# Merlin powered carrier fighter other than Seafire



## Piper106 (Dec 25, 2013)

Looking fo suggestions on another Merlin (or Allison) powered single seat carrier fighter with performance comparable to land based fighters. 

Rules for this discussion. 
H*ll has frozen over and the American Navy is willing to consider a liquid cooled engine on a carrier, so do not limit to British designs. 
We need not limit ourselves to designs that can operate from short slow escort carriers. Assume fleet carriers with decent wind over a long deck. 
I DON'T WANT THIS TO BE A THREAD DISCUSSING THE SEAFIRE I am looking for a liquid cooled carrier fighter that is not a Seafire. 

Should we navalize the P-40?? A single seat Defiant with fixed wing guns and without the turret?? Is there a 'easy' fix that would make the Mustang suitable for carrier use by average avaitors?? Was there a 'paper airplane' on the drawing board??? 

I will start. The American Navy tested a P-51D Mustang with an arrestor hook. They found that reasonable landing speed for that version was too close the limits on wartime arresting gear. It would have been too much of a handful for average pilots. My suggestion would have been to navalize the Allison powered Mustang I / P-51A. These early Mustangs were over a thousand pounds lighter than the Merlin Mustangs and therefore having a slower stall and landing speed than the Merlin Mustangs. Wide track landing gear, and oh... up to an altitude of 20000 feet faster than that Merlin engined carrier fighter that we will not talk about.

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## Kryten (Dec 25, 2013)

That will be the Sea Hurricane then!

How about a Merlin engine P39, tricycle landing gear must be an advantage on a carrier?


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## tomo pauk (Dec 25, 2013)

Several aircraft:
-P-40; the P-40F might be the best
-P-39 (not the lousy Airabonita) - the smallish fuel tankage willt hamper the combat radius endurance; issues with CoG once front guns have used up the ammo
-P-51 (with somewhat bigger wing, so wing loading is lower; maybe add the slats)
-single seat Defiant - put the fuel in fuselge, so guns can be installed in wings


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## RCAFson (Dec 25, 2013)

The USN actually called for Merlin engined fighters for both shore and carrier operations:



> ...Another aspect of
> the attack that proved inadequate was fighter escort. To Fletcher the folding wing F4F-4s
> represented no improvement over the fixed-wing F4F-3s, except more F4F-4s could be
> carried. He echoed the call of Halsey and others of the urgent necessity'' for detachable fuel
> ...



I suspect that the USN might have welcomed the Sea Hurricane in 1942.


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## Piper106 (Dec 25, 2013)

Sea Hurricane. 
On the plus side, light wing load and good deck handling. Eight .303 machine guns would likely shred Japanese aircraft as well four or six .50 caliber guns. If there are Fw200 Condors and the like about, we can go for the 20mm cannon armed versions of the Hurricane. Negatives... slower than a P-40, slightly less fuel capacity / no advantage in range compared to P-40. The biggest black mark is that by early 1942 performance is falling behind that enemy land based fighters. 

P-39
I have frequently been in favor of the P-39 / P-63. In previous discussions on this board, I have advocated limiting the P-39 to just the nose armament, which frees up space in the former wing gun bays for additional internal fuel. But would the US Navy be ready for a liquid cooled engine AND tricycle landing gear?? I admit that the starting premise was the US Navy would look at a liquid cooled engine but even with h*ll frozen over this might be too much to bite off in one sitting. 

Navalized P-40
Maybe tthe easiest sell.

P-51. 
Even the Allison engine versions had far better performance than the P-40 in both speed and range. Could the landing characteristics be made satisfactory for carrier operations by average pilots?? Would leading edge slats as suggested by Tomo Pauk make a significant difference in low speed handling??? Could changes in the flaps help low speed lift?? How much might extension of the wing span help, and at how much loss in performance???


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## Shortround6 (Dec 25, 2013)

Sea Hurricane?

Needs a wing fold for the US. Needs more fuel. 

P-39 needs?

A new Airplane? The Airabonita used tail dragger gear _and_ a bigger wing _and_ light armament (cowl guns were .30 cal) which in fact was never installed and still failed carrier qualification at 6742lbs gross and 5352lbs empty. Service P-39s went around 6200-6300lbs Basic (empty equipped= guns,armor, radios, etc but NO fuel,oil,ammo) figure 7300-7400lbs for clean without wing guns (?). And that is with 120 gals fuel. 

P-40? 

see Zeno's or Flight manuals. P-40E needed 1050ft of runway at 7500lbs 0 wind. The Army fighters need a more runway than the navy fighters. In some cases a _LOT_ more. The fact that Army fighters were flown off carrier decks in ferry operations (with less than full fuel tanks and little or no ammo, in fact in some cases with some guns removed) does NOT mean they are suitable for day in/day out carrier operations with just a few minor "tweaks". For Navy use they NEED full guns and ammo, full tanks if not drop tanks.

AN F6F can take-off in less distance carrying a drop tank and a 1000lb bomb than a P-39 can clean. 

Allison(or Merlin single stage Mustang)? 

When does it show up and what gets delayed because you are basically sticking a new wing on it? leading edge slats, new flaps, extended wing tips (which still have to meet the "G" load requirement). And according to one chart ( and it could be in error?) an Allison powered P-51A (clean) needs around 340 feet more runway than a P-40E (Clean). P-51Ds needed less runway even when heavier because they had more power. 

Admiral Fletcher could request or suggest anything he wanted. He was not an aviator and may not have had a good understanding of what made good carrier planes, He knew what he had wasn't working (lacking performance) and was _looking_ for a quick solution. There wasn't one.


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## nuuumannn (Dec 25, 2013)

In 1938 the British Air Staff released N.5/38 and N.6/38, which called for a carrier based two-seat fighter and a turret fighter respectively. These were updated to N.8/39 and N.9/39. The preferred aircraft to N.8/39 was the Supermarine 333, which was based loosely on the Spitfire, but stretched as a two-seater; one was powered by a Merlin, the other by a Griffon, but aircraft to these two specs were not built. The Type 333 had a cranked wing that abandoned the elliptical form and was tapered on both leading and trailing edges. Armed with four 20 mm cannon in the wings, the Merlin engined version was to be able to reach 34,700 ft with a sea level rate of climb of 2,650 ft/min. Top speed stipulated in the requirement was to be over 275 kts at 15,000 ft.

A single-seat Defiant was investigated by BP - the P.94, which was intended as a stop-gap in case Spitfire or Hurricane production failed to meet expectations during the Battle of Britain. The prototype K8310 had its turret removed for aerodynamics trials. The Defiant was certainly hardy enough and its undercarriage, once the issues were sorted out was strong enough for carrier operations and indeed BP entered a design to the afforementioned N.9/39. On paper the P.94's performance would have been better than the Hurricane's, so it's likely to assume it might have been the same in a naval variant. The issue with the Defiant however was its speed; it was very slow, but I suspect that much to the local strengthening around the centre fuselage to incorporate the turret would not have been present in a single seater, thus saving structural weight. A carrier variant would certainly be feasible in the early years of the war.

By the time the war broke out however the Royal Navy was already investigating a Griffon engined two-seater - the Firefly and further single-seat fighter projects launched were to have more powerful engines than the Merlin, nominally the Griffon, Sabre or Centaurus. Further naval fighters such as the Firebrand and indeed Boulton Paul's own naval fighter designs were powered by these engines.


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## Piper106 (Dec 25, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> P-40E needed 1050ft of runway at 7500lbs 0 wind. The Army fighters need a more runway than the navy fighters. In some cases a _LOT_ more.



Hum... and the 0 wind take-off distance applies... how?? A carrier by its own motion makes 25 mph wind over the deck when the air is still. And if there is any wind, the intent (admittedly not always possible) is the steam into the wind, so on an average day there would be... what... 35 mph wind over the deck??? What does that do to the takeoff distance??? 

Oh by the way... A F6F @ 12600 pounds has a higher wing load (lbs per square foot) than a P-40 at 7500 pounds weight. I don't recall the F6F having any super duper high lift devices to make up for the higher wing load.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 25, 2013)

Take-off distance matters because the Navy planes under the _SAME_ conditions have take-off distances of 620ft (F2A-3) to 950ft (F6F-3 at 12213lbs) with the F4Fs (various) and F4Us (various) F6F-5 falling in between. It is not a question of getting them off the deck at all, it is a question of launching from a deck park that takes up 1/3 to 1/2 the flight deck. 







Granted they are dive bombers but......

Adding 25-35 kts of headwind will shorten up the distance for ALL planes but _it will not_ reverse the ranking position in a list of aircraft from shortest to longest take off runs. 

And "Oh by the way" the F6F has a slightly better power to weight ratio for better acceleration to flying speed and not all airfoils generate the exact same amount of lift per sq ft.

If you don't like those reasons take it up with people that wrote the manuals. 

See: http://zenoswarbirdvideos.com/Images/P-40/P-40TOCLC.pdf

And please note that this chart is for 0 degrees centigrade, warmer air will increase take-off distance. 

Chart for F6F temp not given: http://zenoswarbirdvideos.com/Images/F6F/F6FTODIS.pdf


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## Piper106 (Dec 25, 2013)

Sorry about that Shortround6. Didn't mean to be snotty, but I now see that that I added a big scoop of snotty to my earlier reply. Again, sorry.

Yep, the charts don't lie, The P-40E is about the the best Army fighter in terms of shortest take-off distance, and slowest landing speed, and even then it is not in the same league as the Navy airplanes in either regard. On the other hand, based on what I have read recently, the split flaps used by the Army P-40s would be mainly just more drag for landing. Does not seem like split flaps are the best choice for improving lift at low speed for either take-off or landing. 

The P-39 is a real dog with quite a long take-off run, but (in hindsight) not surprising considering the small wing area.


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## stona (Dec 26, 2013)

And no one is considering the inherent design problems of landing these aircraft, designed for airfield operation on a carrier. They are not easy things to overcome without major alterations, if at all.

Most land based aircraft of the period were designed to land with a maximum rate of descent between 6 and 8 feet per second. US carrier based aircraft were designed to land with a rate of descent of 12 feet per second without breaking. This was a big problem for converted aircraft like the Seafire (7 fps maximum).

What about landing speeds? To land on a carrier the Seafire had to make a final approach at only 1.05 Vse, the Sea Hurricane only slightly better. US carrier aircraft were designed to approach at 1.2 Vse giving a much better margin above the stall.

Many other aerodynamic factors need to be considered. For example good acceleration and poor decceleration (slipperiness if you like) are desirable attributes for a fighter aircraft, but don't make it easy to catch wires on an aircraft carrier.

P-40s were flown off carriers (just like Spitfires and Hurricanes) but they couldn't land back on.

Converting aircraft originally designed for operation from airfields to operate from carriers is never an easy thing to do. The best carrier aircraft were designed as such.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shortround6 (Dec 26, 2013)

Piper106 said:


> Sorry about that Shortround6. Didn't mean to be snotty, but I now see that that I added a big scoop of snotty to my earlier reply. Again, sorry.



Apology accepted. 

Some diagrams of flaps and high lift devices can be found here: http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/av...rier-based-aircraft-worth-effort-39409-4.html

Post #50.

Please note however that the improvement in lift given is _IF_ the entire wing has the specified flap or slot/slat. Partial span flaps/sots/slats only improve the area of the wing they cover. Also please note the the 3rd chart uses a sort of standardized flap deflection to make comparison easier. I don't know what the P-40 used for Flap deflection but the Spitfire was around 80 degrees, not 45. Early flaps _were_ pretty much speed brakes or drag producing elements to shorten glide slopes for landing. Land Spitfires ferried to Malta used wooden wedges to hold the flaps at about 20 degrees for take-off. 
And also please note that the maximum lift is achieved at an angle of attack ranging from 12 to 28 degrees depending on device/s used which are pretty useless most of the time for take-off, At lower angles of attack _some_ of these devices do offer some improvement, some do not (slats/slots do almost nothing for lift until 12-14 degrees). 

And something I just learned is that the Hellcat used Fowler flaps. It's flaps extend as they lower increasing the wing area. They are narrower in cord and do not extend like a P-38s flaps do but they are technically Fowler flaps. WHich points to another problem with armchair (or computer chair) modifications. Not all aircraft used the same basic device/s in the same way. Different percentage of span, different cords (distance front to back), different deflection angles all hung off of different airfoils. 
I am no expert, I do NOT know how much these differences affect things, I only know the differences exist.


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## fastmongrel (Dec 26, 2013)

How about a quick conversion of an advanced trainer much like Miles did to produce the M20. Or (its giving me the dry heaves thinking about it) a liquid cooled F4.


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## Piper106 (Dec 26, 2013)

Shortround6 Thanks for the charts on flaps. Never realized the significate differences between flap types. 

Looks like one of the differences between the navy and the Army fighters is the type of flaps used. As you stated the F6F used Fowler flaps. 

The P-40 and the Spitfire/Merlin Seafires used split flaps. The P-51 used camber changing or 'conventional flaps'. The P-47 appears to have been the only single engine US Army fighter to use 'high performance' flaps. Whether they were slotted flaps or whether they meet the definition of Fowler flaps seems to be an issue of disagreement on some RC model boards. (For completeness, the P-38 used Fowler flaps).


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## Shortround6 (Dec 26, 2013)

The M 20 was not a conversion, it was a new aircraft and there was a naval version or at least a conversion of one of the prototypes for naval trials. While it gets you a naval aircraft (if it worked) with a Merlin engine actual performance wasn't that different than Wildcat. 

If the original intent is to have a Merlin (or Allison) powered fighter for carrier use _before_ the P-51B-D then you are using single stage engines or even single speed engines. Depending on year you have around 1100-1325hp for take-off. 

The Liquid cooled plane will be heavier, but it will be faster (less drag). It will have a slightly higher take-off and landing speed due the weight and it may or may not have a poorer climb ( will lower drag leave enough extra power to overcome extra weight in the climb?). Wildcat has height advantage due to two stage supercharger. 

Also please note the US Navy may require more fuel on board than the aircraft you don't wish to talk about ( or the Sea Hurricane) and/or the ability to get into the air with at least small drop tanks (50-60 gal) in order to escort the strike aircraft. 

A bit like the British the Americans _cannot_ afford specialized aircraft on carriers, they already have 3 types, splitting the fighter group into two different types _per carrier_ was not going to happen and in the early part of the war having different carriers with different aircraft was more by accident than by design. Say the carrier with the liquid cooled superfighter is hit by a submarine torpedo (or just suffers a engine room breakdown) where does that leave the other carrier/s in the task force with their "older" fighters? Granted there was usually a mix but again due to phasing in or out of certain types ) or late war there were enough carriers that task groups had built in redundancy (lots of carriers per task force not 2-4).


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## Shortround6 (Dec 26, 2013)

Piper106 said:


> Shortround6 Thanks for the charts on flaps. Never realized the significate differences between flap types........



F4F used Split flaps:






F4U used ?






And it took a few years to get the F4U rated for carrier use even though it was designed for such use by a company that had built carrier aircraft for about 15 years. 

And this may NOT be a smooth landing;






He has caught the wire but looks a little high.

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## tomo pauk (Dec 26, 2013)

Shortround6 said:


> ...
> If the original intent is to have a Merlin (or Allison) powered fighter for carrier use _before_ the P-51B-D then you are using single stage engines or even single speed engines. Depending on year you have around 1100-1325hp for take-off.
> 
> The Liquid cooled plane will be heavier, but it will be faster (less drag). It will have a slightly higher take-off and landing speed due the weight and it may or may not have a poorer climb ( will lower drag leave enough extra power to overcome extra weight in the climb?). Wildcat has height advantage due to two stage supercharger.
> ...



The weight of the two-stage R-1830 (complete power-plant) was about the same as single stage V-1710, and 200 lbs less than singer stage Merlin. The single stage V-1650 does not have any power disadvantage vs. two stage R-1830, at any altitude. It will offer 100 HP more at take off that should take care of those 200 lbs extra. It will also provide usable exhaust thrust, unlike what early- to mid-war Western radial installations were doing. Further, even the early V-12 installations were far better when it comes down to use of ram effect (unless they manage to mess it up like at P-39); more speed (lower drag + greater total thrust) will add further benefits to that.

The two stage R-1830 might be among the 1st 2-stage engine in wide use. But they were neither light, nor that powerful. They were not capable to compete with widespread V-12s when it comes down to drag (obviously), over-boosting capability (probably the victim of P&W having more pressing requirements to deal with, but it was still present there), intake ramming. Unfortunately, the F4F never received the ejector exhausts, tight cowling and fan cooling, like at this XP-42.


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## Shortround6 (Dec 26, 2013)

tomo pauk said:


> Unfortunately, the F4F never received the ejector exhausts, tight cowling and fan cooling, like at this XP-42.



And strangely enough the XP-42 ended it's days without the fan or the ejector exhaust (if it ever had ejector exhaust). It went through 12 different cowl/nose configurations at a minimum. By the time Langley got through playing with the XP-42 it was late 1942 if not later (or they were using it for other research). By the time Langley (or P&W) had figured out the low drag cowling it was much to late to make difference on a R-1830 powered airplane (factories were already tooled up and starting to produce the first R-2800 powered fighters).


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## tomo pauk (Dec 26, 2013)

Going by the link I've provided just above:


tomo pauk said:


> ... tight cowling and fan cooling, like at this XP-42.


The ejector exhausts were outfitted as early as February 1942 (easy to spot when zoomed), along with cooling fan :
http://www.wisbechaeroclub.co.uk/Scale Drawings/images/C/Curtiss XP-42/Curtiss XP-42(4).jpg
Or maybe as early as Nov 1941 (slots for the exhausts are there, but exhausts themselves cannot be spotted from this angle):
here
Indeed, in 1945, with exhaust marks visible, the XP-42 reverted to 'plain vanilla' collector exhausts:
here 

That should also nix the claim that Fw-190 was a guide for the Bearcat engine installation?


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## R Pope (Apr 4, 2014)

Converting a land based plane to carrier ops means band aid strengthening for tail hook and launch stresses, as well as folding wings. Plus as mentioned, more fuel capacity. All that weight has to have a detrimental effect on performance compared to the original land plane. Plus you end up with an older design craft than if you start with a clean sheet of paper.


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## GregP (Apr 6, 2014)

I think a P-40 with a 2-stage Merlin, slightly longer wings, and after a concerted effort to make it lighter could have been a good choice. Particularly the 2-stage Merlin idea. I also think that moving the radiators to an underwing position aka Spitifre location would have been good.

Merlins and Allison have completely different cooling requirements. The Merlin need more radiator cooling while the Allison needs less, but the Allison needs considerably more oil cooling while the Merlin needs less. The difference might have added up to a much better performing P-40. It would have been at LEAST nice to have trued out the 2-stage Merlin P-40. I do not think it was ever accomplished.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 6, 2014)

The P-40 adopted for CV duties and with a 2-stage Merlin would've been much heavier than the 'regular' P-40. On the bright side, the P-40 was renown as a sturdy bird (sturdiest of all fighters with V-12 engines?), that should come in handy for new duties. The inter-cooler radiators can go in the wing, like the coolant radiators of the XP-40Q? The wing radiators of the Spitfire were never known as well-streamlined items. The heavier 2-stage Merlin would need some equipment (radios, batteries, oxygen cylinders) to be relocated further back, in order to bring back the CoG within limits; maybe install some counterweights in the tail, too?


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## bobbysocks (Apr 6, 2014)

( yes i know this is an old thread but )but a p39? a nose gear on a carrier back then? did anyone have a tricycle gear ac landing on a carrier back then....and if so how did they arrest the landing?


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## GregP (Apr 6, 2014)

You fly it into a net. The prop twists up the net and stops the plane. Simple.

The tough part is untangling the prop. That takes some familiarity with "The Force" and maybe a wookie.


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## wuzak (Apr 6, 2014)

bobbysocks said:


> ( yes i know this is an old thread but )but a p39? a nose gear on a carrier back then? did anyone have a tricycle gear ac landing on a carrier back then....and if so how did they arrest the landing?



Bell proposed a tail dragger version for carrier duties, and even built one.

Bell XFL Airabonita - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

It also used under wing radiators, rather than the fuselage mounted radiator in the P-39.


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## GregP (Apr 6, 2014)

Yeah, it's in the mud at the end of the runway at Patuxent River, Maryland.


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## gjs238 (Apr 10, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> I suspect that the USN might have welcomed the Sea Hurricane in 1942.



However, the FAA was ordering Martlets long before this.


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## RCAFson (Apr 10, 2014)

gjs238 said:


> However, the FAA was ordering Martlets long before this.



The UK/FAA ordered lots of US built aircraft after the Fall of France because the UK couldn't build enough for it's own needs.


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## Glider (Apr 11, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> The UK/FAA ordered lots of US built aircraft after the Fall of France because the UK couldn't build enough for it's own needs.



The UK picked up all the French orders even for aircraft we were not interested in. A key reason was economics. Pre 1938 there were few orders for Military aircraft in the world and around 1938 everyone realised that there was a war coming and countries were more or less buying anything with wings. Manufacturers poured massive amounts into building factories, machine tools, raw materials and then there was the German lightning successes in 1939 and early 1940. The countries who had ordered the aircraft no longer existed and were not going to pay for them. The US manufacturers had borrowed huge amounts of money to build up production and the US government were not going to pick up the tab as isolationism was strong and the money she had to spend was already committed.

The UK picked up the tab as there was a significant risk that the manufacturers might fold or at best cut back, and the factories we knew were going to be needed might not be there. With hindsight was the risk exaggerated? maybe, but at the time the UK couldn't take the risk. 

Its worth asking the question, without the European orders for the P36 what would the financial state of Curtis have been to mass produce the P40 upon which a major part of the USAAF depended on in the first part of the war. Without the European orders for the Maryland which the RAF took over what would have happened to that manufacturer, would the B26 have made it to design and production. You can see where this may have led.

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## Shortround6 (Apr 11, 2014)

Lockheed got large orders for the Hudson without benefit of French orders. 

Even the P-40 and Allison got a major boost from the French even though the French didn't get any into operation. 

Douglas was big enough that they probably would have made it even if the French contracts got canceled but then Douglas did subcontract several hundred DB-7 type aircraft to Boeing when Boeing was running slack due to lack of B-17 orders.


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## gjs238 (Apr 11, 2014)

Instead of the CCC (Civilian Conservation Corps) perhaps we should have had the MCC (Military Conservation Corps.)
Instead of employing wood choppers support the armaments industry, aviation in particular.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 14, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> The USN actually called for Merlin engined fighters for both shore and carrier operations:
> 
> I suspect that the USN might have welcomed the Sea Hurricane in 1942.



You know, I expect the USN would have resisted. Much as the RN FAA resisted incorporating single seat interceptors, I expect the USN at that time would resist a fighter with the short legs of the sea hurricane. I understand a range of 600 miles for the basic Mk I Hurricane compared to 845 miles for the F4F-3. I think it would be a hard sell. I think production numbers and weapons might also be an issue. 

I think the hurricane I and II would have been extremely welcome to the USAAF 49th PG pilots defending Darwin in early 42.

On the other hand In late 42 I expect the USN would have more than welcomed a RN carrier in the south Pacific even if it had an air wing comprised of Gypsy Moths and Ansons.


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## RCAFson (Apr 14, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> You know, I expect the USN would have resisted. Much as the RN FAA resisted incorporating single seat interceptors, I expect the USN at that time would resist a fighter with the short legs of the sea hurricane. I understand a range of 600 miles for the basic Mk I Hurricane compared to 845 miles for the F4F-3. I think it would be a hard sell. I think production numbers and weapons might also be an issue.
> 
> I think the hurricane I and II would have been extremely welcome to the USAAF 49th PG pilots defending Darwin in early 42.
> 
> On the other hand In late 42 I expect the USN would have more than welcomed a RN carrier in the south Pacific even if it had an air wing comprised of Gypsy Moths and Ansons.



The FAA didn't resist single seat fighters and used them throughout the war. However, they needed a folding wing fighter that could fit into the narrow lifts on Ark Royal and the Illustrious class carriers and there were no such single seat fighters in service in the RN or USN until late 1941, however by mid 1941 the Sea Hurricane was being used on FAA carriers with larger lifts and in 1942 even on the Illustrious class via a temporary deck park.

The Sea Hurricane 1 was about 20-40 mph faster than the F4F-4 under 10k ft and had a much higher climb rate:






A Sea Hurricane II would have been about as fast under 10k ft as a Sea Hurricane I but somewhat faster above that altitude, than the Sea Hurricane I. The ideal use for the Sea Hurricane would have been as a point defence fighter in lieu of the Wildcats that were kept as CAP (rather than escorts) where it's high climb rate would have allowed it to gain the altitude advantage over incoming raids and provide top cover for the Wildcat, while the Sea Hurricane I would have given USN pilots speed parity with the zero under 10k ft along with better overall manoeuvrability. The Sea Hurricane II could carry twin 45IG drop tanks and could have served as an escort fighter but without folding wings it could not be carried in the same numbers as the F4F-4.


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## parsifal (Apr 15, 2014)

these are the things needed in 1942

1) Speed in excess of 340mph
2) Operational radius of at least 350 miles
3) Climb rate under 10K of at least 2500 ft per min
4) Armament of at least 2 x 20mm 
5) Dive speeds in excess of 500mph
6) Armour and self sealing tanks
7) a turning circle at under 250 mph of less than 700 feet, and preferably about 625 feet

In other words, somethig able to take on an defeat the Zeke. its that simple. Not sure if a merlin powered carrier fighter can deliver that, but i know the radial powered US types available in 1942 could not provide that


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## tomo pauk (Apr 15, 2014)

Navalized P-40F? The internal fuel tankage was about 120 imp gals, it was one of sturdiest V-12 powered fighters, both low- and high-speed handling were on par with anything, it was a good diver and roller, the armament was sufficient, more so for Asia/Pacific targets.Top speed of ground-based P-40F was ~360 mph.
Another suggestion: someyhing alomng the lines of Mustang, but with a more elaborate flap system, and slats, so the low speed handling is better.


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## GregP (Apr 15, 2014)

The USN would not have welcomed any foreign aircraft at any time early in the war. National Policy. It took getting INTO a war to make us use anything WE didn't make.

Might have been possible in 1944, but never in 1941 / 1942.

I you think otherwise, you are not an American citizen with family who were there at the time. Not gonna' happen until LATE in the war, even if then.


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## Glider (Apr 15, 2014)

Small point but sometimes National Policy is one thing, but what a service wants, is quite another


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## RCAFson (Apr 15, 2014)

GregP said:


> The USN would not have welcomed any foreign aircraft at any time early in the war. National Policy. It took getting INTO a war to make us use anything WE didn't make.
> 
> Might have been possible in 1944, but never in 1941 / 1942.
> 
> I you think otherwise, you are not an American citizen with family who were there at the time. Not gonna' happen until LATE in the war, even if then.



The USAAF had no problem with using Spitfires in 1942/43. 

I'm pretty sure that if USN pilots were allowed to offer their opinion they would have gladly flown Cdn built Sea Hurricanes. It was the pilots who were the leading dissenters regarding the F4F - they wanted something better and said so on many occasions.


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## FLYBOYJ (Apr 15, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> The USAAF had no problem with using Spitfires in 1942/43.



Neither did the US Navy..

http://spitfiresite.com/2010/04/spitfires-of-the-us-navy.html


RCAFson said:


> I'm pretty sure that if USN pilots were allowed to offer their opinion they would have gladly flown Cdn built Sea Hurricanes. It was the pilots who were the leading dissenters regarding the F4F - they wanted something better and said so on many occasions.


And they got the F6F, better than both.


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## RCAFson (Apr 15, 2014)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Neither did the US Navy..
> 
> http://spitfiresite.com/2010/04/spitfires-of-the-us-navy.html
> And they got the F6F, better than both.



True but they had to wait till mid 1943 to get the F6F. The Sea Hurricane would have been a useful stopgap and the USN could have had them in service in mid 1942.


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## FLYBOYJ (Apr 15, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> True but they had to wait till mid 1943 to get the F6F. The Sea Hurricane would have been a useful stopgap and the USN could have had them in service in mid 1942.



Although I believe the Hurricane was the better flying aircraft (I think the F4F could take more punishment and was better carrier suited), I don't believe possible unless that decision was made right after Pearl Harbor (probably sooner), and even then, would Canadian Car and Foundry (who only produced only about 1,400 units) been able to supply the US Navy enough aircraft to really make a difference? The F4F was in full production, the first production F6F was in the air by October 1942. Additionally the aircraft would have been subjected to carrier trials (which it would have easily passed).

Aside from logistics and red tape, I don't see the US Navy taking Canadian Sea Hurricanes as "value added" in the 1942 time frame, additionally you also have the reluctance of US Navy commanders placing large amounts of glycol on aircraft carriers.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 15, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> ...
> 
> The Sea Hurricane 1 was about 20-40 mph faster than the F4F-4 under 10k ft and had a much higher climb rate:
> 
> ...



While I agree that the Sea Hurricane would be an interesting addition for the USN carriers, the F4F-4 did not have Cyclone engine, but the 2-stage Twin wasp. The F4F-3 with same engines (lighter, non folding wings, 4 HMGs) was further 10 mph faster than the F4F-4, ie. at ~330 mph at 19-20000 ft.


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## RCAFson (Apr 15, 2014)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Although I believe the Hurricane was the better flying aircraft (I think the F4F could take more punishment and was better carrier suited), I don't believe possible unless that decision was made right after Pearl Harbor (probably sooner), and even then, would Canadian Car and Foundry (who only produced only about 1,400 units) been able to supply the US Navy enough aircraft to really make a difference? The F4F was in full production, the first production F6F was in the air by October 1942. Additionally the aircraft would have been subjected to carrier trials (which it would have easily passed).
> 
> Aside from logistics and red tape, I don't see the US Navy taking Canadian Sea Hurricanes as "value added" in the 1942 time frame, additionally you also have the reluctance of US Navy commanders placing large amounts of glycol on aircraft carriers.



The USN could have borrowed a couple of Sea Hurricanes from the UK for carrier trials.
CCF's biggest obstacle was a lack of engines, but if more Packard Merlins had been allocated to CCF they could have increased production, especially if given the needed priority levels and the Hurricane was also being produced in very large numbers in the UK at this time. Even a hundred or so Sea Hurricanes allocated to the USN in 1942 would have allowed an allotment of a dozen or so per carrier. Certainly, I don't think the Sea Hurricane was the complete answer to the Zero, but it was the only fully engineered alternative to the F4F that was available and had been used, in combat, aboard RN carriers from July 1941. Converting a Hurricane to a Sea Hurricane was a relatively easy process and could even be done as a field mod, aboard a carrier. However, it would require more extensive mods to be fitted with USN avionics.

The USN did fly off a number of V-12 fighters, from their carriers in 1942, so they probably had some provision for glycol stowage.


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## RCAFson (Apr 15, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> While I agree that the Sea Hurricane would be an interesting addition for the USN carriers, the F4F-4 did not have Cyclone engine, but the 2-stage Twin wasp. The F4F-3 with same engines (lighter, non folding wings, 4 HMGs) was further 10 mph faster than the F4F-4, ie. at ~330 mph at 19-20000 ft.



The two stage engine didn't help performance at lower altitude where most naval air combat took place and even though it was lighter the F4F-3's performance was only marginally better than the F4F-4 which, in turn, had about the same performance as the F4F-4B under 15000ft. The Sea Hurricane II would have been at least as fast as the F4F-3 (and I have commented in the past that the SAC data for the F4F-3/4 is somewhat optimistic) but it's combat climb rate would have been far higher.


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## Glider (Apr 15, 2014)

I think its worth considering the aircrafts footprint. The Wildcat was a very small aircraft and the Hurricane was a lot bigger and while the Hurricane may have a small advantage in the air you could probably fit five Wildcat F4F-4 into the space of two Hurricanes. Now that is an advantage worth having.

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## tomo pauk (Apr 15, 2014)

The SAC data is realistic. The British ADS (available here, scroll down) are in good agreement with SAC tables. What is not realistic is picking out an almost heaviest F4F, that has the weakest engine installed, and then claim that version is _the_ F4F-4.
The 2-stage engines was also offering almost 100 HP more than single stage, or Cyclone, at altitudes between 10 kft and 15000 kft.

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## FLYBOYJ (Apr 15, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> The USN could have borrowed a couple of Sea Hurricanes from the UK for carrier trials.


Again, time frame. If this was to happen you're still talking time to get the aircraft to North America and testing set up. Say at least two months there and another month for carrier trials, at least!


RCAFson said:


> CCF's biggest obstacle was a lack of engines, but if more Packard Merlins had been allocated to CCF they could have increased production, especially if given the needed priority levels and the Hurricane was also being produced in very large numbers in the UK at this time.


Agree but again who would allocate those engines? The first Packard Merlin was produced in 1941. How could this procurement been supported in the allocated time frame? How would this get slipped in for P-40 Packards?


RCAFson said:


> Even a hundred or so Sea Hurricanes allocated to the USN in 1942 would have allowed an allotment of a dozen or so per carrier.


 With the issues just described with the Packard Merlin, do you really think the USN "would have" seen a hundred or so Sea Hurricanes anytime in 1942? Would the UK in early really 1942 even consider cutting loose a hundred Hurricanes? If anything they probably would have wanted someone giving them a hundred aircraft of any type!



RCAFson said:


> Certainly, I don't think the Sea Hurricane was the complete answer to the Zero, but it was the only fully engineered alternative to the F4F that was available and had been used, in combat, aboard RN carriers from July 1941. Converting a Hurricane to a Sea Hurricane was a relatively easy process and could even be done as a field mod, aboard a carrier. However, it would require more extensive mods to be fitted with USN avionics.


Yes, and at the time of Pearl Harbor there were already quite a few F4Fs operational and many more being produced in an area far from the war zone.


RCAFson said:


> The USN did fly off a number of V-12 fighters, from their carriers in 1942, so they probably had some provision for glycol stowage.


They did, and those operations were limited, so would be the supply for glycol.

Unless someone had a crystal ball and there were people within the USN brass that really had a liking for the Sea Hurricane, the only way this was going to happen if the planning and contract were signed before Pearl Harbor - not saying it's a bad idea, just saying even under the best circumstances, not worth the effort for the little extra performance.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 15, 2014)

In case USN really wants another fighter really bad and fast, and will be satisfied with non-folding wings, then why not a 'hooked' P-40?


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## RCAFson (Apr 15, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> The SAC data is realistic. The British ADS (available here, scroll down) are in good agreement with SAC tables. What is not realistic is picking out an almost heaviest F4F, that has the weakest engine installed, and then claim that version is _the_ F4F-4.
> The 2-stage engines was also offering almost 100 HP more than single stage, or Cyclone, at altitudes between 10 kft and 15000 kft.



We've gone through this before. The SAC data on the F4F-3/4 is somewhat optimistic when it comes to climb rates and moderately optimistic when it comes to max speeds. UK and USN trials of actual aircraft show much lower climb rates and lower max speeds than the SAC data, which is inline with actual pilot comments regarding performance of the F4F-3/4.


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## RCAFson (Apr 15, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> In case USN really wants another fighter really bad and fast, and will be satisfied with non-folding wings, then why not a 'hooked' P-40?



The P-40 would probably have pretty poor landing and TO characteristics because of it's high wing loading.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 15, 2014)

Once the P-40 uses up its hefty load of fuel, the wing loading will go down substantially. The P-40s with belly tanks were flown off the carriers.

SAC data for the F4F-4 gives 320 mph at 18800 ft, 310 mph at ~11500 ft, 285 mph at SL. For F4F-3, the SAC gives 329 mph at 21100 ft, 316 at 11500 ft, 290 mph at SL. 
British ADS (Wildcat V, 4 HMGs, 2 stage engine, here) gives 332 mph at 21000 ft, 313 mph at 13000 ft, 292 mph at 3250 ft. The tests found at Williams' site give similar numbers.

I agree that SAC gives rather optimistic RoC figures.


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## RCAFson (Apr 15, 2014)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Again, time frame. If this was to happen you're still talking time to get the aircraft to North America and testing set up. Say at least two months there and another month for carrier trials, at least!


Hurricanes were available in North America, in some numbers prior to Dec 1941 so one or more of these could have been converted to a Sea Hurricane for deck landing trials.



> Agree but again who would allocate those engines? The first Packard Merlin was produced in 1941. How could this procurement been supported in the allocated time frame? How would this get slipped in for P-40 Packards?
> With the issues just described with the Packard Merlin, do you really think the USN "would have" seen a hundred or so Sea Hurricanes anytime in 1942? Would the UK in early really 1942 even consider cutting loose a hundred Hurricanes? If anything they probably would have wanted someone giving them a hundred aircraft of any type!


The P-40 was already engineered for the Allison, so a hundred or so more Allison engined P-40s and a hundred or so fewer P40Fs. The UK had a relative abundance of Hurricanes in late 1941/early 1942 so much so that Hurricane production actually began to taper off in mid 1942. There was actually lots of aircraft in the UK waiting for "export" to other markets such as the USSR and North Africa.



> Yes, and at the time of Pearl Harbor there were already quite a few F4Fs operational and many more being produced in an area far from the war zone.


Actually, not that many (a couple hundred maybe) and the F4F-F didn't begin production till Jan 1942, IIRC.



> They did, and those operations were limited, so would be the supply for glycol.


We're talking maybe a dozen HSHs per CV, and I think the USN was resourceful enough to tackle that problem.




> Unless someone had a crystal ball and there were people within the USN brass that really had a liking for the Sea Hurricane, the only way this was going to happen if the planning and contract were signed before Pearl Harbor - not saying it's a bad idea, just saying even under the best circumstances, not worth the effort for the little extra performance.



It wouldn't have taken a whole lot of clairvoyance in mid 1941 to see that the FAA was short of fighters, and that the USN would be too in a shooting war, so a joint Cdn/USA project to produce Sea Hurricanes would have made some sense, especially as the conversion kit had already been engineered in the UK and the Hurricane was in production in Canada (albeit in small number prior to large scale Packard production). Not a completely likely scenario, but not completely implausible either. 

The ideal fighter might have been a Sea Hurricane II with 4 x .5in with 350rpg (or 8 x .3in with 500rpg) and a couple of 15g internal wing tanks in lieu of the outer guns on the Mk IIB wing. This would have given the FAA and USN a useful addition to the F4F that was carrier ready and also well suited to base defence.


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## RCAFson (Apr 15, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> > Once the P-40 uses up its hefty load of fuel, the wing loading will go down substantially. The P-40s with belly tanks were flown off the carriers.
> 
> 
> 
> ...


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## tomo pauk (Apr 15, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> I'm pretty sure those aircraft were launched via catapult. No way a P-40 with belly tank can get off a carrier otherwise.



Spitfire Vs were capable to take off from a fleet carrier with 200 imp gals (170 + 29 actually; or 240 US gals = 1440 lbs plus empty tank weight) extra, during Malta reinforcement operation. The belly tank fuel for the P-40 weighted 450 lbs for 75 US gals, plus empty tank. From mid 1942, the V-1710F offered 1325 HP for take off, prior that 1150 HP, Packard Merlin offered 1300 HP, Merlin 45 1185 HP.



> Actual performance tests of the F4F-4 (in 1942) at reduced weights (~200lb less than the SAC F4F-3 figures), can't match the F4F-3 SAC Vmax figures:
> http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-4-5262.pdf
> http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-4-4058-performance.jpg



The military power of the F4F-4 (2-stage R-1830-86) was 1050 HP. Rated power, or max continuous power, like the one in the graph, was 1000 HP. Extending the speed graph until 1050 HP value, we have 325 mph for the, still heavy, F4F-4 with 4 guns.



> I suspect that the Martlet V data is taken right from Grumman, and not from an actual flight test, but the data is from Nov 1944 so that aircraft may have more a efficient prop and/or other changes to increase Vmax.




The Martlet II (single stage R-1830, 1050 HP at 13100 ft, no ram) does 317 mph at 14000 ft; British ADS. Wildcat III (F4F-3A, same engine) does 307 mph at 14000 ft; ADS.


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## RCAFson (Apr 15, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Spitfire Vs were capable to take off from a fleet carrier with 200 imp gals (170 + 29 actually; or 240 US gals = 1440 lbs plus empty tank weight) extra, during Malta reinforcement operation. The belly tank fuel for the P-40 weighted 450 lbs for 75 US gals, plus empty tank. From mid 1942, the V-1710F offered 1325 HP for take off, prior that 1150 HP, Packard Merlin offered 1300 HP, Merlin 45 1185 HP.



The 170IG tank was designed for direct flight from Gibralter to Malta. TO from carriers was with the 90IG tank and standard internal fuel (85IG).
Max boost of the Merlin 45 was 16lb from Dec 1941 and so TO HP was about 1450hp; a Spitfire V with a 90 IG tank had more power than the P-40 and weighed about 1500lb less.




> The military power of the F4F-4 (2-stage R-1830-86) was 1050 HP. Rated power, or max continuous power, like the one in the graph, was 1000 HP. Extending the speed graph until 1050 HP value, we have 325 mph for the, still heavy, F4F-4 with 4 guns.



According to the SAC chart military power is ineffective above 14000ft which is in agreement with this test:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-4-02135-performance.jpg




> The Martlet II (single stage R-1830, 1050 HP at 13100 ft, no ram) does 317 mph at 14000 ft; British ADS. Wildcat III (F4F-3A, same engine) does 307 mph at 14000 ft; ADS.



Again these tests appear to be based upon Grumman data, as they do not correspond to any actual test data that I can find and are at considerable variance to actual flight tests of the folding wing Martlet II and IV.


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## GregP (Apr 15, 2014)

When I look up Spitfires in US service, I see they accounted for an entire 15 victories in the ETO and 364 in the MTO where they were the equipment available to us at the time along with some P-40's and P-38's.

The P-40's recorded 592 victories in the MTO and the P-38's recorded 1,431 in the MTO, telling us exactly how widespread they were in US service ... not very. The three British aircraft use by the USAAF were the Spitfire, the Beaufighter and the Mosquito. Among all three types together, they accounted for a Total of 411 victories out of 25,486, or 1.6% of US air-to-air victories.

Like I said, we didn't use them much except as expedient and as available. Nothing whatsoever wrong with them, just the attitudes of the time by the brass who, after all, made the decisions for the men in the services.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 16, 2014)

> RCAFson said:
> 
> 
> > The 170IG tank was designed for direct flight from Gibralter to Malta. TO from carriers was with the 90IG tank and standard internal fuel (85IG).
> ...

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## RCAFson (Apr 16, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Let's not confuse boost allowed with plenty of ram and at mid altitudes, with almost no ram and at sea level (or near to it). The single speed S/C engines, tailored for altitudes of 10-20000 ft (ie. Merlin III or 45, V-1710s with 9:60:1 S/C) were not comparable with two-speed S/C engines (Merlin X, 20 series, Jumo-211), or dedicated low level engines (V-1710s for A-36) when it comes down to take off power.
> Merlin 45 was rated for +12 lbs boost for take off in 1943:
> 
> ...where it gave 1185 HP; the engines with 'M' suffix (S/C diameter of 9.50in) were making a bit more, due to smaller S/C doing less mixture heating, ie. greater mass of air for same boost pressure:



Do you really believe that a Spitfire V pilot trying a one time take off from a carrier while loaded with a 90 IG DT is going to limit TO boost to 12lb? Pilot's Notes weren't written for that scenario, and I'm sure that there are similar entries in the P-40 manual.






> Military power is ineffective above 14000 ft, according to SAC chart??? Where is that chart? And then you present a graph where military power is 1100 HP at 17200 ft*. Please, don't let your credibility to hit rock bottom.
> The 2-stage R-1830 was making 1050 HP at 19-20000 ft*, and there is at least 5 documents at Williams' site that say so. Including USAF and RAF documents.
> 
> * = no ram


See: http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-4.pdf
page 5, line 1 shows the effects of military power and how it is ineffective above 14000ft.





> RAF sheets give better values than Grumman data.
> Every aircraft have had variances. We can find a Mustang I barely making 360 mph clean, a P-47 barely making 420 mph clean, Spitfire V doing 360 mph etc, P-40 making 330 mph. Should we now use only the worst test data and claim that all produced A/C were equally bad, while putting aside the better test results?
> The 'appears' and 'I cannot find' weight far, far less than actual historic documents.



FAA Data sheets are only as accurate as the tests they are derived from. Actual testing of individual aircraft by the FAA and USN shows Martlet and Wildcat performance that is somewhat less than the SAC data and FAA Data sheets that appear to be drawn from Grumman test data.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 16, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> Do you really believe that a Spitfire V pilot trying a one time take off from a carrier while loaded with a 90 IG DT is going to limit TO boost to 12lb? Pilot's Notes weren't written for that scenario, and I'm sure that there are similar entries in the P-40 manual.



Of course he is going to limit his boost to what the manual says - he is about to make a 1000+ miles journey, and an engine that quits 300 or 500 miles ahead will likely kill him. Plus, he, or some other pilot will actually use that A/C once it arrives to the destination. An unexpected or unforeseen use of engine does not make it stronger, so it can use greater boost.
The Spitfire V (with Merlin 45) has about equal wing and power loading as the Wildcat anyway. It does not matter if I (or anyone else) agree or disagree with what was written in the manual for that matter. 
There is no other take off rating for the V-1710s and V-1650-1s than a 'regular' power setting. It took engine modifications strengthening to increase take off rating for the V-1710 from 1040 (1940) hp to 1150 HP (early 1941), and then to 1325 (Spring of 1942); all for single stage engines. The engines, with somewhat up-rated power above ~14000 ft, have had only 1200 HP for take off; available from mid 1942.



> See: http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-4.pdf
> page 5, line 1 shows the effects of military power and how it is ineffective above 14000ft.



Thanks for pointing me to that graph. Seems like the military power was used only in S/C operating in 'neutral' and 'low' position, but not in 'high'? At any rate, that document puts the F4F-4 at 320 mph at 18800 ft and at 310 mph at -11500 ft.




> FAA Data sheets are only as accurate as the tests they are derived from. Actual testing of individual aircraft by the FAA and USN shows Martlet and Wildcat performance that is somewhat less than the SAC data and FAA Data sheets that appear to be drawn from Grumman test data.



The SAC gives 329 mph at 21100 for the F4F-3 (2-stage engine), USN test give 330 or 331 mph at 21100ft, depending on weight here (pdf). This is in agreement with Grumman and British data. Seems like Grumman company was true to their word.

The F4F-4, but with only 4 guns, was good for ~324 mph on 1050 HP at 19000 ft (http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-4-4058.pdf). Other USN tests, but for 'regular' 6 gun F4F-4, give 318 or 319 mph at altitude (pdf). This test gives 316 mph for 'regular' F4F-4, but at 17200 ft. 

Now, in case you can point me to other tests that give top speeds, at respective best altitudes, of under 325 mph for the F4F-3 and under 315 mph for the F4F-3 (both with 2-stage engines), I'd be grateful.


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## RCAFson (Apr 17, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Of course he is going to limit his boost to what the manual says - he is about to make a 1000+ miles journey, and an engine that quits 300 or 500 miles ahead will likely kill him. Plus, he, or some other pilot will actually use that A/C once it arrives to the destination. An unexpected or unforeseen use of engine does not make it stronger, so it can use greater boost.
> The Spitfire V (with Merlin 45) has about equal wing and power loading as the Wildcat anyway. It does not matter if I (or anyone else) agree or disagree with what was written in the manual for that matter.
> There is no other take off rating for the V-1710s and V-1650-1s than a 'regular' power setting. It took engine modifications strengthening to increase take off rating for the V-1710 from 1040 (1940) hp to 1150 HP (early 1941), and then to 1325 (Spring of 1942); all for single stage engines. The engines, with somewhat up-rated power above ~14000 ft, have had only 1200 HP for take off; available from mid 1942.



The Spitfire V with a 90IG drop tank has about the same wing loading as an F4F-4 with fuel internal fuel, but considerably less than a P-40E/F

The Merlin boost override can be engaged at any altitude to be used as the pilot saw fit. In any event, a P40 with 45IG drop tank weighs about 8900lb versus ~7700lb for a Spitfire V with a 90IG drop tank. 




> Thanks for pointing me to that graph. Seems like the military power was used only in S/C operating in 'neutral' and 'low' position, but not in 'high'? At any rate, that document puts the F4F-4 at 320 mph at 18800 ft and at 310 mph at -11500 ft.
> 
> 
> 
> ...



The F4F-4 was test flown against the Zero. USA Flight testing gave the following speeds for the same Zero:
SL/270mph (F4F-4 SAC data = 285
5000ft/287 (F4F-4 SAC data = 290
10000ft/305 (F4F-4 SAC data = 305)
16000ft 326
20000ft 321.5
25000ft 315
30000ft 306

and the results of actual flight testing:






Again, these actual flight tests show the F4F-4 to be somewhat slower at lower altitude than the SAC data - again in line with F4F-3/4 pilot comments regarding their experiences with the Zero in actual combat:



> 8. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
> 
> (a) As evidenced by statements of pilots who flew them in actual combat, the performance of the F2A-3 and F4F-3 types of airplanes is markedly inferior to that of the Japanese 00 1 Sento KI Fighter in speed, maneuverability, and rate of climb. The fact that Marine Fighting Squadron 221 gave such an excellent account of itself should not be allowed to becloud this fact, but is directly attributable largely to an exceptionally fine organization of fighting pilot personnel and apparent great vulnerability of enemy bombers. In view of the foregoing it is recommended that F2A-3 and F4F-3 type airplanes be not assigned as equipment for use in combat, but be retained for use at training centers only.
> Midway 1942 : Documents : Commanding Officer Marine Aircraft Group TWENTY-TWO. Action report. June 7, 1942.


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## FLYBOYJ (Apr 17, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> Hurricanes were available in North America, in some numbers prior to Dec 1941 so one or more of these could have been converted to a Sea Hurricane for deck landing trials.


Could have - but even then you're still looking at a few months of testing and red tape.



RCAFson said:


> The P-40 was already engineered for the Allison, so a hundred or so more Allison engined P-40s and a hundred or so fewer P40Fs. The UK had a relative abundance of Hurricanes in late 1941/early 1942 so much so that Hurricane production actually began to taper off in mid 1942. There was actually lots of aircraft in the UK waiting for "export" to other markets such as the USSR and North Africa.


If the UK had all those Hurricanes, then why were they still taking deliveries of P-40s?



RCAFson said:


> Actually, not that many (a couple hundred maybe) and the F4F-F didn't begin production till Jan 1942, IIRC.


That's still more than what could have been produced in Canada during the same period, even if the order came down after Pearl Harbor. It would have taken at least 6 months to see the first production Sea Hurricane arrive in the US, and that's very wishful thinking.



RCAFson said:


> We're talking maybe a dozen HSHs per CV, and I think the USN was resourceful enough to tackle that problem.


They were - the minute AAF left the hangar deck so did the glycol. Again, US Navy brass did not like "extra" hazmat or flammable materials on ships (same rules as today)




RCAFson said:


> It wouldn't have taken a whole lot of clairvoyance in mid 1941 to see that the FAA was short of fighters, and that the USN would be too in a shooting war, so a joint Cdn/USA project to produce Sea Hurricanes would have made some sense, especially as the conversion kit had already been engineered in the UK and the Hurricane was in production in Canada (albeit in small number prior to large scale Packard production). Not a completely likely scenario, but not completely implausible either.


That's provided someone in the USN liked the Sea Hurricane and saw value added by importing it, apparently that wasnt the case.


RCAFson said:


> The ideal fighter might have been a Sea Hurricane II with 4 x .5in with 350rpg (or 8 x .3in with 500rpg) and a couple of 15g internal wing tanks in lieu of the outer guns on the Mk IIB wing. This would have given the FAA and USN a useful addition to the F4F that was carrier ready and also well suited to base defence.


 Again, Interest, how quick, and was it really worth it when you had, as you said it "a couple hundred maybe" F4Fs available, right there, right now - as the old saying goes, "A bird in hand is worth two in the bush."


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## RCAFson (Apr 17, 2014)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Could have - but even then you're still looking at a few months of testing and red tape.


Which means that the USN Sea Hurricane is ready for production just around Dec 7 1941.



> If the UK had all those Hurricanes, then why were they still taking deliveries of P-40s?



As I stated Hurricanes were being exported to Russia and elsewhere.



> That's still more than what could have been produced in Canada during the same period, even if the order came down after Pearl Harbor. It would have taken at least 6 months to see the first production Sea Hurricane arrive in the US, and that's very wishful thinking.



No, I don't think that's true. The airframe was already for production (conversion to a Sea Hurricane was relatively simple and could be done post production) all they needed was engines and the requisite production priority.



> They were - the minute AAF left the hangar deck so did the glycol. Again, US Navy brass did not like "extra" hazmat or flammable materials on ships (same rules as today)


 They would have had to have some spare amount onboard, but again I'm sure the USN could overcome this relatively easily.




> That's provided someone in the USN liked the Sea Hurricane and saw value added by importing it, apparently that wasnt the case.
> Again, Interest, how quick, and was it really worth it when you had, as you said it "a couple hundred maybe" F4Fs available, right there, right now - as the old saying goes, "A bird in hand is worth two in the bush."



Why wouldn't they like a faster, more manoeuvrable fighter that was already combat proven? The USN resisted liquid cooled engines, but as the statement from Nimitz makes clear by mid 1942 they were not happy with the F4F-4:


> ...Another aspect of
> the attack that proved inadequate was fighter escort. To Fletcher the folding wing F4F-4s
> represented no improvement over the fixed-wing F4F-3s, except more F4F-4s could be
> carried. He echoed the call of Halsey and others of the urgent necessity'' for detachable fuel
> ...



By Oct 1942 the USN was scraping the bottom of the barrel to feed F4F-4s into Guadalcanal. The Sea Hurricane II would have given them another fighter to supplement the F4F-4 and it would have been better suited to shore based ops than the F4F-4 with it's narrow LG. Having the Sea Hurricane in production would have reduced the USN's reliance on a single source for carrier fighters.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 17, 2014)

_Ceterum censeo_, if the USN wants the V-12 powered fighter, the navalized, or just 'hooked' P-40 is a better bet. What kind of performance was the Sea Hurricane displaying, any version?



RCAFson said:


> The Spitfire V with a 90IG drop tank has about the same wing loading as an F4F-4 with fuel internal fuel, but considerably less than a P-40E/F



That's okay with me. Point is that all three were taking off from carriers, with drop tanks. 



> The Merlin boost override can be engaged at any altitude to be used as the pilot saw fit. In any event, a P40 with 45IG drop tank weighs about 8900lb versus ~7700lb for a Spitfire V with a 90IG drop tank.



Until you back up the statement (1st sentence in the above quoted text) that, by take off, the boost can be greater than +12 lbs, your statement is just a claim, not a fact. 



> The F4F-4 was test flown against the Zero. USA Flight testing gave the following speeds for the same Zero:
> SL/270mph (F4F-4 SAC data = 285
> 5000ft/287 (F4F-4 SAC data = 290
> 10000ft/305 (F4F-4 SAC data = 305)
> ...



Thanks. Seems like the F4F-4 was actually able to do 326 mph at 16000 ft.



> and the results of actual flight testing:
> ...



Thanks. The excerpt talks on relative merits between Zero and F4F, not about performance figures of the F4F. 



> Again, these actual flight tests show the F4F-4 to be somewhat slower at lower altitude than the SAC data - again in line with F4F-3/4 pilot comments regarding their experiences with the Zero in actual combat:



The actual flight tests also show that F4F-4 is also faster at medium and high altitudes than it is listed in SAC data - almost 15 mph faster at 16000 ft than SAC data. 
Again, nobody was claiming, here or at other places, that Wildcat is a better climber, or that is faster than Zero - I don't get it why you post those excerpts? But, it seems like the F4F (mostly the heavier F4F-4) have had positive ratio vs. Zero in mid 1942:

_Bottom line here is that between 7 May 1942 and 4 June 1942, and, thus, just on the basis of exposure, in the first 
six months of the Pacific War, there were 12 F4Fs shot down by A6Ms and 14 A6Ms shot down by F4Fs, or an F4F 
victory to loss ratio of 1.167 to 1._

From here.


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## Glider (Apr 17, 2014)

I know this is turning the thread but I always wondered why the UK didn't build a naval fighter based on the Hercules. It was a decent engine that entered service in late 1940 so would have been available for 1941. People tend to get hung up on the Merlin and not consider the Hercules in the same way they tend to consider the Halifax to be a distant second to the Lanc


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## RCAFson (Apr 17, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Thanks. Seems like the F4F-4 was actually able to do 326 mph at 16000 ft.
> 
> The actual flight tests also show that F4F-4 is also faster at medium and high altitudes than it is listed in SAC data - almost 15 mph faster at 16000 ft than SAC data.
> Again, nobody was claiming, here or at other places, that Wildcat is a better climber, or that is faster than Zero - I don't get it why you post those excerpts? But, it seems like the F4F (mostly the heavier F4F-4) have had positive ratio vs. Zero in mid 1942:
> ...



The speeds given are for the Zero! I provided the SAC data for low altitudes since at high altitudes the Zero is faster, even according to the SAC data. However the SAC data suggests that the F4F-4 should be faster than the Zero at lower altitudes when actual flight tests show that the Zero was faster:
The F4F-4 was test flown against the Zero. USA Flight testing gave the following speeds for the same Zero:
*SL/270mph* (F4F-4 SAC data = 285
*5000ft/287* (F4F-4 SAC data = 290
*10000ft/305* (F4F-4 SAC data = 305)
*16000ft 326*
*20000ft 321.5*
*25000ft 315*
*30000ft 306* 
Bolded speeds are for the USA tests of the *Zero* that was flight tested against a F4F-4. 
View attachment 259692


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## RCAFson (Apr 17, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> _Ceterum censeo_, if the USN wants the V-12 powered fighter, the navalized, or just 'hooked' P-40 is a better bet. What kind of performance was the Sea Hurricane displaying, any version?



The "hooked" P-40 never existed, and for good reason; it's high wing loading and high stall speeds made it unsuitable as a carrier based naval fighter.

I gave Sea Hurricane IB performance figures earlier in the thread, on post 33. However what isn't shown there is that the combat climb rating would have been close to 4000fpm up to 6000ft or so, while time to 20,000ft would have been in the 6 minute range.









> Until you back up the statement (1st sentence in the above quoted text) that, by take off, the boost can be greater than +12 lbs, your statement is just a claim, not a fact.
> 
> .



Sorry, but you're the one claiming that boost override was inoperative at TO, when this is clearly not the case, and you'll have to prove that statement. Boost override is fully under the pilot's control and he could engage it when ever needed.


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## RCAFson (Apr 17, 2014)

Glider said:


> I know this is turning the thread but I always wondered why the UK didn't build a naval fighter based on the Hercules. It was a decent engine that entered service in late 1940 so would have been available for 1941. People tend to get hung up on the Merlin and not consider the Hercules in the same way they tend to consider the Halifax to be a distant second to the Lanc




There were proposals for a Hercules power Hurricane.


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## Greyman (Apr 17, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Until you back up the statement (1st sentence in the above quoted text) that, by take off, the boost can be greater than +12 lbs, your statement is just a claim, not a fact.



Sea Hurricane Merlin III engines were modified to allow +16 boost. This gave them performance similar to a regular Hurricane I using +12 boost. 

Climb might have been slightly better, but to say 4,000 feet per minute and 20,000 feet in six minutes seems exceedingly optimistic - especially considering from what I've read, the Sea Hurricanes used the old deHavilland two-speed props.


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## RCAFson (Apr 17, 2014)

Greyman said:


> Sea Hurricane Merlin III engines were modified to allow +16 boost. This gave them performance similar to a regular Hurricane I using +12 boost.
> 
> Climb might have been slightly better, but to say 4,000 feet per minute and 20,000 feet in six minutes seems exceedingly optimistic - especially considering from what I've read, the Sea Hurricanes used the old deHavilland two-speed props.



Sea Hurricanes used either a Rotal or a Dehavillland constant speed prop, but the Dehavilland unit was preferred because it was lighter. The calculated climb performance of the Hurricane 1 at 6700lb is shown here:





and it works out to about 6.4mins to 20k ft. The Sea Hurricane IB is about 3% (~7000lb) heavier than the Hurricane 1 but has another 10% more peak power (1440 versus 1310) so we can expect the peak climb rate to be higher and time to 20K ft to be about the same.

Your previous info from the Sea Hurricane 1b data card indicated 10mins to 20k ft @ 7015lb which is only marginally worse than the Hurricane 1's data card which indicates 9.7min (~3% worse) to 20k ft @ 6793lb.


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## wuzak (Apr 17, 2014)

Basically you are asking the USN to adopt an unproven type before their own unproven type had met the enemy, of unknown or little known capability, in combat.

I know that the title of the thread is "Merlin powered carrier fighter other than Seafire" but you can't escape the fact that the Admiralty wanted a navalised Spitfire before they ever wanted a Sea Hurricane (from as early as 1938, in fact). The problem was that Seafires would reduce the number of Spitfires available for the RAF, and Fulmar production was a priority (!) for the FAA.

When Seafires did enter service they remained stuck with the single speed Merlin until the Griffon powered XV appeared towards the end of the war. A direct legacy of trying to prop up the performance of the Hurricane with the Merlin XX.

As for the F4F, Grumman had begun development on the F6F not long after the F4F entered service (and before Pearl Harbor). Any move to procure Sea Hurricanes would be a short term solution at best.


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## RCAFson (Apr 17, 2014)

wuzak said:


> Basically you are asking the USN to adopt an unproven type before their own unproven type had met the enemy, of unknown or little known capability, in combat.
> 
> I know that the title of the thread is "Merlin powered carrier fighter other than Seafire" but you can't escape the fact that the Admiralty wanted a navalised Spitfire before they ever wanted a Sea Hurricane (from as early as 1938, in fact). The problem was that Seafires would reduce the number of Spitfires available for the RAF, and Fulmar production was a priority (!) for the FAA.
> 
> ...



The Sea Hurricane was not "unproven" as it cleared RN carrier trials in early 1941 and saw combat from RN carriers in mid 1941, so, in fact, it was the only "proven" single seat, monoplane, naval fighter in the Allied inventory at that point in the war.

The FAA wanted the highest possible performing fighter and in 1940 that would have been a variant of the Spitfire. OTOH, it is clear that this was a mistake and that the Hurricane was better suited for carrier ops because of it's more robust LG and airframe. The "priority" for the FAA was to secure a folding wing naval fighter that could fit down the narrow lifts of the Ark Royal and Illustrious class carriers and until very late in 1941, the only such fighter in production, on both sides of the Atlantic, was the Fairey Fulmar.

I am not suggesting that the USN "adopt" the Sea Hurricane as their primary carrier based fighter but I am saying that it would have been prudent and not impossibly improbable that the USN would have decided to support development and production of the Sea Hurricane in mid 1941 with a view towards securing an alternate source of single engine fighters both for itself and for the RN - yes a stop gap, but a very cheap stop gap, that would have paid handsome dividends.

We've already discussed how the RAF installed the Merlin XX in Spitfires, seemingly without difficulty:

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/spitfires-merlin-xx-40257.html#post1108788

If you have proof that the FAA was denied the Merlin XX for the Seafire, I'd really like to see it, but the fact remains that the Merlin 45/16lb bbost peaked at 1515hp which actually exceeded the Merlin XX series until they were uprated to 18lb boost in 1943.


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## FLYBOYJ (Apr 17, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> Which means that the USN Sea Hurricane is ready for production just around Dec 7 1941.


The USN "would have" had to begun procurement way prior. Ready for production? Tooling? Raw Material? Production floor space? People to build the plane? Oh, and you're talking about this being built in Canada where under 2000 Hurricanes were built during the entire war? 



RCAFson said:


> As I stated Hurricanes were being exported to Russia and elsewhere.


Not in early 1941. When was the Soviet Union invaded????



RCAFson said:


> No, I don't think that's true. The airframe was already for production (conversion to a Sea Hurricane was relatively simple and could be done post production)* all they needed was engines and the requisite production priority*.


Which would of had to happen in the middle of 1941 - tell me how long do you think it would have taken for production to be set up? Have you ever worked in an aircraft factory? Even an aircraft as simple as the Hurricane would have taken at least six months to set up, and we haven't even brought up lead times for raw materials and castings!


RCAFson said:


> They would have had to have some spare amount onboard, but again I'm sure the USN could overcome this relatively easily.


Yes, by dumping excess overboard!


RCAFson said:


> Why wouldn't they like a faster, more manoeuvrable fighter that was already combat proven? The USN resisted liquid cooled engines, but as the statement from Nimitz makes clear by mid 1942 they were not happy with the F4F-4:


Because the aircraft were there - period!!!! Within a year the USN got something a lot more suited for the role. Agree the F4F needed to be replaced but in the end it did serve well and even in the most conservative assessments had a pretty good air to air combat record against a superior enemy.



RCAFson said:


> By Oct 1942 the USN was scraping the bottom of the barrel to feed F4F-4s into Guadalcanal. The Sea Hurricane II would have given them another fighter to supplement the F4F-4 and it would have been better suited to shore based ops than the F4F-4 with it's narrow LG. Having the Sea Hurricane in production would have reduced the USN's reliance on a single source for carrier fighters.


I could agree with that but your scenario would only happen if someone in the Navy Dept. started the ball rolling way before Pearl Harbor.


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## Greyman (Apr 17, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> Sea Hurricanes used either a Rotal or a Dehavillland constant speed prop, but the Dehavilland unit was preferred because it was lighter. The calculated climb performance of the Hurricane 1 at 6700lb is shown here:
> 
> and it works out to about 6.4mins to 20k ft. The Sea Hurricane IB is about 3% (~7000lb) heavier than the Hurricane 1 but has another 10% more peak power (1440 versus 1310) so we can expect the peak climb rate to be higher and time to 20K ft to be about the same.
> 
> Your previous info from the Sea Hurricane 1b data card indicated 10mins to 20k ft @ 7015lb which is only marginally worse than the Hurricane 1's data card which indicates 9.7min (~3% worse) to 20k ft @ 6793lb.



I see what you're saying but just going by that is a stretch for me. Too much guesswork, especially considering the only reasonable source we have is the data sheet - and I've certainly found errors/discrepancies in those. When I can find no climb test of a DH prop Hurricane or Sea Hurricane and the data sheet uses a nice round number like '10.0 minutes' that raises a bit of a red flag for me.

And while there is little to choose between a +16 Sea Hurricane and a +12 Hurricane under 8,000 feet, the performance gap afterwards makes me think more pessimistically about your climb estimates. But hey, I'm guessing as much as you are at this point.

Also, I was under the impression the two speed prop was desired due to being _heavier_ (metal) than the wooden Rotol - the CG needing to be brought forward due to the hook gear.


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## RCAFson (Apr 17, 2014)

FLYBOYJ said:


> The USN "would have" had to begun procurement way prior. Ready for production? Tooling? Raw Material? Production floor space? People to build the plane? Oh, and you're talking about this being built in Canada where under 2000 Hurricanes were built during the entire war?
> 
> 
> 
> ...



The First CCF Hurricane left the production line on Jan 1940. CCF had a large plant that was fully tooled up by mid 1941. Production was slow prior to the Packard Merlin because RR Merlins had to come over from the UK. After Packard Merlins came on the scene the P-40F took a large number of them. CCF built about 1450 HHs and HSHs, so they could, and did, build both both types with the bulk of production from early 1942 to early 1943. To put this into perspective, Grumman only built a total 1778 ( 1347 F4F and 431 Martlet ) F4F and Martlet aircraft (according to Dean) from Dec 1939 to the end of 1942, prior to turning over production to GM.

The design engineering for the Sea Hurricane had already been done by March 1941.

The USSR was invaded on June 22 1941.




> Yes, by dumping excess overboard!



I think we'll have to agree to disagree about the coolant. I don't think that carrying a few hundred gallons of glycol represented an insurmountable problem.



> Because the aircraft were there - period!!!! Within a year the USN got something a lot more suited for the role. Agree the F4F needed to be replaced but in the end it did serve well and even in the most conservative assessments had a pretty good air to air combat record against a superior enemy.



They should have been able to do even better with a better performing aircraft.



> I could agree with that but your scenario would only happen if someone in the Navy Dept. started the ball rolling way before Pearl Harbor.



That is what I am suggesting, and given the demand for naval fighters it would have been prudent to have another source for them.


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## RCAFson (Apr 18, 2014)

Greyman said:


> I see what you're saying but just going by that is a stretch for me. Too much guesswork, especially considering the only reasonable source we have is the data sheet - and I've certainly found errors/discrepancies in those. When I can find no climb test of a DH prop Hurricane or Sea Hurricane and the data sheet uses a nice round number like '10.0 minutes' that raises a bit of a red flag for me.
> 
> And while there is little to choose between a +16 Sea Hurricane and a +12 Hurricane under 8,000 feet, the performance gap afterwards makes me think more pessimistically about your climb estimates. But hey, I'm guessing as much as you are at this point.
> 
> Also, I was under the impression the two speed prop was desired due to being _heavier_ (metal) than the wooden Rotol - the CG needing to be brought forward due to the hook gear.



The 9.7min to 20k ft was drawn directly from a flight test of a Hurricane I at 6750lb. I would not expect there to be much difference in climb rates, aside from the 3% weight difference, as the extra drag of the naval gear has a minimal effect on the climb rate due to the slow speeds. Again, the 16lb Sea Hurricane has a better power to weight ratio than the 12lb Hurricane. However, if there was any errors and/or estimation done in the data card, it was probably in the listed speeds. I don't really believe that there's enough of a difference in drag to account for such a major discrepancy between the Hurricane 1 at 1310hp (~ 315 mph at ~1300hp @7500ft) and the Sea Hurricane (316mph at 1440hp @ 7500ft) so I suspect those numbers to be conservative estimates. The Hurricane I trials at an overload weight of 6750lb (310.5mph at 18000ft) almost exactly matches the Sea Hurricane Ib performance at it's mean weight of 6655lb (308mph at 18000ft).


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## wuzak (Apr 18, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> The Sea Hurricane was not "unproven" as it cleared RN carrier trials in early 1941 and saw combat from RN carriers in mid 1941, so, in fact, it was the only "proven" single seat, monoplane, naval fighter in the Allied inventory at that point in the war.



I would think it would take more than carrier trials to make an aircraft proven.

And by mid 1941, when Sea Hurricanes began operating (were these actual carrier aircraft or the CAM Hurricanes?) a replacement for the F4F was on the drawing board. It wasn't going to take a genius to see that if that replacement was any good it would also be superior to the Sea Hurricane.




RCAFson said:


> The FAA wanted the highest possible performing fighter and in 1940 that would have been a variant of the Spitfire. OTOH, it is clear that this was a mistake and that the Hurricane was better suited for carrier ops because of it's more robust LG and airframe. The "priority" for the FAA was to secure a folding wing naval fighter that could fit down the narrow lifts of the Ark Royal and Illustrious class carriers and until very late in 1941, the only such fighter in production, on both sides of the Atlantic, was the Fairey Fulmar.



The original proposal for a navalised Spitfire called for wings which folded just outboard of the landing gear and parallel to the fuselage axis. This could, quite probably, have fitted inside the lifts of the carriers. This was rejected in favour of Fulmars - in 1938/39. If Fairey had lent its carrier expertise to the program at that stage landing gear could have been improved, etc, for the task.

As for the Hurricane being better for carrier ops, was it really? The narrow landing gear of the Spitfire was a downside, but the same could be said of the F4F. But was the Hurricane's structure really more robust? Or was it just simpler?




RCAFson said:


> I am not suggesting that the USN "adopt" the Sea Hurricane as their primary carrier based fighter but I am saying that it would have been prudent and not impossibly improbable that the USN would have decided to support development and production of the Sea Hurricane in mid 1941 with a view towards securing an alternate source of single engine fighters both for itself and for the RN - yes a stop gap, but a very cheap stop gap, that would have paid handsome dividends.



The problem is that they would have barely got them on operations before the squadrons would be taken off active duty to work up on F6Fs.

A more immediate solution, as suggested earlier in the thread, would be for land based units to use higher performing land planes - like P-40s. The Navy can then get the best versions of the F4F until the F6F arrives.

I don't know if it would really have been value for money in the longer term.




RCAFson said:


> We've already discussed how the RAF installed the Merlin XX in Spitfires, seemingly without difficulty



I never said they couldn't be installed - just that they weren't. XXs were allocated elsewhere, and that killed the Spitfire III.

And since the early versions of the Seafire were based on, or modified from, Spitfire Vs they were basically stuck with the single stage engine. Also, the longer and heavier Merlin XX may have caused issues with prop clearence had the Seafires simply added the XX without the other required modifications.




RCAFson said:


> but the fact remains that the Merlin 45/16lb bbost peaked at 1515hp which actually exceeded the Merlin XX series until they were uprated to 18lb boost in 1943.



That is a very narrow reading of the situation.

The single speed Merlins had a more limited operating range than the XX. While peak power of the 45 maybe 20-30hp more at its ideal altitude (for +16psi boost I am assuming it is quite low) the XX has more power over most other altitudes.


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## RCAFson (Apr 18, 2014)

wuzak said:


> I would think it would take more than carrier trials to make an aircraft proven.
> 
> And by mid 1941, when Sea Hurricanes began operating (were these actual carrier aircraft or the CAM Hurricanes?) a replacement for the F4F was on the drawing board. It wasn't going to take a genius to see that if that replacement was any good it would also be superior to the Sea Hurricane.



First HSH 1B kill was 31 July 1941 by HSHs operating from HMS Furious. Who, except for you, is talking about replacing the F4F with the HSH? I'm talking about supplementing USN and RN naval fighter production with the HSH in addition to the F4F.




> The original proposal for a navalised Spitfire called for wings which folded just outboard of the landing gear and parallel to the fuselage axis. This could, quite probably, have fitted inside the lifts of the carriers. This was rejected in favour of Fulmars - in 1938/39. If Fairey had lent its carrier expertise to the program at that stage landing gear could have been improved, etc, for the task.



This is OT. In any event Spitfire production was inadequate during this time frame. 



> As for the Hurricane being better for carrier ops, was it really? The narrow landing gear of the Spitfire was a downside, but the same could be said of the F4F. But was the Hurricane's structure really more robust? Or was it just simpler?



Structurally it was better suited because the LG and airframe was stronger than in the Seafire, and it had better visibility over the nose which allowed the HSH to operate quite successfully from CVEs. Stall speeds were lower and the aircraft was more controllable at low speeds. The narrow LG was not a factor at sea (because the carrier operated into the wind) but was when the aircraft were being operated from shore bases, where the wider HSH LG had a decided advantage




> The problem is that they would have barely got them on operations before the squadrons would be taken off active duty to work up on F6Fs.
> 
> A more immediate solution, as suggested earlier in the thread, would be for land based units to use higher performing land planes - like P-40s. The Navy can then get the best versions of the F4F until the F6F arrives.



Grumman built a total of 272 F6F-3s by the end of April 1943 so the F4F-4 had to hang in there for quite some time. First combat was not till somewhat later. The first HSH conversion was early 1941. 



> I don't know if it would really have been value for money in the longer term.



??? We are talking about an aircraft already engineered by Feb 1941 and was actually being built in Canada by mid 1942.






> I never said they couldn't be installed - just that they weren't. XXs were allocated elsewhere, and that killed the Spitfire III.



Please prove that statement. 



> And since the early versions of the Seafire were based on, or modified from, Spitfire Vs they were basically stuck with the single stage engine. Also, the longer and heavier Merlin XX may have caused issues with prop clearence had the Seafires simply added the XX without the other required modifications.



The Spitfire III had a much modified airframe from the Spitfire I/II and it was this factor that probably killed it. 



> That is a very narrow reading of the situation.
> 
> The single speed Merlins had a more limited operating range than the XX. While peak power of the 45 maybe 20-30hp more at its ideal altitude (for +16psi boost I am assuming it is quite low) the XX has more power over most other altitudes.



The 45 was cleared for 16lb boost in Dec 1941 while the XX was limited to 14lb in low gear for most of 1942 leading to very minor differences using combat power. In any event this is all OT to the topic, as the Seafire itself is OT. OTOH, I think that a HSH with a Merlin 45/16lb boost would have been a real killer naval fighter in mid 1942.


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## FLYBOYJ (Apr 18, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> The First CCF Hurricane left the production line on Jan 1940. CCF had a large plant that was fully tooled up by mid 1941. Production was slow prior to the Packard Merlin because RR Merlins had to come over from the UK. After Packard Merlins came on the scene the P-40F took a large number of them. CCF built about 1450 HHs and HSHs, so they could, and did, build both both types with the bulk of production from early 1942 to early 1943. To put this into perspective, Grumman only built a total 1778 ( 1347 F4F and 431 Martlet ) F4F and Martlet aircraft (according to Dean) from Dec 1939 to the end of 1942, prior to turning over production to GM.
> 
> The design engineering for the Sea Hurricane had already been done by March 1941.
> 
> The USSR was invaded on June 22 1941.


 You just proved my point by your own timelines and indicated logistic issues of the day!!!

From Wiki - _"*By 1939*, with war on the horizon, Canadian Car Foundry and its Chief Engineer, Elsie MacGill, were contracted by the Royal Air Force to produce the Hawker Hurricane"_

Your comment "The First CCF Hurricane left the production line on *Jan 1940."* No comment on actual user acceptance and actual deployment. How many more were built that year? How many F4F were built and already in service in 1940? I believe the first arrester hook Hurricanes didn't reach the fleet until the Summer of 1941. How many F4F were built and readily available during the same period? Oh and BTW, wasn't the FAA operating Marlets in late summer of 1940? Hmmmm, it almost seems the MARTLET was _supplementing_ the Sea Hurricane!

1778 F4Fs and Marlets by the end of 1942. Do you really think CCF could have come close to those numbers, tooled and built the required aircraft, the USN gotten the aircraft carrier qualified and deployed with in a year? Again aside from that where's the "value added"? Although Nimitz wanted the Wildcat replaced it still more than held it's own and was continued to be built till the end of the war. If the USN was really dissatisfied with the aircraft production would have ceased the minute the F6F was rolling out the factory. 



RCAFson said:


> I think we'll have to agree to disagree about the coolant. I don't think that carrying a few hundred gallons of glycol represented an insurmountable problem.


It didn't - they (USN) just didn't want it on their carriers.



RCAFson said:


> They should have been able to do even better with a better performing aircraft.


That's an opinion - the Spitfire "should have" easily handled the Zero and it didn't, especially in initial engagements. How about the Hurricane over Burma? Shall we discuss the Hurricane's combat record against the Zero vs the Wildcat?



RCAFson said:


> That is what I am suggesting, and given the demand for naval fighters it would have been prudent to have another source for them.


Not denying that but your time lines on this happening only "would have" happened if someone recognized the potential in early 1941. A very good crystal ball would have been needed for that, but I repeat, in the end would have it beenworth the effort? In the mean time - 

_"I would still assess the Wildcat as the outstanding naval fighter of the early years of World War II ... I can vouch as a matter of personal experience, this Grumman fighter was one of the finest shipboard aeroplanes ever created."_

—Eric M. "Winkle" Brown, British test pilot

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## fastmongrel (Apr 18, 2014)

Wildcats just needed a bit more power to equal the Hurricanes. Is there a prospect of more horses in the timeframe I know the late models got a 1350hp engine can this be brought forward?


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## FLYBOYJ (Apr 18, 2014)

From Rich L., a great wealth of knowlege with regards to US Naval Aviation.

_"Claims to losses is a sticky subject. If you’re looking for an analysis of actual, verifiable victories to actual verifiable losses, that’s real hard to do. That being said, when talking about F4F’s vs A6M2’s in the first year of the war in the Pacific, the best place to go is two books written by John Lundstrom, “The First Team – Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway” and “The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign”. Both are pretty thick books with real small print. John was probably the last researcher to get to most of the USN and USMC pilots while they were still with us. As an example, from VF-42 he was able to speak to ten of the squadron’s pilots who flew at the Battle of the Coral Sea. There’s only two left today. John went to the Japanese records to reconcile claims to actual victories. I have not personally gone through the books page by page and made a stick count, but I can think of a few of guys who have and all agree that the ratio of F4Fs to A6Ms is damn close to about 1 F4F lost for every 1 A6M in the first year.

Personally, I like to work with the official reports. If you look at the roll up reported by the USN in 1946, you quickly find that it divides aerial victories into enemy bombers and enemy fighters, which, of course leaves out quite a few other players (float planes and the like) and leaves us wondering which fighters are they talking about. The only way to determine who is who is to look at the actual reports from the squadrons. I can do that with the Navy squadrons, I don’t have the information from the reports of the Marine squadrons.

Overall it looks like this (and just for F4F’s; FM-2’s are another story all together, with one of the highest kill claim to loss ratios of the war):

Carrier based F4Fs flew 1,104 combat sorties. Within these combat sorties, 17 F4Fs were lost to AA fire and 47 to enemy aircraft. There were 32 combat related operational losses (that is losses that occurred during a combat sortie but were not caused by combat damage; these are usually due to fuel exhaustion or flight deck accidents), 49 losses on non-combat related flights, and 22 were lost in the sinkings of Lexington, Yorktown, Wasp, or Hornet. On the claims side, there were a total of 302 enemy planes reported destroyed in combat, 190 bombers and 112 fighters.

USMC land based F4Fs flew 1,074 combat sorties. Within these combat sorties, 4 F4Fs were lost to AA fire and 75 to enemy aircraft. There were 11 combat related operational losses (these are usually due to fuel exhaustion or airfield accidents), 34 losses on non-combat related flights, and 26 were lost on the ground, at Wake or Guadalcanal. On the claims side, there were a total of 356 enemy planes reported destroyed in combat, 175 bombers and 281 fighters.

USN land based F4Fs flew 450 combat sorties. Within these combat sorties, 3 F4Fs were lost to AA fire and 56 to enemy aircraft. There were 7 combat related operational losses, 29 losses on non-combat related flights, and 20 were lost on the ground, at Wake or Guadalcanal. On the claims side, there were a total of 147 enemy planes reported destroyed in combat, 53 bombers and 94 fighters.

So, from the USN statistics, there were a total of 178 F4Fs lost in aerial combat versus about 905 claims, of which 487 were fighters. As much as I am an F4F booster, those numbers are a little hard to swallow, although I was interested to read in Herbert Bix’s “Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan” on page 461 reports 892 airplanes and 1882 pilots (and, one presumes, crewmen) lost between August 1942 and February 1943 in the struggle for Guadalcanal. General Yamada Otozo who was on Hirohito’s staff noted that this was “ . . . two and a half times the number of planes and fifteen times the number of pilots lost at Midway.” Certainly the F4F pilots did not shoot down all the Japanese planes lost during that period, but they did shoot down a goodly number, if not a majority. Gives one some pause to think, anyway.

Navy statistical records indicate that F4F’s were out of combat by October 1943, but the last two squadrons in action were VF-11 and VF-21 operating out of Fighter I on Guadalcanal. They left combat in July 1943. There may have been some F4F-4s mixed into with FM-1 squadrons operating from CVE’s between July and October, but they scored no victories of which I am aware.

So much for the gross numbers. If you look at the results culled for reports you can get a better feel for actual types shot down. Since I only have the information on Navy squadrons, you can draw your own conclusions on the Marines. The results I have tabulated for the Navy F4F squadrons looks like:\

Navy F4F-3 pilots were credited with 68.5 victories/10 Probables/7 damaged. Navy F4F-4 pilots were credited with 453/74/34, for a total of 521.5/84/41. Also of interest is that only 494 of these credits were for Japanese planes. Two of them were for German types and 25 for Vichy French (all from the F4F-4 total). If you compare the USN victory credits from the 1946 statistical report you can see that the statistical report has 449 credits for USN F4Fs for just enemy fighters and bombers in the Pacific. That would mean that some 45.5 of the Japanese aircraft shot down were NOT included in the statistical study as they were neither fighters (VF) nor bombers (VB). Counting up the non VF and non VB types listed gives a total of 33 victory credits or 12.5 less than the calculated value. On the other hand, the by squadron count shows 226 Japanese VB types credited and 233 Japanese VF types compared to the 1946 statistical report’s 243 and 206, repectively. My list of enemy types shot down by Navy F4Fs, based upon what was actually reported by squadrons, looks like this:

Japanese: 
219/33/19 - A6M Mitsubishi A6M series Type 00 Models 21, 22, 52 VF (Zeke)
6/0/0 - A6M2-N Nakajima Type 2 Float VF (Rufe)
1/0/0 - A6M3 Mitsubishi A6M series Type 00 Model 32 22A VF (Hamp)
58/14/6 - B5N Nakajima Type 97 VTB (Kate)
115/22/14 - D3A Aichi Type 99 VB (Val)
4/0/0 - E13A Aichi Type 00 2/Float VSO (Jake)
4/1/0 - E7K Kawanishi Type 94 VSO (Alf)
1/0/1 - E8N Nakajima Type 95 Float VSO (Dave)
7/1/0 - F1M Mitsubishi Type 0 Float VSO (Pete)
60.5/5/1 - G4M Mitsubishi G4M series Type 01 2/E VB/VR (Betty)
14/0/0 - H6K Kawanishi Type 97 4/E VP FB (Mavis)
2/0/0 - H8K Kawanishi Type 2 4/E VP FB (Emily)
1/0/0 - U/I 4/E VP Unidentified Japanese Patrol Aircraft
0/1/0 - U/I aircraft Unidentified Japanese Aircraft
2/2/0 - Me-109 Pacific Action Mis-ID, Probably A6M Mitsubishi Type 00 VF (Zeke, Zero)
494.5/79/41 – Japanese Total
German:
1/0/0 - He-115 Heinkel S/E Twin Float VSO
1/0/0 - Ju-88 Junkers Ju-88 Series 2/E VB
2/0/0 – German Total
Vichy French:
1/0/0 - B.174 or P.63/11 Bloch Type or Potez Type 2/E Lt VB 
4/1/0 - D.520 Dewointine Type VF 
8/0/0 - D.520 or H.75 Dewointine Type VF or Curtis P-36 type VF 
8/4/0 - H.75 Curtis P-36 type VF 
1/0/0 - LeO.45 Loire et Olivier Type 2/E Med VB 
3/0/0 - Martin 167 or LeO.45 Martin 'Baltimore' or Loire et Olivier 2/E Med VB 
25/5/0 – Vichy Total
521.5/84.0/41.0 – Grand Total

For what it’s worth.

Rich" _

At a minimum you're looking at 3:1 to 4:1 ratio against the Zero. In hindsight, I don't see any value added by the USN supplmenting the Pacific Fleet with Sea Hurricanes, especially when you had the F6F and later the F4U entering service. I also question if it "could have" happend quick enough to really make a difference, the time, money and materials "would have" been better used elsewhere (and they probably were).

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## tomo pauk (Apr 18, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> The "hooked" P-40 never existed, and for good reason; it's high wing loading and high stall speeds made it unsuitable as a carrier based naval fighter.



That was not the supposed reason (and we don't even know whether the USN really considered the P-40 as CV fighter), and that 'reason' never existed in 1st place. The wing loading was far smaller than of F4U and F6F.



> I gave Sea Hurricane IB performance figures earlier in the thread, on post 33. However what isn't shown there is that the combat climb rating would have been close to 4000fpm up to 6000ft or so, while time to 20,000ft would have been in the 6 minute range.



So the Sea Hurricane with ~1400 HP should climb as twice as F4F-4, let alone F4F-3. It should be also better than Spitfire V on same +16 lbs. Perhaps the 3500 fpm is a more reasonable thing to expect?



> Sorry, but you're the one claiming that boost override was inoperative at TO, when this is clearly not the case, and you'll have to prove that statement. Boost override is fully under the pilot's control and he could engage it when ever needed.



I never said that boost override was inoperative for TO conditions. I've said that boost override was allowed for an aircraft flying already at fast speed. If the Merlin 45 was indeed allowed for +16 lbs for take off in 1942, then what was the point to insist on two-speed engines for Mosquito, Lancaster, Hurricane and other bombers? Install the Merlin 45 on them and you've saved plenty of time and money. Seems the engineers don't agree with you.
Please note here that there is a distinction made for climb, cruise and combat conditions for Merlin 20 series of engines. And here is the power chart for different Merlin 20s, where again the disitnction was made for take off conditions and all-out conditions.



RCAFson said:


> The speeds given are for the Zero! I provided the SAC data for low altitudes since at high altitudes the Zero is faster, even according to the SAC data. However the SAC data suggests that the F4F-4 should be faster than the Zero at lower altitudes when actual flight tests show that the Zero was faster:
> The F4F-4 was test flown against the Zero. USA Flight testing gave the following speeds for the same Zero:
> *SL/270mph* (F4F-4 SAC data = 285
> *5000ft/287* (F4F-4 SAC data = 290
> ...



If you compare the SAC data with Grumman data, you will see that Grumman data is more realistic, for example they list the F4F-4 making 283 mph at 4600 ft. 



Greyman said:


> Sea Hurricane Merlin III engines were modified to allow +16 boost. This gave them performance similar to a regular Hurricane I using +12 boost.



Indeed, they were making 1440 HP at 5500 ft (no ram) as 'combat power'. The take off power remained the same, 880 HP. It took the RR to develop the Merlin XII in order for single speed Merlin to use boost of +12 lbs on take off.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 18, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> The USN actually called for Merlin engined fighters for both shore and carrier operations:
> 
> I suspect that the USN might have welcomed the Sea Hurricane in 1942.



One Admiral, Adm. Frank Jack Fletcher called for ‘P-40F or other suitable aircraft’ to be considered for carrier suitability. Considering Fletcher’s reputation among senior USN aviation leadership that is a suggestion that is unlikely to be given serious consideration, whatever one thinks of Fletcher, one admiral (and a black shoe admiral at that) is hardly “the USN”. In fact, it’s quite possible that Fletcher’s endorsement of such a proposal if anyone else supported it, killed it outright. 

However, I doubt they would have given the notion more than a passing thought and certainly not ‘welcomed’ any such infusion of such airframes… for a number of reasons some of which have already been noted here.




RCAFson said:


> _*The FAA didn't resist single seat fighters *_and used them throughout the war. However, they needed a folding wing fighter that could fit into the narrow lifts on Ark Royal and the Illustrious class carriers and there were no such single seat fighters in service in the RN or USN until late 1941, however by mid 1941 the Sea Hurricane was being used on FAA carriers with larger lifts and in 1942 even on the Illustrious class via a temporary deck park.
> 
> _*The ideal use for the Sea Hurricane would have been as a point defence fighter in lieu of the Wildcats that were kept as CAP*_ (rather than escorts) where it's high climb rate would have allowed it to gain the altitude advantage over incoming raids and provide top cover for the Wildcat, while the Sea Hurricane I would have given USN pilots speed parity with the zero under 10k ft along with better overall manoeuvrability. The Sea Hurricane II could carry twin 45IG drop tanks and could have served as an escort fighter but without folding wings it could not be carried in the same numbers as the F4F-4.



We’ll just have to agree to disagree about the FAA or RN’s '_resistance_' to single seat fighters. In my view, if a navy dedicates its limited resources toward the development of two-seat dive bomber-fighters or fighter-recon aircraft (whatever its justification) and then decides it must procure single seat fighter aircraft from other sources… its demonstrated a certain resistance or reluctance by how it prioritizes its expenditures of money. 

Just to clarify, time line for the F4F-3 (whose interceptor climb performance is competitive with that of the HSH): Initial sea trials of the F4F were in Early December. 1940. 22 F4F-3 were produced in late 1940 while an additional 27 were delivered to the USN by February 21, 1941 with 19 more by July 2, 1941. That’s 68 F4F-3’s sufficient to equip more than three squadrons by midyear.

Squadron transitions to the F4F-3 began in November 1940. By Late 1941, Half the USN carrier air wings (except VF-5, 6 and 2) were equipped with F4F-3s. VF-2 was equipped with F2A-3 (Transition from F2A-2 August, 1941) while the VF-5 6 transitioned to F4F-3As on or about in May 1941 (an investment made in their future receipt of F4F-3s or as it turned out, the F4F-4.) 
Otherwise transitions to F4F-3 occurred as follows with Atlantic Fleet Carriers having first dibbs on the new A/C: 
VF-41: November, 1940. 
VF-72: January 1940
VF-42: March, 1941
VF-71: March, 1941
VF-3: August, 1941. 

By the end of 1941 Grumman had completed its initial run of 185 F4F-3s and was already producing the F4F-4 variant. Apparently by December 31, 1941 all USN Carrier groups were equipped with F4F-3s except for VF-2 (F2A-3) and 6 (F4F-3A) although some of these were understrength (Sara’s e.g. VF-3), some were also overstrength. 
AFAIK, only 5 F4F-4 were produced for the USN in 1941. But production accelerated quickly with squadron transitions beginning soon after the new year.
In contrast, (folding wing) Martlet II deliveries beginning on October 4, 1941 amounted to 48 A/C by December 31, 1941. Prior to that 91 Martlet I and II were delivered between July 27, 1940 and March 14, 1941. This just validates your statement about such folding wing single seat fighter aircraft did not becoming available until late '41. 

Ignoring the previously mentioned significant logistical challenges of a fighter squadron with dissimilar type a/c, there are a variety of better options and good reasons why the addition of a fixed-wing Sea Hurricane or for that matter a navalized fixed-wing P-40F to USN carrier air wing in 1941-42 is a poor option. 

If a mixed composition fighter squadron was desired, the addition of smaller F4F-3’s, whose performance was not too dissimilar to that of the initial HSH (except in its max speed), would be a more logistically suitable option with aircrew already trained in type. In early 42, before there were sufficient numbers of F4F-4s became available, such mixed (F4F-3 F4F-4) air groups were not uncommon. 

Also, the F4F made possible operational options that may have made it more attractive than one might expect despite its relatively poor performance. 

Aside from its anemic climb rate, the biggest objection to the F4F-4 that many pilots expressed was in the reduced firing time of the -4 from the -3’s 30+ seconds to 18 seconds; I believe that’s about the same as a HSH with 8 .303 lmg. However, It looks like F4F equipped squadrons also had the option of removing two HMGs and reducing ammo supply which could reduce the weight by about 300 lbs. That would recover some of the lost performance of the original F4F-3 but of course further reduce firing time. Alternatively, the original max-load configuration could be retained accepting the performance degradation and the two outboard guns used to extend firing time albeit at a lower volume of fire. Whether any of these options was ever exercised is unknown. But the HSH or P-40F options were more limited with endurance that was already extended by the use of external tanks to be comparable with the F4F-3 or 4. AFAIK, from about May 1942 on, the range comparison bar was additionally raised by extending the Grumman’s own range with disposable tanks.

It is clear that proper tactics allowed the F4F for all its faults to be an effective fighter and that whatever configuration was used in combat, it apparently got the job done. 

In the final analysis, the fact that the F4F’s small flight deck footprint allowed many more fighters to be carried significantly outweighs the lack of performance. It’s true that most carrier vs carrier combat starts at no more than 20 or so thousand feet and progresses to lower altitudes. It’s also true that the air battle over Guadalcanal, the turning point of the Pacific war, was largely waged at the higher altitudes where the F4F's two stage SC was an important factor. 

The marines on Guadalcanal were always short of VF VMF F4F-4s. Their numbers were frequently replenished by the land-basing of USN fighter squadrons from the carriers sunk and damaged during the campaign. Attrition was so high that reducing the numbers of embarked USN VF could have compromised the ability of the marine defenders to protect themselves from aerial attack. The HSH’s performance edge was not likely to be good enough to balance such losses.

Lt. General Ross E. Rowell Commander Marine Air Wings Pacific, said, “ What saved Guadalcanal was the loss of so many carriers.” In other words, it was shear numbers of F4F-4’s that made the difference, not performance.

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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 18, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> And this may NOT be a smooth landing;
> 
> View attachment 250728
> 
> ...



Probably a floater. Bounced once on touchdown and proceeded to '_float_' down the flight deck. Not a good thing especially if he floats over the barrier.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 18, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> The USAAF had no problem with using Spitfires in 1942/43.
> 
> I'm pretty sure that _if USN pilots were allowed to offer their opinion they would have gladly flown Cdn built Sea Hurricanes_. It was the pilots who were the leading dissenters regarding the F4F - _*they wanted something better and said so on many occasions.*_



Of course The pilots expressed concern following their disappointment at the loss of performance in exchanging the -3 for the -4. This was exacerbated by the experience during the carrier battles of 1942. However, the diminished ammo supply or firing time seems to have been the chief complaint. Based on their negative comments, BuAer had the GM produced version, FM-1, revert to the F4F-3 armament configuration and did not change the A/C's performance by reducing its weight in any way. In fact it appears the FM-1 basic weight increased by 130 lbs despite the deletion to the two HMGs. Weight reduction and improved performance was deferred until the advent of the FM-2, long after the arrival of the F6F and the performance crisis had passed. The first GM FM-1 appeared in September 1942.

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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 19, 2014)

My apologies RCAFson, I missed your post no. 62 and it at least deserves comment, if not endorsement.



RCAFson said:


> following text preceded by the extended quote from *Black Shoe Admiral* with negative commentary of USN aviation leadership:
> 
> Why wouldn't they like a faster, more manoeuvrable fighter that was already combat proven? The USN resisted liquid cooled engines, but as the statement *from Nimitz makes clear by mid 1942 they were not happy with the F4F-4*:
> 
> By Oct 1942 the USN was scraping the bottom of the barrel to feed F4F-4s into Guadalcanal. The Sea Hurricane II would have given them another fighter to supplement the F4F-4 and it would have been better suited to shore based ops than the F4F-4 with it's narrow LG. Having the Sea Hurricane in production would have reduced the USN's reliance on a single source for carrier fighters.



If the HSH could have been added to the land-based mix in October 42, it would have certainly helped, but that's also when the first P-38s were showing up in Theater with F4U about 5 months later. The suggestion to replace (marine and navy) land based unit's with P-40F Warhawks was acted upon but not by starting a new training and logistical pipeline for USMC and USN, but rather by simply rebasing of army P-40F units. Midway apparently received such a unit in the summer of 42. 

The expressions of the senior USN leaders that derided the F4F-4's performance are worth considering *in the context in which they were made*. Even at this '_late_' stage (Spring of '42) of the war, the skill of IJN pilots and the performance of their aircraft came as a something of a collective shock. Many allied combatants were facing and attempting to come to grips with the new reality for the first time. To this point, and despite the events at Midway (during which the USN F4F-4 acquitted itself fairly well) the disparity in F4F-3 vs F4F-4 performance appeared to be a real war waging handicap that threatened the success of future operations. Also, aircrew having their equipment replaced by a newer model, would naturally expect an improvement which didn't materialize. So, it is perhaps not surprising that Nimitz, Halsey, Murray and every VF squadron commander complained about the F4F-4 to varying degrees. 

Presenting the expressed negative perspective of various USN leaders regarding the F4F-4 to make a case for the replacement of some carrier based F4F, it seems fair to also present LCdr James Flately's endorsement of the F4F-4 from the same period in a letter he entitled _The Navy Fighter _ to ComCarPac with cc's to BuAer, CominCh and CincPac: From* First Team*

"_What the F4F-4 lacks in climb and maneuverability is more than compensated for by its excellent armament, protective armor, protected fuel system, and greater strength._" Focusing on the importance of VF morale and proper tactics, he continues, "_Let us not condemn our equipment…. Let's build the confidence of our fighter pilots by teaching them tactics rather than breaking down their confidence in themselves and their planes by telling them they can't lick the enemy* in those planes.*_" he concludes: "_Let's … quit gripping about our planes._" 

The idea of supplementing F4F-4 with HSH is in my opinion not horrible strictly from the standpoint of improved performance, but I don't believe the performance difference between it and the -3 and that of the A6M was so great that they outweighed the logistical/training/familiarity advantages of a mixed carrier wing comprised of -3 and -4 F4F models. 
It looks like that was also in the mind of BuAer if one can believe Lundstrom in *First team*. He seems to say that BurAer's Cdr. Pearson told Flately that 100 additional F4F-3s were being procured for perhaps just that purpose or at the least to augment Land Based marine units.

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## FLYBOYJ (Apr 19, 2014)

The only way I could see a number of Sea Hurricanes available to any VF unit is if a number of the aircraft "just happened" to be located in San Diego or Norfolk as a carrier group was returning to port. Considering that the first arrestor hook Sea Hurricane came to be during the late summer of 1941, I don't see this happening UNLESS someone in the USN saw the Sea Hurricane as a great advantage over the F4F and began the production ball rolling prior to WW2. The "supplementation" would have been welcomed IMO, to view this as a "should have done" after Pearl Harbor, was not practical or worth the effort when the F6F was on the way and the F4F (in retrospect) was holding it's own.


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## RCAFson (Apr 19, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> That was not the supposed reason (and we don't even know whether the USN really considered the P-40 as CV fighter), and that 'reason' never existed in 1st place. The wing loading was far smaller than of F4U and F6F.



The wing loading was about the same as the F4U/F6F but the airframe and LG were not designed for arrested landings and if the airframe is modded to take the extra stress the wing loading will get higher yet. The Hurricane's low wing loading and stall speed meant that the airframe/LG could withstand arrested landings without difficulty. 





> So the Sea Hurricane with ~1400 HP should climb as twice as F4F-4, let alone F4F-3. It should be also better than Spitfire V on same +16 lbs. Perhaps the 3500 fpm is a more reasonable thing to expect?


 Peak climb rate will be about twice as high as the F4F-4 and about the same as the Spitfire V (similar weight and lower wing loading than the Spitfire VC).





> I never said that boost override was inoperative for TO conditions. I've said that boost override was allowed for an aircraft flying already at fast speed. If the Merlin 45 was indeed allowed for +16 lbs for take off in 1942, then what was the point to insist on two-speed engines for Mosquito, Lancaster, Hurricane and other bombers? Install the Merlin 45 on them and you've saved plenty of time and money. Seems the engineers don't agree with you.
> Please note here that there is a distinction made for climb, cruise and combat conditions for Merlin 20 series of engines. And here is the power chart for different Merlin 20s, where again the disitnction was made for take off conditions and all-out conditions.



We got into this phase of our discussion while talking about whether an overloaded Spitfire V pilot could use the boost cut out on take off, for a one time event and I never suggested that this would be standard practice for high intensity ops in land based aircraft! The Merlin 20 clearly gives more TO/high altitude power, at the same boost, as the Merlin 45 which were critical factors for heavily loaded bombers but much less so for a medium altitude fighter.




> If you compare the SAC data with Grumman data, you will see that Grumman data is more realistic, for example they list the F4F-4 making 283 mph at 4600 ft.


 Grumman revised their data downwards from their initial estimates.




> Indeed, they were making 1440 HP at 5500 ft (no ram) as 'combat power'. The take off power remained the same, 880 HP. It took the RR to develop the Merlin XII in order for single speed Merlin to use boost of +12 lbs on take off.



The Spitfire/Hurricane with the Merlin II/III was being used operationally with 100 octane fuel to increase TO performance in 1938:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/24sept38-spitfire-100oct-approval.jpg

This implies an increase in boost since at 6.25lb boost TO power remains the same even with 100 octane fuel.


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## RCAFson (Apr 19, 2014)

FLYBOYJ said:


> The only way I could see a number of Sea Hurricanes available to any VF unit is if a number of the aircraft "just happened" to be located in San Diego or Norfolk as a carrier group was returning to port. Considering that the first arrestor hook Sea Hurricane came to be during the late summer of 1941, I don't see this happening UNLESS someone in the USN saw the Sea Hurricane as a great advantage over the F4F and began the production ball rolling prior to WW2. The "supplementation" would have been welcomed IMO, to view this as a "should have done" after Pearl Harbor, was not practical or worth the effort when the F6F was on the way.



The FAA and Hawker began engineering the Sea Hurricane in June/july 1940. First arrested landings were in early 1941, first delivery to an operational squadron was probably March 15 of a Sea Hurricane IB converted in the UK, from a CCF Hurricane I. First HSH 1B kill was 31 July 1941 by 880 squadron operating from HMS Furious.


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## FLYBOYJ (Apr 19, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> The FAA and Hawker began engineering the Sea Hurricane in June/july 1940. First arrested landings were in early 1941, first delivery to an operational squadron was probably March 15 of a Sea Hurricane IB converted in the UK, from a CCF Hurricane I. First HSH 1B kill was 31 July 1941 by 880 squadron operating from HMS Furious.


I know - you were talking setting up HSH production in North America. There was no way you were going to set up production, build additional tooling, build the aircraft, get it carrier qualified and off to say Guadalcanal if a contract was signed say January 1942, and again, would it be worth it after all that was shown about the F4F?


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## RCAFson (Apr 19, 2014)

FLYBOYJ said:


> From Rich L., a great wealth of knowlege with regards to US Naval Aviation.



Based on Lundstrom's accounts which use IJN and USN data, the Wildcat achieved about a 1-1 kill ratio with the Zero, in 1942.


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## RCAFson (Apr 19, 2014)

FLYBOYJ said:


> I know - you were talking setting up HSH production in North America. There was no way you were going to set up production, build additional tooling, build the aircraft, get it carrier qualified and off to say Guadalcanal if a contract was signed say January 1942, and again, would it be worth it after all that was shown about the F4F?





The Sea Hurricane was already carrier qualified in early 1941. I'm suggesting that after Packard got the Merlin contract, that the USN could have signed a deal with CCF to build the HSH II (say early-mid 1941), with production commencing ASAP ( ~jan-feb 1942) once the Packard Merlin is available. This would have meant fewer P-40Fs (but more P40Es) as the CCF HSH would have had a higher priority for Packard Merlins.


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## FLYBOYJ (Apr 19, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> The Sea Hurricane was already carrier qualified in early 1941.


By the RAN, not by the USN. It would have had to go thru carrier quals regardless.


RCAFson said:


> I'm suggesting that after Packard got the Merlin contract, that the USN could have signed a deal with CCF to build the HSH II (say early-mid 1941), with production commencing ASAP ( ~jan-feb 1942) once the Packard Merlin is available. This would have meant fewer P-40Fs (but more P40Es) as the CCF HSH would have had a higher priority for Packard Merlins.


Production ~Jan-Feb 1942, and when do you think the first ones will be delivered? This is all wishful thinking, especially when diverting already allocated engines, again for what value added? This is all assuming a contract was signed in early 1941, again not very likely.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 19, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> The wing loading was about the same as the F4U/F6F but the airframe and LG were not designed for arrested landings and if the airframe is modded to take the extra stress the wing loading will get higher yet. The Hurricane's low wing loading and stall speed meant that the airframe/LG could withstand arrested landings without difficulty.



The landing gear of the early P-40s was designed with some healthy redundancy - it weighted 628 lbs in the P-40 (no letter) vs. 351 lbs for the F4F-4. 740-750 lbs was for the Hellcat, that was 50% heavier for same missions. The weight of landing gear went to 649 kbs with P-40B/C, and then 694 ( a typo in the AHT?) P-40E, then lightened to 552 lbs for the heavier (!) P-40F and stood at about that weight until the magnesium wheels were introduced with P-40N, weighting 488 lbs there. The P-40E (1150 HP for take off) was tested with two 225 US gal tanks ( take off weight close to 11000 lbs), for ferry purposes - looks like landing gear, engine and wing were up to the task.
The P-40 was carrying between 112 and 133 imp gals in protected tanks (150 in non-protected tanks), vs. 94 imp gals for the Hurricane. That leaves option of removing one tank, like it was the case for few P-40 versions, for greater RoC and lower wing loading, or retaining it for a range a bit better than F4F, let alone for Hurricane.



> Peak climb rate will be about twice as high as the F4F-4 and about the same as the Spitfire V (similar weight and lower wing loading than the Spitfire VC).



No doubt that the climb rate would be better than F4F. I, however, doubt it that RoC should be better than of Spitfire Vs. The bigger drag should be also a concern?



> We got into this phase of our discussion while talking about whether an overloaded Spitfire V pilot could use the boost cut out on take off, for a one time event and I never suggested that this would be standard practice for high intensity ops in land based aircraft! The Merlin 20 clearly gives more TO/high altitude power, at the same boost, as the Merlin 45 which were critical factors for heavily loaded bombers but much less so for a medium altitude fighter.



Seems like this statement got us side-tracked: "_The Merlin boost override can be engaged at any altitude to be used as the pilot saw fit. _" (your post #60 here). 



> Grumman revised their data downwards from their initial estimates.



Would you be so kind to direct me to the Grumman's data other than what can be found at Williams' site?



> The Spitfire/Hurricane with the Merlin II/III was being used operationally with 100 octane fuel to increase TO performance in 1938:
> http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100-octane/24sept38-spitfire-100oct-approval.jpg
> 
> This implies an increase in boost since at 6.25lb boost TO power remains the same even with 100 octane fuel.



Thanks for posting that. 
In case the +12 lbs boost was allowed also for take off regime, the power should be greater, 1180-1190 HP judging by the power chart for Merlin III. It is puzzling why the later document, that covers even the mid-war Merlins, notes only +6.25 lbs boost (880 HP for take off)?


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## FLYBOYJ (Apr 19, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> Based on Lundstrom's accounts which use IJN and USN data, the Wildcat achieved about a 1-1 kill ratio with the Zero, in 1942.



And the Sea hurricane "would have" done any better? Based on what happened in Burma there's a lot of wishful thinking going on here!


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## RCAFson (Apr 19, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> The landing gear of the early P-40s was designed with some healthy redundancy - it weighted 628 lbs in the P-40 (no letter) vs. 351 lbs for the F4F-4. 740-750 lbs was for the Hellcat, that was 50% heavier for same missions. The weight of landing gear went to 649 kbs with P-40B/C, and then 694 ( a typo in the AHT?) P-40E, then lightened to 552 lbs for the heavier (!) P-40F and stood at about that weight until the magnesium wheels were introduced with P-40N, weighting 488 lbs there. The P-40E (1150 HP for take off) was tested with two 225 US gal tanks ( take off weight close to 11000 lbs), for ferry purposes - looks like landing gear, engine and wing were up to the task.
> The P-40 was carrying between 112 and 133 imp gals in protected tanks (150 in non-protected tanks), vs. 94 imp gals for the Hurricane. That leaves option of removing one tank, like it was the case for few P-40 versions, for greater RoC and lower wing loading, or retaining it for a range a bit better than F4F, let alone for Hurricane.



It is not the take off that stressed the LG and airframe, but the arrested landing and the aircraft will be heavier yet with an airframe modded for that. Additionally the view over the nose is terrible and it would have been very difficult to land on a carrier.




> No doubt that the climb rate would be better than F4F. I, however, doubt it that RoC should be better than of Spitfire Vs. The bigger drag should be also a concern?


The difference in drag at climbing speeds is minimal and offset by the lower wing loading.




> Seems like this statement got us side-tracked: "_The Merlin boost override can be engaged at any altitude to be used as the pilot saw fit. _" (your post #60 here).



Yes, and I stand by that statement.




> Would you be so kind to direct me to the Grumman's data other than what can be found at Williams' site?



See the Grumman specs for the F4F-3:



> Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation
> Report No. 1469A
> August 12, 1941
> Detail Specification
> ...


 and note the performance for the overload fighter at 7432lb.

and then look at the specs for the F4F-4:


> Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation
> Report No. 1471C
> October 21, 1942
> Detail Specification
> ...


 and note the performance at 7426lb and then note the discrepancy between the F4F-4 and F4F-3 at near identical weights! The time to climb to 20K ft has gone from 8.4min in the F4F-3 to 12.7min in the F4F-4 yet the weights are the same! Grumman "sexed up" the performance stats for the F4F-3/4 and then had to back away from them as it was obvious that actual service aircraft, in combat, could not hope to match Grumman's claims, and USN/USMC pilots said so in no uncertain terms.









> Thanks for posting that.
> In case the +12 lbs boost was allowed also for take off regime, the power should be greater, 1180-1190 HP judging by the power chart for Merlin III. It is puzzling why the later document, that covers even the mid-war Merlins, notes only +6.25 lbs boost (880 HP for take off)?



Because, for a land based aircraft it was probably made little difference to a Merlin III fighter with CS prop, so they left the TO rating at 6.25lbs, especially since pilots knew that they were authorized to use higher TO boost if it became necessary.


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## RCAFson (Apr 19, 2014)

FLYBOYJ said:


> And the Sea hurricane "would have" done any better? Based on what happened in Burma there's a lot of wishful thinking going on here!



The Sea Hurricane II was faster and could out roll, out turn, and out climb the F4F-4. Given the same tactical situations it should do better than the F4F-4.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 19, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> Based on Lundstrom's accounts which use IJN and USN data, the Wildcat achieved about a 1-1 kill ratio with the Zero, in 1942.



Interesting compilation but what I really wonder was there a trend as time went on? 

It looks like (Based on *1st Team-GC)* page 528 529 we have summary tabulation including 7 August 42 thru 15 November 42. 

He estimates 31 USN F4F lost vs 25 A6M over this period. So 9 F4F were lost in A2AC against 1 A6M at the outset, including 5 a/c from two divisions of VF-5 on the first day of fighting at Guadalcanal, badly positioned due to overcast. Two divisions of VF-6 also lost 4 more F4F to A6M attacks All in all from that point on, the ratio went 22 USN F4F vs 24 IJN A6M… So as time progressed the tally got no worse and mayhaps got marginally (very marginally) better. I believe most of the USN VF were committed to the island during September with the loss of Sara and Wasp, with Enterprise and Hornet contributing some VF to the total at various times. What we don't have is a compilation of the results of Marine VMF Performance in this volume. We do however, have a quote by Lt. Col. Joe Bauer who exhorted his pilots to, "_Be an aggressor._" His aerial warfare philosophy with the F4F was purported to be:

"_When you see Zeros, Dogfight 'em._"

The supposition is that he recognized that the IJN was losing its best pilots in the war of attrition and the new replacements didn't fully understand how to get the most out of the A6M.

In any event, I think your case suffers when you make comparisons to the F4F performance. I believe it's strongest when you argue that the HSH was a fine aircraft that could make a worthwhile contribution, if it had been available in numbers in that critical time frame, flying primarily from land bases but with the flexibility for staging from A/C carriers at need.
JMHO.


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## FLYBOYJ (Apr 19, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> The Sea Hurricane II was faster and could out roll, out turn, and out climb the F4F-4. Given the same tactical situations it should do better than the F4F-4.


And it "SHOULD" have done better in Burma, don't ya think?

It boils down to tactics, so in the end, I don't see the value added here unless there was a gaggle of HSHs just sitting idle somewhere in a US port shortly after PH.

BTW, although Lundstrom has done some great work, I still take his numbers with a grain of salt. And you say he showed "1942" numbers, what about the rest of the F4F's operational career?



RCAFson said:


> The Sea Hurricane II was faster and could out roll, out turn, and out climb the F4F-4.



So could the Zero


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## FLYBOYJ (Apr 19, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> In any event, I think your case suffers when you make comparisons to the F4F performance. I believe it's strongest when you argue that the HSH was a fine aircraft that could make a worthwhile contribution, if it had been available in numbers in that critical time frame, flying primarily from land bases but with the flexibility for staging from A/C carriers at need.
> JMHO.



*BINGO!!!*


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## RCAFson (Apr 19, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> I
> 
> In any event, I think your case suffers when you make comparisons to the F4F performance. I believe it's strongest when you argue that the HSH was a fine aircraft that could make a worthwhile contribution, if it had been available in numbers in that critical time frame, flying primarily from land bases but with the flexibility for staging from A/C carriers at need.
> JMHO.



If there had been a fly-off between the F4F-3/4 with the Sea Hurricane II, the Wildcat would have been "tamed" pretty convincingly. It simply couldn't compete with the Sea Hurricane II as a pure fighter. As You and I have pointed it, the folding wing F4F-4, was better suited to the overall duties required of a naval fighter but it was not well suited for use as a point defence fighter. For example a Sea Hurricane II could climb to 30k ft in about 17min versus 25-30 mins for the F4F-4. So, would the USN have gained a tactical advantage from having a 1/2 dozen Sea Hurricane IIs on each CV from early 1942? I think the answer is yes.

So if we add a hundred+ HSHs to the USN, we can then give the surplus F4F-4s to the RN for use on the narrow lift RN CVs - everybody wins.


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## tomo pauk (Apr 19, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> It is not the took off that stressed the LG and airframe, but the arrested landing and the aircraft will be heavier yet with an airframe modded for that. Additionally the view over the nose is terrible and it would have been very difficult to land on a carrier.



P-40 have had its' shortcomings, flimsy construction was not one of them.
I've listed the weights of the interesting U/C gears, and P-40 can simply retain the heavy 630-700 lbs ones for CV duties, rather than reduce the strength (and weight at ~550 lbs) as they have done for later marks. Should do as good as Hellcat's 10% heavier U/C.
The view over the nose was maybe not the greatest thing, somewhere between Hurricane and Spitfire (no fuel tank between pilot and engine in P-40). 
The P-40 does not have 'water brakes' - down protruding coolers, like P-51, Hurricane or Spitfire. Should be safer plane to ditch in.



> The difference in drag at climbing speeds is minimal and offset by the lower wing loading.



The Spitfire I, on normal boost and with CS prop, was at 2800+ fpm range at lower altitudes, vs. 2600+ for the Hurricane I, same conditions, of course same engines. 



> Yes, and I stand by that statement.



Okay 



> See the Grumman specs for the F4F-3:
> 
> and note the performance for the overload fighter at 7432lb.
> 
> ...



Grumman 'sexed up' climb rating for the F4F-3. The speed rating was as it was said by Grumman, for both F-3 and F-4. 



> Because, for a land based aircraft it was probably made little difference to a Merlin III fighter with CS prop, so they left the TO rating at 6.25lbs, especially since pilots knew that they were authorized to use higher TO boost if it became necessary.



Could be. 
Perhaps someone with a good book about the Merlin could shed some light on this and other issues?


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## RCAFson (Apr 19, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> P-40 have had its' shortcomings, flimsy construction was not one of them.
> I've listed the weights of the interesting U/C gears, and P-40 can simply retain the heavy 630-700 lbs ones for CV duties, rather than reduce the strength (and weight at ~550 lbs) as they have done for later marks. Should do as good as Hellcat's 10% heavier U/C.
> The view over the nose was maybe not the greatest thing, somewhere between Hurricane and Spitfire (no fuel tank between pilot and engine in P-40).
> The P-40 does not have 'water brakes' - down protruding coolers, like P-51, Hurricane or Spitfire. Should be safer plane to ditch in.



So the P-40 gains weight for the LG and then additional weight for the retractable hook, and that hook must be able to withstand a lot more force than on a HSH.




> The Spitfire I, on normal boost and with CS prop, was at 2800+ fpm range at lower altitudes, vs. 2600+ for the Hurricane I, same conditions, of course same engines.



The Spitfire I at 2800fpm (6050lb)was about 5% lighter than the Hurricane 1 (6317lb) . At similar weights (as per the Sea Hurricane 1B/ Spitfire Vc with HSH 1% heavier) there is very little difference in climb rates: 

Hurricane 1/merlin 45 @ 6645lb = 7.1min to 20k ft and 2940fps at 14400ft. (Secret years, p303)
Spitfire Vc/Merlin 45 @ 6965lb = 7.9min to 20k ft and 2650fps at 14900ft. ( http://www.spitfireperformance.com/aa878.html )
The other climb trials reported by Williams and in The Secret Years show some variation by weight but probably average to a similar result as for the Hurricane 1/merlin 45/





> Grumman 'sexed up' climb rating for the F4F-3. The speed rating was as it was said by Grumman, for both F-3 and F-4.



the -3/4 use the same engine yet at the same weights the -3 is stated to about 10-12mph faster. The logical conclusion is that -3 performance was actually about the same as Grumman finally admitted for the F4F-4 at ~7426lb in Oct 1942.


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## Greyman (Apr 19, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Perhaps someone with a good book about the Merlin could shed some light on this and other issues?



Emergency boost for take-off probably isn't in the Pilot's Notes for any single-engine fighter, but I'm sure it happened.


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## Juha (Apr 19, 2014)

The fact is that Hurricanes did very poorly against Zeros and Oscars during the early part of war in FE, even CW Brewster Buffalos achieved better exchange rate than Hurricane and with its under fuselage radiator Hurri was a lousy ditcher. Difficult to see why would USN/USMC have been interested in Hurricane.

Juha


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## FLYBOYJ (Apr 19, 2014)

Juha said:


> with its under fuselage radiator Hurri was a lousy ditcher. Difficult to see why would USN/USMC have been interested in Hurricane.
> 
> Juha



Great point!


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## wuzak (Apr 19, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> The Spitfire I at 2800fpm (6050lb)was about 5% lighter than the Hurricane 1 (6317lb) .



Yes, it is. 




RCAFson said:


> At similar weights (as per the Sea Hurricane 1B/ Spitfire Vc with HSH 1% heavier) there is very little difference in climb rates:



Why do you expect a Sea Hurricane to be similar in weight?




RCAFson said:


> Hurricane 1/merlin 45 @ 6645lb = 7.1min to 20k ft and 2940fps at 14400ft. (Secret years, p303)
> Spitfire Vc/Merlin 45 @ 6965lb = 7.9min to 20k ft and 2650fps at 14900ft. ( Spitfire Mk V AA.878 Report )
> The other climb trials reported by Williams and in The Secret Years show some variation by weight but probably average to a similar result as for the Hurricane 1/merlin 45/



Was there actually any Hurricane Is fitted with Merlin 45s? Or is that a manufacturer's estimate for the Hurricane I/Merlin 45?

The Spitfire Vc as tested had the 2 x 20mm + 4 x 0.303" armament option. What armament was in the Hurricane I/Merlin 45?

Hurricane II Z-3564 Trials Report has the climbing performance of the Hurricane II as 2710ft/min @ 8300ft and 2160ft/min at 15,700ft at +9.8psi and +9.4psi boost respectively. Time to 30,000ft is 17.0 minutes.

Of course with the 45 in place of the XX some 65lbs will have been saved (from engine weight), but there will be a loss of low down climbing perfromance.

The weight as tested here was 7333lb: http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/z3564-weights.jpg

Not sure if that was the 8mg or 12mg version.

Time to climb for Spitfire Vc AA.878 was 14.3 minutes at normal rating with +9.0psi boost.

(Time to climb to 30,000ft for Spitfire I N.3171 was 16.4 minutes with Merlin III and maximum boost during the climb test of +6.4psi, FWIW. Spitfire Mk I N.3171 Trials Report)


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## RCAFson (Apr 19, 2014)

Juha said:


> The fact is that Hurricanes did very poorly against Zeros and Oscars during the early part of war in FE, even CW Brewster Buffalos achieved better exchange rate than Hurricane and with its under fuselage radiator Hurri was a lousy ditcher. Difficult to see why would USN/USMC have been interested in Hurricane.
> 
> Juha



The key point is to examine similar tactical situations.

The Hurricane was a lousy ditcher but the survival rate of pilots who had to ditch was pretty good. Including combat and ditching of 8 aircraft only one of 8 Sea Hurricane Ia pilots was lost in action.


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## RCAFson (Apr 19, 2014)

wuzak said:


> Why do you expect a Sea Hurricane to be similar in weight?



The Sea Hurricane 1B (per the data card) was 7015 Ib versus a Spit Vc at 6965lb. A Sea Hurricane IIA would weigh about the same as a Hurricane IIB.





> Was there actually any Hurricane Is fitted with Merlin 45s? Or is that a manufacturer's estimate for the Hurricane I/Merlin 45?



Hurricane I P3157 was used as a test bed for the Merlin 45 in Dec 1940, and was the aircraft whose performance is stated above. 



> The Spitfire Vc as tested had the 2 x 20mm + 4 x 0.303" armament option. What armament was in the Hurricane I/Merlin 45?


The Hurricane 1 had 8 x .303mgs.



> Hurricane II Z-3564 Trials Report has the climbing performance of the Hurricane II as 2710ft/min @ 8300ft and 2160ft/min at 15,700ft at +9.8psi and +9.4psi boost respectively. Time to 30,000ft is 17.0 minutes.
> 
> Of course with the 45 in place of the XX some 65lbs will have been saved (from engine weight), but there will be a loss of low down climbing perfromance.
> 
> ...



Time to climb for Spitfire Vc AA.878 was 14.3 minutes at normal rating with +9.0psi boost.

(Time to climb to 30,000ft for Spitfire I N.3171 was 16.4 minutes with Merlin III and maximum boost during the climb test of +6.4psi, FWIW. Spitfire Mk I N.3171 Trials Report)[/QUOTE]

Climbing trials tend to vary depending on tested weight. As i stated, a Sea Hurricane IIa weighs about the same as a Hurricane IIB. The Spitfire V climb tests are also done with climb RPM boosted to 3000rpm above 20k ft (depending on test) which improves boost and climb over the Merlin XX which was held at 2850rpm during the test even though 3000rpm, above 20k ft. during climb was also permitted on the Merlin XX.


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## wuzak (Apr 19, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> The Sea Hurricane 1B (per the data card) was 7015 Ib versus a Spit Vc at 6965lb. A Sea Hurricane IIA would weigh about the same as a Hurricane IIB.



So, about 7300lb?




RCAFson said:


> Hurricane I P3157 was used as a test bed for the Merlin 45 in Dec 1940, and was the aircraft whose performance is stated above.



OK. Didn't know that happened. 

Even so, the time to climb performance is apparently less than the Spitfire I with the Merlin III, going by time to 30,000ft. 

Also, since you are showing the performance of the Hurricane I with the Merlin 45, is it not logical to compare that to a Spitfire VA, also with the 8 mg armament? 

In that case, Spitfire VA X.4922 was tested at a weight of 6450lb (all up weight in service) and had a peak climb rate of 3140ft/min @ 14,400ft and time to climb of 12.9 minutes to 30,000ft. 

Spitfire Mk VA X.4922 Report




RCAFson said:


> Climbing trials tend to vary depending on tested weight. As i stated, a Sea Hurricane IIa weighs about the same as a Hurricane IIB. The Spitfire V climb tests are also done with climb RPM boosted to 3000rpm above 20k ft (depending on test) which improves boost and climb over the Merlin XX which was held at 2850rpm during the test even though 3000rpm, above 20k ft. during climb was also permitted on the Merlin XX.



The Spitfire V tests with Merlin 45 used 3000rpm for combat climbs and for normal climbs above 25,000ft. At 26,000ft and 3000rpm the Merlin 45 is using a mere +2.8psi boost in AA.878!


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## OldSkeptic (Apr 20, 2014)

Shortround6 said:


> Sea Hurricane?
> 
> Needs a wing fold for the US. Needs more fuel.
> 
> ...



By and large agree, but to add:

The P-40 performance was (even with a Merlin) woeful. The Hurricane was obsolete in 1940, performance also woeful.
P-51 landing performance was poor, for a carrier lethal (yes they tested it).
P-39 already woeful in performance ....

For all of them their performance would also deteriorate when 'navalised' (extra weight and all that).

So there was not an airframe, except the Spitfire, that could even have a hope in hell of matching ETO land based aircraft (note that none of the pre late 44 USN fighters could either, the Hellcat, for example, could just about match a Spit Mk V ....with a 2 year separation in time).


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## tomo pauk (Apr 20, 2014)

The speed of the P-40F (Merlin aboard) was in the ball park with Sptfire V, on same boost. The RoC was lower, due to greater weight of the P-40. The P-40F have had more fuel, though (part of the greater weight) - 131 imp gal vs. 84 imp gal for the Spit V.



RCAFson said:


> So the P-40 gains weight for the LG and then additional weight for the retractable hook, and that hook must be able to withstand a lot more force than on a HSH.



The P-40 does not gain any weight for the LG beyond 695 lbs - it is already a strong (and heavy) piece of the A/C. The later marks used lightened LGs, 1st by ~150 lbs, than by another 100 lbs, due to use of magnesium rims. The navalized P-40 can retain the early, strong LG. Arresting gear weighted 36-37 lbs for the Hellcat, per AHT.



> the -3/4 use the same engine yet at the same weights the -3 is stated to about 10-12mph faster. The logical conclusion is that -3 performance was actually about the same as Grumman finally admitted for the F4F-4 at ~7426lb in Oct 1942.



The -4 have had two extra HMGs and their chutes, that will cost some speed. The -4's wing will also cost some speed due to wing fold joint.



Greyman said:


> Emergency boost for take-off probably isn't in the Pilot's Notes for any single-engine fighter, but I'm sure it happened.



Probably it happened. It is really too bad that Merlin does not have the equivalent of the 'Vee's for victory', that will dig deep and really show us the wartime usage, beyond the manuals.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 20, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> Hurricanes were available in North America, in some numbers prior to Dec 1941 so one or more of these could have been converted to a Sea Hurricane for deck landing trials.



If one or more could be procured, no doubt it could be accomplished but I expect the motivation to do so was seriously lacking and I suspect all production was in response to a customer demand so it may have been difficult to get one or a few released… my pure speculation.



RCAFson said:


> Actually, not that many (a couple hundred maybe) and the F4F-F didn't begin production till Jan 1942, IIRC.


XF4F-4 first flight was 14 April, 1941 with USN delivery in May. As noted previously, first production F4F-4's appeared at the end of 1941 with 5 delivered to the USN. Production of folding wing Martlet II's for the RN's FAA began *October 4, 1941*!! with 48 delivered by year's end. 



RCAFson said:


> We're talking maybe a dozen HSHs per CV, and I think the USN was resourceful enough to tackle that problem.



That would appear to be a reasonable number assuming that, with all the uncertainties discussed and to be discussed, that it's concluded to be an effort worth making…Although, it is a bit light for typical assigned CAP numbers in late '42 which seemed to have ranged from between 35 to 50+ F4F aircraft from multiple carriers. If a dozen HSH were embarked after the introduction of the F4F-4, what would be the impact on the air wing for a Yorktown class carrier? 

There are real examples of this drawn from the literature often cited here. For example, on April 1, 1942, VF-6 operated with mixed type squadron equipped with 23 F4F-4 and 4 F4F-3s. On April 7, this was changed to 22 F4F-4 and 5 F4F-3 (the -3s were hung from the overhead). Most relevant was the air wing composition on April 28 when the Enterprise and Hornet then presumably operating air groups nominally composed of ~27 F4F-4, ~36 SBD and ~15 TBD also carried respectively 10 and 11 VMF-212 F4F-3s 1 SNJ (on Enterprise) bound for Efate. Based on subsequent events, that appears to be perhaps over a dozen more aircraft than the maximum operating air wing size would prove to be… In late 42, operational composition apparently changed again to be something like 36 F4F-4, ~24 SBD and ~12 TBF. In other words, the CV type could typically comfortably operate about 72 to a maximum of about 78 aircraft although it might carry as cargo another dozen or so hung from the hangar overhead.. The options for embarking a dozen HSH appear to be either to reduce the strike component by a similar number or reducing the number of op-ready F4F-4 by about 5 F4F-4 for every 2 HSH. That suggests a choice that a Yorktown class carrier can either embark 30 F4F-4 or a dozen HSH. That can't be correct! if we take just area and look at the nominal fixed-wing carrier airwing at the start of the war it was 72: 18 VF, 36 VSB 18 VT. One F4F-3 has an area of 1,092.5 sq. ft. vs the HSH's 1,290 sq. ft. The F4F-3 has 85% of the footprint of the HSH so 18 F4F-3s corresponds to 15 HSHs. In the final analysis it looks like a dozen HSH's would displace all but about 10 to 15 F4F-4s. 

Since escort missions absorbed about 10 F4F, it looks like a dozen HSH would constitute the standard CAP. Mixing types for CAP would create air-ops cyclic problems for the aircraft with dissimilar endurance. Hanging Drop tanks on the HSH at the late stage in the war would not even out the problem since the CAP F4F-4 would also typically be carrying a drop tank. It just seems like if increased performance is what you are looking to achieve, you are going to pay penalties that may be unacceptable on a regular basis. I think there is more on this to be discussed.



RCAFson said:


> It wouldn't have taken a whole lot of clairvoyance in mid 1941 to see that the FAA was short of fighters, and that the USN would be too in a shooting war, so a joint Cdn/USA project to produce Sea Hurricanes would have made some sense, especially as the conversion kit had already been engineered in the UK and the Hurricane was in production in Canada (albeit in small number prior to large scale Packard production). Not a completely likely scenario, but not completely implausible either.



Sorry RCAFson, but I think this is the most unrealistic of statements. Considering the opinion of the west regarding the IJN's capability as a potential adversary and the resultant procurement of large numbers of obsolescent aircraft for future use in the Pacific theater as war clouds gathered, by virtually all the western allies, I can't imagine anyone saying or thinking, "We (the USN) are going to be faced with (what appears to be) a crisis in carrier fighter performance in late 1942 facing the IJN." That would suggest the A6M's performance wasn't the shock that is well recorded in the histories of that period. Even hollywood accepts that! 



RCAFson said:


> The ideal fighter might have been a Sea Hurricane II with 4 x .5in with 350rpg (or 8 x .3in with 500rpg) and a couple of 15g internal wing tanks in lieu of the outer guns on the Mk IIB wing. This would have given the FAA and USN a useful addition to the F4F that was carrier ready and also well suited to base defence.



I'd expect the USN to opt for the 4x .50" armament since that was a familiar suite, but am wondering about that comparison to the HSH established performance with its standard quip and ammo load.

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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 20, 2014)

I do find this notion of a USN HSH-bolstered air-wing interesting, although it seems extremely speculative and unlikely to have been effected in time to contribute to changing any of the events of 1942 in a substantial way, I can think of at least one instance when it might have proven very beneficial to the outcome. I am not convinced the events in mind could not have been altered by a differently configured F4F, but need better information on aircraft climb performance than I now have. I have one source of performance on the HSH, and that is here:

K5083 - Technical Data Part II - Mk. II

Any Help?

Any other sources, I should be looking at?


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## Greyman (Apr 20, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Probably it happened. It is really too bad that Merlin does not have the equivalent of the 'Vee's for victory', that will dig deep and really show us the wartime usage, beyond the manuals.



Had a look at a few of my Pilot's Notes and there is indeed provision for 'pulling the plug' on take-off for many fighters.


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## wuzak (Apr 20, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> I do find this notion of a USN HSH-bolstered air-wing interesting, although it seems extremely speculative and unlikely to have been effected in time to contribute to changing any of the events of 1942 in a substantial way, I can think of at least one instance when it might have proven very beneficial to the outcome. I am not convinced the events in mind could not have been altered by a differently configured F4F, but need better information on aircraft climb performance than I now have. I have one source of performance on the HSH, and that is here:
> 
> K5083 - Technical Data Part II - Mk. II
> 
> ...



Thanks for the link Oldcrow.

If that data is accurate, the Sea Hurricane IIB was 20mph slower than the Hurricane IIB in level flight (320mph vs 340mph), but only marginally slower to 20,000ft. This would make it no faster than an F4F?

In any case, would the USN be after an incremental performance increase or a quantum leap? The latter is suggested by history, where the F4F was replaced by the far more capable F6F and F4U.

The Sea Hurricane coudl not offer that.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 20, 2014)

The question on my mind is whether a small difference in climb rate might have made a difference in the total number of CAP that managed to actually engage the initial IJN VB attack on the Hornet during the Santa Cruz Battle. Seven of the defending CAP missed the intercept during their climb to meet the inbound IJN VB Chutai of seven VALs that ultimately scored three hits on Hornet. What makes the judgment difficult is the seven climbing F4F actually passed over the seven VALs which were about a thousand feet below them. if they had reached their intended altitude a bit earlier they might have been in horizontal flight and been able to make both an earlier detection and set up a more effective beam attack instead of the tail-chase which actually evolved. The initial CAP intercept by Eight F4F was effective taking most of the seven IJN VB at least temporarily out of the fight despite absorbing the attention of all escorting A6Ms but these F4F's had been orbiting at 10,000 feet when alerted. The other seven F4F mentioned above were newly launched from Hornet.

The question is: _*in what A/C configuration was the CAP deployed*_. Was it in a "_fighter_" or "_overload-fighter_" configuration. if the latter, full tanks, maximum ammo load and 6 guns, then some improvement in performance might have made a difference. If the CAP was in the '_fighter_' configuration then it was probably performing about as good as an F4F-4 could perform so perhaps even a small improvement might make a difference. Could the HSH provide the margin? I suspect the only hope of finding out is from Rich Leonard or perhaps the ship's or squadron's logs.

This is so speculative with so many variables, its impossible to say for sure whether better performance would have made a difference in this situation… but (this) one can't help wondering.

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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 20, 2014)

wuzak said:


> Thanks for the link Oldcrow.
> 
> If that data is accurate, the Sea Hurricane IIB was 20mph slower than the Hurricane IIB in level flight (320mph vs 340mph), but only marginally slower to 20,000ft. This would make it no faster than an F4F?
> 
> ...



You are most welcome. I think RCAFson might have some additional, relevant sources against which these numbers might be compared. I think the real potential benefit of a HSH IIB would be as RCAFson suggested as an interceptor because of its superior climb rate compared to the F4F-4.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 21, 2014)

The money shot:

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## RCAFson (Apr 21, 2014)

wuzak said:


> Thanks for the link Oldcrow.
> 
> If that data is accurate, the Sea Hurricane IIB was 20mph slower than the Hurricane IIB in level flight (320mph vs 340mph), but only marginally slower to 20,000ft. This would make it no faster than an F4F?
> 
> ...


 

The Sea Hurricane 1b offered better performance below the F4F-4s critical altitude:



Naval air combat typically took place a relatively low altitudes, but if higher altitude was required then a higher climb rate would be most beneficial while the IIA would have been better at all altitudes.

Just plug the Zero maximum speeds from here:
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/av...r-other-than-seafire-39549-4.html#post1118596
into the above to see what I mean


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## tomo pauk (Apr 21, 2014)

Again the chart with F4F-4 with Cyclone???


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## RCAFson (Apr 21, 2014)

tomo pauk said:


> Again the chart with F4F-4 with Cyclone???



It's a chart with Sea Hurricane IB performance curves but again compare the chart with these numbers from Oct 1942:


> Detail Specification
> For
> Model F4F-4 Airplane
> 
> ...


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 21, 2014)

Well it looks like the Hurricane IB is not much better than the F4F-4 in '_fighter_' configuration. *Based on the chart* for the 4-gun fighter (*Bu no. 4058*) with a weight of 7,370 lbs, (presumably with reduced fuel(?), the light-weight -4 is capable of a 10.5 minute climb to 20,000 ft compared to 12 minutes for the Hurricane IB and 11.7 for the the IA. However, I don't know why they provide a weight of 7,370 lbs in the chart and 7,470 in the table, perhaps a reduction in fuel load?. I can't help wondering how a 100 lb reduction in GW improves time to climb by over 2 minutes. Even a full minute seems a stretch. Don't think I believe the chart but a 12.7 minute climb is in the general ball park of the HSH IB.

Seems the F4F-4 '_fighter_' configuration assumes 200 rpg and 110 gallons of internal fuel. How does this compare with HSH Mk IB and IIB? For the HSH IB, I have about ~116 us gal of fuel and 333 rpg for the 8 x .303. Does that correspond with your understanding? 

In any event, the comparison with the fighter configured F4F-3 (110 gal and 300 rpg) is not favorable with its time of 10 minutes to 20,000 ft. I recognize that the time to climb is probably not so favorable considering that this model A/C (1848 ) still had to have SST installed in December 1941 which probably accounts for both an increase in GW and time to climb to be similar to the HSH IB, so the fixed wing F4F-3 becomes a marginally better option than the HSH Mk IA B for a number of reasons including a slight apparent edge performance. But of course as has been noted… different a.c different results.

It looks like the HSH IIB is in a different class. with a much superior climb rate than the IA IB and F4F-3, although it looks like the data for the -3 was based on a gross weight of 7,300 lbs heavier than the fighter config version (300 rpg and 110 US Gal) of this a/c by 150 lbs listed in AHT, so once again we have a discrepancy which might improve the -3's performance a tad. Without knowing exact configurations it's hard to make a judgment when performance is so close, unless we convince Lewis Air Legends museum in San Antonio to perform a test flight of their F4F-3. 

Without knowing the F4F-4 configuration actually used for CAP at Santa Cruz or anywhere else for that matter, it seems impossible to really be certain about the contribution that might be made. 

However, it seems to me that a squadron of RCAF or RCN Hurricanes or SH would be most welcome deployed anywhere in the Pacific Theater at this time. Break out the allied champagne stocks!  But, I don't see even the better performing HSH IIA/B as changing the outcome in any substantial way and beyond what might be accomplished by an equal infusion of F4F-3s. JMHO.

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## fastmongrel (Apr 21, 2014)

Only way I can see HSHurricanes getting into US service is if a RN Fleet Carrier is loaned to the USN earlier than the USS Robin in 1943. 

HMS Victorious (R38) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

HMS Victorious was equipped with Avengers and I think Martlets (equally could have been Wildcats not 100% sure either way) but if the need for a carrier was more urgent and an Illustrious with Hurricanes was all that was available with no time to modify for US planes then it might have happened.

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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 21, 2014)

Oops made a mistake in reading or typing my translation of data from the F4F-3 (7,300 lb fighter) chart. Looks like the climb to 20,000 feet was recorded as made in 10 minutes flat. Lundstrom lists 10.3 minutes for the climb a gross weight of 7,450 lbs for the -3. I would guess that a fully loaded F4F-3 (AHT 7,543 lb) would be able to climb to 20,000 in under 12 minutes. AHT lists a time to climb to 20,000 ft for the -3 at 7,150 lb (fighter-config with reduced fuel and ammo) to be about 7 minutes…. putting the -3 in the same class as a HSH IIB! I can't help but wonder if this value might not be a misread of the bureau no. 1845 test which had mixed .3 and .5 armament? AHT is awfully good but not perfect. I have yet to see a perfect performance source. This situation illustrates how such tests can either be misinterpreted or misunderstood and the considerable variability that may be common in aero-testing. Yet the best we have are test results when we can find them..


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 21, 2014)

fastmongrel said:


> Only way I can see HSHurricanes getting into US service is if a RN Fleet Carrier is loaned to the USN earlier than the USS Robin in 1943.
> 
> HMS Victorious (R38 ) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> 
> HMS Victorious was equipped with Avengers and I think Martlets (equally could have been Wildcats not 100% sure either way) but if the need for a carrier was more urgent and an Illustrious with Hurricanes was all that was available with no time to modify for US planes then it might have happened.



I was surprised to see the reported claim that US aircrew and aircraft were embarked. I have always assumed the aircrew and craft were FAA. A bit disappointed.  I liked the idea of naval aviation allies working together in the air as well as on deck. Probably too prone to error to be effective. "The bloody yank controller said what?" "Blimey mate!"


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## RCAFson (Apr 22, 2014)

Trying to find definitive answers to the weight of a Sea Hurricane is quite difficult. Mason states that the Sea Hurricane IIC weighed 7618 lbs (he gives a weight breakdown as well) while the Hurricane IIC weighed 7544lb, so there's only a 72lb difference. The small difference between the IIC and HSH IIC makes it rather surprising that there should be a 265lb difference HH I (6750lb per data card) and HSH IB (7015lb per data card) and some sources do list the HSH IB as ~6800lb. Mason gives the weight of the HSH IB as 7410lb but this is almost certainly when equipped with two x 44IG DTs and subtracting the probable weight of the tanks gives about 6750lb. Mason gives the HSH IA weight as 6589lb. Mason gives the weight of a HH IIB as 7233lb. I expect that HH IIB/C weights might vary somewhat depending on whether the aircraft is armoured for the ground attack role and/or tropicalized.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 22, 2014)

Historical examples of how the RN FAA operated with squadrons of dissimilar types in early WW2… 

From the RN FAA 'Pink List' dated 5 PM, 3rd April, 1942: 

*Formidable*: Air Wing comprised of *12 Martlet *(888 Squadron) 21 Albacore 

One second-hand source (Winton, Find Fix Strike) lists the total as *18 x Martlets*. 

*Indomitable*: Air Wing comprised of *12 Fulmar I *(800 Squadron) , *9 Sea Hurricane !Bs* (880 Squadron) 24 Albacore.

These Carriers were operating in the vicinity of the Maldives when the IJN Kido Butai (5 fleet carriers and one CVL) raided British possessions in the Indian Ocean. 

FAA 'Pink List' dated 5 PM, 1st May, 1942: 

*Formidable*: Air Wing comprised of *12 x Martlet *(888 Squadron), 12 x Fulmar (803 Squadron) 12 Albacore 

*Indomitable*: Air Wing comprised of *6 x Fulmar I *(806 Squadron) , *9 x Sea Hurricane !Bs* (880 Squadron) 24 Albacore.

This configuration preceded the Diego Suarez (_Ironclad_) operation where the two Indian Ocean RN Flat tops were joined by Illustrious which, according to Winton: possessed an air wing consisting of

*12 x fixed wing Martlet Is* (881 Squadron), *8 x folding wing Martlet IIs *(882 Squadron) and 20 TBR Swordfish.

Sturdivant in *Fleet Air Arm at War* identifies with side number photo confirmation that at least *some if not all of 881's a/c were Martlet IIs*. 

Finally, here are the composition of the carrier air wings during Torch in November, 1942..

Note in particular the composition of *Victorious* and *Formidable*

What I take from this collection of varied composition of mixed fighter types is that the RN FAA was doing pretty much just what RCAFson was advocating and doing it on a regular basis, including the unthinkable mixing of merlins and radial engines  . Interesting contrast in the two allied naval air operations.

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## parsifal (Apr 22, 2014)

Been watching this thread for a while. Some good points, some rather silly ones as well, FWIW. my oppnion on this Sea Hurricane/Wildcat debate is that both aircraft had strengths and weaknesses. I think the Hurricane was probably a slightly better fighter, but I would think the Wildcat was better in terms of range. 

In the pacific, however, the Wildcat had a better kill/ loss ratio to the hurricanes based in burma. however many of these hurris were either completely clapped out, or were operating as hurribombers. Its not really a fair comparison.


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## RCAFson (May 16, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> I was surprised to see the reported claim that US aircrew and aircraft were embarked. I have always assumed the aircrew and craft were FAA. A bit disappointed.  I liked the idea of naval aviation allies working together in the air as well as on deck. Probably too prone to error to be effective. "The bloody yank controller said what?" "Blimey mate!"



Victorious (as USS Robin) operated with an FAA air complement, but the aircraft were all US built. The plan was to ensure that Victorious's FAA and Saratoga's USN squadrons could operate from each other's carriers and in fact they did just that, but AFAIK, at no time was Victorious's air complement entirely USN. There's an interesting article here:
USS Robin part1 entitled: "USS Robin" : an account of the HMS Victorious' first mission to the Pacific which is drawn from a Master's thesis. During her deployment to the USN Victorious operated with FAA 882, 896, 898 fighter squadrons and FAA 832 strike squadron.

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## oldcrowcv63 (May 16, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> Victorious (as USS Robin) operated with an FAA air complement, but the aircraft were all US built. The plan was to ensure that Victorious's FAA and Saratoga's USN squadrons could operate from each other's carriers and in fact they did just that, but AFAIK, at no time was Victorious's air complement entirely USN. There's an interesting article here:
> USS Robin part1 entitled: "USS Robin" : an account of the HMS Victorious' first mission to the Pacific which is drawn from a Master's thesis. During her deployment to the USN Victorious operated with FAA 882, 896, 898 fighter squadrons and FAA 832 strike squadron.




Ahhhh… I am relieved to find it was as I imagined. This account was a revelation. Thanks mate. Do you suppose the Tarpons were being loaded with the US Mark 13 torpedo?


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## RCAFson (May 16, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Ahhhh… I am relieved to find it was as I imagined. This account was a revelation. Thanks mate. Do you suppose the Tarpons were being loaded with the US Mark 13 torpedo?



If they carried torpedoes it had to be the Mk 13, but I don't know what their load out was.


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## wuzak (May 16, 2014)

Did the FAA actually ever request the Sea Hurricane? And if they did, was it before they had their request for a Seafire knocked back?


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## RCAFson (May 16, 2014)

wuzak said:


> Did the FAA actually ever request the Sea Hurricane? And if they did, was it before they had their request for a Seafire knocked back?



Obviously, they did request them after June 1940 but probably not prior to the initial discussions regarding the Seafire.


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 16, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> If they carried torpedoes it had to be the Mk 13, but I don't know what their load out was.



I had read in Scrivner's _In action_ on the TBM/TBF that the FAA had requested some modifications to be performed by Blackburn and wondered if the TBF's bomb bay could be and/or had been extended to accommodate the longer British torpedo. Seems a crying shame to handicap a good a/c with an inferior fish, although I understand the Mk 13 was improved later in the war, I don't know the time frame.


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## RCAFson (May 16, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> I had read in Scrivner's _In action_ on the TBM/TBF that the FAA had requested some modifications to be performed by Blackburn and wondered if the TBF's bomb bay could be and/or had been extended to accommodate the longer British torpedo. Seems a crying shame to handicap a good a/c with an inferior fish, although I understand the Mk 13 was improved later in the war, I don't know the time frame.



My understanding is that prior to Mid/late 1944 the Mk 13 was not very useful, and in fact, the FAA withdrew the TBF from CV operations until the torpedo issue was sorted out:


> _CAB 80/78/44 - "EXPANSION AND DISTRIBUTION OF FLEET AIR ARM SQUADRONS DURING THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1944" - says:
> 
> "2.The ineffectiveness of the American Torpedo has necessitated the withdrawal of Avenger squadrons from HMS VICTORIOUS and the substitution of Barracudas. This has resulted in more Avengers being available for A/S work in the North Atlantic._


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## oldcrowcv63 (May 16, 2014)

RCAFson said:


> My understanding is that prior to Mid/late 1944 the Mk 13 was not very useful, and in fact, the FAA withdrew the TBF from CV operations until the torpedo issue was sorted out:



Interesting! Not too surprising, considering… Here's our lend-lease superb carrier attack plane for you FAA, but, oh yea, you have to take our sh*t torpedo too…  What a deal… It's a good thing the plane could carry depth charges.


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## Glider (May 17, 2014)

The following is coped from the site NAVweapons re the mk 13 torpedo. In 1943 it was as bad as the FAA thought

These problems continued into the early war years, with a mid-1943 analysis of 105 torpedoes dropped at speeds in excess of 150 knots found that 36 percent ran cold (did not start), 20 percent sank, 20 percent had poor deflection performance, 18 percent gave unsatisfactory depth performance, 2 percent ran on the surface and only 31 percent gave a satisfactory run. The total exceeds 100 percent as many torpedoes had more than one defect. The early models were further handicapped by the need to drop them low and slow - typically 50 feet (15 m) and 110 knots - which made the torpedo planes carrying them vulnerable to attack.


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## fastmongrel (May 17, 2014)

Glider said:


> The following is coped from the site NAVweapons re the mk 13 torpedo. In 1943 it was as bad as the FAA thought
> 
> These problems continued into the early war years, with a mid-1943 analysis of 105 torpedoes dropped at speeds in excess of 150 knots found that 36 percent ran cold (did not start), 20 percent sank, 20 percent had poor deflection performance, 18 percent gave unsatisfactory depth performance, 2 percent ran on the surface and only 31 percent gave a satisfactory run. The total exceeds 100 percent as many torpedoes had more than one defect. The early models were further handicapped by the need to drop them low and slow - typically 50 feet (15 m) and 110 knots - which made the torpedo planes carrying them vulnerable to attack.




If navweapons say a US weapon was bad it really really stank. Whilst its not as bad as it once was the 50% bullsh*t factor on navweapons.com when it is talking about USN weapons still applies in many articles.

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## oldcrowcv63 (May 17, 2014)

fastmongrel said:


> If navweapons say a US weapon was bad it really really stank. Whilst its not as bad as it once was the 50% bullsh*t factor on navweapons.com when it is talking about USN weapons still applies in many articles.




Talk all you want about Navweps BS factor but it's clear from the narrative provided by RCAFson that even after almost 4 years of war, the Royal navy may have gotten better torpedoes but it completely missed the importance of air conditioning and ice cream in war fighting!  What a bunch of amateurs.

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## parsifal (May 26, 2014)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> Talk all you want about Navweps BS factor but it's clear from the narrative provided by RCAFson that even after almost 4 years of war, the Royal navy may have gotten better torpedoes but it completely missed the importance of air conditioning and ice cream in war fighting!  What a bunch of amateurs.



Maybe, but we knew what was important....we had the rum tot whilst you guys were strictly dry ships. wheres the fun in that.....

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## nuuumannn (May 26, 2014)

> we had the rum tot whilst you guys were strictly dry ships. wheres the fun in that...



Ha haaa! Touche!


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## FLYBOYJ (May 28, 2014)

F4F perforamnce chart Dated 1 July 1943. Has anyone seen this? Compare to the earlier posted data...

http://www.alternatewars.com/SAC/F4F-4_Wildcat_ACP_-_1_July_1943_(Tommy).pdf


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## Kevin J (Feb 14, 2020)

Piper106 said:


> Looking fo suggestions on another Merlin (or Allison) powered single seat carrier fighter with performance comparable to land based fighters.
> 
> Rules for this discussion.
> H*ll has frozen over and the American Navy is willing to consider a liquid cooled engine on a carrier, so do not limit to British designs.
> ...


No one mentioned the F5F, LOL.


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## Kevin J (Feb 14, 2020)

Piper106 said:


> Looking fo suggestions on another Merlin (or Allison) powered single seat carrier fighter with performance comparable to land based fighters.
> 
> Rules for this discussion.
> H*ll has frozen over and the American Navy is willing to consider a liquid cooled engine on a carrier, so do not limit to British designs.
> ...


No one mentioned the Defiant or Miles M. 20/2. Is that because:
the Sea Defiant would be no faster than a Sea Hurricane and less manoeuvrable ;
the Miles M. 20/2 would rot in the sea salt spray?


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## Admiral Beez (Feb 14, 2020)

Piper106 said:


> Looking fo suggestions on another Merlin (or Allison) powered single seat carrier fighter with performance comparable to land based fighters.


The Merlin-powered Curtiss P-60 might have merit.

Curtiss P-60 - Wikipedia

Or the twin P-40, swap in some Merlins.

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## GregP (Feb 14, 2020)

I'm thinking maybe an Allison-engined CW-21-type aircraft. Sort of like the Vultee that was an Allison test mule for the V-1710, but with one seat instead of three. The development would not have been difficult, and although the performance might not match the more well-developed landplanes, it would have handily outperformed Navalized a P-40. But, then again, this animal never DID exist, so a "what-if" isn't too far off base.


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