# What if? East Vs West 1945



## Ascent (Sep 25, 2012)

Don't know if this has been asked before but here we go.

It's June/July 1945 and after the Germans are defeated tensions rise between the western Allies and the Soviets. An incident sparks things off and all of a sudden there's another war started between east and west. How does the air battle go?

Is the western allies strategic bomber force still any use given that the Soviet production facilities are so far away? Do the Soviets have anything which could actually worry the bombers?

What about the Sturmoviks? Do they get a nasty suprise when they are clawed out of the sky? Or do they wreak havoc when the wetern allies can't counter them? Who gains air superiority?

Equipment is basically what was in service at the end of the war and anything which might reasonably be ready to enter service straight after.
What are your thoughts on these points and more?


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## ShVAK (Sep 25, 2012)

It would be an effective stalemate. 

The Allies would quickly acquire air superiority over the new European Front (East Germany to Moscow), the Soviets have nothing existing by mid-1945 that can effectively intercept the B-29 (_might _be possible with La-9/11, but that doesn't show up until late '46 and is questionable besides) short of fielding whatever technology available to the Luftwaffe that wasn't destroyed or otherwise inoperable which is a big long shot. American fighters and bombers are superior above 20K feet by a fairly wide margin and would remain unopposed. The VVS also has no night fighter force to speak of, and the Mosquito (later to be replaced by the Hornet/Sea Hornet) had no real competition. Night bombing, the same as daylight, would be largely unopposed.

Moscow would be bombed to hell no doubt along with most of western Russia, the Baltic states, etc., but Russia was not nearly as strapped for resources and manpower as Germany was even after throwing so much into the meat grinder that was the Eastern Front. On top of that most of the factories are deep enough within Soviet territory that it is likely that bases would have to be established within Japan and China to hit anything of import on the Asian Front--we backed the wrong horse in China, and according to your scenario V-J Day hasn't happened yet. This also makes full U.S. commitment to the European Front hard, as we were still ramping up for a possible major invasion of Japan. 

Meanwhile the VVS I suspect would stick to its most successful strategy--using whatever aircraft they had from forward airbases available to support the thrust of the Red Army in the West and that's where the Allies would run into problems. The Red Army was not the joke it was in '41 and whatever Allied advances made on the ground would quickly grind to a halt up against Soviet numerical and materiel superiority. The mistakes of Barbarossa on the Soviet side would not be repeated and Allied victory would ultimately boil down to some sort of miracle--or nuclear intervention. There's a reason why Churchill's plan was called "Operation Unthinkable."


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## tyrodtom (Sep 25, 2012)

Lend Lease supplied about 1/3rd of the Soviets explosives, and of the explosive the Russians produced themselves, 40% of the Toulene was supplied thru Lend Lease. 
The cutting off of just that one part of the supplies that had been coming from Lend Lease would have a big affect on Russia's ability to make war.


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## Vincenzo (Sep 26, 2012)

I don't think that allied fighter had the range to escort the B-29 to Moscow. Bombing western european Russia is useless was already destroyed.


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## RCAFson (Sep 26, 2012)

Imagine the Battle of Bulge but with the attacks being made all along the Allied front. The Red Army outnumbered the Western Allies by about 3-1 and most of the strongest partisan forces in Western Europe were loyal to the USSR. Personally, I think the Red Army would have destroyed the Allied Armies in very short order.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 26, 2012)

It had better be a short fight. Both Armies were at the end of long supply lines, It might take the Soviets a few months to run through any stockpiles but they cannot supply their own army at the rate they had been using ammo fuel if lend lease is cut off. The entire European transport network is a wreck, both east and west.Soviets were supporting the advance with Studebaker trucks. Soviets were running short of manpower but so was the British commonwealth. 

British and American artillery capability was also a generation ahead of what in had been in 1940-42.


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## drgondog (Sep 26, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> Imagine the Battle of Bulge but with the attacks being made all along the Allied front. The Red Army outnumbered the Western Allies by about 3-1 and most of the strongest partisan forces in Western Europe were loyal to the USSR. Personally, I think the Red Army would have destroyed the Allied Armies in very short order.



Not without control of the air - look to Korea when the Chinese had and even larger force advantage. The Soviet logistics chain is a mirror exact similarity the Germans faced pushing to Moscow. May 1945 to August 6 1945 is a short time.


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## RCAFson (Sep 26, 2012)

drgondog said:


> Not without control of the air - look to Korea when the Chinese had and even larger force advantage. The Soviet logistics chain is a mirror exact similarity the Germans faced pushing to Moscow. May 1945 to August 6 1945 is a short time.



Eh? The PRC's PLA pushed the UN Forces back considerably and there's no way that the PLA had anything like the combat efficiency and firepower of the Red Army in 1945. The Red Airforce in 1945 is not going to be lightly brushed aside. The simple arithmetic of the numbers involved make any such war a pretty grim scenario for the Western Allies.

Look at it this way; could the Western Allies have prevailed against the Eastern German Army in June 1944? Then look at what the Red Army did to the Eastern German forces in June-Aug 1944. The Western Allies would have been steamrollered just as the German Army was.


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## tyrodtom (Sep 26, 2012)

A large portion of the Red Army's aviation gas was supplied thru lend lease also. I'm sure someone on this site can come up with the figures.

So unless the Russians had some big stockpiles of gas, and explosives left over after they smashed Germany, they're going to run running short of fuel and munitions pretty quick.


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## stona (Sep 26, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> Imagine the Battle of Bulge but with the attacks being made all along the Allied front. The Red Army outnumbered the Western Allies by about 3-1 and most of the strongest partisan forces in Western Europe were loyal to the USSR. Personally, I think the Red Army would have destroyed the Allied Armies in very short order.



Hold out for a month and drop a couple of atom bombs on Moscow and Leningrad. That should be the end of that.

Steve


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## bobbysocks (Sep 26, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> Look at it this way; could the Western Allies have prevailed against the Eastern German Army in June 1944? Then look at what the Red Army did to the Eastern German forces in June-Aug 1944. The Western Allies would have been steamrollered just as the German Army was.



german did nto have a the stategic bombing capabilities like the western allies. they may have been able to press hard initially but like drgondog pointed out their suppliy lines are now at the mercy of long range HIGH ALTITDUDE bomber that could be stationed in eastern germany on former LW fields...far from the reached of vvs attacks. the russian army never faced a carpet bombing campaign from the germany. massive and concentrated bombing from altitudes that the vvs isnt used to fighting would very much have an equalizing effect on the strength. couple that with robbing them of supplies by bombing and destroying supply lines puts the red army in a world of hurt. within a few months you also have the big game changer the A-bomb. and withthe capitulation of japan the western allies have bases and the long range capability to bomb the eastern and central regions of russia. i dont think its as cut and dry an answer as some would believe. the hardest part would be getting the us public to buy into a ww2 part 2.....

and what would have happened had we give patton the gas instead of the russians??...that slowed the western advance down quite a bit.


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## RCAFson (Sep 26, 2012)

stona said:


> Hold out for a month and drop a couple of atom bombs on Moscow and Leningrad. That should be the end of that.
> 
> Steve



The atomic bomb was dropped on two defenceless cities in August 1945 (the IJA AA never fired a shot - look it up) and no interception missions were flown either. Against the USSR the B-29 must fight through a determined AA defence network and a potent interceptor force. The Allied would probably not use atomic weapons until they had a large stockpile simply because there would have been a high probability that one or both bombs would not make it to the target. In any event Stalin knew all about the bomb and it's tactical limitations and the USSR would probably have moved their governing institutions to secure locations. Use of atomic weapons would probably drive the Red Army into a frenzy and fill it with " a terrible resolve" but two atomic weapons drops in would not alter the basic fundamentals of the war on the ground, nor appreciably alter Soviet industrial output.

I don't quite understand the unwillingness to admit that the Red Army that crushed the Wehrmacht had a lot more combat potential than the Western Allies, in the Summer of 1945 - just add up the numbers. The Allies had it all over the USSR in industrial potential but that doesn't change the fact that the average GI or Tommy in Eisenhower's AGs is outnumbered 3 to 1 or more by a very tough, well trained, determined, and thus highly potent, Red Army equipped with a very modern set of weapons.


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## RCAFson (Sep 26, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> A large portion of the Red Army's aviation gas was supplied thru lend lease also. I'm sure someone on this site can come up with the figures.
> 
> So unless the Russians had some big stockpiles of gas, and explosives left over after they smashed Germany, they're going to run running short of fuel and munitions pretty quick.



If the war lasts six months that might be an issue, but in about 6 weeks the Allied Armies would be well and truly shredded and most likely trying to escape off the continent. Allied Forces might be able to retain a toehold in Italy.


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## bobbysocks (Sep 26, 2012)

i am willing to admit that the russian army devistated the wm. my problem has always been the contention that they either really did it alone or didnt need the western allies to be as successful. as for if one a bomb would have made a difference....what if hitler had one at kursk and could have wiped out the soviet armor prior to them attacking? or dropped it on stalingrad at the beginning and not got bogged down in that mire....1 or 2 bombs ( with the capability to make a lot more ) does count for something.


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## RCAFson (Sep 26, 2012)

bobbysocks said:


> . as for if one a bomb woudl have made a difference....what if hitler had one at kursk and could have wiped out the soviet armor prior to them attacking? or dropped it on stalingrad at the beginning and not got bogged down in that mire....1 or 2 bombs ( with the capability to make a lot more ) does cout for something.



How would Hitler do that? 

How do you ensure that your multi-billion dollar bomb doesn't get shot down by a fighter or a $50 AA shell or horror of horrors drops it on some Pz division by mistake? The AA bomb was a very poor tactical weapon

At Hiroshima the closest survivors were only a hundred yards or so from ground zero. If Hiroshima had issued an air raid warning the casualty rate would have been a fraction of what it was. To knock out a tank, you would almost need a direct hit.


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## Jabberwocky (Sep 26, 2012)

Look up 'Operation Unthinkable', which is a UK planning document on the possibility of resuming hostilities against "Russia", worked up at Churchill's request between May and July 1945.

Their conclusions are that the Russians had a 4.1:1 superiority in manpower, 2:1 in tanks, 2:1 in 'tactical' aircraft, but a 1:2.9 deficiency in 'strategic' aircraft.

It was concluded that against such forces, it would be impossible to win a quick victory, even a limited one, and that the Western Allies (and Poland) would be committed to a “protracted war against heavy odds”. An operational attack was deemed "hazardous" - a masterful British understatement if ever their was one.


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## Jabberwocky (Sep 26, 2012)

On to a theoretical, conventional air war

The May 1945 planning document gives the following air force strength break-downs:

Tactical
Western Allies (+Poland): 6048
Russia: 11802

Strategic:
Allies: 2750
Russia: 960

Total Russian frontline strength, including naval air force and defence forces, was considered to be 16500 aircraft. 

The planners were working without knowledge of atomic weapons. 

They assume that the Russian numerical superiority would be off-set by the “vastly superior handling and efficiency of the Allies Air Forces, especially Strategic Air Forces”. However, they were worried that a lack of replacement aircraft and aircrew would “seriously impair” air strength.

Russian air force morale was considered “high”, but “not nearly as well trained or disciplined” as Western Allied air forces. Pilots were “always reasonably competent, sometimes brilliant” and experienced in short range support for ground operations. 

It was considered that the Western Allies had a technically superior but numerically inferior tactical air force. 

The planning document warns that the Western Allies superiority in strategic aircraft would “be to some extent discounted by the absence of strategic targets compared with those which existed in Germany” and the necessity of using strategic air forces to supplement tactical strength in support of land operations.


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## davebender (Sep 26, 2012)

What makes you say that?

This is the scenerio WWII Germany hoped for. The German Government and armed forces would cooperate. So would Italy, Hungary, Poland, Finland, Croatia, Spain, Slovakia, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, several ethnic groups in the Caucasus etc. The U.S. Army main supply hub would be ports such as Hamburg and they would have full use of the excellent German rail system.


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## RCAFson (Sep 26, 2012)

davebender said:


> What makes you say that?
> 
> This is the scenerio WWII Germany hoped for. The German Government and armed forces would cooperate. So would Italy, Hungary, Poland, Finland, Croatia, Spain, Slovakia, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, several ethnic groups in the Caucasus etc. The U.S. Army main supply hub would be ports such as Hamburg and they would have full use of the excellent German rail system.



Italy and many of the countries you mention had powerful communist controlled partisan armies. The Red Army (and NKVD) had already crushed any and all effective resistance that Hungary, Poland, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia could muster. Somehow, I doubt that Stalin laid awake at night worrying about the Spanish Army...

The German rail network had been degraded by years of Allied bombing...but I guess you mean that Allied bombing was ineffective?

Hamburg was a wasteland in May 1945.


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## bobbysocks (Sep 26, 2012)

do these numbers include any LW ac that would still be operational and serviceable? is there any documentation of how many lw ac there were still flyable at the end of the war?


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## bobbysocks (Sep 26, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> Italy and many of the countries you mention had powerful communist controlled partisan armies. The Red Army (and NKVD) had already crushed any and all effective resistance that Hungary, Poland, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia could muster. .....



that is true. communism was spreading to eastern europe long before the war began and somethign that caused tension between countries. and the russians didnt necessarily crush the non-communist opposition in those countries but let germany do it for them when they failed to give aid and support. the polish resistance was holding its own agaisnt german forces but needed help. they asked the advancing soviet troops for support...the soviets chose to stop for a few days and regroup instead and the polish got crushed. when the us was flying shuttle missions to russia stalin got pissed that on one mission the us dropped supplies to pro west guerillas...
but for as many that were fighting how many werent that could have? without major backing a lot of those would have waited for a better climate or better odds to take action.


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## davebender (Sep 26, 2012)

Is this a spur of the moment decision or is there some national planning involved? 

If the USA intends to switch sides there should be discussions with the German Government (or coup plotters) several months before it happens. Part of that planning should include keeping Hamburg and the German rail network intact for U.S. Army use. The USA should also provide Lend-Lease economic assistance to restart German munitions production just as we did for the Soviet Union during 1941 to 1945. In fact we should re-equip European forces to the maximum extent possible so they can do most of the fighting and suffer most of the casualties.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 26, 2012)

davebender said:


> Is this a spur of the moment decision or is there some national planning involved?



Did you read the first post?

"*It's June/July 1945 *"


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## Jabberwocky (Sep 26, 2012)

bobbysocks said:


> do these numbers include any LW ac that would still be operational and serviceable?


 
No, the planning documentation does not include much in the way of German involvement in such as struggle. In fact, around 10 infantry and 1 armoured division are assumed to have been necessary for rear area security in Germany. That's about 1/6th of total deployable combat strength for the Western Allies.



> is there any documentation of how many lw ac there were still flyable at the end of the war?



No documentation that I know of, but the bulk of German aircraft were scrapped fairly rapidly at the end of the war. Many of these were non-servicable, either because the production system had broken down and they didn't have all the parts they needed, or they had been damaged in action and were awaiting repair, or they had just broken down from normal wear and tear. 

Luftwaffe serviceability rates plummeted over late 1944, early 1945. This was at the same time as fighter deliveries were peaking, to the point where it was easier to simply easier to requisition new aircraft than repair older ones, which were then left out as targets for marauding fighters. The USAAF and RAF claimed thousands of aircraft on the ground in the last few months of the war (More than 4400 by the USAAF in 1945, 3700 in April alone). 

The Luftwaffe also did much of the job themselves, typically rendering aircraft totally unservicable if they couldn't fly them out ahead of the advancing Soviets/Western Allies. They also had a tendency to booby-trap aircraft, hiding bombs in the fuselage or under the aircraft, primed to go off when moved.

The RAF had special units that followed combat units and recovered advanced aircraft (jets/rockets and piston powered aircraft) but pretty much scrapped everything else on site. There are pictures around of dozens of aircraft being bulldozered into shallow graves, or into huge pyramids of scrap metal for recycling. The USAAF had something similar in place - scrapping U/S aircraft and sending a few dozen back to the US for testing.


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## bobbysocks (Sep 26, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> How would Hitler do that?
> 
> How do you ensure that your multi-billion dollar bomb doesn't get shot down by a fighter or a $50 AA shell or horror of horrors drops it on some Pz division by mistake? The AA bomb was a very poor tactical weapon



strap it to fieseler storch flown by a 15 year old punk kid and he's guaranteed success!  . there isnt a defense that cant be beaten or that doesnt have a serious gap that can be exploited. in 1987 with all the high tech radar, awac capablilties, early warning detection systems and the millions of eyes on the ground....how the hell did a 15 year old kid fly from helsinki into russian airspace and circle red square? i believe with the right plan anything can be accomplished....

The Notorious Flight of Mathias Rust | History of Flight | Air Space Magazine


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## Jabberwocky (Sep 26, 2012)

One of the most interesting conclusions drawn from the planning document is that there were few strategic targets worthy of prosecution in Russia, given the dispersal of Russia’s manufacturing base. Russian “lines of communication” (i.e. logistical targets) were considered more profitable to attack.

Combined with the 4:1 manpower inferiority on the ground and the 2:1 inferiority in tactical aircraft, it was assumed that the strategic air forces would therefore be pressed into direct service in support of ground operations. Noted is that this would be “especially at the important crossings of water barriers” in coordination with ground attacks of any Western Allied offensive. 

To do this, bases would be needed to be developed in Northwest Europe, as the range from the UK was too great to allow the aircraft to support operations. However, the “elaborate” support/ground organisation of heavy bomber forces meant that it would take “some months” before such a move could be made. 

Use of staging airfields was considered as a means to allow some attacks to proceed against lines of communication, but noted that it would reduce the loads carried and effectiveness.

This means that if the balloon went up in July 1945, it would be months before heavy bomber support became properly available a la the operations to support the Normandy campaign, or to fully prosecute operations against Russian supply lines. Until this support is available, the Western Allies are going to face heavy going on the ground and in the air.


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## bobbysocks (Sep 27, 2012)

that is what was what i proposed as a likely scenario. the attack and disruption of supply lines to impede the flow of arms, food, medicine etc. to the front coupled with the diversion of lend lease products away from the soviet union and to the newly acquired eastern allies. Also the use of any pacific base to now attack mainland russia ( Vladivostok, etc)...i.e. the alaskan islands and any other land mass acceptable for B29 operations. i also proposed the use of former LW bases in western germany which while bombed were never put out of commission, hence somewhat available with acceptable repairs. within a few weeks after the cessation of hostilities in europe allied troops took off from the UK, landed at airdromes like nuebiburg, patterborn, munich etc. and iirc were operational within a short period of time. at that point under the "actual" circumstances there was no great urgency to occupy those fields. all hostilities had ceased and all threats were nullified. the notion of further conflict that would have changed that strategy. there would have been an emphasis to occupy and bring those airdromes into a state of readiness so operations could be mounted from them. as the western allies moved west any acceptable farm land would have been converted into new airfields and those would have could be constructed very quickly as the were after the invasion. look at how many operational bases we had between D-day ( june 44) and the first of 45 ( a mere 6 months). there were enough allied aircraft in mainland europe to tempt germany into launching bodenplatte. 1000 plane raids would be shifted, at least at the onset of the continuation, from the strategic to the tactical. high altitude mass carpet bombing would have commenced along the front as it was done during D-day. the time line given was june/july 45. the us ( FDR and highest level generals ) knew it nuke capability that was deploy able very soon. stalin knew most of what he did because FDR was way to generous in regards to keeping joe happy. under this scenario that intel would have dried up slowly and steadily. he may have had an inkling of what was going on but would have been more in the dark. so it would have been imperative for the western allies would to need keep the SU army off balance until the first possible first deployment of an A bomb ( 3 months) ...as the allies already had japan backed up to its mainland, the initiative was with them in the pacific. the question now was "who was the bigger threat" at that point? plus, what would japan's reaction be after viewing the results after seeing see the use of the A-bomb in europe by the allies coupled with the threat "this could be you?" hirohito, proved to be more rational and considerate to his people than both hitler and stalin in the final decision. "operation unthinkable" gives a good grounding for what would happen in a "conventional" war, however, the "nuclear" aspect puts a different spin on the whole thing. the crux is the ability of the US to produce enough A/H bombs. I am interested to see what parasifl has to say about this....as i am sure they have run this scenario where he is. forgive the typos, tense changes, and errors its to late to proofread....


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## stona (Sep 27, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> The AA bomb was a very poor tactical weapon.



It wasn't used by the US as a tactical weapon in 1945 and I'm not suggesting that it would be used that way against the Soviet Union. 
By late 1945,with the will to build them,the US could have dropped 7-10 Nagasaki type (Mk III) weapons.There were at least 5 and probably 7 assemblies,without Plutonium,built in 1945.
As far as the Soviets knew,unless some of their Cambridge friends told them otherwise,they might have the same again. Do you really believe that this wouldn't have influenced Soviet decision making?
Steve


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## Jabberwocky (Sep 27, 2012)

Bobbysocks, I feel your time frame for basing heavy bombers in Germany is a little too generous. It is an order of magnitude more difficult getting facilities ready for a 65000 lb bomber than it is for a 15000 lb fighter.

I'd say six to eight weeks is a realistic timeframe to repair, rebuild and improve existing facilities for heavy bombers.


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## davparlr (Sep 27, 2012)

Ascent said:


> Is the western allies strategic bomber force still any use given that the Soviet production facilities are so far away? Do the Soviets have anything which could actually worry the bombers?


Above 20k I do not think they were in their element.



> What about the Sturmoviks? Do they get a nasty suprise when they are clawed out of the sky? Or do they wreak havoc when the wetern allies can't counter them? Who gains air superiority?


 American fighters with their 50s may be a bit under gunned (except maybe the P-47) (This would not be a problem for the Brits), but I suspect that the Sturmoviks would be swatted out of the skies just like the Germans did. Huge quantities of fast moving high altitude aircraft booming and zooming could cause havoc with attacking formations.



> Equipment is basically what was in service at the end of the war and anything which might reasonably be ready to enter service straight after.


 Some American aircraft that I would say could be ready would be the P-80 and P-82 (if pressed). Other aircraft which were already in service but not really engaged heavily but would make an impact would be the F8F, P-51H, P-47M, and P-47N. The Brits also had some super performing aircraft at the end of the war, maybe even the quite capable Vampire. If there was a real threat known earlier even more aircraft could be pressed forward including the powerful XP-72.

The Soviet fighter aircraft tended to be very light and small similar to the Bf-109, which means they were primarily point defense fighters. They tended to designed for lower level combat, highly maneuverable, but ceding altitude, and energy, to the Western allies. Except possibly for a few cases, the P-51D was faster, even at low levels and, if flown like the Navy flew against the Japanese, i.e. keep your speed up and don’t dogfight, I think it would still be quite effective. The P-51H, with over 400 mph SL speed and 470 mph top speed at 25k (with racks), and initial climb rate of 5000 f/min, would be difficult to deal with by any Soviet aircraft at any altitude.




shVAK said:


> Moscow would be bombed to hell no doubt along with most of western Russia, the Baltic states, etc., but Russia was not nearly as strapped for resources and manpower as Germany was even after throwing so much into the meat grinder that was the Eastern Front. On top of that most of the factories are deep enough within Soviet territory that it is likely that bases would have to be established within Japan and China to hit anything of import on the Asian Front--we backed the wrong horse in China, and according to your scenario V-J Day hasn't happened yet.


I think the strategy would be something the Soviets had not seen yet, intensive deep interdiction of bridges, crossroads, marshaling yards, etc. from FEBA(forward edge of the battle area) to 500 to 1000 miles deep.


> This also makes full U.S. commitment to the European Front hard, as we were still ramping up for a possible major invasion of Japan.


War with the Soviets was a major deal and would require a replanning. I would do what MacArthur did in the Pacific, isolate and bypass. Let the half the Navy continue to blockade and starve out Japan and its forces in Indochina and Burma. This would free up a million(?) hardened soldiers and marines for combat with the Soviets and maybe provide a mobile strike force to start a second front, or sent to the eastern front.



Vincenzo said:


> I don't think that allied fighter had the range to escort the B-29 to Moscow. Bombing western european Russia is useless was already destroyed.


I think both the P-47N and P-82 has over 1000 mile combat radius, which would allow them to provide escort to Moscow from, say Sweden.



> Imagine the Battle of Bulge but with the attacks being made all along the Allied front. The Red Army outnumbered the Western Allies by about 3-1 and most of the strongest partisan forces in Western Europe were loyal to the USSR. Personally, I think the Red Army would have destroyed the Allied Armies in very short order.


The Battle of the Bulge showed a weakness in the Allied line. It most likely would not have worked at any other location.
I don’t see a rapid defeat of Allies by the Soviets. It took them four months to enter Germany and get to Berlin against a massively over-powered enemy with no airpower. With huge resources the allies would not be easier . Without Allied support and with interdiction, I suspect the Soviets would quickly run out of materiel.

Also, there were probably quite a few Luftwaffe pilots running around that would like nothing better than to get into a P-51 and attack the Russians violently.


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## Vincenzo (Sep 27, 2012)

davparlr said:


> I think both the P-47N and P-82 has over 1000 mile combat radius, which would allow them to provide escort to Moscow from, say Sweden.



I supposed that Sweden stay neutral


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## Balljoint (Sep 27, 2012)

bobbysocks said:


> that is what was what i proposed as a likely scenario. the attack and disruption of supply lines to impede the flow of arms, food, medicine etc. to the front coupled with the diversion of lend lease products away from the soviet union and to the newly acquired eastern allies. Also the use of any pacific base to now attack mainland russia ( Vladivostok, etc)...i.e. the alaskan islands and any other land mass acceptable for B29 operations. i also proposed the use of former LW bases in western germany which while bombed were never put out of commission, hence somewhat available with acceptable repairs. within a few weeks after the cessation of hostilities in europe allied troops took off from the UK, landed at airdromes like nuebiburg, patterborn, munich etc. and iirc were operational within a short period of time. at that point under the "actual" circumstances there was no great urgency to occupy those fields. all hostilities had ceased and all threats were nullified. the notion of further conflict that would have changed that strategy. there would have been an emphasis to occupy and bring those airdromes into a state of readiness so operations could be mounted from them. as the western allies moved west any acceptable farm land would have been converted into new airfields and those would have could be constructed very quickly as the were after the invasion. look at how many operational bases we had between D-day ( june 44) and the first of 45 ( a mere 6 months). there were enough allied aircraft in mainland europe to tempt germany into launching bodenplatte. 1000 plane raids would be shifted, at least at the onset of the continuation, from the strategic to the tactical. high altitude mass carpet bombing would have commenced along the front as it was done during D-day. the time line given was june/july 45. the us ( FDR and highest level generals ) knew it nuke capability that was deploy able very soon. stalin knew most of what he did because FDR was way to generous in regards to keeping joe happy. under this scenario that intel would have dried up slowly and steadily. he may have had an inkling of what was going on but would have been more in the dark. so it would have been imperative for the western allies would to need keep the SU army off balance until the first possible first deployment of an A bomb ( 3 months) ...as the allies already had japan backed up to its mainland, the initiative was with them in the pacific. the question now was "who was the bigger threat" at that point? plus, what would japan's reaction be after viewing the results after seeing see the use of the A-bomb in europe by the allies coupled with the threat "this could be you?" hirohito, proved to be more rational and considerate to his people than both hitler and stalin in the final decision. "operation unthinkable" gives a good grounding for what would happen in a "conventional" war, however, the "nuclear" aspect puts a different spin on the whole thing. the crux is the ability of the US to produce enough A/H bombs. I am interested to see what parasifl has to say about this....as i am sure they have run this scenario where he is. forgive the typos, tense changes, and errors its to late to proofread....



This is also pretty much my thoughts, particularly the second front. The imponderable would be the hearts and minds campaign. Stalin had a strong cadre of talented, well trained operatives as well as fifth columns throughout Europe and Asia. Churchill would be ready to go but would England have the stomach for it after all it suffered –a question in view of Churchill’s political fate not long after. But it would be much easier for the Allies to recruit than it was for Hitler, and even his troops were often initially welcomed. 

Japan could be isolated under a containment siege, or more likely would agree to a conditional surrender generally on the terms Macarthur instituted. Effort would have to be diverted to China to defeat the Red Army since the conflict would pretty much be a hot war along the lines of the cold war. There are many imponderables along these lines.

As to the first few months the first order of business would be to rein in Patton and establish a series of disciplined retreats to burn through the Soviet supplies and stretch their supply lines. The Soviet tanks would be vastly superior in both quality and quantity, as was their artillery at least in quantity. And, thanks to the US, their army would be motorized. Allied superiority in the air would need to be shifted from strategic to tactical to offset the Soviet advantages and start on attrition with particular attention to trucks. The idea being to revert the Red Army back to horse transport. Heavy bombers would be used, as at St Lo, in a tactical role to carpet bomb any concentrations, which is what the Soviets did with their tanks, artillery and troops when attacking. In the short term this, should bleed and exhaust the red ground force which was overwhelming but extended when overrunning Berlin. Thereafter, with a second Pacific front, it would be air power dismantling the transportation capability of the Soviets. While their factories are remote, this makes their supply lines even longer than Napoleon’s and Hitler’s. The Soviet’s demonstrated unstoppable sweep to and into Germany was against a severely depleted resistance.

If time could be bought –and it most likely could, the US productive might would have stood a good chance of being the deciding factor.


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## RCAFson (Sep 27, 2012)

Balljoint said:


> The Soviet’s demonstrated unstoppable sweep to and into Germany was against a severely depleted resistance.
> 
> If time could be bought –and it most likely could, the US productive might would have stood a good chance of being the deciding factor.



That severely depleted resistance was still far stronger than the German forces in the West, and it took the Allies 10 months to advance to central Germany despite fighting a small fraction of the German Army, even though the Allies had undisputed command of the air.


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## Jenisch (Sep 27, 2012)

I would like to know how the Russians would make large advances when their supply lines are under heavy air attack. The Germans showed that very well to them in 1941. The Allies also could have hit the Russian oil in the Caucasus, which they feared a lot.


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## davebender (Sep 27, 2012)

That doesn't answer my question.

Is this operation planned by the U.S. Government or a spur of the moment decision by Gen. Patton in violation of his orders?


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## Jenisch (Sep 27, 2012)

RACFson, I don't know where you are with your head, but any Russian advance would have a botteneck of be supplied by rail, which would be certainly targeted by the Allied strategic bombing. So, the "stemroller" is really rolling? ;P

I also would expect a deal with the Allies and Japan. Ironically, the planners from Unthinkable thought the opposite, that the Soviets would ally themselfs with Japan. But particularly, I can see more a negociated peace between Japan and the Allies (maybe behind closed doors) if the Russians started to bring worry, which would free a significant Allied strenght against the Russians. Europe was much important for the Allies, and they would not measure efforts to save it. In the way your posts are, looks like the Allies and the Germans are a bunch of incompetents, while the Soviets can destroy everything without being stopped. I don't think the things would be necessarily in that way.


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## RCAFson (Sep 27, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> RACFson, I don't know where you are with your head, but any Russian advance would have a botteneck of be supplied by rail, which would be certainly targeted by the Allied strategic bombing. So, the "stemroller" is really rolling? ;P
> 
> I also would expect a deal with the Allies and Japan. Ironically, the planners from Unthinkable thought the opposite, that the Soviets would ally themselfs with Japan. But particularly, I can see more a negociated peace between Japan and the Allies if the Russians started to bring worry, which would free a significant Allied strenght against the Russians. Europe was much important for the Allies, and they would not measure efforts to save it. In the way your posts are, looks like the Allies and the Germans are a bunch of incompetents, while the Soviets can destroy everything without being stopped. I don't think the things would be necessarily in that way.



The Red Army defeated a much stronger German Army than that faced by the Western Allies. You have to be dreaming in technicolour to think that ~90 Allied Divisions are a match for the Red Army that overran central Europe in 1945.

What might or might not happen in a long war is open to debate, but the Red Army in mid 1945 would have quickly overrun and cut to pieces the Allied Armies, simply because of the huge disparity in numbers. Heck, look at what the Red Army did to the IJA in August 1945. The Red Army was at the top of it's game and Eisenhower simply didn't have enough boots on the ground to stand a chance.



> German forces
> Facing the Allies was Army Command West commanded by Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, who had taken over from Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt on 10 March. Although Kesselring brought with him from the Italian Campaign an outstanding track record as a defensive strategist, he did not have the resources to make a coherent defense. During the fighting west of the Rhine up to March 1945, *the German Army on the western front had been reduced to a strength of only 26 divisions *organized into three army groups (H, B and G). Little or no reinforcement was forthcoming as the German High Command continued to concentrate most forces against the Russians (*It was estimated that in April the Germans had 214 divisions on the eastern front*).[7]
> Western Allied invasion of Germany - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## Jenisch (Sep 27, 2012)

Yes, the Germans had more divisions in the East, and the quality of them? The LW was a factor? Prove the Russians would overcome the Allied armies and Air Forces. The Heer and the LW smashed much more divisions than they lost in 1941, so what's the point?


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## RCAFson (Sep 27, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> Ah, I know your type...
> 
> Yes, the Germans had more divisions in the East, and the quality of them? The LW was a factor? Prove they would overcome the Allied armies and Air Forces.



My type? You mean someone who can count? 

The Germans were trying desperately to stop the Red Army and they had their best and strongest forces arrayed against them, including what was left of the Luftwaffe. The burden of proof is upon you to demonstrate how the Allied Armies could overcome such a crushing numerical inferiority.

Recall again Jabberwocky's post (number 16 in this thread):


> Look up 'Operation Unthinkable', which is a UK planning document on the possibility of resuming hostilities against "Russia", worked up at Churchill's request between May and July 1945.
> 
> Their conclusions are that the Russians had a *4.1:1 superiority in manpower, 2:1 in tanks*, *2:1 in 'tactical' aircraft*, but a 1:2.9 deficiency in 'strategic' aircraft.
> 
> It was concluded that against such forces, it would be impossible to win a quick victory, even a limited one, and that the Western Allies (and Poland) would be committed to a “protracted war against heavy odds”. An operational attack was deemed "hazardous" - a masterful British understatement if ever their was one.



It is a complete fantasy to think that Eisenhower could overcome such a disparity in numbers.


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## Jenisch (Sep 27, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> The Germans were trying desperately to stop the Red Army and they had their best and strongest forces arrayed against them, including what was left of the Luftwaffe.



Ah, yes, now comes the sensasionalism that the Soviets consumed almost everything from the Germans. The Germans had most of their LAND forces against the Russians, but even in that regard I wouldn't underestimate what was left behind, like the 800,000 men in Norway and the Balkans, not to mention the troops in France - all was for the Western Allies. Also, the LW was shot out of the sky in Tunisia, Sicilly, Italy, France, and eventually Germany. There was not such a thing of the Russians also "destroying" the LW. Also, it was thanks to the Western Allies that the LW did not have fuel. Plus, it was because the Western Allies that the Germans couldn't have all they wanted industrially, and that was caused by the Allied naval blockade of Europe and the bombing. It's incredible that you ignore all those factors when comparing the Soviet victories against the Germans, putting the Western Allies in the position of the latter for comparitive purposes for this scenario, which doesn't have sense. In short: Germany couldn't put full potential against the Russians, while the Western Allies could.



> The burden of proof is upon you to demonstrate how the Allied Armies could overcome such a crushing numerical inferiority.



It's up to you, you that are claiming the Russians would overcome the Allied ground and Air Forces. Prove the Russians would not allow their lines of trucks being straffed by Allied fighter-bombers, prove they would not have their railway system attacked by strategic bombers, prove they would not enter in attrition with the USAAF and the RAF, prove they could overcome the Anglo-American air power, prove they would be able to advance in the ground when the enemy controls the skies.

My opinion about this scenario is that the Allies would unlikely advance to Russia, but I also doubt the Russians would dominate the scene like you say.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 27, 2012)

Then again, you may want to take a bit closer look at the numbers: what were the Russian "tactical" aircraft? What where the Allied "tactical" aircraft? How may IL-2s equal one A-26? Or does 1 IL-2 equal a Typhoon? 
American and British artillery control and command were at least on generation if not two ahead of the Russian artillery command and control. Artillery tubes are easy to count. Shells per tube per day are a lot harder to figure. Flexibility of fire plans and forward observer control can multiply the effect of smaller numbers of artillery as long as there is enough ammo. The Germans at times were limited to around 30 shells per day per tube. That amount of ammo could be fired off in under 1/2 hour and a rather relaxed rate of fire. 

While the allies might not be able to win a "quick victory" the other side of the question is could the Russians win a "quick victory" as their long term supply situation was much more in question.


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## DonL (Sep 27, 2012)

@ RCAFson

I havent't read so much bollocks in a long time.

The whole Wehrmacht hadn't 214 Divisions the whole WWII!

The german Wehrmacht attacked the UDSSR with 160. Divisions at June 1941 and it is a fact from lost lists and countless historians that the East Heer (Wehrmacht) didn't reached this strenghts ever again. After the Winter Battles 1941 the Heeresgruppe Mitte was only the half strenght of the June 1941 and wasn't ever realy refreshed the whole war.

To the estimation of serious historians the fighting power of the Wehrmacht was divided 50 to 50 after Troop movements of the Wehrmacht at or near after operation overloard and before operation Bagration.

There were a little more Divisions at the East Front but the most elite Divisions (mot. Infantrie and PzDiv plus SS Div.) were at the Westfront.
The Westfront is France and Italy and also there were Troops of the Wehrmacht at Yugoslawia. 

Your picture of the "mighty" Red Army at 1944-1945 is to me realy absurd, because most of this strenghts comes from Land Lease and the weakness of the Wehrmacht but not from the Red Army itself and the economy of the UDSSR.
And this is only about the Army, the VVS is a whole other issue and much much weaker then the Red Army without Land Lease and against a strong enemy.

Edit: To add something important, the LW strenghts was someting to 80 % (west) to 20 %(east) since midd to end 1943.


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## RCAFson (Sep 27, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> Ah, yes, the old story that the Soviets consumed almost everything from the Germans. The Germans had a good part against of their LAND forces against the Russians, but I wouldn't underestimate what was left behind, like the 800,000 in Norway and in the Balkans - that was all for the Western Allies. Also, the LW was shot out of the sky in Tunisia, Sicilly, Italy, France, and eventually Germany. There was not such a thing of the Russians also "destroying" the LW.
> 
> 
> 
> ...



Tactical airpower was not nearly as efficient as you make it out to be. The Allies bombed and straffed the hell out of the French rail system and German mech transport and the Germans were still able to move forces around France, prior, during and after the invasion. In Normandy the Allies had complete and undisputed air superiority and it took several months to lever the German Army out it's positions around the beachhead. If the Western Allies had had to face the same forces that the Red Army had to face, they would never have made it onto the beaches, but if we suppose that they did they all the Allied airpower in the world would not have turned the tide in the West's favour. Look at Korea, airpower helped but it could not defeat a numerically superior army, except in the long term, and unlike Korea, the European Red Airforce is actually stronger in tactical airpower than the West.

If the Allied airforces couldn't defeat the (very) much weaker western German Army they sure as hell won't be able to beat the Red Army either. Airpower in WW2 helped but it was no substitute for boots on the ground.


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## Jenisch (Sep 27, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> Tactical airpower was not nearly as efficient as you make it out to be.



Perhaphs if you read the books of Christer Bergstrom about the Eastern Front you will change your mind.


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## RCAFson (Sep 27, 2012)

DonL said:


> @ RCAFson
> 
> I havent't read so much bollocks in a long time.
> 
> ...



Fine show me some numbers and sources for the same. 

Air defense of the Reich is not tactical airpower against ground forces.

Losses on the ground:



> According to Frank Biess,
> 
> German casualties took a sudden jump with the defeat of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad in January 1943, when 180,310 soldiers were killed in one month. Among the 5.3 million Wehrmacht casualties during the Second World War, more than 80 percent died during the last two years of the war. Approximately three-quarters of these losses occurred on the Eastern front (2.7 million) and during the final stages of the war between January and May 1945 (1.2 million).[9]
> Jeffrey Herf wrote that:
> ...


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## Jenisch (Sep 27, 2012)

DonL said:


> @ RCAFson
> 
> I havent't read so much bollocks in a long time.
> 
> ...



I was already aware of some of part of those informations, good to know them. I always belived the Russian contribution in the war is exaggerated. Now I have confirmation.


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## RCAFson (Sep 27, 2012)

DonL said:


> @ RCAFson
> 
> To the estimation of serious historians the fighting power of the Wehrmacht was divided 50 to 50 after Troop movements of the Wehrmacht at or near after operation overloard and before operation Bagration.
> 
> ...



Complete crap. There were 58 Nazi divisions in France and about 22 in Italy on July 1 1944 with about 1 million men in France (and about 400,000 in Italy) versus 3.37 million German and Axis troops on the Eastern front. Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, p283 and p304


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## RCAFson (Sep 27, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> I was already aware of some of part of those informations, good to know them. I always belived the Russian contribution in the war is exaggerated. Now I have confirmation.



Sigh. I always try to avoid discussing anything to do with the USSR, because the right wingnuts cannot have a rational discussion about anything to do with it. So without further ado, I bow out of this discussion.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 27, 2012)

Lets see...

You start a discussion, but only want to hear what you want to hear. People have a different opinion on the matter, which is not allowed. So, then you run off and pout like a kid whose parent would not buy them a new toy. 

Basically you want to state your opinion, and have everyone say how great it is.

Why even join a discussion group?


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## DonL (Sep 27, 2012)

> Fine show me some numbers and sources for the same.



And were is your source for 214 german Divisions at *1944* at the east front except wiki?

To give you an example.

The strenghts of the Heeresgruppe Mitte at 15. June 1944 was 32 Divisions.
Involved at Bagration were something of 38 Divisions, because the 2. german Army get involved.

3. Panzerarmee

IX. Armeekorps: 252. Infanterie-Division, Korpsabteilung D
LIII. Armeekorps: 246. Infanterie-Division, 206. Infanterie-Division, 4. Luftwaffen-Felddivision, 6. Luftwaffen-Felddivision
VI. Armeekorps: 197. Infanterie-Division, 299. Infanterie-Division, 256. Infanterie-Division, als Reserve 95. Infanterie-Division

4. Armee

XXVII. Armeekorps: 78. Infanterie-Division, 25. Panzergrenadier-Division, 260. Infanterie-Division, 14. Infanterie-Division (mot.)
XXXIX. Armeekorps: 110. Infanterie-Division, 337. Infanterie-Division, 12. Infanterie-Division, als Reserve: Panzergrenadier-Division Feldherrnhalle
XII. Armeekorps: 18. Panzergrenadier-Division, 267. Infanterie-Division, 57. Infanterie-Division

9. Armee

XXXV. Armeekorps: 134. Infanterie-Division, 45. Infanterie-Division, 296. Infanterie-Division, 6. Infanterie-Division, 383. Infanterie-Division,
XXXI. Panzerkorps: 36. Infanterie-Division (mot.), 35. Infanterie-Division, 129. Infanterie-Division
LV. Armeekorps: 292. Infanterie-Division, 102. Infanterie-Division[9]

With the mighty power of 5 mot. Inf. Divisions (Panz. Gren.D) and no single Panzer Division.
No Division of the whole Heeresgruppe Mitte had a nominal strenghts over 60% at this time and operation Bagration.
So in reality something about 20 Divisions!

Rolf Hinze: Der Zusammenbruch der Heeresgruppe Mitte im Osten 1944.

And I'm not here to make your homework, because you are claimimg that only a little fraction of the Wehrmacht was fighting at the West at June/ July 1944! Please show us some sources but please no Wiki bollocks!

Also most of the Wehrmacht Divisions which were fighting the West (except Italy) were at a nominal strenghts of 100%.

Edit:



> Complete crap. There were 58 Nazi divisions in France and about 22 in Italy on July 1 1944 with about 1 million men in France (and about 400,000 in Italy) versus 3.37 million German and Axis troops on the Eastern front. Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, p283 and p304



How many Ungarian, Romanian and Finish Troops?
How many Russian Hiwis?
How many german Sicherungsdivisions, which were hardly a real fighting Division?


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## Balljoint (Sep 27, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> Tactical airpower was not nearly as efficient as you make it out to be. The Allies bombed and straffed the hell out of the French rail system and German mech transport and the Germans were still able to move forces around France, prior, during and after the invasion. In Normandy the Allies had complete and undisputed air superiority and it took several months to lever the German Army out it's positions around the beachhead. If the Western Allies had had to face the same forces that the Red Army had to face, they would never have made it onto the beaches, but if we suppose that they did they all the Allied airpower in the world would not have turned the tide in the West's favour. Look at Korea, airpower helped but it could not defeat a numerically superior army, except in the long term, and unlike Korea, the European Red Airforce is actually stronger in tactical airpower than the West.
> If the Allied airforces couldn't defeat the (very) much weaker western German Army they sure as hell won't be able to beat the Red Army either. Airpower in WW2 helped but it was no substitute for boots on the ground.




This is not really accurate. The pre-invasion bombing did severely cramp German logistics as well as imposing substantial losses of both personnel and materials. After a cross channel invasion it was necessary to build logistic supply lines and gain/repair harbors. The going was slow through the difficult hedgerow country, but by the middle of August, and with the aid of heavy bombers in a tactical role, there was a breakout with the Falaise encirclement. Sixty thousand German troops were lost –many to air attack. Once the established German defenses were breached, the Allies rolled on to Paris and beyond.

Perhaps the Bulge fighting best illustrates the value of tactical air support in that due to weather there was none initially. But when the weather cleared and German logistics failed, the game was over.

When it became clear that Germany was defeated, Roosevelt and Truman supported Eisenhower in the decision to let the Soviets handle the meat grinder final push to Berlin. If Patton had his way, the US would have been doing this tough fighting rather than hanging out on the Elbe. He would have succeeded at least as well as the Soviets, helped immensely by the German actually fleeing to surrender to the Americans rather than the Soviets.

Finally, Korea is more a sacrificial exercise than a test of military might. Initially, the American forces were ineffective in that they had been disbanded after their WWII victory. Once somewhat ramped up, the North was beaten before China intervened. While the wherewithal was available to handle China, it wasn’t brought to bear for fear of a war like we’re discussing in theory.

It’s just not reliable to extrapolate from the specific to the general; particularly when the specific is driven by unique circumstances as discussed above.


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## Jenisch (Sep 27, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> Sigh. I always try to avoid discussing anything to do with the USSR, because the right wingnuts cannot have a rational discussion about anything to do with it. So without further ado, I bow out of this discussion.


 
If you are certain of your claims, then show us everything we want.


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## RCAFson (Sep 27, 2012)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Lets see...
> 
> You start a discussion, but only want to hear what you want to hear. People have a different opinion on the matter, which is not allowed. So, then you run off and pout like a kid whose parent would not buy them a new toy.
> 
> ...



I didn't start the discussion. The problem is that it's hard to discuss something rationally, when even the most basic facts about WW2, which I learned when I was in elementary school about 50 years ago, are now being disputed. It's sort of like trying to discuss spaceflight history with someone who believes that NASA faked the moon landings...there's just no future in it. 

I'm truly sorry if it seems like I'm running away after having my say.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 27, 2012)

Your right Ascent started it, my apologies.


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## The Basket (Sep 27, 2012)

One could argue why didn't Stalin invade?

Certainly not out of goodness of his heart. I wonder if it crossed his mind?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 27, 2012)

I dont think either side was really in a position to continue a lengthy war. Both sides were prenty spent.


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## Jabberwocky (Sep 27, 2012)

A whole lot of this scenario depends on who are the aggressors and what level of preparations are involved. A month or two of operational preparations, for either side, could mean the world of difference. 

On the Western Allies side, I believe they’d need six to eight weeks to get bomber bases properly operational in Germany. Otherwise, the heavy bombers simply don’t have the range to project power significantly past the Oder river line and the Allies have to rely on their heavily outnumbered tactical air forces.

There is a real difference between sending the heavy bombers in from the UK to bomb Normandy and sending them in from the UK to bomb enemy crossing points on the Elbe, or support bridging positions across the Havel or Oder.

With the bomber bases in place, the picture is quite different, but I still don’t think things are going to be remotely as easy for the Western Allies as some people here believe. 

On the Soviet side, if they’ve had a couple of months to prepare, one of the big dangers would be their use of operational manoeuvre groups held in reserve. With their mass of manpower and the much reduce frontage of N/W Europe compared to Russia/Poland they can afford to probe in strength and then exploit heavily with armour when a weakness is found.

For all the previous comparisons to Korea in terms of equipment/combat standards made in the thread, I really don’t see the two scenarios as comparable. The standards of the forces involved in Korea was much different to the end of WW2. 

Firstly, while the morale and training of Soviet ground forces may not have been as high as in the West, their tank, artillery, engineer and air force training standards were much higher than that of their general infantry. The main problem was their junior officer and senior non-commissioned officer infantry ranks were heavily depleted, with subsequent ‘on the ground’ leadership problems.

Secondly, the main tanks of the two forces – the T-34/85 and the M4A2/3 with 76 mm – were fairly well matched. While some argue that the M26 was coming into service and that would swing the balance, the Soviet’s had their entire menagerie of ‘animal tamers’ – the various ISU/JSU tank destroyers – as well the IS-2 and the T-44. 

There's an old joke from the Cold War. Two Soviet generals are watching the victory parade through Paris. One turns to the other and says "So, who won the air war?"


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## Milosh (Sep 27, 2012)

Where in Germany would these air bases be located?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 27, 2012)

There were many intact airbases left in Germany in 1945.

The Airbase I worked at was a former Luftwaffe field, and it was intact and operational in 1945. The US started using it in in May 1945. Erich was kind enough to show me pics with P-51s. Many of the buildings are still standing today.


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## Milosh (Sep 27, 2012)

double post


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 27, 2012)

Did you read my post? I hope you are not asking me to list all the air bases that were operational. There were plenty...


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## Milosh (Sep 27, 2012)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Did you read my post? I hope you are not asking me to list all the air bases that were operational. There were plenty...



I know there was plenty. A list of the major bases would be nice tho.

I was thinking that they would have to be far enough behind the front lines that Soviet ground forces would not be threat. That would eliminate many bases for the strategic bombers.


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## michaelmaltby (Sep 27, 2012)

"... Both sides were prenty spent."

When I read "August Storm" the definitive (Western) account of the Soviet invasion of Manchuria in August, 1945, I was stunned by the resources the Soviets had in "reserve" in the East -- many delivered by the USA directly from, Seattle. They didn't pull a lot of material from the west to use in the east - communications, engineering and medical mostly.

Now I grant that the operations we are discussing here are in the west, but I would venture that the USSR _was only hitting its stride _in terms of _conventional _warfare in May, 1945. By then, Stalin's methodology and Zhukov's tactics were tested and accepted. It was the west that really couldn't afford to test public opinion any longer -- one of the reasons why the Bomb was such a realistic option for President Truman.. 

MM


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## iron man (Sep 27, 2012)

Milosh said:


> I know there was plenty. A list of the major bases would be nice tho.
> 
> I was thinking that they would have to be far enough behind the front lines that Soviet ground forces would not be threat. That would *eliminate many bases *for the strategic bombers.


And these remaining candidates would have to be sufficiently engineered to carry the MTOW of these machines. A functional rail spur (tied to a functional rail system) to supply the _hundreds of tons_ of POL, defensive ammunition, bombloads, spares, etc... required for _each _Group sized mission would probably be a bonus as well. 
Or are we trucking this all in...while the reeling armies are screaming for requisition of everything on wheels in the theatre? 

This is a _complete non-starter_ if the Soviets come across the river. 

8th AF will be flying out of their same bases in GB, carrying "Berlin" sized bombloads.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 27, 2012)

With bases in Western Germany, Eastern France the bombers are in a much better position to contribute. Even used as staging fields. Bombers fly in with bombs already on board having taken off with partial fuel loads (many of these bombers could not land at or near full gross take-off weight), they are topped off and sent on the mission. They are refueled on the way back. Major maintenance and crew quarters are still in England. Certainly not ideal and requires lots of fuel to be transported but some missions could be mounted. 
The entire bomber airforces to not have to be moved at once. Even a few groups based in Europe can contribute.

I would also like to know what the Russian "strategic" aircraft were? IL-4s and TU-4s? There weren't enough PE-8s to do more than generate a few headlines in the papers. 

Another consideration for tactical airpower is the amount of low level Flak available. The Russians may be a little lacking in that area.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Sep 27, 2012)

Milosh said:


> I know there was plenty. A list of the major bases would be nice tho.
> 
> I was thinking that they would have to be far enough behind the front lines that Soviet ground forces would not be threat. That would eliminate many bases for the strategic bombers.



Oh sorry, I really don't have a list. I know for sure that Katterbach, Illesheim, Bad Kreuznach, Echterdingen and Boeblingen were operational, and I am pretty sure that there were plenty more. Those that were not operational, would could be made operational pretty quick. If we could build air bases on pacific islands in a very quick time, I am sure we can do so in Germany.

If the German bases were too close to the front lines, then there is always France.


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## Ascent (Sep 27, 2012)

I've started something here haven't I.

I was mainly interested in how the air war would go, what kind of differences in the equipment, training and operational theory were there.

How well equipped with AA were the western allies? The threat from the LW was relativley low I understand so a lot of equipment wasn't utilised fully.

Despite the numerical difference was the qualitive difference in the tactical airforces good enough for the western allies?

As for the heavy bombers, how about operating out of Italy?


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## Jenisch (Sep 27, 2012)

Certainty: Russians nuked. I suspect the B-36 would be rushed to nuke Moscow.


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## tyrodtom (Sep 28, 2012)

In the real world the B-36 didn't first fly till the middle of 46, if the could rush that by 6 months or so, it'd still take a miracle to get get it operational in less than 2 years, and that'd be far too late to help in this scenario.

So at best it'd be B-29s or B-50s, maybe some B-32s flying deep into Russia. And they wouldn't have to fly from Europe. Didn't we have some bases that could handle, or did handle B-29s in China and India.


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## Jabberwocky (Sep 28, 2012)

Ascent said:


> Despite the numerical difference was the qualitive difference in the tactical airforces good enough for the western allies?



This might be an unpopular opinion for this board, but I'd question if the Western Allies had any significant technical superiority in over the battlefield operations below 10,000 ft.

Their two main tactical fighter-bombers were never intended to do the jobs they eventually assumed. The Typhoon was a bomber interceptor that had been pressed into low-altitude operations thanks to its low-altitude rated engine and thick wing and the P-47 was originally be envisaged as a high-altitude fighter. 

The Spitfire IX/XIV, P-51 and P-47 were all set up for medium to high altitude combat - 15,000 feet plus. Only the Tempest V was expressly a low-altitude fighter, and by May-1945 there were only 120-140 operational. 

On the other hand, the Soviets had three fighters - the Yak-3, Yak-9/9U and the La-5/La-7 - which all had their best performance below 20,000 ft. They were smaller, lighter and more maneuverable than the majority of their more technically advanced Western counterparts. They also had scads of high performance P-39s and early P-63s. 

Their primary support aircraft were just that: dedicated, designed-from-the-spec-sheets attack aircraft. The IL-2 and IL-10 had no true western counterparts at this point in time. Even adding close to 700 lbs of armour to the Typhoon doesn't count. 

The rear edged of the battle area (say 50-100 km behind the front line) contest is also really interesting. On one hand you have superlative strike/attack aircraft like the A-26, B-25G, Mosquito and Beaufighter for the Western Allies, escorted by plentiful numbers of Spitfires and P-51s. This is going to make life very hard for rear echelon elements.

However, the Soviets also have their own excellent twin engine medium range attack aircraft - the Tu-2 and the Pe-2. Throw some Yak-9Ds in for escort out to 200-300 km and the Allies wouldn't have everything their own way.



> As for the heavy bombers, how about operating out of Italy?


 
There were about 625 heavy bombers in Italy, compared to about 2000-2100 in the UK.


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## GrauGeist (Sep 28, 2012)

What it boils down to, is that the Red army was able to push the Wehrmacht back to Berlin using brute force in manpower...not by thier airforce.

In the west, the Allies pushed the Wehrmacht back by a combination of land and air. This is where the Red army would be at a complete disadvantage against the Allies.

I'm seeing someone suggesting that the Red army would just wash over the Allied armies like a wave without even once considering the fact that the Allies had aircraft that would scour the earth where the Red army stood. It's true that the VVS possesed good aircraft that operated at low and medium altitudes, but so did the U.S. Britain. And with the experience that Britain gained from night bombing operations, plus escorted by night fighters such as the Mosquito and P-61, there would be no rest for the Red army being hammered by day with the U.S. and by night by Britain. It would make sense that the push against the Red army would be slow due to the war torn infrastructure, but the Allied push would be covered by extremely effective air cover. And a type of air cover that the Red army wouldn't have experience against. They were familiar with the Hs129, Stuka and Fw190 against thier positions and armor, but how would they deal with the P-47, A-20G, A-26B as well as the British counterparts? They would learn quickly what the Germans learned.

And when the Soviet fighters took to the air, the Allies would be able to engage on an equal footing, unlike the Luftwaffe, that was had been bled out both in experienced manpower and support for thier diminishing airforce.

Add to that, the ability of the Allies to deploy heavy bombers in large groups virtually unchallenged, during the day and at night, and it starts to look like the Red army wouldn't bo so invincable after all.

Also consider with the lend-lease supplies no longer going to Russia, you would see thier stockpiles dwindling and the much needed material now being diverted to the Allied effort.

With Germany down, this would also free up the Allied atlantic and Mediterranean fleets to challenge the Red navy.

I think that the confrontation between the Allies and Russia would be a hell of a slugfest, but the Allies would be able to push the Red army back into Soviet proper. At that point, I am willing to bet that Uncle Joe would perhaps come to the table to negotiate a peace, not only because he knows that the Allies would most like accept anything to stop fighting and finally end the war, but also by this point in time, Japan has been bombed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which will free up Allied forces to his rear and the potential of the atom bombs targeting him next will worry the hell out of him...


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## Jabberwocky (Sep 28, 2012)

Saying that the Red Army "pushed the Wehrmacht back to Berlin using brute force in manpower...not by thier airforce" does a massive disservice to both the strength and effectiveness of the Russian airforces.

The AFHRA study on the effectiveness of Russian airpower concludes that Soviet airpower was an "essential ingredient of the Soviet victory" and "contributed a decisive share in breaking German resistance". Over 1943-1945, Soviet bombers achieved "a commendable measure of success in operations supporting the army on the ground". Fighter, ground attack and bomber cooperation "produced good results".

To quote the study (USAF historical study 175) at length:



> Soviet air power served almost exclusively to provide direct or indirect support for the army on the ground and made a decisively important contribution to the final Soviet victory
> 
> The salient features of the Soviet air forces in this phase of the war [1944-1945] were their aggressive conduct of operations, their adherence to the principle of power concentration, and their retention of organizational and operational methods this had proved sound in the past.



What the study makes clear is that 
1) The Soviets never had full air supremacy, only superiority, even with their massive numerical advantage
2) Soviet pilots had an inferiority complex compared to the Germans, right up to the end of the war, and the Germans were always more effective in aerial combat
3) Soviet air power only ever achieved 'semi-strategic' projections of power, and only on a moderate scale
4) Soviet night bombing was unimpresssive
5) Soviet pilot training, aggressiveness, technical equipment and morale continued to close the qualitative gap to their German opponents throughout the 1944-45 period, and fighter forces improved their effectiveness across all fields. 

I get the feeling that some here think that an attack by the Western Allies against the Soviets would be like a Barbarossa re-run. I'm of a much different opinion. I feel it would be more like Kursk - more expensive for the Soviets numerically, but ultimately more costly for the attacker in the long run.


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## Milosh (Sep 28, 2012)

iron man said:


> And these remaining candidates would have to be sufficiently engineered to carry the MTOW of these machines. A functional rail spur (tied to a functional rail system) to supply the _hundreds of tons_ of POL, defensive ammunition, bombloads, spares, etc... required for _each _Group sized mission would probably be a bonus as well.
> Or are we trucking this all in...while the reeling armies are screaming for requisition of everything on wheels in the theatre?
> 
> This is a _complete non-starter_ if the Soviets come across the river.
> ...



Yes I was going to get to that. 70,000lb Lancaster, Halifax, B-17, B-24 heavy bombers and 120,000lb B-29 very heavy bombers. I don't think there was any bases in northern Europe that could take those weights at the time and have sufficiently long runways. Also from what I understand is that the bases in England had to be 'improved' to accommodate the B-29.

If the Soviets were the first to attack, what would the result of a _Bodenplatte_ attack on the forward West's airbases?

Someone suggested opening other Fronts vs the Soviets. If a Front was opened in the east, that is a long way from the Soviet industrial complexes. From the south, I wouldn't want to attack thro the Caucasus. Besides, I think it would be to late to have any effect on the battle in north-west Europe.


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## Jenisch (Sep 28, 2012)

I will work with the Soviets as agressors. That would meant their supply lines would be attacked by hundreads of fighter-bombers, while their railway system systematically bombed.


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## Balljoint (Sep 28, 2012)

Milosh said:


> Someone suggested opening other Fronts vs the Soviets. If a Front was opened in the east, that is a long way from the Soviet industrial complexes. From the south, I wouldn't want to attack thro the Caucasus. Besides, I think it would be to late to have any effect on the battle in north-westEurope.



Yes, but the Soviet industrial complexes are likewise a long way from the fighting. Distance tends to work in favor of the defense over the offense not withstanding the ability of the US to supply Europe across the Atlantic. The Soviet transportation links would be the fat target.

As to the second front, you’re right if it’s a short fight with the Soviets quickly overrunning Western Europe. However, the strategy would be to bleed down the initially well-supplied Soviet forces. A second front threat would quickly bleed both forces and supplies. Referring to the above, the Trans Siberian RR would then become a particularly fat target in the case of a second front.

The extensive Lend lease aid to the soviets is a two edged sword. They start from a strong position. But they have little capacity to replace losses in a number of critical areas. Trucks come to mind.


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## Jenisch (Sep 28, 2012)

The bomber force in Italy could set the Caucasus in flammes. Depletion of Russian forces and agriculture.


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## Milosh (Sep 28, 2012)

Balljoint said:


> Yes, but the Soviet industrial complexes are likewise a long way from the fighting. Distance tends to work in favor of the defense over the offense not withstanding the ability of the US to supply Europe across the Atlantic. The Soviet transportation links would be the fat target.
> 
> As to the second front, you’re right if it’s a short fight with the Soviets quickly overrunning Western Europe. However, the strategy would be to bleed down the initially well-supplied Soviet forces. A second front threat would quickly bleed both forces and supplies. Referring to the above, the Trans Siberian RR would then become a particularly fat target in the case of a second front.
> 
> The extensive Lend lease aid to the soviets is a two edged sword. They start from a strong position. But they have little capacity to replace losses in a number of critical areas. Trucks come to mind.



The only close West complexes were in GB with a limited capability. The other complex was in the USA, some 3000 miles across an ocean.

Not to sure about the trucks tho, Lend Lease trucks in Russia
Domestic - 77%
Imported - 19%
captured - 4%

this is total for whole war


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## Shortround6 (Sep 28, 2012)

Same chart gives lean lease trucks as 30.4% of the total in Jan 1945 and 32.8% in May 1945, captured trucks are up to 9.1%

The lend lease trucks tended to be bigger and more powerful than the domestic trucks, Not in all cases but a Studebaker 6 cylinder 2 1/2 ton is going to move more stuff than a Russian built 1930 4 cylinder Ford. The "deuce and half) was rated at 2 1/2 tons cross country and 5 tons on a road. 

Rail networks over the entire area were a wreck. Russian locomotives and rolling stock had a different distance between the wheels (and tracks) than the rest of Europe and England. Russians could and did reset rails further apart (Germans narrowed them upon advancing into Russia) but that is slow going. Allies can import locomotives and rolling stock from England. Not ideal but better than no locomotives and rolling stock.


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## Balljoint (Sep 28, 2012)

Milosh said:


> The only close West complexes were in GB with a limited capability. The other complex was in the USA, some 3000 miles across an ocean.
> 
> Not to sure about the trucks tho, Lend Lease trucks in Russia
> Domestic - 77%
> ...



I don’t mean to minimize the soviet accomplishments. 40,000 aircraft, 30,000 tanks, 150,000 artillery, 500,000 machine guns, 2 million sub-machine guns and 3million rifles at the peak yearly production while winning in the field is no small effort. Overall production expanded 250%. As in the US, central authority can be very effective with a highly motivated work force.

My point is that these resources were poorly located relative to Western Europe and skewed by the needs met by the US aid.


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## tyrodtom (Sep 28, 2012)

Any worthwhile strategic bombing of Russia would be a very difficult mission. Most of Russia's heavy industry was well dispersed, and well east of Moscow, some even past the Urals. 
About the only way to reach those areas would be B-29 based in nothern India, or Iran. We already had a infrastructure in Iran for the Lend Lease supplies going to Russia, but Russia had troops in Iran also. Bases in nothern India would mean flying over the Himalaya mountains, having to gain that much altitute early in the mission would greatly shorten their range. 
Thank goodness this never happened, because we might have been able to disrupt their supply lines, and supply dumps ( if we could find them) , but we couldn't touch their industrial, base with the aircraft we had at the time.


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## Jenisch (Sep 28, 2012)

British planning to bomb the Caucasus in the war's start:



> Planners identified a dependence by Nazi Germany on fossil fuels imported from the Soviet Union as a vulnerability that could be exploited. Despite initial opposition by some politicians, the French Government ordered General Maurice Gamelin to commence a "plan of possible intervention with the view of destroying Russian oil exploitation", while U.S. Ambassador Bullit informed U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt that the French considered that air attacks by the French Air Forces in Syria against Baku would be "the most efficient way to weaken the Soviet Union."[4] According to the report by General Gamelin submitted to the French Prime Minister on 22 February 1940, an oil shortage would cripple the Red Army and Soviet Air Force, as well as Soviet collective farm machinery, causing possible widespread famine and even the collapse of the Soviet Union: "Dependence on oil supplies from the Caucasus is the fundamental weakness of Russian economy. The Armed Forces were totally dependent on this source also for their motorized agriculture. More than 90% of oil extraction and 80% of refinement was located in the Caucasus (primarily Baku). Therefore, interruption of oil supplies on any large scale would have far-reaching consequences and could even result in the collapse of all the military, industrial and agricultural systems of Russia."[4] An important source of raw materials would also be denied to Nazi Germany with the destruction of the oil fields.



Operation Pike - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## Juha (Sep 28, 2012)

Hello Jenisch, the plan wasn't realistic, there were not enough bomber assets available in the area to carry outan effective bomber campaign.

juha


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## Jenisch (Sep 28, 2012)

Perhaphs it was not in 1940, but in 1945 with the 625 heavies in Italy the picture would be another.


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## Juha (Sep 28, 2012)

I refered only the Oper Pike, but IMHO Baku was too distant from Foggia for effective campaign but I have no idea was there in Nile Delta or in Palestine infrastructures that would have allowed sustained heavy bomber campaign. At least B-24s had better chances to survive against contemporary Soviet fighters than Blenheims in 1940 and Blenheims were not even well suited for night ops could carry only pitifully small bomb load.

Juha


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## tyrodtom (Sep 28, 2012)

The Baku oil fields was outside of the range of any aircraft in the allied inventory from airfields in Italy . Even the B29's range at 3250, or 1625 one way would be right at the extreme limits of it's range and would barely reach the edge of the fields.


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## davparlr (Sep 29, 2012)

It is unreasonable to state that the soviets would simply push aside the Western allies when it took them four months to go from the border to Berlin facing one quarter the forces. According to wikipedia, the soviets had a bit over 6 million troops on the eastern front facing Germany while the Western allies had 5.5 million. In any event the western allies had multiples of forces more than Germany had and loads of materiel. Also defensive efforts are always more efficient than attacking, generally considered three to one. I think they would quickly be bogged down facing much larger forces of tanks, men, aircraft, and artillery than they had ever faced.

As for control of airspace below 20k ft., the Allies had several new aircraft capable of 400+ on the deck including the P-51H and Tempest II, not necessarily new, and at, fighter weight, the P-51D is no slouch at low level.


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## GrauGeist (Sep 29, 2012)

Jabberwocky said:


> Saying that the Red Army "pushed the Wehrmacht back to Berlin using brute force in manpower...not by thier airforce" does a massive disservice to both the strength and effectiveness of the Russian airforces.
> 
> The AFHRA study on the effectiveness of Russian airpower concludes that Soviet airpower was an "essential ingredient of the Soviet victory" and "contributed a decisive share in breaking German resistance". Over 1943-1945, Soviet bombers achieved "a commendable measure of success in operations supporting the army on the ground". Fighter, ground attack and bomber cooperation "produced good results".
> 
> ...


And report supplements my point...

The VVS was certainly a presence on the eastern front, but the deciding factor for the Red army versus the German army was the ground war. The Soviets had a numerical and supply advantage over the Wehrmacht. The bulk of the air war in the east was conducted at lower altitudes, where you saw relentless ground attack and low level bombing along with clashes between fighters covering or intercepting the GA/bombers.

In the west, you saw a multi-layered offensive that used heavy bombing, medium and low level bombing along with GA, the latter being done by a wide range of very effective platforms.

This aggressive aerial campaign in the west is the strategy what would be the advantage in a clash between the Allies and the Soviets.

Otherwise you'd have two massive ground armies mired down in a slugfest that could drag on indefinately, which leaves me with the impression that it would devolve into a Stalingrad or WWI style stalemate...nobody really gaining much ground because both ground armies are well seasoned and well equipped.


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## Shortround6 (Sep 29, 2012)

GrauGeist said:


> Otherwise you'd have two massive ground armies mired down in a slugfest that could drag on indefinately, which leaves me with the impression that it would devolve into a Stalingrad or WWI style stalemate...nobody really gaining much ground because both ground armies are well seasoned and well equipped.



Except that the Soviet army becomes increasingly ill supplied the longer the war goes on. They may have adequate supplies for several weeks or even several months but unless they restrict operations they cannot sustain operations like they did for the first 4 months of 1945. 
This does not mean the Allies can roll the Russians back to the Bug river or beyond after a several month stalemate though.


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## Jenisch (Sep 29, 2012)

Well, the conclusion of the planners of Unthinkable was that the war would be a longer one.


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## bobbysocks (Oct 1, 2012)

and i think if stalin had even an inkling he could brush aside the western allies he would have kept going. the russian were already planning for their western expansions into what later became the com-bloc nations. the various communist parties had a ready infrastructure in place unlike the western partisans. russia inspected every piece of western allied machinery and tactic...and learned them i=even if there werent using them. they had people learn how to construct long range bomber bases like we did in northern russia for the frantic missions. <<< that is where i draw my notion of how fast you can put up a bomber base. the only hinderence was the stonewalling by the ussr. as for the final winner? anyone's real guess. the factors that decide a war dont come out until the war evolves. a few bad decisions can turn a tide or seal fate. as i said in my first post the hard part would be selling it to the BC and US peoples. after fighting for over 5 years to think of fighting maybe 5 more? a nation without the resolve for war is snakebit.


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## Jabberwocky (Oct 1, 2012)

> and i think if stalin had even an inkling he could brush aside the western allies he would have kept going. the russian were already planning for their western expansions into what later became the com-bloc nations.



I suppose you have solid evidence to back this up? 

I feel the notion that Stalin and the Soviet Union were going to continue rolling West without a casus belli, against allies that have supported them for five years, is fanciful in the extreme and smacks badly of the legacy of Cold War distrust. At least on the Western side we KNOW they looked seriously at continuing eastward.

The Soviet occupation of the central European states might have been legally unjustified, but it was a political and physical reality that had more to do with Stalin's obsession about protecting the Soviet Union from the West than as an act of any aggression.

You say that selling war to the US/UK would be the hard part of a hypothetical war. The Russians aren't mindless automatons either, don't you think that there would be a major morale effect if they turned on their former allies at the flick of a switch?


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## bobbysocks (Oct 1, 2012)

evidence pertaining to which part or both. the part was "i think"... as stalin was not sbashful about taking what he wanted. they invaded poland at the same time germany did. this did give him a "buffer zone"...but also access to ports and material he needed. his attack on finland was it a posturing move or were raw materials involved there as well. russia declares war on japan when it wasnt needed and fought for on for several weeks AFTER japan surrendered. why did they need this buffer zone? it was a lang grab pure and simple. the way the russians "negotiated" with the west is a matter of record and if you read it very much lopsided towards their needs and not much given back in reciprocity. when the us solders were there in russia. russian solders combed over ac...equipment...and learned every aspect of how to set up a long range bomber base ( for ac which they didnt have ). when us personnel approached a vvs aircraf, installation, etc. they were restricted from getting close and even threatened with harm if they tried. i dont buy "stalin's obsession to protect the ussr". after the us and uk looking the other way they they invaded poland...whole lend lease deal knew how we negotiated and was able to get everything he wanted....doesnt make any sense to then think the uk/us would turn aggressor.

their plans after the war...its been years since i read stuff pertaining to that. but the main goal of communism was the thrust towards expanding into other countries as allies and partners. there were communist parties in most of the ajoining countries. whose leaders had strong ties to moscow... at this point no i can not provide you concrete evidence. but if you would care to research it i think you will be enlightened.

no i do not think the russian people were mindless automatons but they were more will into sacrifice in certain respect than the western allies. the amount of deaths reflect that struggle. if Ike would have given every 5th soulder 5 rounds of ammo and told him to pick up a rifle off of a dead GI when they landed on the beach...i seriously doubt D-day would have happend. but that is what happened in stalingrad and the russian troops did it. in light of that i am more inclinded to say stalin could sell it to his people easier than churchill and fdr could theirs.


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## pinsog (Oct 1, 2012)

Stalin's idea of selling it was "Do it or I'll have you shot".


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## GrauGeist (Oct 1, 2012)

The Soviet Union was Germany's ally before joining the Allies...what was on Stalin's mind then? He had to know that to invade Poland would bring Britain and France to the field.

Also, how many U.S. bombers and Fighters (plus thier crews) were interred when they had to set down on Russian proper both in the east and in the west during the war?

When Tsar Boris III of Bulgaria visited Stalin later in the war, to tell him that he was leaving the Axis and wanted neutrality, he was murdered and the Red Army poured into Bulgaria.

There is no way that Uncle Joe was a friend to anyone but himself.


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## Jenisch (Oct 1, 2012)

There is no justification, ethnically speaking, for the Soviet annexations. Above all, because the Soviets themselfs didn't lived the word of free elections in the "liberated" countries. Before the war, Stalin considerated three countries as potential agressors of the USSR: Poland, Germany and Japan. He belived that an alliance with the West instead of Hitler, would result in the French and English sat behind the Maginot line, while the USSR would be attacked. Stalin then thought: "we gonna let the capitalits fight to the exhaustion, while we gonna profit with such war". Of course, the things didn't turned out that way, and Stalin was "pilot in command" of the USSR, and therefore responsible for the massive casualities the country had, which was not caused by mere bad luck.
In my opinion, had Stalin not purged the Armed forces, and adjusted the defense budget accordintly, there would be simply no necessity of a pact with Hitler, annexations of other countries, etc. 

I don't want appear to be saying the Western Allies didn't commited mistakes as well, but the fact is that the Soviet Union was a very strong country, it was capable of have Armed Forces able to repel an attack by Poland, Germany and Japan. Stalin's dictatorial rule of the country prevented that.


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## zoomar (Oct 2, 2012)

ShVAK said:


> The Red Army was not the joke it was in '41...



That's a bit of an understatement when describing the army that defeated the cream of the Wehrmacht, while the Wallies were pushing east against (for the most part) less well trained and more willing to surrender German forces in 1944-45. The Red Army, together with its huge superiority in frontal (ie low altitude close support) aviation could have easily defeated the US and British and driven them to the sea before an effective strategic bombing campaign of the USSR using B-29s could have been mounted. Only 2 things could have "saved" the Wallie position: (1) use of the few nukes available against the USSR rather than Japan, or (2) the rather unlikely possibility that Soviet troops would be less than motivated to extend their war of liberation and revenge against Germany into France. Use of nukes in Europe rather than agansit Japan, would also have created a very unpredictable situation in the Far East, especially if - at the same time as they were defending western europe - the US and it's allies went ahead with the Invasions of the Japanese home islands.


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## Balljoint (Oct 2, 2012)

bobbysocks said:


> .no i do not think the russian people were mindless automatons but they were more will into sacrifice in certain respect than the western allies. the amount of deaths reflect that struggle. if Ike would have given every 5th soulder 5 rounds of ammo and told him to pick up a rifle off of a dead GI when they landed on the beach...i seriously doubt D-day would have happend. but that is what happened in stalingrad and the russian troops did it. in light of that i am more inclinded to say stalin could sell it to his people easier than churchill and fdr could theirs.




The German troops were welcomed be segments of the Soviet population before the Einsatzgruppen began their work. It’s an open question as t whether the Soviet soldier would have the same motivation in France as in his homeland.


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## RCAFson (Oct 2, 2012)

bobbysocks said:


> evidence pertaining to which part or both. the part was "i think"... as stalin was not sbashful about taking what he wanted. they invaded poland at the same time germany did.
> 
> russia declares war on japan when it wasnt needed and fought for on for several weeks AFTER japan surrendered. why did they need this buffer zone? it was a lang grab pure and simple.
> 
> the way the russians "negotiated" with the west is a matter of record and if you read it very much lopsided towards their needs and not much given back in reciprocity.



It just this kind of cold war distortion of history that makes any discussion of the war in the east and the USSR so hard to have and why I try to avoid these discussions, since it inevitably involves explaining Soviet and Western diplomatic relations, and this is often seen as a defence of Stalin.

The USSR didn't invade Poland at the same time as Germany. They waited for 17 days after the German invasion; basically until the Polish military and government had both collapsed:
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/62/Poland2.jpg
and then occupied eastern Poland, basically up to the Curzon line (the ethnic dividing line between Poland and Russia/Ukraine). The USSR's occupation of these territories in no way hastened Poland's demise and in no way, shape or form, formed a military alliance with Nazi Germany. The Nazi-Soviet pact is quite specific in stating that the USSR would only occupy eastern Poland if the Polish state collapsed, which it did. If the western Allies and/or the Polish armed forces had been successful in stopping the German invasion, then the USSR was not obligated to invade Poland to aid Germany. The USSR was never in an alliance with Nazi Germany any more than Sweden or Switzerland was, both of which traded heavily with Nazi Germany, and the Swedes even allowed German troops to pass through Sweden. 

The USSR declared War on Japan as it agreed to do at Truman's and Churchill's request, 90 days after the end of the war in Europe:


> _At the Tehran Conference (November 1943), Stalin agreed that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan once Nazi Germany was defeated. At the Yalta Conference (February 1945), Stalin agreed to Allied pleas to enter World War II's Pacific Theater within three months of the end of the war in Europe. The invasion began on August 9, 1945, precisely three months after the German surrender on May 8 (May 9, 0:43 Moscow time).
> _Soviet




The USSR lost 25 million dead in the war, or about 15% of the population. I suspect that the USA would have also had a very hard balled negotiating stance if it were invaded and forced to endure the same casualties.


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## RCAFson (Oct 2, 2012)

GrauGeist said:


> Also, how many U.S. bombers and Fighters (plus thier crews) were interred when they had to set down on Russian proper both in the east and in the west during the war?



Allied aircrews who were carrying out operations against Japan were interred if they landed in the USSR since the USSR was neutral in that war until August 9 1945, but they were quietly released prior to the Soviet entry into the war against Japan.


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## Balljoint (Oct 2, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> It just this kind of cold war distortion of history that makes any discussion of the war in the east and the USSR so hard to have and why I try to avoid these discussions, since it inevitably involves explaining Soviet and Western diplomatic relations, and this is often seen as a defence of Stalin.
> 
> The USSR didn't invade Poland at the same time as Germany. They waited for 17 days after the German invasion; basically until the Polish military and government had both collapsed:
> http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/62/Poland2.jpg
> and then occupied eastern Poland, basically up to the Curzon line (the ethnic dividing line between Poland and Russia/Ukraine).




The Soviet pact with Hitler was hardly benign. German aircrews trained in the Soviet Union to avoid the rearmament restrictions. Stalin provided critical materials to Germany that also aided in the rearmament. And while the Nazis were rounding up the Jews, the Russians marched the Polish elite into Katy forest to be massacred.

An ironic aspect of Stalin’s actions was to pull the Soviet defenses out of their established bog land positions which mad them even more venerable during Barbarossa.


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## RCAFson (Oct 2, 2012)

Balljoint said:


> The Soviet pact with Hitler was hardly benign. German aircrews trained in the Soviet Union to avoid the rearmament restrictions. Stalin provided critical materials to Germany that also aided in the rearmament. And while the Nazis were rounding up the Jews, the Russians marched the Polish elite into Katy forest to be massacred.
> 
> An ironic aspect of Stalin’s actions was to pull the Soviet defenses out of their established bog land positions which mad them even more venerable during Barbarossa.



The USSR aided the Weimar Republic not Nazi Germany.

Right away we get into Katyn and the typical knee-jerk equalization of Hitler's death camps with Stalin's crimes, which is another way of stating the extreme right's wish for an alliance with Nazi Germany instead of the Stalin's USSR.

If the West hadn't caved in to Hitler at Munich, and if Poland would have formed an alliance with the USSR instead of helping itself to parts of Czechoslovakia...if, if , if...but the end result is that Stalin gave up on the Alliance which was to have prevented Munich and the destruction of Czechoslovakia by the Nazis, and became neutral and helped himself to parts of Poland...what goes around comes around.


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## Jenisch (Oct 2, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> The USSR was never in an alliance with Nazi Germany any more than Sweden or Switzerland was, both of which traded heavily with Nazi Germany, and the Swedes even allowed German troops to pass through Sweden.



Well, the Allied defeat in 1940 was entirely their fault. BTW, they even planned even to attack the Soviet Union do deny supplies to Hitler. However, the Soviet Union was also enterily blammed for what happaned in it's domains.


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## GrauGeist (Oct 2, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> It just this kind of cold war distortion of history that makes any discussion of the war in the east and the USSR so hard to have and why I try to avoid these discussions, since it inevitably involves explaining Soviet and Western diplomatic relations, and this is often seen as a defence of Stalin.
> 
> The USSR didn't invade Poland at the same time as Germany. They waited for 17 days after the German invasion; basically until the Polish military and government had both collapsed:


But they DID invade Poland...doesn't matter if it was 17 days after the Germans or if it was on Groundhog Day, they invaded Poland...period. No matter how hard revisionism spins it, the nation was invaded regardless of when or for whatever reason.



RCAFson said:


> The USSR's occupation of these territories in no way hastened Poland's demise...


You can't be serious....

And The Soviet Union was interring American crews and thier aircraft in both the PTO and the ETO. The crews may have been released, but the American aircraft were kept. And last time I checked, both sides of the Soviet Union were an Ally of the United States. This alliance (I am assuming) would cover the entire country of the U.S.S.R. And if I remember correctly, the eastern half of the U.S.S.R. was more than happy to recieve thier supplies and equipment from the United States, so I am pretty sure that the eastern half of the Soviet Union was attached to the western half...


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## Jenisch (Oct 2, 2012)

I don't know how such war could have developed, but what I have sure is that the political war is already happening here, and is being fierce. LOL


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## Balljoint (Oct 2, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> If the West hadn't caved in to Hitler at Munich, and if Poland would have formed an alliance with the USSR instead of helping itself to parts of Czechoslovakia...if, if , if...but the end result is that Stalin gave up on the Alliance which was to have prevented Munich and the destruction of Czechoslovakia by the Nazis, and became neutral and helped himself to parts of Poland...what goes around comes around.



And if Hitler had been granted his Art Institute scholarship in Vienna the whole mess would have been avoided.


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## Jenisch (Oct 2, 2012)

I don't want to discuss moral here RCAFson, but the Soviet agressions in Poland, Finland, Estonia and Latvia are hardly what one can expect from a "neutral".


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## drgondog (Oct 2, 2012)

zoomar said:


> That's a bit of an understatement when describing the army that defeated the cream of the Wehrmacht, while the Wallies were pushing east against (for the most part) less well trained and more willing to surrender German forces in 1944-45. The Red Army, together with its huge superiority in frontal (ie low altitude close support) aviation could have easily defeated the US and British and driven them to the sea before an effective strategic bombing campaign of the USSR using B-29s could have been mounted.
> 
> *Idle speculation. There were 70+ Heavy bomb groups of B-17s and B-24s, not to mention Bomber Command or 9th or TAC or 12th AF assets in striking range of all of USSR rear lines and logistics. The Soviets NEVER saw that kind of airpower from the LW and the LW in the East was a shell of the assets they deployed to the west. 'Swept aside' is a bold but baseless assumption. The USSR never confronted artilliary resources like the combined Allies in the west (nor had Allies contended withh Soviet artilliary. The West was 100% mechanized in contrast to Wermacht on eastern front. The USSR was not in great shape for food and most of their refinining assets were within Allied bomber radius without B-29s -
> 
> ...



Also Do not discount the zeal that former Wermacht and LW veterans may have joined the West.


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## Jenisch (Oct 2, 2012)

Something about Dresden:



> An RAF memo issued to airmen on the night of the attack said:
> 
> “Dresden, the seventh largest city in Germany and not much smaller than Manchester is also the largest unbombed builtup area the enemy has got. In the midst of winter with refugees pouring westward and troops to be rested, roofs are at a premium, not only to give shelter to workers, refugees, and troops alike, but to house the administrative services displaced from other areas. At one time well known for its china, Dresden has developed into an industrial city of first-class importance.... The intentions of the attack are to hit the enemy where he will feel it most, behind an already partially collapsed front... *and incidentally to show the Russians when they arrive what Bomber Command can do*



Bombing of Dresden in World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


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## Jenisch (Oct 2, 2012)

A Fatal Guarantee: Poland, 1939 | History Today

This article provides a balanced view of the Soviet and Anglo-French negociations to avoid the war. Not surprinsingly, things were not only fault of the West like RCAFson claimed.


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## bobbysocks (Oct 3, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> It just this kind of cold war distortion of history that makes any discussion of the war in the east and the USSR so hard to have and why I try to avoid these discussions, since it inevitably involves explaining Soviet and Western diplomatic relations, and this is often seen as a defence of Stalin.
> 
> i will say if you have difficulty here discussing any issue then either your presentation of that issue is coming across as vexing to others and thus you may reap a backlash due to that, or you are not keeping an open mind. there are some very knowledgeable scholars, authors, and amateur historians who post here. if you present a topic with solid evidence and in an air of open discussion you may change minds or have yours changed. that is the whole point of a forum. but if someone holds on to their ideal and disregards any argument contrary to that then any forum that does not share the same view as they is going make them feel alienated and frustrate them. you can call my perception of the ussr as "typical cold war distortion" and i can counter with yours as "typical revisionist whitewash". but when i have found that when my idea is in the minority in a forum of educated people with open minds...my idea is worth me questioning.
> 
> ...



the long and the short is...i have never seen someone with an open mind and who is willing to explore all options and proposals have a problem discussing any issue.


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## Jenisch (Oct 3, 2012)

> It should also be remembered that as early as 1942, when the war was still undecided [personal note: for me, it was already decided], Stalin was offered an Anglo-American bomber force that would operate from the Caucasus beginning in 1943, but for political reasons he rejected the proposal, desiring only the aircraft.



Soviet Air Power and Victory in World War II


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## drgondog (Oct 3, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> Allied aircrews who were carrying out operations against Japan were interred if they landed in the USSR since the USSR was neutral in that war until August 9 1945, but they were quietly released prior to the Soviet entry into the war against Japan.



The aircraft - particularly the B-29 - were not released, and became the USSR first strategic bomber as an almost perfect copy, bolt for bolt.


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## drgondog (Oct 3, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> Perhaphs it was not in 1940, but in 1945 with the 625 heavies in Italy the picture would be another.



The 15th alone had 21 B-24/B-17 Bomb Groups with ~ 72 bombers per group. RAF not included in the count.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 3, 2012)

The Allied air forces don't need to bomb the Soviet factories _IF_ they can keep the Soviet supplies from reaching their armies. 

A division can use over 100 tons of supplies per day when _not_ engaged in heavy combat or long distance moves.

How many thousands of tons per day do the Soviets need to move into Eastern Europe to keep their Forces supplied? 

How much chance do they have of blocking the Western Allies supply lines?


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## Jenisch (Oct 3, 2012)

And let's not forgot of something: Japan was demolished by mid-1945. The Allies could have bring relevant reinforcements from the Pacific to be based in the UK. Due to the UK's infraestructure, not to mention the aircraft carriers, the Allies would be able to employ better their forces from Asia in Europe than the Soviets and the logistical problems they would have to support theirs if they bring them.

Ah, and what aircraft contingent the Allies had in Africa by 1945? I'm still thinking the Caucasus oil fields could have been targeted...


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## DonL (Oct 3, 2012)

After the surrender of Japan the Ostsee (East Sea) could function as one very large aircraft carrier directly at/in the flank of the Red Army.

The KM of 1944/45 could hold the East Sea as their very own Sea because they could supply the Heeresgruppe Nord (Kurlandarmee) till 08.05.1945, they could evacuate thousands of civilian and Prinz Eugen, Admiral Scheer and Lützow could operate with their destroyers totaly undamaged the whole years 1944 and 1945 as heavy Artillerie support for the Wehrmacht.

The VVS was so frustrated of this three ships at the East Sea (1944/45) that they were crying for help from the RAF and the USAF, because no single attack of the VVS achieved any damage or could retreat this Ships from their heavy Artillerie support.
Quite the contrary all three Ships could achieve heavy damage with their improved AA over the VVS and shot down numerous a/c's.

As we all know the german AA was not the best, at 1944/45 the improved german AA was much better then bevor but personaly I would rate it second (equal to the RN) but not as good as US Navy AA. 

So to my opinion such a attack through the East Sea at the flank of the Red Army would take the VVS under enormous pressure, because the VVS has no or very little experience in fighting ships and the VVS couldn't do anything against the three german ships, what will happen if 100 RN and USN aircraft carrier, battleships, cruisers and destroyer will enter the East Sea?


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## Jenisch (Oct 3, 2012)

Perhaps the Japanese surrender would be a problem in this scenario. Despite the nukes, they were prepared to resist an invasion, and the Allies obviously would be unable to launch an invasion of Japan in this scenario. The Soviet entering in the war against Japan was a profound shock to the Japanese. The planners of Unthinkable considerated the possibility that the Japanese might become allies of the Soviets. The Japanese probably would have accepted some conditional surrender from the Allies, since it preserved the power of the Emperor. However, had the Allies insisted in unconditional surrender, the Japanese would try to save their skin, and that could have lead to an alliance with the Russians.

Had the Russians were the agressors, I think that launching nuclear attacks in Japan, to "punish" it, and giving a conditional surrender proposal to the Japanese, would be better for the Allies, specially if the transfer of forces from Asia indicated that it would be realistic to push the Russians back to their frontiers. Imperial Japan would still exists, but had it agree to leave China and reduce it's arsenal, for America and Britain it would be better than have Stalin ruling Eastern Europe (Japan also would be a problem for Stalin).


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## drgondog (Oct 3, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> The Allied air forces don't need to bomb the Soviet factories _IF_ they can keep the Soviet supplies from reaching their armies.
> 
> A division can use over 100 tons of supplies per day when _not_ engaged in heavy combat or long distance moves.
> 
> ...



This, IMO is The key battlefront issue - not to metion that there is a lot of rugged terrain in Czechoslovakia, Southern Germany and Austria featuring natural choke points. All rail facilities and marshalling yards, bridges and canals subject to day/night intrusion. Naval Forces in the Baltic and the Eastern Med should provide air cover on the flanks... etc, etc. Oil in the Ukraine should be the primary strategic target.

The wild card is that the average grunt on Both sides will be very disheartened at the thought of another war.


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## GrauGeist (Oct 3, 2012)

Another consideration is the fact that the U.S. was still on a wartime footing, still producing equipment and training soldiers, sailors and pilots since the war was far from over in the PTO and they were estimating that they would be on Japan soil "hopefully" by early 1946. Remember, no one at that time (except for a very few people) knew about the A-bomb so the plans were "game-on" for a serious slugfest.

So in the closing months of the war in the ETO, U.S. capacity was still at an all-time high. With an outbreak of hostilities with the U.S.S.R., American supplies, equipment and manpower just keeps flowing into Western Europe fresh from the U.S. and with the threat of German warships removed from the convoy lanes, I'm sure the flow would increase, too.


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## Jabberwocky (Oct 3, 2012)

US war production actually peaked in either very late 1943 or mid-1944 - depending on how you measure it - and declined slowly until about January 1945, after which the production decline accelerated rapidly.







There were about 2 million less workers involved in direct contribution to the war effort at the by about March 1945 than there were at the beginning of 1944.


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## Jenisch (Oct 4, 2012)

For those saying the Soviets could have had trouble in this scenario, the argumentation of Jhon Mosier in the book Deathride seems to make a lot of sense. Mosier belives that the Soviets managed to advance in the way they did, because the opening of new fronts by the Western Allies, diversion of the LW and elite Heer units to the West, Lend-Lease and the bombing campaign. Contrary to the majority of the contemporany historians, Mosier puts the West, not the Soviets, as the decisive factor in Hitler's defeat. While Mosier is a controversial figure by it's interpretations, it seems he credibility in many things, like this article shows about Kursk: Battle of Kursk: Germany's Lost Victory in World War II

I particularly like from Mosier's argumentation, and I belive that if one side needed more of the other, it was the the Soviets from the Western Allies than vice versa, opposite to what is usually belived. The Western Allies had a balanced aerial, naval and ground power to have a more favourable chance defeat Germany alone, or at least very likely defend themselfs (Britain) from it. While the Soviets would be in a more deeper hole by the factors I mentioned, there would also be another factor that would be the absence of the naval blockade of Europe. Germany would have the Western European industry functioning at full steam, while would consequentely meant that shortages of oil and raw materials would not exist by importations. Alternatively, had Germany had to fight the Western Allies alone, she would have to give to the Soviets substantial stuff she would need to fight the Western Allies, which would make it's situation unfavourable.

Quotes from a reference:



> With hindsight it is hard to avoid the conclusion that after the defeat of France Germany would have done better to adopt a defensive posture, consolidating its position in Western Europe, attacking British positions in the Mediterranean and forcing the British and the Americans to bomb their way onto the Continent. Given that the Red Army ultimately proved to be the nemesis of the Wehrmacht, this is hard to deny. But what is too often ignored in such counterfactual arguments is the grow-ing awareness in Berlin that, even after the occupation of Western Europe, Germany did not have the upper hand in a long war against Britain and America. The chronic shortage of oil, the debility of the European coal mines and the fragility of the food chain, made it seem unlikely that Germany would in fact be able to 'consolidate' its conquests of 1940 without falling into excessive dependence on the Soviet Union. Even if this were possible, the combined manufacturing capacity of Britain and America vastly exceeded the industrial capacity currently under German control and this, in turn, spelled disaster in a protracted air war. The German army, on the other hand, had proved its ability to achieve decisive victory against what were thought to be the strongest armies in Europe. When we bear this range of factors in mind it is easier to appreciate why a defensive strategy seemed like a second-best in the autumn of 1940. After the defeat of France, the dream of a gigantic land empire seemed within reach, and, given the industrial strength looming on the other side of the Atlantic, there was no time to waste.



The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy, page 420.



> The territories that Germany had conquered in 1940, though they pro-vided substantial booty and a crucial source of labour did not bearcomparison with the abundance provided to Britain by America. The aerial arms race was the distinctive Anglo-American contribution to thewar and it played directly to America's dominance in manufacturing.But though the disparity in aircraft deliveries was extreme it was notuntypical. A similarly vast gulf was also evident in relation to energysupplies, the most basic driver of modern urban and industrial society.Whereas the Anglo-American alliance was energy rich, Germany and itsWestern European Grossraum were starved of food, coal and oil.The disparity with respect to oil was most serious. Between 1940 and1943 the mobility of Germany's army, navy and air force, not to mentionits domestic economy, depended on annual imports of 1.5 million tonsof oil, mainly from Romania. In addition, German synthetic fuel fac-tories, at huge expense, produced a flow of petrol that rose from 4 milliontons in 1940 to a maximum of 6.5 million tons in 1943. Seizing thefuel stocks of France as booty in no way resolved this fundamentaldependency. In fact, the victories of 1940 had the reverse effect. Theyadded a number of heavy oil consumers to Germany's own fuel deficit.From its annual fuel flow of at most 8 million tons, Germany now hadto supply not only its own needs, but those of the rest of Western Europeas well. Before the war, the French economy had consumed at least5.4 million tons per annum, at a per capita rate 60 per cent higher thanGermany's. The effect of the German occupation was to throw Franceback into an era before motorization. From the summer of 1940 Francewas reduced to a mere 8 per cent of its pre-war supply of petrol. In aneconomy adjusted to a high level of oil consumption the effects weredramatic. To give just one example, thousands of litres of milk went towaste in the French countryside every day, because no petrol was avail-able to ensure regular collections. Of more immediate concern to themilitary planners in Berlin were the Italian armed forces, which dependedentirely on fuel diverted from Germany and Romania. By February1941, the Italian navy was threatening to halt its operations in theMediterranean altogether unless Germany supplied at least 250,000tons of fuel. And the problems were by no means confined to the Reich's satellites. Germany itself coped only by dint of extreme economy.In late May 1941, General Adolf von Schell, the man responsible for themotor vehicle industry, seriously suggested that in light of the chronicshortage of oil it would be advisable to carry out a partial 'demotoriz-ation' of the Wehrmacht. It is commonly remarked that the Luftwaffe suffered later in the war because of the inadequate training of its pilots,due in large part to the shortage of air fuel. But in 1941 the petrol shortage was already so severe that the Wehrmacht was licensing itssoldiers to drive heavy trucks with less than 15 kilometres of on-roadexperience, a measure which was blamed for the appalling attrition of motor vehicles during the Russian campaign. Shortages made them-selves felt across the German economy. So tight were fuel rations thatin November 1941 Opel was forced to shut down production at itsBrandenburg plant, Germany's largest truck factory, because it lackedthe petrol necessary to check the fuel pumps of vehicles coming off theassembly line. A special allocation of 104 cubic metres of fuel had to bearranged by the Wehrmacht's economic office so as to ensure that therewere no further interruptions.



Page 410.

The reason I did such comparison with Germany is that I belive that the Soviet Union, while strong militarly, was not so strong as usually claimed it was. This does not necessarily meant the Western Allies would have defeat it easily in this scenario, but it means it would not be so simple for the Soviets do that with the Western Allies, that were comparable in strenght with a fully "active" Nazi Germany, which never existed just by their presence, and was capable of at least bring a stalemate to them.


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## Balljoint (Oct 4, 2012)

Jenisch said:


> Perhaps the Japanese surrender would be a problem in this scenario. Despite the nukes, they were prepared to resist an invasion, and the Allies obviously would be unable to launch an invasion of Japan in this scenario. The Soviet entering in the war against Japan was a profound shock to the Japanese. The planners of Unthinkable considerated the possibility that the Japanese might become allies of the Soviets. The Japanese probably would have accepted some conditional surrender from the Allies, since it preserved the power of the Emperor. However, had the Allies insisted in unconditional surrender, the Japanese would try to save their skin, and that could have lead to an alliance with the Russians.



Though Japan had troops throughout its “empire”, it was essentially defeated and could be quarantined with a relatively small force. But I agree a conditional surrender might well have been possible on terms not much different than those imposed during the occupation.


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## zoomar (Oct 4, 2012)

drgondog said:


> Also Do not discount the zeal that former Wermacht and LW veterans may have joined the West.



Talk about "idle speculation". There is absolutely no way to predict what the Western allies might have done if the German military (or what was left of it) offered its services to them in the context of a WW3 breaking out in 1945. Actually, I have no problem with idle speculation (since is what this entire thread is about), but there is probably less evidence to support this possibility than my earlier speculation that the USSR could have pushed well into western Europe and possibly caused a repeat of the situation in 1940. You raised some good points about the comparative strength of the two sides' military and aviation assets, especially the role of supply, so I will retract my statement that the Wallies would be "swept aside". The Soviets would find the going tough - and for different reasons both sides would find their new enemies harder to defeat than the Germans they had been fighting in 1944-45. However, unless the US opted for the atomic option on the battlefield, I still suspect that, if the USSR really wanted to, they could have pushed the Wallies basically out of most of France.


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## Jenisch (Oct 4, 2012)

Without conquer of the air Zoomar? I fail to remember a situation in WWII where the "victim" had a strong air force and was still defeated. And by stong air force, I mean an air arm capable of effectively take part in the fight - just the case of the Allies. The Allies had thousands of heavy bombers within the range of the Soviet supply lines, and they also had thousands of fighters and fighter-bombers, as well as tactical aircraft within the range of the Soviet lines. During Operation Barbarossa, the Soviets well tried to to launch counter-offensives, but the LW prevented them every time, by attacking the Russian supply lines and troops. While the VVS in this scenario would not be as incompetence as 1941, certainly a good fight would be ensured, which consequentely would not bring immediate results in the ground. Also, troops in the defensive role have a force mutiplier. This can be clearly perceived with the Western Allies and Soviets taking months to advance against the Germans, despite their numerical superiority and the fact the Germans practically didn't have an air force anymore.


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## zoomar (Oct 4, 2012)

Jenisch, I see your point, but the VVS was infinitely better equipped and trained in 1945. By saying the VVS of 1945 was just "not as incompetent" as in 1941 implies it was still incompetent. You can't compare how the VVS fared in the Barbarossa surprise assault to the modern VVS on offensive in 1945. Soviet frontal aviation (low-medium altitude fighters, ground attackers, and light/medium bombers) were fully equal to their Allied counterparts, and there was at least a numerical equivalence if not Soviet advantage. The only areas where the Allies would have had a clear technological advantage is in high-level strategic bombing, radar-equipped aircraft, and in the introduction of jet aircraft (all of which might not have an immediate effect on the ground). And of course nukes, but let's assume they are not used - since this changes everything. I agree that a Soviet invasion of western Germany and France in 1945 would have been fought under contested skies. But to say the Allies would have complete control of the air is wrong in my opinion.


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## Jenisch (Oct 4, 2012)

zoomar said:


> Jenisch, I see your point, but the VVS was infinitely better equipped and trained in 1945.



Imagine a stronger Luftwaffe. Would the Anglo-Americans be able to confront it? Yes. So...


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## Shortround6 (Oct 5, 2012)

zoomar said:


> Soviet frontal aviation (low-medium altitude fighters, ground attackers, and light/medium bombers) were fully equal to their Allied counterparts, and there was at least a numerical equivalence if not Soviet advantage. The only areas where the Allies would have had a clear technological advantage is in high-level strategic bombing, radar-equipped aircraft, and in the introduction of jet aircraft (all of which might not have an immediate effect on the ground).



The only way the "Soviet frontal aviation" was the equal of their "Allied counterparts" with the exception of the low-medium altitude fighters, was if they were flying lend-lease aircraft. Sorry but that is the way it was. Best Soviet bomber in the Spring/Summer of 1945 was the Tu-2. There were perhaps 300 or less in service? Please do not quote "Wiki" bomb loads, that is not how they were used in service. 
PE-2s had performed much good work during the war but were under armed by wars end. Max bomb load of 1000kg was two 500kg or four 250kg bombs carried on external racks. Internal bomb load was six 100kg bombs. Four in the fuselage bomb bay and one inside each engine nacelle. PE-2 carried what most US single engine fighters could carry as a max load. 
AS for the IL-4, the idea of operating this aircraft in daylight doesn't bear thinking about. And forget the Wiki numbers. Early versions were good for a 1000kg bomb load over a range of 3585KM at 340kph (211mph), another 700km was possible by flying at 250kph( 155mph). The heavier bomb loads will cut into range/performance rather severely. Again the Soviets did a lot of good work with them but this is almost like the US trying to use a B-18 in 1945. 
IL-2s are slow and carry a small bomb load. Soviet rockets were much smaller than the Allied rockets. The IL-2 was very important to the Soviets because their single engine fighters were worth crap for ground attack. If they carried bombs at all it was a pair of 100kg bombs. 6-8 RS-82 rockets? Warhead was 0.585kg with 0.36kg explosive. 
The Russian 20mm round used a light projectile and carried a proportionally light explosive charge or had less penetration than western 20mm ammunition. Russian fighters carried lighter gun armament than western aircraft. 
They may have been effective in air to air combat against western fighters but their ground attack ability or ability to shoot down western bombers in the numbers needed is suspect.


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## davparlr (Oct 5, 2012)

zoomar said:


> Soviet frontal aviation (low-medium altitude fighters, ground attackers, and light/medium bombers) were fully equal to their Allied counterparts, and there was at least a numerical equivalence if not Soviet advantage.


 
As I have stated before, there were several very high performing low altitude fighters available to the allies. In addition, since there was a clear high alitude advantage of the allied fighters, every time a Soviet aircraft took off he would have to watch high because there would be a untouched enemy just waiting to make a high speed attack.

Another question that needs to be answered is how would the Soviet advances in '43-'45 been affected if the Germans could have replaced their losses in manpower and materiel as the western allies would be able to do against the soviets.


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## Jenisch (Oct 5, 2012)

davparlr said:


> As I have stated before, there were several very high performing low altitude fighters available to the allies. In addition, since there was a clear high alitude advantage of the allied fighters, every time a Soviet aircraft took off he would have to watch high because there would be a untouched enemy just waiting to make a high speed attack.



Someone has the numbers of Soviet fighter types? If I'm not wrong, by '45 their majority was still "common" Yak-9s, which Western aircraft had advantage.



> Another question that needs to be answered is how would the Soviet advances in '43-'45 been affected if the Germans could have replaced their losses in manpower and materiel as the western allies would be able to do against the soviets.



The European Axis had conditions to at least have a stalemate with the Soviet Union. The Eastern Front was the most important front of the war in the sense that for achive victory, Hitler was counting with a Soviet collapse. The problem is that the view of a Red Army which practically won the war single-handely is becoming common, and does not represent the reality.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 5, 2012)

Basically in the Summer of 1945 the Soviets had Yak-9s of several types. Yak-3s and LA-5s 7s. Plus what ever lend lease fighters are airworthy. Lend lease fighters ( and bombers, A-20 and B-25s, etc) need 100/130 octane fuel. How many weeks/months supply do the Soviets have. Lend lease aircraft may need Western lubricants? They definitely need western spark plugs. Planes needed multiple spark plug changes before engine needed first overhaul. Soviets could probably make a spark plug that would work but every US or British spec spark plug made is a Soviet spark plug not made. US and British Spark plugs may use a different thread dia and pitch let alone heat range.


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## vinnye (Oct 5, 2012)

The soviets would have suffered enormous losses due to the western allies fighters and fighter bombers. Even tough the soviets had some well proven low altitude aircraft - as said before they would have been pounced on by P51's. Then the jet fighters could also be brought to bear - which the soviets had nothing to combat.
So even though the soviet ground forces were by this time well drilled and well equipped and motivated, unles they moved at night in in very poor weather - they would be badly mauled before they got far.
Also western tanks etc were being brought on line that would equal things up on the ground. The centurian was being delivered in 1945 and was the equal of most soviet offerings of the day.


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## Jenisch (Oct 5, 2012)

This is a hypotetical Cold War scenario. Cold War is not my area , so gonna ask: assuming the Soviets as agressors, it can be compared to other periods of the Cold War? I ask because the Soviets always had advantage in manpower, as well as numbers of armor and tactical aircraft, and I never heard that NATO would be doomed in a Soviet offensive.


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## Shortround6 (Oct 5, 2012)

There are numbers and there are numbers. 

In this scenario the Soviets are not really self sufficient yet. On their way but not there and a certain percentage of their strength is lend lease supplies which would run out fairly quick. A cold war scenario even a few years later would see the Soviet forces 100% home grown and supplied. It would also see partially restored rail lines and other transport networks in better shape making it harder for Western airpower to interdict supplies. 

During the early part of the cold war the west didn't realize ( or if it knew, did not publicly admit) that some of the soviet weapons suffered a much lower serviceability than western designs and they needed much larger numbers in order to ensure the same number of operational units. Each unit was much cheaper so it requires some careful study to figure out the actual differences in numbers and costs. Say for instance that the Russian tanks would suffer about 40% blown clutches in 4-5 days if hard driving. Each tank is cheaper than a western tank and clutches aren't that expensive in parts (man hours though?) compared to automatic transmissions. But if the Western tanks run longer between _major_ breakdowns how do you compare numbers?
Many Soviet jet engines had a very short overhaul life but again they were cheap, Soviet practice was to run the engines for a short period of hours and then swap the engine for a fresh one and send the old one back for a factory rebuild instead of the low level maintenance that many western units would perform at the local level on their more expensive engines. As long as there are enough spare engines ( and airframes) to keep the sortie rate up and the logistics train to get the engines back to the service point and fresh engines to the forward units all is well. 
It is a different way of thinking but 500 western aircraft or tanks are actually a bigger "number" than 500 Soviet tanks or aircraft because more of the soviet equipment will be out of service at any given time (after the first few days of a planned attack) Soviet equipment is cheaper so they can afford more to begin with.


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## Jenisch (Oct 5, 2012)

Shortround6, what is your view of the Lend-Lease for the Soviet-German front? There's a good number of respectable historians who claim it helped considerably, but was not decisive for the Soviet capability to defeat the Germans.

Something about LL aircraft:



> Robert Huhn Jones, in his study of Lend-Lease, tabulates 1663 Allied aircraft delivered to the Soviets by 1 November 1942—which he notes exceeded the number of modern Soviet-built aircraft used at Stalingrad.2 One of the greatest difficulties in assessing the Lend-Lease contributions to Russia is the lack of information about the Soviet employment of these aircraft. However, German sources have stated that after the spring of 1942 American and British aircraft were particularly noticeable on the Leningrad and Kuban fronts and that, on the latter, Allied aircraft sometimes outnumbered those built by the Soviets.



For the bombing:



> Moreover, the Germans, who were subjected to and could assess both Soviet and Western applications of air power, not only regretted their inability to cope with the Anglo-American strategic bombardment but saw their lack of such a capability as a decisive factor in their defeat in Russia.9



Soviet Air Power and Victory in World War II

In the last quote, I found a connection with this scenario. Apparentely, the Germans were confident that they had a realistic chance of at least stop the Russians, but the bombing prevented this. Again, if we put this factor in the equation, it can be seen that the "unstoppable" Red Army was perhaps not so strong as usually claimed. The Red Army's success late in the war own at least a significant part to the West. This includes German and other Axis troops allocated to other theaters, the majority of the LW, some elite Panzer and infantry divisions that packed a lot of firepower, and the bombing. 

Personally, I belive that Churchill was correct: the Russians should not have been trusted and armed in the way they were. The Allies went to the war to defend Poland, and in the end the same Poland fell behind the iron curtain. Had they not have been, perhaps Operation Unthinkable would be "Operation Plausible".


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## Shortround6 (Oct 6, 2012)

The question of lend lease is a difficult one because it is hard to get a good single source of what was actually shipped/received by the Russians. Tanks and Aircraft are actually a rather small part of the picture. 

My opinion, for what it is worth, is that lend lease was decisive in the defeat of the Germans. 

See this web site, perhaps it is not accurate or is post war propaganda? or there may be double entries ( same product listed in two places?) 

Complete List of Lend Lease to Russia including atomic materials

The west supplied over 450,000 motor vehicles and according to another web site by 1945 L-L trucks were about 30% of the truck park in 1945. cut supply to the troops by 30% and see how far the Russians would have advanced. 

This sentence from the article you linked to is an indication of the problem "The $11 billion of Lend-Lease also provided raw materials, foodstuffs, and technical assistance vital to Soviet sustenance and production." in that it glosses over the raw and not so raw materials supplied. Almost 400 million pounds of insulated copper wire, over 5.4 million pairs of boots/shoes, see page for of the list for the amount of steel sent to the Russia. 

The Russians may not have needed lend lease to stop the Germans and hold them. They needed lend lease to push them back and enter eastern Europe.


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## stug3 (Oct 6, 2012)

What if the Soviets acquire German jet engine technology as they actually did and manage to drag this hypothetical war out for a few years and start cranking out MiG-15s like they were cranking out T-34s, SKS and AK-47s? They had also been stealing our atomic bomb technology and copying the B-29. It would probably end up as a stalemate, but a nasty, Orwellian stalemate. Would the F-86 B-45 end up being the deciding factor?


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## tyrodtom (Oct 6, 2012)

Since the engine of the Mig 15 was a copy of the RR Nene, examples of which were supplied by some unthinking British trade officials to the Soviets. I don't think that's very likely to repeat itself under this scenario.


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## Balljoint (Oct 6, 2012)

Shortround6 said:


> Many Soviet jet engines had a very short overhaul life but again they were cheap, Soviet practice was to run the engines for a short period of hours and then swap the engine for a fresh one and send the old one back for a factory rebuild instead of the low level maintenance that many western units would perform at the local level on their more expensive engines. As long as there are enough spare engines ( and airframes) to keep the sortie rate up and the logistics train to get the engines back to the service point and fresh engines to the forward units all is well.
> It is a different way of thinking but 500 western aircraft or tanks are actually a bigger "number" than 500 Soviet tanks or aircraft because more of the soviet equipment will be out of service at any given time (after the first few days of a planned attack) Soviet equipment is cheaper so they can afford more to begin with.



A bit collateral, but it is rather like the rationale put forth for much of the Japanese aviation defeat according to a conversation several decades ago with a knowledgeable gentleman. I’ve lost his card, but he was the PTO engineer for Wright. In his view, the Japanese practice of shipping engines etc for factory servicing –tasks carried out in the field by the US- severely crippled their efforts, and ultimately shut them down with the US submarine blockade. 

Perhaps tactical aircraft would similarly take advantage of high maintenance logistics.


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## Ascent (Oct 8, 2012)

stug3 said:


> What if the Soviets acquire German jet engine technology as they actually did and manage to drag this hypothetical war out for a few years and start cranking out MiG-15s like they were cranking out T-34s, SKS and AK-47s? They had also been stealing our atomic bomb technology and copying the B-29. It would probably end up as a stalemate, but a nasty, Orwellian stalemate. Would the F-86 B-45 end up being the deciding factor?



The thing to remember is that the Western allies wouldn't stand still either. A lot of development programmes would have suddenly taken a major slow down with the end of the war that wouldn't happen in this scenario.


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