# The piece of paper that fooled Hitler



## BikerBabe (Jan 28, 2011)

BBC News - The piece of paper that fooled Hitler

By Jon Kelly
BBC News Magazine

*It was an audacious double-cross that fooled the Nazis and shortened World War II. Now a document, here published for the first time, reveals the crucial role played by Britain's code-breaking experts in the 1944 invasion of France.*

All the ingredients of a gripping spy thriller are there - intrigue, espionage, lies and black propaganda.

An elaborate British wartime plot succeeded in convincing Hitler that the Allies were about to stage the bulk of the D-Day landings in Pas de Calais rather than on the Normandy coast - a diversion that proved crucial in guaranteeing the invasion's success.

An intercepted memo - which has only now come to light - picked up by British agents and decoded by experts at Bletchley Park - the decryption centre depicted in the film Enigma - revealed that German intelligence had fallen for the ruse.

The crucial message was sent after the D-Day landings had started, but let the Allies know the Germans had bought into their deception and believed the main invasion would be near Calais.
It was an insight that saved countless Allied lives and arguably hastened the end of the war.

Now archivists at the site of the code-breaking centre hope that a new project to digitise and put online millions of documents, using equipment donated by electronics company Hewlett-Packard, will uncover further glimpses into its extraordinary past.

Behind the story of this crucial message and its global impact lies Juan Pujol Garcia, an unassuming-looking Spanish businessman who was, in fact, one of the war's most effective double agents.

The Nazis believed Pujol, whom they code named Alaric Arabel, was one of their prize assets, running a network of spies in the UK and feeding crucial information to Berlin via his handler in Madrid.

In fact, the Spaniard was working for British intelligence, who referred to him as Garbo. Almost the entirety of his elaborate web of informants was fictitious and the reports he sent back to Germany were designed, ultimately, to mislead.

But agent Garbo was so completely trusted at the top level of the Nazi high command that he was honoured for his services to Germany, with the approval of Hitler himself, making him one of the few people to be given both the Iron Cross and the MBE for his WWII exploits.

"He was no James Bond - he was a balding, boring, unsmiling little man," says Amyas Godfrey, an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute.
"But he had the Germans completely fooled. They thought the information he was sending was so accurate."

To maintain his cover, much of what Garbo fed the Germans was absolutely genuine. But when it came to the looming Allied invasion of France, his "intelligence" was anything but.

Ahead of D-Day, the British launched Operation Fortitude, a plot to confound the Nazis about the location of the landings. Garbo was an integral part of the plan.
To establish his credibility, he sent advance warning ahead of the Normandy landings on 6 June 1944 - but too late for the Germans to act on it.

Then, in the days afterwards, he fed them entirely fictitious intelligence from his fake "agents" that the invasion had been a red herring and "critical attacks" would follow elsewhere - most likely down the coast in Pas de Calais. He also reported, again falsely, that 75 divisions had been massed in England before D-Day, meaning that many more were still to land in France.

It was an account the Nazis took extremely seriously. As can be seen in the document reproduced by the BBC, it was transmitted to their high command by Garbo's German handler.

As a result, German troops were kept in the Calais area in case of an assault, preventing them from offering their fullest possible defence to Normandy.
But what truly gave the Allies the edge was the fact that they knew the Nazis had been duped.
Unknown to Berlin, the Germans' seemingly foolproof Enigma code for secret messages had been cracked by Polish code breakers.

In Bletchley Park, Buckinghamshire, some 10,000 men and women were employed deciphering the messages. And when the document above was cracked, the Allies knew they could press forward in the confidence that thousands of German troops would be tied up vainly standing guard at Calais.

"The whole of the 20th Century might have been very different if it wasn't for this," says Kelsey Griffin, Bletchley Park's director of museum operations.

"Churchill's official biographer, Martin Gilbert, said it was difficult to imagine how the D-Day landings could have happened without Bletchley Park.

"We had an army of unarmed intellectuals here."

The intercepted document - in its original, freshly-released, German language version - is all the more extraordinary for having been found by volunteers digging through Bletchley Park's archives.

One of them, retired civil servant Peter Wescombe, 79, recalls the excitement of realising its significance for the first time.
"It was like turning up a crock of gold," he remembers. "It was absolutely wonderful."

It is a find archivists at the site, run by the Bletchley Park Trust, hope will be repeated after HP donated scanners and experts to provide technical expertise to the digitisation project.

Many of the records at the centre have not been touched for years, and the charity hopes that by putting them online in a searchable format they can "crowdsource" the expertise of historians and amateurs alike.

And surely then many more real-life tales of deception, double-crosses and painstaking effort will emerge.

Cheers,

Maria.


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## mikewint (Jan 28, 2011)

Maria, I had heard/read some of this, reminds me of the Mechelen Incident:
On 10 January 1940, a German Messerschmitt Bf 108 made a forced landing at Maasmechelen, north of Maastricht, in Belgium. Among the occupants of the aircraft was a Luftwaffe major, Hellmuth Reinberger, who was carrying a copy of the latest version of Aufmarschanweisung N°2 (complete plans for the German invasion of France). Reinberger was unable to destroy the documents, which quickly fell into the hands of the Belgian intelligence services. The Belgians quickly informed the allied forces who never acted on the information


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## davebender (Jan 28, 2011)

Vainly? I don't think so. Nothing required the Allies to make their primary invasion at Normandy. If Ike's staff were competent then they had invasion plans for multiple locations sitting in the file cabinet.

Calais was the best place to land. If Calais had been weakly defended that's exactly where the June 1944 Allied invasion would have taken place. Perhaps with a secondary invasion at Normandy rather then in Southern France.


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## Aaron Brooks Wolters (Jan 28, 2011)

Excellent find Maria! Thank you for sharing!


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## mikewint (Jan 28, 2011)

Dave, the British General Staff appointed Lt. Gen. Frederick E. Morgan to be Chief of Staff (COS) to a still to be appointed Supreme Allied Commander (SAC) and gave him responsibility for planning the attack. By April 1943 Morgan had established an organization to carry out that task and had named it COSSAC after the initials in his new title. 
During the summer of 1943, COSSAC had formulated a tentative plan of attack that involved a force of from three to five divisions. That assault would depend for supply upon the development of two prefabricated harbors, called MULBERRIES, that were to be positioned along with breakwaters composed of scuttled ships just off the invasion beaches. The MULBERRIES would give the Allies a measure of flexibility by allowing them to provision the force moving inland without having to rely upon the immediate capture of an established port.

As COSSAC developed that plan, the question of where to land posed problems. The site would have to be within the range of fighter aircraft based in Great Britain but also on ground flat enough to construct the airfields that would become necessary once the invading force moved off the beaches and out of the range of its initial fighter support. The landing zones themselves would have to be sheltered from prevailing winds to facilitate around-the-clock resupply operations and would have to possess enough exits to allow the invading force to proceed inland with as little difficulty as possible. Similarly, the area behind the beaches would have to include a road network adequate to the needs of a force that intended to move rapidly. Since the region would ultimately form a base for the drive across France toward Germany, a series of large ports would also have to be close enough to facilitate the unloading of the massive quantities of supplies and ammunition that would be necessary to sustain the attack.

The most appropriate location, COSSAC's planners decided, lay directly across the English Channel from Dover in the Pas de Calais region. The area fulfilled many of the Allies' requirements and offered a direct route into the heart of Germany. Since the enemy had recognized that fact, however, and had already begun to construct heavy fortifications along the coast, an alternative had to be found. The most suitable stood farther to the west, along the Normandy coast near Caen and the Cotentin Peninsula. That region contained major ports at Cherbourg and Le Havre and offered a gateway to ports at Brest, Nantes, L'Orient, and St. Nazaire. Allied planners believed that the Germans would undoubtedly sabotage Cherbourg, forcing the invaders to place heavy initial reliance upon the MULBERRIES, but the damage could be repaired and the region itself was less strongly defended than the Pas de Calais. Offering, as well, a satisfactory opening into the French interior, it became the site of the invasion.


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## Gnomey (Jan 28, 2011)

Interesting story, read it when it appeared the other day. Just finished reading a book about Operation Mincemeat (Operation Mincemeat: Amazon.co.uk: Ben Macintyre: Books) so it tied in rather nicely.


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## RabidAlien (Jan 28, 2011)

I've heard the story of Garbo before (and I remembered it!!! That's a surprise in and of itself...and cause for celebration!), I'm wanting to say it was mentioned in "A Man Called Intrepid", but I've loaned that book out and can't verify. I've always thought that Garbo was one ballsy guy....IIRC, he first went to the Germans to offer his services, but they turned him down because he didn't fit the profile. He then went to the Brits after forming his "circle" of imaginary informants, and showed them what he could do. The Allies took him up on his offer, and the rest is history. Gotta love it! It would make for a really good suspense movie.

Anyone know what the website they're hosting all these docs is? Scanning all of those docs....man, that's gonna be quite the repository!


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## aircro (Jan 29, 2011)

About Garbo, he wasn't only double agent in England and inforormations they send to Germany is served by British intelligence agencies - I read a long time ago A.C.Brown's 'Great Deception of the Second World War 1-4'.


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## davebender (Jan 29, 2011)

> The most appropriate location, COSSAC's planners decided, lay directly across the English Channel from Dover in the Pas de Calais region. The area fulfilled many of the Allies' requirements and offered a direct route into the heart of Germany. Since the enemy had recognized that fact, however, and had already begun to construct heavy fortifications along the coast, an alternative had to be found.


Exactly. The Allies had a plan to invade at Calais. Strong German defenses were the reason for landing at Normandy instead. Remove most German units from Calais and that's where the main Allied landing takes place.


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## mikewint (Jan 29, 2011)

Dave, I would again disagree. Read the above again. You do not do what your enemy expects. The allied forces never had any intent to land where the Germans expected but they did everything they could think of to make the Germans believe that Calais was the intended landing zone. One would think that the Germans would have known better have just attacked France through the impossible Ardennes


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## ctrian (Jan 30, 2011)

The ''germans were so dumb we tricked them and won the war '' story has been debunked years ago.First from zetterling's ''Normandy 1944'' book and recently from Mary Barbier's ''D-day deception: Operation Fortitude and the Normandy invasion'' .Yes disinformation played a part but writing whole books on the subject and claiming that it was vital for the normandy victory is simply crude propaganda


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## RabidAlien (Jan 30, 2011)

Nobody's claiming that disinformation won the war. It was the grunt on the ground with a two-week beard that won the war. Disinformation did, however, play a vital role in the Allies' victory.


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## ctrian (Jan 30, 2011)

No it wasn't vital, because the Anglo-Americans already had overwhelming superiority in men ,tanks,artillery,aircraft etc.I understand that an author wants to sell books but a better case can be made for the strategic effects of German disinformation plans like Sealion and case Kremlin.


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## GrauGeist (Jan 30, 2011)

ctrian said:


> *No it wasn't vital, because the Anglo-Americans already had overwhelming superiority in men ,tanks,artillery,aircraft etc.*I understand that an author wants to sell books but a better case can be made for the strategic effects of German disinformation plans like Sealion and case Kremlin.


And how do you suppose they got "_overwhelming superiority in men ,tanks,artillery,aircraft etc_" on the ground in Europe?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 30, 2011)

ctrian said:


> *No it wasn't vital*, because the Anglo-Americans already had overwhelming superiority in men ,tanks,artillery,aircraft etc.I understand that an author wants to sell books but a better case can be made for the strategic effects of German disinformation plans like Sealion and case Kremlin.



Huh, how do you come up with that?

Disinformation is important and *vital* in any conflict. Has been from the beginning of time to even the most modern wars.


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## ctrian (Jan 30, 2011)

GrauGeist said:


> And how do you suppose they got "_overwhelming superiority in men ,tanks,artillery,aircraft etc_" on the ground in Europe?



Duh let me think , maybe it has something to do with having a much larger population than Germany and half the german army fighting in the East?


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## ctrian (Jan 30, 2011)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Huh, how do you come up with that?
> 
> Disinformation is important and *vital* in any conflict. Has been from the beginning of time to even the most modern wars.



Agreed,but in 99% of cases it passes by unnoticed by the intended target, so in the end all you have is a bunch of guys congratulating each other for something that had no effect on the enemy.I dont want to be argumentative but these books/articles/tv shows saying that super disinformation plans managed to fool the enemy high command and win the war etc etc are simply exaggerating to generate sales and to play up the western allies.


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## GrauGeist (Jan 30, 2011)

ctrian said:


> Duh let me think , maybe it has something to do with having a much larger population than Germany and half the german army fighting in the East?



DUH like, maybe the Allies getting a toe-hold at Normandy had a little something to do with that?

I know, it sounds a little far-fetched, doesn't it? Probably propeganda, huh?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 30, 2011)

ctrian said:


> Agreed,but in 99% of cases it passes by unnoticed by the intended target, so in the end all you have is a bunch of guys congratulating each other for something that had no effect on the enemy.I dont want to be argumentative but these books/articles/tv shows saying that super disinformation plans managed to fool the enemy high command and win the war etc etc are simply exaggerating to generate sales and to play up the western allies.



Where do you get the 99% number?

How do you figure that it had no effect on the enemy? If the enemy believes something different, then disinformation is doing its job. Planting false information to the enemy is a normal part of combat. 

Have you ever sat in on Intel briefs?

And not wanting to be argumentative? You are doing a good job in how your formulate some of your posts...


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## ctrian (Jan 30, 2011)

GrauGeist said:


> DUH like, maybe the Allies getting a toe-hold at Normandy had a little something to do with that?
> 
> I know, it sounds a little far-fetched, doesn't it? Probably propeganda, huh?




I dont understand what you're trying to say.How could the allies NOT outnumber the germans?



DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Where do you get the 99% number?
> 
> How do you figure that it had no effect on the enemy? If the enemy believes something different, then disinformation is doing its job. Planting false information to the enemy is a normal part of combat.
> 
> ...



I mentioned some books before,read,learn.If the enemy does what is logical then why do u you attribute that to ''disinformation'' ? 
I'v read a lot on intelligence in ww2.So i get mad when i read things that are patently false.


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## mikewint (Jan 30, 2011)

Ctrain, arguement is not a problem but you cannot argue about results. If the allied forces did not think disinformation was important would they have spent so much time and energy on it with a major invasion in the works.
The key element of Fortitude South was Operation Quicksilver. It entailed the creation of the belief in German minds that the Allied force consisted of two army groups, 21st Army Group under Montgomery (the genuine Normandy invasion force), and 1st U.S. Army Group (FUSAG) (a fictitious force under General George Patton), positioned in southeastern England for a crossing at the Pas de Calais.
At no point were the Germans fed false documents describing the invasion plans. Instead they were allowed to construct a misleading order of battle for the Allied forces. To mount a massive invasion of Europe from England, military planners had little choice but to stage units around the country with those that would land first nearest to the embarkation point. As a result of FUSAG's having been placed in the south-east, German intelligence would (and did) deduce that the center of the invasion force was opposite Calais, the point on the French coast closest to England and therefore a likely landing point.
To facilitate this deception, additional buildings were constructed; dummy vehicles and landing craft were placed around possible embarkation points. Furthermore, Patton was often photographed visiting these locations. It was originally intended to make many such fakes, but the extremely low level of German aerial reconnaissance and the belief that most German spies were under British control meant that such effort were reduced to a minimum. A huge amount of false radio traffic was transmitted, commensurate with a force of that size.
A deception of such a size required input from many organisations, including MI5, MI6, SHAEF via Ops B, and the armed services. Information from the various deception agencies was organized by and channeled through the London Controlling Section under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel John Bevan.
The Allies were able to judge the effectiveness of these strategies. ULTRA intelligence — that gained from the breaking of German codes and ciphers, such as the Enigma machine — was able to provide an indication of the German high command's responses to their actions. They maintained the pretence of FUSAG and other forces threatening Pas de Calais for some considerable time after D-Day, possibly even as late as September 1944. *This was vital to the success of the Allied plan*, since it forced the Germans to keep most of their reserves bottled up waiting for an attack on Calais which never came, thereby allowing the Allies to maintain and build upon their *marginal **foothold* in Normandy.
So convinced were the Germans by this deception that they ignored several "leaks". One such leak was the crossword that came out in The Herald and Review six days before the beach landings were to take place. Some of the answers consisted of Overlord, Neptune, Gold and other key terms to the invasions; the US government later declared that this was just a coincidence. Through the Cicero affair, the Germans obtained documents containing references to Overlord, but these documents lacked all detail. Double Cross agents, such as Juan Pujol (code named Garbo), played an important role in convincing the German High Command that Normandy was at best a diversionary attack. U.S. Major General Henry Miller, chief supply officer of the US 9th Air Force, during a party at Claridge's Hotel in London complained to guests of the supply problems he was having but that after the invasion, which he told them would be before 15 June supply would be easier. After being told, Eisenhower reduced Miller to Colonel and sent him back to the U.S. where he subsequently retired. Another such leak was Gen. Charles de Gaulle's radio message after D-Day. He, unlike all the other leaders, stated that this invasion was the real invasion. This had the potential to ruin the Allied deceptions Fortitude North and Fortitude South. For example, Gen. Eisenhower referred to the landings as the initial landings.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 30, 2011)

ctrian said:


> I mentioned some books before,read,learn.If the enemy does what is logical then why do u you attribute that to ''disinformation'' ?
> I'v read a lot on intelligence in ww2.So i get mad when i read things that are patently false.



If the enemy does what is "logical" based off of false information, then that is "disinformation". How do you attribute that to anything else.

I have actually sat in on intel briefs before flying combat missions. The information received was not always accurate. That is the point.


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## ctrian (Jan 30, 2011)

mikewint said:


> Ctrain, arguement is not a problem but you cannot argue about results. If the allied forces did not think disinformation was important would they have spent so much time and energy on it with a major invasion in the works.
> The key element of Fortitude South was Operation Quicksilver. It entailed the creation of the belief in German minds that the Allied force consisted of two army groups, 21st Army Group under Montgomery (the genuine Normandy invasion force), and 1st U.S. Army Group (FUSAG) (a fictitious force under General George Patton), positioned in southeastern England for a crossing at the Pas de Calais.
> At no point were the Germans fed false documents describing the invasion plans. Instead they were allowed to construct a misleading order of battle for the Allied forces. To mount a massive invasion of Europe from England, military planners had little choice but to stage units around the country with those that would land first nearest to the embarkation point. As a result of FUSAG's having been placed in the south-east, German intelligence would (and did) deduce that the center of the invasion force was opposite Calais, the point on the French coast closest to England and therefore a likely landing point.
> To facilitate this deception, additional buildings were constructed; dummy vehicles and landing craft were placed around possible embarkation points. Furthermore, Patton was often photographed visiting these locations. It was originally intended to make many such fakes, but the extremely low level of German aerial reconnaissance and the belief that most German spies were under British control meant that such effort were reduced to a minimum. A huge amount of false radio traffic was transmitted, commensurate with a force of that size.
> ...



Mike i will agree with you that the Anglos spent a lot of resources on the fortitude plan (as they should) HOWEVER their victory in Normandy had everything to do with the material resources at their disposal. The whole Fortitude plan reinforced the German belief in the Calais landing ,it didn't not create it. The Germans had always expected a landing there, before fortitude during and after. As for the dummy ships and the fake radio messages they were either marginally effective or completely missed by the Germans.The chapter ''Deception and the planning of D-Day'' by Barbier in ''The Normandy campaign 1944: sixty years on'' is very interesting in this aspect.


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## GrauGeist (Jan 30, 2011)

ctrian said:


> I dont understand what you're trying to say.How could the allies NOT outnumber the germans?


Ok, if it was just that easy, why didn't the Allies simply bum-rush the Germans at the beginning of the war?

You say you have alot of info regarding intel yet you toss off the notion of counter-intelligence as a propeganda ruse instead of seeing how vital it was to the outcome of the war.

Yes, there was a numerical advantage with the Allies, but in the grand scheme of things, the Germans were VERY good at bleeding out thier opponents. A shining example of that would be the horrific losses the Soviets suffered. And yet the Soviets outnumbered the Germans...

Breaking the Enigma code and baiting the Germans with misinformation caused the Germans to apply thier assets in areas away from Allied operations that would ultimately save Allied lives and allow for relatively unopposed access to the European continent.

Once the Allies gained a foothold on European soil, the Germans were faced with two collapsing fronts, much like being caught between a hammer and an anvil.

And as a MAJOR example, the battle of Midway in the Pacific was won by breaking the Japanese code and reacting on that information. Breaking the Axis power's codes and baiting them with misinformation was as critical of a tool as was the infantry on the ground or aircraft over the front.

You CANNOT discredit the key role that the espionage played in any aspect of the war. To do so is simply being ignorant of ACTUAL FACT, regardless of your "opinion"...


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## ctrian (Jan 30, 2011)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> If the enemy does what is "logical" based off of false information, then that is "disinformation". How do you attribute that to anything else.
> 
> I have actually sat in on intel briefs before flying combat missions. The information received was not always accurate. That is the point.



Because it made no sense for the Germans to leave the Calais area undefended. They built up their defenses there before ,during and after the allied disinformation plan.It was simply the normal, logical way to prepare for an invasion of France.Their mobile forces on the other hand where not concentrated there but ready to move either in Calais or Normandy.Disinformation had nothing to do with the limited number of *battle worthy* german formations in the West at that time.


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## ctrian (Jan 30, 2011)

GrauGeist said:


> Ok, if it was just that easy, why didn't the Allies simply bum-rush the Germans at the beginning of the war?
> 
> You say you have alot of info regarding intel yet you toss off the notion of counter-intelligence as a propeganda ruse instead of seeing how vital it was to the outcome of the war.
> 
> ...



You mix up Humint ,Sigint , espionage,counter-intelligence and so on.Of course both offensive and defensive intel operations are important.How do you think the Germans won in France ,they could read the enemy's codes.Same in Russia 85% of soviet communications were read.In this case however the Germans used the limited forces they had at their disposal in the best (more or less ) way.The German formations were low on trucks and fuel.Most were undergoing training and were not battle worthy.Considering the allied strength and their control of the seas they could land anywhere they wanted but the Germans couldn't be strong everywhere. Look what happened at Gela and Salerno.In Normandy the allies had much better odds ,is it strange that they won?


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## Freebird (Jan 30, 2011)

ctrian said:


> The ''germans were so dumb we tricked them and won the war '' story has been debunked years ago.First from zetterling's ''Normandy 1944'' book and recently from Mary Barbier's ''D-day deception: Operation Fortitude and the Normandy invasion'' .*Yes disinformation played a part* but writing whole books on the subject and claiming that it was vital for the normandy victory is simply crude propaganda



Nobody claims that it was the main reason for victory, but it played an imortant part.



mikewint said:


> The Allies were able to judge the effectiveness of these strategies. ULTRA intelligence — that gained from the breaking of German codes and ciphers, such as the Enigma machine — was able to provide an indication of the German high command's responses to their actions. They maintained the pretence of FUSAG and other forces threatening Pas de Calais for some considerable time after D-Day, possibly even as late as September 1944. *This was vital to the success of the Allied plan*, since it forced the Germans to keep most of their reserves bottled up waiting for an attack on Calais which never came, thereby allowing the Allies to maintain and build upon their *marginal **foothold* in Normandy..



Great post Mike.



ctrian said:


> No it wasn't vital, because the Anglo-Americans already had overwhelming superiority in men ,tanks,artillery,aircraft etc.


Hmm, just like the Italians had an *overwhelming superiority* in Africa in 1940?
4 to 1 in troops 
12 to 1 in artillery
2 to 1 in tanks
2 to 1 in aircraft.

Of course with this _overwhelming superiority_ the Italians won, right?


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## RabidAlien (Jan 30, 2011)

Trolls. Gotta love em. Salerno and Anzio could have had very different turnouts, had the generals in overall command of the landing forces not stopped to brew up some tea and consolidate their forces....thus giving the Germans time to rush troops in to reinforce the outnumbered troops already in the target area. Italy's terrain, with all of its mountain ranges, is pretty much custom-designed for defense. If the Allies had continued the initial landings to take the high ground, the German army could have been routed much easier, and not had time to prepare alternate defensive lines to fall back to.

In Normandy, as Mike stated, if Hitler had not been *convinced *(due to disinformation) that the main attack would be by Patton at Pas de Calais, all those crack troops and desperately-needed Panzers (not to mention 88s and 155s that caused so much havoc at Omaha) could have been rushed towards the sound of gunfire, and either contained the landings, or even forced the evacuation of one or more beachhead. Omaha, for example, was a near thing. Had individual platoon commanders and NCO's not taken charge and started a small trickle of men heading up the seawall and bluff, then those bottled up on the beach would have been slaughtered, taken POW, or evacuated. Reinforcements were stopped due to the appalling conditions on the beach. If Omaha were lost, then that leaves a very large gaping hole between Utah and Gold, allowing Utah to be cleaned up in detail (no support on their left flank); all of the paratroopers isolated in and around the countryside could expect no relief/resupply, allowing them to be cleaned up at leisure (or, worst case, surrounded and effectively out of the battle); Juno, Gold, and Sword beaches would be mutually supporting, but there would only be a three-beach front vs a five-beach front, much easier to contain. Plus, all of the troops, tanks, and artillery (not to mention supplies) could be moved wherever needed to ensure nobody broke out of the beachheads. So, all those massive amounts of overwhelming manpower, firepower, equipment, etc, that were sitting so conveniently over in England, *would have nowhere to land.* They are, at that point, effectively useless. By cutting off the beaches, Hitler would have very effectively nullified their numerical superiority. However, he didn't....why? Because he was convinced, partly due to his own insistence in his tactical genius, and partly due to the preponderance of "evidence" (the previously mentioned coded radio traffic that pointed to a 1st US Army Group ready to pounce on the Pas de Calais), that the Normandy landings were nothing but a feint designed to draw his best troops away from the actual landing site. The German High Command was also convinced that the Allies had something like 75 divisions waiting to drop on Europe, which would make a landing by 5 or so divisions a logical diversion. 

So, yes, deception played a vital role in the war in Europe.


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## ctrian (Jan 31, 2011)

Moronic posts , circular reasoning...
From the book i mentioned earlier:
''No one can doubt that the FORTITUDE deception plan had an effect on the Allies' success in Normandy, but the extent of that effect can be questioned. When reaching a conclusion about the importance of FORTITUDE one must first consider whether or not the deception operation was a success. Most historians who mention the deception do so in terms of the success, not the importance, of the scheme. Several of them intimate that success and importance are synonymous and praise FORTITUDE, because it appeared to be successful. They fail, however, to address the issue of which part or parts of the operation — wireless transmissions, physical displays or double agents' messages — successfully transmitted the cover story to the Germans. In general, historians rely upon analyses of the deception's outcome by Sir Ronald Wingate and Roger Hesketh. Both men served on the LCS and. wrote accounts of the planning, implementation and outcome of FORTITUDE. Although he suggested that the deception succeeded in disguising the time and place of the Allied invasion from the Germans, Wingate conceded that not all aspects of the plan contributed to the Germans' acceptance of the fictitious threat. According to Wingate, the OKW Lagebericht (intelligence summary) indicated that the Germans accepted all of the imaginary formations that participated in FORTITUDE as real. He admitted, however, that the OKW might not have obtained its information about these formations from the wealth of wireless traffic sent out over the airwaves as part of the deception: 'It is rather surprising to note that the OKW Lagebericht provides no single example of the wireless programme having brought any item in the FORTITUDE story to the knowledge of the Germans in the first instance. There are a few rare cases where the "Y" report purports to confirm Intelligence which has already been supplied by one of the controlled agents. In addition, the Germans apparently failed to observe the numerous displays of fake landing craft, supply depots, airfields and army camps. The OKW Lagebericht did not, according to Wingate, indicate the presence of landing craft in south-east England, primarily because few German aircraft succeeded in flying reconnaissance missions over the area either before or after Allied troops arrived in Normandy. Wingate concluded, `every phase in the story can be directly attributed to the three double-cross agents, GARBO, BRUTUS, and TRICYCLE. Individual messages can be checked with passages in the German Intelligence Summary'. Wingate did not, however, suggest that Allied deception teams should not have transmitted wireless messages or displayed dummy landing craft, which he called 'valuable insurance, the omission of which might on another occasion cause disastrous results'. Although the lack of enemy reconnaissance flights explained the Germans' lack of awareness of the physical displays, Wingate admitted that he did not understand why the wireless programme failed to gamer German attention.''

Source: ''The Normandy campaign 1944: sixty years on'' p176,177


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## GrauGeist (Jan 31, 2011)

ctrian said:


> Moronic posts , circular reasoning...


A thousand pardons, your Lordship...please let me kiss the bottom of your sandals...NOT

I think the debate has run it's course, all points have been considered and taken...however, your referring to the rebuttal as "moronic" leaves me with only one thought regarding your self-absorbed argument...the rantings of an egocentric dumbass.

I think I'll sit this one out, before I get busted...


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 31, 2011)

Alright everyone chill out! Discuss this in a civilized manner.

One more post about trolls or moronic posts will be tolerated.


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## RabidAlien (Jan 31, 2011)

My bad, Adler. I'm outta this one as well.


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## mikewint (Jan 31, 2011)

ctrian said:


> Their mobile forces on the other hand where not concentrated there but ready to move either in Calais or Normandy.



As you stated. The point being that the disinformation plan had been swallowed hook, line, and sinker by the Germans. Therefore those mobile forces were no longer mobile and did NOT move as they should have against the forming beach heads. The time to stop the allied forces was on the beachheads BEFORE more troops and heavy equipment were in place. 
By the time Hitler released those forces it was to late and the Germans faced a true two front war


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## ctrian (Jan 31, 2011)

This is getting tiring ,but I'll bite..
Before operation Overlord started the Germans had *10 mechanized divisions *in Western Europe.They were scattered over France and Belgium because they were *resting ,training replacements and refitting *.Out of these only *4* could be considered combat ready and only 2nd Panzer Division was complete and *fully combat ready *.Since the Germans anticipated Allied landings at Pas de Calais and Normandy they placed 2nd PD near Pas de Calais and 21st PD in Normandy.The other two ( Panzer Lehr and Hitlerjuge nd) were placed farther from the coast to constitute a reserve. That's the mighty force that was supposed to throw the allies to the sea.


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## Messy1 (Jan 31, 2011)

But, the reserve forces were not thrown into the mix right away because the Germans completely, 100%, totally believed the landings at Normandy were merely a diversion to take attention, men, materials away from the "real" attack at Pas de Calais. When higher ups in the German chain of command were asked to send in reinforcements, they request was denied because the Germans "knew" Normandy was a diversion, due to disinformation, false reports, false army traffic, mis-intelligence. Many reserves units did not get called into action until the following day.


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## mikewint (Jan 31, 2011)

Ctrian, no one has ever stated that disinformation is/wa the be all and end all. In spite of the fact that many of the German High command "looked forward" to the invasion so that the British/American threat could finally be delt with there were many other contributing factors to the success of the invasion
As Rommel had recognised, *Germany's main chance of defeating the invasion lay in prompt counterattacks*, particularly by her panzer forces. However, for a variety of reasons, the powerful striking force within easy reach of the invasion beaches which he had called for was not immediately available. A major problem resulted from a lack of clarity in the panzer command structure. The newly formed 47th Panzer Corps was still in process of taking over command of 21st, 116th and 2nd Panzer Divisions, whilst administrative and supply matters remained under Panzer Group West, with both responsible to Rommel's Army Group B. To complicate matters further, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, Commander in Chief West, *was powerless to commit the strategic reserve without the authority of OKW*, meaning in effect Hitler.
The differences between Rommel and von Rundstedt over the best deployment of the panzer reserves meant that on June 6th, only one unit, 21st Panzer Division, stationed outside Caen, was in a position to counterattack that day.
21st Panzer had gained its reputation as part of Rommel's famous Afrika Korps. However it had been virtually completely destroyed in the spring of 1943 in Tunisia. It had been reformed later that year in Brittany, with a cadre of veterans drawn from the Eastern Front, its ranks filled out with new recruits from Germany. Shortage of equipment had been a major problem, with much use being made of obsolete material captured from the French in 1940. By the beginning of June 1944, the situation was improving, and 21st Panzer had received in the region of 90 Panzer Mark IVs, which with a number of variants, made up over 70% of its armoured strength. However the position of other units in the Division was less satisfactory. Assault Gun Battalion 200, for example, was equipped with modified French tracked chassis carrying 75mm anti-tank guns and 105 mm field howitzers. The motorised infantry battalions were also far from satisfactory; though some troops had armored half-tracks, others had to make do with lorries.
There is also evidence of some lack of unity among the Division's officers. Its commander, Generalleutnant Edgar Feuchtinger was not regarded with great respect. He was by training an artillery officer, not a tank man, and was thought by some to have too great a fondness for the bright lights of Paris. He would later be accused, by officers of 12th SS Panzer Division, of displaying indecision.
The Division began the day in dispersed positions around Caen, intended to operate against airborne or commando landings. Feuchtinger was under strict orders not to commit any forces against a major sea borne invasion without orders from Army Group B.
It may have been around 1 am on June 6th that Feuchtinger first received word of British paratroop landings east of the Orne. His two motorised infantry battalions were committed to support units of 716th Division in dealing with these, whilst his reconnaissance battalion was tasked with searching for further paratroop landings south of Caen. At 4-30 am, Army Group B released the entire Division for operations against the British paratroops east of the Orne, a decision which drew a considerable part of its strength further away from the coast. By 9 am, the bulk of 21st Panzer's armor was moving steadily north-eastwards away from Caen.
Then at 10-30 am, General Marcks, commanding 84th Corps, changed Feuchtinger's orders. He was to direct his main effort against the British and Canadian sea borne landings.
This belated change of objective resulted in what was to prove to be fatal confusion. Many of 21st Panzer's men were inextricably committed against the paratroops, and in an order issued at 1pm, Feuchtinger attempted to make the best of a bad situation. His armored units were to divide their efforts, three of his panzer battalions were to move against the sea borne landings, whilst the fourth, with Panzergrenadier regiment 125, and attached elements, was to continue operations against the paratroops. Three "kampe gruppes" (battlegroups) , named after their commanders, were improvised, two of them to take charge of operations against the sea borne invaders. Panzerkampegruppe "Oppeln " consisted of two panzer battalions, one panzergrenadier, one engineer and one armored artillery battalion; Panzerkampgruppe "Rauch" was formed from two panzergrenadier battalions, supported by armored engineers and artillery.
The result of this probably inevitable compromise was that only two-thirds of 21st Panzer Division was available for the vital counter attack towards the coast. Chances of success were further reduced by the time lost in re-grouping the Division. It took precious hours to bring men and vehicles over the limited number of crossings of the River Orne, whilst the streets of Caen were blocked with rubble as a result of continuous Allied air and naval bombardment, as well as by crowds of fleeing civilian refugees. As the first tanks eventually emerged from the western suburbs of the town, they were themselves subjected to air attack by rocket-firing Typhoons, and six were knocked out.
It was not until about 4pm that Oppeln's group began deploying near the village of Lebussey, north of Caen. At the same time, General Marcks, commanding 84th Corps took personal charge of the deployment of Group Rauch, which would face the dominating high ground of Periers Rise, still thought to be German-held. *Underlining how vital the attack was, Marcks told Oberst von Oppeln-Bronikowski: "If you don't succeed in throwing the British into the sea, we will have lost the war."*At about 4-20 pm, the German assault began. By now, as we have seen, unbeknown to 21st Panzer, Perriers Rise had been occupied by troops of the British Shropshire Light Infantry, equipped with 6 pounder anti-tank guns, and supported by 17 pounder SP guns of the 20th Anti-Tank Regiment. With some trepidation, the British saw a formation of some 40 Panzer IV's rapidly approaching their position. They held their fire until the German tanks began to climb the slope of the Rise, and then opened a devastating fire from their concealed positions. In quick succession, six of the 25 Mark IV's attacking on the right were knocked out. The German advance ground to a halt as surviving tanks sought shelter in patches of woodland. Further to the west, around the village of Mathieu, the 1st Panzer Regiment suffered a similar fate, with around nine tanks knocked out. As a German account admitted: " The fire of the English, from their outstandingly well-sited defence positions, was murderous… within a brief space of time the armoured regiment of 21st Panzer Division had lost a total of 16 tanks, a decisive defeat, from which, especially in morale, it never recovered."
Further to the left, however, PanzerKampfegruppe "Rauch" had found the gap between the British and Canadian forces, and drove unchecked right through to the coast. Here they linked up with the 111th Battalion of Infantry Regiment 736, which was still holding coastal positions to the west of the village of Lion sur Mer. It was a seemingly dramatic breakthrough, which would however require substantial reinforcement if it were to exploit its initial success.
The psychological effects on British troops of the counter-attack were greater than its material results. It did, however, effectively halt for the day the already faltering Allied advance towards Caen, and caused Montgomery to abandon his planned direct assault on the city in favour of a much more time-consuming enveloping movement.
For the Germans, the day ended in frustration. *There were no reserves available to exploit the breakthrough at Lion*. At about 9 pm, as dusk fell, the men of Group "Rauch" heard the roar of approaching aero engines, as wave after wave of transport aircraft, some towing gliders, came into view, carrying the remainder of the British 6th Airborne Division. These were on their way to reinforce the earlier landings east of the Orne, but the German troops at Lion believed that they were about to be cut off. Apart from a few men of Panzergrenadier Regiment 192, who reinforced the defenders of the isolated Douvres strongpoint, both battlegroups of 21st Panzer were ordered to pull back to positions north of Caen. 
*German reaction to the Allied landings had been fatally slow*. The other nearest mobile reserves, 12th SS Panzer and Panzer Lehr Divisions, were not released by OKW to 7th Army until 7 pm, too late for either, harassed as they were by air attacks, to intervene that day. Germany's last chance to split the British and Canadian landings had been lost.


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## ctrian (Feb 1, 2011)

Messy1 said:


> But, the reserve forces were not thrown into the mix right away because the Germans completely, 100%, totally believed the landings at Normandy were merely a diversion to take attention, men, materials away from the "real" attack at Pas de Calais. When higher ups in the German chain of command were asked to send in reinforcements, they request was denied because the Germans "knew" Normandy was a diversion, due to disinformation, false reports, false army traffic, mis-intelligence. Many reserves units did not get called into action until the following day.



Like i said before the mobile forces that could be quickly moved were moved.The rest were infantry divisions with no mobility.Thats the main problem not disinformation,hitler sleeping etc...


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## ctrian (Feb 1, 2011)

Mike as i said before the forces available to the Germans were not enough to defeat an Allied landing provided it was well supported by naval vessels and airpower.It doesnt matter if Rommel's or Rundstedt's plan was followed.Look at what happened at Gela and Salerno.


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## mikewint (Feb 1, 2011)

Ctrain, I semi-agree with you and your points are well taken. However the point still remains that INITIALLY the German forces outnumbered the Allied. Troops and material can only be off loaded so fast. Had the Germans reacted swiftly and decisively the landings could have been vastly limited and contained. There were plenty of reserves within striking distance had they been allowed to be used but the Germans held back allowing the Allied numerical and material build up to continue. This is where the disinformation campaign made itself felt. Much as the Germans had used the French reliance on static defenses and attacked through the "Impossible" Ardennes.
What the German really lacked was IN DEPTH reserves due to the German attack into Russia. Once the landings had been established and a deep water port established it was indeed all over for the Germans. Now they had a true two front war to deal with and the industrial might of the US made itself felt.
Like an infection, the time to deal with it is in the early stages and not when it is fully established


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## mikewint (Feb 1, 2011)

Ctrain, I semi-agree with you and your points are well taken. However the point still remains that INITIALLY the German forces outnumbered the Allied. Troops and material can only be off loaded so fast. Had the Germans reacted swiftly and decisively the landings could have been vastly limited and contained. There were plenty of reserves within striking distance had they been allowed to be used but the Germans held back allowing the Allied numerical and material build up to continue. This is where the disinformation campaign made itself felt. Much as the Germans had used the French reliance on static defenses and attacked through the "Impossible" Ardennes.
What the German really lacked was IN DEPTH reserves due to the German attack into Russia. Once the landings had been established and a deep water port established it was indeed all over for the Germans. Now they had a true two front war to deal with and the industrial might of the US made itself felt.
Like an infection, the time to deal with it is in the early stages and not when it is fully established


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## Messy1 (Feb 1, 2011)

Nice post Mike, agree with you.


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## mikewint (Feb 1, 2011)

Thanks messy, throughout history successful attacks have usually been made where the enemy least expected that attack, i.e. Hannibal over the alps comes to mind immediately.
Feints have also always been a part of any contest as the Germans feinted at the low countries. Deception is just a type of feint. Keep the marks looking at the almost naked lady while the elephant walks off the stage


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## ctrian (Feb 1, 2011)

mikewint said:


> Ctrain, I semi-agree with you and your points are well taken. However the point still remains that INITIALLY the German forces outnumbered the Allied. Troops and material can only be off loaded so fast. Had the Germans reacted swiftly and decisively the landings could have been vastly limited and contained. There were plenty of reserves within striking distance had they been allowed to be used but the Germans held back allowing the Allied numerical and material build up to continue. This is where the disinformation campaign made itself felt. Much as the Germans had used the French reliance on static defenses and attacked through the "Impossible" Ardennes.
> What the German really lacked was IN DEPTH reserves due to the German attack into Russia. Once the landings had been established and a deep water port established it was indeed all over for the Germans. Now they had a true two front war to deal with and the industrial might of the US made itself felt.
> Like an infection, the time to deal with it is in the early stages and not when it is fully established



Thats only true if you compare the entire German force in France with the 156.000 allied soldiers landed on D day .But as i said before only a small part of those forces was mobile and an even smaller one was battle worthy.With a lack of trucks and fuel plus heavily damaged transport network(courtesy of USAAF and RAF bombers) there was no way for the Germans to speedily assemble a powerful force (assuming they had one to begin with).


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## mikewint (Feb 1, 2011)

In 1943, Hitler appointed Field Marshal Erwin Rommel to command Army Group B and with it, the responsibility for the defense of Normandy. Rommel inspected the beach defenses and found them altogether inadequate. He immediately set to building improvements, laying minefields on the beaches and beach approaches and in the English Channel. Fortifications were strengthened, fields of fire were improved, and obstacles of all sorts were placed in the water at approaches to possible landing sites. In addition, flood plains were flooded and fields were positioned with poles to prevent their possible use as landing areas. 
Rommel realized that the defenses he was in charge of constructing were not going to stop an invasion. The best he could hope for was that the defenses could delay the invasion and cause significant confusion among the invaders. *He understood that the invasion force mustn't be allowed to establish a foothold, because if it did, it could bring in near limitless resources. Rommel believed that it was absolutely critical that any invasion must be met quickly by his troops and especially Armored units.* *His belief was that they must defeat the Allies on the beaches, before a foothold could be established.*
Rundstedt's philosophy on the countering an invasion was to *hold back the six panzer divisions in reserve *in Northern France and deploy them in a crushing blow after the it was determined where the _real invasion _was taking place.
By June 1944, the German forces in France numbered 46 infantry divisions and 9 panzer divisions (notably the Panzer Lehr, 1st, 2nd, and 12th SS Panzer Divisions). Several infantry divisions were inexperienced and contained lower quality young troops and older men - troops that were unable to immediately fight on the Russian front. In addition, of the 850,000 men under Rundstedt's command, 60,000 were hilfswillige (prisoners from the Russian front who volunteered for Russian service - mostly Tartars, Cossacks, Ukrainians, etc.) But, most infantry divisions were of good quality and several consisted of battle-hardened veterans from the Eastern front. A typical German division was slightly smaller than an American division, but because of material and fuel shortages, it lacked significant mobile transport - relying on heavy use of horse and train.
Hardly an insignificant force had they been brought to bear on the actual invasion instead of sitting around waiting for the "real" invasion to occur. That's disinformation at work


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## ctrian (Feb 2, 2011)

Look i can't go on repeating myself .If you want you can compare 800.000 Germans to 156.000 allies or even the whole German ground forces ,roughly 4.600.000 troops to 156.000 allies.It is still a wrong comparison since *only a small part of the troops in France had mobility*.
Regarding Rommel vs Rundstedt look at what happened at *Gela and Salerno*, massive allied air support and naval fire stopped the Germans from defeating the Anglo-American forces. The same was bound to happen in Normandy ,only more so.I would advise you to read zetterling's ''Normandy 1944'' book it deals with all these questions in detail.


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## mikewint (Feb 3, 2011)

Ctrain, I guess we'll have to disagree on that point. I simply agree with Rommel, who I would hope knew his forces better than you or I. In my opinion D-day would have gone a lot different had Rommel had a free hand and exploited the breakthrough at Lion.


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## ctrian (Feb 4, 2011)

No problem.However if you are that interested in the Normandy campaign do yourself a favour and buy that book,maybe it will change your mind or make you rethink things.I've already changed a person's mind on this forum regarding the German war economy so trust me on this!


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## mikewint (Feb 4, 2011)

Ctrain, we're still digging out from our blizzard but that book is on my list. Though our debate is not really about the German economy, we really agree on that aspect. Much of that was due to things the Germans did to themselves such as 250,000 RM for a single Tiger I with all its mobility and mechanical problems or attacking Russia and opening a two front war.


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## ctrian (Feb 4, 2011)

mikewint said:


> Ctrain, we're still digging out from our blizzard but that book is on my list. Though our debate is not really about the German economy, we really agree on that aspect. Much of that was due to things the Germans did to themselves such as 250,000 RM for a single Tiger I with all its mobility and mechanical problems or attacking Russia and opening a two front war.



Actually i meant that i know my books.There was an other discussion where the topic of the german war economy came up and i mentioned that the old version ''the german economy was mismanaged/speer increased production'' was debunked by a new book ''Wages of Destruction'' by Adam Tooze.


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## mikewint (Feb 4, 2011)

I'll add that to my list as well


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## ctrian (Apr 26, 2011)

I decided to resurrect this post for the following reason ,the official British history ‘’ *British Intelligence in the Second World War’’ *vol 4 p177-78 debunks the widely held view that the Germans held back their forces due to the deception plan.Case closed !


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## mikewint (Apr 27, 2011)

Ctrain, don't know how you can post this and still hold your position, please read your own post: "the enemy has tied his hand strategically by his fear of future landings". The physical difficulties of bringing up those divisions is another issue


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## ctrian (Apr 27, 2011)

mike it is clearly stated in the *bottom of the pages* that not even the Allies expected that the 15th army would be moved to normandy.At most the 6 divisions mentioned were thought to be in danger of being moved.Out of these 1st SS was not combat ready and the order to move it was cancelled.The *ONLY* armored division in the channel area 2nd Pz Division was however ordered out on 9 June that is *D+3*.Other units mentioned were not mobile in any case.For example 5th parachute was in a bad state and was sent in small units.Also keep in mind that British appreciations are different from German ones.


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## mikewint (Apr 27, 2011)

From further on the same document: "attributed the short-fall to fear of further landings" and a bit further on: "The decrypts referring to the enemies anxiety about further landings" and a bit further: "the importance of maintaining it by all possible means"
From the page bottom: "the difficulty the Germans would have had IF they had decided to move them"
no one has denied the difficulty of transport but the deception program prevented that decision from even being made until the beacheads had been established


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## ctrian (Apr 27, 2011)

I should clarify the _appreciations_ part. The Overlord plan anticipated German reinforcements at a specific rate per day.When the real rate was lower during the actual battle the British estimate was that units where held back in fear of other landings.In reality the major problem for the Germans was that their units were in poor shape with limited mobility due to lack of motor transport and the destruction of the railway lines.Units that had mobility where moved fast like the panzer divisions( 12 SS ,Lehr) .The most powerful unit in 15th army(2nd Pz Div) was also sent to Normandy after three days.So I think it’s obvious that the Brits overestimated the mobility and strength of German units( for example they thought 21Pz Div had 300 tanks while the real number was 113). Hope this clears up things.


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## ctrian (Apr 27, 2011)

mikewint said:


> From further on the same document: "attributed the short-fall to fear of further landings" and a bit further on: "The decrypts referring to the enemies anxiety about further landings" and a bit further: "the importance of maintaining it by all possible means"
> From the page bottom: "the difficulty the Germans would have had IF they had decided to move them"
> no one has denied the difficulty of transport but the deception program prevented that decision from even being made until the beacheads had been established



Yes that was the British appreciation at that time based on Japanese diplomatic decrypts and on their estimate of german *strenghs and mobility*(which was not correct).Also im'not sure who prevented 2 Pz Div from moving to Normandy.


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## mikewint (Apr 27, 2011)

ctrian said:


> The most powerful unit in 15th army(2nd Pz Div) was also sent to Normandy after three days.


All agreed and accepted, but from your own statement why the three day delay before the unit was even attempted to be moved. Time bought by the deception. Time for the beachheads to be established. As Rommel knew, the Allies had to be defeated on the beach before the Allied material advantage club could be wielded.


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## ctrian (Apr 27, 2011)

2 Pz was ordered to move on 9 June and elements of the division entered combat on 12 .Even if they had been ordered on D-day they couldn’t be there until probably 9 of the month? Would that make any difference considering that 156.000 allied soldiers landed on D-day alone? As for the deception it is probably true that the cancellation of the order to move 1st SS
was due to a double agent who claimed that attack on Calais was imminent.


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## mikewint (Apr 27, 2011)

ctrain, do I detect a whiff of consensus?


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## ctrian (Apr 27, 2011)

mikewint said:


> ctrain, do I detect a whiff of consensus?


 
How do you mean?


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## mikewint (Apr 27, 2011)

ctrian said:


> As for the deception it is probably true that the cancellation of the order to move 1st SS
> was due to a double agent who claimed that attack on Calais was imminent.


 As in, the deception did play a role in German inaction during Normandy


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## ctrian (Apr 27, 2011)

Did you forget my past posts? I’ve always said that the deception effort reinforced German fears it did not create them and it’s contribution to the final outcome is very small contrary to what has been preached by most history books. Thats not the same as saying it had no effect.


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## mikewint (Apr 28, 2011)

Personally I'd give it a 60 - 40. 60% deception and 40% transport difficulty. Desperate people can overcome tremendous problems. Had the Germans really believed that this was the real invasion site they would have moved heaven and earth to get more troops and armor there. The "waiting for the real hammer to fall" deception held them static much as it did during the Dunkirk halt. we'll agree to disagree


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## ctrian (Apr 28, 2011)

Well that's where we differ .For me it’s closer to 90% real problems like units not being combat worthy (forming or refitting ) and lack of mobility and 10% deception.


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## psteel (May 15, 2011)

What made most of the allied deceptions work more effectively, was Hitler’s predictable personality. Even from as far back as Stalingrad, Stalin counted on Hitler’s inability to resist the challenge of taking "his city" to suck him into a vortex that would force Hitler to stripe the flanks of his neighboring armies and force Hitler to commit his reserves. Once this was done the Russian Blitzkrieg was guaranteed to work.


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## ctrian (May 16, 2011)

Something tells me you didn't bother to read the previous posts....


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