# Most successful Allied fighter in the MTO



## bob44 (Apr 23, 2013)

What were the more successful Allied fighters in the MTO? Which Allied fighter shot down the most Axis fighters in air combat in the MTO during 1942-43?


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## CobberKane (Apr 23, 2013)

That's a goody. Kills and losses aside, I'm going to put in a plug for the P-40, in both British and US use. It was often outclassed in the air and took heavy losses, but it also took a heavy toll on the opposition, did well in ground attack, was tough, cheap, available and most important of all was easy to service and repair in lousy conditions an absolutely vital quality in North Africa


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## redcoat (Apr 23, 2013)

Almost certainly the Supermarine Spitfire, which saw widespread service in the Med from early 1942 with both the RAF and USAAF.


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## drgondog (Apr 23, 2013)

That is a difficult question. The US flew and fought with P-39, P-40, Spit IX, P-47, P-38 and P-51. The Commonwealth/RAF flew Hurricanes and Spits.

The choice has to narrow down to P-38 (1431 - US), P-40 (592 -US) and Spit (364 -US). 
So, the RAF/Commonwealth credits for P-40 has to exceed 839 or the Spit has to exceed 1036 to exceed the P-38.

I would put my money on the Spit.


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## vikingBerserker (Apr 23, 2013)

I have to agree, I lean more towards the Spitfire myself.


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## Njaco (Apr 23, 2013)

I'll go with the P-40. It held the line until better planes like the Spitfire could be effective. Besides the PTO, this is where the Warhawk, etc, made its name.

Once the Allies controlled NA I would give it to the P-38. Spitfire was very good but I don't think it made its reputation here as much as it did in the ETO so - to me - its up to other types to shine.


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## vinnye (Apr 23, 2013)

You can put a very strong argument for the Warhawk / Kittyhawk, and the Hurricane - they did a holding job until the Spitfire was available to change the game.
So for me - the Spitfire - especially those on Malta.


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## davebender (Apr 23, 2013)

When Ike commanded in the Med his personal B-17 was normally escorted by Spitfires. So it appears the theater commander considered Spitfires to be his best fighter aircraft.


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## FLYBOYJ (Apr 23, 2013)

All did well, but the spit gets my vote - one word - Malta!


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## Jabberwocky (Apr 23, 2013)

I'd also say the Spitfire was the highest scoring aircraft in the MTO in 1942 and 1943. It played a major role for the USAAF and was the main fighter type for the RAF in theatre from early 1943.

Six squadrons of Spitfire Mk V pilots claimed a little over 640 kills over Malta in 1942 alone. They continued to claim through 1943, although at a much lower rate.

Spitfires first flew combat missions with the Western Desert Air Force from August 1942. By June 1943, there were 18 Spitfire squadrons, outnumbering the DAF's remaining Kittyhawk and Hurricane squadrons.


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## nuuumannn (Apr 23, 2013)

> All did well, but the spit gets my vote - one word - Malta!



Agreed. Spitfire Mk.V changed the situation over Malta and had a big impact over Tunisia.


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## redcoat (Apr 24, 2013)

Jabberwocky said:


> I'd also say the Spitfire was the highest scoring aircraft in the MTO in 1942 and 1943. It played a major role for the USAAF and was the main fighter type for the RAF in theatre from early 1943.
> 
> Six squadrons of Spitfire Mk V pilots claimed a little over 640 kills over Malta in 1942 alone. They continued to claim through 1943, although at a much lower rate.
> 
> Spitfires first flew combat missions with the Western Desert Air Force from August 1942. By June 1943, there were 18 Spitfire squadrons, outnumbering the DAF's remaining Kittyhawk and Hurricane squadrons.


According to the Osprey book, Spitfire Aces Of North Africa and Italy, 61 pilots became aces while flying Spitfires in these two theaters and a further 76 aces scored some of their kills while flying Spitfires in these areas (the figures don't include the Malta aces).


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## bob44 (Apr 24, 2013)

Great information. The Spitfire is looking pretty good.


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## MacArther (Apr 24, 2013)

Spitfire for sure...although my love of the P-40 makes me want to plug it as an awesome fighter, I know a lost battle when I see one. Really, the Hurricane and P-40 were great planes when flown by good to exceptional pilots (A South African going from Biplanes to Hurricanes and doubling his score comes to mind).


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## Readie (Apr 25, 2013)

How about another plane?

The Beaufighter...
In the Mediterranean, the USAAF's 414th, 415th, 416th and 417th Night Fighter Squadrons received 100 Beaufighters in the summer of 1943, achieving their first victory in July 1943. Through the summer the squadrons conducted both daytime convoy escort and ground-attack operations, but primarily flew defensive interception missions at night. Although the Northrop P-61 Black Widow fighter began to arrive in December 1944, USAAF Beaufighters continued to fly night operations in Italy and France until late in the war.

Not bad for a (very) heavy fighter.

Cheers
John


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## Jabberwocky (Apr 25, 2013)

Readie said:


> How about another plane?
> 
> The Beaufighter...
> In the Mediterranean, the USAAF's 414th, 415th, 416th and 417th Night Fighter Squadrons received 100 Beaufighters in the summer of 1943, achieving their first victory in July 1943. Through the summer the squadrons conducted both daytime convoy escort and ground-attack operations, but primarily flew defensive interception missions at night. Although the Northrop P-61 Black Widow fighter began to arrive in December 1944, USAAF Beaufighters continued to fly night operations in Italy and France until late in the war.
> ...



RAF scored about 400 night fighter victories with the Beaufighter in the MTO, while the USAAF scored about 35.


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## MikeGazdik (Apr 25, 2013)

Well, I think the question is somewhat open until someone can post the kill numbers of RAF Spitfires and Hawks. The question seems to be two part, specifically in 42-43, and then maybe overall? I would bet the Spit certainly in the first time frame, but maybe by a squeaker the P-38 overall??


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## stona (Apr 27, 2013)

In the ETO/MTO combined The P-38 flew 129,849 sorties, shooting down 1,771 enemy aircraft for a loss of 1,758. I believe, but can't confirm at the moment, that the P-38s worst figures were in the MTO.
That's a lot of aircraft destroyed but it is also a lot of losses (the P-51 had a kill ratio almost double that). It would depend how exactly you define successful.
Cheers
Steve


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## drgondog (Apr 27, 2013)

stona said:


> In the ETO/MTO combined The P-38 flew 129,849 sorties, shooting down 1,771 enemy aircraft for a loss of 1,758. I believe, but can't confirm at the moment, that the P-38s worst figures were in the MTO.
> That's a lot of aircraft destroyed but it is also a lot of losses (the P-51 had a kill ratio almost double that). It would depend how exactly you define successful.
> Cheers
> Steve



The ETO victory credits for P-38 were 452, 1431 in MTO
The ETO victory credits for P-51 (US only) were 4175 and 1061 for MTO 
Total - 1883 for P-38 and 5236 for P-51 (air - US only) for 2.78:1 ratio in favor of P-51. The Mustang destroyed more than all the P-47 and P-38 air credits combined. ... and far more ground credits.


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## redcoat (Apr 27, 2013)

MikeGazdik said:


> Well, I think the question is somewhat open until someone can post the kill numbers of RAF Spitfires and Hawks. The question seems to be two part, specifically in 42-43, and then maybe overall? I would bet the Spit certainly in the first time frame, but maybe by a squeaker the P-38 overall??


I haven't found the figure for the total numbers of Spitfire claims in the MTO yet, but if we look at the Spitfire claim figures we have come across so far in this thread, 640 for Malta based Spitfires in 1942 alone, plus 346 victories by the USAAF in this theatre while flying the Spitfire (the vast majority before 1944) =986, it means that the 16 RAF squadrons who operated the Spitfire in North Africa and Italy only needed to score a further 446 victories to exceed the P-38's score in the MTO.


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## Glider (Apr 27, 2013)

Success is one of those things that we all get sucked into measuring by losses and claims. However it is other almost unmeasurable things that contribute to success. From the day the Spitfire arrived in the Desert airforces losses of all types fell quickly. Not because the Spit suddenly incurred huge losses on the Axis airforces, but because the Axis airforces became far more cautious about attacking, in case the Spitfires were around as cover. 

In Fighters over Tunisia a number of Allied fighter pilots (incl USAAF) were asked what were the best fighters in the Med and they all put the Spit IX first, The SPit V and P38 second depending on the task long or short range and no one said the P40 or Hurricane.


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## oldcrowcv63 (Apr 27, 2013)

I am in a state of shock. To have seen Readie vote for anything but the Spit has left me speechless. Wonders never cease. My vote for the Spitfire. Don't know the ETO/MTO very well, but it appears that the USAAF fighter of choice (for both Ike and the guys wearing silk scarves) in the early going was not a domestic mount. That seems to say volumes.


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## Sid327 (May 17, 2013)

Readie said:


> How about another plane?
> 
> The Beaufighter...
> In the Mediterranean, the USAAF's 414th, 415th, 416th and 417th Night Fighter Squadrons received 100 Beaufighters in the summer of 1943, achieving their first victory in July 1943. Through the summer the squadrons conducted both daytime convoy escort and ground-attack operations, but primarily flew defensive interception missions at night. Although the Northrop P-61 Black Widow fighter began to arrive in December 1944, USAAF Beaufighters continued to fly night operations in Italy and France until late in the war.
> ...



I have a liking for the old Beaufighter too.

Tough and pretty dependable. 
Would love to have seen one developed for more performance by fitting a couple of either Bristol Centaurus or R-2800's.


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## Readie (May 17, 2013)

Sid447 said:


> I have a liking for the old Beaufighter too.
> 
> Tough and pretty dependable.
> Would love to have seen one developed for more performance by fitting a couple of either Bristol Centaurus or R-2800's.



I admire the Beau too...but, Merlin's please 

'I am in a state of shock. To have seen Readie vote for anything but the Spit has left me speechless'

Mal, you know me so well hahaha...believe me I was very tempted .


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## fastmongrel (May 17, 2013)

Sid447 said:


> I have a liking for the old Beaufighter too.
> 
> Tough and pretty dependable.
> Would love to have seen one developed for more performance by fitting a couple of either Bristol Centaurus or R-2800's.



A brick is still a brick no matter how many horsepower it has. Dont think the bluff old girl would have gone much faster if you had strapped a couple of rockets to the wings. The Bristol Brigand had Centaurus engines and a slimmer fuselage but similar wings and with its extra 1,000 hp it went about 25mph faster.


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## pattle (May 17, 2013)

Although the P38 had the range to do things that the Spitfire couldn't and had two engine safety for flying over the Med my vote still goes for the Spitfire as a pure fighter in North Africa as I believe that all things being equal it would usually have beaten the P38 in a dogfight. Although it was clearly old fashioned and clearly not in the running I don't think we should forget about the humble Gloster Gladiator as it did great things in the early days against the Italians and deserves more credit as should the Fairey Fulmar, both of these planes kept our foot in the door and kept things going. I wouldn't like to chose a favourite from the Italian campaign but a certain colour film I have seen a few times of P47s flying ground attack sorties really impressed me. I think that while a lot of allied fighters may have matched the Mustang in a dogfight you always have to come back to the Mustang for its range.


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## nuuumannn (May 17, 2013)

> Would love to have seen one developed for more performance by fitting a couple of either Bristol Centaurus


They did, it was called the Brigand, and while its performance was better than the Beaufighter, it suffered other issues, which meant it never lived up to the reputation or the success in service of the Beaufighter.


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## pattle (May 18, 2013)

No the Brigand was a development of the Buckingham and not the Beaufighter.


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## OldSkeptic (May 18, 2013)

Depends what you mean by 'effective'. I'll take it as making the biggest tactical or strategic difference, rather than just performance (after all there were some 190s late on in Tunisia).

Noting also that the term used is 'fighter', then the one that made the biggest strategic contribution (as a pure fighter) was the Spitfire in Malta and (albeit late) in North Africa, where a couple of squadrons finally wrested air supremacy from the Luftwaffe and eliminated the 109 threat there. Then Spits (and Seafires) for Italy.

The Hurricanes and P-40s were fundamentally used as low level fighter/bombers or bomber killers in NA. When the 109s came they ran or went into defensive circles. While they got some 109s (fire enough lead around something will be hit), the balance was massively in the Luftwaffe's favour (the famous Marseille running up an insane score) where the obsolete Hurricanes and P-40s were basically slaughtered.
They did manage to keep the Luftwaffe's bombers away.

Only poor operational use (the Luftwaffe's _experten_ culture) meant that the 109s (by far the superior fighter until the Spits arrived) didn't have a major strategic impact on the North African campaign. If they had wanted they could have crippled the DAF's bombing abilities. Fortunately Marseille and the other _experten _were too busy showing off shooting down obsolete fighters (and taking care of their 'throat ache') to actually waste their valuable time helping out the endlessly bombed DAK on the ground (or guard their own bombers). You know he only claimed 3 or 4 (that I can see) bombers out of his claimed 158, what a prima donna.

Later for the Tunisian campaign, I'd add the P-38, where its range and performance were invaluable for cutting the 'air bridge'. 

For the invasion of Sicily and Italy, then it is Spitfires and Seafires.


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## tomo pauk (May 19, 2013)

> You know he only claimed 3 or 4 (that I can see) bombers out of his claimed 158, *what a prima donna*.



That was a good one


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## Milosh (May 20, 2013)

from Wiki:

Marseille's 151 claims in North Africa included:

101 Curtiss P-40 Tomahawk/Kittyhawk fighters
30 Hawker Hurricane fighters
16 Supermarine Spitfire fighters
2 Martin A-30 Baltimore bombers
1 Bristol Blenheim bomber
1 Martin Maryland bomber.


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## Shortround6 (May 20, 2013)

You know what this means?????

The British should have scrapped all those P-40s, Hurricanes, Spitfires and Baltimore's and used NOTHING BUT Blenheims and Marylands.

If Germany's greatest ace could shoot down ONLY one of each that must mean they were the best combat planes in the theater.  

You can "prove" a lot of things with combat results.

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## pattle (May 20, 2013)

I read in Flypast recently that Marseille's claims were exaggerated, according to the article he could not have shot down 8 P40's in a single sortie as is popularly believed because eye witness accounts and RAF loss records for that day prove otherwise. Before anyone writes an angry reply defending Marseille I'm not trying to use this article to undermine his reputation because I believe his reputation as a fighter pilot was deserved.


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## altsym (May 20, 2013)

pattle said:


> according to the article he could not have shot down 8 P40's in a single sortie as is popularly believed because eye witness accounts and RAF loss records for that day prove otherwise.



Marseille may or may not have shot down eight P-40's, but It's a 99% probability that his bullets hit all eight P-40's. Would the RAF freely admit to loosing eight from one German pilot? The bullets left in Marseille plane says perhaps. NOT saying its fact.. Just a thought.


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## Njaco (May 20, 2013)

After 70 years the official record is that he shot down those 8 P-40s or 1 Maryland or.....it really doesn't matter. Thats the official record.


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## pattle (May 21, 2013)

Njaco said:


> After 70 years the official record is that he shot down those 8 P-40s or 1 Maryland or.....it really doesn't matter. Thats the official record.


It depends whose official records you believe, kills were often over claimed and you can take the Battle of Britain as a good example of this. I would go with loss records rather than claim records, every plane had to be accounted for and I don't believe that either air force would have falsified their own secret records.


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## stona (May 21, 2013)

altsym said:


> Marseille may or may not have shot down eight P-40's, but It's a 99% probability that his bullets hit all eight P-40's. Would the RAF freely admit to loosing eight from one German pilot? The bullets left in Marseille plane says perhaps. NOT saying its fact.. Just a thought.



1 He did not

2 It is not a 99% probability that he hit eight, in fact it is unlikely

3 RAF losses are RAF losses as reported. Who shot what down is not relevant. How many pilots knew what shot them down, let alone who?

_All "experten" over claimed_. The question is whether this was in good faith (as many were) or down right fraudulent (as some were and provably so, including some of Marseilles colleagues of JG 27 in North Africa). I think Marseilles is probably in the former category. You have to analyse the pattern of claiming. Large clusters when approaching landmark numbers, particularly those associated with awards, are suspicious though not always proof of fraud. If this pattern repeats itself for a given individual then alarm bells definitely should ring.

Cheers

Steve


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## altsym (May 21, 2013)

stona said:


> 1 He did not
> 
> 2 It is not a 99% probability that he hit eight, in fact it is unlikely


Its always about proof, right? So show proof that he didn't. 


Since a few experts and enemy fighter pilots doubted
the veracity of these claims, maintaining that there wasn't
even 26 aircraft in the air, here is the tally sheet from 1 September,
*which was verified by the enemy:*

Oblt. Sinner 0659 hrs, a Curtiss, near El Taqua.
" 0701 hrs, a Curtiss, near El Taqua.
Hptm. Rödel 07-hrs, an unknown make.
Oblt. Marseille 0826 hrs, a Curtiss, SE of Imayid.
0828 hrs, a Curtiss, SE of Imayid.
" 0835 hrs, a Curtiss, SE of Imayid.
" 0839 hrs, a Curtiss, SE of Imayid.
" 1055 hrs, a Curtiss, SE of Alam Haifa.
" 1056 hrs, a Curtiss, SE of Alam Haifa.
" 1058 hrs, a Curtiss, SE of Alam Haifa.
1059 hrs, a Curtiss, SE of Alam Haifa.
" 1101 hrs, a Curtiss, SE of Alam Haifa.
1103 hrs, a Curtiss, SE of Alam Haifa.
" 1105 hrs, a Curtiss, SE of Alam Haifa.
Lt. Remmer 1112 hrs, a Curtiss, SE of El Alamein.
Ofw. Steinhausen 1746 hrs, a Hurricane, SE of Imayid.
Lt. Stahlschmidt 1748 hrs, a Hurricane, SE of Imayid.
Oblt. Marseille 1747 hrs, a Curtiss, SE of Imayid.
" 1748 hrs, a Curtiss, SE of Imayid.
1749 hrs, a Curtiss, SE of Imayid.
" 1750 hrs, a Curtiss, SE of Imayid.
Lt. Stahlschmidt 1750 hrs, a Hurricane, SE of Imayid.
Oblt. Marseille 1753 hrs, a Curtiss, SE of Imayid.
Lt. von Lieres 1754 hrs, a Hurricane, SE of Imayid.


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## pattle (May 21, 2013)

I think the proof is that the aircraft he claimed to have shot down actually returned to base.


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## altsym (May 21, 2013)

Well let's see


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## DonL (May 21, 2013)

Edward H.Sims "claimed"/affirmed in his book, that he had done research on official lost lists of the Desert Airforce and *confirmed* all of Marseille's claims for this day.
Also he wrote that Marseille's claims are very accurate the whole time from lost lists. The last time I have looked he was an english cititzen.

A while ago it was Hartman who was the target in this forum, now it is Marseille, seems to me as a new religion here.



> Only poor operational use (the Luftwaffe's experten culture) meant that the 109s (by far the superior fighter until the Spits arrived) didn't have a major strategic impact on the North African campaign. If they had wanted they could have crippled the DAF's bombing abilities. Fortunately Marseille and the other experten were too busy showing off shooting down obsolete fighters (and taking care of their 'throat ache') to actually waste their valuable time helping out the endlessly bombed DAK on the ground (or guard their own bombers). You know he only claimed 3 or 4 (that I can see) bombers out of his claimed 158, what a prima donna.



Do you have ever heard, that different pilots had different duties/tasks in a Schwarm, when they are flying together?
Something like high cover for the fellows, who attacked the Bomber?


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## tyrodtom (May 21, 2013)

I don't think anyone took that post seriously.


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## drgondog (May 21, 2013)

The more I think about this, the more I conclude that the P-38 must be the 'most successful'. If someone finds the final Spit air victory total it may nudge the P-38 in that category - but -

The P-38 was there at the beginning of the NA campaign, and served as heavy and medium bomber escort, long range sweeps, dive bombing, interceptor - and had high performance and long range. Like the Mustang it was more or less equal over German targets, whereas the Spit was superior in Defense and air superiority in modest range


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## OldSkeptic (May 21, 2013)

tyrodtom said:


> I don't think anyone took that post seriously.



Actually that conclusion is just a paraphrase from Stephen Bungey's book 'Alamein' (He also did "Most Dangerous Enemy").
It is a fair conclusion of why the Luftwaffe had so little effect on the DAF's bomber operations,which was so critical to the (final) success of the British.
Fundamentally it was organisational cultural problem.

That _experten_ culture meant that they set the tone of operations, the rest of the pilots were there to support them. 
The organisation reinforced that behaviour, because it made good headlines, rewarding them, instead of kicking some people to actually go out and do something about the PBI getting bombed to bits.

Plus it was easier and safer. Marseille was a superb pilot and shot. In a vastly superior plane. He could (and did) pick his targets with very little risk to himself.
Going after bombers, even with the limited guns of the British bombers of the time, ran the risk of the laws of chance catching up with you and you taking some bullets in your engine ... and not getting back. Plus the risk of flak. After all German bombers shot down lot of Spits and Hurricanes in the BoB.

So he (and the others like him) had very little incentive to go chasing over the battlefront, to protect their people on the ground and every incentive (heavily reinforced by the organisation) to sit much further back, taking out attacking fighter/bombers that were acting offensively and picking the optimum (for them) targets.

Essentially the organisation fostered and encouraged poor tactical decisions.


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## Glider (May 21, 2013)

drgondog said:


> The P-38 was there at the beginning of the NA campaign, and served as heavy and medium bomber escort, long range sweeps, dive bombing, interceptor - and had high performance and long range. Like the Mustang it was more or less equal over German targets, whereas the Spit was superior in Defense and air superiority in modest range


I think it's true to say that the NA campaign was around before the P38


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## altsym (May 21, 2013)

OldSkeptic said:


> That _experten_ culture meant that they set the tone of operations, the rest of the pilots were there to support them.
> The organisation reinforced that behaviour, because it made good headlines, rewarding them, instead of kicking some people to actually go out and do something about the PBI getting bombed to bits


Really. I think your misguided here friend. With the amount of Allied fighters in Nord Afrika, the 109's had there hands full. And yes it did make for good headlines.



OldSkeptic said:


> Plus it was easier and safer. Marseille was a superb pilot and shot. In a vastly superior plane. He could (and did) pick his targets with very little risk to himself.


Safer then what? Having six .50's on your butt? Just as dangerous I would think.



OldSkeptic said:


> So he (and the others like him) had very little incentive to go chasing over the battlefront, to protect their people on the ground and every incentive (heavily reinforced by the organisation) to sit much further back, taking out attacking fighter/bombers that were acting offensively and picking the optimum (for them) targets.


The 109's as said had there hands full. BF 110's FW 190's had what roll in N.Afrika?


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## DonL (May 21, 2013)

OldSkeptic said:


> Actually that conclusion is just a paraphrase from Stephen Bungey's book 'Alamein' (He also did "Most Dangerous Enemy").
> It is a fair conclusion of why the Luftwaffe had so little effect on the DAF's bomber operations,which was so critical to the (final) success of the British.
> Fundamentally it was organisational cultural problem.
> 
> ...



I haven't read so much bogus in one post and it is the first time I hear that the "organisational cultural" of the Luftwaffe had any impact on their tasks!

1. At Alamein end of September 1942 the LW (JG 27) had 112 a/c's only 65 were operational against 800 of the Allied side. How much impact can they do on a rational point?
2. After all from primary german sources the impact of the german bombers at BoB is estimated to 1%-4% of all fighter losses of the RAF, what is near nil to nothing. You should look of the impact of the much heavier armed B17 and B24 Bombers of USAF before the Mustang arrived. Nothing that had any impact on the LW and the defending of the Reich.

Mr. Stephen Bungey's should do better researches and perhaps thinking about his biases.


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## Juha (May 21, 2013)

pattle said:


> I read in Flypast recently that Marseille's claims were exaggerated, according to the article he could not have shot down 8 P40's in a single sortie as is popularly believed because eye witness accounts and RAF loss records for that day prove otherwise. Before anyone writes an angry reply defending Marseille I'm not trying to use this article to undermine his reputation because I believe his reputation as a fighter pilot was deserved.



Has the writer of the article taken into account SAAF P-40 losses? Forgetting that RAF wasn't the only Alleid operator around has been common error amongst those who doubt Marseille's records. Surely also Marseille overclaimed but so did almost all other claimers too, in all air forces. Overclaiming was the norm, the level of overclaiming varied and IIRC Marseille's claim record was more accurate than the average

Juha


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## Juha (May 21, 2013)

DonL said:


> I haven't read so much bogus in one post and it is the first time I hear that the "organisational cultural" of the Luftwaffe had any impact on their tasks!
> 
> 1. At Alamein end of September 1942 the LW (JG 27) had 112 a/c's only 65 were operational against 800 of the Allied side. How much impact can they do on a rational point?
> 2. After all from primary german sources the impact of the german bombers at BoB is estimated to 1%-4% of all fighter losses of the RAF, what is near nil to nothing. You should look of the impact of the much heavier armed B17 and B24 Bombers of USAF before the Mustang arrived. Nothing that had any impact on the LW and the defending of the Reich.
> ...



1. There were Italians as well
2. I really doubt that, I can from the top of my head name 2 combat were LW bomber air gunners shot down 3 + 2 FC fighters, that made 5 which means over .5% of FC Cat. 3 air combat losses during the BoB.

Juha


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## DonL (May 21, 2013)

Juha said:


> 1. There were Italians as well
> 2. I really doubt that, I can from the top of my head name 2 combat were LW bomber air gunners shot down 3 + 2 FC fighters, that made 5 which means over .5% of FC Cat. 3 air combat losses during the BoB.
> 
> Juha



And how many Italians were there? Perhaps an other 60-70 a/c's?
The claim of OldSkeptic and Mr. Bungey' is simply bogus, at Alamein the axis supply was near zero, that you can read in any good book and numeric advantage of the Allieds at ground and in the air decisive. To claim it was the "organisational cultural" of the LW is ridiculous.

If my calculation is right, something about 1000 RAF aircrafts were lost through air to air combat and the Bombers were credited between 10-40 a/c's from the after combat report of the BoB. Also the after combat report mentioned that the german bombers had a much to less armament for daylight bomber raids.
All german bombers get heavier armament after BoB.
If the defending of the Bombers would have been that good why the heavier armament and an explicit analyse?


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## RCAFson (May 21, 2013)

pattle said:


> I read in Flypast recently that Marseille's claims were exaggerated, according to the article he could not have shot down 8 P40's in a single sortie as is popularly believed because eye witness accounts and RAF loss records for that day prove otherwise. Before anyone writes an angry reply defending Marseille I'm not trying to use this article to undermine his reputation because I believe his reputation as a fighter pilot was deserved.



On *Sept 09 1941* Marseille claimed 2 Hurricanes while 3 other 109 pilots claimed 1 each. The Commonwealth AFs lost 3 Hurricanes that day.

On *Sept 24 1941* Marseille claimed a Martin 167 and 4 Hurricanes, and two other 109 pilots claimed one HH each and another claimed a P-40. The Commonwealth AFs lost 3 Hurricanes that day and a Tomahawk. So Marseile claimed 5 but could only have scored 3 maximum, and probably got 1 or 2. (data from Shores).


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## altsym (May 21, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> On *Sept 24 1941* Marseille claimed a Martin 167 and 4 Hurricanes, and two other 109 pilots claimed one HH each and another claimed a P-40. The RAF lost 3 Hurricanes that day and a Tomahawk. So Marseile claimed 5 but could only have scored 3 maximum, and probably got 1 or 2. (data from Shores).


Did you check losses from 3 Squadron, RAAF, the Nine Hurricanes from 1 Squadron, SAAF?
BTW, Oberleutnant Homuth shot down the Tomahawk.


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## Glider (May 21, 2013)

The P40 was from 3 sqdn RAAF and the 3 Hurricanes were from 1 sqdn SAAF. The RAF didn't lose anything that day


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## Juha (May 21, 2013)

DonL said:


> And how many Italians were there? Perhaps an other 60-70 a/c's?



400, but if you are counting only fighters you guess is fairly accurate, but IMHO at the beginning of the 2nd el Alamein there were some 750 Axis planes vs 750 Allied planes but Allied had some 50 more serviceable planes and some 2.5 times more fighters and bigger reserves.



DonL said:


> If my calculation is right, something about 1000 RAF aircrafts were lost through air to air combat and the Bombers were credited between 10-40 a/c's from the after combat report of the BoB. Also the after combat report mentioned that the german bombers had a much to less armament for daylight bomber raids.
> All german bombers get heavier armament after BoB.
> If the defending of the Bombers would have been that good why the heavier armament and an explicit analyse?



You can find the 2 combats I mentioned here: Air gunners - Juhan Sotahistoriasivut
I have great difficulties to believe that the thousands other encounters produced only 5 more FC fighter losses, in fact I know several other FC losses to bomber air gunners, so the 1% is definitely too low figure.


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## RCAFson (May 21, 2013)

altsym said:


> Did you check losses from 3 Squadron, RAAF, the Nine Hurricanes from 1 Squadron, SAAF?
> BTW, Oberleutnant Homuth shot down the Tomahawk.


 

I edited my post to state Commonwealth rather than RAF. I listed all Commonwealth losses.


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## altsym (May 21, 2013)

OldSkeptic said:


> That _experten_ culture meant that they set the tone of operations,..



I did find this quote from Marseille: 

Marseille said that "there is nothing better than the freie Jagd. 'Fighter pilots should be allowed to operate in their assigned
areas as they see fit. When they spot an enemy, then they attack and shoot him down. Everything else is nonsense.'

IF that's the 'experten culture', then those EXPERTEN are 100% correct.


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## DonL (May 21, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> On *Sept 09 1941* Marseille claimed 2 Hurricanes while 3 other 109 pilots claimed 1 each. The Commonwealth AFs lost 3 Hurricanes that day.
> 
> On *Sept 24 1941* Marseille claimed a Martin 167 and 4 Hurricanes, and two other 109 pilots claimed one HH each and another claimed a P-40. The Commonwealth AFs lost 3 Hurricanes that day and a Tomahawk. So Marseile claimed 5 but could only have scored 3 maximum, and probably got 1 or 2. (data from Shores).



Are this only claims from Marseille or were this claims confirmed officialy from the LW and standing in his record?


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## OldSkeptic (May 21, 2013)

altsym said:


> I did find this quote from Marseille:
> 
> Marseille said that "there is nothing better than the freie Jagd. 'Fighter pilots should be allowed to operate in their assigned
> areas as they see fit. When they spot an enemy, then they attack and shoot him down. Everything else is nonsense.'
> ...



Nope. They have to be a part of an overall strategic direction and tactical plan. Otherwise they will swan around doing nothing useful (as they did).

Take a properly managed operation, the BoB. There were clear strategic directions and the tactical plans conformed to that.
There were several key strategic issues, but concentrating on the offensive side, it was to kill bombers. Not fighters.
Enemy fighters got in the way and as such had to be taken out (the job, wherever possible, of the Spitfires), or distracted, whatever. But the reason for that was to enable the RAF to destroy the bombers.
Therefore the tactical planning and management was to deal with them as cheaply as possible, while maintaining focus on the bombers.
Park, for example, set a directive out to stop the practice of RAF pilots lining up to shoot down a crippled bomber. His order was clear, find another one and hammer it.

They never lost that focus. Park ignored fighter sweeps, ordered pilots not to attack pure fighter groups and to find and hammer bombers. And in that he was 100% correct.

Now these 'experten' in North Africa needed to do 2 things to play their part of their side's fighting capability.
(1) Take out the DAF bombers attacking the front line and behind the line.
(2) Protect their own offensive bombers (inc Stukas).

If in doing that they shot down DAF fighters, then all and good, but killing fighters was part of a path to achieving a goal, not a thing in itself. A methodology.
And that is where they went wrong, the methodology became the aim. The path became the goal.

As Galland said (though he didn't always personally follow it) "war in the exists to facilitate war from the air" (or stop the other side's "war from the air" of course). In itself "war in the air" is meaningless.


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## RCAFson (May 21, 2013)

DonL said:


> Are this only claims from Marseille or were this claims confirmed officialy from the LW and standing in his record?


 

The text states that they are "claims" but on Sept 24 it states that his "claims" were forwarded to higher command and intercepted by ULTRA.


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## DonL (May 21, 2013)

OldSkeptic said:


> Nope. They have to be a part of an overall strategic direction and tactical plan. Otherwise they will swan around doing nothing useful (as they did).
> 
> Take a properly managed operation, the BoB. There were clear strategic directions and the tactical plans conformed to that.
> There were several key strategic issues, but concentrating on the offensive side, it was to kill bombers. Not fighters.
> ...



About what you are talking?

The Axis were attacking till Alamein! Do you understand attacking not defending!

As you look at USAF Bomber attacks to germany from 1943-45 all US fighters were flying freie Jagd and the german fighters (defending) were only concentrating on the Bombers (to my opinion too much on the Bombers), because nobody was attacking the escort fighters other then the RAF at BoB (Spitfires have attacked the escort fighters)

Anyway coming back to to NA and Alamein, as the Axis were sqeezed to the defending role, their supply was zero, they had by no way enough fighters and material to organize a strategic defence plan, their strenghts were exhausted from the attacking and the deficient supply.

You can't change to a sudden defencive role, if have not the supply and material to this.

Yours and Mr. Mr. Bungey's analyse is simply wrong, from the historical facts and numbers around Alamein.


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## mhuxt (May 21, 2013)

RCAFson said:


> The text states that they are "claims" but on Sept 24 it states that his "claims" were forwarded to higher command and intercepted by ULTRA.


 
They certainly appear as quoted in this thread in the records of the "Chef für Ausz. und Dizsiplin Luftwaffen-Personalamt L.P. (A) V" microfilms which Tony Woods transcribed.

for example the extract for 9 September 1941:

9. September 1941
Fliegerführer Afrika

09.09.41	Ltn. Hans-Joachim Marseille: 15 3./JG 27	Hurricane I S.E. Bardia	17.12	Film	C. 2036/II	Nr.69258/41
09.09.41	Ltn. Friedrich Hoffmann: 6	3./JG 27	Hurricane I 50 km. E.S.E. Sidi Barrani	17.12	Film	C. 2036/II	Nr.88771/42
09.09.41	Oblt. Ludwig Franzisket: 23	Stab I./JG 27	Hurricane 30 km. E. Sidi Barrani	17.15	Film	C. 2036/II	Nr.88771/41
09.09.41	Fw.Dr. Peter Werfft: 5	1./JG 27	Hurricane Būcht von Sollūm	17.17	Film	C. 2036/II	Nr.88771/42
09.09.41	Ltn. Hans-Joachim Marseille: 16 3./JG 27	Hurricane I S.E. Bardia	17.18	Film	C. 2036/II	Nr.69258/41


(Please don't shoot me, I'm just the messenger)


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## pattle (May 21, 2013)

I wish I still had this copy of Flypast but it looks like I threw it out. Just had a quick look on the net and it was from what I can gather in fact SAAF Tomahawks that were involved in this controversial dogfight with Marseille, it seems they were attacking Stukas before being bounced by Marseille and friends. There is a very good interview on you tube regarding this encounter with Cecil Golding who was one of the SAAF Tomahawk pilots flying that day. 
Cecil points out that even with the best of intentions claims made by fighter pilots were unreliable due to the fog of war.
I think the Flypast article may have been based on a recently researched and published book about Marseille, perhaps called the star of the desert?


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## altsym (May 21, 2013)

Star of Africa, also I suggest reading the official 1 Squadron, SAAF report of what took place on 24.11.41.


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## mhuxt (May 21, 2013)

Marseille himself appears in this Wochenschau clip - even has a close up of the victory bars on his aircraft's tail and its serial number:


_View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3qsvoRj1GFQ_

According to this site, Wochenschau 615 was from 18 June, 1942, so I suppose the footage was shot not long before then.

Neuschwabenland-Archiv/Filme/Deutsche-Wochenschauen/


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## mhuxt (May 21, 2013)

Alternatively, the 1 Sqn SAAF Operations Record Books are free to download from the U.K. National Archives site:

Squadron Number: 1 SAAF (South African Air force) Summary of Events: Y | The National Archives
Squadron Number: 1 SAAF (South African Air force). Summary of Events: Y. 
Air Ministry and successors: Operations Record Books, Squadrons. NO. 1 SQUADRON S.A.A.F. Operations Record Books. Squadron Number: 1 SAAF (South African Air force). Summary of Events: Y.

Collection: Records created or inherited by the Air Ministry, the Royal Air Force, and related bodiesDate range: 01 September 1941 - 31 December 1942 Reference:AIR 27/9/6Subjects:Air Force, Armed Forces (General)


Some of the SAAF squadron records are rather higgledy-piggledy, however there is a directory document, which I have on a separate HD, which provides a more accurate and full listing. If the above link doesn't prove satisfactory, let me know and I'll try to dig it out.


Edit - You can also browse from here: http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/SearchUI/browse/C2109?v=r


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## RCAFson (May 21, 2013)

Actually, I meant to post this here:



> Compared with the claims recorded in 11,400 traceable air to air combat reports (form 1151), covering all RAF fighter pilots' claims, 55% were by Hurricane pilots, 33% by Spitfire pilots and 12% by pilots of other fighters.



Mason, Hawker Hurricane, p211.

The Hurricane was probably the most successful Allied fighter in the MTO.


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## riacrato (May 22, 2013)

Funny how the conclusion now is that the LW should've concentrated more on bombers in NA, the same directive that led to her quick demise over France and Germany a few years later. Of course whenever that scenario is discussed everyone is quick to point out how stupid Goering was by concentrating on attacking the bombers. But it doesn't matter, the goal seems to be more in line with "if Marseille wasn't a liar he was at least an arrogant prick with no regards for the life of his comrades on the ground".


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## Glider (May 22, 2013)

mhuxt said:


> (Please don't shoot me, I'm just the messenger)



Just remember they used to execute messengers that brought bad news


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## OldSkeptic (May 22, 2013)

riacrato said:


> Funny how the conclusion now is that the LW should've concentrated more on bombers in NA, the same directive that led to her quick demise over France and Germany a few years later. Of course whenever that scenario is discussed everyone is quick to point out how stupid Goering was by concentrating on attacking the bombers. But it doesn't matter, the goal seems to be more in line with "if Marseille wasn't a liar he was at least an arrogant prick with no regards for the life of his comrades on the ground".



Oh concentrating on bombers is the correct strategy. Bombers cost more resources, have larger crews and damage people on the ground. If you sacrifice 1 fighter for 1 bomber then you will win if you productive capacities are similar. Since the US's was so much larger they needed somewhere between 3-5:1, which they achieved easily in '43.

In mid-late 43 the Luftwaffe won the battles with both the USAAF and the RAF, scoring strategic wins. The 8th pulled back to within escorted range and only re-attacked when they had long range escorts. BC pulled back too.

But, the Luftwaffe's successful tactical doctrine was very vulnerable to ecort fighters. They depended on heavy twins (110s and 88s) with rockets and heavy cannons to break up formations, then the single engined fighters could take out the stragglers and the now less well protected groups.

But those twins were far too slow to exists in daylight in contested airspace. Once the ranges of the US fighters grew, they were taken out of the equation. This is where all those poor decisions made prior about single engined fighters came to haunt them. Firstly they didn't have enough. The 190s altitude performance was poor, made poorer if heavier cannons and/or rockets were fitted.
The 109 had the high altitude performance, but not if you loaded it up with 30mm cannons and the like.

And without those they didn't have the firepower to quickly take the US bombers down (estimated it took 20 x 20mm shells on average, vs 3-5 30mm ones).

Now if they had enough fighters, they could have done both, with lighter ones for combat against the escorts, while the up-gunned one slipped through to hit the bombers. But they didn't have enough to do both successfully.
So when the '47s and 38s upped their range they hammered the twins, the Mustangs were the coup de gras and finished the job on the singles.

The lack of numbers killed any chance of applying many obvious tactics, like squadron sized intercepts of the rendezvousing fighters, well before they linked up, to force them to drop their external tanks and hence not being able to complete their escorting.

So the bad decisions made in 41 and 42 on fighter types and production numbers (and pilot training) meant they were unable to respond. Their lack of a fast twin meant that they had nothing that could survive in daylight in contested airspace and the loss of that meant crippling the single engined fighters performance to carry the guns necessary.


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## OldSkeptic (May 22, 2013)

DonL said:


> About what you are talking?
> 
> The Axis were attacking till Alamein! Do you understand attacking not defending!



They attacked and defended prior to then. And while the German ground forces were attacking the DAF was hammering them and their supply lines and their supply bases, etc, etc.

Just prior to and at what is now called 1st Alamein, the DAF was largely considered to being the single biggest reason why Rommel didn't totally beat them then.
With constant bombing and strafing attacks enabling the 8th Army to get to and hold the defensible Alamein ground.

No one but no one doubts the tremendous contribution (on both defence and attack) that the DAF achieved.
The DAF also, despite their totally inferior fighters, kept German bombers and Stukas off the backs of the 8th Army (mostly). They did their job properly. The DAF bombers were also hitting well behind the lines, at ports and so on constantly.

Rommel had endless fights with the Luftwaffe to actually get them some cover to stop his supply lines being hit, and anywhere they stopped and dug in. 
They did not act as well as they did in France by any means, with close coordination to overall strategic and tactical plans.

The average German (and Italian) soldier mostly never saw a friendly aircraft above them, even when the numbers on both sides were close (or on the Axis's side).

They had more than enough 109s (and the skilled pilots) to slaughter the DAF's bombers. The performance advantage over the P-40s and Hurricanes was huge and they had effectively zero ability to escort the bombers successfully. If you look at what the Luftwaffe did in 1939 and 40 against unescorted RAF bombers, they murdered them. 50% bomber losses were on a good day .. a good day for the RAF that was.

But no they ran around shooting down much more replaceable P-40s and Hurricanes which came to their side of the lines, or in other words whether or not the ground forces were on the attack or the defence, the Luftwaffe fighters played a defensive role purely against the DAF's fighters.


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## Tante Ju (May 22, 2013)

OldSkeptic said:


> Rommel had endless fights with the Luftwaffe to actually get them some cover to stop his supply lines being hit, and anywhere they stopped and dug in.
> They did not act as well as they did in France by any means, with close coordination to overall strategic and tactical plans.



Obviously did better in France - they had the whole Luftwaffe in support. The DAF did not have to fight the whole Luftwaffe in Afrika..

In Afrika, Germans had a handful of fighter and bomber Gruppen only for support. Its unfair to criticize them IMHO for not being able to be everywhere all at once. All of the memoirs on the German side explains how they tried to "comb" the desert in even pair of fighter just to give some air coverage with limited numbers. that placed them in a tactical position where prolonged air combat was impossible tactically (suicidal) so what remained option was to use hit and run tactics employing superior performance of the fighter machines.



> The average German (and Italian) soldier mostly never saw a friendly aircraft above them, even when the numbers on both sides were close (or on the Axis's side).



But were the numbers ever close..? Rommel had a tiny, well equipped German corps and about double of that of poorly equipped Italians. Ditto for the air forces.The English had far greater forces in the desert, and its a smaller wonder how Rommel actually managed to get to El Alamein at all. "point defence" (circling above the troops) is rather ineffective air defense tactic anyway.


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## Juha (May 22, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> But were the numbers ever close..?



Tended to be, especially the 1st line strenght but British tended to have somewhat better serviceability rate and bigger reserves.

Juha


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## stona (May 22, 2013)

The Marseilles thing has been gone over time and time again for the last twenty years to my certain knowledge and I'm not going over it again. 

All experts and aces on all sides over claimed. It is in the nature of aerial combat that this was inevitable. Most did so in perfectly good faith, a minority did not, demonstrably so. The so called "experten schwarm" of 4./JG 27 (Vogel, Sawallisch, Bendert and Stigler) were busted by their own side, strafing empty sand dunes before returning to make claims. Anyone who believes that they are a unique example is being naïve. 

Try tying Kurt Welter's numerous Mosquito claims to actual losses. Some were made when no RAF aircraft, let alone Mosquitos, were within 150 miles of him. He is not unique either. 

This is not about bashing long dead aces it's about being realistic about WW2 claims from all sides in general. 

It is arguable that the problem of fraudulent claiming was exacerbated in the Luftwaffe by the way the system worked. Much was made of individual experten by the Nazi propaganda machinery. Certain awards were more or less directly linked to certain scores. The system encouraged fraud in some unscrupulous individuals. I still believe that despite this, these men were a small minority and that most claimed in good faith.

In western allied air forces, particularly the RAF, much more emphasis was placed on a team effort rather than individual brilliance. Nonetheless over claiming remained a problem for intelligence officers throughout the war.

Cheers

Steve


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## DonL (May 22, 2013)

Hello Stona,

I don't disagree in general with you, but we should discuss this sentences:



> Much was made of individual experten by the Nazi propaganda machinery.





> In western allied air forces, particularly the RAF, much more emphasis was placed on a team effort rather than individual brilliance.



At the LW was from beginning the Rotte (two fighters) as team and cover. From what I have read very often skilled pilots took "noobies" as Rotten fellow for learning and support.
Especially at Tollivers book over Hartmann, Hartmann describes how important his Rotten fellows were at the beginning for his later success and also as he was the skilled pilot, as he has supported and defended his Rotten fellows. Hartmann never losses a Rotten fellow as ace.

Also at Tolliver was described as Hartmanns Schwarm flew over Ploiești and Hartmanns Rotte flew always high cover to protect the other fellows, which attacked the bombers.

I think many depends on the character of the Schwarm and JG leader, how they are leading/training and educating their pilots.

I wouldn't in general say the LW didn't do teamwork.


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## altsym (May 22, 2013)

@ OldSkeptic, again, you seem to fail to understand the role of the 109 at this time period, but suffice to say, JG 27 did plenty of escort missions as well. 

@ Stona, as DonL said, there was plenty of teamwork. Strafing of sand/sand dunes was common, usually practicing deflection shooting by trying to hit there own planes shadow. The dunes provided a more 'vertical' target then the flat sand.


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## stona (May 22, 2013)

DonL said:


> I wouldn't in general say the LW didn't do teamwork.



Nor would (or did) I. I think that there was more emphasis on this in other air forces and less tendency to exalt the individual. Air fighting in WW2 was always a team effort.

Could you imagine the Luftwaffe coming up with something like the "Thach weave" ? It's not impossible but this sort of cooperative tactic was far more ingrained in the ethos of USN/USAAF fighter tactics and training than in that of the Luftwaffe.

In the case of some "experten" cooperation seems to have amounted to someone watching their back whilst they did the business, not at all the same thing.

Cheers

Steve


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## stona (May 22, 2013)

altsym said:


> Strafing of sand/sand dunes was common, usually practicing deflection shooting by trying to hit there own planes shadow.



But not then returning to claim fraudulent aerial victories. This is about blatant fraudulent claiming in the summer of 1942, outright lying, there is no nicer way to express it. You seem to be wilfully missing the point. 

The case I cited is well documented. The officer who reported them was the highly respected Hans-Arnold "Fifi" Stahlschmidt who at the time of his death (7 Sept 42) was the Luftwaffe pilot with the most combat mission in North Africa. Other officers (Ernst Boerngen and Rudolph Sinner, men not to be taken lightly, to name two) had expressed doubts about their claims. The Gruppenkommandeur, Gustav Roedel, broke up the group but JG 27 was very short of pilots and they avoided a court martial. Then came the British offensive of October '42 leading to a headlong retreat across Libya and the whole affair was glossed over.

Cheers

Steve


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## Tante Ju (May 22, 2013)

stona said:


> It is arguable that the problem of fraudulent claiming was exacerbated in the Luftwaffe by the way the system worked. Much was made of individual experten by the Nazi propaganda machinery. Certain awards were more or less directly linked to certain scores. The system encouraged fraud in some unscrupulous individuals. I still believe that despite this, these men were a small minority and that most claimed in good faith.
> 
> In western allied air forces, particularly the RAF, much more emphasis was placed on a team effort rather than individual brilliance. Nonetheless over claiming remained a problem for intelligence officers throughout the war.
> 
> ...


 
Sorry but this is very very wrong. Its just how Western airforces, particularly the RAF, tries to explain their "Experten envy". Why did our aces did not do so good, they ask. First excuse was: they scored so high because they were on the Russian front, fighting inferior Russian! (no explanation for Pokrishkin, Kozhedub etc. scores though...). Second excuse was: They only scored so high because they flew until they died. But so did everyone else, except the Americans, who could afford the luxury. Never heard of the same excuse for Johnnie Johnson. Third and latest excuse: It was only because of the supposedly existing "star mentaility" of experten... never explained then why the RAF, that supposedly put so much emphasis of team tactics, _copied _ German fighter teamwork tactics of the Rotte and Schwarm... because until so far, the RAF was rigidly flying after the leader in close, rigid formation.

Oddly enough, the explanation that highly motivated, well trained individuals employing proper and well developed tactics forged in battle experience of Spain, and equipped with generally very high standard equipment never comes to mind in those explanations. Never. They also NEVER question the claims made by Western, particularly the RAF Aces...


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## stona (May 22, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> They also NEVER question the claims made by Western, particularly the RAF Aces...



You haven't bothered to read all my posts.

It is not an attempt to explain anything. The cultures of different military organisations are different, what's wrong with that? The Luftwaffe award system is just one obvious example of this. There are many reasons why some Luftwaffe pilots achieved such high totals and I have not entered into any discussion on that at all.

I said in my original post and repeated at least once that all pilots in all air forces over claimed. It is almost inevitable given the nature of air fighting. Some cheated. There is nothing new or controversial in that.

What's your opinion of the well documented case of JG 27's "experten schwarm" ? 

As for my other cited example, where are Welter's Mosquitos?

I could cite many more. I could show you examples of "cluster claiming" around landmark numbers. One night fighter expert claimed six on one night to get to one such number. I'm not naming him or giving the number because that would seem to be ace bashing and that is not the point I'm trying to make.

On the allied side for every 100 tanks claimed destroyed by the RAF's 2nd TAF only 1 could be confirmed on the ground. Now that's over claiming on a spectacular scale. 

Steve


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## altsym (May 22, 2013)

stona said:


> But not then returning to claim fraudulent aerial victories. This is about blatant fraudulent claiming in the summer of 1942, outright lying, there is no nicer way to express it. You seem to be wilfully missing the point.


I never said there wasn't over claiming, be it intentional or unintentional. You mentioned strafing sands dunes, and I told you one reason why they did that.


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## Milosh (May 22, 2013)

altsym said:


> I never said there wasn't over claiming, be it intentional or unintentional. You mentioned strafing sands dunes, and I told you one reason why they did that.



Claim: one sand dune shadow.


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## altsym (May 22, 2013)

I'm sure a few planes ended up being 'shadows on a dune'.


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## OldSkeptic (May 24, 2013)

stona said:


> You haven't bothered to read all my posts.
> 
> It is not an attempt to explain anything. The cultures of different military organisations are different, what's wrong with that? The Luftwaffe award system is just one obvious example of this. There are many reasons why some Luftwaffe pilots achieved such high totals and I have not entered into any discussion on that at all.
> 
> ...



Everyone over claimed. Often quite honestly. The gunner in a US bomber fires at (along with 50 others) a German fighter, it blows up and he claims it, so does the other 50.
In fighter to fighter stuff, you fire at a another fighter it has smoke coming out of it and you claim at least a damage, maybe a probable, some claim a kill. But it is just the genuine characteristics when the other pilot opens it up to full and belches a lot of smoke.

Galland mentions one episode when he was caught by a bunch of Spits, couldn't get away and tried a desperation move, fired all his guns. The smoke from them convinced the other fighters that he had been hit (and probably made claims) and left him and he got away.

The bigger the groups of planes meeting and fighting each other, the bigger the over claiming.
Bader's 'big wings' were famous for this. Made amazing claims at the time (and for political reasons were accepted). After war analysis showed that they lost more planes than they shot down.

A good example of this is in the film "Battle of Britain', with the unescorted bomber attack from Norway on the British northern areas.
Unfortunately, for them, they were detected and hit by a squadron of Spits. In the film you see one guy claiming a kill, describes, sure he got it .. and was told he had a quarter of a kill. (maybe a third). Because everyone had attacked that one.

Combat, actually firing your guns, happened in (on average) 2 second moments, then you broke off (otherwise you were now a target, the one's that didn't never came back). Not a lot of time to be sure to anything.

The most accurate claims of the entire air war was probably the German night fighters, every one had to be verified by actual wreckage. And their reported claims were very close to actual losses.

Overall though (roughly) fighters over claimed against other fighters by between 2:1 to 3:1. On all sides. Though, of course, there were individual exceptions, both better and worse.
The ones overall (don;t forget the vast majority of pilots genuinely tried to be as correct as possible) that did the worst were where reward systems were tied to numbers. As in 'get this number of planes and you get a medal' sort of thing.

Marseille almost certainly got within 10% of his claims, which means an exceptional and honest level of accuracy by him. My criticism of him is not about his incredible skills, just the tactics and leadership at the time. Plus he was a real prima donna as a person, he was good and knew he was good and was driven by that from earlier experiences in the Luftwaffe (an officially disapproved love affair lost him a promotion).
Oh that 'throat ache' got to so many of them (excepting the night fighters, which were a technocratic elite).


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