# The Fall of France 1940



## Arsenal VG-33 (Nov 15, 2007)

Ok, the notion that France could have made all the difference in 1939 by attacking Germany head-on and end the war then and there, is not only really tiresome but it also ignores what I believe are some very unique circumstances which France was facing. Taking these circumstances into account helps to put things into perpective rather than simply denouncing the French for not having done more to help Poland. 

The one thing I believe all of us can agree on is that overall is that French tactical and strategic thinking on the battlefield was outdated. Save for a few mavericks who advocated immediate and drastic changes, the French high command as well as the political scene in Paris was quite content to let things go along as before. 

(Then Colonel Charles de Gaulle had published 2 books considered somewhat avant-garde among contemporary military thinkers, and which also made him many enemies. Few people will acknowledge that Guderian actually pinched a few ideas from de Gaulle's book "The Edge of the Sword" for his own "Achtung Panzer"). 

I'll also add that insofar as Poland is concerned, the Non-Aggression pact between the Soviets and the Germans sealed their fate. There was nothing the French or the Brits, or the world could have done about that as it took everyone by surprise. For all the French and British knew, the Russians and Germans could have been de facto allies. 

Contrary to popular thinking, the Maginot Line alone was not responsible for the budget shortfalls of French military expenditure. (In fact, there are some historians who will argue that the French military budget was not in dire straits as many would suggest. A crunch? Perhaps, but it wasn't a hopeless situation in terms of monetary spending. There was still enough to go around to aircraft amd armor productions.) Interwar France was hampered mainly by declining birthrate, thanks to WW 1, and also a lot by political squabbling by extreme right and left groups. At one point governments were changing on a weekly basis. Add this to the fact that it wasn't until 1935-36 that the French army finally began to adopt more modern equipment for their troops, more modern tank and aircraft designs as well, all of which would come too late. Nevertheless, the doctrines of Gamelin (originally trained as a staff officer) and later Weygand would mire the French army in near paralysis and indecision as the Blitz would progress. 

After the German attack into Poland in 1939, France launched the ill-fated Saarland offensive, capturing a few small villages and towns, but nothing more. French troops were almost immediately caught in minefields and mine detecting equipment was not to be found. Also, the further they went into Germany, the closer they came to the Seigfreid Line. Again, contrary to popular opinion, this line was not abandoned and it's artillery was fully manned and operational. The lack of French intel in these areas only reinforced their belief that much of the German army was still there, and there was no reason to doubt otherwise. Shortly afterward the French withdrew, and I believe it probably the wisest thing they could have done given their location.

Everyone who studies the European wars from Napoleon to WW2 will tell you that the easiest way to attack Germany is through Belgium and the Lowlands. The easiest way for Germany to attack France was through Belgium and the Lowlands. No one had brought entire armored divisions through the Ardennes before, so there was little reason to believe it could be done. The Saarland region is simply one of the worst places to launch an offensive from. It is in a depression surrounded by dense forests and many streams. The Maginot Line was originally supposed to cover this area and eventually go into Belgium and connect with the famous Eben Emael fortress. Belgian neutrality prevented this from happening, and it also prevented the Allies to properly cooperate with one another in order to come up with a plan they could all agree on. Obviously, the Germans had no problem violating the neutral countries, but France could not and would not. 

This then takes us back to that very interesting episode in 1936 when Germany reoccupied the Rhineland, a flagrant violation of the Versailles Treaty. When this happened, the French were the only ones ready and willing to launch an invasion to expel the German army. However, wary of starting another world war, the French sought assurances that the US and UK would back them. The US said "NO". The UK, waiting to hear what the US said on the matter (nothing changes, eh?) also said "NO". Their arguement? Well, it actually made a lot of sense: The US-UK would in no way help France should she invade Germany to expel the German army from the Rhineland, because this was a percieved threat which could not be fully justified, and for France to launch herself into a pre-emptive strike could have severe ramifications for the French. (funny, how in the past 4 years, the whole concept of pre-emptive warfare has been called into question again). After that rebuttal from what she thought were her closest Allies, the French then demanded that economic sanctions be levied against Germany. Again, the answer was no. A member of UK's goverment even wondered why the German's should be punished at all for taking back what was essentially theirs to begin with. At this point, I should mention that sometimes between 1900 and 1908, there was a study within the French military command that France could not win any fight on their soil alone, and that allies would be needed. Faced with the fact that the US and UK would not follow, and quite possibly even punish France for striking, it's no wonder the French were reluctant to do anything much. 

Yes, the French could have and should have revised their strategic thinking. Yes, they should have implemeted changes and modifications sooner at all levels. Yes, they probably should have paid more attention to their Class B troops as well, since they were the ones that would face the breakthrough at Sedan. Certainly, they should have been improving communications everywhere. (This flaw existed because the French were distrustful of radio communications, fearing the enemy could listen in. This many frontline troops were obliged to use public phone to relay information and orders.)

However, considering the challenges France faced on the military and geopolitical fronts during the years preceeding the war, I find it quite naive to suggest that France could have done more in 1939-40. The French, simply put, were stuck between a rock and hard place and had little choice but accept being brutally run over by a German army that, while not necessarily more modern or better equipped, simply knew what it was doing and knew what it was supposed to do from day 1. The German success in the West in 1940 was almost guaranteed before the shooting even started.


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## Arsenal VG-33 (Nov 15, 2007)

Ok, the notion that France could have made all the difference in 1939 by attacking Germany head-on and end the war then and there, is not only really tiresome but it also ignores what I believe are some very unique circumstances which France was facing. Taking these circumstances into account helps to put things into perpective rather than simply denouncing the French for not having done more to help Poland. 

The one thing I believe all of us can agree on is that overall is that French tactical and strategic thinking on the battlefield was outdated. Save for a few mavericks who advocated immediate and drastic changes, the French high command as well as the political scene in Paris was quite content to let things go along as before. 

(Then Colonel Charles de Gaulle had published 2 books considered somewhat avant-garde among contemporary military thinkers, and which also made him many enemies. Few people will acknowledge that Guderian actually pinched a few ideas from de Gaulle's book "The Edge of the Sword" for his own "Achtung Panzer"). 

I'll also add that insofar as Poland is concerned, the Non-Aggression pact between the Soviets and the Germans sealed their fate. There was nothing the French or the Brits, or the world could have done about that as it took everyone by surprise. For all the French and British knew, the Russians and Germans could have been de facto allies. 

Contrary to popular thinking, the Maginot Line alone was not responsible for the budget shortfalls of French military expenditure. (In fact, there are some historians who will argue that the French military budget was not in dire straits as many would suggest. A crunch? Perhaps, but it wasn't a hopeless situation in terms of monetary spending. There was still enough to go around to aircraft amd armor productions.) Interwar France was hampered mainly by declining birthrate, thanks to WW 1, and also a lot by political squabbling by extreme right and left groups. At one point governments were changing on a weekly basis. Add this to the fact that it wasn't until 1935-36 that the French army finally began to adopt more modern equipment for their troops, more modern tank and aircraft designs as well, all of which would come too late. Nevertheless, the doctrines of Gamelin (originally trained as a staff officer) and later Weygand would mire the French army in near paralysis and indecision as the Blitz would progress. 

After the German attack into Poland in 1939, France launched the ill-fated Saarland offensive, capturing a few small villages and towns, but nothing more. French troops were almost immediately caught in minefields and mine detecting equipment was not to be found. Also, the further they went into Germany, the closer they came to the Seigfreid Line. Again, contrary to popular opinion, this line was not abandoned and it's artillery was fully manned and operational. The lack of French intel in these areas only reinforced their belief that much of the German army was still there, and there was no reason to doubt otherwise. Shortly afterward the French withdrew, and I believe it probably the wisest thing they could have done given their location.

Everyone who studies the European wars from Napoleon to WW2 will tell you that the easiest way to attack Germany is through Belgium and the Lowlands. The easiest way for Germany to attack France was through Belgium and the Lowlands. No one had brought entire armored divisions through the Ardennes before, so there was little reason to believe it could be done. The Saarland region is simply one of the worst places to launch an offensive from. It is in a depression surrounded by dense forests and many streams. The Maginot Line was originally supposed to cover this area and eventually go into Belgium and connect with the famous Eben Emael fortress. Belgian neutrality prevented this from happening, and it also prevented the Allies to properly cooperate with one another in order to come up with a plan they could all agree on. Obviously, the Germans had no problem violating the neutral countries, but France could not and would not. 

This then takes us back to that very interesting episode in 1936 when Germany reoccupied the Rhineland, a flagrant violation of the Versailles Treaty. When this happened, the French were the only ones ready and willing to launch an invasion to expel the German army. However, wary of starting another world war, the French sought assurances that the US and UK would back them. The US said "NO". The UK, waiting to hear what the US said on the matter (nothing changes, eh?) also said "NO". Their arguement? Well, it actually made a lot of sense: The US-UK would in no way help France should she invade Germany to expel the German army from the Rhineland, because this was a percieved threat which could not be fully justified, and for France to launch herself into a pre-emptive strike could have severe ramifications for the French. (funny, how in the past 4 years, the whole concept of pre-emptive warfare has been called into question again). After that rebuttal from what she thought were her closest Allies, the French then demanded that economic sanctions be levied against Germany. Again, the answer was no. A member of UK's goverment even wondered why the German's should be punished at all for taking back what was essentially theirs to begin with. At this point, I should mention that sometimes between 1900 and 1908, there was a study within the French military command that France could not win any fight on their soil alone, and that allies would be needed. Faced with the fact that the US and UK would not follow, and quite possibly even punish France for striking, it's no wonder the French were reluctant to do anything much. 

Yes, the French could have and should have revised their strategic thinking. Yes, they should have implemeted changes and modifications sooner at all levels. Yes, they probably should have paid more attention to their Class B troops as well, since they were the ones that would face the breakthrough at Sedan. Certainly, they should have been improving communications everywhere. (This flaw existed because the French were distrustful of radio communications, fearing the enemy could listen in. This many frontline troops were obliged to use public phone to relay information and orders.)

However, considering the challenges France faced on the military and geopolitical fronts during the years preceeding the war, I find it quite naive to suggest that France could have done more in 1939-40. The French, simply put, were stuck between a rock and hard place and had little choice but accept being brutally run over by a German army that, while not necessarily more modern or better equipped, simply knew what it was doing and knew what it was supposed to do from day 1. The German success in the West in 1940 was almost guaranteed before the shooting even started.


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## Arsenal VG-33 (Nov 15, 2007)

freebird said:


> You are right about that, the French were capable, unfortunately many of them had lost the will to fight. And they did not have strong political or military leadership either.



You should read Julian Jackson's "The Fall of France". While I would agree that strong and decisive political and military leadership was severely lacking, most of the lowly French grunts in the dugouts were actually quite ready to fight. They were indeed bored during the Phoney War, and many of their officers didn't seem to care much about them, but J. Jackson's book gives sufficient evidence that the regular French soldier was actually quite happy that the Blitz was on at last, and that he might finally see some action.


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## Arsenal VG-33 (Nov 15, 2007)

freebird said:


> You are right about that, the French were capable, unfortunately many of them had lost the will to fight. And they did not have strong political or military leadership either.



You should read Julian Jackson's "The Fall of France". While I would agree that strong and decisive political and military leadership was severely lacking, most of the lowly French grunts in the dugouts were actually quite ready to fight. They were indeed bored during the Phoney War, and many of their officers didn't seem to care much about them, but J. Jackson's book gives sufficient evidence that the regular French soldier was actually quite happy that the Blitz was on at last, and that he might finally see some action.


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## mkloby (Nov 16, 2007)

Arsenal VG-33 said:


> You should read Julian Jackson's "The Fall of France". While I would agree that strong and decisive political and military leadership was severely lacking, most of the lowly French grunts in the dugouts were actually quite ready to fight. They were indeed bored during the Phoney War, and many of their officers didn't seem to care much about them, but J. Jackson's book gives sufficient evidence that the regular French soldier was actually quite happy that the Blitz was on at last, and that he might finally see some action.



Arsenal - you have good points in your post, but nothing to sustain the notion that the French couldn't have launched a successful invasion.



Arsenal VG-33 said:


> They were indeed bored during the Phoney War, and many of their officers didn't seem to care much about them, but J. Jackson's book gives sufficient evidence that the regular French soldier was actually quite happy that the Blitz was on at last, and that he might finally see some action.



Now how in God's name can you say that French officer's didn't seem to care about their troops???? Come on - no basis for saying regardless of what someone wrote in a book.


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## mkloby (Nov 16, 2007)

Arsenal VG-33 said:


> You should read Julian Jackson's "The Fall of France". While I would agree that strong and decisive political and military leadership was severely lacking, most of the lowly French grunts in the dugouts were actually quite ready to fight. They were indeed bored during the Phoney War, and many of their officers didn't seem to care much about them, but J. Jackson's book gives sufficient evidence that the regular French soldier was actually quite happy that the Blitz was on at last, and that he might finally see some action.



Arsenal - you have good points in your post, but nothing to sustain the notion that the French couldn't have launched a successful invasion.



Arsenal VG-33 said:


> They were indeed bored during the Phoney War, and many of their officers didn't seem to care much about them, but J. Jackson's book gives sufficient evidence that the regular French soldier was actually quite happy that the Blitz was on at last, and that he might finally see some action.



Now how in God's name can you say that French officer's didn't seem to care about their troops???? Come on - no basis for saying regardless of what someone wrote in a book.


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## Freebird (Nov 17, 2007)

I've decided to start a new thread here about the "Fall of France" I hope one of the Mod's can move all the relevant posts from "British Debts" to the new thread. The discussion was about what the Allies could have done in 1939-1940, would it have been better for the French the BEF to attack right away in Sept 1939, while the bulk of the German army was in Poland.

Quote below from the other thread.



Arsenal VG-33 said:


> Ok, the notion that France could have made all the difference in 1939 by attacking Germany head-on and end the war then and there, is not only really tiresome but it also ignores what I believe are some very unique circumstances which France was facing. Taking these circumstances into account helps to put things into perpective rather than simply denouncing the French for not having done more to help Poland.
> 
> The one thing I believe all of us can agree on is that overall is that French tactical and strategic thinking on the battlefield was outdated. Save for a few mavericks who advocated immediate and drastic changes, the French high command as well as the political scene in Paris was quite content to let things go along as before.
> 
> ...


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## Watanbe (Nov 17, 2007)

France obviously placed to much emphasis on the Maginot line...it was obvious that France and Britain were going to be fighting a war so I would of thought that they should have attacked into Germany and put pressure on them to fight a defensive style war rather than just site behind a wall and wait for them to attack!


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## merlin (Nov 18, 2007)

The success of the German attack on France took everyone by surprise - even the Germans !

The policy of the French was to wait it out, when their re-equipement programme would take effect.
For example French orders placed in the US for engines and aircraft, kick-started the US aircraft industry. It gave the US a good six-month start when it came to their own re-arming.
Many of the 'modern' French aircraft designs needed more time to get to the squadrons, and others to go from development to production e.g. MB-157.
France needed more time to harness the capabilities of the Empire, but German knew that to - that in part why Hitler wanted an autumn '39 campaign!

Yet, while the Ardenne was seen as a 'wild-card' for a substantial attack route, it shouldn't have been too difficult to have mined it, felled trees at choke points etc.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 18, 2007)

Here I will be moving all the relevent threads over from the other thread.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 18, 2007)

Okay bare with me here. When I moved them over it did not work out right.


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## Freebird (Nov 22, 2007)

Originally posted on the "Did the US save Europe thread"



drgondog said:


> As long as we are playing what if on the course of Britain, USSR, Germany and Japan - take into account possible course of action for Britain (and France) not declaring War in September 1939.
> 
> Possibility exists that while Germany consolidates Poland - that he decides NOT to attack westward. There were enough Generals that didn't want the war to continue arguing against it. So say Britain says 'not me'.
> 
> ...


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## Freebird (Nov 22, 2007)

From other thread -


Arsenal VG-33 said:


> I've already stated my reasons for France not being able to take the offensive in 1939-40 in previous posts. When it comes to the _defense_ of France, I have a slightly differing view.
> 
> As for the FR and UK declaration of war against Germany, they were honor-bound to do so by previous treaties with Poland. Hitler himself stated he was surprised that the French and British would actually honor this agreement. Poland's geographical situation prevented any direct aid to affect the outcome. Furthermore, the fact that the invasion of Poland was a COMBINED invasion by Germany and Soviet Russia was more than enough reason for the French and British to be reluctant in attacking Germany directly. Given the strong communist movements in both countries, especially in France in the labor unions, there was a genuine fear of popular upheaval in the event of a war against both the Germans _and_ the Soviets.
> 
> ...


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## Freebird (Nov 22, 2007)

Arsenal VG-33 said:


> As for the Maginot Line, it's primary fault lie in the fact that Belgium's neutrality prevented it from becoming the the real defensive wall it was meant to be. Initial plans were to have it go into Belgium and eventually connect with the fortress of Eben Emael. Not only did Belgium's declaration to remain neutral put a stop to this, it also prevented their French and British counterparts from holding joint exercises and conferences to ensure some kind of unison.
> 
> *In this point you are correct, if the Belgians did not want to prepare a joint defence, the French British should have stayed on the French border in the positions they had spent all winter preparing, instead of a forward shift into Belgium, where there were no hard points, anti-tank ditches, foxholes or anything. If the Belgians gambled on the Germans respecting their neutrality lost, then they would be defending Belgium on their own. (until they retreated into France)*
> 
> ...



*The main problem in the Fall of France is that Gen. Gamelin had no strategic reserve*, so that he had nothing to stop or even slow down the German blitzkrieg, one they had broken through the French lines. Since the French Belgians had as many divisions as the Germans, outnumbered them in tanks, and had elaborate defensive positions for at least half the frontier, they should have been able to hold out for more than 42 days. 

*Assuming that the BEF had stayed on the Dyle river in front of Brussels, How would the French have prevented their 1st 7th armies (and the Belgians BEF) from being cut off, considering that they had no strategic reserve to mount a counterattack? *

The only serious attack was made by Gen. Franklyn's British 5th division + 2 tank battalions at Arras on May 20th.


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## plan_D (Nov 23, 2007)

VG, you've read _Panzer Battles_; it's references to the BEF are all of retreats under pressure. Hoppners Panzer Corps pressed the French at Gembloux on the 13th 14th May, and Gort did request French aid in the counter-attack at Arras to close the gap between there and Peronne on the 20th. 

If you want to defend the French then feel free, but don't start trying to imply that the British were cowards - especially after Great Britain went to the aid of France (a country that should be able to defend itself). The BEF evacuated from the nation because it was hopeless - the French were practically useless in armoured tactics and that was key to winning the battle.


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## drgondog (Nov 23, 2007)

freebird said:


> *The main problem in the Fall of France is that Gen. Gamelin had no strategic reserve*, so that he had nothing to stop or even slow down the German blitzkrieg, one they had broken through the French lines. Since the French Belgians had as many divisions as the Germans, outnumbered them in tanks, and had elaborate defensive positions for at least half the frontier, they should have been able to hold out for more than 42 days.
> 
> *Assuming that the BEF had stayed on the Dyle river in front of Brussels, How would the French have prevented their 1st 7th armies (and the Belgians BEF) from being cut off, considering that they had no strategic reserve to mount a counterattack? *
> 
> The only serious attack was made by Gen. Franklyn's British 5th division + 2 tank battalions at Arras on May 20th.



Good points and Post Freebird


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## AL Schlageter (Nov 23, 2007)

> I would argue the opposite. The presence of the BEF gave the Germans no deterence in invading Beglium-France, and did not affect the overall outcome in anyway. I'm of the opinion that the French and Belgians could have improvised a better defense on the go without the BEF suddenly withdrawing and leaving a 20 km. gap in the Allied lines. Thus I would say that, in hindsight, there was no reason for the French and Belgians to rely on the British. The Allied epedition on Norway ended in a fiasco, and France should have made plans to look out after herself first, damned the BEF.


The BEF (with 9 Div) had the French 1st Army (with 22 Div) on its right and the Belgium Army (with 18 Div) on its left. The German breakthrough was on the line held by the French 9th Army (steamrolled) which had the French 1st Army on its left.


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## Arsenal VG-33 (Nov 23, 2007)

freebird said:


> Which historians are you citing that think it would have been better for the BEF to stay put where they were?



Precisely my point, using post-war 20/20 hindsight to find justification for maneuvers which were at the time questionable does not make a valid arguement. As for my statement on Gen. Gort, "...General Lord Gort, the BEF commander, was a most unfortunate choice. Although he is usually spared any serious blame for the debacle that followed, it would seem that he was pesimistic from the very first moment he arrived in France, and by May 1940 his only instinct was to cut and run". 

*John Mosier, The Blitzkrieg Myth pg. 140-142. Not Mozier's word, he is citing from a British source no less, author Hamilton in his book Monty, pgs. 328-30.*



freebird said:


> The British were well aware of the collape of the French 9th army that Germans had breached the Meuse river, as on May 16th they had began exchanging fire with German armoured units TO THEIR REAR, meaning that the Germans had already gotten behind the French 1st army on their drive westward



I find this astonishing, since all of my sources indicate the Germans had still not gotten past the Oise and Sambre rivers! All of my maps clearly show that on the 16th of May, remnants of Corap's 9th Armee were still engaged with the enemy between Beaumont and Vervins, with Touchon's 6th Armee arriving in Laon. The BEF at this stage is shown well to the North, West of Brussels. How on earth is the BEF engaging the enemy to it's REAR behind the French 1st Armee? 

_*West Point Atlas for the Second World War, Europe and Med. Theatres, Maps #11-#12.*_

Another of my books *"Sixty Days that Shook the West"*_ by Jacques Benoist-Mechin (Map #3, pg. 111)_ also shows the BEF still East of Lille on the 18th. 



freebird said:


> This is not correct, the BEF began a withdrawl because the Fr. 1st army had already begun to pull back, as they had been flanked and Hoth's Kleist's Panzers were already behind them and heading west. The Belgians the BEF and the FR. 1st on May 17th withdrew from the Dyle and pulled back to the Charleroi canal.



I've been kind to have spent all night digging out all of my books to give you my sources of information, I can only hope you will return the courtesy.

Here is an interesting exerpt from Mosier's book, *Chapter 6: The German Assault and the Fall of France: May-June 1940, pg. 143*:

(After receiving Reynaud's panicked phone call)

"..Churhill took the French at face value and decided that the BEF should think seriously about the possibility of evacuation. Given the nervousness of the senior British commanders, the mere hint of the possibility was enough. Ostensibly the order given on the 16th was simply to retreat, but this would precipitate the collapse."

"The BEF was in a position on the *RIGHT of the Beglian army, not it's left*. So a British withdrawal would not only force the Belgians back into a position along the seacoast, it would make it impossible for them to maintain a base inside their country sufficient to defend it. _Of all the leaders, military and civilian, it was the king of the Belgians, Leopold III, who saw this the most clearly: if the British retreated, the Belgian army would be cut off and forced to surrender. Without those two armies, the French could not hope to defeat the Germans. So the British decision guaranteed that the Germans would win."_

Don't like it, write to the author,his words not mine. I think he makes a lot of sense.



freebird said:


> There was no assumption, we have both British AND GERMAN reports of the lack of resistance by some French Belgian units.



There are also plenty of GERMAN reports detailing their bravery. What exactly is your point here? 



freebird said:


> The main problem in the Fall of France is that Gen. Gamelin had no strategic reserve, so that he had nothing to stop or even slow down the German blitzkrieg, one they had broken through the French lines. Since the French Belgians had as many divisions as the Germans, outnumbered them in tanks, and had elaborate defensive positions for at least half the frontier, they should have been able to hold out for more than 42 days.



Hard to do when their ally in the middle decides to pull out.



freebird said:


> Assuming that the BEF had stayed on the Dyle river in front of Brussels, How would the French have prevented their 1st 7th armies (and the Belgians BEF) from being cut off, considering that they had no strategic reserve to mount a counterattack?



Well, this could be thrown into the "what if" category. But I'd bee willing to venture and say that had the BEF stayed alongside it's allies, EVEN while in a retreat, the Belgians may have been able to hold out longer, the withdrawal and evacuations more organized and less chaotic, and perhaps the French 
1er Armee would not have been cut off and encircled at Lille.




freebird said:


> The only serious attack was made by Gen. Franklyn's British 5th division + 2 tank battalions at Arras on May 20th.



This was of no more of importance than Col. de Gaulle's 2 counter attacks towards Montcornet. One is overly glorified by British historians while the other hardly gets any mention. Considering they both failed in their objectives, I find this rather amusing.


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## Arsenal VG-33 (Nov 23, 2007)

AL Schlageter said:


> The BEF (with 9 Div) had the French 1st Army (with 22 Div) on its right and the Belgium Army (with 18 Div) on its left. The German breakthrough was on the line held by the French 9th Army (steamrolled) which had the French 1st Army on its left.




That was ONE of the breakthroughs. We've already discussed this and it's common knowledge. What is your point?


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## Arsenal VG-33 (Nov 23, 2007)

plan_D said:


> VG, you've read _Panzer Battles_; it's references to the BEF are all of retreats under pressure. Hoppners Panzer Corps pressed the French at Gembloux on the 13th 14th May, and Gort did request French aid in the counter-attack at Arras to close the gap between there and Peronne on the 20th.



The French tanks arrived late, nevertheless they did engage with Rommel the following day. Why is this never mentioned in British souces?



plan_D said:


> If you want to defend the French then feel free, but don't start trying to imply that the British were cowards - especially after Great Britain went to the aid of France (a country that should be able to defend itself). .



I feel you're trying to put words into my mouth. I NEVER stated that the British were cowards (soldiers, troops, etc.). I am implying however, that the BEF commanders were no less panicky than their French counterparts, and ALSO share some blame for the debacle of 1940, something which for the past 60+ years British historians have refused to deal with, despite comparative research in the past 10 years indicating there was enough blame to go around. That was the whole premise of my original posting, and somehow it evolved into a heated discussion of the entire battle of 1940.

Furthermore, despite the fact that there is MUCH evidence to the contrary, British historians/authors (and their readers) continue to delight in labeling the French cowards. It would seems that the recieved wisdom of the past 60+ years was a bit erroneous. I feel my analogy of the 3 men in the leaky boat is quite appropriate. 



plan_D said:


> The BEF evacuated from the nation because it was hopeless - the French were practically useless in armoured tactics and that was key to winning the battle.



This is where your are wrong. Again, quoting from *Mosier's Chapter 6: The German Assault and the Fall of France, pgs. 131-132:*

On battle of Gembloux Gap:

"Over the course of the battle, the French had more than one hundred tanks destroyed outright, but they gave somewhat better than they recieved - the German 3rd and 4th Amd. between them lost more than 150 vehicles, with many more being damaged. By the evening of the 15th (May), the Germans had abandonded the battlefield. Given the size ofthe armored forces involved on the German side, 2 division with slightly more than 250 tanks apiece, and given the usual ratio of completely destroyed to unserviceable tanks, the Germans had basically lost one entire armored division in this engagement."

"The Battle of Gembloux Gap epitomizes the paradoxical nature of May 1940. In the firt (and only) serious battle, the only large-scale tank-versus-tank egagement, the French prevailed and forced the Germans to retreat."

"So much for the idea that the French had no notion how to deploy armor."

Here there was a serious French miscalculation, since Gen. Prioux (the architect of this victory) was ordered to withdraw after the Germans had left. With proper intelligence, this could have been exploited.


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## Freebird (Nov 23, 2007)

Arsenal VG-33 said:


> Precisely my point, using post-war 20/20 hindsight to find justification for maneuvers which were at the time questionable does not make a valid arguement. As for my statement on Gen. Gort, "...General Lord Gort, the BEF commander, was a most unfortunate choice. Although he is usually spared any serious blame for the debacle that followed, it would seem that he was pesimistic from the very first moment he arrived in France, and by May 1940 his only instinct was to cut and run".
> 
> _John Mosier, The Blitzkrieg Myth pg. 140-142. Not Mozier's word, he is citing from a British source no less, author Hamilton in his book Monty, pgs. 328-30._
> 
> ...



It worried Von Rundtsted so much that didn't want to risk his Panzers attacking Dunkirk!

See second map, the positions on May 16. Armies coulored BEF red, Belgian green, Frech 1st 7th dark blue, French 9th medium blue. Panzer spearhead positions on May 18, 19, 20, when they reached the sea. Note that the French 1st, BEF Belgians have all been pushed back about 5 - 6 miles.


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## Arsenal VG-33 (Nov 23, 2007)

freebird said:


> Gort was not the best British general, but he was not responsible for the French collapse



Where did I say he was resposible for the French collapse? I argued that that Gort's actions were very much responsible for the collapse of Belgium's forces. From an earlier post of mine on this thread: "..._given that the BEF was on Belgian's right , their withdrawal insured that the Belgians would be forced with their backs to the sea and no alternative but to capitulate_.".



freebird said:


> Yes, I never said that they were not.



???? Please clarify. First you stated: "..._as on *May 16th *they (BEF) had began exchanging fire with German armoured units TO THEIR REAR, meaning that the Germans had already gotten behind the French 1st army on their drive westward"."_

I corrected you by clearly pointing out that this was not the case. Are you supporting my correction, or refuting it? You have me a little confused here.



freebird said:


> No because the Belgians, BEF French 1st all retreated together on the 17th to hold the Charleroi canal/Senne river, which runs through Brussels. The Belgians were nowhere near the seacoast, they retreated into their capital on the 17th



1- With the BEF retreating, the Belgians are forced to do the same, and continue doing so until they have their backs to the sea.
2-The French are also forced to do the same, hence why they appear to all retreat together.
3-The British (on the 16th) decide it is _"best to retire towards the canal behind the city of Brussels (the Lys Canal)._".

This clearly put Brussels within the British zone, not the Belgian's. Last quote sourced from "*Sixty Days that Shook the West*", Jacques Benoist-Mechin, pg. 107.



freebird said:


> No, then they all would have been encircled together, instead of 330,000 escaping. From the 18th to the 20th THERE WAS NOTHING THAT WOULD STOP THE GERMANS FROM ENCIRCLING THE ALLIES



That is your opinion. I'm more of the opinion that had there been more unison, the Allies would have been able to evacuate more troops, not less, and that the French troops stuck in Lille doing the easternmost rearguard action would not have trapped. I also believe the Belgian's would have been able to stay in the fight longer. I'm not argue that the endgame would have been different, I'm argueing that more allied troops would have been saved.



freebird said:


> It worried Von Rundtsted so much that didn't want to risk his Panzers attacking Dunkirk!



If you're refering to the Arras battle, "_a supporting contingent from one of Gen. Prioux's DLMs, Rommel believed himself to have fought off an attack by five Allied divisions. He so reported to Kluge and Rundstedt."_.

From *Strange Victory, Ernest R. May, pg. 442*

After being rereading parts if this book, I notice the French contingent was there at Arras that _SAME_ day, in addition to those that arrived the day afterwards. Yet very few record this, why? It was most likely these tanks that cause Rundstedt to call off the advance for fear of the possible counter-attack from the south. This unfortunately never came.

As for the maps, those are some of the very same maps I have in my possesion. I stand by my original arguement that in the whole 1940 debacle, the British are in now way blameless for the situation in the fighting the Franco-Belgian zones. May I kindly ask where you are getting your information?


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## Freebird (Nov 23, 2007)

Arsenal VG-33 said:


> Where did I say he was resposible for the French collapse? I argued that that Gort's actions were very much responsible for the collapse of Belgium's forces. From an earlier post of mine on this thread: "..._given that the BEF was on Belgian's right , their withdrawal insured that the Belgians would be forced with their backs to the sea and no alternative but to capitulate_.".
> 
> *The withdrawl was ordered by Gamelin. The Belgians are responsible for their own destruction, having refused to cooperate with the Allies earlier.*
> 
> ...



*As the maps show, on the 16th the BEF French Belgians have retreated a few miles by the 16th. On the 17th they are behind the Charleroi canal, and on the 18th the are behind the Escaut.*

As I am travelling right now I do not have access to all my books, but I will give a couple of links. Details of the Battle from German War Machine

Battles Campaigns: Battle of France, 1940

The map of France May 16 1940 is from the Jewish Virtual Library
.
The Vichy Regime


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## Arsenal VG-33 (Nov 23, 2007)

The two links you've provided: the Battle Campaigns is interesting, albeit with very general and non-specific information, at least in my view. I'm not really certain why you've brought up a Vichy related website, since it deals mostly with post-1940 battle French regime and society, and nothing with what we're discussing. Could this be the same Vichy that we, the USA, gave diplomatic recognition to almost immediately after the armisitice and in doing so, ignored the fledgling Free french movement?


*freebird *, and others - 

It is quite clear we have reached an impasse regarding the battle of France in May-June 1940, as it appears neither you or I will convince the other of our viewpoints. We're going to have to agree to disagree on the specifics of the day-by-day operations of the Allied retreat, and what their consequences were.

I am going to maintain my original assertion that the British were a great deal responsible for the Belgian collapse, as well as the encirlcement of the remnants of French 1er Armee in Lille. I feel I have provided much evidence, much of it researched by renowned historians in the past 10 years, which support my assertions and I've posted them clearly for all to see. I also feel that recently (past 10-15 years), there have been many works written disputing, and even proving false the recieved wisdom of the past 60+ years. Quite naturally, you're just as passionate in argueing otherwise from your perspective, and I can respect that. I commend you for keeping the debate civil, which I unfortunately cannot say the same for other forums I participated in.

Nevertheless, it is my emphatic belief that the French and Belgian recieved undue criticism in the battle of 1940, despite their many fault elsewhere, and yes there were plenty of them. That said, I can see why in a forum with mostly US/UK members, there are many who choose to view the role of the British in that battle as completely faultless, which in my view, is flat wrong and smacks of revisionism. Bad relations between France and the USA over the Iraq issue, in my view, only exacerbated these myths and false rumors to suit many people's already existing prejudices.

In conclusion, I thank you for the debate, and I would encourage others views works written by 2nd and even 3rd parties to the war to recieve a comparative outlook of the overall situation in order to better understand what really happened. By doing so, I discovered that one can easily seperate the myths from the reality. 

So, for the time being (and barring anything statement which I find so ridiculous that it merits a response), I'm taking a break from this particular discussion and going back to reading about airplanes.


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## plan_D (Nov 24, 2007)

VG;

Why talk about the Gembloux battle as if it instantly turns the tables on the Germans? You can see from the entire campaign that the French were offering armoured resistance piecemeal and were being destroyed as thus. You forget the superiority of French armour over their German counter-parts in this conflict, and this superiority is recognised by all histories. 

The French losing 100 tanks to the 150 of the Germans in this battle is pretty horrific for the French given the fact that Germany had no heavy tank to match the likes of the Char B, and no tank to match the S-35.


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## Arsenal VG-33 (Nov 24, 2007)

plan_D said:


> VG;
> 
> Why talk about the Gembloux battle as if it instantly turns the tables on the Germans?



I wasn't saying that it had turned the tide. I was supporting my repsonse to your earlier statement: _"the French were practically useless in armoured tactics and that was key to winning the battle."_

The key here was tactical air support, of which the Allies had practically very little to none, but the Germans had understood it's value very well and used it quite effectively. 

...and yes, it was a horrific battle.


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## Glider (Nov 24, 2007)

VG this is an area of which I admit to knowing little and looking at the postings, intend to read up on.
Obviously you have a greater understanding than I on this area, so can I ask you which book you would recommend that I start with?

Many thanks

David


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## Arsenal VG-33 (Nov 24, 2007)

Glider said:


> VG this is an area of which I admit to knowing little and looking at the postings, intend to read up on.
> Obviously you have a greater understanding than I on this area, so can I ask you which book you would recommend that I start with?
> 
> Many thanks
> ...



Hello David,

While I certainly do not claim to be an expert, far from it, I'm very interested in WW 2 history as much as the next person on a forum such as this. It just so happens that for the past 13-14 years, the 1939-1940 years interests me the most.

As for books, I am happy to recommend one that should still be in print (on paperback).

*The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940 - Julian Jackson*
Of all the works concerning 1940 that i've read, I think this one is the most fair. Very well written, not only examines the military but also the political and societal consequences of 1940. Not solely a 20/20 hindsight lesson, but I feel Jackson really tries to understand the "boot on the ground", so to speak, of why people acted/reacted the way they did. Definately the most studious and serious work I've seen on the subject yet. I highly recommend it. J. Jackson is critical of all where it is deserved and gives praises where it is due. 

*btw* - Julian Jackson isn't American or French, but British.  


A much older book which I like is:

*Sixty Days that Shook the West - Jacques Benoist-Mechin*
A day by day account of the battle, both military and political on a per day basis, thus making it simple to understand. Overall it is good, with some generalization here and there, as well as some specifics. I like it because there is a good bunch of early accounts of the High-Commands inter-squabbling as well as national leaders. A sense of panic sets in as you go along. 

Unsure where you might find a copy, but maybe Amazon would be a good place to start.

Good Luck!
Kind Regards, 
-Yann


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## plan_D (Nov 24, 2007)

I meant, VG, that it seems you were using Gembloux as evidence of French abilities to use armour effectively in combat. Gembloux is one encounter in which it seems the French managed to gather enough armour together to make a difference, but throughout the battle for France it was proven that the French, nor the British, had the tactics of armoured warfare grasped. 

When comparing the French to their German counter-parts, it's safe to say that the French were practically useless at controlling armoured [and supporting] units in an effective and decisive manner. 

Tactical air support was not a decisive factor, in the French landscape it was possible for troops to gain cover from any air attack. This was true in 1940 just as much as it was true in 1944, when the German forces faced the Allied air onslaught. The only area in World War II where tactical air was the key to success was North Africa [no cover] - everywhere else it just made life easier. 
The Allied tactical air units were present over the front anyway. The problems facing them was the fluid front, lack of intelligence, lack of air cover and the ferocity [plus ability] of German light and medium anti-aircraft defences. 

The battle of France was decided by the units on the ground. And whichever side of the argument you're on [Every Ally was to blame, only the French, only the British ?] you should recognise (and this is for everyone) that you're attempting to deny the true brilliance of the German military planning and action in the Battle of France. 

That's where the blame it on one or all the Allies came from; no one wants to recognise the fact that the Nazi Wehrmacht was supreme [in tactical ability] in 1940.


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## AL Schlageter (Nov 26, 2007)

Arsenal VG-33 said:


> That was ONE of the breakthroughs. We've already discussed this and it's common knowledge. What is your point?


Looking at the map posted for May 16 I see no large German advance in the area of the BEF and Belgians.

I do see the French 7th Army bugging out from the far left of the line leaving the Belgians with extra line to defend.

I also see on another map the French 1st Army being rolled back by the Germans much more than the German gains made in the sector of the BEF up to May 18. Are you saying the BEF should have stayed put and been out flanked? On May 21 the BEF was on the next defensive line, the Escouf R.

What were the French Armies on the southern German flank doing? Not much from what I can see.

On May 26 the Germans had reached the coast and had almost cut off the BEF from escaping and being made POWs.

The Belgians were doing much better than the French in defending from the German attack but surrendered on May 28 thus the BEFs left flank was wide open.



> That said, I can see why in a forum with mostly US/UK members, there are many who choose to view the role of the British in that battle as completely faultless, which in my view, is flat wrong and smacks of revisionism.


One must also question your objectivity with a French nick and a questionable sig.


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## Arsenal VG-33 (Nov 29, 2007)

AL Schlageter said:


> Looking at the map posted for May 16 I see no large German advance in the area of the BEF and Belgians.
> 
> I do see the French 7th Army bugging out from the far left of the line leaving the Belgians with extra line to defend.
> 
> ...



Had you bothered to read my previous post, you'd see I back my assertions with very credible sources.



AL Schlageter said:


> The Belgians were doing much better than the French in defending from the German attack but surrendered on May 28 thus the BEFs left flank was wide open.



    I realize the Writers Guild may have been on strike recently, but is a five year old writing this for you?




AL Schlageter said:


> One must also question your objectivity with a French nick and a questionable sig.



The question of objectivity is a bit ironic, as I posted sources, whereas you haven't.


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## AL Schlageter (Nov 30, 2007)

Oh my, our French revisionist has troubles reading maps and blaming the British for the French incompetence.

Yup, you post references that support you excuses for French incompetence.

Now is it the BEF or the French sector that has the shortest yellow line in these 2 maps?

Also note where the French 7th Army ended up after leaving the Belgians holding the bag on the left.










Now what yellow line is the shortest in this map?






Yes the Belgians put up a better fight than did the French who melted fast like a snowball on a hot summer's day.


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## Arsenal VG-33 (Nov 30, 2007)

Al, I live here in the US. See the cute little flag under my user name, and the state I live in? The fact that you didn't catch that is telling. For your information, I hold dual nationalities with both the US and France, despite being born here (dad US, mom Fr.). Same goes for my brother. 

Adding colors to maps which I have myself (and proved they need revising - backed up with sources) with cute colored lines is no arguement. These maps do not provide for day-to-day account (unless you're one of those types who doesn't see any importance in those). I feel I've presented enough evidence showing that ALL the Allies shared a good portion of the blame, the French, the Belgians, AND the British. 


The only things you've proven to me is:

1- you're good with crayons.
2- you're still not reading posts and only trying to reinforce your belief using very outdated recieved wisdom.
3- your bias (or should I say your bigotry) against the French perspective is too apparent, thus automatically loses all sense of objectivity.
4- Casualty records alone disprove your arguement.
5- You exhibit every sign of being a troll. 

At least the other members on this thread disagreed and argued with me in a gentlemanly manner, why are you incapable of doing the same? Why don't you do yourself a favor, and find one of the books I've listed and read it. I don't care if you agree/disagree with it, but I least give me the satisfaction of knowing that you're capable of an arguement worth debating and holding some water. Until then, I really don't feel that any further posting on your part merits a response. Let us know when you've read something.

Meanwhile, enjoy your coloring.


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## AL Schlageter (Nov 30, 2007)

> At least the other members on this thread disagreed and argued with me in a gentlemanly manner, why are you incapable of doing the same?





Arsenal VG-33 said:


> I realize the Writers Guild may have been on strike recently, but is a five year old writing this for you?
> 
> 1- you're good with crayons.
> 
> Meanwhile, enjoy your coloring.



Yes this is so gentlemanly. More like juvenile.

As for your references:

Jacques Benoist-Mechin, a Frenchman, so clearly has bias. As for the Englishman, well, the latest fashion in GB is self bashing.



> I feel I've presented enough evidence showing that ALL the Allies shared a good portion of the blame, the French, the Belgians, AND the British.


True but with the French having at least a 50% portion of the blame. All I see is you making excuses for the rapid French retreat by blaming the Brits, and the Belgians.



> 2- you're still not reading posts and only trying to reinforce your belief using very outdated recieved wisdom.
> 3- your bias (or should I say your bigotry) against the French perspective is too apparent, thus automatically loses all sense of objectivity.


2- You are not very good at answering questions.

3- Your French heritage reeks of bias (or should I say your bigotry), thus automatically loses all sense of objectivity.



> 5- You exhibit every sign of being a troll.


Takes one to know one.


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## drgondog (Dec 5, 2007)

Arsenal VG-33 said:


> *freebird *, and others -
> 
> It is quite clear we have reached an impasse regarding the battle of France in May-June 1940, as it appears neither you or I will convince the other of our viewpoints. We're going to have to agree to disagree on the specifics of the day-by-day operations of the Allied retreat, and what their consequences were.
> 
> ...


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## Arsenal VG-33 (Dec 5, 2007)

drgondog said:


> *You have not been around long enough or haven't paid attention if you think the rank and file member thinks Britain or US 'faultless'. To say so smacks of a plea for sympathy that not everybody sails into your camp and swallows your point of view. You compound thta deficiency with ill concealed contempt for those holding another point of view. *


*

Before joining this forum, I took a great deal of time to peruse through the archives. My research told me everything I needed to know. I also learned that bringing up another point of view is not welcome by some members here, including yourself. I presented a well researched case for my point, and instead of showing any willingness to debate the case with sourced material, and a few members such as yourself responded with denial and veiled hostility.



drgondog said:



I personally bailed out of the ascerbic discourse because it smacked of 'fornicating with a skunk' - in other word I enjoyed all I could stand which wasn't much!

Click to expand...


And yet you decided to post your views anyway. 8) 



drgondog said:



I am reminded that since France helped us win our Independence, that relatively few to very few French soldiers have been laid to rest on American soil or on battlefields all over the world supporting any other US cause in which we asked for your help (you as in La Belle France). 

It was OK for us to choke up 500,000 plus dead, and 10 times that in wounded ,of our own so that your relatives could either stay French or regain your country in two world wars.. that was then.. In Viet Nam you had to take a hike, Korea?(did you show up? - I can't remember). 

As for Iraq today? you were too busy trading with Saddam (including sales of defensive weapons technology that unfortunately for him did not work) to honor our reqest for help.

Click to expand...


So your obvious disdain for the French also spills over into other eras in history? May I ask where I may have mentioned the American War of Independence, WW1, Korea or Vietnam? No? It would seem I didn't. So I ask you, why did you bring them up, other than the fact that you strongly believe the French should bow down and kiss your feet? Or perhaps it is much more convenient to forget the fact that the French lost more soldiers in WW 1 than the US has in all of it's wars combined? Yes, I feel it is VERY convenient for you.

As for Korea, you may wish to learn something here:

French Battalion in the Korean War - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

As for Vietnam, you may recall both France and the US left under less than honorable circumstances.

Iraq? Please! Explain to me how this has anything to do with 1940? Or for that matter AWI, WW 1, Korea, Vietnam? Tell me drgondog, how deep does your hatred of France go? Was it impossible for you to simple say "We agree to disagree" on the 1940 discussion without launching a litany of reason why you think the French suck?




drgondog said:



On the other hand whenever I am in England, France or Belgium or Holland I see a virtual sea of crosses and stars of David with the remains of US soldiers ferilizing 'local soil'. Some have been there for 90 years, some only 60.
Iraq is only one of many acts by France since DeGaulle, that showed how little respect France has for the US. For those of us that hold France in some contempt one might ask how many times we asked for your (yes YOU) support and were rejected.

Click to expand...


And here you are completely out of your league because you have no idea what you're talking about. 

Were YOU on the Normandy beaches on June 6, 1944? Were YOU at Belleau Woods in 1918? Please stop comparing yourself with those generations. The French have no reason to be grateful to YOU! The previous generations who commited themselves did so for reasons which I doubt you can understand. I have ancestors who fought and died for BOTH the US and France, and I've only begun to understand. Stop patronizing me with your "gratitude" drivel, you have no meaning of the word. Pardon me for being half French, I must  you.



drgondog said:



Should France ever be in grave peril I have no doubt we will be there simply because we are sentimental about a friendship that existed once 240 years ago that helped us win our freedom - and unfortunately we have short memories

Click to expand...

*
...and limited knowlegde too, but feel free to stay home. Perhaps if you turn off the Bill O'Reilly you might realize that both French and American soldiers have laid down their lives for a mutual cause during much of that 240 years, but the fact that you wish to not recognize that is not the fault of the French, or other Americans, but of yourself alone. I challenge you to put aside the apparent animosity you have for France and the French. Both countries have had greivances towards eachother no doubt, thats what democracies do, but to regard a disagreement between to countries as an ultimate act of betrayal is only taking things completely out of proportions.

I've stated my case. If you, or Al wish continue bashing, then be my guest -bash away! Just be aware that French-bashing disguised as intellectual discourse is quite transparent, and you're won't be fooling anyone. 

Now, if you care to return to Gort, Gamelin, Dunkirk, Belgium, tanks, German planning, etc....I'll be happy to engage. Otherwise, I'm done here and I'll move on.

Have a nice Holiday Season.


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## drgondog (Dec 5, 2007)

Arsenal VG-33 said:


> Before joining this forum, I took a great deal of time to peruse through the archives. My research told me everything I needed to know.
> 
> *I would suspect you fell short*
> 
> ...



Thank you, same to you with reciprocal enthsiasm.


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## plan_D (Dec 6, 2007)

I have to make a simple remark here about the French in World War I ... they were defending their own country, so I should hope they laid more lives down than any other nation.

And for drgondog, I believe that the French and British could have defeated Germany without U.S aid simply because of the introduction of the tank. The battle of Cambrai has proven to me that the Allies had the potential to unleash a devestating blow to the, still, unprepared German Army.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 6, 2007)

plan_D said:


> And for drgondog, I believe that the French and British could have defeated Germany without U.S aid simply because of the introduction of the tank. The battle of Cambrai has proven to me that the Allies had the potential to unleash a devestating blow to the, still, unprepared German Army.



I have to agree. 

While the US entering into WW1 brought fresh soldiers to the battle it did not effect the outcome of the war. There were too little US soldiers too late in the battle to effect the outcome of the war.

I happen to know a bit (not everything ) about the US involvment in WW1simply because I was required to learn it because I was a member of the 1st Infanty Division which was the US unit sent to France.


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## drgondog (Dec 6, 2007)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> I have to agree.
> 
> While the US entering into WW1 brought fresh soldiers to the battle it did not effect the outcome of the war. There were too little US soldiers too late in the battle to effect the outcome of the war.
> 
> I happen to know a bit (not everything ) about the US involvment in WW1simply because I was required to learn it because I was a member of the 1st Infanty Division which was the US unit sent to France.



Guys for me it's speculation (for all of us) regarding what the consequences were for no intervention of US troops in 1917-1918. What is true is that the US drafted 4,000,000 and was sending 10,000 perday by June 1918. I think the British, in comparison drafted 6,000,000 the entire war.

What is not speculation is that the British were pushing the Germans back and the situation at home for Germany was dire, economically and with respect to further reserves. They had potential resources from East to draw on for a protracted war

What is not speculation is that the Germans agreed and Armistice after failing in their Offensives, some major attacks were halted barely even with US. 

What is not speculation is that the Germans were faced with certain total defeat on the battlefield as a result of our intervention and resource pool - but I remain convinced that Britain and France could have prevailed without us - no argument on my part

Had we NOT thrown our weight in and the war had continued, how many more million Brit and French soldiers would have died before a conclusion - however it turned out? 

For US, the casualties were the highest RATE (by far) of any of our wars surpassing even the War Between the States, and were more than 50% of that War in less than a year and a half.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 6, 2007)

The war would have been over in November 1918 with or without the US...


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## renrich (Dec 6, 2007)

I come late to this discussion and I reckon that the question of whether the US tipped the balance toward the Allies in WW1 is not the salient question in this thread but my opinion is that the US's entry into the war was of primary influence and the war may have ended quite differently if Wilson had kept us out of the war. I subscribe to the notion that if the US had not entered the war, a negotiated settlement would have taken place between the Allies and the Central Powers, both of whom were exhausted, the Russian Revolution would have not happened and WW2 would have been avoided.


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## pbfoot (Dec 6, 2007)

Not to brag but if you research the last 100 days of WW1 but Canada did more with less then the US
In this time, the Canadian Corps' four over-strength Divisions of 100 000 men, defeated and/or put to flight 34 German Divisions, roughly one quarter of the German forces fighting on the Western Front.
In contrast, the American Expeditionary Force of 1.2 million men is credited with defeating 46 German Divisions in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.
The Canadians advanced forther captured more men and guns then the US . Ludendorff would agree as he called it the Black day for the German Army


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## drgondog (Dec 6, 2007)

pbfoot said:


> Not to brag but if you research the last 100 days of WW1 but Canada did more with less then the US
> In this time, the Canadian Corps' four over-strength Divisions of 100 000 men, defeated and/or put to flight 34 German Divisions, roughly one quarter of the German forces fighting on the Western Front.
> In contrast, the American Expeditionary Force of 1.2 million men is credited with defeating 46 German Divisions in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.
> The Canadians advanced forther captured more men and guns then the US . Ludendorff would agree as he called it the Black day for the German Army



I AM aware of the Canada contribution, particularly at Arras. 

I'm minded that somewher I read that at any one time through the end of the war that GB had an average of 800,000 troops in theatre and in a short time the US put 1,000,000+ boots on the ground, did a pretty fair job with green troops at Meuse-Argonne, and was re-inforcing the AEF at 10,000 per day from a 4,000,000 man draft pool.

But I guess it was of no significance in the outcome - either psychologically or materially. Ah well, we tried but I wonder why we were needed if everything was over whether we showed up or not?


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## pbfoot (Dec 6, 2007)

drgondog said:


> I AM aware of the Canada contribution, particularly at Arras.
> 
> I'm minded that somewher I read that at any one time through the end of the war that GB had an average of 800,000 troops in theatre and in a short time the US put 1,000,000+ boots on the ground, did a pretty fair job with green troops at Meuse-Argonne, and was re-inforcing the AEF at 10,000 per day from a 4,000,000 man draft pool.
> 
> But I guess it was of no significance in the outcome - either psychologically or materially. Ah well, we tried but I wonder why we were needed if everything was over whether we showed up or not?


I wasn't deriding your contribution but many times things get overlooked . The AEF definately put a different spin on the outcome .


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## AL Schlageter (Dec 7, 2007)

Found this neat site on the AEF.
About.com: http://www.worldwar1.com/dbc/dbc2.htm


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## Freebird (Dec 7, 2007)

Arsenal VG-33 said:


> The two links you've provided: the Battle Campaigns is interesting, albeit with very general and non-specific information, at least in my view. I'm not really certain why you've brought up a Vichy related website, since it deals mostly with post-1940 battle French regime and society, and nothing with what we're discussing. Could this be the same Vichy that we, the USA, gave diplomatic recognition to almost immediately after the armisitice and in doing so, ignored the fledgling Free french movement?
> 
> 
> *freebird *, and others -
> ...


 
Before the "Fall of France" thread wanders to far down memory lane back to 1918...  LOL!

Here is an interesting "what if" thought, in June 1940 the French cabinet took a vote on whether to accept the German armistice, or to keep fighting from Algeria the colonies. If I remember correctly it failed by *one vote!*  

If they had decided to keep fighting, with British help they might have been able to pull 20 - 40 divisions into N. Africa (minus tanks equip. of course), most of their remaining air force, and the French Navy (fourth largest in the world at the time)

Imagine how this would change the dynamics of the war! France and Britain would clear the Italians out of N. Africa within months, and the Japanese position would change too, remember that they used bases in French IndoChina to launch their attacks on Malaya Siam in Dec 1941


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## Marcel (Dec 7, 2007)

renrich said:


> I come late to this discussion and I reckon that the question of whether the US tipped the balance toward the Allies in WW1 is not the salient question in this thread but my opinion is that the US's entry into the war was of primary influence and the war may have ended quite differently if Wilson had kept us out of the war. I subscribe to the notion that if the US had not entered the war, a negotiated settlement would have taken place between the Allies and the Central Powers, both of whom were exhausted, the Russian Revolution would have not happened and WW2 would have been avoided.



Good point, although I question if the Russian Revolution would not have happened


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## plan_D (Dec 7, 2007)

The U.S troops made the war end a lot sooner and the brave men laid down their lives for France (Britain was in no position of danger). But nevertheless, with 20/20 hindsight I think that if that war had continued without the U.S then Germany would have collapsed under the next armoured offensive of the Allies.


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## renrich (Dec 7, 2007)

The theory is and it is just supposition of course that if the war had had a negotiated end in 1917, the Russian Army would have remained intact and loyal to the Czar and a revolution could not have been successful.


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## Glider (Dec 7, 2007)

freebird said:


> Imagine how this would change the dynamics of the war! France and Britain would clear the Italians out of N. Africa within months, and the Japanese position would change too, remember that they used bases in French IndoChina to launch their attacks on Malaya Siam in Dec 1941



I had never thought of that before but its a very good point. With Italy out of the war and maybe some of her ships added to the French Navy life could have been very different.

On the plus side the extra ships would have been very useful in the Far East although lacking carriers they would still be limited. The extra British troops freed up would also be invaluble in building up the defences in Malaya.

On the Down side German would have had more troops available for the attack on Russia that might have made a difference.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 7, 2007)

drgondog said:


> But I guess it was of no significance in the outcome - either psychologically or materially. Ah well, we tried but I wonder why we were needed if everything was over whether we showed up or not?



Dont take me wrong. It certainly had a psycological effect and a material effect on the German's to know that there are tons of fresh troops on the Battle Field.

At first the US forces were used to augment British and French forces in there lines.

The war however still would have been an allied victory with or without the US and it would have ended around the same time. The German military was on the brink of mutiny. Hell in Oct. 1918 parts of the German Navy mutinied. The German people were pressuring there government for peace after suffereing 6 million casualties.

Allied Victory was inevitable.

Again I am not trying to downplay the US involvment. I am proud of the US contribtution, especially having served with the 1st Infantry Division which dates its liniage to the US Expeditionary Force of WW1.


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## Freebird (Dec 8, 2007)

Glider said:


> I had never thought of that before but its a very good point. With Italy out of the war and maybe some of her ships added to the French Navy life could have been very different.
> 
> On the plus side the extra ships would have been very useful in the Far East although lacking carriers they would still be limited. The extra British troops freed up would also be invaluble in building up the defences in Malaya.
> 
> On the Down side German would have had more troops available for the attack on Russia that might have made a difference.



I don't know if it would be any worse off for Russia. The Germans would still have wasted 3 months bailing out Musso' in the Balkans, I think the Germans would have been very nervous leaving a large French army air force in Algeria, they might have to leave another 10 - 15 divisions + LW in France just in case. + bombing Italy from n. Africa would soften her up, the Germans might have to send the LW to help protect Italy


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## kool kitty89 (Jan 24, 2008)

On the WWI topic, Wilson's 14 points would have almost definitely prevented WWII, but of course the European allied nations were more interested in villanizing Germany (and Austria as well) and demanding reparations and division of territory. (as well as intrest of installing colonial governments in former German territories)
Unlike WWII no country was specifically at fault for the war (and there was no real immoral or evil enemy or threat to defeat), or the were all at fault for creating the tangled web of secret alliances which were supposed to prevent war as deturrents. (you could blame Germany for attacking Russia, wich was the major trigger which activated the alliances and resulted in the global conflict; but again it was mainly the whole alliance mess that created the situation-which was just a matter of time to erupt)

On another note, the war may have taken a different turn if Germany had been able to sucessfully conduct unrestricted submarine warfare from the start. (which would have happened if US political issues not caused Germany to limit the submarines; a result of the British puting millitary supplies--illegaly mind you-- on civilian transports which happened to be carrying some American passengers)


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## Freebird (Jan 24, 2008)

kool kitty89 said:


> On the WWI topic, Wilson's 14 points would have almost definitely prevented WWII, but of course the European allied nations were more interested in villanizing Germany (and Austria as well) and demanding reparations and division of territory.



Wilson's 14 points were unlikely to prevent WWII. It was not France the European Allies who blocked the 14 points, *the US Senate refused to ratify it.* In any event, I don't see how France was wrong for demanding reparations, as it was *France* that was invaded and had its land destroyed by the war, not Germany or the USA. 



> *Unlike WWII no country was specifically at fault for the war* (and there was no real immoral or evil enemy or threat to defeat), or the were all at fault for creating the tangled web of secret alliances



??? France was invaded by Germany, regardless of alliances this was an act of war. The prime culprit was Austria-Hungary which invaded Serbia.



> On another note, the war may have taken a different turn if Germany had been able to sucessfully conduct unrestricted submarine warfare from the start. (which would have happened if US political issues not caused Germany to limit the submarines; a result of the British puting millitary supplies--illegaly mind you-- on civilian transports which happened to be carrying some American passengers)



*Sorry, there is nothing illegal in putting American war supplies on British ships*. According to cruiser rules they could be sunk by the U-boats. If US citizens disregarded the warnings not to sail into a war zone, then they would risk swimming around in the Atlantic.



Wikipedia said:


> It was perfectly legal under American shipping regulations for British ships to carry rifle cartriges and other ammunition. Under the "cruiser rules", the Germans could sink a civilian vessel only after guaranteeing the safety of all the passengers; since Lusitania (like all British merchantmen) was under instructions from the British Admiralty to report the sighting of a German submarine, and indeed to attempt to ram the ship if it surfaced to board and inspect her, she was acting as a naval auxiliary, and was thus exempt from this requirement and a legitimate military target. By international law, the presence (or absence) of military cargo was irrelevant.


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## kool kitty89 (Jan 25, 2008)

I know the senate didn't ratify the 14 points, but this was after revisions, it didn't get that far along with the allies either.(they didn't ratify the treaty of Versailles either, by which time only 3 of the points were used aniway) In its original for it may have been likely to be ratified by the US senate. (except for the isolationalists who still disliked the entry of the League of Nations and the entry to the war in the first place) Either way the final treaty had deviated so much from the original plan the failure to ratify it then is understanable. And the whole mess with the senate at the time needed to be handeled differently to compomise realisicly on the subjct; which would have been changed anyway for the treaty of Versailles which, by then, still wouldn't be ratified by the US senate either way.

It was an idealistic and realitively unbiased plan which was not wildly popular at the time (though the Germans were realitively enthusiastic about it), it may not have kept Germany from trying to rebuild its previous empire (which may not have been as fractured anyway) but it probably would have facilitated the continued control by a realitively moderate government and prvented the rise of the Nazi regime. Reparations may have been fair to France, but the way they were handled was poor and the 14 points had a very good plan (in terms of economic and diplomatic stability) for the reconstruction of ravaged Europe. 

The difference was: point 8. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all. instead of direct monetary reparations.


On the U-boats, I was talking about attacks on British civilian passenger ships carrying British millitary supplies which also happened to be carrying some American passengers. (of course, at the time the public and the US government didn't know of the millitary cargo, had they their reaction may have been more twards Britain than Germany) In the case of the Lusitania this factor was technically irrelivant as: Under the "cruiser rules", the Germans could sink a civilian vessel only after guaranteeing the safety of all the passengers; since Lusitania (like all British merchantmen) was under instructions from the British Admiralty to report the sighting of a German submarine, and indeed to attempt to ram the ship if it surfaced to board and inspect her, she was acting as a naval auxiliary, and was thus exempt from this requirement and a legitimate military target. By international law, the presence (or absence) of military cargo was irrelevant. In which case, neutral civilian pasengers were there at their own risk, as the Germans tried to war the US public with failed newspaper adds.


Of Austra-Hungary's invasion of Serbia, this may have not been the correct reaction to the assination, but I can see many other powerful countries with large empires doing the same under the circumstances. And as said, it was the whole mess of secret treaties that made entangled war just a matter of time. (inless all of the treaties were made no longer secret or the whole 'Blance of Power' diplomatic situation was revised)

And the War with, and subsequent invasion of, France was a diect resuld of the declaration of war on Russia due to France's alliance with Russia.


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