# operation Market garden



## fly boy (Jun 2, 2008)

i have read and seen what happend in market garden and My god that was the worst idea for the allies to think they could make the end of the war by dec25th 1944 might as well have just tryed to invade Japan in 42.


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## Thorlifter (Jun 2, 2008)

The idea was fine. The intelligence was bad. "IF" the intelligence was accurate, the offensive would probably had succeeded.

Also remember, the assault was successful initially. Had the British been able to secure and hold Arnhem, the whole operation would have succeeded.


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## fly boy (Jun 2, 2008)

oh yea i guess but the way it whent they might as when have invaded japan in 42


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## syscom3 (Jun 2, 2008)

fly boy said:


> oh yea i guess but the way it whent they might as when have invaded japan in 42




Huh?


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## fly boy (Jun 2, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> Huh?



as in the amont of people the allies lost they might as thought to invade japan in early 1942


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## plan_D (Jun 2, 2008)

_"Had the British been able to secure and hold Arnhem, the whole operation would have succeeded."_

The British 1st Airborne captured and held Arnhem longer than anticipated and all the men there fought with extreme determination and bravery. The plan did not just fail because the British failed to "secure and hold Arnhem". 

Operation "Market Garden" failed for countless reasons, and the Americans were at fault too. First and foremost the lack of communication between commands and intelligence staff was a bad start; the intelligence was present from the outset but it wasn't taken onboard - and the true extent of the German presence wasn't realised. 

Secondly there weren't enough aircraft for the drops to be made; the British drops at Oosterbeek were made in waves and the initial surprise was lost. The U.S. drops had all the aircraft required. The British drop at Oosterbeek was too far from the objective; and the paratroopers had to struggle on foot to Arnhem bridge. And I believe the U.S drop at Nijmegen was also made too far from that bridge.

Short range radios for the 1st Airborne left them out of contact for days. 

The British XXX Corps were held back for confirmation of the drop, and then refused to make a night march on the first night. The Son bridge had been blown by the Germans when the U.S. 101st approached; this led the XXX Corps to slow down and then stop to repair the bridge. 

XXX Corps then had to help the 82nd Airborne capture Nijmegen bridge. And then were held on the single road leading to Arnhem. Meanwhile British 1st Airborne clung onto their positions on the north side of Arnhem which they had captured on the 3rd day of the battle.

The American fliers were also partially to blame for not making the entire drop on the first day, despite having all the aircraft available for the U.S drops. One large drop on day one would have secured Nijmegen and, possibly, Son. 

And finally, the skill and determination of the German defenders is always forgotten. The German defence was quick to apply pressure to the attacking paratroopers and there was a constant aggressive drive toward the landing zones. Without delay or meetings the average German soldier would head toward the firing and jump in the line against the Allied troops...


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## Kruska (Jun 2, 2008)

And don't forget the FOG in England  = Quote from the movie A Bridge to Far

Regards
Kruska


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## Thorlifter (Jun 2, 2008)

Thanks Plan_D. I always learn from you guys!


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## plan_D (Jun 2, 2008)

Brig. General James Gavin: So that's it. We're pulling them out. It was Nijmegen. 
Lt. Colonel J.O.E. Vandeleur: It was the single road getting to Nijmegen. 
Lt. General Horrocks: No, it was after Nijmegen. 
Lt. General Frederick "Boy" Browning: And the fog, in England. 
Maj. General Stanislaw Sosabowski: Doesn't matter what it was. When one man says to another, "I know what let's do today, let's play the war game."... everybody dies


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## ccheese (Jun 2, 2008)

Perhaps the best book on the subject is Corneluis Ryan's "A Bridge Too Far".
Excellent reading......

Charles


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jun 2, 2008)

fly boy said:


> as in the amont of people the allies lost they might as thought to invade japan in early 1942



You are kidding right?


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## Thorlifter (Jun 2, 2008)

You can't compare the two Fly Boy.

I guess your point is Operation Market Garden was such a failure that they should have attacked Japan, which would have been an equal failure. But it's not. You can't compare a failed operation with the estimated 1,000,000+ dead with the invasion of Japan.

Also, the allies knew there would be catastrophic loses attacking Japan. They though Market Garden would succeed.


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## timshatz (Jun 2, 2008)

Never quite bought the premise of the battle. Take the bridges and do an end run into Germany. Just didn't seem to add up.


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## syscom3 (Jun 2, 2008)

It would have been interesting to see if Patton could have cracked the Seigreid line in Sept of that year *IF* he had been given the resources that went to Market-Garden.


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## Kruska (Jun 2, 2008)

Thorlifter said:


> You can't compare the two Fly Boy.
> 
> I guess your point is Operation Market Garden was such a failure that they should have attacked Japan, which would have been an equal failure. But it's not. You can't compare a failed operation with the estimated 1,000,000+ dead with the invasion of Japan.
> 
> Also, the allies knew there would be catastrophic loses attacking Japan. They though Market Garden would succeed.



1 Million+ dead, where did you get this figure? IMO those Japs were already militarily and industrial wise dead before even the A-bombs hit them.

Regards
Kruska


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 2, 2008)

Kruska said:


> 1 Million+ dead, where did you get this figure? IMO those Japs were already militarily and industrial wise dead before even the A-bombs hit them.
> 
> Regards
> Kruska



There would of been over a million casualties had Japan been invaded. They would have fallen but the toll would have been immense.


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## timshatz (Jun 2, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> It would have been interesting to see if Patton could have cracked the Seigreid line in Sept of that year *IF* he had been given the resources that went to Market-Garden.



Sys, that's part an partial to my perspective on this thing. I don't think there really was a blitzkrieg solution to the war by the fall of '44. It was a trick that was played and everyone knew how to do it. In 1940, it was new, but by the time of Market Garden, the way to defeat an penetration in depth had been established (hold the shoulders and elastic defense). It was shown at the Battle of the Bulge (and the primary reason why the Bulge was just that).

Ike's Wide Front Strategy took more time and involved far less glamour but it worked simply because the Wermacht could not handle the threat in all those places at the same time. As much as the Allies were stained, to an even greater extent the Germans were as well. Oil, personel, ammunition, you name it, all were in demand and not readily available. 

I think Monty's Strategy (and to the same extent, Patton's) were flawed to the extent that neither of them could put men through a breach in the enemies line (at one spot) faster than the Germans could contain it. In half a dozen spots, yes. In one spot or sector, no.


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## timshatz (Jun 2, 2008)

FLYBOYJ said:


> There would of been over a million casualties had Japan been invaded. They would have fallen but the toll would have been immense.



Have to toss in the Japanese dead (home islands) from Starvation, Overwork and Disease. Plus, add in the civilians dying in those territories held by the Japanese that were victims of the same affects due to the cut off Japanese troops taking whatever they needed and leaving them with nothing. As well, need to add in the Allied Prisoners of War that would've been executed when the invasion started and finally, add in the combat deaths from the actual invasion. 

You'd go over a million dead in probably the 3rd to 4th month. From there on in, the toll would probably rise and an increasing rate.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 2, 2008)

Yep......


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## fly boy (Jun 2, 2008)

hmmm i thought that the allies lost about 10,005 people i guess not


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## Kruska (Jun 2, 2008)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Yep......



Okay, sorry I thought it was about expecting 1million+ dead GI's.

Regards
Kruska


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## timshatz (Jun 2, 2008)

Kruska said:


> Okay, sorry I thought it was about expecting 1million+ dead GI's.
> 
> Regards
> Kruska



Some people defending the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki use that number but it really isn't credible. Same with the low end people who say it would've been in the range of 38K KIA. 

Total casualties for the US generally went in the realm of 4 WIA (wounded in action) for every KIA (Killed in Action). The people who really had a good line on the total casualties for the invasion were the people who made the medals for the Purple Heart. Unfortunately, they had a lot of experience and had gotten good at figuring out the number of medals they would need. They made up 500K of the medal for the invasion of Japan. By the above extrapolation, that means roughly 100,000 KIA and 400,000 WIA for the US (probably includes allies too). 

Japanese military casualties were tyically 4 to 1 for Marine operations and 17 to 1 for Army operations. Going for the middle ground, that comes out to about 10 to 1 for the Japanese Military. So we're looking at about a million Japanese Soliders dead but a lesser number wounded (they simply didn't evacuate their wounded very well so a guy who may've survived the wound would become a KIA due to neglect or incapacity of the system to handle his case).

Japanese civilians would've starved. Simply that. By the end of 1945, the food shortages (caused by crop failures and destruction of the transit system in the pre-invasion bombardment) coupled with grueling would load would've starved (or put at starvation level) most of the city dwellers. Those out in the country would've been somewhat better off as long as they were not in the way of the fighting. Probably would've at least survived. But the urban populations would've been decimated (real decimation, not the adjective-we're talking 10% of the population in the urban areas). Starvation leads to disease outbreaks as well as malnutrition. A guess at the number would be something like 1.5 to 5 million dead depending on how long the war went on. If it got into 1946, with the failure of the rice crop in the fall of 1945 taken into account, the higher the number gets. 

End result is millions of Japanese dead (both civilian and military), hundreds of thousands of Allied Casualties, several hundred thousand allied civilian dead (in territories occupied by the Japanese- China, Java, Burma, ect) and probably the end of Japan as a coherent nation.


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## Kruska (Jun 3, 2008)

Hello timshatz,

Yes I agree to your summary. 100,000 KIA and 400,000 WIA would also have been roughly my estimate.

I like the part about:
They made up 500K of the medal for the invasion of Japan  

Regards
Kruska


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## timshatz (Jun 3, 2008)

Thanks Kruska, appreciate it. Got the info from a bunch of books on the subject. Richard Franks wrote one (I think it is called "Downfall") as did a bunch of other people. Serious scholars generally come in around that number. 

Oddly enough, there are a bunch of crosschecks based on the stats that support the number. On Kyushu, in late August of the '45, there were something like 820K Japanese troops (planners had estimated 325K by the time of the invasion on Nov 1). More troops were coming in so the number of 1 million (in Army Troops) is plausable. That would reinforce the 10/1 KIA rate for the Allied Troops. 

There was a second check regarding the number of hospita beds being reserved for the invasion that also supported the number but I forgett it at the momment. 

Long and short, the estimates of a million allied dead were way high and the estimates of 50k allied dead were way low. Most of the planners who were going to be responsible for actually moving the dead and wounded or giving them medals had a better idea than revisionist.


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## syscom3 (Jun 3, 2008)

timshatz said:


> Most of the planners who were going to be responsible for actually moving the dead and wounded or giving them medals had a better idea than revisionist.



The medical staff (at the highest levels of the war dept) were usually correct in their assements of "future" casualties. They derived their figures after seeing what happened on Saipan and Okinawa.

One million Japanese dead civillians was not an underestimate.

They knew that once the transport system in Japan was paralyzed, famine was going to begin immediatly. And the systematic attack on the transport system was to begin in Sept 1945.


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## Marcel (Jun 3, 2008)

plan_D said:


> _"Had the British been able to secure and hold Arnhem, the whole operation would have succeeded."_
> 
> The British 1st Airborne captured and held Arnhem longer than anticipated and all the men there fought with extreme determination and bravery. The plan did not just fail because the British failed to "secure and hold Arnhem".
> 
> ...




Often forgotten, but maybe the main reason why the British failed: They jumped to far from the bridge. Believe me, I walked that part, from the Ginkelse heide to Arnhem, it's long walk. It's even surprising that Frost made it to the bridge. As it was, surprise was not on the side of the British, so they could only take the northern part of the bridge and it was held by a small, isolated group. The Germans had all the time in the world to keep Frost separated from the division. It's called "The battle of Arnhem" but apart from Frost, most fighting took place outside Arnhem, the British were not able to get into the city and thus did not capture and hold the city as Plan suggests here, far from it.


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## timshatz (Jun 3, 2008)

Marcel, how long is the walk from the drop zones to the bridge? In terms of minutes or hours, how long does it take? Is the ground flat? Is it built up? Are there any streams to cross? What is the distance in kilometers?

I am curious as I've read plenty on the battle but never walked the ground (hugely important if you want to see what exactly happened). I would like to one day but for now would love to know what your impressions are.


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## Marcel (Jun 3, 2008)

Hi Tim, it's about 15-20 km in a straight line (depending on where on the field you land, it's huge) and unlike the rest of the NL, it's not flat. I don't exactly remember how long it took, but I would say about 3 -4hours, normal walking (in peacetime  ). The main stream there is of course the Rhine, and you don't have to cross a stream as far as I recall enroute to the bridge. What you do have to cross is the railroad, which is in a sort of ditch (don't know how to describe it better), it's lower that the surrounding grounds, with steep borders. There are a lot of trees with not much agricultural ground (again unlike the rest of the NL).


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## timshatz (Jun 3, 2008)

Marcel, thanks for the fast reply. I appreciate it. 

So we're looking at kinda hilly terrain? Just general ups and downs or something like rolling hills you get in say, Southern Germany or Western France. 

Do you know if the ground has changed any since the war? Are there more towns, is it more built up (assuming the drop zones were pretty clear and the city itself was, well, a city). 

15-20KM!? That's well over ten miles!? Given you are carrying around 60lbs of equipment and have to cover that before the Germans get organized...what nut thought this one up!?

I read on the web that the first patrols of the 1st Para Div reached the outskirts of Arnhem around 1330 hours. Does anyone know the time of the drop? 

My reason for asking is I wanted to know how much time the Paras would have (according to the plan) to get set up once they'd gotten into Arnhem before nightfall. Just trying to get my head around it.


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## Marcel (Jun 4, 2008)

timshatz said:


> Marcel, thanks for the fast reply. I appreciate it.
> 
> So we're looking at kinda hilly terrain? Just general ups and downs or something like rolling hills you get in say, Southern Germany or Western France.
> *Well, not like germany or France. It was the end of a glacier in the iceage, and the ground has been pushed up. Not very high, but some ups and downs, highest point about 60m.*
> ...


I believe it was Gen. Urquart. The grounds closer to the city were too wet (general probelm here) and the airforce didn't want to drop near the bridge because of anti a/c on the bridge itself.


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## HealzDevo (Jun 4, 2008)

One thing you have to remember with a landing in Japan is that Japanese troops would hold a lot of the cards. That was the reason why Operation Olympus never actually went ahead. The official estimated casualties for an Operation against the Home Japanese Islands in 1945 after Iwo Jima and Tarawa was for approximately 1,000,000 dead. I assume this is in troop numbers. You have to remember that the Japanese coastline is a defenders paradise in terms of rocky coastline, etc.


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## Kruska (Jun 4, 2008)

Hello timshatz and Marcel,

The landing zones around Arnheim were well choosen and the landings were accurate.

I was in the Arnheim region about 10-12 years ago. The terrain is certainly not hilly (compared to South Germany) it is mostly flat with slopes and has several higher ridges – about 5-10m higher than the average surrounding terrain. Trees are more singular or scattered in groups, I can't remember a forest between Wolfheze, Oesterbeek and Arnheim. Most trees didn’t look to me being 50 years old, even those 50 years before wouldn’t have been much higher than 6-8m. On original Photos one can actually see that around Arnheim trees are very small and scarce = in regards to a forest. 

Source: Operation Market Garden September 17 - 27 1944

The British 1st Airborne Corps headquarters landed near to Groesbeek village at around 13.30 while the 1st Parachute Brigade dropped at 13.53 west of Arnhem to complete the British landings.

The 1st Parachute Brigade (under Brigadier G W Lathbury) started to advance towards Arnhem using three routes, 'Lion' (3/Para with the brigade headquarters) which was the main Oosterbeek Highway, 'Leopard' (1/Para) to the north and 'Tiger' (2/Para) “Frost”to the south.

15 – 20 km in a straight line???

Central landing point was around Wolfheze which is about 8-10 km to Arnheim Bridge
Frost’s unit was about 7-8 km from Arnheim Bridge. He started off south of Wolfheze at around 3.45PM towards the railway bridge and he had reached Arnheim Bridge by about 8.30PM.

Please see attached map







Regards 
Kruska


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## plan_D (Jun 4, 2008)

Elements of the British 1st Airborne held the north side of Arnhem road bridge; and that is all that was required of them. It has been considered by some that the landing zones at Arnhem and Nijmegen were too far from the bridges. 

Rightly or wrongly but approaches have their merits. The 82nd Airborne approach to Nijmegen was a long one that allowed German units to set up defences on boths banks of the Waal. The argument for the LZ being on Groosbeek Heights was that the single highway was more important to hold than the bridge itself. I, for one, think that the U.S. landings there should have been made like the 6th Airborne landings at Caen de Canal bridge for a quick capture. 

The British landings at Oosterbeek could have been considered too far, and landings on and around the bridge would have enabled the British to capture it quickly with surprise. It must be remembered that Jeeps were supposed to be accompanying the 1st Airborne into battle; this would have made the distance a lot less critical. Nevertheless, the British held the north side of the bridge for several days and had XXX Corps managed to arrive on time then the Germans would have been crushed between the two forces. 

I've been all through Holland, including Oosterbeek and Arnhem, the terrain around there isn't hazardous in any sense. There are wooded areas which would actually suit the paratroopers; open ground would be their downfall against a Panzer division.


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## Freebird (Jun 4, 2008)

Market Garden was {like many military operations} a gamble. If it had worked we would have been praising it's brilliance. Consider the {rather foolhardy!} idea of a night attack by Swordfish into Taranto, Italy. By any reasonable measure, the Italians should have been prepared with torpedo nets and able to shoot down most of the attackers. Just as at Pearl Harbour a properly prepared defence would have decimated the Japanese. 

If that had happened we would now be musing how stupid it was to try surprise attacks...


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## Thorlifter (Jun 4, 2008)

Well said Freebird.


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## parsifal (Jun 4, 2008)

I agree with you kinda freebird. However, the flip side of that argument is this...by 1944, the Allies had learnt to be cautious when fighting the Germans. When it came to a war of manouver, the Germans were the masters at it. Eisehowers strategy was to attack across a broad front, applying more or less equal pressure across the entire front, keeping sufficient reserves handy to reinforce any sector of the front under threat. This was a cautious, uninspired kind of generalship, but it was fullproof, if slow. When the Germans tried to apply their armoured breakthrough tactics, notably at the Ardennes, they were fairly easily brought to ground.

Now, whilst the allies had mastered the attritional war they could not beat the germans at a manouver war, and this is precisely what Monty was trying to do at Arnhem. It was a heavy cost for a lesson relearnt


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## timshatz (Jun 4, 2008)

Thanks for the map Kruska and the info. Good stuff from all. 

Couple of quick questions, does the deployments on the map show the the positions of the German Troops at the time of the jump or during the battle (after a couple of days of fighting)? What is the scale of the map in terms of distance?

The drops were around 1pm in the afternoon. Doesn't seem like much time to get to your objective before nightfall. Just a thought. 

Freebird, I agree with you that suprise attacks are an excellent strategy. Matter of fact, there is a school of thought that says all strategy boils eventually boils down to suprise. My point is even suprise can not compensate for a poor plan. 

Time is critical in a battle. Granted. Distance equates into time. Drop zones further from the objective mean more time to get to the objective causing a loss of suprise. 

I guess we are all familar with the movie "A Bridge Too Far" and probably a number of us have even read the book and several like it. Also, it is obvious that many members of this board have walked the ground. Given the knowledge of the battle as it was fought, it seems there had to be a better way to handle this part of the battle. Most of the First Para didn't get to the objective, being held up at Oosterbeek. 

I think Plan D got close to it when he notes a glider drop close to the bridges back at Nijmegen. Something of a coupe de main or an assault on both ends of the bridge at the same time. 

Why didn't the initial drop zone include the same space where the Poles dropped in a couple days later. If the AAA was so heavy on the 17th, would it be less on the 19th or 20th? 

I dunno, it just seems like a squirrely plan that had so many elements in it that worked against it that success was a long shot. You can only screw so many things up before it just all falls apart.


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## Freebird (Jun 4, 2008)

timshatz said:


> I dunno, it just seems like a squirrely plan that had so many elements in it that worked against it that success was a long shot. You can only screw so many things up before it just all falls apart.



Well it sure did have alot of aspects that could go wrong. There are several posts on the drop zones, and whether they were too far away. I suppose the Allies were being cautious, because of the experience on D-day at st. Mare-Eglise and other places, they didn't want to risk landing too close to a town, because if they were off course they could land on top of it and be machine-gunned out of the sky with no way to defend.

There was also a report I read that due to the stiff defence by Panzers at Arnhem, Gen. Horrocks wanted to divert XXX corps to the next bridge downriver from Oosterbeek {I can't remember the town name} that as it turned out was almost undefended at the time.

If the Allies had a decent heavy tank that could have spearheaded XXX corps it would have made a huge difference. The Sherman Fireflys were not tough enough to survive against most Geman AT fire, so XXX corps had to advance very carefully to avoid getting slaughtered by German ambush. A "super-heavy" tank like the Tortoise could stand up to almost all of the German AT fire except at very close ranges, perhaps they could have pushed on during the night as well. Even if the tank could only do 8 or 10 mph, I think it was less than 50 miles from start point to Arnhem IIRC.


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## Kruska (Jun 4, 2008)

timshatz said:


> Thanks for the map Kruska and the info. Good stuff from all.
> 
> Couple of quick questions, does the deployments on the map show the the positions of the German Troops at the time of the jump or during the battle (after a couple of days of fighting)? What is the scale of the map in terms of distance?..............



Hello timshatz,

The map shows the position of the British and German troops from 2-3PM onwards on the same day of airdropping.
As for the scale, a straight line from center of Wolfheze to Arnheim Bridge would be 11 km, so I think the British were as close as possible. One can imagine what would have happened to the airdrops if they would have been closer to Arnheim – see the positioning of the German troops.

As for the Polish landing, the AA fire wasn’t really the issue – not like in the movies. IIRC more than half of the transport planes actually flew back not because of bad weather, but since strong Luftwaffe units were encountered and reported. The remaining 800-900 polish soldiers that landed didn’t really matter in regards to any outcome of the Arnheim objective.

Furthermore if the British had landed closer to the Bridge and actually taken it, FM Model IMO would have ordered the destruction of the Nijmegen Bridge and thus the whole plan would have dissolved itself even earlier – not to mention the outcome in regards to the then entrapped Airborne units in Arnheim with totally no way of retreat.

In conclusion, IMO the whole plan was just to optimistic and relied too much on the estimate of only facing 3rd class worn down German resistance.

Regards
Kruska


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## timshatz (Jun 4, 2008)

Thanks guys, getting a much better picture of what was going on at Arnhem during and immediately after the drop. Good info.

I always believed the SS Panzers were in the neighborhood (10 miles away) when the 1st Para dropped but now realized the Brits dropped right on top of them. In some cases, they were between them and the main objective. 

Coming in a 1pm, dropping 10 miles from the target, with an elite enemy armor division in the way and expecting the troops to grab a bridge and defend it is about as bad as it gets. I don't know if it should be put down to poor planning, poor intelligence or overwhelming optimism. There are probably arguements in all directions for this one. 

One last question. Does anyone know if the American drops happened earlier than the British drops or were all the drops similtaneous?


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## plan_D (Jun 4, 2008)

_"I agree with you kinda freebird. However, the flip side of that argument is this...by 1944, the Allies had learnt to be cautious when fighting the Germans. When it came to a war of manouver, the Germans were the masters at it. Eisehowers strategy was to attack across a broad front, applying more or less equal pressure across the entire front, keeping sufficient reserves handy to reinforce any sector of the front under threat. This was a cautious, uninspired kind of generalship, but it was fullproof, if slow. When the Germans tried to apply their armoured breakthrough tactics, notably at the Ardennes, they were fairly easily brought to ground.

Now, whilst the allies had mastered the attritional war they could not beat the germans at a manouver war, and this is precisely what Monty was trying to do at Arnhem. It was a heavy cost for a lesson relearnt"_

Parsifal,

I disagree. The Germans were only the supreme masters of mobile warfare because the Western Allies refused to step up to the challenge in north-west Europe. Eisenhowers broad front strategy probably cost more lives than it saved, as it constantly gave the German forces to set-up defensive lines in the face of Allied slow march. 

The 8th Army learnt to be mobile in North Africa and they defeated Rommel because they always kept themselves mobile. After El Alamein, Montgomery constantly kept the pressure on Rommel until Benghazi and did not allow one moment for Rommel to set-up effective defences. The lessons of mobility (in the air, and on the ground) that were learnt in North Africa were forgotten in North-West Europe. 

Quick movement to attack the German army was required in Europe after the D-Day landings. When the Germans held the British forces before Caen, the Americans should have been quick to exploit the weakness in the German lines across from them. Instead Eisenhower held them back until Caen had fallen to the British. Caen was not important, holding the Germans at Caen was. 

The Ardennes Offensive that brought up is a perfect example of the western Allies failing to keep the lessons from Africa in their mind. The bulge was pushed out by the 'broad front' strategy; this kind of action allowed the German troops to regroup and set up defences further back. If the Allies were mobile they could have cut the bulge off at its base and forced hundreds of thousand of German troops to surrender. 

A war of attrition is costly and slow; the Allies could have matched the Germans in mobile war and it would have cost them less lives and they would have been much closer to Berlin. Slow cautious warfare will always be beaten by quick, hard strikes in weak points...always.

_"Furthermore if the British had landed closer to the Bridge and actually taken it, FM Model IMO would have ordered the destruction of the Nijmegen Bridge and thus the whole plan would have dissolved itself even earlier – not to mention the outcome in regards to the then entrapped Airborne units in Arnheim with totally no way of retreat.

In conclusion, IMO the whole plan was just to optimistic and relied too much on the estimate of only facing 3rd class worn down German resistance."_

If the 82nd Airborne had landed closer to Nijmegen bridge then Model would not have been able to order its destruction as it would be captured in a short space of time. If everything else was the same the XXX Corps would not have to help the 82nd capture the bridge and thus be rolling toward 1st Airborne at Arnhem at least 2 days earlier. 

And given the fact that the 1st Airborne held the north of the bridge, the Germans would not be able to blow Arnhem bridge either. 

_"If the Allies had a decent heavy tank that could have spearheaded XXX corps it would have made a huge difference. The Sherman Fireflys were not tough enough to survive against most Geman AT fire, so XXX corps had to advance very carefully to avoid getting slaughtered by German ambush. A "super-heavy" tank like the Tortoise could stand up to almost all of the German AT fire except at very close ranges, perhaps they could have pushed on during the night as well. Even if the tank could only do 8 or 10 mph, I think it was less than 50 miles from start point to Arnhem IIRC."_

A heavy tank was not required for "Market Garden" the XXX Corps were held up at the bridges Son and Nijmegen mostly. If Nijmegen had been captured by the 82nd alone then the XXX Corps would have had no problems assaulting Arnhem. 

The plan was a little optimistic, but most plans are. Nothing ever goes exactly to plan. Operation "Market Garden" failed because of a lot of little faults and set-backs that ended up joining together to be a failure. Remove one or two of those faults and the plan would have suceeded; and as Freebird said we would have been praising its brilliance. 

In reality, it was a brilliant plan that went wrong. If the Allies were in a position to perform Market Garden in August, it would have most likely been a resounding success.


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## Freebird (Jun 4, 2008)

plan_D said:


> * A heavy tank was not required for "Market Garden"* the XXX Corps were held up at the bridges Son and Nijmegen mostly. If Nijmegen had been captured by the 82nd alone then the XXX Corps would have had no problems assaulting Arnhem.
> 
> The plan was a little optimistic, but most plans are. Nothing ever goes exactly to plan. Operation "Market Garden" failed because of a lot of little faults and set-backs that ended up joining together to be a failure. Remove one or two of those faults and the plan would have suceeded; and as Freebird said we would have been praising its brilliance.
> 
> In reality, it was a brilliant plan that went wrong. If the Allies were in a position to perform Market Garden in August, it would have most likely been a resounding success.



PlanD, If I recall correctly there were some initial delays though, in the first 48 hours XXX corps met some heavy resistance right from the start by some SS PanzerJager V's, they were held up because the Germans could gut a Firefly from 2,000 yards or more, the British tanks could not get close enough to eliminate them, and had to wait for the infantry to outflank the defenders. Then later on the road between Eindhoven Nimegen German counterattacks forced XXX corps to halt while waiting for the infantry to come forward.

A heavier tank, though while slow would allow the Allies to match the german Tigers on a more even basis. On a more wide open front it would not matter as much, but in the case of a long advance up a narrow highway, even a few heavy Axis tanks could hold up the whole column, where every hour was vital


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## plan_D (Jun 4, 2008)

I understand what you're saying but if you think about the course of the operation, then even with the delays on XXX Corps made by the superior German armour the XXX Corps would still reach Arnhem in time to save 1st Airborne if Nijmegen was open to them.

XXX Corps would have been in a better position on the 1st day if they had moved out before 2pm, and forced marched throughout the first night. The delays on the first day allowed the German defenders to realise what was happening and set up defences against XXX Corps. These defences would have not been present had XXX Corps moved on the word go, the German AT positions and Panzerjagers would have been caughting napping - so to speak...


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## Kruska (Jun 4, 2008)

plan_D said:


> If the 82nd Airborne had landed closer to Nijmegen bridge then Model would not have been able to order its destruction as it would be captured in a short space of time. If everything else was the same the XXX Corps would not have to help the 82nd capture the bridge and thus be rolling toward 1st Airborne at Arnhem at least 2 days earlier.
> 
> And given the fact that the 1st Airborne held the north of the bridge, the Germans would not be able to blow Arnhem bridge either.....



Sorry Plan_D,

too many "ifs" One has to analyse Operation Market Garden to the historic occurences and not "if" - IMO.

Intelligence was poor and ignored by the British. Major Urquard -relative of General Urquard??- had spotted tanks on the recon photos, after the medical doctor examined him he was ordered to go for a holiday - how ignorant things can get in this world-.

The plan IMO was brilliant, or let me rather say the "Idea", but ignorantly executed. One german soldier an officer who particpated in this event said one thing to me that I always keept in my head - how ignorant of a commander to set up a tank advance based on a single road in Holland.

Regards
Kruska


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## Freebird (Jun 4, 2008)

Kruska said:


> Sorry Plan_D,
> 
> too many "ifs" One has to analyse Operation Market Garden to the historic occurences and not "if" - IMO.
> 
> ...




Not much other choice in that area... 

They were counting on taking advantage of the German disorganization, as PlanD says it probably would have worked in August, before the Germans started to firm up from the defence line.

There is a tendency in wartime to "keep rolling" along with a plan, even after it should be cancelled. This is probably due to nobody wanting to go on record opposing, and being seen as "weak" or "cowardly". The operations "Jubilee" {Dieppe} and "Zitadell" {Kursk} were continued on with, regardless that they should have been scrubbed.


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## Kruska (Jun 4, 2008)

freebird said:


> There is a tendency in wartime to "keep rolling" along with a plan, even after it should be cancelled. This is probably due to nobody wanting to go on record opposing, and being seen as "weak" or "cowardly". The operations "Jubilee" {Dieppe} and "Zitadell" {Kursk} were continued on with, regardless that they should have been scrubbed.



True, true - very true

Regards
Kruska


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## Marcel (Jun 4, 2008)

Kruska said:


> I was in the Arnheim region about 10-12 years ago. The terrain is certainly not hilly (compared to South Germany) it is mostly flat with slopes and has several higher ridges – about 5-10m higher than the average surrounding terrain.


Ah, if you were dutch, you would understand that we call that hilly already. I grew up in a polder 



plan_D said:


> In reality, it was a brilliant plan that went wrong. If the Allies were in a position to perform Market Garden in August, it would have most likely been a resounding success.



Nope, the plan was far from brilliant and the Allies were lucky to get this far. The intelligence wasn't poor, the allies had all the info they needed. Dutch resistance was among the best organised resistance organisations in the world, and provided the allies with every info they needed. Thus the allies did know the SS panzers were there, they just choose to ignore it. Further more, the road towards Arnhem through Brabant was just stupid. As Kruska already mentioned, going over one road is just stupid, especially when that road runs over a dyke, metres higher than the rest of the land around it, so you have no place to manoeuvre and are a sitting duck for every German soldier in the neighbourhood.

The area of the bridge in Arnhem was not suited for parachute landings, so they had to drop too far from the bridge. If the times Kruska provides are correct, then it took Frost already almost 5 hours to get to the bridge, being the only one to reach it, that's a long time. It is true, the British paratroopers fought well and brave, but bravery couldn't counter a faulty planning.
The timing was even off. If the plan was executed around the 5th of September (not in August), they probably would have gotten away with the stupid plan. The Germans were on full panic retreat, after the capture of Antwerp and in no position to offer resistance. On September 17th, the Germans had regrouped, so the the chance was lost.


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## Freebird (Jun 4, 2008)

Has anyone ever played this out in a game or simulation? 

I've played GDW's "Road to the Rhine", a strategic division-level game of Sept 44 - April 45. If the Allies allow the Germans a chance to re-group in Sept/Oct then the Axis have a good oppertunity to build up a small reserve, to prevent the Allies from breaching the Rhine.

I also have "Market Garden", also by GDW, a battalion level double blind tactical game from Sept 17 - Oct 5. It's a tough battle for the Allies, too many places that it can go wrong. And the Para's in Arnhem usually end up fighting off a battalion of King Tigers -* Ouch! *


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## Kruska (Jun 4, 2008)

Marcel said:


> Ah, if you were dutch, you would understand that we call that hilly already. I grew up in a polder



I know, I know  that is why I tried to bring in a slight correction.

What surprised me is this teetime attitude. Taking off from England (after a solid breakfest I presume with milk and Tea) at *9 am* and to drop in Holland for late lunch at *1:30 pm*

I could have understood a 5 am morning landing or even though more costly a night landing.

Regards
Kruska


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## Kruska (Jun 4, 2008)

freebird said:


> Has anyone ever played this out in a game or simulation?



Yes many times with some British and American wargamers, 1:72, microarmour, and also the board game Third Reich. Whoever played the English got devastated, massacred. 

I made myself very unpopular when I airdropped some British partroopers over the British HQ to take them out in order to end the battle for Arnheim  

IIRC the Germans did acctually have 40-45 Kingtigers in that area.

Regards
Kruska


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## plan_D (Jun 5, 2008)

_"Sorry Plan_D,

too many "ifs" One has to analyse Operation Market Garden to the historic occurences and not "if" - IMO.

In my opinion only one of those many possibilities need to be changed for Market Garden to succeed. It was recognised at the time that a drop on Nijmegen instead of the heights would have secured the bridge before XXX Corps arrival. 
With Nijmegen secured XXX Corps could have been on the south side of Arnhem bridge in time to save 1st Airborne. I have looked at the historical occurences, and I think the mishaps and faults in the plan I made perfectly clear in my first post. 

"Intelligence was poor and ignored by the British. Major Urquard -relative of General Urquard??- had spotted tanks on the recon photos, after the medical doctor examined him he was ordered to go for a holiday - how ignorant things can get in this world-."

As has been mentioned intelligence was not poor; the Dutch resistance and aerial photography provided the British command with all the information they required about German positions. Maybe the plan should have been called off, or maybe some alterations should have been made - I don't know, I only have my ideas. 
The British command were arrogant when it came to executing Market Garden, but as you recognise the idea was a good one; and it would have been praised had it succeeded.

"The plan IMO was brilliant, or let me rather say the "Idea", but ignorantly executed. One german soldier an officer who particpated in this event said one thing to me that I always keept in my head - how ignorant of a commander to set up a tank advance based on a single road in Holland."

The plan was brilliant and the idea was sound. I'm sorry to say that the German officer you mentioned must not have studied his own nations armoured thrusts during the years '39 - '45, if he believes a tank advance up one road is always ignorant. 

Of course, Herr Guderian always stated that an armoured thrust should be deep and broad. But he always started that quick movement and sharp pinpoint strikes are vital for success. Countless times during World War II did Germany punch through areas that, if they failed, we'd be calling suicidal and the German officers ignorant.

The best examples that instantly come to mind are the Ardennes 1940 and Balcks advance in Greece in '41. Both attacks were made in areas impassable to armour, and Balck advanced with his armour in single file through a valley ! 

"Nope, the plan was far from brilliant and the Allies were lucky to get this far. The intelligence wasn't poor, the allies had all the info they needed. Dutch resistance was among the best organised resistance organisations in the world, and provided the allies with every info they needed. Thus the allies did know the SS panzers were there, they just choose to ignore it. Further more, the road towards Arnhem through Brabant was just stupid. As Kruska already mentioned, going over one road is just stupid, especially when that road runs over a dyke, metres higher than the rest of the land around it, so you have no place to manoeuvre and are a sitting duck for every German soldier in the neighbourhood."

My previous paragraph directed at Kruska answers this. The Allies were not lucky to reach as far as they did, the Germans were caught off guard. Germany forced tanks through areas that were impassable to them over and over again - you only believe Market Garden as "stupid" because it fell short of its objective. If it had succeeded (which it could have) then you and the whole world would be praising it's brilliance; fact. And you prove that with this - 

"The timing was even off. If the plan was executed around the 5th of September (not in August), they probably would have *gotten away with the stupid plan.* The Germans were on full panic retreat, after the capture of Antwerp and in no position to offer resistance. On September 17th, the Germans had regrouped, so the the chance was lost."

The bold says it all, you're holding back from accepting that it was a good idea. If the plan would have succeeded your words would instantly change from "stupid plan" to "excellent plan". Failure of an idea does not make it stupid...war is just as much luck as it is brilliance._


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## Kruska (Jun 5, 2008)

And “if” the Nijmegen Bridge had been taken, the Germans would have increased their push on Arnheim and blown the Bridge right in front of the xxx Corps face. Using whatever they had in order to achieve this. 

The Germans never had/needed a time plan that forced them ultimately to reach point x in y time on a single road for such a distance and so many objectives along it during the attack on Holland in 1940 in order to backup or save forward deployed troops, neither was the case for Greece. And the Ardennes in 1940 was crossed on multiple pontoon bridges – so where does the single road come into this? 

The Dutch resistance delivered very precise and useful information to the Allies, these were however partially ignored and until the day of action, obviously no one was aware that the Germans had not just 3rd grade worn down troops in the area.

The problem with the OMG plan is that it becomes very, very obvious once the Airborne formations landed – the Bridges- not like in the movie were Model is portrait as an arrogant full sized Idiot who says – why do they come, there is nothing of importance here… hey wait I am important and the best part: Why do all my Generals want to destry the bridges.

And this is where the plan starts to suck, because once the objective is known the opposite side should know/knows what to do. 
And the only thing to make a plan work that has been revealed is the speedy, “unhindered” advance of the XXXCorps on one road. – that indeed could be termed as stupid.

Furthermore just for your info, Marcel probably knows more about this: The defense of Holland in 1940 on the Dutch part and in 1944/45 on the German part was based on “opening”-“blowing up” the Deichs – to flood the whole place if necessary. I don’t know why, but luckily for everyone the Germans and the Dutch never did it. Maybe the Germans were too fast in 1940. 

As an example: Kursk was brilliant right? Attack on the Flanks and entrap the whole bunch, brilliant, genius plan and well executed by the German Army masterminds and greatest military genius of all times AH. Unfortunately once the PLAN/Idea became visible the other side (Russians) knew what to do. “IF” the Germans had attacked straight away the plan “would” have been a brilliant counterattack and world history would need to be rewritten. 

So OMG was a brilliant idea but poorly planned and poorly executed on behalf of the XXX Corps. Monty had an easy part in this – if it worked it would be his Idea, if the plan fails, well it was just his idea and just the planning of the others was poor.

Regards 
Kruska


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## parsifal (Jun 5, 2008)

_Has anyone ever played this out in a game or simulation? 

I've played GDW's "Road to the Rhine", a strategic division-level game of Sept 44 - April 45. If the Allies allow the Germans a chance to re-group in Sept/Oct then the Axis have a good oppertunity to build up a small reserve, to prevent the Allies from breaching the Rhine.

I also have "Market Garden", also by GDW, a battalion level double blind tactical game from Sept 17 - Oct 5. It's a tough battle for the Allies, too many places that it can go wrong. And the Para's in Arnhem usually end up fighting off a battalion of King Tigers -* Ouch! *_*[/B

Ive played SPIs "Highway To the Reich" several times. Battalion level sim of the entire campaign. Dmn difficult as the allies. LZs too far away, single road a pain, Germans putting up a stubborn and effective defence. Great game. your heart sinks as your Paras at Arnhem take on the SS, outnumbered about 10 to one, fighting house to house, to save their only hope, that damn bridge*


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## Freebird (Jun 5, 2008)

parsifal said:


> Has anyone ever played this out in a game or simulation?
> 
> *I've played GDW's "Road to the Rhine", a strategic division-level game of Sept 44 - April 45. If the Allies allow the Germans a chance to re-group in Sept/Oct then the Axis have a good oppertunity to build up a small reserve, to prevent the Allies from breaching the Rhine.
> 
> ...



If you ever get a chance, check out GDW's "operation Market Garden", this is a really interesting system, double blind. There are 2 identical maps, one for each side. As your troops enter each enemy controlled hex you call out the #, if unoccupied you keep going, if occupied a battle ensues. The Germans generally have a ring around the Allies, but don't know exactly where the paras are. The Allies don't know from which side the next attacks will come. 

Neither side thinks that they have enough troops {no surprise there!  } and both side are thinking - D**m, this looks bad!


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## Marcel (Jun 5, 2008)

plan_D said:


> The plan was brilliant and the idea was sound. I'm sorry to say that the German officer you mentioned must not have studied his own nations armoured thrusts during the years '39 - '45, if he believes a tank advance up one road is always ignorant.
> 
> *There's a famous quote from a Dutch officer of the Prinses Irene brigade, I think it was also mentioned in the book "A bridge to far":
> Dutch officer: "The first test we did on the KMA (=Military academy) was making a plan to attack the Netherlands.
> ...


Of course, the winner is always right, but nothing went as plan in the operation, so you can hardly speak of a good plan and the objective was not reached. I also said it would have succeeded if they had carried it out in the first week of september. It would still have been a stupid plan, but the big gamble would probably have paid off. 



> So OMG was a brilliant idea but poorly planned and poorly executed on behalf of the XXX Corps. Monty had an easy part in this – if it worked it would be his Idea, if the plan fails, well it was just his idea and just the planning of the others was poor.


I totally agree with Kruska on this



> Furthermore just for your info, Marcel probably knows more about this: The defense of Holland in 1940 on the Dutch part and in 1944/45 on the German part was based on “opening”-“blowing up” the Deichs – to flood the whole place if necessary. I don’t know why, but luckily for everyone the Germans and the Dutch never did it. Maybe the Germans were too fast in 1940.


Well, actually it was carried out. In front of the Grebbelinie were large innudations, and the Waterlinie, further to the west was starting to get flooded when the war ended on may 14th. They were not completed, though. This was largely caused by the the naive Dutch government who thought no one would attack them and the thought that the flooding would spoil valuable land. Thus they were only set in motion when it was too late. These floodings take time and time was running out. To make thinks worse, beacause of cutting budget, some pumps were not installed, slowing the floodings even further.


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## plan_D (Jun 5, 2008)

_"And “if” the Nijmegen Bridge had been taken, the Germans would have increased their push on Arnheim and blown the Bridge right in front of the xxx Corps face. Using whatever they had in order to achieve this."_

That's a very large assumption, Kruska. First off, the Germans would be in no position to lay demolition charges on the bridge because 1st Airborne would be holding the north side. So any attempt on blowing the bridge would have to be made with artillery and tank guns which would make the job a long one, and a tough one. 

If the German forces on the south side of Arnhem bridge did blow the bridge then they themselves would have been trapped between the Rhine and XXX Corps. Losing a SS Panzer Division is probably a good idea if it saves the nation, but you, me nor Marcel know what would have happened in reality. 

_"The Germans never had/needed a time plan that forced them ultimately to reach point x in y time on a single road for such a distance and so many objectives along it during the attack on Holland in 1940 in order to backup or save forward deployed troops, neither was the case for Greece. And the Ardennes in 1940 was crossed on multiple pontoon bridges – so where does the single road come into this?"_

I never stated that Germany ever had a plan in World War II that matched Market Garden word for word. However, the German invasion of Holland did have many airborne assaults that required the invasion force to meet up with them in order to back them up. 

As for the Ardennes and Greece comment; my mention of them was to point out that the most outlandish and, possibly, insane plans are sometimes the best. Both you, Kruska, and Marcel are disapproving of Market Garden simply because of that "single road". Because the plan ultimately failed then it's easy to say that the armour had nowhere to move. However, the fact of the matter is the terrain of the Ardennes (which is a forest! I think your comment was directed toward the Sedan crossing.) and the area around Mt.Olympius are both considered completely impassable to armour. That means that before 1941 no one believe that tanks could attack through those regions, and had May 1940 been a disaster for Germany then people would still believe that. 

_"The Dutch resistance delivered very precise and useful information to the Allies, these were however partially ignored and until the day of action, obviously no one was aware that the Germans had not just 3rd grade worn down troops in the area."_

Unfortunately it wasn't partially ignored, it was totally ignored. And I, personally, with 20/20 hindsight would call off the plan if I were told that two SS Panzer Divisions were in my way. But the arrogance and ignorance of the British Command at the time does not make the initial *plan* a bad one. Keeping in mind that the plan was based around the idea that Germany would not expect the Allies to try that kind of movement... and if you really want to be open minded you can think that Germany was lucky that it had placed the SS Panzer Divisions there for rest. 

_"And this is where the plan starts to suck, because once the objective is known the opposite side should know/knows what to do. 
And the only thing to make a plan work that has been revealed is the speedy, “unhindered” advance of the XXXCorps on one road. – that indeed could be termed as stupid."_

Unfortunately, the XXX Corps didn't need to be fully unhindered. And given the FACT that the PLAN was made around the basis of surprise then the PLAN isn't at fault. The execution of the plan is what went wrong; personally I would have expected the British command to abandon the plan upon arrival of two SS Panzer Divisions... but then I wasn't around in Sept. '44 so what I say has no meaning in the grand scheme of history. 

_"Furthermore just for your info, Marcel probably knows more about this: The defense of Holland in 1940 on the Dutch part and in 1944/45 on the German part was based on “opening”-“blowing up” the Deichs – to flood the whole place if necessary. I don’t know why, but luckily for everyone the Germans and the Dutch never did it. Maybe the Germans were too fast in 1940."_

He must know more simply because he's Dutch, right?! Well slap my thighs and call me Lolita I must know more about Great Britain's history than every Johnny Foreigner on this planet. Be reasonable, please. 

_"As an example: Kursk was brilliant right? Attack on the Flanks and entrap the whole bunch, brilliant, genius plan and well executed by the German Army masterminds and greatest military genius of all times AH. Unfortunately once the PLAN/Idea became visible the other side (Russians) knew what to do. “IF” the Germans had attacked straight away the plan “would” have been a brilliant counterattack and world history would need to be rewritten."_

And this is where the PLAN and EXECUTION become two different things. Plus all great military leaders have said or written somewhere or another that luck plays just as much a part in warfare as skill does. 

_"So OMG was a brilliant idea but poorly planned and poorly executed on behalf of the XXX Corps. Monty had an easy part in this – if it worked it would be his Idea, if the plan fails, well it was just his idea and just the planning of the others was poor."_

I almost agree...brilliant idea, brilliant plan, poorly executed. You have to keep in mind that the plan was a use of surprise. Germany had no inkling that the Allies would attempt to force a crossing at Arnhem, it was luck on their part that they decided to rest two SS divisions in that area at the time. 

Unfortunately, in the end, the operation failed, Montgomery failed but it's not an open view of a man's talents or history to instantly dismiss a failure as stupid.


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## Kruska (Jun 6, 2008)

plan_D said:


> _"And “if” the Nijmegen Bridge had been taken, the Germans would have increased their push on Arnheim and blown the Bridge right in front of the xxx Corps face. Using whatever they had in order to achieve this."_
> 
> That's a very large assumption, Kruska. First off, the Germans would be in no position to lay demolition charges on the bridge because 1st Airborne would be holding the north side. So any attempt on blowing the bridge would have to be made with artillery and tank guns which would make the job a long one, and a tough one.
> 
> ...



*Monty failed in overviewing and assessing the plan of the planers, he could/should have stopped the plan or altered it accordingly to make it work.*

*So in your opinion, Stalingrad was brilliant, the Russians were just lucky that the northern Front was held by Rumanians and Italians. Come on Plan-D you know better then that, FM Paulus and Monty were just gamblers, one lost his bet in Stalingrad and the other hit the jackpot in Al Alamein.*

Regards
Kruska


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## Marcel (Jun 6, 2008)

plan_D said:


> Both you, Kruska, and Marcel are disapproving of Market Garden simply because of that "single road". Because the plan ultimately failed then it's easy to say that the armour had nowhere to move. However, the fact of the matter is the terrain of the Ardennes (which is a forest! I think your comment was directed toward the Sedan crossing.) and the area around Mt.Olympius are both considered completely impassable to armour. That means that before 1941 no one believe that tanks could attack through those regions, and had May 1940 been a disaster for Germany then people would still believe that.



Nope, I am also dissaproving about the plan because the drop zones near Arnhem were to far from the bridge, which made ignoring the intelligence an even bigger mistake. The one road (on a dyke) strategy meant that the timing for XXX corps was too optimistic. This in combination with the fact that only a small group reached the bridge (because of the distance) which meant that they couldn't hold it as long as that made the plan faulty. Thus timing was off, intelligence ignored, were is the brilliance in that. The whole plan was made up with their prediction in mind that the German army could not defend themselves anymore. Other possibilities were not concidered, which means in my eyes that it was a faulty plan.



plan_D said:


> _"The Dutch resistance delivered very precise and useful information to the Allies, these were however partially ignored and until the day of action, obviously no one was aware that the Germans had not just 3rd grade worn down troops in the area."_
> 
> Unfortunately it wasn't partially ignored, it was totally ignored. And I, personally, with 20/20 hindsight would call off the plan if I were told that two SS Panzer Divisions were in my way. But the arrogance and ignorance of the British Command at the time does not make the initial *plan* a bad one. Keeping in mind that the plan was based around the idea that Germany would not expect the Allies to try that kind of movement... and if you really want to be open minded you can think that Germany was lucky that it had placed the SS Panzer Divisions there for rest.



Of course Germany was lucky and the Allies weren't. The whole plan was based on luck, which the Allies lacked.





plan_D said:


> _"Furthermore just for your info, Marcel probably knows more about this: The defense of Holland in 1940 on the Dutch part and in 1944/45 on the German part was based on “opening”-“blowing up” the Deichs – to flood the whole place if necessary. I don’t know why, but luckily for everyone the Germans and the Dutch never did it. Maybe the Germans were too fast in 1940."_
> 
> He must know more simply because he's Dutch, right?! Well slap my thighs and call me Lolita I must know more about Great Britain's history than every Johnny Foreigner on this planet. Be reasonable, please.



I believe he meant that I do know more about the reason why it wasn't carried out. It wasn't an attack on you.


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## plan_D (Jun 6, 2008)

_"Exactly only the north side was under British control, at the end the Luftwaffe would have done the job if necessary just as they did with the Remagen Bridge."_

Remagen bridge was attacked by Me 262s and Ar 234s because they were the only aircraft fast enough to reach the bridge. If the Luftwaffe made the attempt to destroy the bridge with their motley collection of medium bombers in the area (Remagen was '45, there'd be no Ar 234s over Arnhem) then I can comfortably state that they would fail. 
Another point to note is that the Remagen bridge fell due to a combination of the bombing and the weight of the U.S army crossing it. The attacks alone did not breach the bridges structure. 

_"As above stated the southern part would have been attacked, which would have been the sure end for the British airborne. Since nutty Hitler took over personal interest and determination regarding OMG we can be sure that no matter the costs the Bridge would have been destroyed."_

If the bridge were destroyed in the fact of XXX Corps, then we can only assume the German units on the south side would be crushed. If this is the case then, yes, the operation would fail but the resulting casaulties inflicted on the 1st Airborne could only be less due to the support provided by them from the southern bank. 

_"yes, but the German plan never depended on just one road"_

I never stated that it did. However, I was making certain that you were aware that German forces attacking the Netherlands were restricted to roadways and had to be quick to come to the aid of their own paratroopers. I was basically keep history straight.

_"I do not think that these routs were unpassable, even history has shown us that they could be passed. History has also shown that the one road in Holland eliminated the chance for OMG to succeed. It was you who brought in this example based on the assumtion that it would prove something which it actually does not."_

On the contrary it proves my point exactly. 

You believe the Ardennes forest and the area around Mt. Olympus to be passable to armour simply because it has been done ("...even history has shown us..."). However, prior to 1940 (Ardennes) and 1941 (Mt.Olympus/Tempe Gorge) the world believed these routes to be either unsuitable or unpassable to armour. Your view of Ardennes, Tempe Gorge and Market Garden are in hindsight. 

You continually talk about the "single road" as a definate excuse for Market Garden to fail. However, you fail to note that the battle for Mt.Olympus was made on a single road. 

Maj. Gen. von Mellenthin - _"The deeply broken ground, covered with thick bush, was quite unsuitable for armor; the tanks were *road-bound*, and reconnaissance revealed that the road was mined."_

*The bold is my own. 

_"...Balck at once ordered his tanks to push forward - regardless of terrain..."_

Talk of the "atrocious cart track that served as a road" continues on but the idea is there. Before the great Balck pushed his armour through the Commonwealth positions at Mt.Olympus and through Tempe Gorge it was considered impassable, or at least only passable via the "single road". Balck advanced using that road, and he used a railway when his forces moved down into Tempe Gorge. 

The point is this the "single road" in Holland did not make Market Garden fail; there's a lot more to the failure than that. Market Garden was a gamble and a well planned gamble, but a poorly executed one. The battle of Mt.Olympus shows us that a "single road" does not mean failure; it shows us that imagination and surprise are keys to victory. 

The Allies succeeded with imagination but failed with surprise during Market Garden - XXX Corps were slow to get moving, the 82nd did not use shock and awe to capture the bridge quickly, and 1st Airborne were not provided the motorised transport required to reach the north side of the bridge quickly. However, if only one of those variations could have been changed then the chance of success for Market Garden would have been increased greatly.

_"So the plan wasn't brilliant since it was based on unverified assumtions."_

Given the fact that when the plan was written up the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions were not in the area, then the plan remains brilliant. And may we all be reminded that even with the presence of two, admittedly not full strength, Panzer divisions the plan came close to succeeding. 

_"I wouldn't overstress or try to excuse the unsufficient planing on the paper fact of two SS Divisions. What was there acctual strenght? 1 Brigade?
If realy two full sized SS Divisions had been there the whole Idea, plan and execution would have ended in total disaster for the Allies. So the Germans weren't just "lucky" about having these units at place, but the allies could thank God, that these (ignored) units were not full size Divisions."_

Given the fact that airborne cannot face up to armour, no matter its number, then the strength of the panzer divisions is irrelevant as long as there's tanks there. 

And yes, it was lucky for the Germans to have the 9th and 10th there. They had no idea that the Allies were going to mount an offensive in that region. It caught the Germans completely by surprise, and surprise makes victory in most circumstances. If the 9th and 10th were full divisions then they wouldn't have been in Holland, would they? They were there on rest and refit...if they were full then there'd be on the Eastern Front !

_"The Attack on Kursk has nothing to do with luck (besides for the Russians) but on the ignorance and stupidity of Hitler and his follower Generals (not all) who agreed to attacked positions that were totally obvious after giving the Russians 2-3month to prepare and fortify. So the Plan became stupid to follow up since the conditions had changed - such as OMG upon being informed about additional German troops and still to believe that the XXXCorps could follow up one one road where only 3rd grade German resistance was expected.."_

I didn't say Kursk was luck; however your point is correct that the follow-up or execution of the plan becomes "stupid" if the situation changes and the plan doesn't. However, even with the different situation at Market Garden the plan almost came to succeed. Now, in reality I can't say what would have worked, or what wouldn't have worked...frankly, I would have cancelled the plan with the arrival of the 9th and 10th... but then I would have ordered a stronger push toward the Scheldt after Antwerp - that's a completely different story. 

_"A plan involves the tactical setup and movement of forces and timing (Strategy) defined according to recon-enemy forces assessment and deployable counter strategy of the enemy as such it is obvious that the plan was everything but brilliantly thought over."_

A plan is written up and then changed according to the changes in situation. From Day A when the plan was written to D-Day a lot can change. It's the fault of Monty and his staff for not recognising that the original, quite brilliant plan, must be altered. Even giving the units better air support could have provided victory. 

My point is that the original plan was made when the road to Arnhem was not occupied by the 9th and 10th SS Panzer divisions; and I do not disagree that the plan should have been altered or even cancelled in the face of the changing situation ... however, it does not remove the idea that the plan was imaginative and quite brilliant as the idea of surprise (striking in the least expected place) was used by every other nations capable of making mobile war.


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## starling (Jun 6, 2008)

if the welsh guards,the armd recon regt of the guards armd div ,using their cromwells and the mechanised grenadier guards,were the spearhead of the g.a.d.of xxx corps,as they normally would in a british armd div,perhaps things would have been different.remember the same welsh guards,did 100 miles in a day.unfortunately imho,the g.a.d.were simply too bloody rigid.they were not trained by hobo either.the 11th armd div could have been there instead.lee.


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## Kruska (Jun 6, 2008)

plan_D said:


> My point is that the original plan was made when the road to Arnhem was not occupied by the 9th and 10th SS Panzer divisions; and I do not disagree that the plan should have been altered or even cancelled in the face of the changing situation ... however, it does not remove the idea that the plan was imaginative and quite brilliant as the idea of surprise (striking in the least expected place) was used by every other nations capable of making mobile war.



You say: The idea was brilliant; the plan was brilliant (but you can’t actually prove it) and badly executed.

I say: The Idea was brilliant (because the Germans never thought about this possibility), the plan was bad (since it was not changed according to the actual situation, it ignored vital information regarding the SS units since September (not one day before), it did not incorporate any thought in regards to counter measures by the Germans (simply underestimated and neglected) and the whole timeframe based on one road and good weather, and additionally it was badly executed.

So since we still can’t agree, let’s do it step by step with some humor okay?

From the initial XXX frontline to Arnheim is about 100km on road.

17th Sept. at 14.25pm the XXX started and two front driving tanks were eliminated by an 88, - Typhoon – bamm,bamm German resistance finished. At 7:30 pm xxx Major General A.H. Adair reached Valkenswaard in 14km distance (that is 3.5km/h) without any resistance.(What a planning) About the same time the Son bridge was blown up by the nasty Germans.(was this in the planning?) The XII Corps encountered resistance by a Kampfgruppe (minor detachment-maybe 1-2 battalion sized) and progressed slowly.
The 504 took Grave Bridge, 505 and 508 took Heumen Bridge, the other 2 Bridges were blown up by the nasty Germans (in the planning?).
Upon the airborne landing at around 2-3pm SS boy Bittrich suggested FM Model to blow up both Bridges in Arnheim (Yes there is two), but Model refused (was this in the planning?).And don’t worry not any German unit would have been cut off, they could have just moved 30-45 km east into Germany – line Venlo and Kleve. Frost reached the Bridge No.1 at around 9pm.(with rations for 48h) - what a plan -

18th September all allied flights grounded in Belgium (was this also planed?), and OMG was the only time that the LW had air superiority (300 aircrafts were placed under Models command). Beautiful weather lovely chance to bomb Arnheim Bridge if necessary).

XXX from Valkenswaard towards Eindhoven (what did they do the whole night?) Was it planned to do nothing? At 2:30pm stopped at Helmond by a Kampfgruppe (26km in 7 hours = 3.7km/h without resistance. The Best Bridge is blown up, again by those nasty Germans – no Bride left to cross (was this planned?). – The 101st controls Eindhoven and starts to set up a Bailey Bridge at around 2 pm, 3:45 two German Inf.Div and the 86th Corps reach the line Helmond/Weert – 18km East of Eindhoven.

19th September XXX has reached the area around Son at 10 am – 52 km in 42h = 1.2km/h incl. combat. (was that the plan?)The second British airdrop in Arnheim is not able to reach Frost. The 8th Corps can progress only very slowly.
Two inf Bat. and the 1st Polish can’t reach their target, due to Luftwaffe flying 125 sorties (was this planed?) Hey the 208th Kampfbrigade from DENMARK has arrived at Arnheim
At the evening of 19th the 12th corps still had not broken through to Son.
20th September:allied reinforcements can’t be flown in due to bad weather (was this planed?)
XXX corps dragging itself towards Nijmegen. At around 5pm the bad Germans wanted to blow up the Waal bridge (Nijemwegen bridge) **** didn’t work, the fuse ****..ed up– was this planed? German reinforcements start to build up heavily. Hey only 3 days.

21st September: ah the weather is **** (was this planed?) no allied supplies and reinforcements. After 88 hours those lucky German bastards take Arnheim Bridge. (was this planed? and if what should happen?)And German troops cross the Bridge towards Nijmegen.

Best Part so far is that xxx corps, 8th and 12th Corps haven’t met a single of those dreadful SS units and in 90 hours there spearheads had reached about 90 km, wow what a plan man 1km/h incredible brilliant, I just don’t know what to say. 

22nd September and 23rd the German goodies arrive 506th 45 Kingtigers and one company Jagtpanther. (I love this tank).
22nd September: Eisenhower holds a conference in Versailles and the “weakness” of the plan is unfolded.

24th xxx corps still hasn’t arrived at Nijmegen ….. and so on and so on well 26th September OMG finish. 

And you are trying to tell me this thing was a brilliant plan?

Regards
Kruska


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## fly boy (Jun 6, 2008)

what i think they should have done is a pincer


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## Njaco (Jun 6, 2008)

flyboy, I don't think that would have worked. Anyhow Eisenhower liked attacks across broad fronts most of the time.


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## plan_D (Jun 7, 2008)

Yes, I am. And since it's not possible to prove a plan was or wasn't brilliant, is this worth my time? This opinion based discussion seems to have you all hot under the collar. And your childish approach is amusing for a nanosecond; then it becomes boring. Maybe I should be as patronising as you and say "you're better than that". 

Let's take your 17th Sept. -

_17th Sept. at 14.25pm the XXX started and two front driving tanks were eliminated by an 88, - Typhoon – bamm,bamm German resistance finished. At 7:30 pm xxx Major General A.H. Adair reached Valkenswaard in 14km distance (that is 3.5km/h) without any resistance.(What a planning)_

This was not in the plan. The plan was for the XXX Corps to move at daybreak; however, XXX Corps awaited confirmation of the airborne landings before moving off. (Poor execution). 

XXX Corps was also called to make night marches if held up; this they did not do. 

_"About the same time the Son bridge was blown up by the nasty Germans.(was this in the planning?) The XII Corps encountered resistance by a Kampfgruppe (minor detachment-maybe 1-2 battalion sized) and progressed slowly.
The 504 took Grave Bridge, 505 and 508 took Heumen Bridge, the other 2 Bridges were blown up by the nasty Germans (in the planning?)."_

Delays were planned for, yes. However, the initial plan (that I stated should have been changed) did not account for the presence of any German armour. The fact that bridges were blown left, right, and centre did not hinder the progress of XXX Corps to a point of ultimate failure. 

_"18th September all allied flights grounded in Belgium (was this also planed?), and OMG was the only time that the LW had air superiority (300 aircrafts were placed under Models command). Beautiful weather lovely chance to bomb Arnheim Bridge if necessary)."_

Of course, because weather is planned. The British Command decided to plan for themselves to have bad weather and the Germans to have great weather; they prayed to God for that. You seem to be forgetting that Belgium wasn't the only area to have airfields. 

_XXX from Valkenswaard towards Eindhoven (what did they do the whole night?) Was it planned to do nothing? At 2:30pm stopped at Helmond by a Kampfgruppe (26km in 7 hours = 3.7km/h without resistance. The Best Bridge is blown up, again by those nasty Germans – no Bride left to cross (was this planned?). – The 101st controls Eindhoven and starts to set up a Bailey Bridge at around 2 pm, 3:45 two German Inf.Div and the 86th Corps reach the line Helmond/Weert – 18km East of Eindhoven._

Again, it was planned for XXX Corps to make a night march in the event of delay. XXX Corps poorly executed the plan because they just didn't do it. 

The rest of your post quickly becomes a childish rant and absolute BOLLOCKS. XXX Corps arrived infront of Nijmegen on the 19th September where they met 82nd Airborne in Grave, and advanced parties moved on to Nijmegen. And XXX Corps were rolling across the bridge on the 20th! 

So the best bit is you're talking bollocks! My word. Get your facts straight...please.


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## Kruska (Jun 7, 2008)

You are just about the right person to talk about getting the facts straight.

I can’t get of the feeling that your knowledge in regards to OMG is based primarily on the movie A Bridge to Far.

Parts of the lead element of the XXX Corps, the Guards Armoured Division crossed Nijmegen Bridge on the 20th.of September – Not the XXX Corps. Pz.Brig.107 was still fighting with the main body of xxx corps on 22nd till 24th September south east of Nijmegen.
Kenneth Taylor's War Diary - 1 See page 8 crossed the Bridge on the 24th of September, 6th Battalion of Green Howards, of 69th Brigade – XXX Corps.

So if you want to discuss about this topic without just wasting time, sent to me the “Plan” for OMG and not some movie script and assumptions. Proof send me the “Plan”. 

Quote: Again, it was planned for XXX Corps to make a night march in the event of delay.
Who would ever plan a night march in a military operation plan for a Corps? You plan tactical objectives, advance timelines, unit deployments, etc. ….night march …. Ridiculous.

The Plan my friend required the XXX Corps to engage throughout the entire operation in order to ensure an ongoing drive towards Eindhoven to reach Nijmegen on day one – not day four, and as “PLANED” Arnhem in 2 days. (One day for Nijmegen, Two days for Arnhem - what a plan) And this Plan my friend was already thrown overboard on the first day and then replaced and constantly amended/improvised by daily and hourly decisions because the “2 day plan” proofed to be a “Plan of being impossible to achieve plan” in regards to terrain and actual opposition by the Wehrmacht, or in other words a damn ignorant plan.

And I am talking only about “Garden” the XXX Corps, Arnhem itself was doomed already before the 17th September because of ignored recon.

So send me proof for having planned a night march, proof to me that the plan included the objective of taking Nijmegen Bridge on the 20th of September including a night march, Bullocks yourself.

Regards
Kruska


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## plan_D (Jun 9, 2008)

_"Parts of the lead element of the XXX Corps, the Guards Armoured Division crossed Nijmegen Bridge on the 20th.of September – Not the XXX Corps."_

_"24th xxx corps still hasn’t arrived at Nijmegen"_

These two quotes are contradictory, and both from you. Advanced elements of the XXX Corps reached the 20th, I'm glad you realise this now, instead of lying about the times and dates. 

_"XXX Corps arrived infront of Nijmegen on the 19th September where they met 82nd Airborne in Grave, and advanced parties moved on to Nijmegen. And XXX Corps were rolling across the bridge on the 20th!"_

If you note, I state that advanced parties moved to Nijmegen. The fact that elements of XXX Corps were crossing the bridge on the 20th means that XXX Corps was rolling across the bridge! 

_"See page 8 crossed the Bridge on the 24th of September, 6th Battalion of Green Howards, of 69th Brigade – XXX Corps."_

Even this quote contradicts your bollocks statement about XXX Corps not being at Nijmegen on the 24th! 

_"The Plan my friend required the XXX Corps to engage throughout the entire operation in order to ensure an ongoing drive towards Eindhoven to reach Nijmegen on day one – not day four, and as “PLANED” Arnhem in 2 days. (One day for Nijmegen, Two days for Arnhem - what a plan) And this Plan my friend was already thrown overboard on the first day and then replaced and constantly amended/improvised by daily and hourly decisions because the “2 day plan” proofed to be a “Plan of being impossible to achieve plan” in regards to terrain and actual opposition by the Wehrmacht, or in other words a damn ignorant plan."_

The XXX Corps were informed to constantly press forward; there probably isn't the actual wording "Night march on the night of 17th September" but I never said there was. The XXX Corps were ordered to continue pressing forward to Arnhem in two days, as you've pointed out, which meant to press through day and night. Even though I might have failed to mention that h-hour for XXX Corps was not 1400; it was in the morning ! 

The original plan was amended during execution because of realisation that the increased Wehrmacht strength. Getting an armour Corps to Arnhem in two days was possible as the roads were supposed to be cleared by the airborne...as this hadn't happened, the plan had to be changed. Which is all the execution!

If you want a direct copy of the plan I'll just write to the MoD or go back time to Sept. '44 and ask Monty for a copy.


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## starling (Jun 9, 2008)

gentlemen,do we have accurate o.o.b.of xxx corps.i know a few units,i hope,so help me out please.
a/guards armd div.
b/43rd wessex inf div.
c/50th inf div.
d/8th ind armd bde.
e/44th r.t.r. detached from 4th ind armd bde.
f/64th med regt r.a.xxx corps troops.
g/household cav regt.xxx corps troops.
any help would be gratefully accepted.yours,lee.


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## Kruska (Jun 9, 2008)

plan_D said:


> _"Parts of the lead element of the XXX Corps, the Guards Armoured Division crossed Nijmegen Bridge on the 20th.of September – Not the XXX Corps."_
> 
> _"24th xxx corps still hasn’t arrived at Nijmegen"_
> 
> ...



Regards
Kruska


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## Kruska (Jun 9, 2008)

starling said:


> gentlemen,do we have accurate o.o.b.of xxx corps.i know a few units,i hope,so help me out please.
> a/guards armd div.
> b/43rd wessex inf div.
> c/50th inf div.
> ...



If you do not have the books, check Operation Market Garden order of battle - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

It is quite detailed, but not so informative on unit deployments per day and time during OMG.

Regards
Kruska


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## starling (Jun 9, 2008)

thanks kruska,unfortunately i seen the wiki.but my own opinion is that monty did not know how many lifts would be required.gen.brererton did,and therefore should have rejected the brilliant plan.yours,starling.


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## Kruska (Jun 9, 2008)

IMO, but off course it is easy to be smart after knowing all the facts 65 years later, OMG had a better chance if the US 101st airborne troops would have been deployed north of Nijmegen so as to support the British in Arnheim if necessary, and the US 82nd airborne south of Nijmegen as they actually did. Even Sosabowski’s total force was far weaker than that of the 101st. So they should have deployed his force along the 82nd or (in the worst case sacrificed) at Eindhoven.

And just leave the south to the XXX corps, they would have taken the same 4-6 days but Arnhem Bridge and Nijmegen Bridge would have been secured or at least the entrapment of the British would not have taken place. Losses would have been higher but at least this plan could have succeeded in reflection to actual historic occurrences.

And it would have been indeed a brilliant plan.

The allies however could never plan in -the certainty- that the Germans would not just blow up these two vital key bridges, making OMG a failure just as it was in history.

When the Germans attacked Belgium and Holland they almost pinpoint dropped their Para’s in far lesser numbers on the objectives and as such enabled them to secure vital operational positions, needed for the speedy advance on several roads by the Wehrmacht columns. 

Regards
Kruska


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## Marcel (Jun 20, 2008)

Kruska said:


> When the Germans attacked Belgium and Holland they almost pinpoint dropped their Para’s in far lesser numbers on the objectives and as such enabled them to secure vital operational positions, needed for the speedy advance on several roads by the Wehrmacht columns.
> 
> Regards
> Kruska



You know 22nd German paratroopers were utterly defeated near the Hague by recrutes and 2nd line troopers in 1940? They already showed that these kind of operations were dangerous and usually not as effective as expected, even against an inferior enemy.


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## Kruska (Jun 20, 2008)

Hello Marcel,

Yes you are very correct; The German HQ attitude towards the paratroopers was somewhat of neglect towards losses. Actually all German Para operations where very costly, not to mention Crete, however they fulfilled all their operations in conjunction with support infantry or tanks.

Hitler and the Wehrmacht actually could never develop a positive and innovative attitude towards the tactical implementation for airborne assaults, unlike the British or US. As such they spend the rest of the war as infantry, constantly being decimated due to their role as infantry fire brigade without the necessary integration into an armored Wehrmacht division. 

Besides Crete the German paratroopers were a very small unit and as such always used in small scale operations.

If Hitler had actually planed the conquest of England the chances of being recognized as a strategic and tactical component of the Wehrmacht rather than the Luftwaffe, things would have gone probably very different for this unit.

Regards
Kruska


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## Soren (Jun 20, 2008)

The paratroopers dealt out more losses than they recieved though, even on crete which is often considered a slaughter of paratroopers.


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## Kruska (Jun 20, 2008)

Soren said:


> The paratroopers dealt out more losses than they recieved though, even on crete which is often considered a slaughter of paratroopers.



Overall, yes certainly correct.

Regards
Kruska


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## Marcel (Jun 21, 2008)

Soren said:


> The paratroopers dealt out more losses than they recieved though, even on crete which is often considered a slaughter of paratroopers.



You should read up on the assault on The Hague. It was an absolute failure and hampered the deployment of German paratroopers for a long time afterwards. The Germans should have been content with only an assault on the bridges near Dordrecht, which was very successful indeed. As it was now, the Germans sacrificed the whole 22nd, gaining nothing and suffering losses above 2000 casualties.


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## Kruska (Jun 21, 2008)

Hello Marcel,

Sorry I am not so familiar with the issue regarding Den Haag. I am not aware of a 22nd Paratrooper unit and 2000 casualties in regards to a single para operation at Den Haag. Could you forward some details of this “occurrence” to me please.

What I do know is that most parts of the 3rd Battalion landed at Valkenburg – airfield. One company had parachuted and the other were landed. So we would be talking of about 500-600 men, who managed to hold out for 5 days until the capitulation of Holland and reinforcements came in. The 22nd could be the 22nd Luftlande Infantrie Division- (47th and 65th Airborne infantry brigades), which never airdropped but was an infantry formation with Luftlande designation and as such air transported/landed, throughout the entire Holland campaign together with the 7th Fliegerdivision (actually 1st Para Brigade). However the three Battalions planed for Valkenburg (Part of the Regiment 47) only managed to airdrop and land about 1 battallion due to fighting on the ground and congestion of the airfield.

Actually the German airborne drops over Holland caused such havoc amongst the Dutch military command that they were not able to concentrate their efforts on the regular Wehrmacht units and as such surrendered after 5 days. 

Regards
Kruska


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## Soren (Jun 21, 2008)

Very correct Kruska.


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## Marcel (Jun 22, 2008)

Kruska said:


> Hello Marcel,
> 
> Sorry I am not so familiar with the issue regarding Den Haag. I am not aware of a 22nd Paratrooper unit and 2000 casualties in regards to a single para operation at Den Haag. Could you forward some details of this “occurrence” to me please.
> 
> What I do know is that most parts of the 3rd Battalion landed at Valkenburg – airfield. One company had parachuted and the other were landed. So we would be talking of about 500-600 men, who managed to hold out for 5 days until the capitulation of Holland and reinforcements came in. The 22nd could be the 22nd Luftlande Infantrie Division- (47th and 65th Airborne infantry brigades), which never airdropped but was an infantry formation with Luftlande designation and as such air transported/landed, throughout the entire Holland campaign together with the 7th Fliegerdivision (actually 1st Para Brigade). However the three Battalions planed for Valkenburg (Part of the Regiment 47) only managed to airdrop and land about 1 battallion due to fighting on the ground and congestion of the airfield.



I'm using a.o. "The war in may 1940" bij captain Brongers and "the Kingdom of the Netherland in Worldwar 2" bij dr. De Jong as sources. (titles are translated as they are in Dutch). Especially Brongers uses a lot of German references. They mention the 22nd Luftlande division landing on the airfields near the Hague, which indeed landed mostly with Ju52 on the airstrips. The airfield of Ypenburg for instance, was captured on may 10th by paratroopers and soldiers from the Ju52's. Ypenburg was recaptured mainly by recrutes of the 5th compagny of the 4th Depot batalion on 15.30h that day. 

The airfield of Valkenburg was in fact recaptured by two batalions (III-4 RI) at 18.30h that day (may 10th), so they didn't last for 5 days. According to my sources, some 1500 German troops landed on Valkenburg. About 600 Germans fled to the village of Valkenburg were they were sealed off by the Dutch and left alone.

22nd lost 42 % of their officers and 28% of other personnel in those 4 days. 1600 POW were taken and shipped to the UK in time, so the whole operation was a costly one and a total failure.



Kruska said:


> Actually the German airborne drops over Holland caused such havoc amongst the Dutch military command that they were not able to concentrate their efforts on the regular Wehrmacht units and as such surrendered after 5 days.


For the 22nd this is totally incorrect as they were defeated on the first day, when the Germans didn't even reach the Grebbelinie, the main defence line of the Dutch. And as I showed, the Dutch mainly used recrutes from the Den Haag area to eliminate the thread and as such it wasn't the big burden on the whole military effort at the Grebbelinie.
You could say something for the 7th flieger division, as they captured and held Waalhaven and the Moerdijk bridges. They were quite effective.

I do think the plan using airborn troops to attack Vesting Holland was a big mistake, even though 7th Flieger division did do their job. The total operation cost the Germans 220 Ju52, a big part of their transport ability and a big part of their airborn troops, which are very expensive and difficult to create. 
And still the Dutch were not defeated military on May 14th when they surrendered. The Waterlinie was not broken, not even attacked at the time. They surrendered because their air force was defeated and the Germans could bomb at will on Rotterdam, not challenged by any Dutch air defence. To eliminate further loss of lives they surrendered. In the end, the use of 7th and 22nd was not necessary at all..
You could say the Germans won because the Dutch were too greedy in the previous years to build up a modern army and a big airforce.



Soren said:


> Very correct Kruska.


Nope, as I already mentioned above. As I said you should first read up on the subject.


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## Kruska (Jun 23, 2008)

Hello Marcel,

Thanks for the info. As far as I know however only about 500-600 men landed at Valkenburg and they managed to stay and keep the airfield until the Dutch surrender, or retreated to the surrounding area in order to keep the Dutch occupied. As such the objective towards the airfield would have failed, however the Dutch also could not use it – and that was one of the objectives.
So far I only managed to track sentences in regards to the failed operation regarding the 22nd Luftlande Infantrie Division but I have not found anything solid so far on it.

Oberst R. Buhse.htm

This 1600 men POW issue I have only read on WIKI so far and I really doubt that very much.

In contra, I think it is proven that the German para landings contributed greatly to the distortion which speeded up Holland’s surrender. Before the LW bombed Rotterdam, the Dutch and Germans were already negotiating the surrender and the timeline had been extended by the Germans, as such the Rotterdam incident happened – due to the fact that the LW did not recall the bombers being unaware about the capitulation of Rotterdam.

I will see, if I can find some more reliable info’s/sources on this topic.

Regards
Kruska


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## fly boy (Jun 23, 2008)

Njaco said:


> flyboy, I don't think that would have worked. Anyhow Eisenhower liked attacks across broad fronts most of the time.



well think had allied bombers or fighter bombers attack the occupied areas more and the forces evened out it might have worked better


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## Marcel (Jun 23, 2008)

Kruska said:


> Hello Marcel,
> 
> Thanks for the info. As far as I know however only about 500-600 men landed at Valkenburg and they managed to stay and keep the airfield until the Dutch surrender, or retreated to the surrounding area in order to keep the Dutch occupied. As such the objective towards the airfield would have failed, however the Dutch also could not use it – and that was one of the objectives.
> So far I only managed to track sentences in regards to the failed operation regarding the 22nd Luftlande Infantrie Division but I have not found anything solid so far on it.
> ...


Thanks for the link, it's interesting to see both sides. Funny thing is that what this site calls "ein Ruhmesblatt reicher geworden" is called by the Dutch side a "verpletterende nederlaag" You can see how point of view blurres the historians vision on both sides 
Anyway, the two books I mentioned are standard works here in the NL, so I expect them to be reliable. 
About the losses
Quote from "Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de tweede wereldoorlog" Deel 3, blz.128 - Dr. L De Jong (1970):


> Toen het donker werd op 10 mei...Aan gesneuvelden, gewonden en krijgsgevangenen waren de Duitsers bijna de helft van hun sterkte kwijt geraakt van de 3000 luchtlandingstroepen die waren ingezet.
> 
> _When it became dark on may 10th... The Germans had lost about half of their strength to death, injury and POW out of the 300 airlanding troops that were deployed_



From "De oorlog in mei '40" E.H. Brongers(1963):


> De Duitse aanval op Den Haag was reeds op de eerste dag in de kiem gesmoord. Het 22e luchtlandings divisie verloor 42% van haar officieren en 28% van het overige personeel.... 1600 krijgsgevangenen vielen in Nederlandse handen, benevens zeer grote hoeveelheden oorlogsmateriaal, waaronder veel wapens en munitie. Veel slecht uitgeruste compagnieen... heben hier dankbaar gebruik van gemaakt.
> _The German attack on Den Haag was already stopped on the first day. 22nd airlandings division lost 42% of their officers and 28% other personell....1600 POW were taken by the Dutch, together with large amounts of material, including weapons and munition. Many badly outfitted compagnies... mad great use out of it.
> 
> _


_

Quote from "Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de tweede wereldoorlog" Deel 3, blz.462 - Dr. L De Jong (1970):



Bij de verliezen moeten de 1200 krijgsgevangenen geteld worden die via Ijmuiden weggevoerd waren
On top of the losses came the 1200 POW that were transported away from Ijmuiden

Click to expand...

You're right, I remembered a too high number, 1200 were transported to the UK, not all 1600.


Luchtoorlog 10 mei - J.P Nater(1982)
German a/c losses: 220 Ju52 - 430 deployed = 51%

Valkenburg airfield was definitely lost to the Germans in the evening of May 10th, you should be able to find that from several sources. I think you are confusing the 600 para's in the *village* of Valkenburg, who held out untill the surrender.

Valkenburg was never used by the Dutch as an airfield in WWII. The grass runway was just created and the field was still too wet and soft to land on, hence the failure of the German landings (as your link confirms). Preventing the Dutch from using it was totally useless.

The negotiations you are mentioning were about the city of Rotterdam, but the Dutch had still another line of defence between Rotterdam an Den Haag. The situation was critical, but (not yet) lost. I agree on the fact that the 7th flieger division did their job admirably, but I don't think they had any influence on the fighting at the Grebbelinie. But it would have been a matter of time, I agree. Without help, the Dutch would have lost after few more days/weeks of fighting.

Dutch Government and general staff always stated that the total surrender of the armed forces was because of the inability to defend themselves against air attacks like Rotterdam.

I still think the Germans would have easily won in short time without the use of the airborn troops. The high losses of especially the 22nd and the Ju52 staffeln (including crew) was too big compared to the little advantage gained by it.

The Dutch biggest enemy were their own government. Had they not cut budget like they did in 1936-1938 and had they not neglected self defence. The Dutch would have had better arms and having had to fight with only 40 fighters, 11 bombers and guns from 1870._


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## Kruska (Jun 23, 2008)

Marcel said:


> Thanks for the link, it's interesting to see both sides. Funny thing is that what this site calls "ein Ruhmesblatt reicher geworden" is called by the Dutch side a "verpletterende nederlaag" You can see how point of view blurres the historians vision on both sides
> 
> From "De oorlog in mei '40" E.H. Brongers(1963):



The funny and confusing part is actually, that this site is a Dutch site and it refers to Bongers  - did you click on the Dutch link?

Regards
Kruska


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## Marcel (Jun 24, 2008)

I hadn't paid enough attention, probably sleeping . The site mentions the German losses as well:
_Totale verliezen van parachutisten en luchtlandingstroepen in de Vesting Holland: (bron Historic DE)

1.

Aufklärungs Abteilung 22, Major Von Boddien, 10 gefallen, 12 verwundet, 13 vermisst = 35.
2.

Artillerie Regiment 22, Oberstleutnant De Boer, 6 gefallen, 13 verwundet, 1 vermisst = 20.
3.

Flak Bataillon 22, Hptm Kohlhaas, 4 gefallen, 9 verwundet, 4 vermisst = 17.
4.

Infanterie Regiment 16, Oberst Hans Kreysing, 38 gefallen, 106 verwundet, 17 vermisst = 161.
5.

Infanterie Regiment 47, Oberst Heyser, 74 gefallen, 130 verwundet, 61 vermisst = 265. 
6.

Infanterie Regiment 65, Oberst Friemel, 97 gefallen, 89 verwundet, 217 vermisst = 402.
7.

Stab 22. Infanterie-Division Generalleutnant Hans Graf von Sponeck, 7 gefallen, 14 verwundet, 4 vermisst = 26.
8.

Nachrichten Abteilung 22, Major Lorenz, 21 gefallen, 28 verwundet, 23 vermisst = 72.
9.

Pionier Bataillon 22, Hauptmann Burger, 21 gefallen, 25 verwundet, 39 vermisst = 85. 

Gevallenen 278, Gewonden 435, Vermist 379, afgevoerde krijgsgevangenen 1600.
Totaal uitgeschakelde Duitsers : 2692_


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## Kruska (Jun 24, 2008)

Hello Marcel,

 uitgeschakelde  , oh man I love this word, uitgeschakelde 

Thanks for the figures.

However I still remain sceptical regarding these 1600 POW's being brought to England. Let's see what I can find about this issue.

Regards
Kruska


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## starling (Jun 24, 2008)

yes,ike did like to attack on a broad front.i believe his a.d.c.once said during the normandy campaign...ike cant understand why everyone is not just attacking,everywhere...sounds a bit like the french marshal in 1917,who ordererd that tactic,and then had a mutiny on his hands.ooops,wrong thread,sorry.any way,i believe units of xxx corps..household cavalry,and the 4th dorsetshire regt battle group,129bde,43rd wessex inf div,did reach arnhem.imho,people blame monty,but he was an a/g c.o,he was genuinlly looking for a quick end to the war.most of the pplanning for market was done in england,and garden in belgium,all in only a few days.you have to keep up the pressure on a defeated enemy,this is why a broad front would never win in 44.starling.imo.


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## Marcel (Jun 24, 2008)

Kruska said:


> Hello Marcel,
> 
> uitgeschakelde  , oh man I love this word, uitgeschakelde
> Thanks for the figures.
> ...


I agree, I think dr. De Jong's 1200 is more accurate. I do believe 1600 POW were taken, but some of them were liberated after the Dutch surrender. 400 would be a believable number.


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## Soren (Jun 24, 2008)

> Nope, as I already mentioned above. As I said you should first read up on the subject.



Or you should find another book to read ?


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## Marcel (Jun 25, 2008)

Soren said:


> Or you should find another book to read ?



Not sure what you mean, but I must admit, I'm in an advantage, being able to read dutch


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## starling (Jul 8, 2008)

i think ikes strategy was all wrong.montys northern thrust would have finished jerry in 44.1st can army on the left,next,2nd british army,aimed at antwerp,brussels.next,u.s 1st army,aimed at charloa and carry on in that general direction.next u.s 3rd army,aimed n/w above the ardennes.
one of the armies would definately find a soft spot.according to de-guigand,montys chief of staff,monty offered to serve under bradley,for political reasons.
if the allied armies advanced n/w together,the suppply situation would have been lessened,instead of the red ball express driving all over france,the supply trucks etc,would all be headed in the same direction.yours,starling.


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## Mens Agitat Molem (Jul 8, 2008)

Hi there - I've only just come across your site and have spent an hour or so looking around. I actually arrived looking for info about Bombers and came across this post!

My dad was actually there at the time, in the Nijmegen/Arnhem area, he was closer to Remagen. He actually landed in Normandy on D-Day +4 (June 10). He was an engineer with the tanks and was attached to the Canadian forces (even though he and his friend were Scottish and had been called up together, they ended up in an English regiment). He never spoke much about his time in northern Europe between June 1944 and when he was demobbed in 1946, but did remark that mostly the failure was down to poor communication, lack of intelligence and appreciation of how many German troops were in the area, and political in-fighting between the generals on the ground. He and his pals all felt that they'd been let down by the planners more than anything.

Liz


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## starling (May 7, 2009)

does anyone have the plans for xxxcorps,after a succesful crossing at arnhem?.ike,brererton,monty,dempsey must have made plans for this,not just a right turn into/or around the rhur?.i understand the 52nd div was to be landed somewhere?,ive never seen maps though?,any one know where there are some good sites,orr info,cheers.


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## starling (May 8, 2009)

i remember reading that part of XXXCORPS was to turn west,clearing the north bank of the rhine,thus trapping german 15TH army.i cant find the damned book,and i been all over the web searching;can anyone help out please,cheers.


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## Freebird (Jan 28, 2011)

teddieboe said:


> I have male yeast infection urinary tract infection



Ewwww, go away spammer. 
What a mess on this thread


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## starling (Mar 13, 2011)

Thanks for a great thread Marcel and plan d,very informative


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## RabidAlien (Mar 13, 2011)

From what I recall, I think it was in Cornelius Ryan's book, this very situation had been studied by the Dutch at their war colleges, and the scenario was always put to the individual classes. Those students who chose to do the spearhead thrust up the single highway always failed. Those who chose to go up the highway, then send forces in a right-hook across the ferry at _____ (dang, I'm bad with names), and continue up the other side of the river to Arnhem and take the bridge from BOTH sides at once, they succeeded. Too many possible failure points along a single narrow route of advance, especially if you ignore the solid intel coming from the underground, who are on the scene with eyeballs glued to the bogeys of the tanks rumbling by. And the Germans were not quite as demoralized and defeated as the Allies thought. Monty took waaaaay too long capturing the port at Antwerp, allowing some small amount of resupply/reinforcement/reorganization amongst the Germans. 

The "what if" where Patton gets the M-G resources would make for an excellent thread...


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## starling (Mar 14, 2011)

I thought antewerp was taken intact,do you mean the schelt?.cheers.


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Mar 14, 2011)

Starling, I might be wrong, but while Antwerp was taken fairly quickly during the breakout, it was was uselss until the island of Walcheren was occupied. I believe that it wasn't taken(Walcheren) until November.


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## Airframes (Mar 14, 2011)

Correct. Antwerp was taken in August (23rd ?), but extremely stiff resistance along the Scheldt estuary, plus mines etc, and the strong-point on Walcheren island continued to delay all things.; The island was eventually taken by a commando-type raid, and the first supplies arrived in the port (of Antwerp) in early-mid November (when weather started to affect all operations).
The Operation (Market-Garden) covered _only_ the advance to the bridge at Arnhem - any subsequent operation(s) would have been under a different code name (choose any one of around six!), and would have included the 'swing' into Germany proper, and the Rhine crossing, which, of course, eventually happened with 'Operation Varsity'.
Bottom line = any advance into Germany was not under the auspices of Market-Garden.


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## Freebird (Mar 14, 2011)

starling said:


> I thought antewerp was taken intact,do you mean the schelt?.cheers.



I think he might have meant _Arnhem_, not _Antwerp_.



Vassili Zaitzev said:


> Starling, I might be wrong, but while Antwerp was taken fairly quickly during the breakout, it was was uselss until the island of Walcheren was occupied. I believe that it wasn't taken(Walcheren) until November.


 
correct.



RabidAlien said:


> From what I recall, I think it was in Cornelius Ryan's book, this very situation had been studied by the Dutch at their war colleges, and the scenario was always put to the individual classes. Those students who chose to do the spearhead thrust up the single highway always failed.
> 
> The "what if" where Patton gets the M-G resources would make for an excellent thread...


 
They scenarios that you mentioned usually START with the inept airdrop operational plans of Brereton Browning.
A properly executed airdrop operation would have *guaranteed* Allied success.

Monty's plans for Market Garden were good, it was Allied Airborne command that screwed it up. 
The strategic basis for the operation were also correct, which is why it needed to be done (rather than advance on patton's sector)

1.) A successful M-G allows the Allied armies to bypass the Westwall, and the casualties delays that they ran into. (Hurtigen Forest, Aachen etc)

2.) It would also allow for a left hook to isolate Holland, meaning that the (unsupplied) 15th Army could be captured more quickly, and prevent the Dutch winter famine.

3.) It would also capture the areas on the Dutch coast which had the V-1 V-2 launch sites


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## parsifal (Mar 15, 2011)

I thought the general idea after the successful capture of the bridges was to continue deep penetration, going as far and as deep as possible. Monty euphamistically talked about capturing berlin by christmas.

Of course, there would have needed to be some consolidation and widening of the salients shoulders, but why accept the smaller prizes of the ruhr, when the big prize, berlin was within the realm of possibility


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## RabidAlien (Mar 15, 2011)

I was talking about Antwerp, yes, but misspoke: the port city was taken early on, yes, but Monty failed to clear the estuary and the island (Walcheren?) so that shipping could come in to the port unmolested. He also had the Germans on the run at one point, but once he got to Antwerp he just sat back and allowed them to get things back together again.


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## starling (Mar 15, 2011)

But did Montgomery have enough supplies for both the schelt and img?,cheers.


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## Njaco (Mar 15, 2011)

freebird said:


> I think he might have meant _Arnhem_, not _Antwerp_.
> 
> 
> 
> ...


 
I'm not sure I would pin it all on Airbourne. Monty's single road dash for XXX Corps had its faults. The area especially from Nijmagen and Arnhem was very marshy and the high sihouette of the vehicles allowed German artillery to pick them off easily. 30,000 vehicles of XXX Corps took serious losses.


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## starling (Mar 15, 2011)

I know what you mean,but brereton was out of his depth,my opinion of course.please feel free to put me right here,I don't hold grudges,cheers.


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## robtmelvin (Mar 15, 2011)

From what I have read, Monty was bound and determined to get that plan approved and ignored some very critical intelligence that came in after the planning had been long underway, which was ignored. It also seems that some very legitimate practical considerations, such as moving 30 Corps. up a narrow, 1 lane at best road, were not given sufficient consideration. As it turned out, there were some very strong Wehrmacht and SS units refitting in the Arnhem area which resulted in much stiffer German resistance than Monty was "sure" would be met. I have read that Gen. Roy Urquhart was well less than complimentary of the entire plan in comments and interviews given after the war. I've always suspected that Ike approved that plan in an attempt to keep peace with the English elements of the coalition who felt that their number one war hero general was getting short shrift by the mostly American planners.


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## Marcel (Mar 16, 2011)

robtmelvin said:


> From what I have read, Monty was bound and determined to get that plan approved and ignored some very critical intelligence that came in after the planning had been long underway, which was ignored. It also seems that some very legitimate practical considerations, such as moving 30 Corps. up a narrow, 1 lane at best road, were not given sufficient consideration. As it turned out, there were some very strong Wehrmacht and SS units refitting in the Arnhem area which resulted in much stiffer German resistance than Monty was "sure" would be met. I have read that Gen. Roy Urquhart was well less than complimentary of the entire plan in comments and interviews given after the war. I've always suspected that Ike approved that plan in an attempt to keep peace with the English elements of the coalition who felt that their number one war hero general was getting short shrift by the mostly American planners.


 
Monty actually thought the situation of Tuesday September the 5th would continue. The German army and their collaborators were in panic then and disorganized (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dolle_Dinsdag). Unfortunately for him, the German army regrouped and order was restored before Market Garden. This was faithfully reported by the Dutch resistance, but unfortunately the Allied choose/was forced to ignore this info.


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## starling (Mar 16, 2011)

Anyone else got any opinions on gen.brererton?.


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## parsifal (Mar 16, 2011)

the ultimate blame for the failure has to rest with Monty. He was the man in charge, so even if he didnt know, he should have.


having said that one has to appraise the operation for what it was.....a gamble that didnt work out. Was it a crap shoot worth taking. My opinion, absoutely....if the operation had come off history would have recorded how the war ended in 1944, rather than dragging on through half of 1945. monty gets constantly berated for being an overcautious opinionated SOB. He was all of those things, but he could win battles as well. Market garden demostrated that he was prepared to take risks if there was chance for a big gain


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## RabidAlien (Mar 17, 2011)

The general feel I've always gotten for Montgomery was that he did win battles....but only after waiting to build up an overwhelming advantage in men and materials. He had to make sure his flanks and supply lines were rock-solid secure before moving. Patton, on the other hand, would look at the situation and send whatever he had, and once the enemy was reeling, he kept sending everything he had to keep them reeling. He'd bring up supplies as fast as he could, but he seemed to think that the quartermaster's job was to catch up to the troops, not have the troops come to the quartermaster to requisition supplies. So, yes, Monty won battles....but, in some cases, waiting just wasn't the right option. Such as in Market-Garden.


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## Freebird (Mar 17, 2011)

Thorlifter said:


> The idea was fine. The intelligence was bad. "IF" the intelligence was accurate, the offensive would probably had succeeded.
> 
> Also remember, the assault was successful initially. Had the British been able to secure and hold Arnhem, the whole operation would have succeeded.



Indeed it would have.



starling said:


> I know what you mean,but brereton was out of his depth,my opinion of course.please feel free to put me right here,I don't hold grudges,cheers.


 
I would agree with that, he had zero expeience with parchute operations, and his choices let down the whole operation.



robtmelvin said:


> From what I have read, Monty was bound and determined to get that plan approved and ignored some very critical intelligence that came in after the planning had been long underway, which was ignored. It also seems that some very legitimate practical considerations, such as moving 30 Corps. up a narrow, 1 lane at best road, were not given sufficient consideration.



Not true actually.
Monty suggested to Ike that with supplies running thin the allies needed ONE primary thrust to break through the westwall, be it US or British, and that a broad front approach would leave the allies stalled on the German frontier for the winter (which is what happened.)



Marcel said:


> This was faithfully reported by the Dutch resistance, but unfortunately the Allied choose/was forced to ignore this info.



To be fair, their was some question of the reliability of the Dutch intelligence. (There was a German double agent operating IIRC). The data was not confirmed until the 15th of Sept.


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