# Japan and the Soviet Union



## renrich (Jun 30, 2009)

What would have happened if, instead of attacking the US at Pearl Harbor, Japan had only attacked the British in China and Burma and the Dutch in the East Indies and had mounted an attack against the Soviet Union in the Spring of 1942?


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## Soren (Jun 30, 2009)

Hi Renrich,

Interesting thought. I had actually thought myself that it might have worked out pretty well if the Japanese had reached an agreement with Germany to share the oil fields in the Caucasus and mounted a two front offensive against the USSR. 

Had such a thing happened then the Soviet Union would've no doubt collapsed within a year and a half. 

Another great thing for the axis would've been the US unwillingness to go to war then. Had the Japanese not attacked at Pearl Harbor and Hitler not declared war on the US, then Britain and the rest of Europe would've been screwed big time.

Again goes to show how stupid Hitler sometimes was.


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## Glider (Jun 30, 2009)

The British would have lost Burma and China, the US would ae attacked Japan as they were the ones applying political and economic pressure on Japan over their actions in China. I do not believe that the USA would stand on one side and wach Japan up the stakes. The difference of course is that Japan wouldn't have had the advantage of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbour and their losses would have been significant when they faced the USN in open conflict.
The attack on Russia would have failed as they simply didn't have the type of equipment needed for a war in Russia. The second ranked equipment in Russia such as the BT series tanks would have been more than effective against Japan leaving the first line equipment to face Germany.


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## michaelmaltby (Jun 30, 2009)

Renrich - an interesting scenario but seriously flawed. In May - Septemeber 1939 when Japan tried to take on the USSR in Manchuria they received a drubbing. The conflict revealed how seriously the Japanese "misunderestimated" [thank you for that word Geo Bush ] the Soviets. Japan did NOT understand the concept of fighting an industrial war - the Russians overwhelmed them in material (and ultimately outfought them) but Japan repeated the same mistake 2 years later at Pearl Harbour - taking on the US.

Powerful as the German forces were in Russia I cannot see a scenario where Germany would have defeated the Soviet forces. The USA might not have gone to war in 1941 without Pearl Harbour, but the US started making aid available to the Soviets shortly after Barbarossa - before Pearl Harbour.

The Soviets had an entire military force positioned in the Far East - in reserve. The Japanese had poor tanks, no sense of Blizkrieg-type operations, limited reserves of fuel and strategic materials, stretched lines of communication and simply would have lacked the PUNCH to link up with the Germans in the Caucasus.

With or without the US in the war the Germans would have been snuffed at Stalingrad and then rebuffed at Kursk. The war might have lasted several more years without Pearl Harbour and the US (forces + industrial might) BUT Germany and Japan fighing in Manchuria, Siberia and the oil rich Soviet 'Stans doesn't spell success for me -- in the end the Soviets would prevail.

A better "what if" scenario might be if the Japanese had seriously whipped the Soviets in 1939 - as they did in 1905 [think Finland winter war]. If that had happened the Soviets would never have had peace and quiet in their rear - or secure interior lines of communication.

MM
Toronto


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## Amsel (Jun 30, 2009)

I don't think that Japan was motorized enough, or could even produce enough vehicles to win a large campaign in the west. But if Japan would have attacked the USSR proper then I think that the greatest benafactor would not have been Japan but her ally, Germany. If the Japanese forces could put enough pressure on the Soviets, I think that would've relieved enough pressure from the eastfront to allow the Germans to take those key cities, allowing a victory over the communist regime, and possibly a stalemate of the whole war for the ETO.


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## Soren (Jun 30, 2009)

Sorry but there is no way that the Soviets could've dealt with both the Germans and the Japanese, it would've been over quickly.

The Japanese didn't have good tanks, true, but tanks are but one thing. The Japanese had lots of infantry to boot, and fanatic infantry at that. Furthermore and even more crushing was the the Japanese airforce, which would quickly sweep the VVS out of the skies in the far east while the Luftwaffe easily dealt with their part in the west. 

There's simply no way the Soviets could've dealt with this at all. They were hard pressed enough against the Germans alone, so a Japanese attack from the east would've proven disasterous for them. There's also no doubt that a combined landbased invasion of the USSR by the Germans and the Japanese would've resulted in a lot of technology shared, esp. within the area of tanks. So the Japanese would've very likely had a tank similar to the Panzer IV not far after.


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## Soren (Jun 30, 2009)

Amsel said:


> I don't think that Japan was motorized enough, or could even produce enough vehicles to win a large campaign in the west. But if Japan would have attacked the USSR proper then I think that the greatest benafactor would not have been Japan but her ally, Germany. If the Japanese forces could put enough pressure on the Soviets, I think that would've relieved enough pressure from the eastfront to allow the Germans to take those key cities, allowing a victory over the communist regime, and possibly a stalemate of the whole war for the ETO.



Agreed. The Japanese could under no circumstances do it alone, the brunt of the effort would be achieved by the Germans. But the sheer size of the Japanese army and skilled airforce it possessed would've been enough to remove a huge amount of pressure off of the German army's back in the west. 

The IJA IJN would have a turkey shoot against the Soviet VVS and quickly establish airsuperiority, allowing for tank busting a/c to deal with the puny Soviet tanks until the Japanese cold devise a good one of their own. With the help of the Germans the Japanese might very well have had their own Panzer IV's ready not long after.


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## Colin1 (Jun 30, 2009)

michaelmaltby said:


> Powerful as the German forces were in Russia I cannot see a scenario where Germany would have defeated the Soviet forces. The USA might not have gone to war in 1941 without Pearl Harbour, but the US started making aid available to the Soviets shortly after Barbarossa - before Pearl Harbour.
> 
> The Soviets had an entire military force positioned in the Far East - in reserve. The Japanese had poor tanks, no sense of Blizkrieg-type operations, limited reserves of fuel and strategic materials, stretched lines of communication and simply would have lacked the PUNCH to link up with the Germans in the Caucasus.
> 
> With or without the US in the war the Germans would have been snuffed at Stalingrad and then rebuffed at Kursk. The war might have lasted several more years without Pearl Harbour and the US (forces + industrial might) BUT Germany and Japan fighing in Manchuria, Siberia and the oil rich Soviet 'Stans doesn't spell success for me -- in the end the Soviets would prevail


Michael
with no US in the war, there'd be no second front for the Nazis to worry about, unless you're prepared to countenance a D-Day manned only by UK/Canadian forces. With that in mind, they could throw much more of their weight at the Eastern Front and when you consider how close they came to defeating the Soviets in the real time-line, they'd have flattened them under this scenario.

Peripheral interests to this what-if would be the revitalised interest of Italy in a war without the US, the Romanians and don't discount the Finns who had a very vested interest in removing a large threat from their eastern border. With Japan providing the second front, I don't see a way for the Soviet Union to survive.

I think any link-up of Japanese forces in, say, Manchuria with German forces in the Caucasus is ambitious, to say the least, that is a forced march of titanic proportions. Japanese forces would do well to tie up Soviet forces in the Far East and allow the Germans to deal with the European end of the Soviet Union.

If Hitler has regained his senses sufficiently to not declare war on the US, then we can assume he's also decided that wading into Stalingrad with the cream of his _battlefield_ army is just as silly. With Stalingrad (and any other focus of stiff resistance) isolated, he can concentrate on tackling the Soviet Army on the battlefield, something his military were far more capable of; thus defeated, just encircle and wait for Stalingrad to surrender or starve.


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## michaelmaltby (Jun 30, 2009)

Colin - I appreciate your argument but it doesn't change a single important fact - both Geramny and Japan contributed more to their own defeat than any other factor - simply by making ill-thoughtout decisions or emotional decisions. Attacking Pearl Harbour displayed a fundamental ignorance on the part of the Japanese - whatever were they thinking. And the alternative strategy - to expand into Mongolia was equally misguided -- totally underestimating Soviet industrial might and Zhukov's prowess. Likewise - making Stalingrad a strategic objective instead of by-passing it [indeed even thinking that a knock-out punch could be delivered by December 1941 when General Wiinter took command] was pure Nazi hubris.

No - I can't see Britain and the Commonwealth re-taking Western Europe, but the Soviet leadership would have never accepted defeat.

An alliance of two seriously flawed allies - both dillusional in their objectives/philosophy - does not make a longterm effective alliance.

MM


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## Glider (Jun 30, 2009)

Soren said:


> The Japanese didn't have good tanks, true, but tanks are but one thing. The Japanese had lots of infantry to boot, and fanatic infantry at that.


To boot sums it up. It had excellent infantry but on foot, with the distances a war in Russia involves, not forgetting winter. To assume that its over quickly sounds like the same mistake Napoleon and Hitler both made. You have to allow for a winter. Germany at least had a reasionably sized air transport fleet, the Japanese had basically none, just a handful of aircraft. Ground transport was also almost insignificant. 



> Furthermore and even more crushing was the the Japanese airforce, which would quickly sweep the VVS out of the skies in the far east while the Luftwaffe easily dealt with their part in the west.


The IJAF was small and still in the spring of 1942 partialy equipped with the Ki27. The Russian airforce was just as well equipped, but larger and had done well against the Japanese Airforce before the war. 



> There's simply no way the Soviets could've dealt with this at all. They were hard pressed enough against the Germans alone, so a Japanese attack from the east would've proven disasterous for them.


I am sure that Russia woldn't have found it easy but a war in Russia was totally the wrong conflict for Japan. Its armies were too lightly equipped from rifles, SMG's, machine guns, AAguns, field guns and howitzers and once again, transport. 


> There's also no doubt that a combined landbased invasion of the USSR by the Germans and the Japanese would've resulted in a lot of technology shared, esp. within the area of tanks. So the Japanese would've very likely had a tank similar to the Panzer IV not far after.


There is every doubt that they would have shared technology. I am hard pushed to come up with more than one or two items of technology that they shared to the degree that it was deployed in the field. The ones that I can think of were out of date by the time they were deployed. If you could list any it would be appreciated. For instance, the MP40 and Panzerfaust alone would have made a huge difference to the Jananese Army in WW2 but none were deployed that I know of.


> The IJA IJN would have a turkey shoot against the Soviet VVS and quickly establish airsuperiority, allowing for tank busting a/c to deal with the puny Soviet tanks until the Japanese cold devise a good one of their own. With the help of the Germans the Japanese might very well have had their own Panzer IV's ready not long after.


Simple question, what tank busting aircraft did the Japanese have and how long would it take to design, develop and build an effective Japanese tank capable of taking on a T34 or KV1?

That said the Japanese did have one thing that the Germans didn't and that was a good number of long ranged bombers that could have made life more difficult for Russia. They may have lacked payload but they did have the range to force Russia to spread out its fighter defences.


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## michaelmaltby (Jun 30, 2009)

Glider I'm with you - a thoroughly pragmatic response to Soren. The single most effective thing that Japan could have done to support Germany in such an alliance would be strategic bombing of re-located Soviet industry. And we know that strategic bombing of British and Germany industry - while bloody - was not a game changer.

I don't think many posters appreciate the extent to which the Soviets PASTED the Japanese in 1939. The Japanese occupied ground that the Soviets had previously "ranged". It was June-July with daylight from 04:00 until 22:30. Once in position the Japanese troops were fixed by the Soviets - short of water - and while they were courageous as hell, the Bushido code and Japanese elan were no match for Soviet commanders who could afford to take huge casualties. Japan thought the the USSR was the Russia they had humiliated in 1905 ... they were wrong, as with their assessment that the USA was demoralized into ineffectiveness by the Great Depression.

MM


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## Soren (Jun 30, 2009)

Sorry Glider but you are terribly mistaken.

The IJN would be attacking just as-well as the IJA, and the Zeros would've swepped any resistance from the VVS aside with ease. There's also no doubt that a lot of Zeros would simply be given duty with the army airforce.

The Japanese army also would not have to go through all of the USSR to have an effect. They simply needed to tie up the Soviets on a second front to take off pressure from the German's back. And seeing that the Soviets were already pushed to the limit by the Germans and could've been defeated by them alone had it not been for some stupid mistakes made by the German high command, then if the Japanese attacked in force in the east it would've quickly been all over for the Soviets.

Also please recognize that the reason that the Germans Japanese didn't share more technology in WW2 than they did was simply because of the fact that they didn't enter any land based operations together, heck not even any aerial ones. Had that happened the Germans would without a doubt have handed over a lot of technology to the Japanese. They did afterall ship information a very long way over regarding jet technology.


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## Soren (Jun 30, 2009)

Colin1,

I agree with you completey. It is odd that people don't realize just how close the USSR was to defeat even without the help of the Japanese. Had the Japanese attacked in force from the east, along with the German offensive in the west, then the Soviet Union wouldn't have lasted long at all.

Think of this: The Soviets are fighting all they can in the west just in an effort to hold on against the Germans when all of the sudden a 3 million strong Japanese force starts invading from the east. What to do? Do you send your airforce over there to keep the Japs from completely ruling the skies, which they probably will anyhow because they've got much better a/c and pilots, or do you keep them in the west at the mercy of the LuftWaffe ? Also what about your army ? Do you split it up and risk a total quick defeat at the hands of the German army or do you just let the Japanese advance unhindered ?

I'd give the Soviet Union exactly 5 months until defeat had the Japanese attacked at the same time as the Germans, no more. The Japanese AF had the range to srike deep within the USSR, and enough soldiers to slowly but steadily take piece by piece of land in the east. All that needed be done was capture enough land to place airbases within striking range of all Soviet production facilities, and then hold them or push further in to occupy even more of the Soviet army.


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## michaelmaltby (Jun 30, 2009)

Soren - please tell me, in your scenario: are the Germans led by Hitler? And are they STILL attacking Stalingrad? Or is their alliance with Japan also sharpening their sense and muting their hubris?

You write: "It is odd that people don't realize just how close the USSR was to defeat even without the help of the Japanese." Easy to say, but what proof have you that the USSR was months from defeat. And when? December, 1941? ... just before the fresh divisions poured in from Siberia

Summer offensive 1942? .. just before blundering into Stalingrad for nothing. 

Summer 1943 .. Kursk? .. with the Soviets knowing the time and date of the attack for months before th event and a defense in depth thoroughly prepared.

I will argue that when the war with Russia began in 1942 - the Soviet Union was on a stronger military industrial footing than Germany was. The Five Year Plans were beginning to work. [I am NOT discussing QUALITY of production]. Germany didn't ramp up until 1942-43. Without US intervention (and hence no strategic daylight bombing) I'm sure German industry would have worked production miracles, but Russia - unlike Germany and Japan - had vast amounts of territory it could surrender. And success for either Geramny or Japan would mean longer and longer lines of communication and supply. As it was, Germany had to devote large resources to supply their eastern armies over often insecure supply lines -- now imagine those lines stretching to the Urals.

And the attacking kamikaze pilots would have been Soviet - ramming Japanese Betty's and the like. 

Further, I believe everyone posting here is underestimating China. Japan was deep in China and China was vast. Would Japan have conquered China if the US had not enetred the war? As with Russia-germany, I doubt that very much. Japan would have been bled white and in the end (15 years) the Communist forces would have prevailed.

I have great admiration for German military/technological/organizational excellence but in the end - in both WW I and II - this was defeated by citizen soldiery (and I include the Soviet comrades in this definition for the purposes of this debate).

MM


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## Soren (Jun 30, 2009)

Michael,

Remember how close the Germans were at winning eventhough they entered Stalingrad. They had 90% of the city at one point, and Stalin was at his knees ready to beg for peace. It was the US involvement which stopped the Germans taking it all. And had the Japanese not attaeked Pearl Harbor and instead invaded the USSR then the US would've not entered the war as soon as it did. That would've been great for the Germans in two crucial ways: 1.) Not another superpower to deal with in the west 2.) A great amount of pressure taken off the German army in the east by virtue of the help provided by the Japanese.

PS: The USSR was invaded in 1941, not 42.


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## imalko (Jun 30, 2009)

Well Soren, its odd that people don't realize just how close the USSR was to defeat even without the help of the Japanese... And its also odd how people disregard Soviet countermeasures taken during Barbarossa and blame German failure solely on Hitler's poor decisions and bad weather.

Let me remind you that Stalin held large and well equipped and trained forces in the far East for most of 1941 to be able to counter possible Japanese attack and these forces were used at Moscow front only after he received reliable intelligence that Japanese are not going to attack. These forces in my opinion were more that enough to fight off any Japanese attack.

Punny Soviet tanks? T-34? This superb tank appeared in 1941 in ever increasing numbers. And even those earlier "punny" Soviet tanks were better then anything Japanese had and kick their ass at Battle of Khalkhyn Gol in 1939. That is why Japanese never dared to attack USSR again.

Which tank-busting planes Japanese had exactly? I never heard of any. Granted that Zero was probably better fighter than anything Soviets had in 1941, but question remains how many of these plane were at disposal at that time. Anyway I was always under impression that Japanese used only their "less capable" planes in China and mainland Asia, like Ki-27 and Ki-43. Japanese bomber had long range but small payload. Were they capable to attack Ural industrial ares from Far East? I don't think so.

My point is that Japanese attack would helped Germans but wouldn't solved anything. Decisive battles would be fought on Soviet-German front. Even without intervention of Soviet "Far East" divisions I don't think that Germans were capable to take Moscow in November 1941 (after all what happened in true time line). And question remains would even fall of Moscow in November 1941 meant the decisive victory for Third Reich?

With US out of the war and Japanese attack on USSR the war would last maybe longer but probably would have ended with defeat of Axis powers. More so if Japanese attack had occured in 1942 and not in 1941.(Which was Renrich's original premise I believe).


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## Soren (Jun 30, 2009)

Couldn't disagree more imalko.

The Soviet Union wouldn't have lasted 6 months in a combined attack by Germany Japan. The Soviets had reserves yes, but they were essential in the fight against the Germans and they could under no conditions be left out. 

As for tank busting, the Ki-46 could've done a fine job at that. And seeing that the Japanese weren't going to attack the US they would have all their Zeros focused against the Soviets, and that would've meant the total and utter destruction of the VVS. As for the tanks, as already mentioned the T-34 was in the west not the east, and each and every single one was needed to fight the Germans alone. None were available to go to the east, only the puny T-26 and the like were ready in the east.

Had the US not stepped in during WW2 then the USSR would've lost against the Germans, even without the help of the Japanese. The Germans poured a collosal amount of material and manpower to the west in the war against the western allies. Without anyone to fight in the west the Germans would've steamrolled straight through the Soviet Union, only the occasional and unnecessary city fights Hitler loved so much would stall the advance from time to time.


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## Colin1 (Jun 30, 2009)

With no US in the war
the Germans could have sustained their hold on the oilfields and the heavy-industrial and arable territories in the Ukraine. This was the tipping point for the Germans in the real time-line, Stalingrad was simply where everything started to tangibly unravel; German commanders in this what-if would not have faced the decision of 'press on eastwards OR press south and secure the oilfields - but not both'. 
Couple the sustained pressure on Russia's western front with an organised, numerous and capable military in the east. Japan doesn't have to beat the Soviets, they simply have to contain them (there's only so far east they can now push their war manufacture) and tie up sizeable portions of their ground and air forces with fanatical infantry and aircraft that like nothing better than to dogfight at low level plus bombers with a very respectable range.
With the Kriegsmarine securing Baltic resupply lines and the IJN ruling the Indian Ocean, I still can't see a way out for the Soviet Union.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jun 30, 2009)

Soren said:


> Michael,
> 
> Remember how close the Germans were at winning eventhough they entered Stalingrad. They had 90% of the city at one point, and Stalin was at his knees ready to beg for peace.



When was Stalin on his knees begging for peace? I don't remember reading that anywhere. In fact Stalin gave orders that no Russian soldiers were to retreat. Seriously, when was Stalin on his knees begging?

While I agree that Germany could have defeated Russia, Stalin was not begging for peace. Not at Stalingrad or at any other time.


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## imalko (Jun 30, 2009)

Soren said:


> The Soviets had reserves yes, but they were essential in the fight against the Germans and they could under no conditions be left out.



This reserves (Siberian and Far East divisions) were deployed against the Wehrmacht only in December 1941 at Moscow. And this happened only after Stalin recieved positive and reliable inteligence that Japanese will not attack. Up until December 1941 this Soviet reserves were unengaged.



Soren said:


> ...None (T-34) were available to go to the east, only the puny T-26 and the like were ready in the east.



Possible regarding the T-34 in the east but even those "punny" T-26 were better that anything Japanese had.



Soren said:


> Had the US not stepped in during WW2 then the USSR would've lost against the Germans, even without the help of the Japanese. The Germans poured a collosal amount of material and manpower to the west in the war against the western allies. Without anyone to fight in the west the Germans would've steamrolled straight through the Soviet Union, only the occasional and unnecessary city fights Hitler loved so much would stall the advance from time to time.



Disagree. US stepping the war was important and crucial for final overall outcome of the war but this didn't saved the Russians from defeat in 1941. Russians effectively won the war at the gates of Moscow in December 1941 and they did it almost on their own. 
One more point - in 1941 the Germans effectively didn't have anyone to fight in the west.


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## michaelmaltby (Jun 30, 2009)

Soren, you write: "Stalin was at his knees ready to beg for peace". What source does that come from? Pure fantasy. There was no loss of nerve by Stalin at Stalingrad. There was a loss of nerve in the early days after June 21, 1941 when (according to Krushev) Stalin said that Hitler was going to "beat our brains in" and disappeared for a couple of days. But when he returned it was for the duration.

The US may not be in the fighting - in your scenario - but rest assured that American industrialists are heavily into the war and if Japan and Germany don't want to face America they are "respecting" American neutrality (much the way Sweden's was respected despite the iron ore being supplied to Germany).

Soren - in your scenario has Britain fallen to Germany? Has Australia fallen to Japan? Has Egypt and North Africa fallen to Germany?

I ask these questions because I reject the idea of German invinsibility. By 1941 (before Moscow) it had been demonstrated that both Germany and Japan could be defeated. Germany couldn't gain air superiority against an equal - only inferiors. And Japan could be whipped by the Soviets.

Soren - lots of enthusiasm but - I'm afraid your coalition has leadership problems and is dillusional. Next you will claim that Napoleon almost conquered Russia in 1812.

MM


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## Butters (Jun 30, 2009)

The idea that the IJA would be able to field a 3 million man force against the USSR is preposterous. Where would they get these men, and the logistical capability to supply them in the vast space of the USSR? They still had to control and garrison Manchuko and occupied China. They still needed to garrison and hold the European colonies that were the source of their oil (You can't fuel a war machine with the oilfields you MIGHT capture). And they still needed to maintain a sizeable reserve in the event that the US entered the war. 

As for the IJN and the mighty Zero, they also still needed to man their fleets and island bases. And their pilot manpower was not only quite small, but their training system prevented them from turning out large numbers of qualified combat pilots. It would have been an IJAAF fighting the Soviet AF, not the IJN. Furthermore, Japan lacked the industrial capability to churn out the necessary long-range bombers and transports necessary to inflict serious damge on the Russian a/c factories.

The Russians could always retreat, drawing the IJA further and further away from their supplies. So even if they could not crush them quickly, as Zhukov had, they would have squeezed the life out of them in the interior.

The Russians were not disunited Chinese.


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## JoeB (Jun 30, 2009)

The Japanese seriously considered attacking the USSR instead of the Western Allies, in 1941. This was the IJA's preferred plan. The US/British/Dutch oil embargo of July 1941 tipped the scales toward attacking them. 

The Nomonhan War is not a good yardstick for measuring the possibilities of Japan v USSR for a couple ofl reasons. First the IJA contingent in Manchuria was enlarged greatly from 1939 to 1941, whereas the best Soviet forces were drawn west. The Kwantung Army outnumbered Soviet Far East forces by 1941, compared to heavy numerical inferiority (even besides stuff like tanks) in the latter stages of the Nomonhan campaign. Second, Nomonhan was fought on treeless grasslands on the western border of Manchuria, it was a border dispute between Japan's puppet state Manchukuo and Soviet satellite Mongolia. An all out attack on the USSR would have focused initially on the eastern side of Manchuria, to capture Soviet Maritime Province. That would have been over mainly forested terrain, where Soviet qualitative superiority in armor would have been less important.

So Japan's forces in Manchuria were not 'no hopers' v the Soviets in 1941. The issue would have been what could have been achieved *beyond* cutting off (the railway to) and conquering the Soviet Maritime Province, which the Japanese could probably have achieved. After that though, the Soviet Union looked like an island in the East and bigger island in the West with thin causeway of the Trans-Siberian Railway connecting the two, no complete roads connect the two, even today. In 1904-1905 the Japanese won every battle in Manchuria, but didn't have the resources, financial as well as manpower, to think about pushing west along the railway all the way to European Russia. The only big difference in 1941 would be the possibility of the USSR collapsing from the morale strain of another enemy at its back, already under attack by Germany. If you really think the Germans never came close to defeating the Soviets, then a Japanese attack wouldn't have gained anything in the long run. If you think the Germans might have come close (to crushing Soviet *morale*) then a Japanese attack might have pushed them over the edge. It really depends a lot on what impact it has on the Russo-German conflict, especially morale impact. And the Japanese plans were not coordinated diplomatically with the Germans. They also would have been purely speculating as to what the Germans were willing to give them if the joint war resulted in Soviet defeat.

So possibly fruitful but very risky. Then again, attacking the Western Allies was very risky too, as is obvious in hindsight.

Joe


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## Colin1 (Jun 30, 2009)

Butters said:


> It would have been an IJAAF fighting the Soviet AF, not the IJN.
> 
> Furthermore, Japan lacked the industrial capability to churn out the necessary long-range bombers and transports necessary to inflict serious damge on the Russian a/c factories


What Soviet Airforce would this have been? The first few days of Barbarossa saw the Soviets being dealt an absolute hay-maker, most of their aircraft being caught on the ground. 
With no US involvement, who's supplying them with Lend-Lease aircraft? I doubt the UK would be too willing to let go of much with no US industrial powerhouse behind them and assuming the P-39s were forwarded on according to the real time-line, I seriously doubt it would be sufficient to stem the tide.
The Soviets were hurting for aircraft in the first six months, with nothing to replace their hideous losses, the Germans could fully exploit their mastery of Soviet airspace, ground-attack, strategic bombing, reconnaissance and anti-shipping - near totally unopposed; the Soviets would be paralysed.

Moving assets from east to west and the vast terrain poses the same problems for the Soviets as it does for the invaders, they've still got to get it from A to B, with Axis aircraft marauding more or less at will, good luck with that. 

What they do manage to bring west, thins out what the Japanese have to deal with.

As for Japan's lack of long-range bombers, I think this could have and would have been resolved by two allies working to the same, direct end; the Germans would have loaned aircraft and even if they hadn't it's conceivable that the flat expanses present in Manchuria would have provided a succession of rudimentary airstrip-hops into range of Soviet manufacture.


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## imalko (Jun 30, 2009)

Colin1 said:


> ...The first few days of Barbarossa saw the Soviets being dealt an absolute hay-maker, most of their aircraft being caught on the ground.



True, but these were mainly obsolete types useless against Luftwaffe anyway. Aircraft were destroyed on the ground but pilot survived to fight another day flying in new modern types.



Colin1 said:


> With no US involvement, who's supplying them with Lend-Lease aircraft?



And Soviets didn't have aircraft of their own? In period 1939-1945 Soviet war industry produced total number of *149.500* aircraft of all types while in period 1941-1945 Western Allies delivered to the USSR total number of *17.448* of all types.



Colin1 said:


> ...the Germans could fully exploit their mastery of Soviet airspace, ground-attack, strategic bombing, reconnaissance and anti-shipping - near totally unopposed; the Soviets would be paralysed.



Germans did enjoyed full mastery of Soviet airspace for a while in 1941 and they exploit it to best of their abilities and yet Soviets were not paralyzed, but furthermore managed to relocate entire industries from western areas to the Urals.



Colin1 said:


> Moving assets from east to west and the vast terrain poses the same problems for the Soviets as it does for the invaders, they've still got to get it from A to B, with Axis aircraft marauding more or less at will, good luck with that.



Seriously doubt that Axis bombers had sufficient range for "marauding at will" the Trans-Siberian Railway, the main link between east and west of the USSR.


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## Glider (Jun 30, 2009)

Soren said:


> Sorry Glider but you are terribly mistaken.
> 
> The IJN would be attacking just as-well as the IJA, and the Zeros would've swepped any resistance from the VVS aside with ease. There's also no doubt that a lot of Zeros would simply be given duty with the army airforce.



I do not believe that Zero's would have been made available. The IJN and IJAF didn't co-operate on anything, they didn't even share the same rifles, machine guns or 20mm cannons. Why on earth would they share aircraft, it would be a serious loss of face to the Air Force and nothing would allow that. There is also the point that in the Spring of 1942 not all IJN units had been equipped with the Zero and I am confident that the IJN would put them first.



> The Japanese army also would not have to go through all of the USSR to have an effect. They simply needed to tie up the Soviets on a second front to take off pressure from the German's back. And seeing that the Soviets were already pushed to the limit by the Germans and could've been defeated by them alone had it not been for some stupid mistakes made by the German high command, then if the Japanese attacked in force in the east it would've quickly been all over for the Soviets.


If the Japanese are not applying pressure then they are not a threat. If they are applying pressure they are wide open.



> Also please recognize that the reason that the Germans Japanese didn't share more technology in WW2 than they did was simply because of the fact that they didn't enter any land based operations together, heck not even any aerial ones. Had that happened the Germans would without a doubt have handed over a lot of technology to the Japanese. They did afterall ship information a very long way over regarding jet technology.


This is a major assumption with very little to back it up. The only technology that I can think off that was used by the Japanese was the DB601 which the Japanese didn't do well with and were better sticking to what they knew Radials, and the 20mm MG151 which was used on some versions of the Ki61. The Jet information was much too little, much too late and not used by the Japanese and a similar statement goes with the Me163.

In your replies you have not commented on the basic weakness of the structure of the Japanese Army units, the equipment they were issued with or the lack of transport. With these problems they stand no chance.


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## renrich (Jun 30, 2009)

Wow, am I glad I started this discussion. Two factors to consider are: when the Japanese attack the British and Dutch, can FDR get enough support in Congress and among the American people to declare war on Japan and subsequently Germany? I don't think an issue is whether Japan can defeat the Soviets but whether the Japanese can cause the Soviets to divert enough men and equipment to that front so that the Germans can prevail on the other front. Another issue is that by February, 1942, Japan is threatening Australia. The Aussie government wanted to bring home all their troops from the front in North Africa to prevent an invasion of Australia. Instead US troops were rushed to Australia. Without the US in the war, those troops would have to have been brought back home and could they get them home with the IJN controlling the sea and with Japanese air bases in the Solomons and perhaps even Ceylon?


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## Amsel (Jun 30, 2009)

I am actually reading a book right now called Rising Sun Victorious which covers alot of this subject. I guess I'll devote more time to it. I tend to read 3-4 books at a time.


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## Colin1 (Jun 30, 2009)

renrich said:


> ...I don't think an issue is whether Japan can defeat the Soviets but whether the Japanese can cause the Soviets to divert enough men and equipment to that front so that the Germans can prevail on the other front...


This factor is what largely underpins my argument
No US in the west means the Western front is secure in all but name - largely undiluted German field strength with which to hit the Soviet Union.
Japanese air and ground forces enter the USSR from the east and the IJN wreaking havoc with any supply attempts from the western allies (such as they are) - largely diluted Soviet field strength with which to counter the German offensive.
The Japanese do not need to defeat the Soviet Union, I suspect the Soviet commanders would know this but how to disregard the invasion from the east?


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## renrich (Jun 30, 2009)

To add a little spice to the discussion, what if the Germans had treated the people in the occupied area of the Soviet Union humanely and the Japanese had done likewise in China. This scenario is starting to look scary.


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## The Basket (Jun 30, 2009)

The main problem is why would the Germans want the Japs to attack the USSR?

It was going to be all over in 6 weeks. Split the winnings with some non master race types...fat chance.

And by the time it was going wrong, the Japs were doing there own play.

And in 1941, the Germans had no western front and were stronger in comparison to their Soviet foes and still lost. If they were not winning in 1941 then they were never going to win.


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## Lucky13 (Jun 30, 2009)

I think that an attack mounted by the IJN on the Russians and their Pacific fleet, like the one on Pearl Harbor, would have been more devastating for them than the USN.
The Russians didn't have anywhere near the same power on the oceans like the USN or RN. I think that IJN could operated relatively freely outside Vladivostok. What could the Russian Navy possibly have put up against the IJN and its carriers and battleships?
I think that that the Japanese could have, not easily but near enough, landed somewhere in Golden Horn Bay and with Korea and parts of China already under them....


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## vikingBerserker (Jun 30, 2009)

I think the Soviets would have again traded space for time. Even while battling Germany, Russia kept sizable forces in their Eastern sections. Does that area have any natural resources that would have made it worthwhile for Japan?


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## The Basket (Jun 30, 2009)

For sure...the Japs could have invaded territory but could they have marched onto Moscow...

Deal with the main threat and deal with Japan later. Trade land for time just like in the west.

oil oil oil...strategy is driven by strategic need. And having a Navy is no good on the Steppes.


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## Amsel (Jun 30, 2009)

renrich said:


> To add a little spice to the discussion, what if the Germans had treated the people in the occupied area of the Soviet Union humanely and the Japanese had done likewise in China. This scenario is starting to look scary.


If the Germans treated the Russians humanely then there could have been much more available manpower. The morale was not that great in the Red Army until the Soviets were winning. At Stalingrad much of the German Army was made up of Russians. There would always have been communist partisans in China and the Soviet Union, but in the USSR a counter-revolution could have been started if the people on the collectives were treated better then they were under the Stalinist goverment. Its hard to say.


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## michaelmaltby (Jun 30, 2009)

Renrich - come on !! You can't add those kind of what ifs! How the Germans and Japanese treated those they considered inferior was part of what makes them ruthlessly effective. Might as well add: what if Stalin hadn't purged his officer corps in the late '30s.

MM


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## proton45 (Jun 30, 2009)

The Japanese Army had their hands tied by the Emperor in Mongolia...It is difficult to say the role that Japanese air superiority would have played in the ground battles had they maintained their successful momentum from early on. Early in the Mongolian campaigns the Japanese had established a very strong offensive in the "air" with several successful engagements with the Russians. However the Emperor was furious with the generals who had crossed the border into the Russian zone, and he forbade the airforce from further campaigns against the Soviet airfields...their for the Russians where able to replace their lost aeroplanes and the IJA airforce lost their initiative in the air...That little tid-bit didn't help on the ground.


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## renrich (Jul 1, 2009)

Hitler had signed the alliance with Italy and Japan in 1940 so realistically they were his allies. He did make an effort after the defeat at Stalingrad to get Japan to help out with the Soviets. By then it was too late. michaelmaltby, I agree that it is unrealistic to expect the Nazis and Japanese to quit being racists. I was just speculating that if the Japanese and Germans had treated the people in the conquered territories humanely, they would have not needed nearly as many garrison troops. The Japanese actually planned to occupy Australia with, by 1950, two million Japanese there. They were not to be allowed to intermarry with Anglos. in order to keep the Japanese blood pure. It is interesting how big a role racism played in the war. Japan thought the American people were soft and indolent and would not be good fighters and would not support a long war. The Japanese thought the other Orientals in China, Burma, etc were inferior also. Once the war got started with Japan's initial success, the Japanese became over confident. The Americans initially thought the Japanese were a bunch of near sighted, buck toothed, midgets that would be incapable of fighting a modern war. After Pearl Harbor and the fighting in Malaya, the Philipines and the Dutch East Indies, the Americans were somewhat intimidated by the Japanese but Guadalcanal proved they could go one on one with them and the vicious brutality of the Japanese made the Americans feel the Japanese were sub human and needed to be exterminated. Likewise, Hitler believed that the Germans were the master race and especially the races in the Soviet Union were inferior and could not stand up to the Wehrmacht. He was overconfident and initially felt he needed no help in conquering Russia.


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## Soren (Jul 1, 2009)

Glider said:


> I do not believe that Zero's would have been made available. The IJN and IJAF didn't co-operate on anything, they didn't even share the same rifles, machine guns or 20mm cannons. Why on earth would they share aircraft, it would be a serious loss of face to the Air Force and nothing would allow that. There is also the point that in the Spring of 1942 not all IJN units had been equipped with the Zero and I am confident that the IJN would put them first.



So what you're saying is that matters of pride between each armed branch within the Japanese army would prevent them from cooperating in a war against the Soviets? That's really one of the most far fetched ideas I've heard in a long time.

If the Japanese emperor had decided to cooperate with the Germans and do he best to beat the Soviets in the east then you can be sure he'd pour both the IJN IJA in full force and have them cooperate. During the a lot of Zeros operated from land based airfields in the Pacific, and so if the war was to be raged in the Soviet Union then they'd simply be located there instead. 




Glider said:


> If the Japanese are not applying pressure then they are not a threat. If they are applying pressure they are wide open.



Wide open ? To what ? The US ? They weren't gonna hit the Japanese, if so they would've done waay before they invaded China.



Glider said:


> This is a major assumption with very little to back it up. The only technology that I can think off that was used by the Japanese was the DB601 which the Japanese didn't do well with and were better sticking to what they knew Radials, and the 20mm MG151 which was used on some versions of the Ki61. The Jet information was much too little, much too late and not used by the Japanese and a similar statement goes with the Me163.



No it is not major assumption Glider, and you need to pick up you reading again cause the Japanese were given a lot of technology by the Germans near the end of the war. And most of it was hastily put to use, esp. the jet technology!

By wars end the Japanese were working on copies of the Me-262 Me-163 fighters.



> In your replies you have not commented on the basic weakness of the structure of the Japanese Army units, the equipment they were issued with or the lack of transport. With these problems they stand no chance.



The equipment they were issued with in 1941 wasn't much worse than that of the Soviet army Glider. Remember that this is before the Soviets started recieving lend lease equipment.


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## Soren (Jul 1, 2009)

The prime task of the Japanese invasion would be to hold up large portions of the Soviet armed forces, which they no doubt could have easily achieved. This would divert pressure away from the German eastern front. A further and even more important advantage was the lack of a war against the US, this meant loads more fuel, equipment and manpower available for the Germans in the east. And this alone would've been enough to ensure a Soviet defeat at Stalingrad and later Moscow, with the capture of the caucasus region being secured as-well, boosting the German drive through Russia significantly.

Meanwhile the Japanese needed but to advance slowly but steadily towards the west. They weren't gonna be in a hurry. All they needed to achieve was tying up the Soviet forces in the east. The IJAF would station masses of fighters and bombers in the east, following the advance of the troops and striking as far inside the Soviet Union as they could. The goal to destroy as much of the Soviet reserve and industry as possible. And seeing that the Germans weren't fighting the US in the west and had lads more manpower material at the ready in the east, they'd be having a much easier time defeating the Soviets even without the help of the Japanese, nessicating all of Russia's reserves to be diverted against the Germans, which in turn would leave the eastern border completely exposed to the Japanese invasion.


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## Soren (Jul 1, 2009)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> When was Stalin on his knees begging for peace? I don't remember reading that anywhere. In fact Stalin gave orders that no Russian soldiers were to retreat. Seriously, when was Stalin on his knees begging?
> 
> While I agree that Germany could have defeated Russia, Stalin was not begging for peace. Not at Stalingrad or at any other time.



He was, by the time the Germans had 90% of the city Stalin was very close to begging for peace. The changing situation kept him from doing so. His personal secretary recollected all this in a documentary not so lng ago.


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## Amsel (Jul 1, 2009)

The Germans could have beaten Russia and were in my opinion very close to doing so. Blundering away the advantage at Leningrad, near Moscow, and Stalingrad was the death of them though. It was like God addled their brains and caused them to make huge tactical errors.


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## Soren (Jul 1, 2009)

I agree completely Amsel.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 1, 2009)

Soren said:


> He was, by the time the Germans had 90% of the city Stalin was very close to begging for peace. The changing situation kept him from doing so. His personal secretary recollected all this in a documentary not so lng ago.



A source please that we can all reference?


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## Njaco (Jul 1, 2009)

> So what you're saying is that matters of pride between each armed branch within the Japanese army would prevent them from cooperating in a war against the Soviets? That's really one of the most far fetched ideas I've heard in a long time.



Reminds me of Goering and his hold on the Luftwaffe or any airplane to the exclusion of the Navy. Wouldn't let Kreigsmarine have bombers or anything. There even was an argument over torpedoes.


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## Colin1 (Jul 1, 2009)

Looking at a political map of Russia

http://www.russiamap.org/images/full/political-purp.gif

most of the urbanisation is in European Russia, Asian Russia has vast tracts of open territory. I can't think of a tactical reason why the USSR would station valuable troops (at least, not in any significant concentration) in the middle of these open spaces, when the threat would almost certainly come from the west.
This has two aspects that favour the Axis, it will be just as hard to meet the invasionary force as it would be for the invaders themselves to make progress - just as the Japanese have to advance westwards, the Soviets, if they intend not to disregard the threat from the east, will have to transport troops and equipment to a point where they can take the war to them.

Secondly, with the US not about to descend upon them, the Nazis would likely take European Russia, assuming Hitler doesn't do anything silly like committing resources to urban warfare etc. With the most densely populated area fallen (along with the capital), Asian Russia would fall piecemeal. The WWII Soviet Union was bereft of the same standards of communication into mid- and far eastern Russia, which was populated almost entirely by peasants.

The bulk of Soviet forces would be highly likely trying to protect the European (capital city-containing) Russia, the Japanese could content themselves with being the largest nuisance raider in history, knowing that Soviet interference would be just as difficult for the Russians as invasion was for the Japanese. There would likely be provision for rudimentary airstrips in Asian Russia, these would be difficult to find for the Soviets, whilst the Japanese aircrews knew exactly where the Soviet airstrips were.

If the Soviets committed enough resources to settle the Japanese problem, they'd leave themselves wide open in European Russia, if they didn't, they might even have trouble locating the Japanese in the quasi-10th century wilderness of the interior and far east.


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## Soren (Jul 1, 2009)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> A source please that we can all reference?



I'll have to find the documentary then, it was specifically about Stalin. But I remember it very clearly, esp. the part about Stalingrad where the secretary noticed how worried he was at one point, and understandably so as the Germans could've easily won the entire war within a few months at that point had it not been for a few truly mindbuggingly idiotic decisions by Hitler.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 1, 2009)

Soren said:


> I'll have to find the documentary then, it was specifically about Stalin. But I remember it very clearly, esp. the part about Stalingrad where the secretary noticed how worried he was at one point, and understandably so as the Germans could've easily won the entire war within a few months at that point had it not been for a few truly mindbuggingly idiotic decisions by Hitler.



Being worried does not equate to begging on your knees for peace. I seriously doubt that Stalin ever was thinking about begging for peace...


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## Soren (Jul 1, 2009)

Colin1 said:


> Looking at a political map of Russia
> 
> http://www.russiamap.org/images/full/political-purp.gif
> 
> ...



Yup. And that is why the USSR wouldn't last even 5 months in such a situation, they were simply too hard pressed by the Germans alone, even when the Germans were fighting in the west as-well. A US standby would've been the ultimate deathblow to the USSR, and Japanese involvement in the war against the Soviets would've just settled the matter even more swiftly.

The advance in the east would be slow for the Japanese no doubt, but only because of the geographical situation, not because of Soviet resistance. The Japanese would also rely mostly on horse drawn transport, which mostly means slow but steady reliable progress. The Japanese army was well fit for long distance fighting. 

As for numbers, the Japanese army consisted of roughly 2,250,000 professional soldiers in 1941, and over 4,500,000 trained reserves or what you'd call 2nd rate infantry  In short more than enough to tie up huge amounts of Soviet reserves.


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## Soren (Jul 1, 2009)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Being worried does not equate to begging on your knees for peace. I seriously doubt that Stalin ever was thinking about begging for peace...



The secretary said that he was very close to "beg for peace" at one point, he was convinced they were gonna loose at one point.


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## Glider (Jul 1, 2009)

Soren said:


> So what you're saying is that matters of pride between each armed branch within the Japanese army would prevent them from cooperating in a war against the Soviets? That's really one of the most far fetched ideas I've heard in a long time.


The fact remains that they didn't co-operate in the war against the USA, so the question has to be why would they co-operate in a war against Russia. Far from being far fetched it by far the most likely situation as its backed up by history.



> If the Japanese emperor had decided to cooperate with the Germans and do he best to beat the Soviets in the east then you can be sure he'd pour both the IJN IJA in full force and have them cooperate. During the a lot of Zeros operated from land based airfields in the Pacific, and so if the war was to be raged in the Soviet Union then they'd simply be located there instead.


The keu part in this statement is _'If the Japanese Emperor' _The emperor was not making the decisions, the Military were making the political and economic decisions, he was an ineffectual figurehead.



> Wide open ? To what ? The US ? They weren't gonna hit the Japanese, if so they would've done waay before they invaded China.


Wide open to the Russian Tanks, artillery and ground attack forces. The Japanese army had no effective tanks, few Artillery pieces, very poor small arms, few anti tank guns and those they had were very poor plus no ground attack forces and I keep mentioning it they lacked transport. The minute they come out to move forward the Japanese Army is very exposed.



> No it is not major assumption Glider, and you need to pick up you reading again cause the Japanese were given a lot of technology by the Germans near the end of the war. And most of it was hastily put to use, esp. the jet technology
> 
> By wars end the Japanese were working on copies of the Me-262 Me-163 fighters.!


Again your comments support my statement. I said that they gave the technology too late and in insufficient quantity to enable the Japanese to use them, I didn't say they didn't give the techology. The Japanes jet fighter was largely all japanese. They did get some technical information around the swept wing which was incorporated but the jet engine (Ne-12) was designed and built by a joint Japanese Navy/Nakajima team headed by Captain Tanegashima and Tameji Yamada. _Note this wasn't a joint Navy/Airforce team._ 
The amount of technology transfer on the jet engine was one photograph of a cross section of the BMW003, no technical details or measurements were included. On the basis of this the Japanese incorporated the axial compresser design of the BMW003 and developed the Ne-20. So the much vaunted technology transfer of the jet engine amounted to one photograph. 
As you point out the technology was as you pointed out _near the end of the war_, as I said, too late to make a practical difference.



> The equipment they were issued with in 1941 wasn't much worse than that of the Soviet army Glider. Remember that this is before the Soviets started recieving lend lease equipment.


The Japanese Army was poorly equipped compared to the Russian Army in the spring of 1942 and there was much less of it. They didn't need Lend Lease equipment.


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## Soren (Jul 1, 2009)

Again you need to pick up the books Glider, the Japanese Ki-201 was very close to a direct copy of the Me-262! And so was their version of the Me-163.

And why was the technology handed out so late you think ? Because the Germans Japanese weren't fighting a war together. Had they fought together information would've flowed between them from start to finish, and the Japanese would soon have fielded a lot of German inspired equipment.



Glider said:


> Wide open to the Russian Tanks, artillery and ground attack forces. The Japanese army had no effective tanks, few Artillery pieces, very poor small arms, few anti tank guns and those they had were very poor plus no ground attack forces and I keep mentioning it they lacked transport. The minute they come out to move forward the Japanese Army is very exposed.



Russian tanks artillery ? What Russian tanks artillery ? The ones they need against the Germans ?

The only tanks the Soviets would have ready for operations in the east where the likes of the small T-26, which I may say weren't much better than what the Japanese had. And as for ground attack forces, the Japanese was as well equipped as the Soviets in this repect at this point in time. 

And regarding transport: Mostly horse drawn, but reliable. The Japanese also had some VERY good prime movers which many people often overlook! So regarding the issue of transport the Japanese have got it sorted.


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## Colin1 (Jul 1, 2009)

Soren said:


> And regarding transport: Mostly horse drawn, but reliable. The Japanese also had some VERY good prime movers which many people often overlook! So regarding the issue of transport the Japanese have got it sorted.


It's worth noting
that the Cold War Soviet Union used enormous numbers of horse-drawn artillery and for very good reason, when a tracked piece breaks down, repair can be a serious issue. When horses break down, replace the horses.

Horses refuel themselves when you park up for the night.


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## Soren (Jul 1, 2009)

Roger that Colin1. 

Horses and esp. mules are also very good at negotiating terrain which not much motorized equipment can cope with.


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## michaelmaltby (Jul 1, 2009)

" ... It was like God addled their brains and caused them to make huge tactical error ..."

Yes, and his initials were A.H.

MM


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## vikingBerserker (Jul 1, 2009)

Interesting read from the site: Khalkhin-Gol: The forgotten battle that shaped WW2 | Siberian Light
(I'd never heard of Khalkhin-Gol until imalko mentioned it)

*How Khalkhin-Gol changed the course of history*

"The battle of Khalkhin-Gol decisively showed the expansionist Japanese military that it was not a match for the Soviets – particularly while Japanese forces were still bogged down throughout China. The Soviets under combined their forces to stunning effect, while Japanese tactics remained stuck in a pre-modern mindset that valued honour and personal bravery more highly on the battlefield than massed forces and armour. 

When Hitler finally invaded the Soviet Union in 1941 the Japanese, although tempted to join the attack, remembered the lessons of Khalkhin Gol and decided to remain on the sidelines, ensuring that the stretched Soviet military could focus its forces on just one front. This, in turn, meant that Nazi Germany was forced to fight a four year war on two fronts – against the Soviets in the East, and the British and Americans in the West. 

Defeat at Khalkhin-Gol can also be seen as a major factor in the Japanese decision to expand into the Pacific. As expansion to the North-West was no longer an option, ill defended and scattered colonial territories made far easier targets. Even the United States was deemed a less formidable adversary than the Soviet Union and, if the Japanse had not lost at Khalkhin-Gol, they would surely have never attacked Pearl Harbour."


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## Amsel (Jul 1, 2009)

They thought the Americans were a bunch of weak playboys whose women wouldn't let them fight.


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## Soren (Jul 1, 2009)

A lot of tactical blunders were made by the Japanese in that battle. But then again, even if they hadn't made these mistakes they couldn't have ever defeated the Soviets alone.


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## proton45 (Jul 2, 2009)

Khalkhin-Gol was never an "official" campaign...it was more of an "Incident". Its difficult to consider what plans might have been made in Tokyo if Japan had "planned" to move across the border...although its fair to say that their where some military men who thought a provoked incident might force Japan to become involved in expansion across the river...and that the (then) present state of the "on-hand" forces of the IJA where more then enough to deal with the Russians. One can not say how Japan might have done things if they had made plans in Tokyo for a prolonged engagement...Just as the IJN realized that they need a fighter with the performance of the A6M to engage a campaign in the Pacific, the IJA may have realized they need heavy armor in Mongolia...


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## Glider (Jul 2, 2009)

Soren said:


> Again you need to pick up the books Glider, the Japanese Ki-201 was very close to a direct copy of the Me-262! And so was their version of the Me-163.


The Ki-201 wasn't a close copy of the me262, it shared some of the aerodynamics certainly and as mentioned the engine was modified on the basis of the photograph, but a copy it wasn't. The me163 was a copy but as we both agree too little too late for both aircraft. 



> And why was the technology handed out so late you think ? Because the Germans Japanese weren't fighting a war together. Had they fought together information would've flowed between them from start to finish, and the Japanese would soon have fielded a lot of German inspired equipment.


I must have missed something, but I thought that Japan and Germany were both fighting the USA and the UK. 

Its also worth remembering that the Tripartite Pact signed by Italy, Japan and Germany in 1940 covered the technical assistance in Article 4
ARTICLE 4. With a view to implementing the present pact, joint technical commissions, to be appointed by the respective Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy, will meet without delay

A more probable reason for the caution in exchanging technical details lies in the basic lack of trust between Germany and Japan caused by the signing of the Molotov-Ribbontrop pact in 1939, which significantly increased the risk to Japan of an attack by Russia.

So despite signing an accord that set out technical commissions and fighting a war for a number of years against a common foe, the basic flow of technology that enabled the Japanese to field improved weapons is I believe limited to the 20mm MG 151 and the DB601 which was hardly a success. 
Also its hard to think of any examples where the Japanese Airforce and Navy shared anything let alone Japan and Germany.



> Russian tanks artillery ? What Russian tanks artillery ? The ones they need against the Germans ?
> 
> The only tanks the Soviets would have ready for operations in the east where the likes of the small T-26, which I may say weren't much better than what the Japanese had. And as for ground attack forces, the Japanese was as well equipped as the Soviets in this repect at this point in time.


T26 and T28 tanks would do the job, but you are ignoring the fact that a small number of KV1 or T34 tanks would have the same effect against the Japanese as a Tiger against Sherman 75's. If Germany can spare a handfull of Tigers for Tunisia, then the Russians can spare a handful of modern tanks to face Japan.



> And regarding transport: Mostly horse drawn, but reliable. The Japanese also had some VERY good prime movers which many people often overlook! So regarding the issue of transport the Japanese have got it sorted.


The fact that you have a good prime mover doesn't mean that you army has solved its transport problems. 

Besides you still haven't given any details of those Japanes Anti Tank aircraft and the Japanese transport aircraft. Its a bit like the Army Transport situation. Japn built the DC3 during the war which was second to none and better than the Ju52, but no one is going to pretend that Japan had a transport fleet to rival the Luftwaffe.


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## parsifal (Jul 2, 2009)

removing the US from the equation is bound to have a massive effect on the outcome. However the indications from the wartime records are that the US intended to go war at any rate by March of 1942. The intentions of the US administration was to force the issue of the open door policy once the strategic bomber threat was in place in the philipinnes, and the Filipino army was sufficiently trained to defend the Philipinnes. That this whole strategy of the US administration at this time was wildly optimistic (the effects of the 100 B-17s planned for the Far East grossly over-estimated, and the abilities of the filipino army also overrated greatly) are irrelevant....the US was determined not to allow the Japanese exclusive rights in China, and that was that. Moreover by 1941, the US attitude towards Japoanese agression had hardened so much that they would not have even stood to allow for the continued occupation of Manchuria. Rossevelts policy against the Japanese had become so entrenched that he wanted "Open Door" policy to apply to the whole of China, including Manchuria.

In Europe, the US was also taking an increasingly impatient attitude towards Germany, such that effectively, a state of war existed between the two countries from about September '41 onward. Bottom line is this, the US was most unlikely to stand idly by for much longer than they did , except under the circumstances of a massive , fundamental change in foreign policy of both Axis camps. I just cannot see that happening, because for the Axis to comply with the US wishes, they would have to change their own fundamental makeup, in other words they would have to abandon their exapansionary and agressive policies almost in their entirety, and submit to free trade principals, the rights of self determination, and adopt essentially democratic domestic policies I just cannot see that happening

Under the most ideal of circumstances, the entry of the US may have been delayed by six months at most. In the case of the Japanese, that would, at minimum have required a pullout out of french IndoChina, and at least a truce in China, if they had tried to withdraw from mainland China, however, there would have been a civil war within Japan itself, and a rapid succession of political assassinations. The only scenariio that can make any sense in all of this is if we assumne a continued temporary presence in China by the Japanese, but a pull out from South east Asia, and a genuine drive for peace (but paradoxically no military pull out). Where does that leave us?

Well, for a start it means that the Japanese dont have access to the fifty divisions that constitute their army....instead they have access to about 6-8. They did not have a single armoured division operational in 1941, although they did have a number of armoured regiments. The Japanese air forces, between them could spare approximately 600 aircraft, with a further 300 on garrison in Machuria. The main shortages to be faced by the Japanese, however, would have been in the area of Motor transport. The Japanese had 16 independant motor transport groups (they call them companies, but I dont think they are companies in the western miltary sense) in the whole army in 1941, and 12 of them were fully occupied in China, providing logistic support to the expeditionary force. They were in the process of of forming another 2 independant "companies", so overall, they may have had access to 6 or so independant truck formations. The 12 "companies" in China were able to hold a static line for 31 divisions, but an army on the defensive, or not moving, is consuming roughly 1/3 the amount of supply that an army that is advancing or in comabt will consume. So in a defensive situation, where sea transport cannot be used, the 8 companies that might be available might be able to support up to 20 Divs in a static or defensive role, but in an offensive or attacking posture could only support about 6 divs. Moreover this rough formula is only valid for advances not exceeding 200 miles, for distances greater than that, you needed to double and triple your logistic support for each unit.

So this means that the Japanese could support about 6 divs on offensive operations to a depth of 200 miles, and about 3 divs to a depth of advance of about 500 miles. In western terms that amounts to about two corps initially and one coprs after that. .For the record, the Germans attacked the 3 million Russian in the west with no less than 36 Corps (not includiung the minior axis satellites) including 5 Corps of fully formed Panzers. They were supported by more than 200000 trucks, as compared to the 30000 that would be available to the Japanese. The Japanese would be faced by 500000 Soviet tropps (over 200000 of them the highly trained Siberians), so whereas the Germans have an odds ratio of about 1:1, with the advantages of surprise and tanks to support them, the Japanese will have odds of about 1:5 against them, and no tank supoport.

In the air, the Soviet far eastern airfleet amounted to approximately 3000 aircraft in June 1941, and this number actually increased throughout the Summer of 1941. The far eastern air reserves were not raided by the Soviet high command until December 1941, so here we have 3000 Soviet aircraft pitted against 1100 Japanese aircraft, of which no more than 140 will be zeroes, and no more that 40 will be Ki-43s. The remainder will be, mostly Ki-27s, and A5Ms, mostly, against an assortment of Soviet aircraft, ranging from I-15s through to Yak-1s. I believe the Japanese would do quite well in the air, as compared to what would happen to them on the ground, but they would nevertheless have been heavily outnumbered and with a much smaller capability to replace losses. Conversely Soviet pilot training was pretty attrocious in 1941, and their force organization even worse. 

Returning briefly to the west, a retreating Japanese army in Asia would have freed up or allowed the equipment of (courtesy of enhanced Lend Lease) about 40 extra Allied Divisions, 11 Australian (including 3 already in the middle east but recalled in 1941, because of the threat of Japanese invasion), one New Zealand (retained in the Pacific for the same reason) and 32 Indian Divs (include about 6 in the middle east but held back because of equipment shortages). In addition, there are the equivalent of two British Divs no longer transferred from the Middle East to the far East, and the Prince Of Wales/Repulse, the Indomitabl;e, the three Illustriou class, a swag of cruisers, and 3 or four older battleships are no longer needed for service in the far east....wonder where they are going to go????

For the moment, lets be conservative, and assume that the Middleastern command is reinforced by no less than 12 extra Divs, and a gaggle of ships. This does not bode well for Rommel, and rather than undermanning the agheila line in December, the allies after the fall of Bengahzi continue their advance, capturing Tripoli by the end of November 1941. The threats to germany's southern front now are very serious, with the collapse of italy imminent. I estimate the Germans will be forced to withdraw at least 6-8 divs to counter this problem, along with at least 500 aircraft. Straight away there goes your reserves for Typhoon, so the net overall effect on the chances of Axis success have actually decreased by Japan not attacking in the Far East.


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## Soren (Jul 2, 2009)

Glider said:


> The Ki-201 wasn't a close copy of the me262, it shared some of the aerodynamics certainly and as mentioned the engine was modified on the basis of the photograph, but a copy it wasn't. The me163 was a copy but as we both agree too little too late for both aircraft.



I didn't say it was a direct copy, I said it was very close to being one, and that it sure was. Most people would call it copying a design if make two designs as similar as the Me262 Ki-201 were.

Take a peek:






And the point is that the Japanese recieved and immediately put into use technology given by the Germans.



Glider said:


> I must have missed something, but I thought that Japan and Germany were both fighting the USA and the UK.



Glider there's a difference between fighting a war together and just fighting the same people. The Germans Japanese didn't cooperate in any operations together, which is what would've let to the sharing of information. 



Glider said:


> T26 and T28 tanks would do the job, but you are ignoring the fact that a small number of KV1 or T34 tanks would have the same effect against the Japanese as a Tiger against Sherman 75's. If Germany can spare a handfull of Tigers for Tunisia, then the Russians can spare a handful of modern tanks to face Japan.



I doubt that a KV1 or T34 would've had even a fraction of the same effect as the Tiger did against the Allíed tanks from 42 and onwards until the end of the war. The T-34 KV-1 both featurd piss poor optics, ill trained crews, no radios etc etc.. the effect wasn't even gonna come close to that of the Tiger. 

Also these few available T-34's KV-1's were absolutely not gonna be used against the Japanese when the Germans were coming in full force from the west with no mighty US to be concerned about. This alone would've made the German drive even more swift and powerful.



Glider said:


> The fact that you have a good prime mover doesn't mean that you army has solved its transport problems.



Not all of them no, but some of them. Like I've already mentioned the primary means of transportation was horse drawn, which is very reliable and well suited for long range advances. The motorized prime movers, of which the Japanese possessed some excellent ones, would tow the really heavy stuff along. 

So again, in terms of landbased transportation the Japanese have got it sorted.



> Besides you still haven't given any details of those Japanes Anti Tank aircraft and the Japanese transport aircraft. Its a bit like the Army Transport situation. Japn built the DC3 during the war which was second to none and better than the Ju52, but no one is going to pretend that Japan had a transport fleet to rival the Luftwaffe.



The navy would obviously transport the majority of the troops material to the eastern shores of Russia, from which point on the invasion would begin. And an invasion force with over 3 million Japanese troops could be launched, which was more than what the Soviets were gonna be capable of dealing with as the Germans were pushing through from the west. 

As for transport a/c, they weren't needed in any massive numbers at all by the Japanese.

And like I said landbased transportation would be largely horse drawn, which although somewhat slow is very reliable and capable of negotiating the toughest terrains. 

As for the AT a/c, well the Ki-41 could've fulfilled this role quite beautifully I believe.


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## Soren (Jul 2, 2009)

Parsifal,

I'm heading for the bed in 1 min so I only have time to address one or two issues with your post for now, I'll address the rest later.

Anyway, are you saying that the Japanese only had 140 A6M's available in the summer of 1941 ? If so then you'd be severely mistaking. By June 1941 the first A6M3's were even being introduced. 

The Japanese airforce would've wiped the VVS clear off the skies, there's no doubt about it. 

As for the Siberian troops being experienced. from what exactly ? And how smart would it be to pit them against the Japanese when the Germans were steamrolling the Soviet forces in the west ?

If the Soviets had been forced to fight a two front war in 1941 then they would've been screwed beyond measure. They simply couldn't have done it. 

Also lets not forget what the Japanese actually achieved in WW2, they held on for quite a while! And so had they concentrated their efforts against the Soviets instead then there's no doubt they would've done better, esp. in the air but also on the ground.


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## stasoid (Jul 2, 2009)

Soren said:


> The Japanese airforce would've wiped the VVS clear off the skies, there's no doubt about it.



Not so sure. Something quite opposite happened 2 years earlier at the Battle of Khalkhin Gol. What would make it different in 41'? New A6Ms? Well, Russians had Yak-1, Lagg-3, Mig3s that were not available in 39 either.

The Soviets kept around a million men in the Far East throughout the war. At some point in late 41, 20 divisions (200.000 troops) were pulled out and transferred to the west to conduct a counteroffensive in the Battle of Moscow but that's about it, the rest stayed there untill the end of the war.

Ground invasion in Russia's Far East would also lead to a widespread guerrilla war. Considering that every local civilian was a hunter/pathfinder and practically every family kept at least one rifle at home, I dont think the Japanise would've managed to hold that territory for very long.


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## JoeB (Jul 2, 2009)

parsifal said:


> So this means that the Japanese could support about 6 divs on offensive operations to a depth of 200 miles, and about 3 divs to a depth of advance of about 500 miles. In western terms that amounts to about two corps initially and one coprs after that. .For the record, the Germans attacked the 3 million Russian in the west with no less than 36 Corps (not includiung the minior axis satellites) including 5 Corps of fully formed Panzers. They were supported by more than 200000 trucks, as compared to the 30000 that would be available to the Japanese. The Japanese would be faced by 500000 Soviet tropps (over 200000 of them the highly trained Siberians), so whereas the Germans have an odds ratio of about 1:1, with the advantages of surprise and tanks to support them, the Japanese will have odds of about 1:5 against them, and no tank supoport.


The extrapolation from truck units to number of divisions isn't correct. The Japanese like the Germans mainly relied on horse transport. And the IJA covered quite large distances in offensive operations in China early in that war, then again in 1944, it was not a static army. 

The Japanese had specific plan for war with the USSR in 1941, we don't have to speculate it. The Army General Staff plan was based on a force of 22 divisions (the Kwantung Army's 14, Korea Army's 2, 6 withdrawn from North China), total 850,000 men all in including non-divisional units. The Kwantung Army itself, in its typical semi-indepedence from Tokyo, conceived a plan to build its own strength to 20-25 divisions. The operation to expand Kwantung Army strength in 1941 in anticipation of attacking the Soviets was called Kantokuen, short in Japanese for Kwantung Army Special Maneuvers. Besides shifting of divisions it involved large scale transfer of filler personnel to fill out existing formations (war strength of old square type IJA divisions was 25k men, can't be counted equally with Soviet rifle divisions). The basic plan was to strike east from eastern Manchuria using the bulk of that force, in forested terrain where the Japanese inferiority in tanks would have been less important, just as the Soviets made slower progress on that front in August 1945 than elsewhere. In the original Army General Staff plan the war was to start in early September with goal of seizing the Maritime Province before winter shut down operations.

From July the Army's plan to attack the Soviets lost momentum with the cabinet compared to more urgent need to respond to the US/Brit/Dutch oil embargo, eventual decision to 'go south' instead. By 1942 the Kwantung Army had a larger numerical superiority over Soviet far east forces, but obviously Japan had made a large new commitment elsewhere. "Nomonhan" by Alvin Coox describes the 1939 conflict in tremendous detail but also has a chapter about the 1941 build up and plans.

Joe


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## m kenny (Jul 2, 2009)

http://www.warbirdforum.com/nomonhan.htm

http://www.warbirdforum.com/russloss.htm


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## Watanbe (Jul 2, 2009)

I don't think the USSR is capable of fighting a two front war against two powers. The Japanese might not be able to launch a successful land invasion, but they don't have to, they just have to tie up a couple million Soviet troops. I can't see the VVS dealing with the Luftwaffe and Japanese airforce, at least they certainly won't have air superiority. The Japanese Navy would obviously dominate the seas and could help the Army establish a foothold, which it could in theory just hold until German victory.

The Germans had a superb army and were very close to defeating the Soviets, the only thing that really saved them was being able to pump in fresh reinforcements. If the Japanese attack in the east your pool of fresh reinforcements gets dramatically reduced. The Germans had the Soviets on the ropes but couldn't delivered the knockout blow! A Japanese front gives them the opportunity to do this. 

That being said, the Japanese Army really wasn't tailored to fighting in the sort of terrain it would expect to encounter. If the Germans gave the Japanese the production license to manufacturer panzerfausts or some sort of effective anti-tank it would be hard for the USSR to launch a successful attack. The Japanese knew how to fight a defensive war, as the US found out, albeit in a jungle terrain. 

When reading about Soviets troop numbers and the amount of planes and tanks they managed to manufacturer it makes you realise just how impressive the German Army and equipment really was. Even considering the historic circumstances it was an amazing achievement to push Russia that close to defeat!


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## Glider (Jul 3, 2009)

Soren said:


> I didn't say it was a direct copy, I said it was very close to being one, and that it sure was. Most people would call it copying a design if make two designs as similar as the Me262 Ki-201 were.


It wasn't a copy but it did use the same aerodynamics. The Japanese aircraft was a lot smaller, its internal structure was different and it used different materials in its construction. 
_PS you did say it was a copy, you didn't say it was close to being a copy._



> And the point is that the Japanese recieved and immediately put into use technology given by the Germans.


Not immediately. Development didn't start until November 1944 some months after the information arrived in Japan.



> I doubt that a KV1 or T34 would've had even a fraction of the same effect as the Tiger did against the Allíed tanks from 42 and onwards until the end of the war. The T-34 KV-1 both featurd piss poor optics, ill trained crews, no radios etc etc.. the effect wasn't even gonna come close to that of the Tiger.


 
Despite the well known issues of the Russian tanks its easy to forget that these tanks came as a shock to the German Army who had considerable difficulty dealing with them when they first met them on the battlefield. I think you will agree that the German Army was better equipped with anti tank weapons than the Japanese.
At the end of the day the T34 and KV1 are impossible to penetrate wth Japanese anti tank weapons and have the ability to move at will around the battlefield and can destroy any Japanese tank.



> Also these few available T-34's KV-1's were absolutely not gonna be used against the Japanese when the Germans were coming in full force from the west with no mighty US to be concerned about. This alone would've made the German drive even more swift and powerful.


As I said the T26 and T28 would do the job but if it became difficult a small number of the more modern tanks would have a huge impact. As I pointed out the Germans did this with the Tiger in Tunisia so there is form.


> Not all of them no, but some of them. Like I've already mentioned the primary means of transportation was horse drawn, which is very reliable and well suited for long range advances. The motorized prime movers, of which the Japanese possessed some excellent ones, would tow the really heavy stuff along.
> 
> So again, in terms of landbased transportation the Japanese have got it sorted.


I suggest you read Parsifal's posting on the numbers as its a numbers game.



> The navy would obviously transport the majority of the troops material to the eastern shores of Russia, from which point on the invasion would begin. And an invasion force with over 3 million Japanese troops could be launched, which was more than what the Soviets were gonna be capable of dealing with as the Germans were pushing through from the west.


Small point but important, the Japanese only had a small amphibious potential and didn't have the ability or equipment to do a large opposed landing. .



> As for the AT a/c, well the Ki-41 could've fulfilled this role quite beautifully I believe.


I don't know about the Ki 41 can you point me in the right direction, thanks


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## parsifal (Jul 3, 2009)

QUOTE=JoeB;523014]_The extrapolation from truck units to number of divisions isn't correct. The Japanese like the Germans mainly relied on horse transport. And the IJA covered quite large distances in offensive operations in China early in that war, then again in 1944, it was not a static army. 



The Japanese had specific plan for war with the USSR in 1941, we don't have to speculate it. The Army General Staff plan was based on a force of 22 divisions (the Kwantung Army's 14, Korea Army's 2, 6 withdrawn from North China), total 850,000 men all in including non-divisional units. The Kwantung Army itself, in its typical semi-indepedence from Tokyo, conceived a plan to build its own strength to 20-25 divisions. The operation to expand Kwantung Army strength in 1941 in anticipation of attacking the Soviets was called Kantokuen, short in Japanese for Kwantung Army Special Maneuvers. Besides shifting of divisions it involved large scale transfer of filler personnel to fill out existing formations (war strength of old square type IJA divisions was 25k men, can't be counted equally with Soviet rifle divisions). The basic plan was to strike east from eastern Manchuria using the bulk of that force, in forested terrain where the Japanese inferiority in tanks would have been less important, just as the Soviets made slower progress on that front in August 1945 than elsewhere. In the original Army General Staff plan the war was to start in early September with goal of seizing the Maritime Province before winter shut down operations.



From July the Army's plan to attack the Soviets lost momentum with the cabinet compared to more urgent need to respond to the US/Brit/Dutch oil embargo, eventual decision to 'go south' instead. By 1942 the Kwantung Army had a larger numerical superiority over Soviet far east forces, but obviously Japan had made a large new commitment elsewhere. "Nomonhan" by Alvin Coox describes the 1939 conflict in tremendous detail but also has a chapter about the 1941 build up and plans.



Joe[/QUOTE]_


Hi Joe

I am going to have to respectfully disagree with you on this one

Horse drawn supply cannot replace truck borne supply over any distance for a modern army. They can provide fairly efficient supply in a divisional situation (from the Corps depots to the divisional depots, usually no more than 30 miles) but for Corps to Army level supply they are just not efficient enough to be really looked on as an adequate substitute for a modern army (Corps to Army supply lines are typically 50-100 miles long) Quite simply, the draught animals will eat more fodder than they can carry (especially in Russia) , once the supply lines exceed about 100 miles. In the modern era, non-motorised armies rely on railways for their "strategic" supply. after wwi this was heavily supplemented with motor transport. In Russia, motor transport was not just a luxury, it was vital. Even armies like the Rumanian and the Italian armies relied on MT to get the supplies from the railhead to the Corps HQs for distribution to the divs by non-motorised echelons



Usually supplies are not channelled through and army group, but the army to supply head lines can be anything really....in the Siberian context it might be several hundred miles very easily.



Moreover, all this wagon driven scenario fails to take into account that foraging in Siberia is not an option. There is insufficient native fodder to support large numbers of draft animals



In Russia, the Germans did rely on horse drawn transport, but not for their "long range" supply. Horses were used mostly to transport the artillery, and for local supply close to the front. Vehicles provided over 90% of the lift capability for the LOC supply requirements. Thats why the loss of soft skinned vehicles in 1941 was so critical, and was really the main constraint that prevented the capture of Moscow in December.



An issue also worth noting is the general lack of fodder available in Siberia. Much of it does not have open savannah grasslands. It is mostly subarctic tundra or conifer forest, neither of which have much in the way of fodder. Siberia is more akin to desert in terms of its groundcovers. 



With all due respect, I just cannot see the japanese being able to support the 22 divs you mention. It looks like a typically unrealistic Japanese plan to me. 



For the record also, whilst you are correct to say that the japanese were able to launch major offensives in 1941-2, the scale of these offensives were no where near those of a 22 division attack against the Soviets. And these extremely limited offensives very nearly derailed the japanese logistics network. The offensive into Burma in 1942 was by two divs, the offensive into Malaya was by three Divs, and in each case they very nearly ran out of supply, mostly because of a shortage of trucks. The two offensives of 1944 into southern China did involve about 18 Divs, however at no time were more than 8 Divs engaged in offensive operations at any given time. There is no instance that I know of after 1940 that the Japanese engaged in a major land offensive bigger than 10 divs. 



It is also worth looking at the terrain that existing in the approaches to Vladivostock, which would have been the main objective of any Japanese offensive.

For comparison, I have attached a couple of Google Earth images, both at the same scale (wach map is approximately 200 km across), which show the relief and main transport lines. One is of the approaches to Moscow, and the other the border regions just north of Vladivostock. Immediately it should be apparent that the terrain in the Far East is very difficult. There is no direct route to the Port, and no cross border roads or rail lines to speak of. The narrow corridor through which the Japanese would have to advance was one of the most heavily fortified areas on earth at the time, comparable to the Maginot line in fact (your comment about the Russians being held up in 1945 by terrain is only half right, they were also held up by the strong Japanese border defencees that also existed on their side of the borde). The mountains shown on that releif map rise about 6000 feet above the surrounding valleys, in effect making them impassable to most armies.


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## Juha (Jul 3, 2009)

Soren
Quote:” I doubt that a KV1 or T34 would've had even a fraction of the same effect as the Tiger did against the Allíed tanks from 42 and onwards until the end of the war.”
I recommended that you read the history of 6th PzD, Brennpunkte. When they first met KVs one KV blocked the only supply route to the combat parts of the division and it took most of the day to knock that out and while German tried that the KV knocked out a battery of 50mm PaK 38s and one 88mm with its tractor. In the end another 88 knocked the KV out but in the end, IIRC, they needed combat engineers to make sure that the KV didn’t make any more trouble. At the same time some 20-30 KVs and many T-26s attacked the combat units of the 6th PzD. They drove through most of its PzRgt which had to notice that their shells bounced off from KVs even from very short distance, in the end panzers, mostly ex-Czech Pz35(t)s, managed to knock out a few by using PzGr40s but most sailed past the panzers, overran much of A/T battalion and were eventually stopped by heavy field artillery batteries, behind which the PzRgt reformed. Panzergrenadiers suffered heavily and the situation was finally restored when neighbor 1st PzD came into rescue by turning around and hitting the Soviet formation to its right rear. But it was a quite a shock to 6th PzD.
Germans adapted to situation fast, they began to put into their forward kampfgruppen a couple 15cm sH 18s and a couple 88s but even later on there were cases when a few Soviet heavy tanks played havoc amongst German units.

Quote:” The Japanese airforce would've wiped the VVS clear off the skies, there's no doubt about it."

VVS in the end won the air superiority over battlefield at Nomonhan/Khalin Gol in 1939, why it would have been so different in1941.

And on troops, firstly Japan was involved in a major land war in China, most of its army was tided there and on the other hand Soviet Union kept significant forces along its southern border, that’s why it could easily participate the occupation of Persia/Iran in August-Sept 41, IIRC some 3 Soviet armies participated that plus air and naval forces.

Juha


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## parsifal (Jul 3, 2009)

_I don't think the USSR is capable of fighting a two front war against two powers. The Japanese might not be able to launch a successful land invasion, but they don't have to, they just have to tie up a couple million Soviet troops. I can't see the VVS dealing with the Luftwaffe and Japanese airforce, at least they certainly won't have air superiority. The Japanese Navy would obviously dominate the seas and could help the Army establish a foothold, which it could in theory just hold until German victory_.

The Soviets maintained a far easter milatry force structure of between 500000 and a million men, 2-4000 aircraft, and a small naval contingent. This proves that the Japanese would need to do more than just sit ther to have an effect on the battles in the west.

The Japanese have superior quality in the air in 1941, but the combined strength of their army and navy air forces did not exceed 2500 aircraft, and at least 1000 were needed just to hold the line in China. A further 500 or so were needed in the Home islands for training and defence, leaving about 1000 ready for operations elswhere. Of these fewer than 200 were front line fighters. And Japanese pilot replacements were pitifully slow, about 50-100 per month for both air forces. Against this the Soviets were curning out pilots (of far lesser quality) by the thousand

Even after the transfer of the Siberians to the Battle of Moscoe in December, the Soviets maintained an army in excess of half a million men. The units sent west were immedialtey replaced admittedly by untrained levies. 


_The Germans had a superb army and were very close to defeating the Soviets, the only thing that really saved them was being able to pump in fresh reinforcements. If the Japanese attack in the east your pool of fresh reinforcements gets dramatically reduced. The Germans had the Soviets on the ropes but couldn't delivered the knockout blow! A Japanese front gives them the opportunity to do this._ 

Err, by wars end, the Soviets were superior in quality to the majority of the German army. They had proven that they could defeat the germans in open battle. Whilst numbers were a part of this equation, it is often forgotten that the Soviets had an industrial base in 1938 that was only about two thirds that of the Germans. They had vastly superior manpower reserves, but a smaller industrial base. The Russians simply managed their war production more rationally. They produced tanks tanks inferior in quality but far cheaper to produce for example. This philosophy was repeated in every major category incidentally.

I would say that the laurels should go to the Russians for realizing what was needed to win the war, rather than prance around the battlefield with expensive toys that might look good, but which are so expensive as to make any chance of winning impossible. 


_When reading about Soviets troop numbers and the amount of planes and tanks they managed to manufacturer it makes you realise just how impressive the German Army and equipment really was. Even considering the historic circumstances it was an amazing achievement to push Russia that close to defeat!_

The Germans came close to defeating the Russians at just one point, in 1941, and the more authoritative analyses demonstrate that this threat was never as dire as we in the West like to dream


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## Soren (Jul 3, 2009)

Ki-46, not Ki-41. Typo on my part.


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## Soren (Jul 3, 2009)

The Japanese successfully held on against the might of the US for over 4 years and some people now claim they couldn't have held their own in a war against a desperate USSR being steamrolled in the west by th German army. This is getting ridiculous.

By summer 1941 the Japanese had ready 2,250,000 well trained troops and another 4,500,000 million reserves. The amphibious capabilities of the Japanese were not poor either, they successfully operated in the Pacific for over 4 years, landing masses of troops on various locations. Furthermore the A6M3 had started shipments to the IJAF in July 41, and if the A6M2 was superior to anything the Soviets had then the A6M3 only nailed that case shut.

Without checking I believe around 600 Zeros could be deployed for attacks on the eastern border of Russia, and it wouldn't take long before they along with the number of Ki-43 and Ki-27 would sweep the VVS from the skies. 

Also none of this can be compared to Khalkin Gol, that was a struggle between two nations, a one front war for both parties. And the Japanese who did very well to begin with lost merely because of a few major blunders made within the imperial high command. Still the losses were comparable for both sides. The invasion of the USSR in 1941 would've been an entirely different deal, with the situation looking very desperate and hopeless for the USSR as they were being steamrolled in the west by the German army. And the USSR simply wouldn't have been capable of holding a 3 million man invasion force from the east when they were being crushed beyond measure in the west.

And as for the T-34 KV-1 tanks being a shock to the German army, initially yes they were, but only because such a thing was never expected from the Soviets. The KV-1 proved difficult to knock out in the beginning, but on the other hand its' battlefield effectiveness was poor as-well, featuring no radio, poor optics and an ill trained crew. Only in a few instances did the KV-1 tanks manage to halt the Germans, but in general they were simply overrun and as described by various sources on the subject they really had no effect on the German advance at all. The T-34 was more of a shock in that is was fast mobile, but it still lacked a radio and again the Germans overcame it rather painlessly by use of teamwork. 



Parsifal said:


> Err, by wars end, the Soviets were superior in quality to the majority of the German army. They had proven that they could defeat the germans in open battle.



Not so. By mid 44 the average German recruit, while certainly not recieving the amount of training as in the previous years, was still better trained and equipped than the average Soviet soldier. And it showed on the battlefield.

The Soviets succeeded on the open battlefields purely by virtue of superior numbers, and as can be seen from the records also suffered far higher losses than the Germans in nearly every engagement, even at the very end of the war during the struggle for Berlin where the Germans still achieved roughly a 3:1 kill ratio.


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## Juha (Jul 3, 2009)

Soren
Quote:” The Japanese successfully held on against the might of the US for over 4 years”
In 1946 Japan had surrendered and in ruins, I’d not call that successful resistance.

You still forget China, most of IJA was tied there.

Quote:” Furthermore the A6M3 had started shipments to the IJAF in July 41”

First of all IJNAF and where heck you got the date, A6M2 was the type used up to Guadalcanal at least.

Quote:” And the Japanese who did very well to begin with lost merely because of a few major blunders made within the imperial high command.”

Did very well, you mean they succeeded to push Mongolian cavalry and border guards back or what? And what major blunders? Nomonhan/Khalkin Gol was Kwantung Army's show, Imperial HQ has very little to do with it.
BTW Ki-46 was Dinah, unarmed LR recon plane, armed version appeared only 45. Do you mean Ki-45 Nick. now it had a cannon but it was big and vulnerable.

In the end, remember CHINA.

Juha


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## Soren (Jul 3, 2009)

My mistake it was June 42, so forget about the A6M3. Still atleast 500 A6M2 Type 21's were ready in July 41, and it was a far better a/c than any that the VVS possessed.

As for the Dinah, it could quite easily be armed with a 3.7cm AT gun or two of the like, which was well demonstrated later in the war when it was pretty fearsomely armed as a bomber destroyer. The Japanese wouldn't have waited long to introduce effective AT a/c as it would prove highly beneficial in a war against the Soviets, and it could simply be done by putting on large caliber guns on some of their existing designs. The Ki-51 could've in effect operated much the same was as the German Ju-87 Stuka, which proved a devastating weapon against Soviet armour. Also seeing that they were gonna fight the war litterally along side the Germans they'd no doubt be recieving a lot of designs from the Germans.


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## Juha (Jul 3, 2009)

Soren
seriously. Ki-51 bomb load was 200kg, yes two hundred kg, so its lifting capacity was entirely different class than that of Ju 87D/G, so if 87G could carry 2 37mm cannon that really doesn’t mean that Ki-51 could have done the same.

Ki-46 was rather un-manoeuvre a/c, and unprotected, so difficult to see how one could have made it a good ground attack a/c. Moreover, JAAF in real world developed a ground attack version of Ki-45 sometimes in1942/43, so it would have been the first choice. But its first service version, an escort fighter, began its operational life in mid-42, IIRC. Some realism in your scenarios, please.

Juha


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## parsifal (Jul 3, 2009)

In fact the numbers of Zeroes available to the Japanese in December 1941 was 198 a/c, including the units attached to the carriers. My sources indicate that there were about 35 Oscars in and experimental trials unit, and a further 6 or 12 (records are unclear to me) of Tojos, again in an experimental unit.

The Ki-27s in front line service amounted to about 250 of which at least half were fully engaged in China. There were fewer than 50 Claudes in front line service, the remainder were in second line or training units. Dinahs amounted to less than 60 aircraft.There were hordes of Sonias, and these were effective ground support machines, but they were not pinpoint weapons, and could not hope to knock out Soviet tanks or pillboxes. They were roughly equivalent to the HS 123 

There was little interservice co-operation and even less inter-Axis co-operation. The Japanese would never have asked, and the germans would never have provided, any help to the Japanese in the manner suggested.

Moreover whilst equipment was in short supply the over-riding determinant in Japanese air strength was the trained pilots they could call upon. There simply were not the depth of reserves to take on an opponent as prolific as the Russians. Even against the Allies, in the first half of 1942, they were pressed to win and maintain air supremacy. My best information is that in the period December 1941 to the end of April, the Japanese destroyed about 1200 allied aircraft, for the loss of about 250 of their own . Even if the Soviet loss rate is double that of the allies, and they lose 2400 aircraft to the Japanese 250,. I think the Russians would do far better than the allies actually, because they would be unlikley to be surprised (because the Soviet spy rings operating in Japan) and would be far more concentrated, and could rely on the generally attrocious operating conditions to take a heavy and steady toll. For comparison, in the first four months of Barbarossa, the germans had lost over 1200 aircraft to all causes against a Red Air Force only marginally larger than the Far Eastern air force.

I am not saying the Russians could not be beaten, but I also have strong doubts that it would a walkover either. I think in the space of a few short months the Japanese air forces would have been in deep trouble actually


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## Soren (Jul 3, 2009)

Juha said:


> seriously. Ki-51 bomb load was 200kg, yes two hundred kg, so its lifting capacity was entirely different class than that of Ju 87D/G, so if 87G could carry 2 37mm cannon that really doesn’t mean that Ki-51 could have done the same.



What would keep it from mounting two 3.7cm cannons Juha ? I don't see why it wouldn't be capable of it. I should also mention that it did prove itself in the ground attack role in China Burma. So I think you're underestimating this a/c quite a lot.

As for the 200 kg capacity, I'm sure it could bring along more, the A6M could afterall carry more than that. It was probably just the std. load out.

At any rate I'm sure that a/c such as the B5M D3A could've performed quite satisfactorily in this role, being able to perform almost as good as the Stuka in the ground attack role I believe. The B5M could certainly easily accommodate two 3.7cm cannons, no problem, and I am sure the D3A easily could as-well.



> Ki-46 was rather un-manoeuvre a/c, and unprotected, so difficult to see how one could have made it a good ground attack a/c.



Hold on a minute, where exactly do you have this from ? According to all I've read on Ki-46 it was a pretty good a/c with nice handling and a good load carrying capability. Now you're saying the exact opposite.

If you want realism Juha then how about you start basing your on arguments on it as-well.



> Moreover, JAAF in real world developed a ground attack version of Ki-45 sometimes in1942/43, so it would have been the first choice. But its first service version, an escort fighter, began its operational life in mid-42, IIRC.





> Some realism in your scenarios, please.



I can only suggest the same from you. I think my own arguments have been pretty well grounded so far.


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## Glider (Jul 3, 2009)

Soren said:


> The Japanese successfully held on against the might of the US for over 4 years and some people now claim they couldn't have held their own in a war against a desperate USSR being steamrolled in the west by th German army. This is getting ridiculous..


You are right it is getting ridiculous. There is a huge difference between fighting on Pacific Islands and Jungles where the tactic is dig in and sell your lives at as high a price as you can. To fighting on the wide open plains of Russia with nowhere to hide, dreadfull armour few anti tank guns and limited transport against a Russian Army that has amroured divisions.



> By summer 1941 the Japanese had ready 2,250,000 well trained troops and another 4,500,000 million reserves. The amphibious capabilities of the Japanese were not poor either, they successfully operated in the Pacific for over 4 years, landing masses of troops on various locations.


I suggest you look up the ability of the IJN to land fighting troops in any number, it was very small and no Tank Landing craft. Indeed the first TLC they had were copied from RN Landing craft used at Dieppe, _(there you go, some technology that was transferred in this case because the Germans let the Japanese look at the landing craft used._.

.


> Without checking I believe around 600 Zeros could be deployed for attacks on the eastern border of Russia, and it wouldn't take long before they along with the number of Ki-43 and Ki-27 would sweep the VVS from the skies. .


In December 1941 the Japanese only had about 400 Zeros operational and were still in the process of equipping their front line units.

.


> And as for the T-34 KV-1 tanks being a shock to the German army, initially yes they were, but only because such a thing was never expected from the Soviets. The KV-1 proved difficult to knock out in the beginning, but on the other hand its' battlefield effectiveness was poor as-well, featuring no radio, poor optics and an ill trained crew. .


Can I ask how effective you think Japanese tanks would be as they also had no radio, ill trained crews (in tank warfare), as well as no anti tank guns (as most were fitted with a low velocity 57mm), no armour worth talking about (about 17mm in most), narrow tracks, slow speed and were also few in number?


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## Soren (Jul 3, 2009)

Parsifal said:


> There was little interservice co-operation and even less inter-Axis co-operation. The Japanese would never have asked, and the germans would never have provided, any help to the Japanese in the manner suggested.



Oh I fully disagree. In a joint operation as suggested they would ofcourse co-operate, there's no question about it.


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## Glider (Jul 3, 2009)

Soren said:


> Oh I fully disagree. In a joint operation as suggested they would ofcourse co-operate, there's no question about it.



Putting it simply. The IJN and the IJAAF didn't co-operate with each other, plus the Japanese and Germans didn't co-operate with each other in any meaningfull way until it was too late.
Apart from your assumption can I ask if you have anything to support your view?


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## Soren (Jul 3, 2009)

Parsifal,

I just don't see how the USSR are gonna be capable of sacrificing any meaningful amount of their reserves to fight the Japanese in the East if the Germans were pushing forward with 25 to 30% more strength in the West than they originally did when occupied with the western allies.. esp. in terms of numbers of a/c.

If we conclude that the Japanese could muster up 400 Zeros for the operations in the East, then along with the numbers of Ki-27s Ki-43's available that would be enough to control the skies there. The VVS would be forced to dispatch allmost all they had at the Germans, and the little they had left, while it possibly was more than what the Japanese had, wouldn't have been able to cope. We also have to remember that a/c need pilots to fly them as-well, and the VVS were getting robbed of this pretty severely in 41. So they might have had a good deal of reserve a/c parking in the east, but they needed pilots to fly as well. 

So with the Japanese airforce in control of the skies the troops on the ground would have it a lot easier.

Also tanks such as the T-34 KV-1 would've only been made available in the west, they were desperately needed there. So tanks such as the T-26 T-28 were gonna be the armour available to the Soviet forces in the east, and these tanks were highly vulnerable to even the smallest of AT rifles. So the 57mm guns on the Japanese tanks would be sufficient against these.


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## Amsel (Jul 3, 2009)

Glider said:


> Putting it simply. The IJN and the IJAAF didn't co-operate with each other, plus the Japanese and Germans didn't co-operate with each other in any meaningfull way until it was too late.
> Apart from your assumption can I ask if you have anything to support your view?



Why wouldn't they cooperate if they are attacking the same nation at the same time? There would definantly be some sort of cooperation! Obviously it can't be documented because we are discussing alternate history.


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## Soren (Jul 3, 2009)

Glider said:


> Putting it simply. The IJN and the IJAAF didn't co-operate with each other, plus the Japanese and Germans didn't co-operate with each other in any meaningfull way until it was too late.
> Apart from your assumption can I ask if you have anything to support your view?



Ofcourse I have something to support it. Take the cooperation between the Germany and its close allies in Europe for one. The Germans supplied them with a/c as-well as tanks. Why ? Because they were operating along side the Germans!

The Japanese never came to operate together with the Germans in the war, and that is what kept the technology from flowing between them.

Had they agreed upon a joint invasion of the USSR you can be sure that they would've worked together a lot more closely and shared both technology equipment from the beginning.


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## Soren (Jul 3, 2009)

Amsel said:


> Why wouldn't they cooperate if they are attacking the same nation at the same time? There would definantly be some sort of cooperation! Obviously it can't be documented because we are discussing alternate history.



Strike one! Exactly Amsel.


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## JoeB (Jul 3, 2009)

parsifal said:


> Hi Joe
> 
> I am going to have to respectfully disagree with you on this one
> 
> ...


It's not so much disagreeing with me. There are sources discussing their actual plans. You are rejecting them based on an out of thin air analysis you did before learning of those actual plans, it seems.

The German campaign in Russia in 1941 gained fewer miles per day than the French one in 1812. Obviously armies do not inherently require motor vehicles to conduct long range offensives. That assertion or implication doesn't stand even a cursory reading of military history. And anyway comparison to offensives against the Soviet west are not on point because the Japanese Manchurian base of operations was so much closer to the planned objective, Maritime Province. And a second stage longer range offensive going west, if that point had been reached, would obviously have relied on *rail* logistics. Also, considering only the Japanese offensives in 1941-42, most of which were supplied by sea over long distances from Japan, with *shipping* the critical logistical element, is comparing apples and oranges. The Japanese conducted much larger continental land offensives, as large or larger than the proposed one v Soviets, in China, and over much greater distances than an offensive from eastern Manchuria into the Soviet Maritime Province. Read "The History of the Sino Japanese War" by Hsu and Chang, the KMT official history, but it's accurate in basic description of campaigns. Tactically the KMT and Soviets were different, but it shows your analysis of inherent Japanese inability to conduct large long range offensives on land to be clearly wrong. The Japanese could, and had already.

So, your logistical theory why the Japanese would be greatly outnumbered against the Soviets in FE is just wrong. It's especially obvious considering opening border battles of such a campaign, where the Japanese force would be operating right from its bases, ridiculous in that case to assert a 5:1 Soviet numbers advantage, the Japanese had those 20+ divisions in Manchuria, that wasn't a plan but a fact. Then the initial offensives objectives were not all that far away in logistical terms. So the logistically incapable, or vastly outnumbered because of logistics, argument can be firmly rejected based on the facts.

As to whether an IJA offensive would have succeeded in terms of tactical and operational *combat* factors, that can be reasonably debated. However the IJA proved itself clearly superior man for man, combat power for combat power, in combat in relatively closed terrain v second string Allied ground units in 41-42, IOW v countries putting their highest military priorities elsewhere. The IJA was generally outnumbered in those campaigns but scored consistently rapid successes. It was of course always heavily outnumbered in China. But it would have had at least numerical parity with the Soviets in a campaign launched from eastern Manchuria, especially considering the numbers for Soviet FE are for the whole large region, only some of those opposite eastern Manchuria. And if the Japanese had found a way to wait* until the 1942 campaign season, they'd have had a pretty big numerical advantage, and lower quality of Soviet forces remaining.

*the main reason this is all moot is the US/Brit/Dutch oil embargo of July '41, in response to Vichy agreement to Japanese demand for bases in southern Indochina. Once that happened the Japanese had to either make big concessions to the West to get the embargo lifted (it was made it clear that just reversing the bases agreement wasn't enough) or attack the West. If attacking the West they obviously couldn't prevail against the Soviets at the same time as even they realized, which is why they rejected the IJA's plan to attack the USSR. So any 'what if' of Soviet-Japanese war has to assume the Japanese prevent the oil embargo, and also that the West doesn't slap on the embargo *for* attacking Britain's ally of convenience, the Soviets. But just assuming Japan can buy Western oil, they could choose '41 or '42 to attack the Soviets. The latter is as realistic at what is as the former.

Joe


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## Juha (Jul 3, 2009)

Soren
Quote:” What would keep it from mounting two 3.7cm cannons Juha ?”

Simply weight, the 37mm BK 3,7 cannon alone weighted 295kg, add fittings, the gun gondola and ammo, even the limited amount it used, you have the weight over 3 times what the wing had designed to carry (2x 50kg bombs) plus the massive recoil.

Quote:” According to all I've read on Ki-46 it was a pretty good a/c with nice handling and a good load carrying capability”

For ex Green’s and Swanborough’s Mitsubishi Ki. 46 in Air International Nov 1980 p. 232 On Ki-46 “Lacking agility desirable in a fighter” also on its use as a fighter p. 233 “lacked the ability to absorb much battle damage.” To me it sounds that Ki-46 wasn’t very suitable to ground attack plane.

Ki-46 also suffered through its service life from weak undercarriage, so what are your sources?

Quote:” I think my own arguments have been pretty well grounded so far.”

Now I must say that I disagree on that.

Quote:” The VVS would be forced to dispatch allmost all they had at the Germans, and the little they had left”

Have you info what they had?

Quote:” T-28 were gonna be the armour available to the Soviet forces in the east, and these tanks were highly vulnerable to even the smallest of AT rifles.”

Now pre-war T-28 had 20-30mm armour, I would say that that was rather thick armour against the smallest of AT rifle. And already during very late 1939 Soviets began uparmour them, so from early 40 onwards their front armour was 80mm and side armour 40mm. So would you be so kind and post a photo on AT rifle that could easily penetrate 80mm armour?
Not that has much to do the situation in FE in 1941, IMHO there were no T-28s anymore in FE.

Juha


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## Juha (Jul 3, 2009)

Amsel and Soren
Quote:” Why wouldn't they cooperate if they are attacking the same nation at the same time? There would definantly be some sort of cooperation! Obviously it can't be documented because we are discussing alternate history.”

Quote:” Ofcourse I have something to support it. Take the cooperation between the Germany and its close allies in Europe for one. The Germans supplied them with a/c as-well as tanks. Why ? Because they were operating along side the Germans!”

Now of course the might have been so co-operation but not much. A look on a world map shows why. And how Germans treated their smaller Allies wasn’t so generous, they usually gave them some second-rate equipments and then complained that for ex Romanians didn’t stand Soviet attacks. Only from late 43 onwards Germans became generous and then it was too late, some of the equipment were used only against Germans, they arrived so late.

Juha


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## Soren (Jul 3, 2009)

Juha,

Are you seriously suggesting that because an a/c didn't function well as a fighter then it couldn't be used as a ground attack a/c ? Now you're just not making any sense at all! Was the Ju-87 a great fighter ? Did it sport better performance? You're grasping for straws at this point!

As for a source on the Dinah, I'll have to check the book you mention at the library tomorrow if they have it, but as for my own sources are the US evaluations during the war and the general Japanese opinion good enough for you? According to these the Ki-46 sported great handling for an a/c its size and weight, good performance and a good load carrying capability. So the Ki-46 could've very likely have performed the ground attack duty in a similar fashion as for example the Hs-129. The a/c was more than fast enough, so it could easily be armoured for the role without becoming too slow cumbersome. 

Next is the Ki-51. I believe it could easily take 500 kg on each wing if need be, no problem, so the 295 kg BK 3.7 could be mounted easily I believe. Also the recoil wasn't that bad as a hydraulic recoil damper was used. But even if this wasn't gonna work out then just a pair of 20mm auto cannons was more than enough against anything the Soviets could deploy. And a weapon similar to the German 3cm Mk103 could surely be mounted if need be as-well, this gun only weighed ~140 kg.

And as for the T-26 tank, it featured a mere 6 to 10mm of armour, with AP ammunition German MG's could shoot through that at 500m! The T-28 was admittedly a different target all together, but I doubt it was available. I was thinking about the T-27 before, which was just as weakly armoured as the T-26.


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## Juha (Jul 3, 2009)

Soren
IMHO a good ground attack a/c needes some manoeuvrability and ability to absorbe battle damage, not surprised that you have other ideas.

from where you have read the US evalution on Ki-46, source please? I have TAIC info but it is all on specs nothing on handling. And the weak undescarriage is also mentioned in Frankillion's Japanese a/c of the Pacific War

You can believe what you want but the fact is that its max load for Ki-51 normally was 4x50kg bombs. As Kamikaze plane it could take 250kg load. That's the fact, I'm really not interested someone's claims unsupported by facts. Have you some fancy idea why Japanese didn't put those 2 500kg bombs on their Kamikaze Ki-51s?

I'm bit puzzled all those imaginary equipment you are adding to Japanese armoury. Try to keep in the equipment that were available in that time. Nobody is giving to Soviet Union side T-34/85s or Kalashnikovs.

Yes T-26 and amphibious T-37 and T-38 were very weakly armoured as were BT series tanks which had been the main tanks of Soviets during Nomonhan fighting.

Juha


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## Soren (Jul 3, 2009)

Juha said:


> Soren
> IMHO a good ground attack a/c needes some manoeuvrability and ability to absorbe battle damage, not surprised that you have other ideas.



Right back to the old insult you go, very typical of you when you're in a tight spot. But I'm not surprised you don't like anything axis either, also very typical of you.

But I take it that the Ju-87 Hs-129 were both very maneuverable a/c in your opinion and would've been rated so when compared to actual fighter a/c? I must say that's new to me!

I'm also very interested in knowing how you concluded that either one was more maneuverabe than the Ki-46.

And you claim I need to be realistic? I believe you need to strive at this yourself more than me.



> from where you have read the US evalution on Ki-46, source please? I have TAIC info but it is all on specs nothing on handling. And the weak undescarriage is also mentioned in Frankillion's Japanese a/c of the Pacific War



A weak undercarriage, something common with a/c that size. Still it doesn't seem like the Ki-46 had a high accident rate.



> You can believe what you want but the fact is that its max load for Ki-51 normally was 4x50kg bombs.



Max bomb load ? Fact ? Prove it!



> I'm bit puzzled all those imaginary equipment you are adding to Japanese armoury. Try to keep in the equipment that were available in that time. Nobody is giving to Soviet Union side T-34/85s or Kalashnikovs.



What imaginary equipment ? You don't believe that the Japanese had 20mm 30mm auto cannons or could develop the BK 3.7 under license ?? You believe that the Japanese were so far behind technologically that they couldn't develop high velocity 20mm 30mm cannons at a low weight fit for being mounted on a/c ?

I must say you don't think to highly about the Japanese.


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## proton45 (Jul 3, 2009)

I'm not sure if I'm really part of this discussion (as I'm just throwing in a word or two, here and their_lol), but IMO their is a fair case to be made regarding the issue of weak supply capability for the IJA...however I also feel that with the German situation Russian supply support would be equally strained.

The issue of air superiority is not so clear...IJA did take a great loss in Nomonhan, however this was due, inlarge, to the fact that the Russians where allowed to replace and re-enforce their airfields. After the initial bombing raids on the Russian airfields the IJA airforce was told to stop...if they had maintained pressure on the airfields (bombing sorties) they may have been able to maintain air superiority. 

In Nomonhan the most common light bomber (with dive capability) was the Ki-30. The most likely candidate for a ground attack airplane (by 1941) would be the Ki-45 KAIb (maybe the Ki-45KAIc)... Not as robust as the IL2 (by far), but with proper tactics and aircover they may have been quite effective against ground targets...(we will never truly know...lol)


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## Juha (Jul 3, 2009)

Soren
look for ex fromRené Francillion's book (the standard work on japanese WWII a/c) for armament of Ki-51. There it is stated. 
I happened to be fond with Sonia so I have changed e-mails with specialists of Japanese a/c. So i know that the Kamikaze version was modified to carry 1x250kg bomb under fuselage and that Ki-51s of 6 FB carried one 100kg bomb under each wing during shipping strikes during the liberation of Philippines in 1944. So its much better to read a good book on subject than waste one's and others' time in empty speculation, IMHO Japanese were clever enough to arm Ki-51s with 2x500kg bombs for shipping strikes if they had thought that possible.

I really don't believe that all rather small twins had weak undercarriage through their service life.

Did Japanese built BK 3.7 under license or not? The answer reveals is the scenario imaginary or not, simple than that. Try to accept that Axis lost the war or at least keep your dreams yourself. We can argue on the subject of this tread without fictional weapon systems.

Juha


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## Juha (Jul 3, 2009)

Hello Proton
IIRC Ki-45 began its active service mid 42 after long and torturous development period.
On Nomonhan, IIRC the then newest (some 10 years ago) Russian research had came to conclusion that a/c losses were rather same on both sides but the Soviet losses were 10-25 a/c higher, I cannot remember exact figures, maybe some 250 a/c per side.

Juha


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## Glider (Jul 3, 2009)

Amsel said:


> Why wouldn't they cooperate if they are attacking the same nation at the same time? There would definantly be some sort of cooperation! Obviously it can't be documented because we are discussing alternate history.



As mentioned in an earlier posting, both Japan and Germany were facing a common enemy, the USA and the UK, both started out well but the tide turned and both were losing but at no time did they co operate, not to any practical level. The level of co operation between the Navy and the Army was also minimal, even to the point that the Japanese army built their own submarines to supply some of the islands as the navy didn't consider them a Navy responsibility

So the question is, Why would this change?

I totally agree that its the obvious thing to do, the logical thing to do and could write pages on the areas for co-operation big and small, but it didn't happen in real life when defeat was looming and to say it would happen because its a good idea, doesn't do it.



> Soren
> Of course I have something to support it. Take the cooperation between the Germany and its close allies in Europe for one. The Germans supplied them with a/c as-well as tanks. Why ? Because they were operating along side the Germans!


No they supplied them because they didn't have first line aircraft of their own. To fit this scenario they have to give these countries the ability to build 109's, 190's and so on. As far as I know they nearest they came was giving the Italians the DB601 and DB605 which is matched by giving the Japanese the DB601.



> The Japanese never came to operate together with the Germans in the war, and that is what kept the technology from flowing between them.
> 
> Had they agreed upon a joint invasion of the USSR you can be sure that they would've worked together a lot more closely and shared both technology equipment from the beginning.


I covered this in my previous reply suffice to say I am not sure of the co operation, more than planning and objectives.


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## Soren (Jul 3, 2009)

Glider,

You seem to forget that the Bf-109 for one was produced in both Romania Hungary, very late in the case of Romania.


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## Glider (Jul 3, 2009)

Soren said:


> Glider,
> 
> You seem to forget that the Bf-109 for one was produced in both Romania Hungary, very late in the case of Romania.



It wasn't a case of forgetting, it was a case of not knowing, hell we all learn. Any idea as to how many they produced.


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## Soren (Jul 3, 2009)

Juha said:


> Soren
> look for ex fromRené Francillion's book (the standard work on japanese WWII a/c) for armament of Ki-51. There it is stated.[/qoute]
> 
> Does it state maximum load ?
> ...


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## Soren (Jul 3, 2009)

Glider said:


> It wasn't a case of forgetting, it was a case of not knowing, hell we all learn. Any idea as to how many they produced.



Hungary produced around 600 Bf-109G's. As for Romania, I'll have to look that up.


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## Glider (Jul 3, 2009)

Many thanks for the build numbers.

The following is a good link for the Ki46 and supports what I have in other books.
The Mitsubishi Ki-46 "Dinah"


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## Njaco (Jul 3, 2009)

> Some realism in your scenarios, please.





> If you want realism Juha then how about you start basing your on arguments on it as-well.





> Right back to the old insult you go, very typical of you when you're in a tight spot. But I'm not surprised you don't like anything axis either, also very typical of you.





> Try to accept that Axis lost the war or at least keep your dreams yourself.



Can everybody stop with the sly insults?! Just state your point and move on.

Once again I see a thread being locked.


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## imalko (Jul 3, 2009)

renrich said:


> What would have happened if, instead of attacking the US at Pearl Harbor, Japan had only attacked the British in China and Burma and the Dutch in the East Indies and had mounted an attack against the Soviet Union in the Spring of 1942?



I think this discussion shifted completely off topic. If we stick to the Renrich's original premise then all 'what if' theories about cooperation, sharing technology and licence production between Japan and Third Reich don't stand. Basic premise is that after their failure at the gates of Moscow in December 1941 Germans somehow managed to persuade their Japanese Axis Allies to help their 1942 summer offensive by attacking USSR in the Far East. So up to that point we need to stick to the true time line. And in this time line there wasn't any large scale sharing of technology between two countries and since they would had only about six months to prepare this 'coordinated' operation both Axis powers would be forced to use resources they had at their disposal at that time. There wouldn't be enough time for establishing licence production of German technology in Japan, etc, etc. In my opinion, when you consider how things unfolded for Germany in Caucasus and at Stalingrad in 1942, even with Japanese involvement Axis would be defeated anyway. More so, because according to basic premise Japan hadn't attacked USA but did attacked the British in China and Burma and the Dutch in the East Indies...

For the record, Axis powers were never allied in the same manner or not even close as Allies. Hitler haven't consulted with Japanese nor he asked their opinion when he concluded non aggression pact with Stalin, neither Japanese shared with Hitler their planes on waging war against USA. Hitler didn't included Japan in his war plans against USSR because he believed that Germany can defeat Soviet Union on her own. Therefore its unrealistic to speculate that Germany and Japan would have made coordinated plans for attack on USSR in 1941.


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## Colin1 (Jul 3, 2009)

imalko said:


> ...Basic premise is that after their failure at the gates of Moscow in December 1941Germans somehow...


That's quite an assumption
one I don't recall Renrich citing; the premise here is the cause and effect of no US in the war, the cause being no attack on Pearl Harbour, the effect likely being Germany now able to focus her full military attention on the Eastern Front. What clear-cut reasoning leads you to believe that Germany would 'fail at the gates of Moscow'?


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## imalko (Jul 3, 2009)

Colin1 said:


> That's quite an assumption
> one I don't recall Renrich citing; the premise here is the cause and effect of no US in the war, the cause being no attack on Pearl Harbour, the effect likely being Germany now able to focus her full military attention on the Eastern Front. What clear-cut reasoning leads you to believe that Germany would 'fail at the gates of Moscow'?



Because they did fail in true time line... Soviet counteroffensive started on 5 December and Perl Harbor occurred on 7th December. In the event Perl Harbor had no effect on German defeat at Moscow what so ever. They were defeated with Perl Harbor same as they would have been without it. Germany felt the effect of US entering the war only later during 1942 but not instantly in December 1941. 

As I understood Renrich's premise - Japan doesn't attack US in December 1941 but USSR in spring 1942. Up to that point everything else on Eastern front unfolds same as in true time line. Germany did "focused her full military attention on the Eastern Front" in true time line in 1941 and still failed. There is no reason to assume otherwise for this what if scenario.


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## m kenny (Jul 3, 2009)

Soren said:


> The T-34 KV-1 both featurd piss poor optics, ill trained crews, no radios etc etc................
> The KV-1 proved difficult to knock out in the beginning, but on the other hand its' battlefield effectiveness was poor as-well, featuring no radio, poor optics and an ill trained crew



You keep saying this but never give references confirming anything.
Perhaps this would help, they are all German accounts:

Jentz, Panzertruppen 1

 page 205:

_ 
The Russian tanks usually formed in a half circle, open
fire with their 7.62 cm guns on our Panzers already at a range
of *1000 meters*  and deliver enormous penetration energy with
 *high accuracy.* 
Our 5 cm Kw.K. tank guns can achieve penetrations only
on vulnerable locations under very special favorable condi-
tions at very close ranges * under 50 meters.*  Our Panzers are
already knocked out at a range of  *several hundred meters.* 
Many times our Panzers were split open or the complete
commander's cupola of the Pz.Kpfw.lll and IV flew off from
one frontal hit. This is proof that the armor is insufficient, the
mounting for the commander's cupola on our Panzers is de-
ficient, * and the accuracy and penetration ability of the Rus-
sian 7.62 cm tank guns are high.* _

page 206 
_The Panzer crews know they can already be knocked out * at long range*  by enemy (Soviet) tanks_

page 231
_In correctly recognising his technical superiority in weapons the T34 already opens fire on German Panzers at ranges * from 1200 to 1800 meters*_ 

page 233

_Russian tank forces are good.  The level of training also good_
page 233
_The rumors that Russian armor quality has become poorer are emphaticaly denied._
page 243
_firing at  long range they cause considerable losses to the German Panzers_ 


_The  fantastic combat moral of the Russian tank crews has led to having to destroy stationary tanks that have already been hit five or six times.........the Russian crews remained fighting in their tanks so long as their weapons still could be fired_


http://www.rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/weapons/sign_tanks.htm


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## Juha (Jul 3, 2009)

Soren 
Fact is that Ki-51s carried max a 100kg bomb under each wing. Of course you can believe what you want. Even that somehow Japanese could produce BK 3.7 armed A/T a/c clearly before Germans themselves, first 87Gs went to action in early 43 and that was still an experiment, the unit was Erpo Weiss or something like that IIRC. And a bit over 300kg is more than half of 500kg, at least here in Finland.
IMHO the idea of this tread was to argue what might happen if Japanese would have attacked SU instead of going against western powers. So with equipment they had at that time, one didn’t snap his fingers and buff, some exotic weapon system appears. Putting licence production in motion took some time we know that from the limited technical transfer there was from Ger to Japan. 

Juha


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## parsifal (Jul 3, 2009)

imalko said:


> I think this discussion shifted completely off topic. If we stick to the Renrich's original premise then all 'what if' theories about cooperation, sharing technology and licence production between Japan and Third Reich don't stand. Basic premise is that after their failure at the gates of Moscow in December 1941 Germans somehow managed to persuade their Japanese Axis Allies to help their 1942 summer offensive by attacking USSR in the Far East. So up to that point we need to stick to the true time line. And in this time line there wasn't any large scale sharing of technology between two countries and since they would had only about six months to prepare this 'coordinated' operation both Axis powers would be forced to use resources they had at their disposal at that time. There wouldn't be enough time for establishing licence production of German technology in Japan, etc, etc. In my opinion, when you consider how things unfolded for Germany in Caucasus and at Stalingrad in 1942, even with Japanese involvement Axis would be defeated anyway. More so, because according to basic premise Japan hadn't attacked USA but did attacked the British in China and Burma and the Dutch in the East Indies...
> 
> For the record, Axis powers were never allied in the same manner or not even close as Allies. Hitler haven't consulted with Japanese nor he asked their opinion when he concluded non aggression pact with Stalin, neither Japanese shared with Hitler their planes on waging war against USA. Hitler didn't included Japan in his war plans against USSR because he believed that Germany can defeat Soviet Union on her own. Therefore its unrealistic to speculate that Germany and Japan would have made coordinated plans for attack on USSR in 1941.




Your right we have shifted off topic. But I did say in one of my posts that removing the US (or any part of the elements of allied victory) from the equation is bound to have an effect. 

I then went on to assess the likleihood of the US from not getting ibvolved in the war, and its basically zero if the Japanese continued to act agressively in China. It was Japanese aggression in China that was drawing the US into the war, so it makes no sense to try and speculate that somehow the US would all of a sudden not care about what happened in China.

Similalry, attacking just the British (and presumably the Dutch) is a situation that would not be tolerated by the US, for just one reaqson....access to oil. Give the Japanese oil in 1941, and all of a sudden, viewed in 1941 eyes, you have an enemy that goes from being controllable, to an enemy that is not. Allowing Jaoan access to the South east asian oil would allow the Japanese to attack and prepre for war on a far grander scale than they were capable of under other circumstances.

So it is a scenario that was never going to happen. So lets assume for a minute that the Americans dont get involved directly, by some process that is simply not able to be foreseen, they are at least going to pour resources in the form of lend lease to support the allies, and that means a vastly increased allied level of equipment, including the Russians.

As has been indicated by Joe, the Japanese did have a plan to attack the Soviets (with about as much likelihood of happening as the US Orange war plan of fighting Britain were going to happen I might say however) but this required no attack into the southern regions. If the Japanese elect to attack both south AND North, AND west (into China) I see nothing good for the Japanese. The high costs of attacking Russia in Siberia in the dead of winteracross some of the most heavily fortified and trackless inhospitable terrain one could think of should be plain to see. Switching from the defence to the attack in China costs logistic and air support. The carriers from the Pearl operation are of course freed for operations, but nearly all of their first line fighters will be needed to bolster the attacks into Russia and China. There will be less ground troops, pitted against an allied player with relatively more troops (and better trained), with more planes, and a better logistic support. 

It is wide open to debate, but I believe the Japanese would collapse in a very short space of time. I give them less than six months


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## Amsel (Jul 3, 2009)

parsifal said:


> It is wide open to debate, but I believe the Japanese would collapse in a very short space of time. I give them less than six months



Less then six months to collapse? You are underestimating the Japanese quite a bit. I believe Japan could have captured the entire Eastern maritime province, and the Soviets would not have been able to do anything about it until Germany was defeated at Berlin.


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## parsifal (Jul 3, 2009)

Amsel said:


> Less then six months to collapse? You are underestimating the Japanese quite a bit. I believe Japan could have captured the entire Eastern maritime province, and the Soviets would not have been able to do anything about it until Germany was defeated at Berlin.



Okay...how are they going to achieve that? Have a glance at the map first before you say that. Also, remember that Vladivostock itself is a fortress no less formidable than Sevastopol, protected by Mountains and fortifications at the frontier that rival the maginot line. The Japanese army is outnumbered, outgunned and attacking in the teeth of the winter. 

The eastern seaboard that you are referring to contains what??? Sakhalin, the port of Sovietskaya Gavan, a couple of fishing ports, and massive, trackless mountains behind that. They attack the eastern seaboard, take Sakhalin.....then what????

I believe that Vladivostock was essentially an impregnable fortress. It was immune to amphibious assault because of the defences, because of the beach types, and because of the currents . It was as least as impregnable as Sevastopol, and Truk, its only "weakness", if you could call it a weakness, was by landward assault.

Attacking Vladivostock has a near comparison in my opinion, the German assault onto Murmansk. The terrain is similalry devoid of communications, with the added complications of increased distance heavy vegetation and massive fortifications. The temperatures at Vladivostock are as extreme as they are in Murmansk (because of the effects off the gulf stream has on europe), and the distance to the objective many times that faced by the Germans in their assault on Murmansk. Yet you guys smooth over all of these issues, and glibly announce thaqt the Japanese can defeat the Russian in the blink of an eye. Dont forget, at the same time the Russians would be attacking along a front line which in its entirety stretches the same distance as the distance from Moscow to London, whilst the Japanese attempt to defend with about 14 divs (give or take) . Using the old silk road route through Kazakhstan (the route they used to supply their version of the flying tigers fighting the Japanese in China before 1941) would be used to pour men and material into the CCCP formations fighting in northern China. 

People are surprised to learn that for the first six months after their entry, the US was a net liability to the allied cause. Despite the heroic and effective war being waged in the Pacific, this does not compensate for the netlosses being suffered in the Atlantic, nor does it compensate for the considerable aid being provided under the reverse lend lease arrangements that were occurring allover the world. The US was a sleeping giant, that once awaoken would seal the doom of the axis powers. However it would take some time to achieve that, time to teach the Americans how to fight, time for the Americans to leearn some very bitter realities. If those experiences are removed from the equation, the allies in the short term are better off. What I will concede is that a delayed entry of the US into the war is going to have a negative effect at the end of the war....towards the middle and late 1944m, because it will take the US that much longer to gear up for war, and Germany may have enough time to get her wonder weapons in place.......


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## Amsel (Jul 4, 2009)

You could be right, Parsifal. Thats the beauty of a forum; we can discuss all possibilities. 

BTW, I am not surprised to know the weak condition of the US military at the onset of the war. It is common knowledge I thought.


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## parsifal (Jul 4, 2009)

apologies for being quite so dognmatic, but this scenario is one of those "axis wet dreams" that just dont stack up when you look at the details.

no malice was intended in my replies.....


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## Juha (Jul 4, 2009)

IMHO we should have some concrete info on Japanese and Soviet forces available for FE operations in spring 42. Otherwise we simply speculate without connection to reality. I might be able to find some info on VVS units in Mongolia at the time. And I know that from summer 41 to spring 42 at least some LaGG-3s were sent to FE in spite of the situation in west. The fact that much of a/c production of SU was transferred to Urals and beyond during summer-autumn 41 in fact made it easier to rush modern a/c to FE if needed.

Juha


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## Glider (Jul 4, 2009)

Everyone
It appears that I have unintentionally mislead everyone on the ability of the Japanese to land troops and their type 89 tanks. My mistake was to look at the IJN when these were developed for the Japanese Army.

The landing craft was called the LB-D type or the Diahatsu and could carry up to 17 tons.

Apologies all round


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## Soren (Jul 4, 2009)

Juha said:


> Soren
> Fact is that Ki-51s carried max a 100kg bomb under each wing. Of course you can believe what you want. Even that somehow Japanese could produce BK 3.7 armed A/T a/c clearly before Germans themselves, first 87Gs went to action in early 43 and that was still an experiment, the unit was Erpo Weiss or something like that IIRC. And a bit over 300kg is more than half of 500kg, at least here in Finland.
> IMHO the idea of this tread was to argue what might happen if Japanese would have attacked SU instead of going against western powers. So with equipment they had at that time, one didn’t snap his fingers and buff, some exotic weapon system appears. Putting licence production in motion took some time we know that from the limited technical transfer there was from Ger to Japan.
> 
> Juha



You keep ignoring the important facts Juha, one of them being that only a 20mm cannon was needed, and the Japanese already had that in the Ho-03. Integrate a pair of those into the wings of the Ki-51 and you got yourself a tankbuster fit against anything the Soviets could field in the east.

Also the BK 3.7 system weighed 295 kg according to my sources, which is under 300 kg Juha.

Furthermore the Japanese did have other a/c available to perform the ground attack role, a/c such as the Ki-46, D3A and B5M.


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## parsifal (Jul 4, 2009)

Attached to this post are some extracts from Dr Niehorsters OB site. It gives some idea of the force availability of the various Soviet Frontier commands

Here is also a link of tank strengths for every Soviet formation as of June 1941. I count about 1600 tanks for the Far Eastern Front alone

Soviet Tank Strengths, 22 June 1941


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## Juha (Jul 4, 2009)

Soren
I don't ignore facts, you brought along your fictional tank killing Ki-51. 
Yes, BK 3.7 itself weighted 295kg,I gave that info already in my earlier message, but our engineer seems to forget that a cannon neded also some fittings to get fixed into a/c and without ammo it was useless as A/T weapon, and ammo weights also.
And BTW B5M was the Mitsubishi candidate to IJNAF torpedo bomber in competition which was won by B5N Kate and only a limited numbers of it was produced. t was not a standard production a/c.
Ki-46 ground attack version, of which only few were produced, flew first time in late 44.

Juha


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## Soren (Jul 4, 2009)

You don't ignore facts ? Oh really, then how come you again just happened to slip past the fact that only a pair of 20mm cannons were needed? You seem stuck on the BK 3.7 for some reason.

Put two Ho-3's on the Ki-51 and voila! You got yourself a capable T-26 killer! 

Also remember a/c are adapted to what'ever task needs to be performed, and it wouldn't take long to put some guns on the Ki-46 if the need for it was there, which it would be in the case of a landbased invasion of the USSR. Tank busters would be needed big time, and the Japanese weren't stupid so they would've quickly addressed that issue, and that's BEFORE the invasion. Planning would take some months, in which time the equipment on hand could be adapted to the task needed to be accomplished.

Also you forgot the address the rest of my post.


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## Juha (Jul 4, 2009)

Hello Parsifal
Thanks for posting the info. I also visited Niederhorst site but didn't find info from spring 42, which is a pity. But the site showed, or at least I didn't note any LaGG-3s in FE on 22 June 41, that even with critical situation in Western SU during oper Barbarossa Soviets sent LaGG-3s to FE because in Spring 42 there were LaGGs in service in FE. So SU was still suspious on the intentions of Japanese.

Juha


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## parsifal (Jul 4, 2009)

Now for the Japanese, I will have to post the army assets as two posts, and the air force as a separate additional post.

In terms of Divisions, the Japanese had 14 available, plus two armoured brigades. There were about 250 tanks attached to the two brigades

Note that in the Japanese Army there were no Coprs commands, and that an "Army" was equivalent to a reinforced Corps in Western terms.


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## Juha (Jul 4, 2009)

Soren
I really don't care what you think, I only sometimes correct your factual errors. 
Last time, the whole BK 3.7 sideshow orginated from You and shows your limited knowledge on Japanese a/c. As did your Ki-41, B5M etc

Juha


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## parsifal (Jul 4, 2009)

Now for the second part of the Kwangtung Army (the army in Manchuria), this final part being the structure of their 20th Army


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## Juha (Jul 4, 2009)

On Russian troops
Soviet troops from FE who fought against Finns were rather good in forest fighting, probably better than Germans. Finns had rather dim view on Germans forest fighting skills prewar and in 1941. But they had learned a lot by 1944, partly from Finns.
So even if Japanese did well against Commonwealt troops in SE Asia it doesn't mean that they would have done well against Soviets in FE.

Juha


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## parsifal (Jul 4, 2009)

Now for the air units....please note that the Japanese OBs (air and ground) are as at 8-12-41. The Soviet OBs were as at 22-6-41. There were no major transfers of the Far Eastern Soviet forces until December, and for the air units, most of the forming uits were equipped with modern types


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## Soren (Jul 4, 2009)

parsifal said:


> Attached to this post are some extracts from Dr Niehorsters OB site. It gives some idea of the force availability of the various Soviet Frontier commands
> 
> Here is also a link of tank strengths for every Soviet formation as of June 1941. I count about 1600 tanks for the Far Eastern Front alone
> 
> Soviet Tank Strengths, 22 June 1941




Parsifal, good info but, how much do you believe will stay there when the Germans start sweeping aside all resistance in the west ? 90% of the tanks available in the east will likely get dispatched directly to the western front within the first few weeks.

And then two weeks or so into the German invasion the Japanese would launch their own from the east. This would send the Soviet high command into panic, cause what forces do you divert to where, esp. when you aint got enough.

It aint gonna be a cake run for the Japanese in the east, but it they would progress slowly and securely, which was even more than needed. The Japanese would effectively be tying up so much Soviet manpower that the life would've been made a lot easier for the Germans in the west, which is the key role they had to play. And once Stalingrad, Moscow the Caucasus region was secured, the USSR would've been lost. 

The whole process I can't see lasting more than 6 months. And after the this the situation would look very grim for the western allies, very very grim.


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## Soren (Jul 4, 2009)

Juha said:


> Soren
> I really don't care what you think, I only sometimes correct your factual errors.
> Last time, the whole BK 3.7 sideshow orginated from You and shows your limited knowledge on Japanese a/c. As did your Ki-41, B5M etc
> 
> Juha



Grow up will you plz?

Factual errors  Don't throw rocks when you live in a glass house Juha.


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## plan_D (Jul 4, 2009)

A war between the Soviet Union and Japan during their "prior engagements" would most likely result in the defeat of the Soviet Union by German hands. Some people have stated in the past that the Russian victory at Khalin-Gol led to their ultimate victory because it allowed a large diversion of forces from the Manchurian sector. 

The Soviet Union, while in conflict with Germany, would not have had the fighting machines, men or logistics to defeat Japan in the Manchurian sector in under six months. However, Japan while fighting in the CBI (the main Army sector) would not have been able to divert significant forces to a Russian front that would achieve any resemblance of a breakthrough. The Japanese nuisance would force Russian attention though which would in turn ease pressure on the German assault; especially the push toward Moscow - which did have units rushed from Manchuria defending it. 

The naval power of both nations would be irrelevant in the conflict, as Japan had a major foothold on the mainland already plus the Soviet Union had a pityful naval force in comparison.


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## parsifal (Jul 4, 2009)

Soren said:


> Parsifal, good info but, how much do you believe will stay there when the Germans start sweeping aside all resistance in the west ? 90% of the tanks available in the east will likely get dispatched directly to the western front within the first few weeks.
> 
> And then two weeks or so into the German invasion the Japanese would launch their own from the east. This would send the Soviet high command into panic, cause what forces do you divert to where, esp. when you aint got enough.
> 
> ...


'
In fact none were transferred, until the middle of December. In fact, throughout the Summer, all of the tank units attached to the interior commands appear to have been strengthened somewhat.

Moreover the Soviets maintained a force structure in the Far East and TransBaikal of about 1 million men, even during the darkest days of 1941. They werent there to improve their suntans, they were there because the Soviets were unsure of the Japanese intentions. Once those intentions had become known, courtesy of Richard Sorge and his Spy rings, they then moved only the most experienced troops and about half the aircraft to the west, where they soundly defeated the germans in front of Moscow. This suggest a very high standard of training to me, both in the air and on the ground. The forces shipped out of the Far East were immedialtely replaced, but with only half trained conscripts.

You say that the Japanese will make steady progress, but I just cannot see this occurring. They are outnumbered something like 8:1 in tanks, about 10:1 in the air, and about 2:1 in ground formations. The Soviets appear to outnumber their artillery by about 4:1, moreover I think we can assume the Soviet artillery is heavier than that fielded by the Japanese. The terrain is terrible, and the approach routes they must follow heavily fortified. 

How do you propose to overcome each of these deficiencies and problems??????


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## Lucky13 (Jul 4, 2009)

This is what was avaible in December onboard IJN carrier and the aircraft taking part in the attack on Pearl Harbor. All together these carriers carried 407 aircraft, 108 fighters and 299 divebomber/torpedbombers. Question is, if the Japanese would have attacked Vladivostock instead for Pearl Harbor, I'm sure that they knew that the USSR wasn't up to the standard of the US armed forces. swapping Pearl Harbor for Vladivostock, I think that they would have done more damaged to the Russians then they did to USN on Ford Island etc...
What would the Russians be able to throw against this? With about 60-100 or so KM between Japan and Vladivostok, maybe troop ships wouldn't be that far behind...

Akagi, 18 Zeros, 18 Vals, 27 Kates (Dec. 1941)
Kaga, 18 Zeros, 37 Vals, 37 Kates (Dec. 1941)
Sōryū, 18 Zeros, 18 Vals, 18 Kates (Dec. 1941)
Hiryū, 18 Zeros, 18 Vals, 18 Kates (Dec. 1941)
Shōkaku, 18 Zeros, 27 Vals, 27 Kates (Dec. 1941)
Zuikaku, 18 Zeros, 27 Vals, 27 Kates (Dec. 1941)

Swapping torpedoes for bombs....


*Pearl Harbor Attack,*

The first attack wave of 183 planes was launched north of Oahu, commanded by Captain Mitsuo Fuchida. Six planes failed to launch due to technical difficulties. It included:

*1st Group *
-(targets: battleships and aircraft carriers) 
50 Nakajima B5N bombers armed with 800 kg (1760 lb) armor piercing bombs, organized in four sections 
40 B5N bombers armed with Type 91 torpedoes, also in four sections

*2nd Group *
-(targets: Ford Island and Wheeler Field) 
54 Aichi D3A dive bombers armed with 550 lb (249 kg) general purpose bombs.

*3rd Group *-(targets: aircraft at Ford Island, Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Barber’s Point, Kaneohe) 
45 Mitsubishi A6M fighters for air control and strafing.

*Second wave composition*
The second wave consisted of 171 planes: 54 B5Ns, 81 D3As, and 36 A6Ms, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Shigekazu Shimazaki. Four planes failed to launch because of technical difficulties. This wave and its targets comprised.

*1st Group*
— 54 B5Ns armed with 550 lb (249 kg) and 132 lb (60 kg) general purpose bombs 
27 B5Ns — aircraft and hangars on Kaneohe, Ford Island, and Barbers Point 
27 B5N — hangars and aircraft on Hickam Field.

*2nd Group*
-(targets: aircraft carriers and cruisers) 
81 D3As armed with 550 lb (249 kg) general purpose bombs, in four sections.

*3rd Group*-(targets: aircraft at Ford Island, Hickham Field, Wheeler Field, Barber’s Point, Kaneohe) 
36 A6Ms for defense and strafing


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## Soren (Jul 4, 2009)

parsifal said:


> '
> In fact none were transferred, until the middle of December. In fact, throughout the Summer, all of the tank units attached to the interior commands appear to have been strengthened somewhat.
> 
> Moreover the Soviets maintained a force structure in the Far East and TransBaikal of about 1 million men, even during the darkest days of 1941. They werent there to improve their suntans, they were there because the Soviets were unsure of the Japanese intentions.



All true and well understood, but think of the relief put on the German army in the case that all of these troops were forced to stay in the east to fight the Japanese. It would prove an enormous relief for the German forces in the east. Also keep in mind that the Germans would actually have around 20% more manpower available than originally because of the absence of a US involvement, and this alone was enough to secure the Stalingrad, Moscow the Caucasus. 

Furthermore how were the Soviets ever gonna cope without the huge amount of lend lease equipment they originally recieved??



> Once those intentions had become known, courtesy of Richard Sorge and his Spy rings, they then moved only the most experienced troops and about half the aircraft to the west, where they soundly defeated the germans in front of Moscow. *This suggest a very high standard of training to me*, both in the air and on the ground. The forces shipped out of the Far East were immedialtely replaced, but with only half trained conscripts.



No I don't think it suggests that, I think what it shows is what happens when good tactics oppose stupid tactics. Hitler allowed his army to get outflanked by the Soviets, insisting on fighting inside Stalingrad and ordering no retreat to ever be made. It was one of Hitlers biggest blunders of the war, one even the most ill trained enemy could take good advantage of.



> You say that the Japanese will make steady progress, but I just cannot see this occurring. They are outnumbered something like 8:1 in tanks, about 10:1 in the air, and about 2:1 in ground formations. The Soviets appear to outnumber their artillery by about 4:1, moreover I think we can assume the Soviet artillery is heavier than that fielded by the Japanese. The terrain is terrible, and the approach routes they must follow heavily fortified.
> 
> How do you propose to overcome each of these deficiencies and problems??????



Parsifal,

Please keep in mind that in the scenario suggested, where a total invasion of the USSR was planned, the Japanese were sure to have a lot more forces available than you list. The Navy would leave all its material at the disposal, which includes around 500 Zero's by July 41 if those in Japan are counted as-well (I'm looking at the number produced). All they had would be poured at the Soviets.

The Japanese had 2,250,000 trained soldiers and 4,500,000 reserves. That is 6,750,000 men under arms. If the Japanese invade with a force of ~3,000,000 then the Soviets are not only gonna have to leave their 1 million men in the east, they're gonna have to reinforce them if they are gonna be able to stop the Japanese. 

The Japanese would still have atleast 2 million reserves ready for controlling there regions within China, which would've been given VERY low priority in this scenario btw.

We really don't get much out of looking at what forces Japan originally stationed in the east in July 41 as the plan was by then that of waging a war in the pacific, and thus all efforts were directed at achieving this. Had the plan been to invade the USSR there'd have been entirely different list of priorities and everything would've been affected; Training, Production, Troop garrisons etc etc...

If the Japanese were gonna try and fight the Soviets on land in Russia, then they'd pour everything they had at achieving this, not diverting any resources at preparing for a war in the Pacific against the US.


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## parsifal (Jul 4, 2009)

Lucky13 said:


> This is what was avaible in December onboard IJN carrier and the aircraft taking part in the attack on Pearl Harbor. All together these carriers carried 407 aircraft, 108 fighters and 299 divebomber/torpedbombers. Question is, if the Japanese would have attacked Vladivostock instead for Pearl Harbor, I'm sure that they knew that the USSR wasn't up to the standard of the US armed forces. swapping Pearl Harbor for Vladivostock, I think that they would have done more damaged to the Russians then they did to USN on Ford Island etc...
> What would the Russians be able to throw against this? With about 60-100 or so KM between Japan and Vladivostok, maybe troop ships wouldn't be that far behind...
> 
> Akagi, 18 Zeros, 18 Vals, 27 Kates (Dec. 1941)
> ...


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## Juha (Jul 4, 2009)

Some seems to have forgot that during the war SU had significant forces along its southern borders and in FE. So it was capable to sent 3 armies into Iran/Persia in late August 41 in sipite of the fact what was happening in the its Western areas. Also there were strong forces ready for the case that Turkey would choose to join the Axis and attack SU. Also substantia troops were in kazastan etc throughout the war. If someone thinks that SU concentrated all its forces, or even vast majority of them against Germany even in "gloomy summer" 1942, I recomended some reading on history of Red Army .

Juha


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## Juha (Jul 4, 2009)

On Stalingrad
Hitler's decision to forbid the outbrake from Stalingrad was according the oppinion of his AF commander (Göring) and his best army commander (von Manstein), so he simply agreed with his top commanders

Juha


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## Juha (Jul 4, 2009)

Soren
you still forget that Japan was fighting a major war in China, so much of its army was tied there. Idea that Japanese would give only very low priority to China is very stretched because they took the enermous risk to attack US just because they thought it unthinkable to give up their conquests there. And they would had left substantial forces ready for possible US intervention, which knowing FDR's attitude would have been only proper.

Juha


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## Lucky13 (Jul 4, 2009)

Just shows how little I know about this... Cheers Parsifal and Juha!


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## imalko (Jul 4, 2009)

Soren said:


> ...Also keep in mind that the Germans would actually have around 20% more manpower available than originally because of the absence of a US involvement, and this alone was enough to secure the Stalingrad, Moscow the Caucasus.
> 
> Furthermore how were the Soviets ever gonna cope without the huge amount of lend lease equipment they originally recieved??



Disagree. US weren't involved in war in 1941 and their involvement in the war was directly felt by Germany only in late 1942 when Operation Torch took place. So in 1941 and much of 1942 presence or absence of US involvement had no effect on Germany's effort on Eastern front what so ever. Manpower available to Germany would be the same as it was in true time line.

Amounts of land lease equipment handed over to Soviet Union became huge only in 1943. Before that Allied help went to USSR in much smaller quantities. In September 1941 British sent what they could but this was more significant as morale buster then its actual value on the front. (Why do we always have to return to this issue is beyond me.) Look at the total numbers of aircraft for example. In 1939-1945 Soviet industry produced close to 150.000 aircraft of all types while total number of aircraft recieved under lend lease didn't exceed 20.000. Point is that number of aircraft delivered under land lease was valuable for sure but hardly decisive for events on Eastern front. I would venture to say that more valuable to the Soviets were deliveries of trucks then aircraft.




Soren said:


> Please keep in mind that in the scenario suggested, where a total invasion of the USSR was planned, the Japanese were sure to have a lot more forces available than you list. The Navy would leave all its material at the disposal, which includes around 500 Zero's by July 41 if those in Japan are counted as-well (I'm looking at the number produced). All they had would be poured at the Soviets.



This is *not* scenario suggested. Original premise is that after their setbacks in 1941 Germans managed to persuade Japan to take part in 1942 summer offensive. (So they would have some six months for preparations.) Up until that point we fallow true time line. So no "total invasion" of USSR by Japan and Germany was planned in 1941.



Soren said:


> If the Japanese were gonna try and fight the Soviets on land in Russia, then they'd pour everything they had at achieving this, not diverting any resources at preparing for a war in the Pacific against the US.



Again, according to original premise the Japanese *did attacked* British and Dutch in December 1941 but not US at Perl Harbor. So they needed to divert some of their forces to that theater in addition to their war effort in mainland China. Furthermore even if US are not involved in war there is continuous threat that they wouldn't just remain a bystander, so some IJN forces are needed to remain in reserve in case of any US intervention. (Which in my opinion would happen for sure one way or the other.)

PS
Great info you have provided there Parsifal.


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## Soren (Jul 4, 2009)

If the Japanese helped Germany defeat the USSR then they'd be in a VERY good position to take over the entirety of China, with enough oil to make sure a war in the pacific wasn't needed. So if anything they had every reason to pour their best at the Soviets. Over 2 million reserves could secure the already conquered areas within China.


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## Matt308 (Jul 4, 2009)

Keep it civil, guys. Let's not ruin a good thread.


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## Lucky13 (Jul 4, 2009)

How good were these Russian Subs?


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## Soren (Jul 4, 2009)

The IJN would take care of the Soviets subs, which weren't much good btw. The best they had was the Stalinet boats, but even they were outdated by 1941.


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## parsifal (Jul 4, 2009)

I agree with Imalko, it wasnt the terms of refernce for this thread.....however, if we are going to assume that the Japanese are suddenly going to field a regular army bigger than that fielded by the Germans, should we not also consider similar expansions for the the allies, chines or Soviets. The sky is the limit once you start to depart from the known situation. Why couldnt the Chinese be equipped with surplus Russian equipment.....if we assume that then all of a sudden the allies have another 300 divisions to play with....why not assume that lend lease is diverted to the Pacific, in lieu of the US involvement, and field approximately another 30 divs and about 1500 aircraft. The possibilities are endless, and in the end quite silly, from either bias or perspective. 

The only way this scenario can be objectively assessed is on the basis of the forces available. Japan did not have the plane or the pilots to fild 500 zeroes.....they didnt even have enough to field 300 and thats in December, not June. 

The whole excercise becomes a bit ridiculous if we start introducing fanciful what ifs into the equation. Or if we do, it then becomes necessary to postulate logical quid pro quos for both sides


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## proton45 (Jul 4, 2009)

parsifal said:


> I agree with Imalko, it wasnt the terms of refernce for this thread.....however, if we are going to assume that the Japanese are suddenly going to field a regular army bigger than that fielded by the Germans, should we not also consider similar expansions for the the allies, chines or Soviets. The sky is the limit once you start to depart from the known situation. Why couldnt the Chinese be equipped with surplus Russian equipment.....if we assume that then all of a sudden the allies have another 300 divisions to play with....why not assume that lend lease is diverted to the Pacific, in lieu of the US involvement, and field approximately another 30 divs and about 1500 aircraft. The possibilities are endless, and in the end quite silly, from either bias or perspective.
> 
> The only way this scenario can be objectively assessed is on the basis of the forces available. Japan did not have the plane or the pilots to fild 500 zeroes.....they didnt even have enough to field 300 and thats in December, not June.
> 
> The whole excercise becomes a bit ridiculous if we start introducing fanciful what ifs into the equation. Or if we do, it then becomes necessary to postulate logical quid pro quos for both sides



The Chines suffered from poor communication. Many of the troops fighting for the Chinese where led by cooperating "warlords"...if one where too assume that that the "re-enforced"-"re-equipped" Chinese would have been a (more) formidable adversary, one would have to believe that cohesion (coordination) between "generals" was improved too...

Their is reason to believe that the Japanese would have used the same "surprise" tactics they where well know for...if they where able to keep the pressure on the Russian airbases (bombing sorties) they might have been able to keep the Russians on the defensive...in the air anyways.


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## Amsel (Jul 4, 2009)

The interesting thing about alternative history is that many things could have happened that might not make sense at the present time. After the humiliating defeat of the Japanese on their Lake Baikal campaign they correctly surmised that they could not match the Soviets in artillery, armor and especially logistics. They did change their plans for the invasion of the USSR to reflect this. They knew that a campaign into the Lake Baikal region could not work mainly due to the Trans Siberian railroad being such an excellent way to move man and materials to the region. The Incident at Nomonhan made the Japanese realize that a campaign needed to be shorter and closer to its frontier to succeed. Luckily the linchpin of the entire Eastern Maritime District depended on the Trans-Siberian railway for any resupply due to the terrain of the region as pointed out by Parsifal, it was swampy forest and rugged mountains. The key to the region was Voroshilov, a mere sixty km from the Japanese positions.

The Japanese decided that for the Hachi-Go plan to work they needed 30 divisions to jump off and another10 divisions to continue the plan. They would need to pull 10 divisions from the homeland and another 10 divisions from China to add to the Kwangtung army for the initial phase of attack. And then another 6-7 Divisions from the homeland anda further 3 divisions from China for the next phase. With the campaign being much closer to the sea the IJN could play a huge part in the siege and assault of Vladivostok and the destruction of the Russian navy, airfields and subpens. 

The Red Army fielded about 19 rifle divisions, 6 tank divisions, 2 motorized divisions, 4 mechanized divisions, a calvary division and about 10 brigades of rifles. Pretty formidable but at a disadvantage because they had to be spread out from Mongolia to the ocean. Under those circumstances the Japanese could choose how and where to attack. They had pretty good intelligence on the fortifications put up to protect the railway and could find a way to seep through the Soviet lines to sever the Trans-Siberin railway and cut off the resupply of the province from the west.


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## parsifal (Jul 4, 2009)

Lucky13 said:


> How good were these Russian Subs?



Soviet subs were cut to pices in in the Baltic, thats true, mostly from Mines. They were effectively penned in from the beginning of the war, and as a result, had lost 12 boats by December 1941, nearly all of them to mines. In exchange for this they had managed to sinck about 80000 tons of Axis shipping.

However judging Soviet subs by their experiences in the baltic or the Black sea will yield a biased result inmy opinion. In the case of both seas, they are very constricted and shallow (as a swede you would know better than I actually), and mines absolutely massacred them as a result. In the far north, there were nine boats, and during the war they managed to sink about 100000 tons of shipping which is not too bad.

In the Pacific, the seas are neither shallow, nor are the Japanese strong in ASW defence. The actual boats deployed in the pacifc include 12 x Serie I/ II/XI/XIII, 30 x Serie III/V/VBis/X and 16 "S" class (or Serie XVI). These were the Soviet "fleet" types. They also fielded at least 60 of the Type VI "Coastal Boats

The broad characteristics of these boats is not as good as either the German or the Japanese, but compared to the prewar US types (with the very significant exception of the Gatos) were equal to or superior to the US types. There is one exception to this. US Boats later in the war were fitted with radar, which was never used by Soviet Subs

The Serie I/II/XI/XIII had respectively the following general characteristics
*Displacement*: 1354/1372/1400/1416 tons
*Speed:* 15.3/8.7, 15/9, 16/10/, 18/10 
*Dive limit:* 300 ft (all)
*Dive time (secs)*30/30/20/20
*Endurance * 7500/[email protected], 6000/[email protected] (Serie II XI),14000/[email protected] 
(surfaced/Subnerged @sp specified)
*Torps: * 6/2(14), 6/-, (12)(Types II,XI), 6/2(28 ) 
(bow/stern/reloads): 
*Guns * All generally armed with a 100/52 deck gun, a 45 mm AA and either 1 or 2 AAMG
*Mines * Types II, XI and XIII each carried 20 contact mines as an alternate warload


The Serie III/V/VBis had the following characteristics

*Displacement*: 704 /708/749/708 tons
*Speed:* 12.5/8.5, 14/8, 12/7.5, 14/9 
*Dive limit:* 340 ft (all)
*Dive time (secs)* about 18-25 secs for all (Serie IIwere slower, Serie X were very quick divers) 30/30/20/20
*Endurance * all, typically, 6-6500/105 @3 
(surfaced/Subnerged @sp specified)
*Torps: * 4/2(10) (all) 
(bow/stern/reloads): 
*Guns * All generally armed with 2 x 45 mm AA and either 1 or 2 AAMG
*Mines * None


The Series VI (and related) were small coastal boats with the following characteristics

*Displacement*: 200 to 351 tons
*Speed:* 15.7/7.8 
*Dive limit:* 260ft (all)
*Dive time (secs)* Unknown, but quick
*Endurance * all, typically, 3000/[email protected] 
(surfaced/Subnerged @sp specified)
*Torps: * 2 or 4 (Bow) 
(bow/stern/reloads): 
*Guns * All generally armed with 1 x 45 mm AA and 1 AAMG
*Mines * None

The "S" class were the culmination of the prewar building program, and incorporated the following characteristics. They bore a striking resemblance to Type VIIs but larger

*Displacement*: 1090 tons
*Speed:* 19/10 
*Dive limit:* 360 ft 
*Dive time (secs)* about 15 secs 
*Endurance * 9500/[email protected] 
(surfaced/Subnerged @sp specified)
*Torps: * 4/2(12) (all) 
(bow/stern/reloads): 
*Guns * 1x 100 mm, 1 x 45 mm AA and either 1 AAMG
*Mines * None, carried Deguassing equipment 

The earlier types showed poor workmanship and design, these were gradually worked out by the outbreak of the war. The Type Is were particulalry poorly designed. Convesely, the Type XVIs were on par with the German Type VIIs, with additional range, speed and protection (from mines). 

In terms of manpower, whereas the Black and Baltic fleets were subjected to the effects of the purges, the Pacific Fleet was largely spared, Further it did not suffer from the manpower comb outs that characterised the European fleets. It is reasonable to expect that the fleet would have performed better than in the west. It certainly performed creditably in 1945, when called upon to organise and execute a number of amphibious assaults in the north, against defe3nded targets


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## Amsel (Jul 4, 2009)

The Soviets had about 70 subs in the Pacific and they were the number one priority of the IJN to be destroyed, even more important then the bomber airfields, because they would threaten any resupply to the armies fighting on mainland Asia. The Combined Fleet of Japan would try to destroy most of these subs at dock by an airstrike similar to the Pearl Harbor attack. It would be essential to any campaign against the USSR to do so.


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## Amsel (Jul 4, 2009)

Another interesting bit of information is regarding the make up of a division between the two beligerants. A Red Army division was almost always made up of 20,000 men. The Japanese divisions in the early war always had a reserve division organic to each division to replace casualties. That made a Japanese division roughly twice the size of the typical european style division. Though the organic reserve was made up of second line soldiers, usually older men they helped fill the ranks substantially.


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## Glider (Jul 4, 2009)

I admit to getting a little confused about the scenario. I can understand that the Japanese are for the purposes of the exercise to launch an attack in co-ordination with Germany in the summer of 1942 and that the USA stay out of the battle. For this to happen we are using the forces and equipment that were in place.

Should we stray from this all the assumptions are distinctly one way.


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## Soren (Jul 4, 2009)

Crap! Just wrote freaking 3 A4 page worths of stuff and then my internet stopped working so I lost it 

To be continued!


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## parsifal (Jul 4, 2009)

Amsel said:


> The interesting thing about alternative history is that many things could have happened that might not make sense at the present time. After the humiliating defeat of the Japanese on their Lake Baikal campaign they correctly surmised that they could not match the Soviets in artillery, armor and especially logistics. They did change their plans for the invasion of the USSR to reflect this. They knew that a campaign into the Lake Baikal region could not work mainly due to the Trans Siberian railroad being such an excellent way to move man and materials to the region. The Incident at Nomonhan made the Japanese realize that a campaign needed to be shorter and closer to its frontier to succeed. Luckily the linchpin of the entire Eastern Maritime District depended on the Trans-Siberian railway for any resupply due to the terrain of the region as pointed out by Parsifal, it was swampy forest and rugged mountains. The key to the region was Voroshilov, a mere sixty km from the Japanese positions.
> 
> The Japanese decided that for the Hachi-Go plan to work they needed 30 divisions to jump off and another10 divisions to continue the plan. They would need to pull 10 divisions from the homeland and another 10 divisions from China to add to the Kwangtung army for the initial phase of attack. And then another 6-7 Divisions from the homeland anda further 3 divisions from China for the next phase. With the campaign being much closer to the sea the IJN could play a huge part in the siege and assault of Vladivostok and the destruction of the Russian navy, airfields and subpens.
> 
> The Red Army fielded about 19 rifle divisions, 6 tank divisions, 2 motorized divisions, 4 mechanized divisions, a calvary division and about 10 brigades of rifles. Pretty formidable but at a disadvantage because they had to be spread out from Mongolia to the ocean. Under those circumstances the Japanese could choose how and where to attack. They had pretty good intelligence on the fortifications put up to protect the railway and could find a way to seep through the Soviet lines to sever the Trans-Siberin railway and cut off the resupply of the province from the west.



The Japanese only had an army of 51 Division in December 1941, and 31 of them were engaged in holding China. 14 were in Manchuria, and 6 were earmarked for operations in South east asia and the Pacifc. There were four divs in the Home Islands (some of the southern force units were drawn from China, plus the South Seas and other marine assets of the IJN can be included to increase that 51 to about 53 Divs). However, at least two divs were needed to watch the northern parts of Japan from invasion, whilst the IGHQ was concerned for the safety of the emperor, and allotted one complete Div....the Imperial Guards Div, to his protection.

Quite simply, the numbers you are touting dont exist in the japanese army, unless we are going to start navel gazing like some around here.

Now, as far as being able choose where they could attack, this is another furphy that needs to be put to bed early. There was a railway leading northwest into Transbaikal, intersecting the main reanssiberian line near Chita. From the border to this junction is a distance of 270 miles, and the main railhead in Manchuria, the town of TsiTsihar, is a further 560 miles beyond that. There were some frontier depots and villages, no roads, and couple of camels. There is no way this direction is going to work as an MLA for a 30 division attack. 

Then there is the long frontier stretching from the Khentii Mountains in the Northwest to the Amur River near Komsolosk in the east. The Khentii Mountains are formidable, to say the least, there are no roads (it takes four solid days of riding on horseback to even reach the foothils) rising up to a massive 9180 feet, ther is just no crossing this range with any large body of men. 

The area between the Khentii mountains to the Amur is dark, mountainous forest no roads, and the nearest railheads are Hegang and Nunjiang, on the manchurian side of the border. These are some 240 miles from the frontier, with the Transsiberian line passing to about 80 miles from the border, at Kubyshev. A 300 mile trek across trackless freezing tundra....yeah right.

In addition ther is the obstacle of the Amur River, which also has navigable tributaries further to the south (and therefore represent a risk to the activities of the Soviet River Flotillas). The Amur is a major river system that the Japanese would find extremely difficult to cross, and even harder to maintain as a supply line. In 1941 ther were no bridges across the Amur, any large scale crossing would need to wait until a reliable bridge had been built, and that would have taken weeks of months, and would have been under extreme threat from Soviet air power and the Amur River flotilla. In 1941 the flotilla boasted 9 monitors, 17 large gunboats and over 150 guardboats (about 60 tons from memory) . It was the biggest river flotilla in the world, and a major obstacle to crossing the Amur. In winter, the Amur is impassable to river traffic, and unsuitable to pontoon bridges and the like. It is, in effect, impassable. 

The only real game in town for the Japanese is the eastern flank of this long border, and even here it is limited. The area north of Khanka Lake to the Amur River is low lying and swampy at the frontier, but once again rises sharply into deeply incised mountain ranges further to the east. Once again there are no roads on either side of the border, the nearest railheads are more than 200 miles from the frontier for the Japanese. In short, another nightmare

To the south of Khanka lake, which really a small ocean, again dominated by the Soviet naval gungoats, stretching for more than 180 klms from north to south, lies the only real corridor into Siberia. There are no roads, as usual, but at least the japanese have a railway close by (about 30 miles from the frontier). Here there is a mountain range, rising about 6000 feet here, and heavy fortifications. If they are going to attack it will have to be here, albeit at a terrible cost. There is a lesser route further to the south, along the coast from Chosen (Korea) which is flatter, but mined and again with no roads and heavily fortified. These approaches to Vladivostock are all fully covered by the 12 inch (and smaller) batteries I mentioned earlier. An advance by a large body of men in this direction would need to wait until the coastal batteries were dealt with, and that would take at least a month, if at all 

Taking out the Soviet Far Eastern Forcesis simply beyond the capacity of the Japanese. 

And for the record, I am a fan of the Japanese military (not their behavioour). They proved their tenacious attitudes and military prowess on many occasions as far as Im concerned. I am no great fan of the Russian, but lets just say I am in a position to know how tough a nut to crack Vlasdivostock is, and leave it at that


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## Amsel (Jul 4, 2009)

Bear in mind that the locations and dispositions of the Japanese military would be much different if the North plan was decided upon instead of the south. This is all speculative of course and would depend upon political negotiations and stealth. 

Also if we start delving into the tactical situations such as terrain and the plans to attack the railroad it can get real murky. But realize that in war the situation is fluid and ever changing. I can gaurantee that the Japanese had a plan to nuetralize Vladivistock by cutting them off from their resupply. You simply cannot put the idea to bed by showing somepictures of the terrain. Just like any campaign, the invasion of the Maritime Province would be made up of maneuvering and deception. Those forests and mountains were not impenetrable.

If the premise of the whole thread is; could Japan attack the Soviets while they maneuvered against the US, then no. That is preposterous. If the North Strike Group Plan was implemented instead of the South Strike Group Plan, then they could have been successful and that is precisely what I am writing about. It is also alot more interesting to me.


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## Colin1 (Jul 4, 2009)

parsifal said:


> Then there is the long frontier stretching from the Khentii Mountains in the Northwest to the Amur River near Komsolosk in the east. The Khentii Mountains are formidable, to say the least, there are no roads (it takes four solid days of riding on horseback to even reach the foothills) rising up to a massive *9,180 feet (1) *, there is just no crossing this range *with any large body of men (2)*
> 
> *The Amur is a major river system that the Japanese would find extremely difficult to cross (3)*...


It's been done before, with a far less well-equipped army. And a bunch of elephants...

_By now Hannibal had abandoned his Spanish base with *his army of 100,000 mercenaries (2) *and embarked on one of the most daring maneuvers in military history. He had *successfully crossed the treacherous Rhone River (3)*, avoided a confrontation with the Roman army, and replenished his troops on "the island" by following the river northward... ...he was successfully guided to the foothills of the Alps. Hannibal had now come to the Alpes du Dauphine. Although formidable mountains of from four to five thousand feet high, behind them, miles and days ahead loomed the most difficult part of the march at even higher altitudes and over more dangerous roadways. Eventually, after being ambushed by the shadowing allobroges and a three-day march, Hannibal's army had reached the Durance river valley. 
The last and the most difficult leg of the march laid in full view for the army to stare at in awe. 
The Carthaginian column now stood at the valley of the Hautes Alpes, the highest and most difficult mountains in the French Alps and the last barrier that stood between them and Italy. They stood and gazed at the giants that lay before them, the peaks of these mountains soared into the sky and touched the clouds.* These were mountains whose summits rose to 13,000 feet (1)*, and stood like an unassailable wall guarding Rome and daring the mercenaries to scale their heights. _


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## Soren (Jul 4, 2009)

Parsifal,

So far we've only been listing the manpower equipment available to the Japanese, so we're not really speculating much in regards to strength. Simple addons to existing equipment can't really be said to be highly speculative under these circumstances either, as based on where the fighting was expected to take place the various equipment available would be adapted towards it as best as possible.

If we were to really start speculating a lot then we might as-well have concluded from the start that if the Japanese planned a land based invasion of the USSR instead of a war in the Pacific, then tank production would've recieved a much higher priority status and thus a lot more tanks would've been produced in the 1939 to 41 time frame. This would also be the most likely thing to occur actually. But for now we're just gonna stick with what was available in 1941 at the time where a war in the Pacific had been the original goal. 

Furthermore in the case of an invasion of the USSR, China wouldn't have been given much priority at all. The Japanese weren't importing any meaningful amount of important resources from the place yet anyhow. So it would've really been no concern to the Japanese at that point, esp. as they would know that after the defeat of the USSR an invasion of China would prove a lot easier. All they needed to do was hold on to the areas already conquered, and they had over 2 million reserves ready for that task. Way more than was ever needed. The airforce over there wasn't needed either. It was just about having the reserves dig in and hold the ground already gained. 

Moving on..

The Japanese air strength:

By July 1941 around 600 A6M2 Zeros had been produced, of which 400 had so far been delivered to the Navy, 108 of which were used for the raid on Pearl Harbour. Another 200 were stationed in mainland Japan, just sitting there waiting for Navy pilots to come fly them (Sounds cute eh ?  ). 

But like you already stated the IJN had only a little under 300 pilots for its Zeros, with an extra 100 a/c standing without pilots.

However in the scenario suggested the IJN would be stationing all its Zeros near the Russian east coast, while the entire reserve would be handed over to the IJA, which was a total of roughly 300 a/c, 100 of which were from the IJN reserve.

So combined the IJN IJA could muster around 600 A6M2's for the invasion of the USSR. Half being flown by the Navy Airforce and the other half by the Army Airforce. The Japanese knew that they had one of the worlds best fighters in the A6M2 and would've no doubt wanted them all ready in an invasion of the USSR.

In addition to this around 300 or so newly built Ki-43Ia's were standing ready in Japan. These would've been handed over to the army.

So the Japanese could at least gather roughly 900 new fighters for the invasion of Russia, which would be opposing the roughly 1,400 mixed bag fighters of the VVS. And knowing that the Japanese fighters pilots were in general much superior to the Soviets', this would've proven no hard task for the Japanese. The VVS would've been swepped from the skies in a relatively short space of time. Also while the VVS pilots stationed in the east were destined to later become Guards, at this point in time (1941) they didn't have much experience, and it must also be said that throughout the war the Germans in general didn't notice any real distinction between guards regular pilots, it was all the same to them; There were the occasional good ones, as Hartmann said.

Also lets us not forget the number of Ki-27's, A5M's A4N's available either ofcourse.

On top of this the Japanese also had a good number bombers ground attack a/c ready for operations. These included the Ki-51, D3A, B5M G4M1 etc etc. These would be tasked mainly with destroying Soviet airfields tanks, and once far enough in land also target Soviet production facilities.

The numbers available included: 

G4M: >100 (~120)
G3M: >400 (?)
D3A: >250 (~300)
B5M: >150 (~200) 
B5N: ~250
Ki-30: 704
Ki-49: >100 (~120)
Ki-51: ?
Ki-46: ~60 to 70

So plenty of a/c were available for role of ground attacks bombing.

Next are the land based forces available to the Japanese;

By mid 41 the Japanese had at their disposal 2.25 million trained soldiers and another 4.5 million armed reserves. All of the trained soldiers would be needed for the war against the USSR, with at least an extra 1.5 million reserves standing ready. ~2 million could be stationed in China over time.

To add to this the trained Japanese soldier was just as well equipped as the average Soviet soldier, and better trained in many respects as-well. 

As for armour, the Japanese had amongst others available:

Type 97 Tankette: 557
Type 95 Light tank: ~500 
Type 97 Medium tank: ~850

So a total of around 2,000 tanks, not a really impressive number, but these tanks had proven very effective in forested areas, and they were certainly a match for the far majority of the tanks that the Soviets could ever afford to deploy in the east.

So that means that for the invasion of the USSR the Japanese could have available atleast 900 new fighters (+ the older a/c), over 1,000 bombers ground attack a/c, ~2,000 tanks, 2.25 million trained troops 1.5 million armed reserves. 

This would be more than enough to take a lot of pressure off the German army in the West while at the same time putting an unsustainable amount pressure on the Soviets.

Next comes the navies, which I'll deal with later, the Japanese had it all over the Soviets there.

But the whole point of the Japanese invasion would simply be to divert as much of the Soviet manpower as possible, letting the Germans do the true damage.


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## Colin1 (Jul 4, 2009)

Soren said:


> Furthermore in the case of an invasion of the USSR, China wouldn't have been given much priority at all. The Japanese weren't importing any meaningful amount of important resources from the place yet anyhow. So it would've really been no concern to the Japanese at that point, esp. as they would know that after the defeat of the USSR an invasion of China would prove a lot easier. All they needed to do was hold on to the areas already conquered, and they had over 2 million reserves ready for that task. Way more than was ever needed. The airforce over there wasn't needed either. It was just about having the reserves dig in and hold the ground already gained


After the Japanese 
first began their invasion of China in 1937, in each place the Japanese captured, a collaborationist army might be formed and given various names, such as IJA Assistant Army, Peace Preservation Corps or Police Garrisons and so on. Later on, particularly under the Nanjing Nationalist Government they were re-organized in a system of Divisions, Corps and Armies.
This system would have come in highly useful for policing the Chinese territories whilst the IJA troops they released could be deployed in the invasion, I don't think there'd be a political or military vacuum in China as a result of the invasion. Conceivably, some of these units could be used in the invasion.


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## Lucky13 (Jul 4, 2009)

Knock out the railroad and roads to cut off the peninsula...?


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## Amsel (Jul 4, 2009)

Lucky13 said:


> Knock out the railroad and roads to cut off the peninsula...?



You are correct. The IJN covers the sea approaches and the rail line should be cut from the north by attacks at Voroshilov and Iman. The Kwangtung fortifications in Miaoling area provide for the attack near Lake Hanka, and push south into the Maritime Province to link up with the attacks in the Mo River area and a spearhead into the rear of the fortified zone near Voroshilov. Cut the Trans-Siberian railway and it renders the Maritime Province as encircled from resupply. The Japanese would hope the the German armies would make the transfer of any army groups to the region from the west, unlikely.

There was also alot of planning into "political" sabotouge after having contact with many dissedants and anti-Stalinists who looked forward to the fall of Stalin. The Japanese knew that the USSR was so large that a military victory over the entire nation was not feasible and looked to the Siberians, Mongolians, and even Serbians for political support.


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## proton45 (Jul 4, 2009)

This is getting interesting....


BUT I have a question regarding Russian leadership? How many Generals did Stalin have to spare? Who would he have sent east? So much of warfare rests on (Napoleons) luck...


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## GrauGeist (Jul 5, 2009)

proton45 said:


> This is getting interesting....
> 
> 
> BUT I have a question regarding Russian leadership? How many Generals did Stalin have to spare? Who would he have sent east? So much of warfare rests on (Napoleons) luck...


Stalin's 37-38 purge decimated the Soviet high command, many of whom were seasoned veterans...

The purge removed:
3 out of 5 Marshals (equivalent to a 6 star General)
13 out of 15 Commanders (equivalent to a 4-5 star General)
8 out of 9 Admirals
50 out of 57 Army Corps Commanders
154 out of 186 Division Commanders
16 out of 16 Commissars
25 out of 28 Army Commissars


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## Freebird (Jul 5, 2009)

Soren said:


> Sorry but there is no way that the Soviets could've dealt with both the Germans and the Japanese, it would've been over quickly.
> 
> The Japanese didn't have good tanks, true, but tanks are but one thing. The Japanese had lots of infantry to boot, and fanatic infantry at that. Furthermore and even more crushing was the the Japanese airforce, which would quickly sweep the VVS out of the skies in the far east while the Luftwaffe easily dealt with their part in the west.
> 
> There's simply no way the Soviets could've dealt with this at all. They were hard pressed enough against the Germans alone, so a Japanese attack from the east would've proven disasterous for them. There's also no doubt that a combined landbased invasion of the USSR by the Germans and the Japanese would've resulted in a lot of technology shared, esp. within the area of tanks. So the Japanese would've very likely had a tank similar to the Panzer IV not far after.


.
However, the Soviet forces in the far east were winter trained, and the Japanese would have had a hard time in winter. Now if the attack occured in summer, maybe different




renrich said:


> What would have happened if, instead of attacking the US at Pearl Harbor, Japan had only attacked the British in China and Burma and the Dutch in the East Indies and had mounted an attack against the Soviet Union in the Spring of 1942?





Glider said:


> The British would have lost Burma and China, the US would ae attacked Japan as they were the ones applying political and economic pressure on Japan over their actions in China. I do not believe that the USA would stand on one side and wach Japan up the stakes. The difference of course is that Japan wouldn't have had the advantage of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbour and their losses would have been significant when they faced the USN in open conflict.



There is one big factor to consider though - the US had a secret deal with the UK the Dutch to enter the war if Japan attacked. It has only been hinted at, but it's the only logical conclusion. In ~1940 the UK closed down the Burma road to avoid conflict with Japan, and in 1941 the Dutch were prepared to sell oil to Japan. Then as tension with the US increased, the UK the Dutch suddenly have a hard-line position - the UK reopens the Burma road, and the Dutch refuse to sell oil. 

Now ask yourself, why would the Dutch, having already lost their homeland, want to provoke the Empire of Japan? Why would the UK, seriously in trouble in Europe, not make a deal with Japan to keep out of a Pacific war?

The only reason that makes sense is that their was a Quid-pro-quo. The Allies agreed to go along with Washington's policy, and the Americans promised to support the UK Dutch should they be attacked.

Remember that while the US public was against involvement in a EUROPEAN war, there was coniderable support for action agaist Japan, even before Pearl.


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## Freebird (Jul 5, 2009)

imalko said:


> Amounts of land lease equipment handed over to Soviet Union became huge only in 1943. Before that Allied help went to USSR in much smaller quantities. In September 1941 British sent what they could but this was more significant as morale buster then its actual value on the front.



Sorry, but this was not just a "morale boost", it's been estimated that due to huge Soviet tank losses in the summer/fall of 1941, that from a quarter to a third of the tank forces in the defence of Leningrad Moscow in the winter of '41 were British supplied. A substansial number of aircraft were supplied as well, not very many compared to the total, but they were desperately needed at the time.


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## Glider (Jul 5, 2009)

Soren said:


> To add to this the trained Japanese soldier was just as well equipped as the average Soviet soldier, and better trained in many respects as-well.


The average Japanese soldier wasn't nearly as well equipped as the average Soviet soldier but was in many ways better trained with some surprising omissions. For example on the plus side, at the start of the war every Japanese soldier was issued with a compass and trained how to use it which was very unusual. On the negative side, they generally were poor shots and even snipers were only trained to shoot out to 300yards.
The rifle was 6.5mm which even the Japanese found wanting and was in the process of being reissued in 1939 in 7.7mm but both continued in use causing complications.
The LMG's varied but were basically 
The type 11 which was very poor and jammed as soon as you looked at it.
The Type 96 which was a major improvement but was in the now obsolete 6.5mm
The type 99 which was the best of the lot and now came with the 7.7mm round.

HMG The best of the bunch was the Type 92 which had a rate of fire of 450 rpm which is low. 



> As for armour, the Japanese had amongst others available:
> 
> Type 97 Tankette: 557
> Type 95 Light tank: ~500
> Type 97 Medium tank: ~850



Type 97 Tankette
Designed for a 37mm AT gun which had a penetration of 45mm at 300 yards, however most were fitted with an LMG instead. Max armour 17mm

Type 95 Light Tank
37mm gun 25mm at 500yds with a one man turret that only turned 45 degrees each way, max armour 12mm

Type 97 Medium Tank
Came in two types one with 25mm armour and the other 33mm but with thinner side armour. Most had the 57mm low velocity gun which could penetrate 20mm at 500yards. 

Russian Tanks
T26
45mm gun penetrating about 40mm at 500yards, 25mm at a 1000 yards, armour 16mm

T28
76mm howitzer, 80mm of armour

T34/KV1
Need I mention them

To sum up, the T28/KV1 and T34 are almost immune to Japanese tank fire and the T26 has a massive advantage in range.


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## imalko (Jul 5, 2009)

Amsel said:


> There was also alot of planning into "political" sabotouge after having contact with many dissedants and anti-Stalinists who looked forward to the fall of Stalin. The Japanese knew that the USSR was so large that a military victory over the entire nation was not feasible and looked to the Siberians, Mongolians, and even *Serbians* for political support.



Serbians? Could you explain that with more detail? I assume you made some sort of unintentional mistake. Serbians always had strong pro Russian attitude because of Ortodox tradition and Slavic heritage and affection. Now, its true that as traditionally monarchists Serbians were not much fond of communism and after defeat in civil war and establishing USSR many Russian monarchists found refuge in Kingdom of Yugoslavia (for example baron Vrangel found refuge and later died and was buried in Belgrade). However, I fail to see how this nation could influence the events in Far East while fighting German occupation forces in guerilla war in the Balkans.

Sorry to divert off topic, but I needed to ask that because I was surprised with what Amsel wrote.


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## Juha (Jul 5, 2009)

Small additions to Glider's list
T-26, last model, Finns called it T-26C, was that Model 37 or 38, has 25mm frontal armour and IIRC already the older T-26B had 10-25mm turret armour.
BT-5 11.5ton Cruiser type tank, 45mm gun, armour 10-13mm, narrow tracks
BT-7 13,8 tons, development of BT-5, same gun, 10-22mm armour, narrow tracks

And Soviet had more A/T guns than Japanese. And good LMG, some troops had automatic rifles, but those were not usually much liked. Some Finns on the other hand valued highly war booty Soviet semi-automatic rifle.

On generals, there were generals in FE already, IIRC names of some are shown in Dr. Niederhorst's OoBs which Parsifal posted.

Juha


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## Glider (Jul 5, 2009)

There was at least as big a difference in the Artillery

The Divisional Artillery for a Russian Rifle Division when compared to a standard Type B Japanese are as follows:-

*Russia*
Artillery Regiment of two Battalions each with 8 76mm guns and 4 122mm Howitzers
Howitzer Regiment of 24 122mm Howitzers and 12 152mm Howitzers
Anti Aircraft Battalion of 12 x 37mm and 12 x 76mm
Anti Tank Battalion of 18 x 45mm

Total 12 x 152mm Howitzer, 32 x 122mm Howitzer, 16 x 76mm Guns, 12 x 76mm Anti Aircraft/field gun, 12 x 37mm AA, 18 x 45mm Anti Tank

*Japanese Type B *36 x 75mm Howitzers

I should emphasise that the above are purely divisional weapons. Both sides had additional weapons within the Infantry units, I have that for the Russians and will put it up when I have the same info for the Japanese.


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## Amsel (Jul 5, 2009)

imalko said:


> Serbians? Could you explain that with more detail? I assume you made some sort of unintentional mistake. Serbians always had strong pro Russian attitude because of Ortodox tradition and Slavic heritage and affection. Now, its true that as traditionally monarchists Serbians were not much fond of communism and after defeat in civil war and establishing USSR many Russian monarchists found refuge in Kingdom of Yugoslavia (for example baron Vrangel found refuge and later died and was buried in Belgrade). However, I fail to see how this nation could influence the events in Far East while fighting German occupation forces in guerilla war in the Balkans.
> 
> Sorry to divert off topic, but I needed to ask that because I was surprised with what Amsel wrote.



Hello Imalko, I believe we are still on topic concerning this elusive part of the Go-North strategic plan of the Japanese military. It is an elusive subject as well and I did make an error in my mention of the Serbian anticommunists. The Serbians that were in contact with the Japanese intelligence were in fact living in Siberia and possibly were communists as well. The Japanese learned from these Serbians in Siberia that the Siberians were stealing and hoarding arms for an eventual social revolution against the communists. It appears that the Japanese had agents all over Russia and Mongolia interviewing anticommunist factions. Many of these anti-Stalinists supported the defeat of the communists. This was extremely important to the Japanese to have support from Chinese, Koreans, Mongolians, Siberians, White Russians and very surprising, the anticommunist Jewish paramilitary that lived in the east region. 

The Japanese command put as much importance on the political subterfuge as they did the war plans for the North Strike Plan. They did so in case of the failure of Germany to win in the west and just the vastness of Russia itself. The Japanese considered the defection of the NKVD General Lushkov to Japan to be a "gift from the war god" and did in fact use his anti-stalinist contacts to began to build a web of support.


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## parsifal (Jul 5, 2009)

Some understanding of the nature and scope of the war in China is needed here. It appears that some view it as a minor sideshow, in which the Japanese could basically ignore or reduce the scales of deployment in with no ill-effects.

The Chinese war did ultimately develop into a sideshow, but only because the Japanese widened the scale of the conflict, because they found they could not win there. They believed that continued Chinese resistance was due to the support being provided by the western allies the Soviets, and Germany (yep, thats right, the Germans were gunning for a Chinese victory against the Japanese, this continued even after the signing of the Tripartite Pact, just proving, incidentally that agreements with the Nazis were worthless)

Another little political reality that sort of erodes the notion that Japan and Germany might somehow co-operate over Russia was that the 1939 non-aggression pact between Germany and Russia was viewed with great anger on the part of the Japanese, and led directly to some major offensives in China in which the Japanese were heavily defeated ). Under those circumstances the Japanese would never have been properly informed of an impending attack (as indeed they werent.....officialy at least. The Japanese high command was as surprised as everyone by the German attack). So, this notion of German -Japanese coperation before 1941 is basically navel gazing. It was never going to happen...

Anyway, to return to the issue of China, the Japanese are often assessed as having suffered about 1.5 million army casualties. However this is not correct, because it only measures the losses from 1941 to 45. In fact, Japan had been waging war in China, more or less continuously since 1931. Since 1937, the fighting had intensified, and in total Japanese military deaths in the period 1937-41 (excluding operatiuons outside China) amounted to 1.6 million additional losses(they had lost about 200000 before 1937). Thus the casualties 1931-41 amounted to 1.8 million, in addition to those lost after 1941. The Japanese army had suffered approximately 50% casualty rates amongst its frontline formations, which of course had been replaced, but it was these causalty rates that influenced the Japanese to decide to attack the west directly. That (or at least the relaisation that they could not win under the current conditions) plus the threat of the Allied oil embargo (which would have brought them to their knees in less than 10 months unless they did something about it) were the reasons why the war was expanded by the Japanese. Whilst China became a backwater eventually, in 1937-41 it was not viewed that way by anybody.

So why did the Japanese come to believe they could not win, and in fact were facing ultimate defeat if things remained the same as they were. Its not that they did not try to seek a result in China, but from 1939-41 they actually suffered a series of quite heavy defeatsas they stepped up their efforts to achieve a decisive result in the theatre. 

The following is a list of the major Battles fought in China from 1937-41. It shows that the battles fought in 1937-38 were uniformly Japanese victories, whilst those fought after 1939 were uniformly Japanese defeats. I have marked the clear Chinese victories by the words (China) after the relevant battle


Battle of Lugou Bridge (Marco Polo Bridge Incident) July 1937 (Jpn)
Beiping-Tianjin July 1937 
Chahar August 1937 
Battle of Shanghai August 1937 
Beiping–Hankou August 1937 
Tianjin–Pukou August 1937 
Taiyuan September 1937 
Battle of Pingxingguan September 1937 (China)
Battle of Xinkou September 1937 
Battle of Nanjing December 1937 
Battle of Xuzhou December 1937 
Battle of Taierzhuang March 1938 (China))
Northern and Eastern Honan 1938 January 1938 
Battle of Lanfeng May 1938 (China)
Xiamen May 1938 
Battle of Wuhan June 1938 
Battle of Wanjialing (China)
Guangdong October 1938 
Hainan Island February 1939 
Battle of Nanchang March 1939 
Battle of Xiushui River March 1939 
Battle of Suixian-Zaoyang May 1939 (China)
Shantou June 1939 
Battle of Changsha (1939) September 1939 (China)
Battle of South Guangxi November 1939 (China)
Battle of Kunlun Pass December 1939 (China)
1939-40 Winter Offensive November 1939 
Battle of Wuyuan March 1940 (China)
Battle of Zaoyang-Yichang May 1940 (China)
Hundred Regiments Offensive August 1940 (China)
Vietnam Expedition September 1940 
Central Hupei November 1940 (China)
Battle of South Henan January 1941 (China)
Western Hopei March 1941 (China)
 Battle of Shanggao March 1941 (China)
Battle of South Shanxi May 1941 
Battle of Changsha (1941) September 1941(China)

The biggest defeat for the Japanese was at 100 regiments, where Japanese casualties ran at 35-50000 men. 

Ther are several important observations to be made from all this. Firstly, China was not a walkover. The KMT decreased their levels of activity after 12.41 for the obvious reason that they expected the US to win the war for them, plus their ability to wage offensive war had been severely curtailed after the Burma Road had been closed. If the Soviets had been attacked in 1941, the Chinese can be expected to continue, and intensify their actions, because they could now supplement their re-equipment via the Silk Road through Kazakhstan. To believe that the the Japanese could decrease their level of committment in China, leaving the collaboratuionist armies to hold more of the line, is sheer wishful thinking. The more likley outcome is a renewed effort by the Chinese, particulalry the CCP formations and therefore an increased force level for the Japanese, just to hold the current line. They could try and withdraw from China to Manchuria, but this would only allow the Chinese to advance in their wake, and permit a link up with the British forces, which one could expect to be advancing up through Vietnam.

And this talk of 2000 Japanese tanks does not take into account the losses that had been suffered in China since 1937, or the continued need to provide tank support there as well. The Japanese had lost somewhere in the vicinity of 1000-1200 tanks since 1937 (I can be no more accurate than that). 

So this idea of raising another 50 divisions and another 1000 aircraft needs to be balanced against the fact that the Japanese were locked in a bitter struggle that they appeared to be losing, were not aware of the impending german attack (and were never going to be told either),

The other furphy was this idea that the japanese were going to win hearts and minds. Whilst as at December 1941 they had raised collaborationist forces in China totalling 669000 men, these were very rarely risked in battle, because they were so unreliable. 50% desertion rates were not unheard of, with the wepons they carried usually ending up in KMT or CCP hands. After the rape of Nanking, and the deaths of over 20 million Chinese citizens, the sparse populations in Far Eastern Russia were under no illusions as to what they might expect under a Japanese occupation. After the initial greetings, the true intentions of the nazis had soured any real hopes of "turning" the Russian population (though torture, racism and brainwashing did have its successes). This was never going to work in the Far East any better than in the West with the Russian population , in fact past Japanese abuses would probably have returned even less than it did for the germans


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## Soren (Jul 5, 2009)

Parsifal,

Please remember that I only listed three types of AFV's available to the Japanese. The Japanese had been using lots others in China from 1937 on. So the Japanese in all likelyhood actually had more than 2,000 tanks available by July 41.


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## Colin1 (Jul 5, 2009)

imalko said:


> Amounts of land lease equipment handed over to Soviet Union became huge only in 1943. Before that Allied help went to USSR in much smaller quantities. In September 1941 British sent what they could but this was more significant as morale buster then its actual value on the front.
> 
> (Why do we always have to return to this issue is beyond me.) Look at the total numbers of aircraft for example


_*Conversations with N G Golodnikov Part Four*
*A.S.* I was referring to the arguments that one frequently hears now, that if the quality of our aviation had been better, we could have accomplished what was required with fewer numbers.

*N.G.* Those who hold this position have a poor understanding of the subject. Numerical superiority with parity in equipment quality and flight crew training is a great thing. It will bring victory.
At the beginning of they war the Germans were beating us, and why? Tactics, radio communications, and so on. But what was the main reason? The Germans were able to create tactical and strategic numerical superiority.
In their initial attacks* the Germans destroyed an enormous number of aircraft*. The Germans bombed our equipment directly on the airfield and shot us down in aerial combat. What we were unable to evacuate we destroyed ourselves to prevent it falling into enemy hands. This all happened. But *there was still another cause that few mention*.

*A.S.* Insufficient training of Soviet pilots?

*N.G.* No, that’s not it. Our pilots were not bad. In fact, we had good pilots and we had outstanding pilots. The main reason was that *the Germans captured enormous number of facilities to produce and, particularly important, to repair aircraft. Plus gigantic reserves of spare parts were seized by the Germans.* 

This is why we did not have enough aircraft *in the first half of the war*.

The production of new aircraft had fallen sharply and it was impossible to rehabilitate and restore old types in the required quantities. *No aircraft! We had to get aircraft from every possible source*!
The Germans achieved numerical superiority and did not allow us to catch up. Continuous combat with no time to catch our breath! Losses, of course, occurred on both sides._

First half of the war takes us into the end of 1943, which is a little after your 'failing at the gates of Moscow' scenario.
If the Soviet Union 'had to get aircraft from every possible source' (bar their own, which seem to have been denied them) then where would those precious aircraft have come from, in sufficient numbers, to repel the Germans at Moscow?

Is it not fair to say that the Soviets were being kept on their feet by Lend-Lease aircraft from the US?


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## imalko (Jul 5, 2009)

Colin1 said:


> Is it not fair to say that the Soviets were being kept on their feet by Lend-Lease aircraft from the US?



Short answer: in December 1941 - no. Simple because there wasn't any US land lease aircraft delivered to USSR at that time, but only limited British shipments.

If this is your argument, then why did Germans fail at the gates of Moscow in 1941 if not because of their mistakes, logistic problems and *stiff Soviet resistance*. Moscow was defended almost completely by fighter units armed with Soviet build aircraft. Land lease equipment was (to my knowledge) mainly used at Leningrad and Murmansk at that time. But again *in 1941* Soviets received only that amount equipment which British were able to spare. This was valuable but not decisive.

In 1942 maybe, but to answer that correctly I would have to check for number of aircraft produced in USSR and those received by land lease during that year. First half of 1942 was critical in Soviet aircraft industry because many factories were relocated to the East and only beginning to restart their production. Later in the war land lease aircraft continued to provide usefull service supplementing Soviet aircraft production...


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## m kenny (Jul 5, 2009)

Hkans Aviation page - Sino-Japanese Air War 1937-45

East Asian / Pacific Area Minor Air Forces

Changing* from Donkeys to Mustangs



1931-39 The Japanese Army was issued 1,976 tanks and 167 A/Cars.

1n 1941/42 they got a further 1,941 tanks and 593 AFV's

By December 1941 The Army had 2,200 tanks

From Tank Power 10, Japanese Armour Vol 2 

AJ Press TankPower GunPower


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## Glider (Jul 5, 2009)

Soren said:


> Parsifal,
> 
> Please remember that I only listed three types of AFV's available to the Japanese. The Japanese had been using lots others in China from 1937 on. So the Japanese in all likelyhood actually had more than 2,000 tanks available by July 41.



Not really as the new types replaced the old tanks in the fighting units. They didn't create new units and keep the old ones running. Also as you would expect the older tanks were even worse that new ones.


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## m kenny (Jul 5, 2009)

Of the 70 Divisions used in the Soviet counter-attack before Moscow 11 had been transfered from Siberia. Thus though useful the Siberian's were hardly critical.


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## vikingBerserker (Jul 5, 2009)

That's 16% of the total, not exactly a small force.


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## m kenny (Jul 5, 2009)

Add in the 16 Divisions on the Kalinin Front and the 18 on the South West Front (the left/right flanks of Moscow)and that is another 34 non-Siberian Division.


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## vikingBerserker (Jul 5, 2009)

Perhaps you have lost me then, as I'm not sure how that affects the 11 Divisions transferred from Siberia still representing 16% of the force - which IMHO is a nice chunk.


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## parsifal (Jul 5, 2009)

Just as an aside. I think this has been an excellent choice of topic, and an excellent debate, whatever peoples opinions are. I have learnt a lot from all the submissions


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## parsifal (Jul 5, 2009)

vikingBerserker said:


> Perhaps you have lost me then, as I'm not sure how that affects the 11 Divisions transferred from Siberia still representing 16% of the force - which IMHO is a nice chunk.



I think what MK is alluding to is that the defence of Moscow, contrary to ppopular opinion, was not contingent upon the arrival of the Siberians. I concede that is rather controversial, but the fliup side is that the germans were so comprehensively defeated that an 11% shift in force availabilty is not going to make much of sa difference either way. Also, that the german attacks had actually stalled before the arrival of the Siberians....


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## m kenny (Jul 5, 2009)

vikingBerserker said:


> Perhaps you have lost me then, as I'm not sure how that affects the 11 Divisions transferred from Siberia ..................



17 in total were transfered. However only 11 used for the Moscow fighting. 6 were used in places as far apart as Finland and Smolensk. It seems they were not that 'critical' to Moscow and they could afford to spread them around.

And to clear another point up of the 104 Soviet Divisions on the 3 fronts around Moscow 11 were Siberian transfers.


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## parsifal (Jul 5, 2009)

m kenny said:


> 17 in total were transfered. However only 11 used for the Moscow fighting. 6 were used in places as far apart as Finland and Smolensk. It seems they were not that 'critical' to Moscow and they could afford to spread them around.
> 
> And to clear another point up of the 104 Soviet Divisions on the 3 fronts around Moscow 11 were Siberian transfers.




To be fair, though, these new formations were fresh, up to strength, and experienced as compared to many of the existing formations, would you not agree. They certainly are given prominent billing in many accounts, relating to the counterattack.

My opinion is that this counterattack could have occurred with or without the Siberians, but their presence facilitated the process so to speak


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## Glider (Jul 5, 2009)

I have added to my previous posting to try and complete the picture.

The Divisional Artillery for a Russian Rifle Division when compared to a standard Type B Japanese Infantry Division are as follows:-

*Russia*
Artillery Regiment of two Battalions each with 8 76mm guns and 4 122mm Howitzers
Howitzer Regiment of 24 122mm Howitzers and 12 152mm Howitzers
Anti Aircraft Battalion of 12 x 37mm and 12 x 76mm
Anti Tank Battalion of 18 x 45mm

Total 12 x 152mm Howitzer, 32 x 122mm Howitzer, 16 x 76mm Guns, 12 x 76mm Anti Aircraft/field gun, 12 x 37mm AA, 18 x 45mm Anti Tank

*Japanese Type B *36 x 75mm Howitzers

Looking at the Infantry component
*Japanese*
A Japanese Type B Infantry Division had three Infantry Regiments, each of which had 

114 light machine guns (LMG), 
108 50mm mortars (LMRT) (also known as grenade dischargers.)
24 heavy machine gun (HMG)
6 37mm or 47mm anti-tank guns (ATG), 
6 70mm battalion guns, 
4 75mm regimental guns

*Russian*
A Russian Rifle Division in July 1942 had three Infantry Regiments each with
4 x 45mm AT Guns 
4 x 76mm Guns
4 x 120mm Mortars
27 x 82mm Mortars
54 x 50mm Mortars
48 x AT Rifles
27 x HMG
168 x LMG


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## Freebird (Jul 6, 2009)

m kenny said:


> Of the 70 Divisions used in the Soviet counter-attack before Moscow 11 had been transfered from Siberia. Thus though useful the Siberian's were hardly critical.





parsifal said:


> To be fair, though, these new formations were fresh, up to strength, and experienced as compared to many of the existing formations, would you not agree. They certainly are given prominent billing in many accounts, relating to the counterattack.
> 
> My opinion is that this counterattack could have occurred with or without the Siberians, but their presence facilitated the process so to speak




Actually they were more critical than numbers suggest. In addition to being "fresh", they were tough, veteran divisions {the ones that had thrashed the Japanese earlier} not the green conscripts that STAVKA was throwing at the Germans. More importantly, the Siberian divisions were all WINTERIZED. The regular green Soviet divisions were almost as useless as the summer-equipped Germans, but these tough winter-equipped Siberian divisions played a huge role in the success of the attack.


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## parsifal (Jul 6, 2009)

There were experience and full strength units also on the western front. Its just that the Siberians represented an easy access ready reserve of assault troops


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## Glider (Jul 7, 2009)

Does anyone know how well the Japanes would have fared in a Russian Winter?


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## parsifal (Jul 7, 2009)

Well Manchuria is not much better than the depths of Siberia in terms of the cold, and parts of Japan are significantly colder than the relatively mild climates of western Europe. Japanese units in Manchuria were given as standard issue, a fur lined, double breasted coat with hood. They also were issued with fur lined boots and mits. However these items were probably less efficient against the cold than the Russian Valenki or the waterproof fur lined polaschubuk overcoats ansd similalrly waterproofed and quilted telogreika pants and undercoats. These and other items of clothing were unique to the Soviet army. The thick valenki boots were made of specially made compressed felt, were easily the best footwear of any combatant in the snow as were the similalry designed furlined mittens used by the Soviet winter troops. My wifes grandmother was married to a Siberian Cavlryman and she knitted some wolly socks for me (which I still have. These socks use a special knitted stitch that I never have see before....its is incredibly dense and easily the warmest woollen socks I have ever owned, easily superior to even the modern synthetic textiles availble today. Those funny little Russian peasant women that we all tend to laugh at know how to make clothes that are perfectly suited to the extreme Russian conditions...... 

The Germans did eventually try to copy this type of clothing but it was never as efficient as these domestically spun items in the Soviet Army. The difference was that the Soviets knew and had developed their items of kit from centuries of experience with the freezing cold conditions in Russia, whereas nationalities like the germans, whilst experiencing the cold conditions of western europe, had little experience with the utter mind numbing cold of the Russian steppes.

My German stepfather (yes, I have a german stepfather, and a Russian wife with a proud ancestry with the Siberian soldiery) tells me that it was quite common for soldiers to freeze to death whilst on sentry duty, or even whilst just taking a leak. He says that the german army, from top to bottom was totally unprepared for the conditions they had to face in that first winter. The equipment was only part of the issue, it was also psychological. 

Whilst I doubt that the Japanese personal kit was quite as good as that issued to the frontline Siberian troopers, I do think that psychologically they were more ready for the Siberian winters than the Germans were.


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## renrich (Jul 8, 2009)

During the Pacific War, Japan had around 1 M troops in China. If those or a large part of those had been used against Russia, they Japanese attack on the Soviets would have been formidable. I believe it is by no means certain that FDR could have gotten the American people and Congress ready to declare war on the Axis. If Japan had pulled troops out of China to attack Russia, FDR would have lost one of his arguments for war against the Axis, as he and his administration were very pro-Chinese.


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## parsifal (Jul 8, 2009)

renrich said:


> During the Pacific War, Japan had around 1 M troops in China. If those or a large part of those had been used against Russia, they Japanese attack on the Soviets would have been formidable. I believe it is by no means certain that FDR could have gotten the American people and Congress ready to declare war on the Axis. If Japan had pulled troops out of China to attack Russia, FDR would have lost one of his arguments for war against the Axis, as he and his administration were very pro-Chinese.




Maybe, but this then overturns one of the parameters of the scenario....namely a war that continues to involve China. Are the parameters now changing such that somehow Chiina is no longer in the war. How could the Japanese pull out 1 million men from the Chinese TO to concentrate on Russia, without massive and dire consequences if the Chinese (and the allies, less the US), were still in the war????

Your statement also fails to take into account that the US was planning on entering the war anyway, around March or April of 1942. It also fails to take into account the much enhanced level of Lend Lease that would arise from a continuing neutrality of the US forces


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## Amsel (Jul 8, 2009)

renrich said:


> During the Pacific War, Japan had around 1 M troops in China. If those or a large part of those had been used against Russia, they Japanese attack on the Soviets would have been formidable. I believe it is by no means certain that FDR could have gotten the American people and Congress ready to declare war on the Axis. If Japan had pulled troops out of China to attack Russia, FDR would have lost one of his arguments for war against the Axis, as he and his administration were very pro-Chinese.


What if Japan not only pulled out of China to show some "goodwill" towards the US while it redeployed its troops, but signed a non-agression deal over the Phillipines.


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## m kenny (Jul 8, 2009)

I got the data from here

Axis History Forum • View topic - On Russian tactics being responsible for high casualties

10th post down. There are some qualifiers under the frostbite numbers.


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## parsifal (Jul 8, 2009)

Amsel said:


> What if Japan not only pulled out of China to show some "goodwill" towards the US while it redeployed its troops, but signed a non-agression deal over the Phillipines.



If Japan did that there would be no reason for the US to enter the war, but not for the reason you think. The principal result of that action would be an internal collapse of the government in Japan, and a very high likelihood of a full blown civil war. Under those circumstances, there would be no invasion of the Soviet Union.

The inevitability of a conflict between Japan and the US goes all the way back to Commodore Perry in 1851. From that point on, the US and Japan were set to a collision course that was unavoidable unless major changes occurred in the national pschologyy of wither or both nations. The US stood for Open Door and free trade, but still essentially a colonialist approach to Asia (even if they cannot admit that). The Japanese were far more overtly imperialist, into spheres of influence, closed blocs and the like. The two philospohies are so antipathetic to each other that a war was always going to be the only way such a difference was going to be resolved, l


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## Amsel (Jul 8, 2009)

I see, and agree somewhat. I was more interested in the USN heading out to the Atlantic and Med in full force to deal with Germany and Italy, which was deemed much more important then anything in the Pacific. That would allow Japan a little more breathing room for its invasion of Russia. With Churchill so adamant about making sure that Europe was first priority, then Roosevelt would have much less of a reason to attack Japan. I am familiar with Japans' Southern Strike Plan as well as Plan Orange and the Rainbow Plans. War was inevitable but without the catalyst would the US attack Japan or steam full strength into the Atlantic to rescue Churchill?


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## parsifal (Jul 8, 2009)

Amsel said:


> I see, and agree somewhat. I was more interested in the USN heading out to the Atlantic and Med in full force to deal with Germany and Italy, which was deemed much more important then anything in the Pacific. That would allow Japan a little more breathing room for its invasion of Russia. With Churchill so adamant about making sure that Europe was first priority, then Roosevelt would have much less of a reason to attack Japan. I am familiar with Japans' Southern Strike Plan as well as Plan Orange and the Rainbow Plans. War was inevitable but without the catalyst would the US attack Japan or steam full strength into the Atlantic to rescue Churchill?




It might have been possible for japan to delay the entry of the US, by some measure of appeasement on their behalf. However by 1941 the US was so entrenched in its opposition to Japanese aggression that only a full withdrawal from China (and I suspect very strongly this included Manchuria), would placate their resolve to go to war over it.

So whilst it was japanese aggression that provided the raison detre for war, it was the US that was very much calling the shots that led to war. If they did not want war, all the US had to do was to relax the embargo conditions, but i can only see that happening if Japan gives up all of China. That was something never likley to happen. 

What surprised the Americans was the absolute audacity of the Japanese attacks. Nobody ever thought the japanese would attack the US Pacific Fleet in Pearl. The US administration accepted an attack into the Philipinnes, perhaps even Malaya, but a surprise attack into Pearl....not possible....or so they thought. Moreover, it was thought that the "superior" US airpower in the form of the B-17s and the fighters on Luzon could deal an effective blow to Japanese air and sepower in the region. They obviously over-estimated the strength of their own hand, and under-estimated the abilities of the japanese in this assessment. They also had obviously never studied the modus operandi of every major Japanese offensive since 1895, and had not paid all that much attention to the events in Europe....Taranto in particular


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## Soren (Jul 9, 2009)

parsifal said:


> Hi MK
> 
> I dont support Sorens statement either, which is essentially that irt was the weather that defeated the Germans and on his figures, virtually no casualties due to Soviet action.




Parsifal please don't put words into my mouth. I never claimed that hardly any German were killed due to Soviet action, plenty were! But the fact still remains that hundreds of thousands died due to the winter cold alone, and this no doubt had a dramatic effect on the outcome of the war.

The winter of 41 42 stalled the German advance and reduced it to a crawl. The soldiers could hardly complete even the most simple of daily tasks because of the cold and the fact that they weren't wearing the proper winter clothing.

By 1943 measures had been taken to solve the issue much better than previously, and most troops outside of Stalingrad did recieve winter equipment clothing by this time, but not the 6th Army. And it was the 6th Army which most crucially needed it.


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## proton45 (Jul 9, 2009)

I have just one more thought on the issue..."If" Japan never attacked the USA, would the average American soldier have been as resolute in the face of prolonged combat as they where after Pearl Harbor? The attack on PH really galvanized American attitude towards involvement in an "all out" war of attrition...

At the least it would have set Americas involvement in the war back by a couple of years...


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## Juha (Jul 9, 2009)

Soren
In the photo in your message #198 all the Germans seems to have proper warm overcoat and ears covered so they were better clothed than many of the German PoWs taken during winter 41/42.
And I wonder why you think that troops of 6th A needed more crucially winter clothing than the troops further north?

Quote:"that hundreds of thousands died due to the winter cold alone"

When? What reasons are incl? And most importantly, your source? As M_Kenny wrote, frosbite deaths were ca 3500 during winter 41/42 which was a hard winter and to which Heer wasn't prepared.

Proton
the motivation point is a good one. The USA involvement to war is more complicated question, FDR was seeking confrontation with Axis at least most of 41. Sooner or later something so big might have happened that would have made it possible for US to enter war. Also IIRC at least Halsey was in very agressive mood already before PH so it wasn't impossible that something that could have escalated into war would have happened sooner or later. 

Juha


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## Soren (Jul 9, 2009)

Juha, look at their uniforms once more, it AINT std. German winter uniforms. The clothing they have on in that picture is mostly improvised by use of different pieces of cloth etc etc. The overcoat you're looking at, the M36 Wool overcoat, was suited for mildly cold weather only, it was not suited for -30 degree winter!

Here's what the Germans needed and were waiting for(German WInter Parka):


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## Juha (Jul 9, 2009)

Checked by myself. In Heer, at all fronts and incl Ersatzheer 160237 men died in accidents, sickness etc non-combat causes from 1.9.39 to 31.1.45. So “hundreds of thousands died due to the winter cold alone” didn’t hold water. My source: Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau Sept 1962.

Juha


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## Juha (Jul 9, 2009)

On winter parka
now that for camouflage, that would not keep you warm. Have used a same type in Finnish army. It’s good that it isn’t very warm cloth because during winter one needs much less clothing if one is marching through thick snow than when one is standing in guard duty. So what is important what one has under it. To survive in winter element the first importance is to keep warm so in that good overcoat is much better than a winter parka. So if you want to survive in -30 deg C I strongly recommended M36 wool overcoat over a winter parka if you have only normal cloaths under one of them. If you have a good woollen pullover etc and you want to be difficult to see in snowcovered enviroment, then the parka is the right choice.

Juha


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## Soren (Jul 9, 2009)

Juha, if you wanna go by that list then there were only roughly 1.4 million German casualties on the Eastern front.


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## Soren (Jul 9, 2009)

I'd definitely go for the padded Parka over the M36 wool overcoat any day ! And that was also what the Germans wanted. They wanted warm clothing they could fight in.

The M36 wool coat was not meant for -30 degree winters.

The Germans awaited dedicated winter combat uniforms such as the below, the _Wintertarnanzug_ uniforms, it was the only thing that could keep them warm enough. The M36 coat, which was supplied from the start of the conflict, wasn't anywhere near enough.


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## Juha (Jul 9, 2009)

Soren
Quote:"Juha, if you wanna go by that list then there were only roughly 1.4 million German casualties on the Eastern front. "

Wrong, In East 1.105.987KIA 1.018.365MIA and 3.498.059WIA. A bit more than 1.4mil.
And your source on death because of cold was...?

On clothing, I have participated in military manouvres in -30deg C, so I have a first hand experience and can tell you that you have got it wrong. We carried a rolled woollen overcoat over our rucksacks just because if the temperature fell near -30deg and we could not make fire for tactical reasons we put it over. That was almost only use of that overcoat.

Juha


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## Colin1 (Jul 9, 2009)

Juha said:


> We carry a rolled woollen overcoat over our rucksacks just because if the temperature fell near -30deg and we could not make fire for tactical reasons we put it over


Sorry Juha
I don't quite understand you, 'put it over' what?
I've got alot of arctic warfare training experience, I was just interested but couldn't make out what you meant


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## Juha (Jul 9, 2009)

Colin
in winter if we stopped for a while and didn't put up a tent or could make a campfire and it was very cold we put our woollen overcoat on. We kept it tightly rolled otherwise and almost never used it and opened the roll seldom, only when we had to, because of inspection etc, because it had to be rolled in certain way so that it would look neat. We had long underwears, army shirts, wollen pullover, our normal service dress made from sarka, whatever it is in english, winter camo suit, 2 pairs of socks, army boots, balavanka or whatever (wollen head and throat cloth), helmet with camo cover. Wollen glovers so one could shoot and IIRC something over it rukkanen in finnish, more water- and windproof. IIRC I used the wollen overcoat only 2-3times during my service. And of course that was the max clothing, in milder weather or for ex while marching through deep snow one kept less cloths under camo suit.
Our camo suit was two sided, summer and winter camo sides. During a hot summer day we had only our underpants under camo suit and foot and headgear.

Oh a short answer, over everything

Juha


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## Colin1 (Jul 9, 2009)

OK
I was wondering if you meant 'over head' like a shelter. We used alot of Norwegian kit, one was a diamond-shaped canvas with aluminium studs all around the perimeter. We'd have one each and they could be buttoned together to make a shelter. This usually necessitated taking mittens off and I don't know if you've ever tried forcing aluminium through stiff canvas with your bare hands in minus temperatures...

Sections tried keeping them buttoned together for this reason and giving it to one man to carry, while they carried other kit of his to make room in his bergen - bloody heavy, esp if its got an accumulation of snow/frost on it.


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## Juha (Jul 9, 2009)

Hello Colin
Winters are or at least were much harder here, the effect of Golf stream is clearly weaker here, so we had ½ platoon tents and iron stove system. On our guerrilla warfare training, we skied nights and rested days if we had not some special duties to do, for ex attack on enemy supply vehicles, we had the regular stove replaced by a sheet metal one. Now we not exactly waited our tent carrying turn. It wasn’t so easy to go downhill with so much extra weight on your back and in dark. Not that uphill climbing was easy but it only was hard. Once the man front of me hit a tree on rather steep slope, he was just too tired to turn in time in slight curve, thinks happened fast in dark and at fairly fast speed. He was carrying the stove and the pipe so it was rather noisy. Fortunately he was not badly hurt not enough even for a pass to first aid station.

Juha

ADDUM: Now after sleeping over it it might well have been that during guerilla training our tent was a smaller 10 man guerilla tent with the above mentioned sheet metal stove


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jul 9, 2009)

I have removed certain posts from this thread that were about Stalingrad and not Japan vs. Russia. If you wish to continue to discuss that topic, you may do so here:

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww...ange-name-when-i-find-one-suitable-19573.html


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## renrich (Jul 9, 2009)

Since I was the one who started this discussion, I don't recall that having Japan continuing to invade China was part of the scenario. I said that the Japanese would only attack the British in China(Hong Kong) and Malaya and the Dutch in the East Indies and not the US at PH. If they decided to launch an offensive against the Soviets to help their allies, Germany and Italy, they might very well have discontinued any advances in China or even pulled back from that country. I am not aware of any intention of the FDR administration to go to war with the Axis in 1942. That would be subject to the will of Congress and the people of the US. There was a great deal of anti war sentiment in the US at that time and it is not a foregone conclusion that FDR could have obtained the support needed to go to war without provacation against Germany or Japan, especially since Hitler showed no inclination to invade Britain. The fact is that Japan did the world and especially Britain a favor when it attacked PH. America became aroused and energised and was ready for war. If Hitler and the leaders of Japan had been more rational, they possibly could have achieved their war aims. Japan could have held it's gains in China and conquered most of Southeast Asia including Australia with all the natural resources included. Hitler could have have ceased submarine warfare against Britain,and negotiated a truce with that country, maintained his gains in Europe and subjugated Russia. Course, if Hitler and Tojo, et al, had been rational, they would probably have not started the war at all.


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## Juha (Jul 9, 2009)

Being one who has got a forest fighting training I’ll like to make a couple points. Firstly it was it’s own kind of war, rather different to fighting in more open environment. Soviet troops in Siberia were good in it, Japanese, more difficult to say but they could not have been too bad as shown in SE Asia jungle fighting. Because of short ranges and full of unexpected situations submachine guns were ideal of that kind of war, in that Soviets were better equipped. For arty, howitzers suited better and arty needed many fire control teams. Not that 76mm cannon was totally unsuited Finnish army’s main gun was Russian 76mm field gun Model 02, but only because we had got many of them in 1918 from Russian army. Plans were to replace it by a 105mm howitzer but the war intervened. Bigger calibre shell were a plus, especially when winter came, because of deep snow weaken the effects of shell fire. One also needed fuzes suited to sub zero temperatures, Soviet had those. Also their numerous mortars were effective in that kind of war. During winter time ability to ski is crucial for mobility.

Juha


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## Juha (Jul 9, 2009)

Renrich
FDR's action in Atlantic, US taking over escort further and further to east and destroyers giving help to RN in convoy escort missions had already led to some indicences. At least one DD was sunk while an another was badly dam while helping a RN/RCN escort during a night time convoy battle.

In Pac at least Halsey seems to have been ready to attack Jap ships on lightest pretext. So after a naval battle between IJN and US I doubt that Congress would say, oh sh*t happened. Of course at least in late 60s you would have had a full pol debate on US agressiveness against Japan

Juha


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## Juha (Jul 9, 2009)

On Japanese withdrawling from China, not likely. Their leaders had thought that unacceptable and had chosen to risk everything instead and attack PH and SE Asia. The fuel embargo had left to them only two choices, either withdraw from China or attack US which was the force behind the embargo. They saw China market essential for their economy. That's why they attack China in first place.

Juha


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## Freebird (Jul 9, 2009)

renrich said:


> Since I was the one who started this discussion, I don't recall that having Japan continuing to invade China was part of the scenario. I said that the Japanese would only attack the British in China(Hong Kong) and Malaya and the Dutch in the East Indies and not the US at PH. If they decided to launch an offensive against the Soviets to help their allies, Germany and Italy, they might very well have discontinued any advances in China or even pulled back from that country.





Juha said:


> On Japanese withdrawling from China, not likely. Their leaders had thought that unacceptable and had chosen to risk everything instead and attack PH and SE Asia. The fuel embargo had left to them only two choices, either withdraw from China or attack US which was the force behind the embargo. They saw China market essential for their economy. That's why they attack China in first place.
> 
> Juha



Renrich, Juha is exactly correct, if you read the transcripts of the Imperial Japanese conferences in 1941 {translated of course! } their *PRIMARY* goal was to conquer China and it's vast resources. They would not give this up for anything, and in fact even the Emperor couldn't order it, as the IJA was solidly in favor, and had alot of political power. 

There is also very little of value in the Soviet far East to the Japanese, it was only really of great value to the Russians to connect to Vladivostok.

However, in regards to your scenario, it is possible that the Axis would come to some kind of "deal", where the Japanese would attack the Far East as a diversion, for the promise of some Siberian Mongolian territory later. The Japanese attack is unlikely to make much headway, however, by tying up the Siberian troops it makes the Russian winter counter-attack of 1941-1942 very much more difficult, as winter troops were what made the difference.


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## Soren (Jul 9, 2009)

Juha said:


> On clothing, I have participated in military manouvres in -30deg C, so I have a first hand experience and can tell you that you have got it wrong. We carried a rolled woollen overcoat over our rucksacks just because if the temperature fell near -30deg and we could not make fire for tactical reasons we put it over. That was almost only use of that overcoat.
> 
> Juha



I'm sorry I haven't gotten it wrong Juha, you have. I've been to pretty much every climate you can imagine, including Siberia, and I'm telling you the padded Parka combination is a far superior winter combat uniform than anything similar to the M36 wool greatcoat. And you know what ? The Soviets, which were familiar with harsh winter weather, ironically enough agree with me. Hence why you see them wearing padded parka's and hence why the German military specifically asked for the Wintertarnanzug uniforms to replace the M36 wool coats which were NOT warm enough. 

The M36 greatcoat was issued in full quantity from way before the start of the war, and was NOT meant for -30 degree temperatures, and nothing you will say can ever change that Juha. It was NOT warm enough, and thus the Wehrmacht SS both requested dedicated winter uniforms, and the result was the Wintertarnanzug series of uniforms. And from 1943 onwards a full shift was made to the Wintertarnanzug uniforms. Up until then, in 41 42, German troops had tried many makeshift impros to better keep warm in the equipment they were issued with from when they first stepped into the USSR. And this included lots of undergarments and extra tunics beneath the M36 greatcoat and a white sheet cover over the top to provide the camoflage that the M36 also didn't provide.

In short the German POWs you see on the photo I presented are undeniably underdressed! You can easily see how they tried with different makeshift improvisations to keep warm because their std. trenchcoat simply wasn't warm enough.


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## parsifal (Jul 9, 2009)

Soviet theories on thermal insulation , and indeed everyone really is about getting still airpockets close to the body, rather than having tight fitting snug clothing. Look at the arctic gear being used today.....its very buly and loose fitting for that very reason.

The Soviets solved this problem in a slightly diffferent (and I believe better, and unique) way. They used a garment loosely described as Telogreika. This garment was quilted and made from thick cotton padding. The air pockets were literally sown into the garment itself. This special weave combined the advantages of a relatively snug fitting garment with the crucial needs of proper thermal insulation . In my opinion, it was the best solution devised to a difficult problem.


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## Soren (Jul 9, 2009)

Very true Parsifal!

The Soviets knew what they were doing when it came to winterclothing, and the Germans pretty much just copied them with the Wintertarnanzug uniforms, which were basically just improved versions of the dedicated winterclothing that the Soviets issued.

The std. German winter parka issued in 44 to 45 (Below). Note the grey colour instead of the previous white, this was altered because the white easily got stained, removing the snow white camoflage effect, and was difficult to wash. Thus the white was changed to grey, and simple thin trouser jacket sheets were issued to be put over instead in snowy conditions. These thin sheets were also a lot easier to clean. The autumn camoflage was generally kept throughout and could be shifted to in seconds by turning the coat inside out.


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## parsifal (Jul 9, 2009)

What this Soviet Kit looked like.....

the white garment was not the thermal layer, it serves primarily as camourflage, as wind protection, and as a waterproof layer. The thermal protection was derived from the quited gament and the Valenki boots also shown in these figures


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## Soren (Jul 9, 2009)

Another German padded parka, this one from 1944 (Note the rectangular pattern):


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## renrich (Jul 9, 2009)

FB, I understand that Japan wanted the land and resources of China and that is why, according to some historians, they started WW2 in 1937 by invading China. However, the conquest of China did not benefit the Japanese as much as they had hoped and I think it is plausible, assuming the Japanese military was rational, which is a big assumption, that the Japanese could have decided their interests might be better served by acting as a good ally to Germany by supporting the 1941 attack on Russia with troops from the China forces and winding up with theoretically a chunk of western Russia, Malaya, Indo China, the East Indies and perhaps Australia. In retrospect that should have satisfied even Japan. China is a big country, but I have recently read that around half of China is above 5000 feet which really cuts down on arable land. China was not as big a prize as Japan imagined it would be and it kind of acted in the role of a tar baby for the Japanese. Anyway, this is all fantasy but at least is fun to speculate about.


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## Soren (Jul 9, 2009)

Yeah lets get back on topic.

As I've already stated the Japanese just needed to occupy as many Soviet soldiers material in the east as possible, making life easier for the Germans in the west.

The combined Japanese airforce (IJNAF IJAAF) was gonna have no trouble against the VVS, they would've quickly obtained air superiority in the region. But on the ground the Japanese were gonna have to fight hard. The a/c would provide a lot of help, but most of the job had to be finished by the troops on the ground.

In terms of infantry equipment on an individual basis the Japanese Soviets were the equals of each other, and in terms of available tanks there wouldn't be much difference either. The Soviets however could muster heavier artillery, so the Japanese had to counter that with their bomber force. 

The next challenge for the Japanese was the eventual winter fighting, the Soviets were more familiar with this. It would probably take several months before the Japanese got it proper sorted.

So while I believe that the Japanese would advance steadily, it wouldn't be a cake run, but it didn't have to be either. The Germans were delivering the killing blows in the west, the Japanese just had to add that extra pressure needed to stay on track once Hitler made his major mistakes.


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## parsifal (Jul 9, 2009)

renrich said:


> FB, I understand that Japan wanted the land and resources of China and that is why, according to some historians, they started WW2 in 1937 by invading China. However, the conquest of China did not benefit the Japanese as much as they had hoped and I think it is plausible, assuming the Japanese military was rational, which is a big assumption, that the Japanese could have decided their interests might be better served by acting as a good ally to Germany by supporting the 1941 attack on Russia with troops from the China forces and winding up with theoretically a chunk of western Russia, Malaya, Indo China, the East Indies and perhaps Australia. In retrospect that should have satisfied even Japan. China is a big country, but I have recently read that around half of China is above 5000 feet which really cuts down on arable land. China was not as big a prize as Japan imagined it would be and it kind of acted in the role of a tar baby for the Japanese. Anyway, this is all fantasy but atleast is fun to speculate about.



Ren

what are the chinese doing whilst all this adventuring with the japanese army is occurring?


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## Juha (Jul 10, 2009)

Soren
Look your photo in your message #193 inside the hood of the upper white camo parka one sees the green redbrown non-winter camo, so one can turn it over and use it also in summer. Are you suggesting that Germans were using their warmest cloth also as summer camo suit or at least spring/autumn camo. And everyone can see that the parka is made from rather thin material and thickness is very important for insulations.

Here we think that many thin layers is much better than one thick, first of all because one can easily add or remove a layer as needed according the temperature or workload, under hard work muscles generates lot of heat and one not need so much clothing, when one stops one needs warmer cloth and easiest way to get one is to add one or two more layers not to change from one overcoat to thicker one. That’s why camo suits are rather thin as the parka in your photo. So one could use it irrespective the temp. 

Parsifal
IMHO the finnish system is better in Northern European environment, in Arctic, Antarctic, Northern Canada and NE Siberia one might need a bit more insulation.
The Valenki boots were great as a child I had ones. It's huopasaapas in finnish.

Juha


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## Juha (Jul 10, 2009)

Renrich
Japanese needed the resources but especially the markets of China, hundreds of millions potential customers for their products.

And as I wrote Soviets had more light automatic weapons, more heavier mortars and arty so they were better equipped for forest fighting. And forests shields well troops from air attacks even if IMHO VVS wuold have been clearly harder nut for Japanese than Soren thinks. Nomonhan made a significant impact also to JAAF thinking.

Juha


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## Clay_Allison (Jul 10, 2009)

I only see this as potentially workable if the Japanese attacked Russia but NOT China and the other Asian nations. If the US saw Imperial Japan attacking a communist regime that was not well regarded here, who is to say we wouldn't SELL the Japanese weapons?

Imagine them driving into the Russian far east in Shermans and Jeeps.


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## parsifal (Jul 10, 2009)

Juha said:


> Soren
> 
> Parsifal
> IMHO the finnish system is better in Northern European environment, in Arctic, Antarctic, Northern Canada and NE Siberia one might need a bit more insulation.
> ...




Juha

Accepted. I think it goes without saying Finns knew best of all how to fight in the cold


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## Juha (Jul 10, 2009)

Clay
SU wasn't a big bad bear to FDR's administration, or to many US industrialist in 30s, most Soviet trucks were SU made Fords from late 30s onwards because Ford sell a big lorry factory to them, US also sell to SU aviation fuel even during the Winter War IIRC and IIRC one big tyre firm sold a big tyre factory there and a US naval architect firm made BB design for Soviets.
Japan on the other hand was seen as a treat and as wrote earlier was punished by harsh economic sactions because of its actions in China and Indo-China.

Juha


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## Amsel (Jul 10, 2009)

The Japanese did not have a whole lot to fear on the high seas as well. The IJN clearly outmatched the USN in ships and tactics from WWI and on. The Japanese were a major threat to the Pacific rim.


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## renrich (Jul 10, 2009)

Michael, the Chinese did not make a great deal of effort to fight the Japanese during WW2, especially the Communists. They were more interested in fighting one another and stealing from the people. Chiang made just enough effort to keep the US sending support. Mao was more interested in getting ready for the struggle when the war was over. They both fought one another as much or more than the Japanese. The idea of China being a market for Japanese goods in the 1940s is far fetched. China was very poor and had little buying power for manufactured goods. The FDR administration did not regard the Soviet Union as a major threat during WW2. Churchill continually tried to get FDR to understand the Russian menace but failed. FDR actually wrote that, after the war, the Soviets would become more like us and we would become more like them. Prophetic!


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## Freebird (Jul 10, 2009)

Amsel said:


> The Japanese did not have a whole lot to fear on the high seas as well. The IJN clearly outmatched the USN in ships and tactics from WWI and on. The Japanese were a major threat to the Pacific rim.



Hard to see that except in hindsight. The US Pacific fleet was seen as at least equal to the Japanese, and if the British could muster a smaller fleet, they would outnumber the Japanese 3 to 2 in everything except aircraft carriers, which would be about equal. This was the thinking in the fall of '41



Clay_Allison said:


> I only see this as potentially workable if the Japanese attacked Russia but NOT China and the other Asian nations. If the US saw Imperial Japan attacking a communist regime that was not well regarded here, who is to say we wouldn't SELL the Japanese weapons?
> 
> Imagine them driving into the Russian far east in Shermans and Jeeps.



Not doing to get too far in a Sherman vs a KV I. 

It still doesn't work Clay, because capturing China was the whole reason for the Pacific war, it was like the "Lebensraum" for the Japanese. They were willing to sacrifice everything for this.



renrich said:


> Since I was the one who started this discussion, I don't recall that having Japan continuing to invade China was part of the scenario. .



It's not really possible to see how they would do this. The Japanese intent was to subjugate China, which was weak at the time, and the Japanese preferred to avoid conflict with the US Europeans, at least until the late 40's when their industrial base would be bigger



renrich said:


> I said that the Japanese would only attack the British in China(Hong Kong) and Malaya and the Dutch in the East Indies and not the US at PH..



The scenario could be plausible - but if the Japanese still keep the front open in China. It would be possible 
to attack Russia using 70 or 80 thousand, drawn from the troops that would have been used to attack the Philippines.



renrich said:


> If they decided to launch an offensive against the Soviets to help their allies, Germany and Italy, they might very well have discontinued any advances in China or even pulled back from that country..



Not likely, as there not nearly as much of value in the Soviet Far East, compared to China. The Japanese showed almost zero interest in "helping their allies", as the 3rd largest source of lend-Lease aid to Russia was made through Vladivostok by Russian freighters, under the noses of the Japanese fleet! 




renrich said:


> Japan could have held it's gains in China and conquered most of Southeast Asia including Australia with all the natural resources included..



Australia was never in their plans, it was seen as too difficult and too far away
Southeast asia WAS in their long term plans, just not as soon as 1941-1942



renrich said:


> Hitler could have have ceased submarine warfare against Britain,and negotiated a truce with that country, maintained his gains in Europe and subjugated Russia..



That was exactly what he tried, but Churchill refused. The British stranglehold on German imports, continued bombing of German targets, and meddling in operations {ie Greece, Yugoslavia, Aid to Russia meant that no truce was possible



renrich said:


> Course, if Hitler and Tojo, et al, had been rational, they would probably have not started the war at all.



Indeed, had the Axis cooperated even a quarter as much as the Allies, they could very well have beaten Russia China


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## Soren (Jul 10, 2009)

Juha said:


> Look your photo in your message #193 inside the hood of the upper white camo parka one sees the green redbrown non-winter camo, so one can turn it over and use it also in summer. Are you suggesting that Germans were using their warmest cloth also as summer camo suit or at least spring/autumn camo. And everyone can see that the parka is made from rather thin material and thickness is very important for insulations.



Sorry Juha but again you are wrong. The camo you see on the inside (dark brown, light green etc) outside (White) of the Parka I presented is the German late autumn/winter camoflage pattern, it was NOT used in the summer. The camoflaged summer uniforms or smocks which you seem to be refering to are a lot thinner and NOT meant for winter! The padded Parka in post #193 is thick and meant for winter use only, it was NOT worn in the summer (Unless one wished to get a heat stroke ofcourse). I've tried on several of these pieces of clothing at reenactment fairs, and during my stay in the miltary we wore similiar type Parkas in snowy winter conditions such as in Norway Greenland, having been to both places many many times. Only time we wore something even thicker was when we went out on long expeditions in Greenland, we wore thick anoraks for that.

Same padded Parka as in post #193, part of the Wintertarnanzug series:






Another German padded parka, this one with Autumn Oak camo:





And here's a camoflaged summer uniform smock (BIG difference from the Parka!):





As for the magnitude of layers, there you are right however, but a thick overcoat like a winter Parka is always needed when the temperature is at or below -30 degrees Celcius. Staying warm at such a temperature is hard enough as it is.


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## renrich (Jul 10, 2009)

FB, I have a recent book which I have quoted which claims that the Japanese planned to have 2 M of their people moved to Australia by 1950. Sounds like they intended to take over to me. Good book about the last year of the war in the PTO, "Retribution" by Hastings.


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## parsifal (Jul 10, 2009)

renrich said:


> Michael, the Chinese did not make a great deal of effort to fight the Japanese during WW2, especially the Communists. They were more interested in fighting one another and stealing from the people. Chiang made just enough effort to keep the US sending support. Mao was more interested in getting ready for the struggle when the war was over. They both fought one another as much or more than the Japanese. The idea of China being a market for Japanese goods in the 1940s is far fetched. China was very poor and had little buying power for manufactured goods. The FDR administration did not regard the Soviet Union as a major threat during WW2. Churchill continually tried to get FDR to understand the Russian menace but failed. FDR actually wrote that, after the war, the Soviets would become more like us and we would become more like them. Prophetic!



The Chinese , particularly the Communists were responsible for over 1.5 million casualties to the Japanese Army, prior to 1941. After 1941, the total casualty bill for the Japanese was about 1.5 million. These are military deaths, so I am excluding the Civilain deaths from places like Hiroshima. Of this latter total, the US and Australians were responsible for approximately 350000 and the British, Indian, and other Commonwealth forces were responsible for another 350000 roughly (I can get more precise figures, but these will do for the purposes of this discussion). The Russians are estimated to have caused approximately 100000 casualties in their 1945 offensive (a rough guess, because the figures get mixed up with postwar deaths.....Russia took a million Japanese prisoner, 200000 returned from the death camps in 1952. If you include the estimated postwar deaths at the hands of the Russians the Japanese butchers bill clims to about 2.2 million military deaths and approximately 800K civilian deaths ) 

After factoring in all these other effects, that leaves 7-800000 casualties as a result of Chinese activities . That is a marked turn down in lethality, caused by the Nationalists unwillingness to engage in open battle after 1941. That unwillingness was brought about by an expectatiuon that the US could win without Chinas continued help, and by the simple logistic relaities arising from the Burma Road. The KMT was also perparing for the post war show down with the Communists. All of this is true , but your assertion that the Communists were busily ripping off the peasants was not true as a generalization. The communists survival was based on their successful implementation of a "hearts and minds" campaign. They relied very heavily on the goodwill of the peasantry to survive. They certainly managed to do this, as the final outcome in 1949 demonstrates. Its also untrue that the Communists were sitting back doing nothing, or even that they doing less than the KMT. The greatest victory of the Chinese, prior to 1941 was "100 Regiments" in 1940. This was fought by the Communits, and inflicted approximately 50000 casualties on the japanese. Thats Iwo several times over just to put it into a US perspective. I would not call that "sitting back and doing nothing.

China was critical to the battles in the Pacific for the simple reason that it tied down so much of the Japanese Army and air force, allowing the Allies a great deal of freedom in other theatres. If the US had not entered the war, AND the Chinese can be given better access to logistic support, based on the pre-1941 trends, it is very likley that Chinese activity would have increased markedly. The style of warfare in China is not so much one of sweeping, successful offensives, rather it was a constant battle of attrition, small scale battles (that nevertheless would register as large battles in western vernacular). 

If the Chinese were getting better access to resources, and the japanese were the same or smaller in their force structure, the inevitable is going to happen, the japanese are going to buckle, and possibly break. 

IN 1940 China was seen as the sleeping giant that she was. With a populatiuon of 50000000 people, she was seen as a latent market, a manpower source, and a source of raw materials, not just by the Japanese, but by everybody. The US wanted a continuation of the open door policy, ie competion on a level playing field for Chinese trade. The Japanese wanted to establish thei "greater east asian co-prosperity sphere" which is a fancy way of saying they wanted to establish a closed trading bloc, excluding the european nations from trade in China. If they had managed to do that, the japaneseeconomy would have exploded. It was far fetched as you say, because it was an unnattainable goal, but it was a goal believed in nevertheless by the Japanese


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## renrich (Jul 10, 2009)

" Most of Mao's forces, however spent the war struggling to feed themselves and survive, skirmishing only spasmodically with the Japanese. Today, the myth of Communist dominance of the struggle against the ocuppiers is discredited even in China. If Chiang's armies were less than effective on the battlefield. Mao's guerillas lacked either the will or the combat power to do more than irritate the Japanese. By 1944, 70 per cent of Japan's forces in China were committed against the Nationalists. A staff officer at Japan's army headquarters in Nanjing, Maj. Shigeru Funaki, said: 'The Communists operated in regions that were strategically unimportant to us.Their troops were much more motivated than the Nationalists, but we sought only to contain them. Our attention was overwhelmingly concentrated on confronting Chiang's forces further south."
"The Communists were not strong enough to offer a major challenge to the Japanese occupation," says a modern Chinese historian, Yang Jinghua. "In the anti-japanese war the Kuomintang did most of the fighting and killed far more of the enemy--- I say this, as a Communist Party member for 30 years. Statistics tell the story. Some 1200 KMT generals died fighting the Japanese, against just ten Communist ones." Page 405, "Retribution," Max Hastings, copyright, 2007. Joe Stilwell and the British Generals in the CBI would probably disagree with your evaluation of the KMT's contributions toward winning the war against Japan.


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## Amsel (Jul 10, 2009)

I thought the comment was kind of odd, that the Chinese Reds were the main cause of Japanese casualties.


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## Juha (Jul 11, 2009)

Hello Renrich
Chinese were not particularly rich much there were many of them. And the upper and middle class had reasonable spending power. Next is from an article I read some 35 years ago from Kuohuva Vuosisata magazine, not entire sure on timeline but otherwise it should be correct.
Japan was hit very hard by the Great Depression and the rise of protectionism that followed. Sometimes during 20s Japan had given 21 demands to China but nationalist Chinese had replied with boycotting Japanese goods. When the depression hit part of Japanese elite saw that they needed a great closed marked area, China, for the products of their economy because their society could not stand massive decreasing of production and they could not rely on Western markets.
Manchuria was a different scenario, from there they got at least coal and Jap Gov actively encouraged emigration of Japanese there. Mostly to farmers IIRC.

Juha


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## Juha (Jul 11, 2009)

Removed as Njaco asked


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## Njaco (Jul 11, 2009)

Juha, the Stalingrad posts have been moved to a seperate thread to keep the continuity of this thread. If there is something you want to add regarding the previous posts about Stalingrad or the German equipment, I would suggest posting it there. Thanks.

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww...ange-name-when-i-find-one-suitable-19573.html


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## parsifal (Jul 11, 2009)

QUOTE=renrich;527172]" Most of Mao's forces, however spent the war struggling to feed themselves and survive, skirmishing only spasmodically with the Japanese. Today, the myth of Communist dominance of the struggle against the occupiers is discredited even in China. If Chiang's armies were less than effective on the battlefield. Mao's guerillas lacked either the will or the combat power to do more than irritate the Japanese. By 1944, 70 per cent of Japan's forces in China were committed against the Nationalists. A staff officer at Japan's army headquarters in Nanjing, Maj. Shigeru Funaki, said: 'The Communists operated in regions that were strategically unimportant to us.Their troops were much more motivated than the Nationalists, but we sought only to contain them. Our attention was overwhelmingly concentrated on confronting Chiang's forces further south."
"The Communists were not strong enough to offer a major challenge to the Japanese occupation," says a modern Chinese historian, Yang Jinghua. "In the anti-japanese war the Kuomintang did most of the fighting and killed far more of the enemy--- I say this, as a Communist Party member for 30 years. Statistics tell the story. Some 1200 KMT generals died fighting the Japanese, against just ten Communist ones." Page 405, "Retribution," Max Hastings, copyright, 2007. Joe Stilwell and the British Generals in the CBI would probably disagree with your evaluation of the KMT's contributions toward winning the war against Japan.[/QUOTE]

Ren

Your comments are not valid for the fighting prior to June 1941. In that period, the Communists fought more battles than the nationalists, and inflicted more casualties on the Japanese than did the KMT. There 14 major battles, of which 5 are considered Chinese victories. Threee of those battles were fought and won by the Communists, including the largest single victory by the Chinesse until the great batles in central China that virtually destroyed the Japanese forces in that region. I have mentioned this battle before, it is called the "Battle Of the 100 regiments" and resulted in approximately 50000 unrecoverable casualties for the japanese. 

The reason for the greater level of activity in the Communist camp is twofold. Until well into the war (before 1940), the Nationalists were concentrating the majority of their efforts in defeating the Communists rather than fighting the Japanese. However, much of their foreign aid was linked to the proviso that they fight the Japanese rather than pursue the Communists. By comparison, the Communists concentrated most of their efforts on fighting the Japanese.....not because they were interested in achieving a coherent national defence, but simply because in the initial phases of the war the Japanese concentrated thei attacks in the North, where the Communists were ensconced (I admit that the very early battles around Peking are the exception to this, but after the retreat of the Nationalists to Chungking, the Japanese operations were directed almost completely, for a while, against the Communist strongholds). 

The second reason for the greater Communist effort and effect lay in their better access to arms. Up to June 1941, the Soviets were heavily supporting the Communists (who at that time did not include Mao, who had been relegated to a second line position in the hierchy by the Soviet dominated politburo. Mao never forgot or forgave that action by the Russians). After 1941 the situation was reversed, with the nationailist having the greates access to wepons, via the allied airlift over the "Hump". 

Even so, the Communists, now under Mao conducted operations strongly reminiscent to the Spanish irregular campaign during the napoleonic wars. It is true that in this period 1941-45 the Communists did not engage in any major campaigns against the Japanese, until 1945, when they supported the Russian attacks into Manchuria and Northern China. There was much activity expended in wresting provincila control from the Nationalists.

I dont doubt that the sources you are quoting would support the line that it was the nationalists who were the major protagonists of the war, and from 1941 this was in fact th case.....the Chinese lacked the resources to dictate the initiative, and were forced, as a result of resources and their peculiar doctrines, to merely react to Japanese initiatives. Because the Communists no longer controlled areas that were vital to the japanese, and because the Communists had inflicted a number of nasty defeats on the japanese earlier in the war, before 1941, and because the KMT was now th greatest threat to Japanese interwsts, courtesy of Allied aid, and air activity, the Japanese naturally concentrated the majority of their efforts on the KMT. The trend that had been set prior to 1941 (with the Communists doing the lions share of the effective fighting) was now reversed.....nearly all the major battles fought, were now fought between Japan and the KMT.

Wiki has this to say with respect to the effectiveness of the CCP forces:

_During the Sino-Japanese War, Mao Zedong's strategies were opposed by both Chiang Kai-shek and the United States. The US regarded Chiang as an important ally, able to help shorten the war by engaging the Japanese occupiers in China. Chiang, in contrast, sought to build the ROC army for the certain conflict with Mao's communist forces after the end of World War II. This fact was not understood well in the US, and precious lend-lease armaments continued to be allocated to the Kuomintang. In turn, Mao spent part of the war (as to whether it was most or only a little is disputed) fighting the Kuomintang for control of certain parts of China. Both the Communists and Nationalists have been criticised for fighting amongst themselves rather than allying against the Japanese Imperial Army. Some argue, however, that the Nationalists were better equipped and fought more against Japan.[20]

In 1944, the Americans sent a special diplomatic envoy, called the Dixie Mission, to the Communist Party of China. According to Edwin Moise, in Modern China: A History 2nd Edition:

Most of the Americans were favorably impressed. The CPC seemed less corrupt, more unified, and more vigorous in its resistance to Japan than the Guomindang. United States fliers shot down over North China...confirmed to their superiors that the CPC was both strong and popular over a broad area. In the end, the contacts with the USA developed with the CPC led to very little. _ 

My opinion is that with Russia engaged in the war against Japan, the CCP would be less concerned about scrounging for resources, and more concerned about prosecuting the war against Japan more effectively. I believe they would have continued their effective "major battle" campaigns, rather than being forced into the realm of the "poor mans war" that they were after 1941. Japan could not sustain the casualties she suffered against the communists as demonstrated by their reaction to the 100 regiments defeat (they stopped attacking the communists after that and decided to concentrate on the weaker, less effective KMY....another reason why the KMT was the object of most Japanese attacks after 1941), so the logical conclusion to draw is that if Russia was involved in the war, the Communists would be re-invigorated to continue their successful land campaigns, and would drive the japanese to an even quicker defeat.

There is only one flaw in all of this. The Russians did not support Mao, rather they supported a politburo opposed to Mao. Mao may not have emerged as the leader of the CCP (after his temporary eclipse in the late '30s), but then the Russian demonstated their flexibility her by working with Tito and the western allies during the war, so I dont see too much problem in this respect either


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## parsifal (Jul 11, 2009)

Links for further reading on the "Dixie Mission", the US first attempts at establishing a liason with the CCP. I dont agree with every statement i these links, but they provide some good background nevertheless

Dixie Mission Remembered in Beijing
http://en.allexperts.com/e/d/di/dixie_mission.htm


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## vanir (Jul 12, 2009)

I think a little formative background is also enlightening. Both the kuomintang and communists were relatively recent phenomenae amid Chinese culture, which had previously been living under the yoke of foreign dictatorship, the Manchurian Qing dynastic rule, which was extremely racist and authoritarian (a bad combination).

Roughly speaking the nationalists represented southern coastal industrialist interests in governing china, whose corruption was bigger than their ambition. The Qing of course represented an imperial rule farther afield. The communists in fact developed most during the thirties within a very small region in the Yellow River Valley, the seat of original Chinese civilisation and represented traditional values and interests in Chinese government. During the late thirties, due to Soviet interests in regaining territories lost since the Revolution (expanding Vladivostok westwards for one), they decided to back the Yellow Valley conservatives in fighting Japanese attempts to reinstate the Qing with a tailored and biased treaty reflecting their industrial interests. In 1939 the Chinese communists were still a very small and ineffectual organisation without direct Soviet support but were easily the best of bad choices for a future Chinese government, their political ascendancy was at least genuine. Most of China was cut up into warlord provinces who withdrew from national interests with the overthrow of the Qing, because they didn't back the kuomintang who even then were so corrupt they overthrew their own leader immediately following the revolution and made a coastal property grab.

It was not at all like a democratic election where you've got a stable country and a variety of Parties to choose from. Even attributing Party names is misleading, the terms isolationists, industrialists and conservatives would be more reflective of what the warlords, kuomintang and chinese communists represented.


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