# Airwar over France with no Operation Torch, instead 1943 invasion of France



## wiking85 (Dec 4, 2015)

What would a force on force airwar over France in 1943 look like had there been no Operation Torch and therefore Tunisian/Sicily/Italy campaign, but instead the US and UK saving up forces to invade France in 1943 like in Operation Roundup?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Roundup_(1942)

Let's say for the sake of argument that invasion comes in June 1943 in the area of the historical Normandy landings to draw off German forces before Kursk. What does the air campaign look like then if the pull a Transport Plan before doing major bombing of Germany? 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Plan

They put all the airpower they used in Tunisia/Sicily/Italy in 1942-43 instead into Britain to be used over France, while the ground units all end up in Britain to be used in the invasion. Likewise Germany doesn't use/lose all the air units that it lose in 1942-43 in the Mediterranean. For the sake of argument let's say the North African Campaign basically ends with the Axis armies being run out of Africa in Spring 1943 by Monty and the 8th army, but then without an invasion of Sicily. Vichy is respected by both sides so far, so Algeria is not invaded by Monty and the 8th, Germany hasn't yet occupied Vichy France. 

IIRC that means about 2000 or more Luftwaffe aircraft aren't lost, including over 1000 fighters. Italy is still in the war and there is a standoff in the Mediterranean. 

How does fighting in France develop then in June 1943? I'm assuming Kursk then is impossible and the fighters transferred from the West for the offensive aren't, same with the SS Panzer divisions, meaning the Soviet launch their own offensive in the East after the Allied landings in Normandy.


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## wiking85 (Dec 4, 2015)

To add a bit to the OP the P-47 had just entered operation service in June 1943:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_P-47_Thunderbolt#US_service
In Tunisia and Sicily the Axis fighters were heavily worn down due to poor supply, which was not a problem in France. Also there was much greater balance for the Allies and Luftwaffe in aircraft numbers in 1943:
The Defeat of the German Air Force


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## davebender (Dec 4, 2015)

Historical German Government was terribly worried about Anglo-American invasion of Italy. They would be far more worried about a 1943 invasion of France. You can count on Kursk offensive being cancelled. Cream of the Heer and Luftwaffe would be in France instead.


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## wiking85 (Dec 4, 2015)

davebender said:


> Historical German Government was terribly worried about Anglo-American invasion of Italy. They would be far more worried about a 1943 invasion of France. You can count on Kursk offensive being cancelled. Cream of the Heer and Luftwaffe would be in France instead.



Right, so without the historical air losses/commitments of 1942-43 in the Mediterranean what does that mean for the fight in France in mid-1943? I'm assuming that more air units stay in the East in the winter of 1942-43 and do damage to the Soviets, but don't fundamentally change the outcome for the 6th army or the end lines come Spring 1943.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 4, 2015)

Hmm - Spitfire VIIIs and P-38s to escort the bombers to the Ruhr? 

Also: with cream of the LW and Heer rushed West instead of East - who is there to defend against the Red Tide?


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## wiking85 (Dec 4, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> Hmm - Spitfire VIIIs and P-38s to escort the bombers to the Ruhr?
> 
> Also: with cream of the LW and Heer rushed West instead of East - who is there to defend against the Red Tide?



The historical forces available in June 1943 would probably remain unchanged, its just that the June/July reinforcement of IIRC 4 gruppe of fighters wouldn't happen in this scenario. The 5th Panzer army is not lost in Tunisia and the forces used in Sicily in July are being in France instead. So added together they are a significant force along with what was already there in late 1942; perhaps the SS Panzer Corps are brought back west after the fighting in the East in winter 1943 and the paratroopers of the Ramcke brigade are not lost in Africa so are available for the fighting in France. That would leave a formidable ground force in the West in 1943 assuming the remnants of the Afrika Korps are rebuilding in Sicily after being ejected from Libya in Spring 1943.

Edit:
Did the Spitfire VIII have the range to escort past France? And didn't the P-38 get slaughtered as an escort? Plus wouldn't bombing in Germany be called off to make sure all bombers and fighters are available to support the invasion?


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## tomo pauk (Dec 4, 2015)

Even without Torch, the Germans will suffer a good deal of losses in N.Africa (as will the British, of course), both in ground assets as well as in aircraft. They have the option to send less forces there thsn historically (it makes things worse in Tunisia), or try to send morem as much as their questionable logistics allow, in hope of reversal. 
The situation for the 6th Army is set in stone, unless the Soviets don't make some big mistakes in the winter of 1942/43.

The Spitfire VIII have had a radius of 350+ miles; range with 90 gal drop tank was almost 1200 miles, with internal fuel used for warm-up, taxying, tanke off and climb to 20000 ft (distance covered is not in that range 24.5 IMP gals used for that). Eg. 300 miles is from East Anglia to Cologne. 



> And didn't the P-38 get slaughtered as an escort?



No.



> Plus wouldn't bombing in Germany be called off to make sure all bombers and fighters are available to support the invasion?



No, around the clock bombing keeps LW (both fighters and Flak) being spread thin. Let's recall that Anglo-Americans will be deploying better part of the two air forces, vs. less than half of Luftwaffe, even with changes you suggested. Invasion will be supported by tactical air, indeed switching early to the 'Transport plan' would really harm the Germans most.


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## wiking85 (Dec 4, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> Even without Torch, the Germans will suffer a good deal of losses in N.Africa (as will the British, of course), both in ground assets as well as in aircraft. They have the option to send less forces there thsn historically (it makes things worse in Tunisia), or try to send morem as much as their questionable logistics allow, in hope of reversal.
> The situation for the 6th Army is set in stone, unless the Soviets don't make some big mistakes in the winter of 1942/43.
> 
> The Spitfire VIII have had a radius of 350+ miles; range with 90 gal drop tank was almost 1200 miles, with internal fuel used for warm-up, taxying, tanke off and climb to 20000 ft (distance covered is not in that range 24.5 IMP gals used for that). Eg. 300 miles is from East Anglia to Cologne.


Why wasn't it used as an escort historically then? Also 350 miles is in a straight line without leaving room for combat fuel.

Assuming the German don't reinforce in Africa because of the threat of a 1943 invasion and allow that to play out the losses won't really matter, because whatever is there gets hurt and survivors that evacuate don't really have to worry about a British invasion. So the Afrika Korps and whatever Italians get out spend 1943 rebuilding in Sicily, while Luftflotte 2 without the late 1942 reinforcements is hurt, but still a force capable of defense in Sicily. 




tomo pauk said:


> No.


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_P-38_Lightning#European_theater
It was a decent fighter-bomber, but in fighter combat it didn't seem particularly distinguished compared to the P-47 or -51.




tomo pauk said:


> No, around the clock bombing keeps LW (both fighters and Flak) being spread thin. Let's recall that Anglo-Americans will be deploying better part of the two air forces, vs. less than half of Luftwaffe, even with changes you suggested. Invasion will be supported by tactical air, indeed switching early to the 'Transport plan' would really harm the Germans most.


I don't think the Allies had the numbers for that in mid-1943. Plus historically in 1944 when they had a lot more aircraft in Britain and less opposition in France due to LW losses in the Mediterranean and commitments in Italy plus early 1944 losses they called off major bombing of Germany to focus on the Transport Plan and bombing of the V-1 sites. The Transport Plan included a lot of bombing by heavy strategic bombers of France.


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## syscom3 (Dec 4, 2015)

The allies did not have the logistical capabilities at that time to invade France, then actually advance from the beaches. The U-Boats were still a menace that had to wiped out. And until the Allies had air supremacy, then nothing was going to happen. Those were historical facts that SHAEF dealt with. And why a 1943 front was abandoned.

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## tomo pauk (Dec 4, 2015)

wiking85 said:


> Why wasn't it used as an escort historically then? Also 350 miles is in a straight line without leaving room for combat fuel.



See it for your self and draw conclusions: http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spitfirehfviii-ads.jpg.
The Spit VIII was not the USAF aircraft, bar token number, the heavies were to look after them per current doctrine. The USAF even used A-36s to escort the B-25s in the MTO, such was the disparity with what was needed and what was available.



> Assuming the German don't reinforce in Africa because of the threat of a 1943 invasion and allow that to play out the losses won't really matter, because whatever is there gets hurt and survivors that evacuate don't really have to worry about a British invasion. So the Afrika Korps and whatever Italians get out spend 1943 rebuilding in Sicily, while Luftflotte 2 without the late 1942 reinforcements is hurt, but still a force capable of defense in Sicily.



Well, unless you toss in some numbers that will compare the 'land' opponents, anything said about this is wide from the mark.



> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_P-38_Lightning#European_theater
> It was a decent fighter-bomber, but in fighter combat it didn't seem particularly distinguished compared to the P-47 or -51.



In the best part of 1943, it is the only long rage fighter available to the USAF, so they will be used for long range work from the day one.



> I don't think the Allies had the numbers for that in mid-1943. Plus historically in 1944 when they had a lot more aircraft in Britain and less opposition in France due to LW losses in the Mediterranean and commitments in Italy plus early 1944 losses they called off major bombing of Germany to focus on the Transport Plan and bombing of the V-1 sites. The Transport Plan included a lot of bombing by heavy strategic bombers of France.



The RAF already outnumbered the LW in 1941, toss in the USAF and RAF assets that don't go into Maghreb and situation is clear to me. Transport Plan was a major bombing of German war effort.


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## wiking85 (Dec 4, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> See it for your self and draw conclusions: http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spitfirehfviii-ads.jpg.
> The Spit VIII was not the USAF aircraft, bar token number, the heavies were to look after them per current doctrine. The USAF even used A-36s to escort the B-25s in the MTO, such was the disparity with what was needed and what was available.


The A-36 was a P-51 with an Allison engine. So why would the Spit 8 be used to escort USAAF bombers in this scenario if they weren't historically? 



tomo pauk said:


> Well, unless you toss in some numbers that will compare the 'land' opponents, anything said about this is wide from the mark.


Not sure what you mean. 8th army vs. Italians and Germans in Africa being chased back to Tripoli and whatever is left of the Axis forces is evacuated to Sicily in early 1943. Then because transports are needed for France 8th army occupied Italian Libya and that front shuts down. Not sure what the air units were pre-late 1942 reinforcement by the Torch forces and Luftwaffe reinforcements. 



tomo pauk said:


> In the best part of 1943, it is the only long rage fighter available to the USAF, so they will be used for long range work from the day one.


Okay sure, but I'm not sure how well it would do.



tomo pauk said:


> The RAF already outnumbered the LW in 1941, toss in the USAF and RAF assets that don't go into Maghreb and situation is clear to me. Transport Plan was a major bombing of German war effort.


The Transport Plan was a 1944 plan to bomb French RRs:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Plan


> The Transportation Plan was a plan for strategic bombing during World War II against bridges, rail centres, including marshalling yards and repair shops in France with the goal of limiting the German military response to the invasion of France in June 1944.



What were RAF numbers in Britain in 1943? And what was used in Tunisia by the Allies?


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## Balljoint (Dec 4, 2015)

Had Hitler not expended his strength saving the Italian bacon in the Med he would potentially have a much stronger position in France. However, since his critical oil supply was in the Soviet front these resources would have probably been lost on the Soviet front, perhaps even taking Stalingrad with much greater losses. The oil Germany needed was in the east and this was likely Hitler’s driving objective.

Still, I don’t think a 1943 invasion of France would succeed since the inadequate German forces of 1944 would have been sufficient to throw back what the Allies could muster during 1943. The LW fighters that savaged unescorted U.S. bombers during 1943 would have been a strong force over France opposing an invasion. Among other losses, the first six months of 1944 saw U.S. long range escorts –allowed to leave the bombers and hunt LW fighters- gain air superiority over France. 1943 would have been a whole different story IMHO.


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## Milosh (Dec 4, 2015)

There was only JG2 and JG26 in the West.


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## davebender (Dec 4, 2015)

An interesting POD all by itself. 

North Africa employed roughly half of the Luftwaffe air transport capacity at a time when it was desperately needed in Southern Russia. Mediterranean also employed a considerable number of badly needed Ju-87 and Ju-88 dive bombers.


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## davebender (Dec 4, 2015)

Historical Germany did seize Stalingrad for all practical purposes. Problem is holding it against Soviet Uranus counter attack.


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## wiking85 (Dec 4, 2015)

davebender said:


> Historical Germany did seize Stalingrad for all practical purposes. Problem is holding it against Soviet Uranus counter attack.


Perhaps then does the extra airpower and no Mediterranean commitment mean that Stalingrad can be salvaged long enough to pull back 6th army or at least break the encirclement? Perhaps much of the extra German bombers get burned up in the effort against Uranus and Saturn?



Milosh said:


> There was only JG2 and JG26 in the West.


Historically yes, but without the Tunisian/Sicily/Italy campaign much of that airpower is used in France instead. IIRC something like 900 Luftwaffe fighters were lost just in Tunisia. Some of that of course would be still lost in this scenario fighting alongside the Afrika Korps as it pulls back from Egypt all the way to Tripoli, but the majority of it was AFAIK sent into Tunisia rather than being their pre-Torch.


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## gjs238 (Dec 4, 2015)

Wouldn't it be more efficient for the Western Allies to invade from the East, via land, than mount a seaborne invasion like Overlord?


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## tyrodtom (Dec 4, 2015)

I don't think the allies could have successfully invaded Europe without the knowledge that they gained from the previous amphibious operations.

Operation Torch, then the invasion of Sicily, then mainland Italy, each increasingly opposed, each with problems they learned from.

They would have had a pretty steep learning curve if they'd took on mainland Europe first.

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## GrauGeist (Dec 5, 2015)

gjs238 said:


> Wouldn't it be more efficient for the Western Allies to invade from the East, via land, than mount a seaborne invasion like Overlord?


If you look at how Germany was being pulled in all directions, you see that the multiple fronts weakened Germany by drawing their resources too thin.

If Germany had it's assets consolidated on a single front, they would be far more formidable than you could imagine.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 5, 2015)

People have put out the need to tame the U-boats prior the invasion. We can recall that Allies have launched a 3-prong invasion of N. Africa despite the still fluid situation in Atlantic. Plus invaded Sicily and Italy in 1943, obviously US supplies need to go over Atlantic in any case. Having at least half of France under Allied control in late 1943 basically expells the U-boats from Lorient and other bases.



wiking85 said:


> The A-36 was a P-51 with an Allison engine. So why would the Spit 8 be used to escort USAAF bombers in this scenario if they weren't historically?


 
Less need for the Spitfire VIII in the MTO leaves them more for the ETO. Considering that RAF already provided the initial cover for the 8th AF bombers in 1943 (and already in 1942), using the VIII instead the IX seems logical to me.



> Not sure what you mean. 8th army vs. Italians and Germans in Africa being chased back to Tripoli and whatever is left of the Axis forces is evacuated to Sicily in early 1943. Then because transports are needed for France 8th army occupied Italian Libya and that front shuts down. Not sure what the air units were pre-late 1942 reinforcement by the Torch forces and Luftwaffe reinforcements.



I mean how many ground units, with their tanks, arillery, manpower etc. each beligerent can muster in both sides of La Manche before the invasion and immediately after.



> The Transport Plan was a 1944 plan to bomb French RRs:
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Plan



Not just French, attack at Hamm, Germany was conducted by 800 8th AF bombers. Obviously, the USAF will muster less bombers in early 1943.



> What were RAF numbers in Britain in 1943? And what was used in Tunisia by the Allies?



Here is the account of RAF, and partly USAF assets in the MTO (among other things) in 1941-43: link. Please note that RAF nomenclature was roughly Group > Wing > Squadron, while in USAF it was Wing > Group > Squadron, basic Squadron being 16 aircraft in the time, with USAF planning to make a 25 aircraft fighter squadron. This table is of interest: link


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## wiking85 (Dec 5, 2015)

As far as I can tell the Allies had over 3000 total aircraft for the Tunisian campaign, maybe more. By the end of it they had some 2500 operational according to Ellis in "Brute Force". 
Meanwhile the Germans alone lost some 2400 aircraft in 6 months (having only a few hundred operational at any one time):
Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-1945


> The impact of the Tunisian campaign on the Luftwaffe far outweighed whatever strategic advantage the Germans gained in closing the Mediterranean for six more months. In the period between November 1942 and May 1943, the Germans lost 2,422 aircraft in the Mediterranean theater (40.5 percent of their total force structure as of November 10, 1942). Table XXXII89 gives the Mediterranean losses in terms of major aircraft types during the period and suggests their significance for the Luftwaffe.
> 
> What makes such losses so appalling is the fact that Luftwaffe strength in the Mediterranean varied from 200 to 300 fighters and from 200 to 300 bombers throughout the period.90 Thus, combat wastage was well over 200 percent of unit strength. Admittedly, some losses were unavoidable. Nevertheless, the impression left by the North African debacle is that had the Germans cut their losses at Libya, they could have defended Sicily with ground forces deployed to Tunisia. In the air, the Luftwaffe could have used the strategy it had waged so successfully in western Europe over the past year and a half: fighting only on its own terms or for a decisive strategic object. However, the commitment to Tunisia placed the Luftwaffe in a position where it had to fight at great disadvantage with a resulting high rate of attrition.
> 
> At the end of June, air operations in the Mediterranean heated up. The Germans launched a number of bomber and fighter bomber sorties against Allied shipping. In addition, they attempted to neutralize the air forces building up on Malta and Pantelleria; such efforts required strong fighter support. Facing numerical superiority, German fighters had difficulty in fending off enemy fighters much less protecting bombers and fighter bombers. The air struggle soon turned into a battle for air superiority over Sicily and Sardinia.97 By the start of Operation "Husky" on July 10, the Allies had achieved general air superiority over the island. German fighters had trouble protecting their own airfields from high and low level attack. Sorties against the invasion achieved little and suffered exorbitant losses. Within a week, much of the Luftwaffe had withdrawn to the mainland and used Sicilian bases only as forward operating areas.98 Losses for the month were heavy. In July, the Luftwaffe lost 711 aircraft (10 percent of the German air force at the end of June) of which 246 were fighters (13.3 percent of all fighters) and 237 bombers (14.4 percent of all bombers). In August, Allied air forces, now operating from Sicily, pounded southern Italy and inflicted a further 321 losses.99 At this point, reinforcements and resupply to units in Italy dried up, while a number of squadrons (with total complement of 210 aircraft) withdrew from Italy after a severe mauling over Sicily. Only one unit returned to the Mediterranean; the rest remained at home to help defend the Reich.100



According to Ellis again for Sicily the Allies mustered 3462 aircraft and the Axis 1750 of which half were German and serviceability was low. The Allies had better supply and spare parts stocks, plus greater numbers of airbases, while in Sicily the Axis was confined to a few dozen that were constantly attacked. The Axis had low serviceability due to losing so many aircraft and supplies in Tunisia and on route, so they were operating with leftovers by July, especially as many had to be retained to defend Germany and then fight at Kursk, both of which had priority in June-July over Sicily.


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## davebender (Dec 5, 2015)

Extra airpower would help but attaching historical Afrika Korps to German Army Group B as mobile reserve would help a lot more. Indeed, that powerful force (2 x armored divisions. 2 x motorized infantry divisions.) is likely to convert Soviet Uranus offensive into a German victory on a scale similar to Mars offensive. 

Late 1942 Soviet defeat on such a scale dovetails nicely with this scenario as historical USA did have contingency plans for early invasion of France in order to save Soviet Union from outright defeat.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 5, 2015)

The 'powerful force' would not go intact in the Stalingrad area, but will slug it out along with other German units, suffering losses in process. For any extra train of something that goes to Stalingrad area, one less train of something else will not get there. So we'd have more German units in the area, that have less supplies per unit - that ain't end up well for the Axis forces, that have dangerously over-extended supply lines.


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## wiking85 (Dec 5, 2015)

davebender said:


> Extra airpower would help but attaching historical Afrika Korps to German Army Group B as mobile reserve would help a lot more. Indeed, that powerful force (2 x armored divisions. 2 x motorized infantry divisions.) is likely to convert Soviet Uranus offensive into a German victory on a scale similar to Mars offensive.
> 
> Late 1942 Soviet defeat on such a scale dovetails nicely with this scenario as historical USA did have contingency plans for early invasion of France in order to save Soviet Union from outright defeat.


The Afrika Korps is more than a bit busy in Africa at the time, so that's not an option. 5th Panzerarmee is stuck in France if its not in Tunisia. So really there isn't much of a force that could be put into the East other than perhaps some paras and extra airpower/transport capacity. For the sake of argument let's say Stalingrad's outcome doesn't change, the extra airpower batters the Soviets worse, but doesn't change the outcome or course of events as far as 3rd Kharkov. So the Kursk bulge still happens, but no there is no Kursk offensive plan due to fears of an Allied invasion in France in summer.


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## wiking85 (Dec 5, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> I mean how many ground units, with their tanks, arillery, manpower etc. each beligerent can muster in both sides of La Manche before the invasion and immediately after.


Not sure raw numbers, but in terms of Allied armies its the British 1st army and the American 5th and 7th armies.

The Germans would have the forces used in Sicily, the 5th Panzer army, and the forces used to defend Italy historically (10th and 14th armies), plus whatever is in France in 1943 (not sure). The SS Panzer corps might well end up in the west rather than in the East, leaving German forces there to deal with whatever the Soviets throw at them without that powerful force.

I'm not sure what the French would do, probably get operation antoned and have the British 8th army occupy Algeria and raise Free French troops and eventually get ready for an invasion of Sicily or Sardinia in 1944. Or perhaps even an Operation Anvil once the landings in Normandy suck in German reserves.


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## davebender (Dec 5, 2015)

That's unrealistic as Army Group B was desperate for additional armor and motorized infantry. One of the first German Tiger tank battalions is not going to sit idle in France while T-34s more numerous then sand on the seashore steamroll Romanian light tanks.

A more likely option is for the fresh 5th Panzerarmee to be sent east. This allows gutted out east front units such as 14th and 24th Panzer Korps to reconstitute in France.


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## GrauGeist (Dec 5, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> So we'd have more German units in the area, that have less supplies per unit - that ain't end up well for the Axis forces, that have dangerously over-extended supply lines.


Tomo, wouldn't it be right to assume that since the North African assets have been deployed on the Ost front, that the support and supply infrastructure would come with it?

Also, a large number of Ju52, Me323 and other supply transports were lost over the Med historically. These aircraft would have been a tremendous boost to moving supplies along the east.

The same can be said for ground vehicles, personnel and tons of equipment supplies that were lost in the African campaign.


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## wiking85 (Dec 5, 2015)

davebender said:


> That's unrealistic as Army Group B was desperate for additional armor and motorized infantry. One of the first German Tiger tank battalions is not going to sit idle in France while T-34s more numerous then sand on the seashore steamroll Romanian light tanks.
> 
> A more likely option is for the fresh 5th Panzerarmee to be sent east. This allows gutted out east front units such as 14th and 24th Panzer Korps to reconstitute in France.



What? At the time of Stalingrad 2nd El Alamein is going on, there was no way the Afrika Korps was available. 5th Panzer army wasn't ready for deployment really, they were rushed into combat from France out of desperation; HG Panzer division wasn't even formed yet and arrived in pieces. Perhaps 10th Panzer division would be rushed East, but that was all that was potentially available if the Germans don't mind risking thinning out France when the Allies still might invade in 1942.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 5, 2015)

GrauGeist said:


> Tomo, wouldn't it be right to assume that since the North African assets have been deployed on the Ost front, that the support and supply infrastructure would come with it?
> 
> Also, a large number of Ju52, Me323 and other supply transports were lost over the Med historically. These aircraft would have been a tremendous boost to moving supplies along the east.
> 
> The same can be said for ground vehicles, personnel and tons of equipment supplies that were lost in the African campaign.



My point is that railroad capacity in the captured part of the USSR was incapable to sustain the German war effort of such magnitude over such a distance. North Africa didn't put any strain on railroads there (close to non-existant), so there is nothing of that to be relocated East. The aircraft and trucks will help a bit, despite the shortcomings - aircraft unfit to move large weights of war material, while the trucks were not heavy duty types, suitable for moving in rasputitsa or in snow. Bad weather also curtails the cargo aircraft operations, much more the issue in SU than in N. Africa. Plus - the cargo shipped by truck, let alone by aircraft puts another strain on German gasoline supply.


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## davebender (Dec 5, 2015)

Don't be so sure. Historical British 8th Army received priority for USA produced tanks, especially Sherman tanks. This was based on the assumption USA would not be invading France anytime soon. 

Anglo-American invasion of French North Africa forced Germany to occupy Vichy France and Tunisia. It also pressured Portugal and Spain to align against Germany and Mussolini to lose political support in Italy.

Cancelling Operation Torch and implementing early invasion of metropolitan France will force a multitude of changes resulting in a very different WWII. Suggesting that nothing changes in the overall German war effort just won't work.


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## parsifal (Dec 5, 2015)

A nightmare scenario for the allies. 

In June 1943 there were 85 German divs in western Europe, mostly on various garrison duties. Without the invasion of TORCH the Italians will not be easily defeated, even with the loss of North Africa. This frees up close to 12 Divs in Italy, about the same number waiting on the borders of Vichy France, and about 6 divs in the Balkans to replace the Italian units providing garrison forces in the locality. In addition ther are about a dozen Italian Divs in France or along the French med coast, a PG and an Infantry Div in Sardinia and Corsica.

On the Allied side there are three armies, incompletely equipped, and lacking in any experience. 8th Army would need to remain in the Med to keep watch on the southern arm. A significant proportion of 1st Army, say half would need to remain uncommitted to provide a reaction force to protect Gibraltar, and react to either or both Vichy North African belligerency, and/or Spanish aggression.

In other words, far from gaining the initiative by an achievable goal, the allies allow the Axis to retain the initiative and hand them the opportunity to recover,pick up their ally from the flooring they had suffered.

For the Italians the breathing space is vital. They lost more than 800 a/c over Tunisia, and threw away more than a dozen divs in 1943 in Fr Nth Africa. In Sicily another 6 divs were lost.

At the time of her capitulation, the Italians were rebuilding two of their three armoured divs with new tanks about the equivalent of a sherman. They were introducing some formidable new a/c, the RE2005, G-55 among them.

For the Allies they have two US armies, incompletely trained and lacking a lot of equipment. They have about half a British Army. There are no solutions as yet to getting supplies across the beaches, no mulberries, and an assault lift capacity of about a Corps strength, three divs. In the OVERLORD planning the allies could count on a reduced rate of reinforcement to the front for their opponents , thanks to the efforts of IX AF and 2 TAF, but in 1943 neither of these formations were up to that task as yet. The Germans, who relied heavily on rail transport, could expect a much greater re-supply effort from their rail network, whilst the allies were saddled with a a resupply and reinforcement rate about 1/3 of that they historically enjoyed. 

A cross channel invasion in 1943 almost certainly would have been a complete failure for the allies, massively delaying them until 1946-47 at least. British manpower reserves were so low by them that any losses in frontline units was a permanent one. Wholesale front wide shut downs would have resulted, probably the shut down of Burma, and a general retreat from the Far East, as well as abandonment of the middle east except near the oil wells. 

There were good reasons for Churchills insistence that ROUND UP be abandoned, and he was absolutely right to do it.

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## GrauGeist (Dec 5, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> My point is that railroad capacity in the captured part of the USSR was incapable to sustain the German war effort of such magnitude over such a distance. North Africa didn't put any strain on railroads there (close to non-existant), so there is nothing of that to be relocated East. The aircraft and trucks will help a bit, despite the shortcomings - aircraft unfit to move large weights of war material, while the trucks were not heavy duty types, suitable for moving in rasputitsa or in snow. Bad weather also curtails the cargo aircraft operations, much more the issue in SU than in N. Africa. Plus - the cargo shipped by truck, let alone by aircraft puts another strain on German gasoline supply.


The logistics of North Afrika was complicated in the fact that supply by the Kreigsmarine was challenged by Allied naval assets and the DAK did rely heavily on resupply by air.

However, the KGzbV units were mauled heavily by Allied interception and the Luftwaffe was hard pressed to defend the lumbering Me323 or the Ju52 transports and lost a great deal of those assets and their cargo.

So if the DAK and all related assets were pulled back and committed to the eastern front instead of being wasted in the Med, the supply system would have seen a boost over historical system that entailed rail, land and air.

If you stop and think about it, Germany had already allocated fuel, men and equipment to supply the DAK, so it would not add to the historical burden, it would simply be shifted in this case.


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## Milosh (Dec 5, 2015)

What was to be the US 9th AF was still in Italy in 1943. It wasn't transferred to the ETO til the fall of 1943.


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## GrauGeist (Dec 6, 2015)

Milosh said:


> What was to be the US 9th AF was still in Italy in 1943. It wasn't transferred to the ETO til the fall of 1943.


The 9th AF was still based in Cairo and other portions of North Africa, like Tunisia, in 1943. Some portions were transferred to England for D-Day and some were transferred to France after the invasion.

Perhaps you're thinking of the 15th AF that was formed from elements of the 12th AF and 9th AF in Tunisia November 1943 that transferred newly captured southern Italian territory (Foggia) courtesy of the British around the first of the year, 1944.


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## Milosh (Dec 6, 2015)

GG, see the bottom of page 1, http://www.afhso.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-100924-018.pdf

Also, https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/III/AAF-III-5.html

Yes was mistaken saying Italy.


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## davebender (Dec 6, 2015)

No reason it cannot remain in this scenario with an emphasis on attacking Ploesti. USA might also base an air force in Iran to directly assist Soviets Union.


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## wiking85 (Dec 6, 2015)

davebender said:


> No reason it cannot remain in this scenario with an emphasis on attacking Ploesti. USA might also base an air force in Iran to directly assist Soviets Union.



Unescorted raids stopped with the Tidal Wave disaster. So no they wouldn't continue attacks without bases in Italy to enable escorts.


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## GrauGeist (Dec 6, 2015)

wiking85 said:


> Unescorted raids stopped with the Tidal Wave disaster. So no they wouldn't continue attacks without bases in Italy to enable escorts.


Especially flying the historical bombing route from North Africa into the oil fields in Romania, as the Bulgarian Air Force, Romanian Air Force and Luftwaffe units made the bombers pay dearly.


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## wiking85 (Dec 6, 2015)

So given that the majority of the Allied air units in Africa will then end up in Britain for the invasion and a large part of the German air units do too (let's say 75% of each) that is about 750 fighters for the Germans (1000 were lost from November 1942-August 1943) and several hundred other aircraft, and some 2500 or more Allied aircraft plus what they already had in Britain. So that means 4000-5000 front line Allied aircraft? Not sure how many the Germans would have then, probably 2500-3000 total?


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## davebender (Dec 6, 2015)

Attach P-38s for escort. They should perform ok at medium and low level. For that matter Mustang (with Allison engine) was available too during 1942.

Dare I suggest USN F4U as escort for medium / low altitude bombing missions? It had a relatively large fuel capacity and exceptional aerial performance compared to other USA fighter aircraft during 1943.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 6, 2015)

In this case (Tunis is still not home for Allied aircraft, let alone parts of Italy), the distance involved is too big. It is 910 miles from Benghazi to Bucharest.
Short of capturing Crete and estabilshing bases there (or using Soviet air bases?), escorts are out of the question. But then, it is more than 600 miles between Crete and Bucharest, and until late 1943 (P-38J available) Allies cannot provide escort even when flying from Crete.

The F4U will not provide any better range than P-47. The P-38 'behave' do better in Mediterranean in summer, especially the P-38H vs. P-38J, than in the West European winter, but the P-38H have had 1/4 less of fuel than P-38J.
If we're trying to escort the bombers at 15-20000 ft and not at 25000 ft, both defending Flak and fighters have better chances to kill the heavies.


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## wiking85 (Dec 6, 2015)

davebender said:


> Attach P-38s for escort. They should perform ok at medium and low level. For that matter Mustang (with Allison engine) was available too during 1942.
> 
> Dare I suggest USN F4U as escort for medium / low altitude bombing missions? It had a relatively large fuel capacity and exceptional aerial performance compared to other USA fighter aircraft during 1943.




P=38s only had the range to do so from Italy, not from Egypt or the Middle East.


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## syscom3 (Dec 6, 2015)

davebender said:


> Dare I suggest USN F4U as escort for medium / low altitude bombing missions? It had a relatively large fuel capacity and exceptional aerial performance compared to other USA fighter aircraft during 1943.



The USN/USMC will not part with F4U's. Period. And they had Admirals Kings support on that.


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## bobbysocks (Dec 6, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> ( or using Soviet air bases?)



the Russians are going to co-operate enough to make it as successful as it could be. you would have to completely change the soviet leadership and mindset to make that happen... you will end up with a repeat of the frantic missions


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## davebender (Dec 6, 2015)

Soviets may not have any choice if summer 1942 German offensive into Caucasus is reinforced with units historically sent to Tunisia and Vichy France. 

May come down to USA helping to defend Baku. Once such a commitment begins additional units get sucked in until 1943 invasion of France is no longer possible. Now you've got a very different WWII.


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## wiking85 (Dec 6, 2015)

davebender said:


> Soviets may not have any choice if summer 1942 German offensive into Caucasus is reinforced with units historically sent to Tunisia and Vichy France.
> 
> May come down to USA helping to defend Baku. Once such a commitment begins additional units get sucked in until 1943 invasion of France is no longer possible. Now you've got a very different WWII.



Why would the summer 1942 offensive have the DAK? They'd be in Africa.


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## bobbysocks (Dec 6, 2015)

davebender said:


> Soviets may not have any choice if summer 1942 German offensive into Caucasus is reinforced with units historically sent to Tunisia and Vichy France.
> 
> May come down to USA helping to defend Baku. Once such a commitment begins additional units get sucked in until 1943 invasion of France is no longer possible. Now you've got a very different WWII.



stalin and the soviets showed they were willing to absorb massive losses in both territory and manpower. I think stalin would have to be replaced before there was any change in policy....no matter what the situation. he did not want any appearance that the us or any allied force rescued the soviet union...it was bad for propaganda..


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## davebender (Dec 7, 2015)

Not all territory is of equal military value.

Caucasus was critical to Soviet war effort as it was a major route for Lend Lease assistance. Britain and Soviet Union jointly occupied Iran to secure this supply route. German Army Group A blocked the route as long as they remained in the Caucasus.


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## Milosh (Dec 7, 2015)

Engines of the Red Army in WW2 - Routes Overview


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## parsifal (Dec 7, 2015)

This is an altogether different scenario to the one initially postulated. basically stripping out the med front, ignore the crumbling loyalties of the Vichy regime and denuding the implied support to spain by the significant presence in western Europe of the german army. 

Destruction of the Italian positions in North Africa without German support would be over by the end of 1941, assuming a mass transfer of forcesto be completed and ready by may 1942. 

What would I do as the Allied joint Chiefs from that point. No German forces in Italy. no significant german forces in the rest of southern Europe. Significant, strategically vital interests in Rumania. Wavering major axis partners in the form of Fascist Italy and Vichy, with Spain playing games but vulnerable and now isolated. 

There are more opportunities here than I can easily assimilate. they include;

1) invasions of Sicily Corsica, Crete by 8th Army. 
2) Defections of Vichy North Africa and its fleet to the Allies
3) invasions of mainland Italy, probably after (1), again by 8A alone (with re-equipped French divs now fighting for the FNFL) 
4) pressure on Spanish to declare neutrality (as opposed to co-belligerent) 
5) pressure on the turks for access through the bosphorous. It was always the implied threat of German retaliation that held the turks back until 1945, when the threat was all but gone. If the germans voluntarily remove the threat, opportunities do present themselves to the allies. 
6) If (5) eventuates, move immediately to land and use the 2.5 Allied armies to knock out the rumanians and capture the vital oilfields at Ploesti. War is over within 6 months of that happening, and there is the added bonus that most of eastern Europe is in Allied, not Soviet, hands. 

This is scenario where the "soft underbelly" of Europe really is soft.....


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## Freebird (Dec 7, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> People have put out the need to tame the U-boats prior the invasion. We can recall that Allies have launched a 3-prong invasion of N. Africa despite the still fluid situation in Atlantic. Plus invaded Sicily and Italy in 1943, obviously US supplies need to go over Atlantic in any case. Having at least half of France under Allied control in late 1943 basically expells the U-boats from Lorient and other bases.
> ]



"Parts of France" will not be under Allied control in 1943, parts of Allied soldiers will be under France. (as in war graves)
An Allied invasion of France in 1943 will not occur, as the British are not suicidal, and an Allied landing has virtually no chance of survival, let alone breakout. 



wiking85 said:


> Not sure raw numbers, but in terms of Allied armies its the British 1st army and the American 5th and 7th armies.
> 
> The Germans would have the forces used in Sicily, the 5th Panzer army, and the forces used to defend Italy historically (10th and 14th armies), plus whatever is in France in 1943 (not sure). The SS Panzer corps might well end up in the west rather than in the East, leaving German forces there to deal with whatever the Soviets throw at them without that powerful force.
> 
> I'm not sure what the French would do, probably get operation antoned and have the British 8th army occupy Algeria and raise Free French troops and eventually get ready for an invasion of Sicily or Sardinia in 1944. Or perhaps even an Operation Anvil once the landings in Normandy suck in German reserves.



The 8th army may well be stuck on the borders of Tunisia, short of supplies





parsifal said:


> A nightmare scenario for the allies.
> 
> In June 1943 there were 85 German divs in western Europe, mostly on various garrison duties. Without the invasion of TORCH the Italians will not be easily defeated, even with the loss of North Africa. This frees up close to 12 Divs in Italy, about the same number waiting on the borders of Vichy France, and about 6 divs in the Balkans to replace the Italian units providing garrison forces in the locality. In addition ther are about a dozen Italian Divs in France or along the French med coast, a PG and an Infantry Div in Sardinia and Corsica.
> 
> ...



Excellent analysis Parsifal (as usual)


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## parsifal (Dec 7, 2015)

good to see you again freebird. hope you are well


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## Freebird (Dec 10, 2015)

parsifal said:


> good to see you again freebird. hope you are well



Thanks mate!
Yeah, it's been a crap year, and crazy busy, was informed that our contracts next year would get a 10% - 15% cut so told them to get stuffed. 
Happy to see the year over and contracting with a new outfit going forward. 8)

This thread is now p*****g me off, I've just wasted an hour half typing a reply that's just evaporated.    

Anyways, here goes again...



wiking85 said:


> What would a force on force airwar over France in 1943 look like had there been no Operation Torch and therefore Tunisian/Sicily/Italy campaign, but instead the US and UK saving up forces to invade France in 1943 like in Operation Roundup?



First off, what's the reasoning behind the US sitting idle in 1942?
The UK US are committed to opening another front of some sort in 1942, and have promised as much to Stalin.
The Allies have serious concerns about the Soviets holding out in 1942, or possibly collapsing in the south with the Axis capturing Baku and threatening Persia. 
While the Allies are far, far short of being able to mount an invasion of France, the British are convinced that a landing in NW Africa would draw away considerable Axis forces from the East. (they turn out to be right  )

After the cancellation of the Russia convoys Stalin is fuming, and both FDR Churchill are agreed that the US UK need to open a new front in 1942 in NW Africa.
Also, even if Torch is cancelled there's no guarantee that Roundup will be possible in 1943.

So how does FDR explain to Stalin that US ground participation won't happen until 1943 or 1944? 




wiking85 said:


> Let's say for the sake of argument that invasion comes in June 1943 in the area of the historical Normandy landings to draw off German forces before Kursk.



An invasion of France won't happen in 1943 as the Allies would be in no position to manage it, and if they tried it would be a fiasco. Churchill would be a fool to overrule his Chiefs of Staff to push though an operation that would likely end up as a disaster.
In any event, it wouldn't draw anything away from Kursk as the German position on the Eastern front would already be 20 or 30 divisions stronger, and the Soviet position much weaker.
A weak landing in France in 1943 can be handled by the Axis forces already there, and after crushing the Allied landing the Germans will be able to send *another* 15 or 20 divisions to the Soviet front.
Essentially, while a *successful* landing in France will tie down German troops, a* failed *landing attempt would set the Allies back two years or more, and free up more German divisions to send east.



wiking85 said:


> What does the air campaign look like then if the pull a Transport Plan before doing major bombing of Germany?
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Plan



No Transport plan possible as the Combined Bomber Offensive (Pointblank) is a prerequisite for these operations, and Pointblank itself is delayed or cancelled in 1943 as the supplies aircraft needed for it are eaten up by the landing attempt.

In the summer of 1943 there are no Mustangs yet, and the P-47 has only reached operation status in a couple of squadrons, so the support for a landing would be much more difficult in the shorter range Spitfires, and longer range missions to Germany are not feasible .



wiking85 said:


> For the sake of argument let's say the North African Campaign basically ends with the Axis armies being run out of Africa in Spring 1943 by Monty and the 8th army, but then without an invasion of Sicily.


. 
It's far from certain that Monty can push Rommel out of Libya, as without the Torch landings the Germans are not retreating into Tunisia, and will turn and fight the British in central Libya, with the Allies now struggling at the end of a 1,400 mile supply line. Rommel should be able to halt the Allies in a stalemated position at Tobruk, Benghazi or somewhere in Libya

In any case, without the Anglo-American Torch landings splitting Axis forces, the British are not going to capture the 300,000 axis forces that they did historically.




wiking85 said:


> I'm assuming Kursk then is impossible and the fighters transferred from the West for the offensive aren't, same with the SS Panzer divisions, meaning the Soviet launch their own offensive in the East after the Allied landings in Normandy.



No. 
The Luftwaffe will be stronger in the East as the Germans haven't lost massive forces in the Med.
The Eastern front will have all of the SS other divisions that they historically had in 1943, plus some 20 - 30 extra divisions that were not lost in Tunisia, Italy the Balkans.
Kursk is however indeed unlikely to occur, as the Soviets will probably not have recaptured it in early 1943.
Without Hitler's extremely unwise decision to start sending his reserves to Southern Europe in the immediate aftermath of Torch, the Germans could have sent more reserves to Army Group B which would mitigate the damage from "Uranus"


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## wiking85 (Dec 10, 2015)

freebird said:


> In any event, it wouldn't draw anything away from Kursk as the German position on the Eastern front would already be 20 or 30 divisions stronger, and the Soviet position much weaker.


What 20-30 division? There weren't that many German ones in North Africa and Sicily combined and that's including Rommel who cannot go anywhere and his divisions are worn down and will probably need German reinforcements.




freebird said:


> A weak landing in France in 1943 can be handled by the Axis forces already there, and after crushing the Allied landing the Germans will be able to send *another* 15 or 20 divisions to the Soviet front.
> Essentially, while a *successful* landing in France will tie down German troops, a* failed *landing attempt would set the Allies back two years or more, and free up more German divisions to send east.


Assuming that the 5th Panzer army doesn't go to North Africa to shore up Rommel's badly depleted forces and that Operation Anton may not happen, that's debateable, because the Allies will still land at the point of their choosing with overwhelming force after deception operations that historically confused and tied down German troops. So its really debateable whether the Germans of 1943 could have stopped them. In 1944 with significantly stronger forces than existed in France in 1943 they couldn't crush the landings.



freebird said:


> No Transport plan possible as the Combined Bomber Offensive (Pointblank) is a prerequisite for these operations, and Pointblank itself is delayed or cancelled in 1943 as the supplies aircraft needed for it are eaten up by the landing attempt.
> 
> In the summer of 1943 there are no Mustangs yet, and the P-47 has only reached operation status in a couple of squadrons, so the support for a landing would be much more difficult in the shorter range Spitfires, and longer range missions to Germany are not feasible .


How is Pointblank a prerequisite? The target area for the Transport Plan in France is able to be covered by P-38s, P-40s, Spitfire VIIIs, and P-47s. If you mean the lack of Big Week and the destruction of the Luftwaffe, drawing them into decisive air battles in France has the same effect; the goal is bringing them to battle, not where it happens; in 1943 Pointblank didn't really succeed at its goals of wrecking German industry, so wasn't really critical to any subsequent operation, other than gaining experience of unescorted raids into Germany and inflicting some losses on the ground on the Germans.



freebird said:


> It's far from certain that Monty can push Rommel out of Libya, as without the Torch landings the Germans are not retreating into Tunisia, and will turn and fight the British in central Libya, with the Allies now struggling at the end of a 1,400 mile supply line. Rommel should be able to halt the Allies in a stalemated position at Tobruk, Benghazi or somewhere in Libya
> 
> In any case, without the Anglo-American Torch landings splitting Axis forces, the British are not going to capture the 300,000 axis forces that they did historically.


Again how do you figure? Rommel was beaten badly at El Alamein and unable to resist even at El Agheila
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_El_Agheila
Rommel needed reinforcements and that would probably mean the 5th Panzer army. That then means its not available for any other front. Plus then Tripoli is subject to interdiction by Malta, just like Tunisia was and its pretty easy then to find Axis convoys and sink them all headed to one port, just like with Tunisia.


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## parsifal (Dec 10, 2015)

> What 20-30 division? There weren't that many German ones in North Africa and Sicily combined and that's including Rommel who cannot go anywhere and his divisions are worn down and will probably need German reinforcements.



Thats a conservative estimate by Freebird. If the landings were to fail or even just contained, the Germans would be free to strip out their coastal garrisons in Western Europe. As at June 1942 there were 37 divisions deployed along the Atlantic Coast.

In addition there were increasingly substantial forces facing off on the Vichy frontier, being held in Germany and deploying in Northern Italy. Im not entirely certain of the numbers of these troops, but easily in excess of 12 divs, all being held to react to Allied initiative. If there was no Torch landings, ther was no need to withhold reserves to collapse the Vichy. If the allies attempt a cross channel landing and it fails, as it inevitably must, in 1942, then by 1943, the germans are at least 30 divs stronger in the east. This gives them enough wriggle room to do a lot of things, include a complete avoidance of Stalingrad, enough reservers to start rotating units properly, and enough units to establish a viable eastern front strategic reserve. 



> Assuming that the 5th Panzer army doesn't go to North Africa to shore up Rommel's badly depleted forces and that Operation Anton may not happen, that's debateable, because the Allies will still land at the point of their choosing with overwhelming force after deception operations that historically confused and tied down German troops. So its really debateable whether the Germans of 1943 could have stopped them. In 1944 with significantly stronger forces than existed in France in 1943 they couldn't crush the landings.



The choices in 1943 are a LOT more restricted than they were in 1944. The possibilities for landing sites available to the allies were really dictated by some key limitations. Some debate about this but in my opinion they included the range of their fighter forces, which in 1943 was a lot less than 1944 (Im talking the main groups and types available to the allies), the inability in 1943 to work independantly of a port, which means they had to capture a port quickly. This was no Sicily or Italy, the forces involved and the need to out-reinforce the front compared to the Germans was acknowledged as the operational objective. Could not be done in 1943 without a port.

These constraints really limited Allied options to the Pas-De-Calais region, just where the Germans expected a landing. Part of the failure of the Germans in France is that they failed to appreciate the enormous work being done 1942-4 to make the allies less dependant on port facilities. Strategic mobility was denied the allies until that problem was solved. The mulberries were the main solution, and the final form of how these would be built were not worked out until the end of August 1943. Its debatebale as to when they might have been ready, maybe March 1944, but then there was the problem of the channel crossing in winter. There really was no way to bring the cross channel attack forward much earlier than about May 1944, if the strategic choices available historically is to be assumed as available 



> How is Pointblank a prerequisite? The target area for the Transport Plan in France is able to be covered by P-38s, P-40s, Spitfire VIIIs, and P-47s. If you mean the lack of Big Week and the destruction of the Luftwaffe, drawing them into decisive air battles in France has the same effect; the goal is bringing them to battle, not where it happens; in 1943 Pointblank didn't really succeed at its goals of wrecking German industry, so wasn't really critical to any subsequent operation, other than gaining experience of unescorted raids into Germany and inflicting some losses on the ground on the Germans.



For the Americans at least, the thinking for the need to escort its bombers, and indeed mount a heavy and sustained campaign over occupied France with its medium bombers and fighters would not have materialised without its extensive experiences in North Africa and to a lesser extent over Sicily and Italy to help it through the thinking processes required. The Americans as late as October 1943 were still wedded to the concept of the unescorted heavy bomber attacks. It was only after men such as Doolittle were moved in to replace men like Eaker, that a noticeable shift in American thinking began to manifest itself. until that occurred, the Americans were simply not going to have the know how and experience to implement what you are suggesting, and the British dont have enough medium and long ranged fighters to do the job in their place. The North African experiences were absolutely needed, not only to get the troops up to steam, but also the experience in the air leaders as well. This experience is vital in implementing the changes you assume. 



> Again how do you figure? Rommel was beaten badly at El Alamein and unable to resist even at El Agheila
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_El_Agheila
> Rommel needed reinforcements and that would probably mean the 5th Panzer army. That then means its not available for any other front. Plus then Tripoli is subject to interdiction by Malta, just like Tunisia was and its pretty easy then to find Axis convoys and sink them all headed to one port, just like with Tunisia.



I admit I tend to agree, though it is not a lay down mezzaire because of supply issues for the allies as they advance further west. But unlikely that Rommel could stop Monty after alamein. 

I dont think this is the critical question though. The issue is, what happens after Tripoli falls? You cant leave North Africa and the middle East ungarisoned, whilst the italians are still in the ring, and without US support in the med, it is not possible to contemplate HUSKY or Salerno. Italy given the chance to take breath gives back the initiative to the Axis and prevents the allies from concentrating their forces. it has the same effect as if Rommel was holed up in Tripoli......


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## wiking85 (Dec 10, 2015)

The coastal defense divisions were not capable of much else but that. So they weren't a real option to use elsewhere. Also the mobile combat divisions in France were also there to keep the French in line and weren't actually available for other duty for fear of France becoming restive. 

As to landing choices they'd be covered by thousands of Allied fighters, in excess of 4k IIRC, while the Germans save about 1k from the Mediterranean and still need to defend Germany. They'd be at least outnumbered by 2:1 over the beachheads if not even more. Trying to have heavily armed fighters to shoot down Allied bombers then would not be able to survive the Allied fighter sweeps.


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## Freebird (Dec 10, 2015)

wiking85 said:


> What 20-30 division? There weren't that many German ones in North Africa and Sicily combined and that's including Rommel who cannot go anywhere and his divisions are worn down and will probably need German reinforcements.



Note that I said Axis divisions, not only German 

The 20 or 30+ additional divisions available be sent to the Soviet front would be divisions that are NOT lost in 1943 from 3 places

1.) Tunisia - Rommel had about 115,000 troops (including Italian) in Egypt, and loses 50 to 60 thousand by the time he's defending at Mareth. The Axis send *at least *250,000 additional troops to Tunisia, as Allied forces capture some 300,000 troops there in Mar/April '43.

Without any Torch/Husky/Avalanche most of troops are not lost - nor even sent. 
Perhaps 50 - 100 thousand might be sent (mainly Italians) to stop Monty's drive, but there would be at least 150 thousand troops available that wouldn't end up in Tunisia

2.) Med - Considerable forces are sent to Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica etc to prepare for possible invasions, made possible after Africa is cleared. Note that the HG panzer division is raised and sent_ twice_.
These forces (including 15th, 29th motorized, 1st Parachute) end up fighting Allied forces in Italy and are not available in the East

3.) Italy, Balkans, Greece - Following the Italian surrender the Germans are forced to deploy 15+ _additional_ divisions to occupy all of the territory previously held by the Italians, including the Dodecanese islands.
2nd Panzer is sent to Greece, 5th 10th SS Panzer end up fighting in the Balkans etc etc.

While some here will deride Italian troops, there's no doubt that they provide an important role garrisoning Southern Europe, and when Germany must do this alone it's stretched thin.




> How is Pointblank a prerequisite? The target area for the Transport Plan in France is able to be covered by P-38s, P-40s, Spitfire VIIIs, and P-47s. If you mean the lack of Big Week and the destruction of the Luftwaffe, drawing them into decisive air battles in France has the same effect; the goal is bringing them to battle, not where it happens; in 1943 Pointblank didn't really succeed at its goals of wrecking German industry, so wasn't really critical to any subsequent operation, other than gaining experience of unescorted raids into Germany and inflicting some losses on the ground on the Germans.



Pointblank the CBO were designed to cripple the Luftwaffe defence, the big losses inflicted on the LW weren't possible earlier than summer of 1943 as the US is still building up and the Allies lack the resources to support the effort.
In 1943 the P-47 squadrons are just getting active, IIRC there are 2 groups that begin P-47 operations in April '43, and they are using the weaker P-47B, with the poorer climb rate. Spitfires don't have the range to do the job, P-40s are badly outclassed by the FW 190's and the P-38s are phased out. 

Also keep in mind that you can't just assume that you can transfer x number of divisions or air units from one theater to another, and that the situation will be the same.
For example, the Allied forces in the Med (Sicily, Italy) use fuel from the British refineries in Haifa Beiruit, however if transferred to the UK they will have to be supplied across the Atlantic, where shipping tonnage is already in critically short supply. British CW forces can use ammunition supplies South Africa India, while if it is planned to deploy Allied units from the UK it would require using cargo tonnage already stretched to the breaking point by the need to supply the UK needs, transship material through the UK to Russia, build up USAAF air operations, and stockpile for Overlord


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## Balljoint (Dec 10, 2015)

freebird said:


> it would require using cargo tonnage already stretched to the breaking point by the need to supply the UK needs, transship material through the UK to Russia, build up USAAF air operations, and stockpile for Overlord



Agree Churchill was beside himself during 1943 because so many ship bottoms were filled with support for the Eighth which he considered a lost and effort. He thought the American bombers a lost cause for daylight bombing and useless for night bombing. He definitely wasn’t of a mindset for another Dieppe.


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## wiking85 (Dec 10, 2015)

freebird said:


> Note that I said Axis divisions, not only German
> 
> The 20 or 30+ additional divisions available be sent to the Soviet front would be divisions that are NOT lost in 1943 from 3 places
> 
> ...


The Italians and other Axis minor powers were quite important additions to Axis strength and their loss was sorely felt, even if the combat power was limited. Still the divisions you're talking about in the Balkans and Aegean were mostly static 3rd rate divisions only meant to hold coastline, not be deployed for major combat operations in the East. They were in fact worse than the Luftwaffe field divisions. As to the 5th Panzer army I think they're going to have to be deployed to hold even Western Libya, but then run into the very serious issue of supply with Malta astride their LOC. The most likely thing that happens is the Germans are too scared of an invasion of France without Torch to deploy to Libya and the Italians and Germans are rolled up and wiped out without reinforcement. Losing Libya then has the problem of allowing convoys to start again and take a huge burden off of Allied shipping:
HyperWar: HyperWar: War at Sea 1939-1945, Vol. II: The Period of Balance (UK--History of the Second World War)


> The Tripoli-Alexandria leg (and back) was in operation by January, 1943; a special convoy ran west to east the full length of the Med in May, and the full GTX/XTG route (all the way to Gibraltar and back, east-west and west-east) was open by June - a month before HUSKY (see Roskill):
> 
> By the 15th of May a channel two miles wide and 200 miles long had been swept from the Galita Channel to Sousse, and thence on to Tripoli.Nearly 200 moored mines were cut. That day Cunningham signalled that 'the passage through the Mediterranean was clear', and that convoys from Gibraltar to Alexandria could be started at once. The Admiralty sent its congratulations. The Navy thereupon took up the second of the two new duties mentioned - that of escorting these ships safely through the waters which had for so long been closed to our shipping. The first convoy consisted of four fast merchant ships. Escorted by the A.A. cruiser Carlisle and four destroyers they reached Tripoli on the 22nd. Four more merchantmen joined up there, and the Malta destroyers strengthened the escort for the second part of the journey. All ships arrived safely at Alexandria on the 26th. It was the first through-Mediterranean convoy to run since operation 'TIGER' in May 1941. After this special convoy a regular series (called GTX and TXG) was started between Gibraltar and Alexandria. The saving of shipping achieved by the reopening of the Mediterranean was enormous. Before operation 'TORCH' was launched the Naval Staff estimated that it would bring us at least a fifty per cent saving of shipping bound for the Middle East, and about a twenty per cent saving of ships sailing to and from India. In addition more than half of the eighty-five ships permanently employed on the WS convoy route could, so they expected, be released. At the end of 1942 the prospective gain was assessed at about a million tons of shipping; and a further half million tons in French ports had come into our use. On the other hand we lost over a quarter of a million tons of shipping during the North African campaign; delays and postponements of Atlantic convoys had deprived Britain of a million tons of imports, and the enemy gained to his use some 875,000 tons seized in the Mediterranean ports of metropolitan France. Although therefore in terms of statistics the saving of tonnage to the Allies was not very much greater than the losses suffered and the gains received by the enemy, in terms of strategy the advantages to our cause were immense. Quite apart from merchant shipping, our warships and maritime aircraft could now be more economically employed, and more advantageously disposed.




Assuming then Libya is lost with the Africa Corps and Italian forces, then there will still need to be forces deployed to hold Sicily and Sardinia from the Germans to ensure Italy stays in the war. Beyond that whatever is not sent still needs to stay in France in case of invasion which means the 5th Panzer army including HG Division. Likely all the savings from the losses of 1942-43 that are avoided in this scenario then stay in France to defend it against a cross channel invasion. 



freebird said:


> Pointblank the CBO were designed to cripple the Luftwaffe defence, the big losses inflicted on the LW weren't possible earlier than summer of 1943 as the US is still building up and the Allies lack the resources to support the effort.
> In 1943 the P-47 squadrons are just getting active, IIRC there are 2 groups that begin P-47 operations in April '43, and they are using the weaker P-47B, with the poorer climb rate. Spitfires don't have the range to do the job, P-40s are badly outclassed by the FW 190's and the P-38s are phased out.
> 
> Also keep in mind that you can't just assume that you can transfer x number of divisions or air units from one theater to another, and that the situation will be the same.
> For example, the Allied forces in the Med (Sicily, Italy) use fuel from the British refineries in Haifa Beiruit, however if transferred to the UK they will have to be supplied across the Atlantic, where shipping tonnage is already in critically short supply. British CW forces can use ammunition supplies South Africa India, while if it is planned to deploy Allied units from the UK it would require using cargo tonnage already stretched to the breaking point by the need to supply the UK needs, transship material through the UK to Russia, build up USAAF air operations, and stockpile for Overlord


The losses inflicted on the LW only need to be done where the Germans must fight, which means in France. They can be attritioned to death fighting over the beachheads or defending French infrastructure rather than over Germany. The P-40s, Spit VIII, and P-38 can do the job just as they did in the Mediterranean against the superior Fw190 and Me109F/G in 1942-43. As to supply issues, remember the Allied air forces in Britain in 1944 were bigger than all of the combined airpower available in 1944 and they were able to supply that and by May 1943 the Uboats had been defeated with new builds of transports exceeding losses since Autumn 1942. So they could and did supply even more aircraft and divisions out of Britain historically, so doing it in 1943 isn't really an issue. Supplying an advance off the beaches out of the Normandy region without the Mulberries is another story though.


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## parsifal (Dec 11, 2015)

> The coastal defense divisions were not capable of much else but that. So they weren't a real option to use elsewhere. Also the mobile combat divisions in France were also there to keep the French in line and weren't actually available for other duty for fear of France becoming restive.



There were a number of crises on the East Front where so called "coastal defence " divisions were sent to the East Front regardless of their status. The first one that calls to mind were in the crisis after the Soviet counteroffensives December 1941 through to March 1942. According to Nagorski and also Mitcham. Just because its easier to extract the data, Im going to use the data from GDWs "Unentschieden".

Between December 1941 and March 1942, the following Infantry Divs were pulled out of the Atlantic Wall defences and rushed to AGC to bolster the crumbling defences in that sector (units shown in brackets are withdrawals from the east): 

*Late December '41*: 

88th XX; this formation had extensive training elements along with 2 regts of line Infantry attached and an assortment of mostly captured artillery. It was short of wheeled transport. Artillery was at least normalised and they went into battle with between 60-75% authorised MT. They retained their two regt TOE but also had added either security detachment or a training detachment added. With the southern offensive of the following summer, it was necessary to strip the division of further MT and AT assets, and constant exposure to Soviet attrition tactics had reduced it to about 40% strength by December 1943, when it was encircled near Kiev. 

216th XX: Consisted of Landwehr and garrsoned Poland during the Fall Gelb operations,. transferred to the Atlantic Wall and redesignated a "Coastal Div" in 1941. Throughout the Summer, it replaced many of its over age personell, but retained the two regt TOE of the garrison units. Transferred to the Eastern Front in that guise. It fought in many of the East front battles more or less in that TOE until losses forced it to be disbanded in late 1944. 

225th XX: Another Landswehr Div with a similar form to the 216th, was designated a "Coastal Div" until December 1941, by which time its personnel age structures were normalised and the div hurriedly transferred to the East. 

[162nd XX; Formed in January 1940], this formation had fought in the East from the beginning, but by December was in remannts. Its remaining personnel were brought back to Germany (initially) and then to the France, with some new fillers attached and to take over the training and security duties usiung the personnel left behind by other units transferring to the East. 

*Early January 1942*

81st XX; Raised as a mobilization unit, it saw light combat in Fall Gelb, Remained in France on Coastal defence duties until late 41. It was almost immediately in action, even as it was de-training along the hard pressed and exposed northern flank of AGC. Despite being outflanked and then encircled at Tripelevo (as part of the Demyansk pocket) in January, it fought with distinction and held out against determined Soviet attacks. It was not relieved from this position until January 1943, and in the last 2 months of its encirclement destroyed over 170 Soviet tanks. 

83rd XX; Raised as a mobilisation unit, it was used for LOC security duties in both Case white and Case Yellow. It remained in the Coastal sector of the Atlantic wall as a "Security Unit" until late '41. By then its personnel age structures had been more or less normalised and it hurriedly received some of the artillery authorised under its TOE as an infantry unit. As a security unit it was fairly well supplied with MT. 

113th XX; Formed in Germany in October 1940, this formation remained in Germany as a reserve unit until late 41. It was lost at Stalingrad. It was held in Germany in reserve for two reasons, to assist in the trainng functions of the replacement army, and as a strategic reserve in case of an allied invasion. The emergency in December 1941 forced it to be transferred to the east regardless of the risk 

208th XX; Formed on mobilisation in '39, it was lightly engaged in France. Its average age of the personnel at that time was 44yrs, but throughout 1940-41, the age structure of the division was normalised. It remained in the east for the remainder of the war. 

246th XX; Formed in 1939 from mostly Hessian personnel, it fought in France when it assaulted frontally the Maginot line, with some success. After the formation of Vichy, it was sent back to Germany, but then was stationed in SW France to keep watch over the Vichy. It was a fully equipped unit. It left for Russia on January 3rd, but left behind its 313th III as a cadre for its replacement, picking 689th Ersatz III as it passed through Germany enroute. It was more or less immediately thrown into action where for more than three months it withstood repeated attacks by the Russian 22A. It was finally destroyed at Vitebsk in July 1944, as a result of Hitler's insane "stand fast" orders. 

330th XX; Formed in October 1941 as a Coastal Defence unit, the 330th was short of MT and artillery at the time of its reassignment. It initially went into action at Demidov, where it withstood repeated attacks from the Soviet 4th Shock Army. It remained on the east front front line throughout 1942 and 1943, under the control of 9A mostly 

203rd XX; Formed as a security bde for the protection of the coastal regions near the Atlantic wall, this formation was transferred to the east as a security unit, with no artilery (it had a few ATGs and basically 2 security Inf IIIs. It was finally reported as "in remnants" in March 1945, but likely was in that state for at least a year previously. 

65th, 612th Ind Inf IIIs

605th, 619th Eng IIIs

*Late January 1942*;

211th XX;

218th XX; 

331st XX

5 Jaeger XX; the Jaeger units were generally in the initial assaults as 3 regt formations but were withdrawn by September/October. most of them dropped the third Inf regt, and were then returned to the East in early 1942 with a heavier artillery park, which served them better than the initial experiences. 

NDr SS Mot Bde; Dutch "Niederland" SS unit, I believe was stationed in the Netherlands before transfer in early 1942. this entry should be read as a composite of various foreign armies SS detachements that were formed and sent east at about this time 

*Early February 1942*
22 Pz XX;

206th XX; 

328th XX;

7th Gebirgjager XX;

Nor SS Inf Bde, 18 SS "Polizei" Bde, "Dirlewanger" SS Security Bde; these were SS formations of varying strengths and nationalities similar to the comments made above

686th, 693rd Ind Art IIIs, 10 Nebelwerfer III

"Sturm" Ind Para Bde, 

1, 2, 3, 4, 5 LW Inf IIIs (taken from coastal Flak formations), these were generally fairly weak formations handed a rifle and sent into battle as cheap and expendable (and poorly trained) Infantry 

*Late February 1942*
(Italian - from Coastal sector Med near the French Riviera)
"CR-Leg" Italian Inf III, "MC" Alpini ski Bn (not sure about the abbreviations used). These units belie their nationality. They were the creme de la creme of the italian army and were to fight with distinction. 

(German)
329th XX

"Balbo" Cav III (not sure about this one)

*Early March 1942*
342 XX, first fought in Yugoslavia, was transferred to AGC in early March, nearly devoid of any MT, though with a full complement of Draft Animals (DA). The only such units to go into combat like this to date incidentally

8 Jaeger XX, the Jaeger units were generally in the initial assaults as 3 regt formations but were withdrawn by September/October. most of them dropped the third Inf regt, and were then returned to the East in early 1942 with a heavier artillery park, which served them better than the initial experiences. 

51st 609th Sec IIIs; taken from the Coastal sector, NW France, they had been part of the Coastal sector defences. Im unsure of their fate. 

14th LW Inf III (same as LW Inf units described above)

I apologise for not completing all of the entries here, but I think the point is well enough made. Far from being "unsuitable" for the east front operations, the erstaz, coastal, trainng, security, and all manner of other 2nd and 3rd line heer formations were readily transferred to the East as OKW dared to send them. What held them back, overwhelmingly wasnt a shortage of equipment, or at this stage of the war, even manpower, but rather a fear or concern about leaving the west undergarrisoned and vulnerable to a cross channel attack. If that threat was removed, contained, defeated, whatever, large amounts of thoise garrsion forces could be moved to the east where history shows they could and did, fight decisively at times


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## parsifal (Dec 11, 2015)

(Part II)





> As to landing choices they'd be covered by thousands of Allied fighters, in excess of 4k IIRC, while the Germans save about 1k from the Mediterranean and still need to defend Germany. They'd be at least outnumbered by 2:1 over the beachheads if not even more. Trying to have heavily armed fighters to shoot down Allied bombers then would not be able to survive the Allied fighter sweeps


.

I disagree Im afraid. Through to the end of June 1943, USAAC contributions to fighter defences in England were extremely limited, and moreover, many of them were of indifferent quality. Up until June, the priority was to get the heavy bomber forces up and working, and even as late as August, it was a good day to get 350 bombers airborne by the US.

As for the British, I frequently get into spats about the effectiveness of the RAF ofensives over the channel, France and the low countries from 1941 to the end of 1943. Suffice it to say that I am of the opinion they were vital to the Allied efforts rather than pointless as is often claimed. They enjoyed a measure of success as well, but even i would pull up to say they had achieved anything like air supremacy on na universal and general scale over the continent early to mid 1943. The numbers fighters were far less than you are suggesting. I cant be specific either, but according to the statistics in Costello, there were 5297 a/c under the RAF in December 1942, with 1500 in the Med, and a further 1000 or so in the Far East. That leaves about 2800 in the UK, that is to cover the whole of the UK.

For the US about 1900 a/c were available in total in the ETO and MTO as at December 1942. You may be able to strip out and transfer back to the UK maybe 3-400 US a/c. Another way of looking at this might be to use a surrogate measure and count bomb tonnages. The US for the whole of December 1942 was able to drop 340 tons of bombs, It hovered around the 5-800 ton mark until the following May, when it finally started to move upwards to about 2400 tons per month. Unfortunately, I dont have figures for the same time frame for the RAF, but in June 1942, it was 6300 tons per month. For the US the tonnage in June 1944 was 40784 tons, I dont have the RAF tonnages at hand, but I can if pressed, and will be massively larger than 1942. There simply is no comparison between the effectiveness of the allied air forces in 1943 and 1944. None. 

So, speculatively, there might be about 2-3000 allied aircraft, not just fighters, available in early to mid'43....and thats being mighty optimistic. Others may be able to supply better numbers or projections, and I invite them to do so, but it looks highly doubtful to me. And that also means, incidentally that all bombing operations over germany would almost certainly need to be suspended whilst this cross channel attack was developing. It also is almost a certainty that the Germans would throw their reich defences into this battle, since it was a battle of immense strategic importance. 

There were 940 LW a/c in the MTO as at December 1942, and a further 375 in Nth Africa. There were just short of 880 RA a/c as well. In the east, the front line effectives in the LW stood at 2430 a/c. Total front line 1st line strength in the LW as at June 1943 stood at 5003. Deducting the other TOs, that leaves about 1258 for the Reich and the west. Not enough to gain outright air superiority, but with the 940 from the med that brings the potential total under your scenario to about 2100. Still outnumbered, i agree, but also enough to avoid the air force cringe that the heer developed at Normandy.


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## GrauGeist (Dec 11, 2015)

parsifal said:


> ...Still outnumbered, i agree, but also enough to avoid the air force cringe that the heer developed at Normandy.


Considering Priller and his wingman were the only Luftwaffe assets that engaged Allied ground forces during the landings (a strafing pass and a fast exit), I think you're spot-on, Michael.

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## wiking85 (Dec 11, 2015)

parsifal said:


> (Part II)
> I disagree Im afraid. Through to the end of June 1943, USAAC contributions to fighter defences in England were extremely limited, and moreover, many of them were of indifferent quality. Up until June, the priority was to get the heavy bomber forces up and working, and even as late as August, it was a good day to get 350 bombers airborne by the US.
> 
> As for the British, I frequently get into spats about the effectiveness of the RAF ofensives over the channel, France and the low countries from 1941 to the end of 1943. Suffice it to say that I am of the opinion they were vital to the Allied efforts rather than pointless as is often claimed. They enjoyed a measure of success as well, but even i would pull up to say they had achieved anything like air supremacy on na universal and general scale over the continent early to mid 1943. The numbers fighters were far less than you are suggesting. I cant be specific either, but according to the statistics in Costello, there were 5297 a/c under the RAF in December 1942, with 1500 in the Med, and a further 1000 or so in the Far East. That leaves about 2800 in the UK, that is to cover the whole of the UK.
> ...



None of the above indicates that an Allied invasion would be stopped on the beaches given that defenses were far less ready, Vichy France is going to tie down a fair number of German divisions in case they flip sides, and the Allied superiority over the likely beachheads in terms of aircraft. Also your numbers for US AC in the Mediterranean are weird. Why wouldn't all the MTO aircraft be in England instead without a US MTO involvement? As to British aircraft they don't need to defend Britain given that for both sides they will be virtually completely throwing their full weight into the invasion offensive/defense, not leaving much for the Germans to attack Britain with and even that would likely be employed against the beachheads. Meanwhile given the work of the RAF at night its the Germans that will need to keep AC tied down defending Germany. 

As to your earlier point about coastal divisions being used in the East...why are you including Jaeger divisions/units in that? They aren't coast/point defense troops, they are light infantry that were used to attack. Also in the Ukraine in the winter of 1942-43 operations were way to mobile and armor based for a bunch of low quality coastal infantry divisions to make a difference and I find it bizarre that you think equipment wasn't a serious issue for the Germans at this point; it most certainly was, as there were constant unmet demands for just about all categories of equipment, especially transport and horses. Suddenly upgrading 20 divisions with everything they need to make them regular infantry is impossible in 1942-43, same with shipping and supplying them at the ass-end of a attentuated supply system in East Ukraine.


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## syscom3 (Dec 11, 2015)

The allies learned some bitter truth's about a cross channel attack at Dieppe. Among them were the lack of a workable amphibious doctrine. Lack of landing craft and a lack of follow on logistics that would keep the whole thing running.

Nothing was going to happen in 1943 because everyone in SHAEF knew these truths.

And until the Med was free for shipping, that was going to be objective #1 for that year.

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## GrauGeist (Dec 11, 2015)

wiking85 said:


> None of the above indicates that an Allied invasion would be stopped on the beaches given that defenses were far less ready, Vichy France is going to tie down a fair number of German divisions in case they flip sides, and the Allied superiority over the likely beachheads in terms of aircraft. Also your numbers for US AC in the Mediterranean are weird. Why wouldn't all the MTO aircraft be in England instead without a US MTO involvement? As to British aircraft they don't need to defend Britain given that for both sides they will be virtually completely throwing their full weight into the invasion offensive/defense, not leaving much for the Germans to attack Britain with and even that would likely be employed against the beachheads. Meanwhile given the work of the RAF at night its the Germans that will need to keep AC tied down defending Germany.
> 
> As to your earlier point about coastal divisions being used in the East...why are you including Jaeger divisions/units in that? They aren't coast/point defense troops, they are light infantry that were used to attack. Also in the Ukraine in the winter of 1942-43 operations were way to mobile and armor based for a bunch of low quality coastal infantry divisions to make a difference and I find it bizarre that you think equipment wasn't a serious issue for the Germans at this point; it most certainly was, as there were constant unmet demands for just about all categories of equipment, especially transport and horses. Suddenly upgrading 20 divisions with everything they need to make them regular infantry is impossible in 1942-43, same with shipping and supplying them at the ass-end of a attentuated supply system in East Ukraine.


Keep in mind that the German's reaction at Normandy was beset with several mistakes and had Rommel been on hand or any of the other commanders followed protocol at the onset of the invasion (6 June), there would have been a far greater defensive effort than what historically happened.


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## Freebird (Dec 11, 2015)

Wiking85, the British Chiefs of Staff deemed "Roundup" unworkable in 1943, Churchill agreed, and I've not seen any documentary evidence that would make it in any way possible.
If you assert that it was you should, if asked, provide some references for the assumptions you claim, because otherwise it's just an uninformed opinion.

Since you've claimed these numbers options, what do you base it on?

BTW, you have not answered my question from earlier, how does FDR explain to Stalin that he will be going back on his word to land forces in 1942, and that he'll be hanging the Soviets out to dry?
How do the US Chiefs justify the risk of sitting idle in face of a possible Soviet collapse?

The standard that I like to use is "Reasonable and Prudent, _*based on the information available at the time*_"

One other thing to consider is that the Allies can't be making plans on the fly, force transfers take time and a cross channel operation needs a couple months preparation at a very minimum, so you can't just assume that things happen overnight.





parsifal said:


> I admit I tend to agree, though it is not a lay down mezzaire because of supply issues for the allies as they advance further west. But unlikely that Rommel could stop Monty after alamein.
> 
> I dont think this is the critical question though. The issue is, what happens after Tripoli falls? You cant leave North Africa and the middle East ungarisoned, whilst the italians are still in the ring, and without US support in the med, it is not possible to contemplate HUSKY or Salerno. Italy given the chance to take breath gives back the initiative to the Axis and prevents the allies from concentrating their forces. it has the same effect as if Rommel was holed up in Tripoli......







wiking85 said:


> Assuming then Libya is lost with the Africa Corps and Italian forces.



You can't just assume that Libya is lost, given a different situation.

Parsifal, I'm not claiming that Rommel will stop Monty, only that stalemate in Libya is a possibility.

Wiking, the rapid withdrawal from Libya was a direct result of the Allied Torch landings, Rommel would be a fool to stand and fight in Central/Eastern Libya when the Allies were already racing for Tunis and all of the Axis forces sent are landing in Tunisia, much better to stand at the more defensible Mareth line.

Without Torch, these reinforcements would be landing in Benghazi or Tripoli to stiffen the DAK defence, making 8th Army's advance slower.
Note that Case Anton is still possible, even without Torch.


What I'm saying here is that you can't assume that any of the 8th Army troops or aircraft would be available to send to the UK as they would at the very best be finishing the job in early 1943, or possible still fighting into the summer.
In any event, Monty's force would take months to ship back to the UK. (And some forces like the Australians, Indians South Africans would not be sent to the UK anyways.




wiking85 said:


> The Italians and other Axis minor powers were quite important additions to Axis strength and their loss was sorely felt, even if the combat power was limited. Still the divisions you're talking about in the Balkans and Aegean were mostly static 3rd rate divisions only meant to hold coastline, not be deployed for major combat operations in the East.



The strength of the Italians is not really relevant, it's the strength of the German units sent to replaced them after the sudden surrender of Italy, which was many front line units. (2nd Panzer, 5th 10th SS divisions etc)





parsifal said:


> wiking85 said:
> 
> 
> > As to landing choices they'd be covered by thousands of Allied fighters, in excess of 4k IIRC, while the Germans save about 1k from the Mediterranean and still need to defend Germany. They'd be at least outnumbered by 2:1 over the beachheads if not even more. Trying to have heavily armed fighters to shoot down Allied bombers then would not be able to survive the Allied fighter sweeps.
> ...



How in the world do you get 4,000 Allied day fighters? 
The RAF has 1,300 to 1,400 fighters in early 1943, + another 1,400 - 1,500 bombers (including Coastal Command)
but some of those fighters are night fighters.

What USAAF fighter groups are available by May of 1943?

I have: 1, 4, 14, 31, 52, 56, 78 groups, which include those sent to North Africa, this wouldn't be more than about 400 to 500 operational aircraft.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VIII_Fighter_Command#Components

So ~1,200 RAF fighters + 500 USAAF is at best about 1,700 fighters, of which the US pilots are not as experienced as the British or German pilots.

Also, having 1,600 or 1,700 fighters does NOT mean that you can put them all over an invasion beach all of the time for defence.


Aircraft deployments are not my specialty, so can anyone provide some more detail about which US fighter groups are available and how many could be in the UK instead of North Africa?

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## wiking85 (Dec 11, 2015)

GrauGeist said:


> Keep in mind that the German's reaction at Normandy was beset with several mistakes and had Rommel been on hand or any of the other commanders followed protocol at the onset of the invasion (6 June), there would have been a far greater defensive effort than what historically happened.



Like what?


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## parsifal (Dec 11, 2015)

wiking85 said:


> Like what?



We will never know. The best we can do is look at the basic arithmetic and then assume responses commensurate with operational experience, doctrine etc.

Firstly just to get a rough idea of force availability for the germans. In June 1942, there were 28 Divisions in France. Some were newly mobilised units raised to replace those uits rushed East after the emergency of the preceding winter, some were shattered units returned to the west for rebuilding. But as the experiences of Dieppe clearly show, not only was the experience levels for the allies extremely lacking (and far worse for the greenhorn US army units which fell apart in battles like Kasserine), but the experioence levels for the heer vastly superior to what was available in 1944. Moreover the level of mobility available to German units in 1942 was on average about 2.5 times better off than it was in 1944. On top of that the Germans will have a vastly improved road and rail network on which to rely, since at best the allies might be able to gain air parity over small parts of the coastal region where the landing is to take place. In particular this would have meant a far higher reinforcement rate than was possible at Normandy, compared to a much reduced effort that the allies could call upon. 

Just to look at the raw numbers of divs available is revealing. There wre 28 divs in France and the low countries in June 1942. Another 5 1/3 at the frontiers with Vichy, another 7 or 8 in Germany being refitted, 2 in Denmark, 9 in southern Norway acting as an anti-invasion reserve, 5 or 6 in the Balkans, 4 in Greece, 9 in Italy. That gives them a potential of about 70 divs that can be called upon. Obviously not all could be used, but thats not the point. If you are an allied planner you would assume all of these divisions at some point, in some strength could potentially be used against you. If, as was the case in 1942, the ability of the allies to control the initiative, undertake countrywide interdiction they have no other option other than to assume a worst case scenario.

In 1943 its worse. As at June 1943, there were 21 combat ready divisions manning the wall, plus 10 being rebuilt but still considered somewhat ready. There 5 PZ, SSPZ or PG divs plus an armoured heavy assault bde. In the balkans there were 13 divs, in Greece there were 6 Infantry and 1 pz, in southern Norway there were 10 in reserve including 1 pz div (or Bde), and Denmark 3. In the low countries there were 5 or 6 divs. In Germany there were 3 Inf divs listed as combat ready and a further 11 Inf, 1 Jaeger, 2 PZ, and 5 PG divs being refitted. In an emergency these formations could be gotten into battle within days, as the experiences in Salerno showed. In Italy there were 9 Inf Divs on the mainland, whilst in Sicily, and sardinia there were 2 Pz, 1 Pz Bde, and 5 PG Divs . That gives a total available pool of 112 divs that could be called upon at some point, not all at once, but significant portions. The mobility and training of some units was less than in 1942, but on the other hand the mechanised formations were truly formidable. If we assume a frontage for the amphibious assaults similar to Salerno that gives a frontage of 25-30 miles for the allies, and means the Germans only 6-8 divs at any time to contain them (by comparison the allied assault frontages at Normandy were over 80 miles) . Given the available reserves in western and Southern Europe, the Germans would be in a position to completely dominate this battlefield more or less indefinately. In other words, ANZIO on steroids......

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## parsifal (Dec 11, 2015)

> None of the above indicates that an Allied invasion would be stopped on the beaches given that defenses were far less ready,



They were ready enough to deliver a stinging reverse at Dieppe. To argue the defences were "ready" or even "more ready" is just mouthing Nazi propaganda about the Festung Europa. As Rundstedt stated after the war, the whole idea of the Atlantic wall except in a few select locations was a Nazi propaganda lie. So, from nothing in 1944, we are still going to have nothing in 1943 or 1942...... 



> Vichy France is going to tie down a fair number of German divisions in case they flip sides,



Historically one division was held away from the beaches with a specific mission of keeping watch on the Vichy. Once Vichy showed signs of wavering the Germans moved quickly to ramp it up, and also admittedly forces earmarked as strategic reserves held in the interior of France also had a second funtion of dealing with the french if they tried anything. 

But nothing would happen unless the allies were making moves in French North Africa, which in this hypothetical they arent. One way things might change is if the allies captured Paris, but I am doubtful about that. Plus what good for the goose.......the allies will need to station significant forces in and around Gibraltar or held in reserve in England to cover against possible spanish or French moves, or, alternatively to rush to the French aid in the event the Germans and italians decide upon an aggressive takeover of the French colonies. Far from being a net liability for the germans, and uncertain Vichy is a benefit, because whilst uncertain for them, its even more uncertain for the allies.... 



> Also your numbers for US AC in the Mediterranean are weird. Why wouldn't all the MTO aircraft be in England instead without a US MTO involvement?


Even before Torch there were significant numbers of US aircraft deployed into the Middle East , to undertake a number of vital missions. Including, support of the Yugoslav partisans, long range bombing raids over Ploesti, strategic bombing of italy, long range suppression of the italian fleet, to name a few



> As to British aircraft they don't need to defend Britain given that for both sides they will be virtually completely throwing their full weight into the invasion offensive/defense, not leaving much for the Germans to attack Britain with and even that would likely be employed against the beachheads.



The British had far too many assets in Britain to leave vast areas of the country undefended. This was clearly shown to be an absolute necessity during the BoB. Despite the massive pressure bing brought to bear against the british in the SE, they always retained a credible defence in the midlands and the North. The RAF continued with this until th very end of the war. The British Isles were never left totally defenceless, no matter how weak the opposition 



> Meanwhile given the work of the RAF at night its the Germans that will need to keep AC tied down defending Germany.



BC by 1943 were mounting an average of 1-3 big raids per month, and these were being resisted by perhaps 250 Nightfighters. The British had tried this sought of chicanery in 1941 when the Germans had kicked off Barbarossa. Despite valiant efforts by the RAF to draw off fighters to the Reich and the west from the East, not a single fighter was pulled away from the East in response. Later, in support of their own attacksd over Malta, the Germans showed their flexibility by transfering a whole FliegerKorps to Sicily. What this suggests is that making assumptions about what your opponent might or might not do is a very unsound way to plan your campaign. The best you can do is crunch the numbers, know your ownvital interests, and then assume the worst scenario from your opponent. 



> As to your earlier point about coastal divisions being used in the East...why are you including Jaeger divisions/units in that? They aren't coast/point defense troops, they are light infantry that were used to attack.


 They werent classified as Jaeger Divs at the time they were in France. They were regular Infantry, that were being refitted. Whilst under refit they were assigned coastal defence duties. Thats the sort of quandery this whole "coastal div" stuff present, they were often given that status temporarily, either as a mission statement, or because they werent quite fully combat ready 



> Also in the Ukraine in the winter of 1942-43 operations were way to mobile and armor based for a bunch of low quality coastal infantry divisions to make a difference and I find it bizarre that you think equipment wasn't a serious issue for the Germans at this point; it most certainly was, as there were constant unmet demands for just about all categories of equipment, especially transport and horses. Suddenly upgrading 20 divisions with everything they need to make them regular infantry is impossible in 1942-43, same with shipping and supplying them at the ass-end of a attentuated supply system in East Ukraine.



The majority of the units transferred East were not sent to AGS, though a few did, where they fought exceptionally well in line with their veteran experience. The majority were sent to the AGC, where they stayed in static positions for nearly two years. These werent "low grade" by any stretch of the imagination. Most of them were regular infantry that had fought with distinction in the early campaigns.

As to equipment, the heer did find ways to equip new units many times through the war, on a generally mass scale. Thats how the german replacement army worked. Maybe 3 or four times a year it would be able to release a large number of units in a single hit....they were called "waves". And as a generalisation the heer was not short of Infantry weapons or transport as such until; after 1943. Quoting Maclean in his seminal work on German Army weapons, he states onpage 190 "_when home production was unable to keep pace with demand, a point reached in the mid war period (1942-3), factories in the occupied countries were brought in to fill the gaps, along with refurbished captured equipment. Some of them made German weapons others made indigenous designs for the heer. It was not a policy that endeared the heer logisitics officers, but it meant there were always enough weapons to go around. " _In 1942 there were further comb outs of the French vehicle parks, which destroyed the french economy but provided vehicles needed for these transfers. Vast quantities of captured Czech, Russian, French, and Polish (mostly) equipment ensured equipment stocks always remained fairly good. The Heer for example alway maintained rifle reserves in excess of 30 million and enough artillery reserves to equip around 50-80 divs. There was not a problem in doing this sort of thing all the time. 

As the war progressed things did get a lot harder. The big constraints affecting the heer were, trained manpower, shortages of motor transport, multiplicity of MT types, shortages of Draft animals, As 1943 wore on artillery stocks began to dry up as more and more effort went into flak production, Small arms were never in short supply, though some units got the short straw as they were forced to use some disheartening foreign cast offs.

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## stona (Dec 12, 2015)

parsifal said:


> (Part II)
> 
> 
> 
> ...



Winter months always saw a decline in tonnage dropped. I agree with your point though. In December 1942 the RAF dropped just 3,927 tons. This steadily increased to a peak of 25,858 tons in August 1943 before the winter decline to just 16,326 tons in December 1943.

Contrast this with the months leading up to the invasion. March 1944 36,979 tons, April 41,686 tons, May 51,302 tons. By the August peak the RAF was dropping 87,187 tons which fell to a mere 42,594 in the January weather.

The RAF was delivering roughly three times the tonnage in 1944 that it did in 1943.

I'm firmly in the school that reckons a 1943 invasion of NW Europe would have been impossible. An attempt would have ended in catastrophe, which is pretty much why it wasn't tried.

Cheers

Steve

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## stona (Dec 21, 2015)

Further to this, according to 'The Strategic Air War Against Germany 1939-1945', the British equivalent of the USSBS, the following bombers were available at the given times. Totals are for Bomber Command and the US 8th and 15th Air Forces.

*July 1943, 1,823* (51 Mosquito, 124 Wellington, 203 Stirling, 331 Halifax, 444 Lancaster, 670 Fortress and Liberators.

*July 1944, 5,246 * (138 Mosquito, 37 Stirling, 562 Halifax, 864 Lancaster, 3,647 Fortress and Liberators.

Though Bomber Command's total has risen from 1,153 to 1,601 it is the US build up which is more relevant, from 670 to 3,645 bombers. I fail to see how this could have been achieved a year earlier, nor how an invasion could have been carried out without it.

Cheers

Steve

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## syscom3 (Dec 21, 2015)

stona said:


> Further to this, according to 'The Strategic Air War Against Germany 1939-1945', the British equivalent of the USSBS, the following bombers were available at the given times. Totals are for Bomber Command and the US 8th and 15th Air Forces.
> 
> *July 1943, 1,823* (51 Mosquito, 124 Wellington, 203 Stirling, 331 Halifax, 444 Lancaster, 670 Fortress and Liberators.
> 
> ...



Do you have the figures for the tactical air forces? That's what is going to decide the invasion. Not heavy bombers that will need months of work before any results are noted.


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## stona (Dec 22, 2015)

syscom3 said:


> Do you have the figures for the tactical air forces? That's what is going to decide the invasion. Not heavy bombers that will need months of work before any results are noted.



The Tactical Air Forces didn't decide the invasion alone. Those 5,000+ bombers worked literally around the clock for many weeks preparing the ground for the invasion. By mid February 1944 even Harris had resigned himself to supporting the Transport Plan etc. Without them there is no invasion...period.
It's also worth remebering that both pre and post invasion the 'heavy' bombers were used in a tactical role in France with mixed results, doing everything from bombing coastal defences and installations to directly supporting ground operations, often with mixed results. They would continue to be used in this way up to the end of the war, whilst also continuing the combined bombing offensive.

I don't have numbers for the Tactical Air Forces to hand, but the 9th AF went underwent a similar exponential increase in strength from 1943 to early 1944 following its re-organisation and move from North Africa. By May 1944 it was operating nearly 5,000 aircraft. 

The RAF's 2nd TAF was created by dividing Fighter Command in June 1943 rather than building up an almost entirely new force.

Cheers

Steve

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## stona (Dec 26, 2015)

A table showing the build up of fighters in the 8th AF:







Cheers

Steve

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## stona (Dec 26, 2015)

Re-reading this thread I feel I have to clarify the status of the 'Pointblank' directive (as it would become known). When this was initially issued on 10th June ('43) it amended but did not supercede the Casablanca directive. It directed that as an_ intermediate objective_ Luftwaffe fighter forces and the industries sustaining them should be first priority targets whilst not changing the primary objective of the bomber offensive. German Air Force industries, though not fighter forces, were already at number two on the list of targets agreed at Casablanca in January.
The rationale was to degrade the capability of the Luftwaffe enough to allow the Allied air forces that degree of tactical freedom which would permit German targets to be attacked at an unprohibitive cost. It was really a slight shift of emphasis as a means to an end and an acknowledgement that unless something was done with the Luftwaffe the current campaign(s) were not going to be sustainable.

Some commanders took 'Pointblank' and the input from the 'Jockey Committee' set up to help in targeting a little to seriously! Doolittle had to be reminded by Anderson in late 1944 that the output from 'Jockey' was not directives but material issued for information to help in decision making.

In the context of the original thread it must be evident that this had to be achieved before an invasion of NW Europe, and that couldn't happen in 1942. The British couldn't do it and the Americans were not yet in a position to do it so early.

Just saying 

Cheers

Steve

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## wiking85 (Dec 27, 2015)

stona said:


> A table showing the build up of fighters in the 8th AF:
> 
> 
> 
> ...



Do you have one for the 9th and 15t AFs?


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## drgondog (Dec 29, 2015)

I have watched this thread without jumping in simply because the notion that an invasion in June 1943 (latest) prior to June 1944 is ludicrous to me. RAF was weaker in June, AAF was a shell in 1943 compared to 1944. The LW reserves were far higher, depending on actions taken by High Command on notice of invasion from East and South.

The Allies are nowhere close to whittling pilots and crews of LW in May-June 1943 in contrast to May 1944.

The US Build up in GB is impossible with upcoming Sicily Op, and the US troops were relatively un bloodied in May 1943 vs May 1944. Airborne Ops were in its infancy prior to Sicily and Salerno. The LST and LCI inventory was totally inadequate, surface fleet security particularly at night was inadequate.

Most Commonwealth troops potential invasion reserves (absent US troops) were positioned in Africa and CBI. 

The Atlantic Wall was always a fallacy - what was critical was Wermacht reserves within 100 miles of a beach invasion and the ability to counterattack while disrupting the supply chain for Allied reserves.

It was CLOSE enough in June-July 1944 with a FAR stronger ALLIED position and far weaker German position one year later to contemplate success in June 1943


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## tomo pauk (Dec 29, 2015)

Bill - there is no upcoming Sicily op without Torch, that being the main premise of the thread. Without Torch, most of the US aircraft historically shipped to the North Africa end up in UK in 1942/43, and a good deal of RAF.


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## gjs238 (Dec 29, 2015)

So, if the USSR was near collapse, could the western allies mount ANY kind of action to draw off German pressure?
Thinking Sledgehammer, Roundup and Roundhammer here.


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## stona (Dec 30, 2015)

This couldn't be done a year earlier.






It's not because the aircraft are committed elsewhere, it's because most of them haven't even been built.

Don't make too much of the numerical inferiority of the Luftwaffe in NW Europe.






The ratio in favour of the western allies is already substantial in mid 1943. Quantity was not the issue for the Luftwaffe, quality, and later the ability to operate at all, were.

Cheers

Steve


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## gjs238 (Dec 30, 2015)

Wow, looks like oil targets were barely touched in '43


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## parsifal (Dec 30, 2015)

gjs238 said:


> So, if the USSR was near collapse, could the western allies mount ANY kind of action to draw off German pressure?
> Thinking Sledgehammer, Roundup and Roundhammer here.



Survival of the Soviets as a major allied partner was a vital interest for the allies, and they made extraordinary sacrifices to try and ensure this remained the case, as the losses in PQ-17 and other operations clearly illustrate. There were other costs, perhaps less obvious, but no less real. One example I can think of is the horrendous famine in Bengal in 1942-3, brought on, not by a shortage of food, rather by a shortage of rail transport, after most of it had been shifted to the middle east to support the transfer of Lend Lease through through Iran. 

Both ROUNDUP and the earlier SLEDGEHAMMER were devised to exploit German weakness in the event of an Axis collapse in Russia, or aas a desperation measure to try and relieve pressure on the Soviets in the event that they (the Soviets) showed signs of wavering. Both plans were thoroughly unrealistic. Both were dependant on BOLERO, the US build up of forces in the UK for the cross channel attack. By the end of August 1942, the BOLERO movement had transferred 386 airplanes: 164 P-38's of the 1st and 14th Fighter Groups; 119 B-17's of the 97th, 301st, and 92nd Bomb Groups; and 103 C-47's of the 60th and 64th Troop Carrier Groups, all of which became part of the Twelfth Air Force in Africa before the end of the year. 920 airplanes had been sent from the United States to England by the end of 1942, and 882 had arrived safely. This was a welcome addition to the defences in the UK, but hardly a decisive reinforcement able to take on the German garrison in France in anything like winnable terms. 

For the ground forces by July 1, 1942, demands from other theaters, and the constant need to split formations so as to serve as cadres for other units following the training pipelines, had caused a massive downward revision of the BOLERO build-up to a total of 54 air groups and 194,332 men for the army. Later that month USAAF Headquarters estimated that by December 31, 1943, the BOLERO build-up could have in place 137 groups (approximately half of the entire projected strength of the USAAF), including 74 bomb groups of all types and 31 fighter groups. It estimated that 375,000 airmen would comprise the force, 197,000 in combat units and 178,000 in the service organizations. The estimate proved to be remarkably close, particularly the size of the heavy bomber force, to the actual strength of the combined Eighth and Ninth Air Forces at the time of Operation Overlord. I dont have the figures for the army in 1943, but it was of a similar scale I have read. Impressive, becoming a credible threat to German security in the West, but still hardly enough to realistically entertain serious thought to a cross channel attack 

In London the BOLERO Committee estimated that in order to take on the defences of Western Europe, the Americans alone, in 1943, would need 1,147,000 US troops, including 137,000 replacements. They were at about 30% of that strength as at June 1943. To pull off the attack, there would need to be a massive German drain out of troop concentrations in the west. 

So, my opinion is that the SLEDGEHAMMER, ROUNDUP and ROUNDHAMMER plans were all mostly bluff, and not a workable threat.If the Soviets had really needed additional help, the allies could have shut down the Pacific build ups, considered peripheral attacks into places like Spain or other peripheries, but an attack on the main front was really just not a realistic option.


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## drgondog (Dec 30, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> Bill - there is no upcoming Sicily op without Torch, that being the main premise of the thread. Without Torch, most of the US aircraft historically shipped to the North Africa end up in UK in 1942/43, and a good deal of RAF.



Tomo - conversely the German air and ground forces consumed by operation Torch and the reserves available to move to France are considerable. Combine that with green USA forces and fewer total US Fighter groups in UK than available in Jan 1944. Stona and Parsifal's arguments are sound IMO.

Summary - Germany was considerably stronger in December 1942 than December 1943 and the Commonwealth/US forces in Europe were considerably weaker during the same timeframe. 

The sustained build up of infantry, armor and invasion fleet from US in early 1944 tipped the balance (IMO) for June 6, 1944 - combined with the rapid disintegration of LW air assets in the west during that same five month period.


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## gjs238 (Dec 30, 2015)

*"Europe First"*
Is some of this situation due to the Europe First policy not being strictly adhered to and a greater push against Japan?


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## wiking85 (Dec 30, 2015)

stona said:


> This couldn't be done a year earlier.
> 
> 
> It's not because the aircraft are committed elsewhere, it's because most of them haven't even been built.
> ...



The problem with your numbers is that that only factors in the strategic bombing directive that was initiated in 1943. USAAF/RAF army support and operations in the Mediterranean, especially against Sicily. So much of the bombing of 1942-43 was not strategic/economic in nature, it was in support of the army via bombing enemy airfields and units. That was then operational and tactical in nature, which the bombing in 1943 in support of an invasion would be, not strategic in nature as your chart is. So its measuring two different things and is thus not relevant to the discussion about what would be possible.

For the 2nd chart you're leaving out the 5.2:1 section for 1943 in the Mediterranean. As per the OP those Allied forces would be directed to the UK for 1943, so that huge Allied numerical advantage would appear there instead of the Mediterranean.


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## wiking85 (Dec 30, 2015)

parsifal said:


> Survival of the Soviets as a major allied partner was a vital interest for the allies, and they made extraordinary sacrifices to try and ensure this remained the case, as the losses in PQ-17 and other operations clearly illustrate. There were other costs, perhaps less obvious, but no less real. One example I can think of is the horrendous famine in Bengal in 1942-3, brought on, not by a shortage of food, rather by a shortage of rail transport, after most of it had been shifted to the middle east to support the transfer of Lend Lease through through Iran.


What do you think the Allies would do if the Soviets did collapse in 1942, say due to Moscow falling in 1941 and Stalin being couped and a power struggle breaking out? Would the Allies then make peace or continue to fight the war to the bitter end?


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## wiking85 (Dec 30, 2015)

parsifal said:


> In London the BOLERO Committee estimated that in order to take on the defences of Western Europe, the Americans alone, in 1943, would need 1,147,000 US troops, including 137,000 replacements. They were at about 30% of that strength as at June 1943. To pull off the attack, there would need to be a massive German drain out of troop concentrations in the west.


Okay this is just silly. You're completely leaving out that there was Operation Torch/Tunisia/Sicily going on, which sucked in thousands of aircraft and hundreds of thousands of US and UK troops. Sicily alone had almost 500k men involved at its peak.

As per the OP that wouldn't happen here, all that would be directed to the UK instead.


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## stona (Dec 30, 2015)

wiking85 said:


> The problem with your numbers is that that only factors in the strategic bombing directive that was initiated in 1943. USAAF/RAF army support and operations in the Mediterranean, especially against Sicily. So much of the bombing of 1942-43 was not strategic/economic in nature, it was in support of the army via bombing enemy airfields and units. That was then operational and tactical in nature, which the bombing in 1943 in support of an invasion would be, not strategic in nature as your chart is. So its measuring two different things and is thus not relevant to the discussion about what would be possible.



it is measuring the tonnages dropped against the principal target systems. These were not substantially different in 1943 and 1944, though priorities varied as directives were issued. 1942 is irrelevant as the strategic bomber forces comprised Bomber Command which was still struggling to hit anything.

I have a long list of all the directives issued throughout the war and the 'German Air Force'/aircraft industry and oil feature on just about every one from May 1940 on. Even before the 'Transport Plan' communications are listed on some directives, first appearing on 20th June 1940.

The chart also represents in an easy to read way the tonnages dropped which directly relates to the lift capacity of the three air forces involved. In 1942/43 no matter what the targets, that level of bombing was impossible because the aircraft to carry it out were not in Europe, in fact they hadn't been built. To carry out the sort of bombing that was executed in support of the 1944 invasion of NW Europe you would somehow, magically, have to conjure up the hundreds of bombers required do it at least a year earlier.
My argument is that any invasion of France was totally dependant on many factors including the contribution of the strategic air forces.

Maybe a chart of the aircraft available and total bomb lift capacity would make this clearer.







The large spike in bomb lift relative to the number of operational aircraft in 1944 is due to the shorter missions being flown in support of the invasion allowing a heavier average bomb load per sortie.

Cheers

Steve


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## wiking85 (Dec 30, 2015)

stona said:


> The chart also represents in an easy to read way the tonnages dropped which directly relates to the lift capacity of the three air forces involved. In 1942/43 no matter what the targets, that level of bombing was impossible because the aircraft to carry it out were not in Europe, in fact they hadn't been built. To carry out the sort of bombing that was executed in support of the 1944 invasion of NW Europe you would somehow, magically, have to conjure up the hundreds of bombers required do it at least a year earlier.
> My argument is that any invasion of France was totally dependant on many factors including the contribution of the strategic air forces.
> 
> Maybe a chart of the aircraft available and total bomb lift capacity would make this clearer.
> ...



Again that is only the RAF and USAAF units involved directly in strategic bombing, not all bombers operating against Europe. It specifically states 8th AF and RAF BC only, not 9th AF or 15th or tactical bombing units in Britain or the Mediterranean. A strategic bombing force of 1944 size isn't necessary to a successful invasion, they did help, but that was highly wastefully done in Spring 1944 in indirect rail interdiction (which didn't stop the flow of Germans to the battlefield). What was much more crucial was tactical air power, which overwhelmed the Germans in the Mediterranean historically and would be massed against an invasion area to interdict it. Given that Tunisia alone saw over 3k Allied aircraft demolishing the Axis air forces in the Mediterranean with 5:1 numbers in June 1943 (per your chart) that would be available in Europe. Take the island of Pantelleria. It was hit with 4500 bombing sorties in 10 days and surrendered as a result. That sort of air power would be available in June 1943 for France if we go by the OP.
OPERATION CORKSCREW - PANTELLERIA


> In the June of 1943 14,203 bombs amounting to 4,119 tons were dropped on 16 batteries. Out of 80 guns bombed 43 were damaged 10 beyond repair.


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Corkscrew
http://www.afhra.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-090529-104.pdf


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## tomo pauk (Dec 30, 2015)

Maybe this will put the numbers in perspective - USAF aircraft in the ETO vs. total USAF aircraft in theaters vs. Germany. Total minus ETO = MTO; MTO > ETO. Please open the pic separately for hi res.






Actually:


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## stona (Dec 30, 2015)

Well the chart does include the 15th AF.

We fundamentally disagree if you believe that a successful invasion could have been carried out in 1944 without the concerted campaign by the allied strategic bombing forces.

As for tactical air power, we've already shown the lack of aircraft in the 8th and 9th air forces as well as the RAF's 2nd TAF (which was created by breaking up Fighter Command in any case).

4,000 tons of bombs is a pin prick compared to the quantities dropped in support of Overlord. Between 6th March and D-Day 67,000 tons of bombs were dropped on railway targets in France, Belgium, Luxembourg and to a minor extent Western Germany, east of the Ruhr.

Whether it stopped German troop movement I don't know, but it certainly stopped the trains:






Then there is the Oil Plan. Around the time of the invasion oil production (including imports and captured stocks) fell from around 500,000 tonnes/month to less than 200,000 tonnes/month. Total consumption (civil (including exports) and military) always hovered around 500,000tonnes/month, despite ever more severe rationing. At the same time oil reserves started a near vertical fall from about 1,300,000 tonnes in March 1944 to just 400,000 tonnes in January 1945 (last known figure). This was almost entirely due to a combination of loss of territory and the strategic bombing force. Without it the German forces in the west may have been able to operate without one hand tied behind their backs. They certainly could have in 1943 when demand exceeded supply only to fuel offensive operations in Russia.

The destruction of the Luftwaffe fighter forces was also entirely due to the strategic bombing offensive. Without USAAF daylight raids the Luftwaffe could not have been forced up to its destruction. This was not achieved in time for an invasion in 1943. German fighter production did increase under the bombing, but in 1944 single engine fighters comprised 65% of total production, compared with 17.3% in 1940 and 37.7% in 1943. It is estimated that in the second quarter of 1943 German aircraft production was running at 100% of its potential, that allied bombing had no effect. By the same period in 1944 it was reduced to 91%, by the third quarter 80%. That's a lot of aircraft that weren't built. Who would have flown them, had they been built, is a moot point!

Next up landing craft, or lack thereof in 1943. You are going to need something over 4,000 landing craft and landing ships for your invasion. That's on top of the 2,400 aircraft and nearly 900 gliders for your airborne operations. 

Cheers

Steve

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## wiking85 (Dec 30, 2015)

tomo pauk said:


> Maybe this will put the numbers in perspective - USAF aircraft in the ETO vs. total USAF aircraft in theaters vs. Germany. Total minus ETO = MTO; MTO > ETO. Please open the pic separately for hi res.
> 
> View attachment 308399
> 
> ...



Alright these are the numbers that matter. And that's just the USAAF, not even RAF numbers. With 5000 first line aircraft in Europe in June 1943 with just the USAAF that's plenty to invade and provide the necessary air support.


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## stona (Dec 30, 2015)

wiking85 said:


> With 5000 first line aircraft in Europe in June 1943 with just the USAAF that's plenty to invade and provide the necessary air support.



Really. Those figures show 346 fighters in the ETO for June 1943 and 2,048 in the MTO. Are you seriously going to count the 347 P-39s and 717 P-40s as viable for operations in NW Europe against the Luftwaffe? The USAAF clearly didn't. It had a combined total of these types of 5 in the ETO.

Take just them out (not figures for 'others') and you now have 984 first line fighters in the MTO which, added to the 346 in the ETO gives a *total of 1,320 first line fighters to take on the Luftwaffe. This might be the figure that matters.*

I'd suggest leaving the P-38s behind in the MTO as well, now you've got well less than 1,000 first line fighters 

Cheers

Steve


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## wiking85 (Dec 30, 2015)

stona said:


> Really. Those figures show 346 fighters in the ETO for June 1943 and 2,048 in the MTO. Are you seriously going to count the 347 P-39s and 717 P-40s as viable for operations in NW Europe against the Luftwaffe? The USAAF clearly didn't. It had a combined total of these types of 5 in the ETO.
> 
> Take just them out (not figures for 'others') and you now have 984 first line fighters in the MTO which, added to the 346 in the MTO gives a *total of 1,320 first line fighters to take on the Luftwaffe. This might be the figure that matters.*
> 
> ...



P154 shows over 5000 combat aircraft in the European theater. The P-40s fought and killed the LW in Tunisia and Sicily in 1943.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curtiss_P-40_Warhawk#Operational_history


> Tomahawks and Kittyhawks bore the brunt of Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica fighter attacks during the North African campaign. The P-40s were considered superior to the Hurricane, which they replaced as the primary fighter of the Desert Air Force.[9]
> 
> The P-40 initially proved quite effective against Axis aircraft and contributed to a slight shift of momentum in the Allied favor. The gradual replacement of Hurricanes by the Tomahawks and Kittyhawks led to the Luftwaffe accelerating retirement of the Bf 109E and introducing the newer Bf 109F; these were to be flown by the veteran pilots of elite Luftwaffe units, such as Jagdgeschwader 27 (JG27), in North Africa.[31]
> 
> The P-40 was generally considered roughly equal or slightly superior to the Bf 109 at low altitude, but inferior at high altitude, particularly against the Bf 109F.[32] Most air combat in North Africa took place well below 16,000 ft (4,900 m), thus negating much of the Bf 109's superiority. The P-40 usually had an edge over the Bf 109 in horizontal maneuverability (turning), dive speed and structural strength, was roughly equal in firepower, but was slightly inferior in speed and outclassed in rate of climb and operational ceiling.[9][31]


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## stona (Dec 30, 2015)

There is no way that P-40s could have operated at the combat altitudes of the ETO. That's why they were in the MTO. You are just paddling furiously to stay afloat 

The total number of combat aircraft isn't the relevant number. I'm sure the RAF still had plenty of Hurricanes and other older types on its books as well. They were sensibly sent to other theatres where they continued to serve. They didn't take on the Bf 109Gs and Fw 190 As in the ETO.
To defeat the Luftwaffe you need competitive fighters. Allowing the P-38s the USAAF can provide about 1,300. That's more than the single engine fighters that the Luftwaffe had in the west, but it too could free resources from elsewhere in this scenario.
I don't think that the Americans could provide enough fighters in 1943. They certainly couldn't provide enough bombers.
Cheers
Steve


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## wiking85 (Dec 30, 2015)

stona said:


> There is no way that P-40s could have operated at the combat altitudes of the ETO. That's why they were in the MTO. You are just paddling furiously to stay afloat


 Funny. I could apply that to you below. If the fight is low and there is a need for fighter-bombers then the P-40 is just fine. High altitudes in Europe were only an issue for strategic bombing, not tactical combat that would be the issue for an invasion. You keep comparing apples to oranges and think you're making a sound point.



stona said:


> The total number of combat aircraft isn't the relevant number. I'm sure the RAF still had plenty of Hurricanes and other older types on its books as well. They were sensibly sent to other theatres where they continued to serve. They didn't take on the Bf 109Gs and Fw 190 As in the ETO.


A winner from WW2 did rightly say "numbers have a quality all their own". Swamp an already overloaded defender and he's done for. By mid-1943 the Germans were outnumbered ~5:1 overall in the air according to your own chart. 



stona said:


> To defeat the Luftwaffe you need competitive fighters. Allowing the P-38s the USAAF can provide about 1,300. That's more than the single engine fighters that the Luftwaffe had in the west, but it too could free resources from elsewhere in this scenario.
> I don't think that the Americans could provide enough fighters in 1943. They certainly couldn't provide enough bombers.
> Cheers
> Steve


Not really, just force him to fight on your terms in an area you can keep covered and you'll wear him down even if you're taking 2:1 losses. Worked for the Soviets at Kuban and historically for the USAAF in Tunisia and over Sicily. As it was in terms of combat aircraft the Luftwaffe was outnumbered over 5:1 in the Mediterranean in June 1943 and 3:1 in Western Europe.
According to Tomo's chart the USAAF alone, not counting the RAF at all, had 2400 first line fighters in Europe as of June 1943. And 1300 1st line strategic bombers. And over 1000 medium bombers. Plus the RAF and you've at a minimum have at least doubled that. What did the Germans have against the Wallies? Against the Wallies alone they had again according to your own chart a ratio of more than 4:1 against them.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 30, 2015)

stona said:


> There is no way that P-40s could have operated at the combat altitudes of the ETO. That's why they were in the MTO. You are just paddling furiously to stay afloat
> 
> The total number of combat aircraft isn't the relevant number. I'm sure the RAF still had plenty of Hurricanes and other older types on its books as well. They were sensibly sent to other theatres where they continued to serve. They didn't take on the Bf 109Gs and Fw 190 As in the ETO.
> To defeat the Luftwaffe you need competitive fighters. Allowing the P-38s the USAAF can provide about 1,300. That's more than the single engine fighters that the Luftwaffe had in the west, but it too could free resources from elsewhere in this scenario.
> ...



In the air war against Germany, USAF have had in June 1943 some 1300 B-17/24s and 2400 fighters. USAF of 1943 was not the USAF of 1942, let alone of 1941.


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## drgondog (Dec 30, 2015)

Tomo - In June 1943, there were only 3 8th AF and zero 9th AF FG's in ETO. There 11 B-17 BG's and ALL the B-24 groups were TDY to north Africa for Tidalwave attack on Ploesti. The B-26 BGs were in theatre but ltd ops.

Whatever you pull from MTO enables the LW to respond by moving to ETO


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## gjs238 (Dec 30, 2015)

Would it have been more effective for the western allies to "invade" via the Persian route and fight on the Caucasian Front?


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## parsifal (Dec 30, 2015)

wiking85 said:


> Okay this is just silly. You're completely leaving out that there was Operation Torch/Tunisia/Sicily going on, which sucked in thousands of aircraft and hundreds of thousands of US and UK troops. Sicily alone had almost 500k men involved at its peak.
> 
> As per the OP that wouldn't happen here, all that would be directed to the UK instead.



No as these figures show, the numbers sent to England in the earlier part of 1942 were used in the latter part to form 12th AF. As is so often the case for the allies at this time, there is an element of creative double accounting, as a/c sent to England initially are again counted in the MTO figures in the later part of 1942.

Similarly, the troops and lift capacities as well as the available MT was drawn from the BOLERO forces that had been used to painfully build up the forces in Britain prior to the decisions being made about TORCH. It would not be until the following September (1943) that the allies would restore the ground forces deployed in the UK to their pre-TORCH levels.


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## parsifal (Dec 30, 2015)

gjs238 said:


> *"Europe First"*
> Is some of this situation due to the Europe First policy not being strictly adhered to and a greater push against Japan?




To a very limited extent , yes. The truth is, the US were not decisive in any TO until the latter part of of 1943. In the Pacific, substantial ground forces were needed to be held back on the west coast to parry a possible Japanese invasion of the continental US. In the Hawaiian Islands there were the equivalent of 3 divs. There was a a single div deployed defensively in the SWPAC, and I think a similar force deployment to cover Alaska. In Australia there were two grossly incomplete US divs in training and of course there was the one Marine div on Guadacanal. The lions share of ground troops at the disposal of the PTO commanders were Indian and Australian (Aus had 10 incomplete divs in Aus for example, I think in India there were skeletal elements of nearly 20 divs. and overwhelmingly for both, these were needed for home defence. There were the equivalent of two Aus divs in PNG and something similar on the Burma front. There was one NZ div in NZ.

A complete abandonment of any offensive in the PTO and Burma, whilst retaining the defences around the core base areas, might yield 4-5 divs, at a 2 brigade TOE limited MT and no AT capability. Artillery for these formations would be very limited. It would be possible to suck out more manower, but only if the US could increase its weapons production and somehow the manpower could be trained quicker than it was. For the US in particular, training capacity was the major limiting factor, and would remain so until wars end. 

The big advantage of remaining on the defensive in the Pacific would be the shipping released. The limited offensive in the Pacific sucked out huge quantities of shipping. A division as a rule of thumb needed 3-5 times the shipping capacity on the attack as it did whilst idle and on the defence, and compared to the ETO, about 3 times the shipping per unit was needed per unit. Going over to the defensive in the PTO would yield a lot of shipping for the ETO, and give options as far as release of troops in that TO. Difficult choices, dangerous choices would need to be made in the PTO to yield this dubious value capability in the ETO.


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## parsifal (Dec 30, 2015)

wiking85 said:


> What do you think the Allies would do if the Soviets did collapse in 1942, say due to Moscow falling in 1941 and Stalin being couped and a power struggle breaking out? Would the Allies then make peace or continue to fight the war to the bitter end?



The allies had already shown they would continue to fight, as the British had demonstrated June 1940 to June 1941.

A german victory in front of Moscow in 1941 is a far more difficult proposition that might be expected. It is often touted that if the Kiev offensive had not been pushed the Germans would have been in a position to press on to the capital. Thats true, but fails to take into account that the Germans at the beginning of winter would have been faced with a disjointed, dangerously bulged front line with the vital Rumanian oilfields badly exposed as well, and the Red Army with reserves nearly 70 divs stronger than they were historically. The chances of Stalin being removed is a highly debatebale claim, and no historical precedent exists to support that notion. When Napoleon occupied moscow, there was no catastrophic collapse of the govt of the day, and as Napoleon was to find, Moscow was to prove impossible to hold through the winter.

If the the Germans sucked out substantial reserves from the west to push their offensives to the limit, Churchill (and in '42 it was Churchill who would decide), the British might be induced to commit forces to establish a bridgehead either in Brittany or the Cotentin Peninsula. This would depend on whether the Vichy could be induced to change sides and probably would need the PTO initiatives to be completely abandoned, and it would need a massive bleeding out of available German forces in the West. 

In the event of a separate Soviet peace, better described as a temporary truce I think, there would remain substantial partisan activity and the need to retain massive German forces in garrison in the East even after the "peace". The German office of economic development estimated a garrison strength of at least 70 divs, the commitment of at least 1 million workers, the absorption of 3/5s of German rail capacity for a minimum of 2 years to reconstruct the Soviet infrastructure. This would so badly retard the German war effort that the allies would easily achieve an unassailable lead in that period . 


This is all speculation of course, but based on known predictions and known capabilities


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## bobbysocks (Dec 30, 2015)

what was NAs max run capability in 41 to produce 51As? the RAF was flying them in limited amounts in 41 weren't they? if the scenario changed to where every available plane that could be produced was put on the line how many mustangs could we have fielded by the end of 41?


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## stona (Dec 31, 2015)

wiking85 said:


> Funny. I could apply that to you below. If the fight is low and there is a need for fighter-bombers then the P-40 is just fine. High altitudes in Europe were only an issue for strategic bombing, not tactical combat that would be the issue for an invasion. You keep comparing apples to oranges and think you're making a sound point.



How do you imagine the Luftwaffe fighter were destroyed? The RAF had tried to lure them up with it's fruitless operations in 1941/42. The fighters came up when they wanted to and fought on their terms, inflicting unacceptable casualties on Fighter Command.

If you believe that the RAF or USAAF was prepared to accept 2:1 losses in support of the invasion, then we'll disagree again. The Anglo-Americans are not Russians.

The Luftwaffe HAD to rise to the challenge of the strategic bombers and it was in doing so that it was destroyed. Our fundamental disagreement is that you believe an invasion could have been carried out without the strategic bombing campaign and I don't. On that we'll just have to disagree.

Why wasn't the P-40 deployed in the ETO in 1943? It had good range, for which the USAAF was desperate. I think the reason that there were no P-40s in the ETO is summed up in this contemporary report on the N-1. There would have been more Fs and Ks, with lower performance actually available:

_PROOF DEPARTMENT
ARMY AIR FORCES PROVING GROUND COMMAND
EGLIN FIELD, FLORIDA
7 June 1943

FINAL REPORT ON
TEST OF OPERATIONAL SUITABILITY OF P-40N-1 AIRPLANE

CONCLUSIONS. It is concluded that:

a. In speed, maneuverability, and rate of climb up to approximately twenty thousand (20,000) feet the P-40N-1 is the best of the P-40 series tested to date. While the P-40N-1 is the superior in performance of the P-40 series, it is generally inferior to all other current types of fighters tested at this station.

b. The P-40N-1 is of a design which is believed to have reached its limit in performance unless major changes in control surface design, wing form, structure and horsepower are made.
_
Over Anzio P-40s were used to patrol between 5,000 and 8,000 ft (where it was hoped they could survive) and did nothing but waste fuel. The Fw 190 Fighter bombers simply dived in under them and sped away at speeds above the capability of the P-40.

The air situation in the MTO and Italy never bore any resemblance to that in NW Europe. In February 1944 B-17s and B-24s were able to operate unescorted north of Anzio. They couldn't do that in NW Europe at that time in 1944, never mind 1943.

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Dec 31, 2015)

bobbysocks said:


> what was NAs max run capability in 41 to produce 51As? the RAF was flying them in limited amounts in 41 weren't they? if the scenario changed to where every available plane that could be produced was put on the line how many mustangs could we have fielded by the end of 41?



Not sure that we can arrive at the right number, but some comments can be made. There was 138 Mustangs accepted in 1941, including 68 in December. NAA produces 84-86 examples max in 1st half of 1942 monthly. In the same time they produce Mitchels in Inglewood 8and Texans?). Mustangs are to be paid by UK government. Between September 1942 and March 1943, NAA didn't delivered any Mustang.

For the USAF to acquire them, they will need to expedite the testing of the received prototypes (second half of 1941 already), evaluate and place orders. That, combined with existing and future RAF needs, migh mean that Mitchel is earlier farmed out to Kansas City, or maybe Dallas, and similar proposal is for the Texan. of course, that means the Mustang is produed instead of the A-36. Meaning maybe 250 Mustangs delivered to the USAF in 1942.

The service use would probably be at the end of 1942, however.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 31, 2015)

drgondog said:


> Tomo - In June 1943, there were only 3 8th AF and zero 9th AF FG's in ETO. There 11 B-17 BG's and ALL the B-24 groups were TDY to north Africa for Tidalwave attack on Ploesti. The B-26 BGs were in theatre but ltd ops.
> 
> Whatever you pull from MTO enables the LW to respond by moving to ETO



I have no problem with your numbers, Bill. Just was trying to show that USAF commited much more aircraft in the MTO than in ETO in the time of interest - 1942-43. Will try to find the best Luftwaffe numbers and post that.

edit: this table so far (your work?), fighters only?:


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## stona (Dec 31, 2015)

I have a chart which shows the distribution of the Luftwaffe across all three theatres, but only as a percentage of total aircraft of all types. It's not really helpful because the type of aircraft is important. Just as 700+ US P-40s would not be useful in the ETO so ,for example, the numerous Bf 110s operating in the east would be no good to the Luftwaffe in the ETO.
Cheers
Steve


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## drgondog (Dec 31, 2015)

Tomo - that isn't my chart. Dr. Greuhler IIRC

I understand your point about airpower disposed to Torch being available for Overlord in the thesis but the key factor for successful attack is Ground strength and logistics to support them during the invasion. Second factor, following the first, is control of the air.to prevent German movement flexibility on the ground as well as reinforcement/re-supply from reserves.

Steve also brings up a good point about relative quality of Africa based aircraft and pilots for Allies. The P-40 and P-39 was not helpless but they were worthless for high altitude work so only the three MTO P-38 FG's plus 3 P-47 FGs are available for escort work, RAF would operate same.

Contrast the TO&E for June 1944 for Allied air and ground and sea assets versus 1943. The PTO was being starved to build up and supply Africa/MTO in 1942-1943 in a desperate fight against the Japanese. The Battle of the Atlantic was turning against Germany but the sea lanes were still under major threat when the build up of US Army in Britain was just beginning.

If you believe that a force multiplier of 3X for attacking force for a land battle, and the Wermacht could drain much of Italian strength, and Rommel could more successfully either tie down Commonwealth forces absent US presence in Africa or find a way to extract muc of his command, then,

How do you get the necessary forces in the UK, train them, acquire the seaborne assets for a beach assault, have essentially zero Airborne infantry assets trained and blooded in early 1943 when only a battalion of the 82nd Abn had experience in Africa before Sicily? True there were enough seaborne assets to invade North Africa but do you think that would have been enough to successfully take and consolidate French coastal positions? Then, more importantly, build up the reserves to push out, much less resist being pushed back into the sea?

I realize this is a 'what if' and also realize a lot of opinions are floating. I just happen to have the opinion that an invasion in 1943 squanders a huge amount of Allied resources, with a maximum opportunity to re-create WWI stagnation or worse, complete disaster. The stagnation scenario helps the Soviets, but is a complete disaster for the west with great potential for a large scale Dieppe.


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## tomo pauk (Dec 31, 2015)

Going by the table from the USAF statistical digest, by end of March 1943 there were 472 P-38s and 203 P-47s in theaters vs. Germany. The numbers don't show the Spitfires in the USAF inventory, perhaps these are listed elsewhere in the Digest. Granted, the P-47 is not that long legged until they got the drop tanks question answered.
The RAF would've not operated as historically, preparation for invasion would mean most of the Spitfire VIII is in the ETO, not in MTO and CBI/PTO, plus sizable chunk of other RAF assets doing the same.

I believe in 3:1 ratio attacker vs. defender, ground forces, that ratio can be skewed by bringing the majority of USAF and daylight RAF forces in the ETO.



> How do you get the necessary forces in the UK, train them, acquire the seaborne assets for a beach assault, have essentially zero Airborne infantry assets trained and blooded in early 1943 when only a battalion of the 82nd Abn had experience in Africa before Sicily?



It would be easier to bring US forces to the UK than in the MTO, plus there is no need to ship British and Canadian forces in the MTO, bar necessary reinforcements to the 8th Army. Granted, there will not be that much of combat experience, but then most of the forces that invaded Sicily remained in the MTO, the US ground units in Overlord were mostly fresh from training?


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## stona (Dec 31, 2015)

And actually making the landings? The British and Canadians used 418 LCAs just to get infantry ashore on D-Day. For 'Torch' they used 94. The Americans used 839 LCVPs on D-Day, never mind all the rest of the various specialised landing craft, support ships etc.. You can't just magic this sort of equipment up out of thin air. 

I'm still wondering where all the gliders, tugs and aircraft to drop paratroops are coming from!

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Dec 31, 2015)

The 3:1 ratio concept just doesnt hold up when comparing allied combat effectiveness to German combat effectiveness. Dupuy and Zetterling have each done a mountain of research on this, and in 1942, each German soldier was the equivalent of 2.52 Allied soldiers. This qualitative advantage steadily reduced such that by late 1944 it was closer to 1.38.

The 3:1 is a very rough comparison, based on the assumption that the quality of each opposing army , and the FPF per man was the same , which it just isnt . Quality was not the same, and firepower per unit also differed. The 3;1 ratio is based on nothing better than under ideal conditions you have 1:1 pinning the enemy, 1:1 advancing and engaging in close combat and 1:1 ready in reserve to exploit. 

What Dupuy refers to as the "operational score effectiveness rating" throws all of that comfortable and simple comparison out the window. In point of fact, in the ETO, based on the Dupuy institute research the US army needed combat ratios of around 8:1 in 1942 against the Germans to make forward gains. This dropped to about 6:1 in 1943, and again to about 4.5:1 by the time of the Ardennes. This seems to be corroborated by the combat experiences at various times such as Kasserine, on the Rapido and even Salerno. All of these combat experiences show that a straight 3:1 wasnt enough against the Germans


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## tomo pauk (Dec 31, 2015)

How many of thes transports, both sea- and air-borne, were used for Op Husky?


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## syscom3 (Dec 31, 2015)

In 1943 alone, there were 597 allied ships sunk in the Atlantic. Not a good statistic to have to deal with as you are trying to build up for an invasion that year. 1942 was even worse.

I can see it now. The allies have 3000 planes available. But fuel for only a 1000 of them.


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## stona (Dec 31, 2015)

The Allies had 11,590 aircraft available for D-Day (Overlord) to put the numbers in some perspective.

'Torch' is a red herring. The total number of troops landed was about the same as the US contribution to 'Overlord' (less the 15,500 airborne troops). The British and Canadians landed another 83,000 on their three beaches for 'Overlord' as well as another 7,900 airborne. The numbers are not comparable. Furthermore the, 'Torch' landings were virtually unopposed, which was just as well, particularly for those trying to land at Oran.
The point is that not executing 'Torch' and diverting all those resources does not come close to making an 'Overlord', maybe another Dieppe, just on a grander scale.

Cheers

Steve


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## wiking85 (Dec 31, 2015)

syscom3 said:


> In 1943 alone, there were 597 allied ships sunk in the Atlantic. Not a good statistic to have to deal with as you are trying to build up for an invasion that year. 1942 was even worse.
> 
> I can see it now. The allies have 3000 planes available. But fuel for only a 1000 of them.


Yet for almost all of 1943 new construction offset losses by a huge amount and German losses in the much more expensive and difficult to construct Uboat was also so high they had to call off the Battle of the Atlantic by June 1943.


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## wiking85 (Dec 31, 2015)

stona said:


> The Allies had 11,590 aircraft available for D-Day (Overlord) to put the numbers in some perspective.
> 
> 'Torch' is a red herring. The total number of troops landed was about the same as the US contribution to 'Overlord' (less the 15,500 airborne troops). The British and Canadians landed another 83,000 on their three beaches for 'Overlord' as well as another 7,900 airborne. The numbers are not comparable. Furthermore the, 'Torch' landings were virtually unopposed, which was just as well, particularly for those trying to land at Oran.
> The point is that not executing 'Torch' and diverting all those resources does not come close to making an 'Overlord', maybe another Dieppe, just on a grander scale.
> ...



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Torch


> Casualties and losses
> 
> 479-500 dead
> 720 wounded
> ...





> The Western Task Force landed before daybreak on 8 November 1942, at three points in Morocco: Safi (Operation Blackstone), Fedala (Operation Brushwood, the largest landing with 19,000 men), and Mehdiya-Port Lyautey (Operation Goalpost). Because it was hoped that the French would not resist, there were no preliminary bombardments. This proved to be a costly error as French defenses took a toll of American landing forces.
> 
> On the night of 7 November, pro-Allied General Antoine Béthouart attempted a coup d'etat against the French command in Morocco, so that he could surrender to the Allies the next day. His forces surrounded the villa of General Charles Noguès, the Vichy-loyal high commissioner. However, Noguès telephoned loyal forces, who stopped the coup. In addition, the coup attempt alerted Noguès to the impending Allied invasion, and he immediately bolstered French coastal defenses.
> A flyer in French and Arabic that was distributed by Allied forces in the streets of Casablanca, calling on citizens to cooperate with the Allied forces.
> ...


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## syscom3 (Dec 31, 2015)

wiking85 said:


> Yet for almost all of 1943 new construction offset losses by a huge amount and German losses in the much more expensive and difficult to construct Uboat was also so high they had to call off the Battle of the Atlantic by June 1943.



The net gains in shipping in 1943 was offset by the need to replace the huge losses of 1941 and 1942.


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## wiking85 (Dec 31, 2015)

syscom3 said:


> The net gains in shipping in 1943 was offset by the need to replace the huge losses of 1941 and 1942.


Losses for whom? The US added its huge shipping capacity to the war, which resulted in a major net increase of merchant shipping, enough so that they could field hundreds of thousands of men in North Africa, both from the West and via Egypt. That was supplied from Britain and the US. So the shipping was there for an invasion, it just needed to be concentrated in Britain.

Edit: in fact there would be a net efficiency of not having to shipping supplies to troops in Africa from Britain, nor supply combat ops in Tunisia/Sicily. They could then focus their shipping and escort assets in the Atlantic to move troops and accumulate stores in Britain, not use that shipping to move men and material to Africa from Britain and sustain them there.


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## gjs238 (Dec 31, 2015)

parsifal said:


> The 3:1 ratio concept just doesnt hold up when comparing allied combat effectiveness to German combat effectiveness. Dupuy and Zetterling have each done a mountain of research on this, and in 1942, each German soldier was the equivalent of 2.52 Allied soldiers. This qualitative advantage steadily reduced such that by late 1944 it was closer to 1.38.
> 
> The 3:1 is a very rough comparison, based on the assumption that the quality of each opposing army , and the FPF per man was the same , which it just isnt . Quality was not the same, and firepower per unit also differed. The 3;1 ratio is based on nothing better than under ideal conditions you have 1:1 pinning the enemy, 1:1 advancing and engaging in close combat and 1:1 ready in reserve to exploit.
> 
> What Dupuy refers to as the "operational score effectiveness rating" throws all of that comfortable and simple comparison out the window. In point of fact, in the ETO, based on the Dupuy institute research the US army needed combat ratios of around 8:1 in 1942 against the Germans to make forward gains. This dropped to about 6:1 in 1943, and again to about 4.5:1 by the time of the Ardennes. This seems to be corroborated by the combat experiences at various times such as Kasserine, on the Rapido and even Salerno. All of these combat experiences show that a straight 3:1 wasnt enough against the Germans



How did this compare with the US:Japenese?


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## parsifal (Dec 31, 2015)

wiking85 said:


> Losses for whom? The US added its huge shipping capacity to the war, which resulted in a major net increase of merchant shipping, enough so that they could field hundreds of thousands of men in North Africa, both from the West and via Egypt. That was supplied from Britain and the US. So the shipping was there for an invasion, it just needed to be concentrated in Britain.
> 
> Edit: in fact there would be a net efficiency of not having to shipping supplies to troops in Africa from Britain, nor supply combat ops in Tunisia/Sicily. They could then focus their shipping and escort assets in the Atlantic to move troops and accumulate stores in Britain, not use that shipping to move men and material to Africa from Britain and sustain them there.



Ah nope. US entered the war in 1939 with around 8 million tons of US flagged shipping. In 1939-40, around 2 million tons was reflagged to dodge the neutrality laws and assist the Allies in getting war cargoes across the ditch. Prewar construction in US yards was negligible in 1939-40 and still less than the British effort of 1941, which in turn was woefully inadequate and quite unable to keep up with losses. 

When the US entered the war in 1941, there was barely enough to keep the US domestic economy ticking and for many months the US was heavily reliant on British controlled shipping just to keep afloat. Shipping losses by year are set out below. The Allied production efforts were roughly as follows: 

1939: 376,419 (US), 300,000 (Allied); 
1940: 528,697 (US), 810,000 (Allied); 
1941: 1,031,974 (US), 1, 156,000 (Allied); 
1942: 5,479,766 (US), 1,301,000 (Allied); 
1943: 11,448,360 (US), 1,204,000 (Allied);
1944: 9,288,156 (US), 1,014,000 (Allied):

The shipping losses to all causes saw the allies reach their nadir at the end of 1942, with an overall net deficit of nearly 15 million tons worldwide. After March 1943, the loss rates slowed down, production picked up and the Uboat attrition became unsustainable, but this was not apparent until the latter part of 1943, and the allies had a lot of catching up to do. It was well into 1944 before the allies were aheasd of the 1939 shipping capacities.

Overall Allied controlled shipping suffered the following losses during the war;

1939: 935,000
1940: 4,549,000
1941: 4,693,000
1942: 8,338,000

To these outright losses should be added the vast amounts of shipping laid up from damage. I dont have exact figures for ships damaged, but some sources claim it was around 40% of the outright losses. We can probably assume a downtime of around 6 months for each ship damaged. These figures dont include shipping under 500 tons displacement. 

The allies entered the war with 28 million tons of shipping. About a million tons was immediately seized by the Germans in 1939 from the Baltic Neutrals and about 1 million more was captured in that first year of the war. When the japanese attacked in 1942, about 1 million tons was captured in the Far East. None of these captures are included in the above figures.

25 million tons available after the captures are taken into account. Shipping availability with losses, damage, new construction accounted for for the allies is about as follows;

1939: 24,435,419 grt
1940: 19,624,419 grt 
1941: 15,519,393 grt
1942: 11,862,159 grt


As a shipping user, for most of 1942, the US was a net user rather than a provider of allied shipping. There just wasnt enough to undertake any sort of serious offensive action until the latter part of 1943, and even then the allies had to be super careful with their shipping, until a buffer had been built up

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## parsifal (Dec 31, 2015)

gjs238 said:


> How did this compare with the US:Japenese?



It depends on the situation. In open warfare, the standard Japanese Infantry Army (sort of a Corps strength unit) lacked the artillery firepower to fight a stand up fight against the western armies. Their armour in 1942 was equal to our own in quality, but Japanese armoured doctrine as a mass attack weapon was very poor. The japanese, however at the beginning of the war excelled at armoured warfare in the Jungle, or rough terrain.where the norm was to fight in small numbers.

In situations where the Japanese retained some semblance of a logistic support network, the lack of experience in the US field formations showed up very badly. When asked to engage in outright offensive warfare, such as at Gona and Sanananda, the US combat formations just fell apart, much as they did in Europe. We in the west have been brought up on an unhealthy and innaccurate view of the IJA based on a very narrow and quite unique experience on Guadacanal. One needs to look at the variable at work that led to the guadacanal fiasco. No reall suly, always short of food and ammunition, no real artillery support, attacking unsupported against a determined enemy well led and well dug in, at no stage attempting to really counterattack, in terrain heavily favouring the defence. This produced a predictably heavy defeat for the Japanese. Moreover for the remainder of the warthe US always ensured that battles against the Japanese that the defenders were well isolated and unsupported first, and then used their far superiuor firepower levels to blast out the defending Japanese. As straight up Infantry the Japanese were still superior, but in terms of supply and fire support they were just too ill-equipped to be competitive. 

Give the Japanese a 6 month respite, not fight Midway, allow the Japanese time to organise their convoy systems and the story would be completely different.

There arent fpf comparisons that I know for the Japanese, though I bet they exist somewhere. But imagine if it were US formations attacking at Guadacanal and Japanese with the secure supply lines and dug in. Instead of fighting doggedly for 4 months as the Japanese did, I give a US formation in a similar situation about a fortnight......


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## syscom3 (Dec 31, 2015)

And dont forget that each ship sinking on the way to a war zone, was military cargo that didnt get to the front.

Logistics, logistics, logistics.


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## stona (Jan 1, 2016)

Good old Wikepedia! The devil is in the detail. I said that the* landings* were largely unopposed. At Algiers there was NO significant resistance on any of the beaches. Two destroyers attempting to land US Ranger to prevent sabotage of the port etc _at the Port of Algiers_ did meet significant resistance. Nonetheless a local ceasefire was in place by the afternoon of the 8th.

At, or rather around, Oran there was resistance from French naval forces, but again the landings were largely unopposed. The weather and unexpected shallowness of the unsurveyed beaches was a bigger problem than the French.There was some fierce fighting on the road from Azeu to Oran and at La Senia airfield as well as elsewhere post landing.

At Casablanca there was a significant naval battle (100 of the nearly 500 KIA were lost on USS Joseph Hewes alone, another 74 were lost on troopships sunk by U-130 on the 11th, long after the initial landings) but only on one occasion were the landing craft themselves engaged, by the French destroyer _Milan_. Casablanca itself surrendered shortly before the American attack without a shot being fired.

This thread isn't about 'Torch' and I'll leave it at that 

Cheers

Steve


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## LisaM (Jan 3, 2016)

The Med had to be cleared to enable shipping though there via the Suez canal, that saved as much as 2 million tons of shipping, without which an invasion of France was impossible.

To do that NA and Sicily had to be invaded (plus it built up desperately needed experience). Italy is a moot point and you can argue either way on that one. From a convoy air protection point of view Malta, Sicily and NA were enough to guarantee that.

At that point the western allies shipping situation was critical, the U-Boats had their peak success and the US shippng production had not yet come fully on-line.

The logistic requirements for the build of forces for the D-Day invasion were immense (with the US bomber requirements added), plus the needed extra requirements to supply them in France itelf. The Pacific and USSR needs also drained shippng. 
The western allies simpy didn't have enough then.
Plus the German forces were just too strong, it needed more time for the USSR to grind them down more.

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## syscom3 (Jan 5, 2016)

LisaM said:


> The Med had to be cleared to enable shipping though there via the Suez canal, that saved as much as 2 million tons of shipping, without which an invasion of France was impossible.
> 
> To do that NA and Sicily had to be invaded (plus it built up desperately needed experience). Italy is a moot point and you can argue either way on that one. From a convoy air protection point of view Malta, Sicily and NA were enough to guarantee that.
> 
> ...



Thats what a couple of us have been saying. A Normandy invasion didn't take place in 1942 or 1943 because of this very issue.


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## drgondog (Jan 5, 2016)

parsifal said:


> It depends on the situation. In open warfare, the standard Japanese Infantry Army (sort of a Corps strength unit) lacked the artillery firepower to fight a stand up fight against the western armies. Their armour in 1942 was equal to our own in quality, but Japanese armoured doctrine as a mass attack weapon was very poor. The japanese, however at the beginning of the war excelled at armoured warfare in the Jungle, or rough terrain.where the norm was to fight in small numbers.
> 
> *The IJA never adapted to the US introduction of improved versions of every useful weapon (offense and defense), never had the Seabee capability to transform captured strategic points into impressive airfields capable of operating in what the US defeated with PSP, nor did they ever build up repair/mod centers to adapt factory aircraft to field conditions or repair damaged aircraft quickly. The war The IJA fought in 1942 was inadequate to the Allied attacking forces in 1943 - much less 1944 and 1945.*
> 
> ...



Re-read the order of battle and the force structure of August 1942 at Guadalcanal to re-examine that premeise. You have no real facts to back that supposition up regarding the poor fighting will and resolve of US troops at Guadalcanal - or thereafter. Kasserine Pass is your only supporting example of poor behavior of US troops under massive attack scenario.


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## parsifal (Jan 5, 2016)

> Which particular examples did you have in mind? the examples of MacArthur's Island hopping campaigns don't fit that thesis. He simply bypassed strongholds, consolidated attack points and strangled everything behind him. Are you perhaps pointing to comparisons against Montgomery in attack in Sicily, at Caen, Falaise, Operation Market Garden? The Bulge?



Examples that come to mind in 1942 are Buna, Gona and Sanananda, where the americans were fighting on a more or less even playing field against the Japanese, alongside the units of the AIF and also militia units of the Australian Army. Australians referred to them (the Americans) as 'chocos', literally that they melted in any sort of heat. it was a valid criticism at the time.

Macarthur had not worked out his island hopping strategy in 1942. In fact it was a solution more or less forced on him by the resources allocated to his cartwheel strategy in 1943, and the refusal by the chif supplier of ground troops in the TO, the Australian Army, to bow to his unimaginative direct frontal assault tactics. we had to. we did not have the manpower to be quite that haphazard. 

Monty has nothing to do with American Army battle performance in the Pacific, neither does Monty have anything to do with the Australians and their relative success in the same TO. you need to compare apples to apples here, and a better comparison would be harder to find than two armies fighting side by side, one eventually achieving forward movement and solving the problems, and the other sitting on the side of the track totally unreliable and unable to rise to the challenge. 

The allies, particularly the Americans, learnt from this. many of their units were pulled out of the line and spent time learning the tricky science of jungle warfare at the Australian army's Jungle Warfare centre at Canungra and also at Townsville, receiving critical training in what to do and what not to do when faced by Japanese infiltration tactics. 

The following are extracts from The Bloody Beachheads – The Battles of Gona, Buna and Sanananda, November 1942 – January 1943, James Brien, AWM Scholar 2013.

_On 20 November, MacArthur told Blamey that “all columns will be driven through to the objectives regardless of losses”. The next day he told General Harding to “take Buna today at all costs”. Such reckless and ill-informed orders continued when MacArthur replaced Harding with General Robert Eichelberger to hasten the capture of Buna. He informed Eichelberger that:

I want you to remove all officers who won’t fight. Relieve regimental and battalion commanders if necessary, put sergeants in charge of battalions and corporals in charge of companies –anyone who will fight. Time is of the essence, the Japs might land reinforcements any night. I want you to take Buna or not come back alive. 

On 24 December MacArthur issued another unreasonable order to Eichelberger at Buna, that he should be attacking “by regiments, not companies, by thousands not hundreds”. This shows a complete ignorance of the tactical situation on the ground, not to mention the disposition and capabilities of the US ground forces at the time. 

While the campaign began optimistically, it soon became clear that the Japanese defenders were not prepared to relinquish the beachheads, and were generally superior soldiers to the inexperienced Americans. Constantly under pressure, battalion commanders were forced to push their already exhausted troops into battle with little preliminary intelligence, no time for reconnaissance, and without adequate supplies. They were not able to follow standard operating procedures, to concentrate their forces or be provided with adequate fire support for the operations they were undertaking. In most cases, units were committed to piecemeal frontal assaults against well-concealed strongpoints manned by experienced and well led defenders. The battle experience of the AIF units could not save them from a terrible rate of casualties, while the inexperienced American National Guardsmen received a brutal and bloody baptism of fire for little or no material gains. Infantry would attack shortly after a preliminary artillery or air bombardment, but this pattern was frequently repeated and the Japanese defenders came to recognise it. They would seek shelter out of the fire and then reoccupy the forward positions in time to meet the Australian attacks. The lack of experience meant that it was the Australian formations who shouldered the majority of offensive actions. When the infantry reached the Japanese defences they had usually sustained too many casualties to hold the position, and there were rarely reserves to bring up. …..American forces were on hand but could not be relied upon to hold the ground so bloodily won by the Australian forces.

Success at Gona came on 8 December, when Honner’s 39th Battalion did not follow the pattern laid down before. Honner used a delay in his attack to scout an approach through jungle which led right up to the Japanese

The American National Guardsmen were not well trained or prepared for the tasks that faced them along the beachhead front. They were generally outclassed by their Japanese opponents in open battle. _


_The Japanese defenders combined this fanatical resistance with numerous clever ploys which thwarted the Allies for the duration of the campaign. They were experts at the use of terrain and the construction and camouflage of their bunkers. The defenders moved between these positions using shallow crawl trenches to change firing positions, giving the impression that there was overwhelming fire power deployed against the attackers. The Japanese 
also exploited the terrain by positioning snipers in the treetops. These snipers had a commanding view of the battlefield and were able to pick off high value targets like officers and machine-gunners. The attachment of 70mm Infantry gun support directly to the battalion ToE was a master stroke that immediately gave their Bn commanders an in built firepower advantage. 

The untried American troops had suffered heavily, learnt a great deal, but not achieved much in the actual battle. Casualties in their limited fighting role amounted to 687 men killed in action and 1,918 wounded, surprisingly heavy given their limited combat exposure and effectiveness._


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## parsifal (Jan 5, 2016)

> Is this a complaint against US strategy to attack in strength and bypass when possible and starve the isolated Japanese? Or should the US (and Allies always choose to attack when odds were not in favor or a low casualty achievement?



neither, because it is based on a false premise. The Americans in 1942 had not fully worked out the "wither on the vine" strategy, much less marry it into their battlefield tactics. The Americans in 1942 were still firmly wedded to the concept of bringing superior firepower, concentration of force and direct confrontation to destroy the war making potential of the opponent. only when confronted with the severe limits of manpower and other resources, and the quiet refusal by the Australians to put their army through such a meat grinder were they forced to think differently. confronted with their own lack of success in the jungle they realised that the only important things in the jungle were the airfields, and anchorages. isolate an objective, smother it with firepower, concentrate your own forces to achieve a local superiority and then blast the enemy out of existence. These were tactics worked out only after the 1942 experiences. 



> IJA failed at Guadalcanal as Straight Up Infantry with superior numbers and temporarily better logistics. The Aussies defeated them in the Owen Stanley range. What were the IJA superior to?



There are so many misconceptions here, its hard to know where to start. The Japanese in their fight in PNG were not defeated by the Australians so much as they were defeated by the terrain and the breakdown of their logistic system. 8500 men of the SSF went ashore but by the time they were stopped they were down to under 1000 effectives, against around 5000-6000 Australians on that ridge. 

in Guadacanal, the Japanese were defeated as much by the collapse of their supply system and the terrain as they were by the defenders. The Americans as defenders fought well but defending, from prepared positions, against an unsupported enemy, is not a level playing field on which to assess the relative capabilities of each army.


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## parsifal (Jan 5, 2016)

> Re-read the order of battle and the force structure of August 1942 at Guadalcanal to re-examine that premeise. You have no real facts to back that supposition up regarding the poor fighting will and resolve of US troops at Guadalcanal - or thereafter



All I said about guadacanal was that it was not a level playing field on which to judge the fighting capabilities of the japanese army. One marine div is also not representative of the overall capabilities of the US forces at that time.

This is not a critique of the American Army as such, merely that studies have been done for battlefield performance in Europe, but not (that im aware of) for the pacific.


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## syscom3 (Jan 5, 2016)

parsifal said:


> Their armour in 1942 was equal to our own in quality, but Japanese armoured doctrine as a mass attack weapon was very poor.



Their armor in 1942 was nowhere near the US's. namely because they had no need for anything over a light tank.



> The japanese, however at the beginning of the war excelled at armoured warfare in the Jungle, or rough terrain.where the norm was to fight in small numbers.



The IJA rarely used tanks in the jungles because they had no logistical support for them. And the few times they did use them (Mariana's and Peleliu) , they were torn to pieces.




> In situations where the Japanese retained some semblance of a logistic support network, the lack of experience in the US field formations showed up very badly. When asked to engage in outright offensive warfare, such as at Gona and Sanananda, the US combat formations just fell apart, much as they did in Europe.



For 1942, the Marines did fine at Guadalcanal. The Army at Buna. In 1943, the situation was reversed. In Europe, Kasserine Pass was a seminal event for the USA. Wholesale changes in tactics and leadership turned things around in short order and the results were seen at Sicily and Italy. In 1943 in the Pacific, there were no places where the IJA had logistics in place to support the offensive, so they were dug in on defense. Where the USA and marines did fine until the end of the war.



> We in the west have been brought up on an unhealthy and innaccurate view of the IJA based on a very narrow and quite unique experience on Guadacanal. One needs to look at the variable at work that led to the guadacanal fiasco.



Fiasco? Say's whom? At the end of the campaign, we had won. With far longer supply lines than the Japanese. And had beaten them in three major divisional sized attacks. And did you know that in warfare, there is no such thing as a fair fight?



> Give the Japanese a 6 month respite, not fight Midway, allow the Japanese time to organise their convoy systems and the story would be completely different.


. But they didnt because they couldnt.



> There arent fpf comparisons that I know for the Japanese, though I bet they exist somewhere. But imagine if it were US formations attacking at Guadacanal and Japanese with the secure supply lines and dug in. Instead of fighting doggedly for 4 months as the Japanese did, I give a US formation in a similar situation about a fortnight......



And you base this on what? The performance of a couple of National Guard divisions with mediocre logistics support for a few months in 1942? There are lots of examples to prove you wrong with that silly assertion.


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## parsifal (Jan 5, 2016)

> Their armor in 1942 was nowhere near the US's. namely because they had no need for anything over a light tank.


The US heavy armoured div TOE, of which just two were raised, were authorised from the 15 November 1940, but the first of the units themselves were not ready until March 1942, and even then at less than 50% authorised TOE, with equipment such as Grants and Stuarts that were not the equal of the Shinhoto Chi Ha tanks then in service with the IJA. As I said they were about equal in 1942. By the end of that year, there was no comparison. 




> The IJA rarely used tanks in the jungles because they had no logistical support for them. And the few times they did use them (Mariana's and Peleliu) , they were torn to pieces.



Tanks were thought totally unsuitable in the Jungle until the Japanese pioneered their use. They were used to some effect in the Phillipines, Malaya, Burma, Milne Bay, Buna that I know of. 




> For 1942, the Marines did fine at Guadalcanal. The Army at Buna. In 1943, the situation was reversed. In Europe, Kasserine Pass was a seminal event for the USA. Wholesale changes in tactics and leadership turned things around in short order and the results were seen at Sicily and Italy. In 1943 in the Pacific, there were no places where the IJA had logistics in place to support the offensive, so they were dug in on defense. Where the USA and marines did fine until the end of the war.



Never claimed that the US did not fight well on Guadacanal. But in other places, not so well. My point about Guadcanal is that it is not a representative sample of either japanese, or US fighting qualities, for opposite reasons. 

I agree that after 1942, the Americans defeated the dug in positions on the atolls by the use of overwhelming firepower. What does this prove? Give the US forces fpf advantages of 6 or 8:1 and they might win. i dont have any argument with that. in situations whee they could not do that, such as on the Phillipinnes 1945, Biak, Palau and even Okinawa, all of which are battles after 1942, and therefore outside the parameters, and the US could struggle . 




> Fiasco? Say's whom? At the end of the campaign, we had won. With far longer supply lines than the Japanese. And had beaten them in three major divisional sized attacks. And did you know that in warfare, there is no such thing as a fair fight?



Read the comment again. Fiasco, absolutely.....for the Japanese (doh!). In relation to the last comment, of course, but that is not the purpose of this discussion. The question is what firepower advantage the US (and allied) forces needed to make progress. In Europe, in 1942, how far will the US forces get against dug in German positions @ 3:1. Id suggest, nowhere, except dead and defeated. In the Pacific, what advantages were needed to defeat determined and prepred Japanase positions. You are suggesting it was easy, with the US forces barely working up a sweat to do it. Id suggest differently out of respect for the enormous effort needed to defeat the Japanese in the pacific. 



> But they didnt because they couldnt.



I agree. Though my reason for the "Couldnt" is because of materiel shortages. 



> And you base this on what? The performance of a couple of National Guard divisions with mediocre logistics support for a few months in 1942? There are lots of examples to prove you wrong with that silly assertion


.

US forces in PNG were significantly larger than on Guadacanal (edit: there is a differene of opinion on this point. based on unit deployments alone im correct, based on troop numbers, no. max deployment strength on guadacanal for US forces reached 55000 at peak, whereas maximum mUS force commitment in the buna battles only topped about 38000. its a moot point I guess). But here we are basing US army performance on the lesser sized campaign. Why not dismiss the Guadacanal success in the same way? There arent many other experiences to draw from Im afraid in the PTO, unless we want to look at the earlier efforts. Later on we have New Georgia, then Lae, New Georgia was a strictly limited affair, and at Lae US ground forces involvement as limited to 1 or 2 regiments. Better performance, but still small scale.

What example, in 1942, can you name, other than Guadacanal and Buna for the US forces in the PTO? Burma? Philipinnes? Guam?, Wake? Any others?
Im not making claims for any period after 1942, so id very much like to hear about "lots of examples" pertinent to the original premise, namely, US army combat readiness in 1942. Silly assertions indeed!


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## parsifal (Jan 6, 2016)

Here are some pretty good quality analyses of Japanese armoured usage in 1942. no country in 1942 could field a divisional sized armoured unit in the PTO, so necessarily we need to look at small unit actions for the most part. For the first half of 1942 it was almost exclusively a Japanese deployment, though there were exceptions. 

Japanese armour in the NEI

The Japanese Armoured Units in the Dutch East Indies 1941-1942

A general account of IJA tank tactics and armour
https://books.google.com.au/books?i...#v=onepage&q=Japanese armour in 1942&f=false

British tanks in the far east

Singapore:

The British had the 100th Independent Squadron, RAC in Singapore, equipped with Mk IV and Mk VI Light Tanks. These were no match for the weight of Japanese armour sent against them, however. The Malays also had a squadron of Lanchester Armoured Cars, while the Indian 3rd Light Cavalry were equipped with Marmon-Herrington Armoured Cars. However, the 3rd LC do not seem to have managed to get the M-Hs unloaded from their ship and fought instead as motorised infantry. The Australians however, managed to get their hands on some India Pattern MkII Wheeled Armoured Carriers.

Hong Kong:

No tanks, but the HKVDC had a very active squadron of Lanchester armoured cars and a squadron of Carriers (the Indians and Royal Scots also had some Carriers), against which the invading Japanese had very little defence, having lost the bulk of their antitank guns during the landing

Burma (1942 - the Japanese Invasion):

There were initially no tanks in Burma, though the Burma Auxiliary Force had a squadron of antiquated Rolls Royce India Pattern Armoured Cars. However, the 7th Armoured Brigade soon arrived in Rangoon (straight from North Africa) and performed sterling service throughout the long retreat to the Chindwin. The brigade was equipped with two regiments of Stuart, plus a 25pdr battery and an antitank battery, though it was hampered by a near-complete lack of 37mm HE ammo and the fact that the thirsty Stuarts required rather specialised aviation fuel. 

7th Armoured Brigade made short work of their initial armoured opposition at Pegu (five Type 95 Ha Go light tanks of the Japanese 2nd Armoured Regiment that had survived the long march from Thailand), though the balance was redressed once the Japanese gained air superiority and was tipped even further when they took Rangoon and landed their reinforcement army, which included the 1st 14th Tank Regiments, plus a number of independent tankette companies and armoured cavalry squadrons. The Japanese also rapidly made use of captured Stuarts.

7th Armoured Brigade managed to reach the Chindwin with over seventy Stuarts, but only managed to successfully ferry one of them across the river. This surviving Stuart, named 'The Revenge of Scotland' actually returned across the Chindwin in 1945, minus its turret, as the command tank for an Indian Light Cavalry Regiment. The remaining tanks were 'scuttled' reasonably successfully, with only a few being recovered by the Japanese. Five of these recovered Stuarts later fought at Imphal in 1944, where they formed the 5th Company of the Japanese 14th Tank Regiment (along with a freshly-captured 3rd Carabiniers' Lee).

Burma 1942/43 - the First Arakan Campaign:

A single regiment of Valentines from 50th Indian Tank Brigade (I think it was 150th RAC?) was involved in Irwin's disastrous Arakan offensive. Only a single half-squadron saw any action. 

India/Burma 1943-45:

With the elevation of Slim to command 14th Army, three Indian Armoured Brigades were placed in direct support. These details are from memory, but the full details are available on that Fire Fury Games link above (which I wrote, but can't access here from work):

50th Indian Tank Brigade supported XV Corps on the Arakan Coast, though was never committed to battle as a unified brigade due to the very difficult, swampy nature of the Arakan coastal strip. It had a regiment each of Stuart, Lee and Sherman, with each regiment being committed to battle in rotation - Lee/Grants in the Second Arakan Campaign, Shermans in the Third Arakan Campaign and Stuarts in between. XV Corps also had the use of the 81st West African Recce Regiment (Carriers and LRCs) under direct command while 81st Div was engaged on light infantry operations in the Kaladan Valley.

254th Indian Armoured Brigade supported IV Corps at Imphal and was equipped with (if I recall) two regiments of Lee/Grant and a regiment of Stuarts. IV Corps also had at least one regiment of armoured cars at all times, though other regiments came and went (equipped with Daimlers, Humbers or occasionally both, as well as Dingos and dismountable elements in Carriers and/or Jeeps). There were also armoured replacement squadrons (each of 5 tanks) at the Dimapur depot, which were rushed into action when the Japanese cut the Imphal-Dimapur road at Kohima.

255th Indian Armoured Brigade was assigned to XXXIII Corps, which spent a long time sitting around in India (with the amphibious assualt divisions - 2nd 36th), waiting for the planned Operation 'Dracula' - the reconquest of Malaya. However, 'Dracula' never came and XXXIII Corps was transferred to the Imphal theatre of operations, to spearhead the pursuit of the defeated Japanese armies into Burma. The brigade had two Sherman regiments and an armoured car/recce regiment.

After disastrous beginnings, the British/Indian armour supporting 14th Army proved itself time and time again. Its finest hour came in 1945, when 255th Indian Armoured Brigade and 17th Indian Division launched their 'Blitzkrieg' actross the Irrawaddy and thrust deep into the central Burmese plain, taking the city of Meiktila, cutting the Japanese Burma Area Army in two and then launching armoured operations out from the city, defeating each of the counter-attacking Japanese divisions in detail, one after the other, in a battle of 'interior lines' reminiscent of Frederick the Great or Napoleon at their best.


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## syscom3 (Jan 6, 2016)

If you define the US offensive competence for only 1942, I will concur to some of your outlandish claims. The German army was the best in the world that year and would have mauled any US force. In the PTO, The IJA was proven to not be the supermen you seem to give credit to. The USMC proved that at Guadalcanal. And the USA did well in New Guinea once the tactics of the IJA being on the defense were figured out.


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## parsifal (Jan 6, 2016)

what major land campaigns did the US undertake independantly in PNG, not including the amphibious assaults. I can think of one, Nadzab, a rather specialised and limited committment as it was. Another was the assault on Hollandia, where on the 22 April 1944 the 24th and 41st Divisions were involved in one of the most successful US army operations of the war. 

After the bitter experiences at buna and Gona for US army, they never committed anything larger than a RCT to New Guinea. The so called "minor affair" at buna was their biggest divisional sized operation they ever committed to in New Guinea until well into 1944. They seemed to struggle with the necessities behind aggressive patrolling in the jungle and couldnt prise themselves from the ideas about overwhelming firepower in the truly jungle campaigns until well after the war. This led to a certain sluggishness in their rates of advance at times.

US victory was closley linked to its bypass strategy that was gradually developed in 1943. The Americans worked out that it wasnt necessary to comprehensively defeat the Japanese army , their best bet was to concentrate on the key point and overcome them with overwhelming firepower. This does not suggest or indicate a massively superior army. It suggests an army with control of the air and sea, giving it massive mobility and firepower advantages. Combined with massively greater logistical advantages, the issue became inevitable. Full marks to the Americans for that, but in post war analyses this has been extrapolated to suggest the US army was this massive unstoppable battlefield weapon that could demolish its opposition. Truth is somewhat less impressive than that. The US army was competent and effective, but it was never the massive steamroller its made out to be at least on the battlefield. its advantages lay elsewhere, In open combat, it could struggle at times, and the IJA remained a competent dangerous foe until the end. Thats not saying they were supermen. If you want a discussion about Japanese failures, we could write a book about that....i never claimed the jpanaese to be unstoppable, just better than they are often portrayed to be, and at times hard to defeat . We are analysing American failures and limitations as a field force, concentrating on 1942. but to the very end, the US army, like the British army fought with some severe limits on its capability. 

Calling the German Army the finest in the world for the whole war is also fraught with danger. The Germans at the end of the war were basically an armed rabble, but still able to place significant checks on its opponents at times, mostly because of allied limitations rather than german capability. In 1942 it was at the peak of its game, but the quality of its army as a field force also had its limits, as its experiences in front of Stalingrad and other places clearly shows.


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## syscom3 (Jan 6, 2016)

Admiralties - 1st Cav division

Aitape - 1 RCT

Hollandia - 24th and 41st divisions

Aitape (battle) - 32nd division + 1 RGT

Biak - 41st Div + 1 RGT

Morotai - 31st Div + 1 RGT

Macarthurs 6th Army had several divisions available through out 1943 and 1944. But due to the demands of shipping, he could only use one or two divisions at any given time with the others in occupation duty while awaiting their turn. Which was perfectly fine for the nature of the battles in PNG. By fall of 1944, he had multiple divisions in action in the PI in which is was now a true "army group" in the battle.

This does not account for US divisions in action in New Georgia, New Britain or Bougainville. Nor USMC divisions in action in the Solomons.


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## parsifal (Jan 6, 2016)

thanks. I should have checked a little more carefully. Having said that, and purely as a technicality, none of the examples you quote quite fit the parameters of our discussion. Moratai is an island in the halmerheras, part of the NEI, not part of NG. biak is an island off the north coast of current Irian Jaya, also part of the NEI. Aitape and Hollandia were both outside PNG, but admittedly on the island of New Guinea.

The admiralties was under Australian administration before the war, but was an island, where firepower could be concentrated in a way it could not in a regular land campaign. 35000 US Army personnel were needed to subdue 4000 Japanese defenders, in terms of simple odds that's over 8:1.

Hollandia was a great victory for the US, but it doesn't prove its massive battle superiority at all. Over 50000 men were committed to the battle, to subdue about 8000 defenders, of which about 800 were combat troops. at 50000:8000, the basic odds needed for the victory is 6:1+

At biak, 15000 US troop were needed to subdue 10500 Japanese defenders. Casualties were heavy. the Japanese lost 6100 dead, of which nearly all should be considered battle casualties. US losses amounted to 3000 (500 killed) and a further 3500 serious disease related casualties. Sure, the ratio of dead is heavily in favour of the US, but whereas escape and recovery was an option for the Allies, it was not an option for the Japanese. more than half the japanese casualties were suicides, or men who were already wounded. Whilst the US "won" its hard for me to view Biak as a victory of any substance. Pyrrhic victory perhaps. 

Aitape is impossible to analyse in this way, since a significant, I think dominant, role was played by the Australian Army fighting alongside the US forces. 13000 combat personnel were committed to the battle on the Allied side, against an estimated 35000 sick, debilitated and starving Japanese defenders . The Japanese are known to have lost over 9000 men, to the allied losses of about 1500 men. hard to see how this is a representative battle showing the relative fighting skills of each opposing army, when the the Japanese are so poorly supplied 

Moratai saw over 57200 ground troops used in the initial landings, to subdue just 500 defenders. Odds of more than 100:1 .....


Disregarding the very substantial help the US army received earlier, these battle selections are revealing. it took 135200 US soldiers (some of that number fighting more than one battle) to defeat 58500 Japanese defenders. Despite all the advantages weve previously argued about, it still required a numerical advantage of 2.32:1 to defeat a foe clearly on the rope as far as supply and mobility was concerned.

I don't see this claimed massive (qualitative) superiority at all. How do those odds, and those circumstance compare to the land battles the US was immersed in in the ETO. ETO casualties for the US were much higher, we know that, but what were the typical odds ratios they were exposed to in their battles across france for instance.


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## parsifal (Jan 7, 2016)

so, to try and be as objective as I can, I thought I might try and select three random battles in the ETO to try and make some sort of comparison of the relative strengths of the heer vis a viz the US Army. We would need to develop this analysis a little further to consider the possibilities of a 1942 or 43 cross channel attack, but for the moment im just curious about doing a rough comparison of US combat effectiveness versus the alleged german effectiveness

first battle ive selected was the battle of Nancy, fought in September 1944, between three divs of US XII Corps (4th armoured, 35th and 80th inf XXs) and German 47 pz XXX, consisting of 3 PG, 557th VG XXs and two regts 

It was a 10 day battle. Casualties were 2800 US to just under 5000 germans, killed, wounded or captured. The capture of Nancy provided the Allies an important communications center in France and the city later served as the garrison of U.S. 3rd Army Headquarters. The German defenders of Nancy, however, largely escaped the encirclement of the city and were available for further operations during the Lorraine Campaign. The XII Corps' successful assault across the Moselle around Nancy also prompted the subsequent German counter-attack at Arracourt by the 5. Panzerarmee. unfortunately, ive not been abale to nail the troop numbers , but my rough guess is about 100-110000 US : 30-35000 Germans, or around 2.85:1 to 3.66;1 in favour of the Us forces. remarkably similar to the odds we found against the Japanese

In January 1944, the Us 36th Inf Xx, a Texan National guard unit, considered well experienced, with combat in both NA and Sicily, assaulted a well prepared position held by 15 PG XX. it was a difficult river crossing undertaken at divisional strength (but only 4000 who actually crossed the Rapido). In a bloody 2 day battle, the 36th suffered at least 2000 (permanent) casualties to about 500 German. The combat odds for the forces actually engaged were about 1:3 against the American forces. 

In st lo and vicinity, July 1944, 2500 US tanks took on 190 german tanks organised into 3 inf divs and 5 mech divs at cadre strength. 8 more or less full strength US divs attacked and achieved a vital break through at St Lo. They were heavily supported by airforces. in an area measuring no more than 6000yds x 2500 yds, 3000 bombers, including 1800 heavies unloaded on the defenders. Despite these massive advantages, and undeniable success, actual losses were quite heavy for the US forces, about 1800 killed, to something like 500 Germans (we just don't have reliable figures on german losses however, so it could well be more)


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## syscom3 (Jan 7, 2016)

So whats your point? The Germans provided the best infantry men of the war. The Japanese were the worst. The US way of war was firepower. 

You can take anyone off the streets. Show him how to operate a machine gun, put him in a fortified position, and that same person could hold off dozens of well experienced soldiers.

Every army of the war had its fine moments and sub par moments.

As battles go in the SW Pacific (NG or the Solomons), there were three division vs division battles where the US came on top because of great soldiers and doctrine.


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## tomo pauk (Jan 7, 2016)

Perhaps this comparisons are materail for another thread? 

I've posted this before, the availablility of Flak for German armed forces; most of the heavy Flak was located West of Poland.


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## tyrodtom (Jan 7, 2016)

The Battle of St. LO isn't a very good example to use for comparison.

That's the battle where the USAAF heavy bombers bombed our own troops, 2 days in a row. About 200 of those deaths, and I don't know how many tanks lost due to those friendly fire incidents. Lt. Gen. McNair was one of those deaths.
And then they decided to go on with the original attack plan, after they'd given the Germans 2 days warning.
Not exactly the US Army's finest moment.

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## Milosh (Jan 7, 2016)

Tomo, do you know why the number of Flak 18s dropped in number after June/July 1944?


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## tomo pauk (Jan 7, 2016)

Probably a result of combination of Allied ground and tactical-air successes in summer of 1944 - Overlord, Bagration, Anvil, capture of area around Rome.


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## parsifal (Jan 7, 2016)

> So whats your point? The Germans provided the best infantry men of the war. The Japanese were the worst


.

I have a few of points.

1. Army performance should be based on a critical analysis of battles, and identify why battles were lost, or not won easily, or what could be improved, with less emphasis on the drum beating, chest beating jingoism about how good the army allegedly is. Studying why battles were won simply confirms what we already know. This is a point brought out by both Zetterling and Col. Dupuy, and Id recommend them to you if you can get over this dispute. too often we study battles with the agenda of confirming our national superiority, and not from the point of view of learning from our mistakes. 

2. You claim that the german infantry was the best in the world is not based on any serious analysis of outcomes and why those outcomes were achieved. At this stage its an unsupported hypothesis based on a non critical analysis. I end to agree, though, and in particular, in 1942, the US army stood little chance against the German army in France. 

3. In both TOs, US seems to have needed local superiorities on the battlefield of around 8:1 in order to win them. that's not particularly bad, but it comes as a shock for many to know that. its not just a numbers comparison, but should also take into account all factors. to achieve such advantages at the decisive point the US needed front wide advantages of about 2.32:1 in the PTO, and around 3:1 in the ETO. By comparison, at the beginning of the war the british army against the germans needed an estimated front wide superiority of 4:1 and a local advantage at the point of decision of around 9 or 10:1. As the war progressed this requirement reduced gradually, down to about 2.6:1 (in the ETO) and local point of decision advantages of around 6:1. 

looking at the issue in reverse, at the beginning of the war, the germans, versus the brits needed front wide advantages as low as 0.8:1 and breakthrough advantages of about 3:1 to achieve success, whilst by late 1944, it was about 4 or 5:1 overall and about 10:1 at the point of decision. Problems arise when generalising about the germans, however, because there is such a wide variation in quality in the heer. it was very patchy. 

4. im not all that interested in best, worst, nationality or historical outcomes per se. We know the US and the allies won, but was that solely for reasons related to the quality of their army, or also because they outnumbered their opponents and held other advantages as well. this last point is important in the context of why we are doing this in first place. Naval gunfire support, for example, vital in a battle to get ashore, or against a fortified atoll, but not of any importance if you are slugging your way across the countryside 100 km from the shore. Airpower....a very useful force multiplier, so long as the weather allows it, and the terrain permits adequate visual targeting... artillery, the unsung hero of the battle because it was the number 1 firepower source, but not much use , if you cant keep up to its insatiable supply appetite. And so on. its important to know the capabilities of each element of your victory, even more important to know your weaknesses.

Some General observations
US army was strong in logistics, mobility and firepower, weak in tactics, and trained manpower. its infantry was not particularly good, but it compensated for that in other ways. Those "other ways" were generally not available to it in 1942. also in 1942, it was particularly weak in training and experience, and it took longer than you are admitting to acquire that experience. This was applicable in both TOs. As the war progressed, the US tended to rely on a few very experienced units, which it over-used and because of that narrow base of experience, this limited the extent to which it could engage. later, as the Japanese and German quality went into their own respective crises the Americans could risk a more general commitment of its army, though it always needed to be wary of casualties, because its training and replacement capacities were so limited. this observation is based mostly on the analyses by Shelby Stanton and others.


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## parsifal (Jan 7, 2016)

tyrodtom said:


> The Battle of St. LO isn't a very good example to use for comparison.
> 
> That's the battle where the USAAF heavy bombers bombed our own troops, 2 days in a row. About 200 of those deaths, and I don't know how many tanks lost due to those friendly fire incidents. Lt. Gen. McNair was one of those deaths.
> And then they decided to go on with the original attack plan, after they'd given the Germans 2 days warning.
> Not exactly the US Army's finest moment.



That's one of the things about random sampling. you try to be as random as possible. There would be some that say the results at guadacanal are atypical, but they still form part of the historical model on which to draw observations. 

They still managed to flatten the opposition. Pz Lehr, down to about 3000 combat effectives by the time of the battle, effectively ceased to exist after the battle. 

Gamers love St lo as a simulation though because as the US commander, you don't have to try too hard to do better than the historical example.


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## LisaM (Jan 8, 2016)

parsifal said:


> .
> 
> Some General observations
> US army was strong in logistics, mobility and firepower, weak in tactics, and trained manpower. its infantry was not particularly good, but it compensated for that in other ways. Those "other ways" were generally not available to it in 1942. also in 1942, it was particularly weak in training and experience, and it took longer than you are admitting to acquire that experience. This was applicable in both TOs. As the war progressed, the US tended to rely on a few very experienced units, which it over-used and because of that narrow base of experience, this limited the extent to which it could engage. later, as the Japanese and German quality went into their own respective crises the Americans could risk a more general commitment of its army, though it always needed to be wary of casualties, because its training and replacement capacities were so limited. this observation is based mostly on the analyses by Shelby Stanton and others.



The Germans were so good because of a different philosophy, that is 'mission command', delegatng tactical authority down the line and everyone was trained to take over and command.
None of the British, Canadians (though they were better) or the US had it, or does today. It is an alien concept to our hierarchial culture. The closest (even equals, maybe even better then) were the Australians and New Zealanders in WW2, though specalist units (paras, etc) came close.

Martin Van Crevald did a book on this and and an analysis of US/British vs Germans shows German supoeriorty in the attack or defence, whether they had air support or usually none.

Monty was well aware of this and knew that it was impossible to change the British Army enough, quickly enough, so his tactical decisions were very much based around nullifyng those German advantages. The US took a different approach and went for attrition, throwing more and more men into battle..expensive as they found at places like Metz and Hurtogen Forest.

The US ETO logistics was a corrupt useless joke. Ike did not have control of it (and ddn't have the guts to make a scene abut it..ever the politician) and COMZ ran its own comfortable and enrichening war...stuff the soldiers at the front. And they were stuffed.

A US front line soldier basically fought until they were wounded or killed, there was no rest, no reserves to take over and let a regiment or division rest and regroup. They just fought until their couldn't any more. It was US industrial warfare, Taylorism ran rampart. While the backroom 'big' boys drank champagne.

Monty when he took over the US Northern forces at the Bulge, because Bradley screwed up so much even Ike gave him the flick, was horrfied that the US soldiers not gettng hot food, fighting in freezng temps...but the US higher command didn't care one little bit "more where they came from" was ther motto. So they just fed young badly trained inexperienced troops into the meat grinders over and over until they ran out, and then the institutionally racist US Army then had to turn to black troops (who did really well by the way).

US chauvinism meant they rejected the British spcialist tanks (mine clearing, flamethower petard, etc) and the 17 pounder equipped Sherman (firefly), the only tank in the west that could match a MK IV, V let alone a VI. But did Ike, Bradley or Patton care? Nope. they just sent in more..well until there were no more left to send in.

Marshall had decreed that the ETO 'glory' was going to the US Army, Ike agreed (politician), Bradley dithered and did waht Patton said and Patton screwed up by the numbers endlessly. The other US generals (sone like Collins really good, amongst the best of the best) got the short end...and usually wished that Monty was their boss.

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## parsifal (Jan 8, 2016)

Well, I wouldnt be quite that critical. What started this was the notion that with near 1:1 parity in numbers, in 1942, the US Army could handle the germans. I think universally that was rejected, but I tried to quantify that with some quantified analysis , which is not my work, but that of some highly respected soldiers and a very good author. Dupuy has written a book on combat performances and receiverd death threats for his trouble Im told. 

Someone then asked me if similar comparisons had been done with the japanese, which i dont think have been done, but i was asked my opinion anyway. I gave it, not realizing what a sacred cow, with overtly racist overtones I might add, the idea of utter superiority the US ground forces have over the Japanese is retained in this place. 

Between 1942 and 1944, the Americans learnt a lot, and the army fielded at Normandy and fought its way across France was a far cry from the rabble in US uniform in 1942 (there are similar parrallels for the US in the Pacific) . This applied to both TOs. There were still acute shortages of experience. NCOs and junior officers cant be built in a year, and that was the basic problem in the US Army. It showed in a number of ways, their inability to aggressively patrol, the need to retain units under command at a large scale, and the inability to delegate downward are examples. According to Stanton, a US author I might add, the US tried to compensate for that with massive firepower. That was a response that largely grew out of the French Army influences on the US Army, and their overweaning desire to assault stuff frontally. Stanton describes the advance across France as competent, but not brilliant, which i think is reasonable. They kept steady pressure up on the germans, and the germans made some whopper mistakes of their own, and not just because of hitler either. The supply issue Im not so sure of. Maybe you are right, but i always believed the supply shortages were because monty hogged the very limited supplies reaching the front, and the Germans did a massive job destroying the port facilities in France as they retreated .

Its frustrating that we cant discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the various armies without getting into this pointless argument about how convincingly superior one side was and not be able to objectively break apart the strengths and weaknesses that each protagonist had and how those aspects of their military affected the progress and outcome of a given campaign. I realloy wish we could discuss this in a professional way, but people simply want to deal in absolutes all the time. We Australians are not immune from that. We had had some very costly lessons in WWI and were determined to avoid casualties wherever we could. Sounds good, but in reality it probably cost more lives than it saved . We were always the sucker cousin as well, whether the bigger cousin was British or American.....


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## Ascent (Jan 8, 2016)

I have heard that one of the problems for the US army was the fact that the more educated and brighter recruits were grabbed by the specialist branches meaning that the basic infantryman, while not necassarily stupid, tended to be less educated and motivated.

Do you know if there is anything in this?


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## Milosh (Jan 8, 2016)

Ascent said:


> I have heard that one of the problems for the US army was the fact that the more educated and brighter recruits were grabbed by the specialist branches meaning that the basic infantryman, while not necassarily stupid, tended to be less educated and motivated.
> 
> Do you know if there is anything in this?



I would imagine that would be the case in any military.


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## stona (Jan 8, 2016)

Robert Scales, whose views are usually diametrically opposed to mine has written an article whose title is self explanatory, _“Drafted armies are self-killing machines.”_ Whilst you might not agree absolutely his view deserves consideration, he is well qualified to have such a view.
On conscription or some kind of national service in the US he has written.
_"National service sounds like a utopian concept for social leveling, and it might be if it were applied fairly. It might be applied fairly during peacetime. But this is America. When the bullets start to fly Mom and Dad from the middle and upper classes will find a nice internship for their child in a soup kitchen or a Congressman’s office. But the less well connected will, as always, go to war poorly prepared, untrained and resentful."_
These are not exactly my views but may have a bearing on reasons for the poor material the US Armies had to mold into infantry in WW2.
Cheers
Steve

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## syscom3 (Jan 8, 2016)

stona said:


> Robert Scales, whose views are usually diametrically opposed to mine has written an article whose title is self explanatory, _“Drafted armies are self-killing machines.”_ Whilst you might not agree absolutely his view deserves consideration, he is well qualified to have such a view.
> On conscription or some kind of national service in the US he has written.
> _"National service sounds like a utopian concept for social leveling, and it might be if it were applied fairly. It might be applied fairly during peacetime. But this is America. When the bullets start to fly Mom and Dad from the middle and upper classes will find a nice internship for their child in a soup kitchen or a Congressman’s office. But the less well connected will, as always, go to war poorly prepared, untrained and resentful."_
> These are not exactly my views but may have a bearing on reasons for the poor material the US Armies had to mold into infantry in WW2.
> ...



The US had very very few legal deferments from the draft. And where do you get this idea that the US had "poor material" to work with. The US success in this war of unprecedented mechanization was due to this "poor material" already having a lot of the skills necessary to jump into the specialist roles.


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## tomo pauk (Jan 8, 2016)

stona said:


> Robert Scales, whose views are usually diametrically opposed to mine has written an article whose title is self explanatory, _“Drafted armies are self-killing machines.”_ Whilst you might not agree absolutely his view deserves consideration, he is well qualified to have such a view.
> On conscription or some kind of national service in the US he has written.
> _"National service sounds like a utopian concept for social leveling, and it might be if it were applied fairly. It might be applied fairly during peacetime. *But this is America.* When the bullets start to fly Mom and Dad from the middle and upper classes will find a nice internship for their child in a soup kitchen or a Congressman’s office. But the less well connected will, as always, go to war poorly prepared, untrained and resentful."_
> These are not exactly my views but may have a bearing on reasons for the poor material the US Armies had to mold into infantry in WW2.
> ...



Methinks that is not just the case for USA. The better connected Moms and Dads strive to keep the offsprings from the pointed end in all feasible ways anywhere in the world.


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## parsifal (Jan 8, 2016)

With a few exceptions, the best soldiers at a national level has a direct correlation to the education levels that exist in their country of origin. There is still some debate as to why that is the case, but it just is. The one glaring exception to that was the Red Army where basically peasant levels of education produced some of the toughest soldiers in history. Thats a different discussion, but basically the russians solved their problem through specialization, a unit might have just one or two weapon types, and a soldier would be taught how to use that weapon and that was that..... 

Im not referring to overall performance, just the enlisted ranks, the building blocks of the army. Officers and leadership are a different thing altogether. The US produced good soldiers at enlisted level I think because there was a good starting base of education in the wider community. It made "production" of the technical branches easier as well. Even the production of officers was easier with better education base. Personnel could learn their own jobs easier, and could gain appreciation of the way the system as a whole was meant to work. 

What held the US army back were basically two things, small unit leadership and its underlying doctrine. Neither of these aspects of the army were easy to overcome, but the US Army did eventually make allowances. Neither do i subscribe to the theory that it was just about the numbers. They enjoyed a very comfortable numbers advantage (in equipment at least) but they needed to work out ways of applying that advantage. 

Its small unit leadership was heavily constrained by the small size of the army at the beginning of the war. Ive read the army at the beginning of 1940 was 100000 men give or take,, with sizable chunks of the army on overseas deployments and the like where their ability to process and "produce" leaders was limited. A man digging a trench, or guarding a beach isnt learning or teaching anything. By the end of 1942, the army was around 2 or 3 million men. You cant have an expansion like that and expect your army to retain its proficiency levels. The Germans by comparison had 7 years of peace in which to develop their leadership skills, plus from the end of 1918 Von Seekct had made sure the heer was "leader heavy" so that when the expansion came, it could be done as smoothly as possible (just the same ther was a slight crisis for the the germans in 1941, and a massive one in 1944 as they lost, or were caught short of leaders by the unfolding events). You cant build leaders quickly under any circumstance, and this was never more true than for the US Army. Moreover, active engagement can actually decrease your experience levels, not enhance them. Your Corporals, Sgts and Lts suffer massively higher casualty rates (as a percentage of the total) than any other ranks. 

The other constraint holding the US Army combat efficiency was its narrow doctrinal approaches to battle problems. Having emerged from WWI thoroughly influenced by the French model of using firepower over movement, they remained wedded to that very narrow and limited concept for a long time. Theres nothing wrong with firepower, it is one element of the battle problem, but it is only a half solution. Just as important is manouvre, and whilst the US generals did eventually come to use that concept (at the top of the pile in that category has to be Patton) for the army in general ity took a while. That was amply demonstrated in France 1944. Notwithstanding the spectacular breakout in July and the encirclement at Falaise (which put down to German incompetence more than Allied brilliance) , thereafter the US advances were broad front, conservative, unimaginative affairs in which the old maxim of firepower over was dominant again. The Americans would basically waddle up to a German delay point, blast the crap out of it, and then occupy that position, usually allowing the few German defenders plenty of time and opportunity to escape.

These problems were overcome and compensated for, but not as a whole in 1942. in the pacific the one unit that did well in the beginning were the marines, where the leaders were mostly or significantly prewar, and the fighting was positional, where US doctrinal strengths could be exploited to the maximum. Elsewhere, the US in 1942 fought with very mediocre performance. In the later campaigns they compensated for these persistent issues with numbers at the point of impact, coupled with massive supporting firepower. Where that firepower was not available, or less available, they struggled again.


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## stona (Jan 12, 2016)

I was going through the USSBS for an unrelated reason when I found a table showing the total number of aircraft involved in the European war. A footnote explains that for the USAAF this includes 'total combat planes in European and Mediterranean theaters of Operation.' It does also include reconnaissance types as fighters.

June '43 2,273 bombers and 2,621 fighters for a total of 4,894 aircraft

June '44 6,384 bombers and 5,296 fighters for a total 0f 11,680 aircraft.

For the RAF, which was not building up in Europe, it was already there and had been for nearly four years by June 1943

June '43 5,994 bombers and 6,990 fighters for a total of 12,985 aircraft

June '44 5,574 bombers and 7,663 fighters for a total of 13,237 aircraft.

It took until June '44 until the USAAF had anything like comparable numbers of aircraft to the RAF.

Cheers

Steve

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## tomo pauk (Jan 12, 2016)

Thanks for the effort. 

Hopefully, almost 18000 aircraft will subdue the German defences in June of 1943


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## stona (Jan 12, 2016)

Those numbers, particularly for 1943, would contain many obsolete aircraft._ It is not a reflection of front line strength but a total number, by category,_ calculated as monthly averages. For example the RAF total would include every Spitfire I, II, Blenheim, Defiant and Hurricane still flying at the various training units, not exactly useful for an invasion of Europe.
A comparable number for the Luftwaffe would include every fighter, including those a flight schools and other types which might fall into the 'fighter' category. I wouldn't fancy flying an ex French Hawk against the invasion 
Air superiority was secured and maintained in 1944 with about 13,000 fighters not the less than 10,000 of a year earlier. Notice that the RAF strength barely changes (increase of 673/<10% in the year) and yet it was not capable of dominating European air space until the arrival of significant numbers of US air forces in 1943/4. US fighter strength in Europe increased by 2,675, near enough doubling in the same period.
The type of aircraft is also important. Those American fighters, arriving in force, were P-51s.
Cheers
Steve


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## soulezoo (Jan 12, 2016)

parsifal said:


> The US heavy armoured div TOE, of which just two were raised, were authorised from the 15 November 1940, but the first of the units themselves were not ready until March 1942, and even then at less than 50% authorised TOE, with equipment such as Grants and Stuarts that were not the equal of the Shinhoto Chi Ha tanks then in service with the IJA.



Without comment on the rest, the Stuarts were very competitive with the Shinotos and the Shinotos were vulnerable to the 37mm gun on the Stuart (as the Stuart was to the larger gun on the Shinoto). Much as we argue with regard to fighter aircraft, the differences came down to the user. The Grant tanks, ungainly as they were, were much superior in most respects to the Shinoto. The Shinoto Chi-Ha was indeed the best of Japanese tanks; however, that did not make it a very good tank. Although it was very competent for jungle warfare unopposed by other armor.


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## soulezoo (Jan 12, 2016)

stona said:


> Robert Scales, whose views are usually diametrically opposed to mine has written an article whose title is self explanatory, _“Drafted armies are self-killing machines.”_ Whilst you might not agree absolutely his view deserves consideration, he is well qualified to have such a view.
> On conscription or some kind of national service in the US he has written.
> _"National service sounds like a utopian concept for social leveling, and it might be if it were applied fairly. It might be applied fairly during peacetime. But this is America. When the bullets start to fly Mom and Dad from the middle and upper classes will find a nice internship for their child in a soup kitchen or a Congressman’s office. But the less well connected will, as always, go to war poorly prepared, untrained and resentful."_
> These are not exactly my views but may have a bearing on reasons for the poor material the US Armies had to mold into infantry in WW2.
> ...



The same folks arguing this will typically try to have it both ways:

In the first, you have the "we need to have a draft for fair social leveling" thought in which the rich and poor are equally drafted and in that the rich (who usually control governance) will be less likely to start a war. But in any case, the "rich" have to fight too. 

Then the same will argue that a draft unfairly targets the poor as so many more of them are drafted than the rich. Forgetting that there are so many more poor to begin with.

That is how the US ended up with the volunteer services. Hard to discriminate when one volunteers. However, that is also argued against as when it is volunteer, the "rich" don't have to play at all.

All of this screams at me "Marxist class warfare".


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## stona (Jan 12, 2016)

soulezoo said:


> All of this screams at me "Marxist class warfare".



I think you need to check who Scales is. Whatever I may think of him, a Marxist he is not. I doubt that the US would appoint a Marxist as commandant of the U.S. Army War College 

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Jan 12, 2016)

Steve, regarding your post 153....


Im curious as to readiness rates between June 1943 and June 1944. How many sorties per day was the air force of 1943 capable of, compared to the air force a year later. Im willing to wager it was lower per a/c at the earlier date.


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## Milosh (Jan 12, 2016)

from http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a542518.pdf

vs Germany

June '43 
on hand - 5928
sorties - 17352
sorties per a/c - 2.9

June'44
on hand - 15210
sorties - 130043
sorties per a/c- 8.5

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## parsifal (Jan 12, 2016)

Its the sortie rate that makes the difference. it matters not if you have 10000 a/c and they don't fly much, or more specifically, cant fly much. If you've got 5000 a/c flying 2.9 sorties per unit of time compared to 15000 a/c flying 8.5 sorties per unit of time, your 1944 air force compared to your 1943 Air force is going to do 127500 units of (work) compared to 14500 units of (work). that means, disregarding all other efficiency factors, your 1944 air force is 8.7 times more powerful. If your 1944 version of airpower is akin to a Chev muscle car, then the 1943 is the equivalent of a Morris Minor.....

I don't know exactly what combat multipliers to assign to airpower in a ground campaign, but in the western military, it has to be substantial. As a wargamer, if you have normal odds of say 5:1 and then you add effective air support, you could modify those odds to 8 or 9:1 easily. if the 1943 version of airpower could, on average increase your battlefield odds by one shift, you would go from say 5:1 to 6:1. allowing or guesstimating diminishing returns, the 1944 scenario could easily transform that match up to 10 or 11:1. 

Id very much like to hear peoples opinions on the quantitative effects airpower might have on a land battle. We tend to know that airpower was usualy critical, but its hard to be precise.


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## stona (Jan 13, 2016)

parsifal said:


> Id very much like to hear peoples opinions on the quantitative effects airpower might have on a land battle. We tend to know that airpower was usualy critical, but its hard to be precise.



I'll have a look when I have a chance, but the effect of 1940's air power was very difficult to quantify. What figure can be put on denying the enemy freedom of movement in day light hours? Preventing his ability to concentrate forces? Wreaking havoc on his logistical tail?

Much research has shown that WW2 air power was not very good at destroying enemy forces, particularly armour, but also artillery,dug in infantry, at or near the front. It was also not very effective at shifting enemy forces from well prepared defensive positions. It did however have a debilitating effect in other ways.

In the context of the original thread it is not just air power at the front that is relevant but also the application of strategic forces in the preparation for the invasion and then in direct support of it and the ensuing campaigns.

Without all these 'aerial' factors, as well as much else, the invasion of NW Europe would have failed. These factors were not in place in 1943 which is why the Allies did not attempt the invasion at that time.

Cheers

Steve

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## parsifal (Jan 13, 2016)

Ive read somewhere that even at its best, airpower might account for 3-5% of losses. So I have no problem in accepting that as a direct killer, under normal circumstances, airpower was at best a pinning agent, not a direct killer. Against exposed ground forces, not dug in, and concentrated, such as at Falaise, the effects of airpower were far more dangerous, it has to be noted. 

Artillery remained the primary firepower of the army. You are hitting the right nails by inferring the main effect was on mobility. Obviously reducing the freedom of movement to an army, increases its risk to being encircled and pinned, but there are other flow on effects as well. Even in defence an army engaged places enormous strain on its supply train, with the main eater of that supply being the artillery . Without supply to its artillery, a units firepower is reduced, and if its firepower is reduced, its ability to resist also decreases. Add to that if airpower is being applied, the mobility of the target is also decreased. Denied both firepower and mobility, the targets ability to resist is reduced exponentially. 

Moreover a unit restricted to night movement only effectively has both its firepower and its mobility halved. The supply issue is worth having a look at. A German Infantry Div would typically carry with it a 5 day supply load out. A German Infantry Div had four primary supply needs, Fuel, Food (and water), POLs, fodder and ammunition. Ammunition rates had wild fluctuations, depending on the level of engagement. A 1943 Infantry Div had 12000 men at full strength, and its five day load out when not engaged was 1902 tons, when not engaged. If engaged to full capacity and if the division is in a mobile situation, At a low end of activity, it might expend 70 tons per day, but at the high end it could expend, on average 600-800 tons per day. At that rate, with an assumed distance to the rail suppy head of 30 miles, the units 600 motor vehicles would be fully stretched, night and day, just to get the supply to the divisional depots. Reduce the available movement time by roughly 2/3 and your division will suffer fatal losses in logistic support. And its the soft skinned vehicles that you should be going after, not the tanks. Its against the soft skinned supply tails that FFARs were most deadly. You only need to get your rocket within about 30m of the target and your truck is a goner. 

So, with an air force in 1943, 1/8 as capable in terms of the amount of work it could undertake, and an unknown loss of efficiency compared to the 1944 air forces. That isnt even considering any other qualitative changes that might be at work. With 1/8 the amount of work potential, are we looking at a German army with the ability to 8x as efficient? I think not that much, but certainly far more efficient than the 1944 army that faced the allies


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## stona (Jan 13, 2016)

The allied tactical air forces wreaked havoc on German supply. By far the most accurate weapons these aircraft had were the 20mm cannon (RAF) and .50 calibre machine guns (USAAF), both of which were ineffective against armoured vehicles, fortifications etc. Against soft skinned vehicles, the trucks, tankers and horse drawn carts on which the Germans depended they were devastating.

Shortly after the Falaise 'pocket' was closed No.2 ORS conducted a survey to determine the losses to the Germans caused by air attack and the effectiveness of the various air to ground weapons. They surveyed three areas, the 'Pocket' itself, the area at the mouth of the 'Pocket' around Chambois referred to as 'Shambles' and the area leading to the Seine crossings known as 'Chase'. 

In the 'Pocket', of 133 armoured vehicles located only 33 had been the victim of any form of air attack. The remaining 100 had been destroyed by their crews or abandoned.
Of 701 soft skinned vehicles found in the 'Pocket' 325 had been the victim of air attack and of these *85% had been hit by cannon or machine gun fire.*. Nonetheless of the 885 vehicles of all types found in the 'Pocket' 60% had been destroyed or abandoned by their crews. The next question is why? The most obvious answer is that they had run out of fuel, and that too may well have been due to the contribution of tactical air power.

In the 'Shambles' so many vehicles were found, around 3,000, that the ORS could not examine them all and simply took samples of various types. 82 of the 187 tanks and SP guns found in this area were examined. Only 2 were determined to have been destroyed from the air.
A sample of 330 soft skin and 31 'lightly armoured' vehicles was also taken. 110 soft skin vehicles and 6 lightly armoured vehicles were the victims of air attack. The effectiveness of strafing against these targets was once again confirmed.

The 'Chase' area was more difficult to assess, many minor roads were not checked. The ORS estimated that some 5,000 vehicles were destroyed in this area. 301 tanks and SP guns were examined and 10 were found to be victims of air attack. 2nd TAF pilots alone had claimed 222! Again the strafing of soft skinned vehicles had been most effective. The blocking of roads and increasing congestion as well as destroying mobile fuel supplies the ORS reckoned that the almost constant fighter bomber attacks were largely responsible for the abandonment of so many tanks and other vehicles. This view was supported by PoW interrogations. German PoWs described how the threat of air attack had restricted movement to night time until congestion and haste had compelled movement by day. Whenever air attacks materialised crews would stop to take cover and vehicles would be driven off the main roads, into side roads, which in turn became blocked. The continuous air attacks, in a limited area, certainly prevented many tanks and other vehicles escaping, even though they did not directly destroy them. Air attacks also had an acute demoralising effect on the troops subjected to them. This is impossible to quantify, but significant.

It is no accident that the subsequent German offensive in the Ardennes was carried out in conditions that negated the effect of allied tactical air power. It is a testament to the ability of that power to limit the ability of the Germans to carry out large scale armoured operations, but it is still difficult to put numbers to it.

Cheers

Steve

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## tomo pauk (Jan 13, 2016)

parsifal said:


> ...
> *So, with an air force in 1943, 1/8 as capable in terms of the amount of work it could undertake, and an unknown loss of efficiency compared to the 1944 air forces.* That isnt even considering any other qualitative changes that might be at work. With 1/8 the amount of work potential, are we looking at a German army with the ability to 8x as efficient? I think not that much, but certainly far more efficient than the 1944 army that faced the allies



Wonder why the RAF and USAF of, say, mid 1943, will represent just 1/8th of capability, when compared with mid 1944?


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## stona (Jan 13, 2016)

Because 5,928 available aircraft with a sortie rate of 2.9 gives a product for total possible sorties of 17,191 in June '43.

15,210 available aircraft with a sortie rate of 8.5 gives a product for possible sorties of 129,285 in June '44.

It's why the sortie rate is so important. In June '44 the allied air forces were potentially flying 7.52 times more sorties than in June '43. It's yet another measure of effectiveness, like load/personnel factors and a host of others.

I don't have figures for Luftwaffe sortie rates in either period, but I'd bet they compare very unfavourably with allied rates. By 1944 the Luftwaffe still had aircraft but they didn't fly for a variety of well documented reasons. How many Luftwaffe sorties were flown, or even attempted against the invasion beaches? Having a couple of thousand aircraft can be rendered irrelevant by other factors.

In August 1944 No.83 Group 2nd TAF alone flew 13,054 sorties. I wonder how many the entire Luftwaffe in NW Europe flew in the same month! Incidentally another measure of how well you are doing is loss/sortie. For No. 83 Group that month it was 126.7 sorties per loss which is exceptionally good.

Cheers

Steve


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## tomo pauk (Jan 13, 2016)

I don't know where the number of <6000 of combat aircraft for June 1943 comes from. Just the USAF have had on hand 5100 of '1st line' combat aircraft deployed against Germany; plus a likely number of RAF aircraft?
The sortie rate is dependant on how close the target is, and how hard one wants to push their assets. Being sattisfied with less thaan 3 sorties per month is not a great thinking?


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## stona (Jan 13, 2016)

Milosh gave a source for the figures. An increase in sortie rate is, essentially, an increase in efficiency. There may be many factors causing the sortie rate to have been lower in June '43 than a year later. These can be logistical and organisational as well as operational.
I would bet that operational ready rates for USAAF aircraft in Europe was significantly higher in 1944 than 1943, simply for logistical reasons, but I don't have the figures. I would also bet that the Luftwaffe's were a lot lower in 1944 than 1943, I have those figures but not time to look them up. These things make a huge difference to the effectiveness of any fighting force.
Cheers
Steve


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## Shortround6 (Jan 13, 2016)

_IF_ the number of sorties is combat sorties the numbers for the US are quite understandable. Many US Squadrons/groups were _working up_ in 1943. That is debugging aircraft after ocean voyages, training crew men and _slowly_ introducing the new units to combat. Many bomber squadrons/groups flew their first missions to coastal France or the low countries and didn't try to penetrate to Germany until a number of missions had been flown. Sometimes a number of days or even a few weeks passed between missions over enemy territory while working up. Bomber crews that had trained flying over the the southern US might have difficulty with flying (navigating) over Europe and the Channel/North sea. Glimpses of land through cloud cover when you are unfamilar with what you are even looking for is a good way to get lost. 
Throwing green crews and partially sorted aircraft into long range missions would have been fool hardy given the effort it took to get the planes, men and equipment to England.

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## tomo pauk (Jan 13, 2016)

The effort to ship the men gear into MTO, operate from airbases of lower quality than in UK, while expecting them to perform against the enemy was what USAF was doing from late 1942 on. In much greater quantity than in ETO.


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## parsifal (Jan 13, 2016)

tomo pauk said:


> Wonder why the RAF and USAF of, say, mid 1943, will represent just 1/8th of capability, when compared with mid 1944?



Steve explained this pretty well , but we aren't even considering other improvements in efficiency. I think between June 1943 and June 1944, the Allies added to their knowledge of what buttons to push, what to go after , where, and with what. its just not possible to be precise, but its something to at least think about.

So, its pretty clear that between 1943 and 1944 the allies derived massive increases in work potential for their air forces. by "work potential' I mean, "things they could do."

The question is, with the (reduced) level of "work potential" available in June 1943 versus the available response the LW could mount at that time, could a less experienced, less capable, smaller allied ground force have any hope of success. I don't think that it did, but Im willing to at least listen to the counter argument.


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## parsifal (Jan 13, 2016)

> I would also bet that the Luftwaffe's were a lot lower in 1944 than 1943, I have those figures but not time to look them up.



On D-Day, Ive read the germans managed about 300 sorties over Normandy and the beaches. No idea what they were. These included a few critical recon missions, which I don't know the results of. Typically, however recon is the single most important thing your air force can do. 



> These things make a huge difference to the effectiveness of any fighting force.


Bingo! You can say that again


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## tomo pauk (Jan 13, 2016)

parsifal said:


> Steve explained this pretty well , but we aren't even considering other improvements in efficiency. I think between June 1943 and June 1944, the Allies added to their knowledge of what buttons to push, what to go after , where, and with what. its just not possible to be precise, but its something to at least think about.
> 
> So, its pretty clear that between 1943 and 1944 the allies derived massive increases in work potential for their air forces. by "work potential' I mean, "things they could do."
> 
> The question is, with the (reduced) level of "work potential" available in June 1943 versus the available response the LW could mount at that time, could a less experienced, less capable, smaller allied ground force have any hope of success. I don't think that it did, but Im willing to at least listen to the counter argument.



Thanks for being open-minded.

We can discuss how much of 'work potential' was lost in 1943 due to USAF having 2 times more of the 1st line combat aircraft in the MTO (= longer supply chain, lower quality of air bases) vs. what they had in the UK. As for the ground forces of less capability vs. German defences - the Atlantic wall was not in early 1943 what was in early 1944.
The USA was, despite knowing the lack of experience in 1942-43 and sea lines of communications not yet 100% cleared, very willing to bring the war to the Axis, not just in rhetoric.


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## eagledad (Jan 13, 2016)

Gentlemen,

In regards to sorties per aircraft, 

I am not sure that the sortie rate per aircraft per unit of time is an accurate way to measure power of an Air Force because the military situations may not be comparable. IMHO the work that was undertaken in June of 1943 was not equal to the work undertaken in June of 1944. June 1944 sortie numbers include the Overlord invasion and Operation Diadem in the Mediterranean. Both projects would require an increased effort to succeed. The only extra operation in June of 1943 was the reduction of Pantelleria. 

Perhaps the 1943 sorties per aircraft are low compared to 1944 because the amount of work required was not the same in June of 1943 as in June of 1944.

Eagledad


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## parsifal (Jan 13, 2016)

I think what you may be saying, and correct me if I misunderstand, is that the sortie rate per aircraft per day was lower in 1943, because the airforce at that time didn't need to work as hard as it did in 1944. There was less urgency in the tasks before it, so they could go more slowly at it.

If Im understanding correctly, its a valid suggestion. A good surrogate measure to apply in parallel to the sortie rate would be to also look at serviceability rates at the same time. If the serviceability rate in 1943 was lower than in 1944, AND the sortie rate was lower as well, then that would suggest, by surrogate standards of measurement admittedly, that the 1943 air force wasn't able to lift its game. if not, it might be reasonable to assume the '43 air force wasn't working as hard as it should, or could.

The '44 air force did maintain a higher sortie rate, and didn't have to take a breather at the end of that period. by definition we therefore know that it was a sustainable rate of operations in '44. the unknown variable is whether the sortie rate in '43 could be lifted and sustained or not.....


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## stona (Jan 14, 2016)

eagledad said:


> Perhaps the 1943 sorties per aircraft are low compared to 1944 because the amount of work required was not the same in June of 1943 as in June of 1944.
> Eagledad



The Casablanca Directive was issued on 21st January 1943. The implication in your comment is that the allied air forces were not making a maximum effort to carry out the object of _"the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened."_
On 10th June 1943 the Casablanca Directive was modified with the issue of the Pointblank Directive, essentially targeting the German Air Force and its supporting industries etc (hence raids on Schweinfurt for example). This remained in force until control of all allied air forces passed to the Supreme Commander A.E.F. on 27th March 1944. The priorities remained the same, specifically _"German Air Force, particularly fighters. Facilities supporting G.A.F."_ By 17th April the Railway Plan, in direct support of the invasion was added.

My point is that I don't believe that the allied air forces were making anything less than a maximum effort in carrying out their directives in 1943. I don't believe that they had the same capability in 1943 that they would have a year later. The RAF didn't have a tactical air force in Europe until Fighter Command was divided in mid (June?) 1943, and 2nd TAF didn't become a relevant force until Coningham took over in early 1944.

Cheers

Steve


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## eagledad (Jan 14, 2016)

Gentlemen,

Since the strategic situation in June of 1943 was different than the situation in June of 1944, the air forces were given different tasks. The sortie numbers IMHO are reflective of the different tasks. I am not saying or implying that the Western Allies were doing less than max effort in June of 1943, I suspect that the Air Forces were giving max efforts giving the respective priorities. What needs to be asked is could the western allies mount a similar effort in June of 1943 as they did in June of 1944 given the same priorities that the Air Force in June of 1944 had? 

As to the idea of whether there was enough air support for a cross channel invasion in June of 1943, Parsifal idea of incorporating serviceability numbers is a good start. We would also have to look at numbers by type as well as the quality of the Allied aircraft and pilots available in June 1943 v June 1944. The dreaded logistics trains would also have to be compared.

Eagledad

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## stona (Jan 14, 2016)

If the Allied air forces were making a maximum effort in 1943 with a sortie rate of around 3, then something changed to enable this to rise to more than 8 in 1944. Many factors can influence this number, most obviously serviceability rates and crew availability, but also something beyond anyone's control like the weather (though June in NW Europe would not normally have terrible weather, many targets for the bombers might be cloud covered).
Cheers
Steve


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## Shortround6 (Jan 14, 2016)

As example of _why_ sortie rates may be off one might look at the P-47. It didn't come into it's own until late summer of 1943. Spring and early summer saw P-47 Groups (3 of them?) with chronic radio problems, in flight fires, oxygen system problems, and other system problems. I will ignore the drop tank situation as that had little bearing on short range missions. It wasn't a question of flying missions on day, landing and refueling, rearming and being ready to go the next day ( or when weather permitted) but trying to sort out a number of problems in a large percentage of the units aircraft before _trying_ another large scale mission. One Squadron or group only got into action in the Spring of 1943 after refitting all their P-47s with English radios because their own were useless (and apparently unfix-able, at the time). 
By late 1943 and 44 many problems were being fixed at the factory, New groups/squadrons were loaned (or transferred) a few experienced ground crewmen and pilots so their ability to go into action was much quicker than the early groups.

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## stona (Jan 14, 2016)

The Americans certainly seem to have had a logistical issue as they deployed to Europe. In the simplest terms if they needed a bit for one of their P+W engines it was likely to be several thousand miles away, not in Birmingham or Derby. This MUST have had a debilitating effect on serviceability and therefore sortie rates. I would be very interested to see some data on crew availability rates at this time too.
The huge build up of men and materiel for Overlord which took place throughout 1943 would have gone a long way towards alleviating the situation. At the end of 1942 there were about 140,000 US personnel in the UK, at the time of Overlord this had risen to 1.5 million.
It seems to me, whatever the Americans were trying to do in 1943 they were doing much more efficiently in 1944.
Cheers
Steve

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## drgondog (Jan 14, 2016)

First, a sortie rate of three for an average inventory of 5000 - per month translates to one sortie every 10 days for every aircraft - assuming all were operational - and they weren't.

Second, the logistics and Service/Modification/Maintenance resources in Africa were to be kind - primitive when compared to the capabilities of US Base Air Depots and Strategic Air Depots that started in 1942 in the UK. With a Lot of Brit assistance relative to Burtonwood, Warton, etc.

Stona and Eagledad and Shortround are correct that neither the supply chain nor the warehousing of critical parts like Engines nor the machine shops and sheet metal capability and trained personnel were in adequate numbers to support more than a token of the 8th AF in 1942 and well into 1943.

By first quarter 1944, when 8th AF was close to its target TO&E, not only were the BAD's and SAD's capable of rebuilding a badly damaged airplane, modifying all inbound new aircraft to ETO operational benchmarks in a factory assy line format - but many sophisticated functions like replacing a wing or a damaged lower cowl/radiator from a belly landing were re-located to Airfield centric Service Groups. 

The turnaround time for engine changes, equipment mods and replacements, etc. were dramatically enhanced via both learning curve and distribution of key functions from BAD/SAD's to the airfields.

This said, it was much worse in the PTO than MTO, and MTO/ETO were pitiful (for US) in 1942 versus 1944.

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## parsifal (Jan 16, 2016)

eagledad said:


> Gentlemen,
> 
> Since the strategic situation in June of 1943 was different than the situation in June of 1944, the air forces were given different tasks. The sortie numbers IMHO are reflective of the different tasks. I am not saying or implying that the Western Allies were doing less than max effort in June of 1943, I suspect that the Air Forces were giving max efforts giving the respective priorities. What needs to be asked is could the western allies mount a similar effort in June of 1943 as they did in June of 1944 given the same priorities that the Air Force in June of 1944 had?
> 
> ...




That might be the case, but seems unlikely. A bombing mission is a bombing mission isnt it, though you have low level strike, and then high altitude level b ombing ? Same for all the other mission types I can think of. Serviceability might drop if the level of opposition, and damage suffered was greater in the 1943 environment than it was in the 1944 battle, which I would concede is a distinct possibility. Possibly because of greater ability by the Germans to inflict damage. That I can accept, That might do it. But if the 1943 air force assumed the same strategic outcomes as 1944, and undertook the same mission types, I cant see serviceability rates improving. They still will be facing the same, or greater German resistance. moreover, my opinion is that ground support and tactical operations are the toughest there are. You dont need damage per se to ground an aircraft. It flies, you break something then you have to fix it. I believe there was a higher propensity for things to break in ground support than there was with high level formation flying simply because it was harder flying. .


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## stona (Jan 16, 2016)

After the invasion Luftwaffe fighters were almost irrelevant to the fighter bombers of the various Tactical Air Forces.

The 2nd TAF divided it's sorties into two categories, 'Immediate and Pre-arranged Support Sorties' and 'Armed Reconnaissance'. Of the two most losses were sustained on armed reconnaissance sorties which were further sub-divided into 'Deep' and 'Shallow'. Losses to enemy aircraft were very low (even zero by February 1945) on 'Shallow' sorties and low on 'Deep' sorties. Losses to flak were generally 3 to 4 times those to enemy aircraft.

The only US figures I have to hand are for the P-47s of the 1st(Provisional)TAF from November '44 to February '45. There are many more sub-divisions in the US statistics for mission types (dive bombing, armed recce, ground support, fighter sweeps,escort and even a few categorised as miscellaneous). Overall these show a similar trend with 7 aircraft lost to enemy aircraft and 33 to flak.

Had the TAFs existed a year earlier and attempted these sorts of operations over continental Europe I suspect the results would have been very different.

Cheers

Steve


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