# Kursk MkII - The Air Battle



## parsifal (Jul 25, 2011)

Well we had our last thread closed because of two reasons; we wandered off topic far too much, and people were just not treating each other with enough respect in their dialogues. However, I was encouraged at the very end of that thread to see people attempting to dicuss the issues a little better. We were still wandering off topic a litle, but i felt we were at least drifting a little closer to the topic

This thread is about Kursk the air battle. I believe it relevant to discuss the leadup, the consequences and the possible alternatives, to the battle, but the concentration has to be the battle itself, tactics, course of the battles, results, effects.

Because I have started the thread, again, I will lead into the discussion with my last post

_"....in essence the points i wanted to make were

1) VVS emerged from Stalingrad with some additional skills and better survivability. For the first time they had conducted operations that had a strategic effect

2) However, though they now possessed many of the ingredients needed for an effective offensive posture, they still lacked sufficient experience and an effective doctrine to be effective in offensive operations. 

3) LW continued to demostrate marked superiority in its fighter operations over the Kuban. However the campaign as a whole has to be seen as a Soviet maturing of strategy and application of airpower. No longer was the priority for theVVS to shoot down German Fighters and gain air superiority in the traditional sense. VVS fighters were there to keep losses amongst friendly bombers tolerable, and to harass German bomber operations to the point of writing them down to insignificance. losses continued to heavily favour the LW, but the LW was being reduced to no more than nuisance value....VVS completed its mission, which was now firmly wedded to the ground support mission. Germans despite inflicting very heavy losses on the VVS were unable to have any appreciable effect on the ground operations (particularly near Myshakko) and their bomber formations no longer could operate with impunity over the battlefield

4) Many LW bomber operations had to be conducted at night because of the effects of VVS fighters. Also, VVS losses were inflated by the significant effects of the newly re-constituted 9 flak division, operating at the front and with many hundreeds of heavy and light guns attached. Just the same rounds per kill for the flak arm were rising. Over Stalingrad, LW flak had expended around 5000 rounds per kill, now it was over 9000 rpk. 

5) Thiings were getting harder for the LW. VVS now had a workable offensive strategy, an expanding experience base, lessons that it could absorb, and equipment that rivalled LW quality. It could always count on a numerical superiority because of the simplicity of its equipment

6) In the coming three months to Kursk, Soviet frontal Aviation in the TO was to grow by over 75% in frontline strengths which was not done at the expense of other sections of the front. Overall quality was improving in a numbe of areas....Higher echelon leadership, servicieability rates, mechanization, ground organizations, arguably even, aircrew experience. LW expansion between the end of April and the start of the battle in July was extremely modest....question then begs, with such a rapid rise in size, experience and effectiveness by the VVS in that 3 month period, was it a mistake for the germans to wait until July....should they not have continued their offensive-defensive operations as had been demonstrated by Manstein. To successfully implment this stratgy, Germans needed to at least maintain mobility for thei Infantry, but by the latter part of '43 this had gone, and with it, the last hope of salvaging anything in the east. "_ 

I am referring here to the Kuban battles, the last great crucible before Kursk itself. I was alluding to whether the delay in joining battle so late (July) was a better idea than continuing the limited offensive/defensive postures advocated by Manstein....would the Germans have been better off with an earlier start?

The rough statistics of the Kursk battle are that the Germans entered the battle with 2100 aircraft in the front line formations. The Soviets entered the battle with about 2900 aircraft (will post a more accurate OB in my next posts). The Russians lost approximately 4 times as many aircraft as the germans (there is a lot of dispute about the figures however, which I hope to explain in the thread). The effects of the bombers for both sides are vastly overstated.....perhaps 90 tanks destroyed by the Soviets from air strikes, whilst the germans may have destroyed as many as 150 Soviet medium or heavy tanks with their stukas, if they were lucky. Like the other great myth about this battle, that it was the greatest tank battle in history (in reality it was mostly an infantry battle, fought along traditional lines, with the German flair for manouvre and breakthrough removed from the equation) Yet, air power played a crucial part in the outcome of the battle, not because of its material effects on losses, but for other, more subtle reasons. The same can be said about the effects of tanks on the battle....they were not central to the profit/loss sheet, but they were still pivotal to the execution of the battle.

Kursk is a complex battle, one of the most misunderstood battles that ever occurred. For that reason we have to work hard to keep our comments relevant. We can explore the peripheries of the battle, things like preprations, alternatives etc, but really this needs to relate to the historical context, not pure hypotheticals. And we need to do this as a cop-operative exercise...pool our resources, accept differences work together, because the subject is a complex one that can defeat us as we have already seen 

Good luck guys....this is your second chance at this...use it wisely


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## Njaco (Jul 25, 2011)

Want to help some. Heres a map of the area.


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## Altea (Jul 25, 2011)

> 3) LW continued to demostrate marked superiority in its fighter operations over the Kuban.



BTW, can you just quote your sources for the Kuban?

Regards

Soviet map for Kursk, in russian but more precise, with defence lines and armies sectors


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## Ratsel (Jul 25, 2011)

parsifal said:


> 3) LW continued to demostrate marked superiority in its fighter operations over the Kuban.





Altea said:


> BTW, can you just quote your sources for the Kuban?



can't speak for parsifal but heres what I know from the Kuban Bridgehead -

_*Kuban bridghehead only: 
Sorties on day: German 698 (750) – Soviet: 446 
Sorties on night: German 953 (997) – Soviet: 56 
Sum: German 1,651 – Soviet: 502 

Losses of aircraft: German 94 – Soviet 462 

Source is Friedrich Forstmeier, “Die Räumung des Kubanbrückenkopfes im Herbst 1943”, pp. 265-267*._

to answer you next question. this is from Luftwaffe sources. unless you can post reliable russian sources, this will have to be taken as the bottom line.


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## Erich (Jul 25, 2011)

Ratsel what is given as the German LW units taking part during Kuban ? of note is the many evenings sorties of which the WS could not respond to


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## Rivet (Jul 25, 2011)

Gladdened here to see this this topic of enquiry receive another lease on life. The first rendition arrived just as I was considering the importance of this Battle of Kursk in the overall scenario of the Second World War. I don't have many answers, or even questions to raise at this point. I have been in contact with some of the offspring of the participants, asking for recommendations of what to read in order to understand. I wish to include some of their recommendations. Regards

Bergström, Christer (2007). Kursk — The Air Battle: July 1943. Hersham: Chervron/Ian Allen. ISBN 978-1-903223-88-8.

Il-2 Shturmovik Guards Units of World War 2 
Paperback: 96 pages Publisher: Osprey Publishing (March 18, 2008) Language: English ISBN-10: 9781846032967 ISBN-13: 978-1846032967


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## Erich (Jul 25, 2011)

for LW unit histories I would recommend finding the appropriate LW units over Kursk and then doing a search for their histories as some have been written the bomber and fighter Geschwaders of note....... nothing yet though StG 77 has it's won book up till end of 43, not bad really. Bergstroms I had already mentioned to Parsifal in the other thread of which he has ordered a copy.

some hopeful helpful info's :

Early May 1943:
Bagerowo: 10./ZG 1 (Bf 110), Stab, I III/KG 51 (Ju 88A)
Saki: II/KG 55 (He 111H)
Kertsch: StG 2 (Ju 87D), III/StG 77 (Ju 87D), NAGr 9, 1.(H)/21 (Fw 189A), 7.(H)/32 (Fw 189A)
Sarabus:4.(F)/122 (He 111H, Ju 88A/D)

Stab, II JG 3 (Bf 109G), 8./SchG 1 (Hs 129), II/SchG 1 (Fw 190A, Hs 123)
Stab, II, III,13 (Slow), 15 (Kroat)/JG 52 (Bf 109G)


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## Ratsel (Jul 25, 2011)

Erich said:


> Ratsel what is given as the German LW units taking part during Kuban ? of note is the many evenings sorties of which the WS could not respond to


The German Fourth Luftflotte, which included the elite JG52 (Udet), JG51 (Molders) and JG54 (Green Hearts), was responsible for this area. I believe JG3 was responsible for night operations. I also think JG53 (Pik-As) were also involved. Will have to check my references. You would probably know more on which bomber units and/or ZG units were operational in the area then I.


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## mhuxt (Jul 25, 2011)

Here's another file I haven't read:

Battlefield air interdiction by the Luftwaffe at the Battle of Kursk -- 1943. :: Master of Military Art and Science Theses

Summary says it's more about LW air-to-ground than about LW vs VVS in the air.

Tossed into the fray to encourage one and all to have a look around the Combined Arms Reseach Library digital collection.


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## parsifal (Jul 25, 2011)

Hi Altea

My main source for that statement of 4:1 loss ratios comes from Hardesty's "Red Phoenix" , however I stress its an approximation. I have also seen indirect sources, mostly web based that say they are based on Friesner, Glantz and Bergstrom, to name a few. I have a copy of Bergstrom on order, and am eagerly awaiting its arrival

Care needs to be exercised when looking at losses. When is a loss a loss? The figures given for the VVS and the LW may not be necessarily comparable. Many aircraft may return, but may never fly again. I suspect this to be particularly true of the LW, who were labouring under a strained logistics system. The LW would only write an airframe off if it was assessed as having more than 70% damage, whilst most nations would consider an airframe written off at amaximum of about 35% damage. I cannot prove my hypothesis, but i strongly suspect the LW adopted their own system primarily for political reasons....hitler and goring were interested in totals, more than serviceability rates.

However, I am also reasonably confident that VVS losses were significantly higher than the LW. Soviet aircrew were entering combat with only about 20 hours of flying time, compared to over 200 in the LW. VVS was a force still reaching maturity in mid 1943, so it should not be a surprise they sufferd heavy losses. It should also be noted that this disproportionate loss rate was rapidly changing....whilst it was about 4:1 in July, it had droppd to about 3;2 in December, mostly because the VVS leadership made serious efforts to improve the training of replacement aircrew. Ive read somewhere that by the end of the year average training hours were up around 150 hours, whilst the LW was beginning to take a nosedive by that time.... 

It also needs to be acknowledged that the VVS's primary mission was not to destroy LW fighters, or even to shoot down LW bombers. These were considered desirable bonuses to the primary mission for the VVS in mid - 1943. Primarily the VVS was concerned about providing effective support to their own ground forces, which they were demonstrably successful at, and secondly to disrupting LW air support, which i think they were also successful at. VVS success is demonstrated by the obvious at both Kuban and Kursk. At Kuban LW and the heer were unable to dislodge major threats to their front intergity, and many bombers were forced to fly at night...evidence of growing VVS proficiency and threat. At Kursk, it is my contention that the VVS was effective at their primary mission, which was not destruction of ground forces, but rathr interdiction, something that is also the primary CAS mission of all air forces....far more important than destroying the hardware


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## Juha (Jul 26, 2011)

Hello Parsifal
I wonder where you got the info that “The LW would only write an airframe off if it was assessed as having more than 70% damage” because the right figure is more than 60%, and even some of those which were initially judged as over 60% damaged were later repaired and flew again, the opposite might also happened, but that was how all AFs worked, initial assessments could change later.
And what is your source on that “whilst most nations would consider an airframe written off at amaximum of about 35% damage”? 
If you thing that Germans counted how much of airframe was damaged and then gave x% damage assessment to it, that isn’t how the LW system worked, their % system was only a system which told to their organizations the level of damage or what was left from the a/c, a bit same way than the RAF letter and number combinations, even if the RAF system was more based on to what was needed to do in the next stage and the LW system combination of the a/c condition and what was needed to do in the next stage.

What is true, that during the rapid withdrawals some of LW planes which were damaged were lost because there was no way to evacuate them, but that was not the situation during the Kuban battles.

Juha


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## Juha (Jul 26, 2011)

Ratsel said:


> can't speak for parsifal but heres what I know from the Kuban Bridgehead -
> 
> _*Kuban bridghehead only:
> Sorties on day: German 698 (750) – Soviet: 446
> ...


 
Hello Ratsel
a bit odd, first of all IMHO we are talking on the air fighting over Kuban during the Spring 43 not during the Autumn 43 and difficult to believe that VVS would have lost almost all its planes participating in the Autumn 43 battles, ie while flying 502 sorties losing 462 a/c.

Juha


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## parsifal (Jul 26, 2011)

Juha said:


> Hello Parsifal
> I wonder where you got the info that “The LW would only write an airframe off if it was assessed as having more than 70% damage” because the right figure is more than 60%, and even some of those which were initially judged as over 60% damaged were later repaired and flew again, the opposite might also happened, but that was how all AFs worked, initial assessments could change later.
> And what is your source on that “whilst most nations would consider an airframe written off at amaximum of about 35% damage”?
> If you thing that Germans counted how much of airframe was damaged and then gave x% damage assessment to it, that isn’t how the LW system worked, their % system was only a system which told to their organizations the level of damage or what was left from the a/c, a bit same way than the RAF letter and number combinations, even if the RAF system was more based on to what was needed to do in the next stage and the LW system combination of the a/c condition and what was needed to do in the next stage.
> ...



Hi Juha

I am at work, so my ability to respond is limited. however from memory I picked up my understanding of how th Luftwaffe sytem of damage assessment and repair worked from Hayward book on Luftwaffe operations on the Eastern Front.

One thing to note about the Luftwaffe operations in the East....systems almost never worked the way that the textbooks and the procedures manuals would have you believe. When your army is reliant on trains for strategic supply and communications, and even as late as 1944 you are only receiving about 42% of the requireed train movements in your section of the front, you are not going to adhere to the rules and move aircraft with more than 40% assessed damage back to the factory for rebuild. This was the german system in the west, and there it kinda worked....well you can add stated losses by 15-25% in the westfor the LW, but in the east it almost never worked that way. There just wasnt the train capacity to get heavily damaged airframes back to the rear areas for re-construction. They were either repaired at the front, or cannabalized for spares (because spares were not getting through in sufficient quantities). This goes a long way to explaining the very high attrition rates in LW units in the east, compared to the west (roughly three times the loss rate, from memory, for non-combat related causes).......according to hayward, whilst the LW was operating some hundreds of miles forward of the railheads, actual LW losses in the forward airfields was 50-80% higher than the stated combat losses that you often see. Once the Lufwaffe retreated back to supplied airfields in Feb '43, attrition rates fell back to "normal" (for the east front) of about 16-20% per month (attrition rates in Germany were about 7% per month, for JGs, by comparison). I do not know what soviet attrition rates were, but for comparison purposes only, Allied non-combat attrition rates for units based in England were about 2-3% per month, whilst attition rates in the monsoonal jungles were about 8-10% (again from memory....will try and check tonite when i finish work). 

The east front was the most machine nasty environment of the war in my opinion, and it affected the finely tuned German machines very badly....something not readily seen by most published loss accounts


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## Tante Ju (Jul 26, 2011)

parsifal said:


> The LW would only write an airframe off if it was assessed as having more than 70% damage, whilst most nations would consider an airframe written off at amaximum of about 35% damage. I cannot prove my hypothesis, but i strongly suspect the LW adopted their own system primarily for political reasons....hitler and goring were interested in totals, more than serviceability rates.



Sorry this is discussed already.. It was 60%+ for write-off, and also: plane was classed 60% if it was to be write off. Not write off if 60%.. there was system for assessing damage %. It did not depend on how many parts were hit, how many bullet strikes, but what was hit. Vital main element or just a rudder blown off..? Wing tip flew away, or fuselage badly damaged?

Also: Most nations did not use Luftwaffe % system, but something else, equivalanent. For example RAF had Category A for what LW called 10-30%, or Category B for what LW would call 30-60%, and Cateroy C for 60-99%. And, like LW, many Cat B plane would end up re-assessed as Category C (write off) at factory inspection. It is normal. Military organisations would be foolish to "bend" numbers for propaganda reasons - fool whom, themselves? 

And this "hitler and goring were interested in totals" - this is originating from pre-war say of H Goring who said about twin engined bombers. This was true that time, LW was important "deterrent" while army re-armed. Not true for later war.. great generalisation.

IMHO there is no need to "re assess" reported loss numbers. It only serves propaganda who's losses people want to inflate.. "they reported this number, but it was really much higher". It is possible of course, but needs very strong and precise evidence for exact case. Say 10 July they reported this and that, but I have paper of factory say: 5 plane lost, 10 plane received for repairable, but we after though 3 of 10 not really repairable, so total loss is 8 not 5.

It is bit like loss of tanks. Tanks can be repaired even if shot. Aircraft also.


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## Juha (Jul 26, 2011)

Hello Parsifal
now not knowing very well LW repair systems in the East, in the west it utilized also local a/c factories, that was done also in the East at least in tank repairs, even 68 ton Elephants were repaired and got their total overhauls in Ukraine after Kursk in Late Summer/Autumn 1943. Also when Finns got their second batch of 16 109G-2s, which were totally overhauled second-hand planes, some had been earlier damaged over 60% in the East, from memory at least one somewhere near the eastern part of the Black Sea. So clearly they transported badly damaged planes for factory repairs, also in the East.

BTW a good source for later part of war LW losses and loss rates, in the West vs in the East 
http://don-caldwell.we.bs/jg26/thtrlosses.htm

Juha


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## parsifal (Jul 26, 2011)

Hi guys

Zetterling, in his book "Kursk 1943" gives a pretty good appraisal of the problems faced by the Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front. For the record its not a complete endorsement of my own opinion, but it does give a pretty good insight as to why tabulating losses, for either side is so fraught with uncertainty.

At page 124 he states "_Thus, apparently the German forces operating in the vicinity of Kursk lost 193 aircraft shot down while performing 27,221 sorties.....However, this figure does not include aircraft written off when damaged, when aircraft were often cannabalized. It is also unclear if the figures given also include losses due to all causes. The differences can be substantial. For example, during 1942, the Luftwaffe lost 4151 shot down due to enemy action,, plus another 497 were brought home but not repaired. However, a further 3163 were lost without any influence from the enemy, and a further 1791 were damaged but not repaired_" (apparently without passing through the normal damage assessment processes). 

Further loss assessment differ substantially from the figures relied upon by Zetterling. The author himself notes "_Williamson Murray states that the Luftwaffe lost 1030 planes on the eastern front in July-August 1943. Tony Wood and Bill Gunston put LW losses on the Eastern Front at 911 in July and 785 in August_." Zetterlings opinion is that these figures are not necessarily wrong, rather in each case Murrays figures are referring to combat losses, whilst Woods and Gunstons figures are referring to losses from all causes. Zetterling notes that "_contemporary Soviet claims of 3700 LW aircraft lost 5 July to 23 August are very exaggerated_".

All of this serves to underscore that quoting figures you "know" to be correct and representing total losses, or that processes for dealing with damaged aircraft in the Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front in particualr as some kind of "situation normal" is a highly debateable topic. Long ago I learned to treat any kind of absolutely correct figure for ewast front losses with a great deal of circumpsection.....

There is one thing that you guys mentioned , and it has been mentioned before, was the ability to repair aircraft at rear area workshops within Russia itself. Surely the spare part, the specialist repair jigs, the mechanics, the body fitters, the machinist, indeed the factories to repair and fabricate the parts needed could not have been present in great quantities so far forward when reports to implement the exploitation program (I will dig out the report from the Reich supply ministry later tonite conservatively put the time needed to repair the damage in the occupied ukrainian territories at more than 3 years from 1942. I am very sceptical that anything other than minor token efforts were ever undertaken from these forward positions, but I will dig out the necessary proof later on tonite, if I can. But by all means if you have figures on numbers and capabilities, please post them.


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## parsifal (Jul 26, 2011)

According to Deutsche Reichsbahn - The German State Railway in WWII  by Arvo L. Vecamer , the Germans in 1943 required approximately 220 trains per day to meet all the Reich requirements both military and civilian for the area under control of Heersgruppe Sud, and its rear area commands. I assume this also included the vast areas of Transnistria, that had been ceded to the Rumanians in 1941. However the best year for the Deutches Reichbahn was 1943 was 1943, when the average daily train arrivals to the command was just 125 trains per day. Clearly there were insufficient trains arriving to meet all requirements.

However, according to the abovementioned article a priority list for train arrivals to the TO. Relevantly it states

"_One of the biggest problems one can encounter in the railroading business is that of developing an optimal time schedule and being able to adhere to it in a reasonable fashion. From the German perspective, the following types trains (and in order of scheduling priority) had to be considered in German rear and front areas: 


Troop transportation trains; their movement and special troop transfer requirements.

Supply trains

Empty trains which had just unloaded and were returning for a new run.

Military Post/military mail trains

Medical evacuation trains; hospital trains.

Rest and Relaxation trains.

POW trains

Construction and repair/workshop trains

Consideration also had to be made for "Special Purpose" or "Special Mission" trains, such as, but not limited to military intelligence mission, covert infiltration, quick re-deployment of front-line troops, etc_."

Clearly the establishment of repair facilities in the foward areas was not a logistic priority. This suggests the importance of forward deployment for the repair workshops that you mention was not a significant element of the equation.


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## parsifal (Jul 26, 2011)

The OBs for the forces involved

Soviet Frontal Aviation units

16 Air Army 455 Fighters; 241 Gd Attack; 260 Day Bombers; 74 Night Bombers 


Guards Fighter Air Division Ol'khavatka 
2 Guards Assault Air Division Ryshkovo 
271 Night Bomber Air Division Kazanka 
283 Fighter Air Division Mokva/Kursk 
286 Fighter Air Division Zybino 
299 Assault Air Division Kr. Zaria St. 
3 Bomber Aviation Corps Elets 
6 Fighter Aviation Corps Iarische 
273 Fighter Air Division Kolpny 
279 Fighter Air Division Mokhozoe 
6 Mixed Aviation Corps Khmel'nets 
221 Bomber Air Division Pelets 
241 Bomber Air Division Chernovo-Piatnitskaia 
282 Fighter Air Division Kunach 
301 Bomber Air Division Voronets 


17 Air Army 389 Fighters; 276 Gd Attack; 172 Day Bombers; 76 Night Bombers 

208 Night Bomber Air Division Kalinovka 
291 Air Assault Air Division Shumakovo 
1 Assault Aviation Corps Berovki 
203 Fighter Air Division Ostapovka 
268 Assault Air Division 266 ? Dubki 
292 Assault Air Division Kul'ma/Novo Oskol 
1 Bomber Aviation Corps Illovskoe 
1 Guards Bomber Air Division Il'inka 
893 Bomber Air Division Trostanka 
4 Fighter Aviation Corps Vasil'ev Dol 
294 Fighter Air Division Pestunovo 
302 Fighter Air Division Shirokii Gul 
5 Fighter Aviation Corps B. Psinka 
205 Fighter Air Division Sukho-Solotino 
8 Guards Fighter Air Division Trubezh/Oboian 

17 Air Army 163 Fighters; 239 Gd Attack; 76 Day Bombers; 60 Night Bombers @ Roven'ki 
244 Bomber Air Division Belolutsk 
262 Night Bomber Air Division Zapadnoe 
1 Mixed Aviation Corps Rybintsevo 
2 Fighter Air Division Starobel'sk 
5 Assault Air Division Novo-Pskov 
3 Mixed Aviation Corps Novsosinovka 
207 Fighter Air Division Aleksandrovka 
208 Assault Air Division Kurilovka 
9 Mixed Aviation Corps Pokrovskoe 
305 Fighter Air Division Nizh Dubanka 
295 Assault Air Division Ol'shana 
306 Assault Air Division Budennovka 

There were also an estimated 300 ADD and PVO units attached to the battle. I believe there were also about a further 1000 or so aircraft in the reserve army.

The air assets committed to Kursk represented about 26% of total air strength in European USSR. The Soviets had approximately 6000 aircraft reserves they could call upon immediately.

I do not know the serviceability rates or the additional aircrew reserves available to the VVS at this time


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## tyrodtom (Jul 26, 2011)

parsifal said:


> According to Deutsche Reichsbahn - The German State Railway in WWII  by Arvo L. Vecamer , the Germans in 1943 required approximately 220 trains per day to meet all the Reich requirements both military and civilian for the area under control of Heersgruppe Sud, and its rear area commands. I assume this also included the vast areas of Transnistria, that had been ceded to the Rumanians in 1941. However the best year for the Deutches Reichbahn was 1943 was 1943, when the average daily train arrivals to the command was just 125 trains per day. Clearly there were insufficient trains arriving to meet all requirements.
> 
> However, according to the abovementioned article a priority list for train arrivals to the TO. Relevantly it states
> 
> ...


Not directly mentioned in that list, the Germans gave a high priority to movement of people to concentration camps, often interfering with troop and material movements.


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## Juha (Jul 26, 2011)

Hello Parsifal
Of the 14, sorry for the typo in my earlier message, second batch 109G-2s to the FAF, all second hand totally overhauled, 3 had been badly damaged in the East, 
MT-218, appr 50% dam in T/O accident at Krasnovardeisk, S of St Petersburg
MT-222, 35% dam because of tyreburst at Kertš (the eastern tip of Krim)
MT-226, never got to Finland Finland, 70% bomb dam at Krasnovardeisk, S of St Petersburg on 29 Sept 42 and 30% dam in Soviet AA fire 2 Nov 42, so probably repaired somewhere in the East.
MT-228, 60% dam in Tunisia
MT-230, 40% on Pantelleria

2 two which were dam in the forced landings in Kuban 30% and ?%

and one of the later replacement G-2, MT-237, 35% T/O dam at Anapa in Kuban durin Kuban air battles, some others had damaged in lesser degree in Kuban and near Rostov.
MT-238, 70%, pilot error, Kharkov

So clearly badly damaged 109Gs were repaired and some very badly damaged were transported somewhere in the rear or into Germany at least from the area of LfF 1 and from Kharkov.

On those that returned but were never repaired, I have to read the relevant parts of Zetterling and co Kursk book when I have time but in fact 60-80% dam a/c were written off but certain parts could be used as spare parts for other a/c.

Juha


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## Ratsel (Jul 26, 2011)

Juha said:


> Hello Ratsel
> a bit odd, first of all IMHO we are talking on the air fighting over Kuban during the Spring 43 not during the Autumn 43 and difficult to believe that VVS would have lost almost all its planes participating in the Autumn 43 battles, ie while flying 502 sorties losing 462 a/c.
> 
> Juha


my appologies on the late date. as far as Luftwaffe victories, perhaps they were mistaken on the # of russian sorties(?).


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## parsifal (Jul 27, 2011)

This is some stuff of a general nature on the development of the VVS that I thought might be of interest:


_"In April 1942, STAVKA appointed General A. Novikov as commander of the VVS and Deputy Commisar for Aviation. Novikov immediately set about rejuvenating the Red Air Force. He combined Front and Army Air Units into combined Air Armies. These large operational formations maximised the effective use of frontal aviation, concentrating air strength in support of ground operations. Each Air Army was allocated to support an Army Front. Close cooperation was ensured by placing the Air Army's deputy commander and his staff with the HQ of the Army Front to enable direct contact. The Front and Air Army commander's jointly worked out opearational plans, with the Army Front commander determining the priority of missions. The first Air Armies were formed in May 1942 with others following in June, July, August and November, by which time 13 separate Air Armies had been formed. Each Air Army consisted of two fighter air Divisions, each formed from four Regiments, two mixed air Divisions, each formed from two fighter and two ground attack Regiments. In addition to this was added a bomber Regiment, an air reconnaissance Regiment, a night bomber Regiment and a training Regiment. Air Regiments were also based around dedicated types of aircraft, helping to eliminate the logistical difficulties that arose from trying to maintain a variety of different aircraft types. The strength of the Air Regiment was increased from two squadrons to three, operating a total of 32 aircraft per Regiment. The centralisation of air Regiments also simplified operational planning, logistics, training, maintainence and command. Particular efforts were made to destroy German forward airfields and concentrate air resources against key areas involving increased liaison with ground forces. For the first time during the campaign the Red Air Force gained numerical superiority over the Luftwaffe. The quality of its aircraft and the proficiency of its pilots had also greatly improved. 

In April 1943 the VVS began a series of long range raids on targets in East Prussia, using both Il-4's and Pe-8's. However the aircraft were soon reallocated to missions against tactical targets nearer the front line.

Following the battle of Stalingrad, aircraft of the Northern Caucasus Front air force and the Black Sea Fleet air force supported the Russian ground offensive against the Kuban bridgeheads in the Crimea. By the end of June 1943, Russian aircraft enjoyed air superiority over the Kuban region. Ground attack aircraft were employed in large formations against ground targets as were tactical bombers and fighter forces were co-ordinated by a series of ground control radio stations.

In preparation for the battle of Kursk the Russian air force took the initiative and launched a series of air strikes against German airfields, troop concentrations and supply depots, mounted by six air Armies. The result of these concentrated attacks forced the Luftwaffe to move its airfields further from the front and disperse their aircraft more thoroughly. Strenuous efforts were also made to upgrade forward airfields prior to the battle. During the battle itself the Red air force engaged in an intense air battle with the Luftwaffe. It also carried out concentrated attacks against ground targets with IL-2's taking a heavy toll against German armoured forces. Russian aircraft gradually wrestled control of the air from the Luftwaffe, which no doubt helped stall the German offensive which gradually came to a halt in mid July. 
on" _

From:

redairforce


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## Juha (Jul 27, 2011)

Hello Parsifal
on your message #16, in my copy of Zetterling’s and Frankson’s Kursk 1943 (2000) p.124 the text is:
_"Thus, the German forces operating in the vicinity of Kursk lost 193 aircraft shot down while performing 27,221 sorties. OF COURSE, FURTHER AIRCRAFT MAY HAVE BEEN (emphasises mine) written off when damaged..." _

To me, not a native speaker, the meanings are different, may meaning the possibility and in your version it is given as a fact.

I’ll check later what are the sources used by Wood and Gunston, I have a copy of their book which is a bit popular, plenty of big photos and a bit doubtful colour profiles and published by Leisure Books. Gunston is a great popularizer but sometimes a bit cavalier with his facts. On the other hand I respected greatly Tony Wood. IIRC the book did not have notes but I’ll check is there info on from which they have got their loss figures.

On your message #10, I have doubts that VVS aircrews entered combat with only 20 hours flying time. when I'll have time I'll check my copies on FAF intelligence reports on VVS training, which IIRC are translations from LW intelligence reports.

Juha


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## parsifal (Jul 27, 2011)

Hi Juha

It can take a number of differnt meanings in English but in my opinion in the context of this passage, it signals uncertainty in the figures quoted, and suggests a likelihood of further losses not included in the account. Its called the "you understood" principal. English is such a user friendly language.....for every rule ther is an exception, and there are differences of emphasis between nations etc....its a minefield. 

Zetterling seems to confirm his uncertainty in his other statements, which i have also quoted. But then again loss figures may need to be looked at very closely, and still we may not get to a set of numbers we can agree on. It happens. Should not come as any surprise, or be the cause of too much angst. 

With regard to Post number 10, there are three separate sources that i know of that make reference to Soviet training times. You can get a bit of an overview from one of the wiki articles that I saw, it is also referred to in both Hayward and Hardesty in their books. I am reasonably confident this is an accurate representation of VVS training hours up to Kursk. Just be mindful that almost imediately after Kursk the russians began to take steps to improve their aircrew training which inevitably increase flying hours. As I suggested, i am pretty sure that by years end their rookie pilots were receiving closer to 150hours of training before committment.....and this is reflected in the much improved exchange rates the VVS was enjoying by that time.....around 3:2


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## Juha (Jul 27, 2011)

Hello Parsifal
clearly Zetterling and Frankson are uncertain with the real loss figures and after all they are ground war specialists who relied on secondary sources on air war questions, but IMHO one should faitfully repeat quotes between quotation marks, I accept some shortening for ex a/c in place aircraft etc.

And back to the topic, IMHO 20hours is simply too little, maybe they mean 20 hours after elemantary flight school in heavier types or even 20 hours in solo, even the latter sounds rather unbelieveble.

Juha


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## parsifal (Jul 27, 2011)

A short interview with a Soviet Fighter Ace



_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JJdTH8I6ub8_



A film put out for training purposes by the VVS for the LA5...two parts



_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nHfEnNPp6Ds_



_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WgXnzVCpA6Q_



And one further vid on the La5 and LA7


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JJzm4VoouLY_


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## michaelmaltby (Jul 27, 2011)

Thanks for that, Parsifal. Another P-39 fan. 

MM


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## Njaco (Jul 27, 2011)

The closest LW OB I can get for Kursk is from Price's "The Luftwaffe Data Book".......

17 May 1943

Luftflotte 4

_Unit......Total/Servicable_

II./JG 3........40/24
III./JG 3.......35/20
Stab./JG52....4/2
I./JG 52........38/17
II.JG 52.........28/14
III./JG 52.......37/22
15./JG 52.......10/6
10./ZG 1........12/7
Stab./SG 1.....6/6
I./SG 1..........51/41 (mixed a/c)
II./SG 1.........46/34
Stab./SG 2.....3/1
I./SG 2..........12/11
Panzerjaeger Staffel./JG 51......16/14
Stab KG 3......1/0
II./KG 3.........37/27
III./KG 3........31/13
Stab./KG 27....2/0
I./KG 27.........34/13
III./KG 27.......23/15
14./KG 27.......9/6
III./KG 51......21/11
Stab./KG 55....4/4
I./KG 55.........19/13
II./KG 55.......30/19
III./KG 55......33/20
I./KG 100.......37/35
Stab./StG 2.....9/8
I./StG 2.........30/23
II./StG 2........26/20
III./StG 2.......34/27
Stab./StG 3....2/2
I./StG 3.........38/22
III./StG 3.......33/16
Stab./StG 77.......9/8
I./StG 77............39/33
II./StG 77..........39/24


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## Milosh (Jul 27, 2011)

On line as well Njaco

The Luftwaffe at Kursk


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## Altea (Jul 27, 2011)

double


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## Altea (Jul 27, 2011)

Juha said:


> .
> 
> BTW a *good *source for later part of war LW losses and loss rates, in the West vs in the East
> http://don-caldwell.we.bs/jg26/thtrlosses.htm
> ...



I wouldn't quote it as a good source. At best a point of view between the others. It seems to use W. Murray numbres that are much less complete compared with quatermeister archives in Frieburg and Coblenz ones. Moreover ther'e a lot of blanks in german archives in the automn of 44. 

Before criticising Groeler as Calwin does, it should have been _cool_ 8) to provide his numbres first. They are difficult to find now. 
Olaf Groeler biaised in fact, AFAIK because he quoted for german losses in West only from 70% destruction rates and from 30% in the East. Showing this way the Red Army as the main factor od destruction on the Lufwaffe. 
There are similar examples from Murray's book in favor the opposite side founded by other authors browsing german archives, so he's far from being irreproachable too.

At least O.Groeler *arranged the history* but did *not invented *anything, and he wrote during iron curtain aerea, this was certainly *the *condition for a ticket to freedom in W. Germany public archives and green light to publish his works. 

For me he's excusable and very usefull, once d*ue precautions* taken...

Regards


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## Altea (Jul 27, 2011)

Juha said:


> On your message #10, I have doubts that VVS aircrews entered combat with only 20 hours flying time. when I'll have time I'll check my copies on FAF intelligence reports on VVS training, which IIRC are translations from LW intelligence reports.
> 
> Juha



Sorry Juha, it was *my *sentence first, from Khazanov's book.

Maybe it's "20 to 30 training hours in *advanced trainers **and *combat** planes, as UTI-4, Yak-7V, and single seats?

* lost in translation from russian to french j suppose.

An omission in fact, but still not very impressive compared to 200 -300 flying hours of a german rookie of that time...


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## Rivet (Jul 27, 2011)

One historical scenario new to me certainly formed conditions on the Russian ability to rebuff the robust onslaught Hitler's troops posed. On October 1940 the NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs) under its new chief Lavrenty Beria began a series of purges of the Soviet Russian military. Over three hundred military commanders, several manufacturing functionaries and party military liason personnel were arrested on various, often bogus, charges. Confessions were induced under torture and the accused were summarily executed. These executions, coming as they did after the Stalinist purges of the late 1930's, certainly thinned the herd of many experienced military and civil leaders at a time when all were needed to counter the invasion from the West. This said, Soviet aircraft production actually increased manyfold during the last few months of 1941 under the threat of NKVD intimidation. Any mention of the effects of the purges on the military effort, Soviet or German, appreciated. This scenario certainly affected conditions well into the time period and areas we are considering here. Regards


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## Rivet (Jul 27, 2011)

Regarding the flying hours of Soviet aviation trainees, I have read mention of as little as 13 hours of powered flight training given to recruits. There are Lend-Lease sites on the internet that will confirm this figure.


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## parsifal (Jul 27, 2011)

An interesting thesis that I found from a USAF Major dated 1980. I had difficulty scrolling through the article because its one of those facebook attachments, and I dont use facebook. Nevertheless I saw enough of the paper to conclude it might be of interest. Basically it argues that the germans put too much emphasis on the close air support mission at the expense of the interdiction mission, and that this mistake was a crucial factor in the air battle. Not sure if I agree totally with the major, buts still an interesting read. 

Like I said, I found it difficult to navigate through the document, but it might be of interest just the same

Luftwaffe at Kursk


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## Njaco (Jul 27, 2011)

Milosh said:


> On line as well Njaco
> 
> The Luftwaffe at Kursk



Sorry, hadn't seen the link before.


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## parsifal (Jul 27, 2011)

These German OBs are unlikley to involve the 2100 aircraft attributed to the Germans for the Kursk operation. Any ideas why that figure is so oftyen quoted, and yet when detailed OBs appear, the numbers are much less than that???


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## Njaco (Jul 27, 2011)

That link doesn't include all the transport and recon Gruppen involved - just conbat active. Might change the numbers. Price also has numbers for those involved from Luftflotte 6 if interested.


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## Rivet (Jul 27, 2011)

In answer to your enquiry of post #37, Pasifal. There might be a discrepency in numbers due to including the number of all aircraft in a given unit against an official return which would include aircraft unservicable as such and not included in an effective strength tabulation. Regards


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## parsifal (Jul 27, 2011)

Ill have a look as well, but in the meantime, is this figure of 2100 bogus. Total numbers is usually just that, and would include serviceable and unserviceable crates. At the moment, just doing a rough headcount, we might be lucky to see 500 LW aircraft in the lineup. Surely ther has to be a closer correlation in the numbers than that


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## Juha (Jul 28, 2011)

Hello
I gave a short look to Wood's/Gunston's Hitler's LW, very little on the May-June 40 Campaign, the old 1733 vs 915 loss figure for the BoB, the book have two parts, the history part and the tehnical descriptions of LW planes, the latter is rather deprssing, lot of the old 60s misinfo , Romanians using Hs 129As in combat (most probably they got no 129As, more less to use them in combat, they used 129Bs), on 109 all that G was awful and Ks had 15mm MG 151s cowling guns!!!. And of course no info where they got their loss figures, still might they might be OK.

On a/c present, according to the ToE in Khazanov's Air War Over Kursk (2010) VIII Air Corps had at the beginning of the Oper. 928 a/c, it was the LW formation in controlled the air assests of the southern attack (4PzA and Army Det Kempf)

Juha


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## Juha (Jul 28, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Ill have a look as well, but in the meantime, is this figure of 2100 bogus. Total numbers is usually just that, and would include serviceable and unserviceable crates. At the moment, just doing a rough headcount, we might be lucky to see 500 LW aircraft in the lineup. Surely ther has to be a closer correlation in the numbers than that



Zetterling and Frankson give LW 1830a/c, 1100 for VIII Air Corps (South) and 730 to 1st Air Div (North)

Juha


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## Juha (Jul 28, 2011)

Rivet said:


> Regarding the flying hours of Soviet aviation trainees, I have read mention of as little as 13 hours of powered flight training given to recruits. There are Lend-Lease sites on the internet that will confirm this figure.



Eh, what is meant by the term recruit, is this the amount given in Elementary Training Schools, otherwise very doubtful

Juha


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## Altea (Jul 28, 2011)

Rivet said:


> Regarding the flying hours of Soviet aviation trainees, I have read mention of as little as 13 hours of powered flight training given to recruits. There are Lend-Lease sites on the internet that will confirm this figure.




Here's a definished programm for soviet pilots from march 41's ordonnance:

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1) 30 hours of elementary school: _first stage_
(some soviet non-pilot soldiers (tankers, infantrymen, artillerymen..) had already 35-50 hours in DOSAAFS aeoclubs (> civil 130 000 flying licences) previous to the war, so a young recruit generaly had this experience even before joining the elementary military school). 

2) school of military pilots : _secund stage after,the 1st selection, others go to VVS crewmen gunners, navigators, mecanic's schools_

20 hours on bombers
24 on fighters

3) military schools of pilots commanders (officers) _Third stage, for the best elements, 2nd selection_
2 years
150 hours (75 h a year)

Later ZAP (reverve air regiments) were introduced, as transitionnal from school to the front.

This was still not enough, from the soviet well known film " Only good old fellows go to combat", the young pilot was trained for a long time in the combat unit, before being commited in combat missions. But only from 43, the situation in previous years did not allowed such a luxury.

During the war years, there were 55 working schools of military pilots and 29 of military commander pilots.

About 45 000 pilots were formed and sent to VVS. during the war.

That overcompensated 27 600 definite war losses and more than 3 000 by accidents

Regards


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## parsifal (Jul 28, 2011)

Hi Juha

Thanks for those figures from Zetterling and Frankson, and also assessment of Gunstons and Wood. An older refrnce can still be okay, just not a accurate. For the record, but not discussion in this thread, I still happen to believe in the 1733/933 loss ratios for the BoB, as do quite a few others. 

With regard to the Training hours you said you might have some figures that might clarify this issue. I do know that that interview i posted of that Soviet Ace.....he received 6 months of trainng before being posted. He was trained in late 1940. Given that it generally took about 18months for a LW pilot to receive his 250 hours, if the times in the cockpit, per day are comparable, then Soviet pilots were receiving about 80-90 hours of training in total. Most nations had about the same amount of elementary training....about 60 hours or so, before progressing to advanced training. In the RAF that meant moving to an OTU. Russians never had such an organization. Germans had advanced flying schools, but as the strain of the war took effect, pilo9ts were attached directly to operational JGs. These "training JGs were expected to learn the trade at the front....a disastrous policy for the LW, but forced on them by the shortage of advanced trainiers, training staff (after Stalingrad) and the need to get planes forward as fast as possible. Air fleet Commanders like Richthofen refused to commit these greenhorns until they had received considerable additional hours. But as the war progrssed, the situation on all frontsd became increasingly desperate, and front commanders were forceed to commit their training staffeln to battle.

As I indicated, I do not think the russians ever had advanced training schools. They always had a mix training regiment attached to their frontal avaiation formations, where some final, but still rudimetary training on the types they were intended to fly. There was a heavy attrition rate amongst these training regiments. There were over 10600 training accidents in the frontal aviation training formations 1941-5 (compared to 6600 in the USAAC a force roughly 2-3 times the size of the VVS). If that Ace is a typical situation for the Soviets, then with 85 hours before committment to front line operations then each VVS pilot was receiving 20-25 hours on the types they were to fly into battle befor actually going into battle. But I strongly suspect (unless you can produce contrary evidence) that in fact even these elementary levels of training were cut in the emergency years of 1941-2.

If I am correct and training times were greatly expanded after Kursk, to about 150 hours for the VVS by the end of 1943, and if elementary training times remained the same at 60 hours (or thereabouts) then by that time (end of 1943) VVS pilots were entering combat with about 90 hours of advanced flight training under their belts. By comparison, the Luftwaffe was being forced to cut their training times, from about 200 hours in mid 1943, to about 120 hours by the following April. By that time, by extrapolation, LW pilots might be receiving 60 hours advanced training by that time (though this is not necessarily valid as i know that elementary training by then was falling to pieces as well)


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## parsifal (Jul 28, 2011)

I would bow to Alteas far better explanation on this one, that immediately precedes my own. Gives a pretty good account of what was happening on the "other side of the hill" as it were


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## Tante Ju (Jul 28, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Germans had advanced flying schools, but as the strain of the war took effect, pilo9ts were attached directly to operational JGs. These "training JGs were expected to learn the trade at the front....a disastrous policy for the LW, but forced on them by the shortage of advanced trainiers, training staff (after Stalingrad) and the need to get planes forward as fast as possible. Air fleet Commanders like Richthofen refused to commit these greenhorns until they had received considerable additional hours. But as the war progrssed, the situation on all frontsd became increasingly desperate, and front commanders were forceed to commit their training staffeln to battle.


 
Training JGs did not fly combat. They did train pilot to tactics etc. after they complete their training on operational type, they would receive instruction from actual front pilot. When he considered ready, he was transfer to front JG. I think Englisih equivalent is OTU.

Also this system existed before war, so it was not developed wartime. If you read Knoke, you know how it was.


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## riacrato (Jul 28, 2011)

mhuxt said:


> Here's another file I haven't read:
> 
> Battlefield air interdiction by the Luftwaffe at the Battle of Kursk -- 1943. :: Master of Military Art and Science Theses
> 
> ...


 Read it and it raises some interesting points. BUT it does make some blatant errors, e. g. claims Fw 190 were equipped with 30mm cannons. AFAIK only a handful of prototypes were produced and they were never used operationally at least not in the air-to-ground role. Thus some of its implications are very doubtful and if an author makes such obvious mistakes i tend to distrust his work as a whole: who guarantees the parts that I have less knowledge on aren't full of mistakes as well?


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## parsifal (Jul 28, 2011)

Hi Tante


I will try and track down a copy of your source material and have a look, and as for Altea, would bow to your superior knowledge of the LW. However, having said that, this does appear like another case of applying the "situation normal" to the East Front, which for Germany was never normal. It was always in crisis, and consequently almost never operated as the textbooks said they should. This was true for their repair and refit arrangements, and its almost certainly true for their pilot trraining arrangements.

Anyway, a reasonable summary of Luftwaffe training problems can be found with this link:


Pilot Training of the Luftwaffe (German Air Force) in WW2.


Relevantly it says 

"_The relentless rate of losses from the beginning of the Russian campaign, however, made demands which the flying training organisation found almost impossible to meet: during the first six months of the offensive Luftwaffe casualties in aircrew, of all categories from all causes in all theatres, amounted to some 2,200 men; during the second six months an almost exactly equal number of men was lost.

The campaign in Russia also brought more direct forms of pressure on the flying training organisation. Early in 1942 many Ju52 aircraft, together with their instructor pilots, were removed from the C, blind-flying and bomber schools and sent to Russia to supplement the fleet of air transports engaged in flying supplies to the German troops cut off at Demjansk and Cholm. Owing to actual losses and shortages at the front line units, many of the instructors and aircraft were never returned to the training organisation. Later in the year the pace of air operations in the east led to a shortage of aviation fuel throughout the Luftwaffe; again it was the flying training schools that suffered.

The shortages of instructors, suitable aircraft and fuel threw out of gear the training programme for bomber and reconnaissance crews; in the short term there was a surplus of partially-trained pilots from the A/B Schools, but at the same time a lack of trained crews available at the Ergaenzungseinheiten. 
In July 1942 General Kuehl, the Director of Training, brought to Goering's notice the fact that the shortages were leading to an impossible situation at the C Schools. As was so often the case, the Reichsmarschall had a glib answer: he ordered that the C Schools should be disbanded, and their functions taken over by the Ergaenzungseinheiten. 
This proved to be beyond the capacity of the latter, however, for they had insufficient aircraft or instructors to cope with this sudden influx of pupils; so, in their turn, the Ergaenzungseinheiten farmed out many of them to the operational Gruppen (groups) for training. The net result of this confused situation was that the general standard of training of new crews for the bomber and long-range reconnaissance units fell so low that operational efficiency began to suffer_."


So whilst it may be technically correct to say the training groups were not committed to battle, by 1942 the situation was so confused, resources so limited that the effect was the same. Aircrews were being committed without full and proper training according to this article, and efficiency was suffering as a result. In the following year (1943) ther was a partial recovery at least on the east front, before the final nosedive into oblivion in 1944.


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## parsifal (Jul 28, 2011)

mhuxt said:


> Here's another file I haven't read:
> 
> Battlefield air interdiction by the Luftwaffe at the Battle of Kursk -- 1943. :: Master of Military Art and Science Theses
> 
> ...



Hi MX


This is the same article as I posted. Asa Riacrato points out, it does have some errors, but proof that it is considered competent as a body of research is shown in the signatures of the assessment staff at the front of the document, that permits its release for general circulation. It cannot be dismissed as inaccurate because it has some relatively minor errors in the work. 

I dont agree with everything he says, but the research cant be dismissed on the basis of minor errors. Thats akin to saying thee are spelling errors, therefore I can ignore it as aa piece of research


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## Juha (Jul 28, 2011)

Hello Altea
IIRC IMHO Groehler’s book, Geschichte des Luftkrieges 1910 bis 1970, is a bit biased but has some interesting info and tables, but it was some 35 years ago when I read parts of it (very slowly because my knowledge on German was very basic).
IMHO Williamson Murray is not anti-Soviet or anti- or pro-LW but was clearly pro strategic bomber force.

Juha


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## Juha (Jul 28, 2011)

Hello Parsifal
first OT, see for newer info on the BoB losses: BBC News - Battle of Britain: The cost
Sums are in a/c: 1918 vs 1012, RAF losses incl only fighters, LW all combat types, I have also numbers which incl also RAF BC and CC losses, but not time to dig them out.
I still have not had time to dig out the report on VVS training, but Altea gave already good info on that, but I’ll anyway look the report later on. But anyway VVS also used a system in which a new or a reformed regiment first got some operational training in the rear before it was sent to the battle.

Juha


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## Altea (Jul 28, 2011)

parsifal said:


> The OBs for the forces involved
> 
> Soviet Frontal Aviation units
> 
> ...



Now the thread has a good start, don't you mind i present it in another way?

*6 Fighter Aviation Corps Iarische * Gen AB Yumashev 
273 Fighter Air Division Kolpny Col IF Fedorov Yak 1/7/9
279 Fighter Air Division Mokhozoe Col FN Dementyev La-5

*6 Mixed Aviation Corps Khmel'nets * Gen ID Antoshkin
221 Bomber Air Division Pelets Col SF Buzylev A20B, Boston III
282 Fighter Air Division Kunach Col AM Ryazanov Yak-1

*3 Bomber Aviation Corps Elets* Gen AZ Karavysky
241 Bomber Air Division Chernovo-Piatnitskaia Col IG Kurilenko Pe-2
301 Bomber Air Division Voronets Col FM Fedorenko Pe-2

1 Guards Fighter Air Division Ol'khavatka Lt-col Krupenin Yak-1, P-39
283 Fighter Air Division Mokva/Kursk Col SP Denisov Yak-1/7
286 Fighter Air Division Zybino Col II Ivanov Yak-1 La-5
2 Guards Assault Air Division Ryshkovo Col GI Komarov Il-2
299 Assault Air Division Kr. Zaria St. Col VI Krupsky Il-2
271 Night Bomber Air Division Kazanka Lt-col KP Rasskazov U-2
16 ODRAP (organic reconaissance regiment) Maj DS Shertsyuk A20B/Pe-2
98 GvODRAP Lnt-col VP Artemyev Pe-2

Regards

PS this it not to critisize, only to complete post...


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## Altea (Jul 28, 2011)

Juha said:


> But anyway VVS also used a system in which a new or a reformed regiment first got some operational training in the rear before it was sent to the battle.
> 
> Juha



This is true, due to heavy losses in 1941-42 many front line regiments were disactivated (disbanded) and reconstituated/rearmed in the rear. But this was an "imposed by circumstances" not the "normal procedure".
I also point out the fact that some best pupils as Kojedoub or Evstingeyev in schools, were kept as instructors. When the wait to front they already had many hundreds of flying hours. With the obvious results we know.
To complete the big picture, first shortened flying programm occured only in 1940 with VVS tremendous expansion. *All* 1937-1939 pilots recieved the complete 150h programm.

So finding crews with 800 -1 000 flying hours was not that uncommon in 1941.


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## parsifal (Jul 28, 2011)

Juha said:


> Hello Parsifal
> first OT, see for newer info on the BoB losses: BBC News - Battle of Britain: The cost
> Sums are in a/c: 1918 vs 1012, RAF losses incl only fighters, LW all combat types, I have also numbers which incl also RAF BC and CC losses, but not time to dig them out.
> I still have not had time to dig out the report on VVS training, but Altea gave already good info on that, but I’ll anyway look the report later on. But anyway VVS also used a system in which a new or a reformed regiment first got some operational training in the rear before it was sent to the battle.
> ...


 
Whilst talking about BoB losses is off topic, it can be used to illustrate why quoting losses is not so easy or accurate as any of us would like to imagine. Think back just a few posts when we were looking at Zetterlings loss figures. For 1942 he said that the Germans lost 4100 aircraft to combat causes (I think on the eastern front). However, to that total you would need to add a further 497 returned to Germany for rebuilding but ultimately scrapped, and then a further 1700 retained in theatre but also scrapped. These additional losses would not appear as losses under the german system. In particular combat, a reported loss of say 41 aircraft in a given combat in reality the number of airframes lost in that particular combat would be closer to 65 crates, because of these "long term" write offs.

In the west you are going to encounter a similar problem in calculating losses, though on a less dramatic scale. Its not going to be a phenomenon exclusively German, of course, but the reality is that the Luftwaffe suffered from this "lomg term" loss rate to a greater extent than the western allies (I dont have figures for the Soviets). Wheras in the west these kinds of attritional losses increased losses by anything from 15-25% of admitted "immediate" losses, and in the East by as much as 40-50%, for units based in Britain it only ran at a consistent 5-10% of "immediate loses/ These losses are called attritional losses, and the facts are that the allies suffered a lower attritional loss rate than the Germans. US attritional losses (both combat and noncombat related) were about 18000 airframes in the ETO out of a total of 45000 or so airframes lost in total. Thus only 40% of airframe losses were attritional. If we compare this to the attritional losses for the Germans in 1942, from Zetterlings figures, we find an attritional loss rate of about 60% of airframes. In another thread, I found that attritional losses for one particular JG selected at ramdom (JG11) amounted to 248% in one year of the force structure, in just one year. LW attrition rates were exceptionally high for some reason, I suspect for the arduous service their flying units were called upon to provide.

So I am extremely sceptical that this figure pf 1800 to 1000 is at all accurate, despite the meticulous nature of the research that produced it. It gets back to the recurring problem when quoting losses.....when is a loss a loss?????


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## Milosh (Jul 28, 2011)

To illustrate parsifal's comment:

I./JG54 was based at Orel

In July 1943, I./JG54 lost 19 a/c 'due to enemy action' and lost 14 'not due to enemy action' (total 33). In Aug, it was 11 and 17 (total 28) respectively. What is more revealing is that the Germans couldn't keep up with the losses (at least for I./JG54). On July 1, I./JG54 had 38 Fw190As on hand which was reduced to 23 on Sept 1.

Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen, I./JG54


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## Juha (Jul 28, 2011)

Hello Milosh
As I wrote in my message #19 to the original tread:”Fuel wasn’t the only problem, Kless:”A/c allotments were generally sufficient to make up for losses, with exception of Fw 190s, Ju 88s and Bf 110G-2s...”
so that is not surprising, and I checked the 109G equipped II. and III./JG 3, they didn’t have replacement problems in Jul 43, they were recalled to Reich in Aug 43. Or I./JG 52, which stayed in the East See:
Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen, II./JG3 , Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen, III./JG3
Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen, I./JG52

Juha


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## Nikademus (Jul 28, 2011)

parsifal said:


> An interesting thesis that I found from a USAF Major dated 1980. I had difficulty scrolling through the article because its one of those facebook attachments, and I dont use facebook. Nevertheless I saw enough of the paper to conclude it might be of interest. Basically it argues that the germans put too much emphasis on the close air support mission at the expense of the interdiction mission, and that this mistake was a crucial factor in the air battle. Not sure if I agree totally with the major, buts still an interesting read.
> 
> Like I said, I found it difficult to navigate through the document, but it might be of interest just the same



He's technically correct but without having read the article yet, but it sounds like he's waggling his finger at the LW without understanding the nature of the Eastern Front. 

Bergstrom's series relates the major problem the LW had in it's heyday years (1941 - 1942) with the Army continually needing it to perform "flying artillery" missions (aka...tactical ground support), particularily during crisis moments, of which the army had many, particularily during major Soviet offensives and/or during times of great German ground weakness. The LW was well aware that it's primary missions were Operational in nature, including Air Superiority, Interdiction, Supply hub/rail attacks and of course Airbase attack. Bergstrom relates well the frustration the LW flyers and planners felt having to bleed off assets and wear out men and machines conducting these punishing missions but he also well represents the critical effect these tactical missions had, often saving the day for the hard pressed infantrymen.

I think US authors as well as alot of posters tend to forget just how massive and draining the Eastern Front war was. It was after all, the largest modern conflict in human history involving millions of men, hundreds of divisional units (and thousands of smaller sized units), a massive amount of terrain/front and of course thousands of aircraft. It's one thing for example to commit resources to a massive strategic bombing campaign when you have no or limited such ground committments to attend too, another when your fighting such a war as was seen in the East. 

One can argue that perhaps Bergstrom 'over represents' the importance of these ground support missions in regards to the army's situation I suppose but reading Glantz's new 3 volume accounts of Stalingrad as well as his book on Kursk also conveys the sheer amount of manpower and ground assets the Soviets attempted to flood the German lines with. However the air stories tend to mesh with those of the Panzerjager who also, with limited numbers were often forced to perform "fireman" missions, reacting to individual crisis vs. being used for their primary offensive role in exploitation and maneuver.


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## Erich (Jul 28, 2011)

as to close support follow along if you will on some of the Stuka RK winners missions and how many were done per day during 1943 in the summer for just a short time period. you were ordered to fly until you die. easily seen why some could mount well over 400 missions in their talley......unheard of.


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## Juha (Jul 28, 2011)

Nikademus said:


> One can argue that perhaps Bergstrom 'over represents' the importance of these ground support missions in regards to the army's situation I suppose...



IMHO he definitely "over presents" the impact of CAS, at least in his BC/RS Vols 1 and 2 and Barbarossa books, the only ones of his books I have read, and seems to do so in his Kursk book, at least that was my imression when I leafed it a couple years ago.

Juha


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## Erich (Jul 28, 2011)

curious Nik and Juha can you both elaborate further on Bergstroms "overally represents" statements ?


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## Juha (Jul 28, 2011)

Hello Eric
for ex Bergsröm claims that Uman encirclement was the first encirclement executed solely by air power. Now having read some divisional histories, I know, can’t remember which did what, but lets say that the point Kampfgruppe (army ad hoc formation) of 14th PzD was stopped because of Soviet resistance just N of one of the railways that run E from Uman , they saw fully loaded Soviet trains runnig to E out of the pocket, LW declared that it could not help, so the KG sent at night a Pioneer det. with PzGren and tank support to blow up a stretch of the railway to stop the traffic, further east the point of 16th PzD came across a railway line running E from Uman, at first it had a easy job to blast a couple trains coming from W but then the tank troop nearest to the railwayline was wiped off by a attack from the W by heavy Soviet tanks. Now trains are the easiest land transport to stop, one simply cut the rails, trains do not made detours through fields around the cuts. 

Now nad then while reading CB’s books one get an impression that ground forces were just spectators of air war. He seems to have very little understanding of the importance of artillery, which was the cornerstone of Heer’s defensive systems and especially Soviets saw it as the king of the battlefield.

Juha


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## Nikademus (Jul 28, 2011)

Erich said:


> curious Nik and Juha can you both elaborate further on Bergstroms "overally represents" statements ?



I don't personally think that he did. The statement was a rhetorical one, sort of an 'auto-Devil's advocate' acknowledgement that different points of view can convey different impressions. Bergstrom's books naturally focus on the 'air-war' so they emphasis (naturally) the important roles that they played in the overall campaign. It might also be said that being focused on the air war exclusively there was more room to recount specific indicents where airpower was critical just as books focusing on the Panzer arm do. 

There "is" support for Bergstrom's writings in other sources, including Glantz for one. His new volumes on the situation revolving around the 1942 summer offensive convey a new sense of profound respect for the tenacity and tactical/operational skills of the Werhmacht against a foe that at times would commit so many resources simotaniously to try to overwhelm the opposition. Fortunately the Soviet skill sets, particularily those of their leaders tied in with their Command and Control were not yet equal to the large masses they would throw into the fray. Sometimes the STAVKA would commit large army/corps sized operations just to hold down or distract the Germans from other active theaters. 

It is easy to tie these sometimes desperate situations, with overstretched German resources, reserves (particularily their armor) and air assets with some of the issues Bergstrom cites for the Luftwaffe aka...competing priorities including what the German airmen themselves called "Flying Artillery" missions.

One could also say that the author of Pars.' article is exercising a bit in the art of "Sour Grapes" as its pretty clear from numerous readings that the Germans were much ahead of the curve when it came to effective CAS vs. the Western Allies, until later in the war.


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## parsifal (Jul 28, 2011)

I agree with Niks assessment of the article. The good major has a point that is only partially valid, but stretches the argument a bit too far to remain in th main stream.

Are there any other articles that support this notion that the LW concentrated too much on "flying artillery" missions in the battle???? I have to say that I always assumed direct support to be a good thing, and one that the Germans excelled at to be honest. i cant help thinking that if the germans had concentrated their efforts on Interdiction, we would be saying why did they mis-use their equipment and concentrate on a mission that under-utilized their specilised direct support skills and equipment.....


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## Erich (Jul 28, 2011)

good points Gentlemen I appreciate your comments very much, and not to take away from this thread but may I ask does Berstrom over the Ju 88 Destroyer staffel following up in the Soviet rearguard areas destroying trains ? As this does indeed have to be included with flying artilliere the Ju 88's were quite effective in their role.


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## Rivet (Jul 29, 2011)

Blasting railroad ties by explosives by air had its momentary effect, but the Russians became quite adept at rapid repair of the damage. Certainly were enough stretches of railroad for bombers to hone their skills on, the Moskow-Don line served the Kursk area and various feeder lines to the smaller towns.

The mention of Soviet pilot recruits being set lose on active operations with only 13 hours of powered training is on the P-40 Lend-Lease site. This bit of NKVD induced madness did not make it into 1942 and the assecion of Novikov to leadership of the VVS.

I've thought of you're posing the question of "too much" flying artillery in the LW, Pasifal. Udet wanted all the aircraft, including the heavies to have dive bombing capability. The only dedicated horizontal bomber was the He-111. Though heavy strategic bombers existed in small numbers German inventory they were never used as such and only seen in the Russian theater in a transport capacity. Regards


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## Juha (Jul 29, 2011)

Hello Rivet
In which LL P-40 article
a quick look on this serious article on P-40s in Soviet service, The P-40 in Soviet Aviation
did not reveal that kind of info, but some interesting point on VVS training

_Quote:_ _“Reserve air regiments served a dual function in the Soviet VVS: They were training centers for the transition of air regiments and individual crews to specific types of aircraft (analogous to the German C-Schule), and they also were depots for the distribution of these same types of aircraft to the frontal air regiments to replace losses. A reasoned caution was displayed with the Tomahawks. Despite a critical shortage of fighters, those in charge decided initially to train on these aircraft in the rear.
The 27th ZAP was formed in August 1941 specifically for training on the Tomahawk and Hurricane aircraft and was stationed at Kadnikov airfield (along the Arkhangelsk-Vologda railroad line, 140 km from Vologda). In 1941-42 this regiment was the gateway through which Tomahawks were delivered to VVS KA air regiments. The 126th, 154th, 159th, and 964th Fighter Air Regiments (IAP) and scores of individual crewmen were trained here. The regiment was reformed on 2 November into a 2-squadron composition (TOE 105/177) and on 27 December 1941 it had 15 Tomahawk IIBs (AN974, 978, AK172, 197, 243, 247, 250, 258, 321, 327, 342, 345, 363, 388, and 493), 4 two-seat Yak-7 training aircraft, and 2 UTI-4s. Despite the difficulties of utilizing these aircraft during the winter (malfunctioning engines, generators, and other components were the cause of a number of accidents), the instructors of 27th ZAP considered the Tomahawk a relatively simple aircraft to fly and fully within the grasp of pilots of average qualification. Thanks to its durability it withstood the clumsy landings and even forced belly landings that were unavoidable in the training process. Over the 14 months of its intensive exploitation, only five aircraft (AN974, AK316, 196, 243, and 321) were written off. Beginning in July 1942 the 27th ZAP began training on the Kittyhawk, but on 25 September it was disbanded and all the personnel and aircraft were transferred to the 6th Reserve Air Brigade.
The first regiment to arrive at 27th ZAP for training was the 126th IAP, on 15 September 1941. This regiment had fought in the I-16 and MiG-3 from 22 June and had good combat experience, attested to by the presence in the regiment of two Heroes of the Soviet Union (hereafter HSU)-Senior Lieutenants S. G. Ridnyy (Ukrainian) and V. G. Kamenshchikov received this rank by an order dated 9 August 1941...The Tomahawk was not complicated to transition to, and by 1 October 1941 the regiment was undertaking training flights. By 12 October the regiment had to return hurriedly to the front. Under the command of Major V. M. Naydenko, the regiment comprised of two squadrons (20 aircraft) flew to Chkalov airfield and began combat duty for the defense of Moscow”_

in later part of that article they describe training with more details

_Quote: "All aircraft were delivered to the 25th ZAP on Soviet territory (Adzhi-Kabul, Azerbaydzhan [near Baku]). This regiment was formed on 30 October 1941 for training in the LaGG-3, and with the opening of the southern route was re-profiled for foreign fighters. The training in the Kittyhawk began here on 19 November 1942 when the first three P-40Es arrived in the regiment (nos. 1533, 1547, and 1548 [23]). Almost immediately (23 November 1942) they were assigned to the 45th IAP for training. Because of a lack of sufficient numbers of aircraft of a single type, the regiment was trained in two types: Airacobras and Kittyhawks. The instructors and students were in training almost simultaneously, but in a wholly serious manner. 32 pilots completed 671 hours of training, including 1,682 landings, 155 training aerial engagements, 112 passes at ground and 98 at air targets, and 134 routine cross-country and 113 instrument flights."_

That is appr 20 hours IN SERVICE TYPE but that is late 42. And Soviets constructed 2-seat fighter trainers also from LL a/c which show some emphasis on training, even before WWII they had produced 2-seat versions of I-16 just for training and Yak-7 began its life as a 2-seat fighter trainer.

Juha


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## parsifal (Jul 29, 2011)

View attachment Bergstroms deployment map.pdf
I finally have a copy of Bergstroms Book....very impressed. No wonder you guys sing its praises

I thought I would post his deplyment map to claify where the various air units were


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## Altea (Jul 29, 2011)

parsifal said:


> View attachment 174339
> I finally have a copy of Bergstroms Book....very impressed. No wonder you guys sing its praises
> 
> I thought I would post his deplyment map to claify where the various air units were



Nice map in colors, but there are no mention to the 5th VA of the Steppe front, in the rear. Of course it did not participated to the defence operations, but was a kind if inssurance as some other independent stavka reserve units in case of german breakthrough.


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## Rivet (Jul 29, 2011)

Thanks for the inclusion of the deployment map, Parsifal. It works well with the two maps included on page one of this topic. Regards 

An observation regarding Georgy Zhukov. That fellow certainly had luck on his side, both in his operational career and dealing with his fellow Soviet Russians. Zhukov missed most of the purges, only running into personal flak post-war when Beriev tried using air commander Novikov as a foil to try and get him. Beriev did not succeed and was shot some time later, after Stalin's death. Regards


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## Erich (Jul 29, 2011)

Gentlemen my reference was in effect shooting up locos and trains not bombing tracks and stationery rail targets

will be curious Parsifal on your thoughts on Bergstrom's work as you progress..........


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## Nikademus (Jul 29, 2011)

parsifal said:


> I agree with Niks assessment of the article. The good major has a point that is only partially valid, but stretches the argument a bit too far to remain in th main stream.
> 
> Are there any other articles that support this notion that the LW concentrated too much on "flying artillery" missions in the battle???? I have to say that I always assumed direct support to be a good thing, and one that the Germans excelled at to be honest. i cant help thinking that if the germans had concentrated their efforts on Interdiction, we would be saying why did they mis-use their equipment and concentrate on a mission that under-utilized their specilised direct support skills and equipment.....



Good direct support "is" a good thing  but like other airforces of the time, the Luftwaffe personell and leaders did not want to end up a glorified artillery brannch of the Army, subject to it's whims and demands. They saw their primary mission as establishing superiority over the enemy airforce and completing vital operational tasks such as those previously mentioned. There was even a small strategic component as well. 

The CAS missions though were vital, not the least of which was due in part because unlike the lavish army of the US and the later war Soviets, the Army didn't have enough ground support of it's own (aka "Artillery" etc) to be able to assist the infantry at all times hence the Luftwaffe got called in to shuttle run CAS missions, sometimes many times per day for the same aircrews. As mentioned, it also had the negative effect of wearing down the Luftwaffe making it that much harder for it to conduct it's broader scope of operations.

But yes....the CAS was important.....even vital at times. Of particular note was the oft maligned Ju-87's were critical in this theater for their ability to provide pinpoint support, and the Zerstorers which came into their own as effective fighter-bombers. (Despite the reletive obsolecence of the opposition initially, here as elsewhere the 110's utility as a straight up fighter was limited)

One of the best books on this aspect and the conflicts between Luftwaffe and Army requirements is James Corum's "The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-1940" This is a facinating work on the development of the Luftwaffe, it's doctrine, polices and training. Corum's central argument is that the Luftwaffe was a fully developed Operational airforce vs. the "tactical" (aka Ground support) airforce it is often portrayed as. I highly recommend the book.


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## Juha (Jul 29, 2011)

On VVS training, some pilot memoirs, giving info on their training, the first pilot completed his training in Spring 43 the second late Winter 43/44

Interview with Vladimir Mukhmediarov

“— Did you apply yourself, or were you sent by a directive? 
I did it my self. When I finished aeroclub, I was younger then 18 years old, and because of this I was not accepted to a military flight school. Later, from winter 1940, I started flying in Zheleznodorozhniy aeroclub. 
…
— What did you study in aeroclub? 
There was a program in aeroclub. Theory at first, then flight practice. We flew Po-2 with instructor, take offs-landings. Then maneuvers in the zone. Loops, all kinds of combat turns, zooms. That’s with instructor. Then instructor would allow solitary flight. A bag of sand would be placed in the rear cabin in order not to change weight balance… 
— How many flights did you make before your first solo flight? 
About fifteen with instructor. In the second aeroclub I flew solo on the sixth flight already.
In the beginning of 1941, in February, perhaps, instructors from Chernigov military flight school came. They examined how everyone was flying, and the best were listed as candidates.
After that my file was sent from the Voenkomat to the flight school. I came to Chernigov flight school in the beginning of April.
I passed medical commission, but at vesting commission they said:
— You are not 18 years old yet. You should go home.
I replied:
— I will be eighteen in the end of April.
— Fine, we will accept you.
And they allowed me to pass. I studied from 1941 until 1943. When the War broke out, we begun studying with increased speed, by a shortened program…
At first we studied on I-15bis and I-16. There also were I-5, but we did not fly them, only taxied and trained holding direction on take offs and landings. The fabric from the wings was torn away, so that no one would take off. It was done because we had no twin control I-15Bis…
…I finished the flight school in 1943. Instead of supposed four years of training in took two years. Training was weak. Only piloting, in general. At first I-16. UTI-4. I almost completed full program. In 1942 we received Yaks. They were built in Saratov. I finished Yak-1 training program, again take off-landing, and zone practice. 
…
During training time, how many flights did you make? 
Before I got to the front? A few. They are listed in my logbook. Here: U-2, 57 hours flown. UTI-4 – 24,5…
I finished the school in March 1943.”

AND

Interview with P.Ovsyannikov

“…Then we moved on to the Yak-7. In July 1943 they graduated us; we “chased down” the group that had already completed in the Yak-7, but after the I-16. Well, we were like the guinea pigs—test animals. In July they commissioned us with officer rank—junior lieutenant. Before this they graduated as sergeants.
…
Upon graduation, how many total hours had you flown?
Altogether 100 hours, including the aero club. About ten hours in the Yak at flight school. The program was local flight—circuits around the airfield and in the local area. One time we flew cross-country as a pair.
…
Well, we went to Moscow. We arrived at the personnel department and, instead of the front, they sent our entire group to Ivanovo—to be transitioned to the Cobra. On the one hand it was unfortunate, but on the other hand perhaps we were lucky. Initially we were upset. Well, we were officers and we were eager to get into the fight.

We arrived in the town Ivanovo at the 22nd Reserve Air Regiment. We went through another “terka” and transition training. There were no dual-control Cobras. They checked us out in Yaks. The food was worse in the reserve regiment than at flight school. I don’t remember the norm number. At the front, you could eat as much as you wanted for dinner. At the training regiment you could eat only as much as they gave you. Don’t ask for more! We were young then, and constantly wanted to eat.
…
Describe the program for transitioning to the Cobra.
What did we do in the Cobra? First, circuits around the airfield, then a program of flights in zone where we worked out the techniques of piloting the airplane. We did as our instructor directed—there was no dual-seater.
Before the completion tests, that is, toward the end of the program, I had an assignment: fly out, then go to a [gunnery] range and fire my machine guns at ground targets…”

Sometime in February 1944 he was assigned to a first-line fighter regiment

“…Tell us, did you conduct any practice aerial engagements?
Both coordination and training aerial engagements. They trained us well. We fired at both ground and aerial targets. The aerial target was a fabric sleeve towed behind an airplane. They used Cobras to tow it. They rolled it up in a ball, then cast it out, and it fully deployed.” 
…
Did you consider your overall training, including that which you received in the aero club, in the reserve regiment, and later in the regiment before combat, sufficient or barely adequate?
Of course, it was not enough. When I went to the front, I had only 12 flights in a Cobra…”



Juha


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## Rivet (Jul 29, 2011)

Interesting bit of journalism included by you here, Juha. Both Germany and the Soviet Socialist Republics realized the importance of the role aviation would play in their efforts to force their political creedos on the rest of us. Civil aviation in both nations was developed as a springboard to developing military aviation. Both political systems nurtured manufacturing and development efforts by subsidizing efforts. The long-term effects of the efforts were the results seen at the Kursk conflicts, and beyond.

I include here article extract mention of pre-war Soviet Civil aviation efforts.:

By 1935 Russia had 140,000 glider pilots, and in Dec. 1936 the government's youth newspaper called for training 150,000 aircraft pilots, all state-paid and of course quite expensive. By 1941 there were 121,000 'civilian sports'-trained pilots. The other pilots were of course trained, and then mass-trained, by the Russian Air Force. The number of flight schools in the Russian Air Force increased to 12 in 1937, to 18 in January 1940, to 28 in Sept. 1940, and to 41 in early 1941. Russia trained military and para-military pilots and paratroopers at an enormous cost and at an incredible rate which even dramatically increased in 1939 and then even further in 1940, far beyond any reasonable defensive need.

regards


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## parsifal (Jul 30, 2011)

I'm still intrigued with the loss figures for both sides. Bergstrom gives figures for the Luftwaffe as those written off or lost straight away, and those subsequerntly scrapped by the LW QM. I wonder are the first totals part of the second, or are the second additional to the first. Also does the QMs write off figures include those aircraft slated for repair, but lost or scdrapped anyway as a result of Soviet territorial; advannces, or logistic difficulties at the front. I have a good source now, but this only seems to raise more questions for me than are answered.....

The elephant in the room are Soviet losses. Bergstrom appears to give figures that pretty much align to other sources that I have, but I wonder if these represent total losses, from all causes, or if there are attritional losses that we have to add to those figures given by Bergstrom. I was hoping Altea or someone with a better grasp of the VVS might share some of their knowledge in this area.....If you need Bergstroms loss figures for the Soviets, I can post thyem if you like....


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## Juha (Jul 30, 2011)

Hello Parsifal
what is wrong with the Khazanov's numbers 2800 a/c lost by VVS incl the losses of the participating ADD and PVO units, timeframe 5 Jul - 23 Aug 43 and LW losses of 1463 a/c of 4th and 6th Air Fleets written off, timeframe 1 Jul - 31 Aug and because 4th Airfleet suffered losses also on its southern wing Khazanov thinks that LW losses during the Kursk battles (5 Jul - 23 Aug 43) were 2000 destr and dam a/c. Now Khazanov isn't the most highly regarded aviation historian with Russian specialists but neither hopeless one.

Juha


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## parsifal (Jul 30, 2011)

Nothing, I guess, but LW losses seem high and VVS losses seem low, plus we just dont know from any source whether all losses are included in their list, or if it omits or overlooks some of the loss figures. 2800 to 2000 seems like a reasonable number, but that is a lot closer than would have assumed.......


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## Altea (Jul 30, 2011)

parsifal said:


> The elephant in the room are Soviet losses. Bergstrom appears to give figures that pretty much align to other sources that I have, but I wonder if these represent total losses, from all causes, or if there are attritional losses that we have to add to those figures given by Bergstrom. I was hoping *Altea or someone with a better grasp of the VVS might share some of their knowledge in this area*.....If you need Bergstroms loss figures for the Soviets, I can post thyem if you like....



Frankly, i would have like to keep it for the end, in the conclusion, as a kind of Hitchkok's suspense...8)
It should have been better to study the battle first, and then conclude...
However, now if it can help you, even if the effect is lost:



> Originally Posted by *Ratsel *
> ...According to Christer Bergström, VVS losses amounted to 1546 a/c


Bergstorm is using *compilated *Krivosheyev's data.



> *Juha:*According to Khazanov, VVS losses during the Battle of Kursk as Russians definite it (5 July - 23 Aug 1943) were 2800 a/c, that incl. ADD and PVO losses which occured during the sorties connected to the battle.


Khazanov is using* raw war diaries* data. In this case the real amount can even reach up to 3300.

What's the truth? Who's right?
Both are right!

In fact raw data losses list are just the arithmetic sum from war diary losses. Much of them are redundant, that mean the same plane and pilot can be lost several times ahead. Some lost planes and pilots written-off in diaries can be later recovered, and much later you go in time, the much lower are d*efinite losses*. But once soviet diary counts are finished in 17:00 by regiment and sent at 19:00 to the division, even the later in the day, recovered planes pilots after 17:00 are not mentionned inside.

Moreover one plane due to complicated and plethoric soviet maintenance chain (5 levels AFAIR) could be written off several times, one at each level: W.O. in régiment and then sent to division, then W.O. in division and sent in corps, W.O. in corps and sent to the Air Army maintenance workshops , in PARMs etc, and even that, being finally restored by industry or mobile factry workshops! That mean WO by military authority, but restored by the Ministry of Industry means!!!
That makes up to 5 artificially increased losses (write-offs in fact) accounts for zero lost plane at final count!

Complilated data were mainly written after the war by HQG, using all available sources. Published first in 1993 by a team leaded by col Krivosheyev, after _perestroika_ and _glasnost_ time, and the first of all, end of the *50 years legal moratory period*. 

Well, balance = 0 at 2-3% tolerance error. Account is good. Nothing else to say...

Regards


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## Juha (Jul 30, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Nothing, I guess, but LW losses seem high and VVS losses seem low, plus we just dont know from any source whether all losses are included in their list, or if it omits or overlooks some of the loss figures. 2800 to 2000 seems like a reasonable number, but that is a lot closer than would have assumed.......



Hello
Khazanov's VVS figure is for total losses, LW figure 2000 is total losses and damaged, but as Altea wrote, K's VVS number might well be too high, on the other hand LW damaged incl those which could have been repaired at the unit level, so even the LW 2000 isn't comparable to VVS 2800. Maybe appr.1150 LW total losses vs 1546 VVS total losses if the Bergström's figure is for 5 Jul - 23 Aug 43 and incl the losses suffered by ADD and PVO units that participated to the Kursk Battles, you have a copy of CB's book, so.. And the 1150 is only my guess made in 30sec, nothing too serious.

Juha


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## parsifal (Jul 30, 2011)

Guys, great work, and thankyou for your patience. I apologise for not being much help other than to ask the questions I guess.....


So, our figures for losses are 1546 for the Soviets to maybe 1150 for the LW, July to end of August.....does anyone wish to challenge or add to that estimate.....we might as well try and reach concensus on this interesting subset, before moving on.


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## Rivet (Jul 30, 2011)

I've a question that research on my part cannot resolve. Where would one find accurate information regarding the ground vehicle motor pools of either Luftwaffe or VVS units involved in the frontline effort during the 1943 efforts we are considering here? It is my believe, just a gut reaction, that operational efforts on both sides were hampered by the need to support the Infantry as a first priority in transportation. Any thoughts/new research venues regarding this aspect of the Kursk?

The failure of Hitler's Germany to field a strategic bomber force keeps coming back to me as a primary cause of the Third Reich's demise. Regarding the mention of James Corum's text of the history of the Luftwaffe, Yes, Regulation 16 did define the development of the National Socialist Air Arm as a balanced force of the tactical and strategic. The balance of forces changed as time passed due to several factors. Since this is not the place to discuss the topic, yet it is important to any aspect of the course of the war in Europe, you might want to revive the following thread: 

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/walter-wever-luftwaffe-strategic-bombers-22568.html

I don't have anything to add to the topic effort to establish an accurate tally of aircraft losses other than to suggest someone track down what primary strength returns and operational reports might still exist. Paper and flesh are two of the historical venues that are most fragile, once lost we are dependent on derivitive sources of information. 
Regards


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## parsifal (Jul 30, 2011)

Rivet 


I cant make much comment on your post, so if you could let me indulge just a little longer....it just occurred to me, that with something like 250 fighters, plus a flak force, the Germans managed to shoot down about 900 Soviet aircraft, the remainder of Soviet losses should statisitcally fall to non-combat related causes. Of that 900, about 33% are going to fall to the flak arm. That leaves about 600 shot down by the Jagdfliegers. That means on averageeach one of them shot down 2-3 Soviet aircraft in the two months of the battle. 

There are other ways of looking at this......they say that on average 10% of the fighter pilots shoot down 90% of the enemy aircraft. If that adage holds true, then just 25 LW pilots, the best of the best, shot down 540 aircraft in two months....thats an average of 21 Soviet aircraft each....man is that good shooting or what......


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## Juha (Jul 30, 2011)

Hello Percifal
so is the Bergström's figure 1546 for 5 Jul - 23 Aug 43 and does it incl the losses suffered by ADD and PVO units that participated to the Kursk Battles? And before begining to speculate too much, is the figure only for the combat related losses or for losses to all reasons?

On strategic bomber force of LW, now if it would have had a meaningful strategic bomber force, from production of which types of a/c would the necessary resources have taken? And from which types of flying would have been curtailed so that the necessary fuel would havee been amassed? I wonder if a partial curtailment of medium bomber production would have been enough.

Hello Rivet
at least LW suffered from lack of the trucks, see Friedrich Kless' article in Newton's Kursk The German View, unfortunately no figures, probably there is not any anymore, some 90-97% of LW papers were destroyed during the war, maybe something not generally known will be found fron Russian archieves.

Juha


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## parsifal (Jul 30, 2011)

I'll do that in an upcoming post. Firstly the LW strength according to Bergstrom. For a number of units, he does not give strengths, so I have had to estimate on the basis of unit size. Ive indicated this with a ? followed by a number, indicating an estimate only. Some entries are of combined types here I have simply divided the total as equally as possible amongst the various types attached to that entry. So this is still an estimate.

The numbers are as follows: 
269xJu88, 383xHe111, (?) (6) He111,(?)(34) Do217, 16xHs123, (?)(12) FW58, 180xJu52, (?)(6) Ju52, (?)(6) Do17, (?)(18)Fi156, 79xHs129, (?)(8) He46, (?)(25)Ar66, (?)(12 Go145, (?)(12) DFS 230, (?)(5) Ju86, (?)(4) Ar240, 403xJu87, (?) (6) Ju87, 18xHs126, (?)(9) Hs126, 47xFW189, (?)(10) FW189, 

190 x FW190, 89 x FW190 (FB), 228 x Bf109, 84 x Bf110

Roughly that gives a total of 591 Fighters (rather more than I had estimated), and 1568 other types for the LW, to which must be added 30 fighters and 60 others of the Hungarian Air Force.

According to Bergstrom, therefore, the Axis initially committed about 2249 aircraft to the battle

Whats missing are the numbers of reserves available, and the numbers of reinforcements received. These are the figures available at the beginning of the battle


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## Juha (Jul 30, 2011)

Hello Parsifal
have you looked The Luftwaffe, 1933-45 ? An excellent site!!
one can find strenght returns from there also replacements per month, notice that the losses were not total losses but those which were removed from strenght at Gruppe level.

And thanks for the CB's numbers!

Hello Altea
thanks for the analyze for Khazanov's numbers!

Juha


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## parsifal (Jul 30, 2011)

Now, for the VVS, Bergstrom gives figures for 2, 16 and 17 VA. No figures are given for PVO or ADD units, nor is there any indicationm of strength for the Reserve Air Army the 5th or the Air Army on the northern flank of the Orel salient (1VA). There are no figures given for reserves or reinforcements, so again, the Soviet OB is not complete. However it does at least give an indication of air units known to be present at the beginning of the battle.

Because the LW are listed as aircraft available, I have opted to go for "total aircraft available" for the Soviets rather than aircraft serviceable. I did this because the figurees given for the Germans are also "aircraft available", suggesting a total availability, rather than a serviceability number.

Total Availability is 2782, of which 1206 are Fighters. 

From Hardesty approximately 300 airframes from ADD and PVO must be added to this total. So my best estimate based on Bergstrom and Hardesty is about 3100 iniitally available to the Soviets.

Bergstrom does not give numbers of individual types, , but types include Yak-1, Yak-7, Yak-9, Yak7B, La-5, Aircobra, Boston III, Pe-2, Il-2, Boston (not the III), and U-2. Either the Soviets do not have liason and recon types, or they ar3e not included in the OB. No transports are included in their OB, perhaps these were controlled by the ADD organization, or they simply did not have any


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## Gixxerman (Jul 30, 2011)

Rivet said:


> The failure of Hitler's Germany to field a strategic bomber force keeps coming back to me as a primary cause of the Third Reich's demise.



I think Altea has already shown (in the 1st try at this, the closed thread) that what we are really talking about here is the German need for an ultra long range strategic bomber (with reliable ultra long range flying navigation aids) beyond anything possible at that time.

The sort of global strike aircraft which took another decade or 2 to become an everyday reality.



Altea said:


> Anyway bombing Russia, in 41-42 no?
> With what kind of navigation devices and maps would you use, e-net with satellite images and GPS something like that?
> 
> You want to attack the big factory n° 153 in Novosibirsk?
> ...



No matter how you chop it up I keep coming back to the central issue being that Germany cannot take on the rest of the world (even before the 1944 D-day landing she was up against a USSR supplied at least by the western allies) in a drawn out war, certainly not a USSR that has already started organising the shift of heavy industry in the manner they did..

When the smash grab fails in 1941 (which outside of the wealth of possible outcomes character, personality politics offer was IMHO always bound to happen) it's over.
They just do not have the weapons systems necessary to stem the tide not to stop the vast restocking and reequipping the USSR was capable of.
When the tide turned it was Germany suffering huge repeated defeats, encirclements and vast amounts of equipment being destroyed she simply could not do what the USSR had done.

Tactical success is still possible, even to the extent of causing the Russians to pause for thought (see Manstein @ Kharkov) but it hardly matters in the overall scheme of things, merely delaying the inevitable causing further losses Germany cannot afford the Russian can.


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## Ratsel (Jul 30, 2011)

> I think Altea has already shown (in the 1st try at this, the closed thread) that what we are really talking about here is the German need for an ultra long range strategic bomber (with reliable ultra long range flying navigation aids) beyond anything possible at that time.
> 
> The sort of global strike aircraft which took another decade or 2 to become an everyday reality.



Hitler was too in love with the Blitzkrieg. so by default a long range strategic bomber wasn't even in the cards. until it was too late. "Strategic" Bombing in Kursk/Kuban consisted of troop support for the most part.


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## Juha (Jul 30, 2011)

Hello
for ADD 300 might be a bit too low, on 6 Jul ADD flew 269 sorties into Orel area + 85 into Kharkov area, on 7 Jul 210 + 163 according to Khazanov. On PVO, in an article published in a book published to honour 30years anniversity of the Kursk Battle in 1974 (English version) the writer tells that in June 43 over 200 PVO fighters protected the rail connections to Kursk.

Juha


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## parsifal (Jul 30, 2011)

Losses according to Bergstrom


Firstly the LW

Bergstrom has a list on Page 120, that gives three separate entries.....losses according to Flivo2 (not sure what that organization is, but I assume some kind of operational command, and gives a breakdown for the two operational commands involved....FliegerKorps VII and Luftflotte 6. Unfortunately these two formations do not represent the total command of the Luftwaffe committment. Approximately 790 further aircraft, placed at the disposal of these two formations, but not assigned, to them directly, also took part in the battle. Neither are the losses for the Hungarian airforces listed (some 90 a/c committed to the battle). So, instead of seeing losses for all 2250 a/c initially committed to the battle, we are only seeing the losses for 1364 a/c committed to the battle. I guess, to get a rough idea of true losses we could multiply by 2250, anhd divide by 1364, but this is not very accurate.

I am dissapointed in Bergstroms error here, but I will continue nevertheless.

For the two commands that he does look at, he gives three separate entries: Soviet claims, losses according to 2 Flivo, and losses according to the LW QM. QM loss figures are uniformly larger than those given by 2 Flivo. I am going to ignore Soviet claims, simnce they are obviously exaggerated.

However the losses given by flivo2 and the QM may be for separate airframes, in which case I have to add the two totals to get an overall total. Or the QM losses may incorporate 2 flivos losses in which case I should only include those losses given by the QM.

The QMs figures are noted as only those lost to enemy action in the air, or returned and scrapped immediately They dont include aircraft returned and scrapped (but with less thanh 90% damage), or aircraft lost in non-combat related accidents, or aircracraft lost to enemy action on the ground. In other words, Bergstroms loss figures are very restricted in other words.

My assumption is that the the QMs figures include the figures given by 2 Flivo

Losses in the air, or above 90% damage on return are 97 for that 4 day period (5-8 July). However as I saif there are numberous holes in the figures he gives. He is not looking at at the losses sustained by a significant fraction of the force....over 880 of the 2250 a/c in fact. He is not looking at accidents on the ground, losses due to enemy action on the ground (such as bombing, non combat related losses and the like) or aircraft scrapped or lost with les than 90% damage. If we use Zetterlings 1942 loss figures as a proportions guide, we would have to assume that the losses mentioned by Bergstrom only account for about 43% of the total losses for the 1364. We would need to multiply his losses by 2.29 to arrive at a more realistic figure, and then multiply again by 1.65 to take into account that he has not looked at all the formations committed. That increases our 97 apparent loss figures to an actual loss of 367 LW aircraft for that 4 day period. 


Lies, damn lies and statistics............


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## Altea (Jul 31, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Total Availability is 2782, of which 1206 are Fighters.


Considering the 1, 2, 5,16, 17th VA more than 5 500 front-line airplanes were available in Kursk aera.



> From Hardesty approximately 300 airframes from ADD and PVO must be added to this total. So my best estimate based on Bergstrom and Hardesty is about 3100 iniitally available to the Soviets.


ADD had 740 planes in june 1943. 26 from the 34 ADD regiments participated to the Kursk battle.
PVO was represented at least by 3 air divisions, prior to the battle.



> Bergstrom does not give numbers of individual types, , but types include Yak-1, Yak-7, Yak-9, Yak7B, La-5, Aircobra, Boston III, Pe-2, Il-2, Boston (not the III), and U-2. Either the Soviets do not have liason and recon types, or they ar3e not included in the OB.


Not inclueded by Bergstrom, i already gave mention of independent regiments
_16 ODRAP (organic reconaissance regiment) Maj DS Shertsyuk A20B/Pe-2
98 GvODRAP Lnt-col VP Artemyev Pe-2_ in my post n°53.
There were also independent reconaissance _Escadrilia_ in A armies and Air corps. 
Some organic rec. regiments belonged to STAVKA, not air armies.




> No transports are included in their OB, perhaps these were controlled by the ADD organization, or they simply did not have any


ADD? Only Li-2 and C-47 used as night bombers.
Many others belonged to GVF (civilian fleet 2 000- 3 000) or VDV (paratroopers -hundreds).
It seems that there were also VTA (military transport aviation) regiments, simply in VVS without any special Air Command for that...

Regards


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## Juha (Jul 31, 2011)

Hello Parsifal
the Flivo
Fliegerverbindungsoffizier. 

This position was created as part of the re-organisation that took place in Apr/May 1942. 

Luftwaffe Staff officer (usually and Oberst) attached to an Armee Gruppe, Armee or Panzerarmee - responsible for the following:- 

1. Liaison between the Armee gruppe and the Fliegerkorps or Luftflotte operating within the area of the Armees control. 

2. Briefing the Armee headquarters on the local air situation, the operational intentions of the Fliegerkorps or Luftflotte and its order of battle. 

3. Passing to the Fliegerkorps or Luftflotte the Armee Gruppes wishes with regard to luftwaffe operations and any air transport requirements. 

4. Briefing the Fliegerkorps or Luftflotte with regard to the ground situation within the Armee Gruppes carea of control, its operational intentions and the order of battle of the Armee formations. 

5. Employment of the aircraft of the Kurrierstaffel attached to the headquarters of the Armee Gruppe. 

6. Co-operation and co-ordinatioon with the Armees Quartermaster branch. 

staight from Wiki

Juha


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## Juha (Jul 31, 2011)

Hello again Parsifal
It came into my mind that you are not aware the excellent Kursk site of Pawel Burchard see Air Battle over Kursk 1943, Starting Page
Pawel freely admits that the VVS part is a bit out of date but it is still a gem, it has also info on PVO units in the area. And of course on ADD.

HTH
Juha

ADDITION, are you sure that CB used 90% or over definitation for LW losses because that seems odd, 60-80% were unrepairable, useable parts were cannabalized to repair other a/c and 81-99% Written offs, crashed on own territory and 100% Written off, crashed on enemy territory or into water.


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## Erich (Jul 31, 2011)

Juha, Pawel must have re-opened his site then as it was closed for a time ................

Parsifal Bergstorm only had what he could find. 90-95 % of the LW claims and losses are lost forever even Freiburg does not have all Tony Wood has admitted to me some years ago on this very fact. the KTB's are no more, burned up in spring of 45 or lost and buried on the Ost front this is fact and yet we have to pay the piper and make it a guessing game out of it. you can readily see we are just using projections of figures from multiple sources and the frustration abounds in error from German/Soviet sources. no matter still it is all debatable.


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## Juha (Jul 31, 2011)

Hello Eric
yes, it is moved to Yogy's site in late 2010

Juha


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## parsifal (Jul 31, 2011)

Hi Erich

I am frustrated by the lack of finality and precision in the figures. Doing my best to come up with a balanced estimate of losses for both sides, but I alays knew it would be difficult. Happy to stand back and listen to what others have to say regarding strengths and losses. 

great work so far guys. I will have a look at that additional site Juha, might help to claify the issue.


On classification of losses, Bergstrom at the back of the book has a note on damage classification. Says that it is based on officieal LW system. The note is on Page 131. Will go back and check his classifications tonite when I have more time. If I was wrong I will post a revision of my estimated loss figures. However Bergstroms losses in his table on Page 120 are only for aircraft lost in the air, not aircraft scrapped on the ground. He makes that distinction in the notes on the Table. Erich has explained why.....


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## Erich (Jul 31, 2011)

I think unless those that are so fortunate enough to have in their possession all the loss/kills data figures and there are ones that could have in Germany, Russia then it will be hard to only guesstimate those, but we must do our best.

everyone is keeping a level head and the debate is good, please continue.


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## parsifal (Jul 31, 2011)

At this stage, I would say that the superior reserves at the disposal of the VVS were critical in tipping the balance. I do not think at this stage that LW losses can be passed off as minor or insignificant. They took heavy casualties, but inflicted higher caualties on the VVS. The trouble for the LW was that the VVS had the depth to absorb its losses, and come back for more....the LW had no depth and could not sustain the losses it was absorbing.

I know that what I am saying is obvious and safe, but we have to start somewhere. I know that the basis for saying it is not all that solid, but its based on the best information and projections we as a group can put together. If people have information that improves that understanding, including people that have information to support a contrary view, you should bring that forward now. If not, the discussion will move forward I expect.


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## Rivet (Jul 31, 2011)

Parsifal- Regarding your Post #96- See if the Russians, who retook the areas where the German aviation was posted, might have better documentation than the BDU? I'd posted the Lend-Lease Site regarding the P-40, perhaps you might want to go there. One fellow in Buffalo, New York is quite conversant. Regards


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## Rivet (Jul 31, 2011)

Parsifal- Regarding your Post #96- See if the Russians, who retook the areas where the German aviation was posted, might have better documentation than the BDU? I'd posted the Lend-Lease Site regarding the P-40, perhaps you might want to go there. One fellow in Buffalo, New York is quite conversant. Regards


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## Altea (Aug 1, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Hi Erich
> 
> I am frustrated by the lack of finality and precision in the figures. Doing my best to come up with *a balanced estimate of losses for both sides*, but I alays knew it would be difficult. Happy to stand back and listen to what others have to say regarding strengths and losses.
> .


No but you can always use mathematical _frames _or _gaps_
definition:
Conduct approximation of any of a number x is to find two numbers a and b such that a > x > b.
The _magnitude_ of the framing is c = b - a


For sure, magnitude would be considerable, definite conclusion hard to establish, *but* it can be the object of anorther debate *and* we are very far from being there, now.

So, go on!

Regards


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## Nikademus (Aug 1, 2011)

Bergstrom pretty much poo poo's the idea that a dedicated SB campaign against the USSR would have done much (end Vol II - BC/RS). Primary reasons would be the sheer distance, the lack of a dedicated, effective LR escort available to the Luftwaffe and the strength of the VVS rear area defenses. Any such attempt in his opinion would have incurred negligable results in exchange for potentially serious air losses. There was a reason why the Luftwaffe primarily restricted itself to occasional night raids against distant city targets like Moscow. The Moscow PVO was formidable in the same way that the Red Army reserves around the capital were. The Russians achieved miracles in production as well during a very trying time so adding some bomb damage to the mix IMO would not create an obstacle that they could not overcome. If the Germans could do it with all their economic issues, why not the Russians? Personally I don't see it as a magic bullet because the SB campaign for the west wasn't one either.


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## Rivet (Aug 1, 2011)

Interesting post, Nickademus. Albert Speer, Hitler's Minister of Armaments, mentions Germany's efforts to reduce allied bombing efforts. Factories were moved into woods and underground, something that could not be done with the production of Fuels.

Soviet efforts were relegated to the removal of factories back from the range of German bombers. In a nation with thirteen time zones, this was easy, save for those factories already in place in Moscow (Lenses, Electrical Parts) whose tear-down and replacement elsewhere would have slowed production to a crawl. I'd made mention regarding the strategic bombing campaign here. Kursk was a tactical battle. Search down the list for General Wever and fire that puppy up again. Let's get Parsifal the facts he needs regarding losses. Regards


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## Juha (Aug 2, 2011)

Hello
I’ll not bother to open a dedicate “SB possibilities of LW in the East” tread, so a short comment. IIRC LW’s June 43 small SB campaign wasn’t very costly and delivered some effective blows to Soviet armament industry and PVO wasn’t especially effective against those night raids.

IMHO main reason against a SB campaign a la RAF and USAAF by LW was that Germany’s aircraft industry and fuel production didn’t have capacity to produce comparative bomber force without drastically cutting some other essential production/consumption.

And in fact LW thought that it had figured out the Achilles Heel of Soviet war production, the electric grid. SU had lost 41-42 substantial part of its electrical production and Germans reasoned that there was not much reserve capacity anymore left and electrical plants, especially dams were veeery difficult to evacuate to more distance places from the front. Early 44 many bomber units were withdrawn from combat for intensive retraining for LR bombing sorties, but once again LW miss the train, before the training was completed SU had smashed AG Centre and the frontline had moved so much to the west that most of the vulnerable targets had become too distant for the He 111, which was thought to be the main type to be used in the attacks.

Juha


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## Nikademus (Aug 2, 2011)

Juha said:


> Hello
> I’ll not bother to open a dedicate “SB possibilities of LW in the East” tread, so a short comment. IIRC LW’s June 43 small SB campaign wasn’t very costly and delivered some effective blows to Soviet armament industry and PVO wasn’t especially effective against those night raids.
> Juha



I do not wish to derail the thread.....which is about Kursk....however I would be interested in hearing more about these "effective" blows on Soviet industry at night. My comment re: the PVO was in reference to the idea of a dedicated SB op during the day against targets. The Luftwaffe did perform a few night missions. I'm not aware of any lasting impact these raids had reading from Bergstrom's accounts or them.....same as with the few LRA night attacks on German targets. Both sides scored a few hits....but not anything to cause a panic. As with BC's night ops, such a thing would have taken time and a dedicated effort with substantially committed resources to saturate the target area. Feel free to PM me these details. I would be interested in reading them



I disagree that the LW "missed the boat" given it's current committments...which steers us back to Kursk  By the time of Kursk, the LW was stretched to the limit as it was trying to provide limited and local battlefield superiority over the biggest land battle of 1943 against a reinvigorated and typically determined VVS.


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## Juha (Aug 2, 2011)

Hello Nikodemus
because CoS of LFl 6 Friedrich Kless mentioned the June 43 SB missions in his article in Newton's Kursk The German View, it’s not so much OT. Kless’ point was that while effective the raids distracted bombers from attacks against land communications to Kursk just as the SU was strongly reinforcing its troops there. At least the attack on GAZ factory in Gorky was effective, even Soviet era publications admitted this see:

Gorky Automobile plant in the years of Great Patriotic war. /
“…The summer of 1943 brought the difficult trials to the warriors of the Soviet Army and the workers of the plant.
On the 4 of june, 1943 at 23.40 the air alert was declared. The enemy dropped high-explosive and incendiary bombs on the plant, lighted by the enemy's missiles. A lot of workshops, houses of Sotsgorod, offices, building were burnt. Water-supply was broken, there was nothing to extinguish the fires. In many workshops the wooden walls were set in fire. The substation, which was receiving the electricity from Gorenergo was put out of action by splinter of bomb. The plant was in the flame. More than 100 high-explosive bombs were dropped to the plant on the first day of air-bombing. Blacksmith ‘3, chassis workshop, the main conveyer, partially spring workshop and another workshops were put out of action. Several houses, children's garden, a hospital were destroyed in the plant's settlement.
But the enemies continued air-bombing. From 4 to 22 of june of 1943 they appeared at the same time over the plant. Many workshops were destroyed or capitally damaged, arterial communication networks were seriously damaged, the production cycle was impaired. At all enterprise 50 buildings and constructions, more than 9 thousand metres of conveyers, 5900 units of process equipment, 8 thousand of engines, 28 cranes, 8 workshops substations, 14 thousands of kits of instruments and many other were destroyed or damaged.
But despite the destructions, the plant continued to live and to work. The largest Gorky factories: лRed Sormovo“, лThe engine of revolution“, лRed Etna“, the aeronautic factory of Orjonikidze and other enterprises were engaged in reconstructive work. Workers, restoring the plant, at the same time increased the tempoes of manufacturing. And on the 18 of august of 1943 all the workshops of the Gorky Automobile plant were working….”

“Miss the train” What I meant was that when in June 43 LW anyway used its resources to the attacks on Soviet armament industry, if the electric grid plan had the potential LW thought, June 43 was the time to implement it, 13 months later it was too late.

Juha


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## Nikademus (Aug 2, 2011)

> But despite the destructions, the plant continued to live and to work. The largest Gorky factories: лRed Sormovo“, лThe engine of revolution“, лRed Etna“, the aeronautic factory of Orjonikidze and other enterprises were engaged in reconstructive work. Workers, restoring the plant, at the same time increased the tempoes of manufacturing. And on the 18 of august of 1943 all the workshops of the Gorky Automobile plant were working….”



I'd say this proves my point. For any SB campaign to be utimately effective, it must be sustained and dedicated, and even then it takes a long time to make a really serious impact. Doublely so if as with the above example you are talking raids at night. As with BC you cannot gurantee that every or even most raids, even with the numbers BC started employing would cause the required amount of damage via Area Bombing. Even in this one example, the long term results of the raid were negligable in the end. Production increased and the more bombers you devote to this task the less bombers are available for vital mission on the front as described in Bergstrom's three volumes. 

One can argue the LW "missed the boat" back in the 30's when SB was contemplated but its debatable. There were some within the growing Luftwaffe who saw (with far more accuracy than SB's proponents) that a SB campaign's predicted ability to quickly smash civilian morale and/or industry was doubtful.

And i'd disagree that this isn't OT, so i'm going to cease here. The topic is Kursk and the air war directly over it.


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## Altea (Aug 5, 2011)

> Nikademus said:
> 
> 
> > I'd say this proves my point. For any SB campaign to be utimately effective, it was be sustained and dedicated, and even then it takes a long time to make a really serious impact. Doublely so if as with the above example you are talking raids at night. As with BC you cannot gurantee that every or even most raids, even with the numbers BC started employing would cause the required amount of damage via Area Bombing. Even in this one example, the long term results of the raid were negligable in the end. Production increased and the more bombers you devote to this task the less bombers are available for vital mission on the front as described in Bergstrom's three volumes.
> ...


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## Juha (Aug 6, 2011)

Hello Altea
on development of heavy bombers: Halifax, specs reached Handley Page in Nov 1936, tended in March 1937, changed from twin to 4 engine concept during 1937, 1st flight of the prototype25 Oct 1939, 1st production a/c flew 11 Oct 1940, first combat mission 30 June 1941.

But what I meant the “missing the boat” wasn’t a heavy bomber development but that just before LW was to be ready to deliver their massive attack on SU electricity generating plants and transferring systems they lost the Orel bulge and so the targets became too distance to the plane they had thought would carry the main burden of the attacks, the He 111H. So no need to sacrifice anything for a heavy bomber designs only earlier execution.

Quote:” Well, about Strategic raids. Khazanov noticed from march to july 1943 some happy hits by Luft maid on the soviet industry, the best results were the lack of 800 planned Yak-1 from saratov factory during the Kursk battle..”

I would say that more than some happy hits, over 1500 bombs hit the GAZ factory area in Gorgiy. Even if the tank production was not totally stopped, only in Aug 43 they succeeded to surpass the production figure of May 43, so maybe a production loss of 300 tanks, bad to Germans that the tanks were not T-34s but T-70ms. Also the automobile and armoured car production at GAZ was totally stopped for a while. BTW do you know if the production of SU-76M was affected by these raids on GAZ

Quote:” on the same time ADD concentrated on german communication performed > 10 000 sorties at rear and 2 600 on close stations, considerably slowing german's armies (particulary Model's one) growth. No mention about 2th end 16 VA that performed more than 2 000 sorties on Heer's communications.”

As I wrote earlier, the CoS of the LFl 6, Friedfich Kless in his post-war study to US Army mentioned VVS attacks on the railconnections of LFl 6 areas, which according to him, didn’t produce much problem to logistics On the other hand the increased partisan activity against those lines were more effective in disturbing rail transportation. Of course one must remember that the damage achieved by VVS indicated failures by the LFl 6 and the damages achieved by partisans indicated failures by the Heer.

Juha


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## Altea (Aug 14, 2011)

Hello Juha


Juha said:


> > But what I meant the “missing the boat” wasn’t a heavy bomber development but that just before LW was to be ready to deliver their massive attack on SU electricity generating plants and transferring systems they lost the Orel bulge and so the targets became too distance to the plane they had thought would carry the main burden of the attacks, the He 111H. So no need to sacrifice anything for a heavy bomber designs only earlier execution.
> 
> 
> AFAIK the electricity network was not the Achille's heel of the soviet union but logistics, "communism + elecricity" programm launched by Lenin in 20ies was not just a propaganda slogan. The network was dense and oversecured by old unactivated stations working on peat or wood.
> ...


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## Juha (Aug 16, 2011)

Hello Altea
thanks a lot for your answer. 

Yes, it is entirely possible that Germans miscalculated, not the first time when an AF thought that it had find an Achilles’ heel of enemy’s war economy only to find out that nix or that it was impossible to produce enough damage to the system to have decisive outcome. Even if SU had lost significant part of its electricity production in 41-42, it had also lost many consumers of its electricity, big cities, mines and some factories. 

LW was aware of the "communism + elecricity" programm, probably all were at that time, especially the big dam construction program was well known and they calculated that just because of that the psychological effect of the raids would have been great. But as you wrote they probably didn’t fully understand the Soviet power grid.

And thanks a lot for the quote from Rear Area Security in Russia. The Soviet Second Front Behind the German Lines. Washington: 1951.

Juha


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## Rivet (Aug 23, 2011)

Check with the initial producers of Soviet hydroelectric power generation, Juha. Siemens and Phillips- Germany was in possession of all of the drawings and scematics of the dams- Germany designed it all during the period after the first war when nobody wanted to rub shoulders with the two nations. Germany helped build, Germany got to use Soviet air space to train an air force and test equipment.

I've found a source of information regarding the clash of 41-45 between the SU and Hitler's Germany. See Alexander Alexandrovich Novikov, Air marshall during the period in question. Novikov was quite the writer, but not in English. Details.
Regards

Later edit with information just to prove I'm not hallucinating again. :

The Treaty of Rapallo between Weimar Germany and the Soviet Union was signed by German Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau and his Soviet colleague Georgy Chicherin on April 16, 1922, during the Genoa Economic Conference, annulling all mutual claims, restoring full diplomatic relations, and establishing the beginnings of close trade relationships, which made Weimar Germany the main trade and diplomatic partner of the Soviet Union.


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## parsifal (Aug 24, 2011)

What were the results and the lessons learned from the battle? These are my initial thoughts.

LW had done quite well, but subsequent events were to show that they had in fact lost the battle. this is surprising....they had shot down more VVS aircraft and I think it fair to say in ground attacks had been more effective.

VVS operations are marked by the broad front tactics they adopted. Wheras LW ops were concentrated on one or two points, VVS attacks were much more broad. This meant results were slower to emerge, but more deeply felt once the effects started to bite. Each side were playing to their strengths, but the germans needed a quick result to win....when this failed to materialize LW wer staring at defeat....they had to disperse to counter the Soviet counterattacks, and once this occurred the great numerical advatages enjoyed by the VVS became decisive.

VVS realized the big drawback was the low level of proficiency for their pilots. With only 30-50hours on first line types for their pilots on average, they were no match for the LW...yet. Exchange ratios in combat were about 4:1 against them. but between July and the end of the year, VVS trainng was transformed, such that by the end of the year exchange rates were about 3:2 against the VVS. Their quality was now 'good enough", and they had a massive superiority of numbers.

in terms of types, I dont think there was a big quality differential. Each side had strengths and weaknesses for their aircraft and it seems to me after studying the tactics employed that each played to those strengths as much as possible. Il-2s, for example seemed to opt for low altitude attacks to maximize their bombing effect and minimze risk to their achilles heel....the radiator or oil cooler. 

Soviet tactics semed to evolve to not trying to achive outright air superiority....they were a force deicated to the ground support mission, so all they were looking to do was provide cover to get the job done at tolerable losses, and to dny LW the ability undertake counterstrike operations. to the end, however, LW continued to extract a steady toll on VVS formations. It was never enough, and never of serious consequence to the VVS


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## Juha (Aug 24, 2011)

Hello Rivet
I'm well aware of the Treaty of Rapallo. On Novikov's memoirs, there is at least some problems in them, for ex his memoirs gives totally wrong impression on the VVS air attacks on Finland on 25 June 41 .

Juha


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## Rivet (Aug 29, 2011)

Altea- "Actually, i would like to know, what programm ReichLuftministerium would have like to sacrify or slow to develop the strategic bomber mid -30ies. The FW-190, the 109, the Stuka or something else?"

Well, Altea, my money would have been some of Ernst Heinkel's Strategic Bomber designs which probably would have swayed the lines on the map for a while. Heinkel's He-274/277 were as good as one could have worked for given the time
The Junkers 290 was the design with the greatest number of mission specific builds, though little usage of the A-4 variant as a bomber. The primary mission of the 290 was maritime reconaissance. The bomber was decendent of the Junkers-89.
As far as what might have screwed strategic bombers at the point in question might have been the acceptance of the Luftwaffe's using Zeppelins as a heavy bomber. They did re-commission the Hindenburg for detection of British radar establishments for a while, then packed her back in her box. Yeah, Kursk....

The period prior to Kursk saw a lot of upper-level commanders arrested for one anti-revolutionary whim or another. Photographs of the time that Soviet-German military ties existed show Soviet and German troops really buddy-buddy. No way would the Germans let SU get and hold Petsamo. The minerals in the area were essential to German economic planning. Regards


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## Erich (Sep 5, 2011)

ah where is this thread going may I ask ................ seems to have gone OT. parsifal start throwing some WS LW stats for fighters/bombers/ground attack . . . . effective or not, etc....... ??


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## parsifal (Sep 7, 2011)

I have a couple of new books just arrived, and hope these will contain some clue as to the impact of airpower on the ground battle. Need a few days to do this.....


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## parsifal (Sep 7, 2011)

MJy starting thoughts on this issue is that the numbers of tanks destroyed by airpower for both sides is overstated for bth sides. I believe that airpowers main impact even in the direct support role was more subtle than by simple measure of the number of vehicles destroyed. Traditionally, airpower is responsible for about 5% of battle caualties. In Normandy, very few tanks were actually destryed by airpower, yet allied airpower was still decisive to the outcome.

With a more dedicated ground support role, the percentage of losses in Kursk might be as high as 10-12%, which puts the Soviet losses at about 150-200 tanks, and German losses at about 60-90 tanks. Yet these figures dont line up with the claims made by either side. Soviets in one engagement claim the destruction of 34 tanks in one engagement to just 26 Il-2s. German claims are around 500 Soviet tanks destroyed. I dont buy those numbers. Maybe 500 vehicles, but not 500 tanks. 

Favoured weapoons are interesting....the germans rtended to favour guns whilst the Russians used an AT bomb, the PTB (Russian acronym for Anti-Tank Bomb)


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## Erich (Sep 7, 2011)

agreed on vehicles destroyed for both sides they are not going to take much from cannon fire from either side. thinking we may have possibly 100 Soviet tanks destroyed by air power from a number of arms. from present research it looks like the 70 Soviet T-34's destroyed in one engagement by Hs 129's was probably a huge over-claim. the fact that when after the first pass the subsequent attacks came from all direction to confuse the truck-mounted Soviet triple AA proves that an accurate count is not justifiable.


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## Juha (Sep 7, 2011)

Hello
according to Soviet staff studies of the 2nd Tank Army irreparable tank losses 6,5% were put out of action by aviation, and of the 1st TA only 2,0%. Source document in The Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol 7 No 1 March 1994 p.114 Table 3.

Juha


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## parsifal (Sep 7, 2011)

Thanks guys. So what are the published claims of tanks and vehicles destroyed by each side. Another way to estimate losses is to look at claims and work backwards. Do we have totals for a start?


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