# Bomber Losses: USAAF vs RAF



## Marshall_Stack (May 20, 2009)

I have read that the British were trying to convince the USAAF to give up daylight precision raids due to the high losses incurred by the Germans. In looking at the high losses that the RAF suffered, their operations didn't look much better. Am I missing something?


----------



## BombTaxi (May 20, 2009)

Marshall_Stack said:


> I have read that the British were trying to convince the USAAF to give up daylight precision raids due to the high losses incurred by the Germans. In looking at the high losses that the RAF suffered, their operations didn't look much better. Am I missing something?



Yes and no. The RAF tried high-altitude daylight precision bombing with Fortess I's (B-17C) in early 1941. These raids were carried out unescorted at 30,000ft, and were disastrous - not just because of combat losses, but because the aircraft really weren't up to the task and the crews were not trained or equipped for high-altitude work. Ironically, the USAAF had told the British that the B-17C was not sufficiently well-armed for unescorted bombing over Europe, and they were dead right. When the B-17E and -F came along, the USAAF promptly ignored it's own advice in 1942 and Schweinfurt ensued. At this point, the RAF were really getting into heavy night bombing assaults and were probably taking fewer casualties per mission than the USAAF. However, the introduction of long range US escorts would have reduced the risks of daylight raiding at a time when rapidly developing German technology was making night bombing an increasingly dangerous activity. 

In all, it's probably fair to say that at a certain point in 1942, the British had a point - but changes in technology from 1943 onwards reduced the advantages enjoyed by the night bombers and increased the security of US daylight raids, making the RAF argument irrelevant.


----------



## Erich (May 20, 2009)

it would be good to do a comparison study of the ETO USAF bomber vs Bomber Command losses for a true picture year by year.

small notation the German Luftwaffe night fighter arm shot down some 7100 plus Bomber Command bombers during the war


----------



## Vincenzo (May 20, 2009)

for losses
Bomber Command's Losses

Army Air Forces in World War II


----------



## Glider (May 21, 2009)

Erich said:


> it would be good to do a comparison study of the ETO USAF bomber vs Bomber Command losses for a true picture year by year.
> 
> small notation the German Luftwaffe night fighter arm shot down some 7100 plus Bomber Command bombers during the war



On one of the earlier threads which I cannot identify, one member did a very detailed analysis of loss ratios by day and by night. To all intents and purposes the Lancaster and the B24 had exactly the same loss ratios by day and night whereas the B17 had a slightly better loss ratio.


----------



## Soundbreaker Welch? (May 21, 2009)

That means 71,000 airmen were downed by nightfighters alone! 

Incredible losses indeed, and I'm sure took quite a toll on the airmen. I'm suprised morale remained so good in the RAF, but I suppose flying by night in an aircraft beats huddling in the mud of the trenchs in WWI.


----------



## Glider (May 21, 2009)

Soundbreaker Welch? said:


> That means 710,00 airmen were downed by nightfighters alone!
> 
> Incredible losses indeed, and I'm sure took quite a toll on the airmen. I'm suprised morale remained so good in the RAF, but I suppose flying by night in an aircraft beats huddling in the mud of the trenchs in WWI.



Not quite. The Bomber Command Diaries give the crew losses as follows

Aircrew 
Killed in action or died whilst POW - 47,268
Killed in flying or ground accidents - 8,195
Killed in action on Ground - 37

Total - 55,500

POW 8,403

Aircraft Losses 8,953 of which 7,953 were lost at night. 
What the split is between NF/Flak/Accidents over enemy airspace I do not know but 7,100 just to NF seems on the high side as 1,000 were lost in daylight raids

Lancaster 3,431 (2.02%)
Halifax 1,884 (2.28%)
Wellington 1,386 (2.92%)
Mosquito 260 (0.65%)
Sterling 625 (3.39%)
Hampden 424 (2.56%)
Blenhiem 442 (3.62%)
Whitley 317 (3.22%)
Boston 42 (2.61%)
Fortress 14 (1.04%)
Manchester 64 (5.04%)
Ventura 39 (3.91%)
Liberator 3 (0.45%)
Others 22


----------



## davebender (May 21, 2009)

> suprised morale remained so good in the RAF


It's my understanding that morale wasn't terribly good among heavy bomber crews. Switzerland had dozens of Allied heavy bombers parked on airfields by the end of the war. Some of them landed on purpose to opt out of the war.


----------



## Waynos (May 21, 2009)

davebender said:


> It's my understanding that morale wasn't terribly good among heavy bomber crews. Switzerland had dozens of Allied heavy bombers parked on airfields by the end of the war. Some of them landed on purpose to opt out of the war.



It would be fascinating to see more info on that if you have it

Reactions: Dislike Dislike:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Glider (May 21, 2009)

I would also be interested to see any info you may have on that line.


----------



## TheMustangRider (May 21, 2009)

The stories I have read regarding bombers landing in Switzerland are those when the bombers were extremely damaged by flack or German fighters and the crew knew it was quite impossible to make it back to Britain so they decided to try landing in Switzerland instead of landing in Germany.


----------



## Erich (May 21, 2009)

the 7100 plus is confirmed through documentation


----------



## Soundbreaker Welch? (May 21, 2009)

On the Army Air Force site it says the USAAF lost 5,548 heavy bombers. To tell the truth, I thought the total would have been higher. Still heavy losses, since roughly 55,000 US airmen were lost over Europe. It's probably less since many USAAF bombers didn't have 10 crew members, only 9.

If that is how many bombers the USAAF lost including both B-17's and B-24's, then their losses were actually quite lower than the RAF night bombers, which was 10,000 night bombers lost. 

Which can present the argument that in the end, strategic bombing paid off.


----------



## Amsel (May 21, 2009)

You bet it payed off. The steady bombing of the refineries and the interference of Germany's logistics shortened the war considerably.


----------



## HerrKaleut (May 21, 2009)

The RAF tried daylight and got hammered, the Luftwaffe tried it ..same result so when the USAAF decided to have a go, someone was missing something somewhere.!!


----------



## BombTaxi (May 21, 2009)

Bear in mind that those Bomber Command losses are not just for night bombers. All of the Boston and Ventura losses, many of the Mossie, Blenheim and Fortess losses, and a proportion of the Wellington losses would have been incurred in daylight - the Boston and Ventura were used exclusively by the light bomber groups in daylight tactical ops, in which role they largely replaced the Blenheim. Bear in mind also that Bomber Command was taking losses for over two years before the US entred the European war. Most of the Wellington, Hampden, Whitley, Blenheim, Stirling, Fortress and Manchester losses would have been incurred before the US even declared war, never mind before they started boming Europe.This goes some way to explaining the seeimingly huge disparity in losses.

The strategic bombing campaingn did much to shorten the war, but it would have been far less sucessful had it not been 'round-the-clock'. The daylight and night strategies both had strengths and weaknesses - daylight was more accurate but more susceptible to massed fighter attack, while night bombers were harder to intercept, but incapable of hitting anything smaller than a city.


----------



## Watanbe (May 22, 2009)

There isn't a whole lot a RAF bomber can do against a radar operated NF it can't even see. The Germans had a considerable NF force that was well equipped and organised. The bombers best defense was to confuse them. Even RAF NF Mossies and Beau's were to little in number to provide adequate defence!


----------



## Glider (May 22, 2009)

Watanbe said:


> There isn't a whole lot a RAF bomber can do against a radar operated NF it can't even see. The Germans had a considerable NF force that was well equipped and organised. The bombers best defense was to confuse them. Even RAF NF Mossies and Beau's were to little in number to provide adequate defence!



Clearly the British NF were not able to stop the attacks that was impossible but my understanding was that the German NF's were very concerned about the Mosquito NF's over Germany. Considering they were on their own without any ground control the British NF's did pretty well. The best that I have heard about was on Mosquito that shot down four German NF's in one night.


----------



## BombTaxi (May 22, 2009)

The bomber stream concept does not lend itself to dedicated escorts in any case. The best defense that can be provided for it is to have friendly NFs roaming the stream area hoping to catch an enemy NF. Hardly the most sophisticated system, but better than nothing, I suppose...


----------



## Glider (May 22, 2009)

The British did have an organised plan for the defence of the bombers. In brief there were three levels of support:-
1) Protecting the bomber stream
Each NF fighter had a patrol area either side of the bomber stream at differing heights. This patrol area was almost sacrosanct and could only be left if they had a firm contact with a German fighter. When their period on the patrol line was up, normally because the stream was due to have passed the area, then and only then could they go freelancing.
2) Intruders
These tended to be MkVI Mosquito's without radar who would target known NF Bases or Beacons. Freelancing NF's often took up this action on their own initiative
3) Decoy's
Some mosquito's would try to decoy the enemy fighters into attacking them and for obvious reasons, this wasn't very popular. There was a period when the British used a tail warning radar 'Monica' which the Germans soon turned by designing equipment to home in on the radar pulses. Monica was fitted in some Mossie NF's to lure the Germans into a trap.

Wilhelm Johnen a German NF Ace wrote about the Mosquito's in his book _Duel Under the Stars _one chapter is entitiled 'Auchting I Mosquito'

Fast Moquito's were despatched to join the bomber stream and take over the task of air cover. The Mosquito's lived up to their name. They were the nightfighters greratest plague and wrecked havoc among the German crews. The radar equipment of this wodden aircraft surpassed everything that had previously been seen.... 
It was incredibly difficult to get a bomber in our sights as the Mosquito's sought us out and led like rockets to the aid of the bomber. Not only had we the enemy in front of us but on our backs as well. All this was a great strain on the German crews, the losses rose appalingly....
The Mosquito's not only pursued us in the bomber stream but waited for us as we took off from our airfields. They attacked us throughout the whole operation and interfered with our landing. It was almost a daily occurrence that shortly before divisional ops several mosquito's would fly over the airfields and shoot down the Messerschmitts as they took off.

I should add here that I don't have the book 'Duel Under the Stars' its on order and that these quotes are from another book so some caution should be taken, but the general feeling is clear i.e. that the German NF's didn't have it all their own way and the RAF escort plans were pretty effective.


----------



## parsifal (May 22, 2009)

A link on losses and other statistics

NOTE Best viewed with screen realization 1024 x 768,

With regard to losses in the Night bomber offensive, it was not possible to escort bombers in the sense of the US concept, however German aircraft losses were still extremely heavy. This is a facet of the fighting seldom reported, because it is not "sexy". Many German aircraft were lost in landing accidents, many to the intruder squadrons, that circled German airfields, to pick off German fighters as they landed and took off. Many more were destroyed by Radar equipped Mosquitos using Serrate and other technological advances. Basic tactics were for the Mossies to join the Bomber stream and act as "bait for the pursuing German NFs. Serrate would lock onto their AI. At about 1000 yds range, the Mosquito would execute a tight turn, pulling into the Germans Radar shadow (German radar did not have as wide a search arc as the later Mosquitos), There would be a few seconds of blackness for both aircraft, but if the manouvre was successful, the Mosquito would reappear on the tail of the German, with only the tail gunner now to protect the German. 

One of the biggest reasons for British losses was their stubborn use of active radar as navigational and rear ward scanning technologies. This was an unmitigated disaster, which the LW capitlized on very effectively Their passive radar homing devices could pick up a British bomber fromover 100 miles. By using active means, the Britis had committed the mortal sin in night fighting....revelaing the position of their bombers. It was akin to two men each with a knife fighting in the dark....one turns the torch on to try and see bertter, he immediately become a target. This is what happened to British Bomber again and again 

I would saythat the war in the air at night was a war fought in large measure as a technical race, with one side, than the other gaining the advantage. But as a broad (and dangerous) generalization, I would say thsat from July 1944 onward, with the release of later marks of AI in Mosquito squadrons to the escort/intruder functions that the Allies finally started to get the upper hand in the Night Bombing offensive


----------



## Kiwikid (May 22, 2009)

What bugs me is that U-boats had radar detectors called Tunis and later Naxos to warn them of danger from aircraft with radar.

Why couldn't bomber crews be equipped with similar for German night fighter radar frequencies ?


----------



## BombTaxi (May 23, 2009)

Kiwikid said:


> What bugs me is that U-boats had radar detectors called Tunis and later Naxos to warn them of danger from aircraft with radar.
> 
> Why couldn't bomber crews be equipped with similar for German night fighter radar frequencies ?



Although I am quite probably wrong about this, I suspect that production priorities were a major force here. The production of other systems like AI and ASV radar, H2S and Monica probably stretched British production needs to the limits. This means that although the technology was probably available, it just wasn't feasible to build and issue it on the scale Bomber Command required


----------



## red admiral (May 23, 2009)

There were passive devices fitted to detect German radar transmissions but they weren't present on most bombers. Everything like this adds weight and with constantly changing radar frequencies goes out of date quickly.

Active radar like H2S acts as a beacon for German nightfighters, but without it navigation is massively harder. It was felt the increase in the effectiveness outweighed the losses incurred.

There's a book on the history of 100 Group engaged in bomber support operations that has lots of detail on this subject.


----------



## parsifal (May 23, 2009)

H2S and Monica radars were not critical to finding the targets, and in the case of H2S it was manifestly mis-used. The most critical item to bombing accuracy was Oboe, which did not compromise the position of the aircraft nearly as much. However, it was felt by the brass in England that the bombers needed the ability to guide themselves onto the target (with Oboe they were told by a ground station when to bomb, after the target had been "marked" by an Oboe equipped Mosquito pathfinder). They allowed the bombers the ability to "self navigation though H2S, which was in effect, a terrain following radar. In any case H2S was suffered from a large "circular error" (a term used by Gunstan) that was many times greater than Oboe, so even though it was an aid to navigation and target acquisition, it was not critical .

Monica was a rearward warning radar (or RWR) that unfortunately merely acted as a beacon for the searching German Night Fighters. Monica had absolutely nothing to do with navigational or bombing accuracy, but as in the case of H2S was kept on board and used at the insistance by the brass to use them. They increased the RAF loss rates needlessly and massively. H2S was useful, but it should only have been used sparingly (perhaps switching the thing on for a few minutes as the bomber approached the target, to confirm for the crews that they were in the correct location) , and not left on for nearly the entire flight, which simply gave the Germans another radar signature to plot the bombers position. Monica was a backward step in my opinion, and gave little, if any, safety to the Bombers, and vastly simplified the German problem of finding the bombers. Its one of those quirks of victory that its disastrous effects appear to have been suppressed or at least forgotten after the war....a case of history re-written almost. I suspect to protect the reputation of people like Harris.....


----------



## parsifal (May 23, 2009)

Wiki has some very good articles that provide a good starting point into understanding the bewildering array of aids used by the RAF in their offensives against Germany

*Oboe (and why it was developed into G-H)*

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oboe_(navigation)

“_Oboe used two stations at different and well-separated locations in England to transmit a signal to a Mosquito Pathfinder bomber carrying a radio transponder. The transponder reflected the signals, which were then received by the two stations. The round-trip time of each signal gave the distance to the bomber.

Each Oboe station used the radio ranging to define a circle of specific radius, with the intersection of the two circles pinpointing the target. The Mosquito flew along the circumference of the circle defined by one station, known as the "Cat", and dropped its load (either bombs, or marking flares, depending on the mission) when it reached the intersection with the circle defined by another station, known as "Mouse". There was a network of Oboe stations over southern England, and any of the stations could be operated as a Cat or a Mouse as the need demanded.
The initial "Mark I" Oboe was derived from Chain Home Low technology, operating at 1.5 meters / 200 MHz. The two stations emitted a series of pulses at a rate of about 133 times per second. The pulse width could be made short or long so that it was received by the aircraft as a Morse code dot or dash. The Cat station sent continuous dots if the aircraft was too close and continuous dashes if the aircraft was too far, and from these the pilot could make the needed course corrections.

Various Morse letters could also be sent, for example to notify the aircraft crew that the Mosquito was within a specific range of the target. The Mouse station sent five dots and a dash to indicate bomb release. The Mouse station included a bombsight computer, known as "Micestro", to determine the proper release time, there being no particular logic in carrying the bombsight on the Mosquito when it was under the control of the ground station.

Along with the range restriction, an earlier system called Oboe, had another limitation: it could only really be used by one aircraft at a time. As a result, the British rethought Oboe, and came up with a new scheme named G-H (also given as "GEE-H") based on exactly the same logic, differing only in that the aircraft carried the transmitter and the ground stations were fitted with the transponder. In this manner, it operated in a similar manner to the currently employed civilian DME system, with the aircraft following a DME arc procedure on one set, whilst using another set (tuned to a different transponder as close to 90 degrees apart as geography permits) to determine the point of bomb release.

Multiple aircraft could use the two stations in parallel because random noise was inserted into the timing of each aircraft's pulse output. The receiving gear on the aircraft could match up the its own unique pulse pattern with that sent back by the transponder. Each receive-reply cycle took the transponder 100 microseconds, allowing it to handle a maximum of 10,000 interrogations per second and making "collisions" unlikely. The practical limit was about 80 aircraft at one time.

The name G-H is confusing, since the scheme was very close to Oboe and not very much like GEE. The name was apparently adopted because G-H used GEE developments, operating on the same range of 15 to 3.5 meters / 20 to 85 MHz. It was about as accurate as Oboe.

G-H was key to Operation Glimmer, a diversionary "attack" during Operation Overlord that distracted and pinned-down German defences at Calais while the real invasion fleet was 200 miles away at Normandy. G-H-equipped bombers of 218 Squadron flew low, in tight circles, dropping Window over radar transponder-equipped small ships, in order to deceive the German radars that they were the main invasion fleet”_

*Gee*

_“GEE entered service in March 1942 and was accurate to about 165 yards (151 m) at short ranges, and up to a mile at longer ranges over Germany. At its extreme range, which was about 400 miles (640 km), it had an accuracy of 2 miles (3.2 km). Unlike the German beam systems where the bombers flew to their targets along the beam, the GEE pulses were radiated in all directions, so even if detected, they would not reveal the bombers' likely destinations. As the system was passive, unlike H2S, there were no return signals which could give away the bombers' positions to night fighters. “_

*G-H (or Gee-H)*

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G-H_(navigation)

_“G-H was a radio navigation system developed by Britain during World War II to aid RAF Bomber Command.
G-H was a two station radio direction finder system. Instruments in the bomber measured its position from one station and distance from another. It could be used by up to 80 bombers from any one pair of stations. By using more than one pair of stations, multiple targets could be attacked at the same time without the aid of pathfinders and markers. Once a major part of Bomber Command was fitted with the technology, G-H became a most useful blind-bombing device.

G-H was used for the first time on the night of October 4/5 1943 when one Mosquito attacked Aachen; the trial was not a success. The second trial was on the night of October 16/17 1943 when nine Mosquitos attacked Dortmund, one was carrying out a G-H trial but its equipment failed and it had to bomb by dead reckoning. It was used for the first time in a large raid on the Mannesmann steel works at Düsseldorf on the night of November 1/2 when about half of the sets failed leaving only 15 aircraft to bomb the factory on G-H

Along with the range restriction, an earlier system called Oboe, had another limitation: it could only really be used by one aircraft at a time. As a result, the British rethought Oboe, and came up with a new scheme named G-H (also given as "GEE-H") based on exactly the same logic, differing only in that the aircraft carried the transmitter and the ground stations were fitted with the transponder. In this manner, it operates in a similar manner to the currently employed civilian DME system, with the aircraft following a DME arc procedure on one set, whilst using another set (tuned to a different transponder as close to 90 degrees apart as geography permits) to determine the point of bomb release.

Multiple aircraft could use the two stations in parallel because random noise was inserted into the timing of each aircraft's pulse output. The receiving gear on the aircraft could match up the its own unique pulse pattern with that sent back by the transponder. Each receive-reply cycle took the transponder 100 microseconds, allowing it to handle a maximum of 10,000 interrogations per second and making "collisions" unlikely. The practical limit was about 80 aircraft at one time.

The name G-H is confusing, since the scheme was very close to Oboe and not very much like GEE. The name was apparently adopted because G-H used GEE developments, operating on the same range of 15 to 3.5 meters / 20 to 85 MHz. It was about as accurate as Oboe.

G-H was key to Operation Glimmer, a diversionary "attack" during Operation Overlord that distracted and pinned-down German defences at Calais while the real invasion fleet was 200 miles away at Normandy. G-H-equipped bombers of 218 Squadron flew low, in tight circles, dropping Window over radar transponder-equipped small ships, in order to deceive the German radars that they were the main invasion fleet”_

*H2S*

H2S radar - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


_"H2S was a radar system used in various British bomber aircraft from 1943 to the 1990s. It was designed to identify targets on the ground for night and all-weather bombing. The early variants of the transmitter/receiver equipment were officially known as TR3159 (H2S Mk I/ASV VIB) or TR3191 (H2S Mk II).

On January 30, 1943, H2S radar was used by RAF bombers for navigation for the first time and so became the first ground mapping radar to be used in combat. Initially it was fitted to Stirling and Halifax bombers and provided ground mapping for navigation and night bombing.

This development using ten-centimeter radar, (actually 9.1 cm) was possible thanks to the development of the cavity magnetron. Later versions of H2S reduced the wavelength, first to 3 cm and then 1.5 cm at which wavelength the system was capable of detecting rain clouds.
On a raid to Cologne on 2/3 February 1943, a Stirling Pathfinder was shot down over the Netherlands. The H2S set it was carrying was damaged but not beyond repair (fortunately for the Germans it was only the second operational use of H2S), and, known as the Rotterdam Gerät, Telefunken was able to reassemble it, with the exception of the PPI display that had been destroyed. Eventually this led to the development of the Naxos radar detector, which enabled Luftwaffe night fighters to home on the transmissions of H2S.]

H2S was vital in the air battle for Berlin, a series of large raids on the German capital and other cities from November 1943 until March 1944. Berlin was out of range of radio navigation aids such as Gee and Oboe and often obscured by cloud in the winter, so at the start of the battle it was hoped that H2S would, by identifying the many lakes and rivers in the city, be a crucial aid to navigation. The H2S sets available at the start of the battle were not able to do so. It was not until after the night of 2 December when the H2S Mark III, which operated on a 3 cm wavelength and could identify open and built up spaces, was successfully used for the first time on operations, that it became possible to bomb Berlin accurately."_


----------



## Jabberwocky (May 24, 2009)

Erich said:


> it would be good to do a comparison study of the ETO USAF bomber vs Bomber Command losses for a true picture year by year.
> 
> small notation the German Luftwaffe night fighter arm shot down some 7100 plus Bomber Command bombers during the war



I know that German night fighters and their operations are your wicket Eric, but I find your contention that night fighters are responsible for "7,100 plus" of the 7,953 Bomber Command night losses (ie 89.2% of BC night bomber losses) a bit hard to swallow.

Particularly when I run into counter facts such as this, from the link that parsifal provided:

"Between July 1942, when detailed analysis started, and May 1945, 5,807 aircraft went missing on night operations. *Of these 2278 (39%) were shot down by fighters, 1318 (23%) by flak and 112 (2%) were lost in collisions.* But in 2069 (36%) cases the cause of loss is not known. Based on these figures the ratio of fighter to flak losses was very roughly 2 to 1. However because of the large number of cases when the cause was not known this ratio can only be a rough estimate."

As the quote acknowledges, these figures can only be a rough estimate, when more than one third of losses are to unknown causes. However, the RAF's own statistical analysis suggests that, even if evey single other night bomber loss was the result of a shoot down by a fighter, the nachtjager could of scored no more than 6,500 kills.

Couple of statistical rundowns:

If we suppose that Nachtjagers accounted for all the percentage of unknown losses, this would put NF kills of night bombers at about 5,950.

If we suppose that, of the unknown losses, they scored three out of every four (another 27% of the total) then this would put total night fighter kills of BC aircraft at about 5,150 of the total. 

If we suppose that night fighters accounted for two out of every three of the unknowns (another 24% of the total), as the quoted analysis suggests, them nacthjager kills perhaps accounted for around 4,550 of the 7,953 total night bomber losses. 

Now, I acknowledge that there were other RAF bombers lost at night, such as Costal Command and 2 TAF Mosquitos operating at night (a total of 565 lost between FC and the 2TAF, according to John Foreman's _Fighter Command War Diaries_), but I doubt 
that these would account for more than 500 aircraft in total.

I also acknowledge that the RAF definately miss-attributed some night fighter kills to flak, particularly schrage musik equipped fighters.

Still, as I said earlier, I think it is highly unlikely that the nachtjagers accounted for almost 90% of total night bomber losses.


----------



## Glider (May 24, 2009)

Going back to the passive radar warning equipment that could be fitted to bombers. One was fitted to RAF heavy bombers callled boozer. It gave warning that there were German NF's in the area by picking up the radar transmissions. However it caused so many pilots to take evasive action and other spoof readings it was quickly taken out of service.

H2S was fundamental in assisting with navigation and therfore the finding of the target.

Other small point that I have found was that NF Mossies were equiped with equipment that could trigger the German NF IFF equipment thereby helping the Mossies to ID the Germans planes in the forest of returns caused by the bomber stream. The germans countered this by switching off their IFF which caused some difficulty to the ground operators who had difficulty finding their own aircraft. Things like this tended to be temporary while new equipment was brought into service but shows how comples the situation was for the Germans.


----------



## parsifal (May 24, 2009)

QUOTE=Glider;503089]Going back to the passive radar warning equipment that could be fitted to bombers. One was fitted to RAF heavy bombers callled boozer. It gave warning that there were German NF's in the area by picking up the radar transmissions. However it caused so many pilots to take evasive action and other spoof readings it was quickly taken out of service.

H2S was fundamental in assisting with navigation and therfore the finding of the target.

Other small point that I have found was that NF Mossies were equiped with equipment that could trigger the German NF IFF equipment thereby helping the Mossies to ID the Germans planes in the forest of returns caused by the bomber stream. The germans countered this by switching off their IFF which caused some difficulty to the ground operators who had difficulty finding their own aircraft. Things like this tended to be temporary while new equipment was brought into service but shows how comples the situation was for the Germans.[/QUOTE]

Hi Glider

I didnt know about the problems with Boozer. As an early warning system it was very popular, since it allowed the bomber to take evasive action before the NF had closed to lethal range. A violent corkscrew in a heavy bpmber must have been a sight to see, but apparently greater chances of surivavl existed by that manouvre than by trying to slug things out with your tail gunner

The biggest issue I have however is with H2S/ It was essential only where the passive aids were not available, ie, at ranges of more than 200mils for Oboe, and 400 for Gee-h. At these lesser ranges the passive systems were far more accurate than H2S.

Gunstan in his book says "As it was this "king of the pack of TRE Devices" (as Rowe put it) was serving as a constantly switched on lighthouse telling the german fighters exactly where their targets were. What made the situation even more ludicrous was, with the availability of Gee and Oboe, providing far more accuracy and far safer to the aircraft using them, that H2S for targets closer than Berlin was serving no purpose".

So whilst it might be true that H2S was critical in the Battle for Berlin, it was completely unneccessary for the Ruhr Targets (and other targets below 400 miles range). It was far more accurate, and safer, to rely on Oboe and/Gee than to use H2S. 

But even this is is not the whole indictment. The use of H2S was also flawed, and given the British knowledge of radar and passive detection systems should never have occurred. H2S should only have been used sparingly, Gunstan suggests for 10 seconds every two minutes. I would suggest it stay off completely until the bomber is within say five minutres of the target. As H2S was a terrain following radar, why was it necessary to keep it on all the time. Both Oboe and Gee could dod the same job eithout disclosing the position of the bomber.

So in summary, H2S was unneccessary for targets below 400 miles, and was far less relaible and accuratethan the passive aids that served alobgside of it. It only became necessary when targets outside the effective range of the passive systems were selected . Which make Berlin as the chief target of 1944 a very strange choice for target. 

The second failure that could be levelled at the British was the way they used H2S, specifically by training aircrew to keep it on continuously, This had a disastrous effect on British Bomber losses


----------



## Bernhart (May 24, 2009)

also need to consider that the british where 2-3 years longer in the war, so makes sense to me they would lose more bombers because of the longer time frame.


----------



## mhuxt (May 24, 2009)

"I think I read somewhere" that BC crews believed H2S foxed German radar. Can't recall where I read that though.

For me the big missed opportunity was the decision not to develop the Oboe repeater system. It was tested in action before the Battle of Berlin, but the view of the time amongst their Airships was that H2S would be sufficient to do the job, especially given the limited number of boffins available.


----------



## Glider (May 24, 2009)

> The second failure that could be levelled at the British was the way they used H2S, specifically by training aircrew to keep it on continuously, This had a disastrous effect on British Bomber losses



Parsifal
I agree with almost everything in your posting, I only deleted it to save space. The only bit I would comment on is the last sentance. Once the RAF knew that the Germans were on to them they did encourage the crews to use H2S as little as possible but the was little that could be done to stop the crews 'checking' their position. Generally there was a greater fear in the crews of Flak as opposed to NF which they felt they had more control over and a lot of planes were shot down by Flak because they wandered into flak areas.
To a degree this was countered by the latter versions of H2S having a feature that highlighted a NF if there was one in the area. Right now I cannot remember the name of this feature but will dig around and see what I can find. At least it gave some warning if a NF had homed on to them.

In one of the books I read there was a comment about the overconfidence in the bomber crews and their ability to handle NF's. You are probably aware that you could fit three people in a Beaufighter. One of the squadrons used to take bomber squadron leaders up and intercept bombers on their way home. This had some risk as any bomber seeing twin engined aircraft approaching at night would shoot first and worry about questions later. Time and again they took people up and were never seen. In the end Bomber Command asked them to stop doing this as it was bad for the morale of the bomber crews.


----------



## Watanbe (May 24, 2009)

Glider said:


> Clearly the British NF were not able to stop the attacks that was impossible but my understanding was that the German NF's were very concerned about the Mosquito NF's over Germany. Considering they were on their own without any ground control the British NF's did pretty well. The best that I have heard about was on Mosquito that shot down four German NF's in one night.



Yes the Mossie NF's did do very well over Germany and the German NF's were definitely worried about the presence, but overall what I'm saying is that the bombers were virtually unescorted and their defensive armament wasn't very effective at night, its no wonder that they lost so many planes.


----------



## pbfoot (May 24, 2009)

a little scan of a page from the book "The Right of the Line" this is about tactics used in the battle of Berlin Jan 44
"In the course of the battle, Bomber Command used every device that it could muster to outwit the defence . Window was freely distributed in vast quantities, airborne radar aids were used to defect night-fighters (but in fact this enabled the fighters to home in on the bombers) or to jam the enemy radar sets feints and diversions were practiced round about routes were taken . But nothing. it seems could mitigate the effect of the sheer distance to be travelled 1150 miles to Berlin and back .
This was far beyond GEE or Oboe ranges and as in turned out. the sprawling city was a poor reflector of H2S its geography offered no clear characteristic to show up on a screen. Too often Pathfinders and other leaders had to identify targets visually - and to: often these were covered by heavy cloud. Guns and searchlights, as might be expected with a target of such importance, were exceptionally numerous Ground controllers now directed the fighters tab area the bomber stream in groups instead of individually a far more effective tactic."


----------



## Glider (May 24, 2009)

Watanbe
I don't entirely disagree with you. I was trying to explain that the RAF did what they could to escort the bombers given the limitations that they were under namely distance and technology and that they did have some success.

Re the defensive fire of the bombers I don't think it would ahve made much of a difference. At the ranges we are talking about 4 x 303 are still pretty effective and the vast majority of bombers were hit before they knew it.


----------



## Watanbe (May 25, 2009)

I agree Glider. The RAF really did try everything it could, but its hard to escape the fact that the technology just wasn't available at the time. You can't defend against an object you can't see and you can't effectively radar jam if you don't have the technology. It was inevitable that they would lose large amounts of bombers but IMO they still had to carry on anyway. They basically destroyed all the key German cities.


----------



## Glider (May 25, 2009)

I have found the addition to H2S that picked up any aircraft in the vicinity of the bomber when the H2S was in use. The code name was Fishpond.

As an aside I have found some comparisons of the accuracy of Oboe and H2S when bombing which may be of interest. In September 1944 it was calculated that Oboe had a typical error of 350m and H2S 1,800m.


----------



## Watanbe (May 25, 2009)

Another factor is well, probably more on the NF thing. The airborne AI sets in WW2 aircraft were notoriously unreliable, they often failed to work properly. Also the latest AI sets were also used reluctantly by the British over Germany, they couldn't afford to allow any advantages in radar to fall into German hands.

Not sure how relevant it is in our debate, but it is interesting!


----------



## Waynos (May 25, 2009)

What, sabotage by the National Front? The bastards


----------



## Erich (May 25, 2009)

well Jabber as I hurriedly post this the priovate homepage stats are incorrect, I must disagree with his sources as being authorative, I will accept the research of others from England, Germany and Holland besides elsewhere over the past 45-50 years as being more accurate in numbers lost to the Nachtjagd arm nd even then the 7100 I put down am sure can be question within a 100 kills or so not counting what the RAF flew over the Balitc into Soviet held territory

appreciate the link(s) provided and the discussion

gents remember with the SN-2d being jammed that FuG 350z was being used fully when equipped and the pilots also homed in on the huge amounts nightly of the Window dropped getting into the area(s) of most concentration.

v/r E ~


----------



## Airbone Bunny (May 25, 2009)

Regarding British night bombing there is something that has always nagged me: why they reacted so poorly, or didn’t react at all, to the introduction of Schräge Musik cannons by German night fighters?.

That puzzles me because from 1943-44 those Schräge Musik applications were widely used; you would assume the RAF should have implemented some kind of countermeasures by then, but as far as I know, there was nothing…

I read that one of the reasons the RAF didn’t counter effectively was because British bombers were not well suited to carry and use ventral turrets. But that seems like a poor excuse


----------



## pbfoot (May 25, 2009)

Airbone Bunny said:


> Regarding British night bombing there is something that has always nagged me: why they reacted so poorly, or didn’t react at all, to the introduction of Schräge Musik cannons by German night fighters?.
> 
> That puzzles me because from 1943-44 those Schräge Musik applications were widely used; you would assume the RAF should have implemented some kind of countermeasures by then, but as far as I know, there was nothing…
> 
> I read that one of the reasons the RAF didn’t counter effectively was because British bombers were not well suited to carry and use ventral turrets. But that seems like a poor excuse


the advantage was carrying 3 times the bombload of the B17, I can't comment on how effective "schrage music " was but I really doubt it was effective as a normal attack


----------



## mhuxt (May 25, 2009)

Everything I've read indicates it was far more effective. Less chance of being seen, no turbulence off the aircraft in front, no debris flying back at the attacker, larger target area to aim at, easier to avoid hitting the bombload, etc.

I've also read that priority for fitting the oblique weapons went to experience crews - new guys had to "make do" with horizontal attacks.

I believe a lot of the attacks were put down to flak, but as to what the Operational Research Section knew, and when they knew it, I agree is a mystery.


----------



## Watanbe (May 25, 2009)

"schrage music " was very effective.


----------



## fastmongrel (May 28, 2009)

The RAF heavies were designed for a ventral dustbin turret you can see them in the original design for the Manchester and Halifax but the RAF didnt think they were worth the weight. When later on they they were needed to combat Schrage Musik H2s had been fitted in the ventral turrets place. 

I have read somewhere that towards the end of the war a Canadian wing unofficially took out the H2s from its aircraft and fitted a handheld 0.5 Browning in the radome blister cant remember where I read it though.


----------



## JoeB (May 28, 2009)

Also a reason why oblique guns were effective was that the fighter a fighter approaching from below was often silhouetted against the ground and hard to see, the bomber against the sky and easier to see. And effective anti-bomber armament was heavier than any single practical turret on a bomber even if it did see the fighter in time.

On the original question, with early war technology (used by the some combatants throughout the war) a night bomber was much less accurate but much less vulnerable. With the technological advances incorporated by the British in their night bombing, and Germans in their night defenses, that relationship could actually invert: night bombing could become as accurate or more as daylight depending on exact method and conditions; but the night bomber could become every bit as vulnerable or more as the day one. That was the state of things ca. early-mid 1944 where accuracy of day and night bombing overlapped, depending on all the variables of exact method (within Oboe range or not, what weather conditions in daylight etc) but RAF night losses over Germany proper in that period tended to be heavier in % of sorties than USAAF day bombing with the benefit of escorts. 

Joe


----------



## Marshall_Stack (May 28, 2009)

Although I don't have any data, it seems that the likelihood of completing a tour was less for that of an airman of the RAF than of the USAAF. If someone had the data, that would be interesting to see. Also, does the ruggedness of the Lancs and Halifaxes compare to the B-17s?


----------



## pbfoot (May 28, 2009)

Looking at Shrage Musik from my point of view , I'd rather sit back and lob 20mm from afar against the 303's rather then try and snuggle up underneath an aircraft , to me it would seem harder to aim from below as opposed to astern in all my years of reading and listening I have never heard of one guy flying in BC ever mention the thing but I stand to be corrected


----------



## Erich (May 28, 2009)

@ pb

the SM attack was preferred by experienced and non-experienced alike in 1945. some of the aces still felt due to some jamming in the SM installation that the forward fire-power was the trusted method

E ~


----------



## Airbone Bunny (Jun 2, 2009)

Erich said:


> @ pb
> 
> the SM attack was preferred by experienced and non-experienced alike in 1945. some of the aces still felt due to some jamming in the SM installation that the forward fire-power was the trusted method
> 
> E ~




I just realized something: you don't even need Schräge Musik in your fighter to attack a bomber from below. You can just make a normal attack from below using frontal fire 

That means that even without Schräge Musik, british bombers were already awfully vulnerable to attacks from below. Schräge Musik didn't create the flaw, it just exploited it in a logical and rational way.

Perhaps it is not coincidence that Schräge Musik was not a cabinet design; it was born directly in the operational units, and my humble hyphotesis is that there was a reason for that. I can imagine a Luftwaffe night fighter coming back from a mission thinking "You know, those crazy british blokes are flying with no ventral turrets! I can't believe they are doing that .... perhaps I should modify my plane to take adavantage of their madness" 

Anyway, I know that most experts and historians talk very well of british bombers, particularly the Lancaster; but, for me, the lack of ventral firepower has always been an unnaceptable flaw. No idea who was resposible for that (faulty designers, insensitive high command, reckless operational management) but that was a serious black spot.


----------



## Amsel (Jun 2, 2009)

> Freeman Dyson, who was an analyst for Operations research of RAF Bomber Command in World War II, commented on the effectiveness of Schräge Musik: "The cause of losses ... killed novice and expert crews impartially. This result contradicted the official dogma...I blame the ORS and I blame myself in particular, for not taking this result seriously enough...If we had taken the evidence more seriously, we might have discovered Schräge Musik in time to respond with effective countermeasures."


From Wiki


----------



## Watanbe (Jun 3, 2009)

Airbone Bunny said:


> I just realized something: you don't even need Schräge Musik in your fighter to attack a bomber from below. You can just make a normal attack from below using frontal fire
> 
> That means that even without Schräge Musik, british bombers were already awfully vulnerable to attacks from below. Schräge Musik didn't create the flaw, it just exploited it in a logical and rational way.
> 
> ...



Adding more ventral power, would of helped little and slowed the Lancaster down. It was very hard for the gunners in a Lancaster to spot a German NF let alone shoot one down.


----------



## Marshall_Stack (Jun 3, 2009)

Watanbe said:


> Adding more ventral power, would of helped little and slowed the Lancaster down. It was very hard for the gunners in a Lancaster to spot a German NF let alone shoot one down.



Then why have any guns at all?


----------



## Watanbe (Jun 3, 2009)

Marshall_Stack said:


> Then why have any guns at all?



as a deterrent to attack and to act as spotters against NF. The guns weren't useful, the guns they hard were somewhat worth having but very rarely shot anything down.


----------



## tomo pauk (Jun 3, 2009)

I don't buy it that 3 turrets are useful and good in one hand, and on the other the 4th turret would've wastly hamper the performance. 

Either have the full set of guns or delete them all.


----------



## Waynos (Jun 3, 2009)

The dustbin turrets that used to be fitted to RAF bombers like the Wellington were deleted because they were inefficient and draggy, and it was believed that the power operated turrets at the front and rear would suffice. Wellingtons later got beam guns and subsequent designs were fitted with power operated mid upper turrets but of course the belly was still left undefended.


----------



## parsifal (Jun 4, 2009)

Just a small point....Mosquitoes operating in the bomber role were completely unarmed, and yet suffered the lowest attrition rate of any bomber in the allied inventory.. They undertook some of the most dangerous missions of the war I am told. The idea of a heavily armoured, heavily armed, slow moving and large bomber was one way to solve the defensive issue. The other pathway was for a smaller, faster, more manouverable and usually unarmed bomber, examples of which include the blenheim and mosquito. Its intersting to note that the speed/manouverability formula didnt always work....the blenheim was judged too slow and quite vulnerable during the war....whilst the success of the mosquito is self evident. 

I happen to believe that the decision to build large bombers was the wrong one. For every Lancaster, the Britis could have fielded three or four Mosquitoes. Building successors to the Mosquito was technologically less challenging than building a successor to the Lancaster (or B-17 for that matter) and each unit loss would have been less painful than the losses of heavies that were suffered


----------



## drgondog (Jun 4, 2009)

Marshall_Stack said:


> Although I don't have any data, it seems that the likelihood of completing a tour was less for that of an airman of the RAF than of the USAAF. If someone had the data, that would be interesting to see. Also, does the ruggedness of the Lancs and Halifaxes compare to the B-17s?



You would have to do a study 'pre- Mustang/post Mustang' and factor in the attrition of day figher pilot losses versus NJG night fighter attrition. That would be 'complicated'


----------



## Marshall_Stack (Jun 5, 2009)

parsifal said:


> Just a small point....Mosquitoes operating in the bomber role were completely unarmed, and yet suffered the lowest attrition rate of any bomber in the allied inventory.. They undertook some of the most dangerous missions of the war I am told. The idea of a heavily armoured, heavily armed, slow moving and large bomber was one way to solve the defensive issue. The other pathway was for a smaller, faster, more manouverable and usually unarmed bomber, examples of which include the blenheim and mosquito. Its intersting to note that the speed/manouverability formula didnt always work....the blenheim was judged too slow and quite vulnerable during the war....whilst the success of the mosquito is self evident.
> 
> I happen to believe that the decision to build large bombers was the wrong one. For every Lancaster, the Britis could have fielded three or four Mosquitoes. Building successors to the Mosquito was technologically less challenging than building a successor to the Lancaster (or B-17 for that matter) and each unit loss would have been less painful than the losses of heavies that were suffered



I agree. I liked the P-38 Droop Snoot idea. Too bad it wasn't adopted more. Apparently the USAAF was already committed to the 'heavies" and did not want to admit that they might have gotten it wrong...


----------



## diddyriddick (Jun 5, 2009)

If I might add something here...

One thing that we haven't discussed here is that the role of demolition of Axis industry and infrastructure was not the only reason for the heavy bombing campaign in general, and the Eighth Air Force specifically. At least late in the war, the Allied high command wanted German fighters to engage the heavies; the more you take out over the Ruhr, the less you have to deal with over Normandy. Once Allied fighters were able to provide cover deep into Germany, this was possible.


----------



## HerrKaleut (Jun 5, 2009)

just 2 points; 1)Refering to the original thread, I recall reading that the original British warning to the USAAF was about unescorted daylight missions.
2) If you were in a bomber at night and suddenly all sorts of crap comes flying through your aircraft from underneath, how do you differentiate between Shrage Musik fire and standard nose-up fire?


----------



## Soundbreaker Welch? (Jun 5, 2009)

I would have tough time hitting anything in the dark. I don't envy those Lacaster bombers, they had to have guts.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Erich (Jun 5, 2009)

since BC did not know what Schräge Muzik or the attack was it was most probably assumed if the crew made it back to base that they were hit by Flak the only way would determine shrapnel damage

in any case having the rear turrets 303's was a good enough deterent for the LW to plan carefully their rearward attacks with forward firing fixed weapons

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Airbone Bunny (Jun 5, 2009)

I understand that intially Schräge Musik attacks could be attributed to normal horizontal attacks. 

However, soon or later some information on Schräge Musik should start leaking: pictures from recon planes, testimony from surviving crews, reports from spies, analysis of enemy night fighters downed or landed on allied territory.

I can't fully buy the "we didn't know there was something like Schräge Musik until the end of the war" argument. Somebody knows when the existence of Schräge Musik was a proven fact for the allies?


----------



## Waynos (Jun 5, 2009)

Schräge Musik can't have been THAT much of a surprise as British protoypes were built with fixed upward firing guns not only in WW1 but also in the 20's and 30's so the concept was at least known.


----------



## Erich (Jun 5, 2009)

surviving crews knew full well something was up but could not put their fingers on just what it was....yeah sounds vague because that is what was intended, the protection of the BC crews thinking or at least pushing the idea of light flak hitting them in the butt and not some new fangdangled weaponry that the evil nazis had come up with.

point of the matter is it worked far too often


----------



## HerrKaleut (Jun 7, 2009)

I find it difficult to believe that that aircrew would confuse gun/cannon rounds from flak shrapnel.

Don't know about hitting anything in the dark, I dont think I could FIND anything in the dark!!!!


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Jun 7, 2009)

HerrKaleut said:


> I find it difficult to believe that that aircrew would confuse gun/cannon rounds from flak shrapnel.


I don't - having flown in an aircraft that took small arms fire, all you hear is a peppering sound, similar to throwing a hand full of stones at a steel shed. I've heard the same thing from bomber crews as well. The only time you could tell is something really big hit you if there was an actual explosion within the aircraft.


----------



## gruad (Jun 15, 2009)

Hello everyone and thanks for all the posts so far. Just discovered this forum and I am enjoying myself going through the archives!

One of the most interesting points in USAAF vs RAF losses is the losses per shoot down. With the USAAF IIRC it was an average of 3 killed from a crew of 10. The RAF lost between 5 and 6 from a crew of 7.

The difference was caused by the style of fighting. A single cannon shell like the MK108 would take down a day bomber but it would take some time allowing the crew to escape. Nightfighting was about getting into a position unseen by your victim and the RAF bomber would take 20 hits from the infamous pneumatic drill. The crew would stand no chance. 

An RAF bomber was the second most dangerous place to be in WWII. Half those who flew died. Only the U-boats suffered worse where 3/4 died. At the worst during Nov 43 to Feb 44 the odds of surviving the 30 mission tour were 1 in 6. Imagine keeping going when your odds were a throw of the dice. That is some bravery.


----------



## Airbone Bunny (Jun 15, 2009)

gruad said:


> Hello everyone and thanks for all the posts so far. Just discovered this forum and I am enjoying myself going through the archives!
> 
> One of the most interesting points in USAAF vs RAF losses is the losses per shoot down. With the USAAF IIRC it was an average of 3 killed from a crew of 10. The RAF lost between 5 and 6 from a crew of 7.
> 
> ...



Hi Gruad and welcome;

Another thing to consider is how well designed USAAF and RAF bomber were regarding crew safety and evacuation in the case of being shot down. I can't remember where (this same forum?) but I read somewhere that RAF bombers were awfully designed regarding crew evacuation and didn't allow for a quick and easy escape, partially explaining the low survival ratio.


----------



## drgondog (Jun 15, 2009)

Airbone Bunny said:


> Hi Gruad and welcome;
> 
> Another thing to consider is how well designed USAAF and RAF bomber were regarding crew safety and evacuation in the case of being shot down. I can't remember where (this same forum?) but I read somewhere that RAF bombers were awfully designed regarding crew evacuation and didn't allow for a quick and easy escape, partially explaining the low survival ratio.



B17 wasn't all that easy either - lower left crew hatch behind Bombadier and navigator - aft hat rh side and tailwheel for tail gunner. If you could get the bomb bay doors open immediatley - that helped


----------



## Andrew Johnson (Nov 3, 2017)

Also think about the construction. The Lancasters (among many other RAF bombers) used a honeycomb airframe which would enable the aircraft itself to be VERY hard to down, but the crew members themselves were relatively unprotected barring some 'armored' glass, contrary to this is the B-17, which dedicated a bit more of its weight to protecting crew members with actual armor within key places of the crew compartment.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Nov 3, 2017)

Andrew Johnson said:


> Also think about the construction. The Lancasters (among many other RAF bombers) used a honeycomb airframe which would enable the aircraft itself to be VERY hard to down, but the crew members themselves were relatively unprotected barring some 'armored' glass, contrary to this is the B-17, which dedicated a bit more of its weight to protecting crew members with actual armor within key places of the crew compartment.


The Wellington had a honeycomb structure, the Lancaster did not.


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 3, 2017)

FLYBOYJ said:


> The Wellington had a honeycomb structure, the Lancaster did not



Nor was it a honeycomb either. The Wellington used a geodesic design consisting of “W” beams. A honeycomb design is different (I know you are obviously aware of this Joe...).

Honeycomb Structure:






Geodesic Structure:

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Agree Agree:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## wuzak (Nov 4, 2017)

Wellington was geodetic construction. 

I do not know what the difference between geodetic and geodesic is.

Reactions: Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Nov 4, 2017)

wuzak said:


> Wellington was geodetic construction.
> 
> I do not know what the difference between geodetic and geodesic is.



There is no difference. They are the same thing. Both terms are correct. Geodetic = Geodesic
Geodetic airframe - Wikipedia

Reactions: Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Koopernic (Nov 4, 2017)

Airbone Bunny said:


> Hi Gruad and welcome;
> 
> Another thing to consider is how well designed USAAF and RAF bomber were regarding crew safety and evacuation in the case of being shot down. I can't remember where (this same forum?) but I read somewhere that RAF bombers were awfully designed regarding crew evacuation and didn't allow for a quick and easy escape, partially explaining the low survival ratio.





gruad said:


> Hello everyone and thanks for all the posts so far. Just discovered this forum and I am enjoying myself going through the archives!
> 
> One of the most interesting points in USAAF vs RAF losses is the losses per shoot down. With the USAAF IIRC it was an average of 3 killed from a crew of 10. The RAF lost between 5 and 6 from a crew of 7.
> 
> ...



German statistics data showed that on average the 151/20 M round required an average of 25 hits to down a B-17, while 18-20 hits were required to down other 4-engine bomber types, and only four hits were required to down a single-engine fighter.

The casualty rates don’t sound right. Flying for the Luftwaffe after June 1944 became extremely dangerous. Whole bomber squadrons were wiped out.

The escape systems on American aircraft may have been better. Also electrical systems used on US aircraft a little more robust. Finding your way out of a tumbling aircraft at night full of slippery hydraulic fluid wouldn’t be easy compared to doing it in daylight.

Also organising bailout at 25,000ft gives you more time than at 12,500.

The safest and most accurate way to bomb would have been from a B17E at night from 33,000 ft using Oboe or the systems that followed it such as micro-H and could guide 50 aircraft at once.


----------



## stona (Nov 4, 2017)

Survival rates for the Lancaster and Halifax were 10.9% and 29.4% respectively. Pilots and gunners had the least chance of escaping.
Bomber Command determined the reasons as

-More restricted space within the Lancaster and a very poor escape hatch. 

-The entire crew, with the exception of the tail gunner, was supposed to exit through the one hatch in the nose. Unlike US bombers there were very few alternative exits (like the bomb bay). The main entrance door was to be used as a parachute exit only in an "extreme emergency" though I would imagine a burning bomber, plummeting earthwards would qualify as such.

- Jamming of escape hatches which also opened inwards.

-Lancaster tended to break up when out of control, more so then the more strongly constructed Halifax. This was thought to contrbute to the 68% of Lancasters shot down with no survivors.

-A lack of fire warning lights meant that fires often got beyond control before the crew could react.

-There was inadequate training, parachute drill etc.

You can do an experiment in the safety of your own home. Draw a rectangle, 22" by 26.5" on the floor. Now stand on it, imagine you have a parachute attached to your chest and that you have to get through a hole that size.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## pbehn (Nov 4, 2017)

In a damaged aircraft the pilot frequently had to fight to keep the plane steady for the crew to exit, of course as soon as he left the controls the plane would dive or spin trapping him in. In the Lancaster the mid upper gunner had to climb over the wing spar if the rear door jammed while the rear gunner had to get his parachute from outside the turret inside the rear fuselage, which meant he needed power.

The Canadian Mynarski Lancaster is named after a Lancaster crew member who lost his life trying to save a trapped rear gunner. Incredibly the rear gunner Pat Brophy survived the crash and detonation to tell Mynarki's story.

from Wiki.

In the aftermath of D-Day attacks on 12 June 1944, Mynarski was aboard KB726,[4] taking part in the crew's 13th operation, a raid on northern France. They reached their target at midnight, Tuesday 13 June. After encountering flak over the coastline and briefly being "coned" by searchlights, the Lancaster was attacked by a Junkers Ju 88 enemy night fighter over Cambrai, France. Raked by cannon fire with major strikes on the port engines and centre fuselage, a hydraulic fire engulfed the bomber. Losing both port engines, de Breyne ordered the crew to bail out. As Mynarski approached the rear escape door, he saw through the inferno in the rear, that tail gunner Pilot Officer Pat Brophy was trapped in his turret. The tail turret had been jammed part way through its rotation to the escape position.[5]

Without hesitation, Mynarski made his way through the flames to Brophy's assistance. All his efforts were in vain, initially using a fire axe to try to pry open the doors before finally resorting to beating at the turret with his hands. With Mynarski's flight suit and parachute on fire, Brophy eventually waved him away. Mynarski crawled back through the hydraulic fire, returned to the rear door where he paused and saluted. He then reputedly said "Good night, sir," his familiar nightly sign-off to his friend, and jumped.[6]

Except for Brophy, all crew members of the Lancaster managed to escape the burning bomber. Five left through the front escape hatch on the floor of the cockpit. When bomb aimer Jack Friday, tried to release the escape hatch cover in the aircraft's nose, the rushing wind ripped it from his hands. The hatch cover caught him above his left eye and knocked him out. He fell into the open hatch and jammed it closed until Flight engineer Roy Vigars reached him to quickly clip on Friday's parachute and toss him out the hatch while pulling the unconscious crewman's rip cord. Only Mynarski managed to leave via the rear escape door.[7]

Mynarski's descent was rapid due to the burnt parachute and shroud lines, resulting in a heavy impact on landing. He landed alive though severely burned, with his clothes still on fire. French farmers who spotted the flaming bomber found him and took him to a German field hospital but he died shortly afterwards of severe burns. He was buried in a local cemetery. Brophy remained trapped in the bomber and remained with the bomber when it crashed in a farm field. As the bomber disintegrated, and began breaking apart, Brophy survived the crash and the subsequent detonation of the bomb load. Still lodged in his turret, the crash broke the turret open with him pitched out, striking a tree and being temporarily knocked out.[8]

Four of the crew members: Brophy, navigator Robert Bodie, radio operator James Kelly and pilot de Breyne were hidden by the French and, except for Brophy, returned to England shortly after the crash. Vigars remained with the unconscious Friday and both were captured by the Germans, being interned until liberated by American troops. Brophy joined French Resistance fighters and, after joining a resistance unit to continue the fight on the ground behind enemy lines, returned to London in September 1944, where he learned of Mynarski's death. It was not until 1945 when Brophy was reunited with the rest of the crew that the details of his final moments on the aircraft were revealed. He related the story of the valiant efforts made by Mynarski to save him.[9]

Mynarski lies buried in Grave 20 of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission plot in the Méharicourt Communal Cemetery, near Amiens, France.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Peter Gunn (Nov 4, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> *SNIP*
> 
> The safest and most accurate way to bomb would have been from a B17E at night from 33,000 ft using Oboe or the systems that followed it such as micro-H and could guide 50 aircraft at once.



Interesting thought, so for the un-enlightened (i.e. me) can the E model cruise at 33,000 and if so, with what kind of payload?


----------



## stona (Nov 4, 2017)

OBOE had obvious limitations and the USAAF would have had to develop marking systems similar to Bomber Command,and probably a Path Finder Force to implement them.

Micro-H? Do you mean Gee-H? First used experimentally in November 1943, 50% of the bombs dropped fell within 750 yards of the target. It was much more accurate than GEE, H2S or OBOE, but still hardly pin point. 
During April 1944, five more experimental raids were carried out, with a view to developing tactics for the system. An average error of just 275 yards was achieved, similar but not better than bombing by daylight in good visual conditions.

Now to the real world, and use of the system in mainforce bombing raids.
An analysis of GH attacks between October and the end of December 1944 showed that the average error of bomb distributions achieved was *1,172 yards*, with an overall systematic error of 375 yards. *23% of aircraft made gross errors of 2,500 yards or over.*

A final analysis in the first two months of 1945 showed that the *average radial error was reduced to about 900 yards*. That's the best G.H. could do for the British, who were far better trained and less resistant to using bombing and navigational aids than their US counterparts.

Micro-H was certainly not a navigational aid that could solve the accuracy problems of the strategic bombing forces.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Informative Informative:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## wuzak (Nov 4, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> The safest and most accurate way to bomb would have been from a B17E at night from 33,000 ft using Oboe or the systems that followed it such as micro-H and could guide 50 aircraft at once.



Discussions for use of Oboe by the USAAF were held in September 1943.

Options discussed were:

Oboe-less Oboe: using the Oboe ground stations, but without the Oboe set on board the aircraft. This would require a significant formation size, accuracy was yet to be determined, but the range was expected to be of the order of 100 miles - insufficient for USAAF use.
Mk I Oboe: This was the system in operational use by the RAF at that time. Transition to Mk II Oboe in the RAF was expected to begin within two or three months. Oboe would be carried in "leader" aircraft only. The RAF feared that Oboe fitted to a B-17 would survive being shot down, enough for the Germans to determine the frequencies, etc, and be able to jam it. Against this, it was noted that of the 460 8th AF bombers shot down to that point, only 3 "leader" aircraft had been shot down.
Gee-H: This was just coming into use by the RAF. It's accuracy was expected to be between Oboe and H2S. It was also believed to be much more susceptible to jamming than either Oboe or H2S.
After further discussions, it was agreed to release Oboe Mk I to the USAAF from October 1943, under the conditions that it be used only when weather requires its use, in formations of greater than 100 aircraft and that "destructors" be fitted to the equipment. It was also suggested that two Oboe sets be fitted to the lead aircraft, to give a measure of redundancy.

At the same time the Telecommunications Research Establishment (TRE) and US radar developers (MIT Radiation Lab) were soon to deploy 3cm versions of H2S (H2S Mk III and H2X/AN/APS-15 respectively). 

I am unsure as to whether Oboe or Gee-H was ever used by the USAAF, since they adopted H2X early in 1944.

In both Gee-H and Oboe, the bomber had to fly a course at a constant radius from the base station. This, I am sure, would have been problematic for large aircraft flying slowly during daylight.


----------



## FLYBOYJ (Nov 4, 2017)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Nor was it a honeycomb either. The Wellington used a geodesic design consisting of “W” beams. A honeycomb design is different (I know you are obviously aware of this Joe...).
> 
> Honeycomb Structure:
> 
> ...



You are correct!!! My bad, meant to say geodetic, LOL!


----------



## Koopernic (Nov 5, 2017)

Peter Gunn said:


> Interesting thought, so for the un-enlightened (i.e. me) can the E model cruise at 33,000 and if so, with what kind of payload?


One of the requirements of “Oboe” use was operation at very high altitude to get the radar horizon needed. About 500km/ie 306 miles was reasonable for Oboe. A B17 could fly about as high as a Mosquito (Service Ceiling B17F about 37,000ft, so 33,000ft is achievable in the short ranges) so why not use the B17 which had a superior bombload to the Mosquito, certainly 6000lbs and possibly 9000lbs.

The best of the shelf aircraft would be the B-17F lightly stripped down. The B-17D had excellent performance, the B-17E lost performance because of the addition of the tail turret and the B-17F regained it because its engines had a 1340hp WEP rating and the B-17G lost masses of performance due to the chin turret and additional armour.

So the B-17F is best. Speed 318mph at 25,000ft, service ceiling 37,000ft bombload 9600lbs. It won’t need a full load of fuel.
Boeing B-17F Fortress

Oboe was merely an evolution of the IFF transponders both sides used. Two ground stations interrogated (pinged ) transponders on the aircraft and this allowed the aircraft position to be precisely located as the intersection of two circles. Corrective commands were passed to the guided aircraft by using the same interrogating pulse ie long or short pulse to represent morse code.

This system was accurate because the timing circuits were in well developed ground stations and could be calibrated against known survey points on the ground.

There is nothing to stop one ground antenna being set up with multiple freqencies so that multiple aircraft could be guided at once. I’m thinking one would want to cover a squadron. I’m thinking about 12 aircraft.

Gee-H, called Micro-H in its american version worked on the same principles as Oboe but reversed the procedure by having the interrogating transmitters on the aircraft and the transponders on the ground. This meant the timing circuits had to be on the aircraft and they of course had to be simpler and less accurate. Nevertheless by using multiple frequencies and pinging randomely at randomely frequencies about 50 aircraft could measure their own position at once. The clashing pulses were simply filtered out since most pulses would be correct or because they came at the wrong time and represented a change in position that was not possible.

Here is my proposal. The aircraft will guide themselves then switch on their Micro-H or Gee-H systems about 15 minutes from target so that about 50-75 aircraft commence their preparation for bomb runs. About 5 minutes before target the aircraft will try to get the services of one of the 12 Oboe frequencies. It will try for 2 minutes and then cease. If it fails to be assigned to a Oboe frequency it will then complete its bomb run on Gee-H or Micro-H only. I’m allowing 12 Oboe frequencies to control 12 aircraft for a 5 minutes bomb run. This will allow just over 2 aircraft to attack per minute.

So why wasn’t this done? Because the RAF wasn’t thinking mass precision high altitude bombing very much and and had no sich aircraft whereas the Americans weren’t think blind bombing electronic aids or night time bombing very much. The USAAF in fact borrowed its Norden from the USN who had developed the idea with Norden.

The technology was there but the thinking that would see it adapted was not. I’m suprised that blimps or Ballons weren’t used to extend the radar horizon either.


----------



## wuzak (Nov 5, 2017)

The way the RAF operated was to use Oboe equipped aircraft as pathfinders, who would mark the target. The remaining aircraft would then bomb using the bomb sight.

The USAAF would bomb on the leader. The lead aircraft, plus a few replacements, would be fitted with the Norden bomb sight. They would identify and bomb the target. The remainder would bomb on that cue.

On a clear day the Oboe and Gee-H systems offered very little advantage. The Norden required an extended straight run into target, and Oboe would effectively require the same. Or worse - I'm not sure how long the aircraft had to remain on the circular track before target.

Which is something the Mosquito could get away with at night. It was as fast, or faster, than the night fighters sent to intercept them.

The USAAF were considering electronic navigation and aiming aids for situations where visual bombing was not possible - as I showed above.

In the end they decided on H2X over Oboe or Gee-H as their preferred non-visual bombing system.

Oboe's accuracy deteriorated with range. Simply because the same percentage error gives less distance error at short ranges than it does at long ranges. And the extra altitude also does not help with accuracy.

The RAF were experimenting with an Oboe Repeater system.

Here are some calculated results of the system.


----------



## stona (Nov 5, 2017)

The fundamental problem is that none of the systems being discussed were bombing aids, they were navigational aids. As such they were never accurate enough to achieve really accurate bombing. When bombing on H2X the 8th Air Force often achieved results no better those described for Bomber Command in the Butt Report, Bomber Command was significantly more accurate with the system (H2S).

Bomber Command used all the systems to get aircraft into the right area at which point various marking systems could be employed. All the systems had essentially two main variations. In visual conditions the marking would be done visually, the navigation aids use simply for...errr...navigation, and was consequently often much more accurate. Otherwise the marking was done 'blind' with target indicators being dropped using a position based solely on which navigational system was being employed. The marking was usually much less accurate.

The average deviations from intended aiming points using navigational aids to 'blind' mark were rather large. I posted that the RAF achieved an average error about 900 yards using Gee-H. 

The 8th AF, using H2X in 1944/5, dropped 42% of its bombs more than 5 miles from the target and achieved an average circular error_ *for those that fell within 5 miles*,_ of 2.48 miles. In the last four months of 1944 the 8th AF dropped *81,654 tons *of bombs using H2X of which just* 674 tons* fell within 1,000 feet of the aiming point. Put this into context, the much vaunted Oil Plan was supposed to be a series of 'precision' attacks on German oil facilities; in fact just 2.2% of the bombs dropped hit what the USSBS describes as _'damageable' _buildings. 87.1% were_ 'spread over the surrounding countryside'._

There was no miracle navigation device which could solve the cultural and systemic problems which led such poor bombing. Further increasing the altitudes would certainly have made things even worse.

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## Graeme (Nov 5, 2017)

Waynos said:


> Schräge Musik can't have been THAT much of a surprise as British protoypes were built with fixed upward firing guns not only in WW1 but also in the 20's and 30's so the concept was at least known.



Interesting letter to the editor (Air International September1985) from Mr A S Foulkes. I hope the upload is readable...


----------



## stona (Nov 5, 2017)

Schrage Musik exercised the minds of the men who flew the bombers, particularly with hindsight, a lot more than it exercised those of the responsible men in Bomber Command at the time

Even when they became aware of Schrage Musik, losses to fighter attack were never categorised by the type of fighter attack. The principle factors affecting the losses to fighters were and always remained the weather and luck.

Bomber Command was not about to change the conformation of its aircraft, mounting ventral turrets or gun positions, even if this were possible. The H2S radar took the position of such a gun position on both the Halifax and Lancaster anyway. It would have involved a huge effort to mitigate what, harsh though it may seem, were a very small percentage of losses. More lives could have been saved by modifying escape hatches to open outwards rather than inwards, but even this relatively small modification was not deemed practical on aircraft already in service.

Much as Squadron Leader Foulkes might like to think that such remedial action could or should have been taken, the reality is that it was never seriously considered.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Koopernic (Nov 5, 2017)

The German night fighter crews tended to aim at an area between engine and fuselage which would tend to set the tanks alight. I read one night fighter pilots say they did this to give the bomber crew a chance to get out because the crew themselves weren’t subject to direct attack. I would say not firing into the bomb bay was also a motivation? Surely the night fighter feared detonating the bombers load. Nevertheless this method of attack would have produced survivors and evidence on many occasion.

The best Defense would have been a practical tail warning radar or device. Obviously there was village inn and circuitry that was fitted to H2S.

German technology seemed to be evolving to blind fire using radar. A device called Elfe seems to have been in service.


----------



## Shortround6 (Nov 5, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> The best of the shelf aircraft would be the B-17F lightly stripped down. The B-17D had excellent performance, the B-17E lost performance because of the addition of the tail turret and the B-17F regained it because its engines had a 1340hp WEP rating and the B-17G lost masses of performance due to the chin turret and additional armour.
> 
> So the B-17F is best. Speed 318mph at 25,000ft, service ceiling 37,000ft bombload 9600lbs. It won’t need a full load of fuel.
> Boeing B-17F Fortress



Some of the American planes are as bad as the German ones for misleading information published in data sheets.

Chances of a B-17 making it to 37,000ft with 9600lbs worth of bombs is about zero. 

empty weight is 34,000lbs however 40,437 pounds loaded is the weight the 37,000ft Ceiling is good for (*maybe*) .

In one test a B-17F at 39,300lbs was climbing at 100fpm at 36,600ft. Granted they were using climb power or max continuous and not combat power but if combat power is limited to 5 minutes and you are climbing at around 100fpm? 

Even 2000 gallons of fuel is 12,000lbs . A B-17F in the low 40,000lb range is carrying a small bomb load and not much fuel. 

Same plane was tested at 55,900lbs take-off, It took it 63.7 minutes to climb to 31,000ft running the engines at 2300rpm and max rpm the turbos were allowed. (it was later raised). calculated weight was 52,000lbs at 31,00ft at which point the climb was 100fpm. 5,600 feet less than the same plane (same serial number) flying at the lighter weight. 

The way the planes were operated was NOT the way many lists of performance would have you believe. A B-17F at max cruise lean (not max continuous=rich) was using around 240 gallons an hour or 1440lbs an hour in level flight. Throw the weight of the crew, guns/ammo and oil onto the the 34,000lb empty weight and the amount of bombs you can carry even 3-400 miles while flying over 30,000ft starts getting rather small,

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/B-17/B-17F_41-24340_FS-M-19-1470-A.pdf

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Nov 5, 2017)

_"Nevertheless this method of attack would have produced survivors and evidence on many occasion."
_
Roughly one man in ten survived being shot down in a Lancaster, not even one per crew. It was almost tthree in ten for the Halifax, but still not a great chance.

The problem is that it didn't produce evidence. Generally survivors IF they managed to escape and evade to return to the UK (which might take months via Spain, Switzerland etc.) had no idea how they were shot down. Very few aircraft survived a Shrage Musik attack, which by definition was a surprise attack, with cannon armament, at close range.
Evidence on how fighter attacks were carried out was largely gleaned from damaged aircraft which did return and this showed that most attacks were from the horizontal or only slightly below. The damaged aircraft seen by the ex Squadron Leader and described in his letter obviously wasn't one of those seen by boffins from Bomber Command's ORS.

The best way to defeat the night fighter threat was not to react to a particular threat posed by it, as in a new weapon system,but to use tactics and strategies to avoid the fighters making contact with the bombers in the first place. This covered everything from careful routing (away from night fighter beacons), split and spoof raids, to practical methods to jam the German radar systems and radio communications. A huge effort was made in all these areas.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## drgondog (Nov 5, 2017)

The issues for 8th AF to convert to RAF Night Bombing doctrine were legion, both political and practical. The losses in Fall 1943 when the 8th began training with RAF, as well as equipping a B-17BG with H2S/H2X certainly began in earnest but several factors were in play:
1.) the logistics of training Pilots and Navigators in night navigation and bombing were daunting
2.) abandon formation flying, strip bombers of 1/2 armament and crew to increase payload
3.) integrate 800+ B-17/B-24 into airspace over East Anglia while avoiding RAF, including modification of Beacon/Buncher communication. Estimated loss rate to new strategy and tactics due to mid air collisions and take off/landing accidents were high (still looking for the analysis).
4.) weigh achievement of the objectives of POINTBLANK destruction of day fighter capability by changing to night bombing vs 'Stay the Course' and hope P-51B is solution, along with diverting all P-38J to ETO. By this time the performance was widely understood by Giles/Arnold and communicated to Eaker and Spaatz. Time was the issue confronting AAF leadership.
5.) P-51B's arriving in number beginning with late September deliveries, but experiencing similar operational issues with radios, etc
6.) organizational in-fighting between 8th and 9th AF on disposition of the Mustang.

Night bombing was never going to be adopted primarily because POINTBLANK/Overlord REQUIRED engagement with Germany's Day Fighter arm, and 8th AF combined with 15th were only combat units capable of the task..


----------



## pbehn (Nov 5, 2017)

The modifications to the Lancaster to increase speed would only be valid if the RAF only operated Lancasters. The Halifax had already been modified with more powerful engines and front turret removed to allow it to keep pace with the Lancaster in the bomber stream


----------



## stona (Nov 5, 2017)

To add to drgondog's post, the Americans never connected the need for escorts to daylight bombing operations before the war. As late as October 1941 a board was convened to discuss the future development of pursuit aircraft, and failed once again to perceive the issue with insight and clarity. A certain Colonel Spaatz passed up an opportunity to have 623 P-39s equipped with auxiliary fuel tanks in the interests of keeping aircraft design simple and maintaining high volume production.

In the absence of fighter escorts and undaunted by either the German or British conversion to night time operations in the face of unacceptable daylight losses, the Americans convinced themselves that the superior speed and armament of the B-17, along with the maintenance of tight formations, would avoid the troubles faced by European bombers. This became a central point of doctrine with an inordinate faith in the accuracy of the Norden bomb sight.

The British, due to their own grim experiences had no faith in the American's faith to conduct a daylight precision campaign against Germany. Both Churchill and Portal feared that the Americans would commit resources to a campaign which they could not carry out, and that as it failed it would be too late for a tactical volte-face.
The Americans had no interest in changing their plans. Initially the British were proved correct, but the belated arrival of escort fighters turned a looming American defeat into an unequivocal victory. The tactical volte-face was avoided.

Sir John Slessor spent the winter of 1941-42 in the US and he would write (to Sinclair)

_"They_ [the Americans] _have hung their hats on the day bomber policy and are convinced they can do it...to cast doubts on it just at present would only cause irritation and make them very obstinate._"

He was right and the British let them get on with it. Early failures of the British night bombing and American day bombing campaigns very nearly derailed the entire concept of a combined bomber offensive, and it didn't matter who was bombing when.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Agree Agree:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## Shortround6 (Nov 5, 2017)

stona said:


> To add to drgondog's post, the Americans never connected the need for escorts to daylight bombing operations before the war. As late as October 1941 a board was convened to discuss the future development of pursuit aircraft, and failed once again to perceive the issue with insight and clarity. A certain Colonel Spaatz passed up an opportunity to have 623 P-39s equipped with auxiliary fuel tanks in the interests of keeping aircraft design simple and maintaining high volume production.
> 
> In the absence of fighter escorts and undaunted by either the German or British conversion to night time operations in the face of unacceptable daylight losses, the Americans convinced themselves that the superior speed and armament of the B-17, along with the maintenance of tight formations, would avoid the troubles faced by European bombers. This became a central point of doctrine with an inordinate faith in the accuracy of the Norden bomb sight.



While the 2nd paragraph is essentially correct the first warrants a few comments. 

Before the war, or even in the first year of the war, it was impossible to build an escort fighter for the B-17. 
The B-17C first flew in July of 1940. It was rated as carrying 4000lbs of bombs 2400 miles. Now even if we cut that down to a 600 mile radius what _in production_ 1940 fighter was available (or even close) to even try to escort in relays over that distance? This is 3-4 months after the first P-40 no letter is delivered. On August 30th 1940 the B-17E with power turrets is ordered, the prototype won't fly for a year. But the Air Force commanders know it is coming. 
The Americans are handicapped by the Allison engine, in the improved versions ordered for the P-40D/E and the P-39s the critical height is about 12,000ft. Way too low to make a practical escort for bombers flying even in the low 20s. 

In Oct 1941 things had not change a lot. The P-47 was in the works but still 8 months away from being issued to the first squadron. 
there were 929 P-39s built in 1941 but just over 500 were built in the last three months (Oct-Nov-Dec) so doing anything to screw up production-Delivery might be justifiably seen as a problem. 
And what do you get if you do modify the P-39? yes it is fast but it only holds 120 US gallons (100 imperial) so a drop tank isn't going to get you *back* from an escort mission. You need 12-16 gallons to warm up and take-off. you need around 2 gallons a minute at military rating (more at low altitudes) and we can forget WEP in 1941-42, it doesn't exist in command thinking of the time. 15 minutes worth of max continuous is worth 20-25 gallons depending on altitude and you need 10-12 gallons reserve once you hit the coast (whose coast? US or British or Pacific Island?) so you actually have 50-60 gallons at best once you have punched off the tank in enemy territory. depending on speed and altitude that is good for 220-300 miles on the range chart. Basically a P-39, even with a drop tank can't escort even to the German Border at any practical speed/altitude for getting home. 
Now maybe you can pull the wing .30 cal guns and stick extra fuel out there ( there isn't any room in the fuselage) but the P-39 is running close to the wing loading of the Bf 109F , it can't out climb it and it can't out run it at most altitudes (if any). 

I guess it depends on what you mean by "auxiliary fuel tanks", internal or external. With external tanks the P-39 was no more of an escort fighter than the Spitfire and since it's best altitude was thousands of feet below a Spitfire V it wouldn't have dome much good except to absorb bullets that might have been shot at the bombers. 
SO what is the point? 

The only hope in 1940-41 was the P-38.

Reactions: Agree Agree:
2 | Informative Informative:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## drgondog (Nov 5, 2017)

Steve and Shortround both have good insight to the problem. To simplify the issues, the Material Command Never believed that a single engine fighter could be designed with both range AND acceptable performance. Eaker was a former Fighter Group commander and flew the Mustang I - and liked it. So, what? There was never a long range single engine fighter contemplated from US Industry. It wasn't until Ben Kelsey bootlegged an external ferry tank in secret collaboration with Lockheed to get P-38s equipped to fly to England in summer 1942.

Second problem and best known. There were zero two stage/two speed in line engines available for the Allies until the Merlin 61, so 1938-1941 had in-lines AND Radials totally dependent on Turbo superchargers to kick performance - and no US airframe save the Mustang had sufficient internal fuel to be considered, with only the obsolete p-39C w/170 gallons coming close.

Third, The dense and stupid Gen. Oliver Echols was so opposed to NAA Fighter program/Mustang that it took several interventions by Arnold/Giles to rub his nose in the performance reports coming in from RAF/RR Mustang X program. Arnold did approve the A-36 contract to keep NAA production alive in 4-42, but still approved the Xp-75 concept advanced by Echols/GM. That said, MC kept trying to convince NAA to install the 1650-1 because the installation risk was lower than Merlin 61 - It STILL was not conceptually understood that the P-51 mated with the internal fuel, external bomb rack/fuel tank, and the Merlin 61 was THE solution that fit Arnold to Giles directive to Solve escort problem by end of the year.

If you study the issue long enough you will realize that Barney Giles took command after Arnold recovering from heart attack, crystallized the issues, reviewed the deck, constructed the 'to be' (Internal fuel tank increase) and drove the Mustang into the spotlight. He stuffed Echols and the XP-75 as the preferred solution, but allowed the program to continue - but by that time the P-51B-1 was delivered and in serial production.

Could the P-51 have been delivered much sooner? NO. The first flight of the XP-51B was delayed 2 mo because Packard couldn't deliver satisfactory engine.The gating factor was supply of Merlin 61/1650-3. Couldn't import enough from UK (not physically possible, nor politically possible) and NAA had to wait for Packard to tool up, deliver test engines, survive the first several bench test failures at Wright Pat, and move into production. 20+ P-151B-1 airframes were compete save engines except for P-51B-1 43-12093 (#2) which flew May 5, 1943. The next airframe was delivered/accepted by AAF June 30.

The Packard Merlin delivery introduction of the Merlin 61 was the key 3+ mo delay to operational Mustangs in 8th AF. Coulda been there for Black Thursday but that was earliest.

Reactions: Bacon Bacon:
4 | Like Like:
3 | Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## pbehn (Nov 5, 2017)

drgondog said:


> Steve and Shortround both have good insight to the problem. To simplify the issues, the Material Command Never believed that a single engine fighter could be designed with both range AND acceptable performance. Eaker was a former Fighter Group commander and flew the Mustang I - and liked it. So, what? There was never a long range single engine fighter contemplated from US Industry. It wasn't until Ben Kelsey bootlegged an external ferry tank in secret collaboration with Lockheed to get P-38s equipped to fly to England in summer 1942.
> 
> Second problem and best known. There were zero two stage/two speed in line engines available for the Allies until the Merlin 61, so 1938-1941 had in-lines AND Radials totally dependent on Turbo superchargers to kick performance - and no US airframe save the Mustang had sufficient internal fuel to be considered, with only the obsolete p-39C w/170 gallons coming close.
> 
> ...


The above post is why I keep logging on to this forum.

Reactions: Like Like:
3 | Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Shortround6 (Nov 5, 2017)

To further Bill's post I looked through AHT and found, if I did the math right, that the engine installation of the P-51B/C weighed about 2992lbs (individual aircraft may vary) this does NOT include the cowling (possible the engine mounts) or the fuel system but does include controls, starter, propeller, radiator and oil system (empty).
The book does not have the numbers for the Allison powered P-51, perhaps Bill does?
However the weights for the P-40E using the same engine as the early Allison Mustangs come to 2257lbs for the same parts/groups.

What makes this worthwhile and pertinent to this discussion, is that according to the charts, the V-1650-3 made about 1200hp at 25,000ft (61in MAP) while the V-1710-39 made about 600hp at 25,000ft. The powerplant in the P-51B/C made double the power while *only* going up about 33% in weight. It was this change in the power to weight ratio of the powerplant that made the escort fighter fighter possible.

The P-47 does come out better on a HP to weight ratio but needs much more fuel, has higher drag and little exhaust thrust making it much harder to compare.

One half of the powerplant weight of an early P-38 is 2539lbs for 1150hp at 25,000ft but that may not include any weight for the inter-coolers since they were the leading edge of the wing? Or the extra volume (drag) of fuselage needed to house the turbo system.

Reason for not including the fuel system is that the weight of the self sealing fuel tanks could vary tremendously with size and layout of the tanks.

There were sound technical reasons why single engine escort fighters were believed NOT to be possible in the late 30s and 1940-41.
Before somebody brings in the A6M Zero think about an A6M2 with it's single speed supercharger trying to fight BF 109Fs at 25,000ft.
The later Zeros with 2 speed superchargers (and much better altitude performance) don't show up until later and I have a lot of doubts about how far a Zero is going to go trying to fly at 22-25,000ft and at the speeds needed over Europe.

While the B-17 wound up NOT using it's speed due to the large formations, distances and bomb loads desired, it was conceived as a high speed aircraft at least when the turbos were added. An early B-17 could outrun a P-36 at 25,000ft by about 30 mph. and was roughly the same speed as a Hurricane I.
Granted 4 engine bombers rarely ran around at max speed but a B-17, not flying in formation, could cruise at about 260mph or better (on the pre "E") at 25,000ft using max lean (750hp per engine). Trying to build a single engine escort fighter with that kind of speed and altitude capability using the engines and fuel available in 1939-40 wasn't going to happen.

Checking other sources the Allison may have had 675hp or so at 25,000ft. the Merlin had 1330hp at 23,300ft , I doubt it lost 130hp in 1700ft. both figures without ram.


----------



## nuuumannn (Nov 5, 2017)

drgondog said:


> Could the P-51 have been delivered much sooner? NO.



Let's not forget that the Mustang was considered a 'British' aeroplane and was being built to a British requirement for the British services. It took a bit of convincing to get the USAAC/F to buy into it. The First P-51s, i.e. built for US needs were diverted from RAF Mustang production.


----------



## Graeme (Nov 6, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> The best Defense would have been a practical tail warning radar or device.



One response to Mr Foulkes' letter suggested a few other ideas...


----------



## stona (Nov 6, 2017)

Just to clarify, my point about the P-39 was not to suggest that it could have made an escort fighter, even with auxiliary tanks (which were to be external, not sure if they were to be disposable without double checking), but that the American leadership constantly dropped the ball on the concept of auxiliary fuel tanks.
While it's true that by and large the Americans accepted the British position, that no single engine aircraft could be developed to provide an escort fighter, it was something that was discussed time and time again through the 1930s. The lack of clarity in thinking to which I referred was the inevitable fall back position, essentially that the bombers were capable of defending themselves, despite mounting evidence that this was not so.
It took until 1943 for the USAAF to finally accept this harsh reality and it very nearly derailed the American contribution to the combined bomber offensive at a time when it was not exactly going well for the British either. It took even longer for the first US fighters in Europe to be fitted operationally with drop tanks in meaningful numbers. The first was a matter of the obstinacy that Slessor had noted in Washington, the second is far less excusable as there were opportunities to develop such systems long before the US even entered the war.
Cheers
Steve


----------



## drgondog (Nov 6, 2017)

nuuumannn said:


> Let's not forget that the Mustang was considered a 'British' aeroplane and was being built to a British requirement for the British services. It took a bit of convincing to get the USAAC/F to buy into it. The First P-51s, i.e. built for US needs were diverted from RAF Mustang production.



Nuuumaannn - while much of the statement is true, it should be noted that the contributions made by BPC technical review of NAA proposal were directed to self sealing tanks and armor, not the basic airframe. In the mind of Material Command, which wanted NAA to build more P-40's, the NAA entry was a bastard stepchild but NAA was very careful to design the Mustang to AAF published standards.

The first Mustang, already in production, that AAF suborned from the production line, was NA-91 Mustang IA. The IA became the P-51-1-NA with Recon Variant modified form a Mustang IA at factory, the -2-NA were Mustang IA's modified at Depots and two were retained as NA-101 XP-51B base airframes.

I only make this point to emphasize that British Purchasing Commission birthed the Mustang but did not change the proposal in ways that they did not change P-39D to P-400 with self sealing tanks and 20 mm gun - but not airframe. In the same way the British made the brilliant decision to install the new Merlin 61 into the Mustang I, NAA made the production changes to the Mustang IA to change the Cooling system, drop the wing, move carburation intake, install A-36/P-51A external wing racks, controls and fuel lines, modify upper and lower cowl to retain aerodynamic features. for serial production.

The British very much wished to license the manufacturing of the Mustang, particularly the P-51B and modify any feature they wished to better match RAF tactical doctrine. Had the Brits been able to do so, perhaps the Griffon would have been installed - but doubtful given long lead time to secure tooling - similar to P-51C or even Australia.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Agree Agree:
1 | Informative Informative:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## drgondog (Nov 6, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> To further Bill's post I looked through AHT and found, if I did the math right, that the engine installation of the P-51B/C weighed about 2992lbs (individual aircraft may vary) this does NOT include the cowling (possible the engine mounts) or the fuel system but does include controls, starter, propeller, radiator and oil system (empty).
> The book does not have the numbers for the Allison powered P-51, perhaps Bill does?
> 
> "What makes this worthwhile and pertinent to this discussion, is that according to the charts, the V-1650-3 made about 1200hp at 25,000ft (61in MAP) while the V-1710-39 made about 600hp at 25,000ft. The powerplant in the P-51B/C made double the power while *only* going up about 33% in weight. It was this change in the power to weight ratio of the powerplant that made the escort fighter fighter possible.
> ...


----------



## Shortround6 (Nov 6, 2017)

I have no idea why the US resisted the use of drop tanks as they had used quite a number of detachable even if not drop-able auxiliary fuel tanks in the early/mid 30s. You can find pictures of Curtiss P-6 fighters with and without tanks, Same for Boeing P-12s and their navy equivalent. Curtiss A-12s used them, as did the Curtiss Hawk III, perhaps others?
Some may have been drop-able in flight, others not?
Perhaps some bad experiences?


----------



## drgondog (Nov 6, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> I have no idea why the US resisted the use of drop tanks as they had used quite a number of detachable even if not drop-able auxiliary fuel tanks in the early/mid 30s. You can find pictures of Curtiss P-6 fighters with and without tanks, Same for Boeing P-12s and their navy equivalent. Curtiss A-12s used them, as did the Curtiss Hawk III, perhaps others?
> Some may have been drop-able in flight, others not?
> Perhaps some bad experiences?


SR - None of the tanks were designed for combat, pure ferry tanks and MC didn't embark on Spec/Bid/Test/Contract for 60, 75, 110 and 160 gallon tanks until after Arnold February 1942 Conference. MC forbade the use of external tanks for any purpose other than Ferry in non-combat zones prior to the introduction of the 'new tanks' which Kelsey clearly violated (and confessed to Arnold) for P-38 ferry to UK

Reactions: Informative Informative:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## Peter Gunn (Nov 6, 2017)

Man I'm going to feel stupid for asking but the difference between ferry tanks and drop tanks is...?

I assume one is pressurized perhaps?


----------



## drgondog (Nov 6, 2017)

Peter Gunn said:


> Man I'm going to feel stupid for asking but the difference between ferry tanks and drop tanks is...?
> 
> I assume one is pressurized perhaps?


Yes. But certain other features to be leak proof were also incorporated.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Nov 6, 2017)

The issue for me is that the 200 gallon (paper) belly tank for the P-47 wasn't tested and cleared for production until July 1943.
The 84 gallon (metal) belly tank wasn't even tested until August 1943 and the 108 gallon tank not until September.

Quite apart from the missed opportunities years earlier (and the Americans were by no means the only ones guilty of this) the realisation that something really had to be done didn't dawn until the US bombing offensive was on the verge of failure. It was a message rammed home in no uncertain terms with the losses on the Schweinfurt-Regensburg raid in August. This may have been a 'Saul on the road to Damascus' moment, rather like the Butt report was for the British, in the sense that it was suddenly obvious that what they were doing wasn't working or going to work.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Informative Informative:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## drgondog (Nov 6, 2017)

stona said:


> The issue for me is that the 200 gallon (paper) belly tank for the P-47 wasn't tested and cleared for production until July 1943.
> The 84 gallon (metal) belly tank wasn't even tested until August 1943 and the 108 gallon tank not until September.
> 
> Quite apart from the missed opportunities years earlier (and the Americans were by no means the only ones guilty of this) the realisation that something really had to be done didn't dawn until the US bombing offensive was on the verge of failure. It was a message rammed home in no uncertain terms with the losses on the Schweinfurt-Regensburg raid in August. This may have been a 'Saul on the road to Damascus' moment, rather like the Butt report was for the British, in the sense that it was suddenly obvious that what they were doing wasn't working or going to work.
> ...


Actually Steve - the initiative to seek combat tanks was an outcome of Arnold's Fighter conference in February 1942. The first combat tank was not the 200 gallon monstrosity, but the 108 gallon tank in September. It also required a field mod to pressurize. The last combat tank approved (of four priorities) was the 160 steel tank initially made by Lockheed.

The 8th Service Command/Hough were the drivers for the field external tank mods in summer 43 and Barney Giles, Arnold CoS was the driver for internal fuse tank increases at same period.

The 'alarm bell' was ringing quite loudly in the same mid 1943 timeframe, not during the Arnold Fighter conference more than a year earlier. The YB-40 was a desperate short term - easy mod sol'n - that didn't work, the P-51B production reached 100 in that period but clearly not yet operational in ETO, the P-38 operation reliability was a shambles - but offered some promise before deployment exposed the issues post Schweinfurt. 

Even Eaker and Spaatz saw the handwriting on the wall - but Eaker held out to the idea of attrition if he could just keep 600 bombers in the inventory - for which I believe was key reason to promote him 'out' of ETO.

Reactions: Informative Informative:
3 | Like List reactions


----------



## nuuumannn (Nov 6, 2017)

drgondog said:


> I only make this point to emphasize that British Purchasing Commission birthed the Mustang but did not change the proposal in ways that they did not change P-39D to P-400 with self sealing tanks and 20 mm gun - but not airframe.



Hi Bill, absolutely yes. My point was that there were prevailing attitudes within the USA that pointed to the fact that the Mustang was a 'British aircraft', so interest needed to grow from within the service (the USAAC) based on evidence, rather than just grabbing the thing and running with it. As we all know, it took time for the Mustang to gain a foothold, hence my response to your statement, which I was essentially agreeing with, that the P-51 was not going to be put into US service any sooner than it was at that time.



drgondog said:


> The British very much wished to license the manufacturing of the Mustang, particularly the P-51B and modify any feature they wished to better match RAF tactical doctrine. Had the Brits been able to do so, perhaps the Griffon would have been installed - but doubtful given long lead time to secure tooling - similar to P-51C or even Australia.



Yes indeed. Of course opening up Mustang production in Britain then raises the inevitable questions of by whom (I think Gloster was mooted), where and by consequence what get's displaced in favour of the Mustang and what impact does that have on things, but that's a different discussion for a different thread.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Koopernic (Nov 6, 2017)

Peter Gunn said:


> Man I'm going to feel stupid for asking but the difference between ferry tanks and drop tanks is...?
> 
> I assume one is pressurized perhaps?



On the early Me 109E an external ferry tank could be carried but it couldn’t be jettisoned and the pilots couldn't use them for combat. That's what I’ve always considered a ferry tank on a fighter. Some Me 109E1/B even had a bomb rack but weren't plumbed for fuel or the plumbing disconnect to allow jettisoning wasn't developed and tested. This is all rather odd since the Heinkel He 51 had drop tanks and was used during the Spanish civil war and had drop tanks. There is no way the Luftwaffe could have won the air battles over Britain in 1940 without drop tanks yet apart from small numbers drop tanks weren’t the standard till the Me 109E7 which arrived in small numbers at the end of the so called BoB where they could make no difference. The E7 was a very successful aircraft because of its bomb rack and drop tank.

The function of the Luftwaffe was to support the Army and as Germany lacked oil and resources and would always loose a long term war a fast and rapid war called Blitzkrieg or (Breakthrough by the British stragegists that invented it) was needed. A fast flying, fast climbing aircraft was needed to intercept at her borders and gain air superiority over the battlefield.

These were the ideas that dominatated. When WW2 started Germany had 8 Freya radar stations in operation (plus a few naval port based Seetakt and mobile Freya). This had risen to 20 by the Battle of France. Radar changed the Paradgyne to one where forcefull interception of the bomber was inevitable and this may not have had time to sink in yet neither in the Luftwaffe, RAF or USAAF.

It seems likely others in the USA had the same short coming and the drop tank, already technically proven, was eschewed.

Besides there was a reasonably long ranged USAAF pursuit aircraft, the P-38. It was an odd ball design whose thick inner wing (to create fuel storage space) helped create all manner of aerodynamic problems that delayed its entry into service.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Peter Gunn (Nov 7, 2017)

Thanks Bill and Koop, you know, I almost hesitate to post here anymore, you guys all make me feel real dumb most of the time.

So I'll follow the old "keep my mouth shut and ears open" rule, I must say though I sure do learn a lot here.

Reactions: Friendly Friendly:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## drgondog (Nov 7, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> On the early Me 109E an external ferry tank could be carried but it couldn’t be jettisoned and the pilots couldn't use them for combat. That's what I’ve always considered a ferry tank on a fighter. Some Me 109E1/B even had a bomb rack but weren't plumbed for fuel or the plumbing disconnect to allow jettisoning wasn't developed and tested. This is all rather odd since the Heinkel He 51 had drop tanks and was used during the Spanish civil war and had drop tanks. There is no way the Luftwaffe could have won the air battles over Britain in 1940 without drop tanks yet apart from small numbers drop tanks weren’t the standard till the Me 109E7 which arrived in small numbers at the end of the so called BoB where they could make no difference. The E7 was a very successful aircraft because of its bomb rack and drop tank.
> 
> The function of the Luftwaffe was to support the Army and as Germany lacked oil and resources and would always loose a long term war a fast and rapid war called Blitzkrieg or (Breakthrough by the British stragegists that invented it) was needed. A fast flying, fast climbing aircraft was needed to intercept at her borders and gain air superiority over the battlefield.
> 
> ...



Koop - the P-38 airfoil was the same as the F4U/F6F/FW190 --------->NACA 23016, NACA 23018, NACA 23015.6,NACA 23015
and the F8F had NACA 23018

All had Mach tuck issues at Mcr, all in the same range of dive velocities - and the P-38 wake turbulences issue was due to lack of filet between wing and fuselage. The venturi effect between boom and fuselage was the factor that accelerated the attainment of Mcr, not the airfoil thickness per se.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Nov 7, 2017)

"The first combat tank was not the 200 gallon monstrosity, but the 108 gallon tank in September. It also required a field mod to pressurize."

I hate to disagree, but I think the timeline I gave was correct. It is based on the 8th Air Force's own reports.

According to those reports, final tests on the 200 gallon 'pressed paper' tank took place at Bovington on *7th July *1943. The report notes that
_"As a result of these tests the Bowater Lloyd Co.(manufacturers of the tanks and fairings) the British Thermostat Co. (manufacturers of the pressure relief valve) and BAD (manufacturers of the rack) have already been given the go-ahead for full scale production."_

On *17th August*
_"The 75 gal. (actually 84 gallons) metal teardrop tank was installed and today was flight tested and jettisoned..."_
It was decided to convert the 56th FG as soon as possible as they already had the relevant _"Republic two point suspension kits" _available and because there was expected to be a shortage of the 200 gallon tanks.

A report of 3rd September noted
_"Installation and flight tests were conducted with the 108 gal. metal belly tank installation on P-47, *2 September 1943.*"_
Various problems with the installation were discovered, but the conclusion was that once these were addressed the tanks would be _"satisfactorily acceptable as a production auxiliary belly tank for the P-47 airplane."
_
I believe that the 200 gallon monstrosity was first, if only by a couple of months!









Cheers

Steve


----------



## Clayton Magnet (Nov 7, 2017)

drgondog said:


> Had the Brits been able to do so, perhaps the Griffon would have been installed


A Mustang III with 2000 horsepower would have been quite the beast


----------



## Shortround6 (Nov 7, 2017)

The 200 gallon paper tank was used first but problems prevented really widespread use or a large increase in radius, it seems that the tanks were only part filled as there were feed problems at high altitude? It seems the tanks were only used for the climb out (not take-off?), forming up and initial cruise and then dropped as the planes climbed past 15,000, on a later operation they were dropped at 22,000ft. 
It could take P-47 50-70 gallons just to climb from sea level to 20,000ft so this was a good boost but not the one that a 200 gallon tank would suggest. 
They were also using 75/85 gallon tanks from P-39s/P-40s and 10,000 tanks ares shipped from the US during this time period Late August/early September. I am not going to argue about dates shipped and dates received


----------



## Koopernic (Nov 7, 2017)

In regard to the issue of Oboe Bombing by the B-17 and in answer to Shortround6, Stona, Wuzak, drgndog etc etc.

Fist I’d like to note that the USAAF never gave up its ideal of precision and there was recognition of the limits of visual bombing but the USAAF wouldn’t compromise its tactics or strategy. It’s likely at an atavistic level it wouldn’t comprise its ideals or morality by bringing in under developed inaccurate solutions, it would rather operate in daylight an retain the hope and ideal of precision even though clouds and weather eliminated this perhaps 80% of the time in winter. There is evidence it worked in as far as Hermann Goerings Post war statement that US daylight raids often destroyed equipment that could not be replaced wheres housing could be replaced. We're likely dealing with a statistical issue where US daylight raids occasionally did achieve their ideals of precision but this success is swamped by averages.

Consider the “Shoran” blind bombing and navigation system that has its inception to 1938 (contract awarded in 1940). It worked on similar principles to Gee-H but was entirely an US development. Its deployment could certainly have been accelerated. SHORAN - Wikipedia

You can see this dedication to precision also in the AN/APQ-7 “Eagle” radar dating to 1941 which is the only WW2 ground mapping radar that truly can be called a blind bombing system rather than a navigation aid.

To Stona. I’m not great believer in the war era H2S. The 9cm versions shouldn’t have been introduced into service and reserved for submarine hunting as was argued at the time and only the 3cm version with gyro stabilisation antenna showed value outside of detecting the coast. Images taken of the 9cm H2S PPI scope that are genuine and not overlayed by maps and lines are quite poor.

Oboe itself offered a 50 yard accuracy and Gee-H a 150 yard accuracy. This is the measurement accuracy devoid of any other errors such as actually flying the aircraft along this path, time delays in responding to commands, bomb fall errors, low altitude cross winds effecting bomb fall, mapping errors, formation spread, targeting errors, confusion, equipment malfunction, training, fear etc.

The devil is in the details and obviously computing and automation mechanisms needed to be developed to convert the circular coordinates into cartesian coordinates that would allow easier free form bomb runs to make the system easier to use. Such systems apparently came in to use. These would eliminate the true causes of error.

The term “Mico-H” appears often in American War dairies in reference to blind bombing missions yet little is available on this system. To hazard a guess it appears to be Gee-H converted to microwave frequencies. Gee-H itself reused old Gee frequencies (around 1.5m) and equipment to accelerate deployment. New built US equipment would need no such expediency and could directly use microwaves.


Shortround6. In regards to B-17F service ceiling. You would have to admit that 9000m/30,000ft is a plausible attack altitude for a B-17F whose target is 500km/306 miles from the English coast.

10,000m/33,000ft is stretching it a bit but note that at a fuel consumption of about 1440bs/hour that less than 3600lbs is needed for the round trip after having achieved altitude over Britain and such a “B-17F” would be stripped of a moderate amount of weight, such as the waist gunners and the nose guns bar one 30 Caliber.

The Luftwaffe would be hard pressed to intercept in 1942 or even 1944. Ju 88R with their BMW 801 converted to run of Nitrous Oxide kits developed for the Ju 88S1 in the latter half of 1942 or Me 109 without radar but directed by Wurzbug radar. Both have severe operation limits.


The USAAF did have a escort fighter. It was called the P-38 and although it exhibited problems these were resolved. It at least shows a commitment to the escort fighter and the appreciation of its need even if the implementation was somewhat protracted.


----------



## drgondog (Nov 8, 2017)

stona said:


> "The first combat tank was not the 200 gallon monstrosity, but the 108 gallon tank in September. It also required a field mod to pressurize."
> 
> I hate to disagree, but I think the timeline I gave was correct. It is based on the 8th Air Force's own reports.
> 
> ...


Steve - you will note that the 200 gallon tank test (and ops) you pointed to for Hough July test pointed to 'non-pressurized' which by definition is not a combat tank. The 200 gallon tank would not function above 18-20K and jettisoned in combat despite 8th FC saying 'retain'.

It took another several weeks before Service Cmd modified engine to provide pressure pump to the externals. You are right about the 75 gallon tank preceding the 108 but the key was the pressure pump mod that were performed at BAD1 , then BAD2 for the Mustang before the mid block P-51B-5 arrived with factory fix in January, 1944.

Reactions: Informative Informative:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## drgondog (Nov 8, 2017)

Clayton Magnet said:


> A Mustang III with 2000 horsepower would have been quite the beast


 with Merlin 100 - it was a beast. but only a few modified by RAF to chase V-1. P-51H w/2200 Hp was also a beast


----------



## Koopernic (Nov 8, 2017)

Without pressure there is also no suction to raise the fuel.


----------



## Shortround6 (Nov 8, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> Shortround6. In regards to B-17F service ceiling. You would have to admit that 9000m/30,000ft is a plausible attack altitude for a B-17F whose target is 500km/306 miles from the English coast.
> 
> 10,000m/33,000ft is stretching it a bit but note that at a fuel consumption of about 1440bs/hour that less than 3600lbs is needed for the round trip after having achieved altitude over Britain and such a “B-17F” would be stripped of a moderate amount of weight, such as the waist gunners and the nose guns bar one 30 Caliber.
> 
> ...



There were three main problems with trying to operate B-17s at altitudes of 30,000ft and above and I am using the 30,000ft as a general benchmark, not something from official paper work.

There is a pilots manual for the B-17F available in the manuals section with lots of pages of charts. 

A B-17F at 'basic' weight went 41,300lbs this included 9 man crew, 9 .50 cal guns (only one in the nose, none in radio compartment) 3500rounds of ammo, 900lbs of Misc. equipement, 144 gallons of oil and 1500lbs for the outer wing tanks. 

6000lbs of bombs (pretty much internal max, the higher internal loads listed require 1600lb AP bombs of which only a few hundred were dropped in Europe, 7in steel Armour roofs being rather scarce. ) and 1728 gallons of fuel push the weight to 57,700lbs. 
Manual shows weights and ranges for a variety of loads including a pair of 4000lbs external. 

Charts vary on how much fuel was required for warm-up and take off from 132 gallons to 182 gallons???
there is another chart showing horizontal distance traveled and fuel used to climb to altitude at 5 different weights. at 55,000lbs it takes 150 miles and about 320 gallons to reach 30,000ft. There is a bit of cross over between the charts as the warm up and take off charts allow for climb out to 5000ft while the climb chart is from sea level. 

There are 'tactical' range charts but they are calculated and assume the aircraft has been magically elevated to the desired altitude with warm engines/oil and there are no headwinds. 

All of these charts or for a single airplane and not a formation. The larger the formation the more allowances that have to be made. 

the 2nd point was that the airplane and crew simply could not operate at the higher altitudes as originally intended due to the temperatures. Temperatures from a chart in a different book (in Fahrenheit) are 20,000ft -12, 25,000ft -30, 30,000ft -48, 35,000ft -66.

This is for a 59 degree day at sea level, decimals rounded off. Guns, radios, instruments,etc. froze and did not operate, windows frosted over, cabin heaters and even electric crew suits didn't keep up with temperature drop and so on. 

3rd was they found out pretty quick that bombing from 30,000ft wasn't anywhere near as accurate as they hoped. This was one of the main reasons which they canceled all the high altitude medium bomber projects.

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## drgondog (Nov 8, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> The USAAF did have a escort fighter. It was called the P-38 and although it exhibited problems these were resolved. It at least shows a commitment to the escort fighter and the appreciation of its need even if the implementation was somewhat protracted.



Koop - you are correct in the main. When performing to specifications, the P-38FG/H was the Best escort fighter combining range and overall high altitude performance in 1943. The problem is that the Intercooler design, the turbo limitations, the cockpit 'freezer', maintenance complexity, limited both operational availability at mission planning level as well as severe reliability issues in ETO high altitude ops.

The decision to re-route the 55th FG to ETO was made during Blitz Week in late July 1943 when the penetrations were daily and deep and the attrition rate steadily climbed above Q1 and Q2 levels. AAF planners were in a pinch on P-38 demand from Pacific and MTO and the P-51B-1 was just finishing first AAF Flight tests and advancing to Acceptance testing. The P-47D-1/-2 was just arriving with the aforementioned range issues in comparison to P-38. The 200 gallon tank breached the gap of forthcoming external 75/108 and 160 combat tanks - but none of the US fighters, including the P-51B-1 were yet modified to pressure the tanks in 1943 as a factory feature - leaving Col Hough and Service Command to their ingenuity.

So, the P-38G/H while the best on paper for the job, was not truly combat operational in context of reliability, mods to extend range (55 Gal LE Tanks), redesigned Intercooler/turbo system, dive flaps and boosted ailerons as a complete factory package for ETO until the P-38J-25 which only deployed to 9th AF in very late summer, 1944. The J-5/-10 mostly solved the turbo/engine reliability issue, the J-15 had the dive flap and production 55 gal LE tanks and kits were available for boosted flaps (but destroyed in FF incident by RAF en route to ETO in Dec 1943). The J, as modified in ETO, would have been excellent in fall of 1943. If the P-38J-10 w/LE tanks and dive flap kit had been available to say 5 FG in 8th AF in Jan 1944, it would have performed well for target escort - but probably never as effectively as the P-51B/C - in the ETO


----------



## stona (Nov 8, 2017)

The tank tested, 8th July, up to 33,000' was pressurised somehow. The pressure never dropped below 15-17 psi. This is the one which was subsequently cleared for production in the UK

The unpressurised tank was only considered useful up to 25,000', this is the one of which 1,156 were already in theatre having been shipped from the US.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Koopernic (Nov 9, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> There were three main problems with trying to operate B-17s at altitudes of 30,000ft and above and I am using the 30,000ft as a general benchmark, not something from official paper work.
> 
> There is a pilots manual for the B-17F available in the manuals section with lots of pages of charts.
> 
> ...



A lot of interesting information.

My point was that it takes only 3600lbs of fuel to to a round trip of 1000km/612 miles at around 30,000ft. IE 300 miles to target plus 300 miles back. You can take of with a full load of fuel 20,000lbs, it doesn’t matter, burn however much it off to get to 25,000ft and in the lightened state climb the additional 5000ft or more to get to 30,000ft plus. Then you start your mission to target. You’ll even have 60 miles of gliding ability to count into the reserve for the return. 

Surely getting rid of the waist gunners helps keep the cabin warm.

As far as accuracy goes. Radar bombing whether it was x-garaet or Oboe or Gee-H or Micro-H all gave an actual true speed over ground that allowed headwinds to be calculated and entered into the bomb fall calculation. The side ways crabbing I imagine was easy to calculate on x-garaet to give a cross wind and maybe Oboe as well. The main trick of the Norden was to calculate the wind drift of the bomber. If the electronics gives it to you all the better.


----------



## fastmongrel (Nov 9, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> the 2nd point was that the airplane and crew simply could not operate at the higher altitudes as originally intended due to the temperatures. Temperatures from a chart in a different book (in Fahrenheit) are 20,000ft -12, 25,000ft -30, 30,000ft -48, 35,000ft -66.
> 
> This is for a 59 degree day at sea level, decimals rounded off. Guns, radios, instruments,etc. froze and did not operate, windows frosted over, cabin heaters and even electric crew suits didn't keep up with temperature drop and so on.
> 
> 3rd was they found out pretty quick that bombing from 30,000ft wasn't anywhere near as accurate as they hoped. This was one of the main reasons which they canceled all the high altitude medium bomber projects.



Hadnt the RAF already found out about these problems in 1941. Did the information from the RAF get to the USA and what did the USAAF and Boeing do to try and fix the problems. Also why hadnt this been found during tests in the US surely the temperature over a US bombing range at 30,000ft is roughly the same as over France.


----------



## stona (Nov 9, 2017)

The theoretical accuracy of all these electronic aids, navigational or even the bomb sights themselves, were never represented in operational results, _not even close._

The results of US 'radar bombing' are there in black and white for anyone who wants to look them up, I've even posted a brief summary in this thread already. They do not make for easy reading.

In early 1945 the 8th Air Force was still, occasionally, not just bombing the wrong targets but the wrong cities. They were not the only ones.

When Bomber Command used blind marking techniques their accuracy was rarely better than that achieved by the Americans bombing through cloud (equally blind). There were systemic reasons why the results were not quite the same, but it's splitting hairs.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Nov 9, 2017)

fastmongrel said:


> Also why hadnt this been found during tests in the US surely the temperature over a US bombing range at 30,000ft is roughly the same as over France.



The Norden was broadly designed to operate in the 20,000' range. I'm unaware of any testing done in the US at much higher altitudes.
From 20.000' it was supposed to be able to achieve a CEP of just 50' and some bought into this myth. It fitted with the precision doctrine and the 'key node' targeting theory developed by the Americans. In an almost 'cart before the horse' way, through the mid/late 1930s, the Norden sight provided impetus to this doctrine and theory. Stephen McFarland's _'America's Pursuit of Precision Bombing'_ is a good source of information on the development of American doctrine.

In fact intrinsic errors in the sight itself meant that in 1944 75% of sights tested would only have been capable of a CEP of 280' from 20,000'.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Informative Informative:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## Shortround6 (Nov 9, 2017)

Koopernic said:


> A lot of interesting information.
> 
> My point was that it takes only 3600lbs of fuel to to a round trip of 1000km/612 miles at around 30,000ft. IE 300 miles to target plus 300 miles back. You can take of with a full load of fuel 20,000lbs, it doesn’t matter, burn however much it off to get to 25,000ft and in the lightened state climb the additional 5000ft or more to get to 30,000ft plus. Then you start your mission to target. You’ll even have 60 miles of gliding ability to count into the reserve for the return.
> 
> ...



From the Flight Operation instruction charts in the Manual for the B-17F,
600 gallons (3600lbs) will get you 600 miles at 30,000ft *IF* you are flying at 144mph IAS (230 true?) AND your gross weight is between 45,000 and 50,000lbs.
The chart for 50,000 to 55,000lbs gives a range of 500miles for 600 gallons.
In the first case the engines are running at 2050rpm, 30 in MAP and using 216 gallons an hour,
In the 2nd case the enignes are running at 2100rpm, 31 in MAP and using 251 gallons an hour.
Speed has dropped to 141 IAS.

B-17 waist guns went though at least 4 different set ups. This was maybe number 3??





There was a hatch that slide or hinged out of the way when in a combat area, please note the pop out wind deflector in an attempt to keep air currents from affecting the gunners aim, even if it didn't do much to keep him or the tail gunner warm.
Later B-17s got a Plexiglas window




This is the waist gun on the Version the British first used? or movie version?




getting usable waist guns was an ongoing evolution, not a "we tried that, forget it" situation. 

Problem with bombing from 30,000ft (or any high altitude) is that while you _may_ know what the wind is doing at the altitude you are flying at by measuring plane drift or even by electronic monitoring of planes position over time you have no idea of what the wind speed and direction is at intermediate altitudes. Bombing from 20,000ft cuts down (but sure doesn't eliminate) the possible errors. 

While not bombing I once was at a 600yd rifle match where there were 3 range flags flying from poles to give indications of wind direction and strength. One was pointing to the right, one was point left, one was hanging limp and there was a small dust devil in the parking area alongside the range. What wind value do you set on your sight

Reactions: Like Like:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## fastmongrel (Nov 10, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> What wind value do you set on your sight



You need a pair of these

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## stona (Nov 16, 2017)

I've had a chance to flick through the book mentioned above, and it makes for depressing reading.

Between 1930 and 1938 the Air Corps dropped over 200,000 bombs in training. The overwhelming majority of these drops came from 4,000 feet to 11,000 feet._ Less than three percent came from above 16,000 feet._ The Air Corps had no idea how their best bomb sight would perform from, say, 24,000 feet! The highest altitude included in the tables is 15,000 feet.
This data was used by the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) for creating the probability studies on which bombing doctrine was based.

I can't reproduce the whole tables here, but to give an idea of the accuracy calculated.
A B 17 flying at 135 mph was expected to achieve a radial error of 107 feet from 7,000 feet, or 144 feet from 10,000 feet.

Using these tables a study evaluated the requirements for destroying the Sault Ste. Marie locks between Michigan and Ontario (Lake Superior and the Lower Great Lakes). The conclusion was that nine 300lb bombs, carried by one medium bomber could do the job. It was this sort of study on which US bombing doctrine was based.

This was the mind set with which the Americans came into WW2 in Europe. It was deeply flawed, they honestly believed that would not bomb from 10,000 feet at 135 mph, and it would require one medium bomber and nine bombs to destroy targets similar to those in the study.
The reality was that they would be forced to bomb from in excess of 20,000 feet, attacked by fighters and flak, in poor conditions. It would require hundreds of bombers and thousands of bombs to destroy most targets. Often hundreds of bombers and thousands of bombs would fail to destroy the target.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Informative Informative:
2 | Like List reactions


----------



## Shortround6 (Nov 16, 2017)

I would say in defence of the US planners (and it is a very poor defence) that many other nations did the same sort of thing/s although perhaps to a lesser extent. The Germans/Japanese/Italians at least having some sort of war experience to reign in the wilder ideas of planes/bombs needed to get certain target effect/s. Although they too vastly over-rated both bomb effectiveness and accuracy. 

Of course targets also varied, Chinese cities of the 1930s being constructed much different than european cities let alone modern factories.


----------



## stona (Nov 16, 2017)

Shortround6 said:


> I would say in defence of the US planners (and it is a very poor defence) that many other nations did the same sort of thing/s although perhaps to a lesser extent.



It's a valid defence, everybody got the science of bombing seriously wrong in the inter war years.

What is less excusable is the tenacity with which the Americans held on to their doctrine in the face of the overwhelming evidence, supplied by the British and German experiences between 1939 and 1941, that it was deeply flawed.

Again, this was not an exclusively American failing, all the other combatant nations did something similar, but some did learn quicker than others.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## stona (Mar 26, 2018)

Koopernic said:


> The German night fighter crews tended to aim at an area between engine and fuselage which would tend to set the tanks alight. I read one night fighter pilots say they did this to give the bomber crew a chance to get out because the crew themselves weren’t subject to direct attack. I would say not firing into the bomb bay was also a motivation? Surely the night fighter feared detonating the bombers load. Nevertheless this method of attack would have produced survivors and evidence on many occasion.



Oblt. Heiz Roekker, St.Kpt. of 1./NJG 2 would support that contention.

_"At the beginning of 1944 upward firing guns (Schrage Musik - slanting music) were installed on our Ju 88 C-6s and R-2s. They were mainly two MG FF or two MG 151 firing at 70 degrees upward and operated by the pilot. The reflector sight was above him in the cabin roof. Although finding the enemy remained as difficult as ever, the actual shooting down was made considerably easier. Once a four-engined aircraft had been found, the Abschuss was almost 100 percent certain.The fact that aircraft flying below one's own level cannot be seen at night meant that the night fighter, some 100 metres below his enemy, had plenty of time to match his speed to that of his victim and follow his movements without being noticed. From below he also has a much larger target before him. My method was generally to aim at the port or starboard trailing edge of the wings and as I opened fire to push my nose slightly down, sending the burst forward through the wing, the fuel tanks and engines. The wing would then burst into flames at once. Swinging off to one side would take one out of the danger area, for one had to reckon with bomb jettisoning and explosions. I believe that this tactic enabled many of the seven man crews to escape by parachute as the fuselage itself was not usually hit."_

There is no evidence that more men managed to escape from a bomber destroyed in this way than any other. Basically the chances of escaping a burning and out of control bomber were not good. An analysis of four raids on Hamburg showed that of the 39 Lancasters and and 275 men shot down just 8 men survived (2.9%)! Overall the average odds were slightly better, 13.2% of Lancaster crews survived being shot down, 21.9% for the Halifax. being shot down over Germany or occupied territory gave a slim chance of survival and an even slimmer one of making a return. A man in a PoW camp can't provide useful intelligence to the RAF, and even those who did return rarely knew how they had been shot down.

Cheers

Steve


----------



## Jim Daigneau (Mar 26, 2018)

Fantastic discussion! In regards to fuel usage, the fuel used stated for power settings assumes steady power. The lead aircraft would achieve those figures but tail end charlie or the guys on the end of the whip would have used more fuel trying to keep position. For shorter missions probably not too big an issue but on the max range missions, the different fuel usage could mean the difference of making it to base or landing short somewhere (hopefully, not the Channel).
(Basis for statement: 3500 hours in A-4s, A-6s, FA-18s and F-16s. So I'm not a bomber guy. Don't hate me.)

Reactions: Agree Agree:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Zipper730 (Apr 2, 2018)

BombTaxi said:


> Yes and no. The RAF tried high-altitude daylight precision bombing with Fortess I's (B-17C) in early 1941. These raids were carried out unescorted at 30,000ft, and were disastrous - not just because of combat losses, but because the aircraft really weren't up to the task and the crews were not trained or equipped for high-altitude work.


Can you clarify what you mean by "not trained or equipped for high altitude work"?


> Ironically, the USAAF had told the British that the B-17C was not sufficiently well-armed for unescorted bombing over Europe, and they were dead right. When the B-17E and -F came along, the USAAF promptly ignored it's own advice in 1942 and Schweinfurt ensued.


The B-17E and F were way better armed than the -C. That said, they still weren't adequate for self defending operation.



Soundbreaker Welch? said:


> On the Army Air Force site it says the USAAF lost 5,548 heavy bombers. . . their losses were actually quite lower than the RAF night bombers, which was 10,000 night bombers lost.


Holy cow, I thought we'd have lost more...



davebender said:


> Switzerland had dozens of Allied heavy bombers parked on airfields by the end of the war. Some of them landed on purpose to opt out of the war.


Do you have anymore on that?



parsifal said:


> H2S and Monica radars were not critical to finding the targets, and in the case of H2S it was manifestly mis-used.


Which means that GEE, or Oboe should have been used most of the time with H2S used in the proximity of the target to make sure they're where the radio navigation aid says they should be before they continue to release ordinance?


> However, it was felt by the brass in England that the bombers needed the ability to guide themselves onto the target


Was this because they were concerned with a malfunction or spoofing?


> “_Oboe used two stations at different and well-separated locations in England to transmit a signal to a Mosquito Pathfinder bomber carrying a radio transponder. The transponder reflected the signals, which were then received by the two stations. The round-trip time of each signal gave the distance to the bomber.
> 
> Each Oboe station used the radio ranging to define a circle of specific radius, with the intersection of the two circles pinpointing the target. The Mosquito flew along the circumference of the circle defined by one station, known as the "Cat", and dropped its load (either bombs, or marking flares, depending on the mission) when it reached the intersection with the circle defined by another station, known as "Mouse". There was a network of Oboe stations over southern England, and any of the stations could be operated as a Cat or a Mouse as the need demanded._


The description, I'm not sure I mentally wrap my head around that... are you talking about each transmitter producing a ripple of energy and the intersection between the two ripples being the correct flight path? Or are you describing something else, and are there drawings one can find online?


> _The initial "Mark I" Oboe was derived from Chain Home Low technology, operating at 1.5 meters / 200 MHz. The two stations emitted a series of pulses at a rate of about 133 times per second. The pulse width could be made short or long so that it was received by the aircraft as a Morse code dot or dash. The Cat station sent continuous dots if the aircraft was too close and continuous dashes if the aircraft was too far, and from these the pilot could make the needed course corrections.
> 
> Various Morse letters could also be sent, for example to notify the aircraft crew that the Mosquito was within a specific range of the target. The Mouse station sent five dots and a dash to indicate bomb release._


So -.- or .-. indicated you were on course, .....- means "drop bombs"?


> _Along with the range restriction, an earlier system called Oboe, had another limitation: it could only really be used by one aircraft at a time. As a result, the British rethought Oboe, and came up with a new scheme named G-H (also given as "GEE-H") based on exactly the same logic, differing only in that the aircraft carried the transmitter and the ground stations were fitted with the transponder. In this manner, it operated in a similar manner to the currently employed civilian DME system, with the aircraft following a DME arc procedure on one set, whilst using another set (tuned to a different transponder as close to 90 degrees apart as geography permits) to determine the point of bomb release._


I didn't know GEE-H was a blind-bombing aid, though I knew you could guide 80 aircraft with it.


----------



## stona (Apr 2, 2018)

The 10,000 RAF bombers lost needs some qualification.

Operational losses for all Bomber Command aircraft were 8,953. That includes everything from Lancasters and Halifaxes to Blenheims and Whitleys.

There were a further 1,368 aircraft lost in operational crashes.

That gives a total of 10,321 for what are deemed operational losses. 

It is important to remember that Bomber Command commenced operations over Europe in September 1939, whereas the USAAFs did not start such operations until several years later.

Cheers

Steve

Reactions: Like Like:
1 | Informative Informative:
1 | Like List reactions


----------



## Milosh (Apr 2, 2018)

Slightly different numbers than what Steve posted.

Aircraft Type : Operational Losses by Night and Day
BC - Statistics

Summary Of Operational Statistics
Total Aircraft Lost 8,655 (2.58%)

In the ETO the Americans lost 6592 heavy bombers and 1553 medium and light bombers (total 8135).
Army Air Force Statistical Digest: World War II


----------



## stona (Apr 2, 2018)

Operational crashes, defined as aircraft which crashed in the UK while inward or outward bound on operational missions should be included in the total. How many of these aircraft were destroyed or written off is impossible to say.

Cheers

Steve


----------

