# Did the US miss an opportunity in 1940?



## michaelmaltby (Jun 16, 2011)

When the United States entered the war in December, 1941, it began a 'learning process' that Britain, the Commonwealth, and Germany (and Axis allies) had already been working at since 1939 - and earlier.

US neutrality was economicaly beneficial to the US but it was also politically expedient due to the large German-US population and a broad-based desire by Americans to stay out of Europe's wars. This of course changed the moment the first bomb fell on Pearl Harbour.

But the events unfolding in Europe after Hitler's rise in 1933 were very clear to those who didn't turn their gaze away from reality. Men like Winston Churchill.

Having been France's ally in 1917-18, the fall of France in 1940 would have been the opportune moment for the US to declare itself an ally of Britain and the Commonwealth. Had President FDR done so, the learning (and building) processes would have begun 18 months earlier than they ultimately did - giving the US an earlier start. 

This situation was compounded by Roosevelt's choice of ambassador to the Court of St. James (UK) [edit ]. Joseph Kennedy. Kennedy pursued a private agenda - wanting to meet with Hitler, down-playing England's "fight" and saying: "Democracy is finished in England". During the BoB Kennedy moved to the countryside where he was safe. Not only was he a defeatist (from the British point-of-view) but his "intelligence" to Washington failed to convey essential truths. He was forced to resign in late 1940 and never regained influence with Washington.

I suggest that if the US had been active (no later than) the fall of France, the US would have learned some valuable lessons that would have saved US lives and shortened the war in Europe:

1. Fewer surprises such as the initial failure of daylight strategic bombing
2. The nature of a "high altitude" air war where the bomber doesn't always "get through"
3. Co-development/license-build of US-British aircraft types such as the Mosquito, Beaufighter and P-51 Mustang
4. An earlier license-build of the RR Merlin engine with the possibility of greater production, earler, and the option of wider use.
5. Earlier perfection of the Hispano-Suisa 20 mm canon and abandonment of the Oldsmobile 37mm.

[I focus here on aircraft but the list can be extended to other branches of service]

Declaring "for" Britain in 1940 would also have forced Japan's hand against America earlier (as Germany's Axis partner). Japan would have either had to advance plans to attack - which it couldn't - (having just faced a massive discreditation at Russian hands) - or face an already-at-war USA if and when Japan decided to attack.

However, the US did not move to disturb the domestic political realities of its neutrality until forced by external events. When war did come, the US was mobilized and galvanized in an instant, and no one could ask for a stouter, more productive ally than the US. But those extra 18 months of US neutrality came at price - and that price was in American (and Allied) lives.

MM
Proud Canadian


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## ctrian (Jun 16, 2011)

One year would make such a huge difference? I don't think so .I also don't see how points 1-5 add up considering the law of cause and effect.For example why build the P-51 if you don’t need a long range escort since you haven’t failed in daylight bombings.


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## michaelmaltby (Jun 16, 2011)

".... One year would make such a huge difference?"

Yes it would. Consider the Battle of Midway - half-a-year after Pearl Harbor. Consider Stalingrad - 14 months after the invasion of Russia.


"... why build the P-51 if you don’t need a long range escort since you haven’t failed in daylight bombings."

Because Germany has occupied Europe and will still have to be defeated - including airpower. 

MM


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## Glider (Jun 16, 2011)

While its true to say that the USA were not involved in the conflict before Pearl Harbour they had full access to almost every aspect of the British Armed Forces land sea and air from Day 1. They had the opportunity to learn nearly all the lessons that you highlighted but sometimes made what now seems to us in 2011 the most illogical lessons. They did get a lot right, but almost as many wrong. If I can take the specific lessons that you mention 

1. Fewer surprises such as the initial failure of daylight strategic bombing
This was obvious from the start of the war both from the outside and from the access to the RAF that the USAAF had during the first 12 months of the war. Despite the clear lessons and that fact that the B17 was supposed to have been combat ready in the USAAF the first ones received by the RAF were hopeless. Guns wouldn't fire, bomb sights didn't work the list of problems was huge and a similar situation existed on the P39.
2. The nature of a "high altitude" air war where the bomber doesn't always "get through"
To be fair this had never been tried so it might in theory have worked, so I can forgive them this.
3. Co-development/license-build of US-British aircraft types such as the Mosquito, Beaufighter and P-51 Mustang
The USAAF had the P38 in an advanced stage of development so Mosquito and Beaufighter production wasn't really going to happen 
4. An earlier license-build of the RR Merlin engine with the possibility of greater production, earler, and the option of wider use.
This would have been a huge benefit. The Allison was of similar size but was generally 12 months behind in development, cuttin the losses and going with the Merlin would have been an advantage.
5. Earlier perfection of the Hispano-Suisa 20 mm canon and abandonment of the Oldsmobile 37mm.
The US had many chances with this. UK and USA built 20mm guns were tested and the results clearly showed the UK weapons to be far more reliable but even after this test, the US refused to adopt the british changes resulting in many thousands of guns being supplied to the UK which were never installed in any RAF fighter. Also all the US produced ammunition was destroyed due to reliability problems, even on Malta which was desperately short of ammunition. If they didn't change the design after the war had started there was no chance of getting them to change the design before the war. 

As an example of the mistaken lessons that the US learnt probably the most unbelieveable was their assesment of the BOB. Two were produced, one soon after the battle and the other a couple of years later which was published. The first stated that the most successful aircraft of the BOB was the Me110. Not the Spitfire or the Me109, but the Me110, don't ask me how. This was described in the Book _The Burning Blue _which I used to own.

The US Army probably did the best job recognising the importance of Armour and a DP weapon resulting in the Lee and Sherman tank, as well as the importance of an effective AT gun which is why they produced what was basically a copy of the 6pd.

The USN were probably the worst learning nothing about the convoy system or the importance of escort vessels but recognised that their approach to naval aviation was second to none and stuck with it.


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## GrauGeist (Jun 16, 2011)

The lesson about daylight bombing (with or without escort) became very obvious during the Battle of Britain at the cost of the German's effort. Why the Allies assumed it would be any different with larger bombers at higher altitudes escapes me, but they soon re-discovered what the German's learned...

The early P-51 didn't have the extended range or altitude capabilities of the later versions and wasn't beyond prototype stage in 1940.

I think the United States entering the war in 1940 would have changed quite a number of events, but the war still would have been a long drawn out slugfest and many of the lessons learned from 1941 onwards would have still had to have been learned, just sooner.


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## buffnut453 (Jun 16, 2011)

michaelmaltby said:


> This situation was compounded by Roosevelt's choice of ambassador to the Court of King James (UK).



Don't you mean the Court of St.James?

BN-the-Pedant!


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## ctrian (Jun 17, 2011)

michaelmaltby said:


> ".... One year would make such a huge difference?"
> 
> Yes it would. Consider the Battle of Midway - half-a-year after Pearl Harbor. Consider Stalingrad - 14 months after the invasion of Russia.
> 
> ...


 
I don't get it ,how would Stalingrad and Midway happen one year in advance?


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## GrauGeist (Jun 17, 2011)

ctrian said:


> I don't get it ,how would Stalingrad and Midway happen one year in advance?


Actually, if the U.S. entered the war in 1940, midway most likely would not have happened (at least as we are familiar with) and food for thought here guys...Russia was still in a non-agression pact with Germany until 1941...

We may not have had the Soviets as allies if the U.S. entered the war in 1940


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## michaelmaltby (Jun 17, 2011)

"...the lessons learned from 1941 onwards would have still had to have been learned, just sooner."

Essentially, my point. You can't avoid learning lessons but can learn them earlier - or not.  Best early as possible in my book.

@ Ctrian - I think we have a communications problem. You claim "a year does make much difference". I disagreed - and cited Midway and Stalingrad as examples of how tides of war can turn rather quickly - like inside 18 months. Examples only.

Thanks for the fact check Buffnut . Fixed.

"... We may not have had the Soviets as allies if the U.S. entered the war in 1940".

Great point GG . But Stalin would NOT have come to Hitler's assistance had the US entered the war in 1940. But (if things were going well for the Allies) Stalin might have declared war on Germany in 1941 or 1942 (aka 'Ice Breaker' ).

And yes ".... Midway most likely would not have happened".

Thanks. 

MM


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## ctrian (Jun 17, 2011)

Stalingrad was an important battle but up to that point both sides had taken heavy casualties and were producing huge quantities of high quality armaments .Germany and the SU were building their armed forces during the 1930's.A country can’t just declare war and go to the offensive without men and machines.It would take a long time for the US to train men and build quality equipment since they were starting from scratch.This historically took a long time and in your scenario it would also hold back any US offensive action .


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## Shortround6 (Jun 17, 2011)

I think you need to go back and read a few books as to what was really going on. 

Packard had signed on to build 9000 Merlins in Sept of 1940. These were Merlin XX engines. 

How much earlier do you want to go than that? 

In 1939-1940 US and British 100 octane fuel was NOT the same stuff. Because of different allowable components, like aeromatics, they behaved quite differently under rich mixture conditions. Early British 100 octane actually would act like 115-125 under rich conditions, it varied from batch of gas to batch because at that time there was no rich mixture standard. American 100 octane didn't improve much under rich mixture conditions and a few batches of gas actually had lower octane ratings under rich conditions. 
British fuel tended to dissolve American gaskets, early self sealing tank liners and other rubber products. It took a bit of time to get things standardized. 
American aircraft engine factories improved their output by a factor of about 3 from 1939 to 1940, by 3 again from 1940 to 41 and 3 again from 1941 to 1942. The Americans started massive "shadow" factory construction in 1940 for both aircraft and engines, The pay-off didn't show up for 1 1/2 to 2 years. The P&W main plant had quadrupled in size from 1938 to 1940 and Ford broke ground an a NEW factory the size of the expanded P&W main plant in Sept 1940 just for R-2800 production, Government gave them over 14 million to finance the plant construction. Battle of Britain isn't over yet. 
It just took time to build factories, hire and train workers, establish priorities for machine tool distribution and raw material allocations. 

Was the US a bit late, yes, but they sure didn't wait until Dec of 1941. 
Were mistakes made, yes, but some of them would be made in any case.

As far as high altitude bombing goes, that that idea continued for years after the war is really baffling. For a number of years into the 1950s the Bomber Generals seemed to think that another 50mph and another 5,000ft of altitude would allow them to penetrate enemy airspace even in the face of missiles that had no pressurized crew compartment, no crew to withstand "G"s and were powered by rockets that didn't breath air. To men that thought like that a few extra machine guns to fight off a single engine prop plane probably seemed like a good solution


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## michaelmaltby (Jun 18, 2011)

You raise some good points, Shortround. Especially fuel and gaskets  and I am aware that there was a build-up going on in America before Dec. 7-41  how could there NOT be, when the Canadian subs of American companies like Ford, Dodge, GM, Boeing .... to name a few - were _already_ moving towards a war footing - war production - starting the winter of '39.

Did any American Generals seek out and talk to Eagle Squadron pilots ...?

MM


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## michaelmaltby (Jun 18, 2011)

@Ctian:

"... A country can’t just declare war and go to the offensive without men and machines.It would take a long time for the US to train men and build quality equipment since they were starting from scratch.This historically took a long time and in your scenario it would also hold back any US offensive action ."

Operation Torch launched against North Africa from America (and the UK) November 8, 1942. _*That's a mere 11 months after Pearl Harbor. *_Things moved faster than you claim, my friend. 

MM


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## Shortround6 (Jun 18, 2011)

michaelmaltby said:


> Did any American Generals seek out and talk to Eagle Squadron pilots ...?
> 
> MM



I don't know but several accounts of aircraft say that the Americans regarded planes with out armor, bullet resistant windscreens and self sealing tanks as little more than trainers by the fall of 1940 so they must have been talking to somebody. 
733 P-47s Bs and Cs are on order in Sept of 1940.


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## michaelmaltby (Jun 18, 2011)

".... 733 P-47s Bs and Cs are on order in Sept of 1940." That's interesting and telling . The first P-47 flight wouldn't be until May, 1941 - so the USAAF was buying a pig in a poke (so to speak ).

Look - I know America was "winding up" - but the factory order books were full of production for _France_. Neutrality was _profitable_ for America - just as it was for Sweden .

Given events in 1917-18 - it was inevitable that America was going to war. Roosevelt knew that. Churchill knew that. The political question was "how to sell involvement in a war against Nazis Germany". Japan solved that problem for Mr. Roosevelt - _in spades_. 

MM


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## GrauGeist (Jun 18, 2011)

michaelmaltby said:


> @Ctian:
> 
> "... A country can’t just declare war and go to the offensive without men and machines.It would take a long time for the US to train men and build quality equipment since they were starting from scratch.This historically took a long time and in your scenario it would also hold back any US offensive action ."
> 
> ...


And to expand on that, the U.S. launched the first offensive action of the Pacific in August 1941: Guadalcanal (Midway _Et Al_ were defensive actions) and that was not only 8 months after Pearl, but on a second front...


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## ctrian (Jun 19, 2011)

michaelmaltby said:


> @Ctian:
> 
> "... A country can’t just declare war and go to the offensive without men and machines.It would take a long time for the US to train men and build quality equipment since they were starting from scratch.This historically took a long time and in your scenario it would also hold back any US offensive action ."
> 
> ...


 
Sept '39 - Nov '42 . Quite a lot of time passed before they could intervene...


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## ctrian (Jun 19, 2011)

GrauGeist said:


> And to expand on that, the U.S. launched the first offensive action of the Pacific in August 1941: Guadalcanal (Midway _Et Al_ were defensive actions) and that was not only 8 months after Pearl, but on a second front...


 
Why wouldn't they ? The US navy was one of the largest in the world before the war they didn't need to start from scratch.


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## GrauGeist (Jun 19, 2011)

ctrian said:


> Sept '39 - Nov '42 . Quite a lot of time passed before they could intervene...


The U.S. wasn't on a war-time footing until after the declaration of war with the Axis, 8 December 1941



ctrian said:


> Why wouldn't they ? The US navy was one of the largest in the world before the war they didn't need to start from scratch.


You might recall that the Pacific Fleet took a pretty hard hit on 7 December, 1941 and was pretty well matched by the IJN at the time of the assault on the Solomons...

The U.S. Navy lost 4 Battleships, 3 Cruisers, 2 Destroyers at Pearl Harbor as well as losing a Carrier (Lexington) and Destroyer during the battle of the Coral Sea. Add to that the loss of the Yorktown (and yet another destroyer) during the battle of Midway and you can see that U.S. Naval assets weren't as great as some folks might assume by late summer of 1941.


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## ctrian (Jun 19, 2011)

GrauGeist said:


> The U.S. wasn't on a war-time footing until after the declaration of war with the Axis, 8 December 1941
> 
> 
> You might recall that the Pacific Fleet took a pretty hard hit on 7 December, 1941 and was pretty well matched by the IJN at the time of the assault on the Solomons...
> ...


 
The US was already producing a lot of armaments by 1941 look up lend lease.Plus industrial investment was geared towards war production.It just took a long time to create a land army.
Losses in Pearl Harbor didn't include carriers that's why they won in Midway.


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## parsifal (Jun 19, 2011)

some issues about the Pacific. I see there being two possible entry points for the US, with some intersting implications to consider. The first would be in September '39 and the second might be June or July 1940.

In the case of a September '39 entry, compared to the IJN, the USN would enter the conflict with 5 fleet carriers, no fast Battleships, 15 unmodernized Dreadnoughts, 18 Heavy Cruisers, 7 modern Light Cruisers, and just 62 modern destroyers. Under those circumstances they would have been unable to release the excess four stackers until much later. 


The Japanese would have had 6 Carriers, 4 fast Battleships, 6 modernized Dreadnoughts, 14 Heavy cruisers, 18 Light cruisers (all old), 74 modern Destroyers. 

In the period 9/39-12/41, the US would have received as reinforcements 2 Carriers, 2 fast Battleships, 1 Heavy Cruiser, 4 Light Cruisers, 4 AA Cruisers, about 50 Destroyers and 12 Gato Class Subs (the only subs with the range to attack Japanese trade routes from Pearl). 

The Japanese would have received 4 carriers (and probably 6, with the Hiyo and Junyo conversions moved forward), 1 fast BB, 4 Heavy Cruisers, 3 small minelaying cruisers, 2 ex-chinese coastal cruisers, 14 Destroyers, 2 AA Destroyers. About 25 new subs would be added to their force pool. 

There is little that either side could do to speed up their naval reinforcements for the first two years. There will be vigorous debate about who would hold the advantage in the air. I personally think it would be the Japanese qualitatively. Quantitatively the US/Japan would receive 3086/4176 combat a/c in 1940, and 9790/4480. In 1942 when the US historically entered the war, the ratio of frontline combat aircraft received, was 26848/6685. The ratio of reinforcement is much closer in 1939-41 than it was in 1942. 

There are a number of factors that will upset the rate at which the Pacific can be reinforced. With no transfer of Four Pipers to britiain, shipping losses in 1940 will be much heavier, so logistics in the Pacific will be much harder. Moreover there are no viable escorts (no DEs) under development, and no escort carriers. This will mean a greater proportion of US carriers and Destroyers will have to be retained in the ETO.

There will be no Pearl Harbour, but I wonder if this might not be a liability. The Americans will immediately implement their war plan orange, with their battlefleet steaming out from San Diego at their best speed of just 17 knots. At anything less than 21 knots, and with thinned out ASW defences, Japanese Fleet subs will be much more effective. Japanese MS losses will be modest at best, which may well allow them to increase their warship and aircrafdt production. The chances of a Midway are more remote, because the US does not yet have access to the Japanese military codes. Ther is no radar advantage for the US surface navy, and the US ground forces are negligible and likley to expand only slowly for at least a year.

Its all very sobering.....I am not yet convinced that an early entry would have been the best way for the allies....


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## michaelmaltby (Jun 19, 2011)

Very thoughtful, Parsifal. Useful analysis. Personally, I don't think the Japanese were in any mind-set for war in September, 1939. Nomonhan (Kulgin Gol) was 'resolved' just in time for Molotov-Ribbentrop to be signed then implemented in Poland and the Baltics, starting September 1939. And with that, Japan's expansionist dream of "resources in Siberia" ended, turning their focus to Plan B - Malaysian oil, rubber, ores from Australia, etc, etc. 

Is US-Japan war _automatic _- in your view, Parsifal - if the US moves against Hitler after the Fall of France (June, 1940) ...? Curious. 

MM


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## parsifal (Jun 19, 2011)

The more time that passes, the more the balance tips against the japanese. There were good reasons why the US was reluctant to go to war....mostly they wanted time to mobolize their industry....your point about not gaining expereince is well taken, and if at war they would mobolize more quickly, but then, losses would have been heavier as well.

I will give this issue a bit more thought I think....


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## davebender (Jun 20, 2011)

US National Guard units on 16 September, 1940


> In the U.S., the first call up of National Guard units occurs today, Monday, 16 September 1940. Inducted into Federal service are 4 divisions, 12 brigades, 50 regiments and 4 observation squadrons from 26 states. These units, sorted by state, are listed below along with the unit's headquarters location.



The U.S. Army had over a year to conduct post-mobilization training prior to December 1941. Unfortunately it appears most of that time was wasted.

IJA 48th Infantry Division was raised from scratch (on Formosa) during 1940. Despite being green as grass this Japanese Army division sliced through more experienced U.S. Army units on Luzon during December 1941. That's the difference good training makes.

More training time won't make any difference for the WWII era U.S. Army. Unfortunately we needed some serious battlefield defeats to force changes in leadership, operational doctrine and training methods.


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## michaelmaltby (Jun 20, 2011)

Interesting analysis, davebender 

".... we needed some serious battlefield defeats to force changes in leadership, operational doctrine and training methods."

The earlier one learns the hard lessons the easier it becomes to avoid the large mistakes. 

MM


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## Freebird (Jun 20, 2011)

michaelmaltby said:


> I suggest that if the US had been active (no later than) the fall of France, the US would have learned some valuable lessons that would have saved US lives and shortened the war in Europe:



Absolutely disagree. 
Not to mention the fact that FDR couldn't just drag the US into war, if he had he would likely have lost the 1940 election.

Look what happened when the US *did* actually go to war. 

1.) They were unable to provide any significant ground forces until Torch.
2.) By the fall of '42 they had basically one carrier left in the PTO (Enterprise vs Japan) and had to ask the British to lend them one. 
3.) In Dec 1941 there was a shortage of aircraft, trained pilots they had no MBT's
4.) Despite the oppertunity to "_learn some valuable lessons"_ about ASW defence of the US or prepare for war in the PTO, they were sadly lacking.

The US *needed* the extra time in 1940 1941.

A.) With the introduction of Selective Service in Sept 1940, began the draft of hundreds of thousands of soldiers, sailors airmen that would equip US divisions by mid-42 later.
B.) The huge influx of British aircraft orders gave a tremendous boost to the US aircraft industry, as well as battlefront data about modern warfare. This allowed the US to ramp up production in 41-42 without a long build up.
C.) The US's naval building program was given time to build up as well. 11 "Essex" class were ordered Feb-Sept 1940, the first was commissioned in Dec 1942. Without the 18 months lead up to war while the USN was building they would run out of replacement ships long before new ones were available.


Not to mention that an earlier entry into war would likely be worse for Britain.


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## davebender (Jun 20, 2011)

Unfortunately were were still making a lot of dumb mistakes right up through the 1944 Anzio invasion. During 1950 (in Korea) our army was performing as almost as poorly as it did during December 1941.

So I wouldn't hold my breath hoping to improve the U.S. Army in time for WWII.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 20, 2011)

AS far as US aviation goes Here is FDRs speech of May 16 1940.

FDR

Asking for an Appropriation of 896 million dollars to gear up for defense just 6 days after the Germans attack France and a full Month before the French ask for terms does not sound like they the US was sitting around for the next year and half.


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## michaelmaltby (Jun 20, 2011)

Good FDR post. Thanks.

MM


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## michaelmaltby (Jun 20, 2011)

".... an earlier entry into war would likely be worse for Britain."

Expand on this a bit, please, Freebird. 

MM


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## parsifal (Jun 21, 2011)

davebender said:


> US National Guard units on 16 September, 1940
> 
> 
> The U.S. Army had over a year to conduct post-mobilization training prior to December 1941. Unfortunately it appears most of that time was wasted.
> ...


 

What!!!!!!! You need to do some serious research I would suggest. The 48th Division was indeed raised in 1940, but with 2/3 of its personnell coming from units that had seen at least 6 years arduous service in China. It did have some local levies, but these were spliced onto battle hardened veterans with a wealth of experience.

Moreover, they were not pitted against US Army to any significant extent. The army they facxed in the PI was the filipino army, mostly raised in 1941. The only US unit that I know of in the PI campaign was the Phillipine Scouts, and they were never defeated directly by 48 Div


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## davebender (Jun 21, 2011)

What's so unusual about that method? That's the way most military forces create new units. Including the Philippine Army. New recruits received 22 weeks of initial entry training - comparable to the modern day American Army. Most officers were ROTC graduates - also comparable to the modern day American Army. These new officers and recruits were spliced onto veterans of the U.S. Army and Philippine Constabulary.

IJA 48th Infantry Division was created in a similiar manner. However Japanese Army training was far superior to 1940 American Army training.


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## parsifal (Jun 21, 2011)

Your right about the similarity in unit creation, but the differences from there are fundamental. Your initial post, and it continues here, is that the unit was a green unit, officered by green units, with green recruits. on every count these are wrong assumptions. Even the unit I thought was a new levy turns out to have had experience in China. This was the 1st Formosan Infantry Regt. Every other unit, from the cooks and cleaners, to the CO were seasoned veterans with years of combat experience. The officers were, in the majority experienced career soldiers, and not raw recruits out of ROTC.

The Japanese Army went to war in 1937 with 41 divs. These were all the old square Divs, or "A" series in the Japanese system. Between 1937 and 1941 they raised a further 15 divs but these were mostly comb outs of existing formations, as the army divs were triangularized and armoured divs were begun to be formed. They did raise new formations, but these hardly ever were attached to new Divs. Mostly they were formed into Independant Brigades, with fairly junior and inexperienced officers in command. They were given basic training, then sent to quiet sectors of either the China Expeditionary army or the Manchurian army area. They were often given anti-partisan and occupation duties for some years, before being committed to frontline combat operations.

Between 1942 and 1945 the Japanese raised another 63 divisions, of which 12 were mobilzation division raised from existing trained manpower and reserve officers. That meant they raiseed another 51 or so divisions, with the cadres for these coming from existing non-divisional assets, mostly the Ind Inf Bdes. 

By comparison the US started the war with just 8 Divs, all of them at cadre strength. The US had no recent combat experience, moreover every Division they raised was a green unit. They simply lacked the combat base to build their army effectively. Training was good however, and their recruit material was far better educated and thus easier to train in most respects. Every time they worked up a division or regiment to operational status, they would have to break it up and use it for cadres. This explains why it took them nearly two years to buidl their army to full strength. However, the expansion of the US army was several orders of magnitude greater than the japanese. In the same time as the Japanese raised 50 Divs from a starting base of 64 divs, with an existing cadre separate to that divisional base to work with, the US built close to 100 Divs, with no real cadre to work with. 

The Filipino army was not created that way. There was no way to build a cadre system, so units wholesale were given basic training by the US contingent, some small arms of questionable value and little or no artillery. AFAIK there were no MGs no armour and no AA. They were little better than a bunch of tribesman with rifles. Doesnt mean they didnt fight hard, and at times effectively, but they were in no way comparable to either the US regulars stationed in the PI, or the Japanese 48th Div that attacked them


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## hawkeye2an (Jun 26, 2011)

One HUGE item no-one has brought up is the tremendous effect of 'remember Pearl Harbor'. We were attacked and that galvanized the nation. If we would have entered the war earlier, I don't believe we would have been able to focus almost EVERYONE the way that attack did. The U.S. had never been more focused on a single objective and needless to say, will never be again.


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## michaelmaltby (Jun 26, 2011)

"..... We were attacked and that galvanized the nation"

This point cannot be underestimated. But the American propaganda machine was very persuasive  Hollywood. There was no PH in 1917 but when America decided to enter WW1 - they got rolling big time. And industrially, it had been good for them since August, 1914.

MM


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## hawkeye2an (Jun 26, 2011)

When somebody TELLS me I should be kicking someones ass I hesitate. When someone kicks my ass I KNOW what to do. This is about as American as it gets. Propaganda is powerful, I don't believe it is as powerful as REALITY.


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## hawkeye2an (Jun 26, 2011)

michaelmaltby said:


> industrially, it had been good for them since August, 1914.
> 
> MM


What industry are you talking about? I'm not familiar with all production for WWI but not one American fighter aircraft saw action and only the British designed DH-4 light bomber with an American engine did see action.


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## michaelmaltby (Jun 27, 2011)

".... What industry are you talking about? I'm not familiar with all production for WWI but not one American fighter aircraft saw action and only the British designed DH-4 light bomber with an American engine did see action."

Perhaps I should have said "economically ... it had been good since 1914" I wasn't thinking of fighter planes or such - but just about everything America produced from pork bellies, to steel. 

MM


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## Mustang nut (Jun 27, 2011)

If the USA had entered the war in 1940 maybe Adolf would be dissuaded from attacking France and Russia but then Stalin may have over run Europe in 1942


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## michaelmaltby (Jun 27, 2011)

"..... If the USA had entered the war in 1940 maybe Adolf would be dissuaded from attacking France and Russia but then Stalin may have over run Europe in 1942."

.... or some such scenario. 

If the US _had _entered in 1940 - the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact and "division" of Poland and the Baltic Republics was already in place. 

Hitler knew that the ultimate economic challenge for Nazi Germany was the USA - and to overcome the USA he needed the resources of Eastern Europe. 

Stalin knew that the ultimate economic challenge for the USSR was the USA - and for Communism to triumph over Capitalism(militarily) he needed the technology, discipline and industry of Germany. It was only a matter of time before Hitler and Stalin went "at it". 

Had Russia attacked Germany in 1942 I doubt that the west would have intervened. 

MM


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## Mustang nut (Jun 27, 2011)

michaelmaltby said:


> Stalin knew that the ultimate economic challenge for the USSR was the USA - and for Communism to triumph over Capitalism(militarily) he needed the technology, discipline and industry of Germany. It was only a matter of time before Hitler and Stalin went "at it".
> 
> Had Russia attacked Germany in 1942 I doubt that the west would have intervened.
> 
> MM


 
I agree entirely, but Stalin being Stalin I doubt he would have stopped until his soldiers were paddling in the Atlantic and Mediterranean


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## buffnut453 (Jun 28, 2011)

hawkeye2an said:


> What industry are you talking about? I'm not familiar with all production for WWI but not one American fighter aircraft saw action and only the British designed DH-4 light bomber with an American engine did see action.



That's because America wasn't making combat aircraft, not that could compete with the front-line types being produced in France and Britain. It was simply easier to use aircraft "borrowed" from the Allies. 

America did produce huge amounts of munitions that kept the artillery booming and machine guns rattling throughout WWI - I think that's what was being referred to.


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## michaelmaltby (Jun 28, 2011)

"... America did produce huge amounts of munitions that kept the artillery booming and machine guns rattling throughout WWI - I think that's what was being referred to." 

Exactly. And lots of FWD trucks.

Thanks.



M


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## Smokey Stover (May 6, 2018)

I find it rather amusing how Americans argue about ww2 when infact it was US businesses and patriots that funded the Nazi's in the first place. Where does everyone think Germany got all the money and material to build a huge arsenal in the first place had it not been for people like the anti-semitic Henry Ford and Standard Oil who were very cosy with IG Farben. The interest of the Rockefeller family were identical with the interest of Deutsche Bank. And after WW1, their shares of the „Turkish Petroleum Company“ were transferred as „enemy property“ to France. For many years, the Deutsche Bank tried to litigate against this expropriation, but finally they realized that there wouldn’t be any chance on the legal front. There is strong evidence to suggest that approximately in 1927, Deutsche Bank and Standard Oil made a secret pact aimed at bringing Hitler to power in order to conquer the Oil of Baku. Standard Oil promised to supply the fuel. While the European powers wanted to avoid growth of German industry after WW1, US invested huge sums in Germany and never ratified the Versailles Treaty. They sold German bonds in the US financial market. One of the most important was the"Union Banking Corporation" of George H. Walker. He named his son-in-law, Prescott Bush, grandfather of US president George W. Bush, director of the firm. And he made great business with the Germans, before and after 1933. In the board of his „Walkers American Shipping and Commerce Company“ with its Hamburg-America Line was Emil Helfferich, member of „Freundeskreis Reichsführer- SS“ and until end of WW2 President of Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft, later ESSO, and Vacuum Oil Company in Hamburg. As for Churchill (who was half american and broke just before he became leader/how convenient) There is so much irony and bs surrounding ww2 it's not even funny.

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## Freebird (May 7, 2018)

michaelmaltby said:


> ".... an earlier entry into war would likely be worse for Britain."
> 
> Expand on this a bit, please, Freebird.
> 
> MM



In early 1941 the US agreed to help the Allies via Lend Lease, but as they were still technically neutral the. U-boats couldn't attack in U.S. waters, including British ships. Once the US joined the war the "free ride" was over, and both us & Allied ships suffered tremendous losses. In 1940 & 1941 the U.S. doesn't have much in the way of troops or squadrons ready to deploy in combat, so joining the war earlier just exposes Allied shipping to more losses.

(Sorry for the 6+ year delay in my response)

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## buffnut453 (May 7, 2018)

freebird said:


> (Sorry for the 6+ year delay in my response)



At least you've had time to think about it!

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