# England's fighter strength in Battle of Britain



## ralphwiggum (Dec 19, 2008)

I was browsing on another WW2 site when I stumbled onto a remark that the R.A.F's fighter strength wasn't just a "Handful" of fighters during the battle I started to wonder if this might be true Anyone know anything about this? 
I'm sorry about all my questions I really am


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## Airframes (Dec 19, 2008)

Well, ralph, it wasn't quite a handful, being around 600 + front-line fighters (only a rough count, I'd need to verify the exact amount serviceable), but the Luftwaffe at the time outnumbered (in total strength) the RAF by between 3 to 4 times that amount, depending on which figures are looked at. (Before anybody chirps in saying that it was so and so, I know! This is just a quick explanation!) The main thing was, the lack, or low numbers, of trained fighter pilots, and the general shortage of materials, allowing for equipment lost during the retreat from France.
Don't worry about asking lots of questions - that's the way to learn, and I'm sure the people here are only too pleased to help if they can.
Terry.


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## Jerry W. Loper (Dec 19, 2008)

ralphwiggum said:


> I was browsing on another WW2 site when I stumbled onto a remark that the R.A.F's fighter strength wasn't just a "Handful" of fighters during the battle I started to wonder if this might be true Anyone know anything about this?
> I'm sorry about all my questions I really am



Although the RAF's fighters were outnumbered by the Luftwaffe (Me-109s alone outnumbered the combined RAF Spitfire Hurricane force), the RAF's most severe shortage was pilots, not machines. In addition to the 600-some-odd Hurricanes and Spitfires in operational units, there were about 200-300 in storage available for issue; plus, no matter how intense the battle became, the RAF tried to rotate fatigued squadrons to rest sectors as much as possible.


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## kool kitty89 (Dec 19, 2008)

It was 11 group that really had their backs to the wall prior to the switch to city bombing by the Luftwaffe. The incessant attacks on 11 group brought them to the brink of collapse, but the rest of fighter command was very much intact. (the problem was that 11 group was being pounded so hard that transfering planes and pilots from other units was difficult)


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## ralphwiggum (Dec 19, 2008)

I just have to say that although I'm definitely NOT an authority of ANY kind on WW2 I've been a WW2 history enthusiast for a very, very, long time so 
I wonder if what I've read over the years is true  That's why I come to you guys w/my questions I'm REALLY REALLY impressed with how much you guys know I wish I was as knowledgeable as all of you 
Ralph Wiggum


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## Burmese Bandit (Dec 19, 2008)

And perhaps you might want to take this into account: during the Battle of Britain the British factories outproduced the German ones by roughtly four hurrincanes and spits to every three 109s produced!


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## kool kitty89 (Dec 19, 2008)

Is that 4 Hurris _plus_ 4 Spits, or 4 Hurris and spits total? (I would assume the former given German's rather modest millitary production after the Battle of France)


There was a point (just before switching to city bombing) that not only was 11 group short on pilots, but aircraft lossed was actuallt outstripping production. (of course, relative losses and production would have been worse still for Germany)


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## Eurofighter (Dec 19, 2008)

From what I have read the RAF was in fact outnumbered by the Luftwaffe during the battle but one of the decisive factor in the outcome of the battle was the change of strategy by the Luftwaffe and that British fighters were well suited for their role of interceptors while German capable escort fighters like the Bf 109 lacked the much needed range.


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## Freebird (Dec 19, 2008)

Eurofighter said:


> From what I have read the RAF was in fact outnumbered by the Luftwaffe during the battle but one of the decisive factor in the outcome of the battle:.



You mentioned a few key points in the battle:

.


> *1.* was the change of strategy by the Luftwaffe .



Yes



> *2.* British fighters were well suited for their role of interceptors.



Yes



> *3.* German capable escort fighters like the Bf 109 lacked the much needed range.



Yes

Plus also: The British pilots shot down but not killed could return to duty, while Germans shot down landed in the channel or in the UK as POW's

The British interceptors concentrated on the bombers, the losses of German bombers were higher than British, and Hitler didn't want to continue such high losses, he needed them for the future {Barbarossa!}

The turning point was perhaps "Battle of Britain Day" Sept 15, when the Luftwaffe lost 60 aircraft on a single day. 2 days later Hitler postponed the invasion of Britain, and by the middle of October it was clear the Luftwaffe could not defeat the RAF. At this point it was so late in the season that "Operation Sealion" would have to wait until spring, {if ever}


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## kool kitty89 (Dec 20, 2008)

We were discussing some of this here: http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/polls/best-battle-britain-aircraft-507-27.html 

A seaborn invasion would not be possible with what Germany had, assuming air superiority.

Hitler's plan was to use invasion as a threat to bring Britain to the negotiating table. (those "invasion barges" were never a real threat)


In any case Germany couldn't have geared up for a propper invasion in the time it was asked to.

However if Britain continued to resist (which it would so long as Churchill remained in power) and Hitler was willing to postpone the invasion of Russia, there are some other possibilities for invading Britain.

Assuming millitary production was ramped up to full sustainable capacity and Bf 109's got their drop tanks as well as Germany sticking to wearing down the local air defence, attacking airfields -day and night-. (possibly working on ways to work aganst radar)

It may have been possible to mount an entirely airborne invasion of Britain, with air superiorety. (with aircraft like the Me 321 as well as smaller troop gliders and paratroop transports -Ju 52's)


On the other hand I think it would have been better (after the BoF) to regroup, ramp up production and development to build up their forces. Then attempt to delay further conflict with Britain (and the US) for as long as possible while Germany invades Russia in 1941 in far greater force than hitorically. (and with a still undefeated Luftwaffe)


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## Kurfürst (Dec 20, 2008)

Jerry W. Loper said:


> Although the RAF's fighters were outnumbered by the Luftwaffe (Me-109s alone outnumbered the combined RAF Spitfire Hurricane force), the RAF's most severe shortage was pilots, not machines.



Actually no. The LW and the RAF had rough parity as far as single engined fighters go, and through most of the Battle, save for the early period in July, the RAF actually had more fighters available.

On June 29, Fighter Command had 814 fighters in squadrons, of which 587 was ready for operations. On the same day, the LW possessed 1107 s-e fighters in daylight fighter squadrons, of which 856 was ready for operations. Not all of this was employed against England, and the figure is somewhat misleading as some many units were overstrenght.

But, during July action was very light, with relatively few losses on both sides, with action largely limited to skirmishes over the Channel, allowing the RAF FC to further increase its strenght. 

The Germans did not start the battle proper until Adlertag on the 13 August. Just before Adlertag, they had 1106 fighters, of which 749 was ready for operations. This remained more or less stable during the Battle. German s-e fighter strenght was decreasing, partially because of losses, and also because some units were transferred to other duties, ie. training and night fighther, so they no longer show up on _daylight single engined fighter_ reports.

In any case, Fighter Command had 1048 fighters on strenght, of which 732 were servicable on 28 September; the LW S.E.D.F. amounted 920 present, 712 ready for operations on the same day, after the heavy combat on the preceding day.



> In addition to the 600-some-odd Hurricanes and Spitfires in operational units, there were about 200-300 in storage available for issue; plus, no matter how intense the battle became, the RAF tried to rotate fatigued squadrons to rest sectors as much as possible.



FC also had plenty of reserves, ie. on 9 August they reported 80 Defiants, 160 Hurricanes, and 132 Spitfires immidietely ready for issue. There were a lot more in reserve, ie. on the same day 23 Hurricanes were estimated to be ready within 4 day, and 150 under prerarations for issue, and 33 awaiting repair or modifications. The number of reserves fell heavily during the August/September Battles.

The real headache was not planes, it was pilots. Although the numbers were present, behind the numbers there were a large number of semi-trained embryo fighter pilots who finished a much shortened training course, while towards the end of the Battle, some did not even finish the shortened one.


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## Waynos (Dec 20, 2008)

In terms of numbers the available strength of RAF fighter command increased by 40% during the course of the battle from 1,259 pilots on 6th July to 1,796 by 2nd Nov.

By contrast German fighter strength declined by 25% and bomber strength by 30% during the same period (German figures from Otto Bechtler, intelligence officer for KG2) and separate units were being combined together in order to mount attacks in anything like normal strength. Attrition proved a much bigger problem to the Germans than it was to the British. 

The Luftwaffes change of targets against London was NOT critical to the outcome of the battle as is commonly believed, though it certainly provided relief. Whichever target was attacked made no difference to the loss rate in the air and it was in this that the Luftwaffe lost the battle, indeed the Luftwaffes most successful days in the air battle, 11,14 and 28 September, came after they turned on London. For all the fury the Luftwaffe poured on fighter command before this they failed to knock out the radar screen (although to be fair they, rather surprisingly didn't try very hard which in itself was probably their biggest single tactical blunder) and only put one sector, Biggin, out of action and even then for only a few hours.

The use of undertrained novice pilots was a problem shared by the RAF and the Luftwaffe in equal measure, the loss rates of Bf 109 pilots is quite telling, in July 11% of available pilots were lost, in August it was 15% and in September 23%. This is Bf 109 pilots only and a loss rate that ther Germans could not simply ignore. So while the German pilots were much more experienced and combat ready at the start of the Battle than their British counterparts losses quickly eroded this advantage and this set in a rot that plagued the Luftwaffe right through to the end of the war. Theo Osterkamp wrote how the crews lost over England in 1940 were highly trained experienced professionals and that this heralded a 'feckless decline' from which the Luftwaffe never recovered throughout the war (Durch Hohen und Tiefen Jagt ein Herz - 1952).

One of the myths of the battle is the British were unprepared to fight the professionalism of the Germans and that they muddled through. This is complete nonsense, and a view that makes the German defeat look downright embarrassing, as Fighter Command was the best prepared fighter force in the world. In 1940 it was fighting exactly the battle that it had been preparing for since its foundation. Although the aerial formations were naive at the outset, the overall organisation was spot on and the model upon which every modern fighter defence screen is based.

There are many reasons that the RAF won the Battle of Britain that actually come as a surprise when you look into it as you expect things to be the other way round, for instance the RAF had a carefully prepared system of defence which fully utilised the latest technology available to it and fought in a controlled professional manner, the Germans improvised their attacks and looked to their airmen to come up with a herioic tour de force to win the battle, and then Goering berated them for failing to do so.

The British worked as a closely co-ordinated team while the Germans worked as individuals, hunters.

In the RAF the commanders were ruthless and many of the pilots, especially the foreign ones, felt a deep hatred for the Germans while British ones were also fighting a grim battle to keep their homeland free from the Nazi's. The Luftwaffe, however, from correspondence of the time and later, thought of themselves as knights of the air, jousting a noble opponent in a chivalric contest, which was bollocks.

Basically the British behaved, and conducted the battle, exactly how you would expect the Germans to do, while the Germans seem to have done the opposite. This was a very surprising conclusion I came to while researching the battle from sources from both sides and anyone wondering how the Battle of Britain was won (because the myth of it takes some believing and makes it look almost as if Germany got bored and went away rather than actually being defeated) needs to ignore all the myths they have ever been told and look at only the historic records and memoirs of those who took part from the lowliest Sgt Pilot to the highest commanders to get a proper perspective. But it takes a long time.

No doubt I will now get flayed by the 'Superior-at-everything' pro German brigade but there you go, I've said it. And I only speak as I find.

In conclusion you might be interested to learn that Sealion was never officially cancelled. indeed an order was issued as late as 5th February 1944 by Naval High Command that preparation be temporarily halted. I wonder what they thought on june 6th of that same year?


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## parsifal (Dec 20, 2008)

Kurfurst has the most accurate assessment of the relative fighter strengths. I substantially agree with his strength assessment. Its one of the enduring myths that the RAF was heavily outnumbered. This only holds true if you add up the total German A/C strengths. In the critical fighter elements, the ratio was about 1.3:1 in favour of the LW, however there were a number of factors that prevented this apparent advantage from being exploited. First, was that many of the fighters were badly postioned, and simply lacked the range to get into the fight (eg the 80 or so 109s in Norway). Secondly German target selection throughout the battle was consistently very poor, with the result that they tended to send bomber strikes allover the place, apparently in the hope that this would disjoint the defence and send them allover the place as well. But with the highly sophisticated GCI system that Fighter Command possessed, this was never going to happen. The Although the Brits might attack with only a few aircraft, they would try to get the height and speed advantage make a quick pass at the bombers, and then get out of dodge....if they could. The limited fuel of the 109, coupled later with the close escort orders that came later, meant that the German fighters had a hard time engaging the RAF.

The Luftwaffe enjoyed superior pilots, and tactics at the beginning, and in my opinion the 109 was equal to the Spit, and superior to the Hurri. These advantages showed at the beginning, in the loss rates over the Channel and in the early clashes in August. However, as Freebird points out, every pilot lost in combat was a pilot lost for the germans, whereas for the allies only about 50% of the shoot down resulted in a pilot loss. British replacement rates were massively greater than the Germans

Much has been said about the poor choice of targets by the germans,. But this is a misconception. The facts are that any ONE of the strategies if adopted and pursued vigorously would have achieved far better results than they did. If they had gone for the radar systems, it would have been okay. If they had gone for the airfields that would have been okay. If they had gone for the aero factories, that would have been okay. If they had gone for terror bombing, that would have been okay. But to switch and change targets so many times was the mistake....the Germans didnt go for just one target, they went for all of them, and often their iontel was faulty as well Often they would bomb airfields that wernt being used for example

For the record. 1 July, the RAF had the following Se fighters combat ready: 11Gp: 348, 12 Gp 113, 13 Gp; 178. If the germans had swung their main attack onto the British 3 weeks before, they would have faced less than 200 serviceable fighters.

German fighter strength at both time was in the order of 700-850 se fighters. What they lacked in early were serviceable forward airbases.....

By the end of October thye attrition was really taking its toll on the German Fighter arm. Last week of October saw them reach their nadir....with about 250 serviceable machine. Not sure what the Raf was listing asa serviceable, but it was in the area of 1000 to 1200


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## Hop (Dec 20, 2008)

deleted because same figures given in reply to parsifal


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## Waynos (Dec 20, 2008)

According the information I have available, the break down of figures was as follows;

Single seaters - LW 1107, RAF 754

Two seaters - LW357, RAF 149

Bombers - LW 1380, RAF 560

Dive Bombers LW 428, RAF 0

Serviceability rates for the single seaters are LW, 73%, RAF 71%

In overall terms the RAF was outnumbered c.4.5 to 1 but in terms of single seat fighters only it was more like 1.5 to 1


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## Hop (Dec 20, 2008)

parsifal said:


> Kurfurst has the most accurate assessment of the relative fighter strengths. I substantially agree with his strength assessment. Its one of the enduring myths that the RAF was heavily outnumbered.



Kurfurst has done what he has done frequently in the past. He has added together all RAF fighter types, including Defiants and Blenheims, and compared them against Bf 109s only. He has _forgotten_ the several hundred Bf 110s that took part in the battle.

You can of course argue that the Bf 110 wasn't much of a fighter, but it was better than the Defiant and Blenheim.

The true comparison is Spitfires and Hurricanes vs 109s, or Spitfires, Hurricanes, Blenheims and Defiants against 109s and 110s (and Ju 88 fighters should be included as well, but I don't have the numbers for those)

In early July the RAF had 814 fighters in 54 squadrons. However, 9 of those squadrons flew Blenheims and Defiants. That means fighter strength was approx:

678 Spitfires and Hurricanes
136 Defiants and Blenheims

1,107 Bf 109s
290 (approx) Bf 110s (I don't have 110 numbers for early in the battle, but on 10th July they had 289 deployed against Britain)



> This only holds true if you add up the total German A/C strengths. In the critical fighter elements, the ratio was about 1.3:1 in favour of the LW, however there were a number of factors that prevented this apparent advantage from being exploited. First, was that many of the fighters were badly postioned, and simply lacked the range to get into the fight (eg the 80 or so 109s in Norway).



A much larger proportion of the RAF was deployed outside the battle area.

As you say, about 80 or so 109s were deployed in Norway. The RAF maintained about 19 Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons in the North, away from the battle. (out of a total of 45 - 50 squadrons)



> By the end of October thye attrition was really taking its toll on the German Fighter arm. Last week of October saw them reach their nadir....with about 250 serviceable machine. Not sure what the Raf was listing asa serviceable, but it was in the area of 1000 to 1200



31st October the RAF had 626 Spitfires and Hurricanes operational.


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## Kurfürst (Dec 20, 2008)

Hop said:


> The RAF had 814 fighters in squadrons, but that included twin engined fighters like Blenheims and twin seater aircraft like Defiants.



Yes, _in June 1940_... by August 10 they had 1106 fighters (749 servicable) with 1396 pilots. They also had 372 fighters in storage, ready to be issued.

The Luftwaffe on 10 August had deployed 934 SE and 289 TE fighters, 1223 in total, of which 805/224 were servicable, or 1029 in total. 

Its difficult to see how the RAF FC was seriously outnumbered. It simply wasn't, and possessed all the advantages of fighting a defensive operation.



Hop said:


> That means the RAF had about 678 Spitfires and Hurricanes, 136 Blenheims and Defiants, against a Luftwaffe force of 1107 Bf 109s and approx 290 Bf 110s (I don't have 110 strength for June/July, but on 10th August 289 were deployed against Britain).
> 
> So the true totals are RAF 678 vs Luft 1107 or RAF 814 against Luft 1400



These 'true' totals of yours are actually comparing servicable RAF fighters _in June_ vs servicable+unservicable LW SE fighters in the end of June and TE fighters in mid-August..



Hop said:


> Not all RAF strength was deployed against the Luftwafe, either. In fact the Luftwaffe deployed a far higher proportion of their force on the Channel coast than the British did. ... The odds in the combat areas were even more in the Luftwaffe's favour. Practically the entire Luftwaffe fighter force was deployed along the Channel coast. 19 squadrons of Spitfires and Hurricanes were deployed in the north of England, Scotland and Northern Ireland, areas that only saw fighting on 1 day.



And not all of the Luftwaffe fighters stationed along the Channel were flying missions on every day, either. IIRC the maximum effort was flown on 15 September, with 600 fighter sorties a day by the Luftwaffe. The RAF flew around 1000 fighter sorties on most days with heavier actions.

If you want to work out the ratio of fighters in the air, take a look at the sorties flown. 

Ie. Wood and Dempster shows 2355 LW fighter sorties flown between 1 and 8 September, and 875 between 9 and 15 September. Corresponding RAF fighter sorties were 5513 and 3152...

RAF Fighter Command was flying a defensive fight with an equal number of fighters, and generally speaking, more fighter sorties flown.


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## Vincenzo (Dec 20, 2008)

on 28/09/40 the LW have 712 Bf 109 serviceable (with 676 ready pilots) , all the luftwaffe not only versus england


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## Hop (Dec 20, 2008)

> _That means the RAF had about 678 Spitfires and Hurricanes, 136 Blenheims and Defiants, against a Luftwaffe force of 1107 Bf 109s and approx 290 Bf 110s (I don't have 110 strength for June/July, but on 10th August 289 were deployed against Britain).
> 
> So the true totals are RAF 678 vs Luft 1107 or RAF 814 against Luft 1400_
> 
> ...



No. They are comparing _all_ RAF fighters (Wood and Dempster give 814 fighters 29 June, 587 available for operations) against total Luftwaffe SE fighters on the same date. As I said, the 110 figures are from August because I don't have June's figures, but I suspect there would have been more in June, not less. 



> The Luftwaffe on 10 August had deployed 934 SE and 289 TE fighters, 1223 in total, of which 805/224 were servicable, or 1029 in total.
> 
> Its difficult to see how the RAF FC was seriously outnumbered.



I'll take your figures for the Luftwaffe.

Serviceable fighters, 10th August:

805 Bf 109s
224 Bf 110s
Total 1,029 Luftwaffe fighters (this excludes Ju 88 fighters, but what the hell)

245 Spitfires
382 Hurricanes
Total 627 
60 Blenheims
22 Defiants
2 Gladiators
Total 711 RAF fighters

Certainly things had already started to turn the RAF's way by this point. Luftwaffe fighter strength had already begun its precipitous decline. After the first month or so of fighting, Luftwaffe front line strength was down by about 50 109s. The RAF was up by about 150 or so.



> And not all of the Luftwaffe fighters stationed along the Channel were flying missions on every day, either. IIRC the maximum effort was flown on 15 September, with 600 fighter sorties a day by the Luftwaffe. The RAF flew around 1000 fighter sorties on most days with heavier actions.
> 
> If you want to work out the ratio of fighters in the air, take a look at the sorties flown.
> 
> Ie. Wood and Dempster shows 2355 LW fighter sorties flown between 1 and 8 September, and 875 between 9 and 15 September. Corresponding RAF fighter sorties were 5513 and 3152...



Only the Wood and Dempster figures aren't sourced, and are quite close to the _RAF's estimates_ of German sorties. 

Hooton, who sources his figures from the Luftwaffe records, shows 4,050 Luftwaffe fighter sorties 2 - 8 September.

RAF sorties of course included those in the north, not in the battle area, as well as a lot of standing patrols.


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## Kurfürst (Dec 20, 2008)

Waynos said:


> By contrast German fighter strength declined by 25% and bomber strength by 30% during the same period (German figures from Otto Bechtler, intelligence officer for KG2) and separate units were being combined together in order to mount attacks in anything like normal strength. Attrition proved a much bigger problem to the Germans than it was to the British.



Hmm, the German bomber strenghts stayed pretty much the same during the whole Battle, starting it with almost 1400 bombers on strenght, and finishing it with a little over 1400. 

Fighter strenghts certainly fell, altough there was certainly more to it than just losses - the number of aircraft produced and lost was roughly equal during the four, but some units were transferred to others arms (nightfighters, for example), so there appears to be some 'statistical' loss, ie. fighter planes no longer showing up with daylight fighter listings, because they were now listed elsewhere. Even more odd is that they listed very few fighters on strenght in December, even though there was not much of a fighting in the preceeding months, and only very small losses, on both sides. It was probably that the fighters were removed from the frontline units, transferred to training and night units, and the less suited ones written down to aging, while the crew and pilots were doing their R&R in the Hinterland, and units prepearing to receive the new 109Fs.



Waynos said:


> The use of undertrained novice pilots was a problem shared by the RAF and the Luftwaffe in equal measure, the loss rates of Bf 109 pilots is quite telling, in July 11% of available pilots were lost, in August it was 15% and in September 23%. This is Bf 109 pilots only and a loss rate that ther Germans could not simply ignore.



In contrast, Fighter Command's losses were even more severe, with 22.4% lost in August, and 24.4% in September.



Waynos said:


> Theo Osterkamp wrote how the crews lost over England in 1940 were highly trained experienced professionals and that this heralded a 'feckless decline' from which the Luftwaffe never recovered throughout the war (Durch Hohen und Tiefen Jagt ein Herz - 1952).



Interesting, I have seen references to this elsewhere. Can you please provide me a scan/shot of that page where he mentions this (OK in a PM too!), I would like to read his own words.



> The British worked as a closely co-ordinated team while the Germans worked as individuals, hunters.



This is a _very_ false assessement of it IMHO - take a look at the depth the Germans went in organising their bombers fighter escort, for example! Teamwork tactics - this was what the Schwarm and Rotte was all about.. it was very flexible tactical unit, as opposed to the RAF's three plane formation, which was only about concentrating the firepower of three planes against an intercepted bomber, because of rather mistaken pre-war tactical beliefs about an insufficient firing envelope.


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## renrich (Dec 20, 2008)

I don't know if the term, "force multiplier" applies here but the raw numbers of fighters available doesn't really reflect the relative strength because of two factors. The LW single seat fighters had to go a considerable distance to get into the fight and then go home where they were pretty much finished for that day. The RAF did not have to go far and then they could go home and refuel and rearm and fight again that day. Also the British radar helped the RAF to concentrate and not waste too much of the fighter force in empty air. The LW did not have that luxury as they needed to defend almost every bomber whether they were attacked or not. Wear and tear and fatigue took place against the LW fighter force whether they were engaged or not.


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## Kurfürst (Dec 20, 2008)

Hop said:


> Certainly things had already started to turn the RAF's way by this point. Luftwaffe fighter strength had already begun its precipitous decline.



Very wishful.  



> After the first month or so of fighting, Luftwaffe front line strength was down by about 50 109s. The RAF was up by about 150 or so.



Nope, the _Luftwaffe_ front line strength was certainly not down by about 50 109s. The RAF was increasing its strenght while the Luftwaffe was not attacking it with concentrated effort, that is not very surprising is it? 

You are pulling another statistical stunt, comparing the 29 June figures for the entire _Tagjagd_ (which soon 'lost' a unit of 109 that was transferred to the _Nachtjagd_) with the 10 August figures that only include units engaged against England only.. I am sure the RAF would have loved your method of getting rid of 109s, should it would actually remove 109s from strenghts, but it does not do that. Its just playing, and misleading with statistics.

As for the RAF strenght, 3/4 days after Adlertag and a week after the 9/10 August, the servicealbe fighters fell by some 45, and even more telling are the state of reserves, Hurricanes in storage/reserve going down from 356 to 270, Spitfires from 207 to 179. 

In other words, the Luftwaffe started hammering the RAF after lull in July.



> Only the Wood and Dempster figures aren't sourced, and are quite close to the _RAF's estimates_ of German sorties.
> 
> Hooton, who sources his figures from the Luftwaffe records, shows 4,050 Luftwaffe fighter sorties 2 - 8 September.



Actually Wood and Dempster's sources are also _matching_ the figures by Hooton, 'who sources his figures from the Luftwaffe records', and the only reason of difference is that W+D counts 'fighter' sorties which are that, sorties flown by fighters (SE and TE) in an air superiority role, and counting Jabo's amongst bomber sorties (properly, IMHO) while Hooton counts the Luftwaffe air superiority and fighter-bomber sorties as 'fighter' sorties. 

Are you suggesting perhaps that LW Jabo operations also contributed heavily to escorting bombers and winning air superiority..? Another statistical stunt, Hoppie?



> RAF sorties of course included those in the north, not in the battle area, as well as a lot of standing patrols.



So do the Luftwaffe's sorties.


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## Hop (Dec 20, 2008)

> but some units were transferred to others arms (nightfighters, for example)



No, I think we went over this before. The night fighter units were being transitioned away from the 109 during the battle.

From The Other Battle, Luftwaffe Night Aces vs Bomber Command, by Peter Hinchcliffe:


> It was becoming clear there was no place in the new night fighter organisation for the Bf 109, and gradually the pilots of III/NG 1 [renamed from II/NG 1] converted to the Bf 110, only 1 staffel of single seaters remaining until October [1940], when that was itself disbanded.



From German Air Force Air Defence Operations by Walter Grabmann:


> Initially this group had Me 109 aircraft. Since they were found unsuitable for the purpose because of their small time in air capacities and their inadequate equipment for blind navigation, re-equipment of the group's squadrons with Me 110 aircraft commenced in December 1940.


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## Kurfürst (Dec 20, 2008)

None of this transition to the 110 seems to have occured in the time period we are discussing, though. 

There were certainly 109 equipped night fighter units during the Battle, usually operating a mix of 110s and 109s. These were transformed from existing daylight fighter units, 109 units as well. So those 109s 'missing' from the daylight fighter lists were not 'lost', but sent to other duties.


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## Hop (Dec 20, 2008)

> Nope, the Luftwaffe front line strength was certainly not down by about 50 109s. The RAF was increasing its strenght while the Luftwaffe was not attacking it with concentrated effort, that is not very surprising is it?
> 
> You are pulling another statistical stunt, comparing the 29 June figures for the entire Tagjagd (which soon 'lost' a unit of 109 that was transferred to the Nachtjagd)



No, they didn't lose a unit that was transferred to the nachtjagd. Some units went from the JGs on 22nd June, _before_ the figures we are comparing against. 



> with the 10 August figures that only include units engaged against England only.



Which was all the 109s, I believe.

Pilot numbers tell the same story. 29th June the Luftwaffe had 906 109 pilots fit for duty. 1st of August they had 869. (1st September it was down to 735)



> In other words, the Luftwaffe started hammering the RAF after lull in July.



In July the RAF got stronger as the Luftwaffe got weaker. In August, the RAF briefly got a bit weaker, the Luftwaffe got a lot weaker.

RAF serviceable aircraft 13th August - 579 Spitfires and Hurricanes
7th September - 621 Spitfires and Hurricanes

Fighter Command aircrew 10th August - 1,396
7th September - 1,381

In contrast the Luftwaffe. Serviceable SE fighters 13th August - 853
7th September - 658

Bf 109 pilots fit for duty 1st August - 869
1st September - 735

So, between Adlertag and the switch to London, RAF serviceable Spitfire and Hurricane strength _increased_ by 42, Luftwaffe 109 strength _decreased_ by 195.

In terms of pilots, FC aircrew (not just pilots) decreased by 15, Luftwaffe 109 pilots by 134.

Who was getting hammered?



> Hmm, the German bomber strenghts stayed pretty much the same during the whole Battle, starting it with almost 1400 bombers on strenght, and finishing it with a little over 1400.



It wasn't just the Luftwaffe fighters that were getting hammered. 

KG strength 13th August, 1,482 on hand, 1,008 serviceable
7th September 1,291 on hand, 798 serviceable.

That's a decline in bomber strength of 191 total, 210 serviceable, in three and a half weeks.



> Actually Wood and Dempster's sources are also matching the figures by Hooton, 'who sources his figures from the Luftwaffe records', and the only reason of difference is that W+D counts 'fighter' sorties which are that, sorties flown by fighters (SE and TE) in an air superiority role, and counting Jabo's amongst bomber sorties (properly, IMHO) while Hooton counts the Luftwaffe air superiority and fighter-bomber sorties as 'fighter' sorties.



Are you seriously claiming the Luftwaffe flew 2,355 fighter sorties and 1,695 fighter bomber sorties in the first week of September? That 42% of all Luftwaffe fighter sorties were fighter bombers? I'd really, really like to see a source for that.


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## Hop (Dec 20, 2008)

> None of this transition to the 110 seems to have occured in the time period we are discussing, though.
> 
> There were certainly 109 equipped night fighter units during the Battle, usually operating a mix of 110s and 109s. These were transformed from existing daylight fighter units, 109 units as well. So those 109s 'missing' from the daylight fighter lists were not 'lost', but sent to other duties.



No, there were no night fighter units formed with 109s in the period we are discussing. 1 NG1 (iirc) formed with 109s on 22nd June 1940, _before_ the 29th June strength figures.

Whether they gave up any 109s during the period I don't know, it depends how fast they transitioned. Personally I doubt the numbers would have been substantial, if any, but it's certainly not true that missing 109s during the BoB can be accounted for by aircraft transferred _to_ the night fighter units.

What is your source for this claim?


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## Burmese Bandit (Dec 20, 2008)

The british novelist, and amateur historian (albeit an amateur historian that has won critical praise by professional historians) Len Deighton has written an excellent non-fiction study of the Battle of Britain. I highly reccomend it.


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## Kurfürst (Dec 20, 2008)

Hop said:


> No, there were no night fighter units formed with 109s in the period we are discussing. 1 NG1 (iirc) formed with 109s on 22nd June 1940, _before_ the 29th June strength figures.



No, there were night fighter units formed with 109s in the period we are discussing. IV/JG 2 was redesignated to II/NG1 with 109s on 22nd June 1940, but it was still _counted_ in the 29th June strength figures, with 30 Bf 109s and 33 pilots. They are not counted 28 September _Tagjagd_ figures, because by that time they were de facto transferred to another fighter arm, night fighters.

Are you saying that those 30 Bf 109s and 33 pilots were 'lost' in the period? Or they just were transferred elsewhere. 



Hop said:


> In July the RAF got stronger as the Luftwaffe got weaker.



Bull. Already exposed bull, I might add. 



> In August, the RAF briefly got a bit weaker, the Luftwaffe got a lot weaker.
> 
> In July the RAF got stronger as the Luftwaffe got weaker. In August, the RAF briefly got a bit weaker, the Luftwaffe got a lot weaker.
> 
> ...



RAF figures for early in the morning at 9:00, before the major fight on the 7th September, before loosing 27 fighters missing and many more shot up and unservicable, LW figures counted in the evening, where every aircraft with but a single hole waiting for patched up being 'unservicable', right?  

As for the LW's servicable fighters, on 7th September I can count 889 on strenght with 728 servicable (17 of them in ErGr.210 which had 110s as well), but thats still missing data for some units, like Stab and III/JG 77 and I/LG 2. Its fairly reasonable to assume that these units held another 50-60 servicable 109s, so the servicable total was more like around 780, not 728 (as a reminder, on August 10 the SE units deployed against Britain had 805). The list may still miss some other units present in the area, of course. These are also only the units engaged against Britain and stationed in the direct vicinity, not counting units in Germany, while I am sure your count of 13 August do include units everywhere.

The count for 28 September is 920 of which 712 was servicable, this time including I./LG2, Stab and III/JG 77 but not II./LG2 or ErGr.210 (and possibly missing others created in the meantime..?). Overall, very little change, even possibly a small increase.



> Fighter Command aircrew 10th August - 1,396
> 7th September - 1,381
> 
> Bf 109 pilots fit for duty 1st August - 869
> 1st September - 735



RAF fighter pilots 'present' (inc. those unfit for duty being sick, insufficiently trained etc.), LW fighter pilots 'fit for duty'...  



> So, between Adlertag and the switch to London, RAF serviceable Spitfire and Hurricane strength increased by 42, Luftwaffe 109 strength decreased by 195.
> 
> In terms of pilots, FC aircrew (not just pilots) decreased by 15, Luftwaffe 109 pilots by 134.



No, just another one of your statistical stunts, comparing apples and oranges, without a source.



Hop said:


> Who was getting hammered?



Fighter Command. In August 1940 they lost 355 fighters as total loss, and 112 severly damaged to enemy action. 

The Luftwaffe lost 177 SE and 114 TE fighters, a total of 291 written offto enemy action, but only 56 damaged.
The total losses of RAF fighters in August in combat was 467 RAF fighters vs 347 LW fighters. The RAF lost 304 pilots killed, injured or missing, the LW lost 289.

Another set of figures available for between 8 August - 30 September shows 555 Bf 109s, 264 Bf 110s shot down/written off/damaged vs 854 Hurricanes, 520 Spitfires, 65 Defiants/Blenheims to all causes. Or 819 LW fighters vs 1439 RAF fighters.

By 6th September, only 86 Hurricanes and as little as 41 Spitfires were ready for issue, compared to 160 Hurris and 132 Spits on the 9th August. The losses were so severe that pilots were transitioned from fighter schools before they would finish even the already much shortened _six week _course.

Both pilots and reserve aircraft were running out - fact.



> It wasn't just the Luftwaffe fighters that were getting hammered.
> 
> KG strength 13th August, 1,482 on hand, 1,008 serviceable
> 7th September 1,291 on hand, 798 serviceable.
> ...



Source please.

KG strenghts as of

29.6.1940 - 1380
28.9.1940 - 1420
2.11.1940 - 1423
30.11.1940 - 1393



> Whether they gave up any 109s during the period I don't know, it depends how fast they transitioned. Personally I doubt the numbers would have been substantial, if any, but it's certainly not true that missing 109s during the BoB can be accounted for by aircraft transferred _to_ the night fighter units.



To make it short, quite clearly some _Tagjagd _units which have been present and counted on the 29 June 1940 were not counted in the later figures, because they were transferred to the _Nachtjagd_ and counted in the _Nachtjagd_ strenght reports.


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## Waynos (Dec 20, 2008)

Kurfurst;



> Interesting, I have seen references to this elsewhere. Can you please provide me a scan/shot of that page where he mentions this (OK in a PM too!), I would like to read his own words.



Alas I can only give you a 2nd hand reference to it from material that I own (Bungay's The Most Dangerous Enemy, 2000) as, like most of the other references quoted by Bungay which I followed up myself, I had to borrow it. Though I am still hopeful of finding one for myself and if that happens anytime soon I will be happy to oblige.

I don't see where the Luftwaffe 'hammered' the RAF from July, as that would have meant a German victory would it not?

Overall the Luftwaffe only lost 20% more aircraft than the RAF, but they never got near to achieving victory which is why the attempt was abandoned.

Bungay's book is an interesting read, as is 'Invasion 1940' by Derek Robinson as after decades of reading various histories of the Battle of Britain these tweo books added other dimensions and pointed me towards other sources that I had missed before. But, to anyone wanting to learn more about the battle and get a properly balanced view, I wouldn't recommend basing your entire opinion of the Battle on the findings of these two very different books, do look elsewhere as well (like Deighton as mentioned above for instance and others).


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## The Basket (Dec 20, 2008)

Britain...NOT ENGLAND!!!!!!!!!!

The first shoot down of a German aircraft over the UK was not over England.


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## Vincenzo (Dec 20, 2008)

Vincenzo said:


> on 28/09/40 the LW have 712 Bf 109 serviceable (with 676 ready pilots) , all the luftwaffe not only versus england




i look in and of that only 583 109s with 515 pilots were versus england
the LW had 28 jagdgruppen , 23 for fight over england


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## Burmese Bandit (Dec 20, 2008)

Whoops...be careful of merging 'England' and 'Britain' with the Basket around...

...are members of the forum aware that 'Basket' is an old, now-fogotten word for a type of sword (cutlass, I believe)?


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## parsifal (Dec 21, 2008)

This is what one source (Deighton) has to say about the fighter strengths (Total and Combat Ready) on 1 July 1940


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## The Basket (Dec 21, 2008)

Burmese Bandit said:


> Whoops...be careful of merging 'England' and 'Britain' with the Basket around...
> 
> ...are members of the forum aware that 'Basket' is an old, now-fogotten word for a type of sword (cutlass, I believe)?



The question...Dear Bandit...is one of correctness.

How can one talk about the merits of the splendid Spitfire when you cannot even get the country right?

Attention to detail...


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## slaterat (Dec 21, 2008)

Obviously the numbers of single engine ,single seat fighters were comparable, depending on the source ,date ect. What is surprisng to me is the suggestion that the Luftwaffe was at some disadvantage. The RAF was responsible for the air defense of all of Britain, the Luftwaffe being on the offensive had the advantage of concentration of numbers. This is always the case, the defender reacts to the intrusions of the attacker. 

Slaterat


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## parsifal (Dec 21, 2008)

ah yes, but this is where the limited range of the 109, and the fighter command GCI system comes into play. Radar was essential to the functioning of that system, enabling British fighters to remain on the deck until needed, and be placed at the right altitude, and against the most dangerous threats.

It was the first time that the advantage rested with the defence, and not the the attack in air combat


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## Hop (Dec 21, 2008)

> Obviously the numbers of single engine ,single seat fighters were comparable, depending on the source ,date ect.



There are two things confusing the issue.

First there is Kurfurst's comparison of _all_ RAF fighter types (inc Blenheims etc) with German single seat fighters only.

Secondly there are some sources, eg Len Deighton, that are comparing German fighters based only on the Channel coast with British fighters anywhere in the UK, including Scotland and Northern Ireland.

Neither gives an accurate picture. 

The problem with counting Blenheims and Defiants, but excluding Bf 110s, is obvious, especially as the 110 was much closer to a conventional fighter than the Blenheim or Defiant.

The geographical problem isn't quite as obvious, and can be interpreted one of two ways.

First, you can argue that only those fighters in the battle area should be counted. If you do that it shows a much larger German superiority in numbers, as the Luftwaffe based almost all their fighters along the Channel coast, whereas the RAF kept about 40% of its in the North.

Secondly, you could argue that any fighter units available should be counted, even if not committed to the battle, because they are available for reinforcement. This overstates RAF strength, because being on the defensive the RAF had to keep sufficient fighter forces to defend targets all over the UK.

In terms of numbers of available fighters, just before the battle started, on 29th June 1940, the balance was:

Bf 109 - 1,107 (856 serviceable)
Spits and Hurris - 678 (490 serviceable) (both numbers approx) 

We have more precise figures for serviceable fighters on 13th August, the date set by the Luftwaffe for the beginning of their all out assault:

Bf 109 - 853
Spits and Hurris - 579

Both sets of numbers are total fighters deployed in Europe. 

Breaking the numbers down in to those deployed in/outside the battle area is more difficult. I believe 90% or so of the 109s were deployed along the Channel coast, about 60% of the Spitfires and Hurricanes.



> This is what one source (Deighton) has to say about the fighter strengths (Total and Combat Ready) on 1 July 1940



You can clearly see the problem with Deighton's comparison. First he gives Bf 109 numbers as 809 available, 656 serviceable, then says "a further 84 109s based in Scandinavia with Luftflotte 5 lacked the range to take part in the battle". However, his RAF fighter numbers include Spitfires based as far north as Wick (tip of Scotland, 500 miles north of London), Drem (near Edinburgh, 325 miles north of London) and Dyce (near Aberdeen, 400 miles north of London).

In fact in Deighton's table all of 11 Group are in the battle area, 41 aircraft from 12 Group and none of 13 Group. Thus the totals in the battle area are:

656 Bf 109s
168 Bf 110s
Total 824

339 Spitfires and Hurricanes
50 Blenheims and Defiants
Total 389

That's a true like for like comparison, all fighter types (well, excluding Luftwaffe night fighters, anyway) and only those in the battle area.

Comparing all units available, even those based outside the operational area, we get:

724 Bf 109s
200 Bf 110s
Total 924 

545 Spits and Hurris
94 Blenheims and Defiants
Total 639

The true position is somewhere in between those two sets of figures. The Germans enjoyed an advantage in committing nearly all their aircraft to the battle, but the RAF squadrons deployed elsewhere were of some use as reinforcements and for R&R.

Kurfurst, I'll reply to you later or tomorrow.


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## Vincenzo (Dec 21, 2008)

Hop said:


> In terms of numbers of available fighters, just before the battle started, on 29th June 1940, the balance was:
> 
> Bf 109 - 1,107 (856 serviceable)
> Spits and Hurris - 678 (490 serviceable) (both numbers approx)
> ...




LW on 29 june had nod deployed the force versus the british islands, (only 12 gruppen (of 28) so ~400 109s were in battle area


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## parsifal (Dec 21, 2008)

_Secondly there are some sources, eg Len Deighton, that are comparing German fighters based only on the Channel coast with British fighters anywhere in the UK, including Scotland and Northern Ireland._

The problem here is that in terms of the battle, the forces of the un-engaged LW units, the forces in LF-1, 4 and 5 could not easily deploy to the battle. The airfields were too limited, and the support echelons could not be moved at a moments notice. 

The RAF on the other hand had the infrastructure on hand in the South, as well as the airfield capacity to allow redeployment at short notice. This was done on a routine basis in the battle.....units would be rotated in and out of the battle zone on a more or less daily basis, as a squadron got shot up, it would be pulled out of the south and sent north for some rest and replacement....sqdns that had been rested and rebuilt would be fed back into the battle. This was not something that the germans could do with near that flexibility, because of the limits on airbase capacity, distance, and availble SGSU (Sqn Gnd Support Unit).

So in my opinion the comparison parameters you are trying to draw into the equation are even less accurate than those being used by Deighton. 

The geographical problem isn't quite as obvious, and can be interpreted one of two ways.

_First, you can argue that only those fighters in the battle area should be counted. If you do that it shows a much larger German superiority in numbers, as the Luftwaffe based almost all their fighters along the Channel coast, whereas the RAF kept about 40% of its in the North_.

I think that counting the fighters in the battle area is the way to go, but i also think that whilst you cannot include those numbers of the LW not in the battle (for the reasons stated above) you should include 13 gp because in a very real senser they were part of the battle. I would not, however, start counting those units in overseas commands and the like, as they clearly could not contribute to the battle


_Secondly, you could argue that any fighter units available should be counted, even if not committed to the battle, because they are available for reinforcement. This overstates RAF strength, because being on the defensive the RAF had to keep sufficient fighter forces to defend targets all over the UK._

True, but the Brits did use the north as a rest area, so even though they could not use all of their assets at the same time, they could use them. It actually fitted Dowdings strategy perfectly, commit just enough with each battle to stay in the fight, not be reduced to negigent propertions. 

The germans actually wanted the big showdown, and never really got it. Dowding constantly looked to the next days battle before committing RAF assets to battle. It was a subtle , yet brilliant stratgegy that few even today seem to understand

_In terms of numbers of available fighters, just before the battle started, on 29th June 1940, the balance was:

Bf 109 - 1,107 (856 serviceable)
Spits and Hurris - 678 (490 serviceable) (both numbers approx) _

err, would have to disagree here. The 109 figure you are quoting is exactly the same number as is published in the LW quarterly situation reports. The first qtr is March, the second June, the third September.....these quarterly reports are an averge, of the daily availability returns....so in effect they are a massive averaging excercise. 

However, German LW strengths are consistently overstated because the LW includes crates that have been so badly shot up that they are basically only used for parts. To get accrate figures on flyable or potentially flyable crates, one has to deduct all those machines with more than 60% damage, and this was only done at the conclusion of each quarter. hence in the June qtr, the LW returns list 1107 SE fighters as available, but the September qtr, this figure had dropped to 932. This drop in September was not mostly due to the losses inflicted in the BOB, it was mostly due to the write offs that occurred in France and the Low countries finally being taken off the books. The write offs from the BOB dont show themselves until the December qtr, when the qtr shows an average daily strength of 832.

In actual fact the LW had a "potentially" flyable availability (not serviceable, i am just not including the wrecks parked on the side of the tarmac) of just under 900 machines. Of this total about 700 were available for the battle and of this just over 600 were ready, or serviceable

_We have more precise figures for serviceable fighters on 13th August, the date set by the Luftwaffe for the beginning of their all out assault:

Bf 109 - 853
Spits and Hurris - 579

Both sets of numbers are total fighters deployed in Europe. _


Same mistake is being made here....I bet your figures include the toatal write offs, of which by that time there were many. The RAF, incidentally did not use the same accounting system as the germans, so the figures you give for them may well be right

_Breaking the numbers down in to those deployed in/outside the battle area is more difficult. I believe 90% or so of the 109s were deployed along the Channel coast, about 60% of the Spitfires and Hurricanes._

No 100% of the Spitfires and Hurris need to be included, for the reasons outlined earlier


_You can clearly see the problem with Deighton's comparison. First he gives Bf 109 numbers as 809 available, 656 serviceable, then says "a further 84 109s based in Scandinavia with Luftflotte 5 lacked the range to take part in the battle". However, his RAF fighter numbers include Spitfires based as far north as Wick (tip of Scotland, 500 miles north of London), Drem (near Edinburgh, 325 miles north of London) and Dyce (near Aberdeen, 400 miles north of London).

In fact in Deighton's table all of 11 Group are in the battle area, 41 aircraft from 12 Group and none of 13 Group. Thus the totals in the battle area are:

656 Bf 109s
168 Bf 110s
Total 824

339 Spitfires and Hurricanes
50 Blenheims and Defiants
Total 389

That's a true like for like comparison, all fighter types (well, excluding Luftwaffe night fighters, anyway) and only those in the battle area._

Unfortunately it is not a true like for like comparison, because the LW numbers are inflated by the inclusion of wrecks, and also because only a fraction of the available fighters could get into the battle, the british battle strategy never called for an all in effort, and in fact used the north as a rest and recuperation area. Deightons comparison is actually bette than the one you are suggesting, to be honest.


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## Glider (Dec 21, 2008)

A lot of interesting information in that posting. I admit that I thought the quarterly figures were a snapshot in time not an average figure.
Re the RAF I totally agree that all of Fighter command should be included but what was to stop the german forces replacing losses from their reserve or forces away from the front line? The lack of space may well put a cap on the number of aircraft that could participate in the battle at any one time, but units could be replaced with fresh ones. 
In this case there is little difference between including Northern based units in the RAF numbers or those based in Germany.


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## slaterat (Dec 21, 2008)

I have to agree with Hop, either count all the fighters in Europe for both sides or just the fighters available in the south for both sides, anything else is just misleading.

Parisfail wrote : It was the first time that the advantage rested with the defence, and not the the attack in air combat.

If that were the case then the RAF interceptors would outnumbered the escorts on a regular basis and consistantly been deployed at a higher altitude, which was not the case.

If you want to go through the Battle day by day the best resource I have read and own, is a copy of, Francis K Mason`s , Battle Over Britain. The most comprehensive book written about The Battle of Britain. It is meticuosly researched and detailed containing the most complete list of destroyed and damaged aircraft for both sides. It also uses primary sources from both sides.

Slaterat


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## parsifal (Dec 22, 2008)

Like all these discussions the numbers are bit arbitrary. It is not invalid to include the total LW strength in the comparison. However, the reason I dont think that it should be, somewhat disingenously, is because the 13 gp was a clearly identifiable part of the functioning British defence, if only because it was the place that reserves were taken from, and burnt out sqns were sent to recover, this was not so much the case for the LW. Remember, that not even all of the LW assets attached to LFs 2 3 could get into the battle, let alone all of the LW period. What Hop is saying is that neither could all of the RAF. True enough, but in my opinion 13 Gp was still more closely linked to the battle, than were the assets of LF 1, 4 and 5.

Someone raised the issue that why wasnt the LW outnumbered in the individual battles???? Well, that because the attack still held some of the traditional advantages. The defence was still spread allover the entire south, from London right across to Plymouth. The attack could still choose where and when to attack (his inherent advantage), and whilst radar could reduce this advantage, by ensuring the fighters were kept on the ground, until the last possible moment, and not rotated in a continous cycle, it still meant that the defence was left scrambling and did not have that much time to assemble. This was mhy Mallory's "big wing" theories were such a crock....he wanted to let the attackers attack, and then intercept in group strength or above....this was dangerous for the defence because it discounted the actual damage done by the strike, and because it sucked the RAF into a fight much bigger than it could sustain.


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## Hop (Dec 22, 2008)

> LW on 29 june had nod deployed the force versus the british islands, (only 12 gruppen (of 2 so ~400 109s were in battle area



29th June is before the battle started. The Germans were still in the process of deploying.



> I think that counting the fighters in the battle area is the way to go, but i also think that whilst you cannot include those numbers of the LW not in the battle (for the reasons stated above) you should include 13 gp because in a very real senser they were part of the battle.



It's not as clear as that. The Luftwaffe did move its fighters, for example in early August Stab, I and II JG 77 were in Norway. By late August II JG 77 was near Calais and taking part in the battle. That's about 40 of the 84 109s Deighton excludes that definitely did take part in the battle, and we don't know whether pilots were rotated from I JG 77 as replacements.

And some of the RAF squadrons were never moved south. A brief glance shows at least 5 that stayed in the north. Others were only in the south for brief periods.

Take as an example 245 squadron, which Deighton lists with 15 serviceable Hurricanes in 11 Group. On the 20th July they were transferred to Northern Ireland, where they remained for the rest of the battle. In the entire period, counting their time with 11 Group in July, they made 0 claims and suffered 0 losses.

As I said, I can see the merits of using either criteria, whether a unit was based close to the fighting, or total units available. I can't see the merits of using total units available for one side, and only those in the battle area for the other.



> The germans actually wanted the big showdown, and never really got it. Dowding constantly looked to the next days battle before committing RAF assets to battle. It was a subtle , yet brilliant stratgegy that few even today seem to understand



That's true. Don't forget, though, that the Germans could rest their larger force by simply not committing units to action. If they did so they could maintain numerical parity and still rest units, or they could use overwhelming force on those days they chose.



> err, would have to disagree here. The 109 figure you are quoting is exactly the same number as is published in the LW quarterly situation reports. The first qtr is March, the second June, the third September.....these quarterly reports are an averge, of the daily availability returns....so in effect they are a massive averaging excercise.
> 
> However, German LW strengths are consistently overstated because the LW includes crates that have been so badly shot up that they are basically only used for parts. To get accrate figures on flyable or potentially flyable crates, one has to deduct all those machines with more than 60% damage, and this was only done at the conclusion of each quarter. hence in the June qtr, the LW returns list 1107 SE fighters as available, but the September qtr, this figure had dropped to 932. This drop in September was not mostly due to the losses inflicted in the BOB, it was mostly due to the write offs that occurred in France and the Low countries finally being taken off the books. The write offs from the BOB dont show themselves until the December qtr, when the qtr shows an average daily strength of 832.



Are you sure of this? It sounds a bit of a bizarre way of doing things, especially as the statistics were not compiled on a quarterly basis, but weekly, or every 10 days. The quarterly part comes from a British summary of the original documents, showing figures for 3 monthly intervals. It's easy to see why the British would compile a shortened document, but very hard to understand why the Germans would compile strength documents weekly and only add in losses months later.

Anyway, I'll ask Richard Anderson, who supplied the 13 August/7 September figures in a posting on the AHF. 



> Same mistake is being made here....I bet your figures include the toatal write offs, of which by that time there were many.



I'm sure they do. They are figures for aircraft available, and serviceable, so they pretty much have to include losses. An aircraft lost, for any reason, can't show up as on hand, or serviceable, can it?



> The RAF, incidentally did not use the same accounting system as the germans, so the figures you give for them may well be right



I think there's pretty much a broad equivalence between British and German counting of losses. The Germans counted damaged between 10 and 60%, the British Category 2, which meant damaged enough to require repair by an outside contractor. The Germans counted losses as damaged over 60%, the British counted aircraft not worth repairing and instead "returned to produce".

I think the biggest difference is the British were probably quicker to declare an aircraft Cat 2 as the ready availability of replacement aircraft meant they could get a flyable replacement quickly. For the Germans, with a shortage of fighters, there was probably more incentive to hold on to an aircraft and repair it on site, as a replacement wouldn't have been available immediately.



> Unfortunately it is not a true like for like comparison, because the LW numbers are inflated by the inclusion of wrecks,



You are seriously suggesting the Luftwaffe were, every week or 10 days, reporting written off aircraft as "on hand" and "serviceable"? What would be the point of strength returns in that case?



> Re the RAF I totally agree that all of Fighter command should be included but what was to stop the german forces replacing losses from their reserve or forces away from the front line?



That's the point, I don't think there was anything. Caldwell in his history of JG 26 describes a pilot, recently transferred from JG 77, being injured over Folkstone in early December. 

Certainly 40 or so of the 84 109s Deighton excludes were by late August based near Calais and fighting in the battle. Same is true for ZG 76 with Bf 110s, based in Norway at the start of the battle, transferred to Northern France by late August.


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## Vincenzo (Dec 22, 2008)

this are bases for all 109s tagjagdgruppen:
from 01/07/40 to 30/04/41

JagdGruppen	Base	Timeline 
I/JG1	Plumetot 30.6.40 - 2.7.40 Carquebut 2.7.40 - 5.7.40 On 5.7.40 redesignated III./JG27 
I/JG2	Beaumont-le-Roger 27.6.40 - 28.8.40 Mardyck 28.8.40 - 10.9.40 Beaumont-le-Roger 10.9.40 - 20.10.40 Mont-de-Marsan 20.10.40 - 26.10.40 Beaumont-le-Roger	26.10.40 - 3.41 Théville	3.41 - 8.6.41 
II/JG2	Beaumont-le-Roger 27.6.40 - 28.8.40 Mardyck 28.8.40 - 23.9.40 Beaumont-le-Roger 23.9.40 - 20.10.40 Mont de Marsan 20.10.40 - 26.10.40 Beaumont-le-Roger 26.10.40 - 29.3.41 Brest 29.3.41 - 7.4.41 Beaumont-le-Roger	7.4.41 - 18.6.41 
III/JG2	Frankfurt-Rebstock 29.6.40 - 28.7.40 Evreux-West	28.7.40 - 4.8.40 Le Havre-Octeville 4.8.40 - 28.8.40 Oye-Plage 28.8.40 - 14.9.40 Le Havre-Octeville 14.9.40 - 20.10.40 Mont-de-Marsan 20.10.40 - 26.10.40 Bernay 26.10.40 - 23.4.41 Rocquancourt 23.4.41 - 22.6.41 
I/JG3	Grandvilliers 23.6.40 - 31.7.40 Colembert 1.8.40 - 20.9.40 St. Omer-Wizernes 20.9.40 - 24.10.40 Cujot 24.10.40 - 26.10.40 St. Omer-Wizernes 26.10.40 - 16.2.41 Mannheim-Sandhofen 16.2.41 - 5.5.41 
II/JG3	Brombos	23.6.40 - 7.8.40 Wierre-au-Bois 7.8.40 - 23.9.40 Arques 23.9.40 - 19.2.41 Darmstadt-Griesheim 20.2.41 - 4.5.41 
III/JG3	Baromesnil	28.6.40 - 2.7.40 Guines	2.7.40 - 20.7.40 Dortmund	21.7.40 - 8.8.40 Desvres	8.8.40 - 16.2.41 Gütersloh	16.2.41 - 5.5.41 
I/JG20	St. Omer-Nord/Arques 24.6.40 - 2.7.40 On 4.7.40 redesignated III./JG51 
I/JG21	Soesterberg 23.6.40 - 2.7.40 Bergen-op-Zoom 2.7.40 - 5.7.40 on 6.7.40 became III./JG54 
I/JG26	Bönninghardt 26.6.40 - 15.7.40 Audembert	15.7.40 - 7.12.40 Abbeville-Drucat 7.12.40 - 9.2.41 Dortmund 9.2.41 - 1.4.41 Brest-Guipavas 1.4.41 - 1.6.41 
II/JG26	Dortmund 23.6.40 - 21.7.40 Marquise-Ost 21.7.40 - 7.12.40 Abbeville-Drucat 7.12.40 - 9.2.41 Düsseldorf 9.2.41 - 3.4.41 Morlaix 3.4.41 - 1.6.41 
III/JG26	Mönchen-Gladbach 22.6.40 - 1.7.40 Döberitz	1.7.40 - 21.7.40 Caffiers 21.7.40 - 10.11.40 Abbeville-Drucat 10.11.40 - 9.2.41 Bonn-Hangelar	9.2.41 - 1.4.41 St. Brieuc 1.4.41 - 1.6.41 
I/JG27	Bremen-Neulanderfeld 28.6.40 - 2.7.40 Plumetot	2.7.40 - 28.8.40 Peuplingne/Leulinghen 28.8.40 - 31.8.40 Guines 31.8.40 - 30.9.40 Stade 1.10.40 - 21.10.40 Krefeld 21.10.40 - 25.10.40 Laval 25.10.40 - 27.10.40 Brest	27.10.40 - 1.11.40 Dinan	1.11.40 - 3.12.40 Döberitz	8.12.40 - 1.3.41 Comiso	1.3.41 - 10.3.41 München-Riem 10.3.41 - 4.4.41 Graz-Thalerhof 4.4.41 - 11.4.41 München-Riem 11.4.41 - 21.4.41 Ain-el-Gazala 21.4.41 - 7.12.41 
II/JG27	Wunstorf 28.6.40 - 12.7.40 Leeuwarden 12.7.40 - 5.8.40 Crépon 5.8.40 - 28.8.40 Fiennes 28.8.40 - 24.9.40 St. Inglevert 24.9.40 - 5.11.40 Detmold 5.11.40 - 10.1.41 Wien-Schwechat 10.1.41 - 26.1.41 Bukarest-Baneasa 26.1.41 - 1.3.41 Vrba 1.3.41 - 13.4.41 Bitolj 13.4.41 - 17.4.41 Ptolomais	17.4.41 - 20.4.41 Larissa-Eleftherion 20.4.41 - 26.4.41 Athen-Eleusis 26.4.41 - 11.5.41 
III/JG27	Carquebut 9.7.40 - 28.8.40 Guines 28.8.40 - 10.11.40 Diepholz 10.11.40 - 11.40 Vechta 11.40 - 2.41 Bukarest-Baneasa 2.2.41 - 2.41 Giulesti	2.41 - 3.41 Vrba	3.41 - 10.3.41 Belica 10.3.41 - 10.4.41 Bitolj	10.4.41 - 16.4.41 Kozani	16.4.41 - 21.4.41 Larissa-Eleftherion 21.4.41 - 26.4.41 Athen-Eleusis	26.4.41 - 2.5.41 Gela	2.5.41 - 24.5.41 
I/JG28	Bukarest-Pipera 14.10.40 -4.1.41	On 4.1.41 redesignated III./JG52 
I/JG51	Leeuwarden 21.6.40 - 12.7.40 Pihen/St. Inglevert 12.7.40 - 20.11.40 Coquelles 20.11.40 - 7.12.40 Krefeld 7.12.40 - 8.12.40 Mannheim-Sandhofen 8.12.40 - 9.2.41 Abbeville-Drucat 9.2.41 - 9.3.41 Coquelles 9.3.41 - 25.5.41 
II/JG51	Desvres	22.6.40 - 7.8.40 Marquise-West 7.8.40 - 30.8.40 Jever	30.8.40 - 25.9.40 Aalborg 25.9.40 - 1.10.40 Stade 1.10.40 - 4.10.40 Vlissingen	4.10.40 - 5.10.40 Mardyck 5.10.40 - 7.12.40 Köln 7.12.40 - 8.12.40 Mannheim-Sandhofen 8.12.40 - 14.2.41 Mardyck 14.2.41 - 10.6.41 
III/JG51	St. Omer-Nord 4.7.40 - 27.11.40 Peuplingues 27.11.40 - 7.12.40 Mannheim-Sandhofen 7.12.40 - 14.2.41 St. Omer-Wizernes 14.2.41 - 26.5.41 
IV/JG51	Guise	21.11.40 - 7.12.40 Mannheim-Sandhofen 7.12.40 - 9.2.41 Le Touquet 6.2.41 - 16.4.41 Marquise-West 16.4.41 - 7.6.41 
I/JG52	Zerbst	1.6.40 - 17.7.40 Neuruppin	18.7.40 - 21.7.40 Bayreuth 21.7.40 - 24.7.40 Zerbst 24.7.40 - 28.7.40 Bönninghardt 29.7.40 - 2.8.40 Cocquelles 2.8.40 - 31.10.40 Krefeld	1.11.40 - 26.12.40 Katwijk 27.12.40 - 20.2.41 Vlissingen 21.2.41 - 26.4.41 Westerland	27.4.41 - 28.5.41 
II/JG52	Nordholz	27.6.40 - 6.8.40 Peuplingues 6.8.40 - 18.8.40 Jever 18.8.40 - 30.8.40 Aalborg 30.8.40 - 1.9.40 Husum 1.9.40 - 19.9.40 Stade	19.9.40 - 25.9.40 Peuplingues 25.9.40 - 5.11.40 Mönchen-Gladbach 5.11.40 - 22.12.40 Leeuwarden	22.12.40 - 15.1.41 Ypenburg 15.1.41 - 10.2.41 Berck-sur-Mer 10.2.41 - 26.2.41 Mâle	26.2.41 - 6.3.41 Maldeghem 6.3.41 - 15.4.41 Raversijde	15.4.41 - 27.4.41 Katwijk 27.4.41 - 24.5.41 
III/JG52	Jever	26.6.40 - 1.7.40 Werneuchen	1.7.40 - 21.7.40 Leeuwarden 21.7.40 - 22.7.40 Coquelles 22.7.40 - 1.8.40 Zerbst 1.8.40 - 7.9.40 Neuruppin 7.9.40 - 17.9.40 Berlin-Schönwalde	17.9.40 - 12.10.40 Liegnitz 12.10.40 - 14.10.40 Bukarest-Pipera 14.10.40 - 25.5.41 
I/JG53	Rennes 22.6.40 - 28.8.40 Neuville 28.8.40 - 15.9.40 Etaples 15.9.40 - 1.10.40 Le Touquet 1.10.40 - 21.12.40 Krefeld 19.12.40 - 2.4.41 Crécy-Dompierre 2.4.41 - 6.6.41 
II/JG53	Dinan	22.6.40 - 28.8.40 Sempy 28.8.40 - 17.9.40 Berck-sur-Mer 17.9.40 - 20.12.40 Köln-Butzweilerhof 20.12.40 - 12.3.41 St. Omer-Arques 12.3.41 - 8.6.41 
III/JG53	Rennes 22.6.40 - 10.7.40 Brest-Poulmic 10.7.40 - 24.8.40 Le Touquet-Etaples 24.8.40 - 19.12.40 Mönchen-Gladbach 19.12.40 - 18.3.41 Berck-sur-Mer 18.3.41 - 30.3.41 St. Brieuc 30.3.41 - 7.4.41 Berck-sur-Mer 7.4.41 - 17.4.41 Maldeghem 17.4.41 - 7.6.41 
I/JG54	Eindhoven 21.6.40 - 19.7.40 Schiphol 19.7.40 - 26.7.40 Campagne-les-Guines 26.7.40 - 23.9.40 Jever 23.9.40 - 14.6.41 
II/JG54	Waalhaven 4.7.40 - 8.8.40 Hermelinghen 8.8.40 - 22.9.40 Campagne-les-Guine 22.9.40 - 29.11.40 Bonn-Hangelar 29.11.40 - 3.12.40 Delmenhorst	3.12.40 - 27.1.41 Schiphol 27.1.41 - 4.2.41 Etaples 4.2.41 - 5.2.41 Le Mans 5.2.41 - 9.2.41 Cherbourg 9.2.41 - 17.2.41 Le Mans 17.2.41 - 24.3.41 Cherbourg	24.3.41 - 31.3.41 Graz-Thalerhof 31.3.41 - 2.4.41 Deta-Arad	2.4.41 - 9.4.41 Kecskemet 9.4.41 - 11.4.41 Deta-Arad 11.4.41 - 19.4.41 Belgrad-Semlin 19.4.41 - 3.5.41 
III/JG54	Bergen-op-Zoom 5.7.40 - 8.40 Guines-Süd 8.40 - 21.10.40 Amsterdam-Schiphol 21.10.40 - 4.12.40 Dortmund 4.12.40 - 5.2.41 Charleville 5.2.41 - 9.2.41 Le Mans 9.2.41 - 3.3.41 Cherbourg-Querqueville 3.3.41 - 10.3.41 Le Mans 10.3.41 - 29.3.41 St. Dizier	29.3.41 - 1.4.41 Wien-Parndorf 1.4.41 - 4.4.41 Arad 4.4.41 - 7.4.41 Fünfkirchen 7.4.41 - 13.4.41 Deta-Arad 13.4.41 - 15.4.41 Pancevo	15.4.41 - 20.4.41 Belgrade-Semlin 20.4.41 - 28.4.41 Bukarest	28.4.41 - 3.5.41 
I/JG76	Brüssel	22.6.40 - 4.7.40 On 4.7.40 redesignated II./JG54 
I/JG77	Döberitz	22.5.40 - 20.7.40 Berlin-Tempelhof 21.7.40 - 31.7.40 Aalborg-West 31.7.40 - 25.8.40 Marquise 25.8.40 - 21.11.40 On 21.11.40 redesignated IV./JG51 Stavanger-Sola 1.2.41 - 1.42 In 1.42 redesignated I./JG5. 
II/JG77	Kristiansand-Kjevik 9.5.40 - 9.11.40 Aalborg-West 9.11.40 - 10.11.40 Brest-Guipavas 20.11.40 - 30.3.41 Münchendorf 30.3.41 - 4.4.41 Deta	4.4.41 - 13.4.41 Vrba 13.4.41 - 16.4.41 Korinos	16.4.41 - 19.4.41 Larissa 19.4.41 - 22.4.41 Almiros	22.4.41 - 10.5.41 
III/JG77	Trondheim-Vaernes 5.7.40 - 31.7.40 Döberitz	31.7.40 - 26.11.40 Münster-Handorf 26.11.40 - 28.11.40 Dinan 11.12.40 - 16.1.41 St. Brieux 16.1.41 - 24.3.41 Morlaix	24.3.41 - 28.3.41 Münchendorf	28.3.41 - 4.4.41 Deta 4.4.41 - 7.4.41 Vrba 7.4.41 - 10.4.41 Skoplje	10.4.41 - 13.4.41 Prilep	13.4.41 - 14.4.41 Axiopolis 14.4.41 - 18.4.41 Korinos	18.4.41 - 19.4.41 Larissa	19.4.41 - 22.4.41 Almiros	22.4.41 - 27.4.41 Tanagra 27.4.41 - 11.5.41 
I/LG2	St. Inglevert/Pihen 20.6.40 - 12.7.40 Jever	12.7.40 - 8.8.40 Wevelghem 8.8.40 - 22.8.40 Calais/Marck 22.8.40 - 5.11.40 Köln-Butweilerhof	5.11.40 - 26.12.40 Calais/Marck 26.12.40 - 30.3.41 Wien	30.3.41 - 6.4.41 Radomir	6.4.41 - 14.4.41 Bitolj 14.4.41 - 17.4.41 Ptolemais 17.4.41 - 20.4.41 Larissa	20.4.41 - 27.4.41 Eleusis	27.4.41 - 11.5.41 
II/186	Trondheim 11.6.40 - 5.7.40 On 5.7.40 II./186 was redesignated III./JG77


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## Vincenzo (Dec 22, 2008)

Look in the list, we can know what gruppen are in battle area, unlucky not many 109s, i think all agree that the gruppen in battle area are what deployed in nederland, belgie and france (but mont de marsan, and other south base if there are i don't see).


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## ralphwiggum (Dec 25, 2008)

WOW! I wish I was as smart as you guys!! After reading your postings, I realize how dumb I am! I've GOT to do more reading! I really tip my hat to all of you


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## Frantish (Aug 11, 2010)

Hello all,

Is there detailed info on how many of each 109 was used in BoB?

They had 
109E-1
109E-3
109E-4
109E-4/N (I think)
and maybe
109E-7

Best estimates help.

TY


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## FlyingPencil (Aug 11, 2010)

awww nuts...


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## Kurfürst (Aug 14, 2010)

Frantish said:


> Hello all,
> 
> Is there detailed info on how many of each 109 was used in BoB?
> 
> ...



Hi,

I have exact numbers for the types in the battle, but from memory the MG armed E-1 and cannon armed E-3s were roughly 1:1 ratio at the beginning of the battle. Soon after the battle starterd practically all E-3s were converted to E-4s (these differed only in different cannon mechanism that enabled them firing high capacity explosive shells, so the difference was marginal indeed).

There were about a Wing or 30-40 E-4/Ns in the battle from July, but later in the automn other types were built/converted with the DB 601N engine, so by the end of the year a bit over a hundred were around of these types. The E-7 (capable of carrying droptanks) appeared in the end of August, and initially there were but a few dozen of them, but by October-November others were retrofitted with the DT kit, practically making them E-7s, and in the meantime a couple of hundred E-7s were built. No exact numbers for them, except for the end of August though.

Basically E-1 and E-4 were the main types.


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