# Battle of Midway, a better plan



## pinsog (Jun 27, 2017)

I have been a student of the Battle of Midway since 5th or 6th grade. i have always wondered what could have been done for the Marine air group that was slaughtered, my thinking has always centered around providing them with better planes. But after a few threads here, I realize that was impossible. I also think that the US battle plan was rather poor and they had considerable luck in winning the battle, even though, including Midway island, they actually had more airplanes available. 

The US had almost the exact date of the attack and the size/make up of the attacking force. Unless the US carriers are spotted, it is nearly 100% assured that the Japanese will attack the island base first. Knowing this, I believe the US should have concentrated on ambushing the 1st air attack on the island and overwhelmed it with numbers. How could that have been done you ask?

The US had 3 carriers with a combined group of 81 Wildcats, 101 Dauntless dive bombers and 43 or so Devastator torpedo planes. Midway had 21 Buffalos and 7 Wildcats.

What else could have been brought? When the 3 carriers were at Pearl, the entire Yorktown fighter squadron was replaced by F4F-4's, while the Enterprise and Hornet had some damaged fighters replaced. Yorktown left 15 airworthy F4F-3's at Pearl, and 10 replacement F4F-4 Wildcats were also left at Pearl as they were not needed by the Enterprise and Hornet. Also, 21 Marine F4F-3's had just been left at the island of Noumea. I would have picked those fighters up and brought them back to Pearl. When Yorktown docked for repairs, I would have instructed every mechanic on all 3 carriers to go over the 15 Yorktown fighters she just traded in and get them as close to 100% as possible. So, 21 Marine F4F-3's and the 15 Yorktown F4F-3's is 36 extra fighters, along with the 10 unused replacement F4F-4's equals 46 extra Wildcats. Still not overwhelming enough I would have looked around, knowing they won't release any P39 or P40's to me, I would have also loaded up the 22 P36's that were still airworthy, instructing the AAF mechanics to get ready ASAP. That is 58 extra fighters. I would have deck parked them on 2 of the 3 carrier and sent all 3 out together at the time the Yorktown historically left port. I would have told the carriers to park themselves 75 miles or so south of Midway. Only B17's would have been retained at Midway, with all other bombers, Dauntless and Vindicator, sent back to Midway, the 58 fighters replacing them on the island. That now gives me, 53 Wildcat's, 22 P36's and 21 Buffalos on Midway itself, along with 81 Wildcats about the 3 carriers.

Morning of the initial attack: I know from intelligence sources that the attack is expected this morning, so say half of the Midway fighters and half of the carrier fighters are launched at 6 am for CAP mission, the carriers have moved to 50 miles south of Midway. At the sighting of the first Japanese air strike, all remaining Midway fighters are scrambled, and the carrier CAP of 42 Wildcats is sent to Midway while the carriers launch remaining Wildcats as close in CAP to replace CAP now headed to Midway. 

Japanese strike of 36 Zeros, 36 level bombers and 36 dive bombers is about to meet 95 Wildcats, 22 P36's and 21 Buffalos. All 22 P36's and half the Wildcats, say 50, are to go after the Zeros, while the 21 Buffalos and 45 remaining Wildcats go after the bombers. Out numbered 2 to 1, no Zeros should intercept the bomber destroyers, and with 66 fighters going after 72 carrier bombers, no bombers should survive. In fact, I'm not sure many or any Zeros would, or should survive. US casualties shout be very light.

All of this could/should have been done with what was historically available and in the historical time line. Japanese first strike obliterated, possibly, very possibly, completely wiped out. US casualties should be very light do to us jumping the Zeros first with a 2 to 1 advantage, an added plus is the ability of the P36 to actually dogfight, turn and climb with a Zero at around 15,000 feet.

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## mikewint (Jun 27, 2017)

The Japanese were outplayed. Their forces were split and spread, and their main battleship and cruiser force which was supposed to engage the US fleet were far too far away and played no role. The Japanese carriers were pretty much alone.

Part of the outmaneuvering of the Japanese was due to the cracking of naval codes. They intercepted word of the Japanese ambush plan, and ambushed them instead.

American ground fire and fighter coverage over Midway was just enough of a hindrance to the Japanese air attack that the Japanese commanders ordered their aircraft to refit for a second attack on the island instead of hunting for the American carriers. That enabled the American carrier-borne torpedo bombers and dive bombers to find and attack the Japanese carriers while their decks were loaded with aircraft, fuel and munitions. Basically the damage to their carriers after that first attack was catastrophic. Far worse than what Yorktown sustained. In most cases, I don't think repair without being able to dock someplace would've really been feasible for the kind of damage they took with their decks covered in combustibles when the American dive bombers struck.

If they hadn't ordered the second wave of attacks on Midway and had instead gone after the American carriers, the American planes would've either been interdicted by Japanese fighters or would've found the Japanese carriers with their decks empty and wouldn't have been able to deal such devastating blows.

Short answer? Luck. Bombing a carrier while it's covered in explosives is better than bombing one when its deck is empty


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## mikewint (Jun 27, 2017)

The Japanese were outplayed. Their forces were split and spread, and their main battleship and cruiser force which was supposed to engage the US fleet were far too far away and played no role. The Japanese carriers were pretty much alone.

Had Yamamoto kept his huge fleet together, all the scouting planes from his battleships and cruisers and especially from the light carriers would have helped to detect the Americans earlier and then the light carrier planes would have helped to attack the American carriers and to defend the Japanese fleet better. The large number of ships with AA would have made it more difficult for the planes to attack the carriers and would have drawn some bombs away from the invaluable carriers into the less valuable ships.

As it occurred, the incredibly expensive 70,000 ton Yamato and Musashi just wasted fuel, men, etc, sailing around the Pacific throughout the war without doing any damage. The smaller Bismarck at least sank the Hood.
It is ironic that the only American torpedo that exploded and sank a ship was launched by a slow Catalina from Midway and it sank a tanker.

Part of the outmaneuvering of the Japanese was due to the cracking of naval codes. They intercepted word of the Japanese ambush plan, and ambushed them instead.
American ground fire and fighter coverage over Midway was just enough of a hindrance to the Japanese air attack that the Japanese commanders ordered their aircraft to refit for a second attack on the island instead of hunting for the American carriers. That enabled the American carrier-borne torpedo bombers and dive bombers to find and attack the Japanese carriers while their decks were loaded with aircraft, fuel and munitions. Basically the damage to their carriers after that first attack was catastrophic. Far worse than what Yorktown sustained. In most cases, I don't think repair without being able to dock someplace would've really been feasible for the kind of damage they took with their decks covered in combustibles when the American dive bombers struck.

If they hadn't ordered the second wave of attacks on Midway and had instead gone after the American carriers, the American planes would've either been interdicted by Japanese fighters or would've found the Japanese carriers with their decks empty and wouldn't have been able to deal such devastating blows.

Short answer? Luck. Bombing a carrier while it's covered in explosives is better than bombing one when its deck is empty


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## pinsog (Jun 27, 2017)

The tanker torpedoed by the Catalina didn't sink. I know how it played out originally and I also believe there was a lot of luck involved. My plan eliminates much of the need for luck through sheer numbers. You know when and where the first wave of bombers will be and they don't know your waiting, perfect time to completely, or almost completely wipe out 50% of the enemy strike capability.

After crushing the first wave with overwhelming numbers of Wildcats, Buffalos and P36's, our fighters land, re-arm and re-fuel in waves as the Japanese fleet continues to approach, unmolested, at 20 or so knots, the second wave waiting below deck armed for a ship strike. The real question here is, if only a few Zeros return from the first mission, would they cancel the 2nd strike and flee? Or would they re-arm for another strike against Midway? Or would they suspect that our carriers were around Midway and launch the anti-ship strike they are already armed for?

They need to close to 175 miles from Midway to allow fighter escort from Midway all the way to the target so for the US it does become a waiting game. If they do, then the US carriers could launch all 101 dive bombers and 43 torpedo bombers and pick up their fighter escort as they passed Midway, saving fuel for both bombers and fighters. Also, with so many excess fighters, all 53 Wildcats and 22 P36's (minus those lost or damaged during the morning engagement) that were based on Midway could escort the strike leaving all 81 carrier based Wildcats and all 21 Buffalo's to remain for carrier/island defense (Minus of course the few that were lost or damaged in the morning engagement).

A plus of this scenario, no one should get lost. Hornet lost all her escort fighters and a few of her bombers because they got lost. None of the Midway bombers got lost trying to find Midway. Fly north, attack fleet, fly south, Midway hasn't moved. With an escort of 50-75 Wildcats and P36's, the bombers would have NO trouble getting through, so we would not have the needless slaughter of Navy torpedo crew, marine dive bomber pilots and AAF bomber pilots, and there would still be around 100 fighters covering Midway and the carriers. Plus, Midway is an unsinkable radar equipped picked destroyer, 20-50 miles north off the US carriers allowing the Japanese strike, if launched to be hit early by US fighters in the best position.

If an inbound strike is detected, the US strike, I think, should be aborted, all US fighters, and Dauntless bombers (drop bombs and prepare to attack Japanese bombers) should fall back and attack the Japanese somewhere north of Midway when they meet up with the Midway fighters.

If not, the fighters sweep the Zeros out of the way and let 101 dive bombers and 43 torpedo bombers attack unmolested except for flack. Should be a slaughter, 25 dive bombers per carrier attacking without opposition. The US might have to make multiple attacks if the carriers have just launched there strike, but that wouldn't be an issue if even a couple of bombs land on each carrier and destroy the flight decks. It would then become plane-less Japanese carriers running from undamaged US carriers.

Think of how many planes and crew the US would have saved from launching all attacks from, or near Midway. Attack, turn south and fly back to Midway island which is unsinkable and hasn't sailed off in the wrong direction while you were gone. If your short of fuel, land at Midway, if not, we will point you to your carrier. 

Also, in the unlikely event that a US carrier was damaged by Japanese attack (unlikely in the face of that amount of US fighters) You would have continuous fighter coverage from Midway through the whole attack, and continuous anti-sub air patrol from Catalinas and B17's after the air attack or battle was over. My plan should have less attrition of pilots through combat, none through getting lost and no carrier losses


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## Tkdog (Jun 28, 2017)

Long time reader, first time poster. 

I think you are missing a few beats there. 


They didn't want to risk the Japanese guessing they broke the codes
Shooting down aircraft doesn't win a naval war. Sinking carriers does. The USN was aiming for the carriers. Shooting down planes and even defending Midway from air attack is secondary. Cold, but true. 
There was a non-zero chance that the IJN *knew* the codes were broken and/or was otherwise deceiving them. Unwise to strip all defense from Oahu.

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## pinsog (Jun 28, 2017)

Tkdog: so carriers 25-75 miles south of Midway who just happen to be delivering planes to an island stronghold is a direct tipoff of broken codes? Yet 3 carriers 250 miles north of Midway in the middle of nowhere that just happen to be 175 miles due east of the Japanese fleet for no reason seems legit? I would go with delivering planes to Midway as less likely to tip them off.

You also realize that if you shoot down all the enemy carrier planes that the carrier's are now defenseless and can be sunk at will without fear of defending fighters or retaliation against your own ships? It's like, running the enemy out of bullets doesn't win ground battles, but shooting him immediately afterwards when he is defenseless does win ground battles.

My plan removed 22 'obsolete' P36's and 25 Wildcats, leaving 101 P40's and a couple dozen P39's. If the Japanese fleet had attacked Pearl again, they would have faced 140 ish AAF fighters right around where the P39 and P40's worked best. After getting severely worked over by fighters and flak (if you recall, Midway's comparatively pathetic defense had caused 25% attrition to the first wave) the Japanese fleet, now retiring with a MUCH reduced air group, would have been ambushed by the same massive fighter equipped US fleet that was going to ambush them at Midway. I picture Hawaii B17's constantly shadowing them, giving out exact positions while the US carrier group launched 101 dive bombers and 43 torpedo bombers covered by 53 Wildcats while retaining 81 Wildcats for fleet protection. That would work out just great for the US


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## pinsog (Jun 28, 2017)

It must also be remembered that Japanese pilot training and aircraft production was so slow at the beginning of the war, that they couldn't even keep up with plane and pilot attrition from the beginning of the war. NONE of the 4 Japanese carriers at Midway were at full strength. If all the US had done at Midway was shoot down tge entire first attack wave, the Japanese then launch a second strike and it is also wiped out, if that is all the US had done, I believe it would have been as effective as actually sinking the carriers. The Japanese couldn't have replaced the aircrew for probably a year, maybe more. Shooting Japanese aircraft down over or near Midway would guarantee they would not return to action. Most pilots and crew on the carriers that were sunk were saved and lived to fight another day. Those downed over Midway and Yorktown did not return to action


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## Peter Gunn (Jun 28, 2017)

While it's a well thought out scenario you've presented, I think you're using way to much hindsight. You're tasking the USN with tactics that break with their doctrine and training and with what amounts to a massive leap of faith (in untried/untrained initiatives). I see what you're driving at but I can't see how that would get a better result than what was achieved historically. 

For starters, what happens if the American air groups take debilitating casualties? Outnumbered is fine but the Zeros and their pilots were a pretty capable bunch, and as much as I'd like to give the Navy its due, fighter v. fighter 6/6/42, they were still playing catch up to the Japanese.

Don't know if you've read "Shattered Sword" but there's pretty good info in there, also some myths being challenged by it. In the end, I think the USN played to it's strengths to the best of it's abilities at the time. In Shattered Sword they address questions about IJN operations and the reasons they did what they did, and in a word... Doctrine. Same for the USN, and the USN doctrine worked better than the IJN doctrine.

Not to knock your case, as I said, it's well thought out and presented, I give you bacon for that.


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## pinsog (Jun 28, 2017)

Bacons awesome, I'll take it.

I don't see any huge change in tactics, it's basically just bringing a huge deck load of extra fighters to tip the odds. I have Shattered Sword and The First Team, Wildcats essentially fought Zeros to a 1 to 1 ratio, but with the Wildcats bouncing the Zeros from above on the first pass, followed by P36's which could actually dogfight with a Zero on equal footing below 12,000 feet. (Allies using P36/Hawk 75 reported it could outclimb a KI43 and out turn it above 180-200 mph). All the US fighters really have to do is keep the Zeros busy while 66 other US fighters take on 72 bombers, that shouldn't take long. Then it becomes 4 to 1 odds. In reality, 50 Wildcats making a diving firing pass from above on 36 Zeros should/would knock down at least some with the Wildcats zooming back up for altitude advantage. P36's follow behind dropping into the disorganized Zeros and tail chase dogfighting keeping the Zeros busy as Wildcats make diving passes and pick them off. While Zeros are busy not dying, 60 odd Buffaloes and Wildcats line up behind 72 bombers, the Kate level/torpedo bombers being especially helpless, and gun every last one into the sea. None of this plan is using hindsight, if I used hindsight I would leave all US torpedo bombers at home and have 36 dive bombers and 40 or so Wildcats on every carrier.


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## buffnut453 (Jun 28, 2017)

I think it's a big ask to expect USAAF, USN and USMC fighter aircraft to operate cooperatively at scale in a conflict such as this. Simply planning the mission when some units are island-based and others are on the carriers would be a big challenge. Then there's the issue of communicating in the air to ensure attacks are properly coordinated. Given the technology of the day, it was often hard for units within the same service to communicate if the wrong radio crystals were used. Trying to do that across 3 services could be really challenging (one could treat USN and USMC as one service...but don't tell that to the Marines!).


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## pinsog (Jun 28, 2017)

Oh, also, don't worry about Pearl being left vulnerable, another 36 Wildcats and their pilots (VF10 maybe?) arrived at Pearl on the 28th, 2 days before Yorktown left. It was from this ship that the 6 Avengers and crew were flown to Midway in time for the battle. If we really wanted to tip the numbers, we could let Enterprise and Hornet wait and sail with Yorktown and deckload these 36 fighters onto one of the carriers also. Now we have 2 carriers with full deck loads, 1 carrier flying CAP and anti sub patrol (we know from history there were no subs in position and no need for fighter CAP, but again that is looking back, so 1 carrier would need a clear deck for patrols)


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## pinsog (Jun 28, 2017)

Buffnut: I can understand your reasoning, but it isn't a hugely complicated plan. Your on a tiny little island barely bigger than the runway. Navy, marine and AAF guys all sitting in their planes, engines running, half of them are orbiting over airfield, point your finger north and say "Jap come, Jap bad, shoot Jap, him at 17,000 feet, go kill". They wouldn't even need to speak the same language, you could mix French, Belgians, Finns, Poles, wouldn't matter, just 17,000 feet, that way(pointing) or "Follow me" very slowly and loudly in English (slow and loud always helps foreigners understand English better). A huge wad of 3 different makes of fighters rise into the air, climbs to 20,000, and then falls like hail on them en masse


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## buffnut453 (Jun 28, 2017)

Sorry but you're being overly simplistic and making a couple of sweeping assumptions that (a) the plan you take off with is the plan that you actually implement (seldom the case), and (b) that the Japanese will carry on attacking as per the historical record. "Take off and attack the enemy" is blindingly obvious...it's much more challenging to make real time decisions of how you attack and with what forces. Air combat is messy and aircraft are hard to see. It's not likely that any single defending pilot will have total visibility of the entire enemy force. It IS likely, however, that several pilots will see the same part of the enemy attack force, resulting in a large proportion of the defending fighters getting sucked into an initial engagement leaving large portions of the Japanese attacking force to approach unhindered.

It's highly likely that the defenders would need to rely on Midway-based radar and ground control to deliver the kind of results you're advocating. That hadn't been practiced and the communication/coordination issues I highlighted would remain.

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## mikewint (Jun 28, 2017)

The odds at the June 1942 battle favored the Japanese. The imperial fleet had four carriers to the Americans' three, backed up by scores of battleships, cruisers and light carriers as part of the largest armada that had ever steamed from Japan.
No military had ever won more territory in six months than had Japan. Its Pacific Empire ranged from the Indian Ocean to the coast of the Aleutian Islands, and from the Russian-Manchurian border to Wake Island in the Pacific.

However the US did have several things working for it:
American intelligence officers -- often eccentric and free to follow their intuitions -- had cracked the Japanese naval codes, giving the Americans some idea of the Japanese plan of attack at Midway.

American commanders were far more open to improvising and risk-taking than their Japanese counterparts. In contrast, Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto created an elaborate but rigid plan of attack that included an invasion of the Aleutian Islands as well as Midway.
As I posted earlier, such impractical agendas dispersed the much larger Japanese fleet all over the central and northern Pacific, ensuring that the Japanese could never focus their overwhelming numerical advantages on the modest three-carrier American fleet.

The U.S. Navy was also far more resilient than its Japanese counterparts:
A month earlier at the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Japanese suffered damage to one of their carriers and serious aircraft losses on another. As for the US, the American carrier Lexington was sunk, and the Yorktown was severely damaged.

But whereas the Japanese took months repairing the bombed carrier Shokaku and replenishing the lost planes of the Zuikaku, the crippled Yorktown was made seaworthy again at Pearl Harbor just 72 hours after limping into port.
The result of such incredible adaptability was that at Midway the Americans had three carriers (rather than two), against four for the Japanese (instead of a possible six).

Midway was probably the best chance for Japan to destroy U.S. naval power in the Pacific before America's enormous war industry created another new fleet entirely.
Just months after Midway, new American Essex-class carriers -- the most lethal afloat -- would be launched. Before the war ended, 17 of the planned 24 carriers would see action.

In contrast, Japan launched only four more fleet carriers to replace its growing losses. Japanese naval aircraft -- the best in the world in 1941 -- were becoming obsolete by mid-1942.
In contrast, in the months after Midway, tens of thousands of new and superior Hellcat fighters, Avenger torpedo bombers and Helldiver dive bombers rolled off American assembly lines in numbers unmatched by the Japanese.

During the Battle of Midway itself, Japanese Admiral Chuichi Nagumo fatally hesitated in launching his air fleet. He was wedded to rigid doctrine about prepping his planes with the proper munitions.
In contrast, American Admirals Raymond Spruance and Frank Jack Fletcher gambled and sent most of the planes they had at the first inkling of the approaching Japanese fleet.

Japan could not equal American industrial strength, but American aviators and seamen could certainly match the Samurai courage of their Japanese counterparts.

At Midway, 37 of the 41 slow-flying and obsolete American Devastator torpedo bombers lumbered to their deaths, as they were easily picked off by Japanese air cover.
But such heroic sacrificial pawns drew off critical Japanese fighter protection from the fleet. In its absence, scores of high-flying Dauntless dive bombers descended unnoticed to blast the Japanese carriers with near impunity.


Americans took chances to win an their victory. The Japanese command chose to play it safe, trying not to lose advantages accrued over the prior six months.

Midway was not the beginning of the end for Japan. Just five months later off the island of Guadalcanal, only one American fleet carrier was left undamaged in the Pacific after a series of brutal sea battles. But the writing was on the wall, it was just a matter of time.


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## pinsog (Jun 28, 2017)

Buffnut: I understand, but Midway was 2 tiny islands right together, not moving like a ship, 1 island was barely bigger than the runway. The Zeros were all together above and behind the bombers, the bombers were all together also. Let's make it even less complicated, 140ish US fighters, the briefing "unknown number of planes at 17,000, climb to 20,000 feet, pick an enemy plane and kill it. " 
Not sure what else needs to be said with a numerical and altitude advantage. Certainly defending a moving carrier from a combined dive bomber and pincer torpedo attack is complicated and requires training and communication. But this isn't the same, you can make an elaborate over complicated plan but sometimes it's a nail and you just pick up a hammer and beat the snot out of it. I see this as a hammer/nail setup


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## buffnut453 (Jun 28, 2017)

But you have to get those 140 defending fighters to the enemy en masse. That's a big challenge. You have different aircraft types which, inevitably, means different climb rates and flying speeds. Then you have the impact of different tactical formations. VMF-221 was still using Divisional tactics with groupings of 3-5 fighters in a Division whereas the USN was starting to go over to what we now know as the battle pair. The differing tactical formations further complicate the challenge of getting all your fighters into the same place of sky at the same time...and if you can't achieve the mass of force that you're advocating, it's likely the defenders will be picked off in detail, which is exactly what happened to VMF-221.

Tactical formations have to be controlled and that takes communication and practice at handling large formations in a combat environment. The bigger the formation, the less maneuverable it is. If you reduce formation size, you won't achieve the mass of force. The size of Midway is irrelevant. The sky is a very big place and getting large numbers of aircraft to meet is surprisingly hard unless you have good C3 and have practiced it...a lot.

To this day, 12 Group's "Big Wing" tactic during the Battle of Britain is controversial simple because of the delay involved in getting 36-60 aircraft together and committed to the battle. It took time for each squadron to form up, and then for the Wing Leader to get them all heading to the right height and location based on GCI direction...and dealing with Spitfires and Hurricanes in the same formation was challenging. Gathering 140 aircraft is more than twice the size of the biggest 12 Group "Big Wing" with zero practice...and it involves multiple services.

You can dismiss my points as unimportant but I'd like some more tangible evidence other than "it should be easy" before I go any further.


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## Tkdog (Jun 28, 2017)

Couple that with the plan has to allow for the enemy to *not* all come from one direction. We know what happened, but the defenders didn't. They also didn't know the time of the attack. Keeping planes at standby for a couple of days is a challenge. 

You also have to hope the Navy folks can tell which plane is which when they zoom into the dogfight. 

My (decidedly amateur) read is that the planners sent the forces they did as they thought they had a reasonable chance of success. One can always send as much as possible. But frequently it's better to send as much as is likely necessary. They knew for sure it was going to be a long war.


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## pinsog (Jun 28, 2017)

Buffnut: Midway had a CAP up at I believe 6 am with the rest of the fighters in their cockpits with, I believe, engines running. 42 of the Wildcats in my plan came from the carrier CAP, also already aloft say 50 miles out. That leaves 96 on the island. Put 38 of them up at 6 am on CAP, all Buffalos and F4F-4's, keep the 36 F4F-3's and the 22 P36's on the ground(they climb much better than the others, especially the P36) pilots in cockpits engines running. Call comes in from PBY and from radar and the remaining 58 planes takeoff and join the CAP already at 20,000. Battle of Britain had an entire country to defend, they never knew the exact target. Midway was an island barely bigger than an airfield and another just like it. The F4F-3 and the P36 could reach 20,000 feet in 7.6-7.8 minutes. If it's too complicated to bring in the carrier CAP then you still have 36 F4F-3's and 22 P36's to take on the Zeros, leaving 21 buffaloes and 17 F4F-3 and F4F-4 to work over the bombers. 38 fighters vs 72 Japanese single engine carrier bombers doesn't bode well for the Japanese carrier bombers. But, I really don't see the issue, when radar sees them, in sending out a signal that causes the carrier CAP to head to Midway and the carriers to launch all remaining Wildcats to replace the close in CAP over the ships. If they are orbiting 10 miles north of the carriers, 40 miles south of the island, then they can be there in 10 minutes at 240 mph.

Tkdog: If you read Shattered Sword and The First Team, code breakers knew the day of the attack, they figured it would come in the morning. They were right, its why they were on hot standby ready to go on a signal. If they had been wrong they would have continued to fly CAP and be on a more relaxed standby. British pilots were on standby for pretty much the entire Battle of Britain so I think US pilots could handle 1 or maybe 2 days.

Historically they did not split, probably because it presents too much of a problem for the covering Zeros that didn't even have radios, but if they did the target for the Japanese is a non moving airfield, so they had to all come together at some point. 

US Navy fighter pilots at the time were some of the best trained in the world (apart from maybe the Japanese they were about to face) so I would imagine that they probably knew the difference between a Zero and a P36. If nothing else, they may have to hold fire until they get close enough to see big red circles on the Zeros, anything with a fixed landing gear or a bomb or rear gunner would obviously be enemy.
As far as how many to send, I have never read or heard anyone in any kind of fight or battle say they had, too many bullets or too many friends.


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## buffnut453 (Jun 28, 2017)

You maintain CAPs of the size you mentioned for very long with the numbers of aircraft available. Even a relatively modest timing coordination error would result in your CAP running out of fuel and having to run back to base, potentially just as the raid is coming in. Have you any idea how long it takes for 58 planes to take off and reach 20,000ft, particularly if the intent is for them to attack en masse? The numbers you quote for the F4F and P-36 are for single aircraft not for a formation, which takes time to form up and can only climb at the rate of the worst--performing airframe. 

You're not addressing my fundamental question of how all this was going to me controlled, nor have you addressed the assumption that the IJN aircraft might do something different than the historical record. I'm ducking out of this pointless conversation until you actually address the valid issues that are being raised.


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## pinsog (Jun 28, 2017)

Buffnut: I'm not exactly sure what else the Japanese aircraft would have done. They were flying to Midway to bomb the airfield, aircraft and any other target of opportunity that would make a landing easier. What would you suggest they do different? Attack from different directions? That works on moving warships especially for torpedo planes, but you also have to look at this from the Japanese point of view: the bombers needed escorts, the escorting Zeros didn't even have radios and historically some of the badly outnumbered Wildcats and Buffalos got in 3 passes before the Zeros arrived to help. 3 passes in a Buffalo!!!! If you were the Japanese or an Allied attacking force would you want to split your escort up like that? Of course not. The level bombers, I believe, dropped their bombs in formation like B17's did. 

Your correct that fighters can't patrol indefinitely. But the US suspected the attack would come early this morning and the Midway commander had a fighter CAP up, he also had the rest of the fighters on the runway, engines running and pilots in their seats. That tells me he expected an attack and he expected it very soon. Lets say they didn't have time to form up and attack in mass. Lets say, instead, that we have the F4F-3 and P36's on CAP, both were lighter, and longer ranged than the F4F-4. These are the airplanes I would want tangling with the Zeros anyway. The rest of the fighters scramble as soon as possible climb up to attack altitude in pairs and, with the Zeros being sidetracked, they attack the bombers in pairs as they arrive. 

I'm not sure what more ground control you want. Here is the enemy raid, here is their altitude, go get them. Did they need more control than that? It wasn't a radar guided night intercept, it was 72 Japanese bombers in one formation with 36 zeros above and behind them, they were headed for a single airfield that wasn't moving, so I'm not sure what else they needed from the radar station on Midway


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## pinsog (Jun 28, 2017)

buffnut453 said:


> You're not addressing my fundamental question of how all this was going to me controlled, nor have you addressed the assumption that the IJN aircraft might do something different than the historical record. I'm ducking out of this pointless conversation until you actually address the valid issues that are being raised.



I'm not sure exactly why the Japanese 'doing something different' is so insurmountable. All the US fighters really need to do is inflict some massive losses on the bombers and as many as they can on the zeros also. Unlike an attack on a carrier, they don't necessarily need to do it before they drop their bombs, although that would be nice. The Japanese can't sink Midway, and historically they didn't do a lot of damage, the holes that appeared in the runway were quickly filled. Since they can't sink it, it really isn't a huge difference if they destroy the bombers on the way in or if they chase them away from the island and pick them off one at a time (getting the Kates would be 1st priority to me).

During the 2 Yorktown attacks and all of the different attacks on different carriers and Henderson field during the Guadalcanal campaign, sometimes the Japanese tried doing different things, during an attack. The US just tried to get Wildcats behind bombers and shoot them down. Not much finesses, just hitting a nail with a hammer.

If they split their force in 2, then maybe all our fighters crush one force and on the way in and then chase down the other as they retreat. Maybe the US splits their force and attacks both at once. Without a specific example of what the Japanese might do, I can't tell you what the US would do

In fact come too think of it, splitting their force would be great for the US. Everything we have aloft hit one force with only 18 Zeros vs 50-96 US fighters, depending on how many were in position. Then, after laying waste to that group, they attack the other group as they try to retreat. I would hit the dive bombers while they had their bombs if I had the choice because they are more accurate and they are more nimble without them. The Kates would be much less accurate and they are not nimble, in fact, if stripped of their escorts, they would be easy meat to wipe out.


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## Tkdog (Jun 28, 2017)

I think all we are saying is that things aren't that easy. Command and control is hard. Identifying targets with closing speeds at hundreds if miles an hour is hard. 

As for just adding more each additional plane is more space, more fuel, more parts, bullets, pilots, maintenance crew, etc. More supplies might mean more ships to carry it and so on. 

When they loaded it out I'm sure they considered if there were other assets available to send and then did the calculus on where on the strength vs. cost vs. supply chain vulnerability vs opportunity cost. I've sat and talked with the planners for the Pacific fleet (circa 2000) there are an immense array of variables and they know their stuff. I'm sure it was the same during WW2. Though clearly they learned as they went along.


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## pinsog (Jun 28, 2017)

I understand command and control, but when you have 108 planes coming to your tiny little airstrip it isn't a huge planning issue. You get your fighters off the ground and as high as they can get as quickly as possible. Thats it. You can plan for a month, but you have a 1 square mile area they HAVE to cross, thats it. "Oh look they are coming from the north" "Oh look they are coming from the west" "Oh look they are coming from the east and west" I mean just how many variations can there be on tactics? This isn't a lot of planning or end runs or being sneaky, this is about as simple as a battle can be. On this morning we will be here at about this time. It's a bar room brawl pure and simple. I think the key is to bring more friends to the brawl than they did since we had a bit of trouble with performance.


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## Tkdog (Jun 28, 2017)

Last try. They have to get off the ground and form up into a useful array to attack. There is very little time for them to do so. That's tricky. 

Also, if the attackers see a much larger force than expected, what do they do? Maybe they jettison and run. Do you chase them? If you want to destroy their planes yes. If you want to defend the island maybe not. If you want to sink the carriers you should have likely been doing that in the first place. 

Nobody is saying more planes
at Midway would have been a bad idea. We are saying that more planes is more complexity and that it would have been hard to get better results than historical. It was about 10:1 personnel losses and a 4:1 carrier loss ratio. Planners will take that kind of result any day. Boosting it to 11:1 or even 12 for increased logistical tail isn't going to sway many. 

Not much comfort if you or your loved one is among the lost, but that's not how battles are planned.


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## davparlr (Jun 28, 2017)

Don't know if the resources existed but if the US forces had stationed 20 B-26s, piloted by AAF, Navy, or Marine crews, trained and with experience to the level of the carriers torpedo bombers, throw in some good torpedoes, and I think they could have decimated the Japanese carrier force. As it was, three out of the four B-26s attacking the Japanese reached launch range, one actually flying over the deck of one carrier machine gunning the Japanese on deck, and one almost crashing into into the island of a carrier. 15 successful attacks with each carrying two torpedoes could have done tremendous damage.


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## pinsog (Jun 28, 2017)

Davparlr: I agree with that assessment. Or, even better, if they could skip bomb. But, they didn't know how to skip bomb and our torpedoes were awful. 

My plan is completely historical, all planes were there and just had to be loaded onto the carriers. At least the 15 Yorktown and 10 replacement Wildcats. Pilots would be displaced Lexington pilots. AAF pilots had flown P36's off a carrier before, Enterprise I believe, and there were 22 of them. 

Tkdog, when, at the beginning of the war, did the Japanese EVER run from a fight? In the historical battle I believe it was cloudy since some of the defending fighters made as many as 3 passes before the Zeros intervened. 

Early Wildcats were capable of about a 3 hour patrol before drop tanks, so I would put half of my force up in the air on CAP. That means the first 50 could make a pass through the Zeros and break up the formation, giving any scrambling aircraft time to climb. Since they are coming from the north, maybe the scrambling fighters climb heading south until they reach proper altitude and then turn and engage. I imagine maybe half would get to proper altitude ready to fight as the rest were strung out behind them. Bust up that first group of Zeros and the other 46 fighters are going to thin the now unescorted bombers out in a hurry


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## Balljoint (Jun 28, 2017)

davparlr said:


> Don't know if the resources existed but if the US forces had stationed 20 B-26s, piloted by AAF, Navy, or Marine crews, trained and with experience to the level of the carriers torpedo bombers, throw in some good torpedoes, and I think they could have decimated the Japanese carrier force. As it was, three out of the four B-26s attacking the Japanese reached launch range, one actually flying over the deck of one carrier machine gunning the Japanese on deck, and one almost crashing into into the island of a carrier. 15 successful attacks with each carrying two torpedoes could have done tremendous damage.



The minimum speed of a B-26 exceeded the maximum drop speed of the U.S. air-launched torpedoes. Maybe that's why they used a bomb rather than torpedo launch


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## mikewint (Jun 28, 2017)

Speculation is a wonderful thing: If we had some Ham we could have Ham and Eggs, IF we had some Eggs that is...


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## mikewint (Jun 28, 2017)

While by no means denigrating the losses of VT-8 (Det), the USAAF B-26’s, VT-8, and VT-6, all of them made their attacks, and sacrifices, before the various SBD squadrons, VT-3, and the VF-3 escort arrived on the scene. It was, in my opinion, the one-right-after-another frequency of the VT attacks that kept the Japanese off balance, impacted the coordination of their CAP, and kept their attention riveted to defensive zones closer to sea level. The VT-3 attack was the culmination of these repeated strikes.

One has to remember that the Japanese had a very good torpedo plane and even better torpedo technology. As far as they were concerned, torpedoes were the critical danger. Note that Yorktown was able, with effort, to shrug off bomb hits (a function of damage control); it was the later B5N delivered torpedoes that brought her to a final halt and started her down the road to her eventual loss.

US torpedoes, on the other hand were another issue altogether. First of all we know there were no, none, zip, zero, nada torpedo hits on any of the ships of the Kido Butai. In fact, the only torpedo hit scored by any US plane during the period of the Midway action was dropped in a night attack of a PBY on the Japanese invasion force in the wee hours of 4 June, striking a tanker, but with only minor damage as a result. For all of the bad things one can say about US torpedoes at the time of Midway, atrocious, almost suicidal, delivery profile; slow speed; short range; faulty firing mechanisms; and so on; the salient point is that the vast majority of the TBDs that were shot down on 4 June 1942 went down before being able to drop their weapon towards a given target. Probably not more than 30% of torpedo planes, including the B-26, were actually able to drop a torpedo in the general direction of a target. Certainly a gallant effort, but in the absence of fighter escorts, in sufficient numbers, they were pretty much doomed from the start.

Of course, the month before at Coral Sea, Shoho was struck by at least seven TBD delivered torpedoes. There was plenty of time to set up and execute their attacks. There is some evidence that the torpedoes dropped in this case by VT-5 had been subject to some rather meticulous maintenance rather than just being hoisted up from the magazine, given a quick once-over, and loaded on the planes. There was also a small issue of production runs. The torpedoes used by VT-5 on Shoho were of a later production run, i.e., they were newer than the remaining torpedoes aboard the ship. VT-5 losses were none, the VF-42 F4Fs had already cleared out what CAP there was and the AAA was as typical of those days, a lot of smoke and noise. Two days later, against Shokaku and Zuikaku things did not work out so well. While TBD losses were minimal, VT-5 lost none and VT-2 lost, as I recall and without looking it up, 2, the torpedo performance was abysmal, no hits at all, any that came near a Japanese ship were easily avoided.

The torpedo plane business was recognized long before the war as a quick way to ones reward


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## parsifal (Jun 28, 2017)

what major carrier force during WWII was ever decimated by land based air. the nearest I can think of is HMS illustrious, 10 jan 1941, in which 41 on the spot, backed up by over 70 a/c overall, not including RA assets that were also thrown into the fight, managed to surprise the CAP of just 3 a/c and nearly sink the Illustrious.

why all of a sudden have the US forces, who were incomparably less well trained than the germans in January 1941, developed skills that no other land based force, some of them with years of anti shipping experience, were ever able to achieve during the war.

Sorry guys, but im not buying any of it.

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## pinsog (Jun 28, 2017)

Agree with Parsifal. My plan would be, after first Japanese wave is repulsed/crushed, US carriers launch all dive and torpedo bombers with huge escort of Wildcats and P36's. fighters launch from island as carriers launch bombers saving form up time and fuel. 50-100 Wildcat and P36 escorts take historical 101 dive and 41 torpedo bombers to Japanese carriers, sweep aside Zeros and dive and torpedo bombers crush Japanese carriers. Yorktown is not lost, aircraft losses are light.


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## Tkdog (Jun 29, 2017)

Again with the flawless navigation. They have to find the carriers to attack them. The bombers have to get there second, the fighters have to get there in time to "smash" the zeros, not an easy task.

The torpedos are probably not going to work. Bombs will work more or less as historical. Exact timing of all the above may or may not protect Yorktown.

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## XBe02Drvr (Jun 29, 2017)

A couple of points: 1. If I was a carrier skipper, there's no way you're going to get me to sail my ship into harm's way with a deck stacked full of stiff-wing land-lubber airplanes! No way in hell! Sure, P-36s had been delivered from carrier decks, but that was a delivery in a low-threat zone, not a combat launch, and with only a few planes on deck at a time, as they needed most of the deck for takeoff. Army pilots need considerable special training before being launched off a carrier, and the preparations for Midway were something of a mad scramble, IIRC. 
2. Most of these pilots hadn't ever seen a Zero and were trained in tactics that were suicidal against it. The true appreciation of the Zero's strengths and weaknesses, and the training to counteract them, had not taken hold yet. The Akutan Zero was still in the future. I think pinsog's massive fighter force would have been in for a nasty surprise, especially as their huge numbers on a small strip would have resulted in a strung-out launch and a piecemeal arrival at the furball. The Kido Butai would have had their own "Great Midway Turkey Shoot", and the only Zeros lost might have been a few of those who expended all their ammunition.
3. Of course they didn't realize it at the time, but American torpedoes were a waste of effort, and because of its speed the B-26 was a poor choice for a torpedo bomber, besides being a tricky bastard to takeoff and land, so the idea of whipping up a force of USN/USMC crewed B-26s on short notice is absurd.
I think the historical outcome of Midway was about the best we could have expected, given the circumstances. We were granted a healthy dose of luck, which might not have blessed a revised script, so let's not rewrite history, OK?
Cheers,
Wes

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## Peter Gunn (Jun 29, 2017)

Said it before and I'll say again (not being a jerk) DOCTRINE. The USN adhered to what they thought/knew was their best shot at winning the battle as did the IJN. I believe XBe02Drvr hits the nail on the head not once but three times.

Also, you have to consider that stationing your carriers south of Midway totally erases the threat of a "flanking" maneuver the USN was trying to achieve. Enterprise Hornet and Yorktown were at a spot calculated to be the surprise "gotcha" angle the IJN wasn't (hopefully) expecting.

The only thing I've ever thought could be better is if Hornet's attack hadn't gotten off track and would have put paid to Hiryu before she got off a strike on Yorktown, or that Yorktown hadn't been abandoned for so long before they tried to save her the final time.

In any event, again, I fail to see how you could improve on what was accomplished historically.


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## pinsog (Jun 29, 2017)

Tkdog: Historically, all the aircraft attacking from Midway flew straight to the enemy carriers and straight back to Midway (those that were left). They had the coordinates of the Japanese fleet sent to them from the Catalinas that had found them. They were flying to a precise position from a fixed position. Not even the army flyers got lost. They would also have no trouble flying back to Midway since it hadn't moved.

XBe02Drvr: If you were skipper of the USS Wasp you would have delivered a load of fixed wing Spitfires to Malta, in a combat situation, as you were ordered to do.

If you were skipper of the USS Wasp, after all the Spitfires you just delivered were destroyed as they arrived/landed, you would have delivered a second load of Spitfires to Malta, in a combat situation, as you were ordered to do.

(Spitfire pilots had 0 carrier training. All of them took off just fine and 1 even landed back aboard the Wasp without a tail hook because his drop tank wouldn't feed)

If you were skipper of the Hornet, you would have delivered 16 B25's off the coast of Japan, in a combat situation, as you were ordered to do.

In my Midway plan, the extra Wildcats and P36's would have been delivered a couple of days before the start of the battle, with one carrier hauling a full deckload of fighters as the other provided escort, with Yorktown arriving a couple days later. They were not under fire, no one knew they were there, the only thing they had to worry about was submarine attacks and historically there were no subs in the area. The extra 15 F4F-3's from the Yorktown would be flown by Lexington fighter pilots just back from fighting Zeros at Coral Sea.

No pilot ever saw or fought a Zero until the first time he saw and fought a Zero. At the end of Midway, the F4F Wildcat was at about a 1 to 1 kill ratio with the Zero. The P36's at Pearl Harbor shot down 2 Zeros for the loss of 1, the P36's only had 1 30 caliber machine gun installed.

None of the US Navy fighter pilots at Coral Sea and most of them at Midway had ever seen a Zero, and yet, they finished up the end of these 2 battles with a 1 to 1 kill ratio.

50 of the 95 fighters on Midway would be flying CAP, Japanese appear, the other 45 are scrambled, the initial 50 jump the 36 Zeros with a diving firing pass, blowing the Japanese formation apart, scattering them, undoubtedly knocking down at least a few on the first pass while zooming up for more altitude and a second pass. Meanwhile, the other 45 planes are scrambled, because, just like in the real battle, they are in the cockpit with the engine running. If they take off 2 at a time with a 15 second interval, they can all be off the ground in 6 minutes.

The first PBY reported finding the Japanese fleet at 0534, then "many planes headed Midway" was radioed in the plain at 0544. Historically, all Midway planes were aloft by 0600, over half of these were bombers. US fighters made their first pass at 0621. That means, if, in my plan, 50 fighters are already at altitude, the absolute last guy off the runway has 21 minutes to climb up and form up with the rest of the group. Even an F4F-4 in over load can climb to 20,000 feet in 14.7 minutes. This means the very last guy off the runway should be at 20,000 feet by 0615, 6 full minutes before they historically made their first pass.

B26's carrying torpedoes should be left at Pearl Harbor. With perfect hindsight, all US torpedo bombers should have been left at home and replaced with fighters, but they didn't know that.

Peter Gunn: I am not changing any US Navy doctrine, the US Navy barely had any carrier doctrine at the time. I am saying, carry a full deckload of fighters to Midway, fly them off to Midway a couple of days before the battle and keep the carriers far enough south that they cant see them and use Midway as an unsinkable radar picket to both sight enemy raids and crush them, or at least soften them up before they get to the US carriers, which they still don't know are there.


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## pinsog (Jun 29, 2017)

So, historically:

The first PBY reported finding the Japanese fleet at 0534, then "many planes headed Midway" was radioed in the plain at 0544. Historically, all Midway planes were aloft by 0600, over half of these were bombers. US fighters made their first pass at 0621. 

That means, if, in my plan, 50 fighters are already at altitude, the absolute last guy off the runway has 21 minutes to climb up and form up with the rest of the group. Even an F4F-4 in over load can climb to 20,000 feet in 14.7 minutes. This means the very last guy off the runway should be at 20,000 feet by 0615, 6 full minutes before they historically made their first pass. 

If nothing else, even if they are not completely formed up in a perfect attack group, at the very worst there should be 96 US fighters at 20,000 feet in a big gaggle making a diving pass at the Japanese formation. This doesn't take into account that all 3 US carriers are 50 or so miles south and haven't contributed a single plane to the engagement. Lets keep US carriers hiding south of Midway and out of action for now.

US pilots have not fought Zeros yet? The 15 F4F-3's from the Yorktown would be flown by orphan pilots from the Lexington, they had just seen battle. The P36's could hold there own with a Zero in an old-fashioned dogfight (according to allied pilots who flew them against KI43's. They said the P36 could out climb a KI43 and turn with it above 180-200 mph. US tests said the P36 was faster below 10,000 or 12,000 feet) Historically, with about equal numbers meeting in combat, after Midway the Wildcat had a 1 to 1 kill ratio. 96 fighters could actually all make a single pass at the 72 bombers before the Zeros had time to intervene, then all 96 turn on the Zeros (not what i would do, but just tossing out different plans)


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## Peter Gunn (Jun 29, 2017)

pinsog said:


> *SNIP*
> 
> Peter Gunn: * I am not changing any US Navy doctrine, the US Navy barely had any carrier doctrine at the time*. I am saying, carry a full deckload of fighters to Midway, fly them off to Midway a couple of days before the battle and keep the carriers far enough south that they cant see them and use Midway as an unsinkable radar picket to both sight enemy raids and crush them, or at least soften them up before they get to the US carriers, which they still don't know are there.



Respectfully I believe you should rethink that statement. I'm not a navy guy but I'm pretty sure the USN had been running fleet problems for about a decade and a half that included CV's in the mix. At Midway they most certainly did have a doctrine.

Not to harsh your mellow but I think I'll bow out as well, I don't see this as a viable alternative to historical, on paper it _appears_ to work. On paper I am a dead ringer for Errol Flynn (google him if you're too young).

Cheers


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## pinsog (Jun 29, 2017)

Peter Gunn said:


> Respectfully I believe you should rethink that statement. I'm not a navy guy but I'm pretty sure the USN had been running fleet problems for about a decade and a half that included CV's in the mix. At Midway they most certainly did have a doctrine.
> 
> Not to harsh your mellow but I think I'll bow out as well, I don't see this as a viable alternative to historical, on paper it _appears_ to work. On paper I am a dead ringer for Errol Flynn (google him if you're too young).
> 
> Cheers


Read Shattered Sword and The First Team volumes 1 and 2. No one, except possibly the Japanese truly understood how to operate a carrier or especially a fleet of carriers at this stage in WW2. The US war strategy before Pearl Harbor was still "sail the battleships out for a battleship fleet engagement". That alone should tell you that the US didn't truly understand how to operate their carriers. Now, I would say we adapted rather quickly, but we still learned some harsh lessons early on such as, 18 fighters is not nearly enough, carriers should operate extremely close to repel attacks to take advantage of mutual firepower, how to guide fighters using radar to most effectively intercept incoming raids, etc. 

Yes the US Navy had been playing with and learning with their carriers since the 1920's, but weapons, tactics, radar and airplane performance and technology moved at a pace from 1939 to 1945 that at least rivals cell phone and computer advancements of the last 10 years. 1939 stuff was obsolete by 1940, 1940 obsolete by 1941 and so on. We barely got rid of our F3F biplane fighters before the war started. The F4F held its own, but needed replacing before the war started. The less said about the Devastator the better. 

I have been reading about pacific battles for about 36 years. I learned more correct info from Shattered Sword and The First Team volumes 1 and 2 than most everything else combined. They are the best books available that i am aware of. You will get a very deep understanding of the problems of both sides concerning carrier operations.

All that being said, I am still not messing with carrier operations themselves. 

My plan very simply is:
1. bring all available fighters to Midway that were actually available 21 Wildcats delivered to Noumea, 15 Wildcats traded in by Yorktown, 10 Wildcat replacements in Hawaii, and 22 P36's in Hawaii deemed obsolete by the AAF

that totals an extra 46 wildcats and 22 P36's to bolster the Midway defenses

2. deck load those fighters onto Enterprise or Hornet and let the other ship provide escort until somewhere south of Midway. This is exactly what Wasp did when twice delivering Spitfires to Malta and what Enterprise and Hornet did for the Doolittle raid. US carriers delivered P40's, P47's, and Spitfires to areas needing fighters all through out the war. Not sure why delivering 46 navy fighters and 22 P36's is such a huge problem now. The area south of Midway was free from enemy activity, no subs, no carriers and no patrol planes. 

3. Midway is an unsinkable radar picket station with a now rather formidable fighter group. They know the date and approximate time of the Japanese attack, close enough in fact that pilots were in there planes with the engines running. Every single fighter and bomber was off the ground by 0600 the morning of the attack with the first attack on enemy planes starting at 0621. That gives the very last guy off the runway 21 minutes to climb to 20,000 and form up. If the P36's, a P36 can climb to 20,000 in 7.8 minutes, were the last group off the runway, the last guy would be at 20,000 by 0608 giving him 13 minutes to form up with his group. 

4. The carriers could drop off the fighters from 100 miles out and simply wait and see how the first raid played out. I personally think the Japanese raid would have had a rough time. I think the bombers especially would have been decimated. 

The feedback I'm getting is: 53 Wildcats, 22 P36's and 21 Buffaloes bouncing a the Japanese strike was a hopeless case for the US. I'm kind of at a loss. 

At least 15 of these planes would be flown by Lexington pilots who just fought the Japanese at Coral Sea and rated the F4F-3 as equal to the Zero in climb, dive and speed, superior in firepower and protection and inferior in turn. They said if you have a height advantage the F4F-3 could handle a Zero. P36's actually have the wing loading to dogfight with a zero on equal terms above 180-200 mph.


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## pinsog (Jun 29, 2017)

I believe I have laid out, using history as a guide, a reasonable play showing that the US could have had 96 (give or take a couple for mechanical reasons) Wildcats, P36's and Buffalos at 20,000 feet, formed up and ready to bounce the 1st Japanese raid. 

Do you guys actually think that 96 wish US fighters, with the advantage of altitude and surprise would come out on the losing end against 36 Zeros and 72 carrier bombers?


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## RCAFson (Jun 29, 2017)

pinsog said:


> I believe I have laid out, using history as a guide, a reasonable play showing that the US could have had 96 (give or take a couple for mechanical reasons) Wildcats, P36's and Buffalos at 20,000 feet, formed up and ready to bounce the 1st Japanese raid.
> 
> Do you guys actually think that 96 wish US fighters, with the advantage of altitude and surprise would come out on the losing end against 36 Zeros and 72 carrier bombers?



It's not that easy to move squadrons of aircraft around. These aircraft all required maintenance, refuelling, and rearming and that requires having the needed numbers of trained groundcrew in place. 2ndly, Midway was a rather small island with already crowded airstrips and, again, it would not be easy, or even possible to accommodate such large numbers of aircraft at short notice. The fact that the US didn't do something so obvious suggests, that it was not easy to do, nor perhaps, even possible.

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## XBe02Drvr (Jun 29, 2017)

pinsog said:


> XBe02Drvr: If you were skipper of the USS Wasp you would have delivered a load of fixed wing Spitfires to Malta, in a combat situation, as you were ordered to do.


A P-36 is not a Spitfire. The Spit was a grass field airplane, and could take off in the remaining deck space, even with a load of Spits parked behind it. You load the same number of P-36s on the same deck, and you better have a carrier pier and a crane at your destination, cause you're not going to fly them off, especially without the extensive special training the Doolittle raiders got. The Spit that landed back aboard was one lucky and skillful SOB. Compared to a product of the "Grumman Iron Works", the Spit was a relatively fragile machine. You don't base plans or strategy on that kind of luck.


pinsog said:


> If you were skipper of the Hornet, you would have delivered 16 B25's off the coast of Japan, in a combat situation, as you were ordered to do.


The Doolittle raid was an all-out "Hail Mary" operation, a desperation move accompanied with plenty of protection and the option to abort if necessary. It only worked because of the intensive special training the Army crews got and the modifications to the planes and the weight stripped out of them. A huge risk to all concerned. If they had not had one of the newer carriers with their larger decks and higher speeds, it wouldn't have worked.


pinsog said:


> US pilots have not fought Zeros yet? The 15 F4F-3's from the Yorktown would be flown by orphan pilots from the Lexington, they had just seen battle.


So you've got 15 pilots who've seen the Zero and are telling these fantastic stories of what it can do. Given the timeframe available I can't see them refashioning the training of the large mass of fighter pilots who've been taught to fight the turning dogfight. I find the 1 to 1 F4F vs Zero in the first six months hard to believe
. As for P-36s, their record against IJA Ki43s
should not b taken as predictive against Zeros. The A6M was a far more formidable machine and IJN pilots better trained. In the Netherlands Indies Kido Butai Zeros slaughtered Dutch P-36s.
Cheers,
Wes


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## RCAFson (Jun 29, 2017)

mikewint said:


> Of course, the month before at Coral Sea, Shoho was struck by at least seven TBD delivered torpedoes. There was plenty of time to set up and execute their attacks. There is some evidence that the torpedoes dropped in this case by VT-5 had been subject to some rather meticulous maintenance rather than just being hoisted up from the magazine, given a quick once-over, and loaded on the planes. There was also a small issue of production runs. The torpedoes used by VT-5 on Shoho were of a later production run, i.e., they were newer than the remaining torpedoes aboard the ship. VT-5 losses were none, the VF-42 F4Fs had already cleared out what CAP there was and the AAA was as typical of those days, a lot of smoke and noise. Two days later, against Shokaku and Zuikaku things did not work out so well. While TBD losses were minimal, VT-5 lost none and VT-2 lost, as I recall and without looking it up, 2, the torpedo performance was abysmal, no hits at all, any that came near a Japanese ship were easily avoided.
> 
> The torpedo plane business was recognized long before the war as a quick way to ones reward



I have to take the claims of 7 torpedo hits on Shoho rather skeptically. A 10,000 ton ship doesn't float for long after 7 torpedo hits and yet it took a long time for Shoho to go down. I suspect that most of the claimed hits were near misses by bombs from SBDs that were attacking at the same time.


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## XBe02Drvr (Jun 29, 2017)

RCAFson said:


> I have to take the claims of 7 torpedo hits on Shoho rather skeptically. A 10,000 ton ship doesn't float for long after 7 torpedo hits and yet it took a long time for Shoho to go down. I suspect that most of the claimed hits were near misses by bombs from SBDs that were attacking at the same time.


Or torps that didn't explode.


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## pinsog (Jun 29, 2017)

RCAFson: Valid point but, all these planes had either a Wright or P&W radial which all the planes on the island had. Fighters would replace around 30 or so dive bombers, 6 Avengers and 4 B26's, and supplement the 27 Buffaloes and Wildcats already there. Who ever serviced them could service these.


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## XBe02Drvr (Jun 29, 2017)

pinsog said:


> RCAFson: Valid point but, all these planes had either a Wright or P&W radial which all the planes on the island had. Fighters would replace around 30 or so dive bombers, 6 Avengers and 4 B26's, and supplement the 27 Buffaloes and Wildcats already there. Who ever serviced them could service these.


Clearly you've never worked in aircraft maintenance!


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## pinsog (Jun 29, 2017)

XBe02Drvr: "a P36 isn't a Spitfire" your correct. You need to read the British test of a Spitfire vs a P36/Hawk 75. A P36 had a MUCH LOWER wing loading than a Spitfire and was much easier to take off and land than a Spitfire, could take off in a much shorter distance than a Spitfire, easily turn inside of a Spitfire at will, and had a better initial climb rate than a Spitfire. (All of this is what the British said during the test) The Spitfire was much faster and could dictate engagement by breaking off at will. A P36 weighed about 5700 to 5900 pounds vs an F4F-3 coming in at 7,300 or so. Delivering P36's a day or 2 before the battle is not s problem. No Japanese around, not even submarines or scout planes. Get within 400 miles of Midway (would get to 100) and send them on their way.

The Enterprise delivered 39 deck launched P36's to Hawaii in 1940 or 1941. In fact, these 22 P36's are part of that shipment. It was the first time in history that army aircraft were launched from a US Navy carrier. No crane needed, they flew them off.

If you don't believe the 1 to 1 exchange rate of Wildcat to Zero (this is after the war, verified kills, not claims) then you need to read The First Team volume 1 and 2.


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## pinsog (Jun 29, 2017)

"The Hawk 75A-2 was flown with aft tank empty at a loaded weight of 6,025 lb (2 733 kg) and the three RAF pilots participating in the evaluation were unanimous in their praise for the US fighter's exceptional handling characteristics and beautifully harmonised controls. In a diving attack at 400mph (644 km/h) the Hawk was far superior to the Spitfire, thanks to its lighter ailerons, and in a dogfight at 250 mph (402 km/h) the Hawk was again the superior machine because of its elevator control was not over-sensitive and all-around view was better; but the Spitfire could break off combat at will because of its very much higher maximum speed. In a dive at 400 mph (644km/h), the Spitfire pilot, exerting all his strength, could apply no more than one-fifth aileron because of high stick forces whereas the Curtiss pilot could apply three-quarter aileron.

"When the Spitfire dived on the Hawk, both aircraft travelling at 350-400 mph (560-645 km/h), the Curtiss fighter's pilot could avoid his opponent by applying its ailerons quickly, banking and turning rapidly. The Spitfire could not follow the Hawk round in this manoeuvre and consequently overshot the target. In the reverse situation, however, the Hawk could easily follow the Spitfire until the latter's superior speed allowed it to pull away. The superior manoeuvrability of the Hawk was ascribed mainly to the over-sensitiveness of the Spitfire's elevator, which resulted in some difficulty in accurately controlling the _'g'_ in a tight turn; over-correction held the risk of an inadvertent stall being induced.

"Because of the difference in propellers, the Hawk displayed appreciably better take-off and climb characteristics. The swing on take-off was smaller and more easily corrected than on the British fighter and during the climb the Hawk's controls were more effective; but the Curtiss fighter proved to be rather slow in picking up speed in a dive, making the Spitfire the more suitable machine of the two for intercepting high-speed bombers (which was, of course, the primary role for which the British aircraft had been designed).

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## mikewint (Jun 29, 2017)

RCAFson said:


> I have to take the claims of 7 torpedo hits on Shoho rather skeptically.



Shōhō and the rest of the Main Force were spotted by aircraft from Lexington at 10:40. At this time, Shōhō's combat air patrol (CAP) consisted of two A5Ms and one A6M Zero. The Dauntlesses began their attack at 11:10 as the three Japanese fighters attacked them in their dive. None of the dive bombers hit Shōhō, which was maneuvering to avoid their bombs; one Dauntless was shot down by the Zero after it had pulled out of its dive and several others were damaged. The carrier launched three more Zeros immediately after this attack to reinforce its CAP. The second wave of Dauntlesses began their attack at 11:18 and they hit Shōhō twice with 1,000-pound (450 kg) bombs. These penetrated the ship's flight deck and burst inside her hangars, setting the fuelled and armed aircraft there on fire. *A minute later, the Devastators began dropping their torpedoes from both sides of the ship. They hit Shōhō five times and the damage from the hits knocked out her steering and power.* In addition, the hits flooded both engine and boiler rooms. Yorktown's aircraft trailed those from Lexington, and the former's Dauntlesses began their attacks at 11:25, hitting Shōhō with another eleven 1,000-pound bombs by Japanese accounts and the carrier came to a complete stop. Yorktown's *Devastators trailed the rest of her aircraft and attacked at 11:29. They claimed ten hits, although Japanese accounts acknowledge only two.

5 + 2 = 7*

*Lundstrom, John B. (2005). The First Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-471-X.*


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## pinsog (Jun 29, 2017)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Clearly you've never worked in aircraft maintenance!



Your correct, I haven't worked in aircraft maintenance. I do know that Midway had B17's, Catalina's, Wildcats, Buffaloes, Dauntless's, Avengers and Vindicators all deployed for this battle. The Avengers were pulled off a ship that arrived in Pearl on the 28th and flown directly to Midway. They flew 1 mission. Are you suggesting that every one of these types had a full maintenence crew and no one had the ability to work on a another plane with the same P&W 1830 engine as the Wildcat?


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## Tkdog (Jun 29, 2017)

The presumption (i expect) is that there is more to a plane than just the engine.


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## pinsog (Jun 29, 2017)

Tkdog said:


> The presumption (i expect) is that there is more to a plane than just the engine.


I understand and agree. But we aren't talking about a complete overhaul or long term maintenance, we are talking about keeping an early WW2 single engine fighter going for maybe 1 to 4 missions. I'm sure the maintenance problem would become less serious as fewer and fewer returned from each mission.


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## pinehilljoe (Jun 29, 2017)

I think the most plausible "might have been" is if CDR Stanhope Ring the CO of Hornet's Air Group had listened to LCDR Waldron and flown with him to the Japanese Carriers. Hornets SBDs might have allowed Hiryu to be sunk in the first wave. 

A more far fetched what if is if a squadron of A-20s were on Midway, trained in skip bombing.


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## XBe02Drvr (Jun 29, 2017)

pinsog said:


> Your correct, I haven't worked in aircraft maintenance. I do know that Midway had B17's, Catalina's, Wildcats, Buffaloes, Dauntless's, Avengers and Vindicators all deployed for this battle. The Avengers were pulled off a ship that arrived in Pearl on the 28th and flown directly to Midway. They flew 1 mission. Are you suggesting that every one of these types had a full maintenence crew and no one had the ability to work on a another plane with the same P&W 1830 engine as the Wildcat?


As Tkdog suggested, a warplane is a lot more than an engine, and Midway was not an "1830 party". In fact only the "Cats" (Wild and 'Lina) were equipped with them. The others had either Wright 1820s (B-17, Buffalo, SBD), Wright 2600s (TBF), Pratt 1530s (Vindicator) or Pratt 2800s (B-26). We had both Pratt and Wright teardown radials at the mech school I went to, and I'm here to tell you, they're not in the same genus, never mind species.
Cheers,
Wes


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## pinsog (Jun 29, 2017)

XBe02Drvr said:


> As Tkdog suggested, a warplane is a lot more than an engine, and Midway was not an "1830 party". In fact only the "Cats" (Wild and 'Lina) were equipped with them. The others had either Wright 1820s (B-17, Buffalo, SBD), Wright 2600s (TBF), Pratt 1530s (Vindicator) or Pratt 2800s (B-26). We had both Pratt and Wright teardown radials at the mech school I went to, and I'm here to tell you, they're not in the same genus, never mind species.
> Cheers,
> Wes


I understand planes are more than an engine. I also understand that engines are different. 
That being said, this would be Wildcat mechanics working on s slightly less complicated machine that I would assume arrived in working order. They engines both 1830's the P36 version being less complicated than the Wildcat. I know each plane probably has it particular issues, but this isn't a Sopwith Camel mechanic asked to work on a B29. Do you think they flew out a group of mechanics to work on each different plane? If that's what they did, then load up a dozen at Pearl and stick them on whichever carrier has all the P36's on it. A Catalina can pick them up when the P36's fly off for Midway. Problem solved


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## XBe02Drvr (Jun 29, 2017)

pinsog said:


> I understand planes are more than an engine. I also understand that engines are different


And so are the tools, procedures, and spare parts required to support them.


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## pinsog (Jun 29, 2017)

XBe02Drvr said:


> And so are the tools, procedures, and spare parts required to support them.


So, spur of the moment, we deployed 4 B26's with R2800's, and 6 Avengers with R2600's, just loaded pilots in them and sent them from Pearl, flew them there directly, 1 a complex multiengine plane the other a complex single engine plane no one had ever seen before, and they were fine, but we can't send some of the most simple single engine fighters left in the US because all the mechanics would just stand there and look at it, not knowing what to do?

Pick up a dozen or what ever mechanics and tools you need and load them on the carrier that has the P36's on it. Problem solved.


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## Tkdog (Jun 29, 2017)

Is there berthing on the carrier? What spare parts do they need? Are those parts available? Is there room for them? 

Again, what you decline to admit is that doing these things is hard. It's not just send the planes and Zeros fall from the sky.


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## Tkdog (Jun 29, 2017)

And as for "did they have a mechanic for each type of airplane". Yes, yes they did and still do. Absolutely are going to have your personal qualifications standards done before you certify an aircraft as airworthy. 

Now, one can (and many do) cross over from one type to another. But are you going to fly a plane out over the ocean that the mechanic hasn't touched that model before? I was talking with a WW2 vet the other day and they absolutely did some wacky stuff that would never be allowed these days. But the planners aren't going to *plan* to not have mechanics. 

By the way, they also had to have a plan that could function if the Japanese were delayed for a week or two.


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## pinsog (Jun 29, 2017)

Its a 770 foot long carrier, 2 day trip at 20 knots, we can pitch a tent for the crew in the hanger if we have to. 
Deck park them, all the P36's and Wildcats could be deck parked on one carrier, the other used as escort. I guess you could stick then 10 folding wing F4F-4's on the other carrier if you wanted. 

Did the B26 and Avengers flown out at the last minute carry a full supply of mechanics, parts, etc? Fly the first intercept, I assume they would at least fly when they were loaded, and when the 1st shot up plane lands, presto, you have spare parts


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## XBe02Drvr (Jun 29, 2017)

pinsog said:


> "Because of the difference in propellers, the Hawk displayed appreciably better take-off and climb characteristics.


I believe the tests you refer to were circa Battle of France between a Spit Mk 1 with a fixed pitch prop (pitched for speed over acceleration) and a Hawk 75A, a lightweight export version of the P-36 with a constant-speed prop. If you're not in aviation, chances are you don't understand what a huge difference that prop makes. By the time of Malta, the Brits had upgraded to at least selectable pitch, and in most cases, constant speed propellers. Major improvement in takeoff and climb performance.
Meanwhile, the P-36 was busy gaining weight, with fancier radios, heavier armament, and in some cases, self-sealing fuel tanks. So that British comparison of '39-'40 might not hold true a couple years later.
Cheers,
Wes


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## Tkdog (Jun 29, 2017)

I think this all comes from the thought that 1- they just fired these "simple" planes up and flew them and 2- people way back then were stupid. 

Amazingly complex aircraft and very, very smart people.


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## Tkdog (Jun 29, 2017)

pinsog said:


> Its a 770 foot long carrier, 2 day trip at 20 knots, we can pitch a tent for the crew in the hanger if we have to.
> Deck park them, all the P36's and Wildcats could be deck parked on one carrier, the other used as escort. I guess you could stick then 10 folding wing F4F-4's on the other carrier if you wanted.
> 
> Did the B26 and Avengers flown out at the last minute carry a full supply of mechanics, parts, etc? Fly the first intercept, I assume they would at least fly when they were loaded, and when the 1st shot up plane lands, presto, you have spare parts



Right. Not anything else going on in the hanger. Have you been underway?


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## pinsog (Jun 29, 2017)

Export Hawk had heavier armament and weighed more than US P36. It had 6 guns and armor plate, and some on here claim it had self sealing tanks (flyboyJ thinks they had self sealing tanks) The point of that comparison was that the P36 still had lighter wing loading than a Spitfire and had been flown off a carrier before, in fact, same P36's off same carrier.


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## pinsog (Jun 29, 2017)

I think they were very intelligent back then.
I think that they might have been able to find a place to let a few pilots sleep on an 800 foot aircraft carrier. They found a place for the Dolittle guys to sleep. This was 48 hours, maybe rotate bunks? sleeping bag on floor? 

I realize that P36's are complicated. What do you think they did for the B26's and Avengers that were flown out at the last minute for parts and mechanics?


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## pinsog (Jun 29, 2017)

Where did pilots sleep when they sent overloaded aircraft carriers with planes parked on deck to Guadalcanal? They did almost exactly what I am suggesting 2 months later at Guadalcanal. They overloaded carriers headed that way with extra fighters. They had AAF P39's and Wildcats doing intercepts together. They were short of spares so they cannibalized damaged planes. Where did the parts come from when the first fighters landed on Guadalcanal? Did they grab all the tools and spare parts from the Hornet and Wasp as they were sinking when they sent what they could of their airgroups to Guadalcanal? How many extra parts do you need for the first 1 or 2 missions when the planes should be in good shape when they leave the carrier? After the first combat some of the damaged planes could be salvaged for parts


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## parsifal (Jun 29, 2017)

The Japanese most certainly were not ahead of the game in terms of their doctrine for carrier operations. In many respects they were behind, particularly in technology and particularly compared to british ops, where night ops were the norm, ASV radar fitted as standard and the british all weather capabilities years ahead of the Japanese (the Japanese would not have been able to carry out the operations the british were doing like the strikes on the Bismarck) . Between the US and the IJN there was a slight advantage to the latter. For the Japanese Pearl harbor was very much contrary to their established battle plans and intended strategy to fight the Americans. The intention was that as the americans began to fight their way across the pacific, the IJN would use its light forces and its carriers to inflict attrition on the US battlefleet as it ploughed its way toward the Japanese defences somewhere in the central pacific. Most admirals, including the majority of IJN admirals did not believe their carrier assets had the capacity to sink heavy units at sea. They could, however inflict damage, forcing some to either turn back, or reduce speed, thereby increasing the advantages to the other side.


The Japanese were ahead of the game, simply because they had the numbers to concentrate their carriers. Two or three carriers operating as a cohesive unit are exponentially more dangerous than a single carrier or a few carriers operating against many flat tops. In 1941, the Americans had enough carriers to concentrate, but were on the defensive, had lost the initiative were fighting on multiple fronts (including the Atlantic) and even in the Pacific were forced to operate on widely separated fronts whilst the Japanese had the priceless advantage of operating on interior lines with really just one front to worry about. Moreover, the Americans had to withhold significant parts of their force structure back for training purposes. This would deliver great dividends later, but in June 1942 the Americans were forced to fight with dispersed forces as they struggled to contain the rampaging Japanese.


The RN was facing an even more acute crisis as they struggled to meet their world wide commitments. The RN was easily ahead of both the other navies in recognizing the benefits of concentration of effort in carrier operations, but seldom possessed the resources to exploit that knowledge.


Your sources for reinforcement are very unrealistic and unconvincing. If nothing else, it would allow the IJN a free hand in those other TOs. The IJN in addition to their MI strategy had developed their so-called “FS” strategy, which western accounts sometimes refer to as the “second operational phase”. Basically the Japanese concluded that they lacked the shipping to carry out a direct assault on either the HI or Australia, but also recognized the vital importance of putting pressure on both objectives. In March and April 1942, with their “1st operational phase” completed with amazingly light losses, but as yet no strategic victory to force the Americans to the peace table, the Japanese adopted an essentially opportunistic war strategy, in which they would pursue the lines of least resistance. There were four main MLAs considered and a fourth subsidiary one also thrown in rather late in the planning. The four main options considered were


1) A continued advance through India to establish a link with the European Axis. The continued USN activities culminating with the Doolittle raids made the IJN realise that they could not afford to be distracted away from the pacific. This option was quickly dropped from an early stage


2) Plan FO was the plan to invade Australia, and was touted as a viable option by Yamamoto to lure the Americans into a climactic battle of destruction. Coral Sea was fought as a precursor to that plan, but the victory at coral sea did not fully cancel the Japanese desire to carry out the operation. Indeed, there were more than a few in the American commands that expected the Japanese to pour more resources in a second round of Coral Sea, pouriong more carriers into that TO so as to achieve the objectives of the operation.


3) Plan RY. This operation was the IJNs plan to invade and occupy Nauru and Ocean in the south Pacific. The operation was originally set to be executed in May 1942 immediately following op MO and before Operation MI, which resulted in Midway. The primary reason for the operation was to exploit the islands' supplies of phosphate. After a postponement due to interference by enemy forces, the operation was completed in August 1942. The USN cryptanalysts were aware of this plan but lacked the resources to counter it. It had been expected by the IJN that the USN might react, but such reaction neve eventuated


4) Operation FS, already mentioned above had the intention of isolating Australia, It intended to achieve that by the capture of strategic islands including noumea fiji and beyond that American Samoa. If the japanese had been given the latitude to carry out that operation it would have significantly disrupted the allied containment strategy. ,


The Japanese were considering all of these options at the time that the midway operation was also being planned.


In February 1942, Japanese Admiral Yamamoto, proposed an immediate invasion of Australia. He had just implemented his bombing raids on Darwin in the Northern Territory. He pleaded with the Japanese General Staff, to land two Japanese Army Divisions on the northern coastline of Australia which was very poorly defended. They were to follow the north-south railway line to Adelaide, thus dividing Australia into two fronts. Once Adelaide had been taken, a second force would land on the south east coast of Australia and drive northwards to Sydney and southwards to Melbourne.


Yamamoto's plan appeared to be a diversionary invasion plan rather than a plan to occupy Australia. He wanted to draw large American forces away from launching attacks on the Japanese Island chain far to the north of Australia.


General Yamashita agreed with Yamamoto's Invasion Plan and even volunteered to lead the invasion. However, the plan was opposed by Japanese Prime Minister, General Tojo, as he believed that there were no contingency plans considered for Yamamoto's Invasion Plan. IGHQ was receiving fairly accurate intelligence on the steady stream of US air and ground reinforcements streaming into Australia at that time and argued that American airpower, including the fighters being rushed to the TO at that time were a serious risk to the operation. Take away some or all of those reinforcements, and the main opposition to FO evaporates.


3) plan FI was an alternative to FO and called for the invasion of Noumea, the south west pacific, culminating in the capture of Fiji. It was essentially a cut down version of FS. For a while, even after the crushing defeats at midway, the Japanese considered a continuation of that strategy, but the presence of significant land based assets and then carriers deterred the Japanese to the point they cancelled the operation in September.


The point about all this is the fighters you are relying on to achieve your questionable numerical superiority on midway (we wont even go to the extremely limited spot capacity on the atoll that would have made the management of such ac numbers all but impossible) is that you are robbing Peter to half pay for Paul. Denuding the defences in the South pacific at a time when the Japanese were known to be preparing major offensive into those for the purposes of knocking out the major power left standing to resist the Japanese (ANZAC’s contribution to the defence of the pacific at least on land and in the air was not overtaken by the US until the latter part of 1943) would have been a massive loss of faith and trust in the US promises to help defend australia at a time we were struggling. It probably or likely would have brought about the capitulation of the Australians, at least, in much the same way as the Portuguese had done. This was something the US greatly feared and worked very hard to avoid. Part of that response was the deployment of the very assets you are now proposing to plunder.

You might want to consider expanding your reading list before spouting the blessings of shattered Sword. Whilst an excellent reference work, it is not the last word on the pacific by a long shot. as an example, you might want to consider some of the translations slowly becoming available from a truly Japanese perspective, of which the following is an example

http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/ajrp/ajrp2.nsf/WebI/JpnOperations/$file/JpnOpsText.pdf?OpenElement

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## pinsog (Jun 29, 2017)

Parsifal" Every one of these planes except the 21 Marine fighters deposited at Noumea were left behind at Pearl. 15 Yorktown fighters traded in, 10 replacements not used, and the 22 P36's which never did go anywhere else during the war. Only Noumea would be shorted and 21 Wildcats wouldn't have helped much anyway as proved by both Midway and Wake. 20 fighters spread at remote fields here and there will accomplish little in the event of a large carrier strike. A large group of 95 or so would represent a formidable force.

I think they would fit, as I said earlier, I would remove 4 B26's. 6 Avengers, 16 dauntless's and 11 Vindicators. That is 37 planes, some of them are quite large. The 10 folding wing F4F-4's could have their wings folded, at least 2 fighters could be parked for each B26

No Wildcats or P36's were ever deployed to Australia so this has no bearing on them.


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## pinsog (Jun 29, 2017)

Quite honestly this is the strangest thread I have ever done. I'm not time warping Corsairs or Bearcats in time for battle, I'm not miraculously fixing the US torpedo problem and training B26 pilots to deliver them, I'm not miracle'ing 2 squadrons of Spitfires from England to Midway. I am loading planes at Hawaii onto existing carriers in the existing time frame and picking up the 21 Wildcats that were just delivered to Noumea before Halsey was recalled. 

I could have suggested Iron Man and Thor intervene with more support and less argument. 

I have been told adding more fighters is a bad idea because:

1. Who will control them? Because telling trained Navy, Marine and AAF fighter pilots that "108 enemy planes at 15,000 feet, jump them right here (pointing to map) and shoot them down" isn't enough

2. Can't fly mixed missions with Navy, Marine and AAF pilots because they had never done it and the planes aren't the same, they have different performance levels. Even though they flew P39's and Wildcats together at Guadalcanal

3. outnumbering the enemy fighters almost 3 to 1 is bad because the same pilots that can't find the enemy (the original 27 flew right to them just fine, not sure how 27 flew right to them but 95 can't find them) are going to shoot down all their own planes because they don't know what a Zero looks like

4. We can work on B17's, B26's and Avengers but a P36 is just too darn complicated

5. Leaving the carriers 50-75 miles south of the island in a safe place while the beefed up island defenses thin down the enemy air groups absolutely cannot be done because we haven't trained for that and never tried it before

6. Pilots that haven't shot down Zeros can't shoot down Zeros, even though the only fighter pilots that had seen them were the few Yorktown pilots that were retained from the Coral Sea battle and the rest of the first timers held about a 1 to 1 kill ratio

7. P36's can't fly from a carrier, even though these exact P36's were flown from the Enterprise to Pearl in February 1941 

8. Cant fly cap over Midway because they might get caught out of fuel, even though flying CAP over a carrier was standard procedure

9. the attack might not happen even though we were sure enough that it would happen when it actually did happen that we sent 3 carriers and their battle groups out to the middle of nowhere, flew 4 B26's, 6 Avengers and several B17's straight to Midway from Pearl. We did all that, but sending fighters to Midway instead of 4 B26's, 6 Avengers, 16 Dauntless and 11 Vindicators is just crazy over the top. 

10. the 1st wave of Japanese might do something different and sneaky (never found out what that might be) 

11. a battle fleet containing 3 aircraft carriers has no room for 68 extra pilots


This is starting to sound like a Monty Python skit:

"Outpost 4 to Base, we are being over run!!!!"

"Base to outpost 4, hang on we are sending men and weapons to help"

"Outpost 4 to base, did you hear me? I said we are being over run, the last thing I need is more men and weapons!!!!!"


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## buffnut453 (Jun 29, 2017)

I know...I said I'd bow out but some of the points being made need to be rebutted. Regarding maintenance crew, type qualification and the simple fact of maintaining an unusual aircraft for a limited number of sorties is not the problem. The problem is how to turn your quantity of aircraft rapidly at the end of their sortie. You have to have the personnel to replenish them (fuel, oil, ammo, oxygen, check hydraulics etc) which takes time. You also have to have the capabilities to produce stuff like oxygen so you can refill the tanks. Then there's dealing with battle damage to get aircraft patched up and back into the fray. Simply saying "The same guys will do all the planes" is box of rocks dumb because the groundcrew will get exhausted...and FAST. Either that or your sortie generation rate will tank, which means you can't put the force in the air that you need to achieve your objectives. And all the while, Nagumo still has 50% of his aircraft that are not committed to the battle.

Pinsog, you seem to think that it's an easy task to just throw a bunch of aircraft onto an airfield, tell them "Fly north, young men, and kill lots of the enemy" and it will all happen like magic. It WON'T. Situations change and it takes a LOT of planning, logistics and C3 to make it work. Military history is filled of "well it was SUPPOSED to work" events where things just didn't go to plan. Reinforcements of the kind you indicate would probably have been detected by the Japanese, leading to potentially a change of plans by Nagumo....and you're betting the farm on things panning out the way they did in reality. Any time travel show will tell you that a change to one aspect of history will have unexpected, and unforeseen, consequences. They thought they were going in against a single USMC fighter squadron on Midway. If they had ANY inkling of the size of force you're proposing, that plan would have changed...drastically! The Japanese weren't stupid...and bear in mind their primary objective was a major engagement with the USN carriers. If that happens, most of your available fighter defences are sitting on an island while your carriers are being heavily engaged. While there are precedents for AF aircraft taking off from a carrier, it typically wasn't as part of a major combat formation that was expected to carry on with ongoing major operations.

If you want to convince us that this will work, please take on the challenge of doing the maths for a squadron of aircraft in terms of turnaround times, parking space requirements, POL, ammunition, maintenance crews to turn the squadron in, say, 30 mins or less, oxygen production needs, time taken to launch and then climb to height...and then multiple that by the number of squadrons you want to squeeze onto Midway. Then take a look at what was truly available in terms of fuel stores, parking space, food production capacity, accommodation etc. Also bear in mind that you must maintain a reasonable CAP over Midway otherwise all those aircraft you've brought in will just get schwacked whle they're being refueled/rearmed (and the longer that takes, the greater the risk...which gets us back to the number of maintenance crew you need). And all of this hasn't even considered dealing with damaged aircraft, unjamming malfunctioning guns etc etc etc.

Please...stop just repeating that "it should be simple" and show us, mathematically and with schematics HOW it would work. There are plenty of people here who HAVE worked air combat operations, who've turned aircraft without sufficient groundcrew...and several have commented on the complexity of the problem you're laying out but you don't seem to be listening. If you're going to press the issue, then please provide the evidence.

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## parsifal (Jun 29, 2017)

_Parsifal" Every one of these planes except the 21 Marine fighters deposited at Noumea were left behind at Pearl. _


21 fighters was a significant number in June 1942, not enough to win, but enough to make it difficult. Over rabaul, for example, the air defence component at that time was a mere 12 wiraway trainers. Over Port Moresby the numbers were about 16 p-40s, there were just 6 buffaloes defending Fremantle..


_15 Yorktown fighters traded in, 10 replacements not used, and the 22 P36's which never did go anywhere else during the war. _


The most vital part of the equation are these aircraft. They are part of the strategic reserves for the pacific Command and AAF, and at a guess I would say a vital component to the training elements of the US at that time. Even if they were being held as part of the depot reserves, their release would be very difficult to agree to as a good idea or optimal. You don’t wear down your reserves unless you absolutely need to, and reinforcing midway to this extent was definitely not a case of ‘absolutely need to”.



_Only Noumea would be shorted and 21 Wildcats wouldn't have helped much anyway as proved by both Midway and Wake. _


No, and no. Robbing your vital strategic reserves is the issue, not robbing the front line commands. Denuding your reserves does a lot of bad things to your ability to flexibly react, and curtails your capacity building efforts.


The efforts of the far flung air garrisons, strung out like penny packets does appear futile, but in reality was the glue that held the pacific command together. They fulfilled a vital role in fact. Your thinking is failing to understand the situation being faced at this time. The Japanese held the initiative, were not blind to allied defensive preparations (contrary to most American based sources that claim otherwise) were rampaging everywhere and anywhere across the pacific, The Allies had to disperse their forces to react, they had to withhold significant forces as reserves, they had to expend vast reserves for capacity building. The only mobile reserves were the fast carriers, and whilst these carriers did have the ability to pack more fighters onto their decks, and act as aircraft ferries, that would be about the last thing you waould want in a disputed sea area like the midway approaches. The US command had to contingency plan, they had to assume that the Japanese might cotton on to what was happening and might react in ways not foreseen. The last thing you want is your casrrier decks to be caught cluttered and operating inefficiently because of some hair brained scheme as yet incomplete trying to send in your fighters suicidally to defend a pointless speck of dirt in the middle of the pacific. Midway as a piece of real estate was totally unimportant, it was the fight surrounding that real estate and the implications for its loss that made it significant.



_20 fighters spread at remote fields here and there will accomplish little in the event of a large carrier strike. A large group of 95 or so would represent a formidable force._


Wrong. For the reasons ive previously pointed out to you



_I think they would fit, as I said earlier, I would remove 4 B26's. 6 Avengers, 16 dauntless's and 11 Vindicators. That is 37 planes, some of them are quite large. The 10 folding wing F4F-4's could have their wings folded, at least 2 fighters could be parked for each B26_


Look at the air garrisons stationed on the atoll at later stages. Numbers never came close to the numbers you are suggesting. It needs more research, that I would accept, but its just not sitting right at this minute.


_No Wildcats or P36's were ever deployed to Australia so this has no bearing on them_


Some Wildcates were deployed for reapirs that I know of. I would have to check properly, but I suspect that 1 or 2 p-36s wound up in Aus. Irrelevant however, as these aircraft at that time were needed to defend Pearl and more importantly act as strategic reserves.

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## buffnut453 (Jun 29, 2017)

Pinsog, you are grossly misrepresenting the objections. Nobody is saying more fighters is a bad idea. We're just not buying your oversimplication, and outright ignoring, of the challenges. 



pinsog said:


> 1. Who will control them? Because telling trained Navy, Marine and AAF fighter pilots that "108 enemy planes at 15,000 feet, jump them right here (pointing to map) and shoot them down" isn't enough.


Fighter formations must be commanded. When you have multiple units involved, there must be communication between the units to ensure attacks are correctly coordinated. It's not WHO will command but HOW command will be executed in the air. For example, let's say that, en route to the intended intercept point, the P-36 squadron lags behind the others or, because of unfamiliarity with navigation over water, they drift off. How does the commander call them back if they're not on the same radio frequency (indeed, they may not be using the same radios)? Simply saying, "well they'd just stay within visual formation" isn't going to work...and how does one unit warn all other units of the location of the enemy once sighted? You MUST have air-to-air communication and you have steadfastly ignored this issue.



pinsog said:


> 2. Can't fly mixed missions with Navy, Marine and AAF pilots because they had never done it and the planes aren't the same, they have different performance levels. Even though they flew P39's and Wildcats together at Guadalcanal


P-39s and F4Fs did NOT fly interceptions together at Guadalcanal. The relative performance differences of the 2 types were such that the P-400s and P-39s couldn't get to height fast enough and so seldom ever made an interception, hence they were re-roled for ground attack. If you want a formation to stick together, it must fly at the pace of the worst performing airframe...which takes us back to the C3 issue because, if the overall air commander isn't flying the slowest aircraft, how does he know he's not running away from half his formation? 



pinsog said:


> 3. outnumbering the enemy fighters almost 3 to 1 is bad because the same pilots that can't find the enemy (the original 27 flew right to them just fine, not sure how 27 flew right to them but 95 can't find them) are going to shoot down all their own planes because they don't know what a Zero looks like.


The original 27 didn't engage as a single formation. They engaged as separate divisions and were defeated in detail. The problem is not finding the enemy or identifying him. The problem is getting all your fighters into the engagement at the same time. That is a MASSIVE problem. If they don't all go in together, they will be defeated piecemeal. 



pinsog said:


> 4. We can work on B17's, B26's and Avengers but a P36 is just too darn complicated.


Per my previous post, it's not about the complexity of the aircraft. It's how many maintenance staff you need to replenish, repair and launch them. You can't just keep using the same groundcrew because your sortie generation rate will tank...and then you won't have a 3-to-1 numerical advantage because most of your aircraft will be stuck on the ground. Remember, Nagumo still has 50% of his aircraft not committed. Unless you can turn your fighters and get them back in the air, they are simply targets.



pinsog said:


> 5. Leaving the carriers 50-75 miles south of the island in a safe place while the beefed up island defenses thin down the enemy air groups absolutely cannot be done because we haven't trained for that and never tried it before.


50-75 miles is VERY close for carriers. You run a real risk of their being detected...and Nagumo has the spare resources to attack them. Again, you're misrepresenting the objections. Nobody...I repeat NOBODY, anywhere had put 90+ fighters up into a single engagement. USAAF and USN fighters had NOT operated together. You can't just ignore these issues. I'll bet even the R/T vernacular was different between the services...even assuming they could communicate. Joint operations are HARD. Again, there are many of us who have done them and it's hard in an age where Joint is an understood term. That definitely was NOT the case in mid-1942.



pinsog said:


> 6. Pilots that haven't shot down Zeros can't shoot down Zeros, even though the only fighter pilots that had seen them were the few Yorktown pilots that were retained from the Coral Sea battle and the rest of the first timers held about a 1 to 1 kill ratio.


Again, this isn't the issue. It's how your manage your tactics. A divisional formation behaves very differently from a battle pair...and you'd be throwing all this together into the same fight. It's a recipe for confusion and misidentification. 



pinsog said:


> 7. P36's can't fly from a carrier, even though these exact P36's were flown from the Enterprise to Pearl in February 1941.


Flying P-36s off a carrier is easy. Doing that while conducting high-intensity operations against the biggest naval force ever seen in the Pacific is a totally different proposition. It's an incredibly risky proposition to essentially lose a flat top because it's being used as a ferry when you know you're going up against Kido Butai. It would fly against all combat doctrine that the Navy had to deliberately go into a major naval engagement knowing that you can't launch aircraft from one of your carriers. PH in Feb 41 is not the same as confronting the main IJN force off Midway. You'd want EVERY flat top available for the highest number of sorties.



pinsog said:


> 8. Cant fly cap over Midway because they might get caught out of fuel, even though flying CAP over a carrier was standard procedure.


Again, you're misrepresenting the argument. It's not that a CAP can't be flown over Midway, it's simply the expense of doing so. It takes a LOT of resources to maintain a CAP (typically three/four times the number of aircraft airborne). If you want CAPS, you have to resource them, turn the aircraft etc etc. All that will take away from your fighter force that can go out and intercept the incoming IJNAF attack. Also, the CAPs must be coordinated - more units/aircraft means more complexity and more risk of blue-on-blue. 



pinsog said:


> 9. the attack might not happen even though we were sure enough that it would happen when it actually did happen that we sent 3 carriers and their battle groups out to the middle of nowhere, flew 4 B26's, 6 Avengers and several B17's straight to Midway from Pearl. We did all that, but sending fighters to Midway instead of 4 B26's, 6 Avengers, 16 Dauntless and 11 Vindicators is just crazy over the top.
> 
> 10. the 1st wave of Japanese might do something different and sneaky (never found out what that might be)


Putting the best part of 100 fighers on Midway is a major change to the tactical situation. You cannot assume that the Japanese attack would continue as per history when there's such a dramatic change to the local ORBAT. Sorry but commanders don't just blindly charge in regardless of the threat. 



pinsog said:


> 11. a battle fleet containing 3 aircraft carriers has no room for 68 extra pilots.


It's not the pilots. It's the loss of operational capability because you're giving up a flight deck. I don't see any sensible commander agreeing to this when he knows he's going up against the most formidable naval air force in the world.


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## pinsog (Jun 29, 2017)

Why would fighter reinforcements be detected but the dive bombers, B26's, Avengers and extra B17's flown in were not? 
As I have said, I would fly the Vindicators and Dauntless's out and not deploy the B26's and Avengers that were flown in near the end just to make room for the fighters. Without a pic of the runways with Vindicators, Dauntlesses, B26's and Avengers all parked it would be difficult to say just how exactly the fighters could or would be parked. The 10 folding wing F4F-4's could fold their wings, more than 1 fighter per B26. 

Food, accommodation? I just got rid of more people with the bombers I disposed of than fighter pilots I'm bringing in. Bringing in 68 single place fighters to replace, 27 2 place bombers, 6 3 place bombers and 4 B26's (not sure on crew number, 6?) 

Fuel, ammo, oxygen. Fuel for 27 2 place bombers, 6 Avengers and 4 B26's should spread out ok for the fighters for at least a mission or 2. Wildcats could go back to carriers in a dire emergency. All planes bring in full load of ammo and O2 and as much fuel as possible for 1st mission. (it is why I would drop them say 50 to 75 miles out)

We knew, or thought we knew, and we were right, about what day the attack was coming and even guessed about what time the attack would start. So there was no need to fly all these fighters all day every day up until the day of the 1st attack. Recon missions have to go on and they did.

The 27 fighter pilots on Midway took off and flew directly to the 1st wave. So would 30 be different? 50? 70? 90? Not sure why the 'control' needed to be different just because there were more fighters? Who would control however many fighters were crammed on the island? I assume the same guy that controlled the 27


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## buffnut453 (Jun 29, 2017)

I can't go on with this. You clearly have never served in an air combat environment and refuse to listen to those who have. When you're expecting combat. you don't just sit on your backside and wait for the appointed time...if you do that, you'll find you get surprised. Just because the guesstimate proved to be correct doesn't mean the commander could relax and ignore the threat until the appointed time. Your using massive hindsight with that assessment. I'm tired of repeating myself because, clearly, you have no understanding of the problems of controlling a formation of aircraft, The RAF with a full ground control capability never went above 60 aircraft in a single formation, and they were all the same service...and it was after months of practice to make it work Throwing 90 aircraft together without prior training will NOT work. Period.


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## pinsog (Jun 29, 2017)

Again, we suspected knew the day of the attack and we were right. This plan probably wouldn't work if we weren't for certain that Midway was the target.

1. Control. Again, a radar operator guides them to the 1st attack. Correct on the 27 attacking piecemeal. I would say climb rate had an effect on that. Radar operator gives constant updates. Heck, if your worried about that tell everyone to get to 20,000 directly over the island. When they visually spot the attack they go in. Simple, not the best but simple. 

2. P39's and F4F did fly interception together, F4F's went up top, P39's well they got as high as they could. Sometimes they stayed low and picked off stragglers. I never meant they flew wing to wing, but they took off in together in groups and attacked as best they could, many times one peeling a Zero off the other

3. A large formation or maybe 2 smaller formations would be best for attack, but maybe they don't all need to get there at the same time. If a reasonable number of fighters, say all P36's and hopefully a few Wildcats to even up the odds, could dive into the Zero formation and break it up, then other fighters could carve up the bombers as they arrived on scene. F4F's that are left would be especially good at it, followed by Buffalos.


4. True that Nagumo has 50% of his force on his ships. The US has 100% of its force waiting on its carriers, untouched by battle as the Midway pilots whittle down the enemy. As far as fuel, oil and ammo, the pilots and Marine grunts on Guadalcanal pitched in and helped get them back in the air. The B17 and Catalina guys can help to since all their planes are gone. Battle damage is obviously a more specialized problem. Badly damaged will probably be pushed out into the sand and not play any more part in the battle. I imagine many planes would climb into a second strike, if there was one, with unprepared damage much as the Wildcats that fought over Yorktown did in the historical battle of Midway 

5. I doubt that they would work together like a well oiled machine, but once contact is made the best laid plan would probably go out the window anyway. Maybe a bar room brawl at 15,000 is all we could hope for. Zeros fought individually and didn't even have radios so if one decent sized group of Wildcats made a firing pass through the middle of them, then they would be unlikely to ever regroup to protect the bombers. If a decent sized group of fighters got into the unprotected bombers it would be a slaughter

6. Tactics. I would dived group in 2. P36 and some wildcats go after Zeros, everyone else after bombers. Buffaloes should concentrate on bombers. Wildcats fighting Zeros do hit and runs, its the only way they can fight. P36's with 2 machine guns should probably just drop into the Zeros and tail chase dogfight after the Wildcats make a firing pass and break it up. P36 was very close to Zero in turn and climb, depending on altitude, and could always out roll it. They would have a couple of days to discuss it among themselves. hard to say what they would work out. 

7. Flying P36's of a carrier 1 or 2 days before the attack is easier than hauling 16 B25's to Japan or 48 Spitfires to Malta, twice. There was no one in that part of the ocean. Escorting carrier still runs CAP because they don't know this at the time. Again, i was told P36's can't fly off a carrier earlier in thread

8. I suggested half the fighters should be at altitude for CAP the morning of the attack that we knew was coming that morning. I was told they might run out of gas. Well who ever was running Midway guessed nearly perfect on when they would get there. 

9 and 10. According to Shattered Sword the Japanese actually did charge in blind, its part of why they lost. We are trading nearly 40 bombers for 68 fighters, half the time trained pilots can't tell the difference, how would the Japanese? When did they do recon of Midway? How could they tell what a unit was unless they take pictures from relatively close? Why should what the Japanese did historically change at all? Nothing is changing except I am loading fighters onto an empty carrier deck. Enterprise or Hornet carries them, other one provides air cover. Back them up 100 miles from Midway. Look at the Japanese search grid. Both sides of Midway, even with it, nothing past it. No subs, they were late in getting in position. 

11. Were to put the pilots was actually a problem, look back in the thread.


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## pinsog (Jun 29, 2017)

They weren't just sitting on their backside. They had B17's and Catalina's patrolling out every day. Are you saying that because we had 95 fighters sitting on the runway that we need to fly all of them every day? Why not keep all of them fueled and armed and send up CAP patrols with a few of them. I never suggested all the fighter pilots sleep up until the moment of the attack. Engines need started and warmed every day, but again, we thought we knew when the attack was and we nailed it. AND the Japanese got complacent about winning so they didn't follow through with their recon like they should, their subs got into position late and they're carriers were not at full strength on pilots and planes


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## pinsog (Jun 29, 2017)

buffnut453 said:


> I can't go on with this. You clearly have never served in an air combat environment and refuse to listen to those who have. When you're expecting combat. you don't just sit on your backside and wait for the appointed time...if you do that, you'll find you get surprised. Just because the guesstimate proved to be correct doesn't mean the commander could relax and ignore the threat until the appointed time. Your using massive hindsight with that assessment. I'm tired of repeating myself because, clearly, you have no understanding of the problems of controlling a formation of aircraft, The RAF with a full ground control capability never went above 60 aircraft in a single formation, and they were all the same service...and it was after months of practice to make it work Throwing 90 aircraft together without prior training will NOT work. Period.



You are correct that I have "never served in an air combat environment". I assume you are retired US air force. (Thank you, I respect that) But lets be honest, unless you are close to 90 years old I'm going to guess that you have never been in an "air combat environment" either IF we are talking about repulsing an actual enemy air attack. When was the last time US forces were attacked from the air? Early Korea?

You have some valid points. It is never as easy as it seems on paper. But some of the points made by you and others don't hold water either. Where do we put extra pilots on the carrier? Food, fuel, oxygen, sleeping quarters, all were needed by the bombers that I would have either evacuated or never sent at all. A P36 can't take off from a carrier? Cant fly CAP because they might be caught when they run out of fuel? Cant run an intercept with multiple type of planes?

None of those arguments make sense.

Many of the jobs you talk about getting done on these fighters were done by pilots and Marine grunts at Guadalcanal. Repair is one thing, but The First Team talks about Marines gladly helping rearm and refuel aircraft. Mechanics would be left to do skilled jobs such as repairing battle damage.

Why does it have to be all 90 in one formation? How about 3 30 plane formations? If a group can plunge into the Zeros and keep them occupied, then the rest of the defending fighters can pick off the bombers as they arrive on scene. How about 1 30 plane formation and the rest attack the bombers completely piecemeal? Does that scenario make sense? 

I'm not using massive hindsight, notice I didn't leave the worthless carrier torpedo bombers at home. I looked at Coral Sea and the Pearl Harbor attack and said, what if we had a large number of fighters waiting to jump them? Thin out the carrier planes as much as possible before our carriers ever get involved and it will be safer and easier for our carriers to do their job.

How are you giving up a flight deck if you fly the fighters to the island 2 days before the attack when your in completely safe waters 100, 200, 300, 400 miles south of Midway? The very operation that your telling me now was dumb and they would never do is PRECISELY what the USS WASP was doing and why she missed the battle. She went into the Mediterranean twice in a row to deliver Spitfires. The germans even knew she was there because they timed the arrival and destroyed the first group as it arrived. 

How would the Japanese know we beefed up the fighters on Midway? They weren't flying recon, Shattered Sword covered that, again, it is one of the reasons they lost.

Would you like to explain the last 2 paragraphs of questions I have?


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## XBe02Drvr (Jun 29, 2017)

That's it, I'm outta here! This guy has earned the coveted title of "McNamara" that was recently outgrown by another well-known member who did his research, broadened his horizons and began to make sense.
Cheers,
Wes


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## pinsog (Jun 30, 2017)

XBe02Drvr said:


> That's it, I'm outta here! This guy has earned the coveted title of "McNamara" that was recently outgrown by another well-known member who did his research, broadened his horizons and began to make sense.
> Cheers,
> Wes



Aren't you the one that claimed aP36 couldn't take off from a carrier?
The P-36s had been delivered to Hawaii in February 1941 by being loaded on the carrier the USS _Enterprise_ in California, then in a first for the USAAC, flown off the carrier's deck by the P-36's U.S. Army Air Corps pilots when the _Enterprise_ neared the coast of Hawaii. This saved considerable time over the traditional shipping method of having the fighters first disassembled, crated and then loaded by crane in the hold of a freighter, then unloaded and reassembled in Hawaii.[19]

Aren't you the guy that said:
1. If I was a carrier skipper, there's no way you're going to get me to sail my ship into harm's way with a deck stacked full of stiff-wing land-lubber airplanes! No way in hell! Sure, P-36s had been delivered from carrier decks, but that was a delivery in a low-threat zone, not a combat launch, and with only a few planes on deck at a time, as they needed most of the deck for takeoff. Army pilots need considerable special training before being launched off a carrier, and the preparations for Midway were something of a mad scramble, IIRC.

I replied:
XBe02Drvr: If you were skipper of the USS Wasp you would have delivered a load of fixed wing Spitfires to Malta, in a combat situation, as you were ordered to do.

If you were skipper of the USS Wasp, after all the Spitfires you just delivered were destroyed as they arrived/landed, you would have delivered a second load of Spitfires to Malta, in a combat situation, as you were ordered to do.

(Spitfire pilots had 0 carrier training. All of them took off just fine and 1 even landed back aboard the Wasp without a tail hook because his drop tank wouldn't feed)

If you were skipper of the Hornet, you would have delivered 16 B25's off the coast of Japan, in a combat situation, as you were ordered to do

You didn't respond to either of those points.

The Akutan Zero didn't do much except confirm everything that US Navy pilots had been saying.

You also said this: 
So you've got 15 pilots who've seen the Zero and are telling these fantastic stories of what it can do. Given the timeframe available I can't see them refashioning the training of the large mass of fighter pilots who've been taught to fight the turning dogfight. I find the 1 to 1 F4F vs Zero in the first six months hard to believe
. As for P-36s, their record against IJA Ki43s
should not b taken as predictive against Zeros. The A6M was a far more formidable machine and IJN pilots better trained. In the Netherlands Indies Kido Butai Zeros slaughtered Dutch P-36s.
Cheers,
Wes

KI43 was superior to Zero in turn and high speed handling and I think climb also. The zero was faster and had cannon. You may find the 1 to 1 kill ratio b between a Zero and F4F have to believe, but what you believe is irrelevant. That was the ratio. You need to read the First Team volumes 1 and 2 then get back to me.

Pilots returning fro Coral Sea weren't terrified of the Zero. In fact, please refer to page 300 of The First Team Pearl Harbor to Midway "The VF-2 and VF42 pilots respected the enemy fighter, particularly its tremendous maneuverability, but the Mitsubishis did not intimidate them. On the basis of their first combat experiences, the pilots felt their Grumman F4F-3 Wildcats were equal to the Zeros in speed and climbing ability and superior in firepower and protection, being inferior only in maneuverability"

Sounds like you need to do a bit more reading. Let me know your thoughts on what you already got wrong above


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## XBe02Drvr (Jun 30, 2017)

Like I said, I'm outta here. "The First Team" is a good book, but it ain't the Bible.
Cheers,
Wes


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## pinsog (Jun 30, 2017)

Parsifal: 
thats well laid out plan of what the Japanese intended to do. I understand everything your saying but, none of these aircraft were ever used for the defense of Australia. I might be wrong, but I don't think Wildcats were ever deployed to Australia. Let me know if you can find a reference. To my knowledge, P39 and P40's were what was used to defend Australia early on, the lack of altitude capability really hampering their effectiveness until Spitfires and Lightnings finally showed up. 

The training aspect of the fighters I would plan to steal is a very valid point your brought up, the P36's before Pearl Harbor were used for gunnery training and in fact had only 1 30 caliber machine gun mounted when the attack happened. So any victories scored by the P36 was done with only a single 30.


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## parsifal (Jun 30, 2017)

For the record, I served nearly 9 years in the RAN 4 years on the Carrier as a PWO, reaching the rank of Lt. Some of that time was on active operations, not a shooting war, but a war of nerves against a foe at least as cunning as the Japanese. We were reacting to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980, for the record, and itt was as close to a shooting war that I ever want to get. A friend of mine ended up in the drink during those operations and went onto command a Sea Harrier squadron in the RN. I can tell you there is a phenomenon known as the fog of war that absolutely makes your pet scheme unworkable. its called the fog of war. The unknown variables that will take the best laid plans and turn them into scrap at a moments notice. Your plan is full of assumptions and what the enemy is expected to do, the very mistake the Japanese made in their over intense planning for Operation MI. 

Subsequent to my Naval career I was engaged as a tutor for strategic studies units at a local uni. You could say I was a teacher of tactics and how to plan for operations.

so I am confident that I have the training to assess and comment on operational plan. I am confident to say that yours looks good, but for the reasons the vets have pointed out to you, is basically a dud plan.


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## pinsog (Jun 30, 2017)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Like I said, I'm outta here. "The First Team" is a good book, but it ain't the Bible.
> Cheers,
> Wes



Your the one the called me "McNamara" and yet your the one that refuses to acknowledge half a dozen blatantly wrong statements. Have a nice day.


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## Tkdog (Jun 30, 2017)

Dude. 

You have multiple veterans trying to explain to you how the military actually works. Either a bunch of people who have probably never met are carefully sculpting a troll on you or you're beating a dead horse. Which is more likely?

To address (in vain) some issues. 

It appears the intel from the code breaking was correct. At the time nobody was going to bet the farm on that intel. Intel had been wrong before. They firmly believed their were spies on Oahu. That possibility has to be allowed for and it impacted the plans. 

If the carriers (or even one) is covered with deck parked Army planes it's non-operational. That's risky, as pointed out above. 

Sending bombers, and a mix of aircraft did more than just put the planes here. It allowed them to see if the planes worked in an operational environment. It's going to be a long war. They might also do some good at the same time. 

The mission of the carriers and Lang based fleets wasn't to destroy all the planes. It was to defend Midway and sink ships. That's why they focused on defending Midway and sinking ships. Carriers are a primary target. I know you disagree, please don't say so again. The admirals at the time wanted to sink carriers. They were right as more planes back in Japan don't matter without carriers until we want to get to Japan. At which time we will have way more planes than they do as America is big. 

The admirals always knew that if we could stay in the game Long enough we could win. So what they needed to do was play the Long game.


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## pinsog (Jun 30, 2017)

parsifal said:


> For the record, I served nearly 9 years in the RAN 4 years on the Carrier as a PWO, reaching the rank of Lt. Some of that time was on active operations, not a shooting war, but a war of nerves against a foe at least as cunning as the Japanese. We were reacting to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980, for the record, and itt was as close to a shooting war that I ever want to get. A friend of mine ended up in the drink during those operations and went onto command a Sea Harrier squadron in the RN. I can tell you there is a phenomenon known as the fog of war that absolutely makes your pet scheme unworkable. its called the fog of war. The unknown variables that will take the best laid plans and turn them into scrap at a moments notice. Your plan is full of assumptions and what the enemy is expected to do, the very mistake the Japanese made in their over intense planning for Operation MI.
> 
> Subsequent to my Naval career I was engaged as a tutor for strategic studies units at a local uni. You could say I was a teacher of tactics and how to plan for operations.
> 
> so I am confident that I have the training to assess and comment on operational plan. I am confident to say that yours looks good, but for the reasons the vets have pointed out to you, is basically a dud plan.



I respect anyone who has served. I also respect those on here who haven't served. I understand you disagree with me, and thats fine. There is no way to know, we can't rerun history. Without a scale Midway runway and scale airplanes its hard to know if all of the planes I want to land would fit. Who knows how well they would have gotten off the strip, how well they would have climbed, or how well they would have done if they engaged piecemeal or how well they would have done if they engaged in 3 groups, 2 groups or 1 huge gaggle. The Midway bombers found the target and what was left found Midway. We lost a lot of planes and pilots just from them getting lost. 

My plan was 2 fold, land based planes thin down the carrier planes. After second japanese raid, the US carriers close in on Midway and launch a strike at the carriers. My plan was that many fewer pilots and planes would be lost because they can't find the ship. 

I can't prove it would work. It can't be totally disproven. I'm here to have fun anyway and whether I agree with you or not Parsifal, your knowledgeable and state your case well. I enjoy debating you


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## pinsog (Jun 30, 2017)

Tkdog said:


> Dude.
> 
> You have multiple veterans trying to explain to you how the military actually works. Either a bunch of people who have probably never met are carefully sculpting a troll on you or you're beating a dead horse. Which is more likely?
> 
> ...



I understand your reasoning and hate that some guys can get wound up. I also don't claim to know everything. Several of these gentlemen pointed out some good points. Some of these gentleman said things that were either entirely wrong or that I didn't think was a huge problem.(food fuel ammo oxygen had to be provided to the 37 bombers and crew also) Some of the things we disagree on can't be proven either way. I am not offended by anything you said even if I disagree with you.

I also understand the carriers were the prime targets. My thinking was, wear down the japanese air groups with land based fighters who's airstrip can't be sunk. Simple premise, might have been a glorious victory, might have been a complete failure, can't tell now its all just a discussion. Then the US carriers strike after the Japanese air groups have been reduced.

One thing we know now that the admirals back then didn't know, the japanese were terribly short of planes and pilots. If hypothetically all the planes on these 4 carriers were shot down in one day, the carriers would have probably taken over a year to work up new air groups. 

I agree on intel. Thats why I only deck loaded one carrier and the other was for escort. The deck parked carrier planes would be fueled and armed in case of attack. They were all fighters, that would be helpful in repelling an attack. If there is a problem with the P36's then over the side they go so the Wildcats can get aloft.

I also understand that many people on here are veterans. I respect that and I respect their knowledge and if you go through my threads, many times I am simply asking about things that i don't know. That being said, just because your a veteran doesn't make them right and me wrong. The vets argue among themselves on here. All the generals and admirals on the losing side were vets to. 

I'm just here to chat, learn and have fun. This can't be proven either way. I like the idea, you guys don't. Maybe I would have been the "desert fox' of the pacific with this wonderful plan of mine, maybe i would have been General Custer. 

Anyway, thank you for reaching out.


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## Tkdog (Jun 30, 2017)

Reread your first paragraph. Just because one can handle the logistics of 37 planes doesn't mean they can do it for many more. It's called the tip of the spear for a reason, there's a lot behind it to make it work. 

Amateurs talk tactics, dilettantes talk strategy, professionals talk logistics.

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## parsifal (Jun 30, 2017)

Your right about reinforcing the position is generally a good idea. In the context of defending that position. And not allowing or factoring in other outcomes that might arise from that reinforcement process.

I think there are a few areas of potential concern that are likely to turn the assumptions that underpin your scenario on its head.

The first is what, if anything, might the Japanese do in reaction to this concentration of effort. Diverting 96 a/c away from other TOs to bolster the Midway defences is something that the US would find hard to disquise from the Japanese. Contrary to the popular narrative, the SIGINT war was not always one way….the Japanese could and did, at times gather quite accurate reports on allied dispositions. It would also I think be hard to completely hide the lack of pressure on places like Rabaul if most of the aircraft allocated to the defence of Australia (australia included NG at that time) and the SW Pacific (not designated as a separate command until 18 March) were withheld from either of those TOs. The USAAC and marine forces had deployed 108 a/c in those TOs, some of which had to be temporarily manned by RAAF personnel at that time. The most significant raids which materially affected IJN deployments were the B-25 and B-26 attacks on Rabaul carried out from February through to April. These attacks forced the IJN to reinforce their garrsons in Rabaul and Lae by more than 40 A6Ms. These were the best of the best, easily carrier qualified though they had never been assigned as such.

One of the hallmarks, brought out in shattered sword incidentally, was that the CAGs aboard the 6 fleet carriers were substantially understrength at the time of Operation MI. Akagi for example went into battle with a complement of 63 a/c. she had fielded over 73 at Pearl, and was quite capable of carrying over 80 a/c into battle. There were some hundreds of carrier qualified pilots in japan at the time of MI, but these had to be witheld because the frontiers had to be reinforced because of the pressure being applied by the allies on the empires frontiers. Losses account for some of the gaps in the CAGs, but so too was the urgent need to reinforce their air garrisons to counter the rapidly expanding (and unexpected) capabilities and strength of allied air power, which was recovering far quicker than the Japanese had thought possible. Ive read that there were over 60 zekes diverted to the NEI to deal with the rising threat coming from Darwin, for example. Not all of these could be expected to transfer to carriers, but some could.

So the first possible result of your what if, is that the Japanese might well take to opportunity to exploit and reinforce their own CAGs so that they were at full strength. At full strength, there would be five carriers available, not four, plus with a potential CAG of 360+ a/c. Further, with all the signal traffic likely to be generated around this frenzied reinforcement of Midway, there is no telling whether the Japanese might cotton on that something was afoot. This was certainly the nightmare scenario that haunted the Pac flt planners at the time. One possibility is that they might cancel their Aleutians operation and use the two carriers to reinforce the main assault. Another is that the Advance Force (containing the carriers) and the main body(containing a lot of heavy units) might trade places so that the main body undertook the bombardment of Midway with the Advance Force providing aircover against both air and surface intervention by the USN.

Im still not convinced your plan is viable, and I certainly cannot agree that it is a given that the IJN would operate in a certain predictable way. I am prepared to agree that if reinforcement was possible, with no loss to fighting efficiency and no detriment to other fronts of the TO, it might be a useful thing to do .

as a wargamer, ive fought Midway many times on the sand table. its generally a tough fight for the USN to win, they usually lose at least one more carrier than they did historically whilst the IJN usually loses only 2 or at most 3 flat tops in the exchange. add another 100 aircraft to the IJN inventory and the situation becomes hopeless for the Americans, although ive never explored the possibilities thrown up by your hypothetical.....

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## Peter Gunn (Jun 30, 2017)

Just FYI, I have read Shattered Sword, First Team (both) and about every book you can think of on the Pacific War since about 1968. Again, you lay your argument out well, but the U.S. did what it did for a reason.

Also, I'm not sure I'd say that the 96 fighter bounce of the Japanese is hopeless, but coordinating and actually intercepting en mass is the problem. I think logistically this wasn't done because the U.S. made every preparation possible to get ready for the battle. Do you contend that Nimitz et.al. didn't think of something like this? From my reading I got the impression they sent everything they could to Midway, not including obsolete AAF fighters was probably thought of as a good idea.

Again, I'll leave it at that, your scenario makes sense on paper, but then again, so did the Japanese plan for Midway.

Cheers

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## buffnut453 (Jun 30, 2017)

Ok...I'm giving this one last shot. 

Pinsog states that the radar operators on Midway would just tell the pilots where to go. To do that, they have to have radios that work with ALL the defending fighters. There's ZERO guarantee that USN and USAAF radios were compatible. Hell, there were problems communicating between formations of the SAME service. Doing it across 2-3 services (depending on how you assign the USMC) had never been done in mid-1942 (Guadalcanal was a later...but see below).

At Guadalcanal the F4Fs and P-39/P-400s NEVER operated as a cohesive formation for interception. Yet this is exactly what Pinsog wants 3 different types of fighters to achieve...indeed it MUST be achieved in order to establish the aspired numerical superiority. Just 'cos you have 96 planes in the air does not mean you have local, tactical numerical superiority. If each squadron goes in on its own against the Japanese formation, it's highly likely that they will be dismantled piecemeal by the defending Zeros. 

Tactics and formations make a huge difference. Older division and vic tactics demanded closer formation flying and often the designation of a "tail-end-Charlie" to protect the formation's 6 o'clock. That poor bloke had to zig-zag across the back of the formation, using up much more fuel and, inevitably, the formation lead would have to slow down his speed otherwise Charlie would get left behind. The alternative is the "finger four" formation but that spreads aircraft out over a much larger area of sky. You then have problems turning the formation - the inside aircraft has to slow down almost to stalling speed while the outside aircraft has to accelerate considerably to maintain formation. Imagine trying to do this with 96 aircraft, all flying at different speeds...and you MUST keep the formation together if you're to achieve the concentration of force required.

You can't equate the logistics required for bombers with the logistics for fighters. For the former, yes, there's a lot of "stuff" but there's typically a long time between sorties to prepare. Fighters don't have that luxury. You have to turn them quickly which means having sufficient oxygen production to replenish numerous aircraft at the same time. It means being able to get POL to a larger number of airframes which means more fuel trucks or more people hand-lugging jerrycans (as was the case in Guadalcanal). 

In an earlier post, Pinsog equated the presence of B-17s and Avengers as of equal importance to his plan for large numbers of fighters. That is NOT an equivalent change from the Japanese perspective. If you're planning a raid against an enemy airfield, you don't care about the bombers. You do, however, care greatly about how many fighters you're going up against. That fundamentally changes the tactical situation and the resultant decisions. 

You absolutely want CAPs up and running rather than sitting aircraft on the deck. If you're taking the B-17s and other multi-engine types off the island, you have no local patrol capability which is NOT a good idea - remember the surface vessels shelling Wake? CAPs burn aircraft and crews. Without them, you risk being surprised. You can't, with hindsight, say a commander on Midway could guarantee that the Japanese would come in the morning. That was the best assessment. It proved correct. But any commander would still want to be prepared for as many eventualities as possible, which means striking a balance between conserving resources while provide sufficient advance warning. 

Finally, as noted above, in order to achieve the local tactical numerical superiority, you have to get all 96 fighters into the fight at the same time. But you can only have 3 aircraft taking off at a time. Getting all of them into the air will take quite a while...and the aircraft already airborne will be circling the island waiting for the others to form up. That will also take time. The reason VMF-221 operated in the way it did was because they formed up as divisions, and each division went in almost independently. That can happen a lot faster (and had been practiced a lot) than is the case of trying to get 96 aircraft all in the air, all heading in the same direction.

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## pinsog (Jun 30, 2017)

Buffnut453: (I think we all got a little grouchy last night. As I stated to others above, this plan may be a horrible idea, but look at the changes made due to some of your valid points such as getting everyone launched in time to form up and different radio frequencies)

Well thought out post, thank you. I agree with many of your points, some of which I did not know, radio frequencies for one.

As is usual on discussions on the internet, some things get missed, overlooked or misread on both sides that would not happen in person over dinner. I would have absolutely kept all the B17's and Catalinas for exactly the reason you said (it was in my posts but easily missed) but all other aircraft would have been fighters. I also knew P39's and Wildcats didn't fly in the same group (I also said this above, but again, also easily missed when posts are crossing in space) Wildcats went as high as possible and P39's did the best they could or stayed low and picked off stragglers.

Your points on scrambling all fighters into 1 'gaggle' from a small airfield in the time allotted are noted and accepted also.

I would absolutely run a small CAP with a few designated fighters while letting the rest wait for the expected time of battle, fueled and armed of course.

Since all 90ish can't get into 1 gaggle and attack together:
Your thoughts on the CAP of around, say 30 fighters (none of them Buffaloes!!), diving into the Zeros as far out as they could and tying them up in a fight as the rest of the fighters scrambled, hitting the bombers as best they could when they got into action? My thinking is that, without radios, the Zeros would likely fight the CAP and never know the bombers were getting hammered by the rest of the flight. I would prefer the other fighters be formed up and attack in a group, but, it is unlikely, as you have pointed out, that they would have time. That being said, piecemeal attacks on Japanese single engine carrier planes were many times very successful, such as when I believe Alex Vraciu broke up a torpedo attack on Enterprise almost single handed. The dive bombers having a better chance to escape while the Kates (by far the most dangerous in my opinion) would be hard pressed to get away.

I read of the Germans doing that, a small group tied up the escorts while the twins rocketed a large amount of B17's from the sky. The same book pointed out that even if you sacrificed the force attacking the escorts it allowed the bombers to be worked over by unmolested fighters.

Please note: This plan does depend on the Japanese not altering their plan, they attack on the same day, same time, same force. It also depends on the US believing they know the date and approximate time of the first attack. My plan does not, and never did, expect this large force of fighters to sit on Midway for anything over 2 or 3 days, it was a "they are coming June 4th, probably in the morning" so we run in and ambush them. If, for instance, they came in from due west along with or south of the invasion force, my plan would be in trouble. My plan also treated the P36's for certain, as disposable assets that would fight 1, 2 or 3 sorties on day one of the battle and then they are probably spent. It is one reason I wasn't concerned about sending large groups of people to work on them (right wrong or indifferent, that was my thinking. I hope this explains some of the things that seem to be wrong with it, when in my head, maybe or maybe not type out, I didn't account for these things because of the expected shortness of their stay)


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## pinsog (Jun 30, 2017)

Peter Gunn said:


> Just FYI, I have read Shattered Sword, First Team (both) and about every book you can think of on the Pacific War since about 1968. Again, you lay your argument out well, but the U.S. did what it did for a reason.
> 
> Also, I'm not sure I'd say that the 96 fighter bounce of the Japanese is hopeless, but coordinating and actually intercepting en mass is the problem. I think logistically this wasn't done because the U.S. made every preparation possible to get ready for the battle. Do you contend that Nimitz et.al. didn't think of something like this? From my reading I got the impression they sent everything they could to Midway, not including obsolete AAF fighters was probably thought of as a good idea.
> 
> ...



Thank you. I have conceded that without actually knowing the precise time the Japanese would show up, that getting 95 planes into the air, formed up, different radio frequencies, etc is in fact a pipe dream. After considering many of the things pointed out, I have amended my plan now to say:

A standing CAP of around 30 fighters, PBY calls in, radar picks them up and the rest of the group starts to launch. CAP (all one group) jumps Zeros as far out as possible, rest of flight attacks bombers piecemeal, as best they can from sighting near the island to as far out as they care to pursue. My thinking is, the Zeros would stay and fight the initial CAP fighters until they are ready to go home, without radios, the bombers, quickly drawing out of sight of the Zeros before being attacked, would have no way to call for help.

Just a thought. I also agree with your assessment, the P36's would never leave Pearl ever

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## Tkdog (Jun 30, 2017)

The Zeros don't have the job if staying to fight the defending fighters. They are escorts. They will escort the bombers to the best of their ability.


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## pinsog (Jun 30, 2017)

Tkdog said:


> The Zeros don't have the job if staying to fight the defending fighters. They are escorts. They will escort the bombers to the best of their ability.



Correct, that is their job. But in either Shattered Sword or The First Team, Thach and his guys noticed that the Zeros seem to want to spar with the escorts rather than attack the bombers. Also, if jumped by a decently large CAP, they might assume that this was the entire Midway fighter group and think they are doing their job by only fighting them ( a very reasonable assumption on their part) and without radios, the bombers, once out of the Zeros sight, could not radio them for help.


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## parsifal (Jul 1, 2017)

Ive attached an article relating to a similar situation as that being hypothesized about here, the convoy battle for Operation Pedestal


http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/~/media/Files/Navy-PDFs/News-and-Events/Special Events/20120801 Operation Pedestal Aug 42.pdf

In an after action study carried out by the naval staff about 6 months after thr battle, the following conclusions were drawn....

"_Operation “Pedestal” provides an example of the effectiveness of the fighter protection so provided, and also of the disastrous results accruing from lack of it and the break up of the convoy formation. The very heavy air attacks from Sardinia by over 100 escorted bombers throughout daylight hours of 12 August, when the convoy was protected by a total of 60 carrier-borne fighters, only succeeded in damaging one merchant ships and two of the escorting ships. The [FAA] fighters attacking at a distance from the convoy were usually able to break up the enemy formations sufficiently for the A/A guns of escort and convoy to be able to deal with those that got through_".


50 a/c were available for CAP after the loss of the Eagle. Most of these were Sea Hurricanes, but quite a few were Fulmars and the 6 gun version of the Martlet. seven of the CAP were shot down by the enemy, and a further 6 were written off in landing accidents. Due to the relatively short endurance of the allied fighters, an average of only 13 fighters were available at any time during the day. The CAP was assisted by radar enabling interceptions to be made as far out as 30 miles. most importantly the radar assisted the CAP in coordination and teamwork.


Axis losses were exceedingly heavy, more than 30 aircraft, out of more than 140 bombers and fighters thrown at the convoy that day were lost outright, and a further 30 (approximately) forced to turn back damaged. Some of the more determined aircrews did penetrate the convoy , but none of the attacks were well co-ordinated after having run the gauntlet of the CAP and heavy AA defences.

There would be a number of differences in this hypothetical combat. There is little chance of the being "jumped" though the lack of radar , is a problem. This number of 96 is in no way comparable to the airstrikes made by the USN carriers . At high altitude, a concentrated air group of that size will be visible to the outrider pickets of the advance force for 20miles+. At an approach speed of 200mph , the airborne CAP will have about 6 mins to position themselves. Typically, the Japanese positioned their CAP at around 10000 feet . If the US fighter sweep is higher, it really could not be expected to be much higher than 20000, the IJN CAP will have to climb at a rate of a bout 2000 ft per min. I think they can do that easily.

In addition the fighters on the deck could be scrambled and should be able to reach about 5000 feet before the strike aircraft are in position. IJNs might be available for CAP because we cant be certain as to when this hypothetical strike might occur, plus we cant be certain about the total numbers of fighters that the Japanese might commit. Taking a middle ground, we could assume no draw downs from the NEI or the Sth pacific, but we probably should assume the presence of the two Aleutians carriers boosted by a few in the CAGs because losses due to weather in the approach would be less. I estimate on that the IJN carriers would have available about 106-110 Zekes, Historically half were allocated to the attacks on the atoll, whilst half were allocated to fleet defence. assuming the same proportions, we should have 53- 55 for both missions. The much greater endurance of the Zeke relative to the Sea Hurricane means that about 50% of the available CAP can be kept aloft for CAP. That gives the IJN 25-30 immediately available, and probably another 10-20 that Compare this with the lousy 13 available to the RN for Pedestal, of which just 7 or 8 might be in the correct position. how many did those inferior RN fighters bring down again ......oh yes, it was 30 with another 30 forced back damaged. These RN fighters were outperformed by many of the Axis opponents.....Me 109s, Re2001, Mc202s, Ju88s, versus Fulmars. Zekes against P-36s and clapped out F4Fs? You gotta be sh*tting me

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## taly01 (Jul 2, 2017)

The assumption that the US planners could base more aircraft (fighters) at Midway ignores the cascading effect on resources, fuel, food, airbase area (Midway is tiny) and drinking water only comes from a desalination plant! (that US falsely leaked to Japanese was broken before Midway). The US plan as it stands worked perfectly, they knew when the attack would occur and they sent a carrier strike to hit after IJN planes had struck Midway and were returning to their carriers.

I find it more interesting that although the IJN led the world in multiple carrier offensive ops they had an untested doctrine in defense that each carrier deck was tied up servicing its own CAP. It was only after the Midway disaster that they started dedicating a carrier to CAP. Also "Shattered Sword" says the IJN carriers were spaced 5-8km apart so when it came to AAA they were all on their own! As Parsifal described above the secret was breaking up the attack well before the fleet was reached, and without decent radar the IJN was always playing catchup.


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## GregP (Jul 19, 2017)

Hi Pinsog,

I didn't read all of this thread yet, but the question you asked me was whether or not it is materially different to work on a P-36 as opposed to a P-40. The basic answer is no.

They are basically the same airframe with the P-36 having a radial that is way easier to work on than an Allison. You'd need different parts, sure, but anyone who worked on an SBD engine could work on a P-36, assuming they had the tools to remove the cowlings. Cowling tools aren't anything special, a Dzus driver is about all the special tools you need, maybe 2 sizes. The real issue is that the R-1830 in the P-36 is a 2-row radial and the SBD engine is a single-row radial. The parts are similar, but you WOULD need R-1830-specific training to be Navy-legal. In a pinch, any R-1820 or R-1830 -trained mechanic could work on the other and sometimes DID, WITH a variant-specific manual alongside. They are basically either single stage or 2-stage. The two are about the same unless you have to pull the stages apart. Then maybe you'd need a specialty wrench or two; maybe not. I have disassembled an R-1820, but have never tried to reassemble one as a runner.

I see the P-36 / P-40 as VERY similar and have seen them side by side. Interestingly enough, we had three former P-36 pilots at the event when we unveiled the brand new, baby P-36 (see below) and, to a man, all said they'd have kept their P-36s, if allowed to do so. They all considered the P-40 to be a step backwards. They felt as though the shorter-coupled P-36 was a better turner by a significant amount and that more than made up for the slight top speed increase in the P-40.

I have flown IN a P-40 but not in a P-36. I have never actually flown as PIC of either, so I don't have a personal opinion. 100% of the people I know who DID actually fly both prefer the P-36, including one modern pilot (that's what I heard, but not in person). I suppose I have to go with their opinion since they have "been there, done that," and I haven't.

I'll read the rest of the thread at a later date. Interesting read, so far.

Cheers, Pinsog!

New P-36:







Pretty bird! And looked great in formation with our Seversky AT-12 Guardsman! The AT-12 is basically a 2-seat P-35.






Can you see the resemblance? Maybe not the same family, but the same concept.

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## pinsog (Jul 19, 2017)

Thank you for your input Greg. Another aviation mechanic on here told me the same thing, that any of those mechanics could do basic work on the P36 if they had a manual, basically most stuff short of a full overhaul and needing a special tool here and there. One small detail, the question was "could Wildcat, Dauntless, B17 etc... mechanics work on P36's?" But you answered it when you said Dauntless mechanics could. 

I look forward to your opinion when you get a chance to read the full thread.

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## Tkdog (Jul 19, 2017)

Interestingly the "Brewster Buffalo" thread down in (I think) the technical sub-forum has some feedback from in the cockpit at Midway relevant to this thread. 

Brewster pilot scrambled to intercept, couldn't make the intercept mistook the Zeros who went after him in return. Basically exactly the chaos discussed here.


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## pinsog (Jul 20, 2017)

I'm off to bed, can you add a link? Love to read it tomorrow


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## Tkdog (Jul 20, 2017)

Here it is. It was in "stories" not "technical"

Brewster Buffalo F2A-3, BuNo 01562 aircraft history

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## pinsog (Jul 21, 2017)

Tkdog said:


> Here it is. It was in "stories" not "technical"
> 
> Brewster Buffalo F2A-3, BuNo 01562 aircraft history



Thank you. I'll read this as soon as I can.


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## pinsog (Jul 21, 2017)

Tkdog said:


> Interestingly the "Brewster Buffalo" thread down in (I think) the technical sub-forum has some feedback from in the cockpit at Midway relevant to this thread.
> 
> Brewster pilot scrambled to intercept, couldn't make the intercept mistook the Zeros who went after him in return. Basically exactly the chaos discussed here.



That was a good read. He actually did make the initial interception of the Val dive bombers, a head on firing pass in which he reported shooting down either 2 or 3 Val's in flames on his first pass. After he recovered he mistook 3 climbing Zeros for his own people until they were too close to evade.

My take on that article is: 1. Our fighters were out numbered 2. Our fighters were out performed

Buffnut is correct, no way to get 95 (give or take a few) fighters in position from that small a field in that length of time.

My revised plan would be: (trying not to let exact knowledge of the raid cloud my pre battle plan)
1. a reasonable CAP of 20 Wildcats orbits over field at 20,000 ft.
2. As historical, all fighters on field, pilots in cockpit, engines running
3. The first fighters in line are the 22 P36's due to climb rate. At the message from PBY of incoming raid, the 22 P36's launch and climb to meet Wildcat CAP circling overhead. Wildcat CAP leads P36's to historical intercept say 30-40 miles northeast of Midway
4. Wildcat CAP and P36's instructions are to go after Zero escort, 20 Wildcats make initial firing pass through Zero escort,hopefully scattering Zeros. P36's follow and engage in WW1 style turning dogfight, Wildcats zoom up for altitude, dive back into fur ball making firing passes and zooming up again. Who knows what happens. Hopefully 1 to 1 exchange for however many fighters on each side go down. Main thing is, Zeros are tied up with what they would/should think is the entire Midway fighter force. No reason for Zeros to disengage, they should have their hands full as the P36 is a close match to the Zero in climb and turn, P36 tougher and retaining high speed handling, Zero with edge in firepower until it runs out of 20 mm.
5. Remaining 21 buffalos and 35 Wildcats scramble as fast as possible, forming in 2 or 4 plane sections and climbing as quickly as possible. No larger groups should attempt to form as there is not time. 56 total US fighters vs now unescorted Japanese bombers, no radios in Zeros tied up in fur ball out of sight from bombers. Should be a 1 sided slaughter of bombers, with few if any surviving.

That's the plan. US carriers stay X miles south (don't know visibility that day) letting island defenses thin out Japanese air power until time for counter attack


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## Tkdog (Jul 22, 2017)

How long can a Wildcat loiter at 20,000ft? Fuel and oxygen will both be consumed in getting there, as well as staying there.


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## pinsog (Jul 22, 2017)

Tkdog said:


> How long can a Wildcat loiter at 20,000ft? Fuel and oxygen will both be consumed in getting there, as well as staying there.



I'm not sure. If your suggesting to loiter at 10,000 and make the final climb after radar contact, that would probably be a better choice. I'm easily swayed by small details. CAP needs to be at a reasonable altitude, but in hindsight, 20,000 is probably way too high until radar contact has been made


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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 22, 2017)

You could safely get away with 12 or 13K without O2 for the relatively brief time you're likely to be there and every little bit helps in terms of time to climb if needed, and fuel burn while loitering. I've ridden as passenger on a number of wave flights in a sailplane with extended (2+hours) stays at 16-17K with O2 available, but didn't use it. (Mask was a medieval torture instrument!) I was able to do photography, navigate, read maps, take notes, talk on the radio, etc, with no ill effects. I even got a little stick time and had no trouble flying. Don't try this at home, kids! I've had a couple chamber rides to 40+K, and know my limits.
Cheers
Wes


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## Greg Boeser (Jul 22, 2017)

Fascinating thread. 
A few comments. P-36s at Pearl engaged in two fights: Flight of four vs 6 + 3 Zeroes over Kaneohe P-36s bounced unsuspecting Zeroes but lost one while inflicting minor damage on a few Zeroes. All other surviving P-36s were damaged to some extent. Gun failures occurred on at least two a/c due to hasty arming. Second engagement - two P-36s ambush retreating, unescorted B5Ns - two kills to Lt Brown. 
Agreed that P-36 was a far more maneuverable a/c than F2A-3 or F4F-4, but was also 25-30MPH slower, which makes it 40MPH slower than A6M2. In air combat, speed is life. PINSOG expects a slower, more lightly armed a/c, flown by an inexperienced pilot, to best the finest dogfighter in the world.
PINSOG mentions the reserve a/c left at Pearl, but fails to recognize that there were insufficient crew to fly them. For the Midway operation, VF squadrons had been beefed up from 18 a/c to 27 a/c. Virtually all available combat ready USN fighter pilots were used to bring TF 16 and 17 up to strength. The remainder were worn out from nearly 6 months of sea duty, or necessary to ensure a cadre for the increasing flow of replacements. Nimitz also had to keep a large reserve of a/c at Pearl in the event the intel estimate was WRONG, or worse, his plan at Midway FAILED. Marine and USAAF pilots were not trained to the level of USN carrier pilots. VMF 221 pilots were mostly green, fresh from training school. The USAAF had strongly resisted defending islands with Army fighters because the pilots had not been trained in over water navigation. The Army were skeptical of Nimitz's intel, so would be unlikely to release the required assets to defend a minor base, far from a center of supply.
There were two fresh squadrons of B-26s in Hawaii, but they had just arrived from the States and were not operationally ready. They were flown to a "secret" airfield and held in reserve.
The idea of flying land-based planes from a carrier into a combat environment had been faced in the Wake Island reinforcement attempt, VMF 221's original destination. It had been deemed too risky.

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## pinsog (Jul 22, 2017)

Greg Boeser: you bring up some valid points.
P36's at Pearl Harbor had 1 30 caliber machine gun, the 50 had been removed because they were short of 50's on the island. P36's with1 30 were only being used for gunnery training. Any P36 kills at Pearl were accomplished with 1 synchronized 30

Top speed of P36 is somewhat debated with anything from 290-317 mph being quoted. I would definitely want (if I was a P36 pilot) to drag the fight down to 12,000 feet or so, but at least it retain its high speed handling, the high speed dive and roll being top notch, controls remaining light even at 400+. One USAAF report from early 1943 does state, from a test, that the P36 is faster and outclimbs a Zero below 10,000 (I'm not sure if I believe it's faster, but the report says it is) and almost matches it in turn (allied pilots state it could turn with a KI43 above 180-200 mph, Sgt Stuart Garnett)

A full fresh Wildcat squadron and 38 aircraft arrived at Pearl a day or 2 before Yorktown sailed, in fact, the 6 Avengers flown to Midway came from this ship. Agreed that pilots were tired, some still fought at Midway, some did not and were sent home for rest and to train more pilots.

AAF would not have released P39 or P40 from Hawaii because of defense (wise precaution) that's why I choose P36, it was historically there and they might have let them go because they were 'obsolete'. (Some here debate that P40 was step backward from P36 but that's whole new discussion)

P36 pilots would not have flown directly into combat from carrier (not sure you caught that) but would have followed 46 wildcats from carrier 1 or 2 days before attack with navy pilots navigating the short distance to Midway. (How ever close or far they decided to drop them) We know now, but not then, the P36's and extra Wildcats would have been delivered with no interference from the Japanese. In fact, one of their major mistakes was they did not recon the island.

As far as pilot experience, we all must remember that the same 0 combat US Navy pilots I am tossing into this hypothetical are the same guys that fought the Zero to a 1 to 1 kill ratio at Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal. The 0 combat AAF guys in my P36's, well if you can't bring experience, bring as many as you can! (Some of these guys might be high time pilots, just haven't been in combat)

Greg Boeser, please understand, i am playing with history with what was actually there and available. There were no P38, P47,P51, Hellcats, Corsairs, Bearcats, Spitfires etc available. If you play the alternative history game, more Wildcats and P36's were all we had that MIGHT get released.

Hope I covered everything. Give me your opinion after you read my thinking/explanations. I love a good natured debate.


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## pinsog (Jul 22, 2017)

XBe02Drvr said:


> You could safely get away with 12 or 13K without O2 for the relatively brief time you're likely to be there and every little bit helps in terms of time to climb if needed, and fuel burn while loitering. I've ridden as passenger on a number of wave flights in a sailplane with extended (2+hours) stays at 16-17K with O2 available, but didn't use it. (Mask was a medieval torture instrument!) I was able to do photography, navigate, read maps, take notes, talk on the radio, etc, with no ill effects. I even got a little stick time and had no trouble flying. Don't try this at home, kids! I've had a couple chamber rides to 40+K, and know my limits.
> Cheers
> Wes



All of that sounds reasonable and better than my original 20,000 feet. I would tell the CAP to orbit at the highest altitude they felt comfortable at with reguard to fuel, oxygen and tactical position/situation.


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## GregP (Jul 23, 2017)

Reality plays hell with "what ifs," doesn't it?

Pinsog is right. All we had were F4Fs and P-36s that might have been reasonably available at the time. We DID have some biplanes and some P-26 Peashooters, but they would not have been a lot of help except to draw fire away from the more modern aircraft. The sum total of all P-38s in service at the time was very low, and they weren't combat ready anyway. 65 P-38s had been completed by September 1941, along with the 12 YP-38s the service retained minus one lost in a dive test, but I don't know how many P-38s had been delivered to actual combat units when Pearl Harbor happened. It wasn't many.

Boeser is right when he says the P-36 flown by inexperienced pilots is not really a match for a veteran in a Zero, especially when armed with only one 30-cal MG!

Somehow, it looks as if WWII is gonna' start all over again! Or unless the movie "Final Countdown" had played out ...

It might have been better if all the ships had been steamed up and ready to sortie, but that also might well have simply resulted in a blocked harbor entrance. Tough to think what you could have changed at the time unless the people in charge at the time also changed. They were pretty bound by their thinking and probably would have ignored or deferred action on any alarms. I mean, who attacks at 8:00 on a Sunday morning? Don't those heathens respect anything?

Incredibly, the band playing the National Anthem on the fantail of a ship FINISHED the song before breaking for cover (at least, that is the story)! Can you say, "Stuipd!" Sorry sir, they were all killed just as the flute players finished the last refrain ... at least they died in rhythm and on key!


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## pinsog (Jul 23, 2017)

Greg, I can assure you that if I had brought the P36's to Midway they would have carried a pair of synchronized 50's!! Got to give those Pearl Harbor P36 pilots credit for scrambling under attack and bringing down 3 or 4 planes with only 1 30 caliber machine gun

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## Peter Gunn (Jul 23, 2017)

GregP said:


> Reality plays hell with "what ifs," doesn't it?
> 
> *SNIP*
> 
> ...



Interesting thought, used to hang out on a naval warfare board (now defunct) where several of the old salts answered this very question when I posed it, what if the battleships had sortied? Their considered opinion was that they'd need at least four hours warning and maybe more to get steam up and moving (and that's just to clear the harbor). And if they did, consensus was that the dreadnoughts would still have been attacked but this time in deep water, although it was still even money since the fleet would be able to maneuver and would have had AAA ready, but any loss would have been permanent.

A good what if thread, too bad the site is long gone.

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## Greg Boeser (Jul 23, 2017)

At Pearl, the 46th PS had time to fully arm four P-36As between the first and second waves. They had to brave a burning building to get the .50s. These four bounced the Japanese over Kaneohe, claiming 3, but in reality only damaging a few. Lt Sterling was shot down and the other a/c suffered damage to some extent. Lt. Harry Brown of the 46th PS claimed two kills, both B5N's from Soryu. He had only one functioning gun. Look up David Aiken's excellent reconstruction of the dogfight over Koneohe NAS, published in Flight Journal magazine, Oct 2002?


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## parsifal (Jul 24, 2017)

I don’t see how a last minute reinforcement of Midway will make any difference. There are too many logistic issues to resolve for me to see this as an optimal tactic. Ive already given my view on the strategic lunacy of this scheme, now we need to look at the tactical situation to see if there is any hope in the detail of an alternative outcome


The IJN historically launched its attacks on the atoll at 0430 hours, with 108 a/c forming the strike, including 36 escorting A6Ms. This strike was first detected at 0530 by a PBY piloted by Lt William Chase who transmitted his sighting at 0545. Confirmation followed with radar fixes at 0553, whereupon the order was given to scramble. The US forces did manage to get nearly all their fighters into the air, 21xF2as and 6xF4Fs, however the initial intercepts could only be undertaken by 9 of the 27 fighters, and then only with some of these aircraft operating at an altitude disadvantage. This suggests the defenders were still getting into position, suggesting further that it was difficult to get all the 27 defenders airborne in time and in position to make a difference. However, disregarding the 24 search planes already in the air before the fighters,, the atoll was able to launch most of its remaining strike aircraft, roughly 60 a/c (some of which failed to locate the main target, and others shot to pieces).


The second wave of the defending CAP was able to intercept at the very last minute, just outside the flak zone, suggesting they were still climbing at the time of the attack. This is important because it suggests the CAP was struggling to get everything airborne in time.


As to the effectiveness of this Cap, it just wasn’t, to put it in its simplest terms.


Turning first to the initial intercepts, , Parks led six Buffaloes and three Wildcats to intercept the 108 oncoming Japanese planes. Captain John Carey, leading the three Wildcats in Parks’ flight, was first to sight the Japanese. Carey immediately transmitted a sighting report. He then moved to engage the attackers. The Japanese bombers flew in a large V formation, trailed by escorting Zeros. Carey reportedly rolled his Wildcat and powered into the V, claiming a Kate. After this initial pass he then climbed to get into position for another. However Japanese rear gunners raked his Wildcat, riddling Carey’s legs and forcing him to abort. Second Lieutenant Clayton M. Canfield followed Carey into his attack, it is fairly certain he destroyed a Kate. Canfield saw Zeros diving on him. A 20mm cannon shell damaged his Wildcat, and he pulled up into the clouds and lost his pursuers. Coming out of the clouds, Canfield joined Carey and with two damaged birds, they both limped back to Midway. Captain Marion E. Carl,flying the third Wildcat, was jumped by several Zeros after attacking the Kates and was forced to break off his attack as well, with no observable results.

.

While the Wildcats fought for their lives, Parks led his six Buffaloes in an attack on the Kates. The Marines managed one pass before they were jumped by by the Zeros. Parks and four other Marines were killed. Only Lieutenant Daniel J. Irwin survived. He managed to fly his damaged Buffalo back to Midway with Zeros after him all the way. He later said, “Their gunnery was very good, and I doubt if on any run they missed hitting my plane.”


VMF-221’s 12 reserve fighters, led by Captains Daniel J.Hennessy and Kirk Armstead, also attacked the Japanese planes. Hennessy’s six Buffaloes smashed into the bombers and were jumped by the escorting Zeros, which destroyed four of them within seconds of the opening contact with this group.


Only two of Hennessy’s men survived this initial engagement. Armstead’s Buffaloes intercepted the Japanese a few miles from Midway and downed three Kates before the rampaging Zeros destroyed three of them as well. These aircraft really had no chance against the zeroes. It mattered not if the aircraft was an f4f or F2-A. American success at midway was not due to the superiority of its aircraft or aircrew, and its fighters were just not competitive at this time against the zero.


Observing the dogfight from the ground, Lieutenant Charles Hughes said that the defending fighters were clearly completely outclassed by the Zekes, He said the allied CAP “looked like they were tied to a string while the Zeros made free passes at them.”


The Japanese pushed relentlessly toward Midway. To Marine Pfc Phillip Clark at D Battery on Sand Island, the Japanese formations looked like “three wisps of clouds far out on the horizon.” On Sand and Eastern, the Marines and sailors waited for the attack. An observer marveled at the “very calm…lackadaisical air” with which the defenders waited for the strike, “as though they had been living through this sort of thing all their lives.”


Midway’s AA defences appear to have been substantially more effective than the fighters, firing with every available weapon, defenders fought back with everything they had. Major Dorn E. Arnold of the 6th Defense Battalion fired a Browning Automatic Rifle at the enemy; a sailor on Sand Island used a Colt.45. Second Lieutenant Elmer Thompson and another Marine fired a .30-caliber machine gun from a crippled SB2U.

The Japanese attack ended at 6:48 a.m. The all-clear sounded on Midway at 7:15, and the process of picking up the pieces began. Kimes ordered VMF-221’s fighters to land. Six Buffaloes staggered in. Including four aircraft that landed during the raid, 20 U.S. fighters had survived, however nearly all these aircraft were so badly damaged they would not be ready to fly for days, if ever. Of those, only one Wildcat and a single Buffalo were fit to fly immediately. Fifteen Buffaloes and two Wildcats were shot down, and 13 pilots were killed. A combined loss of Eleven Japanese aircraft were recorded, to both fighters and AA. It is difficult to separate these numbers, but it seems maybe 4 or 5 bombers were lost to the airborne defences, the remainder to the AA. 53 were damaged, 15 seriously, the remainder would be ready for operations within a few hours on return, had they survived the surprise attack by the US Carriers.


What can be expected if a whole lot of fighters were committed to the battle. Not much I think. The numbers suggested have become spongy, to say the least. But it is possible to say that the 29 airborne fighters managed to shoot down 4 of the 11 enemy fightes, with 2 of those losses being to the advance guard. I think the advance guard represents all that could be put aloft an in position early in the battle and that the remainder, some 18 or so fighters, being at some level of disadvantage due to position or altitude or both. These additional 18 fighters might have managed to bring down two fighters, whilst losing most of their own. If the fighter defences had been hurriedly added to the defences at the last minute, without an increase in the handling or logistic capabilities of the atoll, it is reasonable to believe the additional aircraft would form part of this second, less effective and badly positioned second group


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## GregP (Jul 24, 2017)

More defense is always better, if it is available. If not needed, it can turn into offense. Simple.

Since we aren't in command, and it has already been fought, there is no counter position that can be checked and verified in real life. It is almost impossible to logically argue that less defense or the same is better than more. I can't buy it. Of course, I am also not really familiar with the possible reinforcement equipment that could logically be sent, except for the post here since I've never considered fighting it a different way. To me, history is played out and has spoken. But it COULD have been changed if action were to be taken, before the battle, to attack or defend differently. I've never been into that myself. but it certainly a possibility that did not occur in real life. 

I'm not sure if they had the pilots for the extra aircraft, but I assume each plane came with a pilot. If not, why was it sent? Unless to replace losses or re-equip with new planes ... and I've never seen any suggestion that Midway should have been re-equipped. Or with what, if so. I'm, thinking a nuclear carrier would have been nice, but wasn't available at the time. Lacking same, and lacking space-based surveillance, they did pretty well, given the resources and technology of the time. I'll take it, anyway.

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## parsifal (Jul 24, 2017)

The single most important aspect of the pacific war was logistics. If you had it you could do stuff, if you didnt, you couldnt. moreover that lesson had already been fought and learnt in spades in places like Corregidor and Singapore.

The second most important factor was having sufficient reserves. You needed reserves to fill gaps train others, react to exigencies. in the pacific, you had reserves, or you lost.

It is not always the case that simply pouring more into a situation of a given resource was going to fix or improve a situation. In fact I would say it was almost never the case that numbers decided the issue in the pacific. this happened on guadacanal, at Moresby and for the Japanese, at Rabaul. Defended by more than 100000 men, Rabaul was bypassed and left to become a liability for the Japanese. In the SoPac region, the allies could call on nearly 12 divs, and yet could barely afford to bring a battalion into battle on the Kokoda track. Impatient at these realities, Macarthur tried what you are advocating, he poured vast numbers into a the battle. The formations were poorly trained and even more poorly supplied. they all fell over at the first gate.

in the vast pacific, numbers do NOT improve your chances of victory. They increase your logistic burdens, They make the place in question a target rich environment. Filling a place up like midway with half trained, tired, unsupported air assets that you cant afford anyway, with badly trained pilots is about as dumb as it gets. You just don't do that where every bullet, every can of bully beef is a massive cost and a massive risk. Every man (or plane) sent to the PTO was the equivalent of 8 in the ETO. Having another 100 a/c in the PTO is the equivalent of robbing 800-1000 a/c in Britain. Its just madness what is being suggested. 

As far as having sufficient trained aircrew on hand in June 1942, the US simply did not have that sort of resource luxury (in June 1942 at least) to throw around in the fashion suggested . aircrew deployed to Australia for example had to be immediately placed in training for a long period and their aircraft either grounded, or seconded to the RAAF temporarily . Similar to the Japanese there were some hard core experienced crews, particularly on the carriers, but not as good as the Japanese at the start and not as numerous either. It took time to train a bigger air force and even longer to make it superior to the enemy, but the US had the fuel the planes and the depth to undertake such an expansion. It was still, for a time , a heavy business, the first fighters of the USAAC did not deploy to England until August 1942. Despite having expanded the army to more than 60 divs by the end of 1942, the US was hard pressed to deploy just 3 divs for TORCH, and even then, the formations committed came up very short in terms of capability and training

For the first year of the war the US fought at a distinct disadvantage. against both of the axis.

The idea of overwhelming the Japanese with large numbers of half trained, or untrained, or completely absent aircrews is a bad idea. the suggestion to pour vast proportions of limited air assets poorly supported , poorly serviced assets of overtired aircrews that will be abysmally organised and unco-ordinated formations up against one of the best trained and cohesive military units takes a bad idea and turns it into lunacy

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## Glider (Jul 24, 2017)

pinsog said:


> I respect anyone who has served. I also respect those on here who haven't served. I understand you disagree with me, and thats fine. There is no way to know, we can't rerun history. Without a scale Midway runway and scale airplanes its hard to know if all of the planes I want to land would fit. Who knows how well they would have gotten off the strip, how well they would have climbed, or how well they would have done if they engaged piecemeal or how well they would have done if they engaged in 3 groups, 2 groups or 1 huge gaggle. The Midway bombers found the target and what was left found Midway. We lost a lot of planes and pilots just from them getting lost.
> 
> My plan was 2 fold, land based planes thin down the carrier planes. After second japanese raid, the US carriers close in on Midway and launch a strike at the carriers. My plan was that many fewer pilots and planes would be lost because they can't find the ship.
> 
> I can't prove it would work. It can't be totally disproven. I'm here to have fun anyway and whether I agree with you or not Parsifal, your knowledgeable and state your case well. I enjoy debating you



Probable outcome (to me anyway) 1) Land based aircraft get chopped down by the Japanese. Why? because the Japanese aircraft are a lot better, the pilots are more experienced and they are concentrated
2) US Carriers suffer serious losses. Why? because the US carriers will not have their war compliment of crews and aircraft, plus their aircraft are not as good, pilots not as well trained and the AA fire from the US ships is almost neglgable at this stage of the war.

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## Peter Gunn (Jul 24, 2017)

Glider said:


> Probable outcome (to me anyway) 1) Land based aircraft get chopped down by the Japanese. Why? because the Japanese aircraft are a lot better, the pilots are more experienced and they are concentrated
> 2) US Carriers suffer serious losses. Why? because the US carriers will not have their war compliment of crews and aircraft, plus their aircraft are not as good, pilots not as well trained and the AA fire from the US ships is almost neglgable at this stage of the war.




Just a few points, while I disagree with pinsog on his scenario I will say that I think point number two isn't correct. The US carriers (if I understand pinsog's idea) is that they are waiting to the South with their full complement of dive/torpedo bombers to strike after the Japanese attack. Also I think USN AA fire was relatively decent even at Midway, to say it was negligible I believe is a far cry from what it was.

The other problem I have (with this scenario) is the carriers being south of Midway, thought the idea was to flank the IJN and come at them from a rather unexpected locale.


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## pinsog (Jul 24, 2017)

Hello Glider: Just to make sure you understand the plan, the US carriers would have all of the 81 Wildcats, 101 dive bombers and 43 (41, 42, 43?) Torpedo planes

46 extra Wildcats, 21 that Halsey delivered to island of Noumea (can't remember spelling) 15 turned in from Yorktown after Coral Sea, and 10 unused replacements, plus 22 P36's that were being used for gunnery training at Pearl.

Most of these would be deck loaded onto Enterprise and then Hornet would escort her to south of Midway and then flown a shore on June 2 or June 3. If they all wouldn't fit, a few could be squeezed onto Yorktown.

1. US was so sure of Japanese attack on morning of June 4, that all fighters not on CAP had engines running and pilots in the cockpits. That is pretty confident of an attack at a certain time. Therefor, I would have a CAP of say 20 Wildcats at 12,000 feet, the first planes on the runway are 22 P36's due to fast climb. Word comes in of attack, P36's go up first, CAP starts climbing to 20,000, P36's join them and they head to historical 1st intercept say 30-40 miles out with orders to jump the escort. 42 Wildcats and P36's vs 36 Zeros. I have no idea how this would turn out, but 20 Wildcats diving into a Zero formation with guns blazing should scatter formation, P36's behind them fall onto Zeros for WW1 style turning dogfight because that is what they had trained for and P36 was near equal to Zero in turn at slow speeds a superior above 180-200 mph. What happens CANNOT BE DETERMINED, but radio less Zero's should be tied up because they would assume this was whole of Midway CAP. Once bombers move away RADIOLESS ZEROS CANNOT BE CALLED TO HELP BOMBERS.

2. This leaves 21 Buffalos and 32 Wildcats to engage 72 Japanese bombers with 0 escort. Remaining Wildcats and Buffalos have been scrambling the whole time, ordered to proceed in groups of 2-4 as they lift off. They would probably be strung out from 15,000 down to relatively low level, but they would be free to pursue Japanese bombers at will, free from Zero escort.

3. Mean while, 3 US carriers are somewhere south-southeast of Midway, historically there were 0 Japanese subs or recon planes in that area. What ever damage is done to 1st raid, US carriers and their aircraft are unmolested and still hidden as Midway fighters cause attrition to Japanese aircraft (hopefully massive attrition) in the first wave.

(you may have already understood plan before, if not, there it is)

Lack of US pilot experience keeps getting brought up. I would like to remind everyone here that these same, inexperienced Navy and Marine pilots are the same guys that fought the Zero to a 1 to 1 kill ratio at Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal in an inferior F4F Wildcat. There is no reason to think these same pilots would do any worse here than they did in real life.

Peter Gunn: Thank you, you are correct that carriers remain in hiding with full historical compliment of fighters, dive bombers and torpedo planes waiting for Midway group to thin out Japanese carrier planes


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## pinsog (Jul 24, 2017)

Parsifal: as usual you have presented wonderful facts and a well laid out perspective. If you could send me a link where it shows the P36's at Pearl Harbor getting more guns installed before intercept, I haven't seen that before and I would enjoy reading that account.

I agree with your assessment of logistics in the Pacific (and actually in europe and north africa also. Our logistics is what allowed us success in all theaters. Most, if not all the time we simply out supplied the guys we beat)

One thing I believe you may be missing is, my alternate battle doesn't depend on logistics like a long campaign does. All extra 46 Wildcats and 22 P36's arrive at Midway on lets say June 3 in the afternoon. All new fighters land with full ammo and nearly full fuel tanks (they take off with full fuel and only use enough for a short flight, depending on how far away you want US carriers from Midway. Or carriers run up very close, fly off fighters and then retire to 50, 75, 100 miles, south of Midway) The 1st Japanese raid was expected on morning of June 4th. So expected was the attack that morning that all of the fighters not already in the air were on the runway, pilots in cockpits, engines running! That is pretty confident that an attack is on the way soon! If I was in charge, I am not concerned about a logistics issue, this combat is going to be a shotgun duel at 10 feet, short and violent. I want enough CAP to engage the Zero escorts and tie them up long enough for the rest of the fighters to get at the single engine Japanese carrier bombers unmolested. We all know what happens to unescorted Japanese Carrier bombers at the hands of a Wildcat, they die and they die quickly.

You say numbers don't help?

What would happen to 29 Hurricanes trying to intercept 72 Stuka's if 36 ME109's were 5,000 feet above them?

I would guess the same thing that happened at Midway

What would happen if 42 Hurricanes jumped 36 ME109's from above and then 53 Hurricanes attacked 72 Stukas in groups of 2-4?

I would say the ME109's would get tied up and the Stuka's would not do well. (and at least the ME109's had radios so the Stuka's could beg for help)

Also, Midway scrambled not only the rest of her fighters, I don't know how many were in the air, but also 4 B26's, 6 Avengers, and around 27 Dauntless and Vindicator dive bombers, all between the sighting of the Japanese 1st attack and 0600. Either Shattered Sword or The First Team says that every airplane was off Midway by 0600, I can't remember which.


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## parsifal (Jul 24, 2017)

_Parsifal: as usual you have presented wonderful facts and a well laid out perspective. If you could send me a link where it shows the P36's at Pearl Harbor getting more guns installed before intercept, I haven't seen that before and I would enjoy reading that account._

I didn’t post that.

_I agree with your assessment of logistics in the Pacific (and actually in europe and north africa also. Our logistics is what allowed us success in all theaters. Most, if not all the time we simply out supplied the guys we beat)_

Okay, so why post a scenario variant where logistics is basically ignored?

_One thing I believe you may be missing is, my alternate battle doesn't depend on logistics like a long campaign does. _

The length of the campaign is relevant only in that the nature of the logisitic challenges will change for a short sharp campaign like this, as opposed to a long drawn out one like say guadacanal. A/c need armourers, controllers, fitters, ammunition, refuellers, vehicles to move them around, hangar spaces, you name it. Take those elements away and you have amassive aircraft handling and servicing issue. What took an hour, say, to refuel, rearm, and scramble a strike or defensive CAP effort historically 9which is roughly what it did take), with the same amount of logiustic support, will take a lot longer. It might easily take 5 or 6 hours to organize your CAP, your runways might be clogged to the point of being unable to function.

I served on a carrier with a crew of 1300, and an air group of 21. The carrier had deck space to accommodate 37 a/c as designed. We still could have crammed 30 something a/c on that carrier, but the logisitic demands of modern aircraft made it inefficient to do so. It was more efficient to operate a lesser number of a/c on a day to day to day basis. Airbases are the same. They have a maximum capacity. As the Japanese found on several occasions, shuttling a/c in and out on a whim like this ruins your logistics both on a lon and short term basis.

You might argue that you could make room by removing your strike and search a/c. very bad idea. Your strike aircraft are your eyes mostly, plus there was no way before the battle of knowing that the land based strikes would not be effective. Unless we are relying on the tea leaves and crystal balls, we need those strike a/c to balance up the numbers for the carriers.

_All extra 46 Wildcats and 22 P36's arrive at Midway on lets say June 3 in the afternoon. All new fighters land with full ammo and nearly full fuel tanks (they take off with full fuel and only use enough for a short flight, depending on how far away you want US carriers from Midway. _

So what? They have been airborne, and at least half of them will require servicing. Because you have sucked out your pool of aircraft from allover, including the reserves, these guys arrive with no integration, no battle tactics, no experience, tired, and aircraft in need of service. Malta provides the best parallel to draw from. In the situations where spits (or hurricanes) were flown off the carrier, for the purposes of reinforcing the island defences and immediate turn around, the support crews for the squadron(s) were already on the island, more importantly the squadrons were fully trained and fully integrated so they could fight as a team, as it was losses of these hurried reinforcement efforts were always heavy. It takes time to learn the ropes, learn who goes high and who goes low, who banks left and who goes right. Your gaggle of untrained, half trained zonked out drones basically will have no chance

Moreover getting those guys onto the island, refueled and rearmed required extraordinary efforts by the existing garrison. A/C were sent out to guide the newcomers in, facilities were built in advance to house service and protect the new arrivals. Major increases in the air garrison would take months of planning in advance, you have hours.

_Or carriers run up very close, fly off fighters and then retire to 50, 75, 100 miles, south of Midway) The 1st Japanese raid was expected on morning of June 4th. _

Expected, but not certain, and with so many changes on your plan, compared to the historical situation, you cannot be sure of this.

NO admiral, worth his salt is going to risk his carriers by taking the carriers to within 100 miles of a disputed island. You have got to be kidding. If a transfer of this kind was attempted, you can bet your last dollar, it will be be from the maximum possible distance from the atoll. Moreover, short or long, there will be attritional losses in your relief force. This is a bunch of untrained, un-integrated wallies flying clapped out reserve aircraft without over water navigation skills. Ever been over the ocean, in the middle of nowhere and not know where your target is. Its scary. For good reason. It would not be out of the question to expect attritional losses of 30-50% in this scenario. When the Japanese tried something similar in 1944, it decimated the transferring formations before even a shot was fired. At the Marianas, where the Japanese tried a similar stunt, non combat losses from emergency transfers from the assets further south and to the west, amounted in total to over 305 of the force commitment. You can probably expect a higher attrition rate from your untrained, un-integrated forces attempting the same thing.

_So expected was the attack that morning that all of the fighters not already in the air were on the runway, pilots in cockpits, engines running! _

It still took a while for them to intercept, and the defending CAP could not fight as a single integrated group. Scramble was ordered shortly after the second confirmation at around 0555 hours. First interceptions were 25 minutes later by just 9 a/c, followed by a further 12 a/c with insufficient altitude to be fully effective. Your reaction times are going to be worse, much worse, no way to know for sure, but could arguably add 15 minutes to the scramble times, maybe more. During the BoB, untrained formations could usually take more than 3 times as long to scramble as fully trained formations. It led to several disaster in that battle. This would be the same.

_That is pretty confident that an attack is on the way soon! If I was in charge, I am not concerned about a logistics issue, this combat is going to be a shotgun duel at 10 feet, short and violent. I want enough CAP to engage the Zero escorts and tie them up long enough for the rest of the fighters to get at the single engine Japanese carrier bombers unmolested. _

You are dreaming. Logisitics 9albeit of a different nature0 is as important, or probably more important in your short shapr fight as it is in a long drawn out fight. I can see large numbers of fighters lost in the over water transfer, large numbers unserviceable after the flight, insufficient ground crews on hand to service them properly, and insufficient air traffic control to get them up in a sufficient time.

In the air, I see a disaster as well. Totally unintegrated formations, with no battle plan, no opportunity to train as a team, many of the pilots lacking the flying skills to be competitive. It would be a turkey shoot alright, a clay pidgeon shoot…of American fighters.

We all know what happens to unescorted Japanese Carrier bombers at the hands of a Wildcat, they die and they die quickly

Really? In the hands of a trained air group, flying to an agreed plan with adequate fighter control, yes. In situations where this was absent, which was the case facing VMG-221, and even moreso with the gaggle you are proposing the results would be very disappointing. Historically the the 22 defending fighters that were lost ofr written off, with the loss of 13 pilots, managed to bring down maybe, but not certain, just 4 a/c. moreover on two occasions in the historical battles they got the drop on the escorts and achieved a clear firing pass on the defending bomber formations.

No, you kid yourself yet again. It is not a given that the Japanese bombers would be hacked out of the sky. Highly unlikely actually

_You say numbers don't help?_

I should qualify this by saying that they don’t help unless properly supported. 

_What would happen to 29 Hurricanes trying to intercept 72 Stuka's if 36 ME109's were 5,000 feet above them?_

It was often the case in the BoB that formations of 50+ bombers escorted by 20-30 Me 109s, stacked high and above the bombers in loose escort formation would be attacked by 2 or 3 hurricanes. It was important for the hurricanes to be high and carry out a diving pass before scarpering gain height and do it allover again. 29 hurricanes would amount to a “big wing” which was found to be unworkable and inefficient in that battle.

_I would guess the same thing that happened at Midway_

It would be a very rare event, for a Cap to be 70+ a/c. With your 50 something defenders, you might get 20 in the first wave. They will be late, and low, fighting uncoordinated and at an altitude disadvantage

What would happen if 42 Hurricanes jumped 36 ME109's from above and then 53 Hurricanes attacked 72 Stukas in groups of 2-4?

The stukas would have bombed their target and be home for tea by the time a formation of that size had formed up. It’s a ridiculous supposition, never happened, never could happen. I suggest you read a little, and study the effects of mallory’s so called “big wings”. They were useless and totally ineffective. As your plan would be. .

_I would say the ME109's would get tied up and the Stuka's would not do well. (and at least the ME109's had radios so the Stuka's could beg for help)_

If it was possible, the numbers would help, but there are so many difficulties in achieving this as to make it possible to rule out as ever happening

_Also, Midway scrambled not only the rest of her fighters, I don't know how many were in the air, but also 4 B26's, 6 Avengers, and around 27 Dauntless and Vindicator dive bombers, all between the sighting of the Japanese 1st attack and 0600. Either Shattered Sword or The First Team says that every airplane was off Midway by 0600, I can't remember which._

Its true, but the first interceptions by a formed up fighter group were some minutes later. Only 9 of the 27 defenders were in position, and even then the form up of this group was incomplete. The second group could only intercept with difficulty just outside the flak zone, and almost all were poorly positioned for their attacked. The second group claimed to shoot down 4 bombers but more likely managed to shoot down just two before being monstered by the A6Ms.

With another 50+ aircraft to get off the ground, response times will suffer. I think the CAP would be far too late to react if it tried to form a defence gp of more than about 15 to 20 a/c. Later with improved radar this response was increased, but not in 1942. The defenders only received 30 minutes warning of the attack from their radar. They were already alerted to the attack by the airborne PBY patrols some minutes earlier than that


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## pinsog (Jul 24, 2017)

Why would large numbers of these planes be lost shuttling 50 miles? 46 of these would be manned by marine or navy pilots. I would use all surviving, unwounded fighter pilots from Lexington and Yorktown, none would be sent home. The AAF pilots in P36's would just follow the Navy and Marine pilots to the island just like later on when P40's were flown directly from Hawaii to Midway following a B17 who navigated, P38's flying to Britain with a B17 navigator. Midway wasn't contested, YET, it was about to be, but the air and sea to the southeast was never scouted before the battle. Also, these planes can be flown in early on June 3 or even on June 2 giving them time to rest, sleep or eat (if any of that is possible before big battle) and fighters serviced and fueled before the June 4 morning attack. These planes would have been well serviced before leaving Pearl so they shouldn't fall apart after a 50 or 100 mile flight to Midway.

Historical scramble was ordered at 0545 but pilots in their planes with engines running couldn't hear the alarm so someone had to drive a truck down and tell them to launch. Again, 20 wildcats should be on CAP at say 12,000 feet and should immediately start climbing to 20,000 when radar picks up the raid. Shattered Sword or First team said every single plane was off of Midway by 0600, so they must have been cranking them out in a hurry to get that many bombers off the runway along with the fighters. First fighter 'tallyho' was at 0619 0620 or 0621, all aircraft were gone from Midway by 0600.

Battle of Britain and 'Big Wing' concept is a little different. The British never knew what the exact target was and they were having to assemble aircraft from multiple fields into one group and try to guess where they should assemble because they didn't know what the exact target was. At Midway, the entire possible target was one airfield and one island the same size as the airfield right beside each other. Every fighter was on one strip and they could have actually just pointed straight up and told all the pilots to orbit the airfield and other island until the bad guys show up. If you have 20 Wildcats on CAP, that leaves the same number of fighters to scramble as Midway had total planes, and on page 135 of Shattered Sword it says all aircraft were gone by 0600. If the first 'Tallyho' was 20 minutes later, then that gives even a Buffalo time to get some altitude, the P36's should have been at 20,000 with little problem if they launched first, P36's showing 0-20,000 in less than 7.6 to 7.8 minutes.

At Guadalcanal, they had almost nothing to work with, pilots lived in the mud with the Marines, planes patched together to make them work, pilots and Marine grunts helping to service planes, refuel and re-arm fighters and bombers alike. (I read that B17 crews on Midway serviced their own planes as well) The first battle would not be a problem, armed when they left the carrier, fueled and serviced afternoon of June 3. There was no 2nd attack at Midway, historically. IF, in my plan, there was a 2nd strike, then there would be plenty of time to re-arm and refuel the US fighters since the Japanese had to switch out the torpedo with bombs before they could mount a 2nd strike.

Oh, on hacking Japanese bombers out of the air: Guadalcanal, Enterprise and Hornet attack, Hornet was eventually lost. There were 53 Wildcats airborne at the time of the attack but they were badly directed by the Fighter Controller on the carriers. The Japanese air groups that attacked the Enterprise and Hornet were devastated, hammered, slaughtered, (Pick your term) Now, we lost the Hornet as a result of these attacks, but there were few Japanese survivors left to cheer those results. In my setup, they can't sink Midway, so the pilots can concentrate on shooting down bombers without being concerned whether or not they have a home to land on after the fight. 

(My apologies on the re-armed P36s at Pearl Harbor, that was the gentleman before you)


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## pinsog (Jul 24, 2017)

Greg Boeser said:


> At Pearl, the 46th PS had time to fully arm four P-36As between the first and second waves. They had to brave a burning building to get the .50s. These four bounced the Japanese over Kaneohe, claiming 3, but in reality only damaging a few. Lt Sterling was shot down and the other a/c suffered damage to some extent. Lt. Harry Brown of the 46th PS claimed two kills, both B5N's from Soryu. He had only one functioning gun. Look up David Aiken's excellent reconstruction of the dogfight over Koneohe NAS, published in Flight Journal magazine, Oct 2002?



Interesting. I had not heard or read that. Any way you could find a link to that? I would be very interested in reading that account. Thank you


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## parsifal (Jul 24, 2017)

There is no way on gods earth that any carrier admiral would ever risk taking his carriers to within 50 miles of a known target like that. ALWAYS, the relieving fighters are launched at much greater ranges than thet. Look at what happened at guadacanak and the WASP. Ships as valuable as those carriers in June 1942 are never going to be risked to that extent. .

Using the remains of the CAGs from Lexington in that way is another nutbrain idea. You keep your CAGs together, as a cohesive unit, replace losses and make sure the replacement fillers are fully integrated into the team. you don't fritter your air assets away by deploying them to an exposed airbase where they run a real risk of being captured.

it is obvious that you have NO CLUE as to the reasons the Japanese began to suffer heavy casualties after Midway. By the time of Santa Cruz, the CV CAGs were fully worked up and up to strength, with vast numbers of veterans, but more importantly, everybody fully trained with new tactics. Start doing the stunts you are suggesting and you would rapidly lose those advantages.

You also are ignoring what you don't want to read. Having more aircraft packed into the same logistic package is going to slow your response times down to a crawl. not having a coherent fully trained unit is going to ruin your tactical planning. This would be a massacre alright...of US Navy pilots no less!

Give it up this is a dud plan with no hope of working that is ignoring some hard truths and underlying principals. .If this were a planning proposal submitted for testing april 1942, it would be dropped like a stone, because it would immediately be seen for what it is, a sure way to lose.

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## Tkdog (Jul 25, 2017)

To put it a bit more nicely (perhaps). Yes, having more and better planes in the air over Midway is an excellent idea. However, what was actually done was to put about as many planes as feasible over Midway of what was considered the best types available. Adding more subtracts from serviceability, add logistical complexity and, in short, quickly leads to diminishing returns. 

Also, a point you discarded earlier is still valid. They didn't want to shoot down Zeros, that was just bonus. They wanted to sink carriers. And they did.

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## parsifal (Jul 25, 2017)

I will post a correction. There were several occasions where carriers were taken in close to an airbase. But not one where the carriers were chock full of deck loaded reinforcements. I can think of a few memorable occasions, some successful some not.

Taranto, a success, in which fully worked up CAG was launched at night against a poorly defended target. 10 January 1941, whilst escorting a relief convoy for Malta, Illustrious was set upon by stukas after shee blundered to within 60 miles of enemy airbases. She was easily located, tracked and almost sunk.

April 1941, HMS Formidable was nearly sunk when she allowed herself to proceed just south of Crete, within 100 miles of enemy airbases. again, no deck cargo, fully closed up CAP but still not enough.

1939, HMS Courageous, was lost SW of Ireland when she stumbled into a declared U-boat area. it was a known enemy hotspot, not a base as such, but same effect. The British paid the price for their stupidity and lost her, with heavy loss of life.

USS Wasp, previously mentioned, USS saratoga (twice), CVE off Tarawa all lost in circumstances similar to this. And just so people are aware the IJN were in the process of deploying an I boat picket line, which unfortunately for them was too late to do its job, but still sank the crippled Yorktown. Problem is the USN was unsure as to their exact whereabouts during the battle, but the closer to the atoll, it would need to be assumed the greater the risk of the most priceless advantage a carrier has.....its not being located.


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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 25, 2017)

One more quibble. How are you going to use a carrier as a "delivery van" full of Army and Marine/Navy aircraft and the next day have it with a fully functioning CAG? Hangar deck on most carriers can't accommodate the entire CAG.
Cheers,
Wes


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## GregP (Jul 25, 2017)

Hi Parsifal,

We're not talking about ground troops, we're talking about front-line aircraft. Individually, ground troops can be beaten with superior tactics by smaller forces. It happens all through history since large numbers of ground troops historically can only move as fast as they can jog. Not everyone was on a horse. They are basically trapped where they are encountered except for slow advance or movement to the side or rear.

That is very far from the case with aircraft. They are not trapped and are not slow. If they are attacking your ship and you ignore one for as little a 20 seconds, you can lose a ship. Also historically, larger numbers of attacking aircraft usually get through unless flown by novices. You might recall that a few aircraft took out the Yamato, the Prince of Wales, and the Repluse, just to mention a few.

It is apples to oranges when it comes to troops and combat planes. Maybe not so much if the planes are cargo planes and can't fight back. Fighters very definitely don't fall into that category. More fighters could only help Midway and I can't see how you can argue otherwise. Fewer is NOT better.

If all encounters are equally lucky (or unlucky), then Lanchester's Law might apply. More is still better, when the quality is unchanged.

But, the outcome is already known, so it doesn't really matter, in the end.


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## pinsog (Jul 25, 2017)

XBe02Drvr said:


> One more quibble. How are you going to use a carrier as a "delivery van" full of Army and Marine/Navy aircraft and the next day have it with a fully functioning CAG? Hangar deck on most carriers can't accommodate the entire CAG.
> Cheers,
> Wes



That is a reasonable point. I do not have data showing how many aircraft a Yorktown class carrier can carry and I couldn't find any hard data in a quick internet search. The following is all I could find...

"Their internal carrying capacity becomes even greater when one remembers that Hornet carried virtually her entire air group below decks during the Doolittle Raid. True, many of these aircraft would have been knocked down in order to make them fit, but that alone indicates just how much internal volume the Yorktowns featured, especially considering she carried two full squadrons of non-folding wing SBDs and the fact that their hangar deck was pierced by their center elevator, further reducing usable hangar volume."

I don't know what "virtually her entire air group" means. Yorktown class carried anywhere from 77 to 90 planes. 

I know the three US ships carried 77, 78 and 79 planes into the Midway battle.

If anyone has the exact number a Yorktown class carrier could squeeze into the hanger it would be helpful.


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## pinsog (Jul 25, 2017)

Tkdog said:


> To put it a bit more nicely (perhaps). Yes, having more and better planes in the air over Midway is an excellent idea. However, what was actually done was to put about as many planes as feasible over Midway of what was considered the best types available. Adding more subtracts from serviceability, add logistical complexity and, in short, quickly leads to diminishing returns.
> 
> Also, a point you discarded earlier is still valid. They didn't want to shoot down Zeros, that was just bonus. They wanted to sink carriers. And they did.



Serviceability and logistics: I agree with this point IF it was a longer drawn out battle and they couldn't keep them supplied. But, in this one instance, again, the fighters would arrive with full ammo and in good condition before leaving Hawaii. After the flight in from the carrier (pick your range you wish to launch them 50, 100, 150, 200 miles) they are fueled and topped off with oil. If any had mechanical issues, they could have a day or 2 to fix them. Once the battle begins, nearly all launch for first battle, some don't come back, some are damaged badly, those that can are refueled and launched IF there is a second attack. Historically there was no second attack. If Japanese decided on second attack they would have had to switch from torpedos to bombs so it was going to be a while giving them time to refuel and re-arm Midway fighters. As on Guadalcanal, there would be no shortage of grunts to assist with fuel and re-arming under supervision of pilots. As in carrier battles, badly damaged planes are moved out of the way, and planes that might not normally fly are committed to battle.

Agree that shooting down Zeros isn't the goal, but every Zero brought down over Midway is one less that can defend a Japanese carrier or escort a strike on US carriers, along with every bomber shot down over Midway is a bomber that can't attack a US carrier. 

Also, large numbers, if not most of the pilots on the Japanese carriers survived to fight again. Aircrew shot down over Midway were gone and as we know now, were irreplaceable. These were the best, most experienced carrier borne pilots and crew Japan had, quite possibly the best in the world. Eliminating as many as possible over Midway would help not only later in Midway battle, but would have a ripple effect through the rest of the war.

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## Glider (Jul 25, 2017)

Re my previous posting, can I ask everyone to treat it with the contempt it deserves, lord only knows what was going on in my head, because I don't.


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## pinsog (Jul 25, 2017)

parsifal said:


> There is no way on gods earth that any carrier admiral would ever risk taking his carriers to within 50 miles of a known target like that. ALWAYS, the relieving fighters are launched at much greater ranges than thet. Look at what happened at guadacanak and the WASP. Ships as valuable as those carriers in June 1942 are never going to be risked to that extent. .
> 
> Using the remains of the CAGs from Lexington in that way is another nutbrain idea. You keep your CAGs together, as a cohesive unit, replace losses and make sure the replacement fillers are fully integrated into the team. you don't fritter your air assets away by deploying them to an exposed airbase where they run a real risk of being captured.
> 
> ...



1. USS Wasp was 300-350 miles from Guadalcanal when torpedoed. I believe Saratoga was close to Pearl the first time she was torpedoed. There were Uboats sinking ships within sight of the cities on the Atlantic coast. Subs, by their very nature can show up anywhere.

2. Yorktown went to battle with a mixed air group. Thach and a few pilots were combined with some of the remaining Yorktown pilots, while some of the Yorktown pilots were shipped back to the states. It was exactly what you are saying not to do. Also, the 21 F4F's from Joe Bauer's Marine Fighter Squadron 212 would be fighting as a unit.

3. Why did the Japanese begin losing more pilots after Midway? You say I have no clue? Please re-read Shattered Sword and The First Team. The US Navy pilots that fought from Midway to end of the year were the lowest time, least trained US Navy pilots of the war. (I believe that is in The First Team) So how did we shoot down the best Japanese pilots with substandard planes like the Wildcat? 1. Japanese planes weren't very survivable 2. at Guadalcanal Zeros had to fly 450 plus miles one way to do battle so it was a bad tactical set up for them 3. Navy pilots were taught deflection shooting which allowed snap shots at Zeros from a slower less maneuverable plane into an unarmored flying gas tank 4. Radar 5. We made fewer mistakes strategically and tactically than the Japanese 

4. in this one instance, again, the fighters would arrive with full ammo and in good condition before leaving Hawaii. After the flight in from the carrier (pick your range you wish to launch them 50, 100, 150, 200 miles) they are fueled and topped off with oil. If any had mechanical issues, they could have a day or 2 to fix them. Once the battle begins, nearly all launch for first battle, some don't come back, some are damaged badly, those that can are refueled and launched IF there is a second attack. Historically there was no second attack. If Japanese decided on second attack they would have had to switch from torpedos to bombs so it was going to be a while giving them time to refuel and re-arm Midway fighters. As on Guadalcanal, there would be no shortage of grunts to assist with fuel and re-arming under supervision of pilots. As in carrier battles, badly damaged planes are moved out of the way, and planes that might not normally fly are committed to battle.

5. The 'dud' plan is almost exactly what we did at Guadalcanal. Keep planes on the island flown in from aircraft ferries, escort carriers and damaged or sunk fleet carriers. Get altitude advantage and make a firing pass at the Zeros and the bombers. Repeat passes at the bombers (mostly 2 engine Betty) if Zeros weren't around


You say in one place that this is too many planes to work, too many, can't co-ordinate them, too much like 'Big Wing' at Battle of Britain. The alternative to 'Big Wing' in Battle of Britain was attack in piecemeal as they get aloft. But then you turn around and say that they can't operate at less than squadron level. 

If you read about the attacks on the Lexington, Yorktown, Hornet and Enterprise, all of them start out with a MAX of maybe 4 Wildcats in a section and then quickly break down into 1 on 1, or 1 on 2, or 1 on 3 or 4 with the Wildcats and Zeros all getting separated from their buddies and single Wildcats jumping single Zeros or 1, 2, 3 or 4 bombers still in some sort of formation. Or maybe 1 Wildcat sees 1 Wildcat against 2 Zeros and makes a pass to help the other guy out. 

Also, stop with the "NO CLUE", "dud plan" and "your ignoring what you don't want to read". Surely 2 adults can keep this civil. Neither side can be proven or disproven, this is all supposed to be in fun, not getting mad because I don't agree with you. Wouldn't be much of a forum if we all thought the same thing. 

There is no way to guess how a single air battle will go: 4 P38's vs 1 Zero? Zero doesn't have a chance, he's going to die quickly. Ask Tommy Mcguire and at least one other in that flight how that one turned out. See? No way to know. No use in getting all tore up about it.


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## Glider (Jul 25, 2017)

A thought. If you are going to give the USA the privilage of modernised tactics then its only fair you do the same to the Japanese. The easiest chnge wold be to keep the Battleship groupl with the Carriers. This I beleive would have definately changed the outcome of the battle.
A) because of the increased AA fire 
B) plus the simple fact that the extra targets would have diluted the attacks on the carriers
C) and finlly because the Japanese battleships had radar, the carriers didn't


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## GregP (Jul 25, 2017)

I thought the premise was to leave everything s it was except find a way to field more aircraft over Midway.

Was I wrong here?


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## Greg Boeser (Jul 25, 2017)

PINSOG,
Here's a link to an interview of Phil Rasmussen, one of the P-36 pilots at Pearl.
https://www.nps.gov/valr/learn/historyculture/upload/PhilRasmussen.pdf
I think he would know.

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## pinsog (Jul 25, 2017)

Greg Boeser said:


> PINSOG,
> Here's a link to an interview of Phil Rasmussen, one of the P-36 pilots at Pearl.
> https://www.nps.gov/valr/learn/historyculture/upload/PhilRasmussen.pdf
> I think he would know.



Great article. Holding the 50 handle back and then letting it go to shoot down a plane. Wow.


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## GregP (Jul 25, 2017)

Doesn't say what he thought of the P-36, though. All it describes is his one dogfight experience, with regard to the P-36.


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## parsifal (Jul 26, 2017)

GregP said:


> Hi Parsifal,
> 
> We're not talking about ground troops, we're talking about front-line aircraft. Individually, ground troops can be beaten with superior tactics by smaller forces. It happens all through history since large numbers of ground troops historically can only move as fast as they can jog. Not everyone was on a horse. They are basically trapped where they are encountered except for slow advance or movement to the side or rear.
> 
> ...



Hi Greg

Planes are quick in the air, slow to service on the ground, slower to service if you overwork your support facilities. moreover, if the spot rate (the rate that you can get things off the ground) is at a certain frequency and you overload that spot rate, you basically paralyse the system, and it slows to a crawl. then you have to consider the size of your CAP and the time to altitude. You can attack from below but you are at a disadvantage, and you still need to be within gunnery range.

The Japanese attack plan was to close to the island above 10000 ft, then to drop quickly to 5000 feet either over the target for the vals or in a steep glide (ie faster at time of drop) from about the position of the outer flak zone for the bombers, whilst the fighters stayed outside this zone to keep the CAP busy....it didn't quite pan out as well as that I admit, but that was the plan and that's what we, as the defending team, so to speak, need to assume will happen..... This was pretty standard stuff really, but it makes for difficulty to intercept. Basically from initial detection to the point where the enemy is entering the flak zone the midway defenders had a little over 15 mins to intercept . the strike aircraft were already airborne , but it still took a mighty effort to get just 9 of the available CAP airborne and in reasonable position by 0615. The remainder of the CAP were late and fought at a disadvantage because of poor placement.

Numbers count, but only if you have the logistic support to support them and make them effective. Simply dumping a gaggle of fighters the night before on the atoll for a variety of reasons cannot be considered an adequately supported force. most wont even be ready for the attack I dont think. getting them to the pointy end, other than being shot down because they are struggling to gain altitude, or worse, on the deck is the issue . they would otherwise be a liability if the tactical planning (meaning tactics and battlefield procedures....'you break left and I will break right" ) have not been worked out. by definition, the sources for this reserve force will have none of those skills, despite some of them being experienced. taking aircrew from the lost carrier Lexington (with holes already shot into the CAG to fragment its cohesion as a unit) and placing them again in harms way in an exposed position is a very bad idea. these are the CAGS that the USN had to use wisely at that time. they would not have risked them on an exposed atoll like Midway, where they might be captured.

Numbers are important and helpful, but only if you can get them where you need them in a functional and effective manner. I am not confident that this "plan" (if you want to flatter with that term) would deliver that.

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## parsifal (Jul 26, 2017)

submarines always deploy to choke or concentration points of some kind. In the western approaches, or the SW approaches, the 'choke points are the convoy routes themselves. Later in the war, after the Uboat codes had been broken, the western approaches command was able to re-route the convoys to avoid the wolfpacks 9to a degree. it was far from a random event. in wartime you just cant wander the ocean as you please, if you do, you will probably be sunk (more than likely by friendly forces).

San Cristobal was across the known traffic route to guadacanal. allowing the Wasp to loiter in that sea lane was stupid, and allowed the Japanese to locate her, and then sink her. Same thing happened to the Courageous. you will find that in most cases, this was the way u-boats caught their carrier prey....it wasn't a case of the uboat sailing along singing hearty renditions of "life on the ocen waves" as they tried their luck...they worked to a plan, based on intell mostly of various kinds. guess, what, the choke point for operation MI was the atoll. the Japanese wanted a pickert line some 200 miles from the atoll, but were too late to trap the carriers. this was not exactly known to the USN at the time, but they did know the IJN was trying to use the atoll as bait to lure the USN CVs into that trap. Ordering the US carriers into the trap is just dumb, and would never happen because of what CinCPac knew already.

this whole concept is very bad, and not worth the risk. we do not know how the Japanese might have reacted to this, but likely something would have happened, though hard to tell what and hard to say if decisive. I dont know if US crypto analysis knew this, but Japanese radio intercepts did notice an increase in USN signal traffic particularly submarine activity and message traffic in the days leading to the battle (IJN SIGINT was able to tell if the signals were submarine carrier based or airborne). If even more traffic was detected as arrangements for this quick reinforcement unfolded, coupled with the lack of air activity in other areas, I think the Japanese stand a good chance of cottoning on and blowing the whole plan to pieces. The Japanese made some silly mistakes, but it would be a mistake to assume they were utterly devoid of any sense at all. 

The signal traffic information was picked up from the Marshalls and passed to Yamamoto prior to the battle. Japanese plans were not changed, which is inexplicable really. Later, as the battle unfolded, Yamamoto, at sea in BB Yamato, assumed Nagumo had received an appropriate signal from Tokyo , a lot has been made of Yamamotos failure to pass on this information, but it was really of minor importance. He had good reason not to transmit, he was observing radio silence (USN were actually pretty lax when it came to signals discipline. lucky for them they didn't have to worry too much, they had cracked the JN25 code and could read IJN intercepts at a strategic level 9but not at a tactical level yet, to get them out of trouble) however, these messages were, contrary to earlier historical accounts, also received by Nagumo before the battle began. For reasons which remain unclear, Nagumo did not alter his plans or take additional precautions. If a carrier was detected that close to the target the day before, and it probably would, ther is no telling what the Japanese reaction or readiness might be. suffiice it to say that the detection of a carrier that close was likely to happen, just on signals analysis alone, and would almost certainly have resulted in a change in the Japanese plans


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## GregP (Jul 26, 2017)

Pinsog,

You buying any of this? Now we're talking about the Japanese battle plan and maritime choke points where your premise was to reinforce the existing Midway aircraft with more aircraft.

From my point of view, more planes at Midway would have been better than not having them, and off-the-topic discussions of planes and submarine tactics won't affect that in the slightest. This is exactly why I should stay out of what ifs. There is no point where you can safely get away from a counter argument that makes no sense, either on the surface or when you get down into the details.

WWII happened some 75 years ago. We know the outcome. Adding a few more resources to the winning side cannot have been a bad thing, and neither the Japanese nor the U.S.A. would have changed what they did. We'd just have a few more aircraft. With a few more aircraft, the Japanese might have lost even more ships. Maybe, maybe not. If so, it would have been better for our side. If not, nothing would have changed.

Midway has been called "the most stunning and decisive blow in the history of naval warfare," and it only lasted 3 days. More aircraft could have made it even more so. I cannot see how having more aircraft would have reversed the outcome or, indeed, would have resulted in a lesser victory. There are some possibilities for making it a better victory, but they also might not happen.

Most of the world sees Midway as a miracle victory for the U.S.A. because we were outnumbered so heavily. But ... we HAD broken the Japanese code and KNEW the attack was coming, and they WERE spread out over a large part of the Pacific. So, despite the Japanese having a massive advantage in ships, including battleships and carriers, we were able to have our land-based planes airborne when the attack happened and save a few planes. Then, right when the first wave was on deck refueling, the planes from the three U.S. carriers found and struck the Japanese carriers.

In this situation, more planes available to the U.S. could only have helped, and we MIGHT have sunk more carriers with them.

I can tell you this: We put on an annual airshow comprised mostly of WWII aircraft. In a typical airshow, we usually sortie about 65 aircraft a day, for 3 days. In 10 years, that's 1,950 sorties of 75 year old WWII aircraft. In those 10 years, we have had maybe 10 aborts, total. Now, these planes are NOT fitted out for war, but their systems are VERY reliable. It is impossible for me to believe the most of the aircraft could not be rearmed and turned around with minimal or no maintenance except fuel, oil, and armament. The battle only lasted 3 days, and we don't have major mechanical or maintenance issues with these same planes (U.S. and Japanese) 75 years later. My bet is they would perform just fine for the 3 days, with maybe a few going down for maintenance. The real issue was to avoid the many expert Japanese fighter pilots when they were fat with fuel and ammo, and get them instead when they landed to refuel/rearm.

We did that and it worked.


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## Greg Boeser (Jul 26, 2017)

I will say this in regards to the idea that the handful of P-36s should have been committed to Midway. The P-36 lacked armor, self sealing fuel tanks and was considered obsolete. What air force commander is going to risk his precious pilots in what had been relegated to an advanced trainer? That a handful got off at Pearl and lived to tell about it is not a very good selling point. The NEIAF had H75A-7s with 4x .303s and some pilot armor and they got slaughtered. The French did OK with them against Bf 109Ds, but against Bf 109Es, they got slaughtered. Later, vs USN F4F-4s at Casablanca, they got slaughtered. And these were veteran French pilots. The Finns liked them, but they were facing a bunch of recruit pilots flying obsolete junk. The good Russian units were facing the real threat further south.
As to using the carriers as taxis for the "unused" planes at Pearl,the USN prior to Midway pushed their VF strength to 27 per carrier, they already faced a challenge of integrating new pilots into the increased force structure. The F4F-3s were left behind because they were fixed wing, took up too much space. It would have been impossible for the VF squadrons to conduct any training at all with the flight decks covered with cargo. Plus, Nimitz had to prepare his forces for future operations. The units that arrived on the 29th were earmarked as replacements for the casualties that Nimitz knew would be incurred at Midway, not to mention that they had just docked and the a/c had to be off loaded and probably reassembled, or at least, unpacked. You don't ship combat ready aircraft.

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## Shortround6 (Jul 26, 2017)

a few points if I may.

How some of the existing fighters got to Midway.









Lower photo at a different time.
I am not saying they could NOT or DID NOT use carriers but it wasn't as common as it might appear.
A Sister ship was at Pearl in July of 1942 but I have no idea of movements before then. There is a photo of the sister ship carrying a Catalina as deck cargo later in the war.

Adding a dozen or so fighters to the defense probably wouldn't screw up anything but as the numbers go up it becomes more difficult.

Even if each fighter arrives with loaded guns and fuel tanks part filled, even well over half, how long does it take to put 20-40 gallons each in 70-90 planes? Using the same ground crew trying to service all the other aircraft.

How many planes can take off per minute form the existing runways and how many can land per minute on undamaged runways and how many can land per minute on damaged runways, this affects the numbers of aircraft in the air at a given time or affects their range/endurance. A plane that is forced to ditch due to low fuel after orbiting the air field for 20-30 minutes waiting for it;s turn to land is lost just as assuredly as one that ditched 60 miles from the Island.

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## GregP (Jul 26, 2017)

Nice pics, Shortround!

Any modern museum or collector would LOVE to have that Buffalo!

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## Old Wizard (Jul 26, 2017)




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## davparlr (Jul 27, 2017)

Ponsog, I am afraid your scenario could not be accomplished. The time frame is wrong. In May It had been only six months since the US suffered the gut blow of Pearl Harbor. In spite of the Tokyo raid, America was still reeling trying to recover from the shock and was in the process of organizing for defense. At this time, the Navy only had three carriers operational in the Pacific theater, the Japanese had ten. The Navy had no battleships available, the Japanese had seven. The Japanese Navy could roam the Pacific at will. Because of code breaking at the first of 1942, the Navy knew a major Japanese offense was underway but there was a great debate on where the strike would occur. Nimitz thought Midway, HQ Washington thought Aleutians, Hawaii, or US. Force deployment, even prepositioning could not occur until the target was identified because no one would be willing to weaken their defenses if they could be the target. Verification of the target did not occur until mid May(see reference), about TWO WEEKS BEFORE FORCES NEEDED TO BE IN PLACE AT MIDWAY. That means he would have to convince the various commands to provide support, which the Army, which Nimitz had no control over, would not do, and that is depleting defensive forces at Hawaii to save Midway (see RAF response to request of help from France at the start of WWII), muster the forces, organize the transportation, and execute deployment. All in one week. Impossible. Then on arrival, forces had to be organized, integrated and dispersed, in a week. Very difficult. And certainly not without alerting possible Japanese spies in Hawaii.

In my opinion, with the Japanese massive fleet at sea and with the location unknown, Nimitz’s, hands were tied and could not mobilize. Once the target was verified, with two weeks to fight, Nimitz, who had a far better understanding of available asset than we do, mobilized everything available and did a miraculous job in a high risk environment.

Ref.
Preparations for the Midway Operation


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## Tkdog (Jul 27, 2017)

Possible spies is a huge consideration. If they exist, and it isn't possible at the time to know, and they see Oahu stripped of defenses then the target could shift. Losing Oahu, of even more damage at Oahu, is a bigger deal than losing Midway.


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## pinsog (Jul 27, 2017)

Greg P: 100% agree with everything you said. Thach flew a 175 mile one way escort, fought, flew back, landed, fuel, oil, ammo, flew against dive bombers, fuel, oil and then fought torpedo bombers. If it needs more than fuel, oil, ammo and maybe oxygen it isn't going to fight.

Greg Boeser: I am aware of P36 performance.i would have a sheet of armor installed behind pilot, (they had 2 or 3 weeks to get them ready at Pearl) and the engines overhauled or changed. Otherwise they fight as is. US committed Buffalos to battle in this fight so I don't see why they wouldn't use a P36. Everything but the 15 Yorktown fighters could go out with Enterprise and Hornet. The Yorktown planes came in on Yorktown, gotten into best shape as possible in 3 days and shipped out in Yorktown. I understand training on 1 ship would be affected but I would trade a couple days of training for 66 extra fighters. 

They absolutely flew combat ready planes off carriers all the time. Wasp flew 2 loads of Spitfires to Malta. 30 P40's were flown off Wasp to Iceland. 
USS Ranger:
Steaming to Naval Air Station Quonset Point, Rhode Island, _Ranger_ loaded 68 Curtiss P-40Es and put to sea on 22 April, launching the Army planes on 10 May to land at Accra, on the Gold Coast of Africa (Ghana).[37] She returned to Quonset Point on 28 May, made a patrol to Argentia, then steamed out of Newport on 1 July with another 72 Army P-40s, which she launched off the coast of Africa for Accra on 19 July. 

Runway space at Midway was mentioned early on, but remember that 20 or so B17's flew out before dawn freeing up runway for fighters to use all day.

Nothing else changes in this. All these fighters could have been available without changing anything else in the timeline.


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## pinsog (Jul 27, 2017)

Gentleman, 'possible spies' missed 3 carriers and 2 task forces, 1 carrier with 1,200 men working on it round the clock to get in shape, all the aircraft restocked on 3 carriers, 20+ B17's, etc etc etc. Were they really going to notice 22 'obsolete' AAF fighters disappearing?

Davprlr, I know they wouldn't release any P39 or P40's. Only reason I thought they might release P36 is because it was 'obsolete'. Talking them into it is just implied, I am not sure anyone would approve of it, just saying 'it happened' and then the scenario. (Yours is a valid point)

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## XBe02Drvr (Jul 27, 2017)

Even if they did notice the P-36s going away, it was probably too late for any remaining spies to do anything about it. With a war on, no Japanese Consulate on the island, radio transmissions scrutinized, and all local Japanese suspect, they would have had to rely on secure but slow means of getting their info to Tokyo.
ComPacAAF surely would have noticed and not been happy with the idea. With Kido Butai on the loose, position unknown, destination SUSPECTED, he would have been most unwilling to give up his reserves. Army didn't have anywhere near as much faith in "that den of spooks led by a damn degenerate" as the Navy did. "Hell, he goes to work in bathrobe and bedroom :slippers! No sense of military bearing, dress or tradition at all!"
Cheers,
Wes


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## pinsog (Jul 27, 2017)

XBe02Drvr said:


> Even if they did notice the P-36s going away, it was probably too late for any remaining spies to do anything about it. With a war on, no Japanese Consulate on the island, radio transmissions scrutinized, and all local Japanese suspect, they would have had to rely on secure but slow means of getting their info to Tokyo.
> ComPacAAF surely would have noticed and not been happy with the idea. With Kido Butai on the loose, position unknown, destination SUSPECTED, he would have been most unwilling to give up his reserves. Army didn't have anywhere near as much faith in "that den of spooks led by a damn degenerate" as the Navy did. "Hell, he goes to work in bathrobe and bedroom :slippers! No sense of military bearing, dress or tradition at all!"
> Cheers,
> Wes



Excellent point. Might be why they couldn't tell them the carriers were gone. Maybe they knew and no way to tell it.

AAF may indeed have been cranky about giving up their P36's, training for one thing (gunnery training to be specific) and another line of air defense behind P39's and P40's


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## pinsog (Jul 28, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> Hello Shortround6, I was on a phone yesterday and missed your post completely. A quick reply to the points you made.
> 
> There are 21 Buffalos and 6 or 7 Wildcats already on Midway along with 20 or so B17's, 4 B26's, 6 Avengers and 27 Dauntless and Vindicator dive-bombers.
> 
> ...

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## GregP (Jul 28, 2017)

Pretty well thought out, Pinsog. 

The thing a lot of people seem to miss is in caps ... try to fight the battle without hindsight. 

That is, we'd do as we did, the Japanese would do as THEY did, but we'd have had a few more planes. That equals more probable damage to the enemy. I fail to see why that is so hard to see.

There are enough runways, enough runway space, and enough fuel for a 3-day fight. If any land-based planes go down for maintenance that is more than a quick-fix, disperse them together to be possible targets ... line them up. It gives any attackers a place to shoot at where there will be the least damage while remaining a prime target.

Meanwhile, if you find their carriers, you KNOW how long it takes to get back to the carrier. If you DON'T find them, you'll not sink any. In the event, we DID find them. Give them that transit time, plus 20 - 30 minutes to be in the middle of refueling / rearming, and attack with carrier planes at max effort. Do this each and time you can, and you have a good chance of getting a fair number of their carriers sunk. You might at least damage almost all of them. That assumes some good luck; to be sure.

But, battle plans rarely survive first contact unless it's an ambush. So, you better be flexible. Not so flexible as if nobody in the squadron had a radio, but flexible. Engage targets of opportunity whenever and wherever possible. Attack if you can, and don't run out of fuel. Better to survive and attack again.


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## pinsog (Jul 28, 2017)

Shortround6,

as i said, I tried to fight this as if I didn't know the future. If I know the future, I would also have left behind every single torpedo bomber from the carriers and had the entire fighter force waiting at 20,000 feet at 0600. 

I believe that a fighter force that large, in position, and I think they should get into position in the time allotted, would take a huge toll on the first wave. 

If my plan worked like I wanted, I would have the 22 P36's at the front of the group, PBY pilot radios sighting of first wave attack at 0544, the P36's launch immediately and join the 20 CAP Wildcats at 20,000 feet. This 42 fighters move out to the historical point 40 miles out and jump the Zero escort. I would think the Zeros would assume 42 fighters to be the entire Midway fighter force so they all stay and fight, drawing entire Zero escort away from the bombers leaving 36 cals and 36 Kates vs 33 more Wildcats and 21 Buffalos waiting for them over just out of flak range of Midway. Zeros have no radios so once out of sight, the bombers can't call for help.

Meanwhile a completely undetected and unmolested US carrier force waits say 100 miles south east of Midway as Midway fighters thin out the Japanese (especially the Kates, which I consider the most dangerous by far) If the plan worked like I think/want, the 1st wave is horribly worked over (not sure how the Zeros would fair, but the bombers, if the Zeros did not interfere, should be decimated). The Japanese, being Japanese, never quit no matter what, would likely launch a second wave, which after having to re-arm the Kates should give plenty of time to re-fuel and re-arm the US fighters that survived and, hopefully, they could do the same to the 2nd raid. 

Finally, after the Japanes carrier aircraft numbers have been whittled down, the US carriers, have been moving into position, launch a huge strike from near Midway (easier navigation for all US pilots, they can always fly back to Midway and get directions to carrier or land on Midway, or ditch or bailout over Midway eliminating all the US pilots that died from getting lost.


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## pinsog (Jul 28, 2017)

GregP,

I agree with what you said

If everything else went as historical, it should, I only added more fighters and put US carriers SE of Midway, then the Japanese carriers should be spotted at 0530 as historical.

IF somehow the US carriers got spotted, Midway is a giant unsinkable Radar picket with 95 fighters than can thin the heck out of an attack force before it gets to the 81 Wildcats the US carriers had.

No reason the US carriers should ever get spotted, there were 0 submarines and recon planes SE of Midway during the engagement. Also, a B17 or 2 or maybe a Catalina or 2 could fly anti sub patrol for the US fleet.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 28, 2017)

The reason they had 3 runways (and there may have been 6, I am no Midway expert and don't know when the the 2nd airfield went in)
is that you use the one facing into the wind or closest to facing into the wind. A triangular layout gives you six options and in some cases the triangle is "squished" to accommodate prevailing wind directions. 
Not all runways were equal either.




Nov 1941. 
Trying to use multiple runways at the same time sounds like something the New Jersey DOT would do (plenty of cousins/brother-in-laws with tow trucks/body shops) 

I would also question your P-36 refurbishment plan. 

i have no idea what shape the P-36s were in and many of them _may _have had engines with a quite a bit of life left. Opposing that is that there probably weren't very many spare engines at Pearl for them. Possible engine doners would be C-47s and Catalinas. 
F4F engines won't fit without a *LOT *of hammering and sawing (two stage supercharger) and the Navy is unlikey to hand over any spare engines anyway. 
The P-36 had one .50 cal in cowling, it _might _be possible to replace the cowl .30 cal with a 2nd .50 cal. but trying to add .50 cal to the wing or under wing is probably not possible in the time available. I have never heard of an early P-40 ever getting .50 cal guns in the wings for example. 
You have no self-sealing fuel tanks unless you can strip some out of the P-40 wrecks at Pearl (a source for pilot seat armor?)


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## pinsog (Jul 28, 2017)

davparlr said:


> Ponsog, I am afraid your scenario could not be accomplished. The time frame is wrong. In May It had been only six months since the US suffered the gut blow of Pearl Harbor. In spite of the Tokyo raid, America was still reeling trying to recover from the shock and was in the process of organizing for defense. At this time, the Navy only had three carriers operational in the Pacific theater, the Japanese had ten. The Navy had no battleships available, the Japanese had seven. The Japanese Navy could roam the Pacific at will. Because of code breaking at the first of 1942, the Navy knew a major Japanese offense was underway but there was a great debate on where the strike would occur. Nimitz thought Midway, HQ Washington thought Aleutians, Hawaii, or US. Force deployment, even prepositioning could not occur until the target was identified because no one would be willing to weaken their defenses if they could be the target. Verification of the target did not occur until mid May(see reference), about TWO WEEKS BEFORE FORCES NEEDED TO BE IN PLACE AT MIDWAY. That means he would have to convince the various commands to provide support, which the Army, which Nimitz had no control over, would not do, and that is depleting defensive forces at Hawaii to save Midway (see RAF response to request of help from France at the start of WWII), muster the forces, organize the transportation, and execute deployment. All in one week. Impossible. Then on arrival, forces had to be organized, integrated and dispersed, in a week. Very difficult. And certainly not without alerting possible Japanese spies in Hawaii.
> 
> In my opinion, with the Japanese massive fleet at sea and with the location unknown, Nimitz’s, hands were tied and could not mobilize. Once the target was verified, with two weeks to fight, Nimitz, who had a far better understanding of available asset than we do, mobilized everything available and did a miraculous job in a high risk environment.
> 
> ...



Reasonable, well laid out position. 

The 15 Yorktown Wildcats could have been worked on as soon as the landed (I mean they flew CAP all the way home, but my guess is they could use some attention) They do as much as they can to get them in as good a shape as possible and them deck park them on the Yorktown when she heads out. 

10 replacement Wildcats that were left at Pearl could be loaded on the Hornet or Enterprise along with everything else, no issues there. 

The P36's, that is a simple chat between 2 higher level officers. Navy says we would really like them, here is our plan, you think they are 'obsolete' anyway. AAF guy, or maybe Navy guy in charge of Pearl decides whether they can do without them or not. If so, I would prefer to change all their engines if they are worn and need it, change both synchro guns to 50's and add a sheet of armor behind pilot. Then they are loaded by crane onto Hornet or Enterprise and they sail on schedule.

That is 25 Wildcats and 22 P36's and it is 'plausible'. Its not an over the top delivering P38's or Mustangs or P47's months before they are built. This 'could' have been done. You may not like the idea (thats no problem, be a boring site if we all agreed) but it could have been done.

The 21 Marines at Noumeou (spelling?) island would have had to be brought back by Halsey on a whim.


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## pinsog (Jul 28, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> The reason they had 3 runways (and there may have been 6, I am no Midway expert and don't know when the the 2nd airfield went in)
> is that you use the one facing into the wind or closest to facing into the wind. A triangular layout gives you six options and in some cases the triangle is "squished" to accommodate prevailing wind directions.
> Not all runways were equal either.
> 
> ...



See, thats why I like chatting with you. I may not always agree with your assessment, but you use facts and lay it out nicely, thank you.

I believe you misinterpreted my runway question. You use the runway heading into the wind, but are those runways WIDE enough for fighters to take off SIDE BY SIDE 2 or more at a time? I have NO idea, maybe that is a stupid question, but since I don't know, I am going to ask you people that do. Can they take off side by side 2 at a time or 3 at a time or is it 1 at a time?
How much interval between fighters taking off? 10 seconds? 15? 20? 30?

Updating P36:
Agree, don't know what engine time looked like, maybe some were fresh, maybe all fresh,. maybe all were worn out and needed replaced.

It would need to be the correct engine, a bolt in engine change, I agree a Wildcat engine wouldn't work.

Armor I believe could be done pretty easy.

2 50's? I don't know, hoping you could tell me. I would prefer that, but if they fight with 1 30 and 1 50 at least they are there and shooting (I wasn't going to try to put any 50's in the wing or under. 2 50's or 1 50 and 1 30 synchronized isn't a lot of firepower, but the KI43 brought down a LOT of well armored allied fighters with the same arrangement)

I don't see self sealing tanks happening, didn't expect to bother trying. If your plane is on fire, you need to leave immediately!!

Does that help the 'plausibility' a bit?


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## Peter Gunn (Jul 28, 2017)

How does the Noumea command feel about Halsey stripping the fighter defense he just delivered to them on a whim? Never been in the Navy but I don't think Halsey could have just said, "hey bring those back", weren't they allocated to another base?

While I believe I get your reasoning, I'm still hazy on why the American carriers are SE of Midway instead of North, you know, on the flank of the IJN, where Nimitz expected to spring his trap from. Again, I've never been an admiral in charge of a fleet (in that I'm sure I'm not alone here) but Nimitz et. al. (the trained professionals) did what they did for a reason.

Also (again), the Navy and AAF sent everything that Midway could handle, the quip that if they sent one more airplane the island may sink comes to mind. You know, these ground crew, repair teams (ship and plane) and supply folks are already working pretty hard to get the traditional resources ready for battle, now their taxed with getting obsolete fighters from training command combat ready. Adding guns and armor, swapping engines, at some point your system becomes overloaded and grinds to a halt.

I said it before, these guys that did this in real life were digging into every possible scenario to prepare for the battle, I'm fairly sure they would have considered a batch of P-36's but came to their senses pretty quick. A case can be made I suppose using the few Buffaloes that were sent as a reason to add the P-36s, but that's already been addressed earlier I believe because they were not only advanced trainers but a strategic reserve of sorts.

I'll bow out for real this time as I really don't see this going anywhere, I don't think it's a bad idea, just not one the professionals would have done (and didn't).

It's a nice "what if" but I think it's already out lived it's shelf life.


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## pinsog (Jul 28, 2017)

Peter Gunn said:


> How does the Noumea command feel about Halsey stripping the fighter defense he just delivered to them on a whim? Never been in the Navy but I don't think Halsey could have just said, "hey bring those back", weren't they allocated to another base?
> 
> While I believe I get your reasoning, I'm still hazy on why the American carriers are SE of Midway instead of North, you know, on the flank of the IJN, where Nimitz expected to spring his trap from. Again, I've never been an admiral in charge of a fleet (in that I'm sure I'm not alone here) but Nimitz et. al. (the trained professionals) did what they did for a reason.
> 
> ...



Hey it's all fun, a detail here and there can make a big difference.

The P36's would be shaped up at Pearl before they left, not at Midway. Your right, Midway did not have the time, people or equipment to work on wore out P36's. All fighters sent to Midway would only need fuel and oil topped off to fight the first raid.

How would Noumeou feel about losing their fighters? Maybe not good, but that happened everywhere, fighters, tanks, bombers, trucks, etc are sent 1 place instead of another. How did the entire Pacific feel about being 2nd or 3rd or 4th place to Europe, Africa and Eastern front?

I feel 21 fighters isn't enough to do anything anyway, (Midway springs to mind!) so let's concentrate and bunch up fighters together and attack en mass instead of piecemeal them out like at Wake and Midway. We know they are coming, let's set an ambush

Carriers are SE of Midway because that puts Midway with 95 fighters between them and 72 Kate torpedo planes and 72 Val dive bombers. If the historical US fleet had been spotted by a sub and reported, before the June 4 morning attack, I believe a Japanese 1st strike would have wiped them out. In my scenario, the US carriers are in an area where Japanese subs were not AND no Japanese recon planes ever looked for the entire battle. 95 US fighters would work over the Japanese air groups, the first wave being a complete ambush catching the Japanese off guard and hopefully decimating the first wave. If they can do it to the 2nd wave, then the US carriers can move up near Midway and strike virtually defenseless Japanese Carriers while US carriers are at 100% and hopefully there is still a strong fighter presence on Midway to provide an oversized escort for the US strike.

Also putting US carriers SE of Midway, moving up close to Midway for launch, gives pilots a fixed position to navigate back to. We lost a lot of airplanes, pilots and people that couldn't find the carrier after the attack


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## Glider (Jul 29, 2017)

I know it might seem obvious but all these changes to the P36 will add a lot of weight and its handleing which was a real bonus will almost certainly be significantly reduced. Problems with COG are also certain to arise, an increase in drag and of course performance in particular climb. Val without a bomb load may well fancy its chances against such an opponent
The assumption that the US could set an ambush is also optimistic. Being able to crack codes is one thing, to get them decoded in time and distributed to those who need them in as close to real time as possible is quite another.
It's also quite a complex plan and they have a high probability of going very wrong


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## pinsog (Jul 29, 2017)

Glider said:


> I know it might seem obvious but all these changes to the P36 will add a lot of weight and its handleing which was a real bonus will almost certainly be significantly reduced. Problems with COG are also certain to arise, an increase in drag and of course performance in particular climb. Val without a bomb load may well fancy its chances against such an opponent
> The assumption that the US could set an ambush is also optimistic. Being able to crack codes is one thing, to get them decoded in time and distributed to those who need them in as close to real time as possible is quite another.
> It's also quite a complex plan and they have a high probability of going very wrong



Hello Glider: The only change to the P36 would be, instead of 1 50 and 1 30 synchronized through prop, exchange the 30 for another 50, so now you have 2 50's. That adds 46 pounds for the gun and 17 pounds for ammo. (Shortround6 wasn't sure that was possible, if it wasn't then they fight with 1 30 and 1 50) The only other thing is a sheet of armor immediately behind pilot. 1/4 inch armor behind pilot was an option on the P36, but US P36's didn't have it. Spitfires first armor weighed 73 pounds, so 75 or so pounds for that. Thats 138 pounds total, shouldn't cause any issues.

I don't see this as complicated. I assume you have read about the Guadalcanal campaign? The US bitterly dumped a bunch of guys on a muddy, mosquito infested cesspool and told them to hold it. The 'airfield', was a muddy straight line sort of cut out of the jungle. No facilities, the airfield was a muddy unfinished mess and the Japanese continually assaulted from the land, sea and air. Marine, Navy and AAF fighters and bombers were funneled in as best they could, some sent in when their carrier was sunk or damaged, supplies were questionable, constant bombing from air and from cruisers and battleships. They held and also had a 1 to 1 exchange with the Zero flown by the best pilots Japan had to offer.

In contrast: Midway was a modern well supplied base, 3 paved runways, triangle shaped, well defended on land, no land assault from Japanese, no cruiser or battleship bombardment, and radar for early warning.

Plan is simple, aircraft available at Pearl Harbor are deck loaded onto Hornet. Enterprise escorts her to somewhere SE of Midway and launches 31 Wildcats and 22 P36's. They are fueled and armed when they leave the ship. They land on Midway a day or 2 or 3 before the attack and are refilled with fuel and oil. Yorktown arrives when she historically does and flies off the 15 Wildcats that she historically left at Pearl Harbor. They wait, a few fly CAP missions, B17's and Catalinas fly search as is historical. Morning of June 4, all the B17's and Catalinas launch early, as historical, on search missions. Put up say 20 Wildcats for CAP. Every other fighter pilot is in his cockpit, engine running, as is historical, nothing new except instead of 27 fighters and 37 bombers sitting on the strip, it is 95 or so fighters. PBY sights fleet at 0530, sends radios message in the clear at 0534, as happened historically. A second PBY sights the incoming raid and signals in the clear at 0544 "Many planes headed Midway". US carriers are safely circling together 100 or so miles SE of Midway, away from any search planes Yamato has launched. Midway Radar picked up raid a couple minutes later and began launching all planes at 0552. Historically, Midway runways were empty by 0600 per The First Team. They launched 60+ fighters and bombers in 8 minutes according to The First Team. In my plan, 20 are on CAP, 75 are left on the runway, engines running, pilots in the cockpit. Add a couple minutes if you want to for a few extra fighters (I would think fighters could scramble faster than bombers) Last pilot lifts off at 0605.

Japanese level bombers started attack at 0630, dive bombers at 0634.

That leaves 25 minutes for the 75 fighters to get into position. I would have them broken into type, 22 P36's fly together, CAP would be the 21 Marines, rest of wildcats are together, 21 Buffalos together.

P36's would be first in line, they climb to 20,000 in 7.6 minutes. They can join Marine CAP at 20,000 and jump Japanese as far out as possible. Everyone else assemble over the field and attack when bombers are in sight.

21 Wildcats and 22 P36's jump Zeros at 40 miles out, that should be plausible. Zeros stay and fight, they have no radios, should think that this is all of Midways fighters, its a reasonable assumption on their part. They get separated from bombers and the 32 Wildcats and 21 buffalos give the now unescorted 72 Japanese bombers a warm welcome starting just out of flak range and stay with them as long as they want, unmolested by 36 Zeros who are busy about 40 miles away with 43 US fighters.

US carriers circle comfortably 100 miles SE of Midway, waiting for Midway to thin out Japanese planes and pilots with 100 percent of her fighters and bombers intact and undetected, waiting for the proper time to do a counter strike.

As far as cracking the codes: The US did crack the codes, they were so confident in the cracked codes they deployed 3 carriers, and reinforced Midway with a bunch of fighters and bombers and parked the 3 carriers in the middle of nowhere and ALL the planes on Midway on morning of June 4 were in the cockpit with the engine running! That is pretty dang confident!!

So what if the US was wrong? Leave the P36's, fly the Wildcats back to the carrier and head back to Pearl Harbor.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 29, 2017)

As far as I can figure the P-36s at Pearl were P-36A's with one .50 cal and one .30 cal in the cowl. The .50 cal had 200 rounds.
I have no idea what shape the engines were in. R-1830s were good for 300-350hrs in initial airline service or over 400 with experienced operators. Large airlines could get 550-650 hours between overhauls on later overhauls. 

I have no idea what the USAAC was getting but with the timeline proposed it pretty much grab whatever P-36s are in good shape, do a quick fix on a few more, fit some seat armor and _perhaps _try to fit a 2nd .50 in place of the .30 cal. 

Next you need pilots and here again there are road blocks. Using green pilots isn't going to give very good results and the Army is unlikely to send predominately experienced pilots with 2nd rate aircraft to Midway while keeping the green pilots with the 1st rate aircraft to protect Pearl *IF *this plan goes pear shaped. b

I also have serious reservations about the lack of Japanese submarines and flying boats operating to the south east of Midway. It may have historically accurate but it was a less that stellar move by the Japanese. Perhaps they thought that the discovery of recon forces would tip their hand (not knowing the codes were broken) but going into a battle/invasion with NO recon assets along your enemies main line of supply/communications seems a bit lacking in military brilliance. 
It seems this is hindsight generalship as depending on the Japanese to do this _before _the battle is a serious risk.


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## Greg Boeser (Jul 29, 2017)

The Japanese had intended to use flying boats to scout Midway and environs, but USN caught wind of plan and parked their own seaplane tender in French Frigate Shoals, the intended refueling point, thus blocking the Japanese plan.


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## pinsog (Jul 30, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> As far as I can figure the P-36s at Pearl were P-36A's with one .50 cal and one .30 cal in the cowl. The .50 cal had 200 rounds.
> I have no idea what shape the engines were in. R-1830s were good for 300-350hrs in initial airline service or over 400 with experienced operators. Large airlines could get 550-650 hours between overhauls on later overhauls.
> 
> I have no idea what the USAAC was getting but with the timeline proposed it pretty much grab whatever P-36s are in good shape, do a quick fix on a few more, fit some seat armor and _perhaps _try to fit a 2nd .50 in place of the .30 cal.
> ...



On the P36's: exactly. I agree. 22 were said to be airworthy, I don't know what shape that means they were in. We agree completely that if 2 50's can be fit, fine, if not then they go with 1 30 and 1 50, fit seat armor and send them. None of us know what pilots are at Pearl Harbor to fly them. Again I would like to remind everyone that the US had many high time pilots that hadn't seen combat, Jimmy Thach being one of them. These same Army, Navy and Marine pilots I would commit to battle here are the same ones that saw combat here or at Guadalcanal and fought the Zero to a 1 to 1 kill ratio. 

Please don't forget, there would be 46 extra Wildcats also, flown by the same men who fought the Zero at Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal. 

Why bring the P36's at all? Because they can help. A Zero can't lock down on a Wildcat if a P36 is behind him shooting or he risks getting shot down himself. Is it perfect? No. Is it superior? No. But we didn't really have anything that was before the Hellcat, Corsair and Lighting finally began to arrive. I mean, they used 21 Buffalos at Midway. That should tell us that they were already scrapping the bottom of the barrel. Who here would choose a Buffalo over a P36? I bet every pilot at Midway in a Buffalo would have traded in an instant if offered.

I also understand that the P36 is not the perfect fighter, but if we try to play this out historically, it is all thats available besides more F4F's. If we can't beat them at quality of plane and experience of pilots, at least try to outnumber them. As Stalin said "quantity has a quality all its own". I would consider the P36 to be, essentially, almost the exact same as a KI43 in climb, turn, speed and firepower. Is it perfect, no, but how many Hurricanes, Spitfires, P39's, P40's etc fall to the 1 50 and 1 30 of the KI43? 

Greg Boeser is correct that broken codes allowed a seaplane tender and a destroyer or 2 to be parked at French Frigate Shoals where the Japanese intended for a submarine to meet up and refuel a large flying boat so it could recon Pearl Harbor looking for the US carriers.

I agree and understand your thoughts or reservations about no submarines and no aircraft recon by the Japanese and in hind sight (or even foresight) it was stupid and the Japanese paid for it, but it is 100% accurate that they did not recon Midway, SE of Midway or Pearl Harbor with aircraft and they did not get their submarine screen in place in time either. All of the Japanese recon failures are covered in Shattered Sword and they are chalked up by that book as the Japanese having victory disease, as in "recon of this or that (Pearl Harbor and Midway) would be nice, but we can easily win anyway. As I recall from Shattered Sword, many of the lower ranking Japanese officers questioned these decisions and others, but lower ranking officers questioning the actions of high ranking officers was something not done in the WW2 Japanese Navy. 

As you guys question parts of the plan and I clarify certain things, does the plan now appear more reasonable to you? 

Would you agree that a submarine could be anywhere, and if spotted, the 3 US carriers would be better off with Midway between them and 4 Japanese carriers as an unsinkable radar picket and fighter base?

Understand that I don't expect 21 Wildcats and 22 P36's to shoot down 36 Zeros without loss. What I do expect is that, with an altitude advantage, a diving first pass from 21 Wildcats should bring down a few Zeros and scatter and disorient the Zeros. P36's are extremely close to the Zero in climb, turn etc, gaining ground as the altitude gets lower (below 15,000 feet would be best for the P36) while retaining the high rate of roll at high speed so diving and rolling to evade the Zero would work for the P36 to disengage (P36 said to outturn a KI43 above 180 to 200 mph), or to drag the Zeros down lower where the P36 could match or some say, exceed the Zero. THE MAIN GOAL HERE IS TO TIE UP THE ZERO ESCORT, just split it away from the 72 bombers, if that is accomplished, then you now have 36 Kates and 36 Vals facing 21 Buffalos and 32 Wildcats with no escorts.


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## pinsog (Jul 30, 2017)

I have been hammered quite continuously for wanting to commit 22 AAF pilots in P36's and an extra 46 Wildcat pilots to Midway island because the we have no idea of the training of the AAF pilots and most of the Wildcat pilots haven't fought Zeros yet (although I did say that I would retain all unwounded Yorktown and Lexington pilots that weren't assigned to Yorktown to man these planes)

Lets look at what was deployed historically just to see how bad my plan is to use P36's with pilots of unknown quality:

21 Buffalos with green pilots. I understand the Buffalo model used at Midway was unable to do a loop. Not sure if that is true

11 Vindicator dive bombers with pilots so green that they couldn't even dive bomb, they had to glide bomb.

16 Dauntless dive bombers with pilots so green they had to glide bomb instead of dive bomb

41 Devastator torpedo planes divided into 3 groups with a grand total between all of them of 4 Wildcat fighter escorts (John Thach escort)

Who here would pick any one of these planes over a P36?

Honorable mention:

6 Avenger torpedo planes, unescorted

4 B26's, unescorted, at least they were fast but were piled on by huge numbers of Zeros (back to the numbers help)

The US won the battle, losing Yorktown and a lot of planes, pilots and crew. If the US Carriers had been spotted by submarine sometime before the morning of June 4th in time for the Japanese to launch their first morning strike with torpedo armed Kates, I believe they would have lost all 3 on the first Japanese strike. The Midway bombers accomplished no hits during the battle, they were simply tossed into a meat grinder, at least a P36 if in good shape was on close to equal footing or equal footing with a Zero, especially at low altitude. I believe if replaced by fighters and fought as I have described, the Yorktown would not have been lost.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 30, 2017)

pinsog said:


> I have been hammered quite continuously for wanting to commit 22 AAF pilots in P36's and an extra 46 Wildcat pilots to Midway island because the we have no idea of the training of the AAF pilots and most of the Wildcat pilots haven't fought Zeros yet (although I did say that I would retain all unwounded Yorktown and Lexington pilots that weren't assigned to Yorktown to man these planes)
> 
> Lets look at what was deployed historically just to see how bad my plan is to use P36's with pilots of unknown quality:
> 
> ...



You are operating with hindsight. 

You _know_ the Devastators, Vindicators, etc won't score hits and so can be replaced without affecting the outcome. That was unknown at the time and since the _goal _was to sink Japanese ships (which P-36s and Wildcats won't do) stripping down the american _strike force _is going to be a hard decision_. _

P-36 is a more limited plane than you seem to believe. Yes it is pretty good at low altitude but it sucks at high altitude, high being relative. that 3900fpm climb fades to 3000fpm at 10,000ft and is down to 2200fpm at 15,000ft. 
It also is rather short ranged for combat duties. It only carries 105 US gallons when loaded for combat. the 57 gal tank behind the seat was for ferrying. The center of gravity was out of wack when filled and combat maneuvers were dangerous. There is also no quick way to dump to the fuel (unlike drop tanks).
It might have had some use as the last aerial line of defense before the AA guns but sending it out over water as the first interceptor? 

As to the pilots, which is it? the good pilots used at Guadalcanal, or the poor pilots used in the strike aircraft? The US had dozens of high time fighter pilots unused at Midway but were using green, barely trained strike pilots? 


The idea of putting the carriers to the north east of Midway was to put them where the Japanese were less likely to look for them. Putting them behind Midway is putting them where the Japanese are most likely to look for them. You have the advantage of knowing the Japanese did not look which as you noted, was a mistake even junior Japanese officers commented on. For the American commanders to put the carriers there without knowing the Japanese mistakes ahead of time would be foolish.


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## pinsog (Jul 30, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> You are operating with hindsight.
> 
> You _know_ the Devastators, Vindicators, etc won't score hits and so can be replaced without affecting the outcome. That was unknown at the time and since the _goal _was to sink Japanese ships (which P-36s and Wildcats won't do) stripping down the american _strike force _is going to be a hard decision_. _
> 
> ...



Good points, let me explain my thinking. As I have stated earlier, I am trying to do this without using hindsight, although it is difficult NOT to sometimes.

I have left the B17's at Midway and all the torpedo planes on the carriers even though none of them scored hits. B17's would be great for scouting of the Japanese battle group after initial sighting, being infinitely more survivable than a PBY.

At the time, for some reason, they expected the Japanese fleet to appear almost exactly where it came from, I believe it was because the Japanese fleet followed a storm front passing through, I'm not sure if there was any other reason. If they know where the Japanese fleet is coming from, and they did, or at least they guessed it right, then to me, the best place for our carriers is exact opposite of them on the other side of Midway Island with Midway full of fighters, and having radar. Any Japanese scout planes would have to fly over or around Midway, skirting Midways radar (which I doubt the Japanese knew about and probably didn't know its capability anyway). SO, in a straight line, you have Japanese fleet NW of Midway, then Midway full of fighters, and then SE of Midway you have the US carriers. Draw a radar circle around Midway that Japanese recon planes would have to avoid because it would be being patrolled by Wildcats, or long range Buffalos might be better. That gives a large area that should be free of Japanese recon planes, and this is without hindsight. Also, if any Japanese recon planes did skirt Midway, get around Midways radar coverage and into the carriers radar coverage, then if the carrier Wildcats intercepted them and shot them down, the Japanese would assume either, they just disappeared or that Midway fighters found them. They had no reason to suspect US carriers in that area, because they didn't know their code was broken.

During the Guadalcanal/Solomons campaign, the Japanese determined where the US carriers were just by which search planes didn't return. The search planes never radioed in, but when 1 or 2 or 3 that were close to each other on the search grid failed to return, the Japanese rightly assumed that they were downed by carrier CAP and determined correctly that US carriers were there. Any search planes that had to fly near Midway to find carriers on opposite side that disappeared, without getting off a message, would be assumed to have been lost to Midway CAP, they would not automatically assume US carriers got them. Does that make sense to you that no hindsight was needed to see this is a benefit?

Can we agree that no one knows when and where a Japanese sub could be and we were just lucky that none saw the carriers where they went and none happened to be where I would send them either?

There is no reason our carriers should ever be spotted if they are SE, but that could not have been known to them back then. Would you agree that IF the US carriers were spotted, the Japanese raid having to pass Midway with radar and 95 fighters, 100 miles (or you pick how far away US carriers are from Midway, I'm flexible on that) or so before US carriers would
1. let the 95 Midway fighters thin out the raid in a long running battle
2. allow US carriers to get every single Wildcat aloft and at proper altitude (there would be 81 Wildcats as they had not seen battle yet) and maybe even commit Dauntless dive bombers to fleet defense as they did at Coral Sea if needed
3. allow Midway fighters to attack the raid on the way back home again, picking off stragglers and cripples, any bomber flying alone would be an almost sure kill for a Wildcat, P36 or Buffalo. (in the attack that crippled Hornet, Wildcats and even Dauntless's slaughtered the Japanese attackers, most all of them flying back home in ones and two's. Could you imagine if that beaten, broken, shot up group of Japanese planes would have had to overfly Guadalcanal on the way to the US carriers, and then overfly Guadalcanal after they attacked Hornet and Enterprise? Its doubtful Hornet would have been lost and its doubtful any Japanese planes would have survived and gotten back to their carriers)

My thoughts exactly on P36. Re-read how I said I would use them: They would be the first 22 planes on the runway until radar spotted the raid, then they would launch, climb to 20,000 feet meeting with Wildcat CAP, then they would intercept at only 40 miles away from island. Do you feel that 100 gallons is enough for that mission? Maybe put enough fuel in overload tank for takeoff and climb to 20,000? (I'm flexible on that because I don't know)

Also re-read what I said about P36, that it does better lower and it would be best if they could drag Zero escort down below 12,000 feet.

Thank you for your thoughtful reply.


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## pinsog (Jul 30, 2017)

Shortround6, do you know if Midway fighters could take off 2 planes side by side at a time? How long between take offs? 10 seconds? 15? 20? 30?


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## Greg Boeser (Jul 30, 2017)

One of the few successes of the Midway based F2As was the destruction of an H8K1 on 10 Mar '42. This a/c had been sent to photograph the US defenses on the island. The Japanese did not follow up, losing their chance to obtain much vital info. Victory disease.
USN base defense plans did not intend such island outposts as Guam, Wake, Midway or Palmyra to be major staging bases, but rather lightly held points to scout the enemy movements and dispositions. That Nimitz chose to meet the Japanese at Midway was based on the intel breakthrough that allowed him to get a jump on their plans. 
Reading the development of the early operations one gets the feel of the Japanese impatience to bring the American fleet to battle to eradicate it so they could solidify their gains. Although there is often a sense that the Japanese were unstoppable up until the defeat at Midway, in fact, each delay inflicted on the Japanese timetable increased the odds in the Allies favor. 
Wake Island tied up forces for two weeks, the Central Pacific carrier raids did distract the Japanese high command and caused the diversion of precious resources to chase after the carriers. The Lea - Salamua raid of 10 Mar '42 sank vital shipping needed to secure New Guinea and isolate Australia, pushing back the timetable for the occupation of Port Moresby a whole month. American carriers at Coral Sea succeeded in turning back the invasion fleet. These delays were the impetus for the whole Midway operation.


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## pinsog (Jul 30, 2017)

Well put Greg Boeser. I was unaware of the H8K1 shot down by Buffalos. Locating and destroying long range recon planes might have been a good job for the Buffalo until the P38 arrived.


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## Greg Boeser (Jul 30, 2017)

You have to look long and hard to find highlights of the F2A in US service.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 30, 2017)

Greg Boeser said:


> You have to look long and hard to find highlights of the F2A in US service.



In part because the F2A actually equipped so few units in US Service after Dec 1941. I believe there was only one carrier borne squadron as of Dec 1941 and it was sent ashore in either Jan or Feb of 1942? They were then given to the Marines or sent to training schools. Marines only deployed them to Midway or used them at Pearl outside the Continental US. 

There is also a bit of argument/confusion about "long range" F2As,. Only the F2A-3 had the extra tankage. Sources differ as to the reason. Only the new tanks in US service with fitted with self-sealing. The old 160 gallon tanks were not. Any "long range" F2A-3 that got a few 7.7mm holes in the old tanks was in serious trouble if on the outer reaches of a long range patrol. AHT claims one old wing tank was sealed and stenciled with a warning about only being fillers under orders of the squadron commander?


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## GregP (Jul 31, 2017)

Hey Pinsog,

You have a solid plan and the naysayers think modern, use hindsight, aren't in command, ... AND ... it's a what-if.

All this conspires to make for no absolutely correct answer. I'd say your plan is better than what was used, with no guarantee it would be better, but no real way to be worse that what happened.

That means it's a decent plan with no guarantee of greater success, and almost no chance of worse results. The result would be up to the beholder. I'd say it would be better; by how much? I can't say. I'd try it.


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## pinsog (Jul 31, 2017)

GregP said:


> Hey Pinsog,
> 
> You have a solid plan and the naysayers think modern, use hindsight, aren't in command, ... AND ... it's a what-if.
> 
> ...



Thank you for the support GregP. 

Do you know how much time they would need on Midway between fighters taking off? 10 seconds? 15? 20? 30?

Could they take off side by side or just 1 at a time?


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## GregP (Jul 31, 2017)

I'd think they could take off in echelon 2 at a time about every 30 seconds or so, but that would assume perfect pilots and no traffic snarls. It would probably be something like an average of every 45 seconds or so.

I've taken off in echelon before in a Cessna and it's not difficult, but I also had a great view over the nose. Maybe it would be one at a time. At our annual airshow, we have a squadron of nine RV-4's that take off three at a time, and they have no trouble. But they also have an order of magnitude better visibility than most WWII fighters!

So, it might come down to 1 at a time. I am not acquainted with formation takeoff training early in the war. It might have been non-existent.


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## Greg Boeser (Jul 31, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> In part because the F2A actually equipped so few units in US Service after Dec 1941. I believe there was only one carrier borne squadron as of Dec 1941 and it was sent ashore in either Jan or Feb of 1942? They were then given to the Marines or sent to training schools. Marines only deployed them to Midway or used them at Pearl outside the Continental US.
> 
> There is also a bit of argument/confusion about "long range" F2As,. Only the F2A-3 had the extra tankage. Sources differ as to the reason. Only the new tanks in US service with fitted with self-sealing. The old 160 gallon tanks were not. Any "long range" F2A-3 that got a few 7.7mm holes in the old tanks was in serious trouble if on the outer reaches of a long range patrol. AHT claims one old wing tank was sealed and stenciled with a warning about only being fillers under orders of the squadron commander?



The only other action of note is a pair of _Lexington_ F2As that assisted in attacking a Japanese sub in January. A few days later a sub put a torpedo in the _Saratoga_, taking it out of action until after Midway. Interestingly, the lack of a flight deck allowed the USN to shuffle its spare carrier squadrons between the serviceable carriers, keeping them in the game at full strength.


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## Shortround6 (Jul 31, 2017)

Greg Boeser said:


> The only other action of note is a pair of _Lexington_ F2As that assisted in attacking a Japanese sub in January. A few days later a sub put a torpedo in the _Saratoga_, taking it out of action until after Midway. Interestingly, the lack of a flight deck allowed the USN to shuffle its spare carrier squadrons between the serviceable carriers, keeping them in the game at full strength.



From AHT, 
Dec 31st 1941, the US has one F2A-1 and one XF2A-2 at Norfolk. 49 F2A-2s (three at San Diago, seven at Miami, others scattered, and 107 F2A-3s (five at San Diago, 37 at New York, 19 with VF-2 on Lexington, 14 with VMF-221 at Midway, seven at Pearl harbor, seven with jeep carrier Long Island, eight at Miami, three at Cape May New Jersey and the rest scattered. 

Jan 3 42- The F2As of VF-2 land at Ewa in Hawaii.
Jan 7 42- The F2As are back on the Lexington.
Jan 27 42 VF-2 FwA-3 planes go back to MCAS Ewa Hawaii where all eighteen (one missing?) are transferred to VMF-221, VF-2 gets F4F-3A Wildcats. 
Mar 42, ten US marine F2A-3s are sent to the island of Kauai and stay there until after Midway.
April 14 42. 14 F2A-s of Marine VMF-221 fly off Lexington to Palmyra Island. 
May 31 42 VMF 221 at Midway has received 7 additional F2A-3s and 7 F4F-3 Wildcats.


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## Greg Boeser (Aug 1, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> From AHT,
> 
> April 14 42. 14 F2A-s of Marine VMF-221 fly off Lexington to Palmyra Island.


I believe that was VMF 211, built up from the rear echelon left at Ewa after Major Putnam took the forward echelon to Wake Island.


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## Shortround6 (Aug 1, 2017)

Greg Boeser said:


> I believe that was VMF 211, built up from the rear echelon left at Ewa after Major Putnam took the forward echelon to Wake Island.


You are correct, I mistyped.


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