# What if, Stalingrad mistakes



## Teapopper (Oct 7, 2009)

delete this thread.


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## Colin1 (Oct 7, 2009)

Teapopper said:


> Germany had about 300 000 men stationed in Norway in 1943, what if they moved 100 000 troops to Stalingrad or Leningrad to take one of the cities, or use them as reserves on the eastern front.
> Britain could not attack Norway in 42-43 when they had 200 000 defenders, it woud have the same result as Italy, bogged down and good terrain for defenders


Some interesting points
but 100,000 troops moved to either city would probably have been 100,000 more troops into the meat-grinder, it might have taken the Soviets longer but I think they would have managed it. 
Getting tied up in a slugging match with any strongly defended installation (or city) was an anathema to the principles of blitzkrieg which emphasised going around any such installations and continuing on to take the 'keys' to the territory. The now-isolated pockets of resistance can then either come to their senses and surrender, or starve and surrender. 
The German forces would have been freed up to do what the Wehrmacht was trained for - battlefield engagements, as well as interdicting relief attempts on the surrounded cities.
With the initiative thus largely handed back to the German commanders as to how they were going to defeat the enemy, it could have been a different outcome.


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## Colin1 (Oct 7, 2009)

Teapopper said:


> delete this thread.


lol thanks


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## Soren (Oct 8, 2009)

????


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## Colin1 (Oct 8, 2009)

Soren said:


> ????


Some interesting points were posted concerning mistakes made by the Germans in the Soviet Union.
I selected a portion as a quote and responded. When I came out of my reply, he'd deleted his original post.


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## parsifal (Oct 8, 2009)

Certainly the germans had an oversupply of units deployed on the Norwegian Coast defence, but these units were severely lacking in mobility and in no way could be considered combat worthy. Like the units in France they were usually organized on a two regiment basis with just two battalions per regiment. Motor transport was virtually non-existent, and horse transport was down to about 30% what was required for mobile operation in the east. I havent checked, but I will bet the artillery and other heavy weapons was obsolete and down to about 50% or less of establishment

Sending troops like this to the east in that state of readiness would have been suicide for those men. They needed time to be ade ready for action, and amajor injection of manpower, since many of the troops were over-age or unfite, and short of establishment strengths anyway. The tanks stationed in Norway all suffered from faulty transmissions


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## Vassili Zaitzev (Oct 8, 2009)

Why did he delete his posting? He couldn't handle somebody putting holes in his theory?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Oct 8, 2009)

Wow don't understand what happened here. Thread stays open...


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## Colin1 (Oct 8, 2009)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Wow don't understand what happened here. Thread stays open...


Shame he didn't leave his original post up, he made some interesting points


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## Juha (Oct 8, 2009)

Agree with Parsifal
many of the German troops in Norway were older ones and rather poorly equipped, especially their vehicle allocations were low. When the main Pz unit there, future 25th PzD, was decided to sent to East in late 43, it was first to sent to France via Denmark to be made Eastern front capable, that took a while, even if the unit was one of the best equipped in Norway, and when the time of deployment was forwarded because of the critical situation in the East, the div suffered badly at first, partly because of peacemeal deployment but also partly because of they were still bit unprepared to what was waiting them.

Juha


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Oct 8, 2009)

Colin1 said:


> Shame he didn't leave his original post up, he made some interesting points



Agreed, but there is still plenty that can be discussed on this topic. Besides maybe he will return and re-post it.


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## RabidAlien (Oct 8, 2009)

What-ifs are always fun. Wish he'd kept it up....hope he's not a one-post wonder!


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## wheelsup_cavu (Oct 9, 2009)

RabidAlien said:


> What-ifs are always fun. Wish he'd kept it up....hope he's not a one-post wonder!


I have to agree RA.

I am looking forward to watching/reading where this thread goes.


Wheels


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## GrauGeist (Oct 9, 2009)

Good point, Colin.

If the Wehrmacht had stayed out of the city and the inevitable meat-gringer, they may have had a far better shot at taking it. Urban warfare is best suited to the defenders, and the ancient art of laying seige should have been the focus in this case.


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## Juha (Oct 9, 2009)

Hello Geist
the problem was that Germans didn't have assests to allow them crossing the Volga, so they could not encircle the city. They tried to interdict the traffic across the river as well as the could, but even if they had squeezed Soviets into tight bridgehead, that wasn't enough to stop the traffic. If Soviets have had much large area in the western bank, interdiction would have been clearly less effective and isolation is important part of siegecraft. Of course late Nov Nature would have delivered a week/couple weeks isolation of Stalingrad, but that was predictable to Soviets.

Juha


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## lesofprimus (Oct 9, 2009)

How about shutting down the ice road the Soviets used to re-supply Stalingrad during the winter???


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## Thorlifter (Oct 9, 2009)

I think it would have depended on what the Germans were going to do with an extra 100,000 men, however, we can probably assume they would have been used to continued the path of death across the Volga.

If they would have been used to flank the city or parachute behind the city, or as Les said, cut the supply lines feeding the Soviet defenders, it may have been successful.


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## Juha (Oct 9, 2009)

Hello
as I wrote, crossing the Volga and staying on the eastern side there would have need more resources than Germans had in the area. It was not only men that were lacking, Germans would have needed more tanks, StuGs, A/T guns and artillery.And of course crossing equipment.

And when the river froze over 6th Army was or was to be encircled. I what if scenario, if Soviets were left to hold Stalingrad, which occupied IIRC some 50 km of the west bank and if, I cannot remember how thickly the river frozed, the ice could carry lorry, in winter that doesn't need very thich ice, new ice can carry much more load than the same thickness of ice in spring, Soviets couls have easily open a new road in different location. It would have been rather hopeless job to keed some 40km wide stretch of ice so weak, that it could not be used at least by the horse drawn Soviet wagons.

IMHO German options were screen the city or take it, both had problems. Thoseof latter option are well known
Juha


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## parsifal (Oct 9, 2009)

I think the whole '42 offensive was faulty in conception. What I think would have been the best option for the german in '42 was to lay down reasonable peace terms, probably a return to the pre-'39 borders. Then fortify the whole eastern front, and establish strong local counterattack forces, built around the panzers, and using mobile defence where the Russians attempted brekthroughs. 

If the germans could inflict enough manpower sapping defeats on the Russians, without suffering castrophic losses of their own, and not giving up too much territory, they may have been able to reach a truce with the Rusians of some sort. That done, they may have been able to deal with the west before a final showdown with the Russians in '44-5 roughly.


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## GrauGeist (Oct 9, 2009)

Since we're working out "what if" scenarios, what if the Germans worked out a peace with the western Allies and turned up the heat on the Soveit Union.

With a considerable amount of manpower and equipment freed up, (and a little better strategic planning), I seriously think Stalin would have been in trouble.

As far as Stalingrad goes, with the additional manpower on the ground, they could have worked a better encirclement on the city as long as they kept the Soviet supply lines broken. Creating a "no man's land" around the city and working the Volga by air (boat traffic and bridges being priority), it would have kept the Wehrmacht from being chewed to peices in that hellish urban street brawl.


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## parsifal (Oct 9, 2009)

a separate peace with the USSR was more likley. The leaders of the western alliance from an early stage laid down by international charter that they would accept nothing less than unconditional surrender. I dont see how that could accommodated into a negotiated settlement


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## RabidAlien (Oct 9, 2009)

Hmmm. I was under the impression that the Volga froze thick enough to drive a tank across it in the winter. Which, after a few weeks of sluggish ice-floes cutting off all traffic across the river, allowed the Russians to resupply/rearm/reinforce with practically little to no wait-times. What the Luftwaffe should have done was pound the river into a thinly-frozen patch of...slush. Surround the city, let it wither on the vine, similar to the island-hopping strategy in the Pacific.

Or, better yet, take those 100,000 men and beat Great Britan into submission, completing the conquest of the West. Then turn everything East.


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## GrauGeist (Oct 9, 2009)

If Germany offered to withdraw from most of it's occupied territories, that would have made a a considerable barganing chip. I know that the Allies said no conditions but an unconditional surrender, however, I'd be willing to bet that on opportunity to ward off a protracted costly war would have the Allies thinking about it.

And by saying "most" of the occupied territories, I'm talking about France, Belgium, Denmark Norway for starters. As far as Poland goes, I don't think that would be in the bargain, since the Ost front is active and Poland happens to be caught in the middle along with the other eastern European countries.


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## stasoid (Oct 9, 2009)

A separate peace between Germany and the USSR in 42-43? Very unlikely.

Turning point for the Soviets was Battle of Moscow demonstrated that Wehrmacht can be beaten up. Since then and on, the victory for the Russians was not a question if but when.

Partisan movement on the occupied territories mounted from thouthands in 41 to hundreds of thouthands armed men, women and children in 43. It was way out of hand for Germans. So, to understand the proportions of the catastrophe on the East: ukrainian partisans alone were accounted for killing more german soldiers during the war then all western european armies all together.


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## parsifal (Oct 10, 2009)

I agree stas, but I am pretty sure after the Battle of Moscow there were some desultory feelers put out, very discreetly. Germany rejected them because the Russian terms were a return to the 1940 borders. The main sticking point would have been Hitler (I dont think he even knew about these talks.

The later war strategy by the Germans was predicated on this sort of outcome.....making the price of victory so higth as to be prohibitive


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## Juha (Oct 10, 2009)

A few points
There was no bridges across Volga at Stalingrad, traffic across the river was based on ferries and boats. And Germans were not stupid, they tried to stop the river crossing as well as they could, but they could not even if by attacking into city they had dramatically narrowed the area which Soviet could use crossing, had got all of it under artillery fire, had much better observation on it etc. Option only screening the city would mean even less ability to harass the traffic across the river.

Hello RabidAlien
When the river froze over 6th Army was already encircled. And keeping the river permanently impassable would have meant very great effort.

Hello Stasoid
Quote:” ukrainian partisans alone were accounted for killing more german soldiers during the war then all western european armies all together.”

Accounted by whom? Is that comparing what the partisans claimed to verified German losses in West or is it verified German losses to Ukrainian partisans vs verified German losses to all Western European armies?

Juha


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## stasoid (Oct 10, 2009)

Hi Juha,

It is generally accepted numbers, 10% of total Wehrmacht losses on the East were inflicted by partisan activities (from the soviet sources, but not surprising numbers).
Here is a quick summary of guerrilla movement on the east: Soviet partisans - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The point I wanted to make is that by the end of 1942 it was too late for any kind of peace talks between Germany and the USSR. The Germans had already commited too many crimes on the occupied territories. Ceasefire negotiations could theoretically have taken place sometimes in Sept - Oct 1941, not in 42 for sure. Bring into consideration the soviet industry quickly ramped up by 1943 with new types of tanks and aircrafts becoming available in large numbers.

The soviets though made a strategic mistake expecting another attempt from Germans to take Moscow during the summer campaign of 1942. Wehrmacht turned south, to caspian oil inltead, that was more pragmatic move in my opinion and partially successful.


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## Juha (Oct 10, 2009)

Hello Stasoid
Interest link, especially the map, but it’s numbers doesn’t support your claim.

Against Western powers WM lost up to 31.1.45 some 166 000 KIA from ground troops alone, plus maybe some 30.000 DoW plus some 600 000 MiA and PoW, if we counted only ground troops. Paratroopers and airlanding troops are not incl.

Even if we accept the 10% of all Eastern front casualties, which I doubt, because of the big killers during WWII were the heavy weapons, from the same source that would meant some 110 000 KIA, some 26 000 DoW plus some some 100 000 MiA and PoW, even if almost all of the latter being killed in East, the total killed would be less than that against Western powers, and during the last 3 months of war only the number of killed by Western powers was still increasing.

Source: Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 12/9 Sept 1962

On possibility to Germany and USSR coming to terms, I generally agree with you, but IMHO even if all those German crimes would have made that very difficult they would not made it absolutely impossible. But IMHO it would not have been possible to adjust between Hitler’s areal and economic aims in the east and what would have been acceptable to Soviets. Also, as you wrote Soviet were winning the production war, so they had no need to yield anything and Germany needed at least the resources of Ukraine and at least some oil.

On the Moscow front, Germans made one big attack there, probably mostly to keep Soviet leaders thinking that they still aimed at Moscow, but it failed badly.

Juha


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## parsifal (Oct 10, 2009)

The "what if" scenario that sees a ceasefire between Germany and Russia pre-supposes further crushing defeats in 1942 inflicted on the Russians by Germany. Without that change of course things will turn out more or less as they did. Further, we know that offensive action in 1942 by Germany was undertaken on "borrowed time and assets", and was ultimately a failure. We could explore alternative to the Fall Blau plan, but I think the more promising scenario to explore is to refuse a further offensive, and adopt a defnsive/offensive posture similar to the one adopted by Manstein immedately after the fall of Stalingrad. If it could work in '43 with inadequate resources, why wouldnt it work even better in 42 with adequate resources, and a weaker, more inexperienced Soviet opponent???


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## Juha (Oct 10, 2009)

Hello Parsifal
Maybe but the main aim of 42 Summer offensive was the oil fiels in Caucasus, only way to get them was the attack. During Summer 42, after the heavy losses in Krim and around Harkova, if Germany would not have attacked, Soviet's would not either.Germany would have been in better position for winter 42/43 fighting but also Soviet troops would have been fresher and more numerous, remember that summer and autumn 42 were very bloody also to Soviet forces and their starting positions would have been much close to all those economic areas of Ukraine, which were very important to German war economy, and Germany's oil situation would still be difficult.

Juha


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## fly boy (Oct 10, 2009)

hey guys i am back again anyone still got that shovel?


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## stasoid (Oct 10, 2009)

parsifal said:


> I think the more promising scenario to explore is to refuse a further offensive, and adopt a defnsive/offensive posture similar to the one adopted by Manstein immedately after the fall of Stalingrad. If it could work in '43 with inadequate resources, why wouldnt it work even better in 42 with adequate resources, and a weaker, more inexperienced Soviet opponent???



Disagree. Time worked for Russians, not for Germans. A Blitzkrieg type offensive was the best option.


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## vanir (Oct 11, 2009)

I've got a pretty good store of primary source material (diary entries, operational instructions, etc.) and a number of publications on Stalingrad as part of some research I've been doing for several years funding a novel.
Having looked over everything I've got, over and over, crawling into different points of view and feeling out every angle I can, quite often looking at the alternative possibilities...

I have to say I've come to the distinct conclusion that all mismanagement aside, Heeresgruppe B was exactly one properly equipped and maintained army short of occupying Stalingrad successfully. Hitler was told this, von Weichs even assumed for a time that holding positions at the Don Bend and simply wiping Stalingrad from the map (at a safe distance) would be enough to satisfy Wehrmacht strategic requirements and this was doable. But as for actually occupying the city, with the Rumanians and Italians on the Flanks and a battle-weary 4th Panzerarmee, what was missing, the only possible way to have countered Uranus was to have had the 17th Armee in reserve holding the Don Bend whilst the 6th Armee and 4th Panzer pressed on Stalingrad, with the 1st Panzer holding the line to Rostov and linking a front with the 11th at Kerch.

Hitler was advised he could have the Caucasus or Stalingrad, not both at once. Either called for a full commitment if there were to be any reserves, this is the standard rationale of strategic warfare and ignoring it cost the entire Southern Front and conspired to lose the entire Eastern Front. He could've had as much as the Kuban and Stalingrad, but what was absolutely needed for the successful occupation of that city was a reserve army behind the 6th.
When the Soviets broke through the Rumanians with literally hundreds of T-34's they had actually been expecting a reserve German regular army to counterattack from the Don Bend region, but there were no German reserves. This turned a violent battle into a Soviet blitzkrieg. Had the 17th Armee been in position there instead of chasing Von Kleist around and attacking naval barracks on the Black Sea, the 6th would never have been encircled, though Stalingrad would still have remained the scene of the bloodiest battle on the Eastern Front thus far.

It was having no reserves that killed the Germans at Stalingrad, and sentenced Heersgruppe B to certain death, in my opinion this singly was the overriding factor. Not equipment or reinforcement, but a fully maintained reserve army holding the Don Bend, forming a continuous fortification up to the front and flanks from the rear supply depots.

Then I think you could bring up mismanagement and tactical errors, but I think those points are muted otherwise.


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## Juha (Oct 11, 2009)

Hello Vanir
I agree that Germans would have been much better of if they had followed the original OKH plan with a proper schwerpunkt, but could even that worked out and especially would it have been possible to hold the gains through winter, that is another question.

Quote:” simply wiping Stalingrad from the map…”

Question is, by what muscle? LW bombed the city very hard, but then it had to divert it forces to other sectors.

Quote:” but there were no German reserves…”

In fact one PzCorps(22nd PzD and Romanian 1st PzD) was ready behind Romanians and the armoured group of 14 PzD ready for counter attack nearer the city and 29 PzGrD, which in fact was the most powerful div in the area and only mech div with reasonable fuel reserves in the area, was ready behind southern part of the city to handle possible problems there. 15th LW Field Div was also in the rear and it was committed against Soviet pincers before they met. That it acted as many LW Field Divs later on did was maybe a surprise to German High Command but it was a fresh full strength infantry div, so Germans reserves were worth of a bit more than two Corpses, no more but no less. And there might have been more, those are the reserve troops which I remember without checking my sources.

Juha


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## vanir (Oct 14, 2009)

Okay that's a little weird because I've got the 14 Panzer and 29 Motorised (PzGr) caught up in the suburb of Yelshanka and the area around the southern train station in October. Certainly not somewhere safely in reserve. In November the 14 Panzer switched to come around at the northern suburbs and pressed at the Barrikady factory along the river bank, forcing Soviet defenders further into the city. But it suffered great attrition during these manoeuvres. It wasn't large tank forces they faced, one tank corps only managed to get about a dozen KV-1, 40 T-34 and about 30 T-70 across the river but the fifty combat worthy tanks were tough as hell, and the little T-70's turned out to be supreme urban-battlewagons, using rubble concealment, a very heavy 45mm gun for their class and their tremendous mobility. Panzers found they could be outmatched in the open and get caught in trouble within the city rubble, the PzIV in particular has its armour concentrated towards the front and is very poorly suited to urban warfare. And we're not even talking about Soviet artillery yet.

On the northwest flank the Soviets held 150km of bridgehead between Kletskaya and Serafimovich from September onwards. The only rearguard allowed to support the Rumanian flank was the two infantry divisions, yes count 'em of VIII Armee K which was all Hitler would allow. Paulus had XI K in addition covering his headquaters, which is effectively the reason they happened to be in the Don Bend region but not as a reserve, they were what Von Weichs hoped was a front, but as they were attached to the 6th Armee it had to be considered a broken front. If Paulus HQ moved, so would they.
This lack of reinforcement was due to Hitler's explicit orders that the XXIV Panzer K was not to leave any rearguard of its armoured formations to protect the flanks maintain a continuous front (one General was sacked for this), which would've turned XI K into a reserve for Paulus. Hitler designated Luftwaffe infantry to support the Rumanians instead, but then in November he cancelled their actual attachment to Rumanian formations due to their inexperience in field operations.

The only arguable reserve you appear to have referenced is the 22 Panzer which had 50 serviceable tanks, the only forces left to hold the Don Bend and these were on standby to counter the expected attack at Kletskaya, but then was redirected to Serafimovich further west. They supposedly reinforced the Rumanian V Armoured Corps (what little of it actually had armour) but what in fact happened was both of them ran headlong into the Soviet 5th Tank Army (something like 500 AFVs) and got pretty much annihilated. Ceased to exist. Whatever was left of the Rumanians on the Don Bend got encircled by three armies and fought to breakout south. For a bit of amusement the Soviet tanks were flanked by two corps of horse riding cavalry, which actually proved exceedingly competent at mopping up entrenched positions after the tanks had rolled past taking out any hardpoints.
And the awkward thing here was acting-Generalfeldmarschall Heersgruppe B von Weichs was giving them one set of orders by radio, and Hitler was sending different orders to them by courier. Go here, no go there, retreat, no don't retreat attack, wait retreat again, no wait go rescue the Rumanians.

Another point, one should recall the manner of replenishment in Stalingrad. The Panzer formations took StuGs from the Motorised formations to replace Panzers and Marders from the Panzerjäger to replace SPG's, the Panzergrenadiers took armoured cars from the scout formations to replace their StuGs and the Panzerjäger took field guns from the Infantry to replace their Marders. When someone asked for reinforcements, if it was absolutely necessary, since no reserves were available Paulus just reassigned battalions as brigade attachments, continuously cannibalising and weakening his formations. Hoth's 4th Panzerarmee (which was really a corps) went from almost no tanks and an infantry division upon arrival to combat worthy again in this fashion for example, back in September. But what it did mean was half his formations were now Czech light tanks and Rad8 armoured cars instead of battle ccompetent Panzers, at least until they were slowly replaced from German rail supply as available (with the latest PzIIIJ, IVG and StuGIIIF which was nice), but it was a much slower process. Hence the Pz div requisitioned StuGs and Marders from the PzGr, etc. And it sapped divisions from elsewhere on the front. The Don Bend was regarded by OKH (clearly stated) as a broken front, which was the cause of severe arguments between Zeitzler and Hitler (who probably wondered why he bothered sacking Halder).

True that during Uranus, at Kletskaya once 22 Panzer struck west the 14 Panzer withdrew from Stalingrad and raced upstream of Kalach, where the German bridgeheads for the 6th Armee had originally been made from the Don Bend. These were the target of the Soviet 65th Army driving southeast as it would cut off the German rear and isolate everything committed to Stalingrad for encirclement. But they were slowed by the XI Armee K rearguard (not particularly well equipped) and the terrain. The 14 Panzer got back across the Don and started furiously counterattacking them before they could press the advantage. What little of 14 Panzer had even managed this famous feat did little more than slow the advance however. In fact the entire XXIV Panzer K including the 3 and 60 Motorised and 16 Panzer had been ordered from the Stalingrad suburbs along with 14 Panzer (which had been variously attached to LI Armee K or 4th Panzerarmee), but they didn't have the fuel or ammunition for it.

By this stage in the South Hoth only had two German divisions left again himself, though he requisitioned the Rumanian 4th Army as attachments. They had no armour or useful antitank capabilities though and were quickly routed in action after losing three divisions to the last when three Soviet armies attacked and broke through. Hoth did pull elements of the 29 Motorised out of the city (which was also variously attached to LI Korps or Hoth) and held it in reserve on the eve of attack, but they got slaughtered when the Rumanians routed and they'd tried to take up the slack.

What wound up happening is five days of brutal attrition and a Soviet linkup at those bridgeheads near Kalach I was talking about. By the end of December Von Weich's described the forces available to Manstein with which to regain the situation as "no more than a strategic expression." The 4th Panzerarmee for example on the 24th November consisted of about three Rumanian infantry and one cavalry division, who had routed quickly enough to escape the slaughter (ordered out to billet on the Kalmuk Steppe Hitler was so upset with them, but alas could not order them all shot because they were all that was left of Gruppe Hoth).

I don't know mate, I'm just not feeling you on the already having reserves thing.

Once again I think that a fully maintained 17th Armee sitting comfortably at Nizne-Chir and reinforcing the Don Bend, well for a start there was always the issue of that 150km bridgehead on the northwest flank. That's what did it. The Soviets sat there for three months happily amassing three armies, a thousand of the latest tanks, 13500 artillery pieces and a million infantry, not including SPG's or katyushkas, right smack bang in full view of Luftwaffe reconnaissance photographs and fly overs. It wasn't any secret. It was simply something there were no reserves to deal with back when it counted.

You know and the 4th Panzerarmee was only ever at corps strength, combine von Kleist and Hoth and you've got one tank army. That's what should've been the southern flank.

Still a horrific battle, but at least an even chance.

As for what to use in the original concept Von Weichs had in mind of sitting back and blasting Stalingrad to oblivion, heavy artillery. Bombers. The fact that the solid and continuous, strongly held Front is now the river Don, 50km west. It would've reversed the situation, with the Werhmacht in a natural fortress and the Soviets needing to extend for attacks, with vulnerable flanks. Otherwise they could just sit there for the next year and blast and bomb away at the place, why ever get closer than about 15km? The place isn't going to be much good as an industrial and transportation centre under those conditions and you can look at tightening the Front up elsewhere on the continent. Bomb Grozny, Maikop and Astrakhan out of existence. Keep it simple, just stop the Soviets from using much, not try to take it all. Plus the bonus is holding the Don and cutting across the Kuban means no US lend lease shipments through the Middle East, they can only use the Siberian railway and that wasn't even fully operational until 1943 after the Americans sent them, well trains, train tracks, engineers, a partridge in a pear tree.


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## Juha (Oct 14, 2009)

Hello Vanir
Quote:” 14 Panzer and 29 Motorised (PzGr) caught up in the suburb of Yelshanka and the area around the southern train station in October…”

Where they were in Oct 42 had little to do where they were 19 Nov 42. Look the unit history of 14PzD for its deployment and Kehrig’s Stalingrad for general picture. 29 PzGrD was withdrawn in rear and was fully re-equipped, for ex got full strength PzAbt, for an attack mission to Caucasus. That’s why it was the most formidable german div besides 24th PzD in the area and the only one with adequate fuel supply.

Quote: “The only arguable reserve you appear to have referenced is the 22 Panzer which had 50 serviceable tanks, the only forces left to hold the Don Bend and these were on standby to counter the expected attack at Kletskaya, but then was redirected to Serafimovich further west. They supposedly reinforced the Rumanian V Armoured Corps (what little of it actually had armour) but what in fact happened was both of them ran headlong into the Soviet 5th Tank Army (something like 500 AFVs) and got pretty much annihilated. Ceased to exist…”

Now if one compared 22nd PzD to other PzDivs it had above average number AFVs. And 1st Romanian ArmD had, IIRC 108 tanks, mostly light Pz38(t) but also some PzIIIs and IVs. The main problem of German Panzer Arm in Nov 42 was the low number of tanks in divisions all along Eastern front. The problem of this XLVIII PzK was that the German radio station at HQ of 1st Rom. Armoured Div broke down and the Corps commander, Heim, lost contact to this div. But one hardly could accuse Herr Hitler on that. And Heim got much of 22nd PzD out of pocket because of he withdrew it to SW instead of ordered SE, for that he was sacked. Also at least part of 1st Rom. Armoured div got out. So the PzCorps didn’t cased to exit even if it suffered heavy losses.

Quote:” Soviet tanks were flanked by two corps of horse riding cavalry, which actually proved exceedingly competent at mopping up entrenched positions after the tanks had rolled past taking out any hardpoints…”

Yes, Soviet cavalry overran also the artillery of the armoured group of 14th PzD, the prize Germans had to pay on decision to employ the group without Panzergrenadiers which were kept fighting in Stalingrad.

As I wrote 29th and 16th PzGrDivs had more armour than any other divs but 24th PzD around Stalingrad and 29th was the most powerful because most of their tanks were PzIV(lang)s, 16th had clealy more PzIII(lang)s than IV(Lang)s.

Quote:” True that during Uranus, at Kletskaya once 22 Panzer struck west the 14 Panzer withdrew from Stalingrad and raced upstream of Kalach…”

Now as I wrote 22 and 1st Romanian. And only the Armoured Group of 14th Pz was moved W of Stalingrad and South of one of Soviet bridgeheads just before the Soviet attack, and attacked, and was attacked by, the Soviet forces which had broken through the Romanians. And yes, at least 16th Pz was so low in fuel that it could just move outside Stalingrad. But just the state of fuel supply of mobile troops around Stalingrad shows why Germans really needed Caucasian oil.

Quote:” Rumanian 4th Army as attachments. They had no armour or useful antitank capabilities though and were quickly routed in action after losing three divisions to the last when three Soviet armies attacked and broke through…”

I wonder who were the troops streaming S and SW in disorder from 4th Rom. Army area if the three divs were lost to the last?

Quote:” Hoth did pull elements of the 29 Motorised out of the city… but they got slaughtered when the Rumanians routed and they'd tried to take up the slack.”

As I wrote 29th was pulled out from the city earlier and replenished and was ready for attack mission towards South and was South of the city when attack started. And they were not slaughtered but fought a hard fight with Soviet armour, end result of which seems to be still debated between German and Soviet military historians, after which it was withdrew by von Weich to cover SE sector of the formatting Stalingrad encirclement. For ex Carell accused von Weich on this, claiming that he chickened and that 29th could have stalled Soviet eastern pincer by fighting a bolt maneuvering campaign against it. To my understanding Russian historians denied that.

Quote:” well for a start there was always the issue of that 150km bridgehead on the northwest flank. That's what did it. The Soviets sat there for three months happily amassing three armies, a thousand of the latest tanks, 13500 artillery pieces and a million infantry, not including SPG's or katyushkas, right smack bang in full view of Luftwaffe reconnaissance photographs and fly overs. It wasn't any secret. It was simply something there were no reserves to deal with back when it counted…”

That was a real problem and it was there a) because Soviet troops had held it during the summer in spite of attacks on them. b)because Germans again underestimate Soviets, see Gehlen’s reports on situation in Eastern front in oct and Nov 42. hitler wasn’t only one who underestimate Soviets.

Quote:” Bomb Grozny, Maikop and Astrakhan out of existence…”

You seem to love the expression, don’t you? Still by what muscle, look Ploesti, all those attacks by USAAF heavy bombers, plus night bombing by British bombers in MTO didn’t bomb it out of existence. I don’t recall LW ever bombed nothing but a couple small country towns/villages in Poland out of existence. Look WM fuel situation during the summer 42 campaign and at Stalingrad, do you really think that they didn’t have need of Caucasian oil. If von Weich though so maybe Herr Hitler was right when he said that the high officers of Heer didn’t understood the significance of economic factors in modern war and Carell when he stated that von Weich was rather short sighted general/field marshall.

Quote:” Plus the bonus is holding the Don and cutting across the Kuban means no US lend lease shipments through the Middle East…”

How? Even by holding a stretch of Volga would not have complete cut the movement of LL assets to the North, and it could not hinder the accumulation of LL aid in the Southern part of the front where in any cases the schwerpunkt of the eastern front was in later part of 42. 

Juha


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