# Best fighter in the world in 1940? Spitfire, 109, Zero, or something else



## pinsog (May 29, 2010)

I would vote Zero. Adolph Galland told Goering that he needed a squadron of Spitfires to win the BoB. I think if he had a squadron of Zero's it would have been a German victory, hands down.


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## Vincenzo (May 29, 2010)

talking of best fighter of '40 i go with 109, but if we talking a fighter for win the BoB, so take most important the range/endurance, i go to Type 0 but unlucky at time the 0 wss rare plane


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## FLYBOYJ (May 29, 2010)

Land Based - Bf 109 with the Spit 1a in a very close second
Carrier Based - Zero


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## renrich (May 29, 2010)

Depends on the mission. Interceptor-109 or Spitfire. Escort fighter-A6M hands down. Carrier fighter-A6M


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## pinsog (May 29, 2010)

renrich, Why a Spit or 109 over A6M in interceptor role? 

What was rate of climb for these three aircraft in 1940 time period?


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## Markus (May 29, 2010)

Thank but no thank to that (slow) flying gas tank from the land of the rising sun. I prefer my two 20mm cannon with armour and protected fuel tanks. For carrier use ... Model 439 would be cheating I guess.


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## Shortround6 (May 29, 2010)

Markus said:


> For carrier use ... Model 439 would be cheating I guess.



Not sure about cheating but the 439 is almost 2 years too late, being delivered in the winter/spring of 1942

and being , I believe, a land plane for the Dutch East Indies it might require a couple of pounds of equipment to refit it for carrier use.


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## Njaco (May 29, 2010)

I agree with everyone's assesment especially about Markus' "gas tank" - I like armour in my plane. I'm gonna go with the Bf 109E ONLY because I think with the 20mm cannon and fuel-injected carb had a slight - and I do mean slight - advantage over the Spit AT THAT TIME!


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (May 30, 2010)

Bf 109E all the way. Better armament, great performance and fuel-injected carb. That gave it the advantage it needed at that time. Its only disadvantage was its lack of range, which made it unsuitable for escort duties.


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## parsifal (May 30, 2010)

It also depends on the training and skill levels of the pilots and the mission being undertaken. In the pacific, where range is at a premium, both European fighters would be at a disadvantage, to the point of being useless really. In a fight where toughness and durability were important, the Zero was at a disadvcantage.

The 109 was an aircraft most suited to the highly trained luftwaffe pilots of 1940, where a limited amount of hard hitting ammunition was a great advantage. But for the RAF, with its less well trained avaitors, a large supply of ammunition firing from a large number of barrels was the ideal weapon, because it maxiised the chances of a kill from a poor to average shot/pilot, that was likley to be skidding around the sky almost out of control.

I'm the reverse of adler, I believe between the spit and the 109, it was the spit by a nose, but that probably has more to do with personal prejudices than anything....there really is not much to choose from between the two aircraft at all to be honest


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## Glider (May 30, 2010)

Njaco said:


> I agree with everyone's assesment especially about Markus' "gas tank" - I like armour in my plane. I'm gonna go with the Bf 109E ONLY because I think with the 20mm cannon and fuel-injected carb had a slight - and I do mean slight - advantage over the Spit AT THAT TIME!



Sums up my position nicely


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (May 30, 2010)

parsifal said:


> I'm the reverse of adler, I believe between the spit and the 109, it was the spit by a nose, but that probably has more to do with personal prejudices than anything....there really is not much to choose from between the two aircraft at all to be honest



I can actually agree with you. In the end it is going to depend on what someone values more. 

The 109 and the Spit are a classic example of two aircraft that paired well with one another. They both started their careers early before the war and remained competitive to the very end. Each aircraft gaiing advantages over the other throughout.


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## fastmongrel (May 30, 2010)

pinsog said:


> I would vote Zero. Adolph Galland told Goering that he needed a squadron of Spitfires to win the BoB. I think if he had a squadron of Zero's it would have been a German victory, hands down.



It wasnt planes that lost the BoB it was tactics. Luftwaffe tactics were faulty and the RAFs tactics whilst not perfect were sufficent to win the day. 

Changing the planes would have made no difference to the ultimate result apart from maybe the RAF losing a few more fighters of which they had a small but growing surplus and a few more pilots of which there were just enough available during the battle with a lot more coming down the training pipeline. The RAF of mid September was much stronger than the RAF at the start of the battle.

As for the best land fighter It is too close to call between the Spit and the 109. As I am British I will I will let crude nationalism sway me and go for the Spitfire


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## riacrato (May 30, 2010)

Bf 109. Fuel injection is a must imo and apart from that there is overall little difference. The A6M may have actually helped as a long range escort in the BoB. But it would've only prolonged the battle by maybe a few weeks.


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## Timppa (May 30, 2010)

Zero. Unrivalled range, which is an undervalued quality in a fighter, IMO.
In terms of pure (speed) performance, Bf109F-1, which came into service in late 1940, was the king of the hill.


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## Milosh (May 30, 2010)

pinsog said:


> I would vote Zero. Adolph Galland told Goering that he needed a squadron of Spitfires to win the BoB. I think if he had a squadron of Zero's it would have been a German victory, hands down.



A6M2 Type 0 Model 11 didn't see combat till Aug 1940 and these 15 a/c flew before testing had been completed.


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## FLYBOYJ (May 30, 2010)

Milosh said:


> A6M2 Type 0 Model 11 didn't see combat till Aug 1940 and these 15 a/c flew before testing had been completed.



It still saw action in 1940...


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## claidemore (May 30, 2010)

"or something else?" How about the Mig1/3? Fastest fighter in the world in 1940, and as speed proved to be (arguably) the defining requirement of WWII fighters the Mig was in a sense ahead of its time.
If we remove the other variables, pilot training, tactical doctrine, etc, and only consider the performance of the plane, the Mig could come out on top, particularly with the eventual weapons upgrade to 2 x 20mm cannon.


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## Vincenzo (May 30, 2010)

The MiG-1 was only at operational test in late '40, and have some trouble, it's more new of a Friederich (-1) that was in fightning from october


edit we can take in consideration the H.75 as escort fighters for BoB time


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## Glider (May 30, 2010)

Nice idea but with such poor weapons, instability at high speed, poor climb and general agility plus poor performance at low altitude I would rather hove one of the others.

As for the twin 20mm unless they did something spectacular to the design it would only increase the weight problems of the aircraft. 

If you want another choice then the Bloch 152 may be worth consideration. It will not win but its an idea


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## lesofprimus (May 30, 2010)

The 109E was slightly superior to the Spitty Ia in most catagories that make my decisions for me, but the fuel injected carb makes this a winner...


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## FLYBOYJ (May 30, 2010)

lesofprimus said:


> The 109E was slightly superior to the Spitty Ia in most catagories that make my decisions for me, but the fuel injected carb makes this a winner...



Agree....


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## krieghund (May 30, 2010)

remember that in 1940 hardly anyone had armor (speed is armor) or SS tanks for that matter.


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## parsifal (May 30, 2010)

From my reading the RAF began to fit armour slightly before the Germans, though ther is less than three months in the difference.

I still think the Spit was more manouverable in the horizontal, and more controllable in a dive. The 109 had heavier armament and was a better climber, and in certain situation was more manouverable horizontally as well. The 109 was a smaller target, but working against that it was cramped and this could sometimes be difficult in a high speed dive. It also had that problem with the opening slats in the wings, which tended to make the aircraft flinch at certain times.

The spitfire had a lighter arment, but it could fire for a longer duration. I think at longer ranges it was probably better.

Both aircraft suffered from narrow tracked landing gear. 

I dont know which aircraft was cheaper or easier to build, but both could be produced as relatively cheap and easy consumer items, in factories not really designed for the purpose. But in 1940, the Spitfire was being mass produced, the Mw 109 was not, and this proved to be a decisive advantage. 

So, it depends on your priorities and who is flying the machine IMO


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## Knegel (May 30, 2010)

Hi,

the 109 was known to be cheap planes in relation to the difficult eliptical wing Spitfire.

The 109E already got mass produced in 1939, the Spitfire production started rather late and slow, almost to slow, thats why there was so few in the med, even in 1941.
With enough Spitfires in 1941, the Hurri wouldnt have been a frontline fighter anymore.

I go for the 109E, for the reason of the best combat speed and climb from sea level to at least 5000m and the cannons was an advantage.

btw, the 109 MG´s had also a way longer duration than the Spitfire or Hurri guns and the 2 nosemounted MG´s probably was as much worth as 3-4 wing mounted guns(very exact gunnery was possible).

A very good fighter in 1940, at least regarding the plain performence was the Yak-1, at least up to 6000m. The Kilmov 105 was a very good 1940 engine, with more than 1000 HP military power. 
Though, i doubt the Yak-1 saw service at that time.

Greetings,

Knegel


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## fastmongrel (May 30, 2010)

This site seems to say that the Spit and the 109E were indistinguishable in terms of performanceSpitfire Mk1 vs Bf109E


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## Marcel (May 30, 2010)

Markus said:


> Thank but no thank to that (slow) flying gas tank from the land of the rising sun. I prefer my two 20mm cannon with armour and protected fuel tanks. For carrier use ... Model 439 would be cheating I guess.





Shortround6 said:


> Not sure about cheating but the 439 is almost 2 years too late, being delivered in the winter/spring of 1942
> 
> and being , I believe, a land plane for the Dutch East Indies it might require a couple of pounds of equipment to refit it for carrier use.



Hmmm:
_F2A-3 (Brewster Model B-439): Third production model. Similar to the F2A-2 but with self-sealing fuel tanks with increased capacity, additional armor protection, and redesigned canopy and nose section. An order for 108 aircraft was placed on 21 January 1941 with deliveries beginning in July 1941. The increased weight due to the additional armor protection resulted in instability and handling difficulties._

So not a landplane for the DEI (that was the 339C/D), delivered in 1941 and not a very good aircraft at all (Midway, anyone?). I think no contender...

I don't understand the negativity about the Zero, especially in 1940. I believe the knowledge about 1944/45 colours this view. Estimated 99% of the fighters at that time (1940) hardly had any armour/self sealing tanks, so almost all fighters in the world were 'flying gas tanks'. But the Zero did that while being very competitive to all fighters at that time. It wasn't slow by 1940'ies standard had more range than any of his competitors and a big punch with it's 20mm canons. I think it's a contender indeed. Would like to see the Bf109e or spit mk.I duel with the Zero in 1940. The outcome might not be so obvious as many think.


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## drgondog (May 30, 2010)

I'm inclined to go with the Zero. In 1940, bombing altitudes were squarely in the Zero's strike zone, it was already carrier qualified, it had enormous range and it proved itself aganst Hurricanes and Spits in 1942.

After that I'm inclined to go with Timppa's comment re: 109F.

Both the Spit and 109 could outdive the Zero and had a speed advantage - and survivability. 

The mission flexibility is all Zero advantage...(IMO)


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## vinnye (May 30, 2010)

I saw somewhere where a Allied WWII pilot had sat in a 109 cockpit and had been suprised by the poor visibilty out of it. I believe he said had he known that back then - he would have been more aggressive!
If you take out the pilot and tactics - each aircraft has advantages that could give it the edge.
Firepower is quite a persuasive argument! But it also quite nice to think you have a chance of surviving if the other guy bounces you! (so I rule out the Zero).
So its down to the 109 or Spitfire - both were not user friendly to the inexperienced pilot.
On aesthetic grounds I would go for the Spitfire - I love its lines.


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## Knegel (May 30, 2010)

Marcel said:


> Hmmm:
> _
> I don't understand the negativity about the Zero, especially in 1940. I believe the knowledge about 1944/45 colours this view. Estimated 99% of the fighters at that time (1940) hardly had any armour/self sealing tanks, so almost all fighters in the world were 'flying gas tanks'. But the Zero did that while being very competitive to all fighters at that time. It wasn't slow by 1940'ies standard had more range than any of his competitors and a big punch with it's 20mm canons. I think it's a contender indeed. Would like to see the Bf109e or spit mk.I duel with the Zero in 1940. The outcome might not be so obvious as many think._


_

At least the the 109E already had selfsealing tanks and a amored seat and afaik also the Hurri and Spit had this, in oposide to the P40B(afaik that was the reason why it didnt count as combat ready).

The Zero only was successfull until the enemys did use tactics like the germans did already in Spain. 
With this tactics speed is the most important factor and a good firepower is most important. 
The RAF and acttually most responsible people in great britain did need a while to understand that WWI like turnfights are badly outdated. 
In most other european countrys and the USA the contructors did understand this and so the wingloads increased a lot(Yak´s, La(gg), P38, P40, D520, MS406, 190, 109, P47, P51). 

Even vs the rather poor F4F the Zero had bad trouble, cause the Zeros high speed manouverability was extreme poor(the 109 was agile in that relation), if it ever got there, cause its dive performence was worse than that of the Hurri.

The Zeros real advantage was its range and as such it would have been better for germany to have the Zero in 1940 than the 109E, on the other hand it would have been easy to fit a droptank to the 109E before boB, but by luck the german HQ was dazled by it own success, so they dont saw this shortcomming.

Already in 1940 it got clear that the RAF estimation, after the mock up fights between Hurri and 109E, where they thought the Hurri was more than a match for the 109E, was badly wrong. 
The Hurri, no matter how nimble it was, couldnt stand the 109E, flown with the new tactics. 

The A6m2 would have been a more difficult target, but it had a very low altitude of best speed (4,6km), as such the 109, same like the Spitfire had advantages in high alt and as we know, with its paperplane behaviour, it even couldnt stand the F4F._


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## Glider (May 30, 2010)

Marcel said:


> Hmmm:
> I don't understand the negativity about the Zero, especially in 1940. I believe the knowledge about 1944/45 colours this view. Estimated 99% of the fighters at that time (1940) hardly had any armour/self sealing tanks, so almost all fighters in the world were 'flying gas tanks'.


This might be a true statement on 1st Jan 1940 but wasn't by mid 1940. By that time all British and German fighters and bombers had self sealing fuel tanks, armour for the pilots and armoured glass on the fighters. Some tanks were never fitted with self sealing but that was a decision that was kept to until the end of the war.


> But the Zero did that while being very competitive to all fighters at that time. It wasn't slow by 1940'ies standard had more range than any of his competitors and a big punch with it's 20mm canons. I think it's a contender indeed. Would like to see the Bf109e or spit mk.I duel with the Zero in 1940. The outcome might not be so obvious as many think.



I understand your frustration but the Zero was very vulnerable and both the 109 and Spit were well armed by comparison. Your comments on the range and firepower are valid. To be honest I believe that to include the Zero is pushing it, I don't disagree that they did see combat but they were pre production prototypes. If you include them then you are lookng at Spitfire IIB and possibly early 109F.

Even if you ignore this the Zero was still vulnerable, slower and poorer in a dive, it would be down to tactics. If the 109 and Spit kept their speed up above 250 then the Zero would also lose most if not all its advantage in agility. The lack of ammunition for the 20mm would also be a problem. A 109 or Spit firing LMGs at a Zero stand an excellent chance of doing fatal damage, a Spit or 109 being fired at by a Zero with 2 x LMG stand a good chance of getting away with it.


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## BombTaxi (May 30, 2010)

I think there is less than a cigarette paper between the 109E and Spit I. The Zero would be neither here nor there in the BoB equation. It was superior tactics, superior pilot training and a stream of obsolescent enemies that made the Zero so deadly in the early days of WW2. Over Kent in 1940 it would have had no of those advantages. On the other hand, it may have been able to give RAF interceptors a bloody nose due to longer combat loiter. But that is still irrelevant unless Hitler continued bombing the airfields. British factories were producing fighters faster than they could be shot down, and unless there was a sudden jump in aircrew fatalities (unlikely, IMHO), there were enough pilots to fly the replacement planes. So the Zero makes no difference either way.


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## pinsog (May 30, 2010)

Has everyone forgotten about the veteran BoB Spitfire squadron shipped to the far east to fight the Japanese? When told to keep their speed up and not to try and turn with the Zero they had a laugh and blew it off. They were told to do high speed hit and run tactics and the squadron commander told them he considered hit and run tactics to be cowardly and would courtmartial anyone who did it. When they engaged the Zero's the first time they got slaughtered. I'm trying to remember where they were deployed, was it Port Moresby?


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## parsifal (May 30, 2010)

Knegel said:


> Hi,
> 
> the 109 was known to be cheap planes in relation to the difficult eliptical wing Spitfire.
> 
> ...



Hi Knegel

The Me 109 was in mass production at the beginning of the war, with monthly deliveries hovering at around 100-150 per month throughout 1939-40. In 1940 1828 Me109s were built. 

By comparison the development of the spitfire production program was slow prewar, but it displayed a spactacular increase in production throughout 1940. In the period mid 1938 to mid 1939, British fighter production did increase, but at a fraction of the rate German production in the prewar period expanded. In that one year time period, Hurricane production increased from 25 airframes per month to 45. In that same period, Spitfire production increased from 13 per month to 34. There was nothing inherently difficult about building Spitfires, though the workforce needed to learn new skills to build the monocoque body. Once this had been mastered, and the workforce found to fill the new factories, the Spitfire could be turned out in great quantities. So too could the Me 109, but that did not happen in 1940, or even 1941. And its 1940 that we are looking at here. 

As I said, in 1940, the Germans managed to produce just over 1800 Me109s. By comparison, Spitfire production started behind early in 1940 (about 80 per month), had overtaken German production by April. By the end of the year, Spitfire production had complewtely eclipsed Me 109 output....the 109 factories were still churning out about 130 per month, to over 450 per month for the British type. In early 1941 the Germans did begin to peg back this disparity , but that is outside the parameters of this discussion. Total British Spitfire production was just under 3000.

And this was not achieved with a massive increase in the workforce. British labour dedicated to Spitfire production increased by only 12% in 1940, though the amount of factory space more than tripled. and there were less workers dedicated to Spitfire production than there were german workers dedicated to 109 production. This is not the fault of the 109....its later production figures point to an eminently buildable type, but neither is it trrue to assert that the Spitfire was somehow difficult to build. Its one of those common myths kicked around in the post war wash up....


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## claidemore (May 30, 2010)

Knegel said:


> Hi,
> A very good fighter in 1940, at least regarding the plain performence was the Yak-1, at least up to 6000m. The Kilmov 105 was a very good 1940 engine, with more than 1000 HP military power.
> Though, i doubt the Yak-1 saw service at that time.
> 
> ...


The first batch of eleven pre-production Yak 1's were delivered to units in June 1940 and had completed all trials by the end of that year. Those would be 'operational trials' which with the Soviet system was an after the fact way of 'proving' a plane already scheduled for serial production. First serial production Yaks came out of the factory in September and were being delivered to units later that fall (total of 64). So yes, they were operational in late 1940. 
Speed was 356mph at best alt (16000ft), climb rate was 3000 ft/min, range 1120 miles (pre-production planes) .


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## Glider (May 31, 2010)

pinsog said:


> Has everyone forgotten about the veteran BoB Spitfire squadron shipped to the far east to fight the Japanese? When told to keep their speed up and not to try and turn with the Zero they had a laugh and blew it off. They were told to do high speed hit and run tactics and the squadron commander told them he considered hit and run tactics to be cowardly and would courtmartial anyone who did it. When they engaged the Zero's the first time they got slaughtered. I'm trying to remember where they were deployed, was it Port Moresby?



I often hear this story but don't know which squadron it was, do you know which unit it was?


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## Glider (May 31, 2010)

parsifal said:


> Hi Knegel
> 
> This is not the fault of the 109....its later production figures point to an eminently buildable type, but neither is it trrue to assert that the Spitfire was somehow difficult to build. Its one of those common myths kicked around in the post war wash up....



The British did a review of the Me109 to understand how easy it was to maintain and buld and basically raved about the design features that made it easy to produce. Somewhere I have the original documents and will see if I can find them.


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## Glider (May 31, 2010)

Found them sooner than expected, apologies for the poor quality.


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## Knegel (May 31, 2010)

pinsog said:


> Has everyone forgotten about the veteran BoB Spitfire squadron shipped to the far east to fight the Japanese? When told to keep their speed up and not to try and turn with the Zero they had a laugh and blew it off. They were told to do high speed hit and run tactics and the squadron commander told them he considered hit and run tactics to be cowardly and would courtmartial anyone who did it. When they engaged the Zero's the first time they got slaughtered. I'm trying to remember where they were deployed, was it Port Moresby?



Afaik this squads actually did fly SpitfireV´s and later versions, not 1940 Spitfires.

But btw, the SpitIIa and 109E4/N also already saw service in 1940, so i think no other plane was comporable to this two types.


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## Knegel (May 31, 2010)

parsifal said:


> Hi Knegel
> 
> The Me 109 was in mass production at the beginning of the war, with monthly deliveries hovering at around 100-150 per month throughout 1939-40. In 1940 1828 Me109s were built.
> 
> ...



It depends how you descripe "Mass production". 1800 109´s in 1940 i would call mass production, although its not as high as later, but so was the "pilot production". 
As we could see in BoB and later over the "Reich", planes dont matter much, if you dont have enough educated pilots to fly them. 

Somewhere i did read that the production of one Spitfire toock 1/3 more hours than to build a 109. 

Greetings,

Knegel


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## parsifal (May 31, 2010)

guys


Thanks for the information but it is not my point that the me 109 was not mass produceable. Rather, i was pointing out that the spitfire also was produceable. Some people have suggested that the spitfire was difficult to produce, and whilst there was some evidence of production difficulties due mainly to the specialised skills needed to build the airframe, in 1940 there is no evidence that added complexity had any noticeable effect on output. in that year, with less resources dedicated to the production of the spitfire than were being devoted by the germans to 109 production, the British outproduced the germans 2:1 roughly speaking. That does not support the notion that the spitfire was hard to build


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## Markus (May 31, 2010)

Marcel said:


> Hmmm:
> _F2A-3 (Brewster Model B-439): Third production model. ..._
> 
> 
> So not a landplane for the DEI (that was the 339C/D), ...



Almost, the model 339-23 or 439 was the second batch for the DEI. None of the planes made it to that place, they were send to Australia in 1942. Compared to the eariler models it´s engine was more powerful at altitude. 



> I don't understand the negativity about the Zero, especially in 1940. I believe the knowledge about 1944/45 colours this view. Estimated 99% of the fighters at that time (1940) hardly had any armour/self sealing tanks, so almost all fighters in the world were 'flying gas tanks'. But the Zero did that while being very competitive to all fighters at that time. It wasn't slow by 1940'ies standard had more range than any of his competitors and a big punch with it's 20mm canons. I think it's a contender indeed. Would like to see the Bf109e or spit mk.I duel with the Zero in 1940. The outcome might not be so obvious as many think.



When in 1940? By May the Me109E-3 had armour, by the time of the BoB the LW had the E-7 with SS-tanks. And the Zero was only competitive because it´s opponents frankly sucked! The RAF in Malaya bore very little resemblemce to the force that won the BoB or held on to Malta. The only "professionals" in the area were the fighter pilots of the USN and they were not outfought by the Japanese.


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## Glider (May 31, 2010)

parsifal said:


> guys
> 
> 
> Thanks for the information but it is not my point that the me 109 was not mass produceable. Rather, i was pointing out that the spitfire also was produceable. Some people have suggested that the spitfire was difficult to produce, and whilst there was some evidence of production difficulties due mainly to the specialised skills needed to build the airframe, in 1940 there is no evidence that added complexity had any noticeable effect on output. in that year, with less resources dedicated to the production of the spitfire than were being devoted by the germans to 109 production, the British outproduced the germans 2:1 roughly speaking. That does not support the notion that the spitfire was hard to build



When looking at numbers it might help to remember other considerations. In this context the most important one being that the UK economy was on a war footing more or less from the moment the war started. Germany wasn't on a full war footing until I think 1942. Factories were not working around the clock and women were not allowed in the factories for what were considered jobs for men.

Its always been my belief that the 109 and Hurricanes were a lot easier to build than the Spitfire but I will have to dig around to see what I can find.


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## davebender (May 31, 2010)

> Land Based - Bf 109 with the Spit 1a in a very close second
> Carrier Based - Zero


I agree with this. 

As for the range issue in the BoB, for some reason the Luftwaffe chose not to stockpile drop tanks at the start of the war. Nor did the German Navy choose to stockpile anywhere near enough aerial mines. Those two logistical decisions made life a lot easier for Britain during 1940 but they are not aircraft flaws.


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## FLYBOYJ (May 31, 2010)

Folks a few points...

The Bf 109 had some features that would outwardly make it an easier aircraft to build. With that said, the point about the Spitfire's elliptical wing might have been an issue if you were to continually hand build each aircraft. Once mass quantities of these aircraft were ordered there was production tooling made to not only facilitate ease of construction, but to allow semi skilled and unskilled labor to assemble the aircraft. This was basically true with regards to all WW2 aircraft manufacturers, allied or axis. Parsifal brings out some excellent points with regards to factory floor space and manhours.

As far as the Hurricane being easier to construct - true to a point but once construction methodologies were developed for the Spitfire, I'm not too sure that was true. Application of dope can sometimes be tedious and time consuming and is also affected by temperature and humidity. Assembling wood sub-assemblies are also time consuming and require skilled workers as opposed to some components that can be "stamped" or drop hammer formed. In the end aluminum is a lot more resilient to the elements than fabric and wood.


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## fastmongrel (May 31, 2010)

I think a lot of the initial problems with Spitfire construction were caused by the simple fact that Supermarines were a relatively small flying boat and seaplane manufacturer. The largest order that Supermarine had before the initial order for 310 Spits was for the Supermarine Walrus. I cant find the numbers for the initial order for Walruses but I imagine it was in the tens not the hundreds. Converting the works and retraining the workforce from a handbuilt batch operation to a proper construction line wouldnt have been a quick or easy task.


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## FLYBOYJ (May 31, 2010)

fastmongrel said:


> I think a lot of the initial problems with Spitfire construction were caused by the simple fact that Supermarines were a relatively small flying boat and seaplane manufacturer. The largest order that Supermarine had before the initial order for 310 Spits was for the Supermarine Walrus. I cant find the numbers for the initial order for Walruses but I imagine it was in the tens not the hundreds. Converting the works and retraining the workforce from a handbuilt batch operation to a proper construction line wouldnt have been a quick or easy task.



Exactly - many other companies were in the "same boat" to coin a phrase!


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## fastmongrel (May 31, 2010)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Exactly - many other companies were in the "same boat" to coin a phrase!



I quite agree all aircraft factories had survived on small runs of essentially handbuilt aircraft since 1919. However Supermarines even though they were owned by a large conglomerate Vickers were still small even by the standards of British aviation. The big beasts of British fighter manufacturers were Hawkers who had bought out there main rivals Glosters in 1936 iirc. Other factories like Fairey, Bristol and De havilland were bigger than Supermarines. If we include the heavy manufacturers like Avro, Handley Page, Vickers and Shorts it is possible that Supermarine werent even the tenth largest aircraft manufacturers in Britain.

It would be interesting to compare how big Supermarine were to Bayerische Flugzeugwerke ( or were they Messerschmitt AG by then I am not sure on the dates ) when both companies started production of the respective aircraft. I would do some research on it but unfortunately my German is of the " zwie grossen bier bitte " standard


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## stona (May 31, 2010)

riacrato said:


> Fuel injection is a must imo.


But look at all the aircraft powered throughout the war by the Merlin engine.I can't imagine many Spitfire or Mustang or Mosquito or Lancaster pilots saying "this would be a great aircraft if only it had fuel injection"
I happen to agree about the Spitfire MkI and Bf109E,nothing in it. I don't know enough about the Zero to have an informed opinion.
Cheers
Steve


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## Marcel (May 31, 2010)

Markus said:


> Almost, the model 339-23 or 439 was the second batch for the DEI. None of the planes made it to that place, they were send to Australia in 1942. Compared to the eariler models it´s engine was more powerful at altitude.



Ah, didn't know the B339-23 was also designated B439, but now found more about that designation on the net, thanks

Well, actually the B339-23 sucked big time (BTW it was actually the 3rd batch, preceded by the B339C and D). The B339-23 had a G5B engine (all ex-KLM DC3 engines) of around 1000hp, while the B339D had a G-205A engine of 1200 hp. The 23 model was based on the F2A-3, with the same weight penalty, so it was heavier than the D version, while having 200hp less. 
Climb-rate dropped from D- to 23-version from 4700ft/min to 3100ft/min. Top-speed dropped from 307 to 264 ft/min. The KNIL only thought the B339-23 version capable for the training role and didn't intend to use them for the fighter role. They probably would have ended up in the fighter role anyway, but they would likely have been just some more turkeys to shoot for the Japanese (be it slightly easier than the others  )


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## Colin1 (May 31, 2010)

riacrato said:


> Bf 109. Fuel injection is a must imo and apart from that there is overall little difference. The A6M may have actually helped as a long range escort in the BoB. But it would've only prolonged the battle by maybe a few weeks.


I'd agree
fuel injection was a critical difference once the RAF was engaged, the Bf109 just couldn't stick around long enough to make the difference count. I think the Luftwaffe should have studied the mission requirements a little more closely too; a standardised armament of 2 x wing-mounted MG131s and 2 x engine-mounted MG131s would easily have sufficed against early-war RAF fighters in the specific role that was being asked of the Luftwaffe during the Battle - dispense with the cannon options.

The point of the A6M is an interesting one, it could have provided long-range escort, certainly but also improved loiter over the areas that the Bf109 was already covering. With longer time over target to grind the RAF down and none of the stock RAF tactics working against the Japanese fighter, Fighter Command may well have bled to death.

For those A6Ms inevitably shot down, these would no doubt be rushed to the RAE for evaluation and in realising what it was that made the A6M so dangerous, the Air Ministry could be faced with a dilemma; do we take the retrograde step of stripping weight from the existing front-line fighters to achieve some sort of short-term parity, or do we plug on with the path Allied fighter design generally took until we have a fighter that achieves air superiority over our own territory? 

The Hurricane is pretty much dead in the water but would the Spitfire be good enough in time?


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## pinsog (May 31, 2010)

Colin1: You hit the nail on the head with what I believe the Zero could have accomplished in the BoB. Instead of a 109 staying with the bombers, fighting 10 minutes max and barely making it home, imagine a gaggle of Zero's going out in front of the bombers on a fighter sweep, engaging the British aircraft well ahead of the bombers. In fact, they could probably loiter over the British airfields for the entire battle and then follow the bombers home. I think it would have been a disaster for the British. If you don't like the Zero's armament, replace the cannon in each wing with 2 machine guns and a good supply of ammo. Should be more than sufficient for Spitfires and Hurricanes. Zero could do anything better than a Hurricane, and only gave up speed to the Spitfire. British pilots, trained to dogfight not in energy tactics, would have been decimated, in my opinion.


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## RCAFson (May 31, 2010)

Colin1 said:


> The Hurricane is pretty much dead in the water but would the Spitfire be good enough in time?



Both the Hurricane and the Spitfire had a significant performance edge over the early A6M. Remember that these are BoB aircraft flying over the UK, with 100 octane fuel, and no tropical filters. 

The early A6M only had 780hp:

_



The Mitsubishi prototype was the A6M1, retractable gear, all metal, low-wing monoplane, powered with a 780 hp Mitsubishi Zuisei 13 engine. During flight testing, the two-bladed prop variable-pitch propeller was replaced with a three-bladed variable pitch propeller. *Apart from maximum speed*, all requirements were met or exceeded.5 The Navy had authorized the production of an initial batch of A6M2s and military trials progressed rapidly. While flight testing the A6M1, a new power plant passed its Navy acceptance tests, and the 925 hp Nakajima NK1C Sakae 12, which was slightly larger than the Zuisei, was installed in the third A6M2 prototype. *The initial trials* were completed in July 1940 and the navy assigned fifteen A6M2s to combat trials in China.

Click to expand...

_Mitsubishi A6M Zero-Sen - Japan

By the time the A6M2-21 showed up the Hurricane IIa was also ready, and the IIa is not inferior to the A6M2-21 in performance.


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## Colin1 (May 31, 2010)

RCAFson said:


> Both the Hurricane and the Spitfire had a significant performance edge over the early A6M. Remember that these are BoB aircraft flying over the UK, with 100 octane fuel, and no tropical filters.
> 
> The early A6M only had 780hp


Try 950hp
The A6M2 was ready early 1940 with a max speed of 335mph
Show me the Hurricane I's 'significant performance edge' - take as much time as you need.

The Spitfire Ia was some 30mph faster but it still had to get to the bombers and in that scenario I couldn't give a fly's eye about max speed; it's combat acceleration that wins knife-fights.


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## pinsog (May 31, 2010)

Colin1: Stop it. Your typing MY answer before I can! 100% agree with you. I think the A6M could fly over the British airfields and loiter until the Brits run out of gas!!


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## RCAFson (May 31, 2010)

Colin1 said:


> Try 950hp
> The A6M2 was ready early 1940 with a max speed of 335mph
> Show me the Hurricane I's 'significant performance edge' - take as much time as you need.
> 
> The Spitfire Ia was some 30mph faster but it still had to get to the bombers and in that scenario I couldn't give a fly's eye about max speed; it's combat acceleration that wins knife-fights.



I just gave you a quote showing that the A6M2 with a 925hp engine did not pass its acceptance trials until *July 1940*, July is the 7th month in the year, so I don't think it qualifies as "early 1940":

Acceleration, and climb, is a function of power to weight ratio so why would the Spitfire or Hurricane with up to 1300hp available be out accelerated by the even the A6M2-21? Under 10k ft the Spit and Hurricane have a better power to weight ratio. At 15k ft, a Spitfire has 1050hp available versus about 900hp, giving both aircraft the same power to weight ratio.


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## pinsog (May 31, 2010)

What are the climb rates for the 3 aircraft?


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## davebender (May 31, 2010)

> imagine a gaggle of Zero's going out in front of the bombers on a fighter sweep, engaging the British aircraft well ahead of the bombers.


That doesn't work when the defender has as many fighter aircraft as the attacker plus the advantage of ground control radar. Your fighter sweep is likely to be ambushed by a defending fighter force at least as numerous and in a superior tactical position.


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## pinsog (May 31, 2010)

So they orbit out over the channel until the Brits run out of fuel and then go in. The allies did the same thing to the Germans later in the war by zigzagging bomber formations so the Germans wouldn't know which target was going to be hit. Interceptors with such short range were launched, bombers zigged, fighters landed for fuel, bombers zagged, interceptors were caught on the ground. Zero's orbit over channel, will they attack? Launch fighters, wait Zero's leaving, wait there back, wait there leaving. Hurricanes and Spits run out of fuel, land, here come Zero's in strafing field. 4 times the range gives you lots of options.


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## davebender (May 31, 2010)

After June 1941 the Allies always had a large numerical superiority of fighter aircraft. This was made much worse during the last year of the war as Germany did not have enough aviation gasoline for the fighter aircraft they did have. 

Britain did not have these problems during the summer of 1940. They always had enough fuel and they were not outnumbered.


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## RCAFson (May 31, 2010)

pinsog said:


> What are the climb rates for the 3 aircraft?



The A6M1? or the A6M2-11? The A6M1 was the only variant that would have been available for the BoB and it only has a 750hp engine.

If we select the A6M2-11, then we should be comparing it to the Hurricane IIa, which became available in Aug 1940 and Spitfire II which entered squadron service in Aug 1940:

Hurricane IIa:http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/hurricane-II-raechart-climb.jpg
so 20k ft in 8.5min
However, this graph is for a Hurricane IIB at 7330lbs. A IIA at 6800-7000lb would probably make 20k in 7.5-7.7 minutes, and you can see how an increase to 8100lb reduce the ckimb rate.
Spitfire II:
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/p7280climb.gif
so 20K in 7 to 7.7 mins


This is a Spit Vc (at 7000lb - 850lb more than a Spit II) climb rate at 16lb boost:
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/aa878climb.gif
note how the time to 20k ft drops from 7.7 to 6.15min, and both the Spit II and Hurricane II would show similar increases in performance.

A6M2-21:

Most sources state about 7.7min to 20k ft.

however this RAAF report tests the A6M3-32 variant:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/japan/RAAF_Hap_Trials.pdf
and it shows a clmb to 20k ft in 6.84 min using military power (5min rating) and 8.11 using continuous power. Max climb rate at Mil power = 3410fpm versus about 3500 for the Hurricane and ~3700 for the Spit II. However this model had a more powerful engine than the A6M2-11 and max climb rate is about 15% better than the A6M2-11 at SL. Time to 20K ft might be a minute better than the A6M2-11


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## pinsog (May 31, 2010)

Fuel on the ground does no good when your shortlegged point defense interceptor runs out of gas while flying CAP and has to land, while long legged fighter patrols out over the channel waiting for just such an event to occur and then comes in strafing.The Germans with A6M's, in effect, could have done to the British what the Americans did to the ME262, wait until they run out of gas and shoot them down while they're landing or strafe them on the ground.


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## RCAFson (May 31, 2010)

pinsog said:


> So they orbit out over the channel until the Brits run out of fuel and then go in. The allies did the same thing to the Germans later in the war by zigzagging bomber formations so the Germans wouldn't know which target was going to be hit. Interceptors with such short range were launched, bombers zigged, fighters landed for fuel, bombers zagged, interceptors were caught on the ground. Zero's orbit over channel, will they attack? Launch fighters, wait Zero's leaving, wait there back, wait there leaving. Hurricanes and Spits run out of fuel, land, here come Zero's in strafing field. 4 times the range gives you lots of options.




The UK developed the CH radar system to permit fighters to stay on the ground until the enemy actually appeared over UK airspace. Even at 250mph it still takes 7 min to cover 30 miles.


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## pinsog (May 31, 2010)

Interesting, that the Hurricane slightly outclimbed the Zero. Spitfire, no suprise. So, would it be fair to say the Hurricanes performance was virtually identical to the A6M2 except for low speed turning?


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## claidemore (May 31, 2010)

pinsog said:


> So they orbit out over the channel until the Brits run out of fuel and then go in. The allies did the same thing to the Germans later in the war by zigzagging bomber formations so the Germans wouldn't know which target was going to be hit. Interceptors with such short range were launched, bombers zigged, fighters landed for fuel, bombers zagged, interceptors were caught on the ground. Zero's orbit over channel, will they attack? Launch fighters, wait Zero's leaving, wait there back, wait there leaving. Hurricanes and Spits run out of fuel, land, here come Zero's in strafing field. 4 times the range gives you lots of options.



You don't fly CAP with short legged interceptors. The cat and mouse game scenario you suggest would work.... once. 
It was not within the strategy of Dowding to chase fighters over the channel anyways, the targets were the bombers. Zeros would still have to escort the bombers.


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## pinsog (May 31, 2010)

Ok. So they faint in to get the Brits off the ground and then back out over the channel. Brits either give chase, land, or orbit over their field. A6M has enough range to keep them in the air until they really do have to land, or come in when they are low on fuel and HAVE to commit to combat when they really don't have the fuel. Then when they're out of fuelin the middle of the fight you shoot them down in the landing pattern. Justlike US pilots did to ME262's.


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## RCAFson (May 31, 2010)

pinsog said:


> Interesting, that the Hurricane slightly outclimbed the Zero. Spitfire, no suprise. So, would it be fair to say the Hurricanes performance was virtually identical to the A6M2 except for low speed turning?



I would say that. 

I corrected my earlier post above and the RAAF actually tested an A6m3-32 with a much more powerful engine than the A6M2-11.


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## RCAFson (May 31, 2010)

pinsog said:


> Ok. So they faint in to get the Brits off the ground and then back out over the channel. Brits either give chase, land, or orbit over their field. A6M has enough range to keep them in the air until they really do have to land, or come in when they are low on fuel and HAVE to commit to combat when they really don't have the fuel. Then when they're out of fuelin the middle of the fight you shoot them down in the landing pattern. Justlike US pilots did to ME262's.



The UK also had the Observer Corp. The Luftwaffe tried fighter sweeps and after the 1st one, the RAF just stayed on the ground, unless bombers were in the formation.


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## claidemore (May 31, 2010)

pinsog: It won't work, because the British fighters are not worried about shooting down the Zeros, they want to shoot down the Ju88's, Do17s and He111's. The 109 gave the RAF a lot of trouble when they would wait high above the bombers and dive on the attacking Spits and Hurris. The 109s good dive speed was difficult to deal with. The Zero on the other hand does not have that dive ability, only dogfighting ability. Bombers are going to suffer heavily when escorted by Zeros (as they generally did in the PTO). 
Dowding rarely sent up all his fighters, so if the Zeros wait over the channel, they will get intercepted piecemeal by one squadron after another, there will always (nearly always) be fresh fully fueled squadrons waiting for the primary targets, the bombers. 

The allied tactics against Me262's were used because they were up against a small number of jets with a huge speed advantage. That would not be as effective against 600+ RAF fighters scattered over several airfields. The bombing campaign against the RAF fighter stations was effective, and would still be the way to negate RAF fighter strength rather than straffing from Zero fighters.


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## pinsog (May 31, 2010)

I was typing my last post when yours came through. Radar would have definately helped, did definately help, but the Germans had radar late in the war and it didn't protect their 262's in the landing pattern short on fuel. Zero's would also have been able to cover the entire British isles, nowhere would have been safe. 

Do you think the Hurricane had the power to keep its speed up above 250mph while fighting the Zero? I think the Spitfire had the ability to energy fight the Zero and win, provided the pilots knew thats what they needed to do. I don't think the Hurricane had the power. Your opinion?


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## pinsog (May 31, 2010)

Claidemore RCAFson: You guys might be right. The whole thing would probably depend on who adapted first/best to the others tactics.

One more question since you have attempted to shoot down(pun?) my A6M theory(I'm not completely convinced but you both have some good arguments): If the 109 had the range of the A6M, would the Germans have won the battle?


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## RCAFson (May 31, 2010)

pinsog said:


> I was typing my last post when yours came through. Radar would have definately helped, did definately help, but the Germans had radar late in the war and it didn't protect their 262's in the landing pattern short on fuel. Zero's would also have been able to cover the entire British isles, nowhere would have been safe.
> 
> Do you think the Hurricane had the power to keep its speed up above 250mph while fighting the Zero? I think the Spitfire had the ability to energy fight the Zero and win, provided the pilots knew thats what they needed to do. I don't think the Hurricane had the power. Your opinion?



The Hurricane had a very good power to weight ratio by early war standards. The thick wing created drag but also lots of lift. It should be able to accelerate away from a Zero in a dive (and apparently the early Zero's engine also cut out with negative G). Also there are lots of combat reports of Hurricanes catching 109s while using over boost. 250mph should be possible in a Hurricane using something like 70% power so I suspect it was possible to maintain that speed through most combat manoeuvres at full throttle.


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## Shortround6 (May 31, 2010)

I don't think they would have won, but the battle would have been more costly for the British. 

Drop tanks would have helped the Germans a lot, but a fighter with the range of the Zero on internal fuel would have meant somewhat less performance than the historical 109 and so changed the exchange rate a bit in favor of the British once combat is joined. Might have traded fighters losses for bomber losses.


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## pinsog (May 31, 2010)

RCAFson: Interesting. Then why did it do sopoorly against the Zero? Do you think most of the problem was pilot inexperience? Do you think the Hurricane in the hands of the US Navy and US Marines would have done well against the Zero?


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## RCAFson (May 31, 2010)

pinsog said:


> RCAFson: Interesting. Then why did it do sopoorly against the Zero? Do you think most of the problem was pilot inexperience? Do you think the Hurricane in the hands of the US Navy and US Marines would have done well against the Zero?



Did the Hurricane perform poorly against the Zero, or was it simply outnumbered and caught in tactically unfavourable situations? We have seen how the experience of the Hurricanes on Malta differed from that of the F4Fs at Henderson. If the F4F-4 pilots at Henderson were given the Hurricane IIa, for example, why would they perform more poorly, if they were flying a faster, faster climbing, aircraft that was probably more manoeuvrable and was better suited to rough field operations? There is every reason to assume that the Hurricane IIa would do better, using exactly the same tactics as the USN/USMC pilots were using.


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## FLYBOYJ (May 31, 2010)

RCAFson said:


> Did the Hurricane perform poorly against the Zero, or was it simply outnumbered and caught in tactically unfavourable situations? We have seen how the experience of the Hurricanes on Malta differed from that of the F4Fs at Henderson. If the F4F-4 pilots at Henderson were given the Hurricane IIa, for example, why would they perform more poorly, if they were flying a faster, faster climbing, aircraft that was probably more manoeuvrable and was better suited to rough field operations?



They also had tactics down on how to deal with the Zero, but at the same time they just dove past the fighters to take on the bombers which was the primary target.


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## pinsog (May 31, 2010)

RCAFson said:


> Did the Hurricane perform poorly against the Zero, or was it simply outnumbered and caught in tactically unfavourable situations? We have seen how the experience of the Hurricanes on Malta differed from that of the F4Fs at Henderson. If the F4F-4 pilots at Henderson were given the Hurricane IIa, for example, why would they perform more poorly, if they were flying a faster, faster climbing, aircraft that was probably more manoeuvrable and was better suited to rough field operations? There is every reason to assume that the Hurricane IIa would do better, using exactly the same tactics as the USN/USMC pilots were using.



Thats what I was asking, was your opinion. Hard to tell on a computer what the other person means, I was honestly asking your opinion. If I were flying the Hurricane in that situation, I would like to opt for 4 or 6 50's and a large supply of ammo, vs 8 303's or 4 20's.


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## RCAFson (May 31, 2010)

pinsog said:


> Thats what I was asking, was your opinion. Hard to tell on a computer what the other person means, I was honestly asking your opinion. If I were flying the Hurricane in that situation, I would like to opt for 4 or 6 50's and a large supply of ammo, vs 8 303's or 4 20's.



Yes, and my opinion is that the Hurricane IIa should have done better than the F4F-4 based upon the performance stats. I would opt for 8 x .303s and a larger ammo supply, if possible, since the .303 should still be effective against the IJN aircraft which were not armoured and an 8 x .303 Hurricane would maximize climb rate and speed. However this site suggests that 4 x 20mm cannon would be best:

WORLD WAR 2 FIGHTER GUN EFFECTIVENESS

and if you only have a brief firing pass, using energy tactics, then maybe the 4 x 20mm would be the way to go. I would guess that pilots would want the lightest possible configuration when fighting the Zero.


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## parsifal (May 31, 2010)

davebender said:


> That doesn't work when the defender has as many fighter aircraft as the attacker plus the advantage of ground control radar. Your fighter sweep is likely to be ambushed by a defending fighter force at least as numerous and in a superior tactical position.



I agree with your conclusions, but not with how you got there. Fighter command was nearly always heavily outnumbered in the air battles, despite having an overall parity or near parity in numbers. Dowding refused to engage his full force because to do so was to hand the germans victory. instead he met each strike with just sufficient force to challenge that raid effectively, leaving the majority of the forces uncommitted, and hence ready for other strikes. In this he was assisted by the poor targetting choices made by the LW and their apparent inability to concentrate most of the time.

How Fighter command avoided the german fighter sweeps was not by meeting the JGs with equal or superior numbers, but simply to vector the angels around such fighter sweeps using their radar advantage and unequalled fighter control to great effect. the limited endurance of the 109 meant they could not loiter to intercept the CAP that had avoided them.

Whether a Zero force with its far superior endurance (but no radios) could rectify this wweakness in the german armoury is a mute point. I personally think the Zero was unsuited to operations in the ETO because of its structural weaknesses, and performance limitations.

Over germany in 1944-5 there was never a massive numerical advatage to the Allies in terms of long range fighters. until the end of 1944, the germans actually enjoyed superiority of numbers. what was diffrerent was the relative lethality (to ground targets) of the heavy bombers, the acute fuel shortages, and the poor logistics and serviceability ratesw brought about by the germasns neglect to build enough spares for their fighters, and most importantly, the abysmal quality of most of her pilots. Unlike the brits, the germans simply had to respond with maximum force to each and every raid, and each time they did so, they suffered enormaous losses....in the order of 7:1 by years end


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## pinsog (Jun 1, 2010)

I gotta disagree on the 303's. I figure if I won't deer hunt with it, then I wouldn't shoot airplanes with it either. Against Japanese, 4 50's would be enough, with a huge supply of ammo of course. 6 would be fine to if it didn't affect performance to badly. 4 20's would be overkill against Japanese aircraft. If you were dead on target everytime you sqeezed the trigger they would fine, since it would only take a couple of rounds to destroy one, but I think that you would spend a good portion of your time missing and trying to get on target and I don't think you would have enough ammo with 4 20's to do that. By the time you miss with 2 or 3 bursts, your out of ammo.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 1, 2010)

pinsog said:


> I gotta disagree on the 303's. I figure if I won't deer hunt with it, then I wouldn't shoot airplanes with it either. Against Japanese, 4 50's would be enough, with a huge supply of ammo of course. 6 would be fine to if it didn't affect performance to badly. 4 20's would be overkill against Japanese aircraft. If you were dead on target everytime you sqeezed the trigger they would fine, since it would only take a couple of rounds to destroy one, but I think that you would spend a good portion of your time missing and trying to get on target and I don't think you would have enough ammo with 4 20's to do that. By the time you miss with 2 or 3 bursts, your out of ammo.



Depends on the plane, I guess.

Hurricane had 90rpg. Not enough you say.

Early Zero's had 55-60 rpg and then were down to a pair or .303 mg's. 

109E's had 55-60rpg and then were down to a pair of 7.9 mg's 

so 2 or 3 bursts for them and then a pathetic armament. 

Not to mention that both of those plane's 20mm cannon were slower firing (less rounds per same length burst) and much lower in velocity making defection shooting much harder. Trying to use the mg's to range on the target and then fire the cannon only works at short range because of the flight times of the guns.

BTW> " I would like to opt for 4 or 6 50's and a large supply of ammo" for the Wildcat wasn't happening, at least the 6 gun part. Wildcats either carried 4 guns with a large supply of ammo or 6 guns with about the least amount of .50 cal ammo per gun of any US fighter. I believe only a few P-40 "stripper" versions carried less.


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## riacrato (Jun 1, 2010)

stona said:


> But look at all the aircraft powered throughout the war by the Merlin engine.I can't imagine many Spitfire or Mustang or Mosquito or Lancaster pilots saying "this would be a great aircraft if only it had fuel injection"
> I happen to agree about the Spitfire MkI and Bf109E,nothing in it. I don't know enough about the Zero to have an informed opinion.
> Cheers
> Steve



Hmm, all the Merlins/Packards in the later half (Spitfire IX, P-51, Mosquito XX) had pressure carburettors no? For a 4 engined bomber fuel injection is not that important.


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## claidemore (Jun 1, 2010)

On the subject of Hurricane vs Zero (or Ki-43), it's been discussed at length on these forums, particularly regarding the CBI theatre. My conclusion, FWIW, is that none of the performance advantages of the Hurricane could be employed tactically to give an advantage over the Zero or Oscar on a regular basis. Combine that with the RAF's 'colonial' attitude in the CBI and the rest is history! 

The .303 British is an excellent deer cartridge, ballistically it is very close to the .308 Winchester (7.62 Nato). Here in Canada it has been (and continues to be) used for everything up to and including moose and grizzly bears. (not my first choice for grizzly). I personally carred a No. 5 jungle carbine as a back up gun while guiding for moose and bears in northern BC. (also carried a 30-30 Winch and a .444 Marlin, witnessed a 500 yard one shot kill on a moose with the .30-30. Pure outhouse luck on that one.)

I think the RAF would have been more effective against the Luftwaffe bombers during BoB if they had been armed with .50 mgs instead of .303, but the .303s did manage to shoot down a lot of aircraft. 

Pretty much every airforce in the world had switched to 20mm cannon by the end of WWII, so the theory that a cannon would miss too often and make it ineffective doesn't carry much weight. Missing or hitting is primarily a product of training or lack of training and sighting systems, not weapon selection.


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## stona (Jun 1, 2010)

riacrato said:


> Hmm, all the Merlins/Packards in the later half (Spitfire IX, P-51, Mosquito XX) had pressure carburettors no? For a 4 engined bomber fuel injection is not that important.



No point in splitting hairs but that is not what I understand by fuel injection.
Cheers
Steve


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## davebender (Jun 1, 2010)

> I don't think they would have won, but the battle would have been more costly for the British.


I agree. 1940 Germany didn't have anywhere near enough aircraft to overwhelm the RAF. However the solution is more Me-109s plus drop tanks. Not a similiar number of A6M2s. 

A significant increase in Me-110s available for fighter sweeps would also make a difference. The Me-110C was faster then a Hurricane and almost as fast as a Spitfire. If not chained to the bombers it would be difficult for the RAF to intercept low level (i.e. invisible to radar) Me-110 attacks on airfields.


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## Colin1 (Jun 1, 2010)

davebender said:


> ...it would be difficult for the RAF to intercept low level (i.e. invisible to radar)...


but not to the Observer Corps


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## pinsog (Jun 1, 2010)

claidemore said:


> On the subject of Hurricane vs Zero (or Ki-43), it's been discussed at length on these forums, particularly regarding the CBI theatre. My conclusion, FWIW, is that none of the performance advantages of the Hurricane could be employed tactically to give an advantage over the Zero or Oscar on a regular basis. Combine that with the RAF's 'colonial' attitude in the CBI and the rest is history!
> 
> The .303 British is an excellent deer cartridge, ballistically it is very close to the .308 Winchester (7.62 Nato). Here in Canada it has been (and continues to be) used for everything up to and including moose and grizzly bears. (not my first choice for grizzly). I personally carred a No. 5 jungle carbine as a back up gun while guiding for moose and bears in northern BC. (also carried a 30-30 Winch and a .444 Marlin, witnessed a 500 yard one shot kill on a moose with the .30-30. Pure outhouse luck on that one.)
> 
> ...



As far as "missing or hitting is a product of training", I agree up to a point, but if your shooting a fast turning fighter like a Zero, Spitfire, Fw190 ect, he knows your behind him and he's flying for his life, it is still going to be difficult to hit him and you will have better luck with say 4 or 6 50's with between 250 and 400 rounds per gun and a high rate of fire, than you will with 2 or 4 20's with 50 to 90 rounds per gun and a low rate of fire.
Heavy bombers are a different story, 20's are the only way to go. Some mediums were very tough also, but ironically, they were mostly American built, B25,B26,A26. 

I have a couple of friends that are amazing shots with shotguns, but they still use #8's for dove, not buckshot.


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## parsifal (Jun 1, 2010)

davebender said:


> I agree. 1940 Germany didn't have anywhere near enough aircraft to overwhelm the RAF. However the solution is more Me-109s plus drop tanks. Not a similiar number of A6M2s.
> 
> A significant increase in Me-110s available for fighter sweeps would also make a difference. The Me-110C was faster then a Hurricane and almost as fast as a Spitfire. If not chained to the bombers it would be difficult for the RAF to intercept low level (i.e. invisible to radar) Me-110 attacks on airfields.



You keep making statements like this, for which there is absolutely no historical backing. I am not trying to give you a hard time, merely to give a different opnion on your statements.

The LW in 1940 outnumbered the RAF by at least 2:1 in frontline aircraft. Thats an advantage at least as comparable as that enjoyed by the allies in 1944. Granted the reserves and the uncommitted forces in 1944 in the allied camp made losses largely irrelevant, but in terms of frontline strengths,. the Germans had enough strength to win (in 1940).

What they lacked was the right equipment a cogent war winning strategy, and the production and training regime to support a sustained campaign with heavy losses. Their bombers were too weakly defended, their bombloads too small, their fighters too short ranged, or too unmanouverable (in the case of the 110) to be of any use. Tactically they failed to concentrate properly which made none of their strikes decisive. 

With regard to the Me 110 possibilities, I agree they were badly used, but they could not have been used in the way you describe to any great effect. Your suggestion was basically tried (with 109s and 110s) and failed due to the existence of the CL stations and for the need for the attacking fighters to approach at much less than top speed in order to conserve fuel. Sufficient early warning existed in the CL stations to give warning, and as the targets of these fighter sweeps were inevitably RAF airfields, this made positioning of RAF assets just easier, not harder. Moreover, Dowding after a couple of sucker punches refused to respond to such tactics, conserving his fighter forces for the bombers. The German fighter sweeps achieved nothing, because the civil defence measures at the airfields meant that strafing runs orfighter bomber raids would do nothing more than cause nuisance. Worse, such efforts simply weakened the fighter defences of the escort thereby making the RAFs job that much easier.


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## Glider (Jun 1, 2010)

davebender said:


> I agree. 1940 Germany didn't have anywhere near enough aircraft to overwhelm the RAF. However the solution is more Me-109s plus drop tanks. Not a similiar number of A6M2s.
> 
> A significant increase in Me-110s available for fighter sweeps would also make a difference. The Me-110C was faster then a Hurricane and almost as fast as a Spitfire. If not chained to the bombers it would be difficult for the RAF to intercept low level (i.e. invisible to radar) Me-110 attacks on airfields.



The 110 suffered very heavy losses when tied to bombers or freelancing against Spits or Hurricanes. They did use them for independent low level attacks of airfields and suffered for it

Its often forgotten that all German raids were invisible to radar once they had crossed the coast as nearly all the RAF radar was on the coast pointing out to sea. Once inland the British relied on the Observer Corps who worked well against all enemy aircraft low down or at altitude.


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## Vincenzo (Jun 1, 2010)

parsifal said:


> The LW in 1940 outnumbered the RAF by at least 2:1 in frontline aircraft. .



maybe but we need do watch only the units that go in the battle and not all.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 1, 2010)

pinsog said:


> I agree up to a point, but if your shooting a fast turning fighter like a Zero, Spitfire, Fw190 ect, he knows your behind him and he's flying for his life, it is still going to be difficult to hit him and you will have better luck with say 4 or 6 50's with between 250 and 400 rounds per gun and a high rate of fire, than you will with 2 or 4 20's with 50 to 90 rounds per gun and a low rate of fire.



the Wildcat with 4 .50s had a Max of 430 rpg. With a rate if fire of about 14 rounds per second per gun that gives 56 rounds per second. It did vary a bit. It also means the F4F-3 had about 30 seconds of firing time. The F4F-4 with 6 guns carried a max of 240rpg. or just over 17 seconds of firing time. Both set ups have much more firing time than the 4 Hispanos in the Hurricane which were good for about 9 seconds or three 3 second bursts. However at 600rpm or 10 rounds a second per gun the Hurricane was throwing FORTY 20mm shells a second which isn't that many fewer than the four .50s and is a far cry from the 18 or fewer 20mm shells per second from the 109 or Zero. The Hurricane also had a good 2 seconds more firing time than the 109 or Zero and with shells that had a MV 280m/s faster than all but the German "mine" shell the Hispano was easier to hit with than the early Axis cannon.


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## davebender (Jun 1, 2010)

*BoB OOB September 1940.*
Document-49: Fighter Command Order of Battle Sept 15th 1940
I see no reason to think RAF fighter aircraft were outnumbered during the Battle of Britain.

RAF Bomber Command flew over 17,000 sorties at night from May to December 1940 while losing 340 aircraft. I suspect that compares well with German bonber sorties over Britain during the same time frame.


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## pinsog (Jun 1, 2010)

Shortround6 said:


> the Wildcat with 4 .50s had a Max of 430 rpg. With a rate if fire of about 14 rounds per second per gun that gives 56 rounds per second. It did vary a bit. It also means the F4F-3 had about 30 seconds of firing time. The F4F-4 with 6 guns carried a max of 240rpg. or just over 17 seconds of firing time. Both set ups have much more firing time than the 4 Hispanos in the Hurricane which were good for about 9 seconds or three 3 second bursts. However at 600rpm or 10 rounds a second per gun the Hurricane was throwing FORTY 20mm shells a second which isn't that many fewer than the four .50s and is a far cry from the 18 or fewer 20mm shells per second from the 109 or Zero. The Hurricane also had a good 2 seconds more firing time than the 109 or Zero and with shells that had a MV 280m/s faster than all but the German "mine" shell the Hispano was easier to hit with than the early Axis cannon.



9 seconds isn't very long when your chasing a hard turning single engine fighter and it was the best of the 20mm group for both firing time and weight per second. Didn't the P47 carry around 400 rpg?


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## Shortround6 (Jun 1, 2010)

pinsog said:


> 9 seconds isn't very long when your chasing a hard turning single engine fighter and it was the best of the 20mm group for both firing time and weight per second. Didn't the P47 carry around 400 rpg?



Yes but perhaps only if not carrying underwing ordnance. In some cases they were restricted to 267rpg.

Most people figure you are doing good if you can keep the opponent in the gun sight for 3 seconds at a time. Keeping the trigger pressed and hosing the sky isn't a good way to get hits. The .50 also had a problem with over heating . very long bursts ruined the barrel by eroding the throat and rifling. This lead to lower velocity and gross inaccuracy. It could also be accomplished in just few hundred rounds if the trigger was held down continuously for 20 seconds or so. 

Hurricane was actually one of the the worst Hispano armed fighters that used a belt feed. Most carried 120-150 rpg.

But we are wandering somewhat off topic.

In 1940 the Spitfire carried either 300 or 350rpg for i'ts .303 depending on MK while the Hurricane carried 334rpg? at 20 rounds/sec or just under that gives them about 15-17 seconds of firing time or a fraction more if guns are a little slow. Zero runs out of cannon shells (assuming that the Zero really is a 1940 fighter) in 7 seconds or less and then is left with the remainder of it's 500rpg ammo load for it's synchronized .303 cowl guns. The 109 is pretty much in the same boat 20mm wise but it's faster firing syrcroed 7.9mm mg's have the rather strange amount of 1000rpg. Almost a full minute of firing time. If the 109 pilot fired in bursts he might run out of fuel before he ran out of mg ammo. Granted they only planed on 500rpg when the engine cannon was fitted and threw in the extra 500rpg when the engine cannon didn't work but it does make one think which guns the Japanese and Germans were getting their kills with and if the two cowl guns worked then why were eight wing guns so bad?


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## Milosh (Jun 1, 2010)

davebender said:


> *BoB OOB September 1940.*
> Document-49: Fighter Command Order of Battle Sept 15th 1940
> I see no reason to think RAF fighter aircraft were outnumbered during the Battle of Britain.



Don't look at total numbers. Most of the fighting was done by 11 Group with a little help supplied by 10 and 12 Groups. 13 group was just too far away from the combat over south east England.


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## Hop (Jun 2, 2010)

> Document-49: Fighter Command Order of Battle Sept 15th 1940
> I see no reason to think RAF fighter aircraft were outnumbered during the Battle of Britain.



They certainly weren't towards the end of the battle.

The beginning is another matter. On 10 July the RAF had 570 operational Spitfires and Hurricanes. The Luftwaffe had about 1,100 operational 109s and 110s.

By 7 September the RAF was up to 620 operational Spits and Hurricanes, the Luftwaffe down to 770 operational 109s and 110s.

Even then, though, the Luftwaffe was pretty much concentrated against the SE of England, whereas the RAF was spread over the UK.


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## Vincenzo (Jun 2, 2010)

Hop said:


> They certainly weren't towards the end of the battle.
> 
> The beginning is another matter. On 10 July the RAF had 570 operational Spitfires and Hurricanes. The Luftwaffe had about 1,100 operational 109s and 110s.
> 
> ...



operational mean?


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## Kurfürst (Jun 2, 2010)

Hop said:


> They certainly weren't towards the end of the battle.
> 
> The beginning is another matter. On 10 July the RAF had 570 operational Spitfires and Hurricanes. The Luftwaffe had about 1,100 operational 109s and 110s.



The RAF wasn't outnumbered in the beginning either. Now, usually the Hops like to quote strenght figures for the RAF at the beginning of July, and of course count only British single engined fighters while 110s are 'naturally' included. 

But that was hardly representative of their relative strenght, since Fighter Command was rapidly expanding at the time, and, the Germans didn't start the Battle proper until mid-August. In specific number, although only 871 fighters were present with RAF fighter squadrons (644 being ready for ops), in just two weeks, by 20 July there were 1052 British fighters, altough the number available for ops remained pretty much the same (658).

Of course during July 1940 not much happened, ops were largely limited to small skirmishes, with light losses - the Germans for example reported just 34 Bf 109s and 19 Bf 110s lost to enemy action during the whole month. In August, when they started the battle proper, the figures were 177 and 114.

When the Battle started, there was pretty much parity between the number of fighters on both sides. 

The Germans weren't committing all of their strength against Britain, either, although Hop quotes figures _for the entire Luftwaffe _(including that in Germany and elsewhere not taking part)

The number of fighters employed against the British Isles on 10th August, when the Germans begun to launch serious operations, was 805 _servicable_ Bf 109s and 224 servicable Bf 110s, out of a force of 934 and 289, 1223 in total "present" (ie. both servicable and unservicable aircraft). The 110s weren't all used as fighters either, as they often acted as light bombers.

Against this, the British reported, on the same day, 1106 fighters present, out of which 749 were serviceable, mostly single engined fighters.



> By 7 September the RAF was up to 620 operational Spits and Hurricanes, the Luftwaffe down to 770 operational 109s and 110s.
> 
> 
> 
> ...


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## parsifal (Jun 2, 2010)

Dave
As others have pointed out, because the RAF was on the defensive, it had to spread itself out allover the british isles , which meant that only a fraction of its strength could be deployed to the battle at any given time. This was admittedly less of a handicap than it might otherwise be, since Dowding needed to constantly rotate units and rest and rebuild them during the battle, which he did by rotating worn units to the quieter sectors.

Just the same the total numbers are entirely misleading. A more accurate estimate is to assume about 2/3 of RAF Fighter command as being available at any given time.

The figures i am giving for the Germans only represent the forces committed to the battle in the Southwast. i have ignored those units on garrison in the east, over Germany and in Norway.

I dont understand why you think the strengths given at 15 Septmeber represent an accurate figure for the initial forces. by 15 September, the Luftwaffe was beginning to feel the strain, which shows in their readiness numbers. The RAF, in contrast was beginning to grow stronger by that time, so quoting numbers from that time period is neither accurate. 

The figures I am giving are frontline operational numbers. Though it can be argued that the RAF enjoyed replacements about two to three times as great as the LW, they also laboured under an acute shortage of pilots, which initially affected the LW less at the beginning. As the battl;e progresed and pilots were killed or more commonly shot down over enemy territory, the Germans too suffered heavily in pilots. Later, because they did not have an adequate air training scheme in place (having planned for a short duration conflict only) they were unable to replace pilots at a fast enough rate and or at a reasonable standard of training.

Lastly a word about readiness rates. As the battle progressed, the poor replacement and logistic system supporting the germans (again as a result of the German lack of depth in thair prewar planning) German readiness rates plummetted in comparison to the RAFs. 

I have a number of sources that I could use, but decided to use the most pro-Axis that I could find, being Ellis's statistical index. The figures at selected dates during the battle are as follws

Jul06

FC: 644
JG: 980
KG: 1280
SG: 220

FC/LW ratio 0.25
FC/JG Ratio 0.67

Aug10

FC: 749
JG: 1030
KG: 1078
SG: 261

FC/LW ratio 0.28
FC/JG Ratio 0.73

Sep07

FC: 745
JG: 752
KG: 772
SG: 180

FC/LW ratio 0.45
FC/JG Ratio 0.95

Sep28

FC: 792
JG: 510
KG: 750
SG: 340

FC/LW ratio 0.56
FC/JG Ratio 1.6


I apologise but my ratios are approximate....i cannot find my calculator....but they are good enough to make the point. Throughout the critical months of July and August the Germans held a critical advantage in numbers. By early September they had been defeated, in particular the Me109 forces so often touted as superior to the RAF FGighters had ben demonstrably cleared from the field of battle. It was a blow that the LW never really recovered completely from. 

But the main point I wanted to make is that at tha the beginning and up to about half way through the battle the LW in all critical categories held a substantial numerical advantage...

It would be intersting to compare this with the operational strewngths of the 8th AF and the Reich Defences in 1944-5


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## Kurfürst (Jun 2, 2010)

parsifal said:


> Dave
> As others have pointed out, because the RAF was on the defensive, it had to spread itself out allover the british isles , which meant that only a fraction of its strength could be deployed to the battle at any given time. This was admittedly less of a handicap than it might otherwise be, since Dowding needed to constantly rotate units and rest and rebuild them during the battle, which he did by rotating worn units to the quieter sectors.



I often wondered about that arguement - while its true the RAF Group in the SE bore the brunt of the fighting, the other Groups too did make a contribution. 

I wonder if there are any figures for how many victory claims were by the RAF FCs Groups respectively?






> Lastly a word about readiness rates. As the battle progressed, the poor replacement and logistic system supporting the germans (again as a result of the German lack of depth in thair prewar planning) German readiness rates plummetted in comparison to the RAFs.



This doesn't sound right. German servicibilty rates did drop, but FC was in still in a poorer position in comparison. Of course the Germans concentrated on destroying British fighters, and the British on destroying German bombers (which started with a very low servicibility rate after the BoF in the first place, ie. 67% readiness on 10 August with the deployed units)

Between the 24 August and 4 September German serviceability rates, which were acceptable at Stuka units, were running at 75% with Bf 109s, 70% with bombers and 65% with Bf 110s. Serviceability rates in Fighter Command's fighter squadrons, between the 24 August and 7 September, were listed as: 64.8% on the 24 August; 64.7% on 31 August and 64.25% on the 7 September 1940, indicating a slow decline.




> Jul06
> 
> FC: 644
> JG: 980
> ...




Something is not right for September... I mean, fighter units drop down by 240 in twenty days (with all permanent losses reported being 220 for the whole month due to all causes!), while Stuka units doubled in size...? Besides that all JG units (everywhere, excluding those in the Nachtjagd) reporting Single engine fighters - 28.09.40 920 Bf 109s present, 712 of them servicable on the same day on the 28th September..?

I suspect that your source counts the 109 Jabo conversions in September as Stukas/dive bombers or something like that for the 28th, but still as "JG" for the 7th.


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## Milosh (Jun 2, 2010)

Another source of Lw OoB.
Luftwaffe Campaign Orders of Battle

Includes 'on hand' and 'serviceable numbers'


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## Milosh (Jun 2, 2010)

Kurfürst said:


> This doesn't sound right. German servicibilty rates did drop, but FC was in still in a poorer position in comparison. Of course the Germans concentrated on destroying British fighters, and the British on destroying German bombers (which started with a very low servicibility rate after the BoF in the first place, ie. 67% readiness on 10 August with the deployed units)
> 
> Between the 24 August and 4 September German serviceability rates, which were acceptable at Stuka units, were running at 75% with Bf 109s, 70% with bombers and 65% with Bf 110s. Serviceability rates in Fighter Command's fighter squadrons, between the 24 August and 7 September, were listed as: 64.8% on the 24 August; 64.7% on 31 August and 64.25% on the 7 September 1940, indicating a slow decline.



One only has to look at the number of German fighters available throughout the BoB. parsifal's statement is true as the number of Lw fighters steadily declined.


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## Marcel (Jun 2, 2010)

parsifal said:


> Dave
> As others have pointed out, because the RAF was on the defensive, it had to spread itself out allover the british isles , which meant that only a fraction of its strength could be deployed to the battle at any given time.


This is one of those things that has been disputed over time. The decision to mainly use 11th group to counter the Germans was mainly made by Dowding, a decision which made him receive a lot of criticism. This coupled with the failure to solve the bitterness between 11th group and 12th group commanders makes one wonder what would have happened if 12th group would have been involved more in the defence of the southern sector. Maybe RAF would not have been so hard pressed, more fighters could have been in the air at any given time over south-east England. But as I said, it's a discussion that has been going on for years.


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## Hop (Jun 2, 2010)

> operational mean?



Serviceable with pilot. 

The RAF had fighters in reserve. I don't believe the Germans did.

However, only an operational fighter can actually take part in combat.

As to sortie numbers, Kurfurst is using an unsourced figure that probably comes from the British estimates of German operations.

Hooton gives German sorties:









> maybe but we need do watch only the units that go in the battle and not all.



Yes. I did a chart of JG deployments, from figures I think you posted on the board some time ago:






A black line indicates a unit which had been disbanded or hadn't been formed. Red means they were deployed away from NW France, green means they were deployed on the Channel coast.

The vertical yellow line indicates Eagle Day.

Fighter Command Deployments for 7 September:






The numbers in the red circles show how many FC squadrons based at a particular field, and the large black circles are a 120 mile radius from the German fighter bases. That's a bit beyond the Luftwaffe's practical radius of action.

In total the RAF had 60 fighter squadrons. About 25 were based outside the normal combat area. However, if you look at the events on 7 September, it highlights the problem for the RAF. The Luftwaffe concentrated on London, which means the squadrons in the West Country were out of the battle area as well.


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## Vincenzo (Jun 2, 2010)

this is the 28 september page with add airports
Unit	Type	Est.	On Str.	Serv.	Est.	Pres.	Ready	Airport
I./JG2	Bf 109E	39	36	29	39	39	33	Beaumont-le-Roger (180 km from england cost)
Stab/JG2	Bf 109E	4	4	3	4	4	2	Beaumont-le-Roger (180 km from england cost)
II./JG2	Bf 109E	39	32	22	39	36	26	Beaumont-le-Roger (180 km from england cost)
III./JG2	Bf 109E	39	25	11	39	41	18	Le Havre-Octeville (130 km from england cost)
Stab/JG3	Bf 109E	4	3	3	4	2	2	Desvres (60 km from england cost)
I./JG3	Bf 109E	39	37	30	39	24	18	St. Omer-Wizernes (70 km from england cost)
II./JG3	Bf 109E	39	31	20	39	24	24	Arques (110 km from england cost)
III./JG3	Bf 109E	39	26	18	39	29	23	Desvres (60 km from england cost)
Stab/JG26	Bf 109E	4	4	2	4	3	1	Audembert (30 km from england cost)
I./JG26	Bf 109E	39	32	27	39	30	24	Audembert (30 km from england cost)
II./JG26	Bf 109E	39	34	26	39	31	20	Marquise-Ost (40 km from england cost)
III./JG26	Bf 109E	39	31	26	39	24	20	Caffiers (40 km from england cost)
Stab/JG27	Bf 109E	4	3	3	4	3	3	Guines (40 km from england cost)
I./JG27	Bf 109E	39	30	26	39	36	19	Guines (40 km from england cost)
II./JG27	Bf 109E	39	30	25	39	31	20	St. Inglevert (30 km from england cost)
III./JG27	Bf 109E	39	32	24	39	32	22	Guines (40 km from england cost)
Stab/JG51	Bf 109E	4	4	4	4	2	2	St. Inglevert/Pihen (30 km from england cost)
I./JG51	Bf 109E	39	37	26	39	30	18	St. Inglevert/Pihen (30 km from england cost)
*II./JG51	Bf 109E	39	35	28	39	34	25	Aalborg (700 km from england cost)*
III./JG51	Bf 109E	39	36	30	39	26	18	St. Omer-Nord (70 km from england cost)
Stab/JG52	Bf 109E	4	2	2	4	1	1	Calais-Marck (40 km from england cost)
I./JG52	Bf 109E	39	28	21	39	24	17	Cocquelles (30 km from england cost)
II./JG52	Bf 109E	39	25	24	39	29	17	Peuplingues (30 km from england cost)
*III./JG52	Bf 109E	39	28	28	39	38	38	Berlin-Schönwalde (780 km from england cost)*
Stab/JG53	Bf 109E	4	3	3	4	4	3	Etaples (60 km from england cost)
I./JG53	Bf 109E	39	31	29	39	34	21	Etaples (60 km from england cost)
II./JG53	Bf 109E	39	28	18	39	24	19	Berck-sur-Mer (60 km from england cost)
III./JG53	Bf 109E	39	31	22	39	36	23	Le Touquet-Etaples (60 km from england cost)
Stab/JG54	Bf 109E	4	3	3	4	3	3	Campagne-les-Guines (40 km from england cost)
*I./JG54	Bf 109E	39	24	15	39	32	23	Jever (420 km form england cost)*
II./JG54	Bf 109E	39	43	29	39	38	20	Campagne-les-Guines (40 km from england cost)
III./JG54	Bf 109E	39	35	28	39	33	28	Guines-sud (40 km from england cost)
*Stab/JG77	Bf 109E	4	4	4	4	4	4	Döberitz (760 km form england cost)*
I./JG77	Bf 109E	39	31	30	39	25	22	Marquise (40 km from england cost)
*II./JG77	Bf 109E	39	42	33	39	35	35	Kristiansand-Kjevik (580 km from scotland cost)*
*III./JG77	Bf 109E	39	26	17	39	38	34	Döberitz (760 km from england cost)* 
*Stab/JG1	Bf 109E	4	4	4	4	4	3	Jever (420 km form england cost)*
I./LG2	Bf 109E	39	27	19	39	34	25	Calais/Marck (40 km from england cost)
TOTAL	-	1132	920	712	1132	917	676

of 676 serviceable pilots 162 were away from england


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## davebender (Jun 2, 2010)

1940 Germany had nowhere near enough fighter and bomber aircraft to bring Britain to it's knees via aerial bombardment. Furthermore the Luftwaffe lacked essential equipment like drop tanks for the Me-109s and aerial mines for the He-111s and Ju-88s.

Replacing all the Me-109Es with an equal number of A6M2s (without drop tanks) is unlikely to change the result in Germany's favor. Germany survived a far larger Allied bombing campaign during 1943 with relatively little damge to their war effort.


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## parsifal (Jun 2, 2010)

You may be right about the Jabos, but I disgree with JG losses you give. In the month 28 August through to 1 October, JG losses (were 300 SE fighters (109s) and 106 TE fighters (110s). By comparison the RAF lost a total of 471, though by that stage the numbers of pilots being lost was dropping. These are the figures that I know....the next bit is my best guess. 

I think that by September the supply of JG pilots was starting to dry up, as in the preceding months there had been an exceptionally heavy drain on the german fighter forces over both France and England. I estimate they lost about 600 fighters in the BOF, and since July over England a further 342 pilots. In September you then have to add a further 406 fighters, and probably close to that number in pilots. Deliveries of replacement aircraft were about 150 new aircraft. There were therefore not enough aiframes to replace the losses sustained. I also believe that with only about 5000 DB601 engines produced in 1940 (and the majority of these being used in new production) that the serviceability rates of the existing fleet had to be suffering. But the shortfall in aircraft and replacement engines was not the limiting factor. I think the main problem for the LW was pilot shortages. they no longer had the pilots to fly those aircraft, very similar to the british, who enjoyed a huge advantage in aircraft reserves but lacked the pilots to fly them. But the pilot wastage for the RAF was much lower than that for the LW....roughly 1/2 to 2/3 of the pilots shot down were returning to duty, unlike the germans who were losing close to 100% of aircrew.

Your figures for available Luftwaffe fighters as at 28 September is completely at odds with at least four other very good sources that I have direct access to, unless you are including wrecks and write offs in that figure. Most sources quote that front line operational strenghts for the me 109 units had fallen to below 300. One source says that by the end of October the germans were down to as few as 238 SE fighters in the operational area. If you are correct on this figure, then the germans simply tired of winning and packed up. On the figures you believe are true they should have won the battle hands down....and clearly they did not

I disagree with your figures about serviceability rates, but suspect that the RAF might be keeping squadron strengths up by calling on those ready reserves mentioned earlier. AFAIK readiness rates in the south east were always maintained at a high level, though squadrons that were no longer ready were often shipped out for R&R, and after heavy fighting this might lead to less squadrons in the critical sector. It might need to be acknowledged as a moot point I guess 

But th4e clincher here is that if you are right, and the Luftwaffe fighter strength remained above 700 through to October, then the British were heavily outnumbered throughout the campaign and not just at the beginning and in the middle as i am suggesting. It means either that the germans simply tired of the battle and gave up, or the advantages of the Spitfire are even greater than i had thought, since they were able to clinch victory despite being so heavily outnumbered. I dont believe that, but I am merely pointing out the inconsistencies arising from the claims you are making.....


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## Colin1 (Jun 2, 2010)

parsifal said:


> ...or the advantages of the Spitfire are even greater than i had thought, since they were able to clinch victory despite being so heavily outnumbered. I dont believe that, but I am merely pointing out the inconsistencies arising from the claims you are making.....


The principal advantage
of the Spitfire was that the Bf109 was forced to engage it at the end of its endurance tether, the Luftwaffe simply couldn't stick around long enough to make any technical superiority/tactics/numbers count. This is borne out by the fate of the RAF when the initiative was handed to them after the Battle of Britain and they embarked on rhubarbs over the continent; Fighter Command losses over Europe mirrored Luftwaffe losses/causes over SE England with remarkable accuracy.


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## pinsog (Jun 2, 2010)

QUOTE=Shortround6;676632]Yes but perhaps only if not carrying underwing ordnance. In some cases they were restricted to 267rpg.

Most people figure you are doing good if you can keep the opponent in the gun sight for 3 seconds at a time. Keeping the trigger pressed and hosing the sky isn't a good way to get hits. The .50 also had a problem with over heating . very long bursts ruined the barrel by eroding the throat and rifling. This lead to lower velocity and gross inaccuracy. It could also be accomplished in just few hundred rounds if the trigger was held down continuously for 20 seconds or so. 

I agree. I didn't mean for the pilot to hold the trigger down and spray, but there are alot more 2 second bursts available with 250-400 rounds of 50 than with 100 or so 20mm. David McCampbell in a Hellcat with I think 400 rnds per gun(?) shot down 9 Japanese aircraft verified(maybe more) in one mission. I don't think a standard single engine fighter armed with 20's could have done that. 

Hurricane was actually one of the the worst Hispano armed fighters that used a belt feed. Most carried 120-150 rpg.

But we are wandering somewhat off topic.

In 1940 the Spitfire carried either 300 or 350rpg for i'ts .303 depending on MK while the Hurricane carried 334rpg? at 20 rounds/sec or just under that gives them about 15-17 seconds of firing time or a fraction more if guns are a little slow. Zero runs out of cannon shells (assuming that the Zero really is a 1940 fighter) in 7 seconds or less and then is left with the remainder of it's 500rpg ammo load for it's synchronized .303 cowl guns. The 109 is pretty much in the same boat 20mm wise but it's faster firing syrcroed 7.9mm mg's have the rather strange amount of 1000rpg. Almost a full minute of firing time. If the 109 pilot fired in bursts he might run out of fuel before he ran out of mg ammo. Granted they only planed on 500rpg when the engine cannon was fitted and threw in the extra 500rpg when the engine cannon didn't work but it does make one think which guns the Japanese and Germans were getting their kills with and if the two cowl guns worked then why were eight wing guns so bad?[/QUOTE]

Maybe this contibuted to the reputation of American fighters being so difficult to destroy? When your out of 20mm and down to 2 rifle caliber cowl guns vs 6 50's on the other plane, I would think it's time to go home. Saburo Sakai said he shot a Wildcat with 500-600 rnds with his cowl guns and it wouldn't fall, so ended up using his 20mm to finish it. (I'm sure you've read that in SAMURI). Oh well, I still think 6 50's were the best weapon of the time period against single engine aircraft. Just my opinion.


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## Milosh (Jun 2, 2010)

The statement of RAF FC squadrons having a serviceability rate of ~65% requires some clarification.

Is this 65% of the establishment or of the flying combat component of the squadron? If the former, then that gives 13 a/c available for combat but if the later only gives 8 a/c available for combat. (establishment = 20 a/c)

If the former then the squadron would have the full combat component available or a serviceable rate of 100%+. 

Another thing is, though it might be said that FC had 750 fighters 'on hand', this is not an indication that this was the number capable of participating in the air battles. Approx. 2/3 of the RAF FC a/c were in the combat zone of southeast England which gives 500 a/c establishment strength. One then has to factor in the combat component of the squadron which gives a number of ~330 a/c.

For the Lw, iirc, a Gruppe had a establishment strength of 40 a/c (3 staffel x 12 a/c + 4 stab a/c). If as it is stated that Lw serviceable rate was 75%, then only 30 a/c were available.

Clearly the RAF had a better serviceability rate than the Lw when compared with establishment numbers.


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## davebender (Jun 2, 2010)

That's to be expected when the RAF were operating out of airfields in Britain (i.e. no logisitics pipeline) and the Luftwaffe were operating out of recently captured French airfields.


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## Kurfürst (Jun 2, 2010)

Hop said:


> The RAF had fighters in reserve. I don't believe the Germans did.



IMHO its pretty obvious they had plenty of fighters in reserve, after all, up to July 1940, some 2212 Bf 109Es were produced (plus 1065 Jumo engined ones that were largely retired by WW2, but I suppose they didn't throw those away either).

Now, at the end of June 1940, they had 1087 Emils with the frontline units, after 250 Bf 109s became a total loss during the Battle of France. A couple of dozen, perhaphs became a loss in Poland, and during the Sitzkrieg, but I would very much doubt it would be much - iirc a mere 200 109s were deployed against Poland, and, half of them were old Jumo engined ones.

2212 109Es produced - 1087 present with units - 250 lost = 875 Bf 109s being in reserve, minus perhaps a hundred at most that were lost in accidents and minor skirmishes during the winter. In addition, during the Battle of Britain, they produced some 718 new ones.

Fighter airframes were never a concern to the Germans during the Battle of Britain. They had plenty in reserve, just do the math.



Hop said:


> As to sortie numbers, Kurfurst is using an unsourced figure that probably comes from the British estimates of German operations.



No, and I do wonder why you keep selling the same false story when a couple of weeks before you told the same story, and the origin and the source of the numbers were made clear to you, not to mention a good deal before you yourself admitted that the sortie numbers I posted and the numbers you posted are from the same source, just counted differently (Hop's source German single engined fighter sorties, twin engined fighter sorties and even fighter-bomber sorties together; mine appearantly counts Jabo sorties as bomber sorties, which they were.)

Hop wants to boast the German sortie numbers a bit, to show how much outnumbered the Fighter Command was, which is making his arguements a bit schizophrenic: at one time he argues the Germans had no fighters available to them, and at another time that their fighters blocked the sun from the sky... 



> In total the RAF had 60 fighter squadrons. About 25 were based outside the normal combat area. However, if you look at the events on 7 September, it highlights the problem for the RAF. The Luftwaffe concentrated on London, which means the squadrons in the West Country were out of the battle area as well.



What was the practical combat range of a Hurricane or Spitfire - zero miles ie. incapable of anything else but to hover over their own base...? At least it would seem so if I go by your reasoning, ie. if a RAF Fighter Sqn's base was not within the range of the 109s, then they were out of the Battle somehow..


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## Milosh (Jun 2, 2010)

Kurfürst said:


> Fighter airframes were never a concern to the Germans during the Battle of Britain. They had plenty in reserve, just do the math.



If that so Kurfurst, then why did the number of 109s available in France steadily decrease during BoB? The Germans should have been able to replace those 109s lost very easily.


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## Kurfürst (Jun 2, 2010)

parsifal said:


> You may be right about the Jabos, but I disgree with JG losses you give. In the month 28 August through to 1 October, JG losses (were 300 SE fighters (109s) and 106 TE fighters (110s). By comparison the RAF lost a total of 471, though by that stage the numbers of pilots being lost was dropping. These are the figures that I know....the next bit is my best guess.



This seems about right, if you count every kind of loss, including damaged ones, to all causes, including outside operations. 



> I think that by September the supply of JG pilots was starting to dry up, as in the preceding months there had been an exceptionally heavy drain on the german fighter forces over both France and England. I estimate they lost about 600 fighters in the BOF, and since July over England a further 342 pilots.



Actual German JG permanent losses (ie. completely destroyed aircraft) during the *Battle of France* were 250 (Murray gives 257, and notes that 169 of these were to enemy action), plus 126 aircraft that were damaged recoverable (Murray: 150, to all causes, inc. outside operations). They operated over enemy terrotory, so I would guess that about 150 pilots become loss, 25-50% of them dead, but most of the rest were libarated and returned to service when France surrendered (most notably Werner Moelders).



> Your figures for available Luftwaffe fighters as at 28 September is completely at odds with at least four other very good sources that I have direct access to, unless you are including wrecks and write offs in that figure. Most sources quote that front line operational strenghts for the me 109 units had fallen to below 300. One source says that by the end of October the germans were down to as few as 238 SE fighters in the operational area.



Hmm. In a post earlier you said that the Germans had some 500 fighters, now its "below 300", and perhaps even as few as a mere 238...? 

I would like to know this source because the figures I posted are taken from German strenght reports directly from files at the BA-MA.



> If you are correct on this figure, then the germans simply tired of winning and packed up. On the figures you believe are true they should have won the battle hands down....and clearly they did not



Certainly the Germans did not packed up and went to mind their own business in the automn - at least not until May 1941. They certainly failed to crush the RAF in a week of heavy hammering, though they came close to bleeding them dry of reserves by early September. 

On the other hand, they pretty much bombed everything they wanted in Britain for almost a year (July 1940 - May 1941), until the LW re-deployed against the USSR.


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## parsifal (Jun 2, 2010)

Though we disagree on many points, it seems your original position that the LW was outnumbered is now being contradicted by your own information, by your own reasoning it had some thousands of fighters, and actually outnumbered the effective RAF strength by at least 2:1 until the very end.

Intersting conclusions that you reach that effectively the LW won the battle. I dont think any other student of this period, with any credibility would support that notion. You do realise this puts you in the category of being "out there", dont you?

The refernce to 500 a/c, is both SE and TE types, the 300 a/c is simply SE types


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## Kurfürst (Jun 2, 2010)

parsifal said:


> Though we disagree on many points, it seems your original position that the LW was outnumbered...



This wasn't my position. To clarify, my position is that Fighter Command wasn't heavily outnumbered by the German fighters, ie. the common notion that runs in BoB mythology. By the time the Germans launched their operations proper in mid-August, the RAF was able to rebuild its numbers from the crippling losses in France. 



> is now being contradicted by your own information, by your own reasoning it had some thousands of fighters, and actually outnumbered the effective RAF strength by at least 2:1 until the very end.



In that case you didn't fully grasp the information I provided.



> Intersting conclusions that you reach that effectively the LW won the battle. I dont think any other student of this period, with any credibility would support that notion. You do realise this puts you in the category of being "out there", dont you?



Again you seem to fail to grasp my actual position - or you distort it proposefully. 

Fighter Command survived the Luftwaffe's attacks, but I fear that is all that can be said about it.



> The refernce to 500 a/c, is both SE and TE types, the 300 a/c is simply SE types



I see. In that case the unnamed reference you are using is clearly contradicted by the actual daily strength reports by Luftwaffe daylight fighter units, as shown.


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## Vincenzo (Jun 2, 2010)

for LW availability on 28th september of bf 109 see my post 105th, there were 514 pilots and 583 fighters within 200 km form british cost


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## Glider (Jun 2, 2010)

Kurfurst I do wonder where you get your figures. I have gone back to this posting as it contains most of the information you supplied regarding numbers.


Kurfürst said:


> The RAF wasn't outnumbered in the beginning either. Now, usually the Hops like to quote strenght figures for the RAF at the beginning of July, and of course count only British single engined fighters while 110s are 'naturally' included.


This is understandable. During the conquest of Europe the Me110 had done everything that was asked of it as a fighter and the Luftwaffe were more than happy with it in the fighter role. 



> But that was hardly representative of their relative strenght, since Fighter Command was rapidly expanding at the time, and, the Germans didn't start the Battle proper until mid-August. In specific number, although only 871 fighters were present with RAF fighter squadrons (644 being ready for ops), in just two weeks, by 20 July there were 1052 British fighters, altough the number available for ops remained pretty much the same (658).



Fighter Command Serviceable Aircraft as at 0900 hours, 20 July 1940
Blenheim - 62 
Spitfire - 224 
Hurricane - 308 
Defiant - 11 
Total - 605 of which 532 can be considered battleworthy



> When the Battle started, there was pretty much parity between the number of fighters on both sides.
> The Germans weren't committing all of their strength against Britain, either, although Hop quotes figures _for the entire Luftwaffe _(including that in Germany and elsewhere not taking part)
> 
> The number of fighters employed against the British Isles on 10th August, when the Germans begun to launch serious operations, was 805 _servicable_ Bf 109s and 224 servicable Bf 110s, out of a force of 934 and 289, 1223 in total "present" (ie. both servicable and unservicable aircraft). The 110s weren't all used as fighters either, as they often acted as light bombers.
> ...



Fighter Command Serviceable Aircraft as at 0900 hours, 10 August 1940
Blenheim - 60 
Spitfire - 245 
Hurricane - 382 
Defiant - 22 
Gladiator - 2 
Total - 711 

So if I understand you correctly, 627 Spits and Hurricanes equals 805 Me109s and 224 Me110s equals 60 Blenhiems. An interesting definition of the word Parity

Can I ask where you sourced your figures?

Mine are from the following site The Battle of Britain - Home Page

PS It should be remembered that the RAF figures are for all Fighter Command not just those in the South East of England compared to the 805 Me109's which as Kurfurst said were _the number of fighters employed against the British Isles on 10th August_


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## Markus (Jun 2, 2010)

Marcel said:


> Ah, didn't know the B339-23 was also designated B439, but now found more about that designation on the net, thanks
> 
> Well, actually the B339-23 sucked big time (BTW it was actually the 3rd batch, preceded by the B339C and D). The B339-23 had a G5B engine (all ex-KLM DC3 engines) of around 1000hp, while the B339D had a G-205A engine of 1200 hp. The 23 model was based on the F2A-3, with the same weight penalty, so it was heavier than the D version, while having 200hp less.
> Climb-rate dropped from D- to 23-version from 4700ft/min to 3100ft/min. Top-speed dropped from 307 to 264 ft/min. The KNIL only thought the B339-23 version capable for the training role and didn't intend to use them for the fighter role. They probably would have ended up in the fighter role anyway, but they would likely have been just some more turkeys to shoot for the Japanese (be it slightly easier than the others  )



Hmm, "America´s 100,000" says she had a G-5E: 1,200hp at TO and 4,200ft, 1,000hp at 6,900ft and 14,200ft, 900hp at 15,200ft. The G-105A was 100hp weaker at TO, the other ratings are not for the same altitudes. And 3,100 ft/min would be a very good climb rate, the F4F-3 made 3,300, the F4F-4 just 2,500.


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## Milosh (Jun 2, 2010)

Kurfürst said:


> This wasn't my position. To clarify, my position is that Fighter Command wasn't heavily outnumbered by the German fighters, ie. the common notion that runs in BoB mythology. By the time the Germans launched their operations proper in mid-August, the RAF was able to rebuild its numbers from the crippling losses in France.



There you go looking the total strength of RAF FC. How many times does it have to be said that not all of RAF FC was in south east England?

Then there is the German bombers which are conveniently forgotten about. It was RAF FC of mostly 11 Group vs Lw fighters *AND* Lw bombers. This RAF fighters vs Lw fighters is a convenient argument for those making excuses why the Lw failed in their mission to defeat the RAF.

One only has look at the combat reports to see that RAF FC was outnumbered *in the air* over south east England.


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## davebender (Jun 3, 2010)

RAF Bomber Command and RAF Coastal Command appear to have been forgotten also. 

It's my understanding that Britain lost more bomber aircrew then fighter pilots during the BoB time frame. So Britain was obviously bombing Germany at the same time Germany was bombing England. In fact Germany formed their first night fighter Gruppe at the beginning of 1940 (IV/N JG2). Several day fighter units were also periodically employed against RAF Bomber Command during 1940. The first night Geschwader was established 22 June 1940, which had the unfortunate side effect of absorbing the cream of the Me-110 force just when they were needed most for bomber escort and fighter sweeps over England. German night fighter expansion was continuous throughout the BoB period and they had 16 staffeln (i.e. squadrons) by January 1941.


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## Milosh (Jun 3, 2010)

Is Germany south east England?


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## parsifal (Jun 3, 2010)

Milosh said:


> There you go looking the total strength of RAF FC. How many times does it have to be said that not all of RAF FC was in south east England?
> 
> Then there is the German bombers which are conveniently forgotten about. It was RAF FC of mostly 11 Group vs Lw fighters *AND* Lw bombers. This RAF fighters vs Lw fighters is a convenient argument for those making excuses why the Lw failed in their mission to defeat the RAF.
> 
> One only has look at the combat reports to see that RAF FC was outnumbered *in the air* over south east England.



hi Milosh

I hardly see the point in trying to reason with this dill, when he genuinely believes the germans won the battle, or at least did not lose it. I still have not stopped laughing after he told me this......


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## fastmongrel (Jun 3, 2010)

Numbers can be argued forever (and probably will be) but the RAF succeeded by *existing* at the end of the Battle. That I believe was Dowdings aim he didnt care about the numbers game.


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## davebender (Jun 3, 2010)

I agree. But propaganda aside, was there ever any doubt about RAF ability to maintain aerial superiority over England?


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## Shortround6 (Jun 3, 2010)

davebender said:


> I agree. But propaganda aside, was there ever any doubt about RAF ability to maintain aerial superiority over England?




Yep, at the time.

Even with Ultra the British probably didn't have exact strength reports on Germans forces or production. And having just suffered losses in Aeriel battles over France and Norway and with daylight bombing already looking rather hopeless it would take a lot of faith to guarantee a certain victory for the British in the first few weeks of the Blitz.


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## Marcel (Jun 3, 2010)

Markus said:


> Hmm, "America´s 100,000" says she had a G-5E: 1,200hp at TO and 4,200ft, 1,000hp at 6,900ft and 14,200ft, 900hp at 15,200ft. The G-105A was 100hp weaker at TO, the other ratings are not for the same altitudes. And 3,100 ft/min would be a very good climb rate, the F4F-3 made 3,300, the F4F-4 just 2,500.


From Brewster B339-C-/D/-23, Dutch Profiles:


> Finally an additional 20 Brewster B339-23 were obtained. These were different a version similar to the last F2A-3 version.... Also there were problems with the delivery of the engines, which in this instance were solved through the purchase of 22 Cyclone R-1820-G2 engines that had been traded in by the KLM. These engines were modified by the factory to a G5B configuration which delivered only 1000 hp, ie 200 hp less than the earlier Brewster B339's, in a heavier aircraft.


So it might have been the intention to install the G5E engines, but due to lack of engines on the market, the G5B was installed and thus delivered with the B339-23.


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## Nikademus (Jun 3, 2010)

Kurfürst said:


> Again you seem to fail to grasp my actual position - or you distort it proposefully.
> 
> Fighter Command survived the Luftwaffe's attacks, but I fear that is all that can be said about it.



Given that the Luftwaffe's objective was to acheive air superiority....isn't that the equivilent of saying the British won the Battle?


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## davebender (Jun 3, 2010)

> British probably didn't have exact strength reports on Germans forces


Of course not. But you can take a pretty good guess based on how many German aircraft participated in the invasion of France only a couple months earlier.


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## Hop (Jun 3, 2010)

Both the British and US intelligence services greatly overestimated the strength of the Luftwaffe. This is from a chiefs of staff report to the war cabinet, 4 September 1940:







US estimates were even higher, iirc.


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## Kurfürst (Jun 3, 2010)

Hop said:


> Both the British and US intelligence services greatly overestimated the strength of the Luftwaffe. This is from a chiefs of staff report to the war cabinet, 4 September 1940:
> 
> 
> 
> ...



They weren't that far off actually, as the actual strenght was 5298 aircraft on 11 April 1940. On 4 May 1940 they reported 5349 aircraft. The next date I have is for 21 June 1941, when they had 5599.

In may 1940 German single engined fighters were 1369, twin engined ones amounted 367, a total of 1736. The British estimate of 1700 was actually very good.

They do seem to overestimate the number of bombers though - on 4th May 1940, bombers: 1758, dive bombers 417, ie. 2175, though the British may have included the sizeable Ju 52 fleet (531 aircraft) as such, as they were used earlier as aux. bombers in Spain and Poland. The British may also have included the German long range recce forces (which were, after all, the same bomber types as found in the 'ordinary' KGs), which had 321 aircraft in May. If they included all that, that would 3027 bomber type aircraft. The Brits estimated 3300.


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## Hop (Jun 3, 2010)

That was the estimate for early September.



> In may 1940 German single engined fighters were 1369, twin engined ones amounted 367, a total of 1736. The British estimate of 1700 was actually very good.



The figures would have been accurate if they'd been for 10 May, but the Luftwaffe had declined a lot since then.

Figures for the Luftwaffe on 7 September, on hand/serviceable figures:

JG - 831/658
ZG - 206/112

KG - 1,291/798
StG - 174/133


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## Glider (Jun 3, 2010)

Can I ask where everyone is getting their figures for the German Order of Battle as I am unable to find any two that are even close to each other.

That aside, I find the figures very interesting. Taking Kurfurst's figures if on the 11th April Germany had 5298 aircraft but on 21st June 1941 they only had 5599. What on earth happened to the approx 14 months production. To only increase your airforce by 300 aircraft when the only battle fought was the BOB in which the heavy fighting was over by the end of October and you have had six months to rebuild your numbers is a pretty poor performance by any standard.


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## Hop (Jun 3, 2010)

I agree. The RAF managed to increase their strength by a large amount even during the heavy fighting of 1940.

The strength of the metropolitan raf in the 6 main operational types, Hurricane, Spitfire, Blenheim, Whitley, Wellington and Hampden:

10 May
serviceable - 1665
unserviceable - 1544

14 December
serviceable - 2970
unserviceable - 1405

That despite 400 aircraft of these types being sent abroad during the same period.

I'll dig out the sources I've been using later.


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## davebender (Jun 3, 2010)

Plus Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, North Africa, Yugoslavia, Greece, Crete and RAF Bomber Command.


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## riacrato (Jun 4, 2010)

Glider said:


> That aside, I find the figures very interesting. Taking Kurfurst's figures if on the 11th April Germany had 5298 aircraft but on 21st June 1941 they only had 5599. What on earth happened to the approx 14 months production. To only increase your airforce by 300 aircraft when the only battle fought was the BOB in which the heavy fighting was over by the end of October and you have had six months to rebuild your numbers is a pretty poor performance by any standard.


Several reasons:
There was no significant increase in LW strength overall so why increase the number of planes you don't have pilots for and which will be obsolete within a timeframe measured in months.
There was a transition to several new plane types and restructuring of the LW force in general (esp. nightfighters).
Most of all: Germany was still in peacetime production and remained so for many months. Output was more or less fixed except for learning curve effects.


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## Marcel (Jun 4, 2010)

davebender said:


> Plus Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, North Africa, Yugoslavia, Greece, Crete and RAF Bomber Command.



Yes, about 400 a/c in the Netherlands alone drains it


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## claidemore (Jun 4, 2010)

riacrato said:


> Most of all: Germany was still in peacetime production and remained so for many months. Output was more or less fixed except for learning curve effects.



I've seen this statement about Germany being in 'peacetime' production during the first year or so of the war a few times and consider it completely misleading. One might even go so far as to label it historical revisionism. 

Yes, later in the war production was stepped up to greater levels, BUT....this does not make the earlier level of production 'PEACETIME'! The war didn't happen by accident, it was planned, and production of materiel was part of those plans. 
If they didn't produced enough, then it was poor planning, but it darn sure wasn't peacetime production.


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## Glider (Jun 4, 2010)

davebender said:


> Plus Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, North Africa, Yugoslavia, Greece, Crete and RAF Bomber Command.



Fair point I admit but the losses in these actions were light compared to expectations and as far as the single engined fighters were concerned the Me109D played a fair part in the battles of Netherlands, Belgium and France. Norway was more or less a battle fought by the twin engined fighters.

The losses incured in the other battles were small compared to the BOB. I was just didn't expect the Luftwaffe to grow by such an almost insignificant amount over such a vital 12 month period. To start the Battle for Russia with an airforce of similar size to that which started the BOB was almost criminal negligence. Can you imagine what would have happened if the Luftwaffe had an extra 1000 front line aircraft at the start of the battle for Russia? After all the Me109E may not be as good as an Me109F but would still be very effective against the Russian Airforce.

Hop
Thanks for looking into the Sources its appreciated.

Riacrato


> There was a transition to several new plane types and restructuring of the LW force in general (esp. nightfighters).


True but so was the RAF. Spit II had more or less replaced the Spit Ia and the Spit V was entering service from February 1941. The Hurricane II was replacing the MkI and the changes to the nightfighters were probably more extensive in the RAF with the Beaufighter being introduced. The Short Sterling entered service in the first half of 1941, I could go on. The point is that there was no excuse for the Luftwaffe to be so poorly prepared.


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## riacrato (Jun 4, 2010)

claidemore said:


> I've seen this statement about Germany being in 'peacetime' production during the first year or so of the war a few times and consider it completely misleading. One might even go so far as to label it historical revisionism.
> 
> Yes, later in the war production was stepped up to greater levels, BUT....this does not make the earlier level of production 'PEACETIME'! The war didn't happen by accident, it was planned, and production of materiel was part of those plans.
> If they didn't produced enough, then it was poor planning, but it darn sure wasn't peacetime production.



I don't really care what kind of nazi-conspiracy-theory you see in this statement. It is a matter of fact. German workers worked under normal PEACETIME shifts. Women were not conscripted into factory labour force, as a matter of fact they were not even allowed to work there voluntarily. Factories producing goods irrelevant for war continued to do so. Nutrition, services and essential materials were not rationalized. Working shifts were not dictated by government authorities but individual companies... the fact that war goods were produced has little to do with PEACETIME production.

Most of these measures were in place in Britain long before. But hey it's all nazi revisionism, right?


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## riacrato (Jun 4, 2010)

Glider said:


> Riacrato
> 
> True but so was the RAF. Spit II had more or less replaced the Spit Ia and the Spit V was entering service from February 1941. The Hurricane II was replacing the MkI and the changes to the nightfighters were probably more extensive in the RAF with the Beaufighter being introduced. The Short Sterling entered service in the first half of 1941, I could go on. The point is that there was no excuse for the Luftwaffe to be so poorly prepared.


True but the step from MkI to MkII was not as major as the step from E to F types of the Me 109. Especially the implications on tooling and thus production. But point taken, new types were being introduced all the time by all major airforces. The more interesting data would be how large the pilot output was, something Germany struggled with throughout all the war. No pilots available -> no planes needed.

And poorly prepared for what? Barbarossa was the main offensive in 1941. The German LW had numeric superior in all important branches if you count only non-obsolete types. And they destroyed the majority of the VVS within weeks. So bad that they enjoyed air superiority much longer than the ground forces could keep their advantage. In the west they did fine, too. Things started changing mid 1942, but no 1940-1941 production would've helped with that.


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## tomo pauk (Jun 4, 2010)

Glider said:


> ...
> 
> The losses incured in the other battles were small compared to the BOB. I was just didn't expect the Luftwaffe to grow by such an almost insignificant amount over such a vital 12 month period. To start the Battle for Russia with an airforce of similar size to that which started the BOB was almost criminal negligence. Can you imagine what would have happened* if the Luftwaffe had an extra 1000 front line aircraft at the start of the battle for Russia?* After all the Me109E may not be as good as an Me109F but would still be very effective against the Russian Airforce.
> ...



Now why would anyone need an extra 1000 planes to take it on the largest army country in the world*? It's much better to produce another 1000 of heavy AA pieces and 5000 light AAA, having half of million men to man them. 
Oh, yeah, the 13 000 (13 thousands) of Luftwaffe's Flak were hitting hard those days (second half of 1940), destroying 4 (four) RAF planes per day 

Just felt to say that, sorry for skewing the thread.

*while still at war vs. the Empire where sun never sets


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## tomo pauk (Jun 4, 2010)

riacrato said:


> True but the step from MkI to MkII was not as major as the step from E to F types of the Me 109. Especially the implications on tooling and thus production. But point taken, new types were being introduced all the time by all major airforces. The more interesting data would be how large the pilot output was, something Germany struggled with throughout all the war. No pilots available -> no planes needed.



What about German allies? Italy, Romania, Hungary, Finland, Slovakia, Baltic states, Balkan sattelites? Even the largest of them, Italy, was in dire need of modern planes - eventually any good ones were those using German engines cannons. Romanians desperately wanted German engines armament for their IARs, but were turned down repeatedly. Fins were stuck with their pre-1940 hardware to 1944...
Then we have countries that would've traded stuff Germany needs for military stuff - Turkey, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, even Japan?
The lack of pilots was another German mistake; Japanese followed the suit.



> And poorly prepared for what? Barbarossa was the main offensive in 1941. The German LW had numeric superior in all important branches if you count only non-obsolete types. And they destroyed the majority of the VVS within weeks. So bad that they enjoyed air superiority much longer than the ground forces could keep their advantage. In the west they did fine, too. Things started changing mid 1942, but no 1940-1941 production would've helped with that.



If they were such well prepared, then how come Russians managed to evacuate many of their factories? With more planes in the air, German land forces would've suffered much smaller casualties (250 000 killed, 500 000 wounded 2700 tanks lost within 1st 6 months, data from Wiki).
Since Russians stroke back in 1942 many times (using hardware that was produced in factories that 'escaped' Germans in 1941), I'd say that low production of 1940 1941 backfired to Germans with vengeance.


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## riacrato (Jun 4, 2010)

Germany was egoistic with their hardware, we very well know that. It's a constant in this context, not a variable.

None of the German bombers was able to annihilate factories. Even the Allied 1943-44 campaign, a scale that Germany would've never been able to achieve in 1941, wasn't able to do that. If Germany had had the possibility to evacuate those sites they could've easily done so. Your assumption they would've suffered less losses with more planes is just that, an assumption. Even with the airforce as large as it was they had problems with logistics and field space.


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## Marcel (Jun 4, 2010)

Glider said:


> Fair point I admit but the losses in these actions were light compared to expectations and as far as the single engined fighters were concerned the Me109D played a fair part in the battles of Netherlands, Belgium and France. Norway was more or less a battle fought by the twin engined fighters.


Actually the D-version played a minor role in the NL, while there were mainly Bf109E's. I count 13 JG's equiped with BF109E's and only 1 (IV/JG2) equiped with Bf109D.


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## riacrato (Jun 4, 2010)

D played a major role only in Poland and the sitzkrieg, if you can call the latter major.


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## davebender (Jun 4, 2010)

Germany planned the war with Poland after that nation rejected a Danzig plebiscite. Germany did not plan a major war with Britain and France, not even after they drew a line in the sand concering Poland. Nor did Germany anticipate the Soviet Union being so aggressive in the Baltic States, Romania and Yugoslavia.

With the benefit of hindsight Germany should have planned for the worst and switched to total war production during 1939. But you don't get that benefit in the real world.


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## claidemore (Jun 4, 2010)

riacrato said:


> I don't really care what kind of nazi-conspiracy-theory you see in this statement. It is a matter of fact. German workers worked under normal PEACETIME shifts. Women were not conscripted into factory labour force, as a matter of fact they were not even allowed to work there voluntarily. Factories producing goods irrelevant for war continued to do so. Nutrition, services and essential materials were not rationalized. Working shifts were not dictated by government authorities but individual companies... the fact that war goods were produced has little to do with PEACETIME production.
> 
> Most of these measures were in place in Britain long before. But hey it's all nazi revisionism, right?


I apologize if this seems to be getting into the political realm, that is not my intention. I do think that if a term is to be used in needs to be defined, and I believe the term _Peacetime production_ is erroneous in this context. 

riacrato: you are labelling a non-TOTAL WAR effort, as PEACETIME. There is a big difference between war, total war, and peacetime. 
Germany had in in fact been ramping up for war for many years, the fact that the regime did not see a need to change production once hostilities were engaged, (which hostilities they initiated), simply shows poor logistic planning. 
How do you measure PEACETIME production? Was it equal to production in the 1920's? early 1930's? Breaking the Treaty of Versailles was in fact a shift from peacetime to war. Hitler outlined his plans for world domination in 1937, and industrial production had already been built up for war. They saw no need to increase production in 1940, since they had already done so years previous. 

The day that the planners said, "oh crap, we're in trouble and need to step up production" is not when war time production started. That simply indicates that the emphasis shifted towards 'total war' production, something which really only Germany and the Soviet Union did. Labelling anything an a scale less than 'total war production' as PEACETIME paints a non-aggressive picture which is simply not accurate. 

On another note: It is silly to say that more planes were not produced because there were not enough pilots to fly them. There is still a need for reserves, and a need for newer and better types to replace old ones. I would love to see a single document indicating that production should be relaxed because of a lack of pilots.


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## davebender (Jun 4, 2010)

Just out of curiosity.....
Niall Ferguson provides military spending information for the WWI era.

*1913 Defense Spending as a Percentage of Net National Product.*
5.1 %. Italy.
5.1 %. Russia.
4.8 %. France.
3.9%. Germany.
3.2%. Austria.
3.2%. Britain.

Does anyone have the same data for 1938 Europe?


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## zoomar (Jun 4, 2010)

I went with the Bf109E, primarily because of its cannon armament and fuel injection, but for all intents and purposes it and the Spit run a dead heat. The A6M was certainly the best carrier fighter (although I'd argue the difference between it and the Wildcat was not as much as is commonly believed). But the A6M was too unbalanced to be in the same class as either the Spit or 109. It was underpowered and achieved its good performance and amazing range by virtue of its extremely light structure and lack of protection. However, one can wonder how the BoB might have come out if, instead of Bf-110's as long range bomber escorts, the Luftwaffe had several hundred Zeros


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## davebender (Jun 4, 2010)

> instead of Bf-110's as long range bomber escorts, the Luftwaffe had several hundred Zeros


*September 15, 1940.*
Document-49: Fighter Command Order of Battle Sept 15th 1940
It appears to me the Luftwaffe had about 90 Me-110 fighter aircraft committed to the BoB on this date. Replacing them with 3 or 4 times as many A6M2s would undoubtedly be an improvement (i.e. several hundred). Replacing the historical 90 x Me-110C fighter aircraft with several hundred Me-110Cs would have a similiar effect.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 4, 2010)

"The day that the planners said, "oh crap, we're in trouble and need to step up production" is not when war time production started. That simply indicates that the emphasis shifted towards 'total war' production, something which really only Germany and the Soviet Union did. Labelling anything an a scale less than 'total war production' as PEACETIME paints a non-aggressive picture which is simply not accurate. "

I am not sure how various countries compare on "Peace Time" Vs "War time" production. 

For example the Russians may not have had a third shift working at the tank factories in 1938-39 but they managed to build well over 20,000 tanks during the thirties, more than the rest of the world put together and then some. A feat made possible buy the notable lack of truck or car production for a country of it's size. Even tractor manufacture may have been secondary.
How much of Russia's GDP was going to it's Military during the "Peace time" of the late thirties?

Going from Peace time to war time is more than a matter of saying "Oh, crap, time to shift" if you do that it is too late. Adding a second or third shift is easy but for the quantities of war material used in WW II you needed new factories, steel mills, ship yards and so on. You even need to establish priorities in rail traffic and shipping space.
the British "shadow" factories were planned and built before 1939-40 and small groups of experienced workmen were taken from existing factories to act as a core and to train the new workers. 
the Americans had 2 years to build completely new factories and still went on to vastly increased the size of their factories and build completely new ones inland in case of bombardment or long range bomber strikes. 

Some american car factories didn't convert over to war production, instead they were shuttered and the work force transfered to new, specially built factories more suited to war production. In some cases they used their tooling to make parts under sub-contract. For instance it was estimated that Allison only made about 1/3 of the engine in house. 1/3 was made by Cadillac, Buick and a few other GM divisions and the remaining 1/3 came from over 800 subcontractors. 
Maytag washing machine company used their casting facilities to make aluminium castings for Packard Merlins.
that is the difference between peace time production and war production. A country might spend double or triple the amount on weapons in 1938-39 than it did in 1933 but until the civilian goods and services production or usage is stopped or limited in order to further military production you don't really have "war production".
While the US didn't resort to drafting workers into factories I would say it came pretty close to total war production. Underfed, forced labor isn't really going to give the production rates that that better treated workers will. There was also a fair amount of cottage industry going on in the US. Small 2-10 man shops in garages or basements using old machine tools to build parts under sub-contract. My Grandfather worked in a 4 man shop making gyroscope parts under subcontract to Nordon. Much of the machinery was run by over head pulleys and belts. Company owner got gas ration coupons for his Piper Cub to fly the parts out to speed delivery. Shop was located about 1/2 way up the coast of Maine or over 400miles from the Nordon factory. No they didn't fly all the way  But the roads were none to good in Maine at the time and the plane helped get the 50-60 miles to a better place to ship from.


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## parsifal (Jun 5, 2010)

Shortround your summation pretty accurately summarises the difficulties facing the German attempts to ramp up their production programs. There are quite a number of factors at work, all of which played their part. Here are some of my thoughts.

Germany prewar had not undertaken a behind the scenes approach to expanding support industries and factories prewar to nearly the same extent that Britain did. That explains why for the same financial outlays the Germans were pushing out 4 times as many aircraft as the british. The British were spending their money prewar getting their factories ready to churn out vast numbers of aircraft that left the Germans for dead in the latter half of 1940. The British were preparing for a long war, the Germans were not, its that simple 

Germany just didnt make this decision by mistake. The so called economic myrical attributed to Hitler in his early years, was nothing of the sort. Whilst other countries were busy pouring money into economic reconstruction programs, to repair the damage of the depression over the long term, the germans frittered their resources away on rearmament programs mostly. These did provide economic stimulus of sorts, but it was a short term policy. That and the already parlous state of the German economy at the time, after their defeat in 1918 (or am I wrong on that score as well as numnuts has already suggested....did they really win, achieve all they set out to do, and just go home for this one as well????) meant that despite some inherent economic strength, the German economy leading up to the war was extremely fragile, though the Nazis were good at hiding this. This meant that germany really could not afford a long war......so they devised war making methods and geared their production for short wars. That did not particularly mean they curtailed production, they simply did not invest in the infrastructure as the Allies did. This meant that in the short term production ramped up quickly, but in the mid term meant that room for expansion of production was not there. Not until the shift to toatal war were the Nazis able to put into effect a wartime expansion program, and by then it was too late. Speer was brilliant at what he did, but his methods were brutal, extreme, and found to be illegal in the finish. By artificial pegging of Europes currencies, systematic use of slave labour, deliberate starvation of the occupied territories, the opening of the labour market to women, the adoption of strict austerity measures at home, and of course the thorough overhaul and centralisation of the procurement machine ( but the decentralisation of the manufacturing processes themselves) was Speer able to achieve what he did. In 1939-41 those conditions did not exist, along with the belief that they (the Germans ) could get by without too much more effort, meant they lost three precious years in getting their production working properly

With regard to losses, Murray says that up until the end of 1941, the Germans had lost 15000 aircraft, the equivalent of three air forces. These numbers are more or less supported by Hayward and Ellis. Whilst a significant proportion of those losses were combat related , a significant proportion were not as well. For example, the Germans even during periods of non engagement were losing about 7% per month of their force structure to attrition, that is non-combat related accidents and write offs. This includes a number of airframes damaged in combat but not written off until the end of a quarter. The Germans had a very peculiar way of reporting numberof available aircraft, which is why numnuts can make the reports from German air ministry documents that he does. The Germans would not write off an aircraft that had less than a certain percentage of damage (from memory it was 35%), the aircraft would continue to be listed on the "available" lists, despite there not being even the slightest chance of the aircraft ever flying again. They used similar tricks with their aircraft readiness rates. Hayward, Higham, Murray (I think) and SJ Harris all expose this piece of accounting trickery really well (I believe it was done mostly to deceive Hitler about the state of the LW, but has since been used by countless German apologists and revisionists to justify various points over the years). 

7% of 5000 is 350 aircraft per month. If you look at the combat losses and the non-combat losses being sustained by the Luftwaffe in that period, it is not hard to deduce that they could barely keep pace with these losses on the low rates of production they maintained until December 1941


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## Milosh (Jun 5, 2010)

parsifal, it was 60%, not 35%, for a write-off.


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## VG-33 (Jun 6, 2010)

Vincenzo said:


> The MiG-1 was only at operational test in late '40, and have some trouble, it's more new of a Friederich (-1) that was in fightning from october
> 
> 
> edit we can take in consideration the H.75 as escort fighters for BoB time



Why not, at high altitude? With 111 I-200 delivered (92 of MiG-1 type, 19 MiG-3) in 1940, it works for the end of the year (december at least).

The 109 F was pretty good, but carrying 660 litres (455 kg) of fuel on internal as MiG-3 did and a "kolossal" 46 litres, 830 kg engine, i feel it would't keep it's impressive performance. So again, comparing apples and oranges...

Moreover, from my sources the first serial 109F rolled out from assembly lines in november 1940. Then occured tail vibration (aeroelasticity weakness) probmems that were not resolved before 1941. Much more grave than *some* MiG's Mikuline serial reliability problems. Since it was not due to airframe conception (as onthe 109 F) but mainly manufacturing defaults.

Regards


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## davebender (Jun 6, 2010)

Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-3 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
That "kolossal" 830kg engine produced only 1,350 hp. Such a low power to weight ratio is normally a bad thing for a lightweight fighter aircraft like the MiG-3.


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## VG-33 (Jun 6, 2010)

davebender said:


> Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-3 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> That "kolossal" 830kg engine produced only 1,350 hp. Such a low power to weight ratio is normally a bad thing for a lightweight fighter aircraft like the MiG-3.



Should it be 1350, what a jackpot! This is the Take Off power. At nominal 1120 hp at SL, 1200 at 6000m.

It makes a 26 hp/ cubic liter power ratio, for 48 on the Merlin! Despite on that, the MiG-3 at 3350 kg weight reached 505 km/h on SL and 640 (657 km/h with 0.732 gear) at 7600m. More a less the 109G performance in 1940!!! Symptomatical case in soviet union, high level physicists and scientists partly compensated the (hudge) industry backwards.

Some little attempts were made to use overblow, 579 km/h reached at 2220m, 603 @ 3000. Soon stopped in order to save engine TBO for the rest of the trials.

Regards


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## Colin1 (Jun 6, 2010)

VG-33 said:


> ...high level physicians...


physicists

physician = an old word for family doctor


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## VG-33 (Jun 6, 2010)

Colin1 said:


> physicists
> 
> physician = an old word for family doctor



 corrected!


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## RCAFson (Jun 7, 2010)

parsifal said:


> With regard to losses, Murray says that up until the end of 1941, the Germans had lost 15000 aircraft, the equivalent of three air forces. These numbers are more or less supported by Hayward and Ellis. Whilst a significant proportion of those losses were combat related , a significant proportion were not as well. For example, the Germans even during periods of non engagement were losing about 7% per month of their force structure to attrition, that is non-combat related accidents and write offs. This includes a number of airframes damaged in combat but not written off until the end of a quarter. The Germans had a very peculiar way of reporting numberof available aircraft, which is why numnuts can make the reports from German air ministry documents that he does. The Germans would not write off an aircraft that had less than a certain percentage of damage (from memory it was 35%), the aircraft would continue to be listed on the "available" lists, despite there not being even the slightest chance of the aircraft ever flying again. They used similar tricks with their aircraft readiness rates. Hayward, Higham, Murray (I think) and SJ Harris all expose this piece of accounting trickery really well (I believe it was done mostly to deceive Hitler about the state of the LW, but has since been used by countless German apologists and revisionists to justify various points over the years).
> 
> 7% of 5000 is 350 aircraft per month. If you look at the combat losses and the non-combat losses being sustained by the Luftwaffe in that period, it is not hard to deduce that they could barely keep pace with these losses on the low rates of production they maintained until December 1941



German aircraft production:

Total Production
Year 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Total
Total 1,928 7,829 9,422 12,822 20,599 35,076 7,052 94,622

German aircraft production during World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


Luftwaffe Serviceable aircraft:

Aug 17 1940: 3157

June 24 1941: 3428

Luftwaffe serviceable aircraft strengths (1940?1945) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## tomo pauk (Jun 9, 2010)

riacrato said:


> Germany was egoistic with their hardware, we very well know that. It's a constant in this context, not a variable.



100% agree, for 1933-45 at least 



> None of the German bombers was able to annihilate factories. Even the Allied 1943-44 campaign, a scale that Germany would've never been able to achieve in 1941, wasn't able to do that.


Never said 'annihilate factories' 
The bomber raids on railway junctions bridges would've made relocation difficult. But, if your bombers are acting as artillery (since the guns you have are mostly horse-drawn), you already have small density per square mile of enemy terrain (that of interest), guess such raids were not possible.



> If Germany had had the possibility to evacuate those sites they could've easily done so.



They did not have the extra space for relocation in 1944 - whenever relocated, it would've been within reach of bombers, plus the production loss in the crucial time would've been huge.



> Your assumption they would've suffered less losses with more planes is just that, an assumption.



Not really, you might want to check out what USAAF RAF were doing with their assets, as early as 1942. And Luftwaffe was all about that from the day one - use the planes to break up enemy assets, so those will not be able to fire back on ground forces. 



> Even with the airforce as large as it was they had problems with logistics and field space.



German top brass (Hitler as a prime example), liked to put aside the long-term planing, since the prospects were bleak in that light, way before 1940


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## Timppa (Jun 9, 2010)

Typical discussion:
After two pages posts are about BoB numbers, D -Day, USAAF, 1944, British and US intelligence services, factory floor space and manhours, B339-23 problems, Observer Corp, Russian tanks, Hitler, Italy, Romania, Hungary, Finland, Slovakia, Baltic states, Balkan satellites, English grammar,Niall Ferguson.

Keep it coming


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## riacrato (Jun 9, 2010)

tomo pauk said:


> Never said 'annihilate factories'


To really make relocation of tools (and personnel) impossible, that's what you'd need to do. 


> The bomber raids on railway junctions bridges would've made relocation difficult. But, if your bombers are acting as artillery (since the guns you have are mostly horse-drawn), you already have small density per square mile of enemy terrain (that of interest), guess such raids were not possible.


I don't disagree, but you kind of prove my point here eh?


> They did not have the extra space for relocation in 1944 - whenever relocated, it would've been within reach of bombers, plus the production loss in the crucial time would've been huge.


exactly where i was getting at: if germany had the space (_possibility_) to relocate the hardware and personnel somewhere out of reach of the USAAF they could've done so. Annihilation of factories was not possible in a short timeframe with the arms available. The whole European air war during 1943 easily proves that. Hence any factory could be evacuated if reasonable.





> Not really, you might want to check out what USAAF RAF were doing with their assets, as early as 1942.


Apples and oranges. Neither of those two air forces was supporting a ground war in eastern europe and russia. They were fighting a strategic war for the most part. The comparison you make here is invalid.


> And Luftwaffe was all about that from the day one - use the planes to break up enemy assets, so those will not be able to fire back on ground forces.


And that's what they did during barbarossa.


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## Njaco (Jun 9, 2010)

Timppa said:


> Typical discussion:
> After two pages posts are about BoB numbers, D -Day, USAAF, 1944, British and US intelligence services, factory floor space and manhours, B339-23 problems, Observer Corp, Russian tanks, Hitler, Italy, Romania, Hungary, Finland, Slovakia, Baltic states, Balkan satellites, English grammar,Niall Ferguson.
> 
> Keep it coming



Better than some who digress to arguments over 100 octane fuel and wingload graphs within 15 posts!


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## Glider (Jun 10, 2010)

Dont mention the 100 Octane!!!


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## tomo pauk (Jun 10, 2010)

The spin-off is here, if someone want to bother:

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/spin-off-about-germany-needing-more-planes-earyl-25072.html#post679538


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