# Could Axis aircraft catch the Mosquito in Dec 1941?



## Freebird (Apr 21, 2012)

Did the Germans or Japanese have any interceptors in 1941 that could catch (or shoot down) a Mossie PR flying at max altitude?


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## Vincenzo (Apr 21, 2012)

maybe the 109F-4 but only if already there


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## Glider (Apr 21, 2012)

To the performance of the Mosquito was its high cruising speed which made it difficult to intercept and its range. It could simply run like hell and was often able to maintain the high speed for longer than the chasing fighters. There were many examples of Mosquito's outrunning fighters.


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## davebender (Apr 21, 2012)

High speed, high altitude aircraft are the toughest targets to intercept. For instance the SR-71 was operational for 30 years and I don't think a single one was lost to enemy action.

Catching a Mosquito flying at max altitude would be mostly a matter of luck.


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## Tante Ju (Apr 21, 2012)

Catching it is probably not a problem, making a good intercept vector is. I don't think it was that fast at altitude. Most Mosquito had low alitude engines did not?


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## Denniss (Apr 21, 2012)

The GM-1 boosted Bf 109 F-4/Z may have been able to be the insect killer if properly vectored in.


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## wuzak (Apr 21, 2012)

Tante Ju said:


> Catching it is probably not a problem, making a good intercept vector is. I don't think it was that fast at altitude. Most Mosquito had low alitude engines did not?



Early versions, such as the PR.I had single stage engines. The performance also varied quite a bit depending on the exhaust. The early saxophone exhaust was some 15-20mph slower than the later ejector exhausts.



> The Mosquito PR Mk I had a range of 2,180 miles, top speed of 382mph and ceiling of 35,000 feet. It had the range and speed to photographic targets inside Germany – indeed one early mission reached as far as Poland! The only problem with the PR Mk I was that there were never enough of them.



De Havilland Mosquito PR Mk I

382mph would be with the ejector exhausts.


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## wuzak (Apr 21, 2012)

After a little more reading, it seems that the PR.I did have the saxophone exhausts. However, PR.Is were basically the same as W4051, which was the PR prototype. This meant it had the single piece flaps with the short nacelle and the short span #1 tailplane.

The max speed would have been achieved between 20,000ft and 25,000ft, I believe.


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## wuzak (Apr 21, 2012)

Denniss said:


> The GM-1 boosted Bf 109 F-4/Z may have been able to be the insect killer if properly vectored in.



How would they be "properly vectored in"?


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## mhuxt (Apr 21, 2012)

A JG 77 pilot was given credit for a Mosquito recce craft on 4 December 1941, though some sources say the Mossie had previously been damaged by flak.


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## davebender (Apr 21, 2012)

Germany was experimenting with ground control radar during 1939. By December 1941 they had a pretty good air defense system for detecting, tracking and intercepting enemy aircraft.


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## wuzak (Apr 21, 2012)

davebender said:


> Germany was experimenting with ground control radar during 1939. By December 1941 they had a pretty good air defense system for detecting, tracking and intercepting enemy aircraft.



More interested in the positioning of the intercepting aircraft.


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## Siegfried (Apr 21, 2012)

davebender said:


> Germany was experimenting with ground control radar during 1939. By December 1941 they had a pretty good air defense system for detecting, tracking and intercepting enemy aircraft.



Indeed by December 41 there were the following
1 Several versions of Freya (Including the A/N version with lobe switching to about 0.2 degree)
2 Wurzburg-D with a range of about 35 knautical miles, 0.3 degree accuracy and 25m range accuracy
3 Wurzbug-Riesse with over double the range and 0.15 degree accuracy.

The Wurzburgs had an electronic computer that converted the elevation, bearing and range data into cartesian form and also gave target velocity independant of the FLAK predictor.

The problem with intercepting a mosquito is that with say only a small speed advantage (say 5%) getting an intercept is very hard. I believe the Luftwaffe used specially prepared Me 109, often with GM-1. An Me 109G1 or G2 would be better than a Me 109G6 because of its cleaner aerodynamics. These aircraft were lightened, polished, well maintained.

The Me 163 rocket fighter's role was meant to be intercepting reconaisance aircraft approaching high value targets, not attacking bombers.

Unfortunatly for the Luftwaffe the Mosquito was configured to be as fast as a single engine fighter but with twin engines; so long as the British maintained reasonable parity in engine technology, which they certainly did, the Mosquito would be fairly safe.


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## Freebird (Apr 22, 2012)

Wuzak said:


> After a little more reading, it seems that the PR.I did have the saxophone exhausts. However, PR.Is were basically the same as W4051, which was the PR prototype. This meant it had the single piece flaps with the short nacelle and the short span #1 tailplane.
> 
> The max speed would have been achieved between 20,000ft and 25,000ft, I believe.



So what would the top speed be at max alt - 34,000 to 37,000?



Siegfried said:


> The problem with intercepting a mosquito is that with say only a small speed advantage (say 5%) getting an intercept is very hard. I believe the Luftwaffe used specially prepared Me 109, often with GM-1. An Me 109G1 or G2 would be better than a Me 109G6 because of its cleaner aerodynamics. These aircraft were lightened, polished, well maintained.
> 
> The Me 163 rocket fighter's role was meant to be intercepting reconaisance aircraft approaching high value targets, not attacking bombers.



I should have put "operational" interceptor I suppose. 
AFAIK, the Me 163 is not operational in 1941 or 1942, and the Me 109G is introduced mid-1942? 

So I suppose the Axis fghter would have to approach at a steep angle and try to shoot up into the Mossie?
What would the effective range of a 20mm cannon be when firing up at 60 or 70 deg angle?

Did Japan have any aircraft that could have a chance to intercept the Mossie in 1942?


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## Siegfried (Apr 22, 2012)

In 1940 the Luftwaffe had the Me 109F1 and from 1941 to 1942 the Luftwaffe had the Me 109F2 and F4 in service. With GM-1 and some stripping they might have stood a chance, the F4 was the fastest of these aircraft. I have only vague information on the mosquito hunters, not dates and types.


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## wuzak (Apr 22, 2012)

freebird said:


> So what would the top speed be at max alt - 34,000 to 37,000?



Don't know. I can't find any reference to that.


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## wuzak (Apr 22, 2012)

freebird said:


> Did Japan have any aircraft that could have a chance to intercept the Mossie in 1942?



I don't think they did, but they didn't really need to either. Mossies weren't deployed to the Far East in 1942 - production was only just getting underway, and they were all bound for teh ETO.


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## mhuxt (Apr 22, 2012)

freebird said:


> So what would the top speed be at max alt - 34,000 to 37,000?


 
Not sure why that's important, no 1941 recce Mossie would have been over its targets at those heights. Even the Mk.IXs of 60 SAAF in 1943 were taking photos at 30k or less, according to the ORB.


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## Vincenzo (Apr 22, 2012)

37000 it's sure out for a Mosquito I, also 34000 is attainable but hardly used operationally, probably the speed were high, around 350 mph but as max speed not as cruise speed


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## fastmongrel (Apr 22, 2012)

Would a PR aircraft be over the target at cruise speed surely they would be going faster than that.


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## Freebird (Apr 22, 2012)

mhuxt said:


> Not sure why that's important, no 1941 recce Mossie would have been over its targets at those heights. Even the Mk.IXs of 60 SAAF in 1943 were taking photos at 30k or less, according to the ORB.



I suppose that if the enemy tried to intercept a PR Mossie it could climb higher and use the greater speed to escape.


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## Vincenzo (Apr 22, 2012)

fastmongerl i'm not sure of understand you but the Mosquito I has 380 mph max speed probably around 22k (and 5' power) it's easy that also over the target if not see enemy planes go slower of 350 mph at 33k or around. Also if see enemy they can go at max power 5' but so high can't go at 380 mph.

freebird can just need to see if this is the right tactic for evade. if climb higher probly go slower and generally Mosquito I is not fastest of F-4 and if is a Z is surely in the wrong element in high altitude


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## parsifal (Apr 22, 2012)

> Would a PR aircraft be over the target at cruise speed surely they would be going faster than that.



The Mosquito PRI had a top speed of 386mph at 15000 ft. Only ten were made, so there is not a lot of data on this variant. It was roughly equivalent to the BIV variant. I dont have the cruising speeds or altitudes for the PRI, but the BIV had a top speed of 366 mph and a cruising speed of 352 mph. With bombload that dropped to 335-340mph.

by extrapolation, that would suggest that a PRI would probably have a cruising speed in unloaded condition (ie internal duel only) of about 370mph. If it was carrying external tanks, its crusing speed would probably be about 360mph. 

The PRXVI introduced in 1943, with Merlin 61s had a max level speed of 408mph, and a crusing speed of 395 mph with internal fuel only. When caarying external fuel, its max crusing speed dropped to 386mph.

Optimal operating altitude was always 15-24000 feet.

Mosquitoes were always fast, very fast, which explains their low operational loss rates. 0.63% overall, with as I recall, losses to enemy fighters for the entire war being less than 130 aircraft all up. They lost many more aircraft to nohn-operational causes than to enemy action


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## Vincenzo (Apr 22, 2012)

Parsifal your number for cruise speed are too high
PR XVI max speed +18 lbs, 3000 rpm 401 mph FS gear 25.2k, (max) cruising +7.5 lbs 2650 rpm 366 mph FS gear 30.6k with Merlin 73, test of prototype of PR XVI, fall '43, Williams Site.


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## davebender (Apr 22, 2012)

Radar is only half the equation. You need operational procedures for vectoring fighter aircraft to intercept. By December 1941 the Luftwaffe has considerable practise at this business thanks to RAF Bomber Command.


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## parsifal (Apr 22, 2012)

Vincenzo said:


> Parsifal your number for cruise speed are too high
> PR XVI max speed +18 lbs, 3000 rpm 401 mph FS gear 25.2k, (max) cruising +7.5 lbs 2650 rpm 366 mph FS gear 30.6k with Merlin 73, test of prototype of PR XVI, fall '43, Williams Site.



Did i misread that data? I checked that site plus another dealing with the Mosquito development. Maybe I made a mistake.

Thanks for the correction


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## woljags (Apr 22, 2012)

am i correct in saying that the mossie had problems in the far-east due to its construction being of wood,i think i saw that recently in a mag article on the type so they had to change to beaufighters


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## Glider (Apr 22, 2012)

The glue could lose its effectiveness, this was fixed but it took time and some losses were incurred


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## mhuxt (Apr 23, 2012)

fastmongrel said:


> Would a PR aircraft be over the target at cruise speed surely they would be going faster than that.


 
Virtually all sorties had more than one target to cover, so they might have managed a fast cruise (30 minute limit) for some of it, but most of the time they were by nature over enemy territory at cruise speeds.


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## stona (Apr 23, 2012)

I'd say that the answer to the original question is theoretically yes but practically almost certainly not.
Cheers
Steve


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## davebender (Apr 23, 2012)

Sounds like the He-162. Except the war ended before Heinkel could fix their glue problem.

Any idea how long it took de Havilland to get on top of the glue problem?


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## parsifal (Apr 23, 2012)

I wouldnt overstate the glue issue too strongly. It was a relatively minor issue that happened to occur in one of the wettest places on Earth....Calcutta, which has an average annual rainfall of over 550 inches per annum. even that is misleading, suggesting the rains fall all year around. This is incorrect. The rainy season in bengal lasts from late June through to early november. So for 4 months every year it rains exceptionally heavy every day. Few aircraft, metal or wood will put up with that.

Australi deployed its Mosquitoes into the tropics with no such difficulties. The deployment of our Mosquiroes included deployments to Darwin and moratai, and after the war to Indonesia and Malaya. There were never any systemic problems of the type experienced in Bengal. 

The rainfall of Darwin and Moratai are in the 70-120 inches per year, again with a 4 month rainy season. Our mossies handled these less rigorous conditions easily, and our Mosquitoes remained in frontline service for 17 years


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## Airframes (Apr 23, 2012)

From memory (I'll need to dig out the reference), it took literally hours to solve the glue problem. I believe a DH rep visited the location, inspected the problem, and sent a signal back to Hatfield. Steps were taken to rectify this immediately, but how this affected those aircraft already in location, I don't know.


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## tyrodtom (Apr 23, 2012)

Was it the rain that was a problem, or the high heat? 
After all, Britain isn't exactly known for it's dry climate.


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## wuzak (Apr 23, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> Was it the rain that was a problem, or the high heat?
> After all, Britain isn't exactly known for it's dry climate.


 
Yes, but the rain being described is of a different scale.

London's annual rainfall is about 600mm/24". Less than half of Darwin's, and 1/20th of that in Calcutta!


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## Airframes (Apr 23, 2012)

And not as humid!


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## iron man (Apr 23, 2012)

davebender said:


> Sounds like the He-162. Except the war ended before Heinkel could fix their glue problem.
> 
> Any idea how long it took de Havilland to get on top of the glue problem?



Germany's "problem" was bigger than just the He 162 Dave; I've posted on this matter in another thread here on this board.

They went "all in" with advanced phenolics, produced at one facility in Wuppertal. Then the RAF razed that facility to the ground (nothing burns like a chemical factory) and they scrambled to find alternatives. The alternatives were LACKING (to say the least) but "things" were going so far "pear-shaped" by that point that they pressed ahead with substitution in airframe component manufacture (using these "ersatz" adhesives) on many components of their late war fighter aircraft. 

I would love to know how many LW pilots were lost, due to failures in their machines basic structure (wooden) under hard manoevering. I'm sure there's a considerable number.

That said? 

Dead men tell no tales.


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## parsifal (Apr 23, 2012)

That number would be found in the exceptionally high attrition rates suffered by LW formations, through no effect of enemy activity, even when operating with the immense advantage of home country airfields. in 1944, LW losses due to non-combat causes were more than twice as high as equivalent allied formations. many were probably due to pilot errors, but im willg to bet at least some were lost due to some kind of structural or engine failure


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## Siegfried (Apr 24, 2012)

parsifal said:


> I wouldnt overstate the glue issue too strongly. Australi deployed its Mosquitoes into the tropics with no such difficulties.



By the time Australia deployed its Mosquitos the issues had been solved


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## parsifal (Apr 24, 2012)

Siegfried said:


> By the time Australia deployed its Mosquitos the issues had been solved



Err no, you are forgetting we were using fully imported mosquitoes well before the first locally produced versions were accepted. 

From the RAAF museum website

"The first Australian Mosquito was delivered on 23 July 1943, and accepted by the RAAF on 5 March 1944. The FB Mk 40 was equivalent to the RAF FB Mk VI and, although 212 were built at Bankstown (A52-1/212), only 209 served with the RAAF because A52-12, 18 and 24 crashed before acceptance. Six of the FB Mk 40s were converted for photo-reconnaissance as PR Mk 40s, and these aircraft operated so effectively that a further 28 FB Mk 40s were converted to PR Mk 41s. Previously, A52-90 had been re-engined with Packard Merlin 69s and became the sole FB Mk 42: however, this marque was superseded and A52-90 was used as the prototype for the PR Mk 41 and re-serialled A52-300.

On 28 January 1943, a RAF Mk II (DD664) became the first Mosquito to operate with the RAAF when, as A52-1001, it was used as the prototype for the local FB Mk 40. It was also the forerunner of 14 RAF T Mk IIIs (A52-1002/1015). Australian versions of these trainers were developed by converting 22 FB Mk 40s to T Mk 43s. In addition, a further 61 ex-RAF Mosquitoes were used by the RAAF as follows: 38 B Mk VIs (A52-500/537) and 23 PR Mk XVIs (A52-600/622). Thus, altogether 209 Australian Mosquitoes and 76 UK-built Mosquitoes served with the RAAF. These aircraft fitted with a variety of engines including the Merlin 31, Merlin 33 and Packard Merlin 69. 

The RAAF Mosquitoes played an effective, part in the later years of the Pacific War and served with No 1 Photographic Reconnaissance Unit, Nos 87 and 94 Squadrons, No 78 Wing, No 1 Aircraft Performance Unit, Aircraft Research and Development Unit, Central Flying School, No 5 Operational Training Unit and Ferry/Survey Flights. Post-war, photo-reconnaissance Mosquitoes were used extensively between 1947–53 on survey flights throughout Australia. Mosquito flying ceased (mainly) in 1954, and the aircraft still on RAAF strength were passed to DAP for disposal, except for a few which were transferred to the Royal New Zealand Air Force. 

After the war, Mosquitoes laden with cameras surveyed all of India, Cambodia, and Australia. The last Mosquito built, an NF 38 (VX916), rolled off the production line at Chester on 28 November 1950, and the last operational combat mission (in combat) was on 21 December 1955 when a Mosquito PR 34A conducted a reconnaissance mission above suspected communist strongholds hidden in the jungles of Malaya".


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## Edgar Brooks (Apr 24, 2012)

Mosquitoes were built with ordinary furniture factory casein glue, which was mixed fresh every day, and heated to the required temperature (don't know what it was, but it was close to boiling.) The glue was liberally brushed on, and the two surfaces mated, then clamped with furniture "cramps." Occasional holes were left in the outer surfaces, for the glue to squeeze out, which was then wiped off while the parts cooled. 
The extreme heat of the tropics brought the glue back to its working temperature, allowing the parts to separate. The problem was solved by a chemicals expert, Andrew Oliver, who devised a completely new material; annoyingly I worked in the same company as Mr. Oliver, for about 5 years, and never knew his claim to fame.


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## Freebird (Apr 24, 2012)

And we shouldn't forget that ordinary (metal based) aircraft would have trouble in the tropics too, the combination of heat salt water means that corrosion becomes more problematic


Vincenzo said:


> freebird can just need to see if this is the right tactic for evade. if climb higher probly go slower and generally Mosquito I is not fastest of F-4 and if is a Z is surely in the wrong element in high altitude



Hi Vincenzo, I was also considering the situation in the Pacific, if the Mosquito had been used in early 1942 instead of 1943, the Japanese would have trouble tyring to intercept, the IJN fighters were slower than the German ones at that point AFAIK


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## davebender (Apr 24, 2012)

Sounds like an ideal aircraft for WWII Australia to build as it doesn't require aluminum and it has long range. Australia could import Packard built Merlin engines just like Britain did. Arm it with a pair of reliable 18" Mark XII torpedoes and you've got a world class maritime attack aircraft. Something desperately needed in the Pacific during 1942.


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## parsifal (Apr 24, 2012)

Australia made a decision to build the Mosquito from early 1942. There were problems in securing industrial quantities of Canadian Spruce.......shipping space mostly. It took time to develop an alternate laninate from locally supplied timber. This was eventually achieved and the first locally produced mossie rolled off the lines in july 1943 9i think it was july).

Why would we import Merlins if we were going to mass produce the Mossie????. Why wouldnt we just install locally produced merlins, as we did for our Mustangs. You never listen do you. i dont know how many times you have tried to spruke this rubbish about Australia not producingh engines, and how many times I have corrected you, how many imes you have been forced to slink away with your tail between your legs on this issue. do i need to re-educate you yet again????


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## Freebird (Apr 24, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Australia made a decision to build the Mosquito from early 1942. There were problems in securing industrial quantities of Canadian Spruce.......shipping space mostly. It took time to develop an alternate laninate from locally supplied timber. This was eventually achieved and the first locally produced mossie rolled off the lines in july 1943 9i think it was july).



I wonder why the delay in deciding to produce them?
IIRC there were about a 1,000 or so ordered in mid 1941, that would be a good time to start the ball rolling in Oz as well...


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## Edgar Brooks (Apr 25, 2012)

davebender said:


> Arm it with a pair of reliable 18" Mark XII torpedoes and you've got a world class maritime attack aircraft. Something desperately needed in the Pacific during 1942.


Arm it where? The torpedo was too long to fit in the bomb bay, and you certainly couldn't fit them under the wings. Anyway, Coastal Command already had a perfectly usable dedicated torpedo delivery system, in the Beaufort, which has been largely forgotten/passed over in the intervening years. It's easy, now, to say that something was desperately needed in the Pacific, but that wasn't the view of Admiral King, who considered the Pacific to be his patch, and everyone else keep out.


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## wuzak (Apr 25, 2012)

http://1000aircraftphotos.com/Contributions/PippinBill/5593.jpg


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## yulzari (Apr 25, 2012)

Perhaps the simplest answer to the original question is _did_ anything catch them? 

Does anyone have access to period Mosquito intercepts as well as losses?


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## wuzak (Apr 25, 2012)

Some data about the Mosquito PR.Is (all ten of them):

W4051	PRI	SOC 22.6.45	
W4054	PRI	Missing from PR mission to Trondheim 28.3.43	
W4055	PRI	Missing from PR mission to Trondheim 4.12.41	
W4056	PRI	Missing from PR mission to Trondheim 2.4.42	
W4058	PRI	Missing from PR mission to Oslo 17.10.42	
W4059	PRI	SOC 20.9.44	
W4060	PRI	Missing from PR mission to Bergen 20.2.43	
W4061	PRI	Engine cut on take-off and wing hit ground nosed over Dyea 22.2.44 DBR	
W4062	PRI	Damaged by flak Pantellaria engine cut stalled on approach and wing hit ground Luqa 13.1.42	
W4063	PRI	Damaged by Bf109s and crashlanded at Luqa 31.3.42	

What it doesn't say is how many missions they did before they met their fate. (SOC = Struck Off Charge, ie retired)


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## parsifal (Apr 25, 2012)

In 1941 we DID have an engine supply problem, largely avoidable, but courtesy of HM govt in londons ban on the export of aero engine techs and aero engines. Exceptions were made for the existing engine factories in canada, but for australia, there was a critical delay 1939-41. What is all the more galling is that our intention to licence produce US designed engines (principally the WASP and double WASP) were thwarted (deliberately IMO) by British spin and promises as they promised us access to thei engine techs and engines, and then failed to deliver.

If these obstructive practices had not occurred, it was australia's intention to produce the Beafort from 1940, and the CA-4 Woomera from late 1941. The beafort was a very capable aircraft, and the Woomera even better. unlike the mossie, both were designd as torpedo bombers. The Woomera was also designed as a divebomber. It was not the Mosquito, but at that time, the Mossie was not really sen as a strike aircraft, and was somewhat anachronistically viewed. There was considerable hostility toward it as a concept, not least in the Australian mililtary.


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## Shortround6 (Apr 25, 2012)

A couple of points; 

First, Australian aircraft engine production:

Aero Engine Production - The Lidcombe Engine Plant

It takes time to establish an engine factory even in the US or Britain. Not just the building but the machine tools have to come from somewhere as do the raw materials and/or subcontracted parts. Even Allison only made about 1/3 of the engine "in house" with about 1/3 of the engine specific parts (connecting rods, camshafts and others) contracted out and the other 1/3 being things like nuts, bolts, studs and such. The nut, bolt and stud makers also had many other manufactures of equipment demanding their product so the pre-war nut, bolt and stud makers had to expand their facilities also. Just because and nation built a certain product in 1945/46 does not mean they could make it in 1942. 

AS for another posters idea that you can just take an axe out to the back wood lot and chop down any assortment of trees to make airplanes out of, well, I think we all know how preposterous that is. ALL wood is not the same and only certain types of wood can be used in certain applications with any hope of success. This was well known in boat building going back hundreds of years (if not a thousand) and some countries used to import certain wood/s for ship building even in the 1700s.


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## parsifal (Apr 25, 2012)

Thanks for the link SR, provides a pretty good summary of the Australian aero engine situation during and immediately after the war.

However.....


_"When the Beaufort project was launched, if was decided that facilities should be established for the production in Australia of suitable engines. When the supply of Taurus engines from England became impossible because of war conditions, the aircraft was redesigned to take the more powerful twin row Wasp, and the Australian engine factory was consequently planned to produce that type"._


whilst true, is an understatement of what was happening. "Wartime conditions" is a polite way of saying we were scr*wed by the British govt, when they placed their ban on the export of engines, and the export of techs to build them. Moreover, our plans to build US designed engines go back to before 1938. It was what wackett wanted to do from a very early point. I suspect he knew something, though I cannot prove that. Whatever the truth, for nearly two years his wishes were overruled, largely because of empty promises given by the British. We could have been producing more US engines earlier, instead we were asked to wait by the british, which we did, and then were bitterly disappointed by their decision to embargo us. Its a sad issue, seldom talked about and largely forgotten, and it really stilted our aircraft industry at a critical moment.....


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## Freebird (Apr 25, 2012)

Edgar Brooks said:


> It's easy, now, to say that something was desperately needed in the Pacific, but that wasn't the view of Admiral King, who considered the Pacific to be his patch, and everyone else keep out.



King wasn't in charge of the US Fleet until after Pearl, and wasn't CNO until Mr 42.
He also wasn't in charge of operations in the SE Pacific area, as that was ABDA command in early 1942.

If Britain the CW decided to put a responsible effort into the theater in 1941/1942, King has no authority or reason to dictate anything


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## parsifal (Apr 25, 2012)

freebird said:


> King wasn't in charge of the US Fleet until after Pearl, and wasn't CNO until Mr 42.
> He also wasn't in charge of operations in the SE Pacific area, as that was ABDA command in early 1942.
> 
> If Britain the CW decided to put a responsible effort into the theater in 1941/1942, King has no authority or reason to dictate anything



The british and CW response was a calculated risk that went horribly wrong. With two major powers to fight largely alone in the ETO, and having suffered a series of costly defeats, Britiain had no choice but to cut force levels in the Far east to dangerously low levels. 

I think the high point of bad decisions, however was the decision to deploy the PoW and Repulse so far forward and so badly protected. By late '41, it was very clear that Captital ships should not and could not operate in a hostile air environment where the enemy was effective in the aeronaval role. ive read that the British appraised the Japanese as being somewhere below the italians in terms of proficiency. Thats a totally unforgivable assumption IMO.

With regard to airpower, my opinion is that the British should have invested in the aircraft producing infrastructure of Australia 9and perhaps india) in the period 1936-41 instead of doing their very best to stymie its development. if they had done that, Australia might well have been producing Merlins in 1942, and Double Wasps from 1940, which would have given us the capability to build Beaforts, Woomeras and Boomerangs from before the outbreak of hostilities. money spent on fielding the Buffaloes, manning obsolete types in malaya, could instead have been poured into establish an aero industry in the far east (India and Australia) That way we would have gone to war with more modern types, and more aircraft overall.

The other thing that stands out for me is that having accepted the risk of undermanning their forward defences, why did the British continue to make assurances they could not keep, and knew they could not keep throughout 1940-41. If they had been honest about the situation, the nations affected, like Australia, could have made more realistic preprations for war.


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## buffnut453 (Apr 25, 2012)

But force levels were INCREASED in the Far East, not cut during 1941. Indeed one of the biggest challenges was the milking of experienced personnel from established Indian Army units in order to create new units (ie to increase force levels). This problem hit home really hard in Malaya where Indian Army units lacked the experience, training and cohesion to cope against the Japanese attacks. 

Now it can be argued that force levels in the Far East weren't built up as much as the should have been and that the theatre received the arse-end of supplies and, in some respects, personnel, but they certainly weren't reduced.


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## buffnut453 (Apr 25, 2012)

parsifal said:


> ive read that the British appraised the Japanese as being somewhere below the italians in terms of proficiency. Thats a totally unforgivable assumption IMO.



Not an assumption but based on observations of Japanese air activities in China. The common racist view was that the Japanese ought to have beaten the Chinese very easily but they didn't, hence the Japanese would have real difficulties when confronted with a first-class adversary. Unfortunately, Allied forces in the Far East (ie Malaya/Singapore, Burma, the Philippines) weren't first-class by any means. They were under-resourced, poorly trained and often poorly led.


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## buffnut453 (Apr 25, 2012)

parsifal said:


> The other thing that stands out for me is that having accepted the risk of undermanning their forward defences, why did the British continue to make assurances they could not keep, and knew they could not keep throughout 1940-41. If they had been honest about the situation, the nations affected, like Australia, could have made more realistic preprations for war.



Because they didn't know. Senior leaders believed their own twisted logic and failed to grasp just how woefully ill-prepared forces in the Far East were. My previous post touches on this, too.


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## parsifal (Apr 25, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> But force levels were INCREASED in the Far East, not cut during 1941. Indeed one of the biggest challenges was the milking of experienced personnel from established Indian Army units in order to create new units (ie to increase force levels). This problem hit home really hard in Malaya where Indian Army units lacked the experience, training and cohesion to cope against the Japanese attacks.
> 
> Now it can be argued that force levels in the Far East weren't built up as much as the should have been and that the theatre received the arse-end of supplies and, in some respects, personnel, but they certainly weren't reduced.



True, but the way military resourcing was managed it ended up that britsain got less out of its military expenditures than it should have. The Brits steadfastly resisted, and mismanaged, their imperial resources in this theatre in the years leading up to the war. 

In the case of Australia, we entered the war in 1939 with 12 air squadrons, all obsolete. Plans weree wel underway to expand the force to 40 squadrons (from memnory) or about 1500 a/c, using locally produced and US imported aircraft. All of that was stymied by the british leadership. We were asked to scrap our local training initiatives and contribute to the EATS scheme instead. We were promised aircraft and production capability that in the end, the british worked as hard as they could to deny. We diverted highly trained troops....the best in the world at that time....out of the TO on the promise that the malay barrier could be adequately defended, a promise repeated well after the british High command knew was impossible.


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## buffnut453 (Apr 25, 2012)

I don't think British High Command knew the defence of the Malay barrier was impossible until it was too late. I do, however, subscribe to the view that they hoped it was possible. Unfortunately, the Japanese proved them wrong. I can't comment on your other assertions because I don't know enough about the situation in Oz at the time. The one point I will make is that no sensible person would countenance building up forces in an area where there was no fighting when other theatres were under attack. Perhaps the hindsight goggles are clouding our view of the difficult decisions that had to be made, without foreknowledge, at the time?


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## pbfoot (Apr 25, 2012)

I guess they should have stood up to the Brits after all they were a sovereign nation


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## parsifal (Apr 25, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> Because they didn't know. Senior leaders believed their own twisted logic and failed to grasp just how woefully ill-prepared forces in the Far East were. My previous post touches on this, too.



They didnt know because they chose not to find out. There were ample reports and information on Japanese capability available to the british high command that were simply ignored....not because they were not believed, but because it was an inconvenient truth that they could not bear to face.

Saying the Japanese were only ever comfronted by inferior troops is clearly an apology for a poorly thought out battle plan. The Japanese resisted effectively against the very best troops in the world, and the very best airforces as well long after the flush of their initial offensives. True, the initial offensives were the periods that Japan was mostly on the attack, but it is misleading, and wrong to suggest they were only ever resisted by second rate troops, or that they only ever defeated second rate troops. What defeated the Japanese, was not the poor qulaity of their troops or aircraft. It was a combination of numbers and poor logistics mostly


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## parsifal (Apr 25, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> Because they didn't know. Senior leaders believed their own twisted logic and failed to grasp just how woefully ill-prepared forces in the Far East were. My previous post touches on this, too.



It is a well documented fact that military appraisals handed to the british high command by the Australians (at least, ther were many many others that did the same) clearly showed the Malayan barrier (and Singas) to be indefensible, and that it was at risk from a landward assault. The British response was completely unsatisfactory. they responded to this threat by sending an unbalanced, out gunned task group to defend the landward approaches by seaborne interdiction. The British suspected Singapore to be indefensible since at least 1921. They were openly worried about it from 1938, and knew they couldnt (or at least had information that conclusively showed it to be indefensible) from the middle of 1940. it is inexcusable that they ignored these appraisals and deliberately misled their allies


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## Glider (Apr 25, 2012)

wuzak said:


> Some data about the Mosquito PR.Is (all ten of them):
> 
> W4051	PRI	SOC 22.6.45
> W4054	PRI	Missing from PR mission to Trondheim 28.3.43
> ...


We don't know ow many missions they undertook but I admit to being impressed as to how long they stayed in front line service before their loss. Not many front line aircraft in 1941 would be in front line service in 1943/4


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## buffnut453 (Apr 25, 2012)

Parsifal,

We're way off topic here...but I'll continue just one more round.

I'm making no apologies for the messy, poorly-implemented defence that was undertaken in Malaya and Singapore. Nor am I excusing the deplorable lack of leadership in certain quarters that failed to identify and practice correct tactics (the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were the only unit who truly trained for the defence of the road through Malaya, although Bennett did implement a cracking ambush...once), or to implement adequate denial measures. However, the fact remains that the majority of Commonwealth troops in the front line on 8 Dec 41 were, by any measure, sub-standard in terms of experience, training, morale and equipment. Putting green soldiers who can hardly shoot a rifle in the path of tanks (a machine they've never seen before) is a recipe for disaster. Should they have been better prepared? Absolutely. 

As to your other point about accurate intelligence being ignored by commanders, well there's ample proof of that occurring. Essentially there are 2 schools of thought, one that intelligence failed completely and the other that intelligence was accurate but commanders ignored it. To en extent, both are correct. The victor in battle takes the glory, the loser blames his intelligence officer. As I inferred earlier, the Far East in 1941 was often a dumping ground for less-able commanding officers who did not train or prepare their formations for the fight that took place...and we can clearly see now the result of that folly.

Finally, where do you get the idea that I ever suggested the Japanese only faced inferior troops? I was referring specifically to the Indian troops in Malaya...and that's not because the troops themselves were poor but because of incredible dilution of experience due to massive and rapid force expansion. Those aren't just excuses - it was the reality in 1941. However, there were other issues including the political angle - Crosby's almost hysterical telegram on the eve of the Japanese invasion demanding that no British soldier should enter Thailand and Far East Command's focus on trying to locate the ships instead of looking for other intelligence indicators like the arrival of IJAAF fighter aircraft in French Indo-China are examples. There was no single issue that resulted in the rout that occurred in Malaya and Singapore - the causes were several and intertwined, many dating back years.


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## buffnut453 (Apr 25, 2012)

In response to Post #62 (for some reason the quote function isn't working on my machine), Malaya was far from indefensible. As to the risk of landward assault, it was Percival serving under GOC Malaya, Dobbie, in the late-30s who first identified that threat and took measures to deal with it. 

Malaya was entirely defensible but the key to the whole region was the port at Singora. If that had been held or denied to the Japanese, there's no way they could have taken the rest of the Malay peninsula because there were no other ports capable of supporting the Japanese Army's logistics chain.

Poorly thought-out strategy, an unwillingness to be seen as the aggressor into Thailand (and hence upsetting the Americans) all militated against the British defence of Singora.

Per my last post...the reasons for failure were complex.


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## parsifal (Apr 25, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> I guess they should have stood up to the Brits after all they were a sovereign nation



No, they were not. We gained theoretical control over our foreign policy in 1931, but that did not include indendance on national borrowings and finances. That remained under the control of the british treasury until 1942. 

Despite our theoretical independance in our foreign policy from 1931, in practice we had no real independance until Curtins declaration in march 1942. often attributed to the fall of Singapore, it was more complex than that, and stretched back to the repeated failures by the britis (in Australian eyes) to the multiple threats challenging the mpire at that time.

Our break with the british began in 1918, and gradually picked up speed through the 30's. the final straw being the fall of Singapore.


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## wuzak (Apr 26, 2012)

Glider said:


> We don't know ow many missions they undertook but I admit to being impressed as to how long they stayed in front line service before their loss. Not many front line aircraft in 1941 would be in front line service in 1943/4



W4051 was, in fact, the prototype PR Mosquito, started operations in September 1945, and was struck off charge at the end of the war. Haveto wonder if it remained operational for that period.

W4055 seems to have gone pretty quickly. A few of them (4) were lost during 1942, 3 of them in the early months. So they didn't last too long.


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## parsifal (Apr 26, 2012)

wuzak said:


> W4051 was, in fact, the prototype PR Mosquito, started operations in September 1945, and was struck off charge at the end of the war. Haveto wonder if it remained operational for that period.
> 
> W4055 seems to have gone pretty quickly. A few of them (4) were lost during 1942, 3 of them in the early months. So they didn't last too long.



Staistically the USAAF suffered around 18% attrition of its forces per annum, though this is a very rough number that tended to decrease as the war progressed. Overwhelmingly, losses were due to non-operational causes.

Luftwaffe losses need to be split between those operating on the eastern front and north Africa, and those operating at home and western europe. Consistently Luftwaffe losses in the east ran at between 30 and 50% depending on the weatherand the state of the airfields. Loss rates for continental formations were about 30% or less until 1944, when the loss rates slid off the chart, so to speak.

If we assume British attrition rates are somewhere between what the germans were losing at home and what the Americans in the ETO were losing in that period 1942-4 we arrive at a figure of about 25% lost per annum most not due to any activities by the enemy. They just fell out of the sky with no help from the enmy mostly.

In the sample that we have, we have 10 airframes, if the statisitical assumption i have made is correct, we should get 2.5 Mosquitoes lost in every 12 months of the war. assuming the service entry was 7/41, 2.5 Mossies should crash in the 1st year of service. Instead we lose 4. in the second year of operations, losses amounted to another 3. In the third year losses dropped to only lost 1. in the fourth year, losses were down to 2, and in the 5th year, we had 1 survivor. Overall, however, the losses to those 10 prototypes was the same as the assumed attrition rate for all the RAF....about 25% of airframes every year.

What we need to make a meanigful comparison, are the o9verall loss rates of the RAF expressed as a percentage, for the 12 month periods, beginning 7/41 to 7/42 and progressing from their on a per annum basis....


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## Jabberwocky (Apr 26, 2012)

Some more information on the December 1941 loss of W4055 reveals that it was shot down by Unteroffizier Rudolf Fenten of I/JG77 at 15:20 hrs near Stavanger at map reference Lg 49 433, 35km W of Feistein. 

Unfortunately, I haven't been able to narrow down what aircraft Unteroffizier Fenten was flying. In late 1941, I/JG 77 apparently flew a motley collection of Bf-109 E-1s, E-3s, E-7s, T-2s shock:!) and F-4s.

So, in answer to the original question: yes, it was possible for Axis aircraft to catch the Mosquito in Dec-1941. Otherwise, W4055 wouldn't of been shot down.

Now, what we don't have are the circumstances of the shoot down.


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## Jabberwocky (Apr 26, 2012)

Ok, did a little more research.

The loss of W4055 PR Mk I appears to be the first Luftwaffe fighter claim against a Mosquito, as well as the only Mosquito claim made by the Luftwaffe in 1941. It is also the only Mosquito loss registered with the RAF in 1941.

The next claim against a Mosquito didn't occur until April 1942 and then there were seven Luftwaffe claims in July 1942 - a rate of claims not met again until April 1943.

There were a total of 23 fighter claims against Mosquitos by the Luftwaffe in 1942, as well as a single flak claim. The RAF gives 71 Mosquito losses for 1942, most of the losses are either 'missing' or crashed on take-off/landing, quite often because of over or undershoots (maybe understandable given night operations). I was also surprised at how many were written off after flying into things: trees, houses, Hudsons, Beafighters even ships and buses!

Lots of the Luftwaffe's 1942 claims register the height at which the claim was made. First is at 5800 m (19,000 ft), then there are four between 8000 m (26,200 ft) and 9200 m (32,200 ft). There there is another at 5,000 m (16,400 ft) and one at 6,000 m (19,700 ft). There is also a sole claim at 5 m (16 ft), which must have been hairy!


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## wuzak (Apr 26, 2012)

Yes, possible, but difficult.



> The first operational sortie by a Mosquito was made by a PR Mk I, W4055, on 17 September 1941; during this sortie the unarmed Mosquito PR.I evaded three Messerschmitt Bf 109s at 23,000 feet (7,000 m).[



de Havilland Mosquito - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


10 is also a very small statistical sample. And surely loss per sortie basis would be better? It's all very well to say there is a general 25% loss of aircraft per year, but if one lot is doing 100 sorties per year and another 300 is it a fair comparison?


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## parsifal (Apr 26, 2012)

no yopur right, im assuming a similar sortie rate per annum for each aircraft. Adding sortie rates just increases the complexity however


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## Siegfried (Apr 26, 2012)

davebender said:


> Sounds like the He-162. Except the war ended before Heinkel could fix their glue problem.
> 
> Any idea how long it took de Havilland to get on top of the glue problem?



Some Info here 
This is the company Goldschmit that made the Tego film now calle Evonik. It was an excellent plywood, certainly it would not have rotted like the Mosquitos primitive Caesin (milk) based product, however some lucky bombing put the plant out of action and the substitute was inferior (corroded the wood) this effected both the Ta 154 and He 162 program.

Evonik Industries - Specialty Chemicals you can find info under corporate history server portal.

Aeroplanes and Veneers (Tego) 
The glue film from Th. Goldschmidt AG was undoubtedly a surprise 
success. After a patent had been applied for in 1929, it advanced to 
become the most important product for the company in just a few 
years. 


Th. Goldschmidt AG had acquired its initial know-how in glue 
production from its involvement in the Kempen electrochemical factory, 
which produced leather glues. However, production of these glues was 
problematic. The wet glues that had been used up to then in many 
applications were based on plant and animal proteins - casein, for 
example - which were extremely perishable. Also, mixing up the glue 
before it was used was laborious and prone to error. 


As the wood processing industry was experiencing similar problems, Dr. 
Josef Weber, member of the board at Goldschmidt AG and a chemist with 
the company since 1892 encouraged the search for a dry glue for 
manufacturing plywood and chipboard. The result of three years of 
research was the Tego glue film which was also distributed 
successfully outside of Germany. It was made out of phenol resins and 
soda pulp paper to carry the glue and was placed in thin layers 
between the layers of wood. Under high pressure and heat, the glue 
film and the wood combined perfectly. Goldschmidt AG entrusted Dr. 
Wilhelm Luethy with selling the new product - a difficult task, 
because potential customers had to invest in special presses before 
they could use the Tego glue film. 


The advantages of the new processes were obvious however and became 
even more apparent under the National Socialists’ four-year plan. The 
glue film was made out of “home grown” raw materials which reduced the 
import of casein. Moreover, the innovative glue was a highly 
successful export which earned the German Reich foreign currency. In 
addition, it had an unlimited shelf-life and applications were of 
consistent quality. 


Accordingly, the glue film business expanded rapidly from 1936. As it 
was indispensable for aircraft production, Th. Goldschmidt AG was 
classified as strategically important to the war effort. The quantity 
produced rose from 22 million m2 in 1937 to 72 Mio m2 in 1943, an 
increase of 327%. 


Glue Film advertising 1951 
Even after WWII, the glue film, which Th. Goldschmidt AG produced in a 
branch factory in Schöppenstedt, continued to play an important role 
for some time, particularly in the furniture industry. However, 
increasing competition from new kinds of synthetic glues affected 
sales more and more. In 1955, Goldschmidt launched Tego-Tex, a new and 
very successful glue film especially geared to furniture veneers. At 
the beginning of 1984, Goldschmidt AG sold the glue film and Tego-Tex 
production to Casco-Nobel


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## Edgar Brooks (Apr 26, 2012)

Casein glue is not a milk-based item, it is a protein, extracted from curdled skimmed milk, dissolved in an aqueous alkyd. Far from being "primitive," some formulae were still secret in the 1920s. It did not rot, either, but attracted mould spores and termites, who enjoyed the naturalness of the ingredients. Oliver started work in 1940, and was involved in the production of W4050, but the problem with the glue did not manifest itself until some early aircraft went out to the Far East, so I'm still unable to give you a clear date. If the product had been prone to rot, every chair, made in this town since the early 1900s, would have fallen apart very quickly in the U.K.'s rainy atmosphere; as it is, when you try to knock some of the older items apart, with a mallet, the wood fails before the glue.


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## Glider (Apr 26, 2012)

I admit that my maths isn't great, so am not even going to try to do my own. Also I could easily be wrong but would be surprised if you took 10 aircraft (of any type, in any airforce) put them in a front line squadron, operated them for 12 months and only lost two which approximates to the 18% loss ratio you mention for the USAAF.

Then figure that three years later some of them are still in the front line, not replaced by more modern versions, not written off in accidents, converted to hanger queens or transferred to other roles.

I still find it pretty impressive


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## fastmongrel (Apr 26, 2012)

My friends plywood fly fishing boat is held together with cascamite we had better stop using it quick its over 40 years old it must be on the point of falling apart. 

When you consider the Chinese were using casein as a glue 2,000 years ago and its still a commonly used glue ingredient for waterproof plywood its not bad for a primitive glue. 

As I understand it the problem wasnt the glue but the way it was applied in one of the factories in the UK.


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## Edgar Brooks (Apr 26, 2012)

freebird said:


> King wasn't in charge of the US Fleet until after Pearl, and wasn't CNO until Mr 42.
> He also wasn't in charge of operations in the SE Pacific area, as that was ABDA command in early 1942.


When the only nation under attack was the Chinese. 


> If Britain the CW decided to put a responsible effort into the theater in 1941/1942, King has no authority or reason to dictate anything


For what purpose? How could the government justify withdrawing troops from the U.K., which was still anticipating a German invasion when there was nobody to fight? (Easy to say, now, that the incursion into Russia made that impossible, but the advance didn't stall for quite a long time, and there was always fear that Hitler still had enough resources to come here again.) King might have had no reason, but he was vehemently opposed to American ships being used to protect U.K.-bound convoys, reasoning that everything should be thrown against the Japanese.


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## mhuxt (Apr 26, 2012)

Yes, Standard Motors.

As posted in another thread, two of the first four Mossies in the CBI had formaldehyde glue.


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## wuzak (Apr 26, 2012)

Glider said:


> I admit that my maths isn't great, so am not even going to try to do my own. Also I could easily be wrong but would be surprised if you took 10 aircraft (of any type, in any airforce) put them in a front line squadron, operated them for 12 months and only lost two which approximates to the 18% loss ratio you mention for the USAAF.
> 
> Then figure that three years later some of them are still in the front line, not replaced by more modern versions, not written off in accidents, converted to hanger queens or transferred to other roles.
> 
> I still find it pretty impressive



It is impressive, but also not completely true.



> Although a Prototype aircraft, W4051 (together with W4054 and W4060) was e,ployed on PR.1 acceptance trials at the A&AEE, Boscombe Down, being used for radio tests as well as an evaluation of camera and cabin temperatures. W4051 later flew operationally with No 1 PRU (as 'LY-U') from Benson and Leuchars, and in September 1942 was fitted with a long range-fuel tank. This aircraft was later allocated to 521 (Meteorological) and 540 Squadrons before transfer to 8 OTU in August 1943. Damaged on 19 April 1944, it was due for repair but was recategorised as a write-off on 17 May 1945.



Ian Thirsk, _de Havilland Mosquito, An Illustrated History, Volume 2_.

So, W4051, though struck off charge in 1945, lay around for more than a year before it was written off. Befoe that it spent the best part of a year at an Operational Training Unit, so its front line service was actually only 2 years.


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## buffnut453 (Apr 26, 2012)

Some OTUs, particularly heavy bomber Units, did fly operational missions so it's possible that W4051 did undertake front-line ops during its last 2 years of usage. However, I'd agree most of it's time in an OTU would have been spent over the UK.


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## wuzak (Apr 26, 2012)

Of the last 2 years of service it sat waiting for repair for 13 months before being struck off charge. So no flying anywhere.


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## buffnut453 (Apr 26, 2012)

Fair enough, assuming the records are correct (which they sometimes aren't). The SOC date could easily be arbitrary paperwork catch-up and the aircraft was actually scrapped long beforehand.


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## yulzari (Apr 26, 2012)

Picking up on the off topic trend. I thought the true break between UK and Australia was 1973 when the UK ended Australia's Commonwealth Preference status and joined it's neighbours in the EU.


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## parsifal (Apr 26, 2012)

Glider said:


> I admit that my maths isn't great, so am not even going to try to do my own. Also I could easily be wrong but would be surprised if you took 10 aircraft (of any type, in any airforce) put them in a front line squadron, operated them for 12 months and only lost two which approximates to the 18% loss ratio you mention for the USAAF.
> 
> Then figure that three years later some of them are still in the front line, not replaced by more modern versions, not written off in accidents, converted to hanger queens or transferred to other roles.
> 
> I still find it pretty impressive



The average life expectancy of a p-51 was 7-9 months under typical combat conditions. A B-17 was not likley to fly more than 25 mission before being lost written off or scrapped, and averaged about 1-2 missions per week. Thats a life span of 3-6 months.

These all seem terrible, until you look on the other side of the hill. For the germans, two flights out of an Me 109 on the eastern Front was good going. they may not necessarily be a total loss, but they would usually need some kind of repair or major overhaul. An Me 262 might get 10 hours out of its engines before being grounded.

Getting 2 or 3 or 4 years out of one airframe isnt exceptional, its a bl**dy miracle


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## wuzak (Apr 26, 2012)

parsifal said:


> The average life expectancy of a p-51 was 7-9 months under typical combat conditions. A B-17 was not likley to fly more than 25 mission before being lost written off or scrapped, and averaged about 1-2 missions per week. Thats a life span of 3-6 months.
> 
> These all seem terrible, until you look on the other side of the hill. For the germans, two flights out of an Me 109 on the eastern Front was good going. they may not necessarily be a total loss, but they would usually need some kind of repair or major overhaul. An Me 262 might get 10 hours out of its engines before being grounded.
> 
> Getting 2 or 3 or 4 years out of one airframe isnt exceptional, its a bl**dy miracle



So, Mosquitos LR503 and LR504 would be considered truely miraculous.



> The tenth production B.IX , LR504 flew a total of 200 sorties, serving with both 109 and 105 Squadrons. It was delivered to 109 Squadron on 31 May 1943 and flew its firest operation (taregt Krefeld) on 21 June 1943. After completing 60 sorties LR504 was assigned to 105 Squadron on 13 March 1944, receiving the Unit Codes 'GB-H'. The aircraft's 100th sortie was completed on 28 September 1944, by which time it sported a night under surface finish and 'needle'-blad propellors. LR504 returned to 109 Squadron in October 1944 but was damaged on 6 December after the undercarriage collapsed on return from an operation to Duisberg. The aircraft was repaired and had flown a further 40 operations by VE Day, including four during 'Operation Manna'.



Ian Thirsk, _de Havilland Mosquito, An Illustrated History, Volume 2_.



> A Mosquito B Mk IX holds the record for the most combat operations flown by an Allied bomber in the Second World War. LR503, known as "F for Freddie" (from its squadron code letters, GB*F), first served with No. 109 and subsequently, No. 105 RAF squadrons. It flew 213 sorties during the war, only to crash at Calgary airport during the Eighth Victory Loan Bond Drive on 10 May 1945, two days after Victory in Europe Day, killing both the pilot, Flt. Lt. Maurice Briggs, DSO, DFC, DFM and navigator Fl. Off. John Baker, DFC and Bar.[



de Havilland Mosquito - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## Gixxerman (Apr 26, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> I don't think British High Command knew the defence of the Malay barrier was impossible until it was too late.



The really sad truth is that in fact Singapore fell due to Japanese bluff.
The Japanese forces were out of supplies (particularly ammunition, water foodstuffs) and the defending forces were unaware of this.
It is also largely a myth that 'the guns all faced the wrong way could not be turned around to face the invasion force'.
Thus Percival surrendered, completely unaware that the position of the besieging Japanese forces was at least as dire as his own and so Singapore entered the cruel murderous nightmare that was the Japanese wartime occupation.


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## Gixxerman (Apr 26, 2012)

Back OT.....

I must admit reading the specs of the Mossie the opposing LW single-seater fighters I have always been surprised (given the LW radar system control apparatus) that the LW was so ineffective in stopping the Mossie raids.
The Mossie PR effort (along with long range Spits) was a disaster for the German effort (the discovery planning of attacks on Peenemunde being a prime example) but the 'on the hour' 4000lb cookie attacks on Berlin going unanswered and unchallenged in any serious effective manner is utterly incredible.


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## parsifal (Apr 26, 2012)

Unfortunately this is a near total myth that has arisen post war as a sap to the worst defeat the British have ever experienced in 200 years. Its true the Japanese were short of supplies. it is not true that they were down to just a few days of supply. it is untrue that the Japanese were so short of supplies that they were incapable of initiating the assault. What in fact was happening was that they were so confident of success in the final assault that large amounts of aircraft, transport, and troops were being transferred out of the theatre to other fronts, particularly Burma, where some difficulties were being encountered.
If the British had been showing any signs of life in their defence of Singapore, the Japanese would simply have slowed down or reversed the movement of supply, troops and aircraft away from this front for a while. they had complete command of the air, and complete command of the sea. The Singapore garrison was going nowhere except down, and fast.

So much has been made in these last few pages about the poor quality of the troops defending in Malaya. But that was a relatively minor problem for the British. their command system was so poor, their planning for requirements so bad in this particular campaign that the quality of the troops would have made no difference. 

It would have been Australia's preferred option in 1939, when the AIF began to be raised was to send three of the four divisions planned to mkalaya in line with British defence thinking that had been in vogue since at least 1921. Instreead three of these divisions, the 6, 7 and 9th were sent to the Middle East, and two Brigades of the 8th sent to Malaya. If the three divs had been sent to malaya, under the british command that was in place historically, and with the logistic, naval and air support provided historically, we would have lost all three divisions. These ground troops were the equal of the Japanese, but they would have achieved very little more than the poor devils actually sent into that living hell. Malaya was lost for a multitude of reasons, but at the very top is the absolutely attrocious leadership displayed by the british in that campaign. 

I am normally very supportive of the british in most debates, and can see the logic and good military sense that the british displayed in most of their wartime campaigns. no such support can be given to the british effort in Malaya. it was an unmitigated, inexcusable disaster, that really did light the fuse that destroyed their empire. I am amazed that there are still people prepared to perpetuate a whole range of myths so that the british reputation can wriggle out of the mess they themselves caused. You will never get even one word of sympathy or support from me when it comes to the british effort in malaya. From before the war to the bitter end, it was one long unmitigated stuff up.


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## wuzak (Apr 26, 2012)

Gixxerman said:


> Back OT.....
> 
> I must admit reading the specs of the Mossie the opposing LW single-seater fighters I have always been surprised (given the LW radar system control apparatus) that the LW was so ineffective in stopping the Mossie raids.
> The Mossie PR effort (along with long range Spits) was a disaster for the German effort (the discovery planning of attacks on Peenemunde being a prime example) but the 'on the hour' 4000lb cookie attacks on Berlin going unanswered and unchallenged in any serious effective manner is utterly incredible.



I guess the answer is that until late in the war the LW fighters held only a marginal performance advantage, if they had one at all, over the contemporary Mosquitos.

And in only having that small advantage chasing the Mossies down took too long and range issues intervened.


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## parsifal (Apr 26, 2012)

dont forget also that for a Mosquito coming in at 30000 feet, they have an altitude advantage. If the 109 sent out to intercept is coming from the deck and climbing, and the Mosquito is gently gliding away, its going to take the Me109 time to get to altitude, and whilst climbing, it will not be able to reach full airspeed, whereas the mosquito diving away will exceed its max level speed

The LW did well to intercept as many PR Mossies as they did


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## wuzak (Apr 26, 2012)

parsifal said:


> dont forget also that for a Mosquito coming in at 30000 feet, they have an altitude advantage. If the 109 sent out to intercept is coming from the deck and climbing, and the Mosquito is gently gliding away, its going to take the Me109 time to get to altitude, and whilst climbing, it will not be able to reach full airspeed, whereas the mosquito diving away will exceed its max level speed
> 
> The LW did well to intercept as many PR Mossies as they did



With the radar systems in use there should have been enough advanced warning for Mossies flying at 30k, possibly, so that the defenders could reach altitude before the Mossie arrives.


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## parsifal (Apr 26, 2012)

wuzak said:


> With the radar systems in use there should have been enough advanced warning for Mossies flying at 30k, possibly, so that the defenders could reach altitude before the Mossie arrives.



True, but in that scenario a differnt problem arises. Say the aircraft takes off 20 minutes before the arrival of the intruder so as to gain height and position. If the interceptor has an endurnce of of 40 mins, and say it takes 10 mins to returnb to base and land, that only leaves 10 mins or so to put into effect an interception. if the mosquito dives away and opens the throttle so that his air speed is say 400mph, and the interceptor open his throttle and dives with him, but is still say 15 miles from the target (a range where airborne radar would easily detect the approaching german) the rate of closure would need to exceed the speed of the Mossie by more than 90mph to make the interception. 

Getting into position with a high sped intruder when you only have limited enduraqnce, only makes the situation worse. better to take your chances with a scramble situation to conserve fuel and thereby increase your endurance....probably need multiple interceptors, acting in tag to complete the interception


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## Siegfried (Apr 27, 2012)

parsifal said:


> An Me 262 might get 10 hours out of its engines before being grounded.



The nominal engine MTBO of the Jumo 004B1 was 25 hours, it generally didn't get near that (except for the craftsmen built Jumo 004B0). *Even then the engine was not scrapped but refurbished*. The 6 combustion chamber cans (which were only plain mild steel) were replace. The turbine was x-rayed, and replaced for a further 12.5 hours if good. The Jumo 004B4 got closer to the 25 hour MTBO because of the cooler running hollow aircooled blades. However despite quotes by Galland it's also possible to find pilots talking of leaving engines 60 hours on the wing (if carefully handled). A new more sophisticated fuel control system supposedly to reach service in March 1945 was to prevent the fuel surges that overheated the turbine. It was commonly refered to as an accelerator valve or acceleration control valve but was more complicated than that.

*Jumo 004 engine weren't overhauled on the wing. They were dropped of and sent to the workshop, new or recently overhauled engines rotated in*.


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## parsifal (Apr 27, 2012)

were there a surplus of engines to keep the bird flying. if so it would be unusual for the LW to be in that position. More commonly there were shortages of engines that meant airframes with engines being repaired were kept grounded for long periods. was particulalry the case on the eastern front, which goes a long way in explaining why luftwaffe airframes were captured in their thousands by the advancing russians in 1944. That and fuel shortages of course.


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## Edgar Brooks (Apr 27, 2012)

wuzak said:


> With the radar systems in use there should have been enough advanced warning for Mossies flying at 30k, possibly, so that the defenders could reach altitude before the Mossie arrives.


But, for that to happen, you have to know where he's heading. P.R. pilots were given multiple "targets," and it was left to them to plan their route, and they never took exactly the same route twice. It's not much use taking 15 minutes to climb to where you think he's going to be, if, in the meantime, he's done a 90 degree turn, and is heading off in the opposite direction.


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## Kryten (Apr 27, 2012)

to intercept a fast aircraft you have to have a considerable overtake speed otherwise the slightest difference in angle of approach or altitude geometrically increases the distance to your target that you must then cover, put another way an aircraft with a 20mph closure rate in a straight tail chase is probably not going to get close enough before overheat or fuel become a major factor, so to catch a mossie your going to have to use a dive to increase your overtake speed enough to close on it in a reasonable time frame?


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## Gixxerman (Apr 29, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Unfortunately this is a near total myth that has arisen post war as a sap to the worst defeat the British have ever experienced in 200 years ........................I am amazed that there are still people prepared to perpetuate a whole range of myths so that the british reputation can wriggle out of the mess they themselves caused.



Parsifal my friend you have entirely the wrong idea here.
I knew little of the details of the fall of Sing, I was merely repeating what I had seen read on my almost month long visit there to the various museums historic sites back in 2009.
Relax, I couldn't alter anyone or anythings rep even if I wanted to.
Which I never had a moments intention of doing btw.

Back OT (ish).....

The thing that I found incredible was the lack of effective opposition to the Mossie raids on Berlin.
Given the target, the German radar coverage the frequency monotony of the cookie raids I just find it hard to understand why the LW response was so poor.


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## rinkol (Apr 29, 2012)

One thing to keep in mind is that the pilot of an aerodynamically clean aircraft, such as a Mossie, can gain significant speed by going into a shallow dive and that an opponent flying an airplane that has a higher drag coefficint will tend to fall behind.


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## parsifal (Apr 29, 2012)

Gixxerman said:


> Parsifal my friend you have entirely the wrong idea here.
> I knew little of the details of the fall of Sing, I was merely repeating what I had seen read on my almost month long visit there to the various museums historic sites back in 2009.
> Relax, I couldn't alter anyone or anythings rep even if I wanted to.
> Which I never had a moments intention of doing btw.
> ...



Hi GX

I apologise for my completely over the top reaction. I do understand where you are coming from, and conceded there is some measure of truth to it. However, Singapore was a near unmitigated disaster, i think you would have to agree, and quitre possibly an avoidable unmitigated disaster. we played our part in that disaster, so not all blame should be levelled at the brits. Our child like tantrums must have driven the British command nuts at times.


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## Gixxerman (Apr 29, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Hi GX
> 
> I apologise for my completely over the top reaction.



NP mate, it's 2d text on a screen my friend, it's sometimes way too easy to get our meanings intentions a bit skew-wiff.



parsifal said:


> and conceded there is some measure of truth to it.



Yes you did and thank you.



parsifal said:


> However, Singapore was a near unmitigated disaster, i think you would have to agree



I completely agree......and I have to admit my view of it previous to my visit was of it as a British military disaster (which of course it was) but I had almost no idea of what happened to the people of Sing under occupation, 'our' disaster pales enormously compared to theirs.



parsifal said:


> we played our part in that disaster, so not all blame should be levelled at the brits. Our child like tantrums must have driven the British command nuts at times.



I promise not to mention a certain Aussie General who departed the scene if you don't. ;¬)

(I kid, I kid........ it's just one guy, not all Aussies I know there are at least 2 opposing distinct views of what he did)


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## pbfoot (Apr 29, 2012)

I think a better question might be how long do you think the Mosquito can outrun the foe, its seems some of us have the impression the pilot took off set pitch and mixture and pushed the throttle to the ident .....


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## Glider (Apr 30, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> I think a better question might be how long do you think the Mosquito can outrun the foe, its seems some of us have the impression the pilot took off set pitch and mixture and pushed the throttle to the ident .....



Probably as long as he needed too. With a bunch of 109's behind I would keep going and worry about engine wear later.


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## Milosh (Apr 30, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> I think a better question might be how long do you think the Mosquito can outrun the foe, its seems some of us have the impression the pilot took off set pitch and mixture and pushed the throttle to the ident .....



How long could the foe try to catch up for?


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## parsifal (Apr 30, 2012)

Milosh said:


> How long could the foe try to catch up for?



It varied of course but a good median value would be about 20 minutes. If sufficient warning was obtained by the intruder of the intercept, its going to be tough to catch.

The complication (or one of them) is that the interceptor will not always be vectoring in as a stern chase. Sometimes they will be coming in beam on, sometimes from ahead, or ahead of the beam. If the intruder is able to turn away from the interceptor, he can largely solve this issue....if not, his speed advantage isnt as important as a variable for the interceptor when attempting to achieve a successful intercept.


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## pbfoot (Apr 30, 2012)

You guys using the jet stream at all in this fantasy . the jet stream is always blowing out of the west . BTW the Jetstream was an unknown in the 40's so any eastbound aircraft at altitude will be doing at least 60mph up to 130 mph faster then any westbound aircraft . Certainly helps with this fantasy and makes interception a bitch > A T6 heading east would be a problem for the intercepters depending on the skill of the GCI or slang Fighter Cops skill. The following ink shows the current euro jetstream
http://www.wunderground.com/global/EU_2xJT_Index.html


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## wuzak (Apr 30, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> You guys using the jet stream at all in this fantasy . the jet stream is always blowing out of the west . BTW the Jetstream was an unknown in the 40's so any eastbound aircraft at altitude will be doing at least 60mph up to 130 mph faster then any westbound aircraft . Certainly helps with this fantasy and makes interception a bitch > A T6 heading east would be a problem for the intercepters depending on the skill of the GCI or slang Fighter Cops skill. The following ink shows the current euro jetstream
> Weather Forecast - Europe - Local Long Range | Wunderground | Weather Underground




Was the jetstream encountered in the ETO at all?

What altitude is the jetstream in Europe?


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## Freebird (May 2, 2012)

Edgar Brooks said:


> When the only nation under attack was the Chinese.



Huh?
ABDA command was in the early months of 1942, when the British, Australians Dutch were all being attacked



> For what purpose? How could the government justify withdrawing troops from the U.K., which was still anticipating a German invasion when there was nobody to fight? (Easy to say, now, that the incursion into Russia made that impossible, but the advance didn't stall for quite a long time, and there was always fear that Hitler still had enough resources to come here again.)



There is no need to withdraw British troops from the UK, or lower available forces, there was more than enough to work with.

As for the war in the east eliminating the threat of a UK invasion, by the end September it was clear that the Soviets wouldn't be defeated before winter, when weather conditions made a cross channel invasion unworkable.
There was still enough time to improve the defences in the Far East


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## Freebird (May 2, 2012)

parsifal said:


> It is a well documented fact that military appraisals handed to the british high command by the Australians (at least, ther were many many others that did the same) clearly showed the Malayan barrier (and Singas) to be indefensible, and that it was at risk from a landward assault.


 
Who had judged the Maylay barrier to be indefensible?
I've havn't seen that assertion anywhere? 

The commanders in the Far East _did_ know that the forces in Malaya (especially air) were not sufficient, but had the forces that had been recommended by the senior leaders (and agreed by the British Cabinet) actually been sent to Malaya, there is good reason to believe that the Maylay barrier defence could have worked.



parsifal said:


> The british and CW response was a calculated risk that went horribly wrong. With two major powers to fight largely alone in the ETO, and having suffered a series of costly defeats, Britiain had no choice but to cut force levels in the Far east to dangerously low levels.
> 
> I think the high point of bad decisions, however was the decision to deploy the PoW and Repulse so far forward and so badly protected. By late '41, it was very clear that Captital ships should not and could not operate in a hostile air environment where the enemy was effective in the aeronaval role.



No, in my mind the high point of bad decisions was agreeing to back the US embargo (knowing that it would likely lead to war) and then not heeding the advice of the commanders in theater of what forces were needed, or otherwise properly preparing for war. 

If they didn't think they could send the forces required they never should have pulled the pin on the grenade, and agreed to support an embargo that would most certainly lead to war.


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## Freebird (May 2, 2012)

> The other thing that stands out for me is that having accepted the risk of undermanning their forward defences, why did the British continue to make assurances they could not keep, and knew they could not keep throughout 1940-41. If they had been honest about the situation, the nations affected, like Australia, could have made more realistic preprations for war.


 


buffnut453 said:


> Because they didn't know. Senior leaders believed their own twisted logic and failed to grasp just how woefully ill-prepared forces in the Far East were. My previous post touches on this, too.



I don't see that they couldn't have kept their promises, or have known that there was a significant risk of war _until_ July of 1941. They were reading the Japanese messages and so they knew that Japan was too engaged in China to pose a significant threat, until the embargo forced the Japanese to take desperate measures.

Who are the senior leaders that you think failed to grasp the danger?
Every one of the senior leaders in the Far East that are on record (Babington, Bond, Dobbie, Brooke-Popham Percival himself) pointed out the need for stronger defences (especially air), nor have I seen any racist angle either, as none them ever expressed the opinion that the meagre assortment of obsolete aircraft would be adequate against the Japanese.

Let's not beat around the bush, the lion's share of the blame can be attributed to the Minister of Defence, (Winston Churchill) who disregarded the advice of the senior leaders in the Far East as regards to Japan.
From what I've read, it seems that he 
A.) Believed that Japan would naver dare to attack the US, and
B.) That even if they did, the mighty US military would make quick work of Japan 

Therefore the UK needn't worry or prepare for a long conflict, as the US would take care of the Pacific
He also believed that sending the Prince of Wales Repulse would intimidate Japan. 



buffnut453 said:


> I The one point I will make is that no sensible person would countenance building up forces in an area where there was no fighting when other theatres were under attack. Perhaps the hindsight goggles are clouding our view of the difficult decisions that had to be made, without foreknowledge, at the time?


 
On the other hand, Chuchhill the War Cabinet recognised the danger in other territories under their control, and beefed up the defences in areas that the Nazis could _possibly_ attack - like Gibraltar, Iceland, Cyprus etc, but that were not fighting at the time (other than a few air raids)

Now, I would agree that there was no justification for expanding forces in the Far East from mid-1940 to mid-1941, 
at which time there was a critical shortage of troops, air forces guns during the French collapse, BoB, Sonnenblume, the expedition to Greece, Battle for Crete, revolt in Messopotamia, campaign in Levant the East Africa campaign.

However by the end of July 1941, things have more or less stabilized in the ETO. (in a relative sense )
With dispatch of the bulk of Axis forces to Barbarossa the danger of an immediate invasion of the UK has passed, and the defence of the UK is far stronger than the year before. The Italians have been defeated in East Africa, the Vichy ejected from the Levant, and the revolt in Messopotamia put down.

At this point, the US asks the British to support the embargo, which will most likely lead to war.
IMO They have 2 options:
1.) if the don't think that they have enough forces to go to war with Japan, they shouldn't agree.
2.) If they do agree, they should be fully prepared to beef up the air ground forces (at least) to what the 1940 conference recommended would be needed to resist a Japanese attack.


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## parsifal (May 2, 2012)

> Who had judged the Maylay barrier to be indefensible?
> I've havn't seen that assertion anywhere?



The australian government and the australian high Command submitted repeated assessments to the effect that the defences for malaya, particularly the land defences were inadequate. According to DM Horner (Australia Allied Strategic Decision making 1939-45), referring to yet another situation report submitted by the Australians in April 1941 and (as usuall) ignored that stated all the deficiencies in the defensive arrangements, Horner states in his book "....the australian government was now placed in an invidious position. It was now faced with a british government that refused to accept the defences were hopelessly inadequate, and that as a result australias defences were now at risk (the deployment of the AIF was conditional to adequate defences being deployed forward into malaya). The australian government now knew that the British refused to provide adequate defences in the far east, that australia had been duped into sending the bulk of its trained forces to the middle east, against the advice of its own military (the Australian GHQ had recommended just one division be sent whilst Japans position remained unclear), and a refusal by the British to either provide arms, or allow Australia to raise the capital to build its own arms. The last refusal led to the deployment of 27th Bde, the only trained reseve left in australia, and forced menzies to seek alternatives for aircraft supply and manufacturing capability. 



> The commanders in the Far East _did_ know that the forces in Malaya (especially air) were not sufficient, but had the forces that had been recommended by the senior leaders (and agreed by the British Cabinet) actually been sent to Malaya, there is good reason to believe that the Maylay barrier defence could have worked.




Possibly, but the "ifs" are so remote from reality as to make the statement menaingless. the british were never going to defend the far east adequately whilst also at war with the European Axis, even though they knew the defences were completely inadequate Whatever resources they did commit were largely the result of repeated criticisms by countries like australia. If they had had their way, i am certain malaya in 1941 would have been defended by no more than the pace guard and the national goat.....



> If they didn't think they could send the forces required they never should have pulled the pin on the grenade, and agreed to support an embargo that would most certainly lead to war.



Britain was never going to go the path of appeasement, however inadequate the forces. they also needed to stand firm, to ensure US entry


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## Edgar Brooks (May 2, 2012)

freebird said:


> Huh?
> ABDA command was in the early months of 1942, when the British, Australians Dutch were all being attacked
> There was still enough time to improve the defences in the Far East


Sorry about that; I'd forgotten how quickly the Japanese launched their invasion forces.
There was no chance to improve the Far East defences, once the decision had been taken to send hundreds of Hurricanes to Russia.
The big mistake with regard to Prince of Wales Repulse, was to continue with their sortie, without the aircraft carrier that was supposed to travel with them, but had run aground during an exercise. The force commander didn't help, when he decided that he could manage without informing the RAF, and getting air cover.



> It was now faced with a british government that refused to accept the defences were hopelessly inadequate, and that as a result australias defences were now at risk (the deployment of the AIF was conditional to adequate defences being deployed forward into malaya). The australian government now knew that the British refused to provide adequate defences in the far east, that australia had been duped into sending the bulk of its trained forces to the middle east, against the advice of its own military (the Australian GHQ had recommended just one division be sent whilst Japans position remained unclear), and a refusal by the British to either provide arms, or allow Australia to raise the capital to build its own arms. The last refusal led to the deployment of 27th Bde, the only trained reseve left in australia, and forced menzies to seek alternatives for aircraft supply and manufacturing capability.
> The commanders in the Far East did know that the forces in Malaya (especially air) were not sufficient, but had the forces that had been recommended by the senior leaders (and agreed by the British Cabinet) actually been sent to Malaya, there is good reason to believe that the Maylay barrier defence could have worked.
> 
> Possibly, but the "ifs" are so remote from reality as to make the statement menaingless. the british were never going to defend the far east adequately whilst also at war with the European Axis, even though they knew the defences were completely inadequate Whatever resources they did commit were largely the result of repeated criticisms by countries like australia. If they had had their way, i am certain malaya in 1941 would have been defended by no more than the pace guard and the national goat.....


Emotive stuff, but not true; the British government (not just Churchill) had written to the Australians, pledging that, if the Japanese were so foolish as to attempt an invasion of Australia, they (we) would have cut their losses, abandoned the Mediterranean, and sent the lot to defend Australia (I found a copy of the message in our National Archives.) You can choose to disbelieve it, if you wish, of course, but that was the government's position.


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## pbfoot (May 2, 2012)

wuzak said:


> Was the jetstream encountered in the ETO at all?
> 
> What altitude is the jetstream in Europe?


It is around the world and a reasom east bound flights take less then west bound


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## wuzak (May 2, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> It is around the world and a reasom east bound flights take less then west bound



Yes, but were they flying hgh enough to encounter/use it?


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## wuzak (May 2, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> It is around the world and a reasom east bound flights take less then west bound



Yes, but were they flying hgh enough to encounter/use it?


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## pbfoot (May 2, 2012)

you were talking about 30000 feet , well it starts at 23000 feet


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## Edgar Brooks (May 2, 2012)

I've just read a biography of a Norwegian pilot, who said they occasionally got caught in it, but never knew (then) what it was. There was also a Lancastrian, just after the war, which was due to cross the Andes, but just disappeared; years later a glacier brought parts of the aircraft (and bodies) out into the open, and it was surmised that they'd flown into the (head wind) jetstream, and let down straight into the mountain peaks, thinking they'd got over the top. The stream isn't constant in its position, which is why the U.K. has such variable weather; sometimes it holds warm weather over us, at others it allows Arctic weather to get here.


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## buffnut453 (May 2, 2012)

freebird said:


> Who are the senior leaders that you think failed to grasp the danger?
> Every one of the senior leaders in the Far East that are on record (Babington, Bond, Dobbie, Brooke-Popham Percival himself) pointed out the need for stronger defences (especially air), nor have I seen any racist angle either, as none them ever expressed the opinion that the meagre assortment of obsolete aircraft would be adequate against the Japanese.



Yes, commanders on the spot did ask for more assets (I don't know of any commander who says he can complete his mission without fewer forces, the exception being Gideon of Old Testament fame). Irrespective, they were all were banking on Japan making a staged assault from French Indo-China through Thailand and not a full-blown seaborne invasion from modern Formosa. Major George Wards, Assistant Military Attaché in Tokyo, provided a briefing to senior British officers in April 1941 where the GOC, then General Bond, deliberately contradicted Wards’ evaluation that the Japanese Army maintained a high standard of efficiency (Source: Wards Papers at IWM). This would seem to contradict your assertion that all Far East commanders accepted the Japanese threat. 

To further reinforce the point, but with a different spin on the effectiveness of FECB's efficacy as an intelligence organisation, Lt Col Ashmore recalled a commanders’ conference on 21st October where the FECB representative ‘painted a fairly indecisive picture and seemed unable to tell the conference much about the latest Japanese moves and forces in Indo-China and elsewhere’ whereas the GHQ representative delivered a clear, logical critique and ‘left an impression…that the Japanese were in no position to attack Malaya at this time or in the near future’. (Source: ADM 223/494, UK National Archives). Brooke-Popham also blamed lack of adequate intelligence for the surprising performance of Japanese aircraft, although this has subsequently proven to be an inaccurate criticism - pretty accurate intel was available on all Japanese aircraft types except the Ki-43.

Reports from military observers in China consistently placed the efficiency and effectiveness of Japanese forces as below that of Italy. These reports were taken to heart by senior staffs in London. Assessments about the military forces of Japan, China and Thailand clearly display a racial hierarchy at play in the thinking of many British intelligence staff and senior military leaders - often the threat was couched in terms of comparison against the Indian Army as if one could readily make such broad, sweeping assertions without factoring in local conditions, ability to concentrate force etc.



freebird said:


> However by the end of July 1941, things have more or less stabilized in the ETO. (in a relative sense )
> With dispatch of the bulk of Axis forces to Barbarossa the danger of an immediate invasion of the UK has passed, and the defence of the UK is far stronger than the year before. The Italians have been defeated in East Africa, the Vichy ejected from the Levant, and the revolt in Messopotamia put down.



Apart from the fact that Rommel's Afrika Korps was barely getting spun up in North Africa. Rommel's forces started arriving in Feb 41 and the deployment finished that May. North Africa was the main theatre at that stage of the war. If it had fallen, it would have resulted in the loss of Egypt, probably the neutralization of Malta, and undoubtedly a second attempt on Iraq. I hardly think that's a stabilized situation.


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## Freebird (May 2, 2012)

Edgar Brooks said:


> The big mistake with regard to Prince of Wales Repulse, was to continue with their sortie, without the aircraft carrier that was supposed to travel with them, but had run aground during an exercise.



The aircraft carrier you are referring to is the "HMS Indomitable", and it did indeed run arground in the Caribbean.
There was an alternative however, they could have easily substituted HMS Hermes to provide cover for Force Z. The Japanese had no fighter escort for the bombers, so even with the limited capacity of the Hermes, a dozen Fulmar or Sea Hurricanes could have thwarted the waves of torpedo bombers.
Ultimately though, since the intent was to use the ships as a "show of force" to intimidate Japan,  they most likely should have been withdrawn after Japan attacked, rather than sent on a suicide mission.

The Cabinet had in fact discussed this very thing Dec 8, with Churchill deciding to "sleep on it", by the time he woke up the next morning they were already sunk



Edgar Brooks said:


> The force commander didn't help, when he decided that he could manage without informing the RAF, and getting air cover.



Admiral Phillips was put in a difficult position, and handicapped by several factors.
The Admiralty policy was complete radio silence, to prevent the signals being used to locate the force.
It was also most unfortunate that the first wave of bombers knocked out the radio on the PoW.
I would agree though, it was a mistake not to call for help as soon as the Japanese strike force was sighted, this would have saved the two ships.


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## wuzak (May 2, 2012)

pbfoot said:


> you were talking about 30000 feet , well it starts at 23000 feet



Sure, at some places, at different strengths.

I've not seen the jet stream mentioned much, if at all, regarding the ETO. For B-29s over Japan it is mentioned often as a complicating factor.

Here's one for thought. The US 8th AF heavy bombers flew in tight formations - the formation had 3 dimensions - width, length and height. The high squadrons could be several thousand feet above the low squadrons - and where the low squadron is theoretically out of the jet stream the high squadron would theoretically be in the jet strem. If that were the case it could present problems for maintaining formation.


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## buffnut453 (May 2, 2012)

freebird said:


> The Japanese had no fighter escort for the bombers, so even with the limited capacity of the Hermes, a dozen Fulmar or Sea Hurricanes could have thwarted the waves of torpedo bombers.



Only for the first wave. There were Zeros based in the same part of French Indo-China so any thwarting would probably have been short-lived.



freebird said:


> Admiral Phillips was put in a difficult position, and handicapped by several factors.
> The Admiralty policy was complete radio silence, to prevent the signals being used to locate the force.
> It was also most unfortunate that the first wave of bombers knocked out the radio on the PoW.
> I would agree though, it was a mistake not to call for help as soon as the Japanese strike force was sighted, this would have saved the two ships.



But Phillips knew he was being shadowed by an aircraft several hours before the attack actually commenced. As soon as his lookouts spotted the aircraft, he would naturally assume that his position was known and so radio silence was immaterial. Had he done so, there's every likelihood that 453 Sqn at Sembawang, which was designated with the fleet protection role, could have seriously handicapped the initial attack, although my comments about the possibility of subsequent IJNAF attacks with A6M escort also apply.


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## wuzak (May 2, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> Only for the first wave. There were Zeros based in the same part of French Indo-China so any thwarting would probably have been short-lived.
> 
> 
> 
> But Phillips knew he was being shadowed by an aircraft several hours before the attack actually commenced. As soon as his lookouts spotted the aircraft, he would naturally assume that his position was known and so radio silence was immaterial. Had he done so, there's every likelihood that 453 Sqn at Sembawang, which was designated with the fleet protection role, could have seriously handicapped the initial attack, although my comments about the possibility of subsequent IJNAF attacks with A6M escort also apply.


 
Shouldn't you guys discuss this topic in its own thread?


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## Njaco (May 2, 2012)

I agree...unless you know something about the Axis flying Zeros in the ETO!


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## buffnut453 (May 2, 2012)

I've seen Zeros engaging F-14 Tomcats...saw it on TV so it MUST be true.


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## parsifal (May 3, 2012)

Dont know about tomcats, but Zeroes (or at least japanese a/c) did engage or attempt to engage Mossies

Its an excellent idea to start a separate new thread. Us far east nutters have probably done enough damage here i think


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## Freebird (May 3, 2012)

wuzak said:


> Shouldn't you guys discuss this topic in its own thread?



I originally started the thread, and it's evolved into 2 separate topics - the Mossie topic the Australian/Malaya strategy topic. I've requested that the Mods split the thread to separate the two topics, but they havn't done so yet.  Remember the mod thread about patience? 


Njaco, could you do this perhaps? 



Njaco said:


> I agree...unless you know something about the Axis flying Zeros in the ETO!



it was actually about the Mossie in *both* the ETO PTO


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## buffnut453 (May 3, 2012)

All we need now is for someone to bring up a link to the Queen (Her Majesty, of course!) and we really will be going round in circles!!!


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## Freebird (May 4, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> Only for the first wave. There were Zeros based in the same part of French Indo-China so any thwarting would probably have been short-lived.



Agreed, although due to the distances involved it would take several hours to set up, with all the difficulties involved with assembly, tracking the target over that time etc.
The ship would probably survive the day, but if it wasn't withdrawn that night it would be pushing it.



buffnut453 said:


> But Phillips knew he was being shadowed by an aircraft several hours before the attack actually commenced. As soon as his lookouts spotted the aircraft, he would naturally assume that his position was known and so radio silence was immaterial. Had he done so, there's every likelihood that 453 Sqn at Sembawang, which was designated with the fleet protection role, could have seriously handicapped the initial attack, although my comments about the possibility of subsequent IJNAF attacks with A6M escort also apply.



True, but the danger would be to call them out too early as they didn't have too much time on station over the ships.
I don't really disagree with your points here, Phillips was indeed to slow to call out air support.
An accompanying carrier would have been a much better option, however truthfully the whole mission was a mistake to begin with IMO


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## Rogi (May 4, 2012)

I read somewhere that the He-162s substitute glue wasn't a problem. 

Workers (Balctic,Mediteranian, Jewish etc who they used as slave labor) sabotaged the glue during production, and I do know of a couple of the He-162s during renovations that had anti nazi slogans painted on the innner workings of the aircraft. I'll try to find the site where they did a whole reno. of the He-162 and they showed it on there in a couple pics. 

This was somewhere wayyyyyy back in this thread


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## Freebird (May 4, 2012)

> Apart from the fact that Rommel's Afrika Korps was barely getting spun up in North Africa. Rommel's forces started arriving in Feb 41 and the deployment finished that May. North Africa was the main theatre at that stage of the war. If it had fallen, it would have resulted in the loss of Egypt, probably the neutralization of Malta, and undoubtedly a second attempt on Iraq. I hardly think that's a stabilized situation.



The Desert campaign was not stabilized, more like stalemated. 
The British couldn't defeat DAK while the Germans were hampered by lack of supplies and couldn't exploit. 
Other than operation Skorpion to recapture Halfaya, the German actions between April November were aimed at Tobruk, which failed.
Despite the Axis success in defeating Brevity Battleaxe, it was the British that took the initiative and launched the Crusader offensive.
But the most important factor in my mind, that despite the need to defeat Rommel and push back the Axis, neither of the veteran Australian 6th or 7th divisions were deployed in Crusader, so I don't see that swapping an inexperienced Indian division for an AIF division on garrison duty would make much difference in the Middle East.




parsifal said:


> The australian government and the australian high Command submitted repeated assessments to the effect that the defences for malaya, particularly the land defences were inadequate. According to DM Horner (Australia Allied Strategic Decision making 1939-45), referring to yet another situation report submitted by the Australians in April 1941 and (as usuall) ignored that stated all the deficiencies in the defensive arrangements, Horner states in his book "....the australian government was now placed in an invidious position. It was now faced with a british government that refused to accept the defences were hopelessly inadequate, and that as a result australias defences were now at risk (the deployment of the AIF was conditional to adequate defences being deployed forward into malaya). The australian government now knew that the British refused to provide adequate defences in the far east, that australia had been duped into sending the bulk of its trained forces to the middle east, against the advice of its own military (the Australian GHQ had recommended just one division be sent whilst Japans position remained unclear), and a refusal by the British to either provide arms, or allow Australia to raise the capital to build its own arms. The last refusal led to the deployment of 27th Bde, the only trained reseve left in australia, and forced menzies to seek alternatives for aircraft supply and manufacturing capability.



My point was that the problem wasn't the Malaya barrier strategy, only that the defences in Malaya (by Dec 1941) were certainly inadequate.
And again, it wasn't the British government that "refused to accept the defences were hopelessly inadequate", as the commanders in the Far East, the Chiefs of Staff the Cabinet had all agreed that there was a need to strengthen the defence of Malaya, and that it would be vulnerable to seaborne attack.

They had agreed that the original 3 brigades in Malaya would need to be increased by 36 battlaions (ie - 4 more divisions) and the air assets boosted by a minimum of 336 modern aircraft.

Truthfully, the Australian govenment should have been more pro-active in this regard.
By late August or early Sept 1941, when it became clear that the British leadership (ie - Churchill) didn't intend to follow through with the agreements on force levels made earlier, they should have demanded an immediate withdrawl of AIF forces to Malaya to cover the difference, rather than wait until Jan 1942 to get this moving.


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## buffnut453 (May 8, 2012)

But withdraw AIF forces from where? The Western Desert? Rather than being "stalemated" which infers an inability to act, North Africa was a pendulum with the front line making huge moves during major offensives. The point I was trying to make earlier was that no sensible theatre commander or central defence senior would recommend denuding the primary combat theatre (ie the Western Desert) of forces when there was a clear, and relatively new, threat in the form of the Afrika Korps. Moving them to Malaya in 1941 just doesn't make sense and anyone who suggests otherwise has clearly donned the hindsight goggles - it was not clear the Japanese would attack Malaya in 1941 until very late in the year, and British leaders didn't expect the sort of "blitzkrieg" tactics that were so successfully implemented by the IJA. Moving troops from Africa to Malaya when there wasn't a direct threat to the latter was a non-starter during 1941 and everyone expected the Japanese to take their time attacking through Thailand and hence affording opportunities to reinforce Singapore and Malaya. Sadly such optimism was misplaced.

And for the Mods...apologies for going OT again - just wanted to make some additional points. Looking forward to this being split off as a separate thread.

Thanks,
B-N


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## Siegfried (May 9, 2012)

wrong thread


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## parsifal (May 9, 2012)

Im holding back until we do split the thread....


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## Njaco (May 9, 2012)

If someone wants to start a seperate thread, please do. The Mods discussed the request and while we feel that it is reasonable, we're not able at the moment to go through pages of posts to pick and choose and transfer relevant posts. Anyone is welcome to start a new thread and post the link here.

As for the He 162 and the glue...

Here is a series of shots of the He 162 falling apart during trial flights.


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## fastmongrel (May 9, 2012)

Were not supposed to swear but Sh*t that makes me shiver.


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## Freebird (May 10, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> But withdraw AIF forces from where? The Western Desert?



No, I don't propose removing *any *air or ground forces from the Western Desert.

With the withdrawl of the bulk of the 9th Australian from Tobruk, there are NO Australian ground troops in the Western desert, other than a battalion or so left in Tobruk



> Rather than being "stalemated" which infers an inability to act, North Africa was a pendulum with the front line making huge moves during major offensives. The point I was trying to make earlier was that no sensible theatre commander or central defence senior would recommend denuding the primary combat theatre (ie the Western Desert) of forces when there was a clear, and relatively new, threat in the form of the Afrika Korps.



But again, no AIF forces were in the Western Desert in the second half of 1941, except for Morshead the 9th division, which were removed in Sept 1941 from Tobruk after serving 6 months. 
There were 3 AIF divisions on garrison duty in the Middle East.
By removing 1 division, it still leaves a 2 division AIF corps in the MidEast in the fall of 1941, in addition to the Indian troops. (That would otherwise have been sent to Malaya)



> Moving them to Malaya in 1941 just doesn't make sense and anyone who suggests otherwise has clearly donned the hindsight goggles - it was not clear the Japanese would attack Malaya in 1941 until very late in the year,



It was however pretty obvious that Japan would be going to war to seize the oil reserves somewhere, (Borneo or Sumatra) and to do that they needed to eliminate Singapore as a major threat against their lines of supply. 
We were reading their naval diplomatic cables, so by Sept 1941 it became clear that they wouldn't back down, the US wouldn't agree to a political solution, so they would either run out of oil or else go to war.


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## Freebird (May 10, 2012)

Njaco said:


> If someone wants to start a seperate thread, please do. The Mods discussed the request and while we feel that it is reasonable, we're not able at the moment to go through pages of posts to pick and choose and transfer relevant posts. Anyone is welcome to start a new thread and post the link here.



Could you perhaps just make a quick split of the thread at post # 53, as the first 52 posts are about the Mossie, and as most of the last 50 or 60 posts are about Malaya/Australia?

The original question was about whether Japan or Germany could shoot down a Mossie, and has mostly been answered.
(Japan probably couldn't except in exceptional circumstances, Germany could but only in daylight in the right conditions)
The topic about He 162 Mossie glue failure could probably have it's own topic too...

Thanks very much for your patience Njaco ( Mods), I'm well aware of what a pain in the @ss it is to split long threads, as I've done it too many times  (on another forum).


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## Freebird (May 10, 2012)

> and British leaders didn't expect the sort of "blitzkrieg" tactics that were so successfully implemented by the IJA. Moving troops from Africa to Malaya when there wasn't a direct threat to the latter was a non-starter during 1941 and everyone expected the Japanese to take their time attacking through Thailand and hence affording opportunities to reinforce Singapore and Malaya. Sadly such optimism was misplaced.



The danger of a direct seaborne assault had been warned by Dobbie Percival himself, and with the availability of bases in Indochina, it became more of a danger.
By the fall of 1941 there was a direct threat to the Far East, and they had recognised that by authorizing 4 divisions sent to Malaya, vs about 3 brigades a ordinary garrision

In any event, the Cabinet DID approve sending additional troops - a second Indian division to Malaya - in the summer of '41, so it isn't a question of whether troops will be sent - it's a question of *which* troops.



> The point I was trying to make earlier was that no sensible theatre commander or central defence senior would recommend denuding the primary combat theatre (ie the Western Desert) of forces when there was a clear, and relatively new, threat in the form of the Afrika Korps.



No theater commander would ever want to lose troops. 
Frankly, Australia should have taken the choice away from the British, by insisiting in Sept or Oct '41 that at least 1 AIF division be withdrawn from the Middle east and sent to the Far East. 

IMO, Churchill unreasonably wanted to keep all 3 AIF divisions regardless of the cost to Australia, and let the Americans clean up the mess later.
The Western Desert campaign would just have to make to with Australia contributing a single division. (Which is exactly what they ended up doing)




buffnut453 said:


> Parsifal,
> Finally, where do you get the idea that I ever suggested the Japanese only faced inferior troops? I was referring specifically to the Indian troops in Malaya...and that's not because the troops themselves were poor but because of incredible dilution of experience due to massive and rapid force expansion. Those aren't just excuses - it was the reality in 1941.
> There was no single issue that resulted in the rout that occurred in Malaya and Singapore - the causes were several and intertwined, many dating back years.



Further to what Buffnut posted, the quality of the Indian troops in Malaya *was* a significant factor in the collapse of the defence, as it created a cascade failure.
The fact that the battalions of the 28th (Indian) brigade shattered on the first day of combat, and the inexperienced 6th brigade lost most of it's artillery vehicles due to premature bridge demolition.
The rapid collapse prevented the proper evacuation reduction of the Penang airbase ships

If you look at the battles where the Britsh/CW were able to form a defensive line, the artillery advantage was something that the Japanese couldn't overcome, and were forced to outflank the position using the naval assets captured at Penang


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## parsifal (May 11, 2012)

> But withdraw AIF forces from where?



This goes to the very heart of the argument raging over this issue. Freebird in a couple of posts has said Malaya was defensible, if adequate resources had been put into the defences. With regard to both air and ground resources, they could have been available, but werent. why, because they were in the Middle East. why were they in the Middle East when logically, from an Australian perspective, they should have been concentrated in either Australia, and /or our near north or both....

That was precisely the plan advocated by Australia on the outbreak of the war in 1939. Our plans in 1939 were to raise 4 Divs for overseas service (what became the 6, 7 8 and 9th Divs , 2nd AIF), and an indepoendant air force largely equipped from domestic sources so as to expand the 1939 12 squadron force out to a 40 squadron force. In 1939-40, we had plans to produce the beafort and the CA4. We also planned to mass produce the Wirraway. we had no plans to build fighters but were relying on a vaguely promised undertaking by Hawker. History shows however that wacket already had all that he needed to build a competitive fighter in 1939 (the boomerang) except engines. and we didnt have engines because of the British....Getting back to the AIF and Australian war plans for 1939. we had originally planned to send just one of the AIF divisions to the Middle East, and one squadron. By various requests and promises made by the british, we ended up sending 3 divisions, plus a corp HQ, and 5 RAAF squadrons. We basically scrapped our plans to raise an expansion for the RAAF, and submitted to the EATS scheme instead. Whilst EATS had huge benefits for the RAF, it had very little benefit for the RAAF until after 1942. And the behaviour of the british with regard to setting up a local aircraft industry in Australia is not a good look for the British Government. It looks very litle like a sound defence planning decision, and very much like protecting what thyey perceived as their turf war. 

If Australia had dug its heels in and only sent one div, and initially only one air force squadron, instead of the indian III Corps on Malaya (so badly trained as to be a liability) you would have had 3 Australian Divs fully trained and ready for battle. instead of the two RAAF squadrons (ill stand corrected on that number), you would have had 10 or 12, and equipped far better to boot. And this reinforcement would have occurred at very litle cost in the capability in the WEestern Desert, as the following reply will show.... 




> The Western Desert?



The Western Desert was a critical fron for Britiain, but the Western Desert is not the entire ME command. australian troops were used like the plaything of the british Government, with only a minority used in the western desert. 

6th Division was the first to arrive, in Septemeber 1940, whereupon it trained in the Delta until December. it then relieved the 4th Indian (which was sent to abysynnia) and played crucial roles in the conquest of Bardia and Tobruk. It was then withdrawn back to the Delta for rest and recovery before being sent to crete, where most of it was either captured or lost its equipment. It then returned to the Delta, to be painstakingly rebuilt for the next six month before being shipped back to Australia. Of the 17 months or so that it was in the ME, it spent 3 months on the main front.

7th division arrived in December 1940. it remained in the Delta, until March or April 1941. Some it was sent to Greece, where it escaped, less its equipment to crete, and then finally back to the Delta, where those element remained until shipping home in 1942. The majority of the division however, went to the Levant to fight the Vichy. On completion of that campaign, those elements of the Division returned to the delta, where they stayed, for the most part until their return to Australia. One Brigade of the 7th was used to relieve elements of the 9th in Tobruk some time in the latter part of 1941. but really, this division spent zero time in the western desert. thats 0 out 15 months deployment in the western desert.

9th Division arrived March 1941 and was immediately used to relieve 6th div. they deployed into Tobruk and played a pivotal role in saving the whole of the ME from German conquest, by delivering repeated stinging reverses on Rommel from the fortress. Rommel could neither take Tobruk nor could he ignore it. It finished up costing him the 1941 camapign. This was not a stalemate...Australians were winning these battles hands down, and, it was the main front of the theatre at that time. What was rupturing, was at the Egyptian frontier, where the british were making an absolute hash of it. 

9 Div shipped out of Tobruk in November, only after voracious calls for the withdrawal of these heroic tropps by their owners. The british high command resisted for as long as they could, and then made yet another cardinal mistake. instead of replacing the 9th with battle experienced troops, they repolaced them with an untried formation, which folded and surrendered fairly quickly. the 9th had been in the Western Desert for 9 of its 12 months in the TO. It was right to send this div to the ME.

So, of the 3 divs sent to the TO, only 1 was really ever used at any given moment in the crucial front. The others, for most of the time were frittered away on unimpoprtant but very dangerous sideshows....



> Rather than being "stalemated" which infers an inability to act, North Africa was a pendulum with the front line making huge moves during major offensives.



This is no more an accurate summation than FBs was. The main front was actually tobruk and not the Egyptian frontier. It was the linchpin that prevented the Delta from falling, and it remained fairly static, but not stalemated. in front of tobruk Rommel was dealt repeated defeats. 

Even what you may see as the main front was reletively static after June. There had of course been an offensive against the italians, then a counteroffensive by the Germans, then a stalemate as both sides moved virtually nowhere on that part of the front. Crusader and rommels reteat did not start until November, and then his counterattack not until April- June 1942.



> The point I was trying to make earlier was that no sensible theatre commander or central defence senior would recommend denuding the primary combat theatre (ie the Western Desert) of forces when there was a clear, and relatively new, threat in the form of the Afrika Korps.



I agree completely, but where this falls down is that the majority of Australian troops were not in that TO....they were being frittered away on pointless Churchillian adventurres in various sideshows of the command. There were long term benefits to these sideshows, but these troops should not have been there. it would have made far more sense to send III Indian Corps to the ME, and I aus corps (6, 7 and * Divs) to Malaya 



> Moving them to Malaya in 1941 just doesn't make sense and anyone who suggests otherwise has clearly donned the hindsight goggles - it was not clear the Japanese would attack Malaya in 1941 until very late in the year, and British leaders didn't expect the sort of "blitzkrieg" tactics that were so successfully implemented by the IJA.




well, thats precisely what the Australian High command wanted from the beginning, and they stuck to that position from 1939 until 1942. What swayed them away from the position were the empty british promises....that Malaya would be addequately defended, that in the event of a japanese attack they would drop everything and deploy a balanced fleet to Singapore, and that they would allow investment to occur for the setting up of a local Australian aero industry. none of these promises were kept. And britiain knew that an attack was imminent....not in a specific sense, but definately in a strategic sense 



> Moving troops from Africa to Malaya when there wasn't a direct threat to the latter was a non-starter during 1941 and everyone expected the Japanese to take their time attacking through Thailand and hence affording opportunities to reinforce Singapore and Malaya. Sadly such optimism was misplaced


.

The same can be said about the middle east. moving troops raised for the purpose of defending malaya, to a theatre under no direct threat (in 1940 there were no germans in the ME. moreover, for most of their deployments most of these troops were never in the main TO - the western desert). It wasnt sad, it was criminal to be honest and there is virtually no mitigation for the gigantic errors made by the british in this whole affair


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## buffnut453 (May 11, 2012)

Hi Parsifal,

The new thread's up on why Singapore was lost. Perhaps you could copy this post and insert it into that thread?

Cheers,
B-N


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