# Day or night strategic bombing?



## Poor Old Spike (Feb 28, 2013)

I'm talking about the heavy bomber offensive against Nazi Europe, America by day and Britain by night.
I've never got round to researching the subject fully, do members think day or night bombing was most effective?
For example daylight bombing meant the bomb aimers job was much easier because he could actually see the target.
Also the bombers gunners could easily see any intercepting German fighters coming.
The downside of daylight bombing was that German fighters and flak guns could easily see the bomber formations.

By contrast, night bombing was far less precise against the largely invisible target, and radar-equipped German night fighters could sneak up on the bombers unseen.
The upside of night bombing was that the night fighters were relatively few in number and were half-blind, having to spend time finding the bombers on radar and stalking them.
Also flak guns couldn't estimate the bombers altitude and were therefore also half-blind until searchlights showed them the bombers.

Does anybody have reliable figures for what percentage of day and night bombers were shot down?
And regarding ground targets, was it found that day bombing was more accurate?

The bottom line is why didn't the Allied commanders sit down and work out whether day or night bombing resulted in fewer losses of aircraft?
For example if they found day bombing was safest, why didn't they completely halt night bombing and switch everything to day bombing, or vice-versa?


----------



## stona (Feb 28, 2013)

Was there a choice for the RAF? 
It tried bombing in day light in 1939/40 and just like the Luftwaffe was forced to concede that the bomber would not infact always get through. Initially night time bombing was wildly inaccurate but as time,technology and techniques advanced could be as accurate as bombing carried out in daylight.

When the Americans arrived a few years later they too were forced to limit and very nearly abandon,at least temporarily, their own day light campaign.

The Allied commanders persisted with their choices because the RAF had invested a huge amount of effort,training and treasure in it's nightime operations,just as the USAAF had in it's daytime effort.

The two complimentary campigns were a double edged sword for the Luftwaffe. Limited resources were split between two defensive systems,only some elements of which overlapped. flak is flak but most nightfighters couldn't operate with any chance of survival during the day (certainly after mid 1943). What use is a searchlight in daylight,or a day fighter whose pilot can't fly on instruments at night? 

Cheers

Steve


----------



## davebender (Feb 28, 2013)

http://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/bitstream/2123/664/2/adt-NU20050104.11440202whole.pdf
An outstanding (and free!) paper on RAF Bomber Command. Well worthing taking a minute or two to download PDF file for reference. It will answer some of your questions concerning sortie and loss rates by aircraft type.


----------



## CobberKane (Feb 28, 2013)

Daylight bombing achieved one vital outcome that night bombing never could have – it forced a major reaction from the Luftwaffe. This not only put the German fighter force into the air where the USAAF could engage them in a war of attrition they could never win, thereby ensuring air superiority over Normandy come D-Day; it also diverted recourses from the Eastern Front, hobbling the tried and true tactic of Blitzgreig which relied on German air superiority and leaving German ground forces there dangerously exposed growing Soviet air power. No discussion of day v night bombing should ignore this vital aspect.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## davebender (Feb 28, 2013)

> Daylight bombing achieved one vital outcome that night bombing never could have – it forced a major reaction from the Luftwaffe


RAF night bombing did the same thing and three years earlier then diversion of day fighters caused by U.S. 8th Air Force.

Creation of Nachtjagd derailed use of Me-110 as bomber escort during BoB and absorbed most Me-110 production for the remainder of the war. Large numbers of Ju-88s were diverted to Nachtjagd from 1941 onward. Even some Do-217 heavy bombers got pressed into service as night fighters.


----------



## CobberKane (Feb 28, 2013)

I would contend that the Me-110 was pretty much useless as a BOB bomber escort in any case. I know there have been posts pointing out that its kill/loss ration was actually pretty good, but my understanding is that this depended on it entering the fray from a favourable situation and avoiding tangling with single engined fighters on equal terms - a bit limiting for an escort fighter. In any case, while night bombing may have pulled in some twin engine production - and single engine fighters too - it did not place those fighters in a situation where they could be swatted out of the sky in their hundreds, as did daylight bombing. I cannot see how night bombing could ever have given the Allies air superiority for Overlord, as daylight bombing did.


----------



## bob44 (Feb 28, 2013)

I do not believe day or night bombing was all that precise. Especially early in the war with fewer bombers. Later in the war, the Allies could put far more bombers on a target and so a much better chance of hitting the targets. And advances in electronics. The Germans where defending the skys pretty well up to 1944. German night destroyers being guided to the night bombers by ground and air radar. But the single most important thing that happened, in my opinion, was the 1944 order to destroy the Luftwaffe. This made the strategic bombing of Germany effective.


----------



## CobberKane (Feb 28, 2013)

A post war analysis of the effects of allied bombing on German industry revealed that throughout the bombing campaign German factory output actually increased all the way through until the industrial regions were over-run by ground forces. To be fair, output may well have increased very much faster had the bombing campaign not occurred, as the Germans did not place their economy on a true 24-7 war footing until after Stalingrad, and bombing proabaly dampened the resulting surge in production. Nonetheless, German industry was still producing plenty of fighters, for example, right through to 1945. What they weren’t producing were replacements for the pilots who had been killed and wounded trying to halt allied daylight bombing.


----------



## Jenisch (Mar 1, 2013)

CobberKane said:


> as the Germans did not place their economy on a true 24-7 war footing until after Stalingrad



This is a myth. It's well covered in The Wages of Destruction, by Adam Tooze. 

As for German production increasing despite the bombing, it's simple: it would increase much more if the bombing didn't take place.

Reactions: Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Poor Old Spike (Mar 1, 2013)

davebender said:


> http://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/bitstream/2123/664/2/adt-NU20050104.11440202whole.pdf
> An outstanding (and free!) paper on RAF Bomber Command. Well worthing taking a minute or two to download PDF file for reference. It will answer some of your questions concerning sortie and loss rates by aircraft type.



Thanks mate, I'm trying to get my crotchety PC to open it..

Hey everybody let me put this simple question to you-
If you were a heavy bomber airman in WW2 would you have preferred flying by day or night?

Personally I think I'd have plumped for night, BUT I'd want my pilot to keep making minor zigs and zags every few minutes to and from the target, and do gently dives and ascents to throw off any stalking night fighters.
If he insisted on flying straight and level all the time I'd ask to be assigned to another aircraft!


----------



## tyrodtom (Mar 1, 2013)

I don't think i'd like flying as a crewman on a night mission, spending hours looking in the night for something you'd likely only see when it opened fire. If your aircraft get's terminal damage, you're likely going to have to put on your parachute, and blunder you're way out of a tumbling aircraft in the dark. No thanks.

Most positions in a bomber crew would be enlisted, not officers. Enlisted goes where they're told to go, there's not much asking where you want to be assigned.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Mar 1, 2013)

CobberKane said:


> I would contend that the Me-110 was pretty much useless as a BOB bomber escort in any case. I know there have been posts pointing out that its kill/loss ration was actually pretty good, but my understanding is that this depended on it entering the fray from a favourable situation and avoiding tangling with single engined fighters on equal terms - a bit limiting for an escort fighter. In any case, while night bombing may have pulled in some twin engine production - and single engine fighters too - it did not place those fighters in a situation where they could be swatted out of the sky in their hundreds, as did daylight bombing. I cannot see how night bombing could ever have given the Allies air superiority for Overlord, as daylight bombing did.



No,but it used a good portion of total aircraft production capacity to produce these two engined types which fairly obviously require two engines (plus spares) which could have been used elsewhere. It also put a strain on Germany's electronics industry. Other more obvious investments in anti aircraft defences have been well documented. Defence of the Reich,by night,was a monumental effort.

I agree that the night bombing wouldn't have minced the Luftwaffe in the same way as the USAAF campaign did but the RAF imagined it was hitting the Luftwaffe's means of production rather harder than it actually was. Harris did say that noone knew if a war could be won by bombing alone because noone had tried. It turned out that in the 1940's it couldn't be done.

In response to your other post,total aircraft production barely and rarely kept pace with losses. Even with the large increase in single engined fighter production in the latter stages of the war the Luftwaffe's strength in these types never significantly increased.It didn't nose dive until near the end. The more fighters they produced the more the allies,particularly the USAAF shot down. The aircraft were replaceable......just about. The pilots were not as you rightly point out.

This was not just a late war problem. The Luftwaffe embarked on Barbarossa with fewer aircraft than it had for the Battle of Britain.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## davebender (Mar 1, 2013)

Not with RAF Bomber Command during 1941 to 1944 but that's a particularly murderous example.

German night bombers over England during 1940 to 1941 averaged less then 1% loss rate per mission. B-29 loss rate over Japan during final year of war was also considerably lower then RAF Bomber Command. German and U.S. night bombing was probably more effective on average too. 

Could RAF improve bombing accuracy while reducing loss rate by employing different night bombing methods?


----------



## stona (Mar 1, 2013)

davebender said:


> Could RAF improve bombing accuracy while reducing loss rate by employing different night bombing methods?



They improved accuracy as the technology and techniques developed.

The Luftwaffe faced no meaningful coordinated night time defence over Britain in 1940 and into 1941. By the time such systems were beginning to be established,and operate effectively,there were bigger fish to fry in the East. The skies of England were hardly a target rich environment for the RAF nightfighters.
The RAF on the other hand faced a well coordinated and agressive defensive system,ever evolving. Their doctrine was also usually to deliver massive raids with hundreds of bombers. Plenty of targets,and inevitable carnage on the occassions when luck,circumstance and skill favoured the defenders. 
It is often forgotten that even on some of the most disastrous raids (for the RAF) most crews flew completely uneventful missions and had no inkling of the losses suffered until later.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## VBF-13 (Mar 1, 2013)

Poor Old Spike said:


> For example if they found day bombing was safest, why didn't they completely halt night bombing and switch everything to day bombing, or vice-versa?


Round-the-clock bombing kept the Luftwaffe tied up and out of London? I don't know to what degree it did that but it makes sense it did it to some degree.


----------



## stona (Mar 2, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> Round-the-clock bombing kept the Luftwaffe tied up and out of London? I don't know to what degree it did that but it makes sense it did it to some degree.



Once the war with the Soviet Union started the Luftwaffe's offensive resources were largely diverted there. The tonnage of bombs dropped on the UK fell considerably. 

Later the combined RAF/USAAF operations in the west forced the Luftwaffe into an almost entirely defensive posture. The whole balance of the Luftwaffe changed and is reflected in the huge increase in production of fighters,principally single engined dayfighters and fewer two engined nightfighters,which came at the expense of other types.

To that extent it kept the Luftwaffe out of London,and everywhere else, by reducing its offensive capabilities and denying it the opportunity to ever develop a meaningful strategic bombing capability.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Readie (Mar 3, 2013)

'Most positions in a bomber crew would be enlisted, not officers. Enlisted goes where they're told to go, there's not much asking where you want to be assigned'. 

Maybe in the USAAF but, in BC I'm pretty sure the crews were all volunteers.

Would you volunteer to fly in a bomber night or day?

If I had to...I would fly at night as darkness gives some element of cover.
Cheers
John


----------



## Readie (Mar 3, 2013)

Would you volunteer to fly in a bomber night or day?

If I had to...I would fly at night as darkness gives some element of cover.

'To that extent it kept the Luftwaffe out of London,and everywhere else, by reducing its offensive capabilities and denying it the opportunity to ever develop a meaningful strategic bombing capability'

I can see your point Steve, but the German assault on London in particular continued with the V flying bombs.

Cheers
John


----------



## tyrodtom (Mar 3, 2013)

In the USAAF all flyers were volunteers also, but beyond volunteering for flight duty, you never had much, if any choice about where you flew, or who you flew with.


----------



## stona (Mar 3, 2013)

tyrodtom said:


> In the USAAF all flyers were volunteers also, but beyond volunteering for flight duty, you never had much, if any choice about where you flew, or who you flew with.



In Bomber Command crews selected themselves at the end of training,beyond that they did what they were told and went where they were told to go. 
Cheers
Steve


----------



## stona (Mar 3, 2013)

Readie said:


> I can see your point Steve, but the German assault on London in particular continued with the V flying bombs.



Yes,but both they and the occasional bombing raids amounted to little more than a nuisance compared with the night blitz of 1940/41. It wouldn't feel that way if your street was one of those hit but that was the reality.
The first V-1s were not launched at London until June 1944 so they were hardly a continuation of the "Blitz".
Cheers
Steve


----------



## CobberKane (Mar 4, 2013)

Readie said:


> 'Most positions in a bomber crew would be enlisted, not officers. Enlisted goes where they're told to go, there's not much asking where you want to be assigned'.
> 
> 
> If I had to...I would fly at night as darkness gives some element of cover.
> ...


 
...and in a Mosquito!


----------



## Readie (Mar 6, 2013)

CobberKane said:


> ...and in a Mosquito!



Absolutely CK.
I would take my chances in a Mossie....or a photo recon Spitfire.

'The first V-1s were not launched at London until June 1944 so they were hardly a continuation of the "Blitz".'

Map Charts Every WWII Bomb Strike in London - Yahoo! News UK

This is an interesting map Steve.

Between 8,000 and 9,000 V1’s were launched against Southern England, primarily London. After the initial shock of the first ones, their impact was limited as V1’s could be shot out of the sky by anti-aircraft fire as these guns could lock onto the trajectory of the incoming V1. The Royal Observer Corps gave an early warning of incoming V1’s. Fighter planes were also used to tip over the ‘wings’ of the V1 so that it continued to fly but off course. Over 50% of the V1’s fired at Britain were destroyed before they crashed to the ground and exploded.

Quite an assault.

Cheers
John


----------



## Gixxerman (Mar 6, 2013)

Proximity fused AAA moved to the coast did much to nullify the V1 threat, the aircraft taking care of the few that got through.
The Americans had a lot of success againt the V1 attack on Antwerp for the same reasons (prox fused AAA aircraft screens).


----------



## drgondog (Mar 6, 2013)

Depends. In fall 1943, daylight bombing wasn't working and for first time 8th AF was attaining loss levels of RAF. After April 1944 the loss rate of 8th AF dropped enormously because of escorts. The RAF never developed the night escort effectiveness and continued to suffer heavy losses right through March 1945.

By the end of the war, the USAAF dropped as much as RAF in tonnage with half or one third of the operational load per sortie but the RAF lost twice the number KIA reflecting the incredible pressure on RAF from the beginning of the war to the end. The RAF BC was staffed by incredibly dedicated crews (as were USAAF) but IMO Night bombing from day one to the end was more dangerous.


----------



## stona (Mar 6, 2013)

Gixxerman said:


> Proximity fused AAA moved to the coast did much to nullify the V1 threat, the aircraft taking care of the few that got through.
> The Americans had a lot of success againt the V1 attack on Antwerp for the same reasons (prox fused AAA aircraft screens).



I'd cite three factors that came in time to increase the effectiveness of British AAA. They all came courtesy of the Americans. First,as you say,the proximity fuse. This,in conjunction with the SCR 584 gun laying radar and the No 10 Predictor system which effectively utilised the flow of information from the new radar,increased the ability of British guns to shoot down V-1s considerably.
British 3.7 inch guns thus equipped were able to average a mere 156 shells per V-1 destroyed. That is a remarkably low figure.
The AAA combined with the standing fighter patrols and balloon barrage meant that only about 1/3 of V-1s launched fell in the Greater London area.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## michaelmaltby (Mar 16, 2013)

".... ...and in a Mosquito!"

Absolutely:


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GLdVIKyx7RE_

MM


----------



## Readie (Mar 16, 2013)

drgondog said:


> Depends. In fall 1943, daylight bombing wasn't working and for first time 8th AF was attaining loss levels of RAF. After April 1944 the loss rate of 8th AF dropped enormously because of escorts. The RAF never developed the night escort effectiveness and continued to suffer heavy losses right through March 1945.
> 
> By the end of the war, the USAAF dropped as much as RAF in tonnage with half or one third of the operational load per sortie but the RAF lost twice the number KIA reflecting the incredible pressure on RAF from the beginning of the war to the end. The RAF BC was staffed by incredibly dedicated crews (as were USAAF) but IMO Night bombing from day one to the end was more dangerous.



RAF USAAF Bomb Tonnages on Germany 1939–45

RAF Bomber
Command (tons)	US 8th Air Force (tons)

1939 31 —
1940 13,033 —
1941 31,504 —
1942 45,561 1,561
1943	157,457 44,165
1944	525,518 389,119
1945	191,540 188,573
Total	*964,644* *623,418*

Bombing Effort,entire European Theatre

Tons	Percent
8th Air Force (including fighters)	692,918	25
9th Air Force	225,799	8.15
12th Air Force	207,367	7.5
15th Air Force (including fighters)	312,173	11.27
1st Tactical Air Force	25,166	0.91
Total USAAF	*1,463,423* 52.8
Bomber Command	1,066,141	38.48
Fighter Command	3,910	0.14
2nd Tactical Air Force	69,138	2.5
Mediterranean Air Command	167,928	6.06
Total RAF	*1,307,117* 47.2
Overall Total	2,770,540	100.0

RAF Bombing Sorties Losses 1939–45
Sorties Losses
Night	297,663	7,449
Day 66,851 876

More stats.
The night missions cost Bomber Command dearly. Which is why its a disgrace that it has taken till 2012 for a memorial to the crews to be erected in London.
Cheers
John


----------



## Tenaces (Mar 16, 2013)

"It makes me furious when I see the Mosquito. I turn green and yellow with envy. The British knock together a beautiful wooden aircraft that every piano factory over there is building, and they give it a speed which they have now increased yet again. There is nothing the British do not have. They have the geniuses and we have the nincompoops." 
----Herman Goering, 1943 

That quote always makes me chuckle. I have to research if they tried to use the Mosquito as a night bomber escort. Does anyone else know?


----------



## michaelmaltby (Mar 16, 2013)

"... I have to research if they tried to use the Mosquito as a night bomber escort."

I think they (Mosquitos) were only used as Intruders - interdicting German night fighters over night fighter airbases.

MM


----------



## mhuxt (Mar 16, 2013)

michaelmaltby said:


> "... I have to research if they tried to use the Mosquito as a night bomber escort."
> 
> I think they (Mosquitos) were only used as Intruders - interdicting German night fighters over night fighter airbases.
> 
> MM


 
Bomber Command's 100 Group used radar-equipped Mosquitos at high level to support raids by the heavies from December 1943 onwards. The initial attempts at Bomber Support came with Bob Braham's Beaufighter-equipped 141 Squadron from mid-1943. 

Neither the Beaus nor the Mosquitos flew "close escort" as such - their radar screens would have been swamped by returns from the heavies and Window, instead they patrolled either sideof the bomber stream, around known night-fighter beacons, etc.

Incidentially, the three FB.VI-equipped squadrons of 100 Group (23, 169 and 515 Squadrons) flew more conventional escort sorties on daylight raids by the RAF heavies.

As for relative loss rates, I'll try to dig out an updated graph I did recently - loss rates for BC and 8th RAF from various sources.


----------



## mhuxt (Mar 16, 2013)

The BC numbers come from Martin Middlebrook and from the Davis study of Allied bombing ops. I believe they differ in the way they treat early returns / "credit sorties" Main % differenc is '42.

The 8th AF numbers come from Davis and from the Williamson Murray book on the Luftwaffe. He cites a USAAF study, the numbers from which I also transcribed, but now can't find. IIRC there were a few minor differences at various times, not sure why that should be.


----------



## J.A.W. (Mar 17, 2013)

The strategic bomber offensives against Germany were shown by the post-war US survey to be another allied example of wasted effort, one that also blotted the moral high ground claims of the democracies, given the level of blatant atrocity involved, such as Operation Clarion, for example, but then I guess the US had its General Sherman doctrines as established war-waging principles, ol`Butch Harris got his RAF career made-man status - bombing Bedouins back into the stone-age pre-war..


----------



## stona (Mar 17, 2013)

J.A.W. said:


> The strategic bomber offensives against Germany were shown by the post-war US survey to be another allied example of wasted effort, one that also blotted the moral high ground claims of the democracies, given the level of blatant atrocity involved, such as Operation Clarion, for example, but then I guess the US had its General Sherman doctrines as established war-waging principles, ol`Butch Harris got his RAF career made-man status - bombing Bedouins back into the stone-age pre-war..



You're not expecting a serious answer to that are you?
Steve


----------



## Readie (Mar 17, 2013)

J.A.W. said:


> The strategic bomber offensives against Germany were shown by the post-war US survey to be another allied example of wasted effort, one that also blotted the moral high ground claims of the democracies, given the level of blatant atrocity involved, such as Operation Clarion, for example, but then I guess the US had its General Sherman doctrines as established war-waging principles, ol`Butch Harris got his RAF career made-man status - bombing Bedouins back into the stone-age pre-war..





You are obviously trying to provoke a reaction with your absurd post.


----------



## J.A.W. (Mar 17, 2013)

Well, who was correct about the right way to snuff Adolf, Harris or Stalin?
It is true that certain specific strategic targets were worth destroying, but the truly wasteful, needlessly awful methods applied were not something to be proud of..
Getting dirty is expected from megalomaniac ideologue dictators, but the democracies didn`t HAVE to climb into the sewer too.


----------



## tyrodtom (Mar 17, 2013)

Give us a good example of some nice wars.


----------



## airminded88 (Mar 17, 2013)

Yeah, I'm all ears too.


----------



## J.A.W. (Mar 17, 2013)

Well, setting an example could be a fine thing, rather than "He started it, so we`ll show em what its like X 10" that's schoolyard-level stuff, - 55,000 [ RAF Bomber Command alone!]casualties to burn ~600,000 civilians..

Here's what Chuck Yager thought..

"Atrocities were committed by both sides. That fall our fighter group received orders from the 8th AF to stage a maximum effort [Operation Clarion].

Our 75 Mustangs were assigned an area of 50 x 50 miles inside Germany ordered to strafe anything that moved. The object was to demoralise the German population.

Nobody asked our opinion about whether we were actually demoralizing the survivors or maybe enraging them to stage their own maximum effert on behalf of the Nazi war effort. We weren't asked how we felt zapping people. It was a miserable, dirty mission, but we all took off on time did it.
If it occurred to anyone to refuse to participate [nobody refused, as I recall] that person would probably have been court-martialled. I remember sitting next to Bochkay at the briefing whispering to him: 'If we`re gonna do things like this, we sure as hell better make sure we are on the winning side.' That's still my view."

"I'm certainly not proud of that particular strafing mission against civilians. But it is there,on the record, in my memory."


----------



## tyrodtom (Mar 17, 2013)

I'm still waiting for that example.


----------



## J.A.W. (Mar 17, 2013)

So are the Taliban, or not, since that "collateral damage" is what they utilize for support in their war..


----------



## J.A.W. (Mar 17, 2013)

Well, aint it kinda hypocritical labelling the [admittedly quite nasty] militaristic dictatorships [Stalin included] as evil, since evil is as evil does, including wanton destruction/killing of civilians on self-evidently spurious "demoralisation" grounds..


----------



## tyrodtom (Mar 17, 2013)

Still waiting for those examples .


----------



## J.A.W. (Mar 17, 2013)

Isn't that the point? 
The WW2 strategic bomber offensives [ Allied claims of upholding decent moral values]were tainted/side-tracked by blatant terror-punishment of civilians atrocities..


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Mar 17, 2013)

Just make sure you all play nice. The thread is being watched.


----------



## airminded88 (Mar 17, 2013)

"If you're going to use military force, then you ought to use overwhelming military force"
Gen. Curtis LeMay (USAAF)

It's no hard to see the Axis Powers using overwhelming military force against their enemies to achieve their ideological, strategic and territorial ambitions; and, by the same token, their enemies responding in kind, resolved to prevail.

When a faction enters a World War of the likes the first half of the 20th century witnessed; there's no point of return. 
Survivors combatants of _both_ sides have to live with the consequences.


----------



## J.A.W. (Mar 17, 2013)

Yeah, but did the dirty stuff done by the RAF/USAAF actually help win the war? 
I dont like that it gives Nazi apologists unrepentant Nippon nationalists a 'you were just as bad, worse in fact, for being hypocrites as well' -retort..


----------



## tyrodtom (Mar 17, 2013)

No matter what we did or how we carried out the war, there would still be Nazi apologists and unrepentant Nippon nationalists.


----------



## nuuumannn (Mar 17, 2013)

Yes, all sides committed atrocities in WW2, but here isn't the right place to air grievances against these.


----------



## J.A.W. (Mar 17, 2013)

Quite likely so..It is sickening though, to have that stuff thrown back in your face...something perhaps we all ought to openly reflect on for a better future..


----------



## airminded88 (Mar 17, 2013)

J.A.W. said:


> Yeah, but did the dirty stuff done by the RAF/USAAF actually help win the war?



Short answer J.A.W.
Yes it did.


----------



## J.A.W. (Mar 17, 2013)

Well, if it helps your conscience to believe that...the facts might not be so supportive though..


----------



## airminded88 (Mar 18, 2013)

My conscience or lack of it is not the epicenter of this rather spirited discussion.
If you want a view unhindered by prejudices of the effectiveness of Allied air power during the war, take a microscopic view of the operations undertaken by both air forces and you will find answers and facts even if they are not to your likings.


----------



## J.A.W. (Mar 18, 2013)

About effectiveness, hitting certain particular targets hit paydirt, but so much of the rest was simply wasteful...resources, human materiel.
For example fitting 4-engined bombers with defensive guns gunners, when, if - like the Mosquito or Republic Rainbow, effort had been put into the best performance, then just like the PRU flights, interceptions would have been much more problematic..
I saw a war-time proposal for a scaled-up Mosquito using Napier Sabre mills that could`ve done 2 trips to Germany in the time it took a Lancaster to do 1, but carrying the same bombload, with only 2 crew...at 400mph cruise.


----------



## tomo pauk (Mar 18, 2013)

I'll not enter the debate about morality of bombing raids, but add my 2 cents about was it worth it. The bomber offensive was a way to bring the war to Germany proper, making it devote great assets for defense, over-stretching thin German war machine. In the process some important targets were being hit, destroyed, forced to relocate, while using material manpower assets to repair facilities etc. If we remove the bomber offensive from picture, Germany has more assets to devote against Allies, not a good thing for Allied war effort.


----------



## stona (Mar 18, 2013)

J.A.W. said:


> Yeah, but did the dirty stuff done by the RAF/USAAF actually help win the war?.



Yes. Sit down and read the USSBS. Take a good look at all those histograms and graphs tailing off towards the end. Take a good look at the same peaking in 1944 and _imagine where they'd have been had there been no strategic bombing campaign_
Now take a look at German records and make notes of the resources poured into air defence that could have gone elsewhere. Armaments,man power,fuel,transport etc.Night defence tied up almost the entire electronics industry even denying resources to pet V projects.
Finally stop making ridiculous contemporary moral judgements with the benefit of seventy years of hindsight. You sound like the Pope who tried to ban the cross bow.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## J.A.W. (Mar 18, 2013)

Crossbow? Barbaric!,BAN THEM [but only for use against Xians in good standing...lol.] No doubting the key bottleneck industry target effects, but contemporary commentators indeed spoke up about the needless area fire-bombings even war-mongering Churchill got squeamish after Dresden..
As P.Closterman wrote, "As these results were gained at the cost of colossal losses...which made the American public blench, a discrete veil had to be drawn over the activity of the Luftwaffe"


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Mar 18, 2013)

Gentlemen - keep this "non-political" please, we don't want to close this thread!


----------



## stona (Mar 18, 2013)

J.A.W. said:


> Crossbow? Barbaric!,BAN THEM [but only for use against Xians in good standing...lol.] No doubting the key bottleneck industry target effects, but contemporary commentators indeed spoke up about the needless area fire-bombings even war-mongering Churchill got squeamish after Dresden..
> As P.Closterman wrote, "As these results were gained at the cost of colossal losses...which made the American public blench, a discrete veil had to be drawn over the activity of the Luftwaffe"



So it did help win the war then?

The losses were significant and the expense enormous. Bomber Commands losses might have been mitigated with better strategic planning but hindsight is a wonderful thing. Whether the effort was worth it is an entirely different question as to whether it was a contribution to winning the war in Europe. 


The fire bombing was not needless. It was the only way to effectively destroy a city and its economic capacity given the technology of the day.We should have returned to cities thus treated and done more, Speer's opinion on Hamburg,not mine.

Moral judgements are redundant. If we'd had to kill every living German to win that war it would bother me not one jot. If you hold back in a fight with a determined opponent _you will lose_.

Would you have dropped the atomic bombs on Japan or organised some ridiculous demonstration on an uninhabited island in the hope that this would force a surrender? 
Would you have sacrificed hundreds of thousands of Americans,and their allies,in an invasion of Japan or killed 200,000 Japanese in two flashes? 
These choices are not difficult for me today.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Tante Ju (Mar 18, 2013)

stona said:


> We should have returned to cities thus treated and done more, Speer's opinion on Hamburg,not mine.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve



Albert Speer said the exact opposite, he said that he was thankful that the British continued their stupid and pointless terror bombings of cities instead of attacking industrial bottlenecks.

So don't misquote him.


----------



## J.A.W. (Mar 18, 2013)

Interesting that Hiroshima was specially selected for atomic destruction, having been deliberately spared the razing of Le May's B-29 conventional fire-bombing attacks that had laid waste to most Japanese cities, [ I give credit to the USN, for hitting clearly defined military/industrial targets] ,but mine-laying by B-29s USN submarines in eliminating the island nation's merchant marine - had placed finite/short-time limits on Japan's capacity to wage modern war, so the A-bomb was really a bit of a [callous] research/watch this Stalin, stunt anyhow...


----------



## mhuxt (Mar 18, 2013)

* sigh *

... ban me now ...


----------



## J.A.W. (Mar 18, 2013)

Is that a Hirohito quote, " ban-me-now" ? L.O.L.[ he got off scot free..]


----------



## stona (Mar 18, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> Albert Speer said the exact opposite, he said that he was thankful that the British continued their stupid and pointless terror bombings of cities instead of attacking industrial bottlenecks.
> 
> So don't misquote him.



I haven't. From his 1945 bebrief,talking about the Hamburg raid. 

"We were of the opinion that a rapid repetition of this type of attack upon another six German towns would inevitably cripple the will to sustain armament manufacture and war production. It was I who first verbally reported to the Fuehrer at that time that a continuation of these attacks might bring about a rapid end to the war."

You might want to at least make a cursory check of the facts. Can you provide a quote of him saying the exact opposite?

Adolph Galland also expressed an opinion.

"A wave of terror radiated from the suffering city and spread through Germany. Appalling details of the great fire were recounted. A stream of haggard, terrified refugees flowed into the neighbouring provinces. In every large town people said: "What happened to Hamburg yesterday can happen to us tomorrow". After Hamburg in the wide circle of the political and the military command could be heard the words: "The war is lost"."

A more ordinary person,Willhelm Johnen who had attempted to defend Hamburg in his nightfighter.

"This devastating raid on Hamburg had the effect of a red light on all the big German cities and on the whole German people. Everyone felt it was now high time to capitulate before any further damage was done. But the High Command insisted that the 'total war' should proceed. Hamburg was merely the first link in a long chain of pitiless air attacks made by the Allies on the German civilian population."

The raid had a profound physical and psychological effect on Hamburg and the German people at large. There are plenty of reports from the various police authorities and internal intelligence agencies who support the contention,illustrated by the quotes above,that civilian morale was badly shaken. Defeatism became quite widespread throughout German society. 

Steve


----------



## Tante Ju (Mar 18, 2013)

stona said:


> I haven't. From his 1945 bebrief,talking about the Hamburg raid.



"We were of the opinion that a rapid repetition of this type of attack upon another six German towns would inevitably cripple the will to sustain armament manufacture and war production. It was I who first verbally reported to the Fuehrer at that time that a continuation of these attacks might bring about a rapid end to the war."

You might want to at least make a cursory check of the facts. Can you provide a quote of him saying the exact opposite?[/QUOTE]

You are quoting Speer selectively. Speer's note of 'this type of attack' was said in the context of this scale - the same scale of Hamburg firestorm. Mass destruction of six major German cities on the scale of Hamburg with tenthousends laying dead would have very seriously effected German production no doubt, but the RAF was incapable of such regular attacks, general area bombing was another matter. And it was unwilling to 

Speer:

_After these experiences I wondered once again why our LuftwaflFe with its by now reduced forces, did not launch similar pinpoint attacks whose effects could be devastating. At the end of May 1943, two weeks after the British raid, I reminded Hitler of my idea of April 11 that a group of experts might pinpoint the key industrial targets in the enemy camp. But as so often, Hitler proved irresolute. *Tm afraid that the General Staff of the air force will not want to take advice from your industrial associates. I too have broached such a plan to General Jeschonnek several times. "But," he concluded in rather a resigned tone, "you speak to him about it sometime." Evidently Hitler was not going to do anything about this; he lacked any sense of the decisive importance of such operations. There is no question that once before he had thrown away his chance—between
1939 and 1941 when he directed our air raids against England's cities instead of coordinating them with the U-boat campaigns and, for example, attacking the English ports which were in any case sometimes strained beyond their capacity by the convoy system. Now he once again failed to see his opportunity. *And the British, for their part, thoughtlessly copied this irrational conduct—aside from their single attack on the dams.*

[...]

Planning on July 29 1 pointed out: "If the air raids continue on the present scale, within three months we shall be relieved of a number of questions we are at present discussing. We shall simply be coasting downhill, smoothly and relatively swiftly. . . . We might just as well hold the final meeting of Central Planning, in that case." Three days later I informed Hitler that armaments production was collapsing and threw in the further warning that a series of attacks of this sort, extended to six more major cities, would bring Germany's armaments production to a total halt. "You'll straighten all that out again," he merely said.

In fact Hitler was right. We straightened it out again—not because of our Central Planning organization, which with the best will in the world could issue only general instructions, but by the determined efforts of those directly concerned, first and foremost the workers themselves. *Fortunately for us, a series of Hamburg-type raids was not repeated on such a scale against other cities.* Thus the enemy once again allowed us to adjust ourselves to his strategy.

We barely escaped a further catastrophic blow on August 17, 1943, only two weeks after the Hamburg bombings. The American air force launched its first strategic raid. It was directed against Schweinfurt where large factories of the ball-bearing industry were concentrated. *Ball bearings had in any case already become a bottleneck in our efforts* to increase armaments production. But in this very first attack the other side committed a crucial mistake.
Instead of concentrating on the ball-bearing plants, the sizable force of three hundred seventy-six Flying Fortresses divided up. One hundred and forty-six of the planes successfully attacked an airplane assembly plant inRegensburg, but with only minor consequences. *Meanwhile, the British air force continued its indiscriminate attacks upon our cities.*

After this attack the production of ball bearings dropped by 38 percent. 12 Despite the peril to Schweinfurt we had to patch up our facilities there, for to attempt to relocate our ball-bearing industry would have held up production entirely for three or four months. In the light of our desperate needs we could also do nothing about the ball-bearing factories in Berlin-Erkner, Cannstatt, or Steyr, although the enemy must have been aware of their location.

In June 1946 the General Staff of the Royal Air Force asked me what would have been the results of concerted attacks on the ball-bearing industry.
I replied:
Armaments production would have been crucially weakened after two months and after four months would have been brought completely to a standstill.
This, to be sure, would have meant:
One: All our ball-bearing factories (in Schweinfurt, Steyr, Erkner, Cannstatt,
and in France and Italy) had been attacked simultaneously.
Two: These attacks had been repeated three or four times, every two
weeks, no matter what the pictures of the target area showed.
Three: Any attempt at rebuilding these factories had

After this first blow we were forced back on the ball-bearing stocks stored by the armed forces for use as repair parts. We soon consumed these, as well as whatever had been accumulated in the factories for current production. After these reserves were used up—they lasted for six to eight weeks—the sparse production was carried daily from the factories to the assembly plants, often in knapsacks. In those days we anxiouslyasked ourselves how soon the enemy would realize that he could paralyze the production of thousands of armaments plants merely by destroying five or six relatively small targets.

The second serious blow, however, did not come until two months later. On October 14, 1943, 1 was at the East Prussian headquarters discussing armaments questions with Hitler when Adjutant Schaub interrupted us: "The Reich Marshal urgently wishes to speak to you," he said to Hitler. "This time he has pleasant news."

Hitler came back from the telephone in good spirits. A new daylight raid on Schweinfurt had ended with a great victory for our defenses, he said.14 The countryside was strewn with downed American bombers. Uneasy, I asked for a short recess in our conference, since I wanted to telephone Schweinfurt myself. But all communications were shattered; I could not reach any of the factories. Finally, by enlisting the police, I managed to talk to the foreman of a ball-bearing factory. All the factories had been hard hit, he informed me. The oil baths for the bearings had caused serious fires in the machinery workshops; the damage was far worse than after the first attack. This time we had lost 67 percent of our ball-bearing production.

My first measure after this second air raid was to appoint my most vigorous associate, General Manager Kessler, as special commissioner for ball-bearing production. Our reserves had been consumed; efforts to import ball bearings from Sweden and Switzerland had met with only slight success. Nevertheless, we were able to avoid total disaster by substituting slide bearings for ball bearings wherever possible.15* But what really saved us was the fact that from this time on the enemy to our astonishment once again ceased his attacks on the ball-bearing industry.16*

On December 23, the Erkner plant was heavily hit, but we were not sure whether this was a deliberate attack, since Berlin was being bombed in widely scattered areas. The picture did not change again until February 1944. Then, within four days, Schweinfurt, Steyr, and Cannstatt were each subjected to two successive heavy attacks. Then followed raids on Erkner, Schweinfurt, and again Steyr. After only six weeks our production of bearings (above 6.3 centimeters in diameter) had been reduced to 29 percent of what it had been before the air raids.17

*At the beginning of April 1944, however, the attacks on the ball-bearing industry ceased abruptly. Thus, the Allies threw away success when it was already in their hands. Had they continued the attacks of March and April with the same energy, we would quickly have been at our last gasp.* As it was, not a tank, plane, or other piece of weaponry failed to be produced because of lack of ball bearings, even though such production had been increased by 19 percent from July 1943 to April 1944.* 18 As far as
armaments were concerned, Hitler s credo that the impossible could be made possible and that all forecasts and fears were too pessimistic, seemed to have proved itself true. _

continued...


----------



## Tante Ju (Mar 18, 2013)

continued...

_Not until after the war did I learn the reason for the enemy's error.

The air staffs assumed that in Hitler's authoritarian state the important factories would be quickly shifted from the imperiled cities. On December 20, 1943, Sir Arthur Harris declared his conviction that "at this stage of the war the Germans have long since made every possible effort to decentralize the manufacture of so vital a product [as ball bearings]." He considerably overestimated the strengths of the authoritarian system, which to the outside observer appeared so tightly knit.

As early as December 19, 1942, eight months before the first air raid on Schweinfurt, I had sent a directive to the entire armaments industry stating: "The mounting intensity of the enemy air attacks compels accelerated preparations for shifting manufactures important for armaments production." But there was resistance on all sides. The Gauleiters did not want new factories in their districts for fear that the almost peacetime quiet of their small towns would be disturbed. My band of directors, for their part, did not want to expose themselves to political infighting. The result was that hardly anything was done.

After the second heavy raid on Schweinfurt on October 14, 1943, we again decided to decentralize. Some of the facilities were to be distributed among the surrounding villages, others placed in small and as yet unendangeredtowns in eastern Germany.* This policy of dispersal was meant to provide for the future; but the plan encountered a great deal of opposition. As late as January 1944 ^e shifting of ball-bearing production tocave factories was still being discussed,19 and in August 1944 my representative to the ball-bearing industry complained that he was having difficulties "pushing through the construction work for the shift of ball-bearing production."20 *Instead of paralyzing vital segments of industry, the Royal Air Force began an air offensive against Berlin. *I was having a conference in my private office on November 22, 1943, when the air-raid alarm sounded. ..._

So yes, Hamburg erupted a smaller panic crisis in Nazi leadership, fearful that attacks on such scale devasting cities may continue. Niether them, nor BC could predict the weather conditions that allowed for the Hamburg firestorm, nor BC could repeat it. The initial panic quickly elapsed, and Speer was very much more concerned about USAAF style hitting of industrial bottlenecks, namely ball bearing plants. His overall conclusion was damning to British area attacks, which he believed were attacking the wrong targets, was simply wasteful. It was not until Harris was dealt a bloody nose in the battle of berlin when BC was forced to - at least temporarily - switch to the right targets, by unsustainable losses and pressure from the USAAF.


----------



## michaelmaltby (Mar 18, 2013)

"... mine-laying by B-29s USN submarines in eliminating the island nation's merchant marine - had placed finite/short-time limits on Japan's capacity to wage modern war, so the A-bomb was really a bit of a [callous] research/watch this Stalin, stunt anyhow..."

Right J.A.W. - the tens of thousands of Allied troops and Japanese civilians that would have died in a land battle to "take" Japan is just a figment of President Truman (and my) imagination. 

*Note to Mods*: We have "Like" and "Share" options on this Forum -- time to introduce a "Disagree" option. Actions may be convincing when logic isn't.

MM


----------



## drgondog (Mar 18, 2013)

J.A.W. said:


> Interesting that Hiroshima was specially selected for atomic destruction, having been deliberately spared the razing of Le May's B-29 conventional fire-bombing attacks that had laid waste to most Japanese cities, [ I give credit to the USN, for hitting clearly defined military/industrial targets] ,but mine-laying by B-29s USN submarines in eliminating the island nation's merchant marine - had placed finite/short-time limits on Japan's capacity to wage modern war, so the A-bomb was really a bit of a [callous] research/watch this Stalin, stunt anyhow...



I suppose that the lessons of Okinawa, during which the Japanese Military and civilian force did not not surrender despite impossible odds, does not stimulate the imagination of the carnage a subsequent assault on Japan on a 50:! scale or resisting forces and impact on the survival of the Japanese people?

Pray tell, what is your vision of the conclusion of the war had Japan not had a way out while saving face?


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Mar 18, 2013)

J.A.W. said:


> Interesting that Hiroshima was specially selected for atomic destruction, having been deliberately spared the razing of Le May's B-29 conventional fire-bombing attacks that had laid waste to most Japanese cities, [ I give credit to the USN, for hitting clearly defined military/industrial targets] ,but mine-laying by B-29s USN submarines in eliminating the island nation's merchant marine - had placed finite/short-time limits on Japan's capacity to wage modern war, so the A-bomb was really a bit of a [callous] research/watch this Stalin, stunt anyhow...



Read Dave Jablownski's book "Wings of Fire." A million man army was defending the mainland and Japan still had about 8000 aircraft available to them. The Japanese were not going to surrender conventionally and the war would have lasted at least another 2 or 3 years. Well documented by allied and Japanese sources. Japan would have starved while Chinese and Korean civilians were continually slaughtered…

There are some of us in the US who had family members on their way over to the South Pacific when the atomic bombs were dropped and some of us probably won't be here today if your so-called "callous research/watch this Stalin, stunt" wasn't carried out. Please think about things and seperate opinion from fact before you spew.

Now with that said, I'm saying it again, if this becomes political, I'm closing this thread. If anyone wants to be a [email protected], your free ticket into cyberspace will be issued accordingly.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Mar 18, 2013)

michaelmaltby said:


> *Note to Mods*: We have "Like" and "Share" options on this Forum -- time to introduce a "Disagree" option. Actions may be convincing when logic isn't.
> 
> MM



Point taken, and below the "Disagree" option, I would also add "STUPID."


----------



## michaelmaltby (Mar 18, 2013)

Now. Now, FBJ ... no hurtin' words,


----------



## Tante Ju (Mar 18, 2013)

AFAIK the Japanese leadership was seriously discussing surrender at the very time the A-bombs were dropped. Now, how much that tipped the scales will be debated forever, but I have no doubt that an actual landing in Japan, should it have been necessary would be an awfully bloody business... also, not going after the Emperor was probably the wisest decision of the whole war.


----------



## michaelmaltby (Mar 18, 2013)

"... the Japanese leadership was seriously discussing surrender at the very time the A-bombs were dropped"

I know, Auntie, I know .... and there were serious men talking about blowing up Hitler, too. Tell me - were these talking Japanese talking _with_ the Japanese Emperor-God .... or were _those _talks yet to be negotiated.

Where I come from we say: "if wishes were horses the beggars would ride" 

MM


----------



## Tante Ju (Mar 18, 2013)

Here you can read on the subject. Surrender of Japan - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Yes they did discuss the matter with the "emperor-god". In fact, Japan was seeking some sort of peace terms since February 1945, and in fact, it was the Empror himself who had tipped the balance of the deadlocked inner council after the dropping of the A-bombs.

The Japanese leaders were not mindless fanatics, some of them were of course, but I doubt they could be considered a bigger nutjob/fanatic than McArthur...


----------



## airminded88 (Mar 18, 2013)

Potsdam Declaration - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Seems to me the Allies were very serious when demanded the empire to 'Surrender or face prompt and utter destruction'.
Japanese peace talks under the table, on the other hand, were not serious enough to wrap up between July 26th and August 6th, 1945.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Mar 18, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> Here you can read on the subject. Surrender of Japan - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> 
> Yes they did discuss the matter with the "emperor-god". In fact, Japan was seeking some sort of peace terms since February 1945, and in fact, it was the Empror himself who had tipped the balance of the deadlocked inner council after the dropping of the A-bombs.


And some of his loyal military actually plotted a coup against him because they didn't want to surrender...
Ky


Tante Ju said:


> The Japanese leaders were not mindless fanatics, some of them were of course, but I doubt they could be considered a bigger nutjob/fanatic than McArthur...


I take that's your opinion - personally I never held the man in high regard, my kid's great grandfather served under him. Egomaniac? Yes. Nutjob? No way. My opinion. Now with that said..

*Day or night strategic bombing? *

This thread gets back on subject or I lock it. LAST WARNING!


----------



## michaelmaltby (Mar 18, 2013)

"... but I doubt they could be considered a bigger nutjob/fanatic than McArthur..."

Auntie, you mean the man to whom The Emperor owed his official existence after the surrender of his Kingdom-Emperorship?
That McArthur ....?

MM


----------



## airminded88 (Mar 18, 2013)

Given the statistics kindly posted by Readie on his post #28, I would say a combination of the both in the ETO.
IMO destruction is destruction whether it's endured by an urban area or industrial complex and puts further strain on the German war effort.
Efficient, maybe, maybe not. Effective, proved by events to follow.


----------



## Readie (Mar 18, 2013)

Strategic bombing during World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

I think this link sums up the bombing campaign rather well.
No one in their right mind would rejoice in the destruction wrought but, needs must when the devil drives.

Night or day?

The most important part is too bomb targets 24/7, someone had to fly in daylight and someone had to fly at night.
The allied heavies were quite diverse.Luckily the B17 was more able to take on the LW in daylight than the Lancaster.That whole role was crucial to the outcome of WW2. The Lancaster had a bigger bomb load / variety of bomb sizes so, it was able to target dams, hit concrete bunkers etc with specialist bombs.

Overall it was a fantastic, if costly achievement by all who flew.

Cheers
John


----------



## J.A.W. (Mar 18, 2013)

Actually, it is clear, that unless the defenses [fighter interception in WW2] can be neutralised [by fighter escort for USAAF ground force invasion of France for RAF], then slow heavy bombers by themselves [even B-29s], whether by day or night, flown by any airforce, will suffer such attrition as to be untenable..or ineffective, simply resource wasteful terror weapons [such as the Steinbok/Baby Blitz LW offensive in `44].


----------



## nuuumannn (Mar 19, 2013)

That has to be taken with a huge dose of hindsight as at the time it was firmly believed that the combined effort was being of enormous benefit despite losses suffered. Any psychological sea change was not going to happen in a hurry as the structure to carry out the bombing raids was enormous for all involved, not to mention there were many in powerful positions who actively endorsed that policy, so even after WW2 heavy bombers continued as the norm. Alternatives, such as smaller high speed bombers like the Mosquito as the principal means of strategic bombing could not be enacted in the time scale, also Mossie builders had issues with delivery since everyone wanted them and not enough could be built fast enough to supply everyone's needs.


----------



## J.A.W. (Mar 19, 2013)

But Le May stripped guns gunners from his B-29s to achieve the same result, as did some LW Do 217 units attacking Britain.
The fact that Mosquito units showed much lower loss rates ought to have spurred more effective/efficient responses in real-time - rather than push-on relentless horrific attrition of your best brightest aircrews.


----------



## stona (Mar 19, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> You are quoting Speer selectively. Speer's note of 'this type of attack' was said in the context of this scale - the same scale of Hamburg firestorm. Mass destruction of six major German cities on the scale of Hamburg with tenthousends laying dead would have very seriously effected German production no doubt, but the RAF was incapable of such regular attacks, general area bombing was another matter.



I'm only quoting Speer regarding the Hamburg raid because that is what my original post pertained to. That is hardly "selective" quotation. Why would I quote his opinion of a Schweinfurt or Berlin raid in the specific context of the Hamburg raid?
You accused me of misquoting him,which I did not,and further maintained that he said the exact opposite,which he did not.

I am well aware of Speer's fear of allied attacks on critical industries and choke points but that is hardly relevant to Hamburg. I originally said that Speer thought we should have repeated the Hamburg treatment on other German cities and he said exactly that. It was you that then rather rudely accused me of misquotation,now modified somewhat ungraciously to selective quotation.

The fact that the RAF could not repeat such raids successfully on other German cities is not relevant.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## stona (Aug 6, 2016)

Shooter8 said:


> First, Losses to AAA were greater at night than in the day time. I know this sounds fatuous, but the British bombers were not capable of flying high enough to minimize losses and the radar made the AAA very much more effective. .



It sounds fatuous because it is
Bomber Command lost 1,345 aircraft to Flak (41%) and 2,278 to night fighter (59%)

Total USAAF losses, not just bombers, in Europe were again more than 50% to flak, 5,400 as opposed to 4,300 shot down by fighters.

The 8th Air Force lost 1,798 heavy bombers to Flak, this represents 31% of losses to all causes.

The 15th Air Force lost 1,046 heavy bombers to flak, representing 44% of losses to all causes.

Flak had very similar success rates by day and night, for aircraft destroyed it had a very roughly 60/40 ratio.

If you want the 'hidden' effects of flak the principle two were forcing the bombers to attack from greater altitudes which dramatically decreased their accuracy (and I have the statistics to back up this contention) and damaging the bombers without necessarily shooting them down.
Between December 1942 and April 1945 flak damaged a total of 54,539 aircraft of the 8th Air Force, which represents 20% of sorties dispatched.

Do you actually look at any data or statistics before you express an opinion?

Cheers

Steve


----------



## wuzak (Aug 6, 2016)

Shooter8 said:


> Two parts in answer to your question;
> First, Losses to AAA were greater at night than in the day time. I know this sounds fatuous, but the British bombers were not capable of flying high enough to minimize losses and the radar made the AAA very much more effective. IIRC, the Brits lost 5-6% to AAA while we lost less than 1% to AAA because we flew so much higher than they did.
> Second, while their fighters shot down more of us plane to plane, we shot down more of them than they did us, while the Brits shot down almost none of the Nazi fighter planes.
> You make the choice as to which trade off was worth more to the total war effort.



First, you have to define what your losses mean? Is it a percentage of losses to all causes, losses per mission, or something else? Otherwise it is quite meaningless.

In the case of the daylight campaign, it stands to reason that a lower percentage is lost to flak than fighters, because the latter are far more effective during the day.

But, at the end of the war the losses of USAAF bombers were around 50:50 flak and fighters *[edit: see Stona's post above]*. This ratio changed throughout the war, the flak having a relatively high proportion at the start of the 8th AF campaign, this reducing as the campaign intensified and the Luftwaffe moved more fighters west to defend and increased again after the US fighters had decimated the Luftwaffe defenders by early/mid 1944.

One thing flak did was injure more US aircrew than did fighters. And it had a psychological effect because the crew couldn't shoot back - they had to sit and ride the flak out. At least with fighters they could try to shoot them down.

The RAF didn't have to deal with as many fighters, but the ones that were there could shoot down the RAF bombers, sometimes without being seen. Using upward firing cannons to shoot into the bomber's belly from beneath.

The night bomber war was quite different to the day bomber war. For one thing it relied more heavily on electronics. The RAF would introduce a radar to detect attacking nightfighters. The nightfighters would introduce a system where they could track a bomber by its radar, etc.

You are right that radar directed AA guns were very effective at night. Except when the radar was being jammed. Which happened a few times during the war, using systems such as "Window".

The biggest down side of German AA fire was common for day and night - the lack of proximity fuses. The fuses had to be set for an altitude (flight time?). If they were too much out they weren't very effective at all.

There is also another difference between the night and daytime attacks regarding the flak. The night attacks were in a loose bomber stream. The day attacks were in massive formations and flew steady and straight for many minutes in the run up to a target. The formation was in place before and after the bombing run.


----------



## wuzak (Aug 6, 2016)

Shooter8 said:


> One reason why they suffered such low loss rates is because the Germans thought they were little more than a nuisance and made very little effort to shoot them down as evidenced by the near total lack of very high performance night fighters to counter the 3-4000 bombers. They also flew much higher than the typical Bomber Command mission and that made them much less vulnerable to AAA.
> Then there is the weight of bombs dropped per mission. 2-4000 pounds depending on target and range for the Mossy and 8-14000 for the big bombers which also carried radar and other Avionic aids which made them much more effective. So all in all, the Mossy was a side show of very limited utility.



Yes, Mosquito raids were often nuisance raids. Often diversionary raids. 

But that is not to say that the Luftwaffe did not expend any effort to shoot them down. On the contrary the reverse may have been the case (incentives for shooting down Mosquitoes).

Mosquitoes formed a significant part of the Pathfinder Force (PFF) in the latter half of the war. In this role they were used to guide the bombers to target and/or mark the target. They did this using those very "radar and other avionic aids", chief among them was Oboe. And the Germans knew that disrupting the target marking aircraft would go a long way to disrupting the bombing mission.

I believe that, until later in the war, most main force bombers aimed visually at the target markers laid down by the PFF, with corrections called by the Master Bomber.

Radar bombing was not the most accurate during WW2. Oboe was quite accurate, but had range limitations. But the higher altitude at which the Mosquito flew increased teh effective range, and that is why they were used.

Mosquito B.IX LR503 F for Freddie was an Oboe Mosquito which flew 213 missions during the war. Note the painted over nose.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## pbehn (Aug 6, 2016)

Shooter8 said:


> Second, while their fighters shot down more of us plane to plane, we shot down more of them than they did us, while the Brits shot down almost none of the Nazi fighter planes..


from wiki
The Mosquito also proved a very capable night fighter. Some of the most successful RAF pilots flew the Mosquito. Bob Braham claimed around a third of his 29 kills in a Mosquito, flying mostly daytime operations, while on night fighters Wing Commander Branse Burbridgeclaimed 21 kills, and Wing Commander John Cunningham claimed 19 of his 20 victories at night on Mosquitos. Mosquitos of No. 100 Group RAF were responsible for the destruction of 257 German aircraft from December 1943 to April 1945. Mosquito fighters from all units accounted for 487 German aircraft during the war, the vast majority of which were night fighters.[105]


and the mosquito was not the only night fighter just the best.


----------



## stona (Aug 6, 2016)

The bombers themselves also shot down night fighters, though the rules of engagement varied from Group to Group. Some were encouraged to be more aggressive, but this led to an increase in friendly fire incidents. Others were encouraged to evade. Firing guns in the dark gives one's position away to any night fighter within at least two to three miles.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## stona (Dec 23, 2016)

Another 'elephant in the statistical room' for different kinds of Bomber Command losses by night is the huge number of aircraft lost to no known cause. Very often there were no survivors and witnesses who saw a burning aircraft plummet to earth could rarely know what had caused it to do so.

1943 night losses. Fighter 964 Flak 574 Not by Enemy Action 26 *Unknown Causes 691.
*
1944 night losses. Fighter 940 Flak 489 Not by Enemy Action 53 *Unknown Causes 867. 
*
1945 night losses. Fighter 205 Flak 89 Not by Enemy Action 26* Unknown Causes 187.
*
For the three years quoted above losses to fighters were 2,105 and to Flak 1,152, which appears to be a 2 to 1 advantage to fighters. However another 1,745 aircraft were lost to unknown causes. 
Losses to Fighters were therefore 42%, to Flak 23% and to unknown causes a huge 35%, often ignored in quoted figures.

Another important figure is the number of aircraft damaged by Flak as opposed to shot down. This is a much larger figure for Flak than for fighters. In 1944, by night, 2,555 aircraft were damaged by Flak, 625 by fighters. A bomber was four times as likely to be damaged by Flak than by a fighter.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## tomo pauk (Dec 23, 2016)

Steve - is it known when the people at RAF BC found out about the 'Shraege musik'?


----------



## pbehn (Dec 23, 2016)

The important thing about bailing out of an aircraft was how much it was under control. For the pilot to get out of a Lancaster and many other types it had to fly pretty straight which a damaged aircraft didnt generally do. I have read of crews staying with the bomber because the pilot was fighting to keep the plane level and couldnt get out himself, it has even been depicted in the movies. The crews that get home have a tale to tell but the crews that didnt are an unknown cause. If a plane is hit in the bomb bay and the bombs explode there is nothing recognizable as an aircraft to find on the ground


----------



## tomo pauk (Dec 23, 2016)

stona said:


> Another 'elephant in the statistical room' for different kinds of Bomber Command losses by night is the huge number of aircraft lost to no known cause. Very often there were no survivors and witnesses who saw a burning aircraft plummet to earth could rarely know what had caused it to do so.
> 
> 1943 night losses. Fighter 964 Flak 574 Not by Enemy Action 26 *Unknown Causes 691.
> *
> ...



Germany have had, in 1944, more than 10000 (ten thusand) of 88+ mm Flak that was supposed to prevent the bombing raids. Compared with how much night fighters - 500?

BTW:


tomo pauk said:


> Steve - is it known when the people at RAF BC found out about the 'Shraege musik'?


----------



## stona (Dec 23, 2016)

I will have to dig out the exact time, but I remember some initial reports of some kind of upward firing armament following the Peenemunde raid in August 1943. Bomber Command does not seem to have been unduly concerned. It was aware that many night fighter attacks took the bomber completely by surprise, and Schrage Musik was just one more method of achieving that surprise. To be honest I can't remember any reference to Schrage Musik in the official history, nor in Harris' 'Despatch'. Neither do I remember any major concern from Bomber Command (like an ORS report). I think that maybe we give the system more attention today than was given to it, at least by the British, at he time.

In August 1943. Bomber Command's ORS estimates from analysis of strikes on aircraft that survived, a sample of 69, showed that only 14 (20%) were attacked from more than 10 degrees below the horizontal. This directly contradicted the Command's assertion that most attacks were being made from 75-90 degrees below the horizontal. This was *not* a reference to Schrage Musik, but to steep climbing attacks, described by Harris as a _'new and deadly tactic'_ nearly a year earlier.This is important because it impacted on how bomber armament might be developed. Of course aircraft subject to a competent attack with upward firing armament were unlikely to survive.
Around this time the ' extended corkscrew' evasive manoeuvre was formalised. This is often mentioned but rarely described, it was the standard tactic to evade a fighter, so I will take this opportunity to quote 'Tactical Countermeasures to Combat Enemy Night Fighters, A.A. Searchlight and Gun Defences'

"The extended corkscrew commences with a straight dive which is converted into a turn of about 60 degrees, losing height by about 1800 ft. This is followed by pulling out of the dive and climbing as sharply as possible in the opposite direction with full power, regaining as much height as possible. The whole manoeuvre is then repeated exactly as before."

Again, this could only work if the fighter was seen in time.

You can't compare numbers of flak guns and fighters in a meaningful way. The guns are more or less immobile and have to wait for the targets to come to them. It's why they concentrate around likely targets. An attacking force will go to great lengths (just look at some of the routes into Berlin) to avoid such concentrations.
Fighters can obviously go and look for their targets.



Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## Greyman (Dec 23, 2016)

stona said:


> I will have to dig out the exact time, but I remember some initial reports of some kind of upward firing armament following the Peenemunde raid in August 1943. Bomber Command does not seem to have been unduly concerned. It was aware that many night fighter attacks took the bomber completely by surprise, and Schrage Musik was just one more method of achieving that surprise. To be honest I can't remember any reference to Schrage Musik in the official history, nor in Harris' 'Despatch'. Neither do I remember any major concern from Bomber Command (like an ORS report). I think that maybe we give the system more attention today than was given to it, at least by the British, at he time.



Interesting bit from here: A Failure of Intelligence

I later applied the same method of analysis to the question of whether experience helped crews to survive. Bomber Command told the crews that their chances of survival would increase with experience, and the crews believed it. They were told, _After you have got through the first few operations, things will get better._ This idea was important for morale at a time when the fraction of crews surviving to the end of a 30-operation tour was only about 25 percent. I subdivided the experienced and inexperienced crews on each operation and did the analysis, and again, the result was clear. Experience did not reduce loss rates. The cause of losses, whatever it was, killed novice and expert crews impartially. This result contradicted the official dogma, and the Command never accepted it. I blame the ORS, and I blame myself in particular, for not taking this result seriously enough. The evidence showed that the main cause of losses was an attack that gave experienced crews no chance either to escape or to defend themselves. If we had taken the evidence more seriously, we might have discovered Schräge Musik in time to respond with effective countermeasures.

- Freeman Dyson


----------



## stona (Dec 23, 2016)

Let's just say that Dyson had his issues with Dickins whom he categorised as "a career civil servant. His guiding principle was only to tell the commander in chief things that the commander in chief liked to hear." This is palpably and demonstrably untrue.

It's not a subject I'd care to go into at length, but many of Dyson's assertions are provably false. In this case it is probably true that Bomber Command didn't take Shrage Musik seriously, it was just seen as another way of surprising a bomber.

As early as July 1943 Dickins wrote a letter in which the ORS intention to find out what was going on and how bombers were being attacked is obvious.

_"It is hoped in due course to obtain further information covering tactics of Enemy Aircraft which shoot down our Bombers from cases in which some of the Bomber crew succeeded in returning..."_

This rather contradicts Dyson's later assertions. It is also worth remembering that these survivors/evaders often had no idea how their bomber had been attacked, precisely because they were taken by surprise.

We, with hindsight, should also remember that relatively few Luftwaffe night fighters were equipped with upward firing weapons.

Anyone interested in Dyson's side of the story should read 'Disturbing the Universe', his, shall we say, cathartic memoir.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## stona (Jan 9, 2017)

From Harris' ' Despatch'.

_"Mention has already been made of the fact that from about September, 1944, onwards, the individual enemy fighters were almost entirely deprived of the use of their aids to interception. This was most fortunate, since an unorthodox type of offensive armament, designed for use in conjunction with homing devices, is thought to have come into much greater use about this time.* Information was received from Intelligence sources in August, 1944, that some of the enemy fighters were equipped with cannon, fitted above or in the fuselage, and fixed to fire upwards at a steep angle to the horizontal.* *The evidence obtained from bombers previously damaged by fighter attack was re-investigated and the results suggested that the weapon had probably started to come into use in January, 1944 and had subsequently been used probably in 10 per cent of non lethal fighter attacks.* Considerable apprehension was felt as to the danger of any extended use of this weapon, since MONICA had already been withdrawn and no effective provision against it could be made in the case of aircraft equipped with H2S, constituting the bulk of the bomber force. These aircraft could not be fitted with downward firing guns and FISHPOND was not able to detect fighters at close range.A tactical note was issued recommending the execution of a diving turn following any FISHPOND indication or of a banking search every 5-10 minutes for all non-FISHPOND aircraft and modifications to FISHPOND were put in hand to reduce its minimum range to the order of 300 yards. Trials carried out by B.D.U. showed the corkscrew to be the most effective form of combat manoeuvre against fighters equipped with upward firing guns and this therefore continued to be the recommended manoeuvre.
The proportion of damaged bombers showing strikes from upward firing armament increased considerably towards the end of 1944 and 1945, and it is probable that, but for the general difficulties of the fighters effecting interception, the extended use of this weapon might have been much more serious."_

My bold.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Informative Informative:
3 | Like List reactions


----------



## ChrisMcD (Feb 17, 2017)

Harris must have been well aware that the RAF had developed a whole range of oblique armament bomber interceptors up until the 30's. Specialised airframes designed to take heavy bore weapons - particularly the Coventry Ordinance Works 37mm cannon!






So I find it very hard to believe that any senior RAF officer could be surprised by Shrage Musik. The surprising thing is that they did so little about it!


----------



## swampyankee (Feb 17, 2017)

ChrisMcD said:


> Harris must have been well aware that the RAF had developed a whole range of oblique armament bomber interceptors up until the 30's. Specialised airframes designed to take heavy bore weapons - particularly the Coventry Ordinance Works 37mm cannon!
> 
> 
> 
> ...



I'm rarely surprised by bureaucrats -- and senior military officers are bureaucrats -- being less than cognizant of technological developments that didn't directly impinge upon them, if for no other reason than that somebody in Harris' position would be so busy with day-to-day operational issues that he'd either not notice or not remember a failed experiment ten years prior, unless he was something like the project manager.


----------



## stona (Feb 17, 2017)

Knowing something existed and that the principle is established is not the same as knowing that the enemy has developed and deployed it operationally. That knowledge came from the intelligence referenced above.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## ChrisMcD (Feb 17, 2017)

stona said:


> Knowing something existed and that the principle is established is not the same as knowing that the enemy has developed and deployed it operationally. That knowledge came from the intelligence referenced above.
> Cheers
> Steve



You are of course correct. But to quote a comment I read years ago - "airfields across the UK must have been littered with bombers riddled with strangely angled bullet holes and yet nobody seems to have drawn the obvious conclusions" - all I was pointing out was that any armaments officer with more than 10 years service in the RAF would have been able to work out that the Luftwaffe were attacking from underneath. Apart from anything else I believe it it was a favourite tactic of the Defiant night fighters as well.

Bomber Command were amazingly complacent about some things and seemed to have had an amazing level of corporate resistance to change. Wilfred Freeman - as Deputy Chief of the Air Staff regularly told Harris to do things and Harris simply refused to do them! Go figure!


----------



## stona (Feb 17, 2017)

Unfortunately the airfields were not littered with bombers fill of oddly angled holes. It's something, angle from which bombers were attacked, that the ORS looked at frequently. Nor were crews reporting such attacks in debriefing. This is testimony to the capability of Schragemusik. Crews and aircraft simply didn't return to base following such attacks.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## Shortround6 (Feb 17, 2017)

It just wasn't experiments from the the early 30s.





Granted the mounting was _supposed _to allow for easy reloading.




But at least a few pilots used to fire upward, Albert Ball among them. 
and




two Vickers guns in the cowl and the upward firing Lewis guns. Which could not be used to fire through the prop even if the angle could be adjusted. 
A pretty standard armament fit for Sopwith Camel night fighters operating over England were two Lewis guns on Foster mountings and NO Vickers guns. 




And a few other fighters also used the general arrangement.




The amount of operational knowledge from WW I lost or ignored is staggering.

Reactions: Bacon Bacon:
1 | Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Greyman (Feb 17, 2017)

Biff's F-15 fired upwards too.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Zipper730 (Feb 17, 2017)

stona said:


> Bomber Command lost 1,345 aircraft to Flak (41%) and 2,278 to night fighter (59%)


Almost on the 60/40 ratio...


> The 8th Air Force lost 1,798 heavy bombers to Flak, this represents 31% of losses to all causes.


So up to 69% were caused by fighters (as well as pilot error, mechanical malfunction): Looking at this, I'd have assumed the 69% loss rate (5800 planes) would be the result of day-fighters possessing potentially better agility, better ability to see their targets. The flak-accuracy on this alone appears to be the result of the fact that the USAAF B-17 and B-24's could fly higher (though ironically I was told that the B-24's usually flew at around 21,000-23,000 feet) and had lower odds of being hit.


> The 15th Air Force lost 1,046 heavy bombers to flak, representing 44% of losses to all causes.


Did the 15th Air Force use less B-17's, and more B-24's, B-25's, B-26's, A-20's, and A-26's?


> It's something, angle from which bombers were attacked, that the ORS looked at frequently. Nor were crews reporting such attacks in debriefing.This is testimony to the capability of Schragemusik. Crews and aircraft simply didn't return to base following such attacks.


Wait... if the crews that were attacked rarely returned: How did they determine attack angles? Other crews?


----------



## stona (Feb 18, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> Wait... if the crews that were attacked rarely returned: How did they determine attack angles? Other crews?



No. Some damaged bombers made it back to bases in the UK and some shot down crew members also made it back (returners). Of the damaged bombers examined, most received damage from flak, but of those that had been engaged by fighters almost all had been engaged from a low angle off.
The issue with gaining intelligence on Schragemusik was its devastating effect. It was in effect a surprise attack with 20mm cannon at point blank range. Bombers simply did not survive to return damaged. If any crew returned they would have no clear idea of how they had been attacked. Other crews certainly did witness Schragemusik attacks. The Luftwaffe used very 'low glimmer' tracer in these weapons so observers saw no stream of tracer, just a sudden explosion. This was not interpreted as a bomber exploding but as some kind of pyrotechnic designed to undermine morale, it was even given an appropriate name 'Scarecrow', despite never existing.
I have read extensively the research of Bomber Command's ORS and refute absolutely the notion that
_"Bomber Command were amazingly complacent about some things and seemed to have had an amazing level of corporate resistance to change."_
Certainly as far as loss rates and casualties are concerned. A vast amount of effort went into understanding why and how losses were incurred and how they might be mitigated.

As far as targeting goes, that is another question altogether. Harris was convinced, and he was not alone, that a general bombing campaign was the correct use of his force and argued strongly against its diversion to a targeted campaign, which he saw as taking his foot of the neck of an opponent who was already down, but not yet out. He also had good scientific and statistical evidence to show just how much effort was required to destroy such targets, many transport targets were particularly difficult. He and his ORS had a far better understanding of such factors than Zuckermann and his 'panacea merchants', whose actual knowledge of operations was just about zero.
Did you mean Portal rather than Freeman? Portal's problem was that he too was caught on the horns of a dilemma in 1944. Did he support the Americans and go after oil *(Harris and Bomber Command attacked oil targets more heavily that the 8th Air Force ever did anyway)* or support Tedder and many at SHAEF and go after transport targets? Alternatively he might allow Harris to continue unmolested, but the political pressure to do one of the other two would be considerable. Policy was not always as clear as we might hope and the late war directives were always the result of compromise (an Anglo-American compromise) and were worded in ways that allowed Harris to carry on his campaign whilst conforming to the broad objectives of said directives.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## wuzak (Feb 18, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> Almost on the 60/40 ratio...



Thanks for rounding off for us.




Zipper730 said:


> So up to 69% were caused by fighters (as well as pilot error, mechanical malfunction): Looking at this, I'd have assumed the 69% loss rate (5800 planes) would be the result of day-fighters possessing potentially better agility, better ability to see their targets. The flak-accuracy on this alone appears to be the result of the fact that the USAAF B-17 and B-24's could fly higher (though ironically I was told that the B-24's usually flew at around 21,000-23,000 feet) and had lower odds of being hit.



German Flak had limitations in that the, apparently, did not have proximity fuses. So they would have to estimate the altitude of the bombers and set their fuses for that altitude.

But to think that flak was ineffectual because the B-17s flew higher is mistaken. My understanding is that flak accounted for more casualties in the 8th AF than did fighters, and caused quite considerable damage to aircraft that were still able to return. Flak also had psychological effects on the air crew, as unlike with fighters they could not fight back.

The 8th AF was predominately B-17s, with most of the B-24s transferred to the 15th AF.




Zipper730 said:


> Did the 15th Air Force use less B-17's, and more B-24's, B-25's, B-26's, A-20's, and A-26's?



From what I gather, B-26s were originally assigned to the 8th AF in the ETO but were soon transferred to the 9th AF.

In the MTO the 9th and 12th AF used both B-25s and B-26s.

A-26s were assigned to the 9th AF (ETO) and 12th AF (MTO). I think the same for the A-20.

These flew completely different mission profiles than the heavies, usually shorter ranges and at low to medium altitudes.

Reactions: Funny Funny:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## wuzak (Feb 18, 2017)

stona said:


> Policy was not always as clear as we might hope and the late war directives were always the result of compromise (an Anglo-American compromise) and were worded in ways that allowed Harris to carry on his campaign whilst conforming to the broad objectives of said directives.



The same could be said of teh 8th AF, which followed the directives but was allowed to attack other targets when not needed for the Transport Plan, or when specified targets were obscured by cloud and their preferred targets (oil) were not.


----------



## stona (Feb 18, 2017)

wuzak said:


> German Flak had limitations in that the, apparently, did not have proximity fuses. So they would have to estimate the altitude of the bombers and set their fuses for that altitude.
> 
> But to think that flak was ineffectual because the B-17s flew higher is mistaken. My understanding is that flak accounted for more casualties in the 8th AF than did fighters, and caused quite considerable damage to aircraft that were still able to return. Flak also had psychological effects on the air crew, as unlike with fighters they could not fight back.



The very action of forcing the bomber to fly higher also reduced their accuracy, making the sort of precision bombing US doctrine had advocated, impossible to achieve.
The Americans were well aware of the problem. Attached is a page from an 8th AF Bombing Accuracy analysis which shows both the decrease in accuracy with altitude and the trend to ever increasing bombing altitudes that was forced on the bombers in an effort to reduce losses.






Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Feb 18, 2017)

Bomber Command scientists kept track of losses, issuing monthly summaries. Particular raids were investigated when circumstances warranted. For, example, in August 1942. Bomber Command's ORS investigates two raids on which unusually high losses were recorded, raids against Kassel (9.8% losses), and Saarbrucken/Nuremberg (11.5% losses). Various sources were used in the analyses, from the crew after action reports and bombing photographs, to signals intercepts. It was concluded that during the attack on Kassel en route losses to flak had been unusually high and conditions in the target area had been ideal for fighter interception. During the second raid it was determined that there had been a record number of controlled fighter sorties, and that again the weather conditions were ideal for fighter interceptions. There were also indications that some bombers were suffering fuel shortages.
The overall conclusion (ORS B 120 'Investigation into the Bomber Losses Sustained on the Nights of 27/28th and 28/29th August 1942') was

_"on both of these nights weather was ideal for fighter interceptions"_

But the increased efficiency of both radar controlled flak and fighter control was recognised.

There were any number of reports of this type, all investigating losses and trying to discover means of mitigating them, issued throughout the war. The number B 120 of the report above, in the autumn of 1942 gives a clue. There were four different series of reports (G, S, M and B. The B series alone, which included 'Interim Raid Reports' is numbered 101-237. There were 141 G reports, 243 S reports and 160 M reports). Between its establishment in September 1941 and the end of the war, Bomber Command's ORS issued 681 reports, at a rate of about one every two days, a considerable effort.

Harris would later write.

_"...Bomber Command's Operational Research Section's investigations always enabled us to know exactly where we stood. In August [1942], they reported that in the previous two months between a third and two thirds of all our losses - our total losses amounted to 5.6% of all sorties - were caused by radar assisted enemy defences, which included radar assisted guns as well as ground controlled fighters. They also estimated that effective countermeasures against radar transmissions would probably cut our losses by about a third, and, because bombing accuracy was seriously diminished by the strength of enemy defences in the target area, would increase the efficiency of our attacks. In fact, there was so strong a case for the immediate use of radio countermeasures that we made another application to the Air Ministry, asking them to be provided at once; we said this was a matter of the greatest importance and urgency."_

I don't see much evidence of complacency there.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## wuzak (Feb 18, 2017)

Excellent information Steve.

Interesting that the B-24 had less accuracy at all altitudes.


----------



## fubar57 (Feb 18, 2017)

wuzak said:


> Thanks for rounding off for us.



LMAO!!!! Thought the same thing


----------



## ChrisMcD (Feb 18, 2017)

stona said:


> I have read extensively the research of Bomber Command's ORS and refute absolutely the notion that
> _"Bomber Command were amazingly complacent about some things and seemed to have had an amazing level of corporate resistance to change."_
> Cheers
> Steve



I would simply cite Harris's resistance to the setting up the the Pathfinders, his opposition to guidance from his superior Freeman and his opposition to providing aircraft for Coastal Command.


----------



## pbehn (Feb 18, 2017)

stona said:


> The Luftwaffe used very 'low glimmer' tracer in these weapons so observers saw no stream of tracer, just a sudden explosion. This was not interpreted as a bomber exploding but as some kind of pyrotechnic designed to undermine morale, it was even given an appropriate name 'Scarecrow', despite never existing.


For the crews in Bomber Command it was impossible to gauge losses. They took off about a minute apart and then hoped they wouldnt see another plane until they landed. A raid could have light losses but some squadrons almost wiped out or heavy losses with some squadrons unaffected, those collecting information on a group still did not know the bigger picture. The legend of scarecrow grew in some squadrons who by chance suffered few losses but saw many explosions.


----------



## Zipper730 (Feb 19, 2017)

stona said:


> No. Some damaged bombers made it back to bases in the UK


Okay


> some shot down crew members also made it back (returners).


They were rescued...


> Of the damaged bombers examined, most received damage from flak, but of those that had been engaged by fighters almost all had been engaged from a low angle off.
> The issue with gaining intelligence on Schragemusik was its devastating effect. It was in effect a surprise attack with 20mm cannon at point blank range. Bombers simply did not survive to return damaged. If any crew returned they would have no clear idea of how they had been attacked. Other crews certainly did witness Schragemusik attacks.


Makes sense


> The Luftwaffe used very 'low glimmer' tracer in these weapons so observers saw no stream of tracer, just a sudden explosion.


So it was just enough for the night-fighter crews to see but little else?


> This was not interpreted as a bomber exploding but as some kind of pyrotechnic designed to undermine morale, it was even given an appropriate name 'Scarecrow', despite never existing.


Yeah, I heard of that


> As far as targeting goes, that is another question altogether. Harris was convinced, and he was not alone, that a general bombing campaign was the correct use of his force and argued strongly against its diversion to a targeted campaign, which he saw as taking his foot of the neck of an opponent who was already down, but not yet out. He also had good scientific and statistical evidence to show just how much effort was required to destroy such targets, many transport targets were particularly difficult.


True, but it was doable.


> Bomber Command scientists kept track of losses, issuing monthly summaries. Particular raids were investigated when circumstances warranted.


When losses went unusually high or unexpected things happened?


> The overall conclusion (ORS B 120 'Investigation into the Bomber Losses Sustained on the Nights of 27/28th and 28/29th August 1942') was
> 
> _"on both of these nights weather was ideal for fighter interceptions"_


Clear sky, moonlit night, stuff like that? I do remember that they sometimes used day fighters to augment night-fighter attack.


> But the increased efficiency of both radar controlled flak and fighter control was recognised.


Sounds about right


> There were also indications that some bombers were suffering fuel shortages.


Holes in the tanks or nav spoofing?


> The very action of forcing the bomber to fly higher also reduced their accuracy, making the sort of precision bombing US doctrine had advocated, impossible to achieve.


True, and one thing that made the RAF probably able to meet accuracy similar to ours even at night


> The Americans were well aware of the problem. Attached is a page from an 8th AF Bombing Accuracy analysis which shows both the decrease in accuracy with altitude and the trend to ever increasing bombing altitudes that was forced on the bombers in an effort to reduce losses.
> View attachment 366013


The B-24 had substantial deficiencies in accuracy at all altitudes when one looks at the ability to place the bombs within 500-feet of the aiming point; it is interesting to note that the accuracy did get proportionally less at 24,000 feet and above, and within 1000 yards of the aiming point, the B-24 actually slightly beat the B-17, though I doubt that figure is all that important.



wuzak said:


> Thanks for rounding off for us.


I see your point


> My understanding is that flak accounted for more casualties in the 8th AF than did fighters, and caused quite considerable damage to aircraft that were still able to return.


Casualties aren't actually the same as aircraft losses, there were people killed in planes that landed just fine.


> Flak also had psychological effects on the air crew, as unlike with fighters they could not fight back.


Never thought of it that way


> The 8th AF was predominately B-17s, with most of the B-24s transferred to the 15th AF.


That makes some sense, during the summer I talked to an elderly man who had a hat on with U.S.A.A.F. and 15th Air Force on it, and that started up a conversation. He was a B-24 electronics warfare guy.


> From what I gather, B-26s were originally assigned to the 8th AF in the ETO but were soon transferred to the 9th AF.
> 
> In the MTO the 9th and 12th AF used both B-25s and B-26s.


Those were all TacAir units?


> A-26s were assigned to the 9th AF (ETO) and 12th AF (MTO). I think the same for the A-20.


The A-26's were some pretty cool aircraft actually.


----------



## fubar57 (Feb 19, 2017)

You must be fun at parties

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Funny Funny:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Feb 19, 2017)

It is important to note that whilst Harris was fundamentally opposed to forming what he called an elite force, independent from the regular squadrons, he was not against the target finding concept. It was an independent path finding force to which he objected. He wanted to form a specialist squadron within each Group for 'target finding'.
He was also intensely irritated by the attitude of a handful of young officers (like Group Captain Bufton, Deputy Director of Bombing Operations), based in London who were convinced that the Command could become a precision force if only Harris would take their advice. It clearly could not, and few commanders would be inclined to take the counsel of a group so inexperienced.
The debate dragged on into June when the Chief of the Air Staff (Portal) ruled in favour of the Air Staff's proposal for an independent force and Harris was obliged to set up the PFF, under Bennett, on 11th August 1942.
The PFF quickly achieved a better concentration of bombing. Between March and August 1942 35% of bomb release photos were plotted within three miles of the centre of the bombing concentration (also called the Mean Point of Impact (MPI) ). Between August '42 and March '43 this figure rose to 50%. The problem is that the MPI and aiming point are not the same thing. The accuracy of the attack was just as important as the bombing concentration, and here the PFF was rather less successful. In the same period the percentage of bombing photos taken within three miles of the aiming point rose from 32% to just 37%. This spread between the concentration values and the accuracy values became known as the 'systematic error' (roughly equivalent to a US 'pattern error') and vigorous action was taken to improve the accuracy of the marking. Accurate marking would mean a good concentration of bombing across the target rather than the surrounding countryside.
No.5 Group developed its own PFF within the Group and developed its own tactics and techniques. This was more in keeping with Harris' concept of a target finding force, though the Group's path finding squadrons did develop into something of an elite within the Group.
It would become obvious that one specialist squadron per Group would not provide sufficient aircraft for the complicated system of marking, backing up and adjusting that became a feature of Bomber Command's raids in 1944/5; by April 1945 No 8 (PFF) Group comprised 19 squadrons.. This was NOT obvious in 1942.
Ultimately the development of more accurate and better bombing techniques went hand in hand with technological developments, better bomb sights and navigational aids, better pyrotechnics and marking systems, most of which did not exist when Harris took over and when the PFF was formed.
Automatic bomb distributors were not introduced until 1942 across the command.
It wasn't until late 1942 that the Mk XIV bomb sight was being fitted as standard to all new aircraft.
GEE was introduced from March 1942.
The first OBOE use was in December 1942, the system allowed the 'Battle of the Ruhr' to be fought in March and April 1943.
New and more reliable and accurate barometric fuses for flares were developed in 1942/3.
The first target indicator bombs would not be used operationally until January 1943.
The development of path finding and the eventual success of the force shows that Harris should probably not have argued against its formation, until ordered to concede. Any idea that its formation two or three months earlier would have had the sort of radical effect on bombing accuracy envisaged by men like Bufton is not supported by the historical facts.
We have the benefit of hindsight, we know these and any number of other advances would be made. Harris may have lacked foresight, but he didn't have a crystal ball either. It is easy, with our hindsight, to criticise decisions made in the midst of war.


As for Coastal Command, it was a shambles in the first two years of the war, under equipped, flying obsolete or obscolescent types and with low morale across the organisation. It was the Germans, making the famous 'Channel Dash' that finally concentrated British minds on the need for some sort of offensive capability within the command.
Harris simply argued for his own force, as any good commander would. He believed that any diversion of resources away from his campaign against Germany, the only one the British were fighting directly against the Reich, was a waste of resources.
The argument was not just between the two air force Commands, but was wider, between Harris representing the RAF and the Admiralty. There was merit in both sides of the argument. In the long run the war would be won by destroying Nazi Germany and Harris found it hard to accept that this would require a united effort from all three services. In 1942-3 it was the U-Boat threat that seemed to pose the greatest threat, at worst severing Britain's transatlantic lifeline with potentially war losing consequences, at best it could inhibit the build up of US forces which would eventually be required for an invasion of continental Europe.
In the long term Harris was right. Battering Germany would be Bomber Command's major contribution to victory in Europe.
In the short term the Admiralty was right. The next step in winning the war was defeating the U-Boats in the North Atlantic.
However, the U-Boats were defeated and I've never seen any sensible argument that the Anglo-American-Canadian (with a few extras) invasion could have been launched a year earlier, no matter how many troops from across the Atlantic had made it to Britain.
Harris continued to batter Germany, so in the end he was at least not wrong.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Feb 19, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> Okay
> They were rescued...



Some may have been, but usually it meant that they had evaded capture and returned to the UK, typically with the help of one of the established Resistance networks.



Zipper730 said:


> So it was just enough for the night-fighter crews to see but little else?



That was the idea. The position of the fighter would not be given away by a stream of tracer.



Zipper730 said:


> When losses went unusually high or unexpected things happened?



The reports were standard procedure. Unusually high losses would cause further investigation to establish the cause.



Zipper730 said:


> Holes in the tanks or nav spoofing?



Poor fuel economy or navigation, unexpected adverse winds were the more usual causes, though a substantial reserve was included for all operations some aircraft did suffer fuel shortages.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## yulzari (Feb 19, 2017)

The RAF conducted extensive testing of no allowance shooting with upward slanting cannon apart from the recent Defiant practice so the Luftwaffe practice should have come as no surprise.


----------



## Robert Porter (Feb 19, 2017)

stona you have the patience of Job!

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Feb 19, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> Okay
> They were rescued...
> Makes sense
> So it was just enough for the night-fighter crews to see but little else?
> ...



How many times do people have to ask you to stop quoting every post in the damn thread in one post???

Is it really difficult for you to break it down, or are you just trying to be difficult to piss people off?

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Feb 19, 2017)

yulzari said:


> The RAF conducted extensive testing of no allowance shooting with upward slanting cannon apart from the recent Defiant practice so the Luftwaffe practice should have come as no surprise.
> View attachment 366171
> View attachment 366172



Numerous British specifications of the inter war period required various systems for 'no allowance' shooting.
It was the increase in armament, which led to the armament being positioned away from the fuselage and in or on the wings that led to the abandonment of the requirement. This went hand in hand with a huge increase in the speed of fighters too.
Schragemusik was not a surprise to the British, they understood perfectly how it worked. It just took some time for the evidence that the Luftwaffe was using such a system to be gathered and confirmed.
Cheers
Steve

Edit. Thinking about the fixed angle of a Shragemusik installation, it would not always have been exactly a 'no allowance' system, dependent upon the speed of the fighter. We can imagine that, to an observer in the fighter, the stream of projectiles might appear to curve backwards or forwards. In a perfect 'no allowance' solution they would appear to take a straight line to the target. Given the short range at which the system was used this is hardly relevant, but it is a valid point and might help in an understanding of exactly what 'no allowance' means.


----------



## pbehn (Feb 19, 2017)

For information

Asperger syndrome - Wikipedia


----------



## stona (Feb 20, 2017)

Re Pathfinder Force

I though some might like to see what Donald Bennett wrote about Harris' visit, in October 1942, to the recently established PFF at Wyton. By the way, there goes another Harris myth, that he never got 'out and about' to see the men under his command 
Bennett wrote of the visit that it was 

_"an inspiration and a stimulant of the greatest value...the personnel of the PFF are all most impressed by the interest you are showing in their work and in their results. It is a tremendous incentive to them."_

This is fairly typical of Harris. He opposed the formation of an elite force within Bomber Command, but once it was a 'fait accompli' he supported it and backed it. He was even solicitous of Bennett's personal safety. In August 1943 when Bennett asked for an exemption from the rule which forbade AOCs from flying on operations so that he could act as Master Bomber on the Peenemunde raid, he was told in no uncertain terms that he was far too valuable to be allowed to go.

_"You must give up the idea of going on operations for an indefinite period. We depend very largely on your personal knowledge for the exploitation of Pathfinder methods during the next critical months...and you know too much. If you are taken prisoner the Germans have their own means and methods of extracting information involuntarily, and I have no intention of allowing to operate these methods on key personnel."_

There was no answer to that, though Bennett did try unsuccessfully to be allowed to fly a Berlin raid the same year.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## stona (Feb 20, 2017)

ChrisMcD said:


> I would simply cite Harris's .....opposition to guidance from his superior Freeman and his opposition to providing aircraft for Coastal Command.



A little more on this. When Harris took over as Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, before taking over at Bomber Command, he was involved in naval matters. He re-established his working relationship with Tom Phillips, now Vice Chief of Naval Staff, in November 1940. It was to him he offered his thoughts on convoy defence against U-boats and long range aircraft. He also urged the adoption of the catapult fighter. Soon afterwards he was advising his old friend Portal along similar lines and also suggesting ways of protecting coastal shipping.
The question of how far the bombers of Coastal Command should be allowed to attack objectives not directly connected to naval warfare was raised, as was the far more fundamental question of who should own the Command. In November there was serious discussion about transferring Coastal Command to the Admiralty, prompted by Beaverbrook, but the Admiralty had for some time been seeking to re-establish control over what it called 'shore based aviation' meaning Coastal Command. In December the Defence Committee's decision was that operational control, but NOT command would rest with the Navy. It was Harris and Phillips who formed a small sub-committee to work out how this might be done. The remarkable cooperation which was to exist between Coastal Command, still part of the RAF, and the Navy is testament to their work.
Harris had no doubts about the critical importance of the U-boat war, however much he disagreed with the Navy of the roles of air power in fighting it. He accepted that the essential minimum of reconnaissance and striking effort should be put into the convoy areas to keep the submarines down and make them 'less resolute' in their attacks. He foresaw the advantages that ASV radar would bring and, as he told Professor Blackett (personal scientific adviser to C-in-C Coastal Command) that the B-24 would be the best aircraft for the job. He was correct on both counts. However, he made it clear to both Portal and Phillips that the correct use of the bomber force was to attack the German and French ports and factories where what he called 'the kernel' of the problem was to be found, not to waste thousands of hours of flying over wide ocean spaces.

Everything that Harris did as DCAS was to build up Britain's strategic bomber force to carry the war to Germany. He, Churchill, Portal and other senior figures in Bomber Command were reaching the conclusion in December 1940 that Bomber Command would need to target industrial areas as a whole, in a general bombing campaign, to inflict serious damage on Germany.
In December 1940 Harris protested to Freeman about the 2:1 ratio in planned fighter to bomber production planned and, worse in his eyes, the 8:1 ratio planned for purchases from the USA.
Next he had a go at Portal, asking why two fighter forces, one for day, one for night, were required now that the Luftwaffe had switched to night bombing. He also detailed various 'diversions' affecting Bomber Command and taking away many of its crews. This was just about anything that didn't involve bombing Germany, minelaying, the Mediterranean war, Coastal Command duties, the war against the beams, even the increasing demands of Dalton's SOE !
He would write

"One very sure way of losing the war is to reach a condition of stalemate whereby the whole populace becomes fed up with going on with it. If we continue to postpone the development of our bomber potential by such means...we may well find ourselves on the road to this particular kind of ruin."

It worked, in January 1941 the Prime Minister authorised the expansion of Bomber Command.

That's enough for now. These things are never simple, never black and white. Harris argued for the bomber force because he believed it gave a good chance of winning the war, not from some selfish or petty reasons. As I said some time ago, a lot of nonsense is written about him, arguably Britain's most controversial war time commander.

I read an article in the Independent on one of the anniversaries of the Dresden raid that showed such a breathtaking ignorance of the issues involved, even why the raid took place, that I sometimes fear for the memory of not just Harris, but the men who served under him.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
4 | Like List reactions


----------



## pbehn (Feb 20, 2017)

stona said:


> That's enough for now. These things are never simple, never black and white. Harris argued for the bomber force because he believed it gave a good chance of winning the war, not from some selfish or petty reasons. As I said some time ago, a lot of nonsense is written about him, arguably Britain's most controversial war time commander.


Great post Steve, however Harris was made a controversial figure in a process that started even before the war ended. My uncle was in Bomber Command in the early years of the war, invalided out with health problems caused by lack of heated suits. He joined up to bomb Hitlers black heart out and that is what he did. I live close to the ex RAF airfields of Middleton St George and Croft, talking to the elderly in the past who actually lived through it I have not met anyone who didnt have 100% support. I was born in 1959 and have seen the anti Harris rhetoric rise through my lifetime.

Churchill said this July 14 1941
We ask no favours of the enemy. We seek from them no compunction. On the contrary, if tonight the people of London were asked to cast their vote whether a convention should be entered into to stop the bombing of all cities, the overwhelming majority would cry, "No, we will mete out to the Germans the measure, and more than the measure, that they have meted out to us." The people of London with one voice would say to Hitler: "You have committed every crime under the sun. Where you have been the least resisted there you have been the most brutal. It was you who began the indiscriminate bombing. We remember Warsaw in the very first few days of the war. We remember Rotterdam. We have been newly reminded of your habits by the hideous massacre of Belgrade. We know too well the bestial assault you are making upon the Russian people, to whom our hearts go out in their valiant struggle. We will have no truce or parley with you, or the grisly gang who work your wicked will. You do your worst and we will do our best." Perhaps it may be our turn soon; perhaps it may be our turn now.
National Churchill Museum | Winston Churchill's Do Your Worst; We'll Do Our Best Speech


If Russia had fallen there is absolutely no doubt that Hitler would have flattened and starved the UK if he could, Harris was doing his job, I have a dim view of those who change the scope of that job to suit the sensibilities of those born much later.

Reactions: Like Like:
3 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Feb 21, 2017)

pbehn said:


> Great post Steve, however Harris was made a controversial figure in a process that started even before the war ended. My uncle was in Bomber Command in the early years of the war, invalided out with health problems caused by lack of heated suits.



That lack of equipment was certainly NOT Harris' fault either, as your uncle would probably have known.
In 1939 Harris was writing letters to Ludlow Hewitt and any body else he thought could help about all sorts of equipment for both aircraft and aircrew he felt were needed. This varied from windscreen wipers, cockpit heating and armour plating, to bombs and bomb doors, all of which were needed or should be improved. At this early stage he described the Hampden as_ 'typical Handley Page junk' _and his relationship with that company would go downhill from there 

Following the Heligoland Bight fiasco he was describing the Hampden's rear gun mount as

_"a rickety, ill designed, badly made piece of work which would not pass muster as a component of a bit of agricultural machinery."_

In November 1939 he was pressing Tizard over why the RAF still had no self sealing tanks

_"Presumably Farnborough are still trying to make our self sealing tanks sing 'God Save the King', and meanwhile our people will die for lack of them, while our enemies live."_

This month he also pressed Ludlow Hewitt about flying clothing which he considered inadequate and incapable of keeping crews properly warm. He also tackled Farnborough over body armour for air gunners. He had several run ins with Farnborough, which, he thought, invariably dragged its feet, had no concept of the urgency that the war had brought, and was effectively allowing RAF crews to die needlessly.

_"Half the essential equipment which we so urgently require is not at our disposal merely for the reasons that most of the authorities, and Farnborough in particular, cannot get it into their heads that half a loaf is better than no bread, that they will invariably make the best enemy of the good, and the hopeless delays are always occasioned while they try to put final and usually unessential touches to some already reasonable serviceable article."_

This down to earth attitude certainly rubbed some people up the wrong way, but it was the men (and women) of the RAF whose best interests he was fighting for. In later years many of those for whom he fought do seem, somehow, to have understood this.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## pbehn (Feb 21, 2017)

stona said:


> That lack of equipment was certainly NOT Harris' fault either, as your uncle would probably have known.


For those who were doing the job things seemed different to the view from the top. When he joined up my uncle had seen very few aeroplanes and hadn't seen a monoplane. A Hampden to him in 1939 was the ultimate in high tech, it is only when you see better "tech" that you know what is what. He was off flying and in the observer corps before he learned that heating a suit was possible.


----------



## tomo pauk (Feb 21, 2017)

Excellent stuff, many thanks


----------



## Shortround6 (Feb 21, 2017)

Well, one does wonder about some of Harris's biases or prejudices.



stona said:


> At this early stage he described the Hampden as_ 'typical Handley Page junk' _and his relationship with that company would go downhill from there
> 
> Following the Heligoland Bight fiasco he was describing the Hampden's rear gun mount as
> 
> _"a rickety, ill designed, badly made piece of work which would not pass muster as a component of a bit of agricultural machinery."_



From about 1930 to 1939 Handley page had made TWO aircraft that made it into RAF service aside from the Hampden. 
The Heyford and the Harrow. Both built in rather small quantities and in peace time so some sort of acceptance inspection should have caught build quality problems. 
I certainly don't know about the quality of the build of those two aircraft but the designs share as much responsibility with the AIr Ministry as they do the Handley Page design staff as do the Hampden and Halifax. 
I also would think but could be wrong, that bits of kit like gun mounts, would have to be approved by the air ministry regardless of who made them. 

From WIki so could very well be false: 
" He also had a low opinion of the Navy; he commented that there were three things which should never be allowed on a well-run yacht "a wheelbarrow, an umbrella and a naval officer"

Given this opinion of the RN (if true) the idea of letting them use land based bombers for anti-sub use has a slightly different shadow on it.


----------



## stona (Feb 21, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> Well, one does wonder about some of Harris's biases or prejudices.
> From WIki so could very well be false:
> " He also had a low opinion of the Navy; he commented that there were three things which should never be allowed on a well-run yacht "a wheelbarrow, an umbrella and a naval officer"
> 
> Given this opinion of the RN (if true) the idea of letting them use land based bombers for anti-sub use has a slightly different shadow on it.



He may well have said something a lot like that. It's not exactly original, but was in common usage among fishermen and merchant sailors long before Harris' time. It usually lists those three items as the most useless things to have on board, but there are other versions.

"Four things shalt thou not see aboard a yacht for its comfort - a cow, a wheelbarrow, an umbrella and a naval officer"

"Nothing is less useful on a Schooner/goulette than a ladder, a gardening hose, or a Navy Officer"

The origins are lost in the mists of time.

I'm sure he had as low an opinion of some officers both of his own service and the other two.
The facts are that he had a very good working relationship with Phillips and the Naval Staff in general. He did have a very different view from that of the Navy about the roles to be played by air power in the fight against the U-boats, but he always acknowledged that it was a fight that had to be fought. He considered it a better use of his aircraft to attack them where he knew they could be found, in the factories, dockyards and bases.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Zipper730 (Feb 21, 2017)

stona said:


> That lack of equipment was certainly NOT Harris' fault either, as your uncle would probably have known.
> In 1939 Harris was writing letters to Ludlow Hewitt and any body else he thought could help about all sorts of equipment for both aircraft and aircrew he felt were needed. This varied from windscreen wipers, cockpit heating and armour plating, to bombs and bomb doors, all of which were needed or should be improved. At this early stage he described the Hampden as_ 'typical Handley Page junk' _and his relationship with that company would go downhill from there
> 
> Following the Heligoland Bight fiasco he was describing the Hampden's rear gun mount as
> ...


He was blunt and gruff, but he made many good points: I would not have told the contractor his work was mostly junk as I would want to cultivate a relationship that's remotely decent (people who like you tend to cooperate more), though I would tell them if I thought it was unsatisfactory.

The idea of providing heating for crews, body armor were common sense ideas, as were self sealing tanks. I personally also agree that I'd rather have a product that does something adequately well than one that does nothing. I'm not sure if we even realized that in the USAF.


----------



## stona (Feb 21, 2017)

To be fair his remarks about the Hampden were for his fellow officers and the Air Ministry, not Handley Page himself or the company.
Harris certainly had an intense dislike for Handley Page himself and consequently the company. Harris would later suggest that it would be a mistake to cease production of the Hampden, which he described as _"a simplified construction type",_ in favour of the _"over complicated, under-defended Halifax"_. In his campaign to stop Halifax production and increase Lancaster production he could be disingenuous, once claiming that it carried only half the Lancaster's bomb load, which is something of an exaggeration. He described Handley Page as_ "not an aircraft manufacturer, just a financier, with all that implies and more"._ He wrote a formal letter to the Air Ministry about the Halifax III, which was achieving _"no ponderable improvement over its predecessors and whose continued short range was adversely affecting the employment of the Lancaster when the two types were operating together"._ I could give many more examples. Once again, he was only trying to get the best tool for the job in hand, and that was the Lancaster. He was presented with any number of perfectly reasonable and valid reasons why Halifax production could not be converted to Lancaster production without a substantial loss in overall heavy bomber production, but to no avail. 
Nobody would describe Montgomery as an easy man either. Many successful commanders share some of these traits, Dowding was another, though Harris had doubted that he could work with Dowding when he was told that he was to become his SASO at Fighter Command. Dowding had been Air Member for Research and Development when Harris was in Plans and the two had never seen eye to eye. In the end Park went to Fighter Command and Harris to the Middle East, so any friction was averted.
On 7th September 1940 Harris wrote Dowding a nice letter saying
_"All my fellows are full of admiration for the magnificent efforts of the fighters, and are almost getting to the stage where they are beginning to hope that you will leave a few for us."_
There was mutual respect and Harris stood by Dowding following his removal after the BoB. Indeed it was Harris who would later call him
_"the only commander who won one of the decisive battles of history and got sacked for his pains."_

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Graeme (Feb 21, 2017)

pbehn said:


> For information
> 
> Asperger syndrome - Wikipedia



My youngest son has Aspergers - which makes life interesting.

Reactions: Friendly Friendly:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Shortround6 (Feb 21, 2017)

stona said:


> To be fair his remarks about the Hampden were for his fellow officers and the Air Ministry, not Handley Page himself or the company.
> Harris certainly had an intense dislike for Handley Page himself and consequently the company. Harris would later suggest that it would be a mistake to cease production of the Hampden, which he described as _"a simplified construction type",_ in favour of the _"over complicated, under-defended Halifax"_. In his campaign to stop Halifax production and increase Lancaster production he could be *disingenuous*, once claiming that it carried only half the Lancaster's bomb load, which is something of an exaggeration. He described Handley Page as_ "not an aircraft manufacturer, just a financier, with all that implies and more"._ He wrote a formal letter to the Air Ministry about the Halifax III, which was achieving _"no ponderable improvement over its predecessors and whose continued short range was adversely affecting the employment of the Lancaster when the two types were operating together"._ I could give many more examples. Once again, he was only trying to get the best tool for the job in hand, and that was the Lancaster. He was presented with any number of perfectly reasonable and valid reasons why Halifax production could not be converted to Lancaster production without a substantial loss in overall heavy bomber production, but to no avail.



So Basically Harris would _lie_ when it suited him?
"..._under-defended Halifax"_
Now the initial Halifax had no top turret and in fact had an almost identical armament to the Wellington (also under defended?), however by the time the Lancaster reached squadron service the Halifax was being fitted with a similar if not identical top turret and since the belly turret on the Lancaster was essentially useless the MK II Halifax had an identical defensive armament in guns and layout to the Lancaster. The Halifax later got a 4 gun top turret and reduced the nose armament to one gun. But the nose turret was usually one of the first things to go on both planes when special purpose conversions were done. Very late Lancasters did get different armament but that was well after the Halifax vs Lancaster controversy.

"_half the Lancaster's bomb load_, which is something of an exaggeration."
Well this one certainly depends on version and desired range. *Normal max *bomb load for the Halifax was 13,000lbs (at almost absurdly short ranges) compared to 14,000lbs for the Lancaster at a useful range. At somewhat longer ranges we have.
Halifax II.................5250lbs.............1660 mile range..................1500lbs........2100mile range
Halifax III................7,000lbs............1985 mile range..................3000lbs........2510mile range
Lancaster 1&III.....10.000lbs............2250 mile range..................7000lbs........2680 mile range

Now the need for ranges of 2000 miles for most missions is doubtful (under 700 miles from Bristol to Berlin so 2000 miles allows for some large doglegs) and we are back to the incendiary vs HE bomb load problem. Once you shift to incendiaries the load becomes more volume limited than weight limited.
I would also note that the Halifax II figures given above are for Merlin XX engines as originally introduced while the Lancaster figures are for later model Merlins with 200-300 more HP depending on altitude.

Halifax III, which was achieving _"no ponderable improvement over its predecessors and whose continued short range was adversely affecting the employment of the Lancaster when the two types were operating together"_

Well, this is somewhat shown to be, shall we say, _in _*error * by the figures above (taken from the RAF data sheets) and I would note the Halifax MK III had cruising speeds 10-18mph faster than the MK II and within 1-2mph of the Lancaster.
Cruising speeds being both most economical and max lean mixture cruise.

Max take-off weight for the Halifax II was 60,000lbs, for the MK III was 65,000lbs and for the Lancaster 68,000lbs which helps explain the Lancaster's superiority.

Please note that I am NOT claiming the Halifax as as good as the Lancaster, it wasn't. It just wasn't anywhere near as bad as Harris claimed and if fitted with the big vertical stabilizers earlier operational losses _might _have been lowered sooner than waiting for the MK III.

Edit: I would also note that some pilot's notes for the Lancaster give different take-off weights. Early Lancasters _may _have been limited to 63,000lbs max take-off weight before later modifications. Subtracting around 5000lbs from the fuel/bomb-load brings the early Lancaster much closer to the Halifax.


----------



## swampyankee (Feb 21, 2017)

stona said:


> The very action of forcing the bomber to fly higher also reduced their accuracy, making the sort of precision bombing US doctrine had advocated, impossible to achieve.
> The Americans were well aware of the problem. Attached is a page from an 8th AF Bombing Accuracy analysis which shows both the decrease in accuracy with altitude and the trend to ever increasing bombing altitudes that was forced on the bombers in an effort to reduce losses.
> View attachment 366013
> 
> ...



It's interesting the B-24 seems to show better worse accuracy. One wonders if it's a real difference or an artifact of poor test methods.

(Error corrected: better changed to worse; I thank Wuzak for pointing it out)


----------



## wuzak (Feb 21, 2017)

swampyankee said:


> It's interesting the B-24 seems to show better accuracy. One wonders if it's a real difference or an artifact of poor test methods.



It's actually worse - except above 24,000ft where the B-24 gets more bombs inside a 1,000ft circle, but less inside a 500ft circle.

At all the other altitudes the B-24 has less bombs inside both a 500ft and 1,000ft circle.


----------



## stona (Feb 22, 2017)

The problem Harris had with the Halifax, apart from its operational limitations when compared to the Lancaster, was that it killed more of his men than the Lancaster did. He thought that they were being needlessly lost, the solution being more Lancasters. Very often it was a concern for the men under his command that drove his outbursts. He was rather uncomplimentary about the Stirling too.
He was a man frustrated by the red tape of the RAF and Air Ministry, particularly once the war had started.

_"One gets the impression that the automatic reaction to every request is a negative...I have long ago adopted in my own Headquarters the principle that in any matters of everyday routine no-one has the power to say 'no' to a unit. If they think it ought to be said they have to come to me. Yet all our urgent operational requirements seem to go meandering through a maze of offices and, no matter how urgent, to be subjected to endless scrutiny, delay, obstruction, idle chatter and superfluous minuting by whole legions of departmental subordinates, some of whom quite obviously haven't the vaguest idea what it is all about."_

And while they did this, his men were dying.

I have never been able to establish where his utter contempt for Handley Page originated. I thought that it might be in the first war, but if it was I've yet to find where.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Feb 22, 2017)

I may now no a reason for Harris' low opinion of the Navy. When playing rugby for his school's Ist XV (Allhallows Grammar School) he suffered a 156 - 0 defeat to the Royal Naval College Dartmouth 

Re:Montgomery. Harris first met him in 1928 when he was sent by Trenchard and Salmond to the Army Staff College at Camberley, effectively to argue the RAF's case for air power on what was an influential course. The then Lieutenant Colonel Montgomery was on the directing staff, and this is what Harris made of him.

"...a very good soldier who will make a damned good general. Incidentally he is the first soldier I have come across who has a proper grasp of the vital role of a tactical air force in land battles."

When in 1929 Harris moved up to the 'Senior Division', he was the only RAF representative, but now the Navy was also represented by Commander John Leach. It seems Leach was not held responsible for earlier results on the rugby field and the two became, and remained, good friends. Leach (and Phillips) were both killed aboard HMS Prince of Wales in December 1941.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Shortround6 (Feb 22, 2017)

stona said:


> The problem Harris had with the Halifax, apart from its operational limitations when compared to the Lancaster, was that it killed more of his men than the Lancaster did. He thought that they were being needlessly lost, the solution being more Lancasters. Very often it was a concern for the men under his command that drove his outbursts. He was rather uncomplimentary about the Stirling too.



For a person who didn't have an unreasoning hatred of a aircraft company (or it's owner) the first rational step would be find out _why_ there was a difference in losses, then see if the difference/s could be fixed. Step 3 would be to see if the fix/es could be implemented quickly or not and only in the last case, (fix/es could not be implemented or not without undue delay) should the extreme measure of switching production be implemented. Harris did his men no favors by trying jumping to step 4 right away. 
There were at least 3 changes that reduced the loss rate of Halifax's unrelated to the engine switch. 
1. was the change to big fins which eliminated the rudder lock over problem. This _may _have been major. 
2. was the slightly extended wing tips. This may have been minor and more to due with higher operating altitudes?
3. Early Halifax's had a rather strange segregated electric system. 3 engines had generators (1000watt) each of which ran a different part of the aircraft. depending on which engine (or generator) was lost different parts of the aircraft (and different turrets) lost power. Later Halifax's got three 1500watt generators, a bit more battery power and the ability to run all parts of the aircraft from 1 or 2 generators. How big a part of of aircraft losses this was I don't know. Both late model Merlin powered and Hercules powered Halifax's got the new electrical system.
other changes that _might _have affected late war losses were some Merlin Halifaxes got Melrin 22 engines could be run at 7lb boost lean compared to 4lbs lean for the Melrin XX. A bit more power in engine out situations. And the provision in 1944 of a nitrogen purge system for the fuel tanks to reduce the fire risk. 

I will also repeat that Harris (and others) didn't seem to grasp that the goal of anti-sub patrols wasn't to sink to U-boats but to prevent the U-boats from sinking ships/shipping. A bit like Barrage Balloons didn't knock down very many enemy bombers but forced them to bomb from higher altitudes with less accuracy or pick other targets. 
A "spotted" sub, even if not attacked could be plotted and instructions given to convoys to route around known u-boat locations. Subs could be forces to submerge (even without dropping bombs) and movement and spotting restricted. U-boats could only patrol for a certain number of days and the more time spent under water the less productive the patrol would be (a smaller area swept by the u-boat=less chance of finding a convoy or shipping). Attacking U-boats at sea would also be safer for the attacking planes as they only had to worry about the AA guns on the U-boat vs the AA guns defending the port/shipyard locations.

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## Elmas (Feb 22, 2017)

Not to say that sinking a sub at sea meant 50 trained seamen killed.

As if a bombing attack to a pen or to a shipyard could destroy 50 skilled workers together with one half-finished sub.

But probably, when a better idea was formed about the real damage caused to the shipyards

U-boat Archive - British Interrogation Reports

things changed.


----------



## stona (Feb 22, 2017)

Harris, or rather the Air Ministry, did not jump to step 4.

Harris always acknowledged that a certain level of long range reconnaissance in convoy areas was essential. He didn't believe that flying thousands of hours over vast expanses of ocean to find (sink, report, force down, whatever) the U boats was the correct use of his strategic bombing force. It's target, entirely in line with RAF doctrine, was the means to produce the boats, which could be extended to the facilities which operated the boats,where they could surely be found


----------



## Shortround6 (Feb 22, 2017)

No the Air Ministry did not jump to step 4 but if Harris was advocating stopping production of the Halifax and switching to the Lancaster then he did jump to to step 4 and was turned down by the Air Ministry. Perhaps the Air ministry was slow to correct the problems with the Halifax? 

Harris only got Bomber Command in Feb of 1942. At that time the need for using 4 engine bombers as maritime patrol planes was somewhat less than than earlier. No 120 squadron had been using Liberators for a while and were re-equipping with Liberator IIs.

However many people see only black and white. The _need_ for 4 engine long range land planes was probably only 1-2 additional squadrons. Not anywhere near the whole of Bomber Command. It wasn't either or. 

How much Harris had to do with earlier decisions about which planes to transfer to or equip Coastal command with I don't know. But Coastal Command went to war in 1939 woefully ill equipped for it's mission, and even it's supposed salvation (the Beaufort) may have been compromised by the intent to have them suitable for use as land bombers to make up numbers. What was needed were planes like the Wellington or Whitley, assuming they could be had with powerful enough engines and good enough propellers to allow safe single engine flight of water for long distances.


----------



## swampyankee (Feb 22, 2017)

wuzak said:


> It's actually worse - except above 24,000ft where the B-24 gets more bombs inside a 1,000ft circle, but less inside a 500ft circle.
> 
> At all the other altitudes the B-24 has less bombs inside both a 500ft and 1,000ft circle.


Let me correct that post, but the basic question stands: why the difference? Was it a real difference or an error in test or data analysis?


----------



## Shortround6 (Feb 22, 2017)

It may relate to how steady the planes were. I believe (could be wrong) the B-24 had a reputation for hunting directionly/yawing. 
While this _may _not affect the actual bomb release all that much it may make it harder to operate the bombsight, ie actually release the bombs at the proper point. It also meant that B-24 formations tended to be a bit looser than B-17 formations (more space between planes) which certainly does nothing for formation bombing accuracy.


----------



## stona (Feb 23, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> No 120 squadron had been using Liberators for a while and were re-equipping with Liberator IIs.



Harris considered the Liberator the ideal aircraft for this work. He was dismayed by the 8:1 ratio, fighters to bombers, proposed for purchases from the US, though the Liberator would not have been the principle reason.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## stona (Feb 23, 2017)

swampyankee said:


> why the difference? Was it a real difference or an error in test or data analysis?



It's not an error in analysis and the data sample was large enough to have smoothed out any anomalous results. It is, and was considered, a real difference. 
There were many factors affecting accuracy. Relevant for the B-24 might be the size of the attacking force or where they were in that force. The first three Groups over a target in a large attack typically bombed between two times more accurately than succeeding Groups (11% and 5% within 500' of AP and 31.5% and 15.5% within 1000'.)
Cheers
Steve


----------



## Ascent (Feb 24, 2017)

Graeme said:


> My youngest son has Aspergers - which makes life interesting.



Likewise. He takes after his father.


----------



## Zipper730 (Feb 28, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> It may relate to how steady the planes were. I believe (could be wrong) the B-24 had a reputation for hunting directionly/yawing.


Like a slow snaking motion?


> While this _may _not affect the actual bomb release all that much it may make it harder to operate the bombsight


I thought the Sperry was a little less accurate...


> B-24 formations tended to be a bit looser than B-17 formations (more space between planes) which certainly does nothing for formation bombing accuracy.


Of course, bomb-bay of the most outboard planes on either side to the center plane sets the width of the bomb-trains; the interval of release sets the length based on speed, and the CEP is based on the ability to correctly predict all the release variables.



stona said:


> There were many factors affecting accuracy. Relevant for the B-24 might be the size of the attacking force or where they were in that force. The first three Groups over a target in a large attack typically bombed between two times more accurately than succeeding Groups (11% and 5% within 500' of AP and 31.5% and 15.5% within 1000'.)


Questions

How big were the B-17 attack forces?
How big were the B-24 attack forces?
When you say groups, do you mean each box, or do you mean like an air-group (several squadrons)?


----------



## Milosh (Feb 28, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> Questions
> 
> How big were the B-17 attack forces?
> How big were the B-24 attack forces?
> When you say groups, do you mean each box, or do you mean like an air-group (several squadrons)?




Maybe this will help, 8th Air Force Fighter and Bomber Unit Markings, Stations in WW-II

and

Reactions: Informative Informative:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## fubar57 (Mar 1, 2017)

Bookmarked, thanks Milosh

Reactions: Winner Winner:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## nuuumannn (Mar 1, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> It just wasn't anywhere near as bad as Harris claimed and if fitted with the big vertical stabilizers earlier operational losses _might _have been lowered sooner than waiting for the MK III.



Regarding the early Halifaxes, before the Mk.III, I'd be inclined to agree with Harris. We forget just how bad the early Halifax was because of its overall war record and how much of an improvement the Mk.III was over its predecessors - the Mk.III was a good aircraft and exhibited none of the dangerous characteristics and poor performance of the early examples; there was a war on and heavy bombers were required, so despite its many failings, the Hali was pressed on with. In the intervening years its many issues have been glossed over, but it was a basket case. Whilst undergoing trials at Boscombe Down, the service examples demonstrated a loss of speed of 20 mph over the prototypes because of turrets etc, maximum range during trials was decreased from 1,850 miles to 1,700 miles, rudder overbalance managed to destroy one aircraft, killing its crew - this issue alone took many hours and lives attempting to rectify over the subsequent couple of years. The scale of the effort undertaken to fix the type's persistent niggles took three years, in which time it consistently under performed, highlighted more so once the Lancaster began entering trial and service use, and in individual aircraft demonstrated dangerous handling, and shoddy workmanship, resulting in major performance deficiencies. This effort can be seen in the large number of types and sub-types of the Merlin engine examples that were built and the relatively small number of each that were built, after modifications were made on the production line after findings within the A&AEE.

It really was that bad. A good book to read detailing the issues surrounding the Merlin installation on the Halifax is _Rolls-Royce and the Halifax_ by David Birch.

Here's a quote from _The Secret Years, Flight Testing at Boscombe Down_ by Tim Mason;

"During 1942 and later the search continued for a solution to the problem of rudder overbalance thought in view of the Establishment's experience on the Mk.Is to be the cause of some unexplained service accidents and operational losses. The worst case considered was failure (and feathering) of the two port engines with the two starboard engines at take off power. The first modification, late in 1941, of reducing the rudder trimmer movement resulted in excessive foot loads until, on reducing speed to 160mph the rudders violently overbalanced to full travel and the resulting uncontrolled manoeuvre could only be overcome by throttling the starboard engines. 'Noseings', (bulbous nose to the rudders) improved matters such that control could be maintained down to a speed of 140mph with 10 deg bank without over balancing, but with very high foot loads.

Further changes, in mid 1942, to the balance tab and rudder tab settings reduced the foot loads to acceptable proportions, but reintroduced a mild tendency to rudder overbalance. It was decided to check the effectiveness on a representative aircraft. W7197 arrived in December 1942 from 102 Squadron; on the first handling test flight on 4 February 1943, the aircraft crashed fatally. The top half of one rudder had detached in flight - attributed to a violent overbalance leading to loss of control. Further investigation on HR679 (the first production aircraft incorporating the full range of aerodynamic improvements known as Series IA in service, but with rudders similar to W7917). Cautious reduction of speed during steady side slips caused no indication of overbalance until at 120 mph the rudders suddenly moved to full travel of their own volition. The pilot regained control at 150 mph after easing the control column forward; 4,000 ft had been lost in the spiral dive. On a second attempt control was regained by opening up the engines on the inside of the spiral. Later tests with restricted rudder movement reduced the speed at which less violent rudder overbalance occurred.

Cords on the trailing edge were tried but removed after it was found that they had no effect on overbalance and again made the rudders excessively heavy. HR727 had rudders with smaller balance areas which overbalanced at smaller angles; the modification was rejected. It was decided that larger fins were the only effective cure..."

The book goes on to describe the issues surrounding its loss of performance.

Reactions: Bacon Bacon:
1 | Like Like:
1 | Informative Informative:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## Zipper730 (Mar 2, 2017)

stona said:


> The first three Groups over a target in a large attack typically bombed between two times more accurately than succeeding Groups (11% and 5% within 500' of AP and 31.5% and 15.5% within 1000'.)


I'm guessing because the flak would build up increasingly accurate as the force progresses in. They can keep fine tuning things until they start increasingly hitting home right?

When was this realized?


----------



## fubar57 (Mar 2, 2017)

This is fantastic, clicked on the "People You Ignore" button and all the scrolling went away, back to learning. Good stuff Grant

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Mar 2, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> I'm guessing because the flak would build up increasingly accurate as the force progresses in. They can keep fine tuning things until they start increasingly hitting home right?
> 
> When was this realized?





Zipper730 said:


> I'm guessing because the flak would build up increasingly accurate as the force progresses in. They can keep fine tuning things until they start increasingly hitting home right?
> 
> When was this realized?



The problem was caused by various factors, but the most important had nothing to do with the defences. It was simply the obscuring of the aiming point by smoke and dust raised by the first Groups to bomb.
It was realised quickly, you don't need a statistician to tell a bomber crew they can't see the target, but the analysis I quoted is from 1943.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## stona (Mar 2, 2017)

As far as the Halifax's appalling handling, a 1942 ORS report noted

_"A further case of a Halifax returning after being out of control and turning on its back occurred during the raid on Kreveld in October. It is therefore recommended that all possible means of improving performance and stability of the Halifax be given urgent priority."_

This begs an unpalatable question. How many Halifaxes were going out of control and NOT returning to tell the story. Bomber Command's pilots were not all vastly experienced, and the ORS acknowledged that it was most likely that an experienced pilot would survive such an experience, less experienced ones might not.

On 14th November the AOC of 4 Group wrote to Saundby, effectively stating that he would give his new crews further on the job training on the Halifax, building up experience attacking _'fresher'_ (meaning easier) targets. This he acknowledged would mean a delay in getting new crews on operations (we can imagine what Harris thought about that) but was considered worthwhile. Saundby forwarded the letter to Harris whose comment was typically concise.

_"He can try it. It is the aircraft not the crew that require improvement."_

June 1943 it was established that 47% of Halifax crews lost between January and May had less than four operations. It was also established that losses in squadrons which had done fighter affiliation training was appreciably lower. For crews attacking easy targets when evasive manoeuvring was less likely the losses were similar to other aircraft types. The Halifax data highlighted the link between aircraft losses and defensive practices. The Halifax was a demanding aircraft to fly (politely... it was a dog) and its crews needed extra training in aircraft handling to acquire the skills necessary for evasive manoeuvres. So serious was the problem that the Command very nearly issued an instruction that the Halifax should abandon defensive manoeuvring as it actually increased the chances of the aircraft being lost!

In July 1943 Basil Dickins mad a personal visit to Handley Page. Various points about the shortcomings of the Halifax were raised, Dickins emphasised that the

_"known rudder stall problem of the Halifax has possibly caused some casualties directly _[he knew that it had] _and others indirectly owing to induced lack of confidence in the machine."_

Dickins reported on the company director's rebuttals, almost all based on the supposed performance of the Mk III which was due to enter service later that year. Dickins was sceptical.

_"I was left with the feeling that the Handley Page organisation has said its last word in the Halifax III. We should therefore press on with consideration of the best results obtained with this type in order to see if they promise that the machine will meet future operational requirements. If they do not, then we know we have little more to expect from the Halifax and must act accordingly.
With regard to the new fin and rudder I feel we should immediately attempt to get the trial installation at present under test at Boscombe Down flight tested in an operational squadron. If the tests promise well, the greatest possible pressure should be brought to bear in order to speed up the introduction of this modification. Otherwise I fear that the promised introduction in August may be somewhat deferred."_

When Dickins' comments were circulated it was not Harris but the CEngO Air Commodore Roach who replied that Dickins had been given

_"exactly the sort of 'guff' that one would expect a stranger to the Handley Page firm to get from that firm, and I don't think I can answer the minute better than by the C-in-C's own words: "I don't believe one word of the firm's statement, and I have no faith in any promises made. "'_

At the end of 1943 Bomber Command's ORS published its report on the new Halifax tail (ORS S 114, 'A Note on the Losses of Halifax Aircraft with Modified Rudders). It concluded that an analysis of the data had NOT pointed to any appreciable reduction in losses. It included a qualitative comment that there was some benefit to inexperienced pilots using the modified aircraft, but a slight disadvantage to experienced crews who were obliged to use new rather than _'seasoned'_ aircraft. This latter comment was based on comments by Wing Commander Smith Eng 3, to an earlier draft. He had noted that crew took a while to get a feel for a new aircraft and that newly assembled controls were

_"stiffer so manoeuvrability may not be so good."_

In view of this a slight diminution of the loss rate might be expected in the future.

In February and March 1944 figures were established showing that the comparative loss rates for the Halifax and Lancaster were still heavily weighted in favour of the Lancaster.
Harris received a report on the March losses which showed just how bad the new Halifax III was doing when compared to the Lancaster.

_"The Halifax III is sustaining 30% higher loss rate than the Lancaster and having regard to the smaller bomb load of the Halifax the relative usefulness of these two aircraft may be given as 1: 2.6."_

Now, we might think that the Halifax III became a competitive aircraft and that most of the issues were solved, but we are not among the extra 30% of men dying bombing Germany.
It was following this that Harris sent his 'Top Secret and Personal' letter to Freeman at the MAP, copies to the CAS and Secretary of State, in which he argued for the replacement of the Halifax with the Lancaster. Harris, most senior officers in Bomber Command and the boffins of the ORS now knew that the Halifax was not, and never would be, the aircraft that the Lancaster was. Harris concluded.

_"On the whole, therefore, it is apparent that my prognostication that the Halifax III would be in the same position by next Autumn as the Stirling and Halifax II and V are today, shows every indication of coming true."_

We can look at performance figures and argue from the safety of our armchairs that the Halifax III was an aircraft in which Handley Page had largely solved the issues with the type, but the simple fact is that the substantially higher loss rate of the type was costing Bomber Command more young lives than was the Lancaster. That's why Harris (and others) argued so vehemently against the Halifax and for the Lancaster.

Cheers

Steve






"

Reactions: Bacon Bacon:
2 | Like Like:
2 | Informative Informative:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## fubar57 (Mar 2, 2017)

Thanks Steve, was totally unaware of the issues surrounding the Halifax. I'm surprised that over 6000 were made

Reactions: Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Mar 2, 2017)

fubar57 said:


> Thanks Steve, was totally unaware of the issues surrounding the Halifax. I'm surprised that over 6000 were made



In fairness to the Mk III it did do better than Harris' worse fears in the latter stages of the war. On 26th October 1943 Harris confided in Portal that he hoped he might be mistaken about the Halifax III, the opinion he formed based on the data from February and March 1943. In truth he wasn't, the Halifax always suffered higher loss rates for a lower return on investment than the Lancaster.
A Halifax consumed 60 man months of effort per ton of bombs dropped, three times as much as the Lancaster's 20 man months.
An analysis of operations against targets in Germany between 1st June and 15th September 1943 showed that the Lancaster suffered a loss rate of 3.5% and dropped 112.6 tons of bombs per aircraft lost. The figures for the Halifax were a 5.4% loss rate and just 45.5 tons of bombs dropped per aircraft lost.

Harris' attitude to Handley Page, the firm and the man, was certainly based in some kind of personal antipathy, but his opinion of the Halifax was always based on the best data he had available. ALL the data showed that the Lancaster was a superior aircraft to all Marks of Halifax in every respect.

Eventually, on 21st December 1943, there was a formal meeting at the MAP (chaired by Portal who, whilst less critical of the Halifax III supported Harris in his convictions about the superiority of the Lancaster, which could hardly be disputed) to discuss the vexed question of heavy bomber production. To cut a long story short, it was clear that only if the war lasted well into 1945 would switches in production start to have significant effects. The MAP agreed to investigate the options available, but it was made clear that Harris would be operating through 1944 with the types and quantities of aircraft he had and was expecting to receive.This is why nearly 6,200 Halifaxes were eventually built.

I think Harris was correct about the Halifax, but he could be wrong, and when he was he could be very wrong! Writing to Freeman in April 1942, about the Mosquito, he reckoned that it would suffer

_"a still grimmer fate than has always been the lot of such naive attempts to produce an aeroplane so much faster than anything the enemy posses that it requires no armament. It will go down in history in consequence as a second 'Battle' as far as its bombing role is concerned."_

Actually Arthur, no it won't 

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Informative Informative:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## pbehn (Mar 2, 2017)

It just shows that pilots recollections of an aircraft should be viewed for what they are. I have read pilots saying they preferred the Halifax to the Lancaster, obviously unaware of the statistics posted above.


----------



## stona (Mar 2, 2017)

pbehn said:


> It just shows that pilots recollections of an aircraft should be viewed for what they are. I have read pilots saying they preferred the Halifax to the Lancaster, obviously unaware of the statistics posted above.



I have too. On the bright side, if they did get shot down, which was more likely statistically, they did have a better chance of escaping their doomed aircraft.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## buffnut453 (Mar 2, 2017)

pbehn said:


> It just shows that pilots recollections of an aircraft should be viewed for what they are. I have read pilots saying they preferred the Halifax to the Lancaster, obviously unaware of the statistics posted above.



For the most part, pilots will defend the aircraft they are currently flying. After all, they must have faith that the aircraft will do its job and bring the crew home safely. If the pilots doubt that simple fact, then they wouldn't get in the aircraft in the first place. Some of it may well be bravado and some self-motivation (perhaps even self-deception). However, pilots are human beings and confidence in the tools they are given is vital to them doing their job successfully. It is precisely that confidence that enables pilots of lower-performing types to go into combat against better aircraft and strive to succeed through better tactics or other non-performance measures (eg outright numbers).


----------



## pbehn (Mar 2, 2017)

buffnut453 said:


> For the most part, pilots will defend the aircraft they are currently flying.



Generally pilots who flew both types flew the Halifax first, as Stona said many liked the Halifax because it had more room and was easier to escape from, since they survived the war they were at the time unaware how much more likely crews needed to escape.

Reactions: Informative Informative:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Mar 2, 2017)

buffnut453 said:


> For the most part, pilots will defend the aircraft they are currently flying. After all, they must have faith that the aircraft will do its job and bring the crew home safely. If the pilots doubt that simple fact, then they wouldn't get in the aircraft in the first place.



This is very true. I would have to look up the details, but one of the early ORS reports which showed the adverse statistics for Stirling and Halifax losses had its circulation severely restricted (it certainly did *not* go to the Groups as would have been normal practice) for almost exactly that reason.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## Milosh (Mar 2, 2017)

This could be controversial.

Non British RAF bomber squadrons got the Halifax because it was the 'lesser' a/c; British RAF bomber squadrons got the Lancaster because it was the 'better' a/c.


----------



## stona (Mar 2, 2017)

Milosh said:


> This could be controversial..



Not really, because it's not true. 6 (Canadian) Group did fly largely Halifaxes (28,126 sorties in the type), but then so did 4 Group, and far more (45,337 sorties in the type). Many of the Canadian squadrons which would transfer to 6 Group on its formation did serve first in 4 Group.

1,3 and 5 Groups largely avoided the Halifax (2 Group is not relevant here) but then 3 Group suffered some bad losses flying the Stirling, a type which the Canadians avoided altogether.

The phrase 'swings and roundabouts' comes to mind.

Even 8 (PFF) Group flew the Halifax and suffered a 3.7% loss rate with it, considerably worse than its loss rate on Lancasters at 2.3%.

In Groups other than 6 Group, Commonwealth nationalities were usually mixed up with British crew members anyway, even in, for example, a nominally 'Australian' squadron. At least one 'Australian' squadron had a majority of British air crew (No. 467) and the same may well apply to other Commonwealth squadrons if anyone can be bothered to look them up.

The reason that 6 Group was so Canadian is, essentially, that the Canadian government paid for it and enough Canadians volunteered to staff it, something along with their losses we should never forget.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## pbehn (Mar 2, 2017)

I read in a post here a long time ago that regardless of the nationality of a squadron almost all flight engineers were British because there was no training scheme set up in Canada.

some more info here.

RAF - Bomber Command No.6 (Royal Canadian Air Force) Group

As the squadrons converted from Wellingtons through Halifax IIs and V's and Lancaster IIs to Halifax IIIs and VIIs and Lancaster Is, IIIs and Xs, many transfers occurred from station to station. Of all the RCAF squadrons of No. 6 Group, No. 419 alone remained at the one station, Middleton St. George, from the formation of the Group until the end of the war. It was to this squadron, incidentally, that the first Canadian-built Lancaster (Mark X), KB700, the famous Ruhr Express, was delivered, after flying three operational sorties with No. 405 Squadron in No. 8 (PFF) Group as "LQ-Q". With the Moose Squadron it became "VR-Z" and flew a further 46 operational sorties before being destroyed in a crash at Middleton St. George on returning from Nuremberg - its 49th op - on the night of 2nd/3rd January 1945.


----------



## buffnut453 (Mar 2, 2017)

Thanks for the detailed response, Steve. Admittedly, I don't know much about Harris but he does come across as being vitally interested in "his boys" irrespective of their country of origin. If there were a nationality bias, one would expect it to show in Commonwealth squadrons routinely receiving the latest equipment last but that simply isn't borne out by the facts. Some RCAF and RAAF units received the Lancaster in 1943 while others soldiered on with the Halifax until 1945. The same could be said of mainline RAF squadrons.


----------



## pbehn (Mar 2, 2017)

buffnut453 said:


> Thanks for the detailed response, Steve. Admittedly, I don't know much about Harris but he does come across as being vitally interested in "his boys" irrespective of their country of origin. If there were a nationality bias, one would expect it to show in Commonwealth squadrons routinely receiving the latest equipment last but that simply isn't borne out by the facts. Some RCAF and RAAF units received the Lancaster in 1943 while others soldiered on with the Halifax until 1945. The same could be said of mainline RAF squadrons.


As per my previous post, a Canadian squadron received the first Canadian built Lancasters, this may have meant them having to stay on Halifaxes longer than neccessary.


----------



## Milosh (Mar 2, 2017)

pbehn said:


> I read in a post here a long time ago that regardless of the nationality of a squadron almost all flight engineers were British because there was no training scheme set up in Canada.



Most engineers were trained in the United Kingdom, but about 1,900 engineers eventually graduated from the Flight Engineers School in Aylmer, Ontario, once it opened in July 1944.

The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan - The Second World War - History - Remembrance - Veterans Affairs Canada


----------



## stona (Mar 2, 2017)

No. 419 (Moose) Squadron converted to the Lancaster in April 1944. I very much doubt that the Canadians were holding out for a Canadian Lancaster, though there was obviously a propaganda opportunity there.

I did read somewhere that there was an intention to create a Canadian Group flying Canadian built Lancaster Xs, discussed back in May 1942 . How relevant this was to eventual equipment schedules I can't say.

Cheers

Steve

Edit. See my later post. I think Pbehn was quite correct in suggesting that the delay in conversion of the Canadians to the Lancaster was related to the delays in the production of Canadian built aircraft.

Reactions: Informative Informative:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## pbehn (Mar 2, 2017)

Milosh said:


> Most engineers were trained in the United Kingdom, but about 1,900 engineers eventually graduated from the Flight Engineers School in Aylmer, Ontario, once it opened in July 1944.
> 
> The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan - The Second World War - History - Remembrance - Veterans Affairs Canada


Good info, but the 49,808 pilots trained for RCAF RAAF RNZF and RAF puts it into perspective.


----------



## stona (Mar 2, 2017)

I've just had a flick through some notes about the establishment of The Canadian Group.
Harris seems to have decided to equip the Canadian Group with Halifaxes in late June 1942, about a month after the original decision to equip it with Lancasters. It seems that it was the government in Ottawa, not the British who wanted to create an entirely new Canadian Group, with all the infrastructure to be built, despite an acknowledgement that this might delay the training and equipment of the new Group on four engine machines. It was certainly Ottawa's intention that the Group should be equipped with Canadian built Lancasters. many senior RCAF officers disagreed, but the Canadian government was convinced that 'Canadianization' would proceed more quickly in a new formation.
Harris' decision to equip this new Group with the Halifax was based on his suspicion that

_"The Canadians will not produce enough Lancasters to equip a Group, or for that matter even to provide OTU backing and equipment for one Squadron."_

He was correct. In September 1941 the Canadian Minister of Munitions and Supply (C.D.Howe) had agreed that the Canadians would produce just 250 Lancasters at a rate of 15 per month, starting _"as soon as possible in 1943". _This schedule could not possibly equip a Group and with no British built Lancasters to spare, except at the expense of existing RAF squadrons, Harris made an easy decision.

I will try to dig out more on this later. I know that the Canadians objected to the Wellington, assigned as an interim measure, and were unhappy about the Halifax, though the reason seems to have been that they thought it only reasonable that the Canadians should operate Canadian built aircraft. The problem was that these were simply not available in 1942, or even 1943 for that matter.
I do know that on 26th September 1942 Freeman ruled that the

_"Canadians were not to get more Lancasters than they were producing in their own country."_

In a way the Ottawa government was hoist by its own petard. It wanted to operate Canadian built Lancasters, but in the absence of any they got the Halifax. To the government in Ottawa it was a question of supply.Once the Canadian Lancaster Xs started to roll off the production lines at Victory Aircraft in Toronto there would be a greater security of supply to the Canadian Group than if it had to depend on an allocation of British built machines.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Informative Informative:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Mar 2, 2017)

The first RCAF squadron to convert to Lancasters was No. 426 which traded in its Wellingtons for Lancaster IIs in June 1943. Harris noted that the Canadians

_"have been promised and deserve one Lancaster squadron."_

No. 426 was joined at Linton on Ouse by No. 408 later that summer when it converted to the same type. Harris believed it right to divide the Lancaster II squadrons between 3 and 6 Groups, while taking advantage of the Canadian's experience with the Hercules engines with which the Lancaster II was fitted.
The Canadians did not, in the end, have to wait for the Canadian built aircraft to arrive.

No. 405 Squadron, in 8 (PFF) Group began converting to Lancaster Is and IIIs in August 1943. This was obviously on British built aircraft as Victory Aircraft produce its first Lancaster X the same month. 'Spirit of the Ruhr' was delivered with much fanfare to No. 405 Squadron in October. The problem for the Canadians, and particularly the government in Ottawa, so keen to equip its Group with Canadian built machines, was that this was little more than a publicity stunt. The aircraft itself was not operationally ready and only 13 more Lancasters were built in Canada during the rest of 1943. It was not until March/April 1944, when No. 419 Squadron received its Canadian built aircraft that even one Canadian squadron was so equipped.
Even the nationalistic Air Marshall Harold 'Gus' Edwards responded to the charge that the Canadians

_"did not get good aircraft._..[and] _found themselves last in line for new aircraft and improved technology..."_

In a fairly straightforward, Canadian way (or maybe Lancastrian, though he emigrated as a very young man). It was, he said 

_"an absolute lie."_

He probably got on well with Harris 

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Informative Informative:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## nuuumannn (Mar 2, 2017)

Good info Steve, a question, do you live at the National Archive?  Is that how you have access to all the official documentation? Thanks for sharing it all, by the way.


----------



## pbehn (Mar 2, 2017)

I started to read up and collect some data about this. I feel a close affinity to the RCAF aircrew though I never ever met one. Middleton St George was an RCAF airfield, it is now Durham Tees Valley Airport my local airport, it is so close that I walked there to see an air display in the 1970s (I took a train back). I also raced motorcycles at Middleton's satellite airfield Croft where the commentator spoke from the old control tower.
I just point out the following.
The number of Halifaxes in service reached its peak in mid 1944 so it was clearly not only Canadian and ANZAC squadrons got Halifaxes many RAF squadrons did too. Canadian airmen were in service in the RAF from 1941 No6 group was formed in October 1942. The Lancaster was preferred on long range missions like the battle of Berlin so it is a matter of debate whether you were actually better off being in a Lancaster or Halifax squadron. Here in the North East of England it is completely understandable why those in the North East of England should be used to mine sea lanes in the North Sea. Harris wanted rid of the Stirling and then the Halifax, On any particular mission your chances of survival was better in a Lancaster compared to a Halifax and even more so to a Stirling however your chances of being on the next mission to Berlin also were greater if you flew a Lancaster. If anyone can provide any proof that RCAF or RAAF and RNZF squadrons were given inferior planes and more dangerous missions then I am willing to read what they have to say. From my point of view missions were planned based on the best way to execute the mission, squadrons were formed based on the availability of aircraft and the experience of the aircrew/ground crew. Canadian squadrons were formed in the North of England and that puts a geographical aspect to mission planning. Personally I just salute each and every one of the guys who did their bit.

Reactions: Agree Agree:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## Milosh (Mar 2, 2017)

RAF bomber bases map, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/...AF-Bomber-Command-base-in-England-mapped.html

Click on the base and there is a short history and lists a/c losses by type.


----------



## Airframes (Mar 3, 2017)

Quite a useful graphic, but note that a number of the bases shown were handed over to the USAAF, and some others were not strictly Bomber Command.


----------



## stona (Mar 3, 2017)

nuuumannn said:


> Good info Steve, a question, do you live at the National Archive?  Is that how you have access to all the official documentation? Thanks for sharing it all, by the way.



It all started many, many years ago with an investigation into the loss of a relative who had been a navigator flying with Bomber Command. This was the first step at the top of a very slippery slope, and what's, whys, hows and wherefores of Bomber Command have become something of a passion (the boss would say obsession) over the last thirty years or so. 
I'm always happy to share. The bombing offensives (we should never ignore the Americans, though I know less about the nuts and bolts of their effort, or the personalities) were the first of their kind and nothing like them will ever happen again. The more we can understand them the better, we won't ever get a chance to look at anything comparable.

I also find myself more frequently defending Bomber Command, and most particularly Harris, the one man who many associate with the organisation, from increasingly serious charges founded in a profound ignorance of what actually happened and how the campaign developed. This ignorance is displayed by reasonable and well educated people who really should know better, but who are not prepared to make the effort to establish the real facts when they might get in the way of a sensational story. A headline featuring the phrase 'war crime' tends to attract attention. So called popular history and the ever decreasing quality of journalism generally do not help. I was recently given a book which purported to show that the Germans had raided the Isle of Wight to attack a radar station there. There is not one shred of evidence to support this contention and what little supposedly solid evidence the author provided was easily refuted with less than half a day at TNA, leaving nothing but some hot air and conjecture... and yet someone was happy to print it

I fear for the reputation of Bomber Command in the future. My post war generation, some of whom have really made the effort to understand what their fathers or grandfathers did will not be here in another twenty years or so. Then what?

Steve

Reactions: Agree Agree:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Mar 3, 2017)

I've attached a map of No 6 Group's bases.
Apologies to the source (which was Canadian) as I don't seem to have noted it in my file.







6 Group ended up in this area, which from the point of view of operational flying was not ideal. Smoke and industrial haze were a problem, the bases are surrounded by higher ground and are further from the targets than bases to the South or East. It was the Canadian government that over ruled plans for the Canadians to simply take over 1 Group (sandwiched between 4 and 5 Groups in Lincolnshire and South Yorkshire) which many Canadian and British officers considered the best and easiest way of creating the Canadian Group, when it decided it wanted an entirely new Group and organisation.
Much of East Anglia was already reserved for the burgeoning needs of the USAAF. The Pathfinders were based there, as was 3 Group, still flying Stirlings which needed every bit of assistance they could get. Thus it was to the Vale of York, between York and Middlesborough that the Canadians were sent, much to the dismay of many Canadian airmen who arrived at muddy camps consisting of nothing but grim Nissen huts, in the middle of nowhere, sometimes miles from the nearest town or railway station, and in a part of England that while noted for its rugged natural beauty (it is stunning) was far from cosmopolitan.

Cheers

Steve

Edit: The map is from 'The Crucible of War - The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force'. I'm not sure which volume, but credit given.

Reactions: Informative Informative:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## Airframes (Mar 3, 2017)

Good stuff Steve, and thanks for the warning about that book on the alleged raid on the IoW.
I saw it listed on the publisher's web-site, and considered buying it, just out of curiosity. Sounds like it might make a reasonable movie, in a similar vein to 'The Eagle Has Landed', but not much else !
Back in the early 1980's, I spent a couple of weeks touring around, visiting every BC airfield in the Vale of York, some still active at that time, but I'm dashed if I can find the photos I took at the time.


----------



## pbehn (Mar 3, 2017)

stona said:


> Thus it was to the Vale of York, between York and Middlesborough that the Canadians were sent, much to the dismay of many Canadian airmen who arrived at muddy camps consisting of nothing but grim Nissan huts, in the middle of nowhere, sometimes miles from the nearest town or railway station, and in a part of England that while noted for its rugged natural beauty (it is stunning) was far from cosmopolitan.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve








To clarify Stonas post, this is what a Yorkshire Nissan hut looks like, Allerton Castle used by the RCAF high command in WW2.

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Winner Winner:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Mar 3, 2017)

Airframes said:


> Good stuff Steve, and thanks for the warning about that book on the alleged raid on the IoW.
> I saw it listed on the publisher's web-site, and considered buying it, just out of curiosity. Sounds like it might make a reasonable movie, in a similar vein to 'The Eagle Has Landed', but not much else !
> .



That would be about the best we could expect of it 

I have opened up a sideline recently, looking at German airborne operations. There seems to be a prevalent notion that such an operation might have been successful in the Folkestone area as part of 'Sealion' (though this ignores the disastrous operations and losses suffered by German airborne forces in Holland). 
Having read Karl-Heinz Golla's book on the Fallmschirmjager and Lieutenant Colonel Brongers book for a Dutch view of the German operations in his country, I thought that maybe the Isle of Wight might have been raided by similar forces, but it turns out that, according to the author, it was just a couple of dinghy loads of commandos....ridiculous to anyone with the slightest notion of how such an operation might actually have been carried out (see Operation Biting, that's how it's done).
Cheers
Steve

Reactions: Informative Informative:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Mar 3, 2017)

pbehn said:


> View attachment 367330
> 
> 
> To clarify Stonas post, this is what a Yorkshire Nissan hut looks like, Allerton Castle used by the RCAF high command in WW2.



That would be some Nissen hut!
Unfortunately that's not what they found at Linton on Ouse or most other bases.
I was fortunate to spend a day in York early this week with a few hours free. It's a beautiful place. I visited the railway museum and had a great time, despite no particular interest in trains or railways. It's a fantastic place and FREE, though I did make a reasonable donation. The Church charged me 15 quid to see the Minster!!!! 

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Funny Funny:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## pbehn (Mar 3, 2017)

stona said:


> That would be some Nissan hut!
> Unfortunately that's not what they found at Linton on Ouse or most other bases.
> I was fortunate to spend a day in York early this week with a few hours free. It's a beautiful place. I visited the railway museum and had a great time, despite no particular interest in trains or railways. It's a fantastic place and FREE, though I did make a reasonable donation. The church charged me 15 quid to see the Minster!!!!


Did you go to Bettys Cafe to see the mirror? In the sixties I have vague memories of Nissan huts all over the place, some were still at Keldy castle camp and some next to Pickering castle where my uncle was custodian. I think a substantial part of the UK population lived in them 1939/45 also the POW population as you can see at Eden camp. My father was on the railways, he worked on or fired three of the locos in the Yorkshire Railway museum and also the Nigel Gresley, in his last days he was one of the few left who could fire up a steamer in the sidings where he worked.
Bettys Mirror

Reactions: Bacon Bacon:
1 | Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## Airframes (Mar 3, 2017)

If you ever get back to York, Steve, try to get out to the Yorkshire Air Museum at Elvington. It's just around 8 miles from the city center, and well worth a visit.
It was the base for two Halifax squadrons, of the Free French, and apart form the aircraft and many very interesting exhibits (including the part replica, part real Halifax MkIII), the remaining wartime buildings, including Nissen and Maycrete huts, the T2 hangar and the control tower, have been preserved and fitted out as they were in wartime.
There's an impressive memorial to the French crews on the approach to the village itself, just about a quarter mile from the airfield entrance, and the 'Grey Horse' pub in the village does a good B&B rate (or did when I last visited).
Here's a couple of general shots, showing the Nissen hut of the French Officer's Mess, with the NAAFI Maycrete hut alongside, now the museum restaurant, and the control tower (or Watch Office, in WW2 RAF parlance).

Reactions: Bacon Bacon:
1 | Like Like:
3 | Winner Winner:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Mar 3, 2017)

That will be on my list next time. Thanks for showing, and very nice photos too.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## Airframes (Mar 3, 2017)

You're welcome Steve.
Karl (Rochie) and I have been a few times over the last three or four years, and I posted a thread covering one visit, back in 2013 I think, when we went there with Jan.
Time for another visit I think ..........


----------



## pbehn (Mar 3, 2017)

I won my first motorcycle race and broke my collar bone in my last one at Elvington, it was a bit alarming one weekend when a parachutist landed on the hairpin half way through a sidecar race.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Funny Funny:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Mar 3, 2017)

I forgot Betty's mirror. I didn't have time to see it, though I am aware of it....maybe next time, along with the air museum!
Cheers
Steve


----------



## pbehn (Mar 3, 2017)

stona said:


> I forgot Betty's mirror. I didn't have time to see it, though I am aware of it....maybe next time, along with the air museum!
> Cheers
> Steve


If you stay in a hotel near York have your breakfast at Bettys it is great to see the city coming to life, most times of the year it is getting packed by 10.30 AM and after 11 in summer people queue to get in, it is ridiculously popular. At the height of summer you could drive to Bettys in Northallerton and be served more quickly than waiting in the queue there.


----------



## nuuumannn (Mar 3, 2017)

Like YAM; great place; not least because of their repro Halifax.

Steve, I also find myself defending both Harris and BC among peers, few really understand Harris and how effective a leader he was.

I like what Hastings said about him in his book _Bomber Command_;

"Harris was an inflexible man, chronically resistant to negotiation and compromise, who treated those who disagreed with him as mortal enemies. He seemed driven, in the words of one historian, by an 'elemental tenacity of purpose'. This was a quality that would earn him many enemies and abrupt dismissal at the end of the war. But it is a most useful characteristic on the battlefield. Harris was a nerveless commander of great forces, and the history of warfare shows that such men are rare. His very insensitivity rendered him proof against shocks and disappointments. He possessed the considerable gifts of clarity of speech and purpose, and from the moment he became C-in-C at High Wycombe, he infused these into his entire command. He was never afraid of taking decisions. He made his officers at every level feel that they were now part of a great design instead of merely running a ramshackle air freight service exporting bombs to Germany."

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## pbehn (Mar 3, 2017)

nuuumannn said:


> Like YAM; great place; not least because of their repro Halifax.
> 
> Steve, I also find myself defending both Harris and BC among peers, few really understand Harris and how effective a leader he was.
> 
> ...


Most of what I read about Harris makes me seethe. Nuuumans post describes almost everything that is required and desired of a commander in difficult times, post war it may be regretted how many civilians died but that is certainly what he was employed to do and at the time he and his staff had the support of the vast majority of people in the UK.


----------



## nuuumannn (Mar 3, 2017)

Just as an aside, whilst in York, not far from Elvington is Breighton, which used to be a BC base; the Real Aeroplane Company is based there. Great stuff. Not far from Howden, too; former bomber base and site of the Airship Guarantee Company's shed, where R.100 was built. The base of one of the big sheds is still there.


----------



## stona (Mar 4, 2017)

Hastings has also written some less flattering things about Harris. It is Hastings that has suggested that at 'morning prayers', when Harris was presented with various potential targets, he invariably chose to attack an area target. It is certainly true that Harris preferred an area target, but not that he invariably chose one. Perhaps the single most important deciding factor was weather, and when this was anything but ideal, and it was often far from ideal, an area target was the correct choice. Actually it was not really a choice, it was the only sensible option, given the accuracy of H2S bombing. When the weather allowed, a considerable effort was made against the 'panacea' targets. This may have been against Harris' better judgement, but he did it anyway.

I don't find Harris to have been invariably inflexible either. He could be persuaded, but only by solid evidence. If the available evidence persuaded him that he should undertake a certain course of action he would. He certainly backed the PFF, but only after it had been more or less forced on him. The evidence showed that it almost immediately increased the concentration if not the accuracy of bombing, which to Harris was a step in the right direction.
If the evidence persuaded him to the contrary then he could be inflexible, his resistance to the Transport Plan is a good example, founded on solid data that showed what a huge effort most of the targets in that system actually required, as opposed to that which others less qualified supposed they required.
I would agree that he was resistant to compromise. He viewed any compromise in terms of a dilution of effort, and he was not much for negotiation which would lead to such compromise.

I don't find Harris insensitive either. He was acutely aware of his losses and, contrary to much written about him, actively argued, cajoled and demanded systems and equipment which might mitigate them. I would say, unscientifically, that Bomber Command's ORS only expended more effort on developing means of increasing bombing accuracy than it spent on understanding the causes of losses and developing ways of mitigating them. This aversion to losses was a trait shared by many senior officers of his generation, including Montgomery for whom he had great respect. It was also something many senior American officers simply could not understand about the British.
Many of the officers who worked closely with him were not only respected him and were unswervingly loyal to him, they actually liked him. 
Sam Elworthy, as Wing Commander Ops 1b, got off to a disastrous start with Harris whilst briefing him on the use of increased incendiaries in bomber loads, so bad that Harris fired him. A few days later he was summoned back to the C-in-C. According to Elworthy's account Harris said.

_"I don't think I was altogether fair. I lost patience with you because I wasn't in sympathy with what you were telling me. It wasn't your fault, you were telling me what you were told to. If you're prepared to stay I'd like you to do so. If in the light of what I said to you the other day you want to leave I shall quite understand."_

Elworthy did stay.

Even R V Jones was surprised when he finally bearded Harris in his den to find that Harris not only received him pleasantly, but spoke with great common sense and allowed Jones to personally brief the crews targeting the V-1 sites. He would later write.

_"I was dismayed that Harris was appointed C-in-C, he had been so critical of electronic warfare, but who else could have stood up to what we had to do?"_

Diana Collins, wife of Padre John Collins (a man who contrary to popular writing had a friendly relationship with Harris, despite their very different views on bombing) often visited the Harris with her husband. She would write.

_"Arthur, when not too exhausted or weighed down by his responsibilities, was very good company. With his wife, Jill, he enjoyed entertaining, and was a humorous, somewhat cynical observer of the human comedy, witty and amusing, and never pompous or self admiring."_

This from the wife of a man that the press of the day portrayed as an arch enemy of Harris! 
As an aside, there was a thread sometime back in which some photographs of demonstrations against the buying of Japanese goods were posted. I thought I recognised the clergyman in one of the photos. I can't find the thread, but I think that the clergyman in question might be Collins.

The image of Harris that most people have gathered from the writing about his military career is very one dimensional, and has no understanding of the man himself.

He certainly was a driven man. He believed absolutely that, in Bomber Command, he had been entrusted with a tool which might potentially win the war and he was guilty of a blinkered vision. He was also fundamentally wrong, though neither he, nor anyone else, could have known so at the time.
No bomber force has ever won any war single handed, no war has been won by air power alone, but it doesn't stop people trying. The contribution of air power to the winning of conflicts has been immense, and it was in WW2.
In Harris' time, as he said himself, winning a war by _'bombing......has never been tried, and we shall see'. _
Well, we did see. It is others who have failed to learn the lesson, but this does not reflect on Harris. Modern writers often fail to make the distinction.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Bacon Bacon:
4 | Like Like:
2 | Winner Winner:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## michaelmaltby (Mar 4, 2017)

well said ....


----------



## pbehn (Mar 4, 2017)

stona said:


> This aversion to losses was a trait shared by many senior officers of his generation, including Montgomery for whom he had great respect. It was also something many senior American officers simply could not understand about the British.



Great post Steve.

British commanders had historically taken care to avoid losses, well at least the good ones did. The first world war with its madness of attrition was a bit of an aberration. Wellington took steps to protect his troops for the simple reason that he didnt have many and there was a huge difference between a trained, experienced regiment and a bunch of civilians with matching clothes and a new musket. Montgomery and Harris were both drawing on the same comparatively small pool of men and machines. The British armed forces already relied on people from the commonwealth and occupied countries, there was not an endless supply of Poles and Czechs coming to the UK and their was not an endless supply of young men in UK and elsewhere to be "called up". The US eventually had to conserve its assets in both men and machines by bringing in such things as escort fighters and even an apparent madman like Stalin learned that you cannot continue indefinitely sacrificing divisions and executing generals.


----------



## stona (Mar 4, 2017)

pbehn said:


> The first world war with its madness of attrition was a bit of an aberration.



I believe it is here that lie the roots of that British (and Commonwealth) aversion to losses. It also underpinned Harris' determination that no such situation would be allowed to develop in Europe again, and his belief that air power could prevent it by denying the enemy the means to fight such a war (or any war).

You would have thought that the American Civil War would have taught the Americans a similar lesson, but then by WW2 it was just about fading from living memory, and there wouldn't be any 100 year old officers still active .

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Robert Porter (Mar 4, 2017)

I hardly think the Americans were not adverse to losses. Read a few of their biographies. But they tended to have a more get it done mentality. I agree the British experience in WW1 was probably why British officers were less likely to be adventurous with their men than a similar American officer. The civil war, while in the more distant past, set the tone for American officers for generations. Of course by the North. (Since I moved to the American South I have learned the proper name for the American Civil war is actually the War of Northern Aggression. ) 

You can see that attitude in McAulliffe's reply of Nuts when being offered surrender terms during the Battle of the Bulge. American units did on occasion surrender when faced with overwhelming odds but much more often than not preferred to fight on. American military culture is/was vastly different from most European versions in that American troops were given far more latitude and often told "what" to accomplish as opposed to "how" to accomplish it. Especially seasoned troops. 

I had occasion to witness this in action myself, I met with a group of British sailors that had taken an in port tour of an American missile frigate. We were all at the NCO club (I was transiting duty stations and stayed at a naval base) and the Brits were both shocked and in awe at the informality of American sailors to their officers. The lone American sailor in the group said he was in awe of the tradition of British sailors being allowed alcohol on board.


----------



## stona (Mar 4, 2017)

You should have seen what happened to the helpful soldier who took me (a civilian contractor) into an office on an RAF station to ask for a first aid kit for my injured hand, but who failed to recognise that the woman he asked was in fact an RAF officer  
(She might have been WRAF back then, it was a while ago.)
Cheers
Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## Robert Porter (Mar 4, 2017)

I know I was far more worried about what my "First Shirt" thought of me than my commanding officer. In all honesty during the majority of my years as active duty I dealt with a lot of officers but at arms length as it were. They never directly tasked us with anything. Because of my duties, when on duty, we were considered one rank above anyone we were dealing with officially. Not in the sense that we would receive a salute but if I told a Colonel to "Freeze" he froze. No Lone Zone violations could and did result in officers being shot with no warning. Not often, but often enough we received a great deal of respect and latitude in our jobs. 

On one occasion I was involved in a situation where an officer, a Major, attempted to bull his way into a secure area without being on the access list. Even though he technically commanded the unit. He tried browbeating us into letting him pass. And was somewhat of an asshole about it. It ended with him stripped to his skivvies and handcuffed to a chain link fence in Nebraska in February. He never did learn and through the whole ordeal continued to threaten us with all kinds of dire consequences. In typical officer fashion they quietly transferred him elsewhere. No it was not a test to see if we could be bullied into a violation he was just an asshole. 

Thankfully officers like him were the exception. When I was based in Wyoming I was a passenger in a vehicle driven by a drunk airman, he crashed the car in sight of the base front gate. I was knocked about pretty good and somewhat the worse for wear. I could have been cashiered just for being involved. But the officer in command of the gate unit quietly pulled me into the gate office before the base LE's arrived and held me there until someone from my unit could come collect me. The only thing he said to me was, "That's your one and only pass. Do it again and I own your ass."


----------



## fubar57 (Mar 4, 2017)

This the thread Steve....?

Boycott Japanese Toys

Reactions: Useful Useful:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Mar 4, 2017)

fubar57 said:


> This the thread Steve....?
> 
> Boycott Japanese Toys


 
It is, thank you.

That clergyman seemed familiar for a reason and I'm now almost certain that he is John Collins. 

This would have been exactly the sort of thing he would have been involved in. He was a founder of both War on Want and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, prominent in the anti-apartheid movement and a member of the Anglican Pacifist Fellowship. Despite all this, and his developing views on bombing and war in general, which were diametrically opposed to Harris', the two men remained on civil, friendly terms.
It was Collin's wartime experience with the RAF, and maybe his association with Harris, which led to his fairly radical views in later life. 

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Zipper730 (Mar 5, 2017)

stona said:


> To be fair his remarks about the Hampden were for his fellow officers and the Air Ministry, not Handley Page himself or the company.


Oh, he was just talking to other RAF officers?


> Harris would later suggest that it would be a mistake to cease production of the Hampden, which he described as _"a simplified construction type",_ in favour of the _"over complicated, under-defended Halifax"_.


The Hampden seemed more maneuverable, but it was slower if I recall?


> He described Handley Page as_ "not an aircraft manufacturer, just a financier, with all that implies and more"._


That doesn't sound good.


> There was mutual respect and Harris stood by Dowding following his removal after the BoB. Indeed it was Harris who would later call him
> _"the only commander who won one of the decisive battles of history and got sacked for his pains."_


I never knew they actually saw eye to eye.


> Harris always acknowledged that a certain level of long range reconnaissance in convoy areas was essential.


What roles fell under coastal and bomber command?

As for the B-24 accuracy issue...


> The problem was caused by various factors, but the most important had nothing to do with the defences. It was simply the obscuring of the aiming point by smoke and dust raised by the first Groups to bomb.


Kind of amazing how something that common sense just completely escaped me.


----------

