# Loss of Singapore - Whose fault was it?



## buffnut453 (May 10, 2012)

This is a continuation of some comments made about the Singapore 1942 debacle (in a WAAAAAY off-topic fashion) in a Mosquito thread - don't ask me how we got there but it was interesting. Since the mods couldn't separate the threads, the next few posts will summarise (hopefully in an understandable fashion) the key discussion points to-date:

• 04-25-2012 09:14 PM #54 
parsifal 
If Britain the CW decided to put a responsible effort into the theater in 1941/1942, King has no authority or reason to dictate anything
The british and CW response was a calculated risk that went horribly wrong. With two major powers to fight largely alone in the ETO, and having suffered a series of costly defeats, Britiain had no choice but to cut force levels in the Far east to dangerously low levels. 

I think the high point of bad decisions, however was the decision to deploy the PoW and Repulse so far forward and so badly protected. By late '41, it was very clear that Captital ships should not and could not operate in a hostile air environment where the enemy was effective in the aeronaval role. ive read that the British appraised the Japanese as being somewhere below the italians in terms of proficiency. Thats a totally unforgivable assumption IMO.

With regard to airpower, my opinion is that the British should have invested in the aircraft producing infrastructure of Australia 9and perhaps india) in the period 1936-41 instead of doing their very best to stymie its development. if they had done that, Australia might well have been producing Merlins in 1942, and Double Wasps from 1940, which would have given us the capability to build Beaforts, Woomeras and Boomerangs from before the outbreak of hostilities. money spent on fielding the Buffaloes, manning obsolete types in malaya, could instead have been poured into establish an aero industry in the far east (India and Australia) That way we would have gone to war with more modern types, and more aircraft overall.

The other thing that stands out for me is that having accepted the risk of undermanning their forward defences, why did the British continue to make assurances they could not keep, and knew they could not keep throughout 1940-41. If they had been honest about the situation, the nations affected, like Australia, could have made more realistic preprations for war. 

• 04-25-2012 09:35 PM #55 
buffnut453 
But force levels were INCREASED in the Far East, not cut during 1941. Indeed one of the biggest challenges was the milking of experienced personnel from established Indian Army units in order to create new units (ie to increase force levels). This problem hit home really hard in Malaya where Indian Army units lacked the experience, training and cohesion to cope against the Japanese attacks. 

Now it can be argued that force levels in the Far East weren't built up as much as the should have been and that the theatre received the arse-end of supplies and, in some respects, personnel, but they certainly weren't reduced. 

• 04-25-2012 09:40 PM #56 
buffnut453 
In response to Parsifal’s comment “ive read that the British appraised the Japanese as being somewhere below the italians in terms of proficiency. Thats a totally unforgivable assumption IMO.”
Not an assumption but based on observations of Japanese air activities in China. The common racist view was that the Japanese ought to have beaten the Chinese very easily but they didn't, hence the Japanese would have real difficulties when confronted with a first-class adversary. Unfortunately, Allied forces in the Far East (ie Malaya/Singapore, Burma, the Philippines) weren't first-class by any means. They were under-resourced, poorly trained and often poorly led. 

• 04-25-2012 09:43 PM #57 
buffnut453 
Because they didn't know. Senior leaders believed their own twisted logic and failed to grasp just how woefully ill-prepared forces in the Far East were. My previous post touches on this, too. 

• 04-25-2012 10:49 PM #58 
parsifal 
In response to Buffnut453’s comment, “But force levels were INCREASED in the Far East, not cut during 1941. Indeed one of the biggest challenges was the milking of experienced personnel from established Indian Army units in order to create new units (ie to increase force levels). This problem hit home really hard in Malaya where Indian Army units lacked the experience, training and cohesion to cope against the Japanese attacks. 

Now it can be argued that force levels in the Far East weren't built up as much as the should have been and that the theatre received the arse-end of supplies and, in some respects, personnel, but they certainly weren't reduced.”

True, but the way military resourcing was managed it ended up that britsain got less out of its military expenditures than it should have. The Brits steadfastly resisted, and mismanaged, their imperial resources in this theatre in the years leading up to the war. 

In the case of Australia, we entered the war in 1939 with 12 air squadrons, all obsolete. Plans weree wel underway to expand the force to 40 squadrons (from memnory) or about 1500 a/c, using locally produced and US imported aircraft. All of that was stymied by the british leadership. We were asked to scrap our local training initiatives and contribute to the EATS scheme instead. We were promised aircraft and production capability that in the end, the british worked as hard as they could to deny. We diverted highly trained troops....the best in the world at that time....out of the TO on the promise that the malay barrier could be adequately defended, a promise repeated well after the british High command knew was impossible. 

• 04-25-2012 10:56 PM #59 
buffnut453 
I don't think British High Command knew the defence of the Malay barrier was impossible until it was too late. I do, however, subscribe to the view that they hoped it was possible. Unfortunately, the Japanese proved them wrong. I can't comment on your other assertions because I don't know enough about the situation in Oz at the time. The one point I will make is that no sensible person would countenance building up forces in an area where there was no fighting when other theatres were under attack. Perhaps the hindsight goggles are clouding our view of the difficult decisions that had to be made, without foreknowledge, at the time? 

• 04-25-2012 10:56 PM #60 
Freebird 
I guess they should have stood up to the Brits after all they were a sovereign nation

• 04-25-2012 10:59 PM #61 
parsifal 
In response to Buffnut453’s comment “Because they didn't know. Senior leaders believed their own twisted logic and failed to grasp just how woefully ill-prepared forces in the Far East were. My previous post touches on this, too.”

They didnt know because they chose not to find out. There were ample reports and information on Japanese capability available to the british high command that were simply ignored....not because they were not believed, but because it was an inconvenient truth that they could not bear to face.

Saying the Japanese were only ever comfronted by inferior troops is clearly an apology for a poorly thought out battle plan. The Japanese resisted effectively against the very best troops in the world, and the very best airforces as well long after the flush of their initial offensives. True, the initial offensives were the periods that Japan was mostly on the attack, but it is misleading, and wrong to suggest they were only ever resisted by second rate troops, or that they only ever defeated second rate troops. What defeated the Japanese, was not the poor qulaity of their troops or aircraft. It was a combination of numbers and poor logistics mostly 



• 04-25-2012 11:11 PM #62 
parsifal 
In response to Buffnut453’s comment “Because they didn't know. Senior leaders believed their own twisted logic and failed to grasp just how woefully ill-prepared forces in the Far East were. My previous post touches on this, too.”
It is a well documented fact that military appraisals handed to the british high command by the Australians (at least, ther were many many others that did the same) clearly showed the Malayan barrier (and Singas) to be indefensible, and that it was at risk from a landward assault. The British response was completely unsatisfactory. they responded to this threat by sending an unbalanced, out gunned task group to defend the landward approaches by seaborne interdiction. The British suspected Singapore to be indefensible since at least 1921. They were openly worried about it from 1938, and knew they couldnt (or at least had information that conclusively showed it to be indefensible) from the middle of 1940. it is inexcusable that they ignored these appraisals and deliberately misled their allies


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## buffnut453 (May 10, 2012)

• 04-25-2012 11:19 PM #64 
buffnut453 
Parsifal,

We're way off topic here...but I'll continue just one more round.

I'm making no apologies for the messy, poorly-implemented defence that was undertaken in Malaya and Singapore. Nor am I excusing the deplorable lack of leadership in certain quarters that failed to identify and practice correct tactics (the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were the only unit who truly trained for the defence of the road through Malaya, although Bennett did implement a cracking ambush...once), or to implement adequate denial measures. However, the fact remains that the majority of Commonwealth troops in the front line on 8 Dec 41 were, by any measure, sub-standard in terms of experience, training, morale and equipment. Putting green soldiers who can hardly shoot a rifle in the path of tanks (a machine they've never seen before) is a recipe for disaster. Should they have been better prepared? Absolutely. 

As to your other point about accurate intelligence being ignored by commanders, well there's ample proof of that occurring. Essentially there are 2 schools of thought, one that intelligence failed completely and the other that intelligence was accurate but commanders ignored it. To en extent, both are correct. The victor in battle takes the glory, the loser blames his intelligence officer. As I inferred earlier, the Far East in 1941 was often a dumping ground for less-able commanding officers who did not train or prepare their formations for the fight that took place...and we can clearly see now the result of that folly.

Finally, where do you get the idea that I ever suggested the Japanese only faced inferior troops? I was referring specifically to the Indian troops in Malaya...and that's not because the troops themselves were poor but because of incredible dilution of experience due to massive and rapid force expansion. Those aren't just excuses - it was the reality in 1941. However, there were other issues including the political angle - Crosby's almost hysterical telegram on the eve of the Japanese invasion demanding that no British soldier should enter Thailand and Far East Command's focus on trying to locate the ships instead of looking for other intelligence indicators like the arrival of IJAAF fighter aircraft in French Indo-China are examples. There was no single issue that resulted in the rout that occurred in Malaya and Singapore - the causes were several and intertwined, many dating back years. 

• 04-25-2012 11:24 PM #65 
buffnut453 
In response to Post #62 (for some reason the quote function isn't working on my machine), Malaya was far from indefensible. As to the risk of landward assault, it was Percival serving under GOC Malaya, Dobbie, in the late-30s who first identified that threat and took measures to deal with it. 

Malaya was entirely defensible but the key to the whole region was the port at Singora. If that had been held or denied to the Japanese, there's no way they could have taken the rest of the Malay peninsula because there were no other ports capable of supporting the Japanese Army's logistics chain.

Poorly thought-out strategy, an unwillingness to be seen as the aggressor into Thailand (and hence upsetting the Americans) all militated against the British defence of Singora.

Per my last post...the reasons for failure were complex. 

• 04-25-2012 11:43 PM #66 
parsifal 
In response to Freebird’s comment “I guess they should have stood up to the Brits after all they were a sovereign nation”

No, they were not. We gained theoretical control over our foreign policy in 1931, but that did not include indendance on national borrowings and finances. That remained under the control of the british treasury until 1942. 

Despite our theoretical independance in our foreign policy from 1931, in practice we had no real independance until Curtins declaration in march 1942. often attributed to the fall of Singapore, it was more complex than that, and stretched back to the repeated failures by the britis (in Australian eyes) to the multiple threats challenging the mpire at that time.

Our break with the british began in 1918, and gradually picked up speed through the 30's. the final straw being the fall of Singapore.

04-26-2012 10:43 AM #86 
Gixxerman 
In response to Buffnut453’s comment “I don't think British High Command knew the defence of the Malay barrier was impossible until it was too late.”

The really sad truth is that in fact Singapore fell due to Japanese bluff.
The Japanese forces were out of supplies (particularly ammunition, water foodstuffs) and the defending forces were unaware of this.
It is also largely a myth that 'the guns all faced the wrong way could not be turned around to face the invasion force'.
Thus Percival surrendered, completely unaware that the position of the besieging Japanese forces was at least as dire as his own and so Singapore entered the cruel murderous nightmare that was the Japanese wartime occupation. 

04-26-2012 11:16 AM #88 
parsifal 
Unfortunately this is a near total myth that has arisen post war as a sap to the worst defeat the British have ever experienced in 200 years. Its true the Japanese were short of supplies. it is not true that they were down to just a few days of supply. it is untrue that the Japanese were so short of supplies that they were incapable of initiating the assault. What in fact was happening was that they were so confident of success in the final assault that large amounts of aircraft, transport, and troops were being transferred out of the theatre to other fronts, particularly Burma, where some difficulties were being encountered.
If the British had been showing any signs of life in their defence of Singapore, the Japanese would simply have slowed down or reversed the movement of supply, troops and aircraft away from this front for a while. they had complete command of the air, and complete command of the sea. The Singapore garrison was going nowhere except down, and fast.

So much has been made in these last few pages about the poor quality of the troops defending in Malaya. But that was a relatively minor problem for the British. their command system was so poor, their planning for requirements so bad in this particular campaign that the quality of the troops would have made no difference. 

It would have been Australia's preferred option in 1939, when the AIF began to be raised was to send three of the four divisions planned to mkalaya in line with British defence thinking that had been in vogue since at least 1921. Instreead three of these divisions, the 6, 7 and 9th were sent to the Middle East, and two Brigades of the 8th sent to Malaya. If the three divs had been sent to malaya, under the british command that was in place historically, and with the logistic, naval and air support provided historically, we would have lost all three divisions. These ground troops were the equal of the Japanese, but they would have achieved very little more than the poor devils actually sent into that living hell. Malaya was lost for a multitude of reasons, but at the very top is the absolutely attrocious leadership displayed by the british in that campaign. 

I am normally very supportive of the british in most debates, and can see the logic and good military sense that the british displayed in most of their wartime campaigns. no such support can be given to the british effort in Malaya. it was an unmitigated, inexcusable disaster, that really did light the fuse that destroyed their empire. I am amazed that there are still people prepared to perpetuate a whole range of myths so that the british reputation can wriggle out of the mess they themselves caused. You will never get even one word of sympathy or support from me when it comes to the british effort in malaya. From before the war to the bitter end, it was one long unmitigated stuff up.

04-29-2012 01:21 PM #97 
Gixxerman 
In response to Parsifal’s comment “Unfortunately this is a near total myth that has arisen post war as a sap to the worst defeat the British have ever experienced in 200 years ........................I am amazed that there are still people prepared to perpetuate a whole range of myths so that the british reputation can wriggle out of the mess they themselves caused.”

Parsifal my friend you have entirely the wrong idea here.
I knew little of the details of the fall of Sing, I was merely repeating what I had seen read on my almost month long visit there to the various museums historic sites back in 2009.
Relax, I couldn't alter anyone or anythings rep even if I wanted to.
Which I never had a moments intention of doing btw.

04-29-2012 07:14 PM #99 
parsifal 
In response to Gixxerman’s comment “Parsifal my friend you have entirely the wrong idea here.
I knew little of the details of the fall of Sing, I was merely repeating what I had seen read on my almost month long visit there to the various museums historic sites back in 2009.
Relax, I couldn't alter anyone or anythings rep even if I wanted to.
Which I never had a moments intention of doing btw.”

I apologise for my completely over the top reaction. I do understand where you are coming from, and conceded there is some measure of truth to it. However, Singapore was a near unmitigated disaster, i think you would have to agree, and quitre possibly an avoidable unmitigated disaster. we played our part in that disaster, so not all blame should be levelled at the brits. Our child like tantrums must have driven the British command nuts at times.


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## buffnut453 (May 10, 2012)

04-29-2012 08:01 PM #100 
Gixxerman 
In response to Parsifal’s comment “Hi GX. I apologise for my completely over the top reaction.”

NP mate, it's 2d text on a screen my friend, it's sometimes way too easy to get our meanings intentions a bit skew-wiff.
In response to Parsifal’s comment “and conceded there is some measure of truth to it.”

Yes you did and thank you.
In response to Parsifal’s comment “However, Singapore was a near unmitigated disaster, i think you would have to agree”

I completely agree......and I have to admit my view of it previous to my visit was of it as a British military disaster (which of course it was) but I had almost no idea of what happened to the people of Sing under occupation, 'our' disaster pales enormously compared to theirs.
In response to Parsifal’s comment “we played our part in that disaster, so not all blame should be levelled at the brits. Our child like tantrums must have driven the British command nuts at times.”

I promise not to mention a certain Aussie General who departed the scene if you don't. ;¬)

(I kid, I kid........ it's just one guy, not all Aussies I know there are at least 2 opposing distinct views of what he did)

05-02-2012 02:29 AM #107 
freebird 
There is no need to withdraw British troops from the UK, or lower available forces, there was more than enough to work with.

As for the war in the east eliminating the threat of a UK invasion, by the end September it was clear that the Soviets wouldn't be defeated before winter, when weather conditions made a cross channel invasion unworkable. There was still enough time to improve the defences in the Far East

05-02-2012 02:30 AM #108 
freebird 
In response to Parsifal’s comment “It is a well documented fact that military appraisals handed to the british high command by the Australians (at least, ther were many many others that did the same) clearly showed the Malayan barrier (and Singas) to be indefensible, and that it was at risk from a landward assault.”

Who had judged the Maylay barrier to be indefensible?
I've havn't seen that assertion anywhere? 

The commanders in the Far East did know that the forces in Malaya (especially air) were not sufficient, but had the forces that had been recommended by the senior leaders (and agreed by the British Cabinet) actually been sent to Malaya, there is good reason to believe that the Maylay barrier defence could have worked.
In response to Parsifal’s comment “The british and CW response was a calculated risk that went horribly wrong. With two major powers to fight largely alone in the ETO, and having suffered a series of costly defeats, Britiain had no choice but to cut force levels in the Far east to dangerously low levels. 

I think the high point of bad decisions, however was the decision to deploy the PoW and Repulse so far forward and so badly protected. By late '41, it was very clear that Captital ships should not and could not operate in a hostile air environment where the enemy was effective in the aeronaval role.”

No, in my mind the high point of bad decisions was agreeing to back the US embargo (knowing that it would likely lead to war) and then not heeding the advice of the commanders in theater of what forces were needed, or otherwise properly preparing for war. 

If they didn't think they could send the forces required they never should have pulled the pin on the grenade, and agreed to support an embargo that would most certainly lead to war. 

05-02-2012 02:30 AM #109 
freebird 
The other thing that stands out for me is that having accepted the risk of undermanning their forward defences, why did the British continue to make assurances they could not keep, and knew they could not keep throughout 1940-41. If they had been honest about the situation, the nations affected, like Australia, could have made more realistic preprations for war. 

In response to Buffnut453’s comment “Because they didn't know. Senior leaders believed their own twisted logic and failed to grasp just how woefully ill-prepared forces in the Far East were. My previous post touches on this, too.”

I don't see that they couldn't have kept their promises, or have known that there was a significant risk of war until July of 1941. They were reading the Japanese messages and so they knew that Japan was too engaged in China to pose a significant threat, until the embargo forced the Japanese to take desperate measures.

Who are the senior leaders that you think failed to grasp the danger?
Every one of the senior leaders in the Far East that are on record (Babington, Bond, Dobbie, Brooke-Popham Percival himself) pointed out the need for stronger defences (especially air), nor have I seen any racist angle either, as none them ever expressed the opinion that the meagre assortment of obsolete aircraft would be adequate against the Japanese.

Let's not beat around the bush, the lion's share of the blame can be attributed to the Minister of Defence, (Winston Churchill) who disregarded the advice of the senior leaders in the Far East as regards to Japan.
From what I've read, it seems that he 
A.) Believed that Japan would naver dare to attack the US, and
B.) That even if they did, the mighty US military would make quick work of Japan 

Therefore the UK needn't worry or prepare for a long conflict, as the US would take care of the Pacific
He also believed that sending the Prince of Wales Repulse would intimidate Japan. 
In response to Buffnut453’s comment “I The one point I will make is that no sensible person would countenance building up forces in an area where there was no fighting when other theatres were under attack. Perhaps the hindsight goggles are clouding our view of the difficult decisions that had to be made, without foreknowledge, at the time?”

On the other hand, Chuchhill the War Cabinet recognised the danger in other territories under their control, and beefed up the defences in areas that the Nazis could possibly attack - like Gibraltar, Iceland, Cyprus etc, but that were not fighting at the time (other than a few air raids)

Now, I would agree that there was no justification for expanding forces in the Far East from mid-1940 to mid-1941, 
at which time there was a critical shortage of troops, air forces guns during the French collapse, BoB, Sonnenblume, the expedition to Greece, Battle for Crete, revolt in Messopotamia, campaign in Levant the East Africa campaign.

However by the end of July 1941, things have more or less stabilized in the ETO. (in a relative sense )
With dispatch of the bulk of Axis forces to Barbarossa the danger of an immediate invasion of the UK has passed, and the defence of the UK is far stronger than the year before. The Italians have been defeated in East Africa, the Vichy ejected from the Levant, and the revolt in Messopotamia put down.

At this point, the US asks the British to support the embargo, which will most likely lead to war.
IMO They have 2 options:
1.) if the don't think that they have enough forces to go to war with Japan, they shouldn't agree.
2.) If they do agree, they should be fully prepared to beef up the air ground forces (at least) to what the 1940 conference recommended would be needed to resist a Japanese attack.


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## buffnut453 (May 10, 2012)

• 05-02-2012 08:18 AM #110 
parsifal 
In response to Freebird’s comment “Who had judged the Maylay barrier to be indefensible?
I've havn't seen that assertion anywhere?”

The australian government and the australian high Command submitted repeated assessments to the effect that the defences for malaya, particularly the land defences were inadequate. According to DM Horner (Australia Allied Strategic Decision making 1939-45), referring to yet another situation report submitted by the Australians in April 1941 and (as usuall) ignored that stated all the deficiencies in the defensive arrangements, Horner states in his book "....the australian government was now placed in an invidious position. It was now faced with a british government that refused to accept the defences were hopelessly inadequate, and that as a result australias defences were now at risk (the deployment of the AIF was conditional to adequate defences being deployed forward into malaya). The australian government now knew that the British refused to provide adequate defences in the far east, that australia had been duped into sending the bulk of its trained forces to the middle east, against the advice of its own military (the Australian GHQ had recommended just one division be sent whilst Japans position remained unclear), and a refusal by the British to either provide arms, or allow Australia to raise the capital to build its own arms. The last refusal led to the deployment of 27th Bde, the only trained reseve left in australia, and forced menzies to seek alternatives for aircraft supply and manufacturing capability. 
In response to comment “The commanders in the Far East did know that the forces in Malaya (especially air) were not sufficient, but had the forces that had been recommended by the senior leaders (and agreed by the British Cabinet) actually been sent to Malaya, there is good reason to believe that the Maylay barrier defence could have worked.”

Possibly, but the "ifs" are so remote from reality as to make the statement menaingless. the british were never going to defend the far east adequately whilst also at war with the European Axis, even though they knew the defences were completely inadequate Whatever resources they did commit were largely the result of repeated criticisms by countries like australia. If they had had their way, i am certain malaya in 1941 would have been defended by no more than the pace guard and the national goat.....
In response to Freebird’s comment “If they didn't think they could send the forces required they never should have pulled the pin on the grenade, and agreed to support an embargo that would most certainly lead to war.”

Britain was never going to go the path of appeasement, however inadequate the forces. they also needed to stand firm, to ensure US entry 

• 05-02-2012 09:27 AM #111 
Edgar Brooks 
In response to Freebird’s comment “Huh? ABDA command was in the early months of 1942, when the British, Australians Dutch were all being attacked. There was still enough time to improve the defences in the Far East”

Sorry about that; I'd forgotten how quickly the Japanese launched their invasion forces.
There was no chance to improve the Far East defences, once the decision had been taken to send hundreds of Hurricanes to Russia.

In response to Parsifal’s comment “The big mistake with regard to Prince of Wales Repulse, was to continue with their sortie, without the aircraft carrier that was supposed to travel with them, but had run aground during an exercise. The force commander didn't help, when he decided that he could manage without informing the RAF, and getting air cover. It was now faced with a british government that refused to accept the defences were hopelessly inadequate, and that as a result australias defences were now at risk (the deployment of the AIF was conditional to adequate defences being deployed forward into malaya). The australian government now knew that the British refused to provide adequate defences in the far east, that australia had been duped into sending the bulk of its trained forces to the middle east, against the advice of its own military (the Australian GHQ had recommended just one division be sent whilst Japans position remained unclear), and a refusal by the British to either provide arms, or allow Australia to raise the capital to build its own arms. The last refusal led to the deployment of 27th Bde, the only trained reseve left in australia, and forced menzies to seek alternatives for aircraft supply and manufacturing capability. 
The commanders in the Far East did know that the forces in Malaya (especially air) were not sufficient, but had the forces that had been recommended by the senior leaders (and agreed by the British Cabinet) actually been sent to Malaya, there is good reason to believe that the Maylay barrier defence could have worked. 
Possibly, but the "ifs" are so remote from reality as to make the statement menaingless. the british were never going to defend the far east adequately whilst also at war with the European Axis, even though they knew the defences were completely inadequate Whatever resources they did commit were largely the result of repeated criticisms by countries like australia. If they had had their way, i am certain malaya in 1941 would have been defended by no more than the pace guard and the national goat..... “

Emotive stuff, but not true; the British government (not just Churchill) had written to the Australians, pledging that, if the Japanese were so foolish as to attempt an invasion of Australia, they (we) would have cut their losses, abandoned the Mediterranean, and sent the lot to defend Australia (I found a copy of the message in our National Archives.) You can choose to disbelieve it, if you wish, of course, but that was the government's position.

05-02-2012 08:07 PM #117 
buffnut453 
In response to Freebird’s comment “Who are the senior leaders that you think failed to grasp the danger? Every one of the senior leaders in the Far East that are on record (Babington, Bond, Dobbie, Brooke-Popham Percival himself) pointed out the need for stronger defences (especially air), nor have I seen any racist angle either, as none them ever expressed the opinion that the meagre assortment of obsolete aircraft would be adequate against the Japanese.”

Yes, commanders on the spot did ask for more assets (I don't know of any commander who says he can complete his mission without fewer forces, the exception being Gideon of Old Testament fame). Irrespective, they were all were banking on Japan making a staged assault from French Indo-China through Thailand and not a full-blown seaborne invasion from modern Formosa. Major George Wards, Assistant Military Attaché in Tokyo, provided a briefing to senior British officers in April 1941 where the GOC, then General Bond, deliberately contradicted Wards’ evaluation that the Japanese Army maintained a high standard of efficiency (Source: Wards Papers at IWM). This would seem to contradict your assertion that all Far East commanders accepted the Japanese threat. 

To further reinforce the point, but with a different spin on the effectiveness of FECB's efficacy as an intelligence organisation, Lt Col Ashmore recalled a commanders’ conference on 21st October where the FECB representative ‘painted a fairly indecisive picture and seemed unable to tell the conference much about the latest Japanese moves and forces in Indo-China and elsewhere’ whereas the GHQ representative delivered a clear, logical critique and ‘left an impression…that the Japanese were in no position to attack Malaya at this time or in the near future’. (Source: ADM 223/494, UK National Archives). Brooke-Popham also blamed lack of adequate intelligence for the surprising performance of Japanese aircraft, although this has subsequently proven to be an inaccurate criticism - pretty accurate intel was available on all Japanese aircraft types except the Ki-43.

Reports from military observers in China consistently placed the efficiency and effectiveness of Japanese forces as below that of Italy. These reports were taken to heart by senior staffs in London. Assessments about the military forces of Japan, China and Thailand clearly display a racial hierarchy at play in the thinking of many British intelligence staff and senior military leaders - often the threat was couched in terms of comparison against the Indian Army as if one could readily make such broad, sweeping assertions without factoring in local conditions, ability to concentrate force etc.
In response to Freebird’s comment “However by the end of July 1941, things have more or less stabilized in the ETO. (in a relative sense ). With dispatch of the bulk of Axis forces to Barbarossa the danger of an immediate invasion of the UK has passed, and the defence of the UK is far stronger than the year before. The Italians have been defeated in East Africa, the Vichy ejected from the Levant, and the revolt in Messopotamia put down.”

Apart from the fact that Rommel's Afrika Korps was barely getting spun up in North Africa. Rommel's forces started arriving in Feb 41 and the deployment finished that May. North Africa was the main theatre at that stage of the war. If it had fallen, it would have resulted in the loss of Egypt, probably the neutralization of Malta, and undoubtedly a second attempt on Iraq. I hardly think that's a stabilized situation.


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## buffnut453 (May 10, 2012)

05-02-2012 08:27 PM #118 
freebird 
In response to Edgar Brooks’ comment “The big mistake with regard to Prince of Wales Repulse, was to continue with their sortie, without the aircraft carrier that was supposed to travel with them, but had run aground during an exercise.”

The aircraft carrier you are referring to is the "HMS Indomitable", and it did indeed run arground in the Caribbean. There was an alternative however, they could have easily substituted HMS Hermes to provide cover for Force Z. The Japanese had no fighter escort for the bombers, so even with the limited capacity of the Hermes, a dozen Fulmar or Sea Hurricanes could have thwarted the waves of torpedo bombers. Ultimately though, since the intent was to use the ships as a "show of force" to intimidate Japan, they most likely should have been withdrawn after Japan attacked, rather than sent on a suicide mission.

The Cabinet had in fact discussed this very thing Dec 8, with Churchill deciding to "sleep on it", by the time he woke up the next morning they were already sunk
In response to Edgar Brooks’ comment “The force commander didn't help, when he decided that he could manage without informing the RAF, and getting air cover.”

Admiral Phillips was put in a difficult position, and handicapped by several factors.
The Admiralty policy was complete radio silence, to prevent the signals being used to locate the force.
It was also most unfortunate that the first wave of bombers knocked out the radio on the PoW.
I would agree though, it was a mistake not to call for help as soon as the Japanese strike force was sighted, this would have saved the two ships.
05-02-2012 09:20 PM #120 
buffnut453 
In response to Freebird’s comment “The Japanese had no fighter escort for the bombers, so even with the limited capacity of the Hermes, a dozen Fulmar or Sea Hurricanes could have thwarted the waves of torpedo bombers.”

Only for the first wave. There were Zeros based in the same part of French Indo-China so any thwarting would probably have been short-lived.
In response to Freebird’s comment “Admiral Phillips was put in a difficult position, and handicapped by several factors. The Admiralty policy was complete radio silence, to prevent the signals being used to locate the force. It was also most unfortunate that the first wave of bombers knocked out the radio on the PoW. I would agree though, it was a mistake not to call for help as soon as the Japanese strike force was sighted, this would have saved the two ships.”

But Phillips knew he was being shadowed by an aircraft several hours before the attack actually commenced. As soon as his lookouts spotted the aircraft, he would naturally assume that his position was known and so radio silence was immaterial. Had he done so, there's every likelihood that 453 Sqn at Sembawang, which was designated with the fleet protection role, could have seriously handicapped the initial attack, although my comments about the possibility of subsequent IJNAF attacks with A6M escort also apply.

05-04-2012 02:59 PM #127 
freebird 
In response to Buffnut453’s comment “Only for the first wave. There were Zeros based in the same part of French Indo-China so any thwarting would probably have been short-lived.”

Agreed, although due to the distances involved it would take several hours to set up, with all the difficulties involved with assembly, tracking the target over that time etc.
The ship would probably survive the day, but if it wasn't withdrawn that night it would be pushing it.
In response to Buffnut453’s comment “But Phillips knew he was being shadowed by an aircraft several hours before the attack actually commenced. As soon as his lookouts spotted the aircraft, he would naturally assume that his position was known and so radio silence was immaterial. Had he done so, there's every likelihood that 453 Sqn at Sembawang, which was designated with the fleet protection role, could have seriously handicapped the initial attack, although my comments about the possibility of subsequent IJNAF attacks with A6M escort also apply.”

True, but the danger would be to call them out too early as they didn't have too much time on station over the ships. I don't really disagree with your points here, Phillips was indeed to slow to call out air support. An accompanying carrier would have been a much better option, however truthfully the whole mission was a mistake to begin with IMO.

05-04-2012 04:37 PM #129 
freebird 
In response to Buffnut453’s comment “Apart from the fact that Rommel's Afrika Korps was barely getting spun up in North Africa. Rommel's forces started arriving in Feb 41 and the deployment finished that May. North Africa was the main theatre at that stage of the war. If it had fallen, it would have resulted in the loss of Egypt, probably the neutralization of Malta, and undoubtedly a second attempt on Iraq. I hardly think that's a stabilized situation.”

The Desert campaign was not stabilized, more like stalemated. 
The British couldn't defeat DAK while the Germans were hampered by lack of supplies and couldn't exploit. 
Other than operation Skorpion to recapture Halfaya, the German actions between April November were aimed at Tobruk, which failed.
Despite the Axis success in defeating Brevity Battleaxe, it was the British that took the initiative and launched the Crusader offensive.
But the most important factor in my mind, that despite the need to defeat Rommel and push back the Axis, neither of the veteran Australian 6th or 7th divisions were deployed in Crusader, so I don't see that swapping an inexperienced Indian division for an AIF division on garrison duty would make much difference in the Middle East.

In response to Parsifal’s comment “The australian government and the australian high Command submitted repeated assessments to the effect that the defences for malaya, particularly the land defences were inadequate. According to DM Horner (Australia Allied Strategic Decision making 1939-45), referring to yet another situation report submitted by the Australians in April 1941 and (as usuall) ignored that stated all the deficiencies in the defensive arrangements, Horner states in his book "....the australian government was now placed in an invidious position. It was now faced with a british government that refused to accept the defences were hopelessly inadequate, and that as a result australias defences were now at risk (the deployment of the AIF was conditional to adequate defences being deployed forward into malaya). The australian government now knew that the British refused to provide adequate defences in the far east, that australia had been duped into sending the bulk of its trained forces to the middle east, against the advice of its own military (the Australian GHQ had recommended just one division be sent whilst Japans position remained unclear), and a refusal by the British to either provide arms, or allow Australia to raise the capital to build its own arms. The last refusal led to the deployment of 27th Bde, the only trained reseve left in australia, and forced menzies to seek alternatives for aircraft supply and manufacturing capability.”

My point was that the problem wasn't the Malaya barrier strategy, only that the defences in Malaya (by Dec 1941) were certainly inadequate.
And again, it wasn't the British government that "refused to accept the defences were hopelessly inadequate", as the commanders in the Far East, the Chiefs of Staff the Cabinet had all agreed that there was a need to strengthen the defence of Malaya, and that it would be vulnerable to seaborne attack.

They had agreed that the original 3 brigades in Malaya would need to be increased by 36 battlaions (ie - 4 more divisions) and the air assets boosted by a minimum of 336 modern aircraft.

Truthfully, the Australian govenment should have been more pro-active in this regard.
By late August or early Sept 1941, when it became clear that the British leadership (ie - Churchill) didn't intend to follow through with the agreements on force levels made earlier, they should have demanded an immediate withdrawl of AIF forces to Malaya to cover the difference, rather than wait until Jan 1942 to get this moving.

05-08-2012 11:58 PM #130 
buffnut453 
But withdraw AIF forces from where? The Western Desert? Rather than being "stalemated" which infers an inability to act, North Africa was a pendulum with the front line making huge moves during major offensives. The point I was trying to make earlier was that no sensible theatre commander or central defence senior would recommend denuding the primary combat theatre (ie the Western Desert) of forces when there was a clear, and relatively new, threat in the form of the Afrika Korps. Moving them to Malaya in 1941 just doesn't make sense and anyone who suggests otherwise has clearly donned the hindsight goggles - it was not clear the Japanese would attack Malaya in 1941 until very late in the year, and British leaders didn't expect the sort of "blitzkrieg" tactics that were so successfully implemented by the IJA. Moving troops from Africa to Malaya when there wasn't a direct threat to the latter was a non-starter during 1941 and everyone expected the Japanese to take their time attacking through Thailand and hence affording opportunities to reinforce Singapore and Malaya. Sadly such optimism was misplaced.


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## buffnut453 (May 10, 2012)

Today 12:36 PM #135 
freebird 
In response to Buffnut453’s comment “But withdraw AIF forces from where? The Western Desert?”

No, I don't propose removing any air or ground forces from the Western Desert.

With the withdrawl of the bulk of the 9th Australian from Tobruk, there are NO Australian ground troops in the Western desert, other than a battalion or so left in Tobruk
In response to Buffnut453’s comment “Rather than being "stalemated" which infers an inability to act, North Africa was a pendulum with the front line making huge moves during major offensives. The point I was trying to make earlier was that no sensible theatre commander or central defence senior would recommend denuding the primary combat theatre (ie the Western Desert) of forces when there was a clear, and relatively new, threat in the form of the Afrika Korps.”

But again, no AIF forces were in the Western Desert in the second half of 1941, except for Morshead the 9th division, which were removed in Sept 1941 from Tobruk after serving 6 months. 
There were 3 AIF divisions on garrison duty in the Middle East.
By removing 1 division, it still leaves a 2 division AIF corps in the MidEast in the fall of 1941, in addition to the Indian troops. (That would otherwise have been sent to Malaya)
In response to Buffnut453’s comment “Moving them to Malaya in 1941 just doesn't make sense and anyone who suggests otherwise has clearly donned the hindsight goggles - it was not clear the Japanese would attack Malaya in 1941 until very late in the year,”

It was however pretty obvious that Japan would be going to war to seize the oil reserves somewhere, (Borneo or Sumatra) and to do that they needed to eliminate Singapore as a major threat against their lines of supply. 
We were reading their naval diplomatic cables, so by Sept 1941 it became clear that they wouldn't back down, the US wouldn't agree to a political solution, so they would either run out of oil or else go to war.

Today 01:00 PM #137 
freebird 
IN response to Buffnut 453’s comment “and British leaders didn't expect the sort of "blitzkrieg" tactics that were so successfully implemented by the IJA. Moving troops from Africa to Malaya when there wasn't a direct threat to the latter was a non-starter during 1941 and everyone expected the Japanese to take their time attacking through Thailand and hence affording opportunities to reinforce Singapore and Malaya. Sadly such optimism was misplaced.”

The danger of a direct seaborne assault had been warned by Dobbie Percival himself, and with the availability of bases in Indochina, it became more of a danger.
By the fall of 1941 there was a direct threat to the Far East, and they had recognised that by authorizing 4 divisions sent to Malaya, vs about 3 brigades a ordinary garrision

In any event, the Cabinet DID approve sending additional troops - a second Indian division to Malaya - in the summer of '41, so it isn't a question of whether troops will be sent - it's a question of which troops.
In response to Buffnut453’s comment “The point I was trying to make earlier was that no sensible theatre commander or central defence senior would recommend denuding the primary combat theatre (ie the Western Desert) of forces when there was a clear, and relatively new, threat in the form of the Afrika Korps.”

No theater commander would ever want to lose troops. 
Frankly, Australia should have taken the choice away from the British, by insisiting in Sept or Oct '41 that at least 1 AIF division be withdrawn from the Middle east and sent to the Far East. 

IMO, Churchill unreasonably wanted to keep all 3 AIF divisions regardless of the cost to Australia, and let the Americans clean up the mess later.
The Western Desert campaign would just have to make to with Australia contributing a single division. (Which is exactly what they ended up doing)

In response to Buffnut453’s comment “Parsifal, Finally, where do you get the idea that I ever suggested the Japanese only faced inferior troops? I was referring specifically to the Indian troops in Malaya...and that's not because the troops themselves were poor but because of incredible dilution of experience due to massive and rapid force expansion. Those aren't just excuses - it was the reality in 1941. There was no single issue that resulted in the rout that occurred in Malaya and Singapore - the causes were several and intertwined, many dating back years.”

Further to what Buffnut posted, the quality of the Indian troops in Malaya was a significant factor in the collapse of the defence, as it created a cascade failure.
The fact that the battalions of the 28th (Indian) brigade shattered on the first day of combat, and the inexperienced 6th brigade lost most of it's artillery vehicles due to premature bridge demolition.
The rapid collapse prevented the proper evacuation reduction of the Penang airbase ships

If you look at the battles where the Britsh/CW were able to form a defensive line, the artillery advantage was something that the Japanese couldn't overcome, and were forced to outflank the position using the naval assets captured at Penang


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## buffnut453 (May 10, 2012)

Freebird,

To pick up on a few of your comments in your last couple of posts....

Re your comment about "stalemated vs stabilized", I was just picking up your phrase from an earlier post about things having stabilized in the ETO by mid-1941. I was simply stating that that was not the case. The deployment of the Afrika Korps was a major threat. Now the one area where I believe changes could have been made was in the provision of adequate air defences for Malaya. By mid-1941, Fighter Command was stronger than it had ever been. Sparing even just a few squadrons for Malaya could have made a signficant difference to the campaign...but they would have needed a better air warning network and radios that worked.

It was Parsifal who was focussing on the Aussies in the Western Desert (or elsewhere). I was being more generic about removing any forces. The Indian Army reinforcements for Malaya were extremely raw and undertrained - I agree entirely with your comment about quality vs quantity of deployed forces.

The threat of direct seaborne assault was noted by Percival but it was believed that during the northwest monsoon such landings would be highly problemmatic if not impossible. The landings were difficult but the Japanese succeeded. That has little to do with the fact that most senior military leaders on the British side expected the Japanese to take the long route overland.

You say we were reading naval cables in 1941. Really? If so, why couldn't we predict the attack on Pearl Harbor? I think you're overstating our code-breaking capabilities at that stage of the war.


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## Capt. Vick (May 11, 2012)

Good job buffnut453


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## parsifal (May 11, 2012)

Well done Buff nut...I will cut and paste my last response on the other thread soon.

Who's fault was it that Singapore was lost. Thats a slightly different topic to what weve been bickering over. Singapore was lost because it was inadequately defended. Two questions arise from that.....was it possible to adequately defend it, given the circumstances in Europe, and were the british optimizing the ability to prepre in the East. Were all the resources taken out of the TO prior to 1941 really necessary for that TO?


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## buffnut453 (May 11, 2012)

Fair enough. It was late when I created the thread - that's my excuse and I'm sticking to it!! Ignore the thread title and just carry on the discussions we were having (which is what we were doing on the Mosquito thread in the first place!).


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## parsifal (May 11, 2012)

The only reason I kind of pulled you up on that is that to me it suggests "who on the spot is to blame?" Certainbly not the troops themselves. The forces in Malaya fought hard, and as well as could be expected. The few squadrons of aircraft did about as good a job as one could expect. I never meant to suggest a criticism of the men on the spot. My cricism was why there were not other men better trained there also, and why was it necessary to seemingly thwart all efforts to provide the necessary arms from local sources. Maybe Im mistaken, but i dont believe so.

The fall of singapore happened because a gamble taken by the Brits that the Japanese would not attack was wrong. They thought the deterrent of the forces at hand was enough to scare off the Japanese. Once that bluff was called, it was game over. The thing is however, the British were being urged to increase the deterrent on a repeated basis. Some will argue that they failed to act because they were flat out in the ETO. To a degree I agree, but I also think better management of the available resources was possible....they could have been better prepred than they were without seriously compromising the situation in Europe


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## syscom3 (May 11, 2012)

The Brits were defeated in Malaya even before the Japanese landed. The commonwealth troops were led by colonial policeman, not fighting generals. The general staff did not have the intellectual capacity to shift immediately from simple police duties to total war. And its inexcusable since they had been at war with Germany and Italy for two years and should have had some inkling of what was expected.


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## Freebird (May 12, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> Freebird,
> 
> To pick up on a few of your comments in your last couple of posts....
> 
> Re your comment about "stalemated vs stabilized", I was just picking up your phrase from an earlier post about things having stabilized in the ETO by mid-1941. I was simply stating that that was not the case.



Well "stabilized" as applied to the ETO, in that BoB had passed, the Greece debacle ended and the bulk of Axis forces were now engaged in the USSR. If we take MTO as a separate theater, the AK was indeed a major threat, but Barbarossa a very determined aggressive defence of Tobruk have taken the initiative away from Rommel. And as mentioned earlier, the winding down of the East Africa, and resolving of the Syrian Iraqi campaigns have reduced the # of crisis on Britain's plate.

I'm not sure that we really disagree much, other than terminology. 

My point was this: up until July 1941, the Allies were in crisis mode, and I don't see how they could have sent anything to the Far East. After July '41 they are able to rest the 6th 7th AIF, and by Sept/Oct the 9th is pulled out. 
Things have "stabilized" enough that they can move some units around, and are still able to prevail in "Crusader" despite the 3 veteran AIF divisions being absent from the Western Desert. 



buffnut453 said:


> The deployment of the Afrika Korps was a major threat. Now the one area where I believe changes could have been made was in the provision of adequate air defences for Malaya. By mid-1941, Fighter Command was stronger than it had ever been. Sparing even just a few squadrons for Malaya could have made a signficant difference to the campaign...



On this we agree as well. 8)



buffnut453 said:


> but they would have needed a better air warning network and radios that worked.



It would help to have a competant, experienced commander to bring things up to snuff.
What about sending Dowding to sort out the mess as AOC Far East?



buffnut453 said:


> It was Parsifal who was focussing on the Aussies in the Western Desert (or elsewhere). I was being more generic about removing any forces. The Indian Army reinforcements for Malaya were extremely raw and undertrained - I agree entirely with your comment about quality vs quantity of deployed forces.
> 
> The threat of direct seaborne assault was noted by Percival but it was believed that during the northwest monsoon such landings would be highly problemmatic if not impossible. The landings were difficult but the Japanese succeeded. That has little to do with the fact that most senior military leaders on the British side expected the Japanese to take the long route overland.



The uncertainty about Japanese strategy wasn't much of a factor, as Percival's deployments, with Kota Bharu, Kuantan Mersing all with a brigade stationed, and preparing the Matador plan, show that he was aware of the danger of seaward invasion, and prepared for it.


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## Freebird (May 12, 2012)

parsifal said:


> The only reason I kind of pulled you up on that is that to me it suggests "who on the spot is to blame?" Certainbly not the troops themselves. The forces in Malaya fought hard, and as well as could be expected. The few squadrons of aircraft did about as good a job as one could expect. I never meant to suggest a criticism of the men on the spot. My cricism was why there were not other men better trained there also, and why was it necessary to seemingly thwart all efforts to provide the necessary arms from local sources. Maybe Im mistaken, but i dont believe so.





parsifal said:


> The fall of singapore happened because a gamble taken by the Brits that the Japanese would not attack was wrong.



My take on it is somewhat different, but the result is the same. Churchill was depending on the US to "deal with it", and any attacks or losses would quickly be rectified.
He didn't understand how unprepared the US was, or how much time they would need to build up.



parsifal said:


> They thought the deterrent of the forces at hand was enough to scare off the Japanese. Once that bluff was called, it was game over.



Not nessasarily, they had the ability to reinforce for 8 weeks until Singapore port became unusable.
But by sending the green units they did, it precluded the possibility to halt the Japanese in Johore



parsifal said:


> Some will argue that they failed to act because they were flat out in the ETO. To a degree I agree, but I also think better management of the available resources was possible....they could have been better prepred than they were without seriously compromising the situation in Europe



I agree with that.
Actually, how about "without compromising the situation in Europe *at all*"


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## Tankworks (May 12, 2012)

Make no mistake, Churchill would have scarificed the entire 'Empire' if it meant saving Great Britain, that was his prime motivation and as far as his decision making processes go you could argue that he was better in the political arena but nobody is correct one hundred percent of the time. 
This thread has been very interesting reading. I have always thought that Percival should have been court-martialed after the war and nothing that I have read here has done anything to change my mind. I still can't get over the surrender of thousands of troops that had never even seen the enemy or thought themselves defeated by him. Even though there was a chain of events I think he was ultimatly responsible for just 'giving up'. If this is too harsh an assessment I am willing to be further enlightened.


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## parsifal (May 12, 2012)

> Make no mistake, Churchill would have scarificed the entire 'Empire' if it meant saving Great Britain, that was his prime motivation



I disagree. Churchils prime motivation was the defeat of the Axis. He saw his best chance of achieving that as keeping Britiain in the war. He saw the prime strategy to keeping Britian in the war as the defeat of the European Axis first. He knew Britian was not strong enough to do that alone, so used every bone in his body to develop a series of alliances to defeat the germans. His most important achievement was his work with the Americanm, but he also managed to keep some rather puriloe and self intereste goverment on the narrow path.

Where he did go wrong was in misreading the japanese 





> I have always thought that Percival should have been court-martialed after the war and nothing that I have read here has done anything to change my mind.



What charge would you have put him up to face?




> I still can't get over the surrender of thousands of troops that had never even seen the enemy or thought themselves defeated by him.



Which formations had not seen combat. If you do some basic reading you will find no such fresh reserves existed. The troops were tired, and worn. At the end of it they were thirsty. And yes demoralised . But everyone fought as well and as long as was humanly possible. Percival did make mistakes, and he wasnt the best commander, but he didnt just "give up"


Even though there was a chain of events I think he was ultimatly responsible for just 'giving up'. If this is too harsh an assessment I am willing to be further enlightened.[/QUOTE]


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## buffnut453 (May 12, 2012)

Percival was an excellent staff officer and was undoubtedly a very intelligent man...it was he, after all, who determined that Singapore's security depended on the defence of Malaya, scuppering the myth of the "impenetrable" jungle. Percival's most significant weakness was that he lacked combat experience and was in no way a "fighting" general. 

The Japanese could decide the "where" and "when" of the attack and hence could always enter the fray with local superiority. Percival's had 2 fundamental options:

1. Try and defend everywhere, with the risk that his forces would be defeated piecemeal by more concentrated Japanese forces.
2. Consolidate his forces to meet the adversary on numerically advantageous terms but risk being flanked (and on a peninsula like Malaya, one's flanks are always open unless one has maritime supremacy). 

His cause was not helped by the orders he'd been given to defend the RAF's airfields which, essentially, forced him to employ Option 1 in northern Malaya. That said, he didn't learn from his mistakes, and when he had an opportunity to try Option 2 in the defence of Singapore he again opted for "defence everywhere", even compounding the mistake by misjudging which side of the causeway would form the main axis of the Japanese offensive. 

The other valid criticism of Percival is that he failed to insist on implementation of measures to delay the advance of an enemy, including making roads less vulnerable to tank attack; Ivan Simson's book is most illuminating in this regard but, as with all writings on the subject of the Singapore debacle, it must be read with some skepticism simply because Simson was the officer in charge of defensive preparations and so he could well simply be offloading responsibility for his own failings. We see the same with Brooke-Popham who blamed his intelligence staff for not making him aware of the performance characteristics of Japanese fighters when it's now been proven that such intelligence was provided to front-line fighter squadrons as far away as Mingaladon, Burma, in late-1941.


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## Tankworks (May 12, 2012)

Parsival: We disagree on Churchill's motivation, so be it, as for Singapore I can be rightfuly accused of not keeping up on later writings on the subject and may be able to find some time to delve into it more deeply.


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## Freebird (May 12, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> Percival was an excellent staff officer and was undoubtedly a very intelligent man...it was he, after all, who determined that Singapore's security depended on the defence of Malaya, scuppering the myth of the "impenetrable" jungle. Percival's most significant weakness was that he lacked combat experience and was in no way a "fighting" general.





syscom3 said:


> The Brits were defeated in Malaya even before the Japanese landed. The commonwealth troops were led by colonial policeman, not fighting generals. The general staff did not have the intellectual capacity to shift immediately from simple police duties to total war. And its inexcusable since they had been at war with Germany and Italy for two years and should have had some inkling of what was expected.



Syscom, I think that this charge of inept and inexperienced generalship is more of a post-war myth, and the facts don't bear this out.

By the summer of 1941, the British have just over one year of "recent" combat experience. Most of the senior generals that had been in combat were in vital roles in ETO or MTO (Brooke, Montgomery, Alexander, Wavell, O'Conner) or else had been found wanting and been passed over (Barker, Gort etc)
Considering the performance of Leslie Morshead, who had last seen combat in command of a battalion in WWI, and yet provided superb leadership in Tobruk, the requirement for "recent" combat is a bit of a red herring. 

Lt. Gen Percival (CinC Malaya) had seen combat in WWI, in Russia in 1919, and as anti-partisan in Ireland in the 1920's. He had a OBE, DSO, MC Croix de Guerre for gallantry in WWI.

Considering the years of experience he had in Malaya and knowledge of the defensive preparations vulnerabilities, he was a natural choice. There's no guarantee that putting someone else in charge who had no experience in Malaya would do any better

Lt. Gen Heath (III corps) KBE, DSO, MC - He had fought in WWI, but unlike most of the others, had recently commanded the 5th Indian division ("Ball of Fire") in the very successful East African campaign, where he showed initiative understanding of fluid warfare.
He was one of the best officers available in the Indian army, and I can't fault his appointment to Malaya at all.



Wiki Battle of Keru Gorge said:


> On 21 January 5th Indian Division had occupied Aicota without opposition and Gazelle Force had reached the strongly defended position at the Keru Gorge held by five Italian battalions. The Italian position at Keru was undone by a bold move by Maj*or-General Heath* who sent the 2nd Battalion Highland Light Infantry and the 2nd Motor Machine Gun Battalion from 10th Indian Brigade northeast along a track from Aicota to the rear of the Italian position at Keru. On 22 January when 4th Indian Division put in their attack, the 5th Indian Division detachment were across the Italians' rear line of communication. The Italian position, which should have been held for weeks, became untenable and while some elements of the Italian 41st Brigade managed to escape across country in the night, General Fongoli with his staff and guns and 1200 men were taken prisoner


East African Campaign (World War II) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Battle of Keren - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Maj.Gen. Bennett (8th Aust div) was also a decorated soldier from Gallipoli France in WWI. His aggressive ambush at Gemas inflicted some solid losses on the Japanese, but was flanked by the enemy when the extremely green Indian brigade withdrew and allowed the Japanese across the Muar river without even informing corps HQ. 

Maj Gen Barstow (9th Ind div) Maj.Gen Key (8th Ind brig) were again both decorated WWI vets, and in WWII they defended the Eastern coast of Malaya, and inflicted some serious losses on the Japanese landing at Kota Bharu, before completing a fighting withdrawl down the peninsula.

Maj Gen Murray-Lyon (11th Indian division) was sacked after the series of defeats of the division, but he was hardly responsible for the poor perfomance of the Indian troops that were lacking in both training equipment.

I could fault the other General in Malaya (Maj Gen Simmons) of the Singapore Fortress garrison for refusing to authorize defensive measures, but on the whole the senior leadership were not incompetant or "Colonial Policeman"



buffnut453 said:


> The other valid criticism of Percival is that he failed to insist on implementation of measures to delay the advance of an enemy, including making roads less vulnerable to tank attack; Ivan Simson's book is most illuminating in this regard but, as with all writings on the subject of the Singapore debacle, it must be read with some skepticism simply because Simson was the officer in charge of defensive preparations and so he could well simply be offloading responsibility for his own failings.


 
An interesting choice of Percival's, considering that he and Dobbie had originally proposed defensive measures for Johore.

I wonder if morale among the inexperienced Indian troops was more of a concern than was widely known.
Had the majority of the troops been British or Australian, I can't imagine that seeing defensive preparations would be cause for concern regarding morale.


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## buffnut453 (May 13, 2012)

The highest rank Percival attained during WWI was Lt Col and had no real experience of combat command above the Battalion level. Commanding several Divisions is a completely different challenge. Heath at least had recent (ie WWII) experience commanding large forces in combat. This experience, and his knowledge that Percival hadn't commanded above the Battalion level, undoubtedly contributed to the well-publicised friction between the 2 officers. There can be few who would argue with my statement that Percival was not a fighting general. That said, he was brave, intelligent and capable as his experiences as a POW, and the respect he earned during that period from his men, indicate.


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## parsifal (May 13, 2012)

The main problem in IIIcorps wasnt the senior leadership. Senopr commanders were adequate, but not inspired for the most part. the big problem was in the lower ranked officers and NCOs . there werent enough of them, and those that were there were totally lacking in experience


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## Freebird (May 13, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> Freebird,
> 
> You say we were reading naval cables in 1941. Really? If so, why couldn't we predict the attack on Pearl Harbor? I think you're overstating our code-breaking capabilities at that stage of the war.



We had intercepts from "Magic" and also JN-25 (IIRC) We didn't have detailed information about specific attacks. 
However the big picture was crystal clear.

Either A.) The Emperor would be humiliated the Japanese would submit, and come begging for oil,
or B.) there would be war

There was a small chance for some sort of negotiated settlement, but the US position was firm - full withdrawl from China.

Certainly by September it was clear that Japan wouldn't back down, the US wouldn't compromise on a negotiated settlement, and that Japan was gearing up for war.
The Allies certainly knew that war was coming, and as Japanese objectives would have to include oil in the DEI or Borneo, that Japan would very likely attack Singapore to eliminate danger to it's flanks.

It was foolhardy to ignore the advice of senior leaders on what was needed to thwart an attack



buffnut453 said:


> The highest rank Percival attained during WWI was Lt Col and had no real experience of combat command above the Battalion level. Commanding several Divisions is a completely different challenge. Heath at least had recent (ie WWII) experience commanding large forces in combat. This experience, and his knowledge that Percival hadn't commanded above the Battalion level, undoubtedly contributed to the well-publicised friction between the 2 officers. There can be few who would argue with my statement that Percival was not a fighting general. That said, he was brave, intelligent and capable as his experiences as a POW, and the respect he earned during that period from his men, indicate.



fair enough, yet the battle in France 1940 was certainly more critical as far as the UK was concerned, how many divisional or corps commanders there had leadership above battalion experience?
Brooke didn't, Monty didn't, nor Pownall, Gort, or any of the other corps commanders.
Of the divisional commanders, AFAIK only Alexander and Fortune (CO - 51st Highlanders) had any experience in WWI commanding above battalion level, each as brigade commander for a few months in 1918.

They managed to command effectively nonetheless.
That being said, more experience is always better than less. 8)

My own thoughts, (as mentioned before) would be to send a second Australian division, along with Morshead as division commander and Lavarack as corps command, both having shown competance in higher command in Tobruk Levant respectively.
There were major difficulties having essentially the entire defence of Malaya handled by a single corps command.
Having an Australian corps on the west coast (along the direct route from Singora) and put Heath's corps on the East coast (Kota Bharu, Kuantan Johore) makes much more sense, allowing each force to concentrate on it's sector without distractions.


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## Glider (May 14, 2012)

This is I admit a personal view but Singapore was never a realistic propect for defence, if only for one reason. It was a huge city with a massive civilian population and you would never be able to defend the area and keep the people fed without command of the sea and sky. If you command the sea and sky then you probably wouldn't need to worry about a defence anyway, because you would win the battle in the first place.

It doesn't matter how many division you send or what the quality is of those divisions, you still have a massive population to keep fed.


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## parsifal (May 14, 2012)

Yes, Singapore was indefensible without control of the air and sea. Or at least dispute of these. The allies lost control of its ability to challenge at sea on the 10 December. When the ability to challenge in the air was lost is an open question. My opinion is that the air battle was lost before the first shot was even fired.


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## buffnut453 (May 14, 2012)

I'm not sure I agree. It all depends on the situation. One could argue that the Allies never had control of the sea - had they possessed such control, the Japanese invasion force would have been prevented from getting anywhere near Malaya. Also, despite losing Prince of Wales and Repulse, the Allies were still able to bring convoys into Singapore as late as 5 Feb 42...and by that stage, the RAF's fighter defences were pretty much non-existent. Equally, all the air and maritime superiority in the world would not have worked indefinitely for the Japanese and, as has been pointed out, their supply situation was pretty grim by the end of the fighting for Singapore (and that's not propaganda...it's provided in Japanese sources on the battle with some front-line Japanese units only able to muster 20 rounds per man at the end).

A more intractable challenge, IMHO, was the political problem. Essentially, Britain was committed to a strategy of not provoking Japan...or, rather, of not provoking Japan unilaterally in the mistaken belief that Japan would never fight both Britain and America at the same time. Against this political backdrop, Brooke-Popham and the other Allied leaders had to develop operational and tactical plans for the defence of Malaya and Singapore. One of the results was MATADOR, a plan to deploy into Thailand and secure key territory and facilities. There were 3 options for MATADOR: Line A just north of Songkhla; Line B near Bandon, and; Line C just north of Chumphon. Percival indicated that Line B was probably the best operationally but that he only had the forces to reach Line A. That said, even that modest move into Thailand would have provided tangible benefits for the Allies and would have made Japan's task much more difficult. 

Additionally, Brooke-Popham was refused permission to launch MATADOR unilaterally unless Japan directly attacked Malaya - the obvious problem here was that MATADOR was largely impossible to implement after Japan had attacked Malaya. We also have the frenzied message from Crosby, Britain's attache in Bangkok, not to violate Thai neutrality. Put together, Brooke-Popham was essentially put in the position of deciding when Britain would be at war with Japan but was politically prevented from taking the necessary steps to secure, via MATADOR, the best operational position with which to defend Malaya (ie by securing Singora).

Defence of Singapore in isolation was never workable - too small an area with too many civilians. Defending Singapore by establishing a forward defence in Thailand was operationally feasible but politically impossible. The only way to break this status quo was by gathering intelligence of Japanese intentions that clearly pointed to an aggressive, direct threat against Singora and northern Malaya. Such intelligence was available to be gathered but Brooke-Popham, Percival and Pulford didn't take the opportunity when it was offered. Instead, they tried chasing the will-o'-the-wisp target that was the Japanese invasion fleet...and they failed.


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## parsifal (May 14, 2012)

Of course speculating about whether "Matador" would have made a difference to the outcome is a matter of opinion, and certainly there is some solid research undertaken recently that supports that notion. but I dont buy it. Most importantly, it assumes the same force structures and the same battle plans by the japanese, and there is no evidence, or at best flimsy evidence that supports that notion. It also fails to take into account the uncommitted reserves and capabilities at the disposal of the Japanese. It assumes that the japanese would obediently follow their historical plans and behave as they did historically. There is little or no evidence to support that. The Japanese made their decision to invade at Singora and Pattani because they were confident that the British would not pre-emptively invade into the Kra Isthmus. If they had assessed the british as being likely to pre-emptively invade Thailand they would have simply committed their ready reserves and focussed their offensive initially on a landward occupation of Thailand and perhaps a subsequent amphibious invasion to support the landward assault. The British did not do well against the japanese resisting amphibious assaults even from prepared positions, witness the efforts at Kuantan, so why would they do any better from unprepared positions... and whilst also worrying about their flanks. Even in frontal assaults the Japanese showed time and again in 1941 they were superior to the Allied forces. Add in the reserves available and the disaster that occurred at Singapore would simply have occurred earlier at Singora. 

Japanese intelligence only detected 30,000 to 50,000 British and Commonwealth troops in Malaya, when in fact there were about 88,600 men; this under-estimation could have easily caused serious harm in the Japanese invasion, but General Tomoyuki Yamashita would later admit that "_our battle in Malaya was successful because we took the enemy lightly_". Thats a nice way of saying they knew the british and colonial troops were not up to the task. Yamashita was given the overall responsibility of the invasion. On paper, he commanded a force 100,000-strong, organized into three divisions; in reality, the Japanese strength was less than that, (with less than 50000 men committed to the invasions). At his immediate disposal but not committed was a complete regiment of the the 5th Division left behind in Shanghai, China until after 26 Dec 1941, while the 18th Division left two regiments in Canton, China. There were two full regiments of armour not used as well. Japanese higher HQs were admittedly short of heavy artillery. Meanwhile, the Imperial Guard Division, elite academically, had no combat experience. There were a further two divisions reserved for the invasion, but not used, one in Japan, and one in North China. The Japanese calculated they could pull out up to 12 of their motor transport units from China in a pinch...enough to support up to 12 division in Thailand. Beyond that the japanese had 12 Division in Japan on garrison duty, and up to 10 division in Manchuria that would be transferred to the Pacific front in the coming year. Logistics would have prevented all these formations from being committed all at once, but they were available, and could have been fed in in echelon if the the british resisted more effectively than they did. The British in Malaya were going nowhere but down, unless they could stop the flow of these forces into the theater.

The Japanese outnumbered the british in every category, they outfought them in every battle. They could rely on control of the oceans and the air, given the prewar varications of the british. their generals were superior, their fighting soldiers better. They had the priceless advantage of having better understanding of jungle tactics and fighting. Their troops were for the most part battle hardened veterans and their equipment was more suited to the jungle and rough terrain. Slick manouvres like Matador might have helped but IMO could not reverse or change the outcome to any significant degree


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## buffnut453 (May 14, 2012)

But the key issue was time. The Allies needed time to reinforce Malaya whereas the Japanese needed to take Malaya quickly before the reinforcements arrived. Singora was the vital ground, together with the road/rail links from there south. Denying that port would have forced Yamashita to undertake the long, overland invasion from French Indochina which was much more difficult and would have taken much more time. The main roads in Malaya were nice, modern, metalled affairs...those in Thailand were dirt tracks which, in the monsoon season, turned into quagmires. The overland route would have been slow and would have sapped Japanese resources.

Even if Commonwealth forces in Singora had folded quickly, there was a much greater chance that The Ledge could have been destroyed, essentially halting any major infiltration into Malaya from Singora. Yes, the Japanese had the capacity to undertake landings at various points along the peninsula but these were typically small affairs and without an equivalent major port, like Singora, would have been very difficult to keep resupplied (look at some of the equivalent attempts in the Philippines where landings were not resupplied and withered on the vine). I agree Kuantan was a dismal failure but the beach defences further north actually inflicted considerable losses on the Japanese. Also, removal of The Ledge would have really hurt Japan's ability to employ its tanks - and they were the real battle-winners, "filleting" Commonwealth positions that had no adequate anti-tank defence (not even PIATs).

I entirely agree that the Commonwealth forces in Malaya were out-fought, their leaders were out-generalled...but I still believe something akin to Matador, if it could have been effected before the Japanese attacked, would have significantly blunted the Japanese offensive. I'm not willing to speculate much further than that because we can "what if" until the cows come home. That said, I think it would have been a much harder task for the Japanese had MATADOR been politically viable in, say, late November 1941 as it would have exposed the fragility of the Japanese logistics chain. 

As I've said before, the Malayan Campaign was superbly orchestrated by Yamashita. He knew he couldn't afford to waste time so when he struck, he struck hard and kept moving. Once his forces started rolling down Malaya, there was no way to stop them with the forces at hand. The only way to do it would have been to halt the movement at its source...but that didn't happen and the rest is history.


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## parsifal (May 14, 2012)

> But the key issue was time. The Allies needed time to reinforce Malaya whereas the Japanese needed to take Malaya quickly before the reinforcements arrived. Singora was the vital ground, together with the road/rail links from there south



Unless the british were able to regain control of the air and the seas around Singas, more troops poured into the TO was merely going to put greater strain on the allied logistics. and in 1941 British logistics in the far east were in far worse shape than the japanese. In the far east, the brits were at least a year off soloving their logistics issues. 




> Denying that port would have forced Yamashita to undertake the long, overland invasion from French Indochina which was much more difficult and would have taken much more time. The main roads in Malaya were nice, modern, metalled affairs...those in Thailand were dirt tracks which, in the monsoon season, turned into quagmires. The overland route would have been slow and would have sapped Japanese resources


.


Why do you assert that an invasion from french indochina was a "much more difficult undertaking that would take much more time" No evidence exists to support that. the japanese oversame much greater difficulties in burma and New guinea with ease. they were in bangkok, in force, by december 9th, and on the burma frontier at regimental strength three days later. yamashita estimated he could be at singora via th overalnd route D+5 if that need arose. it never did. with only 3 or 4 days to prepre, the brits would have been in serious trouble with untrained troops in a close combat like singora


> That said, I think it would have been a much harder task for the Japanese had MATADOR been politically viable in, say, late November 1941 as it would have exposed the fragility of the Japanese logistics chain


. 


Japans supply system was its achilles heel, but only after it had overextended itself. there was no possibility of that whilst the combat remained in close proximity to japanese bases. matador might have slowed them, but not enough....


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## buffnut453 (May 15, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Why do you assert that an invasion from french indochina was a "much more difficult undertaking that would take much more time" No evidence exists to support that. the japanese oversame much greater difficulties in burma and New guinea with ease. they were in bangkok, in force, by december 9th, and on the burma frontier at regimental strength three days later. yamashita estimated he could be at singora via th overalnd route D+5 if that need arose. it never did. with only 3 or 4 days to prepre, the brits would have been in serious trouble with untrained troops in a close combat like singora



Bangkok to the Burma border is about 100 miles (given that the first phase of the Japanese attack was against the southernmost "tail" of Burma). The n-shaped route from French Indochina to Singora was roughly *10 times* that distance. If the Japanese took the intermediate step of landing in force at Bangkok, that's still a distance of 600 miles to Singora - 6 times the distance from Bangkok to the Burmese border. So if it took 3-4 days for the Japanese to reach the Burma border in regimental strength, there's simply no way they could accomplish an overland move to Singora by D+5. What would the impact on the Japanese tanks have been of driving almost 1000 miles (or 600 miles via the Bangkok route) along muddy roads? Tanks aren't designed for long periods of sustained driving even on good roads. Under monsoon conditions, the unserviceability rate over such a distance and on muddy roads would have increased massively. 

Furthermore, even the Bangkok option adds at least 600 miles to the logistics train and the main entry port is smaller, and less capable, than Singora (note Singora also had the main Haad Yai railhead nearby, a facility created to support trade with Malaya and used extensively by the Japanese to move forces and supplies - Bangkok had no such facility). I reckon even the Bangkok option would have garnered the Commonwealth upwards of a month to position forces, prepare defences and bring in reinforcements. It would have removed the command confusion whereby Allied units in northern Malaya had to prepare to advance and defend at the same time - they would have time to move into southern Thailand (probably unopposed) and prepare.

Also bear in mind the impact on the air campaign. The IJAAF employed its Ki-27 units to defend the invasion fleets (and were rapidly deployed to airfields in southern Thailand) while the two Ki-43 Sentai were engaged in offensive fighter sweeps against the airfields in northern Malaya. The fighter assets were, to an extent, mutually supporting because they were operating in the same general area. That would not be the case if the Ki-27s had to support a fleet going into Bangkok or, worse, provide air cover for a long ground move from French Indochina. Based on Japanese post-war reporting, the provision of replacement aircraft was unable to keep pace with the losses sustained during the Malayan Campaign. Is it reasonable to think they could have sustained the same pace of operations for another 30 days without significant impacts on operational effectiveness?


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## Freebird (May 15, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Yes, Singapore was indefensible without control of the air and sea. Or at least dispute of these. The allies lost control of its ability to challenge at sea on the 10 December. When the ability to challenge in the air was lost is an open question. My opinion is that the air battle was lost before the first shot was even fired.



The control of the sea was not really a major factor. Unless the Brtish had a *huge* fleet on hand, they were not going to be able to deny the East coast to the Japanese, they would have been far better to use air assets.
The Japanese on the other hand, couldn't get major assets to the West coast, nor get close to Singapore until the RAF/RAAF were neutralized.
And as for the air campaign, as Buffnut points out, the Japanese couldn't prevent the British from supplying Singapore until the beginning of February.



parsifal said:


> Of course speculating about whether "Matador" would have made a difference to the outcome is a matter of opinion, and certainly there is some solid research undertaken recently that supports that notion. but I dont buy it. Most importantly, it assumes the same force structures and the same battle plans by the japanese, and there is no evidence, or at best flimsy evidence that supports that notion. It also fails to take into account the uncommitted reserves and capabilities at the disposal of the Japanese.



Better to to have them commit these reserves to Malaya where the British have a chance to build up a defence, than to have them free to progress outward to Burma, DEI, New Caledonia, Fiji etc.



parsifal said:


> The Japanese calculated they could pull out up to 12 of their motor transport units from China in a pinch...enough to support up to 12 division in Thailand. Beyond that the japanese had 12 Division in Japan on garrison duty, and up to 10 division in Manchuria that would be transferred to the Pacific front in the coming year. Logistics would have prevented all these formations from being committed all at once, but they were available, and could have been fed in in echelon if the the british resisted more effectively than they did. The British in Malaya were going nowhere but down, unless they could stop the flow of these forces into the theater.



Which 12 divisions are in Japan?







These garrison units in Japan/China would have nowhere near the capability of the 5th division.
The ability of the Japanese to bring down other divisions into Malaya and supply them was limited, especially if the Allies made efforts to interdict Japanese logistics



> The Japanese outnumbered the british in every category, *they outfought them in every battle.* They could rely on control of the oceans and the air, given the prewar varications of the british.



They didn't outfight the Allies at Kampar. The Kampar position was the best opportunity to halt the Japanese advance, had the Allies prevented Japanese movement down the west coast it couldn't have been outflanked. 

Unfortunately the two advantages that the British did have, artillery night operations were not taken advantage of.


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## parsifal (May 15, 2012)

> These garrison units in Japan/China would have nowhere near the capability of the 5th division.
> The ability of the Japanese to bring down other divisions into Malaya and supply them was limited, especially if the Allies made efforts to interdict Japanese logistics




Manyt of the units in Japan were not garrison troops. Many were in fact elite units held back just in case. My source for the following is Japanese Armed Forces order of Battle Vol I and II Military Intelligence Division US Army - my version is a commercial copy edited by Victor Madej. 

Many contemporary source give far lower numbers of troops for the Japanese, not realizing they are quoting available forces in 1937. By 1941, the japanese Army had more than 70 divs available, not 52 as is often reported. 

The following is a brief summary of some of the forces retained in the home islands but ready for action. 1st Gds XX (sometimes referred to a the 1st and 2nd guards Mixed Brigades in 1941), 2nd Gds Division (built around the 1st gds Inf Bde and 1 and 2 Gds Inf Regts....the guards Division that fought in Malaya were different troops drawn from a number of units. Both guards units were lacking in modern combat experience, but later in the war distinguished themselves), 

1st div was involved in North China 1937-40 where it fought outstandingly. It is reported by US intelligence as having been withdrawn back to Port Arthur and was designated part of the CEFs strategic reserves for Operation Z/ 

2nd div was another elite formation not used in the southern drive until after January 1942. It had been involved in the offensives in China, advancing across hundreeds of miles of trackless swamp and desert in north and central China, before beng transferred back to Manchuiria. it fought and was defeated at Nomonhan, and in December 1940 was recalled and rebuilt in Japan. It formed part of Operations Zs strategic reserve, finally being committed to the invasion of Java. It ended the war in Rabaul. 

4th Division was in central China until September 1941. It was then moved to Shanghai where it too became part of the elite reserves to support operation Z. if any part of the operation had struck unexpected trouble, these units were there for the speific purpose of reinforcing those stalled areas. To a degree that happened, but not all forces were found necessary. Because of the difficulties being experienced in the Philipnnes islands, 4th Division was eventually moved to Battaan where it played a pivatal role in the destruction of the allied forces there. In July 1942 it returned to China, for several months before returning to Japan. In 1943 it was returned to Sumatra, and then to Thailand in 1945, following the collapse of the Japanese army in Burma. There is not the slightest evidence that the Japanese had any trouble moving this formation around the Far eastern TO in 1941-2. Difficulties arose later.

7th Division had fought in north China in 1937-8 before being moved to Manchuria. it fought in Nomonhan where it sufferefd heavy casualties. It returned to it home dpot in Japan in early 1941, and was also listed as available in the strategic reserves in December 1941. It provided manpower for the formation of the Ichiki detachment. It remained on garrison however in north japan and the Kuriles for most of the war

8 Di8vision was not part of the strategic reserve, however it was unengaged in Manchuria in 1941, meaning it was available for deployment. these are not my words....they are the assessments made by US intell at the time. They would have been available if needed 

9th div was similarly freed from garrison and frontline duties in 1941. Unlike 8th dive, it was eventually moved to the Pacific, in February 1943.

12 Div was an Army reserve for the Mutanchiang fortified sector in november 1941. in that month it was given orders to prepare for transhipment south, as it was designated one of the emergency reserves for the southern operation. It was never needed. It was eventually moved to Formaosa in January 1945.

14 div was transferred from Manchuria to the home islands in the Summer of 1941. It was reorganised (triangularized) in June, and attached to the strategic reserve in September. It wa another reserve formation that was never needed. It was not transfered to the pacific until March 1943 when it was moved to the Marshalls. it was destroyed there in 1944.


These units I have cited are just a few. There were plenty of others removed from China and Manchuria, and attached to various reserves. Japan had oodles of such forces. And they were far from garrison troops. they were actually more elite than the forces placed under Terauchi's command. And Japan never had the slightest problem moving these troops in the ABDA area until well after 1943 



> They didn't outfight the Allies at Kampar. The Kampar position was the best opportunity to halt the Japanese advance, had the Allies prevented Japanese movement down the west coast it couldn't have been outflanked.



Isolated battles does not constitute a victorious formula. the gurkhas outfought the Japanese at Moulmein and other places. they were still defeated. And not by numbers. they were defeated by manouvre....spcalled hooking tactics for which the Britiah had no answer until 1944.



> Unfortunately the two advantages that the British did have, artillery night operations were not taken advantage of.



I would dispute that they had any significant advantages in night operations, and their advantage in artillery wa curtailed by shortages in supply


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## tomo pauk (May 15, 2012)

I must say that this thread is one of the most informative ones, many thanks for the contributors.


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## Freebird (May 15, 2012)

> Additionally, Brooke-Popham was refused permission to launch MATADOR unilaterally unless Japan directly attacked Malaya - the obvious problem here was that MATADOR was largely impossible to implement after Japan had attacked Malaya.



True, but unfortunately, (probably after having been up for 36 hours) both Percival Brooke-Popham failed to realize that the Khota Bharu landing (at ~ 2am) immediately lifted the restrictions on Matador, and failed to authorize the move forwards. They could at least have gotten the troops forward to "The Ledge" but the order failed to arrive for another 8 or 10 hours more.





parsifal said:


> Manyt of the units in Japan were not garrison troops. Many were in fact elite units held back just in case. My source for the following is Japanese Armed Forces order of Battle Vol I and II Military Intelligence Division US Army - my version is a commercial copy edited by Victor Madej.
> 
> Many contemporary source give far lower numbers of troops for the Japanese, not realizing they are quoting available forces in 1937. By 1941, the japanese Army had more than 70 divs available, not 52 as is often reported.
> 
> ...



Thanks for the details!



parsifal said:


> Isolated battles does not constitute a victorious formula. the gurkhas outfought the Japanese at Moulmein and other places. they were still defeated. And not by numbers. they were defeated by manouvre....spcalled hooking tactics for which the Britiah had no answer until 1944.



Then how did the Australians defeat Japan in New Guinea in 1942. if Japanese Infantry couldn't be stopped and if they had many (dozens) of divisions available?

Britiain did in fact have an answer for the Japanese hooking manouver - stay away from hookers. 
Seriously though, they did hava an answer that was realized pretty quickly in Malaya - don't anchor your line onto jungle, because the Japanese will indeed infiltrate around it.
By forming a line that isn't surrounded by jungle, the Japanese cannot infiltrate around it.

This was exactly the position at Kampar, with mountains to one side and swamp along the coastal side, the position couldn't be outflanked or infiltrated, and the Japanese took much heavier casualties trying to assault it.

The key to the Kampar position was to prevent the Japanese from capturing boats at Penang and to have enough air or sea power on the west coast to deny Japan the ability to land behind the Kampar position, which is the only way they could defeat it.


In a similar manner, instead of falling back to Singapore Island which was far from defensible, they needed to have set up defensive works in southern Johore, where there isn't jungle but mostly plantations.
Had they set up a defensive line in Johore the position would be hard for Japan to break.*

*Note - To do so they will need to have brought in better troops, and enough air assets to at least challenge Japanes air superiority.



parsifal said:


> I would dispute that they had any significant advantages in night operations, and their advantage in artillery wa curtailed by shortages in supply



Sorry, I meant night *air* operations, not ground.
The Allies did indeed not have an advantage on the ground at night, but the RAF, RAAF FAA had considerable success operating at night.


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## parsifal (May 16, 2012)

> Then how did the Australians defeat Japan in New Guinea in 1942. if Japanese Infantry couldn't be stopped and if they had many (dozens) of divisions available?



They forced the Japanese into making direct frontal assaults onto heavily defended positions, much as the Americans did on guadacanal. First successes using this "funelling" method are traditionally attributed to Milne Bay.

Japanese infantry could be stopped, but it required considerable nerve. importantly skill and methods of warfare seen as fundamental principals of battle in Europe had to be essentially unlearned in the pacific. You see the same mindset in this place. Somehow, bigger is better....always worry about your flanks and your logistic tail. Tanks were thought not able to operate in close terrain. all these assumptions had to be abandoned before success could be achieved in the jungle. Some cottoned on quicker than others. 

In fact, in the jungle the allies struggled with getting artillery into position because the artillery they were using waqs too heavy to be effectively used in that terrain. Tanks were initially thought not possible to operate in the jungle. Tactics in the jungle were centred around the squad rather than the platoon, and in general there was a decentralization of command structures. British soldiers even as late as 1943 were stil attempting to enter battles with full packs strapped to ther backs, wearing boofy hobnailed boots and gear bulky and moisture retaining. By contrast the Japanese centred their firepower behind smaller, but far more mobile artillery, they used rubber, threee toed jungle boots and lightweight, quick drying uniforms. Japanese soldiers were conditioned to go without rations for days and carried packs generally 20-40kg lighter than their british counterparts. The Japanese were very adept at using artillery and tanks in jungle terrain. The Japanese learned or practised from the beginning, not to worry about their flanks or their supply lines at all. they knew that the Jungle could nearly always cover a retreat and therefore flanks were not that important in the jungle.

Gradually the Allies learned these skills as well. Australia set up its jungle warfare school in Canungra (Qld) at which both the US and Australian armies learned the necessary skills acquired by the veterans of Buna. its because the Australians paid attention to Japanese tactics, and learned from them, and then adapted them to suit our needs (incoproarating air supply and lightweight artillery mostly.....Japanese tactics were also poor ini some respects and accepted high casualty rates which were unnacceptable to the Australian army. We always emphasised greater use of firepower than the japanese , which meant our guys were still more dependant on re-supply than the japanese). 



> Britiain did in fact have an answer for the Japanese hooking manouver - stay away from hookers.
> Seriously though, they did hava an answer that was realized pretty quickly in Malaya - don't anchor your line onto jungle, because the Japanese will indeed infiltrate around it. By forming a line that isn't surrounded by jungle, the Japanese cannot infiltrate around it.




If they realized it, they certainly didnt practice it, either during the campaign in Malaya, or in any of the other jungle campaigns up to and including Arakan. British armies were repeatedly flanked and defeated because of that one failing. At Araklan, two divisions were essentially defeated by a single Japanese regiment, all because the british could not understand that in the jungle you never worry about being outflanked.

Having a few individuals realize what was needed is not devising effective counters and training to defeat a resourceful and tough enemy. The lessons need to be absorbed on an army wide basis, equipment devised and issued to deal with the problem, and training and tactics implmented in manuals and training. This most definately was not learned or adopted by the british and Indian armies until well into 1943. Wingate led the charge in the transformation of the British thinking 



> In a similar manner, instead of falling back to Singapore Island which was far from defensible, they needed to have set up defensive works in southern Johore, where there isn't jungle but mostly plantations.



FB, I know you know what those plantations in Johore are like. They are as bad as natural jungle as far as access is concerned. They might as well be jungle because whelled vehicles cannot get access to them. The British had no end of trouble with the Japanese around KL 



> Had they set up a defensive line in Johore the position would be hard for Japan to break.


*


Yamashita thought the fighting around Johore was relatively easy. He said repeatedly in post action reports that there was litle effective resistance in the battles around Johore 




> *Note - To do so they will need to have brought in better troops, and enough air assets to at least challenge Japanes air superiority.




I am unware of any evidence to support that. Japanese Infantry formations sliced through Allied positions so easily there was never any opportunity to set up solid lines of defence in the manner you described, and where is was tried, the Japanese simply outflaked it, knowing the British would obligingly retreat every time their "lines of communication" was threatened.


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## parsifal (May 16, 2012)

One thing I should say about the force levels committed to the pacific. Whilst the japanese army was quite prepred to pour the necessary resources into the battles for the southern area, they were not prepred to pour large numbers of groun troops in the Pacific TO, until after Guadacanal. They viewwed operations in the Pacific to be an IJN responsibility. this explains the reluctance of the IJA to send large numbers of troops to the PTO. they wanted to go back to China to finish the job there. Evidence that the japanese had the troops and could move them around as needed, with supply can be found by the fact that byb 1943, the Japanerse had 25 div equivalents in the PTO compared to less than 10 in 1942. They had the troops, they had the logistics, they just didnt have the will to make that committment in early 1942...


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## fastmongrel (May 16, 2012)

Just spotted that there is going to be a documentary on BBC2 May 21st at 9pm "The Fall of Singapore:The Great Betrayal"

Apparently it claims there was a high level Japanese Spy in the British Military who gave information on Singapore and Pearl Harbour. 

Dont know if anyone outside the UK can watch it but might be of interest to you guys. That is as long as its not in the usual run of documentaries on BBC, a celebrity presenter, lots of bouncy camerawork and no information or what little there is wrong or used out of context. The BBC used to do fantastic documentaries now it does celebrity dancing shows.


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## buffnut453 (May 16, 2012)

Hi Parsifal,

Thanks for the info. Undoubtedly the Japanese had more forces available in the region - they considered it "home turf". However, a couple of observations/questions:

1. There's a world of difference between having forces available and being able to mobilize them for combat. How would the Japanese overcome the logistic problem given that, by the end of the fighting in Singapore, they were running out of ammo? And that's not a myth generated by westerners to excuse the fall of Singapore - it's documented from Japanese sources including Tsuji's book about the Japanese side of the campaign and Frei's "Guns of February" which provides several first-hand accounts from Japanese soldiers involved in the Malayan Campaign (unless simply the translation and publishing of these accounts is part of the myth generation?).

2. If the Japanese were so invincible and were able to reinforce Yamashita almost at will, then where does that leave your argument that the British screwed up? By your logic, the Commonwealth forces "could have done better" but ultimately were doomed to failure...so why bother? The net result, per the arguments (and I mean that in a legalistic way rather than an aggressive flame-war manner) you've set forth would simply have been more Aussies either dead or in Japanese POW camps (which for so many was effectively the same thing). Or have I missed something as we've bounced around the topic?

Great discussion - I always learn stuff when I spar with you.

Cheers,
B-N


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## Vincenzo (May 16, 2012)

niehorster pages also report around 50 division for japanese army and commonly him informations are not so bad, missing 20 divisions is very large error. What's your source? there is some online?


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## parsifal (May 16, 2012)

Vincenzo said:


> niehorster pages also report around 50 division for japanese army and commonly him informations are not so bad, missing 20 divisions is very large error. What's your source? there is some online?



ive already provided the reference in preceding posts.

According to the US Intelligence Volumes the Japanese were fielding the following divisions (or division equivalents) in December 1941

1 Gds, 2 Gds, Gds, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 (aug'41), 32 (assets only, no HQ), 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 48 (dec'40), 51 (Aug '40), 52 (Aug '40), 55 (Aug'40), 54 (Aug '40), 56(Aug '40), 57 (Aug '40), 58 (Feb '41), 59 (Feb '41), 60 (assets only, Div HQ formed 4/42), 61(assets only, Div HQ formed 8/42), 63 ( partial assets only, Div HQ formed 4/43), 64 ( formed from existing assets from square divs , HQ formed 6/43), 68 (formed around 14 IMB, plus excess artillery and various existing assets Div fomred 1/42), 69 (same as 68 but around 16 IMB, Div formed 2/42), 70 (same as previous, around 20 IMB, Div formed 3/42), 71 (formed 4/42 2 x free Inf Regts and the hunchon artillery garrison unit, all existing 12/41), 72 9out of sequence, formed 7/41 from training assets attached to the 2nd depot at Sendai) 77 Div was the same but based in Hokkaido, 

(Garrison Divs (mostly formed 1937-8, most demobilised as divs 1941-3, though the assets were never disbanded, just the HQs. The assets were generally redesignated IMBs and various other nondivisional assets. many of the divisional numbers were reactivated in the last year of the war, using different personnel and core formations...many of these ressurrected units were torn to pieces in the Soviet offensive of 1945, and one at Okinawa. others were destroye in the Solomons and NG. Not all of this series of divs were disbanded...110 for example). 

100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 108, 109, 110, 

(the 111 through to 133 Divs were all formed in 1944-5 from existing prewar assets mostly IMBs and surplus independant regts. they were brigaded divs, meaning they were short of artillery and transport, and only had 50-70% of the manpower of the elite divs) 

Armour

In 1941 the Japanese had two divisional sized armoured formations 1 2 armoured. 3 Armoured was formewd in 1942 from existing armoured brigades and assets

There were 18 depot divs in 1941, which also had to provide garrison troops for local defence. as one exception to that that I know of 57th Depot cmd and the Formsan Depot cmds each contributed personnel fo0r the 65 IMB, which was meant to be a garrison unit, but finished up fighting in the front line. though that unit was undistinguished, it still was effective against the early alied field formations.


The IMBs are confusing, and I dont claim to be at all accurate here.....this is a quick reply to give a quick idea of the IJA OOB in 1941. People have spent years trying to unravel this and still cant get it right. but this gives at least some idea....

I count 19 Indepenandent Mixed Brigades and Independant Infantry Brigades that remained independant through the war. Their authorised TOE varied, but typically was about 4-8000 men. Artillery was generally light on, but good enough for the jungle.

Im halfway through VolI (of 2 vols) and have decided to stop at that point

Disregarding everything below the brigades and the depot divs, but counting the garrison units and converting the Brigades to 0.5 Div, we arrive at a figure of 81 divs. To that figure you must also add the equivalent of 5 Divs in the IJN....the SNLF forces and their naval paratroops.

A good estimation of real strength for the japanese in December 1941 was around 90 Divs, of which about 70 might be considered combat worthy


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## parsifal (May 16, 2012)

> Thanks for the info. Undoubtedly the Japanese had more forces available in the region - they considered it "home turf". However, a couple of observations/questions:



Thanks, and your most welcome. not trying to flame this thread up or having a go at you guys, but looking at the allied position in 1941 with rose coloure glasses, whilst disregarding latent japanese capability is just kidding ourselves. Thats why ive come down the pitch with this information.....Malaya, and Singapore were doomed before even the first shot was ever fired....fancy plans and a few extra or better troops might string things out, but would not change the final outcome



> 1. There's a world of difference between having forces available and being able to mobilize them for combat.



As per my previous post, about 90 divs fielded in 1941, or equivalent, with about 70 that can be considered fully combat ready. 



> How would the Japanese overcome the logistic problem given that, by the end of the fighting in Singapore, they were running out of ammo? And that's not a myth generated by westerners to excuse the fall of Singapore - it's documented from Japanese sources including Tsuji's book about the Japanese side of the campaign and Frei's "Guns of February" which provides several first-hand accounts from Japanese soldiers involved in the Malayan Campaign (unless simply the translation and publishing of these accounts is part of the myth generation?).



There were logisitc problems at the very end, but only because the Japanese pushed forward other elements of their overall campaign and had already begun to divert supply to other commands.

The difficulty was not supply availability, or even shipping in 1941. The japanese had adequate of both. But they did find their wheeled transport a tad light on for sustained heavy operations with trucks having to traverse several hundred miles from their supply heads in Singora, tho the front in johore. Any army would find that hard going in terms of logistics. if the defences had been pushed forward into Thailand the Japanese would not have had near the same problem with overextended supply lines. 

Not to say that there werenot limits. Supply was the japanese achilles heel. But my best guess is that they could have kept supplied for a sustained period around 12-15 divs if the main fighting remained in the North 




> 2. If the Japanese were so invincible and were able to reinforce Yamashita almost at will, then where does that leave your argument that the British screwed up?



Because if the forward airfields had been defended properly., and the air force properly exapanded, and a balanced naval task force deployed to Singapore, as had been promised, the ground battle would never have developed in the first place. the war in the pacific, above everything was a battle for control of airfieldws and sealanes. Retain control of those, and you win the battle



> By your logic, the Commonwealth forces "could have done better" but ultimately were doomed to failure...so why bother?



Because a stand had to be made somewhere. if Malaya was abandoned, or not seen as adequately defended, all sorts of bad things would arise....everything from a loss of faith by the ANZACs (and a wholesale withdrawal from Europe) through to a possible collapse in China and a faltering will and resolve on the part of the americans. once the battle was joined with the historical forces, it was game over, the whole thing was a gigantic bluff that went horribly wrong




> The net result, per the arguments (and I mean that in a legalistic way rather than an aggressive flame-war manner) you've set forth would simply have been more Aussies either dead or in Japanese POW camps (which for so many was effectively the same thing). Or have I missed something as we've bounced around the topic?



We are discusing in a friendly way ( I hope) the possibilities in Malaya in December 1941. obviously there is a lot of speculation going on here, and there is no right answer.

I dont think Malaya was a waste of time. I believe it to be a necessary sacrifice for all the reasons mentioned above and more. Japanese military strength was a wasting asset....generally everything they lost, they replaced with difficulty and delay. Losses incurred in Malaya for them has an effect later on, but that doesnt mean we can join the dots and argue the place could be held, with the historical forces, or near the historical forces. Its two different positions really.

I would have thought that you of all people, with such a keen interest in far eastern air power would appreciate why it was so crucial, and why in 1941 it was so hopeless to argue that without adequate airpower the allies had any hope of winning..... 



> Great discussion - I always learn stuff when I spar with you.



Ditto


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## buffnut453 (May 16, 2012)

I don't think I've ever argued that Malaya could be held with the forces assigned. Airpower was vital and the lack of fighter units in theatre was deplorable, as was the lack of flexibility and imagination displayed by AHQFE (eg stringent adherence to stovepiped application of air power such as "airfields must be attacked by bombers" or "fighters are there to defend against the enemy's attacks").

I disagree with your statement that a stronger RAF presence and balanced RN fleet would have prevented the ground battle from ever occurring. The Japanese invasion force would have landed somewhere, if not Singora and Kota Bharu (among other locations) then Bangkok or even into French Indochina. The land battle would have developed but, per my earlier posts, at a much slower pace. 

As for the logistics, if the Japanese needed to remove supplies from Yamashita's army for other theatres then surely that points to a lack of logistical or resupply capacity. Why take such risks with your main axis of assault? One could argue that Yamashita was confident of victory but why, then, did Tsuji as one of the key architects of the campaign complain about lack of supplies at the end? Also, per Frei's book, several Japanese soldiers actually thought they'd surrendered, and not the British, when the guns went quite in mid-Feb 42. This all suggests a far more "touch-and-go" situation from the Japanese perspective. Removing supplies for other, lower priority, theatres just doesn't make sense unless there were some fundamental logistical issues.

Finally, I also your comment that British forward defence would have reduced the length of Japanese supply lines. Per my earlier posts, if Singora was denied to the Japanese, the only viable place to land forces in sufficient quantity was Bangkok which would have resulted in a 600-mile logistics chain just to get to Singora. That's extending supply lines not shortening them.

As for the rest, you're right that we're discussing "might have beens" and there is no right answer. It would be interesting to know how many units Japan felt were needed to defend the homeland, although your earlier posts provide a pretty good indication of what were allotted as reserves. I still wonder about the ability to keep a larger force supplied had Yamashita met stiffer resistance. Fundamentally, I think we are in broad agreement that more could (and should) have been done by Brooke-Popham's forces but we'll probably always differ on relative importance and details. 

Cheers,
B-N


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## buffnut453 (May 16, 2012)

I don't think I've ever argued that Malaya could be held with the forces assigned. Airpower was vital and the lack of fighter units in theatre was deplorable, as was the lack of flexibility and imagination displayed by AHQFE (eg stringent adherence to stovepiped application of air power such as "airfields must be attacked by bombers" or "fighters are there to defend against the enemy's attacks").

I disagree with your statement that a stronger RAF presence and balanced RN fleet would have prevented the ground battle from ever occurring. The Japanese invasion force would have landed somewhere, if not Singora and Kota Bharu (among other locations) then Bangkok or even into French Indochina. The land battle would have developed but, per my earlier posts, at a much slower pace. 

As for the logistics, if the Japanese needed to remove supplies from Yamashita's army for other theatres then surely that points to a lack of logistical or resupply capacity. Why take such risks with your main axis of assault? One could argue that Yamashita was confident of victory but why, then, did Tsuji as one of the key architects of the campaign complain about lack of supplies at the end? Also, per Frei's book, several Japanese soldiers actually thought they'd surrendered, and not the British, when the guns went quite in mid-Feb 42. This all suggests a far more "touch-and-go" situation from the Japanese perspective. Removing supplies for other, lower priority, theatres just doesn't make sense unless there were some fundamental logistical issues.

Finally, I also disagree with your comment that British forward defence would have reduced the length of Japanese supply lines. Per my earlier posts, if Singora was denied to the Japanese, the only viable place to land forces in sufficient quantity was Bangkok which would have resulted in a 600-mile logistics chain just to get to Singora. That's extending supply lines not shortening them.

As for the rest, you're right that we're discussing "might have beens" and there is no right answer. It would be interesting to know how many units Japan felt were needed to defend the homeland, although your earlier posts provide a pretty good indication of what were allotted as reserves. I still wonder about the ability to keep a larger force supplied had Yamashita met stiffer resistance. Fundamentally, I think we are in broad agreement that more could (and should) have been done by Brooke-Popham's forces but we'll probably always differ on relative importance and details. 

Cheers,
B-N


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## parsifal (May 16, 2012)

> I disagree with your statement that a stronger RAF presence and balanced RN fleet would have prevented the ground battle from ever occurring. The Japanese invasion force would have landed somewhere, if not Singora and Kota Bharu (among other locations) then Bangkok or even into French Indochina. The land battle would have developed but, per my earlier posts, at a much slower pace.



The Brits had shown that cariers could operate within disputed airspace with even only moderately performing aircraft and limited numbers. The Jaopanese were an altogether different proposition, that much i will concde, but it is at least plausible that the RN could have repeated it achievements in the med against the European Axis, ie operate for extended periods in enemy controlled airspace.

A properly trained and worked up TF, equipped with Martlets and/or Sea Hurricanes could well have interdicted sea comunications as far north as Cam Ranh Bay IMO. A strike force of about 150 long range maritime strike aircraft, such as the CA-4 or Mosquito, escorted by Mosquitoes and/Beafighters would have been unstoppable for the japanese until their carriers arrived. A force of 2-300 Boomerangs or Hurricanes would have made life very difficult for the British. if the Bris had invested something like decent amounts of money into the development of carrier avaiation prewar (a very long shot admittedly), they would have been flying earlier derivatives of the Fury and Firefly instead of Albacores and Fulmars. These a/c would have been very difficult propositions for the Japanese and would have made any land battle problematic. Land battles would have been supported by CA-4s (a divebomber with a 2000lb warload and a top speed in excess if 300 mph) and may well have given a vital edge to the Allied ground forces. If the allies were able to fortify in the peninsula things may also have gone better 
what 




> As for the logistics, if the Japanese needed to remove supplies from Yamashita's army for other theatres then surely that points to a lack of logistical or resupply capacity. Why take such risks with your main axis of assault? One could argue that Yamashita was confident of victory but why, then, did Tsuji as one of the key architects of the campaign complain about lack of supplies at the end?



The needed to remove supplies because suficient supplies were arriving at the supply heads. There was no more need for additional supply. The difficulty was the same as that faced by Rommel, enough supply at the points of disembarkation, but insufficient supply at the fronts, because the supply lines were over extended. It was a matter of choice for the japanese....do they continue to pour most resources into malaya, where they were winning hands down, or do they bring forward their other key assaults 9principally the invasions of burma, and the East indies, but also the attacks into the SWPA). They chose the latter, because they were nervous about securing their supplies of raw materials, and couldnt believe how successful they had been to that point.

If the land battle had developed closer to their supply heads and rail links (both of which they possessed in Thailand), the strain on their supply lines would have been far less. Halve the distance, and your supplies increase roughly 8 fold, using Rommels experience as a guide. A land battle around the norther frontier, as opposed to somewhhere near Singapore is about 1/10 the distance in terms of the length of their supply lines. At those distances, the amount of transport becomes unimportant, its the actual tonnages of supplies arriving at the supply heads thats important. and 25th army was never short of supply at its supply heads 



> Also, per Frei's book, several Japanese soldiers actually thought they'd surrendered, and not the British, when the guns went quite in mid-Feb 42. This all suggests a far more "touch-and-go" situation from the Japanese perspective. Removing supplies for other, lower priority, theatres just doesn't make sense unless there were some fundamental logistical issues.



Once the battle reached the gates of Singapore, it was a bit dicey, but the issue was never in doubt once that point had been reached. Worst case for the Japanese would have been to hunker down and stockpile, Allies were just withering on the vine by then....the japanese could decide when and in what strength they would attack

If there were no supply issues further north, and no doubt to the oucome further south, there is nowhere for the allies to gio, no magical position for them to defeat the Japanese 



> Finally, I also disagree with your comment that British forward defence would have reduced the length of Japanese supply lines. Per my earlier posts, if Singora was denied to the Japanese, the only viable place to land forces in sufficient quantity was Bangkok which would have resulted in a 600-mile logistics chain just to get to Singora. That's extending supply lines not shortening them.



The problem with a matador strategy is that it alienates the thais even more than they already were. 600 miles over friendly territory, through territory where quite possibly the japanese would have had months to prepre, is no more difficult than keeping units supplied in Brisbane, using supply heads from melbourne. Supply through friendly territory is much easier than through disputed or eney controlled territory 

Might have to accept a differnce her, but I do agree, most points we are in agreement


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## buffnut453 (May 16, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Tanks were initially thought not possible to operate in the jungle.



In Malaya, the tanks didn't operate in the jungle. They drove straight down the roads. The failure of mindset on the British side was that tanks should only ever be used on open terrain (ie a Flanders-like scenario) rather than, as the Japanese employed them, in the role of sledgehammer or steamroller to smash through defensive infantry positions. 



parsifal said:


> They knew that the Jungle could nearly always cover a retreat and therefore flanks were not that important in the jungle.



Were he still alive, I think Lt Col Anderson VC of 2/19th Bn might comment on the practicality of retreating through the jungle. 



parsifal said:


> If they realized it, they certainly didnt practice it, either during the campaign in Malaya, or in any of the other jungle campaigns up to and including Arakan. British armies were repeatedly flanked and defeated because of that one failing.



One unit was well-trained in jungle warfare - Stewart's Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. Stewart realised that the fighting in Malaya wasn't "fighting in the jungle" it was fighting for domination of the road. The actual amount of jungle fighting was minimal, it was simply a useful cover for the Japanese to infiltrate behind fixed defensive positions (usually poorly-located - my earlier comment about Ivan Simson's book applies here).



parsifal said:


> Japanese Infantry formations sliced through Allied positions so easily there was never any opportunity to set up solid lines of defence in the manner you described, and where is was tried, the Japanese simply outflaked it, knowing the British would obligingly retreat every time their "lines of communication" was threatened.



Actually, I think it was the tanks that did the slicing. The infantry did an excellent job of working round the flanks but it was the tanks that smashed through entire formations. 

That said, I agree with all your other comments about it taking far too long for the British to adopt, in a widescale fashion, the techniques promoted by Stewart.


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## buffnut453 (May 16, 2012)

parsifal said:


> The Brits had shown that cariers could operate within disputed airspace with even only moderately performing aircraft and limited numbers. The Jaopanese were an altogether different proposition, that much i will concde, but it is at least plausible that the RN could have repeated it achievements in the med against the European Axis, ie operate for extended periods in enemy controlled airspace.



Perhaps, although the prospect of sustained operations when the Japanese had submarines, long-range torpedo bombers and Zeros in theatre remains highly debatable.



parsifal said:


> A strike force of about 150 long range maritime strike aircraft, such as the CA-4 or Mosquito, escorted by Mosquitoes and/Beafighters would have been unstoppable for the japanese until their carriers arrived.



Not in late 1941. Given that Beaufighters didn't start maritime ops until mid-1942 and that Mossies weren't available in numbers until the same timeframe, I think it's stretching the "what if" scenario to the absolute limits to suggest they could have been available to defend Malaya in late 1941 (although I agree they'd be a great combination for ops over the Gulf of Thailand).



parsifal said:


> The needed to remove supplies because suficient supplies were arriving at the supply heads. There was no more need for additional supply. The difficulty was the same as that faced by Rommel, enough supply at the points of disembarkation, but insufficient supply at the fronts, because the supply lines were over extended. It was a matter of choice for the japanese....do they continue to pour most resources into malaya, where they were winning hands down, or do they bring forward their other key assaults 9principally the invasions of burma, and the East indies, but also the attacks into the SWPA). They chose the latter, because they were nervous about securing their supplies of raw materials, and couldnt believe how successful they had been to that point.



But leaving soldiers with less than 20 rounds per man at the end of the battle, and some artillery units equally down to the last few shells, is cutting things unnecessarily close - too close, in my view, for it to be entirely deliberate. Also, if Singora was not available, the Japanese would have to use resupply hubs further to the rear and, with a couple of less-likely options, Bangkok is the closest. Then consider that the roads weren't metalled which forces you onto rail...and, voila, you have a tempting air strike target that can be easily interdicted. I don't think the resupply problem is as easy as you're making out. And it's still 600 miles from Bangkok to Singora so if the Japanese had difficulties getting supplies the 560 miles from Singora to Johore, then it's probably fair to say that the same problem would exist from Bangkok to Singora.



parsifal said:


> 600 miles over friendly territory, through territory where quite possibly the japanese would have had months to prepre, is no more difficult than keeping units supplied in Brisbane, using supply heads from melbourne. Supply through friendly territory is much easier than through disputed or eney controlled territory



But the route from Singora to Johore was not disputed. Not by the end of the campaign. And as noted above, resupplying from Bangkok would probably have to depend on rail rather than mud-swamped loads. Thus the concept of "friendly" territory is moot because the resupply route would be highly susceptible to air attack. As an aside, the Thai weren't, on the whole, friendly to the Japanese - they were trying to play Japan off against Britain and broadly were about as neutral as it's possible to get...with a few exceptions (Direk's book "Thailand During the Second World War" is most enlightening on this subject). 



parsifal said:


> The problem with a matador strategy is that it alienates the thais even more than they already were.



And this is the nub of the political challenge - Britain didn't want to get sucked into a war against Japan unnecessarily just because the latter invaded Thailand. The only way to overcome the problem was accurate intelligence that would have prompted both London and Bangkok to reach an accommodation. There was a narrow window of opportunity for this to occur between 3 Dec and 7 Dec when the IJAAF were sending fighters to the newly-built airfields on Phu Quoc island and to other airfields nearby on the Indochina mainland. Singapore knew these airfields were being built, and also knew that other airfields were being extended (eg Siem Riep), which was a key indicator of bomber deployments. As late as October 1941, Brooke-Popham was urging FECB to expend every effort to detect the arrival of Japanese fighter aircraft in theatre and yet those priorities changed as soon as intelligence of the Japanese invasion fleet was received. From that point on, the focus became locating and tracking the fleet even though it would provide no real indication of destination or axis of attack. Flying PR missions over the airfields that were known to exist in western Indochina would have provided evidence of a major Japanese build up that was clearly directed at Singora and northern Malaya. Since it was not highly-classified, such PR-derived intel could have been shared with the Thai and US Governments, potentially enabling all to agree on mutual defence. It would still be short notice but having some troops in Singora and preparations to blow the ledge would have hurt Yamashita quite badly.

Interesting discussion...I'm enjoying this. Then again, I can (and do!) bore for NATO on this topic...as you well know!


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## Vincenzo (May 17, 2012)

Parsifal sorry for my fault (you had already posted the source), the source is intelligence info take in wartime or after war collecting/using japanese docs?
i try to compare us intelligence division list with that on niehorster page
1 Gds, 2 Gds, Gds, on orbat.com there is a Gds division in SEA/25th Army, a mix Brigade in East Japan and the depot of Guard division ever in east japan
infantry division 1st to 41nd there are all on orbat.com like that from 43rd to 52nd, there is also a 53rd, there are also 54th-57th, none of division from 58th to 77th, no the 42nd (there are the 1st-20th IMB, plus an other 3 infantry brigade not called mixed)
of the 100s series there are only 104th and 110th and a 116th
there are not armoured division there are 3 armoured brigade this are not near to division are all tanks units with 2/4 tank regiment (regiment like british, battalion strenght)
there is also a para division (very small unit with 2 regiment alone and this are battalion strenght unit)


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## Vincenzo (May 17, 2012)

deleted double post


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## A4K (May 17, 2012)

LOSS OF SINGAPORE - WHO'S FAULT WAS IT?


It was Jan (Lucky 13). I saw him!


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## parsifal (May 17, 2012)

> Parsifal sorry for my fault (you had already posted the source), the source is intelligence info take in wartime or after war collecting/using japanese docs?




not a problem Vincenzo. in reference to your question, the foreword of my copy says "_These two volumes are an edited version of the last edition of the Order of Battle Of the Japanese Armed Forces issued issued by the military intelligence Division of the US Department Of Of the Army. The amended 5th edition was used with pencilled changes through to september 1945. These changes included amnedments made by US occupation authorities during the postwar debriefings and interogations undertaken 1946-7. The original text of 1407 pages has been substantially edited to eliminate redundant entries (ie entries corrected during the war or in the post war debrief).This edition also eliminates certain other information such as unit codes, postal systems and home station designations, that may be of great interest to an Intell analyst, but of limited interest to historians. The editor acknowledges that the high level of accuracy and detailed information on units must be credited to the unknown military writers that prepred the material for direct use in the war. Most of the original text has not been removed or changed. Editing concentrated on removing unneccesary or innaccurate bul without compromising content"_.

_i try to compare us intelligence division list with that on niehorster page_

I will try to do the same to try and get as accurate a picture for you as possible

1 Gds, 2 Gds, Gds, on orbat.com there is a Gds division in SEA/25th Army, a mix Brigade in East Japan and the depot of Guard division ever in east japan

1st Gds HQ was not formed until 6/43, however the most of the assets existed prewar, as 1 Gds Independant Mixed Brigade (see 2gds Inf Div below) , with authorised complement in December 1941 of 12350 men and 36 artillery pieces in place. it did not bear the name division, but with a strength of that size as an IMB it was stronger than many divisions. a bit like SSLAH descibed as a Brigade in June 1941....it had an authorised strength of just under 9000 men. 

2nd gds was the original "Gds unit" . it was forme in 1867. by 1937 it had 1st and 2nd gds Infantry Brigades attached, organized into 1, 2, 3,4, 5 6 Inf Rgts, Gds Recon Rgt, 2 and 3 Gds Art Rgts, 2 Gds Assault Rgt, 2 Gds Construction Rgt, a signals and a transport regt. The Gds Cavalry Rgt was added in 1920. in 1937 it had a complement in excess of 35000 men, making it a corps strength unit in all but name. this sort of thing was typical of the japanese for their elity formation. Totally unworkable as a formation I might add. 

In June 1941 the division was completely reorganized and rationalized. 1st Gds Inf Bde 91 nd 2 Inf Rgts attached) were dropped along with some lesser support echelons which became the 1 Gds Idependant Inf Bde (IIB). 2nd Gds Bde (3 and 4 Inf Rgts attached), half the Cavalry and some artillery were also detached..... these formations were used to build the 1 Gds Independant Mixed Brigade (IMB). 1 Gds IMB became the 1st Gds Inf Div in June 1943 (see the entry for 1st gds Inf Div above) 

This is where I get a little confused. At this point 2nd Gds Inf Div appears to have 5 and 6 Infantry regts still attached, plus some of the support units. According to the Intell report, 2nd Gds Bde (3 4 Inf Rgt) plus some additional assets (which I have yet to identify the source) were also detached and formed the nucleas of the Imperial Guards Division ....the unit that fought in Malaya, but then it says that when the 1st gds Div was activated in 1943, this formation (the gds Div) was also redesignated the 2Gds Div. I cannot reconcile what happened to the remains of the original 2Gds Div and the "new" 2nd Gds Div. 

Confused? i am....But wait theres more.....the report further states" The Guards Div was activated in Tokyo in 1867, and is believed to have remained there until 1940 when 2gds Bde (3 and 4 Gds Inf Rgts) were sent to Shanghai and then to Sth China. in June 1941 this Brigade transferred to Hainan where the 5th Gds Rgt came under its command" ( Iassume this was the 5th regt from the remains of the original 2nd Gds Div, which now leaves 2nd Gds Div with one Inf Rgt attached from its original TOE)...."In July the Gds Div were sent to Sth Indo China. On the outbreak of the war they entered Thailand. Folwing the peace traty with thailand, the division moved soth into Malaya, following the 5th Division, and crossing the frontier 3 days after departure from Bangkok. Its first action is believed to have been north of Ipoh where its lack of combat experience showed....it suffered heavy casualties. Subsequently it was used in amphibious assaults down the west coast, landing at (unreadable) where it was again involved in heavy fighting ...." 




> infantry division 1st to 41nd there are all on orbat.com like that from 43rd to 52nd, there is also a 53rd, there are also 54th-57th, none of division from 58th to 77th, no the 42nd (there are the 1st-20th IMB, plus an other 3 infantry brigade not called mixed)



I will recheck when the assets and the HQs were formed for these formations and get back to you




> of the 100s series there are only 104th and 110th and a 116th
> there are not armoured division there are 3 armoured brigade this are not near to division are all tanks units with 2/4 tank regiment (regiment like british, battalion strenght)
> there is also a para division (very small unit with 2 regiment alone and this are battalion strenght unit)



Will check these as well when I get time.


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## Vincenzo (May 17, 2012)

for orbat.com
the gds division had 3rd, 4th and 5th guards regiment +arty (36 pieces) +recon and support
the gds mixed brigade had 1st and 2nd guards regiment, a Cavalry guards rgt, not indicated artillery, maybe a miss, common mixed brigade had a arty btl (12 pieces)


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## Freebird (May 17, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> *I don't think I've ever argued that Malaya could be held with the forces assigned.* Airpower was vital and the lack of fighter units in theatre was deplorable, as was the lack of flexibility and imagination displayed by AHQFE (eg stringent adherence to stovepiped application of air power such as "airfields must be attacked by bombers" or "fighters are there to defend against the enemy's attacks").



I think we may all be agreed on that point (at least  ), with the forces on hand it woould be difficult to see how Percival (or any commander) could have won the battle.
I think where I disagree with Parsifal ( Glider?) in that the navy would have to prevent a landing. The naval assets needed to do this are just not available.
Parsifal's statement (correct me if I'm wrong) is that once the Japanese land, Malaya is doomed as Japan can reinforce with several (dozens?) of additional divisions.

What I'm saying is that in the absence of huge naval forces, but given proper troops, tank support, defensive preparations, decent air support and good leadership the Allied forces *should* be quite able to halt the Japanese advance.



> I disagree with your statement that a stronger RAF presence and balanced RN fleet would have prevented the ground battle from ever occurring. The Japanese invasion force would have landed somewhere, if not Singora and Kota Bharu (among other locations) then Bangkok or even into French Indochina. The land battle would have developed but, per my earlier posts, at a much slower pace.
> B-N



I agree, the problem here (IMO) is how to properly defend Malay given the assets that were available or could reasonable been made available at the time.




buffnut453 said:


> Not in late 1941. Given that Beaufighters didn't start maritime ops until mid-1942 and that Mossies weren't available in numbers until the same timeframe, I think it's stretching the "what if" scenario to the absolute limits to suggest they could have been available to defend Malaya in late 1941 (although I agree they'd be a great combination for ops over the Gulf of Thailand).



I would also agree, a great combination. (Perhaps some Corsairs Fireflies too?  )

However, let's try this: *Take (late) July 1941 as a starting point*. 
Using forces that we can make available, what are some of our options?
Abandoning Malaya is not a good option. 


Now, I agree with Buffnut that interdicting Singora, is a good idea, however the option to enter in advance of a Japanese invasion just won't work (IMO). Britain had a guarantee from FDR that the US would take action against Japan *providing *that Japan made the first move. It is absolutely critical that the US enter the war when hostilities begin.

I'm also not in agreement with Parsifal that sending a TF into the Gulf of Siam is feasable, given the risk.

So, here are a couple of other options:
Suppose that we are able to send a force of 20 - 25 squadrons of medium bombers to the Far East (Mostly Wellingtons, + some Hampden, Whitley, Bolingbroke Beaufort)
What about a major attack on Singora the next night after Japan lands - to destroy port facilities.

Also, how many mines could we get hold of in the Pacific? What about mining all of the Eastern Malayan ports (Kota Bharu, Kuantan, Mersing) before hostilities begin, and then air-dropping mines at Singora?
Mining was a very effective tool vs German merchant traffic in the ETO, and Japan has nowhere near the sweeping ability or technology that Britian or Germany does.

Did Australia produce mines? How many/month could they make?


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## Glider (May 17, 2012)

freebird said:


> I think we may all be agreed on that point (at least  ), with the forces on hand it woould be difficult to see how Percival (or any commander) could have won the battle.
> I think where I disagree with Parsifal ( Glider?) in that the navy would have to prevent a landing. The naval assets needed to do this are just not available.
> Parsifal's statement (correct me if I'm wrong) is that once the Japanese land, Malaya is doomed as Japan can reinforce with several (dozens?) of additional divisions.


You are correct in that I do believe that the Allied Naval forces were not strong enough to stop a landing and that would be critical.



> What I'm saying is that in the absence of huge naval forces, but given proper troops, tank support, defensive preparations, decent air support and good leadership the Allied forces *should* be quite able to halt the Japanese advance.


And I believe that stopping the landing was critical, because the allies didn't have the tanks, art support, defensive positions, air support and most importantly training in Jungle warfare. The allies were more or less tied to the roads.

Clearly if you have the land forces then stopping the landing was less critical (but still a good idea).


> I would also agree, a great combination. (Perhaps some Corsairs Fireflies too?  )


Who needs these. There were a lot of Spitfires more or less wasting their time over the North Sea in 1941, few squadrons could have made a huge difference. People point out that they didnt do well over Darwin which is a fair point but at the start of the Burma campaign we are talking about Ki27 and early Ki43 with 2 x LMG.



> However, let's try this: *Take (late) July 1941 as a starting point*.
> Using forces that we can make available, what are some of our options?
> Abandoning Malaya is not a good option.
> 
> ...


Wellingtons would be a tough nut to crack with the Ki27 and early Ki43, certainly less vulnerable than the Japanese bombers to the Spit IIb and Spit VB. If you could get hold of the Whirlwinds for GA the Japanese could be in trouble. They are a lot faster than the Jap fighters and being two engined the pilots wouldn't be as likely to try and dogfight the Ki43.



> Also, how many mines could we get hold of in the Pacific? What about mining all of the Eastern Malayan ports (Kota Bharu, Kuantan, Mersing) before hostilities begin, and then air-dropping mines at Singora?
> Mining was a very effective tool vs German merchant traffic in the ETO, and Japan has nowhere near the sweeping ability or technology that Britian or Germany does.


Mining is a good idea as they probably had some left over from WW1 and if not, they are pretty simple things to build assuming that you stick to good old fashioned contact mines.

Did Australia produce mines? How many/month could they make? [/QUOTE]


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## parsifal (May 17, 2012)

There were already extensive minefields down the east coast of Malaya, and also blocking the malacca straits. This was a primary reason why the japanese did not invade closer to Singapore in the first place.


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## Freebird (May 17, 2012)

Glider said:


> You are correct in that I do believe that the Allied Naval forces were not strong enough to stop a landing and that would be critical.
> 
> 
> And I believe that stopping the landing was critical, because the allies didn't have the tanks, art support, defensive positions, air support and most importantly training in Jungle warfare. The allies were more or less tied to the roads.
> ...



Tanks and airpower is something that the Allies had the power to provide, as could be better troops defensive works.



Glider said:


> Who needs these. There were a lot of Spitfires more or less wasting their time over the North Sea in 1941, few squadrons could have made a huge difference. People point out that they didnt do well over Darwin which is a fair point but at the start of the Burma campaign we are talking about Ki27 and early Ki43 with 2 x LMG.



The Spitfires would be handicapped by the short range however, a better idea perhaps would be to use P-40s.



Glider said:


> Wellingtons would be a tough nut to crack with the Ki27 and early Ki43, certainly less vulnerable than the Japanese bombers to the Spit IIb and Spit VB. If you could get hold of the Whirlwinds for GA the Japanese could be in trouble. They are a lot faster than the Jap fighters and being two engined the pilots wouldn't be as likely to try and dogfight the Ki43.



Wellingtons would be an almost impossible nut to crack, if flying at night - against Japanese forces lacking both radar and night fighters.



> There were already extensive minefields down the east coast of Malaya, and also blocking the malacca straits. This was a primary reason why the japanese did not invade closer to Singapore in the first place.



Do you have some details of these minefields?
And could Australia produce mines?


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## parsifal (May 17, 2012)

> Parsifal
> 
> The Brits had shown that cariers could operate within disputed airspace with even only moderately performing aircraft and limited numbers. The Jaopanese were an altogether different proposition, that much i will concde, but it is at least plausible that the RN could have repeated it achievements in the med against the European Axis, ie operate for extended periods in enemy controlled airspace.
> 
> ...



The quality of the anti-surface forces that the Japanese could bring to bear was better than their European counterparts, admittedly, but the quantity was less. the case in point is FKX in the central basin, the forces used to pound the RN near Crete in mid 1941, and the attacks against the pedestal convoys. In all these cases, superior numbers of highly trained and motivated LW and KM men, and less well trained and less well motivated RM and RA men were attacking the RN Carriers. There were successes, and there were failures in all cases, but the carriers proved they could operate and in these disputed waters. In the case of the malta convoys the Brits proved repeatedly that with carriers they could get merchjant shippng through, whereas without carriers it was well nigh suicidal. In the case of this hypothetical we are asking the question, could a well balanced well trained British raiding force imprede or even stop maritime traffic into and out of the Japanese disembarkation points. I would say they could. the Japanese a few month later demonstrated what could be achieved in sea denial with the Ryujo in the Bay Of bengal....why is it less possible for two or three british Carriers to do the same or similar? Say the Ark Royal had not been sunk (a plausible assumption IMO) and she was married to say Indomitable and Implacable (not completed until 1944, but should have been ready 
1941) that gives the RN a potent strike capability....of around 200 a/c. Its all a bit surreal, i admit, and not able to happen, but we are talking about potential here, not reality. 




> parsifal
> A strike force of about 150 long range maritime strike aircraft, such as the CA-4 or Mosquito, escorted by Mosquitoes and/Beafighters would have been unstoppable for the japanese until their carriers arrived.
> 
> 
> ...


.


Point taken about the Mossies, however if the brits had not been so one eyed about their engine techs 1938-41 there is every possibility that both Beafighters and CA-4s would have been available in quantity from Australian factories. The RAAF always intended to use Beafighters for maritime escort, flak suppression and later direct strike. CA-4s were intended to be improved Beaforsts, and Beforts were intended to be in service from 1940. none of that happened because of the embargo placed by the British on the export of their engine and aero techs. Either Boomerangs, or more remotely Hurricanes (projected for construction in Australia) could have been built as well. None of this came to anything, but i keep harping backl to the possibility that it could have happened. there was no real technological isue stopping it, other than Australian industry needed the rights and the jigs and the money to build British (or US) engines locally. For various reasons (that we have argued about elsewhere) this never happened. It could have, it should have, but it didnt, and thats part of the tragedy really.


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## parsifal (May 17, 2012)

> Do you have some details of these minefields?
> And could Australia produce mines?



I have a map at home showing the location of these fields, which were very extensive, but i dont know the density of the fields

Ive read Australian munitions factories produced around 60000 mine during the war, but could be wrong. The attached article is a bit of a propaganda piece, but buried in part 3 is mention of sea mine production....



http://www.google.com.au/url?sa=t&r...3d25CQ&usg=AFQjCNGGvlR5ZrjenBCnp4a2asNB_3a8rA


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## buffnut453 (May 17, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Point taken about the Mossies, however if the brits had not been so one eyed about their engine techs 1938-41 there is every possibility that both Beafighters and CA-4s would have been available in quantity from Australian factories.



Beaufighters might have been available but would they have been the maritime strike variant? Per my earlier post, the MkVI didn't enter service until mid-1942. Prior to that time, the Beau's role was heavy fighter.


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## buffnut453 (May 17, 2012)

freebird said:


> Now, I agree with Buffnut that interdicting Singora, is a good idea, however the option to enter in advance of a Japanese invasion just won't work (IMO). Britain had a guarantee from FDR that the US would take action against Japan *providing *that Japan made the first move. It is absolutely critical that the US enter the war when hostilities begin.



That's why you needed intel that could be shared with other interested parties so that a unified, concerted effort could be brought to bear. There were no guarantees that the Japanese fleet was going to invade Malaya and Thailand until the first troops hit the beaches. Brooke-Popham would have done far better had he stuck to the original indicators of impending attack - the arrival of short-range Japanese fighters. Singapore had PR assets (just!) that could have achieved the required mission but, instead, the Beaufort was sent off to PR a port in Indochina while the Buffalo was not used at all. Presence of the Japanese fighters on and near Phu Quoc Island would have provided vital intel about Japanese intentions - the numbers of fighters involved and the locations of their bases were clear indicators that the overland invasion route was not being considered. With this intel, it might (stress *might*) have been possible to convince Washington and Bangkok that a more cooperative defence approach was needed, enabling MATADOR to be called perhaps as early as 5 Dec - it's a slim margin but it would probably be enough, with Thai troops supporting, to make life much more difficult for Yamashita.


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## parsifal (May 18, 2012)

> Beaufighters might have been available but would they have been the maritime strike variant? Per my earlier post, the MkVI didn't enter service until mid-1942. Prior to that time, the Beau's role was heavy fighter.





Unquestionably if they were operated by the RAAF. 30 sqn was the first unit to operate British supplied Beadfighters. These were an earlier mark to the MkVIs you refer to (though I am embarrassed to say i dont know which mark they actually were).

The following is a brief description of their easrly employment. If Beafighters had been made available earlier, by release of the engines techs, there is no reason to suggest that the Australians would not have still used them for maritime strike/escort/flak suppression purposes. its the specific reason we wanted them in the first place....they were meant to work closely with the CA4s and beaforts

"RAAF Beaufighters: 30 Squadron – Early operations

30 Squadron was the first Raaf unit to be to be equipped with the newly built beaufighters. The unit was formed at Richmond, New South wales, on 9 march 1942. The first beaufighter to be received from the unit was delivered on the 2 june, training commenced under the famous Australia aviator Wg Cdr Brian Walker also known and more commonly referred to as ‘Blackjack’, he also took command of the squadron on the 4th of June.

On the 17th of August the Squadron moved to Bohle River, near Townsville, Queensland, in preparation for the move to Port Moresby, which was where the unit was to be based. At this stage of the war the Japanese where still advancing and had captured most of northern New Guinea, the Japanese had captured Kokoda and was moving up the Owen Stanley Ranges. Milne bay if captured by the Japanese, this would provide an excellent position to provide a base of operations for a flanking attack on the defenders of Port Moresby.

First Sortie:

Coast watchers reported Japanese barges moving along the coast towards Milne bay, kittyhawks from 75 76 squadrons moved to the Milne bay airfield to provide air defence for the local area. The onslaught commenced on 26 August, the Japanese attempted to establish a foot-hold but were fiercely resisted by the Australian air and ground forces. On September 6th, three Beaufighters arrived at Fall river (Milne bay) to assist the Kittyhawks already stationed there. The following day Hudson, Beauforts and the beaufighters were assigned to attack an enemy cruiser and destroyer that had been sighted off Cape Karitahua on Normanby Islanda and with the kittyhawks were to operate as top cover. On takeoff one beaufighter ran off the strip and destroyed itself and a Hudsun, the other two aircraft though made strafing runs on the ships to divert anti-aircraft fire from the beauforts. At the end of the attack neither ship appeared to be seriously damaged. This was the first operational sortie carried out by the squadron.

Move to Ward’s Strip

30 squadron moved to Port Moresby under the control of the fifth air force USAAF on September 12th. The Squadron’s new task was to attack enemy supply lines, gun positions, barges and transports, a role well suited for the beaufighter. The squadron was then involved in operations to attack shipping and various ground targets, including important targets for the now advancing Australian forces on the Kokoda trail. On the 17th, twelve aircraft were sent to attack barges and troop transports at Sanananda Point and Buna beach, three barges were left blazing and others exploding from the attack. Conditions at Ward’s strip had remained primitive until the Japanese advance could be stopped and a major base established for the eventual allied offensive.

Battle of the Bismarck Sea
On the 1st of March, a patrolling USAAF Liberator sighted 14 ships 64 kilometers north-west of Ubili being escorted by at least four destroyers and a top cover of zero’s. The weather closed in until the convoy was located and attacked by B-17’s which attacked one ship. The convoy was still out of range of the beaufighters so an attempt was made to move two flights to Dobodura. On the mourning of the 3rd the convoy was confirmed to be heading directly towards Lae, a total of 90 aircraft rendezvoused at 9.25am over Cape Ward Hunt for what was to become known as the Battle of the Bismarck Sea. Walker expected to lead the squadron in the attack but the medical officer grounded him as unfit for duty. However Blackjack had other ideas and was not going to be left out of such an important engagement, Walker was later sighted cruising along at 12,000 feet amongst the USAAF lightnings, where he would be able to watch the battle unfold.

The first attack was made by 13 B-17’s from about 7,000 feet, a large formation of Zero’s attacked them shooting down one B-17 and 3 of the lightning escorts. The B-17’s sank at least one ship and probably another, immediately after this the 13 beaufighters of 30 squadron attacked. The squadron made mast-height strafing runs over the ships to silence the anti-aircraft guns to pave the way for the following Mitchell’s of the 90th Bombardment Squadron. The beaufighters played an important role in the battle, by making broadside attacks on the destroyers it fooled them into believing that they were torpedo bombers. This caused the destroyers to turn away from the merchant ships which left them to be an easier target. For the next few days beaufighters attacked the remaining barges and rafts in the Huon Gulf to prevent any survivors reaching shore. The final tally of ships sunk was eight transports and four destroyers, with 2,890 personel being killed. The losses to the allied side being thirteen aircrew killed, 10 in combat and 3 in accidents."

Iwould have no problem to claim that Beafighters in RAAF service, had they been available, would have been pressed into a maritime role, with or without prior RAF usage in that role. Beafighters were intended to be used in that role by the RAAF deom at least 1940, and were trained and used for the role from the very beginning. By 1941 we were starting to break free of the arbitrary restrictions being imposed by the british on the use of their equipment.....the Aussies were quite prepred to use any gubn in the AT role for example and not restrict AA guns to AA uses 9just as an example).....


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## Wildcat (May 18, 2012)

According to the official history, Australia produced 12,987 sea mines. Mike, The early RAAF Beaufighter operations were with MkIc's.


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## Freebird (May 18, 2012)

parsifal said:


> The Brits had shown that cariers could operate within disputed airspace with even only moderately performing aircraft and limited numbers. The Jaopanese were an altogether different proposition, that much i will concde, but it is at least plausible that the RN could have repeated it achievements in the med against the European Axis, ie operate for extended periods in enemy controlled airspace.



That's not how I would interpret it.
The carriers were an excellent tool for control of the seas and neutralizing enemy sea power. (eg. Sinking of Bismarck, V. Vento damaged at Matapan etc)
However only when operating _*beyond*_ the range of shore based air power, otherwise the enemy will overload carrier defences and sink or put out of action the carrier.(Illustrious Formidable in the Med)

Given the fact that there are already 2 carriers out of action (in summer '41) attempting to interdict the Japanese in the Gulf of Siam is too risky a prospect. (IMO)
The task would be better done by aircraft (that's why they built the airbases in the first place  )



Wildcat said:


> According to the official history, Australia produced 12,987 sea mines.



Excellent information, thanks very much Wildcat.



buffnut453 said:


> That's why you needed intel that could be shared with other interested parties so that a unified, concerted effort could be brought to bear. There were no guarantees that the Japanese fleet was going to invade Malaya and Thailand until the first troops hit the beaches. Brooke-Popham would have done far better had he stuck to the original indicators of impending attack - the arrival of short-range Japanese fighters.
> 
> With this intel, it might (stress *might*) have been possible to convince Washington and Bangkok that a more cooperative defence approach was needed, enabling MATADOR to be called perhaps as early as 5 Dec - it's a slim margin but it would probably be enough, with Thai troops supporting, to make life much more difficult for Yamashita.



Agreed, but there is no guarantee that this would work.
I would certainly have no problem with _planning_ for Matador, and with a better mix of assets, (ie: tanks) the mission would be much more viable, even if the Japanese landing had already taken place.
However, I wouldn't want to depend on some foreign power (Bankok or Washington) for the success of the mission.
Better to assume that Thailand would remain neutral and make plans for that event. If they later agree to participate - great - but if they don't I would want a "Plan B" ( Plan C)

If the Matador plan isn't used (or they lose control of the port) I would propose a major strategic strike to disable the port facilities. Continued night strikes would continue to keep the port out of action.
Destroying the airbase would be helpful too.
Even if Japan is able to reopen the port for use sometime later, the added logistics demand of repairs, AA and port defence will eat away the supplies needed for the 25th Army.

View attachment songkla1.bmp


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## buffnut453 (May 18, 2012)

freebird said:


> Agreed, but there is no guarantee that this would work.



Agreed. Nothing is guaranteed in this whiffery. However, even a couple of days would enable forces to be positioned and demolition charges set just in case things turn for the worst. 



freebird said:


> I would certainly have no problem with _planning_ for Matador, and with a better mix of assets, (ie: tanks) the mission would be much more viable, even if the Japanese landing had already taken place.



But that was the nub of the problem. Brooke-Popham was not allowed to order MATADOR until the Japanese attacked but by that time it was too late. Lack of tanks, or even decent anti-tank weapons, was a critical shortfall on the British side during the campaign - even relatively modest provision of such weapons would have helped prevent the filleting of entire formations by the hard-charging Japanese tanks.



freebird said:


> However, I wouldn't want to depend on some foreign power (Bankok or Washington) for the success of the mission. Better to assume that Thailand would remain neutral and make plans for that event. If they later agree to participate - great - but if they don't I would want a "Plan B" ( Plan C).



Which is essentially what happened. London didn't want to implement MATADOR unilaterally for fear of:

1. Giving Japan a pretext for invasion.
2. Turning American public opinion against Britain if it was perceived that we were invading a sovereign, and neutral, nation.

The consequences of this political conundrum are well documented - British forces were somehow expected to prepare simultaneously for an advance into Thailand for MATADOR whilst also establishing defensive positions in northern Malaya (this was, essentially, the format of Brooke-Popham's "Plan B"...there was no "Plan C"). What I'm proposing is that intelligence, properly applied, could have broken the political log-jam to enable a mutually-agreeable defensive posture for both Malaya and Thailand, and to do so without upsetting American sensitivities.



freebird said:


> If the Matador plan isn't used (or they lose control of the port) I would propose a major strategic strike to disable the port facilities. Continued night strikes would continue to keep the port out of action. Destroying the airbase would be helpful too. Even if Japan is able to reopen the port for use sometime later, the added logistics demand of repairs, AA and port defence will eat away the supplies needed for the 25th Army.



Entirely agree but AHQFE lacked the heavy bomber forces to implement such attacks, although the job would have been much easier if, per my point above, British forces had been able to set demolition charges in Singora harbour before any withdrawal. I'd add the Haad Yai (Hat Yai in your map illustration) railhead as another target - that was vital to the movement of supplies from Singora down the Malaya peninsula.


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## renrich (May 18, 2012)

The US and Great Britain were totally unprepared for a war against Japan. The loss of Singapore was foreordained once Japan commenced the war.


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## Freebird (May 18, 2012)

renrich said:


> The US and Great Britain were totally unprepared for a war against Japan. The loss of Singapore was foreordained once Japan commenced the war.



Not at all - it's like saying that the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor couldn't have been detected or damage mitigated, because the fact that they DID have radar but didn't use it (or ignored the warning) and the fact that the aircraft were all laid out neatly in rows (for ease of destruction)  doesn't mean that they COULDN'T have been better prepared, using common sense and some better command decisions.

The British were far better prepared for war than the US, simply because they were already at war, and had a far bigger pool of aircraft, crews trained divisions available. The fact that they didn't make better use of the resources in the Empire was the big failing.
The US doesn't have 4 or 5 divisions available to send to the Philippines nor 30 or 40 squadrons, but the British do.

The point here is that the British COULD have been much better prepared to defend Malaya, had the advice of the senior army RAF leaders been listened to, and reasonable prudent preparations been taken



buffnut453 said:


> But the key issue was time. The Allies needed time to reinforce Malaya whereas the Japanese needed to take Malaya quickly before the reinforcements arrived. Singora was the vital ground, together with the road/rail links from there south. Denying that port would have forced Yamashita to undertake the long, overland invasion from French Indochina which was much more difficult and would have taken much more time.



There are other minor Thai ports in the gulf of Siam and a rail line to Singora, but it would make supply much more difficult.



buffnut453 said:


> Even if Commonwealth forces in Singora had folded quickly, there was a much greater chance that The Ledge could have been destroyed, essentially halting any major infiltration into Malaya from Singora. Yes, the Japanese had the capacity to undertake landings at various points along the peninsula but these were typically small affairs and without an equivalent major port, like Singora, would have been very difficult to keep resupplied
> Also, removal of The Ledge would have really hurt Japan's ability to employ its tanks



Hold on a minute, are you mixing up the two routes?- the "Ledge" blocked the road from Kroh, Malaya to Patani, Siam - not the road/rail link from Singora. 




parsifal said:


> the Japanese a few month later demonstrated what could be achieved in sea denial with the Ryujo in the Bay Of bengal....why is it less possible for two or three british Carriers to do the same or similar? Say the Ark Royal had not been sunk (a plausible assumption IMO) and she was married to say Indomitable and Implacable (not completed until 1944, but should have been ready
> 1941) that gives the RN a potent strike capability....of around 200 a/c. .


 
There is no way that Implacable can be ready by late '41, unless you time travel back in to have it laid down a couple years earlier.
Also, if you rushed Implacable up to say, late '42 or early 43' it would be without the mid-war redesign to give it a second hanger deck.

A more realistic scenario would be the Indomitable 2 Illustrious class sent in early '42, but not in time to prevent any landings.
In the summer/autumn of 1941 the Illustrious Formidable still under repair, Furious is in refit and Indomitable is still running trials. This only leaves HMS Victorious, HMS Ark Royal and the (smaller) HMS Eagle HMS Argus, to guard the Britis Isles, Gibraltar and the South Atlantic. 

With only 2 full size fleet carriers available, there is no chance for the RN to send more than 1, and even that would be iffy.

The one big reserve available in the end of '41 is airpower, so I think that's where we have to see what can be done.


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## Freebird (May 18, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> But that was the nub of the problem. Brooke-Popham was not allowed to order MATADOR until the Japanese attacked but by that time it was too late. Lack of tanks, or even decent anti-tank weapons, was a critical shortfall on the British side during the campaign - even relatively modest provision of such weapons would have helped prevent the filleting of entire formations by the hard-charging Japanese tanks.



They did have some 2 pdr anti-tank guns, though not enough. 
We can provide some tanks, not a huge number, but even a few dozen will make a world of difference.



buffnut453 said:


> Which is essentially what happened. London didn't want to implement MATADOR unilaterally for fear of:
> 
> 1. Giving Japan a pretext for invasion.
> 2. Turning American public opinion against Britain if it was perceived that we were invading a sovereign, and neutral, nation.
> ...



Honestly, I can't see that Thailand would go for it, as they see Japan as the stronger power in the Far East. They picked the most logical policy, which was to plaw neutral while making secret promised to the Japanese. In the event that the Allies gained the upper hand, they would disavow any knowledge of a secret pact and play the invaded victim. (Which is exactly how it played out  )

With a stronger force in Jitra/Kroh, (an extra brigade or 2) the defenders would be far better able to prepare a brigade sized force to launch Matador AND to also prepare defensive positions if that failed.
Also, in the event that Matador wasn't possible before the Japanese land, with even a half-regiment of tanks and a motorized brigade, and launched the moment that Kota Bharu is attacked, they could still race forward to seize the airport and rail junction before the Japanese troops can secure the landing and move forwards.
While perhaps not capturing the port, it could still be made unusable by artillery.


Now, if the Thai government would agree I'm all for launching it pre-invasion, I just don't thonk it's likely that they will side against Japan. They may well deduce that the arrival of the fighters was for an attack against Malaya - not Thailand



buffnut453 said:


> Entirely agree but AHQFE lacked the heavy bomber forces to implement such attacks, although the job would have been much easier if, per my point above, British forces had been able to set demolition charges in Singora harbour before any withdrawal. I'd add the Haad Yai (Hat Yai in your map illustration) railhead as another target - that was vital to the movement of supplies from Singora down the Malaya peninsula.



This is essentially my question: (challenge)
If you were in charge in the Far East, what kind of preparations plans could be made? (starting in the end of July, 1941)

Suppose I were representing the British War cabinet, I could give you 30 or 40 Valentine tanks, and say about 250 bombers, along with 250 fighters.
We could also send an Australian division from the Middle East, instead of the 11th Indian division HQ, and the two poorly trained brigades that arrived in Aug/Sept 1941 (22nd 28th Indian brigades)

Other assets such as some minelayers, extra engineers, motor transport, anti-tank, AA artillery can be made available too.
(But no major fleet  )

What sort of plans could be made?


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## parsifal (May 18, 2012)

> That's not how I would interpret it.
> The carriers were an excellent tool for control of the seas and neutralizing enemy sea power. (eg. Sinking of Bismarck, V. Vento damaged at Matapan etc)
> However only when operating _*beyond*_ the range of shore based air power, otherwise the enemy will overload carrier defences and sink or put out of action the carrier.(Illustrious Formidable in the Med)
> 
> ...



Illustrious was overwhelmed by a force of land based airpower, trained for the anti-shipping operations, and tasked specifically to sink the carrier. There were some 40 aircraft involved directly in the actual attacks, but well over 500 involved in the overall operation (including shadowers, italians, aircraft undertaking the feints, aircraft deployed for the purpose but in the wrong positions).....there were 248 attached to FKX, including over 50 lr fighters. The germans had an additional 40 or so floatplane search aircraft, whilst the italians, fom memory had approximately 100 seaplanes searching for the carrier. If memory serves me correctly the italians had approximately 120 torpedo bombers involved in the operation.

Ad to this the fact that the illustrious was operating within 60 miles of the Sicilian coast at the time she was hit, completely unaware of the impending attack, with the majority of her escort completely out of position, and with just 12 Fulmars flying CAP, then her loss becomes far more understandable.

similar situations arose at the time of formidables disbaling. i know of at 330 german aircraft involved in the operation.

Short answer to these situations is that the carriers were left exposed by inadequate escort, escort out of position and not closed up, inadequate fighter protection, and massive numbers ranged against them. At other times carriers operated with virtual impunity in enemy dominated skies. there are numerous examples of that...literlally thousands of operations in WWII and post WWII where carriers operated in heavily defended airspace and came out without a scratch. To successfully hit a carrier was a major operation, requiring a massive advantage in numbers, and a well trained force with very good intell.

Not all these condition existed for 25th flotilla in the south china sea. RN carriers could operate well clear of the coast, there were just 60 torpedo bombers and a few search planes, and just 25 fighters as escort . Brit carriers could operate with virtual impunity in those conditions. In December 1941, the Brits retained potent night strike capability (as demonstrated in their attacks against bismarck and the italian fleet). Time needed to be spent working up an Integrated TG to support the carriers...about 2 months would have been needed to integrate the fleet.

The best chance of retaining Malaya remains a naval solution, given the forces available to the japanese and thei other committments. problem of course is that the japs would probably deploy their carriers to intervene roughly D+30


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## buffnut453 (May 19, 2012)

freebird said:


> There are other minor Thai ports in the gulf of Siam and a rail line to Singora, but it would make supply much more difficult.



Which is precisely my point. Singora was the main logistical hub for the Japanese advance. There was no other port that even came near to its capacity on the east coast of Thailand. 



freebird said:


> Hold on a minute, are you mixing up the two routes?- the "Ledge" blocked the road from Kroh, Malaya to Patani, Siam - not the road/rail link from Singora.



I don't think so. The Ledge was key to preventing Japanese forces from attaining the main road which ran down the western side of Malaya from the Thai border all the way to Johore. There was a rail line on the eastern side of the peninsula but no major road and so the going down the eastern side was much harder.


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## Freebird (May 20, 2012)

buffnut453 said:


> I don't think so. The Ledge was key to preventing Japanese forces from attaining the main road which ran down the western side of Malaya from the Thai border all the way to Johore. There was a rail line on the eastern side of the peninsula but no major road and so the going down the eastern side was much harder.



There are actually 3 routes into Northern Malaya, there is the main road/rail route from Singora through Jitra and then down the West Coast. The second route is where road rail split off at Singora and go down the east coast and over the border into Kota Bharu, and from there the rail line (only) continues south to Johore through the Jungle. (The coast road goes about 50 miles south and then stops before irt reaches Kuantan.)

There is a third route, from Patani a road goes south through "the Ledge" and across the mountains at Kroh. From Kroh the road splits, one fork goes west to join the main road near Penang, the second fork goes south through Grik towards Ipoh.


(See map)

The Matador plan was in fact separate from the plan to have "Krohcol" move north to seize "the Ledge."
Percival made this critical mistake, he forgot that even though Matador could not be done (as the Japanese had already landed) he still should give the go-ahead for Krohcol to move forward. Part of the reason for taking the ledge was to prevent a rapid Japanese move from Patani towards Panang or Ipoh, which would cut off the main part of the 11th division which was defending at Jitra 

The main defensive positions on the primary route from Singora were the Kedah river line, and lower down the Muda river at Gurun.
The Matador plan would still be useful if it could deny or significantly damage Singora to deny the supply port, however it's poorly sited for a defensive line, so I would expect the Matador force to draw back into Malaya as the Japanese advance


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## Freebird (May 20, 2012)

parsifal said:


> They forced the Japanese into making direct frontal assaults onto heavily defended positions, much as the Americans did on guadacanal. First successes using this "funelling" method are traditionally attributed to Milne Bay.



...Which was exactly the point at Kampar, to have them frontal assault a defensive position, especially as it proved extremely difficult to outflank.

A similar plan was for the Muda river line, which could have worked, except for the fact that defensive works were not made beforehand, and the initial position at Jitra collapsed so quickly that there wasn't time to fall back in good order. 



> If they realized it, they certainly didnt practice it, either during the campaign in Malaya, or in any of the other jungle campaigns up to and including Arakan. British armies were repeatedly flanked and defeated because of that one failing.



Well again, they did put it in practice at Kampar, which the Japanese were unable to flank (on land), until they made an amphibious landing behind the Allied positions.
The failing in this case was to not prevent the Japanese from capturing intact shipping at Penang, and not having control over the Western seas, by deploying stronger naval air forces, and denying Japan airfields.

The problem wasn't so much that they didn't know how to fight the Japanese, but that the quality preparations of the forces at hand were totally inadequate



> FB, I know you know what those plantations in Johore are like. They are as bad as natural jungle as far as access is concerned. They might as well be jungle because whelled vehicles cannot get access to them. The British had no end of trouble with the Japanese around KL



I don't mean at KL, but in Southern Johore from Mersing to the western coast, where the road net is better.
Obviously this assumes that defensive emplacements will be built, and that some plantations will have to be cleared to provide fields of fire.



> Yamashita thought the fighting around Johore was relatively easy. He said repeatedly in post action reports that there was litle effective resistance in the battles around Johore



Indeed it was, because Percival made the choice of not contesting Johore at all, and made the fatal mistake to withdraw directly onto Singapore island itself.
No defensive works were emplaced in Johore. Percival was also badly handicapped by having ~ 2 divisions as reinforcements that were next to useless, the 44th 45th Indian brigades that were unfit for combat, and the newly arrived British 18th division was not acclimatized after months-long voyage.



> > Note - To do so they will need to have brought in better troops, and enough air assets to at least challenge Japanes air superiority.
> 
> 
> I am unware of any evidence to support that. Japanese Infantry formations sliced through Allied positions so easily there was never any opportunity to set up solid lines of defence in the manner you described, and where is was tried, the Japanese simply outflanked it, knowing the British would obligingly retreat every time their "lines of communication" was threatened.



I'm not suggesting that is was a plausible option given the raw, poorly trained equipped troops that they had, and the lack of any air assets in late January-early February.
The Japanese did NOT slice through British positions when they faced trained, veteran troops, but did so when they rolled tank formations against barely trained teenagers in the Indian battalions.
The Japanese cannot "simply outflank" positions that can't be outflanked due to natural geography. 

The Johore position that was planned advocated by Dobbie and Simson would be anchored on either coast, and with defensive works established beforehand.
The British battalions were able to check the Japanese advance several times, but establishing defensive lines is hopeless if you can't depend on your supporting battalions to hold your flank.


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## parsifal (May 20, 2012)

nice map incidentally. Whats the simulation. is the one you were asking me about a couple of months ago. if so, any good?


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## Freebird (May 20, 2012)

parsifal said:


> nice map incidentally. Whats the simulation. is the one you were asking me about a couple of months ago. if so, any good?



Yes, it's "Singapore" from Strategy Tactics magazine.
Singapore | Board Game | BoardGameGeek




Sadly the combat system is crap.  The system uses "combat differental" so 5 attack vs 1 defence = +4, while 59 points Japanese attacking 50 defence strength would be (a much better) +9 attack... In any other system the first would be 5 to 1 attack while the second would be 1 to 1. 

Nice map though. 
I'm thinking to fix the CRT and try it out.

I also got the WITP Admiral's edition, but havn't had time to try it out yet


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## renrich (May 25, 2012)

The US and Britain were totally unprepared for the concept of naval warfare that Japan had developed and executed with Kido Butai and their ground forces did not cope well with the tactics of the Japanese Army in the PI and at Malaya and Java. The British were kicked out of Burma. Their lack of understanding about the new naval tactics shows with the Repulse, Prince of Wales debacle and Ceylon. The British may have had more army assets than the US but they were unable to break loose the splendid Australian and NZ troops to send them home and the US had to take over the defense of Australia.


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## Freebird (May 25, 2012)

renrich said:


> Their lack of understanding about the new naval tactics shows with the Repulse, Prince of Wales debacle and Ceylon.



Mostly agreed on your post Renrich.

The Admiralty was actually had a decent grasp of the concept, but was unfortunately over-ruled by Churchill on sending a proper fleet with carrier escort, and instead he pushed his idea of sending Force Z unsupported,  with the belief that Japan would be intimidated by this.  

I wouldn't categorize Ceylon so much as a "debacle", the Admiralty did the correct thing by withdrawing the fleet before an obviously superior force of Japanese carriers, it was unfortunate that the RN lost 3 valuable ships, the Cornwall (hastily pulled out of drydock) Dorsetshire (could have escaped, but sent back to accompany Cornwall) and Hermes (also withdrawn, but found by Japanese scouts without her air group, which had remained in Ceylon)

The correct thing to do would have been to withdraw Force Z until it could regroup with proper carrier support. 
But with Churchill convinced that battleships alone could face the Japanese fleet, the outcome was not likely to be a happy one.



renrich said:


> their ground forces did not cope well with the tactics of the Japanese Army in the PI and at Malaya and Java. The British were kicked out of Burma.
> 
> The British may have had more army assets than the US but they were unable to break loose the splendid Australian and NZ troops to send them home and the US had to take over the defense of Australia.



You might get a disagreement from Parsifal over the "US taking over the defence of Australia" 

My impression is that Churchill wanted to "have his cake and eat it too", by keeping the better ANZAC divisions in the MidEast, and basically sending a bucket of scraps to the Far East. Instead of heeding the advice of the professionals to send what was needed to begin with, they suffered defeats in both theaters as the Aussie divisions were hastily withdrawn anyways in early 1942.
This is much the same as what happened in early 1941, when he was warned against splitting the 8th Army up, (to fight in both Greece in the Desert) which resulted in defeats in both theaters 




renrich said:


> The US and Britain were totally unprepared for the concept of naval warfare that Japan had developed and executed with Kido Butai



Indeed, the concept of *carrier warfare *- the power of a 4 or 6 carrier punch would totally overwhelm either the US or British fleets had they faced them, and it wasn't until Midway where the US had 3 carrier (+ ground based assts) that they could equal the KB's 4 carriers

On the other hand, the concept of _*naval warfare *_developed by the British in the Med would carry over very well into the Pacific, especially given the lack of carriers available in 1941-1942. It involved hitting the enemy with your strengths, rather than let him exploit your weaknesses.

The methods used by the British in the first half of 1941 in the Med:

Night bombing attacks against Italian ports.
Night torpedo attacks against Axis warships freighters.
Aerial laying mines in enemy shipping routes
Sub attacks against enemy shipping.

The Italians had really no way to counter the night attacks as they lacked night fighters radar at the time, it was only with heavy attacks against Malta that stopped the threat of RAF night marauders.

This is what the British should have planned to use against the Japanese, rather than trying to match them in carrier aircraft. The Japanese were also lacking in radar NF, so had little chance to counter this kind of attack, unless they could neutralize *all* the airbases in Malaya, Sumatra Java.

Excerpt from "RAF in the Mediterranean 1940 - 1945"


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## Freebird (May 25, 2012)

parsifal said:


> Not all these condition existed for 25th flotilla in the south china sea. RN carriers could operate well clear of the coast, there were just 60 torpedo bombers and a few search planes, and just 25 fighters as escort . Brit carriers could operate with virtual impunity in those conditions. In December 1941, the Brits retained potent night strike capability (as demonstrated in their attacks against bismarck and the italian fleet). Time needed to be spent working up an Integrated TG to support the carriers...about 2 months would have been needed to integrate the fleet.
> 
> The best chance of retaining Malaya remains a naval solution, given the forces available to the japanese and thei other committments. problem of course is that the japs would probably deploy their carriers to intervene roughly D+30



There are two major problems here Parsifal:

First: is the same problem that Matador ran into - the British can't take any offensive action against Japan until Japan has attacked Thailand and/or the Allies, or else they risk losing US support if it's seen that Britain is the aggressor in the conflict.
The Foreign Office had warned that Japan might send a flottila of ciilian ships into the Gulf of Siam to try to provoke a conflict, so they really had no choice but to wait. So Force Z (with added air cover) is left either hanging around off of Kota Bharu and subject to attack, or else dispatched after Japan has already landed. (which is what happened)

Second: The British do not have prior knowledge of Pearl Harbor, so they would have to assume that all 6 Japanese fleet carriers are available either in the Philippine Sea, South China Sea and/or Gulf of Siam on D +0, not D + 30.

Also, there was no way to know how many bombers the Japanese have available, it could be 60 or 360.
Sending a fleet into the Gulf of Siam is not something that I woud risk, if there are better options available.

The best policy is to have the fleet operate with freindly ground air cover, and beyond the range of Japanese ground based fighters.
I would be more inclined to use the naval assets to block Japanese from gaining entry into the Celebes Sea and Makassar Strait, provided that there is enough air power to counter Japanese movement in the Gulf of Siam.


One question though: While the RN didn't use "deck park" in the Atlantic, the first British fleet carrier operating in the Pacific in late 1942 used deck park to bring capacity up to about 60 aircraft.
Was there any RN analysis of the concept in 1941, and could they have introduced US or Japanese style "deck park" at that time?


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## JoeB (May 26, 2012)

Sending British carriers v the Japanese in 41-early 42 would have been just multiplying the same historical error of underestimating the Japanese compared to the Italo-Germans. This was a problem in US and British approach to the Japanese, and it's telling that the same mentality is still prevalent in some people so long after.

Besides the successes of RN carriers well beyond the range of enemy landbased fighters (the role the RN had mainly conteplated for them pre-war), they also had some success marginally within the range of such a/c in the Med. But marginally. Early on, RN carriers operated in areas where *good interservice coordination by the Italians* would have made it too dangerous, but that cooperation didn't exist. A bit later, the dedicated German anti-ship strike units demonstrated the vulnerability of carriers (eg. Illustrious) that close to land based air which the carriers had no power to suppress, but those German units still didn't have strong or well coordinated single engine fighter support. Later still, Italo-German strike units supported on paper by large single engine fighter contigents sometimes failed against British convoys covered by carriers (most importantly in Pedestal in August 1942). But in reality the short range of the single engine fighters and again only partial coordination meant that the escorts hardly in fact interfered with the small FAA fighter contingents. And, on average Italo-German antishipping a/c were simply far less effective per unit than IJN ones of late '41-early '42. The best German and Italian units were on a par, but there was lots of 'filler' of Italian, and German as well, bomber units which had quite low hit %'s v ships even after getting past fighters, as compared to JNAF units, even as shown v the RN (so it's not a question of USN ships being easier to hit or less able to defend themselves with AA).

Aggressively committing the available RN carriers to the FE in earl '42, absent coordination with the USN carrier force (which is an interesting what if) would highly likely have meant simply losing them. The limited number of ships and small fighter contingents, partly of obsolete types like the Fulmar (as far as fighter combat, at least) were simply not enough to effectively defend them against the JNAF level of anti-ship capability and long range single engine fighter escort capability. 

Anyway, Japanese interference with British sea lines of communiction into Singapore only became really serious after the land battle in Malaya was already essentially lost. The British forces on the ground suffered no more, if even as much, from lack of resupply as the IJA force during the critical phase of the land campaign. OTOH RN naval success great enough to cut the IJA's supplies would have meant operation in the Gulf of Thailand much too close to too-strong contigents of highly capable Japanese land based anti-ship a/c, w/ the main Japanese carrier force also free to intervene as the campaign progressed (it wasn't doing anything else critical after returning from Hawaii). And in that period of the war Allied codebreaking was not right on top of IJN major units' locations most of the time, either.

Joe


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## renrich (May 26, 2012)

The IJN not only decided that a massive strike by multiple carriers was a good tactic but they trained so that the strikes were all coordinated so that the four or six carriers operated like one. The USN had not learned that by Midway and they were fortunate that they got away with the lousy coordination of strikes at that battle. Hornet was hopeless from deck spot through launch and from there on out. Enterprise spotted wrong but at least sent them in roughly the correct direction. Yorktown at least did it's job but none of the carriers acted as if there were any other American carriers in the vicinity. They made the same mistakes at Coral Sea. I don't believe the RN was any better at that concept or doctrine.

I don't mean to say that the US was totally responsible for the defense of Australia or NZ but I believe they sent troops there to form a garrison because the Aussie and Kiwi guys were too heavily involved in N Africa. The USN at Coral Sea frustrated the Japanese attempt to take Port Moresby which would given them the opportunity to interdict supply lines to Australia and their previous raid on Lae and Salamauwea (sp?) helped in that regard.

Doing battle with the Italian Navy in the Med was a whole different kettle of fish than trying on the IJN in the Pacific in 1941-42.


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## buffnut453 (May 26, 2012)

renrich said:


> I don't mean to say that the US was totally responsible for the defense of Australia or NZ but I believe they sent troops there to form a garrison because the Aussie and Kiwi guys were too heavily involved in N Africa.



The fact that Australia was the logical starting/staging point for any forces moving north to engage the Japanese in New Guinea has nothing to do with it. And of course the 30,000 Australian troops committed to the Kokoda Campaign and the predominance of Australian forces in the battle for Milne Bay are clear evidence that Australia couldn't defend itself?


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## parsifal (May 26, 2012)

freebird said:


> There are two major problems here Parsifal:
> 
> First: is the same problem that Matador ran into - the British can't take any offensive action against Japan until Japan has attacked Thailand and/or the Allies, or else they risk losing US support if it's seen that Britain is the aggressor in the conflict.
> The Foreign Office had warned that Japan might send a flottila of ciilian ships into the Gulf of Siam to try to provoke a conflict, so they really had no choice but to wait. So Force Z (with added air cover) is left either hanging around off of Kota Bharu and subject to attack, or else dispatched after Japan has already landed. (which is what happened)
> ...



Wasnt envisaging ny movement before December 8th. Historically Force z made steam 1930 hrs December 8th and were sunk December 10. The japanese began their landings December 8 at 2200 hrs and were still unloading 3 days later. in fact supplies continued to be shipped to Singora and khota throughout the campaign. There was no hurry for Force Z, why would there be more hurry for a carrier TG? The carriers could hit the beaches 200 miles short of the target, out of range of the Zeroes. British carrier strike a/c had already proven their ability to hit and sink shipping. I still think this was the japanese achilles heel .

the japanese thought so too. in response to the threat presented by Force Z they mobilized the whole of 22 air Flotilla.....60 strike a/c and 25 lr fighters of the special detachment yawata....not exactly overwhelming force, but all they could spare. They also had steaming south on an intercept course 2 Kongo class BCs and 8 cruisers (4 of them CAs), and about 24 DDs (6 flotillas). against this kind of force only a balanced TF with its own intrinsic aircover would have worked.

Allied Intell had a fairly accurate idea of japanese strength actually....thats why they could estimate forces needed to counter the threat.


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## parsifal (May 26, 2012)

> Sending British carriers v the Japanese in 41-early 42 would have been just multiplying the same historical error of underestimating the Japanese compared to the Italo-Germans. This was a problem in US and British approach to the Japanese, and it's telling that the same mentality is still prevalent in some people so long after


.

against the cutting edge first line carriers, I would agree. Against the forces that were available in indochina to opoose the british, i do not agree. matsunaga had at his disposal 22 air flottilla, a force of about 100 a/c, with no more than 30 lr fighters. The Brit carriers in the med were routinely opposed by 4-800 land based aircraft in that period. Sometimes there were setbacks, sometimes there were successes. Their opponents were good at their jobs...not as good as the japanese but much more numerous in number. 




> Besides the successes of RN carriers well beyond the range of enemy landbased fighters (the role the RN had mainly conteplated for them pre-war), they also had some success marginally within the range of such a/c in the Med.





Sorry but this is just plain wrong. the attacks on taranto required closure to less than 80 miles of the enemy coast and result4ed in the most succesful carrier strikes of the war (15 a/c sank or disabled 3 battleships, that a far better return rate for the ordinance expended including the japanese...plus it was done at night....)

Moreover, this was not an isolated incident. From memory there were 22 contested convoys through to the end of 1942, most of them opposed by mixed german -italian forces. counting the numbers of enemy a/c destrroyed is such a typically Ameican way of judging the success of these operations. And completely wrong. the critical issue was the interdiction of the axis lines of communication, and the key to that was getting supplies to malata, and the key to that was providing aircover ....to disrupt the axis attacks, not go jaunting off shooting down enemy a/c. 

Operation of british carriers in range of enemy a/c was not an isolated event. it was almost routine ....and unlike the jaunts of the US carriers in the Pacific, critical to the outcome of the war. 




> But marginally. Early on, RN carriers operated in areas where *good interservice coordination by the Italians* would have made it too dangerous, but that cooperation didn't exist. A bit later, the dedicated German anti-ship strike units demonstrated the vulnerability of carriers (eg. Illustrious) that close to land based air which the carriers had no power to suppress, but those German units still didn't have strong or well coordinated single engine fighter support.



The italian flet suffered from a lack of proper air support, and an inability to fight at night. that made it a fleet of limited capability. The german anti-shipping forces were highly trained and dedicated to the purpose, and far more numerous than the japanese off malaya in 1941. They were in the TO from january 1941. The Italians after a slow start developed their torpedo groups to a competent standard as well. British carriers did have some setbacks against them, but their success far outnumbered the failures. Moreover, the japanese forces in the TO were far more limited than those ranged against the british in the far east in 1941. typically British carriers were battling 500-1000aircraft....the japanese could field about 100 in this hypothetical. 




> Later still, Italo-German strike units supported on paper by large single engine fighter contigents sometimes failed against British convoys covered by carriers (most importantly in Pedestal in August 1942). But in reality the short range of the single engine fighters and again only partial coordination meant that the escorts hardly in fact interfered with the small FAA fighter contingents. And, on average Italo-German antishipping a/c were simply far less effective per unit than IJN ones of late '41-early '42. The best German and Italian units were on a par, but there was lots of 'filler' of Italian, and German as well, bomber units which had quite low hit %'s v ships even after getting past fighters, as compared to JNAF units, even as shown v the RN (so it's not a question of USN ships being easier to hit or less able to defend themselves with AA).




Kind of agree, but in order for the japanese aircrews to be considered a greater threat than the italo germn forces in 1941, they would need to be about 10 times more efficient. seems hardly possible.

with regard to aircover...matsunaga could count on just 25 Zeroes which in any case were tasked with flying aircover over their own forces initially. That means the 60 or so bettys and nells are ranged against 100+ RN fighters and fighter bombers (remember the parameters of my variant)



> Aggressively committing the available RN carriers to the FE in earl '42, absent coordination with the USN carrier force (which is an interesting what if) would highly likely have meant simply losing them. The limited number of ships and small fighter contingents, partly of obsolete types like the Fulmar (as far as fighter combat, at least) were simply not enough to effectively defend them against the JNAF level of anti-ship capability and long range single engine fighter escort capability.




Why...there are no 1st line japanese carriers within a range of about 3000 miles in 1941, and an anti-shipping force amounting to less than 100 a/c.


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## parsifal (May 27, 2012)

Just to give some examples of the perspective of British CAG effectiveness in 1941-2. The first arctic convoys provided with Carrier escort apart from the distant cover provided by Victorious in 1941-2, was by CVE HMS Avenger, which provided cover to PQ18 and the return convoy. These convoys involved 39 merchantmen, 6 cruisers (4 CA, 1 CL 1 CLAA) 20 DD, 2 armed merchant aa ships, 4 corvettes 3 minesweepers and 4 armed trawlers. Avenger had by this time 12 sea hurricanes and 3 swordfish.

Against them LF 5 could muster over 110 aircraft. Mostly Ju88 and He 111s, with some Me 110s as well. Avengers CAG was nrew, and inexperienced, compared to the experience of the big carriers 

The following figures are comiled from post war verified sources, They arenot based on claims....

First combat occurred September 12 and 13 . Two shadowers were shot down. The first maassed attacksd occurred September 13, with German patrols dropping bombs from altitude. No hits, no losses. 90 minutes later the convoy was attacked by the first of three massed attacks that day. 55 He111s armed with two torpedoes each delivered determined attacks, pressed home to point blank range. 8 merchantment were hit and sunk. AA fire is believed to have shot down 5 attackers, whilst the CAP accounted for 3 a/c according to the Germans. 

An hour later about 30 a/c hit again. This time the CAP was better used and no attacks were completed. 3 more a/c were shot down. An hour later again, and about 20 aircraft struck again. None of these attackers could penetrate the CAP, all were turned away more than 20 miles from the convoy. 

U-Boats sank one merchantman that night. The Swordfish that night, using their ASV radar and working with one of th4e DDs sankone of the atacking U-Boats that night. 

Air battle resumed at noon the next day when a strike of 20+ bandits were detected (actually according to the Germans the strike was launched with 37 attack a/c). Avenger scrambled 6 fighters in what is still a record for a CVE....Early warning had been hampered by the zero altitude approach of the attackers. The attackers split into two groups, half attacking the convoy, the other half attacking the carrier. The strikes included 16 dive bombers, and anvil attacks were employed. 

The CAP shot down 8 enemy panes, with the flak accounting for 5 more. Whilst attacks on the targets were made, none found their mark, and the Avengers ships log notes how the fighters doggedly pursued their tartgets even within the flak zones. Ther arent many aviators that can claim that level of determination.

A second strike follwed 45 minutes after the first....too quickly for the airborne CAP from the first strikes to remain. There were 26 strike aircraft, all torpedo planes, and all concentrating on the Avenger. 4 fighters were airborne, but this time there was more warning, and another 6 scrambled to join in the defence. Some Ju88s peeled off to attack the convoy and sank one ship, 3 fighters were lost to friendly fire as they again followed the germans into the flak zone. There were no hits on the carrier. 

Later tht afternoon the Germans delivered their last strike of the day at medium altitude, bombing through the cloud cover. totally innefective of course. 

Next day the cloud cover persisted. This time 50 a/c were involved in the bombing effort, no results were obtained. 

There was no further significant air activity until the 18th, though the Swordfish assisted in the sinking of two further U-Boats. On the 18th there was one final attack, resulting in the los of another merchantmen, bu the germans also lost 5 a/c to the CAP and 3 to the flak.

The British Carrier lost five a/c in exchange for downing 41 attackers (about half by flak)., I fail to see how that effort cannot compare in terms of its effectiveness to the very best efforts by the USN at that time, or that somehow, mystically the Japanese could sink the British carriers easily, but not get a glove to the USN carriers. It doesnt make sense, because it is a notion based on fantasy. British carriers were very effective at operating in disputed waters, moreso in early 1942 than the USN, when the aircraft numbers are taken into account. It was numbers, not ability that was the killer for the RN


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## Glider (May 27, 2012)

First class post Parsival. I think its also worth remembering that the mistakes of PQ18 were studied and changes made namely the importance of having 2 x CVE with the convoy. It also reminds everyone that the RN AA fire wasn't as impotent as many people believe and in this period was probably as good, if not better, than any other navy


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## Freebird (May 28, 2012)

JoeB said:


> Aggressively committing the available RN carriers to the FE in earl '42, absent coordination with the USN carrier force (which is an interesting what if) would highly likely have meant simply losing them. The limited number of ships and small fighter contingents, partly of obsolete types like the Fulmar (as far as fighter combat, at least) were simply not enough to effectively defend them against the JNAF level of anti-ship capability and long range single engine fighter escort capability.
> 
> Joe



I tend to agree with Joe on this, considering that the British could send at most perhaps one modern carrier and one smaller one, it isn't going to be enough to take on a significant Japanese force.

If the Admiralty had postponed the refit of the HMS Furious for a couple of months (say, from Oct to Dec/Jan), I could see them sending HMS Victorious and perhaps HMS Eagle to the Far East in Oct/Nov 1941.
That would leave Furious, Argos Ark Royal in the N. Atlantic until the return of the Illustrious Formidable, with Hermes probably sent to patrol the S. Atlantic.

The best course of action after the Japanese landings would indeed be to propose a joint effort with the US, 3 British carriers with 1 or 2 US carriers would be a decent force, and still leaves 2 or 3 US carriers as a Central Pacific force. The best course of action might be to try to draw the Japanese carriers into range of shore based air units, and try for a night strike.


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## buffnut453 (May 28, 2012)

parsifal said:


> .Why...there are no 1st line japanese carriers within a range of about 3000 miles in 1941, and an anti-shipping force amounting to less than 100 a/c.



But that wasn't known at the time. Even during the fighting, inaccurate reporting often led to over-estimation of the IJN forces available, for example:

9 Dec: 1 battleship, 2 cruisers and 7 destroyers sighted off Kota Bharu
14 Dec: Information received that an enemy convoy of 140 ships (including 100 transports and one or two aircraft carriers) has been sighted off the coast of Indochina heading SSW.
18 Dec: A reconnaissance was made 250 miles east of Singapore to search for an enemy aircraft carrier. Glenn Martins operating from Sinkawang reconnoitred the Miri area for Japanese Naval forces. Six aircraft attacked from 14,000ft. A direct hit and a near miss were scored on a cruiser and 2 near misses on a large transport vessel thought to be a seaplane or aircraft carrier.

for some time, AHQFE refused to believe that the Japanese fighters achieving such success over northern Malaya were land-based.


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## renrich (May 28, 2012)

On December 7 , 1941, a large portion of the Australian Army, the Second Australian Imperial Force, was overseas fighting for the UK. Australia had a negligible Navy and Air Force. The SAIF was brought home to defend the home country but the US had to supply most of the air and naval forces to defend Australia. The US also sent ground forces to Australia. Without air and naval forces, Australia would have been difficult to defend if the Japanese had decided to invade and without air and naval forces New Guinea would have undoubtedly fallen allowing the Japanese to interdict supply lines to Australia.


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## parsifal (May 31, 2012)

renrich said:


> On December 7 , 1941, a large portion of the Australian Army, the Second Australian Imperial Force, was overseas fighting for the UK. Australia had a negligible Navy and Air Force. The SAIF was brought home to defend the home country but the US had to supply most of the air and naval forces to defend Australia. The US also sent ground forces to Australia. Without air and naval forces, Australia would have been difficult to defend if the Japanese had decided to invade and without air and naval forces New Guinea would have undoubtedly fallen allowing the Japanese to interdict supply lines to Australia.



There are a few serous factual errors that need to be corrected, before we can move on.

The US in the South pacific only ever committed very limited numbers of ground troops, and until they were properly trained and acclimatized, were found to be of very limited value in any offensive role. 41st US infantry division was committed from November 1942, in the buna fighting, and fell apart so badly they had to be withdrawn. 2 Marine was of course engaged on Guadacanal, but were essentially on the defensive for most of the time. many argue that the americans never got the hang of the jungle fighting in PNG, and I tend to agree. they relied on the "wither on the vine" strategy, which was essentially to take key points held weakly and bypass more heavily defended areas. The trouble with that is that bypassed garrisons still needed to be contained and defeated , which the americans were forced to rely on their allies to do .....

Even if for some reason people dont want to accept that the US Army was lacking in its ability to fight in the Jungle, it was always the junior partner in terms of numbers. The Australian army was still fielding about 450000 frontline troops to the TO, compared to less than 150000 US troops. It was a very similar story in terms of land based air. In terms of naval resources, the heavy ships were almost exclusively American, as were the supply trains, but the lighter ASW forces were mostly Australian.

In the context of the japanese offensive period, until coral sea and Midway, the US contribution to the defence of australia was decidedly minimal. And the AIF had returned by April 1942.

Its a source of constant amazement to me how both the american and British members of this forum can claim, with a complete straight face, how their respective armed forces "knew" how to defeat the japanese in the Jungle. they didnt. for the British, they needed Wingate and slim to develop the necessary skills, whilst for the Americans, it was Eichelbirger who worked out the techniques for the americans


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## parsifal (May 31, 2012)

> But that wasn't known at the time. Even during the fighting, inaccurate reporting often led to over-estimation of the IJN forces available


, 


Have disagree. Just prior to the Dow the British had a clear picture of the naval forces committed. british intell in the months prior to the attack had a very accurate estimate of the strength ranged against them. What was badly estimated was the quality of that force. Plus, I will admit the British simply refused to consider some pieces of intelligence handed to them. ]


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## parsifal (May 31, 2012)

> I tend to agree with Joe on this, considering that the British could send at most perhaps one modern carrier and one smaller one, it isn't going to be enough to take on a significant Japanese force


.

Joes position was that British carriers were marginal and could not defend themselves properly. that is a complete fabrication, based on the limited victories achieved by the FAA. Compounding the situation in the far east was the over-extension of the RN after they must have known what was coming, and after they had promised to send a substantial fleet to singapore. It also completely fails to take into account the extremely limited numbers of anti-shipping types available, known to the british, but for some reason not being acknowledged in this discussion. Even Fulmars against Nells would have highly effective

Consider if the brits had not engaged in greece or Crete, and had withdrawn Fce H around June or July 1941, so as to meet the committments they had made to defence in the far east. That would have given them Ark Royal Formidable and possibly ilustrious and Victorious in a pinch. It would have been better to retain Furious, Eagle, hermes argus and the three escort carriers in home waters because of range and speed considerations. 

Without prior preprations the plan wont work. More pilots, Sea hurricanes were needed 

The best course of action after the Japanese landings would indeed be to propose a joint effort with the US, 3 British carriers with 1 or 2 US carriers would be a decent force, and still leaves 2 or 3 US carriers as a Central Pacific force. The best course of action might be to try to draw the Japanese carriers into range of shore based air units, and try for a night strike.


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## renrich (May 31, 2012)

The fact remains that if the USN had not stopped the Japanese at Coral Sea and decimated the Kido Butai at Midway in 1942, the Japanese had designs on Australia and if there were no invasion plans carried out they could and probably would have isolated Australia and made it very difficult for outside help to get through. The USAAF played the major role in obtaining air superiority in the New Guinea campaign. I never said the US learned to outdo the Japanese in jungle fighting and I question how much good Wingate did for the overall war effort cavorting around in the jungle in Burma. Slim was the owner of most of the success there and in India.


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## Glider (May 31, 2012)

I do sometimes wonder as to how well the Japanese would have done had they landed in Australia. Its a huge country with vast distances between the major cities and precious little infrastructure between them. They were already stretched by prior commitments and were probably the least mechanised army in the war. It is quite probable that they may have been able to take say Darwin, but to move out from there by land or sea could easily stretch them to breaking point.

The Janese Navy was very efficient but it wasn't that large and to try and Isolate Australia would probably been too much.


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## parsifal (Jun 1, 2012)

renrich said:


> The fact remains that if the USN had not stopped the Japanese at Coral Sea and decimated the Kido Butai at Midway in 1942, the Japanese had designs on Australia and if there were no invasion plans carried out they could and probably would have isolated Australia and made it very difficult for outside help to get through. The USAAF played the major role in obtaining air superiority in the New Guinea campaign. I never said the US learned to outdo the Japanese in jungle fighting and I question how much good Wingate did for the overall war effort cavorting around in the jungle in Burma. Slim was the owner of most of the success there and in India.



no argument that it was american naval and airpower that turned the tide on the japanese. I also have no argument that the US ground forces after 1943 were the spearhead of the Allied counteroffensive, for which the japanese had no answer. 

It is also true that if the naval battles of 1942 had been lost, the road back to victory would have been much longer, perhaps to the point of being prohibitive. Japan may well have achieved her war aims....a negotiated peace, if she had had two or three years of relative quiet on her frontiers because the Allies had lost these naval enagaements. 

However it is simply untue that these battles stopped any massive or impending Japanese offensives either in the direction of Hawaii or Australia. Both were well beyond her shipping capacities, and in the case of the the invasion of Australia, well beyond any troop availabilitities or land based logisitics. Moreover the japanese had already decided that by the beginning of April 1942. At their Imperial conference in early April, the Army had steafastly refused to provide the additional 10 divisions they thought was needed. there were other reports that made quite clear they thought it impopssible for them to gather the necessary land transport. The Navy estimated they needed an additional 2 million tons of shipping which they simply did not have. Without any significant setbacks, the Japanese had already concluded they could not undertake either the invasion of Hawaii or Australia with the resources at their disposal. Neither could they invade India or Ceylon.

However, what they were confronted with was an outstanding first phase in their offensive. They had achieved all that they had set out to do, at a fraction of the cost they had thought would be needed, and in a time frame that was about 6 months ahead of what they had estimated would be required. These easy victories made them over confident, and dismissive of the allies. However, the expected negotiated peace still evaded them, so reasons for that had to be found, and some way found to force the allies to the negotiating table. The chief threats were thought to be the threat from Australia, and the repeated raids by the USN on their eastern flank. Yamamoto determined that what was required to force the issue was a decisive battle, which led to midway, and a new limited offensive into the south west pacific, designed to isolate Australia. Coral sea (and Midway) helped to thwart that, though it was still up to the land forces to stop a more gradual occupation of Port Moresby, Milne bay, and beyond that (ie projected); espiritu, noumea and fiji). 

The best way of describing the importance of the naval victories of 1942 were not that they defeated the japanese, or that they saved australia. They did not. What they did do was was to avert defeat, and blunt the final Japanese offensives that may have forced a negotiated peace settlement, or created the opportunity to establish fixed fortified lines of defence, difficult to breach.


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## parsifal (Jun 1, 2012)

> The USAAF played the major role in obtaining air superiority in the New Guinea campaign



Not on the basis of sorties flown in New Guinea. The USAAC always remained very much the junior partner in this regard, though i will concede it was US equipment in both the RAAF and the USAAC. RAAF was flying about twice as many sorties as the USAAC in new Guinea, though the USN made some impact earlier on. In the Solomons (a different TO by that time, it was a different kettle of fish, this was almost exclusively a US run affair, so perhaps you are referring to the SoPac rather than SWPac. 



> I never said the US learned to outdo the Japanese in jungle fighting



I know and acknowledge that. however the forces committed by the US, early as they were, were also totally unready for any sort of offensive combat until 1943. Eventually the US did field very good jungle warfare units, superior in every respect to the Japanese forces but only in very limited numbers...perhaps 2 or 3 RCTs for New Guinea, and latterly only used in Macs island hopping strategy. A really good example of this sort of selective contribution was the Nadzab airborn drop. as part of the Markh landing by 9 Aus. A full battery of Australian artillery was detailed as part of the airborne operation. The only part of the operation that was american was the 503 parachute Bn and the transport command that converyed them. But these troops fought very well in the jungle.... 



> and I question how much good Wingate did for the overall war effort cavorting around in the jungle in Burma. Slim was the owner of most of the success there and in India.




And that places you in the same boat as these guys that are claiming that the Argyll and Sutherlanders knew about how to fight in the jungle, and therefore the british Army also knew how to fight in the Jungle. Brilliant as he was, Slim and indeed the army that he was part of, had no idea of how to fight the Japanese in the Jungle, until after Wingate showed them how. Slim was still sending troops into the Jungle with 90 lb packs on their backs, still issueing steel capped hobnail boots as jungle kit, still thought armour could not operate in the jungle, still would go to water whenever his flanks were threatened until after wingate demnstrated in spades what could be done.


"_Orde Wingate was a British general in World War Two who helped to revolutionise the way war could be fought in the jungle. Orde Wingate was by any standards unconventional but his impact in the war in the Far East should not be underestimated - neither should the part played by his Chindits. 

In May 1942, Wingate was sent to Burma where he formed 'Wingate's Raiders' - though they are better known as the Chindits, named after the Burmese word 'chinthe' meaning lions; after the lion statues that guarded the temples in Burma. General Wavell, Commander-In-Chief, India, already knew about Wingate as he had come near to court-martialing him for insubordination when General-Officer Commanding the Middle East. Wingate arrived as a major but was quickly promoted to colonel.

This group was to cause chaos to the Japanese behind their lines. They used classic hit-and-run tactics against the Japanese who up to 1942, had only really experienced military success. Now they had to fight an enemy they could not see. The Chindits were especially successful along the Irrawaddy River where they caused a great deal of damage to Japanese supply lines. The Chindits also sent information back to the Royal Air Force to assist their operations. This unit did a great deal to weaken the Japanese force that was in Burma and its work continued even after Orde Wingate was killed in a plane crash in April 1944.

"Wingate saw himself as a boot up the backside of Man. The fact that most of his ideas ran directly against those of his superiors did not worry him in the slightest." 

(Arthur Swinson)"_

The main contribution of Wingate was his unconventional tactics....dont worry about flanks and rely n air supply for logistics. His actual material achievements are limited as you say, but his impact on strategic thinking throughout the 14th Army were nothing short of revolutionary.....


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## renrich (Jun 1, 2012)

Well, I have read a number of books about Wingate and the Chindits as well as Merrill's Marauders and it makes interesting and exciting reading but I believe that a number of historians and commanders of Allied forces believe that those escapades were mainly a waste of good men, materiel and mules. One of the best, from a personal point of view is "The Road Past Mandalay" by John Masters. A good read.

I certainly agree that, even if the Japanese had tried to invade and conquer Australia, even without any interference from US forces, they would have failed. Perhaps, under favorable circumstances they could have occupied Darwin and perhaps Brisbane but probably could not have held on long there.

From memory, I think Masters was the son of an officer in the Indian Army, a Brit of course. Masters went to the military academy in India and in WW2 was an officer in a Ghurka outfit. He served in the Middle East and then in the Chindits. I believe at the end he was the adjutant for the CO of the Chindits after Wingate was killed. If memory serves there were only around 1500 Chindits left on their feet and a medical team was sent in to see how many were fit for duty. Only a dozen or so were adjudged fit. Masters was on a leave when the atom bomb was dropped. He became a novelist and several of his books were made into movies. He had moved to the US and lived in the Wind River Mountains in Wyoming. Later he moved to Santa Fe and died there a few years ago. An exciting lfe.


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## yulzari (Jun 8, 2012)

In no order of significance.

Were the Japanese not responsible for the loss of Singapore?

Singapore itself was an indefensible self governing prison camp without control of the other side of the Johore Straits. Perhaps a more (pedantically) accurate title would be the Loss of Malaya?

Given the mindsets of the troops and unit commanders, could the British strategy, when unable to contain the Japanese assault, not have been to deliberately choose to give up the peninsula and concentrate at the south with a view to bringing the Japanese to battle on British terms?


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Jun 11, 2012)

Hey guys, hope you don't mind if I put some more life into this thread. I have with my my senior thesis, which researched the Battle of Singapore. Feel free to critique it, and I hope it opens new avenues of discussion.
View attachment Final Copy to professors.zip


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