# Heavy AAA: was it worth it



## tomo pauk (Jan 22, 2009)

After some reding that suggests that it was required to fire thousands of shells to destroy aircraft, one may conclude that it was a vain effort to have the air defence that way. Any thoughts?


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## Colin1 (Jan 22, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> After some reading that suggests that it was required to fire thousands of shells to destroy aircraft, one may conclude that it was a vain effort to have the air defence that way. Any thoughts?


I'm not sure the bomber crews of the Fifteenth over Ploesti would agree with the sentiment


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## tomo pauk (Jan 22, 2009)

Well, if we could have some info about AAA guns ammo expenditure, then see how it's compared with number of fighters that could be bought for the same amount of money... See where I'm aiming


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## delcyros (Jan 22, 2009)

AAA is cheaper but less efficient. In top of this, it doesn´t cost as much in crew training and upkeep and may be upgraded quite easily.


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## Colin1 (Jan 22, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> Well, if we could have some info about AAA guns ammo expenditure, then see how it's compared with number of fighters that could be bought for the same amount of money...


Aha!
I see your line now
Sounds like an interesting thread in the making, some observations of my own while I'm here

if we're considering flak emplacements and ammo expenditure, shouldn't we be comparing them with fighters and their ammo expenditure too ie

ordnance expended as a function of platform vs ordnance expended as a function of platform

Not sure how easy that would be

In commercial terms, I've no idea what a flak emplacement costs but I'm wondering if it's not cheaper than a fighter, maybe all the fine-tolerance machining bumps the price up...
Unit cost of a flak shell is obviously more than even a heavy-calibre aircraft shell - bit of a balance there?

In strategic terms, did the military thinking of the time consider fighters and flak as separate assets or two threads of the same asset ie did they consider the bang-for-buck of one vs the other or did it not occur to them to contemplate it, on the grounds that the fighters weren't going to shoot down all of the bombers on their own and neither were the flak emplacements?


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## BombTaxi (Jan 22, 2009)

In considering the effect of flak, you shouldn't just be looking at the nuber of shells fired vs. number of planes bought down, IMHO. Flak of all calibres could also have a significant effect on aircrew morale and effectiveness, especially in poorly-trained crews. Flak could break up bomber formations, making fighter attacks easier, and put bomber and ground attack aircraft off their aim, reducing the damage they did - an example of this is how ships fired their main guns into the water ahead of torpedo bombers, making splashes which would either wreck the aircraft or throw the pilot off during the sensitive torpedo run.

Furthermore, heavy flak could inflict heavy but non-lethal damage to a plane which would require serious repair work to correct. This further drained material and consumed man-hours which could be invested in new aircraft. It could also lead to the writing-off of an a/c as a structural loss even if it returned to base after the mission. And of course, the a/c might return with some of it's crew dead and wounded, further debilitating a squadron without necessarily destroying the airframe itself.


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## GrauGeist (Jan 22, 2009)

The American bomber crews dreaded the German flak almost as much, if not more, than the German fighters. Flak can inflict a serious amount of damage to bomber formations, and can deter future bomber strikes if the concentration is high enough around a certain area.

If you want to compare the cost of defending a target in shell expenditure, compare the defending the same target with aircraft.

Of course you have the cost of training the flak crews as well as pilots, but you also have the additional expense of training the aircraft's ground crew as well. Add to that the logistics of maintaining a local airstrip to support the defending fighters and the cost of attrition when you have to replace the pilot and/or aircraft when it becomes damaged or lost in battle.

You can also factor in the cost for the aircraft's ammunition, which can be at least a thousand rounds (this figure is an example) per sorte. And let's not forget the logistics of moving the airfield to another location, as the tides of battle shift.

On the other hand, a flak battery consists to the artillery peice, the truck used to haul it, the crew that mans the peice and a support crew that supplies ammunition from the depot. Your cost of maintaining the artillery peice would most likely consist of repairing the breech mechanism and various parts over time, you could even factor in replacing the barrel efter a certain amount of use. Perhaps replacing the weapon hauler if it becomes disabled, etc. You would simply need to billet the crews locally and typically being mobile, you don't have to establish and maintain any one area to stage that artillery unit.

I would think that a flak unit would be far more cost effective than it's aircraft equivellent.


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## Erich (Jan 22, 2009)

they feared Flak the worst over fighters, they could not fire back at the Flak bursts. Will say that for the larger industrial centres in southern Germany/Austria it was good for the Germans that they indeed had zwilling and single barrel 128mms at their disposal as LW S/E and T/E a/c were far few and between nothing could compare to the Defense measures up to the north in the heart of the Reich, Flak was a definate plus


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## GrauGeist (Jan 22, 2009)

I Definately agree, Erich...plus, I've seen pictutres of those Flak Towers in Berlin...the sight of those monoliths alone was impressive...

I can't begin to imagine what they would have looked like when they went into action...


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## Erich (Jan 22, 2009)

noisy that is a fact, or just even 10 8.8cm's in a batterie. had a good friend who was a gunner of one serving at Kiel before he was moved further estward, he told me the sound was defeaning during the encounters with Bomber Command a/c at night and US heavies by day. he always felt in the 2 years in this position that they were providing some sort of assurance to the German folk even if meager


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## parsifal (Jan 23, 2009)

Erich said:


> noisy that is a fact, or just even 10 8.8cm's in a batterie. had a good friend who was a gunner of one serving at Kiel before he was moved further estward, he told me the sound was defeaning during the encounters with Bomber Command a/c at night and US heavies by day. he always felt in the 2 years in this position that they were providing some sort of assurance to the German folk even if meager



we had a pretty good discussion about flak some months ago as i recall. it was a very intersting discussion. IMO there is no doubt that flak had far more effect than it is given credit for. It affected the accuracy of bombing, kept the bombers high, and damaged huge numbers of bombers compared to the fighters.

German Flak needed to expend far more ammunition per kill at the end of the war than it did at the beginning, but we never really got to a satisfactory explanation for that. I still dont know why that happened......


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## BombTaxi (Jan 23, 2009)

I would venture that declining standards of training were responsible for that Parsifal. By the later stages of the war, sixteen year old kids were being drafted to man flak batteries, and I think it would be safe to surmise that their training was not as thorough as that of their elder predecessors. 

Could it also be the case that heavy AA weapons were being diverted to the AT role in support of the Wehrmacht? I have no concrete evidence for how significant this might be, but I understand that Luftwaffe 88s were deployed in the AT role during the Seelow battles in 1945. I wonder if this and other diversions might have weakened the defences of cities under attack from heavy bombers


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## Erich (Jan 23, 2009)

don't forget about the jamming of LW and W ground based radar systems to track. certainly several LW Flak units were sent to the Ost front, new ones were evolved so in 44 there were actually more Flak apparent per space in the Reich and in 45 when the LW seemed to be absent, truth of the matter 3/4's of the Reich defense day fighters were sent to the Ost front


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## BombTaxi (Jan 23, 2009)

Ah, I didn't think the effect would be particularly huge. Presumably the jamming of ground radar would have forced battery CPs to fall back on optical range heightfinding methods? I imagine that combined with lower training standards that would have had quite a serious effect on effectiveness.


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## RabidAlien (Jan 23, 2009)

Agreed that the psychological impact of flak was alot higher than that of fighters. If industrial targets hadn't been ringed with AAA emplacements, our bombers would've pounded the living hell out of their logistics systems and manufacturing plants with impunity, and (IMO, at least) the war would've been shorter. Also...take a look at the Normandy invasion. Flak most definitely played a greater role there than aircraft did. 

Also, as mentioned earlier, the 88 was easily shifted from AA role to AT role, and presumably could be done in the middle of a battle, without having to go back to refuel and rearm.


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## parsifal (Jan 23, 2009)

The 88 was an effective gun as either AA or AT. But IMO it was a better AT gun. It had an effective ceiling of about 26000 feet, which meant that B-17s could just skim over the top of its effective ceiling. 

By 1944, so many of the flak guns were over used, that many of them had reduced ceilings to well below the theoretical 26000 feet. It was not unheard of for flak batteries of 88s to have effective ceilings of only 21-22K The problem was simply over-use. Guns produced in 1939-40, had by 1944 expended well over 30000 rounds per gun. They were literally starting to fall apart by that stage. 

It is also true that m any of the elite crews had been drafted to serve in the east and elswhere. The huge expansion of the flak Arm had to be done out of necessity by using part timers, and these crews were only a fraction as accurate as the crews of 1941-44.

German flak artillierie in my opnion reached its peak year of effiicincy in 1842, based on the numbers of artillery shells expended per kill. It was around 4000 incidentally. By 1944, with many factors now working against them, the flak artillerie was down to about 16000 rounds per kill, over germany.


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## BombTaxi (Jan 23, 2009)

I'm not sure how 'convertible' the 88 was once deployed on the battlefield - I am almost certain that good AT positions and good AA positions are very different beasts, and the 88 still required a large prime mover and sizeable crew to shift it about. Also, I would surmise that the different ammo types for AA and AT roles were not issued together - could one of our resident LW/Wehrmacht gurus please clarify this? 

I think we can all agree however that flak had an effect material and psychological far beyond that suggested by raw statistical analysis


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## Colin1 (Jan 23, 2009)

parsifal said:


> ...German flak artillery in my opinion reached its peak year of efficiency in 1842...


What were they shooting at?


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## parsifal (Jan 23, 2009)

Colin1 said:


> What were they shooting at?



Probably low flying birds at that date....obviously I meant 1942


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## GrauGeist (Jan 23, 2009)

Colin1 said:


> What were they shooting at?



Those pesky French observation balloons


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## Clay_Allison (Jan 23, 2009)

what, are we budgeting out cannon shells for the first time ever? Of course they were worth it.


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## tomo pauk (Jan 24, 2009)

Does anybody know how many heavy AA guns were produced for ground-based units, and how many were available in 1939 for the same units?


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## Watanbe (Jan 24, 2009)

Another point I heard raised somewhere was the reassurance the general populace felt (especially in BoB) when they heard the sound of the big AA guns open up at enemy planes. They felt they had some protection and could fight back against the enemy. The people didn't feel so helpless and vulnerable when they heard the guns open up!

Another point to consider perhaps!


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## tomo pauk (Jan 26, 2009)

I've digged out that 25 000 of all 88mm Flaks were produced (according to German Flak 88mm 37 L/56 Antitank Gun Photos - Walkaround Gallery. If we subtract that number for 5000 guns (for ships and anti-ground-purposes), thats 20K AA guns. 
The L56 guns weighted some 7 tons in marching order. So, each gun weighted as 3 Bf-109 fighters. 
Then we count in some 10 000 prime movers for guns (or more), each costing half a price of a Panther tank. 
Then we add 20000 X 4000 shells (=80 000 000) that got to be produced if we want to make the AD guns worthwhile (one kill per gun, that 4000 number is the 1942 value; it is worse before and after).  
Now we multiply that 80 milions with 10kg per shell, we now have 0,8 billion kg of material thrown through the barrels. 
Of course, we must add some 8 (give or take) men per gun to man it, so 160 000 men.

Perhaps the Germans would be better off with some 50 000 new single engine fighters*, 5000 Panthers** (requiring 25 000 men of those 160 000; the rest to the _Jagdgeschvadern_) and 800 million tons of shells for the artillery arm, instead of their 88 fleet?


*instead of guns; I know that 1kg per 1kg exchange wouldn't be possible.
** so, 11 000 instead of 6000 produced


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## parsifal (Jan 26, 2009)

The trpouble with this argument is that it assumes the heavy flak was doing nothing and achieving nothing, and therefore every reichsmark not spent on AA could be diverted to other hardware. Problem is, without the AA, the bomber become deadly accurate, so most of the production "saved" is in fact lost to additional bomb damage and losses. There would be a very real danger of a collapse in Morale, as city after city goers up in massive firestorms, and the casualty bill approaches the millions, instead of the tens of thousands

Your argument is akin to saying that ASW defence gets in the way of surface combat capabilities, so lets not build any more depth charges........


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## tomo pauk (Jan 26, 2009)

parsifal said:


> The trpouble with this argument is that it assumes the heavy flak was doing nothing and achieving nothing, and therefore every reichsmark not spent on AA could be diverted to other hardware. Problem is, without the AA, the bomber become deadly accurate, so most of the production "saved" is in fact lost to additional bomb damage and losses. There would be a very real danger of a collapse in Morale, as city after city goers up in massive firestorms, and the casualty bill approaches the millions, instead of the tens of thousands
> 
> Your argument is akin to saying that ASW defence gets in the way of surface combat capabilities, so lets not build any more depth charges........



I'm not following you, parsifal.
The 1st thing suggested im my 'what-if' is to build a huge mass of fighter aircraft instead of heavy AA guns. Since those two do the same thing, namely take it on enemy aircraft, your argument is not valid IMO.


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## BombTaxi (Jan 26, 2009)

Tomo,

The raw statistics you have produced neglect the fact that heavy flak was an integral part of a combined-arms air defence network. 5000 extra Panthers and millions of tons of HE shell are no good if the enemy has air superiority and attacks them at will. And even if thousands more fighters were built, they would be at greater risk of destruction on the ground without AAA defence for thier bases.

Your argument also ignores completely the associated costs involved in fielding these extra weapons. Swarms of new fighters need trained pilots - which need instructors to train them. They than need new bases to house them. These bases require men to build them and then men to man them. How much does that cost? Likewise, 5000 Panthers equates to something like 25 new armoured divisions. These have to be manned, then artillery, small arms, transport and a plethora of other things added. Is this truly cost effective in the long run? 

You have criticised AAA precisely because of it's high secondary costs, then completely ignored secondary cost's in proposing alternative use of resources. The stats you provide have shock value, granted, but they give no real consideration to the actual usefulness of 5000 tanks, etc, IMHO.


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## tomo pauk (Jan 26, 2009)

I like the discussion very much 
My comments are in *bold*:



BombTaxi said:


> Tomo,
> 
> The raw statistics you have produced neglect the fact that heavy flak was an integral part of a combined-arms air defence network. 5000 extra Panthers and millions of tons of HE shell are no good if the enemy has air superiority and attacks them at will. And even if thousands more fighters were built, they would be at greater risk of destruction on the ground without AAA defence for thier bases.
> 
> ...


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## Colin1 (Jan 26, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> 1. Since we now have double as many fighters, I fail to see just how enemy would achieve air superiority.
> I haven't say a word against light AAA, so those air bases would have decent defence. I very much doubt that heavy AA would do any harm to the attackers flying tree top. For the high flying attackers, well, we've just built heaps of fighters And yes, those fighters are perfectly capable to fly tree top too.
> 
> 2. Now, the AAA can be supressed (flak supression anyone? I think that RAF was pretty good at it).
> ...


1. You've neglected a point that has already been made, in the absence of heavy flak emplacements, the strategic bomber will become significantly more accurate and you're having alot more difficulty producing these 'heaps of fighters'; light flak is very good at defending your airfield against marauding tactical fighter-bombers but will have little effect against streams of strategic bombers

2. Presumably you think the RAF (or USAAF, or even the Luftwaffe itself) enjoyed flak suppression as a mere formality? It was difficult, nerve-jangling and suicidally dangerous.

3. Why do you need to train their instructors? Flak crews need to be trained but it doesn't take as long (nor is it as expensive) as training a fighter pilot

4. You do at last have a point; the RLM did a good job of distributing aircraft production into the forests and the Luftwaffe did an equally good job of following them with their fighter strength

5. I'm not sure what your point is there

6. Have you considered platform turnover as a function of primary cost? How many flak emplacements are lost in battle compared to the number of fighters lost? I'm sure some are but do you think it's any where near the number of fighters? Fighters are more expensive to manufacture and they don't generally last as long.

7. I'm sure they would - provided they were also supplied with the fuel and oil necessary to maintain them as an effective asset. As the war progressed, the Germans had trouble doing this for their existing infrastructure, never mind an additional 5,000 tanks and swarms of fighters.


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## parsifal (Jan 27, 2009)

The only "other" way to counter the air defence problem was to buld more fighters with the money saved from not building AA. I believe this is essentially TPs case. Milch was certainly critical of the performance of AA. By the end of the war, some analysts say that the cost to bring down a bomber by AA was almost the same as the cost of the bomber itself.

So there is an argument there to support this notion, however, im not buying it. For starters, AA fulfilled a role that fighters could never do, they downgraded the performance and accuracy of EVERY bomber that came into their range. It is wrong to gauge the effectiveness of flak solely by the numbers of AC they shot down. For a number of reasons (already tabled by others) it had other functions going beyond the mere kill rate.

That is not to say that the flak arm was inneffective in bringing aircraft down. From the beginning of 1944 on, the ratio of a/c brought down by flak compared to aircraft brought down by fighters rose as a proportion of the total. most scholars believe that by about Septmeber, losses to flak was exceeding losses inflicted by German fighters. This may or may not be correct, but it still demonstrates the importance of the flak arm to the Germans defences.

Moreover, the losses the fighters were taking to bring down each bomber were rising sharply, as 1944 progressed. By late 1944, the Germans were losing something like 6 aircraft for every one they were bringing down. At that exchange rate, I do not believe that the fighter arm was, by that stage a cost effective means of air defence for the germans. True, they had lost the war anyway by that stage, but this is just a question of which arm was the more cost effective


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## tomo pauk (Jan 27, 2009)

Colin1 said:


> 1. You've neglected a point that has already been made, in the absence of heavy flak emplacements, the strategic bomber will become significantly more accurate and you're having alot more difficulty producing these 'heaps of fighters'; light flak is very good at defending your airfield against marauding tactical fighter-bombers but will have little effect against streams of strategic bombers
> 
> *If the bomber is destroyed, he will never gona get accurate. 'My' fighters would take care of it.*
> 
> ...



_


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## Colin1 (Jan 27, 2009)

*If the bomber is destroyed, he will never gonna get accurate. 'My' fighters would take care of it. *
That's based on the pretty hefty premise that the fighters will destroy all of the bombers; the problem with your theory is that intercepting fighters can be engaged by escorting fighters and to a lesser extent, by the bombers' own defensive armament. What neither the escorting fighters or the bombers can do is engage the flak.

*No, I don't think that anyone enjoyed it. However, it proved feasible many times.*
It was always feasible to suppress flak but it almost invariably came at a price

*Sure thing pilots are more expensive to train then gunners. Again, germans failed to train the gunners properly from 1942 on*
And how does that change the fact that pilots are more expensive to train than gunners?

*The planes and tanks would continue to function until there is fuel. Since we now have the fighters to KILL the bombers, Ploesti and synthetic fuel factories will be free from bombing.*
Back to your hefty premise. You haven't really presented a good case as to why fighters could supplant flak in defending the industrial base, your argument is that they could have done because... they could have done, you've simply reset the debate back to zero; so WHY do you think oil and synthetic fuel would be free from bombing?


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## tomo pauk (Jan 27, 2009)

Hi, parsifal 

When we talk about AAA, fighters, bombers and all of that, we talk about 1943-45. 
However, what was the task for all of those 88s from 1939 to 1943? 
Those guns haven't brought down any significant number of enemy planes simply because there was no major bombing offensive aginst germany in 1st half of war. Now I know about RAF night bombers, yet their offensives weren't halted by heavy AAA at the peak of it's efficiency. 
In the meantime, fighter planes were flying as much sorties as they could muster. The heavy AAA couldn't help them much to gain air superiority over enemy territory, nor escort bombers, nor attack ground forces. So, while fighters could do the job of the heavy AAA and more, it wasn't possible the other way around. All of that during the 6 year war.  
And as we may conclude, the very moment Luftwaffe fighters lost the upper hand, allied bombers roamed free despite the AAA. Not only above german factories, but also against frontline troops.


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## Colin1 (Jan 27, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> 1. Now I know about RAF night bombers, yet their offensives weren't halted by heavy AAA at the peak of it's efficiency.
> 
> 2. In the meantime, fighter planes were flying as much sorties as they could muster. The heavy AAA couldn't help them much to gain air superiority over enemy territory, nor escort bombers, nor attack ground forces.
> 
> ...


1. No, but they would be driven to higher altitudes where their accuracy would have suffered

2. That's a bit silly; flak is neither an air superiority or an escort platform; you might just as well argue that panzers weren't able to help much during the Channel Dash. Technically, they could/did use 88s to attack ground forces. 

3. You've stated the bleedin' obvious and presented it as your case for the defence. Nobody is going to argue that a flak emplacement can't do what a fighter can do because we know that flak emplacements can't fly. You've once again ignored the fact that they will drive the bombers higher and present the incoming bomber crews with both a psychological and physiological threat ie the fear of being hit and actually being hit. Once driven higher and less accurate, the interceptors can do their part and engage them. This is largely why I think the flak + fighters were two parts of the same defence mechanism, rather than two separate entities that just happened to be fighting the same threat.

4. Allied bombing certainly knocked the stuffing out of Germany's core industrial base but is it true to say they 'roamed free' even in the closing stages of the war? Frontline troops would have been engaged at a tactical level, rather than by bomber streams and guess what they would have been protected by - flak. Flak that moves with them when they move, instead of waiting for hard-pressed fighters to turn up (if they did) to see off the Allied fighters.


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## tomo pauk (Jan 28, 2009)

Colin1 said:


> 1. No, but they would be driven to higher altitudes where their accuracy would have suffered
> 
> *Could we agree that Lancaster bombing Hamburg was as accurate at 15K feet, as it was at 5K or 25K? The city would burn either way. In the same time no flak saved river dams from the Dambusters.*
> 
> ...



.


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## tomo pauk (Jan 28, 2009)

Colin1 said:


> *If the bomber is destroyed, he will never gonna get accurate. 'My' fighters would take care of it. *
> That's based on the pretty hefty premise that the fighters will destroy all of the bombers; the problem with your theory is that intercepting fighters can be engaged by escorting fighters and to a lesser extent, by the bombers' own defensive armament. What neither the escorting fighters or the bombers can do is engage the flak.
> 
> *No, I don't think that anyone enjoyed it. However, it proved feasible many times.*
> ...



1. What escort fighters? Not in 1939, nor in 1940, nothing up to 1944. 
2. Flak supression comes with the price indeed. Are other things, not only in war, free?
3. It doesn't. 
Does the training (or absence of it from 1943) make the heavy AAA to stop bomber offensive? It doesn't. 
4. The bombers would be shot down since the defender has double the number of fighters perhaps?


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## Colin1 (Jan 28, 2009)

*Could we agree that Lancaster bombing Hamburg was as accurate at 15K feet, as it was at 5K or 25K? The city would burn either way. In the same time no flak saved river dams from the Dambusters.*
Both one-offs
Hamburg was well-defended but it wasn't the industrial heartland of Germany, it was an historical city with a correspondingly large number of wooden buildings. It had been an exceptionally dry summer. The Allies used something in the region of 350,000 incendiaries combined with conventional HE; you could have bombed Hamburg from the moon and hit it.
The Dams were a strategic target hit tactically, there was no 'bomber stream' and with the exception of the Mohne, no correspondingly heavy concentrations of flak. 53 out of 133 men didn't make it back (40%), 8 Lancasters and two were so badly damaged they had to abort their mission - statistics sound roughly familiar? You can bet it wasn't down to enemy fighters. 

*My point: fighters can do what heavy flak can, but not vice versa. Panzers are not suposed to kill planes, you should know that.*
My point: heavy flak can do what fighters can't, they can engage the enemy at practically minimal risk of being engaged themselves; anyone foolish enough to go down and take them on likely won't be coming back up again.
Nobody mentioned panzers. The 88, accurate at targetting heavy bombers, was murderously accurate when targetting ground forces, you could make some concession for the wrong type of ammo but you're still shooting at them with the minimum of turn-around time.

*Ceterum censeo: crew killed by fighters is a better bargain then the crew feared by heavy Flak.*
Why crews only killed by fighters? Is that better than a crew killed by flak? You still miss the psychological element viz the crews with nerves shot to shreds that jettisoned their bomb loads and made for neutral Sweden or Switzerland; that's a gap in the defensive box, one less set of guns and bomb load to worry about.

*What the 'less accurate' bomber got to do with the ability of fighters to shot the bombers down??*
Is the answer 'nothing at all'? see below, I left it in
This is largely why I think the flak + fighters were two parts of the same defence mechanism, rather than two separate entities that just happened to be fighting the same threat.

*My impression it that prospects of an allied bomber crew was far brighter in 1944 then in 1943, not to mention earlier years*
And what do you attribute that to? The fact that the German High Command just weren't listening to you and balanced interceptors with flak instead of just more interceptors, or the fact that the Allies could now escort their charges all the way to the target with something that could take on and cancel out the intercepting fighters? 
Swarms of fighters wouldn't have helped your argument, think of Operation Bodenplatte as a case in point; by midday, the Allies had lost roughly 500 aircraft whilst the Luftwaffe lost about half of that, 280'ish.
Despite the disparity in losses, the Allies were flying in replacements by late afternoon of the same day, the Luftwaffe on the other hand only succeeded in hurting themselves; experienced pilots lost, precious aviation fuel expended and it is fair to say that Bodenplatte broke the Luftwaffe in these respects.
So, my point, you fly in a swarm of fighters and the Allies will fly in a bigger one, more quickly.

*Please quote my post where I say a word against light flak?*
You didn't, but you did a poor job of differentiating between attacking frontline troops and Germany's industrial base; the flak you seem to have so little time for was usually all they had, Axis fighters by that time would have been rare to non-existent over their positions.


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## Clay_Allison (Jan 28, 2009)

Remember all of those B-17 veterans who said that FLak was a joke and that they never worried about it? Me either.


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## parsifal (Jan 29, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> Hi, parsifal
> 
> When we talk about AAA, fighters, bombers and all of that, we talk about 1943-45.
> However, what was the task for all of those 88s from 1939 to 1943?
> ...



Hi TP

There are a couple of assumptions embedded into your position that are highly questionable to me

My reply has relied on a number of sources, chief among them is "Flak - German AntiAircraft Defences 1914-45"; EB Westermann, University Of Kansas Press, 2001. This is a good source, perhaps the best currently in print, but it is not without its errors. 

The Flak arm was responsible for the majority of losses over Germany and western Europe, throughout 1941. Relevantly, Westermann states "In the last six months of the year, flak forces in the Reich and western Europe brought down 607 aircraft (405 at night) whilst the nightfighters brought down 421 aircraft, in all of 1941, and approximately 250 in the six month period specified. Clearly the domionant force for the RAF to deal with at this time was the flak forces. This should come as no surprise....Night fighters were still in the experimental stage in 1941, and nearly all the protagonists relied on flak as their primary defences aginst night bombing.

However, it is wrong to suggest that flak was some sort of adjunct to the Nightfighter forces, at this stage it was an indispensable element to the defensive network. more that 70% of Night Fighter shoot downs were assisted by Searchlights, and Searchlights found it absolutely essential to be protected (heavily) by flak. Without the flak, the searchlights were just too vulnerable, and without the searchlights, the Nightfighters could not really function. So without the ground based defences, none of the elements of the defensive network could operate.

As for the notion that the losses were small and therefore unimportant, well that depends on the perspective you take. From the RAFs POV they were crippling and massive, to the point that by November 1941 the RAF was almost admitting defeat and had scaled back operations drastically. The battles in 1941 were neverthe less critical to the overall bomber offensive. It was in 1941 that the RAF learnt the important lessons that led it to better outcomes in subsequent operations....the need for massed attacks, incendiary bombing, pathfinders, the development of better types and technology but most importantly the build up of expertise in the squadrons that enabled the bomber force to hit targets much more accurately in susbsequent years. Without the flak arm, this expertise and indeed the numbers of bombers itself, would have been built up much more quickly and
5the bomber force would have reached potency much more quickly if the flak was not so potent.


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## tomo pauk (Jan 29, 2009)

Thanks for the source  
Is there a really good site about german (or any other) AD guns systems? I'm especially interested about numbers built at disposal for units.

Now, according to that quote from the book, the RAF was loosing, during the night, in the 2nd half of 1943:
-3 and a half per night by Flak only
-4 and 3/4 per night, both by Flak and night fighters.

While I don't know if Bomber command was making bombing runs every night, but the losses under 5 planes per day seem to me hardly a reason to stop those runs.

Does the book have any information about the numbers of heavy AAA available for the Luftwaffe, and about the numbers of night fighters for the same time space?


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## Hop (Jan 30, 2009)

> Hamburg was well-defended but it wasn't the industrial heartland of Germany, it was an historical city with a correspondingly large number of wooden buildings.



I think you're getting mixed up with Lubeck. Hamburg was the largest industrial city in Germany. The buildings were mainly brick or stone.

From The Battle of Hamburg by Middlebrook:



> It is often believed that the raids of the Battle of Hamburg contained a specially high proportion of incendiary bombs but this is not true. It is also believed that Hamburg was a good fire target. This also is a misconception. Because of Hamburg's great fire of 1842, the city contained few really old timbered buildings; most were of fairly modern brick or concrete construction. There was also the presence in Hamburg of so many waterways which might act as firebreaks and which provided convenient sources of water for the city's fire-fighters. Hamburg would not be an easy city to set alight and a study of Bomber Command records shows that the bomb-loads of the first raid of the Battle of Hamburg contained a lower proportion of incendiary bombs than other city raids of this period. The increased number of high explosives were needed to blow apart the strongly built buildings of the city.


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## parsifal (Jan 30, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> Thanks for the source
> Is there a really good site about german (or any other) AD guns systems? I'm especially interested about numbers built at disposal for units.
> 
> Now, according to that quote from the book, the RAF was loosing, during the night, in the 2nd half of 1943:
> ...




Hi TP

I apologise but I didnt understand you in most of the above post. You will have to clarify a bit.

As far as flak numbers, I found the following 

At the beginning of the war, the main protagonists possessed the following flak assets

Germany:

2628 Hy AA, 6700 Light AA 3732 Searchlights
organized as 657 bty, 560 bty, 180 bty.

Britain:

1296 Hy, 1200 Lt


France

1200 Hy, 1800 Lt

The US was about half the size of the Brits. The allies were only a fraction of the efficiency of the German Flak ArmBoth French

By the end of June 1940 German Flak had been expanded to the following levels:

3095 Hy, 9817 Lt and 4665 Seach Lights

As a percentage of Total Armed forces expenditure, the germans were diverting about 17% of their military budget to ground based air defence (including those being used on ships, in the army and the like, in other words the total expaditure) , about 30% was going into air units, 47% into the wehrmacht, and the rest into the Navy (principally U-Boats).


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## tomo pauk (Jan 30, 2009)

Well, I was trying to compose a full picture: 
-how many heavy AA guns and night fighters did have Germans at disposal in the last half of 1941
-how many sorties has RAF flown during those 6 month
-how many planes were involved from RAF for nght attack on Germany
-what was composition of attacker force (types, numbers)

I know my questions require a lot of research, but don't feel pressured  Please post* any additional info whenever you find time.

Now, I wonder what a plethora of those AAA (13000 pieces  ) was shooting at during the 1st year of war....

*and/or any other knowledgeable member


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## Hop (Jan 31, 2009)

Sword in the Heavens: German Ground Based Defences 1918 - 1945 by Edward Westermann answers some of your questions:

In September 1941 the flak arm had 967 heavy and 752 light batteries. Over the next month another 5 batteries of 105 mm guns were added, along with 4 batteries of 37mm, 5 of 20mm and 2 of 40mm guns.

At the same time 49 new "barrier fire" batteries were added. These batteries had the guns but little in the way of optical and radar equipment, and had to fire barrages rather than aimed fire.

The standard size of a battery at this time was 4 guns, although the Luftwaffe had just begun to experiment with larger batteries.

As to RAF sorties, you can find a lot of figures at BC Main Page

Night sorties, second half of 1941:
Aug - 3354
Sep - 2621
Oct - 2501
Nov - 1713
Dec - 1411

Westermann also gives details of the number of aircraft shot down by Flak over Germany and Western Europe in the second half of 1941:

Month - Day - Night 
Sep - 115 - 45
Oct - 52 - 47
Nov - 33 - 41
Dec - 16 - 33

Bear in mind these are the German figures. They will include aircraft from other RAF commands, in particular the fighters that were flying a lot of operations over France and the Low Countries.

Westermann goes on to say flak brought down 242 aircraft in the west at night in the last 6 months of 1941. Night fighters accounted for 421 in the whole of 1941.

The flak forces accounted for another 1,325 aircraft between October and December, mostly in the East.

Westermann also discusses the economics of the flak arm. He has a table showing the percentage of the entire armed forces weapon and ammunition budgets going on flak in 1941:

1st Quarter - Guns 15% - Ammo 18%
2nd Quarter - Guns 17% - Ammo 27%
3rd Quarter - Guns 19% - Ammo 34%
4th Quarter - Guns 24% - Ammo 35%

He then comments:



> The devotion of over one-third of the Wehrmacht's entire ammunition budget to anti-aircraft munitions in the last two quarters of 1941 once again highlighted the importance placed by Hitler on the strengthening of the Reich's ground-based air defences. Several historians have questioned the large-scale diversion of resources to flak ammunition and flak equipment. In turn, many have argued that these resources would have been better spent on building more fighters. It is important to note, however, that the United States Strategic Bombing Survey found that "since earlier limitation of output was largely the result of deliberately restricted demand, it cannot be said that the investment in antiaircraft prior to 1943 represents a cost in terms of other weapons and ammunition." In other words, the opportunity costs associated with expanding the flak arm in the first three years of the war do not appear to have negatively impacted the overall German war economy prior to 1943. Furthermore, the increased production of fighters also entailed numerous hidden resource costs including expanded pilot training programs, increased fuel demands, and the necessity for more air bases, maintenance depots, and supporting aviation infrastructure. In short, the calculus of air defense did not allow itself to be reduced to simple binomial equation.


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## parsifal (Jan 31, 2009)

Hop

I think you may have misread one of the figures. Flak losses on page 133 stated as 647 for the last six months of 1941 in the west. 405 of these were day losses and 242 were night losses.

However, this figure is at odds with his total given in Table 5.3 (page 133...losses September to December) and the figures given for July and August in Table 5.2 at page 125. When you add these totals up you get 507 (I made a mistake in an earlier post by saying 607...just a calculator error) Of this total, 242 were lost at night (so the two lists add as far as losses at night are concerned).

I still think Westermann is a reasonably accurate source, but as I said, he is not without his share of errors


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## Hop (Jan 31, 2009)

I've only just noticed you'd already posted most of the relevant info from Westermann. How I missed that I don't know.



> I think you may have misread one of the figures. Flak losses on page 133 stated as 647 for the last six months of 1941 in the west. 405 of these were day losses and 242 were night losses.
> 
> However, this figure is at odds with his total given in Table 5.3 (page 133...losses September to December) and the figures given for July and August in Table 5.2 at page 125. When you add these totals up you get 507 (I made a mistake in an earlier post by saying 607...just a calculator error) Of this total, 242 were lost at night (so the two lists add as far as losses at night are concerned).



The tables in my copy give the following:

table 5.3
July - 89 - 32
Aug - 100 - 44

table 5.5
Sep - 115 - 45
Oct - 52 - 47
Nov - 33 - 41
Dec - 16 - 33

Totals day 405, night 242, grand total 647

I presume they must have been corrected at some point. 

You can download a pdf copy of Westermann's doctoral thesis at Defending Hitler's Reich: German Ground-Based Air Defenses, 1914-1945

That's the copy I have. How much it differs from the book, I don't know.


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## tomo pauk (Jan 31, 2009)

Hop, thanks for the link about the BC, it's a gold mine 

So it seems that in the 2nd half of 1941 German AAA was destroying a whooping 2- (less then 2!!) RAF aircraft per night. No mean feat for a few thousands heavy AA guns available for Reich defenders.


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Jan 31, 2009)

No expert on this, but my two cents. 

From what I've read, bomber crews feared flak more then the fighters. At least with the fighters, they could shoot back and had some reasonable protection with their escorts. With flak, not a chance. The best thing they could do was ride through it. Having a FW190 riddle your Flying Fortress with 20 MM was bad; but if a flak shell went off right next to a Fortress, no doubt it'd be torn to shreds.


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## parsifal (Jan 31, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> Hop, thanks for the link about the BC, it's a gold mine
> 
> So it seems that in the 2nd half of 1941 German AAA was destroying a whooping 2- (less then 2!!) RAF aircraft per night. No mean feat for a few thousands heavy AA guns available for Reich defenders.



Im not sure how you arrived at just 2 aircraft per night as being representative of the flak arms achievements . In fact the number is closer to 3.5 for the west....if you include all theatres the number is closer to 15 per day. But of course the Russians dont count, I keep forgetting that they did not win the war for us.....

You could look at it another way, flak gave the Germans another 1 1/2 years of relative protection from the Bombers. the bombers were unable to materially affect the germans in that time (with one or two exceptions), whilst taking heavy losses from them (the flak guns) at that time however both sides were still learning their trades even at that stage of the war. 

Was anything happening in that time. Well, if you think that just 2 aircraft per night was all it was worth, I dont know how I will be able to persuade you otherwise


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## Amsel (Feb 1, 2009)

During my studies of the American bomber crews over the ETO I found that account after account show the morale sapping effect of German flak. Flying a bomber over Germany took the outmost bravery and nerve and most of those men on the crews did not think they would ever survive the war. The German flak was and may still be the most effective in history.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 1, 2009)

Hi, parsifal,
I've derived that number form Hop's post:


Hop said:


> ...
> The tables in my copy give the following:
> 
> table 5.3
> ...


So the 242 planes shot down during 183 nights (=half a year) yields 1,3 plane per night; if we count all planes shot down it's 3,5 planes per 24 hrs for a whole Flak arm in the west. 

As for giving germans 1 a half year protection from bombers, I find that questionable. According to their own research in 1941 (Butt Report - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia), RAF night bombing campaign was a failure for not being able to hit a white elephant (no offense). So Bomber command went for two solutions: "dehousing" of German citizens, and developing navigational targeting aids.
And it was fighter arm of Luftwaffe that stopped RAF bombers doing daylight attacks.

Hi Amsel,


> The German flak was and may still be the most effective in history.


Any comparative numbers?


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## MacArther (Feb 6, 2009)

I can't recall the name of the article, but it was something of a compairison of effectiveness of flack from WW2 versus the Vietnam War. Sounds kind of one sided, but for the weirdness of the compairison, supposedly if the Germans had focused more of their 88mm's in the anti-tank role then Germany might have lasted longer, because bombs are great, but you still need troops/tanks to move in to occupy the country. On a somewhat related note, the former leader of Vietnam said something to the effect of "...If Rolling Thunder [(II?)] had continued for even 2 more months then we would have been forced to seek diplomatic meetings with the United States."


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## sturmer (Feb 7, 2009)

in my opinion, the AA was more then worth it. just based on the psychological impact those things had towards the bomberpilots and their crews. i would rather be firing the AA then waiting upthere till the shells explode.


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## Valo300 (Feb 10, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> After some reding that suggests that it was required to fire thousands of shells to destroy aircraft, one may conclude that it was a vain effort to have the air defence that way.


As opposed to not even attempting to defend at all? In WWII it was heavy AAA or nothing if you wanted to shoot down high flying bombers. So it's not like there were any other options...


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## tomo pauk (Feb 10, 2009)

Valo300 said:


> As opposed to not even attempting to defend at all? In WWII it was heavy AAA or nothing if you wanted to shoot down high flying bombers. So it's not like there were any other options...



Some countries did have fighters to shoot bombers...


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## parsifal (Feb 10, 2009)

as has been repeatedly said in this thread, fighters could not replace AA in all situations. It could not disrupt bombing runs, damage aircraft, force quite so many aborts. in the case of nightfighting, it was indispensable, because without the protection of the flak, the searchlights could not operate , and without the searchlights, the fighters would have been about 50-70% less effective than they were.

You should not cherry pick the answers given in the way that you do, it draws you to incorrect and dangerous conclusions on a more or less continous basis


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## Valo300 (Feb 10, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> Some countries did have fighters to shoot bombers...


Fighters cost way more money to build and maintain than AAA guns too.(though personally i would prefer the more fighters approach myself, it does have it's own set of problems).


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## Clay_Allison (Feb 11, 2009)

AAA and fighters complimented each other. Huge, tight formations were best for fending off fighters with mutual defense, but it made them more vulnerable to AAA. Forcing the 8th to balance those needs was worth all the spent gunpowder and steel.


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## JoeB (Feb 11, 2009)

For the Westermann 1941 numbers, from pg 133 of the book, I don't know if it's been mentioned the Germans estimated these as 2.5-4% of British night sorties, fairly heavy losses on that basis (2 a/c a night can't be evaluated unless you know what %). However by 1943 the German's own estimation of British losses to AA per night sortie had dropped to around 0.6%, as quoted for first and fourth quarters on pg. 229.

Question of heavy AA seems to me to differ substantially between night and daylight bombing in WWII, especially night area bombing. I think it's been pointed out that depending on the bombing/navigation technology a night bomber at 12k ft wasn't necessarily more accurate than one at 24k ft. That was surely true of ca. 1941 night bombing. Heavy AA accomplished relatively little just by forcing night area bombers to fly higher, if it even could. 

That was pretty different with day bombing. Many examples showed that reasonably well trained bombers crews could make quick work of fairly small targets from 10 or 12 k (more or less edge of light AA effectiveness) that they struggled over many missions to hit from mid 20's k ft. But good heavy flak could inflict unacceptable losses at the lower altitudes.

To not focus in just on the RAF or ETO or Westermann, another example would be US AA defence of Corregidor. Their 3" AA generally forced Japanese twin engine bombers to fly at or near its effective ceiling, sometimes beyond the ceiling of older powder train time fuze 3" ammo on hand (why new mechanical time fuze ammo was transported there by sub after Corregidor was otherwise cut off). The Corregidor AA batteries claimed many Japanese bombers, though the Japanese accounts don't support that. In fact they didn't lose many outright, though many were damaged by fragments, reducing the number operational. But also they were forced to fly high, and the bombers, after having destroyed above ground buildings, didn't accomplish much in destroying either the coast defense or AA emplacements of the fortress. Japanese heavy artillery did almost all the serious damage against those small hard targets. The two types of AA weapons were .50 mg's and 3" guns, there was no effective US fighter force by the time the bombing started seriously. With just the AA mg's the bombers would probably have been much more effective.

Similarly at Guadalcanal Marine 90mm batteries downed relatively few Japanese bombers. But not all bombing raids were effectively intercepted by fighters, sometimes Japanese escorts held them off effectively. The 90's were a key back up. The fighters did most the attrition of bombers, but the AA preventing cheap easy devastatingly accurate strikes that would have knocked out the airfield in one or a few swipes. The bombers were forced to keep coming back continuously and eventually suffer crippling attrition to the fighters over the whole campaign.

Joe


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## Negative Creep (Feb 16, 2009)

I do remember reading (I think it was in _The Most Dangerous Enemy_) that British AA crews basically fired blindly into the sky. It did boost the civilian morale though; if you were cowering in a shelter the sound of your own guns would at least make it seem as if you were 'giving some back'


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## BombTaxi (Feb 17, 2009)

British batteries could have done little else with the fire control equipment available at the beginning of WW2  

It is true though, civilian morale can be improved by providing air defence, even if it is totally ineffective. The fighter patrols mounted against the Zeppelins in WWI, and the provision of early AAA defences around London are cases in point.


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## parsifal (Feb 17, 2009)

British accuracy improved dramatically during the war. Under the inspired leadership of General Pile, the average ammunition expenditure per shoot down was under 3000 rounds per kill by wars endOnly the USN against the Kamikazes exceeeded this, at around 1500 rounds per kill, with some sources claiming as few as 500 rounds per kill


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## Colin1 (Feb 17, 2009)

parsifal said:


> ...Only the USN against the Kamikazes exceeded this, at around 1500 rounds per kill, with some sources claiming as few as 500rounds per kill


Could it be argued
that the USN's lower rounds per kill ratio was facilitated by the fact that their artillery was configured and concentrated for point defence ie a ship? My point is that enemy planes can fly around your ship(s) all day but sooner or later, if they want to strike you, they've got to fly down the throat of your flak batteries.
I'm not suggesting that planes overflying land-based targets had it easy but they had to sweep across the target in much greater numbers (enhancing their statistical chances of survivial) and usually at a greater altitude to lay a carpet down rather than fly down a cone to near-point blank range of the defensive flak.


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## BombTaxi (Feb 17, 2009)

parsifal said:


> British accuracy improved dramatically during the war. Under the inspired leadership of General Pile, the average ammunition expenditure per shoot down was under 3000 rounds per kill by wars endOnly the USN against the Kamikazes exceeeded this, at around 1500 rounds per kill, with some sources claiming as few as 500 rounds per kill




It certainly did, I was thinking more about the equipment in use in the first few years of the war, which on land was little advanced from the 1917 bombing raids on London. The Royal Navy also laboured under the handicap of the truly poor HACS system for a large part of the war, which did little to enhance the odds of RN vessels surviving air attack.


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## Amsel (Feb 17, 2009)

The flak from the thousands of guns surrounding the synthetic oil plants and storages in Germany in 1945 was so heavy it would literally block out the sun.


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## parsifal (Feb 17, 2009)

Colin1 said:


> Could it be argued
> that the USN's lower rounds per kill ratio was facilitated by the fact that their artillery was configured and concentrated for point defence ie a ship? My point is that enemy planes can fly around your ship(s) all day but sooner or later, if they want to strike you, they've got to fly down the throat of your flak batteries.
> I'm not suggesting that planes overflying land-based targets had it easy but they had to sweep across the target in much greater numbers (enhancing their statistical chances of survivial) and usually at a greater altitude to lay a carpet down rather than fly down a cone to near-point blank range of the defensive flak.




short answer is yes, also the generally low level attack enabled Light flak to take effect, which at close range was quite effective (esp the 40mm batteries)


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## Clay_Allison (Feb 17, 2009)

parsifal said:


> British accuracy improved dramatically during the war. Under the inspired leadership of General Pile, the average ammunition expenditure per shoot down was under 3000 rounds per kill by wars endOnly the USN against the Kamikazes exceeeded this, at around 1500 rounds per kill, with some sources claiming as few as 500 rounds per kill


You know, it's a shame they didn't dust off the Gatling Gun + external power until vietnam. The technology was old enough, it was never a new idea



Wikipedia said:


> The ancestor to the modern minigun was made in the 1860s. Richard J. Gatling replaced the hand cranked mechanism of a rifle-caliber Gatling gun with an electric motor, a relatively new invention at the time. Even after Gatling slowed down the mechanism, the new electric-powered Gatling gun had a theoretical rate of fire of 3,000 rounds per minute, roughly three times the rate of a typical modern, single-barreled machine gun. Gatling's electric-powered design received US Patent #502,185 on July 25, 1893.



With (possibly twin) .50 BMG miniguns developing 3000 shots per minute each (and overheating less than a macine gun) wouldn't Kamikaze attacks be nearly impossible?


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## parsifal (Feb 17, 2009)

I think so. Modern equivalents of gatling guns are the "Vulcan Gun" CIW which are intended to defeat the cruise missile, essentially the pilotless successor to the Kamikaze.

I forget the accuracy stats of these babies, but they are pretty good.

From memory the Brits use a missile for the same purpose....IIRC its Seawolf???


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## Glider (Feb 18, 2009)

The RN use Seawolf as well as various Gun Systems as the Vulcan system


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## BombTaxi (Feb 18, 2009)

The British CIWS of choice is the 30mm 'Goalkeeper' system, Dutch designed IIRC. Sea Wolf and Sea Dart both offer anti-missile capability, and in theory Sea Wolf can engage six targets simultaneously from a single six-box launcher, although the only time it was called upon to do this in combat (during the Falklands), it failed. I am surprised that the Navy hasn't tried to adopt the Rapier missile system used by the Army, it was one of the most deadly short-rage SAMs in existence I believe.


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## tomo pauk (Feb 18, 2009)

IIRC the Broadswords mount(ed) 2 radars derived from ground Blindfire radars that were used to guide Rapier missiles. So, it's unlikely that 6 targets could be engaged in he same time.
As for Rapier used for anti-missile job, it would've been a more cost-effective tool (being COTS), yet the warhead lacks proximity fuse to be really effective against small targets.
However, I doubt that Rapier was that deadly (5 destroyed Argentinian planes according to Wiki), while one frigate managed to bring down 2 Skyhawks during an attack with Sea Wolf (same source).


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## Colin1 (Feb 18, 2009)

parsifal said:


> ...the cruise missile, essentially the pilotless successor to the Kamikaze...


And here's the piloted version, a V1 with a view...


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## Glider (Feb 18, 2009)

The Seawolf has been since the late 70's the most accurate Anti aircraft missile (and still may be). A number of times it has proven this by shooting down a cannon shelll in mid flight.


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## BombTaxi (Feb 18, 2009)

No doubt about it's accuracy mate, I think the flaw in the system is in it's engagement of multiple targets... or inability to do so.

Tomo, I'm 99.99% positive Sea Wolf can engage more than two targets at a time, I will try to get a ref for you.


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Feb 18, 2009)

Colin, is that the Oaka?


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## parsifal (Feb 18, 2009)

Glider said:


> The Seawolf has been since the late 70's the most accurate Anti aircraft missile (and still may be). A number of times it has proven this by shooting down a cannon shelll in mid flight.



It got bad press during the Falklands war, as I recall. No doubt this bad press was not justified.....


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## BombTaxi (Feb 19, 2009)

That bad press was due to the loss of HMS Coventry and severe damage to HMS Glasgow while operating with HMS Broadsword on air defence duties. HMS Coventry was partly to blame in her case, as she fouled Broadsword's range and broke her missile lock, but the Sea Wolf system did not perform as expected, losing very low flying targets against sea clutter and struggling with engagement of multiple and crossing targets. There were also system failures, one of which allowed a flight of Argentine aircraft to attack and cripple HMS Glasgow. All in all, the system was not an unqualified success during the Falklands conflict.


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## Glider (Feb 19, 2009)

BombTaxi said:


> That bad press was due to the loss of HMS Coventry and severe damage to HMS Glasgow while operating with HMS Broadsword on air defence duties. HMS Coventry was partly to blame in her case, as she fouled Broadsword's range and broke her missile lock, but the Sea Wolf system did not perform as expected, losing very low flying targets against sea clutter and struggling with engagement of multiple and crossing targets. There were also system failures, one of which allowed a flight of Argentine aircraft to attack and cripple HMS Glasgow. All in all, the system was not an unqualified success during the Falklands conflict.



I have to admit that my understanding is a little different. There was a problem when the two A4's crossed whilst trying to avoid the inevitable missiles. For some reason this hadn't been tested and the system shut down. Years later I worked with the system engineer on board who described it as the lonliest seconds of his life as he tried to get it back up. He could feel everyone looking at him and all he could hear was the plotter saying seven miles and closing, five miles and closing, three miles and closing while he hit the keys to get it started. 

The Coventry also did cross the missile shot as she tried to avoid the incoming Argentine aircraft but I am not aware of any problems with losing the target plots due to sea clutter. The main reason for developing the Seawolf was to defend against sea skimming missiles and that problem had I thought been cracked.


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## BombTaxi (Feb 19, 2009)

I believe it was cracked by the substitution of Type 911 tracker for the Type 910, which had lost targets in sea clutter during the Falklands. I do not wish to do Sea Wolf down completely - it was a damn sight better than Sea Cat and much more consistent than Sea Dart, but it also had it's problems and it seems that there were times when all the Task Force had for point defence was 30mm cannon and Mk1 eyeballs...


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## Clay_Allison (Feb 21, 2009)

Colin1 said:


> And here's the piloted version, a V1 with a view...


I always thought an Ohka would be a terrifying weapon against strategic bombers. I'd have put in an ejector seat though and give the pilot a chance to punch out at the last minute.


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## GrauGeist (Feb 22, 2009)

Colin1 said:


> And here's the piloted version, a V1 with a view...



lol Colin...

I have to admit, the Japanese version was better looking than the German's piloted V1 (Fi103R)!


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## CharlesBronson (Feb 25, 2009)

Some clips of the fabrication Flak 105 mm, rarely deployed outside Germany.


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PBxOVd1wFFs_


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## JoeB (Mar 2, 2009)

Colin1 said:


> Could it be argued
> that the USN's lower rounds per kill ratio was facilitated by the fact that their artillery was configured and concentrated for point defence ie a ship? .


USN claimed rounds per kill for heavy flak late in the war were more like 60-240, (daylight short range-night long range) not 500 or 1500, and the number one reason was widespread use of proximity fuzes from early 1943, those low late war numbers assumed proximity fuzes. The tactical situation of shipboard AA was more favorable in that the plane had to come to the gun, but OTOH those late war targets were typically relatively small and fast a/c moving in three dimensions, not large bombers flying at constant altitude.

In 1944 British 3.7" and US Army 90mm batteries in the UK also achieved impressive rounds per kill ratio v V1's when they used proximity fuzes, also in defense of Antwerp from V1's, albeit the V-1 also flew a relatively predictable path.

However, another major element of noise in rounds per kill numbers for AA batteries is the accuracy of the claims of a/c shot down, just like air-air stats. The degree of variance between claims and reality was itself highly variable. 

For example I mentioned before the value of 3" AA in defending Corregidor in early 1942, forcing the Japanese bombers to fly high, and holing them frequently per Japanese accounts. But the rounds per kill claim in that case, 500, is based on claimed downing of 50+ Japanese bombers over the campaign, and the actual Japanese losses were far fewer than that.

Joe


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## tomo pauk (Mar 4, 2009)

Joe, what was the real expenditure per kill in Philliphines? What was the target composition (twins, single engine, hidro...)?


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## JoeB (Mar 4, 2009)

tomo pauk said:


> Joe, what was the real expenditure per kill in Philliphines? What was the target composition (twins, single engine, hidro...)?


Almost all the claims by the 3" batteries on Corregidor and the other 'fortified islands' in Manila Bay were against high flying twin engine bombers, mainly Navy Type 96 ('Nell') and Type 1 (Betty), Army Type 97's (Sally) with a few missions by Type 99 Twin Engine Light Bombers (Lily). Machine guns claimed some Army Type 97 Light Bombers (Ann). In fact the larger twins often flew so high that the older powder train fuzed 3" ammo couldn't reach (27k ft max), so newer mechanical fuze ammo was sent in by submarine; this is somewhat at odds with the estimate of very low rounds per kill.

The actual losses can't be nailed precisely because mission by mission Army losses aren't known, just the totals to all causes. OTOH JNAF mission reports for those units survived so you can see the loss and damage plane by plane, and what's immediately apparent is how many a/c were hit for every one actually lost; and the Japanese official history volume for the Army's air operations in the Philippines makes the same comment, lots of planes holed for every one actually lost. I'd estimate the total outright losses to AA over those islands as perhaps <10, surely not a lot more. So the rounds per kill was at least several times what's quoted, though if 500*5=2500 that's still relatively low.

Joe


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