# Kriegsmarine and the aircraft carrier?



## Lucky13 (Jan 11, 2014)

Just keep wondering why Germany designed the Graf Zeppelin at 33,550 ton (...and originally 4 in the class). Wouldn't they have been better off slightly smaller ones, 23,000-25,000 ton?
Yorktown class is, what, 20,100 empty and 25,000 fully loaded and they weren't all bad...plus, Ark Royal was 22,000 empty and 28,160 fully loaded....same again, half decent design. 

So, with 4 carriers at 134,200 ton all together, instead for 6 at 141,000-150,000 ton.

Now, I don't know much about the difference between the industrial power of Germany and UK in the late 20's, early to late 30's, but they were in a bit of 'everything that you can do, I can do better', weren't they, would they've been able to do this, getting their differences put aside in the wehrmacht....

How much would this have cost, in fewer uboats?

I can imagine that these could have caused a bit of hassle to the convoys in the Atlantic as well, if, split in 4 there and maybe 2 in the Mediterranean, or?

Plus, the Royal Navy would have a bit to deal with....

In doing so, how would this effected the Pacific War, would USN diverted more ships to deal with these threats, as victory in Europe was at the top of the list....

Would the Royal Navy at arrive in the Pacific, or?

Another thing, could Germany have their alliance with Japan before WWII, to get the blueprints to any of the Japanese aircraft carriers, would any of them have been suitable for the conditions in the Atlantic and North Atlantic?

(something else will probably pop up in me noggin')


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## delcyros (Jan 11, 2014)

Military aircraft carriers are an instrument of sea controll and not sea denial. In order to employ them successfully, You need to be in possession of command of the sea.
In that condition, there wouldn´t be any convoys anymore, too. and consequently, no need for an CV.
Due to the geographical problem, command of the Seas is almost impossible to achieve against the UK. But Sea denial is possible.
For Sea denial You need raiders (aircraft submarine and surface raiders). Altough smaller designs for GRAF ZEPPELIN in fact were considered, the design as executed is the design of a raiding CV. Well armoured, extremely fast (for the standarts of the time) with good endurance and sufficient gunnery to outgun anything it can catch but fast enough to disengage anything it can outgun.


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## davebender (Jan 11, 2014)

If you want to make Germany better off then why not build something they really need?

Graf Zeppelin Info
The German CVs cost about RM 92 million each. Four cost about RM 368 million.

Enough money to pay for a Nibelungenwerk size tank plant (RM 65 million. 320 medium tanks per month.) and the first 2,500 Panzer IVH. If factory construction begins 28 Dec 1936 (i.e. same date as Graf Zeppelin) those 2,500 Panzer IVH medium tanks should be in service during 1939. German panzer divisions would have real tanks rather then Panzer I machinegun carriers. Poland would probably accept a Danzig plebiscite rather then face a well armed German Army and Europe would avoid WWII (at least during 1939).


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## fastmongrel (Jan 12, 2014)

Better qualified people than myself have called the Graf Zeppelin a poor design that would have been a bad seaboat and a poor flight deck. Thats not a critiscism of her designers the USN and the RN had been working on aircraft carriers since before WWI and the Japanese were given a headstart by the British post WWI when they were given designs, planes and advisors wholesale by the RN. You cant just design a fleet carrier and some planes and go off and win battles it takes time to build the knowledge base before you can do that. 

Post WWII a lot of navies were given the entire package carrier, planes, trainers to get the crews up to speed and the technical back up needed but still struggled with the operations for years. Even if the KM got the carriers in say 1942 no way is a carrier going toe to toe with the RN in the Atlantic before they have had years to work the bugs out of there ships.


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## delcyros (Jan 12, 2014)

Most of the german designs, which didn´t went into operational service are blamed by various authors to be poor designs. On the other extreme, many insist in overexageration of their capabilities. One has to be careful not to fall in one or the other extreme.

I for my part, can´t see evidence for poor seakeeping or a poor flightdeck (heck, it´s flightdeck was larger in area than any RN CV ever, does this make ARK ROYAL having a poor flightdeck?) but I can see issues with the 5.9" casematte armement, particularely with regard to wasted internal space.
GRAF ZEPPELIN would be ill suited for classical carrier warfare but indeed appears to be well suited for raiding strategy employed by the KM in ww2.


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## fastmongrel (Jan 12, 2014)

delcyros said:


> Most of the german designs, which didn´t went into operational service are blamed by various authors to be poor designs. On the other extreme, many insist in overexageration of their capabilities. One has to be careful not to fall in one or the other extreme.
> 
> I for my part, can´t see evidence for poor seakeeping or a poor flightdeck (heck, it´s flightdeck was larger in area than any RN CV ever, does this make ARK ROYAL having a poor flightdeck?) but I can see issues with the 5.9" casematte armement, particularely with regard to wasted internal space.
> GRAF ZEPPELIN would be ill suited for classical carrier warfare but indeed appears to be well suited for raiding strategy employed by the KM in ww2.



Hi Delcryos when I said a poor flight deck I didnt mean size of the flight deck but that the flight deck and aircraft handling facilities as a whole were restrictive and poorly designed. I cant remember the exact numbers but Naval experts thought she would have struggled to launch more than 12 aircraft at a time and iirc the lack of a wire overshoot barrier would have meant no landing whilst aircraft were preparing to launch a strike or CAP. The projected seakeeping problems were I believe caused by overweight and a poor stability, she was bulged or meant to be bulged which might have corrected the problems but bulging wont cure poor original design and weight control during building. 

None of this is a critiscism of her designers no one ever got such a complicated vessel right first time look at the first few USN RN and IJN carriers.

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## parsifal (Jan 12, 2014)

I agree that the GZ was a poor design, but only in a few critical areas. This arose because of a lack of experience in the development of carriers. It was highly overpowered, and that may (or may not) have caused poor seakeeping abilities (we dont know how she woul have behaved). Its main problem were the hull mounted 5.9 in casemates, that seemed to reduce the aircraft capacity to about 40 aircraft. Thats about the same as illustrious, but Illustrious was only 2/3 the weight, and in other respects a far better design. 

I actually think if the problems of the GZ could be solved, and thats a BIG if, she would have made a big difference for the germans. but she needed to be ready from the mid 1930's not completing 1939-41. Completing under warime conditions would have left the germans no time to develop appropriate operational procedures for her, and caused her almost certain loss.

She needed different aircraft for a start...the bf 109 may have been a fantastic land based plane, but it lacked the range and the handing capabilities to be considered effective as a carrier fighter. The Ju87 would have been quite effective, but it needed a torpedo carrying stablemate in 1939 to be fully effective. They seemed to have one in the AR95, or the slightly later FI167, but for reasons I dont understand, seemed to abandon both designs despite their promise 

If nothing else, the possession of a carrier in 1938 would have given the LW time to work out better strategies in defeating carrier TFs operating within their range. CVs are both a sea denial (as evidenced in the central med in 1940, and also in the far north in 1943-4) and sea control ship. In the case of the Germans, GZ would only ever have been a sea denial ship, and really needed a sister ship to operate effectively. If the casemates had been ditched, and two ships built, each with an air capacity of 60+ aircraft with purpose designed fighters and balanced CAGs, during their major operations, like the Bismarck, could have broken out with the support of 130 aircraft or so. Bismarck, operating with the two battlecruisers, a better fleet of long range CL/DDs (such as the type M) in a concentrated, well designed team, would have been a major headache for the British. Even the additioan of the CS ships like Graf Spee, though they would have slowed the TG down, would still have been fast enough to stay away from the really gnarly bits of the British Fleet, and have the legs to cause a lot of disruption, AND, have a good chance of getting back in one piece. Classic carrier based sea denial for early WWII. The british certainly thought so and the IJN a t least toyed with the idea in the Bay Of Bengal with Ryujo. The formation of both Fces H and Z were built around that very concept. Fce Z never received its carrier component leaving its heavy unit fatally exposed, but Fce H did a lot of excellent sea denial work, despite being heavily outgunned in most of its operations.


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## fastmongrel (Jan 12, 2014)

Its a pity the GZ didnt get to serve one of the most interesting planes built in Germany the Fi167 would have been its TSR (torpedo spotter recce) aircraft.

Fieseler Fi 167 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## swampyankee (Jan 12, 2014)

fastmongrel said:


> Its a pity the GZ didnt get to serve one of the most interesting planes built in Germany the Fi167 would have been its TSR (torpedo spotter recce) aircraft.



Boy, is that thing ugly.

Back on the carrier topic: the Kriegsmarine would probably require several years from completion of its first carrier to having an effective carrier aviation arm. If the carriers are completed after 1938, they're going to have a negligible effect on the war: the resources that went into building them would have to come from someplace else, and before 1938, Germany wasn't in a position to do any kind of mass looting. Something else would not get built. Submarines? Cruisers? Battleships? Bombers? Tanks? The carriers may do a bit of damage (how much is moot; the I've read that the Germans did not develop a good aerial torpedo before the war), but the missing stuff would have done some, and which was more damaging is difficult. Say, hypothetically, no Tirpitz and Bismarck.


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## parsifal (Jan 12, 2014)

The Fi 167 had a few intersting characterisitcs. Ive read that it had a very low stall speed, allowing it to more or less 'float' in the sky sinking more or less vertically, whilst retaining a more or less horizontal attitude. I think it would have been a great success.

Germany needed a carrier for training purposes from about 1934, if it was to have any hope of putting together a viable fleet air arm. They may have been able to purchase one of the small carriers for that purpose in 1935, after the Luftwaffe was created (in violation of the Versailles treaty). At that time, thre was still some good will between britain and Germany, and it might have been possible to purchase a carrier from the japanese, or perhaps even the Americans. The choioces though a dishearteningly depressing...from Britain the Argus, Furious or hermes, from Japan Hosho, and from the US the langley. none of these are combat carriers, but they could have provided the training ability to properly work up a limited aircrew and train the fleet into being air minded. 

The carrier design process historically was a drawn out, agonizing affair mostly because the Germans only had the most vague of notions about how to go about the design of carriers. ive read that they had inspected the Furious in the early 30's, and had shown some interest in the Soryu. I dont know how much weight should be given to any of those stories, but really, the only off the shelf design they had any hope of getting hold of would be the japanese Soryu class. if they had accepted these, bought the plans and built carriers as designed, they might have had their firs toperational carrier by 1938, and their second by 1940, roughly speaking.

This is pretty rough and ready, and it was precisley this that prevented the germans ever getting their carriers in time. the Germans, with their mania for order and planning, stifled themselves because they did not act quickly when they needed to. This wasnt helped by the prewar assumptions that there would be no war before 1944, and that the enemy would be Fance, not Britain. I think also that like so many of the continental navies, the importance of carriers to naval warfare was badly underestimated. the prewar assumptions by most navies had been that carriers could not operate in the constricted waters of Europe, and that land based air could substitute for carrier based aviation. British experience showed both these assumtions to be totally incorrect. moreover, to argue that carriers were not essential to victory is a major under-estimation of their contributiuon to the war. in the pacific, the effect of carriers should be obvious, but even in the ETO, it is not a stretch to argue that without its carriers, even with all their shortcomings, the allies would have lost the war. It follows that the germans, provided they had a properly constituted air arm and properly designed ships, they could have put an enormous dent in allied war strategy. but whether GZ could deliver that is highly doubtful


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## syscom3 (Jan 13, 2014)

Several years ago, a member of this group completely and thoroughly debunked the idea that a KM carrier could have amounted to much. I cant remember his name, but his dad was a fighter pilot on the Yorktown in 1942. He knew his stuff.


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## fastmongrel (Jan 13, 2014)

swampyankee said:


> Boy, is that thing ugly.



I think it has a kind of functional beauty but I agree it was no looker. It would have been an ideal aircraft for the Atlantic in winter sort of a supercharged Fairy Swordfish, faster but shorter endurance.


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## fastmongrel (Jan 13, 2014)

syscom3 said:


> Several years ago, a member of this group completely and thoroughly debunked the idea that a KM carrier could have amounted to much. I cant remember his name, but his dad was a fighter pilot on the Yorktown in 1942. He knew his stuff.



The major problem I can think of for the KM is lack of a training carrier, GZ is going to spend a lot of time steaming in the Baltic training its crew. When the KM makes its big break out to the Atlantic you have no training carrier how do you train and keep qualified your replacement aircrew.


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## delcyros (Jan 13, 2014)

R_Leonard deserves credit for debunking GZ. But then again, his perception wasn´t mine:

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/lack-german-aircraft-carrier-8375-2.html



> I think it has a kind of functional beauty but I agree it was no looker. It would have been an ideal aircraft for the Atlantic in winter sort of a supercharged Fairy Swordfish, faster but shorter endurance.



When designed, the Fi-167 was faster than the Sea Gladiator at altitude. Stall speed clean was about 32kts power on. Endurance, range and payload were excellent. But indeed a somehow ugly plane...

fuel capacity was max. 1350ltr internal. Fuel consumption at 4500m for Db601A/B at suggested cruise power (1.1 ata = 800hp = 315 km/h at this altitude) is given with 240ltr/hour...


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## stona (Jan 13, 2014)

Parsifal, all three RN carriers you mentioned took part in combat operations as well as their better known roles ferrying aircraft around the world.
I agree they were far from ideal or developed carriers, but they worked, at least in the hands of the RN.
Cheers
Steve


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## parsifal (Jan 14, 2014)

I know that the RN used them for frontline operations, with a lot of success, and even more courage. but these ships were obsolete, and the RN knew it. Hermes was only ever intended to be a "trade protection" carrier, and with an air complement of just 12 a/c and a top speed of 21-23 knots, she was not useful in any sort of fleet work. Argus started the war laid up and was brought back into service as a training carrier. The losses to the carrier fleet meant that she was press ganged into frontline operations, but the brits were always very careful with her, she had virtually no protection, was built to mercantile standards and was very slow.

Furious was part of the hoome fleet at the outbreak of the war, though she too was laid up and non operational in 1939. She served off Norway, both early and late in the war, and was fairly successful, before reducing to training in late 44 (something she was mostly used for for most of the war anyway. She was a half sister to the Courageous/ Glorious, but unlike these ships had not been lavishly converted in the same way. Her aircraft handling arrangements were poor, and her levels of protection, either from bombing or torps, was also very poor.

Yes, for the RN, these ships ended up doing frontline work, but the RN was not being forced to take quite the ri sks the KM was being forced to do when it put to sea, so the lower standards of equipment accepted by the RN would have been a virtual death sentence for the KM, if they had tried to use these old carriers i the same way


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## parsifal (Jan 14, 2014)

> R_Leonard deserves credit for debunking GZ. But then again, his perception wasn´t mine:
> 
> http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/lack-german-aircraft-carrier-8375-2.html




I dont agree with leonard much on this one either. But he does have a lot of knowledge I have to concede.


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## fastmongrel (Jan 15, 2014)

The RN knew most of its carrier fleet was obsolete and obsolescent and planned to build 10 fleet and 2 smaller carriers. Like most of its plans it came to nothing but it shows that the supposedly big gun anti air power Admiralty knew the Battleship was no longer the main ship anymore and planned to build 3 carriers for every battlewagon


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## stona (Jan 15, 2014)

fastmongrel said:


> The RN knew most of its carrier fleet was obsolete and obsolescent and planned to build 10 fleet and 2 smaller carriers. Like most of its plans it came to nothing but it shows that the supposedly big gun anti air power Admiralty knew the Battleship was no longer the main ship anymore and planned to build 3 carriers for every battlewagon



But when did it know that? Before the losses in the Far east only three of the twelve capital ships sunk between September 1939 and November 1941 had been sunk by air attack alone. All three were Italian ships sunk at anchor but not destroyed. 
Twenty eight destroyers and five cruisers succumbed to air attack in the same period. 
Admiral Cunningham, who knew a thing or two about being bombed and torpedoed from the air, wrote in his autobiography (A Sailor's Odyssey) that _"The hasty conclusion that ships are impotent in the face of air attack should not be drawn from the Battle of Crete." _
Cheers
Steve


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## fastmongrel (Jan 15, 2014)

I havent got my books handy but the plans for up to 12 new carriers would have commenced in 41 iirc so the Admiralty must have been talking about it around 38/39 as such a large vessel must need lots of planning. I think the info on the RNs future plans is in a book by D K Brown though it might be from Friedmans book on British carriers.

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## stona (Jan 15, 2014)

Thanks for the info. It's not something I know a lot about specifically, just in relation to other things. I'm only surprised because the Admiralty looked at the effects of aerial attacks on shipping in the early stages of the war and published, in 1941, the imaginatively titles 'Tactical Summary of Bombing Aircraft on HM Ships and Shipping from September 1939 to November 1941'.
High level bombing (from above 9,000ft) was considered ineffective. The Germans abandoned the tactic in May 1940 so they probably agreed.
Low level bombing from around 1,000ft was considered moderately effective against destroyer/escort classes and trawler/auxiliary classes, but not against anything heavier.
Very low level attacks, called 'flat bombing' by the British were usually considered to be machine gun runs, making the use of bombs impractical and exposing the aircraft to anti aircraft fire in exchange for little advantage.
Dive bombing was considered by far the most effective form of bombing attack on ships and the statistics support this. However, what was a relatively easy attack made on smaller vessels unable to elevate their guns above 40 degrees was not so when attacking larger vessels. The Ju 87 would have to dive slowly through an intense barrage. The British reckoned that the Ju 87 dived slower than its US or Japanese counterparts. Another consideration, particularly in Northern waters, was the weather. The Ju 87 ideally needed clear visibility and a cloud ceiling above 10,000ft.
The Germans didn't really have much of a torpedo bomber in 1939/41.
The Navy did not consider its larger vessels to be at serious risk from air attack, though smaller vessels were. Vice Admiral Sir Arthur Hezlet thought so. He dismissed the idea of small warships operating a flotilla defence in the English Channel in the face of German air superiority but others disagreed.

There was a debate pre-war in Britain about what sort of ordnance was best dropped on war ships. Much of the work was carried out by Henry Tizard (who must have been a busy man) and the correspondence between him and Dowding about the failure of RAF bombs to destroy German warships bombed at anchor on 4th September 1939 survives. Dowding had been involved in the earlier 'Job74 Trials'. Basically the RAF was using the wrong type of bomb with the wrong fusing (delay).

The Admiralty report above confirms that the Germans were doing the same thing. German bombs varied from 50Kg to 600Kg (the latter only 2% of those dropped). 70% of bombs dropped were up to 'about 100Kg'. 73% were fused for delay indicating that the Germans did understand the importance of timed fuses.
The figures are based on unexploded ordnance and 'bombs reported'. How accurately those being bombed assessed and counted the ordnance falling on them is open for debate but the figures convinced the Admiralty that the Germans were mostly dropping bombs too small to seriously inconvenience their larger vessels.

I suspect that the move to produce more carriers was based on other strategic and tactical considerations rather than an appreciation of the vulnerability of large vessels to aerial attack. At least in late 1941 the Admiralty didn't consider its larger vessels to be vulnerable at all.

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Jan 15, 2014)

I have to disagree, and at home have material to support a completely contrary view. the Admiralty was first exposed to sustained air attack during the operations off Norway, and the threat of german airpower, combined with the near complete lack of fighter defences forced the british to rely on inadequate AA cruisers as their primary defences. After Norway the conclusions drawn were that there had been insufficient carriers to make a difference, and those that were available were tactically mishandled. The RN did not at that stage operate CAP to any effective degree, and this more than anything had constrained all fleet operations, and forced the British to abandon a number of critical defensive positions, because re-supply could not be adequately put into effect.

After Norway there were small, but very significant changes that made a considerable difference. Fulmars were being introduced as rapidly as possible (and despite the justified criticism of it limited performance, it was, to the Navy, what the Spitfire was to the RAF), Night capable strike squadrons were being trained as intensively and quickly as possible (with devastating and war changing results to come), to allow the fast carriers to hit and run where needed. From a sea control point of view, efforts were being made to change operating procedures. before Norway standard response after a threat was detected, was to strike down all aircraft, including the fighters, fill the avgas lines with inert gas, and deploy the NBCD crews in readiness . certain AA ships were usually deployed within the TD of the carrier to maximize the carriers defence 9these ships needed to have worked closely with the carrier in order to do that....you need nerves of steel and ship handling responses to match to pull this off in combat conditions) and the centre of the TF was no longer the capital ships, they operated in the defensive ring, as part of the screen. The British from a very early stage recognixed that it was the carrier that was the centrepiece of the modern TF and no longer the BB.

But after Norway, it slowly began to be realised that aircraft offred great defensive potential but needed to be airborne in order to provide that benefit. From at least June, possibly earlier, the british began to deploy their fighters in standing CAP and when a threat was detected, launched fighters to boost the defences, rather than strike the airborne ones down. Fighters no longer flew directly over the carrier, wherer the fleet officers had rightly believed they would get in the way of the AA screen, they operated (usually)some miles outside the screen, harrying the attacking formations and breaking up the attackers. Losses to the fighters were low, but frankly, that was irrelevant. the primary mission of a fleet defence is not to rack up impressive scores, its to ensurtre the defence of the fleet by a tight, integrated defence, and in this regard, the British werre unsurpoassed, even by the Americans. Small wonder that Cunningham said what he did. It was because the British realised that a tight defence alowed carrier TFs to operate deep inside enemy controlled territory, with a reasobnable chance of success.

The British indeed planned for additional fleet carriers, and in June 1940 there were 5 fleet and 3 Light fleet carriers in various stages of construction. By comparison, the 4 (or was it 5) battelships, that were on the stocks had already been cancelled. The pressures of war meant that 5 of the 8 carriers were delayed, 1 to 1942, 2 to 1943 and a further 2, the biggest, until 1944. main problem was a shortage of steel and skilled workers to complete the ships, not a false sense of security. In any event, the wemergency escort carrier program beginning with Audacity and the unsatisfactory CAM ships gave the British some time to make do and fill other gaps in their defences, principally their ASw escort gaps. 

but it is quite wrong to suppose that the British were unaware of the threat from the air, or the limitations of their carrier fleet. Atleast from Norway on, they were acutely aware of the limitations of their existing fleet. And they would have much preferred to have done something about it straight away, but limited resources constrained things everywhere, not least in the reinforcement of the carriers.


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## RCAFson (Jan 15, 2014)

FAA radar controlled GCI during the Norway Campaign:

Page 366

This is a must read.

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## fastmongrel (Jan 16, 2014)

Thanks RCAFson thats a great find


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## tomo pauk (Jan 16, 2014)

+1 on that. All together the contribution here is commendable.


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## stona (Jan 16, 2014)

parsifal said:


> I have to disagree, and at home have material to support a completely contrary view. the Admiralty was first exposed to sustained air attack during the operations off Norway, and the threat of german airpower, combined with the near complete lack of fighter defences forced the british to rely on inadequate AA cruisers as their primary defences.



I don't know, this is not my field at all. I'm just paraphrasing the conclusions of the Admiralty's own report.
Some naval officers were certainly running scared of the Luftwaffe. Admiral Charles Forbes told Churchill (who didn't believe him) that he would not bring the heavy ships of the Home Fleet south of the Wash should a German invasion fleet set sail. Churchill later told Forbes (according to Forbes) that he never believed an invasion was possible anyway.

RN losses off Norway _to air attack _didn't amount to much. The only major vessel lost was sunk by gunfire.

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Jan 22, 2014)

> RN losses off Norway to air attack didn't amount to much. The only major vessel lost was sunk by gunfire.


Maybe if the losses are restricted to RN, this might be correct, but i seriously doubt it. i only have figures for allied losses, which includes the norwegians and the french.

According to my sources the allies suffered the following losses 

107 naval ships sunk or captured
c. 70 merchant ships and transports sunk (combined Norwegian/Allied total)

On the naval side of the Norwegian casualties, the Royal Norwegian Navy, fielding 121 mostly outdated ships at the outset of the German invasion, was virtually wiped out during the campaign. Only 15 warships, including a captured German fishing trawler, with some 600 men had managed to evacuate to the United Kingdom by the end of the fighting. The remaining Norwegian naval vessels were sunk in action, scuttled by their own crews, or captured by the Germans. Among the warships sunk in action during the campaign were two coastal defence ships and two destroyers

The British lost one aircraft carrier, two cruisers, seven destroyers and a submarine but with their much larger fleet could absorb the losses to a much greater degree than Germany.

The French Navy lost the destroyer Bison and a submarine during the campaign, and a cruiser severely damaged. The exiled Polish Navy lost the destroyer Grom and the submarine Orzeł

As indicated above, about 70 merchant ships were lost...

Well over 80% of these losses were to airpower. The stukas were everywhere, and were devastating. it was here that the British realized their air defence solutions were inadequate.


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## swampyankee (Jan 22, 2014)

I have no doubt that the KM could develop an effective carrier air arm, given time, but the UK was not (contrary to some opinions) run by raving morons: the government would have changed the defense programs. In addition, the German government, before 1938, had resource constraints (these were relaxed when the Germans were able to loot Czechoslovakia, Poland, France, the Netherlands....), which means that something else would have to be eliminated.

What would the KM have to give up to have carriers? What would the Luftwaffe lose to keep a carrier air group, which would need to be under the KM's operational control, if not ownership?


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## Juha (Jan 22, 2014)

All allied main units lost during the Norwegian campaign, CV Glorious and the two Norwegian coastal defence ships, were sunk by KM surface ships. OK RN CL HMS Effingham was bigger than the Norwegian coastal defence ships, it ran aground and was sunk by a RN DD, and the old AA-cruiser HMS Curlew was not much lighter than the Norwegian coastal defence ships, it was the only one of the bigger ships sunk by the LW.

Juha


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## Wavelength (Jan 24, 2014)

I find that the KM didn't need aircraft carriers at all. However, they did need a shore based airforce built for naval air operations under naval command-not Luftwaffe command.


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## GrauGeist (Jan 24, 2014)

Wavelength said:


> I find that the KM didn't need aircraft carriers at all. However, they did need a shore based airforce built for naval air operations under naval command-not Luftwaffe command.


Herein lies the problem: The Luftwaffe held absolute control over all air ops...from scouting aircraft aboard Kreigsmarine ships, to coastal defense and even AA units attached to Wehrmacht groups.

As far as carriers go, you can only send aircraft so far from land before you have a point of no return. The battle of the Atlantic for the Germans, was left to slow, long range aircraft like the Condor or the U-Boat fleet in general (with the occasional surface raider). Had the Germans built a carrier (or two) and supported it with an effective surface support group, then perhaps it may have done some damage to the Allied shipping and/or surface fleet - but this would be only for as long as the Luftwaffe was able to maintain adequete air cover.

We can look to the Japanese as an indicator of what happens to your carrier fleet when you lose air supremacy.


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## parsifal (Jan 24, 2014)

Wavelength said:


> I find that the KM didn't need aircraft carriers at all. However, they did need a shore based airforce built for naval air operations under naval command-not Luftwaffe command.



How does a well organised land based air (which i do agree was needed) help in situations like Bismark, or later at many oppotunities where the KM simply had to turn around (or not sortie at all) because a carrier was known to be in the area. I believed that Hitler issued a standing order forbidding his heavy ships from taking any risks if there were carriers about. thats one reason why in 1942, inter4est in obtaining a carrier was renewed.

The KM probably needed carriers even more than the RN


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## Nobby57 (Jan 25, 2014)

Not to derail this thread but just one correct point fastmongrel has made '...and the Japanese were given a headstart by the British post WWI when they were given designs, 
planes and advisors wholesale by the RN.' 

I'm sure many of you know this already...We had traitors in our midst most prominent of whom was William Forbes-Sempill, 19th Lord Sempill.

_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YK4dreccM_Y_ (But please try and see the entire programme for balance)


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## nuuumannn (Jan 25, 2014)

> But there a very good documentary (I highly recommend) on the whole affair which explains more clearly, now that many restrictions have been lifted, what happened.



Actually it's rather rubbish. It's poorly researched and written and the tone is highly suggestive and not accurate in its portrayal of attitudes of the time. While both Sempill and Rutland were guilty of supplying secrets to the Japanese, the implication in the documentary is that the two were on the same pegging as Cold War spies, but the situation between Britain and Japan was definitely not the same as between the USA and the Soviet Union post war. Japan was a British ally - granted, between the Treaty of Washington and the invasion of Singapore, Britain's relationship with its ally degraded considerably, this took place over time - even into the mid 1930s, the Japanese were receiving technical assistance from Britain. 

Sempill and Rutland were not supplying British secrets to Japan with the intent of undermining the British, but to assist an ally, which they - and a great deal many people in Britain at the time regarded Japan as such. In the late 1920s, both Rolls Royce, Shorts and Blackburn made overt measures to supply equipment and knowhow to the Japanese to aid in the construction of long range flying boats - something Sempill was involved in as a result of the British Naval Mission of 1921 (not 1920 as the documentary states) - with the knowledge and acceptance of the British government. Included on the list of acceptable equipment was the Kestrel engine, although, as we know, these were also supplied to the Germans in the Thirties. Napier Lion engines were also supplied to the Japanese by the dozen to equip Japanese Army land and Navy carrier based aircraft, as well as civilian machines.

Regarding the British Mission to Japan, this was preceded by an invitation by the Japanese Navy to supply instructors and aircraft, which the British willingly obliged. Prior to this, the Japanese Army set a precedent by inviting the French Armee de L'Air to supply expertise. The Mission personnel returned to Britain in 1923 as a result of the big earthquake that hit the country that year.

The Documentary: The first error is within the first minute with the statement that HMS Eagle was Argus' sister ship. It was not. Eagle was built on the hull of the incomplete Chilean battleship Almirate Cochrane and interms of commissioning dates was fourth in line of British carriers to enter service, beginning with Furious in 1917, then Argus in 1918, then Hermes in 1923, followed by Eagle in 1924. Another error is that Rutland was squadron leader aboard Eagle; he became sqn commander of Furious' 'F' Sqn after Sqn Cdr Dunning lost his life in deck landing trials in 1917. At the time Eagle entered service, Rutland was was a civilian and was about to go to Japan to take up employ with Mitsubishi.

One thing that is annoying about the whole episode of these two men is the implication that their actions deliberately led to the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor, as many newspapers put it sensationally when their activities became public late last century; whilst their influence on Japanese navy doctrine was considerable, its a rather simplistic view and does not take into account that prior to the outbreak of WW2 the Japanese learned everything they needed to know about carrier aviation from the British as a whole, with the aid of the British government. This is, of course not taking the Taranto raid of 1940 into account, which is openly regarded as a big inspiration behind Yamamoto's plans.

The one aspect that this rather sorry documentary does not consider is that it wasn't just the introduction of carriers to the Japanese navy that proved so useful to them, but specifically the use of air launched torpedoes. Along with the British Mission was two different carrier based torpedoplanes, one of which appears in a still in the documentary, a Blackburn Swift, one of three sent and also six Sopwith Cuckoos, the very first carrier based torpedoplane. Instructors from the former RNAS went to Japan to train the Japanese on the use of these aircraft at Kasumigaura and in torpedo dropping over Tokyo Bay; a vital and constantly overlooked ingredient in the rise of Japanese naval air power, as significant as their acquisition of dive bomber knowledge from the Germans. 

It's also often conveniently overlooked that many British individuals sought employment in Japan after WW1 with the offer of lucrative contracts; one of significance is former Sopwith draughtsman Herbert Smith, who was employed by Mistubishi the same year as the British Naval Mission arrived. Smith was resposible for the world's first purpose designed aircraft carrier based fighter, the Mitsubishi 1MF1, or the Type 10 Carrier Fighter and Japan's first carrier torpedo bomber, the 1MT1, or Type 10 Carrier Torpedo Aircraft. This aircraft bears considerable relation to the Cuckoo, which Smith was responsible for draughting, in that it is based on the same tactical ethos, a highly manoeuvrable unarmed single-seater, apart from the offensive element; once the torpedo is released it would rely on manoeuvrability to escape predators - the Japanese aircraft was a triplane. Both the Cuckoo and its immediate replacement in FAA service, the Blackburn Dart worked on this philosophy.

Smith was also responsible for the excellent Navy Type 13 Carrier Attack Aircraft, the B1M1 torpedo bomber of 1923 that, in common with the Fairey Swordfish, outlived its intended successor and proved a superb aircraft, the IJN standardising on it as its carrier based torpedoplane and bomber recon platform throughout the Twenties and Thirties, taking part in Japan's invasion of China. These were replaced in service by the Nakajima B5N in 1938, although they were being used only as recon platforms by then.

This is not to state that what Rutland and Sempill were doing was _legal_, but lets not get carried away by the hype. They felt they were aiding friends, regardless of the naughty implications of their actions, as like I stated earlier, the British government was still supplying the Japanese with technical knowhow for many years after MI5 began investigating both men.

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## Nobby57 (Jan 26, 2014)

I accept your argument *nuuumannn*, but that's not a kop out on my part. Whenever I've been involved in the past on other sites I've often included stuff like this as a means of testing the mettle of a forum and indicating other perspectives to those who may not know. As I'm an alumnus of University of London, Hist (Hons) this method I've found is likely to get some great perspectives from others. And I've now perceived yours but in the debating manner to which I'm sure you are all familiar I take no offence whatsoever...so let the play, play on! (Sorry back to the GZ)


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## nuuumannn (Jan 26, 2014)

Hello Nobby,

What I have written is not an argument, nor is it a criticism of you personally, nor of your credentials. It is an establishment of facts in place of poorly drawn conclusions. My intentions are clear; I think the documentary is not well produced and could be much better than it is. The producers' background knowledge of the subject is lacking and the establishing of an angle is biased and ill considered.

Yes, Sempill and Rutland are guilty of trading secrets, but their motivations for doing so have been roundly mis-represented in the popular press. Yes, Sempill was a difficult character, but such a trait is not necessarily going to lead him to treason. Rutland in particular has been treated rather harshly, all things considered. He was a true aviation hero; few can justifiably claim that title, but he was one who could. His acts in pioneering naval aviation were truly ground breaking, not to mention courageous. He was an extraordinarily gifted pilot with a quick mind; a 'Boy's Own' character and it is sad that his place in history has been overshadowed by his treatment at the hands of those who don't know any better.

One essential ingredient that is missing from analysis of why these people did what they did is emotional. The Far East in the Twenties and Thirties held a mysticism that few who visited from Europe could resist. Although under developed compared to Britain at the time, Japan was full of welcoming, curious people beholden to a culture so vastly different from any in Europe. It would not be too much of a stretch to state that Sempill and Rutland might have been enchanted - they found the Japanese to be smart, quick learners that exceeded the general perception that Europeans held of Asians at the time. Let's not forget that Rutland met and fell in love with a Japanese girl (who doesn't love Japanese girls? ). Perhaps the Japanese were using them and feeling the way they did about their hosts and surrounding meant they were happy to oblige?

This might seem to be a romatic view of events, but it is worth thinking about. There is no evidence that either man deliberately meant harm to his own country in his actions and vilifying them both so many years after the fact is unnecessary.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 27, 2014)

The British had built much of the Japanese battlefleet used in the Russo-Japanese war and the Kongo (lead ship of the Kongo class battle cruisers) was built in a British shipyard with around 200 Japanese personnel observing, learning between 1911 and 1913. The other other 3 ships were built in Japan with varying amounts of assistance (material) from Vickers. 
The Japanese 15th destroyer flotilla (4 destroyers and a light cruiser) was based at Malta in 1917 and co-operated with the British fleet in the Med on convoy duties and anti-sub work. The British bought thousands of Japanese rifles for training during WW I. I find it hard to believe that British-Japanese relations could have deteriorated by 1923-25 to such an extent that helping then with carrier aviation would have considered "treason" _at the time._

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## Jabberwocky (Feb 4, 2014)

davebender said:


> If you want to make Germany better off then why not build something they really need?
> 
> Graf Zeppelin Info
> The German CVs cost about RM 92 million each. Four cost about RM 368 million.
> ...



Man you come out with some wierd stuff. 

A Panzer IVH. In 1939??? Bizarre. 

May as well have German tank division armed with Pz VIs.



davebender said:


> German panzer divisions would have real tanks rather then Panzer I machinegun carriers. *Poland would probably accept a Danzig plebiscite rather then face a well armed German Army and Europe would avoid WWII (at least during 1939)*.



Argument from assertion. What did you base this probability on?


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## GrauGeist (Feb 4, 2014)

Jabberwocky said:


> Man you come out with some wierd stuff.
> 
> A Panzer IVH. In 1939??? Bizarre.


Sometimes ya' just gotta back away quietly and hope they don't notice

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## parsifal (Feb 4, 2014)

weve all done that at some point or other. Just Dave seems to revel in it....


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## nuuumannn (Feb 4, 2014)

> The British bought thousands of Japanese rifles for training during WW I.



The Japanese also assisted in flushing out the German squadron under Maximilian Graf von Spee at Tsingtao, althought their capture of that port was probably borne out of self interest as it was in eradicating the German threat in the region. Nevertheless, Japanese warships escorted the first ANZAC convoys to Egypt through the Indian Ocean; I've seen photographs of the Japanese armoured cruiser Ibuki in New Zealand waters during the war prior to setting sail with the convoy.

The British were to later mutter under their breaths at the lack of military assistance by their erstwhile allys in hunting the German surface raiders active in the Pacific and also in contributing to the war effort overall, particularly since Japan insisted in some of the spoils of war, the German cruiser Augsburg was allocated to the Japanese post war.


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## vikingBerserker (Feb 4, 2014)

I think a Carrier or two in the Mediterranean would have helped the Axis out quite a bit, especially to counter Malta.


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## GrauGeist (Feb 4, 2014)

vikingBerserker said:


> I think a Carrier or two in the Mediterranean would have helped the Axis out quite a bit, especially to counter Malta.


Remember when I suggested the Japanese Navy help Germany invade Gibraltar in the "German Gibraltar" thread? 
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww2-general/german-gibraltar-20392-4.html#post552143


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## vikingBerserker (Feb 4, 2014)

I do now!


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## GrauGeist (Feb 4, 2014)

vikingBerserker said:


> I do now!


Hey, you were knee-deep in the conversation too...actually had some solid input regarding th German assault on that rock.


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