# Kill Ratios



## ricardo (Jun 24, 2005)

Hi everybody.

I'd wish to know if someone has info about kill ratios (air to air victories). I understand that Hellcats has an astonishing 19:1 over the IJN. I've read that during BoB in fighter versus fighter dogfights, the Bf-109 was the undisputed champion. 333 Bf109 lost compared to the 272 Hurricanes and 219 Spitfires.

Against Spitfires: 219 to 180
Against Hurricanes: 272 to 153

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## GregP (Sep 17, 2005)

The F6F Hellcat did have a 19 : 1 kill ratio. It was the best piston fighter kill ratio of all times. The next best was down around 12 : 1. That was the Corsair.


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## schwarzpanzer (Sep 17, 2005)

Hi ricardo,



> IJN



What is this sorry?  

I've tried to simplify:  



> 333 Bf109 lost compared to the 272 Hurricanes and 219 Spitfires.





> Against Spitfires: 219 to 180



73 to 60 (common denomiator = 3)

or 109.5 to 90 (cd = 2)



> Against Hurricanes: 272 to 153



136 to 76.5 (cd 2)

Against both Hurri Spit:

(Spits Hurris lost) 245.5 to 166.5 (109's lost)

I don't think thats right, surely?  

It had a higher attrition rate than both??  (individually together)


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## lesofprimus (Sep 17, 2005)

IJN - Imperial Japanese Navy


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## Jabberwocky (Sep 17, 2005)

In the Battle of Britain the primary aim of the Hurricane and Spitfire was to intercept the bombers.

You consistently see the RAF scoring higher numbers if kills per day during the Battle, but losing higher numbers of single engined fighters doing so.

Couple of reasons

1. Hurricanes and Spitfires often had to climb into an intercept, facing foes that were already sun up and at better altitude.

2. British fighter tactics were inferior to German ones for much of the Battle; three man sections and 'fighting area attacks' were inefficient compared to the 'finger four'.

3. Dowding's and Park's policy of single squadron or paired squadron intercepts. Often British fighters were significantly outnumbered and had to take a lot of risks to get to the bomber streams.

4. British armament was often insufficient to get a hard 'kill', but did get plenty of 'damageds'. 8 .303s ensured a lot of German aircraft turned back with plenty of bullet holes but still in flyable condition. German armement of 2 cannon was better for ensuring destruction of a fighter sized target.


And if you want high fighter kill ratios look at the Finnish B-239 or the FM-2 Wildcat, you might be suprised just how high they were.


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 17, 2005)

In today's world the F-15 is something like 110 to 0!

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## GregP (Sep 18, 2005)

Yes, well you have to take into account the rules of "kills". If we get shot, but don't go down immediately, then we consider the aircraft that went down later to be an "operational loss." The Russians consider it a kill.

To the F-15.

The Israleis have lost at LEAST one F-15 taht managed to land safely after being shot at, but never flew again. I'd call that a kill.

In any case, the ratio is might impressive in favor of the F-15 Eagle.

Hope the Raptor does as well.


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## plan_D (Sep 18, 2005)

As has been said, the Hurricane and Spitfire were going after the bombers mostly. Overall they achieved a greater kill:ratio but against the Bf-109 it was lower due to obvious reasons; the Bf-109 always had the height and numercial advantage. 

The Luftwaffe tactics were seriously flawed during the Battle of Britain. The fighter cover would hang around the bomber formation and would attack the British interceptors only when they rose to the formation itself. This would make the battle rage around the bomber formation allowing the interceptors to slip in and out of the formation shooting up the enemy bombers while the escorts just had to give chase and risk shooting their own bombers.


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## syscom3 (Sep 18, 2005)

plan_D said:


> The Luftwaffe tactics were seriously flawed during the Battle of Britain. The fighter cover would hang around the bomber formation and would attack the British interceptors only when they rose to the formation itself. This would make the battle rage around the bomber formation allowing the interceptors to slip in and out of the formation shooting up the enemy bombers while the escorts just had to give chase and risk shooting their own bombers.



Substitute Luftwaffe with 8thAF and British with German, and you have a repeat of the US bombers over Germany in early 1944.


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## plan_D (Sep 18, 2005)

Only the British won, and the Germans lost.


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## schwarzpanzer (Sep 19, 2005)

The P51's later gave top-cover to the B17's a much better and very effective tactic, also they didn't have to worry about fuel shortages.

I wouldn't want to be looking at my fuel guage every 3 seconds  

However fatigue levels would be higher for the USAF?


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## GregP (Sep 22, 2005)

I have a VERY good file of all air-to-air kills, but not a good file on air-to-air losses. My kills file does NOT state what aircraft was lost or what aircraft was used by the vivtor, only the name, nationality, # kills, and date.

Whish these data were a bit easier to come by!

Although there is tremendous interest, it seems the governments choose to keep data about vistories and losses as secret as possible.

Frustrating.


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## Erich (Sep 22, 2005)

All air to air kills ? if they are German.........no you don't, sorry


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## GregP (Sep 25, 2005)

I didn't say I had the absolutely accurate file of all times. I said I had a file of all kills, and I meant all aces. It covers 11,054 aces over 45 wars or conflicts, and includes pilots from 72 countries.

Is it complete? Can't say, and neither can you. I suspect not since many Japanese kills are not known.

Unfortunately for your claim above, most German kills ARE known, and I have the ace kills known to be German, and they total 2,463 aces. Collectively, they shot down 137,929 aircraft over all air wars up to about 1996 or so.

I do NOT claim it to be the absolute best list, but it is pretty damned good.

Do you have a better list? If so, would you share it?

I will, if asked.


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## lesofprimus (Sep 25, 2005)

> I will, if asked.


Would u please share ur list with us???


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## Erich (Sep 25, 2005)

I can attest frm factual reference you do not have all the German kills down to an ace with 5. Have said this repeatedly on this board as well at least on another 6: the Luftwaffe quit the processing and officially awarding claims in the fall of 44, so you will not find an 'official' source for these claims othere than the pilots flugbuch or the unit KTB, and I can also tell you that not all the GErman single engine fighter units are correct. There is also no listing of twin engine fighter units kills. JG 7 Me 262 units kills are also not all confirmed

E


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## FLYBOYJ (Sep 25, 2005)

GregP said:


> Yes, well you have to take into account the rules of "kills". If we get shot, but don't go down immediately, then we consider the aircraft that went down later to be an "operational loss." The Russians consider it a kill.
> 
> To the F-15.
> 
> ...



I gave this some tought and recently discussed this with an instructor at the US Air Force Academy (I work there). He's some thought.....

If the "asset" (Plane, pilot or both) is totally destroyed, consider it a kill. If the asset returns and is able to fly again, no kill. If the "aircraft asset" is makes it back to it's base lands normally but never flies again, no kill. The thinking there that both assets returned and even if the aircraft don't ever fly again, components of it will be salvaged and used on another "asset." Make sence?!?!

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## schwarzpanzer (Sep 25, 2005)

Sounds good!  

However:

If the "asset" (Plane, pilot or both) is totally destroyed, consider it a kill

I suppose if another plane/pilot is available, then that's what really matters?

My reason being is if you can afford the losses, then it isn't really a loss.

ie. a German pilot dead in '39 is less significant than one in '44.

Likewise if a replacement plane is/isn't available (with fuel/ammo)

- That sounds a bit Stalinist doesn't it?


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## P38 Pilot (Oct 1, 2005)

> Hope the Raptor does as well.


Oh trust me; it will!


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## FLYBOYJ (Oct 2, 2005)

schwarzpanzer said:


> Sounds good!
> 
> However:
> 
> ...



To me if the plane makes it back and it could no longer fly but you can cannabilize parts from it, it's not a kill. If it makes it back and is completely destroyed, it's a kill.


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## Chocks away! (Oct 6, 2005)

Finnish Bf 109 Gs had a kill/loss ratio of 12 to 1 over the Soviets


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## the lancaster kicks ass (Oct 6, 2005)

> To me if the plane makes it back and it could no longer fly but you can cannabilize parts from it, it's not a kill. If it makes it back and is completely destroyed, it's a kill



to me a kill is when the plane's crashed/destroyed in flight, if the pilot can land it but the plane's unable to fly again, it's written off, not killed...........


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## wmaxt (Oct 6, 2005)

the lancaster kicks ass said:


> > To me if the plane makes it back and it could no longer fly but you can cannabilize parts from it, it's not a kill. If it makes it back and is completely destroyed, it's a kill
> 
> 
> 
> to me a kill is when the plane's crashed/destroyed in flight, if the pilot can land it but the plane's unable to fly again, it's written off, not killed...........



Lanc your right, I think for these reasons:

1, When a plane comes back with the pilot/crew alive they certainly not killed.
2, Virtualy all airplanes brought back contribute something and add a good plane/s to the fight.
3, The persons defining their kill ratio only count those aircraft that crashed without returning (both sides) this keeps it consistant.
4, The aircraft is an asset the one you see going down is positively a lost asset.

The thing about Kill ratios is that as a statisic and can be muddeled easily. Kill ratios must be checked and understood before they mean anything!

wmaxt


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## FLYBOYJ (Oct 6, 2005)

wmaxt said:


> the lancaster kicks ass said:
> 
> 
> > > To me if the plane makes it back and it could no longer fly but you can cannabilize parts from it, it's not a kill. If it makes it back and is completely destroyed, it's a kill
> ...



Yup - and with the exception of the aircraft being entirely written off upon landing, be rest assured the maintenance folks will tear into it for spare parts.....


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## ricardo (Oct 24, 2005)

GregP said:


> I have a VERY good file of all air-to-air kills, but not a good file on air-to-air losses. My kills file does NOT state what aircraft was lost or what aircraft was used by the vivtor, only the name, nationality, # kills, and date.
> 
> Whish these data were a bit easier to come by!
> 
> ...



Hi everybody!!

First of all, I'd wish to thank to all of you for your contribution in this matter.

Greg: Very good!! I'd wish to see the list of kills that you found.

My main interest is to see what happened down in North African / Mediterranean campaign (details of air war, of course).

Thanks in advance.

Ricardo.


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## P1234567890 (Apr 19, 2008)

I have one comment and one question.

Comment: Everyone here has gotten so caught up in whether or not a plane that makes it back but can't fly again has lost sight of the original post; the bottom line is that the F-15 is/was one hell of a fighter! Does it really matter if its ratio is 110:0 or if it's 110:1?

Question: How are planes destroyed on the ground typically counted? If you strafe a runway and take out 10 parked planes all lined up in a row, does that count as 10 kills?


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## JoeB (Apr 19, 2008)

P1234567890 said:


> 1. Does it really matter if its ratio is 110:0 or if it's 110:1?
> 
> 2. How are planes destroyed on the ground typically counted? If you strafe a runway and take out 10 parked planes all lined up in a row, does that count as 10 kills?


1. I agree, sometimes people get too wrapped up in the math of ratio's, with high ratio's it makes a big difference if you discover a few more losses on the favored side; if you think of it like a score in a game, getting beat 28 to 4 or 28 to 7 isn't that much different.
2. The US 8th AF I believe eventually gave 'full' credit for ground victories on the reasonable premise that destroying a/c on well defended (by AA) German airfields required no less skill or courage than downing them in the air. However today almost everybody still distinguishes those victories from aerial ones and implicitly discounts them, I think it's fair to say. Most other US numbered air forces and other air arms didn't count those even nominally as the same as aerial. 

We know that WWII aerial victory credits didn't usually exactly correspond to actual a/c losses by the enemy, and the degree of discrepancy was highly variable. That was even more true of ground claims. As one example Japanese Navy AF claims of great destruction of US a/c on the ground in the initial strikes against the Philippines, in December 1941, were pretty accurate. Claims in the following days and weeks by Japanese Army AF of dozens more US a/c destroyed on the ground were almost all overclaims. They were mistakenly counting bombing and shooting up the same wrecks again and again, some of the a/c deliberately propped back up by US ground crews to look like they needed more going over, to draw more fire away from the surviving a/c now camoflaged and/or dispersed to lesser known airfields, plus newly made wooden decoys were used too eventually: too bad they didn't have the foresight to prepare such measures *before* December 8 '41. 

Ground claims could be accurate or astronomically overstated. Even more so than for aerial claims you need the other side's account or you can't say with any certainty what really happened.

Joe


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## Flyboy2 (Apr 20, 2008)

Espcially in World War II kill claims where heavily exagerated. Alot of times, pilots claimed to have killed the same aircraft and both got credit for the kill. I remember hearing that this was especially true in the Pacific, but I can't find the source. For instance, I have heard multiple figures for kill-to-loss ratios of F-86's in Korea: from 7-1 to 11-1. I know that that is in Korea, but I would think the same general concept applies to World War II.


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## drgondog (Apr 21, 2008)

syscom3 said:


> Substitute Luftwaffe with 8thAF and British with German, and you have a repeat of the US bombers over Germany in early 1944.



That might not be a 'pure' analogy.

Jan 11, 1944 is when Doolittle did his 'pursue the LW in air and on the ground'.

Several of his bomber commanders thought he issued a 'death order'.

Until the battles in first 4 months of 1944, it was not so much fighter to fighter 'around the bombers' as it was 'wait until the fighters run out of range'. The bomber commanders did not want fighter cover out of sight 'hunting' and the 8th AF only had 6 P-47 groups active by October 1943.. not near enough to cover the bombers and could only go a little bit into Germany.

The Mustangs and P-38s changed the game by taking bombers all the way to the target, and made it work.


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## drgondog (Apr 21, 2008)

JoeB said:


> 1. I agree, sometimes people get too wrapped up in the math of ratio's, with high ratio's it makes a big difference if you discover a few more losses on the favored side; if you think of it like a score in a game, getting beat 28 to 4 or 28 to 7 isn't that much different.
> 2. The US 8th AF I believe eventually gave 'full' credit for ground victories on the reasonable premise that destroying a/c on well defended (by AA) German airfields required no less skill or courage than downing them in the air. However today almost everybody still distinguishes those victories from aerial ones and implicitly discounts them, I think it's fair to say. Most other US numbered air forces and other air arms didn't count those even nominally as the same as aerial.
> 
> *Historically, the reason for awarding the ground score in the 8th AF the same as an air award was a 'cynical' incentive to get the fighters to chase the Luftwaffe 'in the air and on the ground'.. the USAF reversed that decision and since the 1950's a ground score is noted but as you know does not count toward ace status.*
> ...



The 8th AF lost a lot more pilots strafing than air to air combat and this 'incentive' was a huge reason for the losses.

The overclaim issues were always a factor in trying to asses the huge scores in April 1945 in Germany and Czechoslovakia and Denmark. There were more severe 'rules' for the 8th AF awards usually based on a.) visible fire or explosion, b.) gun camera evidence via orbiting the airfield and counting fires. 

At the end of the day those claims in context of German aircraft never returning to service were probably accurate, simply because the LW didn't have enough resources (or pilots and fuel) to bother repairing a damaged ship.

The Germans were very good a putting dummies on the field and the a/c in the trees but the dummies didn't have fuel on board.

Joe - On the other side of the ledger a lot of aircraft that did not have fuel had quite a bit of damage from the .50 cal fire, and even if not destroyed (or recorded as such) were so badly damaged as to be written off or out of service for longer than it would take a new one to be built.


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## drgondog (Apr 21, 2008)

the lancaster kicks ass said:


> to me a kill is when the plane's crashed/destroyed in flight, if the pilot can land it but the plane's unable to fly again, it's written off, not killed...........



The USAAF standard for an award was a.) major airframe component (wing/tail, etc) seen to separate from the aircraft rendering it impossible to sustain flight, b.) aircraft seen to blow up or enveloped in fire, c.) pilot seen to bail out, d.) aircraft seen to crash.

I have seen thousands of encounter reports in which several awards were made for what I thought were questionable claims that fit the following:

"Fw 190 last seen trailing heavy smoke in a spin before entering cloud cover" This type claim received anything from a damaged to destroyed based on observation of second witness.

"Me 109 was streaming coolant and smoking heavily when he crash landed in front of me, pilot ran to trees"

This aircraft may have been repaired, but represents intriguing possibilities as the the pilot clearly defeated his opponent, damaged a critical component (coolant), pilot crash landed but survived and we don't know whether the airplane was repairable.. This one appears more frequently.

And my personal favorites for conundrums - "The 109 crash landed, I kept on shooting and noted the pilot slumped in the cockpit".. so maybe pilot KIA but Me 109 repaired. Where does this go in the ledger..??

Both of these 109 examples will easily be awarded "Destroyed" in the Victory Credits Board for the 8th AF but the 190 example could be any of the three types depending on witness statement of HIS perception of the visible characteristics - 

Many LW pilots 'escaped' by putting his 190 in a flat spin, then recovering after he came out below cloud cover.


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## mrjohnwilsonjr607 (Sep 19, 2010)

Would love so much to have a copy of your air to air kills, any chance to email me please.
[email protected]


Thank you
John Wilson








GregP said:


> I have a VERY good file of all air-to-air kills, but not a good file on air-to-air losses. My kills file does NOT state what aircraft was lost or what aircraft was used by the vivtor, only the name, nationality, # kills, and date.
> 
> Whish these data were a bit easier to come by!
> 
> ...


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## Kryten (Sep 19, 2010)

Reffering back to the original question, was the 109 Champ?

You cannot claim any aircrafts superiority based on kill ratios in reality simply due to the operations at the time, as has been pointed out the RAF had a completely different startegy the the Luftwaffe in the BOB, its more a game players menatlity to want to claim one aircraft as being "the best"!

sure there were some poor designs but in reality Hurris and Spits shot down plenty of 109's and vice versa, and the operation those planes were on at that particular time was far more important to the outcome of the caombat than the differences between the aircraft!

The Typhoon was not noted in Historical terms as a great air to air combatant, whereas the FW190 was, yet the Tyhpoons in 1942/43 shot down a lot of 190's and 109s on both anti jabo patrolls over the channel and Ranger operations into occupied Europe!

the situation the combat took place in and the experience of the men flying the aircraft was vastly more important to the outcome than the planes!


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## Denier (Apr 1, 2011)

Kryten said:


> Reffering back to the original question, was the 109 Champ?
> 
> You cannot claim any aircrafts superiority based on kill ratios in reality simply due to the operations at the time, as has been pointed out the RAF had a completely different startegy the the Luftwaffe in the BOB, its more a game players menatlity to want to claim one aircraft as being "the best"!
> 
> ...


 
as addition to this...

an interesting article about the kill/loss ratios during the BoB:
Battle of Britain pilots actually crap shots ? The Register

stating :
'Regarding the battle as a whole, the BBC concludes: "In total the RAF claimed to have shot down 2,698 German planes. The actual figure was more like 1,294. The RAF lost 788 planes - far fewer than the 3,058 the Luftwaffe claimed." '

making most kill/loss figures (dating from that time) an unreliable and most likely useless source, when investigating airplanes superiority over one another.
the effectiveness and excellence of a airplane should depend on how well it performed its tasks and the ease wherewith their pilots could fulfill those, 
and this certainly is not properly represented by kill ratios.


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## muscogeemike (Apr 1, 2011)

I read that Finnish Pilots claimed the B-239 (the export version of the Brewster Buffalo) had the highest kill to lose ration of any fighter they flew.


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## parsifal (Apr 2, 2011)

with regard to the BoB, it needs to be remembered that Dowding was fighting a defensive battle, and had to commit his forces sparingly to actually reduce losses over the longer term. the objective for the RAF was not to destroy the LW, or even to get a higher kill ratio. it was simply to stay a credible force, disputing control of the airspace. Dowding had no real idea how long the german assault was going to last, so he did the best he could to draw the whole thing out waiting and hoping for a miracle. what he didnt realise was that the losses in the Luftwaffe really were hurting its force projection capabilities. couple that with some poor targetting choices and the gradually worsening weather, and there you have the reasons for british victory. this wasnt the destruction of the LW, it was however the survival of fighter command as a viable force, and the denial of airspace control to the germans. The heavier losses suffered by the LW was a welcome and worthwhile bonus, but was not essential to the british victory.

as for those numbers, well, they need to be treated with a great deal of circumspection. remember, FC losses were being inflicted by more than just the 109s, so there is no way of knowing just how many spits and hurris were shot down by 109s. also, if it is taken that a total kill needs to include the pilot, then the jagd waffe did not win, they lost. More than half those recorded FC shoot downs did not result in the kill or capture of the pilot, whereas the losse suffered by the 109s resulted in and almost 100% loss of machine and pilot. This is the main disadvantage of operating over enemy controlled territory....nearly every loss is a total loss of both machine and pilot


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## fastmongrel (Apr 2, 2011)

parsifal you just summed up the Battle of Britain in 8 lines. Well done I might steal that and pretend I came up with it


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## parsifal (Apr 2, 2011)

Thanks for the compliment. if its useful, please use the material


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## renrich (Apr 4, 2011)

The only people that knew for sure how many AC were lost in a given battle were the ones whose AC were lost and even they did not know for sure which AC were lost to enemy action and to other causes. All fighter pilots were enthusiastic over claimers and understandebly so. Same goes for bomber defensive gunners and AA gunners. Just a guess but the Hellcat credits, as well as all other fighter credits would probably get closer to reality if they were sliced in half. That is just a broad rule of thumb. Some individual's credits may be much more accurate than others. The books I have read which painstakingly matched up claims to actual losses per the command that lost the AC seem to point to the 50% area of actual kills in air to air combat.

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## tomo pauk (Apr 5, 2011)

Compliments for posts on this page. Small amount of words accurately depicting claim/kill ratio BoB.


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## Jerry W. Loper (Apr 5, 2011)

ricardo said:


> Hi everybody.
> 
> I'd wish to know if someone has info about kill ratios (air to air victories). I understand that Hellcats has an astonishing 19:1 over the IJN. I've read that during BoB in fighter versus fighter dogfights, the Bf-109 was the undisputed champion. 333 Bf109 lost compared to the 272 Hurricanes and 219 Spitfires.
> 
> ...



The lopsided kill ratio in favor of the Hellcat is not surprising, considering that by 1943, when it entered service, the cream of Japanese naval fighter pilots had been killed off. The U.S. was far better than Japan in turning out large numbers of trained fighter pilots.

I've seen the kill stats for the Me-109, Hurricane, and Spitfire in Jerry Scutts's book _Messerschmitt Bf-109: The Operational Record_, in which it's pointed out that these stats only refer to kills that are _known_ to be between those particular types of fighters. 
Me-109 vs. Hurricane: 153 Me-109s destroyed vs. 272 Hurricanes destroyed is a kill ratio of 1.78-1 in favor of the Me-109.
Me-109 vs. Spitfire: 180 Me-109s destroyed vs. 219 Spitfires destroyed is a kill ratio of 1.22-1 in favor of the Me-109.
Me-109 vs. both: 333 Me-109s destroyed vs. 491 Spitfires Hurricanes destroyed is a kill ratio of 1.47-1 in favor of the Me-109.
A lot more of all three of these types were destroyed during the Battle, it's just not known for sure, to what.


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## parsifal (Apr 5, 2011)

Jerry W. Loper said:


> I've seen the kill stats for the Me-109, Hurricane, and Spitfire in Jerry Scutts's book _Messerschmitt Bf-109: The Operational Record_, in which it's pointed out that these stats only refer to kills that are _known_ to be between those particular types of fighters.
> Me-109 vs. Hurricane: 153 Me-109s destroyed vs. 272 Hurricanes destroyed is a kill ratio of 1.78-1 in favor of the Me-109.
> Me-109 vs. Spitfire: 180 Me-109s destroyed vs. 219 Spitfires destroyed is a kill ratio of 1.22-1 in favor of the Me-109.
> Me-109 vs. both: 333 Me-109s destroyed vs. 491 Spitfires Hurricanes destroyed is a kill ratio of 1.47-1 in favor of the Me-109.
> A lot more of all three of these types were destroyed during the Battle, it's just not known for sure, to what.



Scutts conclusions have been challenged by others, but that aside, a simple comparison of the numbers does not adequately assess the battle problem. British committment of forces to the battle was necessarily conservative, meaning that numbers committed to battle were restrained. To commit large number of forces to individual battles risked increasing losses to an unsustainable rate, and also meant that other strikes might be left unparried. The British priority was always to get at the bombers first, which often meant they had to expose themselves to counterattack from the escort. The escort was invariably well placed for this in the early part of the battle, however, as bomber losses mounted the german fighters were increasingly ordered to provide close escort rather than loose escort, which meant they were tied rigidly to the defence. This tended to decrease losses amongst the bombers, in the short term, but increased losses for the Germans fighters. 

Overall, I stick to my earlier assesment. Depending on how you want to define what is a kill (pilot + plane, plane only, immediate shoot down, or crash landing, or write off due to damage after return), the me 109 crews probably lost the straight up numbers count. In terms of machines lost, its probably true they lost a lesser number, but in terms of overall losses I think they suffered greater losses. 

Total british losses of machines in the battle were in the order of 1000 fighters, German losses to all causes were also much higher....as i recall about 1200 airframes, so you are right that overall losses for both sides were much higher than straight combat losses. For instance, a lot of 109s crashed because they ran out of fuel....this is not classed as a combat loss, but its still a loss


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## Kryten (Apr 6, 2011)

I think this is where the irrelevance of such things as kill ratios and proclaiming the capabilities of particular aircraft become apparent, its pointless quoting statistics as to what was shot down by what when you dont know the circumstances, a hurricane shot down by a 109 whilst attacking a bomber for instance is still shot down but says nothing about the capabilities of the types relative to each other!

what really matters is the outcome of the battle, a section attack that breaks up a bomber formation and disperses its attack is a successfull action regardless of how many end up on the ground!
an interception of a fighter section before they get to the bombers resulting in them disengaging is again a successfull action even if no kills are claimed!
the force that wears down first through attrition, accidents or morale and abandons its operations has lost the battle regardless of how many kills they claim, we saw this exact circumstance in both the Battle of Britain and the air battle for Malta!
put simply a fighter aircraft is only as good as the circumstances of the particular engagement and the man flying it!


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## Tankworks (Jul 22, 2012)

I seem to remember reading that in the battle for Malta the fighter vs fighter losses were about 3-2 in favour of the LW but the RAF pilot's morale did not suffer because they did not know that, they thought that they were winning because of the confusion of over claiming. As regards claims over home territory, they should be more accurate because of more ways of verification but it seems that allowing higher claims for public consumption enters into the mix.


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## Kryten (Jul 22, 2012)

RAF strategy was to destroy the bombers, Axis strategy was to attrit the RAF fighter strength, the RAF won the battle!


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## tyrodtom (Jul 22, 2012)

Confirming claims reguire a buracracy that can take the time to match pilots claims with other witnesses, and wreckage found.
It certainly not unknown for a pilot to misidentify a aircraft, get it's crash site wrong, or time shot wrong, they are busy trying to stay among the living.

And in some defensive situations it may be hard to spare or justify enough time and personnel to do a good check on claims.

In Malta's case a lot of the physical evidence was down with the fish, so all you'd be left with was pilot claims and other witnesses.

Everybody understates their loses, and overstates their victories.


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## Kryten (Jul 22, 2012)

Reality is though these academic ratios don't amount to a hill of beans unless you are able to put the situation into context,

unless you have some way of factoring in the RAF fought outnumbered from bombed out airfields with nowhere to disperse to, pilots suffering malnutrition and dysentry, chronic shortages of servicable aircraft ammunition and fuel, constant weapons failures due to shortages of spares and maintenance tools, constant attacks whilst landing or taking off, the list goes on and on!

that they were able to keep fighting in those conditions, that the allies were able to get replacements to them, is nothing short of remarkable and testiment to determination and fighting spirit in adverse circumstances, and that is the real measure of a fighting force!


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## renrich (Jul 22, 2012)

In most cases the only party who knows exactly how many AC of a certain type were shot down in WW2 is the party whose plane went missing and even that is likely to be inaccurate. The party who has the "kill" is almost certainly in error also. The kill ratios you see are approximate, usually and the bigger the number the more approximate.


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## parsifal (Jul 22, 2012)

renrich said:


> In most cases the only party who knows exactly how many AC of a certain type were shot down in WW2 is the party whose plane went missing and even that is likely to be inaccurate. The party who has the "kill" is almost certainly in error also. The kill ratios you see are approximate, usually and the bigger the number the more approximate.



Even that is an inadequate way of estimating losses to enemy action. Many a/c were lost to unknown causes. Many other ac were able to make it home, refeerred to a maintence unit for rebuild, outside the squadron, and ended up being scrapped or cannibalised.

Others remained with the squadron, but were not airworthy. They would remain on the tarmac, essentially as a decoy or for spares, but still listed as on strength. If the airbase was then under threat, or captured the "runner was then burnt or otherwise destroyed. This happened a lot to the British in 1940, and to the germans 1943-5. 

What destroyed the aircraft? The initial events that led to its grounding, or the demolition undertaken by its owners? 

Close or more than half of aircraft were lost to actions that had nothing to do with enemy action. Its a big reason why fighters as a part of the inventory are overrated. They might, overall, be responsible for 30-40% of losses. There are the effects of flak, and then the effects of non-combat losses, and/or non-operational losses


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## renrich (Jul 23, 2012)

If you will notice I said, "likely to be inaccurate." I just did not go into detail why.


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## GregP (Jul 24, 2012)

I don't think circumstances matter in war. Whether or not the RAF flew from bombed-out airfields or not, were eating right or not, the results speak for themselves. Doesn't minimize the hardships of the RAF in slightest or say anything about the bravery of RAF crews. That is simply not in the kill ratio picture for any group, country, or aircraft type..

Kill ratios are a good indicator, at least to me, of the effectiveness of an aircraft and, approximate or not, tell a tale all their own. I do NOT speak of unit kill ratios, but of kill ratios for the aggregate type as a whole. In WWII the Grumman F6F Hellcat was tops. The 43 or so Buffalos the Fins used are not a kill ratio until you factior in the other Buffalos, which were abysmal. I'd consider a slice of, say, 75% of all Buffalos to be sufficient for a kill ratio, but it would be less than 1 : 1 for the Buffalo regardless of the finish experience with them.

Apologists for the kill ratio speak of quality of opposition, theater of operations issues, and all manner of mitigating circumstances, but the results speak for themselves. They are usually fans of a type without a good kill ratio or for which data are lacking. Apparently nobody can come up with good kill ratios for German aircraft and most Axis aircraft in general, but we can for major Allied aircraft, and at least most major American aircraft. Doesn't tell the whole story, but does tell a story. It would be nice to get the kill ratios for all WWII fighters, but that is probably a pipe dream and we are left with an unsatisfyingly incomplete story.

For me, the kill ratio is not meaningless, but it IS incomplete without data for the opposition in similar amounts. Though I would like to say something about the "top dog" fighter, it is difficult without data on most of the major fighters of WWII so, in that respect, people who don't like the kill ratio as a measure are correct ... we have only partial data. Partial data do not make a good basis for an informed opinion, but we CAN make some relative judgements among the fighters for which we DO have data. 

The facts of WWII tend to confirm the relative conclusions we coluld make, but I am left with the inescapable conclusion that while a kill ratio is nice to know, the amount of missing data for most major fighters leaves kill ratio out on the fringe of meaningful information untl such time as we at least have data for most major types.


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## renrich (Jul 24, 2012)

Some interesting kill ratios.

F4F, FM, Marine, Navy, landbased and carrier based...had 191 losses to E/A and were credited with 1327 kills E/A
F2A, all Marine and all land based...had 14 losses to E/A and were credited with 10 kills of E/A


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## GregP (Jul 24, 2012)

Hi Renrich,

The 150 or so Buffalos lost in the first 3 or 4 mionths of the war were, by and large, not American-owned or flown. I believe they were British, Dutch, and some Indonesian. Don't have their victories, but we know about 150 were lost at the start of the war. That is 150 out of about 750 or so made. The Fins flew 43 ...a sample of less than 5% of production.

Wish I had kill ratios for Spitfires, Hurricanes, Typhoons, Me 109's, Fw 190's, Yak-3 / 9's and Lavochkins La-5 / 7's... but these are difficult to find enough data on to be meaningful. For a good kill ratio, I'd like to see at LEAST 65 - 75% of the aircraft that went into service represented in the sample. At least that size sample is a majority!

I am left unsatisfied, but I also realize that all sides had some pretty good aircaft in their inventories. No side lacked bravery or failed to fly some impressive missions.

While I am an American, I love ALL the WWII planes for their place at the pinacle of propeller-driven, piston-powered aircraft. If you put Hans Joaichim Marseilles in an LaGG-3 and a rookie in a Bearcat, I'd pick Marseilles any day.


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## buffnut453 (Jul 25, 2012)

There weren't 150 Bufffalos lost in the first few months of the war, at least not through air-to-air combat. Depends on what counts as a "loss" - yes, all the British and Dutch Buffalos were lost because their airfields were overrun and the remaining airframes were captured (plus many were destroyed or damaged beyond repair on the ground through Japanese bombing raids). If you're talking losses due to air combat the numbers are much fewer.

Reactions: Optimistic Optimistic:
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## GregP (Jul 25, 2012)

There WERE 150 Buffalos lost. Doesn't matter why. They were ineffective in the extreme. If the operator of an aircaft ceases to oeperate it, the effectiveness goes to zero.

You do NOT have the numbers and neither do I. Your entire statement is conjecture, and that is OK. But the Buffalo did NOT acquit itself well in combat despite the Fins. They stopped making Buffalos VERY QUICKLY, and the entire production was not in combat for long and did not distinguish itself except in Finland. They would have done as well or better with P-40's.

Only my opinion, but the Fins 43 examples were NOT a representative sample of the Buffalo since they were less than 5% of the production. I don't accept ANY 5% samples unless I have MANY of them for a sample average and standard deviation. Basic stastics ...

Give me 25 samples of 5% of the population and I can make a pretty good prediction. Give me ONE and I cannot say ANYTHING except the sample was good or bad. The Finsish example was good. Almost nobody else's was. History ...

The Buffalo was awful in almost any context except for Finland. Let's say we just disagree. That's OK. We don't have to agree.

Don't worry; be happy. We'll be fine whether or not the Buffalo was great or a true flop. Methinks a flop .... but I also don't really care since it was only about 509 (not 750) airplanes in WWII out of maybe several hundred thousand. They made more Blackburn Bothas! The Buffalo was a broken cookie in the breadbox of life, nothing more. Less of a footnote than the CANT Z.1007 that almost nobody except a fan of the type has even heard of!

Still, if one came on the market ... we'd be very glad to have one for a flying example of history, and it's quite aerobatic, even if not competitive with the best of WWII.


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## parsifal (Jul 25, 2012)

> Wish I had kill ratios for Spitfires, Hurricanes, Typhoons, Me 109's, Fw 190's, Yak-3 / 9's and Lavochkins La-5 / 7's... but these are difficult to find enough data on to be meaningful. For a good kill ratio, I'd like to see at LEAST 65 - 75% of the aircraft that went into service represented in the sample. At least that size sample is a majority!




The best books on this for the RAF, Commonwealth and Exiled AFs are Foremans series on the western front. He deals with individual losses and claims (with many of the claims cross referenced to surviving German records) on a daily basis, naming losses by cause and airframe number. Currently, as far as I know ther are three books.....Battle Of Britain, 1941 (to July), 1941-2 (July 1941 to April 1943). I believe he is going to cover the entire war on the western front eventually


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 25, 2012)

GregP said:


> Give me ONE and I cannot say ANYTHING except the sample was good or bad. The Finsish example was good. Almost nobody else's was. History ...
> 
> The Buffalo was awful in almost any context except for Finland. Let's say we just disagree. That's OK. We don't have to agree.
> 
> ...



Greg you're still munching that Buffalo Jerky. 

My biggest objection to what you've written above is of course its evident land lubber's perspective. If you are a nautical type after all, then apologies but you seem to want your feet on terra firma wrt to the lowly Buff. 

Less of a footnote than the Cant Z.1007? It was the first modern naval fighter. In its original form, despite being 'unsuitable' for combat by western standards, the Finns beat the snot out of its more 'modern' (and LANDBASED) opposition with it. I am sorry it didn't wear high heels to the prom but it could dance! What country did the Cant Z.1007 preserve? what breakthrough in contemporary technology did it accomplish? The F2A-1 should be regarded with at least some small respect as a historical icon and not charactized as "_a broken cookie in the breadbox of life_," any more than the I-16 is such. Outside of Finland, the F2A forced Grumman to develop a winner in the F4F so it made a hugely worthwhile contribution to the winning of WW2 there as well. Did the Cant spur development of a plane half as successful as the F4F? Please stop saying such naughty things about the feckless progeny of our chubby little icon.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 25, 2012)

With respect to pilot's claims. I think historically, the claiming process is subject to a similar kind of statistical tyrrany that invests sports. It provides some measure of assessement of the skill of a pilot and competence in doing his job. Many fine pilots had no kills or low scores simply because they didn't get much opportunity to engage an enemy. Organizationally the FAA is foremost among such examples. Apropos nothing: ironically, as an athlete in my youth, I hung on every number, now in old age, only the game matters and how its played. The athlete who outdoes his purely statistical expectations on a given _good_ day is all the more appreciated. 

As far as kill vs probable. The example of Butch O'hare comes to mind. I believe he was credited with 5 and a probable. He actually got 3 outright but I think only one of his victims in a group of 8 actually got back to base and was a total wreck. The others ditched and were lost due to battle damage. Someone with a copy of First Team may check this but in terms of actual planes destroyed on that mission, I think he may have actually gotten 6! which is what Thach believed.


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## Kryten (Jul 25, 2012)

GregP said:


> There WERE 150 Buffalos lost. Doesn't matter why. They were ineffective in the extreme. If the operator of an aircaft ceases to oeperate it, the effectiveness goes to zero.



Sorry but this kill ratio statistic is a nonsense,

if aircraft are unfit to fly because they have no spares or fuel, that says nothing about the effectiveness of the aircraft but of the logistical situation at that time.

if an aircraft is flown by a rookie pilot or the airforce is using poor training/tactics, this says nothing about the effectiveness of an aircraft but of the superior tactics/training/experience of the opposition.

if an airforces strategy is to destroy the enemys bombers then again this says nothing about an aircrafts capability when you then try to compare it to the enemys escorting fighters and the only factor which matters here is was the bomber offensive defeated.

if an aircraft is flown in small numbers against a numerically superior enemy again this says little about the effectiveness of an aircraft and everything about the capability of the airforce to field sufficient numbers of planes and pilots!

to argue a kill statistic declares how good/bad an aircraft was can be interpreted in bizzare ways, an example-- the Hawker Typhoon shot down far more FW190 raiders in 42/43 than they lost to fw190's in combat so would that mean the Typhoon is the superior aircraft? no what it meant was in the tactical situation at that time the Fw190 was caught and shot down trying to intrude/escape , yet later in the war the typhoons were ground attack aircraft which saw little air to air combat and were at the other end of the stick!

the buffalo in the hands of the finns worked well, in the tactical situation they faced, i'm pretty sure you can find plenty of evidence to show the buffalo was fought well by the Finns but badly by the allies, a P40 fought badly was as much use as a Buffalo fought badly.

what kill ratios show is the strategic situation far more clearly than the effectiveness of an airframe!


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## GregP (Jul 25, 2012)

Sorry back, but I disagree, with good reason. Individually, your points are well taken and I can agree. Collecitvely, they are not and I don't.

All the pilots of a particular type are not rookies or below average. If a large sample of aircraft is in service, it follows that SOME pilots are below average, some about average, and some above average. The kill ratio tells me that the aircraft was employed by the operators, using the pilots, tactics, and situation at the time either effectively or not so effectively. Anything above about 3 : 1 was at least marginally effective. Above about 6 : 1 was quite effective. Above 10 : 1 was a real winner.

That, of course, assumes a large sample of the type, not some small number, such as 43 Ta 152's or 43 Buffalos. The US Navy, for instance, operated more than 8,500 Hellcats in the Pacific. That makes for a really good sample, and the pilots were also a large smple. Collectively, they excelled. Individually, pilots and circumstances vary widely. In a large sample, these "outliers" average out to the ability of the aircraft / pilot / tactics / situation taken as a whole.

There will always be the Hartmanns or marseilles around but, in a large sample, the average pilot flying the average mission is what wins or loses the conflict in the air.


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## Rogi (Jul 25, 2012)

We could also say that the 109 was a appauling aircraft because of the under carriage configuration (which caused numerous accidents) and poor pilot performance in the later years of the war. Oh if the Hitler Youth started flying it, I think we could peg it down another notch if that had been the case.

The thing about kill ratios is there dependant on a couple things:
1. intended role
2. pilot and his training
3. environement and if the airframe was upgraded for the better or worse
4. If Equipement was available to maintain the aircraft

If you didn't have fuel for any aircraft it wouldn't run  then it wouldn't of attained any kill ratio, it also depends on statistics and if they were kept honestly or if the numbers were fudged so the aircraft could be reported as acting better than it actually was. Or if numbers were kept at all, we all know the Yak series were amazing, but records of the time arn't easy to come by, if they even exist anymore.


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## parsifal (Jul 25, 2012)

I think "kill ratios" are being mixed up with "loss ratios". in this testosterone enriched discussion. A kill ratio is inherently related to numbers of aircraft shot down by one type against all its foes. But if an aircraft is lost due to causes other than anything to do with the direct actions of the enemy aircraft whose kill ratios we are trying to establish, then that loss has nothing to do with kill ratios.

If, for the Buffalo scenario, we narrow the set to look at its performance in the far east in 1941-2. If we establish that it lost 150 aircraft out of say 200 deployed, its loss ratio is is 0.75:1. 

If we establish that the Buffalo managed to shoot down 20 aircraft in aerial combat whilst losing say 50 in the air (and the other 100 of its total losses not in the air), we might say that its kill ratio was 0.4:1, however that result has no bearing on the aircraft relative merits. How may of the buffaloes were shot down by AA, how many just fell out of the sky, how many of the enemy aircraft did the same....who is on the offensive....what are the distances from friendly bases that the battles take placeetc, etc.

A really good example of how statistics like this regaularly get abused and misused is the situation over France in 1941-2. on the face of it, the RAF took an absolute pounding, until how those losses are actually broken down. How many of the RAF were shot down ny flak, how many ran out of fuel, how many just got lost and didnt come home????? Being on the defensive, over your own territory affects your chances greatly as to whetyher you make it home or not. If you start to apply those variable and think about it a bit, it rapidly become appareant that a "Kill ratio" is not easily defined, and dosent tell us much about the aircraft.

However, saying we must look at every combat before we can make any conclusions about the aircraft, is simply bunkum as well. Looking at the full dataset, is the most accurate statistical analyisi that can be done, but statisitics often have to rely on random sampling, or even targetted sampling to get any result. It isnt as accurate, but it a method of data analysis usesd every day, with usually great accuracy.


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## muscogeemike (Jul 25, 2012)

GregP said:


> The F6F Hellcat did have a 19 : 1 kill ratio. It was the best piston fighter kill ratio of all times. The next best was down around 12 : 1. That was the Corsair.



I've read that the Fin's claim the version of the Buffalo they flew has the hightest kill ratio.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jul 25, 2012)

muscogeemike said:


> I've read that the Fin's claim_* the version of the Buffalo they flew*_ has the hightest kill ratio.



Finally! Thank you Mike. A joy for the discriminating mind or the OCDed.


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## muscogeemike (Jul 25, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Finally! Thank you Mike. A joy for the discriminating mind or the OCDed.



For some perverted reason I’ve always liked this ugly little plane.


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## buffnut453 (Jul 25, 2012)

GregP said:


> There WERE 150 Buffalos lost. Doesn't matter why.



Sorry Greg but that is total nonsense, either as a measure of Buffalo losses or as a statement of how to measure combat effectiveness.  Since when does an enemy army overrunning your airfields constitute any measure of fighter aircraft effectiveness? How about lack of logistics - not relevant to the Buffalo but certainly does apply to the Luftwaffe in 1945? I've never seen anyone try to justify "losses to all causes" as a measure of any aircraft's combat effectiveness, and that has nothing to do with the Buffalo (other than, once again, you trotting out incorrect information...and but if you're going to publish made-up loss figures you have to expect someone who DOES have the knowledge to call you on it!). 



GregP said:


> You do NOT have the numbers and neither do I.



Errr...you may not be interested in research but I certainly am, and I do have the numbers for the RAF to hand (I'm away from home right now so can't access my info for the Dutch losses but it's out there for those who care to learn). For the record, 31 RAF Buffalos were shot down out of a total of 167 that were ever available in the Far East. In case you're interested (which I doubt - let's just keep trotting out your made-up figure of 150 'cos it sounds good) 32 RAF Buffalos were lost due to accidents not related to mechanical issues (ie pilot error) from March 1941 thru to the last flight of a RAF Buffalo at the end of 1943). A further 15 were lost due to maintenance issues (11 of these were due to engine failures) again from March 1941 thru November 1943. 

This is no defence of the Buffalo because I have no idea how the above stats compare to similar loss categories for other aircraft types...however, care to enlighten us as to where your figure of 150 came from?


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## CobberKane (Jul 25, 2012)

I think I’d have to come down on the side of who are wary about attaching too much weight to the whole idea of kill/loss ratios, particularly when they are used to try and gauge the relative merit of the aircraft involved. Take the Hellcat v Zero discussion, for instance. When the Hellcat was racking up it’s scores the USN was in the ascendancy against the IJN. Japan started the war with a solid core of highly trained pilots, many of whom had combat experience in China. By the time the Hellcat arrived a big chunk of those pilots had been lost at Midway and the US pilots had figured out tactics that largely negated the dogfighting inferiority their preceding fighters. These considerations weighed at least as much on the 13:1 kill loss ratio as the superiority of the Grumman. Also of course, not all the Hellcats kills were Zeros, or visa versa. But when the Zero was trying to knock down and enemy bomber it was typically faced with a well armoured target sprouting fifty calibre mgs as opposed to the notoriously flammable opposition the Hellcats encountered. Inevitably this would affect the Zeros kill/loss ratio as compared to the Hellcats.
Added to this is the fact that Pilot claims are inherently unreliable (how could they be otherwise in the confusion of battle) and overstating of victories and understating of losses is endemic to warfare. Look at the ludicrous 15:1 ratio often quoted for the Sabre in Korea. I suspect that Kill/loss ratios are generally useful in assessing, with diminishing relevance:
1)	The capacity of the claimants side for believing their own BS
2)	The tactical and strategic situations of the period
3)	Lastly and leastly, the relative merits of the aircraft involved


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## GregP (Jul 25, 2012)

To put my own postings in perspective, I am not arguing with those who don't like the kill ratio as a reasonable variable, I simply state that I DO like it and disagree with you. Hopefully, I am allowed to do that.

I've been looking into Axis kill credits for more than 50 years and have never seen a comprehensive list of WWII Axis victories or losses. Sure, I have Hartmamnn's complete list of voctories (and his mount when claiming the victories is NOT in the list ... but we know MOST were with the Me 109), but that is only one pilot. I do not believe any list exists of aggregate Bf / Me 109 claims and losses, or Fw 190 either. I wish it DID, but have yet to find it. So, although I like the kill ratio as a meaningful measure, many critical data are simply missing and I can't really use it except to compare American and some British aircraft. So ... it's meaning is less than it might be despite the fact that I like the variable, and I already said that earlier.

I have a list of all fighter kills, but the plane being flown by the victor is NOT in the data ... only the victim, and sometimes not even the victim type ... just a kill.

Some of you guys seem to want to fight about it. Please, let's not. It's not about who is right, it is simply a number that can be calculated by an interested party. I like the kill ratio and you don't. It is as simple as that. I will draw my own conclusions with it and not print them in here. 

I frequent this forum for fun only, not for argument's sake.

Sorry Buffnut, I know you like the Buffalo. I feel it was the worst American fighter of WWII to make production. You don't have to agree, and that doesn't mean it was all bad ... it's just that everything else was better, again, in MY book, not necesarily yours. Aesthetically, it classic art deco and not ugly, but also not my cup of tea. The P-35 looks similar and I like it MUCH better aesthetically, even though they made only about 136 of them and it flew two years earlier than the Buffalo. You are welcome to love the Buffalo and, yes, I know the Buffalo performed better rthan the P-35. They are rough contemporaries, but with only 136 P-35's built, it is pretty much of a non-starter. You can imagine my opinion of a plane with less than 50 built ... like the Ta-152. It was very interesting and a very good effort, but meaningless to the outcome of the war. 

The Finish experience with all of 43 or so Buffalos is a very small sample that simply doesn't not statistically mean anything; it is way too small a sample. If you took a random sample, 43 would be significant, but you'd also likely not have but 1 or 2 Finish Buffalos in an unbiased random sample. The Fins had a uniquely good experience that was WAY better than all the other users had. We should have sold them all 509 airframes! Maybe the war would have been shorter.

Guys, it doesn't matter if you liike the kill ratio or not and it is simply not worth fighting about. If you like it, use it to draw your own conclusions. If you don't, then by all means iignore it. I would use it much more if we had more data. Since we don't, I use it as I see fit and continue looking for more data on Axis victory and loss data. Who knows? I might even find it someday. 

I am very results oriented, and don't much look at circumstances, weather, or anything else. Those should have been taken into account by the mission or operation planners. If they were, then the mission was more probably a success. If not, it still might be a success, but luck can be both good as well as bad.


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## buffnut453 (Jul 26, 2012)

Greg,

Again, my gripe is with your statement that the nature of a loss is irrelevant - I simply added the other data to show how far off your figure of 150 was. I wasn't putting forth any argument about the Buffalo's qualities (good or bad) - you'll note I said that I had nothing to compare the figures against so it's kindda hard to argue from monolithic data!

Cheers,
B-N


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## GregP (Jul 26, 2012)

The figure of about 150 is not "my figure," it comes from several sources, including on the internet. I know a lot were lost early in the Pacific war. How they were lost is unimportant to me ... they were ineffective in the extreme since they did almost nothing in the war except get lost quickly with little or no contribution to the war's outcome. That is almost a definition of "ineffective." The Buffalo is a footnote at best in my account of WWII aircraft and, if not in yours, then by all means, laud it to your heart's content.

The USA made about 300,000 aircraft in WWII. So the Buffalo account for about 0.16% of the US aircraft production. It is relatively meaningless to me except as an interesting bird and, being one of the earliest Naval monoplanes, almost everything else improved upon it. It is historic, to be sure, but simply not one I pay any attention to. There are several others ...

I think the Beechcraft A-38 Grizzly would have been one heck of an attack plane ... but it was not proceeded with, so another interesting aircraft went the way of the Dodo. I LIKE it, but it went nowhere, so it is an interesting footnote at best. People can safely ignore it and not be out of sorts with history. Though the Buffalo was more successful and made production, I feel it is in the same broad category of interesting planes that went nowhere in real life. You, rather obviously, think otherwise. 

I hope you can eventually see one fly somewhere ... I'd like to see it, too, effetive or otherwise, along with a few other "rare" birds. We have a few at the Planes of Fame and happen to have a Republic / Seversky AT-12, which is a 2-seat version of the Seversky P-35 built as a fighter-trainer. Altogether a neat aircraft, even if historically meaningless to the war, too. We also occasionally fly a Boeing P-26 "Peashooter," which I never liked until I saw it in person. Now it is one of my favorites. It climbs quite well and is VERY maneuverable. Doesn't make it a great fighter, and it wasn't, but IS a very neat plane to see fly. I'm glad I'm not the one cranking on the intertia starter!


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## buffnut453 (Jul 26, 2012)

Greg, I really don't understand what you're saying here. We're supposed to be talking about kill-to-loss ratios. A key factor in that is the loss end of the equation. I was simply trying to provide some better information than your grossly inaccurate figure of 150. 

Whether a particular aircraft type made a contribution and whether it was produced in large numbers or not are irrelevant to this discussion because, irrespective, most fighter aircraft have a measurable kill-to-loss ratio that can be compared with other aircraft types (exceptions are aircraft like the Boomerang which never achieved an aerial victory).


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## GregP (Jul 26, 2012)

I suppose I don;t understand you, eithern Buffnut.

The early war losses were stated by some else, Buffnut. I could not care less about the number, which is between 120 and 150 depending on who you believe, and grossly inaccurate or not. They were MOSTLY not lost in air combat, so they mostly don't enter into a kill ratio. They simply contribute to the types ineffectiveness. I simply said I LIKE the kill ratio as a measure and you apparently don't.

Please let it go and be happy not liking it.


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## buffnut453 (Jul 26, 2012)

So you like kill-to-loss as a measure but then want to cite losses to all causes for one particular aircraft type? That's what's confusing me. So if we find that an aircraft has a 1:1 kill/loss ratio (which isn't bad in WWII terms) would you say that aircraft was ineffective? I'm simply trying to understand your statements which, to me, are contradictory.

By the way, I think kill-to-loss is as good a measure of combat effectiveness as any other...it's just that there are so many more variables that there is no really effective way to measure combat effectiveness between different aircraft types unless they were operating in the exact same theatre, under the same conditions, and undertaking pretty much identical mission profiles.


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## GregP (Jul 27, 2012)

Yes, in air combat a 1 : 1 ratio is not good. I'm talking about air-to-air combat kills versus air-to-air combat losses, not operational losses.

Operational losses should be taken into account in overal effectiveness, but not for combat potential.

Total combat effectiveness, combat and operations, might be something like (air-to-air kills plus air-to-ground kills divided by air-to-air losses plus operartional losses).

Total effectiveness might something like (air-to-air kills plus air-to-ground kills divided by air-to-air losses plus operational losses plus non-combat losses not directly operational).

Non-combat losses not directly operational might be planes lost due to being captured by enemy bround forces as just one example.

The thing is, Buffnut, we don't really HAVE the data for complete air-to-air kills and losses only, much less the rest. There seems to be nobody out there with the data for the major types on both sides. And governments aren't seemingly interested in maing these data available either. I'd like to make some comments about the various calculations above, but I have only VERY incomplete data, so I can't SAY what the Me 109 numbers are, and seemingly nobody else can either. 

I DO have some wild conjections from several people who claim to know, but they have no sources for their data ... and again I am left wondering, but not finding the real data. The US Navy published pretty good data and I have it, but almost nobody else did that I can find. Calculating the numbers for the US Navy is not an exercise that I am willing to do unless I have MORE data since I'd have nothing else with which to compare it to. If you know the US Navy WWII numbers and nothing else, it is useless data.


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## parsifal (Jul 27, 2012)

The model is faulty, because it doesnt take into account the specific or general circumstances of each combat. Factors to include might include pilot skills, number ratios, whether one side is on the offense or defense. The amount of flak the weather sates. These might all saffect the outcomes of combats in a very tangible way. Beyond that is the general situation on the ground....if one side is being overrun on the ground, it will fly its a/c regardless of the overall situation...

And the randomizing effect of these and other peculiairities may not necessarily tend to even out with time. The allies were on the attack for more than 4 years during the war, which means all their combats are going to be influenced by that strategic precondition.


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## GregP (Jul 27, 2012)

Parsfail, you MADE my entire point! Thanks.

The number ratio and circumstances, et al, don't matter at all in war ... only the results. The rest is for posterity, but has NOTHING to do with the results. The factors indicate bravery or lack thereof, competence or lack thereof, good planning or lack thereof, but only the results make a difference in the end. The rest is fodder for argument, but inconsequential to the outcome. The winner is the winner and the loser is the loser. If the tradeoffs are equal, then it is a draw or close to it. If the draw leaves the enemy (or YOU) lacking in offensive equipment, such as the Japanese after Midway, then the draw is an obvious victory in hindshight. If not, it is a draw or a loss if the situation is the other way.

A fighter in the ring who is beating his opponent thoroughly but the opponent suddenly flashes a knowckout punch still loses the fight. It's the same in war; a loss is a loss and a win is a win. Circumstances don't matter at all. The cirumstances are vital to the parties at the time, and are nothing to sneer at, but meaningless to the people who write history in the end.

I firmly believe that. If anyone doesn't, perhaps he or she thinks the Axis won the war? If so, boom ... they fail World History 101. Just goes to show the first round is NOT an indicator of victory if your opponent survives the round. You STILL have to finish. Luck plays a part.

The British finding the Bismark at JUST the right time and the torpedo hit on the rudder was LUCK. The two events helped the British at the time. Luck is fickle and helped the Germans, too ... just not enough to make a difference in the outcome.

Circumstances have nothing to do with the effectiveness of an aircraft in combat. The results DO. You might get shot down because you didn't see your opponent, but you still got shot down. Likewise if YOU are the one who gets the victory ...


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## buffnut453 (Jul 27, 2012)

For once I agree with most of what's being said here. 

My only minor observation is your statement that "The cirumstances are vital to the parties at the time, and are nothing to sneer at, but meaningless to the people who write history in the end." Surely the job of historians is to work out why things happened given the benefit of hindsight and understanding the circumstances is a vital part of that work.

But I digress....again!


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## GregP (Jul 27, 2012)

Buffnut, the circumstances at the time make for great stories, novels and movies ... and are the stuff that makes some guy (or outfit, etc.) a hero or a villian. Yes, they affect the outcome, but the outcome is what mostly gets recorded in history.

A huge exception was the 400 Spartans who made a heroic stand. Much had been written about it, but the Spartans lost and people sometimes are enamored enough about the glory to think the Spartans WON. Go figure.

In WWII the outcome, even of a battle or a campaign, is what most people remember this far down the line in time. The kids coming out of high school don't even know that much, they usually know the Allies won and the Axis lost and that's about it. Most don't even have an opinion about Viet Nam, and I was there and it was real for me.

So the circumstance are huge at the time ... but shrink to being unimportant over time, while the results still stand in the end. I like to read about the circumstances, weather, deployment, etc., but I'm probably in the minority in even caring about those things ... at least 50+ years later.


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## fastmongrel (Jul 27, 2012)

GregP said:


> A huge exception was the 400 Spartans who made a heroic stand. Much had been written about it, but the Spartans lost and people sometimes are enamored enough about the glory to think the Spartans WON. Go figure.



The myths about Thermopylae are mostly wrong as well there might have been 300 Spartans at the last stand but there were also approximately 700 thespians 400 Thebans 900 Phocians and possibly up to 900 Spartan Helots who were the Spartan auxilliaries involved in the final battles. Thats the thing about myths the facts usually get in the way of a good story.


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## Njaco (Jul 27, 2012)

for what its worth.....

"Spitfire vs Bf 109: Battle of Britain" by Tony Holmes does give some ratios for the BoB. Pages 71-72 state that;



> Overall, during the four months of the Battle of Britain, 361 Spitfires were lost and a further 352 damaged. Fortunately for Fighter Command and the free world, production of the aircraft far outstripped attrition, with 747 Spitfire I/IIs being delivered in the summer and autumn of 1940.
> During this same period, the Jagdwaffe lost 610 Bf 109s, which compares favorably to Fighter Command's 1,023 Spitfires and Hurricanes. Of course, the only targets presented to the Jagdflieger during this period were fighters and it appears that they claimed around 770 of the aircraft lost by Fighter Command. This gave the Bf 109E pilots a favorable kill ratio of 1.2:1, but this was nowhere near the 5:1 target that Oberst Theo Osterkamp (Jafu 2) had set his pilots in July in order to achieve the desired air superiority required for 'Sea Lion'.


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## JoeB (Jul 27, 2012)

Kryten said:


> Sorry but this kill ratio statistic is a nonsense,
> 
> 1. if aircraft are unfit to fly because they have no spares or fuel, that says nothing about the effectiveness of the aircraft but of the logistical situation at that time.
> 
> ...


I can only partly agree with a couple of those points.

1. Taking this as proxy for all kinds of factors not directly related to either a/c or flying crews, there’s surely some truth to it. But, there’s also a definite tendency for people to look at various matchups from POV of one side, IMHO. For example in early Pac campaigns Japanese land based fighters (overwhelmingly the most common opponents) were quickly shifting from one new field to the next, often very rough ones, outrunning their logistical chain etc. but that’s a lot less mentioned in arguments about the high kill ratio they achieved, compared to logistical and field problems on the Allied side. Then later, neither the Allies nor the Japanese were changing fields or in the midst of chaotic advances or withdrawals, and then, for example in Burma in 1943, the kill ratio of the Type 1 v the Hurricane….stayed the same as it had been in 1942. So your point can be valid, but often IMHO, factors are mentioned without really objectively considering how similar factors also affected the other side, or considering evidence from other periods or cases from which we might deduce how much effect these factors really had. The 1942 v 1943 Type 1 v .Hurricane example suggests it might not have been that much in that case.

2 A valid points if a fighter-fighter kill ratio is used to directly deduce the effectiveness of an a/c regardless of who was operating it, but not if the kill ratio is used to deduce the relative effectiveness of fighter *units*, as it should generally be. Training, doctrine tactics and leadership (last is not brought up nearly enough IMO) are included in that. If the same or two ostensibly similar units have very different kill ratio results with different a/c v similar opposition, *then* we might deduce something about the a/c themselves.

3. As covered umpteen times, this is potentially reasonable statement in cases where kill ratio’s were fairly close to 1, or perceived to be. For example I think it was mentioned RAF fighters on Malta perceived a kill ratio on 2:3 against them (it was actually 1:several Hurricane v Bf109, 1:2 Spit V’s v 109’s, though more favorable v Italian fighters). However the concept of ‘destroying the bombers and not caring so much about the escorts’ is nonsensical when the ratio is heavily against the interceptors. If the 7:1 ratio scored by Zeroes over Spit V’s over Darwin in 1943 had been replicated across the board by Axis fighters over Malta, they would almost surely have gained air superiority, and probably won the whole campaign, Guadalcanal likewise. The 1943 Darwin raids were not really that serious, and the Spit units lost dozens more planes in non-combat situations but were still able to replace them pretty easily. But the Allied units at Malta and G’canal were much closer to the edge in keeping up with losses at it was, and could not have continued against a 1:7 kill ratio. To say it’s ‘nonsense’ to measure and consider those different ratios is itself nonsense, IMHO.

4. This seems reasonable on the surface but actually there is not that strong a relationship between OOB numbers and kill ratio’s in the WW’s. There is a strong relationship between OOB numbers and final overall outcomes of campaigns, yes, but numbers didn’t determine relative fighter unit effectiveness, and plenty of evidence IMO points to kill ratio’s a *generally* good indicator of relative fighter unit effectiveness. So for example it’s hard to explain the tendency of the 109’s to kill ratio advantage over Malta as just an artifact of numbers and their situation as escorts when 109 units (sometimes the same ones!) scored *higher* fighter-fighter ratio’s over the Western Desert when heavily outnumbered in OOB strength, and were usually the interceptors themselves. One obvious point about numbers is that if one side has 200 and the other 100 fighters in a theater that does not necessarily mean each combat will involve 2 on one side for each on the other. As another example, ca. mid 1944 USAAF/RAF fighters hugely outnumbered LW ones overall in the Western theater, but particular USAAF group formations deep in Germany would often face very large and concentrated German fighter formations, and be outnumbered.

Another key point is that ‘fighter unit effectiveness’ has nothing do with courage or devotion to duty, as sometimes seems assumed in emotional responses. Kill ratio’s are IMO a valid general indicator of fighter unit effectiveness, with many limitations of course. But nobody is saying they are a measure of pilot bravery, let alone national mojo generally.

Joe


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## GregP (Jul 28, 2012)

Sorry, but teyh effectiveness of a fighter in WWII was NOT tied to circumstance, pilots, fuel, or anything else. All sides had to deal with those things.

The effectiveness was tied solely to the employment of the fighter (or bomber, etc.) by the operator of same in the situation that was existing, using tactics devised by the forces in contest with the fuel, armament, weather, and maintenace available. All sides had to deal with it. When the results came out, only the results mattered to the opposing sides. If the missions were successful, then the fighter / pilot was considered a very good one. If not, the other way.

The situation was irrelevant since both side had to operate in the same area, with differening weather patterns and differeing spare parts (logistics chain) and crew chief / pilot competence.

Again, the results tell the story of who did better, plane, pilot, crew chief, or whatever. the circumstances don't matter a BIT, the RESULTS matter. The people who argue that point are usually on the losing side and have already lost the argument. Their arguments are false; they lost due to a combination of factors that the victor did not suffer due to superior planning, logistics, maintenance, or crew skill ... or maybe luck of the draw.


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## JoeB (Jul 28, 2012)

GregP said:


> 1. Sorry, but teyh effectiveness of a fighter in WWII was NOT tied to circumstance, pilots, fuel, or anything else. All sides had to deal with those things.
> ...
> Again, the results tell the story of who did better, plane, pilot, crew chief, or whatever. the circumstances don't matter a BIT, the RESULTS matter.
> 
> 2. they lost due to a combination of factors that the victor did not suffer due to superior planning, logistics, maintenance, or crew skill ... or maybe luck of the draw.


I thought in reading over the thread I was agreeing more with you than those arguing against you, but that summary is much too extreme, and contradicts itself.

Points 1 and 2 seem contradictory to me, 1 that circumstances like pilots, fuel don't matter a bit, then 2 they lost because, inter alia, their logistics and crew skill were inferior.

And 1 is the point which defies common sense IMHO. Each side had to deal with factors like logistics and base support, but not the *same* logistics and bases. The only really common factors of that kind were weather/climate/regional geography which were really the same for each side (assuming their bases were fairly close, in very long range operations there wasn't even complete equality in those factors). The factors besides strictly a/c and pilots (and their leaders, again not emphasized nearly enough IMO) that could differ from one side to the other definitely *could* affect outcomes. But stuff like logistics or base conditions would not predict the effectiveness of the same fighter unit equipped with the same a/c in different circustances, a question which can also matter. Are these non-unit factors sometimes blown out of proportion and the difficulties of the sentimentally favored side (some people obviously have one) exaggerated compared to the opponent's difficulties? sure, but that doesn't mean those factors didn't matter 'one bit'.

Maybe you just got too wound up there..

Results matter, but if all that mattered was the final outcome of wars, we could summarize each war in one sentence, and pay no more attention than that. Besides not considering the relative effectiveness per plane or man of fighter arms, there would be no real reason to discuss the technical attributes of planes either. 'All that matters is who won the war....' I can't take that position seriously.

Joe


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## GregP (Jul 29, 2012)

Re-reading my post, it sure SOUNDS like I got wound up, but I wasn't at the time as far as I recall. Maybe just tired of back and forth.

Suffice to say several of us seem to have opposing views of the significance of what happens in war. That doesn't appear to be unusual and I daresay many people can see the same reporting on what happens in war and draw completely diametrically opposed conclusions. I suppose that mkaes us all quite normal.

In the end, I like kill ratio as a measure of effectiveness, and many out there don't. I already acknowledged that, though I personally like kill ratio, the amount of data missing for actually using kill ratio as a measure of effectiveness renders it less than useful. The rest of my digression is off-topic for killl ratio and I'll let this argument go away.

Finally, if we all agreed, there would be litle discussion. I look forward to more topics of discussion.

Cheers.


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## buffnut453 (Jul 29, 2012)

GregP said:


> But the outcome is what mostly gets recorded in history....In WWII the outcome, even of a battle or a campaign, is what most people remember this far down the line in time.



The outcome may be what "most people remember" but it's not what interests historians...and historians certainly don't just record the outcome. They seek to find reasons and rationales for events which, inevitably, results in different perspectives being aired over time - and that's a good thing in my view.


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## parsifal (Jul 29, 2012)

I agree heartily. I differ from BF in that I think the allies suffered a heavy and one sidede defeat whilst using the Buffalo. But I do not think the Buffalo was the sole reason or even the main reason, for those one sided defeats. There were lots of factors.

The Finns are reported to have chalked up a Kill loss ratio of 32:1 with their Brewsters. Would they have achieved 32:1 against an outfit like 1st or 64th hiko Sentai, or the IJNs Yawata Group ? I very much doubt it.


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## GregP (Jul 30, 2012)

Good pilots will shoot down the adversary. The Fins did. Nobody else who was a user of the Buffalo had much success. 

That says something, to me at least. If it doesn't to the rest of you, that's OK. 

I recognize it for what it was. Reality can suck on occasion, with the Buffalo, it did, in spades. The performance was OK for the time but not for WWII a very few years later.


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## parsifal (Jul 30, 2012)

Thats where I think you have your disagreement. Im the last to come to the defence of the Buffalo. I take the view that against a Zero it was a deathtrap. Trouble is, in those opening weeks its main opposition, numbers wise, was not the zero, it wasnt even the Ki 43. it was the Ki 27, at least in terms of overall numbers. and against the Ki 27, the Buffalo had advantages....not many, but some.

Not all the users of the Buffalo were so completely down on it. RAAF or the USN didnt think much of it. But at least one FAA pilot (Brabham) gave it a positive review after Crete

And, the numbers are not as one sided as you think. The Buffalo represented the sole fighter available in Malaya and was the most numerous in Burma as i recall. The Japanese were reported to have lost up to 250 a/c in those opening campaigns through to the end of April, to all causes. Since we are comparing total losses, to all causes for the buffalo, we should do the same for the japanese. 250 a/c lost in a campaign where 150 Buffaloes were lost is not as bad an exchange rate as is being portrayed is it not?


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## GregP (Jul 30, 2012)

Parsifal, please love the Buffalo in good health. I don't and won't. But I'll also will refrain from trashing it unless I detect excessive praise for I believe to be the worst US fighter in service at the start of the war. Then I may be unable to keep from chipping away at the Buffalo ... a bit. 

The Buffalo, to me, is sort of like the worst girlfiend you ever had ... at times she was marvelous, but she's an ex-girlfriend for a reason.


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## [SC] Arachnicus (Jul 31, 2012)

I might be a little late to the show on this topic but personally I think that any pilot that was able to walk away from their plane, wether they landed the destroyed plane or bailed from it can debate for a good reason that they are not a "kill".


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## GregP (Jul 31, 2012)

That brings up a very good question ... is a "kill" an aircaft or a pilot? If a pilot, then shooting one in a parachute might be acceptable. If a kill is an aircraft, then if the aircraft is no longer flyable after combat, IS it a kill? 

Repairs may return it to service, but the result was a kill since it was no longer a flyable opponent. Or, is a kill a "destroyed" aircraft?

If so, what is "destroyed?"

Almost ANY crashed aircaft CAN be restored ato flyable condition. I volunteer at the PLanes of Fame Museum and WE restore absolute wrecks to flying condition. We are just finishing a Yokusuka D4Y Judy to static taxiable condition, and the ONLY reason it is not flyable, is lack of design data. The horizontal longerons are NOT to spec and we can't FIND the spec. Also, we used 7075 Aluminum instead of 2024 T3.

So, what IS "destroyed?" What IS a "Kill?"

If the pilot walks away and it is not a kill, should we shoot him in the parachute or should we award a kill when a fighter pilot brings down another aircraft?

I say when someone brings down an aircaft in combat as a result combat, it is a kill. Not when the enemy's engine fails; not when the enemy is flying off smoking, but when the enemy aircaft goes down as a direct result of combat, whether or not it is returned to service with parts from another wreck or new parts. Repair and return to service can be done even with a plane that burns to the ground with a dead pilot.

What do you think?


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## Njaco (Jul 31, 2012)

For me, 'kill' would mean destruction of the a/c. You can have as many pilots as you may need but if they don't have a machine to fly, they're useless. So destruction of material would be a high priority.


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## stona (Jul 31, 2012)

I think the "kill" game is misleading and certainly produces confusing statistics for the reasons above.

Any air force wants to know how it is doing and calculating estimated kills from the Intelligence Officers' reports and kill ratios has been shown to be a very unreliable way of doing this. Bad intelligence can be worse than no intelligence. 
A far better gauge,but one obviously not readily available to an enemy,is the number of aircraft that an air force itself writes off,i.e. deems not worth repairing_ for whatever reasons._

Cheers

Steve


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## GregP (Jul 31, 2012)

I don't believe victory awards were ever a measure of how an air force was doing. Rather it was a easy way to build pilot morale and foster aggressive flying in fighters. Make 'em heros and everybody wants to be one.

You have a pretty good point in that how many birds are written off operationally is one measure os training and effectiveness. 

If a pilot simply runs out of fuel, is that any indication of a weakness in the aircrtaft? No, but it IS an indiocation of lack of attention on the pilot's part. 

Losses due to mechanical failure are a good indication of either design issues or maintenance issues ... or bad luck. All things mechanical fail, the real question is how often.

Perhaps a good indication of how an air force is doing might be the state of the enemy's air force ... assuming you can ob tain the data.


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## stona (Jul 31, 2012)

GregP said:


> I don't believe victory awards were ever a measure of how an air force was doing. Rather it was a easy way to build pilot morale and foster aggressive flying in fighters. Make 'em heros and everybody wants to be one.
> If a pilot simply runs out of fuel, is that any indication of a weakness in the aircrtaft?



Victory awards were certainly used in the way you specify in the Luftwaffe. The RAF for the most part actively discouraged the lauding of the individual_ at the time _preferring to promote the "team effort".

The intention of all those debriefings and Intelligence Officers' reports was certainly to assess enemy losses and,until they were seen to be palpably wrong,the data wasused in strategic decision making,notably by the Luftwaffe in the second week of August 1940 when they were somewhat surprised to discover that the RAF had plenty of fighters covering the approaches to the Midlands and the North across the North Sea. 
The assessments had a negative effect on Luftwaffe morale too. If you tell your aircrews that the opposition is broken and has little left,only for them to be met by increasing resistance they are likely to be sceptical at best and at the worst feel that they are losing.

I was careful to make the point about written off aircraft that a write of was deemed "not worth repairing",not irrepairable. I suspect that the criteria for the USAAF or RAF in 1944 would be somewhat different to the Luftwaffe's. As you quite rightly said,anything _can_ be repaired.

If your aircraft keep running out of fuel you'd better take a look at your pilot training 

Cheers

Steve


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## drgondog (Aug 1, 2012)

stona said:


> I was careful to make the point about written off aircraft that a write of was deemed "not worth repairing",not irrepairable. I suspect that the criteria for the USAAF or RAF in 1944 would be somewhat different to the Luftwaffe's. As you quite rightly said,anything _can_ be repaired.
> 
> If your aircraft keep running out of fuel you'd better take a look at your pilot training
> 
> ...



The first point is indeed a factor in the discussion of 'aircraft destruction' versus 'badly damaged-but repaired and returned to service' versus 'badly damaged and salvaged for parts'. The Claims review process to award credits for destruction, probably destroyed, damaged and 'no credit' was simply a complex process to try to understand impact to the enemy capabilities. The Victory Credit per se has political/morale overtones. I have been continually mystefied regarding the 8th AF bomber claims versus fighter claims OUTCOMES as the published 'Claims' so far overstated the effectiveness of the bomber gunners - to the point where I cannot believe that the review process didn't weigh trailing crews as the first point of cross reference to individul claims of bombers in front. If the trailing crew concensus was "We saw Perhaps three fighters blow up or lose a wing or enveloped in flames" but the individual totals summed up to "We got 51 German aircraft destroyed" - then the overclaims would not have been so severe.

As to running out of fuel? For escort fighters, particularly the P-47, the wingman was always at a disadvantage on fuel consumption AND every fighter squadron and flight leader was trying to maximize coverage of the bombers - creating a complex judgment challenge. As an example, the 355th FG lost five P-47s due to lack of fuel for three reasons on November 7, 1943. First, the 355th stayed with their assigned bomber box 10 minutes longer than planned because the 'relief escort' was late. Second, the planned route did Not account for severe west to east headwinds during the return leg. Last, the final stage of the return was the North Sea which was a death sentence for a ditching or bail out..

So, easy to make comment about 'training', not so easy to execute despite Very well trained and experienced pilots, when call of duty and the Weather Gods interfere with fate.


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## stona (Aug 1, 2012)

drgondog said:


> As to running out of fuel? For escort fighters, particularly the P-47, the wingman was always at a disadvantage on fuel consumption AND every fighter squadron and flight leader was trying to maximize coverage of the bombers - creating a complex judgment challenge. As an example, the 355th FG lost five P-47s due to lack of fuel for three reasons on November 7, 1943. First, the 355th stayed with their assigned bomber box 10 minutes longer than planned because the 'relief escort' was late. Second, the planned route did Not account for severe west to east headwinds during the return leg. Last, the final stage of the return was the North Sea which was a death sentence for a ditching or bail out..
> 
> So, easy to make comment about 'training', not so easy to execute despite Very well trained and experienced pilots, when call of duty and the Weather Gods interfere with fate.



I would be the last person to demean the commitment and determination of those fighter pilots to stay with and cover their comrades. I understand why they did it. Nonetheless a harsher judge than I could still argue that they made a bad call,albeit for the right reasons.
Me? I'd give them a medal.
Cheers
Steve


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## JoeB (Aug 1, 2012)

stona said:


> I think the "kill" game is misleading and certainly produces confusing statistics for the reasons above.
> 
> Any air force wants to know how it is doing and calculating estimated kills from the Intelligence Officers' reports and kill ratios has been shown to be a very unreliable way of doing this. Bad intelligence can be worse than no intelligence.
> A far better gauge,but one obviously not readily available to an enemy,is the number of aircraft that an air force itself writes off,i.e. deems not worth repairing_ for whatever reasons._


I think we should be looking at this issue from the perspective of historians, not the AF's at the time. Maybe we're not really historians, but we're sure as hell not the participants of the time. 

Of course it's very important to understand that the view of *any* warfare from one side, at the time, is different than the view of a historian who can access information from both sides, and analyze without the stress of combat, or conflicting goals as for example the morale effect on pilots or bomber crews of awarding victory credits v estimating how many enemy a/c were actually destroyed. 

So I assume we're trying to find a somewhat easier answer, how many a/c were downed on each side by the opposing fighters* . If all we have to go on is the claims of one side, then the analysis is over and the answer is: we don't know the kill ratio. If we have only totals of a/c destroyed on each side to all causes, likewise there's not much we can do with that. And if we take the (almost always IME nationally biased and agenda-laden) position 'I don't trust so and so's records', again, stop the process, answer: don't know the kill ratio.

But in many air campaigns of the 20th century there are pretty detailed and complete records from both sides. It's true that in the abstract there are potential 'philosophical' questions about what constituted a kill. But rather than try to find a 'right' answer to all these questions, since kill ratio's are a comparative statistic, I propose simply using a consistent method of counting, and tell people what it is, in fact if people have questions about the count for a particular smaller campaign, the person giving the ratio should be able to also present the 'judgement call' cases and let others make their own decisions.

Personally my standard in counting up kills in various two sided books and in original records (I've studied a fair amount in primary source records in three cases so far: US in Korea, Soviets in Korea, JNAF in Pac War) is to count as kills as follows:
Degree: a/c which crashed, or belly landed either at or away from their a/f's unless it's positively known they were later repaired; not counting a/c which landed wheels down at their a/f's unless it's positively known they *weren't* repaired, and to count the freak cases of pilot death but a/c survival as kills.
Cause: losses attributed in the plane's 'own' side records to enemy fighters, plus a/c which disappeared or ran out of fuel in contact with enemy fighters (as seen from opposing records), ie doesn't include all fuel exhaustion losses, and this is another reason general loss totals are not that useful, but you need actual combat reports or detailed accounts in a (trustworthy) book.

Those may not be the 'right' standards, but if kept consistently a lot of the uncertainty factors out. Also IMO there's a tendency to overemphasize the importance of those marginal judgement call cases. For example in our (in)famous debates here about Zero v Spit over Darwin, of 4 Zeroes lost in the whole campaign 3 'failed to return' and one ditched. Under my rules they all 4 count as fighter combat losses since there were (multiple each) opposing claims, though we can't be 100% sure they were all due to hostile action. But besides those there weren't any purely operational losses, pilot killed a/c saved, don't know if a/c was scrapped etc. Often those marginal cases are a quite small % and quibbling over them doesn't change the answer much or even at all. In other campaigns though classification of fuel exhaustion, particularly, might become a significant issue to debate.

OTOH stuff like counting AA losses of a fighter force (if really apparently so on detailed study) and comparing those to losses inflicted by that force on opposing fighters... is just nonsense IMHO. Sure, it was important what fighters might achieve v ground targets compared to losses to ground fire; but it's completely separate and irrelevant question from the effectiveness of opposing fighter units, again except in highly exceptional cases unlikely to affect overall answers much if at all.

*which I agree is not the only thing to ever look at, but it's one significant metric worth looking at IMO, and I've been totally unconvinced by the counter arguments over the years on this forum, usually by obvious fans of particular air arms that didn't so well in this measure in a particular campaign being discussed. Fighter-fighter kill is *one*, not the only, significant measure to look at in judging the relative effectiveness of fighter units, and in *some* cases we might be able to compare to other information and infer *something* of the capabilities of a/c themselves.

Joe


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## stona (Aug 1, 2012)

The problem is that there was,and probably still isn't,any kind of standard way of calculating losses or kills. I don't believe that any WW2 airforce really had the foggiest idea how many of its enemy's aircraft it had actually destroyed in aerial combat. They had plenty of statistics but they were way wide of the mark.

Figures collated using different criteria are a nonsense as comparitive statistic. It is literally like comparing apples and oranges.

Combat reports,of which I have read hundreds,are certainly not reliable and full of the most basic assumptions. One pilot claims a "probable" for an aircraft that,in his opinion,passed through the cloud base in an uncontrollable and irrecoverable fashion whilst another describes this as his last ditch method of evasion!

Cheers

Steve


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## Kryten (Aug 1, 2012)

there are so many variables involved that I honestly believe the only true way of measuring the effectiveness of an air force during a particular campaign is the actual outcome of the campaign!


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## drgondog (Aug 1, 2012)

stona said:


> I would be the last person to demean the commitment and determination of those fighter pilots to stay with and cover their comrades. I understand why they did it. Nonetheless a harsher judge than I could still argue that they made a bad call,albeit for the right reasons.
> Me? I'd give them a medal.
> Cheers
> Steve



Steve - a harsher 'judge' making the argument that they made a bad call has probably not been flying for long - and certainly not experienced with ETO weather November through April. You might be critical of the Weather forecast at 8th AF HQ for not anticipating the terrible return conditions but the combat leader(s) at the time correctly judged that they had enough fuel to at least make it back to Manston based on the information that they had. So, make your case for a 'bad call' on the part of the guys that couldn't fulfill that expectation? 

Note that 10 more minutes of the extra coverage would not have made a whit of difference to the guys that landed in Holland or the one that ditched in the North Sea but might have been crucial to the two that landed in France. Do all five make a bad call? or the Group leader? or the weather forecaster(s)? or do we chalk it up to the fact that flying combat in Northern Europe presents many risks which became a reality that was impossible to overcome?


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## stona (Aug 1, 2012)

Kryten said:


> there are so many variables involved that I honestly believe the only true way of measuring the effectiveness of an air force during a particular campaign is the actual outcome of the campaign!



But people will even argue about that 

Steve


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## parsifal (Aug 1, 2012)

Njaco said:


> For me, 'kill' would mean destruction of the a/c. You can have as many pilots as you may need but if they don't have a machine to fly, they're useless. So destruction of material would be a high priority.



The reverese is equally true however. The Germans and the Japanese are generally acknowledged as sufering plummetting pilot standards in the last years of the war. as their pilot qualities fell through the floor, their loss es mounted even though they were generally flying aircraft that were still competitive performance wise. For Germany it basically became pointless to put large numbers of a/c into the air, burning up dwlindling supplies of fuel and achieving basically nothing. The Axis were well supplid with aircraft (less wel supplied at the fronts, and less well supplied with spare parts) but this failed to help them a lot. Even if you accept the inevitability of defeat after 1943, I dont think the performance of these air forces was optimised by having large numbers of airframes that could not basically fly, or if they did, were inneffective because of the poor quality of the pilots flying them.


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## parsifal (Aug 1, 2012)

Kills or kill ratios is in no way a valid measure of success. Airpower does not win wars by itself. Each nation has a doctrine, a purpose for the air power that it puts into the field. The measure of its success has to be how effectively it carries out that mission, and how far it is forced to deviate from that primary mission as a result of the camapign outcomes they are involved in. Whilst ultimate victory or defeat may be a measure of that success for some, to me it is a rather crude and poor measure of the forces effectiveness. Example....ultimately the Finn AF was defeated because its country was defeated. However I would argue that its AF was very successfuly applied to the task. However was the Soviet AF defeated just because it suffered heavy losses? The Soviets would argue not....they were not forced to deviate from any of their primary missions in the finish. The Soviets do however, acknowledge that their AF was largely inneffective in 1941-2.

For the allies, we can be obtuse, and say they were successful, because they ultimately won. However, as far as successfully implementing their various doctrines, they had to modify their thoeories considerably before they could claim that victory. The bomber did mopt always get through, night bombing had to be adopted for the bris, high level bombing by B-29s was not that effeective, ground support was a valid application of airpower, range was possible for SE fighters, carrier borne a/c could operate with equal performance to land based air etc etc

So who was the most successful at implmenting their various doctrines. Thats a very hard question. Despite their defeat, I am tempted to claim the Japanese or perhaps the Russians, or even the Finns previously mentioned


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## parsifal (Aug 1, 2012)

Kills or kill ratios is in no way a valid measure of success. Airpower does not win wars by itself. Each nation has a doctrine, a purpose for the air power that it puts into the field. The measure of its success has to be how effectively it carries out that mission, and how far it is forced to deviate from that primary mission as a result of the camapign outcomes they are involved in. Whilst ultimate victory or defeat may be a measure of that success for some, to me it is a rather crude and poor measure of the forces effectiveness. Example....ultimately the Finn AF was defeated because its country was defeated. However I would argue that its AF was very successfuly applied to the task. However was the Soviet AF defeated just because it suffered heavy losses? The Soviets would argue not....they were not forced to deviate from any of their primary missions in the finish. The Soviets do however, acknowledge that their AF was largely inneffective in 1941-2.

For the allies, we can be obtuse, and say they were successful, because they ultimately won. However, as far as successfully implementing their various doctrines, they had to modify their thoeories considerably before they could claim that victory. The bomber did mopt always get through, night bombing had to be adopted for the bris, high level bombing by B-29s was not that effeective, ground support was a valid application of airpower, range was possible for SE fighters, carrier borne a/c could operate with equal performance to land based air etc etc

So who was the most successful at implmenting their various doctrines. Thats a very hard question. Despite their defeat, I am tempted to claim the Japanese or perhaps the Russians, or even the Finns previously mentioned


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## GregP (Aug 1, 2012)

Not suprisingly, I think kills and kill ratios with good data ARE a good measure, so we disagree. But hey, that's OK. Our agreement or not won't change the outcome of the war.

I simply feel victories and kill ratios are a very good indication of the quality of the aircraft / pilot / pilot training / employment of same in whatever situation they were used combination. If we had the real data, I suspect the German kill ratio for the Me 109 would be startling, but I can't prove that. I think it would be better than that of the Fw 190 but, again, I can't prove that. So, I'll just say I THINK that and let it go. I will never claim that to be true ... it's just my hunch based on everything I've read over more than 5 decades on the subject.

But, you may be right in the end since the data are unlikely to surface if they haven't surfaced by now ...


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## stona (Aug 2, 2012)

To touch briefly on an earlier point I think that an analyasis of any of the air campaigns fought in WW2 would show that the killing (or loss in any way) of highly and expensively trained aircrew had a more important bearing on the outcome than the destruction of the aircraft. Simplistically they were harder to replace.

FWIW I agree with Greg that properly collated kill ratios could give a valid comparison of two aircraft as long as all the other factors,type of operation,crew training etc,are not forgotten. Sadly this sort of data is simply not available for WW2 aircraft.

Cheers

Steve


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## JoeB (Aug 2, 2012)

stona said:


> The problem is that there was,and probably still isn't,any kind of standard way of calculating losses or kills. I don't believe that any WW2 airforce really had the foggiest idea how many of its enemy's aircraft it had actually destroyed in aerial combat. They had plenty of statistics but they were way wide of the mark.
> 
> Figures collated using different criteria are a nonsense as comparitive statistic. It is literally like comparing apples and oranges.
> 
> Combat reports,of which I have read hundreds,are certainly not reliable and full of the most basic assumptions. One pilot claims a "probable" for an aircraft that,in his opinion,passed through the cloud base in an uncontrollable and irrecoverable fashion whilst another describes this as his last ditch method of evasion!


I assume this post was in response to mine but if so with all due respect it misses the main point I made pretty much entirely, IMHO. 

We can never calculate a really meaningful kill ratio using one side's claims. The problems you raise seem to assume we'd calculate the ratio based on one side's perception of the outcome of combat. I thought I was clear saying that would *not* be the way to do it.

To calculate fighter combat exchange rates which are at all meaningful to compare among air arms, or needless to say, which don't contradict the ratio calculated from the other side of the same campaign, we need to count losses on both sides, and essentially ignore claims, except as indirect evidence*. And to do that we need the detailed records, or detailed published accounts based on them, from both sides. 

In some large campaigns and especially later in WWII this information doesn't fully exist or the scale of combat prevents us being sure we're viewing the same combat in each sides' records (are we including all units actually involved in a given combat?). But in many campaigns of WWII, and definitely true of early Soviet MiG v US combats in the Korean War, it's quite clear which units were involved on each side in almost all combats, and each sides' account are reasonably detailed. We then count the losses due to air combat, or likely so, according to a consistent standard, combat by combat, bottom up. That's not to say we ignore grand totals of air combat losses given by each side in a campaing, but the bottom up method short circuits IME a lot of tail chasing arguments about (usually supposedly, not actually) missing or fudged info in totals.

And we avoid apples and oranges by, as I said, counting according to a uniform standard, such as I briefly described in earlier post. People who reach different results based on the same books or records should be able to discuss it and discover if and how they are counting differently. But again I think the issue of vagaries in counting tend to be exaggerated, anyway. Often 'judgement call' cases are a pretty small % of all losses.

We are counting the kill ratio using both sides' info, now. We're not directly concerning ourselves with what the participating air arms *thought* the kill ratio was then, which is obviously two (often wildly) different figures.

*for example if one side records losing a/c to unknown causes, the presence or not of opposing claims at similar time and place might clarify that cause. But just because somebody was sure they'd downed an enemy a/c didn't mean it happened; I assume we're all entering the discussion realizing that basic fact of air combat history...

Joe


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## JoeB (Aug 2, 2012)

parsifal said:


> 1. Kills or kill ratios is in no way a valid measure of success.
> 2. Airpower does not win wars by itself.
> 3. Example....ultimately the Finn AF was defeated because its country was defeated. However I would argue that its AF was very successfuly applied to the task.
> 4. However was the Soviet AF defeated just because it suffered heavy losses?...
> ...


1. Sure it is *a* valid measure, of relative fighter unit effectiveness. I've still not seen a cogent argument why, in its proper context, it isn't.
2. This is a collossal straw man. Where did anybody ever say the relevance of fighter-fighter kill ratio's extended to factors which determine the outcome of wars which have nothing to do even with air power?!?, let alone fighters? Nobody ever did. War outcomes aren't determined by air power alone: statement of the obvious with zero relevance to whether fighter-fighter kill ratio's are one valid measure of relative fighter unit effectiveness.
3. As shown by the Finnish fighter forces generally favorable kill ratio v Soviet fighters, among other things.
4. Another straw man. Show me any quote in any of these debates where anyone, let alone me, says that a side suffering heavier losses can't win. Never been said; irrelevant to whether fighter-fighter kill ratio's are *a* valid measure of relative fighter unit effectiveness.
5. As shown by the overwhelming kill ratio advantage of German fighters in that period, an exampe of it as useful measure of relative fighter unit effectivenss.
6. True, and irrelevant to whether fighter-fighter kill ratio's were one valid measure of relative fighter unit effectiveness; they were.

Joe


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## parsifal (Aug 2, 2012)

> 1. Sure it is *a* valid measure, of relative fighter unit effectiveness. I've still not seen a cogent argument why, in its proper context, it isn't.



Its even less valid to restrict fighter kill ratios as opposed to overall kill ratios. Fighter kill ratios account for such a small percentage of overall losses as to be basically irrelevant. Moreover, even under the most optimistic of circumstances the defending side is still goiong to take attritional losses, sometimes approaching or even exceeding those of the bombers it is attacking. Fighter losses due to enemy action, defensive fire (for offensive missions) navigational errors or mechanical failures are much more important than losses due to enemy fire, and have nothing to do with the performance of a fighter in the air. 

To test that theory, if fighter kill ratios were somehow linked to higher performance, one might expect a far higher ratio of kills to losses for types like the Me 262. No such correlation exists. Losses to aircraft like the 262 were as bad, or worse as a percentage of the forces committed as types like the gladiator or CR42. Oh, I know we can say their respective combat situations and levels of opposition were different, and I would agree with that, but those earlier types themselves are, or should, be more vulnerable due to their relative low performance. But they arent. Loss ratios remained remarkably constant for everyone throughout the war.....what mattered was not the losses, but the powers of recovery for the forces involved, the sortie rate, and even more importantly whether the mission those fighters were supporting was successful or not. 




> 2. This is a collossal straw man. Where did anybody ever say the relevance of fighter-fighter kill ratio's extended to factors which determine the outcome of wars which have nothing to do even with air power?!?, let alone fighters? Nobody ever did. War outcomes aren't determined by air power alone: statement of the obvious with zero relevance to whether fighter-fighter kill ratio's are one valid measure of relative fighter unit effectiveness.




Why is it a "collossal straw man". The "colossal straw man" is in fact that kill loss ratios can act independantly so as to neutralize the effects of airpower. if that were the case, we would have to conclude that the Soviet application of airpower was not a success, when clearly it was. And, your claim that airpower does not affect the outcome of wars is also starkly flawed. Name one western style army that has won a war without control of the skies since 1918. Whilst airpower does not win wars independantly, winning wars without airpower is a virtual impossibility.

But fighters are a relatively small proportion of the application of airpower. What is far more important is the development of an appropriate strategy or doctrine to counter or defeat your opponent, and then developing the tools to achieve that outcome. Having the right fighter is of course a part of that. Having success in air combat is also part of that. But it is not a measure of success in the air. What is important is the development of an appropriate strategy and then having the equipment and resources to complete that mission. 



> 3. As shown by the Finnish fighter forces generally favorable kill ratio v Soviet fighters, among other things.
> Another straw man. Show me any quote in any of these debates where anyone, let alone me, says that a side suffering heavier losses can't win. Never been said; irrelevant to whether fighter-fighter kill ratio's are *a* valid measure of relative fighter unit effectiveness.



I dont see it as any sort of straw man. Finnish war aims were achieved by the end of 1941. Thereafter their overall strategy was to sit back and try and weather the storm, ie remain on the defensive, whilst the battle between the Soviets and the germans was played out. That required an essentially defensive weapon. The Finn AF was just that and suited the war aims of the nation perfectly. It has nothing to do directly with kill loss ratios, they are essentially a bi-product of the strategy. 



> 5. As shown by the overwhelming kill ratio advantage of German fighters in that period, an exampe of it as useful measure of relative fighter unit effectivenss.


Achieved at an overall cost to the LW in that period that proved prohibitive and unsustainable. By October 1941, for example, the LW had lost about 300 a/c in air combat, but were down to less than 1000 effective a/c from a starting total of over 3000 plus the reinforcements and replacements sent to the front June-October. Soviet airpower was inneffective not because its doctrine or its a/c were inneffective. It had organizational problems, airworthiness problems, training problems, to name a few, but losses due to enemy air action were a relatively minor issue for them, even at that stage of the war. The kill loss ratios achieved by the JGs at that time had virtually no impact on the outcome of the campaign, let alone the war, the doctrines and resources did. Result....Kill loss ratios are not relevant as a factor in determining the effectiveness of airpower, unless those losses affect the implementation of the enmy strategy. German fighters never achieved that, except at the very beginning of the war, and over Germany itself in 1943. 



> 6. True, and irrelevant to whether fighter-fighter kill ratio's were one valid measure of relative fighter unit effectiveness; they were.



Kill loss ratios are irrelevant if they are not of concern to the protagonists suffering them. They are relevant if they lead to changes to strategy. The losses inflicted on the RAF at the beginning of the war had a dramatic and fundamental effect on the RAFs concept of applied airpower. The efforts of the JGs in 1943 led to a fundamental change in US daylight air raids over germany in 1943. The efforts of the JGs, by far the heaviest losses inflicted on any opponent had no effect on Soviet airpower theories (they did have a massive effect on their techniques and training and even equipment and development policies). And yet loss rates (as aratio of the total forces committed) shows no dramatic change in any of those campaigns. One could argue that the fighters wree irrelevant to the losses overall. I wont go quite that far, but loss rates due to enemy fighter activity, particulalry over wide ranging fronts like the eastern Front have been grossly overstated in terms of their impoprtance since the war.


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## GregP (Aug 2, 2012)

Hi Parsifal,

I seems several of us in here don't particularly agree with you. Since entire countries can't agree on aerial kills and credit standards, I suppose we're all in good company.

Speaking for myself alone, I disagree with you but also don't want to fight about it; your opinion is as vaild as mine is, and you are welcome to it. We are unlikely to achieve consensus on this one.

But we all still like the discussion!

Cheers.


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## parsifal (Aug 3, 2012)

My position just to make it clear, is that air losses are irrelevant unless they have an impact on the outcome of a campaign. Moreover, because the variables are so variable, you cannot ever hope to get comparable events from battle to battle.

The only way to measure success, is to measure it against the campaign or strategy that airpower is supporting. If the airpower applied is decisive and effective in achieving or altering the outcome, the airpower has to be considered a success. Measuring that is hard enough...adding another dimension by trying to gauge the effect of the losses, is not only misleading, its damn near impossioble to get any meaningful results that are comparable to each other


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## GregP (Aug 3, 2012)

Your position can be easily supported and is a good one.

That I disagree is mostly due to my wanting to reward the successful pilots who shoot down enemy aircraft, regardless of of the eventual outcome. The individual pilots can only do their best and cannot affect the overall outcome except through their own individual efforts. Successful ones should be recognized, just as successful ships and land units are recognized.

There is little doubt the Luftwaffe had the best pilots in the ace range, but the rank and file late war were not able to support the performance of the "experten" enough to make the difference in the air. The reasons are numerous, including production, lack of fuel, propellers, and pilot training ... and, lest we forget, attrition.

There are numerous places to go from here, but I still like the accurate kill ratio as a good indicator of the effectiveness of air power at the time, under the circumstances they were faced with at the time. That I can't get the data doesn't make the notion any less valid. Only the real data are missing from which to draw some conclusions. They would not be ALL the conclusions, but would be a good indicator of the tactical situation at the time.


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## stona (Aug 3, 2012)

parsifal said:


> My position just to make it clear, is that air losses are irrelevant unless they have an impact on the outcome of a campaign.



I broadly agree with you but that statement cannot be supported. It takes far too narrow a view. Any loss of men and materiel is relevant,regardless of it bearing on the outcome of an individual battle or campaign. Losses have a quantifiable impact on the economy and war fighting capability of both the winner and the loser and a more nebulous effect on morale and other psychological factors which analysts have struggled to quantify for nearly 100 years.

By your criteria in the second part of your post it would be hard to argue that airpower was succesful in any campaign of WW2.

Cheers

Steve


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## fastmongrel (Aug 3, 2012)

116 posts and none of it makes me care one bit about kill ratios or any kill stats. I couldnt care less who shot down who I love aircraft but stats leave me cold. Its like sport I love to watch and cheer for my team but knowing how many tries, runs or goals they scored in the 1906 season doesnt increase my enjoyment of the game. 

Sorry chaps but numbers and percentages dont do it for me.


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## stona (Aug 3, 2012)

fastmongrel said:


> Sorry chaps but numbers and percentages dont do it for me.



Which is of course fine. However the statistics and analyses of them form a vital part in understanding any conflict. All arms include some sort of statistical unit. These vary from the Operational Research Sections on the ground,trying to find out if what a particular unit or organisation is doing is actually working,through to massive enterprises like the Strategic Bombing Survey,attempting to do the same thing retrospectively and on a much broader scale.

How can we hope to understand ,say,the attempted Stalingrad air bridge without knowing the numbers of aircraft available,operational ready rates,tonnages freighted etc ?
It is no accident that much of this data was carefully noted by the Germans at the time.
Statistics can be dull themselves but they enlighten an otherwise murky picture.

Cheers

Steve


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## fastmongrel (Aug 3, 2012)

Your right stona but the continued rehashing of Fighter claims losses never gets anywhere and usually ends up as a nationalistic pissing contest.


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## stona (Aug 3, 2012)

fastmongrel said:


> Your right stona but the continued rehashing of Fighter claims losses never gets anywhere and usually ends up as a nationalistic pissing contest.



It does,primarily because the relevant data doesn't exist or there are just too many variables to make a definite assessment.People resort to bias unsupported by evidence or "cherry pick" facts to support their position,which is a shame. 

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Aug 3, 2012)

stona said:


> I broadly agree with you but that statement cannot be supported. It takes far too narrow a view. Any loss of men and materiel is relevant,regardless of it bearing on the outcome of an individual battle or campaign. Losses have a quantifiable impact on the economy and war fighting capability of both the winner and the loser and a more nebulous effect on morale and other psychological factors which analysts have struggled to quantify for nearly 100 years.
> 
> By your criteria in the second part of your post it would be hard to argue that airpower was succesful in any campaign of WW2.
> 
> ...



hi steve

i confess i dont quite follow you here. i think you are saying that losses do matter. if so, I agree, but aircraft losses and aircrew losses as a percentage of the nations total losses are usually insignificant compared to the effects that airpower can have. For example, say you lose 100 a/c to sink an enemy fleet, but have aircraft and ships left to complete your forces task(s). for most nations, the loss of 100 a/c is a heavy price, but the loss of the fleet for the enemy, and beyond that (i expect) a key position or resource (eg a convoy or a strategic airbase) is a loss far more serious than the aircrew and machines. In the context of wwii aircraft were viewed as cheap and expendable. largely that is a true statement. What makesw losses even less relevant to determining the effectiveness of airpower is that most losses....about 70% statistically for the west, were unavoidable. as soon as you put large numbers of aircraft in the air, on combat operations under wartime combat conditions, you have immediately accepted that your force will lose a percentage of those aircraft. if those losses are acceptable and sustainable, and you achieve the mission that they set out to do, such sacrifices from the national interst POV is acceptable.

Losses due to enemy fighter activity, in most cases (there are significant exceptions) dont have any significant effect on overall loss rates. thats a statistical fact. you have to look harder, because we have all been brought up on this propagandist notion that fighters in the WWII context were somehow omnipotent. they werent, except in some very specific and specialised circumstances. where the battle is decentralised, across a broad front, like the eastern front, as a generalization such losses from enemy fightes is not a significant factor. the soviets relaized this, the germans did not.....

Stalingrad was of course one of those exceptions that has to be acknowledged. why was it different compared to most othe battles in the east. Simply that the VVS for once was able to concentrate over a specific geographical point and thereby achieve the concentration of effort needed to be decisive. as it was, the activities of the VVS to shutting down the air bridge into the belegured city was still secondary to weather and operational losses for the LW. The germans lost far more aircraft to weather, navigational error, landing and take off crashes, flak and the like than they ever did to soviet fighters. even Soviet flak was more effective at briging german planes down than the Red fighters. I would go so far as to say that the german air supply effort would have failed, regardless of any efforts by the VVS fighters. The conclusion is, therfore, that VVS fighters were not significant to the outcome of the battle....they just added to the german misery

As far as interpreting my statements as airpower not being effective, far from it. I actually believe that whilst airpower cannot, of itself win wars, wars cannot be won without it. Airpower is,, in other words, a critical force multiplier, that modern western armies and countries cannot do without.

The "airpower is expendable" argument does not wash in the post war environment....aircraft have vastly increased in cost and complexity, aircrew have become highly trained, hard to replace personnel, so any loss is a serious loss. Under those circumstances, loss rates do take on a greater significance


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## JoeB (Aug 3, 2012)

parsifal said:


> 1. Fighter kill ratios account for such a small percentage of overall losses as to be basically irrelevant.
> Fighter losses due to enemy action, defensive fire (for offensive missions) navigational errors or mechanical failures are much more important than losses due to enemy fire, and have nothing to do with the performance of a fighter in the air.
> 2. if fighter kill ratios were somehow linked to higher performance...Me-262
> 3. The "colossal straw man" is in fact that kill loss ratios can act independantly so as to neutralize the effects of airpower.
> ...



Before responding, please consider the adtual definition of the term 'straw man', so we're at least on the same page on that: "fallacy based on misrepresentation of an opponent's position."

Moreover in the same vein, consider my actual argument, really try to please, if the consistent strawmen and tangents aren't deliberate but I just haven't really gotten it across.

I say fighter-fighter kill ratio's are an important measure of fighter unit effectiveness, in air combat.
-not the only measure of fighter unit effectiveness, which includes both a/c and all human aspects of the fighter unit itself (training, tactics, leadership, morale, etc)
-not a direct measure of the combat effectiveness of fighter airplanes, though in some cases we can make certain inferences in this regard (eg if units of the same or ostensibly similar air arms using two different fighter a/c types have significantly different kill ratio's v the same or similar opposing fighter forces, we might infer that differing effectiveness of the two fighter types is part of the reason; OTOH if completely different air arms use different fighters v completely different opposition, we probably can't make any such inference)
-not the measure of all larger issues of air power, and certainly not of completely unrelated things like the success of uescorted bombers, obviously unrelated to *fighter-fighter* kill ratio's.
By point
1. I guess you mean fighter losses to opposing fighters are a small % of losses. But sometimes this was true, other times not. It's certainly not axiomatic. One contentious debate of the past is Zeroes v Spitfires over Darwin in 1943 and we saw in that case going through the JNAF 202nd AG's combat reports one by one that *none* of their losses were due to known operational/accidental causes. All 4 a/c lost in the campaign failed to return or ditched in cases where there were (multiple) Spitfire claims to account for (each of) them, and we assume all 4 were air combat losses.

And, in cases where fighter units suffered heavy losses to AA on ground attack missions, this seems to me pretty apparently not related to 'fighter unit effectiveness in air combat'. 
2. Straw man, meaning, I never once said in any of these discussions, ever, that fighter-fighter kill ratio's were strictly a function of a/c performance.
3. That statement itself is a straw man, by you, meaning, I never said 'kill loss ratios can act independantly so as to neutralize the effects of airpower.' whatever that even means...
4. *You* said airpower alone didn't *determine* the outcome of wars, and I said that was obvious. I never said it didn't *affect* the outcome of wars, and in any case it's irrelevant to my argument about fighter-fighter kill ratio's, please review it again, above.
5. This is again irrelevant to my argument. If fighters and fighter units are a small enough factor in the outcome of wars, we needn't discuss fighters or fighter units at all. But if we do discuss them, to the *extent they are important*, then fighter-fighter kill ratio's are an important measure of fighter unit air combat effectiveness. This kind of argument you make is simply illogical, sorry. One side says 'metric X is important in determining the effectiveness of unit Y' and you respond, 'the effectiveness of unit Y is not that dominant in larger issue Z'. The response just doesn't address the first point.
6. Again Finnish war aims are one topic, the effectiveness of Finnish fighter units another topic. Discussing the latter topic does not logically imply that it somehow substitutes for or overrides the first topic. But if we discuss Finnish fighter unit effectiveness, one salient measure is the typically high fighter-fighter exchange ratio they achieved v the Soviets.
7. Again a straw man, meaning, I have never argued that cumulative attrition or ability to make good on it is not an important factor in the outcomes of air campaigns. That said, if the LW fighter units had been less relatively effective, had had a 1:1 or even unfavorable air combat exchange ratio v Soviet fighter units, the LW's problems would have been a lot bigger.
8. Organizational and training problems in fighter units are part of fighter unit effectiveness, of which fighter-fighter kill ratio is one important measure.
9. A good illustration of the fallacy of that argument is RAF fighter sweeps over France in 1940-42. The RAF fighters suffered a consistently, sometime highly, unfavorable kill ratio v LW fighters based on their 'confirmed victories'. Fooling oneself about the kill ratio might instead lead one to believe the enemy has resources to replace losses that he doesn't actually have, because most of the losses you assume aren't actually happening. But in that case Ultra intercepts allowed the British to realize that the confirmed victories were a serious exaggeration of actual German fighter losses, though not which particular claims were overclaims, and of course nobody's personal victory credits were ever revoked on that basis, they all still stand officially. But still the British could plan and proceed on a realistic assessment of the actual kill ratio. But according the logic of your argument, that kill ratio only mattered because the British were able through code breaking to estimate it accurately. If they had had to go just on their pilots 'confirmed' claims, and maintained an unrealistic view of RAF's actual kill ratio v LW in that period, it wouldn't have mattered, because it wouldn't have seemed as much a problem... I think the illogic of that is pretty clear, I hope it is anyway.

Joe


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## parsifal (Aug 3, 2012)

Joe

You are talking about fighter effeectiveness, i am talking about airpower effectiveness. Theren lies the reason for pur diferent opinions

Dress up the term 'straw man" however you like, in my country that is an extremely demeaning and derogatory statement to make. I do take offense to you using it. My position is not a straw man, and you know it, you just want to ratchet up the heat to hopefully start a fire. you should know by now that I am hard to ignite, though i will rfute your essentially proagandist claims every time i see them.


There are too many points in your last post to motovate a full response from me, but a couple of things I do need to refute or clarify 



> This is again irrelevant to my argument. If fighters and fighter units are a small enough factor in the outcome of air wars, or wars in total, we needn't discuss fighters or fighter units at all. But if we do discuss them, to the *extent they are important*, then fighter-fighter kill ratio's are an important measure of fighter unit air combat effectiveness. This kind of argument you make is simply illogical, sorry. One side says 'metric X is important in determining the effectiveness of unit Y' and you respond, 'the effectiveness of unit Y is not that dominant in larger issue Z'. The response just doesn't answer the first point, it's talking past it



Insofar as fighter unit effectiveness goes, loss ratios are relevant. insofar as the role of fightes are concerned, they are a factor, but not the only factor. Reason i say that is that fighters dont have to (always) actually shoot anything down in order to be effective. Fighters are sent somewhere for a purpose, usually to protect something. A good case in point might be the fighters protecting "pedestal". Using your argument as the measure of success, the allied fighters did okay, but not outstandingly. they shot down 28 Axis aircraft, and lost 31 (19 in air combat) in return. However that is not the measure success that should be applied. the fighters primary mission in that operation was to get a convoy through to Malta, and also protect the remaining carriers in the RN TG. They were outsnadingly successful on both counts. the success of the convoy operation IMO ssealed the fait of Panzerarmee Afrika and ledd to the losses of literally hundreds of thousands of axis tropps, and the eventual defeat of the Italians. not directly, but because of the force multiplieying effect of the airpower based on malta. that effect was made posible by the efforts of those 70 fighters, but had nothing to do with their kill ratios.

I am not saying that kill ratios for measuring fighters importance is not a factor i am saying it is not the only measure, and am also saying that kill loss ratios as a measure or airpower effeectiveness is generally unimportant. 




> Again a straw man, meaning, I have never argued that cumulative attrition or ability to make good on it is not an important factor in the outcomes of air campaigns. That said, if the LW fighter units had been less relatively effective, had had an even or unfavorable air combat exchange ratio v Soviet fighter units, the LW's problems would have been a lot bigger.


And again i think you are wrong, and this is no strwaw man argument. The efforts of the LW fighters, courageous and impressive as they are, on the eastern front they had no effect. because the front was so exapansive, soviet losses whilst heavy, were never critical to the outcome of the battle. Soviet losses were due far more to issues other than the activities of the JGs, moreover, as time progressed the JGs were too thinly spread to make any difference to the outcome. This where it gets complicated....whilst they were inneffective, they were still needed....without them the Soviets could have attacked heer positions at will. So, rather like rations, ammunition and overcoats they were needed on the eastern front, but never were decisive or critical to the outcome. There was a reason why most JGs were used mostly as Jabos on the EF 



> I guess you mean what you said at the end of that bit, that fighter losses to causes other than opposing fighters are a small %. But sometimes this was true, other times not, it's certainly not axiomatic. Again a contentious debate of the past is Zeroes v Spitfires over Darwin in 1943 and we saw in that case going through the JNAF 202nd AG's combat reports one by one that *none* of their losses were due to known operational/accident causes. All 4 a/c lost in the campaign failed to return or ditched in cases where there were (a multiple) of Spitfire claims to account for them, and we reasonably assume all 4 were air combat losses




We have had this debate before and one of the fundamental problems with your position on this is that not all the records are available on the japanese side, and you simply will not accept that there is even the slightest possibility that some errors may exist in those japanese records that you have consulted. However, having said that, i am not denying that the losses over darwin were one sided and a heavy loss for the RAAF and USAAC forces involved. Iam also not going to debate with you again the dogmas that you hold to, but suffice it to say that my silence on the matter is not an acceptance of your research....its a resignation that your belief in your own infallibilities is unshakeable. What is contentious is that spitfires were not only engaging Zekes (and infact not just the 202 kokutai either), something you and i have locked horns over before today. The weaknesses of the spitfire are pretty well brought out in these encounters, and in fact reinforce what i am arguing with you about. Overwhelmingly, Spitfire losses had little to do with enemy action and a lot to do with the operational limitations of the type.......how many spits were lost simply because they ran out of fuel, or crashed on the rough strips that they were based on???? In other words, the losses were going to happen as soon as the type left the ground in that environment, regardless of the types other effectiveness. This says volumes about what happens to fighters when they just fly.....they suffer losses just like everyone. In the end, also, the Spitfires were there for a reason, and they achieved that mission. darwin as a base was protected, and pressure on the japanese in the indies was maintained. That IMO is a far relevant measure of success or failure than some questionable kill loss ratio between the fighters. But again, it s because you want to narrow the argument and look solely at fighter effectiveness in air combat, whereas i am looking at overall airpower effectiveness


*



Kill loss ratios are irrelevant if they are not of concern to the protagonists suffering them

Click to expand...

*


> A good illustration of the fallacy of that argument is RAF fighter sweeps over France in 1940-42. The RAF fighters suffered a consistently, sometime highly, unfavorable kill ratio v LW fighters based on their 'confirmed victories'. Fooling oneself about the kill ratio might instead lead one to believe the enemy has resources to replace losses that he doesn't actually have, because the losses you assume aren't actually happening. But in that case Ultra intercepts allowed the British to realize that the confirmed victories were serious exaggerations of actual German losses, though not which particular ones were overclaims, and of course nobody's personal victory credits were ever revoked on that basis, they all still stand officially. But the British could plan and proceed on a realistic basis. But according the logic of your argument, that kill ratio only mattered because the British were able through code breaking to estimate it accurately. If they had had to go just on their pilots 'confirmed' claims, the kill ratio wouldn't have mattered, because it wouldn't have seemed a problem... I think the illogic there is pretty clear, I sure hope so anyway




How on earth does what you have said in reply relate to the statement I have made. And sorry to burst your comfortable little bubble, but in fact the claimed heavy losses suffered by the RAF at that time in those operations only reinforces my argument about how irrelevant kill loss ratios can be, not the other way around. The stated strategic purposes of those sweeps was to draw up the LW, and thereby lend the greates possible assistance to the Russians. The second objectives was to force LW bomber and antishipping units away from the coast and thereby reduce losses to shipping around the british isles. Without going into the detail the RAF was highly successful in that. thirdly, a stated objective was to close the channel to axis shipping whilst keeping it open for themselves. again successful. lastly the objectives was to deny the axis easy access to British airspace, and to gain air superiority over the british isles and the coastal regions of western europe. The RAF was fully successful in terms of controlling british skies, partially successful in gaining control of the skies over western europe. If kill loss ratios had played any part in strategic thinking, the RAF would have abandoned those sweeps in a flash, they didnt,partly because of raw british pig headedness, but also because the losses were serving a higher, more important purpose, which was judged worth the cost....cheap and expendable....remeber that...


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## JoeB (Aug 3, 2012)

stona said:


> 1. To touch briefly on an earlier point I think that an analyasis of any of the air campaigns fought in WW2 would show that the killing (or loss in any way) of highly and expensively trained aircrew had a more important bearing on the outcome than the destruction of the aircraft. Simplistically they were harder to replace.
> 
> 2. FWIW I agree with Greg that properly collated kill ratios could give a valid comparison of two aircraft as long as all the other factors,type of operation,crew training etc,are not forgotten. Sadly this sort of data is simply not available for WW2 aircraft.


1. If we have the date to accurately collate a/c kill ratio's, we have the data to accurately collate pilot loss ratio's in air combat. The latter is generally easier in fact, because it doesn't involve the same judgement calls of whether crashlanded shot up planes were repaired and whether they should count or not either way. And even in the absence of complete records, comrades and families remembered who had been killed and usually dates and general circumstances, and they would also be included in higher level records which didn't deal with particular a/c losses (records of decorations and so forth). For example we know pretty accurately which JAAF fighter pilots were lost in each of the early Pac War campaigns, the names, dates and general circumstances. We don't know in all those campaigns the JAAF fighter a/c losses by incident. For example in the first Philippine campaign that info doesn't exist except for one combat, though it does for JNAF fighter units in that campaign and every other one into 1943. Therfore we can't state a figther-fighter kill ratio for USAAF v JAAF in PI, though we could state a pilot exchange rate in combat.

So I don't disagree with this point exactly, but don't see a big difference in the process of assembling accurate plane v pilot loss ratio's. Virtually any time you can do the first, you can do the second, and each person could decide which is more relevant. Though again I would reiterate, I would look at fighter-fighter kill ratio's as *one* important measure of which unit was the more effective in air combat, and I think it's of interest and relevant to that how effective each side was in downing opposing fighters, not killing pilots per se. 

The latter tends to be affected more by specific circumstances (who is farther over whose territory for example, since POW pilots are 'lost' for the duration) and extraneous factors (who has a good air-sea rescue service for example, again related to distance). This is exactly some people's (albeit situational logic) complaint about a/c kill ratio's, that they are (supposedly) too much affected by specific circumstances not directly related to fighter unit effectiveness (though actually in many cases the prevailing kill ratio of one opponent v another were shown not to vary dramatically in different circumstances, eg. F4F v Zero in carrier battles v G'canal defense, two pretty different circumstances, was essentially the same; Bf109 ratio's over British fighters in Med which were actually lower in the supposedly 'advantageous situation' as escorts over Malta than as interceptors mainly over the Western Desert).

But was a higher pilot loss rate despite a 1:1 kill ratio important? (again over G'canal that was the case, and in New Guinea summer 1942 the JNAF had a big kill ratio advantage but a definitely narrower pilot loss ratio advantage) sure, nobody said to look at only one thing ever.

2. I don't know which info you believe is not available. Detailed two sided accounts from original records of combats in the WW's and Korea, making generally quite clear which a/c and pilots were lost in which circumstances, are certainly very often available, though not always.

Joe


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## stona (Aug 3, 2012)

parsifal said:


> The "airpower is expendable" argument does not wash in the post war environment....aircraft have vastly increased in cost and complexity, aircrew have become highly trained, hard to replace personnel, so any loss is a serious loss. Under those circumstances, loss rates do take on a greater significance



The same applied in WW2.
At 1943 prices a Lancaster crewman cost £10,000 pounds to train. The aircraft cost about £40,000. To arm,fuel and service it for a typical mission cost £13,000. It has been estimated that the cost of a typical Lancaster sortie to the British economy was a staggering £100,000. 
Was this worth it? The war would probably have been won without a single Lancaster sortie. Imagine those resources being spent elsewhere.
Cheers
Steve


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## parsifal (Aug 3, 2012)

stona said:


> The same applied in WW2.
> At 1943 prices a Lancaster crewman cost £10,000 pounds to train. The aircraft cost about £40,000. To arm,fuel and service it for a typical mission cost £13,000. It has been estimated that the cost of a typical Lancaster sortie to the British economy was a staggering £100,000.
> Was this worth it? The war would probably have been won without a single Lancaster sortie. Imagine those resources being spent elsewhere.
> Cheers
> Steve



Ah nope...it was trending that way, but there is no comparison to modern aircraft costs and pilot training and those of WWII. Whats the average cost of the JSF, last time i looked it was 130 million US per copy or something obscene like that. If an average wage is assumed to be $50000 pa, thats the equivalent of 260 years of wages

back in the day of the lanc, the average yearly wages (in Australia) was about 500 pounds per year. That means that it took 80 years of average wages to field a lanc.

The effectiveness of the bombing campaign is a whle diffrent world of debate, but suffice it to say that despite the losses, it was deemed to be worth the cost. i do have some doubts as to the wisdom of that decision, but just the same, the losses were not sufficient to deter the british. That reinforces the argument that kill/loss ratioos were not important in the strategic decision, not the other way around. and certainly, if the decision to send the bombers over might be questionable, how much moreso is it for the germans to build and maintain forces to counter it. 

dont forget the losses being suffered by the NJGs fighting them, and the costs in the flak firing at them.....10-20% of the NJGs force structure was simply falling out of the sky each month combatting those heavy bombers (amounting to about 37% of the RMs fighter budget overall) , and 16000 rounds per kill at an average cost of 85RM per round. 400 barrel failures per month (not sure of the cost) The flak expenditure alone is 13000 RM per kill for a start, then we have the costs of the flak artillerie, and attrition there...maybe 4000 rm per kill . and then there is the actual damage they the bombers caused.....about 17-25% of german GDP was lost to RAF bombing in 1944-5.


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## Milosh (Aug 3, 2012)

stona said:


> The same applied in WW2.
> At 1943 prices a Lancaster crewman cost £10,000 pounds to train. The aircraft cost about £40,000. To arm,fuel and service it for a typical mission cost £13,000. It has been estimated that the cost of a typical Lancaster sortie to the British economy was a staggering £100,000.
> Was this worth it? The war would probably have been won without a single Lancaster sortie. Imagine those resources being spent elsewhere.
> Cheers
> Steve



The only consistent is 'arm,fuel and service'. For every sortie the Lanc flew the cost of the a/c and training of the crew would be lower. If the a/c flew 10 sorties then the cost would be £4,000 per sortie and training £1,000.


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## hurricane55 (Aug 3, 2012)

The Brewster Buffalo is commonly known as a major disappointment and failure, but the kill ratio suggests the opposite! Despite being vastly underrated in American service, in Finnish service it had a very high kill ratio of 32.1 aganst the Soviets. Major coincidence? Maybe, but highly unlikely. Maybe the Buffalo is not so bad after all.


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## stona (Aug 4, 2012)

A rough calculation of relative prices,based on average salary,house prices etc gives the value of a brand new Lancaster in 1943 as about £1.6million.

7377 were built at a cost of roughly £12,000,000,000. That's 12 of our UK billions. How does that compare with the cost of the relative handful of modern fighters any air force will order?
Britain will now purchase a mere 40 F-35s at a cost of £5,200,000,000 (5.2 of our billions). I believe the Australian government has "postponed" its first order. Very sensible IMHO. 

We need to compare the total investment,not unit cost.

In a major cold war conflict,as envisaged by legions of cold war planners you would start with a certain number of assets with little prospect of producing more in the timeframe of the conflict.

Cheers

Steve


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## buffnut453 (Aug 4, 2012)

hurricane55 said:


> The Brewster Buffalo is commonly known as a major disappointment and failure, but the kill ratio suggests the opposite! Despite being vastly underrated in American service, in Finnish service it had a very high kill ratio of 32.1 aganst the Soviets. Major coincidence? Maybe, but highly unlikely. Maybe the Buffalo is not so bad after all.



Unfortunately, that's the "claim ratio" (ie claims to losses) not the kill ratio. As we've discussed at length on this thread, determining the actual kill-to-loss ratio is almost impossible unless you can state with 100% certainty the causes for losses on both sides in every single engagement. Even then there are differences of opinion (at least in this thread) over what constitutes a "kill" - is an aircraft that is damaged in combat but returns to base only to crash there a kill? Per the "standard" definition, it's not but it's still a loss to that side.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 4, 2012)

stona said:


> A rough calculation of relative prices,based on average salary,house prices etc gives the value of a brand new Lancaster in 1943 as about £1.6million.
> 
> 7377 were built at a cost of roughly £12,000,000,000. That's 12 of our UK billions. How does that compare with the cost of the relative handful of modern fighters any air force will order?
> Britain will now purchase a mere 40 F-35s at a cost of £5,200,000,000 (5.2 of our billions). I believe the Australian government has "postponed" its first order. Very sensible IMHO.
> ...



Hard to compare in that perspective as most of the cost of a modern combat aircraft involves avionics. You also have to consider the life span of the Lancaster (the example you showed) compared to the investment. You can try to make the same comparison with the B-52(50 years in service and counting) but would also have to factor in costs for modifications.

It's a bit simplistic to compare costs and investment of WW2 aircraft to modern combat aircraft where you have aircraft being built today who's ejection seat is more complicated than an entire airframe of the same era!


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## stona (Aug 4, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> It's a bit simplistic to compare costs and investment of WW2 aircraft to modern combat aircraft where you have aircraft being built today who's ejection seat is more complicated than an entire airframe of the same era!



I couldn't agree more.

We'd have to start a thread on the economics of WW2 to make any kind of meaningful analysis and that would involve a LOT of statistics 

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Aug 4, 2012)

The whole point of that subdiscussion about cost was that a/c in the modern environment are no longer "cheap and expendable". They werent exactly cheap in WWII either, but I think the point is made that compared to the modern situation they were a lot cheaper (per unit) as a proportion of available resources......Each loss counted for less as a proportion of total resources than a modern day airframe and its crew


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## wmaxt (Aug 5, 2012)

What one must include when talking about the value of airframes and pilots are

1. Pilots are always harder to replace that airframes a fighter may be built is a couple of days a good pilot needs 5 weeks of just basic training.
2. In a war cost is not an issue as its all in or lose the war.

Bill


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## buffnut453 (Aug 5, 2012)

Agree with your first point but not your second. "All in" essentially means leveraging the entire national capacity for the war effort but if your country's total capacity is less than your opponents then it will, ultimately, become an issue and you start cutting corners by reducing training or using non-strategic materials (sounds an awful lot like certain countries during WW2 to me!).


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## stona (Aug 5, 2012)

wmaxt said:


> 1. Pilots are always harder to replace that airframes a fighter may be built is a couple of days a good pilot needs 5 weeks of just basic training.
> Bill



Yes and no. 
A WW2 fighter could be built relatively quickly (days) but it was a very simple machine. 
A modern combat aircraft takes very much longer. That's why I said that in the context of a modern,cold war type of conflict you would not be able to replace assets in the timeframe of the conflict. Your initial investment in aircraft was all you'd have to fight the war with.

Cheers

Steve


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 5, 2012)

stona said:


> Yes and no.
> A WW2 fighter could be built relatively quickly (days) but it was a very simple machine.
> A *modern combat aircraft takes very much longer*. That's why I said that in the context of a modern,cold war type of conflict you would not be able to replace assets in the timeframe of the conflict. Your initial investment in aircraft was all you'd have to fight the war with.
> 
> ...



Not really - depending on the airframe and availability of long lead time items, it's a lot quicker than you think. In the 1980s I seen 2 P-3Cs a month being built. 

A newly minted combat pilot these days takes a year to complete training at the expense of about 7 million dollars and I think those numbers have grown some...


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## GregP (Aug 5, 2012)

I thought this thread was about fighter kill ratios, not airpower effectiveness or the cost of aircraft and crew training. JoeB, me, and a few others feel that the kill ratio is a good measure of the effectiveness of the combination of aircraft, pilot training / skill / tactical situation at the time, and weather ... all combined, plus maybe the relative effectiveness of the enemy's fighters and pilots, etc. assuming we can get the data reliably. Some we can and some we can't.

Parsifal and others argue it is not a measure of anything; we simply disagree. I think we'll have to just disagree since we feel that kill ratio does indicate something to us, and it's OK to disagree. I don't really think either of us will convince the other to change views.

Somehow we got from kill ratios to the Brewster Buffalo. Buffnut argues that the Fins deserve theie own kill ratio due to their claims, despite the fact that they only operated 44 Buffalos out of the more than 500 produced. I responded that any "kill ratio" should be from a sample that comprises at least 75 % of the fighters employed in combat. We still get arguments about the Fin's kill ratio being the number for all the Buffalos. Sorry, won't wash. The Fins may have been wildly successful, but the other 90+% of Buffalos weren't, and thier record covers a LOT more ground with the Buffalo. I use the kll ratio for the Hellcat un US Navy service because they operated a sample of about 90% of the Hellcats employed in WWII, and shot down several thousand enemy planes ... 5,271 to be exact. It wasn't a sample of 50 Hellcats, it was most of them, about 11,000 in fact. The British operated abouit 1,263 Hellcats out of 12,263 produced, so their experience with Hellcats was, on a percantage basis alone, about what the Fins percentage of Buffalos experience was.

The Netherlands East Indies operated Buffalos at the start of the war. They took delivery of 71; just less than twice the number the Fins had. They achieved some 11 - 15 kills, lost 34+ in air combat, and 15+ on the ground plus some 5 or so operationally. That kill ratio in air-to-air combat alone, again, almost twice the percentage sample of the Fins, is about 0.32 : 1; or 1 / 100 as good as the Fins experienced. The Buffalos didn't serve past the March 1942 surrender of the Netherlans East Indies, but the balance that were rescuable were transferred to the USAAF.

The Buffalo in US service didn't survivie much past Midway in combat use; it was taken out of service as rapidly as possible. They were transferred back to the States and used as advanced fighter trainers. 

The Fins could probably have shot down the early Soviet aircraft if they were flying Tiger Moths. The fact that they flew Buffalos does not pull the performance of the rest of the Buffalo up to even acceptable levels, but it DOES show what can be done using good pilots flying poor aircraft against a completely ineffective foe flying outdated equipment.


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## stona (Aug 5, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Not really - depending on the airframe and availability of long lead time items, it's a lot quicker than you think. In the 1980s I seen 2 P-3Cs a month being built.
> 
> A newly minted combat pilot these days takes a year to complete training at the expense of about 7 million dollars and I think those numbers have grown some...



It took Bae Systems more than a year to knock out a Tornado!

That is not a government stastistic but a comment from my brother in law who used to build and overhaul them.

Steve


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 5, 2012)

stona said:


> *It took Bae Systems more than a year to knock out a Tornado!*
> 
> That is not a government stastistic but a comment from my brother in law who used to build and overhaul them.
> 
> Steve



What was the contract flow rate? What was the production flow rate if the line was accelerated? Lockheed by contract was told to accelerate the P-3C production flow around 1981 if I remember correctly. We could have done as many as 4 a month if long lead time items were available. Normally we would deliver one every 45 days.

Just because a company is only producing one aircraft a year doesn't mean it could not be produced quicker. Production flow rates are contract driven depending on lead time times and the customer's ability to deliver progress payments for the aircraft being produced.

BTW, I worked on the P-3, L1011 and B-2 production lines so I speak from personal experience.


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## stona (Aug 5, 2012)

I didn't mean they produced one a year,just that each one took a year. I know there were problems and delays waiting for components and sub-assemblies to come in from other parts of the group. Panavia is a European consortium,not a single company.
Cheers
Steve


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## vinnye (Aug 5, 2012)

Kill ratios can be very badly skewed by the quality of the opposing aircraft and / or the quality of the opposition pilots and their tactics.
Hence the Bf109 had some good kill ratios - against bi-planes in Spain and Poland fe example.
Yes it is a superb fighter but benefited from being before its time / ahead of most of the other current fighters.
It also benefited from poor RAF tactics - use of Vic formation rather than finger four. New pilots often were lost because they were trying to hold formation rather than looking for enemy machines.
Also in the Pacific, the Japanese pilots sometimes took on antiquated planes and poor tactics - and hence had lots of success.
The boot was firmly on the other foot at the Turkey shoot.
So kill ratios are only a very crude measure of an aircrafts ability.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 5, 2012)

stona said:


> I didn't mean they produced one a year,just that each one took a year.


Is this an oxymoron? How long did it take to roll one on the flight line?!?!?


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## stona (Aug 6, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Is this an oxymoron? How long did it take to roll one on the flight line?!?!?



There were more than one in production at any one time,I have no idea how many but there would be several aircraft in various states moving through the plant.

For the second part I'm only repeating what I was told. Each aircraft took more than a year to produce.

This isn't my field,it is my brother in law who worked (retired earlier this year) for Bae systems and its predecessors,in his case British Aerospace, for 35 years.

It's a family affair,his cousin and nephew both still work at Samlesbury/Wharton. Maybe not for much longer the way things are going.

Cheers

Steve


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 6, 2012)

stona said:


> There were more than one in production at any one time,I have no idea how many but there would be several aircraft in various states moving through the plant.
> 
> For the second part I'm only repeating what I was told. Each aircraft took more than a year to produce.
> 
> ...



All good - I worked for BAE as well....

Bottom line, if the MOD needed the production line to move faster I'm sure that BAE "Could Have" built more than one Tornado a year. 

BTW, the first F-22 was delivered in 2003, the last one in 2011. 183 aircraft were produced - do the math! And I would bet a weeks' pay that the F-22 was way more complicated to build than the Tornado.


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## Vincenzo (Aug 6, 2012)

on GregP question on samples dimension
it's not the number of airplane built/delivered the important number, but the number of missions fly and i think that finnish buffalos flying more missions of dutch buffalos


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## VBF-13 (Sep 5, 2012)

GregP said:


> The F6F Hellcat did have a 19 : 1 kill ratio. It was the best piston fighter kill ratio of all times. The next best was down around 12 : 1. That was the Corsair.


Our planes shot down some 6500 Japanese planes and some 80% of those were at the hands of our F6Fs in just the two years the F6Fs saw combat. That's unprecedented.


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## stockyEdwards1940 (May 21, 2015)

What about the spitfires kill death ratio throughout the whole war? All I know is the tempest had a kd of 7:1


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## GregP (May 21, 2015)

How do you know that? Ive seen a list of British aces, but the list shows names, not what plane they flew. Most aces who made kills generally flew more than one type fighter in combat ... if they survived that long.

If you have a list of what planes were flown by whom and how many died in them and when, could you post it so we can see the data? I've been looking for data like this for years ...


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## Koopernic (May 22, 2015)

Some of these super high kill ratios I am reading about here are surely 'claims' rather than confirmed kills or kills confirmed by post war research that had access to the former enemies records and personnel. A claimed kill typically reduces to 50% when matched up against actual losses in the European theatre.


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## GregP (May 22, 2015)

The only nation that did a post-war study to validate aerial victories was the U.S.A.. It is detailed in USAAF Study 85 and by a Navy study document. In the PTO, it was MUCH easier to keep track of victories since it was usually 4 - 8 versus 4 - 8 - 12 rather than many hunderds of planes going at each other as in the ETO. It was determined that the verified victories over the ocean, with fewer distractions was quite accurate atfer the early days.

So the kill ratio of the Hellcat is almost certainly VERY accurate since the Hellcats were mostly engaged in the PTO with many fewer enemies than were the P-51's in the ETO with not only many enemies, but also competition from bomber gunners and AAA.

The 19 : 1 kill ratio is real and is formulatged from a population of more than 90% of all Hellcats operated in the war. You should not look a a kill ratio for a mission or a group, but for a type that is represented by more than 50 - 60% of the planes flown in the war.

A sinlge plane flown by a single man can have 1 or more kills and still retun home for an infinite kill ratio. But 60+% of the planes of that type will not have that same luck. Take a "representative sample" and go from there.

The apologists for the Finns' record with the Buffalo fall into a classic mathematical trap ... the sample consisting of just the Finns is NOT a random sample, rendering the math completely invalid. The only way to get a random sample is to actually collect all the sorties flown by the Buffalo and choose some random sample from that population. I'd want any sample more than 50% to put a lot of faith in it, but even a 20 - 30% sample will show what the Buffalo did in much more real terms than choosing the Finnish Air Force alone.

Ditto the FM-2. It belongs in the sample of results from Wildcats since it was a Wildcat.

If you follow correct procedures, the Hellcat emerges on top ... at least until the F-15 Eagle showed up.

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## Koopernic (May 22, 2015)

FLYBOYJ said:


> What was the contract flow rate? What was the production flow rate if the line was accelerated? Lockheed by contract was told to accelerate the P-3C production flow around 1981 if I remember correctly. We could have done as many as 4 a month if long lead time items were available. Normally we would deliver one every 45 days.
> 
> Just because a company is only producing one aircraft a year doesn't mean it could not be produced quicker. Production flow rates are contract driven depending on lead time times and the customer's ability to deliver progress payments for the aircraft being produced.
> 
> BTW, I worked on the P-3, L1011 and B-2 production lines so I speak from personal experience.



Contracts are often set by Government annual budgets. These sometimes seem absurd: for instance cutting down production of an aircraft by 20% in order to achieve at best a 5% reduction in overall cost. If the program is then stretched over a longer period, another tactic, the per unit cost of the aircraft goes up and the only thing that has been achieved is a reduced rate of deliver, higher cost although annual budget requirements may have been met. Overall it must be a bad bargain but it's probably done to keep a program intact as much as possible.

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## GregP (May 22, 2015)

From 15 years in the industry, it certainly IS done for that reason, with a LOT of justification.

Take the F-22 Raptor for instance. They shut down the line and reassigned or released the workers. If they wanted to restart it for some reason, it would be a whole new learning curve with very little in the way of productive savings from any previous knowledge accrued since the people who accrued that knowledge are not avilable, for the most part, to the new program.

Dito the C-17. When it shuts down, restarting it is as expensive as a new design with the exception of tooling, and that, as expensive as it is, is not a very big part of a production program.


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## Juha (May 22, 2015)

GregP said:


> How do you know that? Ive seen a list of British aces, but the list shows names, not what plane they flew. Most aces who made kills generally flew more than one type fighter in combat ... if they survived that long...




Simply going to squadron and wings data, ORBs and combat reports e.t.c. And in e.g. Chris Thomas' Christopher Shores' The Typhoon Tempest Story (1988 )there are all Typhoon and Tempest claims, some with info on the real LW losses, plus T T losses. 2 TAF claims and losses with some info on the LW real losses can be found from the more recent 2nd Tactical Air Force (4 vols) by the same authors. And then there are John Foreman's Fighter Command War Diaries (at least 5 vols) etc.

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## buffnut453 (May 22, 2015)

GregP said:


> In the PTO, it was MUCH easier to keep track of victories since it was usually 4 - 8 versus 4 - 8 - 12 rather than many hunderds of planes going at each other as in the ETO. It was determined that the verified victories over the ocean, with fewer distractions was quite accurate atfer the early days.



At face value your initial statement is logical, and certainly there was less opportunity for pilots from different units to claim the same enemy aircraft. However, positive confirmation of a victory over the ocean isn't any easier because all aircraft shot down disappear into the depths. Did the Navy study review Japanese loss records in formulating its assessment? If not, then the study is still flawed. Of course loss records aren't always available, particularly Japanese records of which many were destroyed during WWII. This means that any kill/loss ratio will have considerable margin of error.



GregP said:


> So the kill ratio of the Hellcat is almost certainly VERY accurate since the Hellcats were mostly engaged in the PTO with many fewer enemies than were the P-51's in the ETO with not only many enemies, but also competition from bomber gunners and AAA.



Maybe MORE accurate but not necessarily VERY accurate. The ratio is still prone to overclaiming by pilots who "saw" the enemy aircraft go down in flames but for which no loss was reported by the opposing side. Unfortunately, in the heat of the moment, people often see what they want to see. I'm not criticizing or demeaning personal accounts but they are, by their nature, flawed. There are numerous accounts of fighter pilots seeing a puff of smoke then the enemy aircraft dive down and so they claimed a kill when, in reality, the puff of smoke was from the application of power by the enemy pilot and the dive was simply an evasion manoeuvre. 



GregP said:


> The 19 : 1 kill ratio is real and is formulatged from a population of more than 90% of all Hellcats operated in the war. You should not look a a kill ratio for a mission or a group, but for a type that is represented by more than 50 - 60% of the planes flown in the war.



Sadly no more real than any other kill/loss ratio - more of a claims/loss ratio. 



GregP said:


> The apologists for the Finns' record with the Buffalo fall into a classic mathematical trap ... the smaple consiting of just the Finns is NOT a random sample, rendering the math completely invlaid. The only way to get a random sample is to actually collect all the sorties flown by the Buffalo and choose some random sample from that population. I'd want any sample more than 50% to put a lot of faith in it, but even a 20 - 30% sample will show what the Buffalo did in much more real terms than choosing the Finnish Air Force alone.



Firstly, I'm not sure why anyone needs to be an apologist for the Finns' fighting record during WWII. They were brave, resourceful and supremely effective. 

I agree we shouldn't take the Finns as a representative group but, unfortunately for your argument, even when you throw in the Brits, the Dutch and the US Marines, the poor old Buffalo still comes out with a claim/loss ratio of around 23:1. That said, all such claim/loss statistics still have a wide margin of error and are so dependent on local operational and tactical conditions as to be of little real value.

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## GregP (May 22, 2015)

Combat reports are claims, not vetted, real victories. Typhoon and Tempest story is probably pretty good about the planes, but the kills are claims from the British side. And since there are NO studies done of Germany's REAL losses, how can John Foreman's volumes be anything but claims? I have a list of German claims that is basically as complete as yoiu can get, but some have been lost. For instance, I can verify most of Erich Hartmann's claims, but not all from the claims list.

If there are vetted lists of German, Japanese, and Soviet losses and/or victories ... I'd surely like to see them or purchase a copy for myself. Heck, I'd like to see an authoritative list of losses and victories from France, Finland, Poland ... any country other than the U.S.A.

I already have the U.S.A.'s vetted lists in the form of the official military reports, and they aren't everything you'd want. The USAAF Report doesn't list the plane the victor was flying or the victim type and the Navy report is not exactly hopeless, but doesn't list kills by name ... only by type. So they vetted wqhat the Hellcat shot down, for instance, but do not have a list of victories credited to particular pilots. You can back into that list other ways, but the totals, though close, are not entirely equal. You can see what was the probably overall truth, but it's tough to attrubute exact U.S. Navy kills to individuals like you can with the USAAF Report 85.


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## buffnut453 (May 22, 2015)

GregP said:


> Combat reports are claims, not vetted, real victories. Typhoon and Tempest story is probably pretty good about the planes, but the kills are claims from the British side. And since there are NO studies done of Germany's REAL losses, how can John Foreman's volumes be anything but claims? I have a list of German claims that is basically as complete as yoiu can get, but some have been lost. For instance, I can verify most of Erich Hartmann's claims, but not all from the claims list.
> 
> If there are vetted lists of German, Japanese, and Soviet losses and/or victories ... I'd surely like to see them or purchase a copy for myself. Heck, I'd like to see an authoritative list of losses and victories from France, Finland, Poland ... any country other than the U.S.A.
> 
> I already have the U.S.A.'s vetted lists in the form of the official military reports, and they aren't everything you'd want. The USAAF Report doesn't list the plane the victor was flying or the victim type and the Navy report is not exactly hopeless, but doesn't list kills by name ... only by type. So they vetted wqhat the Hellcat shot down, for instance, but do not have a list of victories credited to particular pilots. You can back into that list other ways, but the totals, though close, are not entirely equal. You can see what was the probably overall truth, but it's tough to attrubute exact U.S. Navy kills to individuals like you can with the USAAF Report 85.



Not sure how you can discuss statistical and measurement errors and "truth" in the same breath. The USAAF and USN reports are statistical summaries not "truth" (whatever that means). They may indicate a general trend or identify issues of note but to define the numbers as a "truth" is stretching things considerably. The data just aren't there to support the claim. If the reports had 100% of all records from both sides, and all records were 100% accurate then we could claim it as truth...but this is the real world and I'd say to claim we have even 60% of the necessary data is an overstatement.


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## mhuxt (May 22, 2015)

USAF Historical Study is available here

http://www.afhra.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-090601-121.pdf

and it's a list of approved claims, not of claims which were later linked to actual losses.

Frank Olynyk's books are more complete (aircraft type etc), but a) it's still claims as approved and b), Olynyk's books are as rare as hen's teeth, though apparently he may re-publish at some point.


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## GregP (May 22, 2015)

Not sure at all where you're coming from, Buffnut.

The USAAF Study 85 and the Navy report are the ONLY reports done after WWII thaht even tried to connect the claimed victories with enemy admitted losses. If they aren't as close to truth as you can get given the circumstances of WWII, then there are NO true victory files anywhere in the world, and discussing it is worthless.

I know of no other studies done by any other country that approach the USAAF and US Navy reports. I DO have claims files for all the other countries except for four. But claims are very inaccurate in theaters where large number of aircraft were engaged with one another in conjunction with bomber gunners and AAA.

If you don't think these reports are at least very close, you have no argument on anything concerning victories anywhere at all. I definitely think the US Navy report is VERY close and the USAAF Studay 85 report is as close as they can come given the evidence they could look at. That is, almost by definition, as good a victory list as can be generated by a miltary service or by anyone else. They looked at claims, admitted losses, dates, positions, times, altitudes, and correlated them as best they could. Can't think of a better way to do it even now.


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## buffnut453 (May 22, 2015)

Greg,

I'm simply taking issue with some of the terminology you're using. I'm not disagreeing that the reports may be as good as anyone is going to get...but they have some major holes and "close as you can get" may still be a very, VERY long way from "truth", "accurate" or "real". You "think" the Navy report is very accurate but what is that belief based on? Does the report quantify where gaps existed in the data? 

Personally, I do find kill/loss ratios meaningless because comparing the Hellcat's ratio with that of the Me109 doesn't actually tell us anything about the relative performances of the 2 types. There are so many variable factors that reducing combat capability to a simple ratio seems trite (to me at least).

Cheers,
B-N

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## drgondog (May 22, 2015)

The ETO approach to claims review IMO was the best with respect to packaging the Encounter reports and available film and sending them to the Victory Credit Board to personally verify based on third party and theoretically objective review. The 8th VCB downgraded destroyed claims to Probable or Damaged and in some cases Nada when either a personal witness failed to attest to the observed destruction or the film failed to confirm a blow up, a ball of fire, a loss of wing or fuselage break up - or pilot bailed out.

The 8th AF VCB did contain not only all the claims by pilot name, serial number, date, enemy a/c type and associated award from the board as well as the VCM Report number. The USAF 85 packaged all of this and parsed the 8th VCB for duplicates (many but not massive to the overall total of records) then extracted what was left into 85 for the ETO. In my long and personal deep dive into the 8th and 9th AF as well as comparison to the Tony Woods LW Victory Credits compilation as well as parsing the many squadron histories of Dr. Prien, I would estimate about a 90% match of AAF ETO VC's (fighters) to losses reported by the LW through 1944. 

I am not aware of any theatre, or combat org that was as rigorous as the ETO VC boards and that includes especially the USN/USMC for which I have not seen evidence of a documented process undertaken by each of the command authorities to perform the same evidence gathering, and absent film documentation, a sworn statement by a witness on a documented Encounter Report.

Nor were the LW VC's even close for their awards when matched to our losses - with ratios of 2:1 over claiming not uncommon for either bombers or fighters. I produced a specific sample of the matching process for the April 24, 1944 mission in which I documented a/c, crew, location, serial number/werk number, unit for every single credit and loss - for which the US Fighter awards were about 90% of the destruction claims, and were approximately 95% of the documented LW losses - leaving room for bomber claims. 

The Luftwaffe had a method of damage assessment that in my opinion explains some of the gaps between a US VC award and a LW recorded 'lost or written off'. If a US pilot chased a German plane to the ground and observed it to belly into a field, it was claimed as destroyed and so accounted, but the a/c may have had less than 60% damage and deemed Damaged by the LW in their accounting.

I am not picking on the USN/USMC award process because other AAF theatre processes were just as suspect with respect to formal documentation and review, particularly in 1942 and 1943. 

Greg - you are more knowledgeable about USN review and award processes. Can you shed light on a.) encounter report requirements, intelligence de-briefing, review and assessment - then b.)formal reporting similar to a VCB in the ETO. Can someone go to the source documents and where may they be found today?

Did the USN require confirmation by a witness when film not available or inconclusive? I do know that there are so many IJN and IJA records of losses that are far lower than our awarded victory credits for many engagements and the Marianas Turkey Shoot is one such specific example.


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## FLYBOYJ (May 22, 2015)

Koopernic said:


> Contracts are often set by Government annual budgets. These sometimes seem absurd: for instance cutting down production of an aircraft by 20% in order to achieve at best a 5% reduction in overall cost. If the program is then stretched over a longer period, another tactic, the per unit cost of the aircraft goes up and the only thing that has been achieved is a reduced rate of deliver, higher cost although annual budget requirements may have been met. Overall it must be a bad bargain but it's probably done to keep a program intact as much as possible.



And that's being done right now with the F-35 and F/A-18 Growler.


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## Hiromachi (May 22, 2015)

buffnut453 said:


> At face value your initial statement is logical, and certainly there was less opportunity for pilots from different units to claim the same enemy aircraft. However, positive confirmation of a victory over the ocean isn't any easier because all aircraft shot down disappear into the depths. *Did the Navy study review Japanese loss records in formulating its assessment?* If not, then the study is still flawed. Of course loss records aren't always available, particularly Japanese records of which many were destroyed during WWII. This means that any kill/loss ratio will have considerable margin of error.



As far as I remember Japanese Navy Kodachosho or Japanese Army Sento shoho were never a subject of review and were never taken into account by US post war reports.
In case of the first ones its not that hard to find them, many of them are not only existing but are available in the internet - jacar.go.jp - one just has to browse the archives and download the desired file. I have only been unable to find a unit records a few times, mostly for late 1945 which leads to assumption that possibly some units destroyed their latest reports.

In case of Sento shoho its a bit harder, I think you have to go to Japan since they are not in the internet yet and might not be there any time soon.



GregP said:


> If there are vetted lists of German, Japanese, and Soviet losses and/or victories ... I'd surely like to see them or purchase a copy for myself. Heck, I'd like to see an authoritative list of losses and victories from France, Finland, Poland ... any country other than the U.S.A.



There is a very comprehensive study of Japanese Zero losses and combats printed in 5 tomes, I cant recall the title unfortunately. Anyway, that book still is in Japanese so one would have to learn the language 

Also some of the newest positions on book market are written by the authors who put more effort than just to quote US sources and try to compare them with Japanese sources to obtain some perspective. After few of the books like "Soleil Levant sur l'Australie" and "Guadalcanal, Cactus Air Force contre Marine Impériale" by Bernard Baeza or "Eagles of the Southern Sky" by Michael John Claringbould Luca Ruffato I'm changing perspective over the claims of the Allied pilots, as they often as flawed as Japanese claims.
The confirmed claims are also flawed as the books like the mentioned above present, as older positions did not try to make a more extensive use of Japanese records.


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## GregP (May 22, 2015)

I've never seen a vetted list of Japanese victories, but would certainly be interested in these volumes you speak of.


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## Hiromachi (May 22, 2015)

I tried to search for it in my memory, hell, I even remember how cover looked like. Just cant find in my memory the title.
If it will come back to my mind I will just write it here


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## GregP (May 22, 2015)

Drink some beer and think!


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## mhuxt (May 22, 2015)

As noted on page 2 of the USAF report awarded credits if the claim had been previously accepted by an issuing agency or a claim board. It is not a comparison to German losses.

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## GregP (May 22, 2015)

I don't think there is a record of German losses that was complete. The numbers from the MTO should be better than the PTO, but where is the proof of that? For the Pacific, the Navy flew recon flights and determined the BDA as often as was feasible and the number of aircraft involved was MUCH smaller, making keeping track much easier.

I'm not sure we'll ever have a complete, accurate record of the ETO and MTO, but the numbers from the PTO after some slight hicups in the beginning, are very good. I confess I don't have a good feeling for the accuracy of numbers from the CBI, but there surely weren't too many really big fights. It was over land, but not nearly as congested as over Europe.


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## fastmongrel (May 23, 2015)

The RAF did do very extensive research on claims postwar and downgraded its own overall claims from iirc 16,000 approx to around 9,000. It didnt downgrade claims of individuals partly because the RAF didnt believe in giving pilots scores and partly because it might be a bit embarrasing for a still serving decorated officer to be told his 5 kills is now 1 confirmed, 1 probable and 1 damaged, oh and by the way you should give that nice shiny medal back and have this slightly less shiny one instead. 

Personally it doesnt really interest me all this numbers, going by overall losses in combat all claims can be cut by around 50%. Take the Battle of Britain I think the RAF shot down the entire Luftwaffe in Western Europe at least twice and the LW shot down every single Spitfire about 3 times.

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## GregP (May 23, 2015)

I don't believe it that way all the time, just when there are a lot of planes in the sky.


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## Greyman (May 24, 2015)

There were small scale actions all the time between the Japanese, British and Americans over South-East Asia - and a quick look through any of Christopher Shores' works (Bloody Shambles) shows very quickly that overclaiming is a reliable constant of air combat.


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## Hiromachi (May 24, 2015)

And it happened regardless of the scale. Notoriously USAF, RAAF and IJN in 1942 overclaimed by a ratio 3-7 to 1. It did not matter if there were 50-80 aircraft in the air or just 15. 
The summarized campaign of Tainan Kokutai in New Guinea (1st April to 10th November 1942) against the Allies gives a following results - Tainan killed 148 Allied aircrew in aerial combat, and downed a total of 81 aircraft ( 17 P-40E, 5 B-17E/F, 38 P-39/P-400, 5 A-24 Banshee, 10 B-25C/D, 1 Lockheed Hudson and 5 B-26) for the loss of 24 aircraft in aerial combat (18 Zeros were lost due to enemy fighters and only 6 were direct losses caused by bomber gunners). This are actual losses, much lower than claimed ...

The overall claims are not even counted for the campaign as they were so high, if Allied claims would be taken than most likely Tainan Kokutai would be wiped 2-3 times, if Japanese would be taken than there would be little to nothing left over Port Moresby. 

So its not really matter if there were hundreds of aircraft or dozens, the overclaiming was normal situation for both sides regardless of the numbers.

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## stona (May 24, 2015)

Don't lose sight of what claims were originally intended for, and the effect that huge over claiming had early in the war. Correlation of claims was an intelligence gathering exercise, at least until it was shown to be deeply flawed.

Between 12th and 19th August 1940 German pilots claimed 624 RAF aircraft destroyed. This sort of huge over inflation contributed to a disastrous intelligence failure. At the end of August the Luftwaffe estimated the RAF to be down to less than 300 fighters when in fact it still disposed of more than 700.

Other factors were underestimation of production (the British produced 450 fighters in August against a German estimate of 280) and an overestimation of the effects of bombing. The Luftwaffe thought it had permanently disabled 18 of Fighter Commands airfields when in fact none had been out of action for more than a few days.

Cheers

Steve

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## Hiromachi (May 24, 2015)

Hey Steve, 
Pacific was a bit different in this regard. For instance Japanese did not provide individual claims (although each pilot kept the record in his memory or diary) in official combat reports, there were always unit claims which adds to the mess. 

But in fact there are many reasons behind this state of affairs, mostly honorable. Combat was usually fleeting, there were some instances that G3M and G4M crews were unaware of being attacked !
Whilst longer combats such as occurred in chases did occur, the norm was an ephemeral encounter with a few hundred rounds fired. Tainan Kokutai Zeros if were hit were either removed from the sky or sustained a minimal damage of a few .50 caliber bullets, with some exceptions when were a bit more damaged. But generally few casualties fell between these two extremes. The account underlines the turht that it was much harder to place hits upon an enemy aircraft that might be supposed by pilot claims. In such a dangerous setting, with complex and speedy movements, it is easy to see how several different pilots could claim against the same aircraft.

There were many instances were Allied pilots are positive of a kill, only for the record to confirm that their alleged victim happily cruised back to Lae or Rabaul unscathed. 

But in my opinion its just a nature of the combat of that time. And that is why I dont really take the kill ratios so seriously as there is a high chance that they might be flawed.

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## stona (May 24, 2015)

I don't put much weight on victory tallies or claims either which means inevitably kill ratios are also flawed. Some attempt to make assessments of the relative abilities of aircraft based on kill ratios which are therefore not only based on a deeply flawed set of statistics, but also fail to take into account the myriad of other factors which can effect the outcomes of aerial combats.

In the early stages of the war pilot claims were taken very seriously and used as a basis for intelligence assessments. By late 1940 both the British and the Germans, who both also had fairly rigorous systems, were realising just how unreliable the data were.

When the USAAF entered the fray in Europe the different systems for verifying claims caused some friction between the allies. Here's an interesting correspondence to illustrate how:












A reassuring result, emphasising that the Americans had mended their ways and adopted a more rigorous system:






Cheers

Steve

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## EKB (May 24, 2015)

stona said:


> I don't put much weight on victory tallies or claims either which means inevitably kill ratios are also flawed. Some attempt to make assessments of the relative abilities of aircraft based on kill ratios which are therefore not only based on a deeply flawed set of statistics, but also fail to take into account the myriad of other factors which can effect the outcomes of aerial combats.
> 
> In the early stages of the war pilot claims were taken very seriously and used as a basis for intelligence assessments. By late 1940 both the British and the Germans, who both also had fairly rigorous systems, were realising just how unreliable the data were.
> 
> ...




Those documents neglect to mention that the RAF was every bit as guilty.


*31st December 1941*
_ “ At year’s end, the JG 26 scoreboard for the war to date heavily favored the Schlageter pilots: 916 victory claims had been confirmed (out of about 1,000 submitted) in exchange for ninety-five pilots killed in combat, twenty-two killed in flying accidents, and thirty-four taken prisoner. 
Across the Channel, the end of 1941 found Fighter Command at a new peak in strength, controlling an even one hundred squadrons. But the new war in the Pacific, and the galling fact that the true victory/loss ratio for the previous six months was well in the Luftwaffe’s favor, compelled the war cabinet to warn that a more defensive policy was now a “disagreeable necessity”. The brakes were applied to the non-stop offensive.
The Schlageter fighters, and the Richtofen Geschwader to their west, had totally disrupted the British air strategy for 1941. Between 14 June and 31 December, Fighter Command lost 411 fighters over the Channel and the Continent, while claiming the destruction of 731 Luftwaffe fighters. The true loss to the Germans was only 103 fighters. 
In all of 1941, JG 26 lost forty-seven pilots killed in combat, seventeen killed in accidents, and three taken prisoner. These casualties, while serious, were certainly sustainable. FW 190A-2s were now beginning to arrive for the re-equipment of the Geschwaderstab and the First Gruppe. The experienced fighter pilots of the Schlageter Geschwader were confident that in the new year their Focke-Wulfs would further increase the German margin of superiority._”


*31st May 1942*
_“ A Fighter Command intelligence appreciation dated 19 June claimed that 205 Luftwaffe fighters had been destroyed between 1 January and 31 May for the loss of 242 Royal Air Force fighters. The true picture was much bleaker for the Allies. During this period the combat losses of the two Kanalgeschwader totalled only sixty-seven fighters and forty-seven pilots; the fighter loss ratio was 3.6:1 in the Germans’ favor.”_


See Don Caldwell, *The JG 26 War Diary: 1939-1942*, p.198-199, p.244


What happened on 9th August 1941 is a shining example. The box score in John Foreman’s *Fighter Command War Diaries* shows an outrageous number of victory claims by the RAF: 22 German aircraft destroyed, 11 probably destroyed, and 7 damaged. The majority were claimed during the main event, Circus No. 68. Such big names as Victor Beamish, Jamie Rankin, Alan Deere, Johnnie Johnson, Bluey Truscott, and Paddy Finucane inflated their scores. When Douglas Bader returned from the German PoW camps, he claimed to have shot down two Me 109s on his last mission. At the time, all of this was accepted at face value.

In his book *Bader’s Last Flight*, Andy Saunders finds that the Luftwaffe lost just one aircraft in these combats. The author concluded that Messerschmitt Bf-109F, Works Number 8350, was probably shot down by Nip Heppell of No. 616 Squadron, who noted correctly that the German pilot suffered a parachute failure. 

Saunders also points to convincing testimony in the after-action reports that three Spitfires were shot down in error by RAF pilots, due to faulty aircraft identification. The victims were Christopher Chapman, Justin O’Byrne, and Douglas Bader.

Likewise on 13th October 1941, John Foreman’s *Fighter Command War Diaries* records that RAF fighters claimed 22 German aircraft destroyed, 3 probably destroyed, and 18 damaged. The only known German loss is one Bf-109F, Works Number 8288, that was shot down by return fire from a Blenheim bomber.


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## stona (May 24, 2015)

EKB said:


> Those documents neglect to mention that the RAF was every bit as guilty.



You really need to read all posts properly. I wrote earlier,

_In the early stages of the war pilot claims were taken very seriously and used as a basis for intelligence assessments. By late 1940 both the British and the Germans, who both also had fairly rigorous systems, were realising just how unreliable the data were._

The data for the RAF was just as flawed as that for the Luftwaffe. The RAF even attempted to explain a lack of Luftwaffe wrecks and crash sites by assuming most aircraft destroyed had fallen into the sea. 

Endlessly quoting records of individual combats or original combat/encounter reports (and I've got hundreds of those) is inevitably selective and not always representative of larger trends anyway. For that the raw data requires analysis.

Cheers

Steve


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## GregP (May 24, 2015)

I don't believe any of the above applies to the pacific over ocean areas after a few initial instances of overclaim. After that, that dat are quite relaible. I think I already mentioned that PTO theater in that regard.


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## Hiromachi (May 24, 2015)

Greg, its not a matter of belief but matter or verification. If data were not verified and compared with Japanese records than they are flawed, and even as I can agree that since 1944 the reports can be more accurate than before as chances of the pilots to escape the superior enemy flying Hellcat or Corsair or Lighting or Thunderbolt were much lower than chances of decently trained and experienced pilot ... they are still flawed. 

I also dont understand what you mean by initial instances. What I presented was a combat through almost 9 months. The over-claiming happened on daily bases for both sides. 
And here are results of few major combats involving more than few dozens of aircraft over the Solomon Islands in 1943 :
April 1 - Claims - Japanese 40 and Allies 18;
Actual losses - Japanese 9 and Allies 6

May 13 - Claims - Japanese 28 and Allies 16;
Actual loss - Japanese 4 and Allies 5

June 7 - Claims - Japanese 33 and Allies 23;
Actual loss - Japanese 9 and Allies 9

June 12 - Claims - Japanese 25 and Allies 31
Actual loss - Japanese 7 and Allies 6

From a completely different theater (Burma and China) in June 27 1943 when 308th BS flew to Samah Bay, where 16
B-24s ran into 20 to 30 Japanese fighters, most likely from the 33rd Sentai. None of the B-24s in this instance was lost and they claimed 13 Japanese fighters shot down and another four probables, this tally being revised to 14 destroyed and six probables.
In this and previous encounters B-24s had claimed *37* Japanese fighters shot down without loss - thats more than unit could bring in the air.
In fact only few fighters were lost, some sustained a damage but overall the claims were highly inflated ... which later had a terrible consequences but that's not a matter of the discussion.

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## GregP (May 24, 2015)

Hi Hiromacci,

We'll just have to diagree about this. One letter of dubious origin means about zippo to me, and I spent some time with people who were working on verifying Pacific victories. They didn't find many errors in the time I spent with them ... and they went through a significant percent of the war.

I don't really believe anything any person of the "press" has to say about any war, either. I was there when reporters were taken through the lines in Vietnam, and none of them wrote anything close to what was really happening. They didn't understand the war, the service, the mission, or what was going on at any trime unless they were told specifically. When they WERE told, they chose not to believe it. Made me into a liftime disbeliever of the combat press. I have no use for any of them.

So you can think all threaters were the same if you want. It's all the same to me. 

I also don't particularly wish to get into a pissing contest over it. Like I said, we'll have to disagree and let it go at that.

For every book that purports to tell "the truth," there are several key elements that seem to refer to very dubious sources. Getting to the bottom of the claims hasn't happened since 1945. I don't think either you or I will change that in this forum post. If we do, I'll buy a copy of the results. I don't believe a lot of things that were reported ... but some were at least decently accurate. The trick is to differientiate among them. And before you ask, no, I don't claim to have done so myself for everything or even most things.

Cheers.


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## Hiromachi (May 25, 2015)

Hello Greg, 
well I can absolutely respect that someone has different opinion. You have a right to have it and its fine  

All I wanted to add is that its usually not one letter of dubious origin but selective research over years. I have no reason not to believe them when the amount of material they have reviewed :





It just speaks for itself. 

I also dont think that all theaters were same, but I think that all pilots as human beings were prone to making mistakes. And as such can make mistakes regardless of nationality or race.

Peace, 
Hiro

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## Juha (May 25, 2015)

GregP said:


> Combat reports are claims, not vetted, real victories. Typhoon and Tempest story is probably pretty good about the planes, but the kills are claims from the British side. And since there are NO studies done of Germany's REAL losses, how can John Foreman's volumes be anything but claims?



Because we know surprisingly much on the LW losses. And on LW strenght and plane status etc, look e.g. The Luftwaffe, 1933-45. Thomas, Shores and Foreman sometives give the info on the real LW losses, Foreman even sometimes underestimates the real LW losses because he seems to have been unware of the operational schwarme of the fighter training units (alarm units flying ops manned by flying instructors or even by best pupils) and generally the combat losses suffered by the training units in France.



GregP said:


> ... For instance, I can verify most of Erich Hartmann's claims, but not all from the claims list...



Out of curiosity, what exactly you mean and based on what sources?


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## Hiromachi (May 25, 2015)

Ah, I found it !
I was drinking beer and it happened 

Although I made a mistake, not 5 but 3 were published.

No. 1 - 海軍零戦隊撃墜戦記１: 昭和１８年２月－７月、ガダルカナル撤退とポートダーウィンでの勝利 (IJN Zero battle diary #1 - Victories and losses for Zero over Solomon from February to July 1943) 






No. 2 - 海軍零戦隊撃墜戦記2: 昭和18年8月-11月、ブイン防空戦と、前期ラバウル防空戦 (IJN Zero battle diary #2 - Victories and losses for Zero over Rabaul from August to November 1943)





No 3 - 海軍零戦隊撃墜戦記3: 撃墜166機。ラバウル零戦隊の空戦戦果、全記録。 (IJN Zero battle diary #3 - Victories and losses for Zero over Rabaul from December 1943 to February 1944)





Those books have a very good reviews, although as every material they also are not free from mistakes. Sometimes the lack the data, a few times the author chooses in certain cases when the US plane might be shot down by AA fire or by the fighter (Zero namely), and the author tends to credit it rather for a fighter pilot without further explanation. But overall it has very good reviews and according to Japanese readers it "busts" some myth of a Zero, apparently some Japanese readers learned that Zero was not ultimate fighter in that period anymore. 
It is considered very highly because covers a crucial period of combat in Solomons, from the evacuation of Guadalcanal and strengthening of bases on Bougainville or else, through the Allied operations to weaken and effectively neutralize the Rabaul with eventual success in February 1944.

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## GregP (May 25, 2015)

Thanks Hiromachi. I shall have to look for that. I have a very good friend who is native Japanese and maybe he can find a set. About your posted list of sources above ... that is a list for what book or document? I didn't see that info in the post.

I do NOT see how anyone knows a lot about Luftwaffe real losses without Luftwaffe loss records, and those are not complete, meaning the loss records are also not complete.

As for my data files:

I found a LOT of Luftwaffe claims on Jan Safavick's online website as one source. His sources are listed there, or were at the time if you are curious and are or were more than numerous. I replaced things like "Bell 39" and "Airacobra" with "P-39" and made similar changes to planes described multiple ways. For instance, I turned "Liberator" and "Consolidated" into "B-24" if it was over land, and I don't think I turned any Catalinas into B-24's as I cross-checked with other files to be sure on every record but one (couldn't find it except in one file).

Sometimes a victory was by a Flak unit so there was no name or rank. Some air units also had no name shown. Sometimes a rank, first name, and last name were missing. So "nr" means no rank, "nf" means no first name, "nn" means no last name, "ns" means no Staffel. Some victims were described as unidentified and some were described as unknown. I lumped them all into unidentified in my files.

The top ace's score do not add up. I believe this file accounts for 321 of Erich Hartmann's popularly held 352 victories. But there are also about 1,181 records where the pilot's name and rank were not listed, so many scores can be made up with the unidentified ones if anyone wants to go through the victories of the top 1 - 10 aces and try to fit them to unnamed pilots claims. I decline to do it myself at this point just due to time constraints, though I DID find at least 15 more of Erich Hartmann’s victories in the records without a name ... at least the units, dates, times and areas matched up. This has been a lot of work and I still don't know how useful it will turn out to be.

One source of some frustration is that almost no files seem to have the type flown by the victor and also the type of the victim in one file.

For the Soviet Aces, I used Air Aces Home Page: Air Aces Homepage as well as about 4 other sources.

For a lot of Japanese victories I used files compiled by Allan Magnus (http://users.accesscomm.ca/magnusfamily/mailto.htm) and a file I got from a good Japanese friend who lives near Nagoya close to where the Yokosuka arsenal was. Ny friend's file was easily readable, though you have to do some work on most of the internet files to make them reasonably importable into Excel.

For some of the USAAF victories I used a very good pdf file from Maxwell AFB USAF Historical Society back when that site was a useful resource. It is not so much anymore and has been “under construction” for more than 5 years now. Probably "sequestered."

I cross-checked with 404 Not Found , Fighter Pilot Aces List, 404 Not Found, and http://users.accesscomm.ca/magnusfamily/airaces1.htm .

I see one of my sources above is no loner a vaild URL ... it happens.

I got a lot of Korean victories from the Korwald site, among other sources.

This is a partial list. I have enough work into it that a complete list of references will not be posted. As I have more than 15 years of work in my files, I have no intention of publishing everything unless I get paid for it and this is NOT my occupation. 

But the above will give anyone seriously interested in it a very good place to start.

I have not verified that files I downloaded more than 10 years ago are still there and still free.

We have previously posted USAAF studies and some US Navy pfd files. If you cross-ceck and the file agree, everything is OK. When they don't there will be a considerable tie spent deciding which, if any, of the files are correct, and I doubt any team of 2 - 3 people working independently would come to the exact same conclusions.


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## EKB (May 25, 2015)

stona said:


> You really need to read all posts properly. I wrote earlier,
> 
> _In the early stages of the war pilot claims were taken very seriously and used as a basis for intelligence assessments. By late 1940 both the British and the Germans, who both also had fairly rigorous systems, were realising just how unreliable the data were._





Steve,

The RAF commenced hostilities with Germany in September 1939. Thus by May 1942 they were no longer in "the early stages of the war". But Fighter Command was still taking their pilot claims very seriously through the reporting system.

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## GregP (May 25, 2015)

One man's "early" is another man's "way too late."

This is just one of the many reasons we may never see an end to arguments about skill, claims, real victories, and "what ifs."


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## EKB (May 26, 2015)

One reason for the huge discrepancy between shoot down reports and loss reports was that Daimler Benz aircraft engines emitted a plume of black soot at full power. Possibly this was due to limits of the fuel injectors, chemical properties of the fuel, octane rating, etc. Allied pilots and air crew often assumed that this trail of thick exhaust smoke from German fighters must have been caused by battle damage. 

I'm not sure if BMW and Jumo aircraft engines also smoked heavily from the exhaust stacks.


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## Greyman (May 26, 2015)

EKB said:


> But Fighter Command was still taking their pilot claims very seriously through the reporting system.



This was just for score purposes though, no? I thought British Intelligence had a good idea of overall Luftwaffe numbers due to being able to read German code.



EKB said:


> One reason for the huge discrepancy between shoot down reports and loss reports was that Daimler Benz aircraft engines emitted a plume of black soot at full power. Possibly this was due to limits of the fuel injectors, chemical properties of the fuel, octane rating, etc. Allied pilots and air crew often assumed that this trail of thick exhaust smoke from German fighters must have been caused by battle damage.



Indeed I've also read many accounts where the British thought German aircraft were mounting smoke dispensers to feign damage and escape.


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## GregP (May 26, 2015)

I've watched DB-powered Bf 109 startup, taxi, take off and fly. He didn't leave smoke to speak of, but he also most very probably was nowhere NEAR full power, and was certainly not burning WWII German aviation gasoline.

I've also seen clips when they did leave a small dark trail and when they didn't, much the same as with other engines. The trails they left would not be mistaken for damage, but I also may never have seen a clip at "full rattle" ... I don't know and the film didn't elaborate.

Worth looking into, though.

I've read combat reports from both sides that said they got into a fray over a cloud deck, managed to get on the losing side, snapped into a spin, and escpaed by spinning down through the clouds to recover under the layer. That looks pretty covincing to someone who thinks they hit you. All it is missing is the fire and really heavy dark smoke from a plane actually badly damaged.


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## Hiromachi (May 26, 2015)

GregP said:


> Thanks Hiromachi. I shall have to look for that. I have a very good friend who is native Japanese and maybe he can find a set. About your posted list of sources above ... that is a list for what book or document? I didn't see that info in the post.



That's a list of a mentioned on a previous page book - Eagles of the Southern Sky which portrays the combat actions of Tainan Kokutai over New Guinea.


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## stona (May 26, 2015)

EKB said:


> Steve,
> 
> The RAF commenced hostilities with Germany in September 1939. Thus by May 1942 they were no longer in "the early stages of the war". But Fighter Command was still taking their pilot claims very seriously through the reporting system.



Yes, but the RAF knew that the system was deeply flawed after 1940 and various attempts were made to make the system more rigorous. Knowledge of the flawed nature of the system meant that the figures for pilot claims were no longer assumed to match actual German losses. Ministry propaganda for public consumption was another thing altogether.

The US system was initially considered by the British, and admitted by the Americans who quickly changed it, to be far too lax and lacking in rigour. 

The correspondence above reflects a far deeper resentment by the British of the portrayal of the European war and the relative roles of the two major allies in the US media. It is more about US propaganda than actual concern over claims. 
This is an on going grievance. There were more Lee Enfields than Garrands hitting the beaches on D-Day. The film 'Objective Burma' was banned in the UK in 1945 and not given a general release until 1952. Many Brits were somewhat offended by the story of enigma as portrayed in the film U-571 as late as the year 2000! There are many other examples in which Hollywood's American centric view of the European war and to a lesser extent the war in the Far East, have caused raised eyebrows across the pond. Arguing that Hollywood is in the US and making films for a US market (which isn't strictly true, particularly today) doesn't really cut it. 

Finally all air forces suffered from vast over claiming by their pilots. Possibly one of the worst examples would be claims by 2nd TAF pilots for armour destroyed on the ground following the break out from Normandy. In this case an ORS was able to actually examine the battlefield (obviously not possible in aerial combat) and establish that 99% of the claims were incorrect. No matter how rigorous the claims system, and until late 1944 the Luftwaffe, often maligned for excessive over claiming, had arguably the most rigorous system, the data gathered in this way are inaccurate. The British, in 1943, were just keen that the Americans should admit it.

Cheers

Steve

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## Juha (May 26, 2015)

Hello Greg
IMHO the best internet source for the LW claims was, maybe still is Tony Woods lists, based on microfilms of the original O.K.L docus. Now Leslie Sawyer's site seem to have disappered but Tony's list can still be found here https://web.archive.org/web/20130928070316/http://lesbutler.co.uk/claims/tonywood.htm


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## Juha (May 26, 2015)

On the LW system, e.g. JG 5 from mid-1942 onwards once again showed that man can always beat manmade system. JG 5 was classical case, fairly independent unit far away from the GHQ fighting mostly over sparcely habitat areas, over sea or over enemy held territory. Of course JG 5 wasn't the only one, same goes to II./JG 2 in Tunisia, British AA in UK (in this case the main factor was were the claimed victims crashed, coastal AA batteries claims were less accurate than those in Midlands), the FC/RAF claims in 41-42 were far less accurate than those made during the BoB, also IMHO USAAF claims in MTO and those of 5th AF were less accurate than those of 8th FC etc. On the other hand the claim accuracy of II./JG 51 against P-38s during the Tunisian Campaign was excellent (76.0%), and those of JG 53 (65.5%) and JG 77 (63.6%) very good when that of II./JG 2 was only 22.7%. That of JG 27 was also very good but with only 3 claims vs 2 real losses the sample is too small. So in general the claim accuracy of the Jagdfliegern was still very good in 1942/43 but there were units and individuals whose claim accuracy was well below the average.


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## stona (May 26, 2015)

Juha said:


> So in general the claim accuracy of the Jagdfliegern was still very good in 1942/43 but there were units and individuals whose claim accuracy was well below the average.



But there were also some men in some units (JG 27 being a proven example) who deliberately falsified claims. There was some pressure on Luftwaffe pilots to achieve scores which were in turn linked to the award of decorations. Several experten (and I'm not naming names, if you're bothered do the analysis yourselves) have suspicious patterns of claims as they approach certain landmarks. Suspicious is not necessarily malicious, but it provides food for thought.

There were surely a very small minority in all air forces who made false claims rather than erroneous claims in good faith, but in the Luftwaffe the incentive to 'cheat' was greater. It's just as well that it had a fairly rigorous system right up until late 1944.

Cheers

Steve


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## GregP (May 26, 2015)

Hi Juha,

Tony Woods was and is one of my sources, but thank you very much. Tony together with Jan make a very strong set of data, with only a few "disagreements" between them.


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## parsifal (Jun 1, 2015)

The LW also had the problem of Hitler and Goring who were impatient when it came to aircraft readiness rates. Luftwaffe aircraft would often get shot up but could take some months before they were finally written off by the Quartermaster. In the meantime they would remain on the effectives list even though it was fully understood these airframes would never fly again. Keeping them on the effectives list kept the boss happy, who was only ever interested in numbers, not the details.

The other thing that seems to be played down here is that the RAF was gaining very good reports on LW actual strengths and losses via enigma. They would know when the Germans were fudging things, which was often because they had access to those daily strength reports. When the LW would list an a/c as "effective" but with more than 50% damage, you can safely assume its another LW con job. That a/c is a loss and its entirely reasonable to list it as such in RAF returns and claims. Over claiming keeps the pilot morale up. What was important were having good information on the strength returns via enigma (and other sources. If the claims were vastly out of kilter with the SIGINT, it might require some further cross checking


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## parsifal (Jun 2, 2015)

The following are some excerpts from Piercing the Fog: Intelligence and Army Air Forces Operations in World War II
By Robert C Ehrhart, Jr Alexander S Cochran, Robert F Futrell, Thomas A Fabyanic, John F Kreis, AIR FORCE HISTORICAL STUDIES OFFICE WASHINGTON DC, Williamson Murray

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## Reb Bacchus (Jul 29, 2017)

ricardo said:


> Hi everybody.
> 
> I'd wish to know if someone has info about kill ratios (air to air victories). I understand that Hellcats has an astonishing 19:1 over the IJN. I've read that during BoB in fighter versus fighter dogfights, the Bf-109 was the undisputed champion. 333 Bf109 lost compared to the 272 Hurricanes and 219 Spitfires.
> 
> ...



I have no idea if this is still active, I didn't read all of but it was very interesting. One thing I didn't see discussed were basic fighter tactics. One reason for USA's success were its tactics. Superior tactics allowed inferior plane to succeed even against the Zelenograd.


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## BiffF15 (Jul 29, 2017)

FLYBOYJ said:


> In today's world the F-15 is something like 110 to 0!



104 to Zip.

Cheers,
Biff

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## Greyman (Jul 29, 2017)

Reb Bacchus said:


> One reason for USA's success were its tactics. Superior tactics allowed inferior plane to succeed even against the Zelenograd.



I'll assume your phone auto-corrected a 'Zero' typo there ... 

I can't remember where I read it, but I think it was Saburo Sakai that had a good line about the US Air Forces ... saying that while the Japanese mindset approached air combat as duels, the US squadrons were like a football team and focused on teamwork.

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## GregP (Jul 31, 2017)

Question for Buffnut and all the people who feel a kill means total destruction of the aircraft or the pilot.

Consider the PTO. Assume you are over water.

I would say that any damage causing the aircraft to ditch was a confirmed kill since the aircraft was lost completely to the bottom of the ocean and was not worth recovering for parts, unless it ditched in a shallow bay, right next to a crane on a barge. Some pilots were lost, some not, but planes that were lost over the ocean seem almost certainly a valid kill, even if the damage was only a bullet through a fuel line. Once in the ocean, it CAN fly gain, but not without more effort than is required to build up a plane from scratch.

The ONLY reason I can think of you would DO that is when no other option is available, such as 75+ years later when no new production is possible. If you can recover one, you can at LEAST use it as a template for making new parts. But I wouldn't call it economically a good deal to recover a working warplane if new production is still coming off the line or available in the boneyard.

Any comments on it or thoughts to the contrary?


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## Milosh (Jul 31, 2017)

Greg, I have read 'stories' of Luftwaffe pilots working the throttle to produce black smoke so that an e/a would break off the attack thinking the airplane was fatally damaged.


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## GregP (Jul 31, 2017)

To address my question above, if he "ditched" in the ocean, even due to otherwise-minor damage, is he a kill?

I'd say "Yes!" The plane is a total loss and the pilot is somewhat likely to be the same.

What if the plot bails out, his chute fails, and he is killed, but the plane itself soft-lands to be recovered later. The pilot, however, died. Is THAT a kill?


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## buffnut453 (Aug 1, 2017)

GregP said:


> Question for Buffnut and all the people who feel a kill means total destruction of the aircraft or the pilot.
> 
> Consider the PTO. Assume you are over water.
> 
> ...



The scenario you outline is absolutely a "kill". Not sure I've ever said anything to indicate a different interpretation. Even an aircraft shot down over land that COULD be recovered (eg after an effective forced landing) counts as a "kill". Whether or not the aircraft was subsequently returned to service is irrelevant - I've seen photos of Spitfires that were, essentially, scrap but which were returned to service after factory rebuilds.

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## GregP (Aug 1, 2017)

Thanks Buffnut. Just wondered.

I've always said that if a pilot shot an enemy out of the fight, particularly on escort duty, it should be a victory since he defeated the intent to stop the bomber or stop the fighter attacked from being effective. If that isn't so, then I'd surmise the attackers would LEAVE the escorted planes to pursue the potential victim and ensure a "kill." 

So, my intent was to cause the escorting fighters to STAY with the escorted bombers and get the kill. What good is it to remind pilots of duty when the glory goes to the guys who get the kills? They are young and full of testosterone. No joy ... no real reason to stick around other than a sense of duty. The ones who leave to pursue and get the kill are in target-locked mode. Make THEM stay around by letting them have their victories when they remove someone from the fight. The entire intent of keeping track of kills, at least at first, was to maintain morale in the fighter pilot ranks.

Later, it was a means to estimate the remaining enemy fighter strength. But morale was the primary reason it came into being.

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## drgondog (Aug 1, 2017)

In the ETO, many mismatches between a victory credit and 'no actual loss' occurred when a LW a/c was seen to crash land after hits - but was less than 60% damaged by judgment and carried on LW rolls as "returned to service" after repairs.

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## stona (Aug 1, 2017)

GregP said:


> The entire intent of keeping track of kills, at least at first, was to maintain morale in the fighter pilot ranks.



Not in the RAF

In the very early stages of the war some pilots did receive the sort of press attention more common to WW1. Think of men like Mould, Richey or Kain (until he killed himself in an impromptu celebratory display) and some like Voase Jeff or Orton, now largely forgotten. This was for the benefit of the civilians back home, not the RAF and it was soon more tightly regulated.



GregP said:


> Later, it was a means to estimate the remaining enemy fighter strength. .



That was always its purpose in the RAF. There is a reason that the debriefings were carried out by intelligence officers

It is also worth mentioning that claims, even once filtered and assessed were always treated with a great deal of caution by the men who had some inkiling of what was really going on. Keith Park was notoriously sceptical of the figures accepted by the Air Ministry, his own reports contained much lower figures, yet still too high by a factor of 2-3.

Cheers

Steve


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## Balljoint (Aug 1, 2017)

GregP said:


> Thanks Buffnut. Just wondered.
> 
> I've always said that if a pilot shot an enemy out of the fight, particularly on escort duty, it should be a victory since he defeated the intent to stop the bomber or stop the fighter attacked from being effective. If that isn't so, then I'd surmise the attackers would LEAVE the escorted planes to pursue the potential victim and ensure a "kill."
> 
> ...



Short term staying with the bombers has benefits. But the critical factor is the skill and training of the intercepting pilots. By permitting the escorts to roam the kill rate of this factor is greater. Short term the bombers may suffer marginally if the escorts roam. But long term the interceptors will degrade more with roaming -if not in numbers, in pilot quality. Long term, roaming also lessens the effectiveness of bomber interceptions.

I think that's what Doolittle had in mind.


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## Greyman (Aug 1, 2017)

I'm one of those folks that thinks way too many calories are burned by air combat enthusiasts with regard to kill counts/claims.

When I read Mike Spick's take on the matter I figured it was something I could get behind:

_The vexed issue of overclaiming has bedeviled the question of fighter pilot scores since air combat began. In theory it should be simple to use the modern expression, the body count should give exact answers. But it doesn't. Rarely does the number of bodies match the number of claims. There are many reasons for this, most of which arise from the confusion of a fast-moving three-dimensional combat. Possibly three or four fighters attached a stricken aircraft simultaneously, or in quick succession. The pilot of a damaged aircraft might 'play dead'. leading to a mistaken claim. If the action took place over water, there might be no bodies to count. And even the most careful reconstruction often failed to reveal who did what with any degree of certainty._

_*If we are to avoid a nonsense on the subject of scores, we must avoid the expression 'kill', and substitute 'victory', defining a victory as an event which occurs when an enemy aircraft is defeated in combat in circumstances where the victor believes that it will be a total loss. Only then are we on surer ground.*_


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## GregP (Aug 1, 2017)

Hi Bill,

I've always disagreed with that one. If you shoot someone out of a fight, it should be a victory. I really do not understand the mentality that the aircraft must be destroyed. It is the job of the escort to protect the escorted, and shooting someone out of a fight seems to fulfill that job, at least to me.

Of course, maybe that's why the fight over victories has lasted so long, huh? I still disagree with the Boyington debate. In many files, Lance Wade is credited with 23 victories, making him the 13th best U.S. Ace. But all his victories were in RAF service. If his victories in the service of another nation count, so do Boyington's with the AVG. I don't want to fight that fight in here. Let's just say that resolution doesn't seem much closer than it ever did. 

I've always tried to look at victories from the perspective of what would pass statistical muster. That is, anything that can be analyzed should be a statistically significant event and randomly-selected. That is why single missions are irrelevant. They CAN be chosen from the population, to be sure. But choosing them because they were good is classic statistical bias, and results in incorrect conclusions. That's also why I discount the Finn experience with the Buffalo. It was such a small, stratified sample of Buffalo operations as to be irrelevant in the face of other Buffalo experience. It doesn't take away the skill of the Finns at all. It means their experience was atypical of other experiences with the aircraft. Their skill is undeniable.

Sometimes, rare events happen. Doesn't mean they are statistically significant or that they should affect the general perception of what to expect in future events. Hitler could have had a heart attack early in the war. But counting on it because your neighbor had one would be the height of foolishness.

Hope your analysis of the MTO is coming along well. All the best.


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## buffnut453 (Aug 2, 2017)

Greg,

The challenge with the statistical analysis you're proposing is that it would only ever work for aircraft that saw air-to-air combat in very large numbers. ANY airframe that was used in smaller numbers is likely to have the results heavily skewed by a few missions/events...and that spans everything from the Blackburn Skua in 1939 to the Mitsubishi J2M in 1945. There simply isn't a sufficiently large sample for these types from which to draw any objective statistical conclusions.

Selectively discounting one set of data just because you don't like it runs the risk of even worse subjective analysis than we often see in such debates. You mention discarding Finnish use of the Buffalo because the results were atypical but why not discount the US employment of the type because it only saw one fighter-on-fighter operational engagement on one day, at Midway? From a statistical perspective, that's vanishingly trivial given the scope of combat for US forces in the period 1941-1945.

When dealing with limited-use aircraft types, you have to find some other method of describing their effectiveness. Statistics won't cut it so we, unfortunately, must look across the available evidence and examine it all, evaluating (as far as is humanly possible) why things happened the way they did. That's where the fun lies. I'm afraid kill ratios and totals of claims made by individual pilots are of zero interest to me because we can't really learn anything from them, except in the very broadest sense. They can be a starting point for the "why did it happen like that?" question, but that's about the limit of it.

Just my two penn'orth.

Cheers,
Mark

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## drgondog (Aug 2, 2017)

Greg - after a long delay, a new book project is forcing me to deal with the MTO.

As to Victory credits, the eternal discussion relies on at least factors to close on statistically relevant results. Pilot recognition of the inability of the claimed aircraft to continue to (including pilot bail out) or recover from what seems (to him) a fatally damaged aircraft. The tactic of FW 190 pilots to intentionally spin when in tough situation is an example. Valid confirmation by an equally observant and objective second party or confirmation of the damage observed as 'fatal' by an objective third party reviewing adequate quality combat film. Pilot integrity.

The loss of a wing or empennage or engulfed in flames or exploding in mid air or crashing were criteria for AAF credits. That said, there is no question that IO's were under pressure to grant credits when some doubt as to actual status of the target still remained. The category of Probable was the 'frequent out'.

Ahh, Boyington. Simply, the records were lost when AVG retreated Jan-Feb 1942. Boyington was paid for the ones the AVG reviewing authority granted as destroyed. He go paid for fewer than he later claimed. Take what you want and leave the rest.

Regards,

Bill


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## buffnut453 (Aug 2, 2017)

Bill,

Pressure on the IOs is not the only factor. In a messy, churning air combat, it's very difficult for any pilot to be certain of a particular result. Watching your adversary until he crashes is a certain recipe for you, yourself, to be bounced and probably shot down by his wingman. Having 2 pilots watching the same aircraft crash simply doubles the chance that one or both will, themselves, be shot down. All too often, the pilots interpreted smoke and a rapid departure from normal flight as a sign that the aircraft and/or pilot was destroyed when, in reality, it was often just the adversary firewalling the throttle and taking evasive action. 

I'm not criticizing those involved, simply reflecting the difficulty of confirming "kills" in combat situations. If it were otherwise, we wouldn't see the considerable overclaiming by all sides during WWII.These messy human factors are precisely why I have difficulties using any broad statistics on "kills" or kill ratios.

Cheers,
Mark

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## Shortround6 (Aug 2, 2017)

When judging the accuracy of "claims" it is well to remember that something like over a dozen He 113s were claimed to have been shot down during the summer/fall of 1940 over England and the Channel.


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## GregP (Aug 3, 2017)

Hi Buffnut,

Ther number of aircraft participating is irrelevant. If only 100 fighters participated in air combat, then a good sample is obviously any number greater than, say 39 or so. Doesn't mean thousands; means a significant chunk of the population available. Statistics don't require a set number. They require a set fraction of the population in question.

The biggest stumbling block is lack of available data.

The U.S.A is the ONLY country who did a study of aerial victory claims after the war. So, we are left with wartime claims for the rest. My contention is that if we must use wartime claim data for everyone else. we should use wartime claim data for the U.S.A., too. Apples to apples. I have a VERY GOOD file of German claims, opinions to the contrary notwithstanding. It isn't 100% complete because some data have been lost. But it is VERY good, considering the data available and covers some 67,000+ claims, making it at LEAST a very good statistical sample of claims.

The real problem is getting good claim data from everyone. Soviet data are scarce. Japanese data are almost non-existent.

The Magnus Family website (Ace file attached - sorry for the duplicates. Maybe a mod can delete it down to one file. It has Magnus claims and my own analysis of USAAF Report 85 at the beginning) is good for more or less official victory claims, and Jan Safarik's website is good, though lacking in many areas. Neither one 100% agrees with the other. People tell me. "it's simple, just use these 8 volumes to get Pacific claims for some time period." I am not into buying a library to get good claim data.

Bill Marshall uses MACRs and I am very sketchy about the way to get them and what they actually say.

I am willing to swap files with anyone who is interested in dealing with this and/or working with someone to analyze the data when we get a "good data set." (I do have a 20Mb file size limit in email) My intent is NOT to be 100% accurate, but rather to have a good picture of what went on. Many claim files tell us the victim that was shot down, but not what plane the victor was flying. The U.S. Navy is scrupulous in NOT saving the same data as the U.S.A.A.F., maybe intentionally because they don't want to be compared together, who knows?

It is frustrating and may never be resolved to the satisfaction of everyone. I am wanting to get Bill's new volume when he publishes it and I'd take HIS data for the U.S.A. any day. Now if we can just get him to analyze the UK, Japan, Germany, and the Soviet Union, I'd have what I was looking for!

Best regards, -Greg

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## buffnut453 (Aug 3, 2017)

GregP said:


> Ther number of aircraft participating is irrelevant. If only 100 fighters participated in air combat, then a good sample is obviously any number greater than, say 39 or so. Doesn't mean thousands; means a significant chunk of the population available. Statistics don't require a set number. They require a set fraction of the population in question.



But the smaller the population, the greater the risk that a non-representative fraction may skew the analysis in either direction. You indicated a desire to remove the Finnish experience with the Buffalo which would remove 44 airframes from a (rough) total of 320 that saw actual combat. How is removing such a large proportion a valid basis for any form of realistic analysis?


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## Ascent (Aug 4, 2017)

I think the Finnish Buffaloes show the limitations of a kill ratio. The same aircraft type with different pilots in a different tactical situation achieved a totally different result.

Also is a Spitfire I the same aircraft as a Spitfire 22? They're not even close in performance. What about a Mustang I in British service compared to a P51D in American service? Are they the same aircraft? Different engines, different performance, even used in totally different roles. Do you put their kills in the same ratio?

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## drgondog (Aug 4, 2017)

Greg - Fold3.com has 99% of the ETO MACRs. Thank you for the kind words, but even MACR based research leaves room for error simply because even the 'witness accounts' speculate on cause of loss. When I compliled 8th AF losses in my book I separated air to air as 'confirmed' or 'higher probability' when the witness last saw one of his squadron mates being chased by enemy fighters but didn't see what actually happened. Ditto 'flak' loss when for example a Mustang crashes into aircraft being strafed or hits trees during the run. Could have been loss of control while trying to avoid flak.

There are many 'non-absolutes' in the assessments.


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## GregP (Aug 4, 2017)

Thanks Bill!

Buffnut,

I do NOT wish to remove the Finnish experience. I want ALL the experience lumped together and then we take a random sample. If the Finnish experience is partially selected, fine. What I don't want is a sample of really good missions selected BECAUSE they were good experiences. That is statistical bias. Tne sample selections must be done not knowing what data they contain at all, and must be chosen randomly. If not, then statistics cannot tell you anything of value.

ALL conclusions from statistical process depend upon random samples from populations where each and every member has an equal chance of being selected. If not, the math is invalid.

An obvious example of that are political polls taken at a shopping mall. The actual population is only those people who shop that mall; not the county, state, or country population.

Sorry, it's the engineer in me; and I shall desist.

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## David Fred (Feb 8, 2018)

ricardo said:


> Hi everybody.
> 
> I'd wish to know if someone has info about kill ratios (air to air victories). I understand that Hellcats has an astonishing 19:1 over the IJN. I've read that during BoB in fighter versus fighter dogfights, the Bf-109 was the undisputed champion. 333 Bf109 lost compared to the 272 Hurricanes and 219 Spitfires.
> 
> ...


Well, the Hurricanes were tasked with chasing bombers, so you can’t do a comparison on part of the battlefield. “My tank division wiped out all the other tanks, but we lost the war.”


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## David Fred (Feb 8, 2018)

ricardo said:


> Hi everybody.
> 
> I'd wish to know if someone has info about kill ratios (air to air victories). I understand that Hellcats has an astonishing 19:1 over the IJN. I've read that during BoB in fighter versus fighter dogfights, the Bf-109 was the undisputed champion. 333 Bf109 lost compared to the 272 Hurricanes and 219 Spitfires.
> 
> ...


Battle of Britain - aircraft losses


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## pbehn (Feb 8, 2018)

David Fred said:


> Battle of Britain - aircraft losses


There are lies, damned lies and statistics.


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## FLYBOYJ (Feb 8, 2018)

David Fred said:


> Battle of Britain - aircraft losses


Hmmm, any validation of those numbers aside from a site that that seems to just post random data?

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## Juha2 (Feb 9, 2018)

Agree with FlyboyJ, without the source(s) the figures are rather meaningless.
Here is one set of loss the BoB loss figures, the link to the main source doesn't work any more, but I suppose it is the The Battle of Britain Then and Now Mk V, the last updated impression published of the The Battle of Britain Then and Now book.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11029903
One can download the full data in Excel form.

Ps. There is still a typo in the German losses on 10 July 40, should be 14 a/c lost not 41.

Juha

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## MycroftHolmes (Feb 9, 2018)

There is a massive problem with discussing claims that rarely gets mentioned. Consider the following breakdown of losses (figures for illustrative purposes only):

Definitely lost in air combat: 40%
Definitely lost to non-air-combat reasons: 30%
Lost to unknown causes: 30%

Now consider two air-forces, A and B.

A says:
Losses in air combat = 40% + 30% = 70%
Losses to non-air-combat reasons = 30%

B says:
Losses in air combat = 40%
Losses to non-air-combat reasons = 30% + 30% = 60%

Now for air-force A read 'RAF', and for air-force B read 'Luftwaffe' or 'USAAF' or 'USN'. The truth of this is simply beyond dispute, as a glance at the figures will confirm. In the second half of 1941 the RAF lost over 400 fighters in operations over France, of which about 140 were attributed to flak or non-combat reasons. In the same period JG2 and JG26 lost 235 fighters - but allegedly only 103 in air combat. So, to put it simply, either the Spitfire was vastly more reliable than the Bf109, or there was something seriously wrong with the way these figures were calculated. For the Hellcat you have 815 losses, but allegedly only 245 in air combat, and for the P38 1752 losses but only 451 in air combat. I believe the estimable Hop pointed out that according to German records their bombers allegedly suffered a higher accident-rate in daylight operations than during the night, which makes absolutely no sense.

Another point regarding alleged German losses is that we know from other sources that many lost aircraft never found their way into the official lists. Besides statistical analysis we have Ultra intercepts, other German records (eg diaries) and the reports made by the RAF's crash-investigation teams, though unfortunately these teams only began operation in October 1940 when the BoB was winding down. I find it difficult to understand the reasoning that a signal from a Luftwaffe unit saying "We lost 6 aircraft today" is less accurate than figures compiled by some pen-pusher in Berlin claiming only 2 were lost. For what it's worth, my estimate is that the Luftwaffe lost 500-550 Bf109's shot down by RAF fighters during the BoB, while destroying about 450-500 Spitfires and Hurricanes in return.

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## pbehn (Feb 9, 2018)

MycroftHolmes said:


> For what it's worth, my estimate is that the Luftwaffe lost 500-550 Bf109's shot down by RAF fighters during the BoB, while destroying about 450-500 Spitfires and Hurricanes in return.


Boiling the conflict down to an exchange of front line fighters ignores completely what the conflict was based on and how it was decided. When the conflict was ended both Germany and the UK had as many single engine fighters as they needed. The British were running short of very good pilots and the Germans were running short of serviceable bombers and crews.


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## David Fred (Feb 10, 2018)

pbehn said:


> There are lies, damned lies and statistics.


Very nice. I doubt you know who said ie, and statistics are al we have for these battles.
Most of the men who fought them are dead


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## David Fred (Feb 10, 2018)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Hmmm, any validation of those numbers aside from a site that that seems to just post random data?



Just the U.K. National Archives, recording day by day results at the time. Not the speculation you lot play in.

Go back to your forum. I’ll find primary source data.

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## pbehn (Feb 10, 2018)

David Fred said:


> Very nice. I doubt you know who said ie, and statistics are al we have for these battles.
> Most of the men who fought them are dead


It is part of English language idiom, Mark Twain attributed it to Disraeli but it is hard to say who said or even wrote it first. My point was the bare statistics can be presented in a way that completely miss represents the conflict. For example, bomber command losses are usually excluded. The fight wasn't between RAF Hurricanes/Spitfires and LW Bf 109s, it was the RAF trying to stop bombers and the LW trying to get bombers to their target. When single engine fighter sweeps by the LW were noted they were avoided by Park/Dowding.


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## pbehn (Feb 10, 2018)

David Fred said:


> Just the U.K. National Archives, recording day by day results at the time. Not the speculation you lot play in.
> 
> Go back to your forum. I’ll find primary source data.


The only results that could possibly be recorded at the time were claims, of course a web site concerned with WW2 art work must be considered the most trustworthy.

take one day 15 September 1940 all similar but not exactly the same and nothing like your quoted site and also nothing like the claims published at the time
www.telegraph.co.uk/history/battle-of-britain/11865303/The-Battle-of-Britain-as-it-happened-on-September-15-1940-live.html
Battle of Britain Day - Wikipedia
Warfare - Featured Articles - Battle of Britain Day – 15 September 1940


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## buffnut453 (Feb 10, 2018)

David Fred said:


> Just the U.K. National Archives, recording day by day results at the time. Not the speculation you lot play in.
> 
> Go back to your forum. I’ll find primary source data.



So what about German archives? And how do you ensure that you're counting losses correctly? For example, what about losses where the cause is unknown which, given the proportion of non-combat losses, could seriously skew the data. 

I'd also recommend dialing back the snark just a wee bit. Many members of this forum are VERY familiar with primary sources, including the errors and gaps that they inevitably contain.

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## fastmongrel (Feb 10, 2018)



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## FLYBOYJ (Feb 10, 2018)

David Fred said:


> Just the U.K. National Archives, recording day by day results at the time. Not the speculation you lot play in.


Well the way it was posted, it looked like it was picked up from a cartoon source.


David Fred said:


> Go back to your forum. *I’ll find primary source data*.



Please do as I wait patiently in the forum for your data.


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## Milosh (Feb 11, 2018)

List of Website Contents

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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Feb 11, 2018)

David Fred said:


> Just the U.K. National Archives, recording day by day results at the time. Not the speculation you lot play in.
> 
> Go back to your forum. I’ll find primary source data.



Come on now. Knock it off with the personal attacks.

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## Stig1207 (Feb 12, 2018)

'Hurricane won the Battle of Britain, it got 1593 of the 2739 German aircraft that were knocked down.'

Stephen Fry, an episode of QI; the theme was dogs.

Nothing more to debate, lads


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## GregP (Feb 12, 2018)

Did we ever arrive at a general consensus of losses from both sides by aircraft type? If so, I can't seem to locate it. I've seen 1,652 German losses against 1,087 British losses, but the losses have very uncertain sources. They'll say "single engine fighters and twin-engine fighters, but not aircraft types, and the British number includes Bomber Command and Coastal Command losses, but not aircraft types, either.

Seems the Germans don't recognize 31 Oct 1940 as the end of the BOB ... only the British side does, and Googling it doesn't bring up much. When I try the British National Archives, I can't seem to wade through it to find losses and claims, either.

With all the stuff written about it, you'd think we could come up with some good numbers for the event! But it doesn't seem so, does it?

Makes being a WWII buff not the easiest hobby when there is so much dissent about exactly what took place in a one of the turning-point battles.


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## pbehn (Feb 13, 2018)

GregP said:


> Did we ever arrive at a general consensus of losses from both sides by aircraft type? If so, I can't seem to locate it. I've seen 1,652 German losses against 1,087 British losses, but the losses have very uncertain sources. They'll say "single engine fighters and twin-engine fighters, but not aircraft types, and the British number includes Bomber Command and Coastal Command losses, but not aircraft types, either.
> Seems the Germans don't recognize 31 Oct 1940 as the end of the BOB ... only the British side does, and Googling it doesn't bring up much. When I try the British National Archives, I can't seem to wade through it to find losses and claims, either.
> With all the stuff written about it, you'd think we could come up with some good numbers for the event! But it doesn't seem so, does it?
> Makes being a WWII buff not the easiest hobby when there is so much dissent about exactly what took place in a one of the turning-point battles.


The Germans have no reason to recognise dates for the start or end of the BoB it is purely arbitrary. As an arial assault it sort of petered out, the daytime and night time raids overlapped. I have seen numbers similar to those you have posted but they don't matter. As soon as you have a number for losses then someone asks the following.
How many were:-
Training losses
Accidental losses
Friendly fire
To further complicate things there are losses which weren't losses, how many downed aircraft were put back in the air?

Others will use the losses to establish the superiority of one type over the other which ignores that fact that all fighters were modified during the conflict, and that the majority of victories were against an enemy that didn't see you at all. The Dowding system of detection, interception and control of forces was a massive "force multiplyer" which doesn't show up in the statistics of Hurricane/Spitfire v Bf 109. Similarly German fighters and bombers having different radio frequencies and poor coordination doesn't show up in the fighters performance.

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## Greg Boeser (Feb 13, 2018)

Look. It doesn't really matter. The Battle of Britain was won by a handful of adventurous American barnstormer pilots, who snuck over to England, evading the Gestapo-like US G-men intent on enforcing our neutrality laws, and taught the Brits how to fly. I read it in a book once.


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## buffnut453 (Feb 13, 2018)

Greg Boeser said:


> I read it in a book once.



A book? Can't be true, then!!! Now...if you told me you'd read it on the internet, I'd have believed you!


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## Shortround6 (Feb 13, 2018)

or seen it in a movie


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Feb 13, 2018)

Greg Boeser said:


> Look. It doesn't really matter. The Battle of Britain was won by a handful of adventurous American barnstormer pilots, who snuck over to England, evading the Gestapo-like US G-men intent on enforcing our neutrality laws, and taught the Brits how to fly. I read it in a book once.



Don't forget the love story too...

Gotta go full blown Hollywood with this.


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## pbehn (Feb 14, 2018)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Don't forget the love story too...
> 
> Gotta go full blown Hollywood with this.


If it was made by the BBC the pilots would be women and the commanders gay while Park would be from a Mauri tribe, the conflict would be ended by a party arranged with the LW by the LBGTIQ community.

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## Juha2 (Feb 14, 2018)

the "old" figures for the BoB losses were: for RAF 367 bombers, 1140 fighters and 96 other operational types = 1603 altogether and 1733 all operational types for LW. So losses were fairly close each other.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Feb 14, 2018)

pbehn said:


> If it was made by the BBC the pilots would be women and the commanders gay while Park would be from a Mauri tribe, the conflict would be ended by a party arranged with the LW by the LBGTIQ community.


 
Could be HBO too.


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## pbehn (Feb 14, 2018)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Could be HBO too.


I wasn't actually joking Adler, the BBC have a policy of quotas in their drama casts, this leads to all sorts of ridiculous and completely implausible story lines.

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## fastmongrel (Feb 14, 2018)

pbehn said:


> I wasn't actually joking Adler, the BBC have a policy of quotas in their drama casts, this leads to all sorts of ridiculous and completely implausible story lines.



The only quotas the BBC seems to have in dramas is that all characters are played by nice chaps or chapesses who went to Eton or if they are desperate for an actor Rugby or as a last resort Marlbrough (usually Jack sodding Whitehall). I watched something recently where the actresses accent in one sentence pole vaulted across the Pennines from Lancashire to Yorkshire and ended up sounding like Noddy Holder.

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## pbehn (Feb 14, 2018)

Juha2 said:


> the "old" figures for the BoB losses were: for RAF 367 bombers, 1140 fighters and 96 other operational types = 1603 altogether and 1733 all operational types for LW. So losses were fairly close each other.


That's how I have read it. However the losses must be seen in the context of production. British production was well over German estimates of it while German production was well below British estimates. Both sides believed that Germany was producing most while the reverse was actually the truth. Additionally the German front line bombers were not changed throughout the war apart from a few He 177s while the British had three heavy bombers nearing production.


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## GregP (Feb 14, 2018)

Sorry I asked.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Feb 15, 2018)

GregP said:


> Sorry I asked.



What are you upset about now?


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## Fighterguy (Feb 15, 2018)

Are you talking about the Israeli F-15 that lost a wing, but returned? If so, that was a mid-air collision during a training exercise. Also, getting hit by a SAM does not fall under the scope of air-to-air kill ratio. Regardless, the F-15 A/C has an "unofficial" tally of 104:0 kill, other sources put it at 102:0, with zero losses to ground fire. The F-15E has 1:0, but did lose 3 aircraft to ground fire..Next up is the British Sea Harrier at 21:0, with 3 ground fire losses.


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## FLYBOYJ (Feb 15, 2018)

Fighterguy said:


> Are you talking about the Israeli F-15 that lost a wing, but returned?


NO


Fighterguy said:


> Also, getting hit by a SAM does not fall under the scope of air-to-air kill ratio.


We know that

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## Fighterguy (Feb 15, 2018)

FLYBOYJ said:


> NO
> 
> We know that


So, when was an F-15 (air superiority, not mud hen) hit by a missile, outside the 1990 incident in Alaska?


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## Barrett (Feb 15, 2018)

GregP said:


> The F6F Hellcat did have a 19 : 1 kill ratio. It was the best piston fighter kill ratio of all times. The next best was down around 12 : 1. That was the Corsair.


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## Barrett (Feb 15, 2018)

Just posted a reply on a similar Pacific Theater thread:

The FM-2 "Wilder Wildcat" probably retains the world record for piston fighters at 32-1. And unlike most other VFs, I'm inclined to accept the FM record almost at face value because of the nature of its mission. Air defense of CVE task groups very seldom generated the multi-multi bogey furballs common to Hellcats and Corsairs with their inevitably high claiming errors. Look at the FM's breakdown and it's a high % of "bomber" (bmber-attack) types which GENERALLY were easier to track than fighters.

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## Stig1207 (Feb 15, 2018)

MycroftHolmes said:


> There is a massive problem with discussing claims that rarely gets mentioned. Consider the following breakdown of losses (figures for illustrative purposes only):
> 
> Definitely lost in air combat: 40%
> Definitely lost to non-air-combat reasons: 30%
> ...



The Luftwaffe 'losses to unknown causes' were assumed lost to enemy action, in their quite elaborate reporting procedures.
The Americans attributed 'unknown losses' to the category that seemed most likely i.e. due to enemy aircraft, AAA, etc.
Your 'B' airforce doesn't seem to be beyond dispute when applied to the Luftwaffe. USAAF, or USN.

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## GregP (Feb 15, 2018)

Not upset at all, Chris, and in case you haven't been tracking it, I haven't been in a LONG time. Things are what they are; no point is getting upset about it.

I thought we had some idea of the real losses in the BOB. To see otherwise in graphic detail merely adds to the frustration of trying to find our the number of planes shot down. Been chasing that one for a long time, as you know.

But, if we can't agree on the number of losses during a several-month period by type, we'll probably never arrive at general agreement on losses for the war. I figured that but hope otherwise. To me, we SHOULD know the losses by type and the argument should be lost to what? Combat, operational, unknown, etc. Not how many ran into grief on the missions. That should not be hard to get from somewhere ... but it is.

Cheers.

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## FLYBOYJ (Feb 15, 2018)

Fighterguy said:


> So, when was an F-15 (air superiority, not mud hen) hit by a missile, outside the 1990 incident in Alaska?


As far as I know, never


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## BiffF15 (Feb 15, 2018)

Ditto! However there has been at least once incident of an Eagle almost being taken out by an own ship launched AIM-7 from the front weapons station. He recovered. Eagle Standard.

Cheers,
Biff

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## DarrenW (Feb 15, 2018)

Barrett said:


> Just posted a reply on a similar Pacific Theater thread:
> 
> The FM-2 "Wilder Wildcat" probably retains the world record for piston fighters at 32-1. And unlike most other VFs, I'm inclined to accept the FM record almost at face value because of the nature of its mission. Air defense of CVE task groups very seldom generated the multi-multi bogey furballs common to Hellcats and Corsairs with their inevitably high claiming errors. Look at the FM's breakdown and it's a high % of "bomber" (bmber-attack) types which GENERALLY were easier to track than fighters.



Not to be funny but I really need to do some research and see which versions of which model of fighter aircraft had what kill ratios (i.e. an F6F-3 compaired to an F6F-5, or a P-51B vs. a P-51C or D). I always felt that a Wildcat was a Wildcat, whether an FM-2 or an F4F (dash 1, 2, 3, 4 ect....). Am I basically a minority here to see things this way?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Feb 15, 2018)

GregP said:


> Not upset at all, Chris, and in case you haven't been tracking it, I haven't been in a LONG time. Things are what they are; no point is getting upset about it.
> 
> I thought we had some idea of the real losses in the BOB. To see otherwise in graphic detail merely adds to the frustration of trying to find our the number of planes shot down. Been chasing that one for a long time, as you know.
> 
> ...



Only you know if this is where you want to be...


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## Vincenzo (Feb 16, 2018)

After many years is sad see taking as kill ratio the USN claims as kill ratios (this is true for all the air forces one sided data)

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## vinnye (Feb 16, 2018)

I know that some people are big fans of Kill Ratios, but I am not.
The reasons why I am not a fan are ;
1) the success rate of one aircraft is a product of a LOT of factors. Some of them are ; the quality of the opposing aircraft, their pilots, and the doctrine of their air force.
2) The situation in which the combat or ambush takes place. A defending/ intercepting force may be at a disadvantage of lack of numbers or altitude.
3) The experience of the pilots of both sides. During the BoB, the RAF used outdated tactics - VIC formation etc and had not had the experience that the LW gained in Spain, Poland etc. So in simple terms it was rookies against pro's. It is not that surprising then, that the LW fighters did quite well. Similarly, on the Eastern Front. the LW faced obsolete aircraft flown by inexperienced pilots. The same could be said about the Japanese forces in the Far East - they had experience as well as modern aircraft against some obsolete inexperienced opposition.
When the Allies gained experience and learned from their mistakes and adopted tactics better suited to their aircrafts relative strengths and exploiting their opponents weaknesses - the boot began to be put on the other foot. This is most obvious in the European Theatre when the RAF and USAAF changed tactics and allowed fighter aircraft to seek out the LW on the ground and in the air and also not be tied to close bomber escort. This quickly degrade the LW in terms of strength and also vitally in terms of experienced pilots. A similar situation late in the PTO saw the Japanese lose most of their experienced pilots and aircraft and become a shadow of its former self.
None of the above is taken into account in simple Kill Ratios.

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## buffnut453 (Feb 16, 2018)

The contribution of other systems/data inputs should not be understated. By 1940, the era of the "by chance" intercept, which had been the norm for the preceding 25+ years, was at an end. The Battle of Britain was a tactical success in large part because of non-aircraft factors like radar, ground control system and intelligence. Lack of such inputs put any defending force at a disadvantage. Conversely, correct use of such enterprise-level systems resulted in much improved performance by fighter aircraft (eg the Marianas Turkey Shoot).


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## GregP (Feb 16, 2018)

The large majority of victories were scored when the victim was unaware that he was being attacked until bullets started hitting his aircraft. There is NO system that takes this into account. Dogfights happened, but ambush kills were much more frequent. That from the pilots who flew the war, many times over, over years of hearing it.

My own preferred indicator of pilot skill is victories divided by combat missions flown, with a combat mission being a mission on which enemy aircraft were engaged. This tells us nothing about the aircraft being flown, but is a fairly decent indicator of pilot skill. Unfortunately, even this measure is heavily influenced by the number of targets available to the missions being flown. The ETO was relatively target-rich, with a lot of planes being in the sky over Europe almost any day. The PTO was relatively target-poor, with the ocean being large, and the number of planes being almost laughably low compared with the ETO opportunities. Yet, the top two scorers from the U.S.A. came from the PTO.

Kill ratio is about the only measure of aircraft quality I can think of, and it has the same problem the measure above has ... where can you get the data?

Unfortunately, the data are very difficult to get for almost ANY system of measure. making these discussions interesting even 80 years after the fact. I bet it won't be settled, EVER, but the discussions are fun, aren't they?

Cheers.

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## Barrett (Feb 16, 2018)

Ref. the generic Wildcat v. FM-2 "Wilder Wildcat." A matter of different kittens in the litter. The FM-2 was similar weight to the F4F-4 (FM-1 was nearly identical) with more hosspower. While the six-gun dash four Wildcat (due to RN influence) delivered more rounds on target, it provided significantly less trigger time than the dash three, which had performed better because it was lighter. Similarly, the armament difference between B/C Mustangs and D models affected kill pecentages, somewhat. Would have to dig out my scratchings, but IIRC the 50% increase in firepower (6 guns v. 4) resulted in about 10% increase in claimed lethality. Short version: in WW II air combat, four .50s were optimum.


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## pbehn (Feb 16, 2018)

Barrett said:


> Ref. the generic Wildcat v. FM-2 "Wilder Wildcat." A matter of different kittens in the litter. The FM-2 was similar weight to the F4F-4 (FM-1 was nearly identical) with more hosspower. While the six-gun dash four Wildcat (due to RN influence) delivered more rounds on target, it provided significantly less trigger time than the dash three, which had performed better because it was lighter. Similarly, the armament difference between B/C Mustangs and D models affected kill pecentages, somewhat. Would have to dig out my scratchings, but IIRC the 50% increase in firepower (6 guns v. 4) resulted in about 10% increase in claimed lethality. Short version: in WW II air combat, four .50s were optimum.


I think that what is optimum depends on how many P51-Ds ran out of ammunition, a 10% increase in anything is actually huge.


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## GregP (Feb 16, 2018)

According to the Germans, the undoubted masters at fighter combat, one gun in the fuselage was worth two in the wings because they were all aimed straight with no convergence to disrupt the pattern after the point o convergence.

So, I'd really love to see some hard data that either confirm or give that claim the boot. The Bf 109 had fuselage guns throughout all it's life and was a VERY good killer of airplanes. I'd say that pretty well confirms it. Also, the U.S. mount of the top two aces was the P-38, with all fuselage guns. But the Hellcat and P-51 were quite good, too.

I'm thinking the best armament was a combination of cannons and MG, selectable by the pilot, that allowed the pilot to choose hitting power or rate of fire or both, depending on circumstances ... or else four 20 mm cannons and hang the MGs.

It tells me a lot that virtually all fighters went to cannons after Korea, but tells me nothing about what was optimum with the power and guns available in WWII. I'm leaning toward cannons, myself. This brings back shades of the old "great fighter gun debate."

See: The WWII Fighter Gun Debate: Gun Tables

I hope we don't contrive to re-post that all again but, if so, at least we have some good copy to read going forward.


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## pbehn (Feb 16, 2018)

Not exactly conclusive but the top three planes in order of kills against the V1 were cannon armed. While the Tempest was the quickest at low altitude the Mosquito certainly wasn't.


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## DarrenW (Feb 16, 2018)

My view has always been that in WWII cannon armament proved to be more lethal on bigger slower moving targets such as bombers, but on the smaller faster and more maneuverable fighters nor so much. With a cannon's inherently lower muzzle velocity and fewer rounds available per gun on average, a pilot may find more comfort with a couple of extra .50 cal. or 12.7mm in fighter vs fighter combat where he has a better chance of getting hits on target. Does anyone have any statistics concerning the overall effectiveness of cannons vs machine guns in WWII fighter vs fighter combat? I have no problem being educated to believe otherwise...


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## pbehn (Feb 16, 2018)

DarrenW said:


> My view has always been that in WWII cannon armament proved to be more lethal on bigger slower moving targets such as bombers, but on the smaller faster and more maneuverable fighters nor so much. With a cannon's inherently lower muzzle velocity and fewer rounds available per gun on average, a pilot may find more comfort with a couple of extra .50 cal. or 12.7mm in fighter vs fighter combat where he has a better chance of getting hits on target. Does anyone have any statistics concerning the overall effectiveness of cannons vs machine guns in WWII fighter vs fighter combat? I have no problem being educated to believe otherwise...


In what seems like a simple question there is a lot of politics and logistics too. An organisation with thousands of machines prefers those machines to use the same equipment, once a few million rounds of ammunition have been ordered and stockpiled they become a big argument for continued use, at least until they are used up. You cannot compare a gun with any other gun, it is a system as loaded onto an aircraft. The rifle calibre MGs at their best with a combination of incendiary and AP rounds were much more effective than cannon rounds at their worst which failed to explode. In any case there is always the problem of weight, a Spitfire couldn't carry 8 cannon but did carry 8 x 0.303 mgs it is therefore a comparison of weight of fire and overall effectiveness.

The RAF set 4 x 20mm cannon as their standard armament sometime in 1940/41, all fighters had this except its most successful one, the Spitfire. The Spitfire's wings meant that the outer pair couldn't be properly heated, so 4 x .303 or 2 x 0.5 mgs were used in the outer wings. I learned here recently that Spitfires flew from Malta with 4 x 20mm cannon and also 4 x 0,303 mgs but that is a special case Hurricane Mk II, Typhoon, Tempest and Mustangs (P51s ordered by the British) as well as Whirlwind Beaufighter and Mosquito heavy fighters all had 4 x 20mm cannon specified. The RAF always had to consider attacks on UK which may have included larger slow moving targets.


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## fastmongrel (Feb 17, 2018)

pbehn said:


> o 4 x .303 or 2 x 0.5 mgs were used in the outer wings.



When Spits were equipped with the Browning .50 HMGs they were fitted in the inner gun position.
Concise Guide To Spitfire Wing Types — Variants & Technology | Reference

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## Shortround6 (Feb 19, 2018)

DarrenW said:


> My view has always been that in WWII cannon armament proved to be more lethal on bigger slower moving targets such as bombers, but on the smaller faster and more maneuverable fighters nor so much. With a cannon's inherently lower muzzle velocity and fewer rounds available per gun on average, a pilot may find more comfort with a couple of extra .50 cal. or 12.7mm in fighter vs fighter combat where he has a better chance of getting hits on target. Does anyone have any statistics concerning the overall effectiveness of cannons vs machine guns in WWII fighter vs fighter combat? I have no problem being educated to believe otherwise...



Unfortunate the guns themselves (and guns includes ammo) preclude such a simple statement. The German 13mm was the lowest powered 'heavy' machine gun used in WW II with a light, for it's size, bullet and the lowest velocity. A German pilot with six such guns and no cannon would not have been much better off. Since the gun was designed for cowl mounting to replace the older 7.9mm MG 17 this should not be taken as a failure as it did increase a fighters punch over the 7.9mm guns (it was also the lightest 'heavy' machine gun).

AS the discussion in the other thread shows, 20mm guns showed a huge variation in shell weight, muzzle velocity and rate of fire. 
For the allies the only 20mm gun that matters is the 20mm Hispano and the only .50 cal/12.7mm is the Browning .50 cal. There has been a crap load a of internet band width and a crap load of ink and paper used comparing these. 

Boiling it down the 20mm Hispano, for most of the war, fired at about 600rpm or 10 rounds per second so firing time is pretty easy to figure out. About the only allied fighters built in quantity to use the 60 round drums were the first 400 Beaufighters, the Spitfire Vb and some P-39 Aircobras. Just about everything else got belts of various sizes/lengths. Basically 12-20 seconds of firing time for the belt fed Hispanos. how much is enough? The Browning fired at about 800rpm in the version most often used during the war or about 13 rounds per second (or 13 and a fraction). You really need the extra pair of guns to get a significantly higher rate of fire. 

as for "cannon's inherently lower muzzle velocity" this is most emphatically not the case in regards to the Hispano and the Browning .50cal.
The Hispano had a MV of about 860metes/sec while the .50 had one of of 890m/s at best. Please be sure you are comparing the right barrels as often the velocity for the.50 is given from 45in ground barrels and not the 36in barrels used in aircraft. There was also a variation in types of projectiles. 
The 20mm Hispano and the .50 cal and very similar trajectories and times of flight out 600yds and beyond making any practical differences in air to air combat irrelevant. Not so against other 20mm so........ 

US Navy figured that one 20mm was worth three .50 cal so a plane with 4 four 20mm Hispano's was worth ?????????

Barring golden BBs the 20mm shells were much more destructive. Here the US really had a problem as they never used a HE projectile from the .50 and went to a hybrid armor piercing incendiary round for the majority of their ammo. The AP core meant that only about 1 gram of incendiary material per bullet was carried (a bit under what a British .303 incendiary carried) and the incendiary material was carried in the nose ahead of the AP core so it would be stripped away on any substantial structure hit and not carried into the aircraft interior. 

you *need *to make more hits with the .50 to cause equal damage. 

I would note that the US Navy, which was not happy with 6 gun Wildcats armed with 240rpg in 1942, was experimenting with Corsairs armed with four 20mm guns and F6Fs with the inner most .50 replaced by a 20mm gun in 1944 and in fact the US Navy never *ordered* a plane armed with .50 cal guns after Dec of 1944 (took delivery of plenty) but the FH-1 Phantom jet was the last *NEW* design to be ordered using .50 cal guns. 

I would note that both higher rate of fire .50 cal guns and high velocity, high capacity .50 cal incendiary ammo were well in the works when the Navy made these decisions. 

What conclusions can you draw from this?

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## tomo pauk (Feb 19, 2018)

DarrenW said:


> My view has always been that in WWII cannon armament proved to be more lethal on bigger slower moving targets such as bombers, but on the smaller faster and more maneuverable fighters nor so much. With a cannon's inherently lower muzzle velocity and fewer rounds available per gun on average, a pilot may find more comfort with a couple of extra .50 cal. or 12.7mm in fighter vs fighter combat where he has a better chance of getting hits on target.



There was plenty of cannons with high muzzle velocity in ww2 - MK 151/15, VJa-23, NS-37, MK 103 (granted, this is a bit of stretch for ww2 A-to-A fight), Hispano as noted by Shortround6, some Japanese cannons. In the same time there was plenty of ~.50 MGs witl low MV, like Italian or German types.



> Does anyone have any statistics concerning the overall effectiveness of cannons vs machine guns in WWII fighter vs fighter combat? I have no problem being educated to believe otherwise...



Soviets made a comparison between the results of firepower of Yak-3 (2 HMGs, 1 cannon) and La-7 (two synchronised cannons) with regard to downing anything the Germans threw at them from ~mid 1944 until VE day (read mostly fighters or fighter-bombers). Yak-3 ended emerged as a winner vs. La-7. 
I'll try to find the comparison.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 19, 2018)

Here it is: link.
A very good read.

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## Shortround6 (Feb 19, 2018)

And we have one end of the spectrum. The Russian 12.7mm was the most powerful 12.7mm and the Russian 20mm used the 2nd smallest (lightest) conventional shell. The Russian 20mm being essentially a necked up 12.7mm cartridge case.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 19, 2018)

I like this part
"Comment for the last table: we must bear in mind that the objectives for the Yak-3 and La-7 (1944-45) were in many cases the FW-190, that is, the well-armored aircraft, and the UBS machine guns. *better drilling *compared to ShVAK guns"

I am interpreting the bolded part as "better penetration" but could be wrong  

The 20mm ShVAK ammo used projectiles of 91-99 grams and seem to be a little sensitive to weight and velocity. The light shells having a MV of 790m/s and the slightly heavier ones dropping to 770 or 750m/s. There were AP projectiles but these had little (2.5 grams incendiary) or no HE/incendiary filler. 

The 12.7 Russian used perhaps 10 different projectiles in WW II and four of them were HE or HEI, Leaving out the tungsten cored projectile the regular 12.7mm AP had good penetration while the short, squaty 20mm projectiles did not. 
A 12.7mm projectile is trying to make a hole about 40% of the size of the hole a 20mm projectile is making so high powered 12.7mm guns can often exceed the penetration of low powered 20mm rounds. 

For Details see. From 20mm to 25mm - The Russian Ammunition Page
and From 12.7mm to 14.5mm - The Russian Ammunition Page

The Russian 20mm HE ammo never exceeding 6.7 grams of HE and more commonly 2.8 grams HE + 3.3 grams incendiary. 

British 20mm Hispano HE carried 10.2/10.5 grams HE and US HEI carried 7 grams HE and 4.3 grams incendiary. Obviously 128-130 gram shells do more damage than 91-99 gram shells.


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## DarrenW (Feb 19, 2018)

Thanks for sharing your abundant knowledge on this subject pbehn, fastmongrel, Tomo, and Shortround6. It would seem that I have much to learn about WWII aircraft weaponry but something tells me that I came to the right place to accomplish just that.

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## pbehn (Feb 19, 2018)

DarrenW said:


> Thanks for sharing your abundant knowledge on this subject pbehn, fastmongrel, Tomo, and Shortround6. It would seem that I have much to learn about WWII aircraft weaponry but something tells me that I came to the right place to accomplish just that.


Hey, don't include me in your list, 90% of what I know I read on here

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## DarrenW (Feb 19, 2018)

pbehn said:


> Hey, don't include me in your list, 90% of what I know I read on here



You get the bacon for your honesty Sir!

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## pbehn (Feb 19, 2018)

DarrenW said:


> You get the bacon for your honesty Sir!


There is also, as there always is a time element. The British in 1940 were faced with increasingly heavily protected bombers and fighters, the British had new bomber designs coming into production so it is a normal assumption that the Germans did too. If in 1936-39 the Brits had the option of a reliable 0.5 cal MG they may have taken it but really it wasn't there, at the time. Once committed to a system it has its own inertia and momentum, there were many mods to the British 0.303 MGs to make the best of a bad job until the cannons were got to being a serviceable weapon. The Spitfire was originally specified with 4 x 0.303 MGs and ended being specified with 4 x 20mm cannon. That is not only a statement of what was needed but also what was possible. A Spitfire Mk 1 with 4 cannon may have been devastating in 1940 taking on the LW bombers, if it managed to get up high enough in time to do anything other than give a wave goodbye, at the time they had a lot of trouble just getting 2 to work.

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## Greyman (Feb 19, 2018)

Was reading something that referenced a VIII Fighter Command (P-47) study that said the average duration of fire for a successful attack vs. a Ju88 was 15 seconds.

Things that came to mind:

it's doubtful the Spitfire was ever going to carry 8 x .5in Brownings (probably 4)
it's doubtful the Spitfire was ever going to carry as much .5-inch ammo in total as the P47 could fire in 15 seconds 
the P-47 is probably a better gun platform than the Spitfire
while the toughest to actually catch, the Ju88 seems to be the most vulnerable of the three main German types
I think the Hispano was the right call.

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## buffnut453 (Feb 19, 2018)

Greyman said:


> Was reading something that referenced a VIII Fighter Command (P-47) study that said the average duration of fire for a successful attack vs. a Ju88 was 15 seconds.
> 
> Things that came to mind:
> 
> ...



Luckily for the P-47, the problems with wing-mounted 50cals were all sorted out before the Jug reached front-line service in a combat zone. Luckily for the RAF, the Spitfire and Hurricane had a viable armament mix that could take down German aircraft in the 2.5 years before the P-47 flew its first combat mission.

Not sure what point you're making relative to kill ratios.

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## Greyman (Feb 20, 2018)

buffnut453 said:


> Not sure what point you're making relative to kill ratios.



Less about kill ratios and more tacking into pbehn's post re: .5-inch Browning/20-mm Hispano

Point being - if the P-47 took 15 seconds on average to destroy a Ju 88 with .50s, a .50-armed Spitfire would take even longer, and I think the RAF would find that unacceptable - especially with the 109 escort closing in ...


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## KiwiBiggles (Feb 20, 2018)

Greyman said:


> Was reading something that referenced a VIII Fighter Command (P-47) study that said the average duration of fire for a successful attack vs. a Ju88 was 15 seconds.


Really? 15 seconds is an awfully long time to be firing. And Fighter Command managed to down Ju 88s in 1940 using only 8 x 0.303. 15 seconds of 0.50 would probably correspond to 60 seconds of 0.303, so something doesn't add up somewhere.


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## Greyman (Feb 20, 2018)

KiwiBiggles said:


> Really? 15 seconds is an awfully long time to be firing. And Fighter Command managed to down Ju 88s in 1940 using only 8 x 0.303. 15 seconds of 0.50 would probably correspond to 60 seconds of 0.303, so something doesn't add up somewhere.



I wouldn't say a .50 strike was six times as effective as a .303 strike - probably closer to two/three times - I'd have to look over some firing trials again.

One thing that's probably different was that many Ju 88 kills in 1940 were against aircraft flying in formation - whereas I'd bet the Ju 88s the P-47s caught were on the run and evading.

Unfortunately I have no other details - just the 15 second figure. Not much to go on.

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## Shortround6 (Feb 20, 2018)

You have different criteria or metrics. 
Like rounds _fired _to bring down a aircraft.
or 
Number of _hits _to bring down an aircraft. 

Plenty of Spitfires and Hurricanes emptied their guns without a German bomber (or fighter) falling. Poor aim, too far away, whatever. 
_Average _firing time would be in excess of ammo carried. 
Germans had the same problem. they figured 15-20 20mm _hits _were needed to bring down a B-17. They also figured and average pilot only hit with 2% of rounds fired so they needed 750-1000 rounds of 20mm ammo fired to bring down a B-17. Well in excess of what any single engine fighter carried regardless of the number of guns. 
The P-47s fall into that pond. 8 guns firing at 13 rounds a second = 104 rounds per second x 15 seconds = 1560 rounds fired X 2% = 31.2 hits needed to bring down a twin engine Ju-88. 

Obviously a crap load of variables. 
Also _*averages*_ include the entire spectrum, Pilot A fires fires for 3 seconds (312 rounds fired) to kill his Ju-88 while pilot "B" fires for 27 seconds (2808 rounds , and burns out his barrels) to get his Ju-88. *Average* is 15 seconds. 

While interesting the 15 second number really doesn't tell us much.


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## pbehn (Feb 20, 2018)

One effect of the Spitfire and Hurricanes 8 x 0.303 armament was that although many didn't get destroyed in the air many returned home and were out of service along with many crews.

I think I read elsewhere on this forum that the 0.5 cal guns were in no way reliable in 1936/40 and if you take the Spitfire's 20mm cannon as being three times more destructive than the 0.5 cal then their total armament was about the same.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 20, 2018)

Germans were probably of opinion that there was 5% chance to hit a 4-engined bomber. For what is worth:







pbehn said:


> One effect of the Spitfire and Hurricanes 8 x 0.303 armament was that although many didn't get destroyed in the air many returned home and were out of service along with many crews.
> 
> I think I read elsewhere on this forum that the 0.5 cal guns were in no way reliable in 1936/40 and if you take the Spitfire's 20mm cannon as being three times more destructive than the 0.5 cal then their total armament was about the same.



The Italian 12.7mm Breda-SAFAT was considered reliable much before ww2 started.Ditto for Belgian Browning off-springs.
RAF didn't have to wait for Hispano, Oerlikon was offering several of their models from late 1920s/early 1930s, belt or drum fed, drums being of different sizes (up to 100 rds). Unfortunately, RAF's indecision meant that there was as good as zero of cannon-armed Spitfires and Hurricanes in the BoB.

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## fastmongrel (Feb 20, 2018)

Its been mentioned many times before when comparing the .50 Browning HMG to other weapons. The prewar Browning is not the same as the 1940 onwards Browning. Rate of fire is lower by approx 25%, velocity is lower, terminal energy is lower and Ball rounds with no explosive, incendary and no armour penetrating core were the most common rounds.

A Hurricane or Spit in the BoB with 4x0.50s is not equivalent to a P51B.

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## buffnut453 (Feb 20, 2018)

fastmongrel said:


> Its been mentioned many times before when comparing the .50 Browning HMG to other weapons. The prewar Browning is not the same as the 1940 onwards Browning. Rate of fire is lower by approx 25%, velocity is lower, terminal energy is lower and Ball rounds with no explosive, incendary and no armour penetrating core were the most common rounds.
> 
> A Hurricane or Spit in the BoB with 4x0.50s is not equivalent to a P51B.



Also, wing installation of 50cals continued to have problems until the latter half of 1942 across a range of airframes including the P-51, P-40 and F4F.

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## tyrodtom (Feb 20, 2018)

How many Ju-88s were shot down by P-47s ?


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## Fighterguy (Feb 21, 2018)

BiffF15 said:


> Ditto! However there has been at least once incident of an Eagle almost being taken out by an own ship launched AIM-7 from the front weapons station. He recovered. Eagle Standard.
> 
> Cheers,
> Biff


The early F-15A's experienced engine augmenter (afterburner) malfunctions during station 3 or 7 AIM-7 missile launches. The missile exhaust would enter the engine inlet, starving the engine of air, and causing the malfunction when in full afterburner. This was rectified by the addition of logic within the Engine Electronic Control to signal the Unified Fuel Control to retard to stage one afterburner when a missile was fired (there's five stages of afterburner). This was applicable to the older F100-PW-100 engines. 
The one F-15C that was shot by a missile took place during a training exercise out of Elmendorf AFB, Alaska. One aircraft was ferrying a live AIM-9 Sidewinder to the alert station at King Salmon. The other aircraft, the 54th Tactical Fighter Squadron flagship, was leading the element. They proceeded to do some BFM while on the way, and the aircraft carrying the live missile "inadvertently" fired the missile at his lead. The missile blew off the left horizontal stabilator and hydraulic actuator. The aircraft returned to Elmendorf and landed. The pilot stated it flew normal. The mishap caused debate about the effectiveness of the AIM-9 missile, versus the survivability of the F-15. It took about a year to get the damaged fighter back to flying status, and continued for several years until finally relegated to the bone-yard.

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## DarrenW (Feb 22, 2018)

This is an interesting aspect of the cannon vs. machine gun debate :

Vought F4U Corsair - Wikipedia

_..... the F4U-1C was similar to the F4U-1D but its six machine guns were replaced by four 20 millimeter (0.79 in) __AN/M2 cannons__ with 231 rounds of ammunition per gun. __The F4U-1C was introduced to combat during 1945, most notably in the Okinawa campaign. Aviators preferred the standard armament of six .50 in (12.7 mm) machine guns since they were already more than powerful enough to destroy most Japanese aircraft, and had more ammunition and a higher rate of fire. __The weight of the Hispano cannon and their ammunition affected the flight performance, especially its agility, but the aircraft was found to be especially potent in the ground attack role._

Quoted from: Green, William. _Famous Fighters of the Second World War_. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1975 (page 144).

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## Shortround6 (Feb 22, 2018)

According the Navy airplane characteristics sheets the 20mm armed Corsair was roughly 300lbs heavier, 12,470lbs vs 12,175lbs. 
It was 1 mph slower at 19,900ft, took 12 seconds longer (?) to reach 20,000ft and had a service ceiling 600ft lower, 39,400ft vs 40k.

Firing time should have been about 23 seconds for the 20mm cannon and 30-31 seconds for the .50 cal guns. 
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4u/f4u-1d-acp.pdf


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## pbehn (Feb 22, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> According the Navy airplane characteristics sheets the 20mm armed Corsair was roughly 300lbs heavier, 12,470lbs vs 12,175lbs.
> It was 1 mph slower at 19,900ft, took 12 seconds longer (?) to reach 20,000ft and had a service ceiling 600ft lower, 39,400ft vs 40k.
> 
> Firing time should have been about 23 seconds for the 20mm cannon and 30-31 seconds for the .50 cal guns.
> http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4u/f4u-1d-acp.pdf


Great post S/R

I think as things progressed from 1939 onwards weight became less of a factor. The Spitfire spanned the whole period but at the end had a 2000HP engine with a constant speed prop. In 1939 many Hurricanes still had twin blade wooden props, there weren't may Spitfires at all. I don't think anyone was jumping at the idea of fitting cannon at that time. If you take the 12 seconds to 20,000 ft to one minute on a 1940 Spitfire it becomes an issue in the BoB. I have read about the travails of Spitfires fitted with the drum type cannon, I havnt read how they did as far as take off and climb performance.

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## tomo pauk (Feb 22, 2018)

pbehn said:


> Great post S/R
> 
> I think as things progressed from 1939 onwards weight became less of a factor. The Spitfire spanned the whole period but at the end had a 2000HP engine with a constant speed prop. In 1939 many Hurricanes still had twin blade wooden props, there weren't may Spitfires at all. I don't think anyone was jumping at the idea of fitting cannon at that time. If you take the 12 seconds to 20,000 ft to one minute on a 1940 Spitfire it becomes an issue in the BoB. I have read about the travails of Spitfires fitted with the drum type cannon, I havnt read how they did as far as take off and climb performance.



In 1936-40 period, French, Germans, Polish and Yugoslavs were normally producing 1-engined fighters armed with one or two cannons. British, Japanese, Czech and Americans were test-flying A/C with cannons for test purposes in that time. Soviets produced small series of I-16 with two cannons in 1938-39.
Both US and UK wasted the opportunity of buying at Oerlikon in mid-1930s, opting to wait for Hispano instead, that went too late to matter for the BoB.


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## pbehn (Feb 22, 2018)

tomo pauk said:


> In 1936-40 period, French, Germans, Polish and Yugoslavs were normally producing 1-engined fighters armed with one or two cannons. British, Japanese, Czech and Americans were test-flying A/C with cannons for test purposes in that time. Soviets produced small series of I-16 with two cannons in 1938-39.
> Both US and UK wasted the opportunity of buying at Oerlikon in mid-1930s, opting to wait for Hispano instead, that went too late to matter for the BoB.


I think you missed the spirit of my post, the biggest effect of C/S props is in take off and climb. Whatever anyone was researching in the 1930s they needed much more than 1000BHP and C/S props to make them viable.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 22, 2018)

tomo pauk said:


> Both US and UK wasted the opportunity of buying at Oerlikon in mid-1930s, opting to wait for Hispano instead, that went too late to matter for the BoB.



The trouble was that the Oerlikon came in 3 flavors and wasn't exactly trouble free either. 

You had the short case guns 72-80mm case length the FF series, the FFL series with 100mm long cases and the FFS with the 110mm case (this became the famous AA gun) Weights went around 24-26kg then 30 kg and then 39--48kg for the big Oerlikon. 

Some of the Oerlikons required greased ammunition to function and that was NOT looked on with favor at high altitudes with freezing temperatures. 
Turns out the the Hispano also needed greased ammunition but when initially offered it didn't. Some of the cycle rates quoted for the mid 30s Oerlikons were a little on the optimistic side. But then some of the initial figures for Hispano were on the high side. At least one bbok claims the Hispano 404 was offered at 700 rpm vs the Oerlikons 520 -500-470 depending on model. French service HS 7 & 9s (licensed Oerlikons) were rated at 360-420 rpm. 

If you want the velocity and hitting power of the Hispano then you need the Hispano. With similar weight shells the Hispano had a MV of 850-880 m/s the aircraft Oerlikon FFS had a MV 830m/s, the FFL series was 675-750 m/s and the FF was 600m/s. 

British and Americans might have bought a shell firing gun sooner than the Hispano but it would have been a lower muzzle velocity, slower firing gun. 
better in 1940-41 maybe but not as good in 1943-44-45 let alone post war.


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## Greyman (Feb 23, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> Some of the Oerlikons required greased ammunition to function and that was NOT looked on with favor at high altitudes with freezing temperatures.
> Turns out the the Hispano also needed greased ammunition but when initially offered it didn't. Some of the cycle rates quoted for the mid 30s Oerlikons were a little on the optimistic side. But then some of the initial figures for Hispano were on the high side. At least one bbok claims the Hispano 404 was offered at 700 rpm vs the Oerlikons 520 -500-470 depending on model.



I think the lubrication of Hispano ammunition was just for the use in US manufactured guns. It was used as a stopgap solution of sorts for the larger chamber size of the US gun - the heavy lubricant forming a 'fluid fit'. British Hispano manuals (as late as mid 1943, anyway) specifically state that the ammo is not to be lubricated.

The French Hispano fired at 700 rpm, but it was found that reliability and life of the gun was greatly increased if the rate of fire was lowered to 600 rpm - so when the British manufactured the gun the latter speed was specified.

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## BiffF15 (Feb 23, 2018)

Fighterguy said:


> The early F-15A's experienced engine augmenter (afterburner) malfunctions during station 3 or 7 AIM-7 missile launches. The missile exhaust would enter the engine inlet, starving the engine of air, and causing the malfunction when in full afterburner. This was rectified by the addition of logic within the Engine Electronic Control to signal the Unified Fuel Control to retard to stage one afterburner when a missile was fired (there's five stages of afterburner). This was applicable to the older F100-PW-100 engines.
> The one F-15C that was shot by a missile took place during a training exercise out of Elmendorf AFB, Alaska. One aircraft was ferrying a live AIM-9 Sidewinder to the alert station at King Salmon. The other aircraft, the 54th Tactical Fighter Squadron flagship, was leading the element. They proceeded to do some BFM while on the way, and the aircraft carrying the live missile "inadvertently" fired the missile at his lead. The missile blew off the left horizontal stabilator and hydraulic actuator. The aircraft returned to Elmendorf and landed. The pilot stated it flew normal. The mishap caused debate about the effectiveness of the AIM-9 missile, versus the survivability of the F-15. It took about a year to get the damaged fighter back to flying status, and continued for several years until finally relegated to the bone-yard.
> View attachment 483294



Fighterguy,

Good info! I’m very familiar with plume ingestion problems from missiles as well as the AIM-9 incident. I flew in the same wing as THAT guy on active duty after returning to the Eagle. Felt bad for him as that could literally have happened to anyone (jumped to a spare when flying with the commander-as a new guy). I’m pretty sure it wasn’t to ferry a missile but was a scheduled BFM sortie.

The incident I referred to was a WSEP AIM-7 shot by a LA Guard guy off the front station. Missile suffered control fin failure (AIM-7 it’s the front ones) resulting in a 90 degree up maneuver at pickle and going thru the leading edge of the wing. Lots of lights illuminated on the idiot panel. Can’t remover if he FOD’ed out an engine or not.

The majority of my Eagle time (17 years total) is with the -220 variant. Nice improvement to the -100 however would rather have had GE-110s.

Cheers,
Biff

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## tomo pauk (Feb 23, 2018)

BiffF15 said:


> The majority of my Eagle time (17 years total) is with the -220 variant. Nice improvement to the -100 however would rather have had GE-110s.



Biff - if it is allowed to answer, why would you rather have had the GE-110s instead of P&Ws?


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## BiffF15 (Feb 23, 2018)

tomo pauk said:


> Biff - if it is allowed to answer, why would you rather have had the GE-110s instead of P&Ws?



Tomo,

I love the PW’s! They are robust, modular (three major components) that allow for mix and swap to keep more engines available. However, I don’t work on them only fly the jet. The GE motors weigh less and make much more power. An Eagle with two GE 110s is equivalent to three -220s. That’s a LOT more thrust. There is a reason in my opinion that the majority of foreign sales of the newer Eagles have had GE.

Cheers,
Biff

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## tomo pauk (Feb 24, 2018)

BiffF15 said:


> Tomo,
> 
> I love the PW’s! They are robust, modular (three major components) that allow for mix and swap to keep more engines available. However, I don’t work on them only fly the jet. The GE motors weigh less and make much more power. An Eagle with two GE 110s is equivalent to three -220s. That’s a LOT more thrust. There is a reason in my opinion that the majority of foreign sales of the newer Eagles have had GE.
> 
> ...



Thank you 
Looks like that most of the F-16s produced after early 1990s also have the 110s onboard.

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## fastmongrel (Feb 24, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> The trouble was that the Oerlikon came in 3 flavors and wasn't exactly trouble free either.
> 
> You had the short case guns 72-80mm case length the FF series, the FFL series with 100mm long cases and the FFS with the 110mm case (this became the famous AA gun) Weights went around 24-26kg then 30 kg and then 39--48kg for the big Oerlikon.
> 
> ...



What other cannons were available in the 1930s I have heard of the Madsen 20mm but dont know much about it.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 24, 2018)

For the new Supermarine's fighter, the Type 300, there were several proposals. Apart from Oerlikon FF, Hispano was also considered, so was the Vickers 25.4 mm (280 lbs, MV 3000 fps, shell of 0.551 lb), plus several 37mm cannons (200-600 lb, 1250-2300 fps, shell of 1.1-1.5 lb).


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## fastmongrel (Feb 24, 2018)

tomo pauk said:


> For the new Supermarine's fighter, the Type 300, there were several proposals. Apart from Oerlikon FF, Hispano was also considered, so was the Vickers 25.4 mm (280 lbs, MV 3000 fps, shell of 0.551 lb), plus several 37mm cannons (200-600 lb, 1250-2300 fps, shell of 1.1-1.5 lb).



The Vickers 25.4mm was quite a beast THE VICKERS 25
Would have made short work of all the Luftwaffes aircraft if the pilot could hit them.


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## fastmongrel (Feb 24, 2018)

I have come across a couple of mentions of a prototype 0.8 inch (20mm) machine gun that was developed by a Vickers subsiduary Elswick Works in the 1920s or 30s. Google doesnt bring up any info so not sure what type of gun it was.


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## eagledad (Feb 24, 2018)

Fastmongrel,

I don't remember ever coming across a Masden 20MM cannon for aircraft. However, there was a Masden 11.35MM machine gun and a 23MM cannon.
Attached are some tables of data and sources for the Masden.

Edit: upon further review, my table does have data for a 20MM Madsen.

Shell data includes

*Metric Caliber 20x120
Rim Diameter mm 28.9
Body Diameter mm 29.0
Projectile
Type/Wt gm Muzzle Velocity m/sec muzzle energy Joules 
AP/154 780 46,800
HE/126-112 840-890 44,400

Eagledad*


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## Clayton Magnet (Feb 27, 2018)

Greyman said:


> I wouldn't say a .50 strike was six times as effective as a .303 strike - probably closer to two/three times - I'd have to look over some firing trials again.
> 
> One thing that's probably different was that many Ju 88 kills in 1940 were against aircraft flying in formation - whereas I'd bet the Ju 88s the P-47s caught were on the run and evading.
> 
> Unfortunately I have no other details - just the 15 second figure. Not much to go on.


Perhaps the P-47 would have been better served with 4 Hispano's? in my opinion, the almost ideal fighter armament would be the 3, centrally mounted B-20 cannons on the Yak-3P


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## Fighterguy (Mar 1, 2018)

BiffF15 said:


> Tomo,
> 
> I love the PW’s! They are robust, modular (three major components) that allow for mix and swap to keep more engines available. However, I don’t work on them only fly the jet. The GE motors weigh less and make much more power. An Eagle with two GE 110s is equivalent to three -220s. That’s a LOT more thrust. There is a reason in my opinion that the majority of foreign sales of the newer Eagles have had GE.
> 
> ...


I was an engine technician on F-15's A's through D's, with a three year stint on F-4G Wild Weasels. As a QA inspector, I was involved with the operational testing of the GE-110 on the F-15E. Besides performance capabilities, logistics need to be considered. The GE-110 engines we tested did not have a simple side-to-side interchangeability like the P&W's did. The F100-PW-200/220 series engines were easily interchangeable between airframes (F-15 to F-16 and vise-versa), and LH to RH on the Eagle, where the GE engine required significant engine to airframe connection modifications. Also, parts supply and procurement has to be considered. Some units operate multiple airframes, Air Expeditionary for example. It reduces your logistics tail to have subsystem interchangeability amongst different weapons platforms as much as possible. Having F-16's with a different engine from your F-15's, for example, increases the size of spare parts warehousing and tracking across the entire fleet, increasing the likelihood of procurement mistakes (getting the wrong part) and shortfalls (not having adequate numbers). I will venture, that many of the foreign procurement sales, getting the GE over the P&W, have more to do with "secret handshakes," State Department and foreign government lobbying (the CEO of GE was one of Obama's "Czars"), and some sort of special interest kickbacks, over outright performance. As it is, the P&W F100 series engines are becoming legacy. The F119-PW-100 is their new shiny toy. Maintaining support for foreign sales is sometimes not as lucrative.

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## BiffF15 (Mar 1, 2018)

Fighterguy said:


> I was an engine technician on F-15's A's through D's, with a three year stint on F-4G Wild Weasels. As a QA inspector, I was involved with the operational testing of the GE-110 on the F-15E. Besides performance capabilities, logistics need to be considered. The GE-110 engines we tested did not have a simple side-to-side interchangeability like the P&W's did. The F100-PW-200/220 series engines were easily interchangeable between airframes (F-15 to F-16 and vise-versa), and LH to RH on the Eagle, where the GE engine required significant engine to airframe connection modifications. Also, parts supply and procurement has to be considered. Some units operate multiple airframes, Air Expeditionary for example. It reduces your logistics tail to have subsystem interchangeability amongst different weapons platforms as much as possible. Having F-16's with a different engine from your F-15's, for example, increases the size of spare parts warehousing and tracking across the entire fleet, increasing the likelihood of procurement mistakes (getting the wrong part) and shortfalls (not having adequate numbers). I will venture, that many of the foreign procurement sales, getting the GE over the P&W, have more to do with "secret handshakes," State Department and foreign government lobbying (the CEO of GE was one of Obama's "Czars"), and some sort of special interest kickbacks, over outright performance. As it is, the P&W F100 series engines are becoming legacy. The F119-PW-100 is their new shiny toy. Maintaining support for foreign sales is sometimes not as lucrative.



Fighterguy,

I agree completely with the logistics side of the house. Running a war and keeping the supply line moving is a VERY important part of winning. However, I was not the guy running the logistics train, but the guy who would end up fighting with a restrictive ROE and could end up in a merge with Flankers, Fulcrums, etc. And if your motors weigh 1-2K (GE) less than the PW's, then at 8-9g's that's quite a bit less weight you are moving around (or bleeding energy for / with). Also don't forget cruise mileage will be higher due to lower weights. I speak purely to the pilot's perspective, but understand the logisticians side of the equation.

I would bet that GE cracked the code along the way to make the -110 work with Eagles as well as Vipers. The only previous twin to get the GE-110's was the refitted Tomcats. The difference in it's performance was impressive (airframe was still the limiting factor), and helped with the Bombcat versions payload.

Cheers,
Biff

PS: I watch what the others countries buy engine wise for their fighters. Sometimes they mix GE & PW, sometimes they don't. Must depend on a lot of variables not seen by the general public.


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