# Significance of the Battle of Midway



## tomo pauk (Apr 8, 2014)

Hello,
At one of the current threads, the opinion was stated that US victory in the Battle of Midway was a tactical one. Didn't want to derail that thread, so maybe we could discuss the importance of that battle here. 
I'll kindly ask that flag waving should be kept on minimum; thanks  I'll also ask the moderators to keep this thread in this subforum, if that's o.k.


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## pbehn (Apr 8, 2014)

In a war where Aircraft carriers dominated events the Japanese lost 3 out of 4, a complete disaster for the IJN and a turning point only 6 months after Pearl Harbor.


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## VBF-13 (Apr 8, 2014)

The tide actually could have started to turn at Wake six months earlier had the U.S. followed through. What was the _significance_ of Midway? Well, aside from the fact of the licking the Japanese took, I think one has to consider that, as well, from the point of view of where that would have left the U.S. had the Japanese taken it. For that, in itself, I think, it was very significant. It didn't finish the Japanese, by any means, but it turned the Japanese back, put them on their heels.


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## buffnut453 (Apr 8, 2014)

If the Japanese had taken Midway, it would have been yet another isolated post that had to be resupplied...something the Japanese were simply unable to do. It could have been readily bypassed with little impact on the rest of the Allied war effort. As it stands, Midway remains a major turning point because from that point on Japan's empire was only ever in a downward spiral towards ultimate defeat.


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## GrauGeist (Apr 8, 2014)

Unlike the United States, Japan could not afford to lose a single carrier, let alone three. They could absorbe, to a certain degree, the loss of men and aircraft, without losing their battle capability.

The loss of those carriers without any tactical gain was disasterous.


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## RCAFson (Apr 8, 2014)

pbehn said:


> In a war where Aircraft carriers dominated events the Japanese lost 3 out of 4, a complete disaster for the IJN and a turning point only 6 months after Pearl Harbor.


 The IJN lost all 4 of their fleet carriers present at Midway:

Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu.


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## Garyt (Apr 8, 2014)

> If the Japanese had taken Midway, it would have been yet another isolated post that had to be resupplied...something the Japanese were simply unable to do. It could have been readily bypassed with little impact on the rest of the Allied war effort.



Agreed.

The only potential positive impact for the Japanese would have been if they sunk some American carriers with little loss to their own. And IMO this would have delayed the allied victory a bit, but that's about it.

I've seen another opinion as to where the true turning point of the Pacific war was, and I've come to if not 100% agree at least see some validity in the thought process. Though Midway was not where the Japanese lost the war - they lost their carriers, yes, but the Guadacanal campaign is where they really lost their airforce. I think the Marianas turkey shoot is a good illustration of this, as they had repaired their carrier forces to a point, but their air arm was far from being up to the task of defeating the allies or even inflicting any significant damage upon them.


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## VBF-13 (Apr 8, 2014)

buffnut453 said:


> If the Japanese had taken Midway, it would have been yet another isolated post that had to be resupplied...something the Japanese were simply unable to do. It could have been readily bypassed with little impact on the rest of the Allied war effort.


I think the Japanese, who had both a striking and a landing task force coming into there, would beg to see that a little differently.


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## buffnut453 (Apr 8, 2014)

But where do they go if they succeed in taking Midway? They can't advance further - it just becomes a logistics sink (literally!) for them.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 8, 2014)

The lost of four fleet carriers meant that Battle of the Eastern Solomons was fought on more or less even terms. In case the Midway went, say, with two carriers lost on each side, that would mean the Japanese would have 4 fleet carriers vs. a single one for the USN - a result should be easy to forecast: USN has only one operational carrier at the end of 1942, vs. 4 of the IJN?

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## VBF-13 (Apr 8, 2014)

buffnut453 said:


> But where do they go if they succeed in taking Midway? They can't advance further - it just becomes a logistics sink (literally!) for them.


I was wondering at that, too, buff. I actually asked about it, basically where they go from there, in another thread. It's in the archives, someplace. They didn't come into there from underneath with that huge landing task force, though, had they not been thinking something strategic in reference to that island; the way I see it, anyway.


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## bobbysocks (Apr 8, 2014)

sometimes just denying your enemy's use of something can be strategic or tactically important


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## GrauGeist (Apr 8, 2014)

Also keep in mind that the IJN also lost one of their best carrier commanders, R.Adm. Yamagichi, when the Hiryu sank.


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## beitou (Apr 8, 2014)

How long after Midway was it before the Japanese had another operational fleet carrier?


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## buffnut453 (Apr 8, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> I was wondering at that, too, buff. I actually asked about it, basically where they go from there, in another thread. It's in the archives, someplace. They didn't come into there from underneath with that huge landing task force, though, had they not been thinking something strategic in reference to that island; the way I see it, anyway.



The main purpose was not to take Midway, rather it was to draw out the US Pacific Fleet into open battle where, naturally, the IJN would be victorious. The IJA didn't support the operation because of the resource impact on the Army when there was little tangible gain in terms of defensible real estate. The entire Operation MI plan was lacking in logic and at no stage was wargaming rigour applied, with predictable results. The "diversion" attack on the Aleutians was a stupid dissipation of resources that achieved nothing. Midway is perhaps the best example of Japanese military leaders suffering from "the victory disease".


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## The Basket (Apr 8, 2014)

beitou said:


> How long after Midway was it before the Japanese had another operational fleet carrier?



Japan had other carriers. Midway was simply a means. To fight and destroy the Pacific fleet in a Mahon style decisive battle. Didnt work out that way.


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## Garyt (Apr 8, 2014)

> . In case the Midway went, say, with two carriers lost on each side, that would mean the Japanese would have 4 fleet carriers vs. a single one for the USN -



Well, the US would have had one of the Midway carriers, the Saratoga, and the Wasp. We also may have seen the Ranger transferred over from the Atlantic.

That would have been 4 functioning carriers. I know the Wasp and Ranger were lighter, but in terms of aircraft capacity they were as good as anything the Japanese had. Survivability may not have been great, but they were as survivable as the Soryu and Hiryu at least, and with the superior US damage control.

I think at that point it would be 4 fleet carriers each.


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## Garyt (Apr 8, 2014)

> Japan had other carriers.



Yes and no. They had a handful of escort carriers, carriers with complements of 25-50 planes, and sometimes these were converted merchant ships, which makes them far less fit to handle battle damage.


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## The Basket (Apr 8, 2014)

Garyt said:


> Yes and no. They had a handful of escort carriers, carriers with complements of 25-50 planes, and sometimes these were converted merchant ships, which makes them far less fit to handle battle damage.



Shokuko and Zuikaku were as good as Soryu, Kaga, Hiryu and Akagi.


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## RCAFson (Apr 8, 2014)

beitou said:


> How long after Midway was it before the Japanese had another operational fleet carrier?



Japan started the war with 6 fleet carriers: Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu, Shokaku and Zuikaku. 

Shokaku and Zuikaku were under refit and repair after the Battle of the Coral Sea, and so missed Midway. After Midway they formed the core of the IJN carrier forces. The next "fleet" carriers completed were the Junyo and Hiyo, which became operational in late 1942; however these ships were converted from passenger liners and were not fast nor durable enough to be considered full fledged fleet carriers. The next real fleet carrier to enter service was Taiho in mid 1944. Taiho was a superb ship but had a very flawed avgas stowage system, which proved to be her undoing.

Japan also had a number, of smaller but fast light carriers which combined with Shokaku and Zuikaku still gave Japan an edge in carrier power over the USN in the Pacific (especially after the loss of Wasp and Hornet) until the arrival in numbers of the Essex class in late 1943. The USN repeatedly pleaded with the RN in 1942 to send RN carriers into the Pacific, and after Operation Torch, the RN did send HMS Victorious, which operated with the USN in Mid 1943 pending the arrival of the Essex class carriers.

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## tomo pauk (Apr 8, 2014)

Garyt said:


> Well, the US would have had one of the Midway carriers, the Saratoga, and the Wasp. We also may have seen the Ranger transferred over from the Atlantic.
> 
> That would have been 4 functioning carriers. I know the Wasp and Ranger were lighter, but in terms of aircraft capacity they were as good as anything the Japanese had. Survivability may not have been great, but they were as survivable as the Soryu and Hiryu at least, and with the superior US damage control.
> 
> I think at that point it would be 4 fleet carriers each.



The USN can throw in the Battle of E. Solomons 3 CVs (Wasp, Saratoga, Midway survivor). IJN can throw 4 fleet and one light CV. This requires that Wasp is not, as historically, detached due to low fuel situation (a direct consequence of it's small size?). If things play out as historically, it is is 2 USN CVs against 4.5 IJN carriers. So USN looses both carriers in the battle, Japanese 1 big and 1 small? Hopefully the Wasp will not get hit by sub's torpedoes...
Pulling the Ranger from A/C transportation duties means that less P-40s made it to N. Africa and Burma. Allies are also one CV short during operation Torch.


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## pbehn (Apr 8, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> The IJN lost all 4 of their fleet carriers present at Midway:
> 
> Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu.



Thanks my fault I was reading the early part of the battle.


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## RCAFson (Apr 8, 2014)

pbehn said:


> Thanks my fault I was reading the early part of the battle.



BTW, this is an excellent article on the state of the IJNAF and it's carriers after Midway:

Reorganization of the Japanese Combined Fleet Air Assets - 14 July 1942

by the end of 1942 the IJN had added light fleet carrier Ryuho to the above.

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## FLYBOYJ (Apr 8, 2014)

Yamamoto missed the US Carriers at Pearl Harbor and I believe he felt (and was possibly obsessed) with the notion that he had to destroy all of the Pacific Fleet carriers before the US would either capitulate or be turned into an ineffective combatant, regardless of the gains Japan had achieved after Pearl Harbor. Unknown to him, the US Fleet waited in ambush. Like a boxer who thought he had a fight just about won, Midway was that phantom sucker punch that came out of nowhere and set the momentum to put Japan on the defensive for the rest of the war.



RCAFson said:


> BTW, this is an excellent article on the state of the IJNAF and it's carriers after Midway:
> 
> Reorganization of the Japanese Combined Fleet Air Assets - 14 July 1942
> 
> by the end of 1942 the IJN had added light fleet carrier Ryuho to the above.



"Following the severe losses at Midway, the Japanese reversed their policy from offensive operations to defensive operations."


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## Garyt (Apr 8, 2014)

> Shokuko and Zuikaku were as good as Soryu, Kaga, Hiryu and Akagi.



I'd say they were better than the 4 Midway carriers, though the Midway carriers may have had better aviators. But as carriers go,I'd rate them above the Midway carriers.

I was of course referring to the other carriers besides the Kido Butai survivors.



> The USN can throw in the Battle of E. Solomons 3 CVs (Wasp, Saratoga, Midway survivor). IJN can throw 4 fleet and one light CV. This requires that Wasp is not, as historically, detached due to low fuel situation (a direct consequence of it's small size?). If things play out as historically, it is is 2 USN CVs against 4.5 IJN carriers. So USN looses both carriers in the battle, Japanese 1 big and 1 small?



I'd think there would a good chance the US would do it's best not to respond, or perhaps even hope for some help from Great Britain in the Carrier department, At least until the Ranger is back. What might also be interesting is the plane capacity of the various forces. Pretty well all of the American Carriers have a larger complement of planes than the Japanese carriers.

The US might have been set back a bit, and the Japanese could advance further in the South Pacific for a while. But by Late '43, the US would have 4 brand new Essex class carriers, with an air arm of about 380 planes on these 4 carriers, and Hellcat fighters. With all 6 carriers, Kido Butai's air arm was only 409 planes.


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## GrauGeist (Apr 8, 2014)

Garyt said:


> Yes and no. They had a handful of escort carriers, carriers with complements of 25-50 planes, and sometimes these were converted merchant ships, which makes them far less fit to handle battle damage.


The Japanese Navy (and yes, the Army, too) had more than a handful of carriers. Listed below, are the ones that saw action of any type during WWII. This list does not include the various carriers that were completed, near complete or had been recently laid down and saw no action during the course of the war. Also, this list does not include the aircraft carrying submarine types that the IJN had in service.

The list is organized by the date of which the carrier was either sunk or taken out of action.

*IJN Fleet Carriers:*
Kaga - damaged/scuttled, Battle of Midway - 4 June 1942
Sōryū - sunk, Battle of Midway - 4 June 1942
Akagi - damaged/scuttled, Battle of Midway - 5 June 1942
Hiryū - damaged/scuttled, Battle of Midway - 5 June 1942
Shōkaku - torpedoed/sunk, by USS Cavalla (SS-244) - 19 June 1944
Taiho - sunk, Battle of Phillippine Sea - 19 June 1944
Hiyō - sunk, Battle of the Phillippine Sea - 20 June 1944
Zuikaku - sunk, Battle of Leyte Gulf - 25 October 1944
Shinano - torpedoed/sunk, by USS Archerfish (SS-311) - 29 November 1944
Unryū - torpedoed/sunk, by USS Redfish (SS-395) - 19 December 1944
Hōshō - survived WWII

*IJN Hybrid Battleship Carriers:* (did not see a significant role in WWII) 
Ise - survived WWII
Hyūga - survived WWII

*IJN Light Fleet Carrier:*
Shōhō - sunk, Battle of Coral Sea - 6 May 1942
Ryūjō - sunk, Battle of the Solomons - 24 August 1942
Chuyo - torpedoed/sunk - 4 December 1943
Chitose - sunk, Battle of Leyte Gulf - 25 October 1944
Chiyoda - sunk, Battle of Leyte Gulf - 25 October 1944
Zuihō - sunk - Battle of Leyte Gulf - 25 October 1944
Ryūhō - damaged/AoA(survived WWII), by air attack - 19 March 1945
Amagi - sunk, by aircraft - 29 July 1945
Kaiyo - survived WWII

*IJN Escort Carrier:*
Unyo - torpedoed/sunk, by USS Barb (SS-220) - 17 September 1944
Shinyo - torpedoed/sunk, by USS Spadefish (SS-411) - 17 November 1944

*IJA Escort Carrier:*
Shinshu Maru - sunk - 5 January 1945
Yamashiro Maru - sunk - 17 February 1945

*IJA Light Landing Carrier:*
Nigitsu Maru - sunk - 12 January 1944
Kumano Maru - survived WWII


Midway can be seen as a "turning point" of the war not because the Japanese Navy lost 4 valuable aircraft carriers but because they confronted an enemy and were handed a serious defeat.

However, as seen by the list above, they were certainly still a serious threat and would continue to be for at least two more years.


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## parsifal (Apr 8, 2014)

It was my opinion being discussed here....that Midway was a tactical rather than a strategic victory. I am not denigrating the extent of the victory by stating that. at least thats not my intention. 4 carriers lost to 1 carrier is a very one sided result. Full credit to the USN for achiving the victory.

So why would I claim it only as atactical victory at best. Because other issues were already at work to blunt the Japanese attack anyway. To claim total victory, all of the IJN aircrew would need to have been lost, but in point of fact as Joe B has shown me, nearly all the surviving Japanese pilots were rescued to fight again on the remaining Japanese carriers later in 1942. They suffered some losses to aircrew in the Midway strikes, but there was virtually no loss of pilots over the TG itself, and those on board were also rescued to a man. Japan simply could not sustain the numbers of pilots with carrier training for al 6 of the fleet carriers, and a carrier without planes is a useless piece of hardware. 

A psychological victory of strategic proportions could have been claimed if after midway, the Japanese had shelved their plans for further exapansion. But it didnt. they believed the USN was hurting as badly as they had been hurt, and that all that was was required was a "final push" in order to secure victory. that misplaced belief was what put the final nail in their coffin. At first they embarked on the capture of Milne Bay and Moresby, very rash, both of which unravelled, and this then left them exposed in other parts of the TO, which the green horn Marine formations were able to exploit and achieve a truly strategic seismic shift in the overall situation at Guadacanal. 

What Midway did do was to expose the true Japanese weakness in the levels of recovery they could bring to bear. After the initial headlong rush at the beginning of the year, they proved unable o replace losses, even to the extent of replacing lost planes and aircrew. Akagi and Kaga, for example, were ships quite able to operate in excess of 80 aircraft apiece, but went into Midway with just over 60. Hiryu and Soryu were began the war with 65 apiece, but by Midway managed only to field slightly over 50 for each carrier. Its a telling story as to what was happening already to the Japanese naval air corps. At Rabaul, at a time when they were faced with more than 1000 Allied aircraqft in the combat zone, at the beginning of Coral Sea, the land based air component was slightly over 100, including a large contingent of flying boats. The Japanese were already being overwhelmed, and had Midway not occurred, the outcome could scarcely have been any different. 

Only if the Japanese somehow managed to sink all the US carriers, their support ships, and not lose many of their own aircraft (ie less than 100) could they have claimed any victory. even under that circumstance,it would have taken many months for the CAGs to have been rebuilt, if ever. My opinion is that the Japanese carriers would have wound up beiung used as decoys, without planes embarked within a few short months, even under the most optimistic of scenarios.

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## RCAFson (Apr 8, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> However, as seen by the list above, they were certainly still a serious threat and would continue to be for at least two more years.



However, many of the carriers in the above list were not operational until 1943/44 and so were more than countered by the arrival of the Essex class, along with the USN's new fast light carriers.


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## Garyt (Apr 8, 2014)

GrauGeist wrote:



> The Japanese Navy (and yes, the Army, too) had more than a handful of carriers.



Well, let's make sure the context we were discussing. I was looking at what their carrier assets would have been after midway if both Japan and the US had lost 2 carriers.

The Taiyo, Perhaps Unyo as well would have been available. Converted merchants with a speed of 21 knots and 27 aircraft.
The Hiyo and Junyo, also converted merchants, top speed of 25 knots, 54 aircraft.
The Ryjuho, a true carrier with a 29 knot speed but a complement of only 38
The Zuiho, another true carrier, speed of 28 knots but complement of only 30 aircraft.

And of course, the 4 surviving members of Kido Butai.

All in all, capable of carrying a max of about 449 aircraft. But I must also say it seems that these small/light/merchant carriers seemed to accomplish little in combat situations compared to the larger carriers. And when I say "little", I mean they under performed per what you might have expected from their complement of planes. Maybe it's because their pilots were inferior to the pilots on the bigger carriers.

Parsifal wrote:


> My opinion is that the Japanese carriers would have wound up beiung used as decoys, without planes embarked within a few short months, even under the most optimistic of scenarios.



Interesting. The Japanese struggled with replacing pilots, which did seem to be more the issue than the planes. And the struggled with having enough fuel, but until the US Submarine offensive took out some of their merchant fleet Japan was not in too bad of shape.

I think at some point the pilots would be an issue, but we must remember what a meat grinder Guadacanal was for the Japanese air arm. The go into it very competent, able to go toe-to-toe with the US, and by the end of that campaign they are almost impotent, as evidenced at the Marianas.

If Japan could have kept away from a long campaigns of attrition they would have had more success with keeping competent air crews. Beating the US at Midway, taking more territory against weak opposition as they did in the time leading up to Midway, and some quick decisive carrier strikes would have helped.



> but in point of fact as Joe B has shown me, nearly all the surviving Japanese pilots were rescued to fight again on the remaining Japanese carriers later in 1942.



Indeed. The Japanese air arm died in the Guadacanal campaign, not Midway.


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## RCAFson (Apr 8, 2014)

Garyt said:


> GrauGeist wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> ...



AFAIK, these CVLs were available to the IJN by the end of 1942:

ship/completion

Taiyo/sept 41

Unyo/june 42

Chuyo/dec 42

Ryjho/prewar

Ryuho/Dec 1942

Zuiho/jan 41


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## parsifal (Apr 8, 2014)

Fleet carrier Shokaku was ready for operations mid July, but needed to be worked up which took until the beginning of August. Zuiho was ready, but needed her CAG assembed, which was done with the Midway survivors. So too for the carriers Junyo and Hiyo. Junyo had about 40 aircraft onboard, but the aircrews were not trained properly. This was normalised by the Midway survivors. Ryujo was operating with about 24 a/c at the time of Midway. Hiyo had no aircaft attached at the time of Midway, but this was rectified after the battle. 

Taiyo and Chuyo were never escort carriers in the western sense. they were use as aircraft transports, and as such, never had permanent CAGs attached, Ryuho was never used on fleet operation because of structural defects in the hull. Mizuho, her sister ship was to be taken in hand for conversion (which generally took about 10 months to complete) but was sunk by a submarine before she could be taken in hand. Carriers Chiyoda and Chitose were in existence at the time of Midway as sub tenders, but work on their conversion to carriers was not begun until almost a year later. The japnese were in no hurry to get more carriers. They knew they lacked the pilot replacement rates to use them anyway. At the time of Midway, an average of 16 pilots per month were receiving their carrier wings, and this rate was changing only slowly. It took about 5 years to be carrier trained at the beginning of the war, by mid-43, trained pilots needed about a further 6 months conversion training to be carrier trained. Increasing the supply of carrier pilots was always aq big problem for the Japanese, made worse by the shortages of instructors and training aircraft. Ive read somewhere (but admit i forget exactly where), that by mid 1943 replacement rates had crept up to about 35 pilots per month. There were reasons why the mobile fleet did not sally forth to give battle between Santa Cruz and Phil Sea. Twice the IJN had laboriously built up the CAGs of the fleet, only to be forced to use them as supplements to the rabaul air garrison. Once in April 1943, when about 330 carrier pilots were committed, and once in November, when just over 400. From October to April is a a 6 months delay. The starting total after Santa Cruz was about 100 aviators or an average of 33 aviators per month, whilst the November effort required a replacement rate somewhere just above 35 pilots per month. In the meantime, the USN was churning out aircrew like hotcakes at a school fete.

How did the USN compare to this situation? If you look at USN pilot training, in the years 1925 through 1941 (very few aviators from classes prior to 1925 were still in flying billets by 1941) 7,061 pilots had completed the program. Of these, 44 percent, 3,112 completed the program just in 1941 and about 40% were carrier trained. That equates to about 103 pilots per month for USN carriers, in 1941. Between 1934 and 1941, some 5,687 pilots were trained in the USN . How many of these were carrier qualified? I have not the slightest idea; I would suspect that certainly a majority, as the USN, especially in the 1930’s, had a habit of moving pilots from one type of squadron to another. 

In the USN it wasn’t all that unusual both before and after the war to move from one community to another. This was made relatively eassy for the USN because of the education base of their manpower and the depth of their training programs. IJN pilots took far longer to train and were of limited adpatability, because of the very narrow and rigid training regimes and restricted education bases of the manpower. 


In 1942 USN pilot training programs started to ramp up; 10,869 aviators received their wings of gold, almost twice as many as had completed the program in the previous 8 years. i do not know the proportion of pilots for carriers, but one would assume a proportional increase, which would equate to somewhere in the vicinity of 2-300 carrier qualified pilots each and every month . In 1943 there were 20,842 graduates; 1944, 21,067; and, with then end of the war in sight, 1945 ended with 8,880 graduates. Thus in the period 1942 to 1945, the USN produced more than 2.5 times the number of pilots as the IJN. And each of those USN pilots went through a program of primary, intermediate, advanced, and, for the carrier pilots combat preparation in RAGs before heading west. New pilots were arriving for action in USN carrier squadrons with as many as 600 hours flying under their belts and as much as 200 hours of that in type. 

This was a level of training and preparation with which the IJN could never dream of competing. The IJN training programs suffered from an insufficient number of qualified instructors, lack of fuel for extensive flying time, poor maintenance of training aircraft, and shortages of ordnance. There two most critically lacking areas were a continued adherence to traditional adversarial nature of their programs (for every one graduate, there were nine others who did not) and, of course, time. There was never enough time to develop the students’ skills, to practice attack tactics or defensive actions. Before the war, the average flight time of Japanese aviators was in excess of 1000 hours, with an average of 700 hours in frontline combat. by 1943, this was down to less than 200 hours, with no combat experience. by 1944 it sank even further,, to less than 100 hours training. Limited supplies of pilots, and limited quality puts the Midway situation in sharp focus. The Japanese were defeated in the USNs training progrmas, not in the skies over Midway Island 

Edit:
A significant source for a lot of this material is our own R Leonard. Anyone who knows him, knows he is encyclopedic on this stuff
.

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## Garyt (Apr 8, 2014)

Interesting info, Parsifal. I find the specific numbers on pilots trained and carrier pilots trained per month the most informative. Always knew that was the case, but I never knew the hard numbers. The amount of flight hours is interesting as well.

If I am reading correctly, the Japanese would have about 30-35 pilots per month for carriers at their peak, the US was 200-300 per month on average?

It would make sense to not have a lot of pilots on carriers and try to focus more on land based by late war for the Japanese. With such poorly trained pilots, landing on the carrier itself would be an adventure. Non combat losses would soar when trained pilots were rare.


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## BiffF15 (Apr 9, 2014)

This is very good info, or way of "de-constructing" or breaking down an event (I watch too much Overhaulin). I didn't realize that we were out producing them pilot wise by such a margin. The effects snowballed, and the further behind they go the greater / more devistating the impact.

Cheers,
Biff

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## buffnut453 (Apr 9, 2014)

Japan had problems across the board scaling up for total war. The key strategic challenge for Japan was maintaining SLOCs (sea lanes of communication) to their Pacific outposts which required far more combat and cargo vessels than Japan could produce...and that was before the attrition inflicted by the US Pacific Fleet and, later (and to a much lesser extent), the RN assets dedicated to the theatre.


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## VBF-13 (Apr 9, 2014)

buffnut453 said:


> The main purpose was not to take Midway, rather it was to draw out the US Pacific Fleet into open battle where, naturally, the IJN would be victorious. The IJA didn't support the operation because of the resource impact on the Army when there was little tangible gain in terms of defensible real estate. The entire Operation MI plan was lacking in logic and at no stage was wargaming rigour applied, with predictable results. The "diversion" attack on the Aleutians was a stupid dissipation of resources that achieved nothing. Midway is perhaps the best example of Japanese military leaders suffering from "the victory disease".


Up until Midway, the Japanese Navy, for the most part, was doing the business of the Japanese Army, sweeping through the Southwest Pacific. What of Hawaii and Alaska? What of Panama and the West Coast? We'll never know, but those had to be on their minds. That was a huge occupation force they had coming in there. They were coming in to stay. They didn't throw together an occupation force of that size and secret it from the striking force and try to move it in for nothing. All that had to happen was the striking force had to draw out and get the jump on the U.S. carriers, and finish them off. Instead, the U.S. got the jump, and the Japanese got turned back looking like a wet dog that got kicked out of the house for chewing on a shoe. But they had plans, and that big occupation force says they were big plans. I don't know exactly what they were, and I'd of course like to see record on it, but I can't see it any other way, really, not with that occupation force waiting to take the stage.


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## buffnut453 (Apr 9, 2014)

The occupation force was huge for 2 small atolls but it was miniscule from an operational perspective. IIRC the Japanese Army dedicated approx 5,000 men to the occupation force. That's peanuts. You're not going anywhere with 5,000 men. The key is in the name - it was an occupation force. My question remains - once they took Midway, where next? It's not a jumping-off point to anything or anywhere, just a useful staging post...but staging posts have to be resupplied and THAT was always a problem for the Japanese.


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## VBF-13 (Apr 9, 2014)

What if they parked the carriers they brought there? Was Yamamoto thinking of finishing the job at Pearl? If they just wanted the U.S. carriers, why bring the occupation force? An occupation force supplying Midway and the carriers would make sense if they were thinking a stroke at Pearl.


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## buffnut453 (Apr 9, 2014)

Take a look at this satellite image of Midway Atoll. Where are the port facilities, particularly deep anchorages and fuel storage, sufficient to handle aircraft carriers from an operational perspective? 

The occupation force was just that...to occupy the atoll. If you don't occupy something, someone else will take it while you're back is turned. The only potential use for Midway is as a base for seaplane operations. There's no way you could launch an offensive operation from Midway.


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## parsifal (Apr 9, 2014)

by June 1942, the americans had two reinforced Infantry Divisions permanently stationed and well dug in on Oahu. There were other odds and sods but a conservative estimate of the defensive forces stationed on the island would have to be at or above 100000 men. Two divisions at full ToE is about 70000 men.....15500 men, and an equal number of supporting or Corps Troops. according to Shelby Stanton US Army Order Of Battle WWII huge numbers of independant CA Bn s were attached to the two Infantry Divs (24th and 25th) stationed on the island to defend it. 

The Japanese formation tasked to invade Midway, the so called Midway Occupation Force was actually the Ichiki Detachment, a force of 5000 men, with a combat element of about 2000, built around 28th Infantry Regiment of the IJA. For the record, the Japanese Armed Forces Order Of Battle 1937-45 by Victor Madej ( a commercial version of the US Army's Intelligence Division publication titled simply "Japanese Armed Forces" dated Setember 1945. 

In the version I have the assault forces consisted of 

Ichiki Detachment 

Infantry 28th Regiment (part) 
1 x infantry batallion, with 
4 infantry companies 
MG company (8 HMG) 
infantry gun platoon (2 guns) 
regimental infantry gun battery 
high-velocity (AT) gun battery 
radio unit 
stretcher unit ('1/3 size'...usually stretcher unit had 3 companies, so perhaps only one company) 

1st company, engineer 7th regiment (both 7th ER and 28th IR belonged to 7th division) 

independent high-velocity gun 8th battery

The formation was nominally under the kawaguchi detachment, based on Truk, and was in fact one of the Armies "Independant Mized Brigades". It had formerly been known as the 65 IMB, and had fought, not particularly well at Bataan. The IMBs were meant to be light infantry, and were really only equipped for defensive operations, and lacked many things including organic artillery (to any significant extent), or transport, or indeed heavy weapons. They were used in amphibs bewcause they were easy to move and it was thought they could be sufficient to defeat most of the defences the Americans were likley to throw up against them in the island wars. They were totally wrong...Ichiki was decimated at Tenaru River two months later by a single marine battalion, reportedly losing 916 men in a single night in suicidal Banzi charges against the dug in US marines, who held the high ground.

There were no plans in the Midway operation, or indeed as part of the Japanese "2nd Operational phase" plans to attempt to tackle Hawaii. it was far too well defended and the Japanese knew it. The aim of the Midway invasion was primarily to entice the USN out to a decisive battle, but failingt that , the atoll would be taken and developed as an advanced seaplane base from which the movements of the USN into and out of the naval failities at PH could be watched. this was a knife to the USNs throat, and unacceptable, though exactly what the IJN was going to do with that information, nobody is sure.


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## Garyt (Apr 9, 2014)

> They were used in amphibs bewcause they were easy to move and it was thought they could be sufficient to defeat most of the defences the Americans were likley to throw up against them in the island wars. They were totally wrong...Ichiki was decimated at Tenaru River two months later by a single marine battalion, reportedly losing 916 men in a single night in suicidal Banzi charges against the dug in US marines, who held the high ground.



I agree there was no real chance for the Japanese to take Pearl, at least not with a force the size of the Midway Invasion.

Regarding the battle of Tenaru though, about 1,000 Japanese attacked a US force of 3,000 - and the US had artillery, tanks, even some air support, the Japanese had liitle but mortars and machine guns. Steven Spielberg portrayed it a bit differently of course


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## VBF-13 (Apr 9, 2014)

buffnut453 said:


> Take a look at this satellite image of Midway Atoll. Where are the port facilities, particularly deep anchorages and fuel storage, sufficient to handle aircraft carriers from an operational perspective?
> 
> The occupation force was just that...to occupy the atoll. If you don't occupy something, someone else will take it while you're back is turned. The only potential use for Midway is as a base for seaplane operations. There's no way you could launch an offensive operation from Midway.


OK, but I was thinking more in terms of the reasonably-foreseeable future, say, a strike within a matter of months. The ships didn't need to dock at any ports for that, they needed to lick their wounds, and be supplied, while they were at it. They'd have fresh water, and, in the longer term, crops. I'm using my imagination, now, not drawing on any authority for that proposition. Your proposition makes sense to me, don't get me wrong. It's just a little hard for me to shake off my proposition without any record extant on those intentions.


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## RCAFson (Apr 9, 2014)

buffnut453 said:


> Take a look at this satellite image of Midway Atoll. Where are the port facilities, particularly deep anchorages and fuel storage, sufficient to handle aircraft carriers from an operational perspective?
> 
> The occupation force was just that...to occupy the atoll. If you don't occupy something, someone else will take it while you're back is turned. The only potential use for Midway is as a base for seaplane operations. There's no way you could launch an offensive operation from Midway.



The USN's primary use for Midway was as a submarine refuelling and forward submarine support base. It is about 2200nm to Japan from Midway versus ~3300nm from Pearl Harbor, and it was USN subs, after they sorted out their torpedo problems, that began to strangle IJ marine trade. If Japan had Midway they could use it to interdict USN subs and at the same time refuel their own.


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## VBF-13 (Apr 9, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> The USN's primary use for Midway was as a submarine refuelling and forward submarine support base. It is about 2200nm to Japan from Midway versus ~3300nm from Pearl Harbor, and it was USN subs, after they sorted out their torpedo problems, that began to strangle IJ marine trade. If Japan had Midway they could use it to interdict USN subs and at the same time refuel their own.


That may very well be. Look at how they pounded Wake and just kept coming at it, relentlessly. They weren't trapping any carriers, there. What was Midway to them but the same thing as Wake?


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## drgondog (Apr 9, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Hello,
> At one of the current threads, the opinion was stated that US victory in the Battle of Midway was a tactical one. Didn't want to derail that thread, so maybe we could discuss the importance of that battle here.
> I'll kindly ask that flag waving should be kept on minimum; thanks  I'll also ask the moderators to keep this thread in this subforum, if that's o.k.



IMHO Midway and Stalingrad were the two Definitive turning points of the war. Up to either confrontation, the Axis held the initiative. Afterwards marked a slow but inexorable retreat from high water marks for both the Japanese and Germany.

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## buffnut453 (Apr 9, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> That may very well be. Look at how they pounded Wake and just kept coming at it, relentlessly. They weren't trapping any carriers, there. What was Midway to them but the same thing as Wake?



Because the Wake operation wasn't aimed at trapping the American carriers. Operation MI had precisely that objective. 

Using Midway as a submarine base makes much sense, indeed it's probably the only useful function for it, but such a function won't lead to an attack against Hawaii. You talk of resupplying carriers at Midway - where are the supplies going to come from, even for submarines? The stores have to be transported there which is exactly the point I'm making - the Japanese had tremendous difficulties keeping their isolated outposts resupplied. What was (and often still is) depicted as a red overlay covering most of the Pacific was, in reality, a series of isolated, unsupported locations that could be bypassed unless needed for strategic basing....which was exactly what the Pacific Fleet did for real.


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## The Basket (Apr 9, 2014)

Midway was about getting the Pacific fleet to battle.
Odd the Japanese went 4 carriers. 
At Pearl and Ceylon they went 6.
Perhaps indicative of a larger picture.


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## Garyt (Apr 9, 2014)

> Midway was about getting the Pacific fleet to battle.
> Odd the Japanese went 4 carriers.
> At Pearl and Ceylon they went 6.



Coral Sea had a say in how many carriers would be used.


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## Garyt (Apr 9, 2014)

I might add that Yammamoto's late commitment of the Battleships and other forces had much to do with the fact that he was planning on ambushing the Americans - not vice-versa. It would have been a totally different scenario had the Japanese been on an even keel in intelligence (military intelligence that is). It probably would have played out a lot more like a larger scale version of Coral Sea.

Best Idea would have been to wait for Shokaku and Zuikaku, and replentish the aircraft supply on the other 4 of Kido Butai.

As the battle unfolded, it made no sense for Yammamoto to keep the other 2 forces behind the action. The Carrier force would have been better off having the Battleships up providing AA support for them.

Though it may have been doctrine - The Japanese may have thought providing AA support was not a dignified enough role for a battleship. But you would think Yammamoto who was somewhat forward thinking would have realized that this was their most effective means of employment.


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## VBF-13 (Apr 9, 2014)

buffnut453 said:


> Because the Wake operation wasn't aimed at trapping the American carriers. Operation MI had precisely that objective.
> 
> Using Midway as a submarine base makes much sense, indeed it's probably the only useful function for it, but such a function won't lead to an attack against Hawaii. You talk of resupplying carriers at Midway - where are the supplies going to come from, even for submarines? The stores have to be transported there which is exactly the point I'm making - the Japanese had tremendous difficulties keeping their isolated outposts resupplied. What was (and often still is) depicted as a red overlay covering most of the Pacific was, in reality, a series of isolated, unsupported locations that could be bypassed unless needed for strategic basing....which was exactly what the Pacific Fleet did for real.


I think I'm getting persuaded. It's those red maps, lol. I've seen them, and have hardly given them a second thought. That's right, though, most of those islands couldn't be kept sustained. And they really were of little consequence, anyway.


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## parsifal (Apr 9, 2014)

> Midway was about getting the Pacific fleet to battle.
> Odd the Japanese went 4 carriers.
> At Pearl and Ceylon they went 6.
> Perhaps indicative of a larger picture.



It was. But I need to make a correction here. The overall operation did not just involve 4 carriers. it involved 8 overall, not including the seaplane carriers and seaplane cruisers that supported the operation.

The carriers involved and their air groups were:
(†) denotes killed in the operation, or for ships, sunk
(*) Reserve Aircraft (I think). insufficient or no pilots, or incomplete training


Carrier Division 1 VAdm. Nagumo Chūichi

CV Akagi† 
Capt. Aoki Taijirō

CAG: 1 [1] B5N2Type 97Cdr. Fuchida Mitsuo
AVF: 18 [18] A6M2Type 0 LtCdr. Itaya Shigeru
AVB: 18 [18] D3A1Type 99LtCdr. Chihaya Takehiro
AVT: 17 [17] B5N2 Type 97 LtCdr. Murata Shigeharu
AG-6: 6 [6]* A6M2 Type 0 Lt. Kaneko Tadashi

CV Kaga†
Capt. Jisaku Okada†

CAG: 1 [1] B5N2 Type 97 LtCdr. Kusumi Tadashi†
KVF: 18 [18] A6M2 Type 0 Lt. Satō Masao
KVB: 20 [18] D3A1 Type 99 Lt. Ogawa Shōichi†
KVT: 26 [26] B5N2 Type 97 Lt. Kitajima Ichirō
AG-6: 9 [9]* A6M2 Type 0

Carrier Division 2 RAdm. Yamaguchi Tamon†

CV Hiryū† Capt. Kaku Tomeo†


CAG: 1 [1] B5N2 Type 97 Lt. Tomanga Jōichi
HVF: 18 [18] A6M2 Type 0 Lt. Mori Shigeru†
HVB: 18 [18] D3A1 Type 99 Lt. Kobayashi Michio†
HVT: 17 [17] B5N2 Type 97 Lt. Kikuchi Rokurō
AG-6: 3 [3]* A6M2 Type 0

CV Sōryū† 
Capt.Yanagimoto Ryūsaku†

CAG: 1 [1] D3A1 Type 99 LtCdr. Egusa Takashige
SVF: 18 [18] A6M2 Type 0 Lt. Suganami Masaharo
SVB: 15 [15] D3A1 Type 99 Lt. Ikeda Masahiro
SVT: 18 [18] B5N2 Type 97 Lt. Abe Heijirō
SVS: 2 [1] D4Y1 Type 2
AG-6: 3 [3]* A6M2 Type 0

Attached to the Main Body

Carrier Group
Capt. Umetani Kaoru

Of the other two fleet carriers Shokaku was 

CVL Hōshō
Capt. Umetani Kaoru
HVT: 8 [8] B4Y1 Type 96 Lt. Irikiin Yoshiaki (CAG)


Attached to the Midway Invasion Force


Carrier Group
Capt. Ōbayashi Sueo

CVL Zuihō 
Capt. Ōbayashi Sueo

ZVF: 6 [6] A6M2 Type 0 Lt. Hidaka Moriyasu (CAG)
6 [6] A5M4 Type 96 
ZVT: 12[12] B5N2 Type 97 Lt. Matsuo Kaji


Attached to the Seaplane Tender Group (not actually proper carriers) 


Seaplane Tender Division 11

AV Chitose 
Capt. Furukawa Tamotsu

VS: 16 [12] F1M2 Type 0 ??? (CAG)
4 [4] E13A1 Type 0

AV Kamikawa Maru 
Capt. Shinoda Tarohachi

VS: 8 [8] F1M2 Type 0 ??? (CAG)
4 [4] E13A1 Type 0



Carrier Division 4 (Aleutians element of the operation) 
RAdm. Kakuta Kakuji

CVL Ryūjō 
Capt. Katō Tadao

RVF: 16 [9] A6M2 Type 0 Lt. Kobayashi Minoru
RVT: 20 [18] B5N1 Type 97 Lt. Yamagami M. (CAG)

CVL Junyō 
Capt. Ishii Shizue

JVB: 19 [15] D3A1 Type 99 Lt. Abe Zenji
JVF: 8 [6] A6M2 Type 0 Lt. Shiga Yoshio (CAG)
AG-6:12 [7] A6M2 Type 0*

For the Indian ocean operation in April, only 5 carriers were used. I think Kaga (or it might have been Akagi) was detached to collect and finish the training of reaplacement crews, to make good some of the losses.

Shokaku and Zuikaku had participated in the Coral Sea operation, in whic about 80 aircraft had been lost. Im not sure how many crews had been recovered, but japanese SAQR services were pretty reudimentary compared to the USN efforts to save pilots. . Shokau was out of action due to battle damage, but Zuikaku only had a partial airgroup at that point. They were busily training up replacement caders....effectively the fleet carrier was acting as a trainng carrier at that point, and this gave the IJN a slight lift in pilot numbers in the following weeks and months. nothing to get too excited about, but something at least. 

Shoho had been lost, with heavy loss of life, including a large proportion of its precious air group personnel. Hit by the full force of two US fleet carriers, it never stood a chance


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## The Basket (Apr 10, 2014)

Zuikaku could have been at Midway. Junyo and Ryujo too.
Calling Hosho a carrier is pushing the boat out.
Typical Japanese planning. Overly complex and depends on the enemy doing exactly what you think.
Need battleships for AAA support. 

A Zero from Ryujo on the Aluetians operation was the Koga Zero. so that went well.


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## Francis marliere (Apr 10, 2014)

With respect, the Japanese battleships could hardly provide AAA support.

The IJN wisely estimated that AAA (at least at this stage of the war) was not effective. Ships were not expected to shoot down or deter many planes and had to steer evasively at high speed to spoil attacks. Hence distance between ships was more important the Japanese Task Forces than in other navies and ships could usually not support or be supported by other ships.

Anyway, most battleships had a pretty weak AAA at this time (usually 8 x 5"/50 DP guns and 8 x 25 mm machiune-guns cannons).


Best,


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## Balljoint (Apr 10, 2014)

Francis marliere said:


> With respect, the Japanese battleships could hardly provide AAA support.
> 
> The IJN wisely estimated that AAA (at least at this stage of the war) was not effective. Ships were not expected to shoot down or deter many planes and had to steer evasively at high speed to spoil attacks. Hence distance between ships was more important the Japanese Task Forces than in other navies and ships could usually not support or be supported by other ships.
> 
> ...




Right! But the battleships could have bombarded Midway rather than doing so with carrier planes. Had the IJN carriers been positioned somewhat away from Midway and tasked only with CAP and dealing with the expected US carriers, there would have been a much better chance for Japanese success. As it was the IJN carriers had to deal with Midway air attacks as well as well as the Devastators. With both bombs and torpedoes littering the hanger decks as well as overstressed CAP, the IJN carriers were overexposed and overextended.
The battleships could (and should) have shouldered the major part of the load prior to the USN carriers showing there hand.


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## parsifal (Apr 10, 2014)

Francis marliere said:


> With respect, the Japanese battleships could hardly provide AAA support.
> 
> The IJN wisely estimated that AAA (at least at this stage of the war) was not effective. Ships were not expected to shoot down or deter many planes and had to steer evasively at high speed to spoil attacks. Hence distance between ships was more important the Japanese Task Forces than in other navies and ships could usually not support or be supported by other ships.
> 
> ...



ah, not quite corect.

The Battlecruisers escorting the fast carriers were each equipped with 5 x 5in/40 DPs, 4 x 40mm AA and either 8 13.2mm plus 20x 25mm AA or 28 x 25mm (Ive got conflicting specifications). Yamato went into Midway carrying 12 x 5in and 34 25mm plus 4 13.2mm MG. The carriers were generally fitted with 12 5/40s and typically 24 x 25mm AA plus 22 x 13.2 AAMG

The 5/40 was an older gun than the 5/50 fitted to most of the escort destroyers. it was a reasonably effective AA gun, unlike the 5/50, which had insufficient training and elevating speeds to do this job adequately. The USN 5/38 was far superior in that regard to both guns

The Japanese made the right decision to disperse their task forces and rely on manouvre over massed defensive fire. in order to derive benefit froma mutual fire of their escorts, the Destroyers needed to be carrying an effective DP wepon, and this they simply did not possess. Whereas the 40mm Bofors could also offer some cover fire over the carrier from a normal tactical distance (about 800yards for a Destroyer, roughly 2000 yards for a Battlship) the 25mm was not really effective at those ranges. 

The 25mm never was competitve to the bofors, but it was better than the 20mm fitted to most US ships in 1942. 

Given the limitations of the armament, it made sense to disperse the TF when under attack and rely on manouvre over fire.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 10, 2014)

Francis marliere said:


> With respect, the Japanese battleships could hardly provide AAA support.
> 
> The IJN wisely estimated that AAA (at least at this stage of the war) was not effective. Ships were not expected to shoot down or deter many planes and had to steer evasively at high speed to spoil attacks. Hence distance between ships was more important the Japanese Task Forces than in other navies and ships could usually not support or be supported by other ships.
> 
> ...



The Japanese were right in the notion that their AAA was not effective. Low number of barrels, inadequate 25mm cannons, no electronics means of early warning and fire control - the Japanese BB in mid 1942 cannot put out the volume, RoF and range of the AA fire like the USN BB in mid 1942 was capable for. 
In case the CVs are the only capital ships at the receiving end of a sizable air attack, not only their combing and steering away will make the deck operations as good as impossible, but even the 500 lb bombs will cause huge problems once they hit home. The BBs were less susceptible for such bombs, and, in case 1000 lb bombs are used, the CVs are doomed, BBs less so.


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## Garyt (Apr 10, 2014)

> but even the 500 lb bombs will cause huge problems once they hit home. The BBs were less susceptible for such bombs, and, in case 1000 lb bombs are used, the CVs are doomed, BBs less so.



A few 1000lb bombs with planes being armed/readied is a huge issue. But the carriers could take a few 1000lb bomb hits if not in the midst of conducting air operations. At both Coral Sea and Santa Cruz Japanese carriers took multiple hits of these bombs and did not sink. Needed to be repaired, yes, but sink, no. At Santa Cruz they had radar to know when to cease flight operations - at Coral see they were just luck, or lack of bad luck.



> The 5/40 was an older gun than the 5/50 fitted to most of the escort destroyers. it was a reasonably effective AA gun, unlike the 5/50, which had insufficient training and elevating speeds to do this job adequately. The USN 5/38 was far superior in that regard to both guns



You know, Parsifal, the Japanese might have done better had they retained this gun for their destroyers instead of going to the 5"/50. Or at least made some modifications to the 5"/50, like turrets with better train/elevation, power ramming ability, and ability to be loaded at higher elevations.


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## parsifal (Apr 10, 2014)

Garyt said:


> You know, Parsifal, the Japanese might have done better had they retained this gun for their destroyers instead of going to the 5"/50. Or at least made some modifications to the 5"/50, like turrets with better train/elevation, power ramming ability, and ability to be loaded at higher elevations.



There are other forum members who know thair guns far better than me, but from an AA defence pov, maybe. From a fleet destroyer pov, probabaly not. In the surface actions of the Solomons and after, the USN very quickly developed a very healthy respect for the Japanese fleet destroyers, who used an effective combination of 5/50 and Long Lance in the numerous small scale actions in the Solomons. 

Nathun Okun had this to say about the 5/40

"The Type 89 was the first Japanese AAA weapon designed for the purpose and was used in twin mountings on most World War II warships cruiser size and larger as well as on small destroyers and some auxiliaries. The Type 89 was also used to replace many of the 12 cm/45 (4.7") AA guns on older cruisers. The Type 89 prototype was proved in 1931 and adopted for service use on 6 February 1932. 
The Japanese considered the Type 89 to be a good AAA weapon and it had a fast rate of fire and excellent elevation and training speeds on the later Mods. Its primary shortcoming was a relatively low muzzle velocity and thus a short range and low AA ceiling. Used a spring rammer cocked by the recoil, similar to other Japanese AAA weapons. 

These weapons were of simple construction with autofretted monobloc barrels and breech rings and used horizontal sliding breech-blocks. Total production of Type 89 guns amounted to 1,306 guns, with 836 being manufactured between 1941 and 1945. Of these, 362 were mounted ashore, including 96 in the Yokosuka area and 54 in the Kure area". 

He has this to say about the 5/50

"These weapons were used on most Japanese destroyers built between 1926 and 1945 in both single and twin mounts. The mountings for these guns were a revolutionary design, as the Japanese were the first to use weather and splinter-proof mounts on destroyers. The second batch of these destroyers were also the first to use medium caliber guns with high elevations, giving them a DP function. However, the very slow training speeds and lack of power ramming made these mountings almost useless against the fast-moving aircraft of World War II. 
These weapons were of built-up construction, originally three layers (Model No. I) and later two layers (Model No. I2) along with the usual breech ring and breech bush. About 700 guns were manufactured. Surprisingly for this size weapon, these guns fired bag ammunition and used a Welin breech-block".

Surprisingly perhaps, the HAA armament remained the primary area defence weapons even over the Bofors for the entire war, because of their range and burst radius. Because of this, and the overall ascendance of aircraft as the primary attacking weapon system, the USN 5/38, despite its rather poor anti surface capability, was probably the best destroyer weapon of the war.


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## Garyt (Apr 10, 2014)

> There are other forum members who know thair guns far better than me, but from an AA defence pov, maybe. From a fleet destroyer pov, probabaly not. In the surface actions of the Solomons and after, the USN very quickly developed a very healthy respect for the Japanese fleet destroyers, who used an effective combination of 5/50 and Long Lance in the numerous small scale actions in the Solomons.



The 5"/50 was a pretty good surface weapon, but had a low rate of fire compared to the 5"40. If the 5"40 was used for surface work it would have had a better ROF, though abut 75% of the range. As Destroyers used more common shells than anything, and muzzle velocity does not effect HE type shells penetration really, it would have done OK from that aspect as well. 

The 10cm type 98 would have been good I would think - very high rate of fire, equivalent ROF to the 5"/38. Not sure how effective it would be vs ships, but a great aa weapon. Armed like this they would have made great carrier escorts.



> The 25mm never was competitve to the bofors, but it was better than the 20mm fitted to most US ships in 1942.



The Oerlikon was a heck of a lot better than the Japanese 25mm. Biggest issue was ROF - 300 or so practical for the Oerlikon, the 25mm was held down to about 115 per minute due to have to replace magazines. They also were relatively slow on traiining and elevation,and apparently had excessive muzzle blast, more of an issue with the trip-mounts.

The US 1.1" weapon (28mm) was somewhat subpar. Low ROF (practical about 100) was the biggest issue with this weapon. These were rpelaced with Oerlikons as quickly as possible.



> the USN 5/38, despite its rather poor anti surface capability, was probably the best destroyer weapon of the war.



I don't know how "bad" it was at surface work. It had a good ROF, about 1.5x that of the Japanese 5", fored a heavier projectile with a heavier bursting charge. And AP rounds on destroyers did not make a lot of sense - they did not need them to defeat destroyers or smaller armour, and many cruisers had armor that could not be defeated by a 5" shell even if AP. And forget trying to pierce a Battleship with a 5" AP projectile. That's why destroyer rounds were some form of common, special common or HE.

The only thing the 5"/38 lacked in was range, having about 75% of the 5"50's range. I think what made a difference for the Japanese and help make up for their slower rate of fire - their destroyers were larger, and had mostly dual mounted 5 inchers, the US had single mounts for the most part.

So a US destroyer might have had 4-5 5"/38's, the Japanese destroyers often had 6-8 of the 5"/50's. Plus the Japanese destroyers were about 150% of the tonnage of the US ones.


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## parsifal (Apr 10, 2014)

The Japanese considered it to be an exceelent weapon, but as you point out, compared to the oerlikan, it had a slower rof due to the magazine feed.

The 25mm was somewhere between the bofors and the oerlikan in terms of performance. A quick look at what it could do revelas the following

Elevation With 0.55 lbs. (0.25 kg) HE Shell -10 / +85 degrees 
Range @ 45 degrees 7,439 yards (6,800 m) 
Range @ 50 degrees 8,200 yards (7,500 m) 
AA Ceiling @ 85 degrees Effective: 9,843 feet (3,000 m) 
Maximum: 18,040 feet (5,500 m) 
Rate Of Fire Cyclic: 220 - 260 rounds per minute 
Effective: 110 - 120 rounds per minute 

Its ammunition had the following characterisitcs

The oerlikan had a much rof, but both its bursting charges and effective ranges were far less than the Japanese gun. both guns were obsolete by 1945 b against fast moving aircraft, but the oerlikan, in my opinion was moreso.

Its range characteristics were as follows

Elevation With 0.271 lbs. (0.123 kg) HE-I Mark 3 Shells 
Range @ 10 degrees 3,450 yards (3,154 m) 
Range @ 15 degrees 3,950 yards (3,612 m) 
Range @ 20 degrees 4,275 yards (3,909 m) 
Range @ 25 degrees 4,525 yards (4,138 m) 
Range @ 30 degrees 4,650 yards (4,252 m) 
Range @ 35 degrees 4,725 yards (4,320 m) 
Range @ 40 degrees 4,775 yards (4,366 m) 
Range @ 45 degrees 4,800 yards (4,389 m) 
AA Ceiling 10,000 feet (3,048 m) 
These however are theoretical ballistics ranges Effective range during World War II against aircraft for manually aimed weapons rarely exceeded 1,000 yards (910 m), although USN Oerlikon gunners were expected to open fire at 1,200 or 1,300 yards (1,100 or 1,200 m) which allowed aiming corrections by the point the target entered effective range. This was far too late to be considered effeective against an aircraft travelling at 350mph or more. An aircraft travelling at that speed would be over your position in just over 5 seconds. Against a Kamikaze, the 20mm shell was simply not big enough to stop anything in that time frame. The Japanese didnt have to contend with kamikazes so, the playiong field is not level in this comparison. Effective range of the 25mm was about 2000 yds and that made all the difference. still inadequate, but better than the oerlikon 

The rof of for the oerlikan was far superior to the 25mm

Rate Of Fire 
Cyclic: 450 rounds per minute 
Practical: Between 250 to 320 rounds per minute 

However the type still was affected by the magazine feed, which did downgrade performance by an amount I cannot fully determine

According to nathun Okun .....

Between December 1941 and September 1944, 32% of all Japanese aircraft downed by the USN were credited to this weapon, with the high point being 48.3% for the second half of 1942. In 1943 the revolutionary Mark 14 Gunsight was introduced which made these guns even more effective. This gunsight was developed by Dr. Charles Draper of MIT, who calculated that since the guns fired at relatively short ranges, a crude but simple and effective relative-bearing system could be used to control these weapons. The Mark 14 gunsight used two gyros to measure vertical and lateral rate of change, calculated the lead angle to the target aircraft and then projected an off-set aiming point for the gunner. Use of the Mark 14 did require that an electric power connection be provided to the formerly free-standing mountings. This gunsight was later adopted as part of the Mark 51 director which was used to control the 40 mm Bofors, greatly increasing their effectiveness. See the Technical Board essay on the Mark 51 director for additional information. Postwar, the Mark 14 was replaced by the Mark 20 Gun Sight, which was a lighter, simpler design. The Mark 20 was ready to use in ten seconds after being switched on while the Mark 14 took three minutes. 

In 1944-45, the USN found that 20 mm shells were too light to stop Japanese Kamikaze planes and the higher approach speeds of these planes made manually controlled guns obsolete. As a result, Oerlikons were replaced by 40 mm Bofors where ever possible during 1944-45 and removed entirely from most US ships by the mid-1950s. 

During the war, the USN greatly increased the numbers of 20mm mounts fitted to their ships. This was achieved by replacing the single mounts with the new twin mount, from 1944. this was a definite mistake. It was iplemented in an effort to reduce top weight . The Mark 24 twin mounting was deliberately designed such that it could be installed on the same foundation and with the same working circle as a single mount. On a comparative weight basis, three twins could replace four singles, thus gaining two barrels while saving four crewmembers. However, an SCB analysis tentatively concluded that these three twins were only effective as the four singles, as the increased noise, smoke and vibration of the twin mount reduced the effectiveness of the Mark 14 gunsight.


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## Garyt (Apr 10, 2014)

> The Japanese considered it to be an exceelent weapon, but as you point out, compared to the oerlikan, it had a slower rof due to the magazine feed.



Maybe the Brass thought that early in the war, but here is what the Japanese thought of this weapon:

4) According to US Naval Technical Mission to Japan report O-47(N)-2, the Japanese saw the following deficiencies in these mountings in decreasing order of seriousness: 
a) The multiple mounts could not be trained and elevated rapidly enough, either by power or manual drive. 
b) The gunsights were inadequate against high speed aircraft. 
c) The guns had excessive vibration, making them difficult to keep on target. 
d) The capacity of the ammunition supply equipment was inadequate, causing interrupted fire and a greatly reduced operating routine. 
e) The muzzle blast caused problems for both the guncrew and equipment.

Actually, the US gun that the Japanese 25mm most mirrors is the US 1.1". Similar rate of fire, larger shells. It even had faster train and elevation speeds than the Japanese 25mm. The US 1.1" was phased out quickly and replaced by the Oerlikon 20mm. And actually the Oerlikon as you pointed out was credited with a high percentage of AA kills. It was not the ideal weapon for the kamikaze, but few weapons were ideal, and the kamikaze was a very unusual type of attack. 

Actually, the Navweaps site has this regarding the Japanese 25mm:



> _The 25 mm Type 96 was widely used throughout the Japanese Navy with about 33,000 guns being produced. The Japanese considered this gun to be an excellent weapon, but it did not compare well to either the Bofors 40 mm or the Oerlikon 20 mm weapons used by the Allies. The magazines for the Type 96 held only 15 rounds, so frequent stoppages for change outs were required. _





> However, an SCB analysis tentatively concluded that these three twins were only effective as the four singles, as the increased noise, smoke and vibration of the twin mount reduced the effectiveness of the Mark 14 gunsight.



Interesting. This is one of the primary complaints on the 25mm, and it was more of a problem on the triple mount. I think multiple gun mountings were the bane of many WW2 anti-aircraft autocannon.

Also with the range of the lighter WW2 autocannons - I think range is overrated to a point. The reason why is that the further the range, the lesser chance of a hit. And I'd also think that a weapon with say a 2,000 meter range has a better chance of hitting at 3/4 of it's range (1500m) than a longer range weapon has at hitting at 3/4 of it's max effective range, i.e. a 4,000 meter range gun hitting at 3,000 meters.

So a longer range weapon means more seconds on target. But the seconds gained at the extremes of range are far less important than the seconds on target at say 1/2 range or closer.


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## The Basket (Apr 11, 2014)

With respect, the battleships could have provided flak support. 
Because they still had guns which go bang and shooting down only part of it.
Deterrence is also part of it. why Kamikaze is so scary. You really do have to shoot down the airplane.

The battleships couldnt bombard Midway until the airpower on Midway was defeated. The Japanese demonstrated that even a modern battleship is no match for airpower. Flak or maneuvers dont matter.


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## parsifal (Apr 11, 2014)

The 1.1 in US gun is one of the most hotly debated weapons around, and opinion remains vey sharply divided as to whether it was effective or not. Some would argue that its replacement by the 20mm oerlikon was not due so much to its shortcomings as a gun, but more to do with its cost. Im not sure either way to be honest, but here is a discussion i found regarding its effectiveness

Was the USN 1.1" AA gun good for anything? in Battleship Vs Battleship Forum

Regarding the criticisms of the 25mm, unquestionably it was a weapon that at the end of the war, was considered to have some serious failings. Further, one only has to look at the results that the overall efforts of the Japanese AA, to know that it was far less effective than US efforts. Or so it might appear. Even on that score there is sharp debate, with some knowledgeable people in this place arguing it was only fractionally as effective as the claims made for it (particularly the 5/38). I dont fully buy those arguments, but neither do I fully accept the stuff about the effectiveness of the 20mm. It was considered obsolete by 1946, less than 5 years after service entry, and that speaks volumes about its true effectiveness to my mind. The bofors, by comparison, is stil going pretty strong 70 years later.

Nav Weaps makes the following comment with respect to the US 1.1 inch gun

"In retrospect, it would appear that these defects were little more than teething problems and that the basic design was sound. However, this weapon still lacked the range and larger bursting charge of the Bofors"


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## Francis marliere (Apr 11, 2014)

Balljoint said:


> Right! But the battleships could have bombarded Midway rather than doing so with carrier planes. Had the IJN carriers been positioned somewhat away from Midway and tasked only with CAP and dealing with the expected US carriers, there would have been a much better chance for Japanese success. As it was the IJN carriers had to deal with Midway air attacks as well as well as the Devastators. With both bombs and torpedoes littering the hanger decks as well as overstressed CAP, the IJN carriers were overexposed and overextended.
> The battleships could (and should) have shouldered the major part of the load prior to the USN carriers showing there hand.



Balljoint, all relies on what you mean by "could have". 
Battleships had the physical capacity to shoot at Midway, hence could have bombarded Midway (if not sunk or damaged by planes during their progression toward the island, but that's another story).
But that was not part of Japanese mindset and doctrine. Battleships were designed, build and used to fight battleships. They were not expected to waste their ammunition and wore their gun against what was thought to be a secondary target. It was not after the disasters at Midway and in the Solomons that the IJN reluctanly accepted to send 2 battleships shelling Guadalcanal in October 42. And these battleships were Kongo class ships, which were never used as true battleships but as 'big' cruisers.

Best,

Francis Marliere


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## Francis marliere (Apr 11, 2014)

parsifal said:


> ah, not quite corect.
> 
> The Battlecruisers escorting the fast carriers were each equipped with 5 x 5in/40 DPs, 4 x 40mm AA and either 8 13.2mm plus 20x 25mm AA or 28 x 25mm (Ive got conflicting specifications). Yamato went into Midway carrying 12 x 5in and 34 25mm plus 4 13.2mm MG. The carriers were generally fitted with 12 5/40s and typically 24 x 25mm AA plus 22 x 13.2 AAMG
> 
> ...



Yes, you're right, I wrote too fast (as always) and made the confusion between the 5"/50 (DD SP gun) and the 5"/40 (BB CA DP gun). I also mixed the CA and BB for light guns. My bad. Anyway, we agree that Japanese AAA was not very effective and that IJN relied more on evasive maneuvers than gunfire. Hence a rather large distance between ships in their task forces.

Best,

Francis Marliere


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## Francis marliere (Apr 11, 2014)

Garyt said:


> You know, Parsifal, the Japanese might have done better had they retained this gun for their destroyers instead of going to the 5"/50. Or at least made some modifications to the 5"/50, like turrets with better train/elevation, power ramming ability, and ability to be loaded at higher elevations.



I fear that it would not change much things, because the main problem is the absence of effective fire control for AAA aboard DD.


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## Balljoint (Apr 11, 2014)

Yes, my thought is from the whole cloth with a healthy helping of hindsight. The IJN objective was the decisive battle which means taking out the remaining USN carriers. While the four carriers should have been able to accomplish this, a series of miscalculations and bad luck –primarily the USN intelligence coup- overcame the IJN advantage. 
The B-17s, B-26s and obsolete Marine planes on Midway wouldn’t have been much of a threat to the battleships. A couple of smaller carriers would suffice for CAP. Planes from the USN carriers would have flushed out the Japanese quarry. With the object being to take out the USN carriers, Nagumo’s First Carrier Force would have been better used towards that end. Dividing your force should be a major error in any military engagement whether the strategy is carriers supporting battleships or vice versa. 

For the USN, Coral Sea was the inflection point in the struggle. Midway was the first significantly positive trend. But there was at that point a long way to go.


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## Garyt (Apr 11, 2014)

Francis marliere wrote:



> The B-17s, B-26s and obsolete Marine planes on Midway wouldn’t have been much of a threat to the battleships. A couple of smaller carriers would suffice for CAP.



Absolutely right here. 


The Basket wrote:



> The battleships couldnt bombard Midway until the airpower on Midway was defeated. The Japanese demonstrated that even a modern battleship is no match for airpower. Flak or maneuvers dont matter.



I'd say a flotilla of battleships and some support vessels would not have had much to fear from Midway's land based air. And the best anti battleship weapon a plane has is a torpedo - the armor can withstand bomb damage fairly well. And the US torpedoes and torpedo planes were lacking at this point. Plus with some CAP from the light carriers, the battleships would have been fine. The carrier aircraft could have done some damage I'd think though, a lot having to do with sheer numbers.

But the battleships would have been to a point "bait" for the US carriers. Interesting to see how Midway would have turned out if the US spent it's strike bombing a Japanese battleship flotilla, then allowing the Japanese fleet carriers to get the first strike against the US carriers.

But of course, Japan was far above using the Yamato as "bait", though this might have been the best use of Japan's dreadnoughts at this point.




> Regarding the criticisms of the 25mm, unquestionably it was a weapon that at the end of the war, was considered to have some serious failings. Further, one only has to look at the results that the overall efforts of the Japanese AA, to know that it was far less effective than US efforts. Or so it might appear. Even on that score there is sharp debate, with some knowledgeable people in this place arguing it was only fractionally as effective as the claims made for it (particularly the 5/3. I dont fully buy those arguments, but neither do I fully accept the stuff about the effectiveness of the 20mm. It was considered obsolete by 1946, less than 5 years after service entry, and that speaks volumes about its true effectiveness to my mind. The bofors, by comparison, is stil going pretty strong 70 years later.



I'm not an overly strong critic of the 25mm either. I think it had 2 major shortcomings, rate of fire (magazine issue), and slow traverse/elevation. It's other problems seem to be similar to problems most WW2 naval light AA had, such as excessive vibration which was more of a problem in the trip mounts. As you mention, the Oerlikon had a similar problem when mounted more than 1 to a mount. I think the 20mm was a solid short range weapon, very high rate of fire, and shot down a good amount of planes. It's effectiveness against kamikazes maybe lift a bit to be desired, but that was not a standard threat. And it was obsolete by '46, but so was almost anything to do with military aviation, it changed rapidly during this time. The Bofors indeed stayed around longer, though I think a good portion of it's staying power had to do with it being of a heavy enough round to be effective in a dual purpose role on smaller vessels, even though it's performance as an AA weapon was not overly effective post WW2.


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## parsifal (Apr 11, 2014)

Issues about fire control, or the lack of it in IJN ships are overblown. This certainly had an effect on their HAA, but no effect on their LAA. Fire control also did not effect USN LAA, excluding the 40mm bofors, which did benefit from fire control. US fire control was, however, not nearly as effective as is popularly reported in available literature. you have to dig a lot, but until the latter part of 1944, the fire control directors were not working nearly as well as they should have.

For the Japanese the mainstay of their AA efforts were their LAA weapons, and perhaps medium calibre AA. The best example of their medium calibre weaponry was the 3.9" gun fitted to their Akitsuki DDaa destroyers (they referred to it as their Type 98 100mm gun)> this gun was probably the best all round ship borne AA weapon of both sides during the war, though the 5/38 was far more numerous, and it is quite arguable as to which gun was actually better. .

The main issue affecting Japanese AA effectiveness for their LAA however, was not technological. The 25mm was considered a good weapon by the Japanese, and as the following analysis suggests, they were probably justified in saying that. I must say im still sceptical, but it is what it is.......

The biggest single problem affecting the Japanese AA effectiveness later in the war was actually acute ammunition shortages. 

Some aspects of the 25mm debate I dont fully understand. In interviews conducted by the U.S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan after the end of the war, Japanese military personnel cited the Type 96 as the most reliable Japanese anti-aircraft weapon, but second in effectiveness to the Type 98 100 mm anti-aircraft gun . 

The Type 96 was most effective when used at ranges of 1,000 meters or less, but had a listed effective range of 2000m. Japanese military stated that the estimated ammunition expenditure required for a kill was an average of 1,500 rounds to down an aircraft at a height of 1,000 meters and a range of 2,000 meters and that fire beyond that range was completely ineffective. Against a torpedo bomber travelling at 200 mph (with torpedo), and an estimated launch distance of 800 yards for the torpedo, each firing 25mm has 9.8 seconds firing time, during which time it can fire off 20.5 rounds of ammunition. On average, and by extrapolation, it would take about 70 guns firing continuoulsy for the full 9.8 seconds to ensure a kill of a single aircraft. 

From ranges below 1000m , the Japanese estimated the rounds per kill dropped to about 500 rounds. Moreover, USN usage of torpedoes was quite limited.....they prefrred diving attacks and direct bombing, which can be undertaken higher and at higher speeds. i dont have the estimates of 25mm AA effectiveness at higher altitudes (typically D/B attacks were from about 5000 feet, divespeed could vary, slower for more accuracy, faster for more safety). 

So, allowing for increased accuracy at lower ranges, and firstly returning to the above example of a torpedo attack delivered at 800m. I have to make some gusstimates here, because there really isnt a complete dataset to work from. We know the estimated lerthality at 2000m for the Type 96 was 1500rpk, and the estimate for 1000m is about 500rpk. that would suggest the average rpk from between 2000m to 1000m was about 1000 rounds. From 1000m to 800m we can assume 500rpk. going back to that hypothetical attack run, the number of guns needed to bring down the TBF attacker can now be revised and refined. In the 2000 to 1000 m range, the 25mm gun has a firing cycle now of 8.1 seconds, and will fire off 17.1 rounds (ie one magazine clip....if it was not a magazine fed wepon, it would fire off twice that many rounds). From 1000 down to 800m there will be a further 3.4 rounds fired. The odds of a kill are 17.1/1000 and for the last 200m of the TBFs run 3.4/500. these odds calculate out to 0.0171 +0.0068 = 0.0239, meaning continuous fire for about 42 guns to bring down one TBF.

Divebombing was an inherently safer attack method for the American, and suspect the reason might be higher approach speeds. Typical approach altitude for US D/B can be assumed to be 10K, and release altirudes around 5000K . Max effective firing altiude of the Type 96 was 9800 feet, and i think thats pusshing it to be honest. Max elevation was 85 degrees, so ther is no way to avoid being shot at in the dive. however USN D/B could position over the target with relative impunity.

If the distance (altitude loss) between approach and release is 5000 feet, that equates to 1530m. If the dive sppeed is the same as the TBF (I dont really know what typical divespeed for an SB2U might be) then its exposure to 25mm fire is about 40-50% less than for a level bomber. the level bomber might have advantages in terms of getting some cover from sea state but the D/;B might, conversely derive benefit from cloud cover 

These figures compare very well to the 20mm batting averages, but are rather poor compared to the 40mm averages. however ther were major constraints placed on the effectivemess of the Type 96 that had nothing to do with the gun.

From early 1944 severe constraints were placed on ammunition expenditure. Orders were issued throughout the fleet, not to engage except against targets under 1000m. some sources say 800m. Thgis immediately reduces the odds for a kill from 0.0239 to 0.068. Because the firing cycle is so drastically reduced, you now need 147 guns firing continuously for 3.5 secs to make a kill probable. This is far worse than for both the 20mm and of course the 40mm.

There is a wide divergence of opion on the actual effectiveness of the 20mm gun. Some sources do suggest it to be an absolutely deadly weapon, others not somuch one source I do find quite convincing

HyperWar: Antiaircraft Action Summary--Suicide Attacks [Chapter 2]


This report states that late in the war, against Japoanese suicide attacks, 560000 rounds of 20mm ammuntion was expended, to achieve 62.5 kills. Thats an ammunition expenditure rate of about 9000 rounds per kill. Surprising, given the competing Japanese estimates, but it does bring into focu its effectiveness as a gun system. i highly suspect that the vast majority of ammunition was expended firing at ranges well beyind the effective range of the 20mm gun.


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## Garyt (Apr 11, 2014)

> this gun was probably the best all round ship borne AA weapon of both sides during the war, though the 5/38 was far more numerous, and it is quite arguable as to which gun was actually better. .



I'd say very close, but would give the nod to the 5"/38. Similar rate of fire, the 100mm might have better accuracy at range. Of course the 5"/38 fires a shell with a better burst to it.

The only issue with the 100mm was the barrel wore out quickly and had to be changed often. I guess that and the proximity fuse, though that is not an issue with a gun but a technology issue.



> i highly suspect that the vast majority of ammunition was expended firing at ranges well beyind the effective range of the 20mm gun.



I think that is a huge issue when computing accuracy or how many shells were needed to bring a plane down. And a gun with higher ROF is going to expend more shells when out of range. Also, have a shorter effective range is going to make you extend a lot of shells for nothing. The US (with their wonderful logistics making ammo plentiful) would have as their doctrine to open up fire while still out of range and walk the shells to the target.

Another thing to that is not really fair when evaluating Japanese AA - assuming all weapons were equal, you are going to need more shells on target to knock out about any american plane than it will take to knock out most Japanese planes. Something to do with the plane becoming a fireball 

But seriously, Japanese planes pretty well throughout the war were far easier to bring down. Army fighters from maybe late 43 or 44 would fare better, but even the late model Judy attack craft was a fireball waiting to happen. I think this needs to be taken into account when comparing AA effectiveness and rounds required to do the job.

The other thing that makes Japanese AA ook worse when comparing numbers is something you hint at, Parsifal. The Japanese made more extensive use of torpedo planes, which flying slower and level were more vulnerable to AA fire than dive bombers. With a dive bombers greater speed and vertical attack plane, it was tougher to put rounds on target.


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## snelson (Apr 12, 2014)

if the IJN took midway, did they have a bomber that had the range to reach pearl?


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## GrauGeist (Apr 12, 2014)

snelson said:


> if the IJN took midway, did they have a bomber that had the range to reach pearl?


The distance from Midway to Hawaii is about 1,200 miles. The G4M "Betty" had a range of about 1,700 miles.

To try and bomb Hawaii from Midway would be stretching it...


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## snelson (Apr 12, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> The distance from Midway to Hawaii is about 1,200 miles. The G4M "Betty" had a range of about 1,700 miles.
> 
> To try and bomb Hawaii from Midway would be stretching it...




wow it would seem to be a one way mission unless they could get more fuel in their planes. but if they did bomb pearl the carriers would have to come out and play


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## GrauGeist (Apr 12, 2014)

Any attempted attack on Hawaii after 7 December 1941 would be a difficult chore.

They got caught with their pants down once, but they were determined to never let it happen again.


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## parsifal (Apr 12, 2014)

It was never intended to develop midway for japanese bombers. however they did intend to base long range seaplane recon aircraft and maintain survellance of Pearl more or less continuously


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 12, 2014)

Getting back to Tomo’s original query regarding whether Midway could be characterized as a tactical or strategic victory. I’d argue, despite my agreement with all Parsifal has said, that it was indeed both a tactical and strategic victory. Or perhaps it might be most accurate to say it was a tactical victory with strategic implications. 

Pars, I think you are spot on, in your describing the battle from the Japanese perspective as coming near to being a pyrrhic victory for the USN. With their belief in having traded 4 IJN for 4 USN fleet carriers (after sinking 2 others at Coral Sea) allowed them to retain a commitment to a continued strategy of expansion. However, the US, with perhaps a clearer understanding of the actual changed balance of carrier-based power was sufficiently emboldened to seize the _window of opportunity_ the battle afforded to hastily mount its first pacific offensive leading to the strategic victory at Guadalcanal. 

To be sure, USN carrier admirals retained a healthy appreciation for the threat and capabilities of the remaining IJN carriers. Prior to the Solomon campaign, being ignorant of the IJN’s Long Lance and night fighting skills, the USN could hardly imagine the debacles that would characterize the coming surface actions that would make the campaign so bloody. 
In the aftermath of Midway both sides seem to have been afflicted with a misperception of the other’s real capability, but in the end, the USN’s was perhaps a bit more accurate.


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## GrauGeist (Apr 12, 2014)

parsifal said:


> It was never intended to develop midway for japanese bombers. however they did intend to base long range seaplane recon aircraft and maintain survellance of Pearl more or less continuously


That's actually the original use for Midway and many other small atolls across the Pacific. 

Way stations for the Pan Am Clipper flying boats and other trans-Pacific travellers.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 12, 2014)

The idea that BB’s could simply steam up and have their way with Midway is seductive but at best, I suspect unrealistic as a practical course for the IJN. First, using IJN escort carriers to provide bombardment force cover may be more or less problematic, depending on how many are dedicated to the task. Unless the Aleutian campaign is abandoned, only the 24 aircraft on Zuiho and 8 on Hosho are available. Even throwing in the numbers provided by Junyo (20 VF 19 VB) and Ryujo (16 VF 20 VT) (assuming all aircraft operational) will not necessarily provide overwhelming numbers. The former small carriers provide only 6 modern VF (A6Ms) (plus 6 more obsolescent A5Ms) providing little to protect the small number of VB (8 obsolescent biplane bombers) and VT (12 Kates) if employed in a fruitless attempt to neutralize Midways airfield. The total of 12 VF are unlikely to have provided effective CAP over the IJN battleships and cruisers during their approach to Midway island. Presumably, IJN intelligence had information on the basing of one VF squadron of about 20 fighters and 20 dive bombers on Midway which would have been more than the light carriers (Hosho and Zuiho) could have handled but nothing like the greater numbers actually present. 

Combining all the light and escort carriers together, they would have provided air assets approaching half Kido Butai’s available air force or equivalent to that used to assault the island in the morning attack. However, the 42 available VF would probably have been split in half to cover both the fleet and the strike force. How a roughly 33% reduction in escort and 50% reduction in CAP would have altered results of the battle’s first phase is uncertain and probably too big a risk to contemplate as a viable application of force. We only know in hindsight how badly the F2A’s and Midway’s available attack aircraft performed against the opposition they actually faced. 

In any case, the Aleutian plan was apparently not a diversion but designed as an independent albeit simultaneous operation with its own objectives, so reassigning its carriers to the Midway operation was not an option.

It’s clear that the transports were at grave risk to Midway’s air forces and could not approach to launch an invasion until the airfields were neutralized by naval air or surface bombardment forces. So, the question remains, against the actual undiminished US air power deployed at Midway, what risk did the larger combatants face during their approach to the island?

While heavily armored the BBs and CAs were probably not in actual danger of being sunk unless one or other of the 4 B-26s and 6 TBFs got lucky with their Mk-13s. While the USN torpedo is justly considered to be an ineffective weapon it did enjoy some early if limited success even at Midway. One source 

*TBD Devastator Units of the US Navy *by Barrett Tillman

indicates 10 hits were scored from 95 drops from February to June 1942 for a 10% reliability. So, we have a probability of perhaps one effective hit from the ten torpedo carrying planes at Midway. That’s not counting the 31 PBYs and the four radar equipped black cat PBYs. 

The roughly 40 marine dive-bombers are another problem. Harassing attacks by USN FMs and TBMs on a group of battle ships and cruisers at Leyte Gulf contributed to Kurita's decision to break off the action and retire. Gun laying optical devices and communications equipment may be particularly vulnerable to attack by relatively modest sized ordnance. Even relatively light bombs (~500 pounders) can do much to diminish the fighting effectiveness of even large naval combatants short of outright sinking them. Of course, the number of USN attack aircraft on CVEs was far larger off Samar (over 5 times more bomb-carrying TBMs than Midway’s VBs) so it’s a poor analogy for a number or reasons. However, the IJN also had the example of its own experience with the Prince of Wales and Repulse to demonstrate how deadly could be attacks by relatively limited numbers of aircraft on surface ships without air cover. On that occasion, only about 25 Nell bombers put an end to one modern capital ship and a later attack by a similar number sank Repulse. Without precise knowledge of what it was actually facing, a similar possibility was probably too high a price to contemplate, especially when the IJN was anticipating a war-deciding battle between capital ships in its immediate future.

The trouble with hindsight conclusions is that it’s easy to ignore the uncertainty that attends decisions made during real conflict.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 12, 2014)

In case the Japanese are willing to deliberately close with their heavy units close to Midway to shower it with shells, perhaps the four of the listed carriers (Zuiho, Hosho, Junyo, Ryujo) should be outfitted only with fighters? That would give them 100+ fighters combined - should be enough to protect both 'artillery' ships and CVs from anything that can emanate from Midway? That, of course, assumes that Japanese have enough both fighters and pilots available.
The 4 fleet carries can steam maybe 50-70 miles behind those 4 'other' CVs, and 100 miles behind Midway-bound BBs and CAs? Fleet CVs are there in case USN decides to commit it's CVs and/or BBs.

Though, I'm not sure that shelling of ground forces and facilities by BBs and CAs was exactly favored as part of IJN doctrine.


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## parsifal (Apr 12, 2014)

Japan lacked the fighter reserves to jam nothing but fighters onto her light carriers. these airgroups were, for the most part, hastily put together green horn pilots, that in many respects consituted major comb outs of the training schools. There were also insufficient airframes to kake such a conversion They could possibly have called on their reserve parks, and could have diverted all of the pre-battle reserve pilots to fighter conversion, stripped out the LBA units of fighter pilots. They could also have called on the AVS (seaplanes carriers) for maybe 20-30 pilots and seaplanes to further increase the air umbrella, but Im highly doubtful that any of this was really possible. Stripping out the LBA units would mean even thinner defence of the empire's frontiers. eating into the reserve parks would probably mean usihng clapped out A5Ms, Diverting all pilot trainig befopre midway would have wrecked the aircrew rteplacement programs, and required a level of foresight that elevates the IJN to supermen. 

One further option might be to send carrier Zuikaku into battle with an inclomplete air group , and to use the fast carriers in a more direct and defensive fashion with the battleships. in the case of the former, this would completely wreck Japans pilot training programs (though they could use carrier transport Taiyo and Chuyo if they wasnted to curtail transport operations....none of the choices here are good). Using the fast carriers in a more direct support role (ie defensively) makes a lot of sense, except it defeats the purpose of the whole operation in the first place......they were position and intended as an ambush force to bushwack the pacific fleet as it sallied forth to destroy the invasion forces. 

Another option worth considering would be to simply transfer the CAGs of the smaller carriers to to the five fleet carriers. there was more than enough capacity to do that and then the smaller carriers could be used as bait forward of the Japanese main carriers. This might work, as it did at eastern Solomons, but boy, is it an expensive option or what, and again overrides some of the fundamental thinking behind the whole operation. the idea was to surprise the pacific fleet, not offer carriers as bait.

The Japanese didnt really have the option of using their carriers as defensive fighter platforms in the same way as say the RN could. They lacked the readar and radio technology to do that. They would need to operate Constant Air Patrols during daylight, close to the carriers, with surface pickets at the extremities, and be prepred to break radio silence at the first threat that arose. Not a likley outcome

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## VBF-13 (Apr 14, 2014)

Here's an interesting question. To what degree did Midway show inexperienced pilots can accomplish their objectives against experienced pilots?


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## buffnut453 (Apr 14, 2014)

Depends how you define "experienced". Given the extensive experience of many USN aviators that participated, I don't think the qualitative margin was much different between the 2 sides.


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## buffnut453 (Apr 14, 2014)

parsifal said:


> It was never intended to develop midway for japanese bombers. however they did intend to base long range seaplane recon aircraft and maintain survellance of Pearl more or less continuously



Even that would have been challenging. The Japanese aircraft would have to stay away from Hawaii itself - USN and USMC fighters would prevent their approach too close to Pearl. Thus the IJN seaplanes would have to operate/monitor over a pretty broad area which is very expensive on airframes and personnel. Even had they accomplished it, by the 3rd quarter of 1942 the main focus would have shifted away from Pearl and towards Guadalcanal which brings back the challenge of keeping a large seaplane base at Midway resupplied.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 14, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> Here's an interesting question. To what degree did Midway show inexperienced pilots can accomplish their objectives against experienced pilots?



My vote would be not at all. The US pilots and organizations doing the most damage were the most experienced… just as you might expect. Hornet and her air group performed exactly how one might expect for a collection of rookies. Slow and uncertain in virtually every measure. From a practical standpoint, Hornet's greatest contribution on June 4 may have been simply as an alternate airfield. Hornet's VT-8 was the only unit that saw combat over the IJN fleet with disastrous consequences as it's protective escort got itself lost and ended up ditching en mass.
Even that seems thin gruel. A/C attrition of VB and VF and especially VT in all three CAGs were partially restored by Yorktown refugees. Of course all that deck space was made largely possible by the heavy sacrifice of all the VT as well as CAG 6 VB attrition. 

The CAG 8 learning curve was steep and by June 6, they were apparently beginning to gel somewhat. Against the slow-moving, collisionally maimed cruisers Mogami and Mikuma, VS VB-8's SBDs did pretty well scoring 6 or seven hits for 26 drops, one of which surprisingly included an escorting destroyer. Hornet's performance does seem to validate the notion of even one combat operation doing much to '_season_' a unit.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 14, 2014)

buffnut453 said:


> Depends how you define "experienced". Given the extensive experience of many USN aviators that participated, I don't think the qualitative margin was much different between the 2 sides.



I agree Buff. I think CAG 5 and 6 basic 'skills' compared fairly well with their veteran IJN counterparts even though the IJN had from somewhat to a lot more combat operational experience.


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## VBF-13 (Apr 14, 2014)

buffnut453 said:


> Depends how you define "experienced". Given the extensive experience of many USN aviators that participated, I don't think the qualitative margin was much different between the 2 sides.


The Japanese pilots, compared to the U.S. pilots, were at the top of their game, buff, both in training and combat experience, that's what I was referring to. The devastation to that fleet was a product of the correct aircraft ultimately having been brought to the job, notwithstanding that imbalance, that's the way I see that battle.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 14, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> The Japanese pilots, compared to the U.S. pilots, were at the top of their game, buff, both in training and combat experience, that's what I was referring to. The devastation to that fleet was a product of the correct aircraft ultimately having been brought to the job, notwithstanding that imbalance, that's the way I see that battle.



VB, I don't think that's quite correct. The USN aviators were quite good and (excepting the Hornet's CAG) certainly couldn't be objectively characterized as 'inexperienced.' No one had the experience of the IJN crews but the USN chaps were good and experienced enough to get the job done with the SBDs. The F4F jockeys of Yorktown acquitted themselves reasonably well in the battle in both cap and escort role and even the CAG 5 6 VT did a bit better than the rookies with 6 TBD's returning to their ships out of a total of 26 launched.

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## VBF-13 (Apr 14, 2014)

"Inexperienced" was stretching it, Crow, I'll agree. The advantage in experience couldn't hold off the dive-bombers, though, that's what I was getting at. Add to it, it didn't explain the slaughter of the torpedo-planes.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 14, 2014)

VB, you may have opened up a door to the seemingly never ending (yet always civil) discussion of the relative obsolescence of the TBD! 

Arguably the most experienced CAG was Yorktown's perhaps based on the early raids, their March Lae and Salamua raid with the Lex and the subsequent experience at Coral Sea. It's worth noting that only the Yortown's VT went in accompanied by their 6 escorting F4Fs and 5 of 12 survived the initial attack with three being subsequently lost according to some sources, by an attempt to achieve a more favorable engagement geometry on a different target. Hornet's 10 escorts got lost entirely and the Enterprise 10 found the enemy but lost its TBDs. Its hard to imagine contemporary IJN pilots imitating that record yet they evidently came close to doing just that. Hiryu's VB escorts got distracted in the initial attack and the Vals they were supposed to protect were savaged by the Yorktown's CAP which dispatched a dozen or so of the original 18.


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## Garyt (Apr 14, 2014)

> The Japanese pilots, compared to the U.S. pilots, were at the top of their game, buff, both in training and combat experience, that's what I was referring to. The devastation to that fleet was a product of the correct aircraft ultimately having been brought to the job, notwithstanding that imbalance, that's the way I see that battle.



I don't think the Japanese pilots were "out performed". The Hiryu did a pretty good job knocking out a carrier with a rather small force, against CAP that knew they were coming. and without having the armed and arming planes on the hangar or main decks. I think Midway, instead of illustrating the worth of a nations combat pilots illustrated this -

1) The great advantage that functional early warning radar gives you 
2) The importance of having a secure code for transmissions, or breaking the enemies code, and how this allows one to ambush the opposing forces
3) How vulnerable to bombs carriers which have armed and/or arming planes of hangar/main deck are

The Japanese combat air pilots did not have much of a chance to show what they could do. It was like a great offense and football that you never let have the ball because you are able to keep them on the sidelines.

EDIT - Forgot to add
4) How the Japanese damage control was not on par with that of the US, even looking at rather simple things such as the open hangar US carrier design vs. the closed hangar Japanese design, or the redundancy of things like water mains vs. a single main on the Akagi.


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## VBF-13 (Apr 14, 2014)

They didn't have enough escort, Crow, flying into that big carrier fleet. They couldn't get off a level shot, that was the problem. They were ditching their torpedoes well before that, just to try to stay alive. Those were going straight to the floor. The planes that did manage to get in reasonably low were tore up by the carriers' guns they were flying head-first into. There may be other accounts. That's the account I heard.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 14, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> *They didn't have enough escort,*



Amen! Thach wanted 8 a/c to execute the weave most effectively but was overruled and had to settle for 6. I doubt that even the planned 10 Escorts for VT-6 -8 would have changed the results substantially except for perhaps allowing more survivors unless of course they could have executed simultaneous attacks but the IJN was doctrinally a lot better at that than the USN.


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## parsifal (Apr 14, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> The Japanese pilots, compared to the U.S. pilots, were at the top of their game, buff, both in training and combat experience, that's what I was referring to. The devastation to that fleet was a product of the correct aircraft ultimately having been brought to the job, notwithstanding that imbalance, that's the way I see that battle.



not all the japaqnese aviators were super experienced. Some were positive green horns. In preparation for the war, Japan had stripped out her training schools, to the point that the output of replacements was lacking in both numbers and experience. Even experienced air groups, when used as intensively as the japanerse had used their carriers suffer quite heavy attrition....between 7 and 10% each and every month (even over Pearl, losses had been heavier than in an entire year over China). 

Facts were that the IJN was suffering losses in her air groups at an unsustainable rate, even before Midway. 

What is surprising, however, is that despite the losses of ships, the losses in aircrew were actually quite modest. There was not a single loss of aircrew on or over the carriers, but over Midway, losses were again quite concernig. overall, only a small proportion of air leaders were lost. 

The new Japanese carriers, and the Light Carriers were not in the same league as the four fleet carriers. Destruction of the four fleet carriers, enabled the Japanese to normalise the training levels of their reserve carriers, and restore the airgroups of shokaku and Zuikaku. These carriers fought much better in the next three battles than the fleet carriers had fought at Midway. as far as losses were concerned,. the losses in these battles in the southern seas were much more serious than the losses at midway ever were. but losses to the USN were also not light. The difference by the latter part of 1942 was in the powers of recovery of the two navies. the USN could take heavy punishment and get up and fighht again, the IJN could not. its as simple as that.


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## Garyt (Apr 14, 2014)

> the USN could take heavy punishment and get up and fighht again, the IJN could not. its as simple as that.



Coupled with the fact US AA was more effective than the Japanese AA, and that Japanese planes in general were less survivable than their US counterparts and you have a death spiral for the Japanese aviators that became inevitable.

Japan could sink as many US ships as they would want to - but I think the losses in pilots would eventually catch up with them. They would really need that "decisive battle" they would always shoot for, and they would have had to have an overwhelming victory where their surface fleet and carriers would destroy most of the US Navy, with little losses for themselves. Unfortunately for them, they based their theory for victory on 1920's-30's technology and engagment methods, looking for another Tsushima.


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## Gixxerman (Apr 14, 2014)

Given that Japan had radar too it has always surprised me that they didn't seem to make use of it as early warning detection for their major ships, it might have made all the difference to them at Midway.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 14, 2014)

Gixxerman said:


> Given that *Japan had radar too* it has always surprised me that they didn't seem to make use of it as early warning detection for their major ships, it might have made all the difference to them at Midway.



They had a form of home defense radar chain early in the war but the Japanese didn't have ship mounted pulse radar until September 1942. At the Santa Cruz Island carrier battle in October 1942, a radar mounted on the Shokaku provided the first radar alert of an impending attack which apparently alerted the maintenance crews to suspend fueling and purge the lines. However in that battle and apparently subsequent battles they didn't didn't develop a system of Radar directed fighter control. The IJN didn't have the benefit of the British RN experience in fighter direction made available to the USN.


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## Garyt (Apr 14, 2014)

> At the Santa Cruz Island carrier battle in October 1942, a radar mounted on the Shokaku provided the first radar alert of an impending attack which apparently alerted the maintenance crews to suspend fueling and purge the lines.



Made a huge difference in the surviveability of the Shokaku. It took 3-6 1000lb bomb hits and survived, Compared to 1-5 hits which sunk the first 3 Japanese carriers at Midway.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 14, 2014)

yep… I had always wondered how it survived that pounding. That class was well built.


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## Garyt (Apr 14, 2014)

The Shokaku class was indeed built better than the older carriers of Kido Butai. While Kaga/Akagi had about 3 inches of hangar deck armor, and Soryu/Hiryu about 2, the Shokaku class had about 6" of deck armor protecting the engineering and magazine areas.

Plus newer ships in general were just built better to withstand damage. Shokaku's still had that closed hangar construction that helped cause the Avgas fumes buildup when she was struck by torpedoes in the Marianas battle, which led to an explosion that pretty well destroyed the ship then and there.


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## parsifal (Apr 14, 2014)

It is not valid to compare the losses at Midway to those in the later battles. Japan implemented a number of changes that made huge differnces to the survivability of their carriers. Radar di allow them to strike down aircraft, remove bombs, but most importantly close up the fire doors and watertight compartmentation. additionally they were able to fill the Avgas lines with Co2. Greater effort was put into damage control (unfortinately this appears to have been lost by the time of phil Sea....the performance of DC in the taiho in particular was attrocious...I suspect crew shortages and the overall drop in training even in the fleet itself, as well as the volatile fuels being used). By comparison, the carriers at Midway sucumbed overwhelmingly to the ucontrolled fires that wracked all of the ships after being hit. Moreso, the bomb hits cooked off many of the bombs that were laying around on the decks of the japanese carriers at midway. This never again happened to the japanese, and it shows in the losses they sustained. 

Akagi, with the same levels of passive defence, and not mishandled as she was, was at least as well protected as the Shokaku. one problem facing all the Japanese carriers was the overall lack of horizontal protection, and the horizontal protection is what they most needed, given the lethality of the SBD. It wasnt until Taiho that they possessed a ship that should have been able to withstand a 1000 lb bomb dropped at 5000'. Its significant that Taiho was sunk by a torp, and not a bomb.


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## Garyt (Apr 14, 2014)

> Akagi, with the same levels of passive defence, and not mishandled as she was, was at least as well protected as the Shokaku.



Well for all the Akagi's original design as a battle cruiser it was not armored better than the Shokaku. It's armored belt was a fair amount thicker in spots, but it's deck armor was lacking compared to the Shokaku, about 3.5" for the Akagi, 5.5-6" for the Shokaku.

And a carriers real fear, at least when facing the US was from Dive Bombers. And anyway the Belt is not great protection against torpedoes - it's the anti-torpedo bulge, blister or whatever you want to call it, and I think both had similar anti torpedo armor.



> Its significant that Taiho was sunk by a torp, and not a bomb.



Taiho was sunk IMO by inadequate damage control. One problem that seemed to plague Japanese carriers in particular, although the same thing helped seal the Lexington's fate - Having Avgas storage tanks that were ruptured too easily. I've read they used integral hull tanks for this, which was not the practice of US or UK carriers. A Gas vapor explosion sunk the Shokaku and Taiho. For some reason, gas vapor issues seemed to be the problem with torpedo hits, not bombs. Perhaps due to the fact that the Avgas was stored low in the hull?


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## parsifal (Apr 14, 2014)

Taihos loss is a story of what not to do in damage control. The ship began to fill with vapoure, and rather than keep the ships watertight doors closed, the DC officer decided to open everything up to try and clear out the vapor. A stupid decision if ever there was one. It is believed that a spark from an arcing generator provided the ignition, and the carrier, with its fuel well oxygenated, exploded as a bomb.

by 1944, there were manpower shortages in the Japanese fleet generally, not just the aircrews, and with inadequate crew numbers, it was the DC crews that tended to suffer cutbacks before anyone. Training was also cut back severely, and lastly, of course, the fuls pumped into the ships was unprocessed and too high in octane to be used safely. Japan lacked the shipping, particulalry tankers, to ship the oil back to japan, process it properly and return it to the front. A major reason why most of her battle line spent the war swinging around its anchor chains in Japanese ports. US had similar problems early on, so early deletions fro the TOand E of the active US fleet were the older BBs. They were too slow and too fuel hungry to be usefeul. later, they found a use as bombardment platforms, but that came quite a bit later. 

The American submarine fleet probably did more to destroy the Japanese fleet than any other single arm of the USN. And they did it not by direct fleet support, but a crippling blockade, for which Japan had no answer and no effective defence.

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## syscom3 (Apr 15, 2014)

Just wondering .... for those that are contributing to the thread, who has read "Shattered Sword"?


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## parsifal (Apr 15, 2014)

I have, and i know Old Crow has as well. Ive modified my attitude to Lundstrom quite a bit. he is the best single volume account of the battle around, but he is not quite as accurate as everyone believes. as an example he cites that the reason for hiryu and Akagi having port side islands arose becuse of studies into air turbulence, that suggested ports side islands were less prone to damage. True, but not the only reason, or even the main reason the Japanese designed these two carriers as they did. They in fact wanted these carriers to operate in tandem with their respective sisters, launching and recovering aircraft from the port side, whilst the sisters operated from a starboard side. in formation this allowed the Japanese to adopt the classic diamond formations for their carriers, and it was felt could operate more effectively as a homogenous unit. Unfortunately, there was a very bad side effect arising from this arrangement. human nature being what it is, an aircraft deciding to abort a landing will instinctively pull to port, rather than to starboard, and as a result both hiryu and akagi suffered accident rates somewhat higher than starboard side carriers of the same general class. 

There is no single volume that covers all of the major points of the battle. not even Lundstrom. though I agree with his summation of Fuchida.

My main beefs about Lundstrom relate to his comments about Japanese AA, and his impressions of Fletcher. Suffice it to say I am not a fan of Fletcher, though he did do well enough.

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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 15, 2014)

Pars, glad to see you've read *1st Team*. Like *Shattered Sword*, it is an eye opener in its detailed coverage of fighter ops in the early days. Lundstrom is certainly not perfect. Like many before him, he seems to have missed the significance of the differences in the F2A and F4F entirely, partially redeemed in the second volume but not in a comparative sense. I too have found shortcomings in his coverage of events but believe he has done a service with his generally detailed research. if you can overcome your distaste I recommend his *Black Shoe Admiral*. My main feeling about Fletcher is that he doesn't get the deserved credit for what he did accomplish and has had something of a bum rap in the USN/USNR. If you examine the contemporaries who trash his reputation, you will find they have feet of clay themselves. While I'm generally not overly religious, I like and think "_Let those without sin cast the first stone._" applies in his case.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 15, 2014)

The 'Shattered sword' being written by Parshall and Tully?

Units under Fletcher's command managed to cut down the premier offensive Navy of the world into a shadow of it's former self within less than a year. Of course, he was helped by accurate intelligence and enemy's mistakes, but relegating Fletcher under 2nd (or worse) class of Allied commanders is injustice, plain and simple.

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## Garyt (Apr 15, 2014)

I have not read Shattered Sword. One of my favorite regarding the pacific war is "The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945" though this is not specific to Midway of course. I have read through the 2006 Historicon presentation about Midway by Jon Parshall. He is a well respected source, haven given a presentation on the subject at the US Naval War College's Battle of Midway Commemoration ceremony in 2010.

He corrects things such as Fuchida's comments that planes were on the main deck being refueled and re-armed when the Dive Bombers attacked. This would have been impossible, as planes may recover or launch, but not both, and either voids the flight deck for any other usage. Plus the Japanese in particular did not fuel and arm on the main deck - this was done on the hangar deck. It's a bit of a dry read, goes through things like Japanese flight records of exactly which planes took off and landed and at what time.

That time honored picture though of US dive bombers hitting the Japanese carriers with a bunch of planes on their flight decks is inaccurate - they would have been below the main on the hangar deck. 

Another issue with the Japanese planes being supposedly on deck - it does not match the pictorial evidence either.


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## Garyt (Apr 15, 2014)

Duplicate


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## Garyt (Apr 15, 2014)

> The American submarine fleet probably did more to destroy the Japanese fleet than any other single arm of the USN. And they did it not by direct fleet support, but a crippling blockade, for which Japan had no answer and no effective defence.



Amazing, Parsifal that a nation so dependent upon seaborne imports put so little effort into anti-submarine warfare. The Matsu class DD that came late in the war - they would have worked well as convoy escorts had they been available earlier and in sufficient numbers.

What the Japanese really would have needed though were low cost escort vessels - and these could have been made "cheaply". Something similar to the Corvette or Frigate type ships, maybe 1000 ton displacement, max speed of 20 knots, even use merchant level construction and give them a few 3-4" guns with the standard 25mm AA and depth charges.

Possibly a few small converted merchant escort carriers as well.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 15, 2014)

Garyt said:


> I have not read Shattered Sword. One of my favorite regarding the pacific war is "The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945" though this is not specific to Midway of course. I have read through the 2006 Historicon presentation about Midway by Jon Parshall. He is a well respected source, haven given a presentation on the subject at the US Naval War College's Battle of Midway Commemoration ceremony in 2010.



Parshall (with Tully) is of course one of the authors of "Shattered Sword"



Garyt said:


> This would have been impossible,* as planes may recover or launch, but not both, and either voids the flight deck for any other usage. * Plus the Japanese in particular did not fuel and arm on the main deck - this was done on the hangar deck.



Minor nit to pick… The practice on USN carrier was to move the landed planes forward to the bow park and continue flight operations on the aft portion of the flight deck. The pack placed forward were at risk from an floater catapulting over or missing the barrier entirely and impacting among the deck park. Not a pretty sight. So it's not so much a question of impossibility as differences in doctrine and deck hardware between the two navies.

Of course there could have been and AFAIR some reports state one or a few A6Ms were present on at least some of the IJN flight decks being serviced as they cycled their CAP during the battle.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 15, 2014)

Garyt said:


> *Possibly a few small converted merchant escort carriers as well.*



Actually the IJ Army developed two small saw carriers and apparently intended to use Autogyros to locate subs late in the war. Weird if not inspired but apparently true.

From wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-submarine_warfare

"_The Japanese Army also developed two small aircraft carriers and Ka-1 autogyro aircraft for use in an antisubmarine warfare role._"

History channel did a show that included this item.

That should be 'ASW' carriers (not saw)!! My eyes must be failing me not to catch that typo last month! (5/7/14)


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## Garyt (Apr 15, 2014)

> Parshall (with Tully) is of course one of the authors of "Shattered Sword"



LOL, I did not know that!



> Minor nit to pick… The practice on USN carrier was to move the landed planes forward to the bow park and continue flight operations on the aft portion of the flight deck. The pack placed forward were at risk from an floater catapulting over or missing the barrier entirely and impacting among the deck park. Not a pretty sight.



Well, that was per Parshall. So are you saying a US carrier in WW2 would be conducting launches at the same time it recovers planes?


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## bobbysocks (Apr 15, 2014)

Garyt said:


> LOL, I did not know that!
> 
> 
> 
> We So are you saying a US carrier in WW2 would be conducting launches at the same time it recovers planes?



i think that would be very difficult as the carrier would be facing the wind to launch and then needs ( at least i assume as much ) to be sailing with the wind to recover.


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## Garyt (Apr 15, 2014)

> i think that would be very difficult as the carrier would be facing the wind to launch and then needs ( at least i assume as much ) to be sailing with the wind to recover.



Well, that is what I was thinking as well.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 15, 2014)

Shouldn't the carrier be trying to sail into wind during both take off and landing phases - gives more wind speed for A/C wing for more lift?


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## Garyt (Apr 15, 2014)

Specifically from Parshall:



> *Before angled flight decks, you did
> one thing at a time:
>   Spotting
>   Launching
> ...


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 15, 2014)

Garyt said:


> Well, that was per Parshall. So are you saying a US carrier in WW2 would be conducting launches at the same time it recovers planes?



No, I am saying a USN flight deck is likely to have large numbers of aircraft present on the flight deck: parked forward or aft with flight ops also occurring. landing even with aircraft parked forward and launching with a/c parked aft... That's all. 



bobbysocks said:


> i think that would be very difficult as the carrier would be facing the wind to launch and then needs ( at least i assume as much ) to be sailing with the wind to recover.


 see Tomo's post below



tomo pauk said:


> Shouldn't the carrier be trying to sail into wind during both take off and landing phases - gives more wind speed for A/C wing for more lift?



Yes, Tomo that is correct. Always steaming into the wind for flight ops.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 15, 2014)

USS Sara conducting flight ops, pre WW2. Note the barrier erected behind the 'pack' to prevent accidental collisions. It wasn't unusual for USN carriers to spot and ready their a/c for combat on the flight deck.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 15, 2014)

Apparently as I recall from Parshall and Tully that the big difference in a/c strike prep between USN and IJN was that the latter armed and fueled its a/c in the hangar and the former used both flight deck and hangar for that purpose. Otherwise once armed they seem to have operated similarly. here is a photo of A6Ms preparing to launch December 7, 1941. Note the A/C pack spotted behind the leader. So, a returning IJN a/c would be struck below asap upon landing while a USN a/c might or might not be struck below depending on circumstance.


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## bobbysocks (Apr 15, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Shouldn't the carrier be trying to sail into wind during both take off and landing phases - gives more wind speed for A/C wing for more lift?



after looking at the picture and digging a little....they land from the rear of the carrier. that makes sense...i just never thought of it. for some reason i thought they took off and landed from the front of ther carrier. but as the picture above shows it would be hard to launch and recover at the same time unless you were doing 1 ac at a time...and then that would take forever.


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## syscom3 (Apr 15, 2014)

From what I gathered from Shattered Sword:

1) Even if the Japanese swept the seas of US ships, the IJN/IJA were still probably not going to be able to capture the island. 

2) Even if they did, they couldnt do anything with it.

3) The loss of the four carriers evened the odds in a order of battle POV, between the USN and IJN.

4) The major losses for the IJN were its NCO ranks in the carriers (lost in the attacks or trying to save their ships). Those were the bread and butter of its navy to an even higher degree than the USN.

Other tidbits of mine:
5) The horrific performance (bravery not withstanding) of the VT squadrons led to the immediate end of the TBD.

6) Hawaii was never in danger of being invaded. Oahu was big enough to defend in depth using interior lines of communications. Not an easy nut to crack even with a large invading force.

7) Damage control is everything and the USN did it better and saved a lot of ships because of it.

8 ) The fickle finger of fate "FFF" is what did in the Akagi. One bomb landing right at the most vulnerable point of the deck with another wrecking the rudder. 20" either way, and the IJN has two ships to fight back with.

9) US submarine performance was again, horrible. At every level.

10) The loss was the equivelant to a kick in the groin, sucker punch in the gut and a slap in the face to the IJN. The easy part of the war was now over and the it was quite plain that the US was no pushover.


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## parsifal (Apr 15, 2014)

> The major losses for the IJN were its NCO ranks in the carriers (lost in the attacks or trying to save their ships). Those were the bread and butter of its navy to an even higher degree than the USN.



If you count the loss of two or maybe three air leaders from the carriers, and an unknown number from the seaplane groups as significant, then yes, this is a true statement. Overall, the IJN lost 90 aircrew, including those lost in the seaplanes and observers. as Joe B has pointed out very conclusively. Aircrew losses for the Japanese were actually only moderate. The damage to Japanese aircrews were already happening, and were about to take an absolute nosedive with the sea battles relating to Guadacanal.


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## syscom3 (Apr 15, 2014)

I was referring to the NCO's who ran the ships. The ones who got things fixed and run with efficiency.


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## VBF-13 (Apr 15, 2014)

syscom3 said:


> I was referring to the NCO's who ran the ships. The ones who got things fixed and run with efficiency.


Who ran the craps games? I know on the USN carriers it was the CPOs.


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## parsifal (Apr 16, 2014)

syscom3 said:


> I was referring to the NCO's who ran the ships. The ones who got things fixed and run with efficiency.



ah sorry, misunderstood you. Loss of the trained manpower is never a good thing, and the IJN lost 3000 officers and sailors that day. 

However I would say the effects of those losses were not immediately felt. The ships that the aircrew transferred to were already in commission, and just awaiting normalisation of the CAGs, which could be achieved more rapidly because of the saved aircrews from the cariers lost at midway.

On a different tack, Ive participated in approximately 20 large scale recreations of the pacific campaign, as a dedicated wargamer and designer. My favourite simulation of this is SPIs old War In The Pacific, and my own refinement of that simulation, which has been playtested all up about 35 times, but not published (its too complicated to publish unfortunately). The simulation covers the entire Pacific War at roughly individual ship, 10 plane element and Bn/Regt level. Time scaling is generally two days per naval impulse, but variable scaling allows major battles like midway to be fought at 15 minute time intervals.

Repeated testing shows that midway for the Japanese is a mistake. There is no hope of the Japanese winning outright, but the VPs of the game do allow thenm to "win" on points, even though they always are forced to surrender. The aim is to string out the war for as long as possible. if the japanese remain standing until the end of 1945 they are the winners of the game. The VPs are skewed in Japans favour to make a game of it assume that ther is a better chance of a negotiated settlement if the war drags on. 

On that basis, the biggest threat for the Japanese is the continued overuse of their air groups on active operations. after the establishment of their defensive perimeter, the bes bet is to hunker down and fortify, dismantle some air groups and put them into the training schools. Start building as much merchant shipping as possible, and start building the cheapest ASW escorts as is humanly possible. The 10 projected IJA CVEs are useful to build because they are cheap. As the Japanese you fight a controlled withdrawing action until the Allies start to penetrate the inner defence perimeter. At that point yo are permitted under the rules to initiate Kamikazes, which you do, and at that point you pull out the stops and throw everything at the US attacking fleets. The best you can hope for as the japanese is a tactical victory at that point, which might gain 3-4 months of delay. You fight every inch of the way, making the marines pay for every atoll they assault, and leaving no airfield easy to take. once the US is in control of Saipan, they will start to decimete your cities. You try to stockpile as much oil as possible from the south, and hopefully coast in to the end of 1945, having not been forced to unconditional surrender terms. no easy feat I can tell you.


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## beitou (Apr 16, 2014)

What the Japanese really would have needed though were low cost escort vessels - and these could have been made "cheaply". Something similar to the Corvette or Frigate type ships, maybe 1000 ton displacement, max speed of 20 knots, even use merchant level construction and give them a few 3-4" guns with the standard 25mm AA and depth charges.




How effective would they be, did the Japanese have a usable asdic/sonar ? How good were their anti sub chasing teams, did they compare to the RN in the Atlantic?


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## parsifal (Apr 16, 2014)

The Japanese possessed workable Hydrophones and reasonably efficient sonars from prewar. They derived technological benefit from several captured British warships fitted in 1941 with modern sonars. They copied certain features of these sonars, and also relied pretty heavily on German technical assistance.

They had an effective surface launched depth charge, but lacked ahead throwing wepons like Hedgehog and mousetrap. They had a army derived mortar but not very efficient. They failed to develop TDCs (targetting computers for more precise use of available weapons). Effective ASW requires the formation of dedicated well integrated ASW teams of ships, well versed in working together. Tactics were pretty poor, the numbers of DCs carried in destroyers insufficient, usage of air co-operation not well integrated. Japanese tended to abandon ASW prosecutions too early, and for reasons that escape me, they tended to set detonation depths too shallow.

The Japanese did not institute a true convoying system until 1943, and even then it was not a well organized system such as the Allies had developed. Convoy discpline was poor. The Japanese never really got the assistance that escort carriers in asw protection. 

However, it is a common misconception that the Japanese did not build a large number of ASW escorts, or that many of the designs produced were not efficient. The first escort vessels were the Shumusu class, which were followed by the etoforu class followed by the Ukuru, Mikara , Type C and D classes. About 600 hulls were laid down, with the majority of vessels becoming available 1943-5. There were also large numbers of sub chasers and converted trawlers, generally reaonably efficient designs. Im not sure of the numbers of these other lesser vessel, but in the mid hundreds would be a reanable estimate.

Before the war, Japan estimated the nation required 5,900,000 long tons of shipping to maintain the domestic economy and military during a major war, but in practice during the war this was somewhat of an over-estimation, mostly due to severe rationaing and increased domestic production of certain raw materials. My estimate of minimum shipping requirements is about 4 million tons, which was considerably less than the 6,400,000 long tons (6,500,000 t) of shipping in vessels above 500 tons displacement and in the Japanese merchant fleet and 1,200,000 long tons (1,200,000 t) of smaller craft (ie below 500 tons) at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor. About 600000 tons of shipping was captured and re-used and production 1941-5 was as follows: 44,200, 661,800, 1,067,100, 1,735,100 and in 1945 465,000. The Japanese lost nearly 8 million tons of shipping in civilian service and about 2 million tons in naval service, emerging from the war with about 1.9 million tons of serviceable shipping

Contray also to popular myth, the Japanese were not averse to using their own submarines to sink merchant ships, but the main role was always seen as fleet support, with many submarines in the latter stages used disastrously as supply transports for beleagured garrisons. Japanese I Boats were most active in antishipping operation in East asia (at the beginning of the war, and later off the coast of Australia and in the choke points in the Indian Ocean, with some activity off the US west Coast. in the first year of the war, the allies lost either sunk or captured about 1.6 million tons of shipping to the japanese. For anyone interested in Japanese submarine operations I would highly recommend Carl Boyd and Akihiko Yoshidas book "The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II" published by Bluejacket books, 1995.


Getting back to the technical side of Japanese Sonar, the US Navy produced the following report at the end of the war on Japanese Sonar

http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/prim...Reports/USNTMJ-200B-0343-0412 Report E-10.pdf

There are a whole bunch of similar documents available on line here 

REPORTS OF THE U.S. NAVAL TECHNICAL MISSION TO JAPAN

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## beitou (Apr 16, 2014)

Thank you Parsifal, a very helpful post.


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## Garyt (Apr 16, 2014)

Parsifal - trying to send you a PM, not sure if it's working properly


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## parsifal (Apr 16, 2014)

It is ive received it, and in the words of one of my favourite BoB pilots who had an incessant stutter...."IIIIIMMM bbbbl***dy well working oooout mmmmy mmmethod ooof aatttack"

LOL


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## parsifal (Apr 16, 2014)

Japanese Carrier handling proedures are assessed in a USN TM http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/prim...Reports/USNTMJ-200A-0560-0608 Report A-11.pdf


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## parsifal (Apr 17, 2014)

Allied merchant shipping losses to March 1942. Noteworthy are the numbers of ships captured and salvaged by the japanese

http://www.google.com.au/url?sa=t&r...6IHwAg&usg=AFQjCNGzeK2f0Hx69L3Rpg9bKvitTHudLQ


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## parsifal (May 1, 2014)

Thread has gone dead somewhat, which is a shame. I hope it was not because of me. 

Ive been re-reading Shattered Sword after this thread. Its a very good book, but there are some points that I dont agree with. It is claimed in the book, for example that the Japanese committed insufficient amphibious assets to overcome the garrison. perhaps with the forces embarked. However Ichikis detachment was but one element of the forces mobilised for the operation. in the even that an initial assault was repulsed, there was a full independant Mixed Brigade, the 65th, waiting and embarked at Truk for just such and eventuality.

If the Japanese had gained control of the skies and oceans around the atoll, there is no doubt in my mind the Japanese would have taken the island, either sooner (most likley) with just ichikis detachment, but in the event of a reverse, a few days later with the floating reserve. Shattered Sword doesnt even mention the availability of the reserves, which is dissapointing.


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## Francis marliere (May 2, 2014)

Parsifal, as far as I understand things, the arguments of the authors were :
- Japan has no amphibious assaut doctrine nor training. Japan's doctrine and training called for unopposed landings then a quick move toward the enemy.
- Hence IJN has no training, doctrine and communication system for gunfire support. Cruisers and gunfire coul not support efficiently the troops once the assault is on.
- The Japanese fleet has no staying power. If the Ichiki detachement fails, the fleet cannot wait that reinforcements arrive. The Kido Butai would quickly have to withdrawn to refuel and rearm.

Best,

Francis Marliere


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## buffnut453 (May 2, 2014)

Hi Francis, 

I think those assessments are hindsight-based. In late-1941, Japan had probably the best amphibious assault capability in the world. The ability of the IJA to conduct opposed amphibious landings was clearly illustrated during the initial assault in northern Malaya. They had purpose-built landing ships that supported various types of landing craft. The concept of naval fire support for land forces came much later in WWII based on experience in the Pacific and, later, at D-Day. Whilst I will freely admit that the Japanese amphib capabilities were pretty rudimentary compared to the Allies' efforts for D-Day in 1944, in the 1941 timeframe they were excellent.

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## Garyt (May 2, 2014)

I really don't think the Japanese saw Midway as having much strategic value.

I think it was done more as a way to draw the US Navy out to battle.


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## parsifal (May 2, 2014)

At the beginning of the war the Japanese conducted opposed landings at Luzon, Khota Baru, Sunda, Balikpapaan, Wake, Rabaul, and if i recall correctly also at Ambon. Small scale, yes, the japanese had the amphibious lift capability for about two divisions, and even then did not have the assault capability to land them all at once. However, they had excellent ship to shore and at the beginning their SNLF formations were geared and trained perfectly for small scale operation.

Ichiki detachment was an army formation, formed rather hastily before the war, and used at bataan with fairly mediocre results, when it was part of the 65th Brigade. It was withdrawn from operations, transferred to Truk, where it underwent intensive training in amphibious warfare (according to one of the diaries Ive read). Training exercises were intense and included live fire exercises with ships of Cruiser size and below.

In terms of gunfire and air support, I am aware of what shattered sword has to say, but to be honest, this is one area where they got it wrong in the book. Shattered Sword claims that the Japanese had no real doctrine for close air support of amphibious operations, and neither did they have an efficient fire support system. On both counts the book is wrong. Whilst the Japanese compared to the 1944 Allied efforts was indeed rather pathetic, in 1942, they had the most advanced systems for amphibious support support, though in terms of firepower, it was clearly inadequate. The japanese did not use their fast carriers for ground support but they did use light carriers for this purpose, and these crews were pretty good at it. They also often used their seaplane carriers for direct support as well (At Coral Sea, Shoho was not there as an antishipping weapon, shes was there to provide the air support for the landings). The japanese got a lot of bang for not much bucks with these methods, because the air support was right there, on the spot, at the immediate call of the amphibious commander. The seaplane tenders would literally park a mile, or maybe 5 away from the beach, but real close, and then fly shuttles to and from the battle field, not dissimilar to the US CVEs in 1944, that were used in a similar way. Japanese light carriers and seaplane tenders had been used in this way off Mindanao, and very effectively supported the landings there, and also supporting Java as well. These crews were trained and equipped for this purpose, and whilst not a candle on the allied efforts later in the war, in terms of firepower, in 1941-2, these concepts were astounding, and very efficient, because the air support was there and on immediate call. The allies didnt get this until much later. 

So Japanese air support was well thought out, and practised, but was Lightweight

For Naval Gunfire Support, the japanese had a similar doctrine. They tended not to favour using their heavy battlewagons for that purposes. they were not fuel efficient, and were not particularly good in the gunfire support role, except if specifically and specially trained for the purpose. The Americans found this out at Tarawa....you need your ship to shore communications well developed and your fire support plans near perfect for battleships to work well in this role, because they necessarily operate at arms length from the beach. Battleships have to undertake the fire support function from a good distance, unlike smaller warships, that can get in and real personal with the target. the Americans learned this lesson as well at gela. There are risks, however for smaller warships when used in this way, as the Japanese found out at Wake. Even though close in light NGS is far better than the standoff heavy gunnery favoured by the allies, it also is far more hazardous. 

Though I have not seen the actual fire support plan for the Midway operation, you can bet that the cruisers were there mostly for show. the real work horses would have been the destroyers, that would have been expected to close to very close ranges and fire over open sights basically. The Japanese were willing to take those sorts of risks, and generally it worked provided the defences were not too strong. If they were, then ouch.....

its very telling that the US appraisals at the time, if the Japanese won the naval battle, was they would be unlikely to be able to hold off the actual assault. Shattered Sword doesnt seem to acknowledge that appraisal, and im buggered if I can find it at this minute. Even if the assault had been repulsed, which is admittedly a possibility (Ichiki was a bit of a head butter when it came to tactical finesse), but there was a floating reserve, albeit either at Kwaj or Truk. If the initial assault had failed, as it did at Wake, the Japanese would simply have activated the reserves and returned 3 or 4 days later with a force roughly 4 times the size to attempt the assault again, .

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## parsifal (May 3, 2014)

There is perhaps another point that needs to be made. It should be abundantly clear to most that midway as a strategic concept was a disastrous idea strategically for the japanese. Its effects have been overblown, particularly with regard to impacts on Japanese aircrew losses, but the losses are undeniable, and the loss of the ships themselves, despite not being as catastrophic as is so often claimed, was still a serious and un-reversible loss for Japan. The USNs victory was an enormous conficdence booster, and emboldened them to start taking their first aggressive moves a short time later, and this freedom of manouvre given them as a direct result of Midway did lead to an irretrievable rupturing of the Japanese powers of resistance. .

All this needs to be accepted, but it also dances around the more intriguing question.....was it theoretically possible for the japanese to win some kind of tactical victory from the battle. If it had been the US that lost say two carriers and the Japanese one carrier, and the US losing say 200 aircraft, and the Japanese say 100, Midway not taken, but the japanbese return with all carriers, and 3/4 of their aircrew, would there have been any real advantage to the japanese. 

I think there may have been. this sort of outcome would have left the US in relatively a worse tactical situation than they were and put Watchtower into some doubt. Assuming the Japanese came to their senses after Midway, if I were the Japanese, I would immediately have laid up at least 50% of the CAGs and returned them to Japan for extended rebuilding and retraining. The remainder would have diverted to Truk, whilst at the frontier I would have fortified and reinforced the frontier areas as quickly as possible. These are big what ifs, and most unlikely to actually occur, but by the latter half of 1942, the Japanese were losing the initiative, with or without Midway. But with additional carriers and rebuilt CAGs, the Japanese have the ability to make the US hesitate for a couple of months before making their move. Instead of the decisive battle occurring June 1942, it probably would not now occur until february-May 1943 or so the following year, when the first carrier reinforcements begin to arrive along with some new equipment.....the F6F and the TBF mostly. an interesting what if really....maybe 6 US carriers pitted against 8-12 Japanese. American lift capacity around 660 a/c to about 580 japanese. US pilots with a lot more experience now, versus Japanese CAGs with many more veterans and decently trained replacement pilots. 

An interesting postulation IMO


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## parsifal (May 3, 2014)

One of the things about Shattered Sword that I dont like are the numerous tiny details , really not important to understanding the outcome of the battle, but which nevertheless have the effect of being outright wrong, and for that reason, decreasing the credibility of the overall narrative.

As an example, the book provides some really useful data on the Carrier characteristics. With regard to Akagi, it mentions that the ship had a main armament of 6x8in guns, a maximum speed of 31.5 knots and a practical operating capacity of 63 aircraft. Elsewhere it is stated that the reason for her starboard side island was solely because of air turbulence issues All these statistics are wrong. these characteristics, incidentally relate to the reconstructed (post 1938 version) of the carrier.

In fact the 8 inch guns were removed in 1935, and this lowered the displacement to below the quoted figure of 36500 tons, maximum speed in operational condition was just over 29 knots, and her operational carrying capacity was 78 aircraft at Pearl Harbour. in fact she could carry, comfortably between 85 and 91 aircraft with the enlarged hangars, but Japan never had the aircraft to put oin her. The operating figure of 634 aircraft were all that were availableto put on her, nothing to do with the ship capabilities. She was equipped with a staboard side island, along with Hiryu so that these two ships along with their near sisters Soryu and Kaga, could operate in a tight box or diamond formation, with approaches and landings for the Akagi/Hiryu veing from the port side, and the other two from the Starboard side. It turned out to be a bit of unneccessary (and dangerous) frill operationally

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## RpR (May 4, 2014)

parsifal said:


> I think there may have been. this sort of outcome would have left the US in relatively a worse tactical situation than they were and put Watchtower into some doubt. Assuming the Japanese came to their senses after Midway, if I were the Japanese, I would immediately have laid up at least 50% of the CAGs and returned them to Japan for extended rebuilding and retraining. The remainder would have diverted to Truk, whilst at the frontier I would have fortified and reinforced the frontier areas as quickly as possible. These are big what ifs, and most unlikely to actually occur, but by the latter half of 1942, the Japanese were losing the initiative, with or without Midway. But with additional carriers and rebuilt CAGs, the Japanese have the ability to make the US hesitate for a couple of months before making their move. Instead of the decisive battle occurring June 1942, it probably would not now occur until february-May 1943 or so the following year, when the first carrier reinforcements begin to arrive along with some new equipment.....the F6F and the TBF mostly. an interesting what if really....maybe 6 US carriers pitted against 8-12 Japanese. American lift capacity around 660 a/c to about 580 japanese. US pilots with a lot more experience now, versus Japanese CAGs with many more veterans and decently trained replacement pilots.
> 
> An interesting postulation IMO


You must remember the U.S. even when things started to look better had a multitude of prototype aircraft and unbuilt ships on the drawing board.

Had the U.S. not outright won at Midway, those designs that continued on, even when they for the most part knew they would not need them, would have gotten the green light and you would have seen the Japanese facing, a larger variety of aircraft. an even larger number of carriers and even larger Battleships that would have simply hammered them even harder than the way the existing ships did after the U.S. won at Midway
There would have been a larger variety of super heavy bombers probably also attacking the Japanese fleet and more specialized fighters and medium bombers built just for the Pacific.

Had the Japanese won at Midway the China-Burma campaign would have received a greater effort than it did from the U.S., British, Aussie, Kiwi and other European forces involved as Japan would have probably made their presence there far more formidable than it already was.
Some forces in that area were not beaten, they simply surrendered when the Emperor told them to.

As it was the with the victory at Midway, the U.S. could put its major efforts in Europe while fighting a fierce but secondary war in the Pacific, had Hawaii and the Aleutians remained under threat, the U.S. response would have been massive.


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## Francis marliere (May 5, 2014)

Parsifal,

as far as I understand the author's arguments, the Japanese did have experience, doctrine, training and hardware for amphibious operations, not for amphibious assaut. The Japanese used to land troops on unopposed (or lightly defended) beaches then attack. The only amphibious assaut was against Wake and was not a success.

I understand the lack of doctrine, training, etc. for naval gunfire support as lack of communications between the troops on the beach and the supporting ships. I may be mistaken but I don't think there was teams in IJA or SNLF capable of directing naval gunfire.

Last, the authors point some difficulties for the Japanese such as the lack of room to maneuver and escape the defenders firepower, lack of antitank weapons to face the platoon of light tanks.

With respect, I am not sure that if the first assault fails, the Japanese could come back 3 or 4 days later. The ships and planes would be low on fuel and ammunitions and would certainly need to refuel and rearm. The USN would have time to position submarines and, if practicable, reinforce Midway with new air units. 

Regards,


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## parsifal (May 5, 2014)

> as far as I understand the author's arguments, the Japanese did have experience, doctrine, training and hardware for amphibious operations, not for amphibious assaut. The Japanese used to land troops on unopposed (or lightly defended) beaches then attack. The only amphibious assaut was against Wake and was not a success.



I know that SS makes that claim, but it is an erroneous claim. The best source in English that I can think of is Gordon Rottmans "Japanese Army in WWII - Conquest In the Pacific  It gives a bit of a run down of Japanese opposed landings and their arrangements for handling them. The first opposed landings in the modern era that they undertook were in 1936-7. It states in the book " the IJAs amphibious doctrine against defended targets was well developed long before the attack on Pearl Harbour. A great deal of experience had been acquired in the war in China, where numerous large and small scale landings, some heavily opposed, had been undertaken. The most significant operations were undertaken near Hanzhou, of approximately divisional size, in 1937".

Rottman goes on to point out that during the numerous landing operations in China, the Navy and Army worked out a detailed doctrine of inter service co-operation, despite the legendary rivalry between the two services. This included details operational plans, ship to shore communication and bombardment plans. recon and r3e-supply. It is simply untrue to say that the Japanese were not capable of undertaking opposed landings. They did so many times during the war. 

What is true, is that wherever possible, they sought to avoid such opposed landings, but that is a whole world away from them being unable to carry them out. The undertook complex opposed landings in the PI, off Malaya, in Borneo, New Guinea Java, Wake Guam, Rabaul to name the more important ones. They were not capable of pulling off a Iwo style landing, but Midway in 1942 was no Iwo. More similar really to Rabaul. Wake is certainly not the only example of opposed landings undertaken by the Japanese, it was the only unsuccessful one ( until Milne Bay), and it finished up being successful anyway, with the Japanese returning a few days later after the initial reverses with reinforcements. 

Compared to the Allies in 1944, the Japanese had failed to progress their doctrine, and had been made obsolete by allied developments in amphibious warfare. But in 1942, the Japanese were at the peak of their game, and were considerably more advanced in their levels of equipment, technique and expertise. Against the Midway Garrison, a not particularly well trained garrison, I dont believe the Japanese would have been stopped. They had faced better more comprehensive defences when assaulting Rabaul and Java, and had had not too much difficulty. I dont believe the greenhorn American defenders would have lasted very long at all to be honest. 

One important detail that is worth noting is that japanese opposed landings were almost always undertaken at night, whereas most allied opposed landings were undertaken in the half light of dawn. allied timing allowed them to make landings that were much larger....they could maintain better C&C with daylight. Japanese landings were necessarily smaller scaled, but also tended to be more sharp, intense affairs, with direct NGS being provided right on the spot. If the assault was effctively contained, it usually collapased and failed. This happened at Wake and Milne Bay, and this is a reflection of the overall weakness of the Japanese technique, but the claim that they did not know how to undetyake an opposed landing, is just spurious bunkum Im afraid. 



> I understand the lack of doctrine, training, etc. for naval gunfire support as lack of communications between the troops on the beach and the supporting ships. I may be mistaken but I don't think there was teams in IJA or SNLF capable of directing naval gunfire.



This is a fundamental misunderstanding. Japanese ship to shore co-operation in 1942 was the best in the world at this sort of thing. Comapred to the allies in 1944, there is some merit to this claim, but against the allies in 1942, it is simply untrue. japanese cop-eration, doctrine and experience in amphibious warfare was without equal in 1942. 




> Last, the authors point some difficulties for the Japanese such as the lack of room to maneuver and escape the defenders firepower, lack of antitank weapons to face the platoon of light tanks.




I dont know how they could make such emphatic claims to be honest. The man responsible for planning the Japanese amphibious landing on Midway Atoll was Commander Yasumi Toyama. Toyama planned a simultaneous attack on Sand and Eastern Islands from the southern side of the atoll where the two islands were close to the reef. The Japanese landing force would number about 5,000, and would be spearheaded by two elite assault units - Minoru Ota's 2nd Combined Special Naval Landing Force numbering about three thousand marines, and the Army's Ichiki Detachment which numbered about two thousand men and was commanded by Colonel Kiyonao Ichiki.

Ota's marines would land on Sand Island, and Colonel Ichiki's troops would land on Eastern Island. Both landings would require flat-bottomed landing boats. it would have been very difficult, though not impossible for the FMF forces to move or reinforce positions after the japanese landings began

The US OOB included 

Sixth Marine Defense Battalion (reinforced), Fleet Marine Force 
Col. Harold D. Shannon, USMC
Reinforcing Units

2d Raider Battalion, Company "C" (Sand Island) 
2d Raider Battalion, Company "D" (Eastern Island) 
Antiaircraft and Special Weapons personnel, Third Defense Battalion
22d and 23rd Provisional Infantry Companies

Thus, at the points of intended attack, the US would have two companies of raider battalions, plus, probably a few odds and sods, against basically two regiments of japanese assault troops 


There was a squadron of Light Tanks included in this force. Overall, about 2500 men were stationed on the island, but less than 2000 were front line combatants.

The Japanese assault forces were built around the Ichiki detachment and the 2Maizuru SNLF. Both had been reinforced, well trained and went into battle with extensive AT assets attached. Even the 70mm Bn guns were given a limited AT capability. There were about 5500 attackers, of which over 4000 can be considered frontline combat troops.


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## Shortround6 (May 5, 2014)

Thank you Parsifal. I am learning a lot.

I would note that the Japanese had a 20mm AT that they adopted in 1937, how wide spread it was I don't know: Modern Firearms - Type 97

The Type 11 infantry gun: Type 11 37 mm Infantry Gun - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
A close relative of the French 37mm gun but it was replaced by the Type 94 Anti-tank gun : Type 94 37 mm Anti-Tank Gun - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia which should have been available in the summer of 1942 although the 47mm AT gun may not have been. 

The M3A1 tanks may have been vulnerable from the sides.


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## buffnut453 (May 5, 2014)

Parsifal,

Thanks for your informative post. Once again, I find myself agreeing with you! 

Your comment "What is true, is that wherever possible, they sought to avoid such opposed landings" made me smile because that type of thinking is as ingrained in my brain after 20 years in the military as I'm sure it is in yours. It encapsulates the whole point of manoeuvrist warfare - you attack where your enemy is weakest not where he's strongest. To criticize the Japanese for not undertaking opposed landings is rather like complaining that Japanese fighter pilots didn't fly in a straight line to make it easy for our chaps! 

I stand by my statement that, in late 1941, Japan had the most developed amphibious capability of any of the major combatants. That the Allies rapidly overtook the Japanese should not diminish some of the ground-breaking developments they implemented.


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## parsifal (May 5, 2014)

thanks guys, feel free of course to pull me up when you see something you dont agree with.

its inter4sting rereading SS, one of the most interesting bits was the japanese view on why they were defeated. Nagano looked into the defeat and came up with a number of key points, the over concentration of carriers into one group, the failure to get the recons off earlier (not just the tones single late starter, Nagano believed the recons should have been launched about an hour earlier. The over complexity of the plan was rightly criticised, and excessive hubris of the navy also mentioned. There was some doubt about security, but this wasnt really explored by the chief of the navy. Ugaki mentions it his diary, in particular the security of their radio traffic. I dont know if or where that led to anything, but the JN25 code was changed after the battle, something that was meant to happen at the beginning of May.

The poor DC of the carriers was recognized, and as carriers entered refit, some steps were initiated to rectify. Shokaku was fitted with CO2 flood lines to suppress fire, and fire curtains were deplyed inside the hagars. watertight integrity drills were much improved, such that Shokaku, when she went into battle again in the Solomons, was able to take and withstand damage that would probably have sunk her had she been at midway. The japanese broke up their carriers into smaller defensive groups and increased the size of the fighter squadrons on the carriers . they stopped short of adding a second full squadron of fighjters, such as the USN did, no doubt because of the limited wing folding ability of the Zeke.

Most importantly the japanese recognized the value of radar in defence, and they began to work better ways of using this technology. at Santa Cruz, the defensive efforts of the IJN was much better than it had been at Midway. The Japanese also accelarated and prioritised the construction of the new AA destroyers that fulfilled similar function to the Atlanta Class CLAAs.


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## Francis marliere (May 6, 2014)

Parsifal,

apparently, we don't agree on the term "opposed landing". IMHO, the Japanese did not make amphibious assault against strong defense in WWII, except at Wake. The landings in Malaya, PI, Dutch East Indies or Rabaul were not "assaults" because the defenses were very weak. I may be mistaken, but I think that at Rabaul the tiny garrison flew away in the jungle even before the landing (and it was the best thing to do). I don't know the Japanese landing near Chuanshakou very well, but whar I understand is that the odds were clearly in favor of the Japanese. With respects to Chinese soldiers who could be individually courageous, they usuallly suffered from bad (or lack of) equipement, training, doctrine, morale and leadership and were not as good as their Japanese counterparts. Landing at Midway would be quite another story. 

There was no room to maneuver in Midway and the landing would be a brutal assault on heavily mined beaches against a powerfull and determined foe. As far as I understand things a succesfull amphibious assault needs a ratio of 3/1 plus heavy air and NGFS support to be succesfull. I am not convincted that the Japanese had both.

You wrote " Japanese ship to shore co-operation in 1942 was the best in the world". You may be right, or wrong since you do not support your claims with any evidence. I may be wrong but I am inclined to think that once the landing begins it would be difficult for the ships to engage targets on the shore without hitting their own troops, because of the proximity of both camps and the lack of advanced liaison teams as the allied had late in the war. That is also true for air support. The Japanse may have the best training and doctrine at the time but I guess it's not enough. See how things went wrong at Tarawa because the US still lacked experience.

You wrote that the japanese had 5.000 troops and the marines 2.500, of whom 2.000 combattants. First, that makes a ratio of 2.5/1, not 3/1. Then, no offense, Parsifal, but as far as I know, every marines is a rifleman, and the guys assigned to second line duties proved at Guadalcanal and Attu that they had the guts and skills of true combattants. They should not, IMHO, be treated as second rate soldiers. That makes a 2/1 ratio if everything works well.

And everything may not work well. The invasion fleet could take loses from submarines, air and PT attacks. As you know, the IJN was incredibly bad in ASW and AAW and losing an AP (with hundreds of soldiers and landing crafts) would be a real risk. The progressive loss of landing craft during the operation due to battle damage, mechanical failures, groundings, etc. may slow the arrival of reinforcements and supply to the point that the Japanese would enjoy no numerical superiority at the point of contact (or the marines outnumber their enemy). I would had that the Japanese planned the operation with bad intelligence (they thought there were 750 marines on the islands) and may not direct the battle very well.

All that make me think that the battle would not as easy as you think for the Japanese. That does not mean that they, as SS say, had no chances at all, but I am not convincted that the odds are good for one camp or another.

Best regards,

Francis Marliere


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## buffnut453 (May 6, 2014)

Francis,

I suggest you read about the landings at Kota Bharu. Those landings were fiercely opposed by the 8th Indian Brigade under Brigadier Key. Indeed, he made several attempts to close the initial breach that the Japanese created. The Wikipedia summary, while not 100% accurate, provides a decent overview. I don't see how "heavy casualties" and Tsuji's quote about "The enemy pillboxes, which were well prepared, reacted violently with such heavy force that our men lying on the beach, half in and half out of the water could not raise their heads" can align with an unopposed landing.

Cheers,
B-N


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## parsifal (May 6, 2014)

Part I of my reply 



> apparently, we don't agree on the term "opposed landing". IMHO, the Japanese did not make amphibious assault against strong defense in WWII, except at Wake.




As Buffnut says, you need to do some research before saying things like that. Sure, in the context of an Iwo, or saipan, these operations were fairly weak, but the context of what had gone before it, and even for some time after 1942, the japanese amphibious techniques were against the toughest defences encountered to that point of the war for amphib assaults



> The landings in Malaya, PI, Dutch East Indies or Rabaul were not "assaults" because the defenses were very weak.



but in each example mentioned, the assaults that were delivered were against enemies more experienced, better equipped and more numerous than the defences that existed at Midway at that time. US armed forces on the ground were extremely weak, and quite unready for ground combat. Three months later, and then you may have a point, but not in June 1942

As Buffnut state, you are mistaken. in the case of Rabaul, ther are some very interesting comparisons that can be made. The harbour defences at rabaul were superior to the shore based defences at Midway, the ratio of troops about the same, and the frontages actually smaller. The Australians were experienced troops, but were simply unable to withstand the assault.

The 1,400-strong Australian Army garrison in New Britain—known as Lark Force—was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John Scanlan. It included 716 frontline Australian Imperial Force (AIF) soldiers in the shape of the 2/22nd Battalion, deployed from March 1941 as fears of war with Japan increased. The force also included personnel from a local Militia unit, the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles (NGVR), a coastal defence battery, an anti-aircraft battery, an anti-tank battery and a detachment of the 2/10th Field Ambulance. The defenders included a commando unit, the 130-strong 2/1st Independent Company. 

The main tasks of the garrison were protection of Vunakanau, the main Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) airfield near Rabaul, and the nearby flying boat anchorage in Simpson Harbour, which were important for the surveillance of Japanese movements in the region. However, the RAAF contingent, under Wing Commander John Lerew, had little offensive capability, with 10 lightly armed CAC Wirraway training aircraft and four Lockheed Hudson light bombers from No. 24 Squadron.The assault for the Japanese was made difficult be=cause there really was only one point that the assault could be undertaken, and the Australians were ready and well dug in

Following the capture of Guam, the South Seas Force, under Major General Tomitaro Horii, was tasked with capturing Kavieng and Rabaul, as part of "Operation R". A brigade group based on the 55th Division, its main combat units were the 144th Infantry Regiment, which consisted of a headquarters unit, three infantry battalions, an artillery company, signals unit, and a munitions squad, as well as a few platoons from the 55th Cavalry Regiment, a battalion from the 55th Mountain Artillery Regiment and a company from the 55th Engineer Regiment. On 14 January, the force embarked at Truk as part of a naval task force, which consisted of two aircraft carriers—Kaga and Akagi—seven cruisers, 14 destroyers, and numerous smaller vessels and submarines under the command of Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue.

Starting on 4 January 1942, Rabaul came under attack by large numbers of Japanese carrier-based aircraft. After the odds facing the Australians mounted significantly, Lerew signalled RAAF HQ in Melbourne with the Latin motto "Nos Morituri Te Salutamus" ("we who are about to die salute you"), the phrase uttered by gladiators in ancient Rome before entering combat. On 20 January, over 100 Japanese aircraft attacked in multiple waves. Eight Wirraways attacked and in the ensuing fighting three RAAF planes were shot down, two crash-landed, and another was damaged. Six of Australian aircrew were killed in action and five wounded. One of the attacking Japanese bombers was shot down by anti-aircraft fire. As a result of the intense air attacks, Australian coastal artillery at the harbour entrance was was destroyed and Australian infantry were withdrawn from these positions, to the harbour itself. to make the last stand in Rabaul itself. The following day, an RAAF Catalina flying boat crew located the invasion fleet off Kavieng, and its crew managed to send a signal before being shot down.

As the Australian ground troops took up positions along the western shore of Blanche Bay where they prepared to meet the landing,the remaining RAAF elements, consisting of two Wirraways and one Hudson, were withdrawn to Lae (this is probably the withdrawal you refer to) . Once the aircraft had departed with a number of wounded, the Australians destroyed the airfield. The bombing continued around Rabaul on 22 January and early that morning a Japanese force of between 2,000 and 3500 troops landed just off New Ireland and waded ashore in deep water filled with dangerous mudpools. The 2/1st Independent Company had been dispersed around the island and the Japanese took the main town of Kavieng without opposition; after a sharp fight around the airfield the commandos fell back towards the Sook River. That night, the invasion fleet approached Rabaul and well before dawn on 23 January, the South Seas Force entered Simpson Harbour and a force of around 3500 troops, mainly from the 144th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Colonel Masao Kusunose, began to land on New Britain.

A series of desperate actions followed on the beaches, with the Australians heavily pinned by the accurate close range fire delivered by the supporting destroyers near the beaches around Simpson Harbour, Keravia Bay and Raluana Point. The Australians attempted to turn back the attack by mounting strong counterattacks, but these were broken up by the IJN support group. The 3rd Battalion, 144th Infantry Regiment, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Kuwada Ishiro, was held up at Vulcan Beach (but did get ashore) by a mixed company of Australians from the 2/22nd and the NGVR, but elsewhere the other two battalions of the South Seas Force were able to land at unguarded locations and began moving inland. Within hours, Lakunai airfield had been captured by the Japanese force, and Scanlan ordered "every man for himself", and Australian soldiers and civilians split into small groups, up to company size, and retreated through the jungle, moving along the north and south coasts. During the fighting on 23 January, the Australians lost 38 killed and over 160 wounded, whilst Japanese casualties amounted to 16 killed and 59 wounded. Hardly the results of an unopposed landing, and for the Japanese, hardly a casualty list suggesting a force incapable of attacking a defended target by sea.

Attached is a photo taken from the Pacific War website, showing the Midway oil storage tanks ablaze after being hit on the 4 June. In view is the main command centre near the airfield. note the above ground communications, and that most structures are in fact tents. this is not evidence of a well fortified or prepared position. This phot should have been attached to part II of my reply....

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## parsifal (May 6, 2014)

Part II of my reply



> I may be mistaken, but I think that at Rabaul the tiny garrison flew away in the jungle even before the landing (and it was the best thing to do).




Incorrect. see above. it was a short, sharp fight, at closer odds than was the case for Midway, 



> I don't know the Japanese landing near Chuanshakou very well, but whar I understand is that the odds were clearly in favor of the Japanese.



As would be the case for Midway. The invasion points would be defended by two companies, against two full reinforced regiments....roughly 5500 men to 300 



> With respects to Chinese soldiers who could be individually courageous, they usuallly suffered from bad (or lack of) equipement, training, doctrine, morale and leadership and were not as good as their Japanese counterparts. Landing at Midway would be quite another story.




Not true in 1937 when the first landings took place in China. Chinas regular army was German trained, and better equipped than the marines on Midway. its an army squandered admittedly, but it initially was better equipped than the japanese. 

However for the Americans in the early months of WWII, there were serious training and equipment issues, and a distinct lack of experience. the Americans rectified this issue as quickly as they could, and learnt real fast, but this would not apply to an isolated garrison in a fight that might last a few hours or days at best. 




> There was no room to maneuver in Midway and the landing would be a brutal assault on heavily mined beaches against a powerfull and determined foe. As far as I understand things a succesful amphibious assault needs a ratio of 3/1 plus heavy air and NGFS support to be succesfull. I am not convincted that the Japanese had both.



This cuts both ways, and in fact works against the marine defenders worse than it does the attacking forces. Once the IJN hove to the atoll, there would be no real movement possible , but the Japanese would have some freedom of movement, and would be attacking a concentrated point....5000 men attacking 300. 

On the state of the defences at Midway, one US author states:

"Although Midway now appeared to bristle with defensive firepower, none of the gun emplacements or machine-gun bunkers were "hardened" with reinforced concrete. The large calibre gun emplacements, machine-gun bunkers, command posts, communication facilities, and underground sleeping quarters had all been simply dug out of the sand. The seacoast guns and anti-aircraft guns were protected against strafing, and air and off-shore naval bombardment only by sandbag walls. The machine-gun bunkers, command posts, and underground sleeping quarters were protected by sandbags and roofing comprised of slabs of wood supporting thick layers of sand.

The beaches were guarded against amphibious landings by machine-gun bunkers with overlapping fields of fire, but Sand and Eastern Islands were too small to provide defence in depth behind the beach defences. If a Japanese amphibious landing force breached the line of beach defences, there was little to stop them pouring more troops through that gap".

There were no mines, and no significant hardening of the beach defences. The southern route which was the planned MLA for the Japanese was particularly vulnerable

An idea of the vulnerability of the atoll to bombardment can be found in the accounts of the bombardments carried out in December, as part of the Pearl harbour attacks. 


"Despite having more than 3 hours warning, the Japanese caused considerable damage, with just two destroyers, firing for a total firing time of 16 minutes. The Japanese destroyers commenced their firing run at 2135 ( ceased firing for about 7 minutes after the first salvoes and then recommenced) , moving in a north-easterly direction up the long axis of Sand Island. The seaplane hangar was hit, and the communications tower and shack destroyed in the first salvo and the resulting flames illuminated fresh targets for the Japanese. Ashore, some confusion reigned. Telephone lines were knocked out or jammed, and it was not until 2148 that Lieutenant Colonel Shannon was given permission to engage the enemy with his Marine shore batteries.

At 2153, orders were received by the Marine searchlight batteries to illuminate the Japanese ships. One Japanese destroyer was immediately illuminated under the guns of Battery A, but the 5-inch guns of this battery had been rendered ineffectual by an earlier salvo that had disrupted firing data and fire command communications. It is doubtful whether any incident on this night demonstrated more clearly the extreme vulnerability of the gun emplacements on Midway to damage from flat trajectory naval bombardment.

At this point only Battery D, located on the south-eastern shore of Sand Island, was able to bring its 3-inch anti-aircraft guns to bear on the Japanese destroyers. The destroyers were now close enough to the reef for Captain Jean H. Buckner to see the Japanese Navy battle flag flying from the foremast of the lead destroyer. Buckner ordered his gunners to fire. Battery D was then joined by the 5-inch guns of Battery B on Eastern Island. By 2158, as Marine fire intensified and became better coordinated, the Japanese destroyers ceased firing and withdrew under cover of their own smoke screen.

The very skilful Japanese night attack caused serious damage to the seaplane hangar, and damaged the power house and other buildings on Sand Island. The 6th Defense Battalion lost two killed and ten wounded. The Naval Air Station lost two killed.

This first Japanese attack on Midway provided the Marines with a foretaste of the well-honed night warfare skills of the Imperial Japanese Navy, and its willingness to carry out important naval activities during the hours of darkness". This quot3e is from the US "Naval Historical Centre" website. 



> You wrote " Japanese ship to shore co-operation in 1942 was the best in the world". You may be right, or wrong since you do not support your claims with any evidence. I may be wrong but I am inclined to think that once the landing begins it would be difficult for the ships to engage targets on the shore without hitting their own troops, because of the proximity of both camps and the lack of advanced liaison teams as the allied had late in the war. That is also true for air support. The Japanse may have the best training and doctrine at the time but I guess it's not enough. See how things went wrong at Tarawa because the US still lacked experience.



I did give you a source, Rottmans book. now ive also given you the factual account of the actual Midway bombardment undertaken in December. Trying to cmpare the defences at midway to those at Betio has to be a joke, surely. betio was one of the most heavily fortified atolls in history, Midway was barely dug in properly

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## gjs238 (May 6, 2014)

parsifal said:


> She was equipped with a staboard side island, along with Hiryu so that these two ships along with their near sisters Soryu and Kaga, could operate in a tight box or diamond formation, with approaches and landings for the Akagi/Hiryu veing from the port side, and the other two from the Starboard side. It turned out to be a bit of unneccessary (and dangerous) frill operationally



Did the four carriers ever operate that way together?


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## parsifal (May 7, 2014)

I think so, but ill have to look up some historical launch dispositions. 

The japanese all but abandoned the tight diamond or box pattern after the battle, it being deemed the tight grouping of the carriers had made it easier to sink them in a single strike. After that ther was greater dispersion of the carriers, similar to the way the USN was operating, for example at Coral Sea, where the distance between the two carriers probably contributed to there being only one loss instead of two. Mind you, the Japanese carriers in that battle were also given the benefit of greater separation distances as well, and this probably helped Zuikaku avoid much damage in the battle.


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## Francis marliere (May 7, 2014)

Parsifal,

thank you for your long answer. 

With respect, I won't answer to your kind words such as "you need to do some research before saying things like that", " you are mistaken", etc. English is not my native langage and I sometimes fail to understand somes shades of meaning. Such words in French would be quite rude or unpolite and I want to keep this discussion pleasant and open-minded.

I wrote quickly, from memory, and did not take the time to check the facts. Indeed allied opposition at Kota Bharu and Rabaul was stronger than I wrote. My bad. However, I still fail to see some of your points. 

You wrote : "The assaults that were delivered were against enemies more experienced, better equipped and more numerous than the defences that existed at Midway at that time. US armed forces on the ground were extremely weak, and quite unready for ground combat. (...) in the case of Rabaul, ther are some very interesting comparisons that can be made. The harbour defences at rabaul were superior to the shore based defences at Midway, the ratio of troops about the same, and the frontages actually smaller. The Australians were experienced troops, but were simply unable to withstand the assault"

It's the first time I read that the USMC soldiers (including raiders) were "very weakk, and quite unready for ground combat". Please forgive me if I am a bit sceptical. As far as I see things, the USMC is a prestigious elite corps whose members are said to be very good soldiers. IMHO the difficulties encountered by the Japanese during the invasion of Wake shows how good the Marines were early in the war.

While Australian soldiers gained an excellent reputation in North Africa the NG, please note that the 2/22nd Bn has no experience of combat. As 2/22nd Battalion | Australian War Memorial tells us, the unit was raised in July 1940 and did not leave Australia before going to Rabaul. Hence I do not understand why you say that the Australian were "experienced" and why you rate them superior to the marines. 

You probably did not miss that of the 1400 defender of Rabaul, only 700 were regulars (2/22). As Lark Force - Lost Lives - The Second World War and the islands of New Guinea shows, the other infantryman were New Guinea Volunteer Rifles, who lacked adequate training and weapons. I guess you have also noted that the harbour defences at Rabaul were made of 2 old 6" guns which were hardly "superior to the shore based defences at Midway". 

You also wrote : " The 3rd Battalion, 144th Infantry Regiment, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Kuwada Ishiro, was held up at Vulcan Beach (but did get ashore) by a mixed company of Australians from the 2/22nd and the NGVR, but elsewhere the other two battalions of the South Seas Force were able to land at unguarded locations and began moving inland". That valids my arguments : the Japanese lacked firepower, etc. in amphibious assauts. Their landings succeeded because they quickly landed troops on undefended beaches then moved toward the enemy. 

In your second message, you express the opinion that the Chinese soldier of 1937 is superior to the USMC of June 42. My opinion is that marines have better training, morale, weaponry, doctrine and leadership than the Chinese infantryman. Chinese units were notoriously unreliable and their real strengh was often inferior to their theorical strengh. China was at this stage a failed state and corruption was endemic. Some generals were known to sell the equipement of their troops to make some money.

You wrote "As would be the case for Midway. The invasion points would be defended by two companies, against two full reinforced regiments....roughly 5500 men to 300". Please let me ask how you make your calculation because it may be of interest. As far as I understand things, Midway islands are pretty small. Every man in the island would quickly be able to engage the enemy. For the attackers, it's another story because they probably don't have enough landing crafts to bring 5.500 men at once. They would have to make several trips with less and less crafts as time goes because of battle damage, groundings on reefs, mechanical failures, etc.

May I ask your sources relative to "There were no mines, and no significant hardening of the beach defences" ?
My sources (SS, but also http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmchist/midway.txt and Midway Islands' Undaunted Defenders ? May '96: World War II Feature) say the contrary :

"the extremely extensive system of obstacles, mines, and 
demolitions projected by Colonel Shannon was brought to final completion.
By now Sand Island was surrounded with two double-apron tactical wire 
barriers, and all installations on both islands were in turn ringed by 
protective wire. Antiboat mines made of sealed sewer pipe, and obstacles 
fashioned from concertina-ed reinforcing-steel lay offshore. The beaches were 
sown with home-made mines consisting of ammunition boxes filled with dynamite 
and 20-penny nails; although electric detonation was planned, every such mine 
also had a bull's eye painted on an exposed landward side, so that it could be 
set off locally by rifle fire. Cigar-box antitank mines were filled with 
dynamite to be fired on pressure by current from flashlight batteries, and 
whiskey-bottle molotov cocktails of high-octane gasoline and fuel oil stood 
ready at every position."

"Barbed wire sprouted along Midway's coral beaches. Shannonbelieved that it would stop the Japanese as it had stopped theGermans in World War I. He ordered so much strung that one Marine exclaimed: "Barbed wire, barbed wire! Cripes, the old manthinks we can stop planes with barbed wire!" The defendersalso had a large supply of blasting gelatin, which was used tomake anti-boat mines and booby traps. "

You believe that the island would be devastated by air strikes and naval gunfire : "An idea of the vulnerability of the atoll to bombardment can be found in the accounts of the bombardments carried out in December, as part of the Pearl harbour attacks." While I don't say that Midway is immune to air and naval attacks, I am not so optimistic. 
First, we cannot know how many Japanese planes would be available after the carrier battle. May be none, as what happened, if the carriers are sunk, damaged or in poursuit of the US Fleet. We cannot know neither how many ships would perform NGFS since many of them would be with the main fleet, seeking battle with the USN.
Then, accuracy of gunfire and air strikes would be IMHO very low. The first salvoes or bombes could be aimed accurately but the following ones would probably not because of dusk and smoke.
Anyway, we should not forget that the initial strike on Midway was not considered sucessfull since 25-30 planes (number depends on sources) were lost and a second strike judged necessary. According to Midway under Japanese air attack-4 June 1942 "On Midway itself, twenty men had been killed. Camouflage had effectively protected the 5-inch coastal guns, and much of the damage to installations was repairable".


Let me add a few points if you don't mind. According to http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmchist/midway.txt there was only 2.500 assaut troops (the rest probably being reinforcements and garrison) and their landing on Midway was problematic :

"The actual landing on Midway was to be accomplished by approximately 
1,500 Special Naval Landing Force troops who would storm Sand Island; and by 
1,000 Army troops of the Ikki Detachment, to land on Eastern Island. 
Summarizing the enemy landing plan, Captain Toyama stated:

We were going to approach the south side (of Midway), sending out landing 
boats as far as the reef. We had many different kinds of landing boats but did 
not think that many would be able to pass over the reefs. If they got stuck 
the personnel were supposed to transfer to rubber landing boats. We had plenty 
of equipment for a three months' occupation without help, but were not sure of 
our boats.

Assault elements in the landing would be backed up by the 11th and 12th Construction 
Battalions plus miscellaneous base-development detachments."

As you see, landing assaut troops, then reinforcements and supply would be very difficult. 

By the way, I repeat my argument over the possible loss of ships to air, submarine and PT attacks before and during the landing, meaning less troops and less landing crafts for the operation.

Best regards,

Francis Marliere


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## Francis marliere (May 7, 2014)

double post


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## parsifal (May 7, 2014)

gjs238 said:


> Did the four carriers ever operate that way together?



Took a quick look at SS and it is clear that the approach to midway was using their standard diamond formation. Parshal has done a number of dispositional diagrams for various times of the battle. At 0710, when the first attacks by VT-8 and AAC B-26s were underway, the Kido butai was on a SE heading, with Akagi at the bottom of diamond, Soryu at the top and hiryu abeam to port, and Kaga to the Stern. This is the wrong positioning of the carriers to use this port/starboard side islands idea, but the diamond formation is clearly there. Spacing at that time was about 6000 yards abeam, and the carriers astern were about 7000 yards distant.

parxhall then has a disposition diagram for 0753. The KB was still heading SE, in the same basic diamond formation, and no changes to disposition, but the TF had now dispersed just slightly to about 7000 yards. This was still the case at 0815 when attacked by Norris and the B-17s. By this stage Hiryu, Akagi Soryu and BC Haruna were all making smoke and were undertaking evasive manouvres to starboard. At 0917 Akagi (and presumably the other carriers altered course to generally a northeast heading , except for the landing on operations that began just after the course change, and completed at 0932

At 0920, when attacked by Owens' VT-8, the carriers were still in a rough diamond or box pattern, heading ENE, with Soryu now port side lead, Hiryu Staboard side lead with Kaga astern of Soryu and Akagi astern of Hiryu. TDs were now greatly reduced, though Parshals diagram does not include a scale for this time frame. Owens' attack was head on from the NE, and unexplainably (to me anyway), the carriers took evasive action by altering port, thus presenting broadside on to the attackers, though admittedly it depends on the timing, since the manouvre was actually an "S shaped manouvre....they may have altered to port early to present broadside on and maximise flak effcts, and then turned to starboard at the time of the attack commencing to again present bow on to the launched torpedoes. 

by 0940, when VT-6 delivered their attacks on the Kaga, the carriers were now on a basecourse heading of NW, still in the same relative positions to each other, but the diamond formation was now even more squashed flat than in the previous time periods. this time the torpedo bombers delivered an "anvil attack, which would have been very nerve wracking for the Kaga. no hits, however. 

Parshall has a further dispositional diagram for 10am, and the following commentary...."The fleet dispositions at this time had been so distorted as to no longer resemble a box formation at all, rather a ragged line ahead , with Kaga trailing on the port quarter". the Japanese were beginning to buckle under the pressure, finally. More importanlty, the AA escort was now almost completely out of position. Kirishima was astern kaga, but outside effective AA supporti8ng range, and Haruna out of position completely . Tone and Chikuma were well astern and also out of effective AA range. The fighters were at deck lkevel, no wonder the SBDs had a field day. unsupported carriers, with little or no defensive CAP and no supporting AA fire....a divebombers dream come true basically.


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## Garyt (May 7, 2014)

I've read that the Japanese doctrine was to spread out their forces and rely upon evading strikes, whereas the US doctrine was one of keeping the vessels of the task force closer together and relying on supporting flak for defense. 

I'm not sure how rigid this idea was for the two navies, and if this was even US doctrine at the start or evolved that way through the course of the war.


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## bobbysocks (May 7, 2014)

wow there is a ton of good info here...i will have to read it slowly later....thanks all for posting. good stuff


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 7, 2014)

parsifal said:


> "_At 0920, when attacked by Owens' VT-8, …_"



I think you meant to write *Waldron's VT-8*.


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## parsifal (May 7, 2014)

I just transferred what I saw in SS. Im not that intimate with USN squadron commanders. 


Gary, with regard to whether the japanese used manouvre whilst the USN went more for massed firepower, I think as a generalization thats true, but there are so many exceptions to this general statement. A ship violently manouvered is not an ideal AA platform, but its a harder target than a ship steaming at a measured pace with less violent manouvres.

Both sides however put aa lot of importance on maintaining station, because if your not, you are probably opening up gaps in the fire screen, and not providing mutual support to the other carriers. The japanese were using a tight box formation for their carriers, because the overwhelming weight of AA fire came from the Carriers themselves, and it was intended that if a ship came under attack, the other carriers would be able to provide some protective fire over the carrier being attacked....mutual support. The down side to this was of course that grouping the carriers made them an easier target. 

The diamond formation used by the japanese was too widely spaced for mutual fire to be provided, but close enough for them to spotted and attacked more or less simulataneoulsy. Because the Box had been pushed out of shape, the escort was also out of position, so this made the USNs job just that much easier. 

I suspect the formations being used by the Japanese were adopted, and the carriers placed and spaced as they were, not for defensive reasons, but because this disposition made launch and ranging of combined strikes a bit easier. at 6 yards spacing, communication by flag or aldis lamp was possible, and the spacing meant aircraft could be launched and form up relatively easily. Not a lot of help when you are under attack however, as the morning progressed the Japanese showed clear signs that their C&C over the TF was slipping. They were buckling under the pressure, though I bet they were not exactly aware of it at the time.


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 7, 2014)

Total digression prompted by Pars VT-8 misque. The events we discuss here recede into a past that is perhaps not quite as distant as it may seem. occasionally that becomes crystal clear in an unexpected moment. Picture a young naval cadet visiting the original ramshackle Naval Aviation museum in Pensacola circa 1970. He's resolving a Midway aircraft-type argument with a classmate, using the display of a model TBD memorializing VT-8 at Midway. The cadet becomes aware of a gaggle of 'blue-haired' ladies gathering around the display. They gather closely around the display and suddenly one realizes the historic connection to their own lives. "My God! that's Adelaide's husband's squadron and plane!" one explains. The ladies were friends of Ms. Waldron's who happened to be visiting the museum that same day and moment. It's a moment I'll never forget.

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## syscom3 (May 7, 2014)

"Shattered Sword" talked at length of the IJN carrier formations at the start of the battle and how incessant American attacks stretched and distorted their formation. By the time the Enterprise and Yorktown Dauntless's went into their dives, any semblance of an organized battle group was long gone. That is one of the reasons the Japanese command and control failed them at that point.

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## parsifal (May 8, 2014)

yep, and it makes sense that this is a reflection of the gradual breakdown of C&C in the TF.

I also read in SS that Nagumo was not the preferred commander for the Striking Force. Yammamoto before the war wanted Ozawa to be in Command. Even in 1942, whilst Ozawa was only given relatively minor Commands (his usage of the light carrier Ryujo in the PI and Indian Oceans was outstanding) he showed clear superiority over Nagumos rather manic unpredictability

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jisaburō_Ozawa

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## syscom3 (May 8, 2014)

Ultimately, the most significant thing about Midway is the loss of four carriers. They were irreplaceable, and the Japanese never recovered from that body blow. The US could have lost all three at the battle, yet only a year later, they would be getting a fleet carrier every month.


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## parsifal (May 8, 2014)

Sys, thats probably where you and i diverge. The loss of the four carriers was a remarkable achievement by the USN, and an undeniable victory for them with real benefits conferered on the USN. It was also an enormous deflation to IJN confidence. However, the loss of the carriers was far less important to Japanese capability than might be supposed. Even before midway, Japanese pilot standards were falling, and they were unable to make good pilot losses even in relatively low loss periods. Akagi for example went to war with a complement of just under 80a/c embarked, by the time of the battle this was down to 63 and still falling. somewhere, ive read the Navy was projecting further falls to an air complement of around 50 aircraft by late Septemeber. this was one of the reasons they wanted to write down the US carriers in a decisive battle....they needed to rest and replace their own losses. But as you say, this was never going to happen. 

The IJN fought the remaining carrier battles of 1942, more or less with the survivors of Midway CAGs. They didnt win, but they did fight the USN to the point of exhaustion. Trouble was, they also fought themselves to that same point. from that situation, the USN rapidly recovered, but the IJN could only repleneish at a very limited rate, and with pilots of fairly low quality. Twice in 1943 their CAGs were again committed, as land based elements, and twice these hastily trained aircrews were decimated by the increasingly competent US air forces. It was relentless, and from a Japanese persepective tragic.

By Phil Sea, the Japanese had largely recovered carrier numbers, and fielded a good number of carriers, that again were underutilized in terms of carrying capacity. having four additional carriers might help in the sense of spreading losses out better, but it could hardly affect pilot replacement rates. Ozawas 1st Mobile Fleet would still have gone into battle with about 450 a/c, filled with pilots that were just cannon fodder regardless of the outcome of Midway. Conversely, if the japanese had won their battle, and destroyed all three US carriers in June 1942, the US would have gone to battle in June 1944 with 160 less aircraft than they did. Carrier capacity was the limiting factor for the USN in 1944, not so the IJN.

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## BiffF15 (May 8, 2014)

Gents,
Thanks for the lessons! I'm learning that facts have to be delved into, layer by layer, to get "the maximum learning points".
Cheers,
Biff


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## Garyt (May 8, 2014)

> Sys, thats probably where you and i diverge. The loss of the four carriers was a remarkable achievement by the USN, and an undeniable victory for them with real benefits conferered on the USN. It was also an enormous deflation to IJN confidence. However, the loss of the carriers was far less important to Japanese capability than might be supposed.



I'd agree, Parsifal. Had the Japanese "won" at Midway (we'll say took the island, knocked out 2 US carriers at a cost of one of their own), they would have had a increasingly hard time of keeping the carriers full. As Parsifal mentioned, they were already understaffed in planes/pilots at Midway. With some air to air losses at Midway they would be in trouble.


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## RpR (May 9, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Sys, thats probably where you and i diverge. The loss of the four carriers was a remarkable achievement by the USN, and an undeniable victory for them with real benefits conferered on the USN. It was also an enormous deflation to IJN confidence. However, the loss of the carriers was far less important to Japanese capability than might be supposed. Even before midway, Japanese pilot standards were falling, and they were unable to make good pilot losses even in relatively low loss periods. Akagi for example went to war with a complement of just under 80a/c embarked, by the time of the battle this was down to 63 and still falling. somewhere, ive read the Navy was projecting further falls to an air complement of around 50 aircraft by late Septemeber. this was one of the reasons they wanted to write down the US carriers in a decisive battle....they needed to rest and replace their own losses. But as you say, this was never going to happen.
> 
> The IJN fought the remaining carrier battles of 1942, more or less with the survivors of Midway CAGs. They didnt win, but they did fight the USN to the point of exhaustion. Trouble was, they also fought themselves to that same point. from that situation, the USN rapidly recovered, but the IJN could only repleneish at a very limited rate, and with pilots of fairly low quality. Twice in 1943 their CAGs were again committed, as land based elements, and twice these hastily trained aircrews were decimated by the increasingly competent US air forces. It was relentless, and from a Japanese persepective tragic.
> 
> By Phil Sea, the Japanese had largely recovered carrier numbers, and fielded a good number of carriers, that again were underutilized in terms of carrying capacity. having four additional carriers might help in the sense of spreading losses out better, but it could hardly affect pilot replacement rates. Ozawas 1st Mobile Fleet would still have gone into battle with about 450 a/c, filled with pilots that were just cannon fodder regardless of the outcome of Midway. Conversely, if the japanese had won their battle, and destroyed all three US carriers in June 1942, the US would have gone to battle in June 1944 with 160 less aircraft than they did. Carrier capacity was the limiting factor for the USN in 1944, not so the IJN.



You seem to be ignoring the other factors that would have changed.

Had Midway Islands been captured by the Japanese A: The U.S. would have had to retake the Islands, B: The Aleutian campaign would not have petered out as the Japanese then would have had a base from which it could have assisted the Aleutians Campaign for rearming while being able to fly reconnaissance missions of what the U.S. fleet was doing from Midway Island.
Plus assuming the Japanese had only lost one carrier and the U.S. two or more, he U.S. would have had what would have amounted to a full-on three front war, not just deadly harassment because the Japanese would have had the U.S. trying to decide where the Japanese were going to strike from next.

As I said in another post, the U.S. response would have massive in rearming but having suffered two serious defeats so early in the war while considering how fiercely as the Japanese fought, it would have made the war far more costly and bloody and longer than it was. 
At the same time Germany would have been fully aware that the U.S. was suffering off of its West Coast and may not be able to give as much support to Europe as it wanted to.
Now that might have made Hitler act even more foolish than he did but one simply does not know.


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## parsifal (May 9, 2014)

You seem to be ignoring the other factors that would have changed.



> Had Midway Islands been captured by the Japanese
> A: The U.S. would have had to retake the Islands,



Yes, agreed, or at least neutralize it. however for the japanese to take, hold and maintain Midway, there would have been yet another hole in the dwindling bucket of plenty for the japanese. This would be particualalry true of their merchant shipping and air assets. As they did in the far noth, the Japanese would almost certainly have abandoned these forward positions. 



> B: The Aleutian campaign would not have petered out as the Japanese then would have had a base from which it could have assisted the Aleutians Campaign for rearming while being able to fly reconnaissance missions of what the U.S. fleet was doing from Midway Island.



Midway offered no support to the far north. It was much too far away for it to ever to be abale to provide any kind of support. 

The islands taken by the Japanese were completely untenable, as they eventually realized. With no adequate port facilities, they required major efforts for re-supply, were of no value in terms of projecting air or seapowe, and were just an enormous prison camp for the Japanese really. There was no advantage Adak or Attu to the further advancement into Alaskan terrioties for the japanese, and midway offered even less benefit.

Similar issues surround Midway. It could offer an airfield and flying boat facilities at least, but it was no port, and no re-supply capability, at least for the technology available to the Japanese. Because of the topography of the Atoll, it was very exposed and easy to damage. 

Both the Aleutions and midway were strategic blind alleys for the Japanese. And worse, a net drain on their very limited resources. In no way, except for the fact they could keep tabs on the Pacific Fleet should it be construed that Midway would offer much advantage to the Japanese if taken 




> Plus assuming the Japanese had only lost one carrier and the U.S. two or more, he U.S. would have had what would have amounted to a full-on three front war, not just deadly harassment because the Japanese would have had the U.S. trying to decide where the Japanese were going to strike from next.



This I agree with, more or less. A one sided victory for the japanese exposes the allied position across the pacific.

however, it is highly unlikley that the Japanese could capitaliseon this advantage, and in fact further advanaces by them was about the worst thing they could have done. Their shipping capacities were already stretched past breaking point, and any lengthening of the supply lines is only going to make their logistics even worse, and their defences even weaker. There weas no posibility for the japanese to further expand, though they wanted to. They were deluding themselves when they thought or spoke of the "2nd Operational Phase". The best they could have done, if they had won at midway, was use the time to rebuild their shattered airgroups, rectify the faults in their training regime, fortify their forward positions, and try and improve the construction of shipping. This was not gong to win them the war, but it might have strung things out for a bit. I dont believe this outcome was realisitic, but the Japanese as the war moved into its latter phases, consoled themeselves by believing that a high rate of attrition might induce the Americans to the peace table. It was a forlorn hope, but a more relaistic appraisal, than continuing expansion. 




> As I said in another post, the U.S. response would have massive in rearming but having suffered two serious defeats so early in the war while considering how fiercely as the Japanese fought, it would have made the war far more costly and bloody and longer than it was.




Yes, but it doesnt do that by conquering Midway or the Aleutions, and it doesnt lengthen the war by lengthening its supply lines. 



> At the same time Germany would have been fully aware that the U.S. was suffering off of its West Coast and may not be able to give as much support to Europe as it wanted to.



There is zero basis to make this claim. The germans thought from the start that Japan would pre-occupy the Americans whilst they (the germans) cleaned up in Europe. A victory at midway would simply bring to realization what the Nazis were already relying on as actually happening. No change in strategy for Europe. as it was, Uncle Ernie was already hoarding Landing Craft, shipping and transferring far too many Destroyers to the pacific, in breach of his givernments prior commitments to concentrate on Germany First. 



> Now that might have made Hitler act even more foolish than he did but one simply does not know.




I agree that we cant be sure, but the chances or likleihood of Midway haviing any effect in the ETO are so low as to be discounted

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## Garyt (May 9, 2014)

> Had Midway Islands been captured by the Japanese
> A: The U.S. would have had to retake the Islands,



I'd say the may have to take Midway as part of an island hopping campaign, or depending on their path they could bypass. But they could have picked when to attack, Midway was not really a base and posed no real threat.

As far as carriers go, assuming a 2 carrier loss, the US would still have 1 of the Midway carriers, the Saratoga, Wasp, and Ranger, barring any "borrowed" carriers from the British. The US carriers would have been able to carry 354 planes. This compares to Kido Butai's normal complement of 345 planes, if the Hiryu was taken out.

This is until the Essex arrives around the end of 1942.


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## RpR (May 9, 2014)

parsifal said:


> however, it is highly unlikly that the Japanese could capitalize on this advantage, and in fact further advances by them was about the worst thing they could have done. Their shipping capacities were already stretched past breaking point, and any lengthening of the supply lines is only going to make their logistics even worse, and their defenses even weaker. There was no possibility for the Japanese to further expand, though they wanted to. They were deluding themselves when they thought or spoke of the "2nd Operational Phase". The best they could have done, if they had won at midway, was use the time to rebuild their shattered air groups, rectify the faults in their training regime, fortify their forward positions, and try and improve the construction of shipping. This was not gong to win them the war, but it might have strung things out for a bit. I don't believe this outcome was realistic, but the Japanese as the war moved into its latter phases, consoled them selves by believing that a high rate of attrition might induce the Americans to the peace table. It was a forlorn hope, but a more realistic appraisal, than continuing expansion. ---- You are ignoring what would then have been fact that all that happened after the Battle of Midway would have changed, totally.



The U.S. would not have engaged in a major campaign for months at a minimum and probably closer to a year.
The Japanese would not have had the pressure on them they did when they failed at Midway so all ideas based on how the Japanese were stretched would have been totally different as they would have had the tactical advantage across the Pacific.

The war in China-Burma would have gone differently as Japan rather than licking its wounds would have still been in full attack mode.

The Aleutians are hundreds of miles closer to the Midway Atoll than they are to Japan 1,700 miles verses 2,000.
It was 2,600 miles from Midway to Japan
In a war that is a huge difference in time in transit and supplies could have easily gone to Alaska first then to Midway or the other way around.
Either way it formed a triangle and the U.S. would have had to find out how to recon and defend much less attack another front that did not exist when Midway did not fall. 

While Japan would have eventually faced a greater variety of aircraft developed just for the Pacific, so would the U.S. have been facing a larger variety of aircraft developed to defend Japan's interest.

The U.S. was able to send and keep battleships and lessor carriers in the Atlantic because they were not needed else where, with the loss of Midway, and several carriers, that would have changed drastically.
Germany was no threat to U.S. territory but Japan was.
As it was Japan did not leave Alaska till mid-1943, with its tactical advantage they would have stayed longer and U.S. citizens would have been worried in the Northern West Coast and real unhappy that the Japanese were still on U.S. territory.
My father, who did not go because of his very high blood pressure, doctors said he might live to be seventy, said people at home were more than a little annoyed at their miseries brought on by the war by 1944.
Do not ever forget the political issues at play during the war. Not every one loved Roosevelt as much as historians want to to say they did.

In the actual time scale, the U.S. government had a populace that was tired of spending money on the war.
Had they lost at Midway, the cost would have been far higher and I doubt Roosevelt would have been reelected the last time, as it was under his fourth term that the U.S. was desperate enough to send the boys who raised the flag on Okinawa out to raise funds from an increasingly impatient populace.
Had Midway fallen they would not have been that close at the time of his fourth campaign, assuming he was still president.


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## RpR (May 9, 2014)

Garyt said:


> I'd say the may have to take Midway as part of an island hopping campaign, or depending on their path they could bypass. But they could have picked when to attack, Midway was not really a base and posed no real threat.


As Midway was an airbase that could send aircraft out to attack, how would the U.S. have gone around.
That would have forced U.S. forces into areas totally predictable.
Midway is 1,500 miles from Hawaii, so you are saying that the U.S. could simply ignore the extra 1,500 miles any resupply ship would have had to avoid or transverse to supply the Navy ships.

Even without losing Midway the U.S. did not simply ignore the Japanese in the Aleutians so to say they would simply ignore Japanese on Midway is unrealistic.
Your rhetoric is based on the attitudes and realities of what actually happened.
Had Midway fallen that is completely inapplicable.


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## Garyt (May 9, 2014)

> The war in China-Burma would have gone differently as Japan rather than licking its wounds would have still been in full attack mode.



This could be possible, I am not familiar enough with this theatre of the war to come to an educated conclusion though. The other question would be the Japanese may still be in "attack mode" , but does this make a Japanese victory in this theatre any more feasible?



> While Japan would have eventually faced a greater variety of aircraft developed just for the Pacific, so would the U.S. have been facing a larger variety of aircraft developed to defend Japan's interest.



I'm assuming you are saying with a larger defensive perimeter, Japanese industry would have a better chance of producing quality aircraft and pilots in the numbers needed? Perhaps because the B-29's will have a tougher time of reaching the Japanese mainland?

I do not think so. The Japanese were facing an oil/fuel crisis from the beginning of the war. The US submarine program decimated Japanese shipping and caused that shortage to be much worse. The sub program also severely impacted the Japanese production efforts in many other ways as well.

NOthing you mention curtails the US sub program. Perhaps if the Japanese quickly developed a western style convoy system, had more destroyers and destroyers dedicated to fighting US subs, dedicated some escort type carriers to convoy escort, and improved their anti-sub capabilities (such as hedgehop type depth charge launchers, accoustic homing torpedoes that can be air or surface launched for a start), they might have been able to stave off the economic losses from the Allied subs.

But this is a far different issue than just winning at Midway.


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## Garyt (May 9, 2014)

> As Midway was an airbase that could send aircraft out to attack, how would the U.S. have gone around.



Pretty simple. Use a more southern approach as proposed by Hector Bywater in his book about the 1925 Pacific War. The US "Orange Plan" of 1934 was a more Northernly route, as this is ptretty well what was used.



> As it was Japan did not leave Alaska till mid-1943, with its tactical advantage they would have stayed longer and U.S. citizens would have been worried in the Northern West Coast and real unhappy that the Japanese were still on U.S. territory.
> My father, who did not go because of his very high blood pressure, doctors said he might live to be seventy, said people at home were more than a little annoyed at their miseries brought on by the war by 1944.
> Do not ever forget the political issues at play during the war. Not every one loved Roosevelt as much as historian to to say they did.
> 
> ...



Sounds like you are looking at the US suing for peace because they were unhappy with the war, much as the Japanese had hoped. I don't think this would be the case - the attack on Pearl Harbor I think served to focus the US on winning a longer war. If this were to happen, it would have made the US far more less resolute than Germany, Russia, England or Japan, all nations who were bombed by the opposition and had a lot higher casualties per citizen than the US.

This would be make the US even less resolute than the Italians in regards to winning WW2 

At least the Italians were bombed, had foreign invaders on their soil and were part of a war effort that seemed to be destined to failure before they "quit".


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## RpR (May 9, 2014)

Garyt said:


> Pretty simple. Use a more southern approach as proposed by Hector Bywater in his book about the 1925 Pacific War. The US "Orange Plan" of 1934 was a more Northernly route, as this is pretty well what was used. ---- Go South and go through the Marshall Islands which were already lost?
> 
> "The Japanese forces occupied the Gilbert Islands 3 days after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. As a provided token defense of Tarawa, they built a seaplane base on Makin and dispersed troops along the coastlines of the atolls to monitor the Allied forces movement in the South Pacific.[1] Following Carlson's Raiders diversionary Makin Island raid of August 1942, the Japanese command was made aware of the vulnerability and strategic significance of the Gilbert Islands.[2] The largest and most strategically important islands of the Gilberts was Tarawa. Fortifications were quickly built up by the Japanese starting in March 1943 with nearly 5,000 troops stationed abroad. An additional 3,000 Special Naval Landing Force and base force troops and 940 naval construction units were supplemented by 1,247 laborers."
> 
> ...


``


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## cherry blossom (May 9, 2014)

I don't know if I am repeating points that have already been made earlier, but it seems to me that a different result of the Battle of Midway would produce a significantly different WW2 which would still end in a Japanese surrender around 15th August 1945.

The first point is that a Japanese naval victory would prevent a Guadalcanal invasion during 1942 and also probably prevent an Australian counter attack in New Guinea until well into 1943. Unfortunately, we need to have the results of the Japanese attempt to take Midway in order to predict further.

If we assume that the landing fails, then we may assume that the Japanese become reluctant to launch further landings of their own. Then both sides spend the second half of 1942 building fortifications. Eventually, the USN launches its attacks on the Gilberts and Marshalls more or less on schedule. The fighting is significantly more violent because the IJN has not lost most of their trained aircrews. The American radar is better than off Guadalcanal and the IJN may not know the implications of radar at night which they had learnt from bitter experience by late 1943. However, the USN may not have discovered the range and speed of IJN torpedoes. America still wins in the Marshalls and goes on from there to win more or less as in our history. 

There seem to be a few interesting changes. Firstly, we might expect the Democrats to do worse in the November 1942 elections. Secondly, MacArthur will have great difficulty explaining how he is winning the war when his front is likely to remain static. His skills in managing the press will really need to be exceptional to avoid being forgotten. It is quite possible that the USN will go for Okinawa before the Philippines. Thus we may have a different Last Shogun (who?) and perhaps different policies. Thirdly, Japanese submarines may remain in the Indian Ocean in late 1942. They may even sink the Shermans used by Montgomery to win at El-Alamein. Again nothing really changes, except that Montgomery is less prominent and perhaps Britain has fewer illusions of its role in winning WW2.

The situation if the Japanese take Midway could be rather different because Japan could launch further attacks. They would wear themselves out faster than in the above version but probably no faster than they did at Guadalcanal. However, it does open up the question of whether some of the forces used for Torch would be sent to the Pacific to stop their attempt to cut the supply line to Australia. However, the naval forces for Torch were overwhelming and the land forces limited by transport rather than availability.

There is an intermediate best case for Japan where they just take Midway with the loss of almost all their soldiers. Then perhaps the Army say no more invasions and both IJA and IJN are really convinced that islands can be turned into fortresses. One advantage for Japan is that most submarines operating against Japan took on fuel at Midway, so the submarine campaign is slightly slowed until Midway is recaptured.


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## drgondog (May 9, 2014)

BobR said:


> You seem to be ignoring the other factors that would have changed.
> 
> Had Midway Islands been captured by the Japanese A: The U.S. would have had to retake the Islands, B: The Aleutian campaign would not have petered out as the Japanese then would have had a base from which it could have assisted the Aleutians Campaign for rearming while being able to fly reconnaissance missions of what the U.S. fleet was doing from Midway Island.
> 
> ...



Germany was fully committed to the death struggle he was engaged in with USSR and had no resources to spare. The Brits already had Rommel on the run - delaying our introduction was not strategically critical. Our involvement was primarily to prevent Rommel from extracting from Africa and start 'blooding our troops as a necessary first step before invasion of Europe". The 8th AF at that time was a figment of his Intelligence arm and he was contemptuous of our ability to fight anyway...Had the Atlantic fleet been shifted in part to re-take Midway it would have addressed very carefully because of the U-Boat threat to UK. 

In addition, Roosevelt's likely reaction would have been to tell Marshall and King to 'handle it' - there would be no change to the Atlantic fleet priority to protect the convoys to Russia and UK. What might have changed would be a slowdown of assets to USSR until Hawaii was 100% secure.

Japan was mired in China with no 'victory' in sight other than occupation of the coastal cities, they had just taken the Philippines', were headed towards India and Australia - but had nowhere near the assets or population to support consolidation and protection of their conquests. As Yamamoto said "I can run wild for six months, but we have to force US to sue for peace or we will be overwhelmed". Even defeating the US Carrier fleet at Midway would not have given him the space he needed to consolidate gains in a war of attrition.

Last point - we weren't really awed by the Japanese willingness to fight and die and claw and scratch for every foot - because that knowledge just became somewhat visible during the bloody battle at Guadalcanal starting several months later. Java and the Philippines' were just anecdotal to the US leaders as we were fighting remotely without much awareness of the force structures involved...


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## Garyt (May 9, 2014)

> Go South and go through the Marshall Islands which were already lost?



The island hopping campaign is designed to find the best route through Japanese held territory to facilitate their defeat. Perhaps if Midway was held by the Japanese a southerly route would make more sense - perhaps not, I am not 100% sure of the logistics involved. Look at the following link for the southern route

http://www.clashofarms.com/files/Bywater's_War_(Historicon_2012).pdf

Apparently this was a route under consideration as well in the 1940's. It bypasses the Gilberts and the Marshalls, at least initially, and calls for an earlier assault upon Truk. The US would have needed at least a few of the Essex class available to start on this route, so I wouldn't have expected something like this to be undertaken until mid-late '43, unless something significant happened in the meantime regarding a balance of strength.




> The U.S. would still have won but it would cost far more in time, money, and lives.



I fully agree with what you are stating here. If the US took the course starting thru Midway it would have required more time. Barring any other engagements in the meantime, I think the US would have waited until they at least had 3 Essex class carriers available. With the carriers I mentioned above this would have been a strike force of 600+ planes, better than a 1.5 to ratio over what remained of Kido Butai.


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## parsifal (May 10, 2014)

BobR said:


> > The U.S. would not have engaged in a major campaign for months at a minimum and probably closer to a year.
> > The Japanese would not have had the pressure on them they did when they failed at Midway so all ideas based on how the Japanese were stretched would have been totally different as they would have had the tactical advantage across the Pacific.
> 
> 
> ...

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## RpR (May 10, 2014)

parsifal said:


> BobR said:
> 
> 
> > There is no evidence to support that claim at all. There is some evidence in reverse actually. At the end of guadacanal, there were no operational US carriers , except for the escort carriers, in the SW Pac. The Japanese still had 3, possibly 5. They had aircraft sufficient to put two to sea. made absolutly no difference tyo either the campigns in New Guinea, or in the Solomons.
> ...


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## parsifal (May 10, 2014)

> A: there is not evidence for ANYTHING about what would have happened had Midway fallen.
> This is ALL one hundred percent conjecture!



i agree that there is no evidence, but there are probabilities and possibilities and there there is downright fantasy. Midway would have no effect on what happened in the south pacific, much less burma or China. Youve assumed that Midway has this mystical ofensive capability that it simply does not, and would not, possess if captured by the japanese.The Japanese had no plans to give it ofensive capability,. moreover, Midway whilst in US hands gave no great advantage to the US.

Sure, if midway was in Japanese hands, they would derive some recon advantages that hgave them advanced warning of USN fleet movements, but if anything, this would mean US ships would spend more time away from Hawaii rather than more. 

Moreovcer, having a few extra carriers for Japan makes little or no difference to their capacity to exploit anything in the south pacific.

As far as inhibibiting US offensive operations, hardly. Therer were upwards of 500 aircraft staioned in the PI (maybe more) immediately after Midway, and two reinforced Army Divisions. There were about another 500 in the South pacific, and at least 3 division already, supporting the Australians. There was a marine Division in New Zealand, getting ready for Watchtower. There were already 11 Australian Divisions in Australia, and more than 1000 aircraft. How much difference would two carriers and 150 a/c make to that overall situation. none. 




> B: You are using what happened two months AFTER the attack on Midway was repulsed for what MIGHT have happened if Japan had taken Midway.
> That is more than just a bit illogical.




no. incorrect. im using the situation where the USA found itself without carriers, but still able to launch offensive moves or maintain offensive move, without the need for carriers. 

After Midway, the US used two carriers , Saratoga and Enterprise. They still retained two carriers in the PI for just the reasons you are mentioning, one carrier was in refit. 

At eastern Solomons, the US thre 3 carriers into battle, which left considerable carier strength uncommitted. at Santa Cruz they still had three carriers, only a minority of these carriers were Midway veterans. 

If they had had one less carriers, they could still undertake these operations without too much difficulty. if they lose two additional carriers, it slows them down, they would need to build bases at Ndeni and Sabta Cruz firstm but stil do-able. The Japanese still are not in a position to do much in response. and the Japanese o



> Had the scenarios given here happened the U.S. could not have launched the Guadalcanal campaign or any you mentioned with the Japanese sitting on Midway and able to use the refueling station there for their submarine


s.


The Americans were not responsible for any offensives pother than Guadacanal, until the end of 1942. there is no evidence they would abandon totally Watchtower, or some permutation of watchtower with the a loss at midway, though it does depend on how bad the loss is. As to whether the Japanese would develop Midway for submarines, they had no pplans for such development, and, unlike the US sub forces, no need.Japanese submirineds were based at truk or Kure, and had the range to reach any point in the pacific from their, as well as any part of the Indian Ocean as well. They had huge range advantages over US submarines, one of the feww advantages that they did enjoy. 




> Hmmm, you are again using what happened after Midway WAS NOT TAKEN by the Japanese as proof of what would or would not have happened had MIDWAY FALLEN to the Japanese.
> 
> IF MIDWAY HAD FALLEN, ALL THAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED AFTER THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY* MEANS NOTHING!*



Midway simply has no conceivable effect on the way the Japanese Army, the Australian Armed forces, the Chinese armed forces or the Indian Army will react. It has no conceivable effect on shippinhg availability other than to open up another drain for the japanese.

Sure i am extrapolating, because the occupation never happened, but Im basing what I say on logical extrapolation, not on rather unlikley developments from the battle.


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## drgondog (May 10, 2014)

BobR said:


> parsifal said:
> 
> 
> > Good grief, that makes no sense.
> ...


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## parsifal (May 10, 2014)

Time for me to vacate the drivers seat on this for a while, but, in answer to your rhetorical question, Midway did offer one or two minor advnatages to the Japanese, but the real draw was that it was hoped the USN would come out and fight for it. The Japanese were hoping for total annhilation of the pacific fleet, not just its carriers. if, by some miracle that happened, then the allies were in trouble. but that was never going to happen. Its plausible that the IJN might have won a tactical victory but this does not materiely affect the rest of the TO in any way like is being suggested. The Japanese were being stretched on the wrack irrespective of what was happening in the Central Pacific. Trying to argue that one or two carriers one way of the other is like saying that Carriers in the ETO would have destroyed the LW, or similar. its just not going to happen


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## Garyt (May 10, 2014)

> Midway did offer one or two minor advnatages to the Japanese, but the real draw was that it was hoped the USN would come out and fight for it. The Japanese were hoping for total annhilation of the pacific fleet, not just its carriers



Yeah, Midway was merely bait for that "decisive battle" the Japanese were looking for. It's clear the way the fleet was deployed that this was to be the case, the Yamato, Nagato and Mutsu, the 3 most capable IJN battleships at that time coming up after the landing force, because they were expecting the battle with the US fleet to start after that time. A little to complicated of a plan but the real problem was the code was cracked and the US carriers ambushed the Japanese carrier strike force.

But thinking about it, the only way the IJN might have had success in the Pacific war IMO would have been to have such a decisive engagement, and to win it in a decisive fashion.

And I'm not talking about merely the carrier vs. carrier part, but a decisive engagement with opposing surface fleets. I think the US at the Battle of Midway, were it to be a surface fleet actions would have had 4-5 older battleships available, the newer 4 BB's of the North Carolina and South Dakota classes not ready until later in 1942.

Perhaps if the Japanese would have been able to force a surface engagement per their plans (this would require their code not being broken), I'd think they would have been able to do very well, particularily with the 3 Heavier Battleships present at this engagement. The Japanese torps would have fared a lot better than the US ones as well.

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## Garyt (May 10, 2014)

duplicate post


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## Garyt (May 10, 2014)

> Postulate for the masses just how you, the strategic arm of IJN, would cause any disruption to US initiatives by taking Midway?



I'd think there would be a few minor advantages. Another station for sub re-fueling, replentishment, a more forward base for seaplane re fueling, perhaps the ability to keep a better eye on the American fleet. Not suggesting a frequent flyover of Pearl, but an airbase closer to Pearl that would be more of a warning for Central Pacific operations.

IF there was a substantial air presence on Midway, and IF they were able to keep supplied, this could also be a base that could exert a presence again in the mid Pacific. Though I think it would fall easier than Tarawa. Japanese best bet would be if they could arrive at an attempted US invasion of Midway prior to the US fleet getting there. This way there could be some co-ordination between the land based air and the Japanese carriers, tho these type of attacks did not always co-ordinate the best anyway.


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## drgondog (May 10, 2014)

GaryT - look at Wake Island as closest possible point to provide air transport with small payload to Midway and ask yourself if that is even possible. Next look at how many assets IJN must dedicate to TRY to prevent an assault on Wake Is when staged from Pearl Harbor. Then ask yourself how to build a port at Wake to stage cargo, and build assets on Wake to service the airfield to build up an airpower presence - then reflect on the mission you would expect for Midway presence?

Interdiction to supply chain to Australia? with what type aircraft? Submarine base? Impossible to get subs inside the atoll - impossible to re-supply them and really impossible to defend Wake from US... so, why bother other than use an attack to draw out US Fleet for Midway Battle on June 2?

Take a look at the shallow water/atoll surrounding Midway and ask yourself a.) how you would build up Wake and b.) why?

As to 'co-ordinate' a defense of Midway with IJN air/fleet resources.. How, unless you place on station a substantial portion of the IJN fleet in Midway waters which could react within two days of intelligence warning from submarine or very long range recon from Midway? What could be better for US submarines roaming from Pearl harbor to set up only 1200 miles away rather than travelling to Java, Philippines and Japan to look for targets?


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## VBF-13 (May 10, 2014)

drgondog said:


> Postulate for the masses just how you, the strategic arm of IJN, would cause any disruption to US initiatives by taking Midway?


What about going right from there to Pearl? They had the horses for it.


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## syscom3 (May 10, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> What about going right from there to Pearl? They had the horses for it.



So by sending Betty's on 2600 mile (round trip) missions into the waiting arms of Wildcats, P40s, and Lightnings is going to end good for the IJN aircrews?


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## RpR (May 11, 2014)

drgondog said:


> Take a look at the shallow water/atoll surrounding Midway and ask yourself a.) how you would build up Wake and b.) why?


Here is some fecal debris from 
*
'The Navy Department Library' *
*
Midway*

In the initial plans for Midway, it was proposed to develop it as a base for one patrol squadron of seaplanes. *Subsequently, it became a major submarine base, a major air station for both land- and seaplanes, and a fueling and repair base for ships.*

Midway is a coral atoll situated in almost the exact center of the North Pacific Ocean. Hemmed in by jutting coral reefs enclosing about 28 square miles of shallow lagoon, the two islands of Sand and Eastern, collectively known as Midway, lie 300 miles north and 900 miles west of Honolulu. Sand Island, the larger, measures about a mile and a half long by a mile wide, and was originally capped by a hill rising 42 feet above sea level. Eastern Island, triangular in shape and flat, measured a mile and a quarter long by three quarters of a mile wide.

In 1938, Navy funds to the extent of $1,100,000 were made available to the Army for harbor and channel improvements. The Army was to dredge a channel through the southern reef between Sand and Eastern Islands, scoop out a seaplane basin, and dredge a channel 30 feet deep and 300 feet wide to a proposed submarine basin and an anchorage for small ships. A turning basin was to be provided adjacent to the submarine basin, northeast of Sand Island, and a breakwater was to be built. The Army completed this work in 1940.

I am sure you know better though.


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## VBF-13 (May 11, 2014)

syscom3 said:


> So by sending Betty's on 2600 mile (round trip) missions into the waiting arms of Wildcats, P40s, and Lightnings is going to end good for the IJN aircrews?


Midway was a cinch. They were already having their mail forwarded to there. And look at the battleships they brought to the dance in the main force, which wasn't even the striking force. They weren't contemplating just awaiting a carrier battle, not when they brought everything they had in the barn. They were planning on their two other big carriers, too, but for the fact of one of them having been badly hit, and the other one having lost its air group. They were bringing in their two best air groups, the cream of their crop, to this dance. At Coral Sea, they stood off the best we had to a draw, with only a mediocre air group. I know what the historians say, but in the aftermath, they leave a big, gaping hole. If the Japanese were planning on going for Pearl, they had the battleships in the main force to do it, but they needed Midway off their back. I'm saying, fill in that big, gaping hole with, Pearl was still the jugular, and they brought too much to Midway, way too much, for just a carrier dance. That's why that main force turned back, too, it was useless after the striking force was finished off.


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 11, 2014)

I consider my propensity to engage in "_what if _" scenarios, to be a deep personal flaw, yet I also find them irresistible. 
IMHO, this thread's devolution into _ wild blue-sky speculation_ is a perfect example of its pitfalls and allure. 

Any scenario projection that doesn't take into account real logistics capability and intelligence is IMO fundamentally based on fantasy. Order of battle robustness is almost the least important aspect of warfare (clearly an overstatement so don't jump all over me!  ) Because the US possessed superior intel on IJN intentions and force dispositions, it could concentrate the forces it had on hand to greatest effect. The quality of air crew and aircraft notwithstanding, the forces arrayed by either side were about equal (four CV air wings vs four CV air wings), except for three elements that provided tangible and potential edges to the US in the event of a less than acceptable outcome and an IJN attempt to land on Midway. Those were, the PBY's to provide long-range search (and limited night attack), B-17s from Oahu to provide long range strike on surface targets, and of course the concentration of submarines in the Midway area. Also influencing post-Midway decisions of both sides is the overlay of national military attitudes which include a fatal mutual contempt/conceit for each opponent's abilities. (e.g. the USN's largely racist attitudes and belief in the inferiority of the IJN equipment and personal and an analogous IJ cultural belief in the inherent inferiority of western fighting ability and spirit.)

Given that, by Nimitz personal guidance, an even-exchange of Carriers was not an acceptable outcome, a two-to-one CV exchange would *NOT* have been a tactical defeat, it would likely have been considered a catastrophe. Forget the possible loss of Midway, that was almost beside the point. Minimum standard of victory was at least an exchange of one for two CVs.

To quote Nimitz: "_In carrying out the task assigned....you will be governed by the principle of calculated risk, which you will interpret to mean the avoidance of exposure of your force to attack by superior enemy forces *without prospect of inflicting, as a result of such exposure, greater damage to the enemy*_"

So, there seems to be multiple possible alternate outcomes of the battle that might be in play here: 

1. What is the scenario for a tactical defeat which would be defined by an exchange of one for one.
2. What is the scenario for a tactical catastrophic defeat which would be defined by an exchange of two for one, or worse and currently being discussed. 
3. The consequences of the loss of Midway itself and also currently being discussed.

In the discussion, does the USN lose the services of the air wing personnel from the lost carrier? Considering how often the USN airman from lost CVs were redeployed to operate from land bases in SoPac and that Midway was 'unsinkable', it is likely there would be refugees based there making it that much more difficult a nut to crack. Midway was in fact a temporary refuge for a fair number of Hornet SBDs.

Actually the outcome of the Midway battle did lose the USN the immediate use of two CVs. _Hornet _performed so badly at Midway it was apparently deemed to be in need of training and so would not be available for the next operation: _Watchtower_. 

Seems to me, that both sides regarded Midway as relatively secondary importance compared to destruction of its opponent's fleet units. Why? Because both sides recognized the point on which the Pacific war turned was the isolation of Australia. The USN CVs were the forces that could disrupt IJN progress to that end and IJN CVs a primary implement for successfully securing that objective. if you reduce the USN by 2 CVs which will be replaced by Sara, Wasp and possibly Ranger, Post Midway, Watchtower HAS to proceed because its delay threatens at least the longevity of the war. It was all about logistics.

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## parsifal (May 11, 2014)

The Japanese were very undecided as to what they needed to do. This is discussed at some length in Shattered Sword. The options did include a direct invasion of Hawaii, but that along with other plans at various times after 1941 were all rejected. The Japanese between January 1942 and the end of March 1942 proposed a withering number of different options, none of them realistic and all of them quite beyond the real capabilities of japan. The options seriously considered by the Japanese included

1) Yammamoto favoured a direct assault on Oahu, and he and his staff had been strongly in favour of that option since before the war. but they could not get the support of the senior naval staff, and more importantly the Army simply ruled it out as untenable. For once the Army were more realistic in determining that that shipping would not be sufficient to take and hold the islands. They grossly under-estimated the troop numbers needed to take the islands....45000 men, when the defenders numbered 70000 in combat troops alone.

1) A direct invasion of Australia - vetoed by the Army as being too costly in manpower and excessive in the demands of shipping. Combined fleet was moderately opposed to the concept, 

2) A reduced option to take the northern part of Australia received lukewarm support from the Army, some support by the Combined fleet, but was shot down by the Japanese Admiralty. I forget the exact reasoning, but I think it was to do with the basic untenable nature of a "half conquest" 

3) The South Pacific option, whereby Japan moved to capture islands as far away as fiji and Samoa, to isolate Australia, was supported the Admiralty and the Army, but rejected by Combined fleet, because it would be unlikely to draw the USN out for the all important "decisive battle". The Army and the Admiralty acquiesced to this, though it was not really fully abandoned until the latter part of Guadacanal.

4) An attack into India as that also took in the capture of Madagascar, to link up with the Germans and Italians. The army was half persuaded by the lure of a revolt in India being the main source of manpower. It was war-gamed in April 1942, with bad outcomes. on this occasion the results were accepted by both the Army and Navy staffs. An invasion of India was never shelved though, and in fact was the centre piece of the Army's 1944 campaign under Mutaguchi. A significant naval involvement was again finally still born by Yammamotos opposition. He felt (correctly in my view) that a distraction to the Indian Ocean for the Navy would give the American opportunity to recover and counterattack

5) Relinquish the initiative and go over the defensive, return some air groups to the training schools, and see the decisive battle as the Americans began their counteroffensive, expected in 1944-5in the marshalls and or the Marianas. Nagano strongly favoured this approach and almost had the argument in the bag. Yammaoto strongly opposed such "defeatist" attitude, and worked tirelessly to discredit it. Nagano and Yammamoto hated each other, so more than a little, the debate was personal and bitter. This option almost won the day however, except that in April the USN delivered the Doolittle raid, which sent the Japanese high command loopy over concerns for the emperors personal safety. 

6) For the above reason (the Doolittle raid), Yammamoto was able to establish that the Nagano plan was dangerous to the emperor, and given all the other possibilities had been rejected or deferred for one reason or another came up with the Midway plan (actually the planning was already well under way by the April raid) . there were two permutations considered initially, the capture of the island of Palmyra and secondly the capture of Midway. midway was chosen because there were more facilities alreary built on the island, and this would place the security of Oahu at risk as it would allow almost imediate surveillance to begin. 

Midway was never viewed with a great deal of enthusiasm by anybody, even Yammamoto, but it was a pplan forward, and it compromised for all the people and players involved. as a plan it was a half meassure and a compromise, and likle all such compromises, unlikley to succeed in any of its objectives.

Shattered Sword, in its appraisal of the Midway victory, reluctantly dabbles briefly in the possibilities and implications arising from an alternate history. It rules out the possibility of an assault on Oahu as never a serious proposition for the Japanese, rules out an allied invasion of Gudacanal (but in reaching that conclusion fails to take into account the RAAF and Australian Army at all, and assumes the loss of all three USA carriers on that "what if". It discount the ability of a Japanese victory, of any magnitude at midway as having any significant long term effects on the outcome of the war, though it does acknowledge the possibility of the war extending into 1946. it also discounts the old chestnut of the significant impact on Japanese aircrew, but does point out that the replacement hulls for the IJN were never quite the equals in terms of quality as those in CarDiv 1 and 2, lost at Midway. Points out the loss of "corporate knowledge" with an estimated 40% of the skilled mechanics and technical staff associated with Japanese Carrier Aviation lost in a single stroke.

Midway was not the "battle that saved America". It did not "save Hawaii". It did not "save Australia". Iy had no effect on the ETO, or any of the other super powers that people are attempting to ascribe to it. It defeated a major effort of the Japanese, and showed to the world, that the Japanese were not invincible, and this was going to be a long war, which the US was certain to win. It exposed glaring weknesses in the Japanese air arm, and thje fracture lines in the Japanese high command. Avoiding a total, one sided defeat allowed the USN to consider an early rather than later attack elsewhere.

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## VBF-13 (May 11, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Any scenario projection that doesn't take into account real logistics capability and intelligence is IMO fundamentally based on fantasy.


While the intelligence suggested the Japanese were going for Midway, Emmons, who, like many others, understood little of Rochefort's work, knew the Japanese had the capability to go for Hawaii. His bombers go under CINCPAC control, in effect, leaving him with nothing at Hawaii, he, not Nimitz, takes the blast from the War Department for that. Midway was intelligence winning out over capability.


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## parsifal (May 11, 2014)

> So, there seems to be multiple possible alternate outcomes of the battle that might be in play here:
> 
> 1. What is the scenario for a tactical defeat which would be defined by an exchange of one for one.
> 2. What is the scenario for a tactical catastrophic defeat which would be defined by an exchange of two for one, or worse and currently being discussed.
> 3. The consequences of the loss of Midway itself and also currently being discussed.




This, in its obvious simplicity, is an elegant and succint way of defining the propblem.

In relation to your point 1, I assume you are saying a 1 for 1 exchange rate is an American tactical defeat. If ther was an Ozawa, rather than a Nagumo in charge, it is conceivable that Akagi might have avoided the initial carnage. With two carriers surviving to opening rounds, the Japanese counterattack may well have caused the loss or incapacitation of two US carriers, and from there a withdrawal by the USN rather than a further exposure to more attacks. Its all conjecture of course, but the nature of the Japanese air airm is that it would derive more from its attacking stance, not that it would minimise losses. a more air minded fleet commander such as Ozawa, may have seen the IJN more aware of its surroundings. Ozawa never was caught short by his searches in the same way as Nagumo was. 

So, the most likley (IMO) tactical scenario is the loss of two carriers for two carriers, or tywo IJN for one USN carrier lost and one damaged, a withdrawal by the USN and then loss of the atoll to the surface attack.

In relation to your point 2, a loss of two US carriers for one IJN carrier is lengthening the odds considerably, but I still see this as a strategic US victory. It depends on the aircrew losses for the Japanese really. Say Enterprise survives, that means, if the assault on Guadacanal is delayed by one month, the makes their landings with Saratoga, Wasp, and the big E. If Torch is delayed by a month, you can add Ranger, Chenango, Suwannee and Santee to the available carriers. In this scenario, the Japanese victory has gained them one months freedom of action (maybe a bit more, or a bit less) , but not a great deal else. again the real issue are what the aircrew losses for the japanese are, not the number of carriers they lose.

There is a permutation of this scenario, and that is that the Japanese discover the USN, destroy it, and lose no carriers and no significant numbers of aircrew. this is THE nightmare scenario, the one likley to lead to major changes in the history timeline. 3 US carriers, plus a lot of surface warships, to say under 100 Japanese aircrew lost. That would have been an earth shattering, history changing result 

in relation to your point 3, Midway offered some real advantages to whover controlled it, but not earth shattering. it was always about the fleets and the losses either side might suffer one way ofr the other in my opinion


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## syscom3 (May 11, 2014)

The Japanese had zero capability of going for Peal Harbor. Their attack in the first place succeeded because they had complete surprise at every level. Not so after Dec 8th 1941. Any attack after that date would be a disaster for them.


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## parsifal (May 11, 2014)

why caveat just pearl harbour? all of the studies undertaken by the Japanese (not the most objective of militarys staffs I might add) showed serious problems for all the further exapansions they were considering.

Some have argued that the Japanese might have embarked on some form of blockade against the Hawaii supply lines. There were an average of 70 shiiping movements per month between the west coast and Hawaii . a tempting target, but how vulnerable in reality were these supply lines. At the beginning of the war the Japanese had attempted attempted a Ub-boat camapign off the coast of California with conspicuous lack of success. About 40000 tons was sunk, with a number of submarines lost. Despite several months of effort, this poor excahange rate neer really improved. only after the Japanese moved to other hunting grounds were they able to get a decent return for the sub forces.

They could have intercepted convoys with their carriers, reducing Pearl to a sort of "Malta in the Pacific". i think this might have yielded some temporary good results, but this was no war winning strategy, and certainly did not justify capture of Midway of itself, since the US would be doing exactly the same to the japanese re-supply efforts to Midway. 

In retrospect, ,Nagano was absolutley right. The Japanese had achieved their territotial objectives, and now had to rest, fortify and prepare as best they could for the inevitabloe American riposte. I see great opportunities for some significant delaying actionsby the Japanese. Say, the Americans atttack Tarawa, with 6 or 7 flatops in support as they did, in late 1943. They are met by 6 japanese carriers, plus the 500 or so aircraft based in the Marshalls. Difference is, in the training of the Japanese aircrew. These guys are better trained and better supplied than historical. It becomes a very nasty situation very quickly without thinking too much about it....


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## BiffF15 (May 11, 2014)

Parsifal,

Thanks for delving so deep in the Pacific war for us (or me). My question is who recognized, and when, that the Allies were getting the upper hand? It seems so easy in retrospect looking back through the lens of history that it should have been obvious, however that could just be projection on my part.

Cheers,
Biff


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## kettbo (May 11, 2014)

some very interesting and thoughtful comments here


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## parsifal (May 11, 2014)

BiffF15 said:


> Parsifal,
> 
> Thanks for delving so deep in the Pacific war for us (or me). My question is who recognized, and when, that the Allies were getting the upper hand? It seems so easy in retrospect looking back through the lens of history that it should have been obvious, however that could just be projection on my part.
> 
> ...



Japanese showed a remarkable ability not to face the truth until well into the war. having said that, there are enormous exceptions here and there, as various individuals came to grips with the enormity of the challenge facing Japan.

Im not sure who exactly first realized what was happening, but a good start is Yammamoto himself. he was against war with the US from before the war. once at war, he dived in at the deep end, and was a passionate beliver in taking the fight right up to the Americans.

Others in the Japanese Admiralty were also aware of the fragility of the Japanese position. At the top of the list for me was admiral Nagano, Yammamotos arch rival. After the initial offensive, he was against further expansion. not a defeatist as claimed by Yammamoto. He simply was probably more aware of japanese limitations than most of his colleagues. He advocated a dfensive posture after May 1942. I think the capture of Port Moresby was a necaessary further step, but after that, Japan was well advised to pull up and consolidate gains.

It was not until after Phil Sea that the majority of the Japanese leadership began to accept they were facing defeat. It led to the resignation of Tojo, and from that point on, increasingly conciliatory Japanese governments seeking a way out of the war. Even then, there were significant elements opposed to any peace deal.


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 12, 2014)

parsifal said:


> This, in its obvious simplicity, is an elegant and succint way of defining the propblem.



Thanks but probably too simplistic (see below).



parsifal said:


> In relation to your point 1, I assume you are saying a 1 for 1 exchange rate is an American tactical defeat.



Yep, that's what I am saying. That's how I interpret Nimitz's guidance statement. 



parsifal said:


> If ther was an Ozawa, rather than a Nagumo in charge, it is conceivable that Akagi might have avoided the initial carnage. With two carriers surviving to opening rounds, the Japanese counterattack may well have caused the loss or incapacitation of two US carriers, and from there a withdrawal by the USN rather than a further exposure to more attacks. Its all conjecture of course, but the nature of the Japanese air airm is that it would derive more from its attacking stance, not that it would minimise losses. a more air minded fleet commander such as Ozawa, may have seen the IJN more aware of its surroundings. Ozawa never was caught short by his searches in the same way as Nagumo was.



Ozawa was clearly a smarter cookie than Nagumo but based on your original compelling case for A/C and air crew replacement issues, I believe even that may not make that much difference. Historically, we have the IJN launching half its available a/c for the raid on Midway. In the face of very strong Escort, the relatively week Island CAP destroys or renders inop about 10% of the attacking A/C (with heaviest losses to Hiryu's VT complement). Let's try to keep to the historic events as much as possible and just work within the decisions made at the time as opposed to random altering of events. 

Let's say that, upon the Tone search plane's sighting of a USN surface force, Nagumo preempts Yamaguichi's later suggestion to launch all the available reserve a/c immediately. According to SS, an immediate launch would constitute a strike comprising no more than about 30VT and 34VB and between 12 to 24 VF as escort. There remained 58 VF from which to draw both CAP and Escort. If you assign 24 of the air group VF to escort, you are left with 11 from the CV Air Group and the 21 A6Ms of the 6th Air Group, intended for basing at Midway. A stronger escort will no doubt mean trouble for the USN at their CVs, but also reduces by about half the actual CAP protecting the IJN CV especially during the early USN CV-Based VT and subsequent USN VB attacks so the the chances for damage to the IJN CVs may increase, while losses among USN VT and VB are probably reduced. A toe-to-toe fight between the USN and IJN CVs is likely to be a bloody affair. I expect it will follow the course of the other three CV battles in '42 with heavy IJN aircrew and aircraft losses, sufficient to reduce their effectiveness even if the USN suffers losses and is forced to retire. Protecting the USN CVs will be a CAP comprised of something like two thirds or more of the 56 VF not used as escort. A pitched battle over the CVs of both navies may actually have been more costly than what occurred historically; especially to IJN aircrews if it follows the course of other CV vs CV battles in '42. I think the big difference in outcome would be the preservation of IJN flight decks for future repair and use. However, from what you have said, the increased loss of experienced aircrew and the difficulty in procuring replacement a/c means the repaired IJN flat tops are actually less effective in stopping the USN's operations in SoPac while Watch tower proceeds on schedule with pretty much the CVs historically used. 



parsifal said:


> So, the most likley (IMO) tactical scenario is the loss of two carriers for two carriers, or tywo IJN for one USN carrier lost and one damaged, a withdrawal by the USN and then loss of the atoll to the surface attack.



I think the most likely scenario is two US CVs lost (sunk) with at least damage to three IJN CVs putting them out of the fight. But numbers of flight decks don't reveal the whole story as you have pointed out. 

We have the example of Enterprise at Santa Cruz to show recovery of ~100 a/c on just one Yorktown class CV was feasible with a nearby airbase for overflow divert. So under what appear to be 'optimal IJN circumstances' we have a potential outcome with an operational loss of at least three IJN CVs (not necessarily sunk but forced to retire) vs probably two USN CVs sunk. In terms of air groups, instead of the historic USN numerical aircrew A/C losses equivalent to two CV Air Groups we have instead a loss of about 2.5 AGs with perhaps half an air group (A probable dozen VB and dozen VF formerly CV a/c emplaced at Midway). Perhaps even more of the remaining USN CV-based AG A/C would be based at Midway when the remaining US CV necessarily retreats to PH. it seems to me that once landing operations were commenced, the B-17's effectiveness improves significantly. While only little more than a dozen B-17s were employed at Midway, there were roughly 50 total that could be staged from Oahu. I believe it would be the first time in the Pacific war that such massed heavy bomber attack were mounted. I just don't see Midway falling to an IJN assault with only one operational CV to provide air support. The addition of Zuiho might help a little but her complement was a bit short on A6Ms. 




parsifal said:


> In relation to your point 2, a loss of two US carriers for one IJN carrier is lengthening the odds considerably, but I still see this as a strategic US victory. It depends on the aircrew losses for the Japanese really. Say Enterprise survives, that means, if the assault on Guadacanal is delayed by one month, the makes their landings with Saratoga, Wasp, and the big E. If Torch is delayed by a month, you can add Ranger, Chenango, Suwannee and Santee to the available carriers. In this scenario, the Japanese victory has gained them one months freedom of action (maybe a bit more, or a bit less) , but not a great deal else. again the real issue are what the aircrew losses for the japanese are, not the number of carriers they lose.



I agree, even in the event of a poorer trade but also believe that making good USN A/C and air crew losses would allow the historic schedule to be retained. Sara arrived at Pearl with replacement air crew and carrying 107 replacement a/c on June 6. June 11 Wasp entered the Pacific. I think your point about aircrew losses being more important than flight decks is spot on. 



parsifal said:


> There is a permutation of this scenario, and that is that the Japanese discover the USN, destroy it, and lose no carriers and no significant numbers of aircrew. this is THE nightmare scenario, the one likley to lead to major changes in the history timeline. 3 US carriers, plus a lot of surface warships, to say under 100 Japanese aircrew lost. That would have been an earth shattering, history changing result



That is indeed a nightmare scenario for the USN. I just have a hard time believing that the navy that sets the trap is likely to be surprised but I suppose its possible.    



parsifal said:


> in relation to your point 3, Midway offered some real advantages to whover controlled it, but not earth shattering. it was always about the fleets and the losses either side might suffer one way ofr the other in my opinion



I think it certainly offered some advantages to the USN. I am not sure the IJN could have enjoyed the same ones. The idea of projecting power from Midway to prevent a USN southern or central Pacific advance seems geographically impossible. The US counterpart to the ribbon defense started due south--west of Hawaii at Johnston Island and continued from there South west to Palmyra Island and on to Fiji. Johnston Island is almost 1,000 miles from Midway. I believe typical IJN air search umbrella radius was 600 miles. Palmyra was almost 2,000 miles from Midway.

_*Late edits*_: 
Removed redundant '_search_' from Tone reference. 
Replaced '_follow_' with '_preempts_' before Yamaguchi
rearranged text so that sentence formerly reading '_...IJN aircrew aircraft and losses..._" now reads: '_...IJN aircrew and aircraft losses..._'
Added date of Sara's arrival at PH.


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 12, 2014)

Oops, meant South *East* to Palmyra


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## gjs238 (May 12, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Actually the outcome of the Midway battle did lose the USN the immediate use of two CVs. _Hornet _performed so badly at Midway it was apparently deemed to be in need of training and so would not be available for the next operation: _Watchtower_.





parsifal said:


> 5) Relinquish the initiative and go over the defensive, return some air groups to the training schools, and see the decisive battle as the Americans began their counteroffensive, expected in 1944-5in the marshalls and or the Marianas. Nagano strongly favoured this approach and almost had the argument in the bag. Yammaoto strongly opposed such "defeatist" attitude, and worked tirelessly to discredit it. Nagano and Yammamoto hated each other, so more than a little, the debate was personal and bitter. This option almost won the day however, except that in April the USN delivered the Doolittle raid, which sent the Japanese high command loopy over concerns for the emperors personal safety.
> 
> 6) For the above reason (the Doolittle raid), Yammamoto was able to establish that the Nagano plan was dangerous to the emperor, and given all the other possibilities had been rejected or deferred for one reason or another came up with the Midway plan (actually the planning was already well under way by the April raid) . there were two permutations considered initially, the capture of the island of Palmyra and secondly the capture of Midway. midway was chosen because there were more facilities alreary built on the island, and this would place the security of Oahu at risk as it would allow almost imediate surveillance to begin.



Yet more ramifications of the Doolittle Raid

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww2-general/doolittle-raid-short-long-term-ramifications-40319.html


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## parsifal (May 12, 2014)

hi oldcrow

most certainly the only way the Japanese can win any sort of meaningful victory is if they could somehow pull off a totally one sided victory over the USN. If they did that, then the offensive potential of the allies, not just the Americans, in the whole PTO is lost with the battle, for a considerable period. If those conditions are achieved, then it also gives time to the Japanese to make good their losses and fortify, and perhaps even undertake to odd minor attack or two.

If the USN lost say three, carriers, say 2 or three cruisers, and say 8 Destroyers, their surviving aviators escaping to Midway only to be captured when the island falls, then everything changes. Everything ive said about the Japanese being unable to achieve victory no longer would hold true, because they would have achieved the impossible.

This was precisely what the Japanese were seeking, but it was a pipe dream, an unobtainable goal, well, at least with the plan they had. 

in my view that is the only circumstance that the Japanese could have achieved a meaningful war changing victory. Even then I dont think the Japanese could avoid defeat, it would just take a lot longer.

But anything else is just not going to cut it for them. And achieving a one sided victory like that is just implausible IMO


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 12, 2014)

parsifal said:


> ...achieving a one sided victory like that is just implausible IMO



Yep, I agree. Midway was an '_incredible victory_' not so much because the allies won, but because it was so ridiculously one sided. I don't think anyone on either side really expected or could have imagined that outcome. 

A similarly lopsided IJN victory was even more *in*credible than that of the USN's.


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## parsifal (May 12, 2014)

> Let's say that, upon the Tone search plane's sighting of a USN surface force, Nagumo preempts Yamaguichi's later suggestion to launch all the available reserve a/c immediately. According to SS, an immediate launch would constitute a strike comprising no more than about 30VT and 34VB and between 12 to 24 VF as escort. There remained 58 VF from which to draw both CAP and Escort. If you assign 24 of the air group VF to escort, you are left with 11 from the CV Air Group and the 21 A6Ms of the 6th Air Group, intended for basing at Midway. A stronger escort will no doubt mean trouble for the USN at their CVs, but also reduces by about half the actual CAP protecting the IJN CV especially during the early USN CV-Based VT and subsequent USN VB attacks so the the chances for damage to the IJN CVs may increase, while losses among USN VT and VB are probably reduced. A toe-to-toe fight between the USN and IJN CVs is likely to be a bloody affair. I expect it will follow the course of the other three CV battles in '42 with heavy IJN aircrew and aircraft losses, sufficient to reduce their effectiveness even if the USN suffers losses and is forced to retire. Protecting the USN CVs will be a CAP comprised of something like two thirds or more of the 56 VF not used as escort. A pitched battle over the CVs of both navies may actually have been more costly than what occurred historically; especially to IJN aircrews if it follows the course of other CV vs CV battles in '42. I think the big difference in outcome would be the preservation of IJN flight decks for future repair and use. However, from what you have said, the increased loss of experienced aircrew and the difficulty in procuring replacement a/c means the repaired IJN flat tops are actually less effective in stopping the USN's operations in SoPac while Watch tower proceeds on schedule with pretty much the CVs historically used.




34VT +30Vt + say 16 VF is a very hefty attack. During Coral Sea the strike that caused the loss of Lex consisted of 23 VB, 16 VT (2 were shot down or failed to locate target) escorted by 14 VF. they were picked up at 80 miles by Lex's radar, and all CAP was promptly scrambled. There were a total of 45 US VFs available of which at least 22 were on or over the carriers for CAP, but only 8 were airborne, and these were reinforced by a further nine F4Fs. in desperation the US threw in 23 SBDs as emergency CAP. There are wildly overestimated claims made on the Japanese losses. The Divebombers came in from 17K, the Kates attacked at deck level. The 8 standing CAP were short of fuel,and for the emergency CAP, only 2 F4Fs got to height in time. However the combination of the Flak and the SBDs were effective in protecting Yorktown. The Japanese, as one might expect, split into two groups, 9 Kates attacked the Yorktown, 6 attacked the Lex (dont know what happened to the last Kate), D3As split their attentions more or less equally.

From that committment of force the Japanese made no torp hits on the Yorktown, 2 hits on the Lex. there were three bomb hits on the lex and 1 hit on the yorktown.

American sources claim over twenty japanaese aircraft shot down in these attacks, but Japanese sources show 12 aircaft lost in these attacks.

We dont know how effective CAP against a n early strike at midway might have been. Certainbly at Santa Cruz and Eastern Sooomons it was deadly, and it was also quite effective at Midway I believe, but it really gets down to the luck of the draw, except if you have really well diciplined fighter controllers, and fighters that are listening and in position. The Coral Sea experience showed that didnt always happen.

At Coral Sea, the USN suffered 6 hits from 24 launches/bomb releases (roughly). Thats about a hit ratio of 25% for CarDiv 5. A similar midway attack would see 64 launches. We dont know how many shoot downs the CAP would achieve, but if in proportion to Coral Sea, might be 15-25 shoot downs. in this Midway scenario, we should assume 20 a/c lost to CAP and Flak, leaving an estimated 44 likely launches or releases. CarDiv 1 and 2 were better trained than CarDiv5 but how much difference that might make im not sure. Enterprise was better trained than any other CAG, but Hornet was a lot less well trained. Id guess CarDiv 1 and 2 to be around 35% hit rate, but thats very open to debate.

On that basis, you would expect the early Japanese strike to achieve 14-20 hits. Thats enough to sink two, possibly three carriers, given the DC effectiveness of 1942. but we dont know a lot of things. The effectiveness of the CAP, and whewther the hits are evenly distributed are the most obvious unknowns. 

.


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## Garyt (May 12, 2014)

> On that basis, you would expect the early Japanese strike to achieve 14-20 hits. Thats enough to sink two, possibly three carriers, given the DC effectiveness of 1942. but we dont know a lot of things. The effectiveness of the CAP, and whewther the hits are evenly distributed are the most obvious unknowns.



Another thing as well - fighting off the Japanese attacks would have made it rather impossible for the US to launch it's own strikes, much like the problem the Japanese faced. After such an attack, the US would be lucky to launch a full carrier load of planes as a strike. And this would be against the top Japanese pilots, who would have had a better chance to interdict this strike effectively. IMO, the US is lucky to take out one Japanese carrier with a retaliatory strike, and that launching US carrier is also then lost.


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 12, 2014)

I believe it's John Keegan in *Price of Admiralty* who reduces CV vs CV warfare and probable outcomes to its elemental parts. IIRC, He asserts with some validity that, Carrier forces need to devote one AG to sink a CV. So with his reasoning two CV AGs should nominally be able to destroy two carriers with chance playing a more or less greater role in achieving better results. At Midway the USN destroyed three CVs with three air groups engaged. In an optimistic IJN favorable scenario there are four IJN CVs able to launch an immediate strike with half their strike A/C. So with this calculus, I expect fleet average to be destruction of two USN CVs. Just for argument's sake. 

As to CAP performance at Midway. The only CAP truly engaged did extremely well and set a standard for the rest of 1942. Roughly a dozen VF-42/3 F4F-4s used in two separate sorties destroyed ~21 IJN a/c (11 VB, 3 VF and 5 VT and 2 VF) out of a total of 28 VB VT protected by 12 VF escort. That's 21 of the 40 A/C in the strike or over 50% losses. (my estimate of 2/3rds below is probably over optimistic from USN standpoint.)

The USN VF squadron pilots were pretty much combat vets with practiced FD control some having been at Coral Sea and others with the Lex during the Bouganville raid. Enterprise was also experienced, not quite so much individually as Yorktown's VF, but operating as a unit for a longer period. 
I'd expect a similar performance from Enterprise VF-6 with probably similar numbers of A/C engaged. Hornet's VF-8 is simply an unknown. It apparently ceased to exist for all practical purposes after Midway. Based on such lousy-goosey or back of the envelope (BOTEC) estimates I'd say the chances were that IJN attackers could lose half to 2/3rds of their initial strike on the USN carriers. But that's totally speculative and losses could perhaps be much less given a stronger and better handled IJN escort component.

I think it's safe to say the battle would be pretty bloody for both sides.

Late edit: Had to go back to *First Team* to revise upward the talley of USN CAP-downed IJN strike a/c.


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 12, 2014)

Garyt said:


> Another thing as well - fighting off the Japanese attacks would have made it rather impossible for the US to launch it's own strikes, much like the problem the Japanese faced. After such an attack, the US would be lucky to launch a full carrier load of planes as a strike. And this would be against the top Japanese pilots, who would have had a better chance to interdict this strike effectively. IMO, the US is lucky to take out one Japanese carrier with a retaliatory strike, and that launching US carrier is also then lost.



Gary, the timing is off for this to be an issue. The IJN strike wouldn't have arrived at the USN units until their decks were long cleared. We are really down to two well prepared navies duking it out in comparable conditions of preparedness with the actual forces available to fight the battle. 

Unless of course the IJN breaks the US codes and knows its headed into a trap and springs its own with a./c arriving overhead between about 7 and 9 AM. But the USN has RADAR which IJN does not at this stage and USN decks can be cleared and conditions made safe.


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## VBF-13 (May 12, 2014)

syscom3 said:


> The Japanese had zero capability of going for Peal Harbor. Their attack in the first place succeeded because they had complete surprise at every level. Not so after Dec 8th 1941. Any attack after that date would be a disaster for them.


Where on Earth did you get that from? Certainly, not from here:

"Carried away by the mounting excitement, it was hard for the insiders at CINCPAC to realize that some people were still dubious about the whole business. On May 16 or 17 Nimitz received a letter from General Emmons saying he appreciated the intelligence, but felt he ought to point something out. The estimates were based on enemy intentions rather than capabilities. It was safer to plan in terms of capabilities, and the Japanese were certainly capable of attacking Hawaii." 
-_Incredible Victory_, Copyright 1967 by Walter Lord



oldcrowcv63 said:


> Yep, I agree. Midway was an '_incredible victory_'...


Now _there's_ a coincidence!


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 12, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> -_Incredible Victory_, Copyright 1967 by Walter Lord Now _there's_ a coincidence!



Nope, no coincidence at all! 

Lord's IV was the first Midway book I read before I joined haze gray and under weigh.

Before that, I had built Monogram models of both the SBD and TBF (Grumman ancestor to the A-6 Intruder). Fell in love with Naval Air from that point on… Civil Air Patrol wants me to wear air force blue… The mere thought gives me hives.

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## Garyt (May 12, 2014)

> Gary, the timing is off for this to be an issue. The IJN strike wouldn't have arrived at the USN units until their decks were long cleared.



True, had the Tone's scout plane been launched on time both strikes (Japanese and US) would be launching at the same time. Yammamoto's orders were to keep a reserve armed for anti-shipping strikes, it seems Yammamoto feared enemy carriers more than Midway land based air, and he was correct in this fear. Nagumo decided to countermand these orders however.

The difference though is that the Japanese carriers may not have been as vulnerable as they were at Midway. They would have just landed the wave that struck Midway. Their former reserve would have been off decks and headed towards the opposing carriers.

Hard to say what would have happened, but I'd think maybe 2 Japanese carriers would have been lost, or possibly 1 depending upon what would be happening on the hangar decks. The Japanese had no radar, but it was having armed and fueled planes on the hangar decks which made them as vulnerable as they were. Look at the Shokaku and Zuikaku at Coral Sea and in the Guadacanal campaign - they were not nearly as vulnerable. The 4 carriers at Midway were all struck at the perfectly wrong time, and for the Akagi the exact wrong place (the Bomb destroyed her water main as well as landing among the armed and arming planes on the hangar deck- this bomb for all intensive purposes sunk her, the only direct it, though a near miss damaged her rudder as well).


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## VBF-13 (May 12, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Nope, no coincidence at all!
> 
> Lord's IV was the first Midway book I read before I joined haze gray and under weigh.
> 
> Before that, I had built Monogram models of both the SBD and TBF (Grumman ancestor to the A-6 Intruder). Fell in love with Naval Air from that point on… Civil Air Patrol wants me to wear air force blue… The mere thought gives me hives.


There we go, now we're cooking!


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## buffnut453 (May 12, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Nope, no coincidence at all!
> 
> Lord's IV was the first Midway book I read before I joined haze gray and under weigh.
> 
> Before that, I had built Monogram models of both the SBD and TBF (Grumman ancestor to the A-6 Intruder). Fell in love with Naval Air from that point on… Civil Air Patrol wants me to wear air force blue… The mere thought gives me hives.



Funny 'cos the mere thought of Navy blue makes me break out in hives.


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 12, 2014)

It seems like we seldom consider the opposite side of the issue. The IJN carriers might very well have have been in the process of arming and refueling the morning strike aircraft when hit by the USN attack with likely similar results. 

The air battle over the IJN CVs was also bloody with 14 of the 41 IJN VF Cap lost just during the USN CV-Based attack. One or more VF had been lost earlier countering the attack by the Island's Marines and composite VT unit. 

Considering the size of the strike group sent against Kido Butai (125 strike a/c with 26 escorts) the USN could legitimately have expected some significant results. However, the USN performance was subject to fate and circumstance as well as a substantial number of miscues and outright mistakes. In a non-comprehensive list:

- If Midway's CO Simard sends at least some of its long-legged F2A's as escorts for the island's morning attacks perhaps some hits are scored and the plumes of smoke from the fires created provide a navigational beacon for the CV a/c to home in on. The rookie-Marine's SBD glide bomb attack was a near thing with a few near misses coming within 50 yards of the *Hiryu.*. 
- If CHAG Ring had not lead his 34 SBDs on a wild goose chase across the northern Pacific but instead had taken the same course as VT leader Waldron, it's conceivable that Hiryu would have been destroyed along with her sisters and Yorktown survives the battle.
- If somebody had been smart enough to order all a/c to use a common strike frequency, VF-6's errant Gray and his 9 companions orbiting at 22,0000 ft above Kido Butai, might have been alerted to VT-8's attack and descended from their perch to cover the attack and there might have been other squadron survivors besides Ensign Gay. 
- Yet VT-6's Lindsey did send a distress call on their common freq to Gray's escorts but it wasn't received. Had it been received perhaps their own disaster might have been mitigated.
- Had McClusky's assignment of targets been heard understood, more of the VS squadron's SBDs would have come down on Akagi. Even on an individual pilot bases, this error seems particularly egregious as VS-6 was not AFAIK, a rookie unit. 
- if the electronics on Leslie's VB-3 SBDs is not fried, more bombs are likely to land on Soryu. 

Of these Simard's decision and that of Ring seems the most important and potential game changers in the battle's outcome. if Midway was indeed an unsinkable carrier, and its striking arm consisting of essentially a Carrier Air Wing that included about 25 VMF, 27 VMSB, 10 VT, then like the CVs it could be expected to assign at least 8 to 10 VMF to escort duty.


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## Garyt (May 12, 2014)

> - If Midway's CO Simard sends at least some of its long-legged F2A's as escorts for the island's morning attacks perhaps some hits are scored and the plumes of smoke from the fires created provide a navigational beacon for the CV a/c to home in on. The rookie-Marine's SBD glide bomb attack was a near thing with a few near misses coming within 50 yards of the Hiryu..
> - If CHAG Ring had not lead his 34 SBDs on a wild goose chase across the northern Pacific but instead had taken the same course as VT leader Waldron, it's conceivable that Hiryu would have been destroyed along with her sisters and Yorktown survives the battle.
> - If somebody had been smart enough to order all a/c to use a common strike frequency, VF-6's errant Gray and his 9 companions orbiting at 22,0000 ft above Kido Butai, might have been alerted to VT-8's attack and descended from their perch to cover the attack and there might have been other squadron survivors besides Ensign Gay.
> - Yet VT-6's Lindsey did send a distress call on their common freq to Gray's escorts but it wasn't received. Had it been received perhaps their own disaster might have been mitigated.
> ...



And if Waldron had followed Ring, neither flight would have attacked the carriers. And more planes on the Akagi are not going to sink it twice.

There are a ton of "what if's" that could go the Japanese way as well. What if the carriers were struck when planes were not being readied? What if the US did not break the code and the Japanese plan went well and the US carriers were ambushed instead? Had the Japanese taken Midway, they could at least put a force of float planes there by the time the American TF's responded. What if the Japanese CAP showed better discipline and kept a force at higher altitude to intercept the Dive Bombers? What if either the Shokaku or Zuikaku had been available? Best chance would be to assign the Shokaku's air teams to the Zuikaku. What if the Yammamoto decided not to divide his forces, and sent the light carriers on the Aleutian strike with the main carrier striking force? What If Kido Butai had awaited a refit to bring its plane complement up to the standard numbers, instead of sending the carriers out with about 80% of their normal complement? And one thing that is often overlooked, the planes of Kido Butai, even the functional ones would well have used a refit, or some major maintenance to bring their performance up to standards. 

I think really one issue is really being looked at as a potential "Story changer". That is the Tone scout plane not having technical difficulties that morning.


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## syscom3 (May 12, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> Where on Earth did you get that from? Certainly, not from here:



You said it "What about going right from there to Pearl? They had the horses for it.".

The IJN had zero capability of launching nothing more than a night time nuisance raid on Pearl Harbor, if and only if, they captured Midway.

And the "if" part of taking the atoll is an extreme long shot on their part.


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## parsifal (May 12, 2014)

> As to CAP performance at Midway. The only CAP truly engaged did extremely well and set a standard for the rest of 1942. Roughly a dozen VF-42/3 F4F-4s used in two separate sorties destroyed ~21 IJN a/c (11 VB, 3 VF and 5 VT and 2 VF) out of a total of 28 VB VT protected by 12 VF escort. That's 21 of the 40 A/C in the strike or over 50% losses. (my estimate of 2/3rds below is probably over optimistic from USN standpoint.)




Do you know if these numbers are claims or confirmed. Im at work so i cant really confirm or deny at the moment, but the numbers do seem high to me. 

At Coral Sea, the VFs claimed over 40 aircraft splashed in the main strike. Didnt happen. more like 12 were lost tot he CAP. the oft quoted figure of 80 aircraft lost in that battle, includes aircraft that went down with Shoho, search planes shot down, aircraft lost on the deck when Cardiv 5 was hit, aircraft sent out on search that failed to return, aircraft simply pushed over the side to make room for additional aircraft returning. 80, in itself is inconsistent with what few Japanese records there are. The USN pilots had their advantages, but like everybody, they have to bend over and take their medicine as far as overclaiming.


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 12, 2014)

Wow, the work load is heavy here:



Garyt said:


> And if Waldron had followed Ring, neither flight would have attacked the carriers. And more planes on the Akagi are not going to sink it twice.



Was just thinking about the prospects for additional damage to Akagi, if one 'fatal' bomb hit is not delivered while Akagi is rearming (Yikes! another what if!) 



Garyt said:


> There are a ton of "what if's" that could go the Japanese way as well.



No doubt about that but I believe some of these in your list are answerable… 



Garyt said:


> - What if the carriers were struck when planes were not being readied?



Seems like with the dual task goal (island invasion and USN fleet confrontation), that likelihood is very small, especially without radar warning available. That was the shared dilemma of USN carrier force leaders supporting the Guadalcanal invasion. They were anxious to avoid a Midway-like reversal. 




Garyt said:


> - What if the US did not break the code and the Japanese plan went well and the US carriers were ambushed instead? Had the Japanese taken Midway, they could at least put a force of float planes there by the time the American TF's responded.



You mean the USN CVs were ambushed in their attempt to retake Midway after IJN occupation? Without the example of Midway would USN leadership recognize the dilemma of a dual mission (support an invasion and bring the IJN to battle)… interesting question. 



Garyt said:


> - What if the Japanese CAP showed better discipline and kept a force at higher altitude to intercept the Dive Bombers?



That is the most answerable 'what if.' It's not just altitude. VSB units were notorious at stalking their intended targets from whatever point of the compass provided most advantageous approach. Without Radar Fighter Direction, the IJN was nearly helpless to prevent successful dive bombing attacks. Even with FD, USN CAP had a difficult time forestalling DB attacks. In 1942, The DB's essentially always got thru in every CV vs CV battle. The reputation of the VAL as a ship killer and the SBD as "Slow But Deadly" were both well earned! Didn't seem to matter what the A6Ms did they were just not going to stop the SBDs. When the IJN finally got Radar late in 42, they used it to prepare their ships for attack, purging fuel lines and shoving ordnance overboard but they never developed an effective FD capability (Thanks you GB RN) . It's a myth that the sacrifice of USN VT TBDs provided the clear path for the SBDs. They contributed in other substantial ways but that wasn't one. 



Garyt said:


> - What if either the Shokaku or Zuikaku had been available? Best chance would be to assign the Shokaku's air teams to the Zuikaku.



In that case seems likely that the Lexington is also available. At the close of the Coral Sea battle, Zuikaku recovered 46 a/c of both groups as follows: 8 VF, 12 VB 4 VT of her own group and 9 VF, 7 VB and 6 VT of Shokaku's. After recovery, deck crews pushed overboard, wrecked 3 VF, 4 VB 5 VT. Later in the day, Zuikaku reported as operational the following: 24 VF, 9 VB, 6 VT… for a total of 39 A/C. For all practical purposes, there was no Shokaku Air Group to transfer to Zuikaku or even a combination of the two amounting to an air group. Both had been seriously depleted by operational losses and fighting during the two-day battle. By Comparison, Zuikaku and Sara both arrived at the front at about the same time. (to Wake island vicinity for Zuikaku and PH for Sara) Zui had its usual depleted air wing which was becoming the norm for the IJN while Sara arrived with an air wing and replacements totally 107 A/C for the other two CVs. Normally a USN would comfortably operate about 72 A/C, with spares hung from the hangar overhead. This is the evidence to validate what I believe Parsifal has been saying… IJN and industrial Japan itself just wasn't prepared for a long war of attrition. 



Garyt said:


> - What if the Yammamoto decided not to divide his forces, and sent the light carriers on the Aleutian strike with the main carrier striking force?



That makes for an interesting twist.




Garyt said:


> - What If Kido Butai had awaited a refit to bring its plane complement up to the standard numbers, instead of sending the carriers out with about 80% of their normal complement? And one thing that is often overlooked, the planes of Kido Butai, even the functional ones would well have used a refit, or some major maintenance to bring their performance up to standards.


 Then we have a 5 or 6 IJN CV vs 5 USN CV scenario. IMHO, time delays do not generally work in favor of the IJN. 



Garyt said:


> I think really one issue is really being looked at as a potential "Story changer". That is the Tone scout plane not having technical difficulties that morning.



And of course the decision to ignore the initial warning it provided at 0728 until a positive CV was identified at 0820. A delay of almost an hour, during which Nagumo effectively dug Kido Butai a deeper grave. JMO...


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 12, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Do you know if these numbers are claims or confirmed. Im at work so i cant really confirm or deny at the moment, but the numbers do seem high to me.
> 
> At Coral Sea, the VFs claimed over 40 aircraft splashed in the main strike. Didnt happen. more like 12 were lost tot he CAP. the oft quoted figure of 80 aircraft lost in that battle, includes aircraft that went down with Shoho, search planes shot down, aircraft lost on the deck when Cardiv 5 was hit, aircraft sent out on search that failed to return, aircraft simply pushed over the side to make room for additional aircraft returning. 80, in itself is inconsistent with what few Japanese records there are. The USN pilots had their advantages, but like everybody, they have to bend over and take their medicine as far as overclaiming.



At work? Shame on you (and me) Pars… You are correct that VF pilots over claimed but these appear to be confirmed by IJN sources but also include operational losses not necessarily combat. (almost all data from Lundstrom's First Team.) However, At Coral sea most folk forget the slaughter Op-losses of the IJN May 7 twilight raid on TF 17 and don't consider it in the total for May 8. At Midway, confirmation is provided by many sources quoting the composition of the last Hiryu strike of the day as consisting of 5 VB, 5 VT and 6 VF escort. That's all they had left, except for a substantial CAP force overhead Hiryu. You can check the Coral Sea losses by examining the operational report of Zuikaku at battle's end. She reported only 39 a/c operational. That's down from their original 120+ a/c. So, for practical purposes the IJN essentially lost roughly 80 a/c by battle's end. By May 9, Takagi had brought into operation 5 more a/c for a total of 45 A/C. By 15 May, Yorktown reported 55 a/c operational (of the total of 69 recovered) including refugees from Lex. At Pearl, she received an air wing Larger than she possessed at Coral Sea! That's what you've been saying isn't it? That the IJN just couldn't make up material or personnel losses. These numbers strongly support that contention.


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## VBF-13 (May 12, 2014)

syscom3 said:


> You said it "What about going right from there to Pearl? They had the horses for it.".
> 
> The IJN had zero capability of launching nothing more than a night time nuisance raid on Pearl Harbor, if and only if, they captured Midway.
> 
> And the "if" part of taking the atoll is an extreme long shot on their part.


The Japanese thought Midway was in the bag. There was no "if" about that. As far as their going to Pearl from Midway, they'd have had Midway off their back. As far as Nagumo coming straight across to Pearl, instead, as Emmons and others had speculated he might, that was a threat to be respected, given the capabilities of that force, and even the big brains at CINCPAC knew it.


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 12, 2014)

Should have added that "*the last Hiryu strike of the day*" was only *planned* and obviously never flown.


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## parsifal (May 12, 2014)

In regards to Coral Sea losses, operational aircraft is a different number to losses. Aircraft often would return , be declared non-operational, repaired overnight and ready the next day.

At battle's end heading back to Japan (via Rabaul then Truk), Zuikaku has operational 13 dive-bombers, 8 torpedo planes, and 24 fighters. Non-operational were 1 fighter, 4 dive-bombers, and 2 attack planes. Thus in the two days, Zujikaku had lost 1 fighter, 8 dive-bombers, and 14 attack planes. Of these, the crew had been lost from 1 fighter, 4 dive-bombers, and 9 attack planes. Aircrew losses for Zuikaku amounted to 23 airframes and 14 aircrews. There is some doubt as to whether 9 Zekes were flown in after the battle, from Inouyes command at Rabaul, but I find that difficult to reconcile. There is no record of such transfer from Rabauls daily situation reports of any such transfer, neither is there any record of such a transfer from Truk. maybe they were transferred from the Shokaku survivors, but I tend to think this is a bogus claim. 

Aircraft listed as shot down in Coral Sea, frequently turn up as having made it back to the carriers. Clearly they are not shot down, just damaged. Some are damaged beyond repair, as the 23 lost airframes for Zuikaku clearly show, but also clearly, the claims made for aircraft shot down by the USN for the Coral Sea are pretty clearly not correct. 

Though operational and battle loss figures vary slightly among the sources for Coral Sea, fortunately they all agree in the detail of most interest to historians: how many aircraft remained to Zuikaku on 9 May. . This is the important factor for examining the question of why she was omitted in the Midway Operation. Though Shokaku apparently had 2 dive-bombers and 3 attack planes still aboard after her bomb damage, the Japanese were loath to transfer away from the Shokau which had suffered far more heavily. in terms of airframe losses. Thus officially, both carrier's air groups were considered damaged and lacking after Coral Sea and were besides scheduled to be further diluted. Zuikakus air group was needed to reconstitiute Shakaus and also establish Hiyos air group .

Note that the pre-Coral Sea plans to transfers aviators of CarDiv 5 to other bases or carriers coupled with the lack of adequate ready replacement aircraft for Coral Sea losses was the main reason CarDiv 5 was not pressed to participate in the Midway Operation. No doubt this sentiment to proceed with the scheduled transfers was strengthened by the May 14 message sent to Combined Fleet that CarDiv 5's losses and that Zuikaku had lost 40% of her airframes precluded that carrier's ready use. 40% of 63 is 25 aircraft, incidentally. At the time it was apparently felt that the addition of Zuikaku as a "one division ship" with weakened air complement was redundant and would raise more logistical and tactical problems than it would solve. Only hindsight makes it seem obviously a wrong decision.(The Japanese apparently did not think so even in hindsight, for well after Midway. When a similar situation obtained after the Santa Cruz battle, the same choice was made and an opportunity to reinforce Zuikaku's weakened air group with Hiyo's was not taken and she was instead sent home on November 4, 1942 two days after Shokaku, thus missing the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal in November.) As it was, Zuikaku was on May 25 allocated to the latter June phase of the projected Aluetians Operations should she be required.

For the Shokaku, losses are more obscure, and records incomplete, but she is known to have retained at least 9 aircraft on her decks at the conclusion of the battle. I think there were more. In regard to the losses in the night strike, this is again something misreported in American sources. 1430 CarDiv 5 launched to make a bold and risky nightfall attack on the reported American carriers. Admirals Takagi and Hara had made the decision in an effort to regain initiative, and selected their most night flying skilled pilots to participate. Sacrificing fighter cover (the Zeros aboard were not suited for night-flying escort) the 12 dive-bombers and 15 torpedo planes gamely fly to the very limits of their operational radius and well after twilight, only to find nothing and have to start back. Ironically, they had overflown TF 17, and ran into its CAP. Several are shot down, and even more amazingly, about six come within minutes of actually landing by mistake on YORKTOWN, only to spooked by gunfire at the last moment. To aid their return, Admiral Hara courageously orders CarDiv 5's searchlights switched on to give the planes a chance to land safely. But some are running out of fuel even then, and eleven crash on or near the deck or are damaged while landing. Only six of the strike lands intact and remain operational. however, this does not mean that 21 were shot down as is often reported. Losses as near as I ascertain if the landing accidents are excluded amount to about 6 aircraft. 4 were believed lost in the return flight. That might mean as few as 2 are destroyed over the US carriers

I dont know enouigh about the Midway operation to make any similar conclusions , and though i cant prove it, im willing to bet the farm that many of the so called losses over the US Task Force are in fact damaged aborts. the problem we have here is that many of the logs and records for the Japanese ships including, I believe the Hiryus, were simply lost, even before the japanese final report could be made. all we have in the main are the unsubstantiated claims by the US pilots themelves, and these simply are not accurate, as the Coral Sea stuff does show. 

Whilst this may look or appear as contradicting what Im saying about the japanese being absolutely enslaved to thir loss rates, in fact it is very consistent with it. people are apt to accept the claimed losses as gospel, and therefore proof that the heart was ripped out of the Kido Butai by these horrendous losses. whilst i agree that the heart was ripped out, it didnt take near the losses that are claimed to do that. People simply dont realize how few replacements were being received, and just how sensitive to losses the japanese airgroups actually were.


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## cherry blossom (May 13, 2014)

I feel guilty in supplying what ifs instead of Parsifal's excellent analysis of what actually happened but finding what ifs to change the outcome is particularly easy for Midway.

If we want a simple alternate history change to alter the outcome of Midway in favour of the Japanese, what if during or after the war games, someone realises that the Kido Butai shouldn't have to launch two strikes at Midway because the Kido Butai's aircraft are the tip of the Japanese spear. Thus a last minute rearrangement of the IJN forces sends Kondo's battleships and cruisers, Kongo, Hiei, Atago, Chokai, Myoko and Haguro, with Yura and some destroyers, to sail with the Kido Butai. It is an easy change to make as both started from Hashirajima. However, Yamamoto's main body will now have to take a more southerly course to cover the invasion fleet and perhaps Zuiho will sail with Yamamoto. 

The idea is that Kondo increases speed and races ahead of the Kido Butai before the first wave is launched to attack Midway at 0430 from 240 miles away. Kondo can probably manage 26 knots over the morning keeping his force together. Thus about 1200, he should be able to open fire on Midway. Thus there will be no possible need for a second strike against Midway from the Kido Butai and no need to waste time swapping bombs and torpedoes.

The change may also bring the Kido Butai better luck because at around 1000, McClusky will be somewhere south of the Kido Butai and may happen to see the distant wakes of Kondo ships racing towards Midway. If he does, he will almost certainly investigate. He may waste so much time and fuel veering to the South that he has to attack Kondo. In fact Kondo may also be attacked by many poorly trained air crews from Midway itself during the morning as he will be the first ships that they encounter.

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## parsifal (May 13, 2014)

its difficult to be realistic about japanese tactical alternatives, because we have the priceless advantage of perfect hindsight. We know that the japanese codes had been compromised. We know that there were three, not two carriers waiting for the Japanese. We know that the USN had already outflanked the KB even before the battle had commenced.

Any attempts at reconsidering what might be done needs to allow for these underlying points. Still there are some glaring weaknesses to the japanese plan that really cry out for change, and sadly for them, could have been changed if only the Japanese had not been so far into their own PR. All of the things I mention here, were, at some time in the planning, considered by the Japanese, which makes their final plan all the more incomprehensible.

The over dispersal and overall complexity of the plan is an obvious flaw. The diversion of the support carriers, Junyo, Ryujo, and Zuiho is another. Given the importance of the operation, the insistence on breaking up Zuikakus air group is illogical. That could have waited until after the operation, and the cobination of Junyo, Zuiho Rujo and Zuikaku at around 80% strength, to caver the main and occupatiuon forces would have made it very difficult for the Americans

The assault in the Far North should have been abandoned, and all the support carriers redirected to provide a second TF to support CarDiv 1 and 2, not in the same TF, but covering the Battlewagons and the invasion forces. Some additional troops should have been allocated to the operation. Reduction of Midways defences should have been left up to the bombardment forces. Cardiv 1 and 2 should not have been so far forward, and they should in any case have operated as two separate division, perhaps 20-40 miles apart. The bait should have been the ships that were best able to take the punishment, the Yamato, and Kondo classes (incidentally the battlecruisers had a rated top speed of 30 knots, not 26). Cardiv1 and 2 should have been given just one purpose, instead of three. That purpose should have been to find and then destroy any US surface naval forces, with priority to be the enemy carriers. That was the very reason for the operation, but it was lost in the other flotsam that was introduced into the plan. The Japanese rode into the valley of death with their eyes off the ball 

All of these alternatives were considered, but Japanese over-confidence really threw out any possibility of sanity being put into the plan. The Japanese had convinced themselves that there was nothing to fear from the Americans, they could easily defeat them and could take risks to do it. It was the misplaced over confidence more than anything that defeated the Japanese.

If these measures had been adopted the USN code breakers would have known about it. The best reaction for the USN to such a concentrated effort would be not to show up at all, which i think is what they would have done

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## Garyt (May 13, 2014)

> The over dispersal and overall complexity of the plan is an obvious flaw. The diversion of the support carriers, Junyo, Ryujo, and Zuiho is another. Given the importance of the operation, the insistence on breaking up Zuikakus air group is illogical. That could have waited until after the operation, and the cobination of Junyo, Zuiho Rujo and Zuikaku at around 80% strength, to caver the main and occupatiuon forces would have made it very difficult for the Americans



THis would have been more simple than their over elaborate plan. They seemed to be thinking "We'll hide our battleships until the Americans commit their forces". I'm wondering if Yammamoto was anticipating a response from Pearl that included the 4-5 slow battleship available?

Actually, do that would have made it tough for the Americans. Combine the carriers with the slow BB's - to slow to chase or run. Would have been a sitting duck for the Japanese. Though since the US had their codes, they had the initiative, not he Japanese. By initiative I mean the ability to determine who and where and when combat occurs.



> If these measures had been adopted the USN code breakers would have known about it. The best reaction for the USN to such a concentrated effort would be not to show up at all, which i think is what they would have done



I agree. Midway had little strategic significance, not enough to risk the fleet for.


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## RpR (May 13, 2014)

Garyt said:


> I agree. Midway had little strategic significance, not enough to risk the fleet for.


Midway : "
In the initial plans for Midway, it was proposed to develop it as a base for one patrol squadron of seaplanes. Subsequently, became a major submarine base, a major air station for both land- and seaplanes, and a fueling and repair base for ships.t became a major submarine base, a major air station for both land- and seaplanes, and a fueling and repair base for ships,,,

In 1938, Navy funds to the extent of $1,100,000 were made available to the Army for harbor and channel improvements. The Army was to dredge a channel through the southern reef between Sand and Eastern Islands, scoop out a seaplane basin, and dredge a channel 30 feet deep and 300 feet wide to a proposed submarine basin and an anchorage for small ships. A turning basin was to be provided adjacent to the submarine basin, northeast of Sand Island, and a breakwater was to be built. The Army completed this work in 1940."

I think a major ship, submarine and air-station hundreds if not a thousand miles closer to Hawaii, and only 1,500 miles from Hawaii is of major significance by military standards.
The one thing too many peoples conjecture here has every thing pretty much staying the same even if the U.S. had lost Midway, that is impossible no matter how one sees thing even with 20-20 hindsight.

As I also stated before, it would be foolish to ignore how this would have affected the political scene in the U.S. where the war was being run.
For Washington to report a second major defeat in less than a year, and third out an out defeat, would have been devastating.
Had Midway fallen there would have been no blockade of Wake Island or attacks from Midway.


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## Garyt (May 13, 2014)

> For Washington to report a second major defeat in less than a year, and third out an out defeat, would have been devastating.
> Had Midway fallen there would have been no blockade of Wake Island or attacks from Midway.



My point is that if he US decided not to engage the Japanese at Midway as Parsifal suggests, that would make sense. It would not be a "second major defeat", merely the taking of a small atoll without the Navy fighting it.



> In the initial plans for Midway, it was proposed to develop it as a base for one patrol squadron of seaplanes. Subsequently, became a major submarine base, a major air station for both land- and seaplanes, and a fueling and repair base for ships.t became a major submarine base, a major air station for both land- and seaplanes, and a fueling and repair base for ships,,,



These were plans, by the time of the invasion Midway was not a major base, certainly no one capable of being a major surface fleet port. And the Japanese moved slower at building up bases than the US for certain. Could it have been built into a major base within a year? I doubt the US would allow that, and between the Japanese extended merchant shipping problems and other logistical problems, it would be really tough. I'd think the US subs would feast of the efforts to support Midway.


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## RpR (May 13, 2014)

Garyt said:


> My point is that if he US decided not to engage the Japanese at Midway as Parsifal suggests, that would make sense. It would not be a "second major defeat", merely the taking of a small atoll without the Navy fighting it. ----Either they would abandon it totally or leave the occupants to survive the misery the survivors at Wake Island did.
> That is worse than a military defeat it is out-and-out retreat which is defeat no matter how one looks at it.
> _
> 1943: 98 American civilian contractors on Wake Island
> ...



According to the Navy Dept. Library the air base was finished before the war started including barracks and the 1st hospital.
It took the Navy one year to enlarge/finish the submarine base from start of the war including time spent just working on defense.
New maintenance crews were rotated in, in October of 1943.
There were improvements after that but major work was done by mid-1943.


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## Garyt (May 13, 2014)

> New maintenance crews were rotated in, in October of 1943.
> There were improvements after that but major work was done by mid-1943.



OK, as a US base, mid-late 1943 it could have been more relevant.

In Japanese hands I'd say you would have to double the time if not more to get to there. Actually, double the time might be right, but things change, such as bases in that area not being needed at least to that extent.

But take a look at how slow the Japanese were to rebuild installations such as airfields during the Guadacanal campaign vs the Americans once an airfield was bombed for instance. Or take a look at how long repairs on a ship might take for the US vs. Japan.

So if the Japanese take Midway, they would not be able to have the installation that the US was looking to build completed until mid-late 44. Or more likely, plans would have required that the resources the Japanese were putting towards Midway would now be needed elsewhere.


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 13, 2014)

parsifal said:


> In regards to Coral Sea losses, operational aircraft is a different number to losses. Aircraft often would return , be declared non-operational, repaired overnight and ready the next day.
> 
> At battle's end heading back to Japan (via Rabaul then Truk), Zuikaku has operational 13 dive-bombers, 8 torpedo planes, and 24 fighters. Non-operational were 1 fighter, 4 dive-bombers, and 2 attack planes. Thus in the two days, Zujikaku had lost 1 fighter, 8 dive-bombers, and 14 attack planes. Of these, the crew had been lost from 1 fighter, 4 dive-bombers, and 9 attack planes. Aircrew losses for Zuikaku amounted to 23 airframes and 14 aircrews. There is some doubt as to whether 9 Zekes were flown in after the battle, from Inouyes command at Rabaul, but I find that difficult to reconcile. There is no record of such transfer from Rabauls daily situation reports of any such transfer, neither is there any record of such a transfer from Truk. maybe they were transferred from the Shokaku survivors, but I tend to think this is a bogus claim.
> 
> ...



Apologize for the delay, it took me a while to put this together… Lots of interesting info in your post. Some I had not seen, can you share the source?

Regarding Coral Sea, I think our respective talleys of IJN a/c losses are becoming in greater agreement if I do a more careful accounting using Lundstrom who states he uses both USN IJN sources. As to disparity in USN VF claims at CS (and nominally confirmed by IJN sources), I think Lundstrom does a reasonable job of reporting these although he occasionally goes awry in his force disposition numbers. In any event, I don’t consider so called ‘confirmed’ numbers as necessarily exact but are instead probably ‘best guess estimates’ made in absence of other information as seen below. Coral Sea is especially difficult because lighting/weather and perhaps the loss of the participant carrier's. 

On May 7, he describes the admittedly courageous but star-crossed IJN unescorted twilight raid of 27 A/C (12 VB 15 VT) as running afoul of a CAP of 30 F4F over TF-17. USN *VF CAP Claims amounted to 8 A/C* destroyed (6 VF, 1VB and 1 VT) There were no IJN VF present so this seems to be a systematic misidentification by Lexington’s VF-2 of B5N KATES in the dusk engagement. In any event, he reports that only 18 of the 27 A/C originally launched are recovered aboard IJN flight decks. Differing from the number you quote. One battle-damaged VT flown by its observer (its pilot being KIA) is reported to have ditched near its carrier. Unlikely as it may seem and very unusual in WW2 air combat, the claims appear to be in reasonably good correspondence with actual IJN losses given type misidentification. I expect a good portion of the claimed a/c were perhaps made redundantly on merely damaged A/C that subsequently ditched upon making their way back to their carriers or perhaps some A/C simply became lost in the dark. The mission was sufficiently dangerous to warrant such an outcome. In any event:

Total USN claims on May 7: 8 A/C

Total ‘confirmed’ IJN twilight-strike losses on May 7: 9 A/C (8 VT 1 VB)

*Total IJN losses from all causes on May 7: 12 A/C* (2 VB 10 VT)

On May 8, Lundstrom talleys claims of 20 F4Fs defending Task Force 17 as: 10 VF, 4 VB 1 VT (total: 15 A/C) while the 23 USN VSB Anti Torpedoplane Patrol (ATP) claimed: 6 VF, 1 VB, 10 VT! 

USN CAP and ATP claims on May 8 thus appear to have totaled 32 A/C

IJN sources seem to confirm that VF probably downed: 3 VB and 1 VT (Total: 4 A/C) whereas USN VSB apparently accounted for 1 VB 3 VT (Total: 4 A/C)

Lundstrom estimates AAA downed 1 VB 3 VT

Thus the number of IJN aircraft likely to have been downed by all USN TF-17 defenders on May 8 appears to have totaled ~12 A/C. 

Three additional kills (one of which went to young Lt (jg) Bill Leonard) were recorded by the returning USN strike groups bringing the total IJN A/C lost during the May 8 battle to 15. (8 to Cap ATP, 4 to AAA and 3 to returning strike a/c.)

Lundstrom states that on May 8, 2 IJN CAP VF were lost to USN VF escort. Seven A/C ditched near the Zuikaku and a dozen battle-damaged A/C were jettisoned over the side. One CAP VF one VB each apparently cracked up on attempting to land on damaged Shokaku, subsequent disposition unknown. He also states that his research concluded that 22 (plus the 2 downed IJN Cap to make 24) aircraft were missing or ditched on May 8. Add that to the dozen lost May 7 and the dozen jettisoned overboard and we have ~48 A/C casualties during the battle from all causes. IJN’s Fifth CarDiv starts with 121 A/C (109 operational) on May 6. 48 of these are destroyed one way or another and at least 7 and perhaps 9 are unavailable being stranded on Shokaku. Thus I expect the IJN air group was reduced by ~55-57 A/C. On May 9, of the remaining A/C on Zuikaku as you pointed out there are 45 operational including 24 VF, 13 VB and 8 VT. Seems like there were perhaps another 20 nonoperational a/c distributed between the two IJN carriers. 

The source of attrition during a battle is, in my view, unimportant as to whether it's an operational loss or occurs in combat. An a/c stranded on its carrier due to battle damage to either is combat ineffective until it can be repaired or transferred to a usable runway. Any such loss affects combat readiness at the end of the day. At day's end, the Yorktown had operational: 13 VF, 29 VSB 8 VT (total: 50 A/C). The IJN apparently had an edge in VF for providing both CAP and Escort but retained a relatively anemic strike capacity while the Yorktown could just about defend itself with the VF on hand but had a relatively robust strike component in its VSB units. This relatively small disparity was despite the loss of the 34 airframes that went down with the Lex (30 of which were categorized as operational). 

Later for a discussion of the claims and losses during the two air battles over the Yorktown. It seems a very different circumstance especially regarding what is known due to the existence of witness testimony on both sides.

Late edit removed a pointless sentence comparing the numbers of operational a/c remaining on opposing CVs.

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## VBF-13 (May 13, 2014)

parsifal said:


> The best reaction for the USN to such a concentrated effort would be not to show up at all, which i think is what they would have done


What do you think the Japanese would have done had that happened that way?


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## parsifal (May 13, 2014)

I honestly dont know, but I seriously doubt any move on Hawaii.

It gets down to this. The USN needed a drawn out attritional battle, drawn out over months or years, to suck out all the reserve the Japanese might have. It got that at Guadacanal, but it needed some freed up manouver room to do that which is what midway gave them. Just how much manouver space they needed, well thats open to debate.

The Japanese were seeking a climactic showdown, and needed a one sided victory to shut the TO down. That last bit the japanese didnt see....they wanted a decisive battle to force the Americans to negotiate, but that was never going to happen. If they had won the battle, the Americans still would not surrender, from there, its an open question as to what happens next.


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 14, 2014)

Performance of the USN CAP at Midway (First Battle vs. Hiryu VB Strike ):

Some stage setting ‘initial conditions’ pertaining to the first IJN Strike wave and the Yorktown’s CAP response beginning the air battle to defend Yorktown. 

The 18 Kanbaku in the first wave arrive for all practical purposes unescorted. The remaining 4 escorts from an original group of 6 have been distracted (in uncharacteristic fashion) and their entry to battle is delayed due to their chasing returning SBDs, perhaps looking for some payback. 

The USN defenders are arguably the best led and most experienced group of USN Pilots and FDO team in the PTO at this stage of the war. VF-3 pilots are veterans of the Bouganville interception making O’Hare a legend. The VF-42 contingent are veterans of the Coral Sea battle. Half the 6 Yorktown CAP making the initial interception consists will become aces. 

The dozen VF-3/42 CAP replacements will be the first to meet the enemy are launched and all in the air by 1150 and probably making a relatively leisurely climb to assigned patrol-altitude as they begin to join up by section and division. The join- up will not be completed and the CAP will enter the battle individually or in sections. 

The first IJN wave is detected at about 1152 at 32 miles distance by Yorktown’s Radar. The Radar operator, Bennett (using an A-Scope!) immediately discerns that the bogeys are climbing and presumably in the absence of an IFF response are enemy A/C. At 1152, the FDO, former VF-42 squadron CO, Oscar Pederson, directs half of the newly launched CAP to intercept. At 1158, Pederson directs the remaining CAP to the intercept and identifies the Bogies’ altitude as 10,000 feet and climbing. At this point, the CAP is climbing BttW. 

30 Miles NW of Yorktown, Enterprise FDO Dow (another experienced and capable director) has kept 8 VF-8 F4Fs at 20,000’ and 8 VF-6 Wildcats at 10,000’. At 1158 he begins to position the Hi-CAP, fortuitously nearer the Yorktown than is TF-16, to intercept. Dow positioned the Lo-Cap to block any approach to his own TF. 
At 1200, VF-3/42 Division leader Brassfield, climbing more steeply and now at 8K’ and about 15 miles from Yorktown reports 18 IJN VB approaching TF-17 some miles distant. He continues to climb while maneuvering to achieve a favorable intercept geometry. 

As Brassfield passes 10k’ he spies the two leading F4Fs attack from below the VALs to no effect. These two a/c begin a climbing turn to a future tail-chase intercept position. A third pilot, aggressive (future double Ace) Scott McCuskey just manages to achieve a co-altitude intercept and claims the first VAL as he swings through the two IJN formations (two V of Vs, one leading, one trailing) firing at numerous targets with no certain results. Gibbs follows McCusky and claims a VAL. The two leading F4F’s in the tail chase claim one each with damage to two others. Brassfield’s first target jettison’s his bomb and retreats. He then claims three VALs in a detailed account. At 1202, cruiser Astoria lookouts, nearest to the aerial fight report 18 VB about 15-20 miles distant. They report six a/c hitting the water shortly after. At least 10 VALs are claimed during this initial fight, and apparently 6 are pretty certainly downed as no USN a/c are lost in this phase of the battle which apparently sees the destruction of a third of the attacking force. if there had been no further actions, this intercept would appear to have been quite effective. A seventh VAL was claimed by McCusky to have exploded unseen in the clouds. 

The surviving VALs apparently began to approach their target individually from different points of the compass to ensure an effective attack. However, this also extended the duration of their approach and provided more time for interceptions.

The Yorktown’s tardy second CAP division had reached 18k’ in the interim but could inflict no damage during their brief fight except for claiming three Zero escorts and a probably 4th.

Hornet’s VF-8 HiCAP arrived in time to claim two VALs and three Zeroes. 

Observers on the Yorktown report beginning at 1209, being attacked by 7 VALs with AAA accounting for two one of whose bomb hit with 5 others escaping undamaged after scoring two hits. Apparently the strike leader had jettisoned his bomb in a fight with Brassfield and was orbiting TF-17 to observe strike results. His destruction was claimed by VF-6 pilots arriving on the scene after the bombs had dropped. Brassfield claimed another VB orbiting a ditched Yorktown TBD after the battle.

Total USN VF Claims amounted to: 16 of the 18 VALs present with 8 probable, and 6 Zeros with 3 probable for the four actually present in the battle. AAA accounted for two VB. Based on claims alone, no IJN a/c escaped the battle. 
Lundstrom estimates 11 VB and 3 VF were destroyed by the USN CAP and 2 fell to AAA. perhaps one or two may have survived the battle and returned to Hiryu, too damaged to fly again. However, every source I have read claims that only 5 VB returned to Hiryu as did only one of the 4 escorting A6Ms. Two other escorts had aborted earlier with one of these ditching before reaching Hiryu.


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## Garyt (May 14, 2014)

Interesting, Old Crow.

It to me shows that intercepting dive bombers can indeed be effective - but the further away from the task force the better of course, and being at the right altitude is huge.


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 14, 2014)

Garyt said:


> Interesting, Old Crow.
> 
> It to me shows that _intercepting dive bombers can indeed be effective _- but the further away from the task force the better of course, and being at the right altitude is huge.



It certainly can be but requires a solid well trained and organized Fighter direction capability to do it. That of the USN, with the help of its british allies was slowly improving, but was spotty throughout 1942. The successful Midway interception of the Hiryu VB seems to me to be more the exception than the rule and may have owed much to the participants and unusual circumstances (tardy VB escorts). At Santa Cruz the Hornet's VF-72 intercept appeared to be well done but its success was limited by the combination of good escort performance and the limitations of the F4F… RCAFson's suggestion that it would have been smart for the USN to incorporate Sea Hurricane IIs into a USN air group until the arrival of F6F and F4U has some merit, IMHO.

By 1944, with the introduction of the F6F and F4U, the air defense of the carrier task force approached impermeability until IJ introduced massed Kamikazi assault tactics, essentially overwhelming USN CAP defenses with biologically-guided cruise missiles. In the post war decades, the threatening spectre of Soviet cruise missile armadas was somewhat analogous. 

With respect to altitude and distance, the introduction of the F6F and F4U mitigated the climb performance deficiency of the F4F. Putting RADAR and FD teams aboard Pickett destroyers to improve detection range seems to have begun in 1943 but apparently didn't really mature and come into widespread implementation until late 1944 in response to the Kamikaze threat.

The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia: Destroyers (DD) 

At the end of the war, the first Airborne early warning Radar picket had been developed using a modified TBF.

The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia: Cadillac


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## VBF-13 (May 14, 2014)

parsifal said:


> I honestly dont know, but I seriously doubt any move on Hawaii.
> 
> It gets down to this. The USN needed a drawn out attritional battle, drawn out over months or years, to suck out all the reserve the Japanese might have. It got that at Guadacanal, but it needed some freed up manouver room to do that which is what midway gave them. Just how much manouver space they needed, well thats open to debate.
> 
> The Japanese were seeking a climactic showdown, and needed a one sided victory to shut the TO down. That last bit the japanese didnt see....they wanted a decisive battle to force the Americans to negotiate, but that was never going to happen. If they had won the battle, the Americans still would not surrender, from there, its an open question as to what happens next.


I'm thinking of all those forces they brought to the dance only to then get stood up by their date. I'd think they'd have had to have taken the initiative and come after us at Pearl. Let me just lay it out for your scrutiny. Supposing they remain, how long are they going to last? Supposing they await reinforcements, that only gives us more time to heal our wounds and build up, too. Supposing they turn back just the main force. That main force was there to deliver the knockout punch after their striking force engaged us. Turn it back, they not only weaken their plan, but, overall, their Midway defenses. Going off on a six-day sail to our West Coast or Panama, we're hot on their tail, we're not going to let them do that. Maybe that's how and where they ultimately draw us out? That could be, as well, I suppose. Just racking my little brain, girls. Help me out.


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 14, 2014)

Performance of the USN CAP at Midway (Second Battle vs Hiryu VT Strike ):

Hiryu CAG Tomonaga collected 10 Kates and 6 Escort Zeroes for an attack on the USN carriers. This number included his own damaged Kate, he stubbornly courageously refused to relinquish to a junior pilot. 

Any residual doubt as to the skill of IJN aircrew after the extraordinary demonstration of dive bombing that scored three significant hits and two damaging misses that left Yorktown dead in the water, would be dispelled by their performance during the second strike.

As one might expect at this stage of the war, CAP coverage for Yorktown seems to have degraded a bit and become somewhat more disorganized after the Hiryu’s first strike disabled the Yorktown. 

Most engaged VF sought fuel and ammo on Enterprise Hornet, leaving a small CAP to protect the stricken ship. Also, the USN seems to have been caught by the requirement to recover her returning strike A/C before fully restoring the TF-17 CAP. 

At 1225, Hornet launched a division of 5 or 6 F4F to protect TF-17. It patroled at 12,000’ but unknowingly went NORDO and so it wasn’t operating under FDO control! One FDO controlled section of the VF-8 HICAP sent by Dow patrolled at 18k’ until its fuel was nearly exhausted. 

At 1253, Enterprise was able to launch 8 VF as TF-16 relief CAP. 

At 1253 Hornet launched an additional 3 F4Fs to reinforce TF-16’s CAP, 

Between 1251 and 1304, Hornet recovered 6 Yorktown CAP VF along with the surviving 3 F4Fs of one of the two VF-8 divisions sent to defend Yorktown. Actually only 6 of the 8 fighters in the two divisions ever received Dow’s directions and responded accordingly. Radios and radio reception appear to have been a chronic FD problem . 

At about the same time, Enterprise took aboard the other 6 of the VF-3/42 CAP defenders of Yorktown.

At 1340, the irrepressible McCusky launched leading a composite division that included 3 VF-6 pilots as a new TF-17 CAP. A section of VF-3 fighters followed McCusky and relieved the VF-8 contingent one of which ditched due to fuel starvation. 

Stranded on Yorktown while she was DitW were Thach’s escort A/C recovered prior the IJN VB attack and the her morning CAP. Anticipating the ship might be able to get under weigh, Thach arranged for deck crews to fuel and arm 8 additional F4Fs, in that eventuality, readying them for immediate launch if Yorktown was able to obtain an adequate wind over the deck. At 1400, Yorktown began to get moving and by about 1430 she was steaming at ~20 knots. 

However, at 1427, CA Pensacola detected bogies at 45 miles. At 1429, Yorktown’s FDO Peterson sent McCusky to intercept at 10k’. However, thru a miscue, the division was directed in a slightly wrong direction and they missed the Hiryu’s 10 Kates and their escort of 6 Zeroes. However in directing the VF-3 section he got it right and they intercepted the raid.

At 1430 the Yorktown’s own RADAR picked up the bogies at 33 miles. ‘

Dow sent 8 F4F at high altitude from TF-16’s standing CAP as TF-17 CAP reinforcements and retained 7 fighters in reserve. 

There were 30 F4F’s (in various stages of being serviced) sitting on the flight decks of the other two carriers but would not become available for 20 minutes. 

At 1436, McCusky’s division was informed it had missed the intercept at 20-25 miles distant and was instructed to return. 
At 1438, the VF-3 section under Bill Woolen radioed “Tally ho!” the two fighters destroyed one Kate in Tomonaga’s 1st Chutai before they were both dispatched by the escorting Zeroes. 

Just prior to 1440, the Thach’s 8 F4F had not completed fueling before lines were purged. However, being only partially fueled they were able to launch in the light wind over the deck. 

At 1440, Thach launched followed by Rich’s dad, Bill Leonard and the remaining 6 others at less than 15 second intervals! 

The initial Wildcats engaged the onrushing Kates at effectively point blank range in the midst of the screen so AAA may have played a role in what transpired next.
Thach shot down the lead a/c, Tomonaga’s truncated Chutai of 4 Kates. Leonard flamed the next. He is reported to have said he was sure it was his bullets and not that of the USN AAA since most of that had been aimed at him! 
Adams claimed the third Kate while the fourth Kate in the 1st Chutai escaped. Three Kates dropped their fish but no hits were recorded. 

The fifth VF-3 pilot to launch, Barnes, encountered the 5 Kates of the 2nd Chutai led by Hoshimoto Toshio, approaching in an attempt to execute a classic anvil attack. Barnes was beset by two of Hashimoto’s escorts and could not score. He did well to merely survive, aided by the sudden appearance of the misdirected McCusky who set one of the escorts afire. McCusky’s wingman claimed the other escort. Hashimoto was witness to the two kills as well as a fight with two other of his escorts. This mele was a classic of the Pacific war on a level with the Pug Southerland vs Saburu Sakai over Guadalcanal. However, the outcome was a bit more favorable to the USN on this occasion. 

In the meantime, the fight had momentarily freed the remaining 5 Kates for their runs. They soon ran afoul of a few of Thach’s recently launched F4F’s who were unable to down any Kates before they dropped their fish. Two of which scored on Yorktown. So far 6 Kates (one from the first Chutai and five from the 2nd Chutai had apparently survived the struggle but, in making its exit, the lone survivor of the first, ran into a division of VF-6 fighters that destroyed it. Despite being harassed by elements of the USN CAP during their retreat, five Kates and four escorting Zeroes returned to the Hiryu. Hashimoto bore witness to the events. He survived the war and apparently became an ally while serving as a Vice Admiral in the JMSDF (SS, pg. 316). Most histories of the battle state that Hiryu was preparing a strike consisting of 5 Kanbaku and 5 Kanko but Hashimoto’s testimony in SS suggests 4 of the these were nonoperational so perhaps there were spares aboard the Hiryu? 

USN Claims for the second air battle are 12 VT (3 Probable) and 4 VF (3 probable). This compares with IJN losses to all causes: 5 VT and 2 VF.


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## parsifal (May 14, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> I'm thinking of all those forces they brought to the dance only to then get stood up by their date. I'd think they'd have had to have taken the initiative and come after us at Pearl. .



Who was going to make that decision? An invasion of Hawaii was strongly favoured by yammamoto, and his staff, and the general intent seems to have been to use a blockade of Pearl as some sort of bargaining chip at the expected peace talks, but apart from that, outright invasion had been vetoed by the army, and their agreement would have been needed to undertake the invasion. moreover it was also an operation also expressly refused by the Admiralty....Yammamotos boss.

He would have faced a court martial and disgrace if he had tried to pull it off. He needed to go back to the Imperial Council and get specific authorisation if he wanted to do that. Thats a possibility, but not as an immediate flow on from the operation. To give you a parrallel, in 1944, the USN favoured an invasion of Formosa over Luzon. Mac wanted to return to the PI as promised. Eventually he played dirty pool, went the president and overruled the Navy. What do you think might happen to nimitz if he decided to take Mac to Formosa anyway....things miliatry just dont work that way, not even for the japanese. 

Quite apart from that the MI operation simply lacked the necessary troops to get anywhere in the main island groups.They had 5500 embarked, they already estimated they needed 45000 to invade. Further, for amphibious invasions, you just cant up and change targets like that. The invasion of Normandy....the detailed stuff, took nearly 7 months to prepare, even the japanese cant just switch targets a few days or hours before the event. Amphibious operations are highly structured and rigid operations. you have a preset plan and you pretty much are stuck with it. one of the great achievements of the US Marines, unsung and unnappreciated today, is that they developed techniques, still used today, that gave them a great deal of flexibility in being able to adjust landing plans and committment of reserves and the like. this allowed them to react very flexibly to changing tactical situations on the beach, and why everyone still thinks they are the best at what they do.



> Let me just lay it out for your scrutiny. Supposing they remain, how long are they going to last? Supposing they await reinforcements, that only gives us more time to heal our wounds and build up, too.



Its not so much what was rational, we know now that the US was never going to negotiate with the japanese. Its what the japanese hoped would happen, and flow on from a successful operation. As i pointed out a few posts agao, Midway as a plan was very much a compromise, that really please no one, and had virtually no chance of success in the strategic sense. The Japanese were quite adept at self delusion i can assure you.

What they hoped for in midway was the decisive battle, in which the USN was to be dealt a heavy defeat, and the USA thereby forced to the peace table.That was the ultimate goal of the MI operation. If the USN had declined outright battle, the target selection was designed to put the USN over a barrel anyway. The idea was to maintain surveillance of the only major forward anchorage in the pacific (or at least thats what the japanese assumed...In fact major fleet bases were being developed at Noumea, Brisbane and Auckland....not as big as Pearl, but still substantial). The general idea was that every time the Pacific Fleet moved into or out of pearl, the japanese would know. it was meant to be a dagger at the USNs throat. I doubt it would work that way. There has also been speculation that the incoming shipping....70 transports a month just to feed the population, would be targetted in a blockade operation. 

None of this is relaistic, and the Japanese dont appear to have even considered how they might hold the island, but it was the general idea....force the USN into a fight it could not win, or attrition it by permanently placing it at a disadavanatge by knowing its wherabouts in advance. 




> Supposing they turn back just the main force. That main force was there to deliver the knockout punch after their striking force engaged us. Turn it back, they not only weaken their plan, but, overall, their Midway defenses. Going off on a six-day sail to our West Coast or Panama, we're hot on their tail, we're not going to let them do that. Maybe that's how and where they ultimately draw us out? That could be, as well, I suppose. Just racking my little brain, girls. Help me out




This is too much japanese think for me. the japanese were wont to trying to second guess their opponents thinking all the time...offering sacrifices...thinking "if we do this, then he will do that". But there are no real indications that Yammaoto had a deper penetration rtaid than he already had undertaken. Its always a possibility, but some Japanese officers of flag rank already had cold feet about going this far.

My own opinion is that after a couple of months of trying to build the base, and trying to keep supplies going to Midway, the Japanese would have cut their losses, and abandoned the atoll. As a forward base it was untenable for them. The allies would have begun their attrition campaign, somewhere, and the japanese would have relised they needed to prepre for a long drawn out war. An early return to China might have been explored earlier, and/or the early invasion of India. This is all sheer speculation however. Factrs are we cant be sure about what might have happened. But further advance to hawaii seems most unlikely to me.

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## oldcrowcv63 (May 15, 2014)

Correction: in a prior post (this thread, #205) , I mentioned a CV vs CV model that I attributed to Keegan's Price of Admiralty. That was incorrect. the model was actually presented in _Fleet Tactics_ by retired Captain and Naval Aviator, Wayne P. Hughes Jr. (1986). Upon reviewing it, I believe it has certain flaws of simplicity but may at least be a start for discussing possible outcomes of unsymetric force confrontations we have been hypothesizing. My bottom line for any of these confrontations is that the Midway example is the least likely outcome and was itself pretty savagely fought with considerable loss to both sides despite the USN victory. One very interesting outcome of this "best case" scenario is the fact that, while the Yorktown was lost, damage to her sisters air wings was more than compensated by integrating the many refugees (VSB VF) from the damaged Yorktown's air group. Hiryu benefited in a somewhat similar manner, especially benefitting from reinforcement to her VF by the many orphaned morning CAP. If the IJN had Radar FD to augment the Zeroes performance advantage, it is possible that she might have survived the battle. Thus we may consider the USN as having a distinct survival advantage even with FD in its infancy and with the rather sub-par F4F-4 interceptor. 

It is also worth considering in the outcomes of these early CV battles that a sunk CV was the exception not the rule, for both Navies. Even after two bombs and torpedo hits, Lexington was able steam under her own power and to briefly conduct flight operations. She was ultimately done in by flaws in her design, made manifest by the damage inflicted. Likewise, the immobile Yorktown was being salvaged even after three bombs and at least two torpedo hits when she was only sunk by addition of two submarine launched torpedoes in nominally USN controlled waters. Shokaku took three 1,000 lb bomb hits at Coral Sea and escaped under her own power. Later, at Santa Cruz, she took 4 such hits and once again escaped under her own power. On two Occasions, Enterprise took a number of somewhat smaller, semi-AP HE hits, and was able to escape. Even Hornet pummeled by three 250 kg bombs, two torpedoes and two suicide a/c, was not sunk. In each case involving the loss of a USN carrier, the role of the IJN's type 91 aerial torpedo was paramount in disabling the USN CV in contested waters, forcing a subsequent scuttling. 

By the time of Santa Cruz, the IJN had radar early warning mounted on the Shokaku (September 1942) and the possibility of a Midway like outcome for either side had diminished substantially. 

Whatever the odds, based on carrier numbers, All CV vs CV battles produced significant casualties on both sides, with the more vulnerable IJN A/C generally being in somewhat worse shape at battle's conclusion. 

Also, even though the effect is obscured by events, the location of the battle may play a significant role in the results measured in surviving flight decks. 

If it takes place in ocean territory covered by robust land-based air coverage, the chances for a damaged carrier's survival probably increase. 

I think it matters that at Midway, Nimitz charge to his admirals was the famous "calculated risk" guidance statement. At Santa Cruz, Halsey's guidance was "Attack! Attack!" I am stirred by such aggressive, unambiguous direction and resolve, but was it the best move? The USN had, with Button (Espiritu Santu) and Cactus (Henderson Field) available A/Fs from which to stage strike and search a/c or even relay Carrier strikes. Yet, TF-16 17 responding to Halsey's command, advanced to over 500 miles distance from Button (ES) and over 400 miles distance from Cactus (HF). Land based air at Button was typically searching the area and striking at targets within 500 miles of the air base so, in hindsight, this appears to be an extremely risky move to make with the two remaining precious flight decks. 

In comparison, at Midway, TF-16 17 remained within 200 nm of the island airbase during the battle. Mutual support was difficult even at that relatively close range but the base did serve as a divert as well as fulfilling its role as an unsinkable carrier. 

So, I believe where the battle is fought becomes another factor in its potential outcome.


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## syscom3 (May 15, 2014)

"All CV vs CV battles produced significant casualties on both sides". 

Not true after 1942. US supremacy in aircraft, early warning, C&C of the CAP all contributed to less losses on the American side and increasing bad outcomes for the Japanese. Look at the results of the Mariana's battles in June 1944.

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## oldcrowcv63 (May 15, 2014)

syscom3 said:


> "All CV vs CV battles produced significant casualties on both sides".
> 
> Not true after 1942. US supremacy in aircraft, early warning, C&C of the CAP all contributed to less losses on the American side and increasing bad outcomes for the Japanese. Look at the results of the Mariana's battles in June 1944.



Yes, you are of course correct. I was thinking of those occurring in 1942 but should have specified.


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## parsifal (May 16, 2014)

Even during Santa cruz you can start to see that visible loss of proficiency by the japanese. they were well and truly on the way out by then


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 16, 2014)

Pars, you are probably right, but considering the damage done to the USN carriers, it seems to become most clear in the details. (Here considering only the initial attack on the american carriers by units of the IJN fleet carriers) A lot of the original cadre from Midway were apparently still flying and fighting at SC and they certainly achieved some notable success. Murata's torpedo run being perhaps foremost among them. Together Air Group Commander Takahashi's 21 Zuikaku VB and Squadron CO Murata's 20 Shokaku VT, executed a classic coordinated (near-simultaneous VB VT) attack scoring with three bomb and two torpedo hits (out of 8 drops from the 11 VT in the first Chutai) on Hornet despite its somewhat effective CAP defense against the VB and the 2nd VT Chutai (which had the more favorable near-beam aspect for their drops) and pretty fair ship handling by Mason. Apparently, Murata and company scored twice with stern aspect shots! 

Regarding attacks on Enterprise, considering that only one CAP F4F appears to have been able to score against Seki's Shokaku 19 VB with its depleted escort, one might expect better results than two hits (and a damaging miss). In comparison, Imajuku's 16 Kates arrived on the scene too late to coordinate with the VB component and half (2nd Chutai) met a very effective CAP interception that probably helped along with perhaps bad weather, to disrupt the intended anvil attack. Low cloud cover may have rendered the torpedo attack ineffective as one chutai of 8 unescorted Kates, unopposed by CAP, attacked with a bow aspect while the second Chutai of 8 escorted Kates was effectively opposed by CAP during its attack on the Enterprise's stern. 

One might justifiably expect more from so many attackers. But USN AAA had supposedly become far more effective presumably because of a substantial increase in the number of barrels aboard the defending screen. (I had heard a while back, don't recall the source, that the proximity fuse made its debut at Santa Cruz but I understand that didn't happen until some months later.) 

It's likely that, as you say, aircrew attrition and diminished quality of replacements in all A/C types played a role in reducing the damage to the USN units, especially in the case of Enterprise.


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## Francis marliere (May 16, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> I had heard a while back, don't recall the source, that the proximity fuse made its debut at Santa Cruz but I understand that didn't happen until some months late



According to Norman Friedman (Naval Anti-Aircraft Guns and Gunnery), the first use of proximity fuse was in January 1943. The AA weapon that made its debut at Santa Cruz was the 40 mm Bofors (albeit in small numbers).

Best,

Francis Marliere

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## Garyt (May 16, 2014)

> Whatever the odds, based on carrier numbers, All CV vs CV battles produced significant casualties on both sides, with the more vulnerable IJN A/C generally being in somewhat worse shape at battle's conclusion.



You know, if we look at the carrier losses, Midway was pretty simple, 3 carriers lost at the start due to having flight activities going on the hangar decks, including excess ordinance lying around. As I think you mentioned, use of early warning radar by the Japanese after Midway would make this far more rare. The only later situations of this happening were when some of the US carriers were struck by kamikazes. The Japanese kamikazes did not attack in waves like standard airstrikes, but a few here, a few there but intermitently throughout the day.

I thought this was not a good idea, why waste planes in sporadic attacks of a few at a time? But looking at it deeper, it makes sense. One big issue is the Allies can either cease flight operations and drain their AVGAS lines every time a bogey shows up on the radar - or they can keep on with flight operations but be more vulnerable. And a few bogies are likely not to generate as much concern, plus there is a limit on how many dive bombing (or kamikaze) planes can attack a ship in any given instance of time. This means more planes do not "split up" the AA fire as much as one would hope. The Essex class carriers that took extreme damage from 1-2 bomb or kamikaze hits are good examples of this.

But aside from getting hit while conducting flight operation, carriers were not as fragile as it would seem. Even though they were not struck by airstrikes, Shokaku and the Taiho were also struck in the middle of flight operations, albeit with torpedoes and not bombs.

Lexington was also sunk in a similar way to the Taiho. Avgas fumes getting into the ship, then exploding later. I don't think it's a coincidence that both of these were closed hangar carriers - which the US got away from after the Lexington class. The open hangar types basically had rolled sheet metal doors all around the hangar instead of walls - making it far easier to open to ventilate, or jettison ordinance off the side. Even a hangar deck explosion was not as bad, as an open hangar reduced the "enclosed space" issue than magnified the effects of an explosion. And it was easier for another ship to assist in fire fighting.

I know we always look at the US as having better damage control, which made the IJN vessels therefore "more vulnerable". I think this is true, but their are other factors. Older ships were in general less resistant to fire and flood. Even if recently refitted, a carrier built in 1925 and refitted in 1940 is still not as damage resistant as a ship built new in 1940.

If you look at the Shokaku and Zuikaku, these were both pretty resistant to damage and escaped after being heavily damaged many times. The had a fairly thick armored hanger deck protecting the magazines and engineering areas, about 5.5"-6" vs 3"-4" for the Yorktown and Essex classes. They were also brand new at the start of the war. I'd also add their armored hangar decks compared favorably to the Kaga and Akagi, who's hangar decks were similar to the Yorktown class.

I do think overall Japanese carriers were less damage resistant - lesser damage control, but also if you look at the Japanese vs. US "fleet carriers", Japan had a much higher percentage of pre 1940 carriers. This though had much to do with the US out producing Japan in newer, more damage efficient carriers. The close hangar design the Japanese stuck with I think also contributed to the fragility of their carriers.


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## Garyt (May 16, 2014)

> An invasion of Hawaii was strongly favoured by yammamoto, and his staff,



I never knew that. Thinking about it, It might have been the one thing that could have brought the US to the negotiating table. If not, depending on how intact it coul dbe taken, it would give the Japanese a strong forward base against the US. I think it would have been doomed to failure though, they underestimated the amount of troops needed it seems (45,000 would seem to be at best half of what was needed).

But a successful attack and occupation of the Hawaiian islands seems to fit Yammamoto's high risk high reward style. Very doubtfully would it had success, but were it to be it could have had a major effect on the war.

Any idea how many combat aircraft were stationed at Pearl at this time? And what type?


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## RCAFson (May 16, 2014)

Garyt said:


> You know, if we look at the carrier losses, Midway was pretty simple, 3 carriers lost at the start due to having flight activities going on the hangar decks, including excess ordinance lying around. As I think you mentioned, use of early warning radar by the Japanese after Midway would make this far more rare. The only later situations of this happening were when some of the US carriers were struck by kamikazes. The Japanese kamikazes did not attack in waves like standard airstrikes, but a few here, a few there but intermitently throughout the day.
> 
> I thought this was not a good idea, why waste planes in sporadic attacks of a few at a time? But looking at it deeper, it makes sense. One big issue is the Allies can either cease flight operations and drain their AVGAS lines every time a bogey shows up on the radar - or they can keep on with flight operations but be more vulnerable. And a few bogies are likely not to generate as much concern, plus there is a limit on how many dive bombing (or kamikaze) planes can attack a ship in any given instance of time. This means more planes do not "split up" the AA fire as much as one would hope. The Essex class carriers that took extreme damage from 1-2 bomb or kamikaze hits are good examples of this.
> 
> ...



The basic problem with Taiho and Lexington was not their closed hangars but their very poorly designed avgas systems and it was avgas explosions *outside* their hangars that doomed both ships. The first 3 IJN carriers lost at Midway were lost for much the same reason that Franklin and Bunker Hill were nearly lost; massive conflagrations that were started by bombs that penetrated the unarmoured flight decks into open hangars loaded with fuelled and armed aircraft. The lack of armoured containment systems around the hangars allowed the resulting fires to destroy or nearly destroy the ships. Franklin would probably have been scuttled if operated by the IJN at Midway because she lost power for many hours.


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## Garyt (May 16, 2014)

> The basic problem with Taiho and Lexington was not their closed hangars but their very poorly designed avgas systems and it was avgas explosions outside their hangars that doomed both ships



I know the initial explosions were not in the hangars - It was the AVGAS tanks being ruptured by torpedo hits. Where the closed hangars come into play is that an open hangar ship is very easy do ventilate - a closed hangar much more so tougher to ventilate. From Combinedfleet.com:



> The impact punches a hole in the hull which floods the forward elevator well and gives the TAIHO a 1.5 meter trim by the bow, but she maintains speed at 26 knots. The forward elevator, which was raised for launching operations is jarred loose and falls two meters, disrupting take-off operations and the torpedo hit cracks the av-gas tanks underneath it as well. As a result, free gasoline mixes with the water flooding the forward elevator well and av-gas vapor builds up in the space. Within a half-hour damage control has planked over the settled No.1 elevator and the remaining planes were launched. However, the gas vapor builds in the closed hanger and enclosed bow area and becomes serious. *Efforts to free the mounting vapor by knocking holes in the ship's side or to ventilate the hangar are made.*



If this were an open hangar carrier, ventilation would have been very easy, merely roll up all the hangar sides as one would open a garage door. Far more ventilation than knocking holes in the ship's side, and far more simpler to accomplish.

The explosion of AVGAS fumes later occurred in the Hangar area:



> At 1432 a tremendous induced explosion of gas vapor occurs forward, buckling the armored flight deck upward and blowing out the sides of the hangar deck. The precise force and cause of the explosion are somewhat ambiguous (see Note 1 for details), but the shock of the blast ruptured the hull below the waterline, and all power failed.






> The first 3 IJN carriers lost at Midway were lost for much the same reason that Franklin and Bunker Hill were nearly lost; massive conflagrations that were started by bombs that penetrated the unarmoured flight decks into open hangars loaded with fuelled and armed aircraft. The lack of armoured containment systems around the hangars allowed the resulting fires to destroy or nearly destroy the ships.



Yeah, pretty much what I just mentioned above. And by draining AVGAS lines and ceasing air operations, the carrier is rendered far less vulnerable.


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## RCAFson (May 16, 2014)

Garyt said:


> I know the initial explosions were not in the hangars - It was the AVGAS tanks being ruptured by torpedo hits. Where the closed hangars come into play is that an open hangar ship is very easy do ventilate - a closed hangar much more so tougher to ventilate. From Combinedfleet.com:


I don't want to sidetrack the discussion, but Taiho could have ventilated her hangars by lowering both elevators allowing the air to naturally circulate. Instead they opted to continue air ops and turned on their forced air ventilation systems which forced the vapour into other areas of the ship which then doomed her when it exploded. Taiho sank from explosions within the hull that were under the waterline, yet her hangars were well above the waterline and although they did explode they couldn't have sunk the ship. Lexington's damage report states that the initial avgas explosions occurred forward of the forward elevator, outside the hangars.


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## Garyt (May 16, 2014)

> but Taiho could have ventilated her hangars by lowering both elevators allowing the air to naturally circulate. Instead they opted to continue air ops and turned on their forced air ventilation systems which forced the vapour into other areas of the ship which then doomed her when it exploded.



And an open hanger vessel could have opened the hangars up and continued air operation. Opening up the hangars will provide a lot more ventilation than lowering the elevators would.



> Taiho sank from explosions within the hull that were under the waterline, yet her hangars were well above the waterline and although they did explode they couldn't have sunk the ship



Explosion at the hanger deck can indeed sink a ship - though it might be slowly. Enough interior concussion damage could be done to hurt the ships structural integrity - and cause it too slowly sink due to progressive flooding. But what was the coup de grace was apparently some of the magazines exploding, which would have been set in place by the initial AVGAS explosions.

Even on the Lexington, the explosion was forward of the hangar. That means roughly hangar level. My point being, if you can open the hangar doors you provide a method to thoroughly ventilate the hangar level.


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## VBF-13 (May 17, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Who was going to make that decision? An invasion of Hawaii was strongly favoured by yammamoto, and his staff, and the general intent seems to have been to use a blockade of Pearl as some sort of bargaining chip at the expected peace talks, but apart from that, outright invasion had been vetoed by the army, and their agreement would have been needed to undertake the invasion. moreover it was also an operation also expressly refused by the Admiralty....Yammamotos boss.
> 
> He would have faced a court martial and disgrace if he had tried to pull it off. He needed to go back to the Imperial Council and get specific authorisation if he wanted to do that. Thats a possibility, but not as an immediate flow on from the operation. To give you a parrallel, in 1944, the USN favoured an invasion of Formosa over Luzon. Mac wanted to return to the PI as promised. Eventually he played dirty pool, went the president and overruled the Navy. What do you think might happen to nimitz if he decided to take Mac to Formosa anyway....things miliatry just dont work that way, not even for the japanese.
> 
> ...


I hope you like bacon, lol. Really, this is very good. Let's see if we can climb a higher ladder, still. The Japanese kicked a hornet's nest, on that "date which will live in infamy." But let's go back, just a little further. If they were paying attention--and, you know, Yamamoto was, he "knew"--we were already turning the corner, coming out of our Depression. The “signs” were there. I’ll just get right down on the street, 22nd Street, in Cicero, Illinois, my home town. We had a Western Electric plant, there, it was a four-story building. Even as late into our Depression as 1939, it was still a virtual ghost town. By 1941, it was employing around 60,000 people, in three shifts, around the clock, just making communications and related component-equipment. My grandmother worked there. So, too, did my dad, just before his induction. If they were paying attention, they knew they couldn’t win this. And, there’s possibly your strongest rationale for Yamamoto, and his aggressiveness. The others, naturally, are going to have colder feet. He “knew” our capability, much better than they.

It's interesting to speculate on how far he'd have gone had he had complete autonomy. Maybe we're talking through our hats, talking an invasion of Hawaii. But, maybe we're not. That one's always going to be up for grabs, I think.


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## Balljoint (May 17, 2014)

Imperial Japan had a proud history of decisive battles with Russia and, like England, being a secure island nation, the original Divine Wind victory being an example of the latter. The Doolittle raid caused a profound loss of face. Just how deluded Yamamoto was is illustrated by the planning in the US while he was planning Midway.

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## parsifal (May 17, 2014)

I wouldnt go so far as to say he was deluded. Thats quite derogatory, and he doesnt deserve to be derided. the opposite actually. Yammamoto was against the german alliance, did not want to go to war with the west, did not think that Japan could win a long war with the US, and thought the likely outcome of an aggressive act against the US was a long drawn out war. He is a complex character at the best of times. Was a devoted navy man, and husband and father, yet drank and visited geishas regularly. He was smart, and possessed a keen military eye. 

Tactically he was the first to put carriers together in a group and make them train together so that they worked more effectively as a team. One of the first to recognize that one of the most important attributes of aircraft in the pacific was range, and one of the first to develop the concept of the task group. So he was smart. His country having decided to make war, not his choice, like any patriot, he applied himself with all his energy and strength to getting the best for his country. he did not enjoy the same degree of control over his fleet as nimitz did. he was somewhere between halsey and Nimitiz really. Perhaps a Nelson or a jellicoe 

He was never happy with the Midway plan. But he also knew time was running out for japan. The Japanese needed to do something to force a full showdown and decisive defeat of the US, in the way he had been trained a decisive battle in favour of Japan would force the US to the peace table. Either the US would make peace, or the field of battle left in favour of the Japanese thereby allowing them to consolidate their position to the point of being unassailable.

To reach that point, Yammamoto believed they had to march up the main street of Washington and knock on the door of the White House. he had a very good concept of American resolve. He also knew that Japan had no hope of doing that, so the next best thing was a comprehensive shock and awe program. midway was meant to do that. If Yammamo had had his way all of Japans energies would have been devoted to invading Hawaii, which he hoped might give them the leverage to end the war. All he got was a watered down version....the MI operation. Both scenarios, the invasion of Midway, and the invasion of Hawaii, were unlikely to secure the peace he was looking for. only with the complete defeat of the USN would he able to achieve a situation of impotency for the US, and even then, such reprieve was temporary, One year maybe, at best as the US increased its production, and mobilisation even further.

This isnt delusion, its realism, Japanese style. Being stuck in the losing team, knowing your team doesnt really have the wherewith all to achieve victory makes you think outside the box. Yammamoto did that. He could play on my team anytime if we went to war. during the planning for his destruction, I think it was Nimitz who asked, what the implications would be if he was killed....someone replied.....it would be like if the Japanese killed you (nimitz). The US command relaised he was irreplaceable for the Japanese navy, and took the opportunity to get rid of him.

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## RpR (May 18, 2014)

parsifal said:


> My own opinion is that after a couple of months of trying to build the base, and trying to keep supplies going to Midway, the Japanese would have cut their losses, and abandoned the atoll. As a forward base it was untenable for them. The allies would have begun their attrition campaign, somewhere, and the japanese would have relised they needed to prepre for a long drawn out war. An early return to China might have been explored earlier, and/or the early invasion of India. This is all sheer speculation however. Factrs are we cant be sure about what might have happened. But further advance to hawaii seems most unlikely to me.


Based on what?

The airbase at Midway was done before the war, including a completed hospital.
The allies finished already started, not new plan by mid-1943, so the Japanese would have captured already started work, not start from scratch.
The Japanese never left Wake which was less important than Midway.

You are trying to reduce the importance of Midway, for some reason, to make it less that it really was.
You are thinking too much in internet extremely short term information exchange type think. That was NOT around in the forties.
If the Japanese would be so moronic to abandon a major base only 1,500 miles from Hawaii, had they won and not the U.S.,then they would have been to stupid to successfully attack Hawaii in the first place.


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 18, 2014)

parsifal said:


> "I think it was Nimitz who asked, what the implications would be if he was killed....someone replied.....it would be like if the Japanese killed you (nimitz). The US command relaised he was irreplaceable for the Japanese navy, and took the opportunity to get rid of him."



The way I heard it was that when Nimitz was asked what Yamamoto's value was to the IJN, he or someone else said "at least a carrier battle group" (or something like to that effect). Haven't be able to find any quote or confirmation.


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## syscom3 (May 18, 2014)

BobR said:


> Based on what?
> 
> The airbase at Midway was done before the war, including a completed hospital.
> The allies finished already started, not new plan by mid-1943, so the Japanese would have captured already started work, not start from scratch.
> ...



If you cant supply the island, then what use is it? Basic logistics is what you're forgetting. Midway is several days sailing from the nearest Japanese base. Midway is also only 6 hours flying time for B17's and B24's to pummel it.


I can also imagine that in August 1942, the first US counter offensive would be Midway.


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## GrauGeist (May 18, 2014)

BobR said:


> Based on what?
> 
> The airbase at Midway was done before the war, including a completed hospital.
> The allies finished already started, not new plan by mid-1943, so the Japanese would have captured already started work, not start from scratch.
> ...


I hate to burst your bubble, but Midway was ONLY useful as a waypoint, established originally as a fuelling station for trans-pacific passenger flights.

It had NO real strategic value as it's distance from Hawaii was at the max range for aircraft and in NO way influenced West coast operations. It did not possess a harbor large enough to be an anchorage to Capital ships and the only 2 islands large enough for airstrips were limited in area usuable to store aircraft on a large scale.

Had the Japanese succeeded in securing the island, the U.S. submarine action would have made it costly to Japanese shipping, especially being as close to their homebase in Pearl. And the Japanese would have had to allocate more resources to hold onto it than they would have been willing to commit. They were already proving that fact with their operations in the Aleutians.

And with the Aleutians in mind, tell me, just how much of a tactical success was the Aleutians? It was such a stunning success, that it had nearly a zero impact on the Pacific war.

The ONLY islands that Japan could have taken, that would have a serious impact on the U.S., would be Santa Catalina island, Santa Barbara island or any of the channel islands off the coast of California.

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## parsifal (May 18, 2014)

BobR said:


> Based on what?
> 
> The airbase at Midway was done before the war, including a completed hospital.
> The allies finished already started, not new plan by mid-1943, so the Japanese would have captured already started work, not start from scratch.
> ...




Hi bob

Sys and GG have pretty much given reasons why it was untenable. I think if Midway had fallen, at the very least it would have become a live firing range for the US carriers and surface fleets, a place to send all those older subs that lacked the range to get to the main Japanese shipping lanes, and the subject of much attention by the US marine Corps. As it was, Ichikis detachment and the SNLF formation were both needed elsewhere in the pacific. Something not fully realised was that at this stage of the war, there were only about 3 divisions or equivalent, in the Pacific, and the forces committed to midway represented about 15% of that force structure. Already, on the southern front, the Japanese were facing 3 American Divs (not yet combat ready but getting there), plus the MAF, based around US 2 marine Div. there were two divs in the central Pacific, a further division in the far north. The Australians had recalled the AIF, delivering the 6 and 7th Divisions for offensive operations.These were combat ready and seasoned troops. There were 11 militia divs,. of which about 5 were ready, and perhaps 2 in the combat area already. Japan needed to additional garrison troops, and eventually deployed the equivalent of 10 such divisions into the theatre, but in mid 1942 they were not yet ready to do that. This was one of the reasons why the army was so against open ended commitments in the pacific. from their perspective, the pacific was a secondary front, that distracted thyem from their main game in China. .

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## oldcrowcv63 (May 18, 2014)

syscom3 said:


> If you cant supply the island, then what use is it? Basic logistics is what you're forgetting. Midway is several days sailing from the nearest Japanese base. Midway is also only 6 hours flying time for B17's and B24's to pummel it.
> 
> I can also imagine that in August 1942, the first US counter offensive would be Midway.



Not sure I concur with your "first counter offensive" because maintaining supply lines to Australia is so important. I don't believe Midway was quite as vital, at this stage of the US war effort, as sustaining Australia. Even so, if not the first counteroffensive, then surely the second. That decision is above my pay grade… 

But I do think your suggestion that Midway would be pummeled by B-17s (and 24s) is totally correct and probably more damaging to the IJN effort than might be expected in a cursory examination. As previously mentioned, the heavy bomber force in Hawaii had been heavily reinforced (~60 B-17s). Midway airfield is a small target. 21 A6Ms would be woefully insufficient for the island''s defense, especially without RADAR. IJN defending Zeroes would be as vulnerable as were the Marine fighters at Wake Island. The fleet units and an occupied airfield will be subject to 24 hour attack, including by ASV equipped a/c. Note how quickly Wake Island's VMF a/c were reduced w/o radar. The IJN Zeroes on Midway will be similarly exposed. IJN surface and IJA ground units become more vulnerable as the invasion attempt progresses due to the need for spatial concentration. 

I doubt they would have lasted as long being under continuous day and night attack as would any surface units clustered around the small island. ASV radar suggests the strong possibility of round the clock assault on any attempt to occupy the island or sustain an occupation. Add to that the certain USN Sub presence to interdict the island's resupply and you have a new candidate for starvation island. 

Seems to me that Midway can only fall with the USN suffering a Midway in reverse which is improbable for two reasons. 

1. The USN has RADAR and is unlikely to be caught in quite the same vulnerable state as Kido Butai.
2. The IJN has a split agenda, island capture and destruction of USN carriers which translates to reduction of the initial force that can be brought to bear on the USN. 

Even in the event of a serious USN defeat (one or two CVs sunk, and a third damaged, assuming SS's (page 166) 30 torpedo armed Kates can be added to the attack on the USN forces with a similarly sized VB component. Adding a substantial strike escort will deplete the defenders of Kido Butai to the point where it is likely to suffer more serious damage rather than less. (perhaps a Mk 13 torpedo hit or two  It happened at Coral Sea! )

With two new USN CVs on scene, something like CV parity is restored soon after the events of Midway are resolved.


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## gjs238 (May 18, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> And with the Aleutians in mind, tell me, just how much of a tactical success was the Aleutians? It was such a stunning success, that it had nearly a zero impact on the Pacific war.



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alaska_highway


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 18, 2014)

Gjs, 

From the wiki page you posted:

"_The official start of construction took place on *March 8, 1942* after hundreds of pieces of construction equipment were moved on priority trains by the Northern Alberta Railways to the northeastern part of British Columbia near Mile 0 at Dawson Creek. Construction accelerated through the spring as the winter weather faded away and crews were able to work from both the northern and southern ends; they were spurred on after reports of the Japanese invasion of Kiska Island and Attu Island in the Aleutians._"

My understanding of the allied View of the Alaskan Theater and the Aleutians was as a future launching point for the B-29 raids on the main Japanese islands, perhaps as an alternate to the central pacific route. In the event, Fletcher took command of Naval air forces in the Theater and used the resources provided him to wage a campaign of harassment of the Kurile islands using Lockheed PV-1 -2 Venturas and Harpoons.

PBS _NOVA_ did a show on the recovery of crew remains of a plane lost on one such mission:

NOVA | Last Flight of Bomber 31 | TV Program Description | PBS


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## GrauGeist (May 18, 2014)

gjs238 said:


> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alaska_highway


Well, ok...the Aleutian campaign accelerated the Alaska highway project...lol


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## parsifal (May 18, 2014)

> But I do think your suggestion that Midway would be pummeled by B-17s (and 24s) is totally correct and probably more damaging to the IJN effort than might be expected in a cursory examination. As previously mentioned, the heavy bomber force in Hawaii had been heavily reinforced (~60 B-17s). Midway airfield is a small target. 21 A6Ms would be woefully insufficient for the island''s defense, especially without RADAR. IJN defending Zeroes would be as vulnerable as were the Marine fighters at Wake Island. The fleet units and an occupied airfield will be subject to 24 hour attack, including by ASV equipped a/c. Note how quickly Wake Island's VMF a/c were reduced w/o radar. The IJN Zeroes on Midway will be similarly exposed. IJN surface and IJA ground units become more vulnerable as the invasion attempt progresses due to the need for spatial concentration.




Hi Oldcrow

Japan already had land based radar by the middle of '42, so, provided there was an installation carried out on midway, its likely to expect it. 

In the absence of a radar station, the Japanese are likley to do what they normally did in similar situations, set up a floating observation picket of some description. Not nearly as effective, but unlikely to catch the Japanese fighters on the deck either. 


I would think there would be some delay in getting heavy bombers into action over Midway. is it not too far for B-17s (there were no B-24s that Im aware of in mid 1942 in the PTO) to fly continuously from the main islands of hawaii to midway in a bombed up condition? 


This source

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/B-17/B-17G_Standard_Aircraft_Characteristics.pdf

gives a radius of 2684 miles, cruising at 10000 feet, no bombs or guns and not exceeding 150 mph. with any sort of bomb load it seems to have had an effective combat radius of about 800 miles. roughly the same effective range of the Zeke incidentally


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 18, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Hi Oldcrow
> 
> Japan already had land based radar by the middle of '42, so, provided there was an installation carried out on midway, its likely to expect it.
> 
> ...



You are right on both counts Pars! I didn't know about the IJN Type 1 Model 1 RADAR discovered at Guadalcanal in early August. and the units apparently slated for Midway and the Aleutians. They seem to have performed fairly well. 

The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia: Type 11 Early Warning Radar

Apparently, the first Japanese EW pulse radar was deployed in Japan in November, 1941! 

Also, the B-17's range is as limited as you've described. (should have checked, but I just assumed the army had it under control  ) The performance table in the cited reference do not seem helpful in determining a load out for the maximum cited range. (it seems to assume the same load at all ranges) On the other hand, Range from Hickam field is over 1,300 miles and from Barking Sands about 1,200 miles (I wonder whether BS field could handle a B-17?). There may have been two options to mitigate the range limitation for the B-17. However both are subject to subject to Japanese interdiction. The first is Johnston Island lying about 950 miles to the South West of Oahu. I 'd expect bomb load and defensive ammo carried to be extremely limited. The second is French Frigate Shoals about 750 miles from Midway Island, which did not have an operational airfield until some time after Midway.

Late edit correction. Looks like the chart on the fifth page does allow a smaller bomb load to be carried the required distance under certain flight regimes. 10,000 feet which seems bad if fighters are given even minimal warning.


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## RpR (May 18, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> I hate to burst your bubble, but Midway was ONLY useful as a waypoint, established originally as a fuelling station for trans-pacific passenger flights.
> 
> It had NO real strategic value as it's distance from Hawaii was at the max range for aircraft and in NO way influenced West coast operations. It did not possess a harbor large enough to be an anchorage to Capital ships and the only 2 islands large enough for airstrips were limited in area usuable to store aircraft on a large scale.
> 
> ...


With failure at Midway, the Alaskan campaign became pointless, although they stil stayed til mid-1943. It succeeded in keeping a large Allied force fighting there , in gawd awful conditions, so it was far from a total failure.
You and Parsifal keep stating in your opinion x, y or g which seems to be based on naval history AFTER Midway was successfully defended.

Had Japan won that all means diddly-squat.

Rather than opinion, which is what you repeatedly base your scenario on here is some more history of Midway from official Navy files:

The development of Midway under the Pacific Naval Air Base contracts began on March 27, 1940. A dredge was towed in, and the contractors directed their efforts toward the enlargement of the existing basins and channels. A small-boat channel, 12,000 feet long, 50 feet wide, and 10 feet deep, was dredged between Sand and Eastern islands, and a mooring berth, protected by sheet-piling, was built on the latter. Approximately 3,000,000 cubic yards of material were removed in these dredging operations.

Three asphalt-paved runways were constructed on Eastern Island; each was 300 feet wide and 3250 feet, 4500 feet, and 5300 feet long, respectively. Two hangars were constructed, with parking areas and warm-up mats. Small industrial areas were erected, which included the various necessary shops and storage facilities.

A large seaplane hangar, a parking mat, and one concrete ramp were constructed, and an ordnance shop, radio shop, engine shop, and a storehouse and tool room were built around the seaplane hangar to facilitate major overhaul work.

Fighter, bomber, and patrol ready-rooms were constructed, and housing and messing facilities set up for operational personnel. Quonset huts were extensively used.

Approximately 2800 feet of sheet-piling bulkhead was installed on Sand Island. Dredged material was pumped behind this bulkhead, and upon this fill, a large seaplane parking-mat was constructed. Four, concrete, seaplane ramps were built, together with an additional emergency ramp and approach to the mat, and a large, steel, seaplane hangar was erected on the edge of the mat.

Construction was started on underground gasoline storage in twenty-two 2500-gallon steel tanks.

A naval hospital was built by the contractors, who utilized three of the four existing buildings owned by the commercial cable company. These buildings, located on Sand Island, were later augmented by a large underground structure of concrete.

Barracks for naval and Marine personnel were built, together with all necessary accessories such as messhalls, warehouses, administration buildings, commissaries, and cold-storage buildings. The power plant for Sand Island was housed in a bombproof structure of reinforced-concrete and steel.

Midway was subjected to surface shelling by the Japanese on December 7, 1941, which caused considerable material damage and many wounds to personnel...... April 4, 1943, to relieve the Fifth, which returned to Pearl Harbor. The 50th and the 10th Battalions, acting as a unit, lengthened and paved the Sand Island airfield, two strips to 7,500 feet and one to 8,600 feet; erected four 13,500-barrel underground welded-steel tanks for diesel oil and four 27,000-barrel tanks for fuel oil, complete with piping, and underground pumphouses; constructed six timber finger-piers, complete with electrical, oil, air, and water services; and installed 2,900 feet of cellular steel-sheet piling. They also operated the Navy dredge YD-69.

Late in April 1943, the contractors' men again returned to begin work on an enlarged dredging program. The existing ship channel was widened from 300 feet to 400 feet and deepened to 35 feet. The anchorage area was expanded to a mooring capacity of six cruisers, five destroyers or submarines, and one repair ship.

Three areas were dredged, and 5,000,000 cubic yards of material removed.

CBMU 524 arrived in October 1943 to take over maintenance duties, complete the large underground hospital, and set up a recreation and recuperation center at the submarine base. The 10th Battalion which departed for Pearl Harbor in November 1943, was replaced by CBMU 531. The two maintenance units were then combined and continued to carry on their duties as a unit.

Had the Japanese taken the Island they could have just as easily done similar work post Midway Battle as without Midway Wake would not have been blockaded and it could, probably would have been a shuttle point as it was only 1,180 miles from Midway which is hundreds of miles closer to Midway than Hawaii is. (That work listed was FINISHED by mid-1943, not started as it was continuation of work started before the war.)
As the submarines you say are so important would have had to operate out of Hawaii and not Midway as they actually did, your scenario is void.
They would have been as over extended as you say the Japanese would have been.

Hawaii would not have been the next target, Johnston Atoll would have been


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## GrauGeist (May 18, 2014)

BobR said:


> With failure at Midway, the Alaskan campaign became pointless, although they stil stayed til mid-1943. It succeeded in keeping a large Allied force fighting there , in gawd awful conditions, so it was far from a total failure.
> You and Parsifal keep stating in your opinion x, y or g which seems to be based on naval history AFTER Midway was successfully defended.
> 
> Had Japan won that all means diddly-squat.
> ...


You don't want to hear my opinion, Bob...you wouldn't like it.

I am basing my replies on FACT, not opinion.



BobR said:


> The development of Midway under the Pacific Naval Air Base contracts began on March 27, 1940. A dredge was towed in, and the contractors directed their efforts toward the enlargement of the existing basins and channels. *A small-boat channel, 12,000 feet long, 50 feet wide, and 10 feet deep*, was dredged between Sand and Eastern islands, and a mooring berth, protected by sheet-piling, was built on the latter. Approximately 3,000,000 cubic yards of material were removed in these dredging operations.


Yep, big enough to safe-harbor battleships, aircraft carriers, oilers and sever hundred other ships, just like a cozy Truk Lagoon, right?

I am going to assume that you've looked at a map of the atoll and seen the layout of the channel. that channel is a big, fat, tempting treat for submarines, who would most likely wait until a large ship tries to squeeze into your hypothetical harbor and then sink it right there, blocking the entire access, trapping all the other ships inside.



BobR said:


> Three asphalt-paved runways were constructed on Eastern Island; each was 300 feet wide and 3250 feet, 4500 feet, and 5300 feet long, respectively. Two hangars were constructed, with parking areas and warm-up mats. Small industrial areas were erected, which included the various necessary shops and storage facilities.
> 
> *A large seaplane hangar*, a parking mat, and one concrete ramp were constructed, and an ordnance shop, radio shop, engine shop, and a storehouse and tool room were built around the seaplane hangar to facilitate major overhaul work.


In this reference, "A" means one...single, solitary...not a much to work with there, Bob...



BobR said:


> Fighter, bomber, and patrol ready-rooms were constructed, and housing and messing facilities set up for operational personnel. Quonset huts were extensively used.
> 
> Approximately 2800 feet of sheet-piling bulkhead was installed on Sand Island. Dredged material was pumped behind this bulkhead, and upon this fill, a large seaplane parking-mat was constructed. Four, concrete, seaplane ramps were built, together with an additional emergency ramp and approach to the mat, and a large, steel, seaplane hangar was erected on the edge of the mat.
> 
> ...


I suppose now would be a good time to point out all that was done on Midway after the battle *was done so un-challenged?*

In otherwords, if the Japanese had taken the island, do you suppose the U.S. was just going to roll over and cry and run home, or do you suppose that Midway would now become the focus of it's operations?



BobR said:


> Had the Japanese taken the Island they could have just as easily done similar work post Midway Battle as without Midway Wake would not have been blockaded and it could, probably would have been a shuttle point as it was only 1,180 miles from Midway which is hundreds of miles closer to Midway than Hawaii is. (That work listed was FINISHED by mid-1943, not started as it was continuation of work started before the war.)
> As the submarines you say are so important would have had to operate out of Hawaii and not Midway as they actually did, your scenario is void.
> They would have been as over extended as you say the Japanese would have been.
> 
> Hawaii would not have been the next target, Johnston Atoll would have been


ComSubPac operated out of Pearl, as I mentioned before...well within short operating distance to Midway. I have no idea where you came up with the idea that subs operated from Midway.

My argument is certainly not void...the Japanese taking Midway so close to Pearl means a number of things:
One: we know where they are.
Two: we can easliy strangle the Japanese operation there with submarine attrition.
Three: The Japanese will have to divert resources away from other south pacific operations to protect Midway from constant harrassment.

As far as the comment about the Japanese taking the microscopic Johnston Atoll, well...hey, at least it was important enough for a Japanese submarine to attack it a few times.


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## parsifal (May 18, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> You are right on both counts Pars! I didn't know about the IJN Type 1 Model 1 RADAR discovered at Guadalcanal in early August. and the units apparently slated for Midway and the Aleutians. They seem to have performed fairly well.
> 
> The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia: Type 11 Early Warning Radar
> 
> ...




Thanks. Im not saying that Midway could or should have been held, but its isolation made it similar to wake in some ways. 

The Japanese were wont to taking islands that could not support an airsrtrip or that didnt have an airstrip when taken, and which they didnt develop for the puprose. Midway had an airstrip, a jetty and a flying boat basin, but it was a badly exposed atoll, as the japanese strike themselves showed. Even though a second strike was deemed necessary by the Japanese air leader, the first strike in the morning seems to have done a lot of damage just the same. Despite the claims of our friend, the Marines were not that well dug in and the Japanese might have had difficulties in improving on that given the supply difficulties they could encounter, and the terrain of the atoll. 

But getting back to the heavy bombers over Midway question, i am intrigued. okay, so Hawaii was too far away, but there are intervening islands. Could these be developed for an airstrip. A bomber strip is a different proposition to your standard garden variety. What are the islands between Oahu and Midway like....I believe the ones close to oahu are mountainish crags, but the ones further out are flatter. Anybody seen them? Or know what they are like?


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 18, 2014)

The one at French Frigate Shoals was built shortly after Midway's battle. Here is a photo from 1943 its about 3,000 feet in length. located roughly half way to Midway from Oahu.

http://www.airfields-freeman.com/


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## GrauGeist (May 19, 2014)

The chain of "leeward" Islands were really nothing more than windswept coral atoll complexes and like the one shown above, few barely large enough for airfields.


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## RpR (May 19, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> [/COLOR]
> I am basing my replies on FACT, not opinion.---- ROFL
> 
> 
> ...


---- One would imagine you are laughing at you ignorance so lets take you microscopic atoll and see what it meant and during WWII.
Actually try reading it before you flatulate through your keyboard.



Further development of Johnston Island was undertaken in 1939 with the purpose of providing facilities to support the operation of one squadron

--158--

of patrol planes with tender support. Civilian forces, under the PNAB contract, began work on November 9, 1939, at Sand Island, for which the initial development was planned.

During January 1940, a barge equipped with a crane and a 6-foot clamshell was brought in and put to work widening and deepening the shallow entrance channel. After the barge had worked its way into the lagoon and had excavated a small turning basin, it was dismantled and moved ashore. A 12-foot clamshell dredge arrived on May 5, and continued the dredging. Within the lagoon, a turning basin, 1,000 feet square, was dredged and a narrow channel projected in the direction of Sand Island. Excavated material was used to make a plane parking area, 800 feet long and 300 feet wide, adjacent to the ship channel and connected to Sand Island by a 2,000-foot causeway. This parking area was equipped with a 60-foot bulkhead, a concrete seaplane ramp, 50 feet wide, supported on steel piles, and two 25,000-gallon steel tanks for gasoline. The buildings on Sand Island included barracks for 400 men, a messhall, an underground hospital, a radio station, two water tanks with evaporating equipment, an electric power and boiler house, a laundry, and several storehouses. A 100-foot steel tower served as a combination standpipe for the fresh-water system and control tower for plane operation.

*Dredging meanwhile was continued in the lagoon to provide safe water for seaplane runways. Three such runways were developed, the major one, 11,000 feet long and 1,000 feet wide, with two cross-runways, each 7,000 feet long and 800 feet wide. These were cleared to a depth of 8 feet at low tide.*

In September 1941, work was begun enlarging the land mass of Johnston Island to provide an airstrip. The initial plan called for a filled-in area, 200 feet wide and 2,500 feet long, to be developed along the south shore of the island, but when this area had been completed, the operation was continued to extend the landing mat to a length of 4,000 feet and a width of 500 feet. Material was obtained from the lagoon dredging. With all operations concentrated on Johnston, the contractor vacated the buildings on Sand Island to the naval personnel who moved in to operate the seaplane facilities.

Under the contract, the building program which progressed simultaneously with dredging and runway construction, accomplished the erection of two 400-man barracks, two large mess halls, a 30,000-cubic-foot cold-storage building, a powerhouse, a 50-bed underground hospital, a fresh-water evaporating plant, several shop buildings, three 8-room cottages, 16,000 barrels of fuel storage, and the installation of five 25,000-gallon gasoline tanks. These features were all usably complete by December 7, 1941.

*When the news of the attack on Pearl Harbor reached Johnston Island, construction work was temporarily abandoned and all personnel were used for immediate defense preparations. On December 15, 1941, the island was shelled form an enemy submarine firing from beyond the reef. Several buildings were damaged, but none of the personnel were injured.*

*Land-plane facilities on Johnston Island now became a strategic imperative in the defense plans for the Hawaiian Islands.* A large hydraulic dredge was brought to the island to speed the work. The dredge remained until January 1943, and completed the main seaplane runway to a length of 5,200 feet and a width of 500 feet, and extended the north shore of the island to accommodate an auxiliary runway, 3,400 feet long by 200 feet wide, and a large seaplane parking area.

All civilian personnel, with the exception of the dredge crew, were replaced during July 1942 by a force of 500 men drawn from the 5th and 10th Seabees, who took up construction where the contractors left off and carried the current program, except for the dredging, to completion. The 5th Battalion departed during January 1943; but 250 men of the 10th remained until the following December.

Seabee construction included two 13,500-barrel diesel tanks, two 17,000-barrel fuel-oil tanks, and thirteen 25,000-gallon tanks, with associated pumping, filtering, and issuing equipment; a pier, 460 feet long and 30 feet wide, supported on steel piles; a small-boat pier; a float for seaplanes; a concrete power house; a recreation building; an aviation repair shop; 90 quonset huts for housing; a radio station; and 50 concrete magazines, in addition to the installation of new evaporating equipment which brought the total daily fresh-water production to 30,000 gallons.

During the summer of 1943, air traffic increased steadily as our war effort gained momentum. Johnston Island was, *in addition to being a base for patrol planes and a submarine fueling stop, rapidly

--159--

becoming an important stop along the westward air-transport route*.

As a result, it became necessary to increase the length of the main land-plane runway to enable it to accommodate heavy long-range bombers and transports, and a detachment from the 99th Seabees arrived during December 1943 to do this work. By use of a hydraulic dredge, the island was lengthened 800 feet to provide a 6,000-foot runway. Ten acres of parking area were also added adjacent to the seaplane operating area.



As I said, your rhetoric is void.


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## GrauGeist (May 19, 2014)

And in spite of all of your rabid, bold red text, you fail to see the point.

ALL OF THAT EXPANSION WAS DONE AFTER THE BATTLE, IN SECURE CONDITIONS WHERE THE NAVY HAD THE LUXURY OF ENHANCING THE FACILITIES AS A REAR AREA.

The Japanese would have had no such luxury.

Your entire argument is invalid.


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## parsifal (May 19, 2014)

please, stop shouting and abusing each other. This is a discussion, based on opinion. nobody is right or wrong in these sorts of exchanges, but i tell you what, we can sure all lose

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## GrauGeist (May 19, 2014)

Agreed.

I suppose there's a point when a person has to just step back and let things run their course.


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 19, 2014)

With respect to the USN being a smaller navy: In the most likely hypothesized scenario which adheres to the historical events, Nagumo takes the opportunity to launch a strike at the first sign of USN units at 0728 after the USN had launched three deckloads of strike aircraft at Kido Butai. His undelayed response might have netted him two and perhaps even all three US Carriers sunk while losing the immediate use of at least three IJN flight decks for at least 6 months due to damage and aircraft and air crew losses. Crew losses are likely to be greater than historic due to the battle over the USN CVs. Surface forces retreat to PH leaving the island to its fate. Two USN carriers (Sara and Wasp) arrive in the PTO within one week and by the end of June respectively, with a third, the Ranger transiting the Panama Canal within another month. Total capacity is just over 200 aircraft. The Long Island might be brought forward in such desperate circumstances. 

Two regiments of the first Marine Division, are preparing to go to war. The fifth appears to have left for the South Pacific (New Zealand) in late May while the first departs San Francisco at the end of June. There are forces in Theater to stage an impromptu invasion which is pretty much what happened at Guadalcanal. 

Arrayed against an invasion attempt at the end of July to recover Midway, the IJN has Hiryu, Zuikaku, Zuiho, Junyo and Ryujo. Total embarked are approximately 230 A/C. With significant naval aircrew and airframe losses, on both sides, I don't know which side might have an edge but for a brief period there would appear to be rough parity in embarked naval air forces. Shokaku and perhaps a repaired Akagi becomes available toward the end of August, and tips the balance heavily in Japan's favor. A delay until late 42 or early 43, assuming Torch proceeds historically, the USN can (and historically does, bring forward the four large escort carriers of the Sangamon class of CVEs (~120 total a/c capacity), while the IJN adds Hiyo (~40 A/C) and some smaller escort carriers of similar to capacity as the USN. Japan's industrial capacity and aircrew training and replacement limitations would appear to be a critical factor during the post Midway period, and has already been discussed. With poor quality torpedoes and bomber crew training requirements, as well as B-17 range and payload limitations, I am not sure how effective would be the US campaign to limit resupply of the island until the advent of sufficient B-24s which may provide a marginal improvement in payload/range performance. There might be a significant program to bring ASV equipped PBYs reinforcements from the east coast or to accelerate the equipping of those already assigned to the PTO. Without knowledge of ASV production issues, its tough to make a call on how effective such measures would be. PTO Black Cat operations began to become more effective in early 1943. 

I expect loss of Midway would have caused major political and logistical changes including some kind of torpedo improvement program which might have meant adopting proven foreign aircraft and weapons, all of which would take time. 

At the very least a USN loss at Midway would seem to create big problems for staging an immediate response. Not to say one wouldn't be mounted but it would appear to be a very problematic situation.

Late edit added: "...to recover Midway…" to first sentence second paragraph.

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## oldcrowcv63 (May 19, 2014)

One other observation may be worth making on the topic of a strike launch by Admiral Nagumo against the USN units based upon the 0728 observation by the Tone search plane. The assumption has been that the launch of the strike group and subsequent recovery of the Midway strike would make the IJN carriers less vulnerable to the damage inflicted by the SBDs. However, I don't believe the historical evidence or time line favors this assumption. From about 0710 forward, IJN aircraft were being readied for a second strike or were already prepared and either being rearmed or awaiting the possibility of USN surface units being spotted (depending on the time). Yet, during this same period, Kido Butai was under nearly continuous attack by army and navy a/c from Midway. At no time during the morning's events, did there seem to be any interest or intent to make the carriers safer by suspending the potentially hazardous operations. Had, Nagumo launched the strike by about 0745-0800 based on the first report, he would then have been faced with recovering and rearming the Midway strike aircraft, culminating in the time of attacks by the USN VT and VB squadrons. It is quite probable, given the diminished IJN CAP that these units would have done essentially the same or greater damage to the three carriers. It seems to me that the best (from an IJN viewpoint) that can come out of this scenario is an even trade of three carriers each, sunk or scuttled.


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 19, 2014)

Given the above scenario perhaps an equally valid question to ask is, "_At what point does the IJN call off the invasion?_" Historically, there were 4 lost IJN carriers vs two reported lost by the USN. That was historically sufficient to call a halt. What about three for three carriers? Sara is a mere couple of days away from the scene of battle. Fletcher makes rendezvous with the Sara carrier group, TG-11.2, on June 8. She is carrying 47 VF, 45 VB and 15 VT (10 TBFs and 5 TBDs). In the absence of a need to replenish lost carrier air wings, these numbers are adequate to provide a/c to Midway for both Sara's operational efficiency and to stiffen the island's defense. In order to preserve the precious carrier she might then have been simply approached from the Southeast and been used as merely an aircraft ferry to replenish Midway A/C (the unsinkable carrier) making it more dangerous for Hiryu to sustain an invasion. the IJN had already concluded that Midway's air power was not yet subdued (although in truth it was on the morning of the 4th) so there may have been some hesitation to staging an invasion without adequate air cover with the battle field in a state of contested air control. Just thoughts..


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## RpR (May 19, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> And in spite of all of your rabid, bold red text, you fail to see the point.
> 
> ALL OF THAT EXPANSION WAS DONE AFTER THE BATTLE, IN SECURE CONDITIONS WHERE THE NAVY HAD THE LUXURY OF ENHANCING THE FACILITIES AS A REAR AREA.
> 
> ...


That is your opinion.
No one knows how secure or non-secure it would have been but with the U.S. Navy regrouping from a defeat your rhetoric is void.


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## GrauGeist (May 19, 2014)

Bob, in all honesty, how do you draw a conclusion that it's my opinion when I say that the U.S. Navy would have opposed the Japanese presense on Midway? 

I am having great difficulty in seeing how the Japanese occupation of Midway would have brought the United States to it's knees.

The attack on Pearl Harbor didn't do it, the setbacks at the loss of the Phillipines didn't do it, the setbacks at the Battle of Coral Sea didn't do it and the loss of Wake Island sure didn't do it.

So how was the Midway Atoll so almighty powerful, that it's loss would strike a staggering blow to the U.S. above all other setbacks already inflicted up to that point?

I am also curious how the United States Navy and Army can tear the possesion of Guadalcanal from the Japanese thousands of miles from Pearl and yet they would be totally helpless to stop a small garrison of Japanese from holding the Midway complex.


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## Garyt (May 19, 2014)

> One other observation may be worth making on the topic of a strike launch by Admiral Nagumo against the USN units based upon the 0728 observation by the Tone search plane.



I think there are a few issues here. One, what if the Tone plane was not delayed and reported the sighting 1/2 hour earlier. I would think that would have definitely precipitated a strike from the 4 carriers reserve. This should have been launched by 730am if there was no delay in the Tone's spotting craft. 



> Yet, during this same period, Kido Butai was under nearly continuous attack by army and navy a/c from Midway. At no time during the morning's events, did there seem to be any interest or intent to make the carriers safer by suspending the potentially hazardous operations.



The US attacks were not constant - records show the Japanese were able to recover and launch CAP during the attacks. And they seemed to indeed not stop flight operations during the bombing. This IMO was either over confidence, or the thought that we need to get our strike launched ASAP - thinking that the best defense is a good offense. And with Japanese carrier task forces, this was probably correct. Or perhaps even they did not realize how truly vulnerable they were to dive bombers by conducting flight operations. They knew they were more vulnerable yes, but again, how vulnerable. They could not examine the records of the battle of Midway to see how truly vulnerable they were. 



> ad, Nagumo launched the strike by about 0745-0800 based on the first report, he would then have been faced with recovering and rearming the Midway strike aircraft, culminating in the time of attacks by the USN VT and VB squadrons. It is quite probable, given the diminished IJN CAP that these units would have done essentially the same or greater damage to the three carriers.



My thoughts as to what happened depend on the exact time it is. It appears the returning Midway strike was spotted and landed between 0830-0930, so it's very possible the entire strike force would have landed by the time the Dive bombers attacked. Now the question is what would be the priority? Launching another strike on the American carriers or maximising CAP? I'm not sure what Japanese Doctrine would say at this point, though I think if their goal was to maximize CAP they could well have more CAP up than what happened historically.

If they had only focused on refueling/re-arming CAP, I think they would have been far less vulnerable. And without having in essence two sets of ordinance out they would have been in a much safer situation. The hurried re-arming from ground attack to shipping attack put them in a worse situation than if they merely had been re-arming.

And again, one of the problems with closed hangared carriers was that it took far more time to take ordinance back to the magazines (which was not even done) then it would have taken an open hangared carrier to jettison ordinance off the carrier if they were under attack.



> It is quite probable, given the diminished IJN CAP that these units would have done essentially the same or greater damage to the three carriers.



I think you are underestimating what damage having ordinance on deck does. Here are some results, first from the Shokaku which was NOT conducting flight operations when hit - then the Midway Carriers. 

Shokaku Coral Sea - 3 1,000 bomb hits - Flight deck out of comission
Shokaku Santa Cruz - 3-6 1,000 bomb hits - Flight deck out of comission

Akagi - Midway - 1 1,000 bomb, one 1,000 pound near miss
Kaga - 1x 1000, 3x 500 bombs - sunk
Soryu - 3x 1000 Bombs - sunk

As you can see, the Shokaku took MORE bombs than the Midway carriers, and lived to fight another say.

I'd guess 2-3 Carriers would have to suspend flight operations, perhaps one could get up and running. This could be problematic, many planes though not flight crew may be lost. And there would now be one to two Japanese carriers vs. What I would think would be one US carrier. Based on the results a 1/2 strike from the Hiryu was able to accomplish, I'd bet at least 2 US carriers would be sunk or out of action.


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 19, 2014)

Garyt said:


> Shokaku Coral Sea - 3 1,000 bomb hits - Flight deck out of comission
> Shokaku Santa Cruz - 3-6 1,000 bomb hits - Flight deck out of comission
> 
> Akagi - Midway - 1 1,000 bomb, one 1,000 pound near miss
> ...



At Santa Cruz, Shokaku had radar warning of the impending attack and suspended fueling, purged lines and ceased arming. It's my understanding that's why she survived. 

More later...


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## Garyt (May 19, 2014)

> At Santa Cruz, Shokaku had radar warning of the impending attack and suspended fueling, purged lines and ceased arming. It's my understanding that's why she survived.



Indeed. But the Midway planes were another matter - Having armed and fueled planes on the hangar deck - and a full 1/2 strike prepared (I think this is referred to a full deck strike - the Japanese would launch in two waves even if a total launch, which was the amount of planes that could be launched from 1 "deck load"). In addition to having this many planes and open avgas lines, they also had ordinance for all the Vals, and 2x the ordinance for the Kates. It is questionable how good the "housekeeping" was in the magazines for this ordinance, which would have made the situation even more volatile.

Compare this to merely having open AVGAS lines and no ordinance if the only air operations were to land and launch CAP. That is a huge difference.

Avgas Lines are a problem, but it's a limited amount of storage, as are the planes themselves when fueled. 

Now, rupturing the AVGAS tanks is a different matter, but this were usually ruptured by concussion damage lower in the vessel, such as torpedo strikes.


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## RpR (May 19, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> Bob, in all honesty, how do you draw a conclusion that it's my opinion when I say that the U.S. Navy would have opposed the Japanese presense on Midway?
> 
> I am having great difficulty in seeing how the Japanese occupation of Midway would have brought the United States to it's knees.
> 
> ...


No one has said it would have brought the U.S. to its knees; it would have, partly due to political war that would have started in the U.S. caused the the U.S. to think twice before losing any more men or vehicles.

Had the U.S. lost Midway, the Japanese in all probability would have taking Johnston next giving them another base only 500 miles from Midway and 900 miles from Hawaii.

Hawaii would have been 2,600 miles from *any* support, period, that would have caused serious concern state side without exception.

Guadalcanal was only 1.100 miles from Cairn, Australia so Hawaii was of little importance down there as Midway was 3,000 miles away and Hawaii was 3,600 even Johnston atoll was 2,700 miles away, but Australia was of major importance.
Of course that would have left to close to 5,000 miles of enemy space between Australia and Hawaii if Midway had fallen.
That is a long, long, long way so it is unlikely Guadalcanal would have been retaken any where near the time it actually was during WWII.


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## GrauGeist (May 19, 2014)

And so I'll go out on a limb here and suppose that the U.S. allowed the leeward islands to be taken with little opposition all the way up to Hawaii.

Now the Japanese have Hawaii. Brilliant move by the Japanese. They have over exteneded their resources even further, having to provide men, material and maritime assets to hold these islands. Now what?

The bulk of U.S. Naval power at this point in time was nearing completion in Naval Shipyards on the East and West coast. The American war machine was no where near it's peak output and as it turned out, never committed it's full measure by war's end.

In order to stop the U.S., they would have to actually invade and hold stratetigic U.S. proper. Taking several dusty little Atolls and the Hawaiian island chain would not come close to forcing the U.S. to the negotiating table. It would actually backfire on the Japanese because now their assets have been stretched thinner than they Historically were prior to the Midway campaign. 

Taking Hawaii would no more force the U.S. to the bargaining table than taking Iwo jima forced the Japanese to the bargaining table.

All of this falls deep into the realm of "what if" that has no bearing on the significance of the battle of Midway's outcome.


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## Garyt (May 19, 2014)

> Hawaii would have been 2,600 miles from any support, period, that would have caused serious concern state side without exception.



Hawaii was indeed 2,600 miles away from any support without the Japanese taking Midway.

Midway provided no "support", if anything it was something that had to be supported.

Midway in 1942 was not really any kind of a base, so it lent no real support to Hawaii.


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## Garyt (May 19, 2014)

> In order to stop the U.S., they would have to actually invade and hold stratetigic U.S. proper. Taking several dusty little Atolls and the Hawaiian island chain would not come close to forcing the U.S. to the negotiating table. It would actually backfire on the Japanese because now their assets have been stretched thinner than they Historically were prior to the Midway campaign.



Graugreist, I do indeed see the Japanese occupation of Hawaii as a "war changer". I would think the Japanese would want to make use of the facilities - and having such a base capable of supplying vessels and repairing them is a big plus for the Japanese. They can base their "Far Western" fleet here. If the US chooses to try to take it back (I would think they would feel compelled to), you have an early war Japanese Navy (speaking mostly of pilot quality and no Hellcats) which could also base a substantial airfleet on Hawaii. And a submarine base that could support a submarine picket of Hawaii. If the US chose to Invade, they would have to face a naval Japanese force that still has a lot of fight in it and confidence which would also be backed by a large land based force. A very difficult proposition.

One question I do have is what type of fuel reserves were available on Hawaii? Capturing these would be very important for the Japanese, much like the German's need to capture Allied fuel depots at the Battle of the Bulge.


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## GrauGeist (May 19, 2014)

Taking and holding Hawaii could be looked at as a "war changer" for the favt that a successful invasion of Hawaii would require a consider amount of resources in the way of men and material. It would also force a showdown between U.S. land and naval assets versus the same in the way of Japanese assets. If the Japanese were succeed, at what cost? In otherwords, what did the Japanese sacrific in order to make the invasion happen?

One would assume that the Japanese brought battleships into play as well as carriers. How many would participate in the attack and invasion and how many were sunk during that action? Even if the U.S. lost all their carriers in the defense, there were more in the shipyards stateside under construction. How many Japanese pilots were lost in the invasion? How many aircraft and so on...

Like I mentioned before, the U.S. was still ramping up it's war footing and nowhere near peak capacity, that would happen in 1944 while Japan was already close to capacity in producing ships, aircraft and skilled men to operate them.

There would also have to be a shift in Japanese assets...so where do these come from? Removing occupation troops from one area in order to occupy Hawaii and additional spot garrisons across the Leeward islands will weaken that hold they currently have elsewhere. Keep in mind that Allied troops are not affected by Hawaii's loss and will continue to put pressure on Japanese held areas across the South Pacific and CBI.

As far as material seizure at Pearl, one can assume that the facilities, which are still being repaired from the 7 December attack, would not be just handed over to the Japanese intact.


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## parsifal (May 19, 2014)

I was thinking more along the lines of a completely revised battle plan for the Japanese rather than ditering at the edge of the existing one. That of course has to assume a completely revised American response as well. what might have happened if the plan of battle for the IJN had been altered completely from the historical.....


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## GrauGeist (May 19, 2014)

If Japan was in a position to successfully attack and take Hawaii after the battle of Midway, then they should have been able to refuse the U.S. invasion of Guadacanal which historically occurred just a few months after the battle of Midway. As it turns out, they didn't.

So in the far-fetched scenario where Japan seizes the Leeward islands and Hawaii (including the other main islands), how would they still be able to provide adequate protection for their current possesions?

Also, when people say "Hawaii", I assume they mean Pearl Harbor on the island of Oahu. There were also several Army bases and a Naval air station on Oahu outside of Pearl Harbor. They would also have to take Kauai, Molokai, Lanai, Maui and Hawaii itself in order to ensure possesion security.


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 19, 2014)

You are correct the attacks on Kido Butai weren't _literally_ continuous, but they spanned the time from just prior to 0710 until about 0730 and from about 0750 until just after 0830. So there was about 20 minute break in the attacks from about 0730 until about 0750. The point being made was that at no time during this period did the Japanese cease fueling and arming their a/c. In fact, Nagumo apparently ordered his a/c rearmed during the height of the first torpedo attacks. 

According to Shattered Sword, The Tone plane leaving a half hour earlier does not translate to an earlier sighting report of the USN CTGs (except in popular histories of the battle.). The Chikuma's no. 1 plane appears to have been the one whose path _should _have taken it directly over the americans at 0630 had he flown his planned route, but apparently cloud cover obscured his view. The Tone's later report was pretty much an accident of navigation. had he flown his own planned route it is unlikely he would have seen anything. As many sources have suggested, the real problem with the search plan was that it was too porous. flown by too few planes.

But lets say the pilot of Chikuma's no. 1 got lucky and saw a break in the clouds at just the right time to report back sighting an american carrier at 0630. Then Kido Burai launches its reserve half deck load from each carrier before the return of the Midway strike. This situation amounts to essentially a simultaneous launch of both navies carrier based forces as far as both having been launched by the time the other arrives. However let's examine the time line provided in SS on page 154 and 155. The Midway strike returns at about 0805 and immediately begins to land, landing is completed by 0845. Rearming and fueling immediately commences and with a superhuman effort, A/C are spotted on the flight deck by about 1030, 6 minutes after the USN has arrived and begun dropping its bombs on the now loaded flight decks. That's the best that can be imagined but not realistic. In actuality, the interval between launch of the first, previously readied, strike and the arming and spotting of the second took much longer. The first previously readied strike launched at 1058 and the second Hiryu strike was finally spotted and warming up on the flight deck beginning at 1300. The half hour's or even an hour advance of the time line doesn't appear to work in favor of the IJN. That's the way, I understand the time line from SS. Perhaps 
I've missed some critical element in the sequence of events but it seems to me as long as Kido Butai is committed to a second follow up strike they will remain vulnerable. Perhaps a bit less so, because there will be roughly half the aircraft missing from the numbers that were historically adding fuel and ordnance to the carrier's conflagration. 


As far as the Cap presence, SS has a detailed break down of fighter operations. I believe they had more than 40 fighters airborne during the USN VB attacks and of course others cycling thu the flight decks to refuel and rearm. AFAIK, IJN VF apportionment practice was something like 50% for strike escort and 50% for fleet coverage. With the ferocity of the USN attacks, I believe even a/c of the 21 Zeros slated for Midway were launched. If you dedicate 24 fighters to the first strike, and retain a dozen or so for the second strike, You have less than what were available at the time of the actual USN attack by about 36 A6Ms. Perhaps I am missing something, but I don't see how the CAP can be stronger if two dozen fighters are dedicated to escorting the first strike and so not available for CAP. 

I had to smile (a bit sadly) at your comment:

"_I think you are underestimating what damage having ordinance on deck does._" 

My class officer, a RIO in a VF squadron was a survivor of the 14 January 1969 Enterprise fire that killed 27 and injured 314. Ours was his first assignment after his recovery from severe burns. He was fortunate to have survived and also to have been wearing his helmet visor in the down position as he sat in his cockpit awaiting launch. How did we know his visor was down? it was clearly evident from the pattern of his scarring. He was a great guy and only lived because when he climbed out of his cockpit a quick-thinking CPO saw SV2 he was wearing and immediately realized it was the only chance either of them had for survival. His tackle carried them both off the ship's stern and down 80 feet to the water where the chief inflated the RIO's SV2. They were picked up by the plane guard. 

Oriskany: October 26, 1966. 44 dead.

Forrestal: 29 July 1967: 134 dead

Forget the ordnance and fuel, when an aircrew walks out onto the flight deck he/she may be carrying (in the survival vest) two hand held day-night flares, a flare gun and a personal weapon with extra ammo. A walking incendiary depot.

I was the squadron's line division officer and spent lots of time on the flight deck during flight ops. It was a very dangerous place for many reasons beyond the ordnance being loaded and fuel being dispensed. The types of danger were only a little bit different in 1942 but still one of the most dangerous places on Earth. I have a pretty fair idea of what exploding ordnance can do to a flight deck or carrier. even an armored one.


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 19, 2014)

parsifal said:


> I was thinking more along the lines of a completely revised battle plan for the Japanese rather than ditering at the edge of the existing one. That of course has to assume a completely revised American response as well. what might have happened if the plan of battle for the IJN had been altered completely from the historical.....



That's a tough one… throws the door wide open.


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## gjs238 (May 19, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> I was the squadron's line division officer and spent lots of time on the flight deck during flight ops. It was a very dangerous place for many reasons beyond the ordnance being loaded and fuel being dispensed. The types of danger were only a little bit different in 1942 but still one of the most dangerous places on Earth. I have a pretty fair idea of what exploding ordnance can do to a flight deck or carrier. even an armored one.


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## parsifal (May 19, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> That's a tough one… throws the door wide open.



Absolutely , but not impossible. The problems with the historical plan, from a japanese perspective were many. I think too much was being asked of CarDivs 1 and 2, and the fleet was too far forward to take advantage of what strengths the Japanese plan did possess. Having such complex plan as they did, might have been turned to their advantage, by confusing the USN in the approach, but there was far too much separation between the various TFs. 

Your photos of deck accidents did bring back some memories as well for me. Aboard our carrier, late 70's. A flight deck is no place to be if you dont know what you are doing....


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7WdnpHcQn3Y_

This another video of deck operations on the melbourne. These are deck quals by pilots of VF805. Not my video. It was originally by Peter greenwood, and I rememeber when he took it. Thats me in the superstructure...actually Im not visible...

Video has sound track from actual A4G engine sounds (mostly) made by Peter Greenfield ex-RAN A4G Skyhawk pilot. The first half of the video shows how the nosewheel steering problem affects A4G operations on deck on the catapult. Usually the very effective nosewheel steering makes taxiing on deck easy enough. The second half of this video shows A4G deck landings from a low angle at a point where the aircraft is most likely to stop if the target wire is caught. Sometimes the A4G gets 'hung up' after arrest and once again we see the value of the hard working deck crew coming to remedy the problem swiftly. These aircraft/pilots are doing deck qualifications. 


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQT5yp8-bMs_


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## Garyt (May 19, 2014)

> My class officer, a RIO in a VF squadron was a survivor of the 14 January 1969 Enterprise fire that killed 27 and injured 314. Ours was his first assignment after his recovery from severe burns. He was fortunate to have survived and also to have been wearing his helmet visor in the down position as he sat in his cockpit awaiting launch. How did we know his visor was down? it was clearly evident from the pattern of his scarring. He was a great guy and only lived because when he climbed out of his cockpit a quick-thinking CPO saw SV2 he was wearing and immediately realized it was the only chance either of them had for survival. His tackle carried them both off the ship's stern and down 80 feet to the water where the chief inflated the RIO's SV2. They were picked up by the plane guard.



Interesting, did not know!

My only point was refueling CAP is going to put the carrier in a lot less danger than having strike aircraft all being readied for a strike. And with CAP, they will be off the carrier again shortly after refueling, so you have a bit of a revolving door, which means you don't have 40 armed strike aircraft on the hangar deck with ordinance. Makes a huge difference in survivability. And at Coral Sea, the Shokaku may have been conducting at least CAP flight operations, I am not sure.

And none of these carriers had armored flight decks, So I'd rather have by planes on a flight deck than on the enclosed hangar decks. Of course, an armored flight deck would be nice, but Japan has to wait til the Taiho, the US never had an operational carrier with an armored flight deck in WW2.


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 19, 2014)

Garyt said:


> Indeed. But the Midway planes were another matter - Having armed and fueled planes on the hangar deck - and a full 1/2 strike prepared (I think this is referred to a full deck strike - the Japanese would launch in two waves even if a total launch, which was the amount of planes that could be launched from 1 "deck load"). In addition to having this many planes and open avgas lines, they also had ordinance for all the Vals, and 2x the ordinance for the Kates. It is questionable how good the "housekeeping" was in the magazines for this ordinance, which would have made the situation even more volatile.
> 
> Compare this to merely having open AVGAS lines and no ordinance if the only air operations were to land and launch CAP. That is a huge difference.
> 
> ...



Gary I admit I am having some trouble with your math here. I am assuming the reserve strike launched initially amounts to half the air group from each IJN carrier. In detail, it would be comprised of all the Hiryu and Soryu VB (amounting to 34 VALs) and portions of the Kaga and Akagi's VT units (amounting to about 30 KATES plus escort). The returning Midway Strike, once recovered and rearmed, constitutes the a/c for the second strike consisting of undamaged KATES from Hiryu and Soryu and undamaged VALs from Kaga and Akagi, presumably about 25 to 30 VALS and something like 40 KATES, with escort. the second wave would presumably be launched sometime in the late morning. Is this consistent with what you are envisioning?


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 19, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Absolutely , but not impossible. The problems with the historical plan, from a japanese perspective were many. I think too much was being asked of CarDivs 1 and 2, and the fleet was too far forward to take advantage of what strengths the Japanese plan did possess. Having such complex plan as they did, might have been turned to their advantage, by confusing the USN in the approach, but there was far too much separation between the various TFs.
> 
> Your photos of deck accidents did bring back some memories as well for me. Aboard our carrier, late 70's. A flight deck is no place to be if you dont know what you are doing....
> 
> ...




great video! I hope the pilot survived the ejection without injury. I recalled that you mentioned serving on the Melbourne. lots of great footage of some vintage classic a/c. 

I concur with the flaws you list in the IJN's Midway plan. I expect you have heard the story of the pre-Midway battle war game staged by the IJN that resulted in the predicted loss of two carriers. A war game whose results were ignored.


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 19, 2014)

Hey Pars, was that you up in pri-fly? (at 3:30 into the vid) or is it vultures row? 

I ended up watching a third video with all the classic RAN a/c:


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2CpTQp9sI5c_


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 19, 2014)

Garyt said:


> Interesting, did not know!


 No worries..



Garyt said:


> My only point was refueling CAP is going to put the carrier in a lot less danger than having strike aircraft all being readied for a strike. And with CAP, they will be off the carrier again shortly after refueling, so you have a bit of a revolving door, which means you don't have 40 armed strike aircraft on the hangar deck with ordinance. Makes a huge difference in survivability. And at Coral Sea, the Shokaku may have been conducting at least CAP flight operations, I am not sure.



Wait! Dawn broke over marble head! I see what you are saying about the CAP numbers… There will be a couple lost in the mele with the Midway strike a/c but otherwise it looks like the numbers of CAP should be roughly the same in any case. the reduction only applies to the period before the returning Midway strike escorts are refueled and rearmed… "_A revolving door_" so to speak… Good point!

But still not sure we don't have a disconnect about the arming of the second strike unless you mean Nagumo decides to defer arming until later in the day after Kido Butai has absorbed a USN strike. I don't think there is evidence for that. AFAIK, the IJN was pretty much about staying on offense until an enemy was subdued. 



Garyt said:


> And none of these carriers had armored flight decks, So I'd rather have by planes on a flight deck than on the enclosed hangar decks. Of course, an armored flight deck would be nice, but Japan has to wait til the Taiho, the US never had an operational carrier with an armored flight deck in WW2.


 yes, the Midway class just missed the war with Midway CV-41 commissioned in September 10, 1945


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## parsifal (May 20, 2014)

I saw that one too, was worried it was a little too jingistic for comfort.

Melbourne was a hard worked and working carrier. The A-4 jockeys were the best in the world, and even though i am biased, its a claim i can legitimately make. Ive seen them on excercise getting so low they were flying below deck level just inches above the wave crests. They pushed those A-4s really hard.

US pilots for a time operated on exchange but they discontinued it after a while because of the small size and unrelaiability of our steam catapult. Even though Melbourne had been modernised to take the streeses of operating this aircraft, her cata pults and deck sizes were really not up to the task. By the time I served on her, she was well past it, with severe deck corrugations and a steam catapult that was just aching to fail. Still, in excercise we managed to simulate sinking one US Carrier (with a bit of help), and she streamed a lot of miles for a conventional carrier. 

we still dont have a replacement or capability that comes even close to what the old girl could do.

In 1960, the United States Navy offered an Essex class carrier to the Australian government, in the interest of improving relations between the two nations and their navies. The only cost to the RAN would have been the modifications required to make the carrier operationally compatible with the RAN's primarily British-designed fleet. In the late 1960s, the British made a similar offer, following a 1966 review indicating that HMS Hermes was a superfluous naval unit.In 1968, Hermes took part in a combined exercise with the RAN, during which the carrier was visited by RAN and Australian government officials, while RAN Skyhawks and Trackers practised landings on the larger carrier. Both offers were turned down due to operating and manpower costs.

The need to secure a replacement for Melbourne grew as the carrier's age caused the operating costs to increased. In June 1977, the Defence Force Development Committee approved an investigation into acquiring a STOVL/helicopter carrier. the possible replacements were reduced to three choices; a modified American Iwo Jima class amphibious assault ship, an Italian Giuseppe Garibaldi class carrier, and a Sea Control Ship design that later became the Spanish Navy's Principe de Asturias. By February 1981, the Iwo Jima class was the preferred option.

However, the British then offered the Invincible at a bargain basement price. 

Plans to replace Melbourne changed in July 1981; the British 1981 Defence White Paper had marked the recently commissioned HMS Invincible as surplus to requirements, and she was offered to the RAN for the 'bargain' price of GB£175 million (A$285 million). The Invincible class had been considered and discarded during the investigation, mostly because of the costs of aircraft provisions (unit prices for Harriers is, shall we say, rather off the planet) but the decreased price and the fact the already-constructed carrier would be ready for RAN service in 1983 prompted the Australian government to announce its intention to purchase Invincible on 25 February 1982 and close the carrier acquisition program.The government also announced that the ship would be renamed HMAS Australia and operated as a helicopter carrier, and that a decision on the purchase of Sea Harriers would be made after acquisition.

The deal was put on hold in April 1982, following the outbreak of the Falklands War. The performance of Invincible and other Royal Navy aircraft carriers during the conflict showed that the report which suggested reductions in the size of Britain's carrier fleet—with the flow-on effect of making Invincible available for sale—was flawed, and both sides withdrew from the deal in July. The RAN was again offered HMS Hermes, and again declined due to the carrier's age and manpower requirements. The Australian government began to reconsider the previous contenders for replacement, as well as considering requesting the United Kingdom or United States to build a simple carrier capable of operating F/A-18 Hornet strike fighters, but the issue was suspended at the commencement of the 1983 Australian Federal Election. On 14 March, following the election of Bob Hawke's Labor Government, the announcement was made that Melbourne would not be replaced. Adding insult to an already open wound, the still operational skyhawks and trackers were supposed to remain fleet support units on land bases, but were each repsctively disposed of in a very short space of time. It was death of an air wing on a machiavellian scale. 

Melbourne by then was decomissioning, but still she refused to die. She was sold to Chinese ship breakers, and towed to a chinese port, weathering a typhoon enroute. she was sold with the stipulation that she was to be scrapped immediately, but this did not transpire. the chinese had other ideas, they needed some basic ideas on carrier operation and catapult design. Even back then they had ambitions of developing their own carrier capability, but they were starting from a long way behind. 

The ship was not scrapped immediately; instead she was studied by Chinese as part of the nation's top-secret carrier development program. Melbourne was the largest warship any of the Chinese experts had seen, and they were surprised by the amount of equipment which was still in place. The PLAN subsequently arranged for the ship's flight deck and all the equipment associated with flying operations to be removed so that they could be studied in depth, and reportedly extensively reverse engineered. Either a replica of the flight deck, or the deck itself, was used for training of People's Liberation Army Navy pilots in carrier flight operations> The chinese literally cut the flight deck off the hull, placed it on a land area and used it fleor deck landing training. Clever little Chinese eager beavers.....

Around 1987 the Royal Australian Navy received and "politely rejected" a request from the PLAN for blueprints of the ship's steam catapult. The carrier was not dismantled for many years; according to some rumours she was not completely broken up until 2002. A 2012 article in Jane's Navy International stated that the large quantity of equipment recovered from Melbourne "undoubtedly helped" Admiral Liu Hua-qing secure the Chinese Government's support for his proposal to initiate a program to develop aircraft carriers for the Navy. In some ways I am happy that Melbournes legacy has had such far reachig effects, but of course in other respects it alarms me that it is helping our most likely future enemies.

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## RpR (May 20, 2014)

Garyt said:


> Hawaii was indeed 2,600 miles away from any support without the Japanese taking Midway.
> 
> Midway provided no "support", if anything it was something that had to be supported.
> 
> Midway in 1942 was not really any kind of a base, so it lent no real support to Hawaii.


Go read the U.S. Navy history of bases in the Pacific before you repeat other such statements that go against the actual situation whether or not Midway fell.

Midway kept the Hawaiian Islands from being the last U.S. holding in the Pacific, discounting Johnston.
As I said read the U.S. Navy report I have pasted repeatedly as it makes some repeated rhetoric of the status and importance of Midway, and Johnston, incorrect.

This is *ALL prior* to the start of the war.


'The Navy Department Library'

Building the Navy's Bases in World War II
History of the Bureau of Yards and Docks and the Civil Engineer Corps
1940-1946
Volume II

"...........When the Hepburn Board made its survey of the naval shore establishment in the fall of 1938, the United States had five island possessions west of Pearl Harbor that were of strategic value as potential patrol-plane bases. These were the islands of Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, and Canton. The board's recommendation for the development of each island were the basic criteria upon which their subsequent fortification was predicated.

From a strategic point of view, *an air base at Midway was considered second in importance only to Pearl Harbor.* At that time, Midway was in regular use as one of the stops on the air route to the Orient, and was also the site of a commercial cable station. The board recommended that Midway be developed as a secondary airbase with facilities for two permanently based patrol-plane squadrons. These facilities were to include a pier, a channel, and a turning basin, with the lagoon.......................

...............The development of Midway under the Pacific Naval Air Base contracts began on March 27, 1940. A dredge was towed in, and the contractors directed their efforts toward the enlargement of the existing basins and channels. A small-boat channel, 12,000 feet long, 50 feet wide, and 10 feet deep, was dredged between Sand and Eastern islands, and a mooring berth, protected by sheet-piling, was built on the latter. Approximately 3,000,000 cubic yards of material were removed in these dredging operations.

Three asphalt-paved runways were constructed on Eastern Island; each was 300 feet wide and 3250 feet, 4500 feet, and 5300 feet long, respectively. Two hangars were constructed, with parking areas and warm-up mats. Small industrial areas were erected, which included the various necessary shops and storage facilities.

A large seaplane hangar, a parking mat, and one concrete ramp were constructed, and an ordnance shop, radio shop, engine shop, and a storehouse and tool room were built around the seaplane hangar to facilitate major overhaul work.

Fighter, bomber, and patrol ready-rooms were constructed, and housing and messing facilities set up for operational personnel. Quonset huts were extensively used.

Approximately 2800 feet of sheet-piling bulkhead was installed on Sand Island. Dredged material was pumped behind this bulkhead, and upon this fill, a large seaplane parking-mat was constructed. Four, concrete, seaplane ramps were built, together with an additional emergency ramp and approach to the mat, and a large, steel, seaplane hangar was erected on the edge of the mat.

Construction was started on underground gasoline storage in twenty-two 2500-gallon steel tanks.

A naval hospital was built by the contractors, who utilized three of the four existing buildings owned by the commercial cable company. These buildings, located on Sand Island, were later augmented by a large underground structure of concrete.

Barracks for naval and Marine personnel were built, together with all necessary accessories such as messhalls, warehouses, administration buildings, commissaries, and cold-storage buildings. The power plant for Sand Island was housed in a bombproof structure of reinforced-concrete and steel.

Midway was subjected to surface shelling by the Japanese on December 7, 1941, which caused considerable material damage and many wounds to personnel.

The history is listed chronologically, with every thing that would follow the above last sentence being after the attack.
As it was the majority of work on Mdway, even with the break to put up defenses, was done by mid-1943.

Had the Japanese taken the island within a year they also probably would and could have made it mostly complete in a similar time frame as the U.S. would have been in no position to seriously challenge them as they would have been rebuilding for a massive assault to come.


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## RpR (May 20, 2014)

As this is all conjecture, I am wondering if Japan had taken Midway and Johnston, with the U.S. in no position for some months anyway to mount an major assault, would the Allies possibly have made a truly major thrust in China-Burma to make the Japanese take their attention off of any idea of actualy attacking the Hawaiian Island proper.

I do not think the Japanese would have gone after Hawaii, although that is just my opinion but I do think the Allies would possibly have done something to get Japan's attention else where.

I do not know the state of the British forces but they might have been able to send some of their heavy bombers to India to make a point.


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 20, 2014)

Pars, Thanks for the inside story of Melbourne and RAN carrier aviation… IMHO, its fate is to be lamented. I am happy JMSD carrier aviation is resurgent but I wish we had another ally in the pacific with similar capability. I think the decision to reject SCS design was wise, whereas GG is a pretty neat little package, small capacity but seems to be a real if pint-sized STOVL CV which would be less expensive to crew and would keep some important _art and trade craft_ alive in Oz. Without anything to validate my opinion, I think almost any option built in the US will be ridiculously expensive to create, own and operate and require what amounts to an entire air force worth of expenditure in AC procurement. 

One of the few attractive aspects of the film Battleship was its depiction of '_RAN Hornets_' launching from the deck of a USN CVN. I expect that was more hollywood than RAAF F-18 capability. What's the scoop on that?

I love the big decks but they ARE just gawdawful expensive!


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 20, 2014)

gjs238 said:


>



Thanks, gjs, but the guys who deserve the salute are the young men who spent most days working on the Flight deck and the superb CPOs who directed them. Compared to them, I was an occasional tourist. I was always fortunate in my CPOs. They guided me, kept me alive and as much as humanly possible out of trouble, despite my best efforts to GET into deep too-doo. 

My Line Division Chief was especially good. He gave me (a rookie JO) an indoctrination tour of the flight deck early on, explaining its many esoteric mysteries most of which I've long forgotten. The young men comprising the division just out of HS were also an excellent group… They saw some gruesome sights and remained working with reliable and professional quality. They took great pride in seeing their names affixed to the side of an aircraft when they qualified as its plane captain. I literally trusted them with my life.


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## gjs238 (May 20, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Melbourne by then was decomissioning, but still she refused to die. She was sold to Chinese ship breakers, and towed to a chinese port,



Oh boy.....
Can see where this is going.....




parsifal said:


> weathering a typhoon enroute. she was sold with the stipulation that she was to be scrapped immediately, but this did not transpire. the chinese had other ideas, they needed some basic ideas on carrier operation and catapult design. Even back then they had ambitions of developing their own carrier capability, but they were starting from a long way behind.
> 
> The ship was not scrapped immediately; instead she was studied by Chinese as part of the nation's top-secret carrier development program. Melbourne was the largest warship any of the Chinese experts had seen, and they were surprised by the amount of equipment which was still in place. The PLAN subsequently arranged for the ship's flight deck and all the equipment associated with flying operations to be removed so that they could be studied in depth, and reportedly extensively reverse engineered. Either a replica of the flight deck, or the deck itself, was used for training of People's Liberation Army Navy pilots in carrier flight operations> The chinese literally cut the flight deck off the hull, placed it on a land area and used it fleor deck landing training. Clever little Chinese eager beavers.....
> 
> Around 1987 the Royal Australian Navy received and "politely rejected" a request from the PLAN for blueprints of the ship's steam catapult. The carrier was not dismantled for many years; according to some rumours she was not completely broken up until 2002. A 2012 article in Jane's Navy International stated that the large quantity of equipment recovered from Melbourne "undoubtedly helped" Admiral Liu Hua-qing secure the Chinese Government's support for his proposal to initiate a program to develop aircraft carriers for the Navy. In some ways I am happy that Melbournes legacy has had such far reachig effects, but of course in other respects it alarms me that it is helping our most likely future enemies.



Surprise surprise.


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## parsifal (May 20, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Pars, Thanks for the inside story of Melbourne and RAN carrier aviation… IMHO, its fate is to be lamented. I am happy JMSD carrier aviation is resurgent but I wish we had another ally in the pacific with similar capability. I think the decision to reject SCS design was wise, whereas GG is a pretty neat little package, small capacity but seems to be a real if pint-sized STOVL CV which would be less expensive to crew and would keep some important _art and trade craft_ alive in Oz. Without anything to validate my opinion, I think almost any option built in the US will be ridiculously expensive to create, own and operate and require what amounts to an entire air force worth of expenditure in AC procurement.
> 
> One of the few attractive aspects of the film Battleship was its depiction of '_RAN Hornets_' launching from the deck of a USN CVN. I expect that was more hollywood than RAAF F-18 capability. What's the scoop on that?
> 
> I love the big decks but they ARE just gawdawful expensive!



If your okay to talk OT for a bit, im happy to talk a bit. Have a look at whats happening across Asia, and everyone is quietly getting ready to accommodate the emerging Chinese challenges. Doesnt mean we still dont rely heavily on US alliances. They have the heavy strike capability that we can just mimic really.

To give you a bit of a heads up, starting with India, The Indian Navy presently has two aircraft carriers in active service, the INS Viraat and INS Vikramaditya. INS Viraat is planned for decommissioning after the induction of the first domestically built Vikrant class aircraft carrier, which from what ive read are quite good ships. The Indian Navy has about 250 aircraft, making it the thirds largest FAA in the world I think. In 2004, India bought the Russian aircraft carrier, Admiral Gorshkov for the equivalent of US$1.5 billion. It cost an additional US$1.5 billion to overhaul the vessel and refit it entirely with new electronic, weapon systems and sensors. INS Vikramaditya as it is called sailed to India after her commissioning on 15 November 2013. It joined active service by December 2013 with a complement of 50 a/c, including 50 fixed wing aircraft of Russian manufacture 


The Royal Thai Navy has an interesting VStol carrier, but has been badly let down by its choice of the matador, a 1st generation harrier. HTMS Chakri Naruebet as it is called, is based on the Spanish Navy's Principe de Asturias design (we were considering the same design 20 years earlier) and constructed by Spanish shipbuilder Bazán, Chakri Naruebet was ordered in 1992, launched in 1996, and commissioned into the RTN in 1997. For a long time the thais did not have any fixed wing aircraft, being the last to use 1st gen Harriers (and these were all grounded within a year of purchase, but finally some moves are afoot to re-equip the Thai air wing. The ship is 11400 tons, and carriers 10 fixed wing aircraft and up to 14 choppers. Thats a lot for a small package

The Koreans have the Dokdo Class LPHS ships (amphibious assault ships similar to your Iwo Jima class. Rated for Vstol aircraft with the decks strengthened and heat treated to accommodate the F-35, the Koreans are considering the purchase of the navalised FD-35, and the construction of a second amphibious carrier.

Australia, after more than 30 years without a carrier, has decided now to build two LPHs , which are 25000 ton amphibious command ships with a significant aviation component. Has a ski jump, and designed to accommodate the F-35B, but we still say we arent buying the navalised version of the JSF.

Asian Carriers By the Numbers | USNI News

Nuship Canberra

And what to make of all this. Perhaps best summed up by Shakespeare....."Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more"

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## Garyt (May 20, 2014)

> Had the Japanese taken the island within a year they also probably would and could have made it mostly complete in a similar time frame as the U.S. would have been in no position to seriously challenge them as they would have been rebuilding for a massive assault to come.



Again, as I mentioned earlier in this thread, we need to look at the ability of both Japan and the US to "build" for lack of a better word bases. Japan's lack of ability to build/rebuild as quickly as the americans were able to. In "The Rising Sun" by Toland, frequent comments are made by Japanese about how astounded they are regarding the american's industrial advantages. 

I think we have to be very careful to compare the ability and timeframe of the US to build a base during peacetime vs. the ability of the Japanese to do the same with wartime strains upon their shipping and industrial engine, as well as potential US interdiction of said build up.

Would you not think that this is not an apples to apples comparison?

And as of 6/1942, Midway was merely an atoll with an airfield or the most part. Not a base who's support of Pearl Harbor was paramount for the survival of Pearl.

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## gjs238 (May 20, 2014)

parsifal said:


> And what to make of all this. Perhaps best summed up by Shakespeare....."Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more"



All paid for by shifting our (US) manufacturing to China and India.


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## VBF-13 (May 23, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> If Japan was in a position to successfully attack and take Hawaii after the battle of Midway, then they should have been able to refuse the U.S. invasion of Guadacanal which historically occurred just a few months after the battle of Midway. As it turns out, they didn't.
> 
> So in the far-fetched scenario where Japan seizes the Leeward islands and Hawaii (including the other main islands), how would they still be able to provide adequate protection for their current possesions?
> 
> Also, when people say "Hawaii", I assume they mean Pearl Harbor on the island of Oahu. There were also several Army bases and a Naval air station on Oahu outside of Pearl Harbor. They would also have to take Kauai, Molokai, Lanai, Maui and Hawaii itself in order to ensure possesion security.


Let's think this out. Parsifal introduced a very interesting proposition, I think. What if they took Midway, and we just stayed at Pearl? I'm asking, what's their next move?

I'm not saying try to occupy the Hawaiian Islands. That's as crazy a proposition as it's unnecessary, I think. Hawaii, without Pearl, that's no threat to them. The fleet, starting with the big carriers, that's the threat. 

They wait us out. Besides tying up fleet, they're starving, and need to supply it. And, we're sitting pretty, and getting stronger. We're dealing the cards, now. Maybe we go get them, but not before we're good and ready. On the other hand, they're running out of rice, and soybean soup, and pickles, and sake. Among other things. Let's consider their coming after us. The big carriers. The fleet. They're all in the same place. Pearl. If they're not, if they're at sea, Pearl is still strategic, as it's their sanctuary.

Give it a go. Reinforce, first, if they have to. But, don't lollygag around. Time is of the essence. I'm saying, I've still yet to hear anything that takes that move, an all-out assault on Pearl, off the table. And, I think it makes some sense.


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## GrauGeist (May 23, 2014)

Well, having the Japanese in possesion of Midway won't stop the industrial capacity of the U.S. and it certainly won't stop the U.S. Navy from operating in and around the vicinity. No more than the loss of Wake Island did.

With the taking of Midway Island, the Japanese would either have to take the Hawaiian chain or risk attrition by sub pickets and hazarding attacks. Wake Island was far enough to the east, that the U.S. pretty much left it to it's own until a time that they could commit resources to retake it, since it was not of strategic importance.

During the course of the war, the U.S. adopted an "island hopping campaign" that proved that non strategic islands could be bypassed and in doing so, cut off the island defenders from reliable resupply and saved Allied resources for assualting valuable targets.


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## Aozora (May 23, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> Well, having the Japanese in possesion of Midway won't stop the industrial capacity of the U.S. and it certainly won't stop the U.S. Navy from operating in and around the vicinity. No more than the loss of Wake Island did.
> 
> With the taking of Midway Island, the Japanese would either have to take the Hawaiian chain or risk attrition by sub pickets and hazarding attacks. Wake Island was far enough to the east, that the U.S. pretty much left it to it's own until a time that they could commit resources to retake it, since it was not of strategic importance.
> 
> During the course of the war, the U.S. adopted an "island hopping campaign" that proved that non strategic islands could be bypassed and in doing so, cut off the island defenders from reliable resupply and saved Allied resources for assualting valuable targets.



From Tully's website  _Nihon Kaigun_; he did a brief analysis of  Japan vs U.S production capacity, which shows how foolish the Japanese were to start a war they couldn't win. Had Midway been taken the biggest disadvantage to the US would have been the loss of an intermediate submarine base between Pearl Harbor and Japan.


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## VBF-13 (May 23, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> Well, having the Japanese in possesion of Midway won't stop the industrial capacity of the U.S. and it certainly won't stop the U.S. Navy from operating in and around the vicinity. No more than the loss of Wake Island did.
> 
> With the taking of Midway Island, the Japanese would either have to take the Hawaiian chain or risk attrition by sub pickets and hazarding attacks. Wake Island was far enough to the east, that the U.S. pretty much left it to it's own until a time that they could commit resources to retake it, since it was not of strategic importance.
> 
> During the course of the war, the U.S. adopted an "island hopping campaign" that proved that non strategic islands could be bypassed and in doing so, cut off the island defenders from reliable resupply and saved Allied resources for assualting valuable targets.


They were facing attrition. Get Pearl, while they still had the upper-hand. I think Yamamoto, had he had the autonomy, would have gone at it.


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## VBF-13 (May 23, 2014)

Aozora said:


> From Tully's website  _Nihon Kaigun_; he did a brief analysis of  Japan vs U.S production capacity, which shows how foolish the Japanese were to start a war they couldn't win.


I think Yamamoto would have agreed with that.


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## GrauGeist (May 23, 2014)

At the time of the battle, Midway hadn't been developed to it's full potential as a forward base. Development commenced after the battle, reaching it's peak towards war's end.

At the time of the battle, the primary submarine base was located at Oahu. Even my Uncle's subs (Gato class) operated from Oahu with a secondary call at bases in Australia.

Here is Midway Island, 24 November 1941:






Here's Midway Island about 6 months later, seen just before the battle, 3 June 1942:





As you can see in the photos, Midway was not fully developed by the time of the battle, like some seem to think. As it stands, the U.S. put forth a large effort to develop Midway into a forward base. They had the luxury of working under secure conditions, as well as the materials, equipment and manpower to do so.

The Japanese would have been hard pressed to create a facility like this in a forward area, under combat conditions. (as has been mentioned before)

Midway, Sand Island development by 29 September 1943:





Midway, Sand Island development by 29 January 1944:





Midway, Sand Island April 1945:





Midway, Sand Island April 1945:

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## Garyt (May 23, 2014)

Nice job on the Pics, Graugreist!


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## GrauGeist (May 23, 2014)

Garyt said:


> Nice job on the Pics, Graugreist!


Thanks!


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## buffnut453 (May 23, 2014)

Interesting pics. It looks like the western end of Eastern Island was excavated while the eastern end had stuff added to it. Pretty cool engineering project...but I agree it would be tough to do under any kind of enemy military action.


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## parsifal (May 23, 2014)

It really did not hit home just how tiny the atoll is until i saw those photos. With eight major surface units assigned to the bombardment forces, there rreally would not be much left of the place after a day or so. This would not be another guadacanal. nowhere to run, nowhere to hide, overwhelming japanese firepower. in my opinion, there is no doubt how the invasion would have panned out


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## Aozora (May 23, 2014)

Midway then:
















Midway now...Midway Atoll birdwatching holidays: Pacific Nature and History Refuge.

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## GrauGeist (May 23, 2014)

The Midway complex was really a cluster of little postage stamps and it's amazing to see how the U.S. Navy expanded the land-mass over the span of 3 years, Sand Island in particular.

Earlier in the thread, when I mentioned that it would take an effort to not only secure and supply the island, but it would take a tremendous effort of men, equipment and materials to transform Midway into the base it became, I wasn't making that point based on opinion 
The Japanese would have been hard pressed to create such a facility, like the U.S. made, because the base expansion (as seen in the photos) was done in a secure environment.

If we look across the Pacific theater, at Japanese bases, look at how they had to constantly rebuild and resupply as the Allied forces bombed them, like the base at Rabaul, for example. How many Japanese transports and supply ships lay on the bottom, still full of supplies, equipment and even men? 

It even took the U.S. Marines and Army quite a while to secure and build up Henderson field beyond a muddy spot in the jungle, surrounded by soggy tents and exposed stacks of supplies.

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## Juha (May 24, 2014)

It would have been more like Betio, Roi-Namur or Tanambogo and Gavutu off Florida Is if one wants chronologically nearest case. In fact properly contructed coastal defence fortresses could take amazing amount of pounding without being silenced as shown in cases of Finnish ones during the Winter War,

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## oldcrowcv63 (May 25, 2014)

parsifal said:


> It really did not hit home just how tiny the atoll is until i saw those photos. With eight major surface units assigned to the bombardment forces, there rreally would not be much left of the place after a day or so. This would not be another guadacanal. nowhere to run, nowhere to hide, overwhelming japanese firepower. in my opinion, there is no doubt how the invasion would have panned out



Quantifying:

Land Area:

Wake Island: 4.063 sq. mi. 
Midway Island: 2.4 sq. mi. (not sure if this is before or after the extensive construction program of WW2… which I assume increased land area considerably.)
Estimate of occupied area of Guadalcanal: ~30 sq. miles. (probably a bit underestimated) I couldn't find a better value.

hmmmm… Doesn't look good for the defenders of Midway having to face the big guns of Yamamoto's battle line. 

Apparently, Yamamoto, who had been a mover and shaker in bringing naval aviation to its ultimate expression, was loathe to expose his heavy ships to the combined fire power of the one surviving USN CV and what ever could be staged out of Midway's own airfield which he believed hadn't been neutralized… Or perhaps he was just anticipating that no matter how successful the IJN might be in subsequent days, he couldn't foresee being able to hang on in the face of whatever reinforcements the USN might be able to muster. It would be interesting to know whether spies in either Oahu or the Canal Zone were providing the IJN any current intelligence regarding units coming in to PH (SARA) or entering the PTO (WASP). 

If Yamamoto had employed a different plan, something more as Pars said, mutually supporting flight decks, along the lines of Guderian's "_fist not fingers…_," the outcome might likely have been very different, even in the event of a bloody mutually-damaging carrier battle where the USN retained the element of surprise and did serious damage on its first (morning) strike.


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## Juha (May 25, 2014)

IIRC the fire support of Midway invasion force was limited to 4 CAs, one CL and 11DDs.


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## syscom3 (May 25, 2014)

Aozora said:


> Midway then:



I think thats a diorama that Life magazine created.


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## parsifal (May 25, 2014)

Juha said:


> IIRC the fire support of Midway invasion force was limited to 4 CAs, one CL and 11DDs.



In terms of direct support, yes this was the force attached firectly to the invasion fleet. But from the Kaigun website, the actual bombardment forces were considerably grater than that




Battleship Division 3, Section 1

RAdm. Mikawa Gunichi
BB-1 Kongō, BB-2 Hiei

Cruiser Division 4, Section 1
CA-9 Atago, CA-11 Chōkai

Cruiser Division 5
CA-5 Myōkō,CA-7 Haguro


Destroyer Squadron 4
CL-11 Yura, 
DD-69 Yūdachi, DD-68 Murasame, DD-70 Samidare, DD-71 Harusame

Destroyer Division 9
DD-80 Natsugumo, DD-82 Minegumo, DD-83 Asagumo

Carrier Group
CVL Zuihō
VF: 6 A6M2, 6 A5M4
VT: 12 B5N2

DD-32 Mikazuki, 

Close Support Group (direct Attachment) 
Cruiser Division 7

CA-16 Kumano, CA-13 Mogami, CA-14 Mikuma, CA-15 Suzuya

Destroyer Division 8
DD-76 Asashio, DD-79 Arashio, 


Seaplane Tender Group

AV Chitose
VS: 16 [12] F1M2
4 [4] E13A1

AV 上川丸 Kamikawa Maru
VS: 8 [8] F1M2
4 [4] E13A1

DD-21 Hayashio
APD 35 Momi

Destroyer Squadron 2

CL-16 Jintsū
Destroyer Division 15

DD-19 Kuroshio, DD-20 Oyashio,DD-23 Hatsukaze, DD-24 Yukikaze, DD-25 Amatsukaze, DD-26 Tokitsukaze, DD-17 Kagero, DD-18 Shiranuhi, DD-84 Arare, DD-85 Kasumi, 


Combined Landing Force
2nd Combined SNLF,1,250 men

28th Regiment's detach. 1,200 men

11th Construction Btn (actually pioneers) .
1,250 men

12th Construction Btn.
1,250 men

APD Minekaze x 2 , 1 x Momi

All these units should be considered as provbiding support for the landing forces


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## parsifal (May 25, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Quantifying:
> 
> Land Area:
> 
> ...





Half the size of Wake, wow. guadacanal, the island was much bigger than 30 square miles, and even the perimeter as at October 1942 measured about 6 miles by 3 miles. At the time of Kawaguchis counterattack, 26 october 1942, the active front was about 1-2 miles. 

it is, however, not valid to compare what transpired on Guadacanal, to what might happen if an assault was to occur on Midway. Japanese operations on Guadacanal were never adequately supported and suffered from chronic supply shortages. The terrain greatly favoured the defences, and at times, sheeer dub luck worked against the Japanese.

I think Yammamoto abandoned Midway, because the basic premise on which it had been devised, to lure the American fleet out to batrtle, and then destroy it, had not happened in anything like the way it was designed. I dont agree that Yammamoto was loathe to ri sk his battleships, but neither was he prepred to squander them pointlessly. in 1942 they were still considered necessary for the final showdown with the US battlefleet.....the decisive battle.....and for a short while after the catastrophe he entertained the idea of closing for a night battle . he soon reversed that decision


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 25, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Half the size of Wake, wow. guadacanal, the island was much bigger than 30 square miles, and even the perimeter as at October 1942 measured about 6 miles by 3 miles. At the time of Kawaguchis counterattack, 26 october 1942, the active front was about 1-2 miles.
> 
> it is, however, not valid to compare what transpired on Guadacanal, to what might happen if an assault was to occur on Midway.



My Guadalcanal area estimate was based on gridding the map on page 230 of Frank's _Guadalcanal_, The map depicts the situation on the night of September 12 and 13 during the battle of Edson's Ridge. The value represents an estimate of the area between Aliigator Creek and the Lunga River, capped in the South by the defensive line on Edson's Ridge. 

I was simply working from your suggestion that the barrage concentration (presumably measured in pounds/tons of ordnance dropped on Midway per square yard would be greater than that dropped on Henderson field and surroundings simply due to the larger occupied area. In retrospect, the fact that the target was pretty much Henderson Field itself suggests, the analogy is indeed a poor one. Presumably the targeted area would actually be roughly the same size. Of course, the bombardment at Midway would presumably be made to soften the island defenses in preparation for an invasion, while at Guadalcanal I believe the naval gunfire was mainly to destroy the airfield itself and support facilities. On the other hand, there are the reports by survivors of observing shells marching across the occupied portion of Guadalcanal's coastal plain that suggest the target may have been more broadly defined than just the airfield.


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## parsifal (May 26, 2014)

The whole plan was compromised by the cryptoanalysis of japanese codes. ive always held the belief that the Japanese placed their carriers too far forward, and should have placed them behind the other forces advancing on Midway. What im not sure of is the extent that the codebreakers could read actual battle dispositions. They knew for example, the target, the timing, the force compositions of the plan, but did they know the tactical dispositions. if for example, the Main Body was pushed forward of carriers, would the USN have known about that?

I expect that they would, but surely it was a better basic plan to approach from the southwest, where 24th Air Flotilla could offer some LR recon assistance, advancing the carriers behind the main body rather than sticking its neck out asking to have it knocked off. Approaching from the Northwest meant the KB was left exposed, with no land based support and no ability to undertake any deceptions as to what they were. 

The whole plan, from an operational pov just defies logic in certain respects. it smacks of over confidence. the Japanese should have advanced on the island cautiously. They didnt need to take the risks they did, unless they believed the USN would not come out if presented with a "safe" japanese plan. Placing the carriers behind the amphibious groups was a safe plan, but it would rob the IJN of the surpise element they were looking for.


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 26, 2014)

parsifal said:


> The whole plan was compromised by the cryptoanalysis of japanese codes. ive always held the belief that the Japanese placed their carriers too far forward, and should have placed them behind the other forces advancing on Midway. What im not sure of is the extent that the codebreakers could read actual battle dispositions. They knew for example, the target, the timing, the force compositions of the plan, but did they know the tactical dispositions. if for example, the Main Body was pushed forward of carriers, *would the USN have known about that?*
> 
> I expect that they would, but surely it was a better basic plan to approach from the southwest, where 24th Air Flotilla could offer some LR recon assistance, advancing the carriers behind the main body rather than sticking its neck out asking to have it knocked off. Approaching from the Northwest meant the KB was left exposed, with no land based support and no ability to undertake any deceptions as to what they were.
> 
> The whole plan, from an operational pov just defies logic in certain respects. *it smacks of over confidence.* the Japanese should have advanced on the island cautiously. They didnt need to take the risks they did, unless they believed the USN would not come out if presented with a "safe" japanese plan. Placing the carriers behind the amphibious groups was a safe plan, but it would rob the IJN of the surpise element they were looking for.



Two instances, one of an IJN scouting report and the other of the first US sighting of IIN units are relevant to your questions. 

The first is the scouting report of I-168 made on June 1, 1942, which indicated "incessant air activity" at the island's airfield, which might have been interpreted as preparations being made for an anticipated attack. 

From SS, *Glorious Day...* (Cressman ed.) Japanese submarine I-168 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

According to SS, there were many IJN radio intelligence clues indicating an enhanced state of readiness of the US to receive an attack. 

The Japanese described this "_over confidence_" to a combination of fatigue and "_Victory Disease_" although I'd characterize it as more like "_Victory Blindness_"

Despite this, Nagumo chose to mount a fairly relaxed reconnaissance on the day of the attack. SS suggests communications limitations prevented Nagumo from being made aware of the US state of preparedness.

The second is the ~0930, June 3rd report by Ensign Jack Reid, who, upon spotting the transports of the Midway invasion or occupation formations reported incorrectly, "Main Body." These units were approaching from the SW, from the vicinity of Wake Island. On monitoring the report, Nimitz's transmitted response was the now famous:

"_The force sighted is not, repeat not, the Main Body._" 

This suggests to me that (assuming the USN formation names for the IJN components were the same as those of the IJN) that the intel was very detailed both as to force composition, location and projected track. Although actual force deployment was apparently a mystery. Did the 4 IJN CVs operate together or were they operating, like the USN, as independent divisions?


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## VBF-13 (May 26, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Did the 4 IJN CVs operate together or were they operating, like the USN, as independent divisions?


I believe they were operating together. That's another thing that's often ignored. The Japanese well-versed in carrier operations, the U.S. wasn't.


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 26, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> I believe they were operating together. That's another thing that's often ignored. The Japanese well-versed in carrier operations, the U.S. wasn't.



Hi VBF-13, Sorry, that was meant to be a rhetorical question. In other words, the US intel had revealed a lot of info regarding force disposition but there were blank spots that created problems for the USN. yes, you are right, the USN was doing well to get just one carrier's air group to execute a coordinated strike, while the IJN was able to (and did on December 7, '41) execute coordinated strikes from elements of up to six different carriers. The USN just wasn't in the same league beyond the squadron level and some specific CVs such as the Yorktown. Prior to Coral Sea, TF-17 was coming along (with a very long way to go) when Lexington was lost at Coral Sea, followed by the loss of the Yorktown at Midway. There was a fair amount of experience in that task force that was ultimately dispersed to season other organizations.


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## VBF-13 (May 26, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Hi VBF-13, Sorry, that was meant to be a rhetorical question.


But of course, Crow. I guess I eat crow for not catching that, lol.


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 26, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> But of course, Crow. I guess I _*eat crow*_ for not catching that, lol.



Not that!  Man! you'd choke on the hide.


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## vikingBerserker (May 26, 2014)




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## Juha (May 27, 2014)

Hello Parsifal
the Kaigun's Midway link didn't work for me but the older understanding was that Kondo's Second Fleet's Strike Force, Support Force, Main Body was to screen the southern side of the battle area and the shore bombardment was the job of Kurita's Close Support Group.


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## gjs238 (Jun 9, 2014)

Goodbye to a great thread


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 10, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> The Midway complex was really a cluster of little postage stamps and it's amazing to see how the U.S. Navy expanded the land-mass over the span of 3 years, Sand Island in particular.
> 
> Earlier in the thread, when I mentioned that it would take an effort to not only secure and supply the island, but it would take a tremendous effort of men, equipment and materials to transform Midway into the base it became, I wasn't making that point based on opinion
> The Japanese would have been hard pressed to create such a facility, like the U.S. made, because the base expansion (as seen in the photos) was done in a secure environment.
> ...



And this where apparently much of the early heavy earth moving had already been accomplished by the Japanese pioneers. From Richard Frank's comprehensive _*Guadalcanal*_:

May 18, Lunga Point reported to be suitable for airfield construction by IJN Capt. Miyazaki. (Only a few such areas were suitable for air fields in the Solomons.) 
May 27, Inspection Party examines site and concurs with Miyazaki
JUne 8, Pioneers landed at Lunga to prepare a base.
June 13, decision is made by IJN General Staff to build airfield on Guadalcanal.
June 20 Construction of wharf and airfield commence.
July 6, Twelve ship convoy lands additional workers (two construction battalions, total 2,571 men) and their heavy equipment.
August 7, USMC lands First Division on Guadalcanal and takes possession of uncompleted airfield and uses IJN equipment to continue construction.
August 12, Less than a week after the landings, the first a/c, a PBY-5A, lands at newly established Henderson Field, A/F declared operational, despite no a/c revetments, taxiways, or drainage

August 20, ACV-1, USS Long Island delivers MAG-23 consisting of 19 F4F and 12 SBDs to Henderson. 

Long Island's arrival off Guadalcanal was delayed due to a stopover in Efate to exchange the green pilots of VMF-223 for the more experienced pilots of VMF-212.

Henderson remained a muddy poorly prepared air strip for some time afterward. By Mid September, Fighter One air strip had been constructed but its operation remained subject to rain inundation. 

By the end of October, 1942, three fields had been built, Henderson, now 5,400' in length of which only 3,500' feet was metal matting and two dirt/grass strips of Fighter One and Two. 

Of course, Midway's airfield was already prepared and would need only be repaired for an occupying force to use.

Late addition, added comments about progress on developing Henderson and the two fighter fields.

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## drgondog (Jun 11, 2014)

The Japanese capability and capacity to build airfields was very poor compared to American standards - and proved to be a critically weak link in Japan's ability to project force in the Solomon's. In addition, their ability to deliver spare parts and repair aircraft with little battle damage but lacking critical parts continued to be a major factor in their defeat.

That the entire area north of Australia was such a cesspool of jungle rot, dysentery, malaria, impenetrable jungle, rain and dangerous weather made it the toughest place in the war to mount and maintain offensive actions.

"Little" details like building Service hangars, revetments, ramps and taxiways seemed to be beyond the ability of IJA Pioneer construction battalions and equipment in a timely fashion, and caused crucial delays in their advance to take Port Moresby and the rest of New Guinea in May - or secure Guadalcanal as an airbase before the US arrived in August. Both of those were crucial failures of initiative and execution.

In addition, as primitive as our medical facilities were in contrast to US, Australia and Europe, we were far better off than the Japanese as far as returning our pilots back to flyable duty (but never really defeating disease and illness). I believe this also was a major factor in the ability of the US and RAAF to wrest air superiority away from the Japanese while we were building fleet capacity in the US for the next year after Midway.

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## GrauGeist (Jun 11, 2014)

Also, if we go back and look at the photos of Midway Island's transformation, we'll see that the initial airstrip (pre battle) was situated on Eastern Island.

Following the battle, attention turned to Sand Island where a massive buildup of facilities and a new, larger airfield and port complex were constructed. Extensive reef demolition and dredging contributed to Sand Island's land area increase by a considerable amount while at the same time creating a large harbor access and interior anchorage.


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## parsifal (Jun 11, 2014)

There is no comparison to japanese construction capability to the US, principally due to a poorer standard of planning, materials and manpower shortages, and most importantly due to a much lower standard of mechanisation. Still, US capabilities in 1942 were far more limited than those that occurred later in the war, and unfortunately our view of American capabilities in 1942 assumes that they had the same capabilities early in the war, as they clearly possessed later in the war. Clearly this is a bit of propaganda. 


A good example of the thin deployments that hampered the japanese at this early stage is to take a quick look at the guadacanal construction forces. initially designated Tulagi invasion force. It consisted of a part detachment of the Sasebo SNLF and a part of the 17th Construction (or support) squadron, about 35 specialist construction troops. Total force strength was about 450 men, they were faced by 25 Australian commandoes which i believe were evacuated along with some RAAF personnal. The R$AAF had based a half squadron of Catalina at Tuagi from January. On evacuation, some four PBYs were burnt I believe, to avoid capture.

At this stage Tulagi was the target of the invasion, because it was the seat of the British administration, already had some seaplane facilities (a jetty or slipway I think). It had several buildings worth capturing and a reasonable supply of food on which the garrison could rely. Because of the lack of medical support, the Japanese felt they needed healthy environments for their troops, and this meant getting good bivouacs to avoid the typical jungle diseases that they knew would decimate their formation strengths. Anyway 17th army signaled or advised very early (or perhaps even before the operation began) that it was unable to spare the transports needed to transport large quantities of supply to the new outpost, and the local force would need to rely on local availability for food and water. No capacity existed at that time for the shipment of construction materials. There were no plans to build an airfield at that stage, it was intended merely to establish and maintain a forward seaplane base from which surveillance of Noumea, there eventual target of the operation. 

After the failure to capture Port Moresby, 17th Area Army recognised this position was now badly exposed. I get the feeling from the signal traffic that we do have, that they wanted to evacuate the position. I wonder what they might have said had they been informed of the Midway disaster. IGHQ refused their request. Further, as a sign of the fantasy world that the IGHQ lived, it issued orders to develop a land based airstrip at Lunga, on nearby Guadacanal. GHQ instructed that the construction unit that had been assigned to the Midway operation, was to be transferred to 17 Area Army command for the airfield construction. It appears that IGHQ intended to continue their offensive operations to isolate Australi, and to facilitate this by land based air rather than carrier forces. A direct benfit of the midway operation, but more importantly, a clear sign of the neurosis that still gripped the Japanese leadership 

Known as 'Runga Point' to the Japanese, and code named RXI, Lunga Point was surveyed by the Japanese when they arrived in the area in early May, after the capture of Tulagi. The strip would allow Japanese aircraft to patrol the southern Solomons, shipping lanes to Australia, and the eastern flank of New Guinea.

The major construction units involved 1,145 in another, arriving on July 6, 1942. This team was originally scheduled to work on Midway once it was in captured. Work commenced after July 9th. Construction was observed and reported by coastwatcher and this airfield's presence spawned American plans to capture Guadalcanal.

About the middle of July, 250 additional civilians of the 'Hama Construction Unit' arrived known as the under the command of Inouree Hama, who had had 50 men on Gavutu previously. Also specialists from the 14th Encampment Corps that established the radio stations on Tulagi, Gavutu and at RXI plus the C. O. installing a radar set. Local labor was also used in the construction.

Airfield construction proceeded rapidly, ahead of schedule, despite being very short of mechanisation. At the end of the second week, the unit received 6 trucks and 1 bulldozer, which it used day and night to good effect. 

On the night of August 5, 1942 just prior to the American landing, the construction troops were given an extra sakai ration for completing construction ahead of schedule. The next day, the Americans arrived and capture the airstrip. this began the pivatal campaign of the Pacific. 

There were at least three TOEs and a multiplicity of roles for the Japanese engineers. The most numerous, and typical I think, was the "general Purpose engineer, or _Dokuritsu Kohei Rentai_ , Its TOE was widely variable, but typically such units consisted of about 1100 men and had 14 vehicles attached. Heavy earth moving gear was the exception to the rule.

by comparison, even in 1942, a US General service Regiment, the nearest equivalent of the above, even in 1942 913 enlisted men and 31 officers. and 134 vehicles of a bewildering array attached. These TOEs could be greatly modified, depending on need and situation, but it is clear there is no comparison in the mechanisation levels of the two opposing formations.

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## drgondog (Jun 12, 2014)

Nicely summarized Parsifal. The key subtlety that I agree and would expand on is that the US didn't have the Seabee's organized and equipped, as such, at Guadalcanal, but the pool of extremely skilled heavy construction tradespersons and heavy equipment was literally infinite in comparison to that of Japan... and in process of being organized and deployed as Guadalcanal campaign was underway. 

The other fact worth noting is that when the US deployed the construction units, they were already staffed with 100% skilled folks whereas the Japanese drew heavily on slave or native impressed labor and pitiful equipment TO&E in comparison. The key issue was always 'time to complete' the same task in comparison to US.

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## parsifal (Jun 13, 2014)

Japanese engineers were generally well trained. They did try to substitute their lack of heavy machinery using local (usually forced) labour, but the engineers themselves were actually pretty good at what they did. the burma railway, much as it was a human rights nightmare, was an engineering marvel, completed in record time. Contrary to the movie, British expertise was not needed to complete the bridges, or any other element of the line. And when completed, it provided some assistance to the Japanese in Burma. the fact that it cost nearly 60000 lives, many of them completely unnecessarily has nothing to do with the engineering aspect of the Japanese army, and everything to do with the sadistic magnet that was their Kempetei. 

The other great achievement of the Japanese engineers during the war was their high standard of field fortifications. often completed with nothing but local supplies, they were generally a major headache for the allied invasion forces. in terms of more permanent field fortifications, the Japanese defences at mutanchiang were good enough to make the Soviets in 1945 noyt even attempt an assault against them. instead they went around them......

There was nothing wrong with Japanese engineering know how. what they lacked was numbers, supplies and mechanization ,

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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 13, 2014)

gjs238 said:


> Goodbye to a great thread



Or maybe not...


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## zoomar (Jun 18, 2014)

The battle of Midway was a disastrous and unexpected defeat for the IJN that signaled the beginnning of the end for the IJN, but let's get one thing straight. Even if the IJN had completely destroyed the entire US force arrayed them with no carriers lost themselves (unlikley, but possible I suppose), they still intended to take the islands and the Japanese record at Wake would indicate this might not have been easy. Only a light naval force was detailed to support the invasion fleet and - even with complete air superiority - the invasion might not suceed. Midway was well defended.

Even if the invasion did suceed, Japan was still going to lose the war. The US still had two capable fleet carriers (Saaratoga and Wasp), and within one year, US production capacity would have made good the losses, and then some. Within two years - even assuming that Japan somehow managed not to lose any of its fleet carriers to submarines or in some other schemes in the Solomons, Australia, or the Indian Ocean, the US would have many more and many better fleet carriers at its disposal, while Japan would have at most one new fleet carrier (I'm not counting the wartime tender and liner conversions). Also, US aircraft (F6F, F4U, TBF, etc) would outclass and ournumber their Japanese opponents by a long shot. There is only so much a small cadre of highly trained and dedicated Japanese naval aviators coould achieve against a far greater number of almost-as-well-trained pilots flying better planes.

The Pacific War would play out differently, but Japan would still lose.


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## drgondog (Jun 19, 2014)

Defeating the US and destroying the existing remaining pacific fleet had far reaching consequences - not the least was a greatly lengthened war in the Pacific. The two or three immediate consequences that come to mind are 1.) isolate Wake and starve it out, 2.) complete destruction of the sub bases, 3.) complete elimination of Hawaiian airpower and blockade from re-supply.

Possibly then take Hawaiian Islands.

Immediately after the battle - take New Guinea and expand in SW Pacific, building an airbase net to choke off all military supplies to Australia. The IJN would have a minimum of 18 months breathing space with no interference from USA, USAAF or USN to maneuver in SE Asia, China and India.

Explore the options of taking Madagascar and Ceylon to choke off the Suez Canal and pivot on India - or consider attacking USSR (doubtful). The US, even with vast resources, would take a long time to retake Hawaii and establish a jumping off point - and it would take a very long time to neutralize a Japanese air base net in SWP to move to support Australia. 

I doubt that Hawaii could be taken even if IJN fleet prevailed but that would be the key choke point on US initiatives in PTO.


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## parsifal (Jun 19, 2014)

The aim of the japanese in the war was never to defeat the US outright. they were smart enough to realize they couldnt do that. what they needed to do was firstly to obtain access to the strategic raw materials that they needed to continue their war in China. They achieved that, ahead of schedule and at a fraction of the cost they had anticipated. 

The Japanese knew that the Allies would not willingly accept the Japanese conquests in SE Asia. They hoped however, that if they could inflict a series of decisive defeats on the US and her allies, that these nations would tire of the war and its costs and seek peace terms with the japanese.

Failing that they were confident that hte Germans would force the Russians to the peace table, and then the allies would face a two front maritime war that they would be hard pressed to counter. at the very least they expected a defeat of Russia would lead to the release of the manchurian garrisons, and an intensification of naval operations in the Atlantic. this they hoped would dilute US counterattacks. 

Failing all of those, the japanese aimed to inflict a massive defeat on the US as a direct result of Midway. thus weakened, the US would not be in a position to launch any effective counterattacks and thereby Japan would gain time to fortify and reinforce her pacific outposts. 

As it turned out, none of these assumptions worked. germany was defeated in the week that the japanese declared war, they completely miscalculated US anger over Pearl, and they never achieved the decisive victory they were looking for. Midway, of itself was not the vital turning point, but it was part of the events that were critical to turning the tide and gaining the initiative over Japan . japans assumptions relating to Midway were themselves badly flawed and far too optimistic. Therein lies the basic reasons for Japans defeat.


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## GrauGeist (Jun 19, 2014)

My observation (and it's an observation only) regarding the loss of the leeward islands and Midway/Hawaii, would be that the U.S. would be slowed down in it's ability to bring the fight to the Japanese, but not forced to the table.

However, losing possesion of the Panama Canal would have been disasterous, as it would have seriously hampered the U.S. Navy's ability to bring fresh assets to the Pacific to rebuild the PacFleet. Of course, it would not have stopped the new arrivals, but delayed their arrival considerably as they have to make the trip 'round the horn...

If the Japanese just bombed the canal, damaging the locks like the Mira Flores, etc. that would have been fixable over a period of time but I have seen it suggested eslewhere that the Japanese could have tried to take possesion of the canal and I don't think that the folks suggesting that took into consideration that there were several south and central American nations that would have been more than capable of over-running Japanese forces there at the Panama canal had the Japanese attempted something like this.


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## zoomar (Jun 19, 2014)

The other difficulty the Japanese would have faced in attempting to take the Canal Zone or even mounting a relatively sustained bombing effort against the locks (it's a bit optimistic that they woud succeed on the very first strike given the defenses they'd face) is just getting there. This would be outside the range and endurance of most Japanese carriers and capital ships, requiring a large support train to accompany the fleet on its way. As opposed to the Hawaii Operation, which was mounted in peacetime through seas not regularly patrolled by the USN, this would be an operation in American-controlled waters, in face of extensive long range aerial and submarine recon activity. It's also not a stretch that the USA would be expecting such an operation, since they gamed that repeatedly in the 1930s. I suspect the likelihood is high that the Japanese strike forces would be discovered, forcing Yamamato (or whoever) to decide whether or not to continue or abort the operation.

I've always wondered what would have been the long range effect on WW2 if Japan did not attack the US fleet at Pearl Harbor but instead opened hostilities with a massive attack on the Canal Zone. In this situation, the undamaged US fleet would sortie west to releive the Phillipines as part of Plan Orange and be engaged at sea by the numerically inferior, but in naval aviation assets, superior, IJN. Since this would be 1941-42, the US could go into the action overconfident and the ships would not be bristling with AAA. I think its almost inevitable that the Japanese would sink a number of US capital ships or carriers by air attack and these vessels would not settle into the muck of Pearl Harbor to be raised and repaired, but sink forever. Couple that with a long closure of the Canal Zone, this might give the Japanese a greater advantage long term than they obtained by the Pearl Harbor attack.


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## GrauGeist (Jun 19, 2014)

I know that this is treading very deep into the "what if" waters, but if the plan for the attack at Pearl (7 December) had included a coordinated attack on Panama instead of assaulting the Aleutians, this would have seriously upset the boat for the U.S.

As it stands, the Aleutian campaign delivered little in the way of strategic value, it was always a constant thorn in the Allies' side, but not much more.

As far as the depth of the attack, I'm not sure to what extent the Japanese could have gone...but a surprise attack with bombers and even torpedo attacks (a torpedo would do some serious damage to the lock gates themselves) on the canal infrastructure would certainly be a major setback. Now the question would be, should they be content with simply bombing the hell out of it and withdrawing the strike fleet to other points in the Pacific or should they consider landing forces there to secure the area (like they did in the Aleutians)

The Japanese did have plans to use their I-400 class subs to launch an attack on the canal, though it never happened.

At least this is an interesting point to ponder.


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## zoomar (Jun 19, 2014)

There's a fascinating litte book written in 1925 called the "Great Pacific War" by the British naval journalist Hector Bywater that is a "future history" of a US-Japanese war in the mid 1930's. It starts with a Japanese "sneak attack" on the Panama Canal, but instead of airplanes and bombs, the weapon is a Japanese-manned merchant ship packed with explosives that detonates itself in the canal, destroys a key lock, and also results in a landslide that closes the canal for months. Great read if you can find it.


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## VBF-13 (Jun 20, 2014)

drgondog said:


> I doubt that Hawaii could be taken even if IJN fleet prevailed but that would be the key choke point on US initiatives in PTO.


For sure. You know, you think about it, this would have been their big opportunity. It's the start of the war. Our carriers are coming out of a big battle. They certainly didn't expect the Yorktown at Midway. Heck, by many accounts, they thought it was gone. How much closer are they going to get? Midway was at least water and a oil reserves and a little bit of farming land. I'm not saying that's all it represented, don't get the wrong idea, but, strike while the iron's hot. This was the time for Pearl, they wanted it. They've got a main force of battleships, there. If they got through Midway, as planned, they could even have brought in reinforcements, have thrown everything they had at it, that "choke point." They're not going to get another chance like that. They've got the advantage in the air and on the sea. I don't think I'm ruling out having gone for Pearl, had things gone differently, had they gone their way.


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## GrauGeist (Jun 20, 2014)

If the Japanese were going to be successful in taking Hawaii, they should have done it straight from the start. Instead of splitting their forces, sending an invasion/occupation force to the Aleutians, they should have rolled the dice and followed the planned attacks on 7 December with an invasion force supported by the Battleships and Cruisers once the U.S. Army/Navy complexes on Oahu were neutralized. There were several other auxillary fields and stations elsewhere on Oahu and a few other islands, but Pearl was the big prize.

Seizing Pearl Harbor would have been far more productive for the IJN than taking Midway and had the Japanese taken Hawaii, then the rest of the leewrd islands could have been taken peicemeal.

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## Elmas (Jun 21, 2014)

In 1927 IJN bought an airship from Italy, that was disassembled, sent by ship to Japan and assembled again there.
Ing. Felice Trojani, that was one of her designers and superintended to the works in Japan, in his memories "La coda di Minosse", recalls that he was amazed when he was clearly and candidly told by the Japanese Officers that the Airship was intended for sea recce in order to find the USN gathered together, to blow a definitive strike.
_"I wasn't amazed"_ Ing. Trojani says_ "when I heard about the Pearl harbour strike. My Japanese friends were preparing all the things from long years"._


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## VBF-13 (Jun 21, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> If the Japanese were going to be successful in taking Hawaii, they should have done it straight from the start. Instead of splitting their forces, sending an invasion/occupation force to the Aleutians, they should have rolled the dice and followed the planned attacks on 7 December with an invasion force supported by the Battleships and Cruisers once the U.S. Army/Navy complexes on Oahu were neutralized. There were several other auxillary fields and stations elsewhere on Oahu and a few other islands, but Pearl was the big prize.
> 
> Seizing Pearl Harbor would have been far more productive for the IJN than taking Midway and had the Japanese taken Hawaii, then the rest of the leewrd islands could have been taken peicemeal.


I know. I always wondered at that, too. All I can think is they may initially have just underestimated its significance.


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## vikingBerserker (Jun 21, 2014)

I think on of the biggest issues with the IJN philosophy was their obsession with 1 great battle to knock the US out of the war which guided their strategy. I do not believe they wanted to conquer the US, they just wanted them out of the war. With a large Japanese and Japanese-American population, I think Japan would have had a chance to invade and take over Hawaii right after the attack when panic was setting in and the Navy and Air Force smoldering on the ground.


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## davparlr (Jun 21, 2014)

I'm late coming to this party, and this may already been addressed, but what would have been the impacts to the battles in the south Pacific such as Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands, Port Moresby, Austrailia, if Midway had been a disaster, say three US carriers sunk to one Japanese. It seems to me that a counter invasion on Guadalcanal could not have happened until Japan had finished its airfield and reenforced its garrison. I don't think another carrier would be available until very late '42, first part of '43.

I don't think Japan ever had any ideas of taking Pearl Harbor, certainly not by Midway. It would have been much harder to take than Singapore and I am not sure Japan had the sea lift capability to transport and land a sufficiently large invasion force at one go, which would have been required. By end of June, 1942, the US had 106,000 ground troops and 16,000 air troops (Chapter VIII: The Hawaiian Defenses After Pearl Harbor) in Hawaii.


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## GrauGeist (Jun 21, 2014)

Invading Hawaii on or about 7 December would have most likely been their only opportunity to take the Islands.

Hit Pearl with all planned waves as originally planned, land forces at strategic locations across Oahu driving towards Pearl, maintain readiness for the eventaul counter-strike(s) from the U.S. carriers in the area. Omce Oahu was secured, sweep Hawaii, Maui and the other islands. Then worry about the leeward islands.

Then the U.S. might be driven to the table for discussions (I seriously doubt it, though)

However, like I said, this would only be possible if the invasion was bundled in with the strike at Pearl on 7 December. Because, once the smoke settled, their window of opportunity closed.

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## Shortround6 (Jun 22, 2014)

Given the total Japanese resources if they _do_ invade Hawaii on Dec 7/8 what else does *not* get attacked?

Malaysia? The Philippines? 

How many troops and transports would be needed for a Dec 7th attack?

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## parsifal (Jun 22, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> Given the total Japanese resources if they _do_ invade Hawaii on Dec 7/8 what else does *not* get attacked?
> 
> Malaysia? The Philippines?
> 
> How many troops and transports would be needed for a Dec 7th attack?




More than they could afford. Yamamoto was in favour of a direct attack from before the war, but he was constantly overruled. Finally, in the planning stages for Midway, it was the army who gave the Japanese one of the few reality checks in their high command. They calculated, that they would need 45000 troops for the invasion (a gross underestimate) and 70 trtansports per month just to keep the garrison supplied. This goes far beyond any logistic capability ever possessed. 

As the midway operation progressed, the Japanese came to see the blockade and starvation of Hawaii as possible bargaining chip at the expected peace talks. We have this notion that the Japanese were not prepared to use their submarines and ships in anti shipping roles. this is incorrect. They were quite prepared to use them, but they gave them other priorities as well. In the aftermath of midway, once the USN had been removed from the equation, the Japanese intended to apply a tight blockade of the HI. Faced with starvation for a sizable chink of their population, the Japanese expected the US to sue for peace fairly quickly.

I think these appraisals are totally unrealistic. I dont think the US would give up nearly so easily. If Midway had gone the Japanese way it would have taken longer for the US, but the result can hardly be in doubt.


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## vikingBerserker (Jun 22, 2014)

I agree, it really comes down to natural resources and manufacturing.


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## GrauGeist (Jun 22, 2014)

Considering the Japanese struck Pearl Harbor first, then employed a series of attacks on U.S. territories in the days and months following, after the U.S. had ramped up it's wartime footing.

Had the Japanese adopted a form of "Island Hopping" like the U.S. did during the PTO, then perhaps things may have taken a different course. I know that the Aleutian Campaign was considered a strategic one, because both sides held the idea that this "northern route" was an effective path to North America's west coast and/or Japan's northern islands.

However, an attack and invasion of the Hawaiian Islands along with an attack on the Panama Canal would have been a serious blow. As had been mentioned earlier in this thread, Midway was not yet a large staging area at this early stage and could be effictively bypassed (along with Wake) and picked off at their leisure. Pearl was and would have served as a valuable asset to the IJN in forming a noose around U.S. Pacific territories. Assuming the invasion of Hawaii was successful along with the destruction of the Canal, Japan would have bought them some serious time to either negotiate a deal with Washington or build up their strenght for the next step (Phillipines, Malaysia, etc)


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## WalhallaJPN (Jun 22, 2014)

Hi and welcome all, finally registered :]

I love these "what if" scenarios as they sharpen your mind and imagination. So lets dig into a short story. 

Few weeks before the real encounter happened, Japanese asked themselves: "The risks are too great, if we plan a conventional attack. We must think of something that might be of value to get those 2 small atolls.". They drank and drank, sang songs and played games. Most of the commanders liked shogi, thus it was only a matter of time before they started a game. While drunk, they ignored some rules, yet it was a young assistant, who gave them an incredible idea. 

How could those 2 atolls make USA see red, so they would throw away reasoning and hopefully make grieve errors? Think, what is the first rule of assassination? Strike where it's least expected. The Doolittle's Raid proved that. But is there a place, where it would hurt all US citizens the hardest? Think again. 

With the Midway, Japan could realistically bomb US cities. And with suicidal bombers, they might go as far as Washington or New York. Not for the ordinance that would hit the ground, but for pure fear factor. And since Washington would have been in range, where it would hurt the most than to destroy White House in the first strike? 

-------------------

This of course is only a far fetched imagination, however with modified Tachikawa Ki-77 and sneaky tactics, it might have even worked. (Sneaked tactics: usage of US markings and camo and try to cross US during night...).

/// I personally wouldn't do it, since I'm "Buddhist" (we are all going to die, so why sped up the process with pointless wars over who has a bigger willy, who is cleaner...). But I love letting my imagination roam wild, to see what it will bring out .


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## VBF-13 (Jun 22, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> Considering the Japanese struck Pearl Harbor first, then employed a series of attacks on U.S. territories in the days and months following, after the U.S. had ramped up it's wartime footing.
> 
> Had the Japanese adopted a form of "Island Hopping" like the U.S. did during the PTO, then perhaps things may have taken a different course. I know that the Aleutian Campaign was considered a strategic one, because both sides held the idea that this "northern route" was an effective path to North America's west coast and/or Japan's northern islands.
> 
> However, an attack and invasion of the Hawaiian Islands along with an attack on the Panama Canal would have been a serious blow. As had been mentioned earlier in this thread, Midway was not yet a large staging area at this early stage and could be effictively bypassed (along with Wake) and picked off at their leisure. Pearl was and would have served as a valuable asset to the IJN in forming a noose around U.S. Pacific territories. Assuming the invasion of Hawaii was successful along with the destruction of the Canal, Japan would have bought them some serious time to either negotiate a deal with Washington or build up their strenght for the next step (Phillipines, Malaysia, etc)


Yes, I'd think so. To those who would hasten to point out, "easier said than done," that's hardly full of news. Hawaii and the Canal would have hurt the U.S. the most, more than anything, and that's, I'd think, just a fact. The Japanese, it seems, didn't understand it that sharply. As Hawaii and the Canal kept the U.S. in the war, that's when the idea started to get across. By that time, sayonara. Too late, not enough.


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## GrauGeist (Jun 22, 2014)

Also, one thing that always remained a "fly in the ointment" for Japan, was the breaking of their code.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 23, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> Given the total Japanese resources if they _do_ invade Hawaii on Dec 7/8 what else does *not* get attacked?
> 
> Malaysia? The Philippines?
> 
> How many troops and transports would be needed for a Dec 7th attack?





parsifal said:


> More than they could afford. Yamamoto was in favour of a direct attack from before the war, but he was constantly overruled. Finally, in the planning stages for Midway, it was the army who gave the Japanese one of the few reality checks in their high command. They calculated, that they would need 45000 troops for the invasion (a gross underestimate) and 70 trtansports per month just to keep the garrison supplied. This goes far beyond any logistic capability ever possessed.
> 
> As the midway operation progressed, the Japanese came to see the blockade and starvation of Hawaii as possible bargaining chip at the expected peace talks. We have this notion that the Japanese were not prepared to use their submarines and ships in anti shipping roles. this is incorrect. They were quite prepared to use them, but they gave them other priorities as well. In the aftermath of midway, once the USN had been removed from the equation, the Japanese intended to apply a tight blockade of the HI. Faced with starvation for a sizable chink of their population, the Japanese expected the US to sue for peace fairly quickly.
> 
> I think these appraisals are totally unrealistic. I dont think the US would give up nearly so easily. If Midway had gone the Japanese way it would have taken longer for the US, but the result can hardly be in doubt.



OK, I'll throw this out... Delay the attack on the PI/Big Mac, those 34 B-17s don't pose a real threat at this stage of the US Build up and half are historically wiped out by the Tainan airgroup in any case on the first day, as well as a significant fraction of the defending fighter force. Small scale operations in preparation for the ultimate PI invasion, like seizing the northern small island airstrip on Batan Island could proceed. Yes, PI would be a thorn in the side of IJ during the time it took to reorganize for the PI invasion. But I expect, the USA's overall PI defensive capability is unlikely to have improved significantly during that time.

Organize and use the forces ~70 transports and associated troops to invade Oahu. The USN CVs don't yet represent a real significant threat to the operation and are likely to be eliminated piecemeal during the operation. The three USN CVs wouldn't be able to execute coordinated attacks and the sought-for decisive sea battle would have occurred in the waters around Oahu at the very start of WW2. IMHO, early loss of Lex, Sara and Enterprise would be highly probable (during their attempt to find and engage Kido Butai) and severely cripple subsequent US operations. 

The question in my mind is whether a commando-style raid (with a significant force) with the purpose of destroying local military support infrastructure (harbors power plants, fuel depots, ammo supplies) would have been better than an all-out occupation of the island. 

Pars to your knowledge has anyone every tried to game such a scenario?


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## GrauGeist (Jun 23, 2014)

If the Japanese conducted a multiple-point landing operation while the first/second attack waves were hitting Pearl, this would allow them to get ashore unchallenged. Instead of Nagumo cancelling the third attack wave, continue the attacks (perhaps alternate approach patterns) until the landing forces report a secure foothold.

Then continue air support operations as ground forces need while searching for the U.S. carrier element.

I would imagine that the U.S. carrier force has two options at this point:
1) try and close in and defend Oahu in the face of a considerable Japanese force (battle of Midway rules would not apply here)

2) head for California at best possible speed to preserve the integrity of the carrier force, preserving these assets for a later day and more favorable conditions.


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## drgondog (Jun 23, 2014)

Dave - IMO Nagumo would have been better served targeting the Sub Pens rather than going after Midway.. He had no idea where the US carriers were and to try to land at Midway and stay engaged until it was taken would raise the question "Why"


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## parsifal (Jun 23, 2014)

> OK, I'll throw this out... Delay the attack on the PI/Big Mac, those 34 B-17s don't pose a real threat at this stage of the US Build up and half are historically wiped out by the Tainan airgroup in any case on the first day, as well as a significant fraction of the defending fighter force. Small scale operations in preparation for the ultimate PI invasion, like seizing the northern small island airstrip on Batan Island could proceed. Yes, PI would be a thorn in the side of IJ during the time it took to reorganize for the PI invasion. But I expect, the USA's overall PI defensive capability is unlikely to have improved significantly during that time.



Containment of the PI was achieved fairly easily, and Macs insistence on a forward defence flew in the face of US military planning that stretched back at least 20 years. The Americans always planned to retreat to their fortress hideouts and await relief from the US fleet as it fought its way across the central Pacific with relief. The B-17s, the forward defences, even the arming of the filipino army were all really froth and bubble advocated by Mac and his supporters that in thge end came to nothing. The intent was to fight a decisive battle against japan, somewhere in the vicinity of Guam, win that battle and then press on to break the PI blockade.

All this was known or surmised by the IJN. What really alarmed them was the relocation of the Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbour in 1940. If the US had remained centred around San Diego, as pre-war planners had wanted, Pearl Harbour would never have happened. as part of the administrations "big stick" policy toward Japanese aggression, the insistence in pushing the fleet forward prevailed. But the USN in particular remained jittery about this dangerous deployment....from January 1940 to the actual attack there were, from memory no less than 17 false alarms as to Japanese attacks. The Japanese were known and expected for surprise attacks, though inexplicably thye USN high command seem genuinely surpised that Pearl was, in the finish the focus of that main effort. 

The Japanese traditional planning was also somewhat deviated by Yamamotos plan. the Japanese planned to attrition the US battlefleet as it advanced across the pacific, using a mix of submarines (which were designed for this very purpose....a surface speed of 24 knots compared to the US battlefleets best speed of 21 knots), and then commit their own battlefeelt also in the vicinity of guam, but a reduced strenfgth USN would lose because of the attrition it suffered....according to the Japanese. 

Pearl harbour was promoted by Yamamoto because he wanted to strike preemptively at the USN, but the focus of Japanese operation was always to get control of the strategic resources quickly and a big part of that was securing the PI. diverting troops away from the PI was possible but was counter to the fundamental Japanese strategy. moreover, it was not enough effort. 1.7 divs were committed to the capture of the PI, with a further 2 sivs, earmarked for the conquest of the NEI held back in reserve at okinawa and Palau under the control of 16A. 16A was held back for two reasons, lack of shipping, and also because the level of resisitance in the PI was not fully known. Diverting all thye shipping and all the troops for the right flank attacks south....the NEI and the PI operations, would have delivered about 4 divs in total, and about half the required transpoirts. still not enough to have a crack at the PI. And they knew it . Not only would japan be abandoning their strategic priorities, they would also be likley to fail, even by their own standards of narrow margins.

A better optioon for the Jpanese might have been not to attack at Pearl at all. If the Pacific fleet had been allowed to gather its strength andf advanace across the pacific, it is likley, in my opinion that it would have suffered a huge defeat anyway. It wasnt ready to tackle the japanese in December 1941, and would have sallied forth for combat and gotten itself destroyed at sea, for little loss to the Japanese. this includes their carriers IMO, which in December were just to lightly equipped to be able to mix it with the KB at all really. 




> Organize and use the forces ~70 transports and associated troops to invade Oahu. The USN CVs don't yet represent a real significant threat to the operation and are likely to be eliminated piecemeal during the operation. The three USN CVs wouldn't be able to execute coordinated attacks and the sought-for decisive sea battle would have occurred in the waters around Oahu at the very start of WW2. IMHO, early loss of Lex, Sara and Enterprise would be highly probable (during their attempt to find and engage Kido Butai) and severely cripple subsequent US operations.



As indicated above, even with the entire right wing of the Japanese attack abandoned, there still was not enough transport available to tackle this attack. 



> The question in my mind is whether a commando-style raid (with a significant force) with the purpose of destroying local military support infrastructure (harbors power plants, fuel depots, ammo supplies) would have been better than an all-out occupation of the island.



Hard to see how any surface fleet of any size could approach the PI without giving away their position. give the US forces even a half days alert time and the situation changes completely in my opinion. 



> Pars to your knowledge has anyone every tried to game such a scenario?



I did once or 5 times with the WITP system. We gave the Japanese surpise advantages, even stripped out the japanese economy by raping its shipping reserves . We could not crack the PI landward ddefences except for one attempt, which ended as a bloodbath for both sides. US reinforcements were rushed to the islands, and eventually the Japanese attacks were defeated.

just a game i guess.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 24, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Containment of the PI was achieved fairly easily, and Macs insistence on a forward defence flew in the face of US military planning that stretched back at least 20 years. The Americans always planned to retreat to their fortress hideouts and await relief from the US fleet as it fought its way across the central Pacific with relief. The B-17s, the forward defences, even the arming of the filipino army were all really froth and bubble advocated by Mac and his supporters that in thge end came to nothing. The intent was to fight a decisive battle against japan, somewhere in the vicinity of Guam, win that battle and then press on to break the PI blockade.
> 
> All this was known or surmised by the IJN. What really alarmed them was the relocation of the Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbour in 1940. If the US had remained centred around San Diego, as pre-war planners had wanted, Pearl Harbour would never have happened. as part of the administrations "big stick" policy toward Japanese aggression, the insistence in pushing the fleet forward prevailed. But the USN in particular remained jittery about this dangerous deployment....from January 1940 to the actual attack there were, from memory no less than 17 false alarms as to Japanese attacks. The Japanese were known and expected for surprise attacks, though inexplicably thye USN high command seem genuinely surpised that Pearl was, in the finish the focus of that main effort.
> 
> ...



Pars, I concur with your historical summary and judgement that the USN was in no position to successfully confront the IJN in a decisive battle in late 41 or early 1942. Although AFAIK, if there had been no Pearl Harbor attack, any attempt by the US Battle fleet to sortie from PH would have been handicapped by a lack of fleet oilers until perhaps up to a year after the start of hostilities. Nevertheless, I suspect the political pressure to mount such a sortie would have been immense if only to rescue US forces in the PI… No PH attack would be an interesting scenario in that it would test a set of prewar doctrines that actual war experience seems to suggest was made obsolescent by the very IJN operations that sought to bring about the decisive battle. 

I am assuming your use of "PI" was a typo or perhaps a misunderstanding of what I was actually suggesting (or maybe you were just rescuing me from warranted embarrassment at my rather unrealistic suggestion). I was not suggesting abandoning the SEA operations but rather delaying only the ops focused on a PI invasion. I had assumed the 70 or so transports used in the PI invasion would not detract or diminish the SEA ops but forgot that the main Luzon invasion took place three weeks after the SEA ops were underway on December 22. I concluded that a delay in the PI invasion would have allowed a major amphibious operation directed at occupying, or at least raiding Oahu. In other words, precipitating the decisive clash after the battle fleet had been disabled and only the USN carriers and light forces remained. In retrospect, transports used in the invasion of Luzon may well have included some or many that became available after the SEA amphib operations were completed while others would have been used to continue the advance southward to capture the NEI. In retrospect, not attacking PH seems a far better strategy for IJ capitalizing on the combination of unpreparedness and the general ignorance-based contempt of the US military for IJ capability.


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## davparlr (Jun 24, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> If the Japanese conducted a multiple-point landing operation while the first/second attack waves were hitting Pearl, this would allow them to get ashore unchallenged. Instead of Nagumo cancelling the third attack wave, continue the attacks (perhaps alternate approach patterns) until the landing forces report a secure foothold.



A surprise simultaneous air/land attack would be mandatory for this to be successful. The US had about 43000 Army troops and an unknown Navy and Marine forces available for combat, 99 P-40s, and 53 P-36/P-26s, a strong force, if alerted. Add to that a small island with some very tough terrain features and Hawaii would be a formidable target. To closely approach Hawaii with an invasion fleet would have dangerously exposed the attack to early detection with considerable ramifications, making this option very risky.


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## parsifal (Jun 24, 2014)

it was a typo, sorry about that. i meant the hawaiian islands, not the Philipinne islands


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## GrauGeist (Jun 24, 2014)

davparlr said:


> A surprise simultaneous air/land attack would be mandatory for this to be successful. The US had about 43000 Army troops and an unknown Navy and Marine forces available for combat, 99 P-40s, and 53 P-36/P-26s, a strong force, if alerted. Add to that a small island with some very tough terrain features and Hawaii would be a formidable target. To closely approach Hawaii with an invasion fleet would have dangerously exposed the attack to early detection with considerable ramifications, making this option very risky.


The element of surprise is absolutely key in this situation, however, as historically happened, the Japanese were able to close their taskforce within striking range unchallenged and delivered a series of attacks while everyone on Oahu were enjoying the start of a relaxed Sunday.
With this in mind, assault forces closing under the cover of the night/dawn to coincide their approach during the air attacks (on or before 7:00 a.m. as originally occurred) would certainly offer positive results. The bulk of U.S. forces were in and around the vicinity of Pearl with a few auxillary fields and air stations about the island. These smaller fields did not have a large amount of first line aircraft that would have been able to muster more than token resistance.
The Japanese multiple landing zones would most likely be along the western, northern and eastern shorelines and the IJA was no strangers to rough tropical terrain.
If Nagumo follows through with the three attack waves that were planned, then carry on with follow up strikes while the battleship/cruiser force closes to offer close support while the U.S. fleet was being neutralized, the situation would be very difficult for the U.S. forces.
As poor as communications actually were, it seems to me that trying to muster defenses against Japanese landing forces to the north, east and west would have been nearly impossible, especially while everyone was keeping their heads down during the initial air attacks.

It's certainly interesting to think about.


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## VBF-13 (Jun 24, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> Given the total Japanese resources if they _do_ invade Hawaii on Dec 7/8 what else does *not* get attacked?
> 
> Malaysia? The Philippines?
> 
> How many troops and transports would be needed for a Dec 7th attack?


But one might say that only underscores the theory they didn't appreciate its true significance, at the time, not until much later.


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## GrauGeist (Jun 25, 2014)

The way I am looking at it, is that taking Hawaii creates a buffer in a way.

All the leeward islands (Midway, Wake, etc) and Guam, the Phillipines all are now behind a Japanese "noose".

With the securing of the Hawaiian islands, Oahu and Pearl Harbor's facilities in particular, this gives them a serious base to operate from. As for the U.S., Naval operations are forced back to San Diego, San Pedro, San Francisco and bases in Washington state. Also the U.S. has to operate from Australian bases...
As far as the Phillipines, Wake and Midway are concerned, the Japanese can approach these after a pause to rearm, reinforce, retrain, etc. 

But taking Pearl may not win the war, I seriously doubt that. However, it sure would be a major setback as well as a serious blow to moral.

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## VBF-13 (Jun 25, 2014)

The Phillipines rather than Hawaii would make the more sense for the Japanese to immediately take over (or as soon as they could) for the overall objective they had in that area of the South West Pacific and South East Asia. Hawaii fit in as just dealing the US a big setback, is the way I'm kind of seeing that. It's not that Hawaii wasn't significant. It's rather that its significance rested in how it immediately advanced that overall objective in the South West Pacific and South East Asia.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 25, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> The element of surprise is absolutely key in this situation, however, as historically happened, the Japanese were able to close their taskforce within striking range unchallenged and delivered a series of attacks while everyone on Oahu were enjoying the start of a relaxed Sunday.
> With this in mind, assault forces closing under the cover of the night/dawn to coincide their approach during the air attacks (on or before 7:00 a.m. as originally occurred) would certainly offer positive results. The bulk of U.S. forces were in and around the vicinity of Pearl with a few auxillary fields and air stations about the island. These smaller fields did not have a large amount of first line aircraft that would have been able to muster more than token resistance.
> The Japanese multiple landing zones would most likely be along the western, northern and eastern shorelines and the IJA was no strangers to rough tropical terrain.
> If Nagumo follows through with the three attack waves that were planned, then carry on with follow up strikes while the battleship/cruiser force closes to offer close support while the U.S. fleet was being neutralized, the situation would be very difficult for the U.S. forces.
> ...



GG, that's very much what I had in mind but also caveated by a poor appreciation of the inadequacy of the IJN IJA to support more than about one and a half such major ampib ops at a time. Given that their prime objectives were to seize the natural resources of the NEI, a PH op must have looked to be distracting at best and a potential disaster at worst recognizing the apparent strength of the PH defenses defined above by davparlr. Only in retrospect, with the advantage of hindsight can we see that the US defenses were a relatively hollow shell against the skill and might of Kido Butai. A comparison with the PI campaign provides a hint of the ultimate outcome. defending the PI were some 90 P-40 fighters and 34 B-17 bombers (ineffective in a tactical role) with roughly 30 thousand ground troops (12,000 US Philipine Scouts ~20,000 PA). Against the larger number of US troops and A/C on Oahu was the absence of a pre-planned natural redoubt like the Bataan peninsula and Corregidor. Against the concentration of US airpower on Oahu was the large number of aircraft on Kido Butai carriers (>400 A/C). The wild card in this scenario were the three USN carriers in the general HI area. While not yet formidable individually or collectively in either skill or a/c type allotment, the large number of SBDs aboard the three might mean that luck could still play a role in the outcome.


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## GrauGeist (Jun 25, 2014)

Sure, there's a large number of possible outcomes, based on one or two events in the timeline.

The Phillipines certainly had a formidable compliment of manpower as well as defenses...however, there was no way for them to go anywhere. In otherwords, if Japan did execute an assault on Oahu and adjacent islands and establish a zone around U.S. held regions, the manpower based in the Philippines could only sit by and hear about it. This would be much like the later island-hopping campaign performed by the Allies, where garrisoned islands were passed over during the Allied advance.

As far as the fighters and bombers stationed in the Phillipines, due to a series of mishaps, many were destroyed on the ground: 12 of 17 B-17s alone, at Clark Field. The P-40s at Iba fared little better. The FEAF lost most of it's force from 8 December on through the next few days. So strength in numbers means little if they cannot perform when needed.

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## parsifal (Jun 25, 2014)

The PI re4presented a major threat to japanese lines of communication to the south. the chief threat were the 29 submarines they had stationed there. as luck would have it, an air raid early on on the Cavite Navy yard destroyed the Tordeo stocks being held there, but that cannot be relied upon as a certainty . the japanese needed to get ashore early and capture these forward bases in order to deal with the threat that they posed. All this talk of containment, bypassing whgat was the major strongpoint for the US in the far east, is just trying to take advantage of perfect hindsight after the event

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## GrauGeist (Jun 25, 2014)

Well sure, hindsight can offer a good view of events, but it's interesting to consider the alternatives once in a while.

Nagumo cancelled the third strike at Pearl _because he did not know where the U.S. carriers were._ But then again, the attack at Pearl was successful _because no one knew the Japanese were on their way._

Alot of operations or otherwise significent events never happened because of the lack of intel or acting on the side of caution when we can look back and say "what was he thinking?"

But, like I mentioned, it's an entertaining diversion to look at the big picture and consider how things would have changed had one or another events happened differently.


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## VBF-13 (Jun 25, 2014)

parsifal said:


> The PI re4presented a major threat to japanese lines of communication to the south. the chief threat were the 29 submarines they had stationed there. as luck would have it, an air raid early on on the Cavite Navy yard destroyed the Tordeo stocks being held there, but that cannot be relied upon as a certainty . the japanese needed to get ashore early and capture these forward bases in order to deal with the threat that they posed. All this talk of containment, bypassing whgat was the major strongpoint for the US in the far east, is just trying to take advantage of perfect hindsight after the event


Well, certainly, but not entirely unforeseen. Pearl had all our shipbuilding capability. Look at how quickly we were able to patch up the Yorktown. We're otherwise going to San Diego for that.

I'm a little dark on the actual campaign in the Philippines. I do understand why the Japanese needed that, though, given their plans in that area. Hawaii would have taken a lot out of them, too, I don't think anybody is doubting that.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 25, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> Well, certainly, but not entirely unforeseen. Pearl had all our shipbuilding capability. Look at how quickly we were able to patch up the Yorktown. We're otherwise going to San Diego for that.
> 
> I'm a little dark on the actual campaign in the Philippines. I do understand why the Japanese needed that, though, given their plans in that area. Hawaii would have taken a lot out of them, too, I don't think anybody is doubting that.



You probably mean ship repair capability vice building. I think anything major whether building or repair took place in stateside ports. All the BBs that would eventually become operational again were ultimately made sea worthy and sent back to the states for major repair. 

AFAIK, the need to take the PI was due to the US military presence there and the air and naval bases from which it could act to sever the lines of communication and marine transport between the NEI and the home islands. 

The forward basing of the Pac Fleet in PH moved it closer to the PI bases which already possessed a USN presence in the form of a heavy and a light cruiser a ~dozen DDs and a fair number of submarines. Moreover, the progressive B-17 buildup in the PI was perceived to present a similar threat to both interdict the sea lines of comm and IJ Taiwanese bases. 

Good books on the PI campaign and well worth reading are Bartsch's books: *Doomed at the Start* which I've read and *December 8, 1941 Macarthur's Pearl Harbor* which I haven't. Also *Days of Infamy* by Costello. I recently purchased *Fortnight of Infamy* by Burton about the collapse of allied air power in the Pacific in just the first two weeks of the war. But haven't had a chance to read it yet.

late edit: changed 'sea-safe' to 'sea worthy'… what am I a fr*cken land lubber?


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## parsifal (Jun 25, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> Well sure, hindsight can offer a good view of events, but it's interesting to consider the alternatives once in a while.
> 
> Nagumo cancelled the third strike at Pearl _because he did not know where the U.S. carriers were._ But then again, the attack at Pearl was successful _because no one knew the Japanese were on their way._
> 
> ...



Yeah I get what you are saying, and as a dedicated grognard (someone who plays and designs historically based simulations) on a part time basis, I think i appreciate more than most, the idea of alternative history ...what would happen if this variable were change, that kind of thing.

in most of the dedicated, serious (if, admittedly commercial) simulations of the pacific war, schemes to invade the HI hardly ever work. the chief problem is the element of surpise and the numbers. ive already alluded to the absolute gutting in terms of logistics the diversion of shipping and manpower would have on more essential japanese operations. its not that i dont say that it wasnt possible. i think it was. Japan did have additional reserves of shipping that it could call upon temporarily for emergency usage. They could have, for example, have curtailed all movement operations in China to save fuel and ammunition. Comes at a cost, later on, but its do-able. just not consistent with their war aims at the time. 

So, putting aside the more strategic imperatives like being inconsistent with immediate war aims and placing japans medium to long term survival at risk, why do i still think the HI option is likely to fail?

If the japanese could get their 4 divs ashore in a matter of hours , having arrived off the beaches undetected, and then advance 40-60 miles in the next day or so on foot with little or no artillery support through mountainous terrain, with some built up urban areas mixed in, then the plan might have a chance. By comparison, at normandy it took the allies, with upwards of 2000 heavy transports about 16 hours to land 3 divs and then another day to advance something like 20 miles, maximum, against limited opposition (in that first 48 hours). Allied armies were fully motorised with mobile artillery, amphibious armoured assets and landing craft capability and capacities that the japanese never possessed. It is useful at this point to detour for a bit and look at the landings at Khota Baru, to determine roughly how long an operation of the kind envisaged might have taken the Japanese to complete.

Firstly, the invasion fleet was first spotted December 4, alerting the British of the impending invasion. they decided to adopt a wait an see policy with disastrous results.

Shortly after midnight on 7th/8th December (thats 00.01 hours) , a group of Indian guards at Kota Bharu spotted 13 large shadows, the IJN transport ships, including the Awagisan Maru, the Ayatosan Maru and the Sakura Maru, dropping anchor approximately 3 km's off the coast of Kota Bharu. The ships were carrying approximately 5,200 troops of the Takumi Detachment, commanded by Major-General Hiroshi Takumi, who was on board IJN transport Awajisan Maru. The majority of them were already battle hardened veterans who were unique in that they had undergone intensive jungle training and were also trained for amphibious assault. They were nearest equivalent to the US marines the japanese ever possessed. 

The force consisted of the 56th Infantry Regiment (Colonel Yoshio Nasu, on board IJN transport Sakura Maru), one mountain artillery battery of the 18th Mountain Artillery Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Katsutoshi Takasu), the 12th Engineer Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Ichie Fujii), the 18th Division Signal Unit, one company of the 12th Transport Regiment, one company of the 18th Division Medical Unit and No. 2 Field Hospital of the 18th Division Medical Unit. They were escorted by a powerful escort fleet (Kota Bharu Invasion Force) under the command of Rear-Admiral Shintaro Hashimoto, consisting of a light cruiser Sendai, destroyers Ayanami, Isonami, Shikinami and Uranami, minesweepers No. 2 and No. 3, and subchaser No. 9. Seconds later the guards heard shells passing over their heads. . The loading of landing craft began almost as soon as the transports dropped anchor, but were still shuttling troops from ship to shore more than 18 hours later. Rough seas and strong winds hampered the operation and a number of smaller craft capsized. Several Japanese soldiers drowned. Despite these difficulties by 12.45 hours (12 hours after initial heave to) , the first wave of landing craft carrying troops under the command of Colonel Masu were heading for the beach in four lines. Brigadier B.W. Key's 8th Indian Infantry Brigade of the 9th British-Indian Infantry Division were the main defending force at Kota Bharu, supported by the 21st Mountain Battery - four 3.7in howitzers (Major J.B. Soper). The 3/17th Dogras in battalion strength had responsibility for a ten mile stretch of beach Panti Dasar Sabak front which included the Japanese landing sight. The troops had mined and wired the beach and built a number of pillboxes. They were supported by the 73rd Field Battery of the 5th Field Regiment, deployed adjacent to the airfield. its been described as a light defence, perhaps so, compared to later assaults like Iwo, but in 1941 it was a heavily defended target and a major amphibious operation. 

By morning of the second day Major-General H. Takumi had been able to land three full infantry battalions. Brigadier Key attempted a counter attack in force and when this failed he began to fall back. As it became clear during the day that the local airfields could not be held, Key, who had been ordered to fight a battle of denial rather than annihilation, asked for and recieved permission to withdraw.

Once the beachead was secure, it should be acknowledged that the Japanese could follow up their initial assault groups with fresh troops fairly quickly. The Japanese, now backed by freshly landed troops, forced the British-Indian troops to retreat to the Kuala Lipis area and advanced south to capture Kota Bahru (township) by 2 p.m. on the 9th.

Both sides sustained substantial casualties during the battle. There are no reliable records of British losses, but they certainly were high. Accounts of Japanese casualties vary wildly. Louis Allen, quoting Japanese sources, put the number at 500. Of these, 150 were suffered by troops still on board the transports and the remaining 350 were inflicted during the short journey to the shores or on the beach. On the other hand, Colonel Tsuji put in his book the Japanese losses at 320 killed in action and 538 wounded and calls Kota Bharu "one the most violent actions of the Malaya Campaign".

So, a rapid advance might be possible, but not in a context of advancing in amatter of hours. Just couldnt happen, by any of the protegonists at any time during the war. it takes time to get your assault teams organised and ashore, organised again and then to press on to any inland objectives that you may designate. For a four division assault, the japanese are going to be severely hampered by a lack of specised transport, and this, will inevitably slow down their beach front deployment .

The other issue that places this whole issue in doubt is the very high risk of detection. A four division assault, operating some thousands of miles from home ports is going to need roughly 8 transports per battalion (to cover extra supplies and spares and the like). Four divisions is about 75 battalions , give or take, and thats about 600 trasnports, minimum. Thats an armada that stretches to beyond the horizon. Put simply, its a force the Americans are not going to fail to detect. They are goiong to be ready, alerted with their fleet ready to go, their aircraft primed and armed for attack, their troops at their stations, weapons loaded and ready to go . These are some cold hard realities to think about in any invasion discussion of Hawaii.

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## tyrodtom (Jun 26, 2014)

Do you realize if they advanced even 40 miles in the first day ( depending on where they landed) on Oahu, they'd be back in the water.

If they landed on the most likely northwest coast, it was only about 6 miles to Schofield Barracks down the central valley.

If this fictional invasion caught them unaware as the actual air attack did, just how effective a defense would they have mounted ?


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## VBF-13 (Jun 26, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> You probably mean ship repair capability vice building. I think anything major whether building or repair took place in stateside ports. All the BBs that would eventually become operational again were ultimately made sea worthy and sent back to the states for major repair.
> 
> AFAIK, the need to take the PI was due to the US military presence there and the air and naval bases from which it could act to sever the lines of communication and marine transport between the NEI and the home islands.
> 
> ...


That's right, Crow, the repair yards. My point is though that alone made Hawaii more integral to the maintenance of our presence there than the Philippines. The Philippines was strategic to what the Japanese needed to get done in that South West Pacific region. That's why they took their eyes off Pearl, after the plundering. Pearl more than anything kept the US in the fight. They'd have taken out that sanctuary, we'd have been in trouble. We're maybe not throwing in the towel, but they got our attention. Because they never fully grasped that, that bought us time. Take out Pearl, we're seven or eight days away from that South West Pacific region, and by the time we get there, we're out of gas, and that's all provided we get by an occupied Hawaii, first. That's a lot to ask, even of a big nation. We can recruit and train and build and dress up until we're dizzy. Get it to the dance floor. How are we going to do that? There's nothing there. Giving the US time, that's what leaving Pearl meant. In short, it's what did the Japanese in.

Look at it this way. We were as far away from the action in the South West Pacific as were Britain and France. Why is it we were the main player in that region, and not them? Sure, they were stretched. But Pearl, that was the kicker. Could we have retaken it? Without a doubt, I think we could have, but it would have taken a D-Day type armada, and while the Japanese were going after the Canal and our West Coast, next. I'm playing a video-game in my head, now, but it's an entirely different dynamic, and that's one not implausible way it plays out.


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## Balljoint (Jun 26, 2014)

Learned a lot here. But I suspect that a more (how much?) favorable to IJN outcome at Midway would not change the actual following history all that much largely because the IJA was calling the strategy. The battles would still be Kokoda Trail, July 42 and Guadalcanal, August, 42. The IJA had, I would think, committed to these actions well before Midway with Australia rather than targeting US positions. On paper, and by a reasonable standard, the IJA should have prevailed in both efforts. The locals and the US Marines somehow decided that they shouldn’t, and they didn’t.

So, to my mind, the new element would be one or more of the Japanese carriers surviving and fewer USN carriers. As to the latter, the USN carriers did not significantly participate in these following actions other than ferrying aircraft and being sunk by IJN subs and at actions at Santa Cruz and the Eastern Solomons. Since the Japanese forces had an unsinkable carrier at Rabaul with Bettys the risk/reward would probably discourage exposure of the IJN carriers in these battles. An impromptu blockade of Australia would be difficult though Nagumo could no doubt inflict a good deal of logistics pain or perhaps even another HI raid. 
The IJA strategy was committed to the hilt to these two campaigns and they lost both. Even if the IJN had prevailed at Midway it would be at best a decisive victory against the USN that would not have altered the overall resolve at Kokoda Trail or Guadalcanal a bit. What actually decided these battles doesn’t show up on paper.


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## parsifal (Jun 26, 2014)

> Do you realize if they advanced even 40 miles in the first day ( depending on where they landed) on Oahu, they'd be back in the water.




no, i didnt check , but its about 8 miles north South and about 14 miles east west. The area of the island is, i believe about 14 square miles, compared to 30 square miles for Saipan. Maximum elevation is about 4500 feet. importantly it is just one of the islands in the group, though it is the main naval base 



> If they landed on the most likely northwest coast, it was only about 6 miles to Schofield Barracks down the central valley.



okay, and after several days of unloading they should be able to make a move for it. Amphibious invasions dont hit the beach running, much as we would like to think otherwise. even against light opposition its most critical and slowest rate of advance is immediately after the land force has gone in. The attackers simply need time to consolidate organise their base of operation and then move off the beaches 




> If this fictional invasion caught them unaware as the actual air attack did, just how effective a defense would they have mounted ?



Therein lies the problem. Nagumos Task Group for Pearl was about 20 ships, and got to about 200 miles from the island before launch. The approach speed was quite rapid and there was no delay once the aircraft was in position. They approached the island at the fleet speed from memory...about 25 knots, steaming flat out on the last night. that means on that last night for at least 8 hours, the fleet was last in daylight before the attack about 400 miles away from the island. 

For this amphibious fleet, because it has to be so large, it approach speed is going to be around 10 knots. unlike the carriers, the amphibious will need time to organize itself once it arrives off Oahu, It probably need to be on station from around 0200. That gives the fleet about 6 hours of night steaming. buty its worse than that. Nagumos carriers dispense with zig zag movement to save fuel and the japanese were confident they would not be attacked in their approach. That might also be the case for an amphibious force, but I doubt it. Almost certainly this formation would have to approach cautiously, using standard zig zag patterns of approach. Zig Zaggng merchant shipping slows you down, a lot. Along your MLA you rate of advance might be 7 knots for a fleet travelling theorugh the water at 10 knots. So, the Japanese last position before nightfall, might be somewhere between 40 and 80 miles. think about that. What is the different risk of detection for a fleet of 300-600 warships last seen 40 miles offshore, and a fleet with a last possible detection at 400 miles from target. i would say there is a huge difference in the chances of detection.

So if the Japanese arew detected, less than 100 miles from the Hawaiian coast, what might the US response be. I would say they would go hell for leather to prepre for an attack

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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 26, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> ... Because they never fully grasped that, that bought us time. ...


 I concur in the main, but believe that it was more IJ's perception of the apparent significant risk and the difficulties of securing both their strategic objectives in SEA AND neutralizing the US fleet that made a HI invasion too big a mouthful to digest. I tend to concur with Pars that a smarter move would have been to not raid PH but rather confine their activities to acquiring SE Asian oil and resources and aggressively pursue the isolation of Oz. All while awaiting the inevitable arrival of the US battle fleet in home waters. _Sic transit the US Pacific fleet and US Far Eastern forces..._ I expect.

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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 26, 2014)

Good summary of amphibious ops Pars...


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## VBF-13 (Jun 26, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> I concur in the main, but believe that it was more IJ's perception of the apparent significant risk and the difficulties of securing both their strategic objectives in SEA AND neutralizing the US fleet that made a HI invasion too big a mouthful to digest. I tend to concur with Pars that a smarter move would have been to not raid PH but rather confine their activities to acquiring SE Asian oil and resources and aggressively pursue the isolation of Oz. All while awaiting the inevitable arrival of the US battle fleet in home waters. _Sic transit the US Pacific fleet and US Far Eastern forces..._ I expect.


The Japanese had a good plan. Think about it. On 7 December 1941, were they thinking Midway? That wasn't even in their plan. Those resources were to be devoted to their plan in the Western Pacific. Midway turned out to be a sucker play for them because it was going off on a frolic of their own that wasn't in their plan. How would the course of the war had gone differently had they stuck-out their plan? If we're weighing it against a Pearl plan, that's how it should be weighed. Throw out Midway, it never happened. They didn't grasp the significance of Pearl, I think, because they already had a good plan.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 26, 2014)

I would add to the Japanese plans for a closely timed invasion that they would be _very_ lucky to get an invasion fleet capable of 10 knots as not only do you need several hundred ( or as Parsifal has said 600) that can _TOP_ at 10kts you need ships that can _cruise_ at 10kts. Many/most of these transport ships are using reciprocating steam engines that do NOT take kindly to 24 hours plus of thrashing at full speed. 

While the defenses in 1941 were nowhere near what they would be later there were a small number of 240mm howitzers around the Island. 







A quick listing of Fortifications. 

Hawaii Forts

I am not sure if there were any 155mm guns on Oahu in Nov/Dec 1941 or if there were any railroad guns. But the 240mm how are a far cry from the 3.7in mountain how the British used in Malay. 

Please note MG pill boxes and fire control stations dating from early 30s. Also note than many "beaches" have out lying coral reefs making actual landings with sizable boats a bit of a problem.

Of course landing troop carrying small craft on parts of Oahu's north coast presents a few other problems 






Actual _practical_ landing sites were probably well known and pre zeroed in by existing defensive batteries.


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## davparlr (Jun 26, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> The element of surprise is absolutely key in this situation, however, as historically happened, the Japanese were able to close their taskforce within striking range unchallenged and delivered a series of attacks while everyone on Oahu were enjoying the start of a relaxed Sunday.


The strike force was over 280 miles away when they launched to avoid detection. Sending in a large landing fleet would have increased significantly the risk of alerting the Americans. As it were, the fleet would have been spotted by 0600 off the coast even if it was caused by gun fire. This would have given the AAF over one and a half hours to alert their crews and prepare their aircraft. 



> With this in mind, assault forces closing under the cover of the night/dawn to coincide their approach during the air attacks (on or before 7:00 a.m. as originally occurred) would certainly offer positive results.



The air attack commenced at approximately 0750.



> The bulk of U.S. forces were in and around the vicinity of Pearl with a few auxillary fields and air stations about the island. These smaller fields did not have a large amount of first line aircraft that would have been able to muster more than token resistance.



Wheeler airfield and Schofield barracks are in the middle of the island 10-15 miles away from the sea shore.



> The Japanese multiple landing zones would most likely be along the western, northern and eastern shorelines and the IJA was no strangers to rough tropical terrain.


Two mountain ranges with limited easily defended passes, like Pali Pass, running from north to south along the east and west coast of Oahu would make invasions here risky due to limited maneuver room and overlooking high ground. This would be similar to the Japanese attempt to take Port Moresby. The only viable invasion route would be on the north shore and down through the middle. But, this route takes the Japanese directly into the strength of the defending forces. See pix (from wikipedia) of east coast, west coast, and topological.



> If Nagumo follows through with the three attack waves that were planned, then carry on with follow up strikes while the battleship/cruiser force closes to offer close support while the U.S. fleet was being neutralized, the situation would be very difficult for the U.S. forces.
> As poor as communications actually were, it seems to me that trying to muster defenses against Japanese landing forces to the north, east and west would have been nearly impossible, especially while everyone was keeping their heads down during the initial air attacks.



General Short, while being out to lunch as far as airborne attack, was apparently very diligent in preparing for an invasion and rehearsed defensive tactics often. 



> Within minutes after the first torpedoes and bombs struck at Pearl Harbor, General Short issued orders that put the Hawaiian Department on a full war footing. By 8:45 a.m. his headquarters had begun to operate a forward command post located in tunnels at the Aliamanu Crater, three miles west of Fort Shafter. Between 8:20 and 9:00 a.m. the major ground commands-the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command and the 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions-received word to deploy and take the actions required under a No. 3 Alert. Actually, all three had begun so to act before they got the formal word. The 24th Division had a battalion of infantry on the road from Schofield Barracks to its assigned battle position by 9:00 a.m., and thereafter other divisional units left Schofield as soon as they had drawn and loaded their ammunition and otherwise prepared for action. By late afternoon, all divisional elements were digging in at their assigned field positions, with all weapons except heavy howitzers at hand and ready to fire. As General Short put it, in the deployment "everything clicked," one of his junior officers explaining: "We had gone so many times to our war positions that it just seemed like drill when they were firing at us." 57 The deployment showed clearly enough that the Hawaiian Department was thoroughly prepared to resist invasion, however unready it was against the peril of surprise air attack.



Chapter VII: The Pearl Harbor Attack para. 192




Oldcrowcv63 said:


> Only in retrospect, with the advantage of hindsight can we see that the US defenses were a relatively hollow shell against the skill and might of Kido Butai. A comparison with the PI campaign provides a hint of the ultimate outcome. defending the PI were some 90 P-40 fighters and 34 B-17 bombers (ineffective in a tactical role) with roughly 30 thousand ground troops (12,000 US Philipine Scouts ~20,000 PA). Against the larger number of US troops and A/C on Oahu was the absence of a pre-planned natural redoubt like the Bataan peninsula and Corregidor. Against the concentration of US airpower on Oahu was the large number of aircraft on Kido Butai carriers (>400 A/C).



I think you are underestimating the quality of forces on Oahu verses PI. There were about 17000 US forces in the PI, some were guard units(Wikipedia) vs about 43,000 Army troops in Hawaii, and these were apparently well trained on counter-invasion activities by Gen. Short, who had no concept on defense from air attack. If I remember correctly, most of the new pilots at PI were right out of flight training. I suspect the pilots at Oahu were much better and indeed the few that got into the air performed bravely and effectively. Only about 10 AAF planes got aloft and they shot down as many as 6 Japanese. The Japanese two raids only consisted of 43 and 35 A6M respectively. I suspect that if these raids had been met by 40-60 P-40s with this quality of pilots the air battle would have changed considerably.




Parsifal said:


> no, i didnt check , but its about 8 miles north South and about 14 miles east west. The area of the island is, i believe about 14 square miles, compared to 30 square miles for Saipan. Maximum elevation is about 4500 feet. importantly it is just one of the islands in the group, though it is the main naval base



??? Oahu has an area of almost 600 square miles.

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## parsifal (Jun 26, 2014)

is there a lee side for the island. generally in the pacific, there are islands with more shelter on one side, and it was from these directions that most invasions would be planned. The famous surf at oahu might pose more of an issue over just being great surf....


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## GrauGeist (Jun 27, 2014)

davparlr said:


> > *Originally Posted by GrauGeist:* The element of surprise is absolutely key in this situation, however, as historically happened, the Japanese were able to close their taskforce within striking range unchallenged and delivered a series of attacks while everyone on Oahu were enjoying the start of a relaxed Sunday.
> 
> 
> 
> The strike force was over 280 miles away when they launched to avoid detection. Sending in a large landing fleet would have increased significantly the risk of alerting the Americans. As it were, the fleet would have been spotted by 0600 off the coast even if it was caused by gun fire. This would have given the AAF over one and a half hours to alert their crews and prepare their aircraft.


And yet the Island's defenses didn't spring into action as the Japanese aircraft passed overland but virtually as the bombs were falling...



davparlr said:


> > *Originally Posted by GrauGeist:* With this in mind, assault forces closing under the cover of the night/dawn to coincide their approach during the air attacks (on or before 7:00 a.m. *OR* as originally occurred) would certainly offer positive results.
> 
> 
> The air attack commenced at approximately 0750.


Yep, you found one of my many typos... 



davparlr said:


> > *Originally Posted by GrauGeist:* The bulk of U.S. forces were in and around the vicinity of Pearl with a few auxillary fields and air stations about the island. These smaller fields did not have a large amount of first line aircraft that would have been able to muster more than token resistance.
> 
> 
> Wheeler airfield and Schofield barracks are in the middle of the island 10-15 miles away from the sea shore.


And the initial airstrikes pass right over Schofield Barracks...along the highway the that attack flights followed, leading them right to Pearl. And Schofeild Barracks took a beating in the air attack as it was. As did Bellows, Wheeler, Hickam and Kaneohe fields. The Japanese did miss the auxillery fields at Kahuku, Haleiwa and Mokuleia. Haleiwa was where several P-40s were able to get up and engage the Japanese, downing several.



davparlr said:


> Two mountain ranges with limited easily defended passes, like Pali Pass, running from north to south along the east and west coast of Oahu would make invasions here risky due to limited maneuver room and overlooking high ground. This would be similar to the Japanese attempt to take Port Moresby. The only viable invasion route would be on the north shore and down through the middle. But, this route takes the Japanese directly into the strength of the defending forces. See pix (from wikipedia) of east coast, west coast, and topological.
> 
> General Short, while being out to lunch as far as airborne attack, was apparently very diligent in preparing for an invasion and rehearsed defensive tactics often.
> 
> I think you are underestimating the quality of forces on Oahu verses PI. There were about 17000 US forces in the PI, some were guard units(Wikipedia) vs about 43,000 Army troops in Hawaii, and these were apparently well trained on counter-invasion activities by Gen. Short, who had no concept on defense from air attack. If I remember correctly, most of the new pilots at PI were right out of flight training. I suspect the pilots at Oahu were much better and indeed the few that got into the air performed bravely and effectively. Only about 10 AAF planes got aloft and they shot down as many as 6 Japanese. The Japanese two raids only consisted of 43 and 35 A6M respectively. I suspect that if these raids had been met by 40-60 P-40s with this quality of pilots the air battle would have changed considerably.


The Japanese had over 400 aircraft at their disposal (from 6 CVs) although (obviously) not all were committed. And as we have seen, the air raids did indeed catch the U.S. forces off guard and the U.S. fighters that did get up, made a phenomenal effort, but came up short.
We also might be underestimating the quality of the IJA troops. Since Japan has been already at war and an invasion of this caliber would not be seeing green troops committed, but rather combat seasoned troops rotated out of other areas for this operation. That being considered, how well would the U.S. troops perform, the vast majority having never been in combat? Also, Japanese have severely weakened the Naval and Army air assets, which establishes air superiority or soon will, with successive air attacks and CAP sweeps. Like I mentioned before in this possible situation, the assets intended for the invasion of Alaska would be diverted to the invasion of Hawaii and augmented as much as possible to ensure success.

If the air attack commenced prior to the landings, the U.S. defenses would be on high alert (as they were) but how well would they be ready to deal with the landings? Add to this, the fact that the bulk of the U.S. 7th fleet is burning and sinking in the harbor as the IJN battleships and cruisers are closing in to assist the landing forces?

Some good maps showing the military bases and the highway system along with the 2 Japanese attack waves:











So the bottom line here, is that if everybody was enjoying a lazy Sunday morning and looking up and waving at the passing Japanese aircraft as they were inbound, why should they think anything different about ships on the horizon? As many were used to the comings and going of U.S. naval assets and aircraft in the area, why would they suddenly be alarmed at the sight of distant ships and not aircraft?

Even after the USS Ward caught the IJN mini sub and sank it at the harbor entrance, no one reacted with any alarm.

So this scenario is calling for the same relaxed attitude on that morning, the same failure in communications, the same failure in radar recognition (and again, communications), the same failure in aircraft dispersal, the same failure with locked ammunition access, the same failure in active command, the same capital ships with cold boilers and on and on....so many mistakes were made that morning. These is the conditions that I am proposing that exist when the Japanese come not only with aircraft, but an invasion.

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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 27, 2014)

Great information on PH defenses davparlr SR6! Good source materiel. I had no idea Short had planned, prepared or responded to the possibility of an invasion in that manner or that there was much in the way of significant coastal defense batteries. Truly, I assumed he was only interested in polo and morning rides on his horse.  Jason Robards portrayal in _Tora Tora Tora _appears to do him a bit of a disservice whereas Kimmel is portrayed with a fair amount of sympathy by Martin Balsam. While I agree that I did indeed underestimate the level of US preparedness, the one vulnerability factor that may be decisive is the peacetime mind set of the defenders. I expect the shock factor would be substantial and endure for at least a few days after the aerial attack due to the damage inflicted upon the island's air force and fleet and hard to evaluate how it might degrade the island's defense. I can imagine significant demoralization of the defenders if the invasion fleet had appeared AFTER the aerial raid when IJN air power had destroyed the recon assets of the USN A. At sea, any IJN confrontation with USN carriers is likely to compound the general demoralization. 

IJ invading Oahu might not be a walk over, but I can imagine one gigantic Cluster Muck on the part of the defenders. Of course, under ideal circumstances, amphib ops by any military are pretty much always a C-F to some degree. The lead-time factor in alerting the defenders to the approach of the invasion fleet scheduled to land simultaneously with the attack may make the scenario far less a US disaster. the P-40s may indeed have done much better in defense against the approach of an air fleet at medium altitude… Just the P-40's preferred diet. Bad news for the IJN…. I agree with Balljoint, this has been an educational thread for me.

late edit: added kudo to SR6 for coastal defense battery info. and roll-eye face..


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## Shortround6 (Jun 27, 2014)

a dozen (or a couple dozen) aircraft visible from any observation point at a time might not create alarm. Several hundred ships would certainly arouse somebodies curiosity, being the largest fleet/convoy in modern times at least up until that point in time. 

And remember the time difference. The transports have 28 hours steaming (at 10kts) from the point the planes launch *OR* have to be less than 100 miles from Oahu at sundown of the 6th. Give the game away at Sundown on the 6th and there is NO surprise on Sunday morning. Trying to land on Monday morning might be just a little difficult, too.

The Japanese carriers could certainly have done much more damage but the Japanese have a problem, they are thousands of miles away from any supply points and _unless_ they can capture (not destroy) the fuel storage at Pearl they only have a few days to operate in Hawaiian waters. The Carriers also only have limited bomb storage and the US carriers are at large. They _cannot_ expend all of their aviation ordnance on land targets until the US carriers are dealt with. Underway replenishment of of ordnance is not well developed yet.

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## VBF-13 (Jun 27, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> I agree with Balljoint, this has been an educational thread for me.


That's an understatement, I feel like I'm in the planning room! Let me just throw this out, what about the neck of the harbor? Would it be possible to bottleneck that? That would at least "contain" the fleet. That really wasn't necessary in the surprise attack, but now that they're invading, I'd think they're thinking of that...


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## tyrodtom (Jun 27, 2014)

If we didn't already know of the mistakes that really did happen in the actual attacks on PH and the PI, most of us would argue that they would never have happened .

The mistakes a unblooded, inexperienced, peace time based Army, Navy, or USAAF can make are infinite, the debacles at the HI and PI show that.

I think if the Japanese had chose a different method of attack, it would have just exposed more faults.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 27, 2014)

You are assuming the Japanese make no new mistakes of their own and the US Forces do nothing right. 

Mistaking the Initial Japanese air attacks for US training flights for a number of minutes is a bit different than ignoring a an armada of dozens if not hundreds of ships for hours if not a full day or more. 

American forces had _years_ to figure out likely attack routes/landing sites and even if money was short (very short) at least put a few defenses/observation posts covering the likely sites. Some of the pill boxes date from 1934. Granted they are few and far between in the 30s but assuming massive incompetence for around a decade preceding Pearl Harbor is going a bit far. 

Japanese amphibious capability is woefully lacking compared to what the US would display a few years later, even if the US took several years to learn. What do the Japanese have for landing craft in numbers and types? Are they used to combat loading of the supply ships? What do the Japanese have for shore to ship communications for fire support? 

Landing on hostile shores, even sparsely defended, is a lot different than unloading in port. 

For the Japanese it is really an all or nothing gamble. The resources needed to invade Hawaii are not available for the invasion of the Philippines and Malaysia meaning the Japanese cannot secure the Dutch East Indies (oil) and their supply line for weeks if not months longer even if the Hawaii invasion works. 

It is about 2400 miles from San Francisco to Pearl Harbor and about 3850 miles from Tokyo to Pearl Harbor. It is 2250 miles from Kumamoto ( South Island) to the port of Miri in Borneo and that is by flying over Luzon. 

The Dutch damaged/destroyed a number of the oil fields as it was. Giving them another few weeks?


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## GrauGeist (Jun 27, 2014)

Looking back at the events that unfolded during WWII, we have the luxury of seeing how each action had not only a direct action, but how each action played out in it's entirety.

We also know that war between the U.S. and the Empre of Japan was going to happen and we know when and where it started. However, on Sunday morning, 7 December, the folks at Pearl (and the U.S. at large) didn't.

What did actually happen that morning at Pearl Harbor, was that Japan approached a resting Tiger and beat it about the head and neck with a stick, then shortly afterwards at the Phillippines they poked it in the eye several times. At Midway, they tried to grab this dazed and seriously pissed-off Tiger by the tail and it turned on them and gave them some real hurt. From that point onwards, the Tiger hunted them and gave them a serious mauling all the way home.

Using this same analogy, the idea is to surprise and contain the Tiger before it is fully awake, and thus avoid the invitable ass-kicking.

By the way, I apologize to anyone for the brutal hijacking on the Midway thread. But between the Midway content and the Hawaiian content, there's some great info discussion

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## tyrodtom (Jun 27, 2014)

I'm not saying the Japanese were perfect, but the mistakes they made that were of a smaller degree, except for the greater mistake of the attack itself.

If they were going to attack PH, they should have went all out to do maximum damage and take maximum advantage.
There are different degrees of a all or nothing approach.


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## davparlr (Jun 27, 2014)

parsifal said:


> is there a lee side for the island. generally in the pacific, there are islands with more shelter on one side, and it was from these directions that most invasions would be planned. The famous surf at oahu might pose more of an issue over just being great surf....



The west side of the Hawaiian islands is the leeward side but, as you can see from the topological map there is a mountainous ridgeline, as shown in the last photo, that only has two very small access points to the interior, one in the middle and one along the southern beach, both easily defended.



GrauGeist said:


> And yet the Island's defenses didn't spring into action as the Japanese aircraft passed overland



At the start of any surprise attack, confusion reigned. However, once the bombs fell reaction was immediate and well organized by the Army whose ground forces were not attacked. 



> And the initial airstrikes pass right over Schofield Barracks...along the highway the that attack flights followed, leading them right to Pearl. And Schofeild Barracks took a beating in the air attack as it was. As did Bellows, Wheeler, Hickam and Kaneohe fields. The Japanese did miss the auxillery fields at Kahuku, Haleiwa and Mokuleia. Haleiwa was where several P-40s were able to get up and engage the Japanese, downing several.



Only because of the surprise. Had the invasion fleet been off shore, the Army and Navy would have had an hour and a half to prepare before the Japanese aircraft arrived, plenty of time to crew up and be ready to engage the enemy. The ground pounders would have already been on the march to positions and the sailor boys would have been at stations with armament ready on ships buttoned up for combat some under way (Nevada) or building steam. The Enterprise would have been alerted and would be preparing for war combat.


> We also might be underestimating the quality of the IJA troops. Since Japan has been already at war and an invasion of this caliber would not be seeing green troops committed, but rather combat seasoned troops rotated out of other areas for this operation.



No doubt these would have been crack troops



> That being considered, how well would the U.S. troops perform, the vast majority having never been in combat?


Don’t confuse the ineptitude of high command with the grit of the US service men. Yes they had not experienced combat but when outnumbered and their backs against the wall, they fought ferociously. Just look at the defense of Bataan, Wake Island, and the second wave at Pearl Harbor, where even the Japanese was surprised at the intensity of the defense. If well led and trained, which is quite reasonable given the reactions after the attack, and armed with the M1 rifle, giving the American soldier fire power the Japanese had never encountered, I would not bet against the American soldier or sailor.



> Also, Japanese have severely weakened the Naval and Army air assets, which establishes air superiority or soon will, with successive air attacks and CAP sweeps.



Only if surprised which they would not have been with an invasion fleet off shore.



> Like I mentioned before in this possible situation, the assets intended for the invasion of Alaska would be diverted to the invasion of Hawaii and augmented as much as possible to ensure success.



Alaska? I don’t know of any diversion to Alaska for Pearl Harbor. Midway, yes.



> If the air attack commenced prior to the landings, the U.S. defenses would be on high alert (as they were) but how well would they be ready to deal with the landings? Add to this, the fact that the bulk of the U.S. 7th fleet is burning and sinking in the harbor as the IJN battleships and cruisers are closing in to assist the landing forces?



The air attack could not have occurred before it did due to daylight. Where were all the ships lurking undetected? As already stated, by the afternoon Army forces were already in their defensive positions.





> So this scenario is calling for the same relaxed attitude on that morning, the same failure in communications, the same failure in radar recognition (and again, communications), the same failure in aircraft dispersal, the same failure with locked ammunition access, the same failure in active command, the same capital ships with cold boilers and on and on....so many mistakes were made that morning. These is the conditions that I am proposing that exist when the Japanese come not only with aircraft, but an invasion.



The primary reason the attack was so successful was because of the surprise attack. If an invasion fleet was spotted before the air attack, all bets are off.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 27, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> That's an understatement, I feel like I'm in the planning room! Let me just throw this out, what about the neck of the harbor? Would it be possible to bottleneck that? That would at least "contain" the fleet. That really wasn't necessary in the surprise attack, but now that they're invading, I'd think they're thinking of that...



Possible PH invasion scenario...As at Midway, the transports lag the arrival and strike by KB, but in addition to the mini-sub attack, one or more IJN fleet subs is positioned on the approaches to the harbor entrance to await the sortie of any combatants that might have survived the surprise air attack or the return of any USN fleet units that might have been on operations. (such as the Enterprise group the evening of Dec. 7). Trouble is, that's the one part of the PH defense that appears to have been well organized and maintained so it's quite possible that tactic would not be effective. I don't know what specific efforts (besides regular DD/DE patrols) were made to effectively delouse the harbor approaches but history suggests such efforts were made and were at least somewhat effective....

As argued well by others, if the transports arrive with KB, the US forces have early warning and are prepared. I think the IJN will face a much more challenging situation. They are likely to lose a substantial portion of their CV-based air force over Oahu and probably are much more vulnerable to attack by even the admittedly inexperienced USN CVs.


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## VBF-13 (Jun 27, 2014)

davparlr said:


> If an invasion fleet was spotted before the air attack, all bets are off.


Not necessarily. Consider this. Consider their splitting the forces and the timing. They're closing in from different directions. The carriers strike first along with the subs. The subs are going for the mouth of the harbor and they're undetected until they're pretty much there. They draw out the destroyers in single file and torpedo just one as it's making its way out and they close up that channel like a vault. At the same time the planes are coming in and wreaking havoc. The pressure is taken off the invasion forces as they're landing at any number of selected beaches as we're forced to split our forces to oppose them. Consider this a rough draft.


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## GrauGeist (Jun 27, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> Let me just throw this out, what about the neck of the harbor? Would it be possible to bottleneck that? That would at least "contain" the fleet. That really wasn't necessary in the surprise attack, but now that they're invading, I'd think they're thinking of that...


They very nearly succeeded with the USS Nevada as it was making a run for the open sea, but the skipper kept a cool head as it was coming under serious attack and ran her aground near Hospital Point to prevent her from blocking the harbor


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## Shortround6 (Jun 27, 2014)

Channel is/was a heck of a lot wider than one destroyer. 

The number of _viable_ beaches is limited. 

May I suggest the following web site. Chapter VI: The Reinforcement of Oahu

The Army had been planning for decades to defend Pearl Harbor from over land assault. Perhaps budgets had not given them what they desired but the idea that the Japanese could miraculously discover undefended beaches suitable for landing large numbers of troops and march overland to Pearl Harbor while several divisions of US troops stumbled about in total confusion needs a serious re-think. 

For instance" In any event, because of the increasing threat of war with Japan, the Army from 1935 until the autumn of 1939 accorded the Hawaiian Department top priority in the supply of equipment, and it increased the strength of the garrison by more than 50 percent, from 14,821 to 21,289 between the summers of 1935 and 1938" 

with more increases between 1938 and 1941. The defense of Oahu and the Hawaiian Islands was constantly studied and updated as threats changed. 

Perhaps the Japanese could have taken Oahu in Dec of 1941 but the loss of resources would have delayed taken the Philippines, Malaysia and the Dutch East Indies for months. Since the Japanese were going to war due to a shortage of oil and other resources, delays in taking the regions with those resources would have done Japan little good in the long run.

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## VBF-13 (Jun 27, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> Channel is/was a heck of a lot wider than one destroyer.


That's even better. Side-by-side, they're sitting ducks. Getting the subs in for the shots is the trick.

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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 27, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> That's even better. Side-by-side, they're sitting ducks. Getting the subs in for the shots is the trick.



VB, have you been hitting the kikkapoo juice? (again?)


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## parsifal (Jun 28, 2014)

IMo Shortround has summed up the strategic imperatives from the japanese perspective perfectly


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## GrauGeist (Jun 28, 2014)

I can see the point being made about the Oahu defensive drills....but...

If Oahu was so awesome in their skills, then perhaps they should have been deployed to Singapore, Hong Kong and Java and stopped the war before it began...


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## VBF-13 (Jun 28, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> VB, have you been hitting the kikkapoo juice? (again?)


And furthermore... 

Actually, I think, they got spy subs in there. I know they say Hawaii was just crawling with spies. Case-in-point, on the morning of the attack, just before they launched, they got information radioed to the carriers that enabled them to pencil-in a map of the exact locations of the targets in the Harbor. And GrauGeist is right about the Nevada, and that's why they beached it, just in nick of time, it was trying to get away from battleship row.


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## parsifal (Jun 28, 2014)

There is some evidence of Midget subs penetrating all the way to Battleship row as the following grab shows


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5rhbN9NOSag_

However i would say the majority view remains that they did not penetrate that far and did inflict any significant damage. Submarines were detected and sank outside the harbour, one is known to have made it to the main channel before being sunk. my personal view is that was no mideget sub attack delivered to the battleships on that day. its a bit of wishful thinking. 

Japanese Navy Ship Types--Type A, B C Midget Submarines

An overall view of midget submarine operations off Oahu is contained here

Japanese Submarines

The remains of the 5th "missing midget sub may well have been swept up in the mystery surrounding the so called "second Pearl Harbour disaster, when 6 LSTs were sunk by an accidental explosion, which was quietly cleaned up and remained a secret until 1960.


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## VBF-13 (Jun 28, 2014)

parsifal said:


> There is some evidence of Midget subs penetrating all the way to Battleship row as the following grab shows
> 
> 
> _View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5rhbN9NOSag_
> ...



Pretty interesting. In an invasion they're bringing in more subs as they aren't just looking to hit and beat it, so to speak. That video analysis is interesting, too. It's pretty much accepted torpedos did most of the damage to the fleet. Subs at least at the mouth of the channel would be a part of the invasion, there's little question about that, I'd think. Whether the net would be open, as it was, that's the wild card. It would, were anything coming out. If not, the subs are striking at the tenders. Either way, the net keeps the fleet boxed in, or the subs do it. Coordinated with multiple air attacks, they're wrecking what's there of this fleet, seems to me.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 29, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> I can see the point being made about the Oahu defensive drills....but...
> 
> If Oahu was so awesome in their skills, then perhaps they should have been deployed to Singapore, Hong Kong and Java and stopped the war before it began...



It is not so much drills or "awesome skills" but the fact that the Army had had decades to survey possible landing sites and mount guns (like the already mentioned 240mm howitzers) to cover the the possible landing sites in surveyed positions. Other defensive measures or positions were also pre-planned and pre-built. Alternate gun positions were already prepared to move guns to if movement was needed. 

Coastal defense was a science dating back hundreds of years. Coastal defense gunners were usually shocked in the modern era ( 1880s and smokeless powder) at the close ranges needed by naval ships to get hits. Coastal gunners had been using rangefinders and mathematics for quite some time ( coastal gunners could use the height of the range finder above sea level as the base distance of the range finder rather than the distance between lenses). Their guns and fire control equipment were not rolling and pitching either. Out flanking coastal batteries by shore landings had been going on for centuries as had the study of how to add field fortifications to stop the flanking 

Moving the US troops to Singapore, Hong Kong and Java with only a few weeks or months to prepare would have thrown a large measure of the US advantage away. Also splitting up the force on Oahu into 5-10,000 man units on different land masses hundreds of miles apart would just invite destruction in detail. 

Japanese attacking Hawaii in Dec 1941 is a bit like the US attacking Guadalcanal in 1942, even if you get a number of troops ashore the supporting fleet is going to pull a disappearing act at some point if Pearl Harbor is not in Japanese hands soon. The carrier group had already refueled at sea just to get into launch position. How many days can the "fleet" stay on station before having to turn for home and fuel? Can the Japanese troops take the oil farms and docks before the "fleet" runs out of fuel?


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 29, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> Pretty interesting. In an invasion they're bringing in more subs as they aren't just looking to hit and beat it, so to speak. That video analysis is interesting, too. It's pretty much accepted torpedos did most of the damage to the fleet. Subs at least at the mouth of the channel would be a part of the invasion, there's little question about that, I'd think. Whether the net would be open, as it was, that's the wild card. It would, were anything coming out. If not, the subs are striking at the tenders. Either way, the net *keeps the fleet boxed* in, or the subs do it. Coordinated with multiple air attacks, they're wrecking what's there of this fleet, seems to me.



Major difference if there is early warning and air cover over PH is available and nominally effective. I believe every likely Oahu invasion beach, even those near the Northeastern Kahuku Point is within range of the 14 and 16 inch guns (~20 miles) of the battle fleet. Even if the BB is sitting in the mud with decks awash the BBs might be dangerous to an enemy during an invasion. Spotters in the highlands can probably walk salvos onto the invasion beaches if the directors are damaged. I don''t know whether the north eastern ridge line would have shielded such a bombardment...

Nimitz famous post war quote: Consequences of the attack on Pearl Harbor - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia is perhaps somewhat applicable even in the event of an invasion.

"_It was God's mercy that our fleet was in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941." Nimitz believed if Kimmel had discovered the Japanese approach to Pearl Harbor, he would have sortied to meet them. With the American carriers absent and Kimmel's battleships at a severe disadvantage to the Japanese carriers, the likely result would have been the sinking of the American battleships at sea in deep water, where they would have been lost forever with tremendous casualties (up to twenty thousand dead), instead of in Pearl Harbor, where the crews could easily be rescued, and six battleships ultimately restored to duty.[38] This was also the reaction of Joseph Rochefort, head of HYPO, when he remarked the attack was cheap at the price._"


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## oldcrowcv63 (Jun 29, 2014)

If my math is correct, looks like a beach at about 18 miles would be hit by a shell launched from Ford Island at about 30 degrees elevation (the max gun-barrel elevation of the older, but not oldest, BBs) and comfortably clear the ridgeline taken to be a half mile high and with the northeastern invasion Beach 3 miles beyond the highest elevation. The northwestern shoreline' is I believe a bit beyond the big guns range but AFAIK unsuitable for landing.

Late entry: About half the battle line in port on December 7, were old boats that had a maximum elevation of 15 degrees. That includes Oklahoma and Arizona (both destroyed) and Pennsylvania (in dry dock) and Nevada with a limited range relative to the newer vessels:

Tennesee, Maryland, California, West Virginia


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## parsifal (Jun 29, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> Pretty interesting. In an invasion they're bringing in more subs as they aren't just looking to hit and beat it, so to speak. That video analysis is interesting, too. It's pretty much accepted torpedos did most of the damage to the fleet. Subs at least at the mouth of the channel would be a part of the invasion, there's little question about that, I'd think. Whether the net would be open, as it was, that's the wild card. It would, were anything coming out. If not, the subs are striking at the tenders. Either way, the net keeps the fleet boxed in, or the subs do it. Coordinated with multiple air attacks, they're wrecking what's there of this fleet, seems to me.



Ive got a book at home that deals with Japanese submarine operations in some detail. in 1941-2, the performance of japanese submarine forces fluctuated wildly, the examples of their outstanding successes would proabably have to be the sinking of the Wasp, but in many ways this loss was as much about poor Us handling of such a valuable ship as the outstanding performance of the IJN sub fleet. 

In the opening rounds of the battle, Japanese Subs lived up to this patchy performance. In the far east they sank in less than a month nearly 250000 tons of allied shipping, nearly a quarter of the 1 million tons they managed to sink in 1942. A significant number of minor warships were sunk, but no major ones, which was a cause for a major disspointment to the Japanese Submarine Arm. 

The Japanese submarine , contrary to nearly all our post war western accounts was designed for multiple capabilities, including direct fleet support, but also as very effective anti-shipping weapons. Japanese submariners did not consider a merchant ship an unworthy target, but attacking shipping was a long war strategy and the Japanese needed this to be a short sharp war, and consequently the majority of theirt efforts in the opening year of the war was to try and utlise their subs to attack the US fleet directly. This proved to be a disastrous policy. Japanese subs were large, slow divers and relatively shallow divers. they were not particualalry fast crash divers. They possessed no radar and only the most rudiementary TDC compauters (predictors for torpedo settings).

The submarine arm was designed for deep penetrations, with ranges of nearly 10000 miles. Some of the subs were equipped with aircraft for spotting, the idea being these "command subs" being able to direct other subs onto located targets. The whole idea was predicated on a US fleet speed of about 20 knots...Japanese subs with a surfaced speed of 24 knots would attack, clear the area, surface steam ahead of the target, attack again and so on. Unfortunately this opportunity never really presented itself. The slow BBs never really put to sea until later in the war, amd the carriers, with a fleet speed of nearly 30 knots were simply to quick. The aircraft took too long to get ready for launch.

Conspicously the Japanese deployed Twelve I-type submarines of the Imperial Japanese Navy's 1st Submarine Squadron had taken up position in Hawaiian waters by the evening of December 6, 1941, anticipating an attack on U.S. Pacific Fleet ships if they broke out of Pearl Harbor the next day. They achieved no significant observable result for the first 3 days of their deplayment. 

On December 10, the Japanese learned that an American Lexington-class aircraft carrier was heading for the U.S. mainland. Nine of the 12 subs were ordered to pursue and sink the enemy carrier, then take up positions at designated sites off the Pacific coast and begin attacking American merchant ships. There was no discernible result, though to be fair, early in the war, the Saratoga was hit by a torpedo and suffered extensive damage. 

If the right flank attack on the PI and NEI was postponed, there would be an additional six I boats available for operations. There were three more boats in the entral pacifi and 2 off Pago Pago . there might be a couple more here or there, but its unrealistic to expect any more than about 20 I-boats to be available. thats a significant number, and if the US battle fleet were to sallied forth, one can reqasonably expect some results, however even the Japanese would not have expected it submarines to be able to bottle up the USN. they, like all submarines were an attritional weapon.....not a sea control weapon 

For the USN to effectively disrupt a landing, they dont need to win a battle, and whilst heavy losses may result, all they need to do is get some forces in amongst the invasion barges, and the landings are basically busted. An alerted and undamaged US fleet is going to throw everything at the Japanese invasion fleet, and they are more than likley to stop it with heavy losses to both sides in my opinion. this was precisely one of the reasons the Japanese backed down in the pre-war planning , or discussion of this option. They were not stupid. They knew that an operation like this, was more than likley to be costly, and they could not afford to get into an attritional battle with the US.


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## VBF-13 (Jun 29, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Ive got a book at home that deals with Japanese submarine operations in some detail. in 1941-2, the performance of japanese submarine forces fluctuated wildly, the examples of their outstanding successes would proabably have to be the sinking of the Wasp, but in many ways this loss was as much about poor Us handling of such a valuable ship as the outstanding performance of the IJN sub fleet.
> 
> In the opening rounds of the battle, Japanese Subs lived up to this patchy performance. In the far east they sank in less than a month nearly 250000 tons of allied shipping, nearly a quarter of the 1 million tons they managed to sink in 1942. A significant number of minor warships were sunk, but no major ones, which was a cause for a major disspointment to the Japanese Submarine Arm.
> 
> ...


Pasifal, when are you going to do a nice build for us of the Hellcat? I'm going to put the odds against that at 19:1.


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## parsifal (Jun 30, 2014)

I would very much like to do a hellcat attached to the BPF in 1945. These guys achieved some really good results with amount almost the equal of the Seafire...hehe...


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## VBF-13 (Jun 30, 2014)

parsifal said:


> I would very much like to do a hellcat attached to the BPF in 1945. These guys achieved some really good results with amount almost the equal of the Seafire...hehe...


Moving on, lol...



parsifal said:


> For the USN to effectively disrupt a landing, they dont need to win a battle, and whilst heavy losses may result, all they need to do is get some forces in amongst the invasion barges, and the landings are basically busted. An alerted and undamaged US fleet is going to throw everything at the Japanese invasion fleet, and they are more than likley to stop it with heavy losses to both sides in my opinion. this was precisely one of the reasons the Japanese backed down in the pre-war planning , or discussion of this option. They were not stupid. They knew that an operation like this, was more than likley to be costly, and they could not afford to get into an attritional battle with the US.


OK, this is my issue with this. I think the Japanese had a good plan. I'll just summarize it, thusly. Get that Western Pacific and Eastern Asia region under such control as to require a miracle to undo it. I'm not going to go into natural resources imperatives and national defense and such and why they needed that region under control. I'm just going to say the fact is splitting-off half their forces to go on a wild goose chase hoping to knock off a few of our carriers was indeed plumb stupid. I think so, anyway. We're still trying to figure out where they were going to go from there. Do you know why? I don't think they even knew. But one thing was open, and that was Pearl. And the window wasn't going to stay open. They succeeded at Midway, this was the time to reconsider Pearl. Let those natural resources wait. They're right there, at the doorstep. They changed their plan, already, on impulse. They're resilient. And, they succeeded. They're thinking of Pearl. 

Sure, it's a hard decision. When it's all or nothing, it always is. That's just the nature of it. But, they saw the last six months. Where were they going, having neglected Pearl? Think of the prize. Had Eisenhower been thinking only of the sacrifice, D-Day would never have happened. Some of you folks seem to be getting the Hawaiian beaches confused with the European beaches. There's no way we could have put up the defense the Germans did on those beaches. The Japanese take Midway, they're going to figure in Pearl, next, somehow. I don't know exactly how, but they're going to. I don't see how they're not. The oil and the rubber plants and that business elsewhere will just have to wait until they're finished.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 30, 2014)

> Some of you folks seem to be getting the Hawaiian beaches confused with the European beaches. There's no way we could have put up the defense the Germans did on those beaches.



Some folks seem to be getting the Japanese amphibious capability of 1941/42 confused with the American/allied amphibious capability of 1944. 

The Japanese had what for amphibious tanks? 
Or amphibious tractors?
Or DUKW trucks?
Or large landing craft (something that can get artillery, vehicles, ammo in pallet loads, etc to the beach) in 1941/42?

The Japanese simply didn't have the capacity for a D-Day type assault in June of 1942 let alone Dec of 1941. 

Japanese have got how many hundred airplanes on the carriers compared to the thousands of aircraft supporting the D-Day invasion (not including the parachute drops) 

and so on. 

While the Japanese did have the Shinshu Maru it was only one ship, just about all other Japanese landing ships larger than about 17 meters were completed after 1942. Granted some converted freighters could have been used but compared to the hundreds of large ships and the hundreds of medium LCI and LSTs used at D-Day. 

The American defenses can't hold a candle to the German defenses but then the Japanese cannot put more than a small fraction of troops in each assault wave either. They need to get thousands of troops ashore quickly, not hundreds.


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## GrauGeist (Jun 30, 2014)

Well, this is where I am a little confused, then.

Perhaps I was having the wrong idea that the Japanese were a capable force.

Since they didn't have any amphibious capabilities, or even the ability to motorize their troops, how on earth were they able to occupy any South Pacific territories...and no wonder the attack on midway failed!! They didn't know how to get the troops ashore!


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## Shortround6 (Jun 30, 2014)

The question is the scale of the operation needed. 

The Japanese were quite skillful and capable, the above mentioned Shinshu Maru was the only ship of it's kind in the world in the late 1930s. And there is the Japanese problem, it _remained_ the only ship of it's kind for a number of years. 

The Japanese invasion of the Philippines was massive, it also took at least 12 days for the _initial_ landings, with some of the initial landing being 150 miles from the closest Allied forces. Not quite opposed landings. There were also hundreds of land based aircraft from Formosa supporting the attack including over 150 twin engine bombers. The distances were much smaller for many of the ships to cover too. 
Ships that could top off fuel tanks (or coal bunkers) at bases on Formosa have a much better ability to support landings in the Philippines than ships (cargo ships and transports) that had to sail from Japan or try to stage from Japanese held Islands in the Marshals to attack Hawaii. Please remember that a number of ships in the carrier attack group had to refuel while under way just to make the Pearl Harbor strike. Did the Japanese have the shipping resources to get ALL the transports needed to the windward Islands _with _ fuel and supplies for the time needed? 
BTW Oahu could not feed itself and had to import food from the other Islands. Japanese can hope to capture the oil fuel tanks at Pearl instead of bomb them but if the Invasion looks like it is succeeding and the Americans fire the tanks where does that leave the Japanese ships? How much coal is available for any coal fired Japanese freighters used in the invasion forces? 

The Americans _never_ tried an invasion over such a distance without much closer staging areas.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 30, 2014)

An interesting book on Japanese merchant ships, it is war time so total accuracy is not to be expected. The Japanese certainly had a number of ships that could reach Hawaii and return, they also had a number that were lucky they could make it one way. 

Japanese Merchant Ships Recognition Manual


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## parsifal (Jun 30, 2014)

Its also two different issues. provided the invasion was relatively small scale, the japanese had the expertise and the equipment to undertake some difficult operations. The maximum lift capacity they possessed was about 1.5 to 2 divisions. i think it possible that they could lift more by using just general shipping, but this would have been inherently innefficient.

As it was, japanese LCs were cutting edge in 1941, but were dated and overtaken by 1944. 

Its true that the US would be unlikely to be as efficient in 1941 as the germans were in 1944 in normandy. however they didnt need to be. Japanese capability both in terms of lift capability and in terms of overall efficiency was not comparable to the allies in 1944. overall, its probably fair to say that the lack of efficiency in the japanese amphibious technique was equalled or cancelled by the US lack of capability in its general miliatary preparedness on the isalnd.

However what isnt cancelled out are the raw numbers. The Japanese estimated they needed 45000 troops to assault oahu directly, and they never attempted anything even approaching that size of operation. But they under-estimated what the needs for a sucessful invasion would actually be. There were something like 70000 military personnel on the island, of which about 40000 were military personnel. Typically the rule of thumb is that you need about 3:1 odds to undertake an offensive operation successfully, of which an amphibious assault is a particaualalry difficult example. To successfully assault island, they would have needed around 80-100000 troops in the assault. To give some comparative example, at Saipan, the Allies invaded with 71000 men, to defeat 24000 defeanders. At iwo, the odds were 70000 Marines to defeat about 18000 defenders. At Peleliu it was 28000atacking about 11000 defenders. These are odds ratios of 2.9:1, 3.9:1 and 2.5:1, and some of these operations came close to failure. Dupuy assesses the relative efficiency of the US Marine Coprs troops in 1944 to be in the order of 1.5:1, and Naval Gunfire and airpower has been estimated as shifting or adding about 50% to the efficiency of the ground assault. Conversely Japanese fortifications are thought to adda about 50% to their unit efficiency in defence

If you wanted to reduce the relative strengths to a basic comparable figure, then you have modified or adjusted ratios of 4.44:1 (for Saipan), 5.8:1 (for iwo) and (3.8:1 for Peleliu


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## VBF-13 (Jun 30, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> There were also hundreds of land based aircraft from Formosa supporting the attack including over 150 twin engine bombers.


Midway is two islands. Well, almost.


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## VBF-13 (Jun 30, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Its also two different issues. provided the invasion was relatively small scale, the japanese had the expertise and the equipment to undertake some difficult operations. The maximum lift capacity they possessed was about 1.5 to 2 divisions. i think it possible that they could lift more by using just general shipping, but this would have been inherently innefficient.
> 
> As it was, japanese LCs were cutting edge in 1941, but were dated and overtaken by 1944.
> 
> ...


Parsifal, besides what they brought to Midway, what else would they be bringing to the invasion? I have a vague notion. Supposing they just wanted to finish off Pearl. The landings would take more planning, just suppose. What else are they bringing?


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## parsifal (Jun 30, 2014)

Thats a hard question. There were assets that were commissioned ships in the IJN, and then there were transports requisitioned and generally placed under the administrative contyrol of the various baseforce commands. using the very dated AJ Watts ('Japanese Warships Of WWII'), the order of battle it gives is as follows

Southern Force (invasion of Siam and Malaya)
3rd Blockade and Transport Fleet:Consisting of the 1st and 2nd baseforces there were 46 requisitioned transports attached. 

4th Mandated fleet, consisting of the 3-6 baseforce commands; 41 requisitioned transports attached

5th Northern Fleet, with 7th Baseforce under command: 11 transports attached (not sure if these were naval units or requisitioned merchantmen) 

South Seas Detachment: 7 transports attached

As far as dedicated permantly commissioned ships in the IJN, these are the ships that i know of in existence as at 7/12/41. there were no LSTs, although by the time of Midway 11 had been commissioned. These were rather small at 948 tons and were rated to carry 4 tanks, 4 trucks and 200 men. The Japanese found these craft to be very useful and built slightly larger and improved versions through to the end of 1944.

in 1941, the ocean going amphibious fleet consisted of the Shinsu Maru (could carry up to 20 LCs), 2 x Akitsu Maru (slightly larger at 11800 tons), 2 x Mayasan Maru (7000 GRT). alol these craft had bow doors, and LC davitds, beaching and unbeaching gear . they were very capable amphibious lift ships, but limiterd in number. Up to midway the Japanese had added a further 4 such units and in 1943 they added a further 7 such units. There also 8 merchant conversions taken in hand and given a rapid partial conversion. These conversions did not have the bow doors or the beaching gear, but they were fast (15 knots) and carried extensive cargo handling gear. generally they were aboiut 6-8000 tons 

There were 14 Armewd Merchant cruisers that might be co0nsidered suitable for conversion instead to amphibious transport. 

there were roughly 80 other merchant conversions in the Navy doing various things like Sub tender,, netlaying and salvage work 

in 1941, the japanese merchant fleet consisted in total of 2337 vessels of 500 tons or above totalling 5,629,845 gross tonnage


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## syscom3 (Jun 30, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> ... They need to get thousands of troops ashore quickly, not hundreds.



And get supplies ashore too. The Japanese infantryman was a good fighter, but not supermen. They needed food, water and ammo just like everyone else.


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## Shortround6 (Jun 30, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> Midway is two islands. Well, almost.



Seems to be some confusion. Some people are talking about invading Oahu Dec 7 1941. The thread drifted a bit. 

Midway would be much easier to "take" from a size standpoint. However timing gets a little weird. Take Midway in Dec of 1941? Or are you asking what was needed in June of 1942? 

For amphibious operations the air support for either Midway or Oahu is the carrier based air which is of somewhat limited duration, the carriers only carry so much aviation ordnance and fuel. I don't know what the Japanese carriers had but the US Lexington and Saratoga had about 137,000 gals of av-gas in 1942. 60 aircraft at 150 gallons each is 9,000 gallons. If you have 60 planes each one can go about 15 times and you are out of fuel. Granted they can refuel from a tanker but......

Some British carriers had much less fuel, where the Japanese fell I have no idea. Even modern 60,000 ton carriers are only good for about 5 days worth of air operations though. Granted the jets suck up a lot more fuel. 

But this is the problem with trying to compare or use different campaigns or battles as examples. Opposed vs unopposed landings. Bringing every thing over beaches vs capturing even minor port facilities. Beaches themselves (sand, volcanic ash, rock or coral) and weather (size of waves). There are a lot of variables that can have a large impact on the actual situation.


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## Deleted member 63714 (Jul 1, 2014)

My opinion of the Battle of Midway has always been influenced by other historians and their analysis. If the Japanese HAD taken it, I don't think it would have made much difference in a grand scale of the Pacific War. The Japanese had already occupied most of the islands between Hawaii and Japan. It would have been but one more... The U.S. would still have had the same battles ahead of it. It would have most likely been another moral blow, but the U.S. had suffered those already when the Philippines fell and when Pearl Harbor was attacked. 
The exact same hard fighting would await, regardless. The U.S. had to wrest island after island from Japanese hands as they traversed the Pacific. If Midway had been deemed important, the U.S. would have eventually invaded it again and retook it as it did later with the other islands. It would have been just another small island to retake just like any of the others. I adhere to the view that Japan was doomed from the start. They could not hope to match U.S. output, troop numbers, food, medicine, and medical care. Midway's loss would have made little difference to the ultimate outcome. One of the few things that I believe could have altered the outcome was the bloody losses they inflicted. The high casualties MIGHT have weakened public support for continuing. However, I don't think so. The American public was ENRAGED at the death and damage at Pearl Harbor, and also disliked Japan's awesome cruelty. I think that the U.S. public would have continued to support the defeat of Japan no matter what the casualties were with the possible exception of a Japanese invasion. I think that public support might (note I said MIGHT) have waned once all those islands were returned and Japan was pushed back across the ocean and weakened as a military power. These are just my own thoughts and opinions (influenced by many historians and commentators). Hope I didn't derail the discussion.


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## beitou (Jul 1, 2014)

I can't imagine the number of casulaties that could be inflicted in an invasion of Midway would be anything like enough to weaken US resolve. There simply weren't enough troops on and around the islands. The whole idea of US resolve being weakened enough for them to negotiate I find somewhat starnge. Prior to WW2 can anyone give any examples of the US not being willing to fight because of the butchers bill. They were late in WW1 but once in didn't shy from accepting casulaties.

The US was certainly enraged by the attack on Pearl Harbour but when did the puplic first start hearing of the cruelty towards POWs and native populations. Was it similiar to Germany in that the true measure of the horrors only came out with the liberartion of the camps, individual massacres were known about but the allied general puplic didn't know the full extent until 44/45? How long after the death march were the puplic awear and enraged by it?


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## VBF-13 (Jul 1, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> Seems to be some confusion. Some people are talking about invading Oahu Dec 7 1941. The thread drifted a bit.
> 
> Midway would be much easier to "take" from a size standpoint. However timing gets a little weird. Take Midway in Dec of 1941? Or are you asking what was needed in June of 1942?
> 
> ...


Is Midway not feasible for heavier support-aircraft for the invasion? Is it too far away to figure in for anything like that? They of course would be making round-trips, that's why I ask. 

On my drift, I'm drifting to considering downsizing the invasion. Smash up Pearl real good, then get back to the rubber plants business, etc. It would certainly buy them more time, a serious blow like that to the heart of our fleet and overhaul-capability (i.e., capability to "bounce back"). 



StarScream said:


> My opinion of the Battle of Midway has always been influenced by other historians and their analysis. If the Japanese HAD taken it, I don't think it would have made much difference in a grand scale of the Pacific War. The Japanese had already occupied most of the islands between Hawaii and Japan. It would have been but one more... The U.S. would still have had the same battles ahead of it. It would have most likely been another moral blow, but the U.S. had suffered those already when the Philippines fell and when Pearl Harbor was attacked.
> The exact same hard fighting would await, regardless. The U.S. had to wrest island after island from Japanese hands as they traversed the Pacific. If Midway had been deemed important, the U.S. would have eventually invaded it again and retook it as it did later with the other islands. It would have been just another small island to retake just like any of the others. I adhere to the view that Japan was doomed from the start. They could not hope to match U.S. output, troop numbers, food, medicine, and medical care. Midway's loss would have made little difference to the ultimate outcome. One of the few things that I believe could have altered the outcome was the bloody losses they inflicted. The high casualties MIGHT have weakened public support for continuing. However, I don't think so. The American public was ENRAGED at the death and damage at Pearl Harbor, and also disliked Japan's awesome cruelty. I think that the U.S. public would have continued to support the defeat of Japan no matter what the casualties were with the possible exception of a Japanese invasion. I think that public support might (note I said MIGHT) have waned once all those islands were returned and Japan was pushed back across the ocean and weakened as a military power. These are just my own thoughts and opinions (influenced by many historians and commentators). Hope I didn't derail the discussion.


I see. Midway, though, think about it. It wasn't "in the book" on 7 December 1941, but was rather, largely, a drive on impulse. There was no pre-war planning figuring it in. It was nothing, until six months later, when they looked back, and saw how the cards fell. Consider, now that they're there. Are they reconsidering Pearl? They know, by then, Pearl is what keeps us on their backs. Smash it up, get it out of the way, rewrite the book. This is their big opportunity.


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## VBF-13 (Jul 1, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Thats a hard question. There were assets that were commissioned ships in the IJN, and then there were transports requisitioned and generally placed under the administrative contyrol of the various baseforce commands. using the very dated AJ Watts ('Japanese Warships Of WWII'), the order of battle it gives is as follows
> 
> Southern Force (invasion of Siam and Malaya)
> 3rd Blockade and Transport Fleet:Consisting of the 1st and 2nd baseforces there were 46 requisitioned transports attached.
> ...


I see. We hardly think of these let's call them "administrative challenges" they'd have to get by. I'm thinking largely of their other carriers and aircraft to reinforce the invasion. Let's call it just another run at Pearl. Certainly to put together a landing operation that quickly would be problematic. Think of a window of opportunity, closing fast. Are their other carriers and aircraft ready to meet that challenge? Give the window, maybe, a month, no more. The longer they delay, the better for the defense, the worse for the prosecution.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 1, 2014)

VBF-13 said:


> Is Midway not feasible for heavier support-aircraft for the invasion? Is it too far away to figure in for anything like that? They of course would be making round-trips, that's why I ask.



Midway to Honolulu is just over 1300 miles one way so neither the Japanese or Americans could really bomb each other without an intermediate airfield. 



> On my drift, I'm drifting to considering downsizing the invasion. Smash up Pearl real good, then get back to the rubber plants business, etc. It would certainly buy them more time, a serious blow like that to the heart of our fleet and overhaul-capability (i.e., capability to "bounce back").



Well, that was the _original_ Japanese intention, 3 if not 4 air strikes in one day against Pearl Harbor. However the plan was changed when NO US carriers were found and resistance was stiffer than expected on 2nd strike. Japanese needed to conserve strength and keep planes ready in case they found the American carriers ( or American carriers found them). A constant internet argument over if it was the right decision. 

Please remember that the US had 17 active Battleships at the time of Pearl Harbor counting both Atlantic and Pacific Fleets and that 3 of the South Dakota class had been launched but not completed in 1941. The Massive US ship building program was starting in 1941 with many cruisers, destroyers and carriers ordered and a number laid down before Pearl Harbor. The loss of 5-6 old battleships is not really crippling to the US. 
The Japanese have a very fine line between sticking around to cause more damage and suffering losses that they cannot make up once the New US ships start showing up. Loosing a score of airplanes in a 3rd attack in one thing. Loosing a carrier or two to a US carrier return strike is another. The US had laid down CV 10 11 on Dec 1 1941. They won't be ready until the summer of 1943 but the Japanese have to be very careful with their assets. The US building program was not secret. 




> I see. Midway, though, think about it. It wasn't "in the book" on 7 December 1941, but was rather, largely, a drive on impulse. There was no pre-war planning figuring it in. It was nothing, until six months later, when they looked back, and saw how the cards fell. Consider, now that they're there. Are they reconsidering Pearl? They know, by then, Pearl is what keeps us on their backs. Smash it up, get it out of the way, rewrite the book. This is their big opportunity.



On Dec 7th they don't know that they will sink Prince of Wales and Repulse, They don't know how well the Philippine Malay and DEI campaigns will go. They don't know how well the Indian Ocean raid will go (using many of the carriers used at both Pearl Harbor and Midway). However the US is gathering steam. The Operation that will lead to Guadalcanal is set in motion in May of 1942, before Midway. Granted it is nicknamed "Operation Shoestring" by the troops. 
A collision is coming, is just a matter of where and when. Midway may be a good objective in the summer of 1942 (or not) but Oahu is going to be an awful lot tougher in June of 1942 than Dec 1941 ( commanders won't ignore radar warnings) with more defensive guns and aircraft and troops. And the Japanese face the same problem in June that they did in Dec. They have to _destroy_ Pearl Harbor not just damage it or it can still function as a base (reduced capacity) while their closest real base is thousands of miles away.
Japanese also have no way of knowing just how bad US torpedoes are so all plans have to factor in American submarines as a higher danger than they really were.

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## VBF-13 (Jul 1, 2014)

Short, I have a flight to catch. Let me digest this. This is thinking this out in more depth than I have. I shall return.


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## Balljoint (Jul 1, 2014)

The US was expecting poor results in the Pacific. The 8th Air force was on standby on the Pacific coast. Aft3er Midway –and no doubt Coral Sea- they were released to England.


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## parsifal (Jul 1, 2014)

> I see. We hardly think of these let's call them "administrative challenges" they'd have to get by.



Not sure what you are getting at here, but you can only get so far by improvisation, and a complex and difficult invasion like Oahu it really couldnt be improvised. tring to get ashore Gallipoli style using ships boats isnt going to cut it. The Japanese could lift considerable numbers of troops, but the limiting factor is how many they can get across the beach. A major proble for Hawaii is the height of the surf...Japanese LCs, or anyone for that matter, would have a hard time of it IMO. The assault capability in 1941 for the Japanese, that is the number of troops they can put ashore in a single wave, is about 3-5000. by the time of Midway that appears to have increased somewhat, plus the japanese appear to have acquired a limited capability to include tanks in their assault waves...maybe 50 tanks at maximum in a single wave. Like all early war assaults, the Japanese would be relying on landing and unloading, then getting the amphibious craft off the beaches, to go and pick up more troops from the anchored transpports, which typically could be anchored off the coast, somewhrere between 5 and 20 km. In heavy conditions there are bound to be some comsiderable numbers of LCs damaged, or made US by the surf conditions. ive no idea what the rate of wastage might be, but probably reasonable to assume 10% per assault wave. That doesnt include losses to enemy fire, just purely natural wastage.

Necessary to make some assumptions here based on my own experience in training. Im going to assaume the following:

10% attrition rate in LCs per wave
an initial assault capacity of 5000 troops
Distance to waiting merchant tranport , and the average transport being 10km (6miles, 5 nm) offshore
speed of the LCs 10knots (12mph)
Loading time 1 hour
After the 1st wave, 50% of lift capacity needed for re-supply 


The first wave arrives with 5000 troops at say 4am, disembarkation should take about 3 hours, LCs are back in the water heading back out to the anchored transports by 7am. Reloading to 8am returning with 2750 reinforces, unloading of that wave and the supply by 12 noon, returning, less 10% arriving at the transports 1pm, recommence loading returning with 2500 troops complete dismbarkation 7pm, LC crews now exhausted. In the first day, the Japanese have managed to land about 10200 and about 100 tons of supply. thats a fairly limited capacity in my book 



> I'm thinking largely of their other carriers and aircraft to reinforce the invasion. Let's call it just another run at Pearl.



The weakness in this argument is the aircrews. the japanese easily had the carrying capcity to field more than 650 aircraft at sea at any time. That rivals the carrying capcity of the fast carriers in '44. What they lacked were the crews to fill the carriers. They didnt have enough aviators to properly man the 6 big fleet carriers, let alone the others they had. They had combed out the training schools prewar, to bring the air groups up to strength, but these comb outs had wrecjked their wartime replacements, for the first six months of the war. These hasitly put together air groups lacked the cohesion and training to be considered effective. After Coral Sea, the Zuikaku had very nearly a full complement, but the CAG had to be used to retrain the air group for the shattered The KB



> Certainly to put together a landing operation that quickly would be problematic.


A few people have commented that they are confused. You can include me in that now. Are you suggesting if the Japanese won at Midway, they should attempt an assault Oahu, or undertake some sort of operation involving all the troops and lift capacity they could muster in June 1942? if so, highly unlikely. The army refused to release more troops than they did. already Japan was straining from shipping shortages, by June there were two divisions plus support dug in and ready for such an attack, probably in excess of 80000 combat troops. Its totally unrealistic to surmise an invasion of Oahu in June, with the forces the IJN could reasonably call upon in the Pacific. 



> Think of a window of opportunity, closing fast. Are their other carriers and aircraft ready to meet that challenge? Give the window, maybe, a month, no more. The longer they delay, the better for the defense, the worse for the prosecution.



its arguable in December 1941. in June 1942, what you are proposing would be tantamount to a suicide mission for the entire japanese fleet. You really cant be serious in trying to advocate this as a viable possibility for the japanese


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## syscom3 (Jul 1, 2014)

The Japanese avgas bunkerage was 134,000 gallons for Hiryu and Soryu. 150,000 for Kaga and Akagi.


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## Deleted member 63714 (Jul 2, 2014)

beitou said:


> I can't imagine the number of casulaties that could be inflicted in an invasion of Midway would be anything like enough to weaken US resolve. There simply weren't enough troops on and around the islands. The whole idea of US resolve being weakened enough for them to negotiate I find somewhat starnge. Prior to WW2 can anyone give any examples of the US not being willing to fight because of the butchers bill. They were late in WW1 but once in didn't shy from accepting casulaties.
> 
> The US was certainly enraged by the attack on Pearl Harbour but when did the puplic first start hearing of the cruelty towards POWs and native populations. Was it similiar to Germany in that the true measure of the horrors only came out with the liberartion of the camps, individual massacres were known about but the allied general puplic didn't know the full extent until 44/45? How long after the death march were the puplic awear and enraged by it?





beitou said:


> I can't imagine the number of casulaties that could be inflicted in an invasion of Midway would be anything like enough to weaken US resolve. There simply weren't enough troops on and around the islands. The whole idea of US resolve being weakened enough for them to negotiate I find somewhat starnge. Prior to WW2 can anyone give any examples of the US not being willing to fight because of the butchers bill. They were late in WW1 but once in didn't shy from accepting casulaties.
> 
> The US was certainly enraged by the attack on Pearl Harbour but when did the puplic first start hearing of the cruelty towards POWs and native populations. Was it similiar to Germany in that the true measure of the horrors only came out with the liberartion of the camps, individual massacres were known about but the allied general puplic didn't know the full extent until 44/45? How long after the death march were the puplic awear and enraged by it?



Was this directed at me? Perhaps my posting wandered a bit. I did not mean just the invasion of Midway. I am aware of Midway's relative smallness as noted in my post. I was talking generally about the Pacific campaign and the increasing casualties as it went on. I was particularly referring to the potentially catastrophic invasion of Japan. The astronomical casualties I said *MIGHT* have caused a weakening of resolve during an invasion of Japan would not have been experienced before. No one will ever know what the public or military officials would have thought because it didn't happen. Thinking of what 1,000,000 potential casualties would have done to U.S. resolve is not "strange" at all...

The public and military was aware of Japanese conduct in China and other places they invaded prior to U.S. involvement. The treatment of Chinese at Nanking was well known. The Japanese had made a name for themselves for cruelty prior to Pearl Harbor.


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## parsifal (Jul 2, 2014)

syscom3 said:


> The Japanese avgas bunkerage was 134,000 gallons for Hiryu and Soryu. 150,000 for Kaga and Akagi.




My sources show Implacable carried about 115000 US gallons versus about 230,000 for Essex, as designed. But the Essex class capacity was reduced to about 209,000 gallons after safety mandated redesigns. British carriers were limited mostly because of the very safe stowage worked into the design, to reduce the risk of fire as far as possible. even in the 70's US officers that inspected the melbourne were amazed at the multipe layers of safety worked onto the fuel handling systems, far beyond that in US carriers even those built in the 50's.

The ships of the RN that fell down hopelessly were the old WWI conversions. ive read somewhere the Glorious had something less than 30000 gallons of Avgas stowage, which would have severely limit the effectiveness of this otherwise valuable ship.


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## VBF-13 (Jul 2, 2014)

parsifal said:


> Not sure what you are getting at here, but you can only get so far by improvisation, and a complex and difficult invasion like Oahu it really couldnt be improvised. tring to get ashore Gallipoli style using ships boats isnt going to cut it. The Japanese could lift considerable numbers of troops, but the limiting factor is how many they can get across the beach. A major proble for Hawaii is the height of the surf...Japanese LCs, or anyone for that matter, would have a hard time of it IMO. The assault capability in 1941 for the Japanese, that is the number of troops they can put ashore in a single wave, is about 3-5000. by the time of Midway that appears to have increased somewhat, plus the japanese appear to have acquired a limited capability to include tanks in their assault waves...maybe 50 tanks at maximum in a single wave. Like all early war assaults, the Japanese would be relying on landing and unloading, then getting the amphibious craft off the beaches, to go and pick up more troops from the anchored transpports, which typically could be anchored off the coast, somewhrere between 5 and 20 km. In heavy conditions there are bound to be some comsiderable numbers of LCs damaged, or made US by the surf conditions. ive no idea what the rate of wastage might be, but probably reasonable to assume 10% per assault wave. That doesnt include losses to enemy fire, just purely natural wastage.
> 
> Necessary to make some assumptions here based on my own experience in training. Im going to assaume the following:
> 
> ...


OK, you're misunderstanding where I'm going. I'm saying putting together a landing operation would require too much planning, and they didn't have that time. Their window of opportunity was closing too fast. That opportunity, again, was finishing the job at Pearl. For further clarity, anybody who thinks 7 December 1941 was a Navy imperative is sorely mistaken. The same goes, here, as regards Midway, and a second strike at Pearl. These were Army imperatives to get us off the backs of their Army and its big land conquest campaign. Their Navy was in an adjunct role, there, serving and supporting that Army imperative, from the get go. Had their Navy been calling the shots, they'd have had their sights trained on Alaska, Hawaii, and probably Panama. They'd have cut off our supply lines, while they were at it. It would have been a vastly, vastly different campaign. In that context, I implore you to rethink what Midway was. It was buying their Army time. Nothing more, nothing less. Had their Navy succeeded, Pearl, you better believe it, was next in their thinking. They knew what was coming down the pike out of our shipbuilding yards. They saw that handwriting on the wall. Propelled off a successful Navy operation at Midway, they're thinking of going in for the kill. They're not just thinking of scampering back this time to do their Army's bidding in the Western Pacific, leaving an intact Pearl, minus a couple or three carriers any myopic fool could see were quickly being made up for. It's still an Army campaign. This time, however, they're getting it right. I think so.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 2, 2014)

There is only so far they can go. Panama is pretty much out of reach on Dec 8th 1941. It is over 5000 miles from Hawaii to the Panama canal. Reachable by _large_ long range subs (at any time?) and a few merchant ships _before_ Dec 7th. 

No Japanese Merchant ship is going to be let near the canal after Dec 7th and while a few subs might reach it, staying on station is a bit harder. It is 7800 miles from the Marshals to Panama. Japanese had 4 subs (?) That could make the round trip in Dec 1941. Not many more in June 1942. and at 16 kts surface cruise speed it is 18 days one way. At 10kts it is 28 days (assuming they never have to submerge).

Both sides saw the Alaska route as important but both sides let it fizzle out. Trying to build and maintain the needed infrastructure was too much. And the weather was too lousy to permit the desired air operations. 

Taking out Pearl Harbor in June of 1942 _after_ a successful Midway it a whole new battle. More troops and more defensive guns and more aircraft defending The Base. Even_ if_ the Japanese win the Navel battle off Midway _and_ invade the Island they may not have enough fuel/ordnance left for a good strike at Oahu. And nothing short of boots on the ground is going to take Pearl Harbor out of action for more than a few months. 

The Japanese operated under a constant oil shortage. Sometimes were better than others but strikes had to be planned to get the most results for oil expended.


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## GrauGeist (Jul 2, 2014)

The reason why I ventured into the "Oahu invasion" what-if, was looking at the early (pre) war value of Midway versus Oahu.

Midway, Wake and other seaplane outposts had a basic military value prior to the war, of course, once the war began, Midway's value increased exponentially as it was improved over the course of the war.

There was a school of thought that a decisive first-strike at the U.S. would knock them off balance and perhaps force a negotiation. As we all know, this didn't happen.

However the airstrike at Pearl Harbor did not yield desirable results and was, from my point of view, a failure. It was a failure in the sense that the carriers were not taken out. It failed in the fact that the Pearl Harbor complex was not incapacitated and it concluded with a certain number of battleships/cruisers and other fleet support vessels damaged or sunk and as a whole, did not disable the U.S. Pacific fleet, but only gave it a setback. It also failed in the respect that it did not force the U.S. to negotiate anything except a firm resolve, a declaration of war and an eventual ass-kicking. This can been seen reflected in the battle of Midway only 6 months later, where the U.S. was able to engage, challenge and drive the Japanese Navy off, inflicting more damage than was received.

So this is where the thought process of the taking of the Hawaiian chain entered into consideration.

What would it have taken, for the Japanese to severely limit the U.S. Pacific Fleet from challenging the Japanese Navy. The element of surprise was on the Japanese side, but only for a short time. Prior to 7 December, the U.S. forces in the Pacific and Far East were not enough to challenge the Japanese, both in experienced manpower and modern equipment.

If they had only one chance at a successful strike, that would take the U.S. out of the game, or force it to the table, what would it be then? From what I see, Oahu keeps coming to the front of the line.Yes, it would have been a difficult operation/logistics problem, but with proper planning, timing and support, it would certainly be worth the risk. Taking the Phillipines would not (and did not) have that much impact on the course of the war. Taking Wake Island didn't and even taking Midway would end up being more expensive than it was worth (if only to keep the U.S. from creating a forward staging area).

If they could successfully manage to take Oahu, then expand their hold to the other islands (Hawaii, Maui, Kaui, etc) then they would create sort of a barrier between the U.S. west coast and the eastern fringe of their Empire. Is they could also incapacitate the Panama canal, that would force the U.S.N. to reinforce their fleet from two directions: the "Horn" or from the Indian Ocean.

If the argument that it was "too much of a risk" is tossed out there, then consider this: invading Korea, China and surrounding territories was a risk, too. Starting the war in the first place was a risk. How far are you willing to roll the dice to ensure that your conquest is secured?

*NOTE* The observation of the Phillippines' impact on the war was minimal is in reference to the U.S. to maount decisive strikes from there at the onset. The Island's capture consumed a great deal of Japanese manpower and material to hold it, but if it had been bypassed at the onset, the U.S. would have little in the way of man and materials to mount a challenge to the Japanese at that time. Of course, it proved to be VERY valuable later in the war as the Allies advanced on Japan's home islands.


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## Garyt (Jul 2, 2014)

> The Japanese avgas bunkerage was 134,000 gallons for Hiryu and Soryu. 150,000 for Kaga and Akagi.





> My sources show Implacable carried about 115000 US gallons versus about 230,000 for Essex, as designed.



Very interesting. I guess the next step would be to determine the fuel consumption of the planes (I'd think the Japanese planes, being lighter would consume less fuel), and from there come up with an idea as too how many sorties and CAP a carrier would support.



As to the invasion of Pearl - Pearl is not the beaches of Normandy as far as levels of defense, and of course 1941 Japan is not 1944 US when it comes to support of amphibious landings. But there would be an advantage the Allies did not have at Normandy - surprise. I think this would certainly have an effect. And even if the US is alerted by the bombings, going from peacetime to defending against an invasion is a far bigger step than being at war, expecting an invasion and just not knowing when and where (1944 Germany).

At first I scoffed at the idea of invading Pearl Harbor - but after thinking about it and reading posts, it's not a terrible idea. I'd think that it would have to be done in 1941 though, after that it would not be successful. And not saying it would be successful 12/7/1941 - but it has a reasonable chance of success IMO. I'd think you would need a good re-supply fleet of vessels as well, but these could follow well after the main body. Heck, the Japanese used many of their destroyers as supply and transport vessels in Guadacanal - this would be necessary IMO for an invasion of Pearl. Even using the 4 Kongo class as supply for the carriers would help a lot, though we have the advantage of after sight knowing that these fast battleships risked little from seaborne attack if they refused combat, and that the real threat was enemy aircraft.

It's a gamble for sure but perhaps Japan's best chance at a negotiated peace or at least to make attacking the Japanese empire more of a challenge for the US.

But you just can't get away from Japan's pilot attrition issues. Taking Pearl is not going to change Japan's fuel shortage issues, they won't have an over abundance of fuel for training. Taking Pearl won't change Japan's pilot training infrastructure.


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## Garyt (Jul 2, 2014)

> owever the airstrike at Pearl Harbor did not yield desirable results and was, from my point of view, a failure. It was a failure in the sense that the carriers were not taken out. It failed in the fact that the Pearl Harbor complex was not incapacitated and it concluded with a certain number of battleships/cruisers and other fleet support vessels damaged or sunk and as a whole, did not disable the U.S. Pacific fleet, but only gave it a setback.



And perhaps even less of a setback than sinking the US fleet at Sea. American vessels at this stage of the war were not nearly as well equipped for AA as they would be later in the war, so while a carrier strike against the seaborne American fleet would have been a bit more costly than the Pearl Harbor strike, the results would be better too, i.e sunk at sea, not at port. And there would have been carriers to go after as well, though they could go after the Japanese carriers as well.

But I think what Japan needed was a close to total destruction of the US Pacific fleet - and if the US fleet sortied to support the US troops in the Phillipines, it opens the door for the combined fleet battle the Japanese wanted since day 1. And I think it would have went well for Japan. Kido Butai and perhaps some support carriers against a 3-4 carrier US fleet. Japan should be able to wipe out the US carriers, then it comes down to a US fleet with little air support against the Japanese surviving carriers, possibly Japanese Land based aircraft as well if this occurs close to the Phillipines. This could perhaps be a latter day Tsushima, and may done have brought America to a negotiated peace, but it would mean a much longer and more difficult war. 

Particularly if Japan slows down on it's conquests at this point and pulls a good portion of pilots out and back to the training table


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## Shortround6 (Jul 2, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> However the airstrike at Pearl Harbor did not yield desirable results and was, from my point of view, a failure. It was a failure in the sense that the carriers were not taken out. It failed in the fact that the Pearl Harbor complex was not incapacitated and it concluded with a certain number of battleships/cruisers and other fleet support vessels damaged or sunk and as a whole, did not disable the U.S. Pacific fleet, but only gave it a setback. It also failed in the respect that it did not force the U.S. to negotiate anything except a firm resolve, a declaration of war and an eventual ass-kicking. This can been seen reflected in the battle of Midway only 6 months later, where the U.S. was able to engage, challenge and drive the Japanese Navy off, inflicting more damage than was received.
> 
> So this is where the thought process of the taking of the Hawaiian chain entered into consideration.



yes it failed but it may have been doomed from the start. 



> What would it have taken, for the Japanese to severely limit the U.S. Pacific Fleet from challenging the Japanese Navy. The element of surprise was on the Japanese side, but only for a short time. Prior to 7 December, the U.S. forces in the Pacific and Far East were not enough to challenge the Japanese, both in experienced manpower and modern equipment.
> 
> If they had only one chance at a successful strike, that would take the U.S. out of the game, or force it to the table, what would it be then? From what I see, Oahu keeps coming to the front of the line.Yes, it would have been a difficult operation/logistics problem, but with proper planning, timing and support, it would certainly be worth the risk. Taking the Phillipines would not (and did not) have that much impact on the course of the war. Taking Wake Island didn't and even taking Midway would end up being more expensive than it was worth (if only to keep the U.S. from creating a forward staging area).



Actually the Philippines and Malaysia _may_ have had a considerable impact on the war. Trouble is it is hard to prove a negative. The Philippines sat astride or close to many major Japanese shipping routes. Leaving a large Submarine base there for several months after attacking Pearl Harbor was hardly prudent. We _KNOW NOW_ that the US torpedoes were terrible and many pre-war US sub commanders had spent too long being indoctrinated with the wrong tactics. The US/British/Dutch defense force was thrown together in a matter of days, what happens if it has 6-8 weeks to get itself together? Can the British reinforce Hong Kong and Singapore if given more time? What happens if Phillips has a few more days to think about the Pearl Harbor attack and decides that land based air support might be better protection than radio silence ( The RAF had no idea were Force Z was). 

The Japanese were dependent on the US for about 80% of their oil and when the US started the Oil embargo in Aug 1941 and the British and Dutch joined Japan was in big trouble. Without those three Japan could not come up with 10% of the oil it needed so every month that they waited to grab the Dutch east indies oil fields (which could produce as 90% as much as Russia and Columbia combined in late 1930s) meant that their reserves shrank. The Japanese were also about 88% reliant on imported iron, 50% on zinc, 80% on tin, 100% on cotton, 99% on wool and 100% on rubber. Securing their own supply lines in addition to securing the sources was the main objective. Taking the oil fields with almost 30 submarines between the oil fields and Japanese home islands wasn't a good solution.


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## cherry blossom (Jul 3, 2014)

syscom3 said:


> The Japanese avgas bunkerage was 134,000 gallons for Hiryu and Soryu. 150,000 for Kaga and Akagi.


The Shokaku class carried 496 tons of avgas (English translation of Kojinsha No.6 ‘Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy’: Shokaku class, Soryu, Hiryu, Unryu class Taiho, Translators: - Sander Kingsepp, Hiroyuki Yamanouchi, Yutaka Iwasaki, Katsuhiro Uchida Quinn Bracken, www.combinedfleet.com/kojinshavolume6.pdf), which I calculate as 184,558 US gallons.


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## syscom3 (Jul 3, 2014)

USAAF plane totals before and after the attack.


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## parsifal (Jul 3, 2014)

> Actually the Philippines and Malaysia _may_ have had a considerable impact on the war.


.

The Japanese viewed the PI in particular as a major threat and gave it priority over all other fronts except China. There was a reason why nearly all the land based Zekes and Bettys were based in Formosa. from there they could strike at both the PI, to deal with the airpower based there, and also provide support to the China Expeditionary Force should the need arise....ie the Chinese try to retake teritory that had been conqured in the las three year. 



> Leaving a large Submarine base there for several months after attacking Pearl Harbor was hardly prudent. We _KNOW NOW_ that the US torpedoes were terrible and many pre-war US sub commanders had spent too long being indoctrinated with the wrong tactics.



Right on the money. The Japanese viewed neutralization of the threat posed by those submarines as a major priority in securing the access to the strategic resources they desperately required. The Japanese when they went to war had about a year of strategic reserves for their military, but less than 3 months supplies for their domestic economy. moreover at a time they should have been ramping up production, they were being forced to wind back essential industries to try and conserve resources until they could be replaced. As it turned out, they never reallly achieved a comfortable surplus for some of their resources, though industry did ramp up eventually by the adoption of crippling restrictions in other industries that eventually came home to haunt them. not the only reason, but one of the reasons they reduced training programs was because they could never get enough oil home to allow for a major boost to their training programs. Steel production languished because of shortages of coking coal, which they simply could not get where it was needed for production. The shortages of steel and the inability to produce enough turbines for high performance engines, coupled with the urgent need to divert as much as possible to ASW assets and then Merchant shipping replacements basically killed off any balanced replacement of naval tonnages. The Japanese knew all of this, and were gambling on a short war. But to even survive 1942 they absolutely needed access to thos resources, in a hurry. Any diversion to non-essential operations like an invasion of Oahu would place their national survival at risk. we know now that they did this anyway with the pearl Harbour attack, but in 1941, this was not so apparent. 



> The US/British/Dutch defense force was thrown together in a matter of days, what happens if it has 6-8 weeks to get itself together? Can the British reinforce Hong Kong and Singapore if given more time? What happens if Phillips has a few more days to think about the Pearl Harbor attack and decides that land based air support might be better protection than radio silence ( The RAF had no idea were Force Z was).



The 18th Division was enroute arriving middle of January I believe, Australian 6th and 7th Divisions were enroute, almost being diverted to defend Burma, before the Australian Govt intervened. 50 Hurricanes were unloading in December/January, and several hundred others were enroute. The Japanese conceded just after the fall of Singapore that they were lucky to pull it off. Even small amount of reinforcement would have made a huge difference.

Conversely, there were some downsides. I believe even a few days more delay may have given the Thais a better chance to consider their position, and IMO would probably have more forcefully sided with the Japanese. Even a few days extra would have vastly improved the japanese logistics at the front. But every days delay was tipping the balance very much in favour of the allies. 

T


> he Japanese were dependent on the US for about 80% of their oil and when the US started the Oil embargo in Aug 1941 and the British and Dutch joined Japan was in big trouble. Without those three Japan could not come up with 10% of the oil it needed so every month that they waited to grab the Dutch east indies oil fields (which could produce as 90% as much as Russia and Columbia combined in late 1930s) meant that their reserves shrank. The Japanese were also about 88% reliant on imported iron, 50% on zinc, 80% on tin, 100% on cotton, 99% on wool and 100% on rubber. Securing their own supply lines in addition to securing the sources was the main objective. Taking the oil fields with almost 30 submarines between the oil fields and Japanese home islands wasn't a good solution.



Absolutely. What strikes me in this whole debate is the near total ignorance here as to why Japan went to war. They never believed, or intended to dominate the US. Many had no illusions as to what going to war with the US would mean. Attacking the US was a spoiling attack, because the Japanese believed the US would not remain idle if the Japanese just attacked britain and the NEI. Japan was near expired when she went to war. it was an act of desperation, not an act of a nation bent on conquest. not saying the Japanese were not militaristic and unrealistic, but they went to war because they believed they had no other option, and time was running out fast. l


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## VBF-13 (Jul 3, 2014)

GrauGeist said:


> The reason why I ventured into the "Oahu invasion" what-if, was looking at the early (pre) war value of Midway versus Oahu.
> 
> Midway, Wake and other seaplane outposts had a basic military value prior to the war, of course, once the war began, Midway's value increased exponentially as it was improved over the course of the war.
> 
> ...


Here's another thing, too. The Navy would be riding tall in the saddle had Midway gone off as planned. Internally, that's a powerful statement, a successful operation. Had they drawn our few carriers, and finished them off, they're being taken seriously, they're hot. The Army? Move over, buster, your islands can wait. First, for Hawaii. Then, the "Big Ditch."

I mean, that's what I'd be telling them. 

EDIT: I think I want to add, let's just understand it like this, this was their opportunity. It doesn't mean they go off their plan. I don't think they ignore that opportunity, however, simply because they had a good plan. When they broke off that plan to commit these vast resources to go off on this wild goose chase that only underscored the importance to the plan of their getting our big carriers off their backs, once and for good. That only said, "We get it," i.e., how important that imperative was. They succeeded, they're riding high, surely, but, for how long? If Pearl was a hornet's nest, those carriers were the hornets. Just keep kicking it, where does that get them? We're going to be back. We're not going anywhere, while Pearl is left there. Throw in the Canal. Are they that shortsighted, they don't see that? I know that was the popular stereotype. But, neither did their pilots have to sit on a stack of telephone books, just to see over the windshield, that was just plumb stereotypical, as well. Maybe they're not going for Pearl, after all, but, they're thinking on it. They're just too close to not be thinking on it, i.e., on that all-out gamble, that going-for-broke. There, is that better?


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