# Operation Dragoon - major error?



## rogthedodge (May 15, 2007)

The August '44 landings in Southern France achieved very little and certainly limited the Normandy landings' chances of success (ie 5 landings not 6 - meaning the vital stop line of the Orne River was held by only airborne forces, rather than armoured forces which would have landed in the 6th {most easterly} area and been astride the Orne and the Dives). 

German reinforcements would have been delayed / stopped, Caen and the airfields secured much earlier etc etc - at least accord ing to the original plan! Plus the Ouisterham port would have been secured on D+1 / soon afterwards

The main impact on Overlord was on reduced availability of landing craft and the forces diverted

The forces that actually opposed the Dragoon landings were poor / easily overcome 

The idea that German forces heading North would about turn to meeet the threat was frankly ludicrous! 

It was a major source of disagreement amongst the UK US allies.

My question - was it a stategic error? An exercise in Realpolitik , involve the French (notably exluded from Overlord) to ensure that post-war Europe conatined another European dissenting voice (ie limit UK influence)? or a correct, bold move that ultimately wasted reources as the enemy had unexpectedly scarpered / were poor quality. 

Operation Dragoon - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (accepting the limitations of Wiki) - gives a basic background

Your views?


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## Njaco (May 15, 2007)

I didn't know we had won the war at that time and were fighting for political gains.


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## amrit (May 16, 2007)

One of the main reasons for Dragoon (apart from the political) was the need for ports. The Allied Command was fully aware that there was going to be major problems gaining control of the ports in northern France, and needed a contingency plan.

However, the above interpretation makes two mistakes:

1) the diversion of resources. The reason that Dragoon was delayed until August (as opposed to the original plan that it should occur simultanously with DDay) was because major resources (troops, landing craft, aircraft and tanks) were all diverted to the northern landings, and NOT the other way around.

2) Even though the initial landings were relatively easy, the fighting became more intensive as the troops moved in. So, it did have an effect on the way that the Germans reacted because they were then placed in the position of having two fronts in France, and by ignoring the southern route, they may have opened up easier route for the Allies to move up to the German border. 

There was also the fear that the Allies may be able to swing around and endanger Northern Italy, bypassing the defence lines in Italy that continued to cause such a problem, right through 1945.


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## Soundbreaker Welch? (May 16, 2007)

My thought: It's too bad nobody remembers the soldiers that landed at Dragoon. The whole landing is forgotten.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (May 16, 2007)

Njaco said:


> I didn't know we had won the war at that time and were fighting for political gains.



The war was not decided by Aug 1944.


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## timshatz (May 16, 2007)

Yeah, agree with Adler and Njaco on this one. It wasn't an error. Was not a major part of the war in Europe but it gave the Germans one more headache to worry about. They had less than the Allies did. The Allies were taking advantage of their mobility and equipment advantages. 

In this situation, it's kind of like an investment. If it doesn't lose you money, then it is worth it. Might not make you a mint, but you make a few bucks and that is it. The big money was in Northern France. That was the big battle that had to be won. 

Smaller invasion, important but not earth shattering if it was lost. But it was won. And a win is a win.


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## Njaco (May 16, 2007)

I was being sarcastic. 

a good site about Dragoon is this:

Home Page


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## Joe2 (May 16, 2007)

So if you count this landing the Germans where fighting on 4 fronts-and Hitler hated the idiea of having more than one. If you can support multiple fronts and your enemy can't, then that is a really good thing, in my humble opinion.


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## timshatz (May 16, 2007)

Joe2 said:


> So if you count this landing the Germans where fighting on 4 fronts-and Hitler hated the idiea of having more than one. If you can support multiple fronts and your enemy can't, then that is a really good thing, in my humble opinion.



Yeah, that's pretty much it.


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## rogthedodge (May 16, 2007)

amrit said:


> One of the main reasons for Dragoon (apart from the political) was the need for ports. The Allied Command was fully aware that there was going to be major problems gaining control of the ports in northern France, and needed a contingency plan.
> 
> However, the above interpretation makes two mistakes:
> 
> ...



Not so on the landing craft I'm afraid - the COSSAC plan initially was for a 6 beach landing but cut back to 5 as the landing craft were diverted for Dragoon. Naval assets (ships) were moved down but the landing craft couldn't be moved in time so were allocated to Dragoon at the expense of Overlord. This is an undisputed fact and was the source of major differences between the allied commanders.

Ports - initially cross-channel ports were the priority - after that atlantic ports were needed ie Brest which offered the shortest route from the US. 

If you were looking for a major landing port for logistic support you'd hardly select an option that involved getting into the med and then having supplies at the wrong end of France


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## rogthedodge (May 16, 2007)

Njaco said:


> I didn't know we had won the war at that time and were fighting for political gains.



I never said 'the war was won' at that time - just questioning the effort the US went to fund and equip an French force and land it on French soil - it seems (to me) a mainly political move with an eye on the post-war situation. 

Seems an extraordinary effort to support a nation who actively collaborated and fought with and for the Nazis.


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## Njaco (May 16, 2007)

as Joe2 said;


> If you can support multiple fronts and your enemy can't, then that is a really good thing, in my humble opinion.



nuff said.


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## amrit (May 16, 2007)

rogthedodge said:


> Not so on the landing craft I'm afraid - the COSSAC plan initially was for a 6 beach landing but cut back to 5 as the landing craft were diverted for Dragoon. Naval assets (ships) were moved down but the landing craft couldn't be moved in time so were allocated to Dragoon at the expense of Overlord. This is an undisputed fact and was the source of major differences between the allied commanders.
> 
> Ports - initially cross-channel ports were the priority - after that atlantic ports were needed ie Brest which offered the shortest route from the US.
> 
> If you were looking for a major landing port for logistic support you'd hardly select an option that involved getting into the med and then having supplies at the wrong end of France



Not true. Operation Anvil, as it was originally called was buried as an idea as early as March 1944, and finally in April (TWO months before DDay). See: http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/dl/DDay/006Dec_1943_April_1944OverlordAnvilPapersNo2.pdf

So the idea that resources were diverted is not true.

At the time of DDay, there were no plans to resurrect Anvil/Dragoon, and the idea was only brought up again AFTER Rome had been liberated, freeing up US troops and shipping in the Med AND whilst the Allies were bogged down in Normandy.

Thus, planning for started again on *24th June*, and final approval did not occur until four days before the invasion itself! 

See:
http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/brochures/sfrance/sfrance.htm

And from:
Operation Anvil/Dragoon



> At Hitler's personal order, vital coastal enclaves were to be defended to the last man. However, at that critical juncture in the Southern France Campaign (Anvil), the German High Command began to reevaluate its entire position in the west. By August 16, with many of their divisions in danger of annihilation, the German leaders elected to order a general withdrawal from France. Blaskowitz was to leave strong garrisons at Toulon, Marseille, and several key Atlantic ports.
> 
> Stretching their supply lines thin, all Anvil commanders nevertheless agreed that keeping the initiative was paramount. Allied forces struggled northward on the heels of the retreating Germans to meet Eisenhower’s forces — the hammer striking the anvil — to finally drive the Germans out of France.


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## Joe2 (May 18, 2007)

the whole point of that landing was to tie down German troops, which could of attacked the Normandy landings.
that is the reason


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## 102first_hussars (May 18, 2007)

Joe2 said:


> the whole point of that landing was to tie down German troops, which could of attacked the Normandy landings.
> that is the reason



Or maybe protect Norway from russia


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## Joe2 (May 19, 2007)

What do you mean by that?


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