority reached levels like 4:1, those were the campaigns (a number of the post 1937 campaigns) where the Japanese were unable to hold their gains. 

But the Japanese did cover very large distances in China, way more than the distance from eastern Manchurian border to the Pacific, so distance does not rule out their success. 

The Japanese reduced considerable fortifications at Corregidor; and recall that the Russo-Japanese war was not in the extremely distant past in 1941. The IJA was used to the idea that fighting the Russians in the Far East would involve episodes of siege warfare. I agree Vladivostok wouldn't have been attacked from the sea, again this was taken for granted.

I still don't see a reason why a Japanese offensive against the Soviets in 1941 had to fail, as far as the specific operational goal of seizing (the populated areas of) the Maritime Province. It might have, but OTOH if the Japanese showed anything like the man for man superiority over the Soviets as they did over the Anglo-American-Fil-Dutch armies in the early Pac War campaigns, it's quite plausible it would have succeeded. 

But as I said before there's much more question about the overall strategic success of such a war. And I agree it somewhat parallels the strategic issue in China. The Japanese seized important parts of China proper (ie not considered to include Manchuria in those days) in 1937-8 but that didn't cause a collapse in Chinese resistance. And China was just too big to conquer entirely, and the whole involvement eventually led to fatal strategic consequences in creating a war with the US that might not have happened otherwise. This might well have been paralled in a successful seizure of the Maritime Province, followed by a non-collapse of Soviet resistance in a two-front war, Far Eastern stalemate, then eventual devastating Soviet counter offensive years later when they still managed to completely defeat the Germans. OTOH attacking the US had huge downside as well, which was entirely realized as it turned out. And it's *possible* that the Soviets would have suffered psycological/political/moral collapse under two-front attack in 1941. But if not, then just taking the Soviet FE didn't accomplish much in the big picture, even if the offensive were successful.

Joe


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## Civettone (Mar 9, 2013)

Stavka directives #170149 and #170150 issued 16 march 1942 for the Far East fronts clearly show what kind of war Soviet Command expected in the case of Japanese attack. Far East troops should do their best to wear down Japanese in fortified regions during first 7-10 days of war,"defend at all costs" several key positions deep in the soviet territory until reinforcements arrive.
This clearly shows that the Japanese were expected to penetrate deep into Soviet territory. This also means that the railroads would also be cut. And how can you expect to receive reinforcements when the railroads are cut?

Kris


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## Jenisch (Jun 18, 2013)

I think people underestimate the IJA. Together with the directive Civettone mentioned, the Soviets had many men in Asia to counter the Japanese. If the Japanese were so "weak and with outdated gear" they would not have this attention from the Soviets. Also, as Shinpachi told in this or other topic, the Japanese commander said that he could have defeated the Soviets in Nomonhan if IGHQ had supported him. I noticed this when I read about the conflict for the first time. People say that Nomonhan was a "terrible defeat" to the Japanese which "teach them a lesson that they could not face the Red Army". I don't see that. I see a massive Soviet offensive against a Japanese Army which was actually surprised, outnumbered and poorly equipped. Even so, the casualities were similar for both sides. Not that the IJA did not have it's faults, but the thing wasn't so one-sidded as popularly belived. Also, the main reason for the Japanese *temporary* abandon the idea of fight the Russians was the German pact with Stalin that was signed (intentionally by Stalin) together with the Soviet offensive in Nomonhan to provoke a rupture in the German-Japanese relations. The Japanese government fell and also the advocates of the "North Strike Group".


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## Shinpachi (Jun 20, 2013)

Japan had no remarkable reason to make war with Russia, or Soviet Union, after the Russo-Japanese war of 1904 at all as obtained Korean Penninsula.

Hello, Jenisch. Have you ever checked the Battle of Shumshu before?
As you may know, on August 17 1945, approx 8,000 Soviet troops suddenly invaded a Japanese nothern small island, Shumshu, to be smashed by the joint IJA/IJN garrison. You will realize how tough they were as Soviet Union had to give up to reach to Hokkaido, the second largest island of Japan after all.


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## parsifal (Jun 20, 2013)

Hi Shinpachi San

I agree that the japanese were a tough opponent for any enemy, but Shumshu is considered a Soviet victory in the west. Losses were very similar for each side, but the Soviets did take the place. It was at a very heavy cost however. 

With Shumshu and Paramushiro under Soviet control, the rest of the Kuril Island chain, much more lightly held by Japanese forces, fell to Soviet forces easily. The Soviets completed their occupation of the Kurils on 5 September 

Its problematic that the battle saved Hokkaido from invasion...perhaps. 

Battle of Shumshu - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## Shinpachi (Jun 21, 2013)

The Battle of Shumshu was, of course, Soviet's victory as Japan herself had accepted the Potsdam Declaration on August 15.
The garrison fought under the cease-fire order as invasion did not stop.

I did not say it was Japan's victory but they smashed the Soviet troops with far less casualty than the opponent. 
According to our local wiki, it was approx. 600 vs 3,000 not 1,018 vs 1,567 as Soviet claimed.


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