# Banzai!: General discussion of the Kamikaze and Ramming



## hurricane55 (Aug 4, 2012)

General Discussion about kamikaze attacks and intentional ramming of _all_ nations of WWII.

*Ramming/Suicide Ramming* was pioneered by damaged aircraft in early WWII (and likely before) in which the pilot was unable to return to base due to heavy damage to the aircraft, or otherwise and crashed his aircraft into the a ground target or a ship.

*Aerial ramming*, first surfacing in WWI, was when a pilot rammed his aircraft deliberately into another's, usually when they had run out of ammunition, or as a last resort. This and the above are not attributed to a certain nation, as many used the tactic during the war.

*Japan* pioneered the true kamikaze (_Divine Wind_) by sending up planes packed with explosives in 1944 (feel free to prove me wrong, if you can dig up info of suicide planes packed with explosives before this, but if you do so, provide a valid source) on suicide missions with the objective of ramming into Allied warships, thus resulting in the birth of the kamikaze.

*Germany's* Sonderkommando Elbe unit was tasked with ramming their aircraft into Allied bombers, attempting to decrease the enemies' pilots' morale, so bombers would be grounded long enough for the Me 262 jet fighter to be mass produced.

The *United States* attempted to ram a remote controlled B-24 into a Nazi supergun that could lob shells across the English channel into London from France if put into operation. The result was the bomber exploded in midair over England, killing the pilot who was preping the aircraft for the remote controller. However, shortly after the dismal failure, troops from the D-Day invasion found the gun abandoned for weeks. The project was, in many historians minds, too ambitious, and scrapped after the disaster.

All of these types, and other Ramming-related aerial WWII instances will be discussed in this thread.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 4, 2012)

The B-24 shouldn't be in the same pile. As stated "attempted to ram a *remote controlled *B-24 into a Nazi supergun." had this worked, the crew would have been long gone. The only reason why there were pilots flying the aircraft was to get it in the air (drone technology at that time was primitive and a full size drone had to be flown off the ground). Bottom line the crew in this example was never intended to be part of the guidance system,


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## hurricane55 (Aug 4, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> The B-24 shouldn't be in the same pile. As stated "attempted to ram a *remote controlled *B-24 into a Nazi supergun." had this worked, the crew would have been long gone. The only reason why there were pilots flying the aircraft was to get it in the air (drone technology at that time was primitive and a full size drone had to be flown off the ground). Bottom line the crew in this example was never intended to be part of the guidance system,


The thread includes ramming. It's not just discussion of kamikaze attacks, but also aerial and ground ramming by aircraft not intended for the role, except in that unique case, it was prepared for the attack. However, the B-24 was never built for ramming attacks, so it is acceptable in this thread. I will add to the description the pilot bailed out over England before though, good call.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 4, 2012)

hurricane55 said:


> The thread includes ramming. It's not just discussion of kamikaze attacks, but also aerial and ground ramming by aircraft not intended for the role, except in that unique case, it was prepared for the attack. However, the B-24 was never built for ramming attacks, so it is acceptable in this thread.


There were no pilots in it when it was "ramming." The other aircraft had pilots in them.


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## hurricane55 (Aug 4, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> There were no pilots in it when it was "ramming." The other aircraft had pilots in them.


Sorry, forgot to add that.


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## Jenisch (Aug 5, 2012)

hurricane55 said:


> attempted to ram a remote controlled B-24 into a Nazi supergun that could lob shells across the English channel into London from France if put into operation.



Uhmmm... I think the RAF would be the first to attack this gun, and very conventionally with some "tallboys".


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## CobberKane (Aug 5, 2012)

Ramming has occurred pretty much since day one in ariel warfare but so far as I know only the Japanese used suicide ramming as a formal tactic. The SonderKommando Elbe lot werre asked to volunteer for a mission with a "10% chance of survival", which might seem a bit optimistic but in fact of the six or seven pilots that got past the USAAF escorts and rammed a bomber at least a couple survived the impact and bailed out. Sure as hell none of the Japanese pilots who put their hands up for Kamikaze missions were under any illusions about how it was going to turn out.
The SonderKommando Elbe mission made absoulutely no difference to allied bombing of course, but the Kamikaze attacks in the Pacific caused real damage and a lot of concern. At the end of the day however, five hundered pounds of explosives delivered via a diving aeroplane is moving a lot slower than a five hundred pound free-falling bomb, with consequently less damage. This was particularly true for the British aircraft carriers, which had armoured decks and were far less vulnerable to these kinds of atacks than the American ships.


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## cimmex (Aug 5, 2012)

CobberKane said:


> five hundered pounds of explosives delivered via a diving aeroplane is moving a lot slower than a five hundred pound free-falling bomb, with consequently less damage. This was particularly true for the British aircraft carriers, which had armoured decks and were far less vulnerable to these kinds of atacks than the American ships.



Why, please explain. What speed has a free falling bomb?
cimmex


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## Shortround6 (Aug 5, 2012)

500lbs of explosive packed into a plane is going to do a lot more damage than a 500lb bomb because the 500lb HE bomb may only have around 250-350lbs of explosive in it. Weight of the bomb includes the bomb casing. Damage from the plane also includes what every fuel is left in the tank/s. 

Impact velocity of the bomb depends on the height dropped from, and at lower altitudes the speed of the plane when it was dropped minus the drag plus the remaining altitude to target. 

Armor piercing bombs were usually rated at a minimum height to be dropped from.


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## R Pope (Aug 5, 2012)

I saw a TV movie in which the oldest Kennedy brother was the B24 pilot who got killed testing the flying bomb setup. Any truth to this, or is it hype?


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## R Pope (Aug 5, 2012)

A bomb is designed to penetrate steel armour, where even a large plane would simply splatter all over the surface of an armoured ship. The Kamikazes did damage American carriers, but for the Brits, it was simply "Man the brooms!" Indeed, the extra fuel in the planes was more of a danger than the explosives, causing fires that seeped below decks.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 5, 2012)

R Pope said:


> I saw a TV movie in which the oldest Kennedy brother was the B24 pilot who got killed testing the flying bomb setup. Any truth to this, or is it hype?


True, and that's where I believe his reference comes from. We have a thread on Joe Kennedy and his mission.


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## Njaco (Aug 5, 2012)

Among that list along with Sonderkommando Elbe for Germany, I would add Sturmstaffel 1. They had swore to an oath that when all else failed, they would ram the enemy. I don't believe any ever did and it really wasn't taken seriously by the pilots. Part of the reason for the "Whites of their Eyes" emblem they wore.


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## hurricane55 (Aug 5, 2012)

R Pope said:


> I saw a TV movie in which the oldest Kennedy brother was the B24 pilot who got killed testing the flying bomb setup. Any truth to this, or is it hype?


Yes, the oldest Kennedy Brother, Joseph P. Kennedy, was the one killed.


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## stona (Aug 5, 2012)

If we're talking remote control ramming then the Luftwaffe's "Beethoven Gerat" or Mistel combinations must count.

Cheers

Steve


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## Shinpachi (Aug 5, 2012)

Kamikaze pilots were not ordered to join but asked as a volunteer though when they were asked they understood it as order.
However, believe or not, there were 'outlaw' old conservative pilots who rejected the ask. They were called Fuyo Squadron.

They were given old D4Ys to repair by themselves if they wanted to die for the nation.
They constructed a runway and even a house for them by themselves. 

They carried out effective night attacks repeatedly against the allied vessels to survive the war.
They are regarded as heros now.


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## bobbysocks (Aug 5, 2012)

the us used war weary b 17s and 24s as radio controlled "guided bombs". these were called APHRODITE by the usaac and the navy had a different code name for it but i cant remember it right now. a crew would take then off and then bail out shortly after. the drone would be controled by another heavy remotely. they tried to used them as bunker busters at sub pens in the frisian islands and other heavily fortifided places...they generally werent too successful. and yes...this was the mission joe kenedy was on when he died. he was piloting the drone on which prematurely denotated for some reason.

as for ramming the russians used this tactic often enough togive it a name ... "taran". the pilots would bail out and hopefully live to do it again. Siergiey Luganski is most famous for this.... 

WW II ACE STORIES


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## Njaco (Aug 5, 2012)

*22 June 1941*
At 0425 hours, Senior Lt. I. T. Ivanov of the 46th Fighter Regiment, destroys a He 111 by ramming the bomber over Rovno. Both planes crash and Lt. Ivanov is killed. 

At 0415 hours, Junior Lt. D. W. Kokoryev of the 124th Fighter Regiment knocks the tail off a reconnaissance Do 215 near Sambruv after the guns of his MiG-3 have jammed from attacking a Bf 110.


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## syscom3 (Aug 5, 2012)

Good info Shinpachi!


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## Shinpachi (Aug 6, 2012)

Thanks sys and guys for posting likes!
Sq. Leader Tadashi Minobe is said wrote his experience and philosophy as a professional serviceman in the postwar.
If I am successful to find it, I would like to introduce more details in the future.


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## CobberKane (Aug 6, 2012)

cimmex said:


> Why, please explain. What speed has a free falling bomb?
> cimmex


 
Good question! Obviously the answer depends on the bomb and the hieght it is dropped from. The British Grand slam was carefully engineered and streamlined and went supersonic before impact. I guess a 500lb pound bomb dropped from, say, 3000ft from a dive bomber would not be going that fast but I don't doubt it would be going a damm sight faster than a diving aircraft. Remember, aircraft are designed to generate lift and lift means drag, which in turn means that past a certain point the wings come off, which would kind of spoil the kamikaze pilots aim. Also, a bomb laden plane is a pretty big unit and the energy of the imact is going to be spread over a much larger area. A bomb does not produce lift and is structually much stronger - and much smaller. It stands to reason it's going to have much more penetrative power. Think if it as like being poked with a finger or poked with a needle - only one of them is going to make a hole in you.
Again, I'm open to more knowlegable contradiction, but my understanding is that all the kamikazes did to the British carriers was scorch the paintwork.

Anyone out there got any info on bomb velocities at time of impact? And how fast would a Kamikaze aicraft have been travelling? Not more that 200-300mph max, I'd think.


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## stona (Aug 6, 2012)

CobberKane said:


> understanding is that all the kamikazes did to the British carriers was scorch the paintwork.



A little more than that but they were much better equipped to absorb with Kamikaze attacks.

HMS Formidable is a good example. She was hit on the flight deck,by a Kamikaze on May 4th 1945. This caused no more than a large dent in the armoured deck but unfortunately a splinter passed down through the hangar deck and started a fire in a fuel tank. The fire was brought under control,the deck was repaired with concrete and steel plate and less than six hours after sustaining the hit Formidable was landing aircraft.

Steve


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## hurricane55 (Aug 6, 2012)

bobbysocks said:


> the us used war weary b 17s and 24s as radio controlled "guided bombs". these were called APHRODITE by the usaac and the navy had a different code name for it but i cant remember it right now. a crew would take then off and then bail out shortly after. the drone would be controled by another heavy remotely. they tried to used them as bunker busters at sub pens in the frisian islands and other heavily fortifided places...they generally werent too successful. and yes...this was the mission joe kenedy was on when he died. he was piloting the drone on which prematurely denotated for some reason.
> 
> WW II ACE STORIES


I believe the navy's code name was Anvil. You can read more about it in the description.


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## yulzari (Aug 6, 2012)

R Pope said:


> I saw a TV movie in which the oldest Kennedy brother was the B24 pilot who got killed testing the flying bomb setup. Any truth to this, or is it hype?



Indeed this is quite correct. It was just outside my father's village of Blythburgh and odd bits can still be occasionally found scattered around a wide area.


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## stona (Aug 6, 2012)

I was reading up on the Mistel attacks on the Oder and Elbe bridges and in a communique of 6 March 1945 from Generaloberst von Greim to his staff in Luftflotte 6 found a reference to

"Trials and missions by all other Luftwaffe technical means now under development such as "Wasserballon",the spraying of phosphorous or burning oil etc."

Now the Mistel attacks the bridges and elsewhere against shipping and possibly even bomber formations are well known but does anyone know if the Luftwaffe actually used "Wasserballon".

Cheers

Steve


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## tyrodtom (Aug 6, 2012)

CobberKane said:


> Good question! Obviously the answer depends on the bomb and the hieght it is dropped from. The British Grand slam was carefully engineered and streamlined and went supersonic before impact. I guess a 500lb pound bomb dropped from, say, 3000ft from a dive bomber would not be going that fast but I don't doubt it would be going a damm sight faster than a diving aircraft. Remember, aircraft are designed to generate lift and lift means drag, which in turn means that past a certain point the wings come off, which would kind of spoil the kamikaze pilots aim. Also, a bomb laden plane is a pretty big unit and the energy of the imact is going to be spread over a much larger area. A bomb does not produce lift and is structually much stronger - and much smaller. It stands to reason it's going to have much more penetrative power. Think if it as like being poked with a finger or poked with a needle - only one of them is going to make a hole in you.
> Again, I'm open to more knowlegable contradiction, but my understanding is that all the kamikazes did to the British carriers was scorch the paintwork.
> 
> Anyone out there got any info on bomb velocities at time of impact? And how fast would a Kamikaze aicraft have been travelling? Not more that 200-300mph max, I'd think.


A A6M2 had a never exceed speed of 410 mph, the later A6M5 had a never exceed speed of close to 450 mph. And any Zero could do well over 200 mph, at sea level, even with the 550lb bomb hung under it.

If you watched war time films of the actual attacks, most attacked from a dive, and i'm sure most of those pilots weren't too concerned with that never exceed speed in their final dive.


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## kettbo (Aug 6, 2012)

CobberKane said:


> but my understanding is that all the kamikazes did to the British carriers was scorch the paintwork.



probably a good candidate for the "WW2 Myth" thread

oh yes, some heavy damage but not apparent right off

Short term, there are advantages to the British Armored Deck, but only if your carrier is being bombed or hit with Kamakizes. Lots of compromises to the ship design to achieve this DEFENSIVE capability such as less offensive power due to smaller air group thus fewer fighters. As an aircraft carrier's goal is to bring air power into an area, seems to me that arriving with 2/3 the planes a USN Carrier carries could be a disadvantage. An advantage, again, once a hit is received of the small RN Air Group is that there less things that can burn are on the ship; fewer planes, less ordnance, and less aviation fuel. Then consider what the RN could have done with more strike capability; Taranto, Matapan, and elsewhere. 
Armored Deck does not defend against enemy torpedo planes, however, extra fighters DO. 
Lots to think about when designing a warship especially the conflicting requirements of an aircraft carrier.

I have these article in my favorites, shall present it to you for your due consideration. Discusses the LONG TERM outlook for the armored deck carriers, structural deformities rendered nearly all of them UNFIT for postwar service.. Hmmmm, not the case for the USN Carriers. Then there is that lower hanger deck height to consider with the armored deck and the arrival of the larger Jet-powered planes post war. Lots of info and thoughts in these articles very good read too. The 2nd article discusses the Armored Box.

2 articles here

Were Armored Flight Decks on British Carriers Worthwhile?


edit
another article and stats here

http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-042.htm


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## RCAFson (Aug 6, 2012)

kettbo said:


> probably a good candidate for the "WW2 Myth" thread
> 
> Short term, there are advantages to the British Armored Deck, but only if your carrier is being bombed or hit with Kamakizes. Lots of compromises to the ship design to achieve this DEFENSIVE capability such as less offensive power due to smaller air group thus fewer fighters. As an aircraft carrier's goal is to bring air power into an area, seems to me that arriving with 2/3 the planes a USN Carrier carries could be a disadvantage. An advantage, again, once a hit is received of the small RN Air Group is that there less things that can burn are on the ship; fewer planes, less ordnance, and less aviation fuel. Then consider what the RN could have done with more strike capability; Taranto, Matapan, and elsewhere.
> Armored Deck does not defend against enemy torpedo planes, however, extra fighters DO.
> ...



Some other articles worth reading:
Armoured flight deck - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

and an excerpt from the USS Franklin's damage report:



> As a result of study of damage sustained by various British carriers prior to our entry into the war, two important departures from traditional U.S. Navy carrier design were incorporated in the CVB Class, then still under development. HMS ILLUSTRIOUS in an action off Malta on 1 January 1941 was hit by several bombs, three of which detonated in the hangar space. Large fires swept fore and aft among parked planes thereby demonstrating the desirability of attempting to confine the limits of such explosions and fires by structural sectionalization of the hangar space. On the CVB Class the hangar was therefore divided into five compartments separated by 40 and 50-pound STS division bulkheads extending from the hangar deck to the flight deck, each fitted with a large door suitable for handling aircraft. It is hoped that this sectionalization, in conjunction with sprinkler and fog foam systems, will effectively prevent fires from spreading throughout the hangar spaces, as occurred on FRANKLIN on 30 October and 19 March. The damage experiences of several British carriers, which unlike our own were fitted with armoured flight decks, demonstrated the effectiveness of such armour in shielding hangar spaces from GP bombs and vital spaces below the hangar deck from SAP bombs. Accordingly, the CVB Class was designed with an armoured flight deck consisting of 3-1/2-inch STS from frames 46 to 175 with a hangar deck consisting of two courses of 40-pound STS between frames 36 and 192. Although none of the CVB Class carriers were completed in time to take part in war operations, the effectiveness of armoured flight decks against Kamikaze attacks was demonstrated by various carriers attached to the British Pacific Fleet. Reference (k) reports two such interesting cases. The VICTORIOUS was struck by three Kamikaze aircraft, two of which ricocheted off the armoured flight deck and over the side, causing no important damage. The third carried a bomb which detonated at frame 30 starboard at the butt of the 3-inch flight deck armour with 1-1/2-inch "D" quality (equivalent to HTS) steel. It does not appear that the Kamikaze actually struck the ship. The bomb detonation, however, depressed the 3-inch deck slightly but did not tear it open. On the other hand, the 1-1/2-inch "D" quality deck plating was ripped open over a total area of about 25 square feet. Two days were required for temporary repairs, at the conclusion of which the ship was fully operational. HMS FORMIDABLE was hit by two bombs, the first of which struck and detonated on the flight deck 9 feet to port of the center-line at frame 79, directly over a deep bent and at a juncture of three armoured plates. The armoured deck was depressed over an area 24 feet long and 20 feet wide. Maximum depression was 15 inches. Adjacent bents spaced 12 feet forward and aft of the point of impact were slightly depressed. A hole 2 square feet in area was blown in the 3-inch deck. Three fragments penetrated downward through the ship into the center boiler room. The damage in this boiler room, which was not described, temporarily reduced speed to 18 knots. The second bomb struck and detonated on the centreline of the flight deck at frame 94. The 3-inch deck and deep bent directly below the point of impact were depressed about 4-1/2 inches and one rivet was knocked out. However, the ship was fully operational within about 5 hours, including flight operations.
> [email protected] - War Damage Report #56 - CV-13 Franklin





> The main armor carried on Enterprise is the heavy armored flight deck. This was to prove a significant factor in the catastrophic fire and explosions that occurred on Enterprise's flight deck in 1969. *The US Navy learned its lesson the hard way during World War II when all its carriers had only armored hangar decks. All attack carriers built since the Midway class have had armored flight decks.*
> Cracknell, W.H, Cmdr USN, Warship Profile 15, USS Enterprise (CVAN 65) Nuclear Attack Carrier, p56





> Eadon, Stuart, editor, Kamikaze, The Story of the British Pacific Fleet, Worcester 1991, ISBN 1-872017-23-1, p.338-339: In nine kamikaze strikes "...The Fleet Air Arm suffered...44 personnel killed...By contrast Bunker Hill lost 387 dead in the Kamikaze attack on 11th of May 1945."





> US carriers also suffered considerably heavier casualties from kamikaze strikes; for instance, 389 men were killed in one attack on USS Bunker Hill, greater than the combined number of fatal casualties suffered on all six RN armoured carriers from all forms of attack during the entire war. Eight kamikaze hits on five RN carriers resulted in only twenty fatal casualties while a combined total of 15 bomb hits, most of 500 kg weight or greater, and one torpedo hit on 4 carriers caused 193 fatal casualties earlier in the war – striking proof of the protective value of the armoured flight deck
> Kamikaze - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



USS Franklin suffered over 1200 casualties from two 550lb bomb hits, bombs that would have been rejected by an armoured flight deck. Franklin was also dead in the water for over 12 hours after the attack.

The first sentence of the first quote makes it pretty clear that the USN would have adopted armoured flight decks if they had been able to study the beneficial effects of armoured flight decks prior to the Essex class having finished their design stage. 

The Essex class displaced 27500 tons (38000 tons full load) and typically carried 90-110 aircraft. The RN's Implacable class displaced 23500 tons (33000 tons full load) and carried 70-80 aircraft. The difference in aircraft carried per ton is pretty minor.

USN Armoured carrier designs that were looked at as alternatives to Essex always featured shorter but fatter hulls, that had the side effect of providing superior torpedo protection.

Illustrious did not use a US style deck park during the Taranto attack, but she could have nearly doubled her strike numbers if she had done so, and this had nothing to do with her armoured flight deck.

AFAIK, the UK was bankrupt after WW2 and many ships, including carriers were scrapped because of lack of money, where the US was flush with cash and could afford to even repair Franklin, although she never saw service again.


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## stona (Aug 6, 2012)

Even I,who knows bugger all about ships,found those articles interesting. Thanks both for the postings.
Steve


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## JoeB (Aug 6, 2012)

CobberKane said:


> Good question! Obviously the answer depends on the bomb and the hieght it is dropped from. The British Grand slam was carefully engineered and streamlined and went supersonic before impact. I guess a 500lb pound bomb dropped from, say, 3000ft from a dive bomber would not be going that fast but I don't doubt it would be going a damm sight faster than a diving aircraft.
> 
> Anyone out there got any info on bomb velocities at time of impact? And how fast would a Kamikaze aicraft have been travelling? Not more that 200-300mph max, I'd think.


You can roughly calculate this in a spreadsheet pretty easily with a few inputs. Assume a divebomber has vertical component of velocity 250mph (367fps). Assume the bomb's terminal velocity is 650mph=953fps (might be higher as in example you gave, but not neccessarily for a smaller stubbier bomb, anyway choose any reasonable value you want). In a vacuum the acceleration is 32 fps/s, at terminal it's zero where the air resistance and bomb weight cancel out. Assume the resistance varies as the square of the speed. In the first one second, first row of the spreadsheet, calculation the starting resistance as (367/953)^2 as % of the bomb's weight=14.8%, therefore starting accelaration is 85.2% of 32 or 27.26fps^2 and roughly take that as constant over the 1 sec interval. The bomb speeds up to 393fps in that first second, and don't take that as constant but average it with the starting speed to get 380, travels 380 ft in that first second. Now for the 2nd 1 sec interval recalc the resistance and acceleration starting with 393, and repeat the process for each row of the spreadsheet.

After 5 secs the bomb is going 337mph and has travelled 2100ft, a plausible release altitude for a dive bomber. And with no air resistance it would only be going 359mph and travelled 2200', so the air resistance doesn't even make much difference in this case. But a bomb dropped from low altitude even in a moderate speed dive still won't be going any faster than a fast diving plane with the bomb attached. 

I think your 250-300mph though would probably be closer to an average kamikaze a/c speed at impact than the max dive speed of a Zero. But it would vary tremendously. Some 'special attack' a/c were Type 4 Fighters ('Frank'), a few were slow biplanes. And the approach angles varied a lot, but as a rule AFAIK a long steep high speed dive was not a common tactic; a lot of the a/c came in shallow, or entered the terminal dive from fairly low altitude.

These two links give a list of ‘special attacks’ by IJA and IJN respectively. It’s in Japanese but the following quick key should make it mainly readable without knowing Japanese (set view>encoding to ‘Japanese autoselect’, if your browser doesn’t automatically):
—¤ŒR“ÁU
_•—“ÁU‘à
First column is date, two digit year of the Showa reign, month, day, 19=1944, 20=1945
The second column is the attacking unit
The third column gives number and type of a/c. The initial number if Arabic is self explanatory, ie 97 or 99 otherwise Chinese numerals零, 一, 二, 三, 四, 百 are 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 and 100, sometimes followed by 式= type, but in any case that number is the year type
Then followed by the kind of plane, examples:
重 heavy (bomber)
双軽 twin light (as in Type 99 Twin Light, ‘Lily’)
戦 fighter
襲 assault
艦爆 carrier bomber
So on the Army page 四式戦 Type 4 Fighter (Frank), 一式戦 Type 1 Fighter (Oscar), and 99 襲 Type 99 Assault (Sonia) are common, though there are many other types.
On the Navy page older a/c have year types but later ones names, eg.
彗星 Susei (aka Judy)
銀河 Ginga (aka Frances)

Anyway you can copy>past>google those a/c types and a page will generally come up with the English name(s). 
After the type is the Arabic number of machines(機) in the attack
So for example among navy attacks, third row, first of the 8 attacks:
19.10.25　 「敷 島 隊」　 零戦６ 機
Oct 25 1944, Shikishima Unit, 6 Type Zero Fighters; the rows under that date and columns further to the right give the units and a/c composition of the other 7 ‘special attacks’ that day.

Joe


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## RCAFson (Aug 6, 2012)

kettbo said:


> 2 articles here
> 
> Were Armored Flight Decks on British Carriers Worthwhile?
> 
> ...



The first article, above, states:


> We also have to be very careful when looking at apparent ship histories in the 1945 - 1955 period. There is a lot of statistical deceit used here (Eric Grove in "Vanguard to Trident" makes an eye-opening read). Ships that were apparently in good condition and in service were actually laid up or otherwise non-operational. Illustrious is a good example. Her Ship's Cover is quite clear that she had never recovered from the damage she'd taken in WW2 and was limited to around 22 knots for all practical purposes. That's why she was used for experimental purposes - she wasn't much use for anything else. Indomitable is another example of statistical deceit. After her 1950 gasoline explosion (shortly after she finished her refit), she was completely useless and had to be towed to Spithead for the Coronation Review. As soon as that was over, she went to the breakers...
> 
> Starting with the Forrestal class, the size of the carriers meant that stress requirements forced the abandonment of the external hangar and hangar deck as strength deck concepts. A shallow hull of that size is a design impracticality. In the Forrestal and after, the flight deck is the strength deck, protection considerations had no influence whatsoever on the flight deck design. *In fact, these carriers do not have armored flight decks.* By the way, there is a construction trick that allows the Forrestal and later carriers to have their flight decks as strength decks and deck edge lifts without compromising hull strength. That trick is still highly classified.



This is complete balderdash! It states that Illustrious was limited to 22 knots, post war while Indomitable had to be towed to Spithead. 

USS Forrestal and all US CVs from Midway onward have armoured flight decks! This article is a complete fraud and the authors obviously don't know what the heck they are talking about!!!
Illustrious:


> After the war, she was given the role of a training and trials ship, and she continued to be plagued by vibration problems which were partially cured by new propeller designs. In 1946, she had a new five-bladed propeller fitted to the centre shaft.[4] She was refitted and modernised from January to August 1948, and made 29 knots (54 km/h; 33 mph) on trials with 110,600 shp at 227.5 rpm. In 1950, on full power trials, she made 29.2 knots (54.1 km/h; 33.6 mph) with 111,480 shp at 225.1 rpm.[4] She was decommissioned at the end of 1954, sold on 3 November 1956, and finally, after a successful career, scrapped at Faslane.
> HMS Illustrious (87) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



Indomitable:



> The Indomitable returned to the UK in November 1945. The following year she carried the Great Britain national rugby league team to Australia on their first post-war tour, earning the team the nickname, 'The Indomitables'. In 1947, she was placed in reserve, and then given a refit that took three years, from 1947 to 1950. Late in her refit her boilers were discovered to have only 10 years of life, and the engine spaces had to be torn apart and rebuilt to replace the boilers. Upon the completion of her refit she returned to operational duty with the Home Fleet in far cooler climates than her wartime operations. On 3 February 1953, she was badly damaged by an internal fire and explosion; the damage was later covered in concrete, and was never repaired. She *sailed* to Elizabeth II's Coronation Review, *then did deck landings in the channel, with experimental landing lights replacing the batman.* She returned to the reserve fleet. In October 1953 she was placed in unmaintained reserve. She was sold for scrap in 1955.
> HMS Indomitable (92) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



Forrestal:


> Survivability Enhancements Based on World War II Experience
> Several survivability features recommended by the Navy’s World War Two
> damage reports were incorporated in Forrestal. Forrestal was built with an armored
> flight deck, constructed of thick, high-strength steel. World War Two experiences
> ...



It is pretty incredible that the article *Were Armored Flight Decks on British Carriers Worthwhile?*remains on the web, as parts of it seem to be completely fictional!


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 6, 2012)

apropos the topic thread: Found this on Miss Hannah's Wikipedia page following a hot link from the Eric Brown's page: 

During the winter of 1943-44 she was assigned to the development of suicide aircraft and, under the command of SS-Obersturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny, was the first founding member of the *SS-Selbstopferkommando Leonidas (Leonidas Squadron)*. This project, *in which the pilots flew manned bombs and died during the mission, similarly to the later use of Tokkōtai ("Kamikaze") by the Japanese, was proposed by Hitler on 28 February 1944*. It is probable that the idea originated with Reitsch during her testing of the Messerschmitt Me 163 in 1942:[citation needed] she was the first to volunteer for the newly formed unit. The programme met with considerable resistance from the Luftwaffe high command and was never activated: even Hitler was initially reluctant to accept its use. The unit was disbanded one year later.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 6, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> USS Forrestal and all US CVs from Midway onward have armoured flight decks! This article is a complete fraud and the authors obviously don't know what the heck they are talking about!!!!



100% correct. I knew people who served on the Forrestal (one during the fire) and it was a known fact the flight deck was armored. There were even jokes about this after the fire.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 6, 2012)

It would have been very difficult to find a decent amount of German pilots with the sole purpose of doing suicide missions. It is just not in the German culture.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 6, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> 100% correct. I knew people who served on the Forrestal (one during the fire) and it was a known fact the flight deck was armored. There were even jokes about this after the fire.



My class officer had half his face scarred by the Forrestal fire. He was a RIO about to climb into an F-4 fairly aft in the pack near the rounddown. According to him, a nearby member of the deck crew, a Chief Petty Office saw him garbed in his survival gear including his inflatable life vest and tackled him taking them both over the side into the water. They were picked up out of the water by the plane guard. He claimed the CPO's rapid thinking and action saved both their lives.


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## CobberKane (Aug 6, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> A A6M2 had a never exceed speed of 410 mph, the later A6M5 had a never exceed speed of close to 450 mph. And any Zero could do well over 200 mph, at sea level, even with the 550lb bomb hung under it.
> 
> If you watched war time films of the actual attacks, most attacked from a dive, and i'm sure most of those pilots weren't too concerned with that never exceed speed in their final dive.


 
I suspect these dive figures apply to the Zero operating at its ideal altitude, as is often the case with figures cited for maximum speed. If any Zero, with its light weight and low wing-loading, got close to these velocities at sea level about the only thing the pilot could be confident of hitting would be the Pacific Ocean in general. Likewise, all the footage I have seen of Kamikaze attacks involved the aircraft approaching at a shallow angle and none of them appeared to be travelling at anything like 400 mph plus.
A bomb hits at higher speed and penetrates further before exploding. A Kamikaze has one advantage only – it’s guidance system


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## tyrodtom (Aug 6, 2012)

No aircraft ( except maybe a Swordfish) has to be in a vertical dive to exceed it's never exceed speed, without dive brakes speed is going to build up quick even in a 30 degree dive.

It's pretty hard to judge speed from a film taken from a distance, especially over water there's nothing to judge it by. Plus a lot of that combat film is shown in slow motion.

Even though they were mostly inexperienced pilots, they'd have to realize the faster they went, the faster they got thru the flak, the less time they were exposed to the danger of AA fire. Their only defense was speed .

There is a picture of a Judy coming in with it's dive brakes out, but it's hard to tell the degree of the dive from the picture.

If they could have co-ordinated multiple attacks from different angles at the same time, they probably would have made more strikes. But the intercepting fighters usually has the surviving Kamakazi in such chaos, they had no chance to co-ordinate.


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## VBF-13 (Aug 7, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> A A6M2 had a never exceed speed of 410 mph, the later A6M5 had a never exceed speed of close to 450 mph. And any Zero could do well over 200 mph, at sea level, even with the 550lb bomb hung under it.
> 
> If you watched war time films of the actual attacks, most attacked from a dive, and i'm sure most of those pilots weren't too concerned with that never exceed speed in their final dive.


They come in too hot in those Zeroes and they risk tearing off the wings and going spinning into the ocean. Another reason they want to keep their dive-speeds under control is they want to hit their targets. I've heard of both fates, the aircraft coming apart from the stress of the dives, and just plum missing their targets. I think the good success rate the kamikazes enjoyed had more to do with the vast numbers that were launched than anything else. I wonder if any empirical data survived on those numbers. I know how many got through, but not how many tried.


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## kettbo (Aug 7, 2012)

More on the RN and USN Carriers....lots more

Critique of Slade and Worth's articles:Were Armored Flight.. in Aircraft Carriers Forum


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## tyrodtom (Aug 7, 2012)

VBF-13 said:


> They come in too hot in those Zeroes and they risk tearing off the wings and going spinning into the ocean. Another reason they want to keep their dive-speeds under control is they want to hit their targets. I've heard of both fates, the aircraft coming apart from the stress of the dives, and just plum missing their targets. I think the good success rate the kamikazes enjoyed had more to do with the vast numbers that were launched than anything else. I wonder if any empirical data survived on those numbers. I know how many got through, but not how many tried.



With about every gun in the fleet putting rounds in the air, how could anybody venture a guess that a diving fighter had structural failure?


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## JoeB (Aug 7, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> There is a picture of a Judy coming in with it's dive brakes out, but it's hard to tell the degree of the dive from the picture.


You can see the angle in this picture montage video, from the smoke trail after it hit, around 28 seconds in, not so steep:
Kamikaze Pilot Strikes USS Essex - November 25, 1944

The tail number of the a/c is visible identifying it as that flown by Yoshinori Yamaguchi of the Yoshino Special Attack Unit, from Malabacat a/f Philippines, hit USS Essex Nov 25 1944. Note that this attack is listed on the link I gave in previous post but with the wrong type of a/c, says Type 99 Carrier Bomber rather than actual radial Susei (Judy) type.

Joe


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## RCAFson (Aug 7, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> With about every gun in the fleet putting rounds in the air, how could anybody venture a guess that a diving fighter had structural failure?


The following table indicates the altitudes at which suicide planes first were sighted by ships during the period October-May:

This table summarizes approximate height of kamikazes at first detection:



> Altitude-------------Oct.-Jan.----Feb.-May
> ---------------------Percent	---Percent
> Low (less than 500')	38----35
> Intermediate (500'-2,999')	14----41
> ...



You can see that from Oct 44-Jan 45, 52% of kamikazes came in very low, and from Feb-May 45, 76% came in very low (at least what I would consider very low). This was probably because of need to get under the radar coverage. Low altitude means that diving attacks can't build up that much airspeed. IIRC, the average kamikaze pilot simply didn't have the skills to make high speed, high altitude dives, so a low altitude lower speed approach was typical.


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## tyrodtom (Aug 7, 2012)

If the pictures are in sequence, it looks like the first picture has him in about a 45 degree dive, then he levels out to correct, then steepens again just before impact,
But the last 3 pictures have no positive horizontal line to judge from. You don't know if or not the photo is cropped, so you can't judge horizontal from the photo margins.


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## tyrodtom (Aug 7, 2012)

We'd have to ask some of the very experienced pilots on here as to how much speed a WW2 era aircraft could pick up from a 250 mph speed at 500 ft, if he went into a steep dive.
From my limited experience in light aircraft, you pick up speed pretty quick.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 7, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> the average kamikaze pilot simply didn't have the skills to make high speed, high altitude dives, so a low altitude lower speed approach was typical.


And what skills do you think would have been required???


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 7, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> We'd have to ask some of the very experienced pilots on here as to how much speed a WW2 era aircraft could pick up from a 250 mph speed at 500 ft, if he went into a steep dive.
> From my limited experience in light aircraft, you pick up speed pretty quick.



It will depend on the type of aircraft. For the most part a 500' of altitude would hardly be noticible at 250 mph, at least in a higher performing GA airplane. You could lose 500' "in a flash" just by allowing the aircraft to get out of trim or by putting a little pressure on the stick. Taking a "wag" at this however, if you were to point the nose straight down at 250 I'd say you might see 300 by the time you lose 500' or slam into the ground (which ever comes first.


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## JoeB (Aug 7, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> If the pictures are in sequence, it looks like the first picture has him in about a 45 degree dive, then he levels out to correct, then steepens again just before impact,
> But the last 3 pictures have no positive horizontal line to judge from. You don't know if or not the photo is cropped, so you can't judge horizontal from the photo margins.


Look at the later pictures of the plane's smoke trail after it hit, not the actual photo's of the plane still in flight. It's definitely the same event; and the angle is pretty clear from that smoke trail.

As was mentioned in another post, suicide a/c usually approached from at most moderate altitudes; some dived steeply eventually but only from a pretty low starting point. Anyway it's clear that crashing at particularly high speeds was not a particular goal of 'special attack' a/c but just evading fighter interception and AA and hitting ships. It's true that a high speed target was harder for AA than a slow one all else equal, but all else wasn't equal if predictable higher altitude approach made the a/c easier to detect and intercept; and also manuever was hard for AA gun systems to cope with, it still is.

John Toland's "The Rising Sun" had a chapter on a kamikaze pilot who narrowly missed his target at a shallow dive angle and survived to be captured. It wasn't that hard to miss, though outside the freak occurence of the pilot surviving, there was no way to tell a near miss that was just a miss from one where the pilot or controls had been disabled by AA fire just in time to cause the miss.

Re: your question about how much the plane would accelerate, you can do a rough calculation of that similar to the one I outlined in post 30. Substitute a lower terminal velocity for the plane, perhaps 500mph at sl, and add the plane's engine's effect on acceleration, but that's not big for a WWII prop plane, 'thrust/weight' at already high speed might be 25% or less. Under those rough assumptions a plane going 250mph at 3kft will be going around 360 when it hits the water in a vertical dive, and that's neglecting entirely the time and energy bleed off in making high speed partial split-S to go from horizontal to vertical, plus as we see the actual dive angles were not usually near vertical.

Joe


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## RCAFson (Aug 7, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> And what skills do you think would have been required???


 
First off, flying an advanced aircraft like a Zero or Judy at high speed and high altitude requires a lot of navigational skills, but also things like the ability to control an advanced engine system, oxygen system and radio even, since target selection might have to be made by other aircraft. However, consider a pilot flying a Zeke, who begins a high speed, 45deg dive from 15000 ft. The target will be about 7500 yds, slant range, away. Even at 200 yds per second (360 knots), it will take about 38 seconds to impact the target. A 27 knot target will move about 600 yds during this time, and if it turns as well, this sets up a rather complex geometry, where the pilot must be continuously correcting his flight path, and has to do so in an aircraft where the controls are becoming very heavy, and may be nearly immobile. If the pilot does fly this kind of approach he has only one chance to hit the target since a go around will not be possible. IMHO, high speed high altitude dives would have been reserved for pilots with fairly advanced flight training.

OTOH, flying more slowly, at low altitude, gives the pilot more control and better probability of hitting a radically maneuvering target, because the control corrections can be made with more time before impact.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 7, 2012)

During training Kamikazes were taught to attack from the vertical and horizontal aiming between the bridge and smokestacks or actually attempting to enter the smokestack while attacking from the vertical. From the horizontal they were told to aim at a point above the water line, carrier elevators or the lower portions of the smoke stacks. I believe there was no mention of speed during these attacks.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 7, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> First off, flying an advanced aircraft like a Zero or Judy at high speed and high altitude requires a lot of navigational skills, but also things like the ability to control an advanced engine system, oxygen system and radio even, since target selection might have to be made by other aircraft.


If you're talking about teaching a pilot how to fly an aircraft like a Judy or Zero operationally in a skill consistency for a rated military pilot, yes, but I can tell you that things like "advanced engine system, oxygen system and radio" are not as difficult as you're putting them to be, evidently you have no flying experience.


RCAFson said:


> However, consider a pilot flying a Zeke, who begins a high speed, 45deg dive from 15000 ft. The target will be about 7500 yds, slant range, away. Even at 200 yds per second (360 knots), it will take about 38 seconds to impact the target. A 27 knot target will move about 600 yds during this time, and if it turns as well, this sets up a rather complex geometry, where the pilot must be continuously correcting his flight path, and has to do so in an aircraft where the controls are becoming very heavy, and may be nearly immobile. If the pilot does fly this kind of approach he has only one chance to hit the target since a go around will not be possible. IMHO, high speed high altitude dives would have been reserved for pilots with fairly advanced flight training.


One of the hardest things to do is to teach a "student" pilot how to fly straight and level on a given course. It is easier to teach a student pitch maneuvers than it is to teach coordinated turns and maneuvers in the horizontal. At a "moderate" altitude all one had to do is point and dive (directional control with rudder) and this was indicated in a manual written to train Kamikazes. Speed is controlled with power (of course) and pitch angle, and if the aircraft if so equipped, dive brakes. You can speculate all you want but it’s a lot easier than you think to take an aircraft and point it at a target even if it is moving in the ocean - what makes it difficult is the fact you're getting shot at and you're on a straight non-evasive course.


RCAFson said:


> OTOH, flying more slowly, at low altitude, gives the pilot more control and better probability of hitting a radically maneuvering target, because the control corrections can be made with more time before impact.


You are correct but flying low and slow also sets you up as a nice jucey target - either by ships guns or defending fighters.

The REAL reason why Kamikazes attacks were attempted from lower altitudes were two fold - 1) To escape radar and visual detection (as earlier mentioned) and 2) To avoid fighters at altitude who would tear up low time minimally trained pilots who either did not receive any advanced flight training where they can perform evasive maneuvers and/ or flying aircraft weighted down by their bomb load.


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## tyrodtom (Aug 7, 2012)

Most of the Kamakazi were inexperienced pilots, especially later in the war. But some of the early missions were carried out by regular combat groups suddenly transitioned to a Special attack squadron.

And throughout the campaign experienced pilots also joined in, wheather it was due to each pilot's personel code, or peer pressure, who knows.

I've read of one pilot who performed a loop, just before crashing into the hanger bay of a carrier. If it's true, it must have been a fairly good pilot, who chose to go out with a flair.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 7, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> Most of the Kamakazi were inexperienced pilots, especially later in the war. But some of the early missions were carried out by regular combat groups suddenly transitioned to a Special attack squadron.
> 
> And throughout the campaign experienced pilots also joined in, wheather it was due to each pilot's personel code, or peer pressure, who knows.
> 
> I've read of one pilot who performed a loop, just before crashing into the hanger bay of a carrier. If it's true, it must have been a fairly good pilot, who chose to go out with a flair.


The one way mission of the Kamikaze lended it self to be easily trained for (no pun intended). As long as a low time pilot had minimal training, can get the aircraft in the air and follow an escort, the rest was based on the individuals mental ability to carry out their orders. There were many dynamics built into this mission (JoeB pointed this out earlier) but for the most part the perceived skill level required to carry out the attack did not vary, be it in the vertical or horizontal.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 7, 2012)

_"Dive attack

This varies depending on the type of the aircraft. If you are approaching the enemy from a height of 6,000m, adjust your speed twice; or from a lower height of 4,000m, adjust speed once. 

When you begin your dive, you must harmonise the height at which you commence the final attack with your speed. Beware of over-speeding and a too-steep angle of dive that will make the controls harder to respond to your touch. But an angle of dive that is too small will result in reduced speed and not enough impact on crashing."_

Notes from a suicide manual | World news | The Guardian


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## tyrodtom (Aug 7, 2012)

I read the book "Blossoms in the Wind" a few months ago. It written with the help of Kamakazi survivors, trained but never used.
Lots of casualties during training due to pilot error, of course, but a lot of engine failures also, because of poor gas and poor maintenance.

Even the Ohka ( Baka) pilots had glider versions of their aircraft to practice in, but most got very little training because of the fuel shortage.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 7, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> Even the Ohka ( Baka) pilots had glider versions of their aircraft to practice in, but most got very little training because of the fuel shortage.


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## CobberKane (Aug 7, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> _"Dive attack
> 
> This varies depending on the type of the aircraft. If you are approaching the enemy from a height of 6,000m, adjust your speed twice; or from a lower height of 4,000m, adjust speed once.
> 
> ...


 
I read this too. Obviously the Japanese recognised that the ideal speed at which to execute a Kamikaze attack was a compromise between getting in before you were blown out of the sky and at the same time keeping the airspeed below the level at which the aircraft became uncontrollable. Vitually all reports I have read indicate that the zero, in it's various guises, became very heavy on the controls at speeds approaching 300mph and almost uncontrollable past this point. I'm sure some of the later Japanese fighters were much better in this respect, but I believe the great majority of aircraft expended in the Kamakaze role were examples of the low wing loading/light structure formula that predominated in Japanese aircraft design for most of the war; aircraft that climbed, turned and burned well (burned in both senses of the word) but didn't dive for nuts. In any case, I seriously doubt that any of these aircraft were travelling at anything like 400mph plus at the point of impact. Thank God the Japanese didn't have P-47s!


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 7, 2012)

CobberKane said:


> I read this too. Obviously the Japanese recognised that the ideal speed at which to execute a Kamikaze attack was a compromise between getting in before you were blown out of the sky and at the same time keeping the airspeed below the level at which the aircraft became uncontrollable. Vitually all reports I have read indicate that the zero, in it's various guises, became very heavy on the controls at speeds approaching 300mph and almost uncontrollable past this point. I'm sure some of the later Japanese fighters were much better in this respect, but I believe the great majority of aircraft expended in the Kamakaze role were examples of the low wing loading/light structure formula that predominated in Japanese aircraft design for most of the war; aircraft that climbed, turned and burned well (burned in both senses of the word) but didn't dive for nuts. In any case, I seriously doubt that any of these aircraft were travelling at anything like 400mph plus at the point of impact. *Thank God the Japanese didn't have P-47s!*



LOL! That made my night!

The Zero did loose a lost of it's mystical maneuverability at higher air speeds, a known fact, but what they had to do during a Kamikaze mission IMO had little affect on this as all they had to do is fly direct into a target - be it in the vertical or horizontal. Fly the aircraft with trim and rudder and the "concrete ailerons" almost become a non-issue for a one way mission.


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## tyrodtom (Aug 7, 2012)

From what i've read about the Zero it was very heavy on the ailerons at higher speeds, slow to roll, but pitch and yaw was still effective.

Also what is heavy to test pilots under test conditions is not the same as what would be heavy and unmovable to a pilot under the stress of combat with adrenaline flowing thru his bloodstream.


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## VBF-13 (Aug 7, 2012)

RCAFson said:


> OTOH, flying more slowly, at low altitude, gives the pilot more control and better probability of hitting a radically maneuvering target, because the control corrections can be made with more time before impact.



It gives him a better probability of being hit, too. He's being shot at by everything that can shoot.


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## CobberKane (Aug 8, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> From what i've read about the Zero it was very heavy on the ailerons at higher speeds, slow to roll, but pitch and yaw was still effective.
> 
> Also what is heavy to test pilots under test conditions is not the same as what would be heavy and unmovable to a pilot under the stress of combat with adrenaline flowing thru his bloodstream.


 
So why did the Kamaikaze training manual cation against overspeeding in case the loss of control precluded hitting the target? If full speed ahead was the way to go, why caution against it?


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 8, 2012)

CobberKane said:


> So why did the Kamaikaze training manual cation against overspeeding in case the loss of control precluded hitting the target? If full speed ahead was the way to go, why caution against it?


Because you can still cause airframe damage as you're approaching Vne rendering the aircraft uncontrollable wasting plane and pilot for completing its primary mission.


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## tyrodtom (Aug 8, 2012)

The Zero's elevators were so effective at speed that they designed elasticity into the elevator cables and bellcrank, to prevent structural damage from overcontrol at high speeds.


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## VBF-13 (Aug 8, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Because you can still cause airframe damage as you're approaching Vne rendering the aircraft uncontrollable wasting plane and pilot for completing its primary mission.


You sure can.


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## VBF-13 (Aug 8, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> The Zero's elevators were so effective at speed that they designed elasticity into the elevator cables and bellcrank, to prevent structural damage from overcontrol at high speeds.


Setting the elevator trim tabs I'd imagine would help with the control, there. I don't know what level of training many of these kamikaze pilots had, though.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 8, 2012)

VBF-13 said:


> Setting the elevator trim tabs I'd imagine would help with the control, there. I don't know what level of training many of these kamikaze pilots had, though.


I remember reading somewhere where later in the war the average time was 15 hours. They did teach them to take off and land should they have to abort because of weather.


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## kettbo (Aug 8, 2012)

Just remembered this. CPT Hara of the IJN cruiser Yahagi claims loss of speed during maneuvers allowed the USN planes to hit his ship. He regretted not straight and fast as he had done in his prior destroyer command that he and the ship survived

With this in mind, any idea on the USN ship speeds for most of these actions discussed?
Any research showing Kamikaze hits compared to ship speed or maneuvers?


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## tyrodtom (Aug 8, 2012)

They would only stand for so many aborts though. 
One pilot came back 7 or 8 times, they shot him.

The pilots who did abort was put themselves under such a strong suspicion, and were usually treated so bad on return, that I would bet many just flew into the sea instead of returning.


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## bobbysocks (Aug 8, 2012)

that should go under the ww2 myths....i had heard when i was a boy that the Kamikaze pilots werent trained in landing since they werent supposed to return. i would think you would still need a fair amount of maneuverability...not going so fast your flight controls become ineffective....if you were flying stright in full bore you are an easier target. if you were able to jinx around a little you present a harder target and have a better chance of success...

found this years ago and was able dig it up again...

Interrogation Nav 6, Captain Mitsuo Fuchida

18 Oct 1945

Biography
FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Captain, I.J.N.

FUCHIDA served 25 years in the regular Navy. An aviator with 3000 hours in the air, FUCHIDA aboard Akagi, was in command of the air groups of CarDiv 1 from August 1941 until July 1942. Wounded during the Battle of MIDWAY, he was hospitalized for approximately one year, then in June 1943 senior staff officer, 1st Air Fleet at KANOYA, and, subsequently, when 1st Air Fleet moved to the MARIANAS, at TINIAN. In April 1944, FUCHIDA transferred to OYODO as Staff Officer (Air Operations) of Combined Fleet. When Fleet Headquarters moved ashore to HIYOSHI in September 1944 he continued as Staff Officer (Air Operations) until the end of the war. FUCHIDA answered questions frankly and carefully. He was considered one of the most lucrative sources of information and a reliable witness.

Commanding Officer, Air Group CarDiv I August 1941-July 1942 
Hospitalized August 1942-May 1943 
Senior Staff Officer, 1st Air Fleet June 1943-March 1944 
Staff Officer (Air Operations), Combined Fleet April 1944-August 1945 

Interrogation
INTERROGATION NAV NO. 6
USSBS NO. 40
THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR
THE KAMIKAZE CORPS IN PHILIPPINES AND OKINAWA

TOKYO
18 October 1945

Interrogation of: Captain FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, IJN, a naval aviator since 1928. As air group commander of the AKAGI he led the attacks on PEARL HARBOR, DARWIN and CEYLON. In April 1944 he became Air Staff Officer to CinC Combined Fleet and held that post for the duration of the war.

Interrogated by: Lt. Comdr. R. P. Aiken, USNR.

Allied Officers Present: Col. Philip Cole, AUS; Captain W. Pardae, AUS; Lt. Robert Garred, USNR.

Summary:

Captain FUCHIDA discussed the attack on PEARL HARBOR, and the organization of the Kamikaze Corps during the PHILIPPINE Campaign. He also furnished information relating to suicide attacks during the OKINAWA Campaign, and Japanese Naval and Army Air Forces plans to resist an invasion of JAPAN proper.

Transcript:

Philippine Kamikaze Operations

Q. Were the CV Air Groups, that left the EMPIRE in October, 1944 being sent to the PHILIPPINES for Kamikaze action?
A. No. Part of the 601 Air Group was embarked in October 1944. From the remainder of the Air Group pilot personnel, 30 VF pilots were selected in November 1944 for Kamikaze operations and were sent to LUZON, to join the 201 Air Group.

Q. Were any of the 601 Air Group, embarked on carriers in October 1944, being sent to the PHILIPPINES defense as Kamikaze pilots?
A. No.

Q. How were the 30 fighter pilots selected for Kamikaze operations?
A. They were all volunteers.

Q. How did they rank in flying experience with the other pilots in the Air Group?
A. They were the best.

Q. Regarding Japanese plans for the defense of the homeland against Allied landings, how were Kamikaze aircraft to be employed?
A. According to plans, all Kamikaze planes were to be expended when Allied forced attempted landings on KYUSHU.

Q. Were any kamikaze planes to be held back for the defense of the KANTO PLAIN area?
A. On paper, all aircraft (both Army and navy combat and trainer types) were to be used to resist Allied operations against KYUSHU. Actually, I believe that some Army Air Units would have been held back to repel an invasion of the KANTO PLAIN.

Q. At OKINAWA, what was the ratio of ships hit to aircraft expended in kamikaze attacks?
A. I think about 1/6 of the total aircraft used hit their target.

Q. How many Kamikaze aircraft were expended during the OKINAWA operations?
A. About 900 in all.

500 Navy Aircraft from JAPAN 
300 Army Aircraft from JAPAN 
50 Navy Aircraft from FORMOSA 
50 Army Aircraft from FORMOSA 

These figures are approximations.

Q. Of the 900 that were expended in the OKINAWA Area, how many hit their target?
A. Although it was widely publicized that 400 had been successful, I think that 200 would be more accurate figure.

Q. What percentage of hits did the JNAF expect in the KETSU Operation?
A. We expected about the same percentage as during the OKINAWA operation.

Q. How many Kamikaze aircraft were to be used during KETSU Operations by JNAF?
A. 2500, of which 500 were combat aircraft and 2000 were trainers. We had about 2500 remaining combat aircraft which would be used during KETSU Operations for search, night torpedo, and air cover.

Q. What were the plans for the use of Kamikaze aircraft during KETSU Operations?
A. 500 suicide planes were to be expended during the initial Allied landing attempt. This force would be supplemented by other kamikaze units brought in from SHIKOKU, SW HONSHU, Central HONSHU, TOKYO Area, and HOKKAIDO.

Q. How were JNAF Kamikaze aircraft deployed throughout the Empire?
A.

500 in KYUSHU
500 in SW HONSHU
500 in TOKYO Area
300 in HOKKAIDO
200 in SHIKOKU. 

Q. What was the size and deployment of the JAAF Kamikaze Force?
A. Approximately the same as the JNAF. 2500 aircraft deployed similarly.


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## tyrodtom (Aug 8, 2012)

Cpt. Fuchida is only asked about the experience level of the pilots used in the early Philippines Kamikaze missions, not later operations.


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## bobbysocks (Aug 8, 2012)

i made no claims otherwise....just posted what i found.


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## VBF-13 (Aug 8, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> I remember reading somewhere where later in the war the average time was 15 hours. They did teach them to take off and land should they have to abort because of weather.


That doesn't surprise me. You'd know better than most here I'm sure that 15 hours is hardly "aircraft familiarity." As an aside, I had the honor of sitting in on some of my Dad's flight club meetings in his "golden years." These were former War pilots from all over, but primarily Navy. They'd say about the younger Kamikaze pilots who came in at the War's desperate end, those novices should have known something was up when all they were taught to do was take off. It was somewhat of a joke, of course, but it underscores what you said on their hours logged on those aircraft.


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## tyrodtom (Aug 8, 2012)

Was that 15 hours total flight time? Or 15 hours in fighters?
Some articles seem to confuse the two terms, and sometimes i'm not sure what they mean.

If it's 15 hours total flight time, then flying a high performance fighter at that level of experience is pretty close to a suicide mission just by itself.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 8, 2012)

15 hours total. I would guess 10 hours in primary and then a solo is done, and remainder in fighters.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Aug 8, 2012)

By comparison, for a private ticket here in the states, I can't remember whether there is a regulatory minimum time to be logged before a student does his/her solo. IIRCM, in practice, I've heard about 7 or 9 hours as a minimum and 10 or 12 is about average. In ordinary training, the first hours are typically heavily devoted to pattern work and flying straight and level and basic aircraft handling in a variety of situations, stalls, slow flight etc. So, although some of this wouldn't be necessary, I am still quite astonished that 15 hours was possible. Over-land pilotage isn't that easy and over-water nav is a considerable level above that. Evidently there was a pathfinder aircraft? Did I miss that earlier in the thread?


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## VBF-13 (Aug 9, 2012)

My understanding (and, I'd welcome backup on this, or refutation, as the case may be) is that towards the end it wasn't unlike what we saw out of Germany in their troops. That is to say, some of those Kamikaze pilots were barely into their teens, Japan was that desperate for them. I'm talking, 15, 16, 17 years old.

Getting back to the hours behind the stick at that late stage in the campaign, I can contrast the U.S. Navy pilots. Before they even stepped into the SNJ, they had 100 hours under their belts in the N2S, the bulk of that, solo. The "crash course" (no pun intended) nature of the Kamikaze pilot training at that stage has to be factored into the fate of those missions at that stage. I've heard over and over of ailerons or what have you blowing off those planes or those pilots just plum missing their targets. I can't back that up, so, think what you will. Certainly, though, as the campaign progressed, the skill-level of those pilots receded. I think we can at least say that.


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## CobberKane (Aug 9, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Because you can still cause airframe damage as you're approaching Vne rendering the aircraft uncontrollable wasting plane and pilot for completing its primary mission.


 
What, so the major limiting factor on the kamikaze's speed was the structural strength of the aircraft? I dont think so. Again, to quote the kamikaze training manual: 'Beware of over-speeding and a too-steep angle of dive that will make the controls harder to respond to your touch'.
That seems pretty clear to me; go in to fast and and steep and your controls will lose responsivness, as so many tests on zeros concluded, and you risk missing the target. Nothing there about the aicraft falling to bits - that would come later. Long before the pilot of a light aircraft with low wing loading had to worry about the wings comming off, he would be compelled to limit his speed in order to retain enough control to ensure he hit the target. The limiting factor for airspeed would not have been the integrity of the aircraft but the degree of control retained by the pilot, as inferred in the manual.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 9, 2012)

CobberKane said:


> What, so the major limiting factor on the kamikaze's speed was the structural strength of the aircraft? I dont think so. Again, to quote the kamikaze training manual: 'Beware of over-speeding and a too-steep angle of dive that will make the controls harder to respond to your touch'.
> That seems pretty clear to me; go in to fast and and steep and your controls will lose responsivness, as so many tests on zeros concluded, and you risk missing the target. Nothing there about the aicraft falling to bits - that would come later. Long before the pilot of a light aircraft with low wing loading had to worry about the wings comming off, he would be compelled to limit his speed in order to retain enough control to ensure he hit the target. The limiting factor for airspeed would not have been the integrity of the aircraft but the degree of control retained by the pilot, as inferred in the manual.


Do know what Vne is? If you exceed Vne you can and will start bending the aircraft and eventually it will come apart!!! The Zero, like many other aircraft can have it's Vne speed exceeded in a terminal dive. As stated, the Zero's AILERONS become stiff and unresponsive at high speed but one can still control flight with elevator trim and rudder. Again if the aircraft is allowed to come apart BEFORE reaching the target, the whole mission is a failure - that simple!


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## stona (Aug 9, 2012)

It seems the injunction to pilots not to over-speed was to enable them to retain the ability to move the control surfaces. Everyone agrees that the ailerons in particular became very heavy at high speeds. 

How well a pilot with minimal hours experience and zero experience in a high speed dive could control an aircraft using elevator trim and rudder after the usual controls were locked up is debateable.

A more experienced pilot would be more likely to ignore the advice anyway,like those Bomber Command crews arriving home well ahead of schedule having flown straight home at low level completely ignoring official routing. He'd also be more likely to actually hit his target.

Which comes first,inability to control the aircraft or Vne at which point there is a risk of the aircraft coming apart (definitely uncontrollable then)?

I suspect the inability to effectively control the aircraft and hit a target comes long before Vne for the Japanese types.
I say "suspect" as my knowledge of Japanese aircraft is pretty minimal 

Cheers

Steve


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 9, 2012)

stona said:


> It seems the injunction to pilots not to over-speed was to enable them to retain the ability to move the control surfaces. Everyone agrees that the ailerons in particular became very heavy at high speeds.
> 
> *How well a pilot with minimal hours experience and zero experience in a high speed dive could control an aircraft using elevator trim and rudder after the usual controls were locked up is debateable.*
> 
> ...



Don't be too illusioned about controls "locking up," a low time pilot can be taught to stay out of Vne and maintain control of his aircraft, this is not that hard and can easily be demonstrated during initial training.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 9, 2012)

oldcrowcv63 said:


> By comparison, for a private ticket here in the states, I can't remember whether there is a regulatory minimum time to be logged before a student does his/her solo. IIRCM, in practice, I've heard about 7 or 9 hours as a minimum and 10 or 12 is about average. In ordinary training, the first hours are typically heavily devoted to pattern work and flying straight and level and basic aircraft handling in a variety of situations, stalls, slow flight etc. So, although some of this wouldn't be necessary, I am still quite astonished that 15 hours was possible. Over-land pilotage isn't that easy and over-water nav is a considerable level above that. Evidently there was a pathfinder aircraft? Did I miss that earlier in the thread?


An aggressive flight training syllabus with the right student can have one soloing in about 7 hours. If you blow off the normal pattern work and concentrate on take offs and landings, the transition to a higher performing aircraft is very doable, especially if the initial training is done in a higher performing training aircraft to begin with.


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## stona (Aug 9, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Don't be too illusioned about controls "locking up," a low time pilot can be taught to stay out of Vne and maintain control of his aircraft, this is not that hard and can easily be demonstrated during initial training.



This is pure conjecture but would an inexperienced,relatively untrained,kamikaze pilot ever have flown in a situation in which the "normal" controls became ineffective?
If the first time he ever found that he could not manoeuvre using,for example,his ailerons was his last dive onto a US warship I very much doubt that he would be able to make adjustments in other ways. This would explain the warning in the "Kamikaze manual" about diving too fast.
Cheers
Steve


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 9, 2012)

stona said:


> This is pure conjecture but would an inexperienced,relatively untrained,kamikaze pilot ever have flown in a situation in which the "normal" controls became ineffective?



I am a flight instructor and although it's no longer required in the private pilot's practical test standards I spin my students. I do this so they understand the spin/ stall relationship at slow speeds, but so they also can feel what the controls feel like when the aircraft loads up and starts taking on g forces. This is also shown during “upset maneuver recovery,” again at a primary stage of flying before solo.


stona said:


> If the first time he ever found that he could not manoeuvre using,for example,his ailerons was his last dive onto a US warship I* very much doubt that he would be able to make adjustments in other ways. *This would explain the warning in the "Kamikaze manual" about diving too fast.
> Cheers
> Steve


Wrong - it is easily taught the relationship between the controls and using trim to keep loads off the stick during flight. At 15 or 20 hours I could see a Kamikaze student perfectly capable of understanding this and I think the end results history has shown us speaks for itself!


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## tyrodtom (Aug 9, 2012)

I think more need to read that Hyperwar article, it quotes the Kamakaze training manual, which several times points out the need to ensure high momentum on impact.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 9, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> I think more need to read that Hyperwar article, it quotes the Kamakaze training manual, which several times points out the need to ensure high momentum on impact.


It also points out some of the information will vary with aircraft. In the end the aircraft flight manual should be the document followed to complete the mission.

Going full circle here - getting a 15 hour pilot trained to fly a Zero into a ship at close to Vne is and was very do-able.


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## VBF-13 (Aug 9, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Do know what Vne is? If you exceed Vne you can and will start bending the aircraft and eventually it will come apart!!! The Zero, like many other aircraft can have it's Vne speed exceeded in a terminal dive. As stated, the Zero's AILERONS become stiff and unresponsive at high speed but one can still control flight with elevator trim and rudder. Again if the aircraft is allowed to come apart BEFORE reaching the target, the whole mission is a failure - that simple!



True enough.



FLYBOYJ said:


> Don't be too illusioned about controls "locking up," a low time pilot can be taught to stay out of Vne and maintain control of his aircraft, this is not that hard and can easily be demonstrated during initial training.



I had a blind spot, there, too. Good.



FLYBOYJ said:


> An aggressive flight training syllabus with the right student can have one soloing in about 7 hours. If you blow off the normal pattern work and concentrate on take offs and landings, the transition to a higher performing aircraft is very doable, especially if the initial training is done in a higher performing training aircraft to begin with.



Another one of my blind spots bites the dust. This is becoming a habit. 



FLYBOYJ said:


> I am a flight instructor and although it's no longer required in the private pilot's practical test standards I spin my students. I do this so they understand the spin/ stall relationship at slow speeds, but so they also can feel what the controls feel like when the aircraft loads up and starts taking on g forces. This is also shown during “upset maneuver recovery,” again at a primary stage of flying before solo.
> 
> Wrong - it is easily taught the relationship between the controls and using trim to keep loads off the stick during flight. At 15 or 20 hours I could see a Kamikaze student perfectly capable of understanding this and I think the end results history has shown us speaks for itself!


 


FLYBOYJ said:


> It also points out some of the information will vary with aircraft. In the end the aircraft flight manual should be the document followed to complete the mission.
> 
> Going full circle here - getting a 15 hour pilot trained to fly a Zero into a ship at close to Vne is and was very do-able.



Taking these last two together, I can say those pilots had the basic skills. This is what would occur to me, though. When the moment of truth is still at a distance, that's one thing. When it arrives, that's another thing. And this is the ultimate moment of truth. And, they’re flying into the sights and sounds of enemy guns. 

Call it speculation, but do some of those young boys freeze-up, lost their heads? This isn’t a video game. They know they're not going to walk away from this one. Do they all of the sudden "snap" and forget all that good training? It happens to even the best-trained of pilots, and they're not even flying suicide missions.

I'm saying, skill-set conceded, now let's factor in the psychological/emotional factor. That makes me still think those reports I've heard over the years of some of those aircraft cracking up or those young pilots otherwise simply blowing their targets is plausible. 

I'll give the critics this much, for sure. We'll never know for sure. Maybe that's just where we have to leave it.


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## tyrodtom (Aug 9, 2012)

When you watch the movies made of the attacks, you'll see several aircraft coming down in pieces, and some that impact the water far away from any possible target.

But there's no way we'll ever know what brought on the structual failure, flight stress alone, or AA damage, or both?

And the ones that miss, dead or badly wounded pilots, or just out of control ?


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## VBF-13 (Aug 9, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> When you watch the movies made of the attacks, you'll see several aircraft coming down in pieces, and some that impact the water far away from any possible target.
> 
> But there's no way we'll ever know what brought on the structual failure, flight stress alone, or AA damage, or both?
> 
> And the ones that miss, dead or badly wounded pilots, or just out of control ?


Yes. I think we took this one as far as we can go.

I'm still wondering how many kamikaze pilots there were. If there's a creditable source on that, I mean...


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 9, 2012)

VBF-13 said:


> Taking these last two together, I can say those pilots had the basic skills. This is what would occur to me, though. When the moment of truth is still at a distance, that's one thing. When it arrives, that's another thing. And this is the ultimate moment of truth. And, they’re flying into the sights and sounds of enemy guns.
> 
> Call it speculation, but do some of those young boys freeze-up, lost their heads? This isn’t a video game. They know they're not going to walk away from this one. Do they all of the sudden "snap" and forget all that good training? It happens to even the best-trained of pilots, and they're not even flying suicide missions.
> 
> ...



Agree with everything you say - we can discuss all day what is actually do-able and it's a whole different story in combat. One also has to consider what is happening to pilot and aircraft during the attack (damage to aircraft, pilot being wounded and killed, etc.) and final result will vary with pilot - to - pilot, training and mindset to complete this mission


tyrodtom said:


> When you watch the movies made of the attacks, you'll see several aircraft coming down in pieces, and some that impact the water far away from any possible target.
> 
> But there's no way we'll ever know what brought on the structual failure, flight stress alone, or AA damage, or both?
> 
> And the ones that miss, dead or badly wounded pilots, or just out of control ?


Just as mentioned above - we don't know if those aircraft broke apart by flack, a dying pilot's death grip causing structural damage or a combination of both. I think the point here is history shows us that Japan did manage to take minimally trained pilots and have them fly into heavily defended military targets. Amazingly we saw another aspect of this occur during 911 against civilian targets (not to go off subject).


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## CobberKane (Aug 9, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Do know what Vne is? If you exceed Vne you can and will start bending the aircraft and eventually it will come apart!!! The Zero, like many other aircraft can have it's Vne speed exceeded in a terminal dive. As stated, the Zero's AILERONS become stiff and unresponsive at high speed but one can still control flight with elevator trim and rudder. Again if the aircraft is allowed to come apart BEFORE reaching the target, the whole mission is a failure - that simple!



Again, I'll refer back to the Kamikaze training manual: "Beware of over-speeding and a too-steep angle of dive that will MAKE THE CONTROLS HARDER TO RESPOND TO YOUR TOUCH". (my capitals, sorry to shout!)

My point here is that the manual explicitly identifies loss lack of responsiveness from the control surfaces as the primary limiting factor on airspeed while conducting the attack. It does not say "Beware of over-speeding and a too-steep angle of dive that will cause the aircraft to come apart in the air". Nor does it say "Any speed up to the aircraft's Vne is fine; you'll lose some Aileron response but the elevators and rudder will givbe you enough control to do the job"

Of course any aircraft can come apart if the speed is too great. So would a brick. My point is that the manual clearly identifies deteriorating effectiveness of the control surfaces as the limiting factor, not Vne.


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## tyrodtom (Aug 9, 2012)

The manual was meant for use by ALL Kamikaze, not just those flying the Zero.
The Zero's ailerons did become stiff at high speeds,  but the elevators were so effective that they built stretch into the control cables to keep the pilot from overcontrolling at high speeds.
How did the Ki-43 handle at high speed? The Judy? Or any of the many other aircraft ,even a few trainer biplanes, handle during a high speed dive. Not all would experience controls getting very difficult during dives. Not all would have the same handling characteristics. 
It was just a generic manual, with general guidelines only.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 9, 2012)

CobberKane said:


> Again, I'll refer back to the Kamikaze training manual: "Beware of over-speeding and a too-steep angle of dive that will MAKE THE CONTROLS HARDER TO RESPOND TO YOUR TOUCH". (my capitals, sorry to shout!)
> 
> *My point here is that the manual explicitly identifies loss lack of responsiveness *from the control surfaces as the primary limiting factor on airspeed while conducting the attack. It does not say "Beware of over-speeding and a too-steep angle of dive that will cause the aircraft to come apart in the air". Nor does it say "Any speed up to the aircraft's Vne is fine; you'll lose some Aileron response but the elevators and rudder will givbe you enough control to do the job"
> 
> Of course any aircraft can come apart if the speed is too great. So would a brick. My point is that the manual clearly identifies deteriorating effectiveness of the control surfaces as the limiting factor, not Vne.



See above post



tyrodtom said:


> It was just a generic manual, with general guidelines only.



The flight manual, pilot's notes, POH, -1, what ever you want to call it in any language *ALWAYS TAKES PRESIDENCE OVER ANY TACTICS OR OPERATIONS MANUAL!!!! *


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## RCAFson (Aug 9, 2012)

I found this at Scribd.







Reilly, Kamikaze Attacks of World War II


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## VBF-13 (Aug 9, 2012)

Now that's interesting, RCF. Look at those starting angles. Even the steeper "diving attack" starting angle, 32-35 degrees, was just better than half that in the SBDs. Even fighters that weren't as equipped for dive-bombing as such started at much steeper angles than 32-35 degrees when they were called upon to dive-bomb. 

But, this wasn't dive-bombing, was it? It was collision-bombing. And, those instructions laid out that difference well.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 9, 2012)

Good info and interesting what the speeds show, nothing close to Vne but a lot of that will go out the window as the pilot will more than likely figure out desent and dive angles based on an artificial horizon, point the sitck down and aim.


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## CobberKane (Aug 10, 2012)

Thanks RCF, nice research.
Way back in this thread I think I guestimated the imact speed of an aircraft like the Zero at 200-300 mph (320-480kph) - my reading of this chart is that a fighter should be travelling at 450kph (270 mph) at time of impact, so I wasn't too far off. FlyboyJ, I'm sure you're right that in the heat of battle many pilots would have forgotten this advice, and the advice of the previously quoted manual, and just nailed the throttle. Some few of them may have even hit the target. But this stuff about zeros (which along with the Ki 43 were pobably about the least 'dive-able' fighters the japanese had) preferentially going into ships at 415mph (650k!) plus just doesn't wash. Maybe the odd lucky (if that's the word) kamikaze pilot might have fluked it but the stated best option was to limit speed and retain controlability. The manual states it. RCF's chart gives the recommended speed. The text states that the japanese gave great consideration as to how these attacks should be executed. Kamikaze fighters = 270 mph at impact.


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## stona (Aug 10, 2012)

Thanks for that,very interesting. It's always good to have some solid evidence.
Cheers
Steve


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## tyrodtom (Aug 10, 2012)

The manual was probably meant for the newbies, they probably got that manual out after the experienced flyers were gone so it was geared to the inexperienced pilot.
One expression I can remember from a instructor is " you're behind the airplane", in other words you're putting in a correction too late, it a common problem with new flyers, and the faster the aircraft, the greater the problem can be.
IMO they were limiting airspeed because of the pilots, not the aircraft.

Though in a Ki-43's case that might be a valid reason. I've seen a interview on U-Tube with a ex Ki-43 pilot, he said it shook at high speed in level flight, so i'd guess it was not a good diver. The IJA used a lot of Ki-43 for Kamikaze.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 10, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> One expression I can remember from a instructor is " you're behind the airplane", in other words you're putting in a correction too late, it a common problem with new flyers, and the faster the aircraft, the greater the problem can be.



Not only correction but configuration of the aircraft - for example being at a certain airspeed when entering the pattern so you can get the gear and/or flaps down, remaining in cruise when you're almost on top of your destination, etc.


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## VBF-13 (Aug 10, 2012)

CobberKane said:


> FlyboyJ, I'm sure you're right that in the heat of battle many pilots would have forgotten this advice, and the advice of the previously quoted manual, and just nailed the throttle. Some few of them may have even hit the target.



It's just figuring in the impact of the "human element" at that moment of truth for especially those younger, less-experienced pilots.



tyrodtom said:


> The manual was probably meant for the newbies, they probably got that manual out after the experienced flyers were gone so it was geared to the inexperienced pilot.



I think so. Those starting angles, even for the "dive attack," are more swoop than dive. Yet you see the film on these Kamikaze attacks and many of those pilots are coming in at truer dive angles. That would suggest these shallower starting angles were intended for the less-experienced pilots who probably couldn't handle the aircraft at those steeper dive angles.


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## steve51 (Aug 10, 2012)

VBF-13,
According to the book, " Kamikazes, Corsairs, and Picket Ships" , at Okinawa the Japanese flew 2750 kamikaze sorties and over 3700 conventional sorties.


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## VBF-13 (Aug 10, 2012)

steve51 said:


> VBF-13,According to the book, " Kamikazes, Corsairs, and Picket Ships" , at Okinawa the Japanese flew 2750 kamikaze sorties


Thanks, Steve. Cutting to just the Kamikazes, that's a lot of those younger, less-experienced pilots. As the U.S. lost around ten ships there (mostly destroyers) due to air assaults, even if those were all off Kamikaze hits, one could see how inefficient those tactics were by that late stage in the campaign.


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## steve51 (Aug 10, 2012)

VBF-13,
15 ships were sunk and 50 damaged while on picket duty. 1348 crewmen were killed and 1586 were wounded. Nearly all these losses were inflicted by kamikazes.


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## JoeB (Aug 10, 2012)

steve51 said:


> VBF-13,
> According to the book, " Kamikazes, Corsairs, and Picket Ships" , at Okinawa the Japanese flew 2750 kamikaze sorties and over 3700 conventional sorties.


This was posted earlier, quite a bit lower number: 
" INTERROGATION NAV NO. 6
USSBS NO. 40
THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR
THE KAMIKAZE CORPS IN PHILIPPINES AND OKINAWA

TOKYO
18 October 1945

Interrogation of: Captain FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, IJN, a naval aviator since 1928. 
Q. How many Kamikaze aircraft were expended during the OKINAWA operations?
A. About 900 in all.

500 Navy Aircraft from JAPAN 
300 Army Aircraft from JAPAN 
50 Navy Aircraft from FORMOSA 
50 Army Aircraft from FORMOSA 

These figures are approximations."

I also added up the numbers of a/c for each kamikaze attack of Army and Navy given on these web pages (same as I gave in post 30), 
—¤ŒR“ÁU
_•—“ÁU‘à
The homepage of the series claims the info is from Japanese archival sources.
In the period of the official Okinawa Campaign per US reckoning, ie April 1-June 21, there are 841 Army and 778 Navy suicide a/c sorties listed, 1,619 total, so in between the two estimates given previously. I can't 100% vouch for the links being directly from Japanese archives but I tend to believe it. OTOH the USSBS interviews asked Japanese officers various quantitative questions without allowing them to consult their records (captured Japanese miltiary records were mainly held in the US till the mid 1950's, few ever translated, then given back to the Japanese govt). In other cases the USSBS interviews give good insight qualitatively but numbers and specifics given as 'as I recall' 'approximately' etc. not surprisingly often differ somewhat from Japanese records. OTOH the estimate in the book you gave might be a count from US side which would be subject to duplication. We can't be sure I guess, but anyway those are 3 different numbers for kamikaze sorties at Okinawa.

Further analyzing the two links I gave, the types of a/c used in suicide attacks, from Oct 44-Aug 45, were:
Army:
Codename/No of sorties
OSCAR	245
SONIA	207
NATE	185
FRANK	153
TONY	100
IDA	64
NICK	60
LILY	28
PEGGY	22
KI-79*	21
HELEN	9
DINAH	7
total 1101
*the Mansyu (ie Manchurian a/c co) Type 2 advanced trainer, based on the 'Nate', it never got a codename.

Navy:
ZEKE 662
JUDY	163
VAL	120
FRANCES	112
KATE	61
OHKA	55
KYUSHU K11W** 54
BETTY	51
JILL	38
RECON SEAPLANE*** 28
GRACE	15
ALF	11
CARRIER ATTACK**** 10
INTERMEDIATE TRAINER***** 7
SUSIE	3
IRVING	2
FLYING BOAT****** 1
MYRT	1
total 1394
**bomb/nav trainer that never got a codename
*** prob mainly Jakes
****probably mainly Kates
*****probably the Kyushu K10W
******an Emily, per another source
There's one Frances mission where the number of a/c isn't give and I assumed it was only 1 as several other Frances missions were.

Joe


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## steve51 (Aug 10, 2012)

JoeB,
The book's numbers, broken down a bit, show 1900 navy sorties and 850 army as kamikaze. The biggest discrepancy is in the navy figures.


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## CobberKane (Aug 10, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> The manual was probably meant for the newbies, they probably got that manual out after the experienced flyers were gone so it was geared to the inexperienced pilot.
> One expression I can remember from a instructor is " you're behind the airplane", in other words you're putting in a correction too late, it a common problem with new flyers, and the faster the aircraft, the greater the problem can be.
> IMO they were limiting airspeed because of the pilots, not the aircraft.
> 
> Though in a Ki-43's case that might be a valid reason. I've seen a interview on U-Tube with a ex Ki-43 pilot, he said it shook at high speed in level flight, so i'd guess it was not a good diver. The IJA used a lot of Ki-43 for Kamikaze.


 
Well, I guess one thing we can be sure of is that we are never going to be able to confirm or reject any of our opinions by asking surviving kamikaze pilots for their observations - I believe they're a bit thin on the ground.
These threads tend to wander so maybe I'll just bore everyone by recapping what I've said and leaving it at that. Initially I was musing about the relative effectiveness of a Kamikaze attack vs a bomb, and I speculated that the plane would be travelling at maybe200-300 mph at point of impact. It was suggested that this was way conservative as the various marks of Zero had maximum dive speeds of 400 mph plus so that would be a more logical figure. In response I noted that the zero was notorious for becomming unresponsive at high speed like this and referred to a kamikaze training maual that specifically cautioned against overspeeding in cost of reduced control. But - it was countered - this was a general instruction that did not necescarily refer to the zero, which could be controlled adequately for the task via the rudder and elevators, which were not so prone as the airelons to stiffen up. Fair enough, but then came more evidence in the form of kamikaze training material which recommended that fighter (a catagory that certainly does include the zero) should aim to hit the target at 270 mph, pretty much in line with my guestimate. All of which really leaves us with only two suggestions in support of the idea that kamakazes fighters routinely hit their target at close to their maximum dive speed.

1/ the Instructions were meant for newbies - the shortcommings of the zero in a dive were no so great that an experienced pilot could not overcome them and dive into his target at much higher speeds. Well, even if we accept this, my understanding is that the great majority of kamikazes were NOT experienced pilots an thus would have maximised their chances of a hit by following the instuctions of their trainers, who "gave careful consideration' the best manner to execute an attack - and these instructions recommended an attack speed of about 270mph. 

2/ training notwithstanding, many inexperienced pilots would have forgotten what they had been told and just gone in as fast as possible anyway. Okay - if we accept that some pilot s did digress from their carefully considered training surely they would have decreased their chances of hitting the target and therefore have been underrepresented in hits on allied ships?

So, in summary;

The great majority of kamikaze plots had very limited flight experience. The 'carefully considered' training material directed at these pilots cautioned against overspeeding due to the cy of the aircraft controls stiffening up and this advice did not include an exception for the zero, an aircraft well known for this tendancy. It also recommends an attck speed of about 270mph for fighter. Unless the triners got it wrong and the inexperienced pilot knew better, I think all this is pretty good evidence for my assertion that the majority of impact by kamikazes probably occurred in the 200-300 mph range.


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## VBF-13 (Aug 10, 2012)

steve51 said:


> VBF-13,15 ships were sunk and 50 damaged while on picket duty. 1348 crewmen were killed and 1586 were wounded. Nearly all these losses were inflicted by kamikazes.


At Okinawa I count seven destroyers, one escort destroyer, and three minesweepers, all lost due to air assaults. My source, _Battle Stations!_ (1946).

*EDIT*: Forgot to address the damaged ones you mentioned. That's right, good point, those raise the efficiency-rating of the Kamikazes sent into that battle.


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## steve51 (Aug 10, 2012)

VBF-13,
Ah, the discrepancies continue. The book I have shows 10 DD, 2 LCS(L), 3 LSM(R) sunk and lists them by name, location and time of sinking. These losses were only ships on picket duty. All losses during Okinawa are given as 28 sunk and 225 damaged, most by kamikaze. This is the only book I have about this subject, so I'm not very well informed. Maybe JoeB or others have something more definitive.


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## VBF-13 (Aug 10, 2012)

Steve, we're closer than that, I counted wrong!

OK, re-count of the Okinawa losses from my source (just due to air assaults, now): 11 destroyers, 1 destroyer escort, 3 minesweepers. I have the names and dates of the losses, too. I actually have 12 destroyers lost, but one (the Halligan, 26MAR45) went down for hitting a mine.


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## JoeB (Aug 10, 2012)

steve51 said:


> JoeB,
> The book's numbers, broken down a bit, show 1900 navy sorties and 850 army as kamikaze. The biggest discrepancy is in the navy figures.


Here's a couple of more things I found, for Navy shimpu-tai/kamikaze* attacks. 
In "Kamikaze Attacks of WWII: A Complete History..." by Robin L Reilly, pg 190 it gives a total of Navy special attack sorties in spring-summer '45 as follows:
2/14-3/5: 259
3/26-5/4: 1,207
5/5-6/22: 368
6/23-8/15: 62
Total 1,896, though this obviously extends in both directions from the Okinawa campaign proper (though OTOH US ships at Okinawa were subject to air attack periodically pretty much to the end of the war, though the island itself had been secured)
The book's source in turn is given as Japanese Monograph 141 (the series of campaign histories written by Japanese officers under US supervision during the occupation; more time was available and sometimes more care taken than in putting together the USSBS, but still the quality and detail of these works, the ones I've read directly, vary widely)

But here's another Japanese language web page with details of Navy attacks:
Ií‹L”O“Á•ÊŠé‰æ
It has a table of Navy special attacks in the Okinawa campaign as follows
suicide a/c
Date sent lost
４・６ 215	163
４・７ 53	34
４・11 27 (just gives number lost for this date)
４・12 103	69
４・13 40	2
４・14 52	44
４・15 10	2
４・16 177	106
４・17 45	14
４・20～22 26	3
４・27～30 100	59
５・１～４ 160	65
５・８～11 86	60
５・24～25 107	32
５・27～28 51	26
６・１～７ 23	5
６・16～22 67	28

totals 1315 739

Then, the same page has a table of individual missions which seems very simular to the one in the previous link I gave, which had 753 Navy a/c expended in the exact same period (previously I quoted 4/1-6/21), and a few of these might have been non-Okinawa. So it seems the explanation might be that the higher quoted numbers of Navy sorties are a/c despatched, and the lower number those which actually didn't return (though why the Army figures don't have a similar discrepancy would again be a question). As is well known, kamikazes often returned if they couldn't find a target, for weather or other reasons. 

I believe that the actual names and dates of special attack unit crew who died on missions are well known in Japan. These men were by no means forgotten. If a source is tied to this solid information, then it's probably correct. Again I can't say surely that either of these web links are, but I tend to think this is pretty accurate info.

*in the Japanese written language Chinese characters, called 'kanji' in Japanese, can represent either sounds which evolved from their original Chinese pronunciations (or Korean pronuciations if the words came that way long ago), or can be 'morphemes' used to represent sounds from the ancient indigenous Japanese language. 神風 would have been pronounced 'shimpu' (v. shénfēng in Mandarin and shinpoong in Korean) in the term shimpu-tai ('tai' is 'unit') by an IJN officer, but probably as the indigenous Japanese word 'kamikaze' by an average citizen. The literal meaning of those Chinese characters is 'divine' and 'wind' respectively.

Joe


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## steve51 (Aug 11, 2012)

JoeB,
Thanks for the links and your analysis. As you suggest, there may be some confusion between sorties launched and returns. I just noticed that I havn't given the source used in the book I have. The footnote to the sortie numbers gives " U S Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific) page 328. The author also mentions that numbers vary from source to source.


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## VBF-13 (Aug 11, 2012)

CobberKane said:


> These threads tend to wander so maybe I'll just bore everyone by recapping what I've said and leaving it at that. Initially I was musing about the relative effectiveness of a Kamikaze attack vs a bomb, and I speculated that the plane would be travelling at maybe200-300 mph at point of impact. It was suggested that this was way conservative as the various marks of Zero had maximum dive speeds of 400 mph plus so that would be a more logical figure. In response I noted that the zero was notorious for becomming unresponsive at high speed like this and referred to a kamikaze training maual that specifically cautioned against overspeeding in cost of reduced control. But - it was countered - this was a general instruction that did not necescarily refer to the zero, which could be controlled adequately for the task via the rudder and elevators, which were not so prone as the airelons to stiffen up. Fair enough, but then came more evidence in the form of kamikaze training material which recommended that fighter (a catagory that certainly does include the zero) should aim to hit the target at 270 mph, pretty much in line with my guestimate. All of which really leaves us with only two suggestions in support of the idea that kamakazes fighters routinely hit their target at close to their maximum dive speed.
> 
> 1/ the Instructions were meant for newbies - the shortcommings of the zero in a dive were no so great that an experienced pilot could not overcome them and dive into his target at much higher speeds. Well, even if we accept this, my understanding is that the great majority of kamikazes were NOT experienced pilots an thus would have maximised their chances of a hit by following the instuctions of their trainers, who "gave careful consideration' the best manner to execute an attack - and these instructions recommended an attack speed of about 270mph.
> 
> ...


Cobber, I wouldn't put it that you're boring me, but I am at somewhat of a loss as to where you're going with this, especially after what RCA just posted. I'm saying it's pretty evident from those two recommended approaches that these pilots were hardly dive bombing but were rather peeling-off at the start at shallower angles and at least attempting to sweep into their targets. That's a much slower approach speed, obviously, than in a typical 60 degree dive. It's easier to manage, too. The pilots who for whatever reasons deviated from the recommended approaches, if they were the less-experienced pilots, they probably encountered trouble, while, if they were the earlier pilots, it makes sense they probably fared better. In the horizontal attacks, if you'll notice, these aircraft went barreling into their targets at breakneck speeds once they got to around 700 meters and leveled-off at 20 meters above the water. Their purpose at that point was to pour on the coals to collide at the greatest possible speed (see the "Remarks," horizontal collision data). Those were momentum-collisions, for the most part. In the dive attacks their optimal momentum was cut short for the 10-15 degree angles they were aiming at completing their collisions at. As such, if you'll also notice, those aircraft finished-off at slower speeds.

Now, hell, I don't know where I'm going with this... 

Actually, though, I think I'm just trying to point out, the speeds are right there in that data RCA posted. When these pilots freaked out (and, I'm sure, a certain percentage of them did), well, anything goes. As for the ones who were able to hang in there, here in that data are the predicted speeds of the various aircraft in the two recommended approches.


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## CobberKane (Aug 11, 2012)

VBF-13 said:


> Cobber, I wouldn't put it that you're boring me, but I am at somewhat of a loss as to where you're going with this, especially after what RCA just posted. I'm saying it's pretty evident from those two recommended approaches that these pilots were hardly dive bombing but were rather peeling-off at the start at shallower angles and at least attempting to sweep into their targets. That's a much slower approach speed, obviously, than in a typical 60 degree dive. It's easier to manage, too. The pilots who for whatever reasons deviated from the recommended approaches, if they were the less-experienced pilots, they probably encountered trouble, while, if they were the earlier pilots, it makes sense they probably fared better. In the horizontal attacks, if you'll notice, these aircraft went barreling into their targets at breakneck speeds once they got to around 700 meters and leveled-off at 20 meters above the water. Their purpose at that point was to pour on the coals to collide at the greatest possible speed (see the "Remarks," horizontal collision data). Those were momentum-collisions, for the most part. In the dive attacks their optimal momentum was cut short for the 10-15 degree angles they were aiming at completing their collisions at. As such, if you'll also notice, those aircraft finished-off at slower speeds.
> 
> Now, hell, I don't know where I'm going with this...
> 
> Actually, though, I think I'm just trying to point out, the speeds are right there in that data RCA posted. When these pilots freaked out (and, I'm sure, a certain percentage of them did), well, anything goes. As for the ones who were able to hang in there, here in that data are the predicted speeds of the various aircraft in the two recommended approches.


 
Ahah! You have fallen into my fiendish trap and emulated my waffle and and meandering! (pause for diabolical laughter)
Seriously, I was just summarising my argument as to why I believed the majority of Kamikazes probably came in at 200-300 mph, well below the maximum dive speed of a zero (which were, it seems the most numerous type used in these attacks). A couple of contributors are sticking to higher figures, I think. I certainly cant disprove the proposition that some allied ships were hit by kamikazes travelling at much higher velocities, I
just think it would be unusual. Then again, I can't disprove the proposition that some allied ships were hit by death rays from Mars - I just think it would be that much more unusual. 
Oh well, it's a dry argument and there's a beer in the frigdge. See you later, all...


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## tyrodtom (Aug 11, 2012)

I noticed one of those sites tell of a aircraft that came from straight above a picket ship, but in a spiral.
No gun could track him for very long, then a gun on the other side of the ship would have to start firing, and so on all the way down. Plus reloading the guns were harder when they were shooting straight up.
A very hard to counter attack, but one that could only be done by a skilled pilot.

IMO the maneal was for the inexperienced pilots, the veterans could think of their own way.


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## VBF-13 (Aug 11, 2012)

CobberKane said:


> Ahah! You have fallen into my fiendish trap and emulated my waffle and and meandering! (pause for diabolical laughter)



You fiend! 



CobberKane said:


> Seriously, I was just summarising my argument as to why I believed the majority of Kamikazes probably came in at 200-300 mph, well below the maximum dive speed of a zero (which were, it seems the most numerous type used in these attacks). A couple of contributors are sticking to higher figures, I think. I certainly cant disprove the proposition that some allied ships were hit by kamikazes travelling at much higher velocities, I
> just think it would be unusual. Then again, I can't disprove the proposition that some allied ships were hit by death rays from Mars - I just think it would be that much more unusual.
> Oh well, it's a dry argument and there's a beer in the frigdge. See you later, all...



OK, gotcha. Maybe the Curiosity rover will dig up some evidence to support at least that Martian proposition so we won't have to start debating that.


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## VBF-13 (Aug 11, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> I noticed one of those sites tell of a aircraft that came from straight above a picket ship, but in a spiral.
> No gun could track him for very long, then a gun on the other side of the ship would have to start firing, and so on all the way down. Plus reloading the guns were harder when they were shooting straight up.
> A very hard to counter attack, but one that could only be done by a skilled pilot.
> 
> IMO the maneal was for the inexperienced pilots, the veterans could think of their own way.


I think there's certainly enough information just at this point in this thread to support the proposition that the manual was just for the rookie pilots, if one wants to believe that. It's certainly easier to manage the approaches therein than a dive approach. But it could still just be these were simply the recommended, ideal approaches, for all the pilots, to ensure they got the most out of this different kind of bombing, i.e., collision-bombing. I didn't grasp that, at first, as I was stuck on these pilots were simulating dive-bombing. RCA's post opened my eyes to the differences between that and this kind of bombing, and now I can't close my eyes to those differences. So, I'm back on the fence on this question.


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## stona (Aug 11, 2012)

If the Japanese commanders had decided that the best way to attack enemy shipping in Kamikaze attacks was that laid out in the manual then they would expect all their pilots to carry out attacks in this manner.
Generally,in military organisations,such things are not options.
Cheers
Steve


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 11, 2012)

We have lists of ships attacked by both combatants, I wonder if the Japanese kept information on pilots and their experience levels that went off on kamikaze missions? JoeB?


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## VBF-13 (Aug 11, 2012)

Let's all just make an effort to get our heads around the uniqueness of a manual of this nature. This is the Japanese Army's collision-bombing tactics. It's something unique in that there really isn't any precedent for it. It's the ideal, recommended approaches these pilots were trained to emulate to maximize the effectiveness of their attacks. It's a tactical manual specific to collision-bombing just the same as there are tactical manuals specific to torpedo-bombing, dive-bombing, and fighter-bombing. It's no different than any of those are different among themselves.


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## steve51 (Aug 11, 2012)

Does anyone know if the Soviets ever issued a manual for air to air ramming? It wouldn't surprise me if they had, given the frequency that the tactic was used and assuming higher command approved of the practice. Some pilots reportedly performed a ramming more than once.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 11, 2012)

And don't forget this - I bet there "would have" been a manual for ramming.

_"The plan was simple: fly above enemy aircraft, then enter a high-speed dive and collide with an enemy’s wing or vertical stabilizer. The XP-79B was designed to survive because of the heavily reinforced leading edges on the wings."_


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## VBF-13 (Aug 11, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> And don't forget this - I bet there "would have" been a manual for ramming.
> 
> _"The plan was simple: fly above enemy aircraft, then enter a high-speed dive and collide with an enemy’s wing or vertical stabilizer. The XP-79B was designed to survive because of the heavily reinforced leading edges on the wings."_


Hey, where's the front-half of that plane? 

Reinforced-wings to ram with. They took that job seriously, didn't they?


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## The Basket (Aug 12, 2012)

On 15 September 1940, Flight Sergeant Ray Holmes of No. 504 Squadron RAF used his Hawker Hurricane to destroy a Dornier Do 17 bomber over London by ramming. So its the value of a Hurricane and the pilot v the value of a Do 17 and its crew. Ramming was never a sanctioned practice and a Hurricane and a well trained pilot can be quite a cost.

Although would I happily serve for a military who would happily think my life is totally expendable? Hardly good for morale.

I wonder if once a Japanese Kamikaze has volunteered can he unvolunteer? If he is injured and unable to fight, does he have to commit suicide?

An aircraft is a very expensive machine and throwing them away is not very cost effective,


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## stona (Aug 12, 2012)

Holmes did not initially claim to have intentionally rammed the bomber. He said after landing in Hugh Street,Chelsea that he "hit something during the attack". 
It was only somewhat later that he said "His aeroplane looked so flimsy, I didn't think of it as solid and substantial. I just went on and hit it for six. I thought my aircraft would cut right through it, not allowing for the fact that his 'plane was as strong as mine!"
The Dornier had already been attacked by Hurricanes of 310 (Czech) Squadron and two of its crew had already bailed out so he was hardly the saviour of Buckingham Palace either. The BoB movie has something to answer for in this case.
None of this detracts from Holmes' heroism. He went on to serve in various theatres,including Russia,with considerable distinction.
Cheers
Steve


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## tyrodtom (Aug 12, 2012)

How many big ships ( cruisers, battleships, aircraft carriers) were sunk by one bomb, or torpedo?
If you lose 10-20 aircraft and pilots to sink a carrier, you're way ahead. Aircraft may be expensive, but just a trifle in comparision to what a carrier cost, and the destruction it can inflict if it remains in service. Plus if the sinking of that carrier is swift, some of the crew and aircraft may go down with it.
If you're serving in any military during wartime, the mission comes first. You are expendable.


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## VBF-13 (Aug 12, 2012)

The Basket said:


> I wonder if once a Japanese Kamikaze has volunteered can he unvolunteer? If he is injured and unable to fight, does he have to commit suicide?



It's my understanding that some of those pilots shot themselves in the toe so they could no longer operate the rudder pedals and got out of duty that way. Just kidding!



The Basket said:


> An aircraft is a very expensive machine and throwing them away is not very cost effective



They weren't exactly throwing them away, given what was at stake.


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## The Basket (Aug 12, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> If you're serving in any military during wartime, the mission comes first. You are expendable.



One could say did the Kamikaze do more damage than conventional attacks would have done? Did they do what they were supposed to do and stop American invasion? I think there is a HUGE difference saying you may die in battle and saying you will 100% die in battle. And you will keep on trying until you are killed. 

It may be a western thing but suicide missions are not our bag.


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## VBF-13 (Aug 12, 2012)

Basket, they were desperate, and they were brain-stuffed. What more does one need to know?


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 12, 2012)

The Basket said:


> I wonder if once a Japanese Kamikaze has volunteered can he unvolunteer? If he is injured and unable to fight, does he have to commit suicide?
> 
> An aircraft is a very expensive machine and throwing them away is not very cost effective,



Research more about Kamikaze - what drove this mission and who "volunteered." You may find some information on links posted on this thread....


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## tyrodtom (Aug 12, 2012)

At that stage of the war any mission a inexperienced pilot would go on was likely gonna be one way. It takes experienced pilots in state of the art aircraft to have a any chance of a successful mission against a aircraft carrier group, with all the air support, and anti aircraft in the support ships surrounding it.
Japan was short of experinced pilots, short of fuel and time to train them, and short of aircraft suitable for a conventional attack.

The hope was that the Kamikaze would inflict so many causalties that the US would halt our advance on the home islands, it didn't, but maybe instead helped firm up the decision to use the A-bomb.


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## stona (Aug 13, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> The hope was that the Kamikaze would inflict so many causalties that the US would halt our advance on the home islands, it didn't, but maybe instead helped firm up the decision to use the A-bomb.



The decision to use a nuclear weapon was taken earlier than many appreciate.

From "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb" by Louis Morton.

"On the military side, realization that a bomb would probably be ready for testing in the summer of 1945 led to concrete planning for the use of the new weapon, on the assumption that the bomb when completed would work. By the end of 1944 a list of possible targets in Japan had been selected, and a B-29 squadron was trained for the specific job of delivering the bomb. It was also necessary to inform certain commanders in the Pacific about the project, and on 30 December 1944 Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves, head of the Manhattan District, recommended that this be done." 

Even some,presumably senior,Commanders in the Pacific Theatre knew of the intention to use a nuclear device months before the wholesale use of Kamikazes at Okinawa (April-June 1945).

There were also geo-political considerations,particularly Soviet involvment in the Far East.

"Though responsibility for the decision to use the atomic bomb was the President's, he exercised it only after careful study of the recommendations of his senior advisers. Chief among these was the Secretary of War, under whose broad supervision the Manhattan Project had been placed. Already deeply concerned over the cost of the projected invasion, _the political effects of Soviet intervention_, and the potential consequences of the use of the atomic bomb, Stimson sought a course that would avoid all these evils. The difficulty, as he saw it, lay in the requirement for unconditional surrender. It was a phrase that might make the Japanese desperate and lead to a long and unnecessary campaign of attrition that would be extremely costly to both sides. But there was no way of getting around the term; it was firmly rooted in Allied war aims and its renunciation was certain to lead to charges of appeasement."

On July 4 the British had given their consent to the use of the bomb against Japan. Churchill certainly saw it as a deterrent to Soviet expansion in Europe and later wrote that there was now a possibility "fair and bright indeed it seemed,of the end of the whole war in one or two violent shocks." 



Cheers

Steve


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## VBF-13 (Aug 13, 2012)

One thing that wasn't mentioned thus far was the reason for the Kamikazes. What was Japan hoping to gain by those ultimate sacrifices at that late stage in the War? In one word, it was "negotiations." They knew at that stage, they were finished. Their fleet was for the most part finished after the Philippines and Leyte, before we even went into Okinawa. Four months after those two campaigns, we caught and pounded the remainder of their heavy ships falling back on their heels to defend the Japanese homeland. The Japanese weren't thinking they were going to turn the tide of the War in those Kamikazes. They were rather deployed as a bargaining chip in the hopes of securing a negotiated end to the War. That's the only way that operation makes sense to me. What do you all think?


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## stona (Aug 13, 2012)

From the Japanese point of view,maybe. On the Allied side,in the US,the so called "Interim Committee" reported to the President on 1 June 1945. It recommended unanimously that: 

1. The bomb should be used against Japan as soon as possible. 

2. It should be used against a military target surrounded by other buildings. 

3. It should be used without prior warning of the nature of the weapon. (One member, Ralph A. Bard, later dissented from this portion of the committee's recommendation.) 

It was going to be hard for Japan to dodge the bomb after this.

Stimpson wrote.

"The conclusions of the Committee were similar to my own, although I reached mine independently. I felt that to extract a genuine surrender from the Emperor and his military advisers, they must be administered a tremendous shock which would carry convincing proof of our power to destroy the empire. Such an effective shock would save many times the number of lives, both American and Japanese, than it would cost."

We must remember that the _unconditional_ surrender of Japan was the announced objective of the war and the first requirement of all strategic planning.

There was already a non-atomic plan that was approved on June 18th 1945 

1. Air bombardment and blockade of Japan from bases in Okinawa, Iwo Jima, the Marianas, and the Philippines. 

2. Assault of Kyushu on 1 November 1945, and intensification of blockade and air bombardment. 

3. Invasion of the industrial heart of Japan through the Tokyo Plain in central Honshu, tentative target date 1 March 1946.

At the same meeting there was discussion of the possibility of ending the war by political means. The President displayed a deep interest in the subject and both Stimson and McCloy emphasized the importance of the "large submerged class in Japan who do not favor the present war and whose full opinion and influence had never yet been felt." There was also discussion of the atomic bomb, since everyone present knew about the bomb and the recommendations of the Interim Committee. The suggestion was made that before the bomb was dropped, the Japanese should be warned that the United States had such a weapon. "Not one of the Chiefs nor the Secretary," recalled Mr. McCloy, "thought well of a bomb warning, an effective argument being that no one could be certain, in spite of the assurances of the scientists, that the 'thing would go off." 

The Japanese might have hoped for some kind of negotiated settlement.The Suzuki Cabinet that came into power in April 1945 had an unspoken mandate from the Emperor to end the war as quickly as possible. But it was faced immediately with an additional problem when the Soviet Government announced it would not renew the neutrality pact after April 1946. The German surrender in May produced another crisis in the Japanese Government and led, after considerable discussion, to a decision to seek Soviet mediation. But the first approach, made on June 3 to Jacob Malik, the Soviet Ambassador, produced no results. Malik was noncommittal and merely said the problem needed further study.
The Japanese government had accepted the inevitability of defeat and was seeking desperately for a way out but it was not willing even at this late date to surrender unconditionally, and would accept no terms that did not include the preservation of the Imperial system.
Many in the US wanted to make terms available to Japan,not for entirely selfless reasons either. One memorandum promotes the advantages to US interests of ending the war sooner.

"....before too many of our allies are committed there and have made substantial contributions toward the defeat of Japan." 

In the view of the War Department these aims justified 

"any concessions which might be attractive to the Japanese, so long as our realistic aims for peace in the Pacific are not adversely affected." 

This was politically unnaceptable to the administration and obviously the US allies,particularly Britain,had they ever heard of it. It probably refers more to the imminent entry of the Soviet Union into the fray.
The military men had,earlier in the war considered Soviet intervention vital to any invasion,something that was becoming less palatable politically and militarily by 1945.

Meaningful terms would not be offered and the bomb would drop. Two bombs and hundreds of thousands of deaths later Japan did keep the Imperial system,at least in name.

Steve


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## VBF-13 (Aug 13, 2012)

I know. The Kamikazes didn't achieve a negotiated end of the War but that was Japan's objective in deploying them at a time when it knew the War was lost. That's what I was getting at.


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## stona (Aug 13, 2012)

I'm not sure that their was any long term objective in Kamikaze attacks or any other Japanese military efforts after,say,late 1944 except to carry on fighting and inflict as much damage on her enemies as possible. Japan's capacity to wage war had been severely and terminally reduced. Kamikaze attacks and various other types of suicide missions were one of the few ways that Japan could continue to resist.
In 1945 japan was attempting to seek some form of conditional surrender and still had to be in the game to do that. To that extent I agree with you.
Cheers
Steve


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## The Basket (Aug 13, 2012)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Research more about Kamikaze - what drove this mission and who "volunteered." You may find some information on links posted on this thread....


 
You don't mind if I cut and paste this as I intend to use it on every thread. 

If one is being picky one could say the Japanese did conditional surrender as they were able to keep their Emperor.

Other countries were equally as desperate as the Japanese but suicide squads are unheard of within UK fighting forces. Although one can easily pick missions where survival was zero to non existant but it was never 'suicide'.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 13, 2012)

The Basket said:


> You don't mind if I cut and paste this as I intend to use it on every thread.



Not at all if it turns your crank!


The Basket said:


> *If one is being picky one could say the Japanese did conditional surrender as they were able to keep their Emperor.*
> Other countries were equally as desperate as the Japanese but suicide squads are unheard of within UK fighting forces. Although one can easily pick missions where survival was zero to non existant but it was never 'suicide'.



One way to look at it but....

_"Just a month later the semi-divine Emperor, in striped trousers and a
morning coat, reluctantly handed his top hat to an aide and entered
General Douglas MacArthur's reception room at the refurbished
American Embassy to begin what amounted to his re-incarnation.
Accepting responsibility for the war, he offered to abdicate or do
whatever else was necessary.* But MacArthur wanted him to stay. In
the first of 11 meetings between the Emperor and the new American
Shogun, the two men worked out an odd but intense collaboration.
The U.S. general flatly resisted colleagues who felt that Hirohito
should be tried as a war criminal. Above all he wanted a peaceful
occupation. The Emperor who finally stopped his generals from
continuing a last-ditch war was surely the man who could keep his
subjects peaceful. The Emperor agreed."* _

Emperor Hirohito

The Japenese were in no position to make demands based on this and other similar accounts; had MacArthur wanted the Emperor removed, he would have been hung along side his generals.


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## stona (Aug 13, 2012)

Exactly. The Emperor was maintained but the Imperial system was dismantled. What was left was entirely at the victors' discretion and on the victors' terms. This is not the same as some form of negotiated settlement.
It was a small concession,agreed by all the Allies,to facilitate the end of hostilities.
Steve


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## The Basket (Aug 13, 2012)

So if the Germans wanted Hitler then can that concession be made?

I can understand that Realpolotik was at work but the Emperor was part of any negotiated settlement. Nothing wrong with making it easier but the fact the Emperor was still there was certainly a sore point.

The Japanese were utterly defeated. Anything they got out of negotiation was a concession.


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## stona (Aug 13, 2012)

The Basket said:


> So if the Germans wanted Hitler then can that concession be made?



The Emperor was reduced to a titular Head of State_ for the convenience of the occupiers _and this was not what the Japanese had envisaged at all. As "Flyboyj" said,if the allies had wanted him gone they could easily have tried and hanged him and there's not a thing the Japanese could have done to prevent it. Keeping the Emperor was part of_ US plans _for the future administration of Japan so it was an easy "concession" to make.
The Germans didn't want Hitler,they'd tried to assassinate him on several occasions and his position militarily,politically and constitutionally makes comparisons with Hirohito impossible anyway. Hitler was not part of the Allies' plans for the future of Germany.
Cheers
Steve


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 13, 2012)

The Basket said:


> So if the Germans wanted Hitler then can that concession be made?


That probably would have been up to Ike and Zhukov if Germany was in a similar postion Japan was in but I think its obvious what their choice would have been. The Japanese Emperor was just a figure head when you got down to it, Hitler was calling the shots and making policy.


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## VBF-13 (Aug 13, 2012)

stona said:


> I'm not sure that their was any long term objective in Kamikaze attacks or any other Japanese military efforts after,say,late 1944 except to carry on fighting and inflict as much damage on her enemies as possible.


No, I'm sorry, I disagree. They were pursuing an overall objective, and a very distinct one, IMHO. It just wasn't the type that was aimed at a victory but at getting them a say in the terms of the defeat. That's the whole reason they kept on fighting even though they knew they were licked. Again, they fell short of achieving that objective, that's no news. Once they experienced those A-bombs, that drove home the futility of the pursuit of the objective. That's why they immediately gave it up. They didn't have to do that, they could have kept on fighting. They gave it up because those bombs told them they were going nowhere with the objective, we weren't going to be compelled to deal, not on any issue.

What happened, after, and what concessions they extracted, those were the result of politics, they weren't in the Instrument of Surrender. FWIW, we agree, it was a totally unconditional surrender.


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## tyrodtom (Aug 13, 2012)

We'll never know if they would have gave up or not even after both A-bombs were dropped. The Emperor made that decision for them.
There were a strong faction that though Emperor Hirohito was under the influence of bad advisors, tried to steal the recording of Hirohito's surrender anouncement, and had plans to kidnap the Emperor in the hope of convincing him to fight on, but their plot failed.

You're talking about a military, that as they saw it, had never lost a war in Japan's entire long history. Most would rather die that live with the shame of defeat.
Endure the unendurable might be just words to us, but they had a deeper meaning to the Japanese.


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## VBF-13 (Aug 13, 2012)

tyrodtom said:


> We'll never know if they would have gave up or not even after both A-bombs were dropped. The Emperor made that decision for them.
> There were a strong faction that though Emperor Hirohito was under the influence of bad advisors, tried to steal the recording of Hirohito's surrender anouncement, and had plans to kidnap the Emperor in the hope of convincing him to fight on, but their plot failed.
> 
> You're talking about a military, that as they saw it, had never lost a war in Japan's entire long history. Most would rather die that live with the shame of defeat.
> Endure the unendurable might be just words to us, but they had a deeper meaning to the Japanese.


Well, conceded, Hirohito, or somebody on his behalf, was necessary to made the decision "official." And, while we're at it, let's also concede there was that faction of extremists who wanted to undermine that official decision and hold out to the death. And let's finally concede that culture, right down to the last citizen in the street, had much of those same, extremist, die-hard leanings bred into them since birth. Let's stop and look at what was happening. In as early as March of that year we were bombing military targets in the Japanese homeland to throw them off that we were getting ready to take Okinawa. Throughout the Okinawa campaign and even more so towards the end of it we were escalating those bombing missions in the homeland. In July we were pounding the daylights out of many more of those homeland cities. Before the A-bombs and even before the Soviets got involved, millions of Japanese citizens had enough and wanted to throw in the towel. They had it with that War. That's why their government was trying real hard at that time to "sue for peace." But that wasn't in our plans, because we were holding all the cards. And, that's why we dropped those A-bombs.

Now, a bunch of extremist crackpots undermining the decision of the Japanese Emperor, OK. But they're going to undermine the will of the Japanese citizens, too? And, even so, for how long are they going to do that? Do you see? They were done after those A-bombs. The citizens were done. And, that's all that counted. As I see it.


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## GrauGeist (Aug 14, 2012)

As a little known fact, Bulgarian pilots were known to intentionally ram Allied bombers, the first recorded incedent occurred on 20 December 1943 over Sofia. A flight of U.S. B-24s escorted by P-38s were intercepted by Bulgarian Bf109G-2/4 and D-520 aircraft and during the particularly savage fight, Lt. Dimitar Spisarevsky rammed a B-24, taking it down but costing him his life in doing so. They referred to him as a "human torpedo".

Another account, was on "Black Easter", 17 April 1944 during an Allied raid consisting of U.S. B-24 bombers escorted by P-51B fighters (the Bulgarians at first mistook these P-51Bs as Messerschmitts), Lt. Nedelcho Bonchev rammed a B-24 with his aircraft, and was able to successfully bail out and parachute to safety.


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## stona (Aug 14, 2012)

According to US intelligence reports (G-2), the Japanese leaders were fully aware of their desperate situation but would continue to fight in the hope of avoiding complete defeat by securing a better bargaining position. Allied war-weariness and disunity,or some miracle, they hoped,would offer them a way out. "The Japanese believe,"declared an intelligence estimate of 30 June 1945 "that unconditional surrender would be the equivalent of national extinction,and there are as yet no indications that they are ready to accept such terms." 
It appeared also to the intelligence experts that Japan might surrender at any time "depending upon the conditions of surrender" the Allies might offer. Clearly these conditions,to have any chance of acceptance,would have to include retention of the imperial system.

(From G-2 Memorandum prepared for OPD and quoted in Cline, Washington Command Post and Karl T. Compton in an article entitled "If the Atomic Bomb Had Not Been Dropped," Atlantic Monthly (December, 1946))

It is also worth remembering that an invasion of the Japanese Islands was not favoured by all US Commanders. Admirals Leahy and King were strongly opposed to the plan. Trumann eventually supported a compromise based on the invasion plans as proposed by Marshall and MacArthur. The invasion of Kyushu would go ahead on 1 November 1945 and preparations for the Honshu assault would continue, but no final decision would be made until preparations had reached the point "beyond which there would not be opportunity for a free choice." (McCloy, "Challenge to American Foreign Policy")

That's why the Japanese carried on fighting. 

Cheers

Steve


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## VBF-13 (Aug 14, 2012)

stona said:


> According to US intelligence reports (G-2), the Japanese leaders were fully aware of their desperate situation but would continue to fight in the hope of avoiding complete defeat by securing a better bargaining position. Allied war-weariness and disunity,or some miracle, they hoped,would offer them a way out. "The Japanese believe,"declared an intelligence estimate of 30 June 1945 "that unconditional surrender would be the equivalent of national extinction,and there are as yet no indications that they are ready to accept such terms."
> It appeared also to the intelligence experts that Japan might surrender at any time "depending upon the conditions of surrender" the Allies might offer. Clearly these conditions,to have any chance of acceptance,would have to include retention of the imperial system.
> 
> (From G-2 Memorandum prepared for OPD and quoted in Cline, Washington Command Post and Karl T. Compton in an article entitled "If the Atomic Bomb Had Not Been Dropped," Atlantic Monthly (December, 1946))
> ...


That's what I've been saying from the outset, but, citations omitted. Your citations will do just fine, though. 

As a footnote, the transition in the aftermath let them preserve much of their system, customs, and so forth. But, that was on our terms, not theirs. That's what that unconditional surrender was. It was to our advantage in the aftermath that Japan not be turned completely upside-down (and, actually, from a broader political standpoint, that it be cultivated as an ally, going into the future). It was to their advantage, too, sure, that much of their system, customs, and so forth, be preserved. However, the point is, their advantage was relevant only to the degree it was consistent with ours.


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## stona (Aug 14, 2012)

VBF-13 said:


> It was to their advantage, too, sure, that much of their system, customs, and so forth, be preserved. However, the point is, their advantage was relevant only to the degree it was consistent with ours.



Indeed,I absolutely agree with that. In fact I think we are in broad agreement on the whole "surrender" conundrum. Maybe just two different ways of arriving at the same result 

Cheers

Steve


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## VBF-13 (Aug 14, 2012)

Yup, Steve, we were on the same track the whole way in!


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## steve51 (Aug 14, 2012)

GrauGeist,
Thank you for those details about those Bulgarian pilots. I've read elsewhere that Bontchev was credited with a total of 2 kills. I'd love to find an English language book about the Bulgarian AF. All I know is what I've read in " In The Skies Of Europe " by Hans Neulen.


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## steve51 (Aug 14, 2012)

GrauGeist,
I just pulled the book I mentioned off the shelve, and both those ramming incidents you mentioned are in there. I read that book years ago and forgot those details. So, thanks for reminding me.


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## GrauGeist (Aug 19, 2012)

Steve, look for the book titled: "Air Power of the Kingdom of Bulgaria" by Dimitar Nedialkov (2001, ISBN: 954-90587-7-8)
It's part 4 (the time period of 1940 - 1946) in a series covering the history of Bulgarian air power with 60 pages and over 80 photos, some are unique to the book, and it's in both English and Bulgarian.


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## steve51 (Aug 19, 2012)

GrauGeist,
Thanks for that title. I'm becoming interested in the history of the East Europe air forces but have not come upon many books that concentrate on them in great detail.


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