# Were kamikazes effective?



## Twitch (Jul 27, 2006)

While over all their impact wasn't tremendous it was another danger to deal with aboard ships. Every guy aboard a vessel I've talked to all figured they'd hit some other guy's boat but once there was an attack they were pretty freightening.

The Navy's heaviest casualties came from kamikaze attacks. So what do you think? They were very effective, had no influence on anything or were somewhat effective? That's kinda where I'm at- somewhat effective.


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## syscom3 (Jul 27, 2006)

They were effective to a point.

On the occasion when they did hit a ship, the damage inflicted sometimes was severe.

Look at how many carriers that were damaged bad enough to have to return to port for repairs (Bunker Hill, Intrepid, Enterpise, etc).

But of course the Japanese lost hordes of aircraft and pilots for no gain, so its hard to say it was a success.


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## Gnomey (Jul 27, 2006)

I would agree with syscom ! they were effective up until a point. They damaged lots of ships and instilled fear into those who crewed them but they sank very few ships and those that were damaged the Allies could repair and get the back in action in a few weeks/months. The most effective Kamikazi's were the aerial ones with the Kai-Ten's and other submersible kamikazi devices being less effective. All in all I would of said that the Kamikazi were a waste of lives (as were the Banzai charges) they achieved little in terms of ships sunk which is key but in the end the Japanese were desperate and so they would go to any means to slow the Allies (with the biggest Kamikazi being the Yamato).


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## Hunter368 (Jul 27, 2006)

I would say they were successful given the alternative that they had. They could not effectively mount conventional attacks vs the USA navy b/c their planes and pilots were lacking. All they could was attack in waves (or the best they could mount) and attack and crash their planes into ships. Their planes were inferior and their pilots were inexperienced compared to the USA. Any conventional attack would of had much less success then their Divine Wind attacks. Their losses were staggering, true, but they would of been staggering also in conventional attack also. Conventional attack would of resulted in many fewer successes. Here is some numbers for you:

By the end of World War II, the Japanese naval air service had sacrificed 2,525 kamikaze pilots and the army air force had given 1,387. According to an official Japanese announcement, the missions sank 81 ships and damaged 195, and according to a Japanese tally, suicide attacks accounted for up to 80 percent of US losses in the final phase of the war in the Pacific. However, according to a U.S. Air Force webpage:

Approximately 2,800 Kamikaze attackers sunk 34 Navy ships, damaged 368 others, killed 4,900 sailors, and wounded over 4,800. Despite radar detection and cuing, airborne interception and attrition, and massive anti-aircraft barrages, a distressing 14 percent of Kamikazes survived to score a hit on a ship; nearly 8.5 percent of all ships hit by Kamikazes sank.

The Japanese had the men and planes (relatively speaking) to sacrifice but they needed results. Conventional attacks would not have gained them the results they sought. In the end of course nothing they did could stop the massive USA navy at that point. In the end it was a sacrifice in vain of allot of young men.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 27, 2006)

I would put it like this. As syscom said it was effective to a point. What got through caused tremendous damage, loss of life, and terror, however was it going to change the course of the war? Absolutely not.


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## Bullockracing (Jul 27, 2006)

In terms of bang for the buck, and considering the resources the Japanese had at the time, I would say effective. If they tried to conduct conventional warfare using their aircraft, they would have been torn to shreds with little or, more likely, no effect. Only a very small percentage of kamikaze attacks got past the picket boats and the fighter screen, so if you can imagine the ones that did only trying a conventional attack instead of a 5000 lb gas and explosive guided projectile, you would have a 500 lb dummy bomb. Then you would have to fly back through the picket boats and the fighter screen...


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 27, 2006)

Bullockracing said:


> In terms of bang for the buck, and considering the resources the Japanese had at the time, I would say effective. If they tried to conduct conventional warfare using their aircraft, they would have been torn to shreds with little or, more likely, no effect.



Exactly


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## syscom3 (Jul 27, 2006)

One huge problem the japanese had in the waning months of the war was their delusional believing of their own propaganda.

They thought they were sinking ships on a grand scale without a thought of seeing if it was true.

I bet more than a few Japanese commanders knew the truth and thought they should horde the pilots and aircraft and use them when the invasion of the homeland occured.

My neighbor who was on an LST said a kamikazi hit on a transport or an amphib ship is a devastating experience and did cause problems.


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## evangilder (Jul 27, 2006)

Effective at creating fear, somewhat. But if only 14% of your attacking force makes it through to the intended targets, I wouldl not call that effective, just an aerial version of the Bansai attack. Yes, you can do some damage, but at tremendous cost.


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## Hunter368 (Jul 27, 2006)

evangilder said:


> Effective at creating fear, somewhat. But if only 14% of your attacking force makes it through to the intended targets, I wouldl not call that effective, just an aerial version of the Bansai attack. Yes, you can do some damage, but at tremendous cost.



Like I said before I think that it was relatively effective when concerning they had no other means to damage the USA navy at the time. Had they attacked using conventional means they would achieved very little and been slaughtered.

By using USA and Japanese numbers provided by themselves lets look at it:

USA ships damaged or sunk 402

USA sailors killed or wounded more than 9700

Japanese pilots killed to achieve the above results 3912

Suicide attacks accounted for up to 80% of USA navy losses in the final phases of the war.

14% of all suicide pilots survived to hit their target and of those ships hit by them 8.5 % sank.

Divine Wind tactics were not going to change the result of the war, but they did get results that no other tactic that the Japanese had available to them considering their difficult situation at that time in the war.

They failed b/c they had no chance of winning in the first place. But they did achieve a lot considering the pilot and plane quality and quantities available to the Japanese at the time when compared to the USA.

IMHO


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## timshatz (Jul 27, 2006)

Good posts all. Pretty much get to the point of the matter. The Kamikaze was the most effective method of damaging american ships to a military that was put of options (especially after the results in the Battle of the Phillipine Sea/Leyte Gulf which pretty much wiped out what remained of Japanese Airpower for IJN and most IJA units). However, slamming an airplane into a ship was not as effective as dropping a bomb as the bomb picks up inertia (and is streamlined to a greater extent) and penetrates deeper into the bowels of a ship to do damage. In short, the Kamikazes just weren't going fast enough to do lethal damage in a lot of cases. Against armor, they tended to bounce off (not so much the British carriers in this case as something like a Battleship).


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## Hunter368 (Jul 27, 2006)

timshatz said:


> Good posts all. Pretty much get to the point of the matter. The Kamikaze was the most effective method of damaging american ships to a military that was put of options (especially after the results in the Battle of the Phillipine Sea/Leyte Gulf which pretty much wiped out what remained of Japanese Airpower for IJN and most IJA units). However, slamming an airplane into a ship was not as effective as dropping a bomb as the bomb picks up inertia (and is streamlined to a greater extent) and penetrates deeper into the bowels of a ship to do damage. In short, the Kamikazes just weren't going fast enough to do lethal damage in a lot of cases. Against armor, they tended to bounce off (not so much the British carriers in this case as something like a Battleship).



I do agree with you for the most part. The only part I will talk about is that the Japanese still did have a fair number of planes on mainland Japan for the final fight, if it ever came to it. I don't have that number right now but I have read about it several times and they still had thousands of planes (and pilots) ready for kamikaze attacks vs any invading force. If it ever came down to it, the final invasion would of been very bloody for both sides.


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## syscom3 (Jul 27, 2006)

While the Kamikazi's "bombs" couldnt penetrate into the bowels of a cruiser or battleship, against smaller targets like destroyers and transports, it didnt matter.

Plus having a few hundred gallons of gasoline ignite and burn on the deck was just as devestating. On several carriers, the burning gasoline managed to ignite secondary fires and also cause destruction.


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## timshatz (Jul 27, 2006)

syscom3 said:


> While the Kamikazi's "bombs" couldnt penetrate into the bowels of a cruiser or battleship, against smaller targets like destroyers and transports, it didnt matter.
> 
> Plus having a few hundred gallons of gasoline ignite and burn on the deck was just as devestating. On several carriers, the burning gasoline managed to ignite secondary fires and also cause destruction.



Good point about the flash fire effect and the secondary burns. Pretty much where most of the casualties were centered. And against lighter, less heavily armoured ships (or without armour at all), they could be frightfully efficient. 

But while they did cause casualties, knocked ships out of the battle and made for spectacular film, they had trouble actually killing the ships. Carriers were damaged, but rarely sunk (unless you include the CVEs) by Kamikaze attacks. Even the Franklin, probably the worst damaged of the fleet carriers, still survived. And under her own power, which was the key point. 

But getting back to your point, that was the intention. Both sides were fighting a war that required large amounts of equipment produced efficiently and effectively. Armouring a ship increases the time it takes to build. Given the war in the Pacific's pace, it was a luxury (and cost) dispensed with in most cases. That cost when the Kamikaze came.


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## timshatz (Jul 27, 2006)

Hunter368 said:


> I do agree with you for the most part. The only part I will talk about is that the Japanese still did have a fair number of planes on mainland Japan for the final fight, if it ever came to it. I don't have that number right now but I have read about it several times and they still had thousands of planes (and pilots) ready for kamikaze attacks vs any invading force. If it ever came down to it, the final invasion would of been very bloody for both sides.




Agree. I've heard the numbers 6-10,000 (pretty large spread)thrown around. Depends on whom your source is. Add to that the improved Baka Bombs, suicide swimmers, suicide boats and kaitens and you have one helluva mess for the Allies in November of '45.

Which brings me to a point I've been kicking around for a while. I think the war (and probably this happens in most wars) in the Pacific got more lethal and more effective (not neccessarily the same thing) as the war progressed. What I mean is the weapons/equipment used became better at what they did while the methods (tactics for the most part) became better as well. Add to that increased numbers of individuals using them (on both sides) and you have the makings of a blood bath. 

I think the last year of any war is the most deadly for these reasons. Generally, the time of greatest lethality is when one side or the other gains ascendency and the other is effectively routed. Given that modern war stretches the kill zone back farther than previous wars, the death toll on the losing side increases due to numbers, effectiveness and lethality of the weapons. 

How this all would've played into the last year of the Pacific war would've been after the great Kamikaze attacks of the invasion of Kyushu, after the invasion was established. Bloody though the initial phase would've been, the landings would've succeeded. Once the line that the Japanese held behind the beaches was broken and the same retreat that happened in all Japanese/American battles in relatively open terrain happened, the lethality of the situation for the Japanese would've been immense. At that point, the ordinary Japanese people would've been seen as just another combatant and pretty much the whole island would've been a free fire zone. 

Similar event would've happened on Honshu near the Kanto Plain. 

I know it's a long point that I just wrote out but I would like to hear perspectives on it. The down side about thinking out an idea on your own is the critical audience has a vested in the success of the idea. Kinda mutes the negatives. 8)


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## Twitch (Jul 28, 2006)

Interesting points of view form various perspectives. Great stuff guys!

Tomshatz- they had over 12,000 combat aircraft that we didn't even know existed built in caves and underground facilities. We thought there were less than 2,000. Another thing that evaded intel were 9,200 shinyo kamikaze speed boats and a few hundred kaiten minisubs.

As one fellow on a carrier mentioned to me "As big as a carrier is, when the Jap kamikazes were coming in it wasn't big enough to run to a safe spot."

But I agree, a huge loss of life with negligable results.


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## Bullockracing (Jul 28, 2006)

In concept, one pilot and plane taking out 1000 men and a ship is a pretty good return on your investment. Fortunately (or unfortunately for the Japanese) in practice that wasn't the case, due to mitigating factors...


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## timshatz (Jul 28, 2006)

Twitch said:


> Interesting points of view form various perspectives. Great stuff guys!
> 
> Tomshatz- they had over 12,000 combat aircraft that we didn't even know existed built in caves and underground facilities. We thought there were less than 2,000. Another thing that evaded intel were 9,200 shinyo kamikaze speed boats and a few hundred kaiten minisubs.
> 
> ...



Hadn't heard the figure as high as 12K but that could include the Baka and improved Baka bombs that were ground launched (instead of air launched) from along the coast.

I'm leery of calling all the aircraft that the Japanese would've used as "Combat Aircraft" in a strict sense. Granted, they were going to be used in a combat situation so they would be considered combat aircraft for that reason. But I believe many of them would've had primary duties that were not kamikaze or bombing attacks. Trainers, liason, transport, all would've been used in the attacks. This was the Final Decisive Battle that the Japanese had been waiting and planning for since the begining of the war and everyone was invited. The numbers you quote regarding suicide craft of all types sound about right. Given that, the 7-14% rate of contact gives us a number of between 1,500 and 3,000 successful kamikaze attacks. It's a bloodbath I just can't comprehend. 

However, there are points in the invasion plan that probably would've negated or lowered the % of success. For starters, the plan was to suppress the Japanese airfields starting months before the invasion. That lead to the Japanese dispersing their aircraft away for the fields (in some cases up to a mile away) to avoid their destruction. Getting all these birds together and ready to fly in the same spot would've been a logistical nightmare.

Second, the plan for the Allied Air Forces (as I understand it) called for the Navy/Marines to handle the invasion coverage and most of the close air support while the AAF/RAF/RAAF/RNAF did the interdiction and airfield suppression from bases in Okinawa. That would've parked various types of fighters over Japanese air bases almost continuously. Also, allied medium, light and heavy bombers would be bombing the bases almost nonstop. Getting a Kamikaze attack up in the face of that juggernaut would've been daunting to say the least. I would say suicidal but that is pretty much what it was all about anyway so the point is mute.

Lastly, after 90 days of continuous bombardment from Air and Naval assets, the Japanese communications would probably be a shambles. When the invasion did occur, plenty of units wouldn't get the word for hours, if not days. The kamikaze attacks would then come not as an overwhelming thrust but as a series of waves as organizational/operational restrictions allowed. Also, the problematic nature of the communications would've left them open to false invasion reports. Some units take off to attack days before the real invasion begins, attacking a bombardment unit. There are a mulititude of scenarios that would come into play.

In terms of an air battle, the first several days of Operation Olympic would've been gargantuan. No other word for it. Thousands of aircraft battling from the center of Kyushu out to the Invasion fleet. And not in just one strike, but in an almost continuous stream. From a fighter pilot's perspective, it would've gone beyond a target rich environment. Aircraft would've been fighting for miles in all directions, Kamikaze strikes outbound to the Fleet, in some cases with an escort trying to keep the fighters off but in most cases unescorted. Allied bombers of all types going out to supress airfields and bomb targets close to the beach, also, most likely, unescorted. 

Again, it boggles the mind


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## timshatz (Jul 28, 2006)

Bullockracing said:


> In concept, one pilot and plane taking out 1000 men and a ship is a pretty good return on your investment. Fortunately (or unfortunately for the Japanese) in practice that wasn't the case, due to mitigating factors...



It is an excellent ROI. As you note (and fortunately for us), that wasn't the case. It is akin to the logic used by US Healthcare in the 80s for increasing business to hospitals. They said to Hospitals "Your fixed costs are already covered at such and such a level of business, take on extra business at a reduced price as only the variable costs need be covered". In practice, the fixed costs had to be covered by ALL the business. So they essentially took the business at a reduced rate. Once you sold that idea on one hospital, others had to follows. Good bye to a lot of hospitals. 

Along those lines, the entire attack has to be considered when looking at the success rate. If 100 aircraft are sent, 90 of them will be shot down so that 10 can actually hit something. The lucky ten (if they are all that lucky) succeed because the defenses were busy with the other 90. You couldn't send out 10 and get 10 hits. Or even ten and get 1 hit. The math didn't work that way. 

The USN (and to a lesser extent the RN) developed tactics that negated a good part of the Kamikaze attacks. The attacks became less and less effective as the campaign wore on. Unfortunately, I do not have the hard data to confirm that statement but will try to recall the reasoning as much as possible. 

1. The USN developed the "Big Blue Blanket" (fighter cover response) as well as increased the number of fighters per carrier. Also, up to the begining of the Kamikaze attacks, the doctine called for one defending fighter for every 2 attacking aircraft (based on the idea that supporting fighters were not bombers and that bombers really were the danger). After the start of the kamikaze, the ratio went to 1 to 1 for obvious reasons (everybody is a bomber). 

2. The airfields the kamikaze's flew from went higher on the list of targets. Suppression of the attacks before they got airborne became a higher priority. Made life more difficult for those getting the attacks together. 

3. Anti-aircraft effectiveness increased due to increased weapons per ship, increased training and new weapons (3" Fast Firing AA). 

4. Pilots flying the missions degraded in effectiveness as the higher hour pilots were killed and the replacements came in with fewer hours in the air, less ability in ship recognition and an overall degredation of quility. Hitting a moving ship with an airplane really is a tricky operation. 

5. Picket/Early Warning ships tended to asbsorb attacks. 

None of these ideas was the Golden Bullet. Taken together, they degraded the effectiveness of the kamikaze. While the US Fleet got better with practice, no such thing happens with a kamikaze. It's a one shot and done business. The individuals organizing the attack on the ground may get more polished and the leaders of the attack may be tasked with returning to report (if they can) but the overall result is a degrading in quality for the Japanese as the attacks continue while the US Fleet gets better at handling all aspects of the attack (from suppression of the airfield to intercept to AAA to Damage Controls).


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## P38 Pilot (Aug 2, 2006)

In my opinion, at one point in time during the war, they were effective. But like General Patton said:


> "No ******* has ever won a war by dieing for his country; he won it by making that poor dumb ******* die for his..."


His words were very true...


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## Twitch (Aug 3, 2006)

Bullockracing is right in that is what the Japanese logic was to the letter. It was always a big "if" a plane got through the fleet defensive screen. Theey knew it wouldn't be as simple as that of course but the actual trade off in human lives expended for human lives taken was in the favor of the Japanese in most cases.

If the Okas would have been able to be launched from a greater distance they might have caused more damage. As it was, of course, the Bettys hauling them were easy pickings.


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## syscom3 (Aug 3, 2006)

Well they were effective enough that the USN was very concerned about them.

During the planned invasions, the havoc they would have incurred on the lightly protected transports and amphib vessels would have been enormous.


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## timshatz (Aug 3, 2006)

The math should also take into consideration economies. Not to say a Zero is equal to an Aircraft Carrier in relative cost. That would never work. But losing 3-400 aircraft to hit one carrier (and not even sink it) when you can not replace the aircraft and you are not destroying the Carrier, is at best questionable.

On the other side, the Kamikaze was weapon of desperation born of the inability of the IJNA/IJAA to affect the Allied fleet. By that standard, 3-400 conventional bombers were being destroyed for no gain anyway so the kamikaze becomes an oddly logical step forward.


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## timshatz (Aug 3, 2006)

syscom3 said:


> Well they were effective enough that the USN was very concerned about them.
> 
> During the planned invasions, the havoc they would have incurred on the lightly protected transports and amphib vessels would have been enormous.



It's been a long time since I read deeply into Operation Downfall and what it entails. But I would be amazed if there was not some type of deception plan to "falsestart" the defenses (specifically the Kamikazes) before the actual invasion. Something along the lines of a feint or fake invasion (along the lines of the fake paratroopers dropped on D-Day and the advancing dummy radar targets at Calais) to confuse the Japanese. A kamikaze is probably the ultimate in "fire and forget" weapons. And, give the training of the pilots, experience level and general confusion, once they were up, they were probably pretty much gone (at least by late 45).

Communications would've been horrible. And even in places where communications have been good, rumors and false reports would've gotten everyone going (something like the false alarms the British had in late sumer 1940 with the Church bells being the signal for the invasion). Given the gaps in contact with higher ups, any report would be difficult to counter. And the Allies may not've done just one feint, but many. The idea being to confuse and disorient as well as lull. Any of the those affects would be acceptable. 

But even with feints, the invasion would've been a bloody affair. Just too many machines and weapons, operated with too much skill and too much dedication on all sides to have anything else happen. If the invasions previous to Downfall would've been "Mini-Stalingrads" as one historian once said, the actual Invasion of Kyushu would've been WORSE than Stalingrad.


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## Twitch (Aug 4, 2006)

You are correct Syscom3. There was an estimated 3000-5000 kamikaze attacks during the battle of Okinawa alone, and 36 ships were sunk with 368 damaged by this tactic. 40% of the Americans killed were the result of kamikaze attacks. 20%- 5,000- of all US Navy casualties endured in the war were suffered at Okinawa.

The Navy had good cause to be concerned. I look at it like if 40 planes are shot down attempting to kamikaze into ships the one that gets through and kills 127 guys on a carrier (an insignificant amount relative to the whole crew) they are still a nasty semi-effective weapon.

During any sort of invasion scenario we would have suffered huge casualties.


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## syscom3 (Aug 4, 2006)

timshatz said:


> It's been a long time since I read deeply into Operation Downfall and what it entails. But I would be amazed if there was not some type of deception plan to "falsestart" the defenses (specifically the Kamikazes) before the actual invasion. Something along the lines of a feint or fake invasion (along the lines of the fake paratroopers dropped on D-Day and the advancing dummy radar targets at Calais) to confuse the Japanese. A kamikaze is probably the ultimate in "fire and forget" weapons. And, give the training of the pilots, experience level and general confusion, once they were up, they were probably pretty much gone (at least by late 45).
> 
> Communications would've been horrible. And even in places where communications have been good, rumors and false reports would've gotten everyone going (something like the false alarms the British had in late sumer 1940 with the Church bells being the signal for the invasion). Given the gaps in contact with higher ups, any report would be difficult to counter. And the Allies may not've done just one feint, but many. The idea being to confuse and disorient as well as lull. Any of the those affects would be acceptable.
> 
> But even with feints, the invasion would've been a bloody affair. Just too many machines and weapons, operated with too much skill and too much dedication on all sides to have anything else happen. If the invasions previous to Downfall would've been "Mini-Stalingrads" as one historian once said, the actual Invasion of Kyushu would've been WORSE than Stalingrad.



The Japanese had figured out what the likely invasion beaches were going to be and planned a defense in depth strategy like they had for Okinawa and Iwo Jima.

Many people forget that Japan is a mountainous country and attacking forces would have to get funneled up valleys and ravines with the attendant risks.


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## Simba (Aug 4, 2006)

Kamikaze effective? Sure, it sank ships when conventional attacks couldn't because it was so difficult to deter a pilot who was totally focused on hitting his target. An aircraft that got through the defences was going to damage anything it hit to some extent.

But more effective still would have been the development of a naval air force that could secure air superiority sufficient to enable aircraft with stand-off missiles to range close enough to hit their targets and return safely to re-arm and repeat the process.

Whatever their effectiveness, those Special Attack pilots were brave boys.

<S>

Simba.


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## syscom3 (Aug 4, 2006)

Simba said:


> Kamikaze effective? Sure, it sank ships when conventional attacks couldn't because it was so difficult to deter a pilot who was totally focused on hitting his target. An aircraft that got through the defences was going to damage anything it hit to some extent.
> 
> But more effective still would have been the development of a naval air force that could secure air superiority sufficient to enable aircraft with stand-off missiles to range close enough to hit their targets and return safely to re-arm and repeat the process.
> 
> ...



The Japanese didnt have the technology to develope stand off missles.

And since the USN had dominating air superiority over the Japanese and shot them down by the hundreds, does that mean we employed disproportional force?


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## timshatz (Aug 4, 2006)

syscom3 said:


> The Japanese didnt have the technology to develope stand off missles.
> 
> And since the USN had dominating air superiority over the Japanese and shot them down by the hundreds, does that mean we employed disproportional force?



HAH! Good one. Gotta go easy on those Kamikazes, they are an oppressed minority. Imagine the nerve of the USN putting it's ships in the way of their diving aircraft! Call Kofi Annan and get a measure pushed through the UN condemming the USN. 

Good one Syscom.


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## timshatz (Aug 4, 2006)

syscom3 said:


> The Japanese had figured out what the likely invasion beaches were going to be and planned a defense in depth strategy like they had for Okinawa and Iwo Jima.
> 
> Many people forget that Japan is a mountainous country and attacking forces would have to get funneled up valleys and ravines with the attendant risks.




Accurate points. The Japanese were not confused about where the invasion would happen, only when. In that realm, the Allies had leeway. The defenses, once set, were imoble. The initiative lay with the Allies to attack when they wanted. That include methodology, spoofing, misdirection, all were up to the Allies. Once fixed defenses are set, there is little more you can do but wait. 

Also, in agreement with your point, the Japanese (while having very few if any survivors from the invaded islands that made it home) did have a good idea of how the US invaded. Hence the casualty rate for Okinawa and Iwo Jima. By that time, the method of how the US attacked (and we're pretty much talking the US here as the British were more focused on getting their old colonies back) was known and defensive measures had been tried from Tarawa to Okinawa. In that time span, the defenses had been refined. Interestingly, in both Iwo and Okinawa, both at the beach defense in depth and inland defense in depth, both defenses failed. Granted, they were bloody (and that was the Japanese goal by this time) but they did not defeat the invasion in either place. At no place did the Japanese defeat an American invasion.

Defense in depth in hilly, mountain or broken terrain is easily the best for defensive purposes. There, the terrain does most of the work for you. An example would be the Gustav line and Monte Cassino. And the Japenese would've made it bloody for all. There have been estimates of 1000 dead on both sides for every hour of the invasion during the first day to day and a half. However, every defense can be defeated and eventually, at great cost, the Allies would've broken through the Japanese defenses, severe though they may be. At that point, all the advantages (mobility, supply, firepower, airpower) really came to the forefront. There, past the beaches, the war would've enjoyed a measure of mobility found only in the Phillipines Campagne. I've often thought that the Pacific War would've been a lot shorter if the Japanese and the Americans had fought it in North Africa. There, and not on a small, jungle covered island, is where the advantages of production, mobilization, planning, supply and weaponry really would've come to the forefront. But that is not how it worked out.


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## syscom3 (Aug 4, 2006)

The Japanese strategy was to make the invasion as costly as possible.

Maybe even bloody enough to force a stalemate.

If there was a problem with the planning and logistics of the invasion, it was its shear size. You simply cannot play around with feints and stunts and hope that things will go according to plan.


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## timshatz (Aug 5, 2006)

syscom3 said:


> The Japanese strategy was to make the invasion as costly as possible.
> 
> Maybe even bloody enough to force a stalemate.
> 
> If there was a problem with the planning and logistics of the invasion, it was its shear size. You simply cannot play around with feints and stunts and hope that things will go according to plan.




True, but not my intent. Wasn't thinking of the mititary equivelant of card tricks. The intention of the feints was to confuse the Japanese and get them swinging at the curve. This thing was going to be bloody, no doubt about that. But the Japanese ability to replace losses (and in some ways the problem with the Kamikaze itself) was very limited. The B29s had firebombed every city with a population of over 50K. Given they were a cottage style industrial power, destroying the cities destroyed the industrial base. Feints, spoof and false attacks had the intent (if they were to be used at all, I do not have definite information one way or the other) of getting them to commit limited resources in on an attack without substance. If you get a false alarm called on a bombardment force and 500 to 1000 aircraft are expended on heavily armored/ heavy air cover (essentially something of a Kamikaze trap), you have that many fewer to deal with later. It is worth trying. 

I know that all plans produced now have a deception element built in. That was not generally the case in WW2 but Overlord/Fortitude proved deception was a viable concept for military planning. Whether that carried over to Downfall is unknown to me at present. It is an interesting question though. What was, if any, the deception plan for Operation Downfall.


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## syscom3 (Aug 5, 2006)

In the book "Downfall", the IJA knew that their mobility was going to be limited during the daytime, so whatever forces were in place, where essentially going to stay there.

Plus they werent going to commit the kamikazi's and suicide boats untill the invasion was under way.


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## timshatz (Aug 5, 2006)

syscom3 said:


> In the book "Downfall", the IJA knew that their mobility was going to be limited during the daytime, so whatever forces were in place, where essentially going to stay there.
> 
> Plus they werent going to commit the kamikazi's and suicide boats untill the invasion was under way.



Got so wound up after posting last night that I went bought the books from Franks (and another guy) need to re-read them as I did it during vacation, lent them to a friend and never saw them again. Sneaky bugger!

As for mobility, definitely the static defenses and defenses in depth were immobile. But the reserves would have to move to the point of the threat. By attacking in echelon (even over a period of days), feints, ect, they could keep the reserves tied down to a place long enough or, in the opposite case, get them committed to an attack that was not the main force. The possibility presented by attacking echelon, increasing the force with each attack as the invasion progresses, doesn't give the defenders a good picture of where the next attack is coming. Or even when the attacks are truely over. Again, very similar to D-Day and holding the German forces in Calias. It is possible, by various feints, to keep the Japanese frozen until the static defenses are breached. It doesn't get a lot better after that, but it would get better. For one thing, it would bring the Japanese out in the open. The US Military was a great believer of the Axiom that Firepower kills (still is). Such a situation would be to their advantage. 

About static defense on Kyushu, they could not go on forever. At some point, they have to tail off. Also, I have heard that the Japanese beach defenses were just a little too far back. But, they were very substantial. 

This is all armchair warrior stuff but it makes for interesting posting.


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## Twitch (Aug 8, 2006)

The invasion of Kyushu would have been nothing remotely like D-Day Europe and its 5 measly landing beaches. Operation Olympic had 35 beaches! Kyushu is 17,135 square miles and was honeycombed with underground, interconnected fortifications that made previous islands complexes look like child's play. They had underground aircraft hangars, kamikaze boats in coastal caves and nearly 1 million fighting men at the ready.

The dogged Iwo Jima campaign took place on the island of less than eight square miles in area for five weeks and cost 7,000 American and 22,000 Japanese lives. Okinawa is just 611 square miles and cost 12,000 American and 200,000+ Japanese dead (includes 100,000 civilians) during the 11-week fight. How long would it have taken to vanquish a million fighting men in an area 17,000 miles square?

Shikoku is just 7,258, Hokkaido is 32,246 but Honshu is a whopping 89,194 square miles! There were 10 year mop up contingency plans to eradicate all hostiles that would have gone guerilla after a successful invasion.

One little-known factor that is never discussed is the fact that the worst typhoon in US Naval history swept the proposed armada assembly area off Okinawa on October 9, 1945! 403 ships were either sunk, destroyed beyond repair or scrapped. Countless aircraft were ripped to pieces in the 150 MPH winds along with hangars, other buildings and tents housing 150,000 troops. Harbor facilities were ruined, power was out and supplies blown away.

In relative terms, as it was, there was sparse damage considering a depleted American presence due to the fact that the war was over and personnel were greatly reduced. Had Typhoon Louise set upon the 22 divisions of more than half a million invasion-ready personnel along with some estimated 5,000 ships and 4,000 aircraft, the devastation would certainly been worse and would have no doubt delayed the November 1st date to invade Kyushu.

The Americans thought there were less than 2,000 combat aircraft left when they had over 12,000. They knew nothing about the 9,800 kamikaze boats. They thought Kyushu had 350,000 men at arms when in fact they had over 900,000. They had absolutely no intel on the fortifications. And they never remark on Typhoon Louise. These things were discounted or swept aside and given less impact than they should since the A-bombs ended things differently. The silence helps perpetuate the myth of Allied invincibility.


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## syscom3 (Aug 8, 2006)

> And they never remark on Typhoon Louise. These things were discounted or swept aside and given less impact than they should since the A-bombs ended things differently. The silence helps perpetuate the myth of Allied invincibility



The typhoon would have been a setback, but it would not have changed the outcome.

Lots and lots of eqmt was stockpiled throughout the Pacific and the loss's could be made good.

Any aircraft destroyed by the typhoon would have been replaced the next day by the tens of thousands of aircraft the US had stationed around world.

The question of the Japanese defeat was simply of when, and at what cost.


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## timshatz (Aug 8, 2006)

Twitch said:


> The invasion of Kyushu would have been nothing remotely like D-Day Europe and its 5 measly landing beaches. Operation Olympic had 35 beaches! Kyushu is 17,135 square miles and was honeycombed with underground, interconnected fortifications that made previous islands complexes look like child's play. They had underground aircraft hangars, kamikaze boats in coastal caves and nearly 1 million fighting men at the ready.
> 
> The dogged Iwo Jima campaign took place on the island of less than eight square miles in area for five weeks and cost 7,000 American and 22,000 Japanese lives. Okinawa is just 611 square miles and cost 12,000 American and 200,000+ Japanese dead (includes 100,000 civilians) during the 11-week fight. How long would it have taken to vanquish a million fighting men in an area 17,000 miles square?



Was well aware that the Normandy invasion was much smaller than the proposed invasion of Japan. Used it strictly as a successful example of a deception plan that worked. Also, to re-enforce you point, the Normandy invasion traveled from England to France, a distance of maybe a couple of hundred miles at most (for units operating out of Northern England, if that were the case). For the invasion of Japan, the distances extend all the way from the US West Coast to Okinawa. All of them greater distances than D-Day. 

My point is that you, using deception, try not to fight all 1 Million of the Enemy's troops. Or you fight them in detail, one group after another. Or, you try to catch the enemy moving from one spot to another. Once a defense i set, the initiative moves to the attacking side. It can choose, where, when and how it wishes to attack. The defense, no matter how large or extensive, can only react until the attacking force has exhausted itself. Thereafter, the initiative moves to the formerly defending side in the form of counter-attacks or counter offensives.

The Allies would have to fight to their strengths, and try to avoid getting into a protracted slogg. This would be extremely difficult with a layered defense in depth. The Japanese, as pointed out earlier by another post, knew they were limited with regards to mobility. For the Allies, mobility was their strength. In places like the Phillipines, the US managed to fight a war of manuver against the Japanese. This allowed for a better exchange rate with regards to casualties. That, to my mind, was the goal of the Allied forces and is the goal of all strategy. To get the opposition to see the battlefield as you do, as benefits you.


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## Twitch (Aug 9, 2006)

Yes the typhoon would have set back the invasion schedule but the inevitable outcome would have been the same only in that Japan was conquered. The huge f*cking cost of lives would have sent this country reeling. The conservative estimates and the realistic lesser-known, little spoken of sobering estimates were both dramatic. Maximum possible casualties would have been staggering especially to the Japanese.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff April 1945 estimates implied that a 90-day Olympic campaign would cost 456,000 casualties, including 109,000 dead or missing. If Coronet took another 90 days, the combined cost would be 1,200,000 casualties, with 267,000 fatalities. Since no one knew of the secret manufacture ability, thousands of planes and other sea-borne kamikazes were never considered or projected into calculations so the casualty number certainly would have inflated if they had. 

Inside and outside the government sources studies concluded 1.7- 4 million American casualties, including 400,000–800,000 fatalities, and 5 to 10 million Japanese fatalities assuming a large-scale participation by civilians in the defense of Japan. 

Wonder how many in the US would be buying those marvelous little japaneze cars had we suffered that many deaths?


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## evangilder (Aug 12, 2006)

Good point there, Twitch. The Typhoon is very often not even mentioned, nor is the fact that the intel about the enemy was that poor. It would have been very costly for all participants and could have even possibly wiped out the Japanese culture.


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## syscom3 (Aug 12, 2006)

I wouldnt put too much stock on the civilian participation in the battle.

A 45 yo. woman with a spear just isnt going to intimidate a 24 yo. battle hardened marine with an M1 and bayonet.

Plus, quite a few civilians were already fed up with the war.

Its a good thing that the war ended in August. Since all the important cities had been burned to the ground, the 20th AF and the FEAF B24's next targets were the coastal railroads and roads that carried the bulk of Japans food supplies. By the end of 1945, the Japanese were looking at mass starvation.

Either way, yes the casualities would be severe on both sides, but once the invasion started, the allies werent going to stop.


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## Nonskimmer (Aug 12, 2006)

syscom3 said:


> Its a good thing that the war ended in August. Since all the important cities had been burned to the ground, the 20th AF and the FEAF B24's next targets were the coastal railroads and roads that carried the bulk of Japans food supplies. By the end of 1945, the Japanese were looking at mass starvation.


They were also facing a Russian invasion of Hokkaido, the northern island. They (Russians) were massing to strike. If the war had dragged on just a couple of weeks longer, we might have been looking at a divided communist/democratic Japan, the way Korea is to this day. Imagine that.


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## evangilder (Aug 12, 2006)

It would have been ugly any way you look at it. I agree that a person armed with a spear or knife is not much of a threat, if approached properly, they could have the element of surprise. I think the Russian invasion of Japan plan also accelerated the allied plan to use the bomb.


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## pgm1962a (Aug 12, 2006)

One thing to remember that the Japanese surrender had a lot to do with the USSR entering the war as did the A-bomb. Soviet infantry would have slaughtered the Japanes population by the hundreds of thousands. And as for the possibility of high casualties....2-300thousand were a drop in the bucket to the Soviets (remember they suffered over 200,000 casualties in taking Berlin). With all the effort the Japanese were doing in repeling the Americans, there northern flank would have been more exposed.


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## timshatz (Aug 12, 2006)

A couple of points. 

The one about the Marine facing the Woman with the spear. Agree. Depends on what kind of day the guy had if he pops her or just slaps the spear out of her hand or whacks her upside the head and sends her on her way. However, 20 women with polls topped with spears is a problem. 200 is an tactical threat and 2000 is a human wave. That IS a problem (reminds me of an Infantry joke from the Korean War, "How many Chinese in a Hord?"). The Japanese mobilized their home population to face the invasion based on the idea of the battle being their opportunity to bleed the Allies and bring them to the bargaining table with terms acceptable to Japan. To do so, they were willing to expend a sizeable part of their population. Like the Kamikaze, this was a strategy of desperation. 

Points not covered in common history that would've affected the proposed invasion should include the Typhoon. It would've probably done more damage to the Allied fleet than the attacks off Okinawa. It was a very bad one and odds are the invasion fleet would've been in it's path. Many of the transport and the supply ships came from yards with the idea of focusing on how quickly they could supply the front and less, though not ignored, how they handled heavy seas. 

Starvation is another very, very good one. The rice crop failed in the fall of 45. For people working 12-14 hours a day (hard work) and consuming 1,000-1,400 calories, that spelled disaster. While starvation would've been a major killer as the year progressed and '46 dawned, the attendent diseases (Typhus, various plagues, tuberculosis, beri-beri, rickets, scurvy, ect) would've decimated the population. 

The bombing of the communications systems would've amplified the affects of the starvation plus induced diseases such as cholera.

Civilians, unfortunately, could have on a limited affect on the battle but a major affect on the casualty list. Their general ineffectiveness in the face of massed firepower coupled with little training outside that useful in a human wave lead them to be cannon fodder pure and simple. Once the Allies faced their first couple of human wave attacks, the population in general would've been considered fair game, making Kyushu a free fire zone. 

Another point, Gas. Both sides had stockpiled and were willing to use it.


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## timshatz (Aug 12, 2006)

pgm1962a said:


> One thing to remember that the Japanese surrender had a lot to do with the USSR entering the war as did the A-bomb. Soviet infantry would have slaughtered the Japanes population by the hundreds of thousands. And as for the possibility of high casualties....2-300thousand were a drop in the bucket to the Soviets (remember they suffered over 200,000 casualties in taking Berlin). With all the effort the Japanese were doing in repeling the Americans, there northern flank would have been more exposed.



I agree with the point that the North would've been exposed to invasion in 46 by the Soviets. But think the Japanese surrender was affected more by the isolation of Japan from it's raw material resources, dropping of the bomb, firebomging and general air supremecy and threat of invasion that the invasion of Manchuria by the Soviets. 

Manchuria was not one of the home islands, it only came under Japanese control less than 14 years before. It was a source of Raw Materials for Japan, specifically metals. It was also a safe place to train aircrews. It's affect was economic, not (for lack of a better word) personal. Firebombing the cities of Japan dehoused ("Bomber" Harris terminology) the people, as well as destroyed the cottage industry most of them relied on to survive. Manchuria is far away from that effect. 

Cutting off the Japanese homeland from raw materials via Submarines, mining by B29 and surface blockade (as well as the conquest of Manchuria by the Soviets) destroyed Japan's ability to fight. However, the will to fight (and in direct line the reason to fight) was negated by the Atomic Bomb. It was a weapon for which the Japanese had no answer. Specifically, the Japanese warlords. Lose the inner and outter ring of islands defending Japan?-beef up the defeneses to face the invasion and bleed the Allies white to get acceptable terms. Destroy industry and the ability to arm troops?- turn the entire population into solidiers and arm them with spears. Lose Manchuria to the Russians?- It was of limited use anyway. But the Bomb produce an unanswerable question. For that, the military had no response. The peace party in Japan held their feet to the fire, the emporer informed them he wanted peace and that was pretty much it. 

Short and choppy history perspective.


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## syscom3 (Aug 12, 2006)

timshatz said:


> ....
> Points not covered in common history that would've affected the proposed invasion should include the Typhoon. It would've probably done more damage to the Allied fleet than the attacks off Okinawa. It was a very bad one and odds are the invasion fleet would've been in it's path. Many of the transport and the supply ships came from yards with the idea of focusing on how quickly they could supply the front and less, though not ignored, how they handled heavy seas. .



The typhoon would have caused damage but it wasnt going to destroy the allied amphib force. The shear size of the invasion meant many of the troops and associated eqmt was also going to come from the Mariana's and the PI.


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## davparlr (Aug 13, 2006)

My neighbor in Florida was on the destroyer USS Laffey at Okinawa on picket duty when she was hit by several Kamikazes. My neighbor was in a five inch gun turret. He and one other man were the only ones who survived out of the twenty five men manning the turret. He said blood was ankle deep in bottom. If you want to understand what it was like on that ship during the attack, below is a very good narrative.

TheHistoryNet | Air Sea | USS Laffey: Attacked Off Okinawa in World War II


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## loomaluftwaffe (Aug 13, 2006)

yeah, good narrative


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## timshatz (Aug 13, 2006)

syscom3 said:


> The typhoon would have caused damage but it wasnt going to destroy the allied amphib force. The shear size of the invasion meant many of the troops and associated eqmt was also going to come from the Mariana's and the PI.



True, this invasion was so big that there were parts of it coming from the West Coast of the US. It would've been a masterpiece of planning and logistics. The Typhoon would've done a good deal of damage to those parts of it that were in it's path but the sheer size would've meant many parts of the Armada saw nothing of that storm. 

Good point.


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## Twitch (Aug 17, 2006)

I wrote an article on the account of the Laffey which suffered 22 kamikaze attacks in 79 minutes.

There were a total of 2,350,000 men at arms in Japan in August 1945 and 3 million on the Asian continent ready to come home for defense. Over 900,000 were bolstering the Kyushu defense and we thought there were 250,000. There were 12,000 aircraft when we thought there were less than 2,000. We never knew of the 9,800 kamikaze motorboats or 500+ kaiten mini-subs. The National Volunteer Combat Force which consisted of 28 million people and not all were old women. A boy 15 can kill you as well as a 25 year old woman or 60 year old man using not only bamboo spears but old firearms, satchel charges, mines, bows, axes and Molotov cocktails. There as a contingent of volunteers willing to strap on ceramic containers with bubonic plague, cholera, smallpox, botulism, anthrax, and so on developed by the infamous Unit 731 along with chemical agents from Ubit 516. Another cadre was willing to strap satchel charges to their bodies for kamikaze on a more personal level.

We keep returning to the Allied propaganda we've heard for decades about how the Japanese had no food or ammo and all the rest of the "ready to give up" stuff when they were in fact planning massive suicidal defenses and offenses. Kyushu had massive amounts of ammo and foodstuffs sufficient for months yet we keep playing the propaganda card of not telling the complete truth regarding the Japanese state of defenses. I simply do not understand why we continue to downplay the Japanese capabilities in the face of the evidence. Why must we paint the Japanese as victims?

Kyushu has 35 landing beaches not just 5 like Normandy. It was a humungous honeycomb of the land mines, caves, pill boxes, mortars, barbed wire, snipers, suiciders in spider holes and underground aircraft hangars all linked together. Picture fortified Okinawa times 27 in size!

The number of deaths on both sides combined would have overshadowed all else since they would have occurred in a relatively short time unlike Europe's totals.

Our planners expected that after we took our lumps and laid waste to Japan that it would take 10 years to mop up the guerilla groups that would take to the mountains after what would have been the greatest bloodletting in human history.


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## pgm1962a (Aug 20, 2006)

Although much has been made about Japan ready to repel the U.S. invasion of Kyushu and Honshu there are several factors to consider. It would have been imposible for Japan to bring home most over overseas armies since most of the navy was occupied being sunk. The air transport system would have been completely overwhelmed. Japan WOULD NOT have fought to the death. True early on many would, however as in all nations no matter the culture there would have been those who would have surrendered, chose not to fight, or possibly join the allies. A Soviet invasion of northern Honshu would have been a collosal catastrophe for the Japanese with possibly hundreds of thousands of deaths. It is true that there would have been high casualties for the allies, there is just no getting around that. However the casualties for the Japanese would have been biblical, and an utter anhialation of there society (the US was prepared to obliterate Japan if it would not surrender).


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## jakal (Aug 20, 2006)

The Japanese wouldn't have devised planes like these if this kind of tactic didn't work. Check out photo's of direct hits by Divine Wind... It still scares the hell out of me...


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 20, 2006)

Okha bombs were actually ineffective as they had to be carried to their target by a mother ship which turned out to be meat on the table for USN fighters. The few that did get through were devastating, one cut a destroyer in half.


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## timshatz (Aug 25, 2006)

At that stage of the war, Japan was pretty much throwing mud at the wall and seeing what would stick. The effectiveness of a tactic was answered by one question, did it kill Allied Soliders. If it did, it was effective. The japanese themselves were considered expendible and giving their lives in the defense of the nation. What did it matter to the commanders if 20, 30 60 or 100 Japanese died for each Allied death? In the abstract, it didn't. 

The Japanese started the war focused on the concept of the grand climactic battle. They'd gotten one at sea with the Russians back in 1905 and it had colored the thinking of the planners from there on in. They believed they could do the same with the US (after the attack on 12-7 did not shock the United States into submission) and had tried to set it up via fleet actions from Midway to Leyte Gulf. At sea, their attempts failed. 

The invasion would've given the Army that opportunity. Given the Japanese Army would've outnumbered the invading troops, but had inferior mobility, firepower and logistics, the end result can only be a catastrophic defeat for the Japanese. Given that the Allies were outnumbered, facing a fanatical foe willing to lose millions in defense of their homeland, had a good knowledge of the American plans for invasion (from previous experience) and considered all persons save the Emporer as expendible, the conclusion is inevitable that the Allies were facing a catastrophic victory. 

This was going to be a battle with no winners and only millions of casualties. 

That's the reason the vets who knew the score back then say, without a trace of revisionist irony, "Thank God for the Atom Bomb". They knew the bomb changed the war to a war Japan could not even compete in. It gave them the opportunity to surrender. 

Lucky for all they took it.


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## Erich (Aug 26, 2006)

don't forget one small thing, the Sovetes were ready to pounce at any time had they been given the green light, so Japan in all it's self-proclaimed glory would of felt the heat from another point besdies the usual PTO Allies


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## Nonskimmer (Aug 26, 2006)

Imagine communist Japanese. Thankfully it didn't happen that way.


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## timshatz (Aug 27, 2006)

Nonskimmer said:


> Imagine communist Japanese. Thankfully it didn't happen that way.



Competent Comrades? Be the only ones if they were.


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## timshatz (Aug 27, 2006)

Erich said:


> don't forget one small thing, the Sovetes were ready to pounce at any time had they been given the green light, so Japan in all it's self-proclaimed glory would of felt the heat from another point besdies the usual PTO Allies



Yeah, it is a point mostly forgotten. The Soviets probably would've crossed to the top two islands and there was nothing up there to stop them. All of it was in the south. Have another North/South situation like in Korea. 

The Soviets looked at invasions much like large river crossings. In this, they were very similar to the Germans. Against a defended beach head, it is problematical that it would work. Against norther Japan in late 45/early 46, it probably would've worked.


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## syscom3 (Aug 27, 2006)

timshatz said:


> The Soviets looked at invasions much like large river crossings. In this, they were very similar to the Germans. Against a defended beach head, it is problematical that it would work. Against norther Japan in late 45/early 46, it probably would've worked.



If the Soviets thought that invading Japan would be like another large river crossing, then they would be in for a surprise.

Invading Japan in early 1946 would mean amphibious operations in an area of the world with notoriously horrible winter weather. And I dont think they had the amphib and supply resources required to do the job.


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## pgm1962a (Aug 27, 2006)

No one said that an invasion would be easy. However the Soviets had every intention of taking Hokaido Island (northern most of the home islands). As for not having the resources for such an assault...the Soviets were if anything inovative and very persistent. Just ask the Germans.


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