# Carrier air war "what if"....



## Lucky13 (Jun 24, 2009)

Was just wondering with all the WWII aircraft "what ifs" and thought, what if WWII had continued in such a way that more Shinano and Taiho carriers had seen action for the IJN and the Midway class for the USN. What would the aircraft be that they would have carried? Maybe Bearcat, Tigercat and Skyraider for the USN, but what for the IJN? How does these carriers compare to each other, I know that Shinano and Taiho had armored decks and the Midways wooden....


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## timshatz (Jun 24, 2009)

Not much difference in the war IMHO. By the time both sets of carriers were operational, the Carrier war had been pretty much decided. Japanese air groups were not up to snuff with the US Carrier Groups. Aircraft were lagging in production as well, less so in design. 

On top of that, the US was mass producing carriers while the Japanese were putting them out in ones and twos. In short, by the time the Shinano and Taiho came out, the war had become one of mass production to the extent that one or two ships really didn't matter. Just a couple more targets for the US Carrier Groups.


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## syscom3 (Jun 24, 2009)

Check this artical out at the IJN website.

Grim Economic Realities

Even without factoring in US land based airpower or escorts carriers, the Japanese were outnumbered 2-1 just by fleet carriers alone.


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## plan_D (Jun 24, 2009)

Yes, it could be considered a sad state of affairs when attempting to compare the technical abilities of nations but the fact of the matter is production won the war.


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## BombTaxi (Jun 24, 2009)

Even if the Japanese had been able to build the carriers, they would have struggled to find planes to put on them and pilots to fly the planes. IJN fighter resources were frittered away in lending plnes to the defence of islands and strongpoints - IIRC the defence of Rabaul led to the loss of some 120 planes drawn from carriers, leaving the IJN short of aircraft at the Marianas Turkey Shoot.

On a more general note, carriers with armoured flight decks tended to carry fewer planes - compare British Illustrious class fleet carriers with 36 planes to Essexs with over 90. This would leave the Japanese at an even greater disadvantage...


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## vikingBerserker (Jun 24, 2009)

True, but the US got around that simply by building bigger carriers (ie Midway).


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## syscom3 (Jun 24, 2009)

vikingBerserker said:


> True, but the US got around that simply by building bigger carriers (ie Midway).



Bigger carriers like the Midway didnt translate into better.

The navy discovered that it carried so many aircraft (of ww2 types) that it couldn't launch them all at once and more than a few sat in the hanger as a reserve.

Of course, once the AC got larger with the advent of jets, things changed a bit.


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## parsifal (Jun 25, 2009)

All this inevitable demise stuff aside, I think as a sheer technical excercise, both the jpoanese and the allies would have fielded some intersting aircraft.

The Japanese were intending to field the A7M "Sam" or Reppu fighter, and the the B7M "Grace". They also seem to have been toying with the idea of the C6 Saiun (I forget the code name). I am not so impressed with the Sam, but the strike aircraft appear to be awesome....fantastic ranges, well protected and extremely high speed, with top speeds whilst fully loaded in the high 300 knot range. They would have been hard to catch.

The Americans of course had their Bearcats and perhaps even the skyraiders, whilst the brits were intending to ambark the Sea Fury

Yjere may be others as well...and of course I dont know about carrier born jets... But just glancing over this, I would probably say that the Skyraider was the best bomber, whilst the B was the best torpedo bomber. I happen to think the Sea Fury was the best all round fighter out of this bunch.

But ther is no doubt, by 1945, even under the most favaourable of circumstances, the Japanese were going to be in deep trouble


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## parsifal (Jun 25, 2009)

syscom3 said:


> Bigger carriers like the Midway didnt translate into better.
> 
> The navy discovered that it carried so many aircraft (of ww2 types) that it couldn't launch them all at once and more than a few sat in the hanger as a reserve.
> 
> Of course, once the AC got larger with the advent of jets, things changed a bit.



I read somewhere that 60% of aircraft produced during the war in the US never left the country. If that is true, it just demonstrates the overwhelming industrial power of the US once it got into its stride


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## timshatz (Jun 25, 2009)

parsifal said:


> I read somewhere that 60% of aircraft produced during the war in the US never left the country. If that is true, it just demonstrates the overwhelming industrial power of the US once it got into its stride



Too true Parsifal. 

I was doing the math, just as an oddball exercise, of the financial affect of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The cost, in terms of ships, planes and other damage, came out to be a little under 100 million. Or at least that is the figure I heard thrown around. Further, the GDP of the United States in 1941 was 121Billion. So, if you take that number and consider the losses at Pearl Harbor as a function of GDP (considering GDP a function of industrial capacity), the attack on Pearl Harbor cost the US economy .08 of 1%. Put another way, the industrial capaicty of the US could've replaced all the equipment destroyed at Pearl Harbor in a little under 15 hours.

While this number does not take into consideration all the ins and outs of the economy, other requirements and is just an exercise in back of the cocktail napkin math, it does show the relative insignificance of the attack when taken with the capacity and potential of the US in 1941. 

You seriously have to wonder if Yammamoto (or any Japanese Senior Military Staff) actually sat down and did the math. War might've gone a different way if they had. 

Probably could've used an economist on their staff.


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## Glider (Jun 25, 2009)

timshatz said:


> You seriously have to wonder if Yammamoto (or any Japanese Senior Military Staff) actually sat down and did the math. War might've gone a different way if they had.
> 
> Probably could've used an economist on their staff.



I believe they did. Yamamoto was well known for being against the war I believe it was he who coined the phrase that they had woken a sleeping Tiger or something similar. In the UK the Japanese ambasador made a formal protest to his seniors that Japan was bound to lose any conflict simply because of the economic situation of both Japan and Germany. Unfortunately it wasn't the politicans who were in charge of policy, it was the Military. 
His price was to be dismissed, but the world would have been a different place had they listened to him.


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Jun 25, 2009)

Lucky13 said:


> Was just wondering with all the WWII aircraft "what ifs" and thought, what if WWII had continued in such a way that more Shinano and Taiho carriers had seen action for the IJN and the Midway class for the USN. What would the aircraft be that they would have carried? Maybe Bearcat, Tigercat and Skyraider for the USN, but what for the IJN? How does these carriers compare to each other, I know that Shinano and Taiho had armored decks and the Midways wooden....



Like everybody else has said, I think by that point it would be little signifance. I know the US had at least a dozen or more Essex class out in the Pacific, plus a horde of the smaller Escort carriers. Taking into the account of the lesser trained IJN pilots, low production in aircraft. I don't see the Shinano and Taiho class turning the tide of the war.


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## syscom3 (Jun 25, 2009)

Well, lets just assume they do clash.

USN has F8F's and F4U-4's for fleet defense (Hellcats relegated to 2nd string), F7F's for specialized uses, and Skyraiders for attack.

Can the Japanese put up anything to counter them?


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## diddyriddick (Jun 26, 2009)

Hardware aside, skilled pilots didn't exist for the IJN. IIRC, some of the pilots assigned to Ozawa's carrier force at Leyte were instructed to fly to land fields because they weren't carrier qualified. This alone makes this otherwise fine whatif a moot point.

Btw...the Yamamoto quote about the sleeping tiger is now believed to be a post-war quote. Kinda like Washington chopping down the cherry tree. Nice, but it didn't happen.


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## timshatz (Jun 26, 2009)

Glider said:


> I believe they did. Yamamoto was well known for being against the war I believe it was he who coined the phrase that they had woken a sleeping Tiger or something similar. In the UK the Japanese ambasador made a formal protest to his seniors that Japan was bound to lose any conflict simply because of the economic situation of both Japan and Germany. Unfortunately it wasn't the politicans who were in charge of policy, it was the Military.
> His price was to be dismissed, but the world would have been a different place had they listened to him.



I know Yammamoto understood the potential of the US, but I don't know that he actually did the math on it. He was so apposed to the war that the powers that be had him transfered to a fleet command to keep him from being assasinated. And, he had spent some time up at Harvard, no doubt studying economics amongst other things, and probably had a pretty good line on the forces involved. 

My thought was, did he, at any time during the planning of the attack, actually sit down and figure out what the cost would be in real dollars even if the attack was wildly successful? Did he tab it up, using even a wildly positive estimate of all the carriers being sunk and a couple of BBs as well? Toss in all the aircraft on the islands and you're still looking at under 100 million. Same numbers as before. 

At any time during the planning, did he say (paraphrasing), "Look, Guys, even if we hit every target available, destroy them all. Kill the carriers and the battleships and every airplane in sight, we're still looking at a nation that can replace all of it in the industrial equivelant of 2 working days. How are we going to beat these guys if our best shot is little more than a pinprick in real economic terms?"

I know the Japanese plan was to bleed the US into a negotiated settlement, believing they wouldn't fight. But you have to wonder is anyone had sat down and thought out what they would do if the US did fight. 

Seems a monumental underestimation of the potential and realities of their enemy.


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## diddyriddick (Jun 26, 2009)

timshatz said:


> At any time during the planning, did he say (paraphrasing), "Look, Guys, even if we hit every target available, destroy them all. Kill the carriers and the battleships and every airplane in sight, we're still looking at a nation that can replace all of it in the industrial equivelant of 2 working days. How are we going to beat these guys if our best shot is little more than a pinprick in real economic terms?"
> 
> I know the Japanese plan was to bleed the US into a negotiated settlement, believing they wouldn't fight. But you have to wonder is anyone had sat down and thought out what they would do if the US did fight.
> 
> Seems a monumental underestimation of the potential and realities of their enemy.



Don't know about that, but there is the famous quote that he could run wild for 6-12 months, but could guarantee nothing after that. The Japanese view from the beginning was that the US didn't have the will to fight. With that in mind, early victory was imperative. Responsible Japanese were under no illusions that they could fight a protracted war with the US.


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## BombTaxi (Jun 26, 2009)

Yamamoto did say that he could only win for the first six months - an estimate that proved eerily accurate as events unfolded at Midway. The only prospect for Japanese victory was to smash the US fighting capability, grab all the bits of SE Asia they needed to acheive autarky, and then get to the table and agree favourable terms. IMHO, if the US hadn't been backing the Allied Nations and gunning for revenge, they might have got away with it. But Yamamoto was under no illusions about the need to win a quick victory. His main mistake seems to have been in misjudging just how far the US was willing to go to seetle the account...

EDIT: Diiddy, you read my mind mate


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## Amsel (Jun 26, 2009)

Yamamoto knew that Imperial Japan had a chance to grab the South Pacific and other vital areas and then set up a good line of defense and sue for peace. I think that after the early victories he was drawn into the popular way of thinking that the Japanese were blessed by god and their destiny could offset the material mismatch. After Midway he quickly realized his error.


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## chip haehnel (Jun 26, 2009)

Past mind exercise is good , future exercise is necessary.I often wonder how well our Sino manufactured military equipment wii perform in the next conflict.ch


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## BombTaxi (Jun 26, 2009)

What Chinese-made systems does the US use?


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## timshatz (Jun 26, 2009)

BombTaxi said:


> Yamamoto did say that he could only win for the first six months - an estimate that proved eerily accurate as events unfolded at Midway. The only prospect for Japanese victory was to smash the US fighting capability, grab all the bits of SE Asia they needed to acheive autarky, and then get to the table and agree favourable terms. IMHO, if the US hadn't been backing the Allied Nations and gunning for revenge, they might have got away with it. But Yamamoto was under no illusions about the need to win a quick victory. His main mistake seems to have been in misjudging just how far the US was willing to go to seetle the account...
> 
> EDIT: Diiddy, you read my mind mate



I think Yammamoto was more considering the US capabiity in the Pacific more than the potential. While he understood the US had what it took to fight a protracted war more than Japan did, IMHO, he was looking fore at the ability of the US to get Carriers back into the Pacific and functional around a battle group after he'd destoryed the main US base and such Carriers as were available in the Pacific. With the Carriers goin and Pearl Harbor destroyed, it would set the US back to the point the Japanese would have a free hand on their advance in the far east. For him the math was about him having 10 or so Fleet Carriers to the US 3 Fleet Carriers and strength in the battle line. I am not so sure the industrial capacity really got into it. As it was, the US took two years to get the next Essex types out to the Pacific. 

Also, he knew his pilots and crews had seen combat, the US did not. That accounted for something. 

On another note, while the US had a great advantage in bases on Allied soil in the begining of the Pacific war, it also forced the US to fight to protect those bases. Australia, for instance, was a great base for McArthur's drive in SWPA. Airpower, Subs and Logistics were centered there in the begining of the war. However, it also had to be defended which drew troops there in the first place. Those troops later went into NG and fought in places such as Buna. 

But when you think about it, it may be a chicken and egg arguement with a tempering of "well, ya' gotta fight somewhere" and became a spring board on the way back to Japan.


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## syscom3 (Jun 26, 2009)

> On another note, while the US had a great advantage in bases on Allied soil in the begining of the Pacific war, it also forced the US to fight to protect those bases. Australia, for instance, was a great base for McArthur's drive in SWPA. Airpower, Subs and Logistics were centered there in the begining of the war. However, it also had to be defended which drew troops there in the first place. Those troops later went into NG and fought in places such as Buna.



All of those bases had to eb developed. NG was a small backwater town that had to be turned into a mjor base of operations. And that was it. Nothing else.

While many of the naval bases (Somoa and Fiji) in the pacific were being upgraded towards the end of 1941, there was still a lot of work to be done to make them capable of handling the strains of war.


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## diddyriddick (Jun 26, 2009)

BombTaxi said:


> Yamamoto did say that he could only win for the first six months - an estimate that proved eerily accurate as events unfolded at Midway. The only prospect for Japanese victory was to smash the US fighting capability, grab all the bits of SE Asia they needed to acheive autarky, and then get to the table and agree favourable terms. IMHO, if the US hadn't been backing the Allied Nations and gunning for revenge, they might have got away with it. But Yamamoto was under no illusions about the need to win a quick victory. His main mistake seems to have been in misjudging just how far the US was willing to go to seetle the account...
> 
> EDIT: Diiddy, you read my mind mate



Great minds, man. What can I say?

By all accounts, Japan had to win big and win early. What even Yamamoto realized was that a protracted war meant defeat.


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## wheelsup_cavu (Jun 26, 2009)

I remember reading that before the battle of Midway the Japanese played wargames using dice to simulate different scenarios.
No matter what the dice roll said would happen a referee/judge/admiral would overule the dice roll and the Japanese fleet would come out victorius.

Dice roll says no surprise at Midway-overruled by referee. Now fleet achieves total surprise and victory.
Multiple Carriers sunk-overruled no carries sunk and again total victory.

When I read the article it didn't seem that the Japanese were too worried about the outcome of the battle ahead.
The attack was going to happen and nothing was going to stop them.


Wheelsup


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## syscom3 (Jun 26, 2009)

wheelsup_cavu said:


> I remember reading that before the battle of Midway the Japanese played wargames using dice to simulate different scenarios.
> No matter what the dice roll said would happen a referee/judge/admiral would overule the dice roll and the Japanese fleet would come out victorius.
> 
> Dice roll says no surprise at Midway-overruled by referee. Now fleet achieves total surprise and victory.
> ...



Very true. The book "Shattered Sword" looks at that incident as well.


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## BombTaxi (Jun 27, 2009)

The Japanese certainly did make up wargame outcomes to suit themselves. But one must remember that the timing of the critical strike at Midway, catching the Japanese as they refuelled, was so fortutitous that no die roll could ever simulate it. I'm no statistician, but the odds on the sequence of events leading up to those bombs hitting would be very, very high. Given their progress up to that time, the Japanese could build a sound case that the carrier battle at Midway would actually go their way. They had been lucky up to that point, and at Midway, luck fell decisively to the Americans...


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## diddyriddick (Jun 27, 2009)

*Miracle at Midway* also covers the fixed Japanese wargames.


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## syscom3 (Jun 27, 2009)

BombTaxi said:


> The Japanese certainly did make up wargame outcomes to suit themselves. But one must remember that the timing of the critical strike at Midway, catching the Japanese as they refuelled, was so fortutitous that no die roll could ever simulate it. I'm no statistician, but the odds on the sequence of events leading up to those bombs hitting would be very, very high. Given their progress up to that time, the Japanese could build a sound case that the carrier battle at Midway would actually go their way. They had been lucky up to that point, and at Midway, luck fell decisively to the Americans...



Read the book "Shattered Sword". The Japanese operations on June 4th reminded me of a boxer (the US) who keeps jabbing at his opponent (the IJN) and never allows him to throw a punch, and then finally decks him as he is worn down.

Some Japanese sources say the Midway battle was Japans best planned defeat.


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## BombTaxi (Jun 27, 2009)

The Americans certainly showed a tenacity and determination that the Japaneres would have done well to emulate. But I firmly believe that had it not been for the incredibly fortuitous timing of the US dive bomber strike, the Japanese would have escaped with much less damage inflicted. Time and again in war, luck counts for even more than planning or equipment - Samar strikes me as a another engagement where Lady Luck really smiled upon the US Navy.

I should really read up a bit more on Midway though - the only monograph I have read on the battle is Walter Lord's _Incredible Victory_. I think the title does much to sum up the luck the USN had against statistically and militarily superior forces.


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Jun 27, 2009)

BombTaxi said:


> The Americans certainly showed a tenacity and determination that the Japaneres would have done well to emulate. But I firmly believe that had it not been for the incredibly fortuitous timing of the US dive bomber strike, the Japanese would have escaped with much less damage inflicted. Time and again in war, luck counts for even more than planning or equipment - Samar strikes me as a another engagement where Lady Luck really smiled upon the US Navy.
> 
> I should really read up a bit more on Midway though - the only monograph I have read on the battle is Walter Lord's _Incredible Victory_. I think the title does much to sum up the luck the USN had against statistically and militarily superior forces.



Well, I'm reading Shattered Swords right now, and I'm up to the part where the dive bombers attack. The Yortown's squadrons were the only ones able to coordinate an attack. I think Bombing 3 attacked around the same time Torpedo 3 went in, Vt-3 at Hiryu, and VB-3 at Soryu. I will agree though, a little luck played in, though I think the Japanese CAP was stretched too far, and during the previous attacks, the CAP would converge on a single attack. If I'm reading the book correctly, the CAP was ill suited to counter multiple attacks from the Americans.


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## syscom3 (Jun 27, 2009)

Vassili Zaitzev said:


> .....If I'm reading the book correctly, the CAP was ill suited to counter multiple attacks from the Americans.



Yes, and I will also mention that the IJN had essentially no radio coverage or doctrine to allow coordinated defenses to be made.


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Jun 27, 2009)

Yes, from what I've read, the escorts would fire shells or emit smoke to alert the CAP fighters. I also think the IJN was too focused on torpedo attacks, and had target fixation on the US torpedo squadrons.


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## BombTaxi (Jun 28, 2009)

The luck, as I see it, was in the dive bombers attacking at exactly the time the Japanese were re-arming planes. Loads of combustibles sitting around just waiting to be hit by a bomb. Half an hour either way, and the Japanese might have left Midway with damaged carriers instead of sunk ones. 

The target fixation on torpedo bombers is perhaps understandable - iunder normal circumstances the torpedo is deadlier than the bomb, and fleets had compliocated anti-torpedo measures in place well before WWI. At Jutland, the Grand Fleet battle line totally disengaged to avoid a torpedo attacck, so you can see how important torpedo defense was, and no doubt the Japanese felt the same.


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## syscom3 (Jun 28, 2009)

BombTaxi said:


> The luck, as I see it, was in the dive bombers attacking at exactly the time the Japanese were re-arming planes. Loads of combustibles sitting around just waiting to be hit by a bomb. .....



One other thing ...... the Japanese carriers had fully enclosed hanger decks. The 1000 pound bombs going off in them were amplified in the confined spaces.


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## timshatz (Jun 29, 2009)

BombTaxi said:


> The luck, as I see it, was in the dive bombers attacking at exactly the time the Japanese were re-arming planes. Loads of combustibles sitting around just waiting to be hit by a bomb. Half an hour either way, and the Japanese might have left Midway with damaged carriers instead of sunk ones.
> 
> The target fixation on torpedo bombers is perhaps understandable - iunder normal circumstances the torpedo is deadlier than the bomb, and fleets had compliocated anti-torpedo measures in place well before WWI. At Jutland, the Grand Fleet battle line totally disengaged to avoid a torpedo attacck, so you can see how important torpedo defense was, and no doubt the Japanese felt the same.



In "Shattered Sword", the author makes a point of pointing out the difference between the Japanese fighter direction and the US fighter direction. The Japanese was organic, meaning the fighters flowed to the point at which the attack was coming. Very much like white blood cells attack an infection in the body. Swarming defense. Very effective if you are being attacked from one direction. Not very good against an attack from multiple directions (intentional or not).

Whereas the US had radar directed interception, with some methodologies copied from the Brits. While it was in it's infancy and not very advanced, it was better than the Japanese method. Later in the war, refinements made it pretty effective. But at Midway, it gave the US the ability to locate an incoming raid furhter out than AAA range. That made a huge difference.


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Jun 29, 2009)

I found something pretty interesting reading Shattered Sword. R Leonard's father was in Midway, correct? Because I found a passage that mentions a Lt. Bill Leonard. Here, I'll paraphrase it. It's taken when Tomonagas Kate's launched their attack on CV-5. 

"Here, though, he had found another Grumman coming at him head-on, firing. Damaged, the _Kanko_ jettisioned its fish and turned for a suicide run against the carrier. But the Wildcat, piloted by Lt. Bill Leonard, stuck to his tail, firing from below and setting the torpedo plane on fire. In the end, Leonard brought the _kanko_ down, crashing it off _Yorktown's_ port bow.


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## Butters (Jun 30, 2009)

If you're going to play this game, you ought'a include the improved USN submarine tactics and torpedoes. You know, like the ones that sank the vaunted Shinano before it ever entered service...

JL


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