# Build a better Sea Hurricane 1938



## fastmongrel (Nov 19, 2017)

I am thinking of writing an alternate history timeline and need to ask for some information and ideas.

Its 1938 and the Admiralty belatedly realises Heavy AA guns will not protect its new carriers and decides it needs a high performance fighter to defend the fleet. It also realises that a new fighter will cut into the limited aircraft complement of the carriers so the new fighter must also be capable of carrying bombs, cameras and extra fuel tanks.

There Lordships like the look of the new Supermarine Spitfire but realise quickly that they have no chance of prising any anyway from the RAF plus a quick trial shows that the Spit needs a lot of work to be a Carrier plane.

Hawkers main factory is too busy to build anymore Hurricanes but have some spare capacity at Glosters. RAF contracts mean that no modifications can be allowed to slow production down the Navy will get a small number of standard airframes off the line.

Using sensible modifications and nothing that requires Unobtanium or a time machine what can the navy do to produce a good carrier fighter for service in early 1940.

1: What Merlin can be fitted that will give better power at lower altitudes
2: What propellor, 3 or 4 blades
3: Armament I would like cannon but that seems unlikely how about 12 x .303 Brownings or 6 x (insert name here) heavy machine guns. Make some of the guns easily demountable for extra range/altitude
4: Folding wings obviously needs to be the metal wings but is there any reason the Hurricane wing design cant be modified to fold and fit the Armoured Carrier lifts
5: Navigation can the Radio Navigation beacon be minaturised and made pilot operable
6: Bomb racks for at a minimum 250lb bombs plus plumbed for fuel tanks but probably not droppable I think thats a bit early. Modify flaps to act as dive brakes or drop the U/C to act as dive brakes
7: Can the wing roots be sealed off to make the plane better at floating with the by product of preventing burning fuel tanks venting into the cockpit and toasting the pilot.
8: Add lightness and simplificate. How heavy is a Sea Hurricane likely to be and how will the performance be degraded.
9: Which factory will do the Naval mods

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## tomo pauk (Nov 19, 2017)

fastmongrel said:


> ...
> Using sensible modifications and nothing that requires Unobtanium or a time machine what can the navy do to produce a good carrier fighter for service in early 1940.
> 
> 1: What Merlin can be fitted that will give better power at lower altitudes
> ...



Yay! Long time no what-if here 

1. Mk.VIII, as on the Fulmar Mk.I
2. 3 is enough, 4 is not available at any rate in 1939/40
3. 8-10-12 .303s? Though I'd go for Belgian heavy Brownings, they were advertised as firing at 1000+ rpm shortly before ww2. 
4. Wing fold probably will be easiest to engineer at the flap/aieron joint area.
5. Whatever was fitted on the Sea Gladiator, until better things can be engineered.
6. I'd go for droppable tanks anyway 
7. My favorite tweak would've been going for beard radiator, so in the event of ditching there is no 'speed brake' effect, thus less stress on pilot and aircraft in that emergency. Should also earn a few mph and cut on piping lenght, so there is lower risk for those to be punctured in battle.
8. Hurricane was very light for it's size already. Granted, navalization will increase the weight.
9. If we can kill the Roc, that was produced by Blackburn, then Blackburn can do it.

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## pbehn (Nov 19, 2017)

As far as point 6 goes I believe the biggest problem ditching a hurricane was the radiator scoop underneath.

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## Greyman (Nov 19, 2017)

I've not really heard that the radiator was a big issue in ditching. The worst thing about the Hurricane ditching I've read about many times is the fact that it sank like a stone.

As in, by the time you've got your straps off - you're a few feet underwater already.

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## herman1rg (Nov 19, 2017)

Simplificate?


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## pbehn (Nov 19, 2017)

Greyman said:


> I've not really heard that the radiator was a big issue in ditching. The worst thing about the Hurricane ditching I've read about many times is the fact that it sank like a stone.
> 
> As in, by the time you've got your straps off - you're a few feet underwater already.


From Wiki but I have read it elsewhere
Ditching the Hurricane in the sea called for skill as the radiator housing acted as a water brake, pitching the nose of the fighter downwards when it hit the water, while also acting as a very efficient scoop, helping to flood the Hurricane so that a quick exit was necessary before the aircraft sank.[145]

As you say, the pilot had a matter of seconds to get out.


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## fastmongrel (Nov 19, 2017)

herman1rg said:


> Simplificate?



Build in lightness and simplificate

A favourite quote of Orville Wright though some claim it was Kelly Johnson or Colin Chapman.

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## Greyman (Nov 19, 2017)

Well, I should say I have read that a few times, but not from primary sources. Intuitively it's an issue, for sure - but I've not come across anecdotes where a Hurricane stopped dead trying to ditch and killed the pilot, which is what I (perhaps incorrectly) pictured in my head when the talking point of the radiator comes up.

It makes sense that the radiator placement would exacerbate the sinking issue. I always assumed it was the overall porous nature of the Hurricane's construction that was the cause.

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## fastmongrel (Nov 19, 2017)

pbehn said:


> From Wiki but I have read it elsewhere
> Ditching the Hurricane in the sea called for skill as the radiator housing acted as a water brake, pitching the nose of the fighter downwards when it hit the water, while also acting as a very efficient scoop, helping to flood the Hurricane so that a quick exit was necessary before the aircraft sank.[145]
> 
> As you say, the pilot had a matter of seconds to get out.



The scoop was light aluminium I cant see it staying part of the Hurricane for very long when it hits the water. Anyway a Radial engine would surely be more of a brake when ditching

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## ChrisMcD (Nov 19, 2017)

In the words of Winkle Brown; the Hurricane had the ditching propensities of a submarine - mind you he liked it!

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## Glider (Nov 19, 2017)

It's worth remembering that the Pilots of the Hurricanes launched from CAM ships were told to bale out

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## Shortround6 (Nov 19, 2017)

fastmongrel said:


> I am thinking of writing an alternate history timeline and need to ask for some information and ideas.
> 
> Its 1938 and the Admiralty belatedly realises Heavy AA guns will not protect its new carriers and decides it needs a high performance fighter to defend the fleet.



Historically you are right on the Mark, unfortunately British Aircraft design/development at this time was somewhat like glacier racing.
The requirement that lead to the Fairey Firefly with Griffon engine was issued in 1938. The Fulmar was already viewed as an interim design and would tide them over while they futzed about refining the requirement, which took them until 1940. 




> Using sensible modifications and nothing that requires _Unobtanium_ or a time machine what can the navy do to produce a good carrier fighter for service in early 1940.



you are much more limited than you might think. 



> 1: What Merlin can be fitted that will give better power at lower altitudes


As Tomo has stated the MK VIII is your best bet. 



> 2: What propellor, 3 or 4 blades


Here things get tricky, the 4 blade is out of the question and the main question is if you can even get constant speed propellers vs 2 speed propellers. The earlier you want the fighters the more difficult to get the constant speed propellers. Please Note that the Sea Gladiators used fixed pitch (not even 2 speed) 3 blade metal propellers. 



> 3: Armament I would like cannon but that seems unlikely how about 12 x .303 Brownings or 6 x (insert name here) heavy machine guns. Make some of the guns easily demountable for extra range/altitude



This flies in the face of No. 8. 
Cannon were specified in 1938, they, like many other things, took longer to develop/get into production that anticipated. 
Trying for 12 .303 machine guns, even with a MK VIII Merlin is pushing things. In 1938, early 39 you don't KNOW when the 100 octane fuel is going to show up, you know it is coming but dates are uncertain. 
In 1938-39-40 the heavy machineguns are a big unknown, who will build them? what is their rate of fire (and reliability)? what is the performance of their ammunition? British ammo contracted from Remington in 1940 was equivalent to US M1 ballistics. A slightly heavier bullet than the M2 but at 300fps less velocity. 
It is not that hard to dismount guns, they were routinely removed from aircraft for servicing. What is difficult is getting any worthwhile increase in performance by simple taking a few guns out. Please check performance of the Hurricane IIa and IIb to see actual changes. 



> 4: Folding wings obviously needs to be the metal wings but is there any reason the Hurricane wing design cant be modified to fold and fit the Armoured Carrier lifts


actually they could fit the forward lift. They just had to be turned sideways, wings in line with the hull, a major pain in the butt. 
Aft lift was 22ft by 45 ft. 
The thing is in 1938 you have to fit the 3 old fast carriers. It is only with the time machine that you can KNOW that through stupidity 2 of them will be lost by May of 1940. 



> 5: Navigation can the Radio Navigation beacon be minaturised and made pilot operable



Highly unlikely as the revised (twice) specification was by 1940 still calling for the rear seat operator for the carrier based fighter but dropped it for the shore based fighter (which became the Blackburn Firebrand) 



> 6: Bomb racks for at a minimum 250lb bombs plus plumbed for fuel tanks but probably not droppable I think thats a bit early. Modify flaps to act as dive brakes or drop the U/C to act as dive brakes



You have to get the thing off the flight deck. The Merlin VIII helps but unless you can get constant speed props, under wing loads look a bit iffy. 
The thing with dive brake is that they should affect the trim as little as possible when deploying or retracting, using a "flap" on only the bottom of the wing may present too much of a pitch change. Most aircraft that used the undercarriage as dive or speed brakes retracted the landing gear for and aft, not sideways. I don't know why, it just seems to be that way


> 8: Add lightness and simplificate. How heavy is a Sea Hurricane likely to be and how will the performance be degraded.



Don't worry about it. It is what it is. One source "Hawker Aircraft since 1920" By Mason claims a Sea Hurricane IIC is 80lbs heavier than a land based IIc in empty condition. tropical equipment on the other hand could add up to 230lbs
Of course that is without folding wing. Now do you want manual fold or power fold? 

With the engine and fuel you are going to have in 1940 quit trying to make it a multi-roll aircraft. Get something that can replace the Sea Gladiator


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## RCAFson (Nov 19, 2017)

The two pitch prop is actually quite adequate for 1938 as it gives good TO performance although a CS prop was always in the Fulmar specs. 4 x Vickers .5in would make a nice armament, especially as the RN already used that gun. Merlin X would be optimal for 1938 - this engine would have been of huge benefit in the Fulmar as well, since the MkVIII and XXX was restricted to low altitude making interception of high altitude snoopers problematic.

Manual wing fold would add ~200lb or more.


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## MIflyer (Nov 19, 2017)

Hurricanes built for Belgium had .50 cal guns.

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## Shortround6 (Nov 19, 2017)

The Vicker's .5in was probably a lost cause. The Vickers mechanism wasn't as reliable as they desired. One of the reason for adoption of the Browning. The Vickers was very rarely mounted where the pilot or a crewman couldn't get to it. It may have rugged/durable but the .303 version was subject to either 26 or 27 different jams as listed in the manual. I doubt the .5 in was much different. 
The Ballistics weren't much better than the .303 over the distances most air to air combat took place, velocity being around 100fps more depending on bullet. Target effect was better but rate of fire was down. Army tank guns were at around 450-500rpm while the Navy AA guns did around 700rpm. The smaller .303 aircraft guns rarely did more than 900rpm. I doubt the .5in version was going to fire faster than the .303.

The Belgian big gun is a bit of an unknown. It was offered in both 12.7mm and 13.2 (or 13.0?) and while 1200rpm was claimed it took the US about 4 years and literally dozens of test guns from multiple design teams to get that rate of fire with what the US considered an acceptable level of reliability. Belgians accepted more jams and/or broken parts? Unknown as to what ammo it was going to use, the 13.2mm version used the French 13.2mm Hotchkiss round, which used a slightly heaver bullet than the American .50 but had about 90meters per second less velocity. Barrel life would have been rather interesting at 1200rpm though. 
British would have adopted the gun in what caliber?


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## parsifal (Nov 19, 2017)

RN procurement was not hampered by a lack of imagination, it was hampered by a lack of resources.



Until 1937 there was no Fleet air Arm, the fleets air assets were all controlled by the RAF, and the RAF were deliberate in their intention that the fleet air arm would be starved of resources and made to die a very unnatural death.



Moreover once the FAA did finally get returned to RN control, the RAF was diabolical in opposing the transfer of any equipment, any pilots, and most importantly, made sure that no single engine high performance fighters found their way into the RN inventory. The RN was forced to adapt types and designs discarded or never used by the RAF. Further the acute shortages of trained pilots further forced on the RN the need to make General Purpose the designs of their carrier borne types. Hence you see the Swordfish with a triple role of torpedo carrier/spotting aircraft/ recon , to which were added the roles of ASW and dive bomber. Fulmars, themselves a development of a failed RAF light bomber, were a multi seat fighter/recon/ divebomber (later on). Skua from the start was a triple role aircraft for the same reason.



This need for multi role aircraft, despite the proven limitations of the design approach arose, as I said because of a lack of pilots and also because of a lack of any depth 9and money) in the RN procurement capabilities. Add to that the continued shortage of money to change that situation, and the limited deck space on the carriers themselves, and you have all the reasons you need to know that the early introduction of the sea hurricane was never going to happen. And yet there was still more holdig back this scenario. The RN had convinced itself of two things in the prewar planning. The first was that it was not possible in the soupy conditions of the north atlantic to operate single seat aircraft from carriers safely. It was assumed, without foundation, that a navigator/radio operator was needed to get the aircraft out to target and back to the carrier.



The second assumption that the RN had only itself to blame was that its carriers would never be asked to operate within range of enemy land based air assets. It was assumed that if Italy entered the war, Malta would fall. It was never assumed that France would be defeated. The kind of war envisaged was one of chasing and hunting down enemy surface units, or despatching those inferior Japanese should they venture an attack. It was never envisaged that Britain would call upon her carriers to repeatedly place themselves in harms way within range of enemy land based air, that within 2 years of 1938 they would find themselves battling yjr worlds number 3 and 5 ranked naval powers snd a year later, also the worlds number 3 ranked naval power, and worse that this scenario would be fought with no help from any major power (after the fall of france) .


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## MycroftHolmes (Nov 20, 2017)

One thing that would be pretty easy would be to fit a Malcolm hood and raise the pilot's seat by a few inches to give a better view over the nose. I also have a vague memory that having a bulged hood actually reduced drag, though I can't remember where I read it.

I also think that while a Hurricane or Mustang would be a worse ditcher than (say) a Spitfire, due to the belly scoop, they would be better than any radial-engined aircraft because the radial-powered planes have, in effect, a huge flat plate on the nose, which would almost inevitably dig into the water and cause the plane to flip over onto its back.


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## yulzari (Nov 20, 2017)

tomo pauk said:


> Yay! Long time no what-if here
> 
> 
> 9. If we can kill the Roc, that was produced by Blackburn, then Blackburn can do it.


The Roc was made by Boulton Paul as Blackburns were fully committed to other production so had no spare capacity.

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## Shortround6 (Nov 20, 2017)

As far as ditching and the radiator goes it is not just the scoop. 





later version 
But the radiator/oil cooler.








early and late.
You have to rip these from their mounting points.

The Hurricane doesn't have to sink with scoop and radiators intact, they just have to hang on long enough to tip the nose down. Once the nose is pointed below horizontal it doesn't matter if they break off.


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## MIflyer (Nov 20, 2017)

Read something a little while back that explained why the Fulmar had two seats, but without even a gun for the rear seater.

The FAA was part of the RAF and the RN determined that since the pilots operating off their carriers were RAF personnel, they needed to have a RN person on board the aircraft to make sure things were done in a right and proper manner and that all was shipshape.  For all they knew the RAF pilots did not know the bow from the stern or the Plimsol line from a chorus line.

So on "their" procured aircraft, the RN insisted on an extra seat for the Navy Man. Obviously, this imposed some performance limitations on the aircraft, leading to the Grumman Martlet and Sea Hurricane when reality reared its ugly head.

Another interesting item was that two RN carriers were laid up in Norfolk VA for repairs at the same time, which led to their fighter control people getting together and actually developing real fighter control, with considerable assistance from the American made radios they were able to obtain at the same time.

"Bombers Versus Battleships" is a fascinating book, and the author, an RN officer, is highly critical of the way his service responded to the air threat.


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## Glider (Nov 20, 2017)

I suggest you do a little more research and not rely on one source. It's tempting to put the real reason down here nad now but it would be better if you could that yourself.


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## MIflyer (Nov 20, 2017)

The guy who wrote the book is an expert, I am convinced. I need nothing else.


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## stona (Nov 20, 2017)

[QUOTE="MIflyer, post: 1366015, member: 42472"
The FAA was part of the RAF and the RN determined that since the pilots operating off their carriers were RAF personnel, they needed to have a RN person on board the aircraft to make sure things were done in a right and proper manner and that all was shipshape. For all they knew the RAF pilots did not know the bow from the stern or the Plimsol line from a chorus line.
So on "their" procured aircraft, the RN insisted on an extra seat for the Navy Man. [/QUOTE]

The second crew man was specified as an observer/navigator to share the workload on an aircraft that was to have an endurance of over four hours. It had nothing to do with RN personnel being needed on board.There was no rear gun because none was specified.

There was no room for a second crew member in the contemporary Gladiator/Sea Gladiator and the navy was happy to operate that!

Your 'expert' appears to be repeating stories doing the rounds at the time or using a faulty memory.

Cheers

Steve

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## Shortround6 (Nov 20, 2017)

They had to come up with some sort of explanation without letting out "*the secret*". 

The British carriers were equipped with a rather sophisticated homing beacon that _could *not* be homed in on using a regular radio_.

You want your own aircraft to be able to find the carrier in less than ideal conditions, you do NOT want the enemy using those radio transmission to locate the carrier. 

The rear seater was needed to operate the homing equipment and quite probably the regular radios. At least for long distance work. 
Using the same power transmitter you can transmit code roughly 3 times further than voice. While some pilots may be able to work a code key with one hand while flying it was probably better to have second man doing it. Please look at the Bf 110 "strategic fighter" they did NOT stick a man in the back with a single 7.9mm machine gun and _then say "_since you are there you might as well operate the radio". 
They stuck in the same radio as a He 111 used to get the radio range they wanted and _then _said "since you are already here we might as well give you a machine gun to play with."

Please note that US carrier aircraft were closer in performance and it _might _have been possible that the divebombers/torpedo planes would be responsible for long over water navigation for accompanying fighters?

Swordfish acting as navigators/lead ships for fighter monoplanes?

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## Shortround6 (Nov 20, 2017)

stona said:


> There was no room for a second crew member in the contemporary Gladiator/Sea Gladiator and the navy was happy to operate that!



There had not been any rear seat man in earlier single seat fighters either,






Not sure why after operating 3 squadrons of these for a number of years they decided they needed an "RN man" in a rear cockpit to over see things  
or their experience with these

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## Glider (Nov 20, 2017)

MIflyer said:


> The guy who wrote the book is an expert, I am convinced. I need nothing else.



I was afraid that you would say that. If he were such an expert perhaps you could explain all the single seat fighters flown from carriers between the wars others have mentioned.

I really suggest that you always check sources. I have a book written about Dive Bombers which is full of total rubbish never but never go from a single source


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## RCAFson (Nov 20, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> The Vicker's .5in was probably a lost cause. The Vickers mechanism wasn't as reliable as they desired. One of the reason for adoption of the Browning. The Vickers was very rarely mounted where the pilot or a crewman couldn't get to it. It may have rugged/durable but the .303 version was subject to either 26 or 27 different jams as listed in the manual. I doubt the .5 in was much different.
> The Ballistics weren't much better than the .303 over the distances most air to air combat took place, velocity being around 100fps more depending on bullet. Target effect was better but rate of fire was down. Army tank guns were at around 450-500rpm while the Navy AA guns did around 700rpm. The smaller .303 aircraft guns rarely did more than 900rpm. I doubt the .5in version was going to fire faster than the .303.
> 
> The Belgian big gun is a bit of an unknown. It was offered in both 12.7mm and 13.2 (or 13.0?) and while 1200rpm was claimed it took the US about 4 years and literally dozens of test guns from multiple design teams to get that rate of fire with what the US considered an acceptable level of reliability. Belgians accepted more jams and/or broken parts? Unknown as to what ammo it was going to use, the 13.2mm version used the French 13.2mm Hotchkiss round, which used a slightly heaver bullet than the American .50 but had about 90meters per second less velocity. Barrel life would have been rather interesting at 1200rpm though.
> British would have adopted the gun in what caliber?


 Williams has some comparative data here:

Untitled Document

and I don't see any big advantages for the BHMG, and the VHMG was just as, or more reliable. However, I suggest the VHMG because it was lighter than the BHMG and the Vickers .5in round was considerably better in terms of AP performance than the .303 rnd, and the primary targets of FAA fighters were enemy bombers, which were increasingly heavily armoured.


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## RCAFson (Nov 20, 2017)

Glider said:


> I was afraid that you would say that. If he were such an expert perhaps you could explain all the single seat fighters flown from carriers between the wars others have mentioned.
> 
> I really suggest that you always check sources. I have a book written about Dive Bombers which is full of total rubbish never but never go from a single source



As mentioned the Fulmar observer was there to operate the Type 72 homing beacon receiver:

Fleet Air Arm homing beacons

as before radar (which allowed the carrier to find, IFF and vector wayward aircraft) finding a carrier after a 3 or 4 hour mission was no easy task. The Fulmar's role's also included fleet recon so it had to be able to operate autonomously while performing long range, over water, patrols. 

The other factor is that Martlet performance is often overstated. and the Martlet II/IV was not greatly superior in performance to the the Fulmar II. The early F4F and Martlet variants without armour, SS tanks and folding wings were much lighter than the more developed versions which added a ~thousand lbs of weight with no increase in power and their power to weight ratio was barely better than the Fulmar, which had much greater wing area. When the Merlin XXX was approved for 16lb boost in Jan 1942, the Fulmar had a better power to weight ratio than the Martlet II/IV or F4F-4.

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## Shortround6 (Nov 20, 2017)

RCAFson said:


> and I don't see any big advantages for the BHMG, and the VHMG was just as, or more reliable. However, I suggest the VHMG because it was lighter than the BHMG and the Vickers .5in round was considerably better in terms of AP performance than the .303 rnd, and the primary targets of FAA fighters were enemy bombers, which were increasingly heavily armoured.



I am not saying the big Browning was superior overall, especially at the time of the tests. However the .5 Vickers also has some problems. With a MV of 2470fps for the AP vs 2440 f[s for the .303 there is no real change in trajectory or time of flight over 300yd so the .5 Vickers has no advantage there. 
I would note that Mr Williams may be wrong about the test done in the 20s against the Big Browning using US ammunition.

"The Browning was designed around a longer and more powerful cartridge (12.7x99 instead of 12.7x81) which typically fired bullets weighing *710 grains (46 g) at 2,900 fps (880 m/s)*, generating around two-thirds more muzzle energy. A report, dated 1928, of the tests by the Admiralty of the water-cooled versions of the guns has survived. This reveals the following:"

This is the M2 load which did not show up until the late 30s. The M1 load which the gun was developed with used a 753 grain bullet at 2500fps. This is the load the tests would have been done with and in fact that is the standard ballistics that the British were ordering .50 cal cartridges for in 1940. 
Aside from firing a heavier bullet the 1920s version of the .50 cal doesn't really show much advantage over the Vickers. However some of these tests do confuse reliability and durability. Nobody is changing either lock mechanisms or feed blocks in flight on single seat fighters (or even on bombers). What was important for aircraft guns was how many rounds between a jams or a broken part, not how fast a gunner could replace parts on the ground. 
Vickers guns were certainly long lasting, nobody is denying that. But if they were so reliable _why_ is it that nobody but them in remote locations? Early Gladiators used Lewis guns in the wings and Vickers guns in the Fuselage (where pilot could reach them) until there were enough Brownings. Japanese copy of the Vickers was always a cowl gun, almost never (or never?) used as a wing gun. 

Eight .303 guns were more than enough firepower in 1940-41 and even a good part of 1942. Each .5in Vickers aircraft gun will weigh over twice as much as a .303 Browning and 100 rounds of linked .5in Vickers weighs about 4 times what 100 rounds of linked .303 weighs. 
So for the same weight as eight .303 Brownings with 334 rounds each you get four .5in Vickers guns with about 167 rounds each. 
First battery is firing 150-160 rounds per second, the second on is firing 56-60rounds per second? 

Add lightness and simplify? keep the standard eight .303s.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 20, 2017)

RCAFson said:


> The other factor is that Martlet performance is often overstated. and the Martlet II/IV was not greatly superior in performance to the the Fulmar II. The early F4F and Martlet variants without armour, SS tanks and folding wings were much lighter than the more developed versions which added a ~thousand lbs of weight with no increase in power and their power to weight ratio was barely better than the Fulmar, which had much greater wing area. When the Merlin XXX was approved for 16lb boost in Jan 1942, the Fulmar had a better power to weight ratio than the Martlet II/IV or F4F-4.



I would note that the Early Martlets the British got were NOT F4F-3s or F4F-4s, The British didn't get the two stage superchargers for quite sometime and in fact the Martlet I and IV used the same Wright Cyclone engine as the Brewster Buffalo. Matlet II & III getting single stage two speed R-1830s so performance at altitude was rather different than the 2 stage supercharger planes.


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## RCAFson (Nov 20, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> I would note that the Early Martlets the British got were NOT F4F-3s or F4F-4s, The British didn't get the two stage superchargers for quite sometime and in fact the Martlet I and IV used the same Wright Cyclone engine as the Brewster Buffalo. Matlet II & III getting single stage two speed R-1830s so performance at altitude was rather different than the 2 stage supercharger planes.



The folding wing Martlet II/IV USN equivalent was the F4F-4A/F4F-4B.


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## RCAFson (Nov 20, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> I am not saying the big Browning was superior overall, especially at the time of the tests. However the .5 Vickers also has some problems. With a MV of 2470fps for the AP vs 2440 f[s for the .303 there is no real change in trajectory or time of flight over 300yd so the .5 Vickers has no advantage there...
> 
> ...Eight .303 guns were more than enough firepower in 1940-41 and even a good part of 1942. Each .5in Vickers aircraft gun will weigh over twice as much as a .303 Browning and 100 rounds of linked .5in Vickers weighs about 4 times what 100 rounds of linked .303 weighs.
> So for the same weight as eight .303 Brownings with 334 rounds each you get four .5in Vickers guns with about 167 rounds each.
> ...



Even with the same MV the .5in VMG will have a superior SV at 300 yds than the .303 and almost certainly a shorter ToF was well.

The FAA fitted the Fulmar I/II with 8 x .303 BMGs and 750/1000 rpg. 334 rpg ( ~16 seconds firing time) was inadequate for a naval fighter. Even the Gloster SG had an average 500 rpg. Our hypothetical Hawker SH, designed to FAA specs would probably be fitted with larger magazines as per the Fulmar so armament weight would be greater than the RAF HH Mk1.


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## MIflyer (Nov 20, 2017)

"The British carriers were equipped with a rather sophisticated homing beacon that _could *not* be homed in on using a regular radio_."

USN aircraft had such a system, using the ARR-1, and it was fitted to single seat aircraft.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 20, 2017)

The greater the distance the greater advantage the .5 in has but at around 300yds It probably isn't enough to excited about. a 300mph fighter is only going to cover 44ft in 1/10 of second. So unless there is a large difference in the time of flight it is pretty much academic. 600yds is another story. 

You can add 100 rounds per gun for eight guns at just under 50lbs (not including larger ammo boxes) but getting the .5in or .50 cal up to even 20 seconds of firing time is going to take a fair amount of weight. like around 70lbs for the .5in. If you want even 30 seconds firing time (550-600rpg for the .303) you need 360 rounds of .5in (at 720rpm) and that means 86 pounds of ammo per gun. 

The .5in Vickers just doesn't bring enough to the table for the weight it costs. 
The Japanese Ho-103 was slightly lighter (about 1 Kg or 4%) but fired faster at 800-900rpm instead of 700-750?which does tip it a little further, it was also replacing 900rpm Vickers guns and not 1100-1200rom Brownings.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 20, 2017)

MIflyer said:


> "The British carriers were equipped with a rather sophisticated homing beacon that _could *not* be homed in on using a regular radio_."
> 
> USN aircraft had such a system, using the ARR-1, and it was fitted to single seat aircraft.



Radios changed a great deal during the late 30s and during WW II. I could very well be wrong but when were these systems used?
and at what ranges? The British system would work over hundreds of miles?

Edit: see http://www.skywaves.ar88.net/Docs/YE-ZB Presentation.pdf

American system seems to be several years behind British system. I will leave it to people better versed in electronics to to determine which was "better" at any give point in time aside from the several years where the British system existed and the American one didn't.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 21, 2017)

Going back to the original.


fastmongrel said:


> 1: What Merlin can be fitted that will give better power at lower altitudes


 1. As Tome stated use the MK VIII
2. Steal all the MK Xs you can from bomber command  
3. at some point you can realise that with 100 octane fuel you can just over boost the Merlin III.



> 2: What propellor, 3 or 4 blades


 standard 3 blade constant speed is fine, more theft from bomber command  
From Wiki so......."The Fleet Air Arm preferred the lighter de Havilland propellers over the Rotol types; it was found during tests that the Rotol unit could lead to the nose dipping during arrested landings, causing the propeller blades to "peck" the carrier deck. The lighter de Havilland units avoided this problem."

be very careful of things that affect weight and balance. 



> 3: Armament I would like cannon but that seems unlikely how about 12 x .303 Brownings or 6 x (insert name here) heavy machine guns. Make some of the guns easily demountable for extra range/altitude


Cannon don't become viable till the spring of 1941. Feed is by drums in 1940 and you either stick them upright in the wings with gigantic bulges and fly slow or you flop them on their sides like the Spitfire and have have them jam all over the place. 
As has been said, use eight .303s and add ammo to suit. 



> 4: Folding wings obviously needs to be the metal wings but is there any reason the Hurricane wing design cant be modified to fold and fit the Armoured Carrier lifts


Nobody has come up with a reason they couldn't. aside from engineering time
Folding on the landing light/aileron line is probably the simplest but still makes for large airplane for spotting on decks. folding just out-board of the landing gear requires splitting the flaps and figuring out gun heaters, gun controls and perhaps other things, Other people did it but it takes more work.


> 5: Navigation can the Radio Navigation beacon be minaturised and made pilot operable


probably not in 1940. 


> 6: Bomb racks for at a minimum 250lb bombs plus plumbed for fuel tanks but probably not droppable I think thats a bit early. Modify flaps to act as dive brakes or drop the U/C to act as dive brakes


again see section 8. to keep it simple pick one or two roles and stick with them, the more modifications and the more roles you try to under take the more development time you need and the longer before the plane comes into service. 


> 7: Can the wing roots be sealed off to make the plane better at floating with the by product of preventing burning fuel tanks venting into the cockpit and toasting the pilot.


Probably, you just need a baffle/bulkhead and it doesn't actually have to be air/water tight, just slow things down.


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## MIflyer (Nov 21, 2017)

The American system was called the ZB, and later the radio adapter was called the ARR-1 and still later the ARR-2 was developed. It was in full use by the USN in 1941, fitted to dive bomber, torpedo plane and fighter aircraft as well as PBYs. It was a clever system and remained in use some years after the war ended. I have the aircraft components of it. You can read about it at 'Real radios have motors' under the item "Several Nice Scans of Old Command Set Articles." It was also used with the radio system that preceded the later command sets. Its range was line-of-sight and varied according to aircraft altitude, which was also a feature because the altitude where you lost told you how far away you were.


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## ChrisMcD (Nov 21, 2017)

parsifal said:


> RN procurement was not hampered by a lack of imagination, it was hampered by a lack of resources.
> 
> The second assumption that the RN had only itself to blame was that its carriers would never be asked to operate within range of enemy land based air assets. It was assumed that if Italy entered the war, Malta would fall. It was never assumed that France would be defeated. The kind of war envisaged was one of chasing and hunting down enemy surface units, or despatching those inferior Japanese should they venture an attack. It was never envisaged that Britain would call upon her carriers to repeatedly place themselves in harms way within range of enemy land based air, that within 2 years of 1938 they would find themselves battling yjr worlds number 3 and 5 ranked naval powers snd a year later, also the worlds number 3 ranked naval power, and worse that this scenario would be fought with no help from any major power (after the fall of france) .



Hi Parsifal,

I am afraid I have to disagree with you. 

The "Illustrious" class British armoured carriers were expected to have to deal with bombing in the seas around Europe and were armoured for protection against divebombers

Doctrine determined: Armoured Flight Decks

The resulting smaller air group meant that there was a temptation to go for multi-purpose aircraft - like the Skua.

And when the Skua was seen to be close to useless as a fighter there was suddenly a mad panic to get Spitfires, followed by a more realistic effort to get Hurricanes and Wildcats.

Which is where this debate kicked off


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## parsifal (Nov 21, 2017)

The article is a very good one, but it does not claim that the RN expected prewar to fight within range of enemy land based air. On the very first page of the article it states ”_The initial expectation, however, was for fleet carriers to not to have to operate close to land_”.

Ark Royal was designed and built with the broad oceans in mind, where numbers of planes would count for much, along with the range and capability of the strike aircraft. Since the US was expected to be an ally the only potential enemy in these broad seas scenario was Japan. Japanese aero technologies were disdained by the RN. At the time the skua was being designed and entering service - 1937 to 1938 (not useless incidentally, it was a divebomber and fairly successful at that with a secondary role as fighter, superior to both the SBD and the Val in that role), the Japanese were using aircraft like the A4n, the Yokusuka B4Y and the Mitsubishi Claude. Each of these IJn aircraft were specialist a/c and superior in their specialist role but not an alrounder like the Skua.

Further along in the article, it reports that there were changes to RN policy centred upon mainly the Abyssinian crisis, which if nothing else sheeted home the possibility (or probability) of war in the narrow seas around Europe. From this was born the concept of the armoured carrier. But this did not mean the RN saw the need, or was able to develop mission specific aircraft like the Sea hurricane. Quite the opposite actually.

Selectively quoting from the article (hopefully not in a biased or misleading way)

“…_it was the many advantages which land-based aircraft had over carriers which clinched the deal in the mind of the Admiralty. The fighters were generally larger and faster. Bombers could range anywhere from single-engine attack craft through to four-engine high-altitude machines. The expectation was to contend with large numbers of superior enemy aircraft. Given these considerations, the armoured carrier was quickly judged the most viable prospect.”_

Note that nowhere was it considered viable that carrier based fighter protection was considered a viable alternative. The Illustrious class was expected to be tough enough to withstand most bomb hits and well enough defended by AA defences to make attacks on the ship too expensive. As late as June 1940 this remained operational policy in the RN. Fighters were not scrambled to meet enemy airborne threats. Aircraft were struck to below decks, Fuel lines made inert with CO2 gas and the fire curtains closed up. Friendly aircraft were sen as an impediment to effective defence of the illustrious class, not a benefit.

Further in the article it states

“_The Admiralty of the 1930s believed carrier air wings would be overwhelmed by numbers, quality and exhaustion when operating under a hostile land-based umbrella._

_To this end the idea was for a carrier’s fighters to be “struck below” in a protected space while the ship’s heavy and light anti-aircraft armament took up the defence along with its escort. This was particularly relevant in a world without radar for early warning or direction of air-patrol interceptions._

_When combined with the Royal Navy’s low expectations as to the effectiveness of carrier-based aircraft, one can understand why they settled on armoured carriers.”_

Further on it states

_“A high performance single-seat fighter suddenly became a naval necessity. Early attempts at adapting the Hurricane and Spitfire in 1941 proved successful - though imperfect. But these aircraft could be pitched against land-based opponents on something approaching an equal footing”_

It wasn’t until well into the war that the RN began to realise that it could utilise and indeed needed high performance specialised types like the sea hurricane. Elements of that way of thinking did exist prewar, but the thinking was NOT rN policy and stood no chance of being adopted prewar as RN policy in the lead up to the war and the early years of the war.

You are misrepresenting the thrust of this article in a seriously misleading way im afraid.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 21, 2017)

It has been mentioned in other threads but in 1938 the British have 5-6 carriers in commision (depending on you rate the Argus) with the Ark Royal commissioning in Nov of 1938, the four Illustrious class were all laid down in 1937 but what the planned for completion was I don't know. Actual completion was two in 1940 and two in 1941. Two were under the 1936 program and two under the 1937 program. Indomitable was modified and perhaps delayed as a result. 

However what the number of aircraft berths were was:
Argus, rated at 20 aircraft*
Hermes, rated at 20 aircraft*
Eagle, rated at 24 aircraft*
Courageous, rated at 48
Glorious, rated at 48
Furious, rated at 36?
Ark Royal rated at 60-72 aircraft.

The ratings need a little interpretation (dose of salt?) as the 3 early carriers were rated with early 1920s type aircraft. The Hermes for example was down to 15 aircraft in the early 30s and 12 aircraft by WW II. 
The Argus had been down graded to a training carrier in the 1930s and was only brought back into front line service by the war losses suffered by the newer carriers. 
the British carriers operated air groups below the numbers shown both because of lack of funding and lack of space. The Fairey Flycatcher fighter shown in the photo in a previous post had a 29ft wingspan and was only 23ft in length. For the Courageous and Glorious the "48" aircraft were supposed to be 16 Flycatchers, 16 Rippons and 16 reconnaissance aircraft. in the 1920s. I don't have much in the way of aircraft compliments for the late 30s. except the Ark Royal was supposed to get 48 Swordfish and 24 Skuas. As first in service one source claims Hawker Ospreys were substituting for the Skuas. 
The Eagle on her last months in the Med had a whopping 4 Hurricanes (with non folding wings ) as her permanent fighter group. She may have flown off a max of 31 Spitfires on one ferry mission by they were all parked on deck and normal operations could NOT be conducted until they were flown off. 

Point is that whatever fighter you can come up with will be built in limited numbers in 1940-41 as there is just no place to put them. 
The British should have been able to do a better job than was done historically but spending big money on carrier planes wasn't going to happen. Being a bit generous (like rating the Hermes at 20 planes, calling the Argus an active carrier and the Ark Royal at 72) you get spaces/berths fo 266 planes on all the carriers before the Illustrious. The Americans spent money, not only because of different priorities/doctrines but because they needed more aircraft. The Lexington, Saratoga and Ranger between them needing around 236 aircraft. The Yorktown's being rated at 96 planes apiece. Yorktown and Enterprise completing before the Illustrious with Wasp building.

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## pbehn (Nov 21, 2017)

With many of these discussions I have the impression that the only way to speed things up would be to declare war or a state of emergency in 1936 but there was little basis for such action and little public support most politics at the time was to avoid a conflict but prepare as much as possible. Until war is declared a governments room to compel a business to do what it wants is limited.

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## Shortround6 (Nov 21, 2017)

I would note that the Skua seems to get a lot of "bad press" but we have to remember that the Skua entered service at the end of 1938. 
The Japanese were still using a biplane dive bomber and the Val, after much reworking, would only enter service in 1940. Similarly the Northrop BT (55 built) was hardly a success and with a single .50 cal forward and a single .30 in the rear cockpit and an 825hp engine was hardly a serious substitute fighter. Developed into the Famous SBD but the SBD doesn't become a four gun machine until the -3 model in 1941. One does wonder what Stanley Vejtasa could have done with a Skua 

The British stumbled with the Skua replacement but remember that they had built 192 of them which was ample for the number of carrier berths they had.

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## parsifal (Nov 21, 2017)

pbehn said:


> With many of these discussions I have the impression that the only way to speed things up would be to declare war or a state of emergency in 1936 but there was little basis for such action and little public support most politics at the time was to avoid a conflict but prepare as much as possible. Until war is declared a governments room to compel a business to do what it wants is limited.



Maybe an assumption that the british go to war over czecholsvakia, or the british a blockade against the fascists after Abyssinia.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 21, 2017)

pbehn said:


> With many of these discussions I have the impression that the only way to speed things up would be to declare war or a state of emergency in 1936 but there was little basis for such action and little public support most politics at the time was to avoid a conflict but prepare as much as possible. Until war is declared a governments room to compel a business to do what it wants is limited.



The British were working _almost_ flat out in late 1938 and 39. to get serious increases in numbers or more rapid development of projects you needed more factory space and more workers and more "engineers" please note that for these type discussions "engineers" can include draftsmen. Most or all British companies did NOT have separate prototype shops so work on prototypes/modifications took place in a corner of the normal production floor using personnel grabbed as needed from the production staff. 
for Hawker this means, unless you farm the "Sea Hurricane" out to Gloster or some other subsidiary, work on a Sea Hurricane may wind up delaying the Typhoon/Tornado projects. 

The initial post mentions a fictional alternate history so some of these objections might be more easily dealt with by the stoke of a pen/keyboard


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## parsifal (Nov 21, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> I would note that the Skua seems to get a lot of "bad press" but we have to remember that the Skua entered service at the end of 1938.
> The Japanese were still using a biplane dive bomber and the Val, after much reworking, would only enter service in 1940. Similarly the Northrop BT (55 built) was hardly a success and with a single .50 cal forward and a single .30 in the rear cockpit and an 825hp engine was hardly a serious substitute fighter. Developed into the Famous SBD but the SBD doesn't become a four gun machine until the -3 model in 1941. One does wonder what Stanley Vejtasa could have done with a Skua
> 
> The British stumbled with the Skua replacement but remember that they had built 192 of them which was ample for the number of carrier berths they had.



Skua was very much the compromise. Limited by short sighted RAF limits that carrier borne a/c not carry bombs larger than 500lb it had spare capacity in terms of HP. and a secondary role that finished up being its primary role. 

despite all its obvious limitations, the Skua did manage to useful work in the opening stages the war, including the sinking of a DKM Light cruiser. Not bad for an "utter failure".

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## Shortround6 (Nov 21, 2017)

Few other peoples/countries 1938/39 aircraft were very successful in 1940/41/42 in _unmodified form. _

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## pbehn (Nov 21, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> The British were working _almost_ flat out in late 1938 and 39. to get serious increases in numbers or more rapid development of projects you needed more factory space and more workers and more "engineers" please note that for these type discussions "engineers" can include draftsmen.



You just touched a nerve there, last weekend I went to Preston Hall it is a nice place to go for a walk, this was the home of a wealthy local ship builder, during the war it was used as a drawing office for the huge number of draughtsmen required.(details below)

Preston Park Museum & Grounds (Eaglescliffe, England): Top Tips Before You Go (with Photos) - TripAdvisor


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## RCAFson (Nov 22, 2017)

parsifal said:


> Skua was very much the compromise. Limited by short sighted RAF limits that carrier borne a/c not carry bombs larger than 500lb it had spare capacity in terms of HP. and a secondary role that finished up being its primary role.
> 
> despite all its obvious limitations, the Skua did manage to useful work in the opening stages the war, including the sinking of a DKM Light cruiser. Not bad for an "utter failure".



Both the Val (also limited to 550lb bombs) and the SBD had fixed wings; the folding wing Skua was a more advanced design than either.

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## ChrisMcD (Nov 22, 2017)

parsifal said:


> You are misrepresenting the thrust of this article in a seriously misleading way im afraid.



By pointing out that the "Illustrious" class were armoured to protect against aerial attack? I was just drawing your attention to the facts. 

The earlier design of the Ark Royal was intended to carry a larger complement of aircraft. But, then there was a move to armoured carriers like the "Illustrious" with smaller air groups.

It was *the* major difference between British design philosophy compared to the US or Japanese concepts and has influences all the way through to the IJN Taiho and the design of the "Midway" class in the late 40's.

I have nothing against the Skua as a dive bomber. My point was that "something" - possibly lack of space persuaded the FAA to try multi-role aircraft. After all TSR = Torpedo, strike and reconnaissance aka the weirdly successful Swordfish. 

As has been pointed out earlier in the thread the FAA had some superb fighters earlier in the 30's, like the Flycatcher and Nimrod, so the decision to try a combination fighter/dive bomber was clearly deliberate. Considering how successful some fighters were as dive bombers (A-36 Apache) perhaps they were just a bit premature. 

Or you could simply argue that Blackburn were crap at designing fighters (Firebrand/Firecrest?) and should have stuck to attack aircraft (Buccaneer)


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## Shortround6 (Nov 22, 2017)

ChrisMcD said:


> I have nothing against the Skua as a dive bomber. My point was that "something" - possibly lack of space persuaded the FAA to try multi-role aircraft. After all TSR = Torpedo, strike and reconnaissance aka the weirdly successful Swordfish.



I would note that the US also used multi role aircraft. The Dauntless was SBD (Scout Bomber Douglas) and without bombs, could carry as much as 310 US gallons (in unprotected tanks)_ internal _for the scout/recon mission. Like many countries the torpedo bomber was also the level bomber. With the US it was to the extent that they fitted a Norden bombsight and a special compartment for the bombardier to work in. This is one reason US torpedo bombers are so fat. The Bombardier lay on his stomach underneath the pilot on the TBD. On the Avenger the navigator sat between the pilot and the rear gunner/radio operator but was able to wiggle down behind the bombay to operate the bombsight, he also manned the ventral gun from the same compartment. 

Requirement for the Avenger included 1. attack of heavy ships with bombs/torpedos 2. heavy smoke laying. 3. scouting 4. strafing light surface vessels. 
Obviously No 2 disappeared and the wisdom of No 4 is rather questionable. Using 3 men and a large, heavy, _expensive _airplane to strafe with one (later two) machine guns?

US fighters could also carry light bombs, usually a pair of 100-116lbs during the 30s. USN went to the trouble of publishing weight tables for the Buffalo and WIldcat in "bomber" mode, usually with two guns removed to help counter the weight of the bombs. Rarely, if ever, done in WW II combat. 

the US had a little more time to figure out what worked and what didn't before actually having to shoot and even in the 30s put different emphasis on some roles over others for it;s multi role aircraft.

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## Shortround6 (Nov 22, 2017)

fastmongrel said:


> I am thinking of writing an alternate history timeline and need to ask for some information and ideas.



For an _idea_ have the idiot that ordered the the Ark Royal and Courageous out on anti-sub patrols in Sept 1939 slip and fall in his own bath tub.
Hunter killer groups composed of a _fleet _ carrier and 4 destroyers are actually an invitation to disaster and show no real appreciation of carrier power or operations. A carrier _should _ have planes in the air _continuously _as long as the weather/light permits. A CAP if enemy aircraft are a possibility and planes assigned to surface search (or periscope search) if enemy surface ships or subs are even a possibility.
I have no idea if having Swordfish in the _ air _could have saved the Courageous but she was sunk at the end of a 2 hour "window" in which all planes from an earlier search were being serviced prior to launching another search. Two of her four destroyers had left the group to help a merchant ship under attack leaving her with two escorts.
Ark Royal had been nearly lost 3 days earlier.
Seems like the RN had either learned nothing or forgotten the lessons of WW I. Like the sinking of the HMS Aboukir, Cressy and Hogue.
ill thought out "patrols" with little more objective than to be doing 'something' seldom lead to success and more often disaster. 

The Courageous had only embarked two squadrons of Swordfish a bit over two weeks before her loss (and no fighters) so how much training/practice anybody had in anti-sub work was certainly questionable. 
Having one or perhaps two Fleet carriers (could the Glorious have been saved?) more in late 1940 and 1941/42 might have done a lot more than arguing about which type of machine gun plane "A" had flying form the carriers that were left.

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## fastmongrel (Nov 22, 2017)

Point No1 What Merlin can be used. Several have said the MkVIII used by the Fulmar MkI but there is something that is confusing me in the wiki article on Merlin variants List of Rolls-Royce Merlin variants - Wikipedia

Merlin VIII _*take off* _1,080 hp (805 kW) at 3,000 rpm 
but *max power *1,275 hp (951 kW) at 3,000 rpm, +9 psi (62 kPa) boost, sea level with 100 octane 

Why would take off power with 100 octane be lower than max power at sea level. I suppose It could be the take off power shown is for 87 octane. It is very tempting to go for the MXII from the Spit MkII which was able to run at +12psi but thats not in production till Sept 39

Point No2 A 4 blade constant speed prop is obviously too early but the Blackburn Skua had a 3 blade DeHavilland prop which was either variable 2 pitch or Constant Speed I cant find out for definite. There were plenty of variable pitch props going to the bombers so maybe the Navy can squeeze a couple of hundred out of the Ministry.

Point 3 I have been shot down in flames for asking for 12 x .303 but I wonder if there was room to increase the ammo capacity a bit maybe up to 20 seconds of firing time even if it was only for say 4 of the guns.


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## fastmongrel (Nov 22, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> For an _idea_ have the idiot that ordered the the Ark Royal and Courageous out on anti-sub patrols in Sept 1939 slip and fall in his own bath tub.



Excellent idea. An accident to the captain of HMS Glorious at the same time would also be a good idea, who in their right mind in a war zone has their command chugging along with only half the boilers lit and not even a single Swordfish in the air.

The idea for the Alternate Timeline is a Battle of Norway that goes a good bit worse for the German LW and Heer. The RN and Kriegsmarine suffer the same losses. The British/French/Norwegian forces battle on longer and more succesfully causing a lot more casualties for the German Army. Eventually when it is obvious the campaign is over a large part of the Norwegian Army volunteers to be evacuated and goes on to be a serious thorn in the side of the Germans.


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## fastmongrel (Nov 22, 2017)

I like the idea of Courageous or Glorious surviving longer. The thought of one or both of them linking up with Invincible and Eagle in the Med 1940 and doing serious hurt to Benny the Mooses Navy makes me all giggly.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 22, 2017)

fastmongrel said:


> Point No1 What Merlin can be used. Several have said the MkVIII used by the Fulmar MkI but there is something that is confusing me in the wiki article on Merlin variants List of Rolls-Royce Merlin variants - Wikipedia
> 
> Merlin VIII _*take off* _1,080 hp (805 kW) at 3,000 rpm
> but *max power *1,275 hp (951 kW) at 3,000 rpm, +9 psi (62 kPa) boost, sea level with 100 octane
> ...



The take-off power is at 5 3/4lbs boost, using more means all those pesky notes in the log books and extra maintenance procedures. 
Climb is still restricted to 2600rpm and 4lbs boost.

You simply don't need a 4 blade prop for the power and altitude involved. It is like putting 8in wide tires on a 100hp car. If you can't spin 6 in wide tires then 8in ones don't help you accelerate any faster and in fact may hurt due to extra weight. 
Constant speed props are a big help. 

Better gunnery training would be a big help. Barring that 100 rounds of linked .303 ammo is roughly 6lbs so adding ammo shouldn't be that big a deal. 5 seconds of firing time is just under 100 rounds (the guns barely reached 1200rpm) so for eight guns that is 48lbs plus the bigger ammo bins.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 22, 2017)

fastmongrel said:


> Point No1 What Merlin can be used. Several have said the MkVIII used by the Fulmar MkI but there is something that is confusing me in the wiki article on Merlin variants List of Rolls-Royce Merlin variants - Wikipedia
> 
> Merlin VIII _*take off* _1,080 hp (805 kW) at 3,000 rpm
> but *max power *1,275 hp (951 kW) at 3,000 rpm, +9 psi (62 kPa) boost, sea level with 100 octane
> ...





Shortround6 said:


> The take-off power is at 5 3/4lbs boost, using more means all those pesky notes in the log books and extra maintenance procedures.
> Climb is still restricted to 2600rpm and 4lbs boost.
> ...


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## Shortround6 (Nov 22, 2017)

The Merlin 30, 32 and 34 were later engines based off the MK XII. 

I did make a mistake on the climbing power, 2850rpm at 4lbs instead of 2850rpm at either 9 3/4s or 12 lbs 

look at fold out chart in the rear of the book for differences.


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## tomo pauk (Nov 22, 2017)

I dont have the book 
Granted, the Merlin 30s can't help in this thread, asterisks are not mine.


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## ChrisMcD (Nov 22, 2017)

fastmongrel said:


> Excellent idea. An accident to the captain of HMS Glorious at the same time would also be a good idea, who in their right mind in a war zone has their command chugging along with only half the boilers lit and not even a single Swordfish in the air.



That's not the half of it. He was hurrying home to court martial his Commander (Air)!!

HMS Glorious: History of a Controversy | History Today

Mystery surrounds sinking of HMS Glorious 75 years ago


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## RCAFson (Nov 22, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> The Merlin 30, 32 and 34 were later engines based off the MK XII.
> 
> I did make a mistake on the climbing power, 2850rpm at 4lbs instead of 2850rpm at either 9 3/4s or 12 lbs
> 
> look at fold out chart in the rear of the book for differences.



The Merlin VIII used 100 octane fuel operationally so the relevant entry is for the RM4M:

TO = 1300/3000rpm @ 9.75lb boost
climb = 2850rpm @ 6.75 boost
Combat = 1175hp/3000rpm at 3250ft @ 6.75lb boost

However, I would argue that for our hypothetical HSH we would want the Merlin X:

TO = 1280/3000rpm @ 10lb boost
climb = 2600rpm @ 5.75 boost
Combat = 1280hp/3000rpm at SL @ 10lb boost and 1010/3000 at 17750ft @5.75lb

as this gives our fighter the ability to deal with high altitude recon aircraft.

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## RCAFson (Nov 22, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> The Merlin 30, 32 and 34 were later engines based off the MK XII.
> 
> I did make a mistake on the climbing power, 2850rpm at 4lbs instead of 2850rpm at either 9 3/4s or 12 lbs
> 
> look at fold out chart in the rear of the book for differences.



I think they were based upon the Merlin XX and it's improved SC intake.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 22, 2017)

It is not just the supercharger intake. that allowed the engine to make more power or to make it higher up. There were a number of small changes to the cylinder blocks (the MK VIII used 3 different ones) and other parts that allowed the engine to stand up to the increased power. Different radiuses in certain areas 
A different crankcase was used on both the early and late MK VIIIs and XIIs, that is the early version of both marks used one type of crankcase and later versions of both marks used a different one, D13609.


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## parsifal (Nov 22, 2017)

Losing two of the big fleet carriers, despite their age was regrettable, but not a critical factor in the problems facing the RN in the lead up and early stages of the war. Having a 1st line naval fighter from our perspective might look attractive as an option, and later on as the RN FAA began to change, the availability of aircraft like the sea hurricane did become vital, but in the early years of the war would have been a waste of resources and likely to lead to dangerous conclusions about the FAA needed to do to survive. 

The number one problem facing the FAA in 1939 through to the end of 1940 (at least) was the supply of pilots and aircrew. The RN entered the war with at sea billets on its carriers (disregarding seaplanes), for 245 aircraft, but entered the war with just over 100 pilots. In 1939 several of the carriers, like GLORIOUS had been laid up in reserve for this reason. ARK ROYAL went to war with less than half her complement of available aircraft/pilots.

Moreover the supply of trained aircrew remained at a trickle until well into 1941. In 1939, the RN received a total of 16 trained pilots for the entire year. In 1940, 81 pilots were to receive their carrier wings (however a number of these were promptly seconded to the RAF at least for the duration of .the BoB others, despite the shortages at sea remained land based because of the dire situation in places like the western desert) In 1941, wastage overtook the supply rate. It was this cruel reality of insufficient pilots that dictated more than anything that the RN absolutely could not afford to start getting in the ring with land based air and duke it out with it in the same style as the USN or IJN. In these circumstances, the addition of a true day fighter to the inventory would have been counterproductive for a number of reasons. 

The RN had no choice but to accept multi-role aircraft so that 1 pilot could do mere than one job. It wasn’t shortages of deck space that forced the RN into the arena of multi role aircraft, it was pilots. 

I should mention that the general conduct of the war forced the RN into situations it had sought to avoid in its pre-war planning. Prewar, it had been planned not to place its carriers within striking distance of land based air. But the invasion of Norway and the entry of Italy, as well as the surrender of the French, as well as the very late decision to hold Malta, and a bit later to lend assistance to Greece forced the RN to improvise and devise strategies and procedures that would allow them to operate in these narrow seas with some level of safety and not lose either its remaining carriers or the dwindling suppy of pilots to fly on them. Moreover, the RN in 1940 after the fall of france was in a difficult situation and had to do something to rein in the technological advantages enjoyed by ships like the RM fast battleships, and the KM heavy forces. The RN by December 1940 had received (fully worked up) just one fast battleship, and 1 carrier. They had lost 1 old BB, and two carriers, with 3 others out of theatre chasing surface raiders. They had a whole additional TO to fight against an enemy thought to have at least 3000 first line aircraft 9in reality it was more like 1700 but the british did not know that at the time.

The RN improvised. From the early part of the war, even before Norway, they had begun to train their aircrew for night operations. This took a long time, even for fully trained aircrew it would take more than a year to complete night training. Technologically they worked on night combat procedures, such as designating one aircraft as the pathfinder/ flare dropper, later on efforts were made to install an effect ASV radar (did not really come to fruition until the back half of 1941). They stretched the effectiveness of their very limited daytime fighter resources by developing GCI and radar guided interceptions for their CAP to a degree ubnknown in other navies. The RN was a much more thoroughly trained night strike force than either of the other two carrier equipped navies and this alternate strategy paid off very well, with the destruction of more than 250000 tons of shipping by the carriers alone in the med, as well as the destruction inflicted on the RM at Taranto and the KM in Denmark Strait. In those situations where daytime intervention by RN carriers was deemed necessary, such as the Malta convoys, for the first six months the RN was careful to fly air cover from out of range of the RA fighters. It got careless and overconfident in this regard resulting in the near disaster on 10 january ’41.

The addition of a Sea hurricane type fighter was utterly counterproductive to the development of those abilities and ignores the fundamental weaknesses and chanllenges facing the FAA in the lead up to war. If the RN had decided to build a real day fighter force into its carrier borne assets it probably would have lost the early battles, with potentially war changing effects.

The RN leadership made the right decision not to seek to develop or acquire dedicated single seat fighters pre-war.

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## Shortround6 (Nov 22, 2017)

Well, you can say they made the best out of a bad situation. That doesn't stop the situation from being bad or bordering on tragic.

Not to mention stupid. 

You don't have enough pilots to put full compliments of aircraft (of whatever type) on board the carriers you do have yet you lay down and build four more carriers that will raise the needed numbers of planes/pilots by 60% ????

and then laydown No 5 (the Implacable) on Feb 21st 1939? Space for 60 planes and ??? pilots. 

Please note I am not criticizing the men who worked to perform near miracles with what they were given but there sure seems to be a disconnect somewhere in the system between what was wanted on paper and what was being supplied to the actual forces. 
We will pay for multiple 23,000 ton ships with all the cost and labor that entails but we won't pay for pilots to fly planes from them????


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## RCAFson (Nov 22, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> Well, you can say they made the best out of a bad situation. That doesn't stop the situation from being bad or bordering on tragic.
> 
> Not to mention stupid.
> 
> ...



The FAA was starting at a low ebb and the unexpected advent of war in 1939 and the resulting attrition only made things worse. The FAA did institute aircrew training schemes that would have produced all the needed aircrew by 1941/42, in time to man the new carriers. OTOH, the FAA also had a number of landbased combat and OTU squadrons whose primary function was fleet base defence and strike/interdiction. The first Martlet kills were made by one of these squadrons. 

We have to remember that the FAA went to war in Sept 1939 and had to learn all it's lessons in the school of hard knocks, whereas the USN and IJN could watch events safely from the sidelines, learn from the FAA, and build up their strength under peacetime conditions but with near wartime urgency. If we look at IJN and USN pilot training and aircraft acquisition from Sept 1939 to Dec 1941, it doesn't seem all that different from the FAA, especially for the IJN,

However, it is true that the RAF was probably the FAA's most implacable opponent.

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## parsifal (Nov 22, 2017)

I honestly believe we are more or less on the same page here. The RN did make some dangerous assumptions prewar. Its planning was out of kilter and unrealistic, but as RCAFson points out, had the war began in 1941-2, the RN would have been in a position to better and more comprehensively use its deck space, and also gone to war with something like adequate reserves

A war in 1942 would have been a much different affair for the RN, and again as RCAFson points out, would have made the RN a much more potent force

If you want to put the shoe on the other foot, imagine if the IJN or USN had been forced to go to war in 1939. For the Japanese, this would have meant going to war with just two operational carriers. The HIRYU was still working up and would not be ready for active operations until spring 1940. The KAGA had entered Sasebo December 1938 for a full reconstruction, and would not return to service until early 1941.

AKAGI had completed her major reconstruction by the end of 1938. She was promptly placed in reserve but rejoined (or rather re-constituted) CarDiv 1 about march or April 1939. She was nominally assigned 12 A5M "Claude" fighters with 4 disassembled spares (and no pilots), 19 Aichi D1A "Susie" dive bombers with 5 spares, and 35 B4Y "Jean" horizontal/torpedo bombers with 16 spares.

SORYU was fully operational, but her air group remained incomplete and poorly equipped. Her air group as at september 1939 was supposed to be 18x A5Ms, 27 x D1A, and 12 B4Ys, but in reality she was equipped with about half that number of fighters, consisting of A4N1 biplanes were issued instead. On 25 April 1940, her air group consisted of 9 A4Ns, 12 D1A2s and 9 B4Ys.

HOSHO was in reserve, but would be used periodically as a training carrier after the outbreak of histilities. I believe she was in mothballs until well into 1940 or 1941. 

RYUJO was the only other carrier in existence in the IJN at that time. In February 1938 she had been in service off the Chinese coast, attached to Cardiv 1. At this time her A4Ns were replaced with A5Ms. In this configuration the light carrier supported Japanese operations in Southern China in March–April and again in October 1938. RYUJO was laid up at the outbreak of the war and entered a refit that lasted from November 1939 through January 1940 and became a training ship until November 1940. At that time she became the flagship of Rear Admiral Kakutas newly formed Cardiv 3. With captain Ushio Sugimoto taking command of the ship. As at the outbreak of war in the pacific, her air group consisted of 18 Kates and 16 Claudes In April 1941 she was again re-organised when the first air fleet was formed 10 April 1941, at this time RYUJO was designated flagship of CarDiv 4.

I am certain that if I undertook a brief history of the USN from 1939 through to 1941, we would discover a similar pattern of unreadiness.

The point is that the RN was unready for war in 1939, the same as the other major naval powers. Unlike the other powers, the RN was forced into action of a life threatening kind from the beginning and this affected her ability to expand and modernise. That she she still managed to do both, inflicting serious losses on the enemy along the way ought not be dismissed

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## fastmongrel (Nov 22, 2017)

I wonder what efforts (if any) the RN made to try and encourage RAF pilots with carrier experience to transfer to the FAA.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 22, 2017)

I don't know what the ins and outs of the US rebuilds/refits were but the size of the Navy (and Marines) meant more planes had been purchased at times. A big problem for all three navies was rapid advance of aeronautics during the 30s.
The US was probably the leading exponent of dive bombing. 





124 of these starting in 1935, note enclosed cockpit, controllable propeller and adjustable cowl flaps. 
they were replaced/augmented by 




207 built but some (many?) not until _after _deliveries of monoplane Northrop BT-1s and SBDs started. However there were also about 170 Vought Vindicator monoplane dive bombers

Torpedo bombers we have already seen in another thread but the Devastator was the first all metal, retractable landing gear folding wing monoplane in service on any carrier. 

The US also had over 140 Grumman fighters 




Which were probably the equal of the Sea Gladiator. Monoplane fighters don't show up in double digits until 1940. 

Everything had replacements in the works in 1939. Some just took long than others.


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## parsifal (Nov 22, 2017)

USN reportedly had 117 F3Fs on strength in September 1939, easily making it the most powerful fighter equipped force afloat in the world at the time. Issues relating to structural strength and dive stability had remained despite strong efforts by Gruman to eradicate these problems 1933-35, though to the fair, the issues had been reduced somewhat. IMO the Grumman should be considered a ‘hot” performer, with a maximum level speed of 231 mph 

The basic F3F had been considered largely obsolete by 1937 by the USN, as the navy was one of the first services to reach the conclusion that biplanes were on the way out. They basically had two designs in the pipeline, the f4F and the f2a, both of which were delayed and would not enter active service until 1940ish. As a stopgap, the navy ordered the development of the F3f-2 subtype which markedly improved top speed (reportedly to 264 mph) 

The highly maneuverable Grumman F3F served as the Navy and Marine Corps' premier (and last biplane) fighter of the late 1930s. Used by both the Navy and Marine Corps, the stubby fighter served from 1936 to 1941.

In July 1936, the first XF3F-2 prototype was ordered by the Navy, and tested in 1937. A major change was installation of the 950 horsepower Wright R-1820-22 engine, improving performance and changing the contours of the engine cowling. In March 1937, the Navy ordered 81 F3F-2s, assigning them to VF-6 aboard USS _Enterprise_ (CV-6) and Marine squadrons VMF-1 and VMF-2 in 1938. Finally, the Navy purchased 27 F3F-3s, fitted with uprated Cyclone engines. They were assigned to VF-5 aboard USS _Yorktown_ (CV-5) but remained in front line service for only a year.

The F3F-1 were probably about the equal of the Skua though less well armed and somewhat touchy in terms of dive characteristics, structural strength, and spin recovery characteristics. These same caveats need to be applied to the f3F-2, but its superior performance should not be dismissed. I would place the F3F2 in roughly the category of the A5M. by the time of their service delivery, they really should be compared to the Fulmar which in my view would fly rings around it.

The original Grumman F4F-1 design was a biplane, which proved inferior to rival designs, necessitating a complete redesign as a monoplane named the F4F-2. This design was still not competitive with the Brewster F2A Buffalo which won initial U.S. Navy orders, but when the F4F-3 development was fitted with a more powerful version of the engine, a Pratt & Whitney Twin Wasp R-1830-76, featuring a two-stage supercharger, it showed its true potential. Nevetheless the type still was not without its problems, with leaky fuel tanks and other issues that caused the RN to not grant carrier qualifications to the similar Martlet Is they received in the latter part of 1940. Similalry, the f2A buffaloes were found to be totally unsuited to carrier operations because of the weak landing gear issues that prevented them from extended operations on the US carriers. Had the USN been forced to war in 1939, they would not have had available a satisfactory fighter to call upon for carrier operations


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## Koopernic (Nov 22, 2017)

You could install Fowler Flaps instead of the split trail flaps. The Fowler flap was invented around 1920 by one Harlan Davey Fowler, an engineer who was then in the employ of the U.S. Army. Probably first used in the Lockheed Model 14S Super Electra first flown in 1937. It took Mr Fowler a decade to sell his invention due to the curious disconnection between aerodynamic ressearch and the manufacturers.

Fowler Flaps add about 20% more lift than split flaps and that at a lower angle off attack. I suppose it would be about 14% across the whole wing since only the flapped portion is improved which might drop landing speed 7%.

Electra Model 14 in militarised form as Hudson showing Fowler Flaps







Below Hurricane Split Flap


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## Shortround6 (Nov 22, 2017)

For a Hurricane fighter they aren't needed. They managed to land Hurricanes on board in Norway by putting sandbags in the rear fuselage so they could use full brakes upon touching down without arresting gear (More weight in rear kept them from nosing over) . Far from Ideal but it worked for that squadron. In part due to the low landing speed of the Hurricane. Hurricane I's had a stall speed around 57-60mph (approach speed just under 70mph) so using high lift devices wasn't needed. Unlike some later fighters that needed all the help they could get.





I would note that the Lockheed 14 airliner the Hudson was based on had a landing speed of 65mph (that could be stalling speed, source is not clear) with flaps. Commercial airlines in the 1930s needed to get in and out of small airfields. 

While this thread started with ideas for a work of fiction, the least changes needed are more believable.


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## Koopernic (Nov 23, 2017)

fastmongrel said:


> The scoop was light aluminium I cant see it staying part of the Hurricane for very long when it hits the water. Anyway a Radial engine would surely be more of a brake when ditching



Ditching Involved tentatively dragging the tail of the aircraft in the water and keeping the nose up as long as possible. The kind of radiator the Hurricane and P-51 mustang had made them dangerous to ditch because it acted as a water scoop. I don’t think any navy ever specified that a radiator be placed in this position.

I suspect the Hurricane fabric was torn off so it sank. Best thing to do is move the radiator into the P-40 position. The so called Meridith effect was well known everywhere but so poorly implemented it was hardly worth bothering with, the chin radiator can in any case recover heat energy.

The adaptations the German developed for the long range Ju 87R for the maritime attack role and carrier use are worth emulating. Apart from jettisonable wheels they installed floatation cells in the aircraft and inflatable buoys .


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## XBe02Drvr (Nov 25, 2017)

fastmongrel said:


> Build in lightness and simplificate
> 
> A favourite quote of Orville Wright though some claim it was Kelly Johnson or Colin Chapman.


"Simplicate and add lightness"
Originated by Gordon Hooten, an engineer working for Bill Stout (of Ford Trimotor fame) who adopted it and passed it on to Ed Heineman (of Havoc/Dauntless/Invader/Skyraider/Skyhawk/etc fame) who popularized it and inspired Colin Chapman (of Lotus fame) and a host of others to emulate the magic.
Cheers,
Wes

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## RCAFson (Nov 25, 2017)

fastmongrel said:


> I am thinking of writing an alternate history timeline and need to ask for some information and ideas.
> 
> Its 1938 and the Admiralty belatedly realises Heavy AA guns will not protect its new carriers and decides it needs a high performance fighter to defend the fleet. It also realises that a new fighter will cut into the limited aircraft complement of the carriers so the new fighter must also be capable of carrying bombs, cameras and extra fuel tanks.



One thing which seems to be overlooked is that the FAA did commission the conversion of the Gloster Gladiator single seat fighter into the GSG and the subsequent purchase of purpose built GSGs.


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## fastmongrel (Nov 25, 2017)

RCAFson said:


> One thing which seems to be overlooked is that the FAA did commission the conversion of the Gloster Gladiator single seat fighter into the GSG and the subsequent purchase of purpose built GSGs.



My idea was the Sea Hurricane replaces the Sea Gladiator for service in Norway. That now seems to be too early so maybe the Sea Hurricane takes the place one for one of the Fulmar for Meditteranean serice late 1940 onwards.

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## Shortround6 (Nov 25, 2017)

It sort of depends, do you want a Hurricane II with all the bells and whistles (bombs, drop tanks, belt feed cannon) or do you want a Hurricane I that can operate from a carrier and fit on the elevator to get below deck? 
Pilots would be nice 

from a hardware standpoint, In Malta (and Finland?) they did stick Blenheim engines with two pitch props on Gladiators (the Blenheim engines already had the pump needed for the pitch change mechanism and the right propshaft) for a useful increase in performance (climb more than speed) .

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## RCAFson (Nov 25, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> It sort of depends, do you want a Hurricane II with all the bells and whistles (bombs, drop tanks, belt feed cannon) or do you want a Hurricane I that can operate from a carrier and fit on the elevator to get below deck?
> Pilots would be nice
> 
> from a hardware standpoint, In Malta (and Finland?) they did stick Blenheim engines with two pitch props on Gladiators (the Blenheim engines already had the pump needed for the pitch change mechanism and the right propshaft) for a useful increase in performance (climb more than speed) .


The P.4/34 first flew in early 1937. In Jan 1938 it was ordered as the Fulmar but AFAIK no naval development occurred before 1938. In less than two years the Fulmar flew and was in production by April 1940. Fairey engineered a folding 8 gun (750rpg) wing into the Fulmar, along with a CS prop and fitted it was a 1280hp engine.

If, for example, Fairey had been given a contract to navalize the HH instead, it seems likely that they could have done so and had them (or a conversion kit to fit to Hawker built aircraft) in production by 1 Jan 1940.

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## Koopernic (Nov 25, 2017)

RCAFson said:


> The P.4/34 first flew in early 1937. In Jan 1938 it was ordered as the Fulmar but AFAIK no naval development occurred before 1938. In less than two years the Fulmar flew and was in production by April 1940. Fairey engineered a folding 8 gun (750rpg) wing into the Fulmar, along with a CS prop and fitted it was a 1280hp engine.
> 
> If, for example, Fairey had been given a contract to navalize the HH instead, it seems likely that they could have done so and had them (or a conversion kit to fit to Hawker built aircraft) in production by 1 Jan 1940.




And if it delayed the typhoon a few months it only would have helped Napier by giving them a few months extra time to sort out their novel engine.


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## Koopernic (Nov 25, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> For a Hurricane fighter they aren't needed. They managed to land Hurricanes on board in Norway by putting sandbags in the rear fuselage so they could use full brakes upon touching down without arresting gear (More weight in rear kept them from nosing over) . Far from Ideal but it worked for that squadron. In part due to the low landing speed of the Hurricane. Hurricane I's had a stall speed around 57-60mph (approach speed just under 70mph) so using high lift devices wasn't needed. Unlike some later fighters that needed all the help they could get.
> View attachment 473058
> 
> 
> ...



High lift devices on the Hurricane wing say full span flaperons, perhaps Fowler flaps in board plus leading edge devices over the portion without prop flow such as retractable slats could more than double the wing maximum coefficient of lift. According to aeronautics for naval aviators that could reduce approach speed by 30% ie our hurricane would be approaching at 49mph instead of 70mph.

That’s a useful reduction. So roughly 45 knots approach speed into 10-15 knots headwind gives a net approach of 30-35 knots.

This is what they were trying to land on.





I realise that playing around with leading edge devices impacts on wing washout, pitching moment, gun placement which is why I suggested trailing edge devices only ie the Fowler flap.

Mitsubishi used variable gearing on the A6M zero ailerons which geared up aileron deflection in the landing mode so rigging ailerons to convert to flapperons is not unprecedented or is the use of spoilers for roll control. They have nice characteristics such as post stall roll control and certainly, Messerschmitt had been using them for 10 years. They turned up on the Black Widow as well.

Fowler flaps, wing fold outboard of the undercarriage wouldn’t be too hard as you have to pretty much modify every wing drawing anyway to get the hinges in. *Chin radiator of the “power egg” type used on the Lancaster and Beaufighter.*

Modifying the section of wing outside of the fold with some combination of slats, flapperons and or spoilers would work but of course, adds delay to the effort and time taken.

Sandbagging the tail of an aircraft may help it to brake but it will also reduce its stability.


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## Shortround6 (Nov 26, 2017)

They used the sandbags because the planes evacuating Norway were normal land Hurricanes, NO arresting hooks. 

They flew Avenger torpedo bombers from escort carriers. similar stall speed and approach speeds as the Hurricane.

BTW Those are Sea Hurricanes on the deck of the HMS Avenger, so it looks like they could operated form a deck that small and slow.


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## JAG88 (Dec 2, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> It has been mentioned in other threads but in 1938 the British have 5-6 carriers in commision (depending on you rate the Argus) with the Ark Royal commissioning in Nov of 1938, the four Illustrious class were all laid down in 1937 but what the planned for completion was I don't know. Actual completion was two in 1940 and two in 1941. Two were under the 1936 program and two under the 1937 program. Indomitable was modified and perhaps delayed as a result.
> 
> However what the number of aircraft berths were was:
> Argus, rated at 20 aircraft*
> ...



Courageous light battlecruisers (1917) - Royal Navy (United Kingdom)

Cant attest to its accuracy...

Btw, Graf Zeppelin was laid down at the end of 1936, how could things have changed for the FAA if the Germans had actually given it priority and commissioned it by the end of 1939?

A related question, when were the WW1 conversions due to retire? ANd how many carriers could the RN have? With the Implacables I believe they would have had 7 carriers and been over the 135.000t allowed by treaty. Or am I mistaken?

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## Shortround6 (Dec 3, 2017)

At least one of the old ships had been "retired" in the 30s. I don't know how treaty makers viewed it but some of these old carriers were retitled as training ships or in the case of the US and Langley perhaps "aircraft ferry". The Hermes came back to the "active" list after the early war losses.


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## JAG88 (Dec 3, 2017)

Thx, but even if all the old ships were retired or reclassified, the 6 Illustrious plus Ark Royal made for 157.500t, one 22.500 carrier above the 135.000t limit of the treaties, or am I missing something?


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## Shortround6 (Dec 3, 2017)

Treaty expiration date???

Or at some point they just figured that since nobody else was paying any attention to the treaties why should they? 

HMS Implacable was ordered in Oct 1938 right after the Munich crisis, so any adherence to the old treaties (Japan had already withdrawn in 1936) was being rapidly done away with.

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## JAG88 (Dec 3, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> Treaty expiration date???
> 
> Or at some point they just figured that since nobody else was paying any attention to the treaties why should they?
> 
> HMS Implacable was ordered in Oct 1938 right after the Munich crisis, so any adherence to the old treaties (Japan had already withdrawn in 1936) was being rapidly done away with.



Sure, but the 1936 treaty was signed by the remaining powers and additional treaties with Germany and the USSR were also made, when after several attempts Japan refused to rejoin, a new treaty was signed in June 1938 invoking the escaltor clause AND allowing the subscribers of the 1936 treaty to increase their BBs tonnage to 45.000t each (making Lions, Vanguard, Iowas and Alsace possible), so it was still in force.


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## Glider (Dec 3, 2017)

JAG88 said:


> Btw, Graf Zeppelin was laid down at the end of 1936, how could things have changed for the FAA if the Germans had actually given it priority and commissioned it by the end of 1939?



The problem was the design which wasted a lot of weight and space on 5.9in guns but more importantly aircraft. The Ju87 was up to the job but the 109's were simply inadequate. They lacked range, payload, strength and were difficult to land than most fighters of the period. The there was a total lack of carrier operating experience. Look how difficult it is for the Russians to operate their carriers today and that's in peace time with loads of time to practice


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## JAG88 (Dec 3, 2017)

Ok, I think I found it, the 1922 Treaty set the tonnage limits, it was due to expire on 1936:

_"The present Treaty shall remain in force until December 31st, 1936, and in case none of the Contracting Powers shall have given notice two years before that date of its intention to terminate the treaty, it shall continue in force until the expiration of two years from the date on which notice of termination shall be given by one of the Contracting Powers, whereupon the Treaty shall terminate as regards all the Contracting Powers."_

Once Japan gave notice in 1934 the tonnage limits were dead. Somehow I was sure the 1936 treaty renewed the limits.


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## JAG88 (Dec 3, 2017)

Glider said:


> The problem was the design which wasted a lot of weight and space on 5.9in guns but more importantly aircraft. The Ju87 was up to the job but the 109's were simply inadequate. They lacked range, payload, strength and were difficult to land than most fighters of the period. The there was a total lack of carrier operating experience. Look how difficult it is for the Russians to operate their carriers today and that's in peace time with loads of time to practice



Sure, but the RN didnt know that, the point is how would have the RN reacted had they expected to deal with a KM carrier a lot sooner and whether that could have made the Sea Hurricane happen earlier.

The 109 was very stable to land thanks to the slats and spoilers, its landing gear was widened and strengthened in the carrier version and could carry a drop tank from the start. It wasnt perfect but would have been superior in the air to any carrier aircraft of the time.

The 15cm guns were to be replaced at one point, but since due to thier location they couldnt be replaced by further flak they were kept. The space issue is one that keeps me wondering, its hangar capacity was similar to Ark Royal`s, yet they claimed just 43 aircarft...

The IJN gave a lot of assistance and even offered unlimited access to their carrier designs and construction... which the KM of course... DECLINED!


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## pbehn (Dec 3, 2017)

Washington Naval Treaty - Wikipedia
The Washington Naval Treaty set limits. Ships such as HMS Nelson were built around these treaties. The fundamental problem is how do you verify it and then if someone breaks it what do you do? The Graf Spee was declared at 10,000 tons but was actually 14,000.

German cruiser Admiral Graf Spee - Wikipedia
HMS Rodney (29) - Wikipedia


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## Glider (Dec 3, 2017)

JAG88 said:


> Sure, but the RN didnt know that, the point is how would have the RN reacted had they expected to deal with a KM carrier a lot sooner and whether that could have made the Sea Hurricane happen earlier.
> 
> The 109 was very stable to land thanks to the slats and spoilers, its landing gear was widened and strengthened in the carrier version and could carry a drop tank from the start. It wasnt perfect but would have been superior in the air to any carrier aircraft of the time.
> 
> ...


I disagree. The RN would have known about the design flaws and about the lack of experience the Germans had. They probably knew about the handling differences as they had flown captured examples of the 109E. Clearly it would have been strengthened for carrier operations but at the end of the day the 109 was more difficult to land than a Spitfire or a Hurricane, something even the Germans admitted. 
Someone once quoted the Seafire as being just about good enough to operate from carriers, which sums it up pretty well. Well on all the evidence the 109 would have been worse than that. As for the 109 being the best carrier fighter of the time, not a chance, the Zero was streets ahead.

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## JAG88 (Dec 3, 2017)

They flew a 109E on 1940, not before.

The Spitfire often "floated" on landing causing it to crash land on the barrier, the 109 was equipped with spoilers to prevent this and allow for a power on approach, the rest are just myths.

The Spitfire was barely strengthened for carrier operations, and it was so only on the later marks, IIRC.


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## pbehn (Dec 3, 2017)

JAG88 said:


> The Spitfire often "floated" on landing causing it to crash land on the barrier, the 109 was equipped with spoilers to prevent this and allow for a power on approach, the rest are just myths.
> 
> .


I cant see any reason to think the Bf 109-T would have been better than a Spitfire on carrier operations. A rough sea would make it a single use weapon.


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## Glider (Dec 3, 2017)

The versions of the 109 B - D were very inferior fighters which the Hurricane could easily dominate so it didn't matter that the RAF hadn't flown them. A number of overseas pilots including a number of American pilots flew the early 109 and its secret would have been known,

It was a German pilot who described the Hurricane and Spitfire as follows

Major Werner Mölders, JG 51, ( who I think we can both agree knew what he was talking about) compared the British fighters to his own prior to the Battle:

It was very interesting to carry out the flight trials at Rechlin with the Spitfire and the Hurricane. Both types are very simple to fly compared to our aircraft, and childishly easy to take-off and land.

This isn't a myth sorry.

The 109 had spoilers but it didn't stop it being more difficult to land. All WW2 naval fighters had a power on approach and all cut the engine before landing. A 109 would have been no exception as if you try to land with the engine powered up and miss the wire then you will go full tilt into the aircraft park at the bow of the ship. Grabbing the wire with engine on full power only became possible with the angled deck.

To pretend that the Seafire wasn't strengthened for carrier operations is a myth.


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## JAG88 (Dec 3, 2017)

Glider said:


> The versions of the 109 B - D were very inferior fighters which the Hurricane could easily dominate so it didn't matter that the RAF hadn't flown them. A number of overseas pilots including a number of American pilots flew the early 109 and its secret would have been known,
> 
> It was a German pilot who described the Hurricane and Spitfire as follows
> 
> ...



The 109 got the DB601 only in the E model, and that made a huge difference as the hapless Hurricane pilots soon noticed, or not, wartime RAF was convinced they were anihilating the LW even when they losing aircrafts in a 4 to 1 ratio in 1941...

The LW had a cultural problem towards training which created a large number of accidents due to faulty training, you can read about it here:

FalkeEins - the Luftwaffe blog: Pilot training in the Luftwaffe - flight discipline, pilot culture and the development of procedures and check lists - "Why Air Forces Fail " (2)

On the other hand, the Finns had no problem with the aircraft since they took better care of training since for them both pilots and machines were a much more precious commodity:

virtualpilots.fi: 109myths

So yes, Molders can say that the Spitfire was easier to land, specially since they were taught to land at high speed in order to avoid the opening of the slats, something that would have actually helped in landing the aircraft safely.

The LW continued to have these issues well into the post war, they lost many F84s and F104s to accidents until better training practices ameliorated the problem.

109s into other aircraft? First you are assuming a deck park, that is a nono, why are you assuming a KM would have that? The lifts were large enough to take the 109 under with wings deployed. Second, the spoiler gives you better control over the approach, power and glide angle which is critical for a carrier aircraft. The 109T wasnt an improvised aircraft.

The Spitfire was barely modified for carrier operations, and paid for it, that is a fact.

_"The only major change over the basic RAF Spitfire Mk V machine was the installation of a retractable “V”-frame containing an arrester hook to the strengthened underbelly of the fighter. The final flight-deck modification was catapult spools to allow the Seafire to be mounted on a carrier’s accelerator for an assisted take-off."

"The first navalised conversion – of a Spifire VB – was completed in January 1942. This Seafire Ib was delivered to the RN for operational service on June 15._

_More flight-deck trials were conducted aboard the highly experienced HMS Victorious in March and April 1942. The first Seafire IIC also was tested aboard HMS Illustrious in March. 

Again, the lack of vision over the Merlin was the main complaint from the aircraft tested on Victorious. The Seafire IIC testing, however, raised additional concerns. An inspection of the aircraft after a series of accelerator launches revealed bucking in the rear fuselage and tail unit. The tail plane had become deformed, and the Merlin displayed a startling tendency to cut-out on launch.

Remedial work was immediately commenced. A Supermarine report from November 1942 reveals efforts to strengthen the airframe by up to 50 per cent."

"The main undercarriage legs were strengthened and extensive landing trials conducted aboard HMS Pretoria Castile in February 1944 and HMS Indefatigable in March to find ways to eliminate Seafire’s tendency for arrester-hook bounce.

A major discovery of these trials was that arrester wires needed to be correctly tensioned to avoid the tail of the Seafire rising after capture, which – in turn – caused the propeller to make contact with the deck."_

The Germans had figured out the landing characteristics of the 109T after 1.500 arrested landings on the proving grounds, of course, carrier landings were still ahead of them but they had already eliminated a number of issues pre-war.


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## pbehn (Dec 3, 2017)

JAG88 said:


> The Spitfire was barely modified for carrier operations, and paid for it, that is a fact.
> 
> .


Yes that is a symantic fact, when Spitfires were modified for carrier use they were called Seafires. You seem to forget that the RN operated Martlets which were re named F4F Wildcats, a land based F4F scored its first kill on Christmas day 1940 over Scapa Flow. Spitfires were used experimentally on carriers but any operational aircraft ordered had to be superior to the F4F which remained in service with the US navy until the end of the war. The seafire had to be superior to the Wildcat or it wouldn't be used and an F4F on carrier operations was much superior to a Bf 109.


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## JAG88 (Dec 3, 2017)

pbehn said:


> Yes that is a symantic fact, when Spitfires were modified for carrier use they were called Seafires. You seem to forget that the RN operated Martlets which were re named F4F Wildcats, a land based F4F scored its first kill on Christmas day 1940 over Scapa Flow. Spitfires were used experimentally on carriers but any operational aircraft ordered had to be superior to the F4F which remained in service with the US navy until the end of the war. The seafire had to be superior to the Wildcat or it wouldn't be used and an F4F on carrier operations was much superior to a Bf 109.



You mean semantic maybe?

I truly cant see your point about the F4F or what does it have to do with anything...


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## pbehn (Dec 3, 2017)

JAG88 said:


> You mean semantic maybe?
> 
> I truly cant see your point about the F4F or what does it have to do with anything...


Well then you have selective blindness. The Royal Navy has a custom built carrier capable fighter in 1940, that was the Martlet. Any modified Spirfire had to be superior to that or it would not have been used (there are considerations of Lend Lease I admit but the USA had no interest in the UK failing for want of a few hundred aircraft fighters.


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## JAG88 (Dec 3, 2017)

pbehn said:


> Well then you have selective blindness. The Royal Navy has a custom built carrier capable fighter in 1940, that was the Martlet. Any modified Spirfire had to be superior to that or it would not have been used (there are considerations of Lend Lease I admit but the USA had no interest in the UK failing for want of a few hundred aircraft fighters.



Perhaps, but I was at least able to notice a glaring mispelling so my eyes cant be that bad...

The F4F was slow, even the Zero was faster, the 109 would have that advantage and dictate the fight in any duel, which is why the RN used the Spitfire since even if it wasnt as good a carrier aircraft as the Wildcat, it was a much better fighter and hence, worth it...


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## pbehn (Dec 3, 2017)

JAG88 said:


> Perhaps, but I was at least able to notice a glaring mispelling so my eyes cant be that bad...
> 
> The F4F was slow, even the Zero was faster, the 109 would have that advantage and dictate the fight in any duel, which is why the RN used the Spitfire since even if it wasnt as good a carrier aircraft as the Wildcat, it was a much better fighter and hence, worth it...


Nothing to do with spelling, your selective blindness was ignoring the simple fact that any carrier based aircraft had to be superior to the F4F. The 109 would have dictated the terms of the conflict until the pilot looked at the fuel gauge, please remember it could just reach London from northern France a distance of about 100 miles.


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## Glider (Dec 3, 2017)

JAG88 said:


> The 109 got the DB601 only in the E model, and that made a huge difference as the hapless Hurricane pilots soon noticed, or not, wartime RAF was convinced they were anihilating the LW even when they losing aircrafts in a 4 to 1 ratio in 1941...


So we agree that the early 109's were not up to scratch and that the fact the RAF hadn't flown them wasn't a problem


> So yes, Molders can say that the Spitfire was easier to land, specially since they were taught to land at high speed in order to avoid the opening of the slats, something that would have actually helped in landing the aircraft safely.
> 
> The LW continued to have these issues well into the post war, they lost many F84s and F104s to accidents until better training practices ameliorated the problem.


Sorry but this is far too simplistic, to blame the problems on the F104 with the problems on the 109 and blame the culture is foolish almost crass.


> 109s into other aircraft? First you are assuming a deck park, that is a nono, why are you assuming a KM would have that? The lifts were large enough to take the 109 under with wings deployed. Second, the spoiler gives you better control over the approach, power and glide angle which is critical for a carrier aircraft. The 109T wasnt an improvised aircraft.



If you want to operate your aircraft effectively then you need a deck park. If you don't then the number of aircraft you will be able to operate will be pitiful.


> The Spitfire was barely modified for carrier operations, and paid for it, that is a fact.



_"The only major change over the basic RAF Spitfire Mk V machine was the installation of a retractable “V”-frame containing an arrester hook to the strengthened underbelly of the fighter. The final flight-deck modification was catapult spools to allow the Seafire to be mounted on a carrier’s accelerator for an assisted take-off."
"The first navalised conversion – of a Spifire VB – was completed in January 1942. This Seafire Ib was delivered to the RN for operational service on June 15._


> the Seafire was modernised to the extent it was needed.



The Germans had figured out the landing characteristics of the 109T after 1.500 arrested landings on the proving grounds, of course, carrier landings were still ahead of them but they had already eliminated a number of issues pre-war. [/QUOTE]

My only experience is on the Ark Royal. A full size outline of the Ark was at Culdrose and used to train pilots in carrier landings and the ground crew in how to manoeuver the aircraft, helicopters, aircraft tugs and others safely and effectively and it wasn't easy. This in a Navy which had been operating carriers for decades. Trust me, landing on a carrier is very, very, different from doing it on land. When on exercises the USN F4's had to land on the Ark it wasn't unusual for one to abandon the attempt and they were massively experienced naval pilots. Only when you do it at sea do you realise what the requirements are.
If you think the Spitfire had a problem with the view over the nose what makes you think this would be any different in a 109?


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## JAG88 (Dec 3, 2017)

Glider said:


> So we agree that the early 109's were not up to scratch and that the fact the RAF hadn't flown them wasn't a problem
> Sorry but this is far too simplistic, to blame the problems on the F104 with the problems on the 109 and blame the culture is foolish almost crass.



We agree that you didnt know that the 109T was based on the E and had nothing to do with the early models making your comparison irrelevant.

Sorry, you need to read more on institutional culture and its relevance, and in this case we have the evidence from the Finnish side, they had no issues operating the type and in fact noted the differences with their German counterparts who were busy crashing 109s left and right because they were too macho to concern themselves with learning how to land them...

They also had issues with the 88 in the beginning, and it wasnt just the 104 post war, the F84 also caused trouble, if you cant see the pattern, well, is not my problem.



> If you want to operate your aircraft effectively then you need a deck park. If you don't then the number of aircraft you will be able to operate will be pitiful.



Shokaku operated 72, Akagi 72, Hiryu 64, Ark Royal 60, all without deck park (plus spares for the IJN ones). Pitiful?

GZ had 5.648m2 of hangar space, about the same as Ark Royal, less than the IJN carriers but all KM aircraft had foldable wings. Yorktown had barely 3.194m2, but USN carriers had been DESIGNED for deck parking.



> the Seafire was modernised to the extent it was needed.



I claimed it was barely modified at first, you claimed it was, I provided proof...



> My only experience is on the Ark Royal. A full size outline of the Ark was at Culdrose and used to train pilots in carrier landings and the ground crew in how to manoeuver the aircraft, helicopters, aircraft tugs and others safely and effectively and it wasn't easy. This in a Navy which had been operating carriers for decades. Trust me, landing on a carrier is very, very, different from doing it on land. When on exercises the USN F4's had to land on the Ark it wasn't unusual for one to abandon the attempt and they were massively experienced naval pilots. Only when you do it at sea do you realise what the requirements are.



Which is why I specifically noted that:

_"The Germans had figured out the landing characteristics of the 109T after 1.500 arrested landings on the proving grounds, *of course, carrier landings were still ahead of them* but they had already eliminated a number of issues pre-war."_



> If you think the Spitfire had a problem with the view over the nose what makes you think this would be any different in a 109?



Please feel free to quote me claiming that, if you cant I expect you to retract your statement.


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## JAG88 (Dec 3, 2017)

pbehn said:


> Nothing to do with spelling, your selective blindness was ignoring the simple fact that any carrier based aircraft had to be superior to the F4F. The 109 would have dictated the terms of the conflict until the pilot looked at the fuel gauge, please remember it could just reach London from northern France a distance of about 100 miles.



You forgot the drop tank, so you should be careful about claiming "selective blindness"...


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## Shortround6 (Dec 3, 2017)

Unfortunately we are arguing over a timeline that stretches from 1938 to 1944 so obviously more than a few things changed. 

The 109T evolved a bit and wasn't really ready for use in 1940 or before and according to one book the vast majority were delivered between April and June of 1941. 
All I have seen is that the 109T had spoilers. How they operated is skipped over. Were they pretty much airbrakes? either in or out? were they variable?
could you make them deploy differently on each wing (1/2 out on one side and 3/4s on the other) for roll control? 
Not all spoilers operate the same. Some spoilers just spoil (surprise) the lift over a portion of the wing and increase the sink rate without doing anything for lateral control. Other spoilers are intended to be aileron replacements. they obviously require different controls and control mechanisms. 

I have no idea what the intended glide slope of the 109T was but the leading edge slats are not magic. They only work at certain angles of attack. Bf 109s on land came in nose high at least for short period of time in order to get into the 3 point attitude. At that attitude/angle of attack they maintained aileron control in case the wing started to stall. If you come in flat (two wheel landing) they aren't going to do much good unless the landing is really screwed up. 

We have no idea how well the 109T would have stood up to actual carrier landings. I would note that simulating operating from a carrier is difficult as the "simulation" landing strip is not pitching and rolling. Real carrier landings are going to involve a higher percentage of one wheel hitting before the other and more variation in impact velocity of main wheels (is the deck rising or falling?) 

Early Seafires did have a lot of trouble with landing gear, however a lot of them were operating off of slow, short escort carriers in the Med for the invasion of Sicily, July and Aug in the Med. High temperatures not only affect take-off, they affect landings. In the US pilot notes they often advise increasing approach speeds by 10% and roll out distances by 20% in temperatures over 35 degrees C or 95 degrees F. This is an indication of the increased loads put on the landing gear/arresting system vs testing in cool climates. 

I have no idea how well the 109T would have handled such conditions. It might have done fine or.......


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## pbehn (Dec 3, 2017)

JAG88 said:


> You forgot the drop tank, so you should be careful about claiming "selective blindness"...


Which drop tanks? The 109 never ever took off from or landed on a carrier, you are comparing the theoretical performance of your chosen land based champion with actual carrier based aircraft. The 109 in service was a great aeroplane, on landing it was best on a grass surface and with a three point landing, the Hurricane F4F and Seafire went into carrier service with the RN but the Bf 109 never did, you therefore have all the advantages with your drawing board aircraft. The Bf 109 T would be like the 262 requiring the very best of pilots and then not guaranteeing that pilots would be able to land the plane.


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## JAG88 (Dec 3, 2017)

pbehn said:


> Which drop tanks? The 109 never ever took off from or landed on a carrier, you are comparing the theoretical performance of your chosen land based champion with actual carrier based aircraft. The 109 in service was a great aeroplane, on landing it was best on a grass surface and with a three point landing, the Hurricane F4F and Seafire went into carrier service with the RN but the Bf 109 never did, you therefore have all the advantages with your drawing board aircraft. The Bf 109 T would be like the 262 requiring the very best of pilots and then not guaranteeing that pilots would be able to land the plane.



The 300l ones the 109T was especifically designed to carry, if you dont know something you are better served abstaining than advertising the fact, it just makes you look bad and ignorant.


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## JAG88 (Dec 3, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> Unfortunately we are arguing over a timeline that stretches from 1938 to 1944 so obviously more than a few things changed.
> 
> The 109T evolved a bit and wasn't really ready for use in 1940 or before and according to one book the vast majority were delivered between April and June of 1941.
> All I have seen is that the 109T had spoilers. How they operated is skipped over. Were they pretty much airbrakes? either in or out? were they variable?
> ...



Fair points, all I am claiming is that the Germans took the time to address the most obvious issues the best they could, whether they would have been successful or not we will never know since it never landed on a carrier, all we know is that they spent 2 years making modifications and trials, and then operated them from a windswept sand bar in the North Sea and from northern Norway, were their enhanced capabilities were well appreciated by their crews.

Oh, and claiming that dismissing the aircraft out of hand due to some perceived disadvantages of doubtful merit is foolish.

Nothing more.


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## pbehn (Dec 3, 2017)

JAG88 said:


> The 300l ones the 109T was especifically designed to carry, if you dont know something you are better served abstaining than advertising the fact, kust makes you look bad and ignorant.


I am not ignorant of the simple fact that the Bf 109 T never took off or landed on a carrier and in fact no carrier was ever built for it to operate from, your arguments are purely theoretical. The Royal Navy actually did have carriers and it progressed from the Sea Hurricane to the F4F to the Seafire and also used Corsairs and Hellcats (plus others). Any discussion of the Bf 109 T is theoretical based on the certainty that it never ever operated from a carrier which is when the problems are discovered, especially in the North Sea


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## JAG88 (Dec 3, 2017)

pbehn said:


> I am not ignorant of the simple fact that the Bf 109 T never took off or landed on a carrier and in fact no carrier was ever built for it to operate from, your arguments are purely theoretical. The Royal Navy actually did have carriers and it progressed from the Sea Hurricane to the F4F to the Seafire and also used Corsairs and Hellcats (plus others). Any discussion of the Bf 109 T is theoretical based on the certainty that it never ever operated from a carrier which is when the problems are discovered, especially in the North Sea



Yeah, but you were ignorant about the drop tank, which was my point.


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## XBe02Drvr (Dec 3, 2017)

Boys, boys, boys.....This is beginning to sound like a grade school pissing contest. Let's everybody stop, count to ten, take a deep breath, and relax. When the flow of interesting information degenerates into insults and name calling, it's no fun for anyone, even us spectators.
Cheers,
Wes

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## JAG88 (Dec 4, 2017)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Boys, boys, boys.....This is beginning to sound like a grade school pissing contest. Let's everybody stop, count to ten, take a deep breath, and relax. When the flow of interesting information degenerates into insults and name calling, it's no fun for anyone, even us spectators.
> Cheers,
> Wes



They started it!


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## XBe02Drvr (Dec 4, 2017)

And did you try to de-escalate it? Doesn't matter who started it so much as who winds it down. Diplomacy over denigration.


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## JAG88 (Dec 4, 2017)

XBe02Drvr said:


> And did you try to de-escalate it? Doesn't matter who started it so much as who winds it down. Diplomacy over denigration.



And here I thought the tongue in cheek nature of my comment was rather obvious... oh well.


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## Glider (Dec 4, 2017)

For completeness re the comment of mine that you thought the Spitfire had a problem with the view over the nose. You are correct you didn't make the comment, it was in one of the quotes you used. Post 94 _Again, the lack of vision over the Merlin was the main complaint from the aircraft tested on Victorious_



JAG88 said:


> Please feel free to quote me claiming that, if you cant I expect you to retract your statement.



As we all know the Spitfire did have a problem with the view over the nose and its a problem I believe the 109 would have shared

See post 9363 on Picture of the day.


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## XBe02Drvr (Dec 4, 2017)

JAG88 said:


> And here I thought the tongue in cheek nature of my comment was rather obvious... oh well.


Some people's cheeks can take more tongue than others. You guys might have all been jousting in jest, but it sounded combative to me. Not all of us subscribe to the fighter pilot culture of incessant ball-busting.
Cheers,
Wes

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## JAG88 (Dec 4, 2017)

Glider said:


> For completeness re the comment of mine that you thought the Spitfire had a problem with the view over the nose. You are correct you didn't make the comment, it was in one of the quotes you used. Post 94 _Again, the lack of vision over the Merlin was the main complaint from the aircraft tested on Victorious_
> 
> 
> 
> ...



That is easy to explain, I dont like to mutilate paragraphs in order to prevent suspicions, maybe I should have highlited the point, but since we were talking about modifications to the Spitfire I felt it wasnt needed:

_"Again, the lack of vision over the Merlin was the main complaint from the aircraft tested on Victorious. *The Seafire IIC testing, however, raised additional concerns. An inspection of the aircraft after a series of accelerator launches revealed bucking in the rear fuselage and tail unit. The tail plane had become deformed,* and the Merlin displayed a startling tendency to cut-out on launch.

*Remedial work was immediately commenced. A Supermarine report from November 1942 reveals efforts to strengthen the airframe by up to 50 per cent*."
_
Of course a 12V does cause visibility issues, and although the whole point of the inverted-V DB601 was to improve downward visibility, it was neveer going to be good on the 109 either.


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## pbehn (Dec 4, 2017)

Allow me to clarify.

It is of no importance at all if the Bf109 T was designed with or without a drop tank because the option to fit drop tanks is open to opposing aircraft. The F4F fitted drop tanks which would have increased its range advantage.

The Bf 109 out performed the F4F but the F4F was carrier capable, the pilot could see where he was landing on a straight approach.

Any comments about what the Spitfire/Seafire encountered in service to me just mean that the Bf109 T would have the same if not worse issues.

A windswept headland is not the most severe condition for a carrier based aircraft by any means. The worst condition is a pitching deck on a stationary carrier with no wind is much worse. The North Sea is not like the Pacific, if you steam into the wind for too long you run into land mine fields or an enemy fleet. While high winds do make a rough sea worse, it is completely common to have a swell of a few metres with no wind at all. 

The Graf Zeppelin was only scheduled to have 10 or 12 fighters aboard, it is easy to see a situation where many if not most of those would be lost on one bad day, then what happens for re supply?

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## Shortround6 (Dec 5, 2017)

pbehn said:


> The Graf Zeppelin was only scheduled to have 10 or 12 fighters aboard, it is easy to see a situation where many if not most of those would be lost on one bad day, then what happens for re supply?



That is the big problem for the Graf Zeppelin. It was almost always going to be 2-3 British Carriers vs the GZ and at those odds it doesn't matter that much if the British are using Hurricanes, or WIldcats or Spitfires or even Fulmars.

With 12 109s how many do you send to escort the "strike group" while still keeping a few for either CAP or deck ready for interception? 

If the British have two carriers with 48 planes apiece (pry extra money from treasury if Germans actually have functioning carrier) they can easily have 24 fighters and if the British keep even 12 Fulmars back for CAP can the 6-8 max 109s shoot the Fulmars down fast enough to keep the Fulmars from getting to the Ju 87/Fu 167s? 

Can 4-6 109s stop 8-12 Fulmars and 50-60 strike aircraft? Play with the numbers as you see fit. The Germans just don't have enough planes.

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## BiffF15 (Dec 5, 2017)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Not all of us subscribe to the fighter pilot culture of incessant ball-busting.
> Cheers,
> Wes



Wes,

You almost made my drink shoot out my nose with that one!

Having spent a large portion of my adult life (my wife might argue the adult point) in a fighter squadron I've wondered a time or two why the "incessant ball-busting" occurs. 

It might also be a point of view. 

We plan, brief, lead, and debrief missions. In the debrief everyone has a time in which they may make comments regarding things done well or not. Everyone has skin in the game to do things well, however the way you get better is to point out things done well, and almost more importantly things not done well. In pilot training it's things that will keep you alive, along with your instructor. In flying fighters, it's things that will keep you alive, your wingman or flight lead, or the package of 20-50 aircraft that are following you into bad guy land. 

The debrief is where the a tremendous amount of learning occurs, and for that to occur in the most pristine manner emotions must be pushed aside. For some people that is very difficult, as they take things as an attack when in reality it isn't. I think the incessant ball-busting teaches, and reteaches folks to not take things personally, to stay cool when "attacked", and think on your feet (can you chuck a spear back at the guy who just blind sided you?), and stay knowledgeable about their weapons systems and the tactics / techniques to use it well.

I also relate it to the medical field. I have a friend who went through it and it was quite a bit of a "haze" that sounded remarkably similar to the fighter debrief. However, if I was lying on an operating table and something goes wrong, blood starts gushing, etc., I would want a very knowledgable, cool as a cucumber type individual standing there making sure I was going to see another sunrise.

Also, the ball busting can be very entertaining.

Again, not an attack, it's just a point of view.

Cheers,
Biff

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## buffnut453 (Dec 5, 2017)

BiffF15 said:


> Also, the ball busting can be very entertaining.



There was plenty of mockage (ribald banter if you prefer) when I served on a front-line squadron. One of the pilots gained the moniker "Dot" (in Blighty, Dot is a truncation of the name Dorothy). He was known as Dot because...well, he flew like a Dorothy. Also a dot was what his aircraft looked like when he was formating on you in battle pair! 

In fairness, he came to the squadron after flying PR9 Canberras....not a lot of call for formation flying with those beasts!

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## JAG88 (Dec 5, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> That is the big problem for the Graf Zeppelin. It was almost always going to be 2-3 British Carriers vs the GZ and at those odds it doesn't matter that much if the British are using Hurricanes, or WIldcats or Spitfires or even Fulmars.
> 
> With 12 109s how many do you send to escort the "strike group" while still keeping a few for either CAP or deck ready for interception?
> 
> ...



Indeed, but the mere existance of the GZ means the RN carriers have to be committed in pairs, which actually reduces the numbers of carrier equipped formations and of course the area they can cover, and the ocean is a big place.

As I indicated earlier, the GZ has a hangar area similar to Ark Royal's and yet the Germans declared that they would operate only 43 aicraft out of her, that in spite of the carrier design requirement stipulating 60 aircraft with a percentage as disassembled spares as per IJN practice. IIRC it was LW demands that meant land storing criteria had to be met aboard GZ which reduced its capacity to the 43 aforementioned aircraft.

But how long before such nonsense had been dipensed with once war was declared? The space was there to store up to 70+ aircraft (28x109s plus 45x87s/167s could have been possible), modifications would have been necessary to store extra Avgas (instead of some of the 15cm ammo I would venture), but the ammunition complement was already large enough for the larger group.

That could allow for 9 scouts, a 36 strong strike group with a 12/16 escort, plus 12/16 for an accurately radar directed CAP since the Freya was inherently far more capable than the early RN sets. That would make shooting down any shadower a much easier proposition.

Not too shabby.


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## pbehn (Dec 5, 2017)

BiffF15 said:


> Wes,
> 
> You almost made my drink shoot out my nose with that one!
> 
> ...


Things look different from the outside to the reality inside. When I raced most considered that the class I was in was full of mad men who had no care for their own or anyone elses life. Actually everyone had a heightened sense of danger and truly dangerous nutcases were confronted. Leading up to a race everyone got more and more withdrawn into their own world, when it was over it was party time and the racers friends and girlfriends all went out for a beer. It may look "hairy" from the outside but you don't take a corner at 100MPH+ rubbing shoulders with another guy unless you have complete trust in his and your ability.

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## pbehn (Dec 5, 2017)

The GZ in the North Sea was in range of land based forces, in the Atlantic it had the same problems of supply and repair that all German ships did. It is only partly true that the Royal Navy would have to field two carriers, it would also have to evade engagement with various battle groups which were too big to sink with the aircraft on board the GZ.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 5, 2017)

For a little more "what iffery" had the British not lost two carriers due to stupidity by early 1941 the GZ would have been facing six British fast carriers, three groups of two? With the 3 old slow ones pottering around edges of the Empire (or training new pilots).

And of course, when the GZ is in port arrangements can be more flexible.

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## pbehn (Dec 5, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> For a little more "what iffery" had the British not lost two carriers due to stupidity by early 1941 the GZ would have been facing six British fast carriers, three groups of two? With the 3 old slow ones pottering around edges of the Empire (or training new pilots).
> 
> And of course, when the GZ is in port arrangements can be more flexible.


As with their battleships once they were in port there was a strong chance they would never leave.

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## JAG88 (Dec 5, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> For a little more "what iffery" had the British not lost two carriers due to stupidity by early 1941 the GZ would have been facing six British fast carriers, three groups of two? With the 3 old slow ones pottering around edges of the Empire (or training new pilots).
> 
> And of course, when the GZ is in port arrangements can be more flexible.



But they did, didnt they? Which means at best 4 carriers by the end of 1940, 5 by mid 1941. Not counting maintenance and refits.

Given how hard it was to find a raider in the open GZ would have been a huge pain in the rear, at least the RN thought so, which is why they tried to bomb it even before completion.

_“It is the aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin, which is likely to provide our most disagreeable problem. If this ship, accompanied by Bismarck or one of the Scharnhorsts, were to break out, we should have to be prepared for very serious depredations on our trade. In good weather, the aircraft carrier could reconnoitre some 20,000 square miles in one day and could hardly fail to locate some of our large convoys. Her reconnaissance would serve equally to defend the attackers from our hunting groups. This power of evasion might enable raids to be pressed to the Western Approaches, our most vulnerable area. The conclusion is that the Bismarck herself is not likely to prove the menace that would at first seem likely. It is the aircraft carrier which is going to turn the scales in favour of any raider.”_

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## pbehn (Dec 5, 2017)

What happened to the Bismark?


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## Shortround6 (Dec 5, 2017)

It is docked at the secret Nazi base in Antarctica. It being sunk is a hoax.

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## JAG88 (Dec 5, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> It is docked at the secret Nazi base in Antarctica. It being sunk is a hoax.



Yeah, I hear is moored right next to Hood!


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## Shortround6 (Dec 5, 2017)

Once you got into 1941 the ability of German surface units to stay hidden for long periods of time (say a week or more) in the North Atlantic diminished rather rapidly. The increase in anti-sub patrols flown by shore based aircraft saw to that, as did the replacement of short ranged, low endurance patrol planes by more capable aircraft. Granted this took a while but search radar was being fitted to aircraft in 1941. 

Granted the 109s could shoot down snoopers but trading several Catalina's, Whitley's for the location of Germany's only carrier? 

And nothing says "German Carrier" quite like a Message that a recon plane is under attack by a 109 1000 miles from German territory.

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## pbehn (Dec 5, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> It is docked at the secret Nazi base in Antarctica. It being sunk is a hoax.


Actually it was a sort of serious question. If the Bismark and Prinz Eugen were in a group with GZ when breaking out who would leave whom and who would stay. The Bismark was damaged in the first engagement and leaking oil, after the second engagement the Prinz Eugen was let go and Bismark headed for France. It is easy to see a scenario where all three, being obliged to support each other went down together in a complete disaster.


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## Glider (Dec 5, 2017)

JAG88 said:


> That is easy to explain, I dont like to mutilate paragraphs in order to prevent suspicions, maybe I should have highlited the point, but since we were talking about modifications to the Spitfire I felt it wasnt needed:
> 
> _"Again, the lack of vision over the Merlin was the main complaint from the aircraft tested on Victorious. *The Seafire IIC testing, however, raised additional concerns. An inspection of the aircraft after a series of accelerator launches revealed bucking in the rear fuselage and tail unit. The tail plane had become deformed,* and the Merlin displayed a startling tendency to cut-out on launch.
> 
> ...


I don't disagree with your highlights but the use of an accelerator was a very unusual event on RN carriers in WW2 as the aircraft could take off quite easily without them, landing was the hard part.

One observation is the number of aircraft that could be carried. As you pointed out the hanger deck is about the same size of the Ark Royal and the Fi167 is about the size of a Swordfish. What I truly don't know is if the German aircraft had folding wings, the 109T and Ju87 didn't but I don't know about the Fi167.

This would have had a major impact on the number of aircraft carried.

Another interesting fact is that the GZ was designed to use the catapults whilst landing on as a standard operation. To help with this the catapults could be used twice before being recharged. A downside is your comment that the landing on would be done under full power as if you get it wrong, your straight into the aircraft at the bow of the ship trying to launch.

The GZ had a number of features which were quite interesting


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## JAG88 (Dec 5, 2017)

Glider said:


> I don't disagree with your highlights but the use of an accelerator was a very unusual event on RN carriers in WW2 as the aircraft could take off quite easily without them, landing was the hard part.
> 
> One observation is the number of aircraft that could be carried. As you pointed out the hanger deck is about the same size of the Ark Royal and the Fi167 is about the size of a Swordfish. What I truly don't know is if the German aircraft had folding wings, the 109T and Ju87 didn't but I don't know about the Fi167.
> 
> ...



Actually there are conflicting reports on th 109 folding wing, it was part of the original requirement but several publications claim it was later dropped but, there are original documents stating that the folded width was 2,12m (which seems incredible) and that the de-navalized T2s had the mechanism disabled and welded.












That is indeed something they would have had to figure out once carrier trials had began, they did intend to carry simultaneous launch and recovery operations, but that seems over-optimistic and a recipe for disaster. Everything sounds great on paper.

The reliance on catapults is a bit simple to explain, a carrier running away from someone doesnt get to choose wind direction, so the requirement was for catapults capable of launching independent of the wind.

The carrier had enough compressed air capacity to launch all its fighters and stukas, with the Fieselers doing rolling take offs, after that they needed 50mins to recharge the tanks.

The RN went with armored decks, the USN and IJN with large air groups and CAP, the KM intended to launch its aircraft fast using trolleys, engine, oil and fuel warmers... a tipically complicated German system.

The whole system would be recycled by the IJN in their I400 carrier submarines.

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## JAG88 (Dec 5, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> Once you got into 1941 the ability of German surface units to stay hidden for long periods of time (say a week or more) in the North Atlantic diminished rather rapidly. The increase in anti-sub patrols flown by shore based aircraft saw to that, as did the replacement of short ranged, low endurance patrol planes by more capable aircraft. Granted this took a while but search radar was being fitted to aircraft in 1941.
> 
> Granted the 109s could shoot down snoopers but trading several Catalina's, Whitley's for the location of Germany's only carrier?
> 
> And nothing says "German Carrier" quite like a Message that a recon plane is under attack by a 109 1000 miles from German territory.



True, but all the RN gets is a MPA got shot down by a GZ fighter around X, then they would need to steam all the way there which at least means several hours without certainty as to where exactly the carrier was then, much less hours later. Or send more aircraft, but only if any happen to be close.

Its a datum, and no different from a convoy yelling "we are being attacked by carrier aircraft" at that, so part of the business.

Airborne radar is of course as much greater concern, but I do feel that the crews that emit looking for the carrier would have gotten a date with Tony. ESM and all that.


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## pbehn (Dec 5, 2017)

JAG88 said:


> True, but all the RN gets is a MPA got shot down by a GZ fighter around X, then they would need to steam all the way there which at least means several hours without certainty as to where exactly the carrier was then, much less hours later. Or send more aircraft, but only if any happen to be close.
> 
> Its a datum, and no different from a convoy yelling "we are being attacked by carrier aircraft" at that, so part of the business.
> 
> Airborne radar is of course as much greater concern, but I do feel that the crews that emit looking for the carrier would have gotten a date with Tony. ESM and all that.


B24 Liberators hunting for submarines found it easy to attack a conning tower at night. Unless the GZ was equipped for night operations it would be located and tracked very quickly. Even in daylight you cannot send fighters out to attack recon planes unless you are sure there isn't a pair of carriers outside your radar range. Surface raiders were one way missions, the idea is sound but with few friendly ports and a sea almost completely controlled and boxed in by the enemy Those 50 aeroplanes need a comprehensive supply chain of fuel, munitions and spares. There would be no need to actually attack the GZ, just make sure it couldn't be supplied at sea. The Hellcat F6F was one of the most successful carrier fighters with a great kill rate, but there were over 12,000 were produced, the loss and wear out rate on carrier operations is a different magnitude to those on land.

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## pinehilljoe (Dec 5, 2017)

JAG88 said:


> Actually there are conflicting reports on th 109 folding wing, it was part of the original requirement but several publications claim it was later dropped but, there are original documents stating that the folded width was 2,12m (which seems incredible) and that the de-navalized T2s had the mechanism disabled and welded.
> 
> View attachment 474902
> 
> ...



The Stuka looks like LeRoy Grumman might have a patent infringement case.


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## JAG88 (Dec 5, 2017)

pinehilljoe said:


> The Stuka looks like LeRoy Grumman might have a patent infringement case.



I think it looks like a very happy asian muppet...


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## XBe02Drvr (Dec 5, 2017)

BiffF15 said:


> Having spent a large portion of my adult life (my wife might argue the adult point) in a fighter squadron I've wondered a time or two why the "incessant ball-busting" occurs.


"I'll take any man from any land in any game that he can name for any amount that he can count".
If that's the oath of office for an exclusive club where only the best are admitted, where every move you make, on duty and off, from the day you report to Indoc to the day you're "piped over the side" is recorded, scrutinized, criticized and graded, and every other member is your competitor for the right to remain a member, you best be always on your toes and constantly testing everyone's mettle. Besides the amusement value, the awareness of your squadron mates' strengths, weaknesses, and personality habits may one day preserve your posterior.
Steeped in the aura of a fighter training environment, having observed the training, heard the lectures, ridden through a little "turn and burn", I'm convinced aggression is the single most critical attribute of a fighter pilot.
So there's your outsider's perspective.
Cheers,
Wes

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## XBe02Drvr (Dec 5, 2017)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Boys, boys, boys.....This is beginning to sound like a grade school pissing contest. Let's everybody stop, count to ten, take a deep breath, and relax. When the flow of interesting information degenerates into insults and name calling, it's no fun for anyone, even us spectators.
> Cheers,
> Wes

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## XBe02Drvr (Dec 5, 2017)

Damn! Must have a virus or something in this phone. It copied and pasted my earlier post here! Duhh!
Wes


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## Shortround6 (Dec 5, 2017)

I will note, as an outsider, that a friend of mine went to see Top Gun when it came out with his father who had flown in VMF-124 at the end of the war. His father commented that he thought the locker room scenes were realistic  

Doesn't mean that we should resort to that behavior in a written forum/debate with people of multiple nationalities, languages and cultures.

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## XBe02Drvr (Dec 5, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> Doesn't mean that we should resort to that behavior in a written forum/debate with people of multiple nationalities, languages and cultures.



AMEN!


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## BiffF15 (Dec 6, 2017)

XBe02Drvr said:


> "I'll take any man from any land in any game that he can name for any amount that he can count".
> *If that's the oath of office for an exclusive club where only the best are admitted, where every move you make, on duty and off, from the day you report to Indoc to the day you're "piped over the side" is recorded, scrutinized, criticized and graded, and every other member is your competitor for the right to remain a member, you best be always on your toes and constantly testing everyone's mettle.* Besides the amusement value, the awareness of your squadron mates' strengths, weaknesses, and personality habits may one day preserve your posterior.
> Steeped in the aura of a fighter training environment, having observed the training, heard the lectures, ridden through a little "turn and burn", I'm convinced aggression is the single most critical attribute of a fighter pilot.
> So there's your outsider's perspective.
> ...




Wes,

I haver never flown with a character or in a squadron with that complete attitude. Each weapon system has it's own "group" traits / personality. In my experience USN fighter squadrons have more of what you mention above, in particularly the Tomcat folks. There is internal competition in fighter squadrons, in particular Eagles, however they entire program is designed to get everyone up to as high a level as they can attain (in an Eagle Squad). If someone goes out and beats my arse, in the debrief he will show me what I did wrong, or what he did better in order for "us" to raise the bar. From the times I fought Tomcats I saw that they didn't have the same mentality, as guys would keep "secrets" on how to do things better. It was as if each guy was on his own to get better with out the group instruction mentality. Also the guy who landed on the boat the best was made an IP, not the guy who could kick everyone else's arse. 

In the USAF off time is just that. No one comments or watches unless Johnny Law gets involved or it appears someone might have a drinking problem (only seen that one once). I'm not sure how the USN approaches that, but from what I've seen the USMC squadrons are very much watching what you do (they have their shiza in one sock) but only from the perspective of being respectful, honorable, and not causing a bad light to shine in their direction (old school but in a good way). They also fight / train / like Eagle guys (at least in my day) and were always putting strong effort into their flying.

As for the previously mentioned drink blowing out my nose, that was from laughing as it was a true bullseye remark! The unfortunate side of email, texting, forum communication is perspective can be missed due to lack of face to face comm. I laughed long and hard at your comment due to it's accuracy, and in no way thought our communication was getting personal or into the spear chucking arena.

Cheers,
Biff


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## XBe02Drvr (Dec 6, 2017)

BiffF15 said:


> I haver never flown with a character or in a squadron with that complete attitude. Each weapon system has it's own "group" traits / personality. In my experience USN fighter squadrons have more of what you mention above,


I think it has a lot to do with lifestyle and group dynamics. USAF and to a lesser extent USMC fighter pilots have the luxury of a private life. They are more dispersed with fewer squadrons per base and less concentration of their living and social arrangements. Even within their service they have more contact and interaction with people outside their aircraft community.
Not so in the Navy. Squadrons are grouped by aircraft type in " Master Jet Bases", where all F/A-18 outfits, for example, are at one east coast base and one west coast. Same goes for other aircraft types, except ASW VP outfits, but they don't hit the boat so they don't count.
This makes for a concentrated and cohesive aircraft community which is useful for standardization and training, but not very diverse in cultural influences (ie: the "football locker room" atmosphere). Bear in mind they're only home for two or three months at a time working up for the next deployment, and probably living in base housing unless they're senior officers. Then they spend seven to nine months cooped up in steel cubicles with their squadron mates with few recreational or social options besides the ready room and the gym, and flying circadian-disruptive schedules where every landing has the intensity and potential consequences of combat. Operational accidents claim one or two crews every deployment. Do you wonder that the atmosphere is a cross between a shark tank and an NFL locker room (minus the female reporters!)? The infamous Tailhook Scandal came as no surprise to me. I'd be interested to see the long term effect that female pilots in deploying squadrons are having on the culture.
Cheers,
Wes

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## XBe02Drvr (Dec 6, 2017)

BiffF15 said:


> Also the guy who landed on the boat the best was made an IP, not the guy who could kick everyone else's arse.


The Navy has always lost more aviators to the boat than they ever did to the bad guys.
You landlubber types have the life of Riley, free to concentrate on the mission, fewer collateral duty distractions, mostly a normal working day, mostly home at night, social life, female companionship, etc. Even the option of living in the civilian world after hours (not economically feasible for most Navy JOs near a Master Jet Base).
Cheers,
Wes


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## pbehn (Dec 6, 2017)

BiffF15 said:


> Also the guy who landed on the boat the best was made an IP, not the guy who could kick everyone else's arse.





XBe02Drvr said:


> The Navy has always lost more aviators to the boat than they ever did to the bad guys.
> Cheers,
> Wes



On the race track I and everyone else found someone riding with a "red mist" very easy to beat, being angry and aggressive does not change the laws of physics. It made no difference to me how big any guy I raced against was, if we go bouncing up the track he would get hurt just as much as anyone else, it is a different type of aggression and positivity. 

In any case any social activity with fellow competitors does not involve being killed. I well remember a guy in the paddock giving it "large" with his pseudo hells angel mates, he was a completely different character stood on the start grid, looking around as if he dearly wanted to be somewhere else, preferably with his mum.

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## XBe02Drvr (Dec 6, 2017)

pbehn said:


> I well remember a guy in the paddock giving it "large" with his pseudo hells angel mates, he was a completely different character stood on the start grid, looking around as if he dearly wanted to be somewhere else, preferably with his mum.


Some got the "right stuff", some don't.
Cheers,
Wes


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## pbehn (Dec 6, 2017)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Some got the "right stuff", some don't.
> Cheers,
> Wes


That is true, but everyone is nervous before their first race, I imagine every pilot is nervous before they first go solo. Almost every soldiers accounts of battle has said those who say they were not scared are lying. The question is how you deal with that fear, the guy I was talking about looked beaten before the flag dropped for the start, he was very distinctive green Kawasaki, green leathers and a red beard, I never saw him again. All the aces I have heard speak on TV sound and have the demeanour of retired F1 and motorcycle GP champions, thoughtful, intelligent, affable but with a certain glint in their eyes.
Jackie Stewart and Winkle Brown are as alike two peas in a pod.


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## XBe02Drvr (Dec 6, 2017)

pbehn said:


> All the aces I have heard speak on TV sound and have the demeanour of retired F1 and motorcycle GP champions, thoughtful, intelligent, affable but with a certain glint in their eyes.
> Jackie Stewart and Winkle Brown are as alike two peas in a pod


As Chuck Yeager and Dan Gurney, Bob Hoover and Mario Andretti. Smart, experienced, analytical, confident, and endowed with "grace under pressure".
Cheers,
Wes


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## pbehn (Dec 6, 2017)

XBe02Drvr said:


> As Chuck Yeager and Dan Gurney, Bob Hoover and Mario Andretti. Smart, experienced, analytical, confident, and endowed with "grace under pressure".
> Cheers,
> Wes


They do all have very similar personalities and demeanour.


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## pbehn (Dec 6, 2017)

I found this in respect of carrier operations against the Bismark, despite the anti aircraft armament of the Bismark that was in no way the biggest danger facing Swordfish crews.
www.kbismarck.com/article2.html

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## wuzak (Dec 7, 2017)

The Graf Zeppelin was not due to be completed until after the Bismarck was sunk.

I wonder if the German attitude with the Graf Zeppelin would have been the same as the Tirpitz was after the loss of the Bismarck. That is, basically hidden out of harm's way.


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## wuzak (Dec 7, 2017)

As to topic at hand:

*Build a better Sea Hurricane*

Start with the Spitfire
Make Fairey produce the navalised version rather than pursue their own designs, the design would be worked up with Supermarine

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## pbehn (Dec 7, 2017)

wuzak said:


> The Graf Zeppelin was not due to be completed until after the Bismarck was sunk.
> 
> I wonder if the German attitude with the Graf Zeppelin would have been the same as the Tirpitz was after the loss of the Bismarck. That is, basically hidden out of harm's way.


Well the Tirpitz probably had more effect on the war at sea than the Bismark did, so long as it was in a Fjord and a possible danger then the RN and the RAF had to do something. I mentioned the Bismark as it was used in a scenario in a battle group with the GZ


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## JAG88 (Dec 8, 2017)

wuzak said:


> The Graf Zeppelin was not due to be completed until after the Bismarck was sunk.
> 
> I wonder if the German attitude with the Graf Zeppelin would have been the same as the Tirpitz was after the loss of the Bismarck. That is, basically hidden out of harm's way.



SInce the LW took control of the aircraft, the GZ was usually the first victim in any material shortage which is why the carrier was never completed, the KM put it at the bottom of the priority list until its construction was finally stopped in May 1940. Without aircraft and time to work up, the KM should have taken up the IJN proposal and sold it to them.


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## pbehn (Dec 8, 2017)

If the Tirpitz was out of harms way she wouldn't have been a problem, the fact is she was very much in the way of Atlantic shipping but in a place very hard to hit. Until it was sunk it tied down a huge amount of the British wartime effort, I don't know if the GZ would have done the same.


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## Kevin J (Dec 29, 2018)

Shortround6 said:


> It is docked at the secret Nazi base in Antarctica. It being sunk is a hoax.



Doesn't surprise me. I've learnt over the years not to believe anything the BBC tells me.


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## Kevin J (Dec 29, 2018)

wuzak said:


> As to topic at hand:
> 
> *Build a better Sea Hurricane*
> 
> ...



Have a cosy chat with Grumman and get them to take over CCF (Canadian Car & Foundry). Instead of CCF building Hurricanes and Helldivers, get them to build Wildcats, Hellcats and Bearcats. Forget about the Sea Hurricanes and Seafires. Build decent planes instead.


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## RCAFson (Dec 31, 2018)

Kevin J said:


> Have a cosy chat with Grumman and get them to take over CCF (Canadian Car & Foundry). Instead of CCF building Hurricanes and Helldivers, get them to build Wildcats, Hellcats and Bearcats. Forget about the Sea Hurricanes and Seafires. Build decent planes instead.



The Martlet/Wildcat was considerably poorer in performance than a Hawker Sea Hurricane and not really much better than a Fulmar II under 10k ft. The FAA was having to counter FW190s with Seafires before the Hellcat even came into service, much less the F8F.

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## fliger747 (Dec 31, 2018)

Maybe the conversion of British RAF types to a carrier role was to quote Winkle Brown "When needs must the devil drives". In another thread the discussion was as to the origin of the F8F "_Beer Cat_". Certainly the Grumman team was inspired to a new direction in checking out the FW190, but it was immediately apparent that other than trying to keep the general size and power, and especially the weight, a very different design would be necessary to optimize for a naval aircraft. Grumman produced a very fine aircraft, too late for the war. Having neglected Naval aircraft for the FAA England did not have the luxury of other than a "make do".


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## Glider (Dec 31, 2018)

RCAFson said:


> The Martlet/Wildcat was considerably poorer in performance than a Hawker Sea Hurricane and not really much better than a Fulmar II under 10k ft. The FAA was having to counter FW190s with Seafires before the Hellcat even came into service, much less the F8F.


As a carrier aircraft the Wildcat did have one massive advantage over the Sea Hurricane, it's folding wings giving it a very small footprint. You could probably carry almost twice as many Wildcats compared to Sea Hurricanes. At sea with spares many maile away that was critical


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## RCAFson (Dec 31, 2018)

fliger747 said:


> Maybe the conversion of British RAF types to a carrier role was to quote Winkle Brown "When needs must the devil drives". In another thread the discussion was as to the origin of the F8F "_Beer Cat_". Certainly the Grumman team was inspired to a new direction in checking out the FW190, but it was immediately apparent that other than trying to keep the general size and power, and especially the weight, a very different design would be necessary to optimize for a naval aircraft. Grumman produced a very fine aircraft, too late for the war. Having neglected Naval aircraft for the FAA England did not have the luxury of other than a "make do".



The HSH seems to have done quite well in carrier service, with very low accident rates (unlike the Seafire) even when operating from CVEs. I'd guess that an optimized HSH with folding wings and extra fuel (use the 12gun wing and replace the outer 4 guns with another 30 or 40 gallons of fuel) would have been potent naval fighter in the 1941-43 timeframe.


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## XBe02Drvr (Dec 31, 2018)

fliger747 said:


> Having neglected Naval aircraft for the FAA England did not have the luxury of other than a "make do".


This is what happens when you put ground pounders in charge of anything to do with the sea. How could the the world's premier naval power have allowed that to happen??
Cheers,
Wes

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## RCAFson (Dec 31, 2018)

> fliger747 said:
> Having neglected Naval aircraft for the FAA England did not have the luxury of other than a "make do".
> 
> This is what happens when you put ground pounders in charge of anything to do with the sea. How could the the world's premier naval power have allowed that to happen??
> ...





XBe02Drvr said:


> This is what happens when you put ground pounders in charge of anything to do with the sea. How could the the world's premier naval power have allowed that to happen??
> Cheers,
> Wes



The UK/FAA didn't neglect naval aircraft. The difference between the UK and USA/IJapan is that the UK went to war in Sept 1939 and then the Luftwaffe parked itself 20 miles from the UK in June 1940 and this played havoc with naval aircraft development and procurement. If you compare what the FAA had in service in 1939 and 1940 with the USA and IJ you'll see that there's not much difference. However the dislocation caused by WW2 and the BofB really threw a wrench into the works and the aircraft planned for 1941 and 1942 (and the USA and IJ introduced a whole series of new aircraft in 1941/42) were considerably delayed.

This is a quote from Norman Friedman who has written extensively about the development of USN and RN carriers:



> As in the USA, the advent of engines in the 2,000hp class solved many problems, However, it was much more difficult for the British aircraft industry to switch to new types in wartime, As a result, aircraft which should have entered service about 1941, like this Fairey Firefly 1, did not appear in numbers until the end of the war.
> Aircraft of the Second World War
> The Development of the Warplane 1939-45



and the Firefly 1 would have been a very welcome fighter in 1941 with the performance and firepower to really make a impact.

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## Kevin J (Jan 1, 2019)

My view is that the Admiralty got it right. The Fulmar, an all weather fighter, later the Firefly. The Sea Hurricane, an interim, reasonably fast day fighter, adapted from a standard production aircraft by the addition of what are a number of simple field mods. The Merlin powered Seafire, a high performance low altitude fighter interceptor. During the war, you fill the gaps in your inventory with the Wildcat, Hellcat and Corsair, although its a shame we couldn't have licence built them in Canada. Post war of course you have the Griffon Seafire, the Hawker Sea Fury and the clipped wing Firefly with the two stage Griffon competitive in performance to the Bearcat, Corsair and Hellcat, its just a shame that they arrived a bit late.

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## Glider (Jan 1, 2019)

I must admit that to my mind the Fulmar was a missed opportunity. As has been pointed out earlier in the thread the RN had operated single seat aircraft for many years without any problems.
Had the RN gone for a single seat fighter, with the same advantages as the Fulmar, range and ammunition being the primary advantages, then we would have had a very useful fighter/recce aircraft. She would have been lighter resulting in an increased acceleration, climb and agility. I'm not trying to pretend that she would have been the equal to a Zero but would have filled the gaps more effectively.


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## Kevin J (Jan 1, 2019)

Glider said:


> I must admit that to my mind the Fulmar was a missed opportunity. As has been pointed out earlier in the thread the RN had operated single seat aircraft for many years without any problems.
> Had the RN gone for a single seat fighter, with the same advantages as the Fulmar, range and ammunition being the primary advantages, then we would have had a very useful fighter/recce aircraft. She would have been lighter resulting in an increased acceleration, climb and agility. I'm not trying to pretend that she would have been the equal to a Zero but would have filled the gaps more effectively.



The other option for a single seat fighter would be the Hawker Hotspur which had the outer wing panels of the Hurricane. The radiator is under the engine so there should not be the problems the Hurricane had when ditching. Replace the turret with an extra fuel tank, put the guns back in the wings and add catapult spools and arrestor hook. Availability, pre war just as the Fulmar but a one seater not a two seater. Top speed 317 mph in original form with a turret mock up, so not that much slower than a Hurricane with twice (?) the range.


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## Glider (Jan 1, 2019)

I hadn't thought about that but it sounds like a good option, a bit like a naval single seat Defiant.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 1, 2019)

Kevin J said:


> My view is that the Admiralty got it right. The Fulmar, an *all weather fighter*, later the Firefly. The Sea Hurricane, an interim, reasonably fast day fighter, adapted from a standard production aircraft by the addition of what are a number of simple field mods. .



The Fulmar was an all weather fighter (?) in that it could find the carrier to land back aboard in crappier weather than the same year single seaters. Not sure the system did a whole lot of good at night. It also did nothing for finding the enemy aircraft, that was left to the good old eyeball, MK I.


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## fliger747 (Jan 1, 2019)

I still find it hilarious that Bismarck didn't manage to shoot down any "Stringbags". Maybe like a Battleship Cage Mast, lots of room for stuff to just sail by.


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## parsifal (Jan 1, 2019)

The RN didn't just need a fighter. They lacked the pilots mostly to enjoy that kind of specialisation. From about 1933, nearly all RN procurements were for multi role aircraft. Swordfish for example, was primarily a torpedo aircraft, but it also was the designated spotter and recon aircraft. This multi role capability meant that it could be used in other roles with minimal conversion...….divebombing, ASW patrol ASR.. The Skua was multi role, with divebombing its primary role, but it could and did operate as a fighter. 


At the end the RAF (which controlled FAA procurement and training until the eve of the war), either made sure the FAA went to war undermanned and poorly equipped. They either did thjis deliberately 9concentrating on expansion of the RAF) or simply felt that fleet related requirements were not a priority. At the end, having screwed down the Fleet air arm to the point of extinction, the RAF was more or less relieved to return the FAA to admiralty control to the Admiralty.


In these circumstances, where resources were in such short supply and there was no time left (all this occurred after April 1939), it was absolutely the right thing to opt for the multi role Fulmar over a dedicated fighter. The material shortages wouldn't allow any other solution to be applied. If the RN had tried to develop a new single seat fighter, (the f4F was not yet ready at that time) it would have had to wait even longer for a fighter than it did 9Fulmars didn't begin squadron entry until June 1940), and worse, would not have had any all weather capability and reduced recon capability which the RN placed great significance on. S/E fighters cant really do this job .


The Fulmar arose from necessity


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## parsifal (Jan 1, 2019)

Shortround6 said:


> The Fulmar was an all weather fighter (?) in that it could find the carrier to land back aboard in crappier weather than the same year single seaters. Not sure the system did a whole lot of good at night. It also did nothing for finding the enemy aircraft, that was left to the good old eyeball, MK I.




Fulmars were able to operate at night/conditions of low visibility. They participated in the ill fated operation EF (operations against Kirkenes) July 1941, which saw the loss of two Fulmars when jumped by BF109s. The raid had gone in conditions of half light, with the Fulmars also tasked with flak suppression as well as target making with flares. Two german aircraft were also shot down, but the disaster was the inability of the Fulmars to adequately protect the attacking Albacores. 13 RN aircraft were lost to sink just two ships and bring down 3 LW aircraft (1 Ju87 and 2 me 109s) .


These represented capabilities not yet available to either the USN or the IJN at the time.

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## XBe02Drvr (Jan 1, 2019)

parsifal said:


> At the end the RAF (which controlled FAA procurement and training until the eve of the war), made sure the FAA went to war undermanned and poorly equipped.


Once again, refer to post 162 in this thread. Downright criminal in my book.
At least our naval airedales were truly naval, not exiles from the air force.
Cheers,
Wes


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## jetcal1 (Jan 2, 2019)

I would like to go "slightly (actually way off.) the reservation" with a C&P of my Amazon review of the Mushroom Publications book on the Fairey Barracuda.
I think it covers a lot of points that are generally overlooked about British Industry while pointing fingers where they belong. Just substitute Sea Hurricane for Barracuda and you pretty much have it. From the late 30's when the shadow factories were being built and the new aircraft specifications being drawn up for the impending war, the Fleet Arm just wasn't a priority. Remember by 1938 the British and French were initiating the rebuilding of the American plants by paying for whole new factories to be built for assembly of their new planes. No one had any extra design or manufacturing capacity in 1938. (Also,some thoughts that might better tie things together are in parenthesis.)

The Barracuda represented a microcosm of typically insipid Royal Navy requirements and the resulting mediocre aircraft needs to be examined from a complete perspective of the factors that influenced its development and use.
Here are some examples to contrast the British and American production scale of WWII along with some factors somewhat unique to the British;
1. Excess production capacity, the Brewster Buccaneer failed,the SB2C was almost a failure. The USN had the TBF/TBM and was building a factory for the Vought TBY. That's four programs where metal was cut and three programs that reached production! What excess capacity did the British have? (_Who was going to assemble the new and improved Sea Hurricane?_)
2. The Wichita B-29 program had more engineers working at that one, single plant than England had engineers working in the entire industry. (_Who was going to redesign the Sea Hurricane? Everything was going to new aircraft designs or engineering the assembly sequences for the new plants_)
3. _The aircraft of the RN were controlled by the RAF almost until the last moments before WWII, austere budgets, a customer that was reluctant to develop new technology aircraft, obsolete specifications, etc. all conspired to leave the RN bereft of any truly competitive and state of the art aircraft literally until the introduction of the Hawker Sea Fury. _Consider the 82% increase in HP over the life of the Barracuda airframe compared to only a 38% increase in empty weight, All of that HP resulted in only a 14% increase in useful load.
(The Barracuda also was competing for better engines, all of which went to higher priority programs. - Good examples in the US would include cancellation of the Boeing PBB-1 and the Beech XA-38 Grizzly to ensure availability of the R3350 for those B-29's being built in Wichita.)
_The exigencies of war combined with a lack of engines and manpower conspired with insipid customer design requirements consigned this aircraft to mediocrity._ (_Again back to the rearmament and shadow factories, where were the engineering and assembly resources for the Sea Hurricane in 1938?_) The fact the RN got the mileage out it that they did is a real tribute to the men that flew, maintained and supported it.
In fact, I will go further and say that in my opinion the Barracuda, Sea Fury, possibly the Wyvern and the Blackburn Buccaneer were the only effective aircraft developed by the Royal Navy after 1935. The RN can't even take credit for the Harrier as that was originally operated by the RAF.
End review

There were some interesting comments here about the Fulmar. IMO the combination of, when it fighting, where it was fighting, and who it was fighting contributed more to its success then anything else. For a brief period of a few months the Fulmar rose ascendant over its competition, but by late 1941 its days were numbered. Not a great plane, but the right plane in the right quantities at the right time when it was sorely needed. (That's a greatness unto itself.)

Okay, I'm back on the Sea Hurricane reservation. (Let the fireworks begin!)

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## parsifal (Jan 2, 2019)

The problem with that last post is that it overlooks some very important home truths. The RN didn't need the aircraft types being designed and produced in the US until the carrier famine was overcome. the next problem is that most US types could not be operated from RN carriers for most of the war. Until the problems of the deck park had been solved (circa 1944) the numbers of Hellcats, Corsairs and the like were strictly limited. Even then, the abilities of US types to operate in the rough weather conditions and at night, which was a necessity in RN doctrine, proved very limited. 

moreovewr, at the time the RN needed high performance aircraft.....1939-1940, the US aircraft industry was backward and did not offer any real solution to the problems confronting the RN at that time. The F4F was not ready, neither was the SBD. Aircraft like the Cleveland could not be operated from the small British Carriers

By 1943, things were turning around, but as the recent experiences with aircraft like the F-35, the apparent invincibility of the US aerospace industry is transient and unrelaiable. On the basis of the logic you are suggesting, coutries like Australia would have been far better served to go tell the US president and all his rudeness to stick it, and his JSF where the sun doesn't shine and bought aircraft like the the new SU57. We would have saved ourselves a wad full of cash, had our aircraft at a fraction of the cost, and not have to deal with an "ally" of dubious reliability


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## XBe02Drvr (Jan 2, 2019)

parsifal said:


> Australia would have been far better served to go tell the US president and all his rudeness to stick it, and his JSF where the sun doesn't shine and bought aircraft like the the new SU57. We would have saved ourselves a wad full of cash, had our aircraft at a fraction of the cost, *and not have to deal with an "ally" of dubious reliability.*


HEAR, HEAR! Making America "GRATE" again!? This is the second Pachydermous POTUS this century we've had to apologize to the world for! Nuff said.


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## tomo pauk (Jan 2, 2019)

jetcal1 said:


> ...
> 1. Excess production capacity, the Brewster Buccaneer failed,the SB2C was almost a failure. The USN had the TBF/TBM and was building a factory for the Vought TBY. That's four programs where metal was cut and three programs that reached production! What excess capacity did the British have? (_Who was going to assemble the new and improved Sea Hurricane?_)



Boulton Paul, for example, since in any alternative FAA the Roc does not get built; BP was producing the Roc historically. 



> 2. The Wichita B-29 program had more engineers working at that one, single plant than England had engineers working in the entire industry. (_Who was going to redesign the Sea Hurricane? Everything was going to new aircraft designs or engineering the assembly sequences for the new plants_)



What would be so earth-shaking with redesigning the Hurricane into Sea Hurricane? Was it a harder thing to do than installing the turret into Skua to make the Roc?
Hawker can do it, BP can do it, Blackburn can, too. Gloster does not make the two fighter prototypes from ground up, so they can do it too (belonging to the same concern as Hawker did, and were producing Hurricanes historically). Vickers: no fooling around with 1-engine fighters = spare designer's resource.



> 3. _The aircraft of the RN were controlled by the RAF almost until the last moments before WWII, austere budgets, a customer that was reluctant to develop new technology aircraft, obsolete specifications, etc. all conspired to leave the RN bereft of any truly competitive and state of the art aircraft literally until the introduction of the Hawker Sea Fury. _Consider the 82% increase in HP over the life of the Barracuda airframe compared to only a 38% increase in empty weight, All of that HP resulted in only a 14% increase in useful load.
> (The Barracuda also was competing for better engines, all of which went to higher priority programs. - Good examples in the US would include cancellation of the Boeing PBB-1 and the Beech XA-38 Grizzly to ensure availability of the R3350 for those B-29's being built in Wichita.)



Useful load for carrier-based A/C is very much a factor of wing lift capacity, allowed airframe weight-lifting capacity, and the funky requirement that A/C must actually take off from a carrier with a meaningful fuel & armament. One will not see the Barracuda taking off with 2-3 torpedoes from a carrier even if we somehow graft the Centaurus on the nose, a whole new A/C is needed.

_



The exigencies of war combined with a lack of engines and manpower conspired with insipid customer design requirements consigned this aircraft to mediocrity.

Click to expand...

_


> (_Again back to the rearmament and shadow factories, where were the engineering and assembly resources for the Sea Hurricane in 1938?_) The fact the RN got the mileage out it that they did is a real tribute to the men that flew, maintained and supported it.
> In fact, I will go further and say that in my opinion the Barracuda, Sea Fury, possibly the Wyvern and the Blackburn Buccaneer were the only effective aircraft developed by the Royal Navy after 1935. The RN can't even take credit for the Harrier as that was originally operated by the RAF.
> End review



Royal Navy didn't do development of aircraft, I'm not sure where from you get that. Sea Fury was developed by Hawker, for example. Too bad you don't consider the Swordfish, Sea Hornet and Seafire to be effective aircraft.

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## Kevin J (Jan 2, 2019)

tomo pauk said:


> Boulton Paul, for example, since in any alternative FAA the Roc does not get built; BP was producing the Roc historically.
> 
> 
> 
> ...



If you have a look at how the Hurricane's wings are connected to the centre section then to me it looks like a pretty simple mod to make the wings to fold rearwards as per the Fulmar. 
Google Image Result for https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b4/Hawker_Hurricane_P2617_-_wing_off%2C_side_view.jpg/1280px-Hawker_Hurricane_P2617_-_wing_off%2C_side_view.jpg


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## jetcal1 (Jan 2, 2019)

tomo pauk said:


> Boulton Paul, for example, since in any alternative FAA the Roc does not get built; BP was producing the Roc historically.
> 
> What would be so earth-shaking with redesigning the Hurricane into Sea Hurricane? Was it a harder thing to do than installing the turret into Skua to make the Roc?
> Hawker can do it, BP can do it, Blackburn can, too. Gloster does not make the two fighter prototypes from ground up, so they can do it too (belonging to the same concern as Hawker did, and were producing Hurricanes historically). Vickers: no fooling around with 1-engine fighters = spare designer's resource.
> ...



_The Royal Navy drove the development of aircraft by laying the specifications as the customer. Just as the US, Germany, Japan, etc. drove development by writing specifications for what they desired. I stand by the customer driving development.
My bad on the Swordfish (Outside of the Pacific Ocean.) But in flew in 1934 and i specifically omitted as it predated my 1935 cut-off date. The Sea Hornet? Don't know enough about it. Seafire? No, horrendous non-combat attrition._


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## jetcal1 (Jan 2, 2019)

parsifal said:


> The problem with that last post is that it overlooks some very important home truths. The RN didn't need the aircraft types being designed and produced in the US until the carrier famine was overcome. the next problem is that most US types could not be operated from RN carriers for most of the war. Until the problems of the deck park had been solved (circa 1944) the numbers of Hellcats, Corsairs and the like were strictly limited. Even then, the abilities of US types to operate in the rough weather conditions and at night, which was a necessity in RN doctrine, proved very limited.
> 
> moreovewr, at the time the RN needed high performance aircraft.....1939-1940, the US aircraft industry was backward and did not offer any real solution to the problems confronting the RN at that time. The F4F was not ready, neither was the SBD. Aircraft like the Cleveland could not be operated from the small British Carriers
> 
> By 1943, things were turning around, but as the recent experiences with aircraft like the F-35, the apparent invincibility of the US aerospace industry is transient and unreliable. On the basis of the logic you are suggesting, countries like Australia would have been far better served to go tell the US president and all his rudeness to stick it, and his JSF where the sun doesn't shine and bought aircraft like the the new SU57. We would have saved ourselves a wad full of cash, had our aircraft at a fraction of the cost, and not have to deal with an "ally" of dubious reliability



_Actually, what I'm saying is that the UK simply did not have the excess engineering and manufacturing capabilities to develop every engineering proposal that came along. The UK was far more resource constrained than the US. Programs such as the Albermarle, Botha, Lerwick were under development and a higher priority. My entire post was related to internal politics, production and engineering resources. I wasn't saying US aircraft were better. I was saying the US had the engineering and production capacity to absorb a mistake. The British did not._

_As far the F-35? For the limited numbers being procured for the RN? Does the UK have the ability to develop the aircraft today? Is it engineering or resource constrained? Or is financially constrained? 
As far current politics are concerned? I don't come here for that and find don't particularly find it relevant to the "Sea Hurricane". _


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## jetcal1 (Jan 2, 2019)

Relating back to my original post, did the UK have the engineering, material, and human resources to allocate to the "Sea Hurricane" from 1938-1940?
The simple answer is there was not enough excess capacity to do the project. Let's look at folding the wings, we need to
1. Develop concept and specifications 
2. Spec the materials
3. Manufacture prototype
4. Test prototype
5. Determine the ability to manufacture (New Production Line? Hire New personnel? Use existing personnel from a current production line?)
5a. Assess and determine the impact on production assembly time and impact on current contract obligations
(Does the customer want this enough to impact on their deliveries? Which is more important? Deliveries or folding wings?)
6. Determine lead times for specialized materials and manufacturing operations and schedule production
Remember all this being done while the RAF is rearming, new plants are being built, and there is a shortage of machine tools. And how many new aircraft are being developed and competing for the same resources? Note that items 3-6 can all be concurrently assuming there are no "glitches".


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## tomo pauk (Jan 2, 2019)

jetcal1 said:


> _The Royal Navy drove the development of aircraft by laying the specifications as the customer. Just as the US, Germany, Japan, etc. drove development by writing specifications for what they desired. I stand by the customer driving development.
> My bad on the Swordfish (Outside of the Pacific Ocean.) But in flew in 1934 and i specifically omitted as it predated my 1935 cut-off date. The Sea Hornet? Don't know enough about it. Seafire? No, horrendous non-combat attrition._



'Driving the development' and 'developing' are not same things. Don't know enough about Sea Hornet? 
BTW, what was wrong with Skua as a dive bomber - that it was not a biplane like the 1st Helldiver, or that it didn't have fixed U/C lake the later Aichi 'Val'?
Any numbers to back up the claim that Seafire's non-combat attrition was horrendous?



jetcal1 said:


> Relating back to my original post, did the UK have the engineering, material, and human resources to allocate to the "Sea Hurricane" from 1938-1940?
> *The simple answer *is there was not enough excess capacity to do the project. Let's look at folding the wings, we need to
> ...



Where was proven, without the shadow of the doubt, that 'the simple answer' is negative?


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## parsifal (Jan 2, 2019)

_Relating back to my original post, did the UK have the engineering, material, and human resources to allocate to the "Sea Hurricane" from 1938-1940?._

Yes. Discussions about the use of either the hurricane or the spitfire as a carrier borne fighter had been in progress since at least 1938. The stickin goint was the RAF. They did not want any interruption or deviation of production away from land based air. But as war broke out factories normally used for production of naval aircraft were used to supplement traditional sources of production anyway. 

_Actually, what I'm saying is that the UK simply did not have the excess engineering and manufacturing capabilities to develop every engineering proposal that came along._

Neither did the US in 1938

_ The UK was far more resource constrained than the US. Programs such as the Albermarle, Botha, Lerwick were under development and a higher priority._

Not in 1938-40. UK production in 1940 amounted to over 16000 aircraft whilst US production languished at just over 2000. Nearly all of those 2000 were failures because of the backwardness of the supporting industry and R&D in the US at that time. Not until substantial amounts of (mostly) British cash to set up US production and massivce amounts of technical support provided was the US able to shift to a war footing. Case in point has to be the P-51....powered by a british designed engine and development assisted by British knopw how. 

_My entire post was related to internal politics, production and engineering resources. _

Your entire post was defined by glib one liners, misinformation and downright baloney, self serving and designed for a particular outcome. 

_I wasn't saying US aircraft were better. _

You implied it, and from there made a whole bunch of spurious statements

_I was saying the US had the engineering and production capacity to absorb a mistake. _

They didn't have much capacity in 1938-40, but they also were not in a war situation. it didn't matter that in that period most of the aircraft they built were utter dogs , 


_The British did not._

Yes they did, which they used to haul the US aircraft industry into the modern age. 


_My bad on the Swordfish (Outside of the Pacific Ocean.) But in flew in 1934 and i specifically omitted as it predated my 1935 cut-off date._ 
So, all the numerous and major development of the Swordfish up to 1943 doesn't count. Too bad about that, since it remained the best carrier borne strike aircraft in poor weather conditions throughout the war and was responsible for more sinking more than 50 submarines (including some 30 Uboats). 

_Seafire? No, horrendous non-combat attrition._

Seafire IIIs with proper training, aboard fleet carriers (rather than escort carriers in still air in the med that it was forced to operate from in 1943) enjoyed the lowest attrition rate of the three main types embarked (Hellcat, corsair and seafire) in 1945. 

You don't know what you are talking about.

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## jetcal1 (Jan 2, 2019)

parsifal said:


> _Relating back to my original post, did the UK have the engineering, material, and human resources to allocate to the "Sea Hurricane" from 1938-1940?._
> 
> Yes. Discussions about the use of either the hurricane or the spitfire as a carrier borne fighter had been in progress since at least 1938. The stickin goint was the RAF. They did not want any interruption or deviation of production away from land based air. But as war broke out factories normally used for production of naval aircraft were used to supplement traditional sources of production anyway.
> 
> ...


 
Go back and read my original post. I never said US aircraft were better. I said the US had the luxury being able to produce more engineers and factories. The UK did not. 

And while the US had it's problems, the wealth of resources enabled the US to have far more failed programs and still have the ability to staff modification centers and get tech reps out into the field. As I recall, UK aircraft production plateaued around 25K aircraft or so per annum starting around 1942. Thank you for proving my point about lack of growth capabilities. The UK simply did not enjoy the ability to wily nily pursue every program. And by 1942 the US enjoyed a level of engineering and production capacity to accommodate modifications and growth. 

I have in past freely acknowledged the French and British roles in not only influencing US aircraft design after 1939, but also getting the US out of the Depression by purchasing the products and helping to pay for the expansion. 

Seafire? Torch and Avalanche. 



*Please quote a specific case of where I said US aircraft were better.*


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## jetcal1 (Jan 2, 2019)

tomo pauk said:


> 'Driving the development' and 'developing' are not same things. Don't know enough about Sea Hornet?
> BTW, what was wrong with Skua as a dive bomber - that it was not a biplane like the 1st Helldiver, or that it didn't have fixed U/C lake the later Aichi 'Val'?
> Any numbers to back up the claim that Seafire's non-combat attrition was horrendous?
> 
> ...



The simple answer is too be found in the numbers of aircraft produced and the report by Roy Fedden to Sir Wilford Freeman on US aircraft production.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 2, 2019)

Lets not go too far the other way.



parsifal said:


> _Actually, what I'm saying is that the UK simply did not have the excess engineering and manufacturing capabilities to develop every engineering proposal that came along._
> 
> *Neither did the US in 1938*





> _ The UK was far more resource constrained than the US. Programs such as the Albermarle, Botha, Lerwick were under development and a higher priority._
> 
> *Not in 1938-40. UK production in 1940 amounted to over 16000 aircraft whilst US production languished at just over 2000. Nearly all of those 2000 were failures because of the backwardness of the supporting industry and R&D in the US at that time. Not until substantial amounts of (mostly) British cash to set up US production and massivce amounts of technical support provided was the US able to shift to a war footing. Case in point has to be the P-51....powered by a british designed engine and development assisted by British knopw how. *



Yep, the backwardness of the US using constant speed propellers on large numbers of those *2000* failure aircraft as opposed the British using fixed pitch and two speed propellers. 
BTW the US built 1685 fighters in 1940, some of them were rubbish, some were 2nd tier, none equaled the Spitfire but then the majority of fighters built in Britain in 1940 were not Spitfires. Now how many bombers, both land and carrier, how many patrol planes, how many military trainers (not Piper Cubs ) did the US build in 1940???

I must have missed the massive amounts of technical support the US got in order to build Martin Maylanders, Lockheed Hudsons and Douglas Havocs/Boston's starting in 1939.

All that aid and technical knowhow that Bristol and Armstrong Siddeley gave to Pratt & Whitney and Wright?

The R&D that Saro, Supermarine and Shorts gave to Consolidated for the PBY (First flight 28 March 1935) the Consolidated PB2Y Coronado the Martin PBM (First flight 18 February 1939) is a little hard to find.

Come on Parsifal, you are better than this. US production may not have been large but the US engineers were not a bunch of bumpkins wandering in the wilderness waiting for enlightenment from the UK.
You might want to check were a lot the machine tools that equipped the British shadow factories came from.


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## jetcal1 (Jan 2, 2019)

Shortround6 said:


> Lets not go too far the other way.
> 
> 
> 
> ...




I really had no idea that there was such a level of partisanship here that it would develop into this. My insight was simply as that of someone who deals with customer driven specifications and engineering constraints in aerospace. Too many programs, not enough hands, not enough floor space. But, now I am the evil arrogant American, and responsible for the F-35!


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## tomo pauk (Jan 2, 2019)

jetcal1 said:


> The simple answer is too be found in the numbers of aircraft produced and the report by Roy Fedden to Sir Wilford Freeman on US aircraft production.



One-liner like this is not going to prove many of the points you've written here.


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## jetcal1 (Jan 2, 2019)

tomo pauk said:


> One-liner like this is not going to prove many of the points you've written here.



_I'm sorry, I assumed you would be familiar with the Fedden report. My apologies._

Here, please let me recondense back down to this;
1. Excess production capacity, the Brewster Buccaneer failed,the SB2C was almost a failure. The USN had the TBF/TBM and was building a factory for the Vought TBY. That's four programs where metal was cut and three programs that reached production! What excess capacity did the British have? (_Who was going to assemble the new and improved Sea Hurricane?_)
Tell me, could the UK build multiple factories for 4 concurrent dive/torpedo bomber programs, and fully staff them with engineers and production workers?
_Apparently not, because British production quantities would not have stagnated in the mid-20's from 1942 onward and more Barracudas, Seafires and Hurricanes would be on the deck. _

I'm not being critical of British Aircraft. I am however critical of British procurement policies in regards to developing naval aircraft. You must admit that the RN was extremely conservative in their specifications and this prevented the development of more advanced naval aircraft. 
But more importantly, We should recognize the constraints placed upon the British industry which are borne out by the production numbers. It's not a slam on anyone's national pride.

Do you mind if I quote S L A Marshall? (US Army Historian.) It's geared towards combat, but logistically speaking also rings true. 
*The will does not operate in a vacuum. It cannot be imposed successfully if it runs counter to reason. Things are not done in war primarily because a man wills it; they are done because they are do-able. The limits for the commander in battle are defined by the general circumstances. What he asks of his men must be consistent with the possibilities of the situation*. 

That's why British production topped out in the mid-20's. It just wasn't do-able. The mythical Sea Hurricane? Given all the other programs and priorities assigned by Freeman and his predecessors, (Remember the Sea-Hurricane was in service till '44.) it just wasn't do-able with the resources available.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 2, 2019)

jetcal1 said:


> _I'm sorry, I assumed you would be familiar with the Fedden report. My apologies._
> 
> Here, please let me recondense back down to this;
> 1. Excess production capacity, the Brewster Buccaneer failed,the SB2C was almost a failure. The USN had the TBF/TBM and was building a factory for the Vought TBY. That's four programs where metal was cut and three programs that reached production!



Nice theory but the facts don't quite back it up. Brewster made a total hash of just about anything they tried to produce. Why did the Navy order the F4F? because they already had doubts about Brewsers ability to deliver on time. Brewster's record on the F4U Corsair was also pretty dismal. Started before Goodyear as the 2nd source and Goodyear consistently beat then to first flight and in benchmarks of planes produced. Curtiss needed massive plant expansions to handle war time production The P-40s were built in Buffalo, the SB2C was built in a brand new factory in Cleveland Ohio, Until the factory is built Curtiss had no spare capacity. Grumman built quite a few TBFs but the the TBMs were built by Eastern AIrcraft, a group of plants built and managed by General Motors for the US government to free up the Grumman home factory for Hellcat production. 

British production did not top out back in the 20s.

Britain was not a big country and had a much smaller population than the United States. and that is why production topped out in the middle of the war, the labor pool would only stretch so far.



> That's why British production topped out in the *mid-20's*. It just wasn't do-able. The mythical Sea Hurricane? Given all the other programs and priorities assigned by Freeman and his predecessors, (Remember the Sea-Hurricane was in service till '44.) it just wasn't do-able with the resources available.


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## wuzak (Jan 2, 2019)

The Admiralty were pushing for Searfire development as far back as 1938. The Hurricane was 2nd best option. By 1940 it was becoming clear that the Hurricane didn't have a huge performance advantage over German bombers, such as the Ju 88. 

Fairey were asked to develop folding wings and produce a navalised Spitfire. Fairey counter-proposed that they would be better of building their own designs, and we then given the go-ahead for what would become the Fairey Firefly.

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## Glider (Jan 2, 2019)

With hindsight of course the UK had the research and development capacity to deliver a good naval fighter. The ROC and the Defiant were basically wasted. and Bristol has a very interesting fighter programme that could have been developed without getting in the way of Hurricane and Spitfire production/development. However its very easy from here to make observations like that.
Hindsight is a wonderful thing to have

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## jetcal1 (Jan 2, 2019)

Shortround6 said:


> Nice theory but the facts don't quite back it up. Brewster made a total hash of just about anything they tried to produce. Why did the Navy order the F4F? because they already had doubts about Brewsers ability to deliver on time. Brewster's record on the F4U Corsair was also pretty dismal. Started before Goodyear as the 2nd source and Goodyear consistently beat then to first flight and in benchmarks of pance produced. Curtiss needed massive plant expansions to handle war time production The P-40s were built in Buffalo, the SB2C was built in a brand new factory in Cleveland Ohio, Until the factory is built Curtiss had no spare capacity. Grumman built quite a few TBFs but the the TBMs were built by Eastern AIrcraft, a group of plants built and managed by General Motors for the US government to free up the Grumman home factory for Hellcat production.
> 
> Which again proves my point, you had a completely screwed up manufacturer in Brewster. But other plants (And supply chains!) were still being constructed for other aircraft I mentioned. I would also consider the TBY/TBU be partial failure and we still built a plant for it in PA. We could simultaneously develop new aircraft, build and staff plants for them, or concurrently build new plants to shift production over for new aircraft like the F6F. The British could not.
> 
> ...


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## nuuumannn (Jan 2, 2019)

I might reiterate what I wrote in another thread; every country made mistakes and planning errors prior to the outbreak of WW2, but conversely each one of the main combatants produced some truly brilliant master strokes in design and capability in equal measure. I hope we aren't descending into this 'bias' between the USA and GB.



> _The aircraft of the RN were controlled by the RAF almost until the last moments before WWII, austere budgets, a customer that was reluctant to develop new technology aircraft, obsolete specifications, etc_.



The Admiralty produced aircraft specifications, based on what it felt applied at the time. There was a definite favour for multi-role types that dominated British carrier decks throughout the 20s and 30s in the likes of the Avro Bison and the Torpedo Spotter Reconnaissance requirement, although single seat fighters definitely had a place in that period, see the much favoured Fairey Flycatcher and the excellent Hawker Fury development the Nimrod. So why, when it came to modern designs, was this shunned in favour of combining the requirement with a dive bomber, producing the Skua or a long range two-seater in the Fulmar? Although available, the Gloster Sea Gladiator wasn't that much far removed from the Nimrod it replaced; it's shore based original specification even predated that which produced the Swordfish. 

There definitely was a tendency to stick with a conservative approach to progress, if that's what the Admiralty's approach could be described as. The Fairey Albacore is evidence of this; although very much an improvement over the Fairey Swordfish and Blackburn Shark (both contemporaries and very similar in performance and capability), but was still a throwback compared to the Grumman Tarpon (nee Avenger and to be renamed as such because Tarpon just doesn't cut it as an emotive appellation) that the Admiralty controlled FAA ordered to supplement and fulfill requirements that the British industry could not, again, largely because of the previous misfires of its own board in the production of naval aircraft specifications.

Leaving aside the barely adequate but well liked Fulmar for a moment, that the Sea Hurricane was an interim was a given. It's acquisition was also more of a knee-jerk reaction however, despite work by Hawker prior to the war's outbreak, and it certainly wasn't ideal either. Brown describes it as thus in the introduction on the chapter on the Sea Hurricane in Wings of the Navy;

"Short on range, with the ditching propensities of a submarine, harsh stalling characteristics, a very mediocre view for deck landing and an undercarriage that was as likely as not to bounce it over the arrestor wires. What less likely a candidate for deployment aboard aircraft carriers as a single-seat fighter than the Hurricane could have been imagined when, more than two score years ago, the FAA found itself at war! Yet, legacy of parsimony, expediency and short sightedness inflicted on British naval aviation of the 'thirties through its seagoing assignment two years later undoubtedly was, the Hurricane was to take to the nautical environment extraordinarily well. Its shipboard debut was to give the FAA an enormous fillip, and while no fighter designed solely with shore-based operation in mind could have expected unqualified success at sea, it was to aquit itself with distinction during its brief navial first-line career."

The last surviving Fulmar. It's a big aeroplane for a fighter.




0307 FAA Museum Fulmar 

Even by 1939, the FAA's future fighter requirements did not match what was really required, but again, as has been stated in another thread, pre-war requirements were laid down without the benefit of post war experience and foresight. Both N.8/39 and N.9/39, calling for a two-seater, front gun fighter and a two-seater single engined turret fighter showed promise but again, fell short of the mark in terms of what was really needed. N.8/39 was fulfilled by the rugged and successful Fairey Firefly, but it saw action primarily as an attack aircraft (let's not even mention the FAA's turret fighter du jour the Blackburn Roc!). 

A year later, with the war in full swing and with a year's vital experience under its belt, the Admiralty finally released OR.88 for a single seat naval fighter. This became hardware through specification N.11/40 for a single seat front gun fighter (at last), to which the the over-engineered and much maligned Blackburn Firebrand was designed. It was the first British purpose buiIt single-seat naval fighter for the FAA, but didn't fly for the first time until 27 February 1942. Sure, that Blackburn, producers of a successful line of naval aircraft, beginning with the Swift of 1919 was to fail miserably with the Firebrand can't be blamed on the Admiralty, it did demonstrate that the British industry needed to devote more effort to modern single seat naval fighter requirements than it had because of the absense of a viable requirement. It wasn't as easy as the old throwback of converting a land based fighter for sea service, as experience with the Sea Hurricane showed.

Hawker Sea Hurricane Ib Z7015 seen here in action in the summer of 2018.




0107 Shuttleworth Military Pageant Sea Hurricane

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## wuzak (Jan 2, 2019)

jetcal1 said:


> British production did not top out back in the 20s.
> My books show max the max quantity of aircraft produced in Britain as just over 26K in 1944. Is that mid 20's?



No, 1944 is the mid '40s.

The way you have written your statement sounds like you are speaking of the peak production year.

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## XBe02Drvr (Jan 2, 2019)

parsifal said:


> Discussions about the use of either the hurricane or the spitfire as a carrier borne fighter had been in progress since at least 1938. The stickin goint was the RAF. They did not want any interruption or deviation of production away from land based air.


Here we go again. Ground pounders getting in the way of naval affairs. How did the "senior service" let this happen?


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## XBe02Drvr (Jan 2, 2019)

jetcal1 said:


> That's why British production topped out in the mid-20's.


Mid 20s thousands produced per year, not mid 1920s, right? A tad confusing there.
Cheers,
Wes


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## RCAFson (Jan 3, 2019)

nuuumannn said:


> So why, when it came to modern designs, was this shunned in favour of combining the requirement with a dive bomber, producing the Skua or a long range two-seater in the Fulmar? Although available, the Gloster Sea Gladiator wasn't that much far removed from the Nimrod it replaced; it's shore based original specification even predated that which produced the Swordfish.
> 
> There definitely was a tendency to stick with a conservative approach to progress, if that's what the Admiralty's approach could be described as. The Fairey Albacore is evidence of this; although very much an improvement over the Fairey Swordfish and Blackburn Shark (both contemporaries and very similar in performance and capability), but was still a throwback compared to the Grumman Tarpon (nee Avenger and to be renamed as such because Tarpon just doesn't cut it as an emotive appellation) that the Admiralty controlled FAA ordered to supplement and fulfill requirements that the British industry could not, again, largely because of the previous misfires of its own board in the production of naval aircraft specifications.
> 
> ...



The Skua was an excellent divebomber that also had front guns, just like the SBD and Val - and the Skua also had folding wings, unlike the other two, and was in service before either. Why doesn't the RN get any Kudos for this triumph of naval strike aircraft design? 

The Albacore predated the TBF by many years and even the Fairey Barracuda flew before the TBF and SB2C, yet unlike Grumman and Curtiss Fairey's plants were being bombed. The Firefly and Barracuda were both projected for 1941/42 and both should have been in production before the TBF and F4F-4 except that the war got in the way. The RN also ordered the Supermarine 322 which should have flown in 1941 but Supermarine was too overloaded and it didn't fly until 1943.

Brown's critique of the HSH is a bit over the top as the HSH seems to have had a lower accident rate than the Martlet and neither aircraft was fun to ditch in. The view over the HSH nose doesn't differ much at all from a Martlet. Brown has some very harsh words for various US designed naval aircraft as well, but we all tend not to dwell on failed USN designs but in the same breath wonder how the RN got it so wrong.


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## nuuumannn (Jan 3, 2019)

> Why doesn't the RN get any Kudos for this triumph of naval strike aircraft design?



That the Skua was successful was certainly down to its employment rather than any real merit the aeroplane possessed. Lightning in a bottle it certainly wasn't. Combining a dive bomber and fighter requirement certainly did not bestow any features on it that made it the success it was operationally. It was a successful dive bomber despite the fighter requirement, not because of it.



> The Albacore predated the TBF by many years and even the Fairey Barracuda flew before the TBF and SB2C, yet unlike Grumman and Curtiss Fairey's plants were being bombed.



That doesn't well explain the built-in obsolescence of the Albacore at all. Granted, it was built to a 1936 specification, but did not enter service until four years later in March 1940. As for the Barracuda, how Marcel Lobelle arrived at the Barracuda after the neat designs of the Battle, Fulmar and Firefly is something of a mystery, nevertheless, it was overly complicated owing to a broad specification that wanted too much from a single airframe - torpedo bomber, fleet spotter and reconnaissance platform, and dive bomber. It was esssentially designed around the centre observer's station below the wing, which then dictated everything else's place on the airframe. Fitting in with a familiar pattern. And the question then has to be asked, why build both the Barracuda and the Albacore, when one is more modern than and carries out the same role as the other? The Barracuda was designed to a 1937 specification.



> but we all tend not to dwell on failed USN designs but in the same breath wonder how the RN got it so wrong.



Oh, Brown's quite scathing of some US designs as well, but emphasises that the Americans, specifically Grumman just consistently got it right - which in hindsight they did. The perceived bias that most accuse him of is just not evident when his books are read. His criticism of the Admiralty comes from a unique perspective; he was there, operating at the front line and testing the results of their specifications. That has to qualify for something. As for his opening words about the Sea Hurricane, yes, he was critical of these aspects of it, but overall, he ends on a positive. It proved to be quite adaptable and tractable in the role.


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## tomo pauk (Jan 3, 2019)

jetcal1 said:


> _I'm sorry, I assumed you would be familiar with the Fedden report. My apologies._




I've read the Fedden report, at least what was posted at AEHS. He does not have any figures to back-up your claim that Seafire's non-combat attrition was horendous. He also says nothing on ability of British designers to design a wing to fold



> Here, please let me recondense back down to this;
> 1. Excess production capacity, the Brewster Buccaneer failed,the SB2C was almost a failure. The USN had the TBF/TBM and was building a factory for the Vought TBY. That's four programs where metal was cut and three programs that reached production! What excess capacity did the British have? (_Who was going to assemble the new and improved Sea Hurricane?_)
> Tell me, could the UK build multiple factories for 4 concurrent dive/torpedo bomber programs, and fully staff them with engineers and production workers?
> _Apparently not, because British production quantities would not have stagnated in the mid-20's from 1942 onward and more Barracudas, Seafires and Hurricanes would be on the deck. _




I've already suggested possible candidates for the earlier SH.
British production quantities didn't stagnated from 1942. The number steadily went up, and total of actual weight of produced aircraft very much increased by 1944 due to increased production of 2- and 4-engined types.



> I'm not being critical of British Aircraft. I am however critical of British procurement policies in regards to developing naval aircraft. You must admit that the RN was extremely conservative in their specifications and this prevented the development of more advanced naval aircraft.
> But more importantly, We should recognize the constraints placed upon the British industry which are borne out by the production numbers. It's not a slam on anyone's national pride.



Like in any other country, UK's Air Ministry/Air force/Navy made it's fair share of mistakes. However, not mentioning Sea Hornet, Swordfish and Skua, and excludes Seafire because of his opinion is a sign of poor scholarship.



> Do you mind if I quote S L A Marshall? (US Army Historian.) It's geared towards combat, but logistically speaking also rings true.
> *The will does not operate in a vacuum. It cannot be imposed successfully if it runs counter to reason. Things are not done in war primarily because a man wills it; they are done because they are do-able. The limits for the commander in battle are defined by the general circumstances. What he asks of his men must be consistent with the possibilities of the situation*.



Wow. 
If things are doable, but no-one want's to do them, the things will not be done.



> That's why British production topped out in the mid-20's. It just wasn't do-able. The mythical Sea Hurricane? Given all the other programs and priorities assigned by Freeman and his predecessors, (Remember the Sea-Hurricane was in service till '44.) it just wasn't do-able with the resources available.



It _was_ doable. Just like it was doable for Castle Bromwich to make Spitfires once Fairey made his report on current state of affairs there. Just like it was doable to make 200 Henleys and 560 Bothas. Or Fairey making 5 separate folding-wing A/C designs in less than 10 years. 
FAA does not need 10000s of thousands or aircraft.

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## Kevin J (Jan 3, 2019)

I still think the Sea Hurricane as built was the best possible version. The Admiralty took a rugged fighter, the Hurricane, operational throughout the World, and produced a conversion kit for it, meanwhile developing a more fragile fighter, the Spitfire, not yet operational throughout the World and turning it into a first class deck launched interceptor, the Seafire FIII, LIII & FRIII available from 1943 to the end of WW2. If you want another interim fighter then why not instead of building the Henley(200), re-develop the Hotspur, by replacing the turret with an extra fuel tank, re-instating the 8 wing m/c guns, adding catapult spools, arrestor hook and rear folding wings. First delivery maybe 1940/41 so no need for the Martlet. Likewise the Defiant, instead of converting(150)/building(140) later versions as target tugs, replace the turret with an extra fuel tank, add catapult spools, arrestor hook and upward folding wings, finally putting 4 or 6 HMG's in the wings. Availability, lets say 1942/43 so no need for the Wildcat. Of course, its probably easier and cheaper to buy the Martlet I/II/II and Wildcat IV. Finally, we could have taken the Miles M20 naval version, replaced the Merlin power egg with a Hercules power egg and introduced wing folding to get a fighter faster than the Wildcat V/VI, but slower than the Hellcat I/II. My choice would have been the Grumman fighters.


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## Shortround6 (Jan 3, 2019)

RCAFson said:


> The Skua was an excellent divebomber that also had front guns, just like the SBD and Val - and the Skua also had folding wings, unlike the other two, and was in service before either. Why doesn't the RN get any Kudos for this triumph of naval strike aircraft design?



It never got a MK II version. 1939/40 SBDs and Vals weren't that hot either. 
The British had a hole in their engine supply you could drive a Thorncroft truck through in 1938-40. 
By that I mean there were too many engines of 800-1000hp size and then the big jump to the Sabre, Vulture, Centaurus. Only the Merlin and Hercules fell in between and the Hercules was running late. Griffon being something a back burner engine at that time. 

There was no easy upgrade for any planes powered by the Bristol 9 cylinder engines. The AS Tiger should not have been allowed to fly over water (and in Whitleys was not). The Taurus didn't offer enough improvement and had problems of it's own early on. 
The Hercules was under 1400hp to start ( and heavy) compared to the Wright R-2600 which was being delivered at 1500hp in 1938 and giving 1600hp in 1940 in full production with the promise of 1700hp being made in 1940. The Avenger (and competitors ) and the SBC2 (and competitors ) had the promise of 300-400hp more than any Hercules powered Naval aircraft in this time period. 
The Merlin was fine engine but everybody and their brother ( and cousins) wanted some form of Merlin because there simply wasn't much of an option. 

Getting back the Skua, Had an 1100-1200hp engine been available at a not too great an increase in weight, a MK II might have had better performance and/or a greater payload. But their wasn't one, or at least not in any sort of a useable time frame.

The 3 big British engines all stumbled and fell, for various reason and while they later got up, dusted themselves off and and went on to greater or lesser success the British still faced that gap for too long. The Griffon filled in and with the development of better fuels reached powers that were probably not anticipated in 1939-40.

I have mentioned it before but the British had two classes of carriers in the late 30s. Long and fast (although 3 of the long ones didn't have full length decks) and short and slow, out of 7 carriers 3 were of the short, slow and limited capacity type. Think escort carriers only slightly better (at least as far as speed/deck length) so some aircraft designs may have been compromised in order to operate of all carriers. Also please note the much maligned Douglas Devastator only went into squadron service in 1937 with these claimed firsts. 
It was the first widely used carrier-based monoplane
the first all-metal naval aircraft,
the first with a totally enclosed cockpit,
the first with power-actuated (hydraulically) folding wings.

Many other countries naval aircraft of 1937-40 were already somewhere in the design process when the Devastator was reveled. 

comparing many of the British 1938-40 aircraft to American aircraft of 1942 is comparing different generations.

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## jetcal1 (Jan 3, 2019)

[/QUOTE] The way you have written your statement sounds like you are speaking of the peak production year.[/QUOTE]

My bad.


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## jetcal1 (Jan 3, 2019)

Here,
Let me throw a little more fuel on the fire; 
Here is my review on Smiths's volume on the Skua.
I'm sure some people will have something to say about that as well.
_The dichotomy of so many of the previous reviews is interesting. Several complain about the how mundane the Skua was while other complain there was too much technical detail in the book.
It's important to remember the era in which the Skua was conceived and built. The Skua is the perfect representation of the Fleet Air Arm and Blackburn in the late 1930's. The FAA was seeking a transitional all metal do-it all aircraft within the restrictions imposed by budgets, politics and the RAF while Blackburn had the ability to build aircraft that exactly met customer specifications. (Not always a good thing, given the number of failed designs they produced.)
The result was the Skua.
As far as the complaints of too much detail? Don't read the sections that aren't of interest to you.
Considering the overall performance of the Skua, it's accomplishments and length of service are quite amazing. The Skua was there for the FAA to develop dive bombing tactics, provided the initial cadre of trained pilots, and was in service when it was needed.

Highly recommended as a volume on the Skua, as a prewar and early war history of the FAA. _


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## tomo pauk (Jan 3, 2019)

Shortround6 said:


> It never got a MK II version. 1939/40 SBDs and Vals weren't that hot either.
> The British had a hole in their engine supply you could drive a Thorncroft truck through in 1938-40.
> By that I mean there were too many engines of 800-1000hp size and then the big jump to the Sabre, Vulture, Centaurus. Only the Merlin and Hercules fell in between and the Hercules was running late. Griffon being something a back burner engine at that time..



The hole was not present. No military A/C in 1938-40 used engines beyond 1300 HP.
Probably 99% of military A/C in 1938-40 used engines under 1200 HP, and perhaps 90% used engines up to 1050 HP. Engines of 1000 HP were perfectly capable to power ship-borne fighters and strike aircraft even in 1942.



> There was no easy upgrade for any planes powered by the Bristol 9 cylinder engines. The AS Tiger should not have been allowed to fly over water (and in Whitleys was not). The Taurus didn't offer enough improvement and had problems of it's own early on.
> The Hercules was under 1400hp to start ( and heavy) compared to the Wright R-2600 which was being delivered at 1500hp in 1938 and giving 1600hp in 1940 in full production with the promise of 1700hp being made in 1940. The Avenger (and competitors ) and the SBC2 (and competitors ) had the promise of 300-400hp more than any Hercules powered Naval aircraft in this time period.
> The Merlin was fine engine but everybody and their brother ( and cousins) wanted some form of Merlin because there simply wasn't much of an option.



Comparing promised and deliverd power? C'mon. 
R-2600 was many things, it was not in use aboard the carriers until well into 1942. On 100 oct fuel, Hercules III made 1425 HP, by mid 1941 Hercules VI was making 1670 HP. 
The 1000 HP Pegasus was very much an option for 1938-42, just like the 1000 HP R-1820 was. Those engines that helped sunk a fair proportion of Japanese carriers in 1942.



> Getting back the Skua, Had an 1100-1200hp engine been available at a not too great an increase in weight, a MK II might have had better performance and/or a greater payload. But their wasn't one, or at least not in any sort of a useable time frame..



Skua Mk.2 has a better ring to it than Roc of any mark 



> The 3 big British engines all stumbled and fell, for various reason and while they later got up, dusted themselves off and and went on to greater or lesser success the British still faced that gap for too long. The Griffon filled in and with the development of better fuels reached powers that were probably not anticipated in 1939-40.



Some fell down, some stuttered but managed to pull themselves together. Gap in engine power available was nonexistent, however - that Hercules was not used on FAA aircraft already from 1939 was not the fault of the engine, as it was not the fault of 2-stage Merlin that was not used by FAA.



> I have mentioned it before but the British had two classes of carriers in the late 30s. Long and fast (although 3 of the long ones didn't have full length decks) and short and slow, out of 7 carriers 3 were of the short, slow and limited capacity type. Think escort carriers only slightly better (at least as far as speed/deck length) so some aircraft designs may have been compromised in order to operate of all carriers. Also please note the much maligned Douglas Devastator only went into squadron service in 1937 with these claimed firsts.
> It was the first widely used carrier-based monoplane
> the first all-metal naval aircraft,
> the first with a totally enclosed cockpit,
> ...



Agreed all the way. We should especially avoid the thing from the latest sentence


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## jetcal1 (Jan 3, 2019)

tomo pauk said:


> I've read the Fedden report, at least what was posted at AEHS. He does not have any figures to back-up your claim that Seafire's non-combat attrition was horendous. He also says nothing on ability of British designers to design a wing to fold
> 
> 
> 
> ...



_Yes, we're going to duplicate the logistics chain and tooling just like that! (While competing against higher priorities!) The RN/FAA came out second best in the allocation of resources against the RAF and the politicians. If you can't get the material you need to expand, it ain't do-able. Doesn't matter if it's 1938 or 1944. Britain ain't getting there from here. _

_With all due respect, I believe we can say that the RN/FAA wanted folding wings if for no other reason to have more deck-space. (*You know, more airplanes onboard.*) I do not believe that you can say the RN DID NOT WANT FOLDING WINGS
And lest we forget, Lord Beaverbrook and others were pushing higher priority aircraft._


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## tomo pauk (Jan 3, 2019)

jetcal1 said:


> _Yes, we're going to duplicate the logistics chain and tooling just like that! (While competing against higher priorities!) The RN/FAA came out second best in the allocation of resources against the RAF and the politicians. If you can't get the material you need to expand, it ain't do-able. Doesn't matter if it's 1938 or 1944. Britain ain't getting there from here. _




Curiously enough, UK managed to out-produce Germany and Italy combined even in dark days of 1940-42. They were designing, testing and producing aircraft even when bombed and subjected to U-boot attacks, all while re-tooling factories (Boulto Paul, Westland, Gloster, Fairey, Vickers etc) and buying in the USA before LL. 

_



With all due respect, I believe we can say that the RN/FAA wanted folding wings if for no other reason to have more deck-space. (*You know, more airplanes onboard.*) I do not believe that you can say the RN DID NOT WANT FOLDING WINGS
And lest we forget, Lord Beaverbrook and others were pushing higher priority aircraft.

Click to expand...

_
If you can explain how Lord Beaverbrook is calling shots in British AC production before May 1940, I'm all ears. Ditto for quoting me saying that folding wings are no-no for the FAA.


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## MycroftHolmes (Jan 3, 2019)

One thing that could have helped the Sea Hurricane was to fit it with a Spitfire-style bulged canopy, as I remember reading that this type of canopy had lower drag than the standard Hurricane canopy, and would allow the pilot's seat to be raised by a few inches, thus improving visibility over the nose.

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## parsifal (Jan 3, 2019)

Shortround6 said:


> Lets not go too far the other way.
> 
> 
> 
> ...


You are probably justified to pull me into line. Can get a little excited sometimes. but the main points I made are still valid. For every aircraft that could be considered a success operationally in 1940, there was usually one that could not meet specification, and much less succeed on the battlefield. most of the aircraft supplied to Britain by the US at that time were not risked in open battle, or at best were sent to strategic back waters. Brewster Buffalo, B-17, P-39, SBC, F4f for various reasons when first received could not do the job they were first intended for. F4f, for example leaked fuel like a sieve, and suffered weak landing gear (there were some other problems as well). it would be September 1941 before the RN could operate the type on ships. 
Other aircraft were useful, but were not first line aircraft. Hudson for example was relegated to secondary theatres and/or roles. They were used mostly for maritime patrol and to bolster numbers in quiet areas like the far east. Tomahawks were found to be underpowered and lacking firepower. Marylands were found to be too cramped to work effectively as a bomber, though they did find a use for fast recon
US aircraft had potential but in 1940 they ended up being a liability for the air ministry. They were seen as the great white hope, but they failed to live up to the hype. Eventually they would overtake the british in terms of both numbers and capability, but not in the part of the war that mattered.
You can discount british assistance to US aircraft manufacture if you like, but in 1940 alone, the air ministry invested over 80 million pounds as direct investment in US aircraft manufacturers.  I have the figures somewhere, and it shows the critical role British financial investment had on helping to mobilise the americans. tizard wasn't just about radar and atomic research. Every service and major british war related department was ordered to share its secrets with the americans, on direct orders from Churchill. The US did not return the favour by simply giving stuff away. everything came at a price with the americans. I think it was 2010 that the final payment for lend lease was made .

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## Shortround6 (Jan 3, 2019)

parsifal said:


> You are probably justified to pull me into line. Can get a little excited sometimes. but the main points I made are still valid. For every aircraft that could be considered a success operationally in 1940, there was usually one that could not meet specification, and much less succeed on the battlefield. most of the aircraft supplied to Britain by the US at that time were not risked in open battle, or at best were sent to strategic back waters. Brewster Buffalo, B-17, P-39, SBC, F4f for various reasons when first received could not do the job they were first intended for. F4f, for example leaked fuel like a sieve, and suffered weak landing gear (there were some other problems as well). it would be September 1941 before the RN could operate the type on ships.
> Other aircraft were useful, but were not first line aircraft. Hudson for example was relegated to secondary theatres and/or roles. They were used mostly for maritime patrol and to bolster numbers in quiet areas like the far east. Tomahawks were found to be underpowered and lacking firepower. Marylands were found to be too cramped to work effectively as a bomber, though they did find a use for fast recon
> US aircraft had potential but in 1940 they ended up being a liability for the air ministry. They were seen as the great white hope, but they failed to live up to the hype. Eventually they would overtake the british in terms of both numbers and capability, but not in the part of the war that mattered.



The trouble is we are talking about several years here and many of the planes were delivered in different models. you also have to see what the American planes replaced or were used instead of. 
The Maryland and Hudson were used to replace or supplement Blenheims in a number of roles. They sure weren't B-25s or B-26s but then it didn't take much to be a better plane than the Blenheim for some roles,like maritime patrol. The Hudson's did get progressively more powerful engines however most (or all but the very early ones?) had fully feathering propellers which gave the aircrew a much better chance of making it home than many British bombers with their 2 pitch propellers and a brake on the propshaft to keep the dead engine prop from windmilling. 
There is no question the Maryland was cramped (as was it's successor the Baltimore) But the British kept cranking out the cramped Blenheim and the cramped Hampden was phased out of production in early 1942. The US aircraft certainly did not show up in 1940 and early 1941 and show the British how the job should be done but many of the aircraft the British were using in 1940 and 41 weren't really that much better than the American aircraft. 
The Sunderland was certainly an excellent aircraft but the rest of the British flying boat fleet was old and obsolete (or prototypes of dubious value) 

Unfortunately a number of the first American planes the British got were French leftovers. Most of which had been ordered in 1939 before the need for armor and self sealing fuel tanks was appreciated. The British took over the contracts on the fall of France but I guess many contracts were not updated to reflect new requirements. A number of planes were delivered with French instruments. 
Martin had doubled the size of the Factory based off the initial French order/s for the type 167 and it would multiply in size several times in the years to come, The First French order was placed Jan 26th 1939. 
I would note that some sources claim the French Martins had a lower loss rate than some of the French types they operated with. 
The cramped Martin also was the plane that photographed Taranto before and after the Swordfishes successful raid. It was also the plane that discovered the Bismarck was no longer in Trondheim. 
If the Hudson could not fly from England to Wilhelmshaven in daylight to bomb the German fleet, well, it turns out the Wellington couldn't do it either. not without a suicidal loss rate, 
I would note that many American aircraft went from engines with single speed superchargers and running on 87-91 octane fuel to two speed superchargers and 100 octane fuel from the start of 1940 to the beginning or middle of 1941 so there was performance increase. 

Lets also remember that the First B-24 prototype flew in Dec of 1939. less than 2 months after the first Halifax. 

Yes the French And British did fund a considerable portion of the US expansion but without knowing how much the US spent it is a little difficult to judge. The 12,8 million dollar contract for the first P-40s gets a lot ink but let's remember that Ford got over 14 million less than 18 months later JUST to build a factory. that sum did not include one engine. 

The US appropriated over 7.8 billion dollars for defence in 1940. Granted a very large part of that did NOT go to the aircraft industry.

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## jetcal1 (Jan 4, 2019)

wuzak said:


> The Admiralty were pushing for Searfire development as far back as 1938. The Hurricane was 2nd best option. By 1940 it was becoming clear that the Hurricane didn't have a huge performance advantage over German bombers, such as the Ju 88.
> 
> Fairey were asked to develop folding wings and produce a navalised Spitfire. Fairey counter-proposed that they would be better of building their own designs, and we then given the go-ahead for what would become the Fairey Firefly.



Which entered operational service when? Late '43 early 44?
So to continue to being the A$$hat here on this post, during wartime it took 5 years to get to the squadrons and 6 years to make it into it's first combat deployment? Do think it may have lost some engineering or production priority along the way?


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## jetcal1 (Jan 4, 2019)

tomo pauk said:


> Curiously enough, UK managed to out-produce Germany and Italy combined even in dark days of 1940-42. They were designing, testing and producing aircraft even when bombed and subjected to U-boot attacks, all while re-tooling factories (Boulto Paul, Westland, Gloster, Fairey, Vickers etc) and buying in the USA before LL.
> 
> 
> 
> If you can explain how Lord Beaverbrook is calling shots in British AC production before May 1940, I'm all ears. Ditto for quoting me saying that folding wings are no-no for the FAA.



Okay, let's talk before Lord Beaverbrook,
*"Yes. Discussions about the use of either the hurricane or the spitfire as a carrier borne fighter had been in progress since at least 1938. The stickin goint (sic) was the RAF. They did not want any interruption or deviation of production away from land based air. But as war broke out factories normally used for production of naval aircraft were used to supplement traditional sources of production anyway."*

Well sir, 
Which brings me back the original post that so inflamed you. The RAF/RN were resource poor and the manufacturers were also resource poor for the number of projects that were extant at the time from 1938 until the Sea Hurricane came off the deck. The RN apparently lost the battle of available resources.
Thus.........no folding wings for your Hurricane.


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## tomo pauk (Jan 4, 2019)

jetcal1 said:


> Well sir,
> Which brings me back the original post that so inflamed you.



Let's see. You, as a supposed authority on the subject, are trying to sell short British A/C development & production capabilities, the claim I base on following:
- not being aware of Swordfish, Skua, Seafire, Sea Hornet
- try to make Seafire being more a trouble than asset, yet, when challenged, provided zero evidence
- avoiding mentioning that 7 aircraft types received folding wings in UK in 5 years, 10 in 10 years
- avoiding to acknowledge that Hawker themselves designed and flew two aircraft types between Hurricane and Typhoon/Tornado
- avoiding to acknowledge that companies in the UK were designing, testing and making many new A/C types (from trainers and bombers to jet A/C) even when country was subjected to bombing and U-boat threat
- trying to pitch for fact that people, that were put in charge in mid-1940 were also calling the shots in 1938 and 1939
- trying to sell for a fact that designing the wing fold as impossible to pull off in a coutry that designed & produced vast majority of A/C types, engines and subsystems, including folding wings themselves, multi-engined A/C and even jets, all before 1941

That is too many holes on a picture you're trying to paint.

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## XBe02Drvr (Jan 4, 2019)

jetcal1 said:


> Well sir,
> Which brings me back the original post that so inflamed you. The RAF/RN were resource poor and the manufacturers were also resource poor
> Thus.........no folding wings for your Hurricane.





tomo pauk said:


> Let's see. You, as a supposed authority on the subject, are trying to sell short British A/C development & production capabilities
> That is too many holes on a picture you're trying to paint.


Hoo boy, another exciting fireworks show, and it isn't even Guy Fawkes Day or 4th of July, either! One of the unadvertised benefits of this forum.
Cheers,
Wes


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## Kevin J (Jan 4, 2019)

Lets look at the best case scenario for a better Sea Hurricane. 1938/39 the Hurricane enters service. The RAF wrings the bugs out of it. 1939, tropicalisation trials undertaken in Khartoum, yes they really happened, so add some trials for a Hurricane with an arrestor hook for the FAA. Both Hurricane I Trop and Sea Hurricane Ia produced in 1939/40 time period is feasible but there is no requirement for either plane from either the RAF or the RN. Hurricane I Trop does appear in small nos after Italy enters war in June 1940. Hurricane II Trop and Sea Hurricane IIb with both arrestor hook and catapult spools should then be available in 1940/41. In reality its Sea Hurricane Ib in Med in 1941 and Ic/IIc in 1942. Hurricane IIb/c Trop in 1941 also. What's missing is the Sea Hurricane, lets say III, with folding wings that should appear around 1941/42, but why build it when you can have the folding wing Wildcat with greater internal fuel and longer range? A better Sea Hurricane is a non-starter. And why do the RN go for the Ib/Ic in 1941/42? The reason is simple, better low altitude performance with the Merlin III, 100 octane fuel and 16 lbs boost.


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## jetcal1 (Jan 4, 2019)

tomo pauk said:


> Let's see. You, as a supposed authority on the subject, are trying to sell short British A/C development & production capabilities, the claim I base on following:
> - not being aware of Swordfish, Skua, Seafire, Sea Hornet
> - try to make Seafire being more a trouble than asset, yet, when challenged, provided zero evidence
> - avoiding mentioning that 7 aircraft types received folding wings in UK in 5 years, 10 in 10 years
> ...



- try to make Seafire being more a trouble than asset, yet, when challenged, provided zero evidence
Operation Avalanche and Torch. (Repeat post, you.)
- not being aware of Swordfish, Skua, Seafire, Sea Hornet


tomo pauk said:


> Let's see. You, as a supposed authority on the subject, are trying to sell short British A/C development & production capabilities, the claim I base on following:
> - not being aware of Swordfish, Skua, Seafire, Sea Hornet
> - try to make Seafire being more a trouble than asset, yet, when challenged, provided zero evidence
> - avoiding mentioning that 7 aircraft types received folding wings in UK in 5 years, 10 in 10 years
> ...


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## Shortround6 (Jan 4, 2019)

Somebody may want to do a ship by ship breakdown of this as one ship (the Unicorn) is blamed for up to 21 accidents at Salerno. 
7 carriers were at Salerno and four of them were the even smaller and slower, escort carriers.

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## jetcal1 (Jan 4, 2019)

tomo pauk said:


> Let's see. You, as a supposed authority on the subject, are trying to sell short British A/C development & production capabilities, the claim I base on following:
> - not being aware of Swordfish, Skua, Seafire, Sea Hornet
> - try to make Seafire being more a trouble than asset, yet, when challenged, provided zero evidence
> - avoiding mentioning that 7 aircraft types received folding wings in UK in 5 years, 10 in 10 years
> ...



- not being aware of Swordfish, Skua, Seafire, Sea Hornet

_1a. Swordfish, in production prior to the rearmament and with an established production line. Not influenced by the

1b. Skua, Run what ya, brung airplane, out of service by 1942. I posed my opinion on that airplane earlier. It's in this thread if you care to look.

1c. Seafire, an airplane that was adequate later in the war but did fully not come into its own until re-engined with the Griffon. Did not happen until postwar? (Wonder why?)

1d. SeaHornet, Small production run, mostly postwar development. Benefited from being designed for marinization and navalization from the beginning. Achieved a decade of service which in the early jet age is an achievement._

- try to make Seafire being more a trouble than asset, yet, when challenged, provided zero evidence
_Operation Avalanche and Torch attrition rates. (Repeat post. Guess you missed that.)_

- avoiding mentioning that 7 aircraft types received folding wings in UK in 5 years, 10 in 10 years
_Putting folding wings on an airplane doesn’t mean you have the resources to produce it as such in the case of the SeaHurricane under wartime production constraints. _

- avoiding to acknowledge that Hawker themselves designed and flew two aircraft types between Hurricane and Typhoon/Tornado
_ Would you like to compare and contrast the number of failed US programs that flew that failed to make it to production? How about the German prototype programs.that only reinforces my resources argument. Again, cranking out a hand-built prototype is not the same as mass production. Yours is a non sequitur argument. _


- avoiding to acknowledge that companies in the UK were designing, testing and making many new A/C types (from trainers and bombers to jet A/C) even when country was subjected to bombing and U-boat threat
*See below*

- trying to pitch for fact that people, that were put in charge in mid-1940 were also calling the shots in 1938 and 1939
_Guess it doesn’t really matter when the mid-1940 transition in personal continued the policy of RAF priority over the RN. _

- trying to sell for a fact that designing the wing fold as impossible to pull off in a country that designed & produced vast majority of A/C types, engines and subsystems, including folding wings themselves, multi-engined A/C and even jets, all before 1941
_Putting folding wings on an airplane doesn’t mean you have the resources to produce it as such in the case of the SeaHurricane when it is competing for engineering, prototyping, supply and manufacturing resources. Not that they couldn’t, there just wasn’t’ enough in Britain to do it all._

Okay, let’s try this again…….

I stated that the country was resource constrained. I never said they couldn’t do it. Someone, somewhere, set priorities. (Lord Beaverbrook and Sir Freeman? (And to keep you happy the RAF in 1938-39.) In other words, you just can’t build or modify at will because there ain’t enough “stuff” to go around.

Look at all the lovely prototypes! How many made it into production? (Same as the US, Germany, etc.)

I stated the US had the luxury of being able to almost build, staff, and supply factories at will. Great Britain did not, Germany did not. I’m sorry you took offense to the realities on the ground.

If you feel like I am denigrating the British logistics and manufacturing capabilities by acknowledging their limitations, I’m sorry that you continue to completely misinterpret what I am saying, 
I happen to think that the British did very well with the resources that were available and the RN in particular by some rather limited foresight in terms of specifications.


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## jetcal1 (Jan 4, 2019)

Shortround6 said:


> Somebody may want to do a ship by ship breakdown of this as one ship (the Unicorn) is blamed for up to 21 accidents at Salerno.
> 7 carriers were at Salerno and four of them were the even smaller and slower, escort carriers.



I would be happy to do so once my library is out of storage. (We are recovering from flood damage) Feel free to browse
jetcal1's books | LibraryThing


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## wuzak (Jan 4, 2019)

jetcal1 said:


> _1c. Seafire, an airplane that was adequate later in the war but did fully not come into its own until re-engined with the Griffon. Did not happen until postwar? (Wonder why?)_



The Spitfire XII used a Griffon, started service in early 1943 and was out of service by early 1944. Production was limited to 100. So the Seafire XV would have been possible earlier.

However, Griffon production was not very large in number. The majority of Griffons went to the Firefly (single stage supercharger) and Spitfire XIV (2 stage supercharger), so the Seafire had to make do without.


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## wuzak (Jan 4, 2019)

jetcal1 said:


> Which entered operational service when? Late '43 early 44?
> So to continue to being the A$$hat here on this post, during wartime it took 5 years to get to the squadrons and 6 years to make it into it's first combat deployment? Do think it may have lost some engineering or production priority along the way?



The Firefly was a new design using a new engine.

Griffon development only started around 1938. Late 1939 it was redesigned, as someone at the Air Ministry, or Supermarine, realised that the Griffon could fit in the Spitfire if a few packaging changes were made.

Mid 1940 all engine development at Rolls-Royce was paused, except for the Merlin. That included the Griffon. Wonder why that would have been?

Earlier Seafire proposals from Supermarine used the Merlin, so production delays wouldn't have been a problem, though supply may have been.

in one case, Supermarine proposed a Seafire with a different wing planform, which folded in a similar fashion to the Grumman system. Supermarine were though too slow in development and had, in any case, insufficient production capacity to build Seafires without impacting production of Spitfires. Hence the approach to Fairey.

I'm sure that a Seafire built by Fairey based heavily on the Spitfire would have been available earlier than the Firefly.


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## fastmongrel (Jan 5, 2019)

A major reason why the Seafire didn't arrive when it could have done.

Supermarine factory bombed
The spitfire factory workers

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## Reluctant Poster (Jan 6, 2019)

Morgan and Shacklady devote a couple of chapters of their book to the Seafire and to the Supermarine proposal for a two seat shipboard fighter to N8/39. N8/39 was to similar to the Spitfire in construction but larger, with a tapered wing instead of elliptical in order to simplify construction. It also had a wide undercarriage! The same type of wing folding was proposed for the naval Spitfire. I have attached an image of the proposed Spitfire. It would be interesting to understand why this system was not adopted for the Seafire.

The folding wing Spitfire (Type 338) was submitted to the FAA on 2 Jan 1940. By the way Supermarine had flown a hook fitted Spitfire the preceding October. The Navalized Spitfire was rejected by the 1st Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill on 29 March. Churchill apparently favored the Fulmar. In any event after the invasion of France it is doubtful that the naval Spitfire program would have survived. 
It seems all in all that the FAA shot itself in the foot by insisting on 2 set fighters. 
To quote Admiral of the Fleet C M Forbes. "Our Fleet Air Arm aircraft are hopelessly outclassed by everything that flies and the sooner we get some efficient aircraft the better. We have made a false god of the business of flying on and off a carrier, but now it has been done by four RAF pilots in their first attempt and ten Hurricanes have been flown onto a carrier the matter should be reconsidered."

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## parsifal (Jan 6, 2019)

Rejecting a navalised spitfire in early 1940 was absolutely the right thing to do. The admiralty did not "get it 
wrong" and the decision was not made solely by Winston. 

It would take 2years minimum to get the navalised spitfire up and running, and any production diverted to meet the needs of the FAA would be one less spitfire available to the RAF. every spitfire produced at that time was needed for FC, which also explains why so few were exported at this time.

Equipping the forces afloat with a single purpose aircraft whilst there was such an acute shortage of pilots was something the FAA simply could not afford to do. they needed aircraft that could do more than one thing at a time. They accepted the penalties this brought with it, but it meant the fleet went to sea with eyes as well as teeth. further, the Spitfire with its short range and endurance (this improved later but in 1940, its combat radius was under 100miles) made it utterly unsuited to what the RN needed. As a fighter, there was no expectation for the carriers, or indeed the fleet, to operate in enemy controlled skies. the navala fighters were thought necessary to bring down enemy strike aircraft. they needed moderate performance, large ammo reserves and maximum endurance. They needed to be available as soon as possible 9in early 1940, the FAA had about 40 fighters in total.....skuas and a few sea gladiators. the Spitfire could not meet any of these requirements, the Fulmar could meet all of them.

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## RCAFson (Jan 9, 2019)

Reluctant Poster said:


> Morgan and Shacklady devote a couple of chapters of their book to the Seafire and to the Supermarine proposal for a two seat shipboard fighter to N8/39. N8/39 was to similar to the Spitfire in construction but larger, with a tapered wing instead of elliptical in order to simplify construction. It also had a wide undercarriage! The same type of wing folding was proposed for the naval Spitfire. I have attached an image of the proposed Spitfire. It would be interesting to understand why this system was not adopted for the Seafire.
> 
> The folding wing Spitfire (Type 338) was submitted to the FAA on 2 Jan 1940. By the way Supermarine had flown a hook fitted Spitfire the preceding October. The Navalized Spitfire was rejected by the 1st Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill on 29 March. Churchill apparently favored the Fulmar. In any event after the invasion of France it is doubtful that the naval Spitfire program would have survived.
> It seems all in all that the FAA shot itself in the foot by insisting on 2 set fighters.
> To quote Admiral of the Fleet C M Forbes. "Our Fleet Air Arm aircraft are hopelessly outclassed by everything that flies and the sooner we get some efficient aircraft the better. We have made a false god of the business of flying on and off a carrier, but now it has been done by four RAF pilots in their first attempt and ten Hurricanes have been flown onto a carrier the matter should be reconsidered."



The same page states that the Air Ministry states that 50 Seafires = 200 Spitfires... I'll bet the RAF had a few words to say about that proposal, given that this would have severely impacted Spitfire production up to June 1940. The other point is that it would have halted Fulmar development (if Fairey built it) when it was only a few months away from serial production (fairey having delivered it nearly a year in advance of the projected dates) for an aircraft that had never flown and would have severely impacted production of all of Fairey's other naval aircraft.

The folding wing prototype was not expected to fly until Feb-March 1941, assuming an order in Jan 1940.

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## nuuumannn (Jan 10, 2019)

> 'm sure that a Seafire built by Fairey based heavily on the Spitfire would have been available earlier than the Firefly.



In what world is Fairey going to build a competitor's aeroplane instead of its own when it is competing for the same requirements and it has contracts of its own to fulfill? Secondly, to which specification? 

After the failure of the manufacturers to produce a satisfactory design to N.8/39, calling for a navalised two-seater, new specs were issued, one of which was NAD.925/39 for a navalised single seater, to which Fairey proposed a Griffon engined 8 machine gunned fighter. Supermarine proposed two Spitfire variants, one with a Griffon and another with a Sabre. Incidentally, Hawker offered a Griffon engined fighter based on the Hurricane to this spec. In June 1940, N.5/40 or 5/40/F had been released for Fairey to produce the Firefly. NAD.925/39 went unfulfilled and instead the Admiralty had N.11/40 released to produce Blackburn's B.37, which evolved into the Firebrand, in September. In July 1941 the Air Ministry also released N.1/41 to Miles for a single seat fighter to meet OR.102 for a wooden (!) navalised single seater, to which a naval version of the M.20 stop gap fighter was proposed.

In February 1940 the Admiralty put forward a proposal to the Air Ministry to acquire 'Sea Spitfires', but the idea was canned at the end of March, owing to the fact that the RAF had a greater need and disruption of the production lines was not acceptable at that time, as mentioned earlier in the thread. As an interim, Grumman Wildcats were ordered for the FAA.

By February 1941, delays with the Firebrand gave the Admiralty cause for concern and Hawker proposed the P.1009 'Sea Typhoon' to N.11/40, with folding wings and strengthened undercarriage and although this was ultimately rejected, possibly owing to the structural issues the Typhoon suffered, a hooked Typhoon and Tempest were examined in 1942. 

(Information from various sources, but mainly from the books The British Aircraft Specs File and British Secret Projects, Fighters and Bombers 1935 - 1950)

Bearing all this in mind, it can be seen why the Sea Spitfire was not ordered immediately between 1939 and 1941 as there were sufficient single seat projects underway to which the Admiralty believed it might get something useful. It wasn't until 1941 that the Admiralty got its way with getting Seafires, but even then, with official requirements being fulfilled, they were something of a stop gap - there was expectation that the Firebrand would evolve into something useful and the Sea Typhoon had been proposed in its place if it didn't (little did the Admiralty know.... farting sound). The Sea Hurricane had already been issued for production and the first had entered service that year.


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## Kevin J (Jan 10, 2019)

RCAFson said:


> The same page states that the Air Ministry states that 50 Seafires = 200 Spitfires... I'll bet the RAF had a few words to say about that proposal, given that this would have severely impacted Spitfire production up to June 1940. The other point is that it would have halted Fulmar development (if Fairey built it) when it was only a few months away from serial production (fairey having delivered it nearly a year in advance of the projected dates) for an aircraft that had never flown and would have severely impacted production of all of Fairey's other naval aircraft.
> 
> The folding wing prototype was not expected to fly until Feb-March 1941, assuming an order in Jan 1940.



Of course, if you go with the conversion kit idea that was the Sea Hurricane, you will, if you like, not only get your cake, but get to eat it too. There's no loss of production.


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## Kevin J (Jan 10, 2019)

Just thinking. If a whale is a shark built to admiralty standards then that must mean that a Firefly is a Spitfire built to admiralty standards too. A Helldiver is a Warhawk re-engineered the same way.

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## XBe02Drvr (Jan 11, 2019)

Kevin J said:


> A Helldiver is a Warhawk re-engineered the same way.


Aw, c'mon man, you're rendering the Warhawk an undeserved insult! How about re-engineering the Curtiss Shrike?


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## Kevin J (Jan 11, 2019)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Aw, c'mon man, you're rendering the Warhawk an undeserved insult! How about re-engineering the Curtiss Shrike?


No, I'm insulting the Helldiver which is okay, the Warhawk was a great plane, probably had more aerial victories that the Spitfire whose victories are still on the secrets list.

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## XBe02Drvr (Jan 11, 2019)

Kevin J said:


> No, I'm insulting the Helldiver which is okay, the Warhawk was a great plane, probably had more aerial victories that the Spitfire whose victories are still on the secrets list.


The CO at my first duty station was a WWII Helldiver pilot, and in 1971 a senior Captain on his twilight tour.
When asked about his Helldiver days, his face turned apoplectic, and he snarled: "My career history is none of your business, sailor! The Helldiver was a sorry P.O.S. airplane, and that's all you need to know! Now get out of my sight!"
Cheers,
Wes

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## Kevin J (Jan 11, 2019)

XBe02Drvr said:


> The CO at my first duty station was a WWII Helldiver pilot, and in 1971 a senior Captain on his twilight tour.
> When asked about his Helldiver days, his face turned apoplectic, and he snarled: "My career history is none of your business, sailor! The Helldiver was a sorry P.O.S. airplane, and that's all you need to know! Now get out of my sight!"
> Cheers,
> Wes


Its just that the wing plan form of both Warhawk and Helldiver look so similar. The Firefly would have been okay if they had got a decent speed out of the Mk 1 version.


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## nuuumannn (Jan 11, 2019)

Kevin J said:


> the Spitfire whose victories are still on the secrets list



Hmmm, with good reason!  Nah, it's just that the RAF never officially promulgated ace status, so no lists were ever officially compiled. The only real way is to go through combat reports and/or books on the subject and make a tally, with all the errors and overclaims that this introduces. All you need to do to see this is by comparing different authors' interpretations; according to some books, Ginger Lacey is the highest scoring Battle of Britain ace, some say it's Josef Frantizek, some say Eric Lock. All give different scores for different reasons...

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## ktank (Jan 12, 2019)

fastmongrel said:


> Build in lightness and simplificate
> 
> A favourite quote of Orville Wright though some claim it was Kelly Johnson or Colin Chapman.



I've heard it as "Simplicate and add lightness" and coming from Ed Heinmann. OTOH could have become a common phrase in the aeronautical world.


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## ktank (Jan 12, 2019)

tomo pauk said:


> Yay! Long time no what-if here
> 
> 1. Mk.VIII, as on the Fulmar Mk.I
> 2. 3 is enough, 4 is not available at any rate in 1939/40
> ...



The Typhoon had a beard radiator and was a horror for ditching


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## nuuumannn (Jan 12, 2019)

> If we can kill the Roc, that was produced by Blackburn, then Blackburn can do it.



The Roc was designed by Blackburn, but built by Boulton Paul. Trust me, they didn't want it either; BP had entered its own aircraft into the naval fighter specs and got nowhere!



> The Typhoon had a beard radiator and was a horror for ditching.



Yet bizarrely, Hawker proposed it as an alternative to the Firebrand! Now, if only they fit a radial engine, made the wing a little thinner and strengthened the undercarriage (and rear fuselage!), and maybe even raised the cockpit for improved visibility... Oh wait...




Sea Typhoon descendant

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## tomo pauk (Jan 13, 2019)

ktank said:


> The Typhoon had a beard radiator and was a horror for ditching



Perhaps it was indeed. On the other hand, I've tried to took a page from Fairey, their RR-engined aircraft were mainly with 'beard' radiator and were okay in ditching.


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## Airframes (Jan 13, 2019)

Regarding the poor (bad !) ditching 'qualities of the Typhoon - the radiator wasn't the problem, it was the wing. The Tempest, with the same radiator arrangement, did not have a problem in ditching.

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## fliger747 (Jan 24, 2019)

To some extent the FAA did not view the requirements thru the same glasses as USN. Indeed their mission was envisioned as different, in the Atlantic they were not expected to often engage other fighters, but scouting, patrol, and say interception of bomber types was more likely. From this rose the spec for say the Firefly as a two seater. That said Winkle Brown had quite a soft spot for the arrival of the Martlet when it did.


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## Reluctant Poster (Jan 29, 2019)

RCAFson said:


> The same page states that the Air Ministry states that 50 Seafires = 200 Spitfires... I'll bet the RAF had a few words to say about that proposal, given that this would have severely impacted Spitfire production up to June 1940. The other point is that it would have halted Fulmar development (if Fairey built it) when it was only a few months away from serial production (fairey having delivered it nearly a year in advance of the projected dates) for an aircraft that had never flown and would have severely impacted production of all of Fairey's other naval aircraft.
> 
> The folding wing prototype was not expected to fly until Feb-March 1941, assuming an order in Jan 1940.



One of the advantages that the western allies had over the Germans was that they understood the war was going to go on for some time and therefore they continued the development of longer term projects. The Admiralty's folly was not at least developing a prototype of the navalized spitfire with a view to producing it at a later date. A proper Seafire would have been available earlier.
The other thing to point out is that the RN was the only navy to have an obsession with 2 seat fighters. Both of their main rivals concentrated on single seaters, in Japan's case with exceptionally long range. The idea that a second crewman was needed for navigation was obviously not true


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## RCAFson (Jan 29, 2019)

Reluctant Poster said:


> One of the advantages that the western allies had over the Germans was that they understood the war was going to go on for some time and therefore they continued the development of longer term projects. The Admiralty's folly was not at least developing a prototype of the navalized spitfire with a view to producing it at a later date. A proper Seafire would have been available earlier.
> The other thing to point out is that the RN was the only navy to have an obsession with 2 seat fighters. Both of their main rivals concentrated on single seaters, in Japan's case with exceptionally long range. The idea that a second crewman was needed for navigation was obviously not true



The FAA's secure homing system required a 2nd crew member in the aircraft. The USN's system was easier to use in a single seater (but even at Midway operator error resulted in lost F4Fs) but wasn't ready till 1941. Advances in radar also made life easier for single seat fighters but again it wasn't apparent how rapidly radar would develop.

The Firefly was the same weight as an F4U or F6F and with similar power had similar performance. The BofB and the loss of the Firefly prototype set things back almost two years, but in 1941/42 the Firefly would have been a potent naval fighter and fighter bomber. Also the Sea Hurricane was ready by March 1941 and a folding wing version could have been ready very shortly thereafter, but the lure of the Martlet probably truncated it's development.

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## wuzak (Jan 29, 2019)

RCAFson said:


> The Firefly was the same weight as an F4U or F6F and with similar power had similar performance. The BofB and the loss of the Firefly prototype set things back almost two years, but in 1941/42 the Firefly would have been a potent naval fighter and fighter bomber.



Waiting for its engine.

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## RCAFson (Jan 29, 2019)

wuzak said:


> Waiting for its engine.


Because RR and the UK AM put Griffon development on hold during the BofB and then the RAF poached it from the FAA.

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## wuzak (Jan 29, 2019)

The "poaching" came before the BoB.

The Griffon design was started in 1938. It was realised that with some changes the Griffon could fit a Spitfire, and a redesign took place. This may have been before The original design was complete, and it consisted mainly of repackaging external parts. That occurred during 1939.

The first production Griffon Spitfires started being delivered in October 1943, service starting in early 1943.

The Firefly I was being delivered from March 1943, but did not go into service until July 1944.

The first flight of the Firefly Mk I was December 1941. The first flight of the Spitfire IV/XX was November 1941.

Even if the BoB delayed the Griffon by 6 months, the Firefly wasn't getting into service much before 1943.


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## ThomasP (Jan 31, 2019)

Hello, although I have been visiting your forums for a couple of years, I am new to posting on forums so I apologize ahead of time if I make mistakes.

This post is intended to possibly clarify and answer some questions about why the SeaHurricane was not adopted before the war. It may be a bit long-winded for forum purposes - if so please advise me.


First I would like to stress that the need for a second seat in any carrier based aircraft was not outmoded as such when the US entered WW2 and for the same reasons was not outmoded at the end of the war. The reason for my stating this is as follows:

Prior to WW2 the USN generally prohibited single-seat aircraft from flying over-the-horizon unless they were heading toward large land masses (in daylight), or unless they were accompanied by one or more two-seaters with better navigation capability (in daylight). This was due to numerous serious failures in navigation that sometimes endangered entire squadrons of aircraft, and did result in the loss of a significant number of smaller flights of 1-4 aircraft. Night flying was generally avoided also (other than a minimum amount for training purposes to familiarize the pilots with the dangerous aspects of night operations in case of unplanned situations) due to the recognition of the inherent dangers in terms of landing accidents and failures in navigation. When the USN entered WW2 the official doctrine stressed avoidance of night operations for these same reasons.


The RN/FAA on the other hand had adopted a policy/goal in 1935 of becoming fully night operations capable. This was primarily in order to accomplish the FAA's missions of striking ship targets in harbor, and other shore and near-shore targets, while being relatively immune to enemy retaliation. In order to be able to accomplish the mission the crews needed to be able to navigate at least most of the flight without landmarks while in the dark. This required above average skill in navigation, as well as in night time launch and recovery operations. The RN/FAA found that the navigation skill required was not difficult to instill in the pilot, but that the pilot had a difficult time navigating and piloting at the same. This was partly due to the navigation equipment available at the time and partly due to the difficulty of multi-tasking. With the advent of more capable radios and navigation equipment in the mid-1930s, reliable relatively long range navigation at night became viable, but only if combined with a second crewman. The multi-seat Swordfish with its (for the time) advanced 3-in-1 radio set was the first operational carrier borne aircraft considered suitable for long range strike and reconnaissance by day or night.

By the beginning of WW2 the RN/FAA had the problems mostly worked out and the remaining finer points were hammered out in time for the strike on Taranto and the action vs the Bismarck. With the advent of shipborne and airborne surface search radar the mission to strike ships at sea at long range and at night had become a practical mission.


By contrast, the USN did not focus on improving their night operations during the early war, and were not as concerned with more advanced navigation skills (what might be called blind flying techniques today) as the RN/FAA. This is not to say that the USN was not aware of the benefits of having multi-crew aircraft, it was more a matter of the carrier doctrine adopted, and then prioritizing the type of aircraft put into service, and the crew training within the time available. For the seizing of local air superiority during a strike at the ranges originally imagined, single seat fighter aircraft were considered the best answer, the second crewman requirement imposing unacceptable performance penalties. And if a type of training did not directly go to accomplishing doctrine it was given secondary importance or set aside altogether. Overall this attitude served the USN well in the PTO, with the following exception: during the war 16% of aircraft launched from USN carriers were never seen again, regardless of whether they were assigned to CAP, strike, or reconnaissance, regardless of whether they were launched in clear skies, partly cloudy, or full cloud cover, and regardless of limited visibility (ie hazy) or perfectly clear skies. (The previous statement is based on a USN post-war analysis of USN&USMC aircraft losses in the PTO. I have not been able to find any kind of numerical breakdown of what % of the losses was during what type of mission or of what type of aircraft. The only qualifiers in the report were that while a small but possibly significant % of the losses could be due to mechanical failure, or pilot error - with a very small % possibly due to enemy action - the only available evidence pointed to the vast majority of these losses being due to navigational problems. It was also stated that the 16% value remained more-or-less constant throughout the war. The report stated the stark contrast to the RN/FAA experience, with less than 2% losses due to navigation failures under similar conditions.)

The USN was aware of and alarmed by the losses quite early in the war, but the carrier operational doctrine was working and that was considered paramount, the losses would just have to be accepted.


The Japanese IJN, as mentioned above, also adopted single-seat fighters. They managed the navigation problem through an extremely stringent screening, selection, and training program where navigation was concerned. But even the IJN, with what could be considered far above average flight crews, had problems with losing aircraft due to navigation failures. At the start of the war when the air crews were all 'elite' there were relatively few problems, but as the war progressed the problem increased as more new less well trained air crews entered service. However, even at the start of the war, the IJN squadron and flight leaders were often selected as much for their superior navigation skills as for their leadership qualities.


Just pre-war the RN/FAA carrier doctrine focused on two types of fighters, the single-seat day fighter, and the two-seat long range fighter/reconnaissance aircraft.

The only RN/FAA operational single-seat carrier fighter in 1939 was the SeaGladiator, but it was of limited value due to small fuel load, the previously mentioned navigation problem, and low maximum speed. It had a fuel load marginal for CAP duties and unacceptable for escort or reconnaissance, could not navigate reliably at longer ranges due to the lack of the second crewman, and was considered too slow to intercept the new generation of fast bomber coming into service.

The Hurricane and Spitfire were in land service in limited numbers, and while both types would have solved the speed problem, and could have probably solved the range problem through the use of drop tanks, both were single-seaters which prevented a solution to the navigation problem. Hawker offered a folding wing navalized Hurricane in late-1938 and was turned down by the decision makers for reasons I am not familiar with. Supermarine first offered a folding wing navalized Spitfire in 1941(?) but was turned down due to perceived production issues.

The Fulmar was intended and procured as a temporary solution to meet the need for the two-seat long range fighter/reconnaissance type while the Firefly was developed. It was originally hoped that a speed of just under 300 mph would be achieved, solving the speed problem mentioned above. It had enough fuel to function as CAP, escort, and reconnaissance, and it had the second crewman to help with navigation. As it turned out the actual top speed (247-265 mph) and sustained climb rate (1200-1400 ft/min) were marginal. In spite of its limited performance the Fulmar shot down more enemy aircraft than any other RN/FAA carrier fighter type.

The Firefly was the the original intended two-seat ship-board fighter. If it had entered service when originally intended in 1942 it would have met the requirements of speed, range, and navigation. Delays in development of the Griffon engine, due to the rationalization program of 1940, caused a 1-2 year delay in the Firefly's operational status.

I do not remember the exact range requirement of the FAA navigators operational test, but the qualification test required a flight of over 400 nm total, composed of 3 or more legs, over open ocean, arriving at the destination within a 25 nm radius. The 25 nm radius was considered the maximum range for reliable location finding of the carrier using the Type 72 homing beacon.


One more factor I feel should be mentioned is a problem with intercepting incoming aircraft. Pre-war/pre-radar exercises by both the USN and the RN/FAA revealed that even if there were 3 flights of 4 aircraft each (12 total) at different altitudes (ie above, same, and below the altitude of the incoming enemy) and the weather was clear, there was only a 25% chance of intercepting any particular group of aircraft before they released weapons. During the early war, with radar, the chance of intercept with the same CAP rose to only 40%. It was not until the end of the war in the PTO that the majority of incoming formations/individual aircraft could be reliably intercepted, but it was only possible because of greatly improved radar and radio equipment along with much higher numbers of CAP aircraft. Even during the last of the Japanese air operations against the USN fleet, it was not unusual for some formations/individual aircraft first be spotted by lookouts on the ships, not by radar, and hence there was almost no chance of aerial intercept. This problem of successful intercepts was a big part of the RN/FAA decision to not focus on single-seat single-purpose fighters for CAP duties.

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## fastmongrel (Jan 31, 2019)

ThomasP said:


> Hello,
> 
> 
> > Hello welcome to the forum, that's a great first post.

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## RCAFson (Jan 31, 2019)

Post 244 =


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## XBe02Drvr (Jan 31, 2019)

ThomasP said:


> It may be a bit long-winded for forum purposes - if so please advise me.


The quality of the info far outweighs the length of the post. Bravo Zulu! Welcome aboard, shipmate.
Cheers,
Wes

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## ThomasP (Feb 1, 2019)

Hello again, and thank you for the encouraging welcome.

I think there is one more aspect of the navigation problem I can maybe help expand on.

When I originally read the USN report on the 16% losses mentioned in post#244 above, I was unaware of much of the development history of radio-electronics through the early 1900s, and I readily admit to being appalled by what I interpreted as a rather cavalier attitude by the USN higher-ups toward the loss of lives involved. It turns out that I was at least partially mistaken in my conclusion. I say this for the following reasons:

First reason is the fairly common statement in both anecdotal and in official records of the high regard given the YE-xx homing system used by the USN. (This by itself was not enough to dispel my feelings of anger at my perception of the attitude. I thought perhaps it was apologist propaganda.)

Second, I talked to my brother-in-law who is a radio geek of the highest order. I new that he collected radios from the end of WWI to the 1990s, including military radios, so I mentioned what I had read. He had a very different take on the losses. Basically he said that the YE-xx system was good for the time. His explanation for the problems in navigation despite the Ye-xx system included two major factors:

The first point he brought up is the tendency of radios of the period to not stay on frequency (he used the term "wander"). Apparently the tube and crystal sets would 'wander' for several reasons, including changes in ambient temperature and pressure, changes in internal temperature, unsteady voltage/amperage (ie current), vibration, and shock. This caused many radios and homing receivers (usually preset before launch) to 'wander' off the preset frequency. Apparently, it was very difficult and sometimes close to impossible to retune them in flight unless you really knew what you were doing.

The second point he brought up is the problems in manufacturing design and quality control. Although I had thought of this possibility (I am semi-retired now, but most of my working life was as a machinist-manufacturing engineer-systems engineer) I had not realized the depth of the problem in the late-1930s and early-1940s. This problem was particularly true when it came to the precise manufacture of crystals, and somewhat poorly understood concepts of heat and electrical current regulation in the sets. (It should be noted that even today some of the most common problems with durability reliable performance in modern electronics involves heat and current regulation.) Fresh off the production line, using test gauge quality peripherals, there was significant variance (ie more than 5%) in range due to production problems. Many sets, once installed and factoring in the quality control problems involved in the production of generators, antennae, or even electrical connectors, could not reliably detect the signal at the hoped for ranges.

Point two combined with point one could only increase the chance of loss of the YE signal.

The two points brought up by my brother-in-law, when combined with the range factor, goes far to explain the losses. If the frequency was lost at some time during the flight and this was not realized while still within range of the YE signal, it would be very difficult to reacquire the signal. Any navigation errors away from the YE emitter would then make the reacquisition of the signal almost impossible. The lost aircraft could only hope to return to the radius of the YE signal through old style navigation, using the sun and stars, with the aid of a pylorus or sextant. There were, from I have read, many examples of the carrier radio operators being able to hear the aircrew asking for help, the radio signal gradually getting weaker as the aircraft moved farther away, or remaining somewhat steady as the aircraft flew at right angles, but the aircrew could not not hear the carrier radio operator's replies.

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## XBe02Drvr (Feb 1, 2019)

ThomasP said:


> The first point he brought up is the tendency of radios of the period to not stay on frequency (he used the term "wander").


This had been a problem with practically any "tuned" signal all the way back to Marconi, until the advent of the phase locked loop tuned circuit. These used amplified negative feed back to keep a tuned signal on frequency, and when I went to Avionics "A" School in 1970, were still largely tube driven, and were heavy, expensive, and power-hungry. We each built one in school as a training exercise, and mine used nearly $200 worth of parts, retail value at your local Lafayette Electronics store. Today they come four each on an integrated circuit chip for less than $10.
Cheers,
Wes

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## yulzari (Feb 1, 2019)

Hence giving the task of carrier location to a trained Telegraphist Air Gunner in his own seat in the Royal Navy for their beacon system. The second seat was not normally for a navigator but for the TAG. Had he been a navigator he would have been termed an Observer. In the further ranging strike aircraft (i.e. Swordfish or Albacore) you had a 3 man crew of Pilot, Navigator and TAG. The system involved mobile planned frequencies on a rotating signal with a variable signal at set times so the carrier would only be emitting the signal on one frequency occasionally and in a narrow path at any one moment when operating. The TAG had to listen out at the et times for the fleeting signal as it rotated to plot whence it came. The was negligible chance of an enemy picking up these transmissions at all give their local brevity let alone recognise what they had heard. All in real time so the carrier could launch aeroplanes and later decide to make one or more major changes in speed and heading whilst the strike was in the air and they could still find their way home. The second crewman was well worthwhile at the time and a correct decision.


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## ThomasP (Feb 1, 2019)

Thank you for the info yulzari. Would the second crewmen in the Fulmar and Firefly have been a TAG or an Observer? Or maybe one or the other depending on the mission?


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## fastmongrel (Feb 1, 2019)

ThomasP said:


> *Thank you for the info yulzari. Would the second crewmen in the Fulmar and Firefly have been a TAG or an Observer? Or maybe one or the other depending on the mission?*



Sometimes an Observer flew in Fulmars when they were acting as a lead aircraft. The Club Runs delivering fighters to Malta sometimes used Fulmars for navigation.

The TAG whilst not expected to navigate was often trained unofficially to do basic record keeping and plotting to aid the pilot. Much the same happened in Bomber Command the wireless operator helped the navigator.


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## ThomasP (Feb 3, 2019)

Thank you guys (*
X
 XBe02Drvr
, fast mongrel, 
X
 XBe02Drvr
*), your replies/posts have helped me understand some of the remaining questions I have concerning the navigation problems.


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## ThomasP (Feb 3, 2019)

Although I had to ask my brother-in-law what "amplified negative feed back to keep a tuned signal on frequency" meant.


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## wuzak (Feb 3, 2019)

Welcome to the forum Thomas. Great first post.



ThomasP said:


> The Hurricane and Spitfire were in land service in limited numbers, and while both types would have solved the speed problem, and could have probably solved the range problem through the use of drop tanks, both were single-seaters which prevented a solution to the navigation problem. Hawker offered a folding wing navalized Hurricane in late-1938 and was turned down by the decision makers for reasons I am not familiar with. Supermarine first offered a folding wing navalized Spitfire in 1941(?) but was turned down due to perceived production issues.



The Admiralty were pushing for a navalised Spitfire from 1938. 

Smith at Supermarine proposed a Spitfire with a folding version of the standard wing in 1939. The fold mechanism would have been similar to that used by Grumman, with the wing folding to lay parallel with the fuselage.

A Spitfire was modified to take an arrestor hook in mid-1939, and had flown by October 1939. 

Supermarine also proposed a two seat fighter to specification N8/39, largely based on the Spitfire but with a redesigned folding wing. There was a version to be powered by the Merlin and another to be powered by the Griffon.

The designs were rejected based on the basis that production of Spitfires would be severely affected. 

Fairey was in the discussions for the original folding wing Spitfires, but were busy building the prototype Fulmar. The timeline for the folding wing Spitfire was impractical, and would have pushed back the Fulmar prototype.


The Admiralty weren't too keen on a Sea Hurricane on the basis that the Hurricane's performance was not that much better than the German bombers, the Ju 88 in particular, and the Sea Hurricane would have lesser performance than the standard Hurricane.

Sea Hurricanes did eventuate before the Seafire, but that may be related to the needs of home defence, which delayed the deployment of Spitfires to other theatres.


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## Kevin J (Feb 3, 2019)

With so many "What If" scenarios to choose from, I thought I'd remind everyone of actual production figures. So here we go.
British Production of Aircraft By Year During The Second World War
Lets begin with Spitfire production. 171 built in the last 4 months of 1939, 1252 in 1940 and 19898 during WW2. Total production 20334 minus 341 Mk 22's and 24's because they are post war equals 19993, so only 95 built before WW2 started, then roughly 100 per month during 1940. Castle Bromwich begins delivery during the BoB with maybe 100 delivered by its end. Roughly 50 Spitfires will be required per squadron for every 6 months in the front line, so (95 + 171 + 1252 =) 1518 gives you 30 squadrons for 6 months or 20 for 9 months front line service.
To get a Seafire in service earlier you need another source of production dedicated to what will be a bespoke naval variant. Enter Westland Aircraft Co which produced a batch of 50 Spitfire I's between July and September 1941. So the earliest a hooked Spitfire becomes available Summer 1941 as opposed to late 1941, which could mean that the Spitfire FIII/LIII enters service in 1942/43 not 1943/44. Of course priorities change during the BoB and the Blitz and the government concentrates on building aircraft to counter the immediate threat for almost a year. So we're back to the actual service entry dates for Seafires.
Next the Hurricane. Multiple production lines at Hawkers, then Glosters, CC&F and Austin so lots of spare capacity. The RN wasn't expecting its fighters to have to counter enemy single seat fighters or fast long range twins so there's no urgent need for a Sea Hurricane. Its only with the loss of Norway, France and the entry of Italy into the war that the RN suddenly needs a high performance single seat fighter that's ready for operations immediately. Take a standard Hurricane, add the navy specified equipment and you have an instant carrier capable fighter. Could it have been available earlier? Of course, yes. What would have been its opponents? The Me 110 in 1941 in the Arctic and the Med, and the A6M2 in the Far East in 1941/42. So you don't actually need the Sea Hurricane any earlier or with folding wings, also the RN had both old and new carriers with wide enough lifts to store Sea Hurricanes below deck.
Then of course there was the Martlet which I'm sure was a damn sight cheaper than Seafires, and better engineered from the outset for carrier duty. If you took a Spitfire I, added 20 mm cannon, arrestor hook and catapult spools to it, you get a 335 mph fighter, same as an F4F-3, but less sturdy and with shorter range. Surely its a no brainer, you want a Wildcat.


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## XBe02Drvr (Feb 3, 2019)

ThomasP said:


> Although I had to ask my brother-in-law what "amplified negative feed back to keep a tuned signal on frequency" meant.


That was a scandalously over simplified explanation on my part. I presume he filled in the details. Pretty amazing device, isn't it? It's made possible huge improvements in audio, video, IT, communications, radar, sonar, fire control, robotics, process control, and the list goes on.
Cheers,
Wes


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## Reluctant Poster (Feb 3, 2019)

ThomasP said:


> during the war 16% of aircraft launched from USN carriers were never seen again, regardless of whether they were assigned to CAP, strike, or reconnaissance, regardless of whether they were launched in clear skies, partly cloudy, or full cloud cover, and regardless of limited visibility (ie hazy) or perfectly clear skies.


This simply cannot be true. No military organization can sustain anywhere near those losses and be an effective fighting force. Your force would be almost completely wiped out after 10 missions. If this were true being a USN airman would be by far the most dangerous assignment in World War II, dwarfing the loss rates suffered by heavy bombers over Germany. Note that 4% loss rate was considered to be the maximum sustainable rate for bomber crews


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## XBe02Drvr (Feb 3, 2019)

Reluctant Poster said:


> This simply cannot be true. No military organization can sustain anywhere near those losses and be an effective fighting force.


You don't suppose the intended statistic was "16% of all aircraft assigned to carrier operations were lost, and most were lost to navigation error", making it a lifetime loss rate rather than a per-sortie loss rate?
Cheers,
Wes

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## Reluctant Poster (Feb 6, 2019)

Shortround6 said:


> Somebody may want to do a ship by ship breakdown of this as one ship (the Unicorn) is blamed for up to 21 accidents at Salerno.
> 7 carriers were at Salerno and four of them were the even smaller and slower, escort carriers.


According to David Brown in his book The Seafire-The Spitfire that went to Sea, "Unicorn, larger and somewhat faster than the escort carriers, had her own particular characteristics. The airflow around the island and flight deck had not been so carefully controlled as in the regular Fleet units, in whose design aerodynamic considerations had played a significant part, and there was a violent wind-shear to give a 'cliff-edge' effect as the round down was crossed on landing. Aircraft were thus subjected to heavy landings and a large portion of her own three squadrons' 21 deck-landing casualties were put out of action with strained or broken undercarriages and aft fuselages, as well as two of 894 and one of 885 Squadrons' aircraft."

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## fliger747 (Feb 6, 2019)

Indeed, in the Med, Sea Hurricanes in some instances were unable to catch the JU 88's. Not quite as Hilarious as the Swordfish's being unable to catch the Italian Battle Fleet steaming into a headwind. 

The Hurricane had a number of primary issues that worked against it as a carrier aircraft. As with a number of semi successful naval aircraft, the view over the nose on approach was very bad. The Sea Spit was flown with a bit of a slip, however with the Hutticane this technique produced a rather severe nose down pitch. Winkle Brown evidently had a very bad view making the first carrier landing, not realizing that the carrier wasn't steaming straight into the wind, the cables were down and no "batsman". He discovered after landing they were all "at lunch". Also the ventral radiator supposedly gave the ditching properties of a submarine, though in the event the Hurricat pilots seem to have made out somehow. 

Best way to make an effective sea Hurricane at opined at the beginning of this thread, begin with a Merlin, two wings, an empennage a hook and work from there. The main reason this stuff was never done (besides budget)? It was not appreciated that the RN would be fighting against land based fighters of the performance that eventually occurred. This even in the European theater worked against the well loved "Martlett" which simply didn't have the performance needed against 109's and FW 190's.

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## fliger747 (Feb 7, 2019)

In his book "Wings of the Navy" Winkle Brown made an interesting statement, "not a single British designed single seat purpose built naval fighter was employed at sea during WWII". Interesting as they had certainly been at the forefront of development of Naval Aviation between the wars.


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## ThomasP (Feb 8, 2019)

First, my apologies to fast mongrel for aiding in wandering off the original topic.

Second, my apologies for not being very clear in my original post. When I read the report my interpretation was that 16% of the aircraft that operated off of carriers were lost due to navigation failures. This could maybe stated more clearly as: of all the airframes that operated off of carriers at one time or another, 16 out of 100 were lost due to navigation failure. Not 16% of aircraft per sortie, nor 16% of all aircraft lost.

The only other significant detail that I remember from the report is that the phrase 'lost due to fuel starvation' (usually the end result of navigation failure) seemed to be an alternate catch phrase to 'navigation failure'.

I was not intending ever to be posting on forums about this type of subject and therefore did not bother to record where I found the report. I wish now that I had done so.


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## ThomasP (Feb 8, 2019)

On the subject of making a better SeaHurricane, a few years ago I made a couple of ~engineering drawings of a folding wing version. The type of fold was a simple break-wing mechanism (similar to what was used on the Devastator or Vindicator). The resulting tail down footprint with wings folded was 31' 2"L x 18' 6"W x 13' 1"H. The airframe could have been moved around the hanger with the wings folded, but folding and unfolding would have to have been done between the deep support beams, or on deck. The 18' 6" folded width would have fit on the 22' wide elevators of the armored deck carriers well enough with careful positioning. The folded width for the Barracuda was 18' 3" and that of the TBF/TBM was 19' 0" (the tail width of the TBF/TBM was 20'10") and both airframes were operated from the armored deck carriers in large numbers. The manual folding mechanism would have added only about 186 lbs to the TARE weight.

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## ThomasP (Feb 8, 2019)

I need to correct two errors in my original post #244. (I found my original notes on the Type 72 beacon.)

The reliable reception range of the Type 72 signal by an aircraft fitted with a R.1147 receiver was considered to be 40 nm at 2000 ft altitude. The 25 nm radius was simply considered the minimum reliable reception range of the Type 72 under the worst conditions.

Also, the navigation qualification test required arrival at the destination within a 12 nm radius (not 25 nm).

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## yulzari (Feb 9, 2019)

In the duration of a sortie the carrier can only have moved a certain distance. If it is beyond the reception range it is a comparatively simple search pattern to get within reception range. Of course that implies carrying enough fuel to carry out that search. If the carrier is at cruising speed the potential location is even smaller than if it were at maximum speed. It was enough for the Royal Navy to be an all hours all weather carrier force limited only by extreme weather preventing deck use at all.


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## RCAFson (Feb 9, 2019)

fliger747 said:


> Indeed, in the Med, Sea Hurricanes in some instances were unable to catch the JU 88's. Not quite as Hilarious as the Swordfish's being unable to catch the Italian Battle Fleet steaming into a headwind.
> 
> The Hurricane had a number of primary issues that worked against it as a carrier aircraft. As with a number of semi successful naval aircraft, the view over the nose on approach was very bad. The Sea Spit was flown with a bit of a slip, however with the Hutticane this technique produced a rather severe nose down pitch. Winkle Brown evidently had a very bad view making the first carrier landing, not realizing that the carrier wasn't steaming straight into the wind, the cables were down and no "batsman". He discovered after landing they were all "at lunch". Also the ventral radiator supposedly gave the ditching properties of a submarine, though in the event the Hurricat pilots seem to have made out somehow.
> 
> Best way to make an effective sea Hurricane at opined at the beginning of this thread, begin with a Merlin, two wings, an empennage a hook and work from there. The main reason this stuff was never done (besides budget)? It was not appreciated that the RN would be fighting against land based fighters of the performance that eventually occurred. This even in the European theater worked against the well loved "Martlett" which simply didn't have the performance needed against 109's and FW 190's.



If you look at aircraft geometry the Hurricane has a good view over the nose and seems comparable to a Martlet. In FAA service Sea Hurricanes seemed to have had a lower accident rate than Martlets.

The Ju-88 was a very fast light bomber and it couldn't be caught by a Marlet or F4F-4 either under similar circumstances.

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## Kevin J (Feb 9, 2019)

RCAFson said:


> If you look at aircraft geometry the Hurricane has a good view over the nose and seems comparable to a Martlet. In FAA service Sea Hurricanes seemed to have had a lower accident rate than Martlets.
> 
> The Ju-88 was a very fast light bomber and it couldn't be caught by a Marlet or F4F-4 either under similar circumstances.


It certainly had a much higher kill rate, about 300% more.


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## XBe02Drvr (Feb 9, 2019)

RCAFson said:


> If you look at aircraft geometry the Hurricane has a good view over the nose and seems comparable to a Martlet.


The problem with that comparison is that the issue here is visibility over the nose IN APPROACH CONFIGURATION AT APPROACH SPEED, not a comparison of 3-views on paper. If the Hurricane has a nose high attitude at approach speed, that long schnoz is going to be a problem. This is often the case with landlubber fighters sent to sea.
OTOH, the Hurri's wide spaced landing gear would tend towards fewer landing accidents.
Cheers,
Wes


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## fastmongrel (Feb 9, 2019)

XBe02Drvr said:


> The problem with that comparison is that the issue here is visibility over the nose IN APPROACH CONFIGURATION AT APPROACH SPEED, not a comparison of 3-views on paper. If the Hurricane has a nose high attitude at approach speed, that long schnoz is going to be a problem. This is often the case with landlubber fighters sent to sea.
> OTOH, the Hurri's wide spaced landing gear would tend towards fewer landing accidents.
> Cheers,
> Wes



It doesnt seem to be particulary nose high landing on a runway. In fact it looks pretty near level.
Hurricane Sunset Landing

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## tomo pauk (Feb 9, 2019)

We can recall that 1st people that landed Hurricanes on carrier were never trained for that, so I'd say that (Sea) Hurricane was one suitable aircraft to land on the carrier.


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## XBe02Drvr (Feb 10, 2019)

tomo pauk said:


> We can recall that 1st people that landed Hurricanes on carrier were never trained for that, so I'd say that (Sea) Hurricane was one suitable aircraft to land on the carrier.


Sounds pretty convincing to me.

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## fastmongrel (Feb 10, 2019)

tomo pauk said:


> We can recall that 1st people that landed Hurricanes on carrier were never trained for that, so I'd say that (Sea) Hurricane was one suitable aircraft to land on the carrier.



And didn't have arrestor hooks. I believe all the RAF ground crew did was let some air out of the tyres.

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## Glider (Feb 10, 2019)

fastmongrel said:


> It doesnt seem to be particulary nose high landing on a runway. In fact it looks pretty near level.
> Hurricane Sunset Landing


Its worth noting that this is a Sea Hurricane.


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## ThomasP (Feb 11, 2019)

Hi guys, I have a question of fastmongrel and for those of you who have been posting on the forum for a while. I have been looking into my notes and at a few new sources and have found more information on the losses suffered by carrier aircraft squadrons in WWII. I was wondering if I should start a new thread, so as not to diverge even more from the original subject of this thread, or if it is OK to continue with fastmongrel and others to continue posts about navigation problems on this thread.


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## fastmongrel (Feb 11, 2019)

ThomasP said:


> Hi guys, I have a question of fastmongrel and for those of you who have been posting on the forum for a while. I have been looking into my notes and at a few new sources and have found more information on the losses suffered by carrier aircraft squadrons in WWII. I was wondering if I should start a new thread, so as not to diverge even more from the original subject of this thread, or if it is OK to continue with fastmongrel and others to continue posts about navigation problems on this thread.



If you want to add to this thread by all means post it.

However if you have lots of info it's probably best to start a new thread. If you put it into this thread it might get missed by people who aren't interested in the Sea Hurricane. Also when a thread has been running for a while it gets fewer people viewing it.

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## Clayton Magnet (Feb 11, 2019)

fliger747 said:


> Indeed, in the Med, Sea Hurricanes in some instances were unable to catch the JU 88's


Just like Hellcats couldn't catch the Ki-46 when it appeared


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## MycroftHolmes (Feb 11, 2019)

I've never understood the idea that the Hurricane was particularly bad when it came to ditching. I've no doubt that aircraft with a belly-scoop like the Hurricane or Mustang would be worse than something like the Spitfire, but any radial-engined aircraft would be worse because of the flat nose. I've seen film of Avengers and Hellcats ditching and what happens in the vast majority of cases is that the tail hits the water, the nose goes down and digs into the sea, and the plane flips onto its back.


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## buffnut453 (Feb 11, 2019)

Clayton Magnet said:


> Just like Hellcats couldn't catch the Ki-46 when it appeared



Do you mean "appeared" in the tactical sense (ie they could see it but they couldn't reach it) or in the procurement sense of the Ki-46 appearing in the front line? If the latter, it might be worth noting that the Ki-46 was in service long before the Hellcat.


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## Clayton Magnet (Feb 12, 2019)

buffnut453 said:


> Do you mean "appeared" in the tactical sense (ie they could see it but they couldn't reach it) or in the procurement sense of the Ki-46 appearing in the front line? If the latter, it might be worth noting that the Ki-46 was in service long before the Hellcat.


The former. I was just making a statement that Hurricanes not catching Ju-88's was not usual. 
I may be mistaken, but I believe Hellcats had difficulty intercepting C6N's as well


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## fastmongrel (Feb 12, 2019)

Clayton Magnet said:


> but I believe Hellcats had difficulty intercepting C6N's as well



To be fair I cant think of any wartime carrier aircraft could reliably catch a C6N it was a speedy bird.


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## nuuumannn (Feb 12, 2019)

fliger747 said:


> Interesting as they had certainly been at the forefront of development of Naval Aviation between the wars.



It is interesting; after the Nimrod, the FAA seemed to abandon serious work on a single seater bar the Sea Gladiator, but as I pointed out in another thread the RN had plenty of projects going on beginning before the outbreak of war for single seaters that they had no reason to believe that none of them would actually reach a carrier deck during the war. The Blackburn Firebrand had a lot riding on it; that it became a bit of a non-starter was certainly not the navy's fault and Hawker's offer of a Sea Typhoon as a back-up was there also, as unrealistic as it became with the structural issues the Typhoon suffered. There was also the all-wooden Miles single-seat naval fighter based on the stop-gap Miles M.20, which again, realistically wasn't going to get built. The refusal of the Admiralty's request for Sea Spitfires was met by the order of Grumman F4Fs, or Martlets as an interim, but that's all they were meant to be, as was the Sea Hurricane. The navy wanted Spitfires and the Firebrand.


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## Kevin J (Feb 13, 2019)

Clayton Magnet said:


> The former. I was just making a statement that Hurricanes not catching Ju-88's was not usual.
> I may be mistaken, but I believe Hellcats had difficulty intercepting C6N's as well


It wasn't just the Hurricane that couldn't catch the Ju 88, neither could the Seafire IIc during Operation Torch, which is why it was given the low rated Merlin 32 to become the LIIc and hopefully everyone knows what happened to that one at Salerno. IIRC not a single victory although it did manage to drive off the Fw 190A jabo's.


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## Kevin J (Feb 13, 2019)

fastmongrel said:


> To be fair I cant think of any wartime carrier aircraft could reliably catch a C6N it was a speedy bird.


Only the Corsair, IIRC.


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## fastmongrel (Feb 13, 2019)

Kevin J said:


> Only the Corsair, IIRC.



Did the Corsair catch a C6N on a recce flight or did it intercept it when the C6 was being used as a fighter or Kamikaze. A recon version C6N could fly higher faster and further than a wartime Corsair, it was a remarkable aircraft.

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## Admiral Beez (Aug 5, 2020)

fliger747 said:


> In his book "Wings of the Navy" Winkle Brown made an interesting statement, "not a single British designed single seat purpose built naval fighter was employed at sea during WWII".


This statement is a little disingenuous. With the exception of the Fairey Flycatcher and the postwar Supermarine Attacker and Scimitar, every single seat fighter operated by the RN since the beginning of naval aviation has been either a shared RAF design or an off the shelf USN type. The arguably, very best carrier based piston fighter of all time, the Hawker Sea Fury was a RAF type, and the FAA did just fine with it. Sharing a type with the RAF isn’t worthy of Captain Brown’s scorn or stigma.

In its entire history of naval aviation, CVL and CVEs aside, from the Courageous class of 92 years ago to today’s Queen Elizabeth class Britain has operated all of fourteen fast fleet carriers. It makes no sense to design a dedicated naval fighter for such small deck numbers, the Fulmar and Firefly should never have existed, and should have gone straight from the Nimrod and Sea Gladiator to the Sea Hurricane and then Seafire.

As a similarly small sized economy and industrial power (relative to the US), Japan made the same mistake as the British Fulmar/Firefly program in running dual track IJN and IJAF fighter programs. Instead, the Zero and Oscar should have been one type, with mods for sea and land use. Japan’s industrial capacity was even much smaller than Britain’s, so the need to pursue such efficiencies was even greater.

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## nuuumannn (Aug 6, 2020)

Brown? Voicing a slightly inflammatory opinion?


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## yulzari (Aug 6, 2020)

Admiral Beez said:


> As a similarly small sized economy and industrial power (relative to the US), Japan made the same mistake as the British Fulmar/Firefly program in running dual track IJN and IJAF fighter programs. Instead, the Zero and Oscar should have been one type, with mods for sea and land use.


These are the same people who could not agree on the same 7.7mm small arms cartridge...........

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## tomo pauk (Aug 6, 2020)

Admiral Beez said:


> This statement is a little disingenuous. With the exception of the Fairey Flycatcher and the postwar Supermarine Attacker and Scimitar, every single seat fighter operated by the RN since the beginning of naval aviation has been either a shared RAF design or an off the shelf USN type. The arguably, very best carrier based piston fighter of all time, the Hawker Sea Fury was a RAF type, and the FAA did just fine with it. Sharing a type with the RAF isn’t worthy of Captain Brown’s scorn or stigma.
> 
> ...



The same Sea Fury that flew zero combat sorties during the ww2? 
RAF used the Sea Fury??

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