# Defence of Malaya, Singapore the area: how would you do it?



## tomo pauk (Apr 4, 2011)

The Japanese invasion of today's Malaysia Singapore, along with invasion of today's Thailand Indonesia have subjected UK/Commonwealth armed forces to some dire defeats. If you were main commander of British armed forces there, how would you've prepared to the invasion and battles unfolding from Dec 1941? You assume the position at March 1st 1941. The realistic (in a what if  ) choice of equipment and deployment, please.


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## buffnut453 (Apr 4, 2011)

Hindsight being a wonderful thing, here are a few thoughts:

1. Ensured the Command had an operational photographic reconnaissance capability well before Dec 41 and ensure it was tasked to answer questions that were of greater tactical import (eg resupply routes, logistics hubs etc rather than focussing on imaging the airfields).
2. Directed FECB and Command staffs to focus on the previously-identified intelligence indicators rather than trying to locate the invasion fleet (which was never one of the intelligence indicators).
3. Abandoned defence of Kota Bharu airfield as entirely impractical and focussed air assets on the west coast airfields that could be more easily defended.
4. Set up a local early warning network including ground observers and train it to work in conjunction with the Fighter Ops HQ in Singapore and the deployed fighter units.
5. Mass the ground forces at locations along the western highway to provide defence in depth and train them in the same methods used by the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
6. Develop defensive positions at key choke points in advance of the Japanese invasion as recommended by Ivan Simson.
7. Concentrate the use of artillery firepower to interdict Japanese forces delayed at choke points.
8. Use fighter aircraft as offensive rather than purely defensive assets to strafe Japanese airfields and troop concentrations.

The above list is focussed on what could have been done internally by Far East Command. Externally, I would add the following:

1. Obtain more anti-tank artillery and train those units in conjunction with the choke-point defences outlined above.
2. Obtain 2 more fighter squadrons of Hurricanes.
3. Offer to work with Thailand to defend Singora and develop that defence, including prepared positions, assigned roles, practice deployments etc. well in advance of the Japanese assault.
4. Persuade America to send a small-ish fleet (1 x carrier, 4 x cruisers and a destroyer squadron) on a port visit to Singapore in late Nov 41. Such a presence, in conjunction with Force Z might well have prevented, or at least greatly hindered, the Japanese invasion and resupply route through Singora.


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## syscom3 (Apr 4, 2011)

Buffnut, I would add the following:
Churchill needed to get rid of every colonial administrator and replace them with competent cadres who knew a fight was coming, knew they had to prepare, and who didnt care a bit about how things are done in a peacetime setting.

As for #4 at the bottom, the USN already had refused to send any ships to Singapore as they were needed for the defense of the PI.


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## buffnut453 (Apr 4, 2011)

I agree with the statement about colonial administrators. Actually, what was primarily needed was a unified command structure rather than having parallel but equal RN and Army/RAF organisations. Such a unified command structure needed to be at least equal to, if not superior to, civilian structures to prevent the "mother may I?" limitations that plagued decision-making in late 1941.

As for a USN fleet visit to Singapore, the PI formed part of the "Malay barrier" and hence I don't think it's a correct characterization to state the ships were needed for PI rather than Singapore. My view (not to be construed with fact!) is that defending Singapore was too much of a political hot-potato for the Roosevelt administration given the isolationist leanings of many in the US.


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## parsifal (Apr 4, 2011)

my view for the australian contribution is that once it became clear that the UK was not able to meet its imperial defence obligations in the far east, australia would have to act unilaterally. This means, in the context of this scenario

1) recall of the AIF (6, 7, 8 7 9 Divs)
2) recall of all RAAF personel, and if possible their equipment. I couldnt tell you how many squadrons exactly, but probably in the vicinity of 20 sqdns by mid 1941.
3) recall of the RAN units serving in ETO. This roughly amounts to the entire N class destroyers, the scrap iron flotlla and from memory two cruisers. with the air force returned, we should avoid losing the Sydney, because of increase air patrols in the region
4) Development of fortified bases at Darwin and/or Port Moresby. Darwin will require the construction of a Road south, which would be achieved using militia labour .
5) given the shortage of fighters, in march 1941, immediate and urgent development of the CAC-12 boomerang fighter, with reduced armement of 4 x LMG only. this aircraft should be adapted to carry bombs. service delivery should begin by June 1941....a top speed of about 315mph and probably able to carry a 250lb bombload, or drop tanks. Say 150 available by December 1941, with properly trained and led crews, integrated with the local Buffalo squadrons.
6) concentration of the far eastern british fleet at trincomallee, including the Pow and repulse. shipment of air group for hermes, and reinforcement by at least one more carrier by january.
7) At least 10 fast transports from the ETO to serve as the nucleas of an Amphibious TG. Can use the returned AIF formations as the ground force. Upon putbrealk of hostilites, should relocate to base at darwin for commencement of counterattack operations into southeast asia. There are no IJN carrier presence until march, shoulod be able to recapture most of the oilfields the Japs were counting on properly garrisoned and protected by significant air defence assets. Might be able to provide relief to corregodor force or singapre garrisons.

alittle bit of fantasy never hurt anyone i guess


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## buffnut453 (Apr 4, 2011)

Hi Parsifal,

Yep, 'tis indeed a little bit of fantasy, not least since Australia didn't have the organic shipping to move all these forces and the impact on the current operational theatres hasn't been quantified. The key challenge was the uncertainty of the situation in March 1941. At that point, while there were undoubtedly Japanese proponents for war against the British Commonwealth, the NEI and America, there remained questions about how to proceed - neutralise China first or head south. Indeed, the decision for war wasn't made until the last moment, which wouldn't have afforded any time for the sorts of preparations you're suggesting. However, it would make for an interesting "what if" to explore the full impact of your proposal.


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## Freebird (Apr 5, 2011)

buffnut453 said:


> Hi Parsifal,
> Yep, 'tis indeed a little bit of fantasy, not least since Australia didn't have the organic shipping to move all these forces and the impact on the current operational theatres hasn't been quantified.



Good points, Buffnut, but it's no fantasy.
However we should take into account that this is a 4th priority theater
(after ETO, Western Desert and the Soviet)



tomo pauk said:


> The Japanese invasion of today's Malaysia Singapore, along with invasion of today's Thailand Indonesia have subjected UK/Commonwealth armed forces to some dire defeats. If you were main commander of British armed forces there, how would you've prepared to the invasion and battles unfolding from Dec 1941? You assume the position at March 1st 1941. The realistic (in a what if  ) choice of equipment and deployment, please.



Tomo I was thinking of starting such a thread, but you've beaten me to it. 

Let me suggest a couple of stipulations/modifications to your "What If"
1.) No significant reduction of troops, ships or aircraft from any active theater of war _unless_ you can replace them with something else.
2.) Shipping should be taken into account.
3.) Any action should take into account political strategic considerations, and make sense from the PoV at that time.



buffnut453 said:


> Hindsight being a wonderful thing, here are a few thoughts:
> 3. Abandoned defence of Kota Bharu airfield as entirely impractical and focussed air assets on the west coast airfields that could be more easily defended.
> 3. Offer to work with Thailand to defend Singora and develop that defence, including prepared positions, assigned roles, practice deployments etc. well in advance of the Japanese assault.


Good points Buffnut, but the US Fleet the Thailand defence aren't really options as the Thais wanted to try to avoid conflict with japan, they were hoping to remain neutral and didn't trust the Allies in any event.
An airfield at Khota Bharumight be needed, but not *three *.



syscom3 said:


> Buffnut, I would add the following:
> Churchill needed to get rid of every colonial administrator and replace them with competent cadres who knew a fight was coming, knew they had to prepare, and who didnt care a bit about how things are done in a peacetime setting.
> 
> As for #4 at the bottom, the USN already had refused to send any ships to Singapore as they were needed for the defense of the PI.


 

Good points.



parsifal said:


> my view for the australian contribution is that once it became clear that the UK was not able to meet its imperial defence obligations in the far east, australia would have to act unilaterally. This means, in the context of this scenario
> 
> 1) recall of the AIF (6, 7, 8 7 9 Divs)
> 2) recall of all RAAF personel, and if possible their equipment. I couldnt tell you how many squadrons exactly, but probably in the vicinity of 20 sqdns by mid 1941.
> ...


 
How many RAAF personnel were in the ETO/MTO in 1941?


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## Freebird (Apr 5, 2011)

tomo pauk said:


> If you were main commander of British armed forces there, how would you've prepared to the invasion and battles unfolding from Dec 1941? You assume the position at March 1st 1941. The realistic (in a what if  ) choice of equipment and deployment, please.



First off there is no great pressing need for defensive ground preparations in Malaya Mar 1941, only in July 1941. (after the embargo begins and Japan starts preparing for war)
So suppose I was Duff-Cooper (or some other minister) appointed to oversee aircraft shipments to the MTO Far East in Mar '41, and Minister Resident - Far East in July 1941.

The preparations are already well in hand, unlike the USA which didn't really have a clear plan, Malaya Command has already prepared a detailed defensive plan in the fall of 1940, which upon analysis is _surprisingly accurate_ on exactly what was needed.
The studies by Malaya staff determined that the Far East should have 4 divisions, and 566 _modern_ aircraft to defend the Malaya, for 90 days until the fleet would arrive from the UK.
(Note: These recommenations were approved by both the Chiefs of Staff *and* Cabinet - however were not adopted due to the intransigence of the Minister of Defence, who was insistent that Japan would not attack  ) 
By the summer of 1941, the strategic situation had deteriorated significantly, with the elimination of the French fleet and the Japanese occuping nearby bases in Indochina.
Percival therefore modified his requirements to 48 battalions, with no French participation and assuming that *no British fleet* could be sent.

So let's assume that no major naval assets can be spared, only a few cruisers a destroyer flotilla.



> given the shortage of fighters, in march 1941,


There is actually no shortage of fighters or pilots in 1941, only the awful logistics and poor preparations. However I'll get into the air situation later, for now I'll concentrate on the ground situation.

I'll repost my map from the earlier thread of the ground situation in Dec 1941. Green Brown squares are Indian Australian brigades, red are Japanese Regiments/Brigades.


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## parsifal (Apr 5, 2011)

hi buffnut
this sort of unilateral action was never going to happen until the japanese actually attacked, whereupon the curtin govt jumped its colonial traces and threw its lots and destiny in with the americans. A major step for a country that until 1931 could not even set its own foreign policy. I also agree that there was too much uncertainty about japanese intentions and the assets were more urgently and immediately needed in the ETO.

However that was not the brief. We are simply being asked about feasibility. Ive put the political realities to one side for a minute, and considered what might be possible from a purely military standpoint.

With regard to shipping....in the first instance, if the australians needed, or wanted to bring home their forces for home defence, there was never the slightest chance that the Brits would not provide the shipping on demand. This is exactly what did happen for two of the army divs some months later, though churchil caused an uproar in australian political and military circles when he tried to unilaterally divert this precious convoy to burma. The australian govt demonstrated its increasing idependance at that point 9march 1942) by stamping its political foot and demanding the return of the AIF to Australia, and not burma. The brits had no choice but to comply.

but for the purposes of the excercise, say it was march 1941, and the australians said 'we want all australian forces returned home to the pacific (because you, the british govt have lied to us and have not met your imperial defence committments). Lets say the brits get bullish and say 'you want them, come and get them yourselves. Quite apart from also wrecking relations with the other dominions, could the australians muster the shipping needed to undertake such a transfer?

I think that its possible. In 1941, the australian Government had requisitioned, or was controlling directly, 502000 tons of australian shipping. There were 178 vessels in this fleet, of over 1000 GRT of all manner and type, however there were at least 20 liners or ocean going ferries of at least 7000 GRT. The average displacement of these vessels was about 2000 tons. in addition ther was about 550000 tons of unused shipping sitting around doing very little in the NEI.

in my opinion, the Australian govt, if it had wanted to "go it alone' had the logistical capability to do so....what it lacked was the will to do so. moreover unilateral withdrawal of these forces would have done an enormous amount of damage in the ETO and MTO. This wasnt in the scenario brief however, it was merely a feasbility study of waht could be done 9within the relams of capability i assume), not was likley to be done


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## Freebird (Apr 10, 2011)

parsifal said:


> hi buffnut
> this sort of unilateral action was never going to happen until the japanese actually attacked, whereupon the curtin govt jumped its colonial traces and threw its lots and destiny in with the americans. A major step for a country that until 1931 could not even set its own foreign policy. I also agree that there was too much uncertainty about japanese intentions and the assets were more urgently and immediately needed in the ETO.
> However that was not the brief. We are simply being asked about feasibility. Ive put the political realities to one side for a minute, and considered what might be possible from a purely military standpoint.


 
I don't think we can set aside political realities, nor can we propose any action unless it makes sense at the time. I think it is possible to do that however, and still follow the suggestions that I had made.


freebird said:


> 1.) No significant reduction of troops, ships or aircraft from any active theater of war _unless_ you can replace them with something else.
> 2.) Shipping should be taken into account.
> 3.) Any action should take into account political strategic considerations, and make sense from the PoV at that time.


Despite the Cabinet approval of the plan to have at least 36 battalions and 566 modern aircraft (let alone Percival's 48 batts), on Dec 8 1941 there were only about 28 or 29 on hand, and 188 mostly obsolete aircraft. Worse yet, many of the Indian troops were untrained, unmotivated poorly equipped. 


Suppose that a high-ranking and competant figure is overseeing the far East in June/July 1941. 
I don't see any possibility of any change in action before this time, as the UK still faces an invasion threat, and the MTO is desperately in need of troops after the Greece/Crete debacle.
Now, in July 1941 the situation changes, as the invasion danger to the UK is virtually nil, and the tensions with Japan increase.

Australians:
The Australian govenment is already very concerned about Japan, and has requested that 9th division be relieved from Tobruk.
In July 1941 there are 4 Indian brigades in Malaya, the 6th, 8th, 12th 15th. There are also two mixed Indian/Malayan brigades in Singapore. Between August November two more Indian brigades arrive, the 22nd 28th. Unlike the other Indian brigades, these two don't have a British battalion to stiffen them, they are mostly raw recruits with very limited training.

Here's what I suggest: The Far East command (in consultation with Aus UK govenment) proposes to transfer Australian troops instead of Indian to Malaya.
There are not exactly 9 Australian brigades in the Mideast in July of '41, there are approx 7, with the 8th badly depleted by casualties. (The other brigade was captured in Greece). The Australians will transfer 4 veteran brigades, leaving 1 division and the depleted brigade in the Mideast. (waiting for replacements)

The HQ of the veteran 9th Australian division would be sent from the mideast to Malaya, and also the Australian I Corps HQ. The 4 Australian brigades would be transported instead of the 22nd, 28th, 44th 45th Indian brigades, using the transport of 3 Indian brigades that departed the mideast from Aug - Nov 1941, with Australian transport needed for one brigade. 
The Aus I corps (Lavarack) would have the 8th div (Bennett) and the 9th division, with Morshead commanding the 9th. 

Those 3 Indian brigades (and 11 Ind div HQ) would be retained in the Mideast in place of the departing Australians. 

NZ: The New Zealand government would be asked to provide a brigade to assist in the defence of the Maylay barrier, the 8th NZ brigade. It was historically combined from existing units in the spring of '42, but it could have been done in the fall of '41 had it been required.

British: There are 6 British battalions in Malaya, plus 2 in Hong Kong. I would transfer 1 British battalion from Hong Kong, but would send the 2 Singapore reserve Indian battalions the other way , along with one of the 2 Fortress brigade HQ's. I would have the HQ staff of the British 28th (highland) brigade sent from the UK, with brigade assets sent from Canada or taken from one of the Mideast Indian brigade HQ's.
The 28th would have the 3 Scottish battalions. (2nd Gordons, 2nd Royal Scots, Argyll Sutherlands)
The other 4 British battlaions would be deployed with the 4 Indian brigades. (One in each)


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## parsifal (Apr 10, 2011)

One solution to consider is what might have happened if the Commonwealth had not involved itself in th Greece and crete affairs. Certainly no major losses, which yields at least a full Army tank brigade, and the new Zealanders as well a the 6 Aus and elements of the 7th as well. A major chunk of the RN would also be afloat as well 

Moreover, if O'Connor had been allowed to complete his offensive instead of having his forces stripped out like they were, there would have been no North African front to worry about 

At the conclusion of the eyhiopian camapign, the british had access to two fully trained Colonial Divs which would have performed far better than the Indian levies sent to Malaya in 1941. why not send the Indian raw recruits to Abysinnia (for ocupation duties, to replace the East and West Africans, who languished there until 1943, when they were sent to the CBI)? Another source of trained manpower are the indian forces used in Iraq in 1941. These forces, which by the end of the year were approaching Corps strength (PaIForce???) had combat expeerience and some experienced officers, and were fully equipped. Again, why not use the untrained local forces to replace these garrisons and send the experienced stuff to the far east.

Truth is there are no legit reasons why none of this didnt happen. It goes to the level of importance the brits gave to the far East, and their miscalculation as to how Japan was going to react. They thought that a paper tiger deterrent would be enough to scare the japanese into submission....big mistake.....


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## davebender (Apr 10, 2011)

Assign a competent ground forces commander. You've got 9 months to train the infantry, which is plenty. Properly trained infantry will defeat the relatively small IJA invasion force without too much trouble. You can hold out indefinately even if the Japanese establish a naval blockade.


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## Freebird (Apr 10, 2011)

parsifal said:


> One solution to consider is what might have happened if the Commonwealth had not involved itself in th Greece and crete affairs. Certainly no major losses, which yields at least a full Army tank brigade, and the new Zealanders as well a the 6 Aus and elements of the 7th as well. A major chunk of the RN would also be afloat as well
> 
> Moreover, if O'Connor had been allowed to complete his offensive instead of having his forces stripped out like they were, there would have been no North African front to worry about



Ill advised in a military sense for sure.
However, in the grand scheme of things, it was probably worked out better in the end, as it delayed Barbarossa, and the Falshmirjagr may have been used on malta instead....

But for now lets assume that Churchill is committed to Greece, and will play out as it did. 



> At the conclusion of the eyhiopian camapign, the british had access to two fully trained Colonial Divs which would have performed far better than the Indian levies sent to Malaya in 1941. why not send the Indian raw recruits to Abysinnia (for ocupation duties, to replace the East and West Africans, who languished there until 1943, when they were sent to the CBI)? Another source of trained manpower are the indian forces used in Iraq in 1941. These forces, which by the end of the year were approaching Corps strength (PaIForce???) had combat expeerience and some experienced officers, and were fully equipped.



I don't know if the East African forces are an option in 1941, as there are about 30,000 Italian forces in Wolchefit Pass (Jimma) and Gondar that didn't surrender until the end of Sept Nov respectivly. In addition there were some 7,000 Italian guerrilla forces still at large in 1942.

Battle of Gondar - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

I think the retention of the experienced Indian Australian Corps in the Mideast/Iraq (despite being badly needed in Egypt) in the Autumn of '41 was because the British were seriously concerned about a Soviet collapse in the Caucasus, allowing the Germans to thrust down into Persia.



> Truth is there are no legit reasons why none of this didnt happen. *It goes to the level of importance the brits gave to the far East, and their miscalculation as to how Japan was going to react. * They thought that a paper tiger deterrent would be enough to scare the japanese into submission....big mistake.....


 
Good points, although from comments made by Brooke, Dill and the British military, there was no underestimation of the Japanese threat, the problem was *only* Churchill who insisted that Japan would not dare attack Malaya, and would be dealt with by the US.


In any event, I have a different solution in mind. Although there is limited availability of any more ships troops in the Mideast, there is still excess capacity in the Pacific. (before dec 1941)


I would make three key deployments. (In addition to the above)

*1.)* First the Far East will need an air force at least equal to that specified by the Oct 1940 defence conference. (566 first-rate aircraft)
More specifically, by July 1941 the RAF is well aware that their night bombing efforts over Germany are almost useless. (Butt report, less than 5% of the bombers attacking the Ruhr hit within 5 miles of the taget)
Therefore, the RAF should transfer 200 - 250 obsolete heavy bombers to the Far East, mainly Wellingtons with a few squadrons of Stirlings or Whitleys. These would be used for the two missions which the RAF had proved *very* effective at in night operations.- mining shipping routes and attacking ports. The complete lack of Japanese radar or night fighter capability should allow for these missions to be done with little interference.
Considering how precarious the japanese supply lines were via Singora and Patani, mining the approaches and bombing the facilities could be devastating to the Japanese.

*2.)* In the summer of 1941 there is one great untapped Commonwealth army - the Canadians.
Although the Canadian government is anxious to get their troops into action, they have stipulated that they don't want them deployed to Africa or Mideast, mainly to avoid political fallout from the French Canadians, as much of the early war plans conflict involved the Vichy rather than the Axis. (Syria/Lebanon, Dakar, Cameroons/Congo, Madagascar etc)
However there is much less resistance to conflict with the Japanese, in fact the Canadian government has offered to send troops to the Pacific. (A Canadian brigade group was sent to Hong Kong)

In July 1941 would request the Canadians to send a Corps consisting of a division, a brigade and some tank/mech unitss to form a strategic reserve in the CBI, to be deployed if a critical situation develops in either the ETO (Soviet collapse in the Black sea/ Caucasus) or the PTO (Japanese attack against Malaya)
The Canadians could send the 3rd division, in addition to the brigade already promised which would be sent to malaya instead of Hong Kong. The 3rd ended up being send to the UK in August 1941, where it sat for 3 years doing *absolutely nothing* of importance until D-day, June 1944. Instead, the Canadians could send a brigade or two of the 6th division to the UK in the spring or summer of 1942, as despite training in 41/42 this division never went into combat (except for the 1943 invasion of Kiska, Alaska which had earlier been abandoned by the japanese)
There would also be 50 or 60 Valentine tanks sent from Canada to the CBI, to form 3 squadrons of armour, (1 UK, 1 Can, 1 Aus) and a Canadian mixed Mot/armoured car battalion.

*3.)* One key asset that was barely used was the ability to conduct amphibious raids or attacks on the _*western*_ side of Malaya, as the Japanese couldn't get their navy through the Straights of Malacca until Singapore the RAF had been neutralized.

There was a raid conducted by "Roseforce", a single platoon, on 27 Dec which raided japanese supply lines. 

I would send Adm. Roger Keyes to the PTO in the summer of 1941 to raise, train command an amphibious force of about division size. One of the 4 Canadian brigades and one of the Austr. brigades from the Mideast would be trained to conduct amphibious landings, likely training in Northern Queensland (eg. Moreton Bay), where the climate terrain would be similar to that in Malaya or DEI. There would also be 3 commando battalions, British, Australian Canadian.
These forces could use the hundreds of small craft in Penang Western Malaya, to raid the Japanese rear, or conduct a flanking attack.



Here is my proposed Far Eastern Command:
*British in Red
Australians in Tan
Canadians in Brown
Indians in Green 
NZ in Blue
Malayan in Yellow *


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## parsifal (Apr 11, 2011)

These are all excellent points FB, but need to always consider what or how the Japanese may have responded to this increased defence status....was it possible for them to increase their attack formations to counter this level of defence???? I think that ther still was SOME spare capacity in the japanese war machine to counter this British build up


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## Freebird (Apr 11, 2011)

davebender said:


> Assign a competent ground forces commander. You've got 9 months to train the infantry, which is plenty. Properly trained infantry will defeat the relatively small IJA invasion force without too much trouble. You can hold out indefinately even if the Japanese establish a naval blockade.


 
I agree, leadership is a critical component to the success of the operation.

However this idea that *ANY* forces can be sent in March/April 1941 is just an absolute non-starter. Even if there had been tentative plans to send troops in Mar, they would be thrown out the window with the string of British crisis disasters in April 1941
There is no urgent threat from Japan in Mar '41, before the embargo (July 1941), and it doesn't even crack the top 10 in April 1941.

Here's the Top 10 list of urgent British needs/concerns in April 1941.

1.) Defence of the UK. Still a concern that Hitler will attempt Sealion
2.) Operation Lustre needs troops, as the British try to defend Greece.
3.) Rommel's attack. the British Desert forces are being routed in April '41
4.) Put down the revolution in Iraq, which occurred April 1.
5.) East Africa War. Wavell's forces are still facing some 100,000 Axis.

The British are also concerned with building up forces in 5 areas where the threat of Axis attack is a concern.
6.) Malta. Fliegerkorps X arrives Jan 1941, and the threat to Malta intensifies.
7.) Gibraltar. With Ultra, the British are aware of Axis plans - "Felix".
8.) Iceland. British troops guard against Ikarus until July '41 - US troops arrive.
9.) Maintain a strong force in Cyprus Palestine to guard against attacks from Italian held Rhodos, and the possibility Turkey joining the Axis. 
10.) Prepare for Operation Lifebelt in the event of a German move to occupy Portugal. 



> The Azores was a major topic of discussion at the Trident Conference (May 10th - 25th) from which Churchill had just returned. Both Churchill and Roosevelt agreed that it was critical for the Allies to seize the Azores themselves *(Operation Lifebelt)* unless the Portuguese government could be persuaded to grant the Allies the use of bases on the islands



In fact the British were so short of troops in April 1941 that reinforcements for Malaya were diverted to Iraq.



> Wiki {Although troops were urgently needed in Iraq}, the British armed forces in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean area, already heavily committed with fighting in Libya, in East Africa, and in Greece, suggested the only forces they would be able to use against Iraq was a *single battalion of infantry*, based within Palestine, and the aircraft already based within Iraq.
> Amery contacted General Auchinleck and Lord Linlithgow, Viceroy and Governor-General of India, the same day, inquiring what troops might be sent. *One brigade group, that was due to set sail for Malaya on 10 April, was diverted to Iraq*


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## Freebird (Apr 11, 2011)

parsifal said:


> These are all excellent points FB, but need to always consider what or how the Japanese may have responded to this increased defence status....was it possible for them to increase their attack formations to counter this level of defence???? I think that ther still was SOME spare capacity in the japanese war machine to counter this British build up



A complicated calculation, but the short answer is no, I don't think so. 8)
They had a rough idea of the opposing forces, but not exact intelligence. In actual fact we are not greatly increasing the _quantity_ of the defence, but a vast increase in _quality_. The Japanese didn't anticipate much difference in Allied troops, they were all considered inferior. Whether it's goat herders from the Himilayas, kangaroo farmers from Down Under or fur trappers from Canada, they were all equally weak in the eyes of the Japanese.  

In early November (when the Japanese make their final deployment preparations) there were about 3 1/3 divisions in Malaya. (2 Indian, 1 Aus + Malaya brigade)
With the deployment I've outlined there will be about 4 divisions by early November. (1 2/3 Aussie, 1 Indian, 2/3 Canadian + a couple of UK NZ brigades.

I would expect the last Aussie brigade to arrive in November, along with the last Canadian brigade. The probable course of action would be to have to Canadian Corps deployed in the CBI/DEI in August/Sept as a theater reserve. It would only be in late September '41 (with the Soviet Rostov Defensive Operation) that it became clear the Axis could not capture the Caucasus before winter, which would free up the Canadian Corps.

the Japanese would also not be aware of the Commonwealth amphibious division, as it would be training in Queensland or DEI, and only sent into action after the attack begins. Nor would they be fully aware of the increased Allied air capabilities, as most of the bombers would initially be based in Australia or DEI, out of range of the Japanese strikes.

The Japanese basically have only the 56th division as reserve, and are hesitant to deploy it until they see how the battle goes with the British with the US forces in the Philippines. They are also badly short of shipping, which is why the Guards division is forced to march overland from Thailand. They will undoubtedly send the 56th division to Malaya once they run into stiff opposition. It would in fact be better for the Allies to draw more Japanese divisions into action in a strongly defended Malaya, which would likely forstall or diminish attacks against Burma the DEI. (Burma fell quickly after the Japanese sent 56th transferred the 18th from Malaya)

With the expected major shipping problems at Singora created by British mines bombs, combined with some solid Japanese casualties, they will be hard pressed just to keep up the Malaya offensive. 



davebender said:


> Assign a competent ground forces commander.



My thoughts on the command:

I've already listed the Australian command, Lavarack/Morshead/Bennett, all of them proven in combat except Bennett. Morshead in particular had solid experience in defensive operation.

The Canadians would likely be commanded by Crerar Sansom.
Keyes as chief of an amphibious force should be very effective, as he was known to be both a competant and aggressive commander.

The Indian III Corps would be commanded by Heath who had experience in the East Africa campaign and the Indian 9 div commanded by Barstow, which would be tasked with constructing defensive preparations in Johore

For the top leadership I think it's extremely critical to have _combat experienced_ commanders, so I would appoint Gen Dobbie as Governor of the Straits Settlement, (instead of Governor of Malta) as he was previously G.O.C. Malaya and had drawn up the plans for the defence.

For the command of the Far East army, I would put in Gen. Adam, formerly commanding British III corps during the Dunkirk retreat, where he had performed very well.


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## davebender (Apr 11, 2011)

> idea that ANY forces can be sent in March/April 1941 is just an absolute non-starter


Perhaps so but there should be a British contingency plan in place to send an army corps to Malaya. If XXX Indian Corps arrives in Malaya properly trained they should be able to defeat the invading IJA.

If Britain cannot provide properly trained ground forces they have no hope to defeat the well trained Japanese Army. That leaves only one option. The RN must sink IJA troop transports before the Japanese troops can come ashore.


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## parsifal (Apr 11, 2011)

Thats a very difficult ask for the RN in 1941. Even assuming no major losses prior to that, which would give them Ark Royal, Glorious, courageous and the Hood, and with the main japanese carriers tied up at pearl, the japanese LBAs are a real threat for the British that are not easily defeated. With a concentration of carriers, it might be possible, particulalry if the brits can deliver a night air strike. Inflicting losses is one thing, but stopping a full invasion would be difficult


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## davebender (Apr 11, 2011)

The RN sank anchored Italian warships during 1940 using a relatively small number obsolecent torpedo bombers. Why can't they sink anchored IJA troop transports during 1941?


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## Freebird (Apr 12, 2011)

davebender said:


> Perhaps so but there should be a British contingency plan in place to send an army corps to Malaya.



In April 1941? No. Why would there need to be? Japan has no plans to start a war, _*in April 1941*_.
They were planning to send more troops (as mentioned above) but there were other more urgent concerns.
Remember that the British are reading the Japanese diplomatic military signals, they know what's going on. 

Now in *July 1941* with the beginning of the embargo, everything changes and there is a much more urgent need to send troops, 2 divisions are sent.



davebender said:


> Indian Corps arrives in Malaya properly trained they should be able to defeat the invading IJA.



Debatable, but I don't think so. The first 4 Indian brigades (unit number <20) were at least reasonably trained, but performance was hit miss.
The last 4 brigades (22, 28, 44 45) were poorly trained and performed very poorly.
Even the "better" Indian brigades were poorly equipped often not very motivated.

The British were fighting for King Country
The Australians were fighting to defend Hearth Home.
The Indians were fighting for what? Many wanted independance from Britain.

Personally I don't think there should be more than about a third of troops as Indian. Rather than send a couple of Indian divisions of mediocre (or worse) quality, better to send one *good* motivated division.
Why do you suppose the British felt it necessary to have one British battalion (and two Indian) in most Indian brigades, yet they didn't need to do that with Canadian, Australian, NZ, South African etc?

The Indian units were somewhat better than the Philippine Army forces, but it was a similar outcome, a smaller number of trained, experienced, well equipped aggressive Japanese troops defeating a much larger US Philippine army. 




Wiki said:


> The defending {US Filipino} forces outnumbered the Japanese invaders by 3 to 2, but were poorly trained and equipped, while the Japanese used their best first-line troops at the outset of the campaign







davebender said:


> If Britain cannot provide properly trained ground forces they have no hope to defeat the well trained Japanese Army.



I agree. And there should also be leaders and at least some troops with _combat experience_.



davebender said:


> That leaves only one option. The RN must sink IJA troop transports before the Japanese troops can come ashore.


 


parsifal said:


> Thats a very difficult ask for the RN in 1941. With a concentration of carriers, it might be possible, particulalry if the brits can deliver a night air strike. Inflicting losses is one thing, but stopping a full invasion would be difficult


 
Agreed, you can't gamble on sinking the transports, better to organize a proper defence on the ground.

However the British didn't need carriers, they *did manage* a successful airstrike on the Japanese transports landing in Malayan waters, using the Hudsens at Kota Bharu.
The Japanese anchored 3 large transports off the beach just before midnight of the 8th.
The RAF struck at 3am, bombing strafing the transports, scoring hits on all 3 ships, and setting Takumi's HQ ship on fire.There were a couple hundred Japanese casualties, and at least 50 killed.
The Japanese naval commander was ready to withdraw, but Takumi overruled him.

In addition, the Japanese suffered heavy casualties storming the pillboxes on the beaches, over 1,000 total casulties on the Kota Bharu landing (from a Japanese force of 6,000)

Now, if there had been 2 or 3 well equipped brigades there instead of the single Indian brigade, and if there had been more RAF aircraft available, the Japanese may very well have been thrown back into the sea.


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## davebender (Apr 12, 2011)

Professional military forces make contingency plans for every possible war scenerio. The vast majority of these contingency plans are never used. Singapore was a major British military outpost in Asia so plans for defending it should be updated every year as a matter of routine.



> can't gamble on sinking the transports, better to organize a proper defence on the ground


You shouldn't gamble on either one. The RN should plan to sink the IJA troop transports and the British Army should plan to send a well trained infantry corps to Malaya. If either the RN or British Army are successful then Malaya is saved. If both the RN and British Army are successful then Japan is in big trouble. Or more likely, Japan is deterred from attacking in the first place. Historical Japanese attack plans for December 1941 assumed the American, British and Dutch defenders would be poorly trained.


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## parsifal (Apr 12, 2011)

Yeah, if the is such a large deterent in place, the chances of japan going to war are very slim i think


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## timshatz (Apr 12, 2011)

While I realize the thread is about the British position on Defending Singapore, I'd rather take the Japanese side. Reasons are as follows:

1. Naval Strength far and away above that over Britian in that area. Not only does that give them the power on the seas, it also allows them to make landings wherever they want. Even if you stop the Japanese at one landing, they can simply move on to another. And Singapore is an island. Even if you fight the Japanese to a standstill, it can be isolated and blockaded. 
2. Troops had far more combat experience than the British, both enlisted and officers. Experience really helps. 
3. Aircraft were superior to British models. Pilots were way more experienced as well. 

Logistics, bases, even intelligence (have read, but never could find the exact details, that there was a Japanese spy on the British Imperial staff in Singapore-but take that with a grain of salt) were better situated for the Japanese.

Also, Singapore (even the entire Asia Theatre) was something of a dumping ground for second rate officers in the British Military. They weren't the cream of the crop. And it showed when the war came. They just weren't ready for prime time.


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## Freebird (Apr 12, 2011)

davebender said:


> Professional military forces make contingency plans for every possible war scenerio. The vast majority of these contingency plans are never used. Singapore was a major British military outpost in Asia so plans for defending it should be updated every year as a matter of routine.



Sorry, I misread your post above. There were *plans* in place since Oct 1940 to send two more divisions, but nothing could actually *be sent* until after July 1941. 
(Read my earlier post)



freebird said:


> The preparations are already well in hand, unlike the USA which didn't really have a clear plan, Malaya Command has already prepared a detailed defensive plan in the fall of 1940, which upon analysis is _surprisingly accurate_ on exactly what was needed.
> The studies by Malaya staff determined that the Far East should have 4 divisions, and 566 _modern_ aircraft to defend the Malaya, for 90 days until the fleet would arrive from the UK.





> You shouldn't gamble on either one. The RN should plan to sink the IJA troop transports and the British Army should plan to send a well trained infantry corps to Malaya.
> If both the RN and British Army are successful then Japan is in big trouble.



Correct on all points.




> Or more likely, Japan is deterred from attacking in the first place. Historical Japanese attack plans for December 1941 assumed the American, British and Dutch defenders would be poorly trained.


 


parsifal said:


> Yeah, if the is such a large deterent in place, the chances of japan going to war are very slim i think



Nope, Japan is committed to war regardless.
They have no way to know exactly how well trained the troops are, nor any way way to judge how they will fight.
They just arrogantly assumed that the large Allied armies would be powerless to stop the mighty Japanese Army. 
They also overestimated the effectivness of the American air power in PI and underestimated British air power effectivness.
Should the British provide tougher resistance in the air, they will of course transfer more air assets, but they cannot come close to matching Allied production of aircraft aircrew.

They sent 100,000 Japanese against 150,000 US Allied troops in the Philippines, they won't be too concerned if the British send an extra division or so to Malaya in the fall of 1941.


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## davebender (Apr 12, 2011)

Experience isn't the issue. Training is what matters most. 

For instance practically the entire Germany Army was newly raised during the first year of WWII. But they had just enough well trained cadre to lead and train the new conscripts. That made all the difference.

To some extent Japan was in the same boat. Most of their army remained in China throughout WWII. Consequently the primary Philippine amphibious landing was conducted by 48th Division which had been raised on Formosa during 1940. No combat experience and not much peacetime experience either. But they had good cadre who knew how to train infantry and lead them in combat.


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## davebender (Apr 12, 2011)

> They have no way to know exactly how well trained the troops are, nor any way way to judge how they will fight


Some of the historical IJA intelligence assessments are available on the internet and they are quite accurate. 
Chapter II: Pre-war Japanese Espionage and Intelligence


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## timshatz (Apr 12, 2011)

Agreed, training is important. Not saying it isn't. I was thinking of the old expression "Three minutes in combat is worth 2 years of training". I guess it supposes you survive you first three minutes. 

But given two armies that are trained (and the Japanese army was well trained if it was anything- the Dominion forces in Singapore were less so), I would go with the experienced army as my odds on favorite. But that pretty much goes without saying for anyone on this board. 

Getting on to the point, Japan had an experienced and well trained army, for the most part. The Army facing it at Singapore was neither. Some units were well trained in Singapore, but it was not consistent. The Dominion forces just weren't ready for Prime Time (much like the US Forces in the first year of the war). The Pacific was a backwater for everyone but the Japanese.


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## timshatz (Apr 12, 2011)

Chapter II: Pre-war Japanese Espionage and Intelligence

Good link Dave.


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## davebender (Apr 12, 2011)

That's true only if your pre-war training was poor. For a well trained army the situation is entirely different. 

German Army after action reports from August 1914 are an obvious example. You see a lot of statements like this:
FAR25 (Field Artillery Regiment 25. Organic to 25th Infantry Division)


> 22 August 1914.
> The course of our baptism of fire brought our batteries into the most varied situations, which were mastered in every case, so that on the evening after the battle, leaders and gunners gratefully had the complete conviction "We are the best!". All movements were executed with the exactitude of a training exercise....this brought the troops a feeling of security and confidence in our peacetime training, and created the best possible basis for the unparalleled triumphal march of the coming weeks.



I suspect After Action Reports for the well trained but inexperienced IJA 48th Infantry Division said similiar things after the Philippine invasion of December 1941.


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## timshatz (Apr 12, 2011)

davebender said:


> That's true only if your pre-war training was poor. .


 
Or the training wasn't useful in the circumstances that occured. I would think along the lines of the Vic V Finger Four in the Battle of Britian or early war US Tank doctrine (something of an armored calvary charge into German guns that were hidden or at least more battlewise to show less to the enemy). 

Good training is a Godsend. Bad training is lethal. Experience usually seperates the two. Or, in theory, it should. 

A good counter (tearing my own arguement apart but what the hell) is something like the NTC that the US Army used before Desert Storm 1 or Top Gun for the US Navy.


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## davebender (Apr 12, 2011)

The German Army used somewhat similiar "Major Training Areas" 100 years ago for combined arms training. Every German Active Army regiment trained at such a facility several weeks per year. Obviously they didn't have MILES equipment. However they did have pop up targets and moving targets for the infantry to shoot at, prior to WWI.

You may have heard of the U.S. Army training center at Grafenwoehr, Germany. Prior to WWI it was one of the German MTAs.

I don't know what the IJA had for training centers. But they must have been pretty good also.


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## Freebird (Apr 13, 2011)

davebender said:


> Some of the historical IJA intelligence assessments are available on the internet and they are quite accurate.
> Chapter II: Pre-war Japanese Espionage and Intelligence[/url]



Indeed, but you'll note that your link shows that they knew roughly *how many* troops were there, but says little about their quality or "military value". When counting bodies, Indian troops look much the same as Australian, but many of the Indian battalions just dissolved on the first day of combat, and seemed almost relieved to surrender. 



timshatz said:


> Getting on to the point, Japan had an experienced and well trained army, for the most part. The Army facing it at Singapore was neither. Some units were well trained in Singapore, but it was not consistent. The *Dominion forces* just weren't ready for Prime Time (much like the US Forces in the first year of the war). The Pacific was a backwater for everyone but the Japanese.



The Australians actually fought very well, considering that there were only two brigades of them.
(Australia Canada were Dominions, India was not)



timshatz said:


> While I realize the thread is about the British position on Defending Singapore, I'd rather take the Japanese side. Reasons are as follows:
> 
> 1. Naval Strength far and away above that over Britian in that area. Not only does that give them the power on the seas, it also allows them to make landings wherever they want. Even if you stop the Japanese at one landing, they can simply move on to another.



Actually Tim, this is not correct on both counts.

The Japanese can only land on the east side of Malaya, the British Dutch contol the Sea of Malacca. Japan really only has solid control along the Thai coast on the Gulf of Siam. 
After taking some serious losses at the Kota Bharu landing on Dec 8, the Japanese wouldn't attempt another landing, despite having two more planned with troops sitting in transports in Indochina.

The Japanese 55 infantry regiment (of the 18th division) was supposed to land at Kunatan at the end of December, but the Japanese air force had failed to neutralize the defending RAF, so it was unable to land. Unlike the quick establishment of air superiority in the Philippines, the RAF maintained operations in Malaya during Dec Jan. 
Instead of the planned landing the 55th also had to sail to Kota Bharu, and elements of the 18th division spent 3 weeks hiking through the jungle (along the coast) to attack Kuantan.

The 114th regiment was supposed to land at Mersing to drive into the British flank and cut them off. During a Japanese conference on Jan 11 (when they captured Kuala Lumpur) the Japanese air force had *still* been unable to eliminate the RAF, so the landing was cancelled.



> And Singapore is an island. Even if you fight the Japanese to a standstill, it can be isolated and blockaded.



Actually not true either, the Japanese can only blocade Singapore if they gain control of the airfields in Southern Johore. The British were able to bring in resupply convoys and over a dozen ships without interference. They managed to sink the CPR Empress of Asia, (and prevent further supply) which only occurred on Feb 5, 1942. (All the previous ships had gotten through).

The last British troops had retreated onto Singapore island on the 31st of January, abandoning all of Johore (and the airfields there) to the Japanese. As long as the British halt the Japanese advance in northern Malaya and have enough aircraft to deny Japan air superiority, they can continue to supply Malaya


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## davebender (Apr 13, 2011)

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/txu-oclc-247232986-asia_pol_2008.jpg
Singapore cannot be ignored as long as British troops continue to hold the island. RN submarines and aircraft based at Singapore would take a steady toll of Japanese shipping to the East Indies. Somewhat similiar to the role Malta performed in the central Med. 

Furthermore the most important shipping lane between the Indian and Pacific oceans is within spitting distance. That would put a serious crimp in IJA operations in Burma and points further west.


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## parsifal (Apr 13, 2011)

ive gone away and thought about this from the japanese view point for a couple of days. i must say that my wargaming group many years ago have simulated a similar scenario using SPIs "War in the Pacific' a semi pro kriegspiel style sim that depicts the whole pacific war at a scale of individual battalions, 10 plane units and individual ships down to frigate size. its a detailed laboripous sim, takes about 1 year to play through the whole war, and in my view is fairly accurate. 

When we played this acccelarated buildup, it was assumed that Japan decided to go to war from january 1941, rather than from july. The war party was assumed to take control from that time.....there were a number of spinoffs arising from that assumption. The allies would see the increased belligerency of the japanese and start to respond, pretty much in the manner we have discussed. Though providing the 566 frontline aircraft was always thought to be difficult. in our estimate, the allies were given 360 aircraft in malaya, not all of them up to date, but better than were there. the airstrength basically brought forward some of the reinforcements and had them in place at the outbreak.

however the japanese benefitted also from this earlier mobilization. for a start, they start the war with an additional 12 divs, plus many more Independant brigafeeding in reserves, and adding support elements and artillery from home depots. A good proportion of these formations went straight into battle with no signs of inexperience. The Japs had a pretty military replacement system, in that raw recruits were always interlaced with experienced cadres. 

This was their post december mobilzation, up to march 1942. the source for this inforamtion was 'The japanese Armed forces order of battle - vol I" a publication made commercial, but based on an edited version of by the US military intelligence division at the end of the war. it is the most comprehensive OB for the japanese available in English. The divs included 59-61, 63, 65, 69, 70, 71 and 109. They are not green formations, as most were formed around Independant Infantry brigades which had seen considerable combat in china. the Japanese fleshed out the manpower by providing reserve fillers and artillery and support echeons from their large depot system based in the home islands

With regard to air, the japanese received more than 2000 new aircraft in that first three months of the war. many of these were replacements, but our best estimate was that the army air force would have expanded by about 600 aircraft, whilst the naval air Service by about 500 frontline aircraft. This was based on an assumption that a slightly lower standard of aircrew would be accepted and the small size of the air arms recognized as a problem. Moreover, we also surmised that with a pro-war group in power, the army and navy would accelarate the entry of more modern types ...like Oscars, Bettys and Zekes. 


Whilst i am sure there will be many who disagree strongly with this next point, i at least think it plausible. We thought with the accelarate militarist intervention, greater pressure would be brought to bear on the thais. There is some evidence to support that given a little more sustained pressure the thais may have thrown their lot completely in with the japanese. Phibul, the thai leader was a pragmatist....he wanted british or US gurantees for security and never got them. This eventually pushed him in the direction of the japanese, but they never quite got there...the japanese were too hasty for the thais and finished up invading thailand, before the thais switched sides. We surmised that with an additional 6 months, the japanese would work on the thais a little better and have them in the bag by the time war broke out. We made an assumption at this point....the japanese would be allowed to deploy a single Army pre-war (the equivalent of a Corps) into thailand from pre-war. after the outbreak of hostilities additional troops entered the country very quickly.

the japanese in that sim initially sent two divs down the isthmus and one div into burma, from Day1. The thais made subsidiary attacks along the thai/burma border further to the north. The british basically had an experienced corps in malaya of which one div was pushed into forward defence positions. Whilst resistance was tougher, and held out longer, the massive additionalreserves that the japanese could draw upon tipped the balance....it was allover by March.


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## buffnut453 (Apr 13, 2011)

Parsifal,

That sounds like a fascinating wargame. What you haven't discussed is the political impact of Japan deploying troops to Thailand. Their push into southern Indo-China in July 42 resulted in heavy sanctions from the US and UK. A move into Thailand would have been tantamount to a declaration of war. I think it highly likely that such a move would have accelerated defensive agreements between the ABCD Powers and resulted in US naval forces augmenting the defence of the Malay barrier much earlier, potentially with additional USAAF units deploying in support of the Dutch East Indies. 

I also suspect that the Japanese would have attacked as soon as forces were available rather than waiting for Dec 41. Does that mean an attack on Pearl Harbor earlier in 1941? 

With Japanese forces in Thailand, I think it much more likely that the Allies would have taken early offensive action against the harbour at Singora which was pivotal to Japanese success. Without that harbour, the Japanese had no option but to take the long way round from Indo-China through all of Thailand during the monsoon period. Note that, unlike the nice paved roads down the western side of Malaya, roads in northeast Thailand at that time were primarily surfaced with dirt. During the monsoon they became quagmires which would have greatly slowed any Japanese offensive, putting strain on logistics and exhausting troops before they went into combat. 

One final point - the decision southward in July 1941 was based, at least in part, on Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union which effectively reduced the threat from the USSR to Japanese forces in China. It was this event that enabled Japanese redeployments to undertake the large-scale attacks of late 42/early 42 against the Western powers in the Far East. I fear that Japan was incapable of accelerating its war preparations unless there was a concomitant acceleration of Barbarossa.

Cheers,
Mark


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## parsifal (Apr 13, 2011)

All true issues, in particular the comments about thailand. We did consider that, but perhaps didnt take it into account enough. In the finish we treated the move into Thailand as a "random event"...basically the more troops the japanese poured into thailand, the more likley ther would be an allied backlash...which means the allies gain the initiative, and the japanese lose the first turn surprise. It was a subjective debate, and in the finish the Japanese players got away with it. They managed to get troops into Thailand, and did not trigger an allied riposte. I agree, this is highly debateable, but to be honest, we mostly wanted to explore the military aspects over the political.

We asumed the 'strike south" group had won the debate, and also assumed that the soviets did not react. These are all big assumptions, and to a degree, unrealistic, but as i said, we were mainly about exploring the miltary aspects over the political.

Whilst the camapign in SE Asia went badly for the allies in this sim, the overall result went better. The US managed to hold Wake, and were in a position to launch their counterattack by the end of may instead of waiting till august. Japan finished up collapsingand surrendering by mid'44


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## davebender (Apr 13, 2011)

> Japan decided to go to war from january 1941, rather than from july.


Why would Japan do that? 

It was the July 1941 U.S. military build up in the Philippines (specifically submarines and heavy bombers) which caused Japan to decide on a preemptive strike. If you want Japan to attack early then the American military build up must also begin early.


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## parsifal (Apr 13, 2011)

perhaps I may be unclear in the words.....whilst japan decided to go to war in january rather than July, the actual entry point was still December.

Now as to whether it might be possible, I think it quite likley actually, provided the militarists were in control. Up until July the japanese leadership was slightly more conciliatory, and more reluctant to go to war. If you remove that, and the japanese start prepring for war earlier, the reserves and additional aircraft become a distinct possibility


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## davebender (Apr 13, 2011)

14,530,000,000 yen. 1935 Japan GDP
1,042,621,000 yen. 1935 Japan military budget.
.....7.1% of Japanese GDP even at this early date.

By 1937 Japanese military spending had tripled to 3,277,937,000 yen. Taking economic growth into consideration that still works out to about 20% of Japanese GDP.

I don't have Japanese budget data for 1938 to 1941 but would guess that military spending continued to increase as a percentage of national GDP. 

You will have a tough time wringing more military spending out of the Japanese economy. Eventually the population will force a new government that reduces military spending.


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## timshatz (Apr 13, 2011)

davebender said:


> The German Army used somewhat similiar "Major Training Areas" 100 years ago for combined arms training. Every German Active Army regiment trained at such a facility several weeks per year. .


 
I had heard about those training setups. I think it is referred to in the book "Dreadnaught". They were also used for an annual training/wargame which culminated in the Kaiser getting on a horse and leading a totally unrealistic calvary charge that swept the field. Evidently, after a lot of convincing, the German General Staff got him to stop doing it.


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## timshatz (Apr 13, 2011)

freebird said:


> Actually Tim, this is not correct on both counts.
> 
> The Japanese can only land on the east side of Malaya, the British Dutch contol the Sea of Malacca. Japan really only has solid control along the Thai coast on the Gulf of Siam.
> After taking some serious losses at the Kota Bharu landing on Dec 8, the Japanese wouldn't attempt another landing, despite having two more planned with troops sitting in transports in Indochina.
> ...


 
Freebird, thanks for the response. I'm not sold on the viability of it as it, taken as a whole, leads to the Dominion forces not losing the Penisula and Singapore. But they did. While many of your points have validity, one has to accept the history is what it is. 

For instance, while the RAF was not absolutely, positively wiped out, it was no longer a viable force. The difference between Air Supremicy and Air Superiority. All the Japanese needed as Superiority. That, they attained. Later in the war, when it was the Allies turn to take ground, the same situation occured. For instance, in the Phillipines during 1944, the Japanese still aircraft operating but they were not a major factor. Nor was the RAF in Singapore after the first couple of weeks of the war. They were just worn down to the point of being an annoyance and not much of a threat.

As for the blockade, it is rare that a blockade is 100% effective. Something always gets in and out. Especially in the early parts of a blockade. The longer they last, the more effective they become. Singapore never got to that level. 

As for negating the effect of having command of the seas, I agree with your premise that the Japanese never did another serious invasion after Khota (the invasion of Singapore Island notwithstanding), but they really didn't have to. The collapse on the penisula was so complete, that they got where they wanted to go on land. If the situation had been different, they could have used that command of the sea to go where they wanted and do as they wished. It never came to that, but the option, if needed to be used, was available.


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## timshatz (Apr 13, 2011)

davebender said:


> http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/txu-oclc-247232986-asia_pol_2008.jpg
> Singapore cannot be ignored as long as British troops continue to hold the island. RN submarines and aircraft based at Singapore would take a steady toll of Japanese shipping to the East Indies. Somewhat similiar to the role Malta performed in the central Med.
> 
> Furthermore the most important shipping lane between the Indian and Pacific oceans is within spitting distance. That would put a serious crimp in IJA operations in Burma and points further west.


 
Agreed. Wouldn't think of it being ignored, more worn down to the point of collapse or invasion. It would not be in the Japanese character to run a long siege but it was a possibility. Especially with the option of Singapore being a thorn in the side of the Japanese. 

However, that being said, one advantage Malta had that Singapore would not is the location of major British bases in easy sailing distance. Getting a convoy through to Malta was very difficult when the Axis wanted to stop it. I would imagine the same would hold true for Singapore if a Convoy leaving Ceylon or Darwin tried to do the same thing. A long haul to disaster with the Japanese attacking it every step of the way.


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## davebender (Apr 13, 2011)

> Advantage Malta had that Singapore would not is the location of major British bases in easy sailing distance.


India is within easy sailing distance of Singapore.


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## timshatz (Apr 13, 2011)

davebender said:


> India is within easy sailing distance of Singapore.


 
About 1100 miles from Gibralter to Malta whereas Columbo to Singapore is about 1700 miles. Figure a fast convoy does about 10 knots, that is 4.5 days to Malta and and another two days ( or 7 days total) to Singapore from Columbo. Not a drastic difference. Both Convoys would start out in a relatively quiet end of the Ocean (Western Med and Bay of Bengal), once they got closer to the enemies airfields is where things got dicey. 

From South of Sardinia to Malta, about 400 miles, is all open to Air and Sea Attack. Mostly from the European side, but the African side is a threat as well. About a day and a half to two days. 

With the Columbo to Singapore route, the math is even worse (against a better trained enemy). Upwards of 900 miles you would be open to Japanese attack. That is over three days, close to 4. And the Japanese surface fleet units are way more effective than the Italians. Plus, if the Japanese really thought it mattered they might use a Carrier or two to attack the convoy (failing that, a Naval Air Wing). No decent air cover for the convoy once it gets to the far side of the Bay of Bengal. British Aircraft carriers weren't up to the job and the US wouldn't put it's Carriers in that sort of situation.


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## parsifal (Apr 13, 2011)

davebender said:


> 14,530,000,000 yen. 1935 Japan GDP
> 1,042,621,000 yen. 1935 Japan military budget.
> .....7.1% of Japanese GDP even at this early date.
> 
> ...


 
As a possible outcome I would rate your theory a having low probability of occurrence. What essentially you are saying appears to be in the following order

1)	Early mobilization would lead to increased military spending 
2)	Increased military spending would be unsustainable on social grounds. There would be social unrest as a result of the increased expenditures.


Before I answer this directly, we should perhaps take a quick overview of Japanese industry in the 1930’s. 

From the USSBS

_The orientation of the Japanese economy toward war began in 1928, and continued with increasing emphasis during the Manchurian and Chinese campaigns. By 1940, total production had arisen by more than 75 percent; heavy industrial production by almost 500 percent; and 17 percent of Japan's total output was being devoted to direct war purposes and expansion of her munition industries, as against 2.6 percent at that time in the United States. Construction of industrial facilities in these years assumed -- for the Japanese conditions -- gigantic proportions. Her aircraft, aluminum, machine tool, automotive, and tank industries were erected from almost nothing during this period. 

This industrial expansion was based and depended on the availability of raw materials. Great efforts were devoted to the increase of raw material output in the home islands. In some respects, major results were achieved. Coal production in Japan rose from 28,000,000 tons in 1931 to 55,600,000 tons in 1941. Domestic iron mining made considerable progress. Nevertheless, no country could have been farther from self-sufficiency, with respect to raw materials, than Japan. The development of basic material sources on the continent of Asia constituted almost the central issue of Japan's economic policy during this period. _


Clearly then, Japanese industrial output was expanding rapidly in the 1930s, and military output rose accordingly. In a general sense Japan was spending huge chunks of its gold on defence (roughly 10% of GDP whilst the US was spending just 2.6%),, however this was well within their capability. It does not follow that the expansion of the Japanese military came at a price of increased spending of GDP. Japan in the late 1930s was, like every other industrialised nation pulling out of the depression, which significantly affected government revenues, and military outputs. But in the period 1938-40 this rapidly fell away….the nation was recovering. 

Neither do I see it as a valid extrapolation to say that an early mobilization would lead to social dislocation. We don’t have exact figures for Japanese military outputs, but for the period 1942-5, they produced 76000 aircraft (approximate figures) with 1944 the peak year with 37000 aircraft built. In 1941, they produced about 5000 aircraft, whilst in 1940, about 2000 are thought to have been built. In 1942 about 8000 aircraft were built. In none of these years, despite an obvious ramping up of military spending, is there any evidence of social resistance. Why do you think that by going on a war footing earlier in 1941, rather than in July that this would lead to social unrest? If they went onto a war footing in January rather than July, the 1941 figure would probably have been closer to the 1942 outputs. Reasonably it could be expected the Japanese output for 1941 would be in the order of 7500-8000 aircraft. Why would producing this number of aircraft in the last year of peace be any more difficult than in 1942? Why would there be an increased risk of social upheaval as a result of this intensified effort than there was in 1942. The theory starts to fall apart when you look at it from that perspective don’t you think?


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## davebender (Apr 13, 2011)

> With the Columbo to Singapore route, the math is even worse (against a better trained enemy). Upwards of 900 miles you would be open to Japanese attack. That is over three days, close to 4. And the Japanese surface fleet units are way more effective than the Italians. Plus, if the Japanese really thought it mattered they might use a Carrier or two to attack the convoy (failing that, a Naval Air Wing). No decent air cover for the convoy once it gets to the far side of the Bay of Bengal. British Aircraft carriers weren't up to the job and the US wouldn't put it's Carriers in that sort of situation.



Asia Map
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/txu-oclc-247232986-asia_pol_2008.jpg
If Britain intends to hold Singapore (and why else would they build it?) then Britain should also plan to hold the Amdaman and Nicobar Islands. Each of those island groups should have a well trained infantry division and some airpower. This extends British air cover most of the way to Malaya. It also makes life very difficult for Japanese ships attempting to enter the Indian Ocean. The Japanese invasion of Burma would probably be derailed.

Indian Army during World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
During 1940 Britain raised 5 infantry and 1 armored division in India. I propose the following deployments:
6th Division. Amdaman Islands. Historically intended for Iraq.
7th Division. Nicobar Islands. 
8th Division. Malaya. Historically intended for Iraq.
9th Division. Malaya. Historically intended for Malaya.
10th Division and the Armored Division can go to Iraq or Egypt.

An additional 5 Indian infantry divisions were raised during 1941. However those units should not be deployed until 1942. That gives them some training time.


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## buffnut453 (Apr 13, 2011)

davebender said:


> If Britain intends to hold Singapore (and why else would they build it?) then Britain should also plan to hold the Amdaman and Nicobar Islands. Each of those island groups should have a well trained infantry division and some airpower. This extends British air cover most of the way to Malaya. It also makes life very difficult for Japanese ships attempting to enter the Indian Ocean.



Why? Experience of island-hopping suggested it was very easy to bypass relatively isolated but well-defended islands. Defending islands is just a waste of resources.



davebender said:


> The Japanese invasion of Burma would probably be derailed.



The way to derail the invasion of Burma was by securing Thailand which was key to the defence of both Malaya and Burma.


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## parsifal (Apr 13, 2011)

I wouldnt say it was a waste of time to properly defend islands, just that without control of the surrounding oceans and airspace it becomes well nigh impossible

And agree completely about Thailand....if the Allies had managed to occupy Thailand pre-war, the equation changes completely, as it does if the Japanese do the same.


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## buffnut453 (Apr 13, 2011)

And since the UK couldn't properly defend Malaya or Burma, the potential for defence of isolated islands is pretty much zero.


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## davebender (Apr 13, 2011)

> UK couldn't properly defend Malaya or Burma, the potential for defence of isolated islands is pretty much zero.


Then Britain wasted a lot of money building military bases in Malaya.


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## buffnut453 (Apr 13, 2011)

davebender said:


> Then Britain wasted a lot of money building military bases in Malaya.


 
Unfortunately, the crystal ball wasn't working very well and the risk of simultaneous wars in Europe/North Africa/Middle East/Mediterranean and in the Far East was never really examined because it was recognised as being entirely unaffordable from a defensive position.


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## parsifal (Apr 13, 2011)

Singapore , and the malay barrier would have been a workable defence, if france had not fallen, and Britain had not been called upon to fight the equivalent of three wars at the same time....fighting in the atlantic, in the med and in the far east. If a proper fleet properly supported could be placed at Singapore, it may have worked. As it stood, with an inadequate air force, half a fleet, and weak ground forces, there was little chance of successful defence


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## buffnut453 (Apr 13, 2011)

Careful Parsifal...this is twice in one thread I'm agreeing with you!


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## Freebird (Apr 14, 2011)

buffnut453 said:


> Careful Parsifal...this is twice in one thread I'm agreeing with you!



LoL, well I'll balance it out and disagree with most everyone... 



davebender said:


> Asia Map
> http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/txu-oclc-247232986-asia_pol_2008.jpg
> If Britain intends to hold Singapore (and why else would they build it?) then Britain should also plan to hold the Amdaman and Nicobar Islands. Each of those island groups should have a well trained infantry division and some airpower. This extends British air cover most of the way to Malaya. It also makes life very difficult for Japanese ships attempting to enter the Indian Ocean. The Japanese invasion of Burma would probably be derailed.



I'm not following your reasoning here, a full division each on Andaman Nicobar? Why? 
Besides the fact that Britain didn't have enough transport for all this and these troops would be almost useless.
The islands would be useful airbases, but are not under threat of invasion unless Burma falls. Better to put an extra division (in Burma) if one is available

[/QUOTE]
The way to derail the invasion of Burma was by securing Thailand which was key to the defence of both Malaya and Burma.[/QUOTE]

The problem is that Britain had her hands tied, she couldn't be seen as the aggressor, but Roosevelt guaranteed US support IF Britian were attacked.



buffnut453 said:


> And since the UK couldn't properly defend Malaya or Burma, the potential for defence of isolated islands is pretty much zero.


 
They certainly COULD properly defend both, but this was not done.
One good way to defend Burma is to have a strong defence in Malaya.
Until the arrival of the 18th 56th divisions the attack in Burma went very slowly.




davebender said:


> Then Britain wasted a lot of money building military bases in Malaya.



Nope, not at all. 
The problem was that the British Prime Minister put a damn fool in as Defence Minister.
(Those of you who know whom I'm talking about will see the irony  )



buffnut453 said:


> Unfortunately, the crystal ball wasn't working very well


 


parsifal said:


> Singapore , and the malay barrier would have been a workable defence, if... If a proper fleet properly supported could be placed at Singapore, it may have worked.



No fleet needed, nor any excuse for other commitments France, Greece etc etc.

The British should have understood that joining the embargo (and leaning on the Dutch to do the same) would result in war. 
They should have either been prepared for that war, or else delay the implementation of the embargo.

Even without any fleet whatsoever, they had analysis from EVERY military commander who had looked at the problem in detail (Dobbie, Bond, Babington, Percival, Brooke-Popham etc etc)
Malaya needs about 4 properly trained equipped divisions, and about 600 modern aircraft sent, this would allow them to hold back the Japanese.


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## buffnut453 (Apr 14, 2011)

freebird said:


> The problem is that Britain had her hands tied, she couldn't be seen as the aggressor, but Roosevelt guaranteed US support IF Britian were attacked.



Don't disagree. None of the Allied powers was strong enough to repulse the Japanese attacks where and when they occurred but the politicians were reluctant to get dragged into, or further into, conflict by making formal alliances. Had they made those alliances in July, it's likely the Allies would have done much better against the Japanese. 



freebird said:


> They certainly COULD properly defend both, but this was not done. One good way to defend Burma is to have a strong defence in Malaya. Until the arrival of the 18th 56th divisions the attack in Burma went very slowly.



Yes but Thailand was still the pivot-point. It afforded the Japanese forces internal lines between the 2 theatres. 



freebird said:


> No fleet needed, nor any excuse for other commitments France, Greece etc etc.



No fleet was needed if there were sufficient defences in Malaya to secure the seaward flanks. Without adequate airpower to find and interdict Japanese shipping or the ground forces to defend in depth, a fleet was vital but just wasn't there. In short, the strategy for Singapore relied on hope which is never a good planning assumption.



freebird said:


> The British should have understood that joining the embargo (and leaning on the Dutch to do the same) would result in war.
> They should have either been prepared for that war, or else delay the implementation of the embargo.



But how would that have stopped the Japanese. They were already moving into southern Indo-China. An embargo against a resource-poor nation like Japan was (and still is) a reasonable political response. London and Washington both failed to realise, however, that Japan's progression towards militaristic government was not going to promote peaceful resolution. Like Hitler's Germany, Japan's only response to a problem was to escalate. Both countries made some initial gains using such a strategy but it ultimately proved to be their undoing.



freebird said:


> Even without any fleet whatsoever, they had analysis from EVERY military commander who had looked at the problem in detail (Dobbie, Bond, Babington, Percival, Brooke-Popham etc etc). Malaya needs about 4 properly trained equipped divisions, and about 600 modern aircraft sent, this would allow them to hold back the Japanese.



And here lies the rub. You don't remove "properly trained and equipped" divisions from ongoing theatres of conflict to reinforce a colonial outpost. Again, hope was the main strategy, coupled with an expectation that the Japanese would mount an overland offensive from Indo-China despite Percival's earlier assessment that landings on the east coast were feasible during the monsoon. It was hoped that the Japanese wouldn't attack until 1942 when the build-up of forces in Malaya would have been pretty much complete. Unfortunately, the Japanese weren't obliging and the PBI, particularly the Indian units, many of whom could scarcely fire a rifle, found themselves facing tanks with no way of combating them. 

If you go back to my first post in this thread, I summarise the things Malaya Command could have done better but the bottom line is that the forces were still insufficient for the task, especially the ludicrously small number of aircraft, the lack of a balanced fleet and east-coast defence that hinged on early identification of Japanese intentions. Had British forces been able to interdict or repulse the Japanese invasion fleet and prevent them from taking Singora, then the situation would have been very different. The only option available to Yamashita would have been a long overland invasion from Indo-China which would have taken a long time and thus afforded time for further reinforcements to arrive.


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## parsifal (Apr 14, 2011)

3rd time........


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## timshatz (Apr 14, 2011)

davebender said:


> Then Britain wasted a lot of money building military bases in Malaya.


 
Kinda. Well, maybe. The thing is, Singapore is right in a key trade route. England is a trading country so they control the space. Similar to the logic of Gibraltor, Cape Town, Aden, The Falklands, ect. Gives you presence in the area. 

Part of the presence is a kind of "Don't screw with us" mentality that it projects. In that respect, it was a good move by England. Only problem is when the base moved from being a presence to actually having to defend, it was found seriously wanting. In a time of peace, it worked as a deterrent. Until a war came and somebody figured a way to knock it off. 

IMHO


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## davebender (Apr 14, 2011)

You don't need a crystal ball. 

Military units fight the way they are trained. Infantry divisions need good training and leadership during peacetime so they will will be able to fight during wartime. If Britain is unwilling to fund adequate peacetime training for their army (however small) then it's time to start selling off the empire before someone with a properly trained army takes it away by force.


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## buffnut453 (Apr 14, 2011)

davebender said:


> You don't need a crystal ball.
> 
> Military units fight the way they are trained. Infantry divisions need good training and leadership during peacetime so they will will be able to fight during wartime. If Britain is unwilling to fund adequate peacetime training for their army (however small) then it's time to start selling off the empire before someone with a properly trained army takes it away by force.


 
The problem was massive expansion to prepare for war. That was the same for all combatants. Priority went to those areas where fighting was occurring or most likely. The problem for Britain was that it was aligned against 3 of the 5 other largest powers in the world without combat allies and when the forces of one those powers (Germany) had a larger military and the other was the key regional power (Japan). To argue that Britain should have funded a peacetime military to be at least 3 times bigger than any likely adversary is totally impractical given the financial challenges of rebuilding the economy after WWI and the Great Depression.


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## davebender (Apr 14, 2011)

1934 Germany had a peacetime military 100,000 strong with no reserves. Much smaller then the peacetime British military. Yet they managed to massively expand while producing decent quality infantry divisions. Why can't the British Army expand in a similiar manner?


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## parsifal (Apr 14, 2011)

davebender said:


> 1934 Germany had a peacetime military 100,000 strong with no reserves. Much smaller then the peacetime British military. Yet they managed to massively expand while producing decent quality infantry divisions. Why can't the British Army expand in a similiar manner?



Yes....In complete defiance of her Versailles obligations and in the context off her navy, in complete defiance of the restrictions that applied to her. In the case of japan, they seemed to relish lying about the tonnages of their battleships so are little better than the germans in that regard. Britain on the other hand tried to stick to the letter of her treaty restrictions, and in addition did not want or plan for war in the lead up to the war. 

I hardly think that holding up the german experience and behaviour in the lead up to war, is any sort of shining example of what to do, even from a purely military-economic POV. Germany basically went to war as an economic basket case. She emerged a shattered country. Britain entered the war slightly better and emerged in much better shape economically than germany. Though she seems to have lost the peace since then.....


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## timshatz (Apr 15, 2011)

davebender said:


> 1934 Germany had a peacetime military 100,000 strong with no reserves. Much smaller then the peacetime British military. Yet they managed to massively expand while producing decent quality infantry divisions. Why can't the British Army expand in a similiar manner?


 
Very true. But it also lead them to war earlier than they wanted to. Hitler was shooting for 1945, but the failure of Western Democracies at Munich led him to the conclusion he could go with what he had. The guy always was a gambler. 

On another point, all that expansion of the military put Germany in a huge debt situation. The best way to fix that was take it from somebody else. Socialist economies, be they national socialist or international socialist, are not efficient. Matter of fact, they are usually very inefficient. As such, the expansion of the Army had pretty wiped out whatever assets were left after the Hyperinflation of the Wiemar Republic and the Depression. 

War was a viable solution to Hitler because he didn't have to answer to anyone. Same can be said for Stalin and the Japanese Govt in the 30s and 40s.

But I'm drifting into a totally different subject. 

However, it does give perspective to why the Germans could rearm and the British couldn't. Well, not without an obvious threat.


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## Freebird (Apr 15, 2011)

davebender said:


> If Britain is unwilling to fund adequate peacetime training for their army (however small) then it's time to start selling off the empire before someone with a properly trained army takes it away by force.


 
Dave, there's nothing wrong with the training of the British Army, where did you get that idea? 



timshatz said:


> However, it does give perspective to why the Germans could rearm and the British couldn't. Well, not without an obvious threat.



Where did this notion come from that Britian couldn't (or didn't) rearm? 
Obviously the British losing several divisions worth of kit at both Dunkirk in Greece slowed down rearmament, while the German effort was enormously speeded by capturing huge quantities of British, French, Czech Polish equipment.



davebender said:


> 1934 Germany had a peacetime military 100,000 strong with no reserves. Much smaller then the peacetime British military. Yet they managed to massively expand while producing decent quality infantry divisions. Why can't the British Army expand in a similiar manner?


 
Well in fact they did.
Can you point to any British or Dominion infantry division in combat that you feel was poor quality or performed poorly because of lack of training?

The BEF if France?
The Australians at Tobruk?
The 2nd NZ division on Crete?
The Canadians at Hong Kong or Dieppe?

You also need to keep in mind that at the outbreak of war Germany France (land powers) started a modest increases in Naval strength and a massive increase in the size of the army. Britain (a Sea power) made huge increases in army strength, *and* massive increases in naval strength. In addition, Britain had hundreds of bases throughout the world, (which Germany didn't have) Gibraltar, Barbados, Ascension, Ceylon, Singapore, Fiji, Jamaica etc etc etc, which all needed increases in manpower during wartime. You also need to take into account that the "tail" of a British division is huge compared to that of the Germans, if it has to be supplied across 1,000's of miles of ocean.

If you take a look at Greater Germany (which was about 25% or 50% larger than Britiain the Dominions) at the time of Barbarossa, Germany had about 170 infantry divisions, with about 130 on the Eastern Front.

At the same time, Britain the Commonwealth have raised, trained equipped about 80 infantry divisions, + perhaps another 5 divisions worth of troops garrisoned at the various bases.

55 British (about 35 in the UK)
9 Australian
7 Canadian
2 NZ
3 South African
There are about 4 divisions of Czechs, Dutch, Poles, Belgians Free French - equipped supplied by the British

Total divisions = 80 

In addition to this, there are about 10 - 12 "first line" Indian divisions that have British officers about 30 - 35% personnel British, and also use British supply equipment.
There are a further 8 or so Indian divisions that are being raised or trained during 1941.

Part of the problem here is that some of the Indian divisions were deployed far too soon before they had been trained.


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## timshatz (Apr 15, 2011)

freebird said:


> :
> 
> Where did this notion come from that Britian couldn't (or didn't) rearm?


 
Point came up that Germany expanded it's Army in the early 30s and England did not. At the time, Britain was working under the "Ten Year Plan" (or rule or some such). Idea behind it was if there was no war on the horizon for 10 years, the defense budget would be kept to a minimum. Even with Germany rearming, Britain did not see the need for re-arming herself (at least at the Cabinet level, Churchill was a voice in the wilderness at this time). So Germany got a pretty good head start on rearming and Britain really didn't get going until '36-'37 at the earliest (and even then, it didn't really get going until 1938-39). So, ok, Britain did rearm, but later and almost against it's will (Memories of the Trenches, especially Lloyd George's version of it, were still very fresh).

Interesting part about this. The head of the Exchequar in the early 30s was Chamberlin. He stuck to the Ten Year rule as though it were Gospel. Wouldn't put any money into anything like rearming if he could help it. Later, when he got to be Prime Minister, he refused to take a hard line with Germany because (and you're gonna love this one) the British military wasn't ready for war.

Talk about having your cake and eating it too!


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## Freebird (Apr 15, 2011)

timshatz said:


> So Germany got a pretty good head start on rearming and Britain really didn't get going until '36-'37 at the earliest (and even then, it didn't really get going until 1938-39). So, ok, Britain did rearm, but later and almost against it's will (Memories of the Trenches, especially Lloyd George's version of it, were still very fresh).
> 
> Interesting part about this. The head of the Exchequar in the early 30s was Chamberlin. He stuck to the Ten Year rule as though it were Gospel. Wouldn't put any money into anything like rearming if he could help it. Later, when he got to be Prime Minister, he refused to take a hard line with Germany because (and you're gonna love this one) the British military wasn't ready for war.
> 
> Talk about having your cake and eating it too!


 
Well if we are going back into the mid 30's yes, the army was lagging behind.
But *at the time* there really was no need to raise a large army, as the French outnumbered the Germans, and was far better equipped with tanks aircraft. Britain concentrated on building up it's navy, remember that from 1935 - 1939 they laid down 5 new battleships, 6 new aircraft carriers + a whole bunch of cruisers 500 or so destroyers, frigates sloops.
All of that came at some very considerable expense.




timshatz said:


> For instance, while the RAF was not absolutely, positively wiped out, it was no longer a viable force. Nor was the RAF in Singapore after the first couple of weeks of the war. They were just worn down to the point of being an annoyance and not much of a threat.



I don't think the facts justify this conclusion. The RAF in _*Malaya*_ was certainly hard hit, but RAF _*Singapore*_ wasn't, apart from one raid on Dec 8, it wasn't bombed during the rest of Dec, as more air units were brought in. (obviously far less than needed though). The Japanese certainly considered it a threat, as British bombers continued to raid japanese airfields in Singora and northern Malaya. In early January the Japanese began to bomb Singapore almost daily, but couldn't knock out the airfields. The Japanese have over 250 fighters bombers of the 3rd Air Group the 22nd Air Flotilla, making major raids on the 12th, 13th of January, with express instructions to eliminate the airbases.
At this point there were 60 still British Dutch fighters operational to defend Singapore.


Here's the exact quote from Falk's book on Singapore (p.164): 
"Increased British air activity in early January now caused a delay in the Endau operation" (Endau landing - near Mersing) "Endau was too close to the Singapore fields to be attacked in the face of British air power." "To the dismay of the Japanese commanders, {the raids} were unable to prevent continued British air operations over Malaya the nearby South China Sea"

I think it'c clear from that the RAF were still a _viable threat_ through the first 6 weeks of the war (at least) and the Japanese *did not* achieve complete air superiority during this time, and they couldn't - until they occupied the central Malayan airfields, which were some 200 miles from Singpore



timshatz said:


> As for the blockade, it is rare that a blockade is 100% effective. Something always gets in and out.



There was no blocade from Dec 8 - Feb 4.
No ships were seriously attacked, either by air or by sea.
It wasn't "something" that got through, *everything* got through, every ship, every convoy.
The Japanese blocade was complete *only* from Feb 5 - Feb 15, at which point the British have retreated onto Singapore itself. (Nothing got in after Feb 5.)
So it's hard to say that Japan had "complete superiority" at sea, if they were unable to interfere in British shipping in any way whatsoever during the first 7 weeks.



> If the situation had been different, *they could have used that command of the sea to go where they wanted and do as they wished*. It never came to that, but the option, if needed to be used, was available.



Well no, actually they couldn't. There are about 8 good ports on the West coast which would be perfect for the Japanese to land and cut off the british, but they couldn't land there.
The Japanese considered it suicide to try, as they would be trying to find their way through British minefields, passing within range of Singapore's 15" guns, subject to attack by both British Dutch submarines also subject to air attack by both the RAF and Dutch based aircraft in Sumatra.
Then there is Singapore itself, which is too heavily defended by heavy guns to try a landing. 

So that really only leaves Kuantan Endau (Mersing) on the west coast, both of which the Japanese felt were not feasable until British airpower was eliminated. (especially the ability to bomb ports convoys at night)



> As for negating the effect of having command of the seas, I agree with your premise that the Japanese never did another serious invasion after Khota (the invasion of Singapore Island notwithstanding), but they really didn't have to. The collapse on the penisula was so complete, that they got where they wanted to go on land.



With 20/20 hindsight it's easy to say that they didn't need to, but that's not how they saw it at the time. Had the British been halfway organized in their operations it could have spelled big trouble to the Japanese, even in mid-January

The Japanese have only 3 divisions in Malaya. (Guards, 5th 18th )

After one month of fighting the 11th Indian has been virtually wiped out, leaving the 8th Australian + one Indian division (9th) + about a half division of British Singapore fortress troops.

Now, during January the British managed to send in 2.5 divisions of reinforcements:
5 brigades (45th Ind, 44th Ind, 53rd, 54th 55th) + 10,000 replacement troops.

Unfortunately due to an absolutely appalling failure of British planning, the troops sent were either such poor quality (Indian) or else not acclimatized to the very hot conditions (the British 18th div) as to be next to useless.

*On the other hand*, at this time the British had three tough, veteran Australian divisions sitting in reserve in the Mideast, they could easily have been sent instead of the Indians the British troops. (put the Brits in the Mideast instead to give them time to acclimatize)

With 3.5 Australian divisions (all but one veteran) and about 1.5 divisions of Indian British, this gives 5 Allied divisions to 3 Japanese, which should be able to halt the advance in northern Johore. They also had the oppertunity to send in far more air power than they did - something the japanese couldn't know at the time.

Keep in mind that the southern 1/3 of Malaya isn't primarily jungle, it's mostly fields plantations with open spaces that would allow the Allies a much more effective use of artillery antitank - something that we were much stronger in than the Japanese.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 15, 2011)

Some great info here. Thanks


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## timshatz (Apr 15, 2011)

Freebird, I give up. If your line of reason is accurate, the Brits never lost Singapore. The place was indefensible from the start. Not doubting your facts but the interpetation of them all means the disaster that was the defense of Singapore never happen. It did, it was a complete cockup. Possible the worst in WW2. 

Have a good one guys.


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## Freebird (Apr 15, 2011)

buffnut453 said:


> Don't disagree. None of the Allied powers was strong enough to repulse the Japanese attacks where and when they occurred but the politicians were reluctant to get dragged into, or further into, conflict by making formal alliances. Had they made those alliances in July, it's likely the Allies would have done much better against the Japanese.



Perhaps, but I have my doubts that they would want to, given British weakness in the area.
Better perhaps to stay neutral and hope that the brewing war will take place elsewhere.



> Yes but Thailand was still the pivot-point. It afforded the Japanese forces internal lines between the 2 theatres.



Agreed, I'd still like to plan an operation in Thailand, even if it's just air operations to attack Japanese shipping mine the port.



> No fleet was needed if there were sufficient defences in Malaya to secure the seaward flanks. Without adequate airpower to find and interdict Japanese shipping or the ground forces to defend in depth, a fleet was vital but just wasn't there. In short, the strategy for Singapore relied on hope which is never a good planning assumption.



I don't really see the fleet as a viable option, as the size needed to outgun the Japanese in home waters is far too large.
Far easier and cheaper to quickly send air assests to match Japanese power in the area.



> But how would that have stopped the Japanese. They were already moving into southern Indo-China. An embargo against a resource-poor nation like Japan was (and still is) a reasonable political response.



It's quite clear from Japanese planning that they would *only* go to war with the US/UK in 41/42 if they were backed into a corner by the embargo. If they could obtain oil resources to continue their war in China then they wouldn't attack the west.
(Which the British should know, as they were reading both diplonatic "JN-25" military signals)



> London and Washington both failed to realise, however, that *Japan's progression towards militaristic government was not going to promote peaceful resolution*. Like Hitler's Germany, Japan's only response to a problem was to escalate.



That's the key point right there.




> Again, hope was the main strategy, coupled with an expectation that the Japanese would mount an overland offensive from Indo-China despite Percival's earlier assessment that landings on the east coast were feasible during the monsoon. It was hoped that the Japanese wouldn't attack until 1942 when the build-up of forces in Malaya would have been pretty much complete. Unfortunately, the Japanese weren't obliging and the PBI, particularly the Indian units, many of whom could scarcely fire a rifle, found themselves facing tanks with no way of combating them.



I think Churchill deluded himself into thinking that the US would deal with the Japanese nuisance quickly, that Japan would cower in fear at the mighty US fleet. 



> And here lies the rub. You don't remove "properly trained and equipped" divisions from ongoing theatres of conflict to reinforce a colonial outpost.



Malaya was more than just some "outpost" it was the key colony in the Far East, which produced vital rubber, oil tin, and on which the British taxpayer had invested some 60 million pounds to build a base for the fleet.

But I think that if you look carefully, you'll find that my proposed deployment to malaya doesn't take anything away from any "ongoing theatres of conflict", the key changes being the addition of a Canadian division, and the substitution of the Australian 9th for the Indian 11th.


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## Freebird (Apr 15, 2011)

timshatz said:


> Freebird, I give up. If your line of reason is accurate, the Brits never lost Singapore. *The place was indefensible from the start*. Not doubting your facts but the interpetation of them all means the disaster that was the defense of Singapore never happen. It did, it was a complete cockup. Possible the worst in WW2.
> 
> Have a good one guys.



No Tim, what I'm saying is that Singapore was very defensible *from seaward attack*, and that a Japanese landing in Southern Malaya was very risky while the British RAF was operating. What that the Japanese needed to do was to attack Malaya *overland* from Thailand, capture airbases near to Singapore to allow their superior air force to neutralize the RAF - which is exactly what they did do.

Singapore was very defensible, but provided *and only provided* that Southern Johore was well defended.
It wasn't, for many of the reasons listed by myself Buffnut. (poor quality troops, no defensive preparations, lack of air power, etc etc) 

Basically the Japanese "snuck in the back door" to Singapore.
Worst defeat in WWII? I'm inclined to agree with you, especially as it was so wasteful.

The British chiefs knew that Singapore's weakness was to an *overland* attack, yet unfortunately Churchill "knew better" and dismissed their advice.




Buffnut said:


> Had British forces been able to interdict or repulse the Japanese invasion fleet and prevent them from taking Singora, then the situation would have been very different. The only option available to Yamashita would have been a long overland invasion from Indo-China which would have taken a long time and thus afforded time for further reinforcements to arrive.



Indeed.

So let's continue with the hypothetical "what would you do differently" shall we?
Assume that the air forces have been reinforced by about 600 aircraft. (The number authorized earlier by the Chiefs War Cabinet) I'll get in to the specifics of the aircraft later.

If I was to deploy forces (which I listed earlier) it would be something like this: (on the afternoon of the 7th)

Australian 9th HQ with two brigades at Gurun, with the 18th brigade at the border, on the Jitra-Singora road.

Australian 8th HQ with two brigades at Ipoh, with a brigade forward at Kroh.
1st Corps HQ the Australian mech brigade at Ipoh.


Canadian 3rd division HQ with a brigade on the road/rail junction at Kuala Lipis, along with thew corps HQ the mech brigade.
A Canadian brigade at Kota Bharu, and a second brigade in reserve 10 miles back near Kuala Kerai. An Indian brigade attached to the Canadian corps at Kuantan 

Indian 9th HQ, Indian III corps HQ, one Indian brigade, the fortress brigade a marine brigade in Singapore.
Two Indian brigades of the 9th division in Johore

The British brigade NZ brigade in army reserve in Gemas Kuala Lumpur respectively.

How does that look?


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## buffnut453 (Apr 15, 2011)

Actually, in addition to having sufficient air power actually to hurt the Japanese forces, the other key capabilities that were needed were:

1. More PR aircraft.
2. Better intel staff who could stand up to political pressure - they knew the enemy's capabilities, they had identified the right indicators of impending attack but they became obsessed with "finding the invasion fleet" as an indicator when the presence of fighter aircraft in western Indo-China was the real give-away.
3. Stronger collaboration between the UK and US over defence of the Malay Barrier. The presence of one aircraft carrier, a cruiser squadron (USN ) and destroyer escorts really would have made the Japanese think twice about mounting the seaborne invasion of eastern Malaya and Singora.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 16, 2011)

How much a small fleet of submarines would've hurt Japanese efforts? 
Historically the IJN was not well equipped trained for anti-sub work.


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## parsifal (Apr 16, 2011)

The RNN had a number of subs deployed into the area, and the USN had something like 30 subs based at cavite. The US subs achieved very little, partly because their stock of tordpedoes was blown up in the opening rounds of the campaign. The RNN subs performed somewhat better, but were still fairly limited in their effect. 

Whilst Japanese ASW was admittedlfairly poor, it didnt have to be very good to deal with the allied submarine threat at this time. Japan actually captured more shipping than she lost in the first 3 months of the campaign, and in the first year of the war, there was only a net loss of shipping to allied subs of something like 250000 tons. in comparison the allies lost about 1 million tons of shipping to japanese subs and also to capture. 

One of the myths of the war was that the IJN did not engage in tonnage wars.....in point of fact they did....its just that the camapign was not as well organised as the german, and they tended to flip flop between fleet support work and convoy attacks. The effort was only eve half hearted, and particulalry later on was subverted to other tasks like transport of supplies

There were only two subs of the RN in the whole theatre, and these were some thousands of miles away. Brit subs did okay in the war, but were handicapped by short endurance and range. The weapon par excellance in the pacific was the gato class sub, but there were very vew of these available until later in the year


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## davebender (Apr 16, 2011)

How is that different from Britain esculating the German-Polish border dispute into a general European war by providing Poland with a military guarantee? Or the USA basing 29 long range submarines and 4 heavy bombardment groups on Luzon in response to the Japanese occupation of Vietnam? (The four B17 groups didn't all make it by December 1941. But they were enroute along with hundreds of fighter aircraft plus a dive bomber group and a medium bomber group.)

Everyone threatened military intervention. And everyone had what they considered to be good reasons.


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## parsifal (Apr 16, 2011)

Hi FB

i think your alternative plan is better than the historical one, but at the risk of harping, i think it fails to take into account the likley japanese respoonse to an increased Allied deployment into the area. My opinion is that if the allies began this heightened preparation from march 1941, this would have a big impact on the japanese. i think the likley result would be that the japanese would also begin mobilsation early. instead of five japanese divisions there would probably be about twelve to face....instead of 600 a/c, you are likley to face in excess of 1200. Its at least arguable that instead of being confronted with a neutral Thailand, you will have either an occupied, but more likley an axis thailand.

against that type of problem, this heightened allied deployment is unlikley to succeed. Churchill was right i am afraid....the only game in town for the british with two tother wars raging in Europe, was to try and bluff their way out


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## davebender (Apr 16, 2011)

IMO that depends on what Britain deploys to Malaya. 

Infantry divisions and short range fighter squadrons (i.e. Spitfires and Hurricanes) are defensive in nature and no threat to Japan. Long range submarines and long range bombers that can strike Japanese territory or Japanese shipping are an entirely different matter.


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## Freebird (Apr 25, 2011)

parsifal said:


> Hi FB
> 
> i think your alternative plan is better than the historical one, but at the risk of harping, i think it fails to take into account the likley japanese respoonse to an increased Allied deployment into the area. My opinion is that if the allies began this heightened preparation from march 1941, this would have a big impact on the japanese. i think the likley result would be that the japanese would also begin mobilsation early.



Not harping,  there's nothing wrong with critical analysis and exploring all ramifications.
However I think I should make it clear that there will be no heightened preparation in Mar '41, and nothing absolutely NOTHING additional will arrive in Malaya in Mar, April, May, June or July. 
By the end of September there would be an increase of about two brigades or about 6,000 troops (76,000 vs 70,000)
I would expect that the last 3 or 4 brigades would arrive from mid-Oct to mid-Nov. 

So the Japanese won't be mobilizing early, nor really have much concern until November, when they might assign an extra regiment or two to the 25th Army.



parsifal said:


> against that type of problem, this heightened allied deployment is unlikley to succeed. Churchill was right i am afraid....the only game in town for the british with two tother wars raging in Europe, was to try and bluff their way out



I don't accept the premise that bluffing could in any way succeed. The Japanese had two options; go to war or else have the Empire ( Emperor) suffer a humiliating defeat. I can't see that any knowledgable expert would think that #2 would happen.

Increased Allied defence in Malaya give the US British more time to send in needed units 




parsifal said:


> instead of five japanese divisions there would probably be about twelve to face....instead of 600 a/c, you are likley to face in excess of 1200. Its at least arguable that instead of being confronted with a neutral Thailand, you will have either an occupied, but more likley an axis thailand.



Parsifal the Japanese do not *have* a dozen divisions to send, there are only about 12 available for the entire Southern Army Group.
Nor could they supply more than 3 or 4 divisions through Singora, as it was they were critically short of supplies at the end, and needed quick British surrender.


I've taken some time to diagram the Japanese armies.
Of the 16th army in Japan, it was sent to Java in Feb with the 2nd 48th divisions, with the 56th transferred to Burma along with the 18th, and the 4th 21st sent to Philippines in their place.

However, the Japanese have only about 4 regiments lift capacity, and they also don't have LCV's etc, meaning that there is a slow transfer of troops to smll craft to land on the beaches.
One regiment (143) lands in the ports in Thailand, while 3 regiments land at Singora, Patina Kota Baharu on the 8th.

I can see the Japanese transferring the 2nd to Indochina to bolster the 25th army, and perhaps cancel the landing on Dec 15th in Sarawack. 

The Japanese have no choice but to invade Thailand with the 15th army. I can't see them abandoning the invasion of the Philippines either.

]


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## parsifal (Apr 25, 2011)

_However I think I should make it clear that there will be no heightened preparation in Mar '41, and nothing absolutely NOTHING additional will arrive in Malaya in Mar, April, May, June or July. 
By the end of September there would be an increase of about two brigades or about 6,000 troops (76,000 vs 70,000)
I would expect that the last 3 or 4 brigades would arrive from mid-Oct to mid-Nov_. 

It would be impossible to keep an increased level of military plannig a secret. There are simply too many nations and too many military commands involved to hide this sort of thing. The Japanese knew very well from the military conferences that did occur what the allies were planning, they also knew very well what was actually deployed into the operational areas. If increased military preparations by the allies were begun in March of 1941, it would not matter that the allies tried, (with perfect hinsight I might add), to rush in reinforcements at the last minute. The Japanese would simply know of the planned accelarated expansions and react accordingly. 

_So the Japanese won't be mobilizing early, nor really have much concern until November, when they might assign an extra regiment or two to the 25th Army._

This is an extremely dangerous assumption, and the sort of fantasy that the japanese were guilty of in their planning in the later campaigns of the war. It expects and predicts that the Japanese will act in the manner expected and takes no account of contingencies. Sound military planning doesnt take risks like that. It hopes for the best but prepres for the worst. This plan is doing the opposite I am afraid. 

_I don't accept the premise that bluffing could in any way succeed. The Japanese had two options; go to war or else have the Empire ( Emperor) suffer a humiliating defeat. I can't see that any knowledgable expert would think that #2 would happen._

I tend to agree, but I dont accept that in 1941 the allies could do anything to stop the Japanese war preprations. Perhaps the best strategy therefore would be to pull back the forces for later use. If PoW and Repulse had been deployed to Trincomallee instead of Singapore, they would have posed as much of a deterrent, and not been risked as possible targets, just to look at an obvious example. 

_Increased Allied defence in Malaya give the US British more time to send in needed units _

Not really, it just means a bigger bag of prisoners in my opinion. 


_Parsifal the Japanese do not *have* a dozen divisions to send, there are only about 12 available for the entire Southern Army Group.
Nor could they supply more than 3 or 4 divisions through Singora, as it was they were critically short of supplies at the end, and needed quick British surrender._


The additional divisions I am mentioning would come from China and Manchuria, and the Home Islands defences. These units in turn would be replaced by the mobilised Japanese army units in their original stations of China and manchukuo. Historically the Japanese began their mobilization in November, and had completed it by March 1942, having raised in excess of 16Divs by the beginning of April. If the Japanese mobilization begins in March, they complete their mobilization by July, with an additional 12-20 divs added to the IJA, fully equipped and fully trained and all with combat experience. 

With regard to supply, it would be difficult to provide supply, however, with an additional 5 months over what they had historically to prepare, they are simply going to stockpile a greater amount of munitions in their forward base areas like Hainan and IndoChina. To address the logistics, and assuming a greater level of co-operation from the thais, they simply need to ship in a few more trains to the region to get the supplies from IndoChina to Malaya, or they could organize an additional Baseforce to operate out of Singora. In the initial days they will be short of supplies, but this is a transitory problem for them. As the allies fall back, as they must, the that increased allied presence will leave an increased cache of supplies for Japanese usage. Historically the Corps level of Committment by the allies yielded more than enough in captured supplies to sustain the Japanese Army in Malaya for most of its campaign. They were short of some artillery munitions by the time of the assault on Singapore, but this has tended to be overblown as an issue in post war revisionist histories. 

_I've taken some time to diagram the Japanese armies.
Of the 16th army in Japan, it was sent to Java in Feb with the 2nd 48th divisions, with the 56th transferred to Burma along with the 18th, and the 4th 21st sent to Philippines in their place.

However, the Japanese have only about 4 regiments lift capacity, and they also don't have LCV's etc, meaning that there is a slow transfer of troops to smll craft to land on the beaches.
One regiment (143) lands in the ports in Thailand, while 3 regiments land at Singora, Patina Kota Baharu on the 8th.

I can see the Japanese transferring the 2nd to Indochina to bolster the 25th army, and perhaps cancel the landing on Dec 15th in Sarawack. 

The Japanese have no choice but to invade Thailand with the 15th army. I can't see them abandoning the invasion of the Philippines either._ 

The Japanese in their initial campaigns had a roughly 8 division lift, because they stripped out their coastal shipping fleet temporarily to bolster their lift capacity. In 1941 the Japanese had the most comprehensive and effective amphibious force in the world, and whilst it looks quaint and inneffective compared to the later US capability, in 1941 it was as revolutionary as the German Parachute arm. Even though your revised deployment for the British does thicken up the defences, it is still relatively weak and inadequate. You are attempting to defend a front that is about 300 miles long with about 8 divs, which is about 40 miles per div of frontage. I assume the Japanese are not going to be artifically constrained to the historical landing points....their Khota Baru landings may well occur at another point on the coast.....Against a concentrated assault by a divisional sized assault force, the defnders, which instead of defending in company strength will now have twice that amount at the landing point, are still going to be forced back in detail. 

With regard to Thailand, there may not be a necessity to invade Thailand. If Thailand is more co-operative, for the reasons I have previously suggested, they may in fact be a more co-operative ally of the japanese. The japanese may even begin their war deployed in Thailand. 

Your planning is imaginative, and I am not saying that it is completely impossible, however the exercise you have embarked on is far to optimistic in its expectations of how the Japanese might have reacted. You are assuming that things are not possible when they are, and also assuming that the Japanese are going to act in a certain way, when at this time one of the advantages they possessed was acting in ways that had not been predicted by the allies. Why all of a sudden are the allies being assumed this quality to a greater extent than any other protagonist since probably Alexander the Great, whilst the japanese are reduced to the foresight of a group of Luddites???? This is the ultimate inconsistency of your plan IMO....


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## buffnut453 (Apr 26, 2011)

parsifal said:


> _Increased Allied defence in Malaya give the US British more time to send in needed units _
> 
> Not really, it just means a bigger bag of prisoners in my opinion.



It rather depends on where and how Allied reinforcements are used. Removing access to Singora would remove the only major port on the east cost of the Kra Isthmus which would force the Japanese to undertake an overland assault from Indochina which would take much longer, extend the Japanese logistic lines and make their forces more susceptible to aerial interdiction (note that, according to Tsuji, strafing by RAF fighters was the thing they most feared because it was the most effective form of Allied attack). I also believe that Malaya was defensible, just not with the quality and employment of forces used in 1941-42.



parsifal said:


> _Parsifal the Japanese do not *have* a dozen divisions to send, there are only about 12 available for the entire Southern Army Group. Nor could they supply more than 3 or 4 divisions through Singora, as it was they were critically short of supplies at the end, and needed quick British surrender._
> 
> The additional divisions I am mentioning would come from China and Manchuria, and the Home Islands defences. These units in turn would be replaced by the mobilised Japanese army units in their original stations of China and manchukuo. Historically the Japanese began their mobilization in November, and had completed it by March 1942, having raised in excess of 16Divs by the beginning of April. If the Japanese mobilization begins in March, they complete their mobilization by July, with an additional 12-20 divs added to the IJA, fully equipped and fully trained and all with combat experience.



However, bear in mind that Yamashita didn't initially deploy all his divisions in the assault on Malaya because he was concerned about the combat effectiveness of one formation. I rather doubt your assessment of a uniformly trained and combat-experienced cadre of divisions available for operations in Malaya. The combat effectiveness of these formations would also be reduced if Allied defensive preparations forced an overland assault through Indochina.



parsifal said:


> With regard to Thailand, there may not be a necessity to invade Thailand. If Thailand is more co-operative, for the reasons I have previously suggested, they may in fact be a more co-operative ally of the japanese. The japanese may even begin their war deployed in Thailand.



But we know that Thailand wanted to remain neutral. There were Japanese-leaning elements within the Government, but there were also senior officials who maintained an anti-Japanese policy. Thailand was unique in being the only Asian nation, other than Japan, that had retained independence. As such, I don't see it simply folding until such time as it was attacked.


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## parsifal (Apr 26, 2011)

_It rather depends on where and how Allied reinforcements are used. Removing access to Singora would remove the only major port on the east cost of the Kra Isthmus which would force the Japanese to undertake an overland assault from Indochina which would take much longer, extend the Japanese logistic lines and make their forces more susceptible to aerial interdiction (note that, according to Tsuji, strafing by RAF fighters was the thing they most feared because it was the most effective form of Allied attack). I also believe that Malaya was defensible, just not with the quality and employment of forces used in 1941-42_.

I agree with this assessment, but do not agree that increasing the ground forces in the Peninsula is going to make much of a difference. For every ground forces card the allies play, the japanese are going to be able to trump that with greater forces, and better trained and motivated to boot. The only way that the Japanese ground forces can be stopped is if they can be challenged and defeated in the air, and at sea. and in 1941 the british just couldnt do this, not with 188 a/c, and realistically, not even with 566 a/c. 


_However, bear in mind that Yamashita didn't initially deploy all his divisions in the assault on Malaya because he was concerned about the combat effectiveness of one formation. I rather doubt your assessment of a uniformly trained and combat-experienced cadre of divisions available for operations in Malaya. The combat effectiveness of these formations would also be reduced if Allied defensive preparations forced an overland assault through Indochina._

I thought the division you are referring to was held back mostly as a strategic reserve. The Japanese were expecting to be held up on at least one of the fronts they were pressing, and wanted a ready reserve to cover such an eventuality. As it turns out the reserve was hardly needed until the very end. 

With regard to the combat effectiveness of the units, you do understand I am proposing the Japanese would replace existing, battlehardened divisions from China and Manchuria with reservist Divisions, as they did historically, and send these battle hardened veterans so relieved to Malaya instead. In 1941 the Japanese Infantry formations were superior to even the AIF formations, because of superior training, tactics, experienced leadership, and equipment more suited to the Jungle than the allies. According to DuPuy a US colonel from the 70's who specialised in determining the relative effectiveness of the various protagonists, and finding out their various weaknesses....in December 19421, even against fully trained allied vets, each Japanese soldier was equivalent to 2.37 Allied soldiers. Against untrained levies like the filipinos, the force multipliers are even worse, around 4.5 soldiers per japanese soldier. This explains why the japanese could conduct such offensives as they did with such slender margins of superiority, and still win comfortably 

_But we know that Thailand wanted to remain neutral. There were Japanese-leaning elements within the Government, but there were also senior officials who maintained an anti-Japanese policy. Thailand was unique in being the only Asian nation, other than Japan, that had retained independence. As such, I don't see it simply folding until such time as it was attacked.

Dont agree with that. Thailand had fought a war with the Vichy in January 1941, but were prevented from pursuing the full program of conquests that they had wanted by the japanese, who essentially intervened and took Cochin for themselves. The only persons that mattered at that time in the thai administration were the King and Phibul. The King was ambivalent essentially, and Phibul was opportunistic. A US intelligence estimate of the time suggested that the Thais were likley to go pro-Japanese if given enough time and enough incentive. They suggested the British needed to counter Japanese influence by applying some gentle pressure and making gurantees for Thai security. Britain never gave those gurantees. But neither did the Japanese apply much sustained pressure, and they certainly did not wave any real carrots in front of the thais. Thailand had wanted a greater share of Cochin and some of the states of Eastern Burma and also some of the northern provinces of Malaya. They were given only a fraction of those claims, and in the case of the Northern Malayan states were only given agreement after the invasion by the japanese. In other words, japanese timing in their "diplomacy" was attrocious 

Its not hard to extrapolate what might have happened if the protagonists had organised their relations with the Thais a bit better (which was possible if more time and attention was given to the issue). A sort of bidding war would have been entered into, to try and woo the thais one way or another. Whilst i agree that a likley outcome is that Thailand might simply shut down under such pressure, another is that they might be wooed by the carrots being offered. Since the japanese had more carrots to offer the Thais at that time, it is much more likley they would follow the Japanese path rather than the allied path. 

If the Thais remain neutral as is likley, I agree, the Japanese have a harder task but by no means an impossible one. In that situation I would begin the invasion of Thailand a few days before the main assault, including an invasion of the isthmus. If the allies do react, the japanese are at war two days earlier than scheduled....the US Pacific fleet puts to sea, and is promply sunk at sea, all the better from a japanese perspective.....in the Phillipines Mac has a few more days to dither and procrastinate as he did historically, whilst in Malaya, the british would attempt to implement their Matador strategy, which I think would be a disaster._


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## stug3 (Feb 9, 2013)

Men of the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders training with a Lanchester six-wheeled armoured car in the Malayan jungle, 13 November 1941.


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## vinnye (Feb 9, 2013)

The best thing you could do is make sure you have adequate air defence resources available. Their were not enough fighters of sufficient quality available to stop the Japanese gaining air superiority and not enough medium bombers available to carry out attacks on Japanese ground troops and naval assets. 
Then there was the problem of being outmaneuvered by the Japanese army on a number of occassions. A decent light tank or infantry tank in theatre would be of benefit!


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## yulzari (Feb 9, 2013)

I have been lurking on this thread since it began having been brought up in Singapore and Malaya and heard first hand accounts of 1941.

Folk have been looking at this from the point of view of a government or military high command who see Malayan defence as urgent. 

In the 1941 context Empire forces have been over committed from Norway to Iran since the spring of the preceding year without other military support and taking on the armed forces of Germany, Italy, France and with the Soviet Union and Turkey capable of jumping in. They have cleared all opposition in East Africa and the Middle East proper including taking Iraq, Iran, Syria and Lebanon.

Malaya is important but they have gambled on it not being urgent. We talk of US forces but they are not involved. In the Malayan context Thailand is more important.

To defend Malay means doing so without impacting upon the actual ongoing war. This means maximising the resources already available and introducing only that which could be spared.

So you need to appoint a Supremo who can 'prod buttock' and has the power to appoint and sack as he sees fit no matter who he upsets. You need to support him totally politically and let him have senior officers who can make changes and make them happen, giving them the same powers. You need to woo the support of the local chinese population who can supplement your forces such as with an observer based early warning system, telephone field intelligence and raising local chinese troops.

Your officers, troops and officials are not uniquely incompetent. Motivate them and reward effective zeal.

On the ground the numbers you have, were they 1945 trained troops, would be quite adequate to deal with the invasion. Train them to be jungle savvy and non front line in mentality (eg if the enemy are behind you they are the ones cut off from support). Training, training and useful training. Tell them they are good and they will believe it. By the way you will not get anti tank guns. Take anti tank rifles and site them properly. They are miniature artillery not heavy small arms.

At sea you have the resources to do no more than control the west coast with the Dutch. Do that and do it well and use naval firepower to support land forces near the west coast.

In the air you want aeroplanes that can outperform Ki27s and Ki43s. You won't get them. The Buffalos you have and a few Hurricanes are all you will have released to you. There is an actual war going on elsewhere you know. Now you have to earn your money with moral courage (and I am so glad I do not have to do it). Obsolete aeroplanes are what you can have so take them. The Middle East has Gladiators a plenty including stealing the REAF ones and lots of the Hart family. Maybe Mohawks? Ex FAA Skuas are viable dive bombers, Battles exist in quantity. The FAA are getting in Albacores so they should be able to release some Swordfish which can dive bomb and carry torpedoes. Yes you will have horrendous losses but so will the enemy.

Your objective in the air is to destroy sea landings, secondarily to support ground forces and possibly strike enemy air bases within reach. To do this you need intelligence and a warning system. Your fighters are there to enable your bombers to do their job.

Once done you are in command of a second rate military that is committed to aggressive defence and that works. The starting point would be April 1941 when actions begin against Japan.

This is not an elegant solution but it is an achievable one. Now who might have the driven, ruthless qualities to be the supremo? Someone with a record of ability and a record of standing up to pressure. Wavell has ability but does he have the other? Montgomery has the latter but has he the suitable skills? More likely it would be some less known 'bad boy' banished from the big pond and kicked upstairs to be the big fish in a small pond. He could be from any service.


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## stug3 (Apr 4, 2013)

Catalina flying boats based in Singapore patrolling off Malaya, 1941/ early 1942







Royal Canadian Air Force Squadron Leader Leonard Birchall, the "Saviour of Ceylon", aboard a Catalina aircraft before being shot down and captured near the island of Ceylon by the Japanese in 1942


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## stug3 (Apr 5, 2013)

Although Ceylon had received a warning of an approaching Japanese task force, the Royal Navy ships in the Indian Ocean were once again disadvantaged without proper air cover. The cruisers HMS Dorsetshire and HMS Cornwall were on patrol together when they came under attack from the Japanese carrier based bombers. At 11 a.m. Sunday 5th April, a single Japanese plane was spotted astern and at 1.40 p.m. the ships were attacked by some 80 planes. In less than ten minutes Dorsetshire was sunk and within five minutes more Cornwall went down too.

The cruiser HMS Dorsetshire had assisted with the evacuation of Singapore and of Rangoon and was on patrol in the Indian ocean with HMS Cornwall.






The Kent class Cruiser, HMS Cornwall






HMS Dorsetshire and HMS Cornwall under heavy air attack by Japanese carrier aircraft. The photo was taken from a Japanese aircraft.


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## Timppa (Apr 7, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> The Japanese invasion of today's Malaysia Singapore, along with invasion of today's Thailand Indonesia have subjected UK/Commonwealth armed forces to some dire defeats. If you were main commander of British armed forces there, how would you've prepared to the invasion and battles unfolding from Dec 1941? You assume the position at March 1st 1941. The realistic (in a what if  ) choice of equipment and deployment, please.



Somewhat tongue-in-cheek suggestion (and not the commander to make):

Make peace with Germany and ask German troops.

Two quotes from "Deutschland und Japan im Zweiten Weltkrieg":

Goebbels wrote in his diary 30 Jan 1942: "The Fuhrer naturally feels sorry for the great losses the white man has to suffer in Southeast Asia."

Couple of months later (Hassel) : " Hitler himself is not enthusiastic of the great Japanese successes and thinks that he would rather send 20 divisions to the English to throw back the yellows"


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## vinnye (Apr 7, 2013)

I believe that the Japanese were very surprised when crossing th river to Singapore - that they were unopposed.
They had anticipated artillery and machine gun fire to inflict heavy casualties - did not happen?
Maybe someone in command of the British defence shouild have made this crossing very difficult?


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## parsifal (Apr 7, 2013)

There is no gurantee that sending german troops into Malaya, even on a 'tongue in Cheek" approach would have done any better than the allied formations. On a man for man basis that is. 

The germans had zero experience in jungle warfare, and would have had exactly the same, or worse, logistic problems as the allies. Man for man they were worse than some of the units committed to the malayan defence. The Australian 9th Division, a compatriot of the 8th had already fought and defeated the best that the Germans could field in a "colonial" situation, at Tobruk and elsewhere, but the 8th could not contain the japanese and their new jungle tactics and agressive leadership. The Argyll and Sutherlanders had similar impressive records.

The quality of the Indian III Corps did leave something to be desired, but at least had some jungle training. More importantly, the whole campaign was fought and lost because the japanese had complete control of the air and sea, and as a result of that could dictate the logistics situationh. germany if anything was worse, far worse, at logistics management, than just about everyone. ergo, they would have made an even biger hash of this campaign than historically.

Hows that for "tongue in cheek"?


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## Freebird (Feb 19, 2015)

To dredge up am old thread - it was this week, 73 years ago that Singapore fell. 

....And the beginning of an awful stint as PoWs





vinnye said:


> I believe that the Japanese were very surprised when crossing th river to Singapore - that they were unopposed.
> They had anticipated artillery and machine gun fire to inflict heavy casualties - did not happen?
> Maybe someone in command of the British defence shouild have made this crossing very difficult?


There was sharp fighting with the Australians when they landed on the island, but the crossing is actually fairly favorable for the attackers, the heavy mangrove swamp made it difficult for the defenders to prepare proper fields of fire against landings


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