# The truth about Regia Aeronautica



## Saetta66 (Feb 8, 2010)

Was really in your opinion the Regia Aeroanutica (Italian Royal Air Force) the worst air force in ww2?
And if yes, why?
And if maybe, why?
And if not, why?
Seems like a stupid question but I am very serious. Only talking about things is possibile to undestand them without prejudice and helpin ourselves and the others lookin things form a different point of view.
The truth, for the memory of the thousands of Regia Aeronautica dead pilots and specialist, is my personal crusade.
Please help me in this difficult mission
Thank you
Fabio - son a Regia Aeronautica fighter pilot


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## Vincenzo (Feb 8, 2010)

Saetta66 said:


> The truth, for the memory of the hundred of thousands of Regia Aeronautica dead pilots and specialist, is my personal crusade.



hundred of thousands? the truth it's very less under twenty thousands?


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## Saetta66 (Feb 8, 2010)

Vincenzo said:


> hundred of thousands? the truth it's very less under twenty thousands?



Sorry, I was sure I wrote only the word thousands. Thank you, I correct it immediately.


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## parsifal (Feb 8, 2010)

The RA was like every other air force that participated in the war, it had its strengthss and its weaknesses. Its pilots and other aircrew were brave.

As an example, the RA were effective in the torpedo bombing role. 

They were weak in their fleet co-operation. A fundamental problem for them was the low serviceability rates in their air formation, brought about by a weak support and industrial base, and a political system that was iherently inneffiicient and corrupt. Replacement ratesw were low, and the force as a whole too thinly spread out to be effective. The fascists tended to disdain technological developments like radar, which downgraded the overall effeectiveness of a brave force


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## Timppa (Feb 8, 2010)

_"Good soldiers, bad officers; however don't forget that without them we would not have any Civilization " _- Erwin Rommel on Italians, as quoted in The Rommel Papers (1982) edited by Basil Henry Liddell Hart

_"The German soldier has impressed the world, however the Italian Bersaglieri soldier has impressed the German soldier."_-On the plaque dedicated to the Bersaglieri that fought at Mersa Matruh and Alamein

_
One of the most competent volunteer pilots in Finland was a very experienced Italian Staff Sergeant Diego Manzocchi who was killed in his wounds after forced landing. A bullet had gone through his chest in aerial battle but he still tried to fly his valuable plane back to a temporary ice airfield of LLv.26 at Haukkajärvi near Utti airbase. Probably because of the weakness caused by bleeding blood he got lost and forced landed landing gears down on the ice of a frozen lake west from Utti airbase with the last drops of fuel. His plane turned upside down in deep flush which also packed into the open cabin of FIAT G.50. Manzocchi couldn’t release himself away from the belts but was still alive when the rescue patrol found him six hours later. He had already hung too long time upside down and died soon afterwards. Diego Manzocchi was buried in Helsinki, Finland at Hietaniemi military cemetery._


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## Saetta66 (Feb 8, 2010)

Very interesting the story about the sergente Manzocchi.
Those pics are for you and for the Finnish Air Force: g50 freccia (arrow) with finnish emblems.












Timppa said:


> _"Good soldiers, bad officers; however don't forget that without them we would not have any Civilization " _- Erwin Rommel on Italians, as quoted in The Rommel Papers (1982) edited by Basil Henry Liddell Hart
> 
> _"The German soldier has impressed the world, however the Italian Bersaglieri soldier has impressed the German soldier."_-On the plaque dedicated to the Bersaglieri that fought at Mersa Matruh and Alamein
> 
> ...


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## LWulf (Feb 8, 2010)

There's no absolute worst airforce. Any airforce you look at had its own failings and issues. But I would say that RA wasn't very successful.
They had excellent pilots, that in general weren't as proficient in combat flying and tactics as the other successful airforces. They had some excellent aircraft that too often sacrificied ease of production for a bit of performance more in a design that was already lagging behind competition. They had some leaders that understood things and wanted well for their pilots and airforce in general, but had superiors who had no clue and didn't give a **** about the people they were sending to die.
So in short, any failings of the RA came from the top and affected the tactical level. Despite the best will and skill of pilots, mechanics and other soldiers involved, there wasn't much more they could've done. And while I sympathize with everyone involved in a war I am happy the RA didn't fare better.


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## Saetta66 (Feb 8, 2010)

I wrote in red, hope is clear 



parsifal said:


> The RA was like every other air force that participated in the war, it had its strengthss and its weaknesses. Its pilots and other aircrew were brave.
> 
> As an example, the RA were effective in the torpedo bombing role.
> 
> ...


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## Saetta66 (Feb 8, 2010)

Hope the red is clear enough


LWulf said:


> There's no absolute worst airforce. Any airforce you look at had its own failings and issues. But I would say that RA wasn't very successful.
> They had excellent pilots, that in general weren't as proficient in combat flying and tactics as the other successful airforces. Maybe because their weapon and motor engine power support was too low and poorThey had some excellent aircraft that too often sacrificied ease of production for a bit of performance more in a design that was already lagging behind competition. IMHO I think that our aircrafts were average stuff but absolutely already old when we went into the warThey had some leaders that understood things and wanted well for their pilots and airforce in general, but had superiors who had no clue and didn't give a **** about the people they were sending to die. I AGREE WITH YOU 1000%
> So in short, any failings of the RA came from the top and affected the tactical level. Despite the best will and skill of pilots, mechanics and other soldiers involved, there wasn't much more they could've done YES. And while I sympathize with everyone involved in a war I am happy the RA didn't fare better.Sorry but I have not understand. could you use other words, please? thanks


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## michaelmaltby (Feb 8, 2010)

Saetta66 - I don't know anything about the "truth" of your quest - but as anecdotal comment, I read when young in either's Baeder's or Stanford Tuck's autobios that when the RA came to France to Support the LW during the B of B they only flew a very few missions. The tri-motor bombers were savaged by the RAF. At a crash site they found a superbly packed wicker picnic hamper (basket). Unused. Might that say something about these men. Brave. Romantic. Perhaps a little misguided.

No criticism intended in this comment.

MM


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## LWulf (Feb 8, 2010)

Saetta66 said:


> Sorry but I have not understand. could you use other words, please? thanks



I just said that I am sorry for everyone that had to suffer through that terrible war, no matter which country or side they represented. But I am also happy the RA wasn't more successful since they would've caused more losses on both sides.


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## vikingBerserker (Feb 8, 2010)

IMHO their biggest weakness appeared to be their training program. I wish I could remember where I had read it, but there was an article comparing Italian training soldiers vs the ones trained by Germany and there was a significant difference.


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## Saetta66 (Feb 8, 2010)

The red letters system seems to work.



michaelmaltby said:


> Saetta66 - I don't know anything about the "truth" of your quest - but as anecdotal comment, I read when young in either's Baeder's or Stanford Tuck's autobiosI don't want to seem like the typical victmist but would you believe me if I say that reading pilot allied biographies there a lot of venom deserved for the Regia Aeronautica? Seems always like we were kind of invisibles or jokers but then when a more object point of view grows up you discover is not excatly like that .... that when the RA came to France to Support the LW during the B of B they only flew a very few missions. The tri-motor bombers were savaged by the RAF. At a crash site they found a superbly packed wicker picnic hamper (basket). Unused. Might that say something about these men. Brave. Romantic. Perhaps a little misguided.Well, is like the italian army and the afrikakorps found jam, tea, pudding and excellent scotch whisky in Tobruk. Very typical, but didn't add or less anything form the bravery of english troops
> 
> No criticism intended in this comment.Your opinion is not only always welcome but important, too !
> 
> MM


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## Saetta66 (Feb 8, 2010)

vikingBerserker said:


> IMHO their biggest weakness appeared to be their training program. I wish I could remember where I had read it, but there was an article comparing Italian training soldiers vs the ones trained by Germany and there was a significant difference.[/QU
> 
> Well italian pilots trained more acrobatics then tactical and strtegic, but IMHO I always thougt that like pilots, that means like men who felt and ride the planes, they were second to none.
> But probably I let my heart speaking ....


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## Saetta66 (Feb 8, 2010)

LWulf said:


> I just said that I am sorry for everyone that had to suffer through that terrible war, no matter which country or side they represented. But I am also happy the RA wasn't more successful since they would've caused more losses on both sides.



Claer now, and I agree with you. We can't change the course of history fortunately !
Thanks


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## michaelmaltby (Feb 8, 2010)

".... Well, is like the italian army and the afrikakorps found jam, tea, pudding and excellent scotch whisky in Tobruk. Very typical, but didn't add or less anything form the bravery of english troops ".

Well perhaps, , but to me hardly the same as packing a picnic lunch for a three hour bombing mission over heavily defended Britain.

In land positions, troops are dug in and fighting from their "homes" - in a bomber you're in and out - hardly an excursion in the family car. 

MM


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## DAVIDICUS (Feb 8, 2010)

George Buerling from a book by Miles Constable entitled "George Beurling, Canadian Ace" (Beurling had 32 confirmed air to air kills and faced off against both the Germans and Italians.)

*"The Eyeties are comparatively easy to shoot down. Oh, they're brave enough. In fact, I think the Eyeties have more courage than the Germans, but their tactics aren't so good. They are very good gliders, but they try to do clever acrobatics and looping. But they will stick with it even if things are going against them, whereas the Jerries will run."*


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## Glider (Feb 8, 2010)

Personally I thought the major problem with the Italian armed forces was the equipment. To be more specific the engines let down the aircraft and the armour/transport for the army.
Once the designers had access to modern engines the aircraft were as good as the best anywhere. The army when properly equiped fought well and the navy also did well where the problem was more to do with leadership than anything else.


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## Markus (Feb 8, 2010)

The Italian Air Force did not have radar but they had a unit that specialized in messing with radio navigation equipment. A lot of planes send to Malta fell victim to their "beam-bending". Some just vanished, others found themselvs suddenly over Sicily. 

IMO their biggest weakness was fighter procurement. Whoever decided to approve the Fiat CR42 must have been a spy. Or how else does one explain the design of a new biplane fighter at the same time Hurricanes and Me109 entered service?


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## al49 (Feb 8, 2010)

Hi,
we know by the history why Italy entered in WW2: Mussolini was convinced that Germany was on the brink to win the war.
Mussolini knew that Italy was unprepared for a long war, missing raw materials, just coming out from two wars (Spain and Ethiopia that burned out finance and machines) but for a couple of months of engagement he thought it was enough what he had.
Without entering political discussions, history has already given its verdict, my personal opinion is that Italy had zero possibility to win.
Soldiers as well as pilots and seamen were very brave (most of them) some leaders as well, but just consider a few rough figures about aeroplanes:
Till the armistice in September 1943 Regia Aeronautica employed about 10,000 aircraft in total.
Talking about fighters, the Macchi C 205 was the best fighter produced in reasonable number.
When I say "reasonable numbers" I mean aprox 250 units, nothing in comparison with over 33,000 Me 109, over 20,000 Spitfire and FW 190, over 12,000 P51 and P 47, over 11,000 Zeros etc.
You can add, if you want:
1,100 pcs Macchi C 202
1,100 pcs Macchi C 200
780 pcs Fiat G 50
and 1,900 Fiat CR 42 a biplane, very good in Spain but unable to cope with an Hurricane.
Cheers
Alberto


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## pbfoot (Feb 8, 2010)

could it be said that the Italian airmen were good pilots but slow to pick up or employ the tactics needed in modern warfare and to me that would point to people at squadron level


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## Vincenzo (Feb 8, 2010)

not C.R. 42 in spain,
the italian industrial system was not at same level of british, german, american..., in some sector this was only a dimension question in other also of quality (or best technology level).
Obv. the RA make that can make considerate the actual situation.
back to example to fighter procurement there were three wins, surely too, but in RA saw the air fight in old manner (acrobatic) this is valid not only for the generals but also for pilots in the 1940 a fighter gruppo don't take their M.C. 200 for take the C.R. 42, the G. 50 was of easiest production of M.C. 200 the production line of G. 50 were available and sure need many time for converter that in the (licence) production of M.C. 200, so the choice of both G. 50 and M.C. 200 had some hard motivation the choice of C.R. 42 no (we are talking of '39 the monoplane fighter show in espana, and italians were here, their capability so don't a biplane reserve in the case of fault of monoplanes) but here take in consideration the old tactics in the mind of RA so there is a wrong in the politics that not put the just people in the just place and the corruption (the fiat was/is one of largest italian firm).


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## parsifal (Feb 8, 2010)

Regarding the CR42, this aircraft did have some saving graces. Allied monoplane fighters found them very difficult to shoot down, and if they allowed themselves to gert into a turning dight, the advantage actually swung in favour of the Italian biplane. Hence the predilection to aerobatic manouvres over speed and dive tactics. Pre-war, the italains had engaged in impressive aerobatic displays allover Europe. Their training therefore emphasised manouvre over all other possibilities.

CR42s were employed effectively until the end as ground support aircraft. Their low speed , pleasant flying characteristics and extreme agility made them highly suited to the role. Their lack of armour worked against them however. Whilst not as effective as a Ju87 in this role, they still provided Rommel with a great deal of support in that capacity


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## Shortround6 (Feb 8, 2010)

I once read an account of a single days operations by an Italian fighter squadron on the Russian Front in winter. With no contact with the enemy they lost engines, planes, and mechanics sent to the hospital with frostbite. A dedicated bunch of men trying to do their best under very difficult conditions. As I recall (around 30 years ago that I read it ) the unit had only two engine heaters and it required both of them to warm a single engine enough to start. So one engine would be started and and idled until another one could be started and so on. By the time they were working on the third or fourth airplane the first one would have to be shut down, even in those temperatures they couldn't idle an engine for long periods of time (well over an hour I think?) and the oil would thicken up enough that the oil pump drives would break when the engines were restarted. The thick oil would prevent the oil pressure gauges from reading correctly and in a single day several engines were wrecked. Flights were put in the air and some planes had the shock absorbers freeze solid ( or close enough to it) while flying which lead to several planes being wrecked on landing. 
They did manage to put up flights or patrols 3 different times in one day (morning, mid-day and late afternoon) under such conditions. I don't think any other Air force could have done much better under those conditions except maybe the Russians who had somewhat more practice in dealing with those conditions.
It wasn't glamorous or heroic except in the sense of men trying to do their duty in spite of weather and equipment shortages.


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## al49 (Feb 9, 2010)

Shortround6 said:


> " the Russian Front in winter. With no contact with the enemy they lost engines, planes, and mechanics sent to the hospital with frostbite.


Again this is taking back to my point.
The biggest mistake was done by the government.
To send 230,000 men , with inadequate equipment, to fight in Russia was a decision taken mostly for "prestige" reasons that subtracted men and resources that could be better used in North Africa or to take Malta.
Speaking about aeroplanes and in addition to what said above, the idea to send Macchi C 200, WITH THEIR OPEN COCKPIT, to fly in the Russian winter was simply foolish! 

About the Fiat CR 42, yes she was a nice plane, good fighter in the beginning and valid for ground support later.
The production ended in late 1943 (274 built between July 1942 and July 1943), by the same time Germany was successfully testing the Me 262, why these resources were't dedicated to produce some G 55?
On the total production of CR 42, 110 pcs were built as "night figther"
Besides a few BF 110 that arrived too late, Regia Aeronautica based its opposition to night bombing on aprox 100 Re 2001 CN and above night Falcos.
Even if they were too few in number, the Reggiane fighter were well armed, with two 20 mm MG-151 guns in under-wing gondolas, but the CR 42 only had two 12,7 mg and search lights, really not enough to go against formations of hundreds of Lancasters.
If not yet known, I recommend to Italian speakers to read this book:





Written by Franco Pagliano, a former RA pilot, give a clear picture of our airforce in WW2.
I don't know if iot has been translated in English.
Alberto


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## Lucky13 (Feb 9, 2010)

I don't know enough to comment on this, one thing is for sure though, I do want to know a lot more about the RA. Hopefully this will be the right thread for that....


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## Saetta66 (Feb 9, 2010)

Very, very interesting conversation about something that all the italian members but I can surely say all the aviation and history fans will enjoy: my dream is to create here one day a Regia Aeronautica room, a place where to tell stories, post pics of planes, unforms and badges, talk with other aviation experts.
Why not? A dream can become true


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## Saetta66 (Feb 9, 2010)

If not yet known, I recommend to Italian speakers to read this book:




Written by Franco Pagliano, a former RA pilot, give a clear picture of our airforce in WW2.
I don't know if iot has been translated in English.
Alberto[/QUOTE]

Ciao (Hello) Alberto !
Very interesting book, a masterpiece in italian aviation literature. But I think that unfortunately it has not been translted in english.
Me, I can reccomand this english book to anyone interested on RA: simply great IMHO !
Chris Dunning made an excellent job. Congratulations to him, guys.


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## Saetta66 (Feb 9, 2010)

DAVIDICUS said:


> George Buerling from a book by Miles Constable entitled "George Beurling, Canadian Ace" (Beurling had 32 confirmed air to air kills and faced off against both the Germans and Italians.)
> 
> *"The Eyeties are comparatively easy to shoot down. Oh, they're brave enough. In fact, I think the Eyeties have more courage than the Germans, but their tactics aren't so good. They are very good gliders, but they try to do clever acrobatics and looping. But they will stick with it even if things are going against them, whereas the Jerries will run."*



This words are heavy like a million tons of the toughest stone and make me proud and happy. So we were not the cowards that the propoganda wanted us to be....
That's an important truth that came out in this small thread. Fantastic, IMHO.


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## al49 (Feb 9, 2010)

Saetta66 said:


> If not yet known, I recommend to Italian speakers to read this book:
> 
> 
> 
> ...



Ciao (Hello) Alberto !
Very interesting book, a masterpiece in italian aviation literature. But I think that unfortunately it has not been translted in english.
Me, I can reccomand this english book to anyone interested on RA: simply great IMHO !
Chris Dunning made an excellent job. Congratulations to him, guys.[/QUOTE]

I agree, the book from Chris Dunning is very good, even if I've been told by experts that there are a few mistakes, but it covers all various aspects of RA and, as said by Saetta, it's in English.
Alberto


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## riacrato (Feb 9, 2010)

Lucky13 said:


> I don't know enough to comment on this, one thing is for sure though, I do want to know a lot more about the RA. Hopefully this will be the right thread for that....



Same as me, I hope it stays informative and civil.


Saetta66 said:


> This words are heavy like a million tons of the toughest stone and make me proud and happy. So we were not the cowards that the propoganda wanted us to be....
> That's an important truth that came out in this small thread. Fantastic, IMHO.


It is one man's opinion, I think you are blowing it out of proportion a bit.

I have never seen anyone argue that the RA were cowards. Rather their tactics and much of their equipment were not on par. And their strategists started operations that were impossible to accomplish successfully with any reasonable degree of probability. Same as late war Germany in a way, but really from the start. Hence the impression with many Germans that they had to "help out", wherever Mussolini had been a little too confident. I don't know enough about those operations to assess whether this impression has truth in it or not, I'm just saying that this is what is critizised. Not the courage or fighting ability of the common Italian soldier.


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## DAVIDICUS (Feb 9, 2010)

"_It is one man's opinion, I think you are blowing it out of proportion a bit._"

Pointing out that what one person says is just "one man's opinion" is generally designed to invalidate the matter asserted as all men have opinions and opinions, as you know, are like arseholes. 

George Buerling's opinion is a single man's opinion but an opinion based on first hand air to air combat by "The Falcon of Malta," the most successful Canadian fighter pilot in WWII who faced off against Germans and Italians, often in the same engagement as Germans and Italians would fly missions together. In short, not all men's opinions are created equal. 

Another quote from Beurling from Malta Spitfire, a book co-authored by Beurling and Leslie Roberts.

"*The Jerries are probably better over-all pilots than the Italians, but they certainly let the Eyeties do their fighting for them when the going got tough. When we get around to adding the final score for this show I hope somebody thinks of that*".

Lastly, I have routinely read comments about Italian cowardice being a recognized attribute of Italian soldiers.


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## riacrato (Feb 9, 2010)

Think what you will, it's your right. The way the quote was interpreted as_ important truth_ simply doesn't hold for me. Galland has made a lot of statements, often quoted here and elsewhere, which are highly subjective and questionable and sometimes simply wrong. And please point me to where the Italian pilots were referred to as cowards. I have not seen it here in this forum, let alone in any credible book (or any book for that matter).


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## parsifal (Feb 9, 2010)

The italians were not cowards, thats insulting and untrue. Nor were they inneffective. Rommels main fighter defences in 1942 were built around the the MC 202 equipped units that followed him into Egypt. There were only ever about 60 of these aircraft, and they were battling allied air forces of more than a 1000 aircraft.

In Russia the Saettas shot down at least 80 Russian aircraft for the loss of 15 aircraft.

The Italian defences at Keren rival any of the epic defences at Cassino by the germans, in terms of courage tenacity and effectiveness. The italian Ariete Division in numerous battles in North Africa was exemplary, particulalry the covering role they adopted during Rommels dash to the wire. 

The average Italian resented Mussolnis rush to go to war, and the german betrayals of Italy rapaidly soured all goodwill and co-operation between the Italains and the germans. the cavalier attitude of the germans towards the losses being suffereed by the italian fleet, and ther reluctance to provide adequate fuel for operations, even when critical operations were required (and even though they were short of fuel, they had eneough for these emeergency situations....they just were not co-operating) madde the Italians 9except Mussolini) very reluctant to fight germany's war for them. This is different to being inneffective or lacking courage. 

Germany is not without its instances of failure.....during the Operation Saturn (the encirclement of 6th Army) it was the German formations interlaced to "stiffen" the Rumanians that broke first.


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## CharlesBronson (Feb 9, 2010)

I might be oversimplificating things here, but the lack on aircraft cannon and reliable single engine radio equipment was in my humble opinion the doom for the Regia Aeronautica.


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## DAVIDICUS (Feb 9, 2010)

"_Galland has made a lot of statements, often quoted here and elsewhere, which are highly subjective and questionable and sometimes simply wrong._"

And for me, in the absence of factual inconsistencies or untruthful statements coming to light, a Galland or Beurling is entitled to a presumption of validity/reliability not to be accorded to the run of the mill "just one man" who, like every other, has an opinion.

"_And please point me to where the Italian pilots were referred to as cowards._"

Not pilots per se but soldiers or fighting men in general. It is so widely held that it has become the subject of cultural humor by Germans, Brits and Americans. I have been a member here on this forum a bit longer than you and have seen it more than once. I am not going to go looking for examples for you. As you aptly stated, "Think what you will, it's your right." Like you, I also am not aware of any such critique in a credible book.

I would add that the French are also the butt of such ideas.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Feb 10, 2010)

DAVIDICUS said:


> I would add that the French are also the butt of such ideas.



You will see a lot of this here in this forum, but I think that the majority (honestly) is nothing more than an attempt at humor. I think than any serious historian (whether it is a hobby historian like the majority of us or a proffesional) knows that the French (and even the Italians) fought couragiously like any other soldier or army.


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## Saetta66 (Feb 10, 2010)

riacrato said:


> Same as me, I hope it stays informative and civil.



I'll do my best to make it stay this way.
I am sure no one will come here to offend other members or nations.
Maybe there will be different points of views, but that's the essence of democracy.
So any opinion is welcome, even if different from mine.
If somebody has a valid support for his ideas, any idea is welcome here.


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## Njaco (Feb 10, 2010)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> You will see a lot of this here in this forum, but I think that the majority (honestly) is nothing more than an attempt at humor. I think than any serious historian (whether it is a hobby historian like the majority of us or a proffesional) knows that the French (and even the Italians) fought couragiously like any other soldier or army.



Seeing as how its been brought up, *MY* opinion (and thats all it is) was that the RA were better pilots than the French - in general. Several books I have read give the impression that the Italian soldiers were the ones that had no fightring ability especially in 1940. But I have never read where they were considered cowards.


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## Shortround6 (Feb 10, 2010)

Njaco said:


> Seeing as how its been brought up, *MY* opinion (and thats all it is) was that the RA were better pilots than the French - in general. Several books I have read give the impression that the Italian soldiers were the ones that had no fightring ability especially in 1940. But I have never read where they were considered cowards.



maybe the Italian soldiers were smarter than some others

Given mediocre weapons at best and not enough of them, poorly supplied and poorly lead (at times from the rear) is it any wonder that even brave men might loose heart or wonder what they were sacrificing themselves for?
Some units did fight well but with tales of multiple trucks being used to transport the commanders wine celler while the troops walked and ate poor rations it is little wonder that some units did not.


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## Saetta66 (Feb 10, 2010)

Shortround6 said:


> maybe the Italian soldiers were smarter than some others
> 
> Given mediocre weapons at best and not enough of them, poorly supplied and poorly lead (at times from the rear) is it any wonder that even brave men might loose heart or wonder what they were sacrificing themselves for?
> *Some units did fight well but with tales of multiple trucks being used to transport the commanders wine celler while the troops walked and ate poor rations it is little wonder that some units did not*.



That's sadly hundred per cent true: a ing difference among officers and troops that had no equals in the other western warfares.
Good point.
But you will admit that in all countries not all the units fought similar? That's simply human, I think


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## Shortround6 (Feb 10, 2010)

Saetta66 said:


> That's sadly hundred per cent true: a ing difference among officers and troops that had no equals in the other western warfares.
> Good point.
> But you will admit that in all countries not all the units fought similar? That's simply human, I think



"But you will admit that in all countries not all the units fought similar?"

I will admit it in an instant. NO army's units were constantly good or bad.


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## parsifal (Feb 10, 2010)

The reasons for the Italian lacklustre showing in the war are complex. There was not one single reason for the failures....there were multiple reasons.

Some that come to mind include:

1) Mussolinis misreading of the general war situation in 1940.....it meant that the armed services went to war unmobilized and with severe shortages in equipment. Most countries had some lead period in their decision to go to war, that allowed the buildup resources and spares to give their armed forces that bit extra punch at the time battle was joined. Italy did not get that opportunity. They did not use the 1939 easrly 1940 period as a period to prepre....italy went to war totally unprepared. In fact her strategic reserves were severely worn down by her wars in Libya and Ethiopia. Half her shipping was caught overseas and captured at the wars beginning because of Mussolinis snap decision to go to war

2) A weak and badly organized industrial base. The trademark of the Fascist system was its poor organization....Contracts would be given to friends and family memebers, that kind of thing. there was no co-ordination, no progrmas for planned obsoolesence, so that obviously superseded itmes (like the CR42) were kept in production long after they should have been replaced.

3) Poorly thought out tactical doctrinesand force structures. As an example, during the initia battles in Ethiopia, the italians and their colonial troops were still forming square....a Napoleonic solution in an age of machine guns....The Italians had trouble in achieving good organization for their armour, and their Infantry was based on a binary regimental system, which was inherently weak. It is significant that their better organizations....the Alpini divisions, were organized with a triangular force structure.

4) A lack of social cohesion, which translated into a poor officer to soldier relationship. Officers were often chosen for reasons other than their military abilities

5) A poor educational base which had deep seated bad effects in many areas. A well educated "workforce" makes them easier to train, they are more inclined to accept community values over personal or family needs. A well educated personnel pool is far more likley to be "selfless" and "nationalistic" over a guy who believes he owes little to his society, and a poorly educated guy is more likley to hold these opinions than a better educated guy. 

One final comment on this reason. The army, particulalry the line Infantry formations tended to get the least well educated elements of italian society compar4ed to the Navy, the air force and the technical elments of the army like the engineers and artillery. Formations that were predominantly manned by Southern Italians and sicilians were less reliable than those from the north. 

6) An aversion in the regime to technilogical development. The frascists were inherently conservative, and displayed, at best, a disinterest to technology. This meant that Italy lagged badly in areas such as radar, but even for "mundane" weapons, like machine guns there was a definite display of poor design. This was unfortunate, since Italian armoureres since the 15th century, at least, had shown great ingenuity and skill in the weapons they designed and built

7) For the navy, there was a poorly thought out process concerning warship design. The Fascist had offered bounties for maximum speed, which tended to lead to lopsided designs especially in their cruisers. Italian cruisers might be fast for the purposes of achieving high trials speeds, but in terms of wartime service these "greyhounds of the sea" were frequently found to be quite slow. Their turret designs frequently did not space their guns sufficiently leading to problems in dispersion. Metal working whilst in theory of a high standard was often in practice actually poorly heat treated, leading to armour that was often either butter soft, or over brittle. Italian submarines were often slow divers, and highly visible when surfaced, and the italians never gave too much thought mass attacks until shown by the germans....even then Italian sub commanders tended to be too conservative in their attacks. A number of Italian subs were lost because of sea water entering the battery rooms, which in turn produces chlorine gas inside the sub

On the other hand, the development of italian MAS boats and special forces was outstanding

The problem for the Italaian armed forces is that they suffered from all these handicaps simultaneously, and no amount of bombast from Mussolini or any of the Fascists could rectify that problem easily


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## Watanbe (Feb 12, 2010)

I think people underestimate a soldiers "will to fight". I imagine that the Italians were very reluctant to fight and die for a government whose ideals they didn't agree with. Was the average Italian soldier happy with the Facist regime?


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## parsifal (Feb 12, 2010)

They were until Mussolini led them to war. Italians as a people did not like the germans, they had fought against the Germans in the first world war, and did not like the extremism that pervaded the Nazi regime. For example, the Fascists were not anti-semitic, until the Germans demanded that they be. Italians also resented the inroads the germans had made into areas they considered to be part of their sphere of interest, like Austria.


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## Watanbe (Feb 12, 2010)

Do you think they might have seen the writing on the wall long before their leadership or the Germans did?


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## parsifal (Feb 12, 2010)

No, I think many Germans knew from an early stage that they had embarked on a war they could not win. But the the person that mattered, Hitler, was either too blind, or too stubborn to admit the problems the Axis faced. 

I personally believe that even Hitler realised he could not win outright or easily by the latter part of 1942. He and Halder travelled to the southern sector of the Russian front about Septemeber or October of 1942, and witnessed the defeat of Kleists forces in the caucasus, and the relaization that the Caucasian oilfields would not be restored to production for years (following Soviet sabotage). He is reported to have slumped back in his chair on hearing this news, and muttered something about "this is it then"....or similar


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## Nikademus (Feb 16, 2010)

Saetta66 said:


> Was really in your opinion the Regia Aeroanutica (Italian Royal Air Force) the worst air force in ww2?
> And if yes, why?
> And if maybe, why?
> And if not, why?
> ...



Hi,

I'd say that the RA would have to rank last if comparing to the two other major Axis air forces based on the criteria of overall mission success. This is because unlike the other two, the RA failed to critically impact any of the major campaign that it participated in. The Luftwaffe for example, achieved great overall success in France, being a vital component in the German operational model of warfare as well as in the Balkans and Russia where it's efforts were of critical importance to the German army on the ground. Japan quickly gained mastery of the air over a wide region of the Pacific during the early days of it's war which was a decisive factor in that nation's rise to preeminence (for a period). In comparison, the RA, IIRC, failed to signifigantly impact or alter the situation in any of it's major campaigns....most notably Malta where it never wrested either complete air superiority from the RAF nor shut down the base (by itself)
Local successes and credible achievements? yes......but concrete end results that impacted the war? not really.

The reasons for this are a major topic of discussion and some of the fine points have already been mentioned...and largely rest in the technological and industrial areas.....the latter in particular where Italy in WWII was weak. There were also issues with training above the pilot level. Bottlenecks in new technology and production hobled the RA and impacted overall servicability. There were also mentions of training issues in group tactics and such.

All that said...the RA had strengths and fought hard, gaining grudging respect from it's opponents and winning some notable tactical battles. Problem with the above is that it tends to lead people to dismiss the RA as a clown act....which it most certainly was not. The "numbers" game, if nothing else, proves that. For example in East Africa, where both principle opponents were consigned to fight with largely secondary forces, the Commonwealth exchanged approximately 210 aircraft lost to all causes to 271 Italian. The Commonwealth gained the upper hand in part due to it being able to be resupplied and supported at the end of a tenous logistical link whereas the R.A. in East Africa mostly had to fight with what it had with little support from the outside. Eventually it withered and died on the vine, but accounted for it's actions credibly.

Over Malta in 1940, the RA lost approximately 83 planes to 61 Commonwealth (all causes). The Italian fighter pilots in particular gained the respect of the British who found them very aggressive and skilled.....even to the point of using head on attacks with their CR-42's which initially proved quite difficult for the Hurricanes to shoot down. In 41 the exchange (Axis vs Uk) was approx 220 to 281. (though around 47 were attributible to German fighters) The Greece fighting saw approximately 104 UK aircraft lost to 138 Italian (+61 Luftwaffe)

So in most cases it wasn't the exchange of numbers (which was reasonably competetive) but the lack of overall mission success. Despite the close proximity of the British base Malta to Sicily, the RA proved unable to suppress it without Luftwaffe help. Issues cited were servicability, lack of radios, and tactics. North Africa, similar: (68 Uk to 166 Italian) up to end 1940/Jan 41 when it was mainly the RA vs RAF but in this case it includes "claims" so the accuracy is more particularily an "estimate" here. Still....similar comments arise from the pages.....the Italian fighter pilots were aggressive and skilled but, one point that was noted on more than one occasion....was that RAF pilots commented that at times it seemed the Italian pilots were more concerned with fancy acrobatics than getting the kill or the job done....in other words they seemed to lack the killer instinct that drove the German fighter pilots. Ultimately the growing obsolecence of the CR-42, teething issues with it's replacements and group tactics favored the RAF side. In fairness....despite the spectactular successes of the German "Experten" Shores noted that overall the Luftwaffe failed to gain true air superiority in NA and failed to prevent the RAF executing it's bombing missions....the principle casualties being among the escort fighters....who were the target of choice of the German Frie Jagd patrols. Great for running up personal scores....not so great in thwarting bombing missions on the troops on the ground.

It was noted that any question of Italian "seriousness" went out the window once the USAAF started making runs on Italian cities. No glib attitudes towards war there.....deadly serious but by that point the light armament of most Italian fighters was a handicap vs. the Heavies. Still....the pressing home of attacks was noted.

There were some notable Italian achievements and laurals. The development (albeit belated due to administrative issues) of torpedo bombers was a credible achievement by the RA and gave them some notable successes. Italian skill at high level bombing was cited but ultimately flawed, in part due to issues with the Italian 3E bombers but more so due to the fact that, as all nations would find out....high level bombing at sea was inherantly inaccurate....so while some spectacular near misses were gained, ultimately it didnt' stop the RN. Biggest issue here was lack of coord between the RA and the RM...a problem that was never fully solved. There were also issues with ship recognition. Later war Italian fighters were among the most beautful and capable......i'm a particular fan of the MC-202....a sleek warbird....marred only by it's reletively light armament. 

So ultimatley while the RA did not live up to pre-war expectations....it fought hard and well in places and deserves respect but it failed to win any long term battle of domination of which Malta, I consider the worst defeat. Its a subject i continue to explore with interest. This thread already pointed out a couple of books i'd like to investigate further than might fill in some questions i have regarding why certain things were done the way they were.


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## Saetta66 (Feb 17, 2010)

Nikademus said:


> Hi,
> 
> I'd say that the RA would have to rank last if comparing to the two other major Axis air forces based on the criteria of overall mission success. This is because unlike the other two, the RA failed to critically impact any of the major campaign that it participated in. The Luftwaffe for example, achieved great overall success in France, being a vital component in the German operational model of warfare as well as in the Balkans and Russia where it's efforts were of critical importance to the German army on the ground. Japan quickly gained mastery of the air over a wide region of the Pacific during the early days of it's war which was a decisive factor in that nation's rise to preeminence (for a period). In comparison, the RA, IIRC, failed to signifigantly impact or alter the situation in any of it's major campaigns....most notably Malta where it never wrested either complete air superiority from the RAF nor shut down the base (by itself)
> Local successes and credible achievements? yes......but concrete end results that impacted the war? not really.
> ...



Please let me express to you all my sincere consideration for the above writing, rich of interesting informations and objective evaluations of the RA pros and cons.
If I coluld help you in getting more data, you just have to ask me.
Best Regards
Fabio - Saetta66


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## michaelmaltby (Feb 17, 2010)

".... rich of interesting informations and objective evaluations of the RA pros and cons.
If I coluld help you in getting more data, you just have to ask me."

Right on. Great post, Nikademus.

MM


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## Saetta66 (Feb 28, 2010)

For those who read this thread and need some basic infos about RA. This could help them understand more the sense of my questions.

The Regia Aeronautica (RA), was established in 1928 with 1700 planes and a vigorous aviation industry. Italian airplane manufacturers, dominated by industrial giant Fiat, were strongly committed to the air-cooled engine. They believed them to be more reliable and less prone to combat damage than water-cooled engines, notwithstanding the limitations that design imposed on power. Air-cooled engines meant minimal power and minimal power meant minimal defensive weapons, minimal bomb carrying capacity and no protection from armor plating. In the early years, and for some kind of planes since 1942,Italian-made airplanes were generally not equipped with any type of radar or radio communications system and thus needed daylight and good weather conditions in which to operate. 
Thanks to hard work of the Air Marshall Italo Balbo, an experienced pilot and member of the first Fascist Party that took part on the march on the Rome, very close to Mussolini, who was a fan of the aviation, a great impulse was given to the new air weapon: for example the gouvernment gave the founds to make advanced schools of stratosphear flying and high speed flying. 
At the same time the many trans world air cruises made by Balbo and his crews were happenings that had immense international resonance and gave a big notoriety to italian aviators and aircrafts.
Also the aeronautical industry grow up making competitive planes that many other european countries came to buy from big producers like Fiat, Macchi, Siai, Breda. The first war test of the new armed force was the campaign of Ethiopia with approximately 500 airplanes, that took the complete dominion of the sky. To be honest we have to say that the enemy has just few aircrafts. 
Second heavier test was the civil war of Spain: Italian aviation participated with more than 700 airplanes and nearly 6,000 men, giving proof of efficiency and making experience in the aerial combat. It must be said that also this time the enemy aerial defense wasn't really competitive and for sure had even less experience than RA. Therefore grew up the wrong general opinion that italian military air force was competitive. This mistake was deadly because at the beginning of the second world war Mussolini and the Supreme Chiefs of the Armed Forces thought that RA was competitive when it should have been clear to every one that the greater part of the aircrafts was obsolete or even out of order. 
The Italians were reluctant to commit to a single mass-produced fighter and instead began production on several competing models simultaneously. Either they couldn't or wouldn't make a decision or they didn't want to put all their eggs in one basket. The Fiat G-50, Italy's transition from bi-wing to mono-wing fighters, with a terrible preliminary safety/performance record in Spain, came into service in June of 1940 in the campaign against France. 780 were ultimately built.
When it was declared war to the Allied nations, Italian aviation could count on 105.430 men, whith 6,340 pilots, and 3.296 aircrafts for war employment, of which 1,332 bombers, 1,160 fighters, 497 observation aircrafts, 307 sea rescue ones, and more than a thousand training airplanes; although only 54% of the total was ready for effective employment. There were various types of aircrafts, and many already obsolete and old. Italian aircraft producers suffered poverty of raw materials and technical knowledge if compared to the other powerful countries in war. From june 1940 to september 1943 there were made 10,388 airplanes, not enough to compensate the unstoppable losses; moreover the industrial production was dispersed in the construction of various types of airplane, instead that to concentrate on little but valid models. At the moment of the armistice italian aviation could still count on 1.200 airplanes, but only half of them was ready to fly. 
From 1943 to the end of the war there were two Italian air forces: one, called the Aereonautica Nazionale Republicana that operated in Northern Italy into the fascist’s Republica Sociale Italiana, using, among the others, Macchi MC 205 Greyhound, Fiat G55 Centauro, Reggiane Re 2001; the other one called Aeronautica Cobelligerante that operatedinto the Savoy’s Southern Kingdom and was part of the the Balkan Air allied Force, using also P-39 Airacobra and Spitfires.
But this is another history …..

Now let's see closerly the most important scenaries where RA operated during WW2. 

Libyan Campaign. 
Although the Libyan campaign was seriously limited because of desert conditions, the Règia Aeronautica managed to retain a force of nearly four hundred airplanes, most of them obsolete biplanes such as the Fiat CR-32 and Fiat CR-42. During the first offensive towards Sidi Barrani, the Règia Aeronautica performed poorly, despite minimal enemy resistance. During the first British counter-offensive, the Règia Aeronautica suffered heavy losses (over 400 aircraft) until the German attack on Greece, when British forces had to divert a major part of their land and air forces thus giving the Italian forces enough time to deploy more units and strengthen their air forces. These were supplemented by the arrival of Rommel's Afrika Korps, and the attached Luftwaffe forces deployed almost 200 airplanes in Libya and another 600 in Sicily.
Next to the Luftwaffe, the Italian air force performed better due to the exchange of tactical doctrine between services and the arrival of more modern aircraft. During Rommel's first offensive they managed to keep RAF fighters away from Rommel's forces, and covered Rommel's retreat during the British Operation Crusader while inflicting heavy losses on the RAF bombing airplanes.
During Rommel's second offensive the Règia Aeronautica and the Luftwaffe suffered considerable losses due to stronger Allied resistance until its almost complete destruction during the air battles over El Alamein and the bombing raids over Alexandria and Cairo.
The Règia Aeronautica, almost destroyed in Egypt, was quickly retired to Tobruk, Benghazi, Tripoli and eventually Tunisia.
The Règia Aeronautica also participated in the air offensive on the British controlled island of Malta in an attempt to gain control of the Axis sea routes from Sicily, Sardinia and Italy to North Africa. Although on the edge of starvation and suffering heavy losses, Malta managed to withstand the attacks from the Italian and German air forces, and inflicted losses of almost 1,500 planes. The battle cost the British 800 planes and considerable numbers of transport ships, but the price was worth it: 60% of Axis supplies sent to Africa were sunk thanks to Malta-based aircraft, submarines and destroyers.

Battle of Britain
This was definitely the biggest disaster of Regia Aeronautica during WWII.
From October 25, 1940, some 170 Italian planes (including 73 Fiat Br.20 bombers and old fighters lice fiat Hawk cr 42) were sent to occupied Belgium to form the Corpo Aereo Italiano (CAI) to participate in the Battle of Britain. 
Pilots and aircrafts, as well as military chiefs, as usual, were totally unprepared for this kind of operations and fared poorly against the British defenders; about a quarter of the Fiat Br.20 were lost in 2 months of operations. 
Weather and loss of radio and heat were the italian worst ennemies.
The Corps was finally withdrawn to Greece in December 1940.

Russian Campaign
Italian Air Force detachment sent to the Eastern Front were known as the "Corpo Aereo Spedizione in Russia" and acted from 1941 (from Ukraine),to 1942-43 (Stalingrad operations). It later operated under direct command of the German Luftwaffe under the name 1° Gruppo Aerotransporti "Terracciano", A.N.R. (known also as 1° Staffel Transportfliedgergruppe 10 (Ital)) and operated from the Baltic area and North Russian Front during 1944-45.

Sicilian Campaign
The Règia Aeronautica was put in a defensive role in Sicily, constantly fighting against allied efforts to sink Regia Marina ships. Just before the allied invasion of Sicily, a huge allied bomber offensive struck the airfields in Sicily in an effort to gain further air superiority. This left the Règia Aeronautica very weak, but still alive as planes continued to arrive from Sardinia, southern Italy, and southern France.


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## Saetta66 (Feb 28, 2010)

Now we can see the technical data of the 2 most diffused fighters used by italian pilots during last world war.

FIAT CR 42 FALCO 

Type Fiat CR.32 Fiat CR.42 "Falco" 
Engine Fiat A.30 Fiat A.74 RC.38 
Total HP hp 600 hp 840 
Wing span 9,50 m 9,70 
Length 7,45 m 8,26 
Height 2,71 m 3,30 
Wing area 22,10 m2. 22,40 m2. 
Weight 1,325 kg 1,720 kg 
Max weight 1,865 kg 2,295 kg 
Max speed km/h 375 @ 3,000 m km/h 440 @ 6,000 m 
Range km 780 km 785 
Armament 2 x 12,7mm SAFAT 2 x 12,7mm SAFAT 
Crew 1 
Total built 1,200 1,560


A front where the CR.42 operated in better conditions from the start was the North African one.The 127 "Falco" available in 13° Gruppo, 10° Gruppo and 9° Gruppo operated against an enemy equipped with the Gloster Gladiator, an equivalent biplane fighter. The first combat on 11/19/40 involved the Italian units and the Australian 3 Sqn. RAAF and this was followed by other combats on 12/10 and 12/26. Notwithstanding further CR.42s sent from Italy (among them those of 18° Gruppo, coming from C.A.I.), the Italian retreat and the loss of Cyrenaica by 2/41 brought to the loss of over 400 aircraft, many of them destroyed on the ground in front of the enemy advance. With the arrival of German troops and the start of the new offensive, the main task for the CR.42 biplane begun to be the close support to the ground units and when, on 4/41, the first CR.42 AS arrived (AS = Africa Settentrionale), equipped with sand filters and attachment points for two bombs, the switch of role was clear. The enemy had Hurricanes by now and the CR.42 surely was more useful in the ground support role. Thus, used more and more exclusively on this role with 160° Gruppo, 158° and 159° Gruppi (constituting 50° Stormo Assalto), 101° Gruppo Assalto and 15° Stormo Assalto, the CR.42s followed all the North African campaign showing on many occasions the bravery of its pilots and by early 1943 the surviving 82 examples were sent back to Italy from Tunisia.
Another task undertaken by the CR.42 was the convoy-escort role and, between 1940 and 1942 lots of mission were conducted from Sardinia and Sicily to protect the convoys headed to and from Libya. Last but not least, a few CR.42s were employed also in anti-shipping role with their two 100Kg bombs, dropping them after a dive. Some successes were obtained and the biplanes based in Sardinia took part to "mid-August battle" on 1942 with eight CR.42s. But there was more: the CR.42 was used also as night-fighter. The first attempt was made in Libya by using normal CR.42s in good visibility and with moonlight and five enemy aircraft were downed during 1941. Thus, several CR.42s were modified with shrouded exhausts, complete navigational instruments and radio equipment. Some operated in Sicily with 171° Gruppo from late 1941 but until the end of 1942 no more than seven of them were operational. By late 1942, two N.F. groups, 59° and 60° were based in Northern Italy, 167° Gruppo in Central Italy and several autonomous units in Southern Italy and the islands. A total of about 80 CR.42 CN (CN = Caccia Notturna) was used. Obviously the results were very scarce, due to the improved performance of the enemy aircraft. (taken from the site Comando Supremo)
The evolution of the conflict saw the CR.42 operate from Sicilian airfields as a night fighter. The armistice of September 8th left few planes in the south (under Allied control), while the larger number, mostly aircraft fresh from the factory, fell into German hands. Part of these planes was sent to Germany, while the remaining served in the "Repubblica Sociale" (Mussolini's) Air Force. After the war, very few aircraft were left and they served in training schools.
It was the end of the glorious life of the last Italian biplane, which, even if lacking speed, was able to gallantly fight on all fronts and in multiple roles. 


MACCHI MC 200 SAETTA

Type Macchi Mc.200 Macchi Mc.202 Macchi Mc.205
"Saetta" "Folgore" "Veltro"
Engine Fiat A.74 RC.38 DB.601/A-1 o RC.41 DB.605/A o RC.58
Total HP 840 1,175 1,475
Wing span m 10.68 m 10.58 m 10.50
Lenght m 8.19 m 8.85 m 8.85
Height m 3,51 m 3,02 m 3,05
Wing area m2. 16,81 m2. 16,80 m2. 16,80
Weight kg 1,778 kg 2,357 kg 2,524
Max weight kg 2,208 kg 2,937 kg 3,224
Max speed km/h 512 @ 5,000 m km/h 600 @ 5,500 m km/h 650 @ 7,400 m
Range km 870 km 765 km 1.040
Max elevation m 8,750 m 11,350 m 11,350
Armament 2 x 12,7mm 2 x 12,7mm 2 x 12,7mm
2 x 7,7mm 
Crew 1 1 1
Total build 1154 
(MM.44952 - MM.8843) 1.100 
(MM.7709 - MM.92007) (MM. 9288/9386 - 92153/92302


The Macchi C.200 Saetta (Italian:Lightning) was a World War II fighter aircraft built by Aeronautica Macchi in Italy, and used in various forms throughout the Italian air forces.
Following the end of Italy's campaigns in East Africa, a program was started to completely re-equip the Regia Aeronautica with a new interceptor aircraft of modern design. They were interesting planes powered with a radial engine, with 1-hour endurance, armed with a single 50 caliber (~12.7 mm) machine gun. After realizing the armament was wholly inadequate, they later modified the specification to the also-inadequate two guns. Several companies responded with designs.
At Macchi the design started under the direction of Mario Castoldi, designer of the Macchi entries in the Schneider Trophy races, and thus a direct counterpart to R. J. Mitchell at Supermarine. His design was a completely modern all-metal cantilever low-wing monoplane with retractable landing gear and an enclosed cockpit. One interesting feature was the advanced design for the wing, the hydraulically actuated flaps were interconnected with the ailerons so that when the flaps were lowered the ailerons were drooped as well.
Power was provided by the 840 hp (626 kW) Fiat A.74 radial engine, even though Castoldi preferred inlines and had used them in all of his previous designs. Italian industrial leaders had been instructed to concentrate solely on radials due to their better reliability, but this change may have set back the entire engine industry several years.
The first prototype C.200 flew the day before Christmas in 1937. It was followed by a second prototype early the next year. Testing of the prototypes went smoothly. One of them attained a speed of 500 mph (800 km/h) in a dive, although the puny engine drove the plane to only 315 mph (500 km/h) in level flight. This was nevertheless better than the performance of the competing Fiat G.50, Reggiane R.2000 and Caproni Vizzola F/5, and in 1938 the C.200 won the competition and an initial order for 99 was placed. The G.50 was also placed in limited production because it could be in service earlier. However, first production planes showed control problems in slow speed maneuvers, as consequence of it, the design of the wings was subsequently modified by Sergio Stefanutti, chief designer of SAI Ambrosini.
The C.200 began to enter into service in October 1939, by which time it had been given the name Saetta (Lightning). When Italy entered the war in June 1940, 144 had been delivered and some were in front-line squadrons. The first combat missions were flown as escorts for SM.79's attacking Malta in the autumn of 1940, and the type served subsequently in actions over Greece and Yugoslavia. The Saetta saw extensive use in North Africa and a number were involved in operations on the Eastern Front during 1941-2 where they racked up an impressive 88 to 15 score in that otherwise disastrous campaign.
Performance was never good enough. An attempt to solve this came in the form of a single prototype of the C.201 with the 1,000 hp (750 kW) A.76 engine, but this was abandoned in favor of the Daimler-Benz DB 601 powered C.202. The Saetta was to have been replaced outright by the C.202 after only one year in production, but the C.200's life was extended because Alfa Romeo could not produce enough of the RA.1000 (DB 601) engines, and more C.200's were built using C.202 parts while they waited for production to pick up.
In the end 1,153 Saetta's were produced, but almost all were gone by the time of the armistice in September 1943. Twenty-three were flown to Allied airfields in southern Italy, and flown for a short time by pilots of the Italian Co-Belligerent Air Force.





Aces of the Italian Air Force

Name Kills 
Franco Lucchini 26 
Adriano Visconti 26 
Teresio Martinoli 23 
Leonardo Ferrulli 22 
Franco Bordoni-Bisleri 19 
Luigi Gorrini 19 
Furio Lauri 18 
Morosi 18 
Mario Bonzano 17 
Mario Visintini 17 
Ugo Drago 16 
Duilio S. Fanali 15 
Adriano Mantelli 15 
Luigi Giannella 14 
Brunetto di Montegnacco 14 
Corrado Ricci 14 
Mario Bellagambi 13 
Germano La Ferla 13 
Vittorio Minguzzi 13 
Guido Presel 13 
Luigi Baron 12 
Giovanni Dell' Innocenti 12 
Attilio Sanson 12 
Claudio Solaro 12 
Gianlino Baschirotto 11 
Carlo Magnaghi 11 
Angelo Mastroagostino 11 
Carlo Romagnoli 11 
Carlo Maurizio Ruspoli di Poggio Suasa 11 
Pietro Serini 11 
Giorgio Solaroli di Briona 11 
Ennio Tarantola 11 
Mario Veronesi 11 
Amedeo Benati 10 
Fernando Malvezzi 10 
Guido Nobili 10 
Giulio Reiner 10 
Giuseppe Roberto 10 
Massimo Salvatore 10 
Giulio Torresi 10


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## vanir (Mar 9, 2010)

I noticed browsing the thread a few mentions of less than adequate Italian fighter design, particularly the G50 and Macchi C200 and I'm not sure if anyone has mentioned that actually the Castoldi airframe was quite celebrated internationally when it was prototyped as a leading design, but Italian aircraft manufacture was virtually castrated by lack of suitable aero engine production in the calibre of the Daimler and Merlin.

I find a relevant characterisation might be to think of the G50 and C200 a little like a Hurricane and Spitfire fitted with late series Bristol Mercury engines (on 130 grade it has similar performance to the Italian radial).
With Daimler engines the same designs changed markedly in the performance stakes, we all know the respect accorded the M-C202 and 205V or the G55. They'd be like a Merlin Spit (the Castoldis) or making the Hurricane all metal and tossing in the early series Griffon (for the DB-605 equipped G55). These are however the same basic airframe designs as the radial versions used in the early war (more changes made for the torquey DB-605 respectively, the M-C202 however is virtually identical airframe to the M-C200).

I don't think it's really true to say the Italians lacked in airframe design, it was really indigenous aero engine manufacture that hurt them in terms of fighter performance until the Germans chipped in.
Even then it seems the Italian license built Daimlers underwent marked resetting of tolerances and hand finishing and did not perform quite the same as German made Daimlers (with the exception of early series C202's which used imported and not license made Daimlers). Whilst their overall performance is said to have been a little better, their servicability in field conditions was much worse than for a Messerschmitt with the same engine. Walter Boyne gives a cursory mention of this in his series, among others. (before you say this is because of tropical filters, the Macchis used tropical filters, meanwhile a lot of Me-109s in Africa didn't).

It seems then a good example of an MC202 operating from a well serviced base is an excellent fighter type which is in every sense an early war design and an example of Italian aero manufacture on even footing. What is more impressive is that it was considered to remain contemporary with later war designs and was not at all out of place in service during 1943.

On the armament, the Breda 12.7mm was a pretty good gun according to Tony Williams and the Italians pioneered small calibre explosive shells later developed further by the Japanese, who chose this weapon for remanufacture over the Browning for Army fighters (Allies developed only tracer and incendiary types aside from hard core). In the early war Germany had also assured its allies (Italy and Rumania) that the 2cm aero gun would be made available to them but delivery was protracted, so it was only available from the midwar period. I'd say both nations were expecting to have much heavier armament on their fighters during 1941 but it didn't happen until later.
Back in 1938 however most manufacturers still thought one .50" was adequate interceptor armament and two .30" against fighters, look at the Curtiss Hawk or Brewster Buffalo for example. There was quite an elaborate review by the British ministry which resulted in much heavier armament fitted to regular fighters and pilot request in Germany generally resulted in the 2cm guns becoming standard (they were originally intended for ground attack missions).
The Hurricane, Spitfire and Messerschmitt were all originally intended to carry three or four small calibre MGs, a G50 or MC200 (or a Curtiss Hawk) were all heavily armed by comparison. This of course changes once 8-gun and cannon armament became standard fare which happened just leading into the war.

There is an old Navy saying that a Navy fights a war with whatever equipment it started with. This is a little true also about aero design and technology. Most of the deciding conflicts happen fairly early on, whilst the new models introduced during a conflict were often being prototyped at the start, whilst you fight those early deciding conflicts with what you already had in production.
Not strictly true, it's a very generalised statement, but I make it for introducing an important theme when making comparative assessments.


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## al49 (Mar 10, 2010)

Hi Saetta66, very good explanation of RA situation in WW2, well done!
Alberto


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## Hunterbunter (Mar 11, 2010)

As was eluded to by previous posters, they committed themselves to an air cooled solution in aviation. But no one mentioned the Italians were world leaders in liquid cooled aviation engine technology in the early to mid thirties. It was a major blunder to drop development, assuming air cooled engines could be readily mastered. Ultimately they ended up borrowing liquid cooled inlines attempting to bridge the gap.


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## parsifal (Mar 11, 2010)

Hi saetta

You mentioned the first combats in the desert were against the 3rd squadron RAAF. This is correct, however, the squadron was initially equipped with Gloster gauntlets, and not the newer Gladiators. In rough capability, the gauntlet was approximately similar to the CR32, whilst the Gladiator was roughly equivalent to the later CR 42. I believe it was late 1940 or early 1941 before the squadron re-equipped with gladiators


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## al49 (Mar 11, 2010)

Quite soon this new book will be available from Amazon and, I presume, other booksellers.





I know by reputation the authors and this book should be a very good one for sure.
For more info you can also go here:
MMP Books 
It's also possible to see a preview of 18 pages here:
http://stratusbooks.com.pl/str/books_pdf/119.pdf 
Cheers
Alberto


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## Saetta66 (Mar 12, 2010)

Hunterbunter said:


> As was eluded to by previous posters, they committed themselves to an air cooled solution in aviation. But no one mentioned the Italians were world leaders in liquid cooled aviation engine technology in the early to mid thirties. It was a major blunder to drop development, assuming air cooled engines could be readily mastered. Ultimately they ended up borrowing liquid cooled inlines attempting to bridge the gap.



This is true and your observation is a ... good point !


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## Saetta66 (Mar 12, 2010)

parsifal said:


> Hi saetta
> 
> You mentioned the first combats in the desert were against the 3rd squadron RAAF. This is correct, however, the squadron was initially equipped with Gloster gauntlets, and not the newer Gladiators. In rough capability, the gauntlet was approximately similar to the CR32, whilst the Gladiator was roughly equivalent to the later CR 42. I believe it was late 1940 or early 1941 before the squadron re-equipped with gladiators



Punctual, as usual. Thanks !


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## Saetta66 (Mar 12, 2010)

al49 said:


> Hi Saetta66, very good explanation of RA situation in WW2, well done!
> Alberto



Thank you mate 



al49 said:


> Quite soon this new book will be available from Amazon and, I presume, other booksellers.
> 
> 
> 
> ...



I agree with you 100% ! I will buy it ....


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## Saetta66 (Mar 12, 2010)

vanir said:


> I noticed browsing the thread a few mentions of less than adequate Italian fighter design, particularly the G50 and Macchi C200 and I'm not sure if anyone has mentioned that actually the Castoldi airframe was quite celebrated internationally when it was prototyped as a leading design, but Italian aircraft manufacture was virtually castrated by lack of suitable aero engine production in the calibre of the Daimler and Merlin.
> 
> I find a relevant characterisation might be to think of the G50 and C200 a little like a Hurricane and Spitfire fitted with late series Bristol Mercury engines (on 130 grade it has similar performance to the Italian radial).
> With Daimler engines the same designs changed markedly in the performance stakes, we all know the respect accorded the M-C202 and 205V or the G55. They'd be like a Merlin Spit (the Castoldis) or making the Hurricane all metal and tossing in the early series Griffon (for the DB-605 equipped G55). These are however the same basic airframe designs as the radial versions used in the early war (more changes made for the torquey DB-605 respectively, the M-C202 however is virtually identical airframe to the M-C200).
> ...



Very interesting observations, expecially about engines and armaments.
Thank you for you contribute !


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