# WW2 USN Strategic Bombing Capability



## wuzak (Jun 27, 2016)

This statement was made in the Best Bomber thread #4:



> The USN carrier forces were quite able to smash Nippon industry



So just how capable were they?

What were the bomb carrying aircraft they could use?
The TBF Avenger could carry a 2,000lb bomb load. It had a 1,000 mile range. Top speed was 275mph.
The SBD Dauntless could carry 2,250lb of bombs and had a maximum range of 1,115 miles. Top speed was 255mph.
The F6F could carry up to 4,000lb of bombs. But at what range and speed?
Similarly the F4U-4 could carry 4,000lb of bombs. The F4U-1 only 2,000lb of bombs.

Any others?

If the USN bombers are within range of Japanese industry the fleet will be in range of ground based Japanese aircraft, exposing the fleet to attack, including kamikaze attacks.

Meanwhile the bombing aircraft are all quite slow when carrying ordnance. And very vulnerable to fighter defences.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 27, 2016)

The USN took on a tactical role most of the time. The doctrine of the day was letting long range bombers at altitude knock out strategic targets.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 27, 2016)

James W. said:


> The USN was so confident by 1945, that it was using its battlewagon artillery to bombard Japanese industrial targets.


I don't know what that has to do with USN Strategic Bombing Capability. By late 1945 there was no Japanese Navy so sure a battleship could park itself off shore and blast away. What about targets out of the range of the ships? I think you're confusing things.


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## fubar57 (Jun 27, 2016)

Today I learned a battleship was classified as a strategic bomber

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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 27, 2016)

James W. said:


> No I'm not, the USN may have run out of Japanese ships to sink, but they wanted both to provoke defensive air battles from the Japanese, to waste them & to reduce their war making capacity, hitting all kinds of infrastructure targets also.


And that was late in the war - the USN wasn't going to do that 6 months earlier.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 27, 2016)

James W. said:


> The USN 1st worked over the Nippon home islands in Feb 1945, after taking Iwo Jima, & before Okinawa


Although a crushing blow to Japanese morale, the bombardment of the Japanese mainland was a matter of convenience. There was still industrial centers out of the range of the battleship's guns.

From another site...

"By July and August of 1945, the war in the Pacific was nearing its end. Japan's naval strength had its back broken and was in its final death throes. The Japanese home islands were now under constant attack from American B-29 bombers operating off of Pacific islands. American submarines and aircraft had torn apart Japanese trade routes. The resulting shortage of fuel hampered operations by surviving aircraft and naval vessels. The American Navy was now largely free to sail anywhere in the Pacific. Japan became painfull aware of this in July of 1945 when the US Navy arrived on Japan's doorstep.

On July 1, the US 3rd Fleet under William Halsey set sail from the Philippine Islands to commence direct attacks on the Japanese Home islands. US Submarines went in first to search for naval mines. Meanwhile, US B-29 and B-24 bombers began reconnaissance flights over Japan to pick out targets. Halsey planned to use Battleships and Cruisers to attack military facilities and factories. Meanwhile, carrier aircraft would strike airfields, ships, and other targets. The 3rd fleet arrived off Japan on July 10 and immediately commenced an attack on navy facilities around Tokyo using carrier aircraft form Task Force 38. On July 14, the task force then sailed north and attacked Honshu and Hokkaido which until that point had managed to avoid damage since they were outside the range of B-29 bombers. 19 warships, 41 merchant ships, and 25 aircraft were claimed destroyed.

On July 14, the first naval bombardment also took place. Rear Admiral John F. Shafroth took command of Task Unit 34.8.1 which broke off from Task Force 38. Taking place while the carrier aircraft were attacking targets elsewhere, they were ordered to attack iron works in Kamaishi. The unit was made up of the battleships USS _South Dakota, Indiana, _and _Massachusetts_. In addition the baltimore class cruisers _Quincy_ and _Chicago _plus nine destroyers supported the battleships."

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## fubar57 (Jun 27, 2016)

I know it's Wiki but pretty near what you wrote FBJ....
Allied naval bombardments of Japan during World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 27, 2016)

James W. said:


> Ta FBJ, strategic, for sure.


At the 11th hour and again, out of convenience.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 27, 2016)

James W. said:


> What, are we back to B-29s again? Does that same statement not also apply to the nukes?



No - if you were so smart your would have realized that the Japanese still had a huge deployed army in China and have indicated they were not going to surrender. If you're going to rant about the cruel use of nukes like some revisionist, your time here will be short.


James W. said:


> Some of those industrial targets hit were out of B-29 range, to be fair.


Name one


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 27, 2016)

James W. said:


> FBJ, check the 2nd last sentence of the 2nd paragraph of the insert in your post # 10.
> "...since they were outside the range..."


Good - you actually read my post!


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 27, 2016)

Bottom line, the use of battleships for strategic ops were a matter of convenience. 6 months earlier Halsey wouldn't have been able to get anywhere close to the mainland. This almost sounds like the argument Billy Mitchell had with the USN after WW1.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 27, 2016)

James W. said:


> What would've stopped them 6 months earlier was that they were busy invading Iwo Jima.



And they still had a navy.


James W. said:


> As I noted earlier, the USN did work over Nippon in Feb 1945, between the Iwo, & Okinawa jobs.
> ( when it was "convenient", & why not).


 Have you ever been to those places or seen them on a map??? If you're smart you'll answer you're own question.


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## Reegor (Jun 28, 2016)

The Wikipedia article seems to be mainly about the bombardment. But as mentioned the USN did a minor air attack in February, and a major air attack in July - August. 
The best source I found on this is 
*Whirlwind: The Air War Against Japan, 1942-1945*
By Barrett Tillman , 2010. 

Here is an official description. I presume it is biased; see Tillman's book for a better assessment.
*FAST CARRIER FORCE PRE-INVASION OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN*

After nearly three weeks of replenishment in Leyte Gulf, subsequent to their support of the Okinawa operation, the fast carrier forces of Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet, comprising the greatest mass of sea power ever assembled, proceeded northward on 1 July toward Japan. This huge armada was to complete the destruction of the Japanese fleet, conduct a preinvasion campaign of destruction against every industry and resource contributing to Japan's ability to wage war, and maintain maximum pressure on the Japanese in order to lower their will to fight.

On 10 July the force arrived in the launching area, 170 miles southeast of Tokyo. On that day strikes were made against airfields and industrial plants in the Tokyo area; 72 planes were destroyed on the ground and extensive damage inflicted on other targets. No attempt was made to conceal the location of the fleet but, in spite of this, little enemy air opposition was encountered.

Admiral Halsey then moved north to attack northern Honshu and southern Hokkaido on 14-15 July. Aerial strikes dealt a severe blow to critical water transportation facilities between Hokkaido and Honshu, when 5 railroad ferries were sunk and 4 others damaged. Again, little air opposition was encountered by our planes. Simultaneously with these air strikes heavy units of the force shelled Kamaishi and Muroran, causing damage to the steel mills and oil installations in those cities.

On 17 July the Third Fleet moved south and was joined by units of the British Pacific Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Rawlings. Admiral Halsey was in over-all command and, on that day, ordered the first combined American-British bombardment of the Japanese homeland. Battleships fired 2000 tons of shells into the coastal area northeast of Tokyo and encountered no enemy opposition during the operation.

On the following day American and British carrier-based planes struck at enemy fleet units concealed at the Yokosuka naval base in Tokyo Bay. NAGATO, one of two remaining Japanese battleships, was badly damaged. Numerous shore installations and transportation facilities were also hit.

On 24 and 25 July the combined British and American naval forces launched extensive air strikes against targets in the Inland Sea area. The planes concentrated on the major fleet units still afloat at the Kure naval base. Six major ships were badly damaged and, in all, 22 naval units totaling 258,000 tons were either sunk or put out of action, sounding the death knell of Japanese sea power. Intensive antiaircraft fire was met, and for the first time the enemy mounted aggressive, airborne opposition. A total of 113 enemy aircraft were destroyed during the two-day attack, while only 12 British and American planes were lost.

A follow-up attack was made on Kure and the Inland Sea area by the carrier-based planes on 28 July. Reconnaissance indicated that the enemy fleet units had been effectively reduced by the previous strikes, but additional bombs were dropped for good measure. Extensive damage was also done to merchant shipping and to vital shore installations, particularly railroad facilities. Strong air opposition was encountered once more, but our aircraft knocked down 21 Japanese planes air-borne and destroyed 123 on the ground for a total of 144 for the day, while our forces lost 36.

On 30 July the Tokyo area was harassed for the third time in three weeks by aircraft from the fast carriers, our airmen destroying 121 enemy planes during the day and inflicting severe damage on lighter enemy fleet units found in the region. Meanwhile, the fast battleships were shelling the port of Hamamatsu on the east coast of central Honshu, spreading havoc in that area.

For the first eight days of August the harassed Japanese homeland was given a temporary respite while Admiral Halsey's fleet was riding out a heavy typhoon. On 9 and 10 August, however, the offensive was renewed with another air attack on northern Honshu. It was known that the enemy had withdrawn a large part of his air force to fields in this area, and the strikes were designed to destroy as many of them as possible. The plan was partially successful, for during the two days 397 enemy planes were destroyed and 320 others damaged. Almost no air-borne opposition was encountered, and all but 10 of the destroyed planes were caught on the ground. The British and Americans lost only 34 planes. While these air strikes were in progress, battleships from the Third Fleet bombarded the coastal city of Kamaishi for a second time, inflicting further heavy damage on the steel mills in the area.

Admiral Halsey's final blow was delivered against Tokyo on 13 August. Airfields and other military installations were the primary targets, with 46 planes being destroyed on the ground. The Japanese tried to get through to the surface ships, but 21 planes were shot down in the futile attempt. The strong protective screen around the fleet was too much for the fading enemy air strength.

On 15 August the order of Fleet Admiral Nimitz to "cease fire" was received too late to stop the first of the day's air strikes planned for Tokyo. It knocked 30 enemy planes out of the air and destroyed 10 more on the ground. The second strike had also been launched, but it was recalled in time; its pilots were ordered to jettison their bombs and return to their carriers.

Since 10 July the forces under Admiral Halsey's command had destroyed or damaged 2804 enemy planes, sunk or damaged 148 Japanese combat ships, sunk or damaged 1598 enemy merchant ships, destroyed 195 locomotives, and damaged 109 more. In addition, heavy blows had been struck at industrial targets and war industries, effectively supplementing the bombing by B-29's. This impressive record speaks for itself and helps to explain the sudden collapse of Japan's will to resist. Naval air power, acting in close conjunction with naval surface power and Army bombers, had beaten enemy land-based air power besides inflicting critical losses on naval ships and seriously damaging many shore targets.

Source: www.shsu.edu/~his_ncp/Compac45.html

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## GrauGeist (Jun 28, 2016)

James W. said:


> The USN was so confident by 1945, that it was using its battlewagon artillery to bombard Japanese industrial targets.


In July, one month before the war's end.



James W. said:


> The USN 1st worked over the Nippon home islands in Feb 1945, after taking Iwo Jima, & before Okinawa


In July, one month before the war's end.



James W. said:


> What would've stopped them 6 months earlier was that they were busy invading Iwo Jima.


Japan still had a considerable amount of assets to deal with during the Iwo Jima/Okinawa time frame.



James W. said:


> As I noted earlier, the USN did work over Nippon in Feb 1945, between the Iwo, & Okinawa jobs.
> ( when it was "convenient", & why not).


In July, one month before the war's end.

And in the final months of the war, the Japanese still had over 5 million personnel on the Asian mainland. They also had a considerable amount of aircraft there, too - both Naval and Army.


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## GrauGeist (Jun 28, 2016)

James W. said:


> Wrong.. wrong & wrong - the USN initially blitzed Nippon in Feb 1945, 6 months earlier..


Negative, read a few history books and come back to the discussion.

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## GrauGeist (Jun 28, 2016)

James W. said:


> Wanna put a buck on the barrel head G-G?
> You still owe me for being wrong about the Merlin-Meteor mill..


Don't trifle with me, ass-clown.

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## GrauGeist (Jun 28, 2016)

James W. said:


> Clown-as better check the whereabouts of USS Franklin in early March 1945, when she got hit real bad...


yes, azz-wipe...she strayed too close to the home island and nearly got her ass handed to her by Japanese forces, right?
So there you have it...by Spring of 1945, the Japanese were still a serious force to contend with and no freakin' way a Battleship group is just going to steam up to the coast of Japan and start lobbing shells all over without getting checked up hard.

And last time I checked, a Carrier was not a Battlewagon.

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## GrauGeist (Jun 28, 2016)

James W. said:


> The battlewagons accompanied the carriers.. aircraft were the USN's primary offensive weapon back in `45.
> 
> Still well before July though huh, somebody done got his smirk as-wiped (50 miles is close-as).
> 
> ...


First off, NO battleship shelled the mainland...max. range is 27 miles, 25 optimum...so stick your "smirk" up your chute and STFU.

Secondly, read up on TF58's ops for that point in time and see that the main objective was to intervene Japanese support efforts, not attack Japan's mainland.

So again, take the attitude and bury it as far up your back pocket as it'll go...

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## GrauGeist (Jun 28, 2016)

James W. said:


> Just cant admit when you are wrong, huh G-G, & then try & weasel out by qualifying which weapons were used..
> If the Nippon forces couldn't do much to the USN in Feb/March, off the coast then why would they in July.
> 
> That was why the big guns moved in..


So nearly sinking the Franklin is "couldn't do much?"

No Battleship got within shelling range of Japan proper until July '45...I don't give an eff what you think, do or say.

Facts dictate a much different picture.


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## GrauGeist (Jun 28, 2016)

James W. said:


> Don't know what pictures you are viewing.. But the Nippon forces couldn't even finish off the Franklin,
> even when she was well within reach, since the USN had them in hand, & they were a squeezing 'em, hard..


ok, let's give you the benefit of the doubt.

You claim that the USN shelled the Japanese coast in February of 1945.

Name the Battleships that shelled the Japanese coast and what their targets were.

What the the determined damage to said targets?

And by the way, when using the term "Nippon", you would use the term "Nipponese" when referring in a possessive sense. Like "Nipponese aircraft", " Nipponese Navy", etc.


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## wuzak (Jun 28, 2016)

Who cares? Shelling from a battleship is not strategic bombing.


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## GrauGeist (Jun 28, 2016)

wuzak said:


> Who cares? Shelling from a battleship is not strategic bombing.


You and I know that...

But on the otherhand...there are "some people'...

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## GrauGeist (Jun 28, 2016)

James W. said:


> Where did I claim that? You claimed the USN didn't attack Japan directly until July, & you are wrong.


a few posts back, you stated:


James W. said:


> What would've stopped them 6 months earlier was that they were busy invading Iwo Jima.
> 
> As I noted earlier, the USN did work over Nippon in Feb 1945, between the Iwo, & Okinawa jobs.
> ( when it was "convenient", & why not).


The only thing that got worked over, was the Franklin

So how about you get back on the thread's topic?


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## wuzak (Jun 28, 2016)

Still not talking about the USN's bombing capability.

Which wasn't much, certainly in the strategic sense.

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## wuzak (Jun 28, 2016)

James W. said:


> Based on what data?
> 
> Do you Know what the tonnages are? Or is it a guess? There were hundreds of bomb capable aircraft available,
> & they'd even put ashore many of the torpedo only planes, due to lack of potential targets,



Read the OP.

And then tell me that they were a capable strategic bombing force.


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## GrauGeist (Jun 28, 2016)

James W. said:


> Funny no "battlewagons" there, but the USN was, & beat the hell out of the Japanese defences.
> Shame on you to besmirch the 700 American boys who died on the Franklin like that too..


They didn't beat any Japanese defenses...and you do NOT even start to lecture me on "besmirching" ANY casualties.

Period.

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## GrauGeist (Jun 28, 2016)

James W. said:


> I just did..
> 
> & the USSBS* reports that USN aircraft ( not even counting thousands of massive artillery shells) dropped
> "6,800 tons" of bombs on Japan, 3/4ths of which were "directed against...military targets" & the other 1/4th
> ...


Nope...wrong, your circular argument is falling apart and growing very tiresome.

You claimed that surface vessels "beat the hell out of Japanese defenses".

I'm calling you out on that.

I want you to tell me in detail: which US surface fleet vessels did this in February of 1945.

I want you to tell me what task force, which ships and what targets were involved.

Until you can provide this information to back your previous claims, you have absolutely no credibility around here.

In otherwords, put up or shut up.

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## wuzak (Jun 28, 2016)

James W. said:


> I just did..
> 
> & the USSBS* reports that USN aircraft ( not even counting thousands of massive artillery shells) dropped
> "6,800 tons" of bombs on Japan, 3/4ths of which were "directed against...military targets" & the other 1/4th
> ...



From The Blitz - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia:



> The Luftwaffe dropped around *45,000 short tons* (41,000 t) of bombs during the Blitz disrupting production and transport, reducing food supplies and shaking the British morale. It also helped to support the U-Boat blockade by sinking some 58,000 long tons (59,000 t) of shipping destroyed and 450,000 long tons (460,000 t) damaged.


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## wuzak (Jun 28, 2016)

James W. said:


> Yes, ta, & in how many attacks? How many tons per raid?



From the Wiki page on the Blitz:


> Over a period of 267 days, London was attacked 71 times, Birmingham, Liverpool and Plymouth eight times, Bristol six, Glasgow five, Southampton four, Portsmouth and Hull three and a minimum of one large raid on eight other cities.



That equates to 124 raids, or 330t (370 short tons) per raid.

It would require just 19 of those raids to equal the tonnage dropped on Japan by the USN according to the USSBS.

So, how many raids were done by the USN?


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## Shortround6 (Jun 28, 2016)

James W. said:


> Based on what data?
> 
> Do you Know what the tonnages are? Or is it a guess? There were hundreds of bomb capable aircraft available,
> & they'd even put ashore many of the torpedo only planes, due to lack of potential targets,



OK, I'll bite. What "torpedo *only* planes" did the US, Navy have?

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## Peter Gunn (Jun 28, 2016)

James W. said:


> I just did..
> 
> & the USSBS* reports that USN aircraft ( not even counting thousands of massive artillery shells) dropped
> "6,800 tons" of bombs on Japan, 3/4ths of which were "directed against...military targets" & the other 1/4th
> ...



6,800 tons by the USN, and after consulting the USSBS, how much did the B-29s alone drop?

You have to remember, the USN was a mobile striking force that could overwhelm at any point of attack it chose. No land based installation could have enough assets to stop the 700-800+ aircraft the TF's could bring to the table. But a sustained strategic attack was probably a bit of a stretch for its capability. I could be wrong but I don't think the fleet train could keep the Task Force supplied with enough ammo, fuel, lubricants ect. for a long drawn out strategic campaign. Also remember ships need to return to port for all sorts of reasons. I'm sure the fleet train could keep them going for a good spell, but I think that's an unnecessary strain on resources.

And why would you want to? How many Helldivers or bomb carrying Avengers does it take to equal one B-29 tonnage wise?

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## Shortround6 (Jun 28, 2016)

Peter Gunn said:


> And why would you want to? How many Helldivers or bomb carrying Avengers does it take to equal one B-29 tonnage wise?



Roughly 10 carrier planes to 1 B-29.


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## fubar57 (Jun 28, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> OK, I'll bite. What "torpedo *only* planes" did the US, Navy have?



Seeing how the battleship was reclassified as a strategic bomber in an earlier post, I'm thinking P.T. boat

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## GrauGeist (Jun 28, 2016)

James W. said:


> Yeah right, is that why you have "shut up" on the Merlin-Meteor matter G-G,
> & you just can't admit it - when you are wrong..proved wrong, just like in this thread.


I wasn't involved directly in that particular discussion, sport.

And as I recall, your fantastic claim of putting war-weary aircraft merlins in Metor tanks was proven absolutely wrong by several folks who tried (obviously in vain) to set you straight on that by providing data and detailed explanations.

So here we are, in a different thread and you're deflecting.

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## Peter Gunn (Jun 28, 2016)

So, one B-29 crew=11, or after LeMay and XXI AF removed the defensive armament and crew, even less v. 10 carrier planes crewed by either two or three, say 25 total crew, plus the fuel for 10 engines v. 4 (albeit LARGE engines). 10 chances for a plane and crew loss or a bomb miss v. 1. Mmm... so far not seeing the advantage of having the USN try to do XXI Bomber Commands job.

Also, thanks for the info SR6.


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## GrauGeist (Jun 28, 2016)

Peter Gunn said:


> So, one B-29 crew=11, or after LeMay and XXI AF removed the defensive armament and crew, even less v. 10 carrier planes crewed by either two or three, say 25 total crew, plus the fuel for 10 engines v. 4 (albeit LARGE engines). 10 chances for a plane and crew loss or a bomb miss v. 1. Mmm... so far not seeing the advantage of having the USN try to do XXI Bomber Commands job.
> 
> Also, thanks for the info SR6.


Didn't you mean the C-54 instead of the B-29?

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## Peter Gunn (Jun 28, 2016)

GrauGeist said:


> Didn't you mean the C-54 instead of the B-29?



EGAD!!! You are correct...will go to penalty box...two minutes...feel shame...

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## Peter Gunn (Jun 28, 2016)

Besides, I'm more of a C-69 guy myself.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 28, 2016)

GrauGeist said:


> Didn't you mean the C-54 instead of the B-29?


C-54 mine dropping crew.

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## Shortround6 (Jun 28, 2016)

Sorry guys but I gave some wrong information on the B-29. It was good for 5000lb bomb load at a 1600 mile radius at high altitude and 12,000lbs at 1600 mile radius at medium altitude. That would make it equal to 2 1/2 to 6 carrier planes assuming the carrier planes carried 2,000lbs each. 
I would view max bomb loads like 4000lbs for F6Fs or F4U-4s with extreme suspicion for carrier use. They may very well have used bomb loads like that from land bases on occasion but getting off the carrier deck with such a load might be a bit difficult. You also have the problem of the carrier magazines. You only have so much space and filling up space with extra heavy bombs that are used only on occasion means more frequent replenishment. 
Carriers carried enough aviation fuel and munitions for around 5-7 days of intensive air operations. Keeping an Island airbase stocked was no picnic either but they sometimes stockpiled fuel and bombs for weeks while doing less intesive operations to get ready for a major (multiple raid) operation/campaign. 
I would also note that the US 1600lb AP bomb was pretty much useless as a general bombardment weapon, having less explosive than a noraml 500lb GP bomb.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 28, 2016)

James W. said:


> SR6 I recall reading a USN appreciation of the carrier plane mix needed for the final push against Nippon, & it involved swapping
> out torpedo units for more F6F fighter bombers, which were deemed more useful, given that torpedo targets were rare, but the
> anti-Kamikaze CAP & bombing roles were both real & needful.
> 
> The point was made that crews, planes, ordnance capacity & training were shifting in emphasis, & they wanted to stay on focus.


The Avenger could carry four 500lb GP bombs inside the bomb bay. It could carry a single 1000lb bomb. Some Avengers were fitted with rails for 4 rockets under each wing. 
Avengers were hardly torpedo only. 
Helldivers could carry two 1000lb bombs inside their bomb bay (and two 500lb bombs under wing). 
Both planes had a range of just over 1000 miles while carrying 2000lb of bombs inside. 

The Navy may very well have looked at a different mix, and changing the weapons storage would have been an easy change. Fewer torpedoes and more bombs. 

However this would be a very late war change. The Kamikaze threat only came into existence in the fall of 1944 and given the several months it could take to get planes from the East Coast of the US to the far Pacific (think Panama canal) Changing carrier groups to undertake "strategic" bombing of Japan and guard against Kamikazes wasn't going to happen until the spring of 1945.
B-29s began to show up on Saipan almost two weeks before the Japanese started using kamikazes in the Philippines. 
Waiting for the Navy to take over the strategic bombing campaign against the Japanese might have prolonged the war by months.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 28, 2016)

James W. said:


> ( apart from mining of course, what was the mil-spec Constellation payload).



Changing your mind about the C-54??

BTW price for commercial Lockheed 049 Constellation started at $800,000 in part due to the small number made. By the time you get to the 1947/48 model 749 price had gone to $950,000.

At least the Connie could outrun some Japanese fighters at low altitude.

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## Shortround6 (Jun 28, 2016)

James W. said:


> The USN document I read was ( AFAIR) per the resupply chain, & included the request for pilots trained
> in fighter bomber roles rather than torpedo attack. Replacement planes were coming on escort carriers,
> direct to the fleet, along with the rest of the replenishment fleet train.



And the supply chain stretched all the way back to Long Island NY in the case of the F6F. Yes you had planes in depots at certain points but you also had a steady stream of aircraft going from the Factory to those depots. Some of them to replace simple attrition. Some to equip new units on new hulls. Some trading around of units could be done but large scale changes would have to be planned months in advance.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 28, 2016)

Actually the kamikaze threat and actual damage caused the US Navy to start numerous weapons programs. Few, if any, showed results by the time the Japanese surrendered. Automatic 3in AA guns with proximity fuses to replace the 40mm Bofors was one program. It was hoped to replace twin 40mm mounts with a single 3in and quad 40mm mounts with twin 3in. The Navy funded several competing anti-aircraft missiles which eventually lead to theTerrior and Talos. Quadruple 20mm guns in power mounts was another program and was much quicker but the destructive effect was not what was wanted.





Due to the losses experienced by destroyers used as distant radar pickets they came up with the idea of using submarines as radar pickets complete with replacing part of the torpedo armament with control space for guiding fighter intercepts. This took until about 1948 to actually produce hardware (and may have been less than successful even then) 





The 4th rate Japanese caused an Awful lot of worry to the US Navy.


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## Shinpachi (Jun 29, 2016)

日本
Nippon = Japan
Nippon-jin = Japanese

Nuppon = Japan in my hometown accent. My uncle was asked to correct it to Nippon when he lived in Tokyo

Nihon = another official saying of Nippon. Not Nikon but it came from Nihon Kogaku (Japan Optical)
.............................................................. Canon came from Kannon for Goddess of Mercy.
Nihon-jin = Japanese in another official saying

Characters are same but
Ri-ben = Japan in Mandarin. Modern official Chinese
Zu-ben = Japan in Southern China's accent

Chinese sometimes call Japan as "倭 (wo)" or "倭国 (wo-guo)" which means a small country in ancient saying.
I find them many times in Chinese documents during the ww2.

Italian explorer Marco Polo who stayed in China in the 13th century introduced Japan as "Zipangu" to Europeans.
This would be the origin of Japan in English.

Please do not misuse it with
Ippon = a bottle of hot Sake
Suppon = a turtle for eating

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## Shortround6 (Jun 29, 2016)

And the point is?

The Hiro Naval Aircraft factory had been bombed by B-29s on May 5th, Mines had been laid in the port approaches on both March 30th and May 5th and about 40% of the city destroyed in a raid on July 1st. 

Navy showed up July 24th, 

Navy also suffered 102 aircrew lost and 133 aircraft due to the Heavy AA fire. 

A lot of this attack was political posturing. Revenge for Pearl Harbor (the British were excluded from the attack on the Japanese fleet and attacked targets else where).

The attacks occurred on July 24, 25 and 28. Why the 2 day gap? Damage assessment and planing of new strikes? weather problems? 
Resupply of fuel, munitions and replacement aircraft? 

Did the Navy attack Japan, without a doubt. Did they do a lot of damage, also without doubt. 

Could they have done it much earlier? like months, not weeks or days? 
Could they really have substituted for the B-29 raids without horrific Allied losses in men, aircraft and ships? 
Japanese fuel resources dwindled by the day. Japanese air operations in March-April against an American fleet in the Inland Sea would have been intense. Look at the Battle of Okinawa. Now put the American fleet in the Inland sea at the end of March, early April.

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## Peter Gunn (Jun 29, 2016)

After the Okinawa Kamikazi assault, I doubt the USN was looking forward to the invasion of Japan proper, or tooling around the Inland Sea. So I'm not convinced Admiral King would jump at the chance for this "gig".

SR6, the 102 aircrew lost and 133 planes with them, was that on July 24th only? Or was that over a several day stretch?
Thanks.

Pete


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## Peter Gunn (Jun 29, 2016)

I suggest you keep your suggestions about me to yourself.

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## Peter Gunn (Jun 29, 2016)

I'm not sure what your goal is here, but insulting folks is a funny way of ingratiating yourself to a community.

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## BiffF15 (Jun 29, 2016)

FLYBOYJ said:


> C-54 mine dropping crew.
> 
> Is it me or does only one of the three of them have a safety lanyard on?

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## stona (Jun 29, 2016)

They are Aussies....lanyards are for pussies....and Poms.

Cheers

Steve

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## tyrodtom (Jun 29, 2016)

I don't think that strap is for a safety harness. I think it's the static line for the parachute on the cargo they're about to shove out the door. And hoping they don't go with it.

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## stona (Jun 29, 2016)

Peter Gunn said:


> After the Okinawa Kamikazi assault, I doubt the USN was looking forward to the invasion of Japan proper,
> Pete



You are quite correct. In the discussions around the use of the atomic bomb King is on the record saying.

_"..that the defeat of Japan could be accomplished by sea and air power alone, without the necessity of actual invasion of the Japanese home islands by ground troops. "_

He was echoing Leahy's opinion, expressed at the same June 1st meeting. Leahy later wrote.

_"I was unable to see any justification for an invasion of an already thoroughly defeated Japan. I feared the cost would be enormous in both lives and treasure."_

The idea that King or any other naval commander would have jumped at the opportunity of an invasion, proclaiming it 'their gig' is absolute nonsense.

Incidentally, following the success of the Trinity test, King was one of the small group of men ( with Byrnes, Stimson, Leahy, Marshall and Arnold) who along with Truman took the decision to drop the bomb..

Cheers

Steve

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## GrauGeist (Jun 29, 2016)

Well james, did that make you feel better, disliking all my posts?

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## muskeg13 (Jun 29, 2016)

While not exactly "strategic" don't forget the land-based USN bombing campaign from the Aleutians to the Kuriles using PV-1 Venturas and PV-2 Harpoons. While not in the B-29 class, these planes had some respectable statistics.
Plane
Lockheed Ventura - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## GrauGeist (Jun 29, 2016)

James W. said:


> What, all 14,000 odd of them? Exaggeration much? Count again, one post rated with a dislike, & it sure deserved it..
> If you are actually interested in the thread topic, then cease trolling G-G, & go read post #23.


Nope, child...not playing your game...you were called out for your bullsh!t, mr mil-spec...

Aside from your assumption that they used old merlin parts in meteor engines and should use transports instead of bombers or whatever, you spouted off about surface vessels attacking Japan proper in February of '45...i simply asked you to provide details of TF58 and you couldn't.

Instead, you played games and deflected the discussion proving pretty much that you're a nothing but a tool.

So I'm simply ignoring you...simple as that...so go play your skinflute somewhere else.


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## KiwiBiggles (Jun 29, 2016)

GrauGeist said:


> Aside from your assumption that they used old merlin parts in meteor engines



While I generally agree with most of your comments, I'm afraid JW has you here, GG. It's pretty clear that in 1943 the blocks from old surplus Merlins were reused for Meteors, although it would be wrong to say that this was the normal practice. From what I can gather, it was only done in response to a shortage of Meteor blocks.


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## wuzak (Jun 30, 2016)

Captain Eric Brown first landed a Mosquito on a carrier in March of 1944.


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AMjjrp6axWs_


Given that the US carriers were slightly larger, would Mosquitoes flying off US carriers given them more strategic capability?

The Mosquito Captain Brown landed was an FBVI, which had the smaller bomb load, but equally the B versions with 2,000-3,000lb bomb loads should have been able to operate off carriers?

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## wuzak (Jun 30, 2016)

Or could the Lockheed Ventura operate from carriers too?



muskeg13 said:


> While not exactly "strategic" don't forget the land-based USN bombing campaign from the Aleutians to the Kuriles using PV-1 Venturas and PV-2 Harpoons. While not in the B-29 class, these planes had some respectable statistics.
> Plane
> Lockheed Ventura - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



Wingspan was 10' wider than teh Mosquito, and loaded weight ~8-10,000lbs heavier than a non cookie Mosquito.


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## Peter Gunn (Jun 30, 2016)

James W. said:


> Too funny, but hey Pete, well, if you don't want to improve your subject knowledge, that's cool..
> ( Check out King's response to the U-boat assault on the Eastern Seaboard in early `42.. he should've been fired then).



Kid, don't ever presume to understand what my subject knowledge is, anyway, shouldn't you be trolling teenagers on a gaming board somewhere?

And yes, on the rare occasions in the future when I choose to respond to you, I will use the term kid until you stop posting like one.

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## wuzak (Jun 30, 2016)

From the USSBS:



> The total tonnage of bombs dropped by Allied planes in the Pacific war was 656,400. Of this, 1*60,800 tons, or 24 percent, were dropped on the home islands of Japan*. Navy aircraft accounted for 6,800 tons, Army aircraft other than B-29s for 7,000 tons, and the B-29s for 147,000 tons. By contrast, the total bomb tonnage in the European theater was 2,700,000 tons of which 1,360,000 tons were dropped within Germany's own borders.
> 
> Approximately 800 tons of bombs were dropped by China-based B-29s on Japanese home island targets from June 1944 to January 1945. These raids were of insufficient weight and accuracy to produce significant results.
> 
> ...



United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (Pacific War)

I assume the 6,70 tons of bombs dropped by the USN on the Home Islands was around June/July? That the USAAF dropped 42,700 tons in July alone puts the amount of bombs dropped by the USN in perspective.


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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 2, 2016)

Boys, boys, boys, are we letting our egos get the better of our wisdom here? Young and impetuous, or "mature" and well researched, do we really need to hurl personal insults? Why can't everybody count to ten then recheck their source data before replying to a post they disagree with? I came to this forum to learn, not to spectate at pissing contests and food fights. R E S P E C T! 'Nuf said.

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## Zipper730 (Jul 2, 2016)

FBJ,



> No - if you were so smart your would have realized that the Japanese still had a huge deployed army in China and have indicated they were not going to surrender.


Wait, I was under the impression that the Japanese were extending feelers for surrender prior to the deployment of the nuclear bombs? I remember hearing statements from Admiral Leahy and General Eisenhower to this effect.



> If you're going to rant about the cruel use of nukes like some revisionist, your time here will be short.


I'm not sure why people would regard the use of the nuclear weapons as so unusually cruel with the available knowledge: For most intents and purposes, a nuclear bombing does exactly what a high explosive and incendiary attack does -- it flattens lots of buildings and produces a firestorm with the end result being a whole lot of rubble and debris -- the big difference is that it does it way faster and with one bomb.

Since the attack was an airburst the long term exposure to radiation was actually fairly low: Short term the exposure was massive due to the fission reaction itself and some precip. While the knowledge that deaths would ensue from radiation was understood: I'm not entirely certain if was realized that the more ugly details such as birth defects was actually known at the time.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 2, 2016)

Zipper730 said:


> FBJ,
> 
> Wait, I was under the impression that the Japanese were extending feelers for surrender prior to the deployment of the nuclear bombs? I remember hearing statements from Admiral Leahy and General Eisenhower to this effect.


They where, but this was not a unified attempt within the Japanese leadership and there were many who were totally against any kind of surrender.

Kyūjō incident - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## Zipper730 (Jul 2, 2016)

FLYBOYJ said:


> They where, but this was not a unified attempt within the Japanese leadership and there were many who were totally against any kind of surrender.
> 
> 
> 
> > Kyūjō incident - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


True, but that occurred even with the use of nuclear weapons


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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 2, 2016)

From what I've read, I don't think the American leadership (who didn't have a good understanding of the inner workings of the Japanese power structure) trusted the ability of the intermediaries to actually effect a cessation of hostilities. The die-hard fanatics were vocal and visible. MacArthur, an "Asia man" practically from birth, probably understood it best, but he was a field commander far from Washington. Witness the miracles he accomplished running the occupation.
The post-Hiroshima "revisionist" generation (myself included) are living in a different world and a different sensibility from what existed at the time. I can't imagine having the responsibility of sending a million and a half American boys into the teeth of ninety million men, women, and children armed with a death wish and everything from Kamikazes to pipe bombs, swords, scythes and kitchen knives. Hiroshima and Nagasaki, horrific as they were, pale by comparison.


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## pinehilljoe (Jul 2, 2016)

USN Carrier based aircraft may not have been as effective as land based for Strategic Targets, but if the War had continued, I am sure we would have used every means possible. Any aircraft that could carry a bomb would have been used on Tactical and Strategic targets,

The Eighth was redeploying to the Far East, along with the Tiger Force.


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## GrauGeist (Jul 3, 2016)

Here's a very good overview of the Allied operation during the final stages of the war, leading up to the end. It has the proposed invasion plans outlined, too.

It also covers the continuation of combat, as several overseas districts continued the fight even after Japan formally surrendered. I'd have to go back and look, but I believe the final cessation of hostilities were in mid September in Singapore.

It also covers Japanese forces overseas, by district complete with totals.

This is just Chapter 14, but at the bottom of the page, you have an option to go to the previous chapter or go to the table of contents, if you wish to read more.
Chapter 14: Japan's Surrender

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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 3, 2016)

James W. said:


> I don't think the USN were too keen on twins W, even their own F7F was delayed/revised/land-based.
> ( & don't forget they were 'dry ships' as far as glycol goes too, supposedly, even though P-51s were trialed)
> 
> Seems big singles such as the Boeing XF8B, Martin Mauler & Douglas Skyraider were more favoured.



Demonstrations with Mosquitoes, Venturas, et al to the contrary, operating such aircraft on carriers of the day on a routine basis just wouldn't have been practical. It wasn't until the 50s and 60s when angled decks, hydraulic arresting gear, steam catapults, and tricycle gear combined to make big twins on a carrier into a practical operation. And then they were designed-from-scratch Naval aircraft, not converted landlubbers. Now I know some of you will point to some of the first AJ1s and A3Ds operating from straight decks in the 50s. True enough, but that was never anything but a super hairy operation dictated by the need for a sea-going nuclear deterrent. With the accident rate to prove it!
BTW, did you know the AJ1 was actually a tri-motor? Besides the two wing mounted props, it had a jet engine in the tail.


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## GrauGeist (Jul 3, 2016)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Demonstrations with Mosquitoes, Venturas, et al to the contrary, operating such aircraft on carriers of the day on a routine basis just wouldn't have been practical. It wasn't until the 50s and 60s when angled decks, hydraulic arresting gear, steam catapults, and tricycle gear combined to make big twins on a carrier into a practical operation. And then they were designed-from-scratch Naval aircraft, not converted landlubbers. Now I know some of you will point to some of the first AJ1s and A3Ds operating from straight decks in the 50s. True enough, but that was never anything but a super hairy operation dictated by the need for a sea-going nuclear deterrent. With the accident rate to prove it!
> BTW, did you know the AJ1 was actually a tri-motor? Besides the two wing mounted props, it had a jet engine in the tail.


The USN was looking into a twin built along their guidelines prior to WWII, it was the XF5F (and the USAAC got involved and their version was the XP-50), they even looked into a navalized version of the P-39 (converted to a tail-dragger) and various versions of the P-51. None of those avenues panned out, however.

As it turns out, the short-lived XF5F project led to the F7F.


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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 3, 2016)

And did the F7F ever turn out to be useful/practical as a carrier bird? Don't remember seeing any pix of it in that application.


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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 3, 2016)

And as for Cobras, Mustangs, etc, landlubbers seldom convert gracefully to carrier ops. Different kind of regime, requires a different breed of bird.


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## wuzak (Jul 3, 2016)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Demonstrations with Mosquitoes, Venturas, et al to the contrary, operating such aircraft on carriers of the day on a routine basis just wouldn't have been practical. It wasn't until the 50s and 60s when angled decks, hydraulic arresting gear, steam catapults, and tricycle gear combined to make big twins on a carrier into a practical operation. And then they were designed-from-scratch Naval aircraft, not converted landlubbers. Now I know some of you will point to some of the first AJ1s and A3Ds operating from straight decks in the 50s. True enough, but that was never anything but a super hairy operation dictated by the need for a sea-going nuclear deterrent. With the accident rate to prove it!
> BTW, did you know the AJ1 was actually a tri-motor? Besides the two wing mounted props, it had a jet engine in the tail.



618 Squadron were to operate Mosquitoes from carriers.

Originally they were to use the Highball bomb against the Tirpitz, but that was changed to flying from carriers against the Japanese fleet, again with the Highball.

They were deployed to Australia in December 1944, but did not go into service and were disbanded in July 1945.

No. 618 Squadron RAF - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Given that the Mosquito's wing span was the same as the Grumman TBF Avenger, that it was slightly longer and heavier it would not be beyond the imagination that the Mosquito could operate from a carrier. The main disadvantage was the size of teh Mosquito whem stowed, due to the twin engines, and the glycol coolant required to be stored on the ship.

But the RN carriers operated Sea Hurricanes and Seafires, so the last would not have been as much of an issue.

The Mosquito (B.IV) could carry a similar bomb load to the TBF but could carry it 50% further and ~100mph faster.

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## stona (Jul 3, 2016)

In June 1945 the US Intelligence was reporting that.

"Japan might surrender at any time"

but that this depended on the terms of surrender and there was an understanding that the Japanese believed.

""that unconditional surrender would be the equivalent of national extinction, and there are as yet no indications that they are ready to accept such terms."

Since the defeat at Saipan and Tojo's resultant resignation the so called 'peace army' had been gaining influence in Japan. As early as September 1944 the Swedish Minister in Tokyo was approached unofficially (in the name of Prince Konoye?) to sound out Allied terms for peace. This approach and another in March came to nought, but it did establish that those advocating peace in Japan saw the demand for unconditional surrender as their biggest obstacle.

The Suzuki cabinet that came to power in April 1945 had an unspoken mandate from the Emperor to seek peace, but events moved fast. The Soviet Union announced that it would not renew the neutrality pact after April 1946 and then Germany surrendered in May. On June 3rd the Soviet Ambassador (Malik) in Tokyo was approached with a view to Soviet mediation in a peace process. Nothing came of this. At the end of June the Japanese government, through its Ambassador (Sato) in Moscow, asked the Soviet government to mediate directly in ending the war in the Far East. A series of signals between Moscow and Tokyo were intercepted and decoded by the Americans who therefore knew exactly what was going on. Once again unconditional surrender and terms which did not include preservation of the Imperial system were not acceptable to the Japanese. The Soviets in any case delayed until Stalin had left for Potsdam.The Japanese were desperate to surrender, but not on any terms.

It was in view of these accurate intelligence assessments by the Americans that the decision to use the atomic bomb was taken.

There were other factors, the US was worried about the future role and influence of its allies in the region (mainly Britain, but the USSR and France too) if the war dragged on and they became more committed.
The primary factors were an unwillingness to allow the war to drag on as Japan was strangled to death, as per the June plan agreed by the Chief's of Staff, an understandable unwillingness to undertake an invasion unless absolutely unavoidable, and what the Americans saw as Japanese intransigence in their unwillingness to acknowledge their defeat and accept an unconditional surrender.

What would you have done? The brave decision, not the easy one, was to drop the bomb(s) and I find it completely justified. It's easy to take the moral high ground seventy years later when blissfully unaware of the factors that forced the decision, not so easy when the facts are known. The facts never seem to bother some people 

Cheers

Steve

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## michaelmaltby (Jul 3, 2016)

And there was still a huge, _undefeated_, Japanese army in China that was largely unaffected by either the Communists or the Nationalist forces.


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## stona (Jul 3, 2016)

James W. said:


> & how was this huge army going to get back to Nippon? By sampan?
> Do you imagine the USN/USAAF would allow that?



But they were relevant. The distaste for an invasion of the Japanese islands meant that serious consideration was given to a plan to encircle them and bomb and strangle them to death. This would have entailed seizing bases on the Chinese mainland and as MacArthur pointed out, the seizure of a ring of bases around Japan would disperse Allied forces even more than they already were, and (if an attempt was made to seize positions on the China coast) might very well lead to long-drawn-out operations on the Asiatic mainland. It was his objection to this plan that more or less forced the Chiefs of Staff to adopt the June 18th Plan for the final subjugation of Japan. It did not involve operations in China, but did involve the huge risk of two invasions. The salient points were.

1. Air bombardment and blockade of Japan from bases in Okinawa, Iwo Jima, the Marianas, and the Philippines.

2. Assault of Kyushu on 1 November 1945, and intensification of blockade and air bombardment.

3. Invasion of the industrial heart of Japan through the Tokyo Plain in central Honshu, tentative target date 1 March 1946.

This envisaged a continuation of the war, with all the expense in blood and treasure of almost another 12 months, if everything went according to plan.
Many at the June meetings knew that the atomic bomb was expected to be ready in a matter of months, some knew that a test was expected in the next four to five weeks.
I don't think it is difficult to see why the decision to drop the bomb(s) was taken, but that did not make it an easy decision to take.

Cheers

Steve

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## michaelmaltby (Jul 3, 2016)

"... I don't think it is difficult to see why the decision to drop the bomb(s) was taken, but that did not make it an easy decision to take."

If there ever was a situation that warranted the use of such a weapon ... it was the preemption of invasion of the Homeland by the use of the bombs ... it saved the lives of _both _allies and Japanese, IMCO.

It was fortunate, in hindsight, that Truman came to office with absolutely no awareness of the Manhattan Project and had to evaluate the available tools with the forthcoming military obstacles in short order.

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## stona (Jul 3, 2016)

michaelmaltby said:


> If there ever was a situation that warranted the use of such a weapon ... it was the preemption of invasion of the Homeland by the use of the bombs ... it saved the lives of _both _allies and Japanese, IMCO.



It obviously saved Allied lives and the potential Japanese casualties as the islands were first isolated, conventionally bombed for another 9 months/a year (best case scenario) and then invaded would surely have been many times the number inflicted by the two atomic bombs.

With the benefit of hindsight the decision to use atomic weapons is even more of a 'no brainer' than it was at the time. There were many who had reservations about using the bombs, at least directly on Japanese cities, and some who didn't want to use them at all. Fortunately cooler heads prevailed.

Cheers

Steve

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## Shinpachi (Jul 3, 2016)

Awesome logic and plan on the desk, Steve.
I frankly admire


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## Shinpachi (Jul 3, 2016)

James W. said:


> & how was this huge army going to get back to Nippon? By sampan?
> Do you imagine the USN/USAAF would allow that?



Japanese army in China did not have to go back to Japan as they were deployed there to build up new Chinese Empire.
It was a simple story

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## Shortround6 (Jul 3, 2016)

This thread got started as an offshoot of the Best bomber thread and the contention that the B-29 was not needed and a waste of money.
The U.S. Navy's strategic bombing capability in 1941 (the start of the B-29 program) was pretty much nil and it's likelihood of achieving anything of significance in 1942 or 43 was also nil. It was only with the massive ship building programs and massive production of carrier planes that allowed for any sort of "strategic" bombing capability of land masses in 1944 and 1945. It was also helped by improved aircraft and engines over what was contemplated in 1941.
How much the U.S. could count on fuel shortages and the Japanese not coming up with a better pilot replacement program ( and favourable results in early battles) in 1941/42 to enable the U.S. to switch from a B-29 based offensive to a carrier based offensive is certainly speculative. 
Think cancel B-29 in spring of 1942 and then have Midway turn into disaster for the Americans. When does the U.S. carrier offensive against the Japanese home Islands start then?
Or Japanese develop a better/more effective submarine force?
As for using big twins on carriers, you have to balance the better capability of the large twin against the capability of the single engine aircraft. Like the Avenger being able to fold to a 19ft width. Being able to house/operate more single engine aircraft may make up for their lower capability.

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## stona (Jul 3, 2016)

Shinpachi said:


> Awesome logic and plan on the desk, Steve.
> I frankly admire



It is a terrible logic when we are talking about the deaths or potential deaths of hundreds of thousands of our fellow human beings. There never was and never will be a 'good' war.

Awful though the results of the two bombs were, I honestly believe that another 9 months or a year of conflict and the eventual invasions of the Japanese Islands would have been much worse_ for both sides_.
It's cold comfort to the casualties of the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but their sacrifice prevented something even worse.

Steve

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## Shinpachi (Jul 3, 2016)

It's funny, Steve.
Did I talk about Hiroshima and Nagasaki ?
I only wonder why you always pretend to forget Russians' great contribution to end the war.
If it was because you hate them, looks not fair in history.
At all.


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## stona (Jul 3, 2016)

The Russian contribution to ending the war in the Far East?
Surely that was more of a threat than a reality. The final proposal put to the Japanese government at Potsdam (26th July) made NO reference to the Emperor, contrary to the wishes of many in the US administration (Corden Hull said that it "smacked of appeasement") and there was NO direct threat of Soviet involvement. All the Allies were at least under the impression that there would be a Soviet attack on Japan sometime within two or three weeks of 8th August. The Japanese response, ignoring the declaration, was ill advised, taken as rejection, and certainly precipitated the use of the bombs.
The argument that imminent Soviet involvement precipitated the Japanese surrender rather than the dropping of the bombs doesn't hold water for me. 
The Emperor specifically mentioned that the "new and cruel" bomb employed by the Allies was the "reason why we have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the joint declaration of the powers."

If you mean the contribution of the Soviet Union to ending the war in Europe, I don't think anyone has attempted to minimise that.

Cheers

Steve

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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 3, 2016)

Zipper730 said:


> True, but that occurred even with the use of nuclear weapons


The point is a great portion of the Japanese leadership WAS NOT going to surrender, even if it came from the emperor, that's why the argument about the Japanese seeking surrender terms and the use of nukes were not necessary. Those bombs changed the minds of many, but not all.


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## michaelmaltby (Jul 3, 2016)

"....The Japanese response, ignoring the declaration, was ill advised ..."
_Delusional_ is the word that comes to mind ... Japanese diplomats were seriously pursuing the idea of having the Russians negotiate the "peace" with the Americans, British, et al on their behalf. As if _that_ was every going to happen given the historical background between the 2 countries. This sentiment was floated by some in the Japanese administration despite a fear and abhorrence of communism by Japanese conservatives.


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## stona (Jul 3, 2016)

michaelmaltby said:


> "....The Japanese response, ignoring the declaration, was ill advised ..."
> _Delusional_ is the word that comes to mind ... .



That was one of the words that came to my mind too, but I was trying to use the most moderate language possible whilst making the point about simply ignoring the declaration 

Cheers

Steve


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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 3, 2016)

Sensei Shinpachi-San, please share your insight into the great contribution of the Soviets toward ending the war. Like most Americans, I was led to believe that, despite their huge sacrifices and contribution to defeating Hitler, the Russians jumped into the Pacific war in its last week solely for territorial gain and influence at the bargaining table. Admittedly, this is a somewhat parochial interpretation of events. Would you share your perspective, Sir? Arigato goziamasu Shinpachi-San.

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## Shinpachi (Jul 3, 2016)

Sorry, Steve, I have understood that you know very few about what happened and talked in the Imperial Council held on August 9, 1945.
After 20 minutes Hirohito was informed of Soviet's invasion into Manchuria, he made up his mind to accept the joint declaration.
No ones there objected it as the invasion was totally unexpected incident like a sudden death sentence for them.

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## Zipper730 (Jul 3, 2016)

Shinpachi,

So the decision to surrender was based on the USSR invading?


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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 3, 2016)

Why the surprise? Hadn't the Red Army and the Kwantung Army been taking potshots at each other across the Amur since 1938?


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## Shinpachi (Jul 3, 2016)

Zipper730 said:


> Shinpachi,
> 
> So the decision to surrender was based on the USSR invading?



Yes, it was.


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## Shinpachi (Jul 3, 2016)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Why the surprise? Hadn't the Red Army and the Kwantung Army been taking potshots at each other across the Amur since 1938?



Good question 
Both countries signed Japan-Soviet Non-aggression Pact in April 1941.
It was valid till April 1946.

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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 3, 2016)

But was it effective? I've always heard there was a "quasi-war" going on there most of the time. Not so?


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## Shinpachi (Jul 3, 2016)

XBe02Drvr said:


> But was it effective? I've always heard there was a "quasi-war" going on there most of the time. Not so?



This was our shame but Japan was trusting Soviet Union and asking it mediation for the peace talk with the Allies in July.
Japan was looking forward to answer from Soviet side in August.


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## stona (Jul 3, 2016)

I don't buy this version of history. The attack in Manchuria occurred after the first bomb and the same day as the second. I also don't believe that this came as a total surprise to the Japanese (nor does Glantz). It must also have been obvious to the Japanese, following the Soviet notification that they would not renew the neutrality pact after April '46, and the prognostication and delay over the approaches in Moscow seeking Soviet mediation that this was not likely. The Japanese governments might have sometimes been delusional, but not stupid. 
Cordell Hull had been assured by Stalin, in Moscow, in October 1943, that the Soviet Union would eventually join the war against Japan. promoting Soviet involvement was a corner stone of US policy until a change of heart in mid 1945. Having spent two years urging Soviet involvement the Americans could hardly urge Soviet neutrality at this late stage! The official position of the War Department still held that "Russian entry will have a profound military effect in that almost certainly it will materially shorten the war and thus save American lives," but many in the administration were far from keen to see Soviet involvement when the war was effectively won and even Truman is recorded saying that "he intended thereafter to be firm in his dealings with the Russians." He wasn't !
Cheers
Steve

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## Shinpachi (Jul 3, 2016)

That would be your own favor but please imagine, Steve.
If such massive bombings by the B-29s, including A-bombs, had ended the Pacific War so early as in August 1945, with or without Soviet Union, as your country probably intended, why could not your country win in Korea and Vietnam ? Could not you win in such smaller coutries without A-bombs ? I don't think so. You could have been bombing empty military/factory buildings in my impression.


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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 3, 2016)

Shinpachi said:


> That would be your own favor but please imagine, Steve.
> If such massive bombings by the B-29s, including A-bombs, had ended the Pacific War so early as in August 1945, with or without Soviet Union, as your country probably intended, why could not your country win in Korea and Vietnam ? Could not you win in such smaller coutries without A-bombs ? I don't think so. You could have been bombing empty military/factory buildings in my impression.



That's an easy answer, Shinpachi, WWII was an all-out war, a "national crusade", if you will, against a hated enemy of limited and dwindling resources, with no concern for collateral damage or thought of winning hearts and minds. "Starve'em and butcher'em if you have to!"
Korea and Viet Nam were attempts to preserve a political entity with limited resource expenditure, limited national commitment, and little understanding of the facts on the ground.

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## Shinpachi (Jul 3, 2016)

Thanks for your kind advice, XBe02Drvr.
Our facts are as I have mentioned in above anyway.

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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 3, 2016)

Domo arigato Shinpachi! This has been educational.


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## Shinpachi (Jul 3, 2016)

I appreciate your genuine curiosity, XBe02Drvr.
Thank you very much.


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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 3, 2016)

And I appreciate all the expertise and scholarship available on this forum. Thanks folks.

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## muskeg13 (Jul 3, 2016)

> Or could the Lockheed Ventura operate from carriers too?



Who said anything about Venturas (or Harpoons) operating from carriers? From 1943 until the end of the war, land based USN patrol bombing squadrons in the Aleutians conducted a long-range campaign against the northern Japanese home islands..a campaign sometimes referred to as the "Empire Express."

http://www.norpacwar.com/

https://www.nps.gov/aleu/learn/photosmultimedia/upload/VP-139-Historical-Survey.pdf

http://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/wwii/lockheeds-electra-and-lodestar/
_One of the most important features of the Ventura in U.S. naval service was the installation of ADS-1 search radar, which enabled the crew to detect ships and submarine conning towers from many miles away before enemy sailors knew the airplane was there. Radar also made blind bombing possible using radar navigation, a feature that proved invaluable in the fog-shrouded waters of the Aleutians and Kuriles, where Venturas saw the most action. The Navy’s Venturas and Harpoons came about largely due to a major compromise with the Army Air Corps. The Army objected to the Navy’s use of land-based bombers, an objection that forced the Navy to depend on amphibious patrol bombers and float planes for patrol use during the early months of the war. But when the Army needed a Navy manufacturing plant at Renton, Washington, for the manufacture of Boeing B-29s, it agreed to give up its objections and to allow all Army production of B-34s and B-37s to go to the Navy in return for use of the facility. The Navy also received other bomber types, particularly B-24s and B-25s, from the Army production as part of the compromise._

_The Venturas supplemented Army B-24s and B-25s in the Aleutians, and it was common for the three types to operate together on missions against Japanese positions. Their radar allowed them to drop their bombs without seeing the ground, and the Navy bombers often led Army B-24s on missions against fog-obscured targets on Kiska. The Army Liberators would fly formation on a Navy Ventura, which would drop its bombs using radar, and the B-24 bombardiers would drop as soon as they saw the bombs fall out of the Navy plane._

_Headquarters, U.S. Army Air Forces, elected to withdraw all but two bomber squadrons from the Eleventh Air Force and transfer them to the South Pacific where reinforcements were sorely needed. With Army bomber strength in the Aleutians reduced, the importance of the Venturas to continuing operations against the Kuriles increased. In fact, for several months the Navy bombers would be the only Allied aircraft attacking targets in the Japanese home islands._

There's much more on the website…

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## muskeg13 (Jul 3, 2016)

> If the USN bombers are within range of Japanese industry the fleet will be in range of ground based Japanese aircraft, exposing the fleet to attack, including kamikaze attacks.
> 
> Meanwhile the bombing aircraft are all quite slow when carrying ordnance. And very vulnerable to fighter defences.



As pointed out in previous posts re: the USN land-based bombing campaign against the home islands, several of the points made in the initial post on this thread are invalidated. 

As bombers go, PV-1, PV-2 and PB4Y-2 aircraft weren't all that slow. In answer to the initial question of whether the USN had a strategic bombing capability, the answer is Yes, although not anywhere to the extent that the USAAF had.


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## Elmas (Jul 3, 2016)

I can understand that, after the declaration of war by the Soviets, the Emperor made his mind trying to force the peace to his unruly Generals, but I'm wondering how the Red Army could invade Japan, not having a Fleet worth of this name.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 3, 2016)

Shinpachi said:


> why could not your country win in Korea and Vietnam ?


As bad as it sounds, the politicians did not allow the US to win - look at the both wars and the US fought with both arms tied behind its back.

Let's face it - the atomic bombings got the attention of Japanese leadership - the invasion by the Soviet Union was the final blow,

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## GrauGeist (Jul 4, 2016)

FLYBOYJ said:


> As bad as it sounds, the politicians did not allow the US to win - look at the both wars and the US fought with both arms tied behind its back.


Prime example:
North Korea complained that the U.S. Battleships, which were brutally pounding their shore positions, were unfair - so the U.S. was forced to remove them from active missions against North Korean targets.

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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 4, 2016)

Elmas said:


> I can understand that, after the declaration of war by the Soviets, the Emperor made his mind trying to force the peace to his unruly Generals, but I'm wondering how the Red Army could invade Japan, not having a Fleet worth of this name.



The value of the Red Army was in subduing Japan's huge Kwantung Army in Manchuria, Korea, and China. The last thing any of the western powers wanted was the Red Army meddling in the Japanese home islands. That would have rekindled racial hatreds harkening back to the war of 1904-1905 and before, and led to smoldering resentments like those in Germany after the Treaty of Versailles. We all know what that led to.

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## GrauGeist (Jul 4, 2016)

XBe02Drvr said:


> The value of the Red Army was in subduing Japan's huge Kwantung Army in Manchuria, Korea, and China. The last thing any of the western powers wanted was the Red Army meddling in the Japanese home islands. That would have rekindled racial hatreds harkening back to the war of 1904-1905 and before, and led to smoldering resentments like those in Germany after the Treaty of Versailles. We all know what that led to.


The Japanese and Russians had also been skirmishing off and on for nearly ten years along the Manchurian border, too.

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## Shinpachi (Jul 4, 2016)

Elmas said:


> I can understand that, after the declaration of war by the Soviets, the Emperor made his mind trying to force the peace to his unruly Generals, but I'm wondering how the Red Army could invade Japan, not having a Fleet worth of this name.



They were coming down from the north end of the Kuril Islands island by island.


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## Shinpachi (Jul 4, 2016)

FLYBOYJ said:


> As bad as it sounds, the politicians did not allow the US to win - look at the both wars and the US fought with both arms tied behind its back.
> 
> Let's face it - the atomic bombings got the attention of Japanese leadership - the invasion by the Soviet Union was the final blow,



Since I became member of this forum, I have been thinking that you are one of people who have cool eyes on history.

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## Elmas (Jul 4, 2016)

Shinpachi said:


> They were coming down from the north end of the Kuril Islands island by island.



Yes, but to organize all the logistic chain, from a tiny island to another, without a Navy, I think that could have been for the Red Army an impossible task.
Or we have to think that the U.S. Navy could have lent, very sportingly, all the LST, Liberty ships, etc. and the Carrier cover that were necessary?
Not to point the fact that Red Army vast majority of tanks, artillery, ammo etc. in August 1945 was six or seven thousand km far from Vladivostok, with the Siberia in between.
As noted before, the Japan Island invasion would have been a bloodbath for anyone who have dared to go ashore on a japanese beach.
That the Soviets could have been interested in strategically important positions in Korea, Manchuria etc. that is another matter of fact, but on this I think the Americans had a different point of view...


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## KiwiBiggles (Jul 4, 2016)

Or, as Clive James very wittily put it:

"...although the consideration is usually ignored that the Red Army, which had no amphibious equipment, might not have been in an ideal condition to fight after its troops had swum to Hokkaido."

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## michaelmaltby (Jul 4, 2016)

We can speculate and amuse ourselves about Sampan invasions/evacuations but the facts suggest otherwise .... if Stalin _had intended_ to invade the major Japanese islands he would have had transport_ in hand _to pull the invasion off ... when he tripped the switch - August Storm - on that rainy August night, launching a superbly planned and executed three-pronged envelopment of a widely spread but thinly maned IJA. David Glantz calls August Storm the Soviet Military's "Phd Thesis" in warfare. And the Red Army _had _launched amphibious attacks against the Germans, Crimea and Black Sea IIRC.

Stalin had committed to attack Japan in a timeframe to be determined by the defeat of Germany, and the launch date of August Storm _fulfilled _ Stalin's promise.

Stalin knew all about Los Alamos, the bombs and Manhattan ... he just shrugged when Truman told him at Potsdam that he had a really big bomb. 

Stalin was a poker player par excellence ... emotionally happy to see the USA bleed on the islands ... suffer the way the Russians had suffered, IMCO .... so, August Storm, his move, was the Soviet Army's "Barbarossa" .... the Russians were going to drive as far and as fast as they could while there was time remaining. Stalin understood that America would use the bomb _again_ if necessary and that would be the _final_ blow ... the killing blow. And, so it was. Sanity took hold and returned to Japan. MacArthur and party stepped off a plane in Japan _unarmed_. America and Japan were changed forever.

Post unconditional surrender, the Soviets tried to muscle in on the military governance of Japan  (can you imagine) Truman's administration shut that down by placing the facts of the Soviet contribution in perspective. Accordingly, the Soviets behaved and stood proudly on the deck of the Missouri alongside the other allied leaders and victims.

Stalin didn't care ... he had done very well for himself with very little investment .... we _still _pay for his scheming with North Korea on our hands ... Stalin also learned that America had the _resolution_ to use atomic weapons.

The sources that have influenced my opinions in this post are numerous. I will cheerfully reference if asked

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## gjs238 (Jul 5, 2016)

KiwiBiggles said:


> While I generally agree with most of your comments, I'm afraid JW has you here, GG. It's pretty clear that in 1943 the blocks from old surplus Merlins were reused for Meteors, although it would be wrong to say that this was the normal practice. From what I can gather, it was only done in response to a shortage of Meteor blocks.



Even a broken clock is correct twice a day.

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## wuzak (Jul 5, 2016)

muskeg13 said:


> Who said anything about Venturas (or Harpoons) operating from carriers? From 1943 until the end of the war, land based USN patrol bombing squadrons in the Aleutians conducted a long-range campaign against the northern Japanese home islands..a campaign sometimes referred to as the "Empire Express."
> 
> http://www.norpacwar.com/
> 
> ...



Thanks Muskeg. That is very interesting.

I'd only say that flying from the Aleutians would limit the target opportunities.

But certainly those squadrons did provide a measure of strategic bombing capability for the USN.

The thread was started in response to a quote that suggested that the USN's carrier forces would be quite able to cripple Japanese industry.

Certainly, if Venturas/Harpoons could be launched from carriers they would have increased bombing capability of the carrier force.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 5, 2016)

Basically operations in the Aleutians and the Kuril Islands were strategic only in the sense that they were "pinning" attacks. 
There was no attack on sources of raw materials or of manufacturing/processing plants. Each side had the goal of tying up more enemy forces than they themselves were committing to the area. And trying to keep the enemy from setting up a staging area for a further advance. 
It is 1400 miles from Attu station, the western most island in the Aleutian chain to the closest city on the Northern Island of Hokkaido. 
It is over 1400 miles from Anchorage ALaska to Seattle WA and almost 1500 miles from from Anchorage to Attu Station. 
Given the weather and lack of decent port facilities this "avenue" of attack wasn't really practical. 

The Navy only had 4-5 Squadron of Ventura's in the Aleutians the Privateers only showed up in the last few weeks. 
Strategic bombing capability, in the sense of attacking the Japanese homeland , was zero even using Army B-24s from this area.


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## gjs238 (Jul 5, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> Basically operations in the Aleutians and the Kuril Islands were strategic only in the sense that they were "pinning" attacks.
> There was no attack on sources of raw materials or of manufacturing/processing plants. Each side had the goal of tying up more enemy forces than they themselves were committing to the area. And trying to keep the enemy from setting up a staging area for a further advance.
> It is 1400 miles from Attu station, the western most island in the Aleutian chain to the closest city on the Northern Island of Hokkaido.
> It is over 1400 miles from Anchorage ALaska to Seattle WA and almost 1500 miles from from Anchorage to Attu Station.
> ...



Would B-29 ops have been more productive from the Aleutians than as per the original plan using mainland China?


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## gjs238 (Jul 5, 2016)

Shinpachi said:


> They were coming down from the north end of the Kuril Islands island by island.



And the ramifications of this continue today:
Kuril Islands dispute - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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## Shortround6 (Jul 5, 2016)

Hard to say without more research. It is around 600 miles from the North coast of Hokkaido to Tokyo and around 1180 miles from the North coast of Hokkaido to the south (or southwest ) coast of the southern Island. So basically most of Japan was out of range of the B-29 even if it operated from the western most Aleutian Island. Trying to establish a major air base on a Russian Kuril Island (or Russian mainland?) not only faced opposition from _Uncle Joe _but the logistics would have been as bad or worse than using the more southern Pacific Islands. 

From wiki so.......
"The chain has around 100 volcanoes, some 40 of which are active, and many hot springs andfumaroles. There is frequent seismic activity..."
"The climate on the islands is generally severe, with long, cold, stormy winters and short and notoriously foggy summers. The average annual precipitation is 30–40 inches (760–1,020 mm), most of which falls as snow."

Granted armies and AIr forces have operated in conditions as bad if not worse by why choose this option if there are others?

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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 5, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> Hard to say without more research. It is around 600 miles from the North coast of Hokkaido to Tokyo and around 1180 miles from the North coast of Hokkaido to the south (or southwest ) coast of the southern Island. So basically most of Japan was out of range of the B-29 even if it operated from the western most Aleutian Island. Trying to establish a major air base on a Russian Kuril Island (or Russian mainland?) not only faced opposition from _Uncle Joe _but the logistics would have been as bad or worse than using the more southern Pacific Islands.
> 
> From wiki so.......
> "The chain has around 100 volcanoes, some 40 of which are active, and many hot springs andfumaroles. There is frequent seismic activity..."
> ...



From an operational standpoint, I think B-29s on Attu would have been a disaster. Heavy weights, high landing speeds, short slippery runways with obstacles at the ends and no precision instrument approach system. Venturas and Harpoons are far more nimble airplanes than B-29s, which is hugely important if you have to fly a non-precision instrument approach in the fog into a short runway in mountainous terrain. Been there, done that. Piece of cake in a 1900 or a 99 or a King Air. Whole different animal in a Herc, a P-3, or any of the four engine piston pounders. It's all about weight, speed, turning radius, and climb gradient on the departure or the missed approach.

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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 5, 2016)

XBe02Drvr said:


> From an operational standpoint, I think B-29s on Attu would have been a disaster. Heavy weights, high landing speeds, short slippery runways with obstacles at the ends and no precision instrument approach system. Venturas and Harpoons are far more nimble airplanes than B-29s, which is hugely important if you have to fly a non-precision instrument approach in the fog into a short runway in mountainous terrain. Been there, done that. Piece of cake in a 1900 or a 99 or a King Air. Whole different animal in a Herc, a P-3, or any of the four engine piston pounders. It's all about weight, speed, turning radius, and climb gradient on the departure or the missed approach.



Imagine you and 49 other B-29s have just arrived over a foggy Attu and are circling over the marker beacon, but are VMC above the clouds after a max-range raid on Tokyo. Due to stronger-than-forecast headwinds, you're all a little skosh on fuel, you can't make Dutch Harbor and Kiska is WOXOF. The wind is howling down the runway wrong way for a straight-in approach from the beacon, so each plane in turn has to execute a circle-to-land maneuver. Oh, and BTW, Tail End Charlie (first to land cause he's lowest on fuel) reports clouds six thousand feet deep, moderate icing in clouds all the way down, and severe turbulence and wind shear during the circle to land. Oh, and the the Precision Approach Radar they promised us can't seem to pass calibration tests due to terrain reflections.

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## GrauGeist (Jul 5, 2016)

The other consideration that needs to be looked at, if B-29s were operating from the Aleutians, is the geography.

If the target is Tokyo, IJN Kure or any other strategic location, the time between inbound detection and time over target is greatly expanded, allowing the Japanese to mount a strong defense.

The historical approach from China made for a minimal detection time as did a direct approach from the southern islands. In the case of China operations, the Japanese were alerted, but did not know the path of the B-29s until they approached the home island after crossing the East China Sea.

In the case of missions from the southern islands, the B-29s would be right on top of the home islands with much less warning.

So in short, after a long and difficult flight from the Aleutians, the bomber force would then encounter a long and protracted defense, hit their target and have to run the gauntlet on the return leg.

In all honesty, if such an attempt were made, it would not have gone well and make the Kassel mission look like a Sunday picnic.

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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 6, 2016)

Forget the Aleutians; go south, young man, go south!

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## michaelmaltby (Jul 6, 2016)

but of course .... by then the US Calvary were all in tanks.


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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 6, 2016)

And the 1st AirCav hadn't been thought of yet!


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## GregP (Jul 6, 2016)

Hi XBe02Drvr,

I concur with your analysis of operating from the Aleutians except for the C-130. They are maneuverable and can stop on a dime with reversing props. I bet most in here have seen one do a combat landing at an airshow, shorter than a Beech 1900 usually. They even operate with skis in snow, as you no doubt know.

The P-3s can't fly as slowly as a C-130 can, but are close: 100 kts for a C-130 and 112 kts for a P-3. Both use almost the same powerplant and are of similar weights with the C-130 being a but heavier at gross but having better high-lift devices. The P-3 needs 4,240 feet for a normal takeoff, more if heavy. The C-130 needs 3,586 feet to take off at 155,000 pounds but only 1,400 feet at 80,000 pounds, so it virtually leaps into the air when compared with the P-3.

Here's an assault landing:


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## GregP (Jul 6, 2016)

Here's a short takeoff:


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## GregP (Jul 6, 2016)

Here' are some airshow C-130 "aerobatics" at the Paris airshow in 2011. A very senior C-130 pilot:

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## michaelmaltby (Jul 6, 2016)

"..... Yes, but to organize all the logistic chain, from a tiny island to another, without a Navy, I think that could have been for the Red Army an impossible task......
...... Not to point the fact that Red Army vast majority of tanks, artillery, ammo etc. in August 1945 was six or seven thousand km far from Vladivostok, with the Siberia in between."

Here are the numbers for the three fronts, Elmas:

*Soviet forces under the Far East Command*[1] Wikipedia

Totals (in bold)
Transbaikal Front
1st Far East Front
2nd FarEast Front
Men *1,577,725 (*654,040 586,589 337,096)
Artillery pieces * 27,086* (9,668 11,430 5,988)
Multiple rocket launchers *1,171* (583 516 72)
Tanks and self-propelled guns * 5,556*[c] (2, 416 1,860 1,280)
Aircraft *3,721 (*1,324 1,137 1,260)

The resources for the operational were assembled in Siberia; Europe was only stripped of medical and engineering resources.

As for _amphibious operations_, this ...
"On August 18, several Soviet amphibious landings had been conducted ahead of the land advance: three in northern Korea, one in Sakhalin, and one in the Kuril Islands. This meant that, in Korea at least, _there were already Soviet soldiers waiting for the troops coming overland_. In Sakhalin and the Kurils, it meant a sudden establishment of Soviet sovereignty.

If Stalin had intended wider amphibious operations, Elmas, he would have assembled them by August 8, 1945.


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## gjs238 (Jul 6, 2016)

GregP said:


> Here' are some airshow C-130 "aerobatics" at the Paris airshow in 2011. A very senior C-130 pilot:




The almost constant alarms and warnings are a hoot

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## GregP (Jul 6, 2016)

Yah,

Bitchin' Betty has several lines, "Pull-Up!," "Bank Angle," "Stall, stall," etc.

The copilot has one sentence for most of the flight: "Continue ..."

In all seriousness, an airshow routine isn't exactly normal flying and neither is an assault takeoff or landing. But is DOES get your attention, especially if you are non-flying flight crew.

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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 7, 2016)

Interesting stuff, GregP. You clearly know your Lockheeds. Tell me, are those speeds you quoted for Herc and Orion Vref speeds you would fly on a circle to land approach in turbulence, or max effort straight and level slow flight demonstration. I've spent some time as passenger and/or unofficial "observer" in P-3s, and from the jump seat I never saw less than 155 KIAS on the approach. And those were always straight-ins. And seldom did they fly anything but heavy.
The defining performance factor for operating a heavy aircraft in the vicious weather, limited navaids, and precipitous terrain of the Aleutians has got to be its ability to do a slow, tight circle to land safely in fog and turbulence.
For those of you who aren't instrument pilots, here's how it works. If the available navaids force you to approach the runway with the wind at your tail, you have to get your airplane turned around so you can land into the wind without losing sight of the runway. If the surface visibility is poor, this is a real challenge, requiring steep banks and tight turns. The faster you're flying, the wider the radius of your turns and the better the visibility you need under the overcast and through the fog in order to make it work. If at any point you lose sight of the runway, an immediate max climb missed approach is mandatory to extract yourself from the hills. I'm betting even the ballsiest Herc drivers wouldn't attempt that at 100 KIAS in turbulence, under a low overcast, down between the hills. If a Herc can sustain slow flight at 100, Vstall is probably about 95 give or take. That would make Vref (typically 1.3 times Vstall) about in the 125 knot range. Circling at that speed would require a minimum of 1 1/2 mile vis. Thoe light turboprops I flew could do it in under a mile.


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## GregP (Jul 7, 2016)

They aren't Vref at all. The speeds quoted are the stall speeds for an aircraft loaded to normal max on a standard day.

Actual Vref, as you well know, is calculated by a flight engineer or the avionics for the current weight and atmospheric conditions, and can vary considerably. I wouldn't be surprised if a relatively lightweight C-130 stalled at under 90 knots, but I don't really know as I have never flown one.

All I can say for sure is they can get off and land in a short space.

Cheers.


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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 7, 2016)

It's really nice having a Boundary Layer Control blown wing with 70+% span in direct prop wash and 4800 ponies times 4, who can all dig in their heels in reverse, even if the runway is slippery. And the instant thrust available from those constant speed Allisons, even from idle power, sure is nice, too. Zero spool up time. Imagine an old time B-29 driver experiencing a Herc for the first time.

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## Elmas (Jul 8, 2016)

This way







or this way?









michaelmaltby said:


> "..... Yes, but to organize all the logistic chain, from a tiny island to another, without a Navy, I think that could have been for the Red Army an impossible task......
> ...... Not to point the fact that Red Army vast majority of tanks, artillery, ammo etc. in August 1945 was six or seven thousand km far from Vladivostok, with the Siberia in between."
> 
> Here are the numbers for the three fronts, Elmas:
> ...



How many LST,'s, how many LSS's, how many LSD's, how many carriers, how many cruisers, how many destroyers etc, etc, etc.?

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## michaelmaltby (Jul 8, 2016)

".... How many LST,'s, how many LSS's, how many LSD's, how many carriers, how many cruisers, how many destroyers etc, etc, etc.?"

Operating down the coast from Vladivostok the Soviets were not faced with the same challenges as the USN was when island-hopping. And what the Soviets did, they did well.

There's more than one way to launch amphibious landings and in the end all that matters is that they succeed ...  and they did.


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## Elmas (Jul 8, 2016)

I'm not talking of invading a tiny Kuril island, I'm talking of invading Japan mainland: I don't think that the Red Army would have been greeted with sake toasts.
If to invade an Island was a such a piece of cake, I can't understand how IJN, after Pearl Harbor, did not succed not only to invade Midway, but the whole Hawahiian archipelago.

_Et de hoc satis_
old Romans used to say.


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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 8, 2016)

That's easy to understand: IJN couldn't achieve AND MAINTAIN local air superiority at Midway or Pearl, or later at Guadalcanal. Without that, any island invasion (or other invasion for that matter) is impossible. If the Lex, the Sara, and the Enterprise had been in port on December 7, (and if Kido Butai had been commanded by an aviator admiral rather than a battleship admiral), it would have been a different story. We'd all be speaking Japanese now.

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## Shinpachi (Jul 8, 2016)

If Russians had been a little wiser enough to forget their classical heroism for a few weeks, they could have reached the eastern area of Hokkaido and reserved the entire area of the Hokkaido Island by September 2 in time for the Missouri ceremony. Our fact was simple because Japanese garrison of the Kuril Islands was ordered to obey the coming occupation forces, whichever they were Americans or Russians, by Imperial GHQ in advance as the war was substantially over on August 15. In fact, our garrison was ready to hand all munitions after August 16. However, Soviet troops bravely began armed invasion with the aid of bombardment by warships in the midnight of August 18. With no idea who they were, our garrison fought back based on the right of self-defense until it was ordered to stop fighting by Tokyo on August 21. Russians had wasted 4 days at the north end island of Kuril from the beginning. They only had to say "We are here to disarm you".

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## GrauGeist (Jul 8, 2016)

XBe02Drvr said:


> That's easy to understand: IJN couldn't achieve AND MAINTAIN local air superiority at Midway or Pearl, or later at Guadalcanal. Without that, any island invasion (or other invasion for that matter) is impossible. If the Lex, the Sara, and the Enterprise had been in port on December 7, (and if Kido Butai had been commanded by an aviator admiral rather than a battleship admiral), it would have been a different story. We'd all be speaking Japanese now.


By war's end, the USN had 28 carriers (CV) and 71 escort carriers (CVE) - a huge jump from 8 carriers (CV) at the start of the war. So as the USN started to put their carriers into service, the Japanese started to lose their air superiority. This is not including the USAAF aircraft being transported into the theater, by the way.

In order for all of us to be "speaking Japanese", Japan would have had to take out the United State's industrial capacity. The majority of shipyards were on the east coast, with smaller shipyards along the west coast. This was simply too much for Japan to accomplish, while maintaining their hold in Asia and the southwest Pacific.

So in the unlikely event they captured the Hawaiian islands (uncluding Midway, Wake, etc.), they have really accomplished nothing, but hyper-extending their supply chain and placed a draw on their total strength.

If they actually bypassed the Hawaiian group and conducted a concerted strike against key west coast targets AND the Panama canal, then perhaps there would have been a chance. And incredibly slim chance, yes, but far more effective than capturing Hawaii.

It should be noted that Australia was supplied by the U.S. via the west coast and Panama canal, also...so not only would a strike at the west coast and canal hamper the U.S. war effort, it would have an impact on Australia's war effort, too.

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## michaelmaltby (Jul 9, 2016)

Putting Russian actions, August 9 - 15, 1945 in perspective


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## stona (Jul 9, 2016)

I can't see any valid comparison between these landings and the sort of operations necessary to launch an invasion of the main Japanese Home Islands, as planned by the Americans. We are looking at orders of magnitude in the different requirements for men and materiel.
Land 1,000 men on Kyushu and see how far that gets you 
Cheers
Steve

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## michaelmaltby (Jul 9, 2016)

I agree ... but my point is that by all the evidence available, Stalin had no intention of invading the Home Islands .... he was an opportunist seeking "low hanging fruit".

But the operations by the Russians [edit: xxwere well executedxx] achieved their objectives , which is _also _my point 

[edit for more accurate wording]

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## stona (Jul 9, 2016)

I agree with your basic premise, but I wouldn't call the landings well executed. I've seen the so called Battle of Shumsu/Shimusu (no idea which is correct) described as a Russian shambles and just about anything that could go wrong did. A larger operation, or better defended one, would have been a debacle.
The only landing craft the Russians had were a few US supplied LCIs, how many of those would have been available for larger operations, the Americans needed everyone they had, and then some, for their own invasion plans.
Cheers
Steve

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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 9, 2016)

If the Japanese had let Yamamoto run the war according to his vision without constant restraint from senior "battleship admirals" and the Army (Tojo), I'm convinced his understanding of industrial capacity and the crucial importance of logistics would have led to the choking off of Hawaii and then Australia. He also understood the strategic importance of aircraft and submarines in a resource war in the Pacific. If Kido Butai had succeeded in destroying the American carriers at Pearl, and if it had been commanded by a bold, aggressive, aviator admiral, it could have stuck around Oahu a while longer and taken out the important oversights the first raid missed. Fueling and repair facilities, the submarine base, and long range patrol aircraft (besides the carriers of course) were what sustained the American war effort for the first few months of the war. Yamamoto understood this. A couple more waves of attacks could have eliminated these and left Hawaii essentially defenseless and difficult to supply. IJN doctrine wasted their extensive submarine fleet in a fruitless search for capital ships to sink, rather than the scouting and supply-line strangling which could have been their true value. Yamamoto understood this, but was powerless to change it. GG correctly points out that the majority of American shipbuilding and ordnance manufacturing was East Coast based. Aircraft manufacture, on the other hand (at least of the critical types) was concentrated In California and Washington. I know Bell, Chance Vought, Curtiss, Grumman, Martin, and Republic were East, but Boeing, Consolidated, Douglas, Lockheed, North American, and Northrop were all within easy air raid (or even battleship gun) range of the Pacific. With (as GG suggests) toe holds in Panama and the resource-rich American west coast a lot of the Japanese supply line dilemma would be eliminated, and (as the US later did) bypassed garrisons could be ignored and allowed to starve. With no safe haven Naval bases on the entire west coast, and Hawaii, the Philippines, and Australia gone, we would have been stymied in the Pacific and fighting a defensive war on the mainland. In December 41 and January 42 we would have been too shocked, demoralised, and disorganized to prevent the Japanese from making rapid territorial gains in the west and turning some of our own industrial might against us. They could have withdrawn most of the Kwantung Army from China and shipped them to California. Without foreign military aid neither Chiang nor Mao was any threat to Japan. The US would have had to concentrate its resources at home, leaving Britain and Russia vulnerable. If the Japanese forays into the Indian Ocean had been conducted with a conquest mentality rather than just raiding, India would have fallen, if treated properly, that huge suppressed population would have enthusiastically joined the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" and kicked the "white oppressors" out of Asia entirely. So there you have it; Japan sitting securely on top of a major chunk of the world's resources, with no significant opponents in position to threaten its resources, its logistics, or its industry.


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## gjs238 (Jul 9, 2016)

XBe02Drvr said:


> If the Japanese had let Yamamoto run the war according to his vision without constant restraint from senior "battleship admirals" and the Army (Tojo), I'm convinced his understanding of industrial capacity and the crucial importance of logistics would have led to the choking off of Hawaii and then Australia. He also understood the strategic importance of aircraft and submarines in a resource war in the Pacific. If Kido Butai had succeeded in destroying the American carriers at Pearl, and if it had been commanded by a bold, aggressive, aviator admiral, it could have stuck around Oahu a while longer and taken out the important oversights the first raid missed. Fueling and repair facilities, the submarine base, and long range patrol aircraft (besides the carriers of course) were what sustained the American war effort for the first few months of the war. Yamamoto understood this. A couple more waves of attacks could have eliminated these and left Hawaii essentially defenseless and difficult to supply. IJN doctrine wasted their extensive submarine fleet in a fruitless search for capital ships to sink, rather than the scouting and supply-line strangling which could have been their true value. Yamamoto understood this, but was powerless to change it. GG correctly points out that the majority of American shipbuilding and ordnance manufacturing was East Coast based. Aircraft manufacture, on the other hand (at least of the critical types) was concentrated In California and Washington. I know Bell, Chance Vought, Curtiss, Grumman, Martin, and Republic were East, but Boeing, Consolidated, Douglas, Lockheed, North American, and Northrop were all within easy air raid (or even battleship gun) range of the Pacific. With (as GG suggests) toe holds in Panama and the resource-rich American west coast a lot of the Japanese supply line dilemma would be eliminated, and (as the US later did) bypassed garrisons could be ignored and allowed to starve. With no safe haven Naval bases on the entire west coast, and Hawaii, the Philippines, and Australia gone, we would have been stymied in the Pacific and fighting a defensive war on the mainland. In December 41 and January 42 we would have been too shocked, demoralised, and disorganized to prevent the Japanese from making rapid territorial gains in the west and turning some of our own industrial might against us. They could have withdrawn most of the Kwantung Army from China and shipped them to California. Without foreign military aid neither Chiang nor Mao was any threat to Japan. The US would have had to concentrate its resources at home, leaving Britain and Russia vulnerable. If the Japanese forays into the Indian Ocean had been conducted with a conquest mentality rather than just raiding, India would have fallen, if treated properly, that huge suppressed population would have enthusiastically joined the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" and kicked the "white oppressors" out of Asia entirely. So there you have it; Japan sitting securely on top of a major chunk of the world's resources, with no significant opponents in position to threaten its resources, its logistics, or its industry.

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## gjs238 (Jul 9, 2016)

michaelmaltby said:


> I agree ... but my point is that by all the evidence available, Stalin had no intention of invading the Home Islands .... he was an opportunist seeking "low hanging fruit".
> 
> But the operations by the Russians were well executed, which is _also _my point



RE: low hanging fruit
Then I wonder why Stalin didn't retain Manchukuo, rather than hand it over to the Chinese in '46.

On the other hand, from Wikipedia Manchukuo - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
_Although the territories came under the jurisdiction of the Nationalist government before the Chinese Civil War came to its conclusion in 1949, the brief Soviet occupation helped transform the region into a power base for the Chinese Communist troops led by Mao Zedong where the People's Liberation Army could resupply itself with Japanese equipment and gain strategic advantage against the Nationalist government headed by Chiang Kai-shek._


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## Shortround6 (Jul 9, 2016)

XBe02Drvr said:


> If the Japanese had let Yamamoto run the war according to his vision without constant restraint from senior "battleship admirals" and the Army (Tojo), I'm convinced his understanding of industrial capacity and the crucial importance of logistics would have led to the choking off of Hawaii and then Australia. He also understood the strategic importance of aircraft and submarines in a resource war in the Pacific. If Kido Butai had succeeded in destroying the American carriers at Pearl, and if it had been commanded by a bold, aggressive, aviator admiral, it could have stuck around Oahu a while longer and taken out the important oversights the first raid missed. Fueling and repair facilities, the submarine base, and long range patrol aircraft (besides the carriers of course) were what sustained the American war effort for the first few months of the war. Yamamoto understood this. A couple more waves of attacks could have eliminated these and left Hawaii essentially defenseless and difficult to supply. IJN doctrine wasted their extensive submarine fleet in a fruitless search for capital ships to sink, rather than the scouting and supply-line strangling which could have been their true value. Yamamoto understood this, but was powerless to change it. GG correctly points out that the majority of American shipbuilding and ordnance manufacturing was East Coast based. Aircraft manufacture, on the other hand (at least of the critical types) was concentrated In California and Washington. I know Bell, Chance Vought, Curtiss, Grumman, Martin, and Republic were East, but Boeing, Consolidated, Douglas, Lockheed, North American, and Northrop were all within easy air raid (or even battleship gun) range of the Pacific. With (as GG suggests) toe holds in Panama and the resource-rich American west coast a lot of the Japanese supply line dilemma would be eliminated, and (as the US later did) bypassed garrisons could be ignored and allowed to starve. With no safe haven Naval bases on the entire west coast, and Hawaii, the Philippines, and Australia gone, we would have been stymied in the Pacific and fighting a defensive war on the mainland. In December 41 and January 42 we would have been too shocked, demoralised, and disorganized to prevent the Japanese from making rapid territorial gains in the west and turning some of our own industrial might against us. They could have withdrawn most of the Kwantung Army from China and shipped them to California. Without foreign military aid neither Chiang nor Mao was any threat to Japan. The US would have had to concentrate its resources at home, leaving Britain and Russia vulnerable. If the Japanese forays into the Indian Ocean had been conducted with a conquest mentality rather than just raiding, India would have fallen, if treated properly, that huge suppressed population would have enthusiastically joined the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" and kicked the "white oppressors" out of Asia entirely. So there you have it; Japan sitting securely on top of a major chunk of the world's resources, with no significant opponents in position to threaten its resources, its logistics, or its industry.



The Japanese had nowhere near the amount of shipping (or oil) to undertake such an adventure. The oil is one reason they did attack when they did. They were under an oil embargo and were using up more oil every day than they were getting from whatever supplies/sources they did have. The Dutch East Indies was the big prize/goal of the Japanese 1941/early 42 attacks/campaign. 
Seize the oil fields there or grind to halt. Without the oil fields the Japanese navy and "invasion fleets" would be powered by sails and oars.

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## GrauGeist (Jul 9, 2016)

gjs238 said:


> RE: low hanging fruit
> Then I wonder why Stalin didn't retain Manchukuo, rather than hand it over to the Chinese in '46.


You got your answer right here:


gjs238 said:


> On the other hand, from Wikipedia Manchukuo - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> _Although the territories came under the jurisdiction of the Nationalist government before the Chinese Civil War came to its conclusion in 1949, *the brief Soviet occupation helped transform the region into a power base for the Chinese Communist troops led by Mao Zedong where the People's Liberation Army could resupply itself with Japanese equipment and gain strategic advantage against the Nationalist government headed by Chiang Kai-shek*._


Manchuko may have been a contested region, but if it went to arbitration, the Soviet Union would most likely have to give it back, running the risk of hard feelings.

What Stalin ended up doing was far more in his favor both in terms of securing his border and strengthening a communist ally.

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## michaelmaltby (Jul 9, 2016)

This wasn't a walk-in-the park .... judging by the remains:

Russia finds remains of 35 Japanese, Soviet soldiers on Shumshu Island | The Japan Times


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## Shinpachi (Jul 9, 2016)

michaelmaltby said:


> This wasn't a walk-in-the park .... judging by the remains:
> Russia finds remains of 35 Japanese, Soviet soldiers on Shumshu Island | The Japan Times



In my impression, the remains ratio of 26 : 9 would be close to the actual casualty ratio between Soviet and Japan.
The Japanese garrison held many IJA veterans who fought Nomonhan while Soviet troops was organized by many peasants.
Our survivors from Siberia testified later that they smashed Russians.

Nice find MM

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## GrauGeist (Jul 9, 2016)

XBe02Drvr said:


> If the Japanese had let Yamamoto run the war according to his vision without constant restraint from senior "battleship admirals" and the Army (Tojo), I'm convinced his understanding of industrial capacity and the crucial importance of logistics would have led to the choking off of Hawaii and then Australia. He also understood the strategic importance of aircraft and submarines in a resource war in the Pacific.


Yamamoto was also against dragging the U.S. into a war. He warned against it and when told to do draw up plans to strike a hard blow against the U.S., he said the attack may be a success, but it will only be a matter of time before the U.S. strikes back. However, the war cabinet was pretty sure of themselves and ignored Yamamoto, feeling confident that they would be able to lure the USN into one great victorious showdown.


XBe02Drvr said:


> If Kido Butai had succeeded in destroying the American carriers at Pearl, and if it had been commanded by a bold, aggressive, aviator admiral, it could have stuck around Oahu a while longer and taken out the important oversights the first raid missed. Fueling and repair facilities, the submarine base, and long range patrol aircraft (besides the carriers of course) were what sustained the American war effort for the first few months of the war. Yamamoto understood this. A couple more waves of attacks could have eliminated these and left Hawaii essentially defenseless and difficult to supply. IJN doctrine wasted their extensive submarine fleet in a fruitless search for capital ships to sink, rather than the scouting and supply-line strangling which could have been their true value. Yamamoto understood this, but was powerless to change it.


There were three attack waves planned. the first wave went remarkably well, the second seemed to falter.
One of the reasons for the second wave's diminished success, was that the U.S. defenses were far stronger than they had anticipated.

Add to that, the few USAAC aircraft that had managed to get airborn were unexpected and while not sweeping the skies of the invaders, did cause them great concern.

So the furious response from the defenders coupled with the fact that the carriers and their support ships were out to sea with no known location, the third wave was withdrawn.


XBe02Drvr said:


> GG correctly points out that the majority of American shipbuilding and ordnance manufacturing was East Coast based. Aircraft manufacture, on the other hand (at least of the critical types) was concentrated In California and Washington. I know Bell, Chance Vought, Curtiss, Grumman, Martin, and Republic were East, but Boeing, Consolidated, Douglas, Lockheed, North American, and Northrop were all within easy air raid (or even battleship gun) range of the Pacific. With (as GG suggests) toe holds in Panama and the resource-rich American west coast a lot of the Japanese supply line dilemma would be eliminated, and (as the US later did) bypassed garrisons could be ignored and allowed to starve. With no safe haven Naval bases on the entire west coast, and Hawaii, the Philippines, and Australia gone, we would have been stymied in the Pacific and fighting a defensive war on the mainland. In December 41 and January 42 we would have been too shocked, demoralised, and disorganized to prevent the Japanese from making rapid territorial gains in the west and turning some of our own industrial might against us. They could have withdrawn most of the Kwantung Army from China and shipped them to California. Without foreign military aid neither Chiang nor Mao was any threat to Japan. The US would have had to concentrate its resources at home, leaving Britain and Russia vulnerable.


To give an idea of the density of shipyards on the west coast, here is a list of prewar sites:
California - Alameda, Long Beach, Los Angeles, San Fransisco, San Pedro, Sausalito, Wilmington.
Oregon - Astoria, Goble, Marshfield, Portland, Rainier.
Washington - Anacortes, Bellingham, Everette, Hoquiam, Longview, Port Angeles, Port Blakely, Seattle, South Bend, Suguamish, Winslow.
As far as aircraft companies listed, on the west coast, there were also Hughes, Avco/Vultee, Ryan and Interstate.

To complicate matters a little more, consider the US Navy, US Marine, US Coast Guard and USAAC installations spread all the way from Alaska to the Mexican border. And let's toss in the RCN and RCAF assets in the British Columbia area, too.

To effect a successful assault, it would take a great deal of planning and quietly shifting a vast amount of assets without alerting the U.S.

If the Japanese weren't successful in eliminating the US Pacific fleet in that concentrated area, they would most certainly have their hands full trying to take and hold the north american west coast.

I'm not saying it couldn't be done, but I remain highly skeptical of it's success in light of Imperial Japan's historical strategic blunders.



XBe02Drvr said:


> If the Japanese forays into the Indian Ocean had been conducted with a conquest mentality rather than just raiding, India would have fallen, if treated properly, that huge suppressed population would have enthusiastically joined the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" and kicked the "white oppressors" out of Asia entirely. So there you have it; Japan sitting securely on top of a major chunk of the world's resources, with no significant opponents in position to threaten its resources, its logistics, or its industry.


This was Germany's major Faux Pas, too. When Germany rolled into the Ukraine and Russian proper, the civilians lined the streets, showering the German troops with flowers, hailing them as liberators. Red army soldiers defected to the Germans in droves, ready to take up arms against Uncle Joe and the Communists.

*HAD* Hitler seized on this opportunity and played on the sentiments of the people and played the "great savior" instead of crushing them with his hatred, the taking of the Soviet Union would had been very well within his grasp.

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## stona (Jul 9, 2016)

Shinpachi said:


> In my impression, the remains ratio of 26 : 9 would be close to the actual casualty ratio between Soviet and Japan.
> The Japanese garrison held many IJA veterans who fought Nomonhan while Soviet troops was organized by many peasants.
> Our survivors from Siberia testified later that they smashed Russians.
> Nice find MM



It seems that the Japanese garrison mounted a stubborn defence, but the Soviets made, to use a good old English expression, 'a right dog's dinner' of the landing(s).
Words like disorganised and uncoordinated spring to mind! The Russians simply did not have the experience to allow them to develop the expertise of other Allies, notably the Americans, in amphibious operations.
Cheers
Steve


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## Shinpachi (Jul 9, 2016)

After the Battle of Shumshu was over, Russian Commander General Gnechko told Japanese Garrison Commander Tsutsumi that he was not thinking of peaceful occupation at all because he needed a glorious war record. 
That was his job. Not ours at all either.

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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 9, 2016)

Grau Geist says: "Yamamoto was against the war....."
That was absolutely true, but when ordered to plan the opening raid, like a "good soldier", he complied, but pressed for a far more aggressive war plan than the High Command was comfortable with. He didn't buy the traditional IJN doctrine of maneuvering for "one decisive battle" between massed surface fleets. But like the "good soldier" he was, he "toed the company line" right up to his death.


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## gjs238 (Jul 9, 2016)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Grau Geist says: "Yamamoto was against the war....."
> That was absolutely true, but when ordered to plan the opening raid, like a "good soldier", he complied, but pressed for a far more aggressive war plan than the High Command was comfortable with. He didn't buy the traditional IJN doctrine of maneuvering for "one decisive battle" between massed surface fleets. But like the "good soldier" he was, he "toed the company line" right up to his death.



In another thread it might sound like you were referring to Rommel.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 9, 2016)

Even if the Japanese possessed a sizable number of ships capable of making the voyage the logistics are very against it. The voyage is many times longer than from the south island to the Philippines or Malaya so you need many more times the amount of rations for the troops and crew. You need to either carry water or install bigger desalination plants. Refueling the transports (and escorts) needs to be taken into account. The Japanese certainly cannot afford for the transports to make a one way trip and beach themselves on the California coast. Planning on capturing US fuel depots is a desperate gamble. 
The US west coast is just under 1300 miles long (not counting islands and inlets/bays) and very few major cities would be within mutual support distance of attacking Japanese forces. Which invites destruction in detail. Without port facilities the attackers are doomed and the chances of taking major ports by direct assault are slim. At least taking them in working condition. Landing away from the ports cities and trying to march overland may not work very well either. The Americans having a much better telephone and transportation network than the Asian nations did. Sneaking through the countryside and popping up in unexpected areas isn't going to work as well. The Americans can feed in reinforcements by multiple transcontinental rail lines. The Japanese, assuming they can find fuel, have to send the ships back to Japan, reload and the sail back to the US. Replacement/reinforcements are weeks if not a couple of months away.
US also had coastal defenses, not up to later standards but better than anything Japan had. San Francisco having the first four 16 in guns to be emplaced in the US. Guns from the cancelled battleships/battlecruisers of the 1920s. The mountings were covered with concrete roofs many feet thick. Other older guns were in other batteries and at least some AA guns were provided pre Pearl Harbor, more were added later.

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## gjs238 (Jul 9, 2016)

It would seem that implementing Hokushin-ron would have been a more practical course.
However, the Soviets did give them a shellacking at Khalkhin Gol in '39.

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## Shortround6 (Jul 9, 2016)

I do have a question about "Hokushin-ron" as all I know is from Wiki:

"General Kenkichi Ueda was a strong believer in the _Hokushin-ron_ policy, believing that Japan's main enemy was communism and that Japan's destiny lay in conquest of the *natural resources* of the sparely populated north Asian mainland."

Bolding by me. What were the "known" natural resources in the area/s in question? 

The southern option had known sources of oil, rubber, tin and perhaps other materials?


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## GrauGeist (Jul 9, 2016)

While Japan had domestic oil fields in Akita, Niigata and Nutsu, their production was minimal compared to American output. They looked to the oil fields in Korea, Manchuria, China, Burma and Formosa, then ultimately the Dutch East Indies, Sumatra, Borneo and Malayasia. They even purchased oil from neutral Sakhalin and Siberian sources.

They had sufficient refineries on the home islands to refine the inbound oil, they simply did not have the ability to properly protect the tankers that were vital to the process.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 9, 2016)

Thank you. 
AS in many of the these cases the yield of the various oil fields is important. Going to war with Russian over small, low yield oil fields was probably not smart. May be different if they are high yield. I am questioning this as i have no idea as to how much was known about the resources in Northern Asia in the 1920s and 30s when this plan was being put forward. 
A bit like nobody knew oil existed in Libya? 
The Dutch East Indies crude was also pretty high grade stuff. It contained a lot of the "good stuff" to make high grade aviation fuel (at least high grade in the 1930s context.) 

Not sure why the Japanese anti-sub effort was so poor. While attacking merchant ships was not a high priority for Japanese subs (direct involvement in the "decisive" battle was more their doctrine and may have carried over to the anti-sub effort). However the example of the Germans in both WW I and the first few years of WW II certainly showed the vulnerability of long sea supply lines. 
Perhaps they were betting on taking out any bases the enemy subs could operate from? 
Although they spent a lot of effort in building very long range subs themselves.


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## gjs238 (Jul 9, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> I do have a question about "Hokushin-ron" as all I know is from Wiki:
> 
> "General Kenkichi Ueda was a strong believer in the _Hokushin-ron_ policy, believing that Japan's main enemy was communism and that Japan's destiny lay in conquest of the *natural resources* of the sparely populated north Asian mainland."
> 
> ...



Apparently, Manchuria has long been sought, and fought over, by Russia, the USSR, Japan and China.
I don't know if the Hokushin-ron policy took into account a potential petroleum embargo against Japan.

Japan's Economic Expansion into China in World War 2 | OnThisDay.com


Shortround6 said:


> Thank you.
> AS in many of the these cases the yield of the various oil fields is important. Going to war with Russian over small, low yield oil fields was probably not smart. May be different if they are high yield. I am questioning this as i have no idea as to how much was known about the resources in Northern Asia in the 1920s and 30s when this plan was being put forward.
> A bit like nobody knew oil existed in Libya?
> The Dutch East Indies crude was also pretty high grade stuff. It contained a lot of the "good stuff" to make high grade aviation fuel (at least high grade in the 1930s context.)
> ...



Again from Wiki, but it seems the army preferred the Hokushin-ron northern route while the navy advocated for the Nanshin-ron southern route.
As we know, politics eventually favored the navy.

I wonder if the framers and/or advocates of the Hokushin-ron northern route considered the possible reactions, i.e., an oil embargo, from the west to such a course of action.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 9, 2016)

Thank you.

I am wondering if there were specific goals in mind or if they simply thought if they grabbed _enough_ land there would be resources ( minerals/ores, lumber, food production, etc) _somewhere _in the area?


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## gjs238 (Jul 9, 2016)

XBe02Drvr said:


> If the Japanese had let Yamamoto run the war according to his vision without constant restraint from senior "battleship admirals" and the Army (Tojo), I'm convinced his understanding of industrial capacity and the crucial importance of logistics would have led to the choking off of Hawaii and then Australia. He also understood the strategic importance of aircraft and submarines in a resource war in the Pacific. If Kido Butai had succeeded in destroying the American carriers at Pearl, and if it had been commanded by a bold, aggressive, aviator admiral, it could have stuck around Oahu a while longer and taken out the important oversights the first raid missed. Fueling and repair facilities, the submarine base, and long range patrol aircraft (besides the carriers of course) were what sustained the American war effort for the first few months of the war. Yamamoto understood this. A couple more waves of attacks could have eliminated these and left Hawaii essentially defenseless and difficult to supply. IJN doctrine wasted their extensive submarine fleet in a fruitless search for capital ships to sink, rather than the scouting and supply-line strangling which could have been their true value. Yamamoto understood this, but was powerless to change it. GG correctly points out that the majority of American shipbuilding and ordnance manufacturing was East Coast based. Aircraft manufacture, on the other hand (at least of the critical types) was concentrated In California and Washington. I know Bell, Chance Vought, Curtiss, Grumman, Martin, and Republic were East, but Boeing, Consolidated, Douglas, Lockheed, North American, and Northrop were all within easy air raid (or even battleship gun) range of the Pacific. With (as GG suggests) toe holds in Panama and the resource-rich American west coast a lot of the Japanese supply line dilemma would be eliminated, and (as the US later did) bypassed garrisons could be ignored and allowed to starve. With no safe haven Naval bases on the entire west coast, and Hawaii, the Philippines, and Australia gone, we would have been stymied in the Pacific and fighting a defensive war on the mainland. In December 41 and January 42 we would have been too shocked, demoralised, and disorganized to prevent the Japanese from making rapid territorial gains in the west and turning some of our own industrial might against us. They could have withdrawn most of the Kwantung Army from China and shipped them to California. Without foreign military aid neither Chiang nor Mao was any threat to Japan. The US would have had to concentrate its resources at home, leaving Britain and Russia vulnerable. If the Japanese forays into the Indian Ocean had been conducted with a conquest mentality rather than just raiding, India would have fallen, if treated properly, that huge suppressed population would have enthusiastically joined the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" and kicked the "white oppressors" out of Asia entirely. So there you have it; Japan sitting securely on top of a major chunk of the world's resources, with no significant opponents in position to threaten its resources, its logistics, or its industry.



Japan had been fighting the Second Sino-Japanese War since July 7, 1937, and were unable to defeat China.
How could Japan accomplish in North America what it had been unable to against its neighbor?

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## GrauGeist (Jul 10, 2016)

The Japanese were well aware of strategic locations on the west coast.

When the Japanese submarine shelled the refineries at Ellwood (Santa Barbara), it was not by mistake.


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## GrauGeist (Jul 10, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> ...Not sure why the Japanese anti-sub effort was so poor. While attacking merchant ships was not a high priority for Japanese subs (direct involvement in the "decisive" battle was more their doctrine and may have carried over to the anti-sub effort). However the example of the Germans in both WW I and the first few years of WW II certainly showed the vulnerability of long sea supply lines.
> Perhaps they were betting on taking out any bases the enemy subs could operate from?
> Although they spent a lot of effort in building very long range subs themselves.


One of the many blunders of the IJN, was the understatement of their submarine fleet.

When their submarines were deployed properly, they accounted for quite a few Allied warships, but their deployment was not in such a manner as to maximize their potential, like the Germans or Americans.

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## Elmas (Jul 10, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> Thank you.
> 
> AS in many of the these cases the yield of the various oil fields is important. Going to war with Russian over small, low yield oil fields was probably not smart. May be different if they are high yield. I am questioning this as i have no idea as to how much was known about the resources in Northern Asia in the 1920s and 30s when this plan was being put forward.
> 
> ...





The presence of oil in Lybia was known from 1914, as small quantities were found excavating wells for drinking water and by a geological survey made in the ‘30s from an Italian geologist, Ardito Desio, more known for the K2 mountain climbing.

Lybia is a huge sincline







exactly the right place to find oil while, for example, Egypt is on an anticline, and in Egypt oil is lacking. 

The problem is that in Lybia oil is very deep, from 5000 m to 7000 m and, in the ‘30s, there was no way to drill a hole, perfectly vertical and straight, to those depths. So the Lybian oil remained were it was until the late ‘50s, when the suitable technology was developed.

And, being so deep, the Lybian oil is of a very good quality.

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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 10, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> Even if the Japanese possessed a sizable number of ships capable of making the voyage the logistics are very against it. The voyage is many times longer than from the south island to the Philippines or Malaya so you need many more times the amount of rations for the troops and crew. You need to either carry water or install bigger desalination plants. Refueling the transports (and escorts) needs to be taken into account. The Japanese certainly cannot afford for the transports to make a one way trip and beach themselves on the California coast. .......The Japanese, assuming they can find fuel, have to send the ships back to Japan, reload and the sail back to the US. Replacement/reinforcements are weeks if not a couple of months away.



Implicit in any west coast invasion plan would necessarily be establishment of a staging area in Hawaii from which the invasion would be launched. This would be necessary anyway as a base for interdiction of the Australia pipeline.


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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 10, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> Not sure why the Japanese anti-sub effort was so poor. While attacking merchant ships was not a high priority for Japanese subs (direct involvement in the "decisive" battle was more their doctrine and may have carried over to the anti-sub effort). However the example of the Germans in both WW I and the first few years of WW II certainly showed the vulnerability of long sea supply lines.
> Perhaps they were betting on taking out any bases the enemy subs could operate from?
> Although they spent a lot of effort in building very long range subs themselves.



A couple of reasons why: ONE, US sub capabilities, largely stagnant at a WWI level through the lean budget years of the 20s and 30s, took a quantum leap forward just before WWll with the new classes of fleet boats. The IJN was slow to take this into account. They were still thinking in terms of S-boats. TWO, they lagged behind the western world in electronics in general and particularly sonar. This didn't bother them, as they didn't consider our subs much of a threat, and proudly thought theirs were state of the art. Besides, they didn't have much concept of the strategic value of subs as commerce raiders. It was all about the decisive battle.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 10, 2016)

The topic of invading Hawaii came up in a thread about two years ago. It didn't seem feasible then.
Significance of the Battle of Midway
Pretty much from page 18 to page 23


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## michaelmaltby (Jul 10, 2016)

Shin, earlier in this thread you wrote:
"... Japanese army in China did not have to go back to Japan as they were deployed there to build up new Chinese Empire.
It was a simple story."

I am curious to understand this more fully  ... are you saying that the Japanese army in China were "settlers" who were going to remain in China and reform the society, make it more productive, more harmonious with the economic needs to the Homeland, etc.?

Please write a little more about this.


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## Shinpachi (Jul 11, 2016)

Your curiosity seems endless, MM.
I sometimes forget your age 

Building up a new Chinese Empire was a major premise for Japanese to invade like Mongolians and Manchurians did in their old times. 
Japanese settlers in Manchukuo were already happy to speak Chinese and accept the local culture.
If everything had gone well, the country of Japan would have been disappeared to be a part of China in the 21st century.
The term "China" originally means "The center of the world" to be adored by Asians.
So, it was a simple story.

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## michaelmaltby (Jul 11, 2016)

Thanks for the insights, Shin 

"... I sometimes forget your age ". Wish I could ..

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## Shinpachi (Jul 11, 2016)

You are welcome sir


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## Thorlifter (Jul 11, 2016)

Wow, I did not know that. Thank you Shinpachi.

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## Shortround6 (Jul 11, 2016)

From a Post in the above mentioned Midway Thread.

_The Japanese were dependent on the US for about 80% of their oil and when the US started the Oil embargo in Aug 1941 and the British and Dutch joined Japan was in big trouble. Without those three Japan could not come up with 10% of the oil it needed so every month that they waited to grab the Dutch east indies oil fields (which could produce as 90% as much as Russia and Columbia combined in late 1930s) meant that their reserves shrank. The Japanese were also about 88% reliant on imported iron, 50% on zinc, 80% on tin, 100% on cotton, 99% on wool and 100% on rubber. Securing their own supply lines in addition to securing the sources was the main objective. Taking the oil fields with almost 30 submarines between the oil fields and Japanese home islands wasn't a good solution._

Now perhaps these numbers are in error, after two years I have forgotten were I got them but they point out that the main goal of the Japanese attacks HAD to be the Dutch East Indies oil fields AND a _secure _line of communication between the oil fields and the home Islands.

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## Peter Gunn (Jul 11, 2016)

Not to be a dick or anything, but Japan coming anywhere near conquering the U.S. really wasn't in the cards. Even if the Lex, Sara and the Big E had been taken out at Pearl Harbor the Yorktown, Hornet, Wasp and if needs be Ranger would come from the Atlantic post haste.

Also remember the Essex was commissioned in December of '42, with 28 sisters to follow, plus six super dreadnaughts with four more on the way as the surface escort. The best Japan could hope for would have been a quick negotiated peace to stop the oncoming American juggernaut, and because of the nature of the opening of hostilities (i.e. Sneak Attack) that wasn't going to happen.

So in the end, taking that and the raw material situation into account, what the Japanese accomplished was, in reality, just about what they were going to accomplish, there isn't much wiggle room for "what if" scenarios.

*EDIT* Actually, upon reflection, I doubt the Ranger would have been brought to the Pacific considering her short comings.

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## Shortround6 (Jul 11, 2016)

The Ranger might depend on how desperate things were and/or other duties (aircraft ferry?) it could perform in keeping the other ships at the pointy end of things, at least until other carrier conversions showed up. Either escort carriers or the converted Clevelands. 

The Massive US ship building program was not a secret, having been debated in congress and published in some newspapers. A 1938 spending bill called for a 20% increase in the US navy and other bills/authorizations had followed. Launchings were popular newsreel footage. Even the first two Iowa Class battleships had been laid down before Pearl Harbor. 
Anything the Japanese were going to do had to be done quickly or not at all.

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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 11, 2016)

Shinpachi, this is a mind-blowing concept! Japan to merge into China? And I suppose, to create a new dynasty based on Bushido and the Imperial lineage of Japan? Wouldn't that have poked Mao in the eye!
"Hey Liz, move over; the US is coming back to the fold! We're gonna merge into the UK and save you from your Brexit disaster, but you're gonna have to yield your throne to the Trump Dynasty!"

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## gjs238 (Jul 11, 2016)

Shinpachi said:


> Your curiosity seems endless, MM.
> I sometimes forget your age
> 
> Building up a new Chinese Empire was a major premise for Japanese to invade like Mongolians and Manchurians did in their old times.
> ...



So in the long term, the US economy would have benefited from supporting Japan's expansion, the Western colonies need not have been invaded, stability brought to a long unstable China and a greater ability by the West to contain Germany, Italy and the USSR.


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## GrauGeist (Jul 11, 2016)

gjs238 said:


> So in the long term, the US economy would have benefited from supporting Japan's expansion, the Western colonies need not have been invaded, stability brought to a long unstable China and a greater ability by the West to contain Germany, Italy and the USSR.


Remember that the U.S. didn't start applying economic sanctions against Japan until 1938. Then events between 1938 and 1940 saw greater restrictions imposed on Japan such as financial assets frozen, exclusion from the Panama Canal, halting the sale of scrap iron and finally, the termination of crude oil sales.

Prhaps if Japan had used a "kinder, gentler" approach to conquest, coupled with a more pro-active diplomacy, then perhaps they could have warded off U.S. sanctions...at least for a while longer.

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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 11, 2016)

"Kinder gentler"? In the land of Bushido? Come on now!


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## gjs238 (Jul 11, 2016)

Shinpachi said:


> Your curiosity seems endless, MM.
> I sometimes forget your age
> 
> Building up a new Chinese Empire was a major premise for Japanese to invade like Mongolians and Manchurians did in their old times.
> ...








1935 propaganda poster of Manchukuo promoting "harmony" between Japanese, Chinese, and Manchu. The caption, written from right to left, says: "With the help of Japan, China, and Manchukuo, the world can be in peace." The flags shown are, left to right: the flag of Manchukuo; the flag of Japan; the "Five Races Under One Union" flag of Republic of China.

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## GrauGeist (Jul 11, 2016)

XBe02Drvr said:


> "Kinder gentler"? In the land of Bushido? Come on now!


In the land of Bushido, the Japanese Military didn't commit various acts against her own people...this same restraint, if applied to the occupied territories, would have had a different reaction from the League of Nations and the world in general.

Better treatment of military prisoners would have also had a lesser impact on public sentiment.

It is a fact that the Imperial Japanese were hardasses, but they would not have lost face if they took less of a hardline to the occupied territories. There were even several occasions where some commanders were known to be lenient to those that they were in charge of.


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## gjs238 (Jul 11, 2016)

gjs238 said:


> 1935 propaganda poster of Manchukuo promoting "harmony" between Japanese, Chinese, and Manchu. The caption, written from right to left, says: "With the help of Japan, China, and Manchukuo, the world can be in peace." The flags shown are, left to right: the flag of Manchukuo; the flag of Japan; the "Five Races Under One Union" flag of Republic of China.



On the other hand:
An Investigation of Global Policy with the Yamato Race as Nucleus - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## Shinpachi (Jul 11, 2016)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Shinpachi, this is a mind-blowing concept! Japan to merge into China? And I suppose, to create a new dynasty based on Bushido and the Imperial lineage of Japan? Wouldn't that have poked Mao in the eye!
> "Hey Liz, move over; the US is coming back to the fold! We're gonna merge into the UK and save you from your Brexit disaster, but you're gonna have to yield your throne to the Trump Dynasty!"



Wasn't Japan to China like UK to Roman Empire or EU ?
Totally off-topic with apology but Manchukuo was established based on Shinto, not Bushido.
Last Emperor's younger brother married a Japanese Princess and had babies for the next step but the war was over.


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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 11, 2016)

GrauGeist said:


> In the land of Bushido, the Japanese Military didn't commit various acts against her own people...this same restraint, if applied to the occupied territories, would have had a different reaction from the League of Nations and the world in general.
> 
> Better treatment of military prisoners would have also had a lesser impact on public sentiment.
> 
> It is a fact that the Imperial Japanese were hardasses, but they would not have lost face if they took less of a hardline to the occupied territories. There were even several occasions where some commanders were known to be lenient to those that they were in charge of.



(Shinpachi, correct me if I'm wrong!) To be defeated and die fighting is honorable; to be defeated and captured alive is shamefully dishonorable. That's my "gai-jin" understanding of Bushido. Do you truly expect that it would be possible in that environment for any "honorable" soldier or officer to treat POWs or defeated populations of "inferior" people in a "kinder gentler" way? Historically, those that did so were reprimanded, relieved, or shipped home in dishonor; a fact that usually still failed to save them from being executed as war criminals by the US. The IJA had only recently (in the long view of Japanese history) allowed non-Samurai into the officer corps and conscripted men from the lower classes to bear arms. This created an atmosphere of competition, if you will, where those not raised in the Samurai tradition felt pressured to be "more Samurai than the Samurai". Officers were treated with great brutality while in training, and enlisted troops got that at all times. Thus what we consider brutality became the norm for them. The concept of "pampering" a bunch of dishonored "gai-jin" scum just didn't make any sense to them. They weren't diplomats and they weren't known for their cosmopolitan outlook.

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## GrauGeist (Jul 11, 2016)

There is a level of comtempt that can be maintained while still being in a humanitarian capacity.

For example, the Germans treated the U.S. and British POWs in a far more humanitarian capacity than they did the Soviet POWs.

There would be no losing face or infringement of honor to treat prisoners within a certain level of decency, but such events like the Bataan and Sandakan marches, the Burma railroad or the "Hell Ships", are beyond upholding a code.

Just so that you know, I am fully aware of Bushido and the virtues.
And allow me to share with you, those virtues of Bushido:
1. Rectitude
2. Courage
3. Benevolance (Mercy)
4. Politeness (Morality)
5. Honesty and Sincerity
6. Honor
7. Loyalty
8. Character (Self-Control)

So you see, the brutal treatment of prisoners (those defeated or weaker than the warrior) can actually be contradictory to Bushido.

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## Shinpachi (Jul 11, 2016)

Educated officers understood not only Bushido but western military standards like Geneva Convention very well but ordinary soldiers who were mainly from peasant families didn't. Therefore, our military taught them basic rules like "Obey your officer's order", "Save your lives for the future contribution" or "Don't be captured alive" but these rules had nothing to do with Bushido.
Rules were summarized in a military note book like this picture and soldiers were ordered to bring it to read again and again.

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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 11, 2016)

Shinpachi, thank you for the informative post. Question: Just how educated were IJA officers? Were they all academy or university graduates, or did they have the equivalent of our Officer Candidate Schools where applicants with less education could (back in the day) earn a commission? Our armed forces had a lot of freshly-minted officers with as little as one year or less of college.


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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 11, 2016)

GrauGeist said:


> For example, the Germans treated the U.S. and British POWs in a far more humanitarian capacity than they did the Russians.



Of course. The Brits and the Yanks were nearly civilized, almost Aryans. The Russkis were savage Slav untermenschen!


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## michaelmaltby (Jul 12, 2016)

While this thread has drifted off topic it has developed into an illuminating dialogue on Japanese perceptions, realities, etc. 

Shin, you have expressed _no surprise_ that the Japanese leadership would _trust_ Stalin to negotiate peace with the Allies aka the USA .... would _trust_ Stalin to renew the non-agression treaty the two countries has signed after Nomonhon, in 1939.

So, Shin, I am curious about general perceptions about Nomonhon in Japan. Nomonhon has always been a matter of interest and empathy for me .... my only "academic" source is Alvin Coox's tomb "Nomonhon", written from the Japanese perspective. It was a very depressing read for me ... the incident was so purposeless .... and yet the outcome was so historically significant. 

Without _security_ in the Far East Stalin could never have stripped forces from the Far East in November 1941 and thrown them in front of Moscow. That security came from the confidence of having crushed the Japanese Army in Mongolia ... and _that_ crushing .... included a Soviet strategy to bag as many Japanese prisoners as possible .... these POWs would be enslaved by the Soviets and declared "dead" back home in Japan.

Japanese Military leadership under-estimated the Soviet Army and System very badly ... and they made the same mistake again at Pearl Harbor. In both wars the Japanese forces fought with their usual ferocity, discipline and elan. The pictures are images of the human faces and ironies of an under-appreciated war.


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## Shinpachi (Jul 12, 2016)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Shinpachi, thank you for the informative post. Question: Just how educated were IJA officers? Were they all academy or university graduates, or did they have the equivalent of our Officer Candidate Schools where applicants with less education could (back in the day) earn a commission? Our armed forces had a lot of freshly-minted officers with as little as one year or less of college.



In the army academy, 2 years for preparatory and 2 years for main course.
They were educated in Prussian style though I have no exact idea about it except Spartan training was adopted there.
Most officers came from the army academy and 20% of them were also graduates of the army college.
Ordinary soldiers also had chances to become officers but not so many.

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## Shinpachi (Jul 12, 2016)

michaelmaltby said:


> While this thread has drifted off topic it has developed into an illuminating dialogue on Japanese perceptions, realities, etc.
> 
> Shin, you have expressed _no surprise_ that the Japanese leadership would _trust_ Stalin to negotiate peace with the Allies aka the USA .... would _trust_ Stalin to renew the non-agression treaty the two countries has signed after Nomonhon, in 1939.
> 
> ...



As wrote somewhere in this forum before, Nomonhan Incident was a mere regional conflict for Japanese and nothing more and nothing less.
Soviet troops might have fought Nomonhan with its full power for 4 months but Kwantung Army fought it with no permission and no support from Imperial GHQ in Tokyo. When other IJA troops in the Southern China began to move to the Russian borader to support Kwantung Army, Stalin suggested the cease fire to declare his victory. Such a man.

Nice pictures, MM.
Thanks for sharing


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## gjs238 (Jul 12, 2016)

The consequences of this were far reaching:


Shinpachi said:


> As wrote somewhere in this forum before, Nomonhan Incident was a mere regional conflict for Japanese and nothing more and nothing less.
> Soviet troops might have fought Nomonhan with its full power for 4 months but Kwantung Army fought it with no permission and no support from Imperial GHQ in Tokyo. When other IJA troops in the Southern China began to move to the Russian borader to support Kwantung Army, Starlin suggested the cease fire to declare his victory. Such a man.
> 
> Nice pictures, MM.
> Thanks for sharing



From Wikipedia, 

_After the Nomonhan incident, the Kwantung Army was purged of its more insubordinate elements, as well as proponents of the Hokushin-ron ("Northward Advance") doctrine who urged that Japan concentrate its expansionist efforts on Siberia rather southward towards China and Southeast Asia.[4]
_
If true, the results of the Battle of Lake Khasan in 1938 and Battle of Nomonhan in 1939 may have had global consequences.


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## michaelmaltby (Jul 12, 2016)

"... Stalin suggested the cease fire to declare his victory. Such a man."

In all fairness, Shin, Stalin suggested a truce days before he signed the Treaty of Non-Agression with Hitler .... Japan's Axis Partner .... thus fixing Japan strategically for the period from 1939 to August, 1945.

Such a poker player.

That a militant radical 'rump' within the IJA could blunder into a war without direction from Tokyo over a matter as trivial as grazing land for cavalry speaks volumes about the situation in 1939, IMHO.

1,000s of Japanese soldiers disappeared into Siberia ... unacknowleged.

A very sad affair.


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## gjs238 (Jul 12, 2016)

michaelmaltby said:


> "
> 1,000s of Japanese soldiers disappeared into Siberia ... unacknowleged.
> A very sad affair.



From time to time I dwell on all the different folks who disappeared in USSR/Siberia.
Folks from many countries - even Russia's allies.
How many Americans disappeared there?
And it goes on past WWII.
How many Americans from the Korean War disappeared there?
The Vietnam War?


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## Shinpachi (Jul 12, 2016)

michaelmaltby said:


> 1,000s of Japanese soldiers disappeared into Siberia ... unacknowleged.
> A very sad affair.



Sorry but I should have told you about them much earlier when you talked about your younger days memoir.

Japanese government and historians have ever researched the missing 1,000 Japanese in Russia before.
Most of them refused repatriation in the POW exchange as they thought it disgrace to be known as POWs.
They stayed behind in Russia as Soviet citizens.

However, when the WW2 was over, a few of them joined "new" Japanese POWs in the labor camp to repatriate during 1947-1956.

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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 12, 2016)

michaelmaltby said:


> "
> 
> 
> That a militant radical 'rump' within the IJA could blunder into a war without direction from Tokyo over a matter as trivial as grazing land for cavalry speaks volumes about the situation in 1939, IMHO.



It wasn't just 1939. The Kwantung Army was rife with radical ultra-nationalist officers way back into the 20s, and often had the "tail wagging the dog" by taking aggressive action on their own without authorization from Tokyo. (Manchuria 1931, China proper 1937, Siberia 1938, Mongolia 1939). Presented with a _fait accompli _and troops in contact, the High Command couldn't stomach the embarrassment of ordering a withdrawal and court marshaling officers for displaying their devotion to the destiny of the empire. In many cases, these radicals were sent to the Kwantung to get them out of Tokyo where they were prone to engaging in political plots and assassinations.

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## michaelmaltby (Jul 15, 2016)

"... Most of them refused repatriation in the POW exchange as they thought it disgrace to be known as POWs.
They stayed behind in Russia as Soviet citizens."

That, Shin, is putting the kindest possible light on the subject.  My only source is Coox, granted, but he was deeply immersed in Japanese life and values ....His Nomonhan is exclusively about the IJA side of the event.

_*Paraphrasing*_, here is what he understands happened in POW negotiations with the Soviets:
In the last days of shooting Zhukov's armored forces surrounded large chunks of IJA, meanwhile, the IJA was holding very few Russian soldiers (the Russians feared being taken prisoner and would save a grenade for themselves).

The Soviets 'suggested' a prisoner swap .... _on a one-for-one basis_ ... and the IJA (stupidly, IMO) agreed to that arrangement. When the swap took place the IJA showed up with their 400 odd Russian soldiers, the Soviets took note of the count and said "right .... we'll go and get you yours" and they came back with the matching number of IJA prisoners. All unaccounted prisoners were declared "dead" and no one knows the real numbers, IIRC, that went into slavery.

Coox states that IJA officers that were swapped were de-briefed by their IJA brass and then left alone in a room with a loaded revolver on the table. Their suicide being reported as a glorious battlefield death.

Knowing that history about the Soviets ... learned so painfully ... I can't believe any Japanese leader would ever trust Stalin .... to negotiate_ peace_ with America, really!

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## Shinpachi (Jul 15, 2016)

Thank you very much for your so kind and informative description by Coox. Very interesting.
The IJA officers who were given a loaded revolver would have wanted to stay behind in Russia too.

Japanese government trusted Stalin in August 1945.
Because of this "fact", Japanese government can ask Russia to return its 4 northern islands which have been "illegally" occupied by Soviet Union and are known as "disputed islands" today.

History is not over yet

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## GrauGeist (Jul 15, 2016)

Even though there was a Soviet emissary aboard the Missouri during Japan's formal surrender, they didn't sign the document - Japan and Russia are *technically* still at war.

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## Shinpachi (Jul 15, 2016)

No peace treaty between the two countries yet, Dave

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## pbehn (Jul 15, 2016)

Shinpachi said:


> No peace treaty between the two countries yet, Dave


The town of Berwick in UK is still at war with Germany, happily for Germany they have no plans to invade at present.

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## GrauGeist (Jul 15, 2016)

pbehn said:


> The town of Berwick in UK is still at war with Germany, happily for Germany they have no plans to invade at present.


I thought that Germany surrendered to Berwick in 1987?
There was a formal treaty signed between Berwick and Russia in 1966 formally ending the Crimean war! 

And isn't the Isle of Man still at war with Imperial Germany (since 1914)?

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## GregP (Jul 15, 2016)

The Seminole Indians are technically still at war with the USA, too.

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## michaelmaltby (Jul 15, 2016)

"History is not over yet"
History is _never _over ..... it just keeps eddying round and round.

See "Turbulence" thread in this Forum

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## Shinpachi (Jul 15, 2016)

GrauGeist said:


> Even though there was a Soviet emissary aboard the Missouri during Japan's formal surrender, they didn't sign the document - Japan and Russia are *technically* still at war.



Yes, I have just reconfirmed that the two countries are technically still at war as Soviet Union did not participate in the ceremony for Treaty of Peace with Japan held in San Francisco dated September 8, 1951. The treaty says -

Article 1

(a) The state of war between Japan and each of the Allied Powers is terminated as from the date on which the present Treaty comes into force between Japan and the Allied Power concerned as provided for in Article 23.

Article 23

(a) The present Treaty shall be ratified by the States which sign it, including Japan, and will come into force for all the States which have then ratified it, when instruments of ratification have been deposited by Japan and by a majority, including the United States of America as the principal occupying Power, of the following States, namely Australia, Canada, Ceylon, France, Indonesia, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of the Philippines, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. The present Treaty shall come into force for each State which subsequently ratifies it, on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification.

Original text

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## Shinpachi (Jul 15, 2016)

Sorry but I should have reconfirmed this joint declaration too.

Joint Declaration by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan
(in Moscow)
October 19, 1956

1 . The state of war between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan shall cease on the date on which this Declaration enters into force and peace, friendship and good-neighbourly relations between them shall be restored.

Original text

I'll be more careful in the future.
Thanks.


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## michaelmaltby (Jul 16, 2016)

I've been singing the praises of Alvin Coox' book Nomonhan, here's some perspective on the man and his contribution to modern history:

''Nomonhan was one of the most important battles of World War II, because it bloodied the Japanese, and they remained fearful of the Soviet Union and decided that the Americans would be an easier target,'' said Dr. Chalmers Johnson, president of the Japan Policy Research Institute and former chairman of the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of California at Berkeley. ''It was a classic blunder.

''But it led to a determination of the policy pursued by the Axis powers in World War II. The genius of Professor Coox was to recognize what a critically decisive battle it was to World War II. It was every bit as important as Stalingrad.'' [Obituary, New Tork Times]
*****
"Dr. Coox told colleagues that his book on Nomonhan was a result of 35 years of research and more than 400 interviews.[1] Nomonhan was a "nearly forgotten moment in history," wrote John H. Boyle in his review in the _Journal of Asian Studies_. Coox "reconstructed the Japanese folly at Nomonhan in all of its political, military, and human dimensions to produce a masterful study that will stand as a model of scholarship for military historians." He showed that the Japanese army "*did not know and did not want to know about enemy capabilities," *and that the Japanese decision makers were so shaken by the defeat that they turned their strategic emphasis away from the Soviet Union in the north to opportunities in the south. "

In my mind, understanding the 20th Century _begins _with appreciating how transformational the 1904-05 Russo-Japan war really was ... for the Japanese and for the Caucasian West. I'd appreciate your views on that aspect of our discussion, Shin. 

My taste in reading .... not shown "Empire of the Rising Sun", John Toland

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## Shinpachi (Jul 16, 2016)

Our historical flow after Nomonhan could be -

1. IJA carried out Kwantung Army Special Maneuvers with its fullest scale of 750,000 troops in Manchuria in July 1941, a month after German-USSR War broke out, and this is said delayed the transfer of Soviet troops from Far East to Europe.
2. Japanese leaders decided the attack of Pearl Harbor in October 1941 because of the perfect oil embargo by the U.S in August.
3. 750,000 troops in Manchuria was obliged to be divided into two or three for the southern front to secure oil.

How did Coox understand these matters ?


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## michaelmaltby (Jul 16, 2016)

Coox doesn't include events after the negotiated non aggression treaty with the Russians so his views aren't described. Remember Shin, the 2 quotes in my post are _other_ writers describing Coox' work.


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## Shinpachi (Jul 16, 2016)

I'm fearful of Mods.
Thanks !


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## michaelmaltby (Jul 17, 2016)

A mighty oak tree is just an acorn that _held his ground_, Shin.


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## gjs238 (Jul 17, 2016)

An EXCELLENT thread - great information and insights - much appreciated on this end.

Discussions of the Causes of World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia and the Events leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia are important to have, lest we fall prey to history repeating itself.

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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 17, 2016)

Shinpachi said:


> I'm fearful of Mods.
> Thanks !


Great info and good discussion, carry on!!!

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## michaelmaltby (Jul 17, 2016)

"... In my mind, understanding the 20th Century _begins _with appreciating how transformational the 1904-05 Russo-Japan war really was ..."

Hey Shin, , are you willing to talk about understanding 1904-05 war in your country with me?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 18, 2016)

Shinpachi said:


> I'm fearful of Mods.
> Thanks !



Shinpachi there is no need to fear.


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## Shinpachi (Jul 18, 2016)

I just minded off-topic


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## michaelmaltby (Jul 18, 2016)

".... off-topic "?
Strictly speaking, Shin, yes , but I put it to you that the meanderings and side-tracks _all _lead us to the US Navy at war with Japan with the Allies facing the nightmare of invasion, and that _is_ the topic, n'est-ce pas .

The Japanese victory over Czarist Russia had a profound effect on the course of events in the 20th Century. The Russian regime was so corrupt and in need of reform and the Russian conduct of the war ... not the fighting man but the leaders and generals ... so mismanaged that the war became a spark for the 1905 Russian Revolution ... which failed.

In hindsight that failure was a shame IMO, . If it had succeeded it would not likely have been a _Communist_ revolution ... more likely a socialist revolution. The new government, 9 years in power, would, IMO, have been_ less likely_ to rush into mobilization against Austria-Germany in 1914 and WW1 might have just fizzled out instead of catching hold. The collapse of The Imperial regime in 1905 would also have created additional opportunities for Japan to enlarge her economic sphere of influence in Mongolia and the Siberian far east, easing the quest for resources elsewhere somewhat, IMO.

Unfortunately the 1905 revolution was crushed and the rest is 'history' ... as they say. But the birth of modern Japan was poorly understood by the caucasian west and this led directly to misunderstandings .... in 1905 at the Treaty of Portsmouth and again in 1918 in the territorial settlements spelled out at Versailles. These misunderstandings were, with time, inflamed and reinforced a view that Japan couldn't trust the west to accept her presence as a major player on the world stage. This manner of thought distorts reality and induces political neurosis (just as failure to accept defeat in 1918 led directly to the emergence of Hitler).

So I believe that, like Nomonhan, the Russo-Japan was vastly important to the flow of history ... and _not _as most western pundits thought at the time simply because an Asian nation had defeated a 'western' Christian nation.

And Stalin's strategy to teach the IJA a lesson at Nomonhan, humiliate and discredit them, was influenced by the outcome in 1905 and the trauma and fear that Japan had induced in Russia.

Appreciate your thoughts on this, Shin, 

"Human Bullets" is a great insight into what a ghastly war it was.

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## michaelmaltby (Jul 18, 2016)

How Jack London covered the Russo-Japan War .... terrific read 

Jack London War Correspondent


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## Peter Gunn (Jul 18, 2016)

About 20 years ago I did a fairly large research project on the Russo-Japanese war, the 1905 revolution and the Boer War, I'd say MM that your analysis pretty spot on. I came to consider however that the 1905 revolution, had it succeeded, or at least succeeded partially, is having Imperial Russia headed toward a constitutional monarchy similar to the English version, not necessarily socialist, YMMV though. With that a _possible_ different chain of events in 1914, although I'm not convinced that it would have prevented the First World War.

I still think one of the great tragedies of the twentieth century was the fall of Tsarist Russia and the installation of the communist empire. So much misery came out of that, but I digress.

EDIT - There was a Japanese movie in the early 1980's, "Battle of Port Artur" or "Attack at Port Arthur", can't remember, but I recall it was an interesting take on the affair. "Battle of Port Arthur", that's it, google comes to the rescue.

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## cherry blossom (Jul 18, 2016)

Continuing the meandering, was the purpose of the Allied Embargo to prevent a Japanese attack on the Soviet Union? The normal interpretations tend to mention China (Utley, Going to War with Japan) or the Netherlands East Indies (Marshall, To have and to have not). However, it was clearly in the interests of both Britain and the USA to prevent a Strike North and they were reading traffic between Tokyo and Berlin which might have suggested that it was imminent.


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## michaelmaltby (Jul 18, 2016)

I think the US embargoes were reactions to events in China such as Nanking Massacre. The US was very empathetic with the fate of Chinese despite the obvious corruption and treachery .... as Vinegar Joe Stilwell discovered when he was tossed under the bus. The writings of Pearl Buck .. The Good Earth .. caught the imagination of many Christian Americans. This subjectivity led to some strategic mistakes, IMO


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## GrauGeist (Jul 18, 2016)

michaelmaltby said:


> I think the US embargoes were reactions to events in China such as Nanking Massacre. The US was very empathetic with the fate of Chinese despite the obvious corruption and treachery .... as Vinegar Joe Stilwell discovered when he was tossed under the bus. The writings of Pearl Buck .. The Good Earth .. caught the imagination of many Christian Americans. This subjectivity led to some strategic mistakes, IMO


The USS Panay incident sure didn't help matters much...


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## michaelmaltby (Jul 18, 2016)

No doubt about that.


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## cherry blossom (Jul 18, 2016)

But the Panay Incident and the Nanking Massacre occurred in 1937 and the USA accepted Japan's apology for the Panay sinking. What had changed in 1941?


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## GrauGeist (Jul 18, 2016)

cherry blossom said:


> But the Panay Incident and the Nanking Massacre occurred in 1937 and the USA accepted Japan's apology for the Panay sinking. What had changed in 1941?


Marco Polo Bridge incident in July 1937 started the war with China, the U.S. and Western nations strongly condemned Japan for the incident and the start of war.

The attack of the USS Panay on 12 December and the Nanking incident on 13 December of 1937 brought even stronger condemnation, leading to a series of trade restrictions by the U.S. starting in 1938.

By 1939, the U.S. rescinded it's 1911 trade agreement with Japan and by 1940, the Export Control Act was passed by Congress. None of these measures convinced Japan to stop it's expansion in the region and/or terminate the war with China.

With Japan joining the Axis and continuing to expand into colonial territories held by European countries, and failed peace negotiations, the U.S. froze Japanese assets and terminated oil exports by early 1941.

With only a two year oil reserve, Japan felt it had to act quickly and a plan of war with the U.S. was brought to the table.

With the sinking of the Panay and the many questions not having satisfactory answers revolving around the incident, the stage was pretty much set.


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## tyrodtom (Jul 18, 2016)

Accepting a apology diplomatically, and actually accepting it is two different things. 
And then there's " forgive, but never forget ".


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## gjs238 (Jul 18, 2016)

GrauGeist said:


> The USS Panay incident sure didn't help matters much...



Soon followed by the Allison incident
John Moore Allison - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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## michaelmaltby (Jul 18, 2016)

"...What had changed in 1941?"

The Axis Alliance was now in place* .... and by 1941 everyone who cared knew what Germany was doing.

*[....on September 27, 1940, Germany, Italy, and Japan signed the Tripartite Pact, which became known as the Axis alliance.]

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## GrauGeist (Jul 18, 2016)

gjs238 said:


> Soon followed by the Allison incident
> John Moore Allison - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


Yes, I should ave included this, because his assault and the U.S. Embassy in Nanking being ransacked and looted was also something that did not sit well with Congress.

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## Shinpachi (Jul 19, 2016)

Was not there UK behind Japan to support ?
She was hard to teach Japanese the aviation torpedo bombing in the 1920s.
Yamamoto was grateful for it.

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## Peter Gunn (Jul 19, 2016)

Point well taken, the Royal Navy was a great supporter/teacher for the IJN at the turn of the century, in fact, the RN observers with Admiral Togo at Tsushima Straight were quite proud of their "students" and the way they totally handled the Tsarist fleet. Not to mention the Kongo of 1911(?) was built in England to Japanese specs.

England and Japan had an alliance dating from I believe 1902 until about 1920-21. One might posit that the U.S. and Japan were set on a collision course once Great Britain opted out of the treaty. Which is rather ironic because Japan was seeking to avoid a future war with the U.S., but circumstances being what they were, put the U.S. and Japan on a collision course twenty years in the making.

The United States was worried that Japan would take over trade in China, Commonwealth governments were worried that a war would break out between the U.S. and Japan over China and wanted to make nice with the Americans and the Japanese were trying to both expand and not upset the balance of power in the Pacific while avoiding a war with the U.S.. When you really delve into the situation it can make your head spin. In the end, it just seems that no matter what (sadly), there was going to be a war in the Pacific.

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## gjs238 (Jul 19, 2016)

Peter Gunn said:


> Point well taken, the Royal Navy was a great supporter/teacher for the IJN at the turn of the century, in fact, the RN observers with Admiral Togo at Tsushima Straight were quite proud of their "students" and the way they totally handled the Tsarist fleet. Not to mention the Kongo of 1911(?) was built in England to Japanese specs.
> 
> England and Japan had an alliance dating from I believe 1902 until about 1920-21. One might posit that the U.S. and Japan were set on a collision course once Great Britain opted out of the treaty. Which is rather ironic because Japan was seeking to avoid a future war with the U.S., but circumstances being what they were, put the U.S. and Japan on a collision course twenty years in the making.
> 
> The United States was worried that Japan would take over trade in China, Commonwealth governments were worried that a war would break out between the U.S. and Japan over China and wanted to make nice with the Americans and the Japanese were trying to both expand and not upset the balance of power in the Pacific while avoiding a war with the U.S.. When you really delve into the situation it can make your head spin. In the end, it just seems that no matter what (sadly), there was going to be a war in the Pacific.



More about the January 30, 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Preceded by the July 16, 1894 Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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## gjs238 (Jul 19, 2016)

Shinpachi said:


> Was not there UK behind Japan to support ?
> She was hard to teach Japanese the aviation torpedo bombing in the 1920s.
> Yamamoto was grateful for it.

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## Shinpachi (Jul 19, 2016)

UK had been our best teacher and friend since Meiji Reformation in 1868 till 1926 when Japan refused UK's suggestion to punish Chiang Kai-shek for his Northern Expedition because Anglo-Japanese Alliance was expired in 1923.

On the other hand, there were no Americans in China till the ww1 was over.
They were a new comer and not necessarily welcomed by old comers.
This would be why UK taught Japanese her latest military technologies in the 1920s.
However, result was terrible.


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## michaelmaltby (Jul 19, 2016)

"... there were no Americans in China till the ww1 was over"

American trade with China started in 1784.

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## GrauGeist (Jul 19, 2016)

But Shinpachi, remember that the U.S. was in China prior to WW1 and the U.S. Marines were used to protect the Foreign Legations during the Boxer Rebellion.

And an interesting note regarding Japan's navy - the first modern armored warship of Japan, the Kōtetsu, was a forrmer Confederate ironclad, the CSS Stonewall. She was taken by the United States after the Confederate States surrendered, being sold and delivered to Japan in 1869.

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## Shinpachi (Jul 19, 2016)

Sorry to say but, seeing from our side, there was no such strong impression of America as UK, France, Russia and Germany or America today in the region.

Were Canadians in China too ?
I have no idea at all.


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## Old Wizard (Jul 19, 2016)

In December 1941, there were Canadian troops in Hong Kong and suffered terribly after the British defeat.


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## Shinpachi (Jul 20, 2016)

Thanks for your information, Old Wizard.


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## Just Schmidt (Aug 1, 2016)

Even if off topic I'd like to go back to the question about how the Japanese could contemplate trusting Stalin. The short answer is they didn't, and then again.

Think about it, what is the point in negotiating a non aggression pact if you don't trust the power you don't trust to any degree (except hoping the other to trust you and then stab them in the back)? As Stalin (I'm working on memory here) replied when Ribbentropp suggested their non aggression pact to last a 100 years, nobody could take that seriously as they had been involved in the moist acidly propagating against each other, so 10 years seemed more realistic. Anyway, did Hitler then really trust Stalin, and did Stalin really trust Hitler? I think they did in the short term, Barbarossa surely came as a surprise for Stalin, but arguably more the time than the willingness to break the treaty. Good sense would suggest that Great Britain should be out of the war first, and anyway I belong to those that think Stalin believed the Red Army to be stronger than the Wehrmacht. But the longer the 'capitalist' countries could fight each other, the better for USSR.

Though fighting several of the same enemies, Japan and Germany is often seen as conducting parallel wars rather than being allies in the same war. To be sure they did lend each other a hand on occasion, but any extensive real strategic cooperation was lacking. If their only goal was that the axis should win the war, close cooperation may have given them a chance, luckily we'll never know. But both powers went to war without the benefit of hindsight, and both powers had more immediate goals than winning a global conflict. Hitler seem to have hoped for a nice little war against Poland (what clever ruse by Chamberlain, strange conspiracy theorists haven't seized on that one).

Anyway apart from fighting communists, Japan had little to gain from attacking the USSR, and with the oil embargo had to fight for oil (and other critical resources) or not at all, including giving up ambitions in China. How easy it is to forget that Japan was already deeply involved in China and then decided (or at least enough Japanese decided) to fight the USA and their European and pacific friends at the same time. There's also the question whether the Japanese could really trust Hitler with his racial ideology, and Hitler the Japanese, should they ever acquire a common border.

As we all know Japan opted for the desperate (however well planned and executed) lash out at the western powers, and in the short term the peace between Japan and USSR was more or less a given. Some Japanese may have hoped that Stalin would be grateful that Japan didn't stop land lease supply over the pacific, and othervise adhered strictly to their agreement. Counting on Stalins gratitude seem worse than counting on at least a tactical willingness to adhere to formal agreements. But now we get to the Japanese late war hope of getting the USSR to mediate between Japan and the Western powers.

Well, what alternative did they have, short of surrendering unconditionally? Conversely, whet did they have to loose? Anyway they were no more trusting than still keeping a substantial army along the Soviet border, but of course that army was no real match for the by now well bloodied and equipped Red Army. One lesson learned in 39 (and I fully appreciate that neither the USSR or Japan used all available resources, although Zhukov definitely enjoyed a substantially larger amount of support from his central government than his IJA counterpart), was that especially Japanese armor wasn't up to the job. At least going by technical specifications Japanese tanks weren't impressive at any time before and during the war. Given Japans late industrialization and limited population base, it's no surprise they couldn't be in the front of technical development everywhere, and in some areas they did very well indeed.

'Trusting' Stalin in 45 on balance seem like one of the more reasonable gambles by the axis powers during the war. After all, what exactly did they stand to loose that they hadn't lost already? To be sure a large army on the Asian main land, but as observed before in this thread the means of getting the troops to where they could matter (the Japanese home isles) had by and large been lost, as well as pretty much everything else. Japanese leadership had been divided from the beginning, and it's anybody's guess what kind of negotiated peace was, or could be, contemplated. The hopes as they were may well have been as unrealistic as the hope that the western powers wouldn't risk the casualties involved in an invasion, or indeed find a viable alternative to an invasion. (They knew about the possibility of atomic bombs, as one author put it, Japan was the only main power that didn't have an atomic program for the simple reason that it had two, the army's and the navy's). If cynical (or indecisive) enough they could simply have starved them out.

Which gives me a possibility to end on-thread.

Given that the defenders eventually ran out of food and aa shells, naval dive bombers would be a marvelous economical means of destroying worthwhile targets, the main challenge being finding worthwhile targets. Not that economy in material was that big a problem for the USA at this point, but still. What a strategic target is, is partly dependent on context. If there's no more big factories, and in any case no more strategic materials to use in these factories (the aircraft and engines factories destroyed by B-29's and, as luck would have it earthquakes were in any event on the end run because of lack of raw materials). If any industry (and target) is sufficiently spread out and small scale, this could be a strictly (not to say extremely) hypothetical example on continued usefulness of dive bombers. And a suggestion that what may really have made the dive bomber obsolete is the helicopter. To briefly dig into another thread. Anyway it's hard when keeping up with this excellent forum by neccessity becomes a holiday pastime.


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## michaelmaltby (Aug 1, 2016)

"....did Hitler then really trust Stalin, and did Stalin really trust Hitler? "

The M-R agreement of September, 1939 gave both Stalin and Hitler regional leverage to move towards larger political goals ... and both men knew that each held views and long term objectives that were not mutually compatible. Ending Nomonhan in time so that M-R could be signed with Japan's Axis partners, thus 'fixing' Japan in place, revealed Stalin the chess player .... the man we would see later at Yalta and Potsdam.

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## Shinpachi (Aug 1, 2016)

If you could find the name of Soviet Union in Potsdam Declaration, I might support your theory, Just Schmidt.


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## GrauGeist (Aug 1, 2016)

Just Schmidt said:


> ...Given that the defenders eventually ran out of food and aa shells, naval dive bombers would be a marvelous economical means of destroying worthwhile targets, the main challenge being finding worthwhile targets. Not that economy in material was that big a problem for the USA at this point, but still. What a strategic target is, is partly dependent on context. If there's no more big factories, and in any case no more strategic materials to use in these factories (the aircraft and engines factories destroyed by B-29's and, as luck would have it earthquakes were in any event on the end run because of lack of raw materials). If any industry (and target) is sufficiently spread out and small scale, this could be a strictly (not to say extremely) hypothetical example on continued usefulness of dive bombers.


First of all, the defenders had not run out of food. There were shortages and hardships, but they were not laying in the streets dying like the citizens of Stalingrad or Leningrad had been.
There were also no lack of military targets across the home islands. There were shipyards, munitions factories, aircraft assembly plants, military command and communications centers, military supply depots and on and on. Add to that, the Japanese had employed civilians to produce weapons and essential components in a dispersed "cottage factory" scheme, shipping the articles to a central area for assembly.
The Japanese AA remained a potent force to be reckoned with right to the last days of the war and were exacting not only a toll on the Allied bombers, but the Allied fighter sweeps, too.
Add to that, the fact that Japan had relocated all their most modern and potent fighters to the home islands, concentrated "kamakaze" defenses at key locations (both air and naval), stockpiled munitions and supplies and were ready to aggressively repulse any attempt at Allied invasion of home soil.

So to say that Dive Bombers could have just wandered in over Japan proper and picked off targets at their leisure is completely unrealistic - had any actual attempt to do so along the lines that you're suggesting, would have been a complete disaster, even had they done so with a fighter escort.


Just Schmidt said:


> And a suggestion that what may really have made the dive bomber obsolete is the helicopter...


The helicopter wouldn't see itself as a combat platform until the Korean war and it would even still be another decade before they developed into an effective combat platform.
The only operational helicopters in WWII were:
Focke-Anglis Fa223
Flettner Fl282
Sikorsky R-4
and the IJA's autogyro, the Kayaba Ka-1
And of all of those, only the Fa223 was armed with an MG15 in a defensive nose position. (although the Fa223 and Ka-1 were equipped to drop bombs/depth-charges)

So no, helicopters were not even close to replacing the dive bomber during WWII.

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## Shortround6 (Aug 1, 2016)

Helicopters didn't really become viable close support platforms until powered with Turbine engines. The idea came much earlier but the payload/range combination was somewhat lacking with piston engines. 

"strategic bombing" by carrier aircraft really wasn't viable until the last few weeks of the war and even then the losses have to be looked at carefully.

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## Just Schmidt (Aug 2, 2016)

michaelmaltby said:


> "....did Hitler then really trust Stalin, and did Stalin really trust Hitler? "
> 
> The M-R agreement of September, 1939 gave both Stalin and Hitler regional leverage to move towards larger political goals ... and both men knew that each held views and long term objectives that were not mutually compatible. Ending Nomonhan in time so that M-R could be signed with Japan's Axis partners, thus 'fixing' Japan in place, revealed Stalin the chess player .... the man we would see later at Yalta and Potsdam.


Exactly my point, they 'trusted' it not to be broken immediately. and last as long as it was beneficial for both partners. Then again, in 1940 Stalin and Molotow clearly overplayed their hand.


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## Just Schmidt (Aug 2, 2016)

Shortround6 said:


> Helicopters didn't really become viable close support platforms until powered with Turbine engines. The idea came much earlier but the payload/range combination was somewhat lacking with piston engines.
> 
> "strategic bombing" by carrier aircraft really wasn't viable until the last few weeks of the war and even then the losses have to be looked at carefully.


This goes to both you and GG.

Again I entirely agree. My speculation was an what if, in this case that the war had continued for a year or so. I'm sorry if I didn't make that clear.

Cut off from overseas supplies, Japanese stocks of most kinds were likely to be progressively declining, not only fuel, making the proposal of pin point 'strategic' (note the qualifier) a future possibility. The cost was likely to, on average, go down.

Also to be sure the maturing of the helicopter certainly took even longer time to happen. However, I claim that the dive bombers limitation was connected to survivability (in terms of capability to survive both interception and aa fire) and specialization. Both the Val, the Dauntless and the Stuka (to mention a few) achieved remarkable results, and as platforms for highly accurate delivery of bombs i doubt they were much surpassed by never designs during the war.

Fighter bombers improved survivability, probably at the cost of precision. However they were far more versatile, and given abundance of materiel it made sense to convert fighters which in Europe were running out of targets in the air, or in the pacific was present in an increasing percentage on carrier decks because of the kamikaze threat, to an additional role that made sure available planes and pilots were being utilized more fully. The increased amount of attacks (from more planes than a special build dive bomber) and cumulative effect of more planes surviving a strike, is likely to at least to some extent make up for some loss in precision, and I'm not claiming that fighter bombers couldn't hit anything. Apart from material results is the psychological effect on ground troops being under what may to them seem like contineous attack. Air to surface rockets also seem to have improved results.

In all this I am presuming that a 'true' dive bomber is able to conduct its dive nearly vertical. Of course some confusion arises when different kinds of non horizontal bombing are considered to be dive bombing. How shallow a dive can we allow?. Rule of thump should be that a steeper dive is likely to increase precision (and probably vulnerability). In this I am assuming the Ju 88 as pin point attacker to be in practical terms less efficient than a Stuka but more than fx the Blenheim. As soon as we come to strafing, every fighter have a large inbuild potential.

Conversely the dive bomber was, if not an entirely specialized weapon, less versatile. I believe that the Dauntless being used as fighter was more a question of opportunity than policy. I may be wrong, but the situations I recall is from the pacific battles in 42 with Japanese and American formations passing each other on their respective missions. The Val is said to have been used in the same way on such occasions, I believe non of them were worth that much against fighters, even though any plane with guns shooting forward is likely to send a burst against an overshooting or otherwise 'unlucky' fighter.

What I meant in the helicopter making the dive bomber truly obsolete (not directly replacing it) was that the same kind of precision was achieved if not hugely (depending on the value of 'hugely') surpassed, though surpassed it was. Likewise a helicopter is vulnerable against well defended targets, as they compared to fighters still are sitting ducks (though I doubt even a Skua was ever that easy to down). Other improvements the helicopter offers to a dive bomber is the kind of versatility that comes with its VTOL capability. Aircraft as the A10 of course also springs to mind (and I do admit it wasn't just about to enter service in august 45). And of course the tactics being used by these machines is a world apart from the Stukas near vertical dive.


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## Just Schmidt (Aug 2, 2016)

Shinpachi said:


> If you could find the name of Soviet Union in Potsdam Declaration, I might support your theory, Just Schmidt.


Stalin certainly was at Potsdam, but as not being at war with Japan USSR wasn't included in the declaration.

That's was why he was the man to ask (or USSR the country). It was one of the only possibilities still open, however much it was grasping at straws. On the other hand, the initiative hardly could make matters worse, and of course Stalin was going to attack anyway to earn a right to be included in the next talks, even if he was also delivering on an old promise. He got quite busy after Hiroshima, even if the attack was long planned.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 2, 2016)

DIve bombing lost a lot of it's appeal as light automatic cannon proliferated. DIve bombing gets it's accuracy from a steady speed (that's what the dive brakes are for) steady course (minor corrections aside) dive lasting thousands of feet with a pull out just high enough to ensure the dive bomber does not hit the ground. Ensuring means that there is hundreds of feet (if not over a thousand) of margin of error. It also keeps the dive bomber out of small arms fire for the most part. This meant that the dive bombers flight path, even after dropping it's bomb/s was rather predictable. As light AA progressed from rifle caliber machine guns on pintle mounts to 12.7-13mm guns and 20-25mm cannon to 37-40mm cannon capable of firing 120-160rpm dive bombing became much more dangerous. The large increase in scale of issue didn't help the dive bomber either. A 5-6 G pull out bleeds off a lot of speed which also doesn't help the dive bombers chances against AA. 
Raising the height of the release and pull out helps avoid the lighter AA and reduces the firing time and accuracy of the bigger stuff (big being the 37-40mm) but also reduces the accuracy of the bombs. 
Most of the dive bombers successes were early in the war against light AA although even then the handwriting was on the wall. Allied attempts to bomb the German bridges/bridgeheads in France for instance even though not true dive bombing attacks. 
Against high value targets the risk was thought to be worth the gain (how many dive bombers lost for an enemy carrier or cruiser or bridge) but as a general army support weapon it was losing ground. How many aircraft lost for a road junction that could be driven around in short order? Or suppressing an artillery battery for a short period of time (destroying the guns took almost a direct hit).
Trading aircraft for trucks was losing game unless the losses were really lopsided. 

Different countries often viewed the aircraft differently. The Dauntless was an "SBD" _SCOUT _BOMBER. Not a "BSD" bomber scout. 
It could perform long range recon/search missions carrying max fuel, it could perform "armed reconnaissance" carrying a 500lb bomb with a bit less fuel (less range) and could perform strike missions with 1000lb bombs or multiple bombs at even shorter distances. Heavier loads came later and the really large bomb loads listed in some sources should be take with a large dose of salt. Possible but range/radius is likely to be minimal. 
The VAL had similar duties, the JU 87 did not. 
Use of dive bombers as fighters was due to desperation and positive results depended a lot on luck and circumstances. The few times Dauntless were actually launched with the idea of flying patrols instead of firing at targets of opportunity it was as anti-torpedo plane patrols which obviously limited the altitude and speed of the intended targets (Kates). 

The Helicopter as a true attack platform (and not just a few MGs strapped to it or firing out the door) was 10-15 years after the dive bomber went out of favor. (Skyraiders aside and they weren't true dive bombers). They also required a new generation of rockets and guided missiles to become effective (stand off weapons) instead of iron bombs.

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## Shinpachi (Aug 2, 2016)

Just Schmidt said:


> Stalin certainly was at Potsdam, but as not being at war with Japan USSR wasn't included in the declaration.
> 
> That's was why he was the man to ask (or USSR the country). It was one of the only possibilities still open, however much it was grasping at straws. On the other hand, the initiative hardly could make matters worse, and of course Stalin was going to attack anyway to earn a right to be included in the next talks, even if he was also delivering on an old promise. He got quite busy after Hiroshima, even if the attack was long planned.



How could Japanese leaders know such hindsight as you mention in above ever without spies there ?
No name of Soviet Union in the declaration simply meant Soviet Union was still neutral.
Therefore they trusted Stalin on mediation for the peace talk with the allies.

For your satisfaction, Just Schmidt,
The "they" meant Kantaro Suzuki and Fumimaro Konoe who were closer to Emperor Hirohito.
The army regarded them suckers but no ways as being defeated in the war.

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## tyrodtom (Aug 2, 2016)

Even without spies, why would they think Stalin would not be a Potsdam ?
It was on Russian conquered and occupied territory, and every other major power was there and represented by their leaders.

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## Shinpachi (Aug 2, 2016)

Must not a host be neutral ?
Makes no sense.

PS:
Edited from "Must a host join either side of Axis or Allied" to above.


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## Shinpachi (Aug 2, 2016)

Come on tyrodtom.


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## Shinpachi (Aug 2, 2016)

What was the point which Just Schmidt wondered ?
I do hate off-topic of off-topic.


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## Just Schmidt (Aug 2, 2016)

Shinpachi said:


> How could Japanese leaders know such hindsight as you mention in above ever without spies there ?
> No name of Soviet Union in the declaration simply meant Soviet Union was still neutral.
> Therefore they trusted Stalin on mediation for the peace talk with the allies.
> 
> ...


There's lot I could blame the Japanese leadership for, but I'm not blaming them for trying an option seemingly open to them. It made sense. Im not a native English speaker either, and I'm sorry if i don't always succeed in making my points clear. And of course they couldn't be sure of Stalins intentions. Few people could at any time.

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## Shinpachi (Aug 2, 2016)

I am glad if you kindly understood how our situation was, Just Schmidt

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## Just Schmidt (Aug 2, 2016)

Shinpachi said:


> What was the point which Just Schmidt wondered ?
> I do hate off-topic of off-topic.


Our msg's crossed each other. I'm sorry for the off topic part, what i was commenting was someone (in this tread) asked how the Japanese leadership could trust Stalin. I commented that it was probably not so much a matter of trust (but maybe hope), but of exploring any possible option. And observed that the cost of failure connected with this initiative was extremely small, as Stalin would have launched the Red army at Manchuria anyway.


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## Just Schmidt (Aug 2, 2016)

Shinpachi said:


> I am glad if you kindly understood how our situation was, Just Schmidt


I'm trying, but not being there I never fully can.

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## michaelmaltby (Aug 2, 2016)

Shin, you inquired about Canadians in China, and I only just saw your inquiry .  Other than seamen who may have served on New England Yankee Clippers ... I don't think Canadians were trading with China ... Chinese items would have come to Canada as trade with Britain.

However, one Canadian who is a national hero and revered in China is Communist Doctor Norman Bethune.
Norman Bethune - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. 
Seen here in China in 1939. Interesting read.


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## tyrodtom (Aug 2, 2016)

Anyone of that era who thought Stalin would be neutral at Potsdam, because he was the host, would have to be extremely naïve, or under the influence of wishful thinking..


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## Shinpachi (Aug 2, 2016)

michaelmaltby said:


> Shin, you inquired about Canadians in China, and I only just saw your inquiry .  Other than seamen who may have served on New England Yankee Clippers ... I don't think Canadians were trading with China ... Chinese items would have come to Canada as trade with Britain.
> 
> However, one Canadian who is a national hero and revered in China is Communist Doctor Norman Bethune.
> Norman Bethune - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
> ...



I've just read the article.
I wonder how many people know about him today.
Thank you very much for your precious information.

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## Shinpachi (Aug 2, 2016)

tyrodtom said:


> Anyone of that era who thought Stalin would be neutral at Potsdam, because he was the host, would have to be extremely naïve, or under the influence of wishful thinking..



A person who owns accurate knowledge about the past is irreplaceable.
Please take care of your health and keep enlightening people as longer as possible, tyrodtom.


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## GrauGeist (Aug 2, 2016)

Just Schmidt said:


> This goes to both you and GG.
> 
> Again I entirely agree. My speculation was an what if, in this case that the war had continued for a year or so. I'm sorry if I didn't make that clear.
> 
> Cut off from overseas supplies, Japanese stocks of most kinds were likely to be progressively declining, not only fuel, making the proposal of pin point 'strategic' (note the qualifier) a future possibility. The cost was likely to, on average, go down.


Again, the Japanese were ready to go the distance - every soldier, airman and sailor. Every man, woman and child.
They were prepared to sacrifice themselves to the end. Dwindling food stocks, lack of home heating or cooking fuel, any of that was all part of the sacrifice, right down to meeting the Allied invaders on the beach armed with sharp sticks.



Just Schmidt said:


> Also to be sure the maturing of the helicopter certainly took even longer time to happen. However, I claim that the dive bombers limitation was connected to survivability (in terms of capability to survive both interception and aa fire) and specialization. Both the Val, the Dauntless and the Stuka (to mention a few) achieved remarkable results, and as platforms for highly accurate delivery of bombs i doubt they were much surpassed by never designs during the war.


As has been mentioned earlier, the Divebomber was no longer a viable option as anti-aircraft weapons improved during the war. Sending in TBM/TBF Divebombers against Japanese targets, whether inland or coastal, would have been a suicide mission. The Japanese had solid AA defenses and advanced fighters on the homeland and would have used them to devestating effect against Divebombers. Keep in mind that the second atomic bombing mission "nearly" got intercepted. This was in the closing weeks of the war.



Just Schmidt said:


> Fighter bombers improved survivability, probably at the cost of precision. However they were far more versatile, and given abundance of materiel it made sense to convert fighters which in Europe were running out of targets in the air, or in the pacific was present in an increasing percentage on carrier decks because of the kamikaze threat, to an additional role that made sure available planes and pilots were being utilized more fully. The increased amount of attacks (from more planes than a special build dive bomber) and cumulative effect of more planes surviving a strike, is likely to at least to some extent make up for some loss in precision, and I'm not claiming that fighter bombers couldn't hit anything. Apart from material results is the psychological effect on ground troops being under what may to them seem like contineous attack. Air to surface rockets also seem to have improved results.


There were many types available late in the war, used to good effect against Japanese targets. These would be most U.S. Naval types (F4U, F6F, etc.), U.S. Army types (P-51, P-47, etc.) and the medium bombers like the A-26, B-25 and B-26 - add to that, the gunship varients of the A-26 and B-25 that could lay down devestating firepower against shipping, structures and troop concentrations. The advantage of the types I mentioned above, is that they were fast, hard-hitting and presented a difficult target against defenders.



Just Schmidt said:


> In all this I am presuming that a 'true' dive bomber is able to conduct its dive nearly vertical. Of course some confusion arises when different kinds of non horizontal bombing are considered to be dive bombing. How shallow a dive can we allow?. Rule of thump should be that a steeper dive is likely to increase precision (and probably vulnerability). In this I am assuming the Ju 88 as pin point attacker to be in practical terms less efficient than a Stuka but more than fx the Blenheim. As soon as we come to strafing, every fighter have a large inbuild potential.


The Ju87 was one of the few truly vertical Divebombers, but even with that ability, it did not prevent defensive AA from shooting them down. The SBD was a solid diver at close to 70 degrees, but again, not invincible to defensive fire.
As has been mentioned, a Divebomber aquires it's target from altitude, deployes it's brakes and goes into it's dive. The length of the dive, the consistant speed and subsequent pullout make it an easy target for defenders.



Just Schmidt said:


> Conversely the dive bomber was, if not an entirely specialized weapon, less versatile. I believe that the Dauntless being used as fighter was more a question of opportunity than policy. I may be wrong, but the situations I recall is from the pacific battles in 42 with Japanese and American formations passing each other on their respective missions. The Val is said to have been used in the same way on such occasions, I believe non of them were worth that much against fighters, even though any plane with guns shooting forward is likely to send a burst against an overshooting or otherwise 'unlucky' fighter.


The SBD was designed and built at a time when Scouting aircraft were the "eyes" of the fleet - it was a multi-purpose aircraft and was certainly more capable of defending itself from enemy fighters than most dedicated Divebombers.



Just Schmidt said:


> What I meant in the helicopter making the dive bomber truly obsolete (not directly replacing it) was that the same kind of precision was achieved if not hugely (depending on the value of 'hugely') surpassed, though surpassed it was. Likewise a helicopter is vulnerable against well defended targets, as they compared to fighters still are sitting ducks (though I doubt even a Skua was ever that easy to down). Other improvements the helicopter offers to a dive bomber is the kind of versatility that comes with its VTOL capability. Aircraft as the A10 of course also springs to mind (and I do admit it wasn't just about to enter service in august 45). And of course the tactics being used by these machines is a world apart from the Stukas near vertical dive.


The helicopters of that time period were slow, clumsy and powered by piston engines. It would not be until the 1960's, when next generation jet engines proved to be a far better means of powering helicopters - this in turn allowed them to become a formidible battlefield component. But again, this wouldn't be until the 1960's.

There were far more STOL aircraft used in a ground attack capacity during WWII than helicopters and it pretty much would remain that way until the Vietnam war.

As for the "A10" reference, I think you meant the Douglas A-1 Skyraider?

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## Just Schmidt (Aug 2, 2016)

As for the "A10" reference, I think you meant the Douglas A-1 Skyraider?[/QUOTE]
Grau Geist I said I believed you to be right, and I'll stand by that.

Let me reiterate that I never claimed helicopters to be used in tactical capacity during the war. I meant the kind of precision achievable by dive bombers wasn't achieved again before helicopters were able to do the job even better ( in quite different ways and long after the war). They really are relatively vulnerable too. The delivering one bomb on a small hard target in a surgical strike was largely abandoned altogether. A lot of bombs dropped with less precision could (statistically) do the same, and you mention the airplanes that were there to do it. For strafing, to name one example, fighterbombers and dedicated ground attack aircraft (and other aircraft packed with extra guns) were better than most dive bombers, if not all.

I was of course wrong that remarkable precision wasn't achievable by other means. Remotely controlled bombs (not sure if I get the term right) was first used on the surrendering Italian fleet in 43, if memory serves, though later models became increasingly sofisticated and probably will improve even further. Though the V-1 (Fi 103) can be seen as the first cruise missile, it can hardly be called accurate. I get the impression the modern ones can be quite accurate, and therefore the helicopter is only one of several bids for solutions to the same problem. A long time after.
It was also in that vein I thought about the Fairchild Republic A-10 Thunderbolt. More a dedicated ground attack aircraft I'll grant, but with emphasis on effective delivery rather than ability to avoid damage from ground based defense systems. All weapons systems are compromises.

As for facing an invasion with pointed sticks, I believe a great many Japanese soldiers would have done it. However (and mind you not already in fall 45) starving people wields sticks less efficiently, and people already starved to death dosn't at all. But I can't say with confidence that japan could have been starved into unconditional surrender.


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## gjs238 (Aug 2, 2016)

Uncle Joe would not have allowed the Japanese to suffer from isolation and starvation - he would have "saved" or "liberated" them.

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## wuzak (Aug 2, 2016)

GrauGeist said:


> Sending in TBM/TBF Divebombers against Japanese targets, whether inland or coastal, would have been a suicide mission.



The TBF/TBM was not a dive bomber, but a torpedo and level bomber.


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## GrauGeist (Aug 2, 2016)

wuzak said:


> The TBF/TBM was not a dive bomber, but a torpedo and level bomber.


Yes, I should change that, because I meant SB2C.

I had been reading about the TBM earlier and it must have sabatoged my train of thought!


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## DocB (Feb 12, 2017)

XBe02Drvr said:


> From an operational standpoint, I think B-29s on Attu would have been a disaster. Heavy weights, high landing speeds, short slippery runways with obstacles at the ends and no precision instrument approach system. Venturas and Harpoons are far more nimble airplanes than B-29s, which is hugely important if you have to fly a non-precision instrument approach in the fog into a short runway in mountainous terrain. Been there, done that. Piece of cake in a 1900 or a 99 or a King Air. Whole different animal in a Herc, a P-3, or any of the four engine piston pounders. It's all about weight, speed, turning radius, and climb gradient on the departure or the missed approach.


A very interesting thread, gentlemen! I am new to the forum, and with your permission, would like to add a couple of facts: B-29s, indeed, would be a disaster to operate from Attu with its mountains and short runways. This is why an airfield at flat neighboring island of Shemya was built, specifically to accommodate B-29s to support invasion from the North (Operation "Keelblocks"). (BTW, it still remains the only major operational airfield in the Western Aleutians). However, as it was rightfully noted, the range of B-29s was not enough to fly much farther than Hokkaido. So, the Americans kept asking Stalin for base rights in Kamchatka and Soviet Primorye for refueling. But since Uncle Joe was quite firm not to break neutrality with Japan, the plans to use B-29s were abandoned by the end of summer 1944. Plans of invasion were re-written in the summer 1944 (Operation "Keelblocks II") with the thoughts to bypass Shimushu and Paramushiro, and build an airfield suitable for B-29s on Matsuwa Island in the Central Kuriles. This would still require use of Soviet bases. But by December 1944, with advances in the South Pacific, the whole idea of invasion from the North was abandoned, and plans were revised again (Operation "Keelblocks III") It would be a scaled-down operation to provide the air and naval support to the Soviet troops in their attack on Japan using the port and the airfield in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky. We all know the rest. Some more info on the subject: North Pacific Skies

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## DocB (Feb 12, 2017)

Also, if I may suggest, there are two excellent books on what has been discussed above:


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## Zipper730 (Feb 14, 2017)

FLYBOYJ said:


> As bad as it sounds, the politicians did not allow the US to win - look at the both wars and the US fought with both arms tied behind its back.


I'm confused, I didn't know there was anywhere near as much restraint in Korea as Vietnam.

As for Vietnam, it's my opinion that we should have never been there as the British told us it'd fail (and they had experience with such things): Sure we could have bombed every city into fiery ruin without even dropping a nuke with our B-52's and probably a great number of fighter bombers.



GrauGeist said:


> The Japanese had solid AA defenses and advanced fighters on the homeland and would have used them to devestating effect against Divebombers.


What altitudes could the AAA go up to?


> Keep in mind that the second atomic bombing mission "nearly" got intercepted. This was in the closing weeks of the war.


Can you give me more detail?


> The SBD was designed and built at a time when Scouting aircraft were the "eyes" of the fleet - it was a multi-purpose aircraft and was certainly more capable of defending itself from enemy fighters than most dedicated Divebombers.


So it was supposed to be carrier recon?


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## GrauGeist (Feb 14, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> I'm confused, I didn't know there was anywhere near as much restraint in Korea as Vietnam.
> 
> As for Vietnam, it's my opinion that we should have never been there as the British told us it'd fail (and they had experience with such things): Sure we could have bombed every city into fiery ruin without even dropping a nuke with our B-52's and probably a great number of fighter bombers.


I'll comment on this, even thought it was in response to FlyBoyJ...
The U.S. was involved in Korea because of the French and British failure to re-establish authority over former colonies at the conclusion of WWII. It was such a bad situation, that they actually remobilized the Japanese in several precincts, as the Japanese already had established infrastructure. It was actually Japanese troops that saw the first part of armed conflict as the situation in Korea deteriorated and then the situation escalated into the Korean war.

Enter French Indo-China (aka Vietnam). It was Ho Chi-Minh, who was trained as a guerilla fighter against the Japanese, that turned on the French as they tried to recover control over their former Colony, that ignited the Vietnam War.

In both cases, the U.S. was drug into the conflicts because of ties to Allies and the U.N. but because of politics (and perpetual U.N. passive mediations), was limited in the amount of force needed to suppress the enemy.
Case in Point: the USS New Jersey was recalled after hammering the eff out of North Korean positions, because the North Koreans complained to the U.N. and it was determined that the Jersey was "unfair & unconventional" and demanded that she had to be withdrawn. 

In both cases, the U.S. should NOT have been there, it wasn't our problem and it wasn't our fight, but obligations to Allies and the U.N. was the black hole that sucked us in.

I'll leave it at that, and Joe can expand on it if he likes, but you get the picture.



Zipper730 said:


> What altitudes could the AAA go up to?


While Japanese AA was not as concerted as German AA, it was still very capable.
They had several layout patterns for their installations and these would include a blend of types: 75mm, 105mm, 120mm and 155mm.

That were able to easily reach altitudes of 26 to 30,000 feet and there were many reports from B-17 and B-29 crews that verified that Japanese AA was reaching their altitudes of 32,000 feet and even witnessed bursts as high as 36,000 feet.
I should add that the AA batteries were also protected by a perimeter of 7mm and 13mm MGs as well as 20mm and 25mm pom-pom to protect the batteries from low altitude attack.



Zipper730 said:


> Can you give me more detail?


Shinpachi gave the account and it's been a long time since the discussion, but in summary, there was a lone patrol on the morning of the Nagasaki mission. The pilot (Shinpachi has his name and Sentai info) spotted the B-29 and thought it to be an American recon mission (there was actually several B-29s per Atomic mission) and disregarded it. However, he was at altitude and in a position where he could have intercepted the unescorted B-29s as they turned towards Nagasaki.

But as luck would have it...



Zipper730 said:


> So it was supposed to be carrier recon?


Any USN aircraft that had the prefix "S" was intended for Scouting duties as one of their primary missions.

Curtiss SOC-3 for example, shows it's primary mission is Scouting.

The Douglas SBD was a Scouting Bomber and while it was designed as a Dive-Bomber, it's designed purpose was an armed Scout.

In those, the scouts were the eyes of the fleet, no matter who had radar and who did not.

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## tomo pauk (Feb 14, 2017)

GrauGeist said:


> I'll comment on this, even thought it was in response to FlyBoyJ...
> The U.S. was involved in Korea because of the French and British failure to re-establish authority over former colonies at the conclusion of WWII. It was such a bad situation, that they actually remobilized the Japanese in several precincts, as the Japanese already had established infrastructure. It was actually Japanese troops that saw the first part of armed conflict as the situation in Korea deteriorated and then the situation escalated into the Korean war.
> ...



Dave - French and British can be accused of this or that, but Korea was not within either countrie's sphere of influence, let alone a former colony of those countries. Korea was a place where Russian/Soviet, Chinese and Japanese influences over-lapped, many times the Koreans drawing a short straw in the process.

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## XBe02Drvr (Feb 14, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> I'm confused, I didn't know there was anywhere near as much restraint in Korea as Vietnam.
> 
> As for Vietnam, it's my opinion that we should have never been there as the British told us it'd fail (and they had experience with such things): Sure we could have bombed every city into fiery ruin without even dropping a nuke with our B-52's and probably a great number of fighter bombers.
> Can you give me more detail?
> So it was supposed to be carrier recon?


The big worry in Korea, especially after the Chinese jumped in, was that the Soviet Union would get directly involved and escalate a regional conflict into World War lll. We had abruptly demobilized after War ll, and had neither the preparation nor the stomach for another big one.
In Vietnam, Kennedy, Johnson, and especially McNamara started out helping a (not very worthy) ally stem what they thought was a minor insurgency, and just couldn't comprehend the facts on the ground and the level of commitment of the Vietnamese people to unification. They clung to the illusion that by manipulating military actions and diplomatic initiatives they could discourage the North from their unification campaign.
The Dauntless was spec-ed and designed at a time when there weren't a lot of long range patrol options available to the fleet. PBY-class aircraft were just coming into being, and battleships and cruisers each had a couple of seaplanes, but a carrier's flock of scout bombers were the backbone of the fleet's search capabilities.
Cheers
Wes


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## swampyankee (Feb 15, 2017)

I think the USN had always thought of its aircraft as multi-mission platforms, possibly more so than the USAAC, as carriers were more limited in what they could carry than land bases. The USN did have a shot at scout-fighters, in the Grumman SF, and one wonders how that would have played out had the navy continued that into the monoplane world. Reportedly, the SF gave very little performance away compared to the F2F, and a two-seat, high performance aircraft would have been an interesting basis for a night fighter


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## Shortround6 (Feb 15, 2017)

Given the amount of drag this thing had, the 2nd cockpit wasn't that big a deal. Difference between the FF-1 and the SF-1 was pretty much equipment in the cockpit/s. 
It did evolve to a scout bomber version 




but Curtiss got the contract.


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## yulzari (Feb 15, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> As for Vietnam, it's my opinion that we should have never been there as the British told us it'd fail (and they had experience with such things)



The advice, allegedly, was more along the lines of '_first change the government of South Vietnam into something that the people might support_'. Regime change was a traditional British strategy as a cheaper way to achieve goals and with less casualties. Then harry and isolate the Vietcong on the ground so that they have to concentrate upon survival not attack. Fire power is not a substitute for an infantry/intelligence/police war.

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## XBe02Drvr (Feb 15, 2017)

yulzari said:


> The advice, allegedly, was more along the lines of '_first change the government of South Vietnam into something that the people might support_'. Ngo Dinh Diem, Nguyen Cao Ki, "Big Minh": we just never could get that regime change thing right.
> 
> 
> Fire power is not a substitute for an infantry/intelligence/police war.



The day we acknowledged the failure of the special forces war and started sending in poorly trained, scared shitless draftees, our goose was cooked.
Cheers,
Wes

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## GregP (Feb 15, 2017)

Not to kick a dead horse, but somewhere back early in this long topic someone said a B-29 was hauling a very light bomb load. Something on the order of 6,000 pounds or so. It would take an hour to find it.

Here is a link to a B-29A manual:

http://www.alternatewars.com/SAC/B-29A_Superfortress_SAC_-_19_April_1950.pdf

On page 4 it show s 20,000 pound bomb load could be hauled 2,583 miles, for a radius of 1,428 miles. There are 3 other missions shown with 10,000 pound bomb loads, but I have seen earlier WWII manuals with many missions at 15,000 pound bomb load and some impressive ranges.

Not saying anything except the B-29 could haul a LOT of bombs if the situation required it to do so.


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## FLYBOYJ (Feb 15, 2017)

GrauGeist said:


> I'll comment on this, even thought it was in response to FlyBoyJ...
> The U.S. was involved in Korea because of the French and British failure to re-establish authority over former colonies at the conclusion of WWII. It was such a bad situation, that they actually remobilized the Japanese in several precincts, as the Japanese already had established infrastructure. It was actually Japanese troops that saw the first part of armed conflict as the situation in Korea deteriorated and then the situation escalated into the Korean war.
> 
> Enter French Indo-China (aka Vietnam). It was Ho Chi-Minh, who was trained as a guerilla fighter against the Japanese, that turned on the French as they tried to recover control over their former Colony, that ignited the Vietnam War.
> ...



Couldn't have said it better myself!

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## Robert Porter (Feb 15, 2017)

That has always been one of my pet peeves, yes treaty obligations dragged us in, but as soon as active French participation evaporated so should our own involvement. Over and over, we (the US) and every other European power has paid the price for failed colonial exploitation. I agree, we had no business there and we paid a huge price in blood for what was essentially a lost cause.


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## Zipper730 (Feb 15, 2017)

GrauGeist said:


> I'll comment on this, even thought it was in response to FlyBoyJ...


I'm mostly just interested in the historical facts...


> The U.S. was involved in Korea because of the French and British failure to re-establish authority over former colonies at the conclusion of WWII. It was such a bad situation, that they actually remobilized the Japanese in several precincts, as the Japanese already had established infrastructure.


That's weird, but interesting


> It was actually Japanese troops that saw the first part of armed conflict as the situation in Korea deteriorated and then the situation escalated into the Korean war.


Wow


> Enter French Indo-China (aka Vietnam). It was Ho Chi-Minh, who was trained as a guerilla fighter against the Japanese, that turned on the French as they tried to recover control over their former Colony, that ignited the Vietnam War.


Didn't he come to the US at some point?


> In both cases, the U.S. was drug into the conflicts because of ties to Allies and the U.N. but because of politics (and perpetual U.N. passive mediations), was limited in the amount of force needed to suppress the enemy.


Basically we were drawn in over alliances to other nations.


> Case in Point: the USS New Jersey was recalled after hammering the eff out of North Korean positions, because the North Koreans complained to the U.N. and it was determined that the Jersey was "unfair & unconventional" and demanded that she had to be withdrawn.


How was it unfair and how was it unconventional?


> In both cases, the U.S. should NOT have been there, it wasn't our problem and it wasn't our fight, but obligations to Allies and the U.N. was the black hole that sucked us in.


Some people subscribe to the attitude that right lies in force...


> While Japanese AA was not as concerted as German AA, it was still very capable.
> They had several layout patterns for their installations and these would include a blend of types: 75mm, 105mm, 120mm and 155mm.


I would assume one or two hits from any of those would be fatal?


> That were able to easily reach altitudes of 26 to 30,000 feet and there were many reports from B-17 and B-29 crews that verified that Japanese AA was reaching their altitudes of 32,000 feet and even witnessed bursts as high as 36,000 feet.


I didn't know that


> I should add that the AA batteries were also protected by a perimeter of 7mm and 13mm MGs as well as 20mm and 25mm pom-pom to protect the batteries from low altitude attack.


So basically light stuff on the outside to the big stuff in the middle?


> Shinpachi gave the account and it's been a long time since the discussion, but in summary, there was a lone patrol on the morning of the Nagasaki mission. The pilot (Shinpachi has his name and Sentai info) spotted the B-29 and thought it to be an American recon mission (there was actually several B-29s per Atomic mission) and disregarded it. However, he was at altitude and in a position where he could have intercepted the unescorted B-29s as they turned towards Nagasaki.
> 
> But as luck would have it...


I didn't know we had multiple planes for atomic missions: I did know we had the bomber and a plane in trail and offset to the side...


> Any USN aircraft that had the prefix "S" was intended for Scouting duties as one of their primary missions.


I always thought scouting was predominantly artillery direction...


> Curtiss SOC-3 for example, shows it's primary mission is Scouting.


I never understood the SO designation as they were overlapping, but if scouting is non-photographic reconnaissance, and O was artillery direction it makes perfect sense.


> The Douglas SBD was a Scouting Bomber and while it was designed as a Dive-Bomber, it's designed purpose was an armed Scout.


It was designed as a dive-bomber first (Northrop's BT, which was then modified into the BT-2, then the SBD)


> In those, the scouts were the eyes of the fleet, no matter who had radar and who did not.


Did the Japanese have scouts of this sort?



tomo pauk said:


> Dave - French and British can be accused of this or that, but Korea was not within either countrie's sphere of influence, let alone a former colony of those countries. Korea was a place where Russian/Soviet, Chinese and Japanese influences over-lapped, many times the Koreans drawing a short straw in the process.


So you have a sort of Venn diagram where the PRC and USSR cris-crossed each other?



XBe02Drvr said:


> The big worry in Korea, especially after the Chinese jumped in, was that the Soviet Union would get directly involved and escalate a regional conflict into World War lll.


As they were both communist powers.


> We had abruptly demobilized after War ll, and had neither the preparation nor the stomach for another big one.


What was the motivation for the demobilization? I'm pretty sure I know the answer (so draftees can go home to their families, and we could throttle down military costs)


> In Vietnam, Kennedy, Johnson, and especially McNamara started out helping a (not very worthy) ally stem what they thought was a minor insurgency, and just couldn't comprehend the facts on the ground and the level of commitment of the Vietnamese people to unification.


Why did they not comprehend?


> They clung to the illusion that by manipulating military actions and diplomatic initiatives they could discourage the North from their unification campaign.


Why?


> The Dauntless was spec-ed and designed at a time when there weren't a lot of long range patrol options available to the fleet. PBY-class aircraft were just coming into being, and battleships and cruisers each had a couple of seaplanes, but a carrier's flock of scout bombers were the backbone of the fleet's search capabilities.


Okay, I get it now...



swampyankee said:


> I think the USN had always thought of its aircraft as multi-mission platforms


There's logic to that


> possibly more so than the USAAC


I think it was just in different ways

The USN merged level-bombing and torpedo bombing from the outset it seems into one aircraft type (TBs), by the late 1930's they'd decided to merge the dive-bomber and scout role together into the scout-bomber (SB), though they'd tried merging scout's and fighters into scout-fighters (SF), as well as increasing the capability of fighters to carry dive-bomber loads (F11C to BFC/BF2C) before just reclassifying them as regular fighters again (the exception was that Cruisers, Battlecruisers, and Battleships, had the Scout and Observation roles merged into Scout/Observation or SO).

As time went on the level-bomber component of the dive-bomber mission was seen as largely useless, the torpedo role persisted for a little bit longer, but the torpedo-bomber planes found themselves being used as ASW, AEW, and COD's (level bombing did see effectiveness in land-based campaigns), the dive-bombers eventually were joined together with the torpedo-bomber role (there was some toying with a torpedo-bomber scout or TS), and starting in 1946 dive-bombers, dive-bomber/torpedo-bombers, torpedo-bombers, and anti-submarine warfare aircraft were stuffed into the attack-mission.

Eventually the multi-role torpedo bomber planes were developed into specialized COD's and AEW's as time went on.


> The USN did have a shot at scout-fighters, in the Grumman SF, and one wonders how that would have played out had the navy continued that into the monoplane world.


Did they require two man crews?



yulzari said:


> The advice, allegedly, was more along the lines of '_first change the government of South Vietnam into something that the people might support_'.


I did not know that, but that does make sense (in this author's opinion, it seems preferable to avoid sticking one's nose where it doesn't belong unless absolutely necessary because of the cost in human life, and generates enmity that all too often results in blow-back) to change the regime into something the public would accept rather than the ham-handed job we did.


> Regime change was a traditional British strategy as a cheaper way to achieve goals and with less casualties.


Correct, though if I recall they had problems with the Malayans...


> Then harry and isolate the Vietcong on the ground so that they have to concentrate upon survival not attack. Fire power is not a substitute for an infantry/intelligence/police war.


True


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## yulzari (Feb 15, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> Correct, though if I recall they had problems with the Malayans...
> True


The Malayans were no problem. It was the Chinese communists. Under Chin Peng aka Ong Boon Hua who was appointed to the Order of the British Empire (OBE) for his work against the Japanese before he turned terrorist. 

It was easier in Malaya when his support was principally from only one of the four principal ethnic groups and principally from the urban members at that. Easily isolated and penetrated by Intelligence, forced to withdraw into the jungle and chased around by specialist troops. To be fair taking communist heads by Iban trackers was a bit non PC.

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## Zipper730 (Feb 15, 2017)

yulzari said:


> The Malayans were no problem. It was the Chinese communists. Under Chin Peng aka Ong Boon Hua who was appointed to the Order of the British Empire (OBE) for his work against the Japanese before he turned terrorist.


What's OBE (I've seen it a lot), and why did he turn terrorist?


> It was easier in Malaya when his support was principally from only one of the four principal ethnic groups and principally from the urban members at that. Easily isolated and penetrated by Intelligence, forced to withdraw into the jungle and chased around by specialist troops. To be fair taking communist heads by Iban trackers was a bit non PC.


What do you mean not PC?


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## fubar57 (Feb 15, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> What's OBE (I've seen it a lot), and why did he turn terrorist?
> What do you mean not PC?



GOOGLE

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## Zipper730 (Feb 15, 2017)

So it's a type of perage?


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## Robert Porter (Feb 15, 2017)

Good grief yes!


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## Zipper730 (Feb 15, 2017)

Okay, back to topic


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## swampyankee (Feb 16, 2017)

It's always fun to blame the UN, but in Korea, it was more the US dragging the UN in than vice versa. 

Also, not every military action is a total war against an existential threat. Not intervening in Korea would have been embarrassing, and possibly cause the US be seen as abandoning the world,as it did post-WWI, but there wouldn't have been stalinists taking over Alabama or California, nor would Red Chinese troops be coming ashore in Washington.

Back on topic.

I'm not quite sure where to put the dividing line between tactical and strategic bombing (is attacking the yard where ships are built tactical or strategic? How about the facilities at a naval base?), but I think it's arguable that the USAAF's emphasis on strategic bombardment resulted in a broadly-based tendency to view it as the _only_ tool, instead of part of an armamentarium of methods to bring defeat to an enemy. In the war against Japan, we saw the USN and its allies using a mix of direct combat and strategic warfare -- submarines attacking shipping, for instance -- to defeat Japan. Late in the war, that would have involved direct attacks by USN aircraft on "strategic" targets, like factories or powerplants. Is it "tactical" when it's a dive bomber but strategic if it's a B-29?

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## Shortround6 (Feb 16, 2017)

About the only time attacking an aircraft factory is tactical is if your Army is sitting across the street/down the block and the factory building is being used as a defensive position. 

Definitions of strategy and tactics (and grand tactics) have changed out of necessity over the years. 
For example 
"_To repeat. Strategy is the art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole theater of operations. Grand Tactics is the art of posting troops upon the battle-field according to the accidents of the ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the ground, in contradistinction to planning upon a map. Its operations may extend over a field of ten or twelve miles in extent. Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point; grand tactics decides the manner of execution and the employment of the troops._" *Antoine-Henri, Baron de Jomini*, 1838.

and "_...there are other operations of a mixed nature, such as passages of streams, retreats, surprises, disembarkations, convoys, winter quarters, the execution of which belongs to tactics, the conception and arrangement to strategy_."

Obviously the scale of operations in time and distance from the end of Napoleonic wars to WW II changed considerably with the changes in transportation and communications. 

One might argue that bombing the enemy's means of production it strategic or grand strategic. Deciding to bomb airframe factories vs engine factories or oil production _might _be grand tactics while deciding wither to use low altitude bombers vs high altitude bombers or HE bombs vs incendiaries is a tactical decision. 

Now notice the change in meaning of the word _tactical_ between the 1st sentence of this post the the last sentence of the previous paragraph. 

I think we often get hung up on the words and don't consider the context or situation.


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## ChrisMcD (Feb 16, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> What's OBE (I've seen it a lot)



"Order of the British Empire" - hence the irony!

Usually taken to be "Other Buggers Efforts"


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## ChrisMcD (Feb 16, 2017)

I know the Brits can be blamed for meddling in most countries that had a seaboard, but I am fairly confident that we had very little to do with Korea!

AFAIK Swampyankee is right that the US dragged the UN into the Korean war. But, it was a question of grasping an opportunity. The Russians had walked out of the security council and their veto power was not invoked at the critical vote.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 84 - Wikipedia

Also, on Malaya, we just wanted to hand the country back to the majority population with minimal bloodshed after the debacle with the partitioning of India and Pakistan. OK, special circumstances, but we did win a jungle guerrilla war!


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## Zipper730 (Feb 16, 2017)

swampyankee said:


> Also, not every military action is a total war against an existential threat.


That was often the problem with independent air-forces... their operations were based often around the idea of total war.


> Not intervening in Korea would have been embarrassing, and possibly cause the US be seen as abandoning the world,as it did post-WWI, but there wouldn't have been stalinists taking over Alabama or California, nor would Red Chinese troops be coming ashore in Washington.


Correct -- there are certain wars which we can choose to engage in or not engage in.


> I'm not quite sure where to put the dividing line between tactical and strategic bombing


The term came from an inability to describe the type of warfare waged in WWI by Zeppelins and then bombers against cities.

Truthfully when you use the correct definitions of tactical and strategic: There were many bombing raids deemed tactical that might very well have been strategic.



Shortround6 said:


> Definitions of strategy and tactics (and grand tactics) have changed out of necessity over the years.
> For example
> "_To repeat. Strategy is the art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole theater of operations. Grand Tactics is the art of posting troops upon the battle-field according to the accidents of the ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the ground, in contradistinction to planning upon a map. Its operations may extend over a field of ten or twelve miles in extent. Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point; grand tactics decides the manner of execution and the employment of the troops._" *Antoine-Henri, Baron de Jomini*, 1838.
> 
> and "_...there are other operations of a mixed nature, such as passages of streams, retreats, surprises, disembarkations, convoys, winter quarters, the execution of which belongs to tactics, the conception and arrangement to strategy_."


Fascinating.

While this one will be seen as controversial: It seems that there's little an independent air-force can do that an air-arm of an Army or Navy cannot.


ChrisMcD said:


> "Order of the British Empire" - hence the irony!
> 
> Usually taken to be "Other Buggers Efforts"


That's a good one!


> AFAIK Swampyankee is right that the US dragged the UN into the Korean war. But, it was a question of grasping an opportunity. The Russians had walked out of the security council and their veto power was not invoked at the critical vote.
> 
> United Nations Security Council Resolution 84 - Wikipedia
> 
> Also, on Malaya, we just wanted to hand the country back to the majority population with minimal bloodshed after the debacle with the partitioning of India and Pakistan. OK, special circumstances, but we did win a jungle guerrilla war!


Understood


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## XBe02Drvr (Feb 17, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> Why did they not comprehend?


McNamara was a statistics geek. He thought wars could be won by the number of bombs dropped and bodies counted. He and Kennedy and Johnson thought of the war as one country trying to conquer its neighbor, not one people striving to be united under their own government and to kick out the foreign exploiters.


Zipper 730 said:


> Why?


How the hell would I know?? I'm guessing they (McNamara certainly) were wedded to the concept of cost/benefit analysis and just took for granted everybody else was too. Thus if you could make the cost of invasion too high, you could deter aggression. And with all our high-tech weaponry, that should be no problem, right? The willingness of the Vietnamese to fight on against all odds and withstand staggering losses was incomprehensible to them.

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## ChrisMcD (Feb 17, 2017)

GregP said:


> Not to kick a dead horse, but somewhere back early in this long topic someone said a B-29 was hauling a very light bomb load. Something on the order of 6,000 pounds or so. It would take an hour to find it. Not saying anything except the B-29 could haul a LOT of bombs if the situation required it to do so.



I'm with you Greg. Fat Man was only a 10,000 pounder, but they did try out two Grand Slams!


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## Old Wizard (Feb 17, 2017)




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## Zipper730 (Feb 17, 2017)

XBe02Drvr said:


> McNamara was a statistics geek. He thought wars could be won by the number of bombs dropped and bodies counted.


Wars don't always work that way, with insurgencies, you are going to want to win hearts and minds. This was not a new concept as the US Marine Corps used counterinsurgency tactics as well as the traditional whoop-ass


> He and Kennedy and Johnson thought of the war as one country trying to conquer its neighbor, not one people striving to be united under their own government and to kick out the foreign exploiters.


I'm just surprised they didn't realize that was what was going on.


> How the hell would I know?? I'm guessing they (McNamara certainly) were wedded to the concept of cost/benefit analysis and just took for granted everybody else was too.


Some people don't care about losses as long as they get their way.


> The willingness of the Vietnamese to fight on against all odds and withstand staggering losses was incomprehensible to them.


They didn't know much about Korea and the Chinese hordes simply absorbing bullets by the thousands and thousands



ChrisMcD said:


> I'm with you Greg. Fat Man was only a 10,000 pounder, but they did try out two Grand Slams!


I know the Silverplate was modified with only one bomb-bay in lieu of two. Did the B-50's have such an arrangement?


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## XBe02Drvr (Feb 17, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> Wars don't always work that way, with insurgencies, you are going to want to win hearts and minds.


How do you quantify "hearts and minds"?? As far as Johnson and McNamara were concerned, if you couldn't put a number on it, it didn't exist. McNamara was a whiz-kid from Detroit who made his chops saving a car company from bankruptcy and leading it to market dominance through the power of statistical analysis.


Zipper 730 said:


> This was not a new concept as the US Marine Corps used counterinsurgency tactics as well as the traditional whoop-ass.


Counter-insurgency? Uncle Sam's Misguided Children?? Don't make me laugh, it hurts too much!! "NVA's are in that treeline, top of the hill. Frontal assault, CHARGE!"
My ROTC company in college was trained in counter-insurgency operations by our Green Beret Major advisor at a time when Army doctrine and training were all about a tank war in Europe. When the other kids were off watching the football game or going to weekend parties, we were crawling around in the thules doing recon, ambush, booby traps, camouflage, and eating snakes and wild leeks.


Zipper 730 said:


> I'm just surprised they didn't realize that was what was going on.
> Some people don't care about losses as long as they get their way.
> They didn't know much about Korea and the Chinese hordes simply absorbing bullets by the thousands and thousands


The Chinese in Korea fit K, J, and M's image of a nation-state committing conventional military aggression against a neighbor. The situation in Vietnam of an insurgency of the people, aided and supplied by the "other half" of the people north of the DMZ just didn't fit into their world-view. They never realized how little support the rank and file citizenry had for our "friends" in the RVN government.


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## Zipper730 (Feb 17, 2017)

XBe02Drvr said:


> How do you quantify "hearts and minds"??


I'm not sure, but wasting shitloads of people didn't work short of nuking the place (I'm glad it never came to that)


> As far as Johnson and McNamara were concerned, if you couldn't put a number on it, it didn't exist.


And they were wrong, obviously


> McNamara was a whiz-kid from Detroit who made his chops saving a car company from bankruptcy and leading it to market dominance through the power of statistical analysis.


A car company is not the same as a military


> Counter-insurgency? Uncle Sam's Misguided Children?? Don't make me laugh, it hurts too much!! "NVA's are in that treeline, top of the hill. Frontal assault, CHARGE!"


Actually the USMC did employ both ground-tactics, close air-support tactics, probably generic bomb and strafe tactics in Nicaragua, as well as a COIN manual they developed. They were able to implement them to some degree, though I assume there was more killing than winning hearts and minds, but the fact is they did whip it up.


> My ROTC company in college was trained in counter-insurgency operations by our Green Beret Major advisor at a time when Army doctrine and training were all about a tank war in Europe.


You were in a company lead by smart guys


> When the other kids were off watching the football game or going to weekend parties, we were crawling around in the thules doing recon, ambush, booby traps, camouflage, and eating snakes and wild leeks.


Do snakes taste like chicken?


> The Chinese in Korea fit K, J, and M's image of a nation-state committing conventional military aggression against a neighbor.


They could do conventional tactics but fought through mostly guerilla means as it was far more effective.


> The situation in Vietnam of an insurgency of the people, aided and supplied by the "other half" of the people north of the DMZ just didn't fit into their world-view. They never realized how little support the rank and file citizenry had for our "friends" in the RVN government.


The South had lots of sympathizers?


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## XBe02Drvr (Feb 18, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> I'm not sure, but wasting shitloads of people didn't work short of nuking the place (I'm glad it never came to that)


Nuking the place would have accomplished nothing besides poisoning the landscape and turning us into international pariahs.


Zipper 730 said:


> And they were wrong, obviously
> A car company is not the same as a military


As McNamara eventually came to realize, and publicly admitted late in life. If he were anywhere else than within the borders of the US, he would have been executed for the war criminal he was.


Zipper 730 said:


> Actually the USMC did employ both ground-tactics, close air-support tactics, probably generic bomb and strafe tactics in Nicaragua, as well as a COIN manual they developed. They were able to implement them to some degree, though I assume there was more killing than winning hearts and minds, but the fact is they did whip it up.


If they had COIN in VN other than the LRRPs (hats off to them - the ultimate "snake eaters"), they didn't seem to be much in evidence, according to my many friends and acquaintances who were there. Mikewint, you were there, what's your take on this?


Zipper 730 said:


> You were in a company lead by smart guys


Roger that! Of the guys in my company who earned their commissions and went to the Nam, all came back alive, which is more than you can say for the rest of the ROTC graduating class. Thanks to the Major, I learned early the shortcomings of the Army and determined to do my service a different way.


Zipper 730 said:


> Do snakes taste like chicken?


If you're hungry enough, they taste like ambrosia! Our ubiquitous garter snake emits a foul tasting and smelling secretion if he panics before you get a chance to kill him. You gotta make it swift and sure.


Zipper 730 said:


> The South had lots of sympathizers?


Not as many as we thought they did! There were lots of "yes men" in the South who would have preferred not to live under Hi Chi Minh, but had been through the Viet Minh and Dien Bin Phu experience, and needed to keep their options open in case RVN caved, which it eventually did. This resulted in a kind of "conditional loyalty" to the US war effort and the RVN government.


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## Zipper730 (Feb 18, 2017)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Nuking the place would have accomplished nothing besides poisoning the landscape and turning us into international pariahs.


It would probably have defeated them, but the costs are just not worth it. The way we fought the war was idiotic and for most purpose, we should have just sat on the sidelines with our thumbs up our butts.


> As McNamara eventually came to realize, and publicly admitted late in life. If he were anywhere else than within the borders of the US, he would have been executed for the war criminal he was.


It's nice he finally realized the error of his ways, but it would have been a lot better had he used more common sense at the time. I suppose it's better than some, some people never express any regret for their actions, even when they should.


> If they had COIN in VN other than the LRRPs (hats off to them - the ultimate "snake eaters"), they didn't seem to be much in evidence, according to my many friends and acquaintances who were there.


I'm not saying the USMC used COIN much in the conflict, merely that they developed the ability earlier. My point was we had knowledge of how to employ COIN tactics, but did not have the willingness to do so.


> Roger that! Of the guys in my company who earned their commissions and went to the Nam, all came back alive


Wow, that's quite impressive.


> If you're hungry enough, they taste like ambrosia!


Isn't ambrosia that stuff with peaches and sour-cream and stuff?


> Our ubiquitous garter snake emits a foul tasting and smelling secretion if he panics before you get a chance to kill him.


I guess to deter predators...


> You gotta make it swift and sure.


How do you kill a snake actually?


> Not as many as we thought they did! There were lots of "yes men" in the South who would have preferred not to live under Hi Chi Minh, but had been through the Viet Minh and Dien Bin Phu experience, and needed to keep their options open in case RVN caved, which it eventually did. This resulted in a kind of "conditional loyalty" to the US war effort and the RVN government.


So the yes men is what did it?


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## wuzak (Feb 18, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> Isn't ambrosia that stuff with peaches and sour-cream and stuff?



Ambrosia - Wikipedia




Zipper730 said:


> How do you kill a snake actually?




_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=22aYCoTe-0I_


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## fubar57 (Feb 18, 2017)

Yep, the internet has only so many bytes and then its over

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## XBe02Drvr (Feb 18, 2017)

Zipper730 said:


> So the yes men is what did it?


Jees, man, get a clue!! A disaster on the scale of the Nam can never be attributed to any single cause. You sound like the old-time NTSB: "THE Probable Cause of the accident was....."! The stupidity in Washington, the "yes" men in Saigon, our ignorance and lack of cultural sensitivity towards the Vietnamese, Charlie's highly effective intelligence network, our racial prejudices, the unsuitability of our doctrine, training, and weapons for the type of warfare required, the micromanaging of the war from the Pentagon and the White House, the lack of commitment of the American people to the cause, and a host of other causes ad infinitum.
Now if you go trying to assign percentages of causality to these factors, I swear I'll start calling you "McNamara"!!

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