# 1935: you run (only) the army



## tomo pauk (Mar 8, 2011)

In the absence of what-ifs, decided to start one.
It's 1935, and you need to prepare army (not air force, not navy) of country you choose for an upcoming major war. You can't decide not to go to war, but just to prepare the army in material manpower sections. No nukes 

So I'll start with main changes for Italy, equipment-only:
-issue request for good reliable radios
-semi-auto rifle in 6,5mm
-LMG, drum-fed, same calibre
-GP MG in 8mm, belt-fed
-forget about Brixia, develop mortars in 60 and 81mm calibers
-develop recoilless rifle, hand-held (75mm?) and heavier (100+mm)
-purchase license for a Vickers 6-ton tank, with intent to mount 47mm on it
-develop SPG on that carriage, with regular 75mm gun, later with longer barrel 
-produce 37 or 40mm AAA
-when production of tank chassis increase, allocate a number for SP AA (twin 20mm?)
-mount 149mm howitzers on heavy trucks, like what was done for 75 90mm AAA


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## parsifal (Mar 8, 2011)

Your program for the italians would in many instances arrive too late and in others would arrive as unsatisfactory developments of the technology. In other instances monetary costs would have been prohibitive, which would have reduced other more strategically important programs. 

Just picking one item as an example. Your self loading rifle. Compare that to the US experience. They began developing a self loading rifle in 1916, but th4e general Board was not satisfied with the general standard of performance and reliability until 1931. at that point there were two contenders: the Pedersen and garandsw turning Bolt Action. The Garqand in its original design used a 0.276 calibre round, but realizing the massive stocks of 0.30" ammunition the US Army held in reserve. It was well that he did, because General Macarthur, who was controlling the selection process, flatly refused to accept the protoype unles it could fire the 0.30 round.

It took a lot of time to perfect the production processes and by 1938, there were only 7500 Garands in existence. Even by 1941, the Army was not able to adopt the weapon as standard issue.

The difficulty with adopting a new sidearm, is that it soaks up a relatively large amount of resources to develop and manufacture, and this applies to all weapons really. If Italy had begun a re-equipment program as ambitious as yours, it would not have been ready in time, and would have eaten into other programs severely.

The biggest problem facing the Italians in their ordinance, was the multiplicity of types and calibres. There were something like 11 different calibres and types of small arms ammunition in circulation (actually many more, I am only counting the maqin types). What they needed to do was to standardise their existing types and calibres, and undertake a gradual and sustained program of refurbishment. Instead, they opted for fitful and chaotic modernization program that actually worsened the situation. 

Its the same old story really, one of matching your aspirations with the economic resources that you could realistically apply. Italy in the interwar period, according to Overy commanded less than 2% of the worlds economy, and from 1935 was saddled with severe asanctions from the Loeague. Thoug these sanctions failed to deter italian, or indeed Axis aggression, they were nevertheless effective in economically ruining Italy. ,


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## Shortround6 (Mar 8, 2011)

It has been said that the Italians tried to convert to the 7.35X51 carcano round, not in a quest for better performance but because you take a 6.5 barrel and bore it out and re-rifle cheaper than making new 6.5 barrels. If true it really puts a perspective on the Italian Military budget. 

having said that the Italians, with just a bit more money could have re-barreled the existing rifles to take a 6.5 carcanno round with an 8 gram spitzer bullet instead of the 10.5 round nosed they used. Savings in material over millions of rounds, flatter trajectory over common ranges (simpler sight settings) and possibly greater wounding power (spitzers having more tendency to tip).

Drum fed LMGs have been few and far between and for good reason. Ditch national pride and simply buy/licence the ZB 26 in the new 6.5 carcanno.

keep the Breda 8mm, you need money for other things, or at least redo so it doesn't put the empty cases back in the feed strips, should be low cost change. 

I agree, ditch the Brixa and buy Brandt 60mm just like they bought the Brandt 81mm. No cost in research and development, no time lost and no engineers used. 

Recoilless rifles are an expensive luxury. Both in research/development and ammunition costs. They make lousy anti-tank guns (at least during WW II). 

The Fiat M11/39 was based on the Vickers 6 ton tank. You just have to convince the powers that be that one M11/39 is worth 3-4 L3/35s. And get production going a bit sooner. M11/39 turned into the M13/40 with a 47mm gun. 

The chassis was turned into a 75mm SP gun, the Semovente 75/18 which later had longer higher velocity guns fitted. 

The Italian Navy did have a 37mm gun which was adopted by the army as the da 37/54 modello 39, a little late and, as with most things Italian, not produced in sufficient numbers. 

Using Italian tank production for twin AA mounts is pretty much a waste of resources, the Italians are never going to have enough tank chassis and while the Italian 20mm guns were a good match for the German Flak 30, using the same cartridge and having the same rate of fire. However the practical rate of fire was a little more than half of that of a Flak 38. Sucking up a tank chassis to put 240rpm into the air doesn't seem like a good idea. 

While putting 149mm howitzers on truck may appeal to the Italians (they certainly put enough other stuff on trucks) it really isn't a good idea. Recoil is proportional to the momentum of the shell and not energy. Mass times velocity, not mass times velocity squared. That 149mm howitzer with it's 88-100lb shell ( I haven't looked it up) is going to have a fair amount of recoil compared to even a 90mm AA gun with a 22-25lbs shell. The other problem is tactical deployment. Large AA guns are seldom sited within artillery range of the enemy. Howitzers often are. To protect them they are placed in weapons pits. Dug into the ground with spoil and or rocks piled around to make the walls higher. It is bad enough digging in a normal howitzer. digging in something the length and height of a truck is going to be a real bi*ch. To do shoot and scoot you need good radios (not field phones), pre-surveyed firing positions, good maps, good mobile logistics (plenty of ammo trucks to move with you)., etc. 

A big part of the Italian Army's problems were leadership and morale. While some units fought very well (the artillery seemed to come for a lot of favorable comment) It seems ( i could be wrong here) that the Italian officer class had a lot more 'privileges' in respect to the men than most other armies. Stories are around about high ranking officers using multiple trucks to transport personal wine cellars, bath tubs and luxurious apratment fittings while troops went hungry or were left behind during retreats. Not exactly morale boosting. Trying to over turn a cultural way of life in a few years is not going to be easy.


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## michaelmaltby (Mar 8, 2011)

I'm curious, Tomo.  Why start with the Italians? Any changes made in 1935 would *NOT* have affected Italy's performance in the the build up to and involvement in WW2 (in any significant fashion), IMHO .

On the otherhand, if one had started to better arm and enlarge a permanent Estonian army (and enter into mutual support and training agreements with the Finns and Balts -- Latvia and Lithuainia) the events 1939, post Molotov-Ribbentrop _might_ have been slightly different.

MM


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## tomo pauk (Mar 8, 2011)

Okay, the disagreements are there. Now, what about picking a country and toss some ideas?


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## parsifal (Mar 8, 2011)

My suggestion would be to re-organize the French Army. Assuming no greater level of resourcing, I would concentrate on re-organising the resources rather then coming up with new or increased equipment levels

The first thing I would do would be to legislate a mandatory retirement age for all General Officers. I would suggest about age 60. The French Army was plagued by reactionary elements that prevented the introduction of new ideas. There was considerable talent and innovation in the French army but it was effectively stymied by the ageing and change resistant leadership. Instead of such old timers as Weygand and Gamelin, the French Army of 1940 would have been led by men such as De Gaulle and Tassigny and Bethouart. This would have made a profound difference to the performance of the French on the battlefield in 1940. 

My efforts in reorganization would have concentrated on the mobile formations. By the outbreak of the war (or soon thereafter) historically there were 9 Motorized Inf Divs, 3 Heavy Armoured Divs (DCRs) (with a further two in the process of formation), 3 or 4 Armoured Cav Divs (DLMs) 5 Mixed Armour/Cav Divs (DLCs) and over 45 Independent Armoured Battalions. All of these formations failed pretty badly in battle, for various reasons….poor organization, a lack of supporting elements, late formation, poor levels of training, poor logistics. Simply beginning the process of formation earlier would carry with it major advantages in proficiency. If the French armour had been trained better in 1940 because its formations had been together for longer, there would have been major advantages again. 

My efforsts at re-organization would have centred around forming homogenous mixed armour/artillery/ infantry formations. This wouold have been achieved by grafting armour onto the Motorized infantry formations, and Infantry and Artillery to the armoured formations. Instead of a nearly irrelevant mechanized arm, I would be aimng for a highly effective arm, capable of dealing a death blow to the german Panzer groups. I estimate the French would be capable of fielding about 21 division sized armoured or mech formations, and perhaps a further 10 mixed Infantry/armour brigades similar to the Soviet Mech brigades of 1941. With that force level, retaining the Maginot defences, and led by forward thinking officers, there is no reason to not expect a significant victory in 1940. And this would be achieved for no additional cost in terms of equipment, with no feasible response possible by the Germans. WWII would have ended on the fields of flanders, as WWI had 22 years earlier

There are couple minor tweakings that the French would still need to consider. They needed to improve communications by a wider introduction of radios, and they needed to improve their AA defences. I think these could be achieved without significant additional cost. The French al;so had to ditch the concept of “milch cow” tanks and adopt the german ideas of jerry cans for refuelling……


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## davebender (Mar 8, 2011)

Good luck with that. 

France was a political mess from 1936 onward and the army was not exempt. Many of the French enlisted soldiers were Marxists who had little respect for the largely non-Marxist officer corps. Conducting realistic training and building unit cohesion is almost impossible under those circumstances.


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## parsifal (Mar 9, 2011)

to a point i would agre with that. In the "B" series formations, in particular, there was some evidence of defeatism, and a poor level of morale, made worse by the inactivity of 1939-40. However i do not believe that france was a political mess, or that the french suffered a nationwide collapse of morale. The crisis that they did confront was far more localised than that, which i think would have been largely addressed by better training, and better equipment scales. Getting men busy and proficient would have lessened their fear of battle. 

In the case of the B Divs, after the initial shock of battle had subsided, these formations settled down and fought reasonably well. There were isolated instances of a collapse of morale here and ther, but on the whole the french army fought credibly, given the constraints they were fighting under. If better training and organization and better leadership had been provided, the french would have perfomed measurably better.

With regard to the comment that all the french enlisted men were marxists, I would sure like to know on what basis that claim is made, and then, if it is true, why having an army of marxists makes any difference to its combat performance. The greeks also have been accused of this "problem, but it doent seem to have affected their ability at all. And of course there are the Soviets themselves who never showed any inherent combat weaknesses because of their marxist background


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## michaelmaltby (Mar 9, 2011)

"... With regard to the comment that all the french enlisted men were marxists, I would sure like to know on what basis that claim is made, and then, if it is true, why having an army of marxists makes any difference to its combat performance. "

Don't know the truth of that claim, but, from September, 1939 until June, 1941 *Germany and the USSR were allies* and generally, marxists being the "follow orders blindly" bunch that they tend to be, they would NOT have been too enthusiastic about fighting an "ally". In the political sphere, marxists defended rubbish unthinkingly until the international told them it was OK to fight Hitler. No one is suggesting that Marxists are cowards or can't fight however. 

MM


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## Shortround6 (Mar 9, 2011)

From an equipment point of view the French Tanks really needed to be changed. while the armor and even the guns were adequate for 1940, the 2 man crew and lack of radios were a real hindrance. Trying to control platoon or company formations in combat by waving small signal flags through ports is not going to work very well. Especially when the tanks that have to receive the signals have the only crew member with a hope of 360 vision trying to load and fire the tanks main gun with his eye to the gunsight most of the time. any penetration of enemy lines has to followed by quick lager of the tanks to go over the next phase of the operation if it differs from the plans made earlier (and it will). 
Tank units also need artillery observers with radios to call for support fire. Field phones are not going to work and mounting guns on tracked chassis so they can "keep up" is a joke if they can't communicate with the tanks they are supposed to be supporting. 
As far as refueling goes, the idea of "milch cow" tanks was also a joke. Many theorist of the time wanted "tank formations" in which ALL elements could cross the same terrain at the same speed. Great if you are North Africa or the steppes of Russia, maybe if good if you are trying to bring supplies across a moon cratered WW I no-mans land landscape. Not really needed for large parts of France and Germany. Just how far could the tanks get from a road or rail in France or Germany in 1940? If you can refuel using Jerry cans you can probably refuel from a truck with a tank and pump. I mean it can't really be done under fire either way. 
Yes the entire French command doctrine needed overhaul/change but in the case of armor it also would need equipment changes to make it work. As near as I can figure out the German MK I tanks had radio receivers only but that allowed them to halted, turned or retreated by their platoon commanders without resorting to flags, very pistol flares or running over and banging on the outside of the tank. The MK II's effectiveness was it's three man crew. Not because of the common idea that it had a two man turret (it didn't) but because the extra crew man in the hull was a radio operator. MK II's could control MK I's as platoon leaders or pass information up the chain of command. Jobs the majority of French tanks could not do no matter what you did with the French high command or command structure.


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## parsifal (Mar 9, 2011)

generally politics does not decide whether a soldier, or an army, are any good or not. if the politics of a nation decided how well its armies would fight the equation would be a relatively simple one.

The political leanings of a nation may influence its posture and goals in a war, and affect the resolve of its politicians , but it seldom affects the resolve of the troops in the field. Even during the bolshevik era, the collapse of the Tsars armies had virtually nothing to do with the propaganda of the Bolsheviks. It had a lot to do with them starving and freezing to death, and the belief that they could not survive, but the immediate politics of Imperial Russia had virtually nothing to do with it. That the rise of Bolshevism was a malaise linked to injustices of the system that existed in Russia at the time was only of incidental importance to the rout of the armies. If the Tsar had found a way to victory, his people would have loved him, for a while, but Bolshevism would still have been there regardless of the outcome. 

neither does fanaticism make for particulalry good soldiers in the modern era. Fearsome, perhaps, but not effective. The SS has an awesome reputation to this day, but if you analyse their battles, particularly early in the piece, they were actually less effective than most more mundane regular wehrmacht units. SS totenkopf had its first combat experience near Arras in 1940, and showed distinct signs of panic at the first sign of resistance. So, if fanaticism was the only real difference between it and the wehrmacht units beside it, then the fanaticism of the totenkopf Division mattered for little.

In fact, most post war studies that I know of that look into basic non-military related factors that look at what makes for a good soldier, dont even mention motivation or politicaql beliefs. these are big determinants in what makes a man enlist, but they have virtually no effect on what makes a man an effective soldier. no, the most important single non-military related factor in a soldiers effectiveness is his education level. The better educated a man is, generally the better he is at killing, because education means he is flexible, adaptable, and knows how to think. And thinking means you have a better chance of surviving, and knowing what to do.

A military unit at its most basic, has but one objective, and that is to survive. All other considerations...mateship, duty, courage, aggression, are subservient to that survival motivation. take away the prospect of surviving, and most soldiers lose the will to fight. Not always, there are many exceptions to that, but in reality most soldiers are fighting just to stay alive. 

So, it is the belief that the "system" can keep you alive that determines if an army is effective or not. If a soldier believes that the weapons hes carries, the men who lead him, the colleagues that surround are equipped, trained and motivated to fight and survive, he too will fight. Anyone who has been under fire will know what i am talking about here. If you believe the system system will keep yopu alive, you will fight to keep the system alive. Your political beleifs may make you spruke around in the mess, but your politics will be far from your mind once the enmy start shooting at you. 

Moreover the performance of the french after 1940 puts to bed the lie that they were significantly affected by marxist leanings, or even that they were affected by anti-german feelings after the fallof france. their efforts in the levant they were an effective fighting force. Their contribution to the conquest of Kufra in 1940 also demosntrates their ability to be effective. their performance at Bir Hacheim, at Monte Casino in Tunisia and later in the reformed French Army on the southern provinces in 1944 all show in spades that the french people were effective soldiers and not wracked by politicalo doubt, at any stage, including during those stages when Russia was still "allied" to the nazis.


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## parsifal (Mar 9, 2011)

Here is a link to a book extract that outlines the factors in making of a good soldier. have a read and see what you think

Handbook of the sociology of the ... - Google Books


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## michaelmaltby (Mar 9, 2011)

I will read it, parsifal. Thanks.

I want to clarify my comment (that you have misunderstood, slightly), to wit:
"... In the political sphere, marxists defended rubbish unthinkingly until the international told them it was OK to fight Hitler. No one is suggesting that Marxists are cowards or can't fight however."

By "political sphere " I was shifting focus from military to civilian - specifically parliaments and labour unions. In those years - September, 1939-June, 1941 - there were plenty of examples of mindless utterings from elected individuals (like Tim Buck) who were Canadian Communists. To them - the bond with international communism (Comintern) was stronger than what common sense told the rest of Canada (based on WW1 participation) was really happening and what the issues were. 

Just finished "Bloodlands" and the author makes a related point, stating how Stalin got a free ride on the extermination of the Ukrainian farmers because - socialists in the western democracies simply would NOT criticize the USSR. I recommend the book - but very black and sad.

As for "political" soldiers - doesn't work too well although, I'm told, the Political Officers in the Red Forces were effective WHEN THEY LED BY EXAMPLE AND FOUGHT.

Chairs,

MM


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## davebender (Mar 9, 2011)

Not all. But a good portion, mirroring French society at that time. What else would you expect when France appointed a Marxist Prime Minister in 1936 as part of the "Popular Front" government? Some historians suggest that the Marxist French Air minister was a Soviet Agent. 

It didn't help that the Soviet NKVD were allowed to work practically unhindered in 1936 France. That's why France became the primary recruitment center for organizing the so called "International Brigades" which fought as Soviet proxies in Spain.


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## michaelmaltby (Mar 9, 2011)

I agree davebender. And the UGLY airplanes .... France and Russia both .... ugly of the proletariat.

Still a good reason not to buy a communist-built Renault. 

MM


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## parsifal (Mar 9, 2011)

Hi SR

In all discussions about AFVs, all of the issues regarding their effectiveness can be broken down into three categories

1)	Firepower
2)	Protection 
3)	Mobility 

Moreover, good design is generally a mix of these matters. Issues about such things as range, reliability, crew numbers, and communications are still adjuncts to these basic criteria. For example, crew numbers really relate to issues of firepower. Having and overworked commander/gunner really has an effect on the firepower the weapon (in this case the tank) can generate. Not having radios has an effect in all three areas really. In the case of the French, the design of their vehicles was such that it would require the already overworked commander to also operate the radio when fitted, which only added to their problems. Nevertheless, having a radio fitted would have been an advantage, and having a proficient commander would have at least helped to address his workload. If he could do his tasks quickly and efficiently, he might have been able to offset one of the biggest weaknesses in French tank design. I believe that was certainly within the realm of possibility, as the Allied experiences with the US Grant, a tank as least as complex as the French tanks (but nevertheless a successful type, in the hands of a properly trained crew). 

The germans, in my opinion tended to lose sight of these realities as the war progressed, and tended to produce designs that tried to be all things at all times….the results were overly large, overly complex, and overly expensive behemoths that could only be produced in limited numbers. Whilst individually they were impressive pieces of technology, as a group they were weak because they could not be produced in sufficient numbers to matter. 

I acknowledge that French AFVs suffered some really serious design faults and limitations. The most serious of which was the lack of radios, followed by an overworked commander and poor layout, followed lastly by poor range, and to a lesser extent a poor power to weight ratio. Their strong points remained generally good levels of protection and firepower. Defensively, they could have been decisive in 1940. What they needed was good training to compensate for the poor layout, the introduction of radios, but most crucially a concentration and provision of supporting arms to make them effective. If these issues had been addressed, the French armoured corps could have been decisive. 

With regard to your last statement, changes to the french command system wuld have made at least an indirect impact on tactical matters. For a start, increasing the rotation rate of the french officer corps would have allowed the opportunity for a better regime of trainng and reorganization to be introduced. as suggested above, if the shortcomings of the french tanks could be addressed by better training, this probably would increase their effectiveness. However even more significantly, overhauling the french command system would have yielded much more significant results than what we are talking about here. When the Germans made their ardennes thrust, the french command system was completely incapbale of reacting anywhere near fast enough. They had about four days of being aware of the major MLA of the germans, and frittered that precious time away doing basically nothing, all because their command system was so antiquated and inept. An overhauled command structure, and replacement of personnel would likley address that fatal weakness IMO


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## parsifal (Mar 9, 2011)

Most histories I have read really discount the 5th column conspiracy theories as a major factor contributing to the french collapse. whilst it would be convenient to "blame the marxists" for the french collapse, there really isnt the evidence to support that. France was wracked by disunity and confusion in the period 1936-40, to be sure, but this was not due solely to marxist agitation. In this regard I disagree with yours and daves position. In reality the reasons for frances defeat had nothing to do with her material preparations. The french had more tanks, could have had more planes, had ample artillery and quality of material to defeat her enemies. Her manpower was of sufficient quality and motivation to do the job. The greatest failing was in her command and control systems. They just completely failed in so many ways. So if we are to apportion blame, it should be placed at the right peoples feet. the so-called conservative, reactionary, moribund, right wing, officer corps has a lot to answer for in this regard....


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## michaelmaltby (Mar 9, 2011)

".... France was wracked by disunity and confusion in the period 1936-40 ..."

Understatement. France was in "shock" from the Waterloo onwards. Unlike Hitler, Napoleon was never vilified - nor were his Bonapartists.

France fancied herself - still does. We in Canada live with the ossified remains of French vanity. Parsifal posted earlier about how well Free French Forces performed after 1943. Well .. excuse me .. but the politics around de Gaulle within the Allies was sickening -- it's the one thing I fault Churchill on. He protected and advanced de Gaulle.

The coup de grace for France was WW1. The country - once again - had lost a generation or two - and only pulled it out of the fire because Britain, the Commonwealth, and finally - belatedly - the US of A - saved her. The English-speaking world gave France backbone she lacked (due to her pretensions) _twice _in 50 years - and she still hasn't figured that out.

I don't think the French had a clue what they believed - in 1939. And the boys in Feld Grau sure did.

MM


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## parsifal (Mar 9, 2011)

Hi michael

I dont think there is as much difference between our repsective positions as you think. I am not arguing against that the french were politically in disarray. That is not an understatement. to go any further, one would have to argue the french were in the grips of civil war. clearly they were not.

I would also not disagree that the french have an overly high opinion of themselves. But then again, how does that translate to any sort of failure on the field of battle

Neither can i see any valid connection between all these political failures in france, and her performance in battle. Except for the isolated cases i mentioned earlier about some breakdowns in the reserve units in 1940, there is no evidence to support a general failure of national morale for the country. What failed was the leadership. The Petains, the Lavals, etc do not represent the country as a whole. The frontline units as well as the 1st line reservists which represented all but 16 divs in a 90 div army fought with generally adequate morale. not outstanding, but adequate. There is no evidence that all this posturing that you refer to had any effect whatsover on the performance in the field of her army. what did fail, and badly, was her command system. 

neither is there any evidence of 5th column activity on her military production. What wrecked her aircraft output wasnt 5th column resistance it was a weak and disorganised industry in which there were too many small producers, and a very archaic and change resistant aircraft industry. France took too long to rectify this by forced amalgamations. There were never any real shortages of land weapons, and the french navy was as powerful as it had ever been since napoleon. in shortthere is no evidence that supports the notion that french obnoxiousness in the political arena translated into a failure on the battlefield, or in the factory at least not directly. 

Moreover, whilst i agree Churchill tended to pandy to the french, what relevance does this have on their battlefield performance. I would venture to say...none. What evidence do you have to support the notion that somehow they failed on the field of battle because of their political leanings, particulalry after June 25 1940. I would venture to say, none. 

Annoying as the french are, one has to approach an appraisal of their capabilities in a far more balanced and analytical way. One cannot afford to let ones prejudices against them (or indeed, prejudices infavour of them either) colour the appraisal of their military capabilities


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## parsifal (Mar 10, 2011)

_I don't think the French had a clue what they believed - in 1939. And the boys in Feld Grau sure did._

Another post war myth I am afraid. The germans in 1940 produced at least as many dud divisions as the french. its just that they do not figure prominantly in the events and are glossed over in many accounts.

If you want to learn about some of the less successful german formations, in 1940, do some reading on the following....the 526th, 537th, 539th, 540th, 554th, 555th 556th, 557th Reserve Divisions. these units had virtually no combat value, but they were were never tested in the same way as the French Reserve Divisions were. many were so bad they were quietly disbanded in the latter part of 1940. Similar divisions that were formed in the emergencies of 1944, such as the 559th and the 549th and were found to be very poor formations with at least as many failings as the french reserve divisions. even many of the higher order reserveDivisions such as the 276 infantry Division, in fact most of the 200 series divisions in 1940 could not be considered assault divisions and certainly would not compare favourably to the Active Divs in the french army. its one of those great myths of wwii that in 1940 the germans possessed 100 or so Infantry Divs, all of them capable of heavy assault operations. In fact in 1940, germans could only call on about 30 or so of its Infantry formations as 1st line assault divs. 

The really big difference between the German Army and the Allies was their all arms mechanized Divs, plus the fact that they had a revised doctrine of war and a command structure that was somewhat more flexible than the allied command structure, though this advantage was only marginal at best, given the German High commands repeated halt orders given to guderian during his dash to the channel. The margin of difference was not as great as one would expect. The german army possessed distinct advantages in a few of its units, but it was not a universal advantage, and the advantages were not as great as one might first believe


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## tomo pauk (Mar 10, 2011)

michaelmaltby said:


> Understatement. France was in "shock" from the Waterloo onwards. Unlike Hitler, Napoleon was never vilified - nor were his Bonapartists.....



Why would anyone 'vilify' Napoleon?


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## tomo pauk (Mar 10, 2011)

michaelmaltby said:


> I agree davebender. And the UGLY airplanes .... France and Russia both .... ugly of the proletariat.
> 
> Still a good reason not to buy a communist-built Renault.
> 
> MM



Wasn't mr. Renault sentenced for being Nazi collaborator?


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## michaelmaltby (Mar 10, 2011)

".... to go any further, one would have to argue the french were in the grips of civil war. clearly they were not."

I think the civil war was in the hearts, minds and soul of the French people. I am NOT claiming French units didn't fight well. I am NOT claiming all German units were great performers on the battlefield. What I am getting at is that there was an overwhelming malaise - and not just just France - Britain was undone. The 1st WW had destroyed people's beliefs (in Christianity) and their place in society and the world. Versailles only made things worse. The League of Nations only made things worse.

Now in France's case - the country had gone from Master of Europe - to humiliation (Sudan, Franco Prussian war) to WWI bloodletting - all in less than 100 years.

France needed to re-evaluate itself and its place in Europe and the world - and instead it was overrun by the Nazis and settled into the uneasy, often morally ambiguous years of occupation.

Frankly - I think we are seeing a repeat of sorts in the UK, Europe and the US - where our values are being eroded from within society and we refuse to accept the reality of the world around us. (Pleasing your enemies does not make them your friends.)

As to why anyone would vilify Napoleon .... he may have been the right man at the right time ... and he certainly kick-started modern Europe .... but .... his "secret police" like any dictator's secret police ... were everywhere. There was a nasty side to The Emperor ... and that for the most part is overlooked (or forgiven).

Renault may well have been tried as a collaborator - but the workers on his assembly lines vote(d) "red".

MM


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## parsifal (Mar 10, 2011)

it seems then, that we are assessing two different things. i am trying to assess the military potential of the french , and what could have been done to improve that performance. your assessment seems to be about the social disintegration of the country....its descent into moral and political bankruptcy. that is a whole different debate, and a whole different issue. And somewhat off target as far as assessing the capabilities of its army are concerned. sure, the moral decay of Europe is an issue, but it didnt really affect the effectiveness of the various military forces involved. There were other more significant factors at work.

What makes for an effective military? Motivation is one of them, but the biggest single determinant for motivation is well proven to be the belief in survival and not much else. if you can get soldiers to believe they can survive, they will fight.

What makes motivated men fight well. thats a whole different question. as I alluded to earlier education is a big determinant in what makes men good soldiers. The italians were not good soldiers, partly because they were not well educated. the majority of the educated manpower went to the Navy and the airforce, or the technical branches of the army. Most of the Infantry were poor southern uneducated peasants, and this was reflected in their combat performance.....

Of course education is not everything. Your men need an effective structure, a good command structure, the weapons to do the job, an effective doctrine to use the resources. The french in 1940, more than anything lacked a good command structure, this had numerous flow on effects....their doctrine was poor, their proficierncy and tactics were poor their TO&Es were not good....most as a result, one way or another because of poor leadership. Solve the leadership issue, and you have the opportunity to greatly increase the combat capability of her army in 1940. You would need time to bring that change about, but I think starting in 1935 would be long enough to do that by 1940.

There is an interesting study by Frank Banner and Alan Chadwick, that looks at the combat performaces of the French and German Infantry formations. German formations greatly benefitted in their combat capability from the stosstruppen tactics they adopted , but even that up by the overhaul of the french command structure, and you end up with a very interesting comparison. Chadwick and Banner rate the Infantry as 1st, 2nd 3rd or 4th rate, with 1st rate considered the best, and assault capable and the 4th rate, virtually only good for garrison and not really combat ready. 

The germans fielded the following:

119 Infantry Divs in total

45x1st Rate, 29x 2nd Rate, 41x 3rd rate and 4 x 4th rate

The french only fielded 72 Inf Divs rated as follows

33 x 1st rate, 21 x 2nd rate, 14 x 3rd rate and 4x4th rate

As percentages of their totals, the ratio of the 1st to 4th rates for the respective armies are 

38/24/34/3 for the german army

46/29/19/6 for the french army

this kind of puts paid to the myth that the german army was uniformaly superior to the french. Whilst in absolute terms the germans fielded a large number of assault capable Infantry formations, as a proportion of their total Infantry force in 1940, it is actually less as a proportion of their total force pool than the french. What stopped the french army from being effective was firstly that it was badly outnumbered, and secondly its underlying command structures and doctrine prevented this potential from ever being exploited. Such outnumbering forces the french 3rd and 4th rate divisions into the front line, whilst the german chaff formations were kept in relatively safe positions on quiet sectors of the front. this goes a long way toward explaing the collapse at sedan and elsewhere


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## michaelmaltby (Mar 10, 2011)

I agree that we're at cross-purposes, parsifal. We got on the 'other' track when someone posted that the french army was full of "Marxists" in 1939. You refuted that statement - and noted that why would being a Marxist detract from fighting ability. To which I agreed but noted that in the political realm France was conflicted after September 1939 due to Molotov-Ribbentrop.


While military and political environments should not be confused ... and I am guilty to a degree , any society that loses confidence in itself, or operates outside the gravity of reality .... will suffer militarily over time. (Viet Nam was a political loss on the home front, not on the battlefield, for example. Regimes that lose the 'vigor' [Rome - both east and western empires - and resort to "buying off" the barabarians, is another example].

Political will is very important to the success of the military, as is public confidence. When these fail, the doors open to greater events.

I am not being hyper critical of the French in these comments - the opening Act of "Inglorious Bastards" well-depicted the dilema honest Frenchmen faced when trying to survive the Nazis - and everytime I see gun camera footage of Spitfires blowing up French railway locomotives I feel sad for the poor bastards in the cab just doing their job .... but all that aside, in 1939 France was divided, tired, and perhaps dillusional. While individual German units may have faltered ... there were still Rommels and Guederians.

Now ... I want out of this hole  so I'm going to STOP digging.

Chairs,

MM


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## michaelmaltby (Mar 10, 2011)

Parsifal - this from FlyBoyJr some years ago casts light on our discussion:

THE FRENCH AIR FORCE

MM


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## parsifal (Mar 10, 2011)

Ive seen that article and read it with interest. I agree with it substantially, but i cannot help but suspect it is somewhat biased in its analysis. The it doesnt seem to acknowledge the realities of needing to maintain a proper reserve, or the other shortages that affected the french air force. But this is a whole diffrent ballgame, one i have not researched properly, and one that will need to wait.


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## michaelmaltby (Mar 10, 2011)

Parsifal - ".... it doesnt seem to acknowledge the realities of needing to maintain a proper reserve ..." blah, blah, technicalities, . It may be suspect - but it speaks clearly to the presence of "eroded will" in the Air Force -- and THAT to me speaks volumes about much more. 

I read the 2-3 pages of the analysis of military "cohesion and morale" that you recommended. I won't bother buying the book. 

MM


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## parsifal (Mar 10, 2011)

its always delight debating with you mm....hope you enjoyed the experience as well


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## michaelmaltby (Mar 11, 2011)

I'm not an academic, parsifal, so I'm not much of a debater - more of a free-wheeling, discussion-over-a-beer, by a fire kinda guy. 

But I always enjoy and appreciate the knowledge and well-rounded judgement you bring to these threads.

Chairs,

MM


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## parsifal (Mar 20, 2011)

well, interst seems to have waned after our incursion into the frankish arena. guess its time to move on. What would i do if I were in charge of the german army???

far from being the perfect instrument of war, the wehrmacht suffered many weaknesses. Again working on the assumption that I have no greater resources than was historically available, what would I do that was different.

The wehrmacht suffered three fatal weaknesses IMO. the first was that its high command structure was emasculated by Goring and himmler, mostly out of sheer jealousy. Hitler acquiesced and used the opportunity to re-organize the command, to make it more servile to him, but the structure was basically illogical and innefficient.

If Hitler had been able to get over himself, and retained an autonomous command structure, seeing off the petulant attacks by himmler and goring, the german army would have entered the war with a much better command structure, more clear headed and professional than it actually was. i think germany would have done better with an independant high command, though the risks to hitler were fairly high.

Secondly i would reinstate retreats as a subject in their defensive tactics training for officers and NCOs training courses. in 1935 hitler had ordered they be removed from the training manuals, which remained the case until after 1945. He did this because he thought studying retreats was a defeatist concept. he argued that retreats would never be needed in the new victorious wehrmacht. Though the germans displayed a stubborn doggedness in their defensive operations, they never undertook retreats very well. their retreats tended to turn into routs partly because officers werre not trained in how to deal with them. if retreats had been practised, the germans may have saved enough men and materials to blunt and then defeat the russian steamroller offensives

lastly I would have carried through the motorization rationalisation plan to a much greater extent. the schell plan. this would have introduced a standardized motor vehicle park for the german army, which would have greatly assisted its maintenence and vehicle serviceability rates. in 1939, just prior to the outbreak of the war, germany had a staggering 131 different modls of trucks in its inventory, 55 motor car types and 150 motor cycles. The schell plan called for rationalization of this program, to just 23 trucks, 26 cars and 26 motor cycle types.

The schell program was only partially implemented before the war. thereafter it really slid from view until 1944, when in a panic, and far too late the germans tried to impl emt an even more draconian standardisation program with only two motorcycle types, one car and 9 truck types included in the plan.

If germany had introduced something like the Schell plan in 1935, instead of going to war with amenagerie of vehicles which were hopeless to maintain, they would have gone to war with just a few standard types. this would have greatly reduced maintenance problems and greatly increased serviceability. This was one of the major factors that contributed to the german defeat


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## tomo pauk (Mar 20, 2011)

Tony Williams gives his 'what if' in the book 'Foresight war', and I like it. Here's what he talks about 'new' German tanks/AFV:
-after Pz-I -II, the 25-ton tank would've entered production (Pz-III in his book). IIRC power pack was 'all rear', armament featuring long 5cm gun at 1st (I'd change that for 7,5cm gun, with ballistics close to US 75mm from M4, or from T-34-76)
-'Marder' available in 1939 (Me: Maybe used 1st time in 1940 to surprise the French Brits? Adding Wespe circa 1940/41, plus twin 2cm/single 3cm AAA on Pz-II chassis. Czech tanks would've been canceled, their chassis used for Marder/Wespe/SP AAA systems)
-In 1940/41 Pz-III receives longer barreled 7,5cm wepon
-88mm is mounted in second half of 1941 to the Pz-III hull to create something akin to SU-85
-Pz-IV enters production (88mm, 45 tons) in late 1941
-twin 3cm AAA mounted on Pz-III hull, in 1942
-Pz-IV receives 88mmL71 ordnace ticker armour, late 1942


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## michaelmaltby (Mar 20, 2011)

".... far from being the perfect instrument of war, the wehrmacht suffered many weaknesses. Again working on the assumption that I have no greater resources than was historically available, what would I do that was different."

Successfully assassinate Hitler.



MM


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## imalko (Mar 20, 2011)

tomo pauk said:


> Tony Williams gives his 'what if' in the book 'Foresight war', and I like it. Here's what he talks about 'new' German tanks/AFV:
> -after Pz-I -II, the 25-ton tank would've entered production (Pz-III in his book). IIRC power pack was 'all rear', armament featuring long 5cm gun at 1st (I'd change that for 7,5cm gun, with ballistics close to US 75mm from M4, or from T-34-76)
> -'Marder' available in 1939 (Me: Maybe used 1st time in 1940 to surprise the French Brits? Adding Wespe circa 1940/41, plus twin 2cm/single 3cm AAA on Pz-II chassis. Czech tanks would've been canceled, their chassis used for Marder/Wespe/SP AAA systems)
> *-In 1940/41 Pz-III receives longer barreled 7,5cm wepon*
> ...



Interesting... One point though, historically Pz III was unable to receive high velocity main gun above 50mm caliber because of inadequate turret ring diameter. Maybe if it was designed differently from the outset...?

Personally I think that main weakness of the Wehrmacht when hardware is concerned is that they used too many different types of armored vehicles. Understand the reasoning behind it (to boost the numerical strength of panzer arm), but it was a logistical nightmare.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 20, 2011)

Pz-III is only the name:



> -after Pz-I -II, t*he 25-ton tank *would've entered production (*Pz-III in his book*).



Historical Pz-III started out as more modest tank, size-wise


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## parsifal (Mar 20, 2011)

Quid pro quo....if the germans began development of a heavy 25 ton tank in 1935, would not the allies also start work on either a heavy tank, or a hevier ATG. Marder was a pretty desperate expedient, that just happened to work....not outstandingly, but it worked. Matildas could have engaged it at more or less equal terms notwithstanding the superior firepower of the type. This is because of the very weak levels of protection offorded to the conversion. 

If the germans stated work on a big tank that increased all three criteria of successful tank design ie, the armour, the armament and the mobility, they would invariably have a lot less tanks to use. this is the Tiger argument, allover again, dressed up in different clothes. And the tiger concept, sexy as it seems, was a failure, precisely because it reduced the numbers, put the german armoured assets eggs into less baskets, and thereby increased the vulnerability of the arm as a whole. And in 1935, a 25 ton tank was an enormous tank, given that most tanks being roduced were about 10 tons at that time.

Germany in fact did start a project of this type, with about those dimensions (ie 25tons). it did not reach fruition until 1942, as a tiger tank. at that time tigers dwarfed all other tanks, and yet were still largely a failure for the reasons previously alluded to


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## tomo pauk (Mar 21, 2011)

The main German 'enemies' in late '30s (SU, France) have already fielded much heavier tanks than 25 tons, so 25-ton tank was already falling at medium class in these countries. It's unlikely that clear specifications would've been published before the new tank is in combat units - so in 1938/39. Therefore, I can't see any impetus they would've reacted differently than they did in mid-30s. 
As for historical 25 ton tank mutating into Tiger, it was *30-35 ton* project actually


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## parsifal (Mar 21, 2011)

tomo pauk said:


> The main German 'enemies' in late '30s (SU, France) have already fielded much heavier tanks than 25 tons, so 25-ton tank was already falling at medium class in these countries. It's unlikely that clear specifications would've been published before the new tank is in combat units - so in 1938/39. Therefore, I can't see any impetus they would've reacted differently than they did in mid-30s.
> As for historical 25 ton tank mutating into Tiger, it was *30-35 ton* project actually



Actually, with the exception of the soviets (and their heavy tanks that dated back to 1935 were unsuccessful), germany's enemies were not producing any 25 ton tanks. This deserves a brief overview.

The british in 1934 were producing matilda Is, 11 tons, armed with two HMGs, max speed 7.5 mph. That was the heaviest tank in their inventory at that time. matilda II did not enter service until mid 1939. The French somua was under development, but did not enter production until late 1936, and was, in any case only 19 tonnes. The char b1 was 30 tons, but did not enter service until 1937. The french did, however have some predecessors to the char b, the so-called char Ds, but these were very unsatisfactory, lacking mobility and power, even by french standards.

The soviets had their t-28s and T-35s, which entered service in 1933. these were certainly more than 25 tons, but as designs they were extremely poor.

thats the thing...all of the pre-war heavy tanks built by the allies and the soviets were not really offensive tanks.....they invariably sacrificed mobility, sometimes also armament, and occasionaly protection as well, simply to be big. The most successful heavy tank best suited to german needs of the time was the mk IV at 19 tons, which entered service in 1937, in extremely limited numbers, and with a gun not suited to ATG work. There were not even 50mm ATGs at that time, so its entry as a dedicated ATG platform would have required further developm,ent of a gun of appropriate size. no-ne in germany was working on a 75mm gun, so the most likley gun would be a 50mm gun, that began to be mounted on mkIIIs in 1940.

In 1935, the germans had no tanks, and very little experience designing them. They designed the mkI in hurry, as a training tank, then rapidly moved onto the mkII before finally developing the MkIII, which entered service in 1939. 

one starts to see the difficulties faced by the germans. if they had abandoned their mkI/II tank park and waited or accelarated mkIV production, to amodified design, on a simple weight exchange (which isnt very accurate, or helpful, they would exchange their roughly 2500 tanks in 1939, for say 1000 mkIVs. thats bad enough, but the formations would have been far less well trained than they were, because they would not have had tanks in 1935-6 to practice tactics with. instead of an army of absolute professionals, that trounced everybody that eyeballed them, we would have seen flounder around the battlefield just as spectacularly as the alliesand Just for the record, the tiger began as a Durchbruchwagen (breakthrough) tank design in 1937, as a 30 ton design. In 1941 it was redesigned as the VK4501 project, and emergerged as a 55ton leviathon.

german heavy tank development as it existed in 1935, can be best illustrated by their experimental Neubaufahrzeug tanks, which were multi-turreted affairs similar to the t-35.

I think it unrealistic that the germans coiuld all of a sudden like magic produce a heavy tank ion the 30 ton range, and have it available in numbers with properly trained crews and formations. This is simply an unrealistic supposition in my opinion


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## tomo pauk (Mar 21, 2011)

Coupe of things that might've caused misunderstanding:
-I'm not advocating that Germans would totally dump Pz-II, not even Pz-I - those two are badly needed to train massively expanding number of tank crews upper command layer.
-Nor I'm pushing for a 30 ton tank in late 30's - it's 25 ton all the time. Not Neubaufahrzeug, not Durchbruchwagen, but some kind of German T-34/M4 counterpart.
-One thing is making a request and sticking to it, the other is to start at 30 tons, than request 35 ton tank, then a 45 ton one, and finally arrive at 58 tons. 
-As for tank/AT armament, think it's easier to produce more ordnances from 7,5cm FK 16nA as tank cannons, then to develop 2 x 5cm cannons.
-Methinks it's realistic to have a 45 ton tank, wit 8,8cm in rotating turret, for Germans, in late 1941. If you don't than we disagree


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## parsifal (Mar 21, 2011)

I think your on the right track to advocate a T-34 style answer for the Germans, But the problem is that technologically this was not possible or even being contemplated in germany at that time. As head of the German army, you are not in a position to undertake actual research, you can issue design specs and then ask designers to go away and meet that specification. Because what you are asking for represents a quantum leap for geran designers, in terms of what they could do in 1935, its going to take a lot longer to deploy the new type you are describing. Just to hold up an issue as an example. If the design called for a weight of 30tons, and an armament of 75mm or larger, the thinking of 1935 was that armament overhanging the bow was a poor design. The germans would have spent a lot of time and effort working the 75mm design into some weird shaped hull design. 

development of an effective 75mm ATG took three years historically, so you can add a year approximately to get that design into a turret. 

Trying to circumvent the natural design progression, because you know with the beenfit of hindsight what germany "needs" is to deny some cold hard realities. German designers were just not at the point you want them to be at that time. There were some intermediate steps needed to be trodden before germany could get to that point. There was nothing in the design pipeline that could even come close to what you are describing. its a total fantasy design. buts lets just ssay they do proceed down that pathway....that means that the mkIII, mk38 and MkIV are bypassed, and germany is forced to fight 1939-42 with only light types. They will have a hard time in the west and in Russia in 1941. Good luck. Then in the latter part of 1941 they start their deployment of the new heavy tank. Unless this tank of yours is a total fabrication and product of fancy, it should be assumed that the type is so typically german....large, complex and expensive. A panther for example took something like 10 times the man hours to build compared to a t-34. Ther has never been agreement on the cost of german AFVs but I have found figures that tend to reinforce the man hours argument ....about 3 or four times the cost per unit. We can get into a discussion about that, but my opinion is that making the tanks larger and more complex will reduce the numbers, and thereby increase the vulnerbaility of the arm as a whole. This is not speculation, its a fact that reduced numbers of individually superior types does nothing to increase survivability and effectiveness. Your plan in other words, has serious questions hanging over it as to timing and effectiveness. I believe it possible as well, but i think it would have been a nett negative, rather than a net positive for the germans


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## Shortround6 (Mar 21, 2011)

Engines, transmission/steering gear, suspension/running gear all needed development. what works fairly well on small/light tanks doesn't work so well on larger medium tanks and tends not work at all on really heavy tanks. 

Why did the Americans build the M3 medium tank? Engine, running gear, transmissions were all set, hull size was all set. It took over eight months to design, build and test the turret for the M-4 medium tank over the time needed to design build and test the sponson mount 75mm gun. And this was with the gun and ammo already developed. 

Did the Germans make mistakes in tank design? sure. 


Building tanks with sloped front ends and sloped sponson sides like adopted for the later jagdpanzer IV:

http://cdn.wn.com/pd/9a/63/f62f08531efff0d6f6d5db25e445_grande.jpg

Might have helped protection some without screwing up production too badly. It doesn't require an changes to the mechanical bits anyway and might have provided for a larger turret ring diameter. 

Skipping the 50/L60 and going to an anti tank/tank version of the 7,5cm FK 16nA doesn't buy a whole lot. I don't think it's penetration was any better at practical ranges (under 1000 yds) it had a shorter point blank range by almost 200 meters, the ammo was heavier, the gun was heavier, not a big deal in a tank but for the towed anti-tank gunners who had to manhandle the gun, dig it in/hide it and get it back out of the firering positions it might mean a big deal. Granted the HE shell was much better but the German idea was that the MK IVs were supposed to supply the HE and smoke support and for that there is little to chose between the 75/24 and a 75/36 gun.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 21, 2011)

parsifal said:


> I think your on the right track to advocate a T-34 style answer for the Germans, But the problem is that technologically this was not possible or even being contemplated in germany at that time. As head of the German army, you are not in a position to undertake actual research, you can issue design specs and then ask designers to go away and meet that specification. Because what you are asking for represents a quantum leap for geran designers, in terms of what they could do in 1935, its going to take a lot longer to deploy the new type you are describing.



Perhaps developing one design of 25 tons, (featuring cannon, engine, transimision, radio, sights -just like any decent tank) would be less a task, than to develop two 20 ton types, plus the Nbfw?



> Just to hold up an issue as an example. If the design called for a weight of 30tons, and an armament of 75mm or larger, the thinking of 1935 was that armament overhanging the bow was a poor design. The germans would have spent a lot of time and effort working the 75mm design into some weird shaped hull design.



30tons? 
Since the 24 cal barrel of early Pz-IV was still cca 1m short to protrude, just how much the 36 cal barrel would? A foot?



> development of an effective 75mm ATG took three years historically, so you can add a year approximately to get that design into a turret.



We know in 1935 that 7,5cm of 45-50 cals is needed to supplant the 36 cal one, so we develop it. 



> Trying to circumvent the natural design progression, because you know with the beenfit of hindsight what germany "needs" is to deny some cold hard realities. German designers were just not at the point you want them to be at that time. There were some intermediate steps needed to be trodden before germany could get to that point. There was nothing in the design pipeline that could even come close to what you are describing. its a total fantasy design.



What feature makes 25 ton a fantasy design for 1939? 



> buts lets just ssay they do proceed down that pathway....that means that the mkIII, mk38 and MkIV are bypassed, and germany is forced to fight 1939-42 with only light types.



1942??



> They will have a hard time in the west and in Russia in 1941. Good luck. Then in the latter part of 1941 they start their deployment of the new heavy tank. Unless this tank of yours is a total fabrication and product of fancy, it should be assumed that the type is so typically german....large, complex and expensive.



The thread says 'You run the army'



> A panther for example took something like 10 times the man hours to build compared to a t-34. Ther has never been agreement on the cost of german AFVs but I have found figures that tend to reinforce the man hours argument ....about 3 or four times the cost per unit. We can get into a discussion about that, but my opinion is that making the tanks larger and more complex will reduce the numbers, and thereby increase the vulnerbaility of the arm as a whole. This is not speculation, its a fact that reduced numbers of individually superior types does nothing to increase survivability and effectiveness. Your plan in other words, has serious questions hanging over it as to timing and effectiveness. I believe it possible as well, but i think it would have been a nett negative, rather than a net positive for the germans



Every what-if is pure speculation, since a single thing is not likely to be proved. So we disagree.


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## tomo pauk (Mar 21, 2011)

Shortround6 said:


> Engines, transmission/steering gear, suspension/running gear all needed development. what works fairly well on small/light tanks doesn't work so well on larger medium tanks and tends not work at all on really heavy tanks.
> 
> Why did the Americans build the M3 medium tank? Engine, running gear, transmissions were all set, hull size was all set. It took over eight months to design, build and test the turret for the M-4 medium tank over the time needed to design build and test the sponson mount 75mm gun. And this was with the gun and ammo already developed.
> 
> ...



Thanks for the link  
The point in choosing 7,5cm L36 was to have a gun that would've performed decently in AT role, plus to have good HE punch. Having it in small numbers in 1939, with decent numbers in 1940 as tank armament would've been better for German army, than to have 3,7 7,5cm combo. 5cm was too late for 1940 campaigns anyway.
As for numbers of rounds carried, the 1/4 'bigger' tank would've carried more 7,5cm rounds than Pz-IV.


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## parsifal (Mar 22, 2011)

Hi Tomo

_Perhaps developing one design of 25 tons, (featuring cannon, engine, transimision, radio, sights -just like any decent tank) would be less a task, than to develop two 20 ton types, plus the Nbfw?
Well, not really_. 

Firstly, the designs you are referring to were not begun in 1935, it was sometime after that. Cutting edge technology for the germans in 1935 was the MkI and MkII, which they were both inadequate, and tried to compensate for with their brekthrough and multi-turretted jobs. However these were recognized as probable failures and pretty much abandoned, because they would not fulfil the mobility requirements that would be required in the Guderian style of warfare. There were reasons why nations messed about with cavalry tanks and infantry support tanks and the like in the 1930s, and that in part was because of the limitations on the technology. The other great limitation, was in the area of technique.

In the case of the germans, in the mid ‘30s, they had the technique, but they lagged in the design area. You cannot just wave a magic wand, and will this issue to go away. Granted, if the germans had been able to step up to the plate in 1935 and produce a world beating battle tank in 1935-7 they would have been pretty formidable, but the weak link here is their technology. Granted the germans made very impressive strides in a small space of time, but in 1935 that technological edge just wasn’t there.


_30tons? 
Since the 24 cal barrel of early Pz-IV was still cca 1m short to protrude, just how much the 36 cal barrel would? A foot?_


I thought your original supposition said 25-30 tons, but in any event the heavy tanks of the era, being produced just after1935 were all in the category of 30 tons. But if you want to narrow your type down to just 25 tons, that’s fine. 

I don’t know the difference or any details about this 75/36 gun you are referring to and the standard PAK 75/40. I am guessing it was a non-existent, fictional gun (but I will check later at home) However, at only 4 calibres short of the 75/40, which was eventually fitted to the Mk IV, with a pronounced overhang (more than 1 foot judging from photographic evidence). Moreover with the fitting of the 74/40 L-43 on the F2 subtype, the weight of the mkIV had increased to 23.6 tons, and eventually increased to 26 tons. So essentially what you are saying is that you want to produce a MkIV f2 in 1935. Quite apart from the fact that in 1935 this was quite beyond the germans even conceptually, the F2 was never invulnerable. It was a much feared tank in the desert, but it was defeatable by the 2pdr and 6 pdr ATGs. Given that there would many fewer F2s than the smaller, earlier tanks, it follows that these fewer tanks are going to end up more vulnerable than the historical tanks that were fielded. We are back to where we started, producing heavier tanks means fewer tanks, fewer tanks means a more vulnerable formation. 

_We know in 1935 that 7,5cm of 45-50 cals is needed to supplant the 36 cal one, so we develop it. _

The trouble is, that in 1935, it was not known that the 37mm and 50mm weapons would prove to be insufficient. Where would the germans deduce that these weapons were inadequate. The tanks that defeated these wepons…the matildas, the t-34s, the Somuas and Char Bs were not even in service. As far as I know the germans did not anticipate these heavier types. Its possible that they may have, but then simply saying, “we will develop it” fails to take into account the costs of such development. And increased cost means decreased numbers, and decreased numbers means less tanks. If we abandon development of the 37mm and the 50mm weapons, this means Germany fights the first two years of her war with nothing bigger than a 200mm tank mounted weapon

_What feature makes 25 ton a fantasy design for 1939?_ 

Nothing, except that the germans did not possess a design, a philosophy even for a mobile battle tank to suit that bill. The nearest thing they had was the mk IV which did not enter service in any great numbers until after 1939. The reasons for the concept being a fantasy design are not because it was technically infeasible, clearly it was, but rather because the technology at that strategic moment, along with the foresight to do it simply did not exist. Moreover, when the germans did eventually get around to organizing a design brief for something similar, it still took them the best part of four years to refine the design. So yes, it is something of a fantasy design I am afraid 

_1942??_


This comment was made in the context of building a cut down 45 ton Tiger. Given that the initial design studies for the real Tiger began in 1937, and the tiger did not enter operational service until the latter part of 1942, yes, it is reasonable to assume a 4-5 year lead time for your 45 ton mini Tiger. For your 25 ton tank, there are still going to be delays, because many of the technologies you are looking either don’t exist or are otherwise inadequate. My guess is that to develop a 25 ton tank with along barrelled 75mm weapon is going to take rather longer than the historical short barrelled MkIV. It took the MkIV about 3 years to iron out all its kinks, so a long barrelled version of the same thing is going to take at least as long, coupled with the fact that the MkiV was started in 1936, and you want to start in 1935. So again we are back to the problem of inadequate training and equipment. You will not receive the “wonder tan” until 1939-40, even under the most optimistic estimates. This means you will go to war with just the MkI and MkII, and less of them

_The thread says 'You run the army'_

So, that means what, you are going to teach the lions to eat grass, or the leopard to lose its spots? come on, whilst you could be in charge of the army, it is hardly feasible or reasonable to argue that everything about the german army is going to change at your behest. Even Adolph himself would not attempt that 

_Every what-if is pure speculation, since a single thing is not likely to be proved. So we disagree._

This is the answer to give, when one doesn’t have an answer to give. It can be approached from the point of referenc of a pure daydream, but in reality the excercise can be undertaken as an extrapolation of the possibilities, based on the known historical outcome. In miltary think tanks across the world, participate in this sort of navel gazing all the time. this kind of speculation and testing goes on ad infinitum, but one simply does not say, well we disagree and that’s okay. Are you refuting these numbers, If not, what impact would increasing the size and complexity of german tanks have on the numbers available


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## tomo pauk (Mar 22, 2011)

Hi, parsifal,

I'll try to cover some points; for some of other ones we both will remain in our corners, I'm afraid.

The 7,5cm L36 was ordnance of 7,5cm FK 16nA, standard field gun of Heer before 10,5cm howitzer was produced in quantity. MV just under 700 m/s for 6kg shell.

As for developing more potent 7,5cm, again, the thread is that someone with knowledge of what is going to be in WW2 runs the army. So he can order, for example 76,2mm AA cannon, sold to the Russkies according to navweaps.com, to be used as a basis for AFV gun. 

F2 subtype had something in common with F1 subtype - increased armor vs. AusF D earlier - that was leading to increased weight. I'm aware that every increase in combat capabilities increases weight, but 25 ton tank can easier withstand increase of 3-4 tons, than an 18 ton type. Ditto for vulnerability vs. 2 6pdr, 25mm, and, more important, vs. russian 45mm. So 10-20% less tanks of better quality on May 10th 1940 would've yielded more tanks in late 1941, since it would be less losses.



> This is the answer to give, when one doesn’t have an answer to give. It can be approached from the point of referenc of a pure daydream, but in reality the excercise can be undertaken as an extrapolation of the possibilities, based on the known historical outcome. In miltary think tanks across the world, participate in this sort of navel gazing all the time. this kind of speculation and testing goes on ad infinitum, but one simply does not say, well we disagree and that’s okay. Are you refuting these numbers, If not, what impact would increasing the size and complexity of german tanks have on the numbers available



This is not fair. I've wrote about the stuff, but since it boiled down to me sitting in my corner, and you in yours, I thought that ending the discussion in a polite manner would be better than continuing it. Sorry if you disagree.


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## Shortround6 (Mar 22, 2011)

IF our hypothetical General is in charge of the army he can certainly change some of the decisions that were made. 
MK III was intended to have a 50mm gun and was down gunned to maintain ammo compatibility with the infantry AT gun. This is why it was no great trick to stick 50mm guns later. Make MK IIIs with 50mm guns from the start and put a pointy nose on them. Start 50mm towed AT gun production sooner. It was about 2/3 the weight of the 75mm guns. Skip the 50/L42. 
Need an AT gun that can be dragged by 4-6 men on foot? Make more Czech 47mm guns. 
Start work on the MK IV IMPROVED a bit sooner. Pointy nose and 75mm/L43. Skipping the 75/24 might not be good idea. It did provide good service in a number of other applications even if they did keep it in production too long in tanks. 
A bit wider tracks for both.
With early series tanks you had a 5 ton, a 10 ton, a 15 ton and a 20 ton. The 15 ton grew to 20 tons fairly quickly and then beyond. the 20 ton wound up close to 25 ton. You need a new engine for a "25 ton" class tank that will wind up at 30 tons or better when it is done. Probably a new transmission too. Later MK IVs were getting a bit under powered. Shoe horning a 75mm/L60 gun into a true "25 ton" tank may take some doing. The US managed it post war with the M-41 but you need much thicker armor than it had. The other example is the Comet but it hit 33 tons. Granted both had bigger power packs but your tank is going to come in at 30 tons or better in the field. 

BTW a 1/4 bigger tank will only carry more rounds if the 1/4 bigger is in volume. More volume means taller, longer sides or taller, longer front rear which means more weight unless armor is thinner than than 20 ton tank. 
Tanks are very volume sensitive.

Other things the Germans could have done?
Like just about everybody else they could have adopted the 120mm mortar much sooner. It was on commercial offer from the French company Brandt in mid 30s (that is where the Russians got it from). A quick and easy way to upgrade the punch of infantry units, especially those with transport problems. 
As has been said, standardize vehicle production sooner.
Forget the "gold plate" designs. Build low powered, slow (15-20kph) tractors to pull artillery and wagons instead of horses. They will still be faster and need less fodder and care (won't provide food if surrounded but you can't have everything


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## tomo pauk (Mar 22, 2011)

Fair comment about tanks being volume susceptible (in lack of better words). It can be noted that I'd mentioned the 'all rear' powerpack - the volume needed would've been less than for 'distributed' powerpack (engine at back, gearbox final drive at front, plus the axle it's tunnel to connect those two).


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## parsifal (Mar 22, 2011)

Need to espouse some of the theory behind change management in the military. When you have an organization that "aint broke" like the heer pre-war. the changes are not about revolutionary change. You don't want to upend the apple cart and start again, so to speek. What you are after are evolutionary changes that enhance the combat effectiveness of an already successful force. The buzz word is force multipliers. how do you make a successful combination even better. The best way of doing this is to look for the the weakest link in the chain and take steps to lessen that weakness. Enhancing what is the best parts of the organization is generally of no help, because those weak links usually prevent the better parts from functioning to their full potential.

So, the question you need to ask, in the case of the heer.....were the quality of their tanks the weakest link in the machine. Would they have gained full benefit by spending more of their scarce resources making their tanks better, or were there other constraints that needed to be addressed with a higher priority?

My opinion is that whilst t might be a "nice to have" alternative to have the biggest and meanest tanks on the block, this was not the major constraint that affected the wehrmachts combat performance. My opinion is rooted in the poor transport they possessed, and the ability to react to enemy initiatives, their ability to retreat, if you like.


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