# How Rundstedt could've repulsed the Allied invasion in 44



## Soren (Jan 17, 2006)

Thsi is a very interesting read, and I recommend reading it all through very carefully, enjoy: http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/rundstedt/index.html


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## Gnomey (Jan 17, 2006)

Interesting article Soren, enjoyed reading that and I agree with some of the points that Von Rundstedt makes.


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## syscom3 (Jan 17, 2006)

Yes, that was an inetresting read. Although I do disagree with him on how effective the Luftwaffe "could" have been..."If I had been able to move the troops, then my air force would also have been in a position to attack hostile ships." .......

He himself admits the Luftwaffe was outnumbered 10-1.


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## Hunter368 (Jan 17, 2006)

syscom3 said:


> Yes, that was an inetresting read. Although I do disagree with him on how effective the Luftwaffe "could" have been..."If I had been able to move the troops, then my air force would also have been in a position to attack hostile ships." .......
> 
> He himself admits the Luftwaffe was outnumbered 10-1.



I 100% agree, Luftwaffe would not been able to do much vs USA and UK air forces. Germans would of been slauthered. UK and USA could put more fighters over the battle field than German had total on the western front including home land defence. At that point German could not even try and control the air that close to UK where all the Allied planes could reach them. German bombers would of been torn to pieces and I mean small small pieces,


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## Soren (Jan 17, 2006)

You miss the point, he wasn't trying to gain air-superiority, he wanted to repulse the land-based Allied invasion force. And had he been permitted to move his forces when he wanted to, he could've abruptly halted the Allied invasion of Normandy.

By moving his forces closer to the beaches, he would make life abit harder for the Allied fighters/bombers as-well, harassing them by placing Flak installations and having groups of LW fighters fly high and ready at specific places, thereby relieving the emplacements at the beach. 

And to the comment that the LW would've been slaughtered by the allied airforce, highly unlikely, but casualties would've been high on both sides. 

However even if Hitler would've allowed Rundstedt to move his forces when he wanted to, it is still unclear whether that could've been enough to actually repulse the allied invasion. One thing is for sure though, the initial invasion would've been a much nastier affair for the Allies.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 17, 2006)

I agree with your there Soren on the Luftwaffe. I dont know if they could have done eneogh, but the Luftwaffe pilots were very skilled and the aircraft were equal to the allied aircraft they could have done some damage to the allied airforces.

I too dont know if what Rundstedt wanted there would have been eneogh though to stop the invasion, but I do think the story would have been a bit different.


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## Erich (Jan 17, 2006)

you guys forget one major point concerning Luftwaffe a/c, pilots and crews.

The NACHTJAGD could of easily been prepared enough to strike with bomblets as they did during the March 45 raid "Unternehmen Gisela"

the Ju 88G-1's and Me 410 A'swere available to make the long trip as US and RAF airfields were known at length. Ammo and fuels were not scarce, and it would of created huge havoc, but the nachtjagd was not called up preferring to use the nigh time defence only to combat RAF heavies over the Reich. Fenenachtjagd had been thrown out after 1941 by the morn der Führer and the ultimate "Fat Man" .

had it done so the RAF home nf defence would of been so strung out it could not have defended it's homeland justifibly.

German day time jabos and twin engines were not then needed to take the war back to England.

Remember Bodenplatte from another thread, a conceivable idea much earlier but transgressed to late in the war to not add up to anything except self destruction of the attacking force(s)


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## syscom3 (Jan 17, 2006)

He could have bottled up the invasion into a smaller beachhead for a bit, but eventually, the naval gunfire support and allied bombers would have pushed him out far enough for the allies to have a contiginous beachhead.

The Luftwaffe attacking the ships would have mixed results. They could sink a few ships but the attrition on them would be severe. The allies would have massed naval AA gun fire and an aerial armada of fighters to fend off the bombers. 

Just the shear size of the invasion meant the Germans would have to sink hundreds of ships just to have an impact.


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## Erich (Jan 17, 2006)

the armada would not have been the armada had the Luftwaffe and Rundestedt plus "Fatty" woken up several days before hand. of course this is all a huge what if but yes it would of been ultimately destructive for the Allies had an "official" night bombing campaign been put into effect striking Enmglish ports. As I said the Luftwaffe knew where the fields and ports all were but yet because of faulty leadership in the higher eschelons their hands were tied.

forget day time resistance as the Lufw. day defences were in process of moving deeper into the Reich, as it was shown on the first day 6-6-44 with few sorties flown and only the enxt days were the generation of JG a/c up in force and decimated


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## Hunter368 (Jan 17, 2006)

syscom3 said:


> He could have bottled up the invasion into a smaller beachhead for a bit, but eventually, the naval gunfire support and allied bombers would have pushed him out far enough for the allies to have a contiginous beachhead.
> 
> The Luftwaffe attacking the ships would have mixed results. They could sink a few ships but the attrition on them would be severe. The allies would have massed naval AA gun fire and an aerial armada of fighters to fend off the bombers.
> 
> Just the shear size of the invasion meant the Germans would have to sink hundreds of ships just to have an impact.



100% agree with you there. Could the ground forces been better handled by Germany .... yes for sure. Could their LW been better handled... yes for sure. Would allies suffered higher causalities for sure. Would it have stopped the invasion, no. Not to mention keep in mind that the Germans would not have been able to throw their whole army in France at the beach front b/c they needed a reserve to make sure this was not a feint only. So they could of better rolled out their army yes but they could not of responsibly thrown everything they had at them just in case it was just a feint attack and then their flank would of been open. But their army was mislead for sure. But still if you look at the LW in France at the time compared to the allied air force it does not compare in numbers. Yes German pilots were still good quality in France but they were out numbered hugely. Plus if they (fighters) were given the task of protecting ground attack craft (at low level) and escorting their lightly armed bombers (high level) they would of been very stung out and overly tasked and heavy out numbered. Look at LW in BoB the fighters could not protect their bombers good enough then, their fighters would of been even worse odds to face in this battle. They would of been highly out numbered and they would not of been able to use their hit and run tactics that they used so successfully in 41-42 b/c they needed to defend their bombers. Had they hit and run their they would of done some damage (which the allies could of easly replaced) and then their bombers would of been left hanging out there all on their own and the rest of the allied planes would of torn them to pieces. The LW would of suffered horriable attrition losses that they could not replace (ie see Battle of Germany). But like Adler pointed out I think Allies would of suffered higher losts yes but it would not of stopped them.


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## Hunter368 (Jan 17, 2006)

Erich said:


> the armada would not have been the armada had the Luftwaffe and Rundestedt plus "Fatty" woken up several days before hand. of course this is all a huge what if but yes it would of been ultimately destructive for the Allies had an "official" night bombing campaign been put into effect striking Enmglish ports. As I said the Luftwaffe knew where the fields and ports all were but yet because of faulty leadership in the higher eschelons their hands were tied.
> 
> forget day time resistance as the Lufw. day defences were in process of moving deeper into the Reich, as it was shown on the first day 6-6-44 with few sorties flown and only the enxt days were the generation of JG a/c up in force and decimated



Eric at this time did Germany have the resources available to them (in the west) in the German bomber forces to attack Uk ports? Plus depending of UK ports (I am not sure) could the allies have not just moved the attack force to ports farther north or west in Uk out of range. Then when Germans moved their bombers closer, they attack their airfields. Plus were most ground attack and bombers that they had far in the east where they were desperately needed ?


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## Erich (Jan 17, 2006)

the Luftwaffe night force though fewer than in the day time defence could have dealt some massive blows at the time had they been given fore-notice, something we will never know as a huge what if. Again fuel was there, ammo was there, plenty of crews. bomber formations would of moved to the northern shores of Holland and France to strike out. Co-operation well could of happened between night attacking forces.

As you mentioned which is overall very important, it would not have stopped dthe Allied juggernaut just delayed it. It was evident that the Allies had to play their hand sometime and that sometime was soon in the summer of 44.

♫


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## Hunter368 (Jan 17, 2006)

Yup even with 100% hind sight I don't think Germany could of stopped the Allies. It would of been like trying the bail the sinking Titanic with a table spoon.  You might of been able to do it alittle better than they did but nothing would of stopped the on stopable juggernaut aka the Allies.


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## Erich (Jan 17, 2006)

slight OT but had the Luftwaffe had the quickness to get into action we may have seen V-1 and V-2's aimed in closeness to Allied ports of calling.

then what would of happened... ? Although Peenumünde was obliterated in August of 43, sub factories were not and still dealing with rocket parts for manufacture


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## syscom3 (Jan 17, 2006)

I dont think the Luftwaffe would have based large numbers of aircraft in France/Holland/Belgium. That would present a nice juicy target for the allies. I could imagine the allied response would involve night fighters and bombers to harrass them, followed up by medium bombers to hole the fields in the morning, with heavy bombers next to craterize the airfield.

Just the numbers of fighters that the allies could deploy would mean the Luftwaffe would be on the defensive even before they would be at the forward airfields


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## Hunter368 (Jan 17, 2006)

syscom3 said:


> I dont think the Luftwaffe would have based large numbers of aircraft in France/Holland/Belgium. That would present a nice juicy target for the allies. I could imagine the allied response would involve night fighters and bombers to harrass them, followed up by medium bombers to hole the fields in the morning, with heavy bombers next to craterize the airfield.
> 
> Just the numbers of fighters that the allies could deploy would mean the Luftwaffe would be on the defensive even before they would be at the forward airfields



agreed


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## Erich (Jan 17, 2006)

~ I don't, simply the Allied forces did not have enough NF's at the elected time. Sure this is the reason to spread your forces out evenly and within the tree lines so they do not pose such an easy and quite visible target. But hey I am getting deeper into the what if.

~ As I said bring the Luftw nf force up closer to the coastal borders and the RAF would receive a nasty shock even before they would set over land. Amazing what can happen when a large force gets organized. The RAF knew about Unternehmen Gisela for well over a year and yet some 30 RAF heavies got popped on that March 45 date with the RAF heavies heading home, having no clue what was going to befall them. They were so casual and as standard practice left lights on inplace on the wayward trip leading the German nf's right to the A/F's. Again had the Fernenachtjagd been able to keep up the pace the night air war would have chnged dramaticly


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## syscom3 (Jan 17, 2006)

Erich, could the Luftwaffe been strong enough in April 1944 to begin a sustained bombing offensive against the allied assembly points and depots? If they did, wouldnt that leave Germany wide open for the growing hordes of B17's, B24's and P51's?


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## Erich (Jan 17, 2006)

~ not necessarily. the bomber Geschwaders were not supported by Göring after the invasion of the Soviet Union and his faith in them failed so they were left to their own initiatives. It didn't help to have the ugly moustached one press him on this matter. It was always was attack, attack, attack and with what... ?

~ if the Fernenachtjagd missions had been stepped up instead of just using one meagre NJG2 Geschwader in 1941 you would not have seen B-17's B-24's or probably even a mulititude of RAF Lancs and Hali's fly over the Reich. this was how important the the German Night intruder program could have been. As I said several times the Luftw. knew of every RAF airfield on the UK and they were prepared to take it to them until the short turd of an Austrian called the whole thing off. In my personal opinion this is what caused the dramatic turn around in the air war for both night and day. To make it plain and simple historians have overlooked this all important factoid .............

~ E


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## Hunter368 (Jan 17, 2006)

Erich said:


> ~ not necessarily. the bomber Geschwaders were not supported by Göring after the invasion of the Soviet Union and his faith in them failed so they were left to their own initiatives. It didn't help to have the ugly moustached one press him on this matter. It was always was attack, attack, attack and with what... ?
> 
> ~ if the Fernenachtjagd missions had been stepped up instead of just using one meagre NJG2 Geschwader in 1941 you would not have seen B-17's B-24's or probably even a mulititude of RAF Lancs and Hali's fly over the Reich. this was how important the the German Night intruder program could have been. As I said several times the Luftw. knew of every RAF airfield on the UK and they were prepared to take it to them until the short turd of an Austrian called the whole thing off. In my personal opinion this is what caused the dramatic turn around in the air war for both night and day. To make it plain and simple historians have overlooked this all important factoid .............
> 
> ~ E



Intertesting, I have also read how RAF bombers and night fighters became very careless and they left on landing lights, flying lights etc and German NF shot them down right over their own airfield. Just far to few to make any difference.


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## Erich (Jan 18, 2006)

I guess my repetitive statements are probably precluding the original title of the thread.

Had the Ferne ~ Nachtjagd been in ever greater numbers and meaning up to Geschwader strength and more than just 1-2 units but fielded as many Geschwaders as made by day, this Intruder force alone could have changed the air war before the US could of sent their very first B-17's over in late 1942. the fields would have been under the watchful eyes continually, the RAF would never know if it was safe to come out for a bombing of the Reich or taxiing at night or training at night, etc............since the attackers were always present. the threat was there and the idea had worked but stupid minds get in the way of greatness many times, and in this case the nf's were pulled off duty and sent to Afrika


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## syscom3 (Jan 18, 2006)

Erich, so what happens when the RAF sends their night intruders and fighters to do the same thing to the Luftwaffe?

I dont think the night fighters and night bombers would have much impact on the 8th and 9th AF's. All they (AAF) would do is dig reventments and disperse the aircraft to a higher degree than they did.


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## Erich (Jan 18, 2006)

I still do not think you chaps are taking into consideration what I am trying to state. If the German intruder program would of stepped up to the plate and continued the harrassment full swing the US bomber program never would of happened and the RAF night program would of been further delayed, RAF intruders and nfs would not have gotten off the ground as the Luftw wouild of pulverized anything on the ground - a/c, any euipment, buildings of any sort.

it all would of ceased to exist. My reasoning as you can see is well beofre the reality of Normandie


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## Hunter368 (Jan 18, 2006)

Erich said:


> I still do not think you chaps are taking into consideration what I am trying to state. If the German intruder program would of stepped up to the plate and continued the harrassment full swing the US bomber program never would of happened and the RAF night program would of been further delayed, RAF intruders and nfs would not have gotten off the ground as the Luftw wouild of pulverized anything on the ground - a/c, any euipment, buildings of any sort.
> 
> it all would of ceased to exist. My reasoning as you can see is well beofre the reality of Normandie



Like you admited before what you talk about is a BIG if but ok. I would say if they did that the Allies would of done exactly the same thing. They could of and would of put up alot of nf of their own. Both over their own bases, UK and over German airbases. They would of also inmproved the ackack and radar and spotlights. I still am not convinced it would of changed much. It just would changed how it happened alittle but the outcome would not of changed I think.


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## evangilder (Jan 18, 2006)

The US did not have any dedicated night fighters until the P-61 came out. They could have fitted other fighters for it, I suppose, but the Luftwaffe could have made a heck of a dent in the 8th AF if they had started the NF and night strike missions early on.


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## Hunter368 (Jan 18, 2006)

evangilder said:


> The US did not have any dedicated night fighters until the P-61 came out. They could have fitted other fighters for it, I suppose, but the Luftwaffe could have made a heck of a dent in the 8th AF if they had started the NF and night strike missions early on.



True like I said it would of altered the course alittle but USA ingenuity and massive production power would of fixed that fast. USA just didn't see a great need for a nf at that time, why should they have right? They were operating during the day not night. If German would of started using nf more and more over UK hitting the 8th you think they would of taken that laying down, lol no way. We would of seen the P-61 faster and seen planes that they had already there fitted to become nf to fill the gap. USA ingenuity at work, never say never. We would of seen planes fitted into nf role that we never saw for real. To think that German could of adapted and changed the way they fought the war and then to say that the allies would or could of not also is mmmmmm lets just say does not make sense. As the allies proved many times they had better supply, better industry, and many more pilots. German would of started losing pilots over UK which would of made their other problems happen even faster. Don't forget Germany had to already had to start training bomber pilots to become fighter pilots to fill their gaps in trained pilots for home defence, this would of made it happen even faster. While i like Eric idea in theory, it would of changed things alittle yes, but not stopped the course of the war over all.


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## evangilder (Jan 18, 2006)

If you look at the historical perspective, the early 8th AF was struggling. Without fighter escorts, they were taking pretty heavy losses. If the Germans had aggressively attacked the early 8th AF, it could have caused a major strategy shift. The operrational losses alone almost caused the 8th to stop operations altogether. If they had been aggressively attacked at the same time, that might have been enough to change the whole air war in Europe.

Again, it's kind of moot as it did not happen, but I believe that had the Luftwaffe had a better commander than fatso, they could have been used more effectively.


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## Erich (Jan 18, 2006)

As Eric said Fatty was the prime directive, what he said ruled. You cannot have an 8th or 9th AF flying over the contintient to pop Germany if you do not have a functional base to work from. this IS EXACTLY my point with the German intruders. Germany was the first to put these in effect. had they come to full fruition the night and even the day air war would of changed. How ? no one knows. It is one of the aspects of the air war that there is so little written about.

getting back to the Normandie invasion and that what if, sure we clearly again see the overwhelmingness of the US air armada but had in 1941 things changed with my feelings on night intruders, then what..... ? ok lets not go there as it has been hashed


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## Hunter368 (Jan 18, 2006)

Ok


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## Erich (Jan 18, 2006)

Intruders over Britain by Simon Parry. Not an easy book to find.

probably the only real book in print covering the ver early war exploits of the German nf intruders and the problems the RAF had with them.........a scarey proposition it was for anything in the future.

I had the pleasure of interviewing by letter one NJG 2 member Herbert Thomas who as the result of a severe wounding and crashing of the Ju 88C he was in kept him out of the rest of the war. His feelings were just as I stated, If the continuation had been complete by all the existing NJG's then the course of the air would have changed .............


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## syscom3 (Jan 18, 2006)

In the end, there really was nothing the Germans could have done to stop the Normandy invasion. They could have complicated things but not stop it. As long as the allies held naval and air superiority, the battle for Normandy was never in doubt.


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## evangilder (Jan 18, 2006)

Agreed, the only real difference would have been the cost in lives.


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## Hunter368 (Jan 18, 2006)

very true


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## syscom3 (Jan 18, 2006)

Erich, any information you have, even if its a "what if" or slightly off topic, please post it. It gets us to think about things too.


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## Erich (Jan 18, 2006)

I will say it again had the nf performed the Ferne-nacht there would have been no air superiority over Normandie and Naval ? what protection could the Allies have come up without airfields to fly from ?

I'm getting carried away here so I will now stop.............maybe


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## Hunter368 (Jan 18, 2006)

Erich said:


> I will say it again had the nf performed the Ferne-nacht there would have been no air superiority over Normandie and Naval ? what protection could the Allies have come up without airfields to fly from ?
> 
> I'm getting carried away here so I will now stop.............maybe



They would of had to come up with a viable nf force, between the UK and USA I think they would of been able to modify current planes as a stop gap and then developed other models faster as the need for them heightened. If we are playing the big what if game here Eric do you agree that is also possible. Germany could not match plane for plane or even pilot for pilot with UK USA. Germany would had the lead for a while until the allies were able to catch up and over take them. In 41-42-43 German would have had the upper hand, but as of 44-45 German could not shot down enough UK USA Russian planes on all fronts to halt the waves of planes. German plane production was being massively out produced at this time.


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## syscom3 (Jan 18, 2006)

The only flaw I see in your reasoning is the RAF and AAF wouldnt retaliate in kind. If the Luftwaffe night attacks were serious, you would see a lot more RAF night time counter measures. I would venture to say the RAF would have their own night intruders over the German airfields.

Airfields were always difficult to knock out, and the Luftwaffe could not seriously impede operations. Just too many airfields too take care of.

I will grant you that the night intruders could have effected the RAF strategy to certein degree by forcing them to be far more cautious in coming in to land. But to say they could have any effect on daytime operations is stretching it a bit. The AAF airfields would have been laid out with more revetments, greater aircraft dispersal and under cover and probably more engineer units to fill in bomb craters.

Just as you said in other threads how the sturm fighters could devestate the B17 and B24's "heavy bombers" with their cannons, the P47's with their 8 .50's would have an easier time against the Luftwaffe "medium bombers".


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## Erich (Jan 18, 2006)

it is questionable I would agree, but the central and southern airfields where the RAF/US were bases would of have been blasted early on from 41-43, the US could not take part with the fighters and bombers it had unless it tried to formaulte plans with Ireland and the northern section of England. would of the bombers and fighters had the fuel reserves to make a two way trip/over to Germany and then back in early 43. probably not. the same results for the RAF, implanting northern fields or could they. the Ju 88C series had plenty of fuel to cover all of England and the environs for the time it was allocated.

any time anyone wants to reverse the scenario and get us back on track, but I feel this is all part of the long range: Normandie was conquered via defeating the day time Luftwaffe by overpowering it, and that is because of superior knowledge of the land, airfelds and Luftwaffe strengths that was only built up after the Luftw. nf intruder program came to an abrupt standstill.

I do apoligize for hijacking this thread but it got me thinking, the Luftw intruder program has never been seriously looked at, and covered in books so scantily that 90 % of those interested in the air war have never heard of it.

v/r E time for a


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## syscom3 (Jan 18, 2006)

I dont see the AAF as being strong enough to influence events untill spring 1943. Untill then, it would be a RAF/Luftwaffe fight.

Remember that throughout the later part of 1942, a good part of the AAF groups were going to North Africa.

From what Ive been able to gather, the real fight for the sky didnt begin untill the 1st quarter of 1944 where the 8th AF was finally able to bring the fight deep into Germany. Up till then, the Luftwaffe would only be able to create a nuisance and not do any lasting damage.

The logistical buildup to the Normandy invasion didnt begin in earnest untill late 1943 so the Luftwaffe would have to be in strength and capable of sustained operations to wreck the ports and depots.


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## Erich (Jan 18, 2006)

sys:

the US bomber initiative almost came to a halt after the disaster at Schweinfurt/Regensburg in summer-fall of 1943. It was going through serious growth periods with an ever present thought of not futhering the heavy bomber campagin during the day even with P-47 escorts. the Luftwaffe was bringing it on the US heavies in ever increasing numbers with terrible casualties on both sides.

I repeat the Luftw. intruder program would of negated a pre Normandie buildup on the English coast and everything would of been a shambles.

It is also of note with the disaster of operation Tiger / April 44, the LST sinkings and damages with loss of US sailors how much emphasis was put on bombing out Cherbourg and Le Harve ports housing S-booten, which when thought out were pretty much inconsquential to overall scope of things. but a huge threat they were in the Allied supreme minds


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## wmaxt (Jan 18, 2006)

Erich said:


> sys:
> 
> the US bomber initiative almost came to a halt after the disaster at Schweinfurt/Regensburg in summer-fall of 1943. It was going through serious growth periods with an ever present thought of not futhering the heavy bomber campagin during the day even with P-47 escorts. the Luftwaffe was bringing it on the US heavies in ever increasing numbers with terrible casualties on both sides.
> 
> I repeat the Luftw. intruder program would of negated a pre Normandie buildup on the English coast and everything would of been a shambles.



Until the P-47 with enough fuel and paddle prop the P-47 was limited in its effectiveness. The P-47 escorts at that time, could only go, roughly, to the German border and so were never a serious asset in the long range missions like Schweinfurt/Regensberg.

As for the intruder program, I think the AAF would have moved a few miles further from the coast, beyond the effective range of the intruders. The P-38s were always based at places like Kings Cliff 80 miles or more from the coast. It would have been inconvienient but nothing else.

A major issue was the Germans never had adequate recon on the ground or in the air or they would have been much more formidible - the D-Day buildup is a case in point.

wmaxt


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## Udet (Jan 18, 2006)

While my books and printings on this particular issue are somewhat covered by dust, I recall the essay of an officer, a Lieutenant-Colonel (_Podpolkovnik_) of the present-day Russian army who is the elder brother of one my best friends.

In his paper, he stated that in fact, Germany had the ground forces to smash the allied invasion. The interference of the OKW and Hitler is a fundamental aspect covered, and in fact, played an essential role in letting the allies form the beachhead.

Not that I recall this with all due accuracy, but it is commented the strenght of the main armored divisions of the Heer in France during those days:

(i) Panzer Lehr (nearly 180 Panzers and some 40 self-propelled artillery)
(ii) 21 Pz. Div. (nearly 100 Panzers)
(iii) 12 SS. Pz. Div. (nearly 170 panzers).


All three VERY powerful units and if i recall correctly, they were the ones closer to the main landing beaches of the allies on June 6th. But when we talk about being an extremely powerful unit, the Panzer Lehr takes the gold medal.

(Not included in my comment are other panzer units, such as the 116 Pz. Div. and several other SS.Pz. units; those who were there on June 6th, as well as those who arrived in the days and weeks that followed)

Refitted and mechanized. He stated that only those three divisions had 450 panzers (!). Such force, he stated somewhere in his paper, would have brought havoc and massive destruction if deployed in the eastern front, against the massed T-34 units...how was it possible they failed to destroy the allied beach head?

The force that has just landed and is trying to form and hold a beachhead is a very fragile lifeform. The fact it might enjoy massive naval and air support goes secondary. If the enemy bursts out attempting to exterminate it, you might want to hold your naval and air support or accept killing your own in high numbers.

Also I recall another interesting fact the guy covered, and that I do not recall seeing on any other publication: 

the fact that the allied airborne units dropped during the June 5/6 night, no matter how many paratroopers were landed, did not have the power to achieve anything that significant. By the wat, their landing was a mess, too disperse.

Place the Panzer formations closer to beach areas, annihilate everything that moves there, then you will have the time to look back and go after the paratroopers, they end dead, as POWs or joining the thugs of the French resistance.

Of course, his paper is way more custimozed and comprehensive than this brief comment.

The point is, I agree Germany, although overstretched and overburdened -and overbled-, had the resources to smash the allies in the west in June 1944.[/u]


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## syscom3 (Jan 18, 2006)

The allied battleships could begin shelling the Panzers long before they came close to the beachheads. Then the cruisers would join in, and finally the destroyers. 

Not counting the aircraft I might add.

A concentrated thrust by the panzers would mean they would be grouped together for fast destruction.


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## Udet (Jan 18, 2006)

Mr. Syscome: 

pardon me?

What about advancing at night? Or if it would be necessary to march in daylight, they had camouflage and the French landscape which offered plenty of hideout.

It is recorded, German losses of AFVs to allied planes were minimum during the entire campaign. Other than significant delays in the arrival of German units to critical points of the front, which is already a juicit gain, allied air power achieved little.


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## syscom3 (Jan 18, 2006)

Its a proven fact that guns can be fired at night.

Plus a liberal use of starshells to brighten things up for the aircraft.

If its one thing the allies excelled at was indirect fire. All they had to do was tell one of the battleships that a bunch of tanks are located at a certein coordinate, then blamo....... a few salvo's from the 14" guns and no more target.


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## syscom3 (Jan 19, 2006)

This is why I dont think the Luftwaffe had much of a chance in trying to disrupt the allied buildup from May 1943 through March 1944. These are the average number of fighter groups under operational control of the 8th AF. Quite simply, the allies would own the air in the daylight and within fighter range. When the fighters got the drop tanks, the range would go deeper into Germany. Plus there were a lot more of them. I know its a rehash of what many people already know, but what the heck. Numbers do look impressive.

I think the RAF would also inflict heavy enough loss's at night to wear out the Luftwaffe into just "nuisance" raids.

May 1 1943
three P47 groups with an average of 115 sorties per mission.

June 1 1943
three P47 groups with an average of 130 sorties per mission.

July 1 1943
three P47 groups with an average of 120 sorties per mission.

Aug 1 1943
Four P47 groups with an average of 170 sorties per mission.

Sep 1 1943
Six P47 groups with an average of 200 sorties per mission.

Oct 1 1943
Seven P47 groups 
One P38 group
About 300 sorties per mission

Nov 1 1943
Seven P47 groups 
One P38 group
About 350 sorties per mission

Dec 1 1943
Nine P47 groups 
Two P38 group
One P51 group
About 550 sorties per mission

Jan 1 1944
Ten P47 groups 
Two P38 group
One P51 group
About 650 sorties per mission

Feb 1 1944
Twelve P47 groups 
Two P38 group
Three P51 group
About 825 sorties per mission

Mar 1 1944
Eleven P47 groups 
Three P38 group
Five P51 group
About 900 sorties per mission


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## Jabberwocky (Jan 19, 2006)

In Normandy, the 21st Panzer Division had 127 Mk IVs, 40 assault guns and 127 other tracked vehicles, all of which were deployed ar ound the Caen area before D-day. By June 8 it was down to just 40 tanks. 

Panzer Lehr had simialr problems. When ordered to move in daylight on June 7th, from Chartres to the Seulles Valley for a counter attack on Caen, it lost 130 trucks and fuel tankers, 8 tanks and 84 SPGs, half-tracks and prime movers to air strikes. While Allied air power may not of been completely effective against German armour, it was more than powerful enought to annihilate German suppy units and severly damage 'light' support units. 

12th SS was perhaps the best stroke of luck for the Allies on D-Day. Instead of being deployed around Caen on June 6th, as originally planned, they were strung out on the road between Liseux and Caen waiting for movement orders which come sometime after noon) for most of the morning of June 6th, and took a pounding from Allied air units as they moved towards the Allied bridgehead. An organised and determined counterattack by the 12th SS was one of Monty's greatest worries, and could of slowed or prevented the initial linkage of the beach-heads.

When you look at the numbers though, its a telling story. The Allies landed around 175,000 troops and almost 20,000 vehicles of all kinds on D-day alone, breaching the Atlantic Wall for the cost of about 5,000 casualties. On D +1 they landed a further 75,000 troops and some 10,000 vehicles. How then, would 3 panzer divisions, even elite formations, bombarded from the sea and beset from the air, hope to decesively defeat a well supported force, 5-6 times their size? Even with air superiority, it would be a tall, tall task.

They would have to be deployed through the 'railway desert' that pre-invasion bombing had created and then operate at the long end of a supply chain being constantly interdicted by Allied airpower. They didn't have the room for manouver that they needed and the terrain, and the Allied supply situation, were favourable for defensive operations. It was infantry, not tanks, that proved the biggest obstacle to offensive operations in the first month of Normandy.

German forces were inadequate for offensive operations on any large scale. At the most they could perform strong localised counter-attacks when Allied forces had expended themselves attempting to gain an objective. Even if all 3 formations could of been deployed, Allied strength was probably enough to fend of their attacks. Manouver warfare in Normandy, without artillery or air dominance, given the advantages the terrain gave to the defender, would of been far more costly to German forces than it would of been to the Allies.

If anything, all out offensive be heavy German formations may have made Normandy a more favourable victory for the Allies. Without these strong formations in key postions to block their advance, British and Canadian units may of had an easier time around Caen, Odon, Caumont and Evercy.


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## syscom3 (Jan 19, 2006)

Well put Jabberwocky. In order for the Germans to go on the offensive, they had to concentrate which was not the brightest thing to do. All they could do was disperse and go on the defensive.

I have to read more in depth about the logistics for "Overlord", but I do believe that planners had already factored in a certein number of ships being lost. If they werent lost, great. If they were, it wouldnt disrupt the invasion.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 19, 2006)

Syscom what do you mean by sorties because a sortie is a mission. Do you mean 120 aircraft on a mission or sortie or 120 sorties per day or what?


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## syscom3 (Jan 19, 2006)

I meant to say that on any given mission for the 8th AF as a whole, that was the number of fighters that were involved. That is a rough average.


*Oct 1 1943 
Seven P47 groups 
One P38 group 
About 300 sorties per mission*

would mean 8 fighter groups would send out on average, a total of 300 aircraft on any given mission flown in Oct 1943.


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## Soren (Jan 19, 2006)

> When you look at the numbers though, its a telling story. The Allies landed around 175,000 troops and almost 20,000 vehicles of all kinds on D-day alone, breaching the Atlantic Wall for the cost of about 5,000 casualties.



Jabberwocky, on D-Day the Allies landed around *156,000* troops in Normandy. The American forces numbered 73,000 in total, 23,250 on Utah Beach, 34,250 on Omaha Beach, and 15,500 airborne troops. In the British and Canadian sector, 83,115 troops were landed (61,715 of them British), 24,970 on Gold Beach, 21,400 on Juno Beach, 28,845 on Sword Beach, and 7900 airborne troops.

And Allied casualties were definitely higher than 5,000 ! Total Allied casualties on D-Day was more like 10,000. It is estimated that 2700 British, 6603 Americans and 996 Canadians were the Allied losses on D-day. Total German casualties on D-day was roughly 4,000. 

As a side-note, in April and May 1944, the Allied air forces lost about 12,000 men and over 2,000 aircraft in operations which paved the way for D-Day.



> On D +1 they landed a further 75,000 troops and some 10,000 vehicles. How then, would 3 panzer divisions, even elite formations, bombarded from the sea and beset from the air, hope to decesively defeat a well supported force, 5-6 times their size? Even with air superiority, it would be a tall, tall task.



German forces were used to such odds, and more often than not defied them. On the western front from 44-45 alone it has been estimated that on average 5 Allied tanks were lost pr. 1 German panzer, and on the eastern front this ratio nearly doubled. And coupled with the fact that in 44-45 on average 3 Allied soldiers would die for each German soldier, stopping a force 5 times their size wouldn't have been unachievable for the Germans had they just deployed their forces correctly. 

Now although I place my doubts on whether Rundstedt's plan could've actually repulsed the Allied invasion for good, I am sure that it would've meant a sheer bloodbath for the Allies, one in which they're losses could've very easily been tenfold what they actually were. The Allied forces almost surely would've been brought to a halt, and the actual invasion would have been in jeopardy. 

Keep in mind that although the Allies would have air-superiority, their feeble tanks would still have to slug it out with the Panther's and Tiger's of the 12th SS and 21st Pz. Div. as-well as the Panzer Lehr. (A tough task for the Allied Sherman's and Cromwell's)


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## syscom3 (Jan 19, 2006)

One of the interesting facets of the hedgerow fighting was that the defender had the advantage. When the Allies moved forward, they were hit. When the germans moved forward, they also were hit.

No matter how the German troops were deployed, the overwhelming air and naval power meant that the German forces were not in any position to oppose the allies on a broad front. Hold the allies up in a couple of locations, quite possibly. Hold up all the allies on the whole front, I would say not.

Note - 9 battleships, 23 cruisers, 104 destroyers were available for fire support duties. Thats a lot of guns the German forces could do nothing about.


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## Erich (Jan 19, 2006)

back a post or two the P-47 groups were outnumbered by the Luftwaffe in October of 43 and into March 44 before being overwhelmed by Allied escotrts

In the fall of 43 you had single engine prop jobs as well as day destroyer twins and night fighter twins, also small batches of twin engine bombers armed with heavy cannons and training staffeln. No doubt the last two did not add up to much, but I am refering to overall numerations which were clearly in the Luftwaffes favour as the P-51 did not make itself present till december of 43 with the 9th AF 354th fg.

the Luftwaffe during spring of 44 was in complete blunder under inept leadership. Will say it again had the Geschwader Kommodores had full reign and able to connect with all mobil groundtrasnportation of fuel, arms/ammo and without hierachy interference, then the forward bases in France would of been manned and a defence would of been established waiting for the oncoming hordes of the Allies.

As a result of total blundership (new word guys), the Luftwaffe day fighter cforce was in process of moving to within the Reich, Jg 26 was to the call, 2 a/c on the beaches with other smaller sorties to follow during the 6th of June. "Wachts auf !" and finally the rest of the Geschwaderen came to the call to kick fanny whipped. Case in point was III./JG 3 wiped out to almost a pilot of the original formation in June 44 during the Normandie slaughter. 

Rundenstedt had nothing new to offer


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## Hunter368 (Jan 19, 2006)

Erich said:


> Rundenstedt had nothing new to offer



I agree, all that could of been done better (not that it would of changed the overall out come) is handling the ground forces better (allied casualties would of been higher and progress would of been slower). But the writing was on the wall and it was clear, the end was well within sight, it was just a matter of time.

Mark


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 20, 2006)

syscom3 said:


> I meant to say that on any given mission for the 8th AF as a whole, that was the number of fighters that were involved. That is a rough average.
> 
> 
> *Oct 1 1943
> ...



You mean 300 aircraft per mission or 300 aircraft per sortie. A sortie is a mission. It is another word for it.


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## syscom3 (Jan 20, 2006)

The source book I used listed the missions chronologically by the official mission number as given by 8th AF HQ.

I then looked to see what fighter groups were available for that mission (he did list which ones did have flying that day and which ones were inactive) and averaged the total numbers put in the air. 

It was interesting to see how newly activated fighter groups would be held back for several missions to just patrol. When 9th AF FG's were available, they were used by the 8th AF for escort duties.


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## Erich (Jan 20, 2006)

you will note that depending what 8th AF sources your are investigating that 9th AF 354th fg was performing high altitude escort missions in December 43 with the Mustang, as it was known : the Pioneer Mustang Group, and having the highest number of kills in any ETO fighter group besides. The group is hardly mentioned and their original history book which I have is trash. Osprey did a half way devent coverage of them and 2 web-sites dedicated to the killer group. Have been honoured to know several of the fighter pilots as they live in Oregon, the group itself has it's roots in my wifes hometown of Salem when it first operated the bogus P-39 getting ready for the hot little pony which the crews were very excited about till wars end, and in fact when they had their ponys taken from them in the fall of 44 for a short stint and given to 8th AF groups the 354thfg operated the Jug and hated it. wishing/wanting the P-51 back, and so they got their request as January 45 came upon them with the latest Stangs........

sorry I digressed


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## delcyros (Jan 20, 2006)

I don´t know the details but I cannot imagine how the Luftwaffe could achieve some parity in the airbattles over northern France / Channel transportation. Syscom did correctly showed the sortie´s.
Do we have a statistic how many combat sorties (total) were flown by allied forces on DDay and how many could the Luftwaffe send in respond(both historically and hypothetically if we assume that forces could have deployed in a better way)?
I do think but am not sure, this will underline the general superiority of allied forces.


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## Erich (Jan 20, 2006)

another what if but the Luftwaffe night bomber force should of taken it to the parked Allied shipping and vehicles during the intial days of the Normandie landings. Based too far back and still feeeling the sting of 6 of June. too late to even try to get something going which still causes bewilderment today.

the Mossies were still based in England and the 9th AF P-61 squadrons were still forming up, their first missions were actually to defend England from V-1's.

In essence the Luftw. day fighter force had nothing to stop RAF/US onslaught of a/c


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## syscom3 (Jan 20, 2006)

These are the stats for the 8th AF for sorties on *June 6*
8th AF Mission 394
1805 B17 and B24 sorties 

8th AF Mission 395
782 B17 and B24 sorties 

Escort sorties (continous all day):
P38 555 sorties
P47 414 sorties
P51 750 sorties
Total = 1719

Fighter Bomber sorties (continous all day):
P47 231 sorties
P51 235 sorties
Total = 466

56th FG had 11 missions. All others between 6 and 10.

These are the stats for the 8th AF for sorties on *June 7*
8th AF Mission 397
473 B17 and B24 sorties 

8th AF Mission 398
575 B17 and B24 sorties 

Escort sorties (4 missions)
P38 526 sorties
P51 294 sorties
Total = 820

Fighter Bomber sorties (continous all day):
P47 505 sorties
P51 148 sorties
Total = 653

Some groups had 9 missions.

These are the stats for the 8th AF for sorties on *June 8*
8th AF Mission 400
1178 B17 and B24 sorties 

Escort sorties:
P38 381 sorties
P47 24 sorties
P51 195 sorties

Fighter Bomber sorties:
P47 333 sorties
P51 526 sorties
Total = 1353

Note - These do not count the 9th AF or RAF sorties which would have been just as impressive.
Note - The 8th AF target list for the month of June were airfields and choke points throughout France.


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## Hunter368 (Jan 20, 2006)

Wow nice information, good digging and a hell of alot more patience than I have.


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## syscom3 (Jan 21, 2006)

I'd like to hear more from Erich regarding the Luftwaffe response from May 1944 through the end of June


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 22, 2006)

I am sure he has a lot of info he can provide.


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## plan_D (Jan 22, 2006)

I advise reading _Panzer Leader_ for more information on how the Allied invasion could have been repulsed. Heinz Guderian had many discussions with Rommel and Von Rundstedt in the months and weeks prior to D-Day about the disposition of the German forces. It's an interesting point in the book, and it's unfortunate for the German forces that Von Rundstedt and Guderian didn't have control.


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## syscom3 (Jan 22, 2006)

The allies perfectly disquised the location of the invasion. They had the German leadership hoodwinked into thinking the invasion would take place across from Dover.


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## plan_D (Jan 22, 2006)

And Guderian had an effective disposition plan to provide armoured support to any invasion attempt on the French coast. All the panzer divisions were to be concentrated further back, and not on the coastline. Which would have given the Wehrmacht plenty of armoured reserve capable of moving anywhere on the coast with little problem, as they would have been out of range of the Allied naval guns and the only true problem would have been air power. The Wehrmacht would have had more tanks, and a quick reaction had Guderian got his way.


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## syscom3 (Jan 22, 2006)

His quick reaction force would never have gotten close to the beachheads. As mentioned before, the Allied naval forces would have kept him at arms length. Plus, once he was on the offensive, he would have begun to take casualties and loss's in the hedgerows. 

There was nothing the Germans could have done to stop the invasion after the first day.


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## plan_D (Jan 22, 2006)

The Allied navy only caused the massive loss of armoured force because Rommel had his panzers deployed close to the front, in range of the naval guns. This also constricted them to the use of the coastal road which led to the 21st Panzer Division having to go south to get to the beach heads when they'd discovered 6th Airborne had captured the brigdes over Caen Canal. 

Had the Panzer divisions been further back, the capturing of that bridge would have meant nothing because the information would have reached the 21st Panzer division and they would merely had to move north another way. They would not have had to go south, then north to attack. This is just one example of the advantages of having the panzer forces further south when the invasion happened. 

The first weeks of Operation Overlord were hanging on string, at any moment it could have swung to failure. Don't make the mistake of believing the first day secured victory, the beacheads weren't even effectively linked until June 9th. 

A mobile reserve further from the coast would have given the Wehrmacht a more potent striking weapon to destroy the Allied invasion. With command from the front, it would have not been delayed and the Allied invasion could have been thrown back into the sea. At very least, the losses the Allies encountered would have been ten-fold. Make no mistakes, the Allies achieved a remarkable victory in June 1944 - but it was far from a perfect operation and at any moment it could have failed.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 22, 2006)

syscom3 said:


> There was nothing the Germans could have done to stop the invasion after the first day.



You really underestimate the Wehrmacht. They had superior leadership, weapons and the infantry was the best of the war. Even 5 days into the Invasion it was still a undecided event and could have gone both ways.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 22, 2006)

plan_D said:


> The first weeks of Operation Overlord were hanging on string, at any moment it could have swung to failure. Don't make the mistake of believing the first day secured victory, the beacheads weren't even effectively linked until June 9th.



That is what my American Grandfather who landed on Omaha Beach always told me also. He said they were very lucky.


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## syscom3 (Jan 22, 2006)

As the German divisions or regiments would mass for offensive operations, they would have been ripped to pieces by the naval gunfire support, that was available around the clock. In daytime, thousands of aircraft were also available to go after them.

Even if they would have gotten breakthroughs in spots, they still had a very difficult logistics situation to deal with in order to support their operations. I could imagine the tanks cutting through the allies in places, getting to the beaches then run out of gas and ammo and have to be abandoned.

The best the Germans could ever have done was bottle up the allies ever tighter. But in the end, it was a war of attrition and the Germans would have collapsed.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 22, 2006)

syscom3 said:


> As the German divisions or regiments would mass for offensive operations, they would have been ripped to pieces by the naval gunfire support, that was available around the clock. In daytime, thousands of aircraft were also available to go after them.
> 
> Even if they would have gotten breakthroughs in spots, they still had a very difficult logistics situation to deal with in order to support their operations. I could imagine the tanks cutting through the allies in places, getting to the beaches then run out of gas and ammo and have to be abandoned.
> 
> The best the Germans could ever have done was bottle up the allies ever tighter. But in the end, it was a war of attrition and the Germans would have collapsed.



While I do agree with you, that in the end it still would have ended in an allied victory. You fail to realize one thing that the Germans would not have had such a bad logistical problem as you think because they were still on there own turf. The Allies had to overcome the logistical problem. The Germans did not have the fuel and ammo problems yet as of June 1944. That was not until the winter of 1944 that the problem arose.


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## plan_D (Jan 22, 2006)

I don't think you quite understand what is being suggested, syscom. The concentration and deployment of the reserves would be out of naval gun range. This would save many panzers that were historically destroyed in the opening stages of Operation Neptune and Overlord. 

Planes and ships cannot stop an advance alone, they can cause serious damage and give an advantage to the force that has them in superiority. But this would not be enough. A concentrated effort of the Wehrmacht reserves, if properly executed, could have forced many Allied forces back into the sea or capture. 

Once a breakthrough in any sector had been made, the Allies would have been in a dire situation. Any if German forces did manage to split any beachhead from the others - a beachhead would be lost. 

Take, for example, a concentrated effort on the U.S flank. An assault against the Omaha beachhead (it being the weakest) and forcing it back to the beach with panzer reserves saved due to their deployment out of naval range in the opening stages. This would then detach the U.S forces from the Canadian and British beacheads, leaving Utah on it's own and open for destruction. This could have been achieved with adequete screening of the British forces to the right. This was possible, the Wehrmacht had 10 Panzer Divisions in France. This was easily enough to crush one beachhead while screening four others. Even with air support and naval support, the Allies would haven't been able to stop the Wehrmacht. 

This is easily seen in Italy in the Anzio beachead. Had it not been for the single road and soft soil of the area around the beachead, it would have been crushed. The Allied air and naval support did not halt the German offence on that beach, the surrounding terrain did. The terrain in France is perfect for tank operations, only when in the hedgerows is the going tough ...but they're not around the beaches, they're further inland.


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## wmaxt (Jan 22, 2006)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> syscom3 said:
> 
> 
> > As the German divisions or regiments would mass for offensive operations, they would have been ripped to pieces by the naval gunfire support, that was available around the clock. In daytime, thousands of aircraft were also available to go after them.
> ...



I think the truth is somewhere in the middle. The Germans were an occupying force not a real fighting force. The Germans had not completed the 'Atlantic Wall' fortifications nor had they stocked the area with ammo, POL, or men.

On the other hand the Allies had 150,000 men fighting skirmishes as well as local hot spots but whose supplies, ammo, POL, etc were on a shoestring in an area that could not support them without the massive resupply effort - or to put it simply the Allies were in as much danger of collapsing from lack of supplies as by German counter attacks. It wasn't a sure thing until both the breakout of the hedgerows and a port was operational.

wmaxt


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 22, 2006)

Agreed wmaxt.

What I dont think syscom understand however is that if the Panzers had been used as Guderian had suggested, when the allies moved inland there would have been a suitable defense and they could react wherever needed and still been out of range of the Allied naval power. Also by that time the Luftwaffe would have gained strength in the area. The Luftwaffe was far from defeated in June 1944.


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## wmaxt (Jan 22, 2006)

DerAdlerIstGelandet said:


> Agreed wmaxt.
> 
> What I dont think syscom understand however is that if the Panzers had been used as Guderian had suggested, when the allies moved inland there would have been a suitable defense and they could react wherever needed and still been out of range of the Allied naval power. Also by that time the Luftwaffe would have gained strength in the area. The Luftwaffe was far from defeated in June 1944.



Agreed, if the panzers were used quickly and effectively, the problem is that the first week or so the allies had virtualy the entire airforces of the AAF and Britian over the invasion areas including on two (if I remember right) occasions heavy bombers. The Luftwaffe wasn't decimated but of aircraft in a usable radius they faced almost 2,000 fighters the first few days. The Germans had an impossible task in defending the continent even if the major part of their armies wern't engaged in the east and the Normandy area was especialy vulnerable.

The final analysis is that if the Germans could have gotten the panzers, some men and even some night bombing of the Mulberrys it would have had a terrible effect on the invasion.

wmaxt


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 22, 2006)

Agreed there wmaxt!

Also I am not sure on this but I heard somewhere that the Allied Heavy Bombers on several occasions accidentaly dropped there bombs on Allied positions during the Invasion. Is this true and do you have any info on it if it is.


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## plan_D (Jan 22, 2006)

It's true. I'll find the information.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 22, 2006)

That is what I though. Some bad luck for those guys on the ground!


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## syscom3 (Jan 22, 2006)

On July 24th, 8th AF bombers dropped several salvo's short and 80 casualties resulted. Target area was St. Lo

On July 25th, same thing but this time 382 casualties. St. Lo again was the target.

I might be mistaken, but Gen. Eisenhower and Gen Bradley were mislead about how the 8th AF was going to attack the front lines. They wanted the bombers to travel ina line that paralleled the lines. The 8th AF HQ changed the plans to bomb perpendicular. This lead to "short bombing".

Ike and Bradley were pissed off about what happened and were reluctant to believe in or use heavy bombers in direct support of the infantry ever again.


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 22, 2006)

Damn bad bad luck. or should I say planning.


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## syscom3 (Jan 24, 2006)

I was leafing through a book about the Normandy invasion and I came across this tidbit.

The German navy made use of the port of Le Havre well unto June 14. That night, the RAF wiped out the port, sinking 3 torpedo boats, 10 E-Boats, 15 R-Boats and 18 other smaller craft.

The next night the RAF wiped out the port of Boulogne sinking 25 R-Boats and other craft.

Prior to these events, the German navy was completley ineffectual in their attempts to interdict and slow down the allied buildup. After this, they became the proverbial mosquito biting an elephant. Not worth the effort.


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## Erich (Jan 24, 2006)

U guys need friend James Tents "E-Boat Alert" which will give you full documentation of the sinking of many S-booten in their ports an those that made it out to sink allied shipping later. so much fear was put into these little craft that it was a top priority to sink them before they could get out to sea at Normandie


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 24, 2006)

Sort of off topic but interestingly 24 R-Boots were returned to Germany as part of the New Bundes Marine in 1956 and were used well into the 1960 as coastal minesweepers and patrol boats.


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## mosquitoman (Jan 26, 2006)

I've heard of S-Boots, but what were R-Boots?


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 28, 2006)

They were small minesweepers designed to operate in coastal waters and shallow areas. The Germans built aprox. 300 of them from 1933 till the end of the war. Most of them did not have standard propellors and rudders but horizontally mounted Voith-Schneider propellors which made the boats very maneuverable.

They did mine sweeping, convoy escort, and escorting U-Boots out of there pens.

After the war many were taken over by the Allies: USA got 48, the Soviet Union 45, Denmark 24, Britain 11, the Netherlands 8 and Norway got 4 of them.

Some were eventually used to start the German Minesweeping Service "Deutscher Mienenräumdienst" to remove the minefields in european waters after the war, and 24 were returned to the New German Navy in 1955 and used into the 1960s.

Dimensions 
Size (Max): 155 t 
Length (Total): 41,0 m 
Beam: 5,8 m 
Draft: 1,7 m 
Weapons 
3,7 cm Flak: 1 
2 cm MG: 3 
8,6 cm Missle Launcher "Föhn": 1 
Engines 
Voith-Schneider Propellers: 2 
Engines: 2 
Type: MAN 8-cylinder diesel 
Performance 
Total Performance: 1800 shp 
Speed: 19 kn


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## evangilder (Jan 28, 2006)

Good info there, Adler!


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## Gnomey (Jan 28, 2006)

Good stuff!


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## DerAdlerIstGelandet (Jan 28, 2006)

Thankyou


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## mosquitoman (Jan 28, 2006)

Thanks, great info!


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