# Overall, who had the better bombing campaign of the Third Reich, USAAF or RAF?



## Soundbreaker Welch? (Aug 28, 2007)

Well, I was wondering this question and thought I would ask. 

Both Air Forces developed their own techniques.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 28, 2007)

Both the RAF and the USAAF did a great job however I have to go with the USAAF.

Several reasons:

1. Strategic Bombing is what is going to win a war not area bombing at night.

2. The USAAF had the ability to better do daytime strategic bombing.

Having said that the RAF did a great job as well and it was the combined effort of the RAF And the USAAF that helped win the war.


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## Soundbreaker Welch? (Aug 28, 2007)

Rightly said.

I do now that in the early stages, the Eighth Air Force made little bombing gains for the loss of many men. For one, they often didn't destroy the targets well enough. Ploesti Raids, they thought they did great damage, but then they found out they didn't. Or at least, not enough to really shut it down. But it was brave of them fo' sure.


Adler, six years is a long time to be a Crewchief. whew. I can remember what I was doing back in 2000 and after, and it can seem like a long time, but it certainly wasn't as engaging as that.

In 2000, did you have any inkling you would be fighting a war in 3 years?


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## plan_D (Aug 28, 2007)

The USAAF used more aircraft for equal or less damage generally; so they weren't as effective per plane than the RAF. But overall the USAAF would have done more damage, it dropped more tonnage. 

In any case, they were partners not competitors. And the USAAF offensive would have been useless without the RAF keeping it up at night - and the true is same vice versa.


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## Konigstiger205 (Aug 28, 2007)

USAAF...even an idiot would realize that...lots of planes...excellent bombers...


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 28, 2007)

Soundbreaker Welch? said:


> In 2000, did you have any inkling you would be fighting a war in 3 years?



Absolutely not but you train for it and are ready to do your job.


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## Wildcat (Aug 28, 2007)

plan_D said:


> In any case, they were partners not competitors. And the USAAF offensive would have been useless without the RAF keeping it up at night - and the true is same vice versa.



Couldn't agree more, without one it would've been alot tougher for the other.


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## drgondog (Aug 28, 2007)

plan_D said:


> The USAAF used more aircraft for equal or less damage generally; so they weren't as effective per plane than the RAF. But overall the USAAF would have done more damage, it dropped more tonnage.
> 
> In any case, they were partners not competitors. And the USAAF offensive would have been useless without the RAF keeping it up at night - and the true is same vice versa.



I've often wondered how much MORE damage to critical industries would have occurred if the RAF shifted most of their ops to daylight from D-Day forward.

Harris seemed suprised that his forces did well post D-Day striking rail and other transportation and logistics centers in France during daylight ops but only dedicated a small percentage of the force. The RAF had an excellent bombsight and their radar bombing was better than USAAF.

By that time German industry had shifted priority to day fighters - there were close to enough fighters to cover RAF in addition to USAAF for medium penetrations to Kassel area, etc and perhaps killed LW faster by doubling the strikes? 

RAF probably would have had less attrition in daylight from that point forward also.

All speculation but interesting to contemplate


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## timshatz (Aug 28, 2007)

In terms of sheer mayhem, I'd give it to the RAF. They all but erased German Cities from the map. So much so that after the war, the inhabitants that were left had to figure out how to rebuild the city from scratch. 

In terms of obtaining their objectives, the RAF again but by not as much of a lead. They went after cities and they destroyed cities. They knew what they wanted back in 1941 and by 1945, they were very good at what they did.

The USAAF really didn't know what it was doing until the later part of the war. While the RAF had the strategy worked out by 1941 (and continued to improve the tactics througout the war), the USAAF didn't get around to targeting the oil and communications whole heartedly until 1944. Also, they never really went after the powergrid, which would've stopped Germany in it's tracks. 

Not dissing the USAAF, just the RAF knew what it wanted to do, how it was going to do it and it knew it earlier. Made them more effective in the long run.


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## mosquitoman (Aug 28, 2007)

Ideally, precision bombing would have been the most effective method but the precision wasn't there (forget about 617 Squadron- they were the best of the best). Razing cities to the ground meant that something big got damaged although "morale" as a target was completely useless.


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## syscom3 (Aug 28, 2007)

The USSBS stated the long duration night raids did more damage than the short duration daylight attacks.

More time bombing a target meant more time for fires to burn out of control.


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## Erich (Aug 28, 2007)

the combination was needed both night and day to bomb the Reich 24 - 7
end of story, neither was worse or better, it taxed the German populace the LW in all branches, and the Nazi fool hierarchy to it's limits and absolutely was crucial to the demise of the evil regime for all fronts that it was engaged.


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## Aussie1001 (Aug 29, 2007)

Hey everyone..... ive been gone for a while..... anyone notice    
one hell of a storm hit us nearly lost our roof... lost power for 61 hours and had to pull about 50 branches from trees off the road and one huge bluegum off our driveway....
anyway agree with enrich seems to be the most sensible..... not meant to offend.....
Just a little footnote... Have heard from several sources that the mozzie could carry the same bombload as a B17.... 4000 Lbs


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## plan_D (Aug 29, 2007)

The Mosquito could carry the same payload as the B-17 *if* the B-17 had a long mission and the Mosquito had a short one. If I remember correctly the B-17 could carry 17,600 lbs on a _very_ short mission.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 29, 2007)

Aussie1001 said:


> Just a little footnote... Have heard from several sources that the mozzie could carry the same bombload as a B17.... 4000 Lbs



The B-17 could carry way more than 4000lb of bombs. I believe the usual was about 6000lb.

As pD put the Mossie could carry the same as a B-17 over short missions.


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## drgondog (Aug 29, 2007)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> The B-17 could carry way more than 4000lb of bombs. I believe the usual was about 6000lb.
> 
> As pD put the Mossie could carry the same as a B-17 over short missions.



Literally, the B-17 could carry the 17K+ load cross channel and that's about it.

It carried 4,000 to targets east of Berlin, 5,000 on typical mid to east Germany and 6,000 on a typical Koblenz (or shorter) raid as a max for normal mission.

The F-105 carried far more on typical missions in Viet Nam but sucked from tankers on the way in and out

At the end of the day Strategic Bombing had one huge success that affected the outcome - Petroleum and Chemical (including nitrogen for fertilizer) and the USAAF contributed more in that role - and paid a heavy price.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 29, 2007)

The RAF had the "luxury" of the night, but at the same time that luxury could sometimes be a demon. Returning to bases at dawn in the soup using ancient navaids and instrument approach procedures - that was harrowing in it self...

But when successful, incinerated large areas of German real estate...

The USAAF had the luxury of the daytime, most of the time in good weather, but then again so did the Luftwaffe's fighters. Here you are in a B-17 or B-24 sitting above Germany at 130 knots while flak gunners bead in on you or marauding fighters await to blast you out of the sky...This had always reminded me of 2 19th century armies with muskets lined up in a row across a grass field just blasting away at each other...

But when successful, whole industries ceased to exist...

Over all I think the USAAF had the edge but having flown in the soup at night I take nothing away from the RAF and her aircrews - the fear factor is with them!


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## Aussie1001 (Aug 29, 2007)

like the smilie Flyboy J
Yes i do agree with you both were effective at what they did when they got through as is anything.. By the way i do like you comparing thoes flak guns to the muskets it does make a lot of sense... Poor ba#tards.
However if a B17 could only reasonably expected to carry 6000 lbs compared to a Lancasters load of up to a 22000 lbs Grand Slam well it does put things into perspective doesn't it....


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## Graeme (Aug 29, 2007)

Aussie1001 said:


> However if a B17 could only reasonably expected to carry 6000 lbs compared to a Lancasters load of up to a 22000 lbs Grand Slam well it does put things into perspective doesn't it....



Aussie,
The ability of the Lancaster to carry to the 'Grand Slam' had a lot to do with its capacious and long bomb-bay. The Stirling had the longest bomb-bay with the Lancaster in second place, but the heaviest bomb which the Stirling could accommodate was the 4,000 pounder because its bomb-bay was divided onto sections.

(Good to see you survived Queensland's storms!)


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## Kurfürst (Aug 30, 2007)

drgondog said:


> I've often wondered how much MORE damage to critical industries would have occurred if the RAF shifted most of their ops to daylight from D-Day forward.



I was wondering about that myself. With the RAF adding bomber sorties next to USAAF sorties, and the LW still having the same amount of fighter force as before, then the LW would have either to completely ignore the added bulk of bombers penetrating the airspace, or spread it's forces even more thinly. 

Naturally, this would only makes sense past 1944, with the arrival of the Mustang other long-range capable escort fighters on the scene. Given what happened to heavily armed B-17s and B-24s when unescorted, things would have look bleak for the lightly armed British noctural bomb trucks - otherwise the rather numerous Nachtjagd would simple become an extremely nasty form of heavily armed daylight bomber destroyer forces... And of course, the whole thing of overloading the defenses with masses of bombers requires sufficient mass of USAAF heavies operating.

Interesting none the less, and a valid alternative to what I'd describe with Talleyrand's classic : _'was more than a crime, it was an error._


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## Kurfürst (Aug 30, 2007)

Aussie1001 said:


> like the smilie Flyboy J
> However if a B17 could only reasonably expected to carry 6000 lbs compared to a Lancasters load of up to a 22000 lbs Grand Slam well it does put things into perspective doesn't it....



Lancasters that carried the Grand Slam were specially modified with a lot of stuff removed from the plane. So I don't quite get why compare that to standard-issue B-17s, which were carrying a lot more weight in the form of defensive armament OTOH..

Not to mention the Grand Slam would be of little operational use for conventional task bombers are normally engaged in, and that it was used only at the very end o the war..

It's and odd and unfair comparison.


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## trackend (Aug 30, 2007)

I think there is some confusion over maximum pay load and operational payload.
All bombers carried different load weights depending on range of mission. 
What can be got into the air and what can be got to target are two different things.
An operational average which on a quick calculation seems to come out at roughly 12000-14000 lbs for the Lancaster and 4000-6000 lbs for the B17 
(although I won't be suprised if these figures are disputed)

All bombers from Ju 88s to Lancasters B17's where relitively sitting ducks for the hugely faster and more nimble fighters the horendous loss rates for bombers in general shows this.


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## drgondog (Aug 30, 2007)

Kurfürst said:


> I was wondering about that myself. With the RAF adding bomber sorties next to USAAF sorties, and the LW still having the same amount of fighter force as before, then the LW would have either to completely ignore the added bulk of bombers penetrating the airspace, or spread it's forces even more thinly.
> 
> Naturally, this would only makes sense past 1944, with the arrival of the Mustang other long-range capable escort fighters on the scene. Given what happened to heavily armed B-17s and B-24s when unescorted, things would have look bleak for the lightly armed British noctural bomb trucks - otherwise the rather numerous Nachtjagd would simple become an extremely nasty form of heavily armed daylight bomber destroyer forces... And of course, the whole thing of overloading the defenses with masses of bombers requires sufficient mass of USAAF heavies operating.
> 
> Interesting none the less, and a valid alternative to what I'd describe with Talleyrand's classic : _'was more than a crime, it was an error._



My thoughts on this are two-fold and empahasis on PAST D-Day.

In one stroke this strategy completely neutralize the effectiveness of NJG forces in Germany - at least all the reciprocal engine versions. They proved they could not survive in daylight ops in presence of long range escort. Hence they sit on the ground or fly and lose valuable crews.

It shifts RAF Fighter Command Ops to focus on 'longer range' escorts to relieve the now long range P-47s of the Penetration and Withdrawal Support except further than P-47s before more fuel in late model P-47D's - if not all the way to most targets in Central germany. 

Result, even more overwhelming numbers around Kassel, Magdeburg, leipzig and Halle with RAF bombers capable of bigger bombloads, accurate daylight bombing and quicker destruction of both the Oil and Chemical targets plus more attrition, faster, of Luftwaffe.

Once bases in France and Belgium are secured, Spits and Tempests could go all the way plus RAF Mustangs from beginning of daylight ops.

PS - it would have been interesting to see how fast the RAF could change formation Flying tactics to 'tighten up' for both bomb density around MPI of target as well as make it feasible for escort fighters to protect them. LW simply too good for RAF fly night ops 'strings' into target w/o getting brutalized somewhere along the trail.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 30, 2007)

Aussie1001 said:


> like the smilie Flyboy J
> Yes i do agree with you both were effective at what they did when they got through as is anything.. By the way i do like you comparing thoes flak guns to the muskets it does make a lot of sense... Poor ba#tards.
> However if a B17 could only reasonably expected to carry 6000 lbs compared to a Lancasters load of up to a 22000 lbs Grand Slam well it does put things into perspective doesn't it....



Lancaster had to modified to carry a Grand Slam. That was not a typical payload.

Not taking anything away from the Lancaster though, it was in my opinion better than the B-17.

If you wish to put something in perspective however, what about the B-29 that could carry 2 Tall Boys or a 42,000lb T-12 bomb.


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## Graeme (Aug 30, 2007)

That's a *big* bomb Adler! Ever used?

This is a test drop of a sand filled Grand Slam in March 1945.
http://img213.imageshack.us/img213/4854/lastscanxm8.jpg


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 30, 2007)

I honestly dont know if it was used or not. If it was dropped, it was done so only in tests.


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## syscom3 (Aug 30, 2007)

From wikipedia......

"The 'B1 (Special)' Lancaster bomber could only carry one at a time and it had to be dropped from 22,000 feet (6700 m) which limited its accuracy. The Grand Slam was first used on March 14, 1945 when the Royal Air Force No. 617 "Dambusters" Squadron, lead by Squadron Leader C.C. Calder, attacked the Bielefeld railway viaduct destroying two spans of the viaduct.[1]

The viaduct at Arnsberg was bombed on 15 March 1945 with 2 Grand Slams and 14 Tallboy bombs but they failed to bring the viaduct down. Four days later on 19 March 1945 another attack by No 617 Squadron using 6 Grand Slams was successful and a 12 m (40 ft) gap was blown in the viaduct.[1]

Farge is a small port on the Weser River north of Bremen, and was the site of an oil-storage depot and the Valentin submarine pens that were attacked by the RAF on 27 March 1945. The pens had a ferrous concrete roof up to 7 metres (23 feet) thick. Two Grand Slam bombs penetrated parts of the pen with a 4.5 m-thick roof[2][3]"


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 30, 2007)

We are not talking about the Grand Slam sys. We were talking about the US built T12.


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## Aussie1001 (Aug 31, 2007)

Ok adler..... what about this......
Apprantly this is the most powerfull conventional bomb in the world at 30 000 lbs and filled with 18 000lbs of H6....  

Anyway the green bomb is the largest Nuke ever made and the Orange one is the conventional one.....


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## lucanus (Aug 31, 2007)

Ok here goes....My memory bank seems to remember a
bomb used in Nam and Desert Storm that weighed 15,000 lbs
and was dropped out of a C130 Herc...The bomb was
a BLU-82


BBC NEWS | Americas | Fact files: Daisy Cutter bombs

Or key in daisy cutter in google images for some more snaps of
this thumper

From 303rd BG nice page on all US bombs

Aerial Bombs



> _A "Daisy Cutter" is a huge bomb that can cause massive destruction.
> The blast is so horrific that one of the main reasons merely for threatening its use against an enemy is psychological.
> 
> In the Gulf War, US aircraft dropped leaflets on Iraqi troops depicting a huge bomb, with the slogan "Flee and Live, or Stay and Die!"
> ...


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## plan_D (Aug 31, 2007)

I have to point out here that RAF 2 Group were bombing during day and night through the war. They were using tight formation for mutual support since their first raid on 4th September, 1939. If the rest of Bomber Command needed training for tight formation flying - they had a whole RAF Group on hand to show them how.


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## drgondog (Aug 31, 2007)

plan_D said:


> I have to point out here that RAF 2 Group were bombing during day and night through the war. They were using tight formation for mutual support since their first raid on 4th September, 1939. If the rest of Bomber Command needed training for tight formation flying - they had a whole RAF Group on hand to show them how.



The RAF had exceptional pilots - it wasn't flying skill per se but different acquired skills i.e. Formation leaders keeping a very steady hand on throttles to prevent an accordion effect throughout the bomb group, 'forming up' skills and procedures to speed up process of getting into tight formations (or looser in bad weather) with minimum time and fuel consumption, etc.

The 8th AF thought they had the doctrine down pat before reaching Europe and found out that experienced formation flying pilots had a lot to learn. I have a few formation flying hours in a 51 plus an A-36 Bonanza - I can only imagine what it would be like to fly # 2 or 3 in a heavily loaded B-24 (or Lancaster) at the upper limits of ceiling to avoid flak as much as possible with a wing sticking into the airspace of my leader... for 7-12 hours.

I imagine 2 Group had it down pat - one down, 40+ to go to convert RAF to daylight.

I think the reverse would have been more difficult - namely converting USAAF to night bombing had daylight bombing failed.


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## drgondog (Aug 31, 2007)

Aussie1001 said:


> Ok adler..... what about this......
> Apprantly this is the most powerfull conventional bomb in the world at 30 000 lbs and filled with 18 000lbs of H6....
> 
> Anyway the green bomb is the largest Nuke ever made and the Orange one is the conventional one.....



Aussie - the big 'orange thingy' may be the the beast designed to take out very deep re-inforced bunkers - I'll have to do some checking - in places like Iran

The green thingy may be the 20 megaton Mk26 - one of which is missing deep in river mud in Charleston area (from a B-52) and another off the coast of Cuba from a B-47 Mid air during Cuban Missile crisis


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## mkloby (Aug 31, 2007)

drgondog said:


> The RAF had exceptional pilots - it wasn't flying skill per se but different acquired skills i.e. Formation leaders keeping a very steady hand on throttles to prevent an accordion effect throughout the bomb group, 'forming up' skills and procedures to speed up process of getting into tight formations (or looser in bad weather) with minimum time and fuel consumption, etc.



That's the way to do it. Lead sets a power setting and for the most part leaves it alone. (unless you need to adjust your TOT). We get hammered for jockeying power unnecessarily as lead because you're only screwing your wingmen. In a tight formation, for example parade, you are constantly making power adjustments as wing. Loose forms, such as combat cruise, are much more fluent and require less workload as wing. Flying in a tight form as a wing is draining after a while.

I don't honestly know much about the particular forms they used and practiced back then - but I imagine that there are similar to the forms we fly today.

I have done forms in single engine, multi, and in about a week or so I will be doing helo forms - which should be interesting. Can't wait to do forms in the MV-22!


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## drgondog (Aug 31, 2007)

mkloby said:


> That's the way to do it. Lead sets a power setting and for the most part leaves it alone. (unless you need to adjust your TOT). We get hammered for jockeying power unnecessarily as lead because you're only screwing your wingmen. In a tight formation, for example parade, you are constantly making power adjustments as wing. Loose forms, such as combat cruise, are much more fluent and require less workload as wing. Flying in a tight form as a wing is draining after a while.
> 
> I don't honestly know much about the particular forms they used and practiced back then - but I imagine that there are similar to the forms we fly today.
> 
> I have done forms in single engine, multi, and in about a week or so I will be doing helo forms - which should be interesting. Can't wait to do forms in the MV-22!



mkloby

I don't know if I mentioned this before but my last job at Bell in design before full time structures was the XV-15 wing - complicated mother..to account for deflections in flaps - and stresses in jump take-off..


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## Erich (Aug 31, 2007)

a small thought from a small brain today, still cannot understand even with RAF day light bombing in 1945 why the Lancs were not equipped with a belly rotating turret knowing full well the LW was going to find this out and take full advantage as they did on at least 2 ops with JG 7 me 262's which came from underneath with deadly accuracy.

Granted it was going to be in the US hands with heavy bombing due to the presence of waking hours to deplete German moral, while at night the German populace was asleep except for the rattle of Flak in the larger of the cities


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## mosquitoman (Aug 31, 2007)

The turret restricted the max bombload was the reason gven if I remember correctly. Although some Halifaxes had a single .303 in a blister underneath.


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## renrich (Aug 31, 2007)

Am I mistaken or did not the RAF fly in line astern formation(bomber stream) rather than in formation like US day bombing?


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## Aussie1001 (Aug 31, 2007)

drgondog got that info off wiki....
But yes as i remember the "Orange thingy" is designed to take out underground complexes.....
it is a bit worrying about the "green thingy" isn't it though would hate to be under that bugger when it went off.....


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 1, 2007)

Aussie we are talking about WW2 bombers here not B-52's taking out bunkers in Iraq with orange bunker busting bombs.


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## mosquitoman (Sep 1, 2007)

An RAF bomber formation wasn't tight at all, each plane bombed seperately and it was called a 'gaggle'.


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## Hop (Sep 1, 2007)

> a small thought from a small brain today, still cannot understand even with RAF day light bombing in 1945 why the Lancs were not equipped with a belly rotating turret knowing full well the LW was going to find this out and take full advantage as they did on at least 2 ops with JG 7 me 262's which came from underneath with deadly accuracy.



The technical reason was that H2S took the place of the belly turret. But I don't think they were particularly concerned about the Luftwaffe on daylight opps late in the war.

From Jul 1944 to the end of the war, BC flew about 63,000 daylight sorties. Losses ran at about 0.5%, and most of those were to flak. 

Looking at Jim Perry's claims list, the Luftwaffe day fighters only claimed 108 Lancs and Halifaxes from July 1944 to the end of the war. Probably only a few of those would have been saved by a belly turret, and the reduction in bomb load would have required more sorties.


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## syscom3 (Sep 1, 2007)

I wouldn't doubt that most of the daylight sorties were the short range missions to bomb the V1 launch sites in the Netherlands and Belgium.

As was discussed in another thread, "upgunning" the Lanc to handle a dozen .50's would have added 2000 pounds or so of weight.


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## Aussie1001 (Sep 4, 2007)

so what..... its bomb load still would have been quite considerable....


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## pbfoot (Sep 4, 2007)

Hop said:


> The technical reason was that H2S took the place of the belly turret. But I don't think they were particularly concerned about the Luftwaffe on daylight opps late in the war.
> 
> From Jul 1944 to the end of the war, BC flew about 63,000 daylight sorties. Losses ran at about 0.5%, and most of those were to flak.
> 
> Looking at Jim Perry's claims list, the Luftwaffe day fighters only claimed 108 Lancs and Halifaxes from July 1944 to the end of the war. Probably only a few of those would have been saved by a belly turret, and the reduction in bomb load would have required more sorties.


But when the Lancs were without escorts (missed rendezvous etc) their losses were heavy


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## ace7861 (Sep 4, 2007)

USA we could hit a gnats left nut with the bombing techniques we used its just really foggy and our targets were visual


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 4, 2007)

ace7861 said:


> USA we could hit a gnats left nut with the bombing techniques we used its just really foggy and our targets were visual


OMG A freggin genius!


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## Hop (Sep 4, 2007)

> I wouldn't doubt that most of the daylight sorties were the short range missions to bomb the V1 launch sites in the Netherlands and Belgium.



That was certainly the case in the summer and early autumn of 1944, but later raids were on Germany, although never deep penetration like the USAAF (and BC at night)

For example:

26 October 1944

105 Lancasters of No 3 Group carried out a G-H raid on Leverkusen, with the chemical works as the centre of the intended bombing area. The raid appeared to proceed well but cloud prevented any observation of the results. No aircraft lost.

25 October 1944

771 aircraft - 508 Lancasters, 251 Halifaxes, 12 Mosquitos - attacked Essen. 2 Halifaxes and 2 Lancasters lost. 

18 October 1944

Bonn. 128 Lancasters were dispatched; the raid appeared to go well and only 1 aircraft was lost.

14 October 1944

Duisburg. 1,013 aircraft - 519 Lancasters, 474 Halifaxes and 20 Mosquitos - were dispatched to Duisburg with RAF fighters providing an escort. 957 bombers dropped 3,574 tons of high explosive and 820 tons of incendiaries on Duisburg. 14 aircraft were lost - 13 Lancasters and 1 Halifax; it is probable that the Lancasters provided the early waves of the raid and drew the attention of the German flak before the flak positions were overwhelmed by the bombing.

28 October 1944

Cologne: 733 aircraft - 28 Lancasters, 286 Halifaxes, 19 Mosquitos. 4 Halifaxes and 3 Lancasters lost.

It says much for the state of the Luftwaffe by this time that on 4 October 140 Lancs and Halifaxes were sent to bomb U boat bases around Bergen in Norway. The escort was 12 Mosquitos. 1 Lanc was lost.



> But when the Lancs were without escorts (missed rendezvous etc) their losses were heavy



Can you give an example? As far as I can see BC didn't suffer "heavy" losses on any of their daylight raids in the last year of the war.

Looking at the Luftwaffe fighter claims list, they claimed 8 Lancs on the 8th August, 4 were actually lost. 14 Lancasters were claimed on the 21 September, mostly around Arnhem, but this must be some sort of error as bad weather meant BC were grounded. 21 Lancasters claimed on the 12th December, but only 8 were lost (out of 140). They claimed 12 in another attack on Bergen in Jan 1945, but only 4 were lost. 16 Lancs were claimed on the 31st Mar, actual losses were 11 (out of 461 Lancs and Halifaxes). Whilst 11 aircraft is a serious loss, it was less than 3% of the attacking force. That wouldn't be bad as a long term average, much less a worst case raid.

They only made multiple claims on 1 more occasion, 4 Lancs on the 9th April. 2 were actually lost.

This is all in daylight, of course, on occasion the Luftwaffe still managed to inflict heavy losses on an RAF night raid, but in day time the RAF heavies were far more concerned with flak than enemy fighters. The most BC heavies I can find lost on a daylight raid from July 1944 to the end of the war was 11, and I wouldn't really describe that as "heavy" losses.


BTW, the figure I gave of 108 Lancs and Halifaxes claimed by the Luftwaffe day fighter force needs some more clarification. At least 26 of those were claimed by JG 300 and 301 at night, as far as I can see, which means about 82 _claimed_ shot down in daylight.


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## pbfoot (Sep 4, 2007)

the one that comes to mind is 31 mar 45 where the fighters never rendezvoused with the bombers . One pilot commented that he wished they had a proper formation like the 8th AF . I'll try and find this little anecdote 
March 1945 Daily Operations
or this to check out daily ops 
Daily Operations


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 5, 2007)

ace7861 said:


> USA we could hit a gnats left nut with the bombing techniques we used its just really foggy and our targets were visual



You wanna go back and actually look at the statistics.


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## Kurfürst (Sep 6, 2007)

Hop said:


> It says much for the state of the Luftwaffe by this time that on 4 October 140 Lancs and Halifaxes were sent to bomb U boat bases around Bergen in Norway. The escort was 12 Mosquitos. 1 Lanc was lost.



I'd say such examples are rather more reprsentative of your continously worsening inferiority complex when it comes to the USAAF or LW in WW2... which you compensate by such silly remarks.

I really wonder how is Norway is representative for the Luftwaffe's state at any time of the war, after all it was always a backyard, even more so than France. I wonder what forces were in Norway in October 1944, but I doubt there would be much. In May 1944 there were about 60 Bf 109Gs with Luftflotte 5 - almost all of them servicable, and quite a few old G-2s still present, giving a hint about how 'serious' the fighting in the North was (at least in May 1944, before the Soviet offensive on the German northern Army).

As for October, JG 5 was spread out all around. 

I and II Gruppe was in Germany. 

The III Gruppe was in Norway, but 1000 miles away from Bergen, in practice it operated in Northern Finnland. IV Gruppe was also in Finnland, in Salmijärvi.

I'd say such examples rather tells pages about the Bomber Command's daylight 'operations'. Targets choosen from the margin of the map, with marginal results.. When bombing Bergen on 4th October a single U-boot was lost, with _2 men_ KIA on the boat. Bit thin results for the size of forces thrown at it I'd say

I guess Bomber Command planner's were a bit shy to send British bombers where they _might_ even find German daylight fighters. They had a good reason, since even with the Luftwaffe focusing on the USAAF raids, they still lost 52 bombers in these rather shy daylight operations (6713 sorties) in October 1944, as compared to 75 in noctural missions (10 193 sorties).

As for the RAF Bomber Command formation's record vs the Tagjagd, it was a rather sad one when they were intercepted. Caldwell describes the event of 23 December, when 30 Lancesters and 2 Mosquitos. The bombers belonged to the crack 8th Pathfinder Group of Bomber Command and were supposed to mark the RR station of Cologne. They were unlucky enough to bump into a five FW 190Ds from JG 26, still 40 kilometers short of Cologne. 

The results were rather one sided. The five FW 190s attacked the 30 RAF heavies, and knocked down half of the No 528 bomber Squadron, including the leader, all in all 5 planes, another Lancester from No 405, and an Oboe Mosquito from No 105. Seven aircraft, or about 22% of the formation was lost to a formation of 5 German fighters; the latter escaped without a scratch.


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## Gnomey (Sep 6, 2007)

Together they complimented each other and kept the Luftwaffe on their toes 24/7. Between they effectively crippled Germany by day and by night as well as concentrated the fighter forces on homeland defence rather than sorties against the Jabo's and the Tactical Airforces utilised by the ground offensive.


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## syscom3 (Sep 6, 2007)

Hop, look at the taregts the RAF was bombing in the daylight....... they were not deep penetration misisons like the 8th and 15th were doing.

All those targets in Germany were within range of the Spitfires (and masses of 8th and 9th AF fighters).


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## pbfoot (Sep 6, 2007)

syscom3 said:


> Hop, look at the taregts the RAF was bombing in the daylight....... they were not deep penetration misisons like the 8th and 15th were doing.
> 
> All those targets in Germany were within range of the Spitfires (and masses of 8th and 9th AF fighters).


I must agree with you mostly V1 sites and aid to groundpounders


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## rogthedodge (Sep 11, 2007)

renrich said:


> Am I mistaken or did not the RAF fly in line astern formation(bomber stream) rather than in formation like US day bombing?




No you're not. The bomber stream was developed to 'swamp' the German nightfighter defensive boxes minimize losses. This was more important than the defensive fire arising from formation flying in daylight.

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Overall I think they were complimentary efforts. Both sides were equal in their admiration of the others' efforts - neither would have swapped. With just night or day attack the luftwaffe wouldn't have had to split their defensive efforts.

Don't be fooled that the USAF only used pinpoint attack - at Nuremberg they used 'blind point bombing by radar' (area bombing in all but name) and for Tokyo it was area bombing pure simple.

Bomber command was capable of pinpoint attack from '44 onwards but Harris refused for them to be diverted from the main task - area bombing of cities. All their training tactics were focused on area attack.

When they were directed to use pinpoint the results were embarassingly good (for Harris).


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## plan_D (Sep 12, 2007)

RAF 2 Group and 2nd TAF (of which 2 Group became a part) were striking targets inside the German border. 2 Group were second in number of Noball sites destroyed to the US 8th Air Force alone, but these were not the majority of their targets.


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## Watanbe (Sep 29, 2007)

I voted the RAF for a couple of reasons,

1. The RAF was bombing the Germans long before the USAAF got involved. Although the effectiveness of this is debatable.

2. Arguably the RAF greater fulfilled the goals of strategic bombing, while the USAAF may of done more industrial damage, the deadly, demoralizing bombings of the RAF would of been feared by the Germans. Of course this is debatable on the purpose of strategic bombing in WW2.


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