# Why did the Brits persist with the Seafire until the end of WWII and beyond?



## CobberKane (Aug 11, 2012)

I get why the RN went with the Seafire early in the war - they needed something that could match contemporary German fighters and the Sea Hurricane and Martlet/Wildcat weren't quite up to it. But from the mid-war onwards the American war machine was pumping out Corsairs and Hellcats and the British used both - so why persist with the compromise Seafire? Or was it just because they liked making those great American fighters look so damm ugly?


----------



## Gixxerman (Aug 11, 2012)

I'd suggest any number of things but the primary thing being economics.
Before that though it has to be said that the Seafire wasn't really a compromise was fully up to the job the UK required of it.
The British built part is important as it means production on-going in a lot of firms, it means currency (at a time of dire financial constraints for a British economy basically in the process of being bled white or, post-war, which had been bled white was basically bust) is not exported and lastly it means a more reliable lasting spares supply chain for the Seafire itself anything else using any of its coponentry.

Reactions: Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## CobberKane (Aug 11, 2012)

Gixxerman said:


> I'd suggest any number of things but the primary thing being economics.
> Before that though it has to be said that the Seafire wasn't really a compromise was fully up to the job the UK required of it.
> The British built part is important as it means production on-going in a lot of firms, it means currency (at a time of dire financial constraints for a British economy basically in the process of being bled white or, post-war, which had been bled white was basically bust) is not exported and lastly it means a more reliable lasting spares supply chain for the Seafire itself anything else using any of its coponentry.



The Seafire was derived from the Spitfire, a short range interceptor, and as such it was badly lacking in range, a serious shortcomming for a shipboard fighter. Its narrow undercarriage caused numerous accidents on take-off and landing and I don't think it ever got anywhere near the servicability levels of the Hellcat or Corsair, both of which were much far more rugged. It coudn't match their survivability or ground attack capacity either. The Brits bought and used both those fighters from America, so I'm wondering why they didn't completely supplant the seafire. Maybe they just couldn't get their hands on enough of them?


----------



## fastmongrel (Aug 11, 2012)

Perhaps it did a job the RN wanted doing. Perhaps it wasnt as bad an aircraft as some internet experts think. Perhaps the Grey Funnel Line just wanted the same as what those arriviste boys in light blue had.


----------



## Gixxerman (Aug 11, 2012)

CobberKane said:


> The Seafire was derived from the Spitfire, a short range interceptor



True but from what I can see additional fuel tank space was an option.



CobberKane said:


> and as such it was badly lacking in range, a serious shortcomming for a shipboard fighter.



I don't know about that. "Badly lacking in range" or just less range than the Hellcat or Corsair you seem to prefer?
It's not necessarily the same thing.
Bear in mind (as you yourself note) the RN used all of them and would have been well aware of the various qualities of each.



CobberKane said:


> Its narrow undercarriage caused numerous accidents on take-off and landing



Did it?
I am not aware of any special mention of the Spit or Seafire's undercarriage having a reputation that the Me 109 has for instance, have you data to back this up or is it something you feel just inherent in that type of landding gear.

I'm not saying this to be argumentative, I'm genuinely interested in why you reach this conclusion.



CobberKane said:


> I don't think it ever got anywhere near the servicability levels of the Hellcat or Corsair, both of which were much far more rugged.



Once again in absolute terms that may be so but if the Seafire did the job the RN required of it then it matters little, no?



CobberKane said:


> The Brits bought and used both those fighters from America, so I'm wondering why they didn't completely supplant the seafire. Maybe they just couldn't get their hands on enough of them?



Or maybe as I mentioned you should be giving far more weight to the economic argument.
I'm not sure people understand just how wrecked the British economy was by WW2.....and the effects of which were a drag on the UK economy for decades after, I recently read that the final war-damage rebuilding was completed in the mid 1990's in Germany,
The UK finally repaid the USA the last of the war debts in 2006. 
The UK was broke and we had already gotten up to our necks in debt to the US, alternatives which were 'Made in Britain' would be bound to have an appeal, especially if they could do the job asked of them in doing so allow the UK to cut back on imports from abroad.

I think the answer is as simple as that.


----------



## davebender (Aug 11, 2012)

The same reason Britain built the battleship HMS Vanguard during the war.


----------



## stona (Aug 11, 2012)

I don't think national pride has anything to do with it. We used plenty of US armaments when it suited us including carrier aircraft. The economic argument is very important.
The Royal Navy was also waiting for the Sea Fury to enter production.
Steve


----------



## Gixxerman (Aug 11, 2012)

davebender said:


> National Pride.
> The same reason Britain built the battleship HMS Vanguard during the war.



Given the timings involved (design work began before WW2 began) I would say 'national pride' had nothing to do with it.
The worry of the UK standing alone against Germany Japan's navies is a far more plausible explaination (given that she was laid down on 2nd Oct 1941).


----------



## davebender (Aug 11, 2012)

IMO that doesn't mean much as many pre-war weapon designs were halted when the war began. For instance Germany halted plans to build six H class battleships on 10 October 1939.


----------



## stona (Aug 11, 2012)

davebender said:


> IMO that doesn't mean much as many pre-war weapon designs were halted when the war began. For instance Germany halted plans to build six H class battleships on 10 October 1939.



Germany wasn't trying to protect the largest maritime Empire the world has ever seen. Her naval philosophy has nothing to do with Britain's

Steve


----------



## riacrato (Aug 11, 2012)

Once you introduce an aircraft type on a large scale into the biggest conflict the world has ever seen, the efforts to replace that type are incredible. It is not just the production of airframes, but the logistics of spare parts, the training of air and ground crew and so on... Organizing that is a task X times greater than the production of a few thousand airframes. Purely guessing, I would say by the time the Corsair and the Hellcat became available to the RN, the need to replace all Seafires asap simply wasn't there. Not implying they weren't appreciated.


----------



## JoeB (Aug 11, 2012)

Like most things to do with 'Spitfire/Seafire' it's a bunch of quite different airplanes under a single 'brand name'. The early Seafires were ersatz adaptations w/ only middling performance compared to top line land based fighters they might meet, and serious limitations as carrier planes operationally. But later on the basic carrier compatibility issues were addressed somewhat and the performance was much higher, as in the Seafire Mk.47 which was also stuffed with internal fuel (albeit in perhaps some dangerous locations for the pilot) and had quite good range; though of course was a postwar a/c, seeing some action in Malaya and Korea. The latter case included the Mk.47's only 'air combat' episode when one of HMS Triumph's a/c for some reason thought it a good idea to closely check out a formation of 22nd BG B-29's and was shot down by anxious gunners, July 28 1950*.

Anyway the point is that the design, if you really view it as one 'design', of the Spitfire was made to grow greatly in capability, and this applied to the Seafire as well.

But OTOH the British Pacific Fleet's line up of fighters in July 1945 peaked on its 4 bigger carriers at 72 Seafire LIII's, 73 Corsairs and 6 Hellcats, with the 4 light carriers about to join (though didn't before the end of the war) carrying another 90 Corsairs, so the US fighters were also used a lot. And actually the really important RN carrier ops occurred before the Seafire was even introduced, especially in Med in 1940-2; Seafire introduced only in Torch op when control of Med was shifting to Allies anyway. The BPF operations though fairly large by previous RN standards were a pretty modest increase to the by then enormous USN carrier force, really more of a political operation, 'to keep Britain at the highest table' in the post WWII style, than the do or die purely military ops of RN carriers before the Seafire came along.

*I once met a guy who grew up in North Korea and apparently witnessed this incident from the ground, thinking it was an NK Yak defeated by the B-29's, as the B-29 gunners obviously thought as well! 

Joe


----------



## parsifal (Aug 11, 2012)

Much of the claimed poor safety of the seafire arose from the experiences in 1942-3, when the seafire was principally deployed on escort carriers in the med. Moreover the aircrews manning these CAGs were very lacking in deck landing experience. The escort carriers were not suited to Spitfire operations due mainly to the slow speed of the ships. This reduced the airflow over the control surfaces for the spits. The calm conditions of the med excacerbated that problem. the inexperienced crews added to this problem. 

Between 1943 and 1945, when the seafire was deployed in strength with the BPF, fundamental changes had been made to the seafire deployment. The Mk III variant had been adopted with wing foldingm extra fuel stowage ad somewhat strengthened landing gear. The type had superior climb and high altitude performance to either of the US types, comparable range (there was only 40nm difference in the combat radius of the US and British types). The Seafire III whilst embarked on the BPFs fleet carriers, with well trained crews, and better wweather conditions in which tom operate, establish a reasonable safety record. their heavier firepower and superior dogfighting capabilities, and high speed ensured their position in the British inventory. Where the Seafire fell down was that it was a little too specialised....not having any credible ordinance carrying capability

Compared with other naval fighters, the Seafire II was able to outperform the A6M5 (Zero) at low altitudes when the two types were tested against each other in World War II. The more powerful Seafire III, though, still enjoyed better climb rates and acceleration than the other allied fighters. Late-war Seafire marks equipped with the Griffon engines enjoyed a considerable increase of performance compared to their Merlin-engined predecessors. .

The first use of Seafires in sustained carrier operations was Operation Torch. Seafires saw most service in the Far East Pacific campaigns, serving with No. 887 and 894 Squadrons, Fleet Air Arm, aboard HMS Indefatigable and joining the British Pacific Fleet late in 1944. Due to their good high altitude performance and lack of ordnance-carrying capabilities (compared to the Hellcats and Corsairs of the Fleet) the Seafires were allocated the vital defensive duties of Combat Air Patrol (CAP) over the fleet. They established an enviable record in this role. Seafires were thus heavily involved in countering the kamikaze attacks during the Okinawa landings and beyond. The Seafires' best day was 15 August 1945, shooting down eight attacking aircraft for a single loss. During the campaign 887 NAS claimed 12 kills, and 894 NAS claimed 10 kills (with two more claims earlier in 1944 over Norway).

The top scoring Seafire pilot of the war was Sub-Lieutenant R.H. Reynolds DSC of 894, who claimed 4.5 air victories in 1944–5.

Reactions: Informative Informative:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Vincenzo (Aug 11, 2012)

Just for add infos, the griffon engined seafire XV see no action in WWII (Seafire XV production 6 prototypes in 44, 9 production planes in 44, 4 in jan '45, 10 in feb '45, 16 in march '45, 29 in april 45....)

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Airframes (Aug 11, 2012)

The terms of Lend Lease might also have a bearing - much of the hardware had to be returned, or 'Struck of Charge' at the conclusion of hostilities. 
Whether this was the case with those naval aircraft supplied by the U.S.A., I'm not sure without checking. But, even if it was not the case, those airframes supplied would need to be replaced, due to time-expired in hours, or just plain 'war weary' - as has been stated, Britain could not afford to purchase, outright, equipment from abroad, when it already owed more than the National Reserve. If the Seafire was 'good enough' to do until the arrival of the Sea Fury, then so be it.


----------



## raumatibeach (Aug 11, 2012)

The ever reliable wikipedia mentions that just after the Korean war all but 3 of 800 squadrons sea fire were grounded with wrinkling of the fuselage from carrier landings.


----------



## RCAFson (Aug 11, 2012)

The Seafire emphasized climb rate and maneuverability, IOW, a point defense fighter, to combat high speed intruders. By war's end the USN was introducing it's own light weight fighter, namely the F8F, and for many of the same reasons.


----------



## JoeB (Aug 11, 2012)

raumatibeach said:


> The ever reliable wikipedia mentions that just after the Korean war all but 3 of 800 squadrons sea fire were grounded with wrinkling of the fuselage from carrier landings.


To clarify that quote, when 800 Sdn finished its tour in Korea (fall 1950, not after the war) and peacetime flying restrictions were reinstated, all but 3 a/c required such repair. That's from some Alfred Price article, a reliable author generally but I don't know anything else about it.

OTOH "With the Carriers in Korea" by Landsdown is a day to day account of the RN carrier ops in Korea. The history of Seafire attrition in combat ops is as follows:
June 29: disembarks 4 over-wrinkled Seafires before entering combat, 12 remain available
July 18: 1 Seafire severely damaged in landing (one other became unserviceable of several incidents ments mentioned)
July 22: disembarks 2 unserviceable Seafires, takes on 7 from Unicorn, 17 available 
July 24: 1 Seafire written off to wrinkling, one to fuselage damage from mishandling by deck crew
July 28: Seafire shot down by B-29's, 14 available
Aug 9: Seafire written off to off-center landing, 13 available
Aug 23: 2 more Seafires exceed wrinkling limit and another overstressed by off center landing, says 9 available but this seems a typo for 10
Aug 26: Seafire written off in landing practice, 9 available
Aug 30: embarks Unicorn's last 6 Seafires
Sep 4: Seafire badly damaged in takeoff accident, lands but unserviceable
Sep 8: Seafires written off in landing accident, pilot bailed out of another when arrestor hook wouldn't extend, 10 serviceable (seems 2 others not mentioned)
Sep 9: 4 Seafires exceed wrinkling limit
Sep 14: Seafire written off in heavy landing
Sep 20: 3 Seafires operational (thus 2 others are not mentioned)
Triumph set sail for home with 3 Seafires and 8 Fireflies remaining operational.

About half the Seafire missions were CAP, (not without reason as DD HMS Comus was damaged by NK Il-10's August 23 and CL HMS Jamaica by apparent Yak-9/Il-10 duo Sept 17, of which the Il-10 was claimed downed by AA and NK propaganda names a pair of aircrew heroes lost the same day). The rest were strike. Apparently no Seafires at all were lost to NK action. The CO of the Sdn was killed but in an accident aboard ship when a piece of a Firefly's prop broke off.

So yes the durability of the Seafire was only somewhat improved by the time of F.47 and still a problem.

As far as Seafire III v Zero on August 15 1945, we've been over that one:
"The 252nd AG flight reporting contact with British a/c consisted of 10 Zeroes, but there were F6F's around as well. Ltjg Tadahiko Honma's personal account (source: "Sky of August 15" by Hata) has the opponents as a mixture of 'Spitfires' and F6F's, in basically a single combat. Honma bailed out WIA plane on fire, downed by a Seafire by all accounts. Lt Cdr. M Hidaka crashlanded, cause or enemy a/c type not given. CPO N. Yoshinari was credited with a Seafire. Honma and WO K. Yoshida were both credited with TBF's (only 1 FAA Avenger was downed, no USN ones downed by fighters in the area/time). 

The 302nd Air Group flight of which CPO S. Yamada was part consisted of 4 Raiden ('Jack') and 10 Zeroes. The only specific attribution to Seafires was Yamada's wounding, a/c not mentioned as destroyed; they attributed 4 a/c losses to F6F's, claiming 1 F6F.
The source of 302nd's account is "Maru Special Pacific Air/Sea War Series" which gives same info basically for 252nd as Hata's book."

Although there's *some* room for doubt about the completeness of JNAF accounts in this case, and/or possible mistakes where they credited disappeared a/c to F6F's incorrectly, OTOH all experience of WWII would tell us that if 8 a/c were claimed in a swirling confused fight by a hard pressed fighter unit without much air combat experience...they probably didn't really down 8 enemy a/c. 1 Zero downed plus another damaged in return for one Seafire and one Avenger downed is completely plausible IMO, and actually USN and USAAF v JNAF combats even right at the end of the war didn't *always* go heavily in favor of those air arms either. 

Of course if the issue slips by sloppy logical back to whether 1945 FAA Seafire units *would be expected* to do well against summer 1945 quality JNAF Zero (fighter, not special attack) units in a large sample of cases, that's a different question. But in actual history there's only one Seafire/Zero combat where we know the Zeroes were acting as fighters not kamikazes, actually where we know the Japanese side at all. In that one historical case, fluke or not, it's not clear the Seafires III's did any better than about even.

Joe


----------



## parsifal (Aug 11, 2012)

No Joe, "youve" been over it before, which is code for lecturing the rest of us, trolling for records to promote a particular POV and agenda. That agenda is certainly not to promote the qualities of anything nonamerican or non japanese.

Just to give the alternative position, i rely on rod kirkby's and Gerry Murphy's research as a more balanced and accurate account. Before you jump to the conclusion that they simply regurgitate the 8 claim made by Brown and others, they dont. 

To summarise their research....they were up against 302 Kokutai, which was not a green unit, infact it was one of the most experienced outfits left in the IJN. if i am not mistaken Yamada had fought over Malaya....Kirby claims there were 12 IJN interceptors, including 4 Raidens, Murphy says he saw 4 raidens, but only 10 a/c engaged...notice he does not say there were just 10 in the battle, only that his section (4 a/c) engaged 10). The Japanese were successful in shooting down one BPF Avenger 

There were no hellcats or Corsairs in the air on that day. It was a British controlled sector...any US forces that stumbled into the operational area risked being shot at, and there were no BPF Hellcats or corsairs in the strike....the fighter component consisted of just 7 seafires, of which 3 were topcover and were late to engage. By most accounts (not all), for most of the battle, there were 7 Seafires engaged by 12 enemy a/c, with at least 8 zeroes included.

The battle took place over Tokyo Bay, with the the leader of the top cover trio, Sub Lt Victor Lowden, hit five, destroying two, and was credited with a third, shared with Sub Lt W J Williams. 

The third Seafire F III pilot, Sub Lt Gerry Murphy, shot down two Zeroes in turning combat, which, to quote David Brown's fine book, 'The Seafire', "should have favoured the enemy", but "ended with them both being shot down by some fine deflection shooting." 

These losses were incidentally confirmed in a post war interview i believe on the japanese side. i have it somewhere. i will post it when i find it


----------



## CobberKane (Aug 11, 2012)

Some interesting information here. Gixxerman, I’m sure the ’Buy British’ argument has some merit but I’m not convinced it was the primary reason the RN stuck with the Seafire – generally in warfare if something better is tested and available it is adopted. Riacrato notes that if the enough effort had been put into getting the Seafire into service the whole program may have had enough momentum that it was pretty much impossible to change course even when other options became available, which sounds reasonable.
Regarding the Seafire/Spitfires undercarriage , Gix, I wasn’t for a moment suggesting it was as tricky as the 109 (landing a 109 on a carrier, I bet Luftwaffe pilots would have woken up in a cold sweat over that idea). Re-reading my information it seems the problems the Seafire had with deck handling were more a result of the various marks tendancy to ‘float’ on approach and the reversed prop rotation of the Griffon powered versions which had the alarming habit of steering themselves straight into the carrier’s island on take-off. The Mk 47 cured this with contra-rotating props. Nonetheless, I think it stands to reason that narrow track undercarriages and tossing carrier decks are a less than ideal combination. The only purpose-built carrier aircraft with narrow track undercarriage I can think of was the Wildcat. I don’t know if it was considered a shortcoming on that fighter, (comments please?) but Grumman went to a wide track design with the Hellcat.
Parsifal noted that by the time of the Seafire III the range issue had been largely addressed, but it seems the serviceability thing was always something of a problem. All those wrinkled 47s in Korea. Still, if anyone can demonstrate that the Seafire was no worse than any other shipboard fighter in this respect I’m open to argument. 
I suspect that the Seafire’s shortcomings were tolerated because of it’s potency as an air to air weapon. As I’ve mentioned in another thread, I read an article once written by a Grumman test pilot who flew all the allied carrier fighters (Hellcat, Seafire and Corsair) and the Zero back to back and described the Seafire as a ‘work of art’ that made the others look like ‘plodding workhorses’, but he also noted the lack of range as a serious drawback (if anyone else knows of this article I’d love to get the details – I lost it years ago). 
If the RN could keep the aircraft serviceable and get it on and off the carrier, they had fighter that could match the best ship-borne opposition in the world one on one. I bet a lot of USN pilots, separated from the group and with a zero on their tail, would have happily swapped their Wildcat for a Seafire II at that moment had they been able to!
And at the end of the day, the British could always say to the Americans, “Sure, you may be able to carry more, go further and last longer but, damn we look good!”


----------



## JoeB (Aug 12, 2012)

parsifal said:


> 1. Just to give the alternative position, i rely on rod kirkby's and Gerry Murphy's research as a more balanced and accurate account. Before you jump to the conclusion that they simply regurgitate the 8 claim made by Brown and others, they dont.
> 
> 2. To summarise their research....they were up against 302 Kokutai, which was not a green unit, infact it was one of the most experienced outfits left in the IJN. if i am not mistaken Yamada had fought over Malaya....Kirby claims there were 12 IJN interceptors, including 4 Raidens, Murphy says he saw 4 raidens, but only 10 a/c engaged...notice he does not say there were just 10 in the battle, only that his section (4 a/c) engaged 10). The Japanese were successful in shooting down one BPF Avenger
> 
> ...


1. But what actual evidence did they find of more Japanese losses than mentioned in the sources I named, Hata's 'August 15 book' and Maru series accounts of the various JNAF fighter units? You don't give any.

2. I didn't give any characteriziation of the 302nd. And the only Japanese pilot actually known to have been shot down in this action by a Seafire was Homna from the 252nd AG which therefore we must assume was also engaged. Otherwise the info you give here is same as what I said, eg. 8 Zeroes, 4 Raiden from 302nd.

3. This is simply not so. The Japanese language sources I gave in my previous post for each Japanese unit speak of overlapping combats with F6F's and Seafires. In the English language "Japanese Naval Aces and Fighter Pilots of WWII" by Hata and Izawa pg. 215, the 4 Raiden and 8 Zeroes of 302nd are actually *only* mentioned engaging 'Grummans' this day and losing 4 a/c to them (p. 215), though again the Maru series account by 302nd mentions that Yamada was wounded by a Seafire, though a/c apparently returned safely. And the USN official victory list (published privately by Frank Olynyk, p. 183) lists a number of victory credits over Zeroes by VF-31 and VF-49 in 0540-0620 time period in the same area, which matches the times given in Japanese accounts. So I can't see on what basis the researchers you mention, or you, could have concluded that no F6F's were present. That directly contradicts both Japanese and US accounts.

4. This is just a reiteration of claims in more detail. *We* really *have* been through wrt to *all* combatants that aerial claims almost always have a good faith basis, and therefore detailed accounts written down at the time to back them up. But it doesn't mean they actually represented unduplicated incidents of destruction of enemy a/c. That's what we look in the other sides' accounts to find out.

5. This would not be at all incidental. It would be the *only* info you'd have provided which (correctly) contradicted anything I said. So please do find and post specifics and source, then we'd have real new info, not childish accusations of 'agenda' without actually correctly contradicting, with sourced specifics, *anything* I said. 

For completeness, another recent published source is Osprey series 'Duel Seafire v A6M Zero' by Donald Nijboer. It presents some of the same info, mentioning the 4 losses by 302nd but failing to reconcile the 302nd accounts appearing to say they were lost to F6F's, though OTOH also failing to mention the loss of 252nd AG (Honma's plane) definitely to Seafires according to Japanese accounts. Also it mentions VBF-88 (F4U) claims but those were a bit later, and it doesn't mention the earlier VF-31 and 49 (or VF-6) claims. So, I don't know that the book has any 'agenda', but just doesn't include all relevant known info.

Joe


----------



## parsifal (Aug 12, 2012)

what about the testimony given at the war crimes trial of Sub lt hockley, the seafire pilot downed on that day and subsequently executed by members of the 426th infantry regt

According to Nakamura Kiyozo, an air raid warden in the village of Higashimura, he observed a force of 12 zeroes engaged by 8 Seafires. according to this mans testimony, given under oath and accepted by the tribunal, at least *seven* zeroes were seen to crash as a result of the seafire attacks, and the remainder ran away . Kiyozo was the man that took the surrender of hockley, and handed him over to the soldiers of the 426th regt. Kiyozo testified that the pilot was unhurt at that time and was not armed. The two shook hands and smoked two cigarettes as they watched the battle unfold that the British airman produced. Nakamura then took Hockley to the local civil defence HQ, where the commander decided to hand him over to the local military unit, the 426th Infantry Regiment

This is a japanese source, as good as any of the half baked sources that you consistently pedal on this issue, and has the added weight of being official testimony. I do not know why there were more losses than your sources admit. But given the warped state of japan at that time, its not hard to extrapolate reasons. Wanting to present the best possible profile for posterity for a nation obsessed with national honour has to be considered as at least possible. Whatever the reason, some japanese records are decidely questionable on this issue and indirect contradiction to the official after action reports and the testimony of fairly impartial eyewitnesses.


----------



## stona (Aug 12, 2012)

CobberKane said:


> .
> Regarding the Seafire/Spitfires undercarriage , Gix, I wasn’t for a moment suggesting it was as tricky as the 109 (landing a 109 on a carrier, I bet Luftwaffe pilots would have woken up in a cold sweat over that idea).



The Germans carried out just shy of 500 test landings on a mock up of the Graf Spee's deck,complete with arrestor cables,at Travemunde without a single accident.

This isn't landing on a moving ship and the Graf Spee's deck was to have been longer (860 feet) than the British carriers,nonetheless the Bf 109,the T in this case,tends to have this dodgy narrow track undercarriage argument unjustly thrown at it. A comparison of the undercarriage track of the Spitfire/Seafire and Bf 109 can be enlightening.
Other factors come into play of course,different geommetry and the relative tail heaviness on the ground of the 109 probably being the most significant.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## CobberKane (Aug 12, 2012)

stona said:


> The Germans carried out just shy of 500 test landings on a mock up of the Graf Spee's deck,complete with arrestor cables,at Travemunde without a single accident.
> 
> This isn't landing on a moving ship and the Graf Spee's deck was to have been longer than the British carriers,nonetheless the Bf 109,the T in this case,tends to have this dodgy narrow track undercarriage argument unjustly thrown at it. A comparison of the undercarriage track of the Spitfire/Seafire and Bf 109 can be enlightening.
> Other factors come into play of course,different geommetry and the relative tail heaviness on the ground of the 109 probably being the most significant.
> ...


 
Yep, the Spitfire certainly was not viceless in this respect. I don't know how much of the 109 or spits reputation as being tricky to land was due to their narrow undercarriages or other factosr such as those you mentioned. Still, I think the 109's reputation was worse in this respect. Maybe the spitfire's landing gear was just as bad, but it was better overall due to it's benign low speed handling - I read one account from a Luftwaffe pilot who said that compared to a 109 a spit was 'childishly easy to land'. Either way, narrow track undercarriage seems to have been a feature of aicraft designed before the war, one that fell out of favour as hostilities progressed.


----------



## Kryten (Aug 12, 2012)

My Great uncle Jim was Fleet Air Arm, he was a rigger on Illustrious I believe, his take on the seafire landing problems centered around two issues, one being the undercarriage stroke was really too short for carrier ops, which was the primary cause of monocoque stressing (wrinkling) when landing, especially when the deck was rolling which often resulted in a "harder" landing and secondly the Seafire would have had to have major reinforcement of the monecoque to extend its service life, but this would have resulted in considerable weight incresases, not good for a point defence!

he also mentions the Seafires write off record was worse than the purpose built carrier aircraft however "we wrote off a fair few of them too" was his comment, sounds like carrier ops were rough on all the planes, anyone know the expected life of a Corsair from a carrier relative to a ground based one for instance, that would be of interes here?


----------



## Elmas (Aug 12, 2012)

See §23, pag. 270 - Seafires and the Fleet Air Arm

and


----------



## stona (Aug 12, 2012)

CobberKane said:


> I read one account from a Luftwaffe pilot who said that compared to a 109 a spit was 'childishly easy to land'. Either way, narrow track undercarriage seems to have been a feature of aicraft designed before the war, one that fell out of favour as hostilities progressed.



The comment was made by Werner Molders.

"It was very interesting to carry out the flight trials at Rechlin with the Spitfire and the Hurricane. Both types are very simple to fly compared to our aircraft, and childishly easy to take-off and land."

Cheers

Steve


----------



## yulzari (Aug 12, 2012)

Leaving aside the issues of specific combats, the essential answers to the original question have been given. 

Britain was bankrupt by February 1941, having spent the last of the proceeds of selling off all it's USA industrial assets. The FAA only continued to have USA combat aeroplanes through lend-lease. Once the war ended they had to be returned (or thrown off the ships as USA had no use for them.) If the FAA wanted fighters they had to be British as there was nothing else affordable. Remember, the British civilian food rations were reduced after the war as imports had to be paid for in hard cash. They only came back up to wartime levels shortly before 1950. This was a time when British Coopers were making racing cars out of surplus air raid shelters and old ships engine cylinders while Italian Ferrari made theirs on new American machinery.

The role the FAA had for fighters was in close fleet defence. What was wanted was a seagoing interceptor; the role for which the Spitfire was designed. The USA wanted to achieve air superiority within the range of it's strike aeroplanes. So they needed far longer ranged (and heavier) fighters. The Bearcat was allegedly in response to the recognition of their lack of a close range interceptor. 

Yes the Seafire did have a noticeable write off level (reduced markedly when the propellor tips were cropped and undercarriage stroke was increased.) However, as long as you got the expensive trained pilot back, you simply replaced the losses from production. Wartime fighters were expected to have a short life. Bend it and draw another one when you are next in port. The FAA was optimised for service in the North Atlantic and (post the fall of France) Mediterranean. Carriers could expect to be in reach of replacement aircraft fairly often. The USA navy was optimised for Pacific service far away from land resupply. Different needs, different solutions.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Dislike Dislike:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Gixxerman (Aug 12, 2012)

CobberKane said:


> landing a 109 on a carrier, I bet Luftwaffe pilots would have woken up in a cold sweat over that idea.



Had the Graf Zeppelin carrier ever been made operational the plan was for Me 109T varients to fly from it.....I wonder how many of the ear-marked pilots felt that cold sweat and the relief come the 1943 orders to scrap new surface fleet development!

Reactions: Funny Funny:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Aug 12, 2012)

Gixxerman said:


> Had the Graf Zeppelin carrier ever been made operational the plan was for Me 109T varients to fly from it.....I wonder how many of the ear-marked pilots felt that cold sweat and the relief come the 1943 orders to scrap new surface fleet development!



Following the Travemunde trials they would have had no reason to be nervous.

In the Bf 109 T they would have been landing on a faster carrier with a longer deck and with better forward visibility than their British counterparts in their Seafires.

Steve


----------



## Njaco (Aug 12, 2012)

Word of Warning:

1. Any more sarcastic or personal attacks, the thread will be closed and infractions given.
2. If this goes political (i.e. political reasons for the UK keeping the Seafire, etc), the thread will be closed and infractions given.

I've been asked to close the thread but, against my better judgement I want it to continue. But any more 'he said, she said', and it will be closed.


----------



## stona (Aug 12, 2012)

Thanks for that "Elmas". 
I've got Crosley's book but haven't read it for ages. I've just dug it out and intend to give it another read.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## RCAFson (Aug 12, 2012)

JoeB said:


> OTOH "With the Carriers in Korea" by Landsdown is a day to day account of the RN carrier ops in Korea. The history of Seafire attrition in combat ops is as follows:



You've omitted the fact that the Seafires were operating from the CVL Triumph. Triumph was hard pressed to make 24 knots, and that in combination with her short flight deck was the probable cause of the wrinkling. I suspect that few problems would have occurred if the Seafires had operated from a 30 knot CV.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Aug 12, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> You've omitted the fact that the Seafires were operating from the CVL Triumph. Triumph was hard pressed to make 24 knots, and that in combination with her short flight deck was the probable cause of the wrinkling. I suspect that few problems would have occurred if the Seafires had operated from a 30 knot CV.


How would 6 knots made a difference?


----------



## stona (Aug 12, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> How would 6 knots made a difference?



Good job I've just started perusing Crosley's book. 
From his chapter on Salerno.

"The accident rate of about ten percent of landings was inevitable,for,with the maximum vertical touch down velocity of 7ft/sec,a mandatory 3.5 degree descent path and _with only 15 knots of wind over the deck _,an undercarriage failiure was a mathematical certainty,even on a perfect landing.
Many pilots knew this and tried to flare out at touchdown. However,this resulted many times in aircraft floating over the wires and making a full toss into the barriers."

My italics.

He attributes the high accident rate directly to the failiure of the Admiralty to arrange,

"...for the fighters to operate from faster carriers capable of a better speed than 15 knots,so giving them more windspeed for landing in the calm conditions prevailing in the Mediterranean at that time of year."

I'm sure he would have been very happy to have an extra 6 knots of wind over the deck.

A "full toss" is a cricketing term for a delivery which reaches the batsman without pitching (bouncing) on the pitch on the way to him.

A Seafire landed at only 3 knots above the engine on stall speed (1.05 Vse) and below the engine off stall speed. US naval aircraft were designed to withstand a 12 ft/sec rate of descent and to land at 1.2 Vse.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## parsifal (Aug 12, 2012)

We had very similar problems with A4s landing on a half sister to the Triumph that at times could not make better than 14knots. at those times we tried not to operate the A4s at all. when forced to do so, because operational circumstances, such as when we were being hassled by Russian LR patrol a/c, we ran a high risk of accidents, which explains why we lost two A4s out of 8 in a singloe patrol.

Triumph was a near sister to the Melbourne. There would have been many occasions when the windspeed cross the deck would have been at or below 15 knots, particualarly if the ship was trying to conserve fuel. It would have been a nightmare operating the Seafires under those circumstances.

A Majestic Class had about 16 days of fuel when operating at 15 knots, and about 3 days when operating above 20+ knots

Reactions: Informative Informative:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 12, 2012)

Njaco said:


> Word of Warning:
> 
> 1. Any more sarcastic or personal attacks, the thread will be closed and infractions given.
> 2. If this goes political (i.e. political reasons for the UK keeping the Seafire, etc), the thread will be closed and infractions given.
> ...



*This probably should be said in the Admin/Mod section, but maybe a few others should read it as well...*

It is probably no use. There are too many spoiled rotten brats that were never taught by their parents how to act civil and like an adult. They don't agree with someone, and therefore have start throwing insults and immature comments.

The sad thing is that it ruins for all the adults and mature people here who enjoy reading and learning from the threads. 

I am pretty sick of it. Tired of saying something about it, and it doing no good. I have thought about leaving, but then I have decided against it. Why should they ruin it for me, and others. We will just have to start removing the problems.


----------



## fastmongrel (Aug 12, 2012)

I dont know how long Triumph was out of dry dock but with a foul bottom a war load and warm water I bet her Chief Engineer would only have seen 24 knots on the pit log in his wildest dreams. Plus I have read somewhere that the Colossus/Majestic class didnt have the smoothest shell plating so individual ships of the class could have had big differences in top speed even when fresh out of dock.


----------



## renrich (Aug 12, 2012)

The reason the Seafire stayed in service after the war had to be primarily money. THe RN had Seafires and I suspect that most of the American AC the RN used during the war had to be destroyed or given back to the US because they were lend lease. I recall reading that quite a number of brand new Corsairs were shoved overboard by the NZ navy. Obviously it would have been nice to replace all the Seafires with Sea Furies but Britain was not in good shape financially. In this case, "Old ugly is better than old nothing."


----------



## CobberKane (Aug 12, 2012)

yulzari said:


> Leaving aside the issues of specific combats, the essential answers to the original question have been given.
> 
> Britain was bankrupt by February 1941, having spent the last of the proceeds of selling off all it's USA industrial assets. The FAA only continued to have USA combat aeroplanes through lend-lease. Once the war ended they had to be returned (or thrown off the ships as USA had no use for them.) If the FAA wanted fighters they had to be British as there was nothing else affordable. Remember, the British civilian food rations were reduced after the war as imports had to be paid for in hard cash. They only came back up to wartime levels shortly before 1950. This was a time when British Coopers were making racing cars out of surplus air raid shelters and old ships engine cylinders while Italian Ferrari made theirs on new American machinery.
> 
> ...


 
This makes sense. If the RN was looking for an aircraft that duplicated the Spitfire’s point defence capabilities in a shipboard fighter the Seafire would have been the obvious result. The Wildcat and Sea Hurricane might have been fine for countering Condors in the Atlantic, but sending them up against Fw190s and Bf109Gs in the MTO would have been dicey to say the least. Even when the Corsair and Hellcat arrived on the scene the Sea fires seem to have had the advantage in climb and manoeuvrability, and if the production line was able to keep up with the higher rates of attrition through wear and tear, which wasn’t costing pilots, maybe they were the best option in this role. And when the RN went to the PTO they could just supplement the seafires with the American fighters, with their greater serviceability and ordinance capacity


----------



## davebender (Aug 12, 2012)

> Bf 109 T they would have been landing on a faster carrier with a longer deck and with better forward visibility than their British counterparts in their Seafires.


Me-109T1 would not have been used operationally. There weren't enough (60 built) for the air wings of KM Graf Zeppelin and KM Peter Strasser in addition to naval pilot training. If German CVs had been pushed to completion they would operate the Me-155 which had wide track landing gear.


----------



## parsifal (Aug 12, 2012)

davebender said:


> Me-109T1 would not have been used operationally. There weren't enough (60 built) for the air wings of KM Graf Zeppelin and KM Peter Strasser in addition to naval pilot training. If German CVs had been pushed to completion they would operate the Me-155 which had wide track landing gear.



They simply would have produced more 109Ts if the carrier(s) had been completed. 109s were the planned equipoment of the GZ. Me 155s would have been lucky to have made the war, let alone even be built. The specification for this new type was May 1942, which makes it a contemporary of the Sea Fury, the A7M Sam, the F8 Bearcat and the Seafire XV,. Against contemporary opposition, it is not so impressive. 

When the GZ was revived in early 1942, there was considerable debate about possible replacement a/c. Aiming for a mid 1943 completion of the Carrier, the KM settled on the successor to the Emils. They settleed on the Me 109f along with a wing folding version of the Ju87G. AFAIK protoypes of both a/c were never built. But the important thing is that the KM knew that the Me 155 was of no use in the context of the current conflict. It would not have been ready until 1944-5 at the earliest.


----------



## davparlr (Aug 12, 2012)

The Joint Fighter Conference rated the seafire 6th on there rating of best fighter above 25k, well below the F4U and F6F. Oddly, it was not rated at all below 25k. The performance stats from internet sites indicate the Seafire II and III were relatively slow. Maybe the boost was low.


----------



## stona (Aug 13, 2012)

davebender said:


> Me-109T1 would not have been used operationally. There weren't enough (60 built) for the air wings of KM Graf Zeppelin and KM Peter Strasser in addition to naval pilot training. If German CVs had been pushed to completion they would operate the Me-155 which had wide track landing gear.



They would have been. 
When Hitler ordered in August 1941 that the Graf Spee be completed by October 1942 the Bf 109 T-2s started to be converted back to T-1 configuration. From December 1941 at least 48 were converted to the carrier standard. Why on earth would this have been done if there was no intention to use them on the carrier?
The type was a victim of the shambolic on/off German carrier program but it was the only game in town.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## Njaco (Aug 13, 2012)

"Graf Spee"?

'Graf Zeppelin' , yes?


----------



## stona (Aug 13, 2012)

Njaco said:


> "Graf Spee"?
> 
> 'Graf Zeppelin' , yes?




Oops! Yes,you'd have trouble landing anything on a sunken heavy cruiser 

Steve

Reactions: Funny Funny:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## vinnye (Aug 13, 2012)

I believe Renrich in post39 has the main reason - the terms of the lend lease meant that at the end of hostilities a lot of American fighter were dumped at sea.
This meant that whatever fighters were available were kept in use as long as possible - until the arrival of more modern and specifically designed types such as the Sea Fury, and then the jets.


----------



## davebender (Aug 13, 2012)

The top part of KM Graf Spee remained above water after the ship was scuttled. An Fi-282 helicopter might land on it.


----------



## stona (Aug 13, 2012)

davebender said:


> The top part of KM Graf Spee remained above water after the ship was scuttled. An Fi-282 helicopter might land on it.



A suitable semi-submerged base for a Bond villain maybe 

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## davebender (Aug 13, 2012)

> I am pretty sick of it. Tired of saying something about it, and it doing no good. I have thought about leaving, but then I have decided against it. Why should they ruin it for me, and others. We will just have to start removing the problems.


IMO this is the best English language military history forum on the web. You and the other moderators must be doing something right, even if accidentally.

Reactions: Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## RCAFson (Aug 13, 2012)

davparlr said:


> The Joint Fighter Conference rated the seafire 6th on there rating of best fighter above 25k, well below the F4U and F6F. Oddly, it was not rated at all below 25k. The performance stats from internet sites indicate the Seafire II and III were relatively slow. Maybe the boost was low.


 
 
The Seafire II/III were low altitude rated fighters with single stage, single speed SCs with 16-18lb boost at low altitude. The LIIC and LFIII had the Merlin 32/55m respectively so they had spectacular initial climb rates and good speed at low altitudes. IIRC, the plan when intercepting FW190s was to climb rapidly then attempt an intercept using speed accumulated in the dive. The Seafire XV/XVII had single stage, two speed griffons, with much better high altitude performance and the Seafire 47 two stage, two speed griffons with excellent high altitude performance and a service ceiling of about 40,000 ft.


----------



## JoeB (Aug 13, 2012)

parsifal said:


> what about the testimony given at the war crimes trial of Sub lt hockley, the seafire pilot downed on that day and subsequently executed by members of the 426th infantry regt
> 
> According to Nakamura Kiyozo, an air raid warden in the village of Higashimura, he observed a force of 12 zeroes engaged by 8 Seafires. according to this mans testimony, given under oath and accepted by the tribunal, at least *seven* zeroes were seen to crash as a result of the seafire attacks, and the remainder ran away . Kiyozo was the man that took the surrender of hockley, and handed him over to the soldiers of the 426th regt.


The only version of that account I've seen simply states the FAA claims from FAA POV, 7 Japanese a/c downed, then states that [Nakamura] testified to have seen Hockley alive and turned him over to others, not that Nakamura, as an air warden on the ground, somehow knew the exact loss causes of other Japanese a/c. How would he know that better than the fighter units themselves? There's no question several Japanese fighters were lost, but lots of overlapping USN claims, and the sources I cited only mention one Seafire loss and one pilot WIA as due to Seafires.

But please provide a real source citation backing up your characterization of Nakamura's testimony.

You've accused me of 'pedalling half baked sources' but for example in the last post you said: "i rely on rod kirkby's and Gerry Murphy's research as a more balanced and accurate account." then 
"There were no hellcats or Corsairs in the air on that day. It was a British controlled sector...any US forces that stumbled into the operational area risked being shot at"

The latter statement is clearly wrong, in direct contradiction to both USN and JNAF accounts, and no actual FAA source has been given even claiming it. But it's not clear from your post if that's something you say Kirkby*and Murphy said, or just something you concluded. I won't attack your motives the way you have mine (agenda, half baked pedalling) but I will say that's sloppy sourcing of info. Someone reading your post cannot tell who is really making that obviously wrong statment. 

Likewise I find your Nakamura citation pretty wishy washy, why not just say which book it came from?

*for others reading this debate, Rod Kirkby is an aviation artist; Gerry Murphy was one of the FAA pilots involved in the August 15 1945 combat.

Joe


----------



## parsifal (Aug 13, 2012)

Seafires were considered the best fleet defence fighter by the FAA in their inventory after the war. By 1945 their safety and accident rates were much improved, and their low altitude performance gave them preference as the dedicated fleet defence fighterr until 1949. This was not a matter of penny pinching, or "making do", it was a matter of preference. Seafires from 1945 were not considered any less durable than their US counterparts, and further were as long leged as their USN counterparts (operational range) .

Britain did not use US equipment on its carriers until the 1960s. Australia didnt either. British equipment was also used by the Dutch and Canadian Navies in the post war period. There were reasons for that, the fittings the hangar clearances, and for aircraft operating off smaller carriers, the British a/c I should also add that in the 1960s the cost of American a/c per unit were generally 1.5 to two times the cost of RN equipment. This was not an issue for the cash soaked USN of the 1950s-60s, but for smaller mere mortal navies it was a big issue. For Australia, in 1967, when the Venoms and Gannets were being replaqced, a decision was very nearly made to convert the carrier to a rotary wing carrier, because of the astronomical cost of USN equipment, and the cost of converting the Melbourne to operate the A4s and Trackers. The Canadians and Dutch scrapped their carriers at about that time for precisely the reason of upgrade costs. 

Unfortunately operating off smaller slower carriers was not suited to the Seafire deck handling characterisitcs, and by 1950, the British were paying off (some were being extensively rebuilt, but were out of commission in that 1945-50 time period) nearly all their bigger carriers. The RN, and most other navies using British carriers universally preferred British equipment over US equpiment on their British carriers until the advent of the jet age. Seafires were selected as the fleet defence fighter for the bigger carriers, Furies were designated as Fighter Bombers, and Fireflies were given the roles of night fighter, strike aircraft and ASW. 

But in the world of the RN without big carriers, the RN was forced back into a similar situation they had found themselves in 1936-43....not enough carrier deck space to afford the luxury of a specialised single purpose aircraft. The Seafire was just such a beast. It could only do one thing really well, and that was defend the skies over the fleet (and in this role it was very successful in 1945). Later marks had the range, but no mark really was ever a great bomb truck. And what really damned it was it unsuitability for operation from smaller carriers. Mercifully, by 1951 Jets were entering service in the RN that could replace the Seafire and the Furies doing both jobs in a single aircraft. 

Much is made of the relatively high attrition rate compared to USN equipment, and in particular the alleged poor showing of the Seafire. Both claims are spurious in my observation. Sea Furies were embarked on the Sydney September to January 1951-2 spending from memory 37 days on station. In that period they lost 11 Furies out of 22 embarked, with just 2 confirmed as falling to enemy fire. One of the 11 simply failed to return, entering a cloud and not coming out. That is no worse than the Seafire operational loss rates, and Sydney had the reputation of being a safe and efficient CAG (according to the USN who were there operating next to her).

Our next main fighter was the Sea Venom. It never operated in wartime conditions....39 were acquired (by the RAN), and in a 12 year operational period, 11 were lost. Then we purchased 22 A4 Skyhawaks. In a 13 year operational period, 12 of those 22 were lost over the side or in other accidents. Just to keep this in perspective, USN carrier trained pilots, were forbidden by their own service from operating from our carrier. And we had a truckload of exchange aircrew that flew with us. They just knew their aircraft and training standards were not up to the task of flying off or on to the Melbourne.... 

The idea that at any time USN equipment was safer or more rugged or better at fleet defence than the Seafire in the post 1945 environment, is a toatal crock, in the context of the operating requirements of RN (and allied) carriers after 1945.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## JoeB (Aug 13, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> 1. You've omitted the fact that the Seafires were operating from the CVL Triumph.
> 2. Triumph was hard pressed to make 24 knots, and that in combination with her short flight deck was the probable cause of the wrinkling. I suspect that few problems would have occurred if the Seafires had operated from a 30 knot CV.


1. No you've omitted to read my entire post before responding to it, since it clearly mentioned the name of the ship, Triumph, and anyway I view it as a matter of common knowledge that all FAA/RAN ops in Korea were from Colossus class ships.

2. First I'm not at all sure that's true, but moroever the post I responded to gave a general wikipedia statement about fuselage wrinkling of Seafires in Korea, and I simply added historical details of the actual operations the a/c was asked to perform from the ship actually available from which to perform them, and troubles resulted. That's a historical fact, unless you have a contrary source. If so please provide it.

Joe


----------



## parsifal (Aug 13, 2012)

> The only version of that account I've seen simply states the FAA claims from FAA POV, 7 Japanese a/c downed, then states that Kiyozo testified to have seen Hockley alive and turned him over to others, not that Kiyozo, as an air warden on the ground, somehow knew the exact loss causes of other Japanese a/c. How would he know that better than the fighter units themselves? There's no question several Japanese fighters were lost, but lots of overlapping USN claims, and the sources I cited only mention one Seafire loss and one pilot WIA as due to Seafires.ut please provide a real source citation backing up your characterization of Kiyozo's testimony


.

To get the full testimony, and trial transcript, you will need to apply to the University of Hong Kong and seek special permission for the transcript. The case number is WO235/2031. You will, as i have, be required to agree to a confidentiality agreement that prevents you from posting this stuff allover the internet. 

Her is a link that may help you on your path to enlightenement...good luck it might do your otherwise impressive research credential some good to do some ground truthing rather than accept the credentials of questionable unit records as gospel all the time. 

Hong Kong's War Crimes Trials Collection

Kiyozo does inlcude that in his testimony incidentally, and given the fight was occuring over Tokyo Bay in full view of his OP I have no difficulty in accepting his testimony. Neither do i have any problem with accepting that the Japanese records kept by the Japanese fliers on that day are wrong or incomplete. The battle took place at seven in the morning, by noon that day, Japan had surrendered. In every sense this battle was a symbolic gesture by the IJN, a last hurrah, to save nothing else other than their shattered pride. The battle in fact had many witnesses, including those of Hockleys executioners. Though I cannot prove it, I am certain they killed him because they were P*ssed off at watching the best they could put into the air being shot out of the sky by the British.

Moreover, Nakamuras was no mere civilian, he was a trained air raid warden, and from his testimony observed the battle. I assume he was manning an OP which apparently overlooked the place of battle. He would have been trained in A/C recognition as well as anybody, and in fact was better placed to observe the battlke than the participants themselves. Thisd was common to many ARPs.


Kiyozos account clearly states the allied aircraft involved in this scrap were Seafires, not Hellcats, or Corsairs




> *for others reading this debate, Rod Kirkby is an aviation artist; Gerry Murphy was one of the FAA pilots involved in the August 15 1945 combat.




Who happens to quote and rely on Commander Ormsby's account, the chief prosecutor at Wo235/1021, and someone they have met and talked to personally. These men are well placed to know the truth of what happened


----------



## parsifal (Aug 13, 2012)

> The only version of that account I've seen simply states the FAA claims from FAA POV, 7 Japanese a/c downed, then states that Kiyozo testified to have seen Hockley alive and turned him over to others, not that Kiyozo, as an air warden on the ground, somehow knew the exact loss causes of other Japanese a/c. How would he know that better than the fighter units themselves? There's no question several Japanese fighters were lost, but lots of overlapping USN claims, and the sources I cited only mention one Seafire loss and one pilot WIA as due to Seafires.ut please provide a real source citation backing up your characterization of Kiyozo's testimony


.

To get the full testimony, and trial transcript, you will need to apply to the University of Hong Kong and seek special permission for the transcript. The case number is WO235/1021. You will, as i have, be required to agree to a confidentiality agreement that prevents you from posting this stuff allover the internet. 

Here is a link that may help you on your path to enlightenement...good luck it might do your otherwise impressive research credential some good to do some ground truthing rather than accept the credentials of questionable unit records as gospel all the time. 

Hong Kong's War Crimes Trials Collection

Kiyozo does inlcude that in his testimony incidentally, and given the fight was occuring over Tokyo Bay in full view of his OP I have no difficulty in accepting his testimony. Neither do i have any problem with accepting that the Japanese records kept by the Japanese fliers on that day are wrong or incomplete. The battle took place at seven in the morning, by noon that day, Japan had surrendered. In every sense this battle was a symbolic gesture by the IJN, a last hurrah, to save nothing else other than their shattered pride. The battle in fact had many witnesses, including those of Hockleys executioners. Though I cannot prove it, I am certain they killed him because they were P*ssed off at watching the best they could put into the air being shot out of the sky by the British.

Moreover, Nakamuras was no mere civilian, he was a trained air raid warden, and from his testimony observed the battle. I assume he was manning an OP which apparently overlooked the place of battle. He would have been trained in A/C recognition as well as anybody, and in fact was better placed to observe the battlke than the participants themselves. Thisd was common to many ARPs.


Kiyozos account clearly states the allied aircraft involved in this scrap were Seafires, not Hellcats, or Corsairs




> *for others reading this debate, Rod Kirkby is an aviation artist; Gerry Murphy was one of the FAA pilots involved in the August 15 1945 combat.




Who happens to quote and rely on Commander Ormsby's account, the chief prosecutor at Wo235/1021, and someone they have met and talked to personally. These men are well placed to know the truth of what happened


----------



## JoeB (Aug 13, 2012)

parsifal said:


> .
> 1. To get the full testimony, and trial transcript, you will need to apply to the University of Hong Kong and seek special permission for the transcript. The case number is WO235/2031. You will, as i have, be required to agree to a confidentiality agreement that prevents you from posting this stuff allover the internet.
> 2. it might do your otherwise impressive research credential some good to do some ground truthing rather than accept the credentials of questionable unit records as gospel all the time.
> 3. The battle took place at seven in the morning,


1. I can easily accept that particular sources don't allow full reproduction, but with all frankness have more trouble accepting that you couldn't 'fair use' quote the relevant passages. I'll leave it at that for now as far as that one piece of evidence; without really knowing it it's impossible to opine whether it should overturn the other pieces of evidence, though again it seems quite remarkable for a single ground observer to tally the exact number and cause of losses down to the enemy plane type, better than the air units involved knew...

2. In case of 202nd AG ops over Darwin we're reading directly from combat reports and you've never presented any credible argument why we should assume any other aircraft/pilots were lost than given in those reports. The wrecks of any others were never found. Nobody has found the names of any other pilots killed or unaccounted for in the period. By claiming more Zeroes were really lost, or there's any real likelihood of such, you've always just diminished your own crediblity as a objective observer IMHO, rather than showing that I gullibly (or dishonestly) take 'questionable sources' at face value. 

But again this case August 15 '45 has a bit more wiggle room, as I said each time I initially presented it in a thread. It's accounts from three different books two with overlapping but highly respect Japanese authors. To review once again, "Sky of August 15" gives a detailed account by a 252nd (not 302nd, only unit mentioned by your 'more trusted' researchers) pilot who says he was downed by Seafires, "Maru Special Series" gives a chronology, times, pilots etc. for the two units as from records, but it's not itself a primary source, and gives the same 252nd loss and leader of 302nd flight wounded by Seafire but doesn't otherwise mention Seafires and does mention F6F opponents for both; and Hata/Izawa "JNAF Aces" just say 302nd's 4 losses Aug 15 were to F6F's. But I don't have the actual combat reports of the units in the August 15 '45 case and never said so for this particular case. 

And, much as you've criticized those (8/15/45) sources, or me for citing them, you didn't provide any direct contradiction to anything in them, just added the air warden thing, but we're at a dead end for now in further analyzing that it would seem.

3. Yes, a time directly coinciding with F6F combats recorded in USN records and the Japanese accounts I cited of combats with F6F's. So unless both the 252nd and 302nd AG pilots imagined (or cooked up for some reason? I can't see what it would be) engaging USN a/c more or less simultaneously with Seafires, and more than one USN snd also coincidentally imagined engaging Japanese fighters at the same time and place, then we must reject the idea that no F6F's were around.

Joe


----------



## parsifal (Aug 14, 2012)

The reason I question reecords from either axis partner has to do with the regimes themselves. Trying to judge their objectivity by our standards is flawed. Most of the time records are going to be accurate, but it is my opinion that these regimes were so morally bankrupt that wholesale falsification of records is not beyond the realm of possibility (in fact for the Germans I can confirm that it did happen...often). Its not beyond the realms of possibility for the allies either, but more possible with regimes like tha Nazis or the japanese, and especially true as their regimes came crashing down around their ears.

I have interviewwed several German soldiers from the eastern Front over the years, including my own father. On the eastern front, faslification of records was more or less routine. My father laughed one day when i produced a unit diary entry citing a certain number of casualties and effectives for a particular battle. he just laughed and said the records could not be relied on for historical accuracy. Depending on the wishes of the higher commands, effective strengths, losses and kills could be routinley altered to suit the wishes of the higher command. The true losses were usually communicated informally. Sometimess effectives (both equipment and personnel) were kept "on strength" simply to draw additional supply for these ghost assets. Sometimes it was for a higher purpose. Sometimes the units themselves, as things became more and more chaotioc did not know what happened to personnel or materiel. In the case of Germans units would, at the end of the war, routinely (more or less) press gang convalescents, furlough men, tanks in workshops and the like to form "new" units to meet Hitlers insatiable desire to have "divisions" on the map. Same approaches were applied to air units. The extent of utter confusion, and downright lying that went on on the Axis side ought not be discounted, and I have raised this with you on many occasions, which you steadfastly refuse to accept. The piece de resistance on this issue, has to be your unshakeable belief that the Nanking incident either never happened, or has been grossly overblown. i will never foreget that conversation. At the time we discussed that, even when presented with very strong proof that it did happen, and in numbers substantially greater than you were prepared to admit, you were stubborn in your belief and support of the contemporary Japanese account. If ever i needed proof that I was dealing with a biased analyst, that was it. As a consequence i question every pro-japanese account that you give, simply because it has a demonstrated lack of criticality of the records being relied on. I admit that such cross referencing is often impassible, but in this case it is. Still, you cling to the japanese side of the story almost to the exclusion of all other sources. 

As for 



> And, much as you've criticized those (8/15/45) sources, or me for citing them, you didn't provide any direct contradiction to anything in them, just added the air warden thing, but we're at a dead end for now in further analyzing that it would seem



its not a dead end, and you can obtain the records for yourself, as i have. I have given you the account as read, and it contradicts the partisan accounts and official histories of the units concerned that you are relying and accepting uncritically. Kiyozo is about as independant and impartial as could be asked for....it would be nice to have a Kiyozo for the battles over Darwin Burma and other places where you have plied your trade, but unformatunately there arent


----------



## RCAFson (Aug 14, 2012)

JoeB said:


> 1. No you've omitted to read my entire post before responding to it, since it clearly mentioned the name of the ship, Triumph, and anyway I view it as a matter of common knowledge that all FAA/RAN ops in Korea were from Colossus class ships.
> 
> 2. First I'm not at all sure that's true, but moroever the post I responded to gave a general wikipedia statement about fuselage wrinkling of Seafires in Korea, and I simply added historical details of the actual operations the a/c was asked to perform from the ship actually available from which to perform them, and troubles resulted. That's a historical fact, unless you have a contrary source. If so please provide it.
> 
> Joe



Your post did not state that Triumph was a rather slow CVL, and is written so that it is not clear that Triumph was operating the Seafires in question rather than acting as a ferry to bring the surviving aircraft from Korea.

The fact is that all WW2 CV capable aircraft are more prone to landing damage if the CV or apparent wind is too slow, since it causes much greater strain on the aircraft hooks and LG.


----------



## parsifal (Aug 14, 2012)

Joe, I will have a closer look at your sources and try and see the issue from your pov. I note that one source you seem to rely very heavily on is

Hata I Yasuho, - Japanese Naval Aces and fighter Units of WWII

I notice from Amazone there are the a number of reviews, including a "Joe Brennan" from NJ, which may well be yourself. This man is glowing in his prais of the book, stating "_This book is written strictly from the Japanese perspective. But unfortunately, after so many years, a lot of the Pacific Air War is still only understood in the West via books written strictly, or pretty much, from the Western perspective. There are now a number of notable exceptions to that statement, books written in English using sources from both sides. However for various episodes involving Japanese Navy fighters, it's still either this translation or nothing, as far as English language books giving the Japanese side. It's an indispensable resource, a must have, for anyone at all seriously interested in the Pacific Air War. I think the low rated reviews completely miss the point of why one would buy this book"_.

Nobody agrees with this review according to Amazon

The majority of reviews of this book are far less charitable 

These are other reviews given at Amazon

_Flawed_, (By ANA-607 (NY)) - _Useful for details of personnel and units, but marred by fantastical inaccuracies in accounting of claims and losses_. 
(4 of 10 people found the following review helpful) 

1.0 out of 5 stars _Reads like a patsy high school year book_, (By Yau "Ming" (Melbourne)) _A lot of sappy coverage on the pilots... reads like a high school yearbook written by a drunk cheerleader. A lot of motherhood statements and glorified rubbish about the Imperial Japanese Navy. Interesting that the writer claims that the IJN only had a few of its planes shot down during the Mariannas Turkey Shoot. If I were you, I'd just borrow it from the library, worth a laugh_. 
(5 of 17 people found the following review helpful) 

1.0 out of 5 stars _Hata is careless with sources and commits sloppy analysis, Hata writes a great book apart from the fact that the sources chosen are overly biased and Hata does not acknowledge this. Also the fact that Hata goes into this foray with a direct intention to discredit Iris Chang with her claims in the Rape of Nanking is damaging to what is otherwise a plausible extrapulation of a complex issue._

So, on the assumption that you have relied upon Hata (which you say you do) it is becoming clear that you are in fact relying on extremely dodgy source material, in the eyes of the majority. I am not putting too much credibility on that , but its an indication that something is very wrong here. i will reserve my own judgement until i get a copy and look at it for myself 

I also need to have a look at Japanese Naval Air Force Fighter Units and Their Aces, 1932-1945 , Ikuhiko Hata Yasuho Izawa , Christopher Shores, which I know you also like. Ive heard better things about that source at least.


----------



## Njaco (Aug 14, 2012)

ENOUGH!!!

This is NOT the topic of the thread. You want to argue whose a better researcher or source material for Japanese a/c, please start another thread.

I've given you both infractions for this because it goes on across threads all over the forum and its childish.

Hong Cong's War crimes had WHAT to do with the Seafire????????


----------



## stona (Aug 14, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> The Seafire II/III were low altitude rated fighters with single stage, single speed SCs with 16-18lb boost at low altitude. The LIIC and LFIII had the Merlin 32/55m respectively so they had spectacular initial climb rates and good speed at low altitudes. IIRC, the plan when intercepting FW190s was to climb rapidly then attempt an intercept using speed accumulated in the dive. The Seafire XV/XVII had single stage, two speed griffons, with much better high altitude performance and the Seafire 47 two stage, two speed griffons with excellent high altitude performance and a service ceiling of about 40,000 ft.



Tactics come into this too.
At Salerno in 1943 the Seafires (they were LIIcs) were severely criticised for their inability to protect the beach head from incoming Fw 190s. The Seafires were perfectly capable of catching these low flying Fw 190s but simply didn't have enough warning. The ships' radars did not give sufficient warning because they were well inshore and the radars suffered from severe ground clutter. A Seafire on CAP cruising at around 240 knots needed more than a couple of minutes to get into position and accelerate to the 350 knot diving approach speed of the Fw 190s or 300 knot escape speed. Had the ships stood further off and detected the incoming Fw 190s at longer range then more than the three successful interceptions may have been made.
History repeated itself in San Carlos bay in 1982.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## davebender (Aug 14, 2012)

> At Salerno in 1943 the Seafires (they were LIIcs) were severely criticised for their inability to protect the beach head from incoming Fw 190s.


Salerno was an American operation. Why was the RN responsible for air defense?


----------



## RCAFson (Aug 14, 2012)

davebender said:


> Salerno was an American operation. Why was the RN responsible for air defense?


 
Salerno was a combined US/UK amphibious assault. In any event, the RN would have provided air cover just as they did during the US only invasion of the south of France.


----------



## fastmongrel (Aug 14, 2012)

davebender said:


> Salerno was an American operation. Why was the RN responsible for air defense?



Salerno was a joint Allied operation the Vth army consisted of a US and a British Corp with Canadian division involved as well. The overall commander was General Alexander who was British and his army commander was General Clark who was US.


----------



## davebender (Aug 14, 2012)

My point exactly. Salerno contained some British combat elements but it was an American operation.

Salerno is only about 250 miles from airfields on Sicily. So why wasn't air cover provided by American A-36s and P-38s rather then exposing RN CVs to Luftwaffe air attack?


----------



## stona (Aug 14, 2012)

The Royal Navy task force at Salerno comprised five aircraft carriers, the small fleet carrier Unicorn and the still smaller escort carriers Battler, Attacker, Hunter and Stalker. Admiral Sir Phillip Vian was appointed to command these ships, together with the anti-aircraft light Dido class cruisers Charybdis, Euryalus, Sylla and ten destroyers. He hoisted his flag in Euryalus on the 27th August.
The operation of five carriers together was new. Up till then there had been too few to form such a squadron. The co-ordination of small escort carriers from a cruiser flagship was to prove a successful experiment. In Euryalus, far from the noise of flying operations, full attention could be given to controlling both the squadron at sea and planes in the air. These included fighters sent from Illustrious and Formidable, part of Admiral Willis’s battle force, which was to provide cover from attack from seaward. As Admiral Vian had no experience of carrier operation, he obtained the services of Captain G. Grantham, Chief-of-Staff to Rear-Admiral C. Moody, H.M.S. Illustrious. 
Interestingly it was Vian,with his poor grasp of air operations,who levelled such harsh criticism at the performance of the Seafires.

Force Five’s duty was to provide fighter patrols over the beaches throughout daylight hours until the airfield at Montecorvino was captured and R.A.F. fighters established there. This was expected to be on the second day of the assault. 

By the evening of the 11th, the third day of the assault, Admiral Vian reported that Force Five had ‘about shot its bolt’ but,with no landing ground yet in Allied hands, his orders were to stick it out. U.S. engineers had gone to work constructing a landing strip near Paestum, a little town close behind the beaches and, by the 12th, it was ready. On Admiral Hewitt’s (U.S.N.) orders, all twenty-six available Seafires were sent to this new base, from where they were to continue operations until the 15th.

As others have said this was not a US operation but an Allied operation.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## stona (Aug 14, 2012)

I've just read that Salerno was the scene of a rare mutiny involving British troops in WW2.

"Several hundred of the troops who had been rushed from Philippeville to re-enforce the beach-head at Salerno, had staged a sit down, refusing to join the front-line units. Sitting on the sand and surrounded by military police, they had been warned of the consequences of a mutiny in the face of the enemy. After their refusal, three times, to pick up their weapons and kit, the Corps Commander, General McCreery, made one last attempt.
He understood their main complaint was that, having been promised that they would be rejoining their old regiments, they had been switched to the Fifth Army at the last moment. He promised that as soon as the situation had improved, he would hasten the return to their units.
After he had finished, General McCreery left the beach and, shortly after, was informed that, with the exception of 192 men, the troops had responded to his plea. The recalcitrants were then placed under arrest and sent back to Constantine (Algeria) where, after trial, 191 received sentences of between five to twenty years penal servitude. A handful of ring-leaders received death sentences.
All sentences were immediately suspended, and the troops posted to the Eighth Army. Many years later, allegations were to be voiced that those men received deliberate continuous exposure in the front line."

Good job they hadn't tried that thirty years earlier.

Steve


----------



## Kryten (Aug 14, 2012)

I seem to recall the main gripe was that they were supposed to be going home, some of them had been in North Africa for 3 years without a break, away from thier families!


----------



## davebender (Aug 14, 2012)

I suspect British forces in the Aegean getting bombed to dust by Ju-87s and Ju-88s would have given a lot for the five Seafire squadrons operating from those CVEs.


----------



## RCAFson (Aug 14, 2012)

stona said:


> I've just read that Salerno was the scene of a rare mutiny involving British troops in WW2.



They probably heard that "...it was an American operation..." despite the fact that about 1/2 the forces committed to it were from the UK, and decided they'd rather not participate...


----------



## JoeB (Aug 14, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> Your post did not state that Triumph was a rather slow CVL, and is written so that it is not clear that Triumph was operating the Seafires in question rather than acting as a ferry to bring the surviving aircraft from Korea.
> 
> The fact is that all WW2 CV capable aircraft are more prone to landing damage if the CV or apparent wind is too slow, since it causes much greater strain on the aircraft hooks and LG.


It would be much more graceful for you to admit you missed the reference to Triumph in my original post, which you pretty obviously did, rather than come up with some convoluted comeback like that to still try to say I was omitting something. Also I would repeat that it's common knowledge anyway AFAIC that the RN/RAN only used Colossus class carriers in Korea, and my post was in response to one about Seafire wrinkling *in Korea*. I think you've failed utterly to show that the post was either misleading or not completely relevant to the post I quoted in responding.

And the view of the FAA units at the time was certainly not that rapid disablement of these fighters in normal operations 'didn't count' because it wasn't on a larger carrier. As Landsdowne says for example about the 4 a/c written off Sept 9 p.30 "Some of these a/c had been received from Unicorn only the previous week and not been subjected to anything out of the ordinary in the way of landings". So this case goes beyond the usual rejection of opposing accounts that say things people don't want to hear, to saying the FAA's *own* record and opinion of its own a/c's fault must have somehow been wrong, or irrelevant because of the type of ship. It’s ridiculous. These a/c, in the actual situation in which they were called upon to perform combat operations, had a serious problem with lack of durability in prolonged carrier ops. That's a historical fact.

The only other thing I'd note is that this was 1950 and so the a/c were a few years old. Landsdowne even mentions that some of those which gave out very easily were assumed to be older ones. Whereas, front line a/c in WWII were usually no more than months old (OTOH some WWII a/c served on for 20 or more years after WWII).

Also the record of Sea Furies was mentioned. In fact the results with Sea Furies from the same ships were pretty different. For example HMS Glory following year in similar season (rougher weather and ice made winter more difficult) 23 April-30 Sept 1951
Started w/ 22 Sea Furies, pilots unharmed except as noted
April 27: probably crashed in poor visibility, MIA
May 2: force landed after fired on by flak, ‘engine trouble’
May 15: ditched, flak
Ca. May 20: ditched, engine trouble during carrier landing practice off Japan
June 4: ditched, engine quit after strafing various targets
June 5: damaged by flak, engine quit on approach, ditched, KIA
June 30: catapult fails a/c lost
July 18: two a/c lost to flak, one KIA
July 20: wheels up deck landing after losing a wheel hitting the round-down on the first try, not clear if a/c was a total loss
Aug 16: wheels up landing on beach of UN held island, flak, not clear if total loss
Sep 2: 2 a/c wheels up landings on beach UN held island, flak, one later recovered
Sept 24: engine trouble after strafing junks, ditched

In 13 Sea Fury total losses or possible ones are mentioned, but only 3 directly in carrier landing and takeoff phases, in 1818 landings, and none at all to fuselage wrinkling or overstrain, compared to 15 Seafires in Triumph’s tour, w/ ‘regular’ landing/launch losses on top. There’s an obvious difference there, Sea Fury a satisfactorily rugged a/c for carrier ops, Seafire still deficient even in F.47 version, for operating on the actual ships RN had available for Korean ops. The Sea Furies suffered a lot more flak and ‘engine trouble’ losses (latter often after strafing targets which were probably shooting back) than Seafires on Triumph’s (shorter) tour, but in general flak got more difficult in Korea as time went on, and again Triumph’s fighter sdn was pretty rapidly thinned out by those fuselage strength issues so sortie rate was pretty low.

Joe


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 14, 2012)

This bickering has gotten old. We are no longer playing around. 

I recommend a few people in this thread go and read post #77 in the thread "A Word To Forum Members: Patience".


----------



## wuzak (Aug 14, 2012)

davebender said:


> I suspect British forces in the Aegean getting bombed to dust by Ju-87s and Ju-88s would have given a lot for the five Seafire squadrons operating from those CVEs.


 
Would they have been "bombed to dust"? What was the effectiveness of Ju 87s and Ju 88s against ships, and what was their effectiveness wehn up against fighters?

Ju 87s didn't fare so well in the BoB. Why would they fare any better against Seafires?


----------



## Njaco (Aug 14, 2012)

Interesting pic that I found - was gonna use it for another thread but it fits here....


----------



## RCAFson (Aug 14, 2012)

JoeB said:


> I think you've failed utterly to show that the post was either misleading or not completely relevant to the post I quoted in responding.
> 
> 
> Joe





> OTOH "With the Carriers in Korea" by Landsdown is a day to day account of the RN carrier ops in Korea. The history of Seafire attrition in combat ops is as follows:
> June 29: disembarks 4 over-wrinkled Seafires before entering combat, 12 remain available
> July 18: 1 Seafire severely damaged in landing (one other became unserviceable of several incidents ments mentioned)
> July 22: disembarks 2 unserviceable Seafires, takes on 7 from Unicorn, 17 available
> ...




Some things not mentioned:



> *On 21st July, Triumph sailed for Sasebo, due to deterioration of the packing in the Starboard stern gland*, and arrived the next morning. Here, Triumph replaced damaged aircraft, bringing her Seafire complement to 17, four below complement, and reprovisioned. Triumph and Comus, who had accompanied her back to port, sailed on 25th July, to provide close support for the endangered US 8th Army, and the South Korean Army, who were in danger of being encircled and overrun. Triumph flew 28 CAP sorties, during the day, and moved to the East coast on 26th July, flying Anti-Submarine and CAP sorties again.
> 
> Triumph entered Sasebo on 21st September, where she entered drydock, for two days of temporary repairs to her starboard stern gland. Triumph sailed for Hong Kong on 25th September 1950.
> 
> HMS Triumph



So a two shaft ship was having trouble with one shaft...



> Korean War Service
> Post war, the Fleet Air Arm replaced its Merlin-powered Seafires with Griffon-powered aircraft, initially with the Seafire Mk. XV and Mk. XVII, and from 1948, by the definitive Seafire Mk. 47. In 1950, HMS Triumph began a tour of the Far East, embarking 800 Naval Air Squadron with Seafire Mk. 47s along with 827 Naval Air Squadron, equipped with Fairey Fireflies. Following the outbreak of the Korean War, HMS Triumph was diverted to interdiction operations to try and stem the North Korean offensive, and her Seafires flew both ground attack and combat air patrol missions from July until September 1950, when Triumph was replaced on station by HMS Theseus, equipped with Sea Furies. During operations off Korea, Seafires flew 360 operational sorties, losing one aircraft shot down by friendly fire from a B-29 Superfortress and a second aircraft lost when its arrestor hook failed to extend. The Seafire, however, proved more vulnerable to the stresses of carrier operation with many aircraft suffering wrinkling of the rear fuselage brought about by heavy landings. *Following the end of operations, when peacetime airworthiness rules were re-imposed, all but three of 800 Squadron's Seafires were declared unserviciable owing to wrinkling.*
> https://hangar47.com/Supermarine_Seafire_XV.html



So the status of the Seafire airworthiness was decided upon peacetime, not wartime rules, and by my count 6 were still operational using wartime rules after nearly 3 months of hard service. The replacement Seafires were also the aircraft deemed least airworthy, so 800 squadron was being replaced with culls, not top line aircraft:



> Due to succession of heavy landings caused by bad weather and tiredness some of the fuselage wrinkles on the Seafires were becoming a bit too large for comfort so the worst of the affected aircraft were withdrawn and used for spares...
> 
> On the 30th of August HMS Triumph returned to Sasebo in Japan to replenish stores and recieve the last 6 seafires and 8 fireflys from HMS Unicorn, which were the least serviceable of of all the replacements and as such had been held back until now for that reason...
> http://www.royalnavyresearcharchive.org.uk/Article_Forgotten_Cruise.htm

Reactions: Informative Informative:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Aug 15, 2012)

Nice piccy from"Njaco".

According to Crosley at this time,long before the development of the gyro stabilised mirror landing "sights", the signals from a U.S.N. L.S.O were advisory whereas those given by his R.N. equivalent were mandatory. If the batsman got it wrong then so would you!

Cheers

Steve


----------



## davebender (Aug 15, 2012)

It was historically. 

Seafires operating from CVEs might turn British defeat into a British victory. The Aegean had such huge strategic importance that it was worth losing a few CVEs to win this battle.


----------



## stona (Aug 15, 2012)

davebender said:


> It was historically.



"Accolade" never happened.

Steve


----------



## davebender (Aug 15, 2012)

Dodecanese Campaign - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


> August 1943 the British started preparations to take quickly advantage of a possible Italian-German split, in the form of a scaled-down "Accolade".



Would "Accolade Lite" be the correct title?

Reactions: Funny Funny:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Aug 15, 2012)

davebender said:


> Dodecanese Campaign - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> 
> 
> Would "Accolade Lite" be the correct title?



Very good....yes,less calories, errrr, I mean assets. It still didn't go very well from a British point of view.

Steve


----------



## davparlr (Aug 15, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> The Seafire II/III were low altitude rated fighters with single stage, single speed SCs with 16-18lb boost at low altitude. The LIIC and LFIII had the Merlin 32/55m respectively so they had spectacular initial climb rates and good speed at low altitudes


From my research, climb performance using the 55 engine is very good but airspeed is poor, 300 mph at SL, 346 mph at 15k, quite a bit below the performance of the contemporary F4U-1, 348 mph at SL, 378 at 15k. 


> The Seafire XV/XVII had single stage, two speed griffons, with much better high altitude performance and the Seafire 47 two stage, two speed griffons with excellent high altitude performance and a service ceiling of about 40,000 ft.


According to some sources, these aircraft were not operational in WWII, certainly not the Seafire 47. In any event, comparing them to their contemporaries the F4U-4 and -5, they come up quite short in airspeed and possibly climb (my sources are limited on the F4U-4/5)


----------



## RCAFson (Aug 15, 2012)

davparlr said:


> From my research, climb performance using the 55 engine is very good but airspeed is poor, 300 mph at SL, 346 mph at 15k, quite a bit below the performance of the contemporary F4U-1, 348 mph at SL, 378 at 15k.
> 
> According to some sources, these aircraft were not operational in WWII, certainly not the Seafire 47. In any event, comparing them to their contemporaries the F4U-4 and -5, they come up quite short in airspeed and possibly climb (my sources are limited on the F4U-4/5)



The Seafire LIIC/LIII were CV operable in late 1942 and early 43, where the F4U was not really CV operable until late 43/early 44, so these would not have been usable by the FAA in the MTO in 1942/43, and I suspect the Corsair would have had TO problems if operating from a CVE, so they are not really contemporaries.

Here's the data cards on the LIIC and Corsair I (FAA variant):







and here's the Seafire LIII/55m performance chart:





Vmax at SL for the LIIC and LIII = ~316mph

The Seafire XV was on it's way to the Pacific when the war ended.

In Sept 1943, Boscombe Down test gave these figures for the F6F-3:


> Climb performance
> Max. rate of climb in Main supercharger gear	= 2260 ft/min at 5400 feet.
> Max. rate of climb in Aux. Lowspeed supercharger gear	= 1880 ft/min at 20500 feet.
> Time to reach 10,000 ft. = 4.65 minutes
> ...


----------



## Vincenzo (Aug 15, 2012)

Seafire III was available only from very late '43.
L.III or L.II not LIII or LII (they were Seafire 3 or 2 not 53 or 52)


----------



## stona (Aug 16, 2012)

Abbreviations.

Properly Seafire L Mk IIc for example.

Often written LIIc. What number can you make out of an FIIc ? 

Steve

Reactions: Funny Funny:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Vincenzo (Aug 16, 2012)

none


----------



## davparlr (Aug 19, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> The Seafire LIIC/LIII were CV operable in late 1942 and early 43, where the F4U was not really CV operable until late 43/early 44, so these would not have been usable by the FAA in the MTO in 1942/43, and I suspect the Corsair would have had TO problems if operating from a CVE, so they are not really contemporaries.



Good argument



> In Sept 1943, Boscombe Down test gave these figures for the F6F-3:



This data seems suspect and does not really reflect performance of Navy test nor other Boxcombe test. 
Navy test of overload F6F-3 no water, shows SL climb of 3000 ft/min. Calculated climb at fighter weigh would be about 3350 ft/min.

2000 ft airspeed is good.

11,100 ft airspeed of 288 mph seems way off and probably does not reflect F6F max performance. Navy test of overload fighter shows 340 mph at 11,000 ft.

At 24,000 ft airspeed, of 335 mph is also off. Other Boscombe test shows 374 mph, which is close to Navy test.

In addition, it seems the Brits were stuck with the Seafire III until wars end while the F6F-3 was upgraded to water injection in early ’44,which increased speed significantly over any model of the Seafire III, in addition climb rate at low altitude was competitive but superior higher up.


----------



## Greyman (Aug 20, 2012)

With the A&AEE Spitfire III tests keep in mind they were done on an aircraft with the snowguard and triple ejector 'fishtail' exhausts fitted.

I would assume, and going by photos of Seafires in the Pacific in late '44 and into '45, that the snowguard was removed and multi-ejector exhausts were fitted, resulting in an increase in speed of about 12-14 mph.

Also when comparing performance tests keep in mind that different testing establishments used different methods of performance reduction, resulting in different values for an identical performance.


----------



## RCAFson (Aug 20, 2012)

davparlr said:


> 11,100 ft airspeed of 288 mph seems way off and probably does not reflect F6F max performance. Navy test of overload fighter shows 340 mph at 11,000 ft.



288 was with max weak mixture, which is really max cruise speed.


----------



## davparlr (Aug 20, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> 288 was with max weak mixture, which is really max cruise speed.


 
Thx, I was wondering what that meant.


----------



## HarryMann (Jul 16, 2019)

Quite surprised reading all the way through this thread. Far too much emphasis on the last few kts speed or miles of range.
They persisted because it was a cracking bit of kit once airborne. Highest critical Mach No of anything prop driven built during WWII.
It could climb from scratch very well and turn very well. 
As for the late contra-prop Griffon Seafires, remember a Sea Fury pilot saying when he got to 20,000 ft from deck level, the Seafires had been up there already patrolling for nearly a minute!

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Kevin J (Jul 17, 2019)

Excellent thread. Interesting read. My 2 cents worth of opinion is. If you want a cheap fast climbing fighter to defend your carriers then what could be better than a Seafire LIIc/LIII? An FM-2?

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Freebird (Jul 17, 2019)

yulzari said:


> Britain was bankrupt by February 1941, having spent the last of the proceeds of selling off all it's USA industrial assets.



Rubbish!
Do you understand what the word "bankrupt" means? 
The US policy in Feb 1941 was "Cash & Carry", no debt was allowed or incurred.

Please DO enlighten us, in Feb 1941. what British Empire debt did his Majesty default on?

]


yulzari said:


> The FAA only continued to have USA combat aeroplanes through lend-lease. .



Wrong.
Britain continued to receive aircraft throughout 1941 that they'd previously paid for


----------



## HarryMann (Jul 24, 2019)

As for the de Havilland Hornet... fastest piston aircraft ever to fly off a deck. And as Commander Eric Winkle Brown said... the most impressive and capable piston powered fighter he'd ever flown. And as we know nobody will ever fly as many and varied aircraft as he did, ever, as he's now deceased.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## yulzari (Jul 25, 2019)

Freebird said:


> Rubbish!
> Do you understand what the word "bankrupt" means?
> The US policy in Feb 1941 was "Cash & Carry", no debt was allowed or incurred.
> 
> ...


'Bankrupt' was used loosely. Britain was running out of non sterling reserves and was soon going to be unable to place more orders. Naturally they received the items they had paid for pre Lend Lease. A look at British owned assets in USA industry pre WW2 and 1942 will show how low down the barrel they had scraped. Looking at it another way, without Lend-Lease what could they have used to pay for new orders? 

One thinks in terms of war material but food was a major import too and had to be paid for out of the same reserves. When the war Lend-Lease etc. ended the British food rations had to be reduced below wartime levels as USA food could no longer be afforded. 

More relevant to the OP. If the Admiralty had not persisted with the Seafire the FAA would have had no fighters by the end of 1945 as the USA Lend-Lease carrier fighters would have been returned or destroyed as per the agreement. The same was one of the reasons for maintaining tank production in the UK when the USA Sherman was being over produced and could meet UK needs also.


----------



## wuzak (Jul 25, 2019)

yulzari said:


> 'Bankrupt' was used loosely. Britain was running out of non sterling reserves and was soon going to be unable to place more orders. Naturally they received the items they had paid for pre Lend Lease. A look at British owned assets in USA industry pre WW2 and 1942 will show how low down the barrel they had scraped. Looking at it another way, without Lend-Lease what could they have used to pay for new orders?



Print more money.

Reactions: Funny Funny:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## Kevin J (Jul 25, 2019)

wuzak said:


> Print more money.


That's not how things were done in those days.


----------



## RCAFson (Jul 25, 2019)

yulzari said:


> 'Bankrupt' was used loosely. Britain was running out of non sterling reserves and was soon going to be unable to place more orders. Naturally they received the items they had paid for pre Lend Lease. A look at British owned assets in USA industry pre WW2 and 1942 will show how low down the barrel they had scraped. Looking at it another way, without Lend-Lease what could they have used to pay for new orders?
> 
> One thinks in terms of war material but food was a major import too and had to be paid for out of the same reserves. When the war Lend-Lease etc. ended the British food rations had to be reduced below wartime levels as USA food could no longer be afforded.
> 
> More relevant to the OP. If the Admiralty had not persisted with the Seafire the FAA would have had no fighters by the end of 1945 as the USA Lend-Lease carrier fighters would have been returned or destroyed as per the agreement. The same was one of the reasons for maintaining tank production in the UK when the USA Sherman was being over produced and could meet UK needs also.



Once the UK decided to spend their reserves in the USA they were committed to the path that led to Lend-Lease. The alternate path would have been to spend their reserves within the Commonwealth/Empire, mainly in Canada and Australia and build up their output rather than the USA's. Much of what was purchased via cash and carry had little military value anyways and was paid for at horribly non-competitive prices compared to UK purchases.

Reactions: Winner Winner:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Shortround6 (Jul 25, 2019)

RCAFson said:


> The alternate path would have been to spend their reserves within the Commonwealth/Empire, mainly in Canada and Australia and build up their output rather than the USA's. Much of what was purchased via cash and carry had little military value anyways and was paid for at horribly non-competitive prices compared to UK purchases.



Problems with that path is that it would take too long, neither country had the number of workers needed, or factories in existence and the majority of machine tools would have to come from the US anyway. (England was buying machine tools from the US to equip the shadow factories with, in addition to buying machine tools from Switzerland and Germany)

Reactions: Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## MiTasol (Jul 25, 2019)

Freebird said:


> Rubbish!
> Do you understand what the word "bankrupt" means?
> The US policy in Feb 1941 was "Cash & Carry", no debt was allowed or incurred.
> Please DO enlighten us, in Feb 1941. what British Empire debt did his Majesty default on?
> Britain continued to receive aircraft throughout 1941 that they'd previously paid for



Britain's financial position was far from happy, and Churchill blew all of the colonies reserves as well during 1940. Yes, bankruptcy is an excessive claim - but not by very much.

*For the best and most accurate summary read 1940: Myth and reality by Clive Ponting.*

It was written in 1990 using records that were released under the 50 year secrecy limits and shows the difference between Churchill's claims and the facts on multiple topics. 

When you read it you will also learn all about the muliple efforts to make peace with Germany - again far far different to what is claimed in Churchill's histories

It is readily available at low cost via BookFinder.com: Search Results

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Kevin J (Jul 26, 2019)

Shortround6 said:


> Problems with that path is that it would take too long, neither country had the number of workers needed, or factories in existence and the majority of machine tools would have to come from the US anyway. (England was buying machine tools from the US to equip the shadow factories with, in addition to buying machine tools from Switzerland and Germany)


Of course if all our colonials were working in the factories they wouldn't be available for active service. Maybe more could have been made in the Empire. Perhaps the Miles M20 in India, even the Martin-Baker MB5.


----------



## wuzak (Jul 26, 2019)

Kevin J said:


> Of course if all our colonials were working in the factories they wouldn't be available for active service. Maybe more could have been made in the Empire. Perhaps the Miles M20 in India, even the Martin-Baker MB5.



The MB5 would not have been available until late in the, if at all.

And where would you get the engines from? There weren't too many Griffons built during the war, to supply them for MB5's would be difficult.

Reactions: Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Shortround6 (Jul 26, 2019)

India is often under appreciated in the schemes of the Empire. It not only supplied troops but there was an arms industry there. Not just small arms but some artillery.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## MycroftHolmes (Jul 26, 2019)

MiTasol said:


> For the best and most accurate summary read _1940: Myth and reality_ by Clive Ponting.



Ponting is about as reliable as Mosier.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------

