# A myth about the Me 262?



## Jenisch (Aug 1, 2013)

Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, página 462:



> The Me 262, the world's first operational jet fighter, was a truly extraordinary technological achievement. The fact that in 1945, in the most difficult of circumstances, Germany was capable of producing hundreds of these aircraft should give the lie to any claims about the inherent weaknesses in the German 'technological system'. In the list of dei ex machina with which Hitler might have changed the course of the war, it is amongst the most commonly cited. But it is also one of the weapons most surrounded by self-serving post-war mythology. After the war, Ernst Heinkel, Willy Messerschmitt and the chief of Germany's fighter forces Adolf Galland colluded in the construction of a highly one-sided account of theMe 262's history, designed to celebrate the genius of German technology, whilst at the same time demonstrating the incompetence of the Nazi leadership. In their account, popularized in best-selling biographies and television interviews, it was the meddling of Hitler, Göring and Milch that robbed Galland and his valiant fighter pilots of a weapon with which they might have protected Germany against the merciless onslaught of the bombers. This was a myth that appealed to numerous themes in post-war German political culture: regret at the chance of a victory wasted, the consolation provided by the supposed superiority of 'German technology', the self-righteous commemoration of the horror of Allied bombing. But contrary to legend, all the evidence, in fact, suggests that the Reich Air Ministry seized the opportunity of jet power with every possible speed. What prevented the Me 262 from exercising a decisive influence on the air war was not incompetence and conservatism, but the debilitating material limitations of the German war economy.



I'm not surprise to read this. Actually, claims of "utter stupidness" conducted by military and civilian leaders of any country must be viewed with skepticism. I don't know if this information that the Me 262 could not have been produced earlier is indeed factual, therefore if someone objects it, let's discuss.


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## GrauGeist (Aug 1, 2013)

Looks like the author is leaning toward a little bit of revisionism...

The author also disregards the fact that the Germans had jet aircraft technology available to them since the 1930's, the first jet flying on 27 August 1939. The RLM was not interested.

The He280 is available in 1941. The RLM is a little interested.

The Me262 is available in 1942. The RLM considers it.

History and the scores of missed opportunities by the RLM speak for itself.

Heinkel and Messerschmitt would have never collaborated, Heinkel was forever bitter towards Messerschmitt.


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## silence (Aug 1, 2013)

My guess would be, as usually happens with these "AH vs. the Military" themes, that the truth lies somewhere in-between: lack of raw materials, Goering's halting of all long-term projects, and Evil Al's insistence on a Schnellbomber. Etc.


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## GrauGeist (Aug 1, 2013)

The RLM's response to the He178 at the time, was that it had no use for jet aircraft.

The RLM, after seeing the He280 best a Fw190 in both speed trials and dogfighting, still wasn't impressed. Also keep in mind that when the He280 did this, the Me262 prototype had not yet made it's first flight under jet power...

I think that Adam Tooze either has VERY limited access to historical records or sees history from his own perspective.

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## GregP (Aug 1, 2013)

I think Hitler DID meddle, but not to the extent popularly believed. The pacing item seems to have been the turbine blades ... the metalurgy was dicey. Galland was a leader, but if they had listened ONLY to him, would the conduct of the war have changed materially? I can't say.

To me, the issue was more the number of fronts, the timing of opening them, and of not following through with plans that were well considered before they were initiated. 

Hitler always bit off just more than he could chew. He started the war before the readiness plan was complete, he opened the battle of Britian before he had the people and equipment to follow through with it, he occuiped North Africa before the supplies could be placed, and he invaded the Soviet Union before he had the troops and materiel in place and logistics trail to finish the job. 

When they lost so many planes in the Battle oif Britain, he didn't put top priority on replacing the losses and producing the new pilots to fly them. He never did finish the U-boat flotillas as planed and approved before the war started. He didn't support the building of a strong Navy after losing the Graff Spee, Bizmark, and Tirpitz.

Face it, he would NOT listen to his advisors who were, one and all, more qualified to lead and fight a war than he was. Udet and Galland were consumate masters of the air with very competent lieutanants abounding. Rommel was a great ground commander. Doenitz was certainly qualified to organize and lead a Navy. But Hitler knew better and did what he did regardless of advice from the experts.

He was his own worst enemy and I believe that while he did hinder the Me 262, it's development went about as fast as it could have given the fact that there was a war on. In a perfect world, it might have been deployed somewhat earlier, but I have no way of knowing how early that could have been. 

It certainly would not have been as much as ayear eariler ... the turbine blades were just not ready at that time for mass-production, even had it been so ordered.

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## riacrato (Aug 1, 2013)

I'd like to see the author give some evidence that the RLM "seized the opportunity of jet technology with every possible speed". Plenty of evidence points to the contrary, more or less.

Greg, the Tirpitz was lost long after the leadership hoped to get a strong surface Navy, it certainly played no part in the decision to abandon that idea. And by golly, that was an idea that should've never been there in the first place.


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## GrauGeist (Aug 1, 2013)

Dunno, Greg...if Udet hadn't insisted that all thier bombers be dive-bomb capable, that would have changed a great deal right there.

Also, regarding the RLM's lack of interest in the jet program, had they taken an interest in the jet program in 1939 and funded R&D, this would have allowed the engineers to develope the Hirth, Jumo and other engines far before it became a crisis. They would have had jet aircraft far sooner than they did and in a wider variety than just a heavy interceptor, a bomber and a desperate plywood last-ditch effort at war's end.

Of course, none of it matters now, because unlike Tooze's speculation, no matter how many jets they built, Hitler's Reich would have still gone down in flames. It might have taken a little longer and more effort, but the end would have still been the same.


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## davebender (Aug 1, 2013)

Dec 1941. Jumo 004A engine passes 10 hour endurance test.
8 Feb 1942. Albert Speer appointed Minister of Armaments.
.....During his first year in office Albert Speer had power over weapons production so complete that he was armaments dictator for all practical purposes.

1943. Jumo 004A engine passes several 100 hour endurance tests.

Albert Speer pushed BMW801 engine into mass production at a time when service life was considerably less then 100 hours. If he had ordered Jumo 004A engine into mass production then Germany would have operational Me-262 jagdgeschwader at least a year sooner then historical.

I'm not knocking Herr Speer. Hitler thrust an amateur into the armaments minister position and that's what he got. Speer had to guess which aircraft and engines were worth producing. It's not surprising he made some mistakes.


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## GrauGeist (Aug 1, 2013)

davebender said:


> 1943. Jumo 004A engine passes several 100 hour endurance tests.


Did you perhaps mean the 004B?


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## Juha (Aug 1, 2013)

In 1941 Germany didn't have much demand for a fighter with 2 vacuum cleaners under wings, in the main theatre of war in SU it would have been useless on the primitive front line a/fs from which most of LW fighters operated. Same to North Africa. Only in the West it would have been useful, but West was a sideshow in 41-42. And e.g. Willy was clearly more eager to sell 209s than 262s before Göring cancelled 209 program against Willy's will.

Juha


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## davebender (Aug 1, 2013)

Jumo 004B engine did not achieve 100 hour reliability until early 1945. The switch to hollow turbine blades caused vibration problems which required time to sort out.

Jumo 004A was an earlier variant of the same engine which Germany chose not to place into mass production. 80 prototypes were built to allow Me-262 airframe testing and to gain experience with jet engines in general.


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## Civettone (Aug 1, 2013)

Adam Tooze is the unquestionned expert on Nazi German economy. However ... he is clueless about military affairs. He definitely sees things his own way. His book, Wages of Destruction is famous for his thesis that Hitler went to war with Russia to get the resources to attack the US.

And when it is about the first jets. I think we all need to put outselves in the position of those in charge in 1941. Germany had the best fighters in the world and nobody knew a thing about jet propulsion and the importance it was going to acquire. Maybe they should have invested more in the technology, but I can understand that they preferred to stick with what they knew instead of a brand new experimental technology. 

Btw Dave, I think the hollow turbine blades came at the end of 1944, with the 004B-4.

Kris


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## Gixxerman (Aug 1, 2013)

In Hugh Morgan's 'Stormbird Rising' Adolf Galland writes in the introduction 

_"I am of the opinion that with only 300 Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighters we could have on any day shot down a minimum of 200 bombers. If this would have continued for a week or two, then the day bombings would have had to be stopped. 
As a consequence, the dimensions of the destruction of the targets in Germany would have been diminished.
As a negative consequence, the war would most probably have been prolonged and the Russians allowed more time to conquer further German territory. 
So let us now be satisfied with Hitler's mistakes towards the legendary Me 262". _

Yes he blames Hitler - and he undoubtedly did hinder tyhings - but he is obviously convinced that no 'wonder weapon' could fundamentally alter the balance of power, 262 or other, Germany still loses.

The jet engines themselves were the prime cause of the delays but had the potential been seen earlier (and Germany was hardly alone in that, the UK USA took time to see the possibilities of jet power worthwhile enough to go over to them) things might have been different....in the detail.

You still end up with a bunch of nutters running the show in Germany picking a fight with most of the rest of the developed developing world.
I cannot see any way they win that one.

Personally having read up on the subject some I think the electro-boat (type 21 U-boat) had much more potential to alter things as they turned out to knock the UK out of the war - and given that in large part even it was firmly rooted in it WW1 U-boat tech I think that would have been a better bet for Germany, the large investment in the less capable type 7 class need never have happened saving resources giving the KM a much more deadly weapon at sea.
Pre-fab'ed construction (once the bugs were ironed out) could have had them spitting them out like sausages.


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## parsifal (Aug 1, 2013)

German failure in management and leadership was comprehensive, and not limited to just Hitler. Hitlers mismangement was significant, but then so too were the failures of nearly ever significant figure within the Nazi regime. There were a few exceptions to this blanket indictment, like Speer and Milch

However, WWII in the air was a war a of numbers more than quality. So much of the losses were simply attritional over service related, that reducing numbers, to make way for the introduction of a new type simply made no sense.

The big lie is not that Hitler did or did not oppose the early introduction of the 262. The big lie is that the early introduction would have fundamentally changed the air war.

1400 262s were built. They shot down about 150 allied aircraft. That is not the hallmark of a war winning tech. its the hallmark of an abject failure


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## davebender (Aug 1, 2013)

By 1943 USA and Britain/Canada were spitting out ASW ships and aircraft like sausages. Germany could not even maintain control over coastal waters which U boats had to transit to/ from port. Difficult to see what any diesel electric submarine could accomplish in such an environment.


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## Milosh (Aug 1, 2013)

1400 is what has been published but a person who has done a lot of research on the Me262 says the number is closer to 2000.


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## silence (Aug 1, 2013)

And as I remember reading somewhere it was difficult just to get them to the squadrons.


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## OldSkeptic (Aug 1, 2013)

The problem was (again) their dysfunctional engine manufacturing/R&D effort. They went for an axial flow design, chasing 'perfection' at the expense of getting something that works.
It took years before axial flow engines were perfected.

At the time the centrifugal flow engine was by far the best bet, since it could directly use expertise in superchargers.
For example, RR had done the 5,000lb Nene by the end of the war and the production engines they had were all better than what the Germans had (performance, reliability and fuel economy).


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## Juha (Aug 1, 2013)

Gixxerman said:


> In Hugh Morgan's 'Stormbird Rising' Adolf Galland writes in the introduction
> 
> _"I am of the opinion that with only 300 Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighters we could have on any day shot down a minimum of 200 bombers. If this would have continued for a week or two, then the day bombings would have had to be stopped.
> As a consequence, the dimensions of the destruction of the targets in Germany would have been diminished.
> ...



Ah, Galland was one of those who agreed in the production conference chaired by Milch on 31 Mar 43 that it would be an error to follow Oberst Dinort's proposal to drop 209 and concentrate everything on the 262.

And greatest number of 262 day fighter sorties flown was 76 on 10 April 45, USAAF lost 19 bombers and 8 fighters on that day, but 31 Me 262s were shot down. And because USAAF fighters strafed extensively on that day (they were credited with 309 strafing kills altogether) at least some of US losses fell to the Flak.

Juha


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## Gixxerman (Aug 1, 2013)

davebender said:


> By 1943 USA and Britain/Canada were spitting out ASW ships and aircraft like sausages. Germany could not even maintain control over coastal waters which U boats had to transit to/ from port. Difficult to see what any diesel electric submarine could accomplish in such an environment.



I think the point is Dave that the type 21 was the first true submarine and because it turns out the tech isn't especially 'special' they could have had it in place of the type 7's.
Obviously without the late sensors acoustic matting....but a U-boat with underwater speed range as the type 21 had in 1939/40 might have seen the UK lose the BoA and be forced out of the war.
Given that as it was the type 7's gave the UK Gov sleepless nights aplenty I don't think it too big a stretch.
ASW tech of the time would have a very hard time dealing with the much faster electro-boat (especially with its submerged speed).
Lose that and no D-day how likely is the USA to go it alone?




Juha said:


> Ah, Galland was one of those who agreed in the production conference chaired by Milch on 31 Mar 43 that it would be an error to follow Oberst Dinort's proposal to drop 209 and concentrate everything on the 262.
> 
> And greatest number of 262 day fighter sorties flown was 76 on 10 April 45, USAAF lost 19 bombers and 8 fighters on that day, but 31 Me 262s were shot down. And because USAAF fighters strafed extensively on that day (they claimed 284 strafing kills altogether) at least some of US losses fell to the Flak.
> 
> Juha



You were expecting consistency?
I think the thing going on here is Galland had time to think about it later, after the war, and saw Me 262 making no difference to the outcome, just the level of ruin to Germany (which was catastrophic as it was) and the degree of western European Sovier occupation.

...and it should be not be forgotten buying the Nazi leadership more time to pursue their revolting program of industrial murder.


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## pattle (Aug 1, 2013)

I think the golden rule is we only know what we read. One person reads one thing and another person reads something else, then we argue over who read what was the true version of events and all the time none of us were actually witnesses to what actually happened anyway. I have noticed that a few people on here can get quite rude and aggressive when another person doesn't agree with the version of events that they have chosen to accept. 
I just think that with hindsight in 1945 as in 2013 it is easy to see just how good jet engines were, but in 1940 they were just another thing on the drawing board that may or may not have lived up to expectations.


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## Juha (Aug 1, 2013)

IMHOby the time LW got tactics right for 262 Allied had learned effective anti-jet tactics and real world results shows that 200 Me 262s would not have changed much in fact I don't like the way how G "forgot" JG 7, the main 262 fighter unit and the fact is that in early Apr 45 LW had 180 Me 262s in day fighter units, I seriously doubt that 120 more would have made any big difference, whatever Galland said.

On subs, on the other hand RN had in late WWI hunter-killer subs, the R-Class with 14knots underwater speed, but the last was scrapped in 1934 because RN saw no need for the special hunter-killers.


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## davebender (Aug 1, 2013)

Jumo 004A engine could have been mass produced during 1943. 

Are you suggesting it was possible to mass produce a reliable jet engine before 1943?


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## Juha (Aug 1, 2013)

davebender said:


> Jumo 004A engine could have been mass produced during 1943.
> 
> Are you suggesting it was possible to mass produce a reliable jet engine before 1943?



IIRC the reason why 004A was not put into production was that it used too much strategic metals which were very scare in Germany.

Juha


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 1, 2013)

I bet 1500 Meteors shooting down 150 Luftwaffe planes would be an example of hreat success...

Ok, I will show myself the door.


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## Juha (Aug 1, 2013)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> I bet 1500 Meteors shooting down 150 Luftwaffe planes would be an example of hreat success...
> 
> Ok, I will show myself the door.



Oh I don't catch it. Most of us seem to think that 262 was a better fighter than Meteor III.

Juha


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## GregP (Aug 1, 2013)

According to Adolph Galland, about 1,430 Me 262's were accepted for Luftwaffe service, but no more than about 300 total saw combat, with no more than about 50 - 60 in service at any one time. If anyone would know, he should know.

The few that saw combat shot down about 150 Allied planes.

Given the engine life issues, I don't think it did all that badly. It was a case of new technology not quite mastered in time to make a difference, but it certainly showed the way for future generations of jet fighters.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 1, 2013)

Juha said:


> Oh I don't catch it. Most of us seem to think that 262 was a better fighter than Meteor III.
> 
> Juha



I am just takinga fun stab at certain people. It is all meant in fun, nothing else.

I bet the same people consider two P-80's operational even more of a success...


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 1, 2013)

GregP said:


> According to Adolph Galland, about 1,430 Me 262's were accepted for Luftwaffe service, but no more than about 300 total saw combat, with no more than about 50 - 60 in service at any one time. If anyone would know, he should know.
> 
> The few that saw combat shot down about 150 Allied planes.
> 
> Given the engine life issues, I don't think it did all that badly. It was a case of new technology not quite mastered in time to make a difference, but it certainly showed the way for future generations of jet fighters.



Oh quit it now! You are making sense.

Just more fun. No one should get butt hurt...


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## GrauGeist (Aug 1, 2013)

davebender said:


> Jumo 004B engine did not achieve 100 hour reliability until early 1945. The switch to hollow turbine blades caused vibration problems which required time to sort out.
> 
> Jumo 004A was an earlier variant of the same engine which Germany chose not to place into mass production. 80 prototypes were built to allow Me-262 airframe testing and to gain experience with jet engines in general.


The 004A had vibration problems. The alloy compressor blades were switched out for steel units and bench tested with a 10 hour endurance with positive results. This was in December 1941. 3 months later it was carried up by a Bf110 for testing.

In 1943, the 004B was tested several times with 100 hour runs. Some of the 004B units developed vibration problems but was solved by changing the compressor blade's taper. The 004B weighed over 200 pounds less because of a change in the materials and this also led to a shorter service life (10-25 hours) on average.

(Not sure where you're getting your info...I use Pavelec and Meher-Homji for reference.)


davebender said:


> Jumo 004A engine could have been mass produced during 1943.
> 
> Are you suggesting it was possible to mass produce a reliable jet engine before 1943?


The answer is yes. Like I posted earlier in the thread, *if* the RLM had taken Von Ohain and Heinkel seriously in the late 30's and sponsored the R&D nessecary, they could have had key issues worked out before the war began in earnest and production became a crisis resulting in mad scramble for materials, hiding production facilities and so on.

The timeline:
Dr. Wagner started his design of the axial turbine in 1935. 
Von Ohain successfully tested his He S3a in 1937.
The He178 successfully flew, powered by a He S3B on 27 August 1939.
Jumo004A first tested October 1940
The He280 was demonstrated to Udet on 5 April 1941, who showed no interest.
The Me262 first flew under jet power 18 July 1942 (with a tail wheel).
Jumo 004A ordered into production by RLM August 1942.
The Ar234 first flew 15 June 1943.
Jumo 004B production begins January 1944.
BMW003 ready for mass production August 1944.
He162 successfully flew 6 December 1944.
January 1945 everyone's in a blind panic and coming up with space ships, flying lawn darts and God only knows what...far too late for any coherent jet engine development by this stage...

So in view of the early development of the jet engines, had the RLM taken an interest in this technology, and funded research during the prewar years, alot of progress could have been made when desperation was not a priority.


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## awack (Aug 1, 2013)

> And greatest number of 262 day fighter sorties flown was 76 on 10 April 45, USAAF lost 19 bombers and 8 fighters on that day, but 31 Me 262s were shot down. And because USAAF fighters strafed extensively on that day (they were credited with 309 strafing kills altogether) at least some of US losses fell to the Flak.



This combat record is what makes me hold the me 262 in such high regard, US fighters were staggered meaning that the me 262s climbing to take on the bomber formations were attacked from 6000ft then 8000ft and so on....yet they were able to score victories, imagine instead of me 262s they were Fw 190 D9, P51 D, or Spitfire 14, how well do you think they would have fared.


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## parsifal (Aug 2, 2013)

awack said:


> This combat record is what makes me hold the me 262 in such high regard, US fighters were staggered meaning that the me 262s climbing to take on the bomber formations were attacked from 6000ft then 8000ft and so on....yet they were able to score victories, imagine instead of me 262s they were Fw 190 D9, P51 D, or Spitfire 14, how well do you think they would have fared.



Not much better than the historical types that actually fought. why...because the overwhelming majority of losses for both sides had nothing to do with fighter, provided both sides had fighter. 

What the germans needed over quality was quantity, and the Me 262 didnt go to that. in fact, because of the difficulties in serviceability for the new type, it would be quite arguable that the type would have acted to decrease the effectiveness of German air defences. its the same argument as that which dogs the tiger tank fans.


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## Jenisch (Aug 2, 2013)

Anyway, the Me 262 was something necessary. If the war had continued, the Allies would have fielded their jets (actually the British were already doing it by the war's end, but only over their lines). However, by 1944 the question for the LW was not how to survive, but which would be the better way to inflict the most casualities in the enemy before the defeat.


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## Juha (Aug 2, 2013)

GregP said:


> According to Adolph Galland, about 1,430 Me 262's were accepted for Luftwaffe service, but no more than about 300 total saw combat, with no more than about 50 - 60 in service at any one time. If anyone would know, he should know.



Yes, he should but on 9 Apr 45 there were about 200 in front line units of which 180 were day fighters, according to Price. Maybe he really forgot that there was JG 7.



GregP said:


> The few that saw combat shot down about 150 Allied planes.
> 
> Given the engine life issues, I don't think it did all that badly. It was a case of new technology not quite mastered in time to make a difference, but it certainly showed the way for future generations of jet fighters.



That is ok, I think.

Juha


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## GregP (Aug 2, 2013)

Beat me. Make me feel cheap.

I think the production rates really ramped up in Septober, Octember, and Nowonder, 1944.


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## Civettone (Aug 2, 2013)

Gixxerman said:


> Personally having read up on the subject some I think the electro-boat (type 21 U-boat) had much more potential to alter things as they turned out to knock the UK out of the war - and given that in large part even it was firmly rooted in it WW1 U-boat tech I think that would have been a better bet for Germany, the large investment in the less capable type 7 class need never have happened saving resources giving the KM a much more deadly weapon at sea.
> Pre-fab'ed construction (once the bugs were ironed out) could have had them spitting them out like sausages.


Not really, at most one Elektroboot could be constructed per day. If the Germans were to win the Battle of the Atlantic, they needed hundreds of operational subs at any given time. And that is assuming that these subs have the edge as they did in 1941. 
Do not get me wrong, I think the XII was an amazing machine, far ahead of its time, and close to impossible to destroy. In fact, it was faster than the US Fido torpedo. 
But I assume we are getting off topic, maybe something for the general WW2 forum??

Kris


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## Tante Ju (Aug 2, 2013)

parsifal said:


> What the germans needed over quality was quantity, and the Me 262 didnt go to that. in fact, because of the difficulties in serviceability for the new type, it would be quite arguable that the type would have acted to decrease the effectiveness of German air defences. its the same argument as that which dogs the tiger tank fans.


 
In fact there was nothing wrong with Tiger servicibility (which was pretty much the same as the ordinary German tanks like Pz IV, and better than Panther) or that of the Me 262. Its just a fact that that dogs detractors of both.


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## stona (Aug 2, 2013)

GrauGeist said:


> I think that Adam Tooze either has VERY limited access to historical records or sees history from his own perspective.



You'd be very wrong about the first bit (a google of his name will reveal his credentials) but you'd be very right about the second bit. He is a historian who does not avoid controversy but like all others interprets the data in ways that we might not all agree with.
He has made important contributions to the understanding of the economic effects in Germany of the allied military effort, notably the bombing campaigns of the RAF and USAAF, as well as the inter war German economic situation.
Cheers
Steve


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## pattle (Aug 2, 2013)

Maybe the Ta152 would have had more impact than the Me262? I know you could argue that the Ta152 was a later aircraft than Me262 as there were fewer produced by wars end and that even those few were not perfected, you could also argue over how good the Ta152 actually was as it was never properly tried against the Mustang.
The proposition I am trying to make is would it have been better in principle to have switched production to a much improved piston fighter than to the Me262. Had the alternative option of the Ta152 been there it would have offered a number of advantages over the Me262 which while being a superb aircraft had it's disadvantages and possible Achilles heals. This is not a assertion only a suggestion.
I feel that the Me262's greatest supporters are it's biggest critics by placing to much faith in it, it sort of makes me think of a pushy parent with to greater expectations of it's child abilities.


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## Civettone (Aug 2, 2013)

The Ta 152 might have been better than the P-51, but that is not what the Germans needed. If the Germans wanted to tip the scales, they needed an aircraft which was far advanced to anything the Allies had. This is the only way they could break free from their numerical inferiority. 
In fact, that was the idea behind the wonder weapons: Germany could not outproduce its enemies, so it had no choice but to rely on technological superiority. They failed to achieve this, or at least in time.


Kris


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## Jenisch (Aug 2, 2013)

Civettone said:


> The Ta 152 might have been better than the P-51



Better than the P-51H?


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## Erich (Aug 2, 2013)

insufficient numbers of 262's on any front the only real unit was JG 7 and look where the over-worked had to serve, a couple adhocs made ground attack impressions and some voctires aerially against the soviets in the lat months. the lack of suitable ground to air defenses was a definite trouble for the jet units 

the Ta was no batter than any mark of the 51 no operational records during the war to even compare so don't try..........


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## stona (Aug 2, 2013)

Nobody has yet pointed out that one of the reasons that there were so few Me 262s in service was that the Luftwaffe lacked the infrastructure to support them. That goes for spares and maintenance facilities as well as trained personnel.
Introducing a new type into squadron service, never mind a type with a new and novel propulsion system, is never as simple as armchair Air Marshall's would have us believe. Add to that the pressure under which the Luftwaffe was operating in late 1944/45 and it was nearly impossible. Operating the new aircraft from forests and autobahns would not have been first choice for Luftwaffe commanders.
Cheers
Steve


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## Erich (Aug 2, 2013)

there was the accepted idea that the LW could operate effectively with pitso-engines and the LW seems only the pilots were wishing for a drastic change......gie us the damn jets NOW ! seems trained pilots were there or going through the stages but getting airborne without getting killed by escorts was another matter as you do a circuit, for many in JG 7 and JV 44 it was a scape goat to get out of the war which they effectively chose.......


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## GrauGeist (Aug 2, 2013)

Jenisch said:


> Better than the P-51H?


The P-51H never saw combat...too late for the ETO and several units made it to the PTO before Japan surrendered but again, none ever saw combat.

Comparing it to the Ta152 enters the realm of *what if*...


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 2, 2013)

GrauGeist said:


> The P-51H never saw combat...too late for the ETO and several units made it to the PTO before Japan surrendered but again, none ever saw combat.
> 
> Comparing it to the Ta152 enters the realm of *what if*...



Thats ok though if the allied planes numbers are superior...


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## GregP (Aug 2, 2013)

The Ta 152 made the war in the last month of it. The P-51H did, too. The amount of combat the Ta 152 saw was miniscule. It is a valid comparison. Had the Germans been sucessful in extending the was in Europe (they weren't) that's exactly the plane they'd have been flying against.

The Ta 152 and P-51H would have been a good matchup with little to choose unless the GM-1 ran out.


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## GrauGeist (Aug 2, 2013)

Unlike the Ta152, the P-51H never fired it's guns in anger. It arrived in the ETO after hostilities ceased and it was arriving in the PTO in the closing weeks of the war and while being in theater, it never encountered any Japanese warplanes.

The P-51H had a legacy much like the F8F Bearcat, which also arrived too late for combat duty. Both were much anticipated but never engaged the enemy. Of course the Bearcat saw sevice later on, unlike the P-51H, but that's for another thread...


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## davebender (Aug 2, 2013)

Which metals are you referring to?


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## Mike Williams (Aug 2, 2013)

Jenisch said:


> Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, página 462:
> 
> The Me 262, the world's first operational jet fighter, was a truly extraordinary technological achievement. The fact that in 1945, in the most difficult of circumstances, Germany was capable of producing hundreds of these aircraft should give the lie to any claims about the inherent weaknesses in the German 'technological system'. In the list of dei ex machina with which Hitler might have changed the course of the war, it is amongst the most commonly cited. But it is also one of the weapons most surrounded by self-serving post-war mythology. After the war, Ernst Heinkel, Willy Messerschmitt and the chief of Germany's fighter forces Adolf Galland colluded in the construction of a highly one-sided account of theMe 262's history, designed to celebrate the genius of German technology, whilst at the same time demonstrating the incompetence of the Nazi leadership. In their account, popularized in best-selling biographies and television interviews, it was the meddling of Hitler, Göring and Milch that robbed Galland and his valiant fighter pilots of a weapon with which they might have protected Germany against the merciless onslaught of the bombers. This was a myth that appealed to numerous themes in post-war German political culture: regret at the chance of a victory wasted, the consolation provided by the supposed superiority of 'German technology', the self-righteous commemoration of the horror of Allied bombing. But contrary to legend, all the evidence, in fact, suggests that the Reich Air Ministry seized the opportunity of jet power with every possible speed. What prevented the Me 262 from exercising a decisive influence on the air war was not incompetence and conservatism, but the debilitating material limitations of the German war economy.



That's a very interesting passage and a nice piece of writing; thanks for sharing Jenisch! Adam Tooze certainly has the requisite scholarship, credentials and standing to write authoritatively about such matters. In particular the _"regret at the chance of a victory wasted, the consolation provided by the supposed superiority of 'German technology', the self-righteous commemoration of the horror of Allied bombing"_ are indeed sentiments very evident even in historic aviation forums, this board not exempted.


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## riacrato (Aug 2, 2013)

Whereas you are of course the most neutral person to ever walk the earth.

Maybe Galland has a bit of a "selective memory", how do you expect a man who actually fought the war, instead of just looking back at it from 50+ years distance in a comfy chair, to stay completely neutral and accept the eventual completeness of his defeat? People ought to be a little more sensible and maybe respectful about that.

And no, we do not live in the 50s or 60s any longer. I don't think any of our younger generation of Germans believe that the war could've been won if we had the Me 262 or Panther or V2 or <enter wonder weapon name> 2-3 years earlier. Except for some neo nazis maybe. An entirely different story. And I don't think any of those are present on this forum.


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## Juha (Aug 2, 2013)

davebender said:


> Which metals are you referring to?



Hello Dave.
chromium, tungsten, molybdeum and nickel.

Juha


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## davebender (Aug 2, 2013)

Jumo 004A engine used less chromium then DB605A engine.

Germany had plenty of nickel and molybdenum during 1943. That didn't change until Finland and Donetz Basin switched sides.

Not sure about tungsten. Do you have data on tungsten requirements for Jumo 004A and DB605A engines?


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## parsifal (Aug 2, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> In fact there was nothing wrong with Tiger servicibility (which was pretty much the same as the ordinary German tanks like Pz IV, and better than Panther) or that of the Me 262. Its just a fact that that dogs detractors of both.




54% of Tigers were lost to non-combat related causes, more than double the rate of their mediums (not talking about the panther). According to Chris Willbeck, at Page 187 of his book, (Strengths Flaws Of the Tiger Tanl Battalions)

"_The high degree of maintenance required to keep the Tiger and King Tiger tanks operating was one of their biggest deficiencies. This usually resulted in a low operational rate for tanks within the heavy tank battalions, especially after extended periods of combat. The tendency of the Tigers to break down, coupled with the weight of the tanks, made recovery difficult. The failure to field a suitable recovery vehicle, with the exception of the Bergepanther after mid-1944, or to field them in sufficient quantities, resulted in the loss of Tigers in many instances _".

This failing is perhaps best illustrated by the Tiger Tank Battalion supporting Peiper near Stavelot. 45 crossed the border, more that 20 lost due to breakdowns before any contact was made, Delyed, then fell back, Just 7 returned across the border roughly 1 week later. Many were lost, abandoned due to lack of fuel, but thats not true for the early part of the campaign. they just were junk as far as serviceability was concerned. 


we can find similar abysmal serviceability rates for the 262. just ask (or read) Galland


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## parsifal (Aug 2, 2013)

German defeat was not just about the failure of a few individuals at the top. its defeat was total, from top to bottom, a defeat of all things and all people who aligned with the german cause. german methods, ideas, procedures, organizations, strategy and tactics were all comprehensively and irrecoverably defeated. Why? Numbers, mismanagement, lack of resources, but the failure was comprehensive, total


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## pattern14 (Aug 2, 2013)

Regardless of how you approach this subject, the Me 262 could have never affected the course of a war already lost. Jet engines, swept wings, air to air rockets etc did not compensate for lack of skilled pilots, and lack of pilot training. There was almost no chance of developing effective tactics to make the best use of the new fighter, which was totally outnumbered anyway. So much has been written about this plane, but the fact remains that it made no difference to the final outcome. Its legacy lives on though.


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## Tante Ju (Aug 2, 2013)

parsifal said:


> German methods, ideas, procedures, organizations, strategy and tactics were all comprehensively and irrecoverably defeated. Why?



And then copied. Why?



parsifal said:


> 54% of Tigers were lost to non-combat related causes, more than double the rate of their mediums (not talking about the panther).



I am pretty sure most Tigers (meaning the big furry things with the funny stripes) die of an old age and due to diseases, probably a much larger percentage then the % of boars, pigs, deer, or whater the Tiger eats.


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## davebender (Aug 2, 2013)

I'm under the impression German pilot quality was still pretty good during 1943.


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## GregP (Aug 2, 2013)

Parsifal said, 

"German defeat was not just about the failure of a few individuals at the top. its defeat was total, from top to bottom, a defeat of all things and all people who aligned with the german cause. german methods, ideas, procedures, organizations, strategy and tactics were all comprehensively and irrecoverably defeated."


Sorry Parsifal, I don't get that. 

Yeah, they lost the war, but methods, procedures, tactics? Their weapons were pretty good, procedures are just procedures, and almost everyone used similar tactics in simnilar situations at SOME time. Not saying you are wrong ... saying I don't understand why all things German were defeated.

If nothing else, at least they gave us Sauerbratten and sauerkraut ... gotta' say "thanks" for those ... cheers.


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## silence (Aug 2, 2013)

parsifal said:


> This failing is perhaps best illustrated by the Tiger Tank Battalion supporting Peiper near Stavelot. 45 crossed the border, more that 20 lost due to breakdowns before any contact was made, Delyed, then fell back, Just 7 returned across the border roughly 1 week later. Many were lost, abandoned due to lack of fuel, but thats not true for the early part of the campaign. they just were junk as far as serviceability was concerned.



Note that those were Tiger IIs, not Tiger Is.

Estimated Panzer Serviceability in Normandy:
Tiger I and II – 56% (based on a sample of 30 serviceability returns)
Panzer IV – 67% (based on a sample of 61)
Panther – 65% (based on a sample of 43)

Note that this is both short term and long-term. The Wehrmacht kept any panzer that needed two weeks or less service on its TO&E; the US Army, otoh, passed any tank needing only three days or more back to the rear and removed it from the TO&E.

Inability to recover tanks while retreating was the bane of the Wehrmacht. Its much easier to recover a tank when its not behind enemy lines!!


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## silence (Aug 2, 2013)

GregP said:


> Parsifal said,
> 
> "German defeat was not just about the failure of a few individuals at the top. its defeat was total, from top to bottom, a defeat of all things and all people who aligned with the german cause. german methods, ideas, procedures, organizations, strategy and tactics were all comprehensively and irrecoverably defeated."
> 
> ...



I read an interesting book where the author's thesis was basically that the Germans lost WWI and WWII because of overconfidence, underestimating their enemy, and flaws in their strategic thinking. The campaign against Soviet Russia perfectly illustrates this.

Don't forget the St, Pauli Girl, Greg!


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## tyrodtom (Aug 2, 2013)

silence said:


> I read an interesting book where the author's thesis was basically that the Germans lost WWI and WWII because of overconfidence, underestimating their enemy, and flaws in their strategic thinking. The campaign against Soviet Russia perfectly illustrates this.
> 
> Don't forget the St, Pauli Girl, Greg!



You can say the same thing about most countries that come out on the losing side of a war. 
Very few nations would enter into a war if they thought they had no chance at winning it.


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## GregP (Aug 2, 2013)

Absolutey can't forget the beer ...

Though I don't want to put words into Parsifal's mouth, I think he means that all things Nazi were defeated. Though the Nazis were largely associated with Germany, not all Germans were Nazis and not all Nazis were German. People also tend to forget (not saying Parsifal forgot ...) that millions of Germans were killed in concentration camps along with millions of Jews. It wasn't all one-sided.

I decry the Nazis ... not Germans or things German. Another point, many people in Germany HAD to join the party in order to survive. Doesn't mean they agreed with the Nazis. Means they wanted to eat and survive. 

One of my old friends was a WWII vet who married a German girl after the war. When it ended she was a 16-year old aircraft spotter in a tower. She had to join the Nazi party to eat, but was never a Nazi. Her weapon consisted of a pair of binoculars and she would call in planes she sighted with altitude, speed, and heading. She didn't need to call in position because the tower number located her on the map.

Her descriptions of what life was like in 1944 - 1945 in German were very emotional and telling. She said that after the war, when she got to the USA, she was called "Nazi" in her neighborhood, and all she could do was cry about it. Her war efforts were making soup and spotting airplanes. Big, bad German woman, huh? Her main concern in the late war was where her next meal was going to come from. Sometimes they were several days apart.


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## silence (Aug 2, 2013)

Very true.


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## pattle (Aug 2, 2013)

Erich said:


> insufficient numbers of 262's on any front the only real unit was JG 7 and look where the over-worked had to serve, a couple adhocs made ground attack impressions and some voctires aerially against the soviets in the lat months. the lack of suitable ground to air defenses was a definite trouble for the jet units
> 
> the Ta was no batter than any mark of the 51 no operational records during the war to even compare so don't try..........



As I said in my original post I was not asserting that the Ta152 would have been a better bet than the Me262, I was only suggesting it. Having said that you can't say in the same breath that the Ta152 was no better than the Mustang and that both planes can not be compared, it is contradictory.


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## pattle (Aug 2, 2013)

Civettone said:


> The Ta 152 might have been better than the P-51, but that is not what the Germans needed. If the Germans wanted to tip the scales, they needed an aircraft which was far advanced to anything the Allies had. This is the only way they could break free from their numerical inferiority.
> In fact, that was the idea behind the wonder weapons: Germany could not outproduce its enemies, so it had no choice but to rely on technological superiority. They failed to achieve this, or at least in time.
> 
> I wasn't saying the Ta152 would of won the war for the Germans, I was only suggesting that it may have proved more successful than the Me262 under the circumstances that existed, and there were a lot of unfavourable circumstances conspiring against the Me262.


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## pattern14 (Aug 3, 2013)

davebender said:


> I'm under the impression German pilot quality was still pretty good during 1943.


 It was, and many aces were produced during that year as they got amongst the bombers prior to being outnumbered by escorts. Much the same against the Russians, which rarely get a mention by comparison. By late 1944/early 45, pilot training dropped to an average of 25 hours each ( compared to 150 hours for an average U.S pilot, who also trained without the continuous bombardment, marauding ground attack aircraft, sabotage, lack of fuel etc). By that stage, it was all over bar the shouting.


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## Civettone (Aug 3, 2013)

pattern14 said:


> It was, and many aces were produced during that year as they got amongst the bombers prior to being outnumbered by escorts. Much the same against the Russians, which rarely get a mention by comparison. By late 1944/early 45, pilot training dropped to an average of 25 hours each ( compared to 150 hours for an average U.S pilot, who also trained without the continuous bombardment, marauding ground attack aircraft, sabotage, lack of fuel etc). By that stage, it was all over bar the shouting.


I assume you are talking about specialized fighter training, not the whole training. For instance, American pilot training was well over 300-400 hours.




pattle said:


> I wasn't saying the Ta152 would of won the war for the Germans, I was only suggesting that it may have proved more successful than the Me262 under the circumstances that existed, and there were a lot of unfavourable circumstances conspiring against the Me262.


Understood. My point is that Germany could no longer hope to win the air war with _any_ piston-engined fighters, no matter how good. In order to still make the difference, it needed weapons which were a generation ahead of its opponents. 

Kris


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## stona (Aug 3, 2013)

Civettone said:


> Understood. My point is that Germany could no longer hope to win the air war with _any_ piston-engined fighters, no matter how good. In order to still make the difference, it needed weapons which were a generation ahead of its opponents.
> Kris



I think that view was held by some Germans at the time. I think with hindsight we can say that even with the deployment of the Me 262 and other advanced aircraft Germany was in no position to win the air war.
She was being overwhelmed and nothing would have prevented the situation that developed by mid 1944 onwards.
Cheers
Steve


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## Erich (Aug 3, 2013)

my statements are not contradictory. the Ta and P-51 never met in combat. Tanks version while flying the C and leaving P-51 D's far behind is probably very spurious. lets not bring uy the disasters we have with what if's and a bazillion silly charts.....

the Ta was created to engage the high alt P-51 marks not to engage heavy bombers of course it was never able to carry out this missions 99 % activity was against the Soviets at medium alt with a few Tempest engagements at same alt. the Lw freely admitted amongst it's circles it had to knock out US/BC heavy bomber formations at whatever cost, that included a dynamic and pushed up non t4ried Me 262 program what was produced in the A variants to be supplanted and replaced by more streamlined-updated versions reset fule tanks and arms. something of course never allowed yet time enough to be approved and committed. even Kurt welter with his merry little band of NF's knew full well that chasing Mosquitos of intruder and LSNF was a waste of time and the future would be the two seater but re-arraigned to more his and his crew experience - again never seen, so they dealt with modified crappy trainers and inadequate radar systems.


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## stona (Aug 3, 2013)

And yet the "cutting edge" revolutionary aircraft to knock down the bombers were the rocket powered Ba 349 and Me 163 (what happened to that idea for an interceptor?) or jet aircraft like the Me 262 and He 162 which at least were a doorway to the future.
What realistic chance did Germany have?
Cheers
Steve


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## parsifal (Aug 3, 2013)

GregP said:


> Parsifal said,
> 
> 
> 
> ...


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## Civettone (Aug 3, 2013)

stona said:


> I think that view was held by some Germans at the time. I think with hindsight we can say that even with the deployment of the Me 262 and other advanced aircraft Germany was in no position to win the air war.
> She was being overwhelmed and nothing would have prevented the situation that developed by mid 1944 onwards.
> Cheers
> Steve


I disagree. Given more time, the Me 262, Me 263, Ba 349 and He 162 armed with R4Ms would have stopped the Bomber offensive. In the end, it failed to do so, because there was not enough fuel and trained pilots. Plus, I assume the early radar warning system had collapsed in the Spring of 1945. 

But that does not take away that the jet interceptor was definitely the only way to go.
Kris


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## jim (Aug 3, 2013)

parsifal said:


> GregP said:
> 
> 
> > Parsifal said,
> ...


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## CobberKane (Aug 3, 2013)

What I don't know about strategy would fill books, but it does seem to me that if 262 was ever going to have any chance of halting the allied bombing campaign it would have had to have been available in numbers before things wound up by 1944. By that I mean the 262 might have retained air superiority for the LW, but I don't think it could ever have regained it.
My thinking is that, hypothetically, had the LW been able to send up, say, 200 262s with well trained pilots in 1944 they would undoubtedly have given the USAAF quite a mauling - for a while. But the 262s themselves would have become the prime object of Allied tactics. Allied fighters - which were never particularly vulnerable to the 262 - would have been swarming over LW airfields before and after raids. Bombing, including night bombing, would have been directed towards anything to do with it. I don't think 262 production could have stood that for long. I know German industry managed to re supply the LW with conventional aircraft even in the face of allied bombing, but I think the 262 would have been particularly vulnerable in this respect. It was far more time consuming to build than even the most advanced conventional fighters. It's engines required replacement every ten hours. In an operational sense, it shot itself down every two weeks or so. In the face of concentrated Allied attention, I think the 262, for all it's potential would have withered on the vine.
Now, if the 262 had been available in number before the daylight bombing campaign got under way, that might have been different. In fact I can feel a new thread coming on. I'm off to post it now.


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## Jenisch (Aug 3, 2013)

Civettone said:


> I disagree. Given more time, the Me 262, Me 263, Ba 349 and He 162 armed with R4Ms would have stopped the Bomber offensive. In the end, it failed to do so, because there was not enough fuel and trained pilots. Plus, I assume the early radar warning system had collapsed in the Spring of 1945.
> 
> But that does not take away that the jet interceptor was definitely the only way to go.
> Kris



Indeed. We should not underestimate the WM. Even the D-Day was not something that Commanders were not sure it would work.


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## GrauGeist (Aug 3, 2013)

Civettone said:


> I disagree. Given more time, the Me 262, Me 263, Ba 349 and He 162 armed with R4Ms would have stopped the Bomber offensive. In the end, it failed to do so, because there was not enough fuel and trained pilots. Plus, I assume the early radar warning system had collapsed in the Spring of 1945.
> 
> But that does not take away that the jet interceptor was definitely the only way to go.
> Kris


The Luftwaffe's use of the Komet was a waste of resources. Even considering the Natter Viper was a pure waste of time.

Had they promoted and funded the jet program in it's early days, they would not have been grasping at fantasy projects while trying to fight a defensive war. The He280 and the Me262 would have made thier debut before the Allied bombers started pounding them into ruin and desperate last-ditch fighters like the He162 would have never been drawn up.


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## vikingBerserker (Aug 3, 2013)

A-Fricken-Men!


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## Civettone (Aug 3, 2013)

GrauGeist said:


> The Luftwaffe's use of the Komet was a waste of resources. Even considering the Natter Viper was a pure waste of time.
> 
> Had they promoted and funded the jet program in it's early days, they would not have been grasping at fantasy projects while trying to fight a defensive war. The He280 and the Me262 would have made thier debut before the Allied bombers started pounding them into ruin and desperate last-ditch fighters like the He162 would have never been drawn up.


If we look at kill-loss ratio, the Komet was a successful point defence interceptor, but lack of fuel and inefficient unit location limited its usefulness. Only few flew missions in 1945. It would have been a real asset as the Me 163C or 263 and armed with the R4M. The Natter was probably the best wonder weapon the Germans came up with in 1945. If time had allowed it, it would have revolutionized air combat over Germany. The idea was pure genius: basic trained pilots in a manned air defence missile whose only job was to fire the R4M or Foehn rockets towards the bombers, and then eject with the vital parts of the plane ready for re-use. Brilliant !

Kris


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 3, 2013)

Civettone said:


> *If we look at kill-loss ratio, the Komet was a successful point defence interceptor*, but lack of fuel and inefficient unit location limited its usefulness. Only few flew missions in 1945. It would have been a real asset as the Me 163C or 263 and armed with the R4M. The Natter was probably the best wonder weapon the Germans came up with in 1945. If time had allowed it, it would have revolutionized air combat over Germany. The idea was pure genius: basic trained pilots in a manned air defence missile whose only job was to fire the R4M or Foehn rockets towards the bombers, and then eject with the vital parts of the plane ready for re-use. Brilliant !
> 
> Kris



???

From Wiki...

_"The first actions involving the Me 163 occurred on July 28, 1944, from I./JG 400's base at Brandis, when two USAAF B-17 Flying Fortress were attacked without confirmed kills. Combat operations continued from May 1944 to spring 1945. During this time, *there were nine confirmed kills with 14 Me 163s lost*. Feldwebel Siegfried Schubert was the most successful pilot, with three bombers to his credit."_


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## DonL (Aug 3, 2013)

The Me 163 was nothing else then a pilot killer.

The whole concept was wrong from fuel, speed and the possible tactic with only one try to shoot down an enemy a/c.
The concept wasn't developed any further after the war, which shows it was very inferior.


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## DonL (Aug 3, 2013)

parsifal said:


> German defeat was not just about the failure of a few individuals at the top. its defeat was total, from top to bottom, a defeat of all things and all people who aligned with the german cause. german methods, ideas, procedures, organizations, strategy and tactics were all comprehensively and irrecoverably defeated. Why? Numbers, mismanagement, lack of resources, but the failure was comprehensive, total



If this post is refering to the german politics, of racism, violence, Übermenschen and the thousand year Reich it is true.
If it is refering to the Wehrmacht and the military of Germany at WWII it nothing more then bogus.



> Absolutely.Particularly on the eastern front..at the beginning the limited resources avaliable to the germans dictated that they adopt narrow points of breakthrough....schwerepunkts, followed by deep penetrations. Tanks would then be forced to sit there and wait whilst the slow moving infantry formations completed the encirclements and cleaned up. generally worked, but it was innefficient, and many Soviets that should have been captured got away.
> 
> german logistics was terrible, and pretty much cost them the war. The idea that they could tack on a few mobile units to an unmotorized main body was busted, particualalry as the motorized elements of the infantry (what little they had) fell out of the floor, and then even the horsedrawn elements also lost mobility
> 
> ...



Your descriptions are all true, your analysis are very wrong with a tend to be ridiculous.


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## GrauGeist (Aug 3, 2013)

Civettone said:


> If we look at kill-loss ratio, the Komet was a successful point defence interceptor, but lack of fuel and inefficient unit location limited its usefulness. Only few flew missions in 1945. It would have been a real asset as the Me 163C or 263 and armed with the R4M. The Natter was probably the best wonder weapon the Germans came up with in 1945. If time had allowed it, it would have revolutionized air combat over Germany. The idea was pure genius: basic trained pilots in a manned air defence missile whose only job was to fire the R4M or Foehn rockets towards the bombers, and then eject with the vital parts of the plane ready for re-use. Brilliant !
> 
> Kris


In an alternate universe, perhaps waves of Natter Vipers could have rose up to challenge Emporer Ming's space fleet, with Buck Rogers leading the charge, but here on earth and in this reality, the Natter was a drain on resources. They required assembly and then hoisting onto static launch pads. Their launch components needed manpower to recover in the field and if that weren't interesting enough...after intercepting the bomber formations, they had to glide back to thier launch point for recovery. God help them if the Allied fighters were in the area waiting for them like actually happened when the Me262 was taking off or landing. Also keep in mind that as "point defense" fighters, their launch areas had to be secured, meaning they could not be easily transferred to another airfield if the Wehrmacht couldn't hold the area.

Instead of this fantastic wonder-weapon, why not stay focused on what had already proven to work? The Fw190A-8 did terrible damage to the bombers, especially with Bf109 top cover. So did the Me410 and several other conventional types. And here's the bonus: they could actually defend themselves if challenged by Allied escorts instead of being dead meat floating along powerless...

The problem was air superiority. The Luftwaffe simply did not own thier own airspace. You could send up hundreds of Natters and they would possibly make a dent in the bomber stream that was darkening the German skies. But those hundreds of proposed Vipers built were that much in precious resources that would have been drawn away from production of proven performers.


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## DonL (Aug 3, 2013)

@ Graugeist

It is more than obvious that even till today no a/c is flying with rocket fuel, because the concept isn't good for anything.
The Natter and the Komet were nothing else then pure desperate and far far away from anything that works or could be called a sustainable concept.


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## GrauGeist (Aug 3, 2013)

True, Don...though the U.S. did examine the Me163, because of it's potential, after the war...but that never lead anywhere as far as warplane developement.

Rocket powered fighters were simply a dead-end in the evolution of military aviation, much like steam-powered aircraft and hydrogen filled airships.


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## razor1uk (Aug 3, 2013)

True DonL, but in effect they were the first 'guided' anti-aircraft/bomber rocket (interceptor), who's development partially assisted in the continuing R&D of rocketry systems inc the; RATO, the developing Me.262C mix power BMW04RL , Ground to Air AA Rockets A4/V2 etc. 

At the time with the tech knowledge, skills and industrial availability, the T K Stoffs were likely to be the most reactively powerful fuels then created for a given fuel load fuel weightage. The 163 did effectively fail as a weapon itself, although later in the war its design was adapted to try and make it formation killer/splitting unmanned rocket - had things progressed for longer, it in that guise might had a more damaging effect to the enemy than the farting flea did to its own pilots overall.

Luckely for pilots and ground crews post war chemicals and synsetisation processes created less volitile and more storage stable fuels that rendered the T K Stoffs largely redundant. Apparently the British used as similar rocket fuel system post war where the hydrazine permigranite reacted with a silver and something alloy mesh catalyst which made the Saunders Roe rocket plane safer and more 'throttlable'.

And some torpedoes or underwater hydrosonic missiles still use a variation of one of these stoffs (like the likely Kursk event) ....allegedly.


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## Erich (Aug 3, 2013)

komet is fantasy, look at JG 400 records and it's ops whomever made it through that small ban alive went to JG 7.the LW records that the Schwalbe was the only thing that may put a partial block into the allied attack system..........ha ha


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## DonL (Aug 3, 2013)

I agree razor1uk,

but a rocket at this time is unmanned and an a/c is in generals manned and this is the fundamental difference and my criticism.
Rockets were well known even at 1939, look at the development of the Nebelwerfer or Stalinorgel.
To me it is pure desperate to built manned rockets at this time. Something like Kamikaze.


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## Erich (Aug 3, 2013)

Don you know this but it is not the German frame of mind to commit oneself like the Japanese did to a Kamikaze position.........


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## DonL (Aug 3, 2013)

Yes I know, but there were very strong tendency at the end of the war with the Sonderkommando Elbe, some units of frogmen and the Werwolf units.
The nazi system wasn't disinclined to something like Kamikaze, thankfully the civic education to most of the very very young soldiers was stronger.


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## razor1uk (Aug 3, 2013)

I did say the komet was a weapon systems faliure, but some of its componant parts and knowledge gained in makeing it lead to further things after it during the warring time of WW2.
Modern ideas, newer methods, usages and theories are largely irrelivant in that context to do with WW2, and only highlight the differences of now to then. 
If not for that back then, what would we know now; we don't know what we don't know, only guess at what we think we dont...

...So how does the Komet tie into this 262 topic, e.g: apparently because its Luftwaffe or advanced for the 30's/40's tech?


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## GrauGeist (Aug 3, 2013)

razor1uk said:


> ...So how does the Komet tie into this 262 topic, e.g: apparently because its Luftwaffe or advanced for the 30's/40's tech?


Because it was painted the same colors?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 3, 2013)

I have a feeling by some posts, things might get heated in this thread. Keep it civil or don't post it at all. Don't make bait postings or cheap shots. 

No one is immune or safe to act in any way other than a civil adult like manner.


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## razor1uk (Aug 3, 2013)

roger


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## Civettone (Aug 3, 2013)

FLYBOYJ said:


> ???
> 
> From Wiki...


Wiki is wrong. The Me 163 shot down 16 bombers. It also lost less, but need to look up how many exactly. 



DonL said:


> The Me 163 was nothing else then a pilot killer.


Based on what? Folk stories about pilots being incinerated in their seats? 



> The whole concept was wrong from fuel, speed and the possible tactic with only one try to shoot down an enemy a/c.
> The concept wasn't developed any further after the war, which shows it was very inferior.


What a logical fallacy! Simply because something is not continued with, does not make it bad. We don't use black powder explosives anymore, doesn't mean it was bad at the time. Several countries, especially France, developed rocket fighters well into the 1950s. It was discontinued because turbojets had developed in such a way that they made rocket fighters obsolete. But what was the first jet aircraft to fly? The He 176 rocket plane. What was the first operational jet fighter in the world? The Me 163. Not the He 178 or Me 262. 

The Me 163 scored its first kills when its unit was still becoming operational. They had to work out a lot of technical difficulties, just like the Me 262 and other revolutionary aircraft. But Me 163 operations soon came to a halt, when methanol and other chemicals became even more rare than gasoline. If not, we can assume that the number of kills would have increased. 
Later, the Me 163C and Me 263 were developed which had greater endurance. Armed with R4M rockets, it would have made a very strong short-range interceptor. Of course, it needed to be placed as much to the west as possible. Luftwaffe failed to do so and placed them in remote areas and around Leuna. 



GrauGeist said:


> In an alternate universe, perhaps waves of Natter Vipers could have rose up to challenge Emporer Ming's space fleet, with Buck Rogers leading the charge, but here on earth and in this reality, the Natter was a drain on resources. They required assembly and then hoisting onto static launch pads. Their launch components needed manpower to recover in the field and if that weren't interesting enough...after intercepting the bomber formations, they had to glide back to thier launch point for recovery. God help them if the Allied fighters were in the area waiting for them like actually happened when the Me262 was taking off or landing. Also keep in mind that as "point defense" fighters, their launch areas had to be secured, meaning they could not be easily transferred to another airfield if the Wehrmacht couldn't hold the area.


You can joke about it as much as you like. It was a sound plan. You have to stop seeing them as fighter aircraft and start seeing them as manned SAMs. Germany did not have the technology to guide their missiles to target. Visual guidance as well as homing signals were still under development. 
Your comment on manpower does not make any sense. You always need manpower to operate air defence, be it Flak, SAMs or fighter aircraft. The Natter was extremely cheap to build! Very simple construction with few strategic materials and a very light (around 150 kg) Walter rocket engine. Even a complete loss would not have mattered, as they could be easily replaced. They also did not require well trained pilots, which was the real structural reason why Germany had lost the air war, much more so than the lack of fuel. 
Also, you make the mistake that these areas needed to be secured, because they might get overrun by the enemy? These manned rockets were going to be used near industry and cities, far away from the frontline. 
Of course, if the Allies were about to invade Germany, nothing would have saved it. 



> Instead of this fantastic wonder-weapon, why not stay focused on what had already proven to work? The Fw190A-8 did terrible damage to the bombers, especially with Bf109 top cover. So did the Me410 and several other conventional types. And here's the bonus: they could actually defend themselves if challenged by Allied escorts instead of being dead meat floating along powerless...


None of this is true. The Fw 190A-8 was a dog at hight altitude, even more so when it was used as a Sturmjaeger. Even with a Bf 109 protection group twice its size, it got shot down like in a turkey shoot. The only times the Sturmjaege did any damage was when they managed to find an unescorted US bomber group. Same story with the Me 410. All good bomber destroyers, all shot down in great numbers.
The Natter would be impossible to intercept due to its speed, small size and climb rate. It had an exceptionally armoured cockpit. The only way the pilot would get lost if the Americans decided to shoot him down in his chute. And even then, both semi-pilot and aircraft were easily replaced. 

Kris


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## Erich (Aug 3, 2013)

Kris 

sorry but I interviewed Späte as well as both Rudi Opitz's. the score was 12 claimed fewer confirmed by anyone for the ratsy Jg 400. the unit was worthless, don't even go any farther as this thread is on the 262 let's clear the air now start another one if you prefer on the Komet.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 3, 2013)

Civettone said:


> Wiki is wrong. The Me 163 shot down 16 bombers. It also lost less, but need to look up how many exactly.



Your source??? How about confirmed kills vs, claims?

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/messerschmitt-me-163-komet-24377.html#post664027


Spate, Wolfgang; Bateson, Richard (1975) Aircraft in Profile No.225, Messerschmitt Me 163 Komet - gives the same dismal numbers as well. the -163 was an operational failure, a great propaganda tool, but a failure.


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## parsifal (Aug 4, 2013)

> If this post is refering to the german politics, of racism, violence, Übermenschen and the thousand year Reich it is true.
> If it is refering to the Wehrmacht and the military of Germany at WWII it nothing more then bogus.



Like I said, in my opinion German defeat was from top to bottom. Its moral bankruptcy is reflected in its racial policies, its political bankruptcy reflected by its inability to face facts as to its situation. Its military bankruptcy was its adherence to strategies no longer valid or obtainable given the resources Germany had at its disposal. Tactics and doctrine were wrong, equipment was wrong, military thinking was wrong, appraisals of what could and should be done off the planet. The system was utterly corrupted and utterly broken. It just took a little time for germans to realize it. 




> Your descriptions are all true, your analysis are very wrong with a tend to be ridiculous


.

Matter of opinion really, but please do tell what you find ridiculous. It might be good for a chuckle or two


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## parsifal (Aug 4, 2013)

if we apply this debate to the issue, the Me262, it is a great microcosm of what was happening to Germany as a whole....off in lala land whilst the country faced the most serious crisis of its entire existence. If the Me 262 was developed and ready in '41 or '42, they could have spent 43 and the first paret of 44 getting over and around its numerous technical shortcomings. That would have meant a big differnce, as in the last 8 moths the Germans would have had a real game changer at their disposal. As it was, with so many faults and problems, it was nothing more than a distraction, a diversion of critical resources from where they were needed. 1400 Me 262s were built, about 200 were in squadron service at any one time, they managed to shoot down maybe 150 enemy aircraft and achieve an average serviceability rate of waht...25, 30 (according to Galland). Whata total waste of time....


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## stona (Aug 4, 2013)

DonL said:


> The Me 163 was nothing else then a pilot killer.
> 
> The whole concept was wrong from fuel, speed and the possible tactic with only one try to shoot down an enemy a/c.
> The concept wasn't developed any further after the war, which shows it was very inferior.



But there was a lot of interest in rocket powered interceptors at the end of the war. It did prove to be a dead end but the British shipped no fewer than twenty Me 163s back to the UK compared with only seven Me 262s. It makes you wonder how they were thinking, given that they had invented the jet engine 
We know with hindsight that jet power was the future, but they didn't in 1946.

BTW I only mentioned these aircraft to demonstrate just how desperate and difficult Germany's air defences became late in the war and to imply that the arrival of a jet like the Me 262, even in larger numbers, would still have been too little, too late.

Cheers
Steve


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## pattle (Aug 4, 2013)

CobberKane said:


> What I don't know about strategy would fill books, but it does seem to me that if 262 was ever going to have any chance of halting the allied bombing campaign it would have had to have been available in numbers before things wound up by 1944. By that I mean the 262 might have retained air superiority for the LW, but I don't think it could ever have regained it.
> My thinking is that, hypothetically, had the LW been able to send up, say, 200 262s with well trained pilots in 1944 they would undoubtedly have given the USAAF quite a mauling - for a while. But the 262s themselves would have become the prime object of Allied tactics. Allied fighters - which were never particularly vulnerable to the 262 - would have been swarming over LW airfields before and after raids. Bombing, including night bombing, would have been directed towards anything to do with it. I don't think 262 production could have stood that for long. I know German industry managed to re supply the LW with conventional aircraft even in the face of allied bombing, but I think the 262 would have been particularly vulnerable in this respect. It was far more time consuming to build than even the most advanced conventional fighters. It's engines required replacement every ten hours. In an operational sense, it shot itself down every two weeks or so. In the face of concentrated Allied attention, I think the 262, for all it's potential would have withered on the vine.
> Now, if the 262 had been available in number before the daylight bombing campaign got under way, that might have been different. In fact I can feel a new thread coming on. I'm off to post it now.



This is exactly as I see things myself, and very well explained.


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## Civettone (Aug 4, 2013)

Erich said:


> Kris
> 
> sorry but I interviewed Späte as well as both Rudi Opitz's. the score was 12 claimed fewer confirmed by anyone for the ratsy Jg 400. the unit was worthless, don't even go any farther as this thread is on the 262 let's clear the air now start another one if you prefer on the Komet.


We had this discussion before. http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/best-bomber-killing-aircraft-398-51.html
Anyway, I have re-opened an older thread in case you want to give it another go.

Kris


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## Civettone (Aug 4, 2013)

-


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## Juha (Aug 5, 2013)

davebender said:


> Jumo 004A engine used less chromium then DB605A engine.
> 
> Germany had plenty of nickel and molybdenum during 1943. That didn't change until Finland and Donetz Basin switched sides.
> 
> Not sure about tungsten. Do you have data on tungsten requirements for Jumo 004A and DB605A engines?



No, I cannot recall from were I read the reason of abandoment of 004A, but the material list is from Alfred Price's article on Me 262 in the International Airpower Review Vol. 23. Gunston only tells in his Engine book that 004B used only half of the amount of the strategic materials used in 004A, lost 100kg in trust but also in weight and was much cheaper to produce also in manhours.

Juha


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## nuuumannn (Aug 7, 2013)

> there was a lot of interest in rocket powered interceptors at the end of the war



Slightly off topic, yes indeed, there was. in fact almost all of Britain's first generation rocket engines were fuelled by high test peroxide, the British even continued using the terms 'T-stoff' and 'C-stoff' for a short while since some of the German scientists that went to Britain post war came from the Wather Werk at Hamburg. The use of rocket propulsion was seen at the best means of getting an interceptor to altitude as swiftly as possible in the new age of jet powered aircraft and the British released specification OR301 in 1952 for a rocket powered interceptor based on research conducted using Me 163s. Nothing ever flew to the OR, but the British also built and flew a mixed propulsion interceptor, the Saunders Roe SR.53 and had planned on a successor the SR.177, but this was cancelled in the 1957 Sandys Defence White paper.


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## Balljoint (Aug 7, 2013)

http://www.enginehistory.org/German/Me-262/Me262_Engine_2.pdf


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 7, 2013)

Balljoint said:


> http://www.enginehistory.org/German/Me-262/Me262_Engine_2.pdf



Great info! Found the link on the airframe...

http://www.enginehistory.org/German/Me-262/Me262_Airframe_2.pdf


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## zoomar (Aug 8, 2013)

GrauGeist said:


> Looks like the author is leaning toward a little bit of revisionism...
> 
> Heinkel and Messerschmitt would have never collaborated, Heinkel was forever bitter towards Messerschmitt.[/QUOTE
> 
> It might be incorrect, but it's not revisionism. The basic argument that it was technological limitations, not politics, that delayed the Me-262 was made by William Green at least as early as the late 1960's. You are correct about Heinkel and Messerschmitt hating each other. I don't think the author is necessarily saying that collaborated together in creating the "conventional wisdom" but that they and Galland independently created aspects of the myth that politics and stupidity was the only reason jets were not introduced faster.


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## nuuumannn (Aug 9, 2013)

> The basic argument that it was technological limitations, not politics, that delayed the Me-262



The fact of the matter was that the Me 262 was not ready for the rigours of combat operations when it was introduced proves this somewhat. I don't hold much stock on the theory that the Germans could have had jet fighters in service earlier than they did because of politics etc for this reason; the ones they did put into service were not given enough time for all the troubles to have been sorted. Allied bombing placed strain on resources even in '43, which delayed Junkers from getting the Jumo sorted out; the first 262s were sitting about without engines owing to this delay. I shoulld remind readers (that haven't been through the other Me 262 thread going on at the moment) that the Gloster Meteor actually entered squadron service and was ready for such (despite issues with directional snaking - which also affected the 262 - and reliability of its cannon) before the Me 262. The first frontline jet fighter squadron in the world was 616 Sqn, which equipped with the Meteor I on 12 July 1944. At that time Me 262s were with Ekdo 262 and had been for only a few weeks earlier, which was not a front line squadron, but an evaluation unit. The 262 got to squadron service in October 1944 and even then, was not ready.


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## riacrato (Aug 11, 2013)

Ekdo 262 did fly combat missions with the Me 262. All other is semantics.


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## cimmex (Aug 11, 2013)

riacrato said:


> Ekdo 262 did fly combat missions with the Me 262. All other is semantics.


 the EKdo 262 was built to approve the plane under combat situation. BTW what combat did the 616 Sqn have in july 1944, the early Meteor in summer 1944 was not much faster than a piston engined plane of that time.
cimmex


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## OldSkeptic (Aug 11, 2013)

cimmex said:


> the EKdo 262 was built to approve the plane under combat situation. BTW what combat did the 616 Sqn have in july 1944, the early Meteor in summer 1944 was not much faster than a piston engined plane of that time.
> cimmex



At that stage, with the very early engine .. depends on the altitude. At low level very fast, higher altitudes not so sp:







Naturally another Tony Williiams one from his website.


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## vinnye (Aug 11, 2013)

From Wki - I also saw a prgram on TV about the RAF's early jets and this also said the jets were deployed to combat the V1's.

On 12 July 1944 the unit became the first RAF squadron to receive jet equipment in the form of Gloster Meteor Mk.I fighters, testing them at RAF Culmhead.[8] The first Meteor operational sortie was on 27 July from RAF Manston when it intercepted V-1 flying bombs launched against southern England. The first victories came on 4 August when one V1 was tipped over after a pilot's cannon jammed and another was shot down. The loss rate of the still unproven Meteor Mk.I was high, with three being written off in non-combat incidents between 15 and 29 August. Re-equipment with improved Meteor Mk.III's began in January 1945 and in February a detachment was deployed to Melsbroek near Brussels in Belgium. It was intended as a defence against Me 262's but in the event they did not ever face them. In early April the complete squadron moved to Gilze-Rijen in the Netherlands, commencing ground attack sorties on 16 April. The squadron was disbanded at Lübeck, Germany on 29 August 1945 by being renumbered to No. 263 Squadron RAF.


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## DVH (Aug 11, 2013)

Whittle was ignored after forewarding a jet engine blueprint in the 1930s, so i guess no one saw the potential of this new and unproven technology. 
Its easy in hindsight to see what jets achieved, but back then it would have taken a huge investment to develop something that may or may not pan out.


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## nuuumannn (Aug 11, 2013)

> Ekdo 262 did fly combat missions with the Me 262. All other is semantics.



Semantics, but facts, something often overlooked and ignored by many here on this forum. The fact is the Me 262 had the potential to be a world beater, but it wasn't for the simple fact that it was not ready for service. Too many here have an ideal view of this aircraft and perceive it to be something that it wasn't. There was a big difference between what it had the potential to be and what it actually was. It could not in its existing state live up to its potential and ultimately did nothing to prevent Germany from losing, which is what it was rushed into service to do; to quote you riacriato, "all other is semantics". 

My point, the Meteor was better prepared for squadron service than the 262, even after evaluation with Ekdo 262. Also, the reason why the Meteor did not immediately go into service in Europe was because the RAF took things more cautiosly than the Germans; they could afford to take their time about introducing their jets into service, the Germans couldn't. Another thing also mentioned in the other thread is that the British began to play down the threat the German jets represented because their initial estimates of numbers of jets in service were too high. By late 1944, the RAF believed that the numbers of operational German jets could be contained by existing piston engined fighters and tactics to reduce any numerical advantage - to a degree the British were right. The Americans thought differently and continued attacks on jet production facilities throughout 1944.

Also, the Meteor I's performance is often criticised, but remember that the British were also getting the Vampire I ready for service, which was faster in level flight and climb than the Me 262. Why didn't it go into service sooner? Like I said, the British didn't want or need to rush it.


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## riacrato (Aug 11, 2013)

yadayada

The Me 262 was flying combat ops before the Meteor did and soon in greater numbers than the Meteor too. Whether the unit is called EKdo or JG barely matters for the fact as such. The Germans had the first useful operational jet fighter in the world. No bickering and belitteling is going to change that.


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## nuuumannn (Aug 11, 2013)

> The Germans had the first useful operational jet fighter in the world.



Blah blah blah superior technology blah blah blah would have won the war blah blah blah...

No they didn't. It did not prevent Germany losing the war, therefore it did not live up to its usefulness.


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## stona (Aug 11, 2013)

riacrato said:


> yadayada
> 
> The Germans had the first useful operational jet fighter in the world.



Useful is a moot point. 
It was useful to the allies in killing large numbers of its pilots. It's operational usefulness is debateable. The figure someone quoted of a 20-30% serviceability rate is way too high. Units operating the type often reported low single figures of serviceable aircraft. JG 7 was down to four on several occasions. This needs to be taken into account when talking of "200 operational Me 262s".
Cheers
Steve


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## nuuumannn (Aug 11, 2013)

> No bickering and belitteling is going to change that.



No one is belittling the Me 262 - everything I've stated in my past posts in this thread is a fact. If you must know, I actually think it was faaaar cooler than the Meteor, but that doesn't change anything. It was what it was.


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## stona (Aug 11, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> No one is belittling the Me 262 - everything I've stated in my past posts in this thread is a fact. If you must know, I actually think it was faaaar cooler than the Meteor, but that doesn't change anything. It was what it was.



Yes, it had the potential to be a brilliant aeroplane. Germany had neither the time nor the means to make it so.

Cheers

Steve


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 11, 2013)

EKdo 262 was a test unit and not considered an operational COMBAT squadron - FACT! AFAIK first blood drawn by the 262 was July 26, 1944 when one from EKdo 262 damaged a Mosquito - FACT! 

EKdo 262 did not start actively engaging enemy aircraft until mid August 1944 - they claimed 19 Allied aircraft for six Me 262s lost, never truly confirmed. Regardless, the -262 was staring to become an effective combat weapon.

616 squadron was an operational combat squadron and began Meteor I operations on or just after July 21, 1944 - FACT! 616 Squadron's first combat sortie was July 27, 1944 in an attempt to intercept V-1s. 616 Squadron's first victory did not occur until August 4, 1944 against a V-1. Meteors didn't operate from the continent until April 1945. 

EKdo 262 was disbanded on 26 September 1944 and was formed into Kommando Nowotny, still a "trial and test unit." JG-7 was the first REAL LW fighter unit operating the 262 and that didn't happen until January 1945.

*KG51 was the first REAL LW COMBAT unit operating the -262, they started operations with the Me 262A-2a (fighter bomber) August 1944.*


I don't have a dog in this fight on which aircraft was "the first operational jet fighter," or the first "useful" jet fighter aircraft. The LW was obviously building, developing and testing the 262 under combat conditions as well as developing tactics on the fly (for better choice of words). The Meteor was not in the same heavy combat environment during its introduction, but by considering both air forces terminology of their units, the Meteor was the first jet fighter aircraft to be flown by an operational squadron.

No bickering and belitteling is going to change any of this!!!!


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## cimmex (Aug 11, 2013)

a Luftwaffe unit commanded by a LW officer (Hauptmann Werner Thierfelder) and LW pilots flying combat calling as a not operational unit is really hard to understand. Would you call the “flying tigers” as a nonoperational unit too?
cimmex


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 11, 2013)

cimmex said:


> a Luftwaffe unit commanded by a LW officer (Hauptmann Werner Thierfelder) and LW pilots flying combat calling as a not operational unit is really hard to understand. Would you call the “flying tigers” as a nonoperational unit too?
> cimmex


No - it was a bona-fide operational Unit in the Chinese Air Force, apples and oranges.

"The 1st American Volunteer Group (AVG) of the Chinese Air Force in 1941–1942" It was made up of 3 distinct COMBAT squadrons.

The LW, for one reason or another, gave these units their names and their status, not me.

For clarification...

Erprobungskommando (EKdo) "Testing-command"

Kampfgeschwader - Bomber (medium)

Jagdgeschwader - fighter unit or "wing"


"Kommando Nowotny was a Luftwaffe fighter Gruppe formed during the last months of World War II *for testing and establishing tactics *for the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter, and was created and first commanded by Walter Nowotny, from whom it drew its name."


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## Milosh (Aug 11, 2013)

*Kommando Nowotny* was formed on 26 September 1944 in Achmer and Hesepe with Stab/Kommando Nowotny from Stab III./Zerstörergeschwader 26 (ZG 26), 1./Kommando Nowotny from 9./ZG 26, 2./Kommando Nowotny from 8./ZG 26 and 3./Kommando Nowotny (new). Thus its strength was 3 Staffeln and a Stab flight.

On 3 October it attained operational status with a complement of about 40 Me 262A-1a jet interceptors.

This is the same general time period as when the Fw190D-9, Me109G-10 and Me109K-4 became operational.


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## bada (Aug 11, 2013)

OldSkeptic said:


> At that stage, with the very early engine .. depends on the altitude. At low level very fast, higher altitudes not so sp:
> 
> View attachment 240331
> 
> ...



And now, go take the RAE repport on the same page and you'll see clearly in the repport that NO TEST could be done above 20K Ft because the engines surged in level flight.
Stop comparing the 262 to the meteor MKI/III. the meteor was not combat ready: snaking, snagging, surging, ailerons (great)heaviness,a not stable airplane at all, pilots having to slow down to be able to get the target in the sight. The meteor sucked untill the Mk8 . and the engines reliatibilty was not so great neither...even in 1946.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 11, 2013)

Milosh said:


> *Kommando Nowotny* was formed on 26 September 1944 in Achmer and Hesepe with Stab/Kommando Nowotny from Stab III./Zerstörergeschwader 26 (ZG 26), 1./Kommando Nowotny from 9./ZG 26, 2./Kommando Nowotny from 8./ZG 26 and 3./Kommando Nowotny (new). Thus its strength was 3 Staffeln and a Stab flight.
> 
> On 3 October it attained operational status with a complement of about 40 Me 262A-1a jet interceptors.
> 
> This is the same general time period as when the Fw190D-9, Me109G-10 and Me109K-4 became operational.



It was still a test unit (not my opinion, but what the LW called it), not a Jagdgeschwader and all this came AFTER 616 squadron was flying the Meteor MK 1 and after KG51 was flying the 262.


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## Milosh (Aug 11, 2013)

Yes, just putting in some history and a time period for KdoN.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 11, 2013)

Milosh said:


> Yes, just putting in some history and a time period for KdoN.


Gotcha


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 11, 2013)

bada said:


> And now, go take the RAE repport on the same page and you'll see clearly in the repport that NO TEST could be done above 20K Ft because the engines surged in level flight.
> Stop comparing the 262 to the meteor MKI/III. the meteor was not combat ready: snaking, snagging, surging, ailerons (great)heaviness,a not stable airplane at all, pilots having to slow down to be able to get the target in the sight. The meteor sucked untill the Mk8 . and the engines reliatibilty was not so great neither...even in 1946.


To be specific, neither aircraft was combat ready compared to piston engine aircraft of the day when they first entered service. The -262 was clearly the superior of the two but both aircraft were risky in normal non-combat operations, and that could be said right up to the end of the war.


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## nuuumannn (Aug 11, 2013)

> the Meteor was not combat ready: snaking, snagging, surging, ailerons (great)heaviness,a not stable airplane at all, pilots having to slow down to be able to get the target in the sight. The meteor sucked untill the Mk8 . and the engines reliatibilty was not so great neither...even in 1946.



Like the 262 - which did have so much more potential as a design than the Meteor, but the Meat Box's engines were more reliable than the Jumo 004s. Yep, you're right, there were certainly troubles with the 20 Meteor Is, - and the British knew these issues were delaying effective deployment of the jets - why do you think it took so long for the Vampire to get into service? It could out perform the 262, despite its straight wings and centrifugal flow engines.

Like I said, neither British jet was being rushed into service because the British played down the threat they assumed the German jets posed. They had that luxury. The Germans didn't.


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## riacrato (Aug 12, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> Blah blah blah superior technology blah blah blah would have won the war blah blah blah...
> 
> No they didn't. It did not prevent Germany losing the war, therefore it did not live up to its usefulness.


 Yawn.
Where did i say or even remotely imply that? How about you check your own objectivity towards reality before you imply.me to be a Nazi fanboy. Have your useless little debate where I'm sure the conclusion will be that meteor in the end was just as useful / useless as the me 262 in ww2. I'm out of this forum.


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## cimmex (Aug 12, 2013)

nuuumannn said:


> Like I said, neither British jet was being rushed into service because the British played down the threat they assumed the German jets posed. They had that luxury. The Germans didn't.


This is why it took till 1950 when the Vampire Fb 6 reached the performance of the Me262 of the year 1945. I read this info at the museum in Duebendorf Switzerland many years ago. Meanwhile the jet race was lost against the Americans…
cimmex


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Aug 12, 2013)

I see this thread going downhill. Same usual people as always.

When I get back from Germany, if it has not remained civil, some posters will post no more...


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 12, 2013)

riacrato said:


> Yawn.
> Where did i say or even remotely imply that? How about you check your own objectivity towards reality before you imply.me to be a Nazi fanboy. Have your useless little debate where I'm sure the conclusion will be that meteor in the end was just as useful / useless as the me 262 in ww2.* I'm out of this forum*.


Don't let the door hit you in the @ss on the way out.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 12, 2013)

cimmex said:


> This is why it took till 1950 when the Vampire Fb 6 reached the performance of the Me262 of the year 1945. I read this info at the museum in Duebendorf Switzerland many years ago. Meanwhile the jet race was lost against the Americans…
> cimmex


Instead of relying on a databoard at a museum, why don't you compare flight test data or the pilot's manuals for a more accurate comparison?


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## cimmex (Aug 12, 2013)

Well, Switzerland had the Fb 6 in service and I think they should know what they are talking about. I have a top speed of 548 mph and clr below 5000 ft/min, which is not impressive for a 1950 plane. What does the pilot manual say?
cimmex


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 12, 2013)

Here's a link to an fb5, I'm on my way to work so I don't have time to find the fb6.

de Havilland Vampire FB 5 9 Pilots Notes vamp5pictures


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 12, 2013)

Here's an old thread where the Vampire/ 262 match up was beat to death with good comparisons of both aircraft with referances.

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/vampire-vs-me-262-a-11516.html


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## fastmongrel (Aug 13, 2013)

cimmex said:


> Well, Switzerland had the Fb 6 in service and I think they should know what they are talking about. I have a top speed of 548 mph and clr below 5000 ft/min, which is not impressive for a 1950 plane. What does the pilot manual say?
> cimmex



If you compare that performance to equivalent aircraft the Swiss could have bought in 1950 it was in the ballpark. The F80B was slightly faster, climbed about the same and I believe had a higher ceiling, the F84C was slightly faster but had a much worse climb rate and lower ceiling. Strangely the only aircraft that was faster in level flight, climbed faster and had a higher ceiling was the Meteor 8.


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## davparlr (Aug 13, 2013)

fastmongrel said:


> If you compare that performance to equivalent aircraft the Swiss could have bought in 1950 it was in the ballpark. The F80B was slightly faster, climbed about the same and I believe had a higher ceiling, the F84C was slightly faster but had a much worse climb rate and lower ceiling. Strangely the only aircraft that was faster in level flight, climbed faster and had a higher ceiling was the Meteor 8.


 
It was in the ball park among first generation jets but in 1950 the F-86 and Mig 15 were both operational.


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## fastmongrel (Aug 13, 2013)

davparlr said:


> It was in the ball park among first generation jets but in 1950 the F-86 and Mig 15 were both operational.



They werent available for the Swiss to buy though. I very much doubt the Soviets would have sold Migs to the Swiss and the USAF needed every plane that North American could produce.


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## nuuumannn (Aug 13, 2013)

Sorry about my comments guys, I got a little annoyed with this:


> yadayada



I still stand by my assertion that the Me 262's impact on WW2 was nowhere near as great as many like to think it was, nor could it have been. By far its greatest impact was in the basic design, not its combat role and there is much evidence to support this, including countless interviews with pilots etc that all state, to a man that the 262 was terrific to fly and they loved the speed advantage it had over everything else, but it was essentially unreliable and too troublesome to be an effective warplane. This doesn't take away from the enormous effort put in by the guys of Ekdo 262, Kommando Nowotny et all, but it could not have had any further influence on things. Its biggest influence was in what it offered to the Allies post war in terms of research into jet technology. 

In saying that however, I also don't believe that the Allied jets could not have provided a credible defence against the German ones; their disadvantages would not have been as much of a hindrance as what we like to believe. There's not doubt the 262 was a better design, but the Allied jets - in spite of their faults were more reliable.

This is the myth of the Me 262; that it could have affected far reaching change on the course of the war. It simply could not have in the state it was in.


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## GrauGeist (Aug 13, 2013)

When the forum's search feature is restored, type in "Me262" and see all the various debates about the Me262...it will always one of those enigmas that fuel debates...

Bottom line is that Germany was too slow to recognize and support it's jet technology. They had access to both Axial and Centrifugal designs early on. They also had access to at least two very competitive airframe designs that would have proven themselves IF they had seized the opportunity early on.

Pushing the He280 aside and then allowing the development of the Me262 to crawl along like it did was yet another sad indicator that Germany's leadership was sadly lacking. And once Germany realized the war situation was becoming dire, then the Me262 became a priority. That was like putting a bandaid on a sucking chest wound.

Could the jets have made a difference for the German war effort? Yes ONLY if they had taken advantage of the technology WHEN it was first offered to the RLM.

Could they have won the war? NO they could not have. Nothing could save Germany from itself. The ONLY way the He280 or Me262 could have saved Germany, is if they killed Hitler and his top staff...

All the arguing about the Me262 versus this jet or that jet or dragging the war on for another year etc. is just putting off the inevitable. Even if Willy produced his HG series, or the Ta183 or the Ho229 were to appear, they would still have to deal with the Allies and thier ability to out produce Germany industry.

The very same Me262 versus (insert aircraft type here) argument is the same as the age-old argument of Tiger versus (insert tank type here) argument. They were as advanced as they were innovative, but stood about as much chance of survival as a Wolf Spider in a Fire Ant colony.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 13, 2013)

I think the potential of the 262 propagates the myth. Had these aircraft entered service 2 years earlier could Germany have won the war? Questionable for sure. No doubt the war would have lasted longer but by how much? The same outcome? With the war prolonged, would this have set Germany up as a B-29 target (or B-32) target? In the end would Germany had been the first atomic bomb target? A lot of "what ifs."

One thing that hasn't been mentioned is that Hitler's meddling in some respects did give the 262 priority as a bomber, eventually expediting its introduction, however in the wrong role. I believe this gave Ekdo 262, Kommando Nowotny time and resources to continue to "test" this aircraft while actively engaging the enemy. That alone created a major impact in the allied bombing strategy that enabled Germany to fight on into early 1945 IMO.

During the discussion about the "First Jet Fighter Unit," (not to beat this horse to death again), by the LW's own unit designations, the British could hold the bragging rights of having the world's first operational jet fighter "COMBAT" unit. The first German "COMBAT" unit to operate the 262 was KG51. During my research I've come across some discussion about KG51 receiving around 7 262s as early as 20 July 1944, one day before 616 squadron became operational. If true, it seems that JG51 didn't do much with these aircraft until mid August, one has to question why? Lack of fuel? Trained pilots? If anyone has anything to add, I'm all ears! (Erich are you out there?  )


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## GrauGeist (Aug 13, 2013)

My guess would that it had alot to do with training, the 262 was a tricky machine...even the early prototypes were tough to fly. The tail-drager prototype would run off the runway because the angle of the aircraft was cancelling it's lift. It wasn't until a test pilot "stabbed" the breaks, bringing the nose down, did the 262 get airborn. Of course that problem was fixed by designing a nosegear into the airframe.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 13, 2013)

The 262 was actually very easy to fly (if everything was working)....


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## GrauGeist (Aug 13, 2013)

I recall reading accounts about the pilots learning to fly it. There were several challenges they faced, like the longer takeoff/landing distances and the higher speeds required to land. The rate of closure to target was another.

One serious operating proceedure they needed to pay close attention to, was on the earlier models regarding the throttle. Many of the pilots were used to rapid throttle response and occasionally forgot to "measure" thier throttle position when operating the 262, leading to engine failure. This problem was addressed in later models but was a real dangerous situation for pilots that didn't have time in with the 262.

Once they became familiar with the 262, flying it was "as though angels were pushing" according to Galland.


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## nuuumannn (Aug 13, 2013)

> Yes ONLY if they had taken advantage of the technology WHEN it was first offered to the RLM.



As much as I agree with you Bill, we are entering 'what if' territory here, which is always problematic and raises as many questions as the ones we attempt to answer by proposing the question in the first place. It could be argued also that had the British placed Whittle in a position to build his engines earlier then Britain might have had a jet fighter earlier than the Germans. See what I mean?


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## GrauGeist (Aug 14, 2013)

Sure, it may be considered a "what if" but in light of Germany's capabilities, it certainly would have changed the face of the air war as the jets took to the skies early in the war.

But the Allies would have countered this threat with hardware and tactics of thier own as did happen throughout the war whenever any new hardware surfaced on the battlefield.

So like I said, would it have changed things if they did showed up earlier, you bet. Would they have won the war? Certainly not.


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## nuuumannn (Aug 14, 2013)

Yep, I don't disagree, Bill, a good summary. My concern with introducing 'what if' scenarios is that although the 'what if' questions we can pose are almost limitless, the answers are not and are governed by applicable laws; re-writing history is not easy and what actually happened and circumstances surrounding that has to play into any answer given to a 'what if' question - that is if the answer is to be based on reality and not just total fantasy. Too many people overlook this.


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## GrauGeist (Aug 14, 2013)

I agree.
If we look at the development of the Bf109, for example, we'll see how Willy was able to develop the aircraft after winning the competition and then hurried it to the front during the Spanish civil war with the help of the RLM.

Had he been able to get the same backing by the RLM in the early years with the Me262 project, it would have advanced much more rapidly. And of course, the same can be said for Heinkel, who had the He280 presented before the Me262.

A conclusion could be drawn from results of aircraft the RLM backed, and then look at the state of the supplies that the Luftwaffe had available early on, before resources became stretched thin (fuel, rubber, raw materials, bombing of manufacturing centers) and it can give a person a rough idea of how this may have changed things to a certain degree.

So while it's still in the realm of "what if", it's one that can be looked at with a reasonable amount of credibility.


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## nuuumannn (Aug 14, 2013)

Yes, I agree with you on that example, Bill. Part of the problem with such examples, however is also why decisions are made or not made in the first instance, often the reason might be obscure, but reasonable nonethelss. In this case, why was the decision taken not to back the Me 262 - unlike the Bf 109 and what made the RLM make the decision they did, for example.

This is why I struggle with accepting 'what ifs'! It's never as easy as we purport it to be. 

Also, the more I learn about history, the more I can understand why things happened the way they did, which makes inventing scenarios even more difficult for me!


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## l'Omnivore Sobriquet (Aug 14, 2013)

The absence of air-brakes on the Me-262 delayed its introduction into operations, just by itself and by a sizeable amount, I think.
It made landing procedures more complicated and more stricts too, which must have accounted also to a number of operational losses to the prawling Allied fighters. Accidents during its 'erpropung' time probably too. I read somewhere that German pilots in their training course had to practise take-off and land circuits on some propeller a/c with the gas throttle fixed in an intermediary position, quite a difficult exercise when you think of it. All this was time consuming. And it lasted until the end.

Allied engineers did not shy on putting air-brakes in their wonder-super-fast new machines (some doubts about the very first Meteors?) and I've always wondered why none of the German ones ever considered it. I can only understand that they were somehow 'blinded' by the speed-speed-speed aura their new babies were promising, coupled with the stress of producing some wonder weapons radical enough to impress events... They forgot the humble and the practical, the help for landing. 
[edit : also the fact that 'air-brakes' were considered as 'dive-brakes' in Germany, as circumtances had it. So : "no dive-brakes on my 280", 262, Blitz or Volksjäger, or even Henshel 132 and that was it. A mistake.]
The Go-229 being the one exception, and it comes more as a demand from the flying wing's control system, from an outsider gliders' builder anyway.
I think it hampered the deployment of the 262s, all in all by more than weeks... and remained time consuming until the end.


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## stona (Aug 14, 2013)

I keep reading that the RLM didn't back the Me 262. Has anyone got any figures for how much it did invest in the type and/or jet engines in general? I don't really see any evidence to back up the contention.

In 1939 Germany was the only major power to have embarked on an official development programme for aircraft gas-turbine engines and a parallel programme to investigate their application to military airframes.

After the prototype Me 262s less than staggeringly successful early flights in mid 1942, Milch, in December 1942 issued a top secret order, probably more in hope than expectation.

"The absolute demand for qualitative superiority of Luftwaffe equipment, over that of enemy countries, has led me to order the creation of an urgent production and development programme under the code word Vulkan.
Tasks proceeding under this code word have absolute over riding priority within the Luftwaffe.
The programme encompasses jet propelled aircraft and guided missiles, including associated equipment and the ground organisation necessary to support these activities.
A request has been made to the Reichminister for Armaments and Munitions to extend the legal force of the code word Vulkan throughout the entire armaments field. Development of some of the following equipment is already taking place under priority 'DE'. "


'DE' was already the highest production status that could be ordered within the German armaments industry. The Me 262 programme, already included under Vulkan received this on 22nd January 1943,only six months after Wendel had slammed on the brakes of Me 262 V3 in order to raise the tail (the fuselage blanked the elevators which had no authority even at what we now call V1) and heaved the aircraft into the air.

In March 1943, a year and a bit before the Me 262 was entering service in a fashion only one prototype was flying!. This was largely the fault of Messerschmitt, not Hitler, Goering or the RLM. There were many reasons, from Messerschmitt's point of view conflict between development of the Me 262 and Me 209 was used as an excuse. Production proposals were also low. On 4th February 1943 a target of 40-50 aircraft per month until early 1945 was agreed.
The fact that so many were actually built and that any actually saw combat in WW2 is a minor miracle.

It is an uncomfortable truth for some that the Me 262 was not developed in time to have any kind of strategic impact on the war not because of muddling by the RLM, over riding orders from Hitler or delays and prevarication from the Messerschmitt company. It failed because the Germans, under all the other pressures of war time production, did not have the time or ability to make it work properly within the time constraints of the latter half of WW2. The undoubted lead that Germany enjoyed at the out break of the war had been eroded and was never exploited.

Cheers

Steve


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## Tante Ju (Aug 14, 2013)

FLYBOYJ said:


> It was still a test unit (not my opinion, but what the LW called it), not a Jagdgeschwader and all this came AFTER 616 squadron was flying the Meteor MK 1 and after KG51 was flying the 262.



So which RAF unit was performing operational trials with the Meteor before 616 Squadron? I believe none... So either the British units role was just the same as the German one, or the British were really desperate pressing the Meteor into "operational" service without any trial... which is hard to believe.

As noted its just a playing with semantics, the Luftwaffe tended to use Erprobungskommando/Gruppe quite a lot for new planes, just as it tended to use the term "Sonder" (special) quite a lot for standard items. See Erprobungsgruppe 210 - a unit that was supposed to test the Me 210 but in fact it was a fully operational pin-point ground attack unit with 110s, flying special combat missions during the BoB, i.e. against radar stations. There was little _Erprobung _and even less _210 _in the activities of that unit, still it was called like that.

The British also had the habit of creating ghost units - Squadrons were created on paper as operational ones but in reality receiving a full compliment of aircraft only many months later, and still spending a few months to familirize pilots with new planes. But yeah on paper in was "fully operational combat squadron" from day one. See for example the first Spitfire squadron, created sometime in the spring of 1938 iirc, but not even having a full a/c compliment until about the winter. The Spitfire XIV was supposed to have entered production in October 1943 - that is, if you consider two (IIRC) converted Mark VIIIs as "production" aircraft, following by many months of no production. Quite obviously, they were prototypes, but just like the 262/Meteor, there is a lot of national pride and semantics involved with who was "first".


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 14, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> So which RAF unit was performing operational trials with the Meteor before 616 Squadron? I believe none... So either the British units role was just the same as the German one, or the British were really desperate pressing the Meteor into "operational" service without any trial... which is hard to believe.



Not true - the Meteor was first tested at Moreton Valence and later Farnborough by test units with dedicated test pilots. They did not fly any operational missions and were not attached to any operational squadron. The first lot of meteor Is were turned over to 616 Squadron as earlier mentioned.



Tante Ju said:


> As noted its just a playing with semantics, the Luftwaffe tended to use Erprobungskommando/Gruppe quite a lot for new planes, just as it tended to use the term "Sonder" (special) quite a lot for standard items. See Erprobungsgruppe 210 - a unit that was supposed to test the Me 210 but in fact it was a fully operational pin-point ground attack unit with 110s, flying special combat missions during the BoB, i.e. against radar stations. There was little _Erprobung _and even less _210 _in the activities of that unit, still it was called like that.


I am aware of Erprobungsgruppe 210, bottom line they were a test unit, not a JG or KG. Again, this is by the LW's own designation, not mine.




Tante Ju said:


> The British also had the habit of creating ghost units - Squadrons were created on paper as operational ones but in reality receiving a full compliment of aircraft only many months later, and still spending a few months to familirize pilots with new planes. But yeah on paper in was "fully operational combat squadron" from day one. See for example the first Spitfire squadron, created sometime in the spring of 1938 iirc, but not even having a full a/c compliment until about the winter. The Spitfire XIV was supposed to have entered production in October 1943 - that is, if you consider two (IIRC) converted Mark VIIIs as "production" aircraft, following by many months of no production. Quite obviously, they were prototypes, but just like the 262/Meteor, there is a lot of national pride and semantics involved with who was "first".


What are the numbers of these squadrons? Do you have dates when they were operating and the dates these alledged prototypes arrived and were flown in combat?


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## Tante Ju (Aug 14, 2013)

I will have to consult my books Flyboy, if its very important - they are not available to me. But my opinion is that there is little to tell between an operational trial unit flying combat missions and a combat unit flying operational trials.  The RAF just does not seem to bother with designating operational trial squadrons as such. All were called squadron, and I believe there were just a couple of "test flights" etc., usually for flying enemy equipment.


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## Juha (Aug 14, 2013)

Hello Stona, I also wondered the claim that 262 didn't have RLM backing, difficult to believe when in Jan 44 there were 23 pre-production machines waiting for their engines, would that had been any more helpful for Germany to have hundreds of 262s waiting for their engines?

Juha


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## stona (Aug 14, 2013)

Juha said:


> Hello Stona, I also wondered the claim that 262 didn't have RLM backing, difficult to believe when in Jan 44 there were 23 pre-production machines waiting for their engines, would that had been any more helpful for Germany to have hundreds of 262s waiting for their engines?
> Juha



A very good point. The RLM did back the Me 262 it was regarded as a top priority project. Messerschmitt themselves did not and sought clarification in early 1943 (I'd need to dig out some old files to give an exact date) which they received.
The Me 262 airframe was not new technology, in fact it is a fairly typical Messerschmitt airframe. The new technology lay in the engines and this is also where the problems were.
People need to make a more honest appraisal of the state of development of the engines fitted to "operational" Me 262s. In other countries they would have been years away from operational use. It was the technical difficulties involved in the development of turbojets that prevented their production in quantity until well into 1944. Once the Germans got going they produced plenty, 6,000 Jumo 004s, which is impressive, even if they didn't work very well or for very long.

On another popular myth I can find no evidence that Galland ever stated in an official capacity _during the war_ that the Me 262 should be reserved as a fighter. In the letter he wrote to Goering after he tested the Me 262 at Augsburg in May 1943 he wrote.

"Conclusion :a) Me 209 to be discontinued
b)Total fighter production to switch from the Fw 190 with BMW 801 to the Fw 190 with DB 603 and Jumo 213 respectively.
c) The construction and industrial capacities thus released to be concentrated on the Me 262, with immediate effect."

He was very keen on the Me 262 he wrote "The aircraft represents an enormous leap forward, it would give us an unimaginable lead over the enemy if he adheres to the piston engine". I can't find anywhere he said it should be reserved as a fighter and bomber interceptor until he started revising the history of the Luftwaffe post war.

Cheers

Steve


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## Hop (Aug 14, 2013)

> The British also had the habit of creating ghost units - Squadrons were created on paper as operational ones but in reality receiving a full compliment of aircraft only many months later, and still spending a few months to familirize pilots with new planes. But yeah on paper in was "fully operational combat squadron" from day one. See for example the first Spitfire squadron, created sometime in the spring of 1938 iirc, but not even having a full a/c compliment until about the winter.



The first Spitfire squadron was 19 squadron. It formed in 1915, disbanded in 1919, reformed in 1923. It was an operational squadron in 1938, equipped with the Gloster Guantlet, when it began converting to Spitfires.

RAF squadrons were not declared operational until they were equipped and ready for operations. 



> The Spitfire XIV was supposed to have entered production in October 1943 - that is, if you consider two (IIRC) converted Mark VIIIs as "production" aircraft, following by many months of no production.



I count 20 Spitfire XIVs that had their first flights before the end of 1943: RB140, RB141, RB142, RB143, RB144, RB145, RB146, RB147, RB148, RB149, RB150, RB151, RB152, RB153, RB154, RB155, RB156, RB157, RB158, RB159


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## nuuumannn (Aug 14, 2013)

> The RAF just does not seem to bother with designating operational trial squadrons as such.



Yep, the RAF didn't have test units of the same nature as Ekdo 262; new types were introduced into squadron service, where their issues were worked through at squadron level, often by a Flight. Since the war, pilots went through the Operational Conversion Unit in terms of training on a new type and generally that was introduced through the OCU, rather than straight to squadron service, although this applied to combat aircraft only. A number of the OCUs were formed by Flights of personnel evaluating a new type.

If we are still nitpicking over the difference between Ekdo 262 and 616 Sqn, the primary difference between the two is that 616 (South Yorkshire) Squadron was was an Auxiliary Air Force unit formed in 1938 and relinquished its Spitfire HF.VIIs for Meteor Is in 1944, so it was already a combat unit within the RAF structure and not formed specifically to trial the Meteor.


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## nuuumannn (Aug 14, 2013)

> that is, if you consider two (IIRC) converted Mark VIIIs as "production" aircraft



Just to clarify, there were actually six Mk.VIIIs ordered in late March 1943 and converted with the Griffon as trials aircraft for that powerplant, the 'Super Spitfire', the Mk.XVIII was also based on the 'VIII airframe and much was learned from these. Because of the excellent performance of the Griffon Mk.VIIIs and the predicted time of arrival into service of the Mk.XVIII, the first, JF316 became the prototype of the stop-gap, the Spit XIV. The first production 'XIV was RB140, which first flew in late 1943. A large number of Mk.VIII production aircraft were converted on the production line, as did Spit V production, which became Spit IXs. There was actually around nine months between the first flight of JF316 and RB140, the first production Spit XIV, which isn't all that long for trialling a new powerplant in wartime.

Back to the '262...


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 14, 2013)

Tante Ju said:


> I will have to consult my books Flyboy, if its very important - they are not available to me. But my opinion is that there is little to tell between an operational trial unit flying combat missions and a combat unit flying operational trials.  The RAF just does not seem to bother with designating operational trial squadrons as such. All were called squadron, and I believe there were just a couple of "test flights" etc., usually for flying enemy equipment.



Actually they do with great distinction (as indicated in the posts above mine). The examples you have given seem to be different marks of aircraft already in service, a little different between a minor variant of an aircraft already in service and a newly developed airframe. As stated earlier, Germany lumped everything in to one unit, flight testing, combat evaluation, tactics, etc., but these were not operational "COMBAT" squadrons.

No matter how one wants to slice this KG51 was the first LW "COMBAT" unit to operate the 262.


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## cimmex (Aug 14, 2013)

Here is an organogram of Einsatzverbände Me 262 (Einsatzverbände translated is combat units)
http://www.x19world.de/flieger/Uebersicht_Einsatzverbaende.jpg
cimmex


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 14, 2013)

cimmex said:


> Here is an organogram of Einsatzverbände Me 262 (Einsatzverbände translated is combat units)
> http://www.x19world.de/flieger/Uebersicht_Einsatzverbaende.jpg
> cimmex



"Einsatzverbände" *Joint Task Unit*

"Erprobungskommando" *Testing Command*...

_"Kommando - The use of the term in the World War II era Luftwaffe was for special units used *to test new aircraft for combat readiness *(as Erprobungskommando units) and examples existed that only used the "Kommando" name, such as the Luftwaffe Gruppe-sized Kommando Nowotny."_

_"On 19 April 1944, Erprobungskommando 262 was formed at Lechfeld just south of Augsburg, *as a test unit (Jäger Erprobungskommando Thierfelder)*, commanded by Hauptmann Werner Thierfelder) to introduce the 262 into service and train a core of pilots to fly it."_

Ref: Price, Alfred. The Last Year of the Luftwaffe: May 1944 to May 1945

Ref: Stapfer, Hans-Heiri. Walk Around #42: Messerschmitt Me 262 Carrolton, Texas: Squadron Signal, 2006.


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## cimmex (Aug 14, 2013)

and the organogram clearly shows that this Erprobungskommando is an Einsatzverband 
cimmex


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 14, 2013)

cimmex said:


> and the organogram clearly shows that this Erprobungskommando is an Einsatzverband
> cimmex


No, it shows it operating under it. Look at the LW structure today, its set up the same way and even has transport units under the same structure.

Kommando Einsatzverbände Luftwaffe


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## stona (Aug 14, 2013)

I don't have a dog in this fight, which seems fairly pointless. An Erprobungskommando would certainly qualify as an operational unit by most definitions. Erprobungskommando 210 was one of the most successful Bf 110 units of the Battle of Britain.

Erprobungskommando (EKdo) 262 kept a war diary and the first claim was made on 19th July 1944 by Lt. Alfred Schreiber, a Mosquito. There are many more claims in the following weeks and months. This type of Luftwaffe unit was experimental but as part of the experimentation or proving they carried out combat operations. Whether that is "operational" or not is really just semantics. They were in combat, shooting down enemy aircraft.
This is quite unlike the sort of operations carried out by the RAF at Boscombe Down or Farnborough.

I don't think that "einsatzverbande" translates very well as combat units. In fact I don't think there is an easy English translation. There is no equivalent word(s) to convey exactly the sense of the German word.

Cheers
Steve


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 14, 2013)

Bump


FLYBOYJ said:


> "Einsatzverbände" *Joint Task Unit*
> 
> "Erprobungskommando" *Testing Command*...
> 
> ...


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 14, 2013)

stona said:


> I don't think that "einsatzverbande" translates very well as combat units. In fact I don't think there is an easy English translation. There is no equivalent word(s) to convey exactly the sense of the German word.
> 
> Cheers
> Steve



Einsatzverbande - "use associations"


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## cimmex (Aug 14, 2013)

just curious when all the books will be corrected to follow your claim.
cimmex


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## Tante Ju (Aug 14, 2013)

stona said:


> I don't think that "einsatzverbande" translates very well as combat units. In fact I don't think there is an easy English translation. There is no equivalent word(s) to convey exactly the sense of the German word.
> 
> Cheers
> Steve


 
Einsatz = action, sortie, operation, engagement, to use, "throw into", employ for etc. 
verbaende = units

Its quite literally operational units. "the units for action"


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 14, 2013)

cimmex said:


> just curious when all the books will be corrected to follow your claim.
> cimmex


Don't be a smart @ss - it is what it is, and I'll say it before, I didn't name these units. There was a reason whay these units were named "test units." Maybe you should research why they remained that way and were never given combat status until KG51 got their 262s...


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## nuuumannn (Aug 14, 2013)

> Einsatzverbande



...as opposed to ersatzeier! Sorry, a little German pun!


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 14, 2013)

stona said:


> I don't have a dog in this fight, which seems fairly pointless. An Erprobungskommando would certainly qualify as an operational unit by most definitions. Erprobungskommando 210 was one of the most successful Bf 110 units of the Battle of Britain.
> 
> Erprobungskommando (EKdo) 262 kept a war diary and the first claim was made on 19th July 1944 by Lt. Alfred Schreiber, a Mosquito. There are many more claims in the following weeks and months. This type of Luftwaffe unit was experimental but as part of the experimentation or proving they carried out combat operations. Whether that is "operational" or not is really just semantics. They were in combat, shooting down enemy aircraft.
> 
> *This is quite unlike the sort of operations carried out by the RAF at Boscombe Down or Farnborough.*



And that's where the road splits between the way the RAF did things. When the Meteor left Farnborough, it went on to a COMBAT squadron. The 262 combined both flight testing and combat introduction into one TEST unit. The first JG didn't see the aircrft until Jan., 45, as mentioned KG51 got theirs as early as July 45.


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## Njaco (Aug 14, 2013)

1944


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 14, 2013)

Yep! my bad


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## stona (Aug 14, 2013)

FLYBOYJ said:


> And that's where the road splits between the way the RAF did things. When the Meteor left Farnborough, it went on to a COMBAT squadron. The 262 combined both flight testing and combat introduction into one TEST unit. The first JG didn't see the aircrft until Jan., 45, as mentioned KG51 got theirs as early as July 45.



Exactly so. There is no equivalent to an Erprobunhskommando in the RAF because our testing or proving units do not undertake operations in the same way as was done in the Luftwaffe.
EKdo 262 was flying combat missions and shooting down enemy aircraft whilst claiming a lot more and keeping a war diary which is pretty much what operational units in most air forces do. 

How would you define Erprobungskommando 210's operations against British airfields and radar installations if not operational? I suppose they were trying out new low level tactics, but on a different aircraft to the one they were supposed to be "testing" just to confuse things 

This really is a question of how to define the term "operational". It does not mean the same thing for the Luftwaffe as it does for the RAF or USAAF. I have to say that it doesn't really matter how we classify a unit like EKdo 262. It was demonstrably carrying out operations against the allies whether we call that operational in the allied sense or not.

Cheers

Steve


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 14, 2013)

stona said:


> Exactly so. There is no equivalent to an Erprobunhskommando in the RAF because our testing or proving units do not undertake operations in the same way as was done in the Luftwaffe.
> EKdo 262 was flying combat missions and shooting down enemy aircraft whilst claiming a lot more and keeping a war diary which is pretty much what operational units in most air forces do.



For one reason or another, yes but their mandate was to still "test and evaluate" as well as train and develop tactics.


stona said:


> How would you define Erprobungskommando 210's operations against British airfields and radar installations if not operational? I suppose they were trying out new low level tactics, but on a different aircraft to the one they were supposed to be "testing" just to confuse things


 Or combining flight testing and combat evaluation into one task to save time, they were still a "test unit" by their given name.


stona said:


> This really is a question of how to define the term "operational". It does not mean the same thing for the Luftwaffe as it does for the RAF or USAAF. I have to say that it doesn't really matter how we classify a unit like EKdo 262. It was demonstrably carrying out operations against the allies whether we call that operational in the allied sense or not.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Steve



I think it's shown in my previous comment. The LW created test units that were conducting flight testing and combat evaluations at the same time, in the case of Erprobungskommando 210, probabaly to save time, in the case of the 262, out of necessity. By their own name they were test units, and for one reason or another were converted or re-assigned at a later date. Compare EKdo 262s operations with KG51 and it wasn't untill January 45 where the 262 was fully "let loose" to fighter (JG) squadrons. After that the test units rightfully went away. If EKdo was a bona-fide fighter squadron, why desolve it or even change its name?


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## Erich (Aug 14, 2013)

it's hard to sum up really anything concrete on the Ekdo 262 unit as it was absorbed including what victories it had to Kommando Nowotny who scored maybe 22 kills and lost 28 or so 262's about 10 or so due to accidents. the story needs to be written about the Kommando


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 14, 2013)

Erich said:


> it's hard to sum up really anything concrete on the Ekdo 262 unit as it was absorbed including what victories it had to Kommando Nowotny who scored maybe 22 kills and lost 28 or so 262's about 10 or so due to accidents. the story needs to be written about the Kommando



Exactly Erich! Kommando Nowotny eventually went away for one reason or another - I believe it's because "testing" was complete. Pilots and planes were eventually rolled into JG7 or other units and all the 262 testing units went away, they were now in real live "COMBAT" squadrons.

It seems KG51 followed the same path but entered combat earlier due to Hitler's insistence of the 262 being used as a bomber. I'm still curious about the initial 262s sent to the unit in late July, 1944. Did they sit on the ground or did they fly operationally? Training? KG51 did eventually fly bomber intercept missions, am I right?


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## Erich (Aug 14, 2013)

Nowotny Kommando was dissolved in November of 44 after his death in combat, some sources say he was on landing approach others say no he got his with two P-51's in air combat from the 20th /357th fg's. the remainder of Nowotnys unit formed cadre-experienced for JG 7...

Joe I don't really have much on KG 51 yes it formed operations in 44 and gave US ground forces a headache just for the fact they were quick movers and US forces had to develop if they could adequate Flak defenses.


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## stona (Aug 14, 2013)

In September 1944 EKdo 262 had a strength of 12 aircraft. Kommando Novotny was established with a strength of three staffeln of 16 aircraft each and a further 4 aircraft allocated to a Gruppenstab, which looks a lot like the structure of an early war Geschwader. In fact by October 1944 Kommando Novotny received 51 Me 262s.

KG 51 had converted to the Me 210 by the spring of 1944. It was decided that it would be the first unit to operate the Me 262 as a bomber. During May I./KG 51 was withdrawn from operations in the west to retrain on the Me 262. A new unit under the command of Major Wolfgang Schenk was established from I./KG 51. This was an Einsatzkommando or Operational Detachment designated Kommando Schenk. This unit was subservient to KG 51. By 10th July it had received 6 Me 262s and the first 12 pilots had arrived. Kommando Schenk was most definitely an operational as well as a training unit. It was sent to Chateaudun, with 9 aircraft on 20th July for operations against the invasion, though it was impossible to operate the aircraft as bombers. The saga of Kommando Schenk and attempts to reinforce it with elements of 3./KG 51 whilst in France make for sorry reading before its retreat to Belgium. I don't have time for the whole story now, but with reference to the Me 262's ability as a level bomber one report from Kommando Schenk was discouraging.

"In level flight the Revi was useless for accurate bombing. Pinpoint targets could not be hit. Kommando Schenk was therefore unable to claim any tactical successes."

Other operational elements of KG 51 continued to train on the Me262 and the unit was finally committed on 18th September following "Market Garden".

Cheers

Steve


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 14, 2013)

stona said:


> This was an Einsatzkommando or Operational Detachment designated Kommando Schenk. This unit was subservient to KG 51. By 10th July it had received 6 Me 262s and the first 12 pilots had arrived. Kommando Schenk was most definitely an operational as well as a training unit. *It was sent to Chateaudun, with 9 aircraft on 20th July for operations against the invasion*, though it was impossible to operate the aircraft as bombers.


 If this was the case then KG51 was the first operational jet combat squadron, be it in a bomber role.


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## Erich (Aug 14, 2013)

Nowotny's overstrength due to spares and some were not fit for combat...... of that 51 figure.


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## stona (Aug 14, 2013)

It would have been if they could bomb! There is a long report from Fritz Wendel to the Directors of Messerschmitt explaining why they didn't.
Here's a few salient points:

Insufficient range as the airfield had to be more than 100Km behind the front. The undercarriage and tyres needed to be strengthened. More seriously, after the fitting of extra fuel tanks there were serious stability problems as the CoG shifted to the rear on dropping bombs. 2 of the nose guns had been removed to reduce take off weight and this exacerbated the problem. No bomb sight suitable for single seater and the pilots were not trained to use the Revi gunsight in a shallow dive. The maximum speed of 850kph (530 mph) for aircraft with fabric covered control surfaces was being exceeded and they needed to be changed for metal covered ones. The air frame needed various strengthening for extra fuel, speed above 850 kph, RATO etc,etc.

This is just another reflection of how far from being ready for operational service the Me 262 was in July/August 1944.

As the front collapsed the unit kept moving and its first combat operation was not until 28th August when seven Me 262s were sent against allied assembly points armed with AB 500 containers.

Shortly afterwards, as Kommando Schenk retreated again, this time from Juvincourt to Chievres, Ofw. Hieronymus Lauer's Me 262 was shot down/forced to crash by two P-47s of the 78th FG (Maj Joseph Mayers and Lt Manford Croy) becoming the first Me 262 to be claimed by allied fighters.

Cheers

Steve


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## stona (Aug 14, 2013)

Erich said:


> Nowotny's overstrength due to spares and some were not fit for combat...... of that 51 figure.



He was supposed to have an operational strength of 52 aircraft, he would need hundreds to get anywhere close to that. He often had a total of serviceable aircraft in single figures.

Serviceability rates for the Me 262 were woeful. As Kommando Schenk moved from pillar to post across France and the Low Countries it rarely had more than four or five serviceable aircraft and even fewer crews. That it mustered seven for its first real operation speaks volumes for the determination of its men in the face of adversity.
It's one of the reasons that in October the Kommando was effectively assimilated into I./KG 51.

Cheers

Steve


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## Njaco (Aug 14, 2013)

Curious if the 262 was actually ahead of its time. As a dogfighter, it was inadequate because its agility wasn't spectacular. As a bomber, again it was suspect because of bombsite and speed. Was its design more suited to the missiles and tactics that evolved during the 1950s and 1960s?


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## razor1uk (Aug 14, 2013)

Even the later JV 44 which had on its books (for political clout/mis-direction) upto 100 or more 262's pulled from many units (plus spare turbine blades for well over 150 jet engines) - of those supposed aircraft, most usually didn't survive delivery due to infrastructural attacks destroying them or their carraiges, or being unable to move them effectively in time by road delays. 
Roughly JV 44 had a proposed unit strength per day of roughly 26 serviceable on (geshwader level) paper, of them, under half were actually fit for actual combat or training service if memory form the Battles Over Baveria book is close - mostly due to fuel issues, awaiting specific engine parts or needed being rebuilt for quality checks prio to fit for service by the maintenance men of JV 44 or JG7, also some newer jet pilots didn't have enough hours in their brief ground training, and so only those cleared pilots could fly in those actually usable aircraft. 
Rushed late war manufacturing led to many a pilot dying before each of new /or repaired aircraft had to triple checked by the users erks/'blackshirts'/maintenance staff.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 14, 2013)

Is there any record of KG51 flying combat sorties on July 20, 1944?


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## stona (Aug 14, 2013)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Is there any record of KG51 flying combat sorties on July 20, 1944?



It couldn't be with the Me 262 and couldn't be I./KG 51. That date is actually the day that the first six Me 262s and twelve pilots arrived at Lechfeld to start training. On the 20th July, when Kommando Schenk moved to France, the initial twelve trainee pilots had only four flights each on type.
As far as I know II./KG 51 was still operating its Me 410s at this time but whether they were in action or not I don't know.
Cheers
Steve


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## Erich (Aug 14, 2013)

yes the 262 was ahead of it's time and made an impact on the war Nowotny had roughly 15 jets on hand due to the cout nof it's white numbered machines. again there is no sufficient data on the units activities.


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## FLYBOYJ (Aug 14, 2013)

stona said:


> It couldn't be with the Me 262 and couldn't be I./KG 51. That date is actually the day that the first six Me 262s and twelve pilots arrived at Lechfeld to start training. On the 20th July, when Kommando Schenk moved to France, the initial twelve trainee pilots had only four flights each on type.
> As far as I know II./KG 51 was still operating its Me 410s at this time but whether they were in action or not I don't know.
> Cheers
> Steve



Thanks for the info....

With that said, KG51 was still the first LW combat unit to operate the 262.


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## Milosh (Aug 14, 2013)

I./KG51 
7.44 - 6 Me 262A-1

II./KG51
10.44 - 2 Me 262A-2

Kampfgeschwader 51


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## stona (Aug 14, 2013)

Erich said:


> yes the 262 was ahead of it's time and made an impact on the war Nowotny had roughly 15 jets on hand due to the cout nof it's white numbered machines. again there is no sufficient data on the units activities.



Kommando Novotny received a significant number of aircraft in the second half of 1944. I will try and dig up a number tomorrow. The reason that so few were serviceable has been mentioned above, plus the fact that the Me 262 tended to kill its pilots quicker than the Luftwaffe could train them (see Kommando Schenk above) leaving all Me 262 units almost continually short of trained pilots.

Kommando Novotny was formed from the three Einsatzkommandos set up at Lechfeld, Rechlin-Larz and Erfurt-Bindersleben (to iron out technical problems and to develop tactics), and elements of EKdo 262 including its signal platoon.
EKdo 262 did not cease to exist. It's remnants were combined with remnants of III./ZG 26, which had been training under Messerschmitt at Leipheim, Swabisch Hall and Lechfeld, and hadn't formed part of III./ZG 6, to form a new EKdo 262.

Cheers
Steve


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## stona (Aug 14, 2013)

FLYBOYJ said:


> Thanks for the info....
> 
> With that said, KG51 was still the first LW combat unit to operate the 262.



I would agree, initially in the guise of Kommando Schenk. Incidentally the ground support was drawn from 3./KG 51, so we can see that despite the separate name the Einsatzkommando operated under the control of KG 51 and was supported by and reported through that organisation.

I have been pondering the operational/non operational conundrum! I would say that the closest thing that the Luftwaffe had to the sort of trial and test organisations of the allied air forces for the Me 262 was an organisation called Erprobungstelle Rechlin. This organisation really did test the aircraft and different equipment in a scientific rather than combat environment.

Cheers

Steve


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