# Strategic Bombing Campaign Impact on German Oil Production



## Ratsel (Jul 24, 2011)

In another thread I read that some say that Allied Strategic Bombing Campaign (SBC) had minimal effect on Germany oil/fuel production. this includes both aviation and all other fuel/oil uses. May I submit:


_In June 1944, just 56,000t of oil had been produced against the planned total of 198,000 tons. Consumption was well above stocks produced since mid-May 1944 so that by the end of June 1944, it had been reduced to a reserve of just 410,000t, a 70% reduction from 30 April 1944. ULTRA intercepts confirmed cutbacks in non-operational flying as a direct consequence. According to Speer, by 21 July 1944 98% of all Axis fuel plants were out of operation. The monthly production fell from 180,000t in March 1944 to 20,000t in November; inventory dropped from 575,000t to 159,000t. The campaign caused huge shortfalls in fuel production and contributed to the impotence of the Luftwaffe in the last 12 months of the war, and the inability of the German Army to conduct counter offensives._ 

Based on these facts, I think the conclusion is obvious. The trickle down effect was enormous, the effect on pilot training was huge, the ability to launch intercept missions was severely reduced. Germany may have had equal or technically superior machines and and lots of manpower, however it means nothing without fuel. Germany was finished around the spring of 1944. How they managed to last until May 1945 was a minor miracle.


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## gjs238 (Jul 24, 2011)

In another thread I read that some say the major cause of Axis oil production losses were the oil producing processing facilites being overrun by land armies.


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## Juha (Jul 24, 2011)

As others wrote in the Kursk thread, vast majority of LW fuel was produced in Germany in hydrogenation plants, ie was synthetic fuel. And the production of Romanian oil fields was badly hampered by Allied bombing before they were taken by the Red Army and even that what was produced was partly inaccesable to German war machine because of allied air attacks on transport system for ex the mining of Danue

Juha


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## Ratsel (Jul 24, 2011)

to add to what Juha already posted, allied bombing of the Oil Campaign targets included attacks on Germany oil refineries, *synthetic oil plants*, storage depots, and other chemical works. Natural oil was available in Northwestern Germany at Nienhagen (55%—300,000 tons per year), Rietberg (20%—300,000), and Heide (300,000) and refineries were mainly at Hamburg and Hannover.


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## mhuxt (Jul 24, 2011)

I've not read this file myself, but it may be of interest:

Oil as a factor in the German war effort, 1933-1945. :: World War II Operational Documents

"Oil as a factor in the German war effort 1933-1945". Note that there are 4 parts.

My daughter insists I add the following smiley -


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## Ratsel (Jul 24, 2011)

so you didn't even read that document before you posted it. interesting. 



IV.—Aviation Spirit.
While 175,000 tons of aviation spirit was produced in April,production fell to 12,000 tons, i.e., to two normal days' production in August (1943) due to the destruction of the aircraft fuel installations at Leuna, Poelitz and Bruex which had only recently been restored to working order. For September (1943) production, because of the re-building measures, was still estimated at 101,000 tons even on the 15th August (1943). After the new attacks production will not rise above 10-15,000 tons because of insufficient home defence. With these results the enemy has hit the chemical industry so heavily that only by abnormal changes in the conditions is there any hope for the retention of the bases for powder iand explosives (Methanol), Buna (Methanol) and nitrogen for explosives and agriculture. At the same time the loss in carburettor and diesel fuels is so widespread that even the severest measures will not be able to hinder encroachments on the mobility of the troops at the front. The possibility of moving troops at the front willtherefore be so restricted that planned operations in October will no longer be able to take place. With this fuel situation offensive moves will be impossible.The flow necessary for the supply of the troops and the home country will therefore be paralyzed in the late autumn of this year (1944), since substitute fuels, such as producer gas, are also inadequate to provide the essential help in all sectors.


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## TheMustangRider (Jul 24, 2011)

Donald L. Miller states in his book “Masters of the Air” that even today, no country’s synthetic oil industry can equal Nazi Germany’s peak wartime production of synthetic oil, a critical element to keep the German war machine functioning and engaging efficiently its deadly defensive battles against the Allied forces during the climax of the war in the ETO.
Although the strategic bombing campaign did not completely wipe out the German war industries and hence did not live up to the prediction of some of its pre-war proponents that strategic bombing alone could bring Nazi Germany to its knees; it did, however, inflict sustained damage and prevented an additional growth to such war industries and therefore aided the Allied land armies in their final thrust into Germany’s eastern and western frontiers.


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## mhuxt (Jul 24, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> so you didn't even read that document before you posted it. interesting.


 
Heheheh, no, I didn't. Was one of a number of files I've downloaded from that site, was going to read them all "in due course, when I get to them...."


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## Ratsel (Jul 24, 2011)

yep. my guess Is that you read the first few paragraphs where it said " 2,000,000t a year" and figured the the rest would say the same heh-heh-heh. not quite. and.. 2 million tons/ year is nothing, Germany would still need to import oil. hence the annexing of certain eastern block countries, and the push to the Mid East in N.Africa.


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## wuzak (Jul 24, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> so you didn't even read that document before you posted it. interesting.
> 
> 
> 
> ...



The bombing campaign against synthetic oil had an interesting side effect that the Allies were not so aware - that the materials for making explosives, synthetic rubber (Buna) and agricultural products (ie fertilisers). For the last part of the war many German shells had much less than the normal explosive charges, and had extra filler - like cement - instead.


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## mhuxt (Jul 24, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> yep. my guess Is that you read the first few paragraphs where it said " 2,000,000t a year" and figured the the rest would say the same heh-heh-heh. not quite. and.. 2 million tons/ year is nothing, Germany would still need to import oil. hence the annexing of certain eastern block countries, and the push to the Mid East in N.Africa.


 
Sorry, no, you guess wrong. I didn't read any of it. Simply remembered that it was there, might be of interest, as I posted originally.


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## Ratsel (Jul 24, 2011)

wuzak said:


> The bombing campaign against synthetic oil had an interesting side effect that the Allies were not so aware - that the materials for making explosives, synthetic rubber (Buna) and agricultural products (ie fertilisers). For the last part of the war many German shells had much less than the normal explosive charges, and had extra filler - like cement - instead.


that, I did not know. that is very interesting information.

mhuxt,
my appologies. thanks for the link.


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## mhuxt (Jul 25, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> that, I did not know. that is very interesting information.
> 
> mhuxt,
> my appologies. thanks for the link.


 
No worries, hope there's some files over at that location which will be uf use.


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## Njaco (Jul 25, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> so you didn't even read that document before you posted it. interesting.
> 
> 
> 
> .



Ratsl, can you post your sources?


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## Ratsel (Jul 25, 2011)

Berthold Konrad Hermann Albert Speer, Minister of Armaments and War Production from February 8, 1942 – May 23, 1945

Griffith, Charles. The Quest: Haywood Hansell and American Strategic Bombing in
WWII. Maxwell AFB, ALA: Air University Press, 1999.

Harris, Arthur. Bomber Offensive. London: Greenhill Books, 1998

Jacobs, W.A. “The British Strategic Air Offensive against Germany in WWII.” In Case
Studies in Strategic Bombardment. R. Cargill Hall

the last paragraph was curtisy of the link provided from mhuxt.

bits and pieces from Strategic bombing during World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## Njaco (Jul 25, 2011)

Thanks!

From "The Last Year of the Luftwaffe 1944-45" By Dr. Alfred Price pg 95 - 96

"Compared with the 175,000 tons of aviation fuel produced in April, in August there was only 16,000 tons and in September a mere 7,000 tons. Throughout the summer the Luftwaffe kept going on its fat - the reserve of over half a million tons of aviation fuel it had accumulated previously. But with consumption running far in excess of production, by the beginning of September more than half this reserve had been consumed: from a high point of about 580,000 tons at the beginning of May, stocks were only about 180,000 tons at the end of September."


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## michaelmaltby (Jul 25, 2011)

According to Adam Tooze (Economic history of the 3rd Reich), the cost of the output from the hydrogenation plants in Germany was way more expensive than 'market value'oil by-the-barrel. This was a price the Nazi economists were willing to pay for "self sufficiency". Natural oil from Ploesti must have been much cheaper, I would think.

MM


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## Milosh (Jul 25, 2011)




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## gjs238 (Jul 25, 2011)

Economy of Nazi Germany - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

From late 1944 on, Allied bombings were destroying German factories and cities at a rapid pace, leading to the final collapse of the German war economy in 1945 (Stunde Null). Synthetic fuel production dropped by 86% in eight months, explosive output was reduced by 42% and the loss of tank output was 35%.[66] The Allied bombing campaign also tied up valuable manpower, with Albert Speer (Germany's Minister of Armaments) estimating that in the summer of 1944 between 200,000 and 300,000 men were permanently employed in repairing oil installations and placing oil production underground.[67]


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## Ratsel (Jul 25, 2011)

Njaco said:


> Thanks!


Your very welcome. This is one of the key aspects to the defeat of Germany, in my opinion.


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## Ratsel (Jul 25, 2011)

another sobering fact of the USAAF determination to knock out Germany's oil/fuel plants ~ supplies:

USAAF loses that directly involved the ' oil campaign '. 5400 aircraft lost of which 4300 were shot down by German fighters. 
(source: Masters of the air: America's bomber boys who fought the air war against Nazi Germany).


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## wuzak (Jul 25, 2011)

Imagine what could have been achieved if the RAF had spent more time on the synthetic oil plants?

From memory, in _Masters of the Air_, Miller points out that the RAF caused more damage in the few raids thatthey did do because they used larger, more damaging bombs. Namely they used 4000lb cookies in tandem with 500lb, 1000lb and 2000lb GP/MC bombs and incendiaries. The USAAF, on the other hand, tended to use 250lb and 500lb bombs for the task. 

The battle was one of attrition. The damage from the bombings could be repaired, but as soon as they were done there would be another raid, perhaps before.


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## Ratsel (Jul 25, 2011)

yah, you'd figure after dropping the 4000lb cookie, it would be ' whats there to rebuild ' but, apparently the Germans tried/did. like I said earlier, its a minor miricle on how the Luftwaffe survived mid 1944 until the end of the war...


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## drgondog (Jul 26, 2011)

Wuzak - I would seriously doubt that 250 pound bombs (unless incindieries) were used. Standard doctrine for 8th and 15th AF was 500 and 1000 pound HE for industrial targets - 2000 pounders for reinforced/hardened targets.


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## drgondog (Jul 26, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> another sobering fact of the USAAF determination to knock out Germany's oil/fuel plants ~ supplies:
> 
> USAAF loses that directly involved the ' oil campaign '. 5400 aircraft lost of which 4300 were shot down by German fighters.




Equally sobering was that the LW lost so many fighter pilots in April/May that were Not available to deploy against the Invasion


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## wuzak (Jul 26, 2011)

drgondog said:


> Wuzak - I would seriously doubt that 250 pound bombs (unless incindieries) were used. Standard doctrine for 8th and 15th AF was 500 and 1000 pound HE for industrial targets - 2000 pounders for reinforced/hardened targets.



From 303rd BGA Combat Missions and Reports

303rd BG (H) Combat Mission No. 152
12 May 1944
Target: Launa Synthetic Oil Plant at Merseburg, Germany
Crews Dispatched: 17
Length of Mission: 8 hours, 10 minutes
*Bomb Load: 16 x 300 lb M-31 G.P. bombs*
Bombing Altitude: 26,000 ft.
Ammo Fired: 570 rounds

303rd BG (H) Combat Mission No. 213
28 July 1944
Target: Leuna Synthetic Oil Plant, Merseburg, Germany
Crews Dispatched: 37
Length of Mission: 7 hours, 50 minutes
*Bomb Load: 10 x 500 lb M43 bombs*
Bombing Altitudes: 26,200, 25,200 24,200 ft
Ammo Fired: 0 rounds

303rd BG (H) Combat Mission No. 214
29 July 1944
Target: Leuna Synthetic Oil Plant, Merseburg, Germany
Crews Dispatched: 51
Length of Mission: 8 hours, 25 minutes
*Bomb Load: 20 x 250 lb M57 bombs*
Bombing Altitudes: 26,600, 25,600, 25,200 24,600 ft
Ammo Fired: 3,560 rounds

303rd BG (H) Combat Mission No. 231
24 August 1944
Target: Leuna Synthetic Oil Plant at Merseburg, Germany
Crews Dispatched: 39
Length of Mission: 8 hours, 15 minutes
*Bomb Load: 38 x 100 lb G.P. M30 bombs*
Bombing Altitudes: 25,100, 24,950 24,500 ft
Ammo Fired: 40,820 rounds

303rd BG (H) Combat Mission No. 275
21 November 1944
Target: Leuna Synthetic Oil Refinery at Merseburg, Germany
Crews Dispatched: 39
Length of Mission: 8 hours, 15 minutes
*Bomb Load: 10 x 500 lb bombs*
Bombing Altitudes: 19,800, 19,700 18,100 ft
Ammo Fired: 14,700 round

303rd BG (H) Combat Mission No. 279
29 November 1944
Target: Synthetic Oil Refinery at Merseburg, Germany
Crews Dispatched: 39
Length of Mission: 7 hours, 25 minutes
*Bomb Load: 12 x 500 lb G.P. M43 bombs*
Bombing Altitudes: 25,000, 23,600 25,500 ft
Ammo Fired: 6,540

303rd BG (H) Combat Mission No. 283
6 December 1944
Target: Leuna Synthetic Oil Plant at Merseburg, Germany
Crews Dispatched: 39
Length of Mission: 8 hours, 15 minutes
*Bomb Load: 20 X 250 lb G.P. bombs*
Bombing Altitudes: 21,600, 21,700, 23,000 ft
Ammo Fired: 1,710 rounds

303rd BG (H) Combat Mission No. 286
12 December 1944
Target: Leuna Synthetic Oil Refinery at Merseburg, Germany
Crews Dispatched: 38
Length of Mission: 8 hours, 15 minutes
*Bomb Load: 12 X 500 lb RDX M43 bombs*
Bombing Altitudes: 25,200, 24950 25,500 ft
Ammo Fired: 2,390 rounds


That is the 8 missions that the 303rd BG attacked the Leuna Synthetic oil plant at Merseberg. On 4 of these missions 500lb GP bombs were used - the first two of these with 10 bombs and the last with 12.

Twice the bombers were loaded with 20 x 250lb GP bombs, once with 16 x 300lb GP bombs and once with 38 100lb bombs.

A further mission was scheduled to hit Leuna, but the secondary target was hit instead. 10 x 500lb GP bombs were used in that instance.


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## Ratsel (Jul 26, 2011)

were those bombers escorted?


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## drgondog (Jul 26, 2011)

wuzak - i stand corrected on the light loads... it sounds like they were after storage facilites versus cracking units, etc

The USSBS emphasized the 'normal' Refining/chemical plant bomb loadings were 500 and 1000 pound mix (8th and 9th AF)- with contrasts to RAF greater effectiveness using 2000 and 4000 pound bombs.


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## Milosh (Jul 26, 2011)

May 12 1944

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): 

Mission 353: 886 bombers and 735
fighters are dispatched to hit oil production facilities in Germany and Czechoslovakia; there is strong Luftwaffe fighter reaction and 46 bombers and 7 fighters are lost:

1. 326 B-17s are dispatched to Mersenburg (224 bomb) and Lutzkendorf (87 bomb); 1 hits Hedrongen and 1 bombs Bullstadt; 2 B-17s are lost, 3 damaged beyond repair and 189 damaged; 4 airmen are KIA, 6 WIA and 20 MIA.

2. 295 B-17s are dispatched to Brux, Czechoslovakia (140 bomb) and Zwickau (74 bomb); 11 hit Chemnitz, 14 hit Gera marshalling yard, 15 hit Hof and 4 hit targets of opportunity; 41 B-17s are lost, 1 is damaged beyond repair and 162 damaged; 3 airmen are KIA, 8 WIA and 377 MIA.

3. 265 B-24s are dispatched to Zeitz (116 bomb) and Bohlen (99 bomb); 14 hit Mersenburg, 1 hits Ostend Airfield, Belgium and 12 hit targets of opportunity; 3 B-24s are lost, 5 damaged beyond repair and 61 damaged; 7 airmen are WIA and 33 MIA.

Escort is provided by *153 P-38s*, 201 P-47s and *381 P-51s*; P-38s claim 2-0-0 Luftwaffe aircraft, P-47s claim 26-0-8 and P-51s claim 33-0-3 in the air and 5-0-2 on the ground; 4 P-47s and 3 P-51s are lost and 4 P-47s and 9 P-51s are damaged; 7 pilots are MIA.

Mission 354: 5 of 5 B-17s drop 1.74 million leaflets on Denmark; 1 aircraft is damaged; 2 airmen are KIA and 3 WIA.

USAAF Chronology:


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## drgondog (Jul 26, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> were those bombers escorted?



Always - 

as to lighter loads, the bomb load out was limited by range considerations and rack hanngers - the issue with the smaller bombs is that weren't enough hangers in a B-17 to carry 4,000 pounds of 100 pounders.


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## Ratsel (Jul 26, 2011)

I was reading somewhere ( can't remember where at the moment maybe {Adolf Gallands book?}), that German Fighter pilots pretty much ignored the fighter escorts during the later part of the war, as downing the heavies was more important. This led to allied pilots having a free-for-all time picking off Luftwaffe fighters.


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## drgondog (Jul 26, 2011)

Milosh said:


> May 12 1944
> 
> EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)
> 
> ...



The May 12 battle was one of those situations where a.) the LW chose to strike within range of the P-47 escort, and b.) where they were able to position very large forces of Fw 190A-8s and 109G-6 in a fairly small area.

Specifically the First Task Force of B-17s was 20 minutes late, and 50 miles south of planned route. The 355th, 4th and 357th were orbiting between Bonn and Kassel waiting for them when JG11 and 3 and everyone else hit the lead (un escorted) B-17s head on west of Frankfurt.

The 56th was way out in front in the first deployment of the Zemke Fan - and Zemke was almost shot down by Rall in this famous encounter. The other two P-47 groups that were able to engage in flight deployments were the 78th and 353rd. They arrived after calls for help, from the Koblenz area. 

The 352nd FG split away from the 2nd TF heading for Koblenz and went south, the 355th FG dropped back to pick up the vacuum from the 352nd, and both the 357th and 4th FG headed sw fron Giessen/Kassel to engage between Giessen and Frankfurt. 

Most of the bomber losses were from 20 miles west of Frankfurt, to Frankfurt, then northeast toward Kassel. Most of the fighter- fighter action between the 8th FC and the LW were in flight versus flights or sections for approximately 30 minutes in the area noted above.

None of the P-38s engaged there, no more of the p-47 groups engaged, and the 339th, 359th, 355th, 361st were out of the battle until the Brux, Zwickau, Leipzig areas were reached etc, 

Summary - the quantity of P-51s were 4th FG, 357th Fg and two flights of 352nd FG - ~ 100 Mustangs, the quantity of P-47s were 56th, plus two flights each 78th and 353rd ~ 60 P-47s.


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## Milosh (Jul 26, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> were those bombers escorted?



Bill, I was replying to Ratsel's question.


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## Ratsel (Jul 26, 2011)

drgondog said:


> Always -


wasn't the B-24s attacking Ploiesti Astra Romana refinery unescorted?


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## drgondog (Jul 26, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> wasn't the B-24s attacking Ploiesti Astra Romana refinery unescorted?



Neither Halpro nor Tidal Wave (low level Aug 43) were escorted.


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## drgondog (Jul 26, 2011)

Milosh said:


> Bill, I was replying to Ratsel's question.



What I was pointing out is that the heaviest concentration of LW damage was to the First Task Force - which was unescorted through Frankfurt. It was supposed fly a route through Koblenz-Bonn and then to Kassel but was 50 miles south - thereby missing the 78 and 353rd (P-47) Penetration escort, and missing the 355th, 4th and 357th (P-51) final penetration/Target escort positioned along that line. 

The 56th FG is the only force that saved the lead boxes of B-17s from complete disaster from JG11 and JG3. As it happened 25 from just three bomb groups were shot down before any fighters were able to intercept them. This is a classic example where the LW Controllers got it Exactly Right in directing two complete JagdGeschwaders to a point which was completely undefended... and even then it took 10 minutes for the P-47s to dribble in.


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## Ratsel (Jul 26, 2011)

you seem extreamely knowledgable in this area. question for you, in your opinion do you think some fighter units (like some staffel in JG11) on the western front ignored orders to shoot down fighters and went straight to attacking the bombers during the ' oil campaigns '?


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## wuzak (Jul 26, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> you seem extreamely knowledgable in this area. question for you, in your opinion do you think some fighter units (like some staffel in JG11) on the western front ignored orders to shoot down fighters and went straight to attacking the bombers during the ' oil campaigns '?



I believe the case was opposite - they were ordered to ignore the fighters, much to Galland's dismay, and concentrate on teh bombers.


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## wuzak (Jul 26, 2011)

drgondog said:


> wuzak - i stand corrected on the light loads... it sounds like they were after storage facilites versus cracking units, etc
> 
> The USSBS emphasized the 'normal' Refining/chemical plant bomb loadings were 500 and 1000 pound mix (8th and 9th AF)- with contrasts to RAF greater effectiveness using 2000 and 4000 pound bombs.



I think this was carpet bombing - the more bombs the merrier.

In the case of Leuna the 8th AF may have decided that destroying some of the facilities was unlikely, but by carpet bombing the area they could do damage to many of the services that ran unprotected between plants - like pipes. 

Of course if Harris' Lancasters joined (more often) in they could too have carpet bombed - instead of 12 x 500lb bombs they could have dropped 12 x 1000lb bombs.


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## Ratsel (Jul 26, 2011)

wuzak said:


> I believe the case was opposite - they were ordered to ignore the fighters, much to Galland's dismay, and concentrate on teh bombers.


yep thats how I remembered it. many thanks! yet the main reason imo for so many Luftwaffe fighter losses for 1944.


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## mhuxt (Jul 27, 2011)

Have never seen an 8th AF bomb plot before - just came across this one at the excellent 486th BG website. This is for a November 21 1944 attack on Leuna, so may be of interest to this thread.

http://www.486th.org/Photos/Strike1/LeunaB.jpg

Note that not all of the bomb falls could be plotted.


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## wuzak (Jul 27, 2011)

Reading through some more mission reports.

Found this one:

303rd BG (H) Combat Mission No. 77
10 October 1943
Target: Center of city, Coesfeld, Germany
Crews Dispatched: 21
Length of Mission: 5 hours, 30 minutes
*Bomb Load: 12 x 1,000 lb G.P. plus 38 x MA47A1 Incendiaries*
Bombing Altitude: 24,650 ft
Ammo Fired: 7,120 rounds

I think that may be a mistake, and shoudl be 6 x 1000lb bombs plus Incendiaries.


Here is the first Schweinfurt mission:
303rd BG (H) Combat Mission No. 60
17 August 1943
Target: V.K.F. Ball Bearing Works #1, Schweinfurt, Germany
Crews Dispatched: 30
Crews Lost: S/Sgt. L.A. Kesky (KIA), 1Lt. L.E. McCord (WIA),
3 others wounded
Length of Mission: 5 hours, 55 min. (303), 6 hours,15 min. (Comp)
*Bomb Load: 16 x 250 lb British incendiary bombs*
Bombing Altitudes: 20,000 ft (303), 22,000 ft (Composite)
Ammo Fired: 98,090 rounds (303), 48,060 rounds (Composite)
Enemy Aircraft Claims: 15 destroyed, 14 probable, 6 damaged (303rd) 18
destroyed, 7 probable (Composite)

I can only assume that not all groups on that mission carried the same load.


On the second mission to Schweinfurt the same group dropped a different bomb mix:
303rd BG (H) Combat Mission No. 78
14 October 1943
Target: V.K.F. Ball Bearing Plant, Schweinfurt, Germany
Crews Dispatched: 20
Crews Lost: 1 crew 1Lt. R.C. Sanders, 2 KIA, 9 POW
Length of Mission 7 hours, 15 minutes
Bomb Load: 3 x 1000 lb G.P. bombs plus 5 M47A1 Incendiaries
Bombing Altitude: 24,050 ft
Ammo Fired: 99,930 rounds
Enemy Aircraft Claims: 24 Destroyed, 15 Probable, 3 Damaged


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## drgondog (Jul 27, 2011)

mhuxt said:


> Have never seen an 8th AF bomb plot before - just came across this one at the excellent 486th BG website. This is for a November 21 1944 attack on Leuna, so may be of interest to this thread.
> 
> http://www.486th.org/Photos/Strike1/LeunaB.jpg
> 
> Note that not all of the bomb falls could be plotted.




Based on the AP it looks like there was a wind out of 200-180 degrees based on the dift from the aiming point. Or the target may have been partially obscured because virtually all the plotted impact points were 'to the left of the bomb run course'.


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## drgondog (Jul 27, 2011)

The LW developed tactics in the Spring of 1944 that recognized they couldn't 'ignore' the escorts and started flying formations with 109s providing 'high cover' to have an advantage of altitude over the Mustangs. This would have been in late March.

When Rall was leading JG11 on May 12 he was flying this type escort over the JG3 Sturms when he bounced Zemke's flight and nearly got Zemke.

ALL the LW pilots either dove to escape or turned and fought. It was far easier for Goering to order 'just attack the bombers and ignore the fighters' than it was to obey and still have a chance to survive.

Having said this, the orders reduced the aggressiveness of the LW Fighter arm and gave the initiative to the US escorts.


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## Tante Ju (Jul 27, 2011)

Have looked at the mission summaries gave by Milosh for May 1944. May 21 especially bad day for both side... 

P-47 and less extent, P-38 did score lot of claim for Luftwaffe fighter. This was ignored so far by drgdog analysis. Of course I cannot get total for this period (too many to list), but it would be a guess that P-47 scored least 1/3 of claims during this first half 1944 period.

So I cannot understand, how can we ignore P-47 sorties when assess the air situation, and relative power in air (outnumber, local, operational etc). And say only P-51 sortie counts, and P-51 was outnumbered, P-47 sorties, hundreds do not count because they had short range.. they still seems to shoot down German fighter, divert German fighter sortie from P-51 group etc.

I understand that US fighter were divided up along bomber route, but so were German attackers.


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## Ratsel (Jul 27, 2011)

yeah in most cases starting around the spring of 1944 the LW was outnumbered. combined with suicidal orders from the higher ups,
made suvivability low for the LW.

drgondog, 
many thanks for the info. also, where are you getting it from? most of my stuff comes from unit diaries of JG 11.


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## drgondog (Jul 27, 2011)

Personal deep research with collaboration with others. I did the same for March 16, March 29, April 13, April 24, June 20, July 7, Sept 11, November 26, December 5th and a few others.

Studying an air battle is complex stuff.


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## Ratsel (Jul 27, 2011)

Göring should have been dismissed and Galland appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe in late 1943.


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## jim (Jul 27, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> Göring should have been dismissed and Galland appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe in late 1943.


 
The "Fat one " should have been dismissed but i dont understant the popularity that Galland enjoys today. He was a great pilot. But what great accomplished as General der Jagdflieger? According to him his finest hour was the Channel Dash in February 42 . Did he provided his pilots with com petitive engines by pussing the superiors?Did he pressure for improvements in airframes fast? No(Many imrovements in Bf109 airframe were ready in 1942 and enter production in 44 or never)No (specially 43 early44) . Did he developed proper tactics in time? No He can have excuses dut the results are so negative and he has great part . And at the end, that shamful,egoistic,arogant fiasco, JV44 .


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## Ratsel (Jul 27, 2011)

alright, so your not a Galland fan, what about Walter Grabmann as Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe?


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## drgondog (Jul 27, 2011)

Jim - I only know several Luftwaffe aces personally and my comments must be taken as pure opinion.

Galland was well respected by his fighter leaders and was highly regarded for advancing their views regarding tactics and requirements with Goering and Hitler. He was not successful, nor was any German leader who advanced views contrary to Hitler's own views.

Galland was very passionate about bringing the 262 into air defense operations, as well as shutting down Me 109 and Me 410 production in favor of the Fw 190 and 190 variants. He was not persusaive.

Galland articulated the need to turn the Luftwaffe Fighter Arm on the fledgling USAAF when it entered extended combat operations and free up LW JG Kommodores to develop and execute tactics they believed in. Goering and Hitler dismissed the idea that 'mongrels' from the US could possibly challenge the LW. Remember that Hitler and Goering believed that the US was only good for making razor blades, cheap automobiles and making movies - how could the US possibly learn to fight?

Galland argued that centralizing the LW LuftFlotte Reich in central Germany was a far more effective deployment than piecemealing units all over Germany. Hitler believed that to be a sign of weakness.

Which of those recommendations do you regard as flawed?


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## Ratsel (Jul 27, 2011)

262's yes. I believe the Germans had 262's during the BoB. anyways, I personally only know one Bf109 ace (R.I.P.), and one with three victories. they bothed believed in:

1. All of the Bf 109 Gruppen should be assigned to engage the U.S. escorts
2. Two Gruppen should take-off ahead of the main interception force to disperse the escort
3. The more heavily armed Fw 190 Gruppen would be directed to the bomber fleets after the bombers had been "stripped of their escorts".

They thought that Galland ideas ( the three points above) would provide an very effective means to defend against the hoards of heavies and escorts. They also believed by this method ( and others outlined) they could fight the allies to a Stalemate, and save what was left of Germany. At this time, niether thought Germany would win the war however.


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## jim (Jul 27, 2011)

drgondog said:


> Jim - I only know several Luftwaffe aces personally and my comments must be taken as pure opinion.
> 
> Galland was well respected by his fighter leaders and was highly regarded for advancing their views regarding tactics and requirements with Goering and Hitler. He was not successful, nor was any German leader who advanced views contrary to Hitler's own views.
> 
> ...



To be a great soldier is enough to show great effort . to be a great leader you MUST achieve great results. Since his pilots were dying in dozens he should confront both Goring and Hitler ,(and Udet, and RLM)and not in 1945 ,but in early 43 .Even if he had to pay the ultimate price. Rommel,Guderian,Hausser , and others true leaders took their chances and achieved results against impossible odds.
More specificaly:
1)Its easy to ask but how can put Bf109 out of production with the Fw190 poor performance at altitude and without loosing many months of production? Why did not insist to put DB603 in FW190 in early 43? Additionaly Fw190 proved somewhat unfit against soviet fighters. Why while Dora was production ready early 44 was its production delayed and what his reaction was?
2) How bring Me 262 in operation when there were not enouph raw materials to produce Jumo 004A? 
3) How leave the eastern front without fighters ? In autumn 43 itwas Jagdwaffe who saved Army group south from total disaster during its reatret .Or Leave ploesti undefended?
4) Local Jafu s had difficulty direct even a few Gruppen . How could they direct masses of fighters in close distances with all the german weaknesses in command and control? (And intelligence)
5) Did favored elitism within the ranks of Jagdwaffe undermining the moral of the less succesful pilots? Did with his behavior encouraged (specially early in war) personal scores and thus indirectly led to abnormal behaviors of the officers pilots(e.g see Marseille complaints during his service with JG52 although when he became famous had similar or worse behavior in combat , read Hanning s account about the behavior of Lang in the day that claimed 18 kills) After the war there were nco reunions in which were not invinted the officers pilots of the same unit!
6) Bf 109 did not -Practically- improved from late 42 to March 44 . It only recieved 1,42 ata clearence in Autumn 43( At last) . Did he ever said anything about this? Was not within his duties to press for continius improvements? 
7) About his famous idea to send 2000 fighters in late 44, "to soot down 400-500 bombers" was so far from reality that needs no comment
What about his cigarette-lighter equiped Bf109, or his aunthorised combat flying, or the statement "thus i missed the best years of the war"
Great pilot,adequate wing kommandeur, respect for his personal bravery and his wounds but in my opinion average staff officer at best. Kills can not be the major factor for a staff position


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## jim (Jul 27, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> 262's yes. I believe the Germans had 262's during the BoB. anyways, I personally only know one Bf109 ace (R.I.P.), and one with three victories. they bothed believed in:
> 
> 1. All of the Bf 109 Gruppen should be assigned to engage the U.S. escorts
> 2. Two Gruppen should take-off ahead of the main interception force to disperse the escort
> ...


 1) I dont know who Walter Grabmann was.
2)More or less thats the tactics(with variations) that should have been treid but idont believe that even Stalemate was possible. Just more casualties for the alleis.
3) Galland maybe believed these tactics but failed to make them happen. And that was his duty.


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## Ratsel (Jul 27, 2011)

Walter Grabmann was a Luftwaffe Generalmajor. 

Galland tactics were made well known, right to Göring by Galland. Göring didn't take to kindly to Gallands demands and thought he was a ' trouble maker '. Long story short, Hilter dismissed accusations made about Galland as 'nonsense', and axed any investigations into Adolf Galland. So, at the end of the day, Göring's say was the final one.


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## Tante Ju (Jul 27, 2011)

jim said:


> Great pilot,adequate wing kommandeur, respect for his personal bravery and his wounds but in my opinion average staff officer at best. Kills can not be the major factor for a staff position



I tend to agree with the opinion. Galland is bit like Rommel in my opinion. Very popular, very talented, but perhaps not the best man to place very high up, where organisational skills are more required..


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## drgondog (Jul 27, 2011)

Tante Ju said:


> I tend to agree with the opinion. Galland is bit like Rommel in my opinion. Very popular, very talented, but perhaps not the best man to place very high up, where organisational skills are more required..



It looks like you and Jim have judged Galland and found him deficient. So, who could have had the right strategy, forcefully rammed it down a dictator's throat and prevailed?

LEADERSHIP skills were required and he had them, Experience would be required to properly define the issues. Milch had organizational skills (?) and he took the easy way out. Who was your candidate to replace Rommel and Galland in their roles for a better outcome for Germany?

So, who would have done a better job in your humble opinion(s)??


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## Ratsel (Jul 28, 2011)

I don't think any answers will be forthcoming. Galland imo, was a very good choise.


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## drgondog (Jul 31, 2011)

Tante Ju said:


> I tend to agree with the opinion. Galland is bit like Rommel in my opinion. Very popular, very talented, but perhaps not the best man to place very high up, where organisational skills are more required..



An excerpt from a Steinhoff interview - questions about Galland

*"Do you feel that Galland's appointment as general of the fighters was good for the service, and if so, why?

Steinhoff: Definitely. . Galland was a very energetic man, a strong leader and great fighter, successful, loyal to his men and a most honorable and honest gentleman. 

He was never awed by Hitler or swayed by Göring, and he always answered truthfully when they questioned him on any subject, regardless of how unpopular the truth might have been. 

Galland was a visionary who knew how to turn the tide in the air 
war and how to rebuild the fighter force. But his standing beside his fighter
pilots, against Göring and Hitler, as well as many others, gave Hitler cause to replace him, which was a bad mistake. 

In Berlin honesty was, often, not fashionable.*

Excerpts from WWII magazine 

Johannes Steinhoff 
15 September 1913(1913-09-15) – 21 February 1994(1994-02-21) (aged 80) 
By Colin D. Heaton [ abridged ]


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## Ratsel (Jul 31, 2011)

Franz Stigler was of the same opinion. so was Horst Petzschler, Theo Nau, Gunther Rall, Heinz Bar, Anton Hackle, etc.

Galland with his ' Big Blow' plan while not destroying the USAAF as a whole, would have bought time for the Luftwaffe to reorganize, and for fuel/oil refineries, synthetic fuel plants to rebuild. Also in this point of the war, he wanted all fighter units to be centralized in Germany instead of being scattered over four fronts. seems like very sounds proposals to me.

Reminds me of Werner Molders.


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## gjs238 (Jul 31, 2011)

In this scenario you would end up with the Soviet Union possessing more of Europe.
All of Germany would be Soviet, plus who knows what else.


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## Ratsel (Jul 31, 2011)

how so?


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## Ratsel (Jul 31, 2011)

yes scenarios. an interesting thing. who's to say that the scenario presented would have led to a conditional surrender of Germany to the west? then fought side by side against the COMMUNIST russians? In this scenario Hilter and some of his higher ups would have either commited suicide, or arrested. Germany would then be under the control of the west. this would be an equally plausible scenario.


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## gjs238 (Jul 31, 2011)

I understand that such overtures were made to the West, and refused.


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## Ratsel (Jul 31, 2011)

Adolf Hitler committed suicide by gunshot on 30 April 1945 in his Führerbunker in Berlin. Any offers of Surrender to the Allies before that date is bogus. After that date, some Luftwaffe units offered surrender to American and British troops. which were glady accepted. so again, before April 30th, 1945, no such offer was made by anybody authorized to do so.


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## wuzak (Jul 31, 2011)

Could the oil shortage in Germany been hastened by more RAF participation against targets?



> There were 22 attacks on Leuna, 20 by the Eighth Air Force and 2 by the RAF.



United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (European War)


I can't help but think a large industrial site like Leuna was very well suited to the RAF's attack methods against cities.


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## Ratsel (Jul 31, 2011)

I assume you mean firebombing? if so, then yes. it would be very effective. more so then dropping cookies in my opinion. perhaps the USAAF wanted the site somewhat intact?


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## wuzak (Jul 31, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> I assume you mean firebombing? if so, then yes. it would be very effective. more so then dropping cookies in my opinion. perhaps the USAAF wanted the site somewhat intact?



The RAF used cookies with incendiaries. 

But i meant more in terms of how they marked an area for bombing and then were able to put most of their bombs in that area.


I think a mix of 4000lb cookies, 1000lb mc, 500lb mc (the RAF didn't have a 2000lb MC, but they did have a 1900lb GP bomb which I believe they rarely used), and incendiaries. For an industrial target like Leuna there would be fewer incendiaries than used on cities, I would think.

They even may find it useful to lob a few tallboys in there.


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## mhuxt (Jul 31, 2011)

It appears BC did use at least one tallboy on an oil target:

http://warbirdsforum.com/showthread.php?t=3397


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## drgondog (Aug 1, 2011)

Wuzak - I think the RAF would have made a very strong contribution had Harris permitted them to join earlier..the weakness in the USAAF doctrine was over estimating the effect of 500 and 1000 pound bombs, which curiously lasted through 1966 in Vietnam.

Fire certainly did a lot of damage to the pertochemical plants and the 8th and 15th AF did cripple German petrochemical industry - but in retrospect the USAAF should have used 1000 pound bombs as minimum, with mix of incindieries, and 2000 pounders would have been preferable.

I have often wondered why the 8th AF didn't get intelligence feedback regarding the success of German rebuild efforts and ask the question about bomb types.


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## Ratsel (Aug 1, 2011)

I don't think the US was trying to minimize civilian casulaties with the smaller bomb loads. I still think they wanted to capture some plants relatively intact.


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## drgondog (Aug 1, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> I don't think the US was trying to minimize civilian casulaties with the smaller bomb loads. I still think they wanted to capture some plants relatively intact.



The US wanted the refineries bombed into oblivion. The Russians were amazed at the damage to the "US" owned refineries at Ploesti.


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## wuzak (Aug 1, 2011)

I don't think that was it either. I think their main concern was causing damage, and with big bombs in their bombers, primarily the B-17, they couldn't carry too many. So they loaded up with smaller bombs, mostly 500lbs and 250lbs, so that they had a chance of hitting a few things in the target area. Particularly as the synthetic oil plants were spread out installations. It was carpet bombing.

If they had Lancs they could have used 12-14 x 1000lbs for the same carpet effect they were getting with their 10-12 x 500lbs.


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## Ratsel (Aug 1, 2011)

3. Report of 30th August, 1944.
State Top Secret. Berlin
"MyFuehrer,
The last air attacks have again hit the most important chemical works
heavily. Thereby the three hydrogenation plants, Leuna, Bruex and Poelitz,
although only recently in commission again, have been brought to a complete
standstill for some weeks.
As the home defence against enemy air attacks promises no appreciably
greater ,results in September as against August, chemical (oil) production in
September must now be considerably lowered.
Nevertheless, no effort willbe spared to restore the hydrogenation plants so
that past production, at least, can be made possible in a short lime.
The effect of these new raids on the entire chemical industry are extraordinary
as severe shortages willoccur not only inliquid fuels but also in various other
important fields of chemistry.
(1) Methanol Production. The production of Methanol dropped, as a result of the air-attacks, from an estimated essential production of 34,000 tons in August to 8,750 tons, and will at the outside only attain this figure in September. The reserves of Methanol willonly be 9,000 tons at the end of August therefore heavy inroads willbe suffered in the following essential chemical fields in September if this reserve is completely used. In the powder and explosives sector, the estimated production of precious explosives (Hexogen and Trinitrotoluol) willdrop 30 per cent, inspite of the use of emergency measures and what is more, this notwithstanding that Methanol willbe reserved for powder and explosives and use of itgreatly reduced inother branches. Aparticularly severe inroad is to be expected in artificialresins and plastics, the production of which willdrop from 4,000 tons a month to 2,700 tons a month due to the shortage of raw materials. The production of melamine glue willreach about half the requirements,
while solid fuel for the Wehrmacht (for spirit stoves, &c.) willnow be completely counted out in September.
(2) Buna Production. By the failure of hydrogen from Leuna for Schkopau and the air raid damagein Ludwigshafen, Buna production sank from an estimated possible total of 13,000 tons to 5,400 tons in August. After the new attack on the 24th August on Leuna, this figure cannot be improved in any way inSeptember. The Buna reserves, which we were able to increase in the monthly production during the last months before the attacks, stood at 9,000 tons on the
Ist October so that October is secure as far as Buna is concerned. About one-third of the anticipated production for November willnot be sufficient.
(3) Nitrogen Production. Here also the new attack on Leuna has meant a considerable decrease in production, so that against an anticipated output of 85,000 tons for September, the highest possible figure willbe 45,000. This decrease inproduction willhit agriculture which at the moment holds only about 45 per cent, of its last year's allocation, which means that next year's harvest willsuffer unusual losses. Even worse are the effects in the field of liquid fuel as the hydrogenation plants and oil refineries have again been heavily hit in the last few days in
the Protectorate and round Hanover. [30934]
*

I. Carburettor Fuels. Before the Aprilattacks the carburettor fuel production in the Reich stood at 125,000 tons. In August, as a result of air attacks, at the most 60,000 tons were produced in August instead of the 84,000 tons estimated at the end of July.
Ifsimilar attacks continue the highest figures to be expected in September and October is 40,000 tons.
—
II. Diesel Fuels. Before the April attacks the diesel fuel production figure stood at
88,900 tons.
Due to air attacks only about 65,000 tons were produced inAugust as against 93,000 tons estimated at the end of July. Ifsimilar attacks continue the highest figure to be reckoned with for September and October is 60,000 tons.
lll.—Bottled Treibgas.
InAprilthe production of bottled gas stood at 37,600 tons (reckoned interms of gasoline.) Only about 3,000 tons were produced in August due to air attacks. Ifsimilar attacks continue a figure of 2,500-3,000 tons is the highest to be
reckoned withinSeptember and October.
IV.—Aviation Spirit.
While 175,000 tons of aviation spirit was produced in April,production fell to 12,000 tons, i.e., to two normal days' production inAugust due to the destruction of the aircraft fuel installations at Leuna, Poelitz and Bruex which had
only recently been restored to working order. For September production, because of the re-building measures, was still estimated at 101,000 tons even on the 15th August.
After the new attacks production willnot rise above 10-15,000 tons because of insufficient home defence.
With these results the enemy has hit the chemical industry so heavily that only by abnormal changes in the conditions is there any hope for the retention of the bases for powder iand explosives (Methanol), Buna (Methanol) and nitrogen for explosives and agriculture. At the same time the loss in carburettor and diesel fuels is so widespread that even the severest measures willnot be able to hinder encroachments on the mobility of the troops at the front.
The possibility of moving troops at the front willtherefore be so restricted that planned operations in October willno longer be able to take place. With this fuel situation offensive moves willbe impossible.
The flow necessary for the supply of the troops and the home country will therefore be paralyzed in the late autumn of this year, since substitute fuels, such as producer gas, are also inadequate to provide the essential help inall sectors.
There— remains only one possibility, and this onljy with a large \amount of luck :—:
—
Ifthe enemy
(1)
As was his former custom, begins his new attacks only when the plants, at present damaged, are again in commission, i.e., in about three weeks, when
(2)
The German fighter weapon at home can be so considerably strengthened inthis three-to four-week breathing space as to inflict heavier losses on the enemy and to hinder the compact carpet bombardments by splitting up the bomber formations.
(3)
In the coming autumn months, operations are restricted through bad weather conditions and both enemy and German air weapons are more restricted inoperation.
We shall do the troops a bad service bj sending pursuit planes from home
to the front and thereby allow the vitalmaterials for the front (powder, explosives
and fuel) to be hattered.
Ifit were possible to combat the attacks with—some good measure of success
inSeptember, thenitis feasible that there willbe
Onlya10per cent, production dropinpowder and explosives inOctober;
Arise inBuna from 5,000 tons inSeptember to 10,000 tons inOctober ;
A rise in nitrogen from 45,000 tons in September to 60,000 tons in
October;


A rise incarburettor fuel;-from 40,000 tons in September to 65,000 ton'fcj^ inOctober ; A rise in diesel fuel from 60,000 tons in September to 90,000 tons in October ; A rise in aircraft fuel from 10-15,000 tons inSeptember to 75,000 tons in October.
If,however, the homeland is protected only by Flak, then, despite the greatestconcentration, no substantial results from defence can be obtained as the attacks on Leuna, Bruex and Poelitz have proved. In this case the production level in October willremain the same as inSeptember but willnot exceed it.
be ready for this last great stake by the middle of
The Luftwaffe must
September at the latest. They must include their best strength, their flying instructors and their most effective pursuit planes in this undertaking. The most modern machines must be ready for this attempt at an item figure of not less than 1,200 items.
Ifthis course is taken it will,if successful, mean the beginning of a new air force or it willmean the end of the German air force.
Ifthe attacks on the chemical industry continue in the same strength and with the same precision in September as in August the output of the chemical industry willdrop stillfurther and the last stocks willbe consumed.
Thereby those materials which are necessary for the continuation of a modern war are lacking inthe most important spheres.
Hail, my Fuehrer,
Always yours,
SPEER."


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## wuzak (Aug 1, 2011)

Thanks for that Ratsel. Informative read.


I have just found a mission of the 8th AF where 1000lb bombs were dropped on a synthetic plant.

The 486th bomb group attacked Leuna/Merseberg on the 28th September 1944 with a total of 110 1000lb GP bombs, from 22 a/c that attacked. ie 5 x 1000lb bomb loads each. One a/c was lost and one returned to base from 24 that were sent.

Flimsy 084, 28 Sep 1944


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## wuzak (Aug 1, 2011)

Here's one where the 486 used a mix of bombs:

Flimsy 175, 30 MAR 45

190 x 100GP
434 x 150GP
239 x 100IB

From 38 attacking aircraft.


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## Ratsel (Aug 1, 2011)

thanks for those links. were you able to find anything from RAF bomber command on oil/chemical/synthetic plant attacks?

continuation:

*MAY/JUNE 1944*
APPENDIX 12.
The Reports to Hitler on the Effects" of the Attacks.
In the course of the offensive against the oil plants Speer submitted five reports to Hitlerdetailing the damage done and the counter-measures being taken Translations of these reports are given below. Insome of them a certain amount of unimportant detail has been omitted. Many of the figures given by Speer check withstatistics that have been obtained from other sources, and these letters consequently provide an authoritative account of the effects of the attacks. The italics are as given in the original documents.
1. Report of 30th June, 1944.
'' State Top Secret. Berlin.
MyFuehrer,
The enemy's attacks on the hydrogenation works and refineries were intensified during June; his current air reconnaissance and espionage enable him to damage severely, mostly soon after they had started up again, those works whichhad been hitinMay.
Although Herr Generalfeldmarschall Keitel reports precisely to you on the
weightoftheattacks andontheresults,Ifeelitismydutytosendyouanoverall report on the losses of the German fuel production since May this year and of the vitalmeasures resulting from them.
—
I. 'The focal point of the attacks inMay and June was the German aviation spirit production.
In these attacks the enemy succeeded on the 22nd June in increasing the effects on aviation spirit by 90 per cent. — reconstruction
— Only by the most speedyof the damaged works which was well below schedule can the effects of this catastrophic attack be eliminated.
Nevertheless, aviation spirit production is at the moment utterly insufficient.
In Aprilthe Luftwaffe used 156,000 tons and 175,000 tons were produced.
The average daily production for Aprilwas 5,850 tons daily.
InMay the daily production was as follows
May Tons daily.
Ist to 11th 5,845 
12th Attack on Leuna and Bruex ... ... ... 4,821 
13th ... ... 4,875 
14th 4,842 
15th 4,775 
16th 4,980 
17th ... 4,839 
18th 4,920 
19th 5,010 
20th 4,975 
21st 5,025 
22nd 5,075 
23rd 5,051 
24th ... 5,073 25th 
Leuna again inproduction at 20 per cent. ... 5,487 
26th 5,541
27th 5,550 
28th Second attack on Leuna, result 100 per cent. 5,526 
29th Attack on Poelitz, result 100 per cent. ... 2,775 
30th 2,743 
31st ... 2,794
InMay altogether 156,000 tons aviation spirit were produced, compared with an essential production of 180,000 tons. [30934] T 2
124Dtiimtiim
—
InJune the following production is shown :—:
June Tons daily.
Ist 2,476 2nd 2,535 3rd ... 2,580
4th 2,555 2,511
5th
2,226*
6th
1,823
7th
Bth 3,718 2,756
9th
10th 2,873 11th 3,052 12th ... ... 2,120 13th Gelsenberg drops out 100 per cent. Welheim
slight damage ... ... 1,078 14th ... 1,587
15th Scholven slight damage ... 1,527
16th 1,275 17th 1,214 18th Scholven again attacked, slight fall-off in
production 1,323 1,278
19th
20th Through the attack on Poelitz re-opening of the plant postponed tillAugust 1,392
21st ... 1,268 22nd Scholven fall off in production 20 per cent. Wesseling 40 per cent. ... 632
23rd ..... 868
24th Leuna again inproduction at 20 per cent. ... 1,268
25th ... ... 1,223
26th Moosbierbaum production fall-off 100 per
cent 1,204 27th 1,252 28th 1,241 30th 1,218
Total production in June therefore only 53,000 tons aviation spirit as againstthe requirements of 195,000 tons inMay. After the first attack of the 12th May this year a production figure of 126,000 tons aviation spirit was reported to you inthe Obersalzburg for June. This quantity would certainly have been exceeded, due to the increased speed
of reconstruction, but owing to the continuous attacks in June production was wellbelow the estimated figure. Attention is drawn to the fact that production during the second half of June again decreased considerably and only corresponded to a monthly production of 42,000 tons; should the attacks continue an extra ordinary fallingoffinJuly can already now be foreseen withcertainty.
—


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## wuzak (Aug 1, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> thanks for those links. were you able to find anything from RAF bomber command on oil/chemical/synthetic plant attacks?



Unfortunately not at this stage.


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## wuzak (Aug 1, 2011)

Some mention here: RAF History - Bomber Command 60th Anniversary

No mention of what bombs used.


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## Ratsel (Aug 2, 2011)

seems that the USAAF wasn't as prolific at destroying targets the first time around. reading some of the documents I have, they had to go back multiple times in the same week to the same plants. Suprisingly also, sometimes they were met with no resistance. That would be a good arguement for one of Gallands recomendations to centalize all the JG units to Germany.


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## wuzak (Aug 2, 2011)

Not just the ability of the USAAF to destroy targets, but also the ability of the Germans to repair them. Often the USAAF would time a new attack on teh same plant to coincide with the completion of repairs.


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## mhuxt (Aug 2, 2011)

There are some (brief) first-hand reports of damage to the hydrogenation plants during May '44 in the Fischer-Tropf archive, think it's one of the Technical Oil Mission reels, TOM-214-1301.1407.pdf


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## mhuxt (Aug 2, 2011)

There"s a table of oil attacks, number and tonnage dropped, by air force by month, on this page from the BBSU report.







Edit - if you download the image and zoom in, the numbers are fairly clear. 

"Please not to shoot messenger."

Will see if I can post links to the whole section on oil, will take more organisation than I can generally muster.


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## mhuxt (Aug 2, 2011)

Oil-related stuff from BBSU. 

Download the images, open and zoom in, should be fine.




http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/P1010027.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/P1010028.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/P1010029.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/P1010030.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/P1010031.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/P1010032.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/P1010033.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/P1010034.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/P1010035.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/P1010036.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/P1010037.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/P1010038.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/P1010039.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/P1010040.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/P1010041.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/P1010042.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/P1010043.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/P1010044.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/P1010045.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/P1010046.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/P1010047.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/P1010048.jpg


To repeat, download to your disk and zoom in.


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## Nikademus (Aug 2, 2011)

drgondog said:


> Wuzak - I think the RAF would have made a very strong contribution had Harris permitted them to join earlier..the weakness in the USAAF doctrine was over estimating the effect of 500 and 1000 pound bombs, which curiously lasted through 1966 in Vietnam.
> 
> Fire certainly did a lot of damage to the pertochemical plants and the 8th and 15th AF did cripple German petrochemical industry - but in retrospect the USAAF should have used 1000 pound bombs as minimum, with mix of incindieries, and 2000 pounders would have been preferable.
> 
> I have often wondered why the 8th AF didn't get intelligence feedback regarding the success of German rebuild efforts and ask the question about bomb types.



Probably a combination of several factors.....dogma, questionable intel, and the limitations of the primary air types in use by the USAAF. By "dogma" I'm referring to some comments made by Dr. Alan Zimm on an unrelated subject but one that can be applied to any military situation. Zimm was commenting about conclusions re: the battleship Arizona's cause of destruction. The original conclusions were reluctant to admit that the armor deck was penetrated as it would make the design look bad so they tended to side towards arguments that explained the loss through more extenuating circumstances. For the SB campaign.....there was probably a similar feeling re: it's standard 500lb GP bomb.....put enough on target, the math says they'll do the job.

The intel picture, IIRC from reading Miller's book (Masters of the Air) was anything but crystal clear. As with Harris and BC, they would pour over photos and try to access the damage....often the accessments were far more rosy than real life and it wasn't really until after the war when they could access on the ground the effects that they realized just how hard it could be to destroy a target even if the damage appears severe from above (such as a collapsed roof etc....but with machine tools intact inside) 

Also, now that i think of it....with the whole original idea being "Precision" bombing.....the USAAF would not initially have looked at mass incendiaries because this would cause "civilian casualties"....something they learned to live with by 1944-45 over Germany and in particular over Japan under LeMay.

Lastly there were the planes themselves. B-17 was an "old fashioned" design and had a very limited bay which did not allow anything like the 4000lb "cookie" The B-24 with it's Davis wing was more advanced and had a roomier bomb bay but don't believe it could accomidate one of those monsters either. UK bombers sacrified defensive capability for such generous bomb space....even a Mosquito could carry a cookie under limited circumstances....whilst the US bombers emphasized the concept of the self defending bomber.


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## Ratsel (Aug 2, 2011)

Well I think Albert Speer's letters to Hitler summed up the situation really well. Also, the drop of Aviation fuel in the first half of 44 is staggering. So what to do? send fewer fighters to intercept the heavies? or send more fighters with 1/2 tanks. Both situations are extreamely dangerous. I have a diary stating many were sent with less then full tanks of fuel. Also I have a friend, who flew the -109 from 1944- Jan.1945 who confirmed that fact. well at least for his unit. Named withheld for his privacy. 1944 or 2011.. its all about the oil.


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## wuzak (Aug 2, 2011)

Nikademus said:


> Lastly there were the planes themselves. B-17 was an "old fashioned" design and had a very limited bay which did not allow anything like the 4000lb "cookie" The B-24 with it's Davis wing was more advanced and had a roomier bomb bay but don't believe it could accomidate one of those monsters either. UK bombers sacrified defensive capability for such generous bomb space....even a Mosquito could carry a cookie under limited circumstances....whilst the US bombers emphasized the concept of the self defending bomber.



The Lancaster and Halifax owed their large open bomb bays to the original requirement of carrying two large torpedoes internally. The Stirling had a long bomb bay, but I believe it was divided into sections, preventing it from carrying the larger bombs that the Lancaster and Halifax could.

Early Lancasters had a lower gun turret, which was sighted by periscope. 

No doubt the ball turret ate into the bomb bay space of the B-17, but that didn't appear until the B-17E. I think it was a case of designing the bomb bay around what bombs were available and expected.


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## Ratsel (Aug 2, 2011)

there were designed as litterally ' flying fortresses', no need for escorts. just enough room for a decent bomb load but mostly for weapon placements. IF the USAAF really wanted to, I suspose they could have used the B-29. Wern't a few stationed in England?


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## TheMustangRider (Aug 2, 2011)

I believe the B-29s stationed in England were on their way to China to join the US 20th BC and were used only to deceive the Germans into thinking that the B-29 would be unleashed over Germany.


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## Milosh (Aug 2, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> there were designed as litterally ' flying fortresses', no need for escorts. just enough room for a decent bomb load but mostly for weapon placements. IF the USAAF really wanted to, I suspose they could have used the B-29. Wern't a few stationed in England?



How many guns did the early B-17s have?

The B-17's armament consisted of up to 4,800 pounds (2,200 kg) of bombs on two racks in the bomb bay behind the cockpit, and five 0.30 inches (7.62 mm) machine guns.


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## Ratsel (Aug 2, 2011)

whats your point? it ended up with 13 × .50 in (12.7 mm) M2 Browning machine guns in 4 turrets in dorsal, ventral, nose and tail, 2 in waist positions, 2 beside cockpit and 1 in the lower dorsal position. remember, we're talking 1944 here.


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## Ratsel (Aug 2, 2011)

TheMustangRider said:


> I believe the B-29s stationed in England were on their way to China to join the US 20th BC and were used only to deceive the Germans into thinking that the B-29 would be unleashed over Germany.


unleashed? well maybe. I think they didn't want B-29 parts raining over Germany.


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## Milosh (Aug 2, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> whats your point? it ended up with 13 × .50 in (12.7 mm) M2 Browning machine guns in 4 turrets in dorsal, ventral, nose and tail, 2 in waist positions, 2 beside cockpit and 1 in the lower dorsal position. remember, we're talking 1944 here.



Be sure, they were initially designed as flying fortresses with 5 .303" mgs.



> there were designed as litterally ' flying fortresses'


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## Ratsel (Aug 3, 2011)

maybe the USAAC determined that was more then enough at the time.


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## wuzak (Aug 3, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> whats your point? it ended up with 13 × .50 in (12.7 mm) M2 Browning machine guns in 4 turrets in dorsal, ventral, nose and tail, 2 in waist positions, 2 beside cockpit and 1 in the lower dorsal position. remember, we're talking 1944 here.


 
The point is the bomb bay wasn't designed around the improved defensive armament from the E model on. The bomb bay, and its limitations, is something that the B-17 was stuck with throughout its life.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 3, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> unleashed? well maybe. I think they didn't want B-29 parts raining over Germany.



What makes you think it would have been less succesful?


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## Mustang nut (Aug 3, 2011)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> What makes you think it would have been less succesful?



I am sure the British enquired about using the B29 during the war but stuck with what they had, they did of course use them post war.


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## Ratsel (Aug 3, 2011)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> What makes you think it would have been less succesful?


I'm not saying it would be less succesful in the bomber roll in Europe. the B-29 was capable of flight up to 40,000 feet (12,000 m), at speeds of up to 350 mph (true airspeed). This was its best defense, because* Japanese *fighters of that day could barely get that high, and few could catch the B-29, even if they were at altitude and waiting. The Germans however could get that high, and can catch the B-29 (Me 262, Me 163). A B-29 expensive piece of machinery to loose over Europe. Its odds of survivability were much better in the Pacific.


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## Milosh (Aug 3, 2011)

What was the distance traveled by the B-29, fully loaded, to get to 40,000'?


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## tyrodtom (Aug 3, 2011)

How many aircraft did the Me 163 shoot down ? I think it might have been about as efficient at killing Luftwaffe personel as Allied .


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## Nikademus (Aug 3, 2011)

wuzak said:


> The point is the bomb bay wasn't designed around the improved defensive armament from the E model on. The bomb bay, and its limitations, is something that the B-17 was stuck with throughout its life.



correct. The B-17 had a conventional low-wing configuration that was in some respects outdated by the 1940's. It was thick and heavy which of course made it very strong but the spar attaching the wings to the fuselage constricted the area available for the bomb bay, inhibiting the bomb load. So the defensive armament had nothing to do with the Fortresses's limitations on bomb loads.


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## Nikademus (Aug 3, 2011)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> What makes you think it would have been less succesful?



Teething issues....and something I'd never really considered before reading Barrett Tillman's book on the B-29 campaign against Japan.......cost.

According to Tillman, the B-29 ushered in the era of the uber-expensive plane....so expensive that you could not look at B-29 losses in the same way as even other 4E designs. Basically like we do today when the loss of even one multi-million or billion dollar plane downed during a campaign makes major news.

Per the author, a B-29 in 1944 cost $605,000 to build....3x that of a B-17. This made even non-combat losses hurt when it came to the Military's wallet. General Arnold wrote _"In my opinion, the B-29 cannot be treated in the same way we treat a fighter, medium bomber, or even a Flying Fortress. We must consider the B-29 more in terms of a naval vessel, and we do not lose naval vessels in threes and fours without a very thorough analysis of all the causes and what preventative measures may be taken to avoid losses in the future." _

Arnold's quote is telling. Even if one discounts the threat of the Luftwaffe at the late stage of the game, there was still a serious issue of teething and mechanical problems that caused both a high abort rate and operational losses. While overall loss rates for the 29's operating out of Saipan around the time LeMay showed up only equalled 4% at that moment, which was acceptible for 17's and 24's....it was not acceptible for the far more expensive B-29. And this against the Japanese air defenses which are usually scoffed at. 

B-29 was a formidable weapons platform, but one can argue the tried and true.....(and cheaper) 17's and 24's could do the same job, in the same amount of time with less fuss within the 1944-45 time frame as they were fully mature weapons systems.


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## Ratsel (Aug 3, 2011)

tyrodtom said:


> How many aircraft did the Me 163 shoot down ? I think it might have been about as efficient at killing Luftwaffe personel as Allied .


around 16 victories for 10 losses. Still, it along with the Me 262, had enough punch to disable/destroy a B-29. also, what Allied fighter escort would be effective at that altitude? now this is assuming that the B-29 took off north first to get to altitude then circled back south towards Germany to hit oil/fuel plants/depots.


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## TheMustangRider (Aug 3, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> unleashed? well maybe. I think they didn't want B-29 parts raining over Germany.



I must admit I was not mindful of the Superfort’s early teething problems with its Wright R-3350 radial engines (I read Tillman’s book a couple of months ago and I still should have it in my memory) when I wrote my challenging and somewhat fearless statement.

It is my belief that the tendency of these engines to catch fire while operating at the high altitudes the B-29s flew over Japan was a factor for LeMay to switch to the nocturnal low-level carpet bombing of early 1945 along with intelligence suggestions that the Japanese were spreading the manufacture of small engine components to civilian households throughout urban areas and the fact that the wooden infrastructure of Japanese cities was vulnerable to fire bombing.

When it comes to the European Theater, I believe that once these engine problems were resolved, the B-29 wouldn’t have much trouble operating effectively from England taking in consideration that the Allied air forces had already achieve air superiority over Germany and the remnants of the Luftwaffe were fading away towards the end of the war and its superior capacity of bombardment would have had a greater impact than the B-17 and B-24.

But just as it has been mentioned, a diversion of B-29s to European battlefields would have been too costly and would have weakened the Pacific effort; once the 8th AF and British BC were achieving favorable results with what they had, the use of Superforts in Europe would have been redundant.


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## drgondog (Aug 3, 2011)

Wuzak the length of the bomb bay and the cg of the bombs within were designed to be close to the cg of the airplane where it would be located without bombs. In the timeframe the B-17 started design ~ 1933 that was one hell of a bomber, with a great bomb load.


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## Glider (Aug 3, 2011)

The B29 would have been wasted in Europe. There were thousands of bombers Lancs, Halifax's, B17's and B24's you can argue which was the best but all were effective over europe. For the strategic planner the one thing the B29 had was a massive (by ww2 standards) range and payload far in excess of the others, and that was the prime advantage


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## Ratsel (Aug 3, 2011)

Milosh said:


> What was the distance traveled by the B-29, fully loaded, to get to 40,000'?



good question. 150 miles @ 900ft/min. not sure if thats loaded or not.


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## wuzak (Aug 3, 2011)

drgondog said:


> Wuzak the length of the bomb bay and the cg of the bombs within were designed to be close to the cg of the airplane where it would be located without bombs. In the timeframe the B-17 started design ~ 1933 that was one hell of a bomber, with a great bomb load.



Yes, it was impressive for that time.

I would say that if the need for larger bombs were foreseen, or a fortutious requirement to carry a large torpedo (as the case for the P13/36 bombers - Manchester and Halifax), the bomb bay may well have been bigger. But at that time large bombs were relatively rare.

Its RAF contemporaries were the Handley Page Hampden, Armstrong Whitworth Whitley and Vickers Wellington, each of which was a twin engined aircaft with similar bomb load capacity to the B-17. The B-17 was much more advanced aerodynamically and had a much higher top speed, and the use of 4 engines allowed it to operate better with one engine out. But, the Wellington could carry a 4000lb internally and the Hampden an 18in torpedo (the P13/36 bombers were required to carry two of these). Not sure on the Whitley, but I believe it had a number of small bomb bays which restriced the size of bombs it could carry.

It is more surprising, perhaps, that the B-24 bomb bay wasn't larger, given its later design time frame.

As an interesting aside, whil looking for bomb bay comparisons between a Lancaster and a B-17 I found B-17 vs Lancaster threads on other forums, where one of the opinions was that they were designed for different roles, and so not directly comparable. The idea was that the B-17 was designed for coastal defence and the Lanc for night time operations. I do believe the B-17 was designed as a strategic bomber, but the USAAC claimed it was for coastal defence in order to obtain the funds for its purchase. The Lancaster wasn't designed, as such, but adapted from the Manchester, which I do not believe was ever specifically designed for night operations.


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## Ratsel (Aug 3, 2011)

the -17 was indeed designed for coastal defence, to bomb ships as a matter-o-fact. but couldn't 'strategicaly' hit the ships worth a darn. so they found a different role for it.


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## wuzak (Aug 3, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> the -17 was indeed designed for coastal defence, to bomb ships as a matter-o-fact. but couldn't 'strategicaly' hit the ships worth a darn. so they found a different role for it.



I believe that is a myth, and the USAAC used the coastal defence argument to justify the purchase of the B-17 in isolationist/neutral USA in the mid 1930s.


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## Ratsel (Aug 4, 2011)

the isolationists had no problems with military build up for home defence. but I get what you saying.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 4, 2011)

Glider said:


> The B29 would have been wasted in Europe. There were thousands of bombers Lancs, Halifax's, B17's and B24's you can argue which was the best but all were effective over europe.



That I can agree with. There was no need for the 29 in Europe, but I doubt that it would have been less successful.


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## Nikademus (Aug 4, 2011)

wuzak said:


> I believe that is a myth, and the USAAC used the coastal defence argument to justify the purchase of the B-17 in isolationist/neutral USA in the mid 1930s.



Air Commanders in the US War Dept in the 1930's viewed bombers on the whole as "Defensive" weapons that would protect American airspace 'and' American coastal shores. However the "Bomber Mafia", a cliche within the Air Corps Tactical School, always envisioned the bomber as an offensive weapon. The B-17 and the Norden Bombsight gave substance to their vision of high speed, high altitude precision daylight bombing.

As others have said the 17 was a 1930's design and thus incorporated some limitations. It was not 'designed' for coastal defense....CD was simply a role the WD envisioned for its bombers in general. The 17 was designed to be fast and high flying with a big payload. With later marks it was envisioned as the optimal self defending bomber, which turned out to be the real myth. No such thing.


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## drgondog (Aug 4, 2011)

No, the B-17 was Designed as a long range daylight strategic bomber. It was Sold as a Coastal Defense bomber


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## Ratsel (Aug 4, 2011)

I was re-reading on the development of the B-17, and as usual, drgondog is 100% correct. and I was 100% wrong lol.


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## mhuxt (Aug 4, 2011)

Some scans from the HMSO "Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany".












The memoranda from Speer to Hitler to which Ratsel refers are reproduced in their entirety, along with supporting figures. I can scan them in, along with the chapter on the later-war oil campaign from the RAF point of view, if the board has interest.

Will also try to scan in some of the tables and appendices relating to oil, though most of those are actually from the USSBS.

Have a couple of other graphs which I've put together from Davis' "Bombing the European Axis Powers", will post next.

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## Ratsel (Aug 4, 2011)

awesome! as far as the other documents, please by all means.. post them. all this seems to be confirming my hypothosis. many thanks.


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## mhuxt (Aug 4, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> awesome! as far as the other documents, please by all means.. post them. all this seems to be confirming my hypothosis. many thanks.


 
Wilco, give me a wee while to get them scanned in while wife and daughter are out of the house. Will likely post links instead of images so as not to slow the board down too much.



Below is the weight of bombs on oil-related targets by air force by month from Davis:






BC seems to have been less "late to the party" than I thought, according to those figures.

I like Davis' spreadsheets as one is able to drill-down to individual raids, however another Mosquito tragic tells me Davis excludes a lot of the the Light Night Striking Force efforts. I've also not yet cross-checked against the tonnages given in the BBSU table, might make an interesting contrast.

Davis' data looks like this:






May try to post a filtered table of all the oil-raids he lists, however I have my doubts about whether it includes enough of the early BC stuff - by October 1940 at the latest, Harris' successor Pierce was being instructed that oil was to be his primary target system. One of the criticisms made of Harris is that although he was perfectly correct that BC had neither the bomb lift to do significant damage nor the navigational aids to find precision targets when he took command, he continued area attacks when those two conditions were no longer valid.

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## Ratsel (Aug 4, 2011)

those spreadsheets are really nice. detail wise I mean, great post!


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## mhuxt (Aug 4, 2011)

No worries, all credit to Davis really. His book is available (I think the pdf download is still free...) here:

Air University Press Book Store - Book Information

However, I believe the links to the spreadsheets no longer work:

http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/books/Davis_B99/Davis_B99.pdf
http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/Davis CD/Pages/i.htm
http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/Davis CD/Pages/IIb.htm


http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/Indexes/author_ndx_bks.htm

http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/Books/Davis_B99/Davis_B99.pdf 

http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/Books/Davis_B99/Davis_B99.pdf
http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/Davis CD/Pages/i.htm

However, I did download the sheets when they were available, anybody wants them email me 

markhuxAThotmailDOTcom, replace the AT and DOT with the @ and .

Also I have the pdf of the Davis book, if it's not available at the links above, same offer applies.

Have to re-scan the tables from the British Official History, resolution was too low. However, I believe all the tables they use in the appendices are actually in the document I posted waaaaay back in the first link I posted in this thread, the one I said I hadn't read. Be aware the latter consists of four files.

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p4013coll8/id/2085/rec/3

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## mhuxt (Aug 5, 2011)

Links to Speer memoranda and an oil-related snippet from his post-war interrogation:

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/speer0001.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/speera0001.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/speera0002.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/speera0003.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/speera0004.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/speera0005.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/speera0006.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/speera0007.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/speera0008.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/speera0009.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/speera0010.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/speera0011.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/speera0012.jpg


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## mhuxt (Aug 5, 2011)

Download to disk, zoom in. The policy-making whys and wherefores of the RAF's involvement in the oil and communications attacks of 1944 onwards, from the Official History.

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/text0001.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/text0002.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/text0003.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/text0004.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/text0005.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/text0006.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/text0007.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/text0008.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/text0009.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/text0010.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/text0011.jpg 

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/text0012.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/text0013.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/text0014.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/text0015.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/text0016.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/text0017.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/text0018.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/text0019.jpg

http://i937.photobucket.com/albums/ad212/mhuxt/text0020.jpg


The text begins with an indictment of Harris' under-estimation of his own force's capacity for accurate bombing during the pre-invasion campaign to shut down the French railways.


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## mhuxt (Aug 5, 2011)

Quick cross-check of bomb tonnage by air force by month on oil targets.







Very good match with Davis' numbers, except for BC in August 44 - not sure how 7,800 tons go missing.

May try to use Davis to do an assessment of "% of total effort against oil targets" by air force.


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## mhuxt (Aug 5, 2011)

I guess this is the real criticism of Bomber Command vs Oil. 

Using Davis numbers and judgement of target type, BC never seems to have taken oil quite as seriously as the 8th and 15th until after the job was done.


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## Ratsel (Aug 5, 2011)

just finished taking all this in, outstanding! thanks! everything seems to coincide with Operation Overlord. It would also seem that BC got more into SBC of German oil industry after the Luftwaffe was effectively neutralized. that is to say, the LW did not have the means to send its forces, due to lack of aviation fuel. I say this becouse for example in June/1944 and January/1945 the LW had more fighters then any time in 1939/40/41/42/43. I think that the USAAF and her allies knew that aircombat alone would not get them air superiority over Europe, and their losses would be to much to justify. Hence the Oil Bombing campains. losses were still severe, but not as bad as it could have been. B-17's and its crews were expendable acceptable. I believe that the RAF BC did not think the same way. Hope this makes sense. thanks again for the posts.


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## Ratsel (Aug 5, 2011)

to further illustrate my point:

*For January-April 1945 the following total—supplies can, according to the, present position, be reckoned with, that is including the Hungarian
production ::
—•Estimated 
January Tons

Aviation spirit ... 13,000 
Carburettor fuel 68,000
Diesel fuel (with J.2) 73,000
Total ... 154,000 

if Theoretically inadequate possible.
—• AirDefence.
January Tons. 
Aviation spirit ... 12,000 
Carburettor fuel 60 000 
Diesel fuel (with J.2) 65,000
Total ... 137,000*

so in a nutshell: planes the LW had, Pilots the LW had. chemicals for the planes they did not have. I also think that the glory of the P-51 should be put into perspective too, as the above data would seem to say. limited fuel.. do you attack the heavies, or the fighters? Goering said heavies(in this case all day/night fighters attack allied heavies), Galland said fighters ( in this case only the Bf109 attacking allied fighters). This applies to mid 1944 doctrine. so what won the air war? certainly not he P-38/P-47/P-51. It was the allied Heavies.


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## drgondog (Aug 5, 2011)

Ratsel - the entire USAAF was 'expendable', based on Allied spectrum of losses by perhaps Churchill and Stalin, if Germany was defeated, but nobody in operational coommand took the notion that 8th BC was expendable. The losses to achieve air superiority over the LW was considered acceptable in 1944. In fall of 1943 the losses had creeped above the 'acceptable line' and didn't come down for good into 'easily acceptable' until May 1944 during the start of the Oil/Chemical campaign


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## Ratsel (Aug 5, 2011)

drgondog,

Did I get this wrong? who then from the 8th AF ordered B-17's into meaningless raids into Germany, the ordered escorting fighters upon seeing LW fighters, to engage and completely ignore the -17's? the Bait Trap scenario. I believe the -17s suffered serverely for this.


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## Milosh (Aug 5, 2011)

A much better target would have been the electrical power producing plants.

THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

Electric Power

The German power system, except for isolated raids, was never a target during the air war. An attack was extensively debated during the course of the war. It was not undertaken partly because it was believed that the German power grid was highly developed and that losses in one area could be compensated by switching power from another. This assumption, detailed investigation by the Survey has established, was incorrect.

The German electric power situation was in fact in a precarious condition from the beginning of the war and became more precarious as the war progressed; this fact is confirmed by statements of a large number of German officials, by confidential memoranda of the National Load Dispatcher, and secret minutes of the Central Planning Committee. Fears that their extreme vulnerability would be discovered were fully discussed in these minutes.

The destruction of five large generating stations in Germany would have caused a capacity loss of 1.8 million kw. or 8 percent of the total capacity, both public and private. The destruction of 45 plants of 100,000 kw. or larger would have caused a loss of about 8,000,000 kw. or almost 40 percent, and the destruction of a total of 95 plants of 50,000 kw. or larger would have eliminated over one-half of the entire generating capacity of the country. The shortage was sufficiently critical so that any considerable loss of output would have directly affected essential war production, and the destruction of any substantial amount would have had serious results.

Generating and distributing facilities were relatively vulnerable and their recuperation was difficult and time consuming. Had electric generating plants and substations been made primary targets as soon as they could have been brought within range of Allied attacks, the evidence indicates that their destruction would have had serious effects on Germany's war production. 

United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (European War)


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## drgondog (Aug 5, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> drgondog,
> 
> Did I get this wrong? who then from the 8th AF ordered B-17's into meaningless raids into Germany, the ordered escorting fighters upon seeing LW fighters, to engage and completely ignore the -17's? the Bait Trap scenario. I believe the -17s suffered serverely for this.



If you are referring to Big Week - forward - name one 'meaningless' target between Feb 20 and June 6? You will not find any - and Fighter Group CO's that ignored the role of escort had opportunities to explain their motives first to Kepner who would be asked the same question if a bomb wing was hammered - before getting a chance to explain to Doolttle. Those were not pleasant conversations and Doolittle didn't 'wink' when he was chewing out a Group CO!

You are making a mistake in extrapolating Eisenhower/Spaatz/Doolittle acknowledgement that the LW would not be destroyed by close escort - into believeing the 8th AF high command could care less about bomber crews.

That is why the 'piecemeal tactics' of dribbling flights, sections, then squadrons to face an enemy attack, were developed.


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## drgondog (Aug 5, 2011)

Ratsel - go get a serious documentary like Eighth Air Force War Diary and LOOK at the targets that were bombed in 1944. If you think Oberphaffenhofen where the LW was buliding Do 335s, or Augsburg (109s) or Brunswick (190s), or Berlin, or Schwienfurt, or Posnan or Leipzig or Halberstadt or Kassel or Brux or Stettin or Misburg or Hannover or Halle or Regensburg or Munich were 'meaningless' maybe you need to research the word's definition or explain why all those targets were foolishly selected as 'easy' or 'meaningless. 

You suppose the LW would defend cornfields and picnic grounds? The targets were incredibly strategic, the Germans wished them to remain undamaged and responded in great force to stop the raids.

Where are you getting your 'facts'?


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## Ratsel (Aug 5, 2011)

yep. not gonna argue. your right and I'm wrong. congratulations.


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## mhuxt (Aug 5, 2011)

I mentioned in an earlier post that some of the documents from the Technical Oil Mission had damage reports from the various refineries. The relevant pdfs are located here:

T.O.M. Microfilm Reels 214 AND 215

Nota bene though, the individual pages ARE mixed up, as noted in the blurb, and are in German, so I assmume Ratsel may have the inside track on deciphering how many bombs, of which type, fell inside and outside the plants, what damage was done, and the estimated repair times.

Will also post up the supporting tables from the USSBS/Official History. May also get a chance to scan in a couple more chapters of the latter, which continue to discuss the tensions within the Allied leadership around the relative priorities of oil targets. 

Will also take a crack at the Davis list of oil raids, but I think it will be too large for the board software. 

Offer still stands on the Davis spreadsheets, which list pretty much all major raids by the allies, early BC stuff and Light Night Striking Force stuff less so.


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## Ratsel (Aug 5, 2011)

for sure.. beim at live dot ca

I'll also translate some German docs. on USAAF bombers being sent to allready destroyed areas. should be a good read


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## wuzak (Aug 5, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> drgondog,
> 
> Did I get this wrong? who then from the 8th AF ordered B-17's into meaningless raids into Germany, the ordered escorting fighters upon seeing LW fighters, to engage and completely ignore the -17's? the Bait Trap scenario. I believe the -17s suffered serverely for this.


 


drgondog said:


> If you are referring to Big Week - forward - name one 'meaningless' target between Feb 20 and June 6? You will not find any - and Fighter Group CO's that ignored the role of escort had opportunities to explain their motives first to Kepner who would be asked the same question if a bomb wing was hammered - before getting a chance to explain to Doolttle. Those were not pleasant conversations and Doolittle didn't 'wink' when he was chewing out a Group CO!
> 
> You are making a mistake in extrapolating Eisenhower/Spaatz/Doolittle acknowledgement that the LW would not be destroyed by close escort - into believeing the 8th AF high command could care less about bomber crews.
> 
> That is why the 'piecemeal tactics' of dribbling flights, sections, then squadrons to face an enemy attack, were developed.



When Doolittle took over the 8th AF from Eaker in early 1944 he changed the role of the escort fighters - instead of close escort they were instructed to engage and destroy the Luftwaffe. To that end the routes taken by the bombers to target no longer contained diversionary tactics and they flew more directly to the target. The bombers became the bait, but they still had important missions to accomplish.

If the Luftwaffe didn't come to fight then the escorts were encouraged to go find them and destroy them on the ground, or otherwise destroy targets of opportunity.

The initial results of the new tactics didn't change the number of losses of the 8th AF much, but it did have a greater effect on the losses of the Luftwaffe.


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## Ratsel (Aug 5, 2011)

meaningless was perhaps the wrong word for me to use.. my name isn't google so I don't pretend to know everything.


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## wuzak (Aug 5, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> B-17's and its crews were expendable acceptable. I believe that the RAF BC did not think the same way. Hope this makes sense. thanks again for the posts.



I think the strategic importance of the target also came into the acceptable losses calculations. I think Miller mentions that for some targets late in 1943, which were not attacked mainly due to the weather, Eaker was willing to lose as much as 50% of his attacking force. This could not possibly be acceptable for the majority of raids.




Ratsel said:


> just finished taking all this in, outstanding! thanks! everything seems to coincide with Operation Overlord. It would also seem that BC got more into SBC of German oil industry after the Luftwaffe was effectively neutralized. that is to say, the LW did not have the means to send its forces, due to lack of aviation fuel.



The initial attacks on oil by the 8th AF were in the months leading up to the invasion, and were essentially secondary targets at that stage. The 8th AF and RAF BC had come under the command of Eisenhower, and the direction was to hit targets which would maximise the chances of success of the invasion. To that end Spaatz put forward the oil industry, but the plan adopted was the Portal's (or was it Tedder's?) Transportation Plan. The 8th AF and the RAF were free to hit other targets when the transportation targets were not available - eg in case of weather over transportation targets.

As BC operated primarily at night the effect the 8th AF had on the Luftwaffe day fighter strength had less influence on them. The night fighters still gave strong resistance into 1945.

BC had a couple of tricks to tackle the Luftwaffe. First was the Light Night Striking Force, whose main mission was to draw opposition away from the main attack - which they did with some success. Second was the decision to allow night fighters to operate over Europe, from late 1943 IIRC. At first these were the older NFs with the older radar systems, but from mid 1944, if not earlier, the latest NFs were used. While the RAF NFs did not have the numerical superiority of the 8th fighters late in 1944 it could be argued that they held a greater technological advantage.

BC could have hit the oil industry harder and sooner, but chose to concentrate on other targets. Also, during the lead up to the invasion they had less excuse to divert to alternate targets due to their methods. If the target was clear they would mark with TI bombs. But if the target was obscured by cloud or smoke screen BC could and did use sky markers to designate the target.


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## wuzak (Aug 5, 2011)

Number of oerations against oil targets:


```
Month          8th AF 15th AF  RAF BC
May 1944           11      10       0 
June 1944          20      32      10 
July 1944           9      36      20 
August 1944        33      23      20 
September 1944     23       8      14 
October 1944       18      10      10 
November 1944      32      19      22 
December 1944       7      33      15 
January 1945       17       5      23 
February 1945      20      20      24 
March 1945         36      24      33 
April 1945          7       1       9
```


Short tons dropped on oil targets:


```
Month          8th AF 15th AF  RAF BC 
May 1944        2,883   1,540       0 
June 1944       3,689   5,653   4,562 
July 1944       5,379   9,313   3,829 
August 1944     7,116   3,997   1,856 
September 1944  7,495   1,829   4,488 
October 1944    4,462   2,515   4,088 
November 1944  15,884   4,168  16,029 
December 1944   2,937   6,226   5,772 
January 1945    3,537   2,023  10,114 
February 1945   1,616   4,362  15,749 
March 1945      9,550   6,628  21,211 
April 1945      1,949     124   5,993
```

From Oil Campaign of World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Also, some interesting info http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_Campaign_chronology_of_World_War_II


Many of the RAF raids used relatively few aircraft.


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## wuzak (Aug 5, 2011)

Wouldn't mind seeing the operations table expressed in number of sorties - that would be a more telling statistic, I think.


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## Ratsel (Aug 5, 2011)

_'with Leuna a total of 6,552 bomber sorties were flown against the plant, 18,328 tons of bombs were dropped and an entire year was required._'


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## syscom3 (Aug 5, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> _'with Leuna a total of 6,552 bomber sorties were flown against the plant, 18,328 tons of bombs were dropped and an entire year was required._'



And?

Leuna was never completely destroyed. But the cumulative effects on it meant it never operated at full capacity. That in itself was just as effective. The German economy needed millions of tons of fuel and could only produce a fraction.


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## Ratsel (Aug 5, 2011)

and nothing. the other guy wanted to know the number of sorties.. so I provide a number for one plant. thats all I could find.
6500 sorties 18,000 tons of bombs you'd figure 'Leuna' would be on the 'moon'.


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## mhuxt (Aug 6, 2011)

wuzak said:


> Wouldn't mind seeing the operations table expressed in number of sorties - that would be a more telling statistic, I think.


 
Sorties against oil targets according to Davis. These exclude early returns I believe:







See my comments above re: August '44 and percentage effort, though according to HMSO BC was more heavily occupied in supporting the Armies in Normandy than 8 AF.


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## mhuxt (Aug 6, 2011)

Davis' numbers for sorties (left) and bomb tonnage (right) for Synthetic Oil only.

Note that if you juggle the naming convention a wee bit (Merseburg / Leuna and Merseburg / IG Farben), the numbers tie up to Ratsel's 6,500 sorties and 18,000 tons of bombs.


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## drgondog (Aug 6, 2011)

wuzak said:


> When Doolittle took over the 8th AF from Eaker in early 1944 he changed the role of the escort fighters - instead of close escort they were instructed to engage and destroy the Luftwaffe. To that end the routes taken by the bombers to target no longer contained diversionary tactics and they flew more directly to the target. The bombers became the bait, but they still had important missions to accomplish.
> 
> *And the fighters were still assigned to 'close' escort. What changed was that fighters, when they spotted LW, engaged and pursued - rather than drive them off and return. The Fighter Groups however were not homogeneous in leadership. The 4th and 357th and 352nd were perhaps the 'most aggressive' with the 356th at the other end of the spectrum and the rest of the Groups falling in between. The 'Tweeners' like the 355th were parsimonious about sending forces to engage and pursue but favored leaving most of the escort force in proximity, or filling in behind the 4th for example, in a fight which drew most of their fighters away.*
> 
> ...



The losses were significant in the January-May timeframe but a far lower % of the force. The difference was that the LW still had opportunities to find un-escorted bombers and attack in force. This was the period when the long range escort force was starting from a low number of Mustang/Lightning groups to eight combined - or enough to put two groups to cover 300+ bombers each.


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## wuzak (Aug 6, 2011)

drgondog said:


> The losses were significant in the January-May timeframe but a far lower % of the force. The difference was that the LW still had opportunities to find un-escorted bombers and attack in force. This was the period when the long range escort force was starting from a low number of Mustang/Lightning groups to eight combined - or enough to put two groups to cover 300+ bombers each.



Part of the effect on loss rates was the increased size of the raids in 1944.


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