# Yamamoto and Rommel: war geniuses or blunders?



## Elmas (Jan 22, 2018)

This of course it is not a provocative question, I want just to know the opinion of the highly qualificated people that there are in this Forum…now that we can have the invaluable auxilium of that potent instrument called r_ectospectroscope_… 

In almost all books of history these two High Officers are highly regarded as creators of innovative and efficient war plans but, after having read a lot of books and. for N.A. Campaign, having spoken with some Italian officers that fought in N.A., and in the late ’60s, when my Father was working in Cyrenaica, having seen all the places were that campaign was fought, there are some reflections I’d like to speak to.

First, at Rommel insistence, Malta was left practically alone, and all resources sent to NA. Terrible blunder, but that was exactly what Hitler and Mussolini wanted to listen. Second, Rommel, during the First Battle of El Alamein, was completely deceived by false information provided by British Intelligence, and sent tanks and troops in search of unexixtant gaps in the mined fields, so having at no avail heavy losses that, one thousand five hundred km from the harbour of Tripoli, he could never replace; third, at El Alamein he had to his shoulders the Sollum Ridge, a place that could have been ideal to resist. Fourth, he completely sacrificed Italian troops: Germans tried to stole even the few trucks Italians possessed so, as one Italian Officer wrote _“shootings were in those days on a triangular basis…”_

Yamamoto: IJN for years sought after the “decisive battle” between Japanese and American Fleets but, in the Battle of Midway plans, battleships and cruisers and their essential anti-aircraft component, were left one thousand km behind, doing a pleasant cruise in the Pacific. But weren’t they looking for a “decisive battle”? With the Fleet split in two?

Could be, and this is a personal point of view, that to toady this two Officers beyond their merit was an intelligent idea of the Allied propaganda: _“You can see how strong we are”_ they could say to their public opinion _“they have outstanding Generals but, at last, we defeated them and we won…”_

Of course the opposite face of the medal was to deliberately lessen the strenght of Italians and Japanese forces, so to say to their troops _“C’mon boys! Certainly you wont’t fear some ragged Dagoes and Japs…”_

I have a signed First Edition copy of _“Fly for your life”_ from R.R. Stanford Tuck: he recalls that he spent a couple of hours at the phone trying to get in contact with a columnist that described very “lightly” a fight between Hurricanes and CR42s, and to tell him that several Hurricanes had holes from CR42 guns, and that fight had not been a _promenade_... But, as he recalls in the book, the Secretary always replied that the columnist _“had just left…”_

Any reply will be appreciated, of course.


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## pinehilljoe (Jan 23, 2018)

Elmas said:


> This of course it is not a provocative question, I want just to know the opinion of the highly qualificated people that there are in this Forum…now that we can have the invaluable auxilium of that potent instrument called r_ectospectroscope_…
> 
> Second, Rommel, during the First Battle of El Alamein, was completely deceived by false information provided by British Intelligence, and sent tanks and troops in search of unexixtant gaps in the mined fields, so having at no avail heavy losses that, one thousand five hundred km from the harbour of Tripoli, he could never replace; third, at El Alamein he had to his shoulders the Sollum Ridge, a place that could have been ideal to resist. Fourth, he completely sacrificed Italian troops: Germans tried to stole even the few trucks Italians possessed so, as one Italian Officer wrote _“shootings were in those days on a triangular basis…”_
> .



IMHO Rommel did as well as any Commander could have done in North Africa. Many historians give Von Mainstein credit for being the best, and I agree. With regard to being deceived, the British counter Intelligence achieved many deceptions during the War, looking back its amazing how well some worked, like Operation Fortitude. In Ben Macintyre's book, Operation Mincemeat, he makes a point that its easier to deceive someone when they want to believe what you are telling them. Its not hard to think of Rommel falling into that with the Cairo so close.

For Yamamoto, I don't think history is kind to him. As Combined Fleet Commander he made strategic errors. Committing the strategic assets of two fleet carriers to the Coral Sea, when Midway was a month away was a mistake. Midway was not well planned and also assumed the USN would do what the IJN thought it would do.

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## Hansie Bloeckmann (Jan 24, 2018)

With the caveat that I think Irwin Rommel and George Patton were the two best field commanders in the ETO-WW11, I will shift to the PTO-- I had a uncle who was in the USN 1943-1945 in the PTO, and that's the only insight I had into the aspects of the USN and their combat experiences in that TO. 

But, as I believe that Yamamoto was educated in the USA, and had an understanding of the industrial potential America had pre-1941 (in spite of the Great Depression and its devastating effects on the US economy )--I do agree that it would seem he made many strategic errors, grossly under-estimating the strength and determination of the USA's Armed Forces. 

The usage of the term "Japs"- as in the posters reading "Slap The Jap" were perhaps politically correct in the 1941-1945 era, and may have given American forces the miss-guided concept that the "Little Yellow Bastards" , as Adm. Wm. "Bull" Halsey called them, were inferior in fighting ability to the US Forces. Big mistake- when you fight an enemy deeply entrenched and determined to die for their sworn cause- Emperor or Fuhrer-- you had better know that the casualties were be great, regardless of the final outcome. 

I am "reaching" here when I say that the Japanese troops with their Bushido code of honor would die for Hirohito willingly in combat, in the post-Stalingrad era in the ETO, perhaps more of the Waffen SS units were of that mindset regarding dying for Hitler, whereas the Wehrmacht troops might have decided surrender (hopefully to Allied forces) was the best option. Just my opinion, and I have an open mind to other opinions from any members of this forum. Hansie


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## taly01 (Jan 26, 2018)

Rommel and Yamamoto is a bit much for one thread.........Rommel was commander of a small Panzer Corp in a 2nd string theatre, Yamamoto was the head of the Imperial Japanese Navy.................but trying to answer it.

They were leading their armies at times of victories so they had to be "geniuses", no one wants to be told they were beaten by incompetent fools  (Not that Rommel or Yamamoto were incompetent or fools).

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## Hansie Bloeckmann (Jan 26, 2018)

taly01 said:


> Rommel and Yamamoto is a bit much for one thread.........Rommel was commander of a small Panzer Corp in a 2nd string theatre, Yamamoto was the head of the Imperial Japanese Navy.................but trying to answer it.
> 
> They were leading their armies at times of victories so they had to be "geniuses", no one wants to be told they were beaten by incompetent fools  (Not that Rommel or Yamamoto were incompetent or fools).


In my biased opinion (I am a Rommel fan, ditto Patton) if the attempt to kill Hitler at the Wolf's Lair in July 1944 hadn't occurred at all, then perhaps some of the innocent Generals and Field Marshalls Hitler "purged" afterwards would have been involved in the "Autumn Mist" attack starting in Dec 1944-through the Ardennes, etc. 

Why Hitler thought Rommel would turn against him is a mystery to me- possibly explained by Hitler's heavy drug usage at that point in time-- but alas, things turned out differently for Rommel- if his supply lines to Africa had been maintained as he wanted, I think he would have defeated the British at El Alemain-hands down.


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## pinehilljoe (Jan 26, 2018)

[


Hansie Bloeckmann said:


> Why Hitler thought Rommel would turn against him is a mystery to me- possibly explained by Hitler's heavy drug usage at that point in time-.



You can not use normal logic and reasoning to understand why Hitler took the actions he did, plain and simply he was mentally ill.

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## Hansie Bloeckmann (Jan 26, 2018)

pinehilljoe said:


> [
> 
> 
> You can not use normal logic and reasoning to understand why Hitler took the actions he did, plain and simply he was mentally ill.


Agree 100%- by 1944- Hitler was a full-blown "meth-head".


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## mikewint (Jan 26, 2018)

I would agree with most above and Rommel along with Patton are two of my favorites. For such an accomplished military leader it did not begin that way. Rommel’s sister described him as a gentle and docile child who, in school, developed an interest in mathematics and engineering. However his grades were not high enough to allow him to attend a university. With few prospects his father, the headmaster of a school, urged him to consider the military. After being rejected by the artillery and engineers, 18-year-old Rommel received acceptance to the infantry in 1910 as an officer cadet. He would remain in the military for the rest of his life unlike his father and other male relatives, who left upon completing their mandatory service.

In the military he was continually taking part in dangerous raids and reconnaissance missions. His men said, “Where Rommel is, there is the front.” During one 52-hour period his unit captured some 9,000 Italian prisoners. In September 1914, for, Rommel charged three French soldiers with a bayonet after running out of ammunition, only to be shot in the thigh so badly that a hole opened up as big as his fist. Three years later in Romania, he lost quite a bit of blood from a bullet to the arm, and he also continuously suffered from stomach ailments, fevers and exhaustion. More physical hardships came during World War II, from appendicitis to a face wound caused by a shell splinter. Then, just before the D-Day invasion, Allied aircraft strafed his open-topped car as it rode through Normandy, France, causing it to somersault off the road. When Rommel was found he was unconscious, with multiple skull fractures and glass fragments in his face. This accident was used later to cover-up his forced suicide. Nazi officials told the public he had died as a result of those injuries.

Though he apparently never joined the Nazi Party, his devotion to Hitler was incontrovertible. When Hitler took power, Rommel approved of his remilitarization plans, calling him the “unifier of the nation.” Later on, as the two men became better acquainted in the lead-up to the invasion of Poland, Rommel wrote to his wife that “the Führer knows what is right for us.” He also attended Nazi indoctrination courses and signed his letters “Heil Hitler!” Hitler even gave him an autographed copy of “Mein Kampf.” Only later in the war did Rommel grow disillusioned wirh Hitler’s policies, believing that Germany must negotiate with the Allies rather than fight to the bitter end.

During the 1940 blitzkrieg in France, Rommel lead a tank division. Then he was transferred to North Africa in order to help the struggling Italians fight the British. Almost immediately he reversed the tide, pushing the British back hundreds of miles in a series of audacious assaults, for which he received his “Desert Fox” nickname, along with a promotion to field marshal. Finally, in October 1942, the numerically superior British halted his advance near El Alamein, Egypt. Running low on tanks, ammunition and fuel, Rommel prepared to retreat. But Hitler sent a letter telling him not to yield “even a yard of ground.” “As to your troops,” the Führer added, “you can show them no other road than that to victory or death.” Despite those orders Rommel disobeyed fearing that his force would be completely annihilated. He also disregarded an order directing German generals to execute Allied commandos caught behind enemy lines. In the end, Rommel fled all the way to Tunisia, winning a tank battle there against the Americans and losing one against the British. He returned to Europe in March 1943. Two months later, the Allies kicked the Germans out of North Africa altogether, setting the stage for their invasion of Italy.

With an Allied invasion of Western Europe imminent, Rommel was assigned in late 1943 to inspect Germany’s defenses along some 1,600 miles of Atlantic coastline. Despite Nazi propaganda to the contrary, he found the area highly vulnerable. Under his supervision, the Nazis built fortifications, flooded coastal lowlands to make them impassable and placed massive amounts of barbed wire, mines and steel girders on beaches and offshore waters. Rommel also wanted tanks at the ready to prevent the Allies from establishing a bridgehead, but his superiors overruled him, preferring to keep most of them inland.

As Germany’s military situation deteriorated, a group of senior officials attempted to assassinate Hitler with a briefcase bomb which unfortunately failed. Rommel was friends with some of the conspirators and certainly had discussed a post-Hitler future. That being said the full extent of his involvement in the plot remains unknown. (According to his widow, he opposed assassination but wanted Hitler to be arrested and brought to trial.) Whether innocent or not, his name came up during the subsequent Nazi dragnet, prompting Hitler to arrange for his death.

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill praised him before the House of Commons. “We have a very daring and skillful opponent against us,” Churchill declared, “and, may I say across the havoc of war, a great general.” George Patton, Bernard Montgomery and other top Allied generals likewise expressed their respect for him. As a result unlike other prominent World War II-era Germans, Rommel has escaped mass vilification. In fact, his name still graces two military bases and several streets in Germany, and a monument in his hometown praises him as “chivalrous,” “brave” and a “victim of tyranny.” Not all agree however and a German historian recently called him a “deeply convinced Nazi” and “an anti-Semite” who used North African Jews as slave laborers. At the very least, most historians agree, Rommel likely cared more for his career than he did about Nazi atrocities.

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## Hansie Bloeckmann (Jan 26, 2018)

mikewint said:


> I would agree with most above and Rommel along with Patton are two of my favorites. For such an accomplished military leader it did not begin that way. Rommel’s sister described him as a gentle and docile child who, in school, developed an interest in mathematics and engineering. However his grades were not high enough to allow him to attend a university. With few prospects his father, the headmaster of a school, urged him to consider the military. After being rejected by the artillery and engineers, 18-year-old Rommel received acceptance to the infantry in 1910 as an officer cadet. He would remain in the military for the rest of his life unlike his father and other male relatives, who left upon completing their mandatory service.
> 
> In the military he was continually taking part in dangerous raids and reconnaissance missions. His men said, “Where Rommel is, there is the front.” During one 52-hour period his unit captured some 9,000 Italian prisoners. In September 1914, for, Rommel charged three French soldiers with a bayonet after running out of ammunition, only to be shot in the thigh so badly that a hole opened up as big as his fist. Three years later in Romania, he lost quite a bit of blood from a bullet to the arm, and he also continuously suffered from stomach ailments, fevers and exhaustion. More physical hardships came during World War II, from appendicitis to a face wound caused by a shell splinter. Then, just before the D-Day invasion, Allied aircraft strafed his open-topped car as it rode through Normandy, France, causing it to somersault off the road. When Rommel was found he was unconscious, with multiple skull fractures and glass fragments in his face. This accident was used later to cover-up his forced suicide. Nazi officials told the public he had died as a result of those injuries.
> 
> ...


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 26, 2018)

Since we are on the topic of Rommel being “purged”, I have been to the spot where he was forced to commit suicide, as well as his grave several times (including the 50th anniversary of his death.) 

I have also met his late son on several occasions when he was the Mayor of Stuttgart.

Here are a few pics I took the last I went there a few years ago.

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## Elmas (Jan 27, 2018)

Rommel was a protege of Hitler, as he did not come from a noble family, unlike the whole old class of German officers: but Hitler was an extremely vindictive person, and he did not forgive anyone.
And Rommel made two big mistakes: to promise Hitler and Mussolini to get to Alexandria and then to Suez, and to stop the Allied invasion of the second front on the beaches.
Moreover, on both occasions, when the Allied offensive broke out, he was on leave at home, and that was very serious for Hitler, who never asked for a license during the entire World War I.
His alleged participation in the July coup was, IMHO, just an excuse for Hitler to get rid of him.

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## parsifal (Jan 28, 2018)

Yamamoto’s greatest tactical achievement is undoubtedly the attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941. His awareness of America’s industrial and military strength allowed him the foresight to understand that Japan could not withstand or endure a long drawn-out battle. His plans were to take control of the entire Western Pacific by destroying as much as possible of America’s land, sea and air power in a period of less than 12 months, thereby allowing Japanese forces a remote chance of victory. It was also his knowledge of America’s strengths that enabled him to predict Japan’s ultimate demise in the war if they could not take control quickly and establish key strongholds throughout the Western Pacific region.

While the attack on Pearl Harbour was considered a success in Japan, Yamamoto was concerned about its impact on US resolve.

The often stated quotation about waking a sleeping giant is questionable, but there is not denying that Yamamoto was firmly opposed to a war with the US, because of that’s nations marked industrial and manpower advantages. Yamamoto did not believe that the US could be brought to the peace table by the one climactic “decisive battle”. The most he thought was possible was a negotiated peace in which Japan might be able to achieve some of her war aims.

Yamamoto did say on many occasions that Japan needed to secure victory quickly to have any chance at all. This was a remarkably accurate estimation of japanese prospects 

Similar to the above quotation was another quotation that, while confirmed as real, was widely misinterpreted in the US press. Yamamoto, when once asked his opinion on the war, pessimistically said that the only way for Japan to win the war was to dictate terms in the White House. Yamamoto's meaning was that military victory, in a protracted war against an opponent with as much of a population and industrial advantage as the United States possessed, was completely impossible—a rebuff to those who thought that winning a major battle against the US Navy would end the war. However, in the US, his words were recast as a bombastic boast that he would literally dictate peace terms at the White House. This deliberate mistranslation became famous when read by narrator Walter Huston over stock footage of Yamamoto and his men on parade, in Frank Capras “Why we fight” propaganda films

After the Pearl Harbour attacks Yamamoto held grave concerns for Japans chances for victory because a number of America’s carriers, heavy cruisers and submarines that were absent from Pearl Harbour on the day of the attack. Yamamoto wrote to a friend ‘_The fact that we have had a small success at Pearl Harbour is nothing. The fact that we have succeeded so easily has pleased people . . . people should think things over and realize how serious the situation is._’ Yamamoto struggled to keep the upper hand in the war. For example Admiral Nagumo an IGHQ appointment was a torpedo expert to command the aircraft carriers, and this, combined with superior US Naval Intelligence, worked against him in the Battle of Midway. Midway was not the planning of Yamamoto or his staff, though combined fleet HQ contributed greatly to it That defeat started a chain of events that resulted in the ultimate demise and subsequent defeat of Japan’s efforts in the war.

The plan of attack at Midway was needlessly complex. The IJNs forces were too widely dispersed and when the US Navy was able to surprise Japan’s aircraft carriers, which had been sailing ahead of the main fleet, Nagumo’s lack of experience resulted in the loss of four of their best aircraft carriers and their elite crews. Had Yamamoto been present, the outcome may have been different because his expertise was in the tactical manoeuvring of aircraft and aircraft carriers.

Despite being vehemently opposed to entering into a war with America and challenging Japan’s army and government to try and prevent it, Yamamoto was considered with the utmost respect by both his enemies and allies. He had always been a fair man who fought hard, clean battles and the Imperial Navy followed his sense of honour during his command. Even after the defeat at Midway, America still considered Yamamoto to be its most dangerous enemy. When US Intelligence provided an opportunity for an assassination attempt, Admiral Nimitz Commander of the US Pacific Fleet was so concerned about the political implications that he took the unusual step of seeking advice from Washington before carrying out the attack.

After Yamamoto’s death, he was posthumously promoted to the highest rank of Fleet Admiral, received the highest state honours at his funeral and was the only foreigner to receive the Knights Cross from Germany, one of its highest medals.

The attack on Pearl Harbour was a crushing blow to America and without it Japan would have been overwhelmed much earlier in the war. Regardless of the success at Pearl Harbour, Japan was always going to be competing against a far better equipped and resilient navy. It is unlikely that Yamamoto was ever going to be in a position to alter the course of history. He understood that it was possible but implausible that Japan could be victorious in a war with America. He was obligated to follow ‘Japan’s funeral march of aggression’ as he put it even though he recognised that the Japanese government and army suffered from ‘jingoism – unrealistic and overblown patriotism’ Despite the intellectual qualities that he developed from studying and working in a Western culture, he could not influence the higher command. Ultimately, only his patriotism provided the necessary motivation to participate in the battle he fought very hard to avoid and it was that battle that subsequently resulted in his own demise. American pilots shot down the aircraft that he was flying in 18 months after the attack on Pearl Harbour.

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## pinehilljoe (Jan 29, 2018)

parsifal said:


> Yamamoto’s* greatest tactical achievement *is undoubtedly the attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941. His awareness of America’s industrial and military strength allowed him the foresight to understand that Japan could not withstand or endure a long drawn-out battle. His plans were to take control of the entire Western Pacific by destroying as much as possible of America’s land, sea and air power in a period of less than 12 months, thereby allowing Japanese forces a remote chance of victory. It was also his knowledge of America’s strengths that enabled him to predict Japan’s ultimate demise in the war if they could not take control quickly and establish key strongholds throughout the Western Pacific region.n who fought hard, clean battles and the Imperial Navy followed his sense of honour during his command. Even after the defeat at Midway, America still considered Yamamoto to be its most dangerous enemy. When US Intelligence provided an opportunity for an assassination attempt, Admiral Nimitz Commander of the US Pacific Fleet was so concerned about the political implications that he took the unusual step of seeking advice from Washington before carrying out the attack.
> .



A new book on Pearl Harbor is 
Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions, by Alan Zimm
He overturns much of the legend of the attack, suggesting the attack not only was not well planned but also not well executed. He also points out the Japanese did not have a purpose built armor piercing bomb, relying on using a 16 inch shell with fins. He points out contradiction in the Japanese accounts such as Fuchida's about the attack.


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## parsifal (Jan 29, 2018)

Havent read the book, but sounds like post war revisionism to me. In December 1941 there were just a handful of people in the world capable of thinking through the issues to deliver an attack like this. There was no "go to" set of instructions, and only one (or possibly two) precedents, Taranto being one, and the sinking of a German cruiser off Bergen in 1940. Part of its brilliance was that nobody expected it to happen, and hitting your enemy that hard that he might not get up again. 
Nope, this is a book I wont be in a hurry to go and read.

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## taly01 (Jan 29, 2018)

The failure of Pearl Harbour was the US carriers not been in port to be sunk, but that was partly bad luck (or intel)?

Heres a what if..........No Pearl Harbour but invade Malaya, Dutch East Indies for the resources as it happenend (some even say the US might not have interfered if Phillipines was not invaded), If the US Fleet shows up in full strength to interfere with the invasions 1941 they get to face the 6 Japanese fleet carriers, I imagine every USN capital ship would have been sunk just like Repulse and Prince of Wales was, the skill and preparedness level of the Japanese was so far ahead of the US navy in 1941.


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## pbehn (Jan 29, 2018)

History is what it is. The attack on Pearl Harbour would have been a bigger success if the USA carriers were in port, but since they were at sea all the Japanese carriers could have been attacked and lost while the attack on Pearl Harbour was in progress.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 29, 2018)

pinehilljoe said:


> He also points out the Japanese did not have a purpose built armor piercing bomb, relying on using a 16 inch shell with fins.



This is often repeated but sometimes a key word is left out.
"Modified" being the word.
According to Campbell (and he may have been in error) the Japanese type 99, No 80 Mk 5 bomb was a 'converted' 41cm AP shell that weighed 1757lbs.
It was rated as penetrating 150mm of armor but drop height (or speed) is not given.

Now consider that the standard 41cm AP shell as fired by the Nagato and Mutsu weighed 2249lbs with no fins 
So they somehow got rid of about 500lbs of steel and added tail fins. they may have hollowed out the explosive cavity a bit and used a bit more explosives too, percentages do not add up (about 50lb HE for the bomb and 35lbs for the AP shell.)
I don't know what they took of the nose (a pointy ballistic cap?) but the bomb with fins was only about 22 in longer than the unmodified shell. 





Please note the lack of any parallel section on the bomb body. a considerable amount of lathe work needed. 

I would also note that the Americans did not introduce purpose built AP bombs until May of 1942 with an assortment of bombs based on converted AP shells being used before then.

I would also note that only the Kate could lift the Japanese AP bomb and for the Americans only the Avenger and Helldiver could lift the 1600lb bombs for most of the war.

Large AP bombs for use against battleships were rather specialized devices (many American carriers even late in the war only carried about 20 such bombs in the magazines) so the fact that the Japanese didn't develop a "specialized" bomb instead of a converted battleship gun shell doesn't really indicate bad planning. One also wonders what the type 99, No 80 MK 1, MK 2 MK 3 and MK 4 bombs were???? service bomb being the MK 5 shows a tleas t some development went on, rather than a hasty lash up as is sometimes implied.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 29, 2018)

taly01 said:


> The failure of Pearl Harbour was the US carriers not been in port to be sunk, but that was partly bad luck (or intel)?
> 
> Heres a what if..........No Pearl Harbour but invade Malaya, Dutch East Indies for the resources as it happenend (some even say the US might not have interfered if Phillipines was not invaded), If the US Fleet shows up in full strength to interfere with the invasions 1941 they get to face the 6 Japanese fleet carriers, I imagine every USN capital ship would have been sunk just like Repulse and Prince of Wales was, the skill and preparedness level of the Japanese was so far ahead of the US navy in 1941.



We have been over this before, chances of the Japanese leaving the Philippines alone were about zero. Americans had been building air fields and sending B-17s to the Philippines for a number of months before Pearl Harbor. More importantly was the fact that there was a large submarine base in the Philippines with 29 subs there on Dec 7th. The Japanese were NOT going to leave such a submarine force (with support facilities) smack in the middle of the supply routes from the newly conquered areas and homeland. They had no idea how bad the US torpedoes were.

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## Hansie Bloeckmann (Jan 30, 2018)

pbehn said:


> History is what it is. The attack on Pearl Harbour would have been a bigger success if the USA carriers were in port, but since they were at sea all the Japanese carriers could have been attacked and lost while the attack on Pearl Harbour was in progress.


The Japanese also failed to destroy the oil reserves at Pearl Harbor- no oil, you have crippled the Fleet-big time! Hansie


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## Hansie Bloeckmann (Jan 30, 2018)

taly01 said:


> The failure of Pearl Harbour was the US carriers not been in port to be sunk, but that was partly bad luck (or intel)?
> 
> Heres a what if..........No Pearl Harbour but invade Malaya, Dutch East Indies for the resources as it happenend (some even say the US might not have interfered if Phillipines was not invaded), If the US Fleet shows up in full strength to interfere with the invasions 1941 they get to face the 6 Japanese fleet carriers, I imagine every USN capital ship would have been sunk just like Repulse and Prince of Wales was, the skill and preparedness level of the Japanese was so far ahead of the US navy in 1941.


We might well remember the courts-martial against Gen. Billy Mitchell for trying to prove to our Navy that an aircraft could sink a battleship, withy either a well-placed bomb or torpedo-- but the Japanese were paying attention. All the decoded messages in the month or so prior to PH should have sent off alarms all over CINC-PAC, as well as Washington D.C.-- But our Secretary of State, Welles, was an "old school" highborn gent- who once said: "Gentlemen do NOT read the mail of others"!!


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## pbehn (Jan 30, 2018)

Hansie Bloeckmann said:


> The Japanese also failed to destroy the oil reserves at Pearl Harbor- no oil, you have crippled the Fleet-big time! Hansie


If you make a list of all the things that should have been destroyed it becomes a job for 1000 four engine bombers.

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## Shortround6 (Jan 30, 2018)

Or jobs for the 6th and 7th strikes to be flown on Dec 8th 

Destroying bunker fuel for ships is a lot harder than destroying gasoline. The stuff only flows somewhat better than roofing tar and is going to need a lot better ignition source than machine gun bullets.

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## mikewint (Jan 30, 2018)

Beyond a doubt the third wave should have been launched to hit the fuel, repair facilities, dry docks, and sub facilities. Battleships were no longer the most important naval vessels the carriers were. Even so only the Arizona and Utah were not salvaged in the shallow water of the harbor. The third wave would have been costly for the Japanese as the base was on full alert but destroying the above would have severely crippled the fleet much more so than the damaged battleships

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## parsifal (Jan 30, 2018)

Up until Pearl Harbour, Battleships were still the most important weapon in the USN arsenal. they were obsolete, but somebody needed to tell the USN that. Yamamoto was the man that did that. 

Before the attack, the long standing plan was for the US forces based at Pearl and also (later) for the forces on the mainland to join them, to sally forth out and head west toward the Far East, meeting the Japanese fleet somewhere in the middle of the Pacific for one massive decisive battle. The battleships were the key to that plan, the so called War Plan Orange. It was something the USN truly believed in until their BBs were sunk or disabled. they WERE the reason for the attack. The Japanese feared the Plan Orange, because the Americans outnumbered them in Battleships, especially if the british fleet is included in the mix. All of Japans defensive plans (and yes Pearl was a defensive measure) were designed to try and even things up for the IJN. The IJN were just as wedded as the Americans to the idea of the single decisive battle to win the war. Sinking carriers to the IJN was secondary to that (Yamamoto did NOT believe that....he knew the carriers were as important to the USN plan as the BBs, but his bosses were not).

In the context of what they were facing, the Japanese attack was a massive success. too successful. it forced the US to rethink its whole response, to cancel the march across the Pacific temporarily which in turn caused the loss of the strategically vital Far east. It forced the US to adopt a long war strategy with massive numbers of troops and aircraft, a vast logistic train and the centre piece of the fleet moved from the battleship. The ultimate plan that did emerge from the ruins of Pearl harbour was still a Plan Orange, but heavily modified. And by the time it could be implemented, with the added issue of having to retake the lost ground and bases on which the whole plan was also reliant.


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## swampyankee (Jan 30, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> Or jobs for the 6th and 7th strikes to be flown on Dec 8th
> 
> Destroying bunker fuel for ships is a lot harder than destroying gasoline. The stuff only flows somewhat better than roofing tar and is going to need a lot better ignition source than machine gun bullets.



On the other hand, destroying the tanks will make a terrible mess and probably leave much of the fuel unrecoverable.


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## Hansie Bloeckmann (Jan 30, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> Or jobs for the 6th and 7th strikes to be flown on Dec 8th
> 
> Destroying bunker fuel for ships is a lot harder than destroying gasoline. The stuff only flows somewhat better than roofing tar and is going to need a lot better ignition source than machine gun bullets.


Given the greater viscosity of bunker fuels, once ignited, would they not tend to burn like napalm, rather than flash like high octane aviation fuels?


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## mikewint (Jan 30, 2018)

Michael, true but not launching that third strike doomed the anti-battleship scenario as well. The first repaired battleship was launched in Feb of 1942 and US fuel supplies remained intact. 
True, both sides were wedded to the surface-ship slug fest. The Japanese counter to the US plan was to allow the US fleet to sail across the Pacific while sniping at it with subs and carrier aircraft THEN force that decisive battle against a weakened US fleet.
The US modified its plan only a bit as surface action was mostly carrier driven. The methodical, cautious, island hopping (never outside of land-based aircraft) remained intact.
The real deciders were Japan's inability to appreciate the effects of submarine warfare and they never developed an effective anti-sub defense. US subs effectively choked Japan's industrial production and paralysed her Navy. Japan also never developed an anti-commerce ability. Commerce-raiders could have played havoc with US supply lines and made the Pacific war much more difficult and costly


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## pbehn (Jan 30, 2018)

Hitting one or two tanks maybe easy but if you set them alight the chances of seeing the others goes down very quickly.

Here is the tank farm.

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## Shortround6 (Jan 30, 2018)

To be fair the Oklahoma was effectively destroyed, damaged beyond economic repair.
On the other hand the Utah was no longer a battleship and would have taken a considerable amount of time to turn it back into a battleship. It mounted no main guns (or, indeed, even some of her turrets/gun houses) and had been stripped of large amounts of armor.




Utah being painted at Puget Sound 1941. 

The trouble for the Japanese was that the US was a two ocean navy and they had only knocked out/severely damaged a small portion (less than 1/3) of the US total number of battleships. The US had 15 old battleships in Service in Dec 1941 not including the 2 targets/training ships and 2 new battleships, with 3 more new ones commissioning in one each in March, April and May of 1942. Granted the new ones had some troubles and needed working up/training. 
However of the eight battleships at Pearl 3 were back in service (the Pennsylvania was never official out of service despite being in drydock at the time of the attack ) by Feb/March of 1942. 
The Japanese had eight old battleships and While the Yamato was commissioned in Dec 1941 she conducted training exercises until the end of May 1942. The Musashi would not be done working up/training until the end of 1942/Jan 1943. 

The Japanese had bought themselves some time, but not enough.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 30, 2018)

Hansie Bloeckmann said:


> Given the greater viscosity of bunker fuels, once ignited, would they not tend to burn like napalm, rather than flash like high octane aviation fuels?



No, Bunker fuel is so viscous that it needs steam pipes in the tanks just to be able to be pumped from the tanks to the boilers. It also needs to be heated to around 200 degrees ( I forget exact amount) to flow through the burners and atomize for proper combustion in the boilers. 

This doesn't mean you can't get it to burn at all outside of a boiler but it does take quite a bit of effort and favorable conditions. 

Please see the photo of the tank farm posted by Pbehn, each tank was surrounded by a retaining wall. Blowing open one or two tanks and setting them on fire does NOT result in a lake of burning fuel lapping up against the other tanks. A lot depends on the damage control/firefighting capabilities on site or nearby. 

Bunker fuel is the some stuff left _after _you take out a large amount of the compounds that make up gasoline and kerosene/diesel fuel. 
It is not crude oil like at the well or being transported to the refinery which has a mixture of a lot of compounds and in a fire situation the more volatile compounds can burn out of the crude. 

From wiki so......" *Number 6 fuel oil* is a high-viscosity residual oil requiring preheating to *104–127 °C (219–261 °F)*. Residual means the material remaining after the more valuable cuts of crude oil have boiled off. The residue may contain various undesirable impurities, including 2% water and 0.5% mineral soil. This fuel may be known as residual fuel oil (RFO), by the Navy specification of *Bunker C*, or by the Pacific Specification of PS-400.[2]

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## pbehn (Jan 30, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> Please see the photo of the tank farm posted by Pbehn, each tank was *surrounded by a retaining wall*. Blowing open one or two tanks and setting them on fire does NOT result in a lake of burning fuel lapping up against the other tanks. A lot depends on the damage control/firefighting capabilities on site or nearby.
> 
> .[2]


Great post SR Hard to tell from the photo but from my experience on tank farms the retaining walls are on top of berms so the tanks are actually sunk by several meters in the ground, it seems the same in the photo. Also I was in Saudi Arabia when a fuel tank was blown up.

List of terrorist incidents in Saudi Arabia - Wikipedia
1988 30 September - four Shi'ite men are beheaded for blowing up fuel storage tanks[3] at the Saudi Petrochemical Company (SADAF) facility in Jubail. They had entered the plant by cutting a hole in the perimeter fence. One tank happened to be empty, but another was full and burned for several days. Eventually the fire was extinguished when a firefighting team literally plugged the hole in the tank.

I was working doing thermography on the Petromin Shell plant next door. We were not allowed to work for two days. The people there explained that the fire was allowed to burn down, with a lot of hoses on the tank, then the fire was blown out with an explosion "Red Adair" style and then it was plugged. The point is the terrorist blew a hole in the tank and started a fire but it didn't produce a Hollywood style conflagration and mushroom cloud.

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## parsifal (Jan 30, 2018)

It is very common that most US sources misrepresent the losses and extent of damage sustained. To understand the seriousness of the damage inflicted, one really has to refer to primary sources.

For the war In Europe thread, myself and Chris (“Njaco”) carried out some pretty detailed research on this very issue and came up with the following:

*BB OKLAHOMA (USN 27500 grt)* was sunk at her moorings by IJN carrier based a/c. She was not returned to service. On the day of her loss she was moored in berth Fox 5 in Battleship Row. Outboard alongside BB MARYLAND, OKLAHOMA took three torpedo hits almost immediately after the first Japanese bombs fell. As she began to capsize to port, two more torpedoes struck home, and her men were strafed as they abandoned ship. In less than 12 minutes, she rolled over until halted by her masts touching bottom, her starboard side above water, and a part of her keel exposed 

*BB ARIZONA (USN 29158 grt)* was sunk was sunk at her moorings by IJN carrier based a/c. She was not returned to service. Shortly after 08:00, 10 Nakajima Kates, five each from the carriers KAGA and HIRYU attacked ARIZONA. All of the aircraft were carrying 410-millimeter (16.1”) AP shells modified into 797-kilogram (1,757 lb) bombs. Flying at an estimated altitude of 3,000 meters (9,800 ft). KAGA’s aircraft bombed ARIZONA from amidships to stern. Soon after, HIRYU's bombers hit the bow area.

The aircraft scored four hits and three near misses on and around _Arizona_. The near miss off the port bow is believed to have caused observers to believe that the ship had been torpedoed, although no torpedo damage has been found. The stern most bomb ricocheted off the face of Turret IV and penetrated the deck to detonate in the captain's pantry, causing a small fire. The next forward most hit was near the port edge of the ship, abreast the mainmast, probably detonating in the area of the anti-torpedo bulkhead. The next bomb struck near the port rear 5-inch AA gun.

The last bomb hit at 0806 in the vicinity of Turret II, likely penetrating the armored deck near the ammunition magazines located in the forward section of the ship. It is not possible to judge the exact location of this hit, its effects are indisputable: about seven seconds after the hit, the forward magazines detonated in a cataclysmic explosion, mostly venting through the sides of the ship and destroying much of the interior structure of the forward part of the ship. This caused the forward turrets and conning tower to collapse downward some 25–30 feet and the foremast and funnel to collapse forward, effectively tearing the ship in half. The explosion touched off fierce fires that burned for two days; debris showered down on Ford Island in the vicinity. The blast from this explosion also put out fires on the repair ship VESTAL, which was moored alongside and ablaze. The bombs and subsequent explosion killed 1,177 of the 1,512 crewmen on board at the time

*BB CALIFORNIA (USN 33190 grt)* was sunk at her moorings by IJN carrier based a/c. CALIFORNIAwas moored at the southernmost berth of Battleship Row and was with other dreadnoughts of the Battle Force. She was struck on the port side with two torpedoes. One detonated below the armor belt at frame 52 (between number 2 turret and the bridge), creating a hole 10 feet high and 24 feet long, destructively deforming the first antitorpedo bulkhead and transverse stiffeners between frames 47 and 60, and holing the second bulkhead with fragments. Watertight integrity had been impaired by preparations for a material inspection; and the ship suffered extensive flooding damage when hit.

The second torpedo detonated below the armor belt and turret 3 at frame 101, causing nearly identical damage. The third and fourth bulkheads were deformed but remained intact at both locations. The innermost fifth armored bulkhead was deflected approximately 1 inch forward and punctured by a fuel line fitting aft. This damage caused by the shifting fuel line aft allowed flooding of the centre motor room through the port thrust block room.

At 08:45, a 551-pound (250 kg) bomb entered the starboard upper deck level at Frame 60, passed through the main deck, and exploded on the armoured second deck, setting off an AA ammunition magazine and killing about 50 men.

A second near miss bomb off the port bow ruptured hull plates between frames 10 and 15 causing immediate flooding of all first platform compartments forward of frame 21, and three compartments on the second platform putting CALIFORNIA down about one meter by the bow. Smoke from fires started by the bomb hit caused evacuation of the forward engine-room at 1000 and ended pumping efforts to keep CALIFORNIA afloat. After three days of progressive flooding, CALIFORNIA settled into the mud with only her superstructure remaining above the surface. When the action ended, 100 of her crew were lost and 62 wounded.

CALIFORNIA had been extensively wrecked and her repair was marginally effective yet as much for prestige reasons as operational requirements, she was raised and repaired.

On 25 March 1942, CALIFORNIA was refloated and dry-docked at Pearl Harbor for repairs. On 7 June, she departed under her own power for Puget Sound where a major repair and reconstruction job was undertaken, including improved protection, watertight compartmenting, stability, AA battery, and fire control system. Her original twin funnels were combined into a single funnel faired into the superstructure tower as with the newer STH DAKOTA class. It would take until *31 January 1944* before she was to emerge ready for action again.

*BB WEST VIRGINIA (USN 32100 grt)* was sunk in the attack.
Seven Type 91 aerial torpedoes struck the port side of WEST VIRGINIA. One hit the steering gear, dislodging the rudder. At least three struck below the armor belt, with one or more striking the belt itself (requiring the complex replacement of seven armor plates). One or two torpedoes exploded on the armored second deck after entering the listing ship through holes made by previous torpedoes. One torpedo failed to detonate, and was recovered and disarmed by shipyard explosive technicians. The torpedo attack made two large holes, extending from frames 43 to 52 and 62 to 97.

WEST VIRGINIA was also damaged by two Type 99 No. 80 Mk 5 bombs made from 16 in AP naval shells fitted with aerial fins. The first was found, unexploded, in debris on the second deck after passing through the searchlight platform, signal bridge and main deck deck near frame 70. The second bomb penetrated the 4-inch (100 mm) roof of turret three and broke apart destroying one of the turret's two guns, but did not detonate. It destroyed the Vought OS2U Kingfisher floatplane on the turret catapult. The impact knocked a second floatplane upside down to the main deck below, spilling gasoline (which ignited) from its fuel tanks. Burning aircraft fuel injured turret personnel and damaged the remaining gun. WEST VIRGINIA was eventually engulfed by an oil-fed conflagration, begun by the burning ARIZONA and sustained for 30 hours by fuel leaking from both ships.

Port-side torpedo damage caused rapid compartment flooding; prompt counter-flooding by four damage-control parties under the command of Lcdr John S. Harper and early closure of all water-tight doors and hatches ordered by Harper's assistant, Archie P. Kelley, prevented the ship from capsizing. Water damage ruined much of the ship's communications gear and electrics, including its battle-phone batteries.

With a patch over the damaged area of her hull the BB was pumped out, refloated on 17 May 1942 and docked in Drydock Number One on 9 June. This enabled a more detailed damage assessment, indicating six (not five) torpedo hits.

Shipyard workers were confronted with a monumental task because of the damage to her port side, WEST VIRGINIA sailed from Pearl Harbor on 7 May 1943 to Bremerton and a complete rebuild at Puget Navy yard. During this reconstruction, the cage masts supporting the three-tier fire-control tops, the two funnels, the open-mount 5-inch (127 mm)/25 caliber guns and the casemates with the single-purpose 5-inch/51 caliber guns were replaced by a single funnel and 5/38 dual-purpose guns. On the decks, 40 mm Bofors and 20 mm oerlikon batteries were added. Although the two-ocean naval policy dictated a beam limit of 108 feet for U.S. BBs to traverse the Panama Canal when WEST VIRGINIA, TENNESSEE and CALIFORNIA were rebuilt their beams were widened to 114 feet feet, effectively limiting their service to the Pacific theater. WEST VIRGINIA was finally ready to return to active duty by *early July 1944*. 

*Demilitarised BB UTAH (USN 21825 grt)* was sunk. Shortly before 0800, some crewmen aboard UTAHobserved the first IJN planes approaching, but they assumed they were US aircraft. The Japanese began their attack shortly thereafter, concentrating on the BBs moored around Ford Island of which the UTAH was considered by them to be one. At 0801, the first of two torpedoes struck UTAH, which caused serious flooding. The ship began to list to port and settle by the stern.

UTAH was attacked mercilessly because like the Japanese HIEI, which had been similarly “demilitarised” in the 30’s it was quite possible this ship might have been re-equipped and returned to service as a BB. As such the IJN considered her a potential threat deserving of attack.

US BB NEVADA was damaged with 57 fatalities and 112 wounded. NEVADA was the only BB to get underway during the attack, making the ship "the only bright spot in an otherwise dismal and depressing morning" for the United States. Still, it was hit by one torpedo and at least six bombs while getting underway forcing the crew to beach

the stricken ship on a coral ledge. The ship continued to flood and eventually slid off the ledge and *sunk* to the harbor floor. NEVADA was subsequently salvaged and modernized but took some time to return to active service..

NEVADA was struck by at least 5x250kg bombs as she proceeded down the channel as the IJN attempted to sink her in the channel to impede use of the harbor.

The gasoline fires that flared up around Turret 1 would have caused more critical damage if the main magazines had not been empty. For several days prior to the attack, all of the 14-inch-gun (356 mm) battleships had been replacing their standard-weight main battery projectiles with a new heavier projectile that offered greater penetration and a larger explosive charge in exchange for a slight decrease in range. All of the older projectiles and powder charges had been removed from the magazines of NEVADA, and the crew had taken a break after loading the new projectiles in anticipation of loading the new powder charges on Sunday.[

As bomb damage became evident, NEVADA was ordered to proceed to the west side of Ford Island to prevent her from sinking in deeper water. Instead, she was grounded off Hospital Point at 10:30, though she claimed to have forced down three planes before she struck the shore. Gasoline fires prevented damage control parties from containing flooding forward of the main torpedo defense system. Flooding the main magazine and counterflooding to keep the ship stable lowered the bow allowing water to enter the ship at the second deck level. Lack of watertight subdivision between the second and main decks from frame 30 to frame 115 allowed water entering through bomb holes in the forecastle to flow aft through the ship's ventilation system to flood the dynamo and boiler rooms.

In addition to the immediate casualties mentioned above, NEVADA suffered two more men died aboard during salvage operations on 7 February 1942 when they were overcome by H2S gas gas from decomposing paper and meat. The ship suffered a minimum of six bomb hits and one torpedo hit, but "it is possible that as many as ten bomb hits may have been received, from not more than 18 attackers. Certain damaged areas were of sufficient size to indicate that they were struck by more than one bomb according to the DNS report.

NEVADA urgently required both repairs and modernization. DNS reported the repairs complete November 1942, but the modernization, which was necessarily modest (as it was intended that NEVADA would henceforth be used only as a convoy escort) were completed April 1943. 

US BB PENNSYLVANIA was damaged 29 men killed and a further 29 wounded. It is often reported that she returned to service by 30 March 1942m, but in fact this is very misleading. She was indeed recommissioned on that date, only to find that she suffered repeated machinery failures due to the secondary effects of the repairs. It was not until *4 June 1942* that she was finally deemed fit for service. Even then she would need several months of work up exercises to be considered combat ready. 

US BB TENNESSEE was damaged with 5 killed and 24 wounded. It is often misreported that she returned to service almost immediately, but this is untrue.

TENNESSEE was struck by two armor-piercing bombs that detonated incompletely. The first one hit the center gun of turret two, and it made all three guns inoperable.[7] Debris from the bomb hit on TENNESSEE's turret two hit the command deck of WEST VIRGINIA which mortally wounded her commanding officer. The second bomb went through the roof of turret three; and low-order ignition, rather than detonation, burned out only the left gun compartment of that turret. It was extremely lucky this bomb hit was a dud. TENNESSEE was showered with debris when the magazine of ARIZONA exploded and her stern was engulfed in flames from _Arizona_'s burning fuel oil.

Wedged between the sunken WEST VIRGINIA_a_ and her mooring quays, TENNESSEE was trapped at her berth for ten days before being freed, and four days later she set sail for the West Coast to be repaired.

After preliminary repairs at Pearl Harbor, TENNESSEE headed for Puget for permanent repairs. In addition to repairing her, crews upgraded her AA capbiliities which after the pearl Harbour attack were considered essential. Search and Fcradars were fitted. . Other modifications improved the BB's habitability. On 26 February 1942, TENNESSEE departed from Puget Sound with the work ostensibly complete. She was not declared fully combat ready, however, until *after June 1942*

US BB MARYLAND with four killed and 21 wounded. She was the first damaged ship at Pearl to actually be considered combat ready…..in *June 1942*.

MARYLAND was struck by two armor-piercing bombs which detonated low on her hull. The first struck the forecastle awning and made a hole about 12 ft (3.7 m) by 20 ft (6.1 m). The second exploded after entering the hull at the 22 ft (6.7 m) water level at Frame 10. The latter hit caused flooding and increased the draft forward by 5 ft (1.5 m). MARYLAND continued to fire and, after the attack, sent firefighting parties to assist her compatriots, especially attempting to rescue survivors from the capsized OKLAHOMA. The men continued to muster the AA defenses in case the Japanese returned to attack. In all, two officers and two men were killed in the attack. The damage to the ship was more extensive than the casualties would suggest.

The Japanese erroneously announced that MARYLAND had been sunk, but on 30 December, the damaged ship entered Puget for repairs just behind TENNESSEE. Two of the original twelve 5/51 guns were removed and the 5 in/25 cal guns were replaced by an equal number of 5/38s. These were deemed essential at the time, due to the generally poor performace of the USN AA during the 7 December attack Over the course of the next two months, she was repaired and overhauled, receiving new fighting equipment. Repairs were complete on 26 February 1942, but she was not combat ready until the following June. She underwent a series of shakedown cruises to iron out persitent faults and work up the crews,. She was finally declared a combat ready unit of the USN sent back in *June 1942*, just prior to Midway

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## mikewint (Jan 30, 2018)

Twas not even counting poor old Utah. On Dec. 7th 1941 the U.S. had 17 Battleships in both Atlantic and Pacific fleets
2 of the 17 were on shakedown cruises
8 of the 17 were at Pearl Harbor during the attack
Of the 8 battleships at Pearl only 1 was declared a total loss (Arizona). Oklahoma was raised but never repaired
As far as carriers, the US had 7 plus one Escort Carrier

U.S. Battleships on Dec. 7, 1941

BB - 33 Arkansas Casco Bay Maine. Atlantic

BB - 34 New York Argentia Newfoundland. Atlantic

BB - 35 Texas Casco Bay Maine. Atlantic

BB - 36 Nevada Pearl Harbor Hawaii. Pacific

BB - 37 Oklahoma Pearl Harbor Hawaii. Pacific

BB - 38 Pennsylvania Dry Dock, Pearl Harbor Hawaii. Pacific

BB - 39 Arizona Pearl Harbor Hawaii. Pacific

BB - 40 New Mexico Norfolk Virginia. Atlantic

BB - 41 Mississippi Hvalfjordur Iceland. Atlantic

BB - 42 Idaho Hvalfjordur Iceland. Atlantic

BB - 43 Tennessee Pearl Harbor Hawaii. Pacific

BB - 44 California Pearl Harbor Hawaii. Pacific

BB - 45 Colorado Overhaul, Bremerton Washington. Pacific

BB - 46 Maryland Pearl Harbor Hawaii. Pacific

BB - 48 West Virginia Pearl Harbor Hawaii. Pacific

BB - 55 North Carolina Post shakedown overhaul, Portland Maine. Atlantic

BB - 56 Washington Shakedown cruise, Gulf of Mexico. Atlantic


Battleships at Pearl Harbor Dec 7, 1941

Arizona (BB-39) (Sunk Total Loss)

California (BB-44) (Sunk Raised And Repaired)

Maryland (BB-46) (Light Damage)

Nevada (BB-36) (Beached Heavy Damage, Repaired)

Oklahoma (BB-37) (Capsized -Raised Not Repaired)

Pennsylvania (BB-38) (In Dry Dock No. 1. - Light Damage, Repaired)

Tennessee (BB-43) (Light Damage, Repaired)

West Virginia (BB-48) (Sunk Raised And Repaired)


U.S. Aircraft Carriers on Dec 7, 1941

CV - 2 Lexington Transporting aircraft to Midway Island, 460 Miles East of Midway. Pacific

CV - 3 Saratoga At San Diego California. Pacific

CV - 4 Ranger At sea returning to Norfolk Va. Caribbean. Atlantic

CV - 5 Yorktown At Norfolk Va. Atlantic

CV - 6 Enterprise Returning to Pearl Harbor from Wake Island. 200 Miles West Of Pearl. Pacific

CV - 7 Wasp Grassy Bay Bermuda. Atlantic

CV - 8 Hornet Fitting out Norfolk Virginia. Atlantic

AVG – 1 Long Island Norfolk Virginia. Atlantic

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## Shortround6 (Jan 30, 2018)

Thank you both for the more detailed accounts of damage and dispositions of the US major ships. 

The Japanese had, for all practical purposes, sunk 5 of the American Battleships. A tremendous achievement, but not enough in light of the American reserve of battleships and their production program. (four of the Iowas were already laid down by the time of Pearl Harbor) 
In fact they may have simplified things for the Americans as the Americans didn't have enough fleet oilers to supply both the carrier task force and a large number of Battleships for most of 1942. This was also simplified by the fact the old American battleships could not tactically combine with carriers (only the modern battleships could exceed 21 kts). 

The Japanese had spent large sums of money to modify all their old battleships and combined longer hulls (mostly additions to the stern) and more powerful engines to bring the battleship speeds up to around 25 kts and the Kongo class battlecruisers were almost totally rebuilt into fast battleships (over 3500 tons of armor being added) with new boilers/turbines of almost double the power and another 14 ft added to the length to increase speed form 27-27.5 kts to 30.5 kts despite the much greater weight. The Japanese had the same problem of combining units only not to the same extent. Only the 4 battlecruisers could really operate with carriers in terms of speed but with only eight 5 in guns (four twin mounts) they weren't exactly large floating flak batteries like the later American Battleships or the old American ships with major rebuilds.


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## parsifal (Jan 30, 2018)

The USN fought most of 1942 in the PTO without relying on its battleships because it had to, not because it wanted to. There were persistent, almost unsolvable problems that prevented the wholesale use of the battleship force in the massed role that had been intended. In no way could any of the US battleships, old or new, be considered combat ready until the latter part of 1942. By the time the battleship force was deemed ready, the war in the Pacific was largely decided and there were safer and more efficient ways of defeating the IJN. 

The central role of the US carriers in the operations that followed the Pearl Harbour debacle ought not be diminished by some erroneous belief that the USN could always fall back on its battleshiips if the need arose (at least not until after august 1942) . Despite its numbers, the US battlefleet was found to be badly in need of modernisation and in no way ready to take on the IJN in those early months of the war. I have no doubts that if the climactic Mahanist battle had been fought as planned, the IJN would have torn the heart out of the USN. The difference in quality was just too great for that to be risked. 

And there was no joy to be had from the new battleships then entering service either. Even though the North Carolinas were either commissioning, or nearing commissioning at the time of pearl harbour, it would take a lot of time to get any of these ships combat ready. They suffered many serious delays in getting to combat ready status. WASHINGTON for instance suffered severe engine vibrations for many months that virtually prevented her proceeding to sea, affected her gunnery until the problem was “solved, and could not enter work up status because of those persistent nagging issues. In the case of WASHINGTON she continued to have big problems with the vibration and cavitation issues (that affected her stability as a gun platform and reduced her speed to dangerous levels) until well into 1943, and in fact these vibration issues to a lesser extent persisted even after they had ostensibly been solved. In WASHINGTON’s case it was a very wise move to fit radar to her so early as the WASHINGTON was the first of 20 USN ships selected for a full radar fitout, making it possible for the crews to be fully trained by the time it was needed

That the new fast battleships continued to suffer dangerous teething issues can be found in the conduct of the November battles. Despite being heavily outgunned, caught by surprise and facing a well trained radar equipped enemy, the Japanese forces very nearly caused an upset in this battle.

Despite the resounding victory for the USN that was snatched from defeat at the November showdown with the IJN Battlecruiser, it ought not be overlooked that both USN Battleships suffered numerous failures. Sth Dakota was very lucky to escape more serious damage than she did. It was not as one side a battle as it first appears

[email protected] - BB-57 USS South Dakota Gunfire Damage - Battle of Guadalcanal - Nov 14-15, 1942

What I consider to be the very best damage analysis on the IJN KIRISHIMA provides an interesting foil to the above article

http://www.navweaps.com/index_lundgren/Kirishima_Damage_Analysis.pdf

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## mikewint (Jan 31, 2018)

Plain and simple the day of the slug-fest battlewagon vs. battlewagon was over. It always seems like the military is fighting the LAST war and has to be dragged into the present. Weapons will always (eventually) outpace armor. 
The German approach to Tanks is a perfect example and just as self-defeating in the end

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## parsifal (Jan 31, 2018)

mikewint said:


> Plain and simple the day of the slug-fest battlewagon vs. battlewagon was over. It always seems like the military is fighting the LAST war and has to be dragged into the present. Weapons will always (eventually) outpace armor.
> The German approach to Tanks is a perfect example and just as self-defeating in the end



Substantially I agree. Battleships as the last arbiter in naval power had ended. However that was not fully apparent in 1942, not even in 1944. What did become apparent was that maintining a battleship force was an expense few nations could afford and for which the returns were limited.

In 1942, both side fought each other to a standstill with respect to their carrier capabilities. As a result of that most of the battles fought in the latter part of 1942 through to most of 1943 were surface naval battles. As a generalisation, the IJN proved to be superior to the USN but was unable to replace losses as effectively. They were nearly always, invariably, outnumbered and the increasing advantages of radar tipped the balance increasingly in favour of the USN. Other improvements in areas like Damage Control and tactical control of surface forces gradually helped the USN to achieve the upper hand in surface battles. There were several in late 1943 that were clear US victories, in which the USN, even when outnumbered could get the better of the IJN. By the time of Samar, the Japanese surface fleet was thoroughly inferior, both numbers and capability in surface combat.

The problem for heavy ships was not that they were obsolete in these battles, but that they were too valuable and were often exposed to threats like destroyers, PT boats and submarines, as well of course as aircraft. But given that the surface naval engagement was still the prevalent 9but not the dominant) form of naval warfare, it is not true to claim that battleships were obsolete.. They were just no longer the sole arbiters of sea power, and there were cheaper, more efficient ways of force projection available

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## Shortround6 (Jan 31, 2018)

There was also quite a difference between the old battleships and the new ones in terms of basic AA ability, this tends to cover all nations. Many older battleships having 6-8 guns of 4-5in caliber for AA work, not much better (if any better) than heavy cruisers. British and few others flirted with heavier AA guns, like 6in but rates of fire counted against them even if the mount had high angle elevation. 
The new generation of battleships (and some of the most reworked older ones) often had 16-20 4in -5.25in guns and, in theory, could offer increased AA protection to the formation. 
Dockyard time, weapons availability, and even deck space/stability often prevented as much AA firepower from being mounted as desired. 
Battleships, briefly ( few years) , could operate at times or conditions that prevented effective airstrikes (Northern Convoys). The battleships being much reduced in capability by heavy seas and poor visibility but carriers were restricted even more. 

Much is made of the loss of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse but the Repulse, despite the heroic efforts of her captain and crew, was handicapped by a distinctly second rate (if not 3rd rate) AA suite.


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## parsifal (Feb 1, 2018)

It was more a difference between AA carried early in the war and AA carried later. A good illustration of this is HMS warspite, designed to carry just two medium caliber AA guns in 1915, by March 1941 she was provided with the following fitout

Warspite March 1941 

8 x BL 15-inch /42 main guns (with increased elevation) in four twin-gun turrets (two forward, two aft).
8 x 6-inch Mk XII (152mm) guns
8 x 4-inch Mk XVI anti-aircraft cannons in four twin-gun turrets
32 x 2-pdr (40mm) "pom-pom" anti-aircraft cannons
15 x 20mm anti-aircraft cannons
16 x 0.50 caliber Vickers anti-aircraft machine guns in quad mountings. 

By comparison, USS North Carolina (BB55) in March 1941 was carrying:
4x4 quadruple 1.1 in and 12x.50 caliber HMG

It was a similar story for most BBs. For the british, the problem was that many of their more useful ships were so busy they didn't get the chance to upgrade the AA fitout. Repulse was definately in that category.

Fast BBs were so valuable (and so expensive) there was a rapid and comprehensive increase in their AA fitouts though the older US BBs also received quite a few upgrades as the was progressed.

BBs actually were not the most efficient Aa platforms in either navy. the most efficient ships were actually the purpose built Aa cruisers, because they had smaller TDs they could get in close and provide better levels of support where needed. BBs couldn't really do that.


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## swampyankee (Feb 1, 2018)

This is rather far afield from the Yamamoto question, but there is still a lot of fanboyism around battleships. I think, in hindsight, had the USN canceled every one of the Iowas the net effect on the war would probably have been to shorten it by like ten minutes. Of course, they didn’t know that when they needed to decide. 

Yamamoto had a tendency to draw up very complex plans requiring accurate timing between widely separated forces. I suspect his greatness as an admiral grew as he died before the IJN started on an obvious course to Davey Jones’ locker. What he and the IJN failed to do included any kind of offensive or defensive trade warfare. Considering the IJA and IJN treatment of civilians in occupied areas, arguments that this was beneath their warrior ethic seem rather inane.

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## Shortround6 (Feb 1, 2018)

The Renown had been rebuilt with one of the more effective heavy AA Batteries of the time. 
10 twin 4.5 in mounts which puts her ahead of just about everyone else in 1939. 
One can argue rates of fire and training speeds and so on, but this battery may well have been better than the eight twin 5.25in battery of the KGVs or the eight twin 10.5cm guns on the Bismark. 

The old American ships had eight single 5in/25s which doesn't make for good fleet defence. The 5in/25 may be under rated but there are too few barrels per ship to make them useful as an addition to carrier group. The old battleships don't bring enough AA to the game, they are too slow to keep up and they suck fuel like football fans suck beer on game day. Some of them got eight twin 5in/38s which brought them near to the modern battleships but that was not until much later in the war. 

the 40mm Bofors is marginal for "fleet" defense and the 2pdr and smaller are pretty much for individual ship defence. They don't have enough range to cover a nearby ship unless you are so close that you are starting to restrict freedom of movement. 

I would agree that the Japanese really dropped the ball on submarine (offensive or defensive trade warfare) warfare. Considering the size/range of some of their own subs, not figuring that an enemy could build long range subs to operate in Japanese waters seems really strange.


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## swampyankee (Feb 1, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> The Renown had been rebuilt with one of the more effective heavy AA Batteries of the time.
> 10 twin 4.5 in mounts which puts her ahead of just about everyone else in 1939.
> One can argue rates of fire and training speeds and so on, but this battery may well have been better than the eight twin 5.25in battery of the KGVs or the eight twin 10.5cm guns on the Bismark.
> 
> ...


Not noticing the amount of effort the RN needed to put forth to deal with submarines 20 years earlier, the damage caused by surface raiders on the US 4 score years earlier, or, essentially 500 years of RN history dealing with trade war strikes one as appallingly uninterested in anything beyond tactics.


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## parsifal (Feb 1, 2018)

Neither the IJN or the USN were particularly interested at the outbreak of hostilities in ASW warfare. Both navies viewed convoy as a concept as essentially defensive and unsuited to the type of battle they wanted to wage

Further, for the Japanese it was always assumed that the war would be very short duration. This rapidly was a hope that was dashed, but then to add insult to injury, the Japanese pored hopelessly inadequate resources into their ASW effort and adopted some rather pathetic technological and doctrinal solutions.

Still the abilities of the allies to sink Japanese shipping were rather poor at the beginning. To December 1942, the Japanese lost just over 800000 tons of unrecoverable shipping losses whilst capturing or otherwise enlisting the services of just over a million tons 

1943 was a worse year for the Japanese, but still not a killer blow, the real killer to the Japanese merchant marine occurred in 1944.

By comparison, Japanese submarines were not always used for merchant shipping attacks, although there is zer evidence to support the calim they refused to attack merchant shipping as a target of opportunity. Moreover, in the first year of the war, an awful lot of allied and neutral shipping was seized and put into Japanese service. More than 650000 tons was captured intact, and re-used by the Japanese. About 1 million tons of allied shipping was sunk, comfortably exceeding comparable allied effort. In several areas, such as the indian Ocean, dedicated anti shipping campaigns were mounted by the Japanese, with some impressive results achieved for TOs with only limited target densities.

However several factors have coloured western views of the IJN submarines. To this end I would highly recommend Akira Akihito’s (????) book on Japanese submarines, co-written by an American whose name escapes me. It debunks many of the myths and half truths that have been written about IJN submarine operations. Undoubtedly the complete failure of the IJN efforts around Pearl Harbour and the West Coast colour the mostly American view on this subject. Counter this to their deadly efforts off the eastern seabord of Australia and operations in the Indian Ocean.

Japan wanted their submarines to be able to operate as part of or as an extension of the decisive battle they expected to occur in the Central Pacific. Japanese subs were built with high surfaced speeds and the ability to provide scouting capabilities. The idea was that as the Pacific Fleet sallied out with its best flet speed of 19 knots, the Iboats would attack and then reposition themselves at a point ahead the main force, using their design sustained sea speeds of 24 knots to do so. Not a bad concept, and probably would have worked, except with the loss of the BBs from the force structure, fleet speeds increased to nearly 28 knots, more than enough to get away from an iboat on patrol. Couple that with the MAGIC intercepts, and I-boat losses skyrocketed and allied shipping bottomed out after guadacanal.

Just the same the IJN did achieve some good results against Allied naval groups. Loss of the Yorktown., damage to the Saratoga (twice), loss of the Wasp, loss of CA Indianapolis and DD Obrien, and a couple of others come to mind. But by 1944, even in this area of direct tactical support the USN subs had caught up, and probably overtaken the IJN as they tore into the IJN, sinking such valuable ships as the Taiho and the Yamato class CVS conversion (Ive had a pensioner moment and forgotten the name….starts with an “s”)…….


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## Hansie Bloeckmann (Feb 1, 2018)

swampyankee said:


> This is rather far afield from the Yamamoto question, but there is still a lot of fanboyism around battleships. I think, in hindsight, had the USN canceled every one of the Iowas the net effect on the war would probably have been to shorten it by like ten minutes. Of course, they didn’t know that when they needed to decide.
> 
> Yamamoto had a tendency to draw up very complex plans requiring accurate timing between widely separated forces. I suspect his greatness as an admiral grew as he died before the IJN started on an obvious course to Davey Jones’ locker. What he and the IJN failed to do included any kind of offensive or defensive trade warfare. Considering the IJA and IJN treatment of civilians in occupied areas, arguments that this was beneath their warrior ethic seem rather inane.


Yamamoto was apparently NOT a believer of simplicity in drafting battle plans and orders. The more complex you make your plans for your subordinates to put into action, the greater the odds of big-time SNAFU arise. The initial attack on Midway may verify this- The JN assumed that Halsey had taken the "bait" and was steaming toward the Aleutians-- how their intel missed the fact that Halsey was in sick bay with some form of skin disorder, and had picked Raymond Spruance as his "stand-in"-- the rest is history, the USN came out ahead on this historic battle due to sheer luck--IMO


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## cherry blossom (Feb 9, 2018)

Yamamoto Isoruku was an energetic, determined and charismatic leader. However, the problem with calling him a genius is that his judgement, particularly of American attitudes, tended to be very poor.

The Pearl Harbor attack was certainly Yamamoto's idea and he possibly started planning even before the British attack on Taranto. Yamamoto realised that the IJN could carry out such an attack "successfully" despite the doubts of other IJN officers (and also the general American belief, except for Adm. Richardson, that it was not logistically possible).

There are serious criticisms of the military planning of the Pearl Harbor attack made for example by Alan D. Zimm in "Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions", which points out that there was little attempt to protect the bombers either from anti-aircraft fire or possible fighter attack and that there was little overall plan of target selection.

However, the worse problem with the Pearl Harbor plan was that it made it almost impossible for Japan to make a subsequent compromise peace with America. Yamamoto was warned about that by Onishi Takijiro in August 1941, who argued “...we should avoid anything like the Hawaiian operation that would put America's back up too badly” (“The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy” by Agawa Hiroyuki, page 229) but ignored Onishi. Interestingly, Yamamoto actually planned the attack with an eye on American opinion according to Minoru Genda, who is quoted as saying "Yamamoto wanted to target only battleships. He appreciated the importance of destroying aircraft carriers but believed that the psychological effect on the American people of destroying all the American battleships would be greater than that of the destruction of carriers." (I found this in “ Winning” the Pacific War: The Masterful Strategy of Commander Minoru Genda by Angelo N. Caravaggio https://usnwc2.usnwc.edu/getattachm...the-Pacific-War--The-Masterful-Strategy-.aspx where it is referenced to Minoru Genda, interview by Gordon Prange, 9 March 1948, interview no. Minoru 2A, transcript, Prange Papers).

The other obvious point about the Pearl Harbor attack was that Japan could not try to attack only the British and Dutch possessions. I am slightly hesitant to discuss this because I have never convinced myself that I understand who wanted to attack the Philippines in 1941. However, Yamamoto clearly saw no advantage in trying to avoid American territory. There is a brief mention of a war game on 26th-28th November 1940 presided over by Yamamoto with "leading members of the Naval General Staff" in "From Mahan to Pearl Harbor" by Sadao Asada (page 279). The conclusion was that an attack on the Dutch East Indies would involve war with America. I am not sure how that conclusion was reached but I suspect that Rear-Adm. Maeda Minoru was involved. Marder's "Old Friends, New Enemies" mentions an interview with Maeda from 1962 in which he claimed responsability and that he had used the argument that the Dutch and the Americans were the same race! Yamamoto was probably correct about America entering any war by late 1941 but I am not so sure about 1940 or that he had the right reasons or that he was thinking beyond the start of the war towards possible negotiations.

As well as posible political errors, Yamamoto has also been criticized for his planning as Combined Fleet Commander. I have not read Mark Stille's short biography "Yamamoto Isoroku" (except the extract at Yamamoto Isoroku) but I suspect the comment "As with any famous military commander, there is always reality and myth. For Yamamoto these stand in stark contrast." is inspired by doubts about his military rather than political judgement. Certainly, Yamamoto did not feel bound to keep the six carriers of the First Air Fleet (Kido Butai) together, which almost everyone with the benefit of hindsight supports. Interestingly, according to Mark Peattie's "Sunburst" it was not Yamamoto but Ozawa who had been the early advocate of concentrating Japan's carrier force (Sunburst).

However, whilst it is obvious that the plans which divided the carriers for Coral Sea and Midway (and earlier without a carrier battle around Wake Island) were very bad, I can see a crazy logic for the Midway plan at least. I believe that Yamamoto assumed that the Americans would not fight unless they were offered a very tempting target. Thus, he was happy to send two carriers to the Aleutians and spread his battleships across the Pacific in order to offer such a target. As Nimitz had sent two carriers to fight against up to five Japanese carriers at Coral Sea (Kaga was believed to be attached to the 4th Fleet on the basis of early decrypted signals), Yamamoto again failed to understand his enemies or learn from recent history.

An earlier example may show the same failure to understand America, although I am not at all sure if Yamamoto was deeply involved. However, Yamamoto was certainly keenly interested in the development of long range bombers, especially the G3M. Indeed, that is the only major technical innovation in which he played a major role. What is less clear is whether he, at the time Vice-Minister of the Navy, supported the IJN's use of the G3M from the start of the 1937 conflict in attacks on Chinese cities. Photographs of those attacks, which naturally were chosen to show civilian casualties, did little to improve Japan's image, especially America with its missionary linked China lobby.

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## Elmas (Feb 10, 2018)

Did the Naval High Staffs understand after the sinking of the BIsmark that BBs whitout proper air cover were sitting ducks?
Probably, thinking of PoW and Repulse, no.


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## parsifal (Feb 10, 2018)

some were aware, some were not. It took a while for the lesson to become universally understood. For the Japanese there was the added constraint of there often not being any air support available, but a crucial naval mission to undertake nevertheless, to deal with.


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## swampyankee (Feb 10, 2018)

parsifal said:


> Neither the IJN or the USN were particularly interested at the outbreak of hostilities in ASW warfare. Both navies viewed convoy as a concept as essentially defensive and unsuited to the type of battle they wanted to wage
> 
> Further, for the Japanese it was always assumed that the war would be very short duration. This rapidly was a hope that was dashed, but then to add insult to injury, the Japanese pored hopelessly inadequate resources into their ASW effort and adopted some rather pathetic technological and doctrinal solutions.
> 
> ...



Shinano.

The USN did have to protect trade, but the US was a net exporter of food, metals, and fuel at that time; Japan, despite a of effort to promote rice cultivation was a net importer of food, fuel, and raw materials. Without merchant shipping, Americans don't get Guiness, good wine, and bananas; Japanese starve.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 10, 2018)

swampyankee said:


> Without merchant shipping, Americans don't get Guiness, good wine, and bananas; Japanese starve.



And they starve while walking most places and freezing in winter. While Japan as a whole was self sufficient in coal 90% of it was either on the North Island or the South Island. You need ships to get it to the other other two Islands.


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## Freebird (May 8, 2018)

Hansie Bloeckmann said:


> With the caveat that I think Irwin Rommel and George Patton were the two best field commanders in the ETO-WW11,



Back to Rommel...

Rommel and Patton were hard driving officers, although probably best suited for tank Corps commander, not higher rank.

Despite the hype, it should be remembered that in the battles against the British (& Commonwealth Allies) in North Africa, Rommel only won *ONE* of his major battles, and even if we only count the battles where his forces equalled or exceeded the Allies, he still only won just 1 battle out of 4.


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## redcoat (May 8, 2018)

Elmas said:


> Did the Naval High Staffs understand after the sinking of the BIsmark that BBs whitout proper air cover were sitting ducks?
> Probably, thinking of PoW and Repulse, no.


The Bismarck was damaged by aircraft, but not sunk, that was achieved by surface warships. Until the POW and Repulse not a single capital ship had been sunk while at sea by aircraft.


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## GrauGeist (May 8, 2018)

mikewint said:


> U.S. Aircraft Carriers on Dec 7, 1941
> CV - 2 Lexington Transporting aircraft to Midway Island, 460 Miles East of Midway. Pacific
> CV - 3 Saratoga At San Diego California. Pacific
> CV - 4 Ranger At sea returning to Norfolk Va. Caribbean. Atlantic
> ...


Great list, Mike, but don't forget the USS Langley (CV-1).
She was at anchor off Cavite in the Philippines when war broke out.


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## Freebird (May 8, 2018)

GrauGeist said:


> Great list, Mike, but don't forget the USS Langley (CV-1).
> She was at anchor off Cavite in the Philippines when war broke out.



She wasn't an aircraft carrier at that point though, Langley had been converted to a seaplane carrier, and even had half of her deck cut off.


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## mikewint (May 8, 2018)

GrauGeist said:


> don't forget the USS Langley (CV-1).


As Freebird stated above on 26 Feb 1937 our very first (converted from a collier) aircraft carrier had been converted again, this time into a seaplane tender so she was, from that time forward, no longer a carrier and was assigned hull number AV-3.


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## GrauGeist (May 9, 2018)

Yes, I'm aware that the Langley was converted from the collier Jupiter and then relegated to a Seaplane Tender just prior to the war, but she was still considered a carrier in the rolls of lost Carriers of the war, just like the carriers of the IJA were also included. She was also considered in many circles as the first Allied carrier casualty of the PTO.
And the Langley had been shuttling P-40s back and forth, trying to get them to safe Allied locations, just ahead of the Japanese advances, and when she was attacked and damaged, she had several dozen P-40s aboard.


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## mikewint (May 9, 2018)

Dave, I would suspect that whomsoever made up that list was stretching a bit due to the historical significance of the Langley. As above half her deck had been cut away and ordinary aircraft could not take off or land on her which is the essence of a carrier. In addition she had a different hull number AV-3 no longer CV-1. I really don't see, except perhaps in an honorable sense, that the Langly could be considered a carrier. 
As an aside almost her pilots were lost when Edsall was sunk on the same day and the Pecos was also sunk taking more of her crew with it


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## swampyankee (May 9, 2018)

freebird said:


> Back to Rommel...
> 
> Rommel and Patton were hard driving officers, although probably best suited for tank Corps commander, not higher rank.
> 
> Despite the hype, it should be remembered that in the battles against the British (& Commonwealth Allies) in North Africa, Rommel only won *ONE* of his major battles, and even if we only count the battles where his forces equalled or exceeded the Allies, he still only won just 1 battle out of 4.




Back to Patton...

A historian, I think John Eisenhower, called Patton “a master of pursuit,” by which I believe he meant that Patton was best when the battle was fluid and he was on the attack.

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## Hansie Bloeckmann (May 9, 2018)

swampyankee said:


> Back to Patton...
> 
> A historian, I think John Eisenhower, called Patton “a master of pursuit,” by which I believe he meant that Patton was best when the battle was fluid and he was on the attack.[/Q
> 
> ...


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## Freebird (May 10, 2018)

swampyankee said:


> Back to Patton...
> .



The thread was actually about Rommel & Yamamoto...

For some reason we have a Patton thread which is fixated on Monty, and a Rommel thread discussing Patton.

Anyways, I'll take my Patton reply to the Patton thread.


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## swampyankee (May 10, 2018)

freebird said:


> The thread was actually about Rommel & Yamamoto...
> 
> For some reason we have a Patton thread which is fixated on Monty, and a Rommel thread discussing Patton.
> 
> Anyways, I'll take my Patton reply to the Patton thread.




Every time any WWII general is mentioned, Montgomery or Patton must be mentioned. 

Yamamoto probably best understood the US of the Japanese military leaders; he seems to have been the only one to have understood that a long _naval_ war is as much a test of industry as of warriors. What he -- and the remainder of the Japanese military establishment failed to understand -- is how Americans, with nothing evident as a "warrior culture" were much tougher than the Japanese expectations.


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## Freebird (May 10, 2018)

swampyankee said:


> Every time any WWII general is mentioned, Montgomery or Patton must be mentioned.
> 
> Yamamoto probably best understood the US of the Japanese military leaders; he seems to have been the only one to have understood that a long _naval_ war is as much a test of industry as of warriors. What he -- and the remainder of the Japanese military establishment failed to understand -- is how Americans, with nothing evident as a "warrior culture" were much tougher than the Japanese expectations.



True, and to be fair, expecting Yamamoto to be able to beat the US in the Pacific was like trying to pull a rabbit out of a hat....


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