# Hurricane vs.Bf-110



## tomo pauk (Dec 24, 2008)

It's time to clash the two classics. Which one was better one-on-one, then, in many different roles, then, whatever you can think of it.


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## Flyboy2 (Dec 24, 2008)

I think it is pretty obvious that one-on-one the Hurricane wins over the Bf-110, as combat experience during the Battle of Britian shows. Bf-110's were just to heavy to combat with the faster and nimbler Hurricanes. In a dogfight, I believe that the Hurricane wins.
However in different roles the Bf-110 wins because of its night fighter varients but I think that is a comparison of two completely different aircraft. The Hurricane is a single engined fighter while the Bf-110 is a twin engined fighter bomber/night fighter.


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## lesofprimus (Dec 24, 2008)

The 110 was meant as a long range escort...


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## KrazyKraut (Dec 24, 2008)

... but it turned out it didn't do that very well. So like Flyboy2 said, 1 on 1 a Hurricane will have the edge. As far as many different roles are concerned, the Bf 110 pretty much did them all at one point or another.


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## Clay_Allison (Dec 24, 2008)

A three seat fighter is just as silly a prewar idea as a self-defending bomber. The British should have called the 110 the acemaker. Might as well try to dogfight in an SBD Dauntless.


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## Thorlifter (Dec 24, 2008)

Flyboy2 said:


> I think it is pretty obvious that one-on-one the Hurricane wins over the Bf-110, as combat experience during the Battle of Britian shows. Bf-110's were just to heavy to combat with the faster and nimbler Hurricanes. In a dogfight, I believe that the Hurricane wins.
> However in different roles the Bf-110 wins because of its night fighter varients but I think that is a comparison of two completely different aircraft. The Hurricane is a single engined fighter while the Bf-110 is a twin engined fighter bomber/night fighter.



I agree with you the Hurricane wins hands down one on one. But I wouldn't be so quick to dismiss the Hurricane when comparing these two planes in accomplishing multiple roles. The Hurricane was a good fighter, fighter/bomber, attack, navy fighter (sea hurricane and the Hurricats), and intruder.


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## Juha (Dec 24, 2008)

Now Bf 110 wasn’t as bad as its reputation is in English speaking countries. I would say that Hurricane I had a bit more than slight edge over Bf 110C/D. In North-Africa Hurricane I Trops (it had worse performance than normal Mk I) fought a draw against Bf 110Cs/Ds before Bf 109s arrived there. Usually in those combats the side which saw the enemy first got better results. So IMHO Hurricane Mk I Trop and Bf 110C/D were more or less equal.

Juha


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## Eurofighter (Dec 24, 2008)

As everyone here has already pointed out the Hurricane had the edge against the Me 110 but since the doctrine of a heavy fighter proved to be a failure in the Battle of Britain the 110 was however a very succesful aircraft in several other roles.


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## kool kitty89 (Dec 24, 2008)

There were some cases where twin engine 2-seat "cruiser" or "destroyer" type aircraft were actually superior to their single engined single seat contemporaries. In particular there is the Fokker G.I, which could out-climb, out run, and had similar maneuverability (worse roll, better turn) than the Fokker D.XXI.

I beleive the Bf 110C was actually slightly faster (~10-15 mph) than the Hurricane Mk.I, should be better in a dive as well, though climb, turn, and maneuverability were worse and while speed is the most important factor the difference here is too small to be difinative. (it could probably use Boom Zoom tactics, though this ability depends on the situation)


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## JoeB (Dec 24, 2008)

Juha said:


> Now Bf 110 wasn’t as bad as its reputation is in English speaking countries. I would say that Hurricane I had a bit more than slight edge over Bf 110C/D. In North-Africa Hurricane I Trops (it had worse performance than normal Mk I) fought a draw against Bf 110Cs/Ds before Bf 109s arrived there. Usually in those combats the side which saw the enemy first got better results. So IMHO Hurricane Mk I Trop and Bf 110C/D were more or less equal.


Another example is Hurricane v Bf110 combats on the Continent in 1940 before the BoB, also about even. There's a tendency to judge too much based on the BoB, assuming it typical when in fact it was a relative low point in German fighter effectiveness in the whole first half of WWII. Goes for 109 v Brit fighter comparisons too, the 109* held a greater advantage in most other situations into 1943 than it did in the BoB.

*109 units, not 'pure plane v plane combat effectiveness' which I doubt is possible to fully factually analyze.

Joe


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 26, 2008)

It depends on the role being used. As a fighter I would take a Hurricane any day, but the 110 was a very decent (not the best) night fighter.

I also do not see what having 3 seats has to do with anything...


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## Clay_Allison (Dec 28, 2008)

I'd take my chances flying nearly any early war single seat fighter against the BF-110 one on one (M.S.406, Polikarpov I-16, C.200, Fiat G.50, Brewster Buffalo, Seversky P-35) I might be unfair, but it was a 3 seat light bomber, not a fighter.


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## delcyros (Dec 28, 2008)

I take the chance to defend the underdog.
What does the Bf-110C has as advantage against the Hurricane?
(A)It has a significant speed advantage, beeing lowest at the deck but increasing with altitude. Some Hurricane´s have 100 oct. fuel 12lbs boost, allowing them to keep up with the 110C at low and medium altitudes but generally spoken, the 110C is faster except for a short timeframe at BoB where no DB-601N is yet deployed but the Hurricane does have the 12 lbs boost.
(B) It dives faster. In fact, the limiting dive speed is 50 kp/h larger on the 110C than was on the -109E. It also dives while keeping the engines under power during negative g-loads
(C) It has the most deadly armement of fighters from that period. 2x20mm MGFF/M and four LMG concentrated into the nose gives more than an argument. Don´t attack a 110C head on!
(D) It has a significant range advantage
(E) It climbs better than a Hurricane!
(F) It may take more punishment than a single engined A/C

Of course, the 110C also has a share of it´s problems:

(I) It´s roll charackteristics are poor, esspeccially in initial roll rate, meaning that more agile fighters do have an general edge in maneuverability
(II) While it has a good rate of turn for a twin, it does not match the turnrate of the Hurricane
(III) Worse than all, it has a poor acceleration, meaning that low slow, the 110C driver has very few options
(IV) It´s a large target to hit

Theoretically spoken, good 110C driver may use the superior level speed, climb and dive to boom zoom a Hurricane to death, firing with it´s heavy nose armement during the pass while keeping the initiative.
If I compare these arbitrary selected advantages disadvantages it looks for me personally quite a bit like the setup for the P-47C in 1943 over Germany: worser acceleration, maneuverability and climb but better high altitude performance, faster and better diving ability with quite a good armement. 
What do You think?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 28, 2008)

Clay_Allison said:


> I might be unfair, but it was a 3 seat light bomber, not a fighter.



Again I ask, what does 3 seats have to do with it?


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## KrazyKraut (Dec 28, 2008)

It was originally designed with three seats (as requested by the original heavy fighter doctrine), this was later changed to the two seat arrangement.

It's the reason why the cockpit is comparably long and also the reason why it could be made into a pretty decent night fighter (unlike the Me 210/410).


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## claidemore (Dec 28, 2008)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Again I ask, what does 3 seats have to do with it?



Dead weight. (Eventually!)


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## Kwiatek (Dec 28, 2008)

delcyros said:


> I take the chance to defend the underdog.
> What does the Bf-110C has as advantage against the Hurricane?
> (A)It has a significant speed advantage, beeing lowest at the deck but increasing with altitude. Some Hurricane´s have 100 oct. fuel 12lbs boost, allowing them to keep up with the 110C at low and medium altitudes but generally spoken, the 110C is faster except for a short timeframe at BoB where no DB-601N is yet deployed but the Hurricane does have the 12 lbs boost.
> (B) It dives faster. In fact, the limiting dive speed is 50 kp/h larger on the 110C than was on the -109E. It also dives while keeping the engines under power during negative g-loads
> ...



I think that Bf 110 C-4 with Db 601 A-1 engine dont have such adventage over Hurricane like many think. Hurricane during BoB time with Merlin III engine was allowed to 12 lbs with 100 octane fuel. So at low alt the maximum speed od Hurricane was very close to Bf 110. Hurricane reach its maximum speed at lower alt ~3500m then Bf 110 which reach maximum at 4500m so at higher alts 110 have small adventage but not so much. Hurricane have small adventage in climb rate, manouverbility and acceleration. Service celling was the same. 
Dont know what was 110C -4 maximum dive speed - Hurricane had 650 km/h - so possilby 110 have here some adventages. Generally great adventage of 110 was armement.
I think thats way 110 pilots was little shocked over Britain - their Destroyers were not so good like they thought.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 28, 2008)

KrazyKraut said:


> It was originally designed with three seats (as requested by the original heavy fighter doctrine), this was later changed to the two seat arrangement.
> 
> It's the reason why the cockpit is comparably long and also the reason why it could be made into a pretty decent night fighter (unlike the Me 210/410).



Yes I know, but I would still like him to explain why that puts it at a disadvantage over the Hurricane.


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## slaterat (Dec 28, 2008)

In their designed roles the 110 was an absolute failure, as a long range escort fighter, the Hurricane a complete success as a short range interceptor/bomber destroyer . In their second lives they both found success the 110 as a nightfighter and the Hurricane in ground attack.

JoeB wrote


> Another example is Hurricane v Bf110 combats on the Continent in 1940 before the BoB, also about even. There's a tendency to judge too much based on the BoB, assuming it typical when in fact it was a relative low point in German fighter effectiveness in the whole first half of WWII. Goes for 109 v Brit fighter comparisons too, the 109* held a greater advantage in most other situations into 1943 than it did in the BoB.



So is it only fair to count situations where The Germans had the advantage? Even with the advantages of combat experience, superior tactics and concentration of force, the 110 might of been 1:1 with the Hurricane in France. This is fighting against Hurricanes with a 2 blade fixed pitch prop or 2 pitch 3 blade props, 80 oct fuel and guns set to an 800 yd convergence.The Hurricane that took part in the Battle of Britain was greatly improved over the ones operating in France in 39-40 Sometimes refered to as the Hurricane 1a, a BoB hurricane has 100 oct fuel, 12 lbs boost, dixon/dewilde ammo, 250 yds convergence, ejector exhaust, 3 blade constant speed prop. Combine these improvements with better tactics ,ie finger 4, and combat experienceand its a whole new ball game.

Slaterat


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## Clay_Allison (Dec 28, 2008)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Again I ask, what does 3 seats have to do with it?


You design a place for another human being, you get a bunch of added on weight as well as changing the shape of the airframe to a less aerodynamic one. 

As a night fighter, having the extra space to put the radar in was a good thing and it was probably on par with the Black Widow and the Mosquito in that role.

Had it been designed as a lighter more streamlined single seat aircraft, it might have been comparable to a P-38. Something like the Fw-187 but with 601s instead of Jumos.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 28, 2008)

Clay_Allison said:


> You design a place for another human being, you get a bunch of added on weight as well as changing the shape of the airframe to a less aerodynamic one.



Yes I understand that, I work with aircraft so I have a decent knowledge of how that works.

The two aircraft were designed for two different purposes and used in different roles from one another, hence the difference in design. Therefore it is irrelevant. Just my opinion however. 



Clay Allison said:


> Had it been designed as a lighter more streamlined single seat aircraft, it might have been comparable to a P-38. Something like the Fw-187 but with 601s instead of Jumos.



I can see where you are coming from, and in that case I can agree with you.

But being how the aircraft was designed, I think it is worthless to compare.


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## Clay_Allison (Dec 28, 2008)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Yes I understand that, I work with aircraft so I have a decent knowledge of how that works.
> 
> The two aircraft were designed for two different purposes and used in different roles from one another, hence the difference in design. Therefore it is irrelevant. Just my opinion however.
> 
> ...


To be fair the 110 was designed for a role that should have brought it into dogfighting contact with the Hurricane. It filled a different role (night fighting) but it was supposed to be a long range escort.

It occurred to me as I was reading on the Battle of Britain that had the Germans had any kind of heavy bomber, even one equivalent to the unfairly criticised B-24 Liberator, the British would have beend in deep trouble in the battle of Britain.


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## delcyros (Dec 28, 2008)

To be fair, not every Hurricane Spitfire had 100 oct. fuel and 12 lbs boost during BoB. 100 oct. fuel was aviable in limited quantity, only. The Bf-110C captured and tested by the RAE at BoB was found to be faster than their contemporary Hurricane´s at all altitudes but as Hohun pointed out, the test data is likely a freak event and has to be carefully interpreted.
Limiting dive speed on the 110C was 750 Km/h vs. 700 Km/h for the Bf-109E and ca. 650 Km/h for the Hurricane.
The 110C has a significant cruise speed advantage over the Hurricane and while the climb rate is in within the same range, the Hurricane achieves it´s best climb at a much lower speed and steeper climb angle and thus may be outzoomed by a 110C driver in a climb duel who uses the superior excess speed at equal climb rates.
Remember that the 110C was ordered to fly close escort during BoB! In such a situation, this A/C couldn´t benefit from any of it´s advantages but heavily exposed all it´s weaknesses, most notably the low acceleration, low maneuverability and large target size!
Nevertheless, the 110C was underperforming but not terribly from a statistical perspective. During the august september 1940 period, the 110C Gruppen claimed 213 enemy A/C destroyed (9 of those are night claims) for the loss of 199 Bf-110C to enemy action (+10 losses in non operational flights and 12 in landing accidents). A number of these claims relate to RAF or coastal command bombers and seaplanes but the majority were RAF fighters. Given the typical range of overclaiming You would expect a trade ratio of two Bf-110 for each kill. The close escort orders significantly contributed to the result but nevertheless that´s a reasonable account for an underdog facing 100 oct. Hurricane Spitfire.
Imagine the P-47 would have been ordered to fly close escorts with B-17 formations over Germany in 1943/44!







This is a speed comparison for the BoB -Hurricane with 12 lbs boost 100 oct. fuel and a typical BoB Bf-110C with DB-601A. The Hurricane Bf-110C appear to be equally fast at altitudes below 14.000ft. while at higher altitudes, the -110c has definitely an edge in performance over the 100 oct. Hurricane. Those Hurrianes to run on lower grade fuel and 6.25 lbs overboost will suffer from inferior top speed at all atlitudes. I personally tend to believe that top speed is not as important as acceleration.


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## slaterat (Dec 28, 2008)

delcyros wrote


> To be fair, not every Hurricane Spitfire had 100 oct. fuel and 12 lbs boost during BoB. 100 oct. fuel was aviable in limited quantity,



By August 1940 fighter command was running completely on 100 oct fuel. Testing was done in march 1940.



> Remember that the 110C was ordered to fly close escort during BoB!



Only partly true, Luftwaffe fighters were also assigned to fly in front of and above the bomber units. German fighters often held the altitude advantage over RAF intercepting fighters.



> Nevertheless, the 110C was underperforming but not terribly from a statistical perspective. During the august september 1940 period, the 110C Gruppen claimed 213 enemy A/C destroyed (9 of those are night claims) for the loss of 199 Bf-110C to enemy action (+10 losses in non operational flights and 12 in landing accidents). A number of these claims relate to RAF or coastal command bombers and seaplanes but the majority were RAF fighters. Given the typical range of overclaiming You would expect a trade ratio of two Bf-110 for each kill



The Luftwaffe overclaimed at a rate of nearly 3 to 1 during the BoB, making 110 kills close to 70 against 200 losses or almost 1:3.

The performance curves you have for the Hurricane at 6.25 lbs are a little on the slow side. Also the switch to 100 oct and 12lbs had no affect above
17,000 ft

I suppose I'm being a little too picky, essentially Delcyros, we probably agree. If the 110s are equal in numbers, and use the right tactics, with very little margin for error, they could pull it off using their very heavy firepower.

Slaterat


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## delcyros (Dec 29, 2008)

> By August 1940 fighter command was running completely on 100 oct fuel. Testing was done in march 1940.


That is particularely interesting, slaterat. Do You happen to have a fuel quantity analysis for the timeframe in question?



> Only partly true, Luftwaffe fighters were also assigned to fly in front of and above the bomber units. German fighters often held the altitude advantage over RAF intercepting fighters.


Depending on event and situation, I agree. Just wanted to point out that it was a close escort situation and event when 110C Gruppen required to be escorted by Bf-109 Gruppen, not a freie Jagd situation when they were free to apply their tactics on their own.
I am not going to say that the Bf-110C was the better plane but it was a significantly more capable if flown to it´s tactical performance envelope than BoB does imply.



> The Luftwaffe overclaimed at a rate of nearly 3 to 1 during the BoB, making 110 kills close to 70 against 200 losses or almost 1:3.


While it is true that the Luftwaffe as a whole overclaimed three to one, one should remmember that this includes bomber claims. Realistically spoken, I used to ignore the bomber claims and concentrate on the fighter claims for the comparison. It appears that at BoB an even two to one claim rate for german and englisch fighter groups can be established, which matches pretty well other events.
(nobody would seriously count bomber claims in the Battle over Germany, don´t?)



> The performance curves you have for the Hurricane at 6.25 lbs are a little on the slow side. Also the switch to 100 oct and 12lbs had no affect above
> 17,000 ft


I happen to use Mike Williams site for the Hurricane performance. While there are some graphs for better performance Hurricanes, they do relate to individual planes in a state pre BoB, meaning no pilot armour, armoured windscreen and bulletproof bulkhead infront of the cockpit. At BoB, these were refitted to all remaining Hurricane I, resulting in the performance of the red graph. I happen to have doublechekced this source with a later, 1943 Hurricane source, which doesn´t show altitude drop but 6.25 12 lbs boost speeds and both do match nicely in within a range of individual performance differences, making me feel that it´s a reasonable extrapolation. But You are basically right, that are only two relevant RAF sources, perhaps I should compile a larger number of test results. Unfortunately, I am limited to these two ones as they do match the BoB condition Hurricane best and I don´t see any point in using fixed pitch prop or lighter airframe tests as those were hardly in use by BoB period.


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## Kurfürst (Dec 29, 2008)

slaterat said:


> By August 1940 fighter command was running completely on 100 oct fuel. Testing was done in march 1940.



So far no evidence is that so it remains on the list of wishful Mike Williams claims.

What is known that 16 (out of 50-60) RAF fighter Squadrons and two Blenheim Squadrons used 100 octane fuel in the Battle, a wider use was proposed in August but as evidenced by the unchanging level of actual fuel consumption, _none of that was realized, and remained just that, a plan._

It would appear that most Hurricanes and RAF fighters ran at 87 octane fuel through most of the Battle. BTW, at the start of the Battle it should be noted that three Bf 110 wings, or about 100 aircraft, about half of the 110s, had the improved DB 601N engine, and was running on 100 octane fuel.


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## KrazyKraut (Dec 29, 2008)

As already pointed out it's nonsense to evaluate the 110 (as a fighter) based on the BoB alone. It performed well during 1939 and early 1940 campaigns and held its own over North Africa against Hurricanes (until the arrival of better fighters) and was important again in the Balkans campaign (don't know about Barbarossa).


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## steelDUST (Dec 29, 2008)

What a head-on comparison!

The Bf110 only excelled in firepower vs the mosquito. Though badly mauled as escort fighters during the BoB, it is not without distinction esp in nightfighting in continental europe.
Meanwhile, the DH98 mosquito distinguished itself in almost all aspect of twin-engined fighter performances eventhough many of which had been destroyed in nightfighting by the He219 Uhu.

The mosquito wins in this comparison.

But I think the most ideal twin-engined plane to be clashed head-on aginst the mosquito should be the Fw187 Falke of which the only 3 aircraft produced were much more preferred by a Jagdstaffel in Norway than the Bf110. Unfortunately, RLM and Nazi Germany got very small interest in the 187 project and were relegated to defending the Bremen industrial complex. They were even used by Goebbels as the new state-of-the-art heavy fighter in the 1940s.


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## Hop (Dec 29, 2008)

> To be fair, not every Hurricane Spitfire had 100 oct. fuel and 12 lbs boost during BoB.



Fighter Command had switched completely to 100 octane fuel some time before the BoB began.



> 100 oct. fuel was aviable in limited quantity



British aviation fuel stocks at the start of September 1939 were 153,000 tons of 100 octane, 323,000 tons of other grades. 

By February 1940, when the decision to start using 100 octane was made, there were 220,000 tons in stock.

In early November 1940, just after the BoB, British stocks were 500,000 tons of 100 octane, and a similar amount of other grades.

According to Wood and Dempster, between 11 July and 10 October, Fighter Command used 22,000 tons of 100 octane. With a Spitfire or Hurricane using about 85 gallons maximum (no drop tanks at the time) that's 612 lbs of fuel for a full sortie, assuming they landed with empty tanks.

With 2,240 lbs in a British ton, that's enough 100 octane for just over 80,000 sorties (assuming each sortie empties the tanks). According to Hooton, quoting RAF records, Fighter Command flew 50,500 sorties in the period.

I presume the extra fuel was used in ground running, flight testing etc, but it's clear that fuel consumed was easily enough to allow for all flights.

Lastly, the evidence is in the records. Go to Mike Williams site and he has the combat reports from every Spitfire squadron that showed they used 100 octane in combat. (from memory 1 squadron is missing, but I suspect that's one of those that saw little or no fighting).

ALL the evidence shows FC used 100 octane exclusively. I have seen no evidence that suggests otherwise.



> So far no evidence is that so it remains on the list of wishful Mike Williams claims.
> 
> What is known that 16 (out of 50-60) RAF fighter Squadrons and two Blenheim Squadrons used 100 octane fuel in the Battle, a wider use was proposed in August but as evidenced by the unchanging level of actual fuel consumption, none of that was realized, and remained just that, a plan.



Against the evidence from the official records, Kurfurst has a forum posting by an Australian who claimed to have seen documents to that effect in the Australian archives, and was recalling them from memory.

However, the simple explanation of the Australian's recollections is that what he saw was *the plans from early 1939, not the actions of 1940*.

The key is in the numbers. Note the *16 fighter squadrons and 2 Blenheim squadrons* Kurfurst quotes.

From The Narrow Margin of Criticality: The Question of the Supply of 100-Octane Fuel in the Battle of Britain by Gavin Bailey:



> RAF tests with 100-octane had begun in 1937, but clearance for operational use was withheld as stocks were built up. *In March 1939*, the Air Ministry decided to introduce 100-octane fuel into use with *sixteen fighter and two twin-engined bomber squadrons by September 1940*, when it was believed that the requirement to complete the war reserve stock would have been met, with the conversion of squadrons beginning at the end of 1939


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## Glider (Dec 29, 2008)

Kurfürst said:


> So far no evidence is that so it remains on the list of wishful Mike Williams claims.
> 
> What is known that 16 (out of 50-60) RAF fighter Squadrons and two Blenheim Squadrons used 100 octane fuel in the Battle, a wider use was proposed in August but as evidenced by the unchanging level of actual fuel consumption, _none of that was realized, and remained just that, a plan._
> 
> It would appear that most Hurricanes and RAF fighters ran at 87 octane fuel through most of the Battle. BTW, at the start of the Battle it should be noted that three Bf 110 wings, or about 100 aircraft, about half of the 110s, had the improved DB 601N engine, and was running on 100 octane fuel.



The attached lisk shows a copy of the instruction dated 7th August authorising the use of 100 octane was authorised for use in all Commands. Note the use of the word Commands, not other fighter units, or other groups in Fighter Coammand but Commands. The only other commands include Bomber Command, Training etc, there were no other Fighter Commands in the UK.

The clear implication being that Fighter Command was already using it. Even if there were was some obscure corner of Fighter Command that wasn't, this allows the use of 100 octane.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100oct-7aug40-allcommands.jpg

Kurfurst
Every time this topic crops up you keep trotting out the theory that only a small proportion of Fighter command used 100 Octane. Is your only source an Australian who was looking at a 1939 report as HOP states, or have you something more substantial to support your claim, if so can I ask what it is?

PS re the widespread use of 100 Octane in the Luftwaffe, can I ask how widespread it was? I note that you asay that at the start of the BOB approx 100 Me110 were using the DB601N. However at the end of January 1941 the number was about 150. An increase of about 50 aircraft over 4 months doesn't seem a huge increase, so I was wondering if the figures were accurate.


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## Kwiatek (Dec 29, 2008)

Kurfürst said:


> So far no evidence is that so it remains on the list of wishful Mike Williams claims.
> 
> What is known that 16 (out of 50-60) RAF fighter Squadrons and two Blenheim Squadrons used 100 octane fuel in the Battle, a wider use was proposed in August but as evidenced by the unchanging level of actual fuel consumption, _none of that was realized, and remained just that, a plan._
> 
> It would appear that most Hurricanes and RAF fighters ran at 87 octane fuel through most of the Battle. BTW, at the start of the Battle it should be noted that three Bf 110 wings, or about 100 aircraft, about half of the 110s, had the improved DB 601N engine, and was running on 100 octane fuel.



Did you have maby any detailed info or confitmation about DB 601 N in Bf 110 C-4? I need it to our small Il2 mod project. We dont know really if 110 C-4/B had 601 N and what was their perfomance expecially speed and climb at different alt. If you have any info plz send it to me.
The same about maximum dive speed. I cant find any info about these.


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## ponsford (Dec 29, 2008)

Hi gents:

There’s quite a bit of interesting documentation about the Hurricane’s performance, 100 octane fuel use during the Battle of France, over Dunkirk and during the Battle of Britain, as well as combat reports and pilot’s accounts noting +12 lbs boost, pulling the plug, etc. at these pages:

Hurricane Mk I Performance
Hurricane Mk I Combat Report
Spitfire Mk I versus Me 109 E


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## Kurfürst (Dec 29, 2008)

Hop said:


> Fighter Command had switched completely to 100 octane fuel some time before the BoB began.



Thats very nice for fantasy and wishful thinking, however there is no evidence for it. You are welcome to post that evidence.

There's evidence, however, that 100 octane was only supplied to selected fighter stations, and only 16 Sqns of Fighters and 2 Squadrons of Blenheims were concerned.

More later.


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## Kurfürst (Dec 29, 2008)

Kwiatek said:


> Did you have maby any detailed info or confitmation about DB 601 N in Bf 110 C-4? I need it to our small Il2 mod project. We dont know really if 110 C-4/B had 601 N and what was their perfomance expecially speed and climb at different alt. If you have any info plz send it to me.



The only information is from Mankau who notes that as of July 3 Gruppen of 110 and one Gruppe of 109 had been refitted with the 601N (see the 601N page on my site).

I don't think I have seen figures for the 110C w. 601N, however as far as speed goes its fairly easy to estimate with a good level of accuracy by comparing the power output of the DB 601A and 601N, and then correcting the figures for higher out for the 110C-2 (chart in other topic on 110). Power requirements for speed are increasing with the cube, while climb is roughly linear.



> The same about maximum dive speed. I cant find any info about these.



According a 110C-D datasheet, dive speed limit was 700 km/h.


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## Kurfürst (Dec 29, 2008)

Glider said:


> The attached lisk shows a copy of the instruction dated 7th August authorising the use of 100 octane was authorised for use in all Commands. Note the use of the word Commands, not other fighter units, or other groups in Fighter Coammand but Commands. The only other commands include Bomber Command, Training etc, there were no other Fighter Commands in the UK.
> 
> The clear implication being that Fighter Command was already using it. Even if there were was some obscure corner of Fighter Command that wasn't, this allows the use of 100 octane.
> http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100oct-7aug40-allcommands.jpg



Oh yes, and appearantly nothing of this suggestion come to fruitation - at least until October 1940 - see the Appendix for this discussion your are pointing to.

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/100octane-annexure-7aug40.jpg

Note that in the 2nd Quarter, April, May and June, before tha Battle when fighter command had much fewer fighters and when much fewer sorties were flown, consumption was 18 100 tons.

They estimate that 93 700 tons will be required for the 3rd and 4th Quarters of 1940, after the revision of 7 August 1940 so that others Commands would use this fuel as well. 

That works out on avarage something like 47 000 tons / quarter.

However we do know that in the 3rd Quarter - which covers the most active period of the Battle - only 22 000 tons were _issued_ (which is not the same as consumed), only about that was estimated to be the requirement for the 'Commands', and if fact only very slightly more than in April, May and June, when Fighter Command had about half the number of fighters it did have in the Battle of Britain, and was flying incomparably fewer sorties - given that there was no heavy combat in France until May, and even that was limited to Hurricanes in France. 

The peak of activity was over Dunkerque, and Fighter Command flew something in the order of 1000 sorties in the duration of a week or so, a number Fighter Command flew _on a daily basis during the Battle of Britain..._ 

From which it logically follows that the number of Sqns using/aircraft flying sorties with 100 octane was not much different during the Battle as it was in April, May and June 1940. And, as the evidence reveals, even in May 1940 (when FC had about half as many fighters as it did in August), 100 octane was only supplied to selected units (or to be more precise, selected fighter stations, as fuel was supplied to airfields, and not units which often changed their base) - take note of the expression: 'the _units concerned_ had now been stocked with 100 octane fuel. 

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/18may40-100octane.jpg

With a good likelyhood, these were those 16 Fighter and 2 Blenheim Squadrons that were originally planned for 100 octane by _September_ 1940, ie. 1/4 of Fighter command.



> PS re the widespread use of 100 Octane in the Luftwaffe, can I ask how widespread it was? I note that you asay that at the start of the BOB approx 100 Me110 were using the DB601N. However at the end of January 1941 the number was about 150. An increase of about 50 aircraft over 4 months doesn't seem a huge increase, so I was wondering if the figures were accurate.



Decision was made in the 2nd half of 1940 that SE fighters would enjoy priority for DB 601N engines - before that 110s had priority - namely the Bf 109E-x/N and the Bf 109F-1 and F-2, as the F was just coming into production in July 1940. 

You may want to check the number of E/Ns and Fs (at this time, all Fs were fitted with 601N) in March 1941 when the 109F came into service: Single engine fighters - 29.03.41


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## Kurfürst (Dec 29, 2008)

Hop said:


> Go to Mike Williams site and he has the combat reports from every Spitfire squadron that showed they used 100 octane in combat. (from memory 1 squadron is missing, but I suspect that's one of those that saw little or no fighting).



Oh surely, but then there of course is a courious circumstance that there is never more than about four Spitfire Squadrons reporting using 100 octane in Combat in a month, and coincidentally when they report that happening, they were somehow always stationed at the same fighter stations - Hornchurch, CATTERICK, KENLEY or NORTH WEALD for example. But thats only a couple of fighter stations, on which usualy two to four Squadrons were stationed at a time.

The answer to that mystery is very simple, it was selected fighter Stations, and not Squadrons that were supplied with the precious 100 octane fuel, and Fighter Squadrons kept rotating off and into combat. 

So, when say Squadron X reported the use of 100 octane on say 10th August, and then was re-deployed to the North say on 14th of August, the aircraft remained as they were and only the crew travelled North; they were replaced by the crew of say Y Squadron, using the very same planes left behind by X Squadrons, they reported a few day later using 100 octane fuel, too. But then of course, such reports from Squadron X would 'suddenly' disappear.



> ALL the evidence shows FC used 100 octane exclusively. I have seen no evidence that suggests otherwise.



That's wonderful, I though none existed so far, but surely if they do you can easily post a few, right?



> Against the evidence from the official records, Kurfurst has a forum posting by an Australian who claimed to have seen documents to that effect in the Australian archives, and was recalling them from memory.



I have never seen him stating he was 'recalling it from memory', so I guess its again something you made up, as you have in the past making up everything imaginable to dismiss the information he dug up, although you never actually dare to make you accusation face to face, implying that he was just making it up but appearantly he just saw the same paper Gavin Bailey has found at AVIA 10/282 and referred to in his study. 

Some shot of which, having been presented with the reference by Bailey, allowed Neil to make a trip to the PRO in October and present a couple of pages from the hundreds to further his point - but none of those pages actually suppurt the 100% use, the theory they are pushing forward for a long time, before having any evidence to it. Knowing the fanatic attitude of both Neil and Mike to this agenda, it can only mean that there's nothing to support their claims in these set of documents, or worse, there is something amongst that utterly disproves it, and hence why only a couple of pages from selected reports are posted on their site. Its probably the second case.

And you, Neil and Mike was implying he was just making it up, all these years. Now, all that remains to be done is to get a copy of AVIA 10/282 and publish it in its entirety, rather than the cherry picking and the wishful misinterpretation Mike does with it, as usual.

Here's what this gentleman found out in the National Archieves of Australia, and posted on the subject on another discussion board:
_
"The first bulk shipment of 100 octane fuel had arrived in Britain in June 1939 from the Esso refinery in Aruba. This and subsequent tanker shipments from Aruba, Curacao and the USA were stockpiled while the RAF continued to operate on 87 octane petrol. Having secured what were considered reasonably sufficient quantities of 100 octane, Fighter Command began converting its engines to this standard in March 1940, allowing boost (manifold) pressures to be raised without the risk of detonation in the cylinders. This initial increase in maximum boost from 6 lb to 9 lb delivered a useful power growth of around 130hp at the rated altitude. 

By the time of the invasion of the Low Countries by Germany in May 1940 the RAF had converted approximately 25 % of it's total fighter force to 100 octane fuel use. The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel. Against the backdrop of total war the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time.

Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis. Firstly 87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place. Those existing fighters already so converted (approximately 125) would continue to use what supplies of 100 octane were available, but all other fighters that had not been modified to continue with the use of 87 octane (of which there was more than adequate supply). The second action was for the British Government to contract the Shell Oil Refining Company to assist the British-controlled Iraqi Petroleum Company at Kirkuk to produce 100 octane fuel. This arrangement proved quite successful as production was quickly converted to 100 octane fuel. 

The first Middle East shipment of 100 octane fuel arrived in Portsmouth on 12th August, with a further two deliveries in September and four in October. Although too late to allow widespread conversion for the use of the fuel the deliveries did ensure that from this point on Britain would not be lacking in 100 octane fuel levels. With the newfound supply RAF Fighter Command again embarked upon a Merlin II and III conversion to 100 octane use from late September, finally achieving 100% conversion of it's fighter force by the end of November in 1940.

I came across it when I was in fact researching another subject (Dutch East Indies Fuel levels prior to the Japanese Invasion) at the Australian War Memorial Archives. It's from a document, copied to the Australian Military Commission in England in February 1941, by Roll Royce to Lord Beaverbrook outlining past, current and proposed changes to the Merlin; and factors that affect it's performance. It was quite an interesting paper actually, even though i found it to be a very dry subject. It was a collection of lose-leaf typed pages, included as an addendum in a report titled Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War. The reason why it is included amongst AWM papers is because the Australian Government at that time was protesting vigoriously about the continued supply of lower grade 87 octane fuel when it too wanted 100 octane for the RAAF. I believe that McFarland, Pugh, Hart, Perret, Lumsden and even Churchill have all quoted parts from the report._


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## Glider (Dec 29, 2008)

Kurfürst said:


> Oh yes, and appearantly nothing of this suggestion come to fruitation - at least until October 1940 - see the Appendix for this discussion your are pointing to.
> 
> http://www.spitfireperformance.com/100octane-annexure-7aug40.jpg
> 
> Note that in the 2nd Quarter, April, May and June, before tha Battle when fighter command had much fewer fighters and when much fewer sorties were flown, consumption was 18 100 tons.


Correct, they used 18,100 tons in the second quarter



> They estimate that 93 700 tons will be required for the 3rd and 4th Quarters of 1940, after the revision of 7 August 1940 so that others Commands would use this fuel as well.
> 
> That works out on avarage something like 47 000 tons / quarter.


Correct



> However we do know that in the 3rd Quarter - which covers the most active period of the Battle - only 22 000 tons were _issued_ (which is not the same as consumed),


Correct, Issued is not the same as consumed. Your assumption is based on the false premise that every ton consumed in the second quarter, was issued. You don't know what was Issued in the second quarter. It is certain that more was issued in the first and second quarter than was consumed resulting in a reserve. See the notes below.

What isn't in doubt is that all commands were given the OK to use 100 octane after the 7th August 1940. 

The evidence trail is very clear
12 December 1939
Permission is given to use 100 Octane in Hurricane Spitfires and Defiants. Note that it specifically mentions that Supplies in Bulk should be available before it is issued to the relevent stations.
There you are, the phrase you love to misquote Relevent Stations. What you always leave out of your quote is the specific mention of 'Non Operational Stations'. The meaning is clear, Relevent Stations are those with Spitfire Hurricane and Defiant aircraft. Non Operational Stations will not be stocked with 100 Octane until later.

18th May 1940
The Committee took note that the use of 100 Octane had been made clear to Fighter Command re the use in Spitfire and Hurricane aircraft and that the Units involved had been so equipped. Again the meaning is clear, in December they had been given permission to use the 100 Octane and deliveries would start, in May 1940 this had been made available.
The Board even passed on that the Air Ministry had been impressed with how well this had been undertaken.

7th August as previously stated permission that it could be used in all operational aircraft and the Commands were so authorised, i.e. not just the Fighters.

Nowhere on any of these notes does it refer to certain squadrons, units or areas.




> With a good likelyhood, these were those 16 Fighter and 2 Blenheim Squadrons that were originally planned for 100 octane by _September_ 1940, ie. 1/4 of Fighter command.


You have nothing to back it up.





> Decision was made in the 2nd half of 1940 that SE fighters would enjoy priority for DB 601N engines - before that 110s had priority - namely the Bf 109E-x/N and the Bf 109F-1 and F-2, as the F was just coming into production in July 1940.
> 
> You may want to check the number of E/Ns and Fs (at this time, all Fs were fitted with 601N) in March 1941 when the 109F came into service: Single engine fighters - 29.03.41


Thanks for this I will look at it.


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## Glider (Dec 29, 2008)

I have had a look at the site and its very interesting, many thanks for it. I was surprised to see how large a drop there was in servicable fighters and ready pilots between June and December 1940.

from 856 Operational 109's and 906 pilots 
down to 586 operational aircraft and 711 ready pilots

Considering that November and December were quiet periods where the strength would have built up and with new production introduced the OOB. The Luftwaffe must have been on their knees by the end of October.


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## Hop (Dec 29, 2008)

> Is your only source an Australian who was looking at a 1939 report as HOP states, or have you something more substantial to support your claim, if so can I ask what it is?



As you can see, he doesn't have anything substantial, just a lot of leaps of faith using documentation that says the opposite of what he claims.



> Note that in the 2nd Quarter, April, May and June, before tha Battle when fighter command had much fewer fighters and when much fewer sorties were flown, consumption was 18 100 tons.





> However we do know that in the 3rd Quarter - which covers the most active period of the Battle - only 22 000 tons were issued (which is not the same as consumed), only about that was estimated to be the requirement for the 'Commands', and if fact only very slightly more than in April, May and June, when Fighter Command had about half the number of fighters it did have in the Battle of Britain, and was flying incomparably fewer sorties - given that there was no heavy combat in France until May, and even that was limited to Hurricanes in France.



This is one of those leaps of faith.

There's a fairly obvious reason for high consumption in the second quarter that Kurfurst, in his quest to find evidence to support his faith, overlooks.

We know that RAF Hurricane squadrons based in France were using 100 octane, because Mike has the combat reports. See for example 1 squadron's Paul Richley. 1 squadron were based at Vassingcourt.

What happened to the RAF airfields in France in the second quarter of 1940? They were overrun by the Germans.

What happened to the fuel at those airfields? With tanks, artillery, trucks and equipment all left behind, what's the chance soldiers at Dunkirk had their pockets full of aviation fuel?

The truth is that any fuel the RAF had sent to France was lost in the second quarter, so trying to equate sorties to fuel consumption is futile.



> 100 octane was only supplied to selected units (or to be more precise, selected fighter stations, as fuel was supplied to airfields, and not units which often changed their base) - take note of the expression: 'the units concerned had now been stocked with 100 octane fuel.



OK, only you do understand ALL FC airfields had switched over to 100 octane, don't you?

From the 7th December 1939 memo:


> The operational stations at which the fuel will be required in the first instance are:



It goes on to list operational stations. Then:


> All non-operational Stations in the Fighter Command will also have to hold certain quantities of this fuel for visiting aircraft. Non-operational Stations and Stations which have no Hurricane or Spitfire aircraft at the moment are:



On the 9th:



> It is proposed, therefore, that storage space
> for 100 octane fuel at stations shall be made available
> by the consumption of the D.T.D. 230 fuel already in stock.
> When a tank in the installation becomes empty, it is to be
> ...



So all lower grades of fuel were to be removed from operational stations, and replaced with 100 octane.

How much clearer can it be?



> Oh surely, but then there of course is a courious circumstance that there is never more than about four Spitfire Squadrons reporting using 100 octane in Combat in a month, and coincidentally when they report that happening, they were somehow always stationed at the same fighter stations - Hornchurch, CATTERICK, KENLEY or NORTH WEALD for example. But thats only a couple of fighter stations, on which usualy two to four Squadrons were stationed at a time.
> 
> The answer to that mystery is very simple, it was selected fighter Stations, and not Squadrons that were supplied with the precious 100 octane fuel, and Fighter Squadrons kept rotating off and into combat.



Only we've seen the list of operational, and non operational, airfields that were to be supplied with 100 octane. Even the ones that weren't on the list in 1939, eg Westhampnett, are listed in Mike's combat reports.



> Nope, you are lying, the Australian was taking notes and was sharing and you keep dismissing these, calling him just making up but appearantly he just saw the same paper Gavin Bailey has found at AVIA 10/282 and referred to in his study.



Yeah?

Why are his facts so badly out, then? Why, after more than 4 years, has he yet to post anything to back his claims up?

Let's look at some of the "facts":



> The first bulk shipment of 100 octane fuel had arrived in Britain in June 1939 from the Esso refinery in Aruba.



We know the stocks as at 3rd September were 153,000 tons from Gavin Bailey. So we are expected to believe 150,000 tons arrived in the 3 months before war broke out? An average of 50,000 tons a month?



> Having secured what were considered reasonably sufficient quantities of 100 octane, Fighter Command began converting its engines to this standard in March 1940, allowing boost (manifold) pressures to be raised without the risk of detonation in the cylinders. This initial increase in maximum boost from 6 lb to 9 lb delivered a useful power growth of around 130hp at the rated altitude.



We know for a fact that 100 octane allowed boost pressure to increase from 6.25 to 12 lbs, not 9.



> By the time of the invasion of the Low Countries by Germany in May 1940 the RAF had converted approximately 25 % of it's total fighter force to 100 octane fuel use. The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel. Against the backdrop of total war the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time.



Right. Only look at the documents we've seen from the second quarter. 

Stock at 31st March 1940 - 220,000 tons
Due in by the end of the year - 383,000 tons

With a Spitfire using at most a quarter of a ton per sortie, and the RAF's peak fighter sortie rate of 5,000 a week, that's a maximum of about 1,250 tons a week, or about 63,000 tons in an entire year. That means stock was enough for over 3 years, and the next 9 months were expected to see another 5+ years supply come in.

And we are expected to believe they were worried about lack of supply?

Doesn't.Make.Sense.



> Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis. Firstly 87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place.



Right, so in May the position is so bad they have to halt the conversion of Fighter Command, and yet at the beginning of August the position is so good they can convert the whole of the RAF?

Doesn't.Make.Sense. Especially when you see they didn't have to "discover" new supplies, they had them on order.

And the other reason I don't believe what he posted was a quote of an official document? The language isn't right. There is no way an official report from 1940 has language like "Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis."


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## Kurfürst (Dec 29, 2008)

Glider said:


> The Luftwaffe must have been on their knees by the end of October.



Certainly a just as wishful claim as the one that all RAF fighters were using 100 octane fuel in the BoB.

Looking at the strenght reports, on 28.09.40 (a day after some very heavy combat and losses btw) the LW day fighters reported 920 fighters on strenght and 917 pilots. 

They reported practically the same number, 889 aircraft on strenght, 7 September 1940 (without II/LG 2, which could mean about 20-30 aircraft missing)

During October they reported 104 fighters lost to enemy action, against 184 lost to enemy action in September, indicating just how crippled Fighter Command have become, right?

Anyway, are we to believe that after loosing 184 fighters to enemy action September, and yet strenght was even slightly increasing, the strenght was supposedly declining in October, when much less fighters were lost...?

On 28 December 1940 they reported 829 fighters and 915 pilots. The number of fighter pilots remained unchanged compared to September, in fact many were back to Germany and on leave, while the units were prepearing to receive the new 109Fs. This explains the low servicibility numbers for the end of December, that is effected by some units reporting 0 servicable aircraft, ie. 

Stab/JG51, I./JG51, II./JG51, III./JG51 curiously reporting 0 Bf 109Es ready for operation _out of the 46 present_, while II./JG54, that was almost on full strenght with 35 aircraft reported a_gain with 0 mission capable aircraft_. Which is more than just odd. Not one, not half of them, _none_.

Obviously these units were in the process of rest and refit, and units were busy creating their own operational training units, to which they transferred to old aircraft, and awaiting the new 109Fs.

Of course, there's a tad bit more of a problem with the theory that the Germans were running out fighters, and that is that they weren't. During the entire Battle of Britain, July to October, they lost 663 single engined fighters on and outside of operations (502 of these were attributed to enemy action). 

At the same time, their factories delivered 884 new ones, adding to the sizable reserves they also had before the Battle.

Surely the Jagdwaffe was not its knees (except for those pilots which were hunting with Göring as a reward and taking aim on a stag), quite the contrary, they had on arm behind their back. They pulled it out in the spring:

On the 29 March 1941, they were reporting 1104 aircraft present, with much of the frontline strenght now consisting of the new 109Fs, with much of the Emils retired, and the last batches of them running out of the production line, and 1204 pilots.

The only ones on their knees and praying for their lives in December were British citizens, in their bomb raid shelters.



Glider said:


> What isn't in doubt is that all commands were given the OK to use 100 octane after the 7th August 1940.



What isn't at doubt that originally only 16+2 Squadrons were meant to receive 100 octane fuel. What is at doubt how many actually received it in the end.

What isn't at doubt that on 18 May 1940 the wording of the historical documents leaves no doubt that only some _units were concerned_ with being supplied with 100 octane fuel.

What isn't at doubt that on 7th August 1940 they decided that they want to convert aircraft from other Commands, and that would require nearly 50,000 tons of fuel per quarter.

What isn't at doubt that they supplied 18 000 tons of 100 octane fuel in Q2 of 1940 to far fewer aircraft engaged far less heavily in Combat than in the Q3 1940 when they supplied practically the same amount at 22 000 tons.

What is at doubt is the exact reason as to _why_ the plans of 7th August 1940 were not carried out in the end, not that wheter they were carried out or not - as we know from the lack of fuel issues is that it simply wasn't.

What is at doubt are the wishful claims of a few nationalist who claim that each and every fighter of Fighter Command was running on 100 octane fuel, and having nothing to offer for the validity of their claim so far.


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## Glider (Dec 30, 2008)

Kurfürst said:


> Certainly a just as wishful claim as the one that all RAF fighters were using 100 octane fuel in the BoB.



Kurfurst I was only looking at the site that you gave me. One important thing is that I was using the servicable aircraft number as thats the important one. It reflects whats available for action.

Or are you saying that a drop from
from 856 Operational 109's and 906 pilots at the end of June 
down to 586 operational aircraft and 711 ready pilots at the end of December doesn't represent a significant fall?



> Looking at the strenght reports, on 28.09.40 (a day after some very heavy combat and losses btw) the LW day fighters reported 920 fighters on strenght and 917 pilots.


However there were 711 planes operational down from 856 at the end of June which is a decent drop,



> On 28 December 1940 they reported 829 fighters and 915 pilots. The number of fighter pilots remained unchanged compared to September, in fact many were back to Germany and on leave, while the units were prepearing to receive the new 109Fs. This explains the low servicibility numbers for the end of December, that is effected by some units reporting 0 servicable aircraft, ie.
> 
> Stab/JG51, I./JG51, II./JG51, III./JG51 curiously reporting 0 Bf 109Es ready for operation _out of the 46 present_, while II./JG54, that was almost on full strenght with 35 aircraft reported a_gain with 0 mission capable aircraft_. Which is more than just odd. Not one, not half of them, _none_.
> 
> Obviously these units were in the process of rest and refit, and units were busy creating their own operational training units, to which they transferred to old aircraft, and awaiting the new 109Fs.


Fair point


> On the 29 March 1941, they were reporting 1104 aircraft present, with much of the frontline strenght now consisting of the new 109Fs, with much of the Emils retired, and the last batches of them running out of the production line, and 1204 pilots.


However in March 1941 they still only had 814 Servicable Aircraft, less than in June 1940, even less than Sept 39. Not impressive.


> What isn't at doubt that originally only 16+2 Squadrons were meant to receive 100 octane fuel. What is at doubt how many actually received it in the end.


The paper trail is clear and well documented I don't know how you can cling on to such a fantasy. However can I ask where you got the 16+2 squadrons from in the first place as they are not mentioned anywhere.

A slightly different point where I would like some assistance. There is always a big debate over the fighter losses and combat results but less on the bombers who were the targets in the first place.
Have you any sources, either books or sites that I can look at as I am finding it more difficult than expected. I have the details on Bomber Command, its the German side I am having difficulty with. Any help would be appreciated


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## Hop (Dec 30, 2008)

Luftwaffe sorties and losses during the BoB according to Hooton, Eagle in Flames:






Take the attribution of losses to "accidents" with a pinch of salt. Note how the daytime "accident" rate for bombers is often much higher than the night accident rate. I suspect bombers lost to unknown causes are being listed as "accidents".


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## Glider (Dec 30, 2008)

Hop
Thanks for the figures, appreciated


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## Juha (Dec 30, 2008)

Hello Kurfürst
Quote:” So, when say Squadron X reported the use of 100 octane on say 10th August, and then was re-deployed to the North say on 14th of August, the aircraft remained as they were and only the crew travelled North; they were replaced by the crew of say Y Squadron, using the very same planes left behind by X Squadrons, they reported a few day later using 100 octane fuel, too.”

Have you source for that, first time I hear on that system, the few sqns whose operations I know flew their old a/c to south and the sqn they replaced flew their remaining fighters to north. So both sqns kept their fighters. For ex. when 603 Sqn replaced 65 Sqn at Hornchurch and they were in transit at same time because 65 landed at Turnhouse in Scotland one hour after 603 had departed from there. And next day 603 was in alert, ie readiness to scramble from Hornchuch.

Juha


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## Hop (Dec 30, 2008)

> So, when say Squadron X reported the use of 100 octane on say 10th August, and then was re-deployed to the North say on 14th of August, the aircraft remained as they were and only the crew travelled North; they were replaced by the crew of say Y Squadron, using the very same planes left behind by X Squadrons, they reported a few day later using 100 octane fuel, too.



That's just another Kurfurst flight of fancy. Aircraft remained with squadrons most of the time. You can check that with serial numbers and squadron codes quite easily.

There's actually an example on Mike Williams page very close to the dates Kurfurst gives. On 8th August 41 squadron were at Hornchurch, using 100 octane fuel. By 15th August they were at Catterick, Yorkshire, in the north of England, still using 100 octane fuel.


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## ponsford (Dec 30, 2008)

_>>Having secured what were considered reasonably sufficient quantities of 100 octane, Fighter Command began converting its engines to this standard in March 1940, allowing boost (manifold) pressures to be raised without the risk of detonation in the cylinders. This initial increase in maximum boost from 6 lb to 9 lb delivered a useful power growth of around 130hp at the rated altitude.

>We know for a fact that 100 octane allowed boost pressure to increase from 6.25 to 12 lbs, not 9._

Yes Hop, I also noticed right off that the boost inconsistency seriously called into question the credibility of that quoted passage especially when bearing in mind the +12 clearance document dated March 20, 1940 _ ("The emergency use of higher boost pressures up to + 12 lb/sq. in. is now available for short periods by operation of the modified boost control cut-out") _ and Dowding’s statement from August 1, 1940 that _ ("The use of the automatic boost cut out control enables + 12 lbs. per sq. in. from the engine for 5 minutes when circumstances demand it. Some pilots "pull the plug" with little excuse on every occasion")_, not to mention +12 in all those combat reports and pilot’s accounts. Was someone really trying to pass that off as some official document? I’m not sure that it looks like the author was intentionally misleading but if so it would be a weak attempt at a hoax, especially giving the enormous quantity and quality of evidence that draws a completely different picture. Ah, he probably just didn’t know better and made a mistake. 

Juha: That rings a bell. I have books by Gray Deere from 54 Squadron where they mention flying their aircraft from Hornchurch to Cattererick while 41 Squadron swapped places with them using their own aircraft, both during the Dunkirk battle and the subsequent Battle of Britain.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 30, 2008)

*Please Read!*

*Hop and Kurfurst and anyone else involved:

This is a great debate with lots of information, however it better remain peaceful. If you two can not keep it peaceful, you will both go on a little vacation from the site.

Is this understood?*


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## Kurfürst (Dec 30, 2008)

Hop said:


> OK, only you do understand ALL FC airfields had switched over to 100 octane, don't you?



Where is the evidence?



> From the 7th December 1939 memo:
> 
> It goes on to list operational stations.



No, it doesn't list 'operational stations', it mentions _18 operational stations_ that are _proposed_ to be supplied with 100 octane. Not all. Just 18 (later they appear to have added 2-3 stations to that list though).

Hmmm... weren't the plan was to equip 16+2 Squadrons with 100 octane fuel. Of course it was. Coincidence? No. 

It is a proposal in December 1939, and we do not know how much of it was actually materialized, yet you state it as a fact that not only these stations were supplied with 100 octane fuel, but in fact all the others.

Pure fantasy, without evidence. Of course you have been stating the same for the last 8 years, without evidence, just as you keep repeating it now.



> So all lower grades of fuel were to be removed from operational stations, and replaced with 100 octane.



No, it was only proposed to be removed from _eighteen selected fighter stations_.



> How much clearer can it be?



Its quite clear actually. The RAF wanted to equip 16 single engined fighter Squadrons and 2 Blenheim Squadrons with 100 octane fuel. 

There is no mention in any document that on the subject this quantity was revised. 

You claim it was revised, and all Fighter Squadrons were supplied with it, but you cannot produce ANY evidence to that. 



> Yeah?
> 
> Why are his facts so badly out, then?



They are not. Yours are, OTOH, and are without evidence. 



> Why, after more than 4 years, has he yet to post anything to back his claims up?



Probably because in the last four years you have never actually asked him to do so, you only keep spreading your accusations behind his back..

And, as he is generally considered to be credible person without a personal agenda in the matter, nobody actually to doubted his word. 

He has given his references, and that satisfies everyone, well, everyone except Neil, Mikey, and Hoppie. But I guess the reason for that is obvious, isn't it?



> Let's look at some of the "facts":
> 
> We know the stocks as at 3rd September were 153,000 tons from Gavin Bailey. So we are expected to believe 150,000 tons arrived in the 3 months before war broke out? An average of 50,000 tons a month



I think you don't actually understand the difference between _facts_ and _speculation_. Yours above is just specualtion, and even for that, its a poor one, as it leads to nowhere.

It proves nothing, except that you have doubts. Feel free to have them.



> We know for a fact that 100 octane allowed boost pressure to increase from 6.25 to 12 lbs, not 9.



We know for a fact that you are making this up and in fact documentation shows that at some time, +9 lbs was the limit for the Combat regime, even with 100 octane fuel. Take a look at the Spitfire II manual below. It says all out level, 5 mins limit, +9lbs, 3000 rpm. Not +12, that was only cleared _for takeoff _up to 1000 feet or 3 mins).

Of course that's the initial rating - later on the 'Combat' limit was raised to +12. That's exactly what our Australian source noted, despite your pathethic attempt to misconstruct his words:

_'This *initial* increase in maximum boost from 6 lb to 9 lb delivered a useful power growth of around 130hp at the rated altitude.'_

Of course you were shown that document many times already, and you are already fully aware of this, yet you repeat the same.. for many times now. 

BTW, care to comment why all Spitfire manuals produced in the period (summer 1940) are always mentioning two seperate maximum boosts - one when using 87 octane fuel, and one when using 100 octane fuel? If the latter was soooooooooo standard at the time? 








> Right. Only look at the documents we've seen from the second quarter.
> 
> Stock at 31st March 1940 - 220,000 tons
> Due in by the end of the year - 383,000 tons
> ...



Well, at least in your opinion, which is based on an extremely amatourish estimation that takes into account on combat sorties and ignores everything else, including the fuel requirements of the two Blenheim Squdrons using 100 octane fuel, training flights, servicing flights, running in the engine and so on.

Curiously, when the RAF decided to convert the 2nd TAF Spitfires to 150 grade fuel - with about 1000 aircraft (but it appears that it only effected about 500 Spitfires in it, ie. much fighters less than what FC had in 1940 - they estimated the avarage monthly consumption as _20 000_ tons. Per month.

Now, you are telling us that some 1000+ fighters could do with 20 000 tons for 3 months in 1940, but oddly enough, in 1945, 500 fighters required the same amount for a single month...?



> And we are expected to believe they were worried about lack of supply?



They certainly were, after all, it is well documented. After all, they wanted to convert all operational aircraft in August, and consumption shows nothing of that actually materialized. All the documentations are clearly tie proposed changed in consumption to the expected shipments.



> Right, so in May the position is so bad they have to halt the conversion of Fighter Command, and yet at the beginning of August the position is so good they can convert the whole of the RAF?



Apparently. Lets not forget, the Australian source is apparently from the same one as the in the PRO. But I do wonder, why is only tidbits of it are present on Mike's site, hmm?

Is it the same thing than when he waved about a graph showing the performance of the Spit XIV at +25, claiming, as well as you did, that it was in service with that boost?

Years after that, the complete document containing that graph turned up, and its text said they couldn't even finish the trials with the aircraft, because at +25 lbs boost the engine failed almost immidiately, and other papers repeatedly noted bearing troubles at the said boost?



> Especially when you see they didn't have to "discover" new supplies, they had them on order.



Certainly. The only trouble was that it was on the far side of the world, and had to be taken in by tankers, under the eyes of U boots and the Luftwaffe's bombers.



> And the other reason I don't believe what he posted was a quote of an official document? The language isn't right. There is no way an official report from 1940 has language like "Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis."



Well he never actually stated it was a direct quote, I think it was pretty clear for everyone at the time that he was summerizing the contents of the documents he found.

But, why don't you just go to the National Archieves, dig up AVIA 10/282, take shots of it and post the whole thing in its entirety, if it would prove your point?

Why doesn't Mike or Neil? Because it would say the same as the summary by our Australian source?

Perhaps for the same reason Mike quotes Gavin Bailey's article in tidbits, though, *but not the part when Bailey's actually noting that the 100 octane conversion programme effected 16 fighter squadrons only* - thats not relevant eh..?

Bailey:
_
"RAF tests with 100-octane had begun in 1937, but clearance for operational use was withheld as stocks were built up. *In March 1939, the Air Ministry decided to introduce 100-octane fuel into use with sixteen fighter and two twin-engined bomber squadrons by September 1940*, when it was believed that the requirement to complete the war reserve stock would have been met, with the conversion of squadrons beginning at the end of 1939.34

By the time war broke out, the available stocks of aviation fuel had risen to 153,000 tons of 100-octane and 323,000 tons of other grades (mostly 87-octane).35 *The actual authorisation to change over to 100-octane came at the end of February 1940 and was made on the basis of the existing reserve and the estimated continuing rate of importation in the rest of the year.*36 The available stock of 100-octane fuel at this point was about 220,000 tons. Actual use of the fuel began after 18 May 1940, when the* fighter stations selected for the changeover* had completed their deliveries of 100-octane and had consumed their existing stocks of 87-octane. While this was immediately before the intensive air combat associated with the Dunkirk evacuation, where Fighter Command units first directly engaged the Luftwaffe, this can only be regarded as a fortunate coincidence which was contingent upon much earlier decisions to establish, store and distribute sufficient supplies of 100-octane fuel.37"_

So, sixteen squadrons it is. Wait, that's about 1/4 of Fighter Command, isn't it?


----------



## Juha (Dec 30, 2008)

Hello Kurfürst
with all you pure fantasy, wishful thinking and made up accusations.

Quote: ” No, it doesn't list 'operational stations', it mentions 18 operational stations that are proposed to be supplied with 100 octane. Not all. Just 18 (later they appear to have added 2-3 stations to that list though). 

Hmmm... weren't the plan was to equip 16+2 Squadrons with 100 octane fuel. Of course it was. Coincidence? No.”

As you yourself wrote earlier in message #36” …fighter stations, on which usualy two to four Squadrons were stationed at a time.”

So how much is 3 * 18?, It isn’t 18. If 18 operational stations had switched to 100 octane and there were only 18 sqns ready to use the 100 oct, what the other two sqns per station did? And how many operational fighter stations Fighter Command had?

Juha


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## Hop (Dec 30, 2008)

Only time for a partial reply at the moment:



> No, it doesn't list 'operational stations', it mentions 18 operational stations that are proposed to be supplied with 100 octane. Not all. Just 18 (later they appear to have added 2-3 stations to that list though).



But that IS all of them.

If you read what it says:



> The operational stations at which the fuel will be required in the first instance are:
> 
> ACKLINGTON
> BIGGIN HILL
> ...



As you note, two days later the following stations are taken from the non operational list and added to the operational list:



> CHRUCH FENTON
> GRANGEMOUTH
> FILTON



If you go to RAF Fighter Command Index they list all the RAF fighter squadrons based in the UK. The Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons in the UK on the 7th December, their bases, and whether those bases are listed to have 100 octane fuel:

Squadron	Base	100 Octane
3	Croydon	Y
17	Debden	Y
32	Biggin Hill	Y
41	Catterick	Y
43	Acklington	Y
46	Digby	Y
54	Hornchurch	Y
56	Martlesham Heath	Y
65	Northolt	Y
66	Duxford	Y
72	Drem	Y
74	Rochford N	
111	Drem	Y
151	North Weald Y
152	Acklington	Y
213	Wittering	Y
501	Tangmere	Y
504	Debden	Y
602	Grangemouth Y
603	Turnhouse	Y
605	Tangmere	Y
609	Kinloss N	
610	Wittering	Y
611	Digby	Y
616	Leconfield	Y

The only two that weren't listed to receive 100 octane were Rochford (74 squadron) and Kinloss (609 squadron). In both cases these squadrons were on short detachments. 74 squadron were flitting back and fore between Rochford and Hornchurch, and had only arrived on the 2nd December (and were back in Hornchurch by the 16th).

609 had been based at Drem until the 5th December, and were back there by 10th Jan.

Both Hornchurch and Drem are on the list to convert to 100 octane.

So yes, every active Spitfire and Hurricane base was listed for 100 octane. That's why after listing operational stations they say:


> All non-operational Stations in the Fighter Command will also have to hold certain quantities of this fuel for visiting aircraft.



It would hardly make sense to say SOME operational stations, and ALL non-operational stations, must have 100 octane fuel supplies, would it?


----------



## ponsford (Dec 30, 2008)

_>If you go to RAF Fighter Command Index they list all the RAF fighter squadrons based in the UK. […snip…] So yes, every active Spitfire and Hurricane base was listed for 100 octane._ 

Nice work Hop, that adds up nicely. I had a hunch that might be the case. Fwiw, just to supplement your listing 74 Squadron was converting to 100 octane in March 1940 and at that time they were bouncing back and forth between Hornchurch and Rochford. Hmm, that could be seen as inspecting and converting one aircraft on March 16. I wouldn’t know when the balance of the Squadron’s aircraft converted.


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## Glider (Dec 30, 2008)

Very Good information Hop.


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## Kurfürst (Dec 30, 2008)

Hop said:


> But that IS all of them.



No, there were dozens of other fighter stations.

Middle Wallop, Warmwell, Exeter, Kirton-in-Lindsey, Coltishall, Wick, Dyce, Montrose, Kenley etc. Should I go on? None of them on that list of proposed 100-octane receiving stations as of December 1939., however.


I actually listed all (not in your sense of 'all' of course, but actually all) fighter squadrons and their stations, which was unfortunately lost in keyboard accident just before, but there were certainly a lot of fighter squadrons at stations that were not even _proposed_ for receiving 100 octane fuel shipments in December 1939.



Hop said:


> If you go to RAF Fighter Command Index they list all the RAF fighter squadrons based in the UK.



Are you seriously suggesting, _based on a website_, that the RAF had _only 25 Fighter Squadrons in Britain_?

Lets see, thats 4-500 fighters at best, based on establishement (16 or 20). They lost 450 fighters in France alone... which either means that they sent ALL the fighters in France and lost all of them.

Ridiculus, isn't it? But that's what you are suggesting, when you are claiming you are listing all Fighter stations and Squadrons. Based on a _website_ (and one rather hastily put together, if I may add).

The Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons in the UK on the 7th December, their bases, and whether those bases are listed to have 100 octane fuel:





Hop said:


> Squadron	Base	100 Octane
> 3	Croydon	Y
> 17	Debden	Y
> 32	Biggin Hill	Y
> ...



No, you have 25 Squadron's station listed. 16+2 of these were eligible for 100 octane fuel. 
That's not all of the RAF's fighters, and we don't know how many stations of these actually received 100 octane fuel in the end.

During the Battle of Britain, there were around 60 Squadrons in combat, were there not?



> It would hardly make sense to say SOME operational stations, and ALL non-operational stations, must have 100 octane fuel supplies, would it?



Well, it would hardly make sense when wanting to equip 'all' fighter stations - save of course for Middle Wallop, Warmwell, Exeter, Kirton-in-Lindsey, Coltishall, Wick, Dyce, Montrose, Kenley and a couple of dozen others - and then go listing them one by one, would it?

And it of course make sense to have all non-operational stations have a couple of barrels of 100 octane fuel around, if a plane from one of those 16 squadrons that were running on 100 octane fuel happens to miss its way and land there? 

Its not particularly healthy for an engine that is set to run at 100 octane to be given 87 octane fuel. It tends to shorten its lifespan to a couple of minutes.


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## Vincenzo (Dec 30, 2008)

RAF fighter stations in BoB 
Acklington
Dyce
Turnhouse
Usworth
Wick
Catterick
Drem
Grangemouth
Kirkwall
Sumburgh
Church Fenton
Digby
Duxford
Kirton in Lindsey
Wittering
Coltishall
Leconfield
Tern Hill
Filton
Middle Wallop
Boscombe Down
Colerne
Exeter
Pembrey
Roborough
St. Eval
Warmwell
Biggin Hill
Debden
Hornchurch
Kenley
Northolt
North Weald
Tangmere
Croydon
Detling
Eastchurch
Ford
Gosport
Gravesend
Hawkinge
Hendon
Lee on Solent
Lympne
Manston
Martlesham
Rochford
Stapleford
Thorney Island
Westhampnett
West Malling


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## Juha (Dec 30, 2008)

Kurfürst
I have appr. 10 books on BoB and there were not in 1939-40 dozens fighter stations more than those already mentioned.

Middle Wallop, Warmwell, Exeter were far west and Wick, Dyce, Montrose were far north from the areas where planners in Dec 1939 could think that there might have been contacts with enemy heavy fighters. Kirton-in-Lindsey probably also. Only Coltishall and Kenley were stations that could have been counted as possible front line stations in Dec 39. Of course situations chanced in April and May 40, but those changes were unpredicted by British.

And Hop, Mike and Neil were not only ones claiming that FC had changed to 100 oct before BoB, for ex. Richard Hough’s and Denis Richards’ The Battle of Britain. The Jubilee History (1990) gives that info on p. 35 and had Appendix XII 100 Octane Fuel on p. 387 which repeat the info with some more background info.

And still like to hear the sources to Your claim that :” So, when say Squadron X reported the use of 100 octane on say 10th August, and then was re-deployed to the North say on 14th of August, the aircraft remained as they were and only the crew travelled North; they were replaced by the crew of say Y Squadron, using the very same planes left behind by X Squadrons, they reported a few day later using 100 octane fuel, too.”

because all sqns I’m aware kept their a/c when they moved in or out SE England during the BoB.

Vincenzo
those are airfields where fighter units were stationed during the BoB, not all were FC stations, I'm not even sure that they all had fighter units stationed during the BoB. for ex. Sumburgh was civilian airfield in 1939, I have seen correspondence between its owner and Air Ministry, Kirkwall probably also, otherwise it is difficult to understand why fighters protecting Scapa Flow were based usually at Halton. Boscombe Down was a research center, Roborough was hastly occupied field needed for protection of a naval base, Eastchurch was CC station, Ford, Gosport and Thorney Island were Naval Air Stations IIRC, and probably also Lee on Solent. There might be others that were not FC stations in your list but those came first in my mind, I'm doubtful for ex on Tern Hill.

Juha


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## Vincenzo (Dec 30, 2008)

source it's raf historical web pages they called it fighter stations
a field can was civilan in 1939 and a fighter station in BoB


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## Kurfürst (Dec 30, 2008)

Vincenzo's list shows about 50 fighter stations - the December 1939 proposal mentions 20 of these (~40%) with the intent to be supplied with 100 octane fuel. I understand however that some of these were wrecked out of service by the Luftwaffe in August.

This seems to be pretty much in line with Gavin Bailey's summary of AVIA 10/282 and our Australians source's summary (of probably the same source) that about 16+2 Squadrons or in other words 1/4 to 1/3 of Fighter Command was using 100 octane fuel during the Battle.

Thanks for taking the trouble for listing these Vincenzo, when I will have bit more time on my hand I will take a look at RAF station maps if we have missed some more.


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## Juha (Dec 30, 2008)

Vincenzo
if you look for ex Thorney Island, it was CC not FAA station, you would see that its occupant, the only one named, is given as 236 Sqn fron July 4th 1940onwards, and in you look 236 Sqn you will see that from 4th July onwards it was part of CC.

Juha

ADDITION
and this is what the cite says on Tern Hill 

"Tern Hill was one of the 12 Group airfields used for resting units, and as a training airfield and maintneance depot. It was used as a relief landing ground and as a temporary base for night fighters operating against raids on Liverpool and cities in the north midlands."

I would not call it fighter station as was for ex Duxford, Biggin Hill or Kenley.


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## Vincenzo (Dec 30, 2008)

so there are some wrong on raf pages tell they to correct


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## Juha (Dec 30, 2008)

Hello Vincenzo

Look RAF Eastchurch, the site gives only one sqn using it, 266, and if you look info from 266 Sqn, you see that it was at Eastchurch from 12 Aug to 14 Aug. Maybe Kurfürst would claim that because there was appr 2 days during BoB a fighter sqn stationed that it was a Fighter Station, but it was a Coastal Command Station.

The purpose of the site isn't to list FC stations but name all airfields which had a connection to FC, how weak it might be, during the BoB. It fullfill that purpose but if one wants a list of FC stations in Dec 39, when the fuel decisions were made, one must look somewhere else.

Juha


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## Vincenzo (Dec 30, 2008)

tommorrow i take list of squadrons and airbase so crossed, after we know what squadron in what field for many days


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## Juha (Dec 30, 2008)

Hello Vincenzo
to easy your job
sector airfields were all FC Stations, also at least almost all fighter airfields which had numerous sqns listed. Those mentioned as naval air stations were not. Also at least most of satellites were not FC Stations, system for them worked so that a sqn usually flew in the morning from a sector airfield to the satellite, operated there for a day with a detachment from the sector airfield doing the refuelling and rearming if necessary and in the evening the sqn returned to the sector airfield, where normal maintenance etc was done during the night.

Juha


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## Hop (Dec 30, 2008)

> No, there were dozens of other fighter stations.
> 
> Middle Wallop, Warmwell, Exeter, Kirton-in-Lindsey, Coltishall, Wick, Dyce, Montrose, Kenley etc. Should I go on? None of them on that list of proposed 100-octane receiving stations as of December 1939., however.



How many of those were fighter stations in December 1939 when the instructions were issued?

Middle Wallop wasn't opened until 1940. Warmwell was home to No 10 Air Observers School. Exeter was home to some research flights from the RAE. Kirton in Lindsey didn't open until 1940. Coltishall didn't open until 1940, etc.

The point remains in 1939 they listed all the active Spitfire and Hurricane airfields as requiring switchover to 100 octane, and then listed ALL the non active stations as well.



> Are you seriously suggesting, based on a website, that the RAF had only 25 Fighter Squadrons in Britain?



No. 25 Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons. The memo does say, after all:



> regarding the issue of 100 Octane fuel for use in Hurricane and Spitfire aircraft in this Command.



That's all they were discussing. Spits and Hurris.



> Lets see, thats 4-500 fighters at best, based on establishement (16 or 20). They lost 450 fighters in France alone... which either means that they sent ALL the fighters in France and lost all of them.
> 
> Ridiculus, isn't it?



Yes, it would be. But the fighters in France *were already in France* and therefore not in Britain.



> But that's what you are suggesting, when you are claiming you are listing all Fighter stations and Squadrons. Based on a website (and one rather hastily put together, if I may add).



Hastily put together? It's been there at least 6 years, and is pretty comprehensive.

Of course, if you can find another Spitfire or Hurricane squadron in the UK as of 7th December 1939 please add it. I don't think there are any missing, though.

Denis Richards in his official history of the RAF says there were 22 Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons, 35 fighter squadrons in total, at the start of the war. I'm not sure if that includes those sent to France.

By December 1939 another 18 fighter squadrons had been added to the RAF, but they were mostly equipped with Blenheims and Battles.



> No, you have 25 Squadron's station listed. 16+2 of these were eligible for 100 octane fuel.



Based on a plan from 9 months earlier, that was due to come in to effect 10 months later.



> During the Battle of Britain, there were around 60 Squadrons in combat, were there not?



I believe there were about 45 Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons at the start of the battle. 



> Well, it would hardly make sense when wanting to equip 'all' fighter stations - save of course for Middle Wallop, Warmwell, Exeter, Kirton-in-Lindsey, Coltishall, Wick, Dyce, Montrose, Kenley and a couple of dozen others - and then go listing them one by one, would it?



It makes perfect sense to list all the stations, especially when they fall in to two groups, those with squadrons and those that might have squadrons in future.



> Why, after more than 4 years, has he yet to post anything to back his claims up?
> Probably because in the last four years you have never actually asked him to do so, you only keep spreading your accusations behind his back..



The original post was made at Butch's board in 2004. It was resurrected in 2007 with a request for more information. The author last posted on the board in early 2008.

But I'm not accusing Pips of anything other than misunderstanding something he says he chanced upon whilst researching another topic. I think it's you who's attaching far too much significance to what "pipspriller" wrote.



> Curiously, when the RAF decided to convert the 2nd TAF Spitfires to 150 grade fuel - with about 1000 aircraft (but it appears that it only effected about 500 Spitfires in it, ie. much fighters less than what FC had in 1940 - they estimated the avarage monthly consumption as 20 000 tons. Per month.



Where does it say they only converted Spitfires? The one thing logistics people do not like is separate types of fuel. Even if some aircraft were getting little benefit, it makes sense to standardise on one type of aviation fuel, especially when supplying units in the field.



> Now, you are telling us that some 1000+ fighters could do with 20 000 tons for 3 months in 1940, but oddly enough, in 1945, 500 fighters required the same amount for a single month...?



2nd TAF flew 90,000 sorties in 1945 (to the end of the war). That's about 22,000 a month, for perhaps 0.9 tons of fuel per sortie.

We've already seen FC flew about 50,000 sorties in the period Wood and Demspter say they used 22,000 tons. That's about 0.44 tons per sortie.

The maximum fuel you could get in a BoB Hurricane or Spitfire was just over 600 lbs. A 1945 Spitfire IX could take up to 1,150 lbs internally, another 650 lbs in a drop tank. A Mosquito FB VI took over 3,100 lbs internally, up to 1,500 lbs externally, and had an option for an extended range tank as well. 

So could the 2nd TAF be using twice as much fuel per sortie as Spitfires and Hurricanes in the summer of 1940? Easily. Bigger, heavier, thirstier planes and the widespread use of drop tanks increase fuel consumption dramatically.



> Well he never actually stated it was a direct quote, I think it was pretty clear for everyone at the time that he was summerizing the contents of the documents he found.



Thank you. That's what I've been saying all along, whilst you have claimed he was "quoting". He wasn't, he was giving us his understanding of what he'd seen.


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## Vincenzo (Dec 31, 2008)

this is the list with all the fields, for all FC squadrons (63+2 of FAA)
Stations/Squadrons	When used Days (max 114) 
RAF Acklington.	Ever 114 
RAF Dyce.	31/8-11/10 42 
RAF Turnhouse.	Ever but 27/8 and 20/7 112 
RAF Usworth.	Ever but 1/9-7/9 107 
RAF Wick. Until 1/9 53 
RAF Catterick.	Ever but 26 and 27/7 112 
RAF Drem.	Ever 114 
RAF Grangemouth.	Until 1/9 54 
RAF Kirkwall.	Never 0 
RAF Sumburgh.	17/7-17/9 63 
RAF Church Fenton.	Until 22/10 105 
RAF Digby.	Ever 114 
RAF Duxford.	Ever 114 
RAF Kirton-in-Lindsey.	Ever 114 
RAF Wittering.	Ever 114 
RAF Coltishall.	Ever 114 
RAF Leconfield.	Ever 114 
RAF Tern Hill.	Never 0 
RAF Filton.	From 26/9 36 
RAF Middle Wallop.	Ever 114 
RAF Boscombe Down.	From 14/8 79 
RAF Colerne.	Never 0 
RAF Exeter.	Ever 114 
RAF Pembrey.	Ever 114 
RAF Roborough.	From 1/8 92 
RAF St Eval.	Ever but 13/8 and 10/9 112 
RAF Warmwell.	From 12/7 112 
RAF Biggin Hill.	Ever 114 
RAF Debden.	Ever 114 
RAF Hornchurch.	Ever 114 
RAF Kenley.	Ever 114 
RAF Northolt.	Ever 114 
RAF North Weald.	Ever 114 
RAF Tangmere.	Ever 114 
RAF Croydon.	Ever but 19/8-31/8 101 
RAF Detling.	Never 0 
RAF Eastchurch	Never but 12 and 13/8 2 
RAF Ford.	From 12/9 50 
RAF Gosport.	Never 0 
RAF Gravesend.	Until 29/10 but 10/9 111 
RAF Hawkinge	Never but 10/7 1 
RAF Hendon.	5/9-25/9 21 
RAF Lee on Solent.	Never 0 
RAF Lympne	Never 0 
RAF Manston	Until 21/8 43 
RAF Martlesham.	Ever but 1-4/9 110 
RAF Rochford.	Until 23/7, the 27/8 and from 29/10 18 
RAF Stapleford.	From 29/8 64 
RAF Thorney Island.	Never 0 
RAF Westhampnett.	From 31/7 93 
RAF West Malling.	12/7-20/7 and from 30/10 11 
Castletown	Ever but 1/9 and 14-17/9 109 
Fowlmere	Until 29/10 but 23/7 111 
Collyweston	Until 11/9 64 
Wellingore	Ever 114 
Matlask	From 30/10 2 
Castle Camps	From 3/9 59 
Sealand	Never but 11 and 12/7 2 
Prestwick	From 21/7 103 
Gatwick	From 24/10 (D from 18/9) 8 
Redhill	From 12/9 50 
Skitten	13/10-23/10 11 
Chibolton	From 30/9 32 
Aldergrove	From 20/7 104 
Speke	From 26/9 36 
Hatson	Until 9/10 92	(FAA Squadron under FC)	
Worthy Down	Until 5/9 58	(FAA Squadron under FC)


p.s. all FC squadrons so also blenheim, gladiator, defiant, the FAA one was on gladiator->martlet and other one on fulmar


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## Vincenzo (Dec 31, 2008)

We have 59 fields used from FC (not counted the 0 days). of this 41 with almost a squadron for almost 58 days


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## Vincenzo (Dec 31, 2008)

Tab for only spit and hurry squadrons (54):
Stations/Squadrons	When used Days (max 114)
RAF Acklington.	Ever 114
RAF Dyce.	31/8-11/10 42
RAF Turnhouse.	Ever but 27/8 and 20/7 112
RAF Usworth.	Ever but 1/9-7/9 107
RAF Wick.	Until 1/9 53
RAF Catterick.	Ever but 26 and 27/7 112
RAF Drem.	Ever 114
RAF Grangemouth.	Until 1/9 54
RAF Sumburgh.	17/7-17/9 63
RAF Church Fenton.	Until 22/10 105
RAF Digby.	Ever 114
RAF Duxford.	Ever 114
RAF Kirton-in-Lindsey.	Ever 114
RAF Wittering.	Ever 114
RAF Coltishall.	Ever 114
RAF Leconfield.	Ever 114
RAF Filton.	From 26/9 36
RAF Middle Wallop.	Ever 114
RAF Boscombe Down.	From 14/8 79
RAF Exeter.	Ever 114
RAF Pembrey.	Ever 114
RAF St Eval.	Ever but 13/8 and 10/9 112
RAF Warmwell.	From 12/7 112
RAF Biggin Hill.	Ever 114
RAF Debden.	Until 7/10 90
RAF Hornchurch.	Ever 114
RAF Kenley.	Ever 114
RAF Northolt.	Ever 114
RAF North Weald.	Ever 114
RAF Tangmere.	Ever 114
RAF Croydon.	Ever but 19/8-31/8 101
RAF Eastchurch	Never but 12 and 13/8 2
RAF Gravesend.	25/7- 29/10 but 10/9 96
RAF Hawkinge	Never but 10/7 1
RAF Hendon.	5/9-25/9 21
RAF Martlesham.	From 5/9 57
RAF Rochford.	Until 23/7 14
RAF Stapleford.	From 29/8 64
RAF Westhampnett.	From 31/7 93
RAF West Malling.	From 30/10 2
Castletown	Ever but 1/9 and 14-17/9 109
Fowlmere	24/7-29/10 98
Matlask	From 30/10 2
Castle Camps	From 3/9 59
Sealand	Never but 11 and 12/7 2
Prestwick	From 23/8 but 10/10 68
Skitten	13/10-23/10 11
Chibolton	From 30/9 32
Aldergrove	From 20/7 104
Speke	From 26/9 36

total 50 fields, 36 with almost a squadron for almost 57 days


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## ponsford (Dec 31, 2008)

Hi Gents:

I had a look at RAF fighter Squadrons Stations as of December 1939 and came up with the following break down, principally taken from _Fighter Squadrons of the R.A.F._ by John Rawlings.

Squadrons equipped with Hurricanes in the UK during December 1939:
3, 17, 32, 43, 46, 56, 79, 111, 151, 213, 501, 504, 605.

7 squadrons converted to Hurricane from Battle or Blenheim after December 1939:

145 Converted from Blenheim to Hurricane at Croyden in March 40
229 Converted from Blenheim to Hurricane at Digby in March 40
242 Converted from Blenheim to Hurricane at Church Fenton in Feb. 40 
245 Converted from Blenheim to Hurricane at Leconfield in March 40
253 Converted from Battle to Hurricane at Manston in Jan 40
263 Converted from Gladiator to Hurricane at Drem in June 40
601 Converted from Blenheim to Hurricane at Tangmere in Feb. 40

5 Squadrons formed and equipped with Hurricanes after December 1939

232 Formed with Hurricane at Sumburgh in July 40 
257 Formed with Hurricane at Hendon in May 40
302 Formed with Hurricane at Leconfield in July 40
310 Formed with Hurricane at Duxford in July 40
312 Formed with Hurricane at Duxford in July 40

1 RCAF with Hurricanes: my source didn’t list their history. Maybe someone can help with them.

Fighter Squadrons in France during December 1939:
1, 73, 85, 87 607 in Hurricane and 615 in Gladiator

Squadrons equipped with Spitfires in December 1939:
19, 41, 54, 65, 66, 72, 74, 152, 602, 603, 609, 610, 611, 616

5 Squadrons converted from Blenheim or Battle to Spitfire after December 1939.

64 Converted from Blenheim to Spitfire at Church Fenton in April 40
92 Converted from Blenheim to Spitfire at Croyden in March 40
222 Converted from Blenheim to Spitfire at Duxford in March 40
234 Converted from Blenheim to Spitfire at Leconfield in March 40
266 Converted from Battle to Spitfire at Sutton Bridge in Jan 40

I get 27 Spitfire and Hurricane Squadrons in Great Britain as of December 1939. The only other ones I found that were not on Hop’s list are 79 Squadron which was based at Manston in December 39 and 19 Squadron which was based at Duxford in December 1939. Of course both Manston and Duxford were on the list of stations to receive 100 octane fuel. All 27 squadrons were based at stations listed to receive 100 octane fuel. Of those units equipping with Hurricanes or Spitfires after December 1939 the only stations I see that were not on the December operational station lists are Sumburgh, Hendon and Sutton Bridge. These three were listed as non-operational stations as of December 7th. 

I found the source for the operational stations instructed to be issued 100 octane fuel at 100 Octane Fuel Memos


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## Hop (Dec 31, 2008)

> 1 RCAF with Hurricanes: my source didn’t list their history. Maybe someone can help with them.



From Squadrons of the Royal Air Force and Commonwealth 1918 - 1988:



> No 1 squadron was formed in June 1937 at Trenton and left Canada on 9th June 1940 for the United Kingdom. Arriving on 19th June the squadron received Hurricanes at Middle Wallop and began operational training





> I get 27 Spitfire and Hurricane Squadrons in Great Britain as of December 1939. The only other ones I found that were not on Hop’s list are 79 Squadron which was based at Manston in December 39 and 19 Squadron which was based at Duxford in December 1939.



Mea Culpa on 79 squadron. The site I linked to said arrived Manston 12/11/39 To France 11/05/40. I misread that as "To France 12/11/39".

Their fault on 19 squadron, they list them arriving at Duxford 16/05/40. Perhaps because 19 had been at Duxford so long (since mid 1935) the date they arrived fell before the period they checked.

I checked 74 and 609 in "Squadrons of the RAF and Commonwealth". That lists 609 at Drem in December with no mention of Kinloss. 74 squadron was based at Hornchurch, with, in their words, "frequent detachments to Rochford".

So I think it's safe to conclude that *every* active Spitfire and Hurricane squadron base in December 1939 was scheduled to have their 87 octane fuel totally replaced by 100 octane, and *all the other fighter stations*, that weren't home to Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons, were scheduled to have supplies of 100 octane available for visiting Spits and Hurris.


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## Kurfürst (Jan 1, 2009)

Hop said:


> So I think it's safe to conclude that *every* active Spitfire and Hurricane squadron base in December 1939 was scheduled to have their 87 octane fuel totally replaced by 100 octane,



Hmm, now where will you read that actually? 

I am re-reading that December 1939 latter, it oddly it doesn't mention anything about 'scheduling' or that they will _'have their 87 octane fuel totally replaced by 100 octane'_ 

It simply requests for information on 100 octane fuel. It certianly does not say it will be issued to these stations, and even less that it will replace 87 octane.

Actually it would be very funny to say so, as it's quite obvious that whoever wrote this latter, had actually no idea when and where will 100 octane fuel be available at all.

All this because _'as instructions will have to be issued to Stations to make the necessary arrangements for acceptance'._ But of course. 

'Spitfire' and 'Hurricane' fighter types have been cleared for the use of this fuel, so they will certainly need some sort of operational, maintenance instructions for it. Then it simply list the the stations that will be effected by this, ie. stations which have 'Spitfire' and 'Hurricane' type fighters.

I am sorry but this is not an memo regarding issuing the fuel to these stations, but requiring information, thats all.

It says : _'operational stations at which the fuel will be* required*'_ and not _'operational stations at which the fuel will be *allocated*'_. 

________________________________________________________________

_Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my letter FC/S.15447/76/EQ.2. dated 27th October, 1939, regarding the issue of 100 Octane fuel for use in Hurricane and Spitfire aircraft in this Command.

2. It is understood from your R.D.E.6 Branch that the use of this type of fuel has been authorised for use in the above types of aircraft. *Information is now sought* as to:-

(i)	When the 100 Octane Fuel will be available in quantity.
(ii)	The contract no. etc., for demanding purposes.
(iii)	The Petroleum Distributing points for the various Fighter Command Stations, situated as they are in various parts of the country.

3. It will probably be necessary, when the 100 octane fuel is available, to request disposal instructions for varying quantities of D.T.D.224 and other grades of petrol that will not be required in such large quantities on the introduction of the 100 Octane fuel.

4. It would be appreciated if you would kindly give this Headquarters as much notice as possible regarding this new type of fuel, as instructions will have to be issued to Stations to make the necessary arrangements for acceptance.

5. The operational stations at which the fuel will be required in the first instance are:

*LIST OMMITTED*

6. All non-operational Stations in the Fighter Command will also have to hold certain quantities of this fuel for visiting aircraft. Non-operational Stations and Stations which have no Hurricane or Spitfire aircraft at the moment are:- 

*LIST OMMITTED*

[signature etc.]_
_________________________________________________________________


Where does it say these Stations will be supplied with 100 octane fuel? It certainly doesn't.



> and *all the other fighter stations*, that weren't home to Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons, were scheduled to have supplies of 100 octane available for visiting Spits and Hurris.



Again, that particular source doesn't say anything like that. 

It says: 

'will also have to hold certain quantities of this fuel', and not 'will hold certain quantities of this fuel'. A wish, rather than a statement.

Of course which units would receive 100 octane fuel was already decided, in March 1939 - 16 Spitfire/Hurricane squadrons and 2 Blenheim Squadrons. You say there were about only 30 Squadrons in 1939? That works out as ca 50%; during the battle there were about 50-60 Squadrons, that works out as around 25%.


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## Juha (Jan 1, 2009)

Vincenzo, thanks for Your effort.

Kurfürst
now standard works on BoB claim that FC converted to 100 oct before the BoB. To prove that the all those specialists were wrong you need something more concrete than your speculations. For example Denis Richards wrote with a co-writer the 3 volume official history of RAF in WWII and in fact he wrote alone the Volume I which covered the period from pre-war to middle of 41. I don’t claim that official histories got it all right but the burden of proof is on you not on Hop

Juha


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## Glider (Jan 1, 2009)

Kurfürst said:


> Hmm, now where will you read that actually?
> 
> It simply requests for information on 100 octane fuel. It certianly does not say it will be issued to these stations, and even less that it will replace 87 octane.
> 
> ...


If you are planning to introduce one type of fuel in place of another you need to know when that fuel is going to be available, its common sense.


> 'Spitfire' and 'Hurricane' fighter types have been cleared for the use of this fuel, so they will certainly need some sort of operational, maintenance instructions for it. Then it simply list the the stations that will be effected by this, ie. stations which have 'Spitfire' and 'Hurricane' type fighters.
> 
> I am sorry but this is not an memo regarding issuing the fuel to these stations, but requiring information, thats all.


I don't disagree with most of this statement but the list is not a final list, see my comments later



> It says : _'operational stations at which the fuel will be* required*'_ and not _'operational stations at which the fuel will be *allocated*'_.


Your inflexion is wrong here. You need to know which stations need the fuel before you issue it. The clear meaning here is that they wanted confirmation as to which stations require the fuel so they can send it there. There is no hidden meaning that you may not have enough fuel to send it to all the stations.


> ________________________________________________________________
> 
> _Sir,
> 
> I have the honour to refer to my letter FC/S.15447/76/EQ.2. dated 27th October, 1939, regarding the issue of 100 Octane fuel for use in Hurricane and Spitfire aircraft in this Command._


_
Note is refers to Hurricanes and Spitfires in this command, not certain aircraft or certain districts. If there was a shortage you would expect it to say for instance 'Hurricane and Spitfires in 11 Group'.



2. It is understood from your R.D.E.6 Branch that the use of this type of fuel has been authorised for use in the above types of aircraft. *Information is now sought* as to:-

(i)	When the 100 Octane Fuel will be available in quantity.
(ii)	The contract no. etc., for demanding purposes.
(iii)	The Petroleum Distributing points for the various Fighter Command Stations, situated as they are in various parts of the country.

Click to expand...

Totally understandable questions. (i) When will the fuel be available, (ii) what are the admin processes involved, (iii) What are the Petroleum Distributing points for Fighter Command.



3. It will probably be necessary, when the 100 octane fuel is available, to request disposal instructions for varying quantities of D.T.D.224 and other grades of petrol that will not be required in such large quantities on the introduction of the 100 Octane fuel.

Click to expand...

Again totally understandable question, you don't expect them to just pour fuel down the drain do you?



4. It would be appreciated if you would kindly give this Headquarters as much notice as possible regarding this new type of fuel, as instructions will have to be issued to Stations to make the necessary arrangements for acceptance.

Click to expand...

Again totally fair question.



5. The operational stations at which the fuel will be required in the first instance are:

*LIST OMMITTED*

Click to expand...

Note the use of the words in the first instance. This is not a definitive list, its stating which stations should be issued first. Again a totaly understandable piece of information.



6. All non-operational Stations in the Fighter Command will also have to hold certain quantities of this fuel for visiting aircraft. Non-operational Stations and Stations which have no Hurricane or Spitfire aircraft at the moment are:- 

*LIST OMMITTED*

[signature etc.]

Click to expand...

_Again totally understandable.
_________________________________________________________________




> Where does it say these Stations will be supplied with 100 octane fuel? It certainly doesn't.


It certainly does say that. The entire memo is about wanting the information so that it can be distributed




> 'will also have to hold certain quantities of this fuel', and not 'will hold certain quantities of this fuel'. A wish, rather than a statement.


Wrong. its not a wish, its a statement of fact. They will also have to hold certain quantities of 100 Octane.



> Of course which units would receive 100 octane fuel was already decided, in March 1939 - 16 Spitfire/Hurricane squadrons and 2 Blenheim Squadrons. You say there were about only 30 Squadrons in 1939? That works out as ca 50%; during the battle there were about 50-60 Squadrons, that works out as around 25%.


This is the bit which I admit I don't understand. All the documentation is about the authorisation of distributing 100 Octane and the mechanics of that distribution to an initial list of stations. As you know more than one squadron was normally based at a station, so even the intial list of stations would result in more than 18 fighter squadrons, yet you stick to 18 squadrons?


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## Kurfürst (Jan 1, 2009)

Juha said:


> Kurfürst
> now standard works on BoB claim that FC converted to 100 oct before the BoB.



So far you have quoted none of these 'standard works'. 

It is clear for Gavin Bailey summary of the RAF's archieve documents that only 16+2 squadrons of Fighter Command were scheaduled for operating 100 octane fuel. Its also clear FC first started to convert these Squadrons in March-May 1940. 

There is no evidence at all that more than 16+2 Squadrons have received 100 octane fuel during the Battle of Britain.

If you wish to prove that the March 1939 decision for 18 was revived later, and that *all* Fighter Squadrons were issued 100 octane fuel, provide the documentation for that. 




Juha said:


> To prove that the all those specialists were wrong you need something more concrete than your speculations.



So far you have quoted none of those specialist.

You keep distort the actual statements of these authors - none of them I am aware of state that 100 octane fuel was used exclusively, in fact, Gavin Bailey makes it clear that 16+2 Squadrons were meant to use it, and also fabricate strawman arguements. I have never claimed these specialist are wrong.



> I don’t claim that official histories got it all right but the burden of proof is on you not on Hop.



Its clear that you are incapable of supporting your claims and that you wish to be freed from the burden of prooving them.

See also Russell's teapot - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia regarding your tactics.

The burden of proof is always on the one making a postive claim. You are making a positive claim when you say that each and every Fighter Command Squadrons was supposedly provided with 100 octane fuel during the Battle of Britain. Thus the burden of proof is on you. So far you have provided no evidence for these claims.


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## Kurfürst (Jan 1, 2009)

Glider said:


> This is the bit which I admit I don't understand. All the documentation is about the authorisation of distributing 100 Octane and the mechanics of that distribution to an initial list of stations.



The document does not say a word about there being plans to distrubute fuel to all the Stations listed. You seem to have troubles with reading comprehension.

The document says:

'The operational stations at which the fuel will be *required* in the first instance are'

You appearantly having trouble with understanding the meaning of 'required'. Oxford defines it as :

*require*

_ • verb 
1 need for a purpose; depend on. 
2 wish to have. 
3 instruct or expect (someone) to do something.
— ORIGIN Latin requirere, from quaerere ‘seek’._

Ie. 

'The operational stations at which the fuel will be *needed for a purpose* in the first instance are'
'The operational stations at which the fuel will be *wish to be had* in the first instance are'
'The operational stations at which the fuel will be *expected* in the first instance are'



> As you know more than one squadron was normally based at a station, so even the intial list of stations would result in more than 18 fighter squadrons, yet you stick to 18 squadrons?



Wishful speculations are your table, not mine. In fact, you have supplied no evidence at all to this discussion, but your own speculations.

Gavin Bailey makes it clear that only 16+2 Squadrons were concerned as far as issue of 100 octane fuel goes. There's no evidence that this was revised. 

In fact, the 18th May 1940 make it clear that the fuel was only stocked with the 'Units concrned', not 'all units'.

If you wish to prove your 'teapot' floating in deep space full of 100 octane fuel, from which it pours to each and every Spit and Hurri around, you need to prove that this teapot exists, not others that it doesn't exist.


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## Juha (Jan 1, 2009)

Kurfürst
look again at my message #55. Denis Richards happened to be the author of the official history, all you have is a plan made ½ year before the outbrake of the war, IMHO most of us understand that outbrake of war usually has impact of plans of armed forces. Now can you give a book wrote by BoB specialist in which claimed that during the BoB FC fighters used 87 oct fuel? Please.

Juha


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## Kurfürst (Jan 1, 2009)

Can you provide a scan or a quote from Denis Richards book which state all FC Squadrons were using 100 octane fuel during the Battle of Britain?


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## Glider (Jan 1, 2009)

Kurfürst said:


> The document does not say a word about there being plans to distrubute fuel to all the Stations listed. You seem to have troubles with reading comprehension.
> 
> The document says:
> 
> ...


Exactly, he is saying that the operational stations that he wishes. or wants, or expects in the first instance to be equiped with the fuel are.
You have to remember that there is a difference between asking for something to be done, and it being able to be done. He knows that he is asking a lot but doesn't know if the person he is asking can do it. 
You know that at the next meeting they passed on the offical thanks of the Air Ministry as to how well this task was undertaken. 
You also know that at later meetings permission was given for the fuel to be issued to other commands.




> Wishful speculations are your table, not mine. In fact, you have supplied no evidence at all to this discussion, but your own speculations.


Sorry there is a wealth of evidence and you are simply not taking it into account.



> Gavin Bailey makes it clear that only 16+2 Squadrons were concerned as far as issue of 100 octane fuel goes. There's no evidence that this was revised.


I admit to not knowing this Gavin Bailey. Can I ask you to point me to a link or book as it seems to be the crux of the confusion. It might help straighten me out.



> In fact, the 18th May 1940 make it clear that the fuel was only stocked with the 'Units concrned', not 'all units'.


And according to everythng that I have read *'all units' *is all *Hurricane and Spitfire Units*.
Think it through, why would they give it to a Blenhiem Unit and not a Spitfire Unit when all a Blenhiem Unit is, is basically target practice for the Luftwaffe?



> If you wish to prove your 'teapot' floating in deep space full of 100 octane fuel, from which it pours to each and every Spit and Hurri around, you need to prove that this teapot exists, not others that it doesn't exist.


We have 
(i) the actual stocks of Fuel, 
(ii) The order authorising it to be issued to all Hurricane and Spitfire Units
(iii) the paper containing the list of stations to be so equipped in the first instance
(iv) the paper passing on the thanks of the Air Ministry for the way this was carried out
(v) the paper authorising the fuel to be released to all other commands. 
(vi) The Pilots reports on the use of the extra boost from a number of squadrons including its use in France
(vii) The squadrons moving around during the battle with their ouw aircraft and no evidence of them having to take their own fuel with them.
Now I may be out of order, but as a paper trail it seems pretty good to me and I expect most others.

You have Gavin Bailey. As I said if you could point me to a copy of this source I would appreciate it so I can study it.


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## Juha (Jan 1, 2009)

Kurfürst
I don't have a scanner but IIRC you have sometimes quoted Wood's Dempster's The Narrow Margin. In my old HB 1961 edition on page 98 "...By July 11th, 1940, the day after the BoB opened, stocks of 100 octane petrol used in the Merlin engine stood at 343,000 tons..."

Juha


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## Kurfürst (Jan 1, 2009)

Gavin Bailey: The Narrow Margin of Criticality: The Question of the Supply of 100-Octane Fuel in the Battle of Britain -- Bailey CXXIII (501): 394 -- The English Historical Review


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## Kurfürst (Jan 1, 2009)

Juha said:


> Kurfürst
> I don't have a scanner but IIRC you have sometimes quoted Wood's Dempster's The Narrow Margin. In my old HB 1961 edition on page 98 "...By July 11th, 1940, the day after the BoB opened, stocks of 100 octane petrol used in the Merlin engine stood at 343,000 tons..."
> 
> Juha



He seems to suggest that 100 octane petrol was used in the Merlin engine, but nothing more. I don't think any of us disagrees with him that 100 octane fuel was used during the Battle. 

Some however claim that nothing else was used. This claim is what we need evidence for.


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## claidemore (Jan 1, 2009)

Too Funny!
Logic is being applied as orders and messages are dissected to 'prove' one point or another. 
So, using logic....a war starts, Britain is 'on the ropes'facing imminent invasion, they have supplies of 100 octane fuel which they know gives their fighters a tremendous boost.

Do they:
A-leave it in storage
or
B-use it. 

Duh.


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## KrazyKraut (Jan 1, 2009)

Utilizing the fuel requires substantial logistical effort and modifications on the aircraft.

Duh.


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## delcyros (Jan 1, 2009)

From my perspective, it would help to end the debate if not only the amount of 100 oct. fuel would be considered (to which a lengthy discussion has evolved) but in addition to this the quantity of 87 oct. grade fuel would have been included. _Was there really no 87 grade fuel beeing issued to the fighter command in between august and oct. 1940?_
If that question can be answered negative we might find solid grounds that 100 oct. fuel was used exclusively.


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## Kurfürst (Jan 1, 2009)

Glider said:


> Exactly, he is saying that the operational stations that he wishes. or wants, or expects in the first instance to be equiped with the fuel are.
> You have to remember that there is a difference between asking for something to be done, and it being able to be done. He knows that he is asking a lot but doesn't know if the person he is asking can do it.
> 
> 
> ...


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## Juha (Jan 1, 2009)

Kurfürst
You don't find it odd that Wood and Dempster, writing on BoB mentioned only 100 oct and its amount and how much of it was issued but didn't mentioned at all 87 oct, which according to you, was the fuel used by 75% of FC's sqns? Only indirect mentionof 87 oct came a couple line later "With other grades of aviation spirit total stock available on Oct 10th, 1940 was 666,000 tons." A bit odd, isn't it. No mentions on 87 oct, how much of it was issued, how much of it was in stock. And the grade in question was the one which 75 % of FC fighters used, according to you, and I must admit that only to you in my knowledge.

Juha


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## Kurfürst (Jan 1, 2009)

I do find a lot of things odd with Wood and Dempster. They categorically state for example that there were 4 gunned Spitfire MkIs, while the eight gunned ones were designated 'MkIA', or that the Bf 109E had an engine cannon, and of course the Bf 109F did not participate in the Battle (dissing a contemporary German intel report mentioning the type!).

As far as why mentioning 100 octane fuel only, I guess they worked from the same AVIA 10/282 which appears to be about 100 octane fuel only. 

I leave it to you to speculate on other possibilities.


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## ponsford (Jan 1, 2009)

Hi Juha: There are scans to be found online from various authors that are in agreement with conventional wisdom, the majority viewpoint and with what you’ve read:

Wood Dempster






Rolls Royce Heritage Trust





David Ross





Alfred Price


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## Vincenzo (Jan 1, 2009)

ponsford nobody tell that the 100 octane was not in use in Bob, and also before, kurfust and i agree with him that was not in use for all fighter squadrons


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## Waynos (Jan 1, 2009)

According to 'the history of Aircraft Lubricants' which can be found on google quite easily, page 12 states that Fighter Command converted to 100 octane as standard on all Spitfires and Hurricanes in March 1940. This matches with the editorial of Flight magazine from March 28th 1940 which is entitled 'hundred octane'.

I'm not sure why not all Spits and Hurri's in the Command are thought to have the fuel by some? The only instance I have read of 'lesser' fual being used is in another 1940 article that talks of the Blenheim using 100 octane for take off and switching to 87 for the rest of the flight (not sure about that myself) but as far as the Spit and Hurri go it seems to be 100 octane all the way.

Also, is it too much of a stretch to read 'all applicable squadrons' as meaning 'all Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons in Fighter Command'?


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## Glider (Jan 1, 2009)

Kurfürst said:


> I do find a lot of things odd with Wood and Dempster. They categorically state for example that there were 4 gunned Spitfire MkIs, while the eight gunned ones were designated 'MkIA',



I don't want to disappoint you, Kurfurst but the Original Spitfire design did only have 4 x 303 mg and that is one of the differences between the Mk1 and the Mk1A.
There were a number of other differences probably the most surprising of which was that the Mk1 was designed with a larger fuel tank.

No Mk 1 Spitfires were built. The four gun design was in the mock up and rejected by the RAF as they wanted 8 x LMG's. Changes were made and the production versions were the Mk1A with 8 x LMG and the smaller fuel tank.


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## Juha (Jan 1, 2009)

Thanks Ponsford
we seems to have lot of same books.
Narrow Margin but clearly a different edition
RRHT book I don't have
Ross's excellent "The Greatest Squandron of Them All" Vol I the page is 125.

Vincenzo
maybe Gladiators and Blenheims didn't use it but I doubt at least the Blenheim case, bacause Blenheim IV's Mercuries could be modified to 100 oct.
And what first line fighter sqns didn't use 100 oct during the BoB? And why for ex Price and RRHT claimed that FC changed to 100 oct if only 1/4 of it changed as Kurfürst claims? Why Wood Dempster have no interest on the fuel situation of 3/4 of FC as would has the case if KF's claim is true? I have not seen any proof of KF's claim yet. A plan made ½ year before the beginning of war doesn't proof anything on situation 1 1/3 year later. I doubt that US MC had many plans for Guadalcanal landing in May 41, but that doesn't proof that Guadalcanal landing was only American fiction, fantacy or whatever terms KF has used on 100 oct conversion.

Juha


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## ponsford (Jan 1, 2009)

Vincenzo said:


> ponsford nobody tell that the 100 octane was not in use in Bob, and also before, kurfust and i agree with him that was not in use for all fighter squadrons



That’s fine Vincenzo, you’re perfectly entitled to hold and share your opinion, however, we will remain in disagreement as I find your position singularly unconvincing and it’s apparent you are likely too invested in your view to change it no matter the evidence. That said, I promise not to ridicule, smear, slander you or subject you to verbal abuse and character assassination because our views differ. We will simply have to agree to disagree on this subject.


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## beaupower32 (Jan 1, 2009)

In my mind the 110 would be a better aircraft.


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## KrazyKraut (Jan 2, 2009)

Juha said:


> And why for ex Price and RRHT claimed that FC changed to 100 oct if only 1/4 of it changed as Kurfürst claims? Why Wood Dempster have no interest on the fuel situation of 3/4 of FC as would has the case if KF's claim is true? I have not seen any proof of KF's claim yet. A plan made ½ year before the beginning of war doesn't proof anything on situation 1 1/3 year later. I doubt that US MC had many plans for Guadalcanal landing in May 41, but that doesn't proof that Guadalcanal landing was only American fiction, fantacy or whatever terms KF has used on 100 oct conversion.
> 
> Juha


Hello Juha,

I don't really want to join this lengthy debate as clearly others involved here are more knowledgable (though biased) on this subject. But surely you would agree with me that scientifically, the burden of proof is the one who wants to prove his theory not on the one who challenges it. If Wood Dempster disagree they surely list their primary source which should be available somewhere. I still have books claiming that Thundebolts regularly took out Tiger tanks by shooting .50 calibre bullets at roads which then deflected and penetrated the soft belly of the tank.


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## Glider (Jan 2, 2009)

Kurfurst
Lets look at your argument

The paper you refer to was some months before the BOB in which case things change.

18 Squadrons you keep saying this but when asked Which Squadrons? - I believe you don't know
Where are they based? _ I believe you don't know
What happens when they change base? - I believe that you don't know
Do they take the fuel with them? - I believe you don't know
Why supply 2 x Blenhiem Squadrons at the expense of Spitfire Squadrons? - You don't know
Why leave many thousands of tons of fuel unused? - You don't know.
You say that the authorised conversions didn't happen - Yet you don't have any evidence.


The evidence trail is very clear
12 December 1939
Permission is given to use 100 Octane in Hurricane Spitfires and Defiants. Note that it specifically mentions that Supplies in Bulk should be available before it is issued to the relevant stations.
There you are, the phrase you love to misquote Relevant Stations. What you always leave out of your quote is the specific mention of 'Non Operational Stations'. The meaning is clear, Relevant Stations are those with Spitfire Hurricane and Defiant aircraft. Non Operational Stations will not be stocked with 100 Octane until later.

18th May 1940
The Committee took note that the use of 100 Octane had been made clear to Fighter Command re the use in Spitfire and Hurricane aircraft and that the Units involved had been so equipped. Again the meaning is clear, in December they had been given permission to use the 100 Octane and deliveries would start, in May 1940 this had been made available.
The Board even passed on that the Air Ministry had been impressed with how well this had been undertaken.

7th August as previously stated permission that it could be used in all operational aircraft and the Commands were so authorised, i.e. not just the Fighters.

Nowhere on any of these notes does it refer to certain squadrons, units or areas.

To this can be added quotes from :-
Wood and Dempster
Rolls Royce Heritage Trust
David Ross
Alfred Price
The History of Aircraft Lubricants

This is your favourite quote
_What is known that 16 (out of 50-60) RAF fighter Squadrons and two Blenheim Squadrons used 100 octane fuel in the Battle, a wider use was proposed in August but as evidenced by the unchanging level of actual fuel consumption, none of that was realized, and remained just that, a plan._
All we are asking you to do is support it, if its known then you shold be able to find something, or it isn't known, its unknown. Can you find any reference anywhere that shows that Hurricane and Spitfire Pilots didn't have 100 Octane fuel in the BOB. You state that only a quarter of the RAF Fighter squadrons had 100 Octane so you should be able to find sme reference somewhere.

Your main evidence is Gavin Bailey quote
_RAF tests with 100-octane had begun in 1937, but clearance for operational use was withheld as stocks were built up. In March 1939, the Air Ministry decided to introduce 100-octane fuel into use with sixteen fighter and two twin-engined bomber squadrons by September 1940, when it was believed that the requirement to complete the war reserve stock would have been met, with the conversion of squadrons beginning at the end of 1939_

No doubt in March 1939 well before war broke out it would have taken until September 1940 to build up war stocks at a peace time rate of import. But as has been mentioned, war changes things.
No doubt in March 1939 the UK didn’t have many plans to purchase all the equipment from the USA, that they did. However that doesn’t mean that they were not purchased or delivered, clearly they were as were the fuel stocks which clearly outstripped demand.


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## Kurfürst (Jan 2, 2009)

There does not seem to be a disagreement between authors. Though vaguely referred to, they all agree that the introduction of 100 octane fuel actually occurred at around March 1940. 

None of them state however that 87 octane was removed from issue, or that 100 octane was the only fuel used and issued. Juha is simply 'interpreting' those vaguely constructed sentences in his own curious manner. 

Luckily we have also primary material which gives more detail on the matter, stating that 16 + 2 Squadrons were in the RAF's plans, and that the supplies were seen inadequate in May and conversions were stopped, and 87 octane was designated to the primary fuel. 

We also know they used 18k tons in the Q2 of 1940 (when the RAF FC had around 30 Sqns as Hop tells us), and ca 22k in Q3 1940, when they had about _twice_ the amount of fighters around than in Q2, and flying _much_ more sorties. We also know that in 1944 for ca. 30 Squadrons of Spitfires, the RAF estimated 20 000 tons of fuel being required _per month_.

Juha of course simply ignores it while cheerfully pursuing his own fantasies, as he has always been.


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## Kurfürst (Jan 2, 2009)

Glider said:


> The evidence trail is very clear
> 12 December 1939
> Permission is given to use 100 Octane in Hurricane Spitfires and Defiants.



No, already discussed. Its a memo _from a Group Captain_, and nowhere it states 'permission', and neither does it 'authorize' anything.



Glider said:


> 18th May 1940
> The Committee took note that the use of 100 Octane had been made clear to Fighter Command re the use in Spitfire and Hurricane aircraft



The text actually says:

_'The Committee took note of the fact that the position with regard the use of the fuel in Hurricane and Spitfire engines had been made clear to Fighter command....'_

We also know archieve materials what was this 'position' :

_'Firstly *87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities* to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place. Those existing fighters already so converted (approximately 125) would continue to use what supplies of 100 octane were available, but all other fighters that had not been modified to continue with the use of 87 octane (of which there was more than adequate supply).'_



Glider said:


> and that the Units involved had been so equipped.



Which alone makes clear not all units were issued with 100 octane fuel, so there goes your main argument that *ALL* Squadrons were supplied with the fuel.



Glider said:


> Again the meaning is clear, in December they had been given permission to use the 100 Octane and deliveries would start,



Even if you keep repeating that, no such permission was given in December according to the available documentation.



Glider said:


> 7th August as previously stated permission that it could be used in all operational aircraft and the Commands were so authorised, i.e. not just the Fighters.



This has been already discussed too, that in they also estimated the requirements for this and those were in the order of 90 000 tons.

Then they issued only 22 000 tons in the Q3 of 1940, woefully inaduquate to fullfill these plans.



Glider said:


> Nowhere on any of these notes does it refer to certain squadrons, units or areas.



Of course they do, they say, in May 1940:
_
'the units concerned had now been stocked with the neccesarry 100 octane fuel'_

The units concerned, pretty clear isn't it.



Glider said:


> Your main evidence is Gavin Bailey quote
> 
> _RAF tests with 100-octane had begun in 1937, but clearance for operational use was withheld as stocks were built up. In March 1939, the Air Ministry decided to introduce 100-octane fuel into use with sixteen fighter and two twin-engined bomber squadrons by September 1940, when it was believed that the requirement to complete the war reserve stock would have been met, with the conversion of squadrons beginning at the end of 1939_
> 
> ...



This is just speculation. We can all speculate all day, but that does not bring facts to the table.

You are the one who is claiming that there was a change in the number of Squadrons effected from the March 1939 plans and not 18 but _ALL_ Squadrons were supplied with 100 octane fuel. 

Just like that, without any evidence to it, you say that all of them were converted.

Trouble is, you are the one making a positive claim, so you will have to prove that *ALL* Squadrons/Stations were issued with this fuel, against documentary evidence which says they were not. Why don't you just go the National Archieves in Kew, find that AVIA folder that has all the 25 meetings in it, and see for your own eyes? You live right there, after all...


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## Glider (Jan 2, 2009)

Kurfurst
You need to support your statements with some facts.

18 Squadrons you keep saying this but when asked Which Squadrons? - no reply
Where are they based? _ no reply
What happens when they change base? - no reply
Do they take the fuel with them? - no reply
Why supply 2 x Blenhiem Squadrons at the expense of Spitfire Squadrons? - no reply
Why leave many tens of thousands of tons of fuel unused? - no reply.
You say that the authorised conversions didn't happen but when asked to support that - no reply
You say that the plan remained a plan and was not achieved but supply no evidence.
When asked if you can find any reference anywhere that shows that Hurricane and Spitfire Pilots didn't have 100 Octane fuel in the BOB. You cannot
You state that only a quarter of the RAF Fighter squadrons had 100 Octane so you should be able to find some reference somewhere but can find no reference.
You would think that of all the hundreds of books written about the BOB one of them would mention the practical problems of only having 18 squadrons equipped with the 100 Octane fuel, both tactically and strategically but nothing, not one. All I am asking you to do is find one reference.

The centre of the argument is that I beleive that all the papers mentioned above refer to all the Spitfire and Hurricanes. You believe that they refer to the 18 unknown squadrons on the unknown bases that were in the original plan of March 1939 before war broke out.
None of the papers refer to the 18 squadrons and at least the list of stations to be stocked in the first instance would be expected to list where those 18 squadrons are based, but they don't.

Re speculation about the imports. War changes things that is a fact to continue to plan on a prewar basis for such a strategic item is unheard of, can you find another from any country, on any strategic item? I suspect the reply will be no.


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## Juha (Jan 2, 2009)

Hello KrazyKraut
I happened to have university degree on history and can say that the burden of proof is clearly on KF because acknowledged authors like Richards and Price in their books give info that FC front line sqns changed from 87 oct to 100oct in the spring of 1940 and Wood and Dempster gave only info how much 100 oct was issued and how the stock situation of it developed and didn’t say a word on 87 oct. I don’t say that it is certain all those specialists got it right but probably they got it right. To proof otherwise one needs to produce some concrete proofs, more concrete than that someone in some discussion board had wrote something.

Until KF produce some proof that 66 000 tons of 87 oct was issued to FC between 10th July and 10th Oct 40, or if we assume that those sqns using 87 oct flew fewer sorties say 55 000 tons. Simple as that. And I’ll wait if KF is capable produce the proof.

KF
not surprisingly you behaved as usual. Now if FC has changed to 100 oct authors of course didn’t say anything on 87 oct, they said nothing on 72 oct either or other low oct fuels because they are irrelevant to FC front line fighters. As we know from Goebbels, repeating something many times doesn’t make it a truth. Produce evidence! And at least up to now it has been you who is living in his fantasy world being unable to proof his case. Till you produce concrete proofs and not only try to hide lack of them behind arrogance and aggressive abuses.

Juha


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## Kurfürst (Jan 2, 2009)

It seems both Glider and Juha are infinitively capable of arguing the facts but not capable of bringing facts to their arguements. Until they do, there is no reason to waste any more time on this.

Now, all the decisions are appearantly there in AVIA 10/282, publicly available at the National Archives in Kew.


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## KrazyKraut (Jan 2, 2009)

Juha said:


> Hello KrazyKraut
> I happened to have university degree on history and can say that the burden of proof is clearly on KF because acknowledged authors like Richards and Price in their books give info that FC front line sqns changed from 87 oct to 100oct in the spring of 1940 and Wood and Dempster gave only info how much 100 oct was issued and how the stock situation of it developed and didn’t say a word on 87 oct. I don’t say that it is certain all those specialists got it right but probably they got it right. To proof otherwise one needs to produce some concrete proofs, more concrete than that someone in some discussion board had wrote something.


I read only the pages posted here and while they make it clear that 100 octane fuel was available in time for the battle of Britain (and before), they also leave certain room for speculation as to how widespread that fuel was used by fighters. So either the underlying primary sources were not that completely conclusive (or at least left a certain possibility that there were still fighters running on 87 octane fuel) or the authors simply forgot to mention that. I personally would assume the former. Most likely the authors would agree with you, that, to the best of their knowledge, all fighters were converted. But I find it unlikely that, if they had ultimate proof, they would not have said so explicitly in their articles. But that is speculation on my part.


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## ponsford (Jan 2, 2009)

Waynos said:


> According to 'the history of Aircraft Lubricants' which can be found on google quite easily, page 12 states that Fighter Command converted to 100 octane as standard on all Spitfires and Hurricanes in March 1940. This matches with the editorial of Flight magazine from March 28th 1940 which is entitled 'hundred octane'.
> 
> I'm not sure why not all Spits and Hurri's in the Command are thought to have the fuel by some? The only instance I have read of 'lesser' fual being used is in another 1940 article that talks of the Blenheim using 100 octane for take off and switching to 87 for the rest of the flight (not sure about that myself) but as far as the Spit and Hurri go it seems to be 100 octane all the way.
> 
> Also, is it too much of a stretch to read 'all applicable squadrons' as meaning 'all Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons in Fighter Command'?



Good stuff Waynos. 

Excerpted from Flight, March 28, 1940:

















Full pdf of the article for the reading pleasure of the board membership:
Fighter Station with the Spitfires in Scotland

Anyone care to venture a guess as to the squadron? I’m thinking either 602 or 603, both based at Drem. 

Excerpt from: W.G. Dudek and D. R. Winans, AIAA Paper No. 69-779, Milestones in Aviation Fuels, Esso Research and Engineering Company, New York 1969.


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## Glider (Jan 2, 2009)

Kurfürst said:


> It seems both Glider and Juha are infinitively capable of arguing the facts but not capable of bringing facts to their arguements. Until they do, there is no reason to waste any more time on this.
> 
> Now, all the decisions are appearantly there in AVIA 10/282, publicly available at the National Archives in Kew.



Facts are what we are after Kurfurst, and facts are the one thing you have not brought into the debate.

My earlier post listed a number of questions that have been raised a number of times and never replied to, not one. 
You make statements and refuse to support them. The fact that you have not replied to any of them says it all, which is a shame, as I thought that you were better than that.

I will look up AVIA 10/282 when I am next in Kew but it isn't something that I can do at the drop of a hat.


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## KrazyKraut (Jan 2, 2009)

You can easily do that from the comfort of your home if you are willing to invest 8.50 pounds, which is probably less than the trip and the search would take:

The National Archives | The Catalogue | Full Details | AVIA 10/282


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## Kurfürst (Jan 2, 2009)

Glider said:


> Facts are what we are after Kurfurst, and facts are the one thing you have not brought into the debate.



I wonder what you were arguing about the last 7 pages then I wonder...? 



Glider said:


> My earlier post listed a number of questions that have been raised a number of times and never replied to, not one.



Your questions were largely irrevelant to the discussion and were basically refusing to accept the facts stated by Gavin Bailey about Blenheim squadrons etc. They were not material to the question, and ask Bailey anyway.



Glider said:


> You make statements and refuse to support them. The fact that you have not replied to any of them says it all, which is a shame, as I thought that you were better than that.



Again, I wonder, was it another Glider who were arguing those facts that hasn't posted in the last 7 pages...?

I have already supported my statements with the summary of referenced archive materials. You on the other hand were unable to provide any sort of primary reference material that would clearly and without doubt would say: 'All Fighter Command Squadrons and Stations use and are supplied with 100 octane fuel'.

Until then, ponder on this:
_
"The first bulk shipment of 100 octane fuel had arrived in Britain in June 1939 from the Esso refinery in Aruba. This and subsequent tanker shipments from Aruba, Curacao and the USA were stockpiled while the RAF continued to operate on 87 octane petrol. *Having secured what were considered reasonably sufficient quantities of 100 octane, Fighter Command began converting its engines to this standard in March 1940,* allowing boost (manifold) pressures to be raised without the risk of detonation in the cylinders. This initial increase in maximum boost from 6 lb to 9 lb delivered a useful power growth of around 130hp at the rated altitude. 

By the time of the invasion of the Low Countries by Germany in *May 1940 the RAF had converted approximately 25 % of it's total fighter force to 100 octane fuel use. *The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel. Against the backdrop of total war the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time.

Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet *in May* to resolve the looming crisis. Firstly *87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used* until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place. *Those existing fighters already so converted (approximately 125) would continue to use what supplies of 100 octane* were available, *but all other fighters that had not been modified to continue with the use of 87 octane* (of which there was more than adequate supply). The second action was for the British Government to contract the Shell Oil Refining Company to assist the British-controlled Iraqi Petroleum Company at Kirkuk to produce 100 octane fuel. This arrangement proved quite successful as production was quickly converted to 100 octane fuel. 

The first Middle East shipment of 100 octane fuel arrived in Portsmouth on 12th August, with a further two deliveries in September and four in October. Although too late to allow widespread conversion for the use of the fuel the deliveries did ensure that from this point on Britain would not be lacking in 100 octane fuel levels. With the newfound supply *RAF Fighter Command again embarked upon a Merlin II and III conversion to 100 octane use from late September, finally achieving 100% conversion of it's fighter force by the end of November in 1940.*_

Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War. / 
Australian War Memorial Archives.



> I will look up AVIA 10/282 when I am next in Kew but it isn't something that I can do at the drop of a hat.



Well, that would be very constructive to the discussion! Let us know what you find there, but I am fairly certain you will find the same as in the paper of AWMA. 
Until then, I really see no point to run the same circles over and over again. Hopefully, you will also find answer to the question of which and where those 16+2 Squadrons were, and what precisly happened in March-May 1940.


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## Marcel (Jan 2, 2009)

Not taking any sides here, but I found this (apologies if it's already posted):


> BATTLE OF BRITAIN
> The Royal Airforce had used 87 octane fuel until March 1940 when fighter command converted *all it's Spitfire and Hurricane Rolls-Royce Merlin powered fighters* to 100 octane (i.e., grade 100/130)


From: History of Aircraft Lubricants - Google Book Search



> In fact, it was only a few months before the Battle of Britain
> that *all* fighters were changed over from 87- to 100-octane
> fuel,.


From the pdf below.


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## beaupower32 (Jan 2, 2009)

Intresting read Marcel, from what they are saying is that they all did have 100 octane fuel at the battle of britain. I like this part in the article.


Nevertheless, let us not forget that between the fuel and the
airscrew there are also many other links in the chain, any one
of which, had it failed, could have vitally affected the issue,
while all the technical superiority in the world would, of course,
have been of no avail at all without the efficient training, skill,
and courage in combat of the Battle of Britain pilots.


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## Glider (Jan 2, 2009)

Kurfürst said:


> Your questions were largely irrevelant to the discussion and were basically refusing to accept the facts stated by Gavin Bailey about Blenheim squadrons etc. They were not material to the question, and ask Bailey anyway..


These are the same facts you based your whole position on and hey presto, when they are questioned, they become irrevelant. An interesting approach it has to be admitted.


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## ponsford (Jan 2, 2009)

> *Waynos:* _According to 'the history of Aircraft Lubricants' which can be found on google quite easily, page 12 states that Fighter Command converted to 100 octane as standard on all Spitfires and Hurricanes in March 1940._





Marcel said:


> Not taking any sides here, but I found this (apologies if it's already posted):
> 
> From: History of Aircraft Lubricants - Google Book Search





> BATTLE OF BRITAIN
> The Royal Airforce had used 87 octane fuel until March 1940 when fighter command converted *all it's Spitfire and Hurricane Rolls-Royce Merlin powered fighters* to 100 octane (i.e., grade 100/130)





> In fact, it was only a few months before the Battle of Britain that *all* fighters were changed over from 87- to 100-octane fuel,. From the pdf below.




Nice!


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## Glider (Jan 2, 2009)

Kurfürst said:


> Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War. /
> Australian War Memorial Archives.



I have tried to find this paper but it seems hard to find. Other people have followed the information that you gave and the following is a reply one of them had from the AWMA.

_Thank you for your inquiry. Yes this appears to be a mysterious item! The reference should have included a series and item number if the report came from our official records. I cannot find any publication in our books database with this title. Wikipedia should be contacted to request the writer provide a more precise reference._

As I know that you are the writer in question can I ask you to supply the detail so we can check up on what you are claiming, or better still the paper in question?


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## Kurfürst (Jan 2, 2009)

Glider said:


> These are the same facts you based your whole position on and hey presto, when they are questioned, they become irrevelant. An interesting approach it has to be admitted.



Lately I have this feeling that your responses are being increasingly detached from the realities of discussion, probably a result of desperation as the evidence becomes clearer. You don't seem to be able to decide wheter you should completely deny and dismiss the primary source material presented, simply doctor and manipulate their meaning, or develop a sudden amnesia about the whole discussion and the documents presented and ultimately resort to strawmen arguments, as in your last post. 
 
Feel free to 'question' primary sources which contain the actual decisions taken in 1939 and 1940 by the British Goverment, while having to offer no alternative that would support your view. Doubt is a very good thing, unless its just irrational partisanship that fanatically sticks to a preconceived dogma. The dogma, which in this case appears to be the religious conviction that each and every Spitfire and Hurricane had been fuel with 100 octane fuel, no matter what, and as a dogma, it doesn't need proof or evidence, becoming a fact in the same moment it has been declared.

The historical evidence, on the other hand, has been gathered from reliable primary sources, and it is that Britain decided in March 1939 to convert 16 single engined and 2 Blenheim Squadrons to 100 octane fuel use. In March 1940 they begun to converting aircraft to be able to take advantage of 100 octane fuel. In May 1940 it become clear that stocks are inadequate, and 87 octane fuel was designated as the primary fuel, while the Squadrons already converted would be allowed to use 100 octane. Circumstantial evidence from AVIA 10/282 also support these facts. With the supply situation easing in August and September 1940, they could continue with the conversion, which achieved 100% conversion by the end of November 1940.

Feel free to have your doubts of course, but I must say I find them irrational, and so far they are unsupported. You have not been able to refute the record of the events detailed in _Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War_ and the additional information about the 16+2 Sqadrons provided by Gavin Bailey, University of Dundee, in his work _'The Narrow Margin of Criticality: The Question of the Supply of 100-Octane Fuel in the Battle of Britain'_.

As noted before, until you are not able to refute or question the documented facts with documented facts of similar weight, there's no point in repeating the same hollow chatter and partisan arguments advancing what would seem to be irrational beliefs and dogmatic denial, and generally speaking, a waste of time.


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## Kurfürst (Jan 2, 2009)

Glider said:


> As I know that you are the writer in question can I ask you to supply the detail so we can check up on what you are claiming, or better still the paper in question?



Glider,

The source was already given in this thread. It also made clear where it comes from (not me). I do have to wonder why you are asking things you already know.

But then of course you can always get AVIA 10/282 or just ask ponsford to give you a copy.


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## Glider (Jan 2, 2009)

I don't know the link. I do know that you were the original writer and I do know that the AWMA found the detail to be insufficient to find it. I have tried various searches on the AWMA and not found it. 

So can I have the link to enable me to check this source.


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## Kurfürst (Jan 2, 2009)

Well, this has been discussed a couple of years ago in 2004 on butch's board, and the material was researched by an Australian member of that board, not me.

You can find the discussion here: Board Message

As a matter of fact, both Mike Williams and Neil Stirling are aware of it for years.


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## Clay_Allison (Jan 2, 2009)

This is the most boring argument of all time


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## KrazyKraut (Jan 2, 2009)

Lol, not quite. But it has increasingly less to do with the original topic.


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## Marcel (Jan 2, 2009)

Clay_Allison said:


> This is the most boring argument of all time



Some people have the tendency not to stay polite during these kind of discussions. That's what makes it annoying, I think.


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## slaterat (Jan 2, 2009)

Well the overwhelmlng amount of evidencence supports the widespread use of 100 oct fuel in Fighter command during the BoB. The March 1939 document must be regarded as irrelevant due to the outbreak of the war. At best it is a prewar plan for the introduction of said fuel.

One key piece of evidence supporting widespread use, would have to be Dowdings memo of Aug 1st 1940, where he complains of the over use of 12lbs boost by Spitfires , Hurricanes and Defiants. This memo was sent to 10,11,12 ,13 and 14 fighter groups.

I've got another book, Battle of Britain Illustrated, written by two extremely over qualified American writers, Robert Lightsey and Paul Jacobs[ the book is very nicely illustrated by Jacob's drawings] On page 131-132 they explain how Shell could not make enough 100 oct fuel for the RAF so the RAF turned to Esso for their supply, quote:

"initially there were some problems clearing Esso to sell 100 oct fuel to Britain
because of the American Neutrality Act,but Roosevelt worked an arrangement that allowed the sale to proceed in time for its use in the Battle of Britain"

Slaterat


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## Clay_Allison (Jan 2, 2009)

Marcel said:


> Some people have the tendency not to stay polite during these kind of discussions. That's what makes it annoying, I think.


It's the argument about what a dead british commander really meant in a memo about high octane gas that kills me. Barring new evidence, we just don't know.


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## slaterat (Jan 2, 2009)

Then why waste your time posting in the thread?

Slaterat


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## Clay_Allison (Jan 2, 2009)

slaterat said:


> Then why waste your time posting in the thread?
> 
> Slaterat


Because I keep hoping people will go back to talking about the aircraft.


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## claidemore (Jan 2, 2009)

Aircraft use fuel.


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## Clay_Allison (Jan 3, 2009)

claidemore said:


> Aircraft use fuel.


I get that, and the discussion was interesting out to half a dozen posts but they had clearly degenerated to the "no they didn't - yes they did" phase of the argument.


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## Glider (Jan 3, 2009)

Clay_Allison said:


> Because I keep hoping people will go back to talking about the aircraft.



I can understand your frustration. When I get a chance to check the records at Kew and a working link to the Australian Paper (_Kurfurst this one doesn't work either_) I will reopen the debate in a thread of its own which I believe is fair to all parties.


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## Glider (Jan 4, 2009)

Kurfurst
Without a link or copy of that Australian Paper which forms the core of your argument I cannot proceed.

I have tried the links given and they don't work, I know that you gave the same information to the Wikipedia people when you questioned this point with them and the links didn't work for them. I know that they contacted the Australian Archives who you assured us have the paper and they couldn't find it either.

So the subject for me is closed unless you can supply something we can all look at.


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## KrazyKraut (Jan 4, 2009)

Which link doesn't work?


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## Glider (Jan 4, 2009)

The links that he gave me to find this document
Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War. / 
Australian War Memorial Archives.


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## Kurfürst (Jan 4, 2009)

Works for me - you have to register to that board though.

One interesting tidbit posted by Neil in this thread:

_7./ Air Ministry reserves as of November 1940, 500,000 tons. This = 80 weeks consumption.

8./ At one time 800,000 tons was the target.

AIR 2/2151, AIR 2/3531, AIR 19/254._

From that the consumption works out as 500 000 / 80 = 6250 tons a week _or 25 000 tons a month in November_. As we recall, in the Q3 of 1940 22 000 tons were issued.. during a _three_ month period. 

This seems to agree again well with the Australian source:

_'The first Middle East shipment of 100 octane fuel arrived in Portsmouth on 12th August, with a further two deliveries in September and four in October. Although too late to allow widespread conversion for the use of the fuel the deliveries did ensure that from this point on Britain would not be lacking in 100 octane fuel levels. With the newfound supply RAF Fighter Command again embarked upon a Merlin II and III conversion to 100 octane use from late September, *finally achieving 100% conversion of it's fighter force by the end of November in 1940.*'_

So if by the end of November they had all fighters converted to and using 100 octane, it logically follows that in the July-October period roughly 1/3 of the fighters had 100 octane, though I would imagine that in July - October a lot more operational and training sorties were flown than in November.


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## Glider (Jan 4, 2009)

I will wait until I get to the paper. In the meantime you may want to awnser some of the questions posed earlier.

PS I like the idea that an 8o week fuel reserve isn't sufficient. What did the Germans have as their standard?


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## Kurfürst (Jan 4, 2009)

If found a curious photograph that may (or may not be) some lead.

It depicts No 602 sqn's Spitfire I, stationed at Drem, in April 1940. The photo's sharp and the angle it was taken from gives good view of the cowling above the fuel tank - on aircraft fueled with 100 octane avgas there was a warning label for the ground crew to fuel the proper type of fuel :

'100 OCTANE - CAPACITY 85 GALLS.'

Its definitively missing from this aircraft, however.


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## tomo pauk (Jan 4, 2009)

While many websites book I have repeat the Vmax of Hurricane II, it seems no one knows how fast (slow?  ) was the Mark IV with 1650HP. Any info from fellow forum members?


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## Glider (Jan 4, 2009)

I am pretty sure that is an earlier photo as I think thats a Gas Warning Panel on the wing and these were removed soon after war was declared.
I admit to not knowing when they were removed but I have never seen a photo of an aircraft from 1940 with them on. Also I have normally seen them on other types such as Ansons, but they were infrequent not a standard fit and didn't last long so photos are uncommon.

If anyone has any more information I would appreciate anything they may have as I don't pretend to know much more than that.


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## pbfoot (Jan 4, 2009)

My source or book indicates 100 was not issued until may 1940 but it was in stock and had been since june 1939 , it was also and I haven't seen it mentioned here dyed green . The Merlin engine was designed or modified during construction to be ready to use 100 octane
Air Commodore R Banks was the one that ensured the engines were 100 octane compatable in june 37


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## Glider (Jan 5, 2009)

Kurfürst said:


> Works for me - you have to register to that board though.
> 
> .



I am afraid that the link doesn't work for me the error I am getting is 
'Sorry, the link that brought you to this page seems to be out of date or broken.'

As you say the link is working for you can I ask you to send me a copy we can move forward. If you are willing to do this, then I will PM my e'mail address to you.


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## Wildcat (Jan 5, 2009)

Does this help at all..

http://naa12.naa.gov.au/scripts/imagine.asp?B=642029&I=1&SE=1


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## Glider (Jan 5, 2009)

Wildcat
Many Thanks but unfortunately its not the right paper. That said it is interesting and fills a few more holes
Thanks again


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## cherry blossom (Jan 16, 2009)

If Bf-110s had been sent to the Middle East in summer 1940, would they have defeated the local opposition? There were a very few Hurricanes. Was there any 100 octane fuel in Egypt ? There were also Gladiators and RN Fairey Fulmars. Bf-110 against Fulmars seems the hardest result to predict.


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## Juha (Jan 17, 2009)

Hello Cherry Blossom
as I wrote in message #7 “In North-Africa Hurricane I Trops (it had worse performance than normal Mk I) fought a draw against Bf 110Cs/Ds before Bf 109s arrived there. Usually in those combats the side which saw the enemy first got better results. So IMHO Hurricane Mk I Trop and Bf 110C/D were more or less equal.” 

III/ZG 26 arrived in NA in late Jan 41. In late summer 40 ZG units were first fully occupied in BoB and then many of them were converted to night fighter units. 

Well Bf 110 C/D vs Fulmar, I’d pick 110.

Juha


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## Glider (Jan 17, 2009)

cherry blossom said:


> Was there any 100 octane fuel in Egypt.



Only a small amount. I can tell you that the average Monthly consumption of 100 octane in the Middle East from Sept to Nov 1940 was 100 tons a month. As for stocks the records simply state that in Nov 1940 the reserves of 100 Octane in the Middle East were 8,000 tons.
It should be noted that Before Nov 1940 it was stated as being Not Available. This with the very small consumption figure for November would tend to make me believe that it first started to be used around Oct/Nov 1940.


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## Colin1 (Jan 17, 2009)

Flyboy2 said:


> ...Bf-110's were just to heavy to combat with the faster and nimbler Hurricanes...


The prevalent model in the BoB was the Bf110-C and I don't think the Hurricane was faster than it although history has shown that that particular performance advantage didn't really help much.

The rear gunner position was pretty ineffectual but it's possible with the Hurricane's slow rate of gain (if it even had one) that it could remain exposed to the rear gunner long enough to be hit somewhere vital, like a coolant line or the radiator.

I think the Bf110 came into its own in the night-fighter role without offering any real advantage over the Hurricane in any other duty that the two types were asked to perform.


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## delcyros (Jan 18, 2009)

I think that the best assest to have a rear gunner with You is his function as observer. As You know, most air to air kills were bouncing events with no knowledge of the immediate danger for the killed plane. 
Therefore, I suspect that the Bf-110 is less likely to be bounced with a rear gunner.
However, during most of the BoB, flying close escort this is not much of a help.
The Bf-110F was a decent plane over Malta, Crete and North Afrika when facing Hurricane and P-40 on the other hand, so I believe she was not a full dog.


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## Glider (Jan 18, 2009)

I think that its worth remembering that in Europe before the BOB the Me110 more than held its own in air to air combat against all types. It had a clear speed advantage against nearly all the opposing fighters and heavy firepower.

Against bombers it was lethal as the MG armed 109's didn't always have it their own way against bombers.

Its one of the reasons that the BOB came as such a shock, up until then it had done everything that was expected of it.


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