# The German Army...



## Lucky13 (Dec 2, 2013)

What was it that made the German Army so successful in the Beginning of WWII, was it their training, education, officer schools etc.?
How did these factors compare between the fighting armies?
What education did the NCO's and higher ranking officers receive?
Was it much of a difference between Army, Navy and Air Force?

Not interested in the 'political education' here, just the pure military one...


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## gjs238 (Dec 2, 2013)

Lucky13 said:


> What was it that made the German Army so successful in the Beginning of WWII,



The same can be asked of the Japanese as well.
I've long felt it is a matter of unbalanced, or mismatched forces, surprise, and momentum.

The Axis did best when their opponents were weak.
As the years went by, momentum was lost and a sort of parity was achieved.
Finally, momentum swung to the side of the Allies and the war reversed.
Then the Allies did best when their opponents were weak.


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## GrauGeist (Dec 2, 2013)

What gave the Wehrmacht an edge initially, was it's mobility and close air support. If you look at their performance early on, they enjoyed great successes with this formula, but as the air superiority started to diminish, so did their gains.

Eventually, the Wehrmacht suffered the same fate their opponents experienced early in the war, when the Allies gained aerial supremacy over the battlefield. Without the luxury of air dominance, they had to restrict movements and tactics or else be mauled before they ever made contact with opposing ground units.


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## michaelmaltby (Dec 2, 2013)

"....was it their training, education, officer schools etc.?"

They started wars on_ their _terms ..... preemptive.


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## Angels one-five (Dec 2, 2013)

Some of the themes that always seems to appear for me when reading about German battlefield successes is a sound doctrine encompassing all-arms battle and Auftragstaktik - a mission command ethos that enabled all levels of command to support the higher commanders intent - permeating through the officer and NCO corps. Of course these are generalisations and a simplification of why the Wehrmacht was such a capable force, but the doctrine that underpinned integrated all-arms battlegroups was not really practiced effectively by any of the Western Allies. I think the Germans managed to develop the thinking soldier earlier on than others and it is no coincidence that Mission command is now a feature of most joined-up Armies.

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## vinnye (Dec 2, 2013)

Not sure, but what about motivation?
Since Germany was crippled from the WW1 settlement and its reparations, a lot of Germans felt that this was unfair and unjust and had a score to settle - mostly with the French?


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## davebender (Dec 2, 2013)

Operational doctrine, leadership and training. The same factors that made the German Army so formidable during WWI.


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## pattle (Dec 2, 2013)

In a nut shell the Germans knew how to use modern weapons such as tanks and aircraft where the British and French did not.


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## Crimea_River (Dec 2, 2013)

Our chief weapon is surprise, fear and surprise; two chief weapons, fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency! Er, among our chief weapons are: fear, surprise, ruthless efficiency, and near fanatical devotion to the Pope! Um, I'll come in again...

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## Shortround6 (Dec 2, 2013)

There are a lot of things the Germans had going for them at the beginning of the war. Better training of NCO's and junior officers for one. A real emphasis on these leaders coming up with a plan of action in just a few minutes and communicating it the plan to the units (or men) needed to carry it out. One saying was a good (or even not so good) plan that you can start putting in action in 5 minutes beats the best plan in the world that starts an hour later. ( I may have botched that up but hope it gives the idea). The Germans relied more on radio communication than other armies. They still used field phones to a very large extent but most other armies use of radios was very sketchy. This allowed the Germans to react quicker to changing situations. The Germans were also partially motorized, even a "standard" division ( if the Germans had such a thing) that had thousands of horses had enough trucks that the supply train for the divisional artillery had many more tons of ammo than the equivalent Polish of French Divisions. 
Even if the men are marching on foot, how much artillery support do they have (rounds per gun per day) and how fast can they resupply? 

There are many more reasons why the German army at low levels out performed most other armies.


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## parsifal (Dec 3, 2013)

This is altogether the wrong question. The question that needs to be answered is why, despite having so many overwhelming advantages, they still manged to screw the pooch and lose. 

The Germans entered the war with greater economic potential, better trained manpower, a more cohesive and decisive leadership, more friends, better and more numerous equipment levels, better leadership, effective doctrines, higher levels of motorization central positioninterior lines surprise, and many other advantages. They still managed to lose the initiaitve in the west by 1941, upset their friends, isolate themselves, fight too many wars at the same time, waste their strength on unimportant fronts, become sloppy in their security, waste their military leadership, lose their training edges, mismanage their economy and so many other failures. And yet, people across the world belive in the myth of superior german war performance during the war.

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## DonL (Dec 3, 2013)

Angels one-five said:


> Some of the themes that always seems to appear for me when reading about German battlefield successes is a sound doctrine encompassing all-arms battle and Auftragstaktik - a mission command ethos that enabled all levels of command to support the higher commanders intent - permeating through the officer and NCO corps. Of course these are generalisations and a simplification of why the Wehrmacht was such a capable force, but the doctrine that underpinned integrated all-arms battlegroups was not really practiced effectively by any of the Western Allies. I think the Germans managed to develop the thinking soldier earlier on than others and it is no coincidence that Mission command is now a feature of most joined-up Armies.



I think your analyse got it to the point especially for the Heer and partly for the LW, the KM is an other issue. 



> This is altogether the wrong question. The question that needs to be answered is why, despite having so many overwhelming advantages, they still manged to screw the pooch and lose.
> 
> The Germans entered the war with greater economic potential, better trained manpower, a more cohesive and decisive leadership, more friends, better and more numerous equipment levels, better leadership, effective doctrines, higher levels of motorization central positioninterior lines surprise, and many other advantages. They still managed to lose the initiaitve in the west by 1941, upset their friends, isolate themselves, fight too many wars at the same time, waste their strength on unimportant fronts, become sloppy in their security, waste their military leadership, lose their training edges, mismanage their economy and so many other failures. And yet, people across the world belive in the myth of superior german war performance during the war.



Your whole post is political motivated and has very little to do with the intention of the thread, the focus on battlefield success and the reasons for this success.

A while back your posted this:

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/polls/should-allies-have-bypassed-italy-32824-4.html

from post 46-71.

The Germans entered the war with greater economic potential (debatetable), better trained manpower, a more cohesive and decisive leadership( only military), more friends (wrong), better and more numerous equipment levels (numerous is wrong), better leadership (only military), effective doctrines, higher levels of motorization central positioninterior lines surprise, and many other advantages. They still managed to lose the initiaitve in the west by 1941 (political), upset their friends (political), isolate themselves (political), fight too many wars at the same time (political), waste their strength on unimportant fronts (political), become sloppy in their security, waste their military leadership (political), lose their training edges, mismanage their economy (political) and so many other failures. And yet, people across the world belive in the myth of superior german war performance during the war.

Superior german battlefield performance isn't a myth and the military leadership *are not the political leadership* and they arn't the decision-maker for nearly all your arguments. 

From the post starter:



> Not interested in the 'political education' here, just the pure military one...

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## fastmongrel (Dec 3, 2013)

You could ask why were Germanys opponents so bad. The French Army shouldnt have collapsed like a punctured balloon, when they fought the Germans on more equal terms they generally gave the Heer a bloody nose. If the French Army had fought in May 40 more like it fought in June 40 (when things were terminal) its quite possible that Germany would have got no further than they did in 1914. The BEF didnt exactly cover itself in glory but at least retreated in generally good order. I sometimes read about the Fall of France and shake my head "How could Armies and there political masters get so many things so wrong", is it a case that Democracies are generally not very good at the start of wars but at least learn from there mistakes if given a chance.

The armies of Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands were little more than border guards so dont really count. As for Poland I dont know enough about the Polish Army or the September campaign to comment.

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## fastmongrel (Dec 3, 2013)

Lucky13 said:


> Not interested in the 'political education' here, just the pure military one...



Unfortunately politics is too tangled up with the military to talk about military matters on its own. The military is an arm of government just like diplomacy and economics without discussing Germanys (and its opponents) home political/economic situation you cant discuss its military organisation the two go hand in hand.

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## DonL (Dec 3, 2013)

fastmongrel said:


> Unfortunately politics is too tangled up with the military to talk about military matters on its own. The military is an arm of government just like diplomacy and economics without discussing Germanys (and its opponents) home political/economic situation you cant discuss its military organisation the two go hand in hand.




I heavily disagree!

The education and training of the german Army had nothing to do with the Nazi Regime.
The doctrine of Auftragstaktik and combined all-arms (Infantry, LW, tanks, artillery and anti-tank units), had also nothing to do with the Nazi regime.
The whole organisation of the Wehrmacht, regiments and division (infantry and tank), except the Oberkommando of the Wehrmacht had also nothing to do with the Nazi regime.
All this was developed and worked out between 1920-1939 from the german military leadership of the Reichwehr and the Wehrmacht.
It is well known that the german military leadership was educated unpolitical. The highest General, which was a real Nazi was von Reichenau, not anyone which much influence to the named issues.
The Wehrmacht and it's leadership was weather involved which were the Allies of Germany, nor at which time the Nazi Regime declared war on other Nations. Also it was to no time involved in the war economy organisation!

Now we can discuss the military success compare to the Polish-, French, GB- and Russian Army at the first three years and the reasons, or we can make destructive comments and posts, which only involve political and econimical Nazi reasons.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 3, 2013)

parsifal said:


> And yet, people across the world belive in the myth of superior german war performance during the war.



Because it was NOT a myth on the unit level. Say Division or smaller. Either that or studies made during the war were attempts to cover up allied bungling of small unit tactics and training. If German troops were ( to pick a number out of a Hat) 1.3 times more effective than allied army "A" troops it doesn't matter to the out come of the war if the German leadership bungles things so badly that they have to fight 2-3-4 times their numbers. Their "edge" gets swamped. 
And there is only so much that combat units can do. They are dependent on supply and the German army units almost always operating on a shoestring ( a broken, tied together one at that) after the first few campaigns. 

And like ALL armies, there were some very good units and some not so good units so you are looking at averages and not specific examples. 
The French get a bit of a bum rap when some of their units fought very well but their leadership let them down. And leadership can include the command structure and signals. If the high command fails to "see" that Unit XX is exposed and about to be cut off because unit YY has retreated and _also fails_ to get orders to Unit XX to withdraw in a timely fashion then the blame lies with the high command (bad reconnaissance, bad signaling, bad situational awareness) and NOT with Unit XX which may have fought well.


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## pattle (Dec 3, 2013)

You have to remember that politics was involved heavily in certain German military decisions such as Stalingrad, and it is also worth remembering that German military leadership did make crucial mistakes that lost decisive battles.


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## DonL (Dec 3, 2013)

pattle said:


> You have to remember that politics was involved heavily in certain German military decisions such as Stalingrad, and it *is also worth remembering that German military leadership did make crucial mistakes that lost decisive battles.*



Which decisive battles or any battles were lost through crucial mistakes of the military Army leaders?


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## michaelmaltby (Dec 3, 2013)

"...Which decisive battles or any battles were lost through crucial mistakes of the military Army leaders?"

Was putting the Romanians and Italian forces at the end of your flank at Stalingrad the _wisest _military deployment -- DonL ...? In hindsight ..... it was the weak spot and Chuikov cracked it.

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## DonL (Dec 3, 2013)

This was also a political decision from several primary sources.

Both AoK 6 and Heeresgruppe B wanted emphatically a mixed flank protection with much more german troops.
The Leaders of Romania and Italy insisted that their Army's could only be apllied as closed units. 
They threatened to call their Army's back if their Army's would be mixed with german divisions.

Both Romanians and Italians were very sensitive and bigheaded at this issue, because the german local military leaders knew the lower fighting power of the axis Army groups, but Hitler had not the nuts at several conferences to this issue to enforce the opinion of his local military leaders against Romania and Italy.

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## fastmongrel (Dec 3, 2013)

DonL said:


> I heavily disagree!
> 
> The education and training of the german Army had nothing to do with the Nazi Regime.
> The doctrine of Auftragstaktik and combined all-arms (Infantry, LW, tanks, artillery and anti-tank units), had also nothing to do with the Nazi regime.
> ...



I dont believe that the German armed forces operated in a political vacuum thats impossible an army is an arm of government. Armies dont usually go to war with another country, nor do the the army leaders do what they fancy they are directed by the government's policy. Better tactics which the Germans certainly had and better weapons (debatable) do not win campaigns. Without the Nazi government the Army wouldnt have had the new weapons to go with the tactics, without the Nazis the Army wouldn't have been anywhere near as big and without the Nazis or a similar government the Army wouldnt have gone to war no matter how much they wanted to.

As for the Army leadership being apolitical well they must have been the first and so far unique in that respect, generals are politicians first and soldiers second.


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## DonL (Dec 3, 2013)

fastmongrel said:


> I dont believe that the German armed forces operated in a political vacuum thats impossible an army is an arm of government. Armies dont usually go to war with another country, nor do the the army leaders do what they fancy they are directed by the government's policy. Better tactics which the Germans certainly had and better weapons (debatable) do not win campaigns. Without the Nazi government the Army wouldnt have had the new weapons to go with the tactics, without the Nazis the Army wouldn't have been anywhere near as big and without the Nazis or a similar government the Army wouldnt have gone to war no matter how much they wanted to.
> 
> As for the Army leadership being apolitical well they must have been the first and so far unique in that respect, generals are politicians first and soldiers second.



I totaly disagree!

Your claim of how big the Army was is right all other claims are to my opinion wrong.

The first and main goal of every government of the Weimarer Republik was to eliminate the Versaille Treaty and rearm the Reichswehr later Wehrmacht, equal if it was SPD, Zentrum or other parties. And the rearm included an Air Force, Navy and at least 500000 men Heer.

The combined arms doctrine were developed from Ludwig Beck and his stuff at 1932-1933, also the doctrine of modern tank doctrine were developed from Nehring, Guderian and Lutz also 1932-1933.

So all Allied Generals and German Generals in WWI and WWII were politicans first?
Which of these generals equal from which nation had real political power through elections or Houses of Parliaments?
You are aware that the Nazi Regime was a dictatorship with SS and Gestapo, which of the german Generals had political power?

Ludwig Beck withdraw from the Oberkommando des Heeres, because he didn't agree with the politics of Hitler since 1936 and also the german military leadership planed a subversion 1938 through the CSSR issue, which was prevent through the conference of Munich.

Please name Allied Generals/Admirals which had political power to avoid the WWI or WWII?
At which non military dictatorship or democracy the military leaders had the political power to decide about the declarations of war?


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## stona (Dec 3, 2013)

DonL said:


> The doctrine of Auftragstaktik and combined all-arms (Infantry, LW, tanks, artillery and anti-tank units), had also nothing to do with the Nazi regime.



But without the Nazi regime there would have been much less of all the above and no Luftwaffe at all! Difficult to develop or implement such a doctrine in that case.

It is impossible to separate the military and political in any state. National Socialist Germany was no different.

You cannot separate the German armed forces from Nazism, that is a dangerous revisionism completely unsupported by historical fact.

Cheers

Steve


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## DonL (Dec 3, 2013)

stona said:


> But without the Nazi regime there would have been much less of all the above and no Luftwaffe at all! Difficult to develop or implement such a doctrine in that case.
> 
> It is impossible to separate the military and political in any state. National Socialist Germany was no different.
> 
> ...



Please Stona do not assume something to me, what I haven't post or said.

I don't deny that the Wehrmacht (military leadership) was involved in war crimes and also was partly (begining 1933)to be game to be exploit from the Nazi regime!

I deny that the german combined arms and tank doctrine had anything to do with the Nazi-regime and I also deny that the military leadership of the Reichswehr or Wehrmacht was involved in the political decissions from 1935 to 1939. (Rhineland, Austria, CSSR and Poland)

This was all Hitlers and Nazi-regime political decissions.
You should read why Blomberg and Fritsch were removed from their positions.

Hossbach Memorandum - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blomberg-Fritsch-Krise

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ludwig_Beck


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## Angels one-five (Dec 3, 2013)

stona said:


> But without the Nazi regime there would have been much less of all the above and no Luftwaffe at all! Difficult to develop or implement such a doctrine in that case.
> 
> It is impossible to separate the military and political in any state. National Socialist Germany was no different.
> 
> ...



Auftragstaktik pre-dated Nazism by some measure and the German army had a strongly embedded sense of Mission Command that did not exist within the French or British Armies (in fact, one could make an argument that the British Army didn't adopt mission Command as a formalised doctrine until the 1980s). When going back to the OP, the low level understanding of 'the plan' contributed significantly to the Wehrmacht's ability to do things quicker and more effectively than the opposition. That doctrine was not developed by the Nazis, rather it was a continuation of a teaching process that had commenced in the 19th Century. 

A quote attributed to Rommel is contained within the current version of ADP (Ops) "The British write some of the best doctrine in the world; it is fortunate that their officers do not read it". Whether apocryphal or not, for me it sums up one of the key differences in approach between the Germans and British in the early part of WW2.

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## stona (Dec 3, 2013)

DonL said:


> I don't deny that the Wehrmacht (military leadership) was involved in war crimes and also was partly (begining 1933)to be game to be exploit from the Nazi regime!



I never mentioned either of the above, they have nothing to do with the thread. I simply pointed out that the "combined arms" doctrine of the Wermacht was facilitated and made possible by the Nazis. So were any number of other strategies, Doenitz got his U-Boats for example. 
The military strategists could dream up any methods they liked, but they still needed the tools for the job, and the _political_ will to use them.
Cheers
Steve


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## DonL (Dec 3, 2013)

You haven't read my post 22.

And I think you are not aware about the goals of the german democratic parties of the Weimarer Republik!

*The first and main goal of every government of the Weimarer Republik was to eliminate the Versaille Treaty and rearm the Reichswehr later Wehrmacht, equal if it was SPD, Zentrum or other parties. And the rearm included an Air Force, Navy and at least 500000 men Heer.
*

Edit:

The Reichswehr operated airebases and tank training grounds since 1927 at the UDSSR through the Treaty of Rapallo
and also was involved in the development of submarines at the Netherlands through dummy companys since 1925.

This all happened with the full agreement, support and financial support of the german democratic parties and governments of the Weimarer Republik..
There was a very big shadow budget of the Reichswehr to fund this illegal programs and the governments gave the money.

You are all a little bit to focused on the Nazi's, the Versaille Treaty was very big german writing on the wall and all people inclusive all democratic parties worked very hard to eliminate it.


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## stona (Dec 3, 2013)

It was Hitler who stated that the purpose of the German economy was to support "Germany's self-assertion and the extension of her Lebensraum". No democratic politician ever made such a statement.

It wasn't until March 16th, 1935 that the German government announced its intention to rebuild the army, in contradiction to the Treaty of Versailles, long after the Nazis had been voted in.

Military spending rose from RM 1,9 billion in 1933/4 to RM 18.4 billion in 1938/9 under the national socialist government, this during a global depression.

Cheers

Steve


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## DonL (Dec 3, 2013)

What has this to do with german military doctrine?

And was this a political decision or a military or forced military decision?


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## stona (Dec 3, 2013)

DonL said:


> What has this to do with german military doctrine?
> 
> And was this a political decision or a military or forced military decision?



I am was replying to your post in which you said.

_"The first and main goal of every government of the Weimarer Republik was to eliminate the Versaille Treaty and rearm the Reichswehr later Wehrmacht, equal if it was SPD, Zentrum or other parties. And the rearm included an Air Force, Navy and at least 500000 men Heer."_

That may have been an intention of pre-Nazi governments but they lacked the will or means to do much about it.
Large scale re-armament and massive increases in military spending did not start until after the Nazis came to power. You surely don't expect to make such assertions unchallenged?

Cheers

Steve


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## DonL (Dec 3, 2013)

You are aware that Nazi's couldn't have done this without the preliminary work of all Weimarer goverments?

And now you kew exactly what democratic partys have done 1935? 



> "The first and main goal of every government of the Weimarer Republik was to eliminate the Versaille Treaty and rearm the Reichswehr later Wehrmacht, equal if it was SPD, Zentrum or other parties. And the rearm included an Air Force, Navy and at least 500000 men Heer."



This are facts from sources and 500000 men is not a large force for a 80 million nation at 1930.
The elimination of the Versaille Treaty was the goal of all parties, also all democratic parties also rearnament!

Edit:

You should think about your logic, why democratic party's and governments spent lot of money to develop tanks, submarines and a/c's illegal, if they don't have the goal to eliminate the Versaille Treaty and rearm the Reichswehr with this weapons?
You should think about this.


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## stona (Dec 3, 2013)

I refer the honourable gentleman to the figures for military spending posted earlier. RM 1.9 billion in 1933/4 and 18.4 billion in 1938/9. An increase AFTER the Nazis came to power of over 900%.

If the government(s) of the Weimar Republic, even the post 1930 Hindenburg governments, had survived the Nazis do you believe any of them would have carried out the long series of treaty contraventions from the occupation of the Rhineland to the invasion of Poland?

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Dec 3, 2013)

Some books claim that the 1920s German army was training their troops to a level 2 -3 ranks above the actual ranks that they held in order to have a a good cadre of men for _when_ expansion did come. This does not require big spending but does allow for a fast growth in size without some of the problems that dogged the rapid expansion of both the American and British armies. I am not saying the Germans had no problems but if corporals are trained as sergeants and sergeants trained as lieutenants/captains and lieutenants trained as captains/majors (or at least have working knowledge of their duties/responsibility's) a fast expansion is much smoother. 
The German army was planning for expansion years before it came.


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## stona (Dec 3, 2013)

But surely the British system was to build an army around the core of the regular Army, even using experience from overseas. My own grandfather was a senior non-commissioned officer who found himself brought back from India in 1938 to do precisely that.
There were problems in the rapid expansion of the British Army in the late 1930s, but the performance of the army in France had little to do with this.
Others have already alluded to the doctrinal differences between it and its German opponents. Of all German commanders the one who seems least to have understood the new methods used by men like Guderian was Hitler !
Cheers
Steve


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## DonL (Dec 3, 2013)

> If the government(s) of the Weimar Republic, even the post 1930 Hindenburg governments, had survived the Nazis do *you believe any of them would have carried out the long series of treaty contraventions from the occupation of the Rhineland* to the invasion of Poland?



I'm convinced they would (all democratric partys) try it mid to end 1930's till the Rhineland, which was no occupation only a rearm of the Rhineland.
That was the foreign-policy agenda of every democratic party.


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## parsifal (Dec 3, 2013)

> Because it was NOT a myth on the unit level. Say Division or smaller. Either that or studies made during the war were attempts to cover up allied bungling of small unit tactics and training. If German troops were ( to pick a number out of a Hat) 1.3 times more effective than allied army "A" troops it doesn't matter to the out come of the war if the German leadership bungles things so badly that they have to fight 2-3-4 times their numbers. Their "edge" gets swamped.




Im not arguing that at a tactical or operational level the Germans did not excel. Go back and read my post carefully. They had tremendous advantages....and still lost, In the end they were out numbered, and badly so, but that just didnt happen, it arose because of the attrocious Nazi leadership.

At the beginning of the war the Germans commanded the second most powerful economy in the world, and the most powerful was neutral and disorganised. They were several orders of magnitude stronger than both the British and the Russians. And at the beginning the Russians were on their side. The French economic power was negligible....about 2% of world GDP compared to over 15% for the Germans. Britain was about 10%, but was falling rapidly.

Strategically the germans were short of manpower, that is, over the long haul. But at the beginning of the war they had vast reserves of trained manpower, as did the Italians. The British had fairly good reserves of manpower, but it was largely untrained. And it took about 18 months for them to rectify that. When the Americans came ito the war, it took them even longer to train their vast reserves of manpower, and it remained a problem for both armies to keep up even with modest casualty rates even at the end of the war. 

The Germans used a combination of motorization, tactics and numbers to win their early victories. at Sedan, for example, they were able to hit the poorly trained and equipped French with well trained and well led troops, that because of their motorization were able to achieve decisive concent5rations at the decisive point and moment.

This was rfepeated in the following year in Russia where the purges made the Soviets even more vulnerable.

These are by no means the only advantages enjoyed by the germans. But to illustrate my point, in one or another, the German leadeship, including the army heads, squandered all these advantages, and not because they were being pressured or outnumberd. They lost these advantages because of very poor management. 

In the case of motorization, the failure to rationalise the MT park by overhauling their support industries, meant they steadily lost their mobility advantages (more rapidly than it should have, because the plethora of types made maintenance and spares a nightmare for them) . This particualarly affected the line Infantry formations. In 1941, the average German Infantry Div had over 6500 Draft animals (in part coutesy of the British Army, who had sold their horses to the heer before the war), and nearly 1000 other MT vehicles attached. By 1943, the average numbers of Draft animals were down to about 3000, and the average number of MT vehicles to about 300. On the eastern front in particular, the Germans were no longer capable of even fighting a defensive mobile war on a front wide basis . they were able to strip out sections of the front so that other bits could get mobile, but once the initiative was lost, after Kursk, they could not retreat or advance without suffering huge losses due to a lack of mobility. this was a totally avoidable crisis, and arose because of stupidity more than anything. 

In terms of manpower, the germans retained the largeest army of any nation on earth until 1943. That inludes the Soviets, if one does not include the hasty conscripts dragged off the street, handed a rifle (or often, not even a rifle) and sent to the front. If you want to argue these drafts were "soldiers", then the Soviets had the largest army from June 1941. But according to Dupuy, at this time, the Soviets were qualitatively outgunned to the tune of being only about 10% effective per man as the germans. By the middle of 1943, Dupuy estimates this advantage had shrunk to 2.31 times. But what was known by the germans was that the Russians would have tremendous resilience in terms of their manpower reserves and their ability to trade space for time. They should have made massive adjustments to their replacement army, increasing its ability to train and process men when they were needed. They failed to do anything, and as a result, by 1942,, the German Army in the East was nearly 1 million billets short, and by 1943 the frontline formations were down to about 40% authorised strengths. despite this, they insisted on continuing their offensives, moreover it was a situation that could have been handled far better but was not. No other army made that mistake, including the Soviets. everyone else had the ability to check how much cloth was in the cupboard before embarking on major offensives. Yet, somehow, the Germans were the best military planners on earth. you think!!!!!u 




> And there is only so much that combat units can do. They are dependent on supply and the German army units almost always operating on a shoestring ( a broken, tied together one at that) after the first few campaigns.



Logistics is still a part of military planning, and in this the germans failed miserably. it neednt have been so. They entered the war with the largest reserves of trained manpower, one of the largest armiues, the largest wartime ecomomy (the US was not at war), motivated leadership, a good plan, and yet they still failed. And it wasnt all Hitlers fault either


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## stona (Dec 3, 2013)

In British government papers it is always referred to as "the German re-occupation of the Demilitarised Zone". You can argue semantics if you want. Britain was a guarantor of the Treaty of Locarno and this caused considerable consternation for the government as they were well aware that there was no stomach for any kind of military action against Germany, even if it was militarily possible, which is debatable. British sentiment at the time was judged to be strongly "anti-French".
Cheers
Steve


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## DonL (Dec 3, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Im not arguing that at a tactical or operational level the Germans did not excel. Go back and read my post carefully. They had tremendous advantages....and still lost, In the end they were out numbered, and badly so, but that just didnt happen, it arose because of the attrocious Nazi leadership.
> 
> At the beginning of the war the Germans commanded the second most powerful economy in the world, and the most powerful was neutral and disorganised. They were several orders of magnitude stronger than both the British and the Russians. And at the beginning the Russians were on their side. The French economic power was negligible....about 2% of world GDP compared to over 15% for the Germans. Britain was about 10%, but was falling rapidly.
> 
> ...



Where are your proves that your arguments, which are mostly correct, goes to the military leaders except the OKW.
All your arguments are political, because the Wehrmacht was forced to do all the things you described, by the political leadership.



> At the beginning of the war the Germans commanded the second most powerful economy in the world, and the most powerful was neutral and disorganised. They were several orders of magnitude stronger than both the British and the Russians. And at the beginning the Russians were on their side. The French economic power was negligible....about 2% of world GDP compared to over 15% for the Germans. Britain was about 10%, but was falling rapidly.



The german economy wasn't stronger then the Commonwealth economy, it wasn't only GB, it was also Australia, Canada and Indian. 



> Strategically the germans were short of manpower, that is, over the long haul



This is very wrong, if you not only look at the military men, but also on the economy.
Germany had a shortage of economy manpower, especially skilled engineering worker since the early mobilization of 1939, this was totaly the opposite at all Commonwealth countrys and the UDSSR.



> These are by no means the only advantages enjoyed by the germans. But to illustrate my point, in one or another, the German leadeship, including the army heads, squandered all these advantages, and not because they were being pressured or outnumberd. They lost these advantages because of very poor management.



Also you should explain, what this claim has to do with the Army leaders plus the next passage of your post.
Through several primary sources, espicially Halders diaries, it is very explicit described, what the Army leaders thought about Operation Blue! All this Army leaders were well aware about their short commings and Halder wanted a totaly other plan, through the short comming of reserves and motorized vehicles.

Again all your claims has to do mostly and mainly with the political Nazi leadership and very minor with the classical Army/Wehrmacht leadership.
It didn't help myour argument to write:" It wasn't only Hitler's fault"!
Please present your sources for the involvement of the Army leaderships to your described arguments.


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## pattle (Dec 3, 2013)

DonL said:


> Which decisive battles or any battles were lost through crucial mistakes of the military Army leaders?



What about North Africa, Rommel was not given a brief to out stretch his supply lines as he did, he was sent only to stop a Italian defeat. The Battle of Crete was another notable failure, yes Crete was eventually taken but at a terrible cost which caused at a lot of problems later on. The whole idea of using Crete as a springboard to capture Cyprus and hop across to the middle east was flawed. Governments will always have a say in military plans and you can not lay all of the blame on government, if you look at it the opposite way around who should take credit for the successes of the German army, the Generals or the politicians?


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## Shortround6 (Dec 3, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Im not arguing that at a tactical or operational level the Germans did not excel. Go back and read my post carefully. They had tremendous advantages....and still lost, In the end they were out numbered, and badly so, but that just didnt happen, it arose because of the attrocious Nazi leadership.



But that is not what the original question asked. It asked what made the Germany army successful at the Beginning of the war. Training, education, communications, transport and a number of other factors made the difference, not ideology or politics. Ideology and politics helped an awful lot with the down fall of the 3rd Reich 







parsifal said:


> Logistics is still a part of military planning, and in this the germans failed miserably. it neednt have been so. They entered the war with the largest reserves of trained manpower, one of the largest armiues, the largest wartime ecomomy (the US was not at war), motivated leadership, a good plan, and yet they still failed. And it wasnt all Hitlers fault either



Your right, it was _Goring's_ Fault 

They got carried away with some of the early successes and started to believe their own propaganda. What "planning" there was tended to devolve to crisis management instead of long term planning. And weapons procurement started to shift from workman like products to trick toys in too many cases and weapons that could have prolonged things ( they were never going to _win_) were sometimes turned down due to prejudice.


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## parsifal (Dec 3, 2013)

> But that is not what the original question asked. It asked what made the Germany army successful at the Beginning of the war. Training, education, communications, transport and a number of other factors made the difference, not ideology or politics. Ideology and politics helped an awful lot with the down fall of the 3rd Reich



I know, but the basic premise...."wht was the German army so successful?" is a wrong premise. A better wording for the question would be "How did the Germans manage to snatch defeat out of certain victory?" The answer does not lie with their tactical handling. It lies in their strategic miscalculations and repeated bungling even during the salad years of victory.

Jim Dunnigan some years ago did a study on motivation. Why is it that the german Army, was so successful when armies like the Italians, which had a very similar military sytem for mobilzation and training , was so unsuccessful. Nationalism, and propaganda has very little to do with it. Those issues get people into the army, it doesnt make them good soldiers. At the end of the day, the important manpower issues psychologically are the desire to survive, and trust you have in your leaders. In the Italian army there was this enormous gulf between the men and their officers. Trust was zero. The soldiers were trained okay, but they just didnt believe the army would save them. the result is that they tend3ed to throw their arms up in surrender a lot. The heer did not suffer from this. Their soldiers were better educated, which in itself made them more effective, but there was not a huge gap between officers and their men. The men believed in their officers, and the ratio of officers (including NCOs) to enlisted ranks was fairly high. This meant the unit retained cohesion even when under stress, and the men kept fighting even when taking casualties. 

These werent the problems that defeated the wehrmacht. Where they failed was in the strategic area. For example, they never quite got the concept of a front commander controlling all the assets in a TO, and fighting a battle for a strategic objective. Commanders tended to fight battles in isolation, with control over only some of the resources and with little knowledge or care as to what was happening around them. There was never a unified command, in the sense of a SoPac or a SHAEF. And certainly anything quite likie the JCS which pooled resources of many nations. Compare the relationship of the JCS to the German-Italian relationship, or the relationship of hitler to his military commanders, comp0ared to the much more constrained ability of people like Churchilol over their military . there is no comparison actually


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## DonL (Dec 5, 2013)

> I know, but the basic premise...."wht was the German army so successful?" is a wrong premise. A better wording for the question would be "*How did the Germans manage to snatch defeat out of certain victory*?" The answer does not lie with their tactical handling. It lies in their strategic miscalculations and repeated bungling even during the salad years of victory.



That was not the question and the intention of the thread!
The thread starter asked explicit after the german military.
As always, if the topic German pop up, you always will foward your agenda of anti german biases, equal of the thread intention, essential anti-german!
Perhaps you should sit in a plane and visit this country, but I bet you don't have the nuts to do it, because your biases and view of the world got crashed!

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## GrauGeist (Dec 5, 2013)

DonL said:


> That was not the question and the intention of the thread!
> The thread starter asked explicit after the german military.
> As always, if the topic German pop up, you always will foward your agenda of anti german biases, equal of the thread intention, essential anti-german!
> Perhaps you should sit in a plane and visit this country, but I bet you don't have the nuts to do it, because your biases and view of the world got crashed!


Parsifal's post was in keeping with the theme of the original post. If you feel uncomfortable with what he said, too bad.

Personally, who'd want to visit Germany if there's people like you in it...

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## parsifal (Dec 5, 2013)

I can see i need to simplify the issue even further. 

These are the basic facts

Germany started the war with many advantages, military economic, strategic, tactical. Her enemies were weak, disorganized,outnumbered and stayed that way for a very long time. By decisions of her own choosing, Germany chose to expand the horizons of the war, and made decisions, strategic and tactical that eventually lost her the war. 


how is that not stating the basic facts? Getting to understand why will require getting ones hands dirty. i cant help that. I have no problem dissecting it and calling it like it is. I dont get any joy out of it and i dont seek to denigrate the germans for it. They statred with great advantages, and her army did fight with great distinction. But they lost. How did that happen. I reject the hammed up arguments that it was all Hitlers fault.....


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## Glider (Dec 5, 2013)

parsifal said:


> This is altogether the wrong question. The question that needs to be answered is why, despite having so many overwhelming advantages, they still manged to screw the pooch and lose.
> 
> The Germans entered the war with greater economic potential, better trained manpower, a more cohesive and decisive leadership, more friends, better and more numerous equipment levels, better leadership, effective doctrines, higher levels of motorization central positioninterior lines surprise, and many other advantages. They still managed to lose the initiaitve in the west by 1941, upset their friends, isolate themselves, fight too many wars at the same time, waste their strength on unimportant fronts, become sloppy in their security, waste their military leadership, lose their training edges, mismanage their economy and so many other failures. And yet, people across the world belive in the myth of superior german war performance during the war.


I think this sums up my views on the topic, an excellent post. The first part sums up their advantages for the first part of the war and the second what went wrong and ultimately cost Germany the war


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## DonL (Dec 6, 2013)

GrauGeist said:


> Parsifal's post was in keeping with the theme of the original post. If you feel uncomfortable with what he said, too bad.
> 
> Personally, who'd want to visit Germany if there's people like you in it...



Post 1:



> The German Army...
> 
> What was it that made the German Army so successful in the Beginning of WWII, was it their training, education, officer schools etc.?
> How did these factors compare between the fighting armies?
> ...



Perhaps english is not my first language, but to my understanding the thread had the intention, to discuss the above examples and questions.

I don't deny in summary Parsifal's arguments (not all, but the most), but all his examples were decisions of the political leaders and have very minor to do with the questions of the thread poster.
But perhaps my language understanding is so bad, that you cam explain to me, why you think I'm wrong and also that Parsifal was keeping to the theme with all of his posts of the original post?


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## GrauGeist (Dec 6, 2013)

Because parsifal was putting forth a good summary of the demise of one of the modern age's most powerful armies and in a non-biased light.

He summed it up well and just because it doesn't seem favorable in your eyes, it's what happened.

My ancestry is rich in German and Prussian lineage and it pains me to see how Germany fell to ruin and then rose from the misery of WWI to become a super power, only to sh!t it away and leave the country broken, devestated and fragmented. But I look at the historical aspect of what happened and don't wear blinders and carry a torch what "could have been" or "should have been". 

The bottom line is Germany got it's ass kicked because of stupidity all across the board in it's leadership and the burden fell on the shoulders of the landser who performed his task as he was trained and ordered to do. If there was any credit due to anyone, it was the sailors, soldiers and airmen of Germany who had to suffer the folly of those a**holes who led them into the breech.


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## pattle (Dec 6, 2013)

I feel it is often difficult to distinguish whether victories or defeats can be attributed to one of either generals or politicians because the two are mostly intertwined. If you look at D-Day for example it was the generals who were responsible for planning and directing the operation but it was the politicians that ordered it's planning and execution, the same goes for any other major offensive so it is difficult to know who to thank or blame. After all with the possible exception of Japan it was the politicians that had ultimate control of the armed forces.


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## pattle (Dec 6, 2013)

GrauGeist said:


> My ancestry is rich in German and Prussian lineage and it pains me to see how Germany fell to ruin and then rose from the misery of WWI to become a super power, only to sh!t it away and leave the country broken, devestated and fragmented. But I look at the historical aspect of what happened and don't wear blinders and carry a torch what "could have been" or "should have been".
> 
> I hope this does not mean you are not glad that Germany lost the war as Germany's aims and intentions were very negative to say the least.


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## DonL (Dec 6, 2013)

GrauGeist said:


> Because parsifal was putting forth a good summary of the demise of one of the modern age's most powerful armies and in a non-biased light.
> 
> He summed it up well and just because it doesn't seem favorable in your eyes, it's what happened.
> 
> ...



Please read the whole thread from the beginning!
I have no problem with your above post and also with most of parsifal's arguments. The most are correct!

But what the hell had these arguments to do with this questions?



> The German Army...
> 
> What was it that made the German Army so successful in the Beginning of WWII, was it their training, education, officer schools etc.?
> How did these factors compare between the fighting armies?
> ...



To make it clear, I have no problems with the arguments that parsifal posted in this thread, I have a problem that this arguments weren't ask for, to my language understanding and to my feeling he had rededicate the thread, because as always he wanted to post his anti-german agenda.


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## Marcel (Dec 6, 2013)

To be considered the best, you should be measured against the rest. And the rest was not very good. Other countries were not very well prepared, to say the least. Germany started the rearmament race and were ahead. Other countries suffered from years of pacifism, cutting expenses for defence to a criminal low and realised too late what was happening in Germany. The rearmament of those armies were like panic football, chaotic, slow and full of indecision. You can see it in the french army, where standardisation was non-existant. An extra handicap was that for a long time, the minds of the people did not catch up with the political situation, so that large pasifist movements still disrupted the rearmament in democratic countries. No wonder that thes countries had no time to also modernise their military philosophy. The Germans had no democraty and had their mind set long before the other countries did. They used it to their advantage and the result is obvious.

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## stona (Dec 6, 2013)

Marcel said:


> An extra handicap was that for a long time, the minds of the people did not catch up with the political situation, so that large pasifist movements still disrupted the rearmament in democratic cou tries.



True. I would have used 'a movement for appeasement' rather than 'pacifist movements' but I know what you mean and English is my first language 

The British people were definitely against any war and supported appeasement. Their sentiment was judged by their own government during this period as strongly anti-French, not anti-German.
Many German complaints, particularly regarding the Treaty of Versailles seemed reasonable to the British.

A strong Germany was seen as a buffer to the expansion of every western capitalist nation's favourite bogeyman...."bolshevism".

Hitler had many admirers both within and outside Europe. We shouldn't forget that he was Time magazines 'man of the year' in 1938, though to be fair it was for _avoiding_ a war over Czechoslovakia . (In 1937 it was Chiang Kai-Shek and his missus and in 1939 Stalin, which makes you wonder!)

In the 1930s the policy of appeasing Hitler was popular with the British people who remembered all too well the carnage of the previous war. It was based on the fallacy that Hitler and the Nazi government were reasonable and could be reasoned with. We know that this was a fallacy now, the British and the French did not at the time.

Cheers

Steve


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## parsifal (Dec 6, 2013)

One of the earliest mistakes made by the Germans was in their Naval Construction. They set their sights on a massive building plan that in the end came to nothing, because war came too early, and in any event was still not enough to overtake the British Navy. Building submarines, prewar, instead of the Heavy Cruisers, Battlecruisers, and the two dreadnoughts was a better optioon. And permissible under the Anglo German Naval Treaty of 1935.

Clause 6 of the treaty stipulated that "_In the matter of submarines, however, Germany, while not exceeding the ratio of 35:100 in respect of total tonnage, shall have the right to possess a submarine tonnage equal to the total submarine tonnage possessed by the Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The German Government, however, undertake that, except in the circumstances indicated in the immediately following sentence, Germany's submarine tonnage shall not exceed 45 percent. of the total of that possessed by the Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The German Government reserve the right, in the event of a situation arising, which in their opinion, makes it necessary for Germany to avail herself of her right to a percentage of submarine tonnage exceeding the 45 per cent. above mentioned, to give notice this effect to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, and agree that the matter shall be the subject of friendly discussion before the German Government exercise that right_".

in 1921 the Royal Navy had 83 submarines. by 1935, only 23 of these remained in service, but by 1939, the RN had 103 subs in commission. If the Germans had not built their cruisers, Battleships and aircraft carriers, they would have freed about 300000 tons of naval construction and around 15000 naval personnel afloat. Roughly, that would have given them the tonnage to build and man up to 300 subs. if they had elected to not build the aircraft carriers (alone), they would have freed sufficient tonnage to build another 60 subs. 60 subs was well within their treaty obligations. If they had not built the carriers or the heavy cruisers, they could have gone to war with 120 subs, and have had about 80 additional subs being completed 1939-40. A submarine fleet of those proportions would have destroyed the British ability to resist, and forced them to th peace table


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## stona (Dec 6, 2013)

parsifal said:


> A submarine fleet of those proportions would have destroyed the British ability to resist, and forced them to th peace table



This last bit is debateable and I'd have to look at the figures. The actual German submarine fleet never came close to sinking enough shipping to cause that, I remember posting the figures a while back, despite Churchill's much quoted view.

As for the rest I pretty much agree.

Cheers

Steve


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## DonL (Dec 6, 2013)

stona said:


> This last bit is debateable and I'd have to look at the figures. The actual German submarine fleet never came close to sinking enough shipping to cause that, I remember posting the figures a while back, despite Churchill's much quoted view.
> 
> As for the rest I pretty much agree.
> 
> ...



I think parsifal is refering to the beginning of the war (September 1939) till the whole year 1941.
I don't agree fully with him, but the submarine war took GB as a suprise (they felt save through Asdic) and they needed nearly 3 years to have a effective defense, so imagine Germany could field something about 150 subs at September 1939 which will increase till 1941.
So the wolfpack tactic would be in charge from the beginning, this would cause a lot of losses to GB's merchant fleet

Anyway I have douts that such a one-dimensional naval tactic and building program is the best thing, it is very unsurprising, as soon as the enemy knows your naval tactic and you have not a single other option.


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## pattle (Dec 6, 2013)

And don't forget how many British ships the German Battleship threat tied up.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 6, 2013)

It is very doubtful that the Germans could have hidden such a building program from the British and the British may have been able to adjust their own building program accordingly, at least to some extent. 

And simple tonnage swaps paint a very biased view of what was actually possible. A battleship has an awful lot of "stuff" made out of plain steel. But plain steel is NOT the production bottle neck. Armor steel, guns (and mounts) and machinery are. 

Sub hulls are not made of "plain steel" but alloy steel, not the same alloy as armor but using lesser percentages of some of the same elements. Gun makers are not torpedo makers ( and torpedoes are a specialty unto themselves), Trying to turn 12 boilers and tree 50,000hp steam turbines ( Bismark main machinery) into 100 diesel engines totaling about the same HP might be a little difficult too.

Not all sailors can be submariners ( and you might not want them to try) so crew numbers don't quite line up either. 

Most sources agree that on the unit level ( division and smaller) the Germany army was better than most if not all of it's opponents_ on average_ until at least the middle of the war, say 1943 or so. Granted ALL armies exhibited a rather wide variation ( and many late war SS divisions were pretty sorry units).

It is this small scale superiority that can use study and discussion. Rush to rearm is not quite a good excuse. German tanks were pretty much crap in France in 1940, why did they work so well? (one hint, they fought few tank to tank battles). 
The French use of motorcycle messengers to transmit orders, while safe from radio interception also _guaranteed _ that most orders were received too do any good in the situation that existed when the orders did arrive (if they did). 
There are dozens of reason that the German "system" worked so well and it's opponents 'systems' failed so often.


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## stona (Dec 6, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> And simple tonnage swaps paint a very biased view of what was actually possible. A battleship has an awful lot of "stuff" made out of plain steel. But plain steel is NOT the production bottle neck. Armor steel, guns (and mounts) and machinery are.



It's not really a simple tonnage swap so much as a different application of resources. The Germans could have built many more U-boats, but there are numerous reasons (not just battle ships and aircraft carriers) why they did not.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Dec 6, 2013)

True but in some cases the plans for such a "different application of resources" have to be made years ahead of time. Boiler shops do not make diesel engines. Even the US had to make DE's with three different propulsion systems because there wasn't enough production capacity to standardize on one system. And in some cases it wasn't even the shortage of the ability to make steam turbines but the shortage of the ability to make the reduction gears for them. Which is one reason for the diesel electric escorts. The US was also lucky in that it could easily adapt the new Diesel railroad locomotive power plants to marine use. 

In the US ALL submarines up until 1944 were built in just 4 yards, Electric boat in Groton, Portsmouth Navy yard, Mare Island Navy yard and Cramp Shipyard. 

Not just any shipyard can build submarines ( not if you want them to come back up from the first test dive) without a steep learning curve.


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## DonL (Dec 6, 2013)

From german sources it was the main reason, because the shipyards were blocked from the BB's, Cruisers and Destroyers, but most important the skilled workers were blocked and also through the mobilization at 1939 this problem tightened massively.

To come back to the Army,

I think also german corps and Army's had tactical advantages over their enemys.

I disagree about the most named reasons why the german were better, except their developed doctrine.
I think the main reason is, that the german officer corps (Heer) of the Reichswehr, did a very deep and extensive analyse about the WWI, why they lost, why the war was faught as a static warfare with very huge material battles and casualtys.
There are countless of memoranda from the 1920's, which were written to this issues and how to avoid such a style of warfare.

The Reichswehr was from the beginning open to new ideas and technical developments to avoid static warfare. You can say they searched and researched with great effort, every possibilty to develop a counter strategy and they had the possibility and time to test "new", technical development, doctrine and ideas at the UDSSR.
As I said before in this thread the combined arms doctrine and tank doctrine were developed at 1932-1933 without any Nazi influence.

For example no other Army in the World had and was experimenting with massive radio use since 1933. Every german tank had from the beginning a radio and many many other smal units and that was all to coordinate the combined arms doctrine and to be faster on battlefield reaction then other Armys, also this was massively trained since 1934.

I think the reintroduction of the compulsory military service was also a big advantage, because the new doctrine, technical developments and ideas could be trained with much more soldiers.

Anyway I think the huge efforts of the Reichswehr at the 1920's, to brutally honest analyse the WWI and the own failures (from a military viepoint) and to do all to develop a counter stategy to static warfare, was the cornerstone of the tactical success of the Wehrmacht.

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## stona (Dec 6, 2013)

I think that is a very valid point. Whilst the Germans were seeking to develop a mobile form of _offensive_ warfare, avoiding the pit falls of WW1, their principal continental opponent, which was of course France, not Britain, was developing almost the exact opposite, based on a defensive mind set. 
Cheers
Steve


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## Marcel (Dec 6, 2013)

stona said:


> True. I would have used 'a movement for appeasement' rather than 'pacifist movements' but I know what you mean and English is my first language


You're right, especially with the British, but pacifism was also a big part in many countries. Here in the Netherlands we had "het gebroken geweertje" (the broken little rifle) en "geen cent voor defensie" (not a penny for defence) movements. People didn't want the army and detested the ones that served. This led to cutting on army funds until right into 1937, after which only sparsely money could be made free for rearmament. By then it was too late and we only could try to get what others didn't want to have. Also many years people were hardly trained, so our whole army was a big club of untrained amateurs. The groups that were good, like our airforce were far too small and usually had second rate equipment. No wonder we only lasted for 5 days. I'm pretty sure it was the same with many other countries like Belgium, Norway and others.

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## parsifal (Dec 6, 2013)

stona said:


> This last bit is debateable and I'd have to look at the figures. The actual German submarine fleet never came close to sinking enough shipping to cause that, I remember posting the figures a while back, despite Churchill's much quoted view.
> 
> As for the rest I pretty much agree.
> 
> ...





There are not direct correlations I agree, because the laws of diminishing returns apply. However, with an average at sea force of just 6 boats in the western approaches in the Summer and autumn of 1940, the Germans were able to sink (from memory, ill stand corrected), about 400000 tons of shipping per month. They had managed to save or enlist about 4.5 million tons of neutral shipping from occupied Europe since the beginning of the war, but these sources were drying up.

To survive, and maintain a minimum defensive capability at home the British needed 10 million tons. thats debateable, but its the figure generally acceptedby by most people. However, to retain the economies of her allies, and retain a presence in north Africa and overseas, she needed another 7 million tons. this was still a minimal, defensive level. . To retain good relations with the south Americans and other neutrals, she needed about 1 million more tons. these figures are based on the excellent work done by SG Sturmey on Allied Shipping in WWII. Its not based in any way on Churchills questionable comments. 

From the above, we have a minimum figure of shipping for defensive operations of 18 million tons. as the war progressed, things did change. for instance, the Americans made availble greater and greater proportions of their merchant fleet for operations in the Atlantic, the Pan American defensive arrangements, decreased the needs of the neutrals on shipping and other similar arrangements. but in the dark days of 1940, the British needed a minimum figure of about 18 million tons, just to maintain their then current world situation. 

By Summer 1940, the British had already lost 850000 tons of shipping but had acquired about 4.5 million tons. Thus, on the eve of the first critical offensive, they had access to about 26 million tons of shipping. that is a comfortable margin, but it rapidly got worse. In the period September 1940 to March 1941, they managed to lose about 4 million tons, with the average U-Boat number on station never exceeding 12 boats. that does not include U-Boats deploying or returning. To maintain 6 Boats on station, they needed about 27 boats in commission. With larger numbers in commission the numbers on station appear to have increased, not in a linear fashion, but more as a curved shapoed graph (increasing efficiency with greater numbers). With 90 Boats in commission (roughly the number available at the beginning of the second happy time) , the Germans were able to keep on station about 30 Boats. However with that average of 30 boats, sinkings increased from 564 ships (in 1940, to just under 1500 ships in 1942, and tonnages increased from 3.5 million tons to about 8 million tons. The US entry affceted this greatly, but in 1940, the Brits had problems of their own, which meant that every U-Boat added to the fleet at that time would more or less be a direct correlation in terms of tonnage increases. 


if the Germqans had entered the war with 100 boats instead of 57 in 1939, and added 100 additional boats by the end of 1940, instead of 35 that they did (give or take....Ive lent my copy of Sturmey), one can reasonably expect tonnages to increase to June 1940 to around 1.5 milion tons, and tonnages to March 1941 to around 9 million tons. That reduces tonnage availablity to a dangerous level. About 14 million tons. Thats not enough to retain even minimum defensive needs, though Britiain itself would not yet be starving. RN overseas deployments are at risk, middle east deployment levels by that stage would be in crisis. the econoimies of Austalia, NZ, the Far east, and India are all in crisis. There would be absoulutely no chance of aid to Russia once she entered. Australia, for example would be unable to maintain their military committments. Britain, in fact is now in an untenable position

There are a lot of variable difficult to quantify, but saying or claiming the U-Boats were not a serious threat, to the point of being able to win the war, is just the stuff of misinformation. And is im afraid, in direct contradiction to some very well placed opinions and forecasts, and smacks of post war revisionism to me.


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## silence (Dec 6, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Jim Dunnigan some years ago did a study on motivation. Why is it that the german Army, was so successful when armies like the Italians, which had a very similar military sytem for mobilzation and training , was so unsuccessful. Nationalism, and propaganda has very little to do with it. Those issues get people into the army, it doesnt make them good soldiers. At the end of the day, the important manpower issues psychologically are the desire to survive, and trust you have in your leaders. In the Italian army there was this enormous gulf between the men and their officers. Trust was zero. The soldiers were trained okay, but they just didnt believe the army would save them. the result is that they tend3ed to throw their arms up in surrender a lot. The heer did not suffer from this. Their soldiers were better educated, which in itself made them more effective, but there was not a huge gap between officers and their men. The men believed in their officers, and the ratio of officers (including NCOs) to enlisted ranks was fairly high. This meant the unit retained cohesion even when under stress, and the men kept fighting even when taking casualties.



What's the title of that book? It could be a very significant source for my planned master's thesis.


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## silence (Dec 6, 2013)

parsifal said:


> One of the earliest mistakes made by the Germans was in their Naval Construction. They set their sights on a massive building plan that in the end came to nothing, because war came too early, and in any event was still not enough to overtake the British Navy. Building submarines, prewar, instead of the Heavy Cruisers, Battlecruisers, and the two dreadnoughts was a better optioon. And permissible under the Anglo German Naval Treaty of 1935.
> 
> Clause 6 of the treaty stipulated that "_In the matter of submarines, however, Germany, while not exceeding the ratio of 35:100 in respect of total tonnage, shall have the right to possess a submarine tonnage equal to the total submarine tonnage possessed by the Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The German Government, however, undertake that, except in the circumstances indicated in the immediately following sentence, Germany's submarine tonnage shall not exceed 45 percent. of the total of that possessed by the Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The German Government reserve the right, in the event of a situation arising, which in their opinion, makes it necessary for Germany to avail herself of her right to a percentage of submarine tonnage exceeding the 45 per cent. above mentioned, to give notice this effect to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, and agree that the matter shall be the subject of friendly discussion before the German Government exercise that right_".
> 
> in 1921 the Royal Navy had 83 submarines. by 1935, only 23 of these remained in service, but by 1939, the RN had 103 subs in commission. If the Germans had not built their cruisers, Battleships and aircraft carriers, they would have freed about 300000 tons of naval construction and around 15000 naval personnel afloat. Roughly, that would have given them the tonnage to build and man up to 300 subs. if they had elected to not build the aircraft carriers (alone), they would have freed sufficient tonnage to build another 60 subs. 60 subs was well within their treaty obligations. If they had not built the carriers or the heavy cruisers, they could have gone to war with 120 subs, and have had about 80 additional subs being completed 1939-40. A submarine fleet of those proportions would have destroyed the British ability to resist, and forced them to th peace table



I think this treaty was later amended to allow Germany 100% of the RN Sub force, but I may be wrong.

As mentioned previously the KM surface fleet was more of a fleet-in-being, and the enemy originally envisioned was France, not the RN (don't ask me how they planned to pull that off). The Dunquerkes were built to counter the Deutschlands, the Scharnhorsts to counter the Dunquerkes, etc. The Z-plan, while not being of a size with the RN, would have been an all-modern fleet with a (necessarily) huge range advantage over the RN capital ships save perhaps the planned Lions (not sure and too lazy to look it up). Even as a fleet-in-being look at what the RN kept ready in case Tirpitz tried to break out, or the size of the force sent to take Scharnhorst a Christmas present. Heck, look at what was sent out against Bismarck. Overreaction or just stacking the deck?

But had the KM focused on subs, then the RN would have been free to focus on ASW ships rather than perhaps upgrading the QEs and Rs and building the KGVs. I can well imagine the RN having many more destroyers and small carriers with the tonnage freed up from not building the KGVs. Also a lot of money could have been saved by simply NOT having to develop the 14/45 gun. Maybe this money could have gone towards RN Aviation. On the flip side, a focus on subs may mean that when war kicked off the German torpedoes would already have been troubleshot and worked as intended from the start.

And I'm gonna stop now before I do any more what'ifs and counter-what-ifs.

And who knows? Maybe Hood would now be a museum ship; that would be quite grand.


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## parsifal (Dec 7, 2013)

silence said:


> What's the title of that book? It could be a very significant source for my planned master's thesis.


Its not a book as such, though I think he later wrote a book and included his study in that publication.

It was a military simulation called 'Campaign For North Africa" written by Al Nofi, Richard Berg and Jim Dunnigan. It is a simulation used at Sandhurst andf Duntroon until fairly recently and fights the North African campaign at company level. It takes 10 participants more than two year to fight 2.5 years of actual fighting. 

The actual article that this appears in is some of the supporting material. Its an essay entitled "Historical Notes", 16 pages.

Nofi has gone on to work for a Defence think tank in the US , and Dunnigan I believe worked for many years for the Pentagon as a senior analyst. Not exactly sure what Bergie is doing these days


Some links thqat might be helpful

James F. Dunnigan

Richard Berg - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

http://www.russgifford.net/MovesScans/Moves49/CNAGPM49.pdf

Albert Nofi - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Over the years ive met and spoken to these guys a number of times. Whilst the material they produce are often referred to as games, and in reality they are games, to be played, it is a better description to call them Simulations I think, and the research they do to underpin their sims is as good or better than most publications. these giys are at the cutting edge of military theory and military history, or were....they are getting on a bit now......


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## fastmongrel (Dec 7, 2013)

parsifal said:


> It takes 10 participants more than two *year *to fight 2.5 years of actual fighting.



I hope thats a typo


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## silence (Dec 7, 2013)

parsifal said:


> Its not a book as such, though I think he later wrote a book and included his study in that publication.
> 
> It was a military simulation called 'Campaign For North Africa" written by Al Nofi, Richard Berg and Jim Dunnigan. It is a simulation used at Sandhurst andf Duntroon until fairly recently and fights the North African campaign at company level. It takes 10 participants more than two year to fight 2.5 years of actual fighting.
> 
> ...



Cool! Thank you!

BTW, have you read "A Genius for War" by DuPuy?


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## parsifal (Dec 7, 2013)

fastmongrel said:


> I hope thats a typo


Nope thats correct. calling this a game doesnt do it justice. its about as close as commercial stuff gets to the military sims used to work out actual tactics. And really, unplayavle to be honest, unless the people are just about certifiable.

ive played it.

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## parsifal (Dec 7, 2013)

silence said:


> Cool! Thank you!
> 
> BTW, have you read "A Genius for War" by DuPuy?



No, i havent. but books by Trevor Dupuy that i have read...

Understanding War: Military History And The Theory Of Combat, New York, 1986
Understanding Defeat: How to Recover from Loss in Battle to Gain Victory in War, New York, 1990 
Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties And Equipment Losses In Modern War, Virginia, 1990 
If War Comes, How To Defeat Saddam Hussein, Virginia, 1991; issued as a paperback with the title How To Defeat Saddam Hussein 
Future Wars: The World's Most Dangerous Flashpoints, New York, 1992 


The guy Im talking abouyt was a decorated retired US Colonel.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 7, 2013)

DonL said:


> That was not the question and the intention of the thread!
> The thread starter asked explicit after the german military.
> As always, if the topic German pop up, you always will foward your agenda of anti german biases, equal of the thread intention, essential anti-german!
> Perhaps you should sit in a plane and visit this country, but I bet you don't have the nuts to do it, because your biases and view of the world got crashed!



Here we go again, same old **** again.

Jesus Christ this is getting old. 

Don't even bother with another whining PM either.


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## DonL (Dec 7, 2013)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Here we go again, same old **** again.
> 
> Jesus Christ this is getting old.
> 
> Don't even bother with another whining PM either.



I'm sick of this, I have never whined!
Read the thread from the beginning and the questions of the thread starter!


Ich habe echt die Schnauze voll!
Lies bitte den ersten Post, die Fragen und was Lucky 13 wissen wollte.

Ich heule nicht, ich bin es nur schrecklich leid, dass Parsifal jeden Thread so gestalten kann wie er es gerne möchte, und die Regeln interessieren ihn einen Scheissdreck, Hauptsache er kann seine übliche Agenda ablassen. Es ist vielleicht besser, dass ich gehe, weil anscheinend bin ich hier der Störenfried.

Bevor du mich rügst, oder beschimpfst/lächerlich machst, solltest du mich entweder rausschmeißen, oder nachprüfen was ich geschrieben habe und warum! 

Er hat hier Narrenfreiheit, egal was er schreibt und in welchem Thread er es schreibt.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 7, 2013)

DonL said:


> I'm sick of this, I have never whined!
> Read the thread from the beginning and the questions of the thread starter!
> 
> 
> ...









Jemand könnte furzen, und Sie würden denken, es ist ein Anti Deutsch Agenda.

So viel wie Parsifal kotzt mich an, das einzige, was falsch mit seiner Beiträge waren die Tatsache, dass Sie dir nicht gefahlen haben. Alles nur, weil Sie denken, alles ist ein Angriff auf Deutschland.

Sie sind von allem beleidigt.

Die Tür ist offen, wenn es dir nicht gefaehlt.

*Excuse my German, it has sort of gone down hill since moving to the United States and speaking English all day.*


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## DonL (Dec 7, 2013)

Das ist eine völlig falsche Interpretation!

Ich habe nicht die geringsten Probleme mit Parsifals Argumenten, sie sind richtig!

Nur waren sie in diesem Thread nicht gefragt!

Lucky 13 wollte wissen warum das deutsche Militär am Anfang so erfolgreich war und *nicht* warum sie den Krieg verloren haben

It is a wrong interpretation.

I have not any problems with Parsifals argumentation, they are mostly correct and I have written it more then one time.

The problem is, this arguments were not ask at this thread.

Lucky wanted to know, why the german Army was such successfull at the beginning of the war *and not* why they lost the war.
That's are totaly different questions and issues.


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## pattle (Dec 7, 2013)

Order Gentlemen please!


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 7, 2013)

DonL said:


> Lucky wanted to know, why the german Army was such successfull at the beginning of the war and not why they lost the war.
> That's are totaly different questions and issues.



It is a fricken discussion! How many discussions stay completely true to the question??? That is what happens on a forum. One question or discussion leads to a complete other one. Get over it!

Don L, you obviously don't understand how a forum works. People discuss topics, they are not going to always stay on the exact form or topic. As long as they are relevant, we let the discussion continue. YOU DONL DO NOT GET TO DECIDE WHAT IS RELEVANT TO THE DISCUSSION, AND THEN GET IN A TEMPERTANTRUM LIKE A KINDERGARTNER. 

If you don't think it is relevant, then just ignore it and don't respond to it. You attacking them over it, just destroys the whole thread, which is exactly what has happened now. Instead of discussing the topic, you have a person who is offended by anything they don't agree with just arguing with a moderator! Great addition to the topic huh? I bet everyone is learning something...

1. This argument is over. Period!

2. If you don't like it, then move on!

This thread has been detracted enough! Get back on topic, or get out. Simple as that. It is always the same two people. Parsifal likes to bait people in the hope of drawing them into an argument (Which pisses me off, and will get him banned eventually. He knows it as well...), You whine because someone is anti German just because they don't think everything German was gods greatest thing since sliced bread and butter. 

Quit it! 

Now, get this thread back on topic, everyone quit your bitching. Damn it feels like a Kindergarten in here.

And another thread is ruined! Thanks...

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## DonL (Dec 7, 2013)

You are partly right!

I have a real problem with your claim that I'm a real and only german biased bonehead.
You have written in an other thread about the german USA friendship at Stuttgart, I was part of it at the end of the 1990's begining 2000's, through my friendship with Mr and Mrs. Griesinger (perhaps you know them) and I don't want to be only german biased. 

I thought I have read many history books; I thought I'm not a german bonehead, but certain people aggravate my trigger points and things get out of control through my temper.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 7, 2013)

Did I not say, the argument was over? To get back on topic? You are bone headed! 

If I have to go over this again, you will be shown the door.

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## pattle (Dec 7, 2013)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Did I not say, the argument was over? To get back on topic? You are bone headed!
> 
> If I have to go over this again, you will be shown the door.



I don't want to take sides here but the way you are speaking to DonL is bloody shocking, you are supposed to be a moderator but yet you resort to personal insults and have also contradicted yourself in a number of areas. Just because you are a moderator it does not give you the right to speak to people as though they are dirt and act like a tyrant.

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## GrauGeist (Dec 8, 2013)

Hmmmmm


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 8, 2013)

pattle said:


> I don't want to take sides here but the way you are speaking to DonL is bloody shocking, you are supposed to be a moderator but yet you resort to personal insults and have also contradicted yourself in a number of areas. Just because you are a moderator it does not give you the right to speak to people as though they are dirt and act like a tyrant.



1. I am talking to him the way I am because I have done so in a civil manner on dozens of occasions, and have been ignored by him over and over. I am tired of the same people over and over derailing threads and then ignoring repeated requests by the staff to knock it off. Do you like repeating yourself to someone for years on end? Probably not. I bet you would lose your cool as well. 

2. I am sorry that you feel the way you do. I am human like everyone else. As I stated above, I get tired of the same people bickering and arguing which derails from threads. 

3. I have used no personal insults to anyone. Go back and read the posts carefully. I did not call him any personal names or anything that. If you are referring to my bone headed comment, it was meant in jest. (Note to yourself: He said he was not boneheaded, I called him a bone head and put the little wink smiley after it, letting him know it was in jest. Next time I can put [In Jest][/In Jest] tags behind it for you if you wish). Other than that, please go and show me where I personally insulted him. (do so in a PM, I am tired of this thread being detracted). You won't because I did not personally insult him.

4. I do not act like a tyrant. I think you will find that I am probably one of the more lax moderators here. It is pretty hard to get me going. I have probably banned less people, and give the most opportunities for people to correct the childish behavior. I am just tired of the same people over and over derailing threads, and then ignoring repeated attempts (all of them civil) to get them to act like adults and stay on topic.

5. I treat others as they treat people themselves. 

6. Go back to 4. I don't act like a tyrant.

7. Probably the most important thing. If you have a problem with me or any other moderator, *contact us directly in a PM*, and we can try and work it out.

8. If you do not like it here, the door is open. I don't wish to see people leave. I believe that each and every person on this forum is what makes it great (even DonL and parsifal), but I will not twist someone's arm and make them stay if they do not like me, or any of the other staff.

9. If you wish to continue this discussion, go back and see number 7. There is a PM function. 

10. For the last time, lets get back on topic. (Okay this one is more important than number 7...) We don't need anyone else from the peanut gallery derailing an already derailed thread. There is a ton of good stuff to be discussed on this topic, if people would just do so. Is it too much to ask????

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## pattle (Dec 8, 2013)

As far as pm's go certain things need to be said openly and not behind closed doors. I believe I have made my point and I do not wish to spend anymore time on it, but if you feel the need to have the last word then be my guest.

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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 8, 2013)

pattle said:


> As far as pm's go certain things need to be said openly and not behind closed doors. I believe I have made my point and I do not wish to spend anymore time on it, but if you feel the need to have the last word then be my guest.



No you can have the last word since it will obviously make you feel better, and hopefully you will allow this topic to finally get back on track. Somehow I doubt that. 

Signed

Forum Tyrant

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## stona (Dec 8, 2013)

Mr. Blonde: Boy that was really exciting. I bet you're a big Lee Marvin fan aren't ya. Yeah me too. I love that guy. My heart's beatin' so fast I'm about to have a heart attack.


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## Lucky13 (Dec 8, 2013)

Ok, beer's up and NFL on the picture box, where's the bacon!!??





Sorry.....wrong thread!


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## parsifal (Dec 8, 2013)

I was the reason for this disruption to the thread, and I apologize for that. not for what ive said, or the positions ive taken. . But i dont like to see any members losing their tempers, and threads coming apart at the seams because of opinions expressed.

I am not going to get involved in this stuff any more than i am, but Adler is doing a very difficult job and us guys should not interfere. If you have issues with what hes saying, the appropriate way of doing that is via PM.

As far as objecting to what i say, you can PM me, or, do as i have done, add those people you dont wish to have a conversation with to your ignore list. That way, you dont ever have to read what they want to say. This is a free forum, and people are entitled to a great deal of freedom. There are some basic rules though, which I shall give my advice on free and gratus

1) Dont argue with the mods. Its a sure way to get banned, and a sure way to get a thread closed down.

2) Put your opinions down as you see them. If you are going to disagree with another members post, keep it constructive, back up your rebuttal with facts or sources

3) Dont resort to personal insults and try to keep away from inflamatory language.

4) The material you post should have some relevance to what is being discussed. if the topics stray too far, the mods will pull us into line. We should try to self manage relevance, but its almost an everyday occurrence that discussions end up straying a bit.....

5) If you dont like the posts being made by another member, either dont read them, dont visit the thread, or use the Ignore function to hide that members' comments.

I strongly advise we get back to the discussion if we want to save this thread.

Edit:
Lucky is around and as the thread starter could say if he is happy or not with what we are discussing. For me that has some weight, especially as he is a friend of mine.

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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 8, 2013)

No pasifal, you are not the reason in this case. You made a post that was relevant, nothing else.

Now can this can get back on topic? This is a prime example of how bickering ruins threads, ans why we sometimes blow our tops.


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## Lucky13 (Dec 8, 2013)

I don't mind at all, if the discussion moves along to later in the war. Always interesting to about other armies doctrines (is that the right word here?), in teachings, practices etc., etc..
Don't mind should it spill over to the navies or air forces either...as the Japanese navy air force and army air force had the same successes early in the war as well....much thanks to the zero, but I'm sure that the time in school, helped as well...

Bickering wink or whatever you want to call it, will always be around, shame to see good people getting banned over it...there's always a chance that a discussion get heated...


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## Shortround6 (Dec 8, 2013)

As far as the Japanese go, your "time in school" comment is appropriate as even if of not all pilots/crews had experience in China the Organization's did and for a number of years. That was experience that stood them in good stead at the beginning of the war but may have helped contribute to their reversal of fortune as the Chinese air force wasn't very good and allowed the Japanese to believe that "modern" warplanes didn't need protection (armor/self sealing tanks) and that light armament was sufficient ( most/all Chinese aircraft lacking both armor and self-sealing tanks except perhaps for some Russian supplied aircraft?).


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## Lucky13 (Dec 8, 2013)

The Chinese did get a few of those I-16's, didn't they?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Dec 8, 2013)

I can dislike too. 

(Yes my disliking was in fun, don't get any panties in a bunch pattle...)

Lucky, no one is getting banned. We just need the topic on track and the same people to stop detracting.

Last time to repeat it. Lets get this topic. We are all friends, lets keep it that way.


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## pbehn (Dec 8, 2013)

Lucky13 said:


> What was it that made the German Army so successful in the Beginning of WWII, was it their training, education, officer schools etc.?
> How did these factors compare between the fighting armies?
> What education did the NCO's and higher ranking officers receive?
> Was it much of a difference between Army, Navy and Air Force?
> ...



From my point of view germany was successfull in the early years because the military had a plan and were professional in its execution. In later years the political leaders gave the military un achievable targets. in the end it could be fair to say Adolf went nutz. I havnt read one word about his intervention being positive to the outcome after 1940.

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## GrauGeist (Dec 8, 2013)

Lucky13 said:


> The Chinese did get a few of those I-16's, didn't they?


Yes, about 250 of them. Don't recall the type, but they were up-amed with additional set of 7.62mm MG

They also had the I-15, numbering about 345 (347?) I'll have to look the numbers up for an exact head-count...

*Edit* I-16 type 10, I-15 was 347 
All these were to the Chinese Nationalist Air Force

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## Lucky13 (Dec 8, 2013)

pbehn said:


> From my point of view germany was successfull in the early years because the military had a plan and were professional in its execution. In later years the political leaders gave the military un achievable targets. in the end it could be fair to say Adolf went nutz. I havnt read one word about his intervention being positive to the outcome after 1940.



In other words, uncle Adolf should have kept his fingers out of the biscuit tin!
Less unachievable goals and listened to his generals, things _might_ have gone well, a wee bit longer...


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## parsifal (Dec 8, 2013)

pbehn said:


> From my point of view germany was successfull in the early years because the military had a plan and were professional in its execution. In later years the political leaders gave the military un achievable targets. in the end it could be fair to say Adolf went nutz. I havnt read one word about his intervention being positive to the outcome after 1940.



Germany was successful in its early campaigns for a whole range of reason. Strategically they were able to surpise theior enemy, and not just once. They had a doctrine superior to anybodys, and not just blitzkrieg. They had technology more developed and ready for war, and for a number of years retained that lead. They had a large, well trained and well motivated army. They had leadership both military and political (pretty much the same person) in tune with the national capabilities. 

But things did go wrong. Their naval strategy was flawed. Their military leaders were not good at front wide or combined arms operations point of view beyond the immediate operational needs of their own command. A classic example would be Rommels refusal to return the airborne assets after the fall of tobruk. The agreement had been to return these assets to maintain the blockade of Malta. instead, bedazzlewd by the pull of the pyramids, he appealed over the headsof his superiors directly to Hitler, and got the assets retained under his command. After Tobruk, he didnt get much more of value, and lost a lot, as the Malta djeni jumped out of its box and monstered his command. I think his defeat was inevitable before Tobruk, but if Malta had remained suppressed, he may have been able to hold out longer, or even achieve some evacuation of his troops before the gates slammed shut. 

Like all armies, the germans had their strenfths, and their weaknesses. They were essentially a continental army, and this gave them great strengths and advantages, but it also made them less good at other operations. Late in the war they attempted several ampbibious operations....with conspicuous lack of success.


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## Njaco (Dec 8, 2013)

I read somewhere that one difference between the German army and the Allies was a restriction on freedom of movement for a commander - from a General on down to a Sgt. In other words, sometimes combat situations require the top-ranking soldier to act and not wait for orders, but the Wehrmacht did not allow this type of decision making, viz-a-viz June 6, 1944 and waiting for Hitler to release the panzers.

Is this true?


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## Glider (Dec 8, 2013)

I thought that regimental officers and men were encouraged to take advantage of any chances that appeared on the battlefield but at senior level, in particular when Hitler and Himmler became involved in making combat decisions everything came to a stop.


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## parsifal (Dec 8, 2013)

sometimes the Germans could react very quickly. Using Rommel again, in north Africa, it was his ability to adapt quickly and flexibly to a fluid situation that made him so dangerous. 

On the other hand, after the issue of the "No Retreat" maxim in November 1941, the Germans became increasingly constricted in their ability to undertake orderly tactical withdrawals. There were some very significant exceptions, such as during Mansteins time in command of AGS, but then there were some first class disasters as well. Guderian was dismissed for retreating, as were a whole range of other prominent commanders. Stalingrad was another example of this sort of thing at work.

The majority of the blame for this can be laid at the feet of Hitler, but not entirely. The heer dropped training and studies in retreat before the war, with the result that retreats tended to become headlong routs with greater costs in men and machnes than was necessary. Hitler also tended to forbid the prepration of defensive lines behind the front, because as the war progressed, he tended to not trust his commanders, and was of the opinion that prepared positions was defeatist and encouraged retreats when they were not necessary.

After 1943, the main part of the German army was no longer capable of true mobile warfare, either in attack or defence, due to the loss of transport in their main army. The mechanised formations retained mobility, but they were given no rest because they were constantly having to work as fire brigades to try and save what they could in terms of the Infantry, which were constantly being overtaken and then defeated in isolation. 

If the Germans had retained enough transport to retain mobility, and had adopted more flexible defence plans, from '42 when the writing clearly was on the wall, instead of going nuts and attacking when they lacked the strength (something supported by the remaining senior commanders including the super defender Halder. Bock, and Richthofen also supported the offensive, though few supported the diversion of effort into Stalingrad) to do so effectively, they probably could have achieved a better outcome than they did, at least on the eastern front. By 1945, even the Russians werre running out of men, all the Germans had to do was increaser the cost of the Soviet offensives, whilst reducing their opwn costs. not a simple task, but they hardly could have done worse strategically given the inability for the heer to use their greatest strength of 1939-42, namely the operational ,mobility of their army.


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## Totalize (Dec 9, 2013)

The Campaign against the Soviet Union was the rock that smashed the creme of the German Heer. The failure to correctly estimate the logistical demands of such a massive campaign combined with Hitler's meddling in military operations and strategy were at the heart of the army's decline and eventual defeat. The campaign in Russia was like a huge black hole that sucked in so much material and resources that it affected the German Military's ability to wage war on all fronts.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 9, 2013)

Njaco said:


> I read somewhere that one difference between the German army and the Allies was a restriction on freedom of movement for a commander - from a General on down to a Sgt. In other words, sometimes combat situations require the top-ranking soldier to act and not wait for orders, but the Wehrmacht did not allow this type of decision making, viz-a-viz June 6, 1944 and waiting for Hitler to release the panzers.
> 
> Is this true?



Actually in the beginning of the war I believe the opposite was true. At least on the "small" unit level. Lower level leaders were encouraged to take action quickly and NOT wait for orders for higher up. It helped keep up the momentum of attacks and allowed for quick response and flexibility in defense. Like many other things though the well trained and experienced pre and early war NCOs and low level officers suffered a disproportionate amount of causality's and the "system" could not supply enough replacements especially while trying to expand the army. 

I read someplace years ago ( could have been a Jim Dunnigan Game extra) that a German NCO week long tactics course had the students given one problem every hour, they had 5 min to come up with a plan and then several of the plans (but not all) were discussed before the next problem was presented. This went on for a week. In contrast a British NCO week long tactics school and one problem in the morning and one in the afternoon (after lunch) with an hour being given to come up with a plan and then the discussion. In a Week the German NCO was presented with 3-4 times the number of problems and while his plans may not have been as carefully thought out there was a definite emphasis on the speed of coming up with _some sort of plan. _


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## silence (Dec 9, 2013)

parsifal said:


> No, i havent. but books by Trevor Dupuy that i have read...
> 
> Understanding War: Military History And The Theory Of Combat, New York, 1986
> Understanding Defeat: How to Recover from Loss in Battle to Gain Victory in War, New York, 1990
> ...



Yep, same guy.


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## silence (Dec 9, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> Actually in the beginning of the war I believe the opposite was true. At least on the "small" unit level. Lower level leaders were encouraged to take action quickly and NOT wait for orders for higher up. It helped keep up the momentum of attacks and allowed for quick response and flexibility in defense. Like many other things though the well trained and experienced pre and early war NCOs and low level officers suffered a disproportionate amount of causality's and the "system" could not supply enough replacements especially while trying to expand the army.
> 
> I read someplace years ago ( could have been a Jim Dunnigan Game extra) that a German NCO week long tactics course had the students given one problem every hour, they had 5 min to come up with a plan and then several of the plans (but not all) were discussed before the next problem was presented. This went on for a week. In contrast a British NCO week long tactics school and one problem in the morning and one in the afternoon (after lunch) with an hour being given to come up with a plan and then the discussion. In a Week the German NCO was presented with 3-4 times the number of problems and while his plans may not have been as carefully thought out there was a definite emphasis on the speed of coming up with _some sort of plan. _



Correct. German doctrine was "mission-oriented": basically, the superior gives the objective, and the unit commander is expected to determine how to best achieve it. This gives the advantages of having someone on the spot determining the best course of action and also gives them the ability and authority to improvise if an unexpected opportunity suddenly presents itself. This also helps build trust at all levels. Also check out Cordell and Zabecki's _On the German Art of War: Truppenfuehrung_, a translation of the German Combat Unit Command manual. it also has as an appendix a post-war review by some German generals of the US Army's manual. Some of the comments, views, and criticisms are very interesting. Its a great buy for $20 or so.

Back to topic: What's really interesting is that on the Eastern Front this is how the Heer started out, but as the reversals started and AH became more and more of a micromanager mission-oriented gave way to Simon-says, while for the Red Army the almost exact opposite happened when Stalin learned that some of his generals could actually be trusted - as much as he trusted anyone.


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## parsifal (Dec 9, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> I read someplace years ago ( could have been a Jim Dunnigan Game extra) that a German NCO week long tactics course had the students given one problem every hour, they had 5 min to come up with a plan and then several of the plans (but not all) were discussed before the next problem was presented. This went on for a week. In contrast a British NCO week long tactics school and one problem in the morning and one in the afternoon (after lunch) with an hour being given to come up with a plan and then the discussion. In a Week the German NCO was presented with 3-4 times the number of problems and while his plans may not have been as carefully thought out there was a definite emphasis on the speed of coming up with _some sort of plan. _




This is a parqadox. On the one hand you are obviuously not a convert to someone like Dunnigan and his work, but in the same breath are singing the praises of the german system of "gaming" out problems. Your understanding of how the germans developed small unit tactics is wrong, but the sentiment is clear enough....the germans emphasises quick thinking and encouraged even small unit NCOs to think clearly about military problems, the British army far less so. in fact this is about the only aspect of the summary that is correct. The secret of the German system was their embracement of "Krigspiel", literally "wargame" which in its original modern form dates back to 1811, in the Prussian War College. Major changes were made in 1871 with something called "free form Kriegspiel". Free form simulation was the format used to test plans and train officers until after WWII. it was less accurate than "rigid" Kriegspiel, but it enabled battle problems to be analysed very quickly. 

Rigid Kriegspiel is more accurate, but slow. It forms the basis of the CNA system, and it is significant that it was used as a training aid at Sandhurst until the mid 90s. The germans virtually abandoned rigid kriegspiel except at very senior command levels. Barbarossa was tested using both free form and rigid Kriegspiel, Midway wqas tested using Free form Krigspel in its naval format. Both plans ended up being a failure...barbarossa because the assumptions that underpinned it proved incorrect, Midway because the gamers changed the parameters to suit their preconceptions as to the outcome....Sort of defeats the purpose of simulation in my opinion..... 

The debate really gets down to systems based on analytical problem solving versus intuitive problem solving. Free Kriegspiel is much more attuned to intuitive problem solving, whereas the British system was far more attuned to analytical problem solving. The Germans embraced free form kriegspiel, whereas the emhasis in the British officer training remained rigid krigspiel oriented until after WWII 

Both systems have their advantages and disadvantages. But in the case of the British Army, the problem with their NCO training was not that they were given training in one system or the other. It was that they were given no training at all in problem solving. Problem solving in the British Army was considered an commissioned officer responsibility. The British Army published a handbook in 1938 that set out in written form, the various tactical approaches to a given battle problem. NCOs were expected to read that book and know it backwards. to a much greater extent, German NCOs were encouraged to think and come up with alternative solutions. It explains in large measure, the various performances of the two armies in WWII....the Germans were flexible, but sometimes things did go wrong, the British were rigid and unimaginative, but always dependable and measured. both systems had advantages and disadvantages

http://www.usma.edu/cfe/Literature/MacNab_12.pdf


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