# Kamikaze: Ever had a chance of success?



## gjs238 (May 20, 2013)

The historical use of Kamikaze seems to have been another example of a day late and a dollar short.
If employed earlier or differently, could this tactic have been successful?


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## altsym (May 20, 2013)

Seems to me every kamikaze completion was a success. Unless you mean to win the Pacific war, then imo not a snowballs chance in hell. The US won the Pacific War the very moment the Japanese attacked pearl, there was NO other outcome that did not end in complete US victory.


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## FLYBOYJ (May 20, 2013)

Please refrain from using the term "JAPS" on this forum. Thanks!


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## frogg (May 20, 2013)

At the highest levels the Japanese didn't believe the use of kamikazes would bring them victory (well, except perhaps for Admiral Onishi). What they wanted was A victory, something that would allow them to get a face-saving, negotiated peace. 

I don't think that goal was achievable. There was a learning curve in the use of the tactic; even if the Japanese had started using kamikazes during the Philippine Sea battle (so that the most effective tactics were understood earlier) they just didn't have enough aircraft available in theater to defeat the invasions of Leyte, Mindoro, or Luzon.

The ten kikusui attacks during the Okinawa campaign caused massive (5000+) casualties on Allied ships and though it gave the Allies pause it still wasn't enough to defeat the invasion of that island and give them the wanted victory. To my mind the Japanese High Command seriously underestimated the Allies' will to prosecute the war to the desired conclusion despite the casualties suffered. I don't think there's anything the Japanese could have done earlier, or differently, to change that.


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## tyrodtom (May 20, 2013)

The Japanese hoped that the use of Kamakaze would prove to the allies that the invasion of the homeland would be extremely difficult. That we'd suffer very high causalties, and it did exactly that.
It may have been a major influence on our decision to use the nukes.

A Kamakaze attack, to be fully successful, needed skilled pilots. That in itself, makes it a self defeating tactic.


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## CobberKane (May 20, 2013)

I tend to agree. I see the kamikazes as a part of the overall strategy of making the Allies pay as dearly as possible, even though the outcome was a forgone conclusion. If they had been a little earlier with the peace proposals it might have worked, but the atomic bombs eliminated any wriggle room they created.


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## bobbysocks (May 20, 2013)

i dont know...look how costly the taking oki was to the us navy. had they employed the same tactics to other battles prior to when they did and had them stationed on islands to meet and greet the us strike forces...the pacific would have been even a bigger blood bath than it was. landing at some islands were unopposed until the invasion force was already miles inland. had they positioned 30 to 50 kamakazie who could strike the troop carriers...you sink a ship or 2 with 400-500 troops on it....just glad it didnt happen that way.


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## cherry blossom (May 20, 2013)

I have a slight interest in the Kugisho or Yokosuka MXY7 Ohka as might be guessed from my name. The problem with the Ohka was that the carriers were vulnerable and that they had to come within range of American radar coverage and risk interception whilst still carrying the Ohka. 

There was consideration of using a liquid fuelled rocket which would have given significantly longer range. However, the designers were worried that Japanese industry could not supply the fuel used by the Germans for the Me 163 and chose to use the available solid fuelled RATO rockets. It is possible that a longer ranged Ohka would have been hard to intercept and might have had much greater success. 

The Model 33 was later designed with a single Ne-20 jet and would certainly have been a serious threat but needed the Nakajima G8N1 Renzan as carrier. 

There was a clever feature of the Ohka that pilots could train in a version with a water “warhead”. When they wanted to land, the water could be released and the Ohka landed quite well as a glider.


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## davebender (May 20, 2013)

Cost of aircraft plus cost of trained pilot adds up to a very expensive smart bomb. 

Yokosuka MXY7 Ohka - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
IMO MXY-7 (Ohka) was the right idea but it should have been wire guided. In any case Japan needs a lot more then historical 852 MXY-7 and limited number of carrier aircraft to make a dent in massive USN Pacific Fleet of 1945.


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## tyrodtom (May 20, 2013)

If it had been wire guided, the guiding aircraft would have had to get even closer to the target than the mother ship arrangement that they used.
Even more likely to get shot down by the CAP.


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## nincomp (May 21, 2013)

I have seen comments here and in other places that one of the reasons for the Kamikaze was to drive the Allied forces in to negotiated peace. The US insisted in unconditional surrender. Was the desire for a negotiated peace due to the fear that the US might subjugate or exterminate the population, or was it really just "saving face."

To put this more into context, the US had been bombing civilian areas already, so the killing of civilians was not considered to be a forbidden act. I am sure that this was not lost on the leaders of Japan.


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## gjs238 (May 21, 2013)

davebender said:


> <SNIP> to make a dent in massive USN Pacific Fleet of 1945.


But what about earlier?
Doesn't need to be MXY-7 (Ohka), can be conventional aircraft.


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## tyrodtom (May 21, 2013)

Most of Japan's population live on the coast, most of the industry is on the coast, they're not separate.
Just like any other part of the world before personal transportation became affordable, people lived close to where they worked.
If you bombed the industry, you bombed the population.


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## VBF-13 (May 21, 2013)

tyrodtom said:


> A Kamakaze attack, to be fully successful, needed skilled pilots. That in itself, makes it a self defeating tactic.


From what I understand, they did use pilots with good flying skills, and those were the ones who got through. The rest were there primarily to provide distraction for those pilots.


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## tyrodtom (May 21, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> From what I understand, they did use pilots with good flying skills, and those were the ones who got through. The rest were there primarily to provide distraction for those pilots.



That could be true, but there's no way to prove it.
Poor record keeping on the Japanese side, and no attempt on the allied side to recover plaques or other ways to Id the successfully crashed aircraft. And live witnesses from the Japanese side are rare.
That makes it almost impossible to know who crashed where.


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## VBF-13 (May 21, 2013)

No, no way of proving those were the ones who got through. Just a likelihood, really, if we accept there were pilots with better flying skills.


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## davebender (May 21, 2013)

You don't conduct Kamikaze attacks unless you are desperate. Japan wasn't desperate prior to 1945.

MCLOS guided air to surface weapons available during 1943 (i.e. same time as Germany) would probably make a significant difference in the Pacific naval war. It appears Japan didn't develop the technology and Germany didn't share what they knew.


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## tyrodtom (May 21, 2013)

davebender said:


> You don't conduct Kamikaze attacks unless you are desperate. Japan wasn't desperate prior to 1945.
> 
> MCLOS guided air to surface weapons available during 1943 (i.e. same time as Germany) would probably make a significant difference in the Pacific naval war. It appears Japan didn't develop the technology and Germany didn't share what they knew.



The main problem with the Okha was the carrying aircraft had to get within about 20 miles of the target, most were detected and shot down before they got in range.
What chanch would a MCLOS carrying aircraft have, that had to get to about 1/4 of that distant, and then keep a steady perspective for the missle guidance operator to guide the missle onto the target ? 
In other words, the MCLOS carrying aircraft had to approach from about the same altitude as the traditional Kamakaze, fly a steady course, within easy intercept range of the CAP, and at the drop, within easy AA range, then fly a steady course until the missile impacted.

It might have worked over the Roma, with NO aircover, and little AA. But I doubt it'd work very well over a US Navy fleet.


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## davebender (May 21, 2013)

Hs.293 carried 12km of guidance wire specifically to keep the carrier aircraft outside effective AA range.

Enemy fighter aircraft are a different story. Carrier aircraft must have adequate fighter escort just like any other bomber.


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## VBF-13 (May 21, 2013)

tyrodtom said:


> The main problem with the Okha [...]


That sounds like that ingredient in gumbo. Actually, FWIW, the Navy boys referred it as "Baka."


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## tyrodtom (May 21, 2013)

davebender said:


> Hs.293 carried 12km of guidance wire specifically to keep the carrier aircraft outside effective AA range.
> 
> Enemy fighter aircraft are a different story. Carrier aircraft must have adequate fighter escort just like any other bomber.


 The preferred drop altitute was 18,000 ft for the Fritz X, and lower than that for thev Hs 293, that's within the effective range of anything 5 in. and up. And within the possible range of smaller stuff.


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## Dogwalker (May 22, 2013)

I do not believe that to achieve a negotiated peace could be more than a vague hope in someone's head in the the higher levels of the Japanese government and military, and it seems more an explanation _a posteriori_. At that time, only to talk about a peace deal, which, given the situation on the field, could only be on the pejorative basis compared to pre-war situation, and then a declaration of defeat, could lead to serious personal consequences. I do not think that has ever been made ​​an organized speech like: "if we send our aircrafts to crash on American ships, then we can negotiate peace without having to surrender"

The need to "save face" had led to a vicious circle, so, in order to avoid having to admit in front of their subordinates, and even to themselves, to have wasted so many lives, Japanese decision makers had to waste even more, and eventually led to the suicide of many of the decision makers themself.

The kamilaze were not a way to win, or to negotiate, but only a way to keep fighting when conventional methods seemed to have become useless, since every alternative to keep fighting was unthinkable, or at least not speakable.

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## VBF-13 (May 22, 2013)

They wanted peace. They wanted it even before the Russians got involved. But they wanted to play poker with us to get it.


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## gjs238 (May 22, 2013)

What overtures were the Japanese making?


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## bobbysocks (May 22, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> They wanted peace. They wanted it even before the Russians got involved. But they wanted to play poker with us to get it.



it was pretty divided from what i understand...close to 50/50 peace vs keep fighting. there was a large portion of the military that wanted to continue hostilities. what their reasons were i have no idea. fortunately for the sake of peace the emperor was on the side that wanted to sue for peace. there was a coup planned to prevent the emperor from making the radio broadcast that didnt work...otherwise ???????


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## OldSkeptic (May 24, 2013)

davebender said:


> Cost of aircraft plus cost of trained pilot adds up to a very expensive smart bomb.
> 
> Yokosuka MXY7 Ohka - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> IMO MXY-7 (Ohka) was the right idea but it should have been wire guided. In any case Japan needs a lot more then historical 852 MXY-7 and limited number of carrier aircraft to make a dent in massive USN Pacific Fleet of 1945.



Yes but by that time the Japanese had used up all their well trained pilots.
Even more than the Germans they had gone a 'short war' strategy, without all the industrial and training infrastructure necessary.
Their ovarall strategy was to give the US a 'black eye', then negotiate a settlement, which recognised their claims in Asia.

In the beginning they probably had the the finest carrier pilots around, but when they lost those they were quickly reduced to very poorly trained pilots.
Plus their technical advantage (very significant at first) had been lost.

So given that, throwing poorly trained pilots into kamikaze attacks made sense. One poorly trained pilot vs taking out a ship? Made a mad sort of sense.

So doing it at the beginning of the war, with their superior pilots and planes, made no sense, so they didn't. 
After that when they were down to poor pilots and inferior planes, then they did it.


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## CobberKane (May 24, 2013)

tyrodtom said:


> Most of Japan's population live on the coast, most of the industry is on the coast, they're not separate.
> Just like any other part of the world before personal transportation became affordable, people lived close to where they worked.
> If you bombed the industry, you bombed the population.



Very roughly, the progression of US thinking in terms of bombing was: "we will bomb industry while minimising civilian casualties", to "we will bomb industry and unfortunately kill lots of civilians" to "we will bomb cities, and thereby destroy industry and kill civilians". 
Bottom line, by 1945 everyone was happy to bomb civilians, no matter how it in order not to offend sensibilities.
On the other hand, not all protagonists made a policy of working POWs to death or making suicide a tactic, so there were some pretty clear differences too.


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## delcyros (May 24, 2013)

tyrodtom said:


> The preferred drop altitute was 18,000 ft for the Fritz X, and lower than that for thev Hs 293, that's within the effective range of anything 5 in. and up. And within the possible range of smaller stuff.


 
While 18,000ft is clearly within the theoretical AA ceiling of this weapon, that doesn´t make it automatically within effective AA ceiling / effective range of the US 5"/38. -nor most other AA (there´s no 5" up in shipboard AAA, except for SP guns desperately trying to do AAA). 

The definition for "effective" is that a 400 mph airplane needs to be taken under fire for at least 20 seconds, and that additionally the fuses need to be operable at the range. This condition is fulfilled by multiple solutions with regard to range / altitude / vector combination. Hit rate for high altitude (larger 10,000ft) work was very poor and dropped with increasing range / altitude.

The case of USS SAVANNA, operating under an air umbrella of USAAF P-38 in addition to radar guided 5" AAA makes it clear. The Fritz X was released at 18,700 ft and the carrier planes, albeit precisely tracked for some time were considered out of effective engagement range for the shipboard 5"/38 which didn´t open fire. P38 and AAA tried to take down the Fritz X without success.

The Fritz X could be released at any altitude within 4km (min. 13,100ft) and 9km (29,500ft), but I doubt the japanese had carrier planes for very high altitude drops.

Kamikaze would have been more dangerous had they concentrated on troop ships, transports, oiler, and the general fleet train instead of the warships as they did. The soft targets are more diffcult to protect (usually withotu good subdivision and firefighting capacities required to deal with Kamikaze hits), carry more important war material and are easier to sink (slower, slow on helm, less crew, less structural strength).


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## Civettone (Jun 1, 2013)

The solution should have been clear: the Ohka with a pulsejet engine. Or simply licence produce the Fieseler Fi-103R manned flying bomb. Impossible to intercept for the F-4U-1 or F-6F. And a 800-1,000 kg bomb.

I believe that flight training of these pilots could be reduced to extensive ground training and a single flight. Not ideal but should be sufficient. All they need to know is how to handle the controls. Not to take off, not to land, not to take evasive manoeuvres ...

Kris


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## Civettone (Jun 1, 2013)

Does anyone know what the range/radius of US Navy CAP was? If it was less than 200 miles, the carrier aircraft for the Fi-103R would be safe. And the Fi-103R would be in the clear.

Btw, there was a Japanese pulsejet design, the Kawanishi Baika, but this was a much smaller design with only a 250 kg bombload.

Kris


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## Jenisch (Jun 1, 2013)

gjs238 said:


> If employed earlier or differently, could this tactic have been successful?



I don't see that. The American advantage was too great.


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## VBF-13 (Jun 5, 2013)

Let's just top this question off with the rationale was never really there before the Marianas to give this question any real serious consideration. To really appreciate that one has to understand this wasn't the result of insanity or anything like that but rather was purely a rational decision. The way things looked in October 1944 these pilots were all but dying in vain. The pilots in the Marianas who just came off those nine carriers were trained combat pilots with maybe half their squadron training under their belts and left nothing to show for it. A number of those pilots made it back to those carriers or Rota or Guam and by October 1944 were hardened combat veterans. The command were the guys who struggled with the idea the most. Just think if just 25 of those pilots had been suicide pilots with 250kg bombs under their aircraft, how effective they could have been. Once the command made the decision, the pilots jumped at it. If you're going to die, why die in vain? But that rationale wasn't there while Japan still had hope. Could Japan have hurt us had they instituted the program before they lost hope? Definitely, yes. But, then, they would have been insane. And, they weren't.


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## bobbysocks (Jun 5, 2013)

the rationale wasnt there but the strong conviction of the japanese people/solder was. by this i mean had they asked for kamakazie pilots at any time they would have had volunteers...whether they were winning or losing.


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## gjs238 (Jun 5, 2013)

Kamakazies at Coral Sea or Midway, hmmm


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## tyrodtom (Jun 5, 2013)

There was at least one Kamakaze at Pearl Harbor. Not a true Kamakaze, but a suicide dive by one of the torpedo planes with a holed fuel tank.
He knew his minutes in the air was limited, and parachuting out to be captured was unthinkable. 
His name is know.


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## VBF-13 (Jun 5, 2013)

Tom, according to _The Divine Wind_, the concept arose from the practice of suicide-crashing into bombers. They figured, why not make the targets these big carriers they've been trying to get all this time? It was said the commanders had tears in their eyes as they decided to put the first squadron to the cause, as they knew the pilots would embrace it enthusiastically, which is exactly what happened.


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## VBF-13 (Jun 6, 2013)

gjs238 said:


> Kamakazies at Coral Sea or Midway, hmmm


What's the difference between that and a bomb run except in the former you're wasting a pilot and aircraft that can be utilized in another bomb run? What I really hear you asking is why they didn't make more bomb runs. They had the aircraft suited for that. At Midway it was our SBDs that wrecked those carriers. By October 1944 they were hurting for pilots who could perform those tricks, even if they had the aircraft suited for it.


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## stona (Jun 6, 2013)

bobbysocks said:


> the rationale wasnt there but the strong conviction of the japanese people/solder was. by this i mean had they asked for kamakazie pilots at any time they would have had volunteers...whether they were winning or losing.



Not just the Japanese. 

SS General Wolff worked on the manned V1 (Fi 103 R) project at the same time as the Ba 349 project, which was under SS control. At one point it seemed like the "Natter" might be developed as a one way suicide attacker too. Other people on the Bachem project were taken aback by this development but Wolff assured them that he already had "1000s" of volunteers for the one way V-1.

He also told Willy Fiedler that he could immediately call up 100 volunteers to ram Ba 349s into B-17 bombers.

Cheers
Steve


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## Marcel (Jun 7, 2013)

Russians rammed their opponents, too, especially early in the war. I-16's were known for their ramming tactics.


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## Civettone (Jun 8, 2013)

I agree that using trained pilots for these suicide missions is a dead end. Germany and Japan suffered from great shortages of properly trained or experienced pilots. 
What has not been properly mentioned in this discussion is that some aircraft would not require properly trained pilots. The F-103R, Ohka or Ba 349 pilots would not need to practice take off and landing, and did not need to learn any evasive actions as they relied on superior speed. All what was needed was sufficient ground training, to learn the instruments, and a couple of glider training sessions. 

Given the fact that the Japanese and German air forces were neutralized through a lack of pilots and fuel, these kind of emergency weapons were really the only thing left. The Japanese would have had an amazing anti-ship weapon with the Baika, especially if it was a copy of the Fi 103R. And the Germans had a potent bomber destroyer with the Ba 349. Very unconventional but I believe that they would have proven to be effective, had the war lasted longer.

Kris


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## tyrodtom (Jun 9, 2013)

All aircraft go thru handling changes at different speeds, you can't simulate it with ground training, or a gentle flight in a glider.
Just from my limited flight experience, some aircraft require a lot of trim changes with different speeds. and i'm just talking about regular flying. I don't know if I could keep up with the trim changes on a Cessna 172, if I put one in a suicide dive. I remember one time I complained to the instructor about how busy I was changing elevator trim, so he let me with fly it for awhile without trim changes, it began to require a lot of muscle to fly with just some minor airspeed changes, I never complained again.
That is IMO one of the problems encounted by the Okha pilots, they had glider training, but none of them had even flown the aircraft at the speeds they attained in that finale dive.
And then there's the problem of what is called getting behind the aircraft, where things happen faster than you accustomed to reacting to.

Training pilots in gliders that maybe could approach 200mph, and then expecting them to be able to sucessfully dive them on a target at speeds approaching 500mph was madness.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 9, 2013)

tyrodtom said:


> All aircraft go thru handling changes at different speeds, you can't simulate it with ground training, or a gentle flight in a glider.
> Just from my limited flight experience, some aircraft require a lot of trim changes with different speeds. and i'm just talking about regular flying. I don't know if I could keep up with the trim changes on a Cessna 172, if I put one in a suicide dive. I remember one time I complained to the instructor about how busy I was changing elevator trim, so he let me with fly it for awhile without trim changes, it began to require a lot of muscle to fly with just some minor airspeed changes, I never complained again.
> That is IMO one of the problems encounted by the Okha pilots, they had glider training, but none of them had even flown the aircraft at the speeds they attained in that finale dive.
> And then there's the problem of what is called getting behind the aircraft, where things happen faster than you accustomed to reacting to.
> ...



Some good points there - in general the Okha would probably had a tendency to pitch up when the rockets were fired. I do know that the aircraft was flight tested before it was used operationally but I've seen little information on its flying characteristics. Training in gliders was probably the best approach given the circumstances, especially if some of the test flight experiences was incorporated into the training syllabus.


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## Civettone (Jun 9, 2013)

I think you are exaggerating. They only needed to know two settings: max cruise speed and dive speed. All the pilots needed to do was to steer it to the target. I respect the skills a pilot needs, but this is not what the drivers of the Ohka (not Okha) or Natter needed. 


Kris


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## tyrodtom (Jun 9, 2013)

Civettone said:


> I think you are exaggerating. They only needed to know two settings: max cruise speed and dive speed. All the pilots needed to do was to steer it to the target. I respect the skills a pilot needs, but this is not what the drivers of the Ohka (not Okha) or Natter needed.
> 
> 
> Kris


 I don't think you know what you're talking about. 
Even a Cessna 172 can get build up control forces hard to over come, with the small speed ranges it can cover. 

And then there's the even bigger problem of operating in a speed range you're not experienced with, everything happens faster, much faster. Like learning to drive in a Jetta diesel, and then immediately expected to be able to handle a 5 sec. A/A fueler in the quarter.

I'm not a experienced pilot, just low time, but I can understand some of the difficulties of jumping to a much faster aircraft, and the increased problems of just controlling the aircraft in simple manuvers can be much different.

Bou I am a fairly experienced in car racing, and very acquanted in people having trouble when mover up to faster cars, from what they were formally experieced with.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 9, 2013)

Civettone said:


> I think you are exaggerating. They only needed to know two settings: max cruise speed and dive speed. All the pilots needed to do was to steer it to the target. I respect the skills a pilot needs, but this is not what the drivers of the Ohka (not Okha) or Natter needed.
> 
> 
> Kris



Exaggerating? How do explain a max cruise speed then you have no control of thrust? Its not quite as simple as "steering it to a target." When you're flying an aircraft at high speeds it's not always a gentle ride and even the most minor control deflections could send you in various directions very quickly. Trim is really important to maintain pitch attitude and unless you've been there, you can't understand. BTW my statements are just considering perfect conditions, throw in winds, turbulent air and someone shooting at you and you have other limiting aspects to look at. If it was a matter of just "steer it to the target" Kamikaze training would have been one hour.


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## Civettone (Jun 9, 2013)

Ohka pilots had a training of 30 hours. Don't know if that includes ground training or not. 


Kris


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 9, 2013)

Civettone said:


> Ohka pilots had a training of 30 hours. Don't know if that includes ground training or not.
> 
> 
> Kris



Then to put it in perspective, it takes 40 hours to get a PPL, not including ground training.


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## VBF-13 (Jun 11, 2013)

tyrodtom said:


> Training pilots in gliders that maybe could approach 200mph, and then expecting them to be able to sucessfully dive them on a target at speeds approaching 500mph was madness.


But that's what this was. Look up "Baka." This was fanaticism that rationally-followed from their indoctrination, namely, to die for the Emperor and their cause. These guys knew they were beat, right down to the boots on the ground. That's why the atomic bombs were necessary. Kris is right. They drop the guy into the narrow cockpit through the bomb bay and he points the thing to the target and they hope for the best. What do you think this was, flying school? Quite the contrary, it was a desperate attempt at holding out to the last man. The bigger problem with these was the Bettys needed heavy fighter escort just to get into range to make the release as they were very slow and handicapped carrying these 1800 kgs of explosives. Bottom line? This wasn't any strategy to win any war. It was a strategy to show uncompromising resolve, right to the bitter end. In fact I'll go as far as to say it didn't even matter if they hit their targets. Maybe they'll get a concession out of it, who knows? If one needs a larger strategy, that was probably it.


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## tyrodtom (Jun 11, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> But that's what this was. Look up "Baka." This was fanaticism that rationally-followed from their indoctrination, namely, to die for the Emperor and their cause. These guys knew they were beat, right down to the boots on the ground. That's why the atomic bombs were necessary. Kris is right. They drop the guy into the narrow cockpit through the bomb bay and he points the thing to the target and they hope for the best. What do you think this was, flying school? Quite the contrary, it was a desperate attempt at holding out to the last man. The bigger problem with these was the Bettys needed heavy fighter escort just to get into range to make the release as they were very slow and handicapped carrying these 1800 kgs of explosives. Bottom line? This wasn't any strategy to win any war. It was a strategy to show uncompromising resolve, right to the bitter end. In fact I'll go as far as to say it didn't even matter if they hit their targets. Maybe they'll get a concession out of it, who knows? If one needs a larger strategy, that was probably it.



I know they hoped that their resolve would result in a more favorable surrender terms, but the results were two nuclear bombs.
Showing resolve, but no results convinces your enemy you're so far from reality he's not going to be able to have any realistic chance of reaching any agreement with you.


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## VBF-13 (Jun 11, 2013)

As a matter of fact, Tom, that's exactly what it did. It only made the case for the bombs that much better.


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## parsifal (Jun 11, 2013)

All natinalities at one time or another, employed suicide attacks. It was prevalent in the Pacific, where the battles were particularly vicious and had didtinct racial overtones that exist to this day. Allied nations tend to play down the role of suicide attacks that were made by their personnel as suicide was a characterisitc frowned upon even in the service of ones country. In Japan it was revered, but never specifically asked for until Leyte. By then nearly every strike was a suicide mission anyway, so it made sense to try and expend the pilot and aircraft in a direct attack.

Kamikazes were still an adaptation of the basic japanese naval strategy which extended all the way back to Tsushima and beyond. destroy the enemy fleet by a decisive naval engagement, using small, light expendable forces to attrition the enemy strength before the decisive battle. It was a strategy and a dictum that pervaded every japanese naval operation and technology that they pursued except their battleships. The Zero was seen and designed in this light. Their submarine strategy was designed for fleet co-operation (and failed miserably at it), Japanese cruisers and destroyers were designed primarily as support elements of the battle line at the expense of all other capabilities. 

By 1945, Japan no longer possessed a fleet capable of challengng the Americans. Moreover, they knew they needed to make peace, but like the germans, had hoped for the grand alliance to break up under the strain of the war. After this, the Japanese simply were looking for a face saving peace and somehow avoid the worst elements of the Potsdam declaration. In the final months of the war they were looking for two main concessions....that the Home islands not be occupied and that the position of the emperor be respected. They managed to obtain one of those concessions....the position of the emperor was respected (though that undertaking was only ever given verbally, but it was more than any of the other Axis...except Siam,...ever got in their surrender terms). Whether the Kamikazes had anything to do with achiving that concession I am doubtful, but then, who knows....

Kamikazes sunk 47 ships and damaged 288 (at least). Not often acknowledged is that a significant number of those 288 never put to sea again. Undoubtedly many didnt because peace broke out, but several, including one of the two Essex class damaged, were simply no longer seaworthy. British carriers were very stoutly built, but those hit by kamikazes were not able to be fully repaired even in the post war peacetime conditions

Could the Kamikazes have made a difference. I doubt it, but they could have increased losses if adopted earlier.


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## RCAFson (Jun 11, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Kamikazes sunk 47 ships and damaged 288 (at least). Not often acknowledged is that a significant number of those 288 never put to sea again. Undoubtedly many didnt because peace broke out, but several, including one of the two Essex class damaged, were simply no longer seaworthy. British carriers were very stoutly built, but those hit by kamikazes were not able to be fully repaired even in the post war peacetime conditions
> 
> Could the Kamikazes have made a difference. I doubt it, but they could have increased losses if adopted earlier.



AFAIK, all RN carriers returned to service after being hit by kamikazes. After the war the UK was bankrupt and the RN couldn't possibly support all the carriers in service and those under construction, so some had to be decommissioned and scrapped.


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## parsifal (Jun 11, 2013)

Its a complex question regarding the Brit carriers. Mostly I agree with you, but the armoured box conept did have some down sides, long term, that made them highly susceptible to long term damage. Nav weapons 9 i acknowledge its inherent anti British bias) has an article dealing with this, that suggests the armoured carriers were a long term design failure, and certainly postwar british carrier design did not repeat the process

Were Armored Flight Decks on British Carriers Worthwhile?


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## VBF-13 (Jun 12, 2013)

FWIW you hit any carrier with just so much as a 500-pound bomb about 1/3 in from the bow and you immediately cripple it as that's its central elevator shaft and most vulnerable spot. On other ships you want to go for the base of the bridge.


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## RCAFson (Jun 12, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Its a complex question regarding the Brit carriers. Mostly I agree with you, but the armoured box conept did have some down sides, long term, that made them highly susceptible to long term damage. Nav weapons 9 i acknowledge its inherent anti British bias) has an article dealing with this, that suggests the armoured carriers were a long term design failure, and certainly postwar british carrier design did not repeat the process
> 
> Were Armored Flight Decks on British Carriers Worthwhile?



Here's a quote from the above article:


> in fact, the British designs failed. Off Okinawa, the resistance of the British carriers seemed impressive but in reality the damage they took was severe. Having the hangar inside the hull girder made the hull structure weak and the ships were deformed by comparatively minor damage. Note how quickly nearly all the armored carriers were scrapped postwar - surveys showed they had irreparable hull damage. In contrast, the Essex's, which suffered much more severe damage, lasted for decades.
> 
> The severe damage suffered by the British armored carriers is documented by their post-war surveys. These surveys were carried out to determine the suitability of the ships for modernization.
> 
> ...



Now here's the truth:

Formidable steamed for another 100,000 miles in the post war period before being laid up pending a complete reconstruction (as per Victorious):





> P o s t W a r N o t e s
> HMS FORMIDABLE did not take part in surrender ceremonial in Japan. The ship was deployed to carry repatriated Japanese prisoners of war to Sydney and returning troops from the Far East. *During this duty she carried nearly 14,000 passengers and steamed over 100,000 miles.* Returning to UK in February 1946 the ship was Paid-off on 26th July that year. In 1947 she was reduced to Reserve without preservation or maintenance for 4 years. The resulting deterioration of the hull prevented the planned modernisation and HMS FORMIDABLE was placed on the Disposal List in 1950. Sold to BISCO for demolition by TW Ward the ship arrived in tow at the breaker's yard in Inverkeithing on 12th May 1953.
> HMS Formidable, British fleet aircraft carrier, WW2



Illustrious:


> HMS ILLUSTRIOUS remained under refit after VJ Day in order to up-date her equipment fit and did not resume service until June 1946. The ship was then used for deck-landing trials until reduce to Reserve status in 1947. Recommissioned in 1948 the ship had refitted for further trials and training duties during which she carried troops to Cyprus in 1951 and attended the Coronation Review at Spithead in June 1953 but never deployed with the operational Fleet. Placed in Reserve and laid up in the Gareloch this ship went on the Disposal List during 1956 and sold to BISCO for breaking-up at Faslane where she arrived in tow on 3rd November for demolition.
> HMS Illustrious, British fleet carrier, WW2
> After the war, she was given the role of a training and trials ship, and she continued to be plagued by vibration problems which were partially cured by new propeller designs. In 1946, she had a new five-bladed propeller fitted to the centre shaft.[5] She was refitted and modernised from January to August 1948, and made 29 knots (54 km/h; 33 mph) on trials with 110,600 shp at 227.5 rpm. In 1950, on full power trials, she made 29.2 knots (54.1 km/h; 33.6 mph) with 111,480 shp at 225.1 rpm.[5] In 1953 she took part in the Fleet Review to celebrate the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth II.[11] She was decommissioned at the end of 1954, sold on 3 November 1956, and finally, after a successful career, scrapped at Faslane.
> HMS Illustrious (87) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



So in no way shape or form was Illustrious a "write off".

Indomitable



> HMS INDOMITABLE was deployed with the BPF in the Far East until 12th November 1945 and returned to the United Kingdom on 12th December. The ship was reduced to Reserve in 1946. Between 1948 and 1950 she was extensively refitted and modernised including replacement of bow and stem structure as well as installation of British radars. On completion she re-commissioned and was deployed as Flagship of the Home Fleet. In 1954 she was again put in Reserve and then placed on the Disposal List. On 30th September 1955 this ship arrived at Faslane to be broken-up.
> http://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono-04CV-Indomitable.htm:
> 
> The Indomitable returned to the UK in November 1945. The following year she carried the Great Britain national rugby league team to Australia on their first post-war tour, earning the team the nickname, 'The Indomitables'. In 1947, she was placed in reserve, and then *given a refit that took three years, from 1947 to 1950. Late in her refit her boilers were discovered to have only 10 years of life, and the engine spaces had to be torn apart and rebuilt to replace the boilers.* Upon the completion of her refit she returned to operational duty with the Home Fleet in far cooler climates than her wartime operations. *On 3 February 1953*, she was badly damaged by an internal fire and explosion; the damage was later covered in concrete, and was never repaired. In the same year she sailed to take part in the Fleet Review to celebrate the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth II.[6] She *then did deck landings in the channel, with experimental landing lights replacing the batman.* She returned to the reserve fleet. In October 1953 she was placed in unmaintained reserve. She was sold for scrap in 1955.
> HMS Indomitable (92) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



So Indomitable was heavily modernized including brand new boilers (which would have required the complete dismantling of her upper decks.

Here's another quote which indicates that Formidable was slated for modernization:


> There seems to have been general agreement that the first ship to be modernized should be an Illustrious. Formidable was laid up and required a long refit in any case, so she was provisionally selected for modernization. *Illustrious was a deck landing training and trials carrier, and could not be spared, particularly as she was needed to test the new generation of naval aircraft*. This left HMS Victorious as the only other candidate. In early 1951 the other two ships of the programme were HMS Implacable, followed by HMS Indefatigable, for modernisation, respectively, 1953–55 (to relieve HMS Eagle so that she could refit in 1956 with steam catapults) and 1954–57. HMS Indomitable was scheduled for a more limited modernisation (1957) as the future deck landing training ship. At this time Eagle was scheduled for completion in August 1951 and Ark Royal in 1954, so that the full programme would provide the Royal Navy with _five fleet carriers_ plus a semi-modernised deck landing training ship.
> Friedman, British Carrier Aviation, p305



However, the RN did commission the two Audacious class CVs above in the 1950s (*both with 4in armoured flight decks*) but they also scrapped 2 others on the slipway. The RN eventually commissioned 4 Centaur class CVs but scrapped 4 others on the slipway. Something like 16 other Light Fleet Carriers were also eventually completed so there's just no way that the RN could have afforded to modernize and operate all 6 of the Illustrious and Implacable class armoured flight deck carriers.

The post war history of the Illustrious class makes it clear that none were write-offs and and IMHO the navweaps article is so flawed and filled with errors of fact and omission as to be a disgrace.


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## RCAFson (Jun 12, 2013)

Another bald faced lie from the navweaps article:


> Originally, the Midway's were to have had a heavy (8 inch) deck gun battery. Eventually, this was discarded and the weight saved was used to provide *two inches of flight deck armor*. This was in addition to the *3.5 inches of hangar deck armor sported by the Essex*'s. *The suggestion that they are a response to the UK armored carrier designs is largely a myth* - the discussions that lead to the Midway's actually predate the Illustrious class



and the truth as revealed in a USN damage report (USS Franklin):



> *As a result of study of damage sustained by various British carriers prior to our entry into the war, two important departures from traditional U.S. Navy carrier design were incorporated in the CVB Class, then still under development.* HMS ILLUSTRIOUS in an action off Malta on 1 January 1941 was hit by several bombs, three of which detonated in the hangar space. Large fires swept fore and aft among parked planes thereby demonstrating the desirability of attempting to confine the limits of such explosions and fires by structural sectionalization of the hangar space. On the CVB Class the hangar was therefore divided into five compartments separated by 40 and 50-pound STS division bulkheads extending from the hangar deck to the flight deck, each fitted with a large door suitable for handling aircraft. It is hoped that this sectionalization, in conjunction with sprinkler and fog foam systems, will effectively prevent fires from spreading throughout the hangar spaces, as occurred on FRANKLIN on 30 October and 19 March. The damage experiences of several British carriers, which unlike our own were fitted with armoured flight decks, demonstrated the effectiveness of such armour in shielding hangar spaces from GP bombs and vital spaces below the hangar deck from SAP bombs. *Accordingly, the CVB Class was designed with an armoured flight deck *consisting of 3-1/2-inch STS from frames 46 to 175 with a hangar deck consisting of two courses of 40-pound STS between frames 36 and 192.
> [email protected] - War Damage Report #56 - CV-13 Franklin



Additionally the Essex class had a 2.5in not 3.5in armoured hangar deck.


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## parsifal (Jun 12, 2013)

Thats a good answer that i like a lot. I would dearly like to debunk the Navweapons claims on this, and i do acknowledge the quotes that you have. However one or two details do need to be pulled up on. 100, 000 miles is really small change for carrier steaming. HMAS Melbourne, for example decommissioned on 30 June 1982, having spent 62,036 hours underway and having steamed 868,893 nautical miles. Thats about 9 times the mileage of the much bigger 

also the 16 Light fleet carriers were closed hangars, but not armoured boxes , in fact they were designed specifically as a response to the perceived failures of the Illustrious class, namely the susceptibility to internal explosions that the armoured box conferred on them. HMAS Melbourne, was one of those 16 carriers, and was designed for the the decking to blow upwards and outwards to try and protect the lower decks and also lower the CG so as to maximise carrying capacity on the smallest possible tonnage. At 14000 tons, with a capacity of 32 (wartime complement) a/c, the Majestics were very good value, for what they were, but not comparable to a full on true fleet carrier. The question begs....why despite this obvious infereiority, did the British prefer to scrap tyheir high value CVs for less capable CVLs? 

I do have a question as well.....were any of the big fleet carriers used in Korea. if not, why not??? Why was it cheaper for a cash strapped Britiain to build new carriers postwar rather than refurbish the existing fleet carriers, which were all pretty new ships. In the case of the Indomitables, the answer was the low hangar heights of the double hangar system, but this is not true for the Illustrious class. Why was the RN keen to build the Light Fleets and not convert the Illustrious (except the Victorious) to angled deck, jet capable carriers. the RN seemed to prefer conversion of the Light Fleets (which desp[ite their excelent design as value for money were in no way comparable in theory to the Illustrious Class.


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## RCAFson (Jun 12, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Thats a good answer that i like a lot. I would dearly like to debunk the Navweapons claims on this, and i do acknowledge the quotes that you have. However one or two details do need to be pulled up on. 100, 000 miles is really small change for carrier steaming. HMAS Melbourne, for example decommissioned on 30 June 1982, having spent 62,036 hours underway and having steamed 868,893 nautical miles. Thats about 9 times the mileage of the much bigger
> 
> also the 16 Light fleet carriers were closed hangars, but not armoured boxes , in fact they were designed specifically as a response to the perceived failures of the Illustrious class, namely the susceptibility to internal explosions that the armoured box conferred on them. HMAS Melbourne, was one of those 16 carriers, and was designed for the the decking to blow upwards and outwards to try and protect the lower decks and also lower the CG so as to maximise carrying capacity on the smallest possible tonnage. At 14000 tons, with a capacity of 32 (wartime complement) a/c, the Majestics were very good value, for what they were, but not comparable to a full on true fleet carrier. The question begs....why despite this obvious infereiority, did the British prefer to scrap tyheir high value CVs for less capable CVLs?
> 
> I do have a question as well.....were any of the big fleet carriers used in Korea. if not, why not??? Why was it cheaper for a cash strapped Britiain to build new carriers postwar rather than refurbish the existing fleet carriers, which were all pretty new ships. In the case of the Indomitables, the answer was the low hangar heights of the double hangar system, but this is not true for the Illustrious class. Why was the RN keen to build the Light Fleets and not convert the Illustrious (except the Victorious) to angled deck, jet capable carriers. the RN seemed to prefer conversion of the Light Fleets (which desp[ite their excelent design as value for money were in no way comparable in theory to the Illustrious Class.


Formidable steamed over 100,000 miles in the *6 months* from the end of the war against Japan until her return to UK. IOW, she was almost continuously underway from Aug 45 to Feb 46 when the Navweaps article claims she was a write off from the end of the war. Formidable probably steamed nearly as many miles during WW2 as Melborne did during her whole career.

The Audacious class CVs had armoured flight decks and armoured boxes as per the Illustrious class. The Centaur class had armoured flight decks but the other light fleet carriers were too small to have any armour at all. The RN scrapped their fleet CVs (except Victorious) because they had the nearly identically sized Centaur class coming into service along with the much larger Audacious class and there simply wasn't enough money or manpower in the RN to operate all these carriers - and so the older carriers were run for another 5-10 years or so after the war and then scrapped as the CVs laid down during the last years of WW2 were slowly completed and brought into service. 

I don't know why the RN used the light fleet carriers in the Korean war rather than their armoured fleet carriers, but I presume that it was simply because they were cheaper to operate and because the UK was nearly bankrupt at the time and the RN didn't have the budget to man all their ships. Indomitable, Illustrious, Implacable and Indefatigable were all capable of operating the FAA aircraft that were actually used during the Korean war, but they also required about the twice the crew size and twice the fuel:



> HMS IMPLACABLE landed her air crews and aircraft in Australia and was converted to accommodate passengers. She was then deployed for repatriation of British POW and embarked 2,127 at Manila to take passage to Canada arriving at Esquimalt on 11 October 1945. In January 1946 she visited Melbourne with HMS INDEFATIGABLE and sailed for UK in May, arriving in June that year. The ship was placed in Reserve and refitted before joining the Home Fleet as Flagship in 1949. *Due to manning problems during 1950 many Home Fleet ships had to be withdrawn from service and HMS IMPLACABLE was deployed in the Training Squadron and continued service in the training role until 1954 when placed in Reserve.* Placed on the Disposal List she was sold for breaking-up at Inverkeithing, Rosyth arriving at the breaker’s yard on 3rd November 1955.
> HMS Implacable, British fleet aircraft carrier, WW2


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## fastmongrel (Jun 12, 2013)

Operating costs, I believe the Light Fleets were around 1/2 the cost per aircraft to operate as a Large Fleet. In a country where rationing was still in place and for some foodstuffs was actually less generous than wartime rationing costs were very important. Its the same reason why the RN sent nothing bigger than a Light cruiser to Korea or any RAF squadrons.


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## parsifal (Jun 12, 2013)

> Formidable steamed over 100,000 miles in the 6 months from the end of the war against Japan until her return to UK. IOW, she was almost continuously underway from Aug 45 to Feb 46 when the Navweaps article claims she was a write off from the end of the war. Formidable probably steamed nearly as many miles during WW2 as Melborne did during her whole career.



No. Melbournes Steaming distances remains an unbroken record by any carrier of any Navy. She was a hard worked carrier


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## VBF-13 (Jun 12, 2013)

Getting back to the Bakas, it might be interesting to note, those were actually conceived of just days before the Marianas. In fact, they were designed, for the most part, then, too. The Japanese knew, they lose those islands, which constituted their perimeter defense, they may as well hang it up, and go home. That's why they sent that massive fleet consisting of nine carriers and some 500 planes from Tawi Tawi after us to help oppose the landings at Saipan. The ensuing slaughter and turning back of that fleet only served to confirm the desperate position they were in and basically sold the Baka concept to Fukadome, although it was still kept very secret. Only after the Philippines were lost and the Japanese had evacuated that Kamikaze program and those records to Formosa did they have the Bakas ready for the inaugural whirl. The Kamikaze program preceded the Baka program as the latter not only had to be built, but the tactics and manner of deployment had still to be worked out. When the Bakas were conceived, there was heavy fighting at Saipan, both on the ground, and in the air from the Japanese bases at Rota and Guam, but those weren't enough to hold. We could have chased after that fleet and finished it off with our F6Fs but Spruance was more concerned with making sure we had those islands secured, and that's why we let it off. The Baka program still needed work, and the Kamikaze program was an easy deployment, and that's why they went with the Kamikaze program, first. That was in October 1944, out of small bases in the Philippines, for the purpose of opposing the Philippine landings. Those were basically small units, consisting of just a few planes, with spotter escorts to record the latitude and longitude of the hits, and report those back.


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## parsifal (Jun 12, 2013)

> The Kamikaze program preceded the Baka program as the latter not only had to be built, but the tactics and manner of deployment had still to be worked out


.


Bakas were a part of the Special Air corps inventory. Suggesting it was something different is misleading 



> We could have chased after that fleet and finished it off with our F6Fs but Spruance was more concerned with making sure we had those islands secured, and that's why we let it off.




There are three pieces of misinformation here. Firstly, that the F6Fs had the ability to sink japanese carriers. they never did. They could carry bombs out to a range of about 180 miles but lacked the firepower and the accuracy to ever sink any major warship of the IJN. Secondly, Spruance operational orders were to protect the beachhead, and he was rightly concerned that being drawn off by 1st mobile fleet might expose the beachhead to some outflanking move. Thirdly, Sprunace calculated that by the time he had caught them again, he may well be subject to massive attacks (2-3000 a/c) from air units based in the Home Islands. Japan even at that stage had significant forces retained for homed defence.

Catching and destroying the Japanese fleet at phil sea is one of those popular urban myths put out by post war armchair strat5egists whi really dont know what they are talking about.....




> The Baka program still needed work, and the Kamikaze program was an easy deployment, and that's why they went with the Kamikaze program, first.



Bakas were a part of the Kamikaze effort, not separate to it. Its logical that it followed the initial employment of the tactic, not preceded it. 



> That was in October 1944, out of small bases in the Philippines, for the purpose of opposing the Philippine landings. Those were basically small units, consisting of just a few planes, with spotter escorts to record the latitude and longitude of the hits, and report those back.



What??????. The Phillipines and Formosa had been comprehensively worked over by the fast carriers prior to Leyte. The Kamikazes were controlled from Formosa initially, but had to operate from small dispersed fields because they were the only ones left in operation after halseys cariers had rooted out most of the Japanese air strength in the TO. Japan by October 1944 was staring defeat squarely in the face and needed a miracle to stem the tide. Some of the fanatics believed that making a supreme self sacrifice might deliver that miracle and save the empire. It was a complete pipe dream....


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## VBF-13 (Jun 12, 2013)

parsifal said:


> What??????. The Phillipines and Formosa had been comprehensively worked over by the fast carriers prior to Leyte. The Kamikazes were controlled from Formosa initially, but had to operate from small dispersed fields because they were the only ones left in operation after halseys cariers had rooted out most of the Japanese air strength in the TO. Japan by October 1944 was staring defeat squarely in the face and needed a miracle to stem the tide. Some of the fanatics believed that making a supreme self sacrifice might deliver that miracle and save the empire. It was a complete pipe dream....


You're more mixed-up than anybody. I'll just address this part. Get your facts straight. The Kamikaze program was conceived at Mabalacat Airfield, which formed a part of the Clark Base complex, which was some 50 miles NW of Manila, on or about 19 October 1944, with fewer than 100 planes operational, out of the 201st Air Group, just as we were at the mouth of the Leyte Gulf. When that bunch was all but finished the records and the program were forthwith removed to Formosa under two separate covers in two separate flights to make sure they could restart-up the program from there with whatever assets they could command, which is exactly what they then did. That's from Rikihei Inoguchi and Tadashi Nakajima, who were there from the inception of the program to the end, look those gentlemen up. The Japanese had the Bakas designed, as I said, well-before that, but couldn't deploy them until after the Formosa program was operational, because of the different logistics involved. Do yourself a favor and pick up of a copy of _The Divine Wind_, read it, then tell me where anything I said herein is inconsistent with those first-hand narratives.


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## cherry blossom (Jun 12, 2013)

The answer to the initial question is almost certainly not. We can produce a best case for the Special Attack Units and I have also been thinking about the decisive Battle of the Philippine Sea in 1944. 

First we assume that the original proposal by Ensign Ohta Mitsuro in 1943 is immediately accepted and design started. How much time does that gain?

According to “Kamikaze: Japanese Special Attack Weapons 1944-45” by Steven Zaloga, work started at Kugisho on 16th August 1944. However, preliminary plans had been drawn up by Professor Ogawa Taichiro and his coworkers at The Imperial University of Tokyo over the previous few months. Exactly when they started isn't obvious. “Japanese Special Attack Aircraft and Flying Bombs” by Ryusuke Ishiguro Tadeusz Januszewski mentions that Captain Tadanao Mitsugi had carried an analysis of Ohta original idea before the IJN gave permission for the work at Tokyo but even that seems to date to “mid 1944”. 

We know that the first Ohkas were being sent to the Philippines in December 1944 but never got there IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY MYSTERIES. Thus if we assume a start approximately 8 months earlier, we could have deployment for May-June 1944 in time for the Battle of the Marianas.

Secondly, we assume that liquid fuel rockets are available. The obvious way to achieve that is for German designs together with manufacturing details to arrive in Japan by early 1944. Unfortunately, I do not know which German design would be chosen or what performance was possible. The HWK 109-507 of the Hs 293 seems too heavy and has relatively low power for only a short time. The Schmidding 109-513 Schmidding 109-513 Motor was better but a system for relighting would need to be added. The best performance would be achieved by accepting the risks of the hypergolic HWK 109-509. According to Wikipedia Walter HWK 109-509 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, this is the lightest and most powerful, weighing only 100 kg and in the case of the A-1 variant “The thrust here was adjustable between 100 kp (1 kN) and 1600 kp (15.7 kN (3,500 lbf))”. This is more than twice the power of all three solid fuel rockets of the Ohka, which was much smaller even than the Me 163 Komet. The problem is trying to work out how long the rocket could give the thrust needed to keep the Ohka in the air and moving fast enough to be hard to intercept. Me-163 Komet has “Operational time at full thrust 4 min 11 seconds . However, the Komet carried only enough fuel for 7 ½ minutes of powered flight.” The Komet carried quite a lot of fuel as there was roughly two tons difference between empty and loaded weights. If we halve the warhead weight of the Ohka from 1,200 kg to 600 kg, we might free up enough weight to have a half scale HWK 109-509 and still get either 4 minutes of full power or perhaps 10 minutes of variable power, keeping the Okha at 350-360 knots which would be hard to intercept. That gives a range of about 70 miles, which would probably generally allow release before interception (hopefully you will all check my guesses ).

Perhaps 100 of these Ohka and their G4M carriers will be positioned on Guam and perhaps more than half of them will survive the first day of attacks, perhaps in specially constructed partially underground hangars. Before dawn on the 13th June, the G4Ms will take off and fly initially north in a curve to approach from between Guam and Saipan, rising up to release the Okhas when reconnaissance aircraft report the position of the American aircraft carriers. The US fleet had 15 fast carriers in the area, so it would be fairly astonishing if about 50 Ohka hit all of them. It does seem likely that a few of the Essex Class will be out of action after such an attack. However, enough will probably survive to win the battle.


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## VBF-13 (Jun 12, 2013)

That's consistent with the narratives in _The Divine Wind_. 

Guys, Ohka means "cherry blossom." So don't argue with cherry blossom on this.


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## Civettone (Jun 13, 2013)

cherry blossom said:


> Secondly, we assume that liquid fuel rockets are available. The obvious way to achieve that is for German designs together with manufacturing details to arrive in Japan by early 1944. Unfortunately, I do not know which German design would be chosen or what performance was possible. The HWK 109-507 of the Hs 293 seems too heavy and has relatively low power for only a short time. The Schmidding 109-513 Schmidding 109-513 Motor was better but a system for relighting would need to be added. The best performance would be achieved by accepting the risks of the hypergolic HWK 109-509. According to Wikipedia Walter HWK 109-509 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, this is the lightest and most powerful, weighing only 100 kg and in the case of the A-1 variant “The thrust here was adjustable between 100 kp (1 kN) and 1600 kp (15.7 kN (3,500 lbf))”. This is more than twice the power of all three solid fuel rockets of the Ohka, which was much smaller even than the Me 163 Komet. The problem is trying to work out how long the rocket could give the thrust needed to keep the Ohka in the air and moving fast enough to be hard to intercept. Me-163 Komet has “Operational time at full thrust 4 min 11 seconds .


Just skip the rocket engines and go for the pulsejet engine of the V 1 flying bomb. The Kawanishi Baika was derived from it. The Fi 103R had the same weight as the Ohka, so expect similar performances but with a range of at least 150 miles! 
I don't know if anyone knows the CAS radius for US carriers but geometrics of a circle indicate that it would be close to impossible to intercept these aircraft.

Kris


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## parsifal (Jun 13, 2013)

> You're more mixed-up than anybody. I'll just address this part. Get your facts straight. The Kamikaze program was conceived at Mabalacat Airfield, which formed a part of the Clark Base complex, which was some 50 miles NW of Manila, on or about 19 October 1944, with fewer than 100 planes operational, out of the 201st Air Group, just as we were at the mouth of the Leyte Gulf.




Disagree, and further, would suggest you are misquoting the Japanese sources you mention. Suicide attacks had been used unnofficially by all nationalities from the beginning of the war, but in particualr the japanese. The first recorded or known use of deliberate suicide attacks occurred during Santa Cruz, in October 1942, thereafter ther were increasingly frequesnt instances of their usage. 

In the fall of 1943, the AAF began to form its first "Special Attack Units" in New Guinea. In the fall of 1943 and for about a month at the beginning of 1944, Lt. Col. Koji Tanaka, a staff officer of the Imperial General Headquarters, surveyed the situation in New Guinea. In an effort to stop the constant raids, some Japanese army pilots had resorted to crashing their planes into American B-17s and B-24s. The use of these special attack methods by the army began in 1943 and lasted into the spring of 1944. They included deliberate suicide attacks against airborne, land based and sea based targets, including a successful attack on DD 394

Tanaka returned to Japan and reported his findings to the highest echelon of the Army and recommended that the use of special attack operations be considered. Philosophical disagreements sprang up among the top army officers. The discussion centered on whether or not special attack tactics and squadrons should be under a mandate from the Imperial Army or whether they should be strictly volunteer. Both the Inspector General of Aviation, Gen. Korechika Anami and his deputy chief, Lt. Gen. Torashiro Kawabe, felt that they should be strictly voluntary. After conversations with Maj. Gen. Shuichi Miyazaki, the Chief of the First Bureau, General Staff Headquarters, it was decided not to order army pilots to engage in special attack training. Shortly thereafter, in July 1944, the army “Aviation Inspector-General sent a letter to all flight school superintendents requesting a list of special attack volunteers be submitted. (A similar letter was sent from the War Minister to all air group commanders.)” Within a short period of time the army had selected fifty volunteers. Bomber pilots trained at Hamamatsu and Hokoda Army Flight Schools and the fighter pilots at Hitachi and Akeno Army Flight Schools. The following month, another sixty volunteers were accepted for special attack training and the program began to grow. By fall of 1944, the army pilots were still undergoing training, but the navy had also been considering special attacks. The program was initiated by the navy using regular pilots who were asked to volunteer.


Japanese sources frequently credit RAdm. Masafumi Arima as the inspiration for the beginning of the suicide attacks at the Philippines. Arima commanded the 26th Air Flotilla which was based at Manila. On 15 October 1944, he decided to lead a strike against American carriers near Luzon, an unusual undertaking for an officer of his high rank. Japanese reports claim that Arima crashed his Zero into the carrier Franklin CV 13, but this is unlikely. Neither Franklin nor the other carriers in the American force were hit by kamikazes that day.


The official (American version) of the beginning of the Japanese Navy’s kamikaze units came on 19 October 1944 when VAdm. Takijiro Onishi (who was headquartered at Formosa) toured the base of the 201st Air Group at Mabalacat, Philippines. His command at that time had already suffered heavy losses from repeated strikes undertaken in prepration for the main operation ( source Rielly, Robin L. Kamikaze attacks of World War II : a complete history of Japanese suicide strikes on American ships, by aircraft and other means)Onishi had just been appointed commander of the First Air Fleet with his operational orders including the formation of "special attack units" similar to the above described army units already in training. AFAIK, the Navy was also training units along the same lines. The Navy General Staff had recognized that Japan’s position in the war was tenuous. Onishi, in accordance with his orders suggested to the air group’s leaders that suicide crashes were their only chance to defeat the enemy. Within the hour the determination had been made to use this extreme attack method and twenty-seven members of the 201st volunteered for the mission. These men were not poorly trained beginners but were ranked among the best pilots in the air group. Lt. Yukio Seki, a graduate of the Naval Academy, was selected as their leader.


So, saying the initiatve for the kamikazes came from an obscure small unit in the Phillipines is completely misleading and frankly, untrue.


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## tyrodtom (Jun 13, 2013)

If you drop the Ohka 150, 70 or whatever miles from their targets, how are they going to find their targets? 
You surely don't expect to just point them in the general direction of where you hope the fleet to be, and let them go ?

The long range sounds nice, but if it's inexperinced pilots envolved, that just gives them more ocean to get lost in.


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## Civettone (Jun 13, 2013)

I thought about that too. But then again, how do those Betty bombers find them? All they can do is fly high, follow the designated course and hope that the intel was correct. Also, adding an experienced but now suicide pilot seems essential...


Kris


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## tyrodtom (Jun 13, 2013)

The Betty bombers had fairly experinced pilots and way more than adaquet range. 
When you're flying along at 20,000-25,000 feet, with several eyes aboard, you've got a lot of abilty to search for targets. But they had to get within visual range of the target to release the Ohka. Without radar on the Bettys, that's the only way possible.
That's why so many Bettys got shot down before they got the chance to release the Ohka.
If the dropping aircraft didn't have radar, the added range Ohka wouldn't help at all. It would just mean you'd lose fewer dropping aircraft.


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## Civettone (Jun 15, 2013)

No, I think you are mistaken. The reason why the Betties had to get so close was because the range of the Ohka was only 35 km.

I don't think it is relevant if the Betty crews have more eyes or if they are more experienced. Without radar, all they could do, is follow a set course and look out for large fleets. A large swarm of Baikas or Ohkas would be just as capable of visually detecting a US Task Force. 


Kris


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## tyrodtom (Jun 15, 2013)

Civettone said:


> No, I think you are mistaken. The reason why the Betties had to get so close was because the range of the Ohka was only 35 km.
> 
> I don't think it is relevant if the Betty crews have more eyes or if they are more experienced. Without radar, all they could do, is follow a set course and look out for large fleets. A large swarm of Baikas or Ohkas would be just as capable of visually detecting a US Task Force.
> 
> ...


 You've evidently never had to do a visual search from the air. Very small specks, that a untrained eye wouldn't even stop to focus on can turn out to be a target, or just dirt on the windshield. The more eyes you have, the more time each has to focus on a sector long enough to see something.
One man would be just flying along head in and out of the cockpit, having to concentrate on flying and searching, and being a newby to flying, flying might take quite a bit of his concentration.


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## tyrodtom (Jun 15, 2013)

How far is the horizon on a clear day at 20,000-25,000 feet ?

You've got some fairly experienced pilots on this forum, i'm not one of them. But I can imagine myself as a newby pilot though, brecause i'm not far above that level right now.
I can imagine me at the 50 hour level of experince flying around trying to find something, maybe with a pair of binoculars, i'd soon merge with the ground.
I'm very experienced with search from the air over ground from the Army aviation, plus have helped the CAP in some downed aircraft searches, it's not something you do with inexperinced pilots, unless you want to add to the aircraft downed.


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## VBF-13 (Jun 15, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Disagree, and further, would suggest you are misquoting the Japanese sources you mention. Suicide attacks had been used unnofficially by all nationalities from the beginning of the war, but in particualr the japanese. The first recorded or known use of deliberate suicide attacks occurred during Santa Cruz, in October 1942, thereafter ther were increasingly frequesnt instances of their usage.
> 
> In the fall of 1943, the AAF began to form its first "Special Attack Units" in New Guinea. In the fall of 1943 and for about a month at the beginning of 1944, Lt. Col. Koji Tanaka, a staff officer of the Imperial General Headquarters, surveyed the situation in New Guinea. In an effort to stop the constant raids, some Japanese army pilots had resorted to crashing their planes into American B-17s and B-24s. The use of these special attack methods by the army began in 1943 and lasted into the spring of 1944. They included deliberate suicide attacks against airborne, land based and sea based targets, including a successful attack on DD 394
> 
> ...


Excuse me for drawing attention to your inability to be responsive but since when did I mention "Special Attack Units" and for that matter since when are those even but tangentially-related to the discussion? The Kamikaze concept was rationalized in Mabalacat off the practice of suicide-crashing into bombers, I had already pointed that out, go back and refresh your recollection on it. You're hardly being full of news, there. Thank you for pointing out Ohnishi's role, that's good information. However, it's only supplemental to what I said. I left his role out, you put it in. It was integral, I agree. But let's not go non-responsive and scatter-brained, which is precisely what you're doing. Get _The Divine Wind_ and learn what the facts were relating to the Kamikaze program from those first-hand narratives. They'll tell you all about Ohnishi, in detail, and beyond. I'm talking specifically about the Kamikaze concept and the development of that specific program. Focus before you criticize. That's all you have to do. That, for a change, would be refreshing. Hell, it would be welcomed.


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## VBF-13 (Jun 15, 2013)

tyrodtom said:


> If you drop the Ohka 150, 70 or whatever miles from their targets, how are they going to find their targets?
> You surely don't expect to just point them in the general direction of where you hope the fleet to be, and let them go ?
> 
> The long range sounds nice, but if it's inexperinced pilots envolved, that just gives them more ocean to get lost in.


From 6000 meters altitude the Bakas had a range of some 30,000 meters and were released at around 20,000 meters to go plummeting toward their targets. Again, Tom, the big deal was, protecting those twin-engined bombers. It took a lot of fighter-escort for that as they were slow and very vulnerable carrying that 1800 kilograms of explosives beneath them.


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## Jenisch (Jun 15, 2013)

If I were the Japanese, I would try to import some Ar-234s to do reccon flights. I'm trying to be smart here, but actually they certainly must have thought of this at the time, and certainly it was not done because impossibility to bring things from Germany.


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## parsifal (Jun 15, 2013)

> Excuse me for drawing attention to your inability to be responsive but since when did I mention "Special Attack Units" and for that matter since when are those even but tangentially-related to the discussion?



Special Attack units ARE Kamikazes. Kamikaze is not even a word in Japanese. "Special Attack Units" is the best English translation for what we term "Kamikazes. They are, however, the same thing 



> The Kamikaze concept was rationalized in Mabalacat off the practice of suicide-crashing into bombers, I had already pointed that out, go back and refresh your recollection on it.



Koji Tanakas recommendations, and the activities of the AAF unit in PNG was not just limited to attacks on Allied Bombers. it included organised and deliberate attacks of air, sea and ground targets. 



> You're hardly being full of news, there. Thank you for pointing out Ohnishi's role, that's good information. However, it's only supplemental to what I said.



No its completely different to what you said. You claimed that the initiative for the kamikazes stemmed from a local source, in the phillipines. In fact it was an operational order handed to onishi, who was based in Formosa. His orders came directly from IGHQ, and the navy and army were both busy training attack units in Japan. You also claimed or inferred that there were no real attacks on Onishis command prior to Leyte...that the US forces had not entered the battle zone until just before the battle (a few days being the inference). In fact Onishis command had been subjected to repeated attacks since at least the 12 october that had completely wrecked all the major airfields, destroyed well over 800 aircraft, and left him with no choice but to skulk around remaining airfields and implement the new policy. Thats why he was in the Phillipines when he was. 



> I left his role out, you put it in. It was integral, I agree.



It wasnt "integral", it was critical. Kamikazes would not have developed in the historical way thet they did without his involvement, and beyond that the decisions made by IGHQ. The role of the 201st was simply to provide the "voluteers", but apart from that they were following orders, nothing more. Thats completely at odds with what you claimed. you claim they dreamed suicide attacks up and were the driving initiative behind it. 



> But let's not go non-responsive and scatter-brained, which is precisely what you're doing.



No, I am pulling you up on spurious claim after spurious claim. You claimed the genesis of Kamikazes was a localised phenomena, emananting from the Phillipines. You claimed that Kamikazes were a direct result of the defeat at Phil Sea, when clearly the Japanese were taking steps to form suicide units well before that. You also attempted to claim the Baka preceded the development of kamikazes in concept, and finally you made spurious claims about what the Hellcat as an aircraft could do. Oh, and you also made claims that Spruance "missed an opportunity" to destroy the 1st mob Flt when no such opportunity ever existed without him directly disobeying orders (now, that IS getting OT, but its still worth correcting your claims as the need arises). 



> Get _The Divine Wind_ and learn what the facts were relating to the Kamikaze program from those first-hand narratives. They'll tell you all about Ohnishi, in detail, and beyond.



Ive already read the book, and many others on this subject, which is one reason why I know when you are taking people out of context, or misqupoting them, or simply telling enormous porkies (which is most of the time sad to say)....



> I'm talking specifically about the Kamikaze concept and the development of that specific program.



So am i, and its development was a process that began at least from 1942 for the japanese.....in fact the whole concept self sacrifice, in the sense of the Kamikaze mindset goes all the way back to the Bushido. 



> Focus before you criticize. That's all you have to do. That, for a change, would be refreshing. Hell, it would be welcomed


.

I am focussed. Focussed on getting the truth out, despite the best efforts of special intersat groups to suppress and promote their version of history. And if you want to avoid my criticism, stop making outlandish claims and spurious remarks

And we are both talking about Kamikazes here...


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## Coyote (Jun 15, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Special Attack units ARE Kamikazes. Kamikaze is not even a word in Japanese. "Special Attack Units" is the best English translation for what we term "Kamikazes. They are, however, the same thing



So what does 神風 mean????
This is the first time in 40+ years I have ever read that Kamikaze is not a Japanese word. I guess I'm gonna have to write all the authors from the hundreds of books I've read and tell them to come up with another Japanese term for Divine Wind...............I'll be right back...............


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## VBF-13 (Jun 15, 2013)

Coyote said:


> So what does 神風 mean????
> This is the first time in 40+ years I have ever read that Kamikaze is not a Japanese word. I guess I'm gonna have to write all the authors from the hundreds of books I've read and tell them to come up with another Japanese term for Divine Wind...............I'll be right back...............


Coyote, the special unit born at Mabalacat was given the name, _Shimpu _ (_Shimpu _ is just another way of reading the characters for "Kamikaze").

Let me add just a quick footnote that might be helpful in understanding the wider picture. When Vice Admiral Ohnishi came to Mabalacat from Tokyo on 17 October 1944 to assume command of the First Air Fleet the Japanese had already had a plan in the works, called _Sho_, which had been completed in July 1944. That plan had basically set out, whichever area was invaded next by the enemy shall be declared the "theater of decisive battle," and all available forces shall be rushed to there to oppose the said invasion. That plan was activated at 1701 on 18 October 1944 with the first intimation of the American invasion at Leyte, and the Philippines was declared that decisive battle area. That's, also, the how, when and where of the Kamikaze Special Attack Corps, in a nut.


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## VBF-13 (Jun 15, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Special Attack units ARE Kamikazes. Kamikaze is not even a word in Japanese. "Special Attack Units" is the best English translation for what we term "Kamikazes. They are, however, the same thing
> 
> Koji Tanakas recommendations, and the activities of the AAF unit in PNG was not just limited to attacks on Allied Bombers. it included organised and deliberate attacks of air, sea and ground targets.
> 
> ...


I give up. Whatever you want to say, we leave it at that.


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## Civettone (Jun 15, 2013)

tyrodtom said:


> How far is the horizon on a clear day at 20,000-25,000 feet ?
> 
> You've got some fairly experienced pilots on this forum, i'm not one of them. But I can imagine myself as a newby pilot though, brecause i'm not far above that level right now.
> I can imagine me at the 50 hour level of experince flying around trying to find something, maybe with a pair of binoculars, i'd soon merge with the ground.
> I'm very experienced with search from the air over ground from the Army aviation, plus have helped the CAP in some downed aircraft searches, it's not something you do with inexperinced pilots, unless you want to add to the aircraft downed.


I am not convinced. FIghter plane pilots did not have more trouble finding enemy task forces, than bomber crews. I agree that more eyes is useful. But I am sure a flight of 30 Baika/Ohka crews would be able to spot a task force of a dozen major warships plus smaller supporting ships, while still being able to keep their plane in a straight line and at constant speed...

Also, kamikaze flight formations were lead by experienced pilots. I assume the same would have happened with a formation of Baikas/Ohkas.

Credit where credit's due, but this idea that inexperienced pilots cannot spot ships nor fly a plane straight, is IMO grossly exaggerated. Reminds me a bit of those pilots who used to discredit the idea of UAVs, believing their experience and flying capabilities were indispensable.

Kris


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## tyrodtom (Jun 15, 2013)

Fighter pilots, again, experienced pilots. In radio comunication with each other.
And I think you need to do a more indepth study of the UAV program before setting it up as a example of sucess.


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## altsym (Jun 15, 2013)

Coyote said:


> So what does 神風 mean????
> ...


Divine wind. In Japanese, the formal term used for units carrying out suicide attacks during 1944–1945 is tokubetsu kōgeki tai (特別攻撃隊), which literally means "special attack unit". This is usually abbreviated to tokkōtai (特攻隊). More specifically, air suicide attack units from the Imperial Japanese Navy were officially called shinpū tokubetsu kōgeki tai (神風特別攻撃隊, "divine wind special attack units").


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## parsifal (Jun 18, 2013)

altsym said:


> Divine wind. In Japanese, the formal term used for units carrying out suicide attacks during 1944–1945 is tokubetsu kōgeki tai (特別攻撃隊), which literally means "special attack unit". This is usually abbreviated to tokkōtai (特攻隊). More specifically, air suicide attack units from the Imperial Japanese Navy were officially called shinpū tokubetsu kōgeki tai (神風特別攻撃隊, "divine wind special attack units").



thankyou and exactly right


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 19, 2013)

Civettone said:


> , but this idea that inexperienced pilots cannot spot ships nor fly a plane straight, is IMO grossly exaggerated.



As far as spotting ships, probably a different subject all together, but I suggest talking to someone who has flown aircraft at high speeds (300 mph plus) and let them tell you have difficult it could be for a low time or even student pilot to maintain altitude and directional control, it takes a while to understand and master using trim, especially in pitch attitudes.

You mentioned yourself that Kamikazes had 30 hours training - a PPL requires 40. How proficient do you think these pilots really were, especially if the only training aid was a glider (in the case of flying an Okha)?


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## Civettone (Jun 19, 2013)

If you are flying at a constant speed and in a straight line, how much time, percentage wise, do you need to devote solely on trim control?

I have trouble believing a flight of experienced pilots are better at seeing a US TF in open ocean, than inexperienced pilots. Add an experience pilot to lead the flight and I think they will be fine. And yeah, I guess then the real difficulty is controlling the plane in a straight high-speed dive towards US carriers without spinning out of control and missing the target. That part seems more credible than the inability to even fly a simple-to-fly plane like the Ohka is said to have been, in a straight line and at constant speed.

Kris


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 19, 2013)

Civettone said:


> If you are flying at a constant speed and in a straight line, how much time, percentage wise, do you need to devote solely on trim control?


You are continually trimming to maintain pitch attitude and this will vary with speed and attitude. During abrupt maneuvers you are “muscling” the aircraft as you maneuver, once you level off you start trimming to maintain a cruise altitude and attitude. The first several hours learning to fly is devoted to this, it is a constant action that must be learned and initially you have a student "all over the place" when trying to make coordinated turns or maintaining altitude.


Civettone said:


> I have trouble believing a flight of experienced pilots are better at seeing a US TF in open ocean, than inexperienced pilots. Add an experience pilot to lead the flight and I think they will be fine.


Things look very different in the air, although that may sound simplistic its the truth. Unless you have some experience in the air, "things" on the ground seem to all blend in. I've had a student of mine fly right over an airport and didn't even know where they were.


Civettone said:


> And yeah, I guess then the real difficulty is controlling the plane in a straight high-speed dive towards US carriers without spinning out of control and missing the target. That part seems more credible than the inability to even fly a simple-to-fly plane like the Ohka is said to have been, in a straight line and at constant speed.
> 
> Kris



Understand that when you start applying power (or thrust) there is a tendency on most aircraft for the nose to pitch up and unless you trim rapidly, you're really putting muscle on the stick to counter act that upward pitch. This even happens in small GA aircraft when you're in a landing configuration and you power up in a go-around, so imagine a 30 hour pilot who may have never flown faster than 120 knots suddenly at 10,000' in a rocket at 450 knots.


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## Jenisch (Jun 19, 2013)

The Ohka was essentially a rocket glider. But given the short wings, the things must have had a very poor glide ratio. Not that it was bad, it was actually necessary to have lower drag and get the benefit of the rocket engine.


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## tyrodtom (Jun 19, 2013)

When you're at sea you've got nothing to sight on to know if you're going straight, all you've got is a horizon To stay level by.
Unless you're flying straight into the wind, or away from the wind, you've got wind drift.
A newby pilot isn't going to be able to scan the few gauges he had to keep a compass course.
And a formation of 30 hr level pilots following a experienced pilot sounds like a situation guaranteed to produce a lot of mid air collisions.


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## razor1uk (Jun 19, 2013)

I think of the Ohka as a descent/thrust glider when its rockets are on, without power, its just a like an aerodynamic stone with a long lance warhead in it and a human guidance componant... which AFAIK wasn't welded or chained in/up as allied wartime propaganda would have you believe.

Mind due, the Japanese apparently had the largest home islands reserve of combat able a/c for directing against the invasion fleet - and of the axis powers late war, they probably had the better trained pilots as far as average hours went for verses the other axis powers.

Not that would stand up against the million plus combatants propossed invasion force - it was planned to be bigger than Normandy after the difficulties encountered during the island hoping battles - but the A-bombs became 'online' and so, lives were inevitably saved on all sides. (methinks that the 3rd bomb was still being made/processed, and when ready, was used in the 'Baker' test in '45/'46 - hence why the quick use of the 2nd upon Nagasaki, to create the appearance of more waiting, and weaken the nearest regional command centre to the propossed invasion axis via Kyushu after the next invasion step onto Honshu, which was the 1st bomb target of Hiroshima... sorry I am getting off-topic.)


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## stona (Jun 20, 2013)

Minor detail, he third bomb was ready to go. The "hardware" was already shipped and the nuclear component was ready to go. Truman stopped it, according to Oppenheimer and others.

Cheers

Steve


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## VBF-13 (Jun 20, 2013)

stona said:


> Minor detail, he third bomb was ready to go. The "hardware" was already shipped and the nuclear component was ready to go. Truman stopped it, according to Oppenheimer and others.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve


Now there's something I totally didn't know. I "knew" this, though. After that Nagasaki bomb, the Japanese had to be thinking, there's more where that came from.


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## parsifal (Jun 20, 2013)

> Not that would stand up against the million plus combatants propossed invasion force - it was planned to be bigger than Normandy after the difficulties encountered during the island hoping battles - but the A-bombs became 'online' and so, lives were inevitably saved on all sides. (methinks that the 3rd bomb was still being made/processed, and when ready, was used in the 'Baker' test in '45/'46 - hence why the quick use of the 2nd upon Nagasaki, to create the appearance of more waiting, and weaken the nearest regional command centre to the propossed invasion axis via Kyushu after the next invasion step onto Honshu, which was the 1st bomb target of Hiroshima... sorry I am getting off-topic.)



After Phillipines Sea and Leyte, very few in Japan believed they could achieve victory. The battles in 1945 were about making the achievement of final victory by the allies so expensive that better terms than those offered at potsdam could be obtained. The Japanese in 1945 had two basic war aims....that any peace treaty respect the authority and person of the emperor, and secondly that the Home Islands not be the subject of foreign occupation. They achieved one of those aims.....the empereor was respected, his position in the government retained of sorts. He had to make declarations after the war that he was not a deity, but the Americans did honour their undertakings (only ever given verbally) that neither he or any member of his immediate family would be subject to war crimes trials or similar. Thats a bit of an embarrassment, since at least one senior memeber of the royal family was responsible for the massacres at Nanking.

The A-Bombs had an undoubted effect on japanese thinking, but a more important element in their final agreement to surrender was the Soviet invasion of Manchuria

One discussion of this alternative viewpoint can be found here...

Why did Japan surrender? - The Boston Globe

The article doesnt bring it out so well, but if you get the relevant transcripts from the japanese war cabinet, it imedialtely becomes apparent that the bombs were not their prime motivation for surrender. The cabinet was essentially deadlocked, they asked the emperor for guidance and he indicated that surrender was the best option.....the cabinet then discussed why that might be so, and it was the Russian invasion that influenced them far more than the bombs. 

"In recent years, however, a new interpretation of events has emerged. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa - a highly respected historian at the University of California, Santa Barbara - has marshaled compelling evidence that it was the Soviet entry into the Pacific conflict, not Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that forced Japan’s surrender. His interpretation could force a new accounting of the moral meaning of the atomic attack. It also raises provocative questions about nuclear deterrence, a foundation stone of military strategy in the postwar period. And it suggests that we could be headed towards an utterly different understanding of how, and why, the Second World War came to its conclusion.

“_Hasegawa has changed my mind_,” says Richard Rhodes, the Pulitzer Prize-winning author of “_The Making of the Atomic Bomb.” “The Japanese decision to surrender was not driven by the two bombings_.”


President Truman’s decision to go nuclear has long been a source of controversy. Many, of course, have argued that attacking civilians can never be justified. Then, in the 1960s, a “revisionist school” of historians suggested that Japan was in fact close to surrendering before Hiroshima - that the bombing was not necessary, and that Truman gave the go-ahead primarily to intimidate the Soviet Union with our new power.


Hasegawa - who was born in Japan and has taught in the United States since 1990, and who reads English, Japanese, and Russian - rejects both the traditional and revisionist positions. According to his close examination of the evidence, Japan was not poised to surrender before Hiroshima, as the revisionists argued, nor was it ready to give in immediately after the atomic bomb, as traditionalists have always seen it. Instead, it took the Soviet declaration of war on Japan, several days after Hiroshima, to bring the capitulation".


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## Civettone (Jun 21, 2013)

it is a very very stubborn Western myth that the Japanese surrendered because of the A-bombs ...

Just looking into the records as well as the timing of the war cabinet meetings around that time clearly indicates that the A-bombs were not the major concern.



Kris


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## tyrodtom (Jun 21, 2013)

First bomb probably not, but the second bomb just a few days later and the uncertainy of when and where the 3rd bomb might drop would have had them concerned.


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## Civettone (Jun 21, 2013)

Look up the transcripts of their meetings and you will see just how little it mattered to them. They talked more about the Russians, the expected invasion, their honour and the emperor, than about the A-bombs. They had become immune to the carnage around them. 


These guys were not like you and I. They were far far detached from the suffering around them. Even in the last meeting, they could not agree on a capitulation, so they asked the emperor. 

Kris


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## tyrodtom (Jun 21, 2013)

But the bombs mattered to the emporer, so much so that he even mentioned them in his surrender address to his people.
The order of decussion proves nothing, sometimes it's last but not least.


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## VBF-13 (Jun 21, 2013)

Japan was suing for peace before the first bomb and before Russia entered the War. They played poker to the end. The bombs finished them.


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## gjs238 (Jun 21, 2013)

Perhaps the Soviets finished them.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jun 21, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> Japan was suing for peace before the first bomb and before Russia entered the War. They played poker to the end. The bombs finished them.



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surrender_of_Japan


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## Civettone (Jun 21, 2013)

tyrodtom said:


> But the bombs mattered to the emporer, so much so that he even mentioned them in his surrender address to his people.
> The order of decussion proves nothing, sometimes it's last but not least.


I agree that it mattered to the emperor. He also mentioned them during his final verdict asked by the War Cabinet. It seems he was more aware of what was going on, than the generals. I guess that's what happens when you let the military run a country.
However, it also shows the lack of courage the emperor had. He kept his little divine mouth shut, when he was already convinced the war was lost. 

One simply cannot understand WW2 Japan from a Western POV. For instance, when the emperor had decided to surrender, the ministers and generals started to weep uncontrollably, hysterically. Grown men, leaders of armies and fleets, weeping like little children over words of an emperor, who was in some weird way prohibited in speaking in the first place.

Things were not what they seem and the Japanese surrender was not because of the A-bombs. No meeting was assembled after the drop of the first bomb. They only assembled after the news arrived of the Russian invasion. At most, the bombs accelerated the surrender.


Kris


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## VBF-13 (Jun 21, 2013)

gjs238 said:


> Perhaps the Soviets finished them.


"And mark you! Japan sued for peace before the atomic bomb hit Hiroshima and before Russia entered the Pacific War." - Rear Admiral Robert B. Carney, USN. 

Hiroshima and Manchuria happened almost concurrently. But Japan's armies and air forces at that time were actually larger than they were in 1941. The prospect of opposing the Russians wasn't what made that nation, with its military strength still for the most part intact, quit so quickly and decisively. They were facing, not just defeat, but total extinction. That's what those atomic bombs got across to them, and in no uncertain terms.


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## tyrodtom (Jun 21, 2013)

The second atomic bomb, and Russia's entry into the war was on the same day. The 9 th of Aug. 
The meeting between the emperor and cabinet was late that night going into the next morning. 

Hiroshima bombed Aug 6, Russia declared war Aug 8. Russia invaded Mancuhko early morning Aug 9, later that same morning Nagasaki was nuked.


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## Civettone (Jun 21, 2013)

Indeed, Tyrodtom. 

And VBF-13, you are right, that they were facing complete destruction. But this was already going on before the A-bombs. Firestorms had turned its largest cities and industries into ashes. 

Many of the generals/admirals stated that it was better to die to the last man. If Japan was to be taken over by the enemy, it could just as well stop existing. 

What you guys should also realize is that Japan considered its territories in Manchukuo and Formosa as part of the Japanese empire. An attack on these territories was almost an attack on the home country. Until the end, the Japanese had hoped to keep these territories if they surrendered to the Americans. In the end, they were not allowed to. Only their wish to see the monarchy is place, was met. 

The existence of the emperor was a symbol of the Japanese identity. If the emperor would remain, Japan would live on.

Like I said, it's not our Western way of thinking at work here.
Kris


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## tyrodtom (Jun 22, 2013)

I'm not so sure it's that the eastern way of thinking is so different, but I think people who have been in absolute power for so long don't realize how powerless they'll become when they lose. They can have a totally unrealistic view of their worth to their enemy.
Take for example how some in the Nazi hierarchy thought they could negotiate a separate peace with the western allies, then combine forces with them against the Soviets.


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## parsifal (Jun 22, 2013)

Joes wiki link is worth reading. Relevantly it says


"The combined shock of these events caused Emperor Hirohito to intervene and order the Big Six to accept the terms for ending the war that the Allies had set down in the Potsdam Declaration. After several more days of behind-the-scenes negotiations and a failed coup d'état, Emperor Hirohito gave a recorded radio address across the Empire on August 15. In the radio address, called the Gyokuon-hōsō ("Jewel Voice Broadcast"), he announced the surrender of Japan to the Allies"...

Saying the bombs had no effect is not valid, but then trying to discount the Soviet invasion is also clearly at odds with known facts. Its true that the Japanese were seeking a way out of the war from at least June 1944, but the unconditional surrender terms and the refusal by the allies to give any concessions regarding the empereor were major sticking points for the Japanese, and until the Soviets attacked, Japan was showing absolutely no signs of accepting them. They seemed prepred to committing national sengoku rather than risk having the emperor mistreated. The "big six" were dead locked, and remained so until after the invasion of Manchuria. It was the invasion, not the bomb that caused them to seek the emperors guidance, something that had not occurred since the Meiji Restoration. So, as far as the "big six" were concerned, it was not the bomb that loomed large for them. However for the emperor, we dont actually know what pushed him to instruct the war cabinet to accept Potsdam and surrender unconditionally.... Given that some members of the big six were appalled by the losses being suffered, and the emperor was clearly favouring the peace initiatives, one can only surmise that he too was influenced by the effect of the bomb(s). He never made it clear, however, in the post war period what caused him to intervene in the way that he did. He just did..... 

In trying to understand japanese intransigence, one has to remember the very nature of Japanese politics.....I call it "assassination politics". If the Kwantung Army (the real power brokers in japan) did not like what a politician was doing or saying, they would rub him out without a moments hesitation. Even after the emperors intervention on August 8/9, there were grave fears of a coup de tat that would see the emperor killed or detained. thats exactly what was attempted by Anami and his associates but thankfully it failed


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## cherry blossom (Jun 22, 2013)

There is a slightly Machiavellian interpretation of Japan's decision to surrender. “Eurasian Eclipse: Japan's End Game in World War II”, Yukiko Koshiro, The American Historical Review, Vol. 109, No. 2 (April 2004) (pp. 417-444) has:

A two-front war against both the United States and the Soviet Union was looking like an impossible scenario; the Soviet attack alone would be the end of Japan's war in Asia and the Pacific. However, Japan's surrender tactic was now to have the United States and the Soviet Union compete against each other in their planning for the future of East Asia. Thus Japan's plan for surrender and beyond, both politically and militarily in the Eurasian context, was made assuming a Soviet attack beginning in Manchuria and assessing its impact on the United States. In fact, by mid-April 1945, when the Imperial Headquarters acknowledged the rapid reinforcement of Soviet forces in the Far East, the Army War Operations Plans Division made no recommendations for preparations for counterattack. Instead, it made the following observation: the key to accomplishing the goal of the Greater East Asian War was to predict precisely when the Soviet attack would occur and to complete by then a quick and proper response and measure concerning it. The "quick and proper response and measure" seems, in this context, to mean Japan's surrender. But nowhere in the observation did it hint that Japan should do so *before* the Soviet attack.


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## VBF-13 (Jun 22, 2013)

Civettone said:


> Indeed, Tyrodtom.
> 
> And VBF-13, you are right, that they were facing complete destruction. But this was already going on before the A-bombs. Firestorms had turned its largest cities and industries into ashes.
> 
> ...


Kris, I'm buying a lot of that. As Tom pointed out, though, the second atomic bomb and Manchuria were almost simultaneous. I'm loosening up, though. At any rate, I didn't mean to imply Russia wasn't a consideration. I just still think Nagasaki was the straw that broke the camel's back; the procuring cause; the main event. 

As a slight digression, do you know what Stalin wanted? This is just my personal view. He wanted his boys on the USS Missouri (that is to say, in a manner of speaking). He wanted a piece of Tokyo just as he ultimately got that piece of Berlin. That greedy bastard.


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## VBF-13 (Jun 22, 2013)

Just proceeding from my slight digression, from Japan's point of view, knowing they were licked, the ultimate question was who they wanted to unconditionally surrender to. Russia's late entry into that War at that point was almost insulting, too, after all that fighting we did, there.


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## gjs238 (Jun 22, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> Kris, I'm buying a lot of that. As Tom pointed out, though, the second atomic bomb and Manchuria were almost simultaneous. I'm loosening up, though. At any rate, I didn't mean to imply Russia wasn't a consideration. I just still think Nagasaki was the straw that broke the camel's back; the procuring cause; the main event.
> 
> As a slight digression, do you know what Stalin wanted? This is just my personal view. He wanted his boys on the USS Missouri (that is to say, in a manner of speaking). He wanted a piece of Tokyo just as he ultimately got that piece of Berlin. That greedy bastard.


 Uncle Joe did get part of the Kuril Islands Kuril Islands dispute - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## davebender (Jun 22, 2013)

WWII era Kamikaze appear normal compared to these lunatics.
Counter-Terrorism: Butt Bombs A Bust


> For over a decade now Western terrorism experts (and script writers) have predicted that Islamic terrorists would hide bombs inside their bodies in order to avoid detection before the bombers got to their targets (usually high-value individuals). The simplest method to carry a bomb internally is to insert a small (500 gr/a pound of explosives) package up the rectum.


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## cherry blossom (Jun 22, 2013)

davebender said:


> WWII era Kamikaze appear normal compared to these lunatics.
> Counter-Terrorism: Butt Bombs A Bust


My point in #107 was that according to Yukiko Koshiro some Japanese leaders were not only rational but almost prescient. They calculated that waiting for a Soviet attack and then surrendering would lead to Soviet – American conflict over Korea and China which they believed was the best chance for Japan to regain its independence. 

Of course finding evidence that some officers thought that way in early 1945 does not prove that they were influential, still less that they were controlling Japanese policy .


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## cherry blossom (Jun 24, 2013)

Returning after the digression into the politics of the Japanese Surrender to the original question and particularly whether the Battle of the Philippines Sea could have been affected, it does seem clear that a far sighted IJN officer should have been worried by the difficulty that a Kamikaze pilot with only limited training might have in finding an American aircraft carrier. He might have also been concerned by the difference in the handling of an Ohka under power compared with the glider version used in training. 

I don't think that it would have been wise to have included use of the T-Stoff and C-Stoff powered flight in the training syllabus because of the hazard. However, perhaps it might have been possible to have added the RATO rockets actually used historically to a glider to give a student some idea of the characteristics of an Ohka at 350-380 knots. The Japanese probably had enough RATO rockets as they used those on carriers in 1944 (none of the Japanese carriers in WW2 had catapults – Kaga had tested a bad design pre-WW2). I don't know if it would have been necessary to develop a method of jettisoning the RATO rockets as well as the water warhead before landing the glider.

The problem of finding an aircraft carrier might be soluble by turning the Ohka into an anti-radiation missile with sophisticated terminal guidance. The German night fighters in 1944 were homing on bomber emissions using Naxos against the centimetric radar of H2S and also used the RAF IFF if it was switched on. We might imagine that plans for Naxos had arrived at the same time as planes for the liquid fuelled rocket motors. However, while radar emissions might find a USN ship, finding a carrier might require more discrimination. 

The unique signal of the USN carriers was their verbal fighter direction system, about which I know very little (help!). Thus I have no idea how easy it would be to use this for homing, although it would seem that a simultaneous conventional attack should get the USN talking. The signals could be picked up at a fair range. There is an account of pilots over Guam being called back to defend their carriers by the code signal “Hey Rube” when Ozawa's strike was detected. It would be necessary to identify frequencies and I assume that the system involved some frequency hoping. A few G4Ms flying with the Ohka carriers could possibly carry equipment to analyse the signals and inform the Ohka pilots of settings if early investigations during the attacks on the Marshalls and Truk had identified how the American system worked (perhaps aided by examination of aircraft shot down over Truk). The RAF could break into the German fighter direction system and give false instructions HyperWar: Royal Air Force 1939-1945: Volume III: The Fight is Won [Chapter 12] and RAF West Malling which implies that finding the frequencies for that system was possible.


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## VBF-13 (Jun 24, 2013)

cherry blossom said:


> Returning after the digression into the politics of the Japanese Surrender to the original question and particularly whether the Battle of the Philippines Sea could have been affected, it does seem clear that a far sighted IJN officer should have been worried by the difficulty that a Kamikaze pilot with only limited training might have in finding an American aircraft carrier. He might have also been concerned by the difference in the handling of an Ohka under power compared with the glider version used in training.


The Kamikazes were led to their targets by escorts, who also did the progress-reporting.


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## parsifal (Jun 24, 2013)

VBFs comments are correct. The japanese needed to locate and fix the position of the 5th fleet before they could hit them. It was one of the stnad out successes for the japanese during the battle. they retained this recon advantage to the end of the war. USN was located by long range land based seaplanes almost as they left their anchorages. They retained good surveillance of the USN until the last days, when the USN finally closed up this source of vital information for the Japanese. That helps to explain (but not fully so) why one of Ozawas strike almost completely missed their targets. 

The Japanese really sucked at inter-command co-operation. The LBA elements of the plan were supposed to keep the 1st mob fleet of accurate updates on their progress...the idea being they would attrition the USN to even up the odds. They gave completely spurious and innaccurate reports of sinking US carriers and huge unsubstantiated US aircraft losses, when in reality the USN was absolutely working them over and wiping the floor with them for very few losses 

Japanese fighter direction was really a matter of guesswork by the ground based commander...most of the airborne deployments were left up to the discretion of the airborne leaders in tactical command. Good flexibility but limited capability is the way i would describe Japanese fighter direction. 



> The unique signal of the USN carriers was their verbal fighter direction system, about which I know very little (help!).



In 1942 the USN fighter direction was poor, overcentraliused and lacking discipline by the pilots. two critical elements thwat the USN just didnt get to grips with until later. But still markedly better than the Japanese. By 1944, fighter direction techniques were much perfected, with far better radio discipline and better central control exercised by the FCs. It was this excellent C&C that was the single most important element to victory at Phil Sea and elsewhere....being in the right place at the right time at the right height and in the right numbers was a critical element to USN success. The pilots did play a role in achieving that advantage incidentally By 1945 it was the second most effective navy at fighter control techniques second only to the BPF. The British were, and remained, the masters of the trade until the advent of high tech AEW and AWACs aircraft. There was only a slight advantage by 1945, but a clear one. in our view, the USN jockey still retained an element of ill discipline. which tended to cost them despite the massive numbers they could bring to bear by that stage. 

I might be a little biased on this last subject, but its a genuine opinion, backed up by some good stats. .


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## Civettone (Jun 25, 2013)

Apparently the term 'kamikaze' was known in the West before the war. 

A Mitsubishi Ki-15 flew from Japan to Europe with the word kamikaze written on the fuselage. Written in Western letters, so either this is the source of the misuse of kamikaze for suicide planes, or means that the word was already known in the Western world.







http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kamikaze_%281937_aircraft%29
Kris


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## parsifal (Jun 25, 2013)

"Kamikaze" is a modification of two japanese words....from Japanese, "kami" divine + "kaze" wind, referring to the winds that, according to Japanese tradition, destroyed a Mongol invasion fleet in 1281. Kamikaze as a name has been used quitre regularly by the Japanese, for example they named a class of Destroyers "Kamikaze" class DDs. in Japoanese vernacular, the term has more to infer divine providence or miraculous good luck or good fortune, so the phrase was used quite a bit in prewar Japan. 

But the Japanese whilst making references to the "divine winds" of 1281 when they formally initiated suicide atacks, never formally referred to the term as a description of their special attack units. That was a name given to them by the west.

Even this explanation belies the extent of bastardization that has occurred . Before 1940, many Japanese texts refer to this word as equivalent to kami ( y ) god (earlier *kamui ) + kaze wind (earlier *kanzai). As should be apparent, the word was mangled and misused by the Allies....a clear indication of near total ignorance of the Japanese motivations.


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## Civettone (Jun 25, 2013)

My point is merely that I believe the word kamikaze was known in the West prior to WW2. This record-setting Ki-15 is either a result of the Western knowledge of this word, or it contributed to it.

In other words, I do not believe it is a coincidence that the Japanese used exactly this word for their first and only aircraft trip to Europe.

Kris


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## parsifal (Jun 25, 2013)

Yeah, okay I understand, and fair enough. But the japanese never referred officially to their Special Attack Corps as "kamikazes". They were popularised in the west by that name, and it may even have been used in their local popular press. But I am yet to find any evidence of that. If you want to be a bit pedantic , it should really should be shown as two separate words ie Kami Kaze and not the bastardised westernised version of 'kamikaze", since in japanese language the term is a combination of two words. of course, in the post war, it probably crept into even Japanese language as a new word, because of the gradual westernization of the country and the popularization of the supreme saacrifices made by these men. 

I dont think we as observers have the moral right to show such disrespect .......they were our mortal enemeies, but they fought more bravely that just about any other group of warriors in human history....


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## Civettone (Jun 25, 2013)

It is written as one word on that plane of theirs


Kris


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## cherry blossom (Jun 26, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Yeah, okay I understand, and fair enough. But the japanese never referred officially to their Special Attack Corps as "kamikazes". They were popularised in the west by that name, and it may even have been used in their local popular press. But I am yet to find any evidence of that. If you want to be a bit pedantic , it should really should be shown as two separate words ie Kami Kaze and not the bastardised westernised version of 'kamikaze", since in japanese language the term is a combination of two words. of course, in the post war, it probably crept into even Japanese language as a new word, because of the gradual westernization of the country and the popularization of the supreme saacrifices made by these men.
> 
> I dont think we as observers have the moral right to show such disrespect .......they were our mortal enemeies, but they fought more bravely that just about any other group of warriors in human history....


I don't feel that use of the word Kamikaze shows any racial disrespect. Several Japanese sources use the term in their official English translations such as at ???????? where it is written at the bottom of the page. Those sources may themselves show some disrespect for the leaders of Imperial Japan but not for the pilots involved. An example might be Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney Kamikaze Diaries: Reflections of Japanese Student Soldiers by Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, an excerpt and Kamikaze, Cherry Blossoms, and Nationalisms: The Militarization of Aesthetics in Japanese History, Ohnuki-Tierney. When Japanese books are translated into English, Kamikaze is often used in the translations presumably with the approval of the Japanese authors as in “Thunder Gods: The Kamikaze Pilots Tell Their Story” by Naito, Hatsuho; Ichikawa, Mayumi Thunder Gods: The Kamikaze Pilots Tell Their Story by Naito, Hatsuho by Naito, Hatsuho; Ichikawa, Mayumi: Kodansha Amer Inc 1989-05-01 9780870119095 Hardcover - Anaco Books.


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## Dogwalker (Jun 26, 2013)

parsifal said:


> it should really should be shown as two separate words ie Kami Kaze and not the bastardised westernised version of 'kamikaze", since in japanese language the term is a combination of two words.


Nope. Many Japanese, as well as Chinese, words are the combination of two kanji. Many, if not the major part, of the Japanese personal names are composed that way. To name some other Japanese terms popular in the west composed that way: "yakuza" (three kanji), "ronin" (two), "karate" (two), and any martial arts or philosophy that ends with "do" (Bushido, Aikido, ecc...), but they are translitterated in western languages as one words terms, from before WWII, by Japanese authors themself.


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## Dogwalker (Jun 26, 2013)

The same term "Blitzkrieg" was not invented by Germans (it was first used by British press) , and is composed by two words. Hovever, the term is not grammatically incorrect, and is not offensive, even if Hitler disliked it.
The fact is that nothing as a foreign word is capable to explicate fully the meaning of a new thing. It was way more aesy to say "kamikaze" than "Japanese suicide pilots that crash on our ships with aircrafts full of explosive", and "blitzkrieg" than "tactical use of mechanized units developed by the Germans in the '30s".


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## Civettone (Jun 26, 2013)

Similar to banzai. A Japanese word taken out of context and now generally used in the derived meaning. But then again, a lot of our words have an etymological meaning far removed from the current meaning. 


Kris


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## parsifal (Jun 26, 2013)

well, thats what I get when I dont speak the language very well. Tough love, but thanks for the correction just the same. 
What is certain however, is that the japanese did not officially refer to their suicide units as Kamikazes. And rememeber, this all stems from the claim that kamikazs and 'special attack corps' were somehow different. There is no such distinction


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## parsifal (Jun 26, 2013)

> The same term "Blitzkrieg" was not invented by Germans (it was first used by British press) , and is composed by two words. Hovever, the term is not grammatically incorrect, and is not offensive, even if Hitler disliked it


.

Its origins for the west are believed to have originated from an italian journalist and first appeared just after Poland. May well have been coined in the british press as well. ther is some doubt as to the origins . However, the term had already made an appearance as early as 1935, in a German military periodical Deutsche Wehr (German Defense), in connection to quick or lightning warfare. As a concept, however, "blitzkrieg" is a bit of a myth anyway, since it was never an officially a formalised or codified military doctrine. 

Senior officers of the Wehrmacht, including Kurt Student, Franz Halder and Johann Adolf von Kielmansegg, dispute that the blitzkrieg was ever an organized military concept and most certainly it was never a military tradition attracting tradional values or respect as such. Many contemporary German officers instead asserted that what many regarded as the blitzkrieg was nothing more than "ad hoc solutions that simply popped out of the prevailing situation" (Johann Adolf von Kielmansegg) and ideas that "naturally emerged from the existing circumstances" (Kurt Student) as a response to operational challenges.

German historian Frieser summarized the blitzkrieg as "simply the result of German commanders blending the latest technology in the most beneficial way with the traditional military principles and employing the right units in the right place at the right time" on the operational level of warfare, and that it was in no way a brand-new military doctrine or concept

The origins of the term blitzkrieg are obscure. It was never used in the title of a military doctrine or handbook of the German army or air force. It was rarely used in the German military press before 1939. There are only two military articles from the 1930s in which it is employed. Neither article advocates any radically new military doctrine or approach to war. Both use the term simply to mean a swift strategic knockout. 

Another relatively early use of the term in a German-language work was in a book by Fritz Sternberg, a Jewish Marxist political economist who was a refugee from the Third Reich. Entitled Die Deutsche Kriegsstärke (German War Strength), it was published in Paris in 1939. It had been preceded by an English-language edition of 1938 called Germany and a Lightning War. The German edition uses the term blitzkrieg. The book’s argument is that Germany is not prepared economically for a long war but might win a lightning war. It does not treat in any detail operational and tactical matters, and does not suggest that the German armed forces have evolved a radically new operational method. It offers scant clues as to how German lightning victories might be won.

Regardless, from the german perspective (or at least from Hitlers pespective, it was an incorrect term and rather offensive...though because it riled hitler, I really dont care on that score... 

Hitler, in a speech in November 1941, said "I have never used the word Blitzkrieg, because it is a very silly word", and it seems even at the beginning of 1942 he dismissed it as 'Italian phraseology'

Given that "Blitzkrieg" is really a bit of a myth, its hard for anybody to argue that using a new term to describe an imaginary doctrine is something offensive. 



> The fact is that nothing as a foreign word is capable to explicate fully the meaning of a new thing. It was way more aesy to say "kamikaze" than "Japanese suicide pilots that crash on our ships with aircrafts full of explosive", and "blitzkrieg" than "tactical use of mechanized units developed by the Germans in the '30s"




No one is suggesting that you do. Officially the 'Kamikazes' were referred to as Shinpu tokubetsu kogeki tai. A better more contemporary description for Blitzkrieg might be Kesselschlacht. There was another name also given to it by Guderian, but i forget what it was. 

Its just that we westerners really like to denigrate things that are foreign, and one way we do that is by calling it by a differnt name, which has inferred in it some kind of insult. It goes back to our days in the school yard. You know, the kid with the red hair might be blue or carrot top, the tall kid might be 'stretch' or 'tiny', the black kid as a boong or ******. Its not offensive to the person saying it....they might use it as a term of endearment or even think that its respectful or funny. but for the person on the receiving end, it is usually taken as an insult. they might try and hide it, or not respond, but its still an insult that has been done. 

And just to reiterate.....most definately, there is no difference between 'special suicide attack corps" and kamikaze.


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## Ivan1GFP (Jul 29, 2013)

Chance of success? No.

Just causing some hurt to the enemy by any means possible.

- Ivan.


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## vikingBerserker (Jul 29, 2013)

Not without control of the air.


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## Civettone (Jul 30, 2013)

tyrodtom said:


> All aircraft go thru handling changes at different speeds, you can't simulate it with ground training, or a gentle flight in a glider.
> Just from my limited flight experience, some aircraft require a lot of trim changes with different speeds. and i'm just talking about regular flying.


How do you explain the V1? High speed, unmanned, no trimming whatsoever. Managed to fly straight and with reasonable accuracy... 

Imagine there would be a guy inside to make it fly it to target even more accurately and smoothly. That's when you get the Baika and Ohka.

Kris


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## Dogwalker (Jul 30, 2013)

parsifal said:


> .No one is suggesting that you do. Officially the 'Kamikazes' were referred to as Shinpu tokubetsu kogeki tai.


Yeah. I can imagine a scout on a US ship, seeing a small Japanese fighter approaching, shouting in the intercom: "Shinpu tokubetsu kogeki tai!!"
Almost better: "A Japanese suicide pilot is going to crash on our ship with an aircraft full of explosive!!" (pity that, at that point, the plane has already arrived).

When I said: "nothing as a foreign word" I intend "one word". You can describe everithing with a periphrasis.
But the words of one language are already "occupied", already have their meaning. So, a new meaning requires a new word. That often is taken from a foreign language.
An example is the meaning given in the west to the terms "troika", or "kanban".
Once again, there is nothing offensive in the term "kamikaze". Whatever the habits of Westerners about the guys with red hair are.


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## swampyankee (Jul 30, 2013)

davebender said:


> WWII era Kamikaze appear normal compared to these lunatics.
> Counter-Terrorism: Butt Bombs A Bust



Anecdote time: My father served in the USN during WW2, on PT boats, mostly around Borneo and in the Philippines. While in Borneo, one of his shipmates (boatmates?) was visiting an Australian Army encampment. While there, a Japanese soldier walked up to the encampment showing that he was going to surrender. One of the Australian soldiers being visited with grabbed his rifle and shot him. My father's shipmate was rather aghast, after which the Australian told him to take a look: the Japanese soldier was wired with explosives: he was a suicide bomber. (note that my father was telling me this on his death bed, almost sixty years after the events would have taken place.)


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## tyrodtom (Jul 30, 2013)

Civettone said:


> How do you explain the V1? High speed, unmanned, no trimming whatsoever. Managed to fly straight and with reasonable accuracy...
> 
> Imagine there would be a guy inside to make it fly it to target even more accurately and smoothly. That's when you get the Baika and Ohka.
> 
> Kris


 The V1 only flew at one speed , no trimming necessary. Except during it's terminal dive, then it went wherever gravity and chance took it. It was sometimes accurate enough to hit London, not exactly a point target.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 30, 2013)

Civettone said:


> How do you explain the V1? High speed, unmanned, no trimming whatsoever. Managed to fly straight and with reasonable accuracy...
> 
> Imagine there would be a guy inside to make it fly it to target even more accurately and smoothly. That's when you get the Baika and Ohka.
> 
> Kris



The V-1 was flying on an autopilot which is actually more accurate then any pilot could fly. There is a tendency to over correct when opposing forces are placed on an aircraft being flown by hand. That overcorrecting intensifies at higher speeds thus the necessity for continual trim. The auto pilot wont over correct opposing forces, it just applies the correct inputs just to keep the aircraft on course.


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## Civettone (Jul 30, 2013)

tyrodtom said:


> The V1 only flew at one speed , no trimming necessary. Except during it's terminal dive, then it went wherever gravity and chance took it. It was sometimes accurate enough to hit London, not exactly a point target.


Exactly my point. While the Baika/Ohka would fly straight and at continuous speed, no trimming is needed. Not on the V1 and as such not on these kamikaze fighters. 
In its final descent, it would become more difficult, but not enough to lose control over the aircraft. This is also shown by the principle of German Mistel and Reichenberg aircraft. These would be released - without pilot - in the dive. Germans engineers believed it would fly in a stable and controlled fashion.



FLYBOYJ said:


> The V-1 was flying on an autopilot which is actually more accurate then any pilot could fly. There is a tendency to over correct when opposing forces are placed on an aircraft being flown by hand. That overcorrecting intensifies at higher speeds thus the necessity for continual trim. The auto pilot wont over correct opposing forces, it just applies the correct inputs just to keep the aircraft on course.


The V1 did not have trim tabs. 

Kris


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 30, 2013)

Civettone said:


> The V1 did not have trim tabs.
> 
> Kris


I know

It didn't need them - it didn't have human inputs that would either over correct for control inbalances or become fatigued when applying continual stick forces for inbalances.


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## tyrodtom (Jul 30, 2013)

The Baka-Ohka never flew at a constant speed. It was in a glide until it chose a target, then could fire all three solid fuel rockets at once to boost it's terminal dive speed, or it could fire them one at a time. 
Glide, dive, or dive with one to three rockets thrusting. That doesn't sound like a formula for a constant speed to me.


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## swampyankee (Jul 30, 2013)

All aircraft before FBW were either stable or only very slightly unstable with regards to small disturbances. Indeed, even the primitive autopilot present in the V-1 was probably not able to cope with anything beyond very slightly unstable. Since the V-1 could be flown by a human pilot -- there was a manned version (or womanned; I think the first pilot of one was Hanna Reitsch), it was probably a stable aircraft. Trim tabs are not present for dealing with short-term disturbances: they do not react quickly, as anyone who has heard of somebody trying to land an aircraft by using the trim tabs.

Incidentally, it is true that even relatively primitive autopilots, like the ones on the 707s and DC-8s, could fly more efficiently than human pilots.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 30, 2013)

swampyankee said:


> All aircraft before FBW were either stable or only very slightly unstable with regards to small disturbances. Indeed, even the primitive autopilot present in the V-1 was probably not able to cope with anything beyond very slightly unstable. Since the V-1 could be flown by a human pilot -- there was a manned version (or womanned; I think the first pilot of one was Hanna Reitsch), it was probably a stable aircraft.


 Stable enough to be flown by an experienced test pilot.




swampyankee said:


> Trim tabs are not present for dealing with short-term disturbances: they do not react quickly, as anyone who has heard of somebody trying to land an aircraft by using the trim tabs.


There you're wrong. Trim tabs stabilize an aircraft in to a desired attitude without the need for the pilot to constantly apply a control force. If a "short-term disturbance" is causing you to gain or loose +/- 500 from a planned cruising altitude, you bet you're gonna use them and they do react quickly (I don't know if you're a pilot of not). I've flown straight tailed Cessna 150s and 172s with mechanical flaps and I have made both types of aircraft land quite safely with just the use of trim (also adjusting power when on final). Jumping up a bit, I've also flown several jets, trim tabs work almost immediately and some are electrically driven. There have been countless reports of aircraft losing elevator control and they were safely landed using elevator trim and careful power management.

BTW - If I'm not mistaken I believe that FAR Part 23 single engine aircraft have to demonstrate emergency landings without elevators to receive a type certificate.

In a faster moving aircraft or jet, you are continually trimming the aircraft when "flying by hand."


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## Civettone (Jul 30, 2013)

Actually, I just noticed that the Ohka does not have trim tabs either. So I guess our entire discussion was rather superfluous (though interesting).



tyrodtom said:


> The Baka-Ohka never flew at a constant speed. It was in a glide until it chose a target, then could fire all three solid fuel rockets at once to boost it's terminal dive speed, or it could fire them one at a time.
> Glide, dive, or dive with one to three rockets thrusting. That doesn't sound like a formula for a constant speed to me.


Of course, but all this time, I have been talking about a pulsejet engined Baika or Baka/Ohka. The former was probably derived from the Fi 103R.

Kris


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## tyrodtom (Jul 30, 2013)

The pulsejet version of the Ohka was only a proposal, it was never built. So discussing it's possible handling is pointless.
A thermojet ( a jet with a gasoline engine powering the inlet turbine) version of the Ohka was tested, also never reached production. 
And a enlarged Ohka with a turbojet engine, same engine that powered the Kikka, was proposed. I don't know if it ever flew or not.


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## Civettone (Jul 30, 2013)

Apparently the standard Ohka was easy to fly. This does not mean a pulsejet version would also be, but it is a good indication. 

However, the Fi 103R was difficult to fly. This seems to indicate that the Ohka but maybe not the Baika had the advantage here. 

To conclude, an Ohka aircraft, easy to fly, with a speed of well over 600 kmh at low level, a range of 200+ km and a warhead of 800 kg, though probably reduced fir fuel, would have been an extremely dangerous opponent. Flown by pilots who would be able to steer their aircraft, without any need for a non-existing trim, led by a couple of experienced pilots, large formations of pulsejet Ohkas would be able - just like ordinary kamikazes - to locate a large invasion fleet, avoid fighter intercetion, enter a shallow dive toward the US ships and - providing a small target at high speed - have a larger chance of sinking these ships.

Kris


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## tyrodtom (Jul 30, 2013)

You seem to think absence of the ability to trim a aircraft is a advantage.
What it means is as the aircraft increases speed, goes from a glider to a powered aircraft and undergoes trim differences ( and all aircraft do, some more than others) the pilot can only use brute strength to overcome them.

And assuming the Ohka is easy to fly ??? On what proof ? How many pilots flew a operational Ohka, under power, and lived to tell how well it handled?
How many Ohkas hit a target ?


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## parsifal (Jul 30, 2013)

> How many Ohkas hit a target ?



I dont think we will ever know the answer to that.However, from the end of October through to the end of the Okinawa campaign, the IJN produced the following statistics

Japanese Naval Planes Used from Oct. 1944 to the end of the Okinawa Campaign1 
(including Escorts) 

Sortied 2,314 
Returned 1,086 
Expended 1,228 

Not included in the the totals are Japanese Army planes used as Kamikazes and Escorts. In the US Strategic Bombing Survey report, there is an estimate of 2,550 Kamikaze sorties being flown from all services. This number apparently does not include Escorts. Some 475 of these Kamikazes, or 18.6 percent, were effective in securing hits or damaging near misses (the difficulty with the IJAAF stats is that not all their aircraft were expended on ships). It is not clear if these totals include strikes on British vessels, but I suspect that they do not.

The confirmed hits by the Kamikazes were 288 ships, of which 47 were sunk. Many others remained afloat but never returned to service. wsome of these non-returnees were due to the end of the war, but some would never have returned under any circumstances (Ive seen some reports that say as many as an additioanl 100 ships suffered un-repairable damage). 

More USN ships were sunk or damaged than during the entire precedeing combat in the pacific, Pearl Harbour included. By any standardsd the suicide attacks were effective, there just was no hope of them inflicting enough damage to stop the American advances. but they were successful in getting one concession out of the Allies in the surrender terms.


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## swampyankee (Jul 31, 2013)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Stable enough to be flown by an experienced test pilot.
> 
> 
> There you're wrong. Trim tabs stabilize an aircraft in to a desired attitude without the need for the pilot to constantly apply a control force. If a "short-term disturbance" is causing you to gain or loose +/- 500 from a planned cruising altitude, you bet you're gonna use them and they do react quickly (I don't know if you're a pilot of not). I've flown straight tailed Cessna 150s and 172s with mechanical flaps and I have made both types of aircraft land quite safely with just the use of trim (also adjusting power when on final). Jumping up a bit, I've also flown several jets, trim tabs work almost immediately and some are electrically driven. There have been countless reports of aircraft losing elevator control and they were safely landed using elevator trim and careful power management.
> ...



"Short term disturbance" is something on the order of seconds, not much greater than the human reaction time; as you said trim tabs are for trimming, not immediate control. As for trim tabs' control authority, I believe that the aircraft's regular control surfaces have to have sufficient authority to override the trim tabs, at least from my reading of 23.667. 

Overall, though, I'd consider it unlikely that the V-1 was not stable, at least against small disturbances, although it may have had flight characteristics, such as non-linear stick forces (10 lbf stick force = 1.2 g; 2 lb stick force = 10g) or bad control harmonization (heavy, unresponsive ailerons and very light stick forces) that would make it difficult to fly. 

I'm a recovering aeronautical engineer; starting with ground test work (ALF502, then helicopter structures) and later aerodynamics (I did some work on the Cypher and RSRA, more on propellers). For medical reasons -- I get migraines -- I was told that it was unlikely I could get a medical certificate, so I never pursued a license.


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## GregP (Jul 31, 2013)

The Okha may or may not be easy to fly. I've never seen a pilot report on it ...

I seriously doubt a pulsejet unit was viable. We have a runnable WWII pulsejet (Google Chino pulsejet ... ) and you can hear the thing for 10 miles. The main thing you notice is the vibration. It would likely cause damage to an airframe not specifically designed to cope with the vibration. 

The V-1 was designed with that in mind but I don't know if the Ohka was ...

The V-1, for a piloted plane, did NOT have enough vertrical tail or rudder for maneuvering. It had just enough to stay more or less straight when upset by nothing more than normal air conditions.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 31, 2013)

swampyankee said:


> "Short term disturbance" is something on the order of seconds, not much greater than the human reaction time; as you said trim tabs are for trimming, not immediate control. As for trim tabs' control authority, I believe that the aircraft's regular control surfaces have to have sufficient authority to override the trim tabs, at least from my reading of 23.667


. They do, but there is always a tendency to over correct, so for example, as you're flying through turbulent air you are continually trimming if it’s desired to maintain a specific altitude and heading. In a matter of seconds you could be +/- 300 feet, putting this into perspective when one flies IFR you must maintain +/- 100'. 


swampyankee said:


> Overall, though, I'd consider it unlikely that the V-1 was not stable, at least against small disturbances, although it may have had flight characteristics, such as non-linear stick forces (10 lbf stick force = 1.2 g; 2 lb stick force = 10g) or bad control harmonization (heavy, unresponsive ailerons and very light stick forces) that would make it difficult to fly.


Is this power on or off???? At full power all those characteristics change for the reasons given. Without trim the aircraft will have to be designed to fly nose heavy without power as there is a tendency for an aircraft to pitch up at full power. 


swampyankee said:


> I'm a recovering aeronautical engineer; starting with ground test work (ALF502, then helicopter structures) and later aerodynamics (I did some work on the Cypher and RSRA, more on propellers). For medical reasons -- I get migraines -- I was told that it was unlikely I could get a medical certificate, so I never pursued a license.


Very cool! Too bad about the migraines!


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 31, 2013)

Civettone said:


> Apparently the standard Ohka was easy to fly.





tyrodtom said:


> You seem to think absence of the ability to trim a aircraft is a advantage.
> What it means is as the aircraft increases speed, goes from a glider to a powered aircraft and undergoes trim differences ( and all aircraft do, some more than others) the pilot can only use brute strength to overcome them.


This is spot on - What I think what a few folks are missing here is when you apply power to an aircraft there is a tendency for the nose to immediately pitch up, so you counter that with elevator trim. Depending what type of aircraft, how much HP or thrust the aircraft has and how much arm strength the pilot has will determine how much pitch control (input) is needed and how quick. I instruct in GA aircraft, I had a female student a couple of years ago who just about stalled us on a go-around; when she applied full power the yoke came back at her so quick she didn’t have the strength to hold it with one hand and trim with the other.

I've flown C182RGs and C210s and if I was slow applying trim on a go around it would be like doing vertical bench press - good for the biceps but a bit nerve racking!


It would seem to me that both the Okha and the Fi 103R would have to be designed to be nose heavy in a power off configuration to compensate for the thrust of their engines. I only know of one aircraft that actually pitches down when applying power and that’s the recip or prop driven BD-5.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 31, 2013)

tyrodtom said:


> How many Ohkas hit a target ?



From Wiki...

_The Yokosuka MXY7 Ohka was used mostly against American ships invading Okinawa, and if launched from its mothership, could be extremely effective due to its high speed in the dive. In the first two attempts to ship the Ohkas to Leyte Gulf through aircraft carriers, the carriers Shinano and Unryu were sunk by the US submarines USS Archer-Fish and USS Redfish.

Attacks intensified in April 1945. On 1 April 1945, six "Bettys" attacked the U.S. Fleet off Okinawa. At least one made a successful attack, with its Ohka thought to hit one of the 406 mm (16 in) turrets on the battleship West Virginia, causing moderate damage. Postwar analysis indicated that no hits were recorded and that a near-miss took place. The transports Alpine, Achernar, and Tyrrell were also hit by kamikaze aircraft, but it is unclear whether any of these were Ohkas from the other "Bettys". None of the "Bettys" returned.

The American military quickly realized the danger and concentrated on extending their "defensive rings" outward to intercept the "Betty"/Ohka combination aircraft before the suicide mission could be launched.[14] On 12 April 1945, nine "Bettys" attacked the U.S. Fleet off Okinawa. The destroyer Mannert L. Abele was hit, broke in two, and sank, witnessed by LSMR-189 CO James M. Stewart. Jeffers destroyed an Ohka with AA fire 45 m (50 yd) from the ship, but the resulting explosion was still powerful enough to cause extensive damage, forcing Jeffers to withdraw. The destroyer Stanly was attacked by two Ohkas. One struck just above the waterline just behind the ship's bow, with the charge punching completely through the other side of the hull before splashing into the sea and detonating like a depth charge, causing little damage to the ship, and the other Ohka narrowly missed (likely due to the pilot being killed by anti-aircraft fire) and crashed into the sea, knocking off the Stanly's ensign in the process. One Betty returned. On 14 April 1945, seven "Bettys" attacked the U.S. Fleet off Okinawa. None returned. None of the Ohkas appeared to have been launched. Two days later, six "Bettys" attacked the U.S. Fleet off Okinawa. Two returned, but no Ohkas hit their targets. Later, on 28 April 1945, four "Bettys" attacked the U.S. Fleet off Okinawa at night. One returned. No hits were recorded.

May 1945 saw another series of attacks. On 4 May 1945, seven "Bettys" attacked the U.S. Fleet off Okinawa. One Ohka hit the bridge of a minesweeper, Shea, causing extensive damage and casualties. Gayety was also damaged by a near-miss by an Ohka. One "Betty" returned. On 11 May 1945, four "Bettys" attacked the U.S. Fleet off Okinawa. The destroyer Hugh W. Hadley was hit and suffered extensive damage and flooding. The vessel was judged beyond repair. On 25 May 1945, 11 "Bettys" attacked the US Fleet off Okinawa. Bad weather forced most of the aircraft to turn back, and none of the others scored hits.

On 22 June 1945, six "Bettys" attacked the U.S. Fleet off Okinawa. Two returned, but no hits were scored. Postwar analysis concluded that the Ohka's impact was negligible with no US Navy capital ships actually hit during their attacks due to an extremely effective set of defensive tactics that were employed._


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## tyrodtom (Jul 31, 2013)

The V1 had to be a very stable aircraft, it had NO ailerons. All it had was a rudder and elevator for control.
That how some were brought down just by tilting them.

I know the Ohka had a very short flight test program, but I've never found any write ups of the conclusions.
I have read Blossoms in the Wind, and other books about the Special Attack Corps, and remember the Ohka pilots in particular got a very abbreviated flight training program.

The Ohka for all it's potential was the most unsuccessful of all the special attack methods. A lot of that lack of success can be blamed on the delivery method, but there also seemed to be problems after they were launched.
What was the cause of those problems ? A hard to control aircraft ? Or pilots faced with problems they weren't trained to meet ?


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## tyrodtom (Jul 31, 2013)

The proposed jet powered version had a level speed of 345mph, and a range of about 150miles.
So until it went into it's terminal dive it was fast, but not so fast it couldn't be intercepted, or tracked by flak.


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## FLYBOYJ (Jul 31, 2013)

tyrodtom said:


> The V1 had to be a very stable aircraft, it had NO ailerons. All it had was a rudder and elevator for control.
> That how some were brought down just by tilting them.


Remember, it was guided by an autopilot, If there was enough lift and thrust it could have been a barn door and it would have flown straight and level


tyrodtom said:


> I know the Ohka had a very short flight test program, but I've never found any write ups of the conclusions. I have read Blossoms in the Wind, and other books about the Special Attack Corps, and remember the Ohka pilots in particular got a very abbreviated flight training program.
> 
> The Ohka for all it's potential was the most unsuccessful of all the special attack methods. A lot of that lack of success can be blamed on the delivery method, but there also seemed to be problems after they were launched.
> 
> What was the cause of those problems ? *A hard to control aircraft ? Or pilots faced with problems they weren't trained to meet *?



All the above plus some pretty stiff opposition...


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## VBF-13 (Aug 1, 2013)

FLYBOYJ said:


> If there was enough lift and thrust it could have been a barn door and it would have flown straight and level.


You boys are way over my head. This is about the only thing I understood in the last three pages.


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## Civettone (Aug 1, 2013)

tyrodtom said:


> You seem to think absence of the ability to trim a aircraft is a advantage.
> What it means is as the aircraft increases speed, goes from a glider to a powered aircraft and undergoes trim differences ( and all aircraft do, some more than others) the pilot can only use brute strength to overcome them.
> 
> And assuming the Ohka is easy to fly ??? On what proof ? How many pilots flew a operational Ohka, under power, and lived to tell how well it handled?
> How many Ohkas hit a target ?


Yokosuka test pilot claimed it was. But I guess you pilots know better ... 
For you there is NO way possible that a pilot with limited training can fly this aircraft straight and put into a shallow dive toward an aircraft carrier. And I do not think there is anything I can say which will change your mind 

Kris


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## Civettone (Aug 1, 2013)

GregP said:


> I seriously doubt a pulsejet unit was viable. We have a runnable WWII pulsejet (Google Chino pulsejet ... ) and you can hear the thing for 10 miles. The main thing you notice is the vibration. It would likely cause damage to an airframe not specifically designed to cope with the vibration.


So what if they can hear it 2 minutes before it impacts? 
And you may be right about the vibration, but you might be wrong. There is no way in knowing if the Ohka could have handled the vibration. But I think we can agree that modifications to counter this were _possible_.



> The V-1, for a piloted plane, did NOT have enough vertrical tail or rudder for maneuvering. It had just enough to stay more or less straight when upset by nothing more than normal air conditions.


So how did it land during training? Fly straight from one air field to the next?  The Fi 103Re had ailerons added...

The Kawanishi Baika would probably have been a copy of the Reichenberg and be fully capable of all these things.
Kris


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## tyrodtom (Aug 1, 2013)

Civettone said:


> Yokosuka test pilot claimed it was. But I guess you pilots know better ...
> For you there is NO way possible that a pilot with limited training can fly this aircraft straight and put into a shallow dive toward an aircraft carrier. And I do not think there is anything I can say which will change your mind
> 
> Kris


 Not very impressive when you only say that as a parting shot.
If you have any access to a Yokosuka test pilot's report, by all means let's see it.

To me any aircraft that in it's terminal dive is going over 800 feet per second, would not be easy for a beginning pilot to handle, even if it handled perfect.
It'd give a whole new meaning to the phrase that I sometimes would hear. "You're getting behind the aircraft"


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## Civettone (Aug 2, 2013)

I do not like to be questioned on my integrity. Or are we going to question every one for their sources now? Do you see me questioning your experience as a pilot? No, I assume you are honest in your intentions. 

Anyway, I got it from a Japanese website, which I ran through google translate. It seems it is taken from this book:
Thunder Gods: The Kamikaze Pilots Tell Their Stories
by Hatsuho Naito

Does anyone have this book?
Kris


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## tyrodtom (Aug 2, 2013)

I wasn't questioning you integrity, I was wondering why you would withhold that till the last.

I have read Blossoms in the Wind, and some others. In Blossoms it has a chapter on the Ohka flight training.

According to Blossoms in the Wind, the Ohka flight training program experienced heavy loses, and that's just with the glider.
But all military flight training programs experienced loses.
What a test pilot may consider good enough flight characteristics may not translate to a easy handling aircraft for a neophyte.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 2, 2013)

Civettone said:


> Yokosuka test pilot claimed it was. But I guess you pilots know better ...



Not tooting my own horn - I've flown over 1000mph. I've dove an aircraft in excess of 450 knots; These were in aircraft designed and built a lot better than the Okha...

Based on MY experience, putting a low time pilot in an Okha and expecting them to hit a naval target at 500 knots while getting shot at is a gamble only a desperate combatant would undertake and it is not an effective weapon platform. 

BTW, I'm also a flight instructor so I have "a little" experience on how a low time pilot flies...


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## swampyankee (Aug 2, 2013)

From my very brief experience as a low-time pilot (I found I could not pass the medical, so I stopped taking lessons), the way low-time pilots fly tends to be "very badly."


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## fastmongrel (Aug 2, 2013)

At 10 miles and 10,000 ft even a flat top is going to be a speck on the ocean and very hard to accurately aim at. Light the rockets and that speck is getting close very fast, start your attack dive even a bit off course, fail to take account of the carrier doing 30 knots or even just fail to anticipate the change in trim when the power kicks in and in a few seconds a novice can be way off line. That novice now only has a few seconds to correct the aim, as a novice myself I have enough trouble hitting a 2500 ft long runway which luckily for me doesnt move or throw supersonic metal at me and I am only doing 60mph not 500mph.


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## VBF-13 (Aug 2, 2013)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Not tooting my own horn - I've flown over 1000mph. I've dove an aircraft in excess of 450 knots; These were in aircraft designed and built a lot better than the Okha...
> 
> Based on MY experience, putting a low time pilot in an Okha and expecting them to hit a naval target at 500 knots while getting shot at is a gamble only a desperate combatant would undertake and it is not an effective weapon platform.
> 
> BTW, I'm also a flight instructor so I have "a little" experience on how a low time pilot flies...


Joe, this from _The Divine Wind_...

"In a moment of sudden emergency it is not so difficult to make up one's mind to die. But it must have been agony for the young men who were chosen to train and study for the _Ohka _special attacks, because it was more than six months after training started before even the first of them got a chance to die in battle. They were carefully selected from throughout the air force, and all were well qualified. These men were especially well prepared during their long training period. They proved to be just as dependable and capable about their duty as the kamikaze pilots who gave their lives in the Philippines."


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## tyrodtom (Aug 2, 2013)

I checked Blossoms in the Wind out of the library today and read again some of the chapters about the Okha pilot training.
Tokuro Takei was in Basic flight training Cycle 38, on graduation from basic flight training he volunteered for the Ohka.
His training consisted of instruction in dive techniques in a 2 place Zero, and 1 (one) flight in the glider version of a Ohka, no powered Okha flights, no dives.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 2, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> Joe, this from _The Divine Wind_...
> 
> "In a moment of sudden emergency it is not so difficult to make up one's mind to die. But it must have been agony for the young men who were chosen to train and study for the _Ohka _special attacks, because it was more than six months after training started before even the first of them got a chance to die in battle. They were carefully selected from throughout the air force,* and all were well qualified*. These men were especially well prepared during their long training period. They proved to be just as dependable and capable about their duty as the kamikaze pilots who gave their lives in the Philippines."



"Well Qualified." So unlike recip mission, these guys had some experience, a slight game changer, so throw in everything else and you're still looking at a pretty desperate weapons platform.


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## tyrodtom (Aug 2, 2013)

Plus at that time, late 44, in Japanese flight training , after solo, you might share a 2 place aircraft with another student, both would get the time counted as solo hrs for the full duration of the flight. So the hours quoted as flight time at the end of basic flight training might not reflect the actual flight time of each student.
And so far I've found nothing that says how many hours the average student had at the end of basic flight training, at that time.


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## Civettone (Aug 3, 2013)

fastmongrel said:


> At 10 miles and 10,000 ft even a flat top is going to be a speck on the ocean and very hard to accurately aim at. ... That novice now only has a few seconds to correct the aim, as a novice myself I have enough trouble hitting a 2500 ft long runway which luckily for me doesnt move or throw supersonic metal at me and I am only doing 60mph not 500mph.


You do not need to land on that carrier. You need to hit it or crash just in front of it.
Hundreds of poorly trained kamikaze pilots managed to hit their targets, many hundreds failed. They all had to fly aircraft with heavy piston engines, trying to keep it under control while going over 300 mph. I am sure a jet driven Ohka or Baika would be able to get near a 200 m long target. 
Pilots for the Ohka/Baika would have limited training, but at least they would not need to learn how to land or dogfight. They would need a very purpose orientated training, emphasis on aircraft handling and aiming  




tyrodtom said:


> I checked Blossoms in the Wind out of the library today and read again some of the chapters about the Okha pilot training.
> Tokuro Takei was in Basic flight training Cycle 38, on graduation from basic flight training he volunteered for the Ohka.
> His training consisted of instruction in dive techniques in a 2 place Zero, and 1 (one) flight in the glider version of a Ohka, no powered Okha flights, no dives.


It seems I looked at the wrong number. It came from ISBN 4-06-185016-4. Some Japanese book from 1991, from page 400-410. I have no idea which book that is  

Does it mention Nagano Kazutoshi of the 721th squadron? He is the one who is supposed to have said the Ohka is more manoeuvrable than the Zero?
Kris


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## tyrodtom (Aug 3, 2013)

A A6M2 Zero weighted 5300 lbs and had 241 sq ft of wing area.
the Ohka weighted 4700 lbs and had 64 sq ft of wing area, how could it be remotely as maneuverable as a Zero ???


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## Civettone (Aug 3, 2013)

I don't know. Manouevrable is a very broad term. Maybe he meant the roll rate, maybe he meant its handling?? In any case, there is more to it than simply wing loading.


Kris


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## fastmongrel (Aug 3, 2013)

Civettone said:


> You do not need to land on that carrier. You need to hit it or crash just in front of it.



It needs to be a very near miss USN carriers and other major vessels had very good torpedo defence and were well known to be tough resilient and hard to sink or even damage with a single near miss. I dont know how the warhead was fused but if it was a contact fuse it might blow when it hits the water. To get under the keel of a big ship to do big damage it would need to be a slight delay.



> Hundreds of poorly trained kamikaze pilots managed to hit their targets, many hundreds failed. They all had to fly aircraft with heavy piston engines, trying to keep it under control while going over 300 mph. I am sure a jet driven Ohka or Baika would be able to get near a 200 m long target.



500mph is a whole different ball game to 300mph from 10 miles out your going to have approx 120 secs to the target, at 500mph you have approx 75 secs



> Pilots for the Ohka/Baika would have limited training, but at least they would not need to learn how to land or dogfight. They would need a very purpose orientated training, emphasis on aircraft handling and aiming



Agreed but still a very poor return on the time and money invested


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 3, 2013)

Civettone said:


> You do not need to land on that carrier. You need to hit it or crash just in front of it.
> Hundreds of poorly trained kamikaze pilots managed to hit their targets, many hundreds failed.


Do you have numbers of how many of the more experienced kamikazes pilots who hit their targets as opposed to the minimally trained ones? I'd bet dollars to donuts those with minimal training wound up as a score card on the side of an F6F.



Civettone said:


> They all had to fly aircraft with heavy piston engines, trying to keep it under control while going over 300 mph. I am sure a jet driven Ohka or Baika would be able to get near a 200 m long target.


Providing the mother ship didn't get shot down first.


Civettone said:


> Pilots for the Ohka/Baika would have limited training, but at least they would not need to learn how to land or dogfight. They would need a very purpose orientated training, emphasis on aircraft handling and aiming


And again, it's not as easy as you think, especially at terminal speeds while getting shot at. I'll put my own experience out there to say you're wrong!



Civettone said:


> It seems I looked at the wrong number. It came from ISBN 4-06-185016-4. Some Japanese book from 1991, from page 400-410. I have no idea which book that is
> 
> *Does it mention Nagano Kazutoshi of the 721th squadron? He is the one who is supposed to have said the Ohka is more manoeuvrable than the Zero*?
> Kris



If it was over 280mph I'd believe it (NOT!), but I'll call BS on that statement regardless where it came from. The Zero had a wing loading of 22 pounds - the Okha,* over 73!!!!!*


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## swampyankee (Aug 3, 2013)

An interesting datum: aircrew in kamikaze squadrons had lower casualty rates than those in heavy bomber squadrons in Europe. Obviously, the reason is that relatively few of the kamikaze aircrew went on "missions."

You've got to wonder at target selection skills of some of the pilots: at least one PT boat was destroyed by "special attack," which strikes me as a bit less than brilliant. As for the level of training needed by kamikaze pilots? Three of the four attacks on Sept 11, 2001 succeeded, albeit with no opposition, against immobile targets, and the modern autopilots: far less training was required than that for a pilot who would be expected to bring his plane back. A lot of the kamikaze pilots flying conventional aircraft were shot down (radar + CAP was probably more important than AAA), and the Okha was probably quite difficult to control, especially during the phase shortly after it was dropped from its launch aircraft (many of which would probably have fallen to radar + CAP). 

eta: iirc term "kamikaze" harkened back to First Battle of Hakata Bay, when a typhoon struck the fleet of the Mongol invaders. While I'm sure that there were US academics sufficiently familiar with Japanese and Mongol history to be aware of divine wind, it's quite unlikely more than a few USN officers, petty officers, or non-rated personnel had any clue. The term was probably passed to the US via Japanese propaganda broadcasts.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 3, 2013)

Considering the operational history is was almost as suicidal for the carrier (mother) aircraft as it was for the Ohka itself.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 3, 2013)

In the book Rocketing Into the Future: The History and Technology of Rocket Planes By Michel van Pelt, there's a good narrative about the first powered Okha flight undertaken by Nagano Kazutoshi in a trainer version. There were wing mounted rockets on this model tested (the trainer version) and it also had a water ballast tank.

Rocketing Into the Future: The History and Technology of Rocket Planes - Michel van Pelt - Google Books


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## parsifal (Aug 3, 2013)

According to that source,the following attacks were made with the okha (date/numbersof attacks/numbers of hits/ships sunk)

21 Mar:16/0/0
1 Apr: 6/1+3(?)/0
11 Apr: 9/4/1
14 apr:7/0/0
16 Apr: 6/0/0
28 Apr; 4/0/0
4 May:7/2/0
11 May:4/1/1
25 May:11/0/0
22 June:6/0/0


On that basis, the Okha 76/11/2

Compare that to the overall average of 2550/448/47
For the overall effort, there was a 17.6% chance of hitting a target, and a 1.8% chance of sinking a ship. For the Okhas 14.4% chanceof hitting a ship, but a 2.5% chance of sinking it. An Okha was only 80% as likley to hit something as other aircraft, but if it did hit, it was twice as likley to sink itand


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## Civettone (Aug 3, 2013)

fastmongrel said:


> It needs to be a very near miss USN carriers and other major vessels had very good torpedo defence and were well known to be tough resilient and hard to sink or even damage with a single near miss. I dont know how the warhead was fused but if it was a contact fuse it might blow when it hits the water. To get under the keel of a big ship to do big damage it would need to be a slight delay.


Yes, that is correct. The Ohka was meant to hit the target just below the waterline thereby creating a water bubble which would crack open the hull. 





> 500mph is a whole different ball game to 300mph from 10 miles out your going to have approx 120 secs to the target, at 500mph you have approx 75 secs


Those are 75 loooong seconds. In fact, I think, the longer time, the more chance you will miss the target as you will be blown out of the sky. All in all, the speed will improve accuracy!



> Agreed but still a very poor return on the time and money invested


But that is where you are completely wrong ! Kamikazes were a very good return on the time and money. They achieved more than what fully trained combat pilots in torpedo bombers were able to sink. (at least in 1944/1945)




FLYBOYJ said:


> Do you have numbers of how many of the more experienced kamikazes pilots who hit their targets as opposed to the minimally trained ones? I'd bet dollars to donuts those with minimal training wound up as a score card on the side of an F6F.


Nobody does. I also agree that the better pilots would have a bigger chance of avoiding the American fighters. I also think they would be better at hitting the target. But what would the ratio be? We will never know! 
I also wonder if there are figures on how many kamikazes missed their target, unhindered by American AA fire? Now that would be interesting for this discussion ! 



> If it was over 280mph I'd believe it (NOT!), but I'll call BS on that statement regardless where it came from. The Zero had a wing loading of 22 pounds - the Okha,* over 73!!!!!*


Like I said in my previous post, manoeuvrability is much more than wing loading! It is a matter of interpretation. But in any case, it seems to me that the Ohka was not just a fly-straight-ahead-rocket




parsifal said:


> According to that source,the following attacks were made with the okha (date/numbersof attacks/numbers of hits/ships sunk)
> 
> 21 Mar:16/0/0
> 1 Apr: 6/1+3(?)/0
> ...


Awesome stuff Parsifal ! Thanks for the effort !
We have to take into consideration that most Ohkas were shot down together with the mother ship. If we discount that, we would probably see that the chances of hitting a target would have increased three t four times, and so would the number of kills! This would mean that 1 out of 10 Ohkas would sink a ship. Of course it would require a turbo/pulsejet or a ground based version.

Kris


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 3, 2013)

Civettone said:


> Nobody does. I also agree that the better pilots would have a bigger chance of avoiding the American fighters. I also think they would be better at hitting the target. But what would the ratio be? We will never know!


All we have is how many were launched and how many actually hit their targets, the attrition rate is horrible!



Civettone said:


> Like I said in my previous post, manoeuvrability is much more than wing loading! It is a matter of interpretation. But in any case, it seems to me that the Ohka was not just a fly-straight-ahead-rocket


Wing loading is the benchmark, it starts from there. Anything with a 72 lb per sq in wing loading will certainly not maneuver well, at least compared with a zero. If Bill (Drangondog) sees this I'm sure he'll come with the match to show the Ohka maneuvered like a barn door!



Civettone said:


> Those are 75 loooong seconds. In fact, I think, the longer time, the more chance you will miss the target as you will be blown out of the sky. All in all, the speed will improve accuracy!


 Tell me, why do you think that?



Civettone said:


> If we discount that, we would probably see that the chances of hitting a target would have increased three t four times, and so would the number of kills! This would mean that 1 out of 10 Ohkas would sink a ship. Of course it would require a turbo/pulsejet or a ground based version.
> 
> Kris



Would have, could have, should have - sorry Kris, you're stretching it a little - just that alone shows the flawed concept of the Okha. For it to have been successful the Japanese would have needed thousands of aircraft AND pilots to immediately overwhelm US defenses, and if they had thousands of extra pilots in reserve and the resources to build thousands of aircraft, why send them on suicide missions? 

Cripes, if the Marines had 500 F2As at Midway they "might" have been more successful as well!

I've said it once before - if the Queen had balls she'd be the king!


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## Jenisch (Aug 3, 2013)

They say the Ohka was a rocket powered glider (indeed, it should glide for a time before the rockets were activated). The problem is that with those tiny wings it would be offensive to call it a glider. =/


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## Civettone (Aug 3, 2013)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Wing loading is the benchmark, it starts from there. Anything with a 72 lb per sq in wing loading will certainly not maneuver well, at least compared with a zero. If Bill (Drangondog) sees this I'm sure he'll come with the match to show the Ohka maneuvered like a barn door!


There are several fighter aircraft with high wing loading, which were manoeuvrable! For instance, the Bf 109 was very manoeuvrable. But again, it depends how you define this. Surely, the Bf 109 could not turn with a Zero, but it turned better than most ww2 fighter aircraft. Manoeuvrability is also crisp controls and roll rate.



> Tell me, why do you think that?


The slower the aircraft, the more chance it will get shot down. As such, there will be less chance of it hitting a target. My guess is that this largely mitigates any advantage lower speed gives to handling. 



> Would have, could have, should have - sorry Kris, you're stretching it a little - just that alone shows the flawed concept of the Okha. For it to have been successful the Japanese would have needed thousands of aircraft AND pilots to immediately overwhelm US defenses, and if they had thousands of extra pilots in reserve and the resources to build thousands of aircraft, why send them on suicide missions?


I have always said that I was thinking of a long-range jet kamikaze. This topic is about what kind of kamikaze could have had a chance! 
The Ohka as existed was flawed, because of the short range. It might have been useful in November 1945 when the invasion would take place, but in general, the Betty carrier was simply too vulnerable.
Second, by giving the Ohka longer range or by producing the planned pulsejet Baika, this deficiency would be gone. There is not much chance that Navy fighters will intercept jet kamikaze doing 400 mph at low altitude. Given the fact that most Ohkas were lost due to US Navy fighters, the numbers speak for themselves. 
The Ohka and Baika were extremely simple and easy to produce. Together with other kamikaze measures, the US Navy could face a war of attrition, which it would ultimately lose: it could not replace ships as fast as kamikazes could destroy them. 
Of course, in the end, the Japanese were going to surrender anyway due to the Soviet invasion and the A-bombs. But this does not take away that the kamikaze jet aircraft were a cost effective and thus succesful weapon.

Kris


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 3, 2013)

Civettone said:


> There are several fighter aircraft with high wing loading, which were manoeuvrable! For instance, the Bf 109 was very manoeuvrable. But again, it depends how you define this. Surely, the Bf 109 could not turn with a Zero, but it turned better than most ww2 fighter aircraft. Manoeuvrability is also crisp controls and roll rate.


Not when you have a 72 pound wing loading!!!!


Civettone said:


> The slower the aircraft, the more chance it will get shot down. As such, there will be less chance of it hitting a target. My guess is that this largely mitigates any advantage lower speed gives to handling.


Do you also realize the faster the aircraft, the more of a workload on the pilot? Read about "staying ahead of the aircraft." This applies 2x when dealing with faster moving aircraft (even if they are going on a one-way mission). Speed does mitigate risk, but with manned flight there is always another dynamic thrown into the fray...



Civettone said:


> I have always said that I was thinking of a long-range jet kamikaze. This topic is about what kind of kamikaze could have had a chance!
> The Ohka as existed was flawed, because of the short range. It might have been useful in November 1945 when the invasion would take place, but in general, the Betty carrier was simply too vulnerable.


That sums it up right there...


Civettone said:


> Second, by giving the Ohka longer range or by producing the planned pulsejet Baika, this deficiency would be gone. There is not much chance that Navy fighters will intercept jet kamikaze doing 400 mph at low altitude. Given the fact that most Ohkas were lost due to US Navy fighters, the numbers speak for themselves.
> The Ohka and Baika were extremely simple and easy to produce. Together with other kamikaze measures, the US Navy could face a war of attrition, which it would ultimately lose: it could not replace ships as fast as kamikazes could destroy them.


 this is very wishful thinking. Again, if those resources were available, why use Kamikazes?


Civettone said:


> Of course, in the end, the Japanese were going to surrender anyway due to the Soviet invasion and the A-bombs. *But this does not take away that the kamikaze jet aircraft were a cost effective and thus succesful weapon.*
> Kris



But they weren't - look at the actual numbers. kamikaze jet aircraft? $$$$ Better off with the rocket propelled Okha!

In the end the Japanese would have been better off launching them pilotless and hoping for the best!


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## parsifal (Aug 3, 2013)

> In the end the Japanese would have been better off launching them pilotless and hoping for the best!



That does pose an intersting question in itself, what were the sortie to hit rates for the German guided bombs in say Salerno/the med, controlling the bomb by RC over los. Thats about the nearest equivalent to this situation I can think of. Its not quite a level playing field, though, since air defences off salerno and over the sea in the ETO are not comparable to the air defences over TF 58


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## Civettone (Aug 3, 2013)

FLYBOYJ said:


> this is very wishful thinking. Again, if those resources were available, why use Kamikazes?


What resources? The Ohka required very few materials, less fuel and hardly any fully trained pilots. This is impossible with the standard Kates, Nates and Betties.
Kamikazes were the best option for the Japanese: plenty of fanatics willing to give their lives, thereby mitigating Japan's technological inferiority. Conversely, American sailers were petrified of the Japanese kamikazes. An American invasion in November 1945 would have seen a carnage, never before seen in American history. They were preparing hundreds and hundreds of suicide bombers, subs and torpedo boats. Although of course, the outcome would be the same.

Kris


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 3, 2013)

Civettone said:


> What resources? The Ohka required very few materials, less fuel and hardly any fully trained pilots. This is impossible with the standard Kates, Nates and Betties.


The rocket powered one were. It cost a lot of $$$ to build turbine engines with basically a drain of strategic materials.


Civettone said:


> Kamikazes were the best option for the Japanese: plenty of fanatics willing to give their lives, thereby mitigating Japan's technological inferiority. Conversely, American sailers were petrified of the Japanese kamikazes. An American invasion in November 1945 would have seen a carnage, never before seen in American history. They were preparing hundreds and hundreds of suicide bombers, subs and torpedo boats. Although of course, the outcome would be the same.
> 
> Kris


agree


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## razor1uk (Aug 3, 2013)

T eh phsycological effect of the kamikaze is in aways akin to the modern weaponed version to the impaling spears used by Vlad Tapesh of Wallacia against the Ottomans 550+ years ago...


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## swampyankee (Aug 3, 2013)

razor1uk said:


> T eh phsycological effect of the kamikaze is in aways akin to the modern weaponed version to the impaling spears used by Vlad Tapesh of Wallacia against the Ottomans 550+ years ago...



I disagree: it wasn't that unusual, at the time, to kill prisoners (another normal practice was to sell them into slavery), although Vlad seemed to enjoy it far too much (to the point it disturbed his _allies_).


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## Civettone (Aug 4, 2013)

Oh no no, its rocket engines, or at least those by Walter, were much cheaper than turbojets.


Kris


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## VBF-13 (Aug 11, 2013)

*Kamikaze: Ever had a chance of success?*

Let's get back to the question. The answer is a resounding "no." We'd have kept fighting these fanatics until we wiped out that entire suicidal race. In fact, we were right on the brink of that, when cooler minds prevailed.


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## parsifal (Aug 11, 2013)

VBF-13 said:


> *Kamikaze: Ever had a chance of success?*
> 
> Let's get back to the question. The answer is a resounding "no." We'd have kept fighting these fanatics until we wiped out that entire suicidal race. In fact, we were right on the brink of that, when cooler minds prevailed.



Based on an incorrect premise. "kamikazes" were never intended to win outright. From before Phil sea the Japanese were looking for a way out of the war. The issue was the terms. By the start of the start of Okinawa, Japan was really only after two concessions in the surrender....that the Home islands not be occupied, and that the person, position and family of the emperor be respected. Though the US never accepted formally any terms, in reality, the Japanese did secure a verbal undertaking by the allies that thempereror would be respected. the sacrifices of the "Kamikazes" played its part in securing that undertaking.

The final campaigns, from that perspective, were a success for the Japanese, hard as it mis to accept. They got a better deal than their german counterparts because of it


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## razor1uk (Aug 13, 2013)

I'd say the "...suicidal race" is verging on being offencive to some of the forum, perhaps 'ideology' should be used - also most of the people who volunteered, were those who perhaps stereotypically had been in or from higher education - they generally didn't wish to die easy, but to make it expensive for the enemy, and if their knowledge and teachings would do so, if even for one more day without enemy encroachment....


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## VBF-13 (Aug 13, 2013)

razor1uk said:


> I'd say the "...suicidal race" is verging on being offencive to some of the forum, perhaps 'ideology' should be used - also most of the people who volunteered, were those who perhaps stereotypically had been in or from higher education - they generally didn't wish to die easy, but to make it expensive for the enemy, and if their knowledge and teachings would do so, if even for one more day without enemy encroachment....


Had they not at some point abated, they're indeed a suicidal bunch. Better?


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